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MEN WHO The men who persevered
PERSEVERED
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This book is dedicated to all those men who served in and with the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam. For the warriors, all.
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MEN WHO PERSEVERED The AATTV—the most highly decorated Australian unit of the Viet Nam war
Bruce Davies and Gary McKay
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First published in 2005 Copyright © Bruce Davies and Gary McKay 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10 per cent of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Allen & Unwin 83 Alexander Street Crows Nest NSW 2065 Australia Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218 Email:
[email protected] Web: www.allenandunwin.com National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: Davies, Bruce, 1943– . The men who persevered : the AATTV—the most highly decorated Australian unit of the Viet Nam war. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 1 74114 425 6. 1. Australia. Australian Army. Australian Army Training Team,Vietnam. 2.Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975 Regimental histories - Australia. 3.Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 - Participation, Australian. I. McKay, Gary, 1947– . II. Title. 959.7043394 Typeset in 12/15 pt Bembo by Bookhouse, Sydney Printed in Australia by Ligare Pty Ltd, Sydney 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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Major General John Hartley
Foreword
The story of the Australian Army Team Vietnam is unique in the annals of Australia’s military history. No other unit experienced its range of activities and actions.And yet, the story is not widely known.This outcome is sadly becoming more so as the ranks of its former members are thinning and the memories of an increasingly distant war are dimming.The Men Who Persevered, therefore, is a timely reminder of the challenges, achievements and memories of the Team. Bruce Davies and Gary McKay, both distinguished and decorated soldiers and veterans of the Viet Nam conflict, have produced a highly readable account that nicely blends personal experiences with the politics and strategic direction of the war. A unique quality of the Team was its varied and frequently changing function. Certainly there was a training element, but members also led units, advised all manner of Vietnamese officers and officials, served on headquarters and determined policy. They were closely involved with regular and irregular forces, with Special Forces, Montagnards and Cambodians, with combat, combat support and service support units. At one time or another, they were deployed—individually or in small teams—to almost every province of South Viet Nam. Despite their small numbers, they remain the Australian face in the memories of many Americans and Vietnamese. Most Australian Viet Nam veterans served with the 1st Australian Task Force, based in Phuoc Tuy Province. Few would experience the intensity V
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of conflict that characterised appointments to combat units in the five northern provinces or parts of the highlands. Personal accounts from these areas are particularly valuable and represent a significant part of the Team’s service in South Viet Nam. Over time, as commanders changed, so too did the role and functions of the Team as they sought to take account of the threat, or changes to the capabilities of the South Vietnamese, or to incorporate the outcomes of, firstly, America’s expansion and then to the reduction of its forces. Indeed, many who returned for a second or subsequent tour would often express amazement at how much had changed. Many were also required to adjust as they were frequently transferred within country to another appointment. I came to the Team late in its deployment as a junior officer, although I had served a tour previously in Viet Nam as a rifle platoon commander. Reading the book brought back so many memories of the qualities and attitudes of that hand-picked force of Australian soldiers, ably complemented by a small band of Kiwis, who were frequently exposed to significant combat, without the benefit of media attention and thus largely unknown to the Australian public.The strength and character of its members comes through so clearly in this book from their personal accounts: humour and humanity, a sense of personal commitment, a blend of professionalism and self-discipline. There is also a sense of frequent frustration with the short-sighted and uncaring attitudes of those they advised, or who were meant to advise or who sought to influence the direction of the war. And many felt a sense of betrayal when they finally came home, leaving former comrades to the mercy of another regime. To serve with the Team was an extraordinary privilege with lasting memories of a proud and professional group of men who did all that was asked of them and more. This is an excellent read and I found it quite moving.
Major General John Hartley, AO (Ret.) Buderim, Queensland
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Contents Contents
Foreword by Major General John Hartley Maps Preface
v ix xiii
Prologue 1 To Viet Nam—Treaties, despatches and troops 2 Defeat, doubt and death—1963 3 Doom and gloom—1964 4 Outside the wire—1965 5 Walking the tightrope—1966 6 Business as usual—1967 7 The beginning of the end—1968 and the Tet Offensive 8 Valour and Vietnamisation—1969 9 The bleak times—1970 10 The bitterness of the end—1971 11 The final torment—1972 Epilogue
1 6 28 42 64 84 98 113 134 162 187 199 211
Appendix 1 Appendix 2
Nominal roll of men posted to AATTV 217 Foreign awards to members of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam—1962–72 370 Glossary of terms and acronyms 380 Notes 388 Bibliography 400 Index 406 VII
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MAPS
Map 1: Provinces of South Viet Nam
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Map 2: The main roads in South Viet Nam
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Map 3: The Military Corps areas of responsibility in South Viet Nam
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Preface
This book was born of curiosity. Much has been written on the war in Viet Nam in which Australians were involved. However, there has never been a complete nominal roll of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) that showed when and where these men served.We set out to rectify this anomaly, but soon realised that it could not be a simple reference of only names and places.Too many untold stories were uncovered during the research, and the story of the men who persevered bubbled to the surface. Also at the forefront of our minds was our wish to tell the stories of some of these men that have never seen the light of day. The war that the men with the AATTV fought was no ordinary war. Most Australian soldiers who served in Viet Nam saw action in Phuoc Tuy and surrounding provinces to the south in III Corps. The bulk of the Team saw action in I Corps and the provinces of the Central Highlands and it was a completely different form of combat involving actions where entire units could be in contact for days on end.Although named the ‘Training Team’ it was only one part of the role that the men played in their struggle against the enemy of the Republic of South Viet Nam.The authors have tried to show the diversity of roles and the intensity of combat that the men faced on their tours of duty. XIII
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Nearly one thousand Australians and eleven New Zealanders served in the Team and the bond of unit pride formed during that war has continued for more than thirty years. That team spirit has been an important element in the gathering of information, which has greatly assisted in making this book both accurate and readable. Many men provided their stories to assist us with this project and although not every piece of correspondence is included in this book, every piece helped to solve a complex jigsaw puzzle of names, places, dates and locations.To all those who wrote letters, telephoned and sent emails, a genuine thankyou. This was a very difficult research task, and two men helped us gather details and information without which this book could not have been written. To David Hearder, son of Team member Simon, and to Rick Carr in Seattle, Washington, a very sincere well done! Some Team members and family stepped forward with courage to re-open windows in their minds that had been closed for many years, and they probably suffered some emotional stress through our persistence to get their information documented.To you all, there were times when we cried with you and we hope this record makes it all worthwhile. No recognition of this period can be complete without acknowledging the people with whom we, as a nation, fought.To those Allies who walked beside us, not always in the best of circumstances, who laughed, cried, fought and cursed with us—we believed that it could be done. To the families, friends and lovers who stayed at home and sought with all their being for our safe return—this is also your story. And finally, to Anne and Gay, two wives who have provided the support and ongoing energy that is needed in writing a military history— thankyou for it all. Bruce Davies Point Lonsdale
Gary McKay Coolum Beach
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Prologue Prologue
The country we now know as Viet Nam has been an imbroglio of regional warfare for centuries. In essence the battles were north versus south, and the two geographic regions have rarely been unified in their history. During World War II President Roosevelt suggested in a meeting with Anthony Eden in March 1943 that Indochina1 might become a fourpower trusteeship after the war. However, Britain’s stubbornness on postwar colonial matters buried that idea at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 and in July 1945, at Potsdam, it was agreed that the British would accept the surrender of the Japanese and take control of the Japanese-occupied Vietnamese territory south of the 16th Parallel and the Chinese to the north. The 16th Parallel was the historical barrier between the Trinh–Dutch alliance of the north and the Nguyen–Portuguese alignment of the south. Although the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), the forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had assisted the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, during the final weeks of the war primarily to rescue downed US pilots, their reports to Washington branded Ho Chi Minh ‘a revolutionist, a communist from Moscow’2, and they continued to brand him a communist in their subsequent reports.3 After World War II Europe was seen as being vital in the defence against communism and 1
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without France, Europe would be in difficulty. Therefore, when the United States studied Indochina, their views were prejudiced by France’s standing in Europe. Western leaders and their advisers at this time concentrated their strategic planning on anticommunism, Europe and economic development. When the Chinese communists took control of mainland China in 1949, western strategists thought a fault line of instability stretched across Europe and through Asia along which communism, Moscow in particular, had gained a strong foothold from which they could threaten the interests of the West. Indonesia, Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines and Burma were all experiencing communist-inspired insurgencies by 1950.4 In April 1950 General of the Army, Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), provided the views of the JCS on South-East Asia to the American Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum which stated: ‘South East Asia is a vital segment in the line of containment of communism stretching from Japan southward and around to the Indian Peninsula.’5 The United States recognised the Associated States of Viet Nam (Bao Dai’s Provisional Central Government of Viet Nam) in February 1950, and in a parallel move, Communist China and the USSR supported the Democratic Republican Government that was proclaimed in 1945 by Ho Chi Minh and agreed to by the French in March 1946. However, the Truman administration continued to regard Viet Nam as a corollary of its European strategy as Charles Bohlen of the US State Department said in an April 1950 briefing: ‘If we can help France to get out of the existing stalemate in Indochina, France can do something effective in Western Europe.’6 On 25 June 1950 North Korea attacked across the 38th Parallel, which was initially thought to be a feint for greater military action in Europe. This caused President Truman to direct ‘acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina’. 7 The United States contributed approximately US$4 billion in support up to 1954 and it is estimated to have paid for at least 50 per cent of the French War, but some also say at least 75 per cent was funded by the US.8 A military demarcation line on the 17th Parallel, which was not intended to be a political or territorial boundary, split Viet Nam as a result of the Geneva Accords that came into effect on midnight on
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22 July 1954.The Viet Minh had argued for the 16th Parallel, and Saigon, alone, argued against any settlement that would divide Viet Nam as they claimed it would only bring about more war. The ‘Big Four’ (US, UK, France and USSR) had first mentioned a negotiated settlement of the war in Indochina on 18 February 1954. Their message of a settlement was emphasised by the defeat of the French forces at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, where approximately one third of that force was native Indochinese who are rarely recognised in the history books). The talks began coincidentally on 8 May. In February 1955 Australia ratified The South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty and Protocol (SEATO) that documented Australia’s obligations to the State of (South) Viet Nam. However, Australia’s links with Viet Nam dated back to November 1952 when Australia had an accredited minister for Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos who was resident in Saigon. A new state formed in the south of Viet Nam in October 1955, which was named the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN), refused to be bound by the Geneva Accords, and the countrywide election planned for 1956 was never held. Australia’s diplomatic relations continued with the government of the Republic of Viet Nam under Ngo Dinh Diem, who succeeded the emperor Bao Dai. In 1959 William Forsyth was appointed Australia’s ambassador to South Viet Nam and minister to Laos, and the legation in South Viet Nam became an embassy. Not only was the political situation in South Viet Nam complex and tense at this time, the region was soon plagued by east-versus-west conflagrations. China’s first nuclear explosion took place on 16 October 1964, an event with significant strategic psychological influence. In April 1961, Indonesia’s president, Sukarno, made stronger contacts with the People’s Republic of China. Sukarno also claimed the Dutch West New Guinea (West Irian) for Indonesia and warned he would use force if necessary to bring the province under Indonesia’s control. He mobilised Indonesian forces, and both China and the Soviet Union provided their support to his cause. Soon after, Sukarno labelled the British-sponsored union of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah as ‘neo-colonialism’, and in January 1963 he announced a policy of confrontation (Konfrontasi) to stop the union. This came at a time when the Indonesian Communist Party was increasing its power, West Irian was transferred to Indonesia against
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Australia’s wishes, and Canberra was extremely worried that a threatening communist-controlled state was being established to its immediate north. All of these crises were compounded by the recent Cuban Missile blockade and the Chinese attack on India in October 1962. In 1963 the government of Robert Menzies identified Indonesia as posing the main strategic threat to Australia and its territories.9 But the major predicament in the region was the 1961 complex struggle between three Laotian factions that had escalated into a major international crisis. Laos bordered North and South Viet Nam, China, Burma,Thailand and Cambodia. At this time, the United States backed the right-wing forces of Laos and the Soviet Union backed the communist Pathet Lao. In April 1961, the Kennedy administration considered military intervention, but following a lengthy period of difficult negotiations, agreements were reached at Geneva in July 1962 that provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the neutralisation of Laos and the establishment of a coalition government.The lack of action by the USSR to stop North Viet Nam’s forces using Laos as a transit route to South Viet Nam caused the Kennedy administration to increase defence aid and civil project support to South Viet Nam. Many allies of the United States believed that action was needed to stop the establishment of a communist front in SouthEast Asia that would permit an easy ‘rolling up’ of the nations across to Burma, which would isolate Japan—which was viewed as critical—and eventually Australia also. The West was concerned about the economic wellbeing of the South-East Asian region and its impact on western economies should the Asian raw materials and potential markets be denied them in the future. Following its independence from Britain in 1948, Burma was plagued with unrest from ethnic insurgents and later Chinese Nationalist Party/Kuomintang (KMT) irregulars.A few officers of the Burmese army had trained in Australia during the 1950s and Major Maung Maung, a staff officer who knew Colonel Serong, requested the colonel, or another Australian, to lecture at a Burmese senior officers’ seminar for two months in 1957. Colonel Serong was sent and he returned there in 1960 to serve as a tactical adviser to the Burmese Army Schools. During this period he suggested that a small group of Australian officers should form a training team to develop the tactical skills of the Burmese, but this was not taken up. His mentor resigned in early 1961 and Serong was
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marginalised; however, he remained in the hope that Maung Maung would return to a position of influence. He did not, and Serong returned to Australia in April 1962. On his way back to Australia he went to Viet Nam as part of his official debriefing-cum-information-gathering tour through the South-East Asia region. He had written to Lieutenant General Pollard, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), in February 1962 to suggest Australia should offer a small group of officers (10–15), which he would lead, to work with the US group in Viet Nam. Although this suggestion was one of three that Serong put to the CGS on his future,10 and Australia had not made a decision on military assistance to South Viet Nam, the visit would help lay the foundation for one of Australia’s most remarkable military units. This is the story of that unit and its men.
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1 To Viet Nam Treaties, despatches and troops To Viet Nam
On 30 March 1961 in Washington DC, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, answered several specific questions on South Viet Nam’s military position, which would soon be relevant to Australia.Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, asked why the Special Warfare units that were withdrawn in November 1960 were not being sent back to work with the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG). In summary, there were several major concerns. One was the organisational structure of the armed forces of South Viet Nam and how they were trained.The MAAG had been responsible for training the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) only.The United States Operations Mission (USOM) had trained the Civil Guard and Self Defence Corps in police type roles, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was responsible for guerrilla warfare. Viet Nam’s defence strategy was then based on the ARVN protecting the nation from outside force, while the Civil Guard would provide provincial security and the Self Defence Corps would protect the villages. The US advisory group had also been restricted in its size by the requirements of the Geneva settlement in 1954. Although the United States and South Viet Nam did not sign the agreement, the United States signed a separate unilateral accord in which they agreed to ‘respect’ the 6
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Geneva Accords.That obligation restricted the Americans to 736 personnel, which was the number of Americans based in Viet Nam in 1954. In May 1961 the US Presidential Task Force on Viet Nam discussed, amongst other items, the contributions other Free World countries might make towards countering the communist guerrilla threat. The United Kingdom had already expressed a willingness to cooperate by providing training personnel and financial support. Australia and the Philippines were mentioned at the meeting almost as an afterthought in that it was thought that they had a capability. The use of third-country nationals (TCN) was identified as an administrative problem, but one that was worthwhile if the British would participate, as there were strong political benefits to be gained within the western alliance if they shared the difficulty.This brought about an exchange between Lieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, Chief of MAAG (CHMAAG), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, on 7 June 1961. McGarr complained that the State Department was applying pressure to bring British, Malayan and other third-country nationals into the antiguerrilla training program, which was MAAG’s responsibility. There had been a few discussions on the diplomatic network, in the latter half of 1961 and early 1962, between the United States and Australia, on what Australia may be able to provide to assist South Viet Nam, and Australia now anticipated a request from Admiral Felt, US Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), for some trainers.1 McGarr was concerned that confusion would result if MAAG’s counterinsurgency doctrine and training were to be diluted by methods employed by other countries. President Diem had assured him that third-country trainers in the MAAG field were not desired although McGarr was aware that several US ambassadors were to visit South Viet Nam in an effort to change Diem’s mind and to tell him that South Viet Nam had a lot to learn from the British and Australians. General McGarr did not agree and wanted to obtain the qualifications of the ‘experts’ under Sir Robert Thompson, who would head the British Advisory Mission in Viet Nam (BRIAM) in 1961. Thompson had been initially invited to South Viet Nam by Diem. The Chief of MAAG wanted not only the group’s qualifications, but its authority and anti-guerrilla material that he could evaluate before he approved their arrival. He also wanted it clearly understood that if they came they were
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to be controlled by MAAG. He thought the introduction of instructors from other countries would be counterproductive. Thompson’s ‘Delta Plan’ caused considerable consternation with McGarr, and he took strong exception to Thompson exceeding his terms of reference. The CHMAAG also objected to being told things he already knew.2 This professional jealousy would not be confined only to Americans in the coming war. Clear indicators on where and how TCN troops (Australians) would be deployed in 1962 can be seen in the previously mentioned despatches and study papers.3 Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, a US Air Force officer with a strong OSS background, had some influence in the development of counterinsurgency thinking for South Viet Nam in the early 1960s. President Kennedy was impressed by his ideas, especially his recommendation to shift away from emphasis on a Korea-style threat (although he was not alone in this), which forecast a major invasion across the 17th Parallel in a conventional attack with divisions, tanks and all, including major military support from the Communist Bloc. (Ironically, exactly what was to happen in North Viet Nam’s offensive of 1972.) During 1961, Lansdale was impressed with Israel’s counterinsurgency methods and Colonel Prihar, who had served in the ‘Israeli Survey Team’ to advise the Burmese on ways to cope with insurgency, which emphasised the ‘strong village concept’. (The ‘strong village concept’ was to fortify villages for their own protection, including defensive perimeters and the organisation of the villagers for self-defence.) Sir Robert Thompson, DSO, MC (BRIAM) had served with the Chindits in Burma, 1943–44, as well as the Secretary for Defence in Malaya, 1959–61. Colonel Serong, who would be the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam’s (AATTV) first commander, assisted the Burmese with their training during 1960–61 for which he was awarded an OBE. Respect for Burmese experience appeared to flow from the World War II operations of Merrill’s Marauders, Wingate’s Chindits and General Donovan’s OSS Detachment 101, but Malayan veterans were the new experts and would soon be the most wanted by the Vietnamese and some Americans. The US Department of State succeeded in getting a provision written into the Presidential Program for third-country participation in South Viet Nam, but this was done against very strong opposition by CHMAAG,
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Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), the US ambassador, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.4 Australia’s position was discussed at a US meeting in Honolulu in January 1962 during which the Secretary of Defense said, ‘that if it were politically wise to accept Australian help we should do so’. General McGarr replied he ‘would be glad to have small numbers of Australians if they were willing to serve under the MAAG’.5 He had toned down his previous adamant rejection of third-country personnel and Australians were discussed again at the 19 February meeting in Honolulu: It will probably be necessary to assign considerable number of American and possibly third country NCOs to work with the Vietnamese in organizing defense and civic action in the villages.This will be a difficult decision since good NCOs who could fit into the Vietnamese way of life are hard to find in large numbers and it will present the political problem of increasing American casualties. The Australians, Malayans, Filipinos, and even the Koreans and ChiNats might also be asked to supply some of their NCOs.6
Australia’s contribution would be raised when the Australia, New Zealand, US (ANZUS) Council met in Canberra on 8 and 9 May 1962, the first meeting since October 1959.7 Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and Admiral Felt (CINCPAC) represented the United States. Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs, was Australia’s representative. Prime Minister Holyoake represented New Zealand. Admiral Felt briefed the meeting on Laos and Viet Nam, and the diplomatic talks between Barwick and Rusk on the viability of President Diem, as well as the strength of commitment by the United States to South Viet Nam, were vigorous. The question of military aid from Australia was raised, but Barwick was non-committal. Reportedly, during an informal diplomatic chat it was suggested that Colonel Serong, Commandant of the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra in Queensland, might command an Australian group. Serong had held that position from April 1955 to September 1957 where he had utilised the expertise of Lieutenant Colonel George Warfe, DSO, MC, and Major Ben O’Dowd, MBE, to run the Battle Wing of the Jungle Training Centre. They were also the two principal officers that Serong had suggested for his training team in Burma. General Pollard, CGS, had written on
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Colonel Serong’s return-to-Australia itinerary on 19 March 1962 that he would be high on the list ‘if a senior officer were required for service in Viet Nam or some similar area’. At Barwick’s press conference on 9 May 1962, he said Australia would send ‘a handful . . . I mean something in the order of three or four’ trainers to Viet Nam, which would seem to rule out a colonel commander.8 Admiral Felt offered to talk about an Australian and New Zealand commitment on his next visit to South Viet Nam that was to be soon after the ANZUS meeting.When Australia announced later in May that they would provide military trainers, the general perception was that South Viet Nam had already presented a request for this assistance.The request was more likely to have been a discussion between officials and Admiral Felt during his visit to South Viet Nam in May.9 Following the AATTV units arrival in Viet Nam on 3 August, an inward cablegram from the Australian Embassy, Saigon, of 7 August 1962 said, in part: ‘Assume you have received “invitation” for A.A.T.T.V. through the Viet Namese Embassy in Canberra.’10 This would suggest that an invitation had not been received and the introduction of Australian trainers had been arranged by the United States via Admiral Felt’s ‘back-channel’ discussion. Subsequent Army Headquarters documents as well as Hansard reports record the legal basis for inter alia, instructors and advisers from Australia to be in Viet Nam as an ‘invitation from the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam and SEATO.’11 Ambassador Hill expressed his concern again in a November cable to the Defence Liaison Branch. It read: ‘By the time you receive this letter AATTV will have been in Viet Nam about three and a half months and nothing has been done to establish their legal status. I must say that this is a situation that causes some concern.’12 Activities in Army Headquarters by now must have been in frantic overdrive. Fortuitously, Colonel Serong had, in April, come back from Burma to Australia via South Viet Nam where he had been on an officially authorised information-gathering visit. His notes on that visit were:
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1. General Situation worse than I had been led to believe and worsening. VC Plan is steadily developing. Government plan is developing—on paper—in fact? Problems MAAG and RVNAF not meshing Strategic Hamlets policy not understood at level of implementation. Plan for two types. Strategic policy is passive and reactionary. Not active. No unified control. Border problem is not appreciated. Gen HARKINS hasn’t grasped the nature of his task. Let’s hope he does soon, for all our sakes. His job is to sell unified command to DIEM. 2. Personal Well pleased with arrangements for visit. Saw more than I expected to. Tell US to tell RANGOON I am pleased and to thank [them]. These people need me. I hope to return. 3. DANANG Comd OK Living conditions rough. Bucket to a bushfire. No planned end use. Check Allowances to equal up to US. Tour of Duty as for single man—15 months, but keep some for up to 2 years and have a phased turnover. Syllabus well within SAS capability. Put in an A Team. Well-selected instructors. Two officers. This is an Army deal not MO9 [ASIS]. Logistics to be all US. No formalised ‘status of forces’ agreement. Give ambassador authority to send home—as for US. We will probably lose some, tactically. We may lose the lot strategically. This is not a reason for being against it. Wear Australian uniform except for working dress, which could be US and will be supplied. However this project does not meet the stated requirement for a display of solidarity. CIA—security. It is a good start, but we want something more prominent. 4. Strategic Village—NGO’s plan is no plan—a dream of a worried man—if they’re all strategic, none are strategic.13
11
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During a Department of External affairs debriefing conducted on 15 May Colonel Serong highlighted the weaknesses of the Vietnamese command structure, training and strategic hamlets. He also said he hoped to return to Viet Nam as the commander of the Australian team, although no decision had been made by the CGS.14 His recorded observations were profound, but at the time uninformed. There had been numerous reports on Viet Nam from the days of the French through to analyses, and inspections by both military and civilian members of the Kennedy administration as well as Australians. Mr R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, had talks with US Lieutenant General Samuel T.Williams in Saigon in 1957 on Williams’ plan for the raising of guerilla units in the South Vietnamese Army, a concept with which Casey agreed. Colonel Stuart Graham, Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), for example, reported to the Joint Planning Committee on 5 December 1961 on the inadequacy of the command structure—in Viet Nam. Robert Tompson’s discussion on Viet Nam with Australia’s Chief of Staff Committee on 28 March 1962 also highlighted the challenges for South Viet Nam.15 Strong and continuing arguments were in progress over the reported successes of military action, the development of political reform and how to describe South Viet Nam’s total strategic picture—was the South improving and winning or not? CHMAAG McGarr wrote a forceful letter to the Chairman JCS on 12 October 1961 in which he provided ‘an analysis and appraisal of the basic causes behind the presently worsening situation here.’16 The political and military lessons of victory and defeat had been written previously in Vietnamese, French and English.The good and the bad were well known. When the Australian government formally announced on 24 May 1962 that it would send a group of up to 30 military instructors to Viet Nam the US embassy in Saigon reported to the Department of State that the Australian government was ‘dispatching military officer to Saigon to discuss just how Australian personnel can be used’.17 Colonel Serong and Wing Commander Brinsley were sent to Saigon in June to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Australia’s involvement and the possible stationing of an RAAF Dakota there. Sir Garfield Barwick had visited Viet Nam for discussions late in May during which the possibility of deploying an Australian group in Quang Ngai Province was suggested. Nguyen Dinh Thuan, the Assistant Minister
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for National Defence and Minister at the Presidency, attracted Barwick’s attention to the proposal for several reasons. First, it was to be a jungle warfare training school that would concentrate on the Civil Guard.The Vietnamese government would provide the buildings and administrative personnel including Malayan trained instructors. It would allow the Australians to be identified as a group and to manage the counterinsurgency plan in their own style.Thuan emphasised that Quang Ngai was a vital sector and hoped that Australian aid would ‘snow-ball’ in this province. Barwick thought the plan had merit as long as the difficulty of logistics was addressed. He wrote a two-page report to Athol Townley, Minister for Defence, in which he said, ‘no doubt you will talk this over with your military wallahs’. The use of the generic ‘military’ in the correspondence at this stage in the planning (1 June) indicated that a decision on who would command the group had not been made. He commented, ‘I have made no commitments of any kind’, and he finished the letter, ‘I hope you’ll watch the climate in relation to Indonesia. I still might have to reconsider my own position’. Sir Robert Thompson, BRIAM, accompanied him during his inspection and although Thompson thought that the Delta was the higher priority he ‘recognised great value of [an] effective contribution in Quang Ngai’.18 Negotiations on where the Australians would be deployed in South Viet Nam opened a veritable Pandora’s box of international suspicions, professional military jealousies and some necessary bureaucratic nitpicking. General Paul D. Harkins, Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), strongly opposed the deployment of Australians as a main identity in Quang Ngai. He believed the proposal ‘was off the rails, and he did not consider there was an established priority for training of the Civil Guard in jungle warfare’.There was also a strong dislike of the potential for other national commands to be scattered around the country. Serong did not reject Quang Ngai, but in his first report he said the aim was firstly integration with MACV and to get all parties thinking on common lines until Vietnamese forces were ready to accept Australians in Quang Ngai.19 He also said getting the team into training in other locations would allow them to move into Quang Ngai at a later date (December) and function immediately. A few days later he saw it as a
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‘difficult but challenging project that was a task within capacity, and that the conditions met our [Australian] requirements’.20 In a personal letter to the CGS, dated 5 June 1962, Serong expressed some angst, writing, ‘Thompson’s fingerprints [are] all over this business’, but again he did not reject the Quang Ngai centre. His letter also contradicted (unknowingly) statements made by Barwick in his June letter to Defence Minister Townley.21 The Serong letter also confirmed that he had not been appointed commander of an Australian group at that stage.21 The Defence Committee did note that the use of Australians should be suitable to the Vietnamese as well as the Americans and the Committee’s deliberations contained the following observation: It would be quite embarrassing for example if, at some future time when Australian press or political representatives might be discussing the matter with South Vietnamese authorities, the latter were to say that the Australian contribution was being employed in a manner desired by the Americans, but not necessarily by the South Vietnamese who would have preferred us to be doing something different.22
Colonel Serong’s final report from his visit in June also provided guidance to the Defence Committee in its considerations on the unit’s deployment. He reported the mission had been completed and the memorandum of understanding provided for: Integration of the Australian Component into the US MAAG organisation, while preserving a ‘national presence’ and the selection of the Hue area . . . was in large measure dictated by available living conditions.’23
When kitted out, however, it would take an astute Vietnamese to recognise an Australian soldier, especially as they wore a dominant blueand-white MAAG patch on their uniform. And, for some of the elders, an Australian slouch hat worn in ‘bush mode’ may have looked a little too French for their liking. The tactical setting was considered to be satisfactory as the Hue area was comparatively quiet, but not moribund. Serong included Danang, Hiep Khanh and Phu Bai in the definition of Hue for reporting purposes even though Hue and Danang were in different provinces. Ted Serong made the quixotic observation: It had enough activity (average 20 VC dead per week) in the province to provide an interesting PR project.The general level of activity . . . is
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sufficient to provide a stimulating professional environment without causing worry in Australia. Some casualties are possible.24
Duc My, the Ranger Training Centre, which was considered by General Harkins to be ‘the jungle training camp’ that negated the need for a new jungle facility in Quang Ngai, would be suitable for some Australian instructors. Two officers would also be deployed with Special Forces, initially at the Hoa Cam Training Centre just west of Danang and then with the CIA Combined Studies Division (CSD).The final decision was driven simply through logistics. The Australian Army was not in favour of the Quang Ngai option as it would cut them off from American logistic support and the Americans emphasised that point. Support from the Vietnamese alone was considered to be unsatisfactory. A secondary consideration was the likelihood of action against the Viet Cong in Quang Ngai would be high, but contact with the enemy in other regions could not be discounted either.25 The enemy was more active further south where there were large Viet Cong units operating in War Zone D, just to the north of Saigon, and there was heavy enemy action around the capital city and in the southern Delta.26 The deployment of AATTV members was decided following the recommendations of the CGS to the Defence Committee. It was: HQ MACV 1 (Commander AATTV) HQ MAAG Danang Phu Bai (Dong Da) Hiep Khanh Duc My
3 2 10 10 4 27
Colonel Serong, as Australia’s negotiator on the MOU, was in a strong position to lobby for his appointment as commander of the Australian group.28 Several telegrams between the CGS and the Australian Embassy in June emphasised that normally Australia would not send such a senior officer with such a small group; however, if Serong’s experience could be utilised then Army would be happy to make him available.29 Harkins
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replied on 27 June 1963: ‘I would be delighted to have Colonel Serong as commander of Australian Advisory and Training components and as special adviser to me on counter-insurgency matters.’ He also said he would abide by the Australian decision and, ‘should that decision be to provide an officer of less seniority I will regret that my pleasant association with Colonel Serong cannot be furthered. However, I will look forward to having another fine Australian officer to serve in his stead.’30 Colonel Serong was appointed commander on 5 July 1962. Harkins offered him a position on his headquarters even though,‘Serong had the impression that Harkins did not want an adviser on counter-insurgency, or the representative of a third nation attached to his staff to perform any function whatsoever.’31 Considering the discussion the two officers had when they met this time it was a magnanimous offer by the general. Harkins had asked Serong what he had been doing in Burma, and he replied, ‘running the war’. Harkins asked how many staff he had there, and Colonel Serong replied, ‘just myself ’. The MACV commander indicated that it must have been a small war, but Serong replied, ‘No, it was about the same size as this one and, he wasn’t losing it’.32 This was an exaggeration and probably went down like the proverbial lead-balloon. The appointment was most likely influenced by the Department of State’s desire to be seen to have other nations involved in Viet Nam, and a bit of tactical play by Harkins to keep the Australian commander close. With the MOU signed, Australia agreed to reimburse the United States for support provided at the rate of US$150 per month for each officer and $125 for each enlisted member. An additional $100 per month was to be paid for a sedan to be provided for the commander, and included the cost of fuel, maintenance and the driver’s salary. On victualling the arrangement was that, ‘It was understood that payment for meals would be at the expense of individuals and was not included in the reimbursement rate!’. There was some discussion over the length of postings for the Australians and at first all were to be between 15 and 18 months, but it was soon realised that this would entitle the married men to be accompanied by their families, and consequently their tenure of posting was reduced to less than 12 months unaccompanied. A single man was expected to serve up to 18 months on a phased rotational basis. The commander was appointed for at least two years and would be
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accompanied by his family.33 Colonel Serong later attempted to have all officers’ postings accompanied, but this was rejected probably with good reason, other than economics, because in January 1963 Serong requested a guard for his house as his family was vulnerable to enemy action.34 Discussions on the status of Australian forces continued for some time following the initial basic agreement. They included such things as customs, diplomatic arrangements for the commander, civil law and military discipline. Medical evacuation beyond Viet Nam continued to be negotiated into 1963. Routine treatment within Viet Nam was covered by the MOU between the United States and Australia, but getting a patient to facilities outside of Viet Nam was an Australian responsibility. At first it was thought that evacuation out of Viet Nam would be uncommon, but it was eventually decided to include all (routine and emergency) medical evacuation into the agreement signed with the Americans.The status of the Australian force in Viet Nam was added through diplomatic settlement to the Pentalateral Agreement of December 1950.35 Back in Australia the corps directorates had selected men for duty in Viet Nam and by 25 June 1962, 37 men (including the commander) had assembled at the Intelligence Centre, Middle Head, for their first taste of what was to come in Viet Nam.The camp had magnificent views of Sydney Harbour and a fort beneath with dank and dark cellars, which were most suitable for code of conduct (POW) courses. Ian Gollings remembered his selection many years later: In early 1962 as an infantry lieutenant, I was posted to the Special Air Service (SAS) Company at Swanbourne in WA after completing six months of courses at the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning in Georgia, USA including the rigorous Ranger Course. To my surprise, only a few months later, I was plucked out of this professionally challenging new environment to undertake a period of training and indoctrination at the School of Military Intelligence at Middle Head overlooking Sydney Harbour.36
Warrant Officer Joe Vezgoff recalled what it felt like to be a member of that first group: It was with some pride that I became one of the 36 officers and NCOs, including reserves, who sat in the lecture room on the 26th June 1962
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at the Intelligence Centre, Middle Head, Mosman, listening to addresses given by the CGS Lieutenant General Pollard, Director of Military Operations and Plans, Brigadier T.F.P. Macadie, and finally the Minister for the Army, J.O.Cramer. My thoughts strayed to my first briefing by an officer, twelve years before, prior to going to Japan to reinforce 3 Battalion before their move to Korea.That officer had held a National Geographic in his hand and all I would remember was that he had said there were tigers in Korea! The two-week briefing in 1962 was far better. I think I was selected because I had served two years (1955–57) attached to the British Jungle Warfare School in Malaya as an instructor in Jungle Warfare. In the following days Colonel Serong interviewed us individually. During my interview I was informed that I would be with him, Lieutenant Colonel Adrian ‘Joe’ Mann and Major Leo Fitzpatrick, based in Saigon, and that I would only be there six months. (This became a little over twelve months in fact.) My general brief was indeed brief— to be responsible for administration and pay.37
The two-week indoctrination course was intended as an introduction and familiarisation with the situation in South Viet Nam.The Australian Army Component Vietnam was formally raised as a unit on 1 July 1962 and renamed the Australian Army Training Component then designated the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam on 12 July.38 The role of AATTV was to assist in the training (not combat) of the ground forces of SouthViet Nam and it was not to be employed in any other role without the prior consent of the Australian government.The CGS also told the Secretary Department of Defence ‘. . . our instructors would be using American doctrines and techniques, so as not to confuse theVietnamese’.39 The unit was sent to Canungra where members were to complete the 1/62 Jungle Warfare Indoctrination Course at the Jungle Training Centre (JTC). The course was conducted from 9–13 July, after which the final team selection by the commander of 29 men would be completed.The aim of the JTC course was threefold: to refresh instructors in the tactics and techniques of tropical warfare up to platoon level (which indicated Australia’s military size and recent experience); to demonstrate training aids and methods of instruction; and to advise on the design of training programs. It was a very basic course, almost comical in its methods to refresh experienced soldiers on their way to train, in some cases, battle-experienced Vietnamese. An introduction to tropical warfare
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got one hour and fifteen minutes of the course’s time, but physical training and lines inspection took three hours out of the program. Ian Gollings remembered that they were all amused. ‘When our commander, Colonel ‘Ted’ Serong, arrived on the last day at Canungra when we were completing the obstacle course, [he] jumped off the tower into the river to show his empathy with the troops.’40 Lieutenant Peter Young thought it all a bit ‘gung-ho’, but he and Captain John Healy were required to undergo a more gruelling mental challenge in Melbourne as they had been selected to serve with the Special Forces-cum-CIA program in Danang. Although the Civilian Irregular Defence Group’s (CIDG) program was in the process of handover to the American Special Forces under Operation Switchback, which was to be completed by 1 July 1963, some camps still remained with the CIA.41 The seven reserves were named on 14 July: Captain Barry Petersen, Warrant Officer George Francis, Sergeants M. John Petersen (who did not serve in Viet Nam), ‘Jack’ Roughley, Bill Brennan, Daniel Neville and Ronald Cook.The first team would consist of eight men who had served in World War II (one in the British Merchant Navy), three of whom also served in Korea and Malaya. Of the other men in the team, three had been in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (Japan)— two of those also served in Korea; fourteen others had served in Korea—four of those had been in Malaya as well, and another seven had served in Malaya only. Colonel Serong had World War II experience, predominantly as a staff officer and instructor, but he had not served in Korea or Malaya and his service in Burma was as a training advisor.42 Three men did not have any active service experience.When the main body of the unit departed Australia on QANTAS Flight 739 on 29 July 1962, officers of field rank and above were directed to pack their Sam Browne belt and medals, and every member needed a white mess kit, which could be purchased in Singapore if necessary. They were now on active service!
The Team came together as a group again in Singapore. Lieutenant Young had gone ahead on 22 July; Colonel Serong on the 27th, and three from
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Perth joined Flight 739 on the 29th. Singapore was the last safe haven before the crucible of Viet Nam.The Australian Army element Far East Land Forces (FARELF) was responsible for Australian administration of AATTV and it was also the formation commander for legal and disciplinary matters. Major Leo Fitzpatrick and Warrant Officer Joe Vezgoff went to General Headquarters in Singapore to collect the unit’s pay in American dollars, which was to be approximately $15 000. Joe Vezgoff takes up the story: We were then astounded to learn that they did not carry American dollars, only Australian dollars, which to us was about as useful as a chocolate teapot. Their suggestion was that we take the Australian dollars to Change Alley and do business with a moneychanger there. Change Alley no longer exists, but in those days it was a narrow alley with stalls on either side, where bargaining was the order of the day. It was a rather seedy area where you had to watch your pockets. With borrowed briefcases stuffed with Australian currency, and with much trepidation, we ventured into the bowels of Change Alley. We soon spotted a transaction occurring by a shoe shop and sidled up to the Indian, asking if we could change some Australian currency for American dollars. He agreed and asked how much we had. When we said $15 000 his eyes rolled like a poker machine hitting the jackpot! Once he recovered, he told us to wait and disappeared out of sight leaving us wondering if he would appear next with thugs to relieve us of the money. Fortunately he turned up shortly with a bag stuffed with American dollars. An onlooker would have been bemused to see two white men and an Indian on their knees counting money with all due care, and oblivious to the numerous bystanders watching the transaction with wide-eyed awe. I wondered if other paydays would follow such unusual procedures.43
Colonel Serong arrived in Saigon on 31 July and this day is mistakenly celebrated as the unit’s birthday. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Mann, and the remainder of the unit would arrive on Pan Am Flight 808 at 12:30 hours, 3 August 1962. The trip over from Singapore provided the passengers with some amusement as the men boarded in civilian clothes and then proceeded to change into uniform in the toilets. Their reception in Saigon was a VIP affair with a special clearance through customs and a personal greeting at MAAG Headquarters
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the next day from COMUSMACV Harkins and senior army officers. Joe Vezgoff recounted his arrival in country: My first impression of Saigon in particular was of a country not at war, apart from the anti-grenade protections round street cafes and bars, and the strict precautions taken when the President of South Viet Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, decided to go driving accompanied by a cavalcade of cars. On one occasion I was walking down the main street when much to my consternation I, and all others nearby, were ordered to face the shop fronts.As our faces were pressed against the wall; the presidential cavalcade roared by. I thought this was unjust and hardly likely to win the hearts and minds of the locals.44
Infantryman Warrant Officer Ron Perkins, who would become the sergeant major of the Hiep Khanh Training Centre, remembered: On arrival in Saigon, the heat and humidity created the greatest immediate impression.The second was the chaotic traffic system.A great number of Renault taxis, motor scooters and bicycles competed for the limited road space. Each driver ensured he received the maximum space possible by frequent and extended use of the horn.45
The men were allocated into the teams as previously approved and Lieutenant Colonel Mann became a member of the US Army (MAAG) Training Inspection Team, which was responsible for checking training installations around the country. Major Fitzpatrick and Warrant Officer Vezgoff worked in MAAG’s Adjutant Division, and as Joe Vezgoff recalled, the Australians were the poor cousins. ‘Major Fitzpatrick and I had a small space in MAAG as our office, where we had two desks and a filing cabinet. All our equipment, even paper and pens, had been scrounged from the Americans.’46 Within ten days of arrival in Saigon, Serong reported all of the men were fully integrated into their teams at each of the locations.That report was too sanguine, as niggling professional concerns at Hiep Khanh would soon attest. Lieutenant Ian Gollings was thrust into an American team and thought: We 30 Australians were inserted into American advisory teams . . . mainly in the northern province of Thua Thien. At Hiep Khanh, near the ancient imperial capital city of Hue in the north of South Viet Nam,
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tensions quickly arose, first with the US Army advisers already at this training centre. Among the Americans there was no understanding of why we ten Australians had suddenly been inflicted on them, more than doubling the total advisory effort.47
By the end of August some of the AATTV officers were annoyed that they were not permitted to go hunting in the hills. Perhaps the word of the first contact with the Viet Cong had not yet spread to all the centres by then. Captain Healy and Lieutenant Young were aboard a helicopter that made a forced landing owing to mechanical problems northwest of Quang Ngai at 16:15 hours on 17 August 1962. Peter Young recalled: There were about a dozen of us in the helicopter,American officers and ourselves. About half an hour into the flight, there was a loud bang and the next thing we knew was that the helicopter was auto-rotating towards the ground at an alarming rate. To this day I don’t know whether we were hit by ground fire or had engine failure, but we ended up on the ground with a God-almighty thump. We clambered out to find ourselves in one of a series of dry paddy fields about fifty by fifty metres with a raised bund of about knee height dividing them. All very dry and exposed but with a picture book village, complete with temple and surrounded by tall bamboo a few hundred meters away. A check of my map showed that we were in the middle of a Viet Cong stronghold area.This was reinforced when a couple of shots went over our heads and two columns of men in black suits started running out towards us from the village. The next thing I saw was Healy who had raced back into the helicopter and unscrewed, or tore out, the machine gun mounted in its waist. He then proceeded to press-gang the crew chief into helping him set it up in a corner of our fort and let rip.The thing I remember most is that the first burst took out what I imagined to be priceless antique ridge tiles complete with Dragon finials on the roof of the temple. I remember thinking at the time that it was not very politic to annoy our potential hosts by knocking the roof off their temple. His second burst however was much more effective and the men in black took cover. The noise was deafening with Healy blazing away, the Viet Cong firing back when another helicopter landed right alongside and
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about a dozen Vietnamese infantrymen charged out. Healy calmly positioned them around the perimeter and ordered us to get into the relief helicopter whose understandably nervous pilot wanted to get away as soon as possible, as did I.48
An ambush also occurred in the Phu Bai (Dong Da) training area on 31 August and although no Australians were involved it appeared that Captain Robert George had left the training area and driven through the ambush on his way back to camp. At Hiep Khanh, in September, bubbles of dissatisfaction against operational and training matters burst into an open conflict between the senior Australian, Captain Barry Tinkler, and the senior American adviser, a major. Tinkler recounts the feelings at the time: It became very obvious that the first aim to be achieved was to re-educate the US people. None had the slightest idea of all round defence, let alone the basics of counter-insurgency warfare. There was not an adequate defence plan for the advisers’ compound, the communications to HQ I ARVN Div were deficient, no DF [Defensive Fire] or DF SOS tasks from the artillery at PK17 [a fire support base], no weapons pits (and so no range cards) and no evacuation plan.The US S3 [captain, operations officer] persisted in the concept of ‘lines of defence’ (as per NW European warfare) and could not get his head around the probability of a ‘rear’ attack. As our lives were at stake I persisted with my plan to develop a defence plan for the compound and its 20 inhabitants.Thank God I prevailed.49
Barry Tinkler’s concerns highlighted the (grand) tactical puzzle of South Viet Nam; it was a war with two prongs. Firstly, there was an internal (police) war, and the State was also under threat of attack by an external military (invading) force. Lieutenant Ian Gollings found the situation at Hiep Khanh to be grimmer than that: The seriousness of this problem was second only to that caused by the American messing officer who arranged for so much ice cream to be supplied that we ran short of the essential meat and vegetable components of the ration scale. We Australians were not happy about that!50
Colonel Serong recorded that time would eventually solve the problem. Later in the month, a change of manning saw the Australians
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take an increased part in Hiep Khanh’s administration, which helped to calm the clash of professional skills between the Australian and American officers. Colonel Serong intervened to stop a move to relieve the American major, which he considered would have been unfortunate from every point of view, and by the end of September he judged that the overall situation in the camp was quite good.51 Captain Bob Hagerty remembered the challenges of training the Civil Guard: Most of the Civil Guard Companies that went through the [Hiep Khanh] Centre had had a varied amount of training. Some of the companies impressed you with their efficiency; others were very poor. When you checked their previous training and operational experience, you usually had a fair degree of sympathy for the miserable existence they had. Poor leadership, indifferent training, no home leave (often for years), poor rations, one uniform to wear until it fell off their back (a second uniform kept in pristine condition for parades only) all led to lousy morale. In spite of many drawbacks the training environment was as good as you could hope for. The instructors were ARVN—they varied also in ability and motivation. Many were excellent and had plenty of combat experience. Some were posted to Hiep Khanh after convalescing from wounds received on operations. (Incidentally, whilst inspecting sentries one night, I spoke in poor French to a Civil Guardsman, older but very alert, wearing parachute wings—he had been dropped into Dien Bien Phu before it fell in 1954.) On arrival we were placed with our US allies in the various committees. I do not wish to be critical of them, as it transpired that they had little training or warning before being sent to South Viet Nam to do the advisory job. However, their lack of knowledge of South-East Asia was depressing.Their attitudes and opinions of all things Vietnamese and French were derogatory. Our arrival actually coincided with the last week of the 12-week training cycle, which was the preparation, rehearsing for an elaborate series of displays, including fire power and battle assault courses and a formal graduation parade. This was an MGM-style extravaganza, which we Australians immediately thought was a complete waste of time and resources.52
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In October 1962, AATTV began to veer a little off the track from its initial terms of deployment. First, a low-grade report had been received from Cambodia that Australians were to be regarded as priority targets and shot on sight. This, allegedly, brightened up the lives of the team members! Second, Colonel Serong was soon to take advantage of an offer made by the US Special Forces to attach individuals for observation of their village defence program.Warrant Officer Ray Simpson was detached to a village near Lao Bao, which was on Route 9 very near the border with Laos, and then to the village of Khe Sanh. Captain Adrian CluniesRoss had accompanied the senior adviser to I Corps to observe a regimental sweep south of Danang, and Sergeant Roy Weir went off with 20 Special Battalion in Kontum. This was a time of high optimism with a report that the war had turned in the government’s favour.The Americans reduced the number of their personnel at Hiep Khanh and Dong Da, which permitted the Australians more latitude in their methods of training. However, to their embarrassment, they were to experience that it was not just a matter of cutting out what they thought was inappropriate. Captain Bob Hagerty observed: We had our comeuppance a few months later, after enthusiastically briefing a newly arrived US officer being posted to the CG Directorate in Saigon; we received a ‘rocket’ about our unauthorised changes to the POI [program of instruction].We never even thought about informing them, we thought we were there to advise the Vietnamese. However, we were embarrassed. So we went to inform our counterparts who were quite distressed, as they preferred the ‘new’ POI.After some ‘grave’ discussion— with a decidedly mischievous look on his face, Lieutenant Dam said no problem, we will continue as we are and I will keep a copy of the old POI on the wall for the benefit of those visitors that may need to know. The CG Directorate never asked us to explain and justify our changes to the POI—presumably they knew best!53
One of the successes was the introduction of demonstration platoons to aid instruction, which seemed to please everyone. Lieutenant Ian Gollings and Sergeant Ron Pincott organised the platoon at Hiep Khanh. Warrant Officer Tony Toghill and Sergeant Bill Kennedy were commended for their excellent work at Phu Bai, and Sergeants Joe
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Flannery and Roy Weir were much admired for their outstanding work at Duc My. The Australian contingent’s expertise and skills in training were being noticed and the men had settled into a routine that also permitted some to escape to Saigon for a well-deserved break. However, because the expense of these visits was well above the Australian allowances, this problem was brought to the attention of Army Headquarters in Canberra. Australia had also provided, under the Colombo Plan, the wherewithal for the establishment of a dairy farm at Ben Cat, which was about 35 kilometres north of Saigon. Mr Hill, the Australian Ambassador, opened the facility in September 1962 and Warrant Officer Joe Vezgoff accompanied him: On touching down at Ben Cat we were met by 20 or so Vietnamese Government officials and an equal number of white-coated animal attendants. In the background, looking forlorn, were the real VIPs of the day—the Jersey cows, much out of place in a land of paddy fields and oppressive heat. The poor cows looked as though they were still in a state of shock after enduring the long trip from Australia by ship and road transport.They were not ‘happy Vegemites’, and I’m sure they would have booked their passages for home if they could have predicted their future! I scrambled up a small rise and took a strategic tactical position, as any one-man army would do. Whilst the official speeches were going on I contemplated the scene below. On reflection today, I realise that there were also agents and members of the Viet Cong watching the scene with even greater interest than I before hurrying back to their headquarters to order supplies of barbeque equipment.The sight of Meals on Legs must have caused much salivation for members of the Viet Cong division in the area. Cooks would have begun sharpening their knives and readying their cooking pots for action.Their next big offensive was underway! Needless to say, over the next months, gradually the jersey cows mysteriously disappeared, whilst the smell of cooking meat also pervaded the air at the same time.54
Several years later, 1 RAR, the first Australian infantry battalion deployed to South Viet Nam, would patrol through Ben Cat in 1965; they saw all that remained of the dairy farm were a few derelict buildings. But 1962 ended on a positive note; the message was optimistic. Although casualties on both sides had increased, South Viet Nam’s had
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increased only slightly, but their casualties were predominantly in the Self Defence Corps, which were double that in the Civil Guard and ARVN. The Self Defence Corps was protecting the villages and hamlets and it was the force most likely to come in contact with the enemy. Self Defence Corps were morbid proof that such plans as Agrovilles, the Delta Pacification Plan, Strategic Hamlets and Civic Action Groups were at the heart of the struggle, but execution was, and would continue to be, the weak link. An operationally static ARVN did not help either. The Team’s efforts could be best summarised by a report from Captain Robert L. Korchek, Commander Detachment A-131 on Sergeant Ray Simpson’s attachment to them between 29 October to 29 November 1962: You joined Detachment 131 when the training phase consisted of patrolling, immediate action and ambushes. By contributing hard work, long hours, your unlimited experience, and a fine ability to instruct, you helped make the training in these subjects more complete and successful. Without your commonsense approach, many problems would have become much more complex. In addition to the fine qualities already mentioned, your constant good humour and willingness to help others effectively helped to maintain the unit’s morale at a high level. I have seen few soldiers who possess the broad military knowledge, know how, and commonsense that you do Sgt Simpson.You reflect great credit on your organisation.55
Captain Barry Tinkler lobbied for, and was promoted major. Peter Young was promoted captain and had taken up a Combined Studies Division intelligence/operations officer position in Danang. He and John Healy were being groomed to operate a CIA-sponsored Montagnard Scout Programme at Pleiyit in Pleiku Province. The total American military strength was now 11 326, which comprised a small MACV staff, MAAG and support troops, but a plan had started to withdraw American forces with an aim to have only 1500 remaining in 1964.Australia’s military commitment remained at 30.
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Ap Bac! Everything came back to earth with a thud.Ap Bac was a hamlet in Dinh Tuong Province in the Mekong Delta, around which an ARVN operation was mounted to destroy a Viet Cong concentration in early January 1963.The operation failed and the ARVN were severely criticised by their American advisers and the press. The failure was attributed to, amongst many complaints, the poor state of training of the ARVN and Civil Guard units. The senior American adviser to IV Corps endorsed the extremely critical observations of Lieutenant Colonel John P. Vann, 7th ARVN Division Senior Adviser, and added a list of his own. Relationships between the military and the press became strained as the military blamed the media for the subsequent international attention heaped on the operation. Colonel Serong reported on 18 January that the press had exaggerated the story and there was some suggestion from outside [Viet Nam] that a ‘Laos Solution’ [a cease-fire agreement] may be in the offing. In I Corps, Warrant Officer Ron Perkins also raised questions about overall counterinsurgency skills: I accompanied an ambush patrol, together with two American Special Forces members, and a platoon of Montagnards [mountain tribes]. An ambush position was selected in the late afternoon, and we settled down 28
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in observation, ready to spring the ambush. A little later, after dark, one of the US soldiers became ill, and was escorted by the other American back to Khe Sanh, leaving me as the sole advisor with the group. Later that night, I could hear the sound of snoring within the ambush position, and about 2.30 a.m. a water buffalo wandered through the ambush position. Next morning, having remained awake all night, I asked through the interpreter, if anyone noticed anything during the night. Not one had sighted the water buffalo, and I therefore assumed that everyone, bar me, was asleep for most of the night. During another operation I was allocated to observe the rear platoon. Having been a map-reading instructor in Australia, I took with me my trusty compass, and a map of the area. As we headed off into (illegally) the Demilitarized Zone we were looking for Viet Cong Training Camps, which we knew had been set up in the DMZ. As we headed off, I was taking compass bearings to satisfy myself that we were sticking to the heading that had been stipulated by the Executive Officer. To my surprise, the XO [Executive Officer] saw me doing this and ordered me to put away my map and compass, as it was not necessary, because these people know the country ‘like the back of their hand’. I still took the compass bearings, and noted that every time the course indicated we should go over a hill, the leading scouts went round the side of it. Next morning, as the sun was rising, I approached the XO, and jokingly said, ‘Hallelujah, it’s the second coming of Christ!’ He said, ‘What do you mean by that?’ I told him the sun had now risen in the west, and the rivers were running uphill. He was rather annoyed with me when I told him that we had gone on a track 180 degrees from our original heading. His response was ‘Bullshit!’. About half an hour after we moved off, the column came to a shuddering halt, so I moved forward to find out what was happening. I was informed that we had come across the track of some 400 Viet Cong. On looking around, I saw a couple of lolly papers, and a discarded cigarette packet, and informed the XO that we had, in my opinion, just crossed the trail that we had blazed yesterday.1
Ian Gollings remembered other differences: The second major tension was in our daily dealings with our Vietnamese counterparts.The senior and middle level officers and NCOs of the ARVN had initially been trained in the ways the French conducted their military operations. They had been at war since the 1930s, first against the Japanese then in opposition to the French. We perceived that they
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generally resented having to accept the advice of the transient American advisers, most of whom had no operational experience, and the newly arrived Australians who were in such small numbers that we would not have any real effect on the outcome of the war and, in any case, we did not control the air, combat and logistic support they relied on which was under American control. This support was only available if they accepted the presence and advice of their advisors and so they did.2
The men of the Team were now beginning to feel ‘bored and inadequate’ owing to their political restriction to training units.Although some had been rostered through temporary detachments to Special Forces, and to observe ARVN operations, they were chomping at the bit to get into some action. Sir Wilfred Kent-Hughes, a distinguished soldier and Liberal Party stalwart, was extremely critical of how Australia’s leading experts in jungle warfare were wasting their time in basic training. He intended to raise the matter in Parliament when he returned to Australia following a private visit to Viet Nam in March 1963. Not unexpectedly, more than a few briefing notes were despatched between departments and their ministers on how to handle Kent-Hughes’ questions, but the government position remained unchanged on the role of the Team. The training centres were now more active. The ARVN 25th Division in Quang Ngai Province had a good success against the Viet Cong. Its 49th Regiment had been completely trained at Phu Bai from where favourable comments on the efforts of AATTV men had been passed to the headquarters in Saigon. Even though enemy activity had increased in 1963, some signs of friction were beginning to appear in the US–Viet Nam relationship, and Colonel Serong recorded that the Vietnamese wanted the numbers in the US advisory (military) effort to be reduced. Diem’s brother Ngo Dinh Nhu also told the Washington Post in May 1963, ‘there were too many American advisers in Viet Nam, [and] that half of them could be sent back to the US’. The Americans had 13 143 in Viet Nam with another 1900 coming.3 The number of Australians remained at 30. The first two Australian replacements arrived in Viet Nam on 24 May 1963. Major Joe da Costa would go to Phu Bai and Warrant Officer Class Two Barry Sullivan to Hiep Khanh. Colonel Serong was invited to lecture at Fort Bragg in the United States during May 1963. Prior to
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his departure he and the ambassador were invited to an interview with President Diem. Serong told the president that recent improvements in ARVN operations were an AATTV achievement, and he used the 25th Division’s success in Quang Ngai as an example. President Diem was perhaps too polite to remind Serong that several hundred South Vietnamese officers and NCO had been trained in jungle warfare techniques in a continuing program at the British school at Kota Tinggi in Malaya. Colonel Serong also stressed South Viet Nam’s ‘currently favourable position’, but warned against ‘premature extension of the Strategic Hamlet Programme’. This was one of Serong’s main criticisms of the conflict’s process.4 The Hamlet program expansion had also previously attracted caution from BRIAM and some senior Americans. This led to a detailed explanation by Diem on every province in the country and ‘was in minute detail’. Serong objected to President Diem’s manpower solution on the grounds that Viet Nam was near the bottom of the barrel. An earlier US report said that South Viet Nam had 500 000 men under arms, but the problem was focus.There were:ARVN, Civil Guard, Self Defence Corps, Civilian Irregular Defence Group, Hamlet Militia, Montagnard Commandos, Force Populaire, Republican Youth, Catholic Youth, independent groups controlled by Catholic priests and an army controlled by a businessman in Vung Tau.5 President Diem expressed his disappointment at not having the Australian effort centred on Quang Ngai. Diem had a personal interest in this province; not only did he see it as an area of strategic importance it was also where his older brother, Khoi, had been governor prior to his assassination by the Viet Minh. An Embassy report said he wanted to,‘give [us] that task, comparable to the effort at the Dardanelle’. Later, Diem is reported to have said, that ‘a disaster at Quang Ngai would, he expected, have led to a massive third nation [Australian] intervention’.6 This subterfuge was allegedly seen by the Australian planners and avoided, but the Defence Committee documents and embassy reports of 1962 do not support that contention. Diem’s discussions and briefing appeared to be a method of conveying a soothing message to Washington for their continued support to ‘maintain and extend the machinery of democracy [South Viet Nam] against communism’, but a Buddhist demonstration in Hue on 8 May 1963 was an omen for the future of
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the Diem regime. The subsequent riots and self-immolation of monks would bring a ‘Secret–Immediate’ signal from Australia to ensure that the AATTV would only be used in counter-insurgency training and not for purposes related to martial law or police activities. Shortly after (in June), Warrant Officer Don Dalton had not been long in country when he witnessed immolation at close quarters: I was coming back from the Swamp Camp one day and we had to go through the little town of Ninh Hoa. As we got to the village square, there were a whole lot of people standing round and I decided to stop and have a look at what was going on. My little driver did not want me to do this. I decided to walk across and look into what was going on. Now, in the middle of the square, a Buddhist monk was sitting down he got a can of petrol, he opened it, tipped it across himself and set himself alight. I was speechless! I was absolutely speechless! I didn’t know what to say. I had never seen anything like it before, nor have I since, and it torments me to this day, just watching that happen. It was amazing and it just stuck in my mind and I think of it frequently.7
Meanwhile, Colonel Serong’s 1963 tour of the United States went ahead, but contrary to Anne Blair’s recorded report of his presentations in her book Ted Serong, the US President never chaired the ‘Special Group’ (Counter Insurgency). Also, according to David Halberstam’s account in The Best and the Brightest, the minutes of the meeting at which Serong gave his presentation to the Special Group showed that US Marine General Victor Krulak ‘immediately and violently challenges him’. Krulak was not a man to have as a professional enemy, but this was at a time when there was considerable torment amongst Kennedy’s advisers as to what was really going on in Viet Nam and Serong’s appraisal was generally well received.8 June 1963 continued to be a tense month as the dispute between the government and the Buddhists intensified. There were several incidents that turned into serious conflicts, which deteriorated into religious confrontations between the Catholic minority ruling elite and the more numerous Buddhists.The war, for a time, appeared to be a side issue, but
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sadly for the Australians they were to suffer their first fatality on 1 June. Captain Bob Hagerty remembered when Bill Hacking died: Sergeant Bill Hacking and I were the first to go to the battalion, which was deployed on a search-and-destroy operation in the mountains northwest of Hue. We flew in with the re-supply helicopter together with the live pigs and ducks etc. On the second day, while we were attached to Battalion HQ, the column stopped at midday to allow the lead company to clear a ridgeline ahead. Bill had been moving with the Battalion RSM and he walked up to join me and we dropped our packs and had a chat. I moved up the column to look at some soldiers just ahead. Scarcely a minute had passed when a shot rang out and Bill was killed when his own weapon discharged accidentally. This was a tragic and inexplicable happening, which defied any rational explanation. Later that day, Major Barry Tinkler, the senior Australian adviser at Hiep Khanh flew in to evacuate Bill’s body. I gave him the notes I had made and was told to stay with the battalion for the planned attachment.9
The initial investigation into Sergeant Hacking’s death was insufficient, and inexplicably a court of inquiry into the death was not held until 27 November, almost six months later. Several matters pertaining to the death were not examined forensically, and this poor routine of investigation permitted a cloud to hang over Sergeant Hacking’s death for more than 40 years. The conclusions drawn by the court from the observations of the investigating officer—that the weapon fouled on his person, personal equipment or undergrowth—cannot be supported.The angle of the bullet’s penetration and powder burns on Bill Hacking’s forehead provided evidence to the contrary. However, additional information has also been gleaned from Hacking’s personal correspondence, which was not available to the investigators. These letters revealed an unhappy man who obviously hid his mental anguish from everyone and whose anxieties may be traced to his two tours of duty in South Korea.10 Sadly, this evidence indicates that Sergeant Hacking probably took his own life. Approval was given on 3 June for Sergeant Hacking’s body to be returned to Australia at Commonwealth expense and be interred at Springvale Cemetery, Victoria, with military honours.
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New men continued to arrive in a trickle system of replacement for members completing their tours of duty. Don Dalton, who had been Company Sergeant Major of Alpha Company, 1 RAR, joined AATTV in June 1963. Don described both his first impressions and how he was prepared for his tour of duty with the Team: We did some courses here in Melbourne; a couple of small scale raids on Swan Island; quite a bit on the Vietnamese language. I would have liked to have done a bit more because I later found the use of interpreters was pretty questionable.They were initially translating into French and then into Vietnamese and, by the time they’d done that, it had lost its meaning. We then travelled to JTC and did all the things one does at JTC including the Bear Pit and all that sort of stuff. In Viet Nam I was sent to the Ranger Training Centre at Duc My where I was assigned to the Mountain, Jungle and Swamp School section. I was given a Jeep and a driver.The Jeep was left-hand drive so it took some getting used to. The driver was a Vietnamese Ranger, a little fellow, who could not drive a nail, true he couldn’t, but throughout the period of time I was there he was good company. He always seemed to be at my back, particularly at night-time, which I found to be comforting, because like most on the Training Team, your back was a bit of a worry to you. Little Choi didn’t speak English much at all, but we did get to understand one another.When I left the country, he cried. The Mountain Camp concentrated on weapon training, shooting, vehicle and counter-vehicle ambush, rappelling and subjects of that nature. I might add that these little fellows couldn’t shoot for quids. Somewhere along the line they were taught to shoot in the standing position. This was okay as long as they weren’t trying to shoot with those great big American Garands, which used to knock them over backwards. At the Jungle Camp we would concentrate on ambush, counter-ambush, jungle warfare and movement at night.At the swamp camp it was basically water and various activities related to water. It took some time before the Vietnamese would accept you and accept your advice. They treated you with a certain amount of suspicion. The chief of the Jungle Mountain Swamp School was a Major Hai, who had
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fought with the French at Dien Bien Phu. He ignored me until after I’d been there about a month. One day we were up a hill watching a patrol exercise and there were more things wrong with it than you could poke a stick at. At the end of it I just shook my head from side to side to indicate that I thought it was a real mess.The major came up to me and said, ‘Mr Dalton, what did you think?’ So I proceeded to tell him in no uncertain manner and from that moment on he became a great mate of mine and even invited me to his house for dinner.You had to get to the stage where they would accept you. It was very frustrating because whatever you did today, you had to redo tomorrow because it was just as if you hadn’t taught them anything.They just never seemed to be able to carry an idea onwards. What we must appreciate was the fact that we as advisers never got to teach the individual students themselves. We had a counterpart; in fact I had two, one who ran the Mountain and Swamp Camps and the other who used to run the Jungle Camp.They both spoke pretty good English and we got on pretty well together, but we were strictly in an advisory capacity.We did not take part in any active actions like the guys in the northern parts of the country did. To my mind they did things much harder than we ever did. However, the danger was always there. You could not take your mind off the fact that somewhere along the line anything could happen.11
Operation Switchback, which was the handover of the Civilian Irregular Defence Group responsibility from the CIA-driven Combined Studies Division to the American Special Forces that started prior to AATTV’s arrival in 1962, was formally completed on 1 July 1963. The replacement program for ‘AATTV Team 1’ was now well underway with around six men per month coming and going. Excluding Colonel Serong, seventeen of the original team would return on a second posting to Viet Nam and five of those would do three tours, but only five of the seventeen would serve with the Team again.12 Captain Guy Boileau came in to replace Peter Young in Danang. Boileau had previously served in the Directorate of Military Intelligence where he had concurred with an opinion that Australian instructors (AATTV) would
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be insignificant beside the much larger US and possibly UK contingents, and although they might be useful there would be difficulties.13 He was accredited to the sensitive CSD position in Danang where he was immediately occupied with the military aspects of Montagnard resettlement. Not long after his arrival, Clifford Strathern, the CIA covert action branch controller, requested Boileau fill the base officer’s slot at Ban Me Thuot, which was to be done on detachment out of Danang, but this did not happen. Captain Barry Petersen, who arrived at the end of August, got the job and became the first Australian officer to run a CIA field program and he moved to the Ban Me Thuot area in late September. August 1963 was reported by Colonel Serong to be ‘a most unfortunate month’, with Vietnamese–US relations sinking to an all-time low. The raids on Buddhist pagodas by the government, continuing self-immolations by Buddhist monks and the proclamation of martial law disturbed the American administration. Serong reported in a cable to the CGS on 21 August that a ‘State of Siege’ had been announced at 0530 local time on 21 August 1963.The following limitations applied: advisory personnel were to remain in quarters; troops under training were withdrawn to provide security; air traffic was reduced to essential minimum; gatherings were banned; external communications were suspended; and a curfew applied between 2100 and 0500. On 29 August, Ambassador Lodge signalled his superiors in Washington: We are now launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government . . . there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration, still less that Diem or any member of the family can govern the country in a way to gain the support of the people who count.14
The messages on the Diem–Nhu families, transmitted through the Australian External Affairs network from mid-1963, were uncertain regarding the families’ usefulness, and reflected the pro and anti biases displayed by America. On 26 August 1963 the Department of External Affairs transmitted to Washington and London a view that,‘we [Australia] should seek a leadership in South Viet Nam, which will command
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respect internally and internationally, but Diem, in recent months, had not lived up to these requirements’.15 The general disquiet in the Vietnamese community continued into September and Sir Robert Thompson, BRIAM, told Serong ‘we are forcing them to fight’ and there would be trouble surviving the next few months with the present political power grouping. The diplomatic cables were rife with suggestions that feelers had been put out for some form of rapprochement between the North and the South. Serong did not agree with either of Thompson’s beliefs. He reported that there had been an improvement in the US–VN relations and it appeared possible that the dispute would simmer down to minor dimensions.16 The political and diplomatic trials and tribulations appear to have distracted the Allies from the fact that a war was being fought in the provinces. In mid-August, South Vietnamese casualties were reported to be 256 for the week with 141 weapons lost.The basic infrastructure of the South came under increasing attack with 135 of the 215 houses in Ben Tuong Hamlet (near Ben Cat) set on fire by the Viet Cong. Colonel Serong expressed his concern, again, on the matter of monotony and put forward a proposal for more Australian participation in the CIDG program. His concept was to reduce Hiep Khanh and Dong Da by three men each and Duc My by one to provide a seven-man team for deployment with the US Special Forces.The general area of deployment was to be in the Kontum–Pleiku area of the Central Highlands.The report went missing and Serong complained in November that he would despatch another copy, as he was anxious to secure AHQ approval on his proposal. The plan did not eventuate. The current activities for the camps in which AATTV men were deployed were reported to be: Dong Da—2200 students in training; Hiep Khanh had just completed training of four CG companies and were awaiting the next intake—student strength was 800; Duc My had just trained one ranger battalion; other courses were continuing with a student strength of 1300. Boileau and Petersen, the officers with CSD, were well established in their tasks at Danang and Ban Me Thuot. Captain Petersen would report from Ban Me Thuot in mid-October that there was evidence of ‘trouble making’ by the French amongst the Montagnard, which was a precursor of the challenges soon to follow. French influence had not collapsed entirely with their military defeat.
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French culture, customs, institutions, capital and businesses were still prominent in Viet Nam. Administratively, the pay to the members of AATTV had been eroded to an unsatisfactory point due to a large monetary increase to the US forces serving in South Viet Nam.The Australians on active service were worse off than their colleagues on exchange in Fort Bragg, USA, and Okinawa. In early September 1963 the Times of Viet Nam accused the CIA of financing a coup, which was considered to be preposterous by most senior officials in Viet Nam. Unbeknown to all but a select few, a small group of senior State Department officials released a crucial message to Ambassador Lodge, which told Lodge to advise key Vietnamese military leaders that the US government would not continue to support the Diem regime if improvements were not made to relations with the Buddhists. His brother had to be dismissed as well.17 All of the senior members of the administration, including the President, who read the cable after its despatch, had misgivings, but its directive was not cancelled.Two conflicting versions of President Kennedy’s knowledge of the directive exist.18 Sir Robert Thompson and ‘Ted’ Serong met on 29 October to discuss Thompson’s latest appreciation that contained guidance on how to live with the Diem regime with which Serong agreed, but plotting by the Americans and Vietnamese against the Diem regime had not stopped.19 Thompson had also told Australia’s Chiefs of Staff Committee in March 1962 that if a coup did occur a probable struggle for power amongst the factions would result in disunity of the Vietnamese Army, and that such a development could lead only to victory for the Viet Cong.20 The previously reported ‘organisation of confusion’ continued and, according to Washington analyses, a coup was imminent on 30 October. On 31 October Colonel Serong left for Nha Trang and Ban Me Thuot. The coup generals struck Saigon on 1 November. General Harkins, COMUSMACV, sent off the following signal allegedly 40 minutes prior to the attack:‘MACV has no info from advisory rpt advisory personnel, which could be interpreted as clear evidence of an impending coup.’21 Colonel Serong was stuck in Ban Me Thuot, but managed to get on board a mail flight to Saigon via Nha Trang on 2 November. Nha Trang was quiet and he found Sergeant William Kennedy, who was on his way
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home from Dong Da, had spent the night in a water-filled weapon pit with a BAR as part of the Special Forces HQ defence plan. The AATTV monthly report for November said that the coup was ‘quite a smooth operation’. The government of General Minh was in firm control and a carnival atmosphere was evident in Saigon, but in the northern provinces the Viet Cong had stepped up their attacks against hamlets, particularly in the vicinity of Hiep Khanh. Later in the month, Captains Boileau and Petersen, who were involved with the Montagnard, expressed concern that the ‘border areas were experiencing increased harassment and the Montagnard were bewildered’.22 Barry Petersen had to tread a very difficult pathway in the highlands, as he explained: I met and drank rice wine with the 100 Montagnard paid and supported by the CIA. They also paid and supported another 150 Montagnard ostensibly under the control of the province chief.The latter group were non-existent. In Darlac Province, I found that the Ede (Rhade) and Jarai (the two prominent tribal groups in the province) were MalayoPolynesian and my knowledge of the Malay language enabled me to fairly quickly understand their dialects. It was like stepping into an entirely different world from the soldiering I was used to. It really wasn’t until I had gained control over the 100 Montagnard who really did exist under National Police Surete control that I could turn some of my attention to soldiering again. However, throughout my entire tour I was immersed in political intrigue, intelligence collection, propaganda dissemination and soldiering. With the Montagnard hatred of the Vietnamese and the Vietnamese disdain of the Montagnard, interspersed with communist overt and covert action, plus a Montagnard revolt against the Vietnamese, I really found myself walking a political tightrope.Taking over control of the first 100 Montagnard from the police Chief of Surete was, in itself, a very delicate feat assisted by a forged letter from the US Embassy to the Director of National Police for the Central Highlands Region. He was the previous chief of the Surete who knew of my loyalty to his predecessor—who was arrested during the coup that overthrew the Ngo Dinh Diem government. His successor, Truc, was a mean little man who did not want to relinquish control of the 100 Montagnard armed propaganda and intelligence teams. With the benefit of hindsight, I believe that the later attempt to poison me with a cyanide-laced chicken was his work rather than that of the
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Viet Cong. I was the CIA’s man on the ground in Darlac Province and this gave me, even as a mere captain, considerable influence.At the same time, I was virtually the commander of a Montagnard force recruited from the three tribal groups in the province. I kept the Vietnamese at bay by constantly telling the province chief that he was the commanderin-chief and I was operating the force on his behalf. Initially Ted Serong loaned Danny Neville to me for a couple of months to train a training cadre then he later gave me a full-time warrant officer assistant—first Bevan Stokes, Harry Pope, then Larry McGarry and finally John ‘Jock’ Roy. However, because the Mnong were ethnically different to the Rhade and Jarai and lived in Lac Thien District in the southern part of Darlac Province separated by a mountain range, my Warrant Officer Assistant had to operationally control that group.23
When Warrant Officer Class Two Kevin Conway arrived on 15 November 1963, the rotation of AATTV personnel had been completed, and ‘Team 2’ was on the ground. The unit had received a letter of congratulations from General Harkins, which was addressed to ‘Colonel Sarong’ (sic). COMUSMACV recognised and commended the achievements of the Team during the past year: The achievements of your unit in the mountain and jungle warfare training of Regular and Paramilitary forces have been most impressive. There is no question that your team is making an outstanding contribution to the counter-insurgency effort in this country. Needless to say I am quite proud to serve with individuals of such obvious professional competence, healthy attitude, and enthusiasm for the successful accomplishment of the job at hand.24
Thirteen men had received letters of appreciation and/or commendation from both American and Vietnamese commanders for the outstanding manner in which they performed their duties, and three would receive Imperial awards for exceptional service. The training activities at the three locations had returned to normal by the end of November. Militarily, however, matters had deteriorated in I Corps; the Australians were concerned that Hiep Khan would be
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closed, but HQ MAAG said they would oppose its closure. Captain Boileau reported that the Viet Cong intended to strike against the Special Forces camps on the border, which worried Serong because of the AATTV detachment to Khe Sanh. In Long An Province, just south of Saigon, 169 out of 219 hamlet militias handed in their weapons and said they would not fight anymore as they were not getting support. Colonel Serong wrote in the commanders’ diary for 10 December, ‘briefed Ambassador Lodge on the current [country-wide] operations during which he said that “the war would be over [lost] in 1964 at the present rate”’.25 General Harkins was incensed by Colonel Serong’s memorandum that was delivered to Ambassador Lodge on 10 December, and he wrote: [Your report was] . . . a gross and unsoldierly affront, to me, to my staff, and to my superiors and I must insist, that you, as Senior Officer, Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), attached to my staff, operate in accordance with the spirit and the terms of the reference in the future.26
On his own admission Serong blamed ‘my own stupidity in trusting Lodge’s security’ and told Australian Ambassador Hill,‘I think the General is feeling the strain . . . however, that, too, is part of the climate I should have appreciated’.27 Ironically, in his final report for 1963 Colonel Serong wrote, ‘the year closes with thunder on the left’.28 It was a reference to increased enemy activity.
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3 Doom and gloom 1964 Doom and gloom
On 30 January Major General Nguyen Khanh, Commander I Corps, in concert with several other generals, conducted a quiet, bloodless and effective coup. Khanh had told MAAG on 28 January that a ‘pro-French’ group of generals, who favoured neutralism, would attempt to take over the government within three days. Khanh was deeply disturbed by the move towards neutralism and the group of ‘rabidly pro-French’ generals within the Military Council. Colonel Jasper Wilson, senior MAAG adviser, I Corps HQ, had told General Harkins that a counter-coup by Khanh was in the offing, but the United States was opposed to any coup or counter-coup.1 The Australian commander reported in his monthly summary that: ‘Advisory components had no knowledge of this coup at all’, which was not correct; the Americans knew, he didn’t.Throughout January the men of the AATTV had been busy at the three training camps, but Hiep Khanh’s new intake did not come, as it was now almost certain that the camp would close, which it did in mid-February. Twenty Civil Guard companies had been trained at the centre during AATTV’s period there. But it wasn’t all bullets and battles and occasionally the Australians were able to celebrate just being Australians, as Warrant Officer Don Dalton serving with the Duc My Ranger Training Centre discovered: 42
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In 1964 when Australia Day was coming up we talked to the Yanks about a mixed grill and they had no idea what we were talking about. So we decided that for Australia Day we would have a mixed grill and we sent a young captain, a captain for goodness sake, all the way to Hong Kong. And his job was to get a whole heap of Kangaroo Tail soup and as much Australian beer as he could find. He duly arrived back with the supplies and we briefed the Vietnamese cook as to how to cook a mixed grill and proceeded to put on a turn for the Americans with this and the Australian beer, which was much stronger than the stuff they were used to. I was the security officer of the compound and I often thought afterwards that if ever the Viet Cong were going to attack our compound that was the day as there were half-drunken Yanks all over the damn place after drinking this Australian beer. And, to make matters worse, we introduced them to two-up and took all their money off them as well. It was quite a day.2
Back at the war, the men from Hiep Khanh were redeployed to Special Forces teams at Danang, An Diem, Khe Sanh, A Shau and Kham Duc, and they were reported to be ‘irreverently jubilant’ at the change. Captain Peter Jarratt went to CSD in April and was employed at the newly created Psywar Centre for village cadres in Vung Tau. The changes saw an immediate increase in the contacts with the enemy. Several wounded civilians needed evacuation from a patrol accompanied by Warrant Officer Class Two John ‘Jock’ McCourt near the Ta Rau (Nam Dong) camp in mid-March. The next day Captain Noel De La Hunty’s troops used T-28 strike aircraft and armed helicopters to suppress Viet Cong action against them during their extraction from a patrol area near the border with Laos. Colonel Serong forecast, ‘with the increase in tempo of operations, and specific Viet Cong activity being directed against the advisory component, it should be appreciated that our present run of luck without casualties may not last much longer’.3 The trend continued into April when Captain De La Hunty was wounded slightly while on patrol out of An Diem with a 56-man Civilian Irregular Defence Group unit that came under fire from an enemy platoon over seven separate days. He would be awarded a Military Cross for his personal courage and professional ability under dangerous and exhausting conditions.
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Also in April Captain Rex Clark and Warrant Officer Class Two George Chinn were attached to 32 Ranger Battalion for an operation in the Ba Long area south-west of Quang Tri. The unit killed ten enemy soldiers and captured quantities of food, documents and some ammunition. Warrant Officer Chinn received a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his courage, calmness and devotion to duty during this attachment. The MAAG Awards Board approved two awards for Captain Clark, a Bronze Star and an Air Medal. Both awards were for his meritorious service, but Colonel Serong did not support the awards and they were let ‘die a natural death’ by the MAAG staff system. It wasn’t only the lower ranks that were coming under fire. In April, Lieutenant General Westmoreland, Deputy COMUSMACV, was aboard a Caribou taking off from A Shau when it was hit by ground fire that wounded some of the passengers. Although the men of AATTV were on active service there was no approved medal for South Viet Nam, and this was reported to be the cause of ‘discontent and criticism’. This prompted the commander to request that ‘recognition of their operational service be effected or an appropriate reason provided why this should not be done’.4 At this point, it is likely that a distinct difference of opinion existed between army and the government over what AATTV was doing. Australians were there as trainers, not combat soldiers.This difference of opinion probably influenced the approval process even though, contrary to a political directive,AATTV were being placed further forward in the combat zone. Army knew this, but did not stop it. Major Jose da Costa, who was on his way home, was unhappy at the change in procedures established by the new American senior adviser at Phu Bai. Costa felt that the new broom had swept away time-tested actions in an endeavour to stamp his personality upon the advisory team, which was reflected in the commander’s diary of April 1964. International tension also caused some expressions of annoyance against Colonel Serong that percolated through diplomatic channels in April 1964. Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary Department of External Affairs, requested that Australia’s Ambassador David Anderson report upon alleged US dissatisfaction with Serong’s statements of ‘doom and gloom’. Some of the US discussion was deemed to be a bit light-hearted, but some of it was also antagonistic.Anderson wrote in agreement with Alan Renouf, Minister in Washington, that there should be no question of
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Serong’s recall, but his tour should not be extended. Anderson also stated: ‘I feel strongly that there should be no question of any trace of blame attached to an officer who has the courage to voice unpopular truths.’ Anderson also wrote in the postscript: ‘I’ve had a hint that demands for a bigger Australian effort may be forthcoming soon.’5 The tactical situation in I Corps, the five northern provinces, was less euphoric than the operational situation reports suggested, and security in Quang Ngai Province had deteriorated, as Captain Ian Teague remembered: Ted Serong told me to go to Quang Ngai Province to find out what was going on there and submit a report for CSD [Combined Studies Division] to consider. Following several weeks in Quang Ngai discussing matters with a range of people from fishermen to the Province and District Chiefs and a visit to Barry Petersen at Ban Me Thuot, I submitted my report in mid-June 1964. The Viet Cong controlled the larger part of the province, which was in poor shape from military, local government and general administrative points of view. My report recommended that a CSD Province Plan be implemented. The aims of the plan were to identify, harass and destroy the VC provincial infrastructure, to secure and consolidate South Viet Nam Government control over the province and achieve popular support for the Government. The ten parts of the plan were: to support and guide provincial intelligence activities down to village and hamlet level; to build a professional and effective Sector Operations and Intelligence Centre (SOIC); to train and guide six ten-man ‘Black Teams’ whose mission was to be to identify Viet Cong cadre and disrupt the VC organisation and propaganda; to build on and develop the concept of the district level combat/psywar/civic action teams, which were later named People’s Action Teams to support and guide a radio scriptwriter/announcer for the purpose of propaganda and harassment of the Viet Cong organisation; to recruit, train and guide, 25 Counter-Terror Teams of five men each to ferret out the Viet Cong infrastructure and destroy it; to guide and support district assemblies that represented villages and hamlets; to train, support and guide a province-wide informant system to track the VC infrastructure; to recruit, train and guide 25 fifteen-man Commando Teams to destroy Viet Cong paramilitary units; to recruit, train and guide six Armed Drama Teams, and to retrain and motivate village and hamlet officials.
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This plan, financed and controlled administratively by CSD, was approved with some minor modifications and I was ordered to implement it.WO2 John Clarke, who was at Dong Da, joined me in Quang Ngai in September 1964.The Sector Operations and Intelligence Centre was established and working by September, but it took until January 1965 for the District Operations & Intelligence Centre to be fully effective, due mainly to the November flooding of the province.The People’s Action Teams program commenced with an existing group (taken over from Guy Boileau/US Operations Mission/United States Information Service)6 and the next five teams were recruited, trained and made operational at the rate of one or two per month.They were so successful within their first few months that a decision was made to increase the number of teams for each district from one to three.7
The Black Teams were trained and operational by the end of July, but had limited success, and the teams were disbanded in September 1964. The Counter-Terror Teams completed their training in October and had about five months of limited success supervised by the Province Deputy Chief, but the Counter-Terror Teams ended in March 1965 owing to misuse and lack of supervision and control.The first radio scriptwriter/ announcer failed, and a second person was selected and came under the direct control of the Sector Operations and Intelligence Centre in January 1965. The District Assemblies were initiated in September but were not operating properly until December 1964, owing mainly to the November flood and interference by a political party (VNQDD).8 The Commando Teams program was cancelled because it was found that the People’s Action Teams could carry out this mission. By May 1965 there were twelve People’s Action Teams in the province who had killed 379 Viet Cong, captured another 214 and taken 187 weapons. People’s Action Teams had 32 killed and 118 wounded. Two Armed Drama Teams were trained and operating successfully by February 1965. The training and motivation of village and hamlet officials commenced in March 1965 with only limited results by June 1965. Supervision of this program proved difficult.The province-wide informant system program had not commenced by June 1965.9 Ian Teague describes the living conditions at the time:
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WO2 John Clarke and I lived in a rented civilian house in Quang Ngai city, and after bounties were placed on our heads, and the house shot at, we employed four trained Vietnamese guards who doubled as drivers. Clarke handled all the logistics and resupply and monitored all training. I had a weekly meeting with the Province Control Group and visited CSD HQ in Saigon each month to report, submit requisitions and obtain money. I also monitored all programs and liaised directly with each member of the Province Control Group. My concept for the People’s Action Teams was for a team of about 40 men to be recruited from their local area where they would train and from where they would operate. They knew, and were known by, the people and understood the local issues and environment.They were organised similar to a 1960s Australian infantry platoon but used US weapons.They lived with the people.To help teams gain the confidence and acceptance of the villagers I developed a simple set of principles taken, unashamedly, from Communist practice.They were: to respect the people, help the people, protect the people and obey their leaders. As a result of their success, the Combined Studies Division was convinced that the program should be tried in some other provinces and in early 1965, AATTV members, Jim Devitt, Allan Thompson and David Brockett expanded the program into their provinces. In March 1965 it was decided to develop the program countrywide. My tour was extended to oversee the development of the program and I assisted in setting up a large training school at Cat Lo, but I objected to the mass production of People’s Action Teams units that removed the recruits from their home districts for training and did not return them to their home districts when they completed training. In June 1965 I was reassigned to CSD Headquarters in the US Embassy in Saigon as a Special Advisor and Coordinator for the People’s Action Teams program, which, by December 1965, had 310 teams in 18 provinces.When I left Viet Nam in December 1965 I felt uneasy about the direction that the program was taking.10
Colonel Serong wrote to Colonel Jackson in December 1965 commending Captain Teague’s efforts in Quang Ngai as ‘the most successful single element in the conduct of the Vietnamese war’,11 which was a glowing and well-deserved accolade.The PAT concept, however, was attributed to Major Nguyen Be, an ARVN officer. Civic action-style operations were also discussed and developed at the highest levels of
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diplomatic and military command through 1964–65 and implemented in accordance with RVNAF-MACV Campaign Plans AB 139 and 141. But this was against the enemy’s internal arm only. The more powerful and dangerous North Vietnamese Army licked some wounds and lay in waiting. Jim Devitt would set up a similar unit in Binh Dinh Province after spending a few weeks with Ian Teague in late 1964: I visited fellow Aussie Captain Ian Teague in Quang Ngai Province and I gleaned much from his very professional operation.Then my US cohort Harry Munck joined me at Binh Dinh. Harry was a tough, stocky little bloke, happy-go-lucky and totally laid back. I immediately liked Harry and we hit it off from the start. Harry requested and obtained the services of Maj Kinh, an ARVN airborne officer who he served with previously on clandestine operations in Laos. Kinh was a tough, no-nonsense, and wiry Vietnamese. He was a staunch Catholic and, in my opinion, totally incorruptible. An early bond of mutual respect, professionalism, codependence and absolute trust developed with Harry, Kinh and me. This bond has lasted 40 years. Our most successful People’s Action Teams leader was Chan a former Viet Minh battalion commander and he became a very valuable asset to our group. His People’s Action Teams conducted numerous successful small-scale operations resulting in a respectable number of Viet Cong defectors. The VC was liberal with assassination and torture and it was common to find a dead government official in his house after a nocturnal visit from the Viet Cong.The art of beheading and disembowelling and leaving a note pinned to the body denouncing the government was a speciality of the VC and engendered fear in the villagers.We trained and maintained a tight rein on twenty Counter Terror Teams, which became a major aspect of our operations.The theory of the People’s Action Teams was good and initially in practice it was good. The US viewed the program as one of the few success stories in getting the upper hand on the enemy.The American government threw money, equipment and resources into a major expansion. Unfortunately, along with the expansion, the People’s Action Teams became less successful. The major cause was the dilution of the quality of teams. I left the country shortly after the expansion began, but my good memories are of the men I served with. Kinh was captured by the enemy in 1975 and not heard of again until 1990. He was reunited with his family in the US having spent fourteen years in a re-education camp outside Hanoi.
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He was deaf, had lost all his teeth and had dire health problems. He had ten good years with his wife, children and grandchildren before succumbing to cancer. Harry Munck is retired and living in Hawaii.12
Man cannot live by bread alone and some members found interesting ways to supplement their meagre supplies in far-flung outposts, as Jim Devitt recounted: And, [then there was] ‘Monty’ the red wine-drinking, pasta-eating, ‘Italian Godfather’, who ran the large CIA warehouse in Saigon. Monty produced all our requests for supply on a monthly basis.We became good friends in the early days and the monthly pro-forma would contain, apart from uniforms, weapons, etc., a special request from me. Month one, a large framed map of Australia for our house—received; month two, a one-man submarine—declined, only one in the country; month three, a set of bagpipes—declined, the 1/7 Duke of Edinburgh’s Ghurkha Rifles in Hong Kong said no. If a request was denied a fifth of scotch [750ml] would always be sent ‘in lieu’. It was a good game and as each month passed; the special request became less and less realistic, which ensured my ready supply of scotch.13
A series of changes rolled through 1964. Programs were revamped and renamed. A revised National Pacification Plan was unveiled. This became known as the ‘spreading oil drop’ with the idea that a coordinated military and civil effort would clear and spread from secure to insecure areas and drive the Viet Cong out. Strategic Hamlets became Hamlets of the New Life and the US advisers nodded with approval as the program marked acceptance of previous recommendations made to the Diem regime. MAAG was absorbed by MACV on 15 May and on 20 June General Westmoreland took over command of MACV. Lieutenant Colonel John Monaghan replaced Lieutenant Colonel Russell McNamara as Commanding Officer of AATTV in mid-May 1964. Major John Murphy was moved to the Special Forces HQ in Nha Trang and Major Colin Bannister arrived on 15 May to go to the Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Colin recalled: My year was relatively peaceful. Duc My was a convenient short haul from Saigon for the Team Commander, Colonel Serong to bring visiting VIP like the then Minister for Defence, Senator Paltridge or the ABC
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TV Four Corners crew, to see at least some of the Team at work. The Death Slide, with Ranger students or often the Demonstration Platoon whizzing down a rope with a wet rope halter, to eventually splash into the river was a favourite and quick-to-put-on showpiece. There was a second Ranger Training Centre at Trung Lap northwest of Saigon, not far from the infamous Cu Chi, and sited in a more volatile area than Duc My, which a few of us at Duc My were able to visit. Occasional threats of VC regiments about to march on Trung Lap would result in standing-to for most of the night but during our visits naught eventuated. Team members had open US travel orders to simplify travel within and beyond SVN [South Viet Nam].These were very helpful for Saigon visits to Team HQ for special occasions when the then Team CO, Lt Col John Monaghan, would make his spare room at the Bachelor Officers’ Quarters available for out-of-towners. The need for diversion by Duc My residents could be more simply met by a Jeep trip to Nha Trang where seafood and French cooking were of a high order. For further distraction, the wives of some of us travelled to Saigon to spend some of their husbands’ annual leave sipping coffee on the verandas of the Continental or in the Caravelle. Back at work, the training cycle ground on as the Australian adviser, slowly and patiently, developed a constructive, purposeful relationship with his South Vietnamese and US counterparts. It seemed to help with the soldiers to be seen to be doing a lot of the tasks that the students and staff (occasionally) were asked to do, like whirring down the Death Slide or sweating your way through the Jungle, Mountain, and Swamp Course.When air support was on the program, John Murphy could rustle up SF [Special Forces] resources from nearby Nha Trang when we Australians, to the chagrin of the US para-qualified advisers, were able to manage some free jumps from a variety of aircraft. One jump, I remember with the odd shudder, saw me being carried by a fairly strong wind, despite my increasingly desperate but futile attempts to steer away, towards a pen of water buffalo.We had been well warned that Vietnamese water buffalo held a particular dislike of the round eye smell/colour—or was it a Viet Cong trick? As I drifted down inexorably towards these long-horned beasts, I started to flex my ankles and toes in preparation for a Fred Astaire routine across the backs of these beasts when I managed to tumble to ground just clear of them. Had I not, the incident would have made an interesting accident report.14
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The team grew The Chief of the General Staff in Canberra also advised Colonel Serong by letter (received on 22 May) that the AATTV was to be increased in strength.The Khanh government had accepted American military advice that US advisers should be deployed at battalion level, and to permit advisers in critical provinces to be employed at district level. This agreement was obtained following discussions in Honolulu on the first two days of June 1964. Senator Paltridge, Minister for Defence, announced on 8 June that the number of Australian advisers would be increased to 60 and ‘the training personnel would now also be employed in the field at battalion and lower levels as adviser teams’.15 The Military Secretary also told Colonel Serong that Colonel O.D. Jackson would replace him in early 1965. Subsequently, Serong was posted as the Director of Infantry, but he did not take up that position. Warrant Officer Kevin Conway was the first Australian killed in action, on 6 July 1964, during a full-scale attack upon the Nam Dong Special Forces camp, which was located in an isolated valley 50 kilometres to the west north-west of Danang. The camp’s defenders included: twelve US Special Force soldiers, one Australian, 372 Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG), 40 Nungs and 16 Vietnamese Special Force soldiers. Initially the Nungs were employed as bodyguards for Special Forces soldiers and USSF installations, but later they were used in a broader range of operations. In the camp, there was also a handful of support personnel and an American anthropologist, who was studying the Katu Montagnard for the Rand Corporation. A camp prostitute had caused a major fight amongst the CIDG the day before, which fortuitously made the Nungs ‘stand-to’ in readiness rather than sleep in their barracks that night. The battle began at approximately 0245 hours on 6 July when an enemy battalion used mortars and machine-gun fire to target the inner perimeter of the camp.Their heavy fire, which now included a 57-mm recoilless rifle, knocked out the communications building after the first message that the camp was under attack had been transmitted.A flareship arrived just after 0400 hours, but armed gunships did not get to the battle site until after daybreak.The defenders held out, but they lost 62 killed
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and 65 wounded.There were 55 confirmed enemy soldiers killed and a ‘large number’ carried out of the battlefield area. Their wounded was also estimated to be a ‘large number’.16 Captain Roger Donlon, the detachment commander, was badly wounded and awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroism in the defence of the camp. Anecdotal evidence suggests there was strong disagreement within the AATTV headquarters about Warrant Officer Conway’s time of death and what part he took in the battle. A witness, who was not available to the initial investigating officer, told an Australian court of inquiry that Conway was killed almost immediately as the battle began when he ran to a mortar pit, and he did not take any further part in the battle. The court also collected information on the enemy’s actions that included the use of loudspeakers on three occasions in an effort to entice the defenders to surrender. The assault troops, who had penetrated the perimeter without detection, only carried grenades and explosives and the enemy withdrawal was well coordinated with the observer in the flareship seeing red-and-green flashing lights being used to guide the attackers away from the camp. Captain Donlon commented, as he was being evacuated,‘do away with communication trenches as the VC crawl right into mortar positions’.17 Colonel Serong and the Australian Ambassador inspected the camp on 7 July and Serong noted in his monthly report that some of the enemy dead were in Regular uniform. He reported,‘that the attackers appeared to be from a recently infiltrated PAVN (North Vietnamese) regiment of the 304th(?) Division’. On 8 July Colonel Serong spoke with General Westmoreland about a joint action for posthumous awards for Warrant Officer Conway and Master Sergeant Alamo, US Special Forces. A funeral service was held on the same day, which was attended by COMUSMACV, the Deputy US Ambassador, the Australian Ambassador and Colonel Serong, where General Phan Van Dong awarded Conway the Knight of the National Order and Cross of Gallantry with Palm. At this stage the Australian system was still having difficulty with foreign awards, but the Ambassador made it clear that the posthumous awards were made without consultation, and in any case, he would have recommended acceptance. Almost at the same time Army Headquarters in Canberra advised that Vietnamese and US awards were to be referred
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and adapted to appropriate Australian awards. This exasperated Serong. ‘For Heavens sake’, he wrote, ‘let us sort things out as an operational area first and then let them through’. This was an extraordinary exclamation; not only was AATTV on active service, but two awards for gallantry in action had been recommended by AATTV in April and May.18 Also, up to this date, Colonel Serong had given his verbal authorisation (to the disquiet of a US staff officer that nothing was given in writing) for all decorations approved by the MAAG Awards Board. Perhaps a more dynamic piece of staff work may have prevented the never-ending emotions that foreign awards have stirred to this day. In a parallel move, in the same week, MACV requested Congressional approval for US personnel to accept and retain Vietnamese decorations.19 Army Headquarters in Canberra then advised AATTV that Warrant Officer Conway was to be buried locally. Serong said, ‘this is bad’, and asked for reconsideration, but he had a letter from Conway’s family that said a local burial was acceptable. Nevertheless, he persisted with his request for the body to be taken out of Viet Nam.The Australian Army element in Singapore, AATTV’s administrative superior, supported the request, but AHQ again directed otherwise.20 But Conway was not buried locally. Lieutenant Colonel Monaghan, Captains McDonagh and Greggs as well as Warrant Officers Ramsdale, Cassidy and Holland, attended a ceremony on 22 July conducted at Mausoleum 50 in Mac Dinh Chi (Saigon) cemetery, for the laying up of Conway’s body, as Vietnamese law prohibited exhumation for three years if a body was buried below ground.There were a few Vietnamese present. The funeral was to be done quickly and quietly, by order, as it was reported in Australia that he was already buried.21 This note contradicted the commander’s diary entry for 18 July that said, ‘AHQ directed temporary burial in Saigon with subsequent transfer to Singapore’. Conway’s body was later moved to Singapore, buried, exhumed and moved finally to the island’s Kranji Military Cemetery.22
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Status of command The first revision of the Directive issued to the Commander AATTV in July 1962, was received in August 1964. It was dated 27 July 1964 and one of its amendments placed the Commander AATTV under command COMUSMACV. This was a dramatic change from control. In essence, Colonel Serong had been warned that he had upset some influential people. All of the approvals for the expanded deployment of AATTV were given by Army Headquarters in August, and the Team was now also authorised to be a parachute unit.The new arrivals could now go to ARVN battalions as well as Special Forces and training camps. Life had its ups and downs in more ways than one.Warrant Officer Malcolm ‘Mick’ Coffey was one of the Team, and he recounted some of his experiences: I volunteered in Melbourne and we had a couple of lectures on what to expect in Viet Nam such as fortified hamlets, and not to cross my legs when sitting and talking to Vietnamese.Then we went to JTC, and we were supposed to do a four-week course. JTC had part of what they considered to be a Vietnamese village with tunnels connecting one hut and other things and we crawled through these, but I didn’t think very much of it at all. At that stage we all thought we were going to be instructors for Regional Force and Popular Force soldiers.23 Two weeks into the course we were sent to Viet Nam immediately. I don’t think many people back in Australia, and that includes JTC, knew very much about what was going on at all. We were in Saigon for a couple of days and then we went to Danang where we were introduced to Colonel Kopke, a US bird colonel, and I must say I liked the man. He didn’t mess about or pull any punches and told us that we were going straight into the field as advisers.We were to try to advise the battalion commanders and help them out, as he said most of them didn’t know much, which I thought was quite funny as the Viet Minh had defeated the French and I thought they would have a few clues as to what was going on. I was sent to the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment. I cannot remember what hill we were on. I arrived there by chopper, was dropped off and met an American captain, the senior adviser. Master Sergeant Sam Amstein teamed up with me and from then right through my time in Viet Nam we sort of stuck together. He had seen action in
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Korea. So things weren’t too bad with Sam. On the hill we had a two 105-mm howitzers and a couple of 60-mm mortars. A necklace of fire pits surrounded the command post and the bunkers where the company commanders were.The commanding officer was Captain Phuc, but more about him later. We sat up on this hill for a couple of weeks and every now and then the howitzers would fire away into the foothills.About a week later Sam and I were to go on a four-day company patrol.We went off and worked our way up to the side of the hill, which the howitzers used to pound. I thought we would find something there, but all we found were holes in the ground. Lo and behold about 4.00 p.m. a halt was called and I thought we would deploy into a harbour for the night, but this didn’t happen. The next thing, hammocks are being strung up between the trees while we are still on the same track, and they had killed a chook and started to prepare dinner.We had a depth of four feet from one side to the other! I had a talk to the company commander, who spoke pretty good English and understood what I was saying, and I asked him about security, but nothing happened. On the third day there was firing from up ahead, and being the new chum, I thought we had a contact. By the time we headed up to the front of the column, all the firing had stopped.We got up there and were told they’d had a fight with the Viet Cong. I asked if there were any bodies, and was told that no one had been hurt, there were no casualties whatsoever, the VC had run away. The company commander came to the fore and we had a search for any blood trails at my insistence.Then the penny dropped and I figured out that this had been put on for Warrant Officer Coffey to show how good they were. It didn’t work; I didn’t have a bit of it. Back on the hill, I tried to range their little 60-mm mortars in on a few places that I thought we could be hit from. Four or five of the rounds misfired, and I put them away to one side, but my little Vietnamese mortar man put them back in their cases. I was told that it was very difficult to get ammunition and that was why they kept them, but they were only of use if you hit someone on the head with them. One day our hill was hit by a typhoon. The next morning I was trying to get around and see what was going on, but it was very difficult. Sam and I found the positions full of silt and the CO sheltered under some corrugated iron next to a BAR pit with nothing but the barrel of the BAR sticking out of it. I pulled the BAR out of the pit and
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threw it down in front of the CO and told him what I thought of him and his battalion. To my surprise he came out of that corrugated iron, and you talk about Johnny Wayne and quick drawing, he had a .45 pistol out of his holster pointed straight at me.When you look down the barrel of one of those things only inches from your eyes you begin to wonder what you have done. He told me in no uncertain terms that he was the CO and I was only the adviser and that he would take my advice only if he wished to. So I settled down and my two American mates settled him down and I backed off. Nothing else I could do, really.The upshot was that Sam and I were moved on to a place called Ly Tin where we went with the RF and PF forces.24
To illustrate the lengths some of the men had to go to obtain defence stores and other military paraphernalia, Mick Coffey relates his adventure when he was determined to improve the basic security and defences of his allegedly fortified camp: Our compound had just a single fence around it. I was a bit of a nagger and I kept telling them if the enemy ever hit this compound there is nothing we can do to stop them. That was very good, they said, but where do we get the wire or the pickets? Jack Morrison was posted to Hue and he came down to see me at Ly Tin and he told me that if I could get to Hue he could get me all the wire and pickets I needed. We had an old Dodge Weapon Carrier that we used to use for the PX run to Danang and Sam and I decided to go to Hue. We found Jack and loaded the truck up with wire and pickets and after a few beers with Jack we headed off to be back before dark. We chuffed along and were about half way between Hue and Danang when the engine stopped. I’m under the bonnet with my head in the engine. Next minute there’s these shots coming over the top of us and zinging off the road around us. Sam said to hurry up because the Cong were coming down the ridge, but they had a heavy machine-gun further up the hill that was doing the firing at us. Sam had a BAR and he gave them a couple of bursts, which slowed the fellows running down the ridgeline with their AK-47.We were in a very bad position if the engine didn’t go. I looked down and saw the coil only had one wire attached. I found the other wire and twisted it into position and ran around and hit the starter and the old girl burst into life. Sam, at this stage of the game, was letting them have it up the hill and I just put my foot on the
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accelerator and away we went. The remainder of trip back to Ly Tin was quite uneventful and we put up a bloody good barbed-wire fence.25
Politically, Viet Nam was still a mess in August 1964. Khanh deposed Minh who then became a member of a triumvirate that included Khanh and Khiem. Matters were no better in the field. South Vietnamese forces suffered heavy casualties in August and the USS Maddox was reported attacked for the second time, which later proved to be a wrong call by some very confused sonar operators. Serong requested the RAAF Caribou, soon to arrive, to be put under his command, ‘in the event of further position deterioration’.26 The request was refused. Evacuation of unnecessary personnel was discussed as major disturbances continued in Saigon and the major coastal cities.The onus was placed upon the Australian Ambassador to request a combined command in the event of an emergency. Nineteen replacements for AATTV arrived in August, which put 61 men on the ground. Warrant Officer Ron Monkhouse had flown in to Kham Duc, a Special Forces camp in western Quang Tin Province. He had come from the delightful surrounds of Balcombe on the Mornington Peninsula to what surely looked like a mini-Dien Bien Phu. Ron recalls: The best part was flying QANTAS to Singapore then first-class Pan Am to Saigon. Our reception in Saigon was well organised with MACV briefings and familiarisation then off to our respective postings. I arrived at Kham Duc to be greeted by a 12-man US Special Forces ‘A Team’ and about 300 Montagnards. My job was to supervise the military training of the Civilian Irregular Defence Group, a task made much more difficult by the presence of Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) who were more interested in their own importance than the poor civilian soldiers who had to endure their bullying. Most times the LLDB would use the CIDG to better their conditions. On one occasion, the night before we were departing on a 10-day interdiction patrol, they said they were not going until we supplied the whole camp with new boots. After issuing new boots to the LLDB everything was back on track and the poor CIDG missed out.The team
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house, which was the centre of our existence, was an eye opener to me: civilian cooks, bottle washers and housemaids.We were most vulnerable at night to mortar attack and always mounted our own sentry duty. One incident, which sticks in my mind, involved the large heavily insulated icebox. During the hot nights on duty it was a welcome relief to go to the box for a cold Coke. One particular night someone let the lid drop from a considerable height, which sounded like a mortar landing.Within seconds the whole team was up, fully armed and ready to defend the team house from attack! From then on there was a heavy fine for anyone who dropped the lid. My next job was back in Danang with the C Team as Assistant S3 (Air) and I then went across to the Nung Reaction Force to set up the administrative side of what was to become a large force. Working with US Special Forces was most rewarding.They were highly skilled in their field and dedicated as a team. I thought the Vietnamese allies were a different matter. As the only Australian in Kham Duc I longed to talk to another Aussie.Whenever ‘Ossie’ Osborn came in with my pay, I would start talking and keep at him until he got back on board his chopper to go to the next camp. Good job he was a good listener.27
On one task, two companies of Viet Cong surrounded Ron Monkhouse and nine Nungs. Ron’s team got out by helicopter and were covered by air strikes, which resulted in 30 enemy dead.
Political disruption continued through September 1964 when Nguyen Cao Ky emerged as a military power broker. Ambassador Anderson thought the Catholics and the Dai Viet Party were fomenting the internal unrest. Serong disagreed. He had also written a report on the political situation without consulting Anderson, which annoyed the Ambassador and he requested the Department’s view’s on the matter. Captain George Irvine, based at A Ro camp, was given 50 000 piastres to pay for results by patrols. AATTV reported ‘nothing else would get them out’. The money allegedly came from the CIA Head of Station and was returned to him when other methods succeeded.
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In the middle of the month Warrant Officer Ray Simpson was wounded in action on a patrol out of Ta Ko, one of the most isolated camps in Viet Nam located near Laos in western Quang Nam Province. He was evacuated by helicopter to Danang and then by RAAF Caribou to Nha Trang. Ray Simpson would be awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his leadership and personal example of selflessness during and after the battle. MACV offered to have him convalesce in Japan, where his Japanese wife was living. Army Headquarters in Canberra initially rejected the offer, but later relented and approved the move. A few days after the Ta Ko battle, Captain Petersen sent Warrant Officer Stokes to Saigon with a warning that a Montagnard revolt would erupt soon. A difficult and very dangerous period of armed standoff and negotiation between the Vietnamese and the Montagnard followed, during which Barry Petersen’s courage and steadying persuasiveness on the Buon Enao (village) group would help defuse a serious threat to the security of the highlands. He would be awarded a Military Cross for his influence and courage during the revolt. At the end of September, there were 78 members of AATTV in the country. In October, the Australian Adjutant-General, Major General Harrison, visited and told a gathering of the Team that a new British General Service Medal was to be issued soon and that they would be eligible. Only 68 GSM with clasp ‘South Vietnam’ would be awarded; 66 to AATTV members, and two staff at the Embassy were entitled to it as well. General Harrison also discussed with the Commander that prior to Warrant Officer Conway’s death, the Department of Defence simply couldn’t understand that AATTV personnel were in any danger. The Team had been on active service since July 1962; this simple fact appeared to be lost in the conversation.28 Lieutenant Colonel John Monaghan, Deputy Commander AATTV, was moved to Dong Da in October 1964.The move attracted a rumour that as the president of the court of inquiry he had not drawn the ‘correct’ conclusion on Warrant Officer Conway’s action in the Nam Dong battle.This argument would continue well into the 1970s, but there was no evidence to support an award of the highest order to Warrant Officer Conway.
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Increased enemy activity was reported against Ta Ko and A Ro camps in October. Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces were also under dire threat with the town of Quang Ngai almost besieged. Commander AATTV advised the United States Operations Mission and Ian Teague to vacate the countryside, close in on the city and to secure the airfield. At this stage Army Headquarters in Canberra floated an idea to post corporals as temporary sergeants to AATTV. Serong opposed this plan. MACV also attempted to give powers of detention to US military police over the Team. They were told by Serong to forget it! November began with the destruction of five B-57 bombers and damage to thirteen at Bien Hoa by a Viet Cong mortar attack, which put half of the available B-57 force out of action. The explosions also killed four Americans and wounded 72. But in I Corps, nature was much more destructive, as floods caused thousands of deaths. Danang was isolated; landslides blocked Route 1 to the north, the main bridge in town was destroyed, and floodwater, blown bridges and Viet Cong activity restricted movement to the south. The Vietnamese appeared to be doing nothing.The Americans and the Australians did what they could. Warrant Officer Mick Coffey described the dramas that occurred as a result of this monsoonal storm: In November 1964 a typhoon hit Ly Tin and there was water everywhere; the village was almost under water. We had a 12-foot boat in the compound with an outboard motor on it. Most of the people from the compound had gone towards the foothills to high ground and left Sam and me, and a guy we called ‘Bilko’, and the lieutenant colonel who ran the place. First, we had to get our own ammunition out. We had these long French colonial barracks and at the end of one of these was our ammunition so we dived down and got all the ammunition out and put it up on the roof.We took our boat down to the village and were able to help the villagers who were inside the thatch on their roofs. They took the thatch off from the inside and we put them in the boat and took them up to this bit of high ground. The nearer the centre of town you got the better the houses were and some had corrugated iron roofs.We could hear them inside, so Sam
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would hold the boat and Bilko and I would dive in under the eaves and go through the door (thank heavens most of them were open) and come up inside the building and here would be the Vietnamese sitting in the rafters like a mob of chooks in a chook house roosting for the night. They couldn’t swim and they didn’t want to swim, but we could get them to come with us up to the boat outside. We couldn’t take many on each trip and on one return trip a big fishing boat had turned up, but it couldn’t get past the bridge, thankfully. There were some Cong on board who started firing on us, but had to stop when we turned by the convent. As soon as we’d appear again to bring back another load of people they’d into us.That night, the water was still very high, right up over the compound gates and all this ammunition was sitting up on the roof in plain view of everyone. So Sam, the American colonel and I had to sit in the boat all night to protect the ammunition. Physically it was very, very tough as well as mentally demanding when the Cong fired on us.29
Warrant Officers John Clarke, Mick Coffey, John McEwan-Ferguson and John Malone were each awarded a Queen’s Commendation (QC) for bravery during the floods of November 1964. The bad weather continued into December and the scarcity of food in the main centres was a problem for all, including the Viet Cong.
Major Ian McKeown was moved to HQ I Corps to be the senior Australian on the staff there and to keep a watchful eye over AATTV deployment in the region. During the night 8–9 December a large enemy force attacked Hill 159 to the west of Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province. Although wounded, Warrant Officer Jack Morrison, Distinguished Conduct Medal (Korea), an adviser with 3/3 ARVN Battalion, fought with, rallied and coordinated the ARVN force. Eventually they were forced off the hill. Jack Morrison and Lieutenant Skinner, US Army, reconnoitred the position the next day, during which time Lieutenant Skinner was killed, and Morrison was wounded again. A relief force retook Hill 159 with severe losses to the Viet Cong. Jack was awarded his second Distinguished Conduct Medal for outstanding leadership, bravery and devotion to duty.
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On 24 December 1964 a bomb exploded at the Brink Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ) in Saigon, which also housed AATTV personnel.Their quarters were damaged and flying glass wounded Captain Alex Cochrane. Two Americans were killed and more than 100 Americans and Vietnamese wounded. A major battle started in Binh Gia, Phuoc Tuy Province on the 28 December and Colonel Serong advised ‘an agitated’ British Embassy, ‘there wasn’t going to be any [enemy] Phase III [conventional warfare]’ in his monthly report.The battle continued into early January with severe losses for the South Vietnamese. The reported attacks on the USS Maddox and the C Turner Joy in August 1964 by the North Vietnamese brought about the US Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave President Johnson the authority to wage war on North Viet Nam. Later, reported attacks on the destroyers Morton and Edwards in September were not confirmed and the planned ‘tit-fortat’ strikes were not released. No reprisal was taken over the attack on Bien Hoa of 1 November even though it was strongly recommended by the Ambassador and military chiefs.The bombing of the Brink BOQ on Christmas Eve also pushed the military attack plans to the fore again, but they were not approved. General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was convinced that the presence of US dependents in Viet Nam was ‘the hurdle which trips decisions’. President Johnson wrote to Prime Minister Menzies on 12 December 1964 and made the following request: Down the road in the future, if the situation in Saigon should require and justify it, there may be a need for organized allied combat units, but that is not the immediate problem. There are the following urgent requirements in the military field: 200 additional combat advisors, Mine sweepers for harbor defense, river and coastal patrol, LSTs, Salvage and repair ships and Hospital ships.30
At the end of 1964 there were 23 292 American service personnel in South Viet Nam, 242 had been killed there since 1962—149 of those in 1964. Australia’s contribution was now 167, and AATTV advisers numbered 84 of that total of which two had died since 1962. South Viet Nam’s forces had suffered 17 579 deaths in the same period. The New Year began quietly in Saigon. General Westmoreland called Colonel Serong to thank him for 1964. Further north, two warrant officers
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celebrated in the quintessential manner of Australian ‘Diggers’. As Mick Coffey recalls, the story goes: Another Australian,Warrant Officer Wally Thompson a really good mate of mine, and I had to go to a big New Year’s Eve dinner at the US Officers’ Mess. Prior to the dinner we got on the booze together and then woke up that we were going to be late. Wally said he had to go to the Medical Centre first. I was driving the Jeep;Wally was sitting out the front where the mascot would sit with a bottle of Jim Beam in his hand.When we arrived at the Medical Centre I hit the accelerator instead of the brake and we went straight through the gate between the two MPs and pulled up right at the Medical Centre tent.The Medics were running around,Wally was laughing and the MPs grabbed me and wanted my regimental number. I kept telling them my regimental number was 1965 and they thought I was having a go at them because that was the New Year. They rang up the Provost Marshall and the next thing we had an escort to the dinner at the Officers’ Club. Everyone thought it was a huge joke and it turned out the Provost Marshall had said not to do us any damage, but to get us to the dinner.31
Colonel O.D. (David) Jackson, OBE, arrived in Saigon on 22 January 1965 to take command of AATTV on 1 February. Colonel Serong, OBE, departed for Singapore on 31 January 1965.The war for the Team would change markedly from this point on.
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Colonel Oliver David Jackson was an experienced battalion commander and staff officer. He had commanded 1 RAR in Korea in 1956, and he was coming to AATTV from 2 RAR, which was then based in Enoggera, Queensland. Jackson had also served as the Australian Army Representative in Washington, and as the Director of Infantry. The enemy was militarily more aggressive in 1965 prompting many to think that the North had directed a more intensive phase of warfare to be commenced. The South Vietnamese, on the other hand, were dispirited, not only by their political instability but their grave and continual losses in battle. In January, COMUSMACV had no definite proof that any ‘organized units of the North Vietnamese Army had entered South Viet Nam’, but they were certain that ‘many thousands of North Vietnamese had been infiltrated to join Viet Cong units’.1 Paradoxically the more military effort that was provided to the South Vietnamese the less capable they appeared to be in fighting the war. Colonel Jackson recalled the situation on his arrival: At this time the Viet Cong, without doubt, held the military initiative. Except for most of the 1st ARVN Division in the north and some units in the southern Delta regions, the South Vietnamese Army was on the 64
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defensive.Very few operations of any size seemed possible. Units were mostly confined to the immediate vicinity of provincial capitals and to wire enclosed army posts on hilltops. The Viet Cong was having great successes in large-scale ambush operations and seemed to know all they needed of ARVN plans and operations. American families (there were more than 1500 dependents in Viet Nam) were evacuated from the country, political coups and attempted coups were the all-too-frequent order of the day and the clouds of doom were gathering. Communist operations had passed to Stage 3 of Revolutionary Warfare.The enemy was gathering their strength for the final stroke of full-scale conventional operations to destroy the South Vietnamese forces. From the viewpoint of Team operations, it seemed to me that some types of activities were of greater significance than others. It seemed important to continue the advisory effort with the units of the 1st ARVN Division. This Division was strategically located as the most northerly division and closest to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and near to the towns of Quang Tri, Hue and Danang. General Thi, the dynamic commander, was keen to retain the Australian effort. Greater participation was needed in the US Special Forces ethnic units, which were located along the border close to the North Vietnamese infiltration routes as well as ready reaction reserves in Danang.Their meaningful role in the war was evident and there was a growing bond of mutual respect between them and the members of AATTV. The Duc My Ranger Training Centre was producing excellent results and it was the nearest approach to a JTC Canungra-type operation in Viet Nam. Perhaps the greatest need was to increase our support for the paramilitary activities being conducted under the Combined Studies Division. The CSD tasks were to identify, locate and destroy the Viet Cong insurgent cadres and infrastructure in contested hamlets and villages and to restore them to government control. In fact, in many Viet Cong controlled or in grey areas, this was the only real resistance being offered to the enemy. My other concern was to provide a more effective degree of Australian control and support for members of the Team. I thought Australians should visit, at regular intervals, Australians deployed for long periods in dangerous places. The Deputy Commander was moved to Danang permanently, a Team RSM [Regimental Sergeant Major] was appointed and a senior officer for each geographic region was named. Steps were taken to formalize and expand Australia House in Danang to be the
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residential home for those off duty in the northern areas. I think all of these things were a considerable help.2
Enemy action around the country supported the assessment that Phase 3 warfare had started. Jackson reported on 15 February that the Viet Cong were in the process of consolidating up to regimental organisations and were not far removed from divisions should they wish to use them. The US compound and the airfield in Pleiku had been attacked on 7 February, which resulted in eight US servicemen killed, 108 wounded, five aircraft destroyed and 15 damaged.This attack caused the approval of immediate reprisal air strikes inside North Viet Nam, and according to the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they had a ‘profound effect on US policy, which led . . . to a significant widening and strengthening of the US commitment’, which would subsequently flow through to Australia’s commitment.3 American intelligence agencies had now identified five regiments, 47 battalions and 135 companies of Main Force Viet Cong operating in South Viet Nam. Captured documents, interrogation reports and other information also showed that the broad guidance on policy, strategy and doctrine flowed from Hanoi.4 The possibility of a military defeat of the South was evident: its forces had suffered 3313 killed or wounded in the first month of 1965. Worse still, 7000 men had deserted, which was at the same monthly rate as 1964, but it would soon leap to 11 000, and the number of weapons lost in January and February was 2000 per month.5 The United States had over 23 000 armed service personnel in Viet Nam, 15 000 being army of which approximately one third were advisers or on staff, the remainder provided combat support. Australia now had 85 advisers with most now in field advisory positions such as battalions, Regional Force/Popular Force (previously CG/SDC), sector and subsector and Special Forces. Colonel Jackson wrote in a report, ‘the title “Training Team” is now rather inaccurate and misleading’.6 The US policy on keeping their ground combat troops out of South Viet Nam changed dramatically when the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed in Danang on 8 March 1965. The deployment of the Marines caused some unease in the US administration, as there were thoughts that this was the top of a slippery slope that would cause the United States to slide inexorably into a ground war in Asia and not be
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any more successful than the French. Militarily, the provision of a more capable force to protect the very important Danang airbase was a prudent move.Ambassador Taylor, a critic of the idea to deploy US ground forces in a direct combat role, agreed with the need for protection, but he continued to express caution that the ARVN might be prepared to stand back and let America do the fighting.The subsequent strong disagreements between the Marines, especially Generals Krulak and Walt, and General Westmoreland over the conduct of the Vietnam war stemmed from the Marine Corps experiences in the so-called Banana Wars. Their knowhow on how to fight an insurgent war was learnt in the Nicaraguan Campaign (1925–33) and it was written into the Marine Small Wars Manual dated 1940, which had an influence upon the Marine generals’ method of operations.That manual also provides a salutary lesson that not all past wisdom on counter-insurgency warfare had resided within the armies of Britain and Australia. Australia was also at something of a crossroads in its decision-making on the contribution of forces to the South-East Asia region. Cabinet had discussed in January (among other things), Australia’s obligations to Malaysia apropos the Indonesian build-up and associated diplomatic pressure from the United Kingdom; a potential commitment on the New Guinea border; and the country’s limited military resources that appeared to be unappreciated by the US and the UK governments.Viet Nam was the Cabinet’s greatest concern and it was considered imperative ‘the United States should hold out in South Viet Nam’.7 Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, KBE, CB, DSO, AFC was sent to Honolulu for military staff talks on the situation in Viet Nam, which were held on 30 March and 1 April 1965. It was during these talks that the suggestion that Australia might deploy an infantry battalion with the US Marines in Danang was made by Admiral Sharp, Commander-In-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC).8 Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Preece, MVO, arrived in March to assume the roles of Deputy Commander and Commanding Officer of AATTV, and he was initially located in Danang. He provided these comments from a 40-year-old notebook: In the north of the country, the ARVN had the 1st and 2nd Divisions with a Corps HQ at Danang. The divisions were located generally in
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Quang Tri and Quang Nam Provinces (Sectors) respectively. AATTV members, in teams of two each with a US ‘buddy’ were assigned throughout the divisions. Training assistance with Regional Forces (at Province level) and Popular Forces (at District level) was also provided by Team members in these two provinces and in the provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Ngai and Quang Tin. A typical adviser organisation in 1st Division in Quang Tri in June 65 looked like this: 1 ARVN DIV (QUANG TRI) Province (Sector) Adviser Maj Gildart Evans (US) RF/PF Capt Lucas (US) WO1 S. Kent*
S3
S4
S5
Don Ha RF/PF National Trg Centre Capt Robinson (US) WO2 Bray*
ARTY
Military Region 1 (CTZ 1)
1st REGT
Major Romsey (US) 1st Bn Capt Hougen (US) WO2 Wheatley*
2nd Bn Lt Myers (US) WO2 Swanton*
3rd Bn Capt Norris (US) WO2 Stockley*
4th Bn Lt Okrina (US) WO2 Batiste*
*Australian. A similar organisation applied to 2 Division.
Advisers were also located at or with: RF/PF forces, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Dong Da National Training Centre, HQ I Corps Danang, CSD teams located at: Danang, Quang Ngai, Ban Me Thuot, Vung Tau, Hoi An, Qui Nhon,Tuy Hoa.AATTV were also with Special Forces operating on reconnaissance and interdiction type activities out of Danang, Khe Sanh, A Shau, Kham Duc, Gia Vuc, and Ha Thanh. In 1965 Team members were spread over some 55 locations: HQ Saigon 4 1 Div 13 2 Div 12 Duc My Ranger Training Centre 4
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Dong Da National Training Centre HQ I Corps and Admin Component Danang RF & PF at Sector and Sub-Sector CSD Special Forces (including 11 Ranger Bn)
5 4 20 11 19 92
Each AATTV member was posted for a 12-month tour of duty. This could be voluntarily extended by six months. Team postings were regarded in general as either hazardous or less hazardous. When appropriate, members were relocated from one to the other at six-monthly intervals. Some politically sensitive postings, such as that of Captain Barry Petersen with the Montagnards, were handled exclusively by COMAAFV [Commander Australian Army Force Vietnam, Saigon]. My responsibilities and time were spent roughly one-third in Saigon and two-thirds in I Corps based on Danang. I was initially quartered in a ‘spook’ house occupied from time to time by Captain Ian Teague and later at a requisitioned house in Le Loi Street, closer to the bulk of Australian advisers, with Major John Harding. The advisers were in a compound of Australians and Americans; there was also a small house occupied by the French widow of a Vietnamese academic and her four little girls—friends of the local mayor who owned the property. Later, after some pressure by me, the Americans left and all Australians in the area were concentrated at Australia House. If it could be called such, my headquarters comprised a senior warrant officer acting as RSM in the field, an administration warrant officer responsible for pay, postal, clothing etc. and my much-used notebook. My responsibilities to Team members called for regular visits to all locations. This was done by air, using a mixture of Caribou (RAAF), Otter, Beechcraft and helicopters. The last three were provided on a generous basis by the quasi-military Air America organisation, which supported intelligence and other clandestine operations in country. When 1 RAR arrived later in the year I remember the Captain of HMAS Sydney was very sensitive to the possibility of mine attacks on his ship by divers. He had his own divers in the water checking regularly but hoped for a quick unloading and departure. On the second day he contacted the Australian Ambassador, David Anderson, seeking his help to hurry things along—a matter well outside the Ambassador’s capability. On the third day, the Captain had a luncheon on board. I was amongst the guests who included the Australian Ambassador, the Commander
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USMACV General William C. Westmoreland, Colonel Jackson and a number of other dignitaries. It was a splendid lunch until, in the middle of lunch, in the middle of summer, in a cabin under the old steel flight deck, the air-conditioning failed! A number of guarded but increasingly urgent calls to ‘fix it’ met with no response. I have never seen such a group of well-dressed VIPs perspire so profusely while feigning not to notice, as on that day!9
Whether the enemy had moved from guerrilla warfare to Phase 3 operations mattered little to the men of the AATTV. Operations in I Corps had become more hectic and it was not unusual to encounter company-sized and larger Viet Cong formations. In February, the town of Viet An (west of Tam Ky), was besieged by two main enemy battalions.Two battalions of the 5th ARVN Regiment with advisers Warrant Officers Jim Husband and Bert Hague, and 11th Ranger Battalion with Warrant Officer Anthony Thorp, engaged a large enemy force in a heavy battle on 3 March in an attempt to relieve Viet An. Although they caused heavy casualties and looked like inflicting a solid defeat on the enemy, the 2nd ARVN Division inexplicably called off the operation on 6 March. Ninety-three Viet Cong were killed during Operation Quyet Thang 492 in May. The South Vietnamese forces included Australian advisers Warrant Officer Eric Miller, 1/4 ARVN Battalion, and Warrant Officer Bert Hague who was with 2/5 ARVN Battalion. Also in May, an estimated three battalions of Viet Cong attacked the Ba Gia outpost, north-west of Quang Ngai City. The battle continued from 29 to 31 May when 1/4 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Eric Miller joined up with the remnants of the 39th Ranger Battalion that had been overrun the night before.ARVN casualties were 107 killed, 123 wounded and 367 missing. On 29 May, HQ AATTV reported an ARVN battalion with an Australian adviser was ambushed at Nam Dong: First Battalion,Third regiment (WO2 Osborne [sic]) heli-lifted to Nam Dong . . . to relieve Ke Trey [Khe Tre], which had been overrun the previous night. Battalion ambushed by Viet Cong using 81-mm mortar
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fire which landed amongst Battalion headquarters. Battalion CP panicked and ran despite efforts of the Battalion Commander who was killed soon afterwards. US Captain [Chalmers] advisor wounded during withdrawal and was carried by WO2 Osborne and US sergeant [Allen] latter group evacuated by helicopter with Viet Cong only 100 metres distant. Fortyeight ARVN killed twenty-six wounded and thirty-two missing. [The] enemy’s casualties [are] not known.10
Warrant Officer Osborn received a Military Medal for his gallant efforts in this battle.
A large Viet Cong force was seen in an ambush position near Hoi An in mid-July, and it was attacked by an ARVN force that included two Australian advisers,Warrant Officers Vic Harris and Bert Franks.The enemy lost 352 men, mainly due to air strikes, but the ARVN had 73 killed and 39 wounded. The Team advisers in the northern provinces continued to report heavy contact with the enemy on an almost daily basis over the remainder of the year. In October, three Viet Cong battalions attacked 2/1 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer ‘Butch’ Swanton, in the Ba Long Valley south-west of Quang Tri and killed 12 ARVN and wounded 34, but more than 150 Viet Cong were killed. A large quantity of enemy arms and ammunition was captured. Also in October, the Viet Cong attacked 4/1 ARVN Battalion in the Quang Tri area.An excerpt from the commander’s diary read: At 0500 hrs on the night 20/21, an unknown number of VC entered the position occupied by 4/1 Bn, accompanied by WO2 Batiste.Three 155-mm guns were severely damaged and 4/1 Bn suffered 10 KIA [Killed in Action] and 10 MIA [Missing in Action]. Both the Bn Comd and Senior US Advisor were captured. The US Advisor escaped.11
Battalions of the 1st ARVN Regiment accompanied by Warrant Officers Graham Neitz and Herb Beezley had several fierce clashes with large enemy forces in the Quang Tri area during November, and confirmed more than 150 enemy dead. The ARVN casualties were
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slightly more than 30. Another major battle, reported by AATTV in November, was fought by 2/3 ARVN Battalion near Phu Trach, a village southeast of Quang Tri: Following an air strike on the night of 19 November, 2/3 Bn, accompanied by WO2 (Don) Hawksworth, made a first light assault on a VC held village in the area of Phu Trach.The village was occupied by a Bn minus and two previous assaults on it had been repulsed. In this attack the village was taken by 2/3. Results: En 88 KIA (confirmed) 5 captured, ARVN 9 KIA, 7 WIA. US advisors 2 WIA. Large qty of arms and ammunition captured.12
A serious loss for the ARVN occurred in early December 1965 when the 11th Ranger Battalion was destroyed as an effective fighting force in a battle along the Thang Binh–Hiep Duc road in Quang Tin Province, but their Australian adviser, Warrant Officer Bruce Sutherland, was not on the operation.Warrant Officer Ken Stoker, serving with 1/5 ARVN Battalion, was on the Ranger’s left flank when two Viet Cong battalions attacked his unit and forced them to withdraw.Warrant Officer Bill Dickey, 1/6 ARVN Battalion, came in to reinforce the area, but they too were heavily attacked, but held their ground. US Marines air-assaulted to the west of the ARVN and joined the battle. Eventually, three Marine battalions plus were used in a counterattack, which caused the enemy to retreat into the Phuoc Ha valley west of Tam Ky. At the end of the battles, 45 Marines and 90 ARVN were killed, 218 and 141 wounded respectively, and 91 ARVN went missing.Viet Cong killed numbered 417 and numerous weapons and supplies were captured. Tactical bombing support by B-52 bombers flying out of Guam was approved to support the Marines going into Phuoc Ha in pursuit, but the strategic use of B-52s into North Viet Nam was not authorised until April 1966.
Mobile Strike Force (Mike Force) patrols accompanied by men such as Warrant Officers Jack Bishop, Alec Morris, Jim McFadzean, ‘Derby’ Munro, Clem Kealy, Don Hawksworth and Bill Baxter, to name a few
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of the few, operated either from remote Special Forces’ camps or Danang into extremely difficult and dangerous country in the western regions of I Corps.The Mike Forces were intended as multipurpose reactionary units with a three-fold mission: reinforcement of camps under construction or attack; performing raids and patrols; and conducting small-scale conventional combat operations.They were a re-invention of the French Composite Airborne Commando Groups (GCMA). The rapport established by these men with their soldiers and the US Special Forces would manifest itself in another manner when in the first week of August 1965, the C Team, 5th Special Forces Group at Danang, received instructions to establish an outpost at Tra Bong in the central north of Quang Ngai Province. This outpost was to be special in another way besides the title. The Special Forces in I Corps were stretched to the limit, and when tasked to open a camp at Tra Bong, they requested Lieutenant Colonel Alex Preece, Commanding Officer of the AATTV, to allow Australians to command and predominantly staff the A Team. Preece agreed. Captain Geoff Skardon was nominated the commander of the team designated Detachment A-107, and he wrote the following account of its establishment: The other Australian members were Warrant Officer Class One Les Dowsett, Warrant Officers Class Two, Jim McFadzean, John Gordon, Andrew Arnold, Jack Malone and Kevin McPherson. The second in command was (US) Lieutenant David Bussey. Staff Sergeant Edgar Foshee and Specialist James D.Wilde, both highly trained medics, made up the remainder of the American component. The remainder of the outpost consisted of a Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB) A Team, two companies of Vietnamese CIDG [Civil Irregular Defence Group] and a company of Montagnards CIDG.The CIDG companies designated for Tra Bong at best had a few weeks training with many soldiers having as few as ten days service. None had been in a helicopter and none had operational experience. Tra Bong was joined by a 30-kilometre dirt road east to Quang Ngai, but it was impassable due to hundreds of trenches dug across it by the Viet Cong.The Viet Cong used the Tra Bong valley to move troops and supplies from their jungle bases deep in the mountains in the west to the populated coastal plains in the east. A small 1100-foot dirt airstrip,
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suitable for dry weather use, serviced the village. Caribou could land there, but only with experienced pilots because houses had been built up to the airstrip and the margin for error when landing was nil. In peaceful times, Tra Bong, nestled in the valley beside the river, would have been considered a beautiful spot. Tasked to establish a defensible outpost there, the geography and ambience of the place took on very different characteristics. Good defensible terrain was virtually non-existent in the valley. A long low lying hill capable of holding three companies, located 500 metres from the airstrip, was the best ground available. When properly prepared for defence it would provide reasonable protection to the force while at the same time allowing for the execution of our primary tasks.These tasks were: to provide protection to the civilian population, interdict Viet Cong lines of communication, and stabilise the civilian infrastructure.The greatest single drawback of the position was the nearest mountain, 1000 to 1500 metres to the north, which dominated the position. If it were to be occupied by the enemy with heavy weapons it would make a protracted defence against a determined ground assault a serious problem. On the brighter side, Tra Bong was not so deep into the mountains that low cloud was likely to hamper close air support. It was this factor that made the occupation of a defensive position without artillery support viable. A major concern about establishing the post at Tra Bong was that the intention to do so would leak to the enemy in time for them to arrange a warm reception. In an environment where informants were well placed in both the military organisation and the civilian infrastructure, secrets were difficult to keep.This caused a number of problems. While the planning group could get on with their task, liaison with the District Chief at Tra Bong and ground reconnaissance was by necessity limited to one visit. In the interests of the overriding need for secrecy, some aspects of sound planning and preparation had to be overlooked. The early briefing of the CIDG was out of the question.The trade-off was that the force might expect at least two or three days before the enemy could react decisively against the deployment. By then it was planned that the position would be too hard to overwhelm without the enemy suffering huge casualties. A highly trained Nung company, led by Warrant Officer Class One W.H. ‘Bill’ Abigail and Warrant Officer Class Two A.J. ‘Alf ’ Seal, accompanied the deployment of our force.This company was tasked to occupy the high ground dominating the position and to patrol and ambush
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likely approaches while the initial defensive position was being developed. The protection provided by the Nung Company was excellent. The patrolling and ambushing tasks were intensive and few missions ended without contact with the enemy. In hindsight, it now seems probable that the enemy were aware that Tra Bong was to be occupied but did not know when, where or the size of the force. Later information, provided by a Viet Cong prisoner captured by a patrol from Tra Bong, confirmed that two battalions of Viet Cong were in the vicinity with the intention of engaging the new force.The Viet Cong, renowned for their detailed planning at unit level, were denied the essential intelligence for detailed planning to take place until it was too late. At the time, ignorance of the Viet Cong force and their intentions was bliss. With the Nung Company providing protection, the immediate tasks of developing the defensive position began. When it came to digging weapon pits, the work ethic of the relatively untrained CIDG was almost non-existent. It was only the example set by the Australians and Americans, reinforced by the very direct Vietnamese A Team’s disciplinary methods, that work got under way in a meaningful sense. Nevertheless, by evening, machine guns were properly sited, mortars were ready for action, some barbed wire was strung, claymore mines were positioned, fighting pits were half dug and close standing patrols were in place. If Australian soldiers had been occupying the position, it would have been judged ready to receive the enemy; however, the position was manned by inadequately trained CIDG. The first night was a long one. At about midnight on the second night of our occupation, a Regional Force Company at Dong Phu outpost, seven kilometres down the valley, east of Tra Bong, came under serious attack.The District Chief requested our assistance to provide an immediate relief force, but this was refused. There were two approaches to Dong Phu. One was through the jungle skirting the mountainside, the other along the valley.The former would take at least until mid-morning to reach the vicinity of Dong Phu which would be too late, while the second approach down the valley was fast, but too tailor-made for the Viet Cong bait-and-ambush tactic.The Viet Cong used this tactic time and time again with incredible success. The Tra Bong valley with its river and rising ground on either side provided numerous ambush positions and ideal killing grounds.The decision was to helicopter lift a company down to Dong Phu shortly after dawn, but an air reconnaissance at dawn determined that the post was abandoned. To find out from the prisoner that the attack on Dong Phu was carried
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out by one platoon as a feint, and was only intended to draw the new force from Tra Bong into a two battalion ambush, was sobering.13
The term ‘winning hearts and minds’ is often bandied around when discussing allied strategy in the Second Indochina War but a practical example serves to illustrate what it meant, as Skardon describes: Besides providing a measure of protection to the civilian population, a primary task was to support the civilian infrastructure, which was controlled by the District Chief. The District had to rely solely on Vietnamese resources, and because of the existing circumstances, these were extremely limited. Food was in short supply, and medical services were non-existent. These were two areas where we could make an immediate impact. Lieutenant Bussey did valuable work in assisting the District Chief in establishing a proper logistical framework. When requests went through Vietnamese channels, notification was also sent via the parallel link to the US advisor at province level.The advisor would keep track of the request and see that it was handled in a timely manner. The civilians at Tra Bong had no doctor, nurses or supplies.The seriously ill would either pull through by the natural course of events or die.The badly injured would be lucky if an irregular supply aircraft evacuated them. This situation was terrible but, in the hinterland beyond road transport, not unusual. It did not take long for our American medics, Foshee and Wilde to establish an aid post at the main entrance to the camp. Within days, about 200 civilian patients were being treated. The impact that these two men had was immense and the goodwill they created within the civilian community towards our presence was a major achievement.14
But Skardon’s number one priority was to bring the bulk of his untried force up to a standard capable of repelling attackers and he knew that day would not be too far away. Captain Skardon summed it up: Because of the poor standard of the CIDG troops, we had to train them in every military aspect. The conflicting demands of preparing the position, protective patrolling and training ate up every hour of the day. The heat and humidity during the day was intense and enervating, which made these tasks difficult to accomplish. While we had the services of the highly trained, experienced and well-led Nung Company, training of the CIDG was a top priority.Within a few days the training became an on-the-job task with short patrols and ambushes. Contacts with the
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enemy were a daily event and early success using our methods provided a great morale and confidence booster to the CIDG.15
It wasn’t long before Geoff Skardon became aware that his camp was going to be under enemy pressure unless he did something about it. He related the events of their first major operation with the Civil Irregular Defence Group and the resulting (organised) chaos: It became apparent from our patrols and intelligence sources that many of the Viet Cong were coming from the small village 2000 metres to the east. If we were to have influence in the valley, this situation could not be allowed to continue. Fifteen to twenty Viet Cong were living in relative comfort in the village, and according to the District Chief, had absolute control. Operations against them in the past had failed.The Viet Cong, either through good luck or more probably good intelligence, invariably were aware of operations against them and faded away to return again later. Surprise, speed and overwhelming force seemed to be the answer. We organised to airlift two companies into blocking positions, north, east and south of the village. A third company was to simultaneously strike east on foot from Tra Bong and close the cordon. The plan was simple enough, but to be executed with relatively untrained troops who had never been in a helicopter before, problems arose. Furthermore, the need for secrecy meant that the CIDG could not be briefed until they arrived at the airstrip.Through interpreters, the CIDG were given a basic outline of the operation. Even more basic was the implied knowledge of all concerned that where the advisors led they were to follow. By this stage of training, the CIDG had shown a willingness to follow if the advisers were at the front. The advisors divided the companies into helicopter loads and waited. A dozen CH-34 (Choctaw) Marine helicopters appeared over the mountains and dropped quickly onto the airstrip.What happened next was unbelievable. Hundreds of civilians rushed to the side of the airstrip to see what was happening. The CIDG troops were beside themselves, laughing and waving to the crowd as the excitement of a helicopter ride clearly outweighed any thoughts that they were about to land in a hostile environment. McFadzean, leading the first company into the landing zone covering the north and east of the village, came under immediate fire.The second company accompanied by my command group consisting of Malone,
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MacPherson, Foshee and an interpreter, landed south of McFadzean hard up against the village but still about twenty metres into the paddy field. The command group was immediately engaged on landing by a small group of dug-in Viet Cong. A quick assault by the command group eliminated the problem. The cordon to the north, east and south was quickly coordinated with the company moving on foot from Tra Bong. The search teams were ready to start when a strange sequence of events occurred. The passage of information through interpreters, especially on the battlefield, was generally difficult. Advisers often did not know whether their instructions had been passed correctly until an action occurred, and if it was not as intended, it was difficult to change. In this case a series of shots rang out from McFadzean’s company. Our interpreter on the Vietnamese radio net reported that Viet Cong had been sighted within the cordon. Before we could get an accurate assessment on the advisor net, firing started from different parts of the cordon. Whatever the original target may have been it was now apparent from the tracer that the majority of fire was directed at opposing sides of the cordon. Although the range was 300 metres and the CIDG were not known for their marksmanship, the volume of fire from three companies was enormous. The advisers had to move down the lines and literally tear the weapons out of the hands of the CIDG to stop the fire. When the firing stopped, nine Viet Cong stood up in the middle of the cordon and surrendered. The volume of fire, although not directed at them, obviously had the desired effect! At the completion of the search, the village chief dobbed in two more Viet Cong and promptly announced that the 150 civilians in the village were going to abandon their homes and move to the protection of Tra Bong. Despite our warnings that shelter and food were not available, the village chief remained adamant. He explained that the people had had enough of the Viet Cong taking their young men, food and money. It was a sad sight to see these people abandon well-built comfortable houses and virtually all their possessions to move to the protection of Tra Bong.16
Trying to manage the feeding of a battalion-sized group of soldiers posed some hefty logistical problems. Geoff Skardon recalled their efforts to keep the soldiers fed inside the Tra Bong camp:
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Because there were no refrigeration or ration packs, as we know them, the CIDG required fresh rations.This meant that cattle, pigs, chooks and ducks had to be flown in live, kept until needed and then slaughtered. Chooks and ducks were no problem, but a load of cattle made the aircraft too heavy to land on the airstrip. Parachutes were the answer.The best drop we achieved was six beasts in the air at once and although their parachuting technique left much to be desired, all landed safely. For the CIDG, rounding the rather cranky beasts up from the drop zone was a gala event and provided much light relief in the midst of our more serious business. With so many conflicting operational, administrative logistical and training requirements all demanding scarce adviser effort, progress was slow but steady. The defensive position gradually took on a businesslike appearance with wire and other obstacles properly laid, communication trenches dug and major bunkers well underway. Solid training was having a noticeable effect on the performance of the CIDG. As they improved it was possible to extend our operational area and significantly reduce Viet Cong influence in the valley. Although great success was achieved against the local Viet Cong, intelligence derived primarily from radio intercept indicated that several main force companies were operating within a day’s march of Tra Bong. It was always unlikely that they would allow such early success against the local Viet Cong to occur without retaliation, but that is another more compelling story.17
And that story would tell of disagreement, great courage and disaster. Captain Felix Fazekas assumed command of A-107 in October. On 13 and 14 November 1965, Captain Fazekas and Warrant Officers Kevin ‘Dasher’ Wheatley and Ron Swanton accompanied a Civilian Irregular Defence Group patrol under the command of Lieutenant Quang, Vietnamese Special Forces (LLDB), that was to patrol east of the camp and south of the river for two days. Not long after the patrol began Lieutenant Quang changed his plan to move from the western edge of the Hon Doat feature to the eastern side, as he considered the west valley too dangerous for the company. After some discussion, Fazekas agreed with the change in plan.
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At 1130 hours they stopped for lunch and Quang then divided the company into three groups to start a search-and-destroy operation. It was now 1330 hours. One platoon was sent north-west without advisers. Another went north into the centre of the valley with Sergeant Sershen, a US adviser, and Wheatley with Swanton moved with a platoon that went to the north-east to follow the Tra Voi stream. Soon after, probably around 1400 hours, the Wheatley group came in contact with the Viet Cong. At first, the reports indicated that the platoon could handle the contact, but it wasn’t long before the Vietnamese platoon commander reported to Quang that he had three casualties and his radio was out of action. This information was relayed on the advisers’ radio. Wheatley reported that the platoon commander had stopped, but said that they could still handle it. However, soon after that the firing increased and Wheatley told Fazekas they would need help. Quang was reluctant to move, but Fazekas and Sershen began to make their way to the contact area without him and the troops. The CIDG then followed slowly. It was at this stage that Sershen was told that ‘Butch’ Swanton had been hit and he would need to be evacuated.‘Dasher’ Wheatley also requested an air strike. That was the last time he was in radio contact. Sergeant Sershen and Captain Fazekas got to the contact area with 15 CIDG soldiers, and even though the requested mortar and machine-gun support did not get to them, they engaged the Viet Cong, who withdrew. A helicopter arrived to evacuate the wounded, but the two Australian warrant officers were not found. Quang had ordered the platoons to withdraw at the same time an air strike struck the area of the main contact. Fazekas now judged that the CIDG soldiers would not fight anymore and requested, at 1620 hours, a Nung reaction force to be brought in. They arrived at 1800 hours and were moved into ambush positions in the contact area by 2030 hours. It was now very dark and no further action could be taken to find the Australians. Butch Swanton and Dasher Wheatley were found dead at 0630 hours the next day on 14 November; they had been shot repeatedly. Warrant Officer Wheatley had refused to leave his wounded mate and had carried him to thick undergrowth after the CIDG soldiers deserted them in the hope they would not be found by the Viet Cong. Dasher had displayed the greatest valour of all for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross. Captain Fazekas was awarded the Military Cross.
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In January 1966 the LLDB commander claimed a ‘loss of face’ against the A Detachment, which was replaced by a predominantly American team, although AATTV kept several men in the camp up to 1967, particularly Warrant Officers Keith Winbank, Ralph Witten and Mick Youl who left in May 1967. On 28 January 1966, the District Chief, the LLDB camp commander, Captain Fewell (the US detachment commander) and the 144th CIDG Company set off to investigate an attack on the Dong Phu outpost. At 1100 hours the patrol radioed they were going to attack, but immediately after that call all contact was lost. Thirty-nine bodies were found the next day, and eight bodies, including Captain Fewell’s, were never found.18 They had been sucked into an ambush at Nhan Hoa about a kilometre short of Dong Phu.
Up in the highlands, Captain Barry Petersen was about to depart after having spent over two years in one stretch with his beloved ‘Tiger Men’. He recapped on his time with these tough mountain warriors: At the time I left Viet Nam our Truong Son Force had grown to 1200 men.We operated two operation bases and built an airstrip next to the one on Lac Thien District. Our Vinh Son operation base with its airstrip became the district’s lifeline to the province. Our Truong Son Force operated in small teams of eight men trained to constantly move in their area of responsibility—the villages where they were originally recruited and could therefore readily gain intelligence.Their task was to ambush/intercept enemy movements in their area of responsibility and to conduct hit-and-run tactics against larger enemy groups.We generally attacked during early-afternoon siesta and it always worked. One time, a team stumbled on Viet Cong and NVA preparing a linear ambush of over 100 pits ready to ambush a convoy. Our team had no idea that they were taking on more than 100 enemy, but as they ‘rolled it up’ they realised that they had no choice but to press on. The enemy who survived fled. The operations in which I or my warrant officer assistant took part lasted only long enough to make a concealed approach march with a
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strike force, attack, round up prisoners, weapons and equipment and return to base.The duration of such an operation was only two or three days. One village tried to get me to shoot a rogue tiger, which was knocking off the village goats and the odd cow. As a boy I had read of how some hunters built a platform in a tree overlooking a proposed killing ground and tethered a few poor bloody goats one after the other in the killing ground to allow the tiger to build up its confidence. It was the wet season so eliminating my scent and that of a couple of Montagnard offsiders was not a problem.The problem arose when we found out that the Viet Cong had learned of our preparations and had plans to use our tree platform as their killing ground. Needless to say, I never got around to shooting a tiger.19
By the end of 1965 the approved level of American troops to be deployed in Viet Nam included 34 manoeuvre battalions and 24 combat support battalions. No sooner had this level been set than further adjustments were requested as senior commanders agreed more battalions would be needed to take the fight to the enemy and destroy him.When the President approved the introduction of US combat elements in April, he also directed urgent explorations with other governments to determine the possibility of their deployment of combat elements. Australia made the first formal commitment of a combat formation by a third nation.A Military Working Arrangement was signed on 5 May that provided for the overall command of the Australian forces to be Commander Australian Army Force Viet Nam under the operational control of COMUSMACV. Australia would pay US$40 per month per man and $20 per vehicle for logistic support; the AATTV Memorandum of Understanding was also adjusted to these rates. The First Battalion,The Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) arrived in the first weeks of June and was attached to the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) at Bien Hoa, and by the end of the year the Australian strength was 1557, of which 88 were in the Team. COMUSMACV’s objective was to have an ANZAC brigade deployed during 1966, and it would seem that he had lobbied for Australian forces for some time, but these
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matters were now well and truly in the hands of the State Department. Lieutenant Colonel Preece sadly relinquished his post as Commanding Officer AATTV on 30 November to replace an injured Lieutenant Colonel Brumfield as Commanding Officer of 1 RAR. Lieutenant Colonel Russell McNamara returned to South Viet Nam as Commanding Officer AATTV (temporarily); he had been with the Team in 1963–64.20
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5 Walking the tightrope 1966 Walking the tightrope
The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces suffered 35 446 killed in action in 1965, with 13 466 of those reported in the last quarter of the year. These heavy losses reportedly caused a rethink of strategy by the hierarchy in Hanoi; they directed their forces to avoid combat except under favourable circumstances, with a plan to test the patience of America and other Free World Forces in what was to become a war of attrition. The total force available to South Viet Nam was now believed to be three times the number of enemy forces reported in the Republic. Estimates fluctuated, but in early 1966 the MACV enemy order of battle showed eight confirmed and two possible North Vietnamese Army regiments and 13 confirmed Viet Cong regiments in South Viet Nam. These units were well armed with the new family of 7.62mm weapons.1 Owing to their heavy losses in late 1965, the enemy now engaged in more hit-and-run attacks.Warrant Officer Ron Lees was killed in one such ambush on Highway 1 north of Hoi An on 13 January, bringing an ominous start to the year for AATTV. Three members of the adviser team attached to 3/51 Independent Regiment were on their way back to Mieu Bong, just south of Danang, when they were ambushed at 1900 hours. Their Jeep crashed off the road and the captain, who had 84
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at first been knocked unconscious, attempted to rouse the other two, but when that failed he made his way, under fire, to a US Marine outpost. A platoon of Marines fought off the Viet Cong and recovered the bodies of Ron Lees and the US sergeant. February was worse.Warrant Officer James MacDonald, serving with 1/3 ARVN Battalion, was killed in action on 7 February while on a multi-battalion operation 17 kilometres south of Quang Tri City, and Captain Graham Belleville was killed on 12 February. Belleville was returning from Hue in a convoy of vehicles, when it was ambushed at approximately 1415 hours in the Hai Van pass about 10 kilometres north of Danang. An American army captain and a number of Vietnamese civilians and soldiers also died in the attack. Warrant Officer John Sheehan, 11 Ranger Battalion, was wounded in action on 12 February and he was evacuated to Australia. He had been in country only eight days.Warrant Officer John Andrews, 3/3 ARVN Battalion, was killed on 21 February on an operation 20 kilometres northwest of Hue near the hamlet of Thanh Tan on road 598. A US army corporal stayed with him while the unit withdrew around them, and they were left in no-man’s land for about 45 minutes when the corporal went to get help. A volunteer ARVN patrol reached Warrant Officer Andrews’ body at 0300 hours the next day although several other attempts had been made to get to him during the night.When the bodies of the three men killed in February were recovered, they had been stripped of their personal possessions such as rings, watches and wallets, a macabre practice not restricted to the Viet Cong alone. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew John Milner assumed as Commanding Officer AATTV on 14 February and in March 1966, Duc My, with three instructors, was the only original base of the 1962 deployment that retained AATTV men. The Team now had 20 with Special Forces, 19 in ARVN battalions and special units, ten men with the CIA–CSD operations; nine in headquarters-cum-administrative duties, and in the most unappreciated posts were the 18 on sector and sub-sector duties.2 Major ‘Vin’ Musgrave’s memory of Nam Hoa is a strong tribute to all who served in sometimes remote, difficult and dangerous locations with minimal support. Musgrave’s account details the political and cultural sensitivities that the Team members had to grapple with on a daily basis:
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After wasting more than six months of my tour at Dong Da, I escaped and spent from August 1965 to January 1966 leading a small advisory team at Nam Hoa and Huong Thuy, two adjacent sub-sectors in Thua Thien Sector, the second northernmost province in South Viet Nam. I inherited US Captain Bart Furey, as well as Warrant Officer Class Two Bill Dickey, and another infantryman, US Sgt Lloyd Simpson joined us soon after.Warrant Officer Trevor Barrett RAE eventually relieved Bill Dickey.Trevor had been told that he was being sent to a sub-sector for a rest and used to luridly recall this misinformation from time to time. Our sub-sectors were, in approximate distances, 1000 kilometres north of Saigon, 600 kilometres south of Hanoi and 100 kilometres south of the DMZ. Although neighbours, the two sub-sectors were different in character. A coastline with extensive inlets and lagoons on one side and Highway 1 and the railway on the other bordered Huong Thuy. It was heavily populated with extensive paddy fields, which produced a lot of rice by local standards. Nam Hoa Sector continued, in theory, inland from the Huong Thuy boundary for about another 60 kilometres to the Laotian border. Its small population lived or had been resettled in an area centred on the sub-sector headquarters and was poor in comparison with its neighbours. We controlled less than one per cent of this vast area.We also shared part of our boundary with the USMC [United States Marine Corps] Tactical Area of Responsibility. The Marines were a godsend, which took the form of the 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, supported by an artillery battalion, M-48 tanks, M-50A1 Ontos3 and CH-34 [Choctaw] helicopters. I don’t think that we would have survived without them. The fire support of the 155-mm artillery was crucial for Nam Hoa.The Marines’ operations officer was a Major Ruthazer and to this day I do not know his first name. He called me Musgrave and I called him Ruthazer, but the traditional Australian dislike of bare surnames was stifled by the instant rapport that developed between us. The people were mostly farmers with a sprinkling of public servants, craftsmen and tradespeople. Many of them were pro-government, a few were pro-communist whilst the majority just wanted to be left alone. As they were Central Vietnamese they had no great regard for either Saigon or Hanoi and this sentiment was returned in full by any southerners or northerners who happened to be in the area. The relationship between the Sector Chief, a local, and Captain Dat, the sub-sector Chief of Nam Hoa, who was a northerner, was an
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example. They hated each other, with Dat convinced that his boss wanted him dead.This was a worry for my little team because we spent a lot of time alongside Dat and, besides that, we liked him. Another indication of regional attitudes was the comment by a northerner, a major at HQ 1 ARVN Division. He said to me, ‘Major, you must understand that there are three Viet Nams; in the North we have the philosophers and politicians, in the South we have the businessmen and in the Centre we have the shit.’ I certainly did not agree with his opinion of the locals, but it was a good example of how the task of defeating the enemy was complicated by this and other issues. Captain Dat was the son of a nationalist Viet Minh officer who had fought against the French and been executed in the purge of noncommunists after the communist takeover of North Viet Nam. Dat’s mother fled to the South with her two sons who, in time, became officers in the ARVN. The last I heard of Dat was that he, his wife, his mother and his two young sons were murdered during the temporary communist occupation of Hue in 1968. The sub-sector Chief at Huong Thuy was Captain Tang, a local man and well favoured by the Sector Chief. Tang and Dat were like chalk and cheese.The former was westernised, urbane and as relaxed as anyone could be in his situation. However, he was also still very much the autocratic mandarin type with apparent strong attachment to the values and traditions of the old imperial system. He was very sure of himself and at first I thought him to be just a touch too smooth, but as time went by I found him to be sensitive, brave, efficient and trustworthy. Dat had these latter qualities, but was also inscrutable, defensive and somewhat superstitious, although he loosened up a lot as one got to know him. Both men were Buddhists. Our role in the sub-sectors was to fight the civil war component of the conflict. This was an unpublicised struggle that went on every day and every night throughout the length and breadth of South Viet Nam. The protagonists were the paramilitary RF/PF [Regional Force/Popular Force] and their Viet Cong equivalents.We usually had two RF companies at Nam Hoa and one or two at Huong Thuy.These companies had an establishment strength of about 120, but actual numbers depended on how long they had been in place; at Nam Hoa one company was down to 23 and the other had about 50 or so, whereas a newly arrived company at Huong Thuy had more than 100.The RF was full time and relatively local with their families close by and not located inside the
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perimeters of the headquarters, as was the fashion in some sub-sectors. The RF was required to defend headquarters and outposts and pre-empt or react to enemy activity. The PF were part time in theory but were frequently employed for several consecutive days with the RF, although their primary task was to defend their own hamlet or village. The PF were organised into platoons that averaged strengths of 15 to 20. Weapons were basic and light, consisting mainly of World War II vintage rifles, carbines and machine guns plus a .30-calibre machine gun and 60-mm light mortar for each sub-sector. Ammunition was plentiful but we had to steal defence stores such as sand bags and barbed wire from Danang.We also acquired an extra .30-calibre and some claymores from Nam Hoa. In addition, Nam Hoa boasted a 105-mm artillery piece. We could handle the local Viet Cong force, but the enemy also had Main Force battalions and sometimes two or more managed to concentrate and when they got together we were not in the same league. Fortunately, they were frequently on the back foot because of ARVN and USMC operations in our area and we always had the Marines’ artillery in range.The enemy usually had the initiative because we were tied to the defence of the sub-sector HQ for a lot of the time. The siting of a sub-sector HQ was governed by civilian administrative and political prestige considerations, not by sound tactical principles. Huong Thuy was as flat as a tack right alongside Highway 1 and surrounded by villages and hamlets. Nam Hoa was just sufficiently removed from civilian habitation but was surrounded by hills and a river. Our nickname for Nam Hoa sub-sector HQ was ‘Little Dien Bien Phu’. The enemy’s activities were varied; they harassed the people, used terror as desired; they harassed and attacked headquarters and outposts by both fire and assault and they damaged or destroyed bridges, roads and the railway. They usually operated at night and most attacks were started between 1 and 2 a.m.Their use of terror was selective, with most of the victims being village chiefs or elders, teachers and other government representatives.They used a range of brutalities, but in our area, specialised in burying people alive. Our operations were limited by the paramount need to defend headquarters, outposts and populated areas. Within our own resources the best we could do was lay ambushes and conduct small-scale searchand-destroy operations. We had some success and usually managed to get a few Viet Cong without losing too many of our own. One of our
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ambushes at Nam Hoa got a tax collector and his escort one night and captured several weapons and a lot of money causing great jubilation at all levels. However, disciplinary measures were applied a few days later when Dat noticed two of our worthy RF gadding about on new motor scooters. A less successful outing was conducted a few nights before Christmas when, for reasons undisclosed to me, we changed locations twice in about three hours. Just after arriving in the third position, I was quietly counting to ten when Dat signalled me to follow him and took off to our front. We had crawled forward for about 50 metres when I saw a dim light shining from the window of a building. We crept up to the window and I peeped inside. Dat nudged me and whispered, ‘Look, Christmas tree’. He was right! It was a Christmas tree. Apparently our meandering had brought us to a mission conducted by German Lutherans. As we withdrew I didn’t say anything; I just started counting to ten again and put my grenade back in my basic pouch.4
At 0300 hrs on 21 February 1966,Trieu Phong District HQ, which was defended by 45 Popular Force soldiers and two advisers, including Warrant Officer Bob King, was attacked and overrun by a Viet Cong company. Most of the HQ buildings were destroyed by satchel charges and 22 Popular Force soldiers were killed and a further eighteen wounded. Bob King was extremely lucky to survive when he ran out of ammunition and stood in the corner of a room through which the Viet Cong moved without seeing him. Two days later Warrant Officer Bob Foster’s 2/2 ARVN Battalion engaged a Viet Cong company and captured a lieutenant who had documents that connected him with the Trieu Phong attack. Captain Kevin Aspinall arrived shortly after this attack to assume duty as the senior sub-sector adviser. His duties at Trieu Phong sub-sector in Quang Tri Province caused him to suffer the full spectrum of emotion, from frustration and confusion through to elation and sadness, but one episode brought a little humour to his grim business of war: The US Marines had a large base at Dong Ha with operational responsibilities mainly towards the Laos border. I was aware that our adviser to
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the Dong Ha Training Centre, which was co-located, was experiencing some difficulties with the Marines regarding defence coordination. He requested my assistance and I accompanied him to a meeting at the Marine base. We were served cups of coffee and everything went swimmingly. I was really impressed with the manner in which we were treated and thought no more about the matter until some time later when another member of the advisory team raised the subject with me. He confided that I had been introduced in such a way that my rank had not been mentioned.The Marines had apparently mistaken my three pips for the rank of a three-star general.5
Another example of the challenges associated with advising Regional Force/Popular Force occurred on 18 March at Mo Duc, 15 kilometres south of Quang Ngai City. Warrant Officer Jack Selmes and Warrant Officer Tom Phillips were advising 236 and 423 Regional Force companies on a clear-and-pacify operation. The 423 Company Commander said there was a Viet Cong battalion in the area and they wanted reinforcements although only light contact had been made over the previous ten days. On the 18th, two Regional Force soldiers standing near the advisers ‘accidentally’ shot four of their RF comrades. Soon after that the position was fired upon and a company of PAVN (North Vietnamese Army) troops was seen about 200 metres away and the enemy began to mortar the RF locality, which caused the RF soldiers to abandon their position. When the company commanders and the advisers (who had been left alone) tried to withdraw, two American advisers were wounded. Jack Selmes went to their assistance and Phillips provided covering fire.Tom Phillips was mortally wounded during this engagement and Jack Selmes came to his aid, but he was also shot. A call for help eventually brought some gunfire and two helicopter gunships.The men were evacuated by 0910 hours, approximately one hour after the fire fight began. A report submitted after the action estimated that the enemy force was a Viet Cong battalion, which included at least one company of North Vietnamese Army troops.Tom Phillips died two days later in Chu Lai hospital on 20 March.
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Warrant Officer Geoff Annett arrived in Saigon on board a Pan Am flight from Manila on 31 March during which he had consumed his fair share of a champagne and asparagus breakfast. His arrival went off with a bang! Geoff recalled: The day was confusing and surreal followed by an interesting night when at about 5 a.m. I was flung out of bed by an almighty explosion.When I crawled to the window to see what had happened I saw that the multistoried building down the opposite side of the street had no façade.6
The building was the Victoria Bachelor Officer Quarters and an estimated 450 pounds (205 kilograms) of explosives had extensively damaged the first three floors. Six people were killed and at least 110 wounded, including three Australians. Geoff arrived in Danang when serious demonstrations and open rebellion against the government had broken out in I Corps. All of the advisers had been confined to their compounds in Hue and Quang Tri. Danang city was placed on ‘Red Alert’ and barricades were set up during the night of the 4/5 April, which were manned by troops who opposed the government. Hoi An airfield was in the control of the rebels, but Quang Ngai was not affected. The cities bubbled with discontent, which was principally Buddhist unrest against Catholic-dominated rule. The advisers were now in a quandary as some units openly defied the government, and potentially ARVN might go to battle against ARVN. On 9 April, MACV warned AATTV personnel in Danang to be ready to evacuate on 15 minutes’ notice and to limit their possessions to a weight of 60 pounds (27 kilograms).The warning order was given at 0300 hours and the directive to leave came at 0830 hours.The order was triggered by the movement of the 2nd ARVN Division in Quang Ngai towards Danang. Although the plan was to move the evacuees by helicopter to the Marine base at East Danang, near Marble Mountain, the Australians decided to ‘borrow’ discarded vehicles, which would permit them to take more personal belongings and equipment from Australia House, which was a storage area for the field advisers. Under the guidance of Warrant Officer Class One ‘Curly’ Aiken, the RSM based in Danang, the Australians loaded as much of the gear from the house as time would permit and then set off to drive through the blockaded city in a convoy that included a white Cadillac station wagon. As things quietened down,
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they returned from East Danang to Australia House the next day to find the buildings had been looted, and much to the disappointment of some members, the borrowed vehicles were returned to their owners. The Buddhist–Catholic animosity continued and even though there was understanding and sympathy for the Buddhist grievances, the professional concern of the Australian advisers was towards the tactical advantage that the enemy would obtain during the period of military inactivity by the major ARVN elements in I Corps.
April 1966 also saw the arrival of the Advance Party for the Australian Task Force (ATF) of two battalions and supporting troops, which would replace 1 RAR who had served with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Bien Hoa. Australia requested and received assurances that its forces would not be used near the Cambodian border because of its diplomatic relationships with Cambodia.The 1 ATF was placed under the operational control of II Field Force Viet Nam and deployed in Phuoc Tuy Province.7 In May, Captain Vin Murphy, who had been down at the 5th Special Forces HQ in Nha Trang moved to the Nung Force in Danang, which was in the process of some serious reorganisation, recruitment and training.Their prowess as a fighting force was much depended upon by the members of the A Teams spread around the wilds of I Corps, but the force was not in a good fighting condition at this time as they were reorganising.Vin recalled his experience: First, we had to bring the force back up to strength, and, at the same time, meet the demands of the C Team to provide protection/reaction forces for the A Teams at such places as Tra Bong and Thuong Duc. Additionally we had to conduct local security operations. I was fortunate to have such good and dependable warrant officers. When we were all in camp, and this was very rare, we had, with the American Team, a very formidable group of men. It was difficult to keep tabs on all of the blokes all of the time because of our commitments, but the work was always done. Perseverance was certainly the name of the game. It is difficult to think back to those days without recalling the people, outside the Team, with whom we lived. A constant stream of
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visitors came with mail and pay but they also came to look. Some came to gaze at us as though we were a novelty, others to envy us our job (really!). A regular visitor, from the hospital down the road, was a very welcome CPO [Chief Petty Officer] who I only ever knew as Chief. He was a great guy with a magic smile and he always came with ice and fresh food. What a marvellous man. Then there was Cookie who did a great job in spite of the advice and criticism he received from his customers at every meal. Cookie disappeared at night and I never found out where he went but he was in good physical condition and I guess he was marked ‘P’ [Present] in some near-by roll book. ‘Pop’ was a Nung from the ‘good old days’ and he lurked around our camp in the pretence of producing charcoal for our cooking fires, which he sold to us at exorbitant prices. Pop insisted on cleaning my rifle and loading magazines for me, a task I did again when he wasn’t around. He always pinned a good luck charm, a stone in a small cloth bag, to my uniform prior to an operation and claimed it back, with a big smile, when I returned. I don’t know whether the charm did any good but I am still here and I’ll bet Pop is not. Some members of the Team did not trust Pop and I suspect the feeling was mutual.We worked hard but we had fun too.There were many humorous moments shared in the Team House and on the job while training the recruits, many of whom had already been trained in another place by different people and on different weapons. However, they learnt well and they learnt quickly. It was a case of had to!8
In the same month, Warrant Officer Class One Russ Bee, the field engineer who was given the construction engineer’s task to build a new camp for the Police Field Force (PFF) at Trai Mat, near Dalat, was joined by Warrant Officers Bill Dickey, Wayne Shennan and Ken Stoker. The Police Field Force was a counter-insurgency concept that had been identified in the Malayan campaign and first suggested by Sir Robert Thompson (BRIAM). The idea was to establish a police force capable of performing light military operations to execute its police duties in areas that were now extremely dangerous. Colonel Serong, who had been placed on Special Duties within the Department of Defence for duty in Viet Nam in February 1965, had a connection to the PFF, and in May arranged for Colonel George Warfe to come under contract to establish the training centre along Canungra
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lines. Later, there was an acrimonious falling-out between the agencies involved with the PFF and Colonel Serong. AATTV ended its involvement with the PFF in December 1967 when its adviser Warrant Officer Thomas Fairfax was not replaced.
By June 1966 the civil and military unrest had settled down in I Corps and all Australian advisers were back in the field by 15 June. Australia also negotiated to move some advisers to Phuoc Tuy Province to work in concert with 1 ATF. Five positions were identified and AATTV in I Corps was to give up the equivalent manpower. Captain Mike Wells, a recent arrival, was attached for duty with the sector HQ in Phuoc Tuy in June. He would provide valuable assistance to the Task Force during the battle of Long Tan on 18 August, when Delta Company 6 RAR with artillery, APC and helicopter support, defeated a large Viet Cong force. Delta Company and 1 APC Squadron suffered 18 killed and 24 wounded.The enemy losses were 254 killed with many more wounded and evacuated from the battlefield. Warrant Officer ‘Snow’ Mathews, who had been at the headquarters in Saigon, went up-country to replace Warrant Officer Ray ‘Shorty’ Chance at 3/1 ARVN Battalion in July 1966. He remembered that Shorty had gone by the time he got there, but a US sergeant recommended he always had a signal mirror to contact the choppers in case the Vietnamese took off on him. Snow recalled: On my second operation, the CO’s batman pinched my hexamine tablets, but he didn’t own up so I thought I’d get in first at mealtime. Previously, I had hung back to let the ARVN officers have first choice. This time I jumped in and grabbed the biggest piece of chicken I could find only to find it was the chook’s head. Unfortunately I had to eat it with my gluggy rice.9
One of the anomalies of AATTV’s manning also started during this time when Majors Philip Burns and Robert Salas were attached to the Team for duty with USAID—Chieu Hoi programs.10 They, and several others, served their tour with AATTV but were not posted to the unit.
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In the period up to the end of September, three men were wounded in action, two at Mo Duc, and Warrant Officer Class Two ‘Snowy’ Blanck was killed near Thuong Duc camp on 20 September. Warrant Officer Barry Rust, who had arrived in Saigon on 19 September, had to fly immediately to Danang to replace him. He remembered the speed with which it all happened: As it was my first time out of Australia my eyes were sticking out as I looked around Saigon. That night we stayed in a hotel without airconditioning and had a meal and a few beers. On 20 September, I was told that I had to fly up that afternoon to take over a platoon of Montagnards as an Australian had been killed. Due to the urgency, I did not have a briefing in Saigon or in Danang. I had not heard before about the Montagnards. I was to find that they were not Vietnamese but indigenous who lived in the mountains. I was confused by how to speak to, and command them.As I had done some French at school I was able to speak a little of that to them. Later, I used French to learn some of the Rhade language and in the end I was able use French, English and Rhade and Army hand signals to get by. My first operation was on the 22nd [September] when we were hit in an open paddy. Shots were hitting the ground and then three of the ‘Yards’ were hit. One was killed alongside me. Looking around I could see why they were shooting at me; I was about two feet taller than the rest. When it was all over I thought that I was more concerned that I had done okay for the others rather than being worried about being killed. On return to Danang later that week, [WO2] Ed Nicholas and I were asked by [WO2] Bill Bryson whether we would volunteer to join a new group to be called a Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF).We both agreed. The MGF were intended to operate independently in remote regions of Viet Nam for up to 60 days, but none did more than 30 days. Resupply was by air, and one trick was to use modified napalm canisters to drop in supplies. The Danang force would include a headquarters, a reconnaissance platoon and four rifle platoons. The Team number was A-100 and was the first MGF to start in the 5th Special Forces Group. The force was only Montagnards.We did a start-up operation of a week at Kham Duc where we saw elephant and tiger tracks regularly. Resupply was a problem due to the height of the trees and we had some problems with
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the Vietnamese in the A Team camp, as they would not let the Montagnards into the camp. Then in late October we did our first long-range operation to A Shau. The operation was to be about two months but was called off after five weeks. It would have to be the most physical and mentally demanding operation I have done. I have always been a very physically fit member but for the first time in my life I had to use my rifle as a crutch up the muddy hills. It was in the middle of the Monsoon and it rained heavily. It was very cold and everything was wet. The operation was a bit of disaster because of the rain and fog we could not get our resupplies and then the North Vietnamese Army found us. One US member and two Montagnards were killed and we were forced to move and had to leave the bodies in quick ground burials. In December 1966, a team was winched back in to recover the bodies. Later we did short operations in Tra Bong, Khe Sanh and Gia Vuc. On 31 March 1967 we were briefed for a long-range operation in the area of Nam Dong, which was an overrun camp location. We operated in that area for approximately three weeks and we had numerous contacts with North Vietnamese Army units. One time we were on track on the low side of a hill and I just looked up to see—on the high side—a large group of North Vietnamese Army going past singing as they went. We just stayed still until they were gone. Contact with the enemy became more frequent until we were attacked by, I believe, a battalion on 19 April 1967.We were surrounded for about eight hours. [WO2] John Stone was killed. I understand we had about 60-plus air strikes plus Puff the Magic Dragon (gunship) and 55 enemy bodies counted. This was my last operation with the Montagnards as I was posted to an ARVN battalion after my R&R.11
This operation was Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF) Task Force 768, which consisted of four AATTV, eight US Special Forces and 170 Civilian Irregular Defence Group soldiers. The area of operation was between Thuong Duc and Nam Dong, which are on an arc that runs approximately southwest-northwest 45 kilometres out from Danang and where the hills range upwards to 4000 feet. The four Australians in the Force were: Warrant Officers Bruce Prosper, Barry Rust, Tony Siggers and John Stone. Bruce Prosper and John Stone were recommended for (US) Silver Stars. Bruce Prosper was awarded a Military Medal for his
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bravery under fire during this operation, and his determined and gallant leadership that prevented the enemy achieving their objective.
During the night of 14–15 December 1966, 3/6 ARVN Battalion was attacked by a large enemy force near Tam Ky.Warrant Officer Class Two Brian Clarke would be awarded a Military Medal for his bravery and professionalism during the battle, which greatly assisted in beating off the attackers.At least 35 Viet Cong were killed, seven US personnel were wounded and 34 ARVN were killed in a battle fought at close quarters. As at 31 December 1966 the US had 388 568 servicemen and women in South Viet Nam. Australia now had 4533 and New Zealand 155. Deaths owing to hostile action in the year numbered: 11 953 Vietnamese forces; 5008 US, and 60 from Australia and New Zealand.
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AATTV’s year began with a turnover of advisers either returning home or moving between postings in country. A policy based on six months in a hectic place to be followed by the remainder of the tour somewhere calmer, saw men change around, sometimes against their will and sometimes from hectic to more dangerous. Captain George Mansford, who had served the first part of his tour at Duc My, and then moved to Phuoc Tuy, finished his tour in mid-January: In the final phase of my tour of duty I was located with a very much under-strength, poorly trained, and ill-equipped South Vietnamese infantry company at an outpost adjacent to the village of Binh Ba in Phuoc Tuy. The unit’s indifference towards the war and the accepted establishment was clearly evident by the abundant dirty and rusty weapons scattered carelessly throughout the area. The company was Regional Force, which in simple terms meant it was at the bottom of the barrel when it came to resources, priorities, and some would argue more often than not that such rag tag units had been totally neglected by higher authorities. My responsibilities included three Australian warrant officers and an interpreter, Corporal Michael Henry who was attached to us from the Australian Task Force at Nui Dat. On arrival it was clear that the outpost 98
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was under significant threat and lacked adequate defences. As well as constant patrol and recon tasks, immediate action was taken to dig in, including bunkers with overhead protection, the laying of minefields and the construction of wire obstacles. As was always the case in such circumstances, rank had no benefit and all were required to participate in heavy labour from dawn to dusk unless on patrol or manning the command post. One of the significant challenges facing the group was the need to lay M16 and M14 mines on the approaches to our positions. Fortunately two of us had some basic assault pioneer experience and did our best to train mine-laying teams before the big event. The task was made even more difficult because of our lack of local language, and after all, as versatile as he was, the ever-reliable interpreter, Mick Henry, could not be everywhere at the one time, particularly in a minefield. Suffice it to say, as the days went by, everyone was suffering from both mental and physical fatigue. Like many outposts manned by Team members throughout South Viet Nam there were always critical shortages, and predictably the warrant officers used their ways to rectify problems, be it scrounging .30 calibre machine-guns, fresh rations, or whatever took their fancy from other units. There was one memorable occasion when the irrepressible WO2 Robert ‘Sooty’ Smith liberated a Jeep from an unsuspecting American unit, and it was still in service at Binh Ba when we departed.1
On 20 February 1967 Lieutenant Colonel Terry Tripp assumed command of AATTV and Warrant Officer Class Two Max Hanley, MM (Malaya) was killed in action. Hanley was awarded a Bronze Star for exceptional heroism while serving as a platoon leader with Detachment A-113 in action near Ha Thanh in I Corps. Bernard Fall, author of Street Without Joy, was killed on 21 February by an enemy mine 19 kilometres northwest of Hue during Operation Chinook II.The ‘Street without Joy’ was a fortified area that was spread to the east and south-east of Quang Tri, and to the east of Highway 1 down to approximately the northern tip of the inlet Pha Tam Giang.The main road through the district was Route 555, which bordered the sandy coastal dunes that stretched out to the sea. As an interesting aside, Stanley Karnow said in his epic account, Viet
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Nam: A History, that Rue sans Joie was Route 4 to Cao Bang in the far north of what would become North Viet Nam. Warrant Officer Class Two Ron ‘Jack’ Boyce who had volunteered for service with the Team in 1966 arrived in March 1967. He recalled his admission to the Team and his impressions after he arrived in country, demonstrating the ingenuity of the Australian Digger: When I volunteered I was immediately sent for psychological assessment, ostensibly to test my suitability for deployment as an adviser to the South Vietnamese Army although the popular furphy at the time was that anyone who wanted to join the Team probably needed his head examined. I did the usual courses and I still remember the sober news of the Battle of Long Tan being announced one morning and for the remainder of that day a very subdued class struggled with their lessons. My initial and most vivid memory of Saigon was the smell of Southeast Asia: cooking, humidity, humanity and rubbish. On my first night we had a meal at the BOQ [Bachelor Officer Quarters] and as we ate we watched tracer fire and mortar explosions on the outskirts of the city.Welcome to South Viet Nam! Twenty-four hours later I flew to Danang and then after a brief stop in ‘Uc House’ [Australia House], I was ‘choppered’ to my unit; 2/51 ARVN at Mieu Bong.The battalion commander was a captain and the advisory team consisted of a US captain, lieutenant, staff sergeant and me. Having had drummed into me throughout my infantry training that wire in defence must be covered by firepower, it was with some shock and trepidation that on my inspection of the defences to the direct front of the advisers’ bunker I found two single strands of barbed wire and four claymore mines, two of which had the firing detonators disconnected, and no flares. After hastily rendering temporary improvements I promised myself to sleep lightly until more permanent improvements could be made. I was surprised by the obvious neglect of the defences that had been there for a long time. The main responsibility of the battalion was to protect railway and road bridges spanning the Song Cau Do River and its approaches, which was approximately 10 kilometres southwest of Danang. We conducted a lot of operations throughout our area, often in conjunction with the US 1st Battalion 7th Marines. I remember one humorous incident on my very first operation when I was with the forward company. The operation was in paddy fields and bamboo lines and the company was
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strung out walking along a paddy bund when we came under fire. Instantly my training came to the fore and I dived to the ground and rolled off the paddy bund into cover of the paddy field. I surfaced to lots of laughter from the ARVN soldiers who had not bothered to move off the paddy bund. I stunk to high heaven for the next few hours until fortunately we made a river crossing which helped somewhat to remove the human fertiliser. This smelly episode helped to ‘break the ice’ as many a laugh was had at my expense. I had been with the unit a month when [WO2] Bill Collins arrived at 1/51 ARVN who were located around Hoi An. It was a great morale boost to hear another Australian on the regimental advisers’ radio net, even though we were many miles apart. Late in July 1967 the battalion captured a North Vietnamese intelligence officer who revealed that the railroad and the secondary road bridge over the Song Cau River were to be attacked and demolished. Later that night a vicious fire fight developed, and under cover of the firing, the Viet Cong floated a massive mine disguised as a floating lily pad under the bridge and destroyed the centre span. Not long after this incident I decided to do something about the perimeter defences, which were sadly lacking in firepower. I had my relatives back in Australia send me some boomerangs and I had scrounged a couple of slouch hats in various states of disrepair. With my trade material in hand, Jim Limieux, the US staff sergeant, and I went shopping to the US Marines logistics area. We returned in triumph the proud owners of a battle tank.The gearbox was a mess and it only had one gear—reverse—the turret still worked although the main gun was unserviceable, but most importantly the machine guns still operated.The tank was dug in as part of perimeter defence. Positioning drums of napalm mix around the perimeter with an explosive charge attached solved the lack of flares on the perimeter. They were very impressive and most effective in stopping perimeter probes.2
Warrant Officer Geoff Annett departed Saigon on 17 March. One of the last members of the Team he saw in the field as he climbed on board his helicopter was Major Peter Badcoe. Geoff ’s days of combat and incredible challenges in dangerous locations were now over. He recalled the men and units with whom he shed blood, sweat and tears: I remember when I first arrived and was allocated to RF/PF in Hoi An, and getting ambushed on Highway 1. Then I went to the 1 Div Recon Company for a couple of months until I was transferred to
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2/1 ARVN (Battalion).We were very successful, if body count is a measure. These were the best Vietnamese soldiers that I served with.The Vietnamese officers were of a high and trustworthy standard. I was comfortable for the first time.3
April 1967 was a bad month for the Team.Two men were killed in action: Major Peter Badcoe on the 7th and Warrant Officer John Stone on the 19th. Stone would be awarded a posthumous Mentioned in Despatches (MID) for his sheer courage and determination in leading his platoon in an effort to outflank what was thought to be a North Vietnamese Army company position.There were seven posthumous awards of an MID to AATTV members, and readers should be aware that at that time there were only two awards granted posthumously, the Victoria Cross and the MID. The award of the Victoria Cross acknowledged Peter Badcoe’s conspicuous gallantry and leadership on three occasions, 23 February, 7 March and 7 April.
A new strategy named ‘Revolutionary Development’ had stumbled and bumbled its way through 1966 with limited resources and a plan that was still under development. The proposal to place the 59-man Revolutionary Development Cadres—who were specially trained government teams that went into villages and hamlets to improve security and encourage development—was another phase in the evolution of pacification, but again the plans appeared to be too ambitious, which was a complaint made against Diem’s Strategic Hamlet program in 1963. In I Corps, the AATTV reported in two provinces that the Viet Cong had anticipated the deployment of the Revolutionary Development cadres and had caused heavy casualties on two teams during their setup. Robert McNamara’s anti-infiltration barrier idea to impede the flow of troops and matériel from North Viet Nam was now in a very active planning phase.A force of no less than a division was considered necessary
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to monitor the barrier, and additional forces from Australia and New Zealand were desired, but it was doubted they would be approved if requested.The barrier plan proved to be impractical and was abandoned.
April and May in the province of Quang Tri saw battles and artillery duels experienced by very few Australians who served in Viet Nam.The fighting around Nui Con Thien between 9 and 21 May is one example. Mike Force from Danang, commanded by Captain Karl Baudistel, Warrant Officer Class One Ray ‘Gunner’ Stevenson, with Warrant Officers Fred Callander, Clarrie Upton, Warwick ‘Blue’ McFadden, Malcolm Sinclair, and Brian Smith arrived at Con Thien in the afternoon of 9 May and immediately dug in.Warrant Officer Class Two Peter Cowan came a few days later. The Con Thien position had been attacked the day before when the Marines had 41 killed and 80 wounded and the Civilian Irregular Defence Group had 21 killed and 37 wounded while the enemy lost 207 men. North Vietnamese Army artillery engaged the position with heavy mortar and artillery fire on the 10th. Two surface-to-air missiles as well as anti-aircraft fire were also seen in action.A major piece of one surface-to-air missile was found the next day, which excited the technicians, not to mention the pilots. On 11 May, Mike Force patrols were heavily mortared, between 60–80 rounds landing in four minutes, and although the enemy base-plate position was seen, the Mike Force element was forced to withdraw owing to an increase in mortar and small-arms fire. Later that day, Con Thien took 300 rounds of in-coming artillery and mortar fire. There were several major clashes with North Vietnamese Army forces between 9 and 11 May with secondary explosions seen around one of the enemy mortar positions, and 35–40 bodies were counted when an enemy force was caught in the open by an air strike. On most days the Con Thien position would take on average 100 shells of artillery, mortars or rockets, but on 13, 16, 18 and 19 May, Con Thien was heavily bombarded, which caused substantial matériel damage and over 100 casualties.
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When Major Peter Badcoe was killed in action on 7 April 1967, Major Harry Lovelock, who had been with the Pacific Islands Regiment for four years, replaced him. He was on the intelligence course at Middle Head when he was told to take pre-embarkation leave and move immediately to Viet Nam. Harry recalls that hectic period and his subsequent jobs: Sydney, Darwin to Nui Dat and then light aircraft to Tan Son Nhut and then two days in Saigon for a briefing. I arrived in Hue a few days later where I was posted as the G3 Operations, Thua Thien Province. This task also involved going to the field with the provincial reaction force, which was commanded by Captain Dao who had experience in North Viet Nam against the French; in all some 15 years active service. My advice was almost entirely confined to laying on fire support. When Major Ross Buchan went home I took over his job as G3 Training on HQ I Corps in Danang.The daily briefings at I Corps HQ kept me aware of the 50-odd AATTV members deployed in I Corps. The 1st ARVN Division briefing map had a red kangaroo for every AATTV member located in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, so highly regarded were the Australian advisers. In 1968, the CO reached a decision that advisers were no longer needed in ARVN battalions but this was strongly opposed by General Lam, the I Corps Commander, and his ‘political pressure’ kept the AATTV in I Corps.4
Major Lovelock was less than impressed when he had to take care of ‘visiting firemen’ and he recalled some of the less than salubrious moments of his job as a staff officer: One of the real chores of my job was looking after Australian visitors from AFV in Saigon who were probably looking for some excitement. Then there was Mr Gough Whitlam, Leader of the Opposition, who performed well as the barman in Uc House, but very poorly when a guest of the mayor of Danang, a most highly decorated ARVN officer. A bottle of whisky and damage to furniture was cause enough for me to say I had more important things to do the following day. Years of
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good PR by AATTV members took a set back with this opinionated bully. The Minister for the Army in riding boots and well-soiled open neck shirt inspecting the HQ I Corps ceremonial guard was also less than impressive.When I escorted Colonel Griff, the Deputy Commander AFV [Australian Force Vietnam], to Cam Lo he was upset by the amount of incoming artillery fire before a Jeep arrived to take us inside the compound. I suggested he remove his red hat. In 1969 he evened the score when, as Commandant JTC [Jungle Training Centre], he gave me a week’s duty staff officer for wearing greens from the Coast via the Gorge road at 0530 hours, along with Warrant Officers Brian Clark and Terry Egan, as if we weren’t busy enough. On one of his many visits, the CGS [Chief of General Staff], Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly, authorised a monthly Caribou load of Australian beer to be delivered to Uc House in Danang. His visits to the field were greatly appreciated by all of us.When the defensive plan for Australia House came under question by the US command, they appeared satisfied when I confirmed it was based on the RSM,Warrant Officer Ray Dummett, firing a few bursts from his AK-47 into the nearest Bachelor Officer Quarters.The resulting wall of fire would allow us to retire to the bar! Most members of AATTV enjoyed the comforts of Australia House on ANZAC Day 1968, but then we were told that Captain Tony Danilenko had been killed. Ironically, our Admin Warrant Officer John ‘Chesty’ Bond, responsible for most of the day’s activities, was killed on ANZAC Day 1969. I remember the tragic death of Tony Siggers on 28 August in a light aircraft crash at Tam Ky. He was on his way home.5
Sometimes the strain of operations can get to men, especially after they have been subjected to extraordinary events. However, there are rules of war, which might sound like an oxymoron, but Australian soldiers understood and stuck to the principles. One warrant officer who served during this period remembered a quiet chat and a reposting as a result of him sticking to his guns and maintaining an ethical standard in war:
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The battalion senior adviser was a captain and we had a few minor conflicts over such things as the size of an enemy force in contact or the number of enemy allegedly killed. His numbers were always many more than mine. But I blew it when we got into a couple of little skirmishes, nothing big—one bloke killed and a couple wounded.Then this bastard fired mortars into a nearby hamlet and killed some civilians. I got stuck into him and he told me it was his decision. I told him there was no decision to make, we had not received any fire from the hamlet, therefore, we didn’t have the right to fire on them. I finished off by calling him a bloody murderer. Naturally that didn’t impress him and I had to front the regimental senior adviser. Immediately after that I went to Danang to explain my bit. I was moved to another battalion. An interesting side-note to this incident, the US forces involved were from Task Force Oregon, which went on to become the Americal Division of the infamous My Lai massacre.6
Australia and New Zealand’s total force numbers also began to creep upwards with the arrival of a NZ infantry company on 13 May, and the introduction of eight Australian Canberra bombers (B-57) on 19 May, to the Phan Rang airbase. On the 20th of the same month, 7 RAR arrived at Nui Dat.The majority of AATTV personnel remained deployed in I Corps throughout 1967 and the tempo of operations in the five northern provinces varied month by month, but amongst it all there was some time for an Aussie prank as recounted by Warrant Officer Sam Chambers. Sam was posted to a sub-sector in Quang Tri Province and close to the Demilitarised Zone: Some of our problems at Gio Linh were visitors with cameras writing ‘I’ve been to the DMZ and here are the photos to prove it’ stories. Ranald McDonald—then a young pup journo for the Sydney Morning Herald— arrived on public transport from Quang Tri after dodging the USMC Combat Information Bureau in Danang—quite an accomplishment— with a photographer in tow. He announced he wanted to see this and that which included Con Thien, Khe Sanh and the freedom bridge over the Ben Hai, and if I didn’t smarten my footwork to make it happen pronto then [I could] expect some bad PR. Not a good approach! To cut a long story short, I told him I’d give it serious consideration, but in the meantime he and his photographer had better do a bit of work on how to get to the back bunker when the mortars started.They
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were told it rained mortars around here. After a couple of practice runs and when they had settled down I rang Bill Eade on the quiet at the outpost and arranged the ‘mortar attack’. Bill obliged about an hour after last light and put a brace of 4.2-inch mortars just outside our wire in the sand. We put on an act and a bit of radio traffic to no one in particular just to keep our guests worked up. It had the desired effect and the two visitors didn’t leave the bunker until breakfast.They then had a sudden change of plan and hightailed it south much to our relief. The sequel was that many months later Bill Brennan found an article in the Sydney Morning Herald and sent it to us reminding us we were a bunch of pricks for misleading the media! He twigged it was cooked.The intrepid pair had spent a night in hell apparently and they were suitably impressed by the calm attitude of the team under fire! Now that was good PR! I was tempted to tell Macca it was our mortars when he was waffling on Radio 3LO years back, but never did.7
Warrant Officer Albert ‘Dick’ Powell who was with 2/2 ARVN Battalion, and Warrant Officer James Challenger, 1/2 ARVN Battalion, who operated around Gio Linh, Con Thien and Dong Ha in northern Quang Tri, would have agreed with Sam Chambers’ statement that ‘it rained mortars around here’. Gio Linh was approximately 4 kilometres south of the Demilitarised Zone and Con Thien was 10 kilometres to its south-west.The 1/2 ARVN Battalion took 200 rounds on 18 March, 200 rockets on 28 April, and in July they made contact with a North Vietnamese Army battalion that used mortar and artillery fire in support. In the period 24 July through to 24 August, 2/2 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Dick Powell was based on Gio Linh and it took over 1000 rounds of in-coming rocket, mortar and artillery fire in that month. In September, Con Thien was hit with just over 3000 rounds of in-coming fire between 19 and 27 September 1967. Dick made these notes in his August report on the Gio Linh bombardments: North Vietnamese Army are not firing artillery at the outpost during the hours of darkness and any activity in and around the outpost . . . not of a routine nature . . . is going to prompt the North Vietnamese Army artillery.The minefield . . . is slowly being rendered ineffective by artillery fire.8
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Warrant Officers Ron Seiler, 1/1 ARVN Battalion, Des Wise, 2/1 ARVN Battalion, and Jack Hayes, 4/1 ARVN Battalion, were involved in Operation Lam Son 79, which was a very successful operation conducted in the Trieu Phong-Hai Lang districts of Quang Tri on 8 and 9 July.This edited summary of the after-action report provides a running commentary on the battle: 0600 hrs, 2/1 Bn under mortar attack on pick up zone. 0700 hrs, ground contact was joined, 2/1 estimated 200 enemy. 0900 hrs, original plan aborted and reinforcements moved to point of contact. 0930 hrs, 4/1 Bn ordered to enter the area and join up with 2/1 Bn for co-ordinated assault. USMC requested to sweep the coastal villages. Estimate of enemy force now increased to an enemy battalion (reinforced)—possibly two full Bn. Gun ships employed on fleeing enemy. Air strikes used to seal off escape routes. 1000 hrs, 1/1 Bn (-) ordered to area as reserve. Heavy contact raged until 1100 hrs. 4/1 and 2/1 did not link up due to enemy action. Casualties. Friendly. KIA 14. WIA 77. Enemy. KIA 193, body count. 2/1 accounted for 89 KIA. Highly probable 200 killed by air. Enemy weapons captured: 64 individual and 26 crew-served plus large quantities of ammunition, explosives and equipment.9
Warrant Officer Bill Collins, 1/51 ARVN Battalion, conducted a successful operation in the An Hoa District from 12 to 27 July. An Hoa was 25 kilometres west of Hoi An and south of the Vu Gia River. This is a summary of Bill’s report to HQ AATTV. He was with the 3rd Company of the battalion. Companies were identified numerically, and in this case the company would be 3/1/51: Prior to contact the company virtually broke every rule in the book, bunched together plus numerous others; however, when the shooting started they performed incredibly well. The two attacks our company
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did were well controlled and ruthlessly pressed home. Fire discipline was deplorable and recon by fire loses its effectiveness and accounts for a vast wastage of ammunition. It also reached the stage when one wonders who is firing at who? The enemy had . . . lines of communication trenches . . . through the village. Most of the casualties [to the enemy] were caused by air or .50 cal machine gun on the APC. The ARVN seemed reluctant to booby trap bodies and either ambush or mortar the area when the trap went off. I would estimate the overall count at 70 dead Viet Cong. The operation was a success due to the following: excellent fighting spirit of the battalion, quick air strikes, covering fire from APC and failure by the enemy to use heavy weapons against the battalion . . . during the critical crossing of paddy in the assault.10
Even the Commanding Officer of the AATTV experienced some sharp-end action on 12 August when he was wounded in an attack on Trieu Phong District. Major John Hughes, who was severely wounded, and Warrant Officer Class One Ray Dummett were decorated for their distinguished conduct during the battle. On 6 September, a large Viet Cong force supported by mortar and recoilless rifle fire attacked Warrant Officer Dave Wallner’s unit, 3/6 ARVN Battalion, located at Tam Ky.The enemy got into the compound several times, but counterattacks, including a bayonet charge, repelled them. Fifty-seven Viet Cong were killed.The enemy troops were identified as members of 70 and 72 Viet Cong Battalions and support troops commanded by 2 Viet Cong Division.11 Captain Peter Ray took command of the Mike Force at Danang in September.The Force had sacked 400 men in June, which saw the need for them to gather new recruits, train and re-equip. Ray instituted a new force structure based on four platoons in each company that he copied from the former Australian Pentropic organisation used in the early 1960s. He also applied a strict administrative procedure to lessen the non-battle casualty losses that came mainly from malaria. The introduction of roll books to record the daily dose of an anti-malaria pill also applied a financial tourniquet around the Vietnamese officers’ purse strings.A more accurate pay system was not amenable to building a surplus of funds! Even though an American staff officer suggested a bit of flexibility, when questioned on a policy guideline, the matter was dropped.
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Captain Len Opie, Distinguished Conduct Medal (Korea), was further south-west in Kontum Province with Warrant Officer Ray Simpson, Distinguished Conduct Medal. Both men served in Viet Nam on extended tours. Len was a Citizen Military Forces (CMF) officer on full-time duty and remembered he was not welcomed with open arms when he applied for AATTV: I went before a selection board and immediately clashed with D/Psych [Director Pyschology Corps]. I was 46 at the time, but he had some skeletons in his closet about which I knew and he knew that I knew, so that was obstacle one overcome and I passed. When I went to the Australian Embassy in Saigon about visas, the Australian Military Attaché, a previous Team member, told me that I had no right to be there as I was taking the place of an ARA [Regular Army] officer, so we parted on less than friendly terms. I find it ironic that this same person was the commentator at the ‘Welcome Home’ parade and when the CMF ‘visitors’ came by he twittered on about these brave young men who had given up their time to put their lives at risk in order to improve their military knowledge! It gave a whole new meaning to the word Team! I remember my arrival; Mike Wells and I, the first two CMF men from our course, flew by Pan Am from Manila to Tan Son Nhut on a Chicken and Champagne flight. In front of us was a Queen’s Messenger with all his gear. I don’t know if he had any chicken, but by the time we landed he was pickled in champagne.We arrived at lunchtime. Nobody to meet us and absolutely clueless, expecting to be shot or bombed.After about an hour an Australian came by and directed us to the Australian Bachelor Officer Quarters.12
Opie’s first assignment was in Quang Tin Province where he commanded the weapons company on operations, conducted a Long Range Patrol program and Provincial Reconnaissance Unit-related activities. On 11 June, it was reported by AATTV to HQ AFV that he was on board an aircraft that had been shot down:
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Captain Opie was involved in an incident, which ultimately caused the destruction of an Air America aircraft. At 1545 hours . . . approaching Quang Ngai . . . the aircraft was struck by small arms fire. The fire . . . in the air could not be extinguished in the air, nor later when the aircraft landed, and the aircraft was completely destroyed.13
After eight months with Combined Studies Division in Tam Ky, Len Opie moved into the Central Highlands to operate Trail Watch Montagnard patrols. The Vietnamese Special Forces in Polei Kleng did not welcome the Montagnard teams (owing to racial tensions), and that prevented the deployment of Opie’s teams into the Plei Trap Valley, which forced them to move to Dak To where they patrolled in cooperation with the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Some of the Trail Watch tasks during June, July and August 1967 included the watch over river crossings in the Tri-Border area14 to provide early warning of a possible North Vietnamese Army division’s movement. The Montagnards were adept at providing information on rivers, trails and the practicality of movement in the constant rain. The American requirement to describe vegetation, soil composition, size and types of trees puzzled them. Len Opie’s tasks varied over the next 18 months from Provincial Reconnaissance Unit operations in the highlands to Market Time15 patrols out of Danang, to training, and operations in Vung Tau and the Rung Sat. His exploits deserve a book of their own. The AATTV had also expanded its connection with 5th Special Forces in II Corps at Nha Trang. Captain Frank Palmer, Warrant Officers Maurice James, Danny Neville, Joe Flannery, Dennis McClymans,Trevor Gilliver and Peter Cowan were all associated either with B-50 (Project Omega), Mike Force or the Recondo School. B-50 operated long-range reconnaissance patrols in the western regions of II Corps. During July, August and September 1967 they launched 25 patrols of which 14 allegedly went into Cambodia. No Australians were on those patrols. Warrant Officer Cedric ‘Shorty’Turner was with Detachment B-52, Project Delta, based in Nha Trang, but with a wide-ranging reconnaissance role throughout the country. By the end of the year most of them had moved to Pleiku as Special Forces company and platoon commanders.
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On 17 October Australia announced that it would increase troop levels from 6300 to 8000 and New Zealand said it would up its force to 546. With an increased emphasis by Australia in Phuoc Tuy Province,AATTV now had 13 men in the province posted to positions with sub-sector, Regional Force/Popular Force, Combined Studies Division and Civil Affairs at 1 ATF and Special Forces. Warrant Officer Jim Cahill and Arthur Robertson moved from Mike Force, Danang, in November to join Detachment B-36 whose base was located on the Vung Tau side of the Long Hai Hills. Jim Cahill had been ill and, sadly, Arthur Robertson died from the effects of malaria in early December. Soon after,Warrant Officer Ian ‘Sonny’ Edwards and Captain Stan Krasnoff joined the unit, which was now on Operation Rapid Fire V in Tay Ninh where they conducted some daring but dangerous daylight raids along the Cambodian border. The men were in different teams, but Captain Krasnoff did six raids between 11 December and 7 January, which were limited to daylight hours and same-day insertionextraction, five to engage targets of opportunity and the last to reinforce a mission in trouble. Most of these actions were light with a total of two recorded enemy killed, but Krasnoff considered their method of operation to be foolhardy, and he would complain to the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Burnard, in February 1968, and request that AATTV be withdrawn from B-36.16 By the end of 1967 AATTV had 87 men on the ground. December had been a black month for the Team with three deaths. In addition to Arthur Robertson’s death, Warrant Officers Ron Seiler and Mal Henderson were ambushed and killed near the Binh Ba rubber plantation on 16 December. Four others were wounded in action in the same month.
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7 The beginning of the end 1968 and the Tet Offensive The beginning of the end
A 36-hour New Year’s stand-down ended at 0600 hours on 2 January, when an enemy battalion, thought to be the 406th Sapper Battalion, attacked Nghia Hanh District HQ eight kilometres south-west of Quang Ngai, which killed 18 ARVN and wounded 40 against an enemy loss of 65 killed in action. Military activity for the remainder of the month continued with clashes sprinkled throughout the country. The AATTV reported that enemy pressure had mounted in the provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai.Warrant Officer Percy White, 2/4 Cavalry, had participated in a number of missions in southern Quang Nam during January when the unit was credited with 50 Viet Cong killed and six captured for the loss of one ARVN soldier. Percy White was awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his leadership and bravery during these actions, as well as his gallant actions in December of the previous year. Also in January, and to their discredit, two AATTV warrant officers got drunk and allegedly struck a Vietnamese company commander at Binh Ba. After that, one of them called for a Dustoff. The Australian Task Force (1 ATF), who monitored the radio net, refused to send assistance. Later, when ARVN troops had secured the area, the two men were evacuated to 8 Field Ambulance, and ejected from the province. 113
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Coincidentally, the 25th US Infantry Division operating in Tay Ninh received a number of radio calls from a station that identified itself as Australian and as part of the ‘Australian 173rd Airborne Brigade’. Some confusion followed, and by the time American forces were told there were no Australians in the area, any Viet Cong nearby had gone. The two incidents were unrelated and the ‘Australian’ voices in Tay Ninh were a hoax. The Viet Cong announced a seven-day truce for the Tet (New Year) holiday from 27 January through to 3 February, but the Allied forces’ response was a 36-hour stand-down from January 29, excluding I Corps, the Demilitarised Zone and certain recognised supply routes in North Viet Nam. Most of the ARVN units in the northern region went into holiday mode anyway, and many soldiers went off for some home leave. During the night of 29/30 January all hell broke loose when a series of attacks rippled down through South Viet Nam from the top to the toe of the country.The major attacks happened on 31 January, of which the battles for Hue and Saigon–Cholon are the most recognised clashes. Nevertheless, there were many other notable struggles against the attacking forces, and to their credit, many ARVN units not only stood their ground, but counterattacked and repelled the enemy. The ARVN 3rd Regiment and 4/2 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Don MacDonald, fought hard and suffered heavy casualties during the fight for Hue. One Australian adviser who was in the Quang Ngai battle remembered his battalion’s reaction: We were lazing around at the western end of the city, along the railway line that had long ceased to be operational. I remember thinking that it would be a good time to take up an invitation to go to the home of one of the officers in Quang Ngai. He had a rather good-looking sister, but I digress. Then, without warning, the ARVN battalion commander jumped to his feet and ran off along the line shouting and gesticulating with his swagger stick. We were all surprised, including the HQ staff. The poor old cook copped the lot as we grabbed our gear and stumbled off in pursuit, straight through the meal that he laid out for us. Our battalion had, unwittingly, ended up in the withdrawal route of a large group of enemy. To this day I do not know who organised the fire support, but they had their act together.There were a couple of [helicopter] gunships, APCs
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and some artillery. All of this was out of the city.We caught them in the open although it was still difficult because of the vegetation, which was bamboo and sugar cane.The aircraft struck over the top of us and along one flank, the APCs were out on the other flank. I’d like to say that was my advice, but it wasn’t. Frankly, we slaughtered them and it was the first time that I had seen a dead enemy soldier tied to a crew-served weapon supposedly to prevent them from running. At the end of the day, I let one of them escape back into a tunnel. He was wounded, and even now my thoughts still haunt me. I was going to kill him for no reason, just for the sheer pleasure of it.The safety was off, my finger was on the trigger, but I let him go, turned my back, rather stupidly, and walked off. This was after advising the Commanding Officer to burn the sugar cane, as that would get the bastards on the run.1
The town of Tam Ky was attacked on 31 January. The defence of Tam Ky and Quang Ngai was principally a 2nd ARVN Division responsibility with minimal American support and within a day the enemy had lost 1223 men as well as 384 individual and 56 crew-served weapons. Total casualties throughout Viet Nam at the end of January were: killed in action, ARVN 300, US 232, Free World2 3 and friendly wounded was 1678. On the enemy side of the ledger the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army losses amounted to 4959 KIA. The heavy fighting continued into late February. In Australia Lieutenant Colonel Ray Burnard had prepared himself to assume command of the Team. He was due to fly out on 5 February: At home in Canberra my wife and I were shocked to hear on the radio that most of the cities and towns in Viet Nam were under attack.When I arrived at the Personnel Depot at South Head I was amazed to be issued with an SLR packed in grease. Cleaning the filthy rifle was not a pleasant way to spend my last evening in Australia. Our QANTAS flight was diverted to Butterworth where we were transferred to a C-130 Hercules for the flight to Vung Tau. Much to our surprise Vung Tau was all peace and quiet. Saigon, however, was a different story.With a major battle underway in Cholon and sporadic fighting in other suburbs, an
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almost total curfew was in place. At least this enabled ‘Ned Kelly’, our Vietnamese driver, to whisk my predecessor [Lieutenant Colonel] Terry Tripp and me around the city at speed. Due to the chaotic air travel situation we could not visit the Team locations around the country and it took me almost a month to meet the last group in the recently liberated city of Hue.3
Warrant Officer Graham Snook, who had arrived in late November 1967, remembered getting to Post Kilometre 17 (PK 17), near Hue and the subsequent Tet battle that was raging near the former Imperial city: A day or two was spent in Saigon MACV getting kitted out. The Q Store character hadn’t been reading the temperature charts for the northern provinces and blithely assured me I would not need cold or wet weather gear. I didn’t know his name, which is probably just as well as I froze until I scrounged some suitable clothing for the cold and wet. My first operation, I rode out in my M113 APC, helmet, flak jacket and a cigar clamped in my jaw and I cursed the drizzling rain and that Q Store character in Saigon. Fairly low key 9 to 5 stuff, but a good settling-in stage. My use of chopsticks was looked upon favourably by my crew and I learned to squat like the locals as I ate. No sissy folding chairs for me. So the days passed, with Christmas preparation a joint effort in our hut at PK 17 Team HQ, when we had good food and drinks in the traditional manner, and an image that has remained with me of a young Vietnamese cavalry trooper playing Christmas Carols with two spoons outside of our quarters that evening. No doubt the Catholic background, for so many of my troop was Catholic. Days and nights rolled by with every new experience and I, just like other advisers, coped in my own way. Then came Tet 1968. So many aspects of that period come from my notes jotted down on any piece of paper; notebook and the back of an envelope gave a day-to-day picture as I saw it. It took me about a week to transcribe those scraps and scribbles into an action report to AATTV HQ. In hindsight, I wish that I had kept those scraps as keepsakes. Reports don’t tell of washing one’s socks in your helmet, unshaven for three weeks, smelly and unwashed, low cloud, ever-drizzling rain and no regular meals. Indeed at one stage my American Captain Jack Chase, Sergeant Troy USMC, and I shared a jar of pickled vegetables, which had been scrounged from somewhere.Troy was good at scrounging and dealing. As the days went by, a bottle of Teachers Scotch appeared and as we
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survived some particular drama on the streets of Hue, we would share a nip and bless our good luck. Memories that come to me are of one’s initial belief in immortality, but that was shattered when an American chaplain insisted on going down the street to visit a US Marine forward section trusting his clerical garb would give him immunity. It didn’t and his body joined others in the street.That belief did not help the young 3/7 ARVN trooper who volunteered to go in the M113 APC to pick up wounded from further down the street, for he was not spared as on the return trip a rocket came through the back loading ramp and took his head off and spread fragments of his body and helmet over those wounded who had been rescued. As I picked him up and carried him to an evacuation site, I did pause to wonder if Viet Nam would ever know peace. Other images of that Tet Offensive in Hue still come to mind. But the day came when our severely depleted troop returned to PK 17 for rest and refit. We had eight vehicles destroyed in Hue.4
Graham Snook was Mentioned in Despatches for his exceptional bravery and gallantry during the Tet Offensive and on a number of other occasions.The battle for Hue reached a peak on 24–25 February when 2/3 ARVN Battalion, with Warrant Officer Max Evans, and the 1st Division’s Black Panther Company with Warrant Officer Terry Egan, cleared the western wall and palace area of the Hue Citadel. Egan would be awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his outstanding conduct under fire during the total battle for Hue.While this action was underway, 2/2 ARVN Battalion, with Warrant Officer Ron Harris, conducted a night attack to secure the southern wall, and Vietnamese Marines swept through to the south-west wall. For the period 31 January to 29 February the ARVN killed 1084 enemy forces and captured 268 individual and 88 crew-served weapons in the Citadel battles.5 One of the many other locations attacked during Tet was the town of Baria in Phuoc Tuy Province. The official AATTV report filed after the Tet Offensive recalled: The Viet Cong attacked the town of Baria and concentrated on known US houses, the A and L Company, National Police HQ, the airstrip at Van Kiep and many Vietnamese locations. Warrant Officer Antonio Parrello reported on 1 February that rockets, small arms and mortars were hitting his building in Baria. He was later killed on 1 February
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while travelling in an Australian APC with a relief force to rescue a besieged American adviser.6
Tony Parrello was Mentioned in Despatches for conspicuous gallantry for his actions during the battle. Captain Clarry Rule who was then District Senior Adviser said, ‘the American major recommended Tony for a Silver Star; he deserved a Military Medal at least’.7 Captain Rule and a 40-man RF/PF force were also involved in a series of reaction operations in the areas under assault that included the A and L Company area, which was partially occupied by members of D445 Battalion. Courageously, they recaptured the airstrip and the A and L compound.8 The magnitude of the 1968 Tet Offensive was a massive military effort in the annals of revolutionary warfare, and it took quite some time to be appreciated.The National Liberation Front mobilised almost its entire military force in South Viet Nam for a countrywide series of concerted attacks against civilian and military targets. From the Demilitarised Zone to the Delta, the people of South Viet Nam were subjected to assaults, raids, ambushes and terrorist bombings. Five Australian advisers were wounded during the period of Tet, one accidentally.Two were evacuated to Australia and the others remained on duty.The end of the Tet Offensive is recorded as midnight 29 February 1968. Killed in action: ARVN 3557, US 1825, Free World Forces 92, which was measured against an enemy loss of 45 005.There were 23 009 allied forces wounded in action. One statistic that is rarely seen is the number of refugees caused by the offensive; this is registered as 599 858 with 68 099 homes destroyed.
When Lieutenant Colonel Ray Burnard took command of AATTV on 17 February 1968 he remembered coming back to the capital city after getting to see his men in Hue: I returned to Saigon impressed by what I had seen, especially the Team members in Hue and Quang Tri who had borne the brunt of the Tet Offensive. However, I was uneasy about the employment of members
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in Mike Force, Danang and B-36. Captain Krasnoff had spoken with me when he was stuck in Saigon during Tet when he and several other officers had come in for an interview with the Military Secretary. My prime task was to ensure that members of the Team were deployed where their expertise could be fully utilised under competent leadership. The commander of B-36 was an eccentric, gung-ho officer who seemed to thrive on hazardous operations and I soon decided that the detachment was not a suitable posting for Australians. I know that Captain Krasnoff and Warrant Officer Jim Cahill and Sonny Edwards were greatly relieved. In February 1968 the bulk of the Team was in I Corps.The 1st and 2nd divisions were unquestionably the best in the ARVN and it was no coincidence that almost all their combat units had an Australian adviser. I believed we had reached the stage where our advisers could gradually be deployed to other more needy tasks. However, a furore erupted with protest calls to COMAFV from divisional and corps commanders when I tried to place Warrant Officer Kevin ‘Shaky’ Gabriel, who arrived on his third tour,9 in a position away from 2/1 ARVN Battalion. I underestimated Shaky’s ties to the battalion and there he promptly went.10
The pace of operations in March slowed as both sides licked their wounds and consolidated. When ARVN units returned to areas where Revolutionary Development action had been underway prior to Tet, they found much evidence of atrocities by the Viet Cong. People loyal to the government were murdered or kidnapped. In Nam Hoa,AATTV advisers confirmed 43 had been murdered and 68 taken prisoner.Tragically, after securing the Hue Citadel, the North Vietnamese Army troops rounded up and then massacred much of the civilian population. The graves of 2800 people were later uncovered but another 3000 civilians were not accounted for at that time.
Warrant Officer Jim Cahill moved from B-36 to the MACV Recondo School at Nha Trang. Sonny Edwards, who had broken his leg in January, remained at the Long Hai base to act as operations officer with B-36. Captain Krasnoff was redeployed to the headquarters of B-35 at Duc Hoa, just west of Saigon. Here he was responsible for the training and
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reorganisation of defences of two camps at Tra Cu and Duc Hue, a position he reported as being not too strenuous and non-combat when he requested two warrant officers to assist him with the task. Lieutenant Colonel Burnard had seen what the Recondo School in Nha Trang had accomplished in the training of ARVN reconnaissance companies for long-range patrolling and he was convinced that conducting this type of training would be an ideal task for ex-Special Air Service (SAS) members of AATTV. Burnard described the frustrations: Major General A.L. MacDonald agreed and gave me the go-ahead to discuss the idea with MACV and Central Training Command. The response was positive and in a surprisingly quick time a LRRP [Long Range Reconnaisance Patrol] school was established at Van Kiep. Captain Krasnoff, Warrant Officer Sonny Edwards and Roy Weir were moved there as Australian instructors to teach an Australian syllabus. Despite some teething problems the first courses were a success, but my elation was diminished when it was discovered that the ARVN divisions were not employing them properly. We organised a briefing to demonstrate how they should be used, but it became apparent that they were unwilling or unable to accept the concept of long-range patrolling.11
In April, Warrant Officer Joe Urquhart and Captain ‘Anatoly’ Tony Danilenko were aboard a helicopter flying over the wilds of western Quang Tin Province, north of Dak Pek, when the aircraft was engaged by small arms and heavy machine-gun fire.The aircraft was hit, but not disabled; however, the helicopter was unable to get over a ridgeline due to fog and then it lost power. The pilot managed to auto-rotate into a creek line, from where they were rescued 40 minutes later. On 13 April a battalion minus patrol from 2/2 ARVN Battalion was ambushed two kilometres from Gio Linh in I Corps.Twenty-seven ARVN were killed, 17 wounded and 31 were posted as missing in action.There was no Australian adviser with this group, but 1/2 ARVN Battalion, with Warrant Officer Chris McEvoy, and elements of 7th ARVN Cavalry, with Warrant Officer Al Hunter, cleared the enemy in a two-day battle that killed over 100 enemy soldiers and recovered about 20 weapons lost in the battalion’s ambush. Warrant Officers Don Cameron and Frank Lucas were with a Mike Force patrol that was ambushed by a North Vietnamese Army force on
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18 April near Ngok Tavak.The two advisers and the leading section were cut off and missing for a day, but they managed to get back to Kham Duc camp a day later. Captain Tony Danilenko was killed in action while leading his Mike Force company in an assault against a North Vietnamese Army force on ANZAC Day. Sergeant Utz, who was with the company, reported later: We were nearing the top of the feature when we made contact with a sizeable force and were receiving RPG and small-arms fire, including many automatic weapons. Captain Danilenko gave the order to move, hoping to outflank the enemy.The forward elements then encountered heavy frontal fire. Captain Danilenko instructed me to hold firm while he moved forward to assist and assess the situation. Some minutes later, I was hit in the right arm. While being treated I saw the indigenous troops who had gone with the captain move back into our perimeter and I believe that the troops had run [away] on him.12
The enemy force was estimated to be a battalion and Captain Danilenko was reported missing on 24 April, but he and his radio operator were not found until the 26th. Captain Danilenko was Mentioned in Despatches for his personal bravery and his outstanding devotion to duty as an adviser. Many of the Team, including the Commanding Officer, had gathered in Danang for ANZAC Day, and Ray Burnard remembered it was an opportunity for him to chat with many people: About a third of the team were well known to me from previous service. Jack Morrison had saved my life in Korea when he led a stretcher party into no-man’s land in daylight. Ray Simpson had been my first platoon sergeant in Korea. I recall asking him if there was a VD problem and he replied, ‘Well, Skipper, I think a quarter of the platoon have the drip, but the rest of the buggers haven’t been on leave yet.’ I was well aware of the stress they were under and one of the purposes of my visits was to see how they were coping. Overall they coped remarkably well.13
Later in the month, Major Michael Casey reported on a deplorable affair near Quang Tri City. One of the principles of internation cooperation is trust and it was totally lacking on this occasion:
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A Regional Force company had sprung an ambush in which they killed five Viet Cong. The RF lieutenant went to the US cavalry CO, who had been laagered nearby for two weeks, and told him there were enemy in the area and they were on 100 per cent alert.The cavalry ignored his warning and withdrew their listening posts for an early breakfast. Fifteen minutes later an APC was blown up and an enemy sapper platoon got into the regimental HQ area. The result was ten dead enemy, eleven friendly forces killed, 47 wounded, two M-48 tanks and five APC [Armoured Personnel Carrier] destroyed as well as sundry other equipment.14
That action, although much more serious, mirrored the contempt experienced by Warrant Officer Graham Snook during a water-crossing operation with 7th ARVN Cavalry: The troop was on a big operation with a US Marine cavalry unit to our left that involved crossing a wide and fairly deep waterway. We all stopped to do our flotation procedures to ensure the M113 were ready to swim the distance. My troop corporal mechanic, who spoke English well, went across to the nearest USMC vehicle to have a yarn and pointed out that the crew had overlooked some procedure. He was told bluntly, ‘fuck off gook’.The corporal came back with a broad grin and excitedly told me, ‘Mr Snook, Mr Snook, you watch that APC. He sure to sink.’ And so it did, and with its antennae showing above the surface we paddled past it, with my corporal absolutely delighted as he waved farewell.15
May 1968 was a significant month.After many disagreements, both Hanoi and Washington accepted Paris as the location for official peace talks. However, on 5 May, a mini-Tet Offensive was launched throughout Viet Nam.The enemy actions were obviously designed to maintain pressure at the conference table.There was heavy fighting in and around Saigon and three Australian newsmen were killed in Cholon. The 1st and 2nd ARVN Regiments were involved in the battle mainly around Dong Ha between 5 and 12 May. The AATTV had nine advisers with battalions of those regiments and they were very successful. The 4/1 ARVN Battalion, with Warrant Officer Robert King, lost 14 men and had
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82 wounded including two advisers, for a body count of 234 North Vietnamese Army troops from the 302 North Vietnamese Army Division. Captain John ‘Jed’ White was in command of a Mobile Strike Force Nung company at the Ngok Tavak base near Kham Duc, 75 kilometres west of Tam Ky, on 10 May when it was attacked by a North Vietnamese Army battalion. Following a bitter fight, Captain White led the survivors to safety in a well-executed withdrawal. Ray Burnard recommended him for a Military Cross, but the CO was to be disappointed: After the battle of Kham Duc I recommended Captain John White be awarded the Military Cross. When the awards were promulgated I was astounded to find John had received an MID yet the two warrant officers with him, Lucas and Cameron, had been given medals for bravery. Don Cameron (MM–Korea) would be awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his actions during this period and subsequent battles; Lucas got an MM. In the same list John’s brother Peter, who was a company commander in 1 ATF, was given an MC. I confronted Major General A.L. MacDonald only to be told in no uncertain terms that ‘I’m not having two brothers getting an MC at the same time and I decided it should go to the elder’. I was furious.16
This was a disgraceful decision which, when coupled with the absurd quota system that limited the number of gallant men a unit could have in a reporting period, still aggrieves many soldiers today.17 This is a summary of Captain White’s after-action report: [The] 11th Company was located on a hill eight kilometres to the southsouthwest of Kham Duc on Route 14.Their mission was to establish a Forward Operational Base and to follow the movements and gain intelligence on a North Vietnamese Army division who were believed to be moving east from Laos. The force consisted of: three AATTV personnel, three US Special Forces men, 44 US Marines, two 105-mm howitzers, 122 Nung–Mike Force, 35 from Kham Duc, three interpreters, three Vietnamese Special Forces soldiers (LLDB), and some heavy weapons. Sporadic contact with the enemy began on 6 May and there was evidence that there were enemy sympathisers in the Civilian Irregular Defence Group unit who were kept out of the main perimeter. On 10 May, troops from the Civilian Irregular Defence Group position approached and called ‘don’t shoot, don’t shoot, friendly’. They were
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allowed through, but when they got to the artillery [pieces] they threw grenades and satchel charges. A large North Vietnamese Army force immediately charged into the Marines’ position and inflicted heavy casualties. Two of the enemy were armed with flamethrowers and they ignited the artillery and mortar ammunition, which perversely provided illumination that was an advantage to the defenders. A three-pronged (ground) assault followed with the AATTV and US Special Forces positions targeted specifically by the North Vietnamese Army soldiers in an effort to knock out the command post. Two US Special Forces were wounded and later one was killed when he moved to help the USMC. The North Vietnamese Army took the howitzer position and the eastern side of the Forward Operational base position. A ‘Spooky’ [gunship] arrived and fired around the position and into the eastern sector even though there may have been friendly wounded there. This proved to be profitable as the enemy cleared the area temporarily. The enemy then used tear gas three times, but the wind was against them and it did not affect the friendly troops. The fight continued until dawn on 11 May when Warrant Officers Lucas and Cameron launched a counterattack that retook the howitzer position. Spooky ran out of ammunition, but he remained on station to direct other air strikes, which permitted casevac helicopters to evacuate some wounded. Reinforcements in the form of 12th Company Mike Force, arrived by CH-46 Sea Knight.The first two got in and out without incident, but the next two were destroyed on the LZ by direct hits from RPG.The Marines were ordered to destroy their howitzers as a second assault was anticipated and the position could not withstand even a light attack.The position was cleared of casualties and all other weapons were collected and blown up. Mike Force and the support elements withdrew from the position at 1300 hours, 10 May. The enemy continued to mortar the position for 90 minutes after it was abandoned. Despite the official estimate that a regiment attacked Ngok Tavak, it was estimated the attacking force was either a reinforced battalion or a special strike-force battalion.18
On 11 May, the Mike Force 11th (White, Cameron and Lucas) and 12th companies were replaced by part of the 137th CIDG Company from the Ha Thanh camp. The North Vietnamese Army pressed home their attack on Kham Duc in the early hours of 12 May and the camp was abandoned at 1633 hours the same day. The Americal Division’s19
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aerial evacuation was disorderly and bordered on absolute chaos. Eight aircraft were shot down, the artillery destroyed their own howitzers, and then Americal soldiers shoved aside Vietnamese to get aboard aircraft, and in one shameful episode soldiers and refugees trampled the weak to get onto a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. The Hercules in standard configuration would normally carry 64 paratroopers or 92 fully armed soldiers in combat mode. Now, with more than 200 people on board it took off and was shot down and crashed in flames at the northern end of the runway.20
Lieutenant Colonel Burnard was keen to see the experience and expertise of Team members spread as widely as possible and he seized every worthwhile opportunity to deploy Team members where Australians could get greater recognition of their national presence: The CIA Phoenix program21 in which Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) were deployed to target Viet Cong [cells] was impressive. I was especially pleased to see Captain Len Opie approved as the chief of training at the Vung Tau centre. Len, with 60 Vietnamese instructors, was able to have a major influence on the quality of training. Team members were well suited for the PRU role as exemplified by the outstanding result achieved by ‘Ossie’ Ostara at Qui Nhon where he controlled a very successful PRU.22
In May 1968,Warrant Officers John Durrington and Fred Hamersley were with a Mike Force company that had been positioned on Hill 52 on the northern side of Route 4 that connected Thuong Duc camp with the outside world in Quang Nam Province. At 1430 hours on 30 May a road convoy with 18 vehicles, escorted by a platoon of US Marines with three tanks, was ambushed by elements of 1st Battalion, 36th Regiment, 308th North Vietnamese Army Division. Eight vehicles and one tank were destroyed. Two platoons of Mike Force under Warrant Officers Durrington and Hamersley set off to aid the survivors. When they were about 400 metres from the ambush site they came under heavy fire, and John
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Durrington was mortally wounded. Fred Hamersley went forward to aid John, and after the battle his body was found only ten feet away from Durrington’s.Warrant Officer Hamersley was Mentioned in Despatches for his outstanding bravery and complete disregard for his own safety in his attempt to rescue his mate. The deaths of Warrant Officers John Durrington and Fred Hamersley would bring a change in the deployment of AATTV to Special Force (the Green Berets) units in I Corps. The Commanding Officer of AATTV was not impressed by the operation that took their lives. Lieutenant Colonel Schungel, the Special Forces Commander in Danang, had not endeared himself to some of the Australian officers by his previous cavalier attitude. Some considered him to be courageous, but tactically imprudent, and the Ngok Tavak battle probably had an influence in this matter as well. Ray Burnard felt it was time to take the Team out of the unit: I thought it an ill-conceived resupply operation and I knew it was time to sever our long connection with SF in I Corps. The SF commander in Pleiku, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Weaver, had impressed me and after discussions with him and Colonel Ladd, Commander 5th Special Forces Group, we agreed that AATTV’s contribution to SF operations would be concentrated in II Corps, mainly in Pleiku. We also agreed that wherever possible the Australians would be concentrated in companies rather than dispersed throughout the Mike Force. Looking back now to the Team’s involvement with the ‘Green Berets’ and knowing the extreme danger they were exposed to, I believe the commitment was well justified as they accomplished a great deal against the North Vietnamese Army efficiently and cost-effectively.23
The other major new deployment of AATTV was a move into the IV Corps military region or ‘the Delta’, as it was more commonly known. The Commanding Officer was delighted when he was told to go to Can Tho: COMAFV told me [in May] to fly down to Can Tho and discuss with Major General Eckhardt a request for assistance from the Team. In my discussions with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) staff,24 I insisted the senior Australian adviser be
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two-hatted in that he should command the Team detachment as well having an advisory responsibility for territorial security.25
Major Graham ‘Curly’ Templeton was attached to the Team from HQAFV and he and seven experienced warrant officers were redeployed in May into Vinh Binh and Chuong Thien provinces. Ray Burnard was not disappointed. He believed, the outstanding success of the concepts devised by Team members left no doubt that the ‘Delta experience’ was one of the most worthwhile contributions made by the Team. Warrant Officer John Allan, serving with the 21st ARVN Ranger Battalion, corrected the official after-action report on Operation Hung Quang 1/38 that had been conducted at the end of May in an area west of Hoi An and Route 1, but south of the Dien Binh River, with his scathing report on their new commanding officer: On 22 May, the 21st Ranger Battalion command post came under mortar attack.The CO and senior adviser were both wounded and 53 soldiers were killed. On 24 May, the battalion moved to the west and made contact again when we received light small arms fire and fairly heavy mortar fire.The battalion was deployed in open rice paddy and suffered heavy casualties. I recommended to the new battalion commander that we should continue to move forward. He denied that they had stopped, but we stayed in the same position until nightfall. The next day the CO locked himself in an APC and he would not come out. I finally coaxed him out, but he went to a slit trench and refused to budge. I continued to urge him to move the battalion, but he refused. He then refused to talk with me. Subsequently a casevac helicopter was destroyed by mortar fire, which caused the deaths of two US personnel.The officer was relieved of his command, and in my opinion by his actions he caused many deaths and casualties sustained during this operation.26
Such were the vagaries of serving in the Team.
In Phuoc Tuy Province, 4 RAR arrived on 1 June 1968 to replace 2 RAR at Nui Dat, and General Westmoreland departed Viet Nam on 9 June
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to become head of the US Army. General Creighton W.Abrams replaced him on 3 July. In mid-June there were reports of North Vietnamese Army helicopters and aircraft operating in the eastern area of I Corps. The heaviest fighting for that month continued to be in the two northern provinces, and the AATTV I Corps report on ‘enemy air’ suggested that it was for emergency resupply as North Vietnamese Army units had suffered badly in clashes against the ARVN’s 1st Division. COMUSMACV Command History recorded the event as confused activity: US units did report and fire upon suspected enemy helicopters and jet aircraft.The jets were later confirmed to be US aircraft, which hit HMAS Hobart and killed two and wounded seven sailors. The question of reported helicopters remained unsolved.27
AATTV members experienced the quietest month of the year in July although Warrant Officer Sydney Colley, a second tour veteran, was wounded by gunfire while on operations with 4/5 ARVN Battalion near Tam Ky, Quang Tin Province. Advisers around Dong Ha in northern Quang Tri Province reported several new methods of camouflage used by the enemy whereby the enemy made bunkers to look like graves, and the other was to wear grass mats on their backs to hide from aircraft. Approval was also given in this month for Australians to go with their units into the Demilitarised Zone, provided they did not cross the international border. There was an upsurge in activity during August and three AATTV men were wounded: Warrant Officer Jim Geedrick was hit by mortar shrapnel on 20 August north of Dong Ha, and evacuated to Australia; Warrant Officer Albert ‘Rocky’ Massingham was also wounded by mortar fire on 22 August on Hill 10 west of Quang Ngai, and he too was evacuated to Australia; Captain David Savage was wounded by gunshot on 24 August during the relief of the Duc Lap camp. He was hospitalised until late September when he returned to Pleiku. Duc Lap was a Civilian Irregular Defence Group camp located in Quang Duc Province, five miles from Cambodia. A CIDG force of up to 300, a Vietnamese Special Forces detachment (LLDB) and fifteen US Special Forces were in the camp when the North Vietnamese attacked it on 23 August. What follows is an edited summary of the battle that was written by HQ AFV Public Relations personnel and attached to
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the AATTV monthly report. The B-20 Mobile Strike Force (MSF) Detachment was officially renamed 2 Mobile Strike Force on 15 August and a new organisation had just been promulgated that changed the company designators to match parent battalions. First Battalion companies, for example, became 211, 212 and 213, but in the Duc Lap reports companies are shown with their old identification numbers: Captain David Savage’s 202 Company included platoon commanders Warrant Officer Barry Tolley, George ‘Geoff ’ Smith, and Laurie Jackson, MM [Malaysian Confrontation].They were part of a three-company relief force that flew in on 23 and 24 August. The Australian-led company was first in and they were joined the same day by 204 Company and both companies fought their way to a defended position on a small, bare hill nearby where they dug in and remained for the night. August 24 saw the arrival of 203 Company that remained on the LZ [Loading Zone] while the other two headed for Duc Lap. They did not make contact until they got to the airstrip where they were engaged by heavy fire including 12.7-mm machineguns.The Australian-led force managed to get to the edge of the camp area, about 150 metres short, but the area was covered by enemy fire. They made it into the camp under cover of tactical air support and through the calm and courageous actions of the Australians and Montagnard leaders. Small ground attacks against the camp supported by mortar and RPG fire continued through the day. Barry Tolley took command of the company when David Savage was wounded, and efforts were made to evacuate the wounded, but four helicopters were shot down and the casevac helicopter was also hit. The enemy did not attack again until 0600 on 25 August when a ground assault followed an hour-long mortar barrage.After the defenders had fought this attack off word was received that another relief force was coming and everything quietened down. Then a second assault began at 0900 hours and the position was in danger of being overrun. More air strikes were called, some to within 25 metres of the defences, the wounded were crying for water and by midday the stench of battle was sickening. Then almost in storybook fashion the relief force from Nha Trang fought its way into the perimeter. The fight was far from over, but the danger of losing the camp was gone. The Mike Force companies were credited with killing 224 North
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Vietnamese Army and a bounty of 124 000 piastres was paid to each company.28
As with most battles, participants have diverse memories of the clashes. Duc Lap is no exception. More comprehensive details of this significant battle may be read in David Savage’s Through the Wire and at the Mike Force website.29
September was fairly quiet except for Team members in the southern part of I Corps.The average strength of the Team this month was fifteen officers and 75 warrant officers, which was ten warrant officers under the war establishment. Warrant Officer Class One Ron O’Brien and Warrant Officer Class Two Graham Neitz were wounded in action, but remained on duty.To complicate matters, typhoon Bessie ripped through the region in the early part of the month, which restricted operations and caused considerable damage. MACV reported in September that allied forces had captured 920 individual weapons, 15 000 mortar rounds, 5500 pounds of TNT, over 1500 miscellaneous rocket rounds and more than 1 000 000 rounds of small arms in the Demilitarised Zone.American Marines discovered more than 4000 mortar rounds, nearly 8000 grenades, 2900 pounds of TNT, and over 300 000 rounds of 7.62 mm near the Rockpile, which was along Route 9 west of Dong Ha. Warrant Officer Ernie Snelling’s report in September for 3/1 ARVN Battalion included a mention of 1/1 ARVN Battalion’s success that included the find of 1000 rounds of 82-mm mortar ammunition south of Quang Tri City. The USS New Jersey commenced combat operations near the Demilitarised Zone on 30 September 1968. She fired 20 rounds of 16inch shells and was the first American battleship to go into action since July 1953. Contact with the enemy remained at a low level into October 1968, recorded at an all-time low by MACV up to 18 October, when only five American servicemen were killed over three days.Warrant Officer Robert Carter was wounded on 16 October in a mortar attack upon A-1, which was a fire support base six kilometres to the east of Gio Linh,
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and most AATTV advisers elsewhere were active, but the level of contact with the enemy was low. Captain Franz Kudnig sent a summary of his experiences from July to 31 October with 2/6 ARVN Battalion to HQ AATTV, in which he noted enemy tactics and the problems of being an adviser: The following differences were noted in the enemy’s tactics: the use of numerous hand grenades in attack and in ambush; the use of an approach in attack not to their advantage; an apparent inability in Quang Tin to concentrate and react quickly against vulnerable targets, and inflexibility— an unwillingness to change from set plans.30
The major problems Kudnig faced as an ARVN adviser were, he added, ‘common’, as his report continues: ARVN did not desire advice, but wanted all types of fire support and material assistance. There was a lack of control, co-ordination and operational planning by US units, ARVN units and at provincial HQ. Scrounging was a set precedent, but it did nothing to motivate the ARVN resupply system. Some US units set poor examples in minor tactics and co-ordination. US staff officers were often disinterested, and his [Kudnig’s] inability to speak Vietnamese was a problem.31
Franz Kudnig also wrote unashamedly, ‘In hard fact and complete honesty, I am unable to claim one achievement in terms of improving ARVN tactics.’ He added somewhat prophetically: I do have one general recommendation to make. Senior battalion advisers should be authorised to deny fire and air support if in his opinion there was no sound plan, co-ordination was lacking, or its use would be an abuse of the system. ARVN must be prepared to fight this war on their own and as long as advisers provided assistance unchecked the ARVN will not develop their own competency.32
The Commanding Officer of the AATTV did not agree with Captain Kudnig’s assessment of ARVN’s effectiveness and he did not support the recommendation that fire support should be withheld if an adviser thought the tactical plan unsound. Captain Kudnig had previously complained about the tardiness of getting air support at night, which took between fifteen and 20 minutes to arrive. Lieutenant Colonel Burnard was in Quang Ngai when the support was requested and he
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knew there were a number of attacks in the region at the same time. He did not agree with the captain’s complaint in his monthly report.
The number and scope of combined operations during November, and the Australian Counter Revolutionary Warfare pamphlet attracted a lot of interest from the Vietnamese in I Corps Tactical Zone, who had produced a paper based on its contents.The US III Marine Amphibious Force that commanded US forces in 1 Corps Tactical Zone also asked for copies.The senior US provincial adviser for Thua Thien wrote a positive report in November in which he said the following: Continuous operations by integrated Free World/ARVN forces using a cordon and search and hold concept with complete exploitation of Phuong Hoang (Phoenix) agencies has resulted in the virtual elimination of VC and VC Infrastructure in selected areas. The sphere of influence is expanding and people are beginning to believe that true pacification is returning to the lowlands of the province.33
Warrant Officer Ernest ‘Ossie’ Ostara, who was the senior Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) adviser in Binh Dinh Province in II Corps, achieved similar results. He had been highly commended by the Programme Director, which was passed in a report to the Australian HQ: During October, for example, this PRU of 75 Vietnamese, all of whom are Hoi Chanhs,34 mounted 77 operations resulting in the capture of 27 Viet Cong Infrastructure personnel and the killing of two.They made significant inroads into the VC network.35
In IV Corps, the US welcomed the more experienced Australian warrant officers to work with their Mobile Advisory Team (MAT). An American report glowingly stated:‘Their professionalism, experience and motivation help to provide a backbone for the inexperienced members of [US] MAT.’ Two warrant officers had also been employed in training Revolutionary Development teams at Can Tho and Australian teams were deployed into Chau Doc and Kien Giang provinces.
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Elsewhere in December, contact with the enemy in I Corps was infrequent except for Quang Nam. Warrant Officer John Garrigan was drowned when the APC he was travelling in hit a submerged object as it was crossing a tributary near the Cua Viet north-east of Dong Ha on 27 December. Captain Kudnig was moved to Chief of Training and Operations at the Special Activities Training Centre near Vung Tau where he proceeded to achieve excellent results. Warrant Officer John Allan had moved in to replace Captain Brian Palmer in the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit training team for the Central Highlands and he wrote a detailed report of the scheme on his departure. He provided sound observations on a program that he believed had improved and should continue to do so with the right people and equipment. The AATTV also arranged for the men who would join Special Forces, predominantly now in Pleiku, to attend a 12-day combat orientation course conducted by Special Force instructors on Hon Tre Island, near Nha Trang. Its mission was to prepare selected personnel in special combat skills to deal effectively as counterparts to the Vietnamese Special Forces in their conduct of counterguerrilla warfare. The course concentrated on map reading, patrol training, weapons training and combat operations. At the end of 1968, Australia had 7661 personnel in South Viet Nam of which 96 were with AATTV. American strength was now 536 500. The Team had suffered five fatalities, and 4282 South Vietnamese soldiers had been killed in I Corps during the year.36
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The year began with low operational activity in the northern part of I Corps, with little contact with the enemy during January. There was a bit more action in the southern provinces, where Warrant Officer Matthew Jensen was wounded slightly while on an operation with the 21st Ranger Battalion in an area south-west of Danang.The Mobile Strike Force in Pleiku was also quiet. Can Tho airfield in IV Corps was attacked on 12 January where the enemy destroyed or damaged eighteen helicopters, and five US soldiers were killed and another twelve were wounded. Lieutenant Colonel R.D.F. Lloyd flew in on the 28th to prepare to take command of AATTV in early February and replace Ray Burnard. Burnard remembered some of the day-to-day activities that came with the command of this unique unit: I flew many thousands of kilometres in a wide variety of aircraft and spent an enormous amount of time waiting for them. Even scheduled flights were often delayed or cancelled and quite often I was forced to hitch a lift. I escorted VIP frequently, but that had its benefits as I was able to catch up with Team members and the VIP aircraft was comfortable and on time! The most popular visitor was the CGS, Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly, KBE, CB, DSO. He surprised many people by not only knowing their names, but also something of their background. His 134
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relaxed manner, empathy and incisive questions endeared him to the Team. In my previous job I had been his military assistant and had accompanied him on numerous overseas trips. During the flights he would study the large folio of briefs on the problems he was likely to encounter, but for the last hour or so he would put those aside and concentrate on the brief that named and described the men he was likely to meet. His wide knowledge and understanding of the Team was the result of a lot of mental effort on his part often when he was tired and beset by many worrisome problems. He had a very high regard and admiration for the Team.1
Lieutenant General Tom Daly, who would become Patron of the AATTV Association, bluntly expressed his dismay in later years at the demonstrations in Australia against those who had served in Viet Nam: I found it abhorrent that the Australians could actually denigrate their fellow citizens who were carrying out their government’s instructions on behalf of the country. I think that the general feeling throughout the Army was they were a pack of bastards, the whole bloody lot of them.2
Media publicity was a challenge, and Burnard knew the value of good PR on the morale of his unit: I was careful in choosing which journalist to encourage and I was very pleased with the coverage given to us by eminent journalists such as Denis Warner3 and Creighton Burns. Stewart Harris, a rather oldfashioned gentleman, was amazed by what he learned from our advisers in Hue and gave us world-wide publicity in Time magazine. Unfortunately the official policy banned unauthorised contact with the press and I got a very sharp reprimand. Fortunately, the excellent coverage we got soothed COMAFV and he turned a blind eye to our relationship with the press. It was an important element that helped AATTV men cope with stress. This was not so with the Americans. The traumatic events of 1968 such as Tet, the decision by Johnson not to stand for re-election, the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King and the strong anti-war feelings in the USA led to a noticeable decline in the morale of my American friends. As my time drew to a close with AATTV little did I realise when I left this beautiful country and friendly people that I would return four years later as the Defence Attaché to see out the closing stages of the war.4
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Lieutenant Colonel Ray Burnard was Mentioned In Desptaches for his outstanding leadership, personal example and high standards by which he inspired each member of the Team during his tour. Obviously a couple of terse exchanges with COMAFV did not help him in the decoration stakes.
Lieutenant Colonel R.D.F. Lloyd took command on 10 February 1969 and the ‘battle season’ began again. There were indirect-fire attacks and some ground assaults on more than 100 cities around the country. Saigon was hit with 122-mm rockets, the first since November 1968, and Captain Cameron Spencer, serving with 1/51 ARVN Battalion, reported favourably on his unit’s action for the month: The battalion conducted two major operations south of Danang.There were eight friendly KIA and 70 WIA. Most of the wounded was as a result of mines and booby traps. Enemy casualties were approximately 180 KIA and large quantities of mortar and RPG ammunition were captured.The morale of the soldiers in this battalion is high even though leave was stopped during Tet.There was a big drop in the desertion rate brought about by quick and accurate support received for casevac, artillery and air.5
Captain Kudnig at Special Activities Training Centre,Vung Tau, had quite a different challenge when 70 per cent of the instructional staff went AWOL between 25 and 28 February.When disciplinary action was taken against the staff there was a major walk-out, some voluntarily and others by coercion. A variety of threats followed against the facility and families, but matters were resolved after both parties compromised considerably during negotiations. Captain Ray Hinde, Chief Instructor of the Long Range Patrol Wing at Van Kiep, also experienced ongoing frustration in the training and deployment of trained ARVN long-range patrol soldiers. Students arrived late or not at all and their subsequent deployment by their units raised serious doubts about the value of the program. He recommended that the whole program should be inspected and re-evaluated.
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Warrant Officer John Barker, who had been with 1/2 ARVN Battalion, transferred to 5/2 ARVN Battalion in late January. He was impressed with his new battalion and wrote enthusiastically: This battalion patrols aggressively and appears to be by far one of the better battalions. Their discipline in ambush sites is above average, particularly under abnormal conditions. One important point noted is they have a tendency not to let the whole enemy party get completely in to the killing area. They maintain a very good standard of weapon and bunker maintenance, which came from the efforts of the company commanders.6
Major General R.A. Hay replaced A.L. MacDonald as COMAFV on 25 February, and as the month drew to a close the 9th Regiment of the 3rd US Marine Division found a major cache of weapons in the A Shau Valley.The hide contained approximately 350 tons, of which 90 per cent was new weapons and munitions, and included in the haul were vehicular prime movers and 122-mm artillery pieces. The intensity of operations remained high into March. Warrant Officer Max Poole, serving with 2/4 ARVN Battalion, was busy around Nghia Hanh District and Quang Ngai City with a significant clash against an estimated North Vietnamese Army battalion in late February that continued through to 4 March. He reported that 2/4 ARVN Battalion had remained in contact for most of that period. His summary is indicative of the fighting that took place: The results were: 102 North Vietnamese Army KIA, captured one, one Chieu Hoi, 10 AK-47, four B-40 RPG, three machine guns, numerous field packs, ammunition and grenades were found as well as many graves and blood trails.There were 20 friendly killed and 47 wounded. Enemy losses were confirmed, and I estimate that the enemy suffered many more dead and wounded.7
An enemy force that included ten North Vietnamese Army PT-76 tanks8 attacked Ben Het, a CIDG camp that was located seven miles from the Tri-Border area on 3 March.The 66th North Vietnamese Army Regiment bombarded the camp with more than 600 rounds of artillery and mortar prior to the assault, but the defenders held. Second Battalion Mobile Strike Force operating out of Pleiku was patrolling in the area
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to the south-west of Ben Het, and they had a heavy contact on 16 March when they assaulted an abandoned US fire base and killed 28 North Vietnamese Army. That force included Warrant Officer Peter Wilkes who was the company commander of 223 Mobile Strike Force Company. During their attack on the enemy, that lasted more than nine hours, ‘Wallaby’ Wilkes displayed outstanding leadership and personal bravery. Wilkes had previously shown great courage when he assaulted an enemy position as an adviser with 5/2 ARVN Battalion in July 1968, and he would be awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal for his cumulative efforts of heroism and leadership in 1968 and 1969. Captain Peter Harris, who had just completed the Combat Orientation Course at Nha Trang–Hon Tre, flew in to Ben Het to take command of 223 Company in late March. Peter tells what it was like going in to take over his command: 223 Company was deployed on operations in the Ben Het area. Leading the Company was Wallaby Wilkes, and the other AATTV blokes in the company were [Warrant Officers] Des Aylett, Bob Cameron and [Sergeant] Dave Scheele. On approach to the A camp the heli crew became very alert, and they told me that as the only pack [passenger] I should jump for it when the bird [chopper] got to the LZ.The camp was being shelled from across the border and some rounds were falling into the camp right then.Welcome back to the real world of Viet Nam, mate! Off the chopper, into the Team House, a brew, a US SF [Special Forces] briefing, a meal and then, when the shelling had stopped, off to meet the Mike Force battalion commander and arrange a lift to 223 Company. Got a resupply chopper that afternoon and linked up with the company. Wallaby and I agreed that he should continue to command the company until after the operation, when I’d take over. This was my on-the-job training.9
By the time he got to Pleiku, Peter Harris noted that the soldiers of Mike Force were tired, over-used and needed a rest, refit and training in solid platoon and company tactics: This did not reflect on the US or Aussie Mike Force company advisers [commanders], it was the nature of the conflict in II Corps, and the essentially recon and light Infantry Mike Force was being used as a conventional force, a task for which they were completely unsuited and untrained, and inadequately armed.That said, these soldiers gave a damn
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good account of themselves when necessary, most of the time.With little prospect of an end to the interminable conflict, or better treatment from their political masters, it was no surprise that the Montagnard eventually refused to move, but that was after my time in Viet Nam.10
Russell Lloyd, Commanding Officer of the AATTV, must have had a feeling of misgiving on the training and deployment of the Mike Force when he wrote his March report to COMAFV: In recent months the type of operations required to be undertaken by 2 MSF [Mobile Strike Force], with whom AATTV members are deployed, and the manner in which the MSF battalions and companies are being committed to these operations has not been very satisfactory. There are indications that MSF will go back to independent operations instead of being under the operational control of US formations. In addition, it appears that a little more training may now be done between operations.11
Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd reached agreement (again) with the commander of Mike Force that platoon commanders of AATTV were to serve under Australian commanders; the exception was the Training Company. Obviously such agreements only lasted for the tenure of each commander as a similar understanding had been agreed upon under Burnard. To avoid an imbalance of Australian/US commanders it was now agreed that the total number of AATTV to serve with 2 Mobile Strike Force would be fourteen. On 5 April, Major Alexander Harkness was attached to the Team from HQAFV to replace Major Graham ‘Curly’ Templeton as the senior Australian adviser in IV Corps. His first report to HQ AATTV contained the following information: There are now 12 AATTV members in IV Corps spread between Can Tho, My Tho,Vinh Long, Ba Tri, Sa Dec,To Chau and Vinh Binh.The enemy was still targeting RF and PF outposts that were either undermanned or lacked good security techniques.Viet Cong continues to demonstrate the ability to concentrate battalions by day. Local friendly forces show a reluctance to close with them and most engagements are inconclusive. The acceptance of defence at village level will be a slow process.Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT), manned by Australians, are deployed in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa and Vinh Long, and I assisted
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in drafting the terms of agreement for the employment of Warrant Officers [Geoffrey] Munro and [Geoffrey] Horne in Vinh Long.12
The strong village concept, how the wheel had turned!
Elsewhere the level of operational activity remained unchanged, but there was a decrease in contact with the enemy compared with the end of February and early March, with the exception of I Corps, where there were several heavy contacts.Warrant Officer John ‘Chesty’ Bond was killed on ANZAC Day near Lang Vei, the old Special Forces camp not far from Khe Sanh. Warrant Officer Class One Jim Geedrick serving with 1/2 ARVN Battalion, was involved in a major clash along the Demilitarised Zone, which he recorded in his monthly report: Moved to about one click from the DMZ.Viet Cong in their hundreds— calling artillery down. Every hill occupied by the VC. Our biggest fight soon started for Objective Alfa—approx 100 metres from DMZ. It was estimated that two platoons were there and heavily equipped with weapons. All the Viet Cong killed were young. Clothes khaki, weapons well kept. Some kids probably 14–16, fought bravely. Very fair complexion and features more regular than our ARVN soldiers. There is not a hill west of Con Thien approaching the DMZ that is not occupied by the VC. His assaults and counter-assaults have been early morning, firing B-40 and AK. Their positions are well fortified and there is much Russian material in the area.13
May cost the AATTV one soldier killed and ten wounded—four in I Corps and six in the Central Highlands. The Mike Force units from Pleiku were heavily committed in areas south-west of Ban Me Thuot and west of Kontum, where contacts with enemy units up to battalion size were frequent, especially south-west of Ben Het. Warrant Officer Michael Gill, 232 Company, led his platoon in an assault on an enemy position on 6 May, but they were driven back by intense hostile fire. During the assault he was badly wounded and Warrant Officer Ray Simpson carried him out of the battle to an evacuation point. Two aircraft made an attempt to land, but took fire and the evacuation
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was aborted, and Warrant Officer Gill died that night. He was Mentioned in Despatches for his personal bravery in this fight. (Ironically, had Warrant Officer Gill survived it is probable he would have received a much higher award). Sergeant David Scheele, who commanded another platoon in the company on 11 May, displayed personal courage and aggressive leadership in the extremely hazardous conditions for which he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. During the same operation, Warrant Officer Andrew ‘Jock’ Kelly was wounded and separated from the main body of his troops in a position that was covered by enemy observation and fire. Captain Green, the US Battalion Commander, went to his assistance with a small group of Montagnard, but he was killed. Ray Simpson now organised two platoons to move with him to the point of contact where they came under heavy fire, and all but a few of the soldiers retreated. Jock Kelly told what happened to Training Command, Australia, as part of their oral history tapes on the AATTV: I contacted ‘Simmo’ (on the radio) and told him what had happened, what features we had cleared and so on. Simmo said,‘Okay, I’m coming in.’ I was there for a couple of hours, I suppose. In the meantime Brian Walsh came forward and he managed to drag me behind a tree after a God-almighty burst of gunfire went between us, but in the same burst I got shot through the backside. Then Simmo came on the scene, but the Montagnard would not come forward with him. He got up to me and he brought an American medic with him who administered first aid to me. Simmo went further forward towards the North Vietnamese Army where he took up the classic sitting position and started to return fire, and he was on his own!14
Kelly was dragged out of harm’s way and carried back to a landing zone that had been selected by Captain Peter Rothwell who had come out to the operation with Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd on a visit. Rothwell had moved from Pleiku to a staff position at HQ 5th Special Forces Group in March and he had only seven days left in country. Lloyd had manned the rear link during this ordeal and he was none too pleased with the support they got, and he said so in no uncertain terms. The first attempt to get Kelly out in a Dustoff helicopter was thwarted by fire from a heavy machine gun. Peter Rothwell then convinced several
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Montagnards, ‘at the point of a CAR-15’, to carry Kelly back to where Lloyd was, and from there he was evacuated to hospital. Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd praised the professional efforts of the Australians, Americans and some Montagnards during the contact, but overall he thought the operation was a shambles, and he told the Americans there was a need for improvement: I said that unless things improved with regard to training the Montagnard and gathering better intelligence before committing elements then I would have to recommend to my Australian commander that Australians with Special Forces be withdrawn.15
Warrant Officer Ray Simpson was awarded the Victoria Cross for his repeated acts of personal bravery in this operation. However, the normally implacable Simpson was angered by the actions of the Montagnards as he wrote in his after-action report: On the 11th, when we moved to the area where Kelly was and we were about 60 metres away, I observed a leaderless rabble. The majority of the company were sitting around doing nothing. We moved down and made contact with Walsh and Kelly where SSGT [Staff Sergeant] Homberg, the medic, administered first aid.The ‘Yards’ refused to obey their leaders and the advisers. They were completely demoralised. The enemy concentrated his main firepower, a 12.7 mm machine gun, on the area and the Yards had had enough. I ordered the advisers to carry Kelly to the rear, which they did. Subsequently Walsh rejoined me, and Rothwell looked after the preparations for the Dustoff.16
On 24 May, in Kontum Province,Warrant Officer Keith Payne was in command of 212 Company when they hit a superior enemy force. Payne temporarily held off the enemy’s assaults, but despite his outstanding efforts they were forced to withdraw. Keith Payne covered the withdrawal. He then stopped the remnants of two Mike Force companies who were now in a disorderly withdrawal, and organised a night defensive position. During the night he went alone from this defensive position to the previous battle site to gather and bring soldiers back into the established perimeter. His sustained and heroic personal efforts, which were
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outstanding and undoubtedly saved the lives of a large number of his soldiers and fellow advisers, won him the Victoria Cross. In somewhat of a surprise move, the AATTV Pleiku report for August recommended that ‘although not essential, redeployment of Warrant Officer Payne—if easily accomplished—would be desirable, as a personality clash exists between him and Warrant Officer McLaughlin’.17
In I Corps, Warrant Officer John Barker, serving with 5/2 ARVN Battalion, had been active from late April into early May on Operation Lam Son 277/1 during which he reported one rather unpleasant experience: The lead company again began to receive heavy 82-mm mortar fire causing them to break and retreat. The Command Post also began to fall back. We had no flank or rear protection at this stage. The whole battalion then began to flee to Hill 162 in a disorganised rout casting off field packs and weapons en-route—during this incident the battalion commander was seriously wounded by mortar fire.18
This was a far cry from the satisfaction of his first report with this battalion. Over the next few days the battalion made several efforts to attack the enemy who were in well-fortified positions. Heavy artillery, tanks (including a flame-tank) and air strikes were used in support. Although they eventually secured the objective, it was a difficult battle that cost the ARVN 35 dead and 92 wounded for an enemy toll of 117. Hasty withdrawals-cum-retreats were not all one-sided. Many North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units broke under the crushing firepower available to the allies, but these were not frequently reported.The South Vietnamese episodes, on the other hand, are more apparent owing to the greater transparency in the reporting of battles by advisers and, in particular, the press.Why did it happen? Strong and capable commanders held units together and if the leaders were incapacitated then a unit would generally stumble. Sometimes the unrelenting pressure of battle was too much for even the best to endure, and if a unit was of a poorer quality, the chances of them fleeing in heavy contact was greater. Perhaps there
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were occasions when the Vietnamese soldiers thought that the Americans would save them, which may have taken some of the sting from their willingness to do battle. The enemy did break, but conceivably from a northerners’ point of view, other than to desert, they had no place to which they could run.That may have helped hold units steady, especially those with families still in the North. Some advisers have also said that NVA battle behaviour may have been no different to the ARVN if large Chinese formations, for example, had been available to take the brunt of the fighting. Senior NVA General Van Tien Dung’s opinion that followed the 1975 defeat of the South was more telling. He said, in his report on the victory, that the infantry of the North was not much superior to the infantry of the South.19 Warrant Officer Ron Gurney, travelling with 3/2 ARVN Battalion a bit further to the east, expressed his frustration at the lack of coordination in the clearance of US fire support for his unit’s operations around A-1 Fire Support Base which was to the south-east of Gio Linh: I believe that the proposed reduction of artillery advisers is having an adverse effect now. Once the fact is accepted we may get back to a sane and sensible co-operation on clearance of US support. A possible immediate solution is the placing of ARVN arty liaison groups with US batteries in support of ARVN troops.20
Another adviser recalled his experience with artillery approvals for requests for fire: I’d just written a letter to my wife and told her how beautiful the view of the sea was from the top of our hill. It was a lovely warm day and I had my boots off. Suddenly my Vietnamese signaller ran to me and he was babbling a million words a minute. ‘There,’ he yelled, and pointed at a large group of enemy in columns, moving at a light infantry pace across the flat land in the shadow of the hills. They were like a bloody centipede contouring the end of the spur lines and I tried to crank up some guns. Well, by the time I’d convinced them I had what looked like 300–400 in the open, the enemy started to disappear across a stream and into the beginnings of a tree line. I managed to get a couple of salvos in the general area and then walked them out along what I thought was their route, but stopped the guns when I couldn’t see the ‘splash’ [impact].
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Do you know what? No one gave a stuff! The Vietnamese went back to sleep, and the guns turned to another target after I told them they must have hit something; probably another fictitious body count. I eventually calmed down, put my boots on and went and kept a very close eye on the foothills.21
Further south, in the 2nd ARVN Division’s tactical area, 1/6 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Tom Dolan, had a successful encounter near Binh Son, Quang Ngai Province, on 17 May. In Quang Tin Province, on 20 May, Warrant Officer Jack Morrison with 1/5 ARVN Battalion and Captain Russell Smith killed at least 20 Viet Cong and captured a crew-served weapon. Smith recorded a memory of an earlier incident that would have had all those who knew Jack Morrison nodding in agreement: The first time I came under enemy fire I stood on the edge of a paddy checking our position when I suddenly felt very alone. On looking around I noted everyone had gone to ground and had no idea why. Jack Morrison ‘whispered’ in a controlled roar,‘Sir! The sounds you are hearing are you being shot at and whilst standing out there you are attracting attention in Mrs Morrison’s much-loved husband’s direction; get the fuck out of it or otherwise she may take to you. Sir!’ This was one of the times he rolled his eyes heavenwards! I hadn’t heard a thing!22
AATTV casualties for June 1969 were one killed and two wounded. Contacts with the enemy in I Corps were reported as light, but for an adviser in the midst of any fire fight all clashes were significant. Major Francis Johnston, senior Australian at I Corps HQ, reported the following encounters: 6 June, 5/2 ARVN (Battalion) mortared at A-2 FSB. 8 June, 4/2 ARVN mortared west of Gio Linh, 80 rounds. 10 June, 4/2 ARVN, 65 rounds mortar. 17 June, 1/2 ARVN attacked at C-1 FSB unknown sized force, 58 enemy dead—45 weapons, friendly casualties light. 17 June, 2/1 ARVN, killed 13 west of Quang Tri City. 18 June, UH-1D shot down westnorthwest Quang Ngai City. 2/4 ARVN recovered bodies of crew
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under enemy fire. 20 June, 2/6 ARVN, northwest of Quang Ngai City, mortared and attacked by (est.) two North Vietnamese Army companies. ARVN lost 7 KIA and 23 WIA, enemy 25 KIA. CO AATTV was present during the contact.23
Warrant Officer William Brown, a medical adviser, had finished his 12-month tour of duty and was on his way home in June. His job had been to advise and assist those who were responsible for the ARVN hospital situated in Hue and to provide support for their medical specialists serving in several villages nearby. He recorded these memories of his time in the Hue area: I cannot speak highly enough of my fellow US advisers. They were dedicated to their task and appreciative of a can of VB, but not Vegemite! Our rapport and support for each other was excellent. I also provided administrative support for Team members serving out of Hue. When I visited some of the villages we would lunch with the village chief. During these social occasions I did get the distinct impression that village chiefs had three major thoughts regarding their responsibilities. These were: the planting and harvesting of the twice-yearly rice crops, a sneaking regard for Chairman Ho and his efforts to reunite the two Viet Nams, and very little regard for the South Vietnamese government. Their positions regarding Ho and the government made me do a lot of thinking about our role and the slogan of ‘Seven Flags defending Democracy’. However, I kept my own counsel on these matters and represented our Flag by carrying out my duties to the best of my ability. One noteworthy event I remember was Denis Gibbons, the freelance journalist, who arrived in Hue to do a story on the reopening of the railway passenger service between Hue and Danang. Denis was writing for the Sydney Morning Herald. The line had been inoperative for the previous two years and the reopening was a big step forward in showing how we were winning the war. I drove Denis down to the Hue railway station at 0700 hrs and bade him goodbye. At about 1130 hrs Denis reappeared in the compound;‘Charlie’ had blown the train off the tracks a few kilometres out of Hue! During my second visit to Australia House in Danang, I raised the question of the difficulty I was having in the transport department. One of our admin men there indicated that he might be able to assist. Sure enough his contact was able to supply a Jeep in return for a case of frozen steak and a case of whiskey. Back at the house someone produced
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our khaki vehicle paint and the essential boomerang and kangaroo templates to complete the task. Behold a fair dinkum Australian Jeep! It should not have shocked me, but it did, to discover that bubonic plague was still a problem in Viet Nam. Several of us decided that we could do a little towards limiting the effects of this disease by conducting an inoculation program in the nearby village of Phu Bai. The three member advisory team plus two US specialists and an ARVN sergeant for interpreter duties with boxes of vaccination drove into the Phu Bai market place and set up shop. The next half hour provided some real fear for us all as we were quickly mobbed as a huge crowd turned up and demanded their ‘shot’.We tried to close the operation down and it looked like getting ugly when a section of ARVN soldiers arrived on the scene and restored order.We high-tailed it back to Hue and decided that we had to do things differently.We did, and the whole show went well with hundreds being vaccinated but, sad to say, we never had a breakdown of the figures to indicate how many Viet Cong we treated!24
It is a well-known fact that in their own minds all soldiers, regardless of their age, are ten feet tall and bulletproof. This next piece from Bill Brown is an example of how this sometimes translates into actions we would rather forget: My biggest headache came from getting the courier out of Saigon back to Saigon, especially on wet days, as flights were limited and always fully loaded. On one occasion whilst taking a courier back to Phu Bai we came across an accident in the village involving a Honda motorcycle, a small child and a woman. The child was unconscious and appeared to have suffered a fractured skull. I loaded the child and mother into the Jeep and, at that moment another Jeep arrived, which was driven by a US Marine top sergeant. He said, and I quote,‘Follow Me!’We did, and after handing over our wee patient to a US Medical establishment for treatment, Hank informed us that he was an operative in flight movements out of Phu Ba, a great contact. He proved his worth by organising a flight for my courier in double-quick time. So we went off to his hut for a drink and a bonding session. Several hours later after visiting, among others, the ‘Sea-Bees’ boozer and the Press Club, I was more than a little intoxicated. At about midnight I got the urge to return to Hue, despite the protestations of Hank. I duly left Phu Bai, after an extensive debate with the US sentries on the gates, and drove back to Hue. I knew I was safe
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because of three things: one I had my trusty .45 on the seat alongside me—that would fix the bastards if they dared, two, I had a good vehicle and the road was open—like I was the only vehicle on the road, and three, I was an Australian and therefore indestructible! Hank turned up next day with my shirt and slouch hat fully expecting to learn of my demise. That was the dumbest thing I ever did.25
In II Corps, the Mobile Strike Force activities in June centred on operations in the Dak To–Ben Het area where the battalions formed part of Task Force Linh.The Commanding Officer AATTV later sent a critical appraisal on this operation to COMAFV: A great deal of publicity has been given to this operation and the battle success of the Task Force. Members of AATTV, who were involved over the entire period, said that this publicity is highly exaggerated. It is considered that the US statement, which indicated that South Vietnamese forces and commanders are now able to stand on their own feet and handle enemy operational pressure of the kind involved in the Ben Het area, is not a truthful representation of the situation as it occurred at Ben Het and does not accurately indicate the current situation regarding South Vietnamese forces.26
The Ben Het camp had been shelled for 19 consecutive days up to 26 June, when it was estimated that just over 1500 rounds had hit the camp area. An enemy deserter stated that the intention was to destroy the camp to support the North’s position at the Paris conference. The Mike Force had been put in the area on the 23rd ‘to relieve the pressure on Ben Het by close patrolling with the aim of breaking up the North Vietnamese Army elements harassing the camp’.27 Warrant Officer John Vincent remembered the valour of two Americans in this contact. He wrote: ‘The US Special Force soldiers I worked with were highly skilled, very professional and brave men. I remember the two Americans who died trying to recover [Warrant Officer] Brian Walsh’s body in the middle of a contact with the North Vietnamese Army [on 6 May].’28 On the same day, Captain David Rowe was wounded and
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hospitalised in Pleiku, and Captain Peter Harris was also wounded, but remained on duty. Further south, training of Regional Force personnel by AATTV at the 18 ARVN Division Heavyweight Training Centre continued and was reported to be satisfactory even though there were some difficulties caused by the lack of ranges and close training areas. Soldiers detached from 5 and 9 RAR assisted Warrant Officers Clem Kealy,Walter Frost and Allan Joyce with the training. Captain David Savage, Chief Instructor of the Long Range Patrol Wing, had a few disciplinary problems with members of the 3/69 Course and a lieutenant and four others were removed from an otherwise successful course.
In IV Corps, the enemy followed their previous pattern of indirect-fire attacks, and ground assaults against the most vulnerable targets, which were generally successful.The Australian Village Defence Advisory Teams program had made slow but steady progress, and in doing so the teams needed to provide more than military expertise as the monthly AATTV report of June 1969 recorded: The men have assisted and advised on village self-help and administration. The Team must be prepared to advise in these and other non-military fields if they are to be accepted at this level. The maturity and downto-earth approach of the older and more experienced members of AATTV makes them admirably suited to this project.29
These were not new ideas, but principles lost from earlier times.To defeat a revolutionary enemy, the incumbent government had to provide the basic comforts of life as well as beating the enemy’s soldiers on the battlefield. It required a complex mix of skills that were often lost in the very large military quagmire that now existed in Viet Nam. The US ambassador, Maxwell O. Taylor, had expressed caution, prior to the
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deployment of US Marines in 1965, that the danger was the Vietnamese would sit back and let the foreigners do it all. Many others believed the same. Nixon’s administration now wanted to turn the tide. When Melvin Laird, US Secretary of Defense, went to Viet Nam in March 1969, he told hierarchy that it was their task ‘to promptly and methodically’ shift the combat burden to the Vietnamese. This would turn into the phrase ‘Vietnamisation’. Laird wanted to move 50–70 000 US troops out by the end of 1969.30 The pattern of warfare throughout the country remained relatively unchanged in July. There was a lull in I Corps for the first two weeks of the month and then moderate increases of enemy activity in the latter weeks. Major Frank Johnston, serving as a staff officer in Danang, reported to AATTV that the slowdown experienced in early July should not engender a false sense of security. All available information tends to indicate the enemy is placing an increased emphasis upon reaching a political solution to the war. However, the enemy does maintain the capability to launch attacks up to regimental size. My personal opinion based on my assessment of US activity in I CTZ [Corps Tactical Zone] is that preparations are being made by the US to go and go quickly. 9 July, 4/2 ARVN [Battalion], attacked by North Vietnamese Army force southeast of Gio Linh. Twenty-eight enemy soldiers killed with light friendly casualties. 17 July, HQ 3 ARVN Regiment mortared and attacked by a North Vietnamese Army Sapper Battalion who suffered 23 killed. On the same day, 2/54 ARVN [Battalion] took 40 rounds of 60-mm mortar. On 20 July, 1/1 ARVN [Battalion] killed 25 North Vietnamese Army and found a hospital complex of 50 huts. Contacts continued over two days and 118 bodies were found buried in the general area.31
Captain David Paul, who was with 3/3 ARVN Battalion in the A Shau Valley in the last week of June, submitted a translated document with his July report that provided the details of a North Vietnamese Army artillery unit in the area, which was identified as the 675th Brigade: The unit started infiltration in November 1967 and they came from Hoa Binh through Laos to South Viet Nam. In May 1968 they began operations in the Tri-Thien-Hue Military Zone.32
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The captured document named the battalions’ officers, and listed its main equipment as: ‘1 x battalion 85-mm and 2 x battalions of D-74, 122-mm artillery. In April 1969 their strength was 916 men. They had 38 guns and over 100 trucks’.33 July also saw Captain Peter Harris replace David Savage as the Chief Instructor Long Range Patrol Wing at Van Kiep in III Corps. Savage then visited a number of units in III and IV Corps to get information on Long Range Patrol deployments. Central Training Command was told, but it was now possible that the course would just fade away. On a visit to IV Corps, the Commanding Officer conducted a detailed examination of the Village Defence Advisory Team (VDAT) projects in July and he wrote this report, which echoed past programs of the early 1960s: Progress varied considerably and methods in some cases caused teams to get bogged down and diverted to side issues. It is quite clear there is a big job to be done and the need is recognised. A written method of operation was prepared for the VDAT, which should help push the project along. The emphasis was placed on ensuring the Vietnamese chiefs realised they were responsible for security, not the advisers. It is hard to judge how much success we will have in this project, as it will take time. However, it is clearly evident that it is in the village/hamlet area that the basic issues of the war in Viet Nam exist, particularly in the Delta. The recent increased infiltration by the enemy and the importance placed by the enemy on the Peoples’ Self Defence Force (PSDF) in the villages and hamlets emphasises this.34
Although there were 192 incidents recorded in the I Corps Duty Log for units with AATTV advisers in August 1969, the majority of the contacts were indirect-fire and harassing probes with light casualties recorded for both sides. Warrant Officer Robert Desmond Cameron, later awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal, was wounded by a white phosphorus grenade booby trap and evacuated to Chu Lai on 2 August.The biggest clash was between 1/2 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Class One Stan Rosenberg, and a reinforced company from the 27th North Vietnamese Army Regiment, on 18 August, in which 32 enemy were killed. Warrant Officer Ron O’Brien, with 4/5 ARVN Battalion, was wounded by mortar fire on 20 August west of Tam Ky and he was
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evacuated to Chu Lai.To illustrate just how long some operations could take, elements of the 4th and 5th ARVN Regiments finished Operation Lien Ket that had started on 20 April. The toll was: friendly 126 killed and 408 wounded against more than 800 enemy killed. However, as Major Johnston’s monthly report said, the US forces in I Corps bore the brunt of the attacks during August: All things taken into account it seems that the enemy has lost some of his ability to sustain operations.The enemy continued to either destroy or otherwise render ineffective the local government administration and pacification assets and programs. Once again in spite of the increase in incidents no ARVN unit was involved in heavy contact. Facts show that the US forces were the ones involved in heavy contacts. Whether the US forces were set upon deliberately is not known, but this does give an indication of the scale of activity, which Vietnamese forces would need to handle if the US withdrew from I Corps Tactical Zone.35
Warrant Officer Ron Gurney, who had served with 3/2 ARVN Battalion in the northern area of I Corps, wrote his final report in August prior to going south to the training centre at Heavyweight. His report highlighted the experience of the battalion’s officers: The Commanding Officer has been with the battalion for 13 years, and has been the CO for three years.The XO [Executive Officer] has been with the unit for five years, he is a good leader and is never fazed or rushed into things and if he cannot comply, he says so. He is willing to speak out when he doesn’t agree. Lieutenants command all the companies except one. It is a real benefit to be an adviser with the companies as they will seek advice, but only after rapport is established, which takes time.36
Mike Force units in II Corps also had a quiet month in August. Major Bill Brydon’s 1st Battalion was finally able to recover Captain Green’s body from the Ben Het area without incident. He had been killed in May trying to help Jock Kelly. Captain David Rowe, 2nd Battalion, reported that the results of the month were not outstanding, but they were successful: The Montagnards have improved to a marked degree. It appeared they felt at home in an area where the enemy were in squad-sized groups
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and were unwilling to make sustained contact. It is still my opinion that this unit requires further training and there is an eight-day period scheduled after the next operation that should raise the standard.37
The monthly report from IV Corps also said that enemy activity remained at a low level until mid-month. Indirect fire, harassment and road interdiction increased in the latter half of August. Large enemy formations were also reported to be on the move from Cambodia and around the Seven-Mountains to Kien Giang Province.
Ho Chi Minh was 79 when he died on 3 September and the Viet Cong Liberation Radio announced a cease-fire would start on the 8th to respect his passing. Enemy activity in I Corps declined during September with only twelve recorded clashes between units with AATTV advisers and the enemy. There were indications that there would be a general pullback towards the east by ARVN and US forces owing to the proposal to withdraw the 3rd US Marine Division from the north-west of Quang Tri Province. Captain David Paul, with 3/3 ARVN Battalion, wrote a report that Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd recommended be sent to the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra to help train new advisers. Captain Paul’s paper highlighted his unit’s general weaknesses in infantry minor tactics, which included: bad orders, use of gunships rather than follow-up, company patrols rather than platoons to match the enemy’s squads, crowding in defensive positions and the lack of ambushes: Although it is easy to understand the ARVN soldier’s reluctance to become involved in heavy contact, I feel it has reached an alarmingly high level. The CO believes he has been promoted over by his juniors and desires only to last the war out so that he can retire to civilian life. They have little confidence in their ability to survive should they become engaged in heavy contact and are perhaps confused by the American withdrawals and Paris talks. My solution—Peace!38
All other AATTV reports for the month listed low or minor levels of contact.The Montagnard Mobile Training Team that operated through
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the Highlands had been reduced to two men, Captain Bill Deane and Warrant Officer George Jamieson, both AATTV.Warrant Officer Robert Carter, who had been with the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) program for seven months, was redeployed as the senior PRU adviser in Tuyen Duc Province, and was based in Dalat. The problems with Long Range Patrol misemployment by the ARVN continued, and there were some rumblings of discontent at the PRU in Phuoc Tuy Province that were resolved. In IV Corps, teething problems associated with the Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT) saw them have varying, but improved success.The thrust was to expedite the spread of VDAT influence [spreading oil drop of 1964], and to produce example hamlets and villages. In Saigon, the hierarchy in the MACV department for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was now very interested in the concept.
MACV announced that US casualties from late September through October were the lowest for the past three years; their strength at this time went below 500 000. The Team recorded relatively low levels of activity around the country, but Warrant Officer Tom Dolan was wounded by mortar fire on 2 October and was evacuated to Australia. In the Mobile Strike Force areas, contact was also light. Major Brydon expressed his concern about the lack of suitable artillery fire support on his last operation, which he discussed with Lloyd, Commanding Officer of the AATTV. American Special Force commanders said they ‘were aware of the shortfall and every effort was to be made to ensure it did not occur again’. Lloyd reported that adequate and readily available air support was on call and that probably tempered his dissatisfaction.39 An increase in the number of Team personnel to Phuoc Tuy Province required that four more men be transferred in from other teams around the country and by 9 November there would be six warrant officers with Regional Force, Peoples’ Self Defence Force and Revolutionary Development; two warrant officers with 1 ATF in ARVN training, and one captain with four warrant officers on Long Range Patrol training. Warrant Officer Charles ‘Chicka’ Ison moved to the Rung Sat Special
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Zone in November, but the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit program was to be reduced over the next 8–12 months to a point where it would cease at unit level.The low enemy activity in IV Corps was a reflection of all other areas and despite evidence of increased North Vietnamese Army infiltration into South Viet Nam, there were no major contacts. Major Johnston, I Corps, wrote in November that, in his opinion, there would be a major offensive later in the year or by early January 1970: ARVN and US sources think that an enemy offensive will happen in late December, which was based on troop movements, and the lack of North Vietnamese Army activity that indicated a period of training and refit. Some sources said that the enemy was hurting badly, but prisoners were well-fed and clothed, it is therefore difficult to see how such a claim can be substantiated.40
Early in the month, elements of the 4th Regiment, 2/4 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Bruce Davies and Warrant Officer Daniel Burke with 1/4 ARVN Battalion, had contacts in the Mo Duc and Duc Pho districts of Quang Ngai.Warrant Officer Geoff Horne with 4/5 ARVN Battalion had a contact south-east of Que Son, which was north-west of Tam Ky.Action in Quang Tri Province was scattered and light until midmonth when an increase in tempo took place mainly to the north-west of Cam Lo. Warrant Officer Duncan Strachan serving with 1/2 ARVN Battalion, was involved in a series of contacts that included American forces, which recorded 183 enemy killed for moderate friendly losses. Warrant Officer Edward Taylor’s 5/2 ARVN Battalion was mortared twice on 14 November.The first salvo of 89 rounds of 82-mm mortar, did not cause any casualties, but later that day they took another 50 rounds which caused light casualties and killed the US senior adviser. Extracts from the Headquarters I Corps ARVN log for the remainder of the month included the following report: 17 November, 161 RF Company and 3 Troop, 17th Cavalry,WO1 Ron Almond, contacted an enemy force nine kilometres south of Hoi An in which 37 enemy were killed and 42 captured, they probably came from V.25 Main Force Battalion. On 23 November 3/4 ARVN [Battalion], Warrant Officer Bob Cameron, was attacked, they counter-attacked and killed two. Captain Tony Mogridge and Warrant Officer Kevin Brady, 2/6 ARVN, killed five enemy on 24 November. On 27 November the
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21st Ranger Battalion,Warrant Officer Des Aylett, ambushed an enemy force and killed 12 of them.41
In II Corps, the Mobile Strike Force battalions also experienced an increase in enemy activity. Both battalions were deployed in the area of Bu Prang to the north-west of Dalat very near the Cambodian border. Major Brydon’s 1st Battalion was heavily involved in the period from 30 October to 15 November, when they suffered seven killed, including one US Special Force soldier, and 36 wounded, which included two AATTV men,Warrant Officer Frank Moffitt and Warrant Officer Clem Black, who were both evacuated to Australia on 2 December. After that contact there was little or no contact with the enemy. Major Brydon was critical of the abandonment of one of the American fire support bases in the area and he spoke with the Commanding Officer who passed the information to AFV in his monthly report: One of the US FSB [Fire Support Base], which had been set up near Bu Prang, perhaps need not have been abandoned, as the enemy pressure on it bore no resemblance to that reported in the press or through US military channels. There was an abundance of air support available, but it was uncoordinated. The Montagnards performed well under the circumstances.The enemy also used artillery from within Cambodia and the fire was accurate and effective.The operation was ARVN controlled and a degree of confusion and inefficiency was evident.A small number of 4th US Infantry Division ground troops were committed and on the whole they performed badly.42
In Phuoc Tuy Province, there was considerable confusion and argument over the security of the training centre site known as Heavyweight. Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd made it quite clear that without a secure area the Regional Force training programs would not continue. A new site needed to be selected and facilities built, a task that neither AATTV nor 1 ATF would accept because it was a Vietnamese responsibility.The warrant officer trainers would, in the meantime, be used on a mobile training team and be accommodated at Van Kiep. November was extrememly eventful for IV Corps, which experienced a large increase in enemy activity in the Mekong Delta. Allied casualties were reported to be high.Warrant Officer Kevin Troy died of illness on 23 November at the 3rd US Surgical Hospital located near Can Tho.
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Meanwhile, the Village Defence Advisory Team operation continued to improve and MACV decided to devote more effort from their Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) into hamlet and village defence. However, the AATTV reported that it was doubtful the US MAT would be able to cope: The quality of MACV MAT efforts is severely restricted by the lack of experienced US officer team leaders and to an extent MAT members. [See the warning made at the 19 February 1962 meeting in Honolulu.] The complexities of advice required at this level will probably be beyond the standard of maturity and experience that exists now in the MAT.43
Lieutenant William Calley, Jr. was ordered to stand trial by general courtmartial on 24 November on charges of premeditated murder of 109 Vietnamese in My Lai Hamlet back in March 1968. An Australian who was in Quang Ngai remembered the day the investigating officer raced up to the Kramer Compound: We were shoved aside by his entourage. I remember how amused I was by this three star general, chomping on a cigar, and measuring bullet angles through some tree trunks that they had brought out of the area. We didn’t know what was going on, but when one bloke told me it was evidence of the shooting in the area, we all laughed—even the Vietnamese. The area of the My Lai hamlets had been an enemy stronghold forever, and had been brassed up by everyone, including the French,Viet Minh, Japanese, Americans and us.We jumped in our Jeeps and sped off in search of a cold beer and covered them in a bit of dust, which pleased me.44
Prime Minister John Gorton announced on 16 December 1969 that a withdrawal of Australian troops would start in concert with the American redeployments after their Phase III, although in September he had said America’s move would not result in an Australian withdrawal. Politically, such matters would have been unpalatable to discuss earlier with an election due on 25 October, and 8 RAR’s order to be in Viet Nam in November.The announcement made not one iota of difference
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to the advisers in the field, who continued to face the daily realities on the ground in Viet Nam. With the exception of IV Corps, December was a light month, and enemy-initiated incidents fell to their lowest levels since January 1967. The AATTV’s I Corps report for December sounded a little apologetic following the November analysis of impending doom: This was in sharp contrast to the indications forecast in the last AATTV report. It would appear that the enemy has not been able to build up in his staging areas. It is considered this reflects the higher standard of ARVN, RF and PF units and the successful pacification programs in the two northern provinces.45
The situation in the southern provinces of the Corps Tactical Zone was not as good. ARVN operations were confined to the coastal plain, which was due to the continued presence of enemy units in the area that now had a very high North Vietnamese Army content. Lloyd reported that the area around Quang Ngai was of major importance to the enemy’s plans for a future settlement of the war. Despite this, he was encouraged by the improved operations of the 2nd Division, especially the 4th Regiment: I took part in one of their battalion operations, which involved the combat assault by helicopter of companies into numerous LZ over a large area.The operation was successful and showed clear indications of good use of up to date information, increased delegation of authority and a real attempt to close with and destroy the enemy.46
AATTV units in the 1st and 2nd Division tactical areas had twenty reported contacts in the month. The monthly summary listed the daily contacts: 1 December, 4/1 ARVN [Battalion], Warrant Officer George Logan; 2 December, 3/3 ARVN, Captain Doug Tear and Warrant Officer Raymond Heathcote; 5 December, several contacts, 3/17 Cavalry, WO1 Ron Almond, and 21 Rangers, Warrant Officer Tony ‘Kiwi’ Breakwell, and 3/1 ARVN, Warrant Officer Barry Young; 6 December, 21 Rangers, Breakwell; 7 December, 1/4 ARVN, Captain John Nelson and Warrant Officer Daniel Burke, and 1/1 ARVN, Warrant Officer Jack Fitzgerald; 8 December, 1/4 ARVN, Nelson and Burke; 9 December 4/1 ARVN,
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Logan, and 3/4 ARVN,Warrant Officer Robert Cameron; 11 December, 1/6 ARVN, Warrant Officer David Eather; 12 December, 2/5 ARVN, Warrant Officer Kenneth Heard; 14 December, 6th Regiment Recon Coy during which Warrant Officer William Dunstan was wounded and eventually evacuated to Australia; 18 December, 3/4 ARVN, Cameron; 19 December, 2/4 ARVN, Warrant Officer Bruce Davies, and on 22 December, 2/5 ARVN, Warrant Officer Ken Heard.47
December also marked the handover of Captain Deane and his team with the Montagnard Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) to Vietnamese control, but the decision to base the training in Vung Tau (in southern Phuoc Tuy Province) was reversed. Nevertheless, there were misgivings about the PRU program and the three AATTV personnel with PRU would not be replaced at the end of their tours. Russell Lloyd supported Captain Deane’s comments on his PRU experiences, although Lloyd said ‘his [Deane’s] comments do not apply to the same degree [to the PRU] with members of AATTV’. He added: If the four provinces in which I have seen PRU and Phoenix operate are typical, then the effectiveness of the PRU has not justified the expense or effort put into it. However, ignoring that, an important side-benefit to the US may be that they now have a much clearer idea of South Viet Nam’s ability and inclination to resist Viet Cong activity away from battlefields. There appears to be a marked lack of commitment to the Allied cause amongst the population, chiefly manifested in the paucity of information on Viet Cong Infrastructure.48
A combination of factors finally cancelled the Regional Force training project that was at Heavyweight, and the AATTV trainers were allocated to Popular Force projects in the province. Phuoc Tuy Province was also stumbling through the diversified hamlet—village programs that had Popular Force, People’s Self Defence Force and Revolutionary Development elements were all making an effort to reach the same goal, but in a fragmented manner. Commanding Officer AATTV suggested
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to the Deputy Provincial Senior Adviser that the advisory teams divide themselves into two or three teams along IV Corps VDAT lines. The AATTV teams in the Delta made good progress except one in Vinh Long Province that was to be redeployed into Kien Hoa in February 1970. Preliminary talks on the future of infrastructure projects in the Delta considered a plan to enlarge the program in 1970 and, although no decision was made, there was a possibility of AATTV supervising and training US Mobile Advisory Teams. The AATTV now had 98 men spread across all four corps zones: Quang Tri fifteen; Thua Thien thirteen; Quang Nam nine; Quang Tin two; Quang Ngai nine; Pleiku eleven; Kontum one; Binh Dinh one (Qui Nhon);Tuyen Duc one (Dalat); Khanh Hoa one (Duc My); Phuoc Tuy fourteen; Saigon nine, and twelve in six provinces in IV Corps. Probably the most isolated adviser was Warrant Officer L.B.‘Abe’ Green who was with an ARVN Cavalry troop at Dak To, which was about 50 kilometres north of Kontum along Route 14 in the Central Highlands.Abe recalled his time in this far-flung and very isolated outpost: Dak To was a fortified compound that had previously seen a great deal of fighting.What remained of the compound comprised an airstrip that paralleled Highway 512, an ARVN Artillery regiment, and a various assortment of other ARVN and US troops. Tucked away within their own compound was a detachment of US Studies and Observation Group (SOG)49 troops who operated over the border along the Ho Chi Minh trail. I remember one operation at the top end along road 512 just south of Ben Het when we stopped in a dry dusty clearing for the midday meal and I got off the APC to have a leak. I walked back along the tracks of the APC to a little bush some dozen paces away and proceeded to give it a thorough drenching when I heard a click under my boot. I looked down and could see a ring of fine dust forming under the edge of my boot. My first thought was, shit a mine, my second was, now I will be blown to bits with my dick in my hand and that will not look good. I looked around for a stick or something to have a poke at what I was standing on. The only sticks handy were on the little bush I had just drowned, but I had no choice so I broke off a twig and carefully scratched around under this very visible circle of dust, and to my relief, found I had trodden on the edge of an old lid from a 105-mm artillery
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case.When I stood up, after what seemed like hours, I think every Viet in the Troop was staring at me no doubt thinking I had gone nuts . . . and I knew it was no good trying to explain.50
At the end of the year Australian forces numbered 7672, which included 5, 6 and 9 RAR and supporting units. Australian and New Zealand forces suffered 99 fatalities in 1969 of which four were AATTV. There were now 483 326 American forces in South Viet Nam.
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9 The bleak times 1970 The bleak times
This year was to be one of change; most advisers who had come back felt it. The Americans had circled the wagons and cracks of frustration appeared in some teams, not that Australians were without fault: When I came back in late 1969 to an area where I had been previously, I felt stifled by the military bureaucracy. Bloody paperwork and initials to get fire support and everyone protected their arse, and I don’t mean from the enemy.1
In January,Warrant Officer Don Killion told Headquarters AATTV of his challenges and frustrations as an adviser to the Medical Platoon, Administration and Direct Support Logistics Company, based in Hue: Second Lieutenant (2LT) Ngoc is only a figurehead. He appears to have no control over the staff. E7 [platoon sergeant] Thuan rules this platoon. He is, in my opinion, a troublemaker and anti-adviser, as all of my advice has been rejected although 2LT Ngoc agrees with me on most points.2
Killion went on to say that the medical platoon’s greatest needs were instruments and basic equipment.The Vietnamese system needed to obtain the items rather than have advisers ‘scrounging’ (often another word for stealing) for them, which Don Killion would not do. His critical 162
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assessment on the deployment of medical advisers brought an instruction from Thua Thien Sector to produce a detailed Standard Operating Procedure. His report concluded: My task would be made easier if the majority of medical advisers in this province were motivated and not lacking in initiative. There is so much that can be done in the medical field, but I’m afraid if the type of person that work in this province continue to appear in Viet Nam, no real progress will be achieved.3
Men like Don Killion were some of the unsung heroes of Viet Nam. They were required to perform ‘miracles’ often in the most trying of circumstances. Don remembered what it was like many years later: We went to the provincial civilian hospital. Even I was shocked at the state of decay and filthiness of that facility. Vietnamese standards were worse than anything I had ever encountered.We were walking along a wide, open veranda and saw a young couple with dishevelled clothes and unwashed bodies. On the ground, lying on a filthy mat was a baby. I could not tell the sex as the child had been burnt from the waist down. The parents sank to their knees with hands out seeking our assistance. The lieutenant stated that we should quickly move on as the hospital director had given instructions that no assistance from Australian/USA personnel would be allowed in his hospital. One of the most difficult things that I did was to leave those pleading parents. This incident had a profound effect upon my entire time in South Viet Nam.4
Don Killion wore many hats. Not only did he keep the Australians’ fridge full of beer, he instructed at the Divisional Military Hospital, assisted at two Catholic orphanages and taught English at a local high school in the evenings.As the Provincial Medical Supervisor, he was also responsible for another handful of duties, from medical supplies to missing persons: At the 1 ARVN Divisional Hospital, I was involved with the training course for newly conscripted army medical personnel. I started off using a medical interpreter sergeant, but decided I could convey my knowledge by practical demonstrations. This worked extremely well considering that no one on any of the courses spoke English; French was the second language. I also visited (once a week) the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners who were injured and recovering at the Hospital Prison Ward. I noted that nearly all the North Vietnamese soldiers
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were around 14–15 years of age.The Viet Cong patients were extremely hostile and I always kept an eye on them, although most were severely injured and confined to bed. I never felt any hostility from the North Vietnamese patients, who were always pleased to see me. [But the toughest of times was when] I was instructed to visit Nam Hoa District village to ascertain whether it was a fact that the remains of some of the victims of the Tet massacre in 1968 had been found. I cannot, in words, describe the scene that confronted me when I arrived at that place. Approximately a thousand bodies had been retrieved and placed in Nam Hoa Village.A shrine had been erected and the skeletons separated, so that the skulls were together, femur bones together, etc. In front of the shrine was a large open space where skeletons were laid on plastic for identification. It was a devastating sight.5
AATTV units in I Corps were involved in 42 contacts in January; all but two were light contacts. Warrant Officer Duncan Strachan was wounded on 6 January during a day-long fight, but despite his wounds he elected to stay with the Team and was allocated to IV Corps following his recovery in early February. Duncan Strachan was awarded the Military Medal for his outstanding ability, leadership and courage under fire throughout his tour. Warrant Officers Ray O’Hara and Dave Powell were also wounded slightly in January, but they remained on duty. On the 30th, 4/5 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Don Rolph, hit an enemy company well east of Route 1 in the coastal sand dunes, 10 kilometres south of Hoi An, and killed 28. It was also the ‘predicting season’ in the northern provinces; everything, from a Tet Offensive to a major offensive in the winter or spring, was forecast. Rumblings also surfaced in several advisory teams, especially in the 51st Regiment, where Warrant Officer Colin Keioskie serving with 2/51 Battalion, was unhappy with some new rules: The [American] regimental senior adviser now had his own policies, which unfortunately hamper the battalion adviser in his task. Advisers have to record all advice given and actions taken by his counterpart. One is continually compiling reports. He then discusses these reports
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with the regimental commander who then informs the battalion commanders.This had led to a poor relationship between the battalion commander and advisers as the former considers us as spies.The senior adviser was replaced soon after.6
Captain Wally Sheppard, serving with 1/51 ARVN Battalion, wanted to get down with the ‘forward scout’, but MACV would not permit advisers to go below company level, and as Australian advisers were under the operational control of MACV, they were required to ‘respect’ MACV directives. This caused a few vigorous debates as the directive dismayed some Australians. When he finally got approval to go forward, Captain Sheppard found that he couldn’t: Now I’m told we can go down to platoon and squad level.This is desirable because this is where the most tactical advice is required. However, even though I’ve been given a ‘go-ahead’ to assist with their minor tactics, and importantly ambush techniques, I have problems with my advisory team, which prevent me from doing so. The advisory team is one lieutenant, two sergeants and one Private First Class [PFC]. Not one of them has been to an advisers’ course, language training, or commanded anything beyond a squad.The lieutenant is straight out of Officer Cadet School, the PFC is not long out of basic training, and one of the sergeants has spent most of his five years’ service behind a desk in Berlin. They themselves have little concept of minor tactics, let alone the means of conveying such to the Vietnamese. It will be some time before this team starts advising down to platoon and squad level.7
The challenges and frustrations were known by MACV, and up the line to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but again the problem was having sufficient men of the calibre required to have an influence not only in combat units, but also in the pacification roles. In early 1970 the US had approved 487 Mobile Advisory Teams, each to be led by a captain, but by October there were less than 80 captains assigned. Australia also had difficulty maintaining an establishment of advisers that consisted of 100 warrant officers and officers. In January, Mike Force battalions with AATTV advisers-cumcommanders were on operations in the areas of Bu Prang, Ben Het, and Dak Seang and near Pleiku. Warrant Officer Aleck McCloskey was hit by grenade shrapnel on 17 January and was hospitalised until early
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February, when he returned to Mike Force. Strong discussions were now underway within MACV, and up to the Secretary of Defense, on the future of Civilian Irregular Defence Group camps and Mike Force units. This would be a watershed year for the CIDG program and camps were either closed or transferred to the ARVN Ranger corps.The five battalions within 2 Mobile Strike Force were to be reduced to two. Battalions 1 and 3 were to remain as Mike Force, but the others would be converted to Regional Force and/or Popular Force units. Lieutenant Colonel John (Alex) Clark, who assumed command of AATTV on 27 January, expressed caution on the reduction of 2 Mobile Strike Force. He thought ‘it was a bit premature unless the ARVN are prepared to take a more active part in operations in this area’. He added, ‘As this appears to be unlikely I would not be surprised if the phase down program was once again postponed’.8 Within III Corps, AATTV training tasks were not going well.There was only one warrant officer, Edward Taylor, who remained with the 1 ATF ARVN training assistance group. Alex Clark reported Long Range Patrol standards were below that of previous courses and there were many minor difficulties associated with running the courses. Only thirteen of the 41 soldiers who attended course 6/69 passed. Although preliminary work had started on consolidating the Regional Force, Popular Force, People’s Self Defence Force and Revolutionary Development cadres in Phuoc Tuy into a Village Defence Advisory Team-type system, nothing much had happened owing to the Tet holidays. In IV Corps, AATTV had four Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT) in the provinces. VDAT 1 was in Dinh Tuong with Warrant Officers Robert Smith and Douglas Bell.Team 2 was in Kien Hoa with Warrant Officers Thomas Waters and Ray O’Hara. Three was in Vinh Binh with Warrant Officers Wilbur Tillett and Chris McEvoy. Team 5 was in Phong Dinh with Warrant Officers William Eade and Ray Oliver. VDAT 4 was to be opened on 1 February at Ba Tri in Kien Hoa with Warrant Officers Allan Joyce and William Butler. Enemy activity in the region had dropped to light, but an increase was expected during Tet. Major Harkness, the Senior Australian Adviser in the province reported: ‘My personal opinion is if a surge of activity does occur it will be limited to indirect fire and sapper attacks against major population centres.’9 A booby-trapped 105 mm shell lightly wounded Warrant Officer Ray
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Oliver on 16 February and he returned to duty on the 28th after treatment in Vung Tau. Otherwise, enemy activity remained light throughout IV Corps for the month, which was the general pattern around the country. Long Range Patrol training at the National Training Centre (NTC) at Van Kiep was still a bother as the Commanding Officer AATTV, reported following a visit: It was fairly obvious that the Chief Instructor would be happy if the Australian-sponsored LRRP wing ceased to exist. I believe the reason for this attitude is because of the standard we set . . . At this stage I do not know the final Australian plan for working in the province and hence I did not want to leave the NTC or make . . . arrangements [that were] more concrete.10
Enemy activity in the Special Forces’ area of operations in II Corps was light in February.The 1st Battalion was at Ben Het and the 2nd was in the Bu Prang area. Further north, in the I Corps region, moderate clashes were reported in an area south of Danang, ARVN armour and Rangers conducted successful operations that included Regional Force troops. Warrant Officer Class One Ron Almond’s unit, 3/17 ARVN Cavalry, reported clashes almost every other day during January and early February. Then on 16 January, elements of 17 Cavalry combined with the 37th and 39th Ranger Battalions and Regional Force units in a day-long battle in which 160 enemy were killed. The weather proved to be a deciding factor in March when the 1st, 3rd and 54th ARVN Regiments attempted a deployment into the western area of Quang Tri Province. The AATTV report for March highlighted the problems of operating in the monsoon season: The weather proved unseasonable and generally the movement was either abandoned or did not proceed as far as intended. It is now planned for the 1st Regiment to assume major responsibility for A Shau . . . with the 2nd Regiment concentrating to the west and north of Camp Carroll. [Carroll was 5 kilometres west of Cam Lo and 2 kilometres south of Route 9] Large-scale deployment will start in April. Indications
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are that the enemy has made quite a significant build up . . . during the winter months. The next few months will provide a major test for the ARVN units in the northern I Corps area.11
Two major contacts in the ARVN 1st Division area happened in March. The first involved 3/2 ARVN Battalion, with Warrant Officer John Lefel and the Black Panther Company with Warrant Officer Keith Forden, in a clash on 14 March north of Camp Carroll.The ARVN engaged a sapper battalion from the 305 North Vietnamese Army Division and killed 55 for the loss of three men. On 29 March, 3/2 ARVN Battalion fought another battle that claimed the lives of 58 enemy troops.The 2nd ARVN Division conducted a large operation in the month with two regiments in the Quang Ngai region during which large caches of equipment and supplies were found.When they returned to their normal areas of responsibility, 2/5 ARVN Battalion with Warrant Officer Bert Franks, found and attacked an estimated North Vietnamese Army company, and killed 31. Throughout the remainder of the country enemy activity against units with AATTV advisers remained low. The future of the AATTV Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol course at Van Kiep was decided on 1 April; the Team would soon hand over responsibility to the Chief Instructor of the National Training Centre and eventually only one adviser would remain with the wing. Significant changes to AATTV’s methods of operations in IV Corps were discussed between Lieutenant Colonel Alex Clark and Mr John P. Vann (a central character in A Bright Shining Lie) on 7 March 1970.They agreed that:‘The AATTV VDAT had been very successful.The AATTV effort should now be employed on night operations in a district.’12 Subsequently,Vann stated that Australian advisers would be concentrated in Ben Trinh District of Dinh Tuong Province. Clark agreed, but mentioned there would be considerable AATTV redeployment and administrative effort needed to set up the new scheme. He wrote: ‘In brief, the scheme envisages advice and training at district level . . . on the conduct of night operations. A team of about eight is envisaged.’ Clark then went on to comment on the training of AATTV replacements and the type of men needed by AATTV:
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In very general terms there are two quite different types of warrant officer in AATTV. One type is a commander at platoon level in SF and can be young and a dasher.The other type is an adviser and should be a mature, tolerant and knowledgeable man at battalion and company level tactics. With the run down in SF there will be no requirement for the young dasher type.Training in Australia should be directed towards this end. It is becoming more important that advisers arrive in country with at least a smattering of the Vietnamese language.13
On 1 April 1970, Dak Seang, a Special Forces camp, came under siege. The camp was located approximately 15 kilometres north-east of the Tri-Border intersection and about 12 kilometres east of the Laos Border. It was in an area of Kontum Province where the mountains ranged up to 4000 feet (1218 metres).The camp was on the eastern edge of Route 14 that ran along the spine of the Annamite Chain and supposedly connected the highlands with the northern region through Quang Nam Province. Mike Force battalions, one of which was commanded by Major Pat Beale, MC, were sent to its aid on 3 April. The battles raged for 11 days, and at the end Alex Clark had to intervene to get the Australian–Montagnard Battalion rested. He could see they had been pushed too far. Notes from the Commander’s Diary on the siege are reproduced here, but the full story is better read in Pat Beale’s book, Operation Orders:14 An estimated North Vietnamese Army regiment plus a sapper battalion and an anti-aircraft battalion are believed to be involved. 1 Battalion, 2 Mobile Strike Force was redeployed by road to Dak To on 3 April and most of the battalion were combat assaulted into a prepared LZ about 3000 metres south of the besieged camp. Numerous probing attacks by fire have occurred on the camp. Most of these have been broken up by air support. 1 Battalion, 2 Mobile Strike Force has also been attacked by fire and their positions have been probed. As at 5 April, 1 Battalion is still 1500 metres short of the besieged camp. Two ranger battalions are also involved in the relief force. It is planned to commit 4 Battalion, 2 Mobile Strike Force on 6 April. Three Caribou aircraft have been shot down, and all aircraft are being fired at when in the Dak To-Dak Seang area.15
The next part of the report stated:
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1st Battalion, 2 Mobile Strike Force continued its operation in the Dak Seang area until 13 Apr. In this eleven day operation the battalion suffered 33 per cent casualties in moving 4000 yards [3657 metres] whilst under continual ground and/or mortar attack. One AATTV adviser was killed [Warrant Officer John Pettit], two were wounded and subsequently evacuated to Australia [Warrant Officers Lachlan ‘Lachie’ Scowcroft and George Jamieson] and one was wounded and after a minor operation returned to duty [Warrant Officer Peter Sanderson].The 4th Battalion, 2 Mobile Strike Force was air assaulted into the 1st Battalion perimeter . . . and . . . was virtually under command of the Australian-led 1st Battalion. These battalions succeeded in the relief of the besieged camp.Two ranger battalions and an ARVN battalion were unable to link up . . . and on 13 Apr were 7000 metres from Dak Seang [when the siege was lifted]. There were to be no Australian replacements for Warrant Officer Pettit and the three wounded men.16
Warrant Officer Class Two John Pettit was Mentioned in Despatches (posthumously) for his great personal courage when his company was leading the battalion’s advance on 4 April. The courage, leadership and aggressiveness displayed by the Australians during the fight to relieve Dak Seang were recognised through the following awards: Warrant Officer George Jamieson, Mentioned in Despatches; Warrant Officer Des Cochrane, Military Medal; Warrant Officer A.G. ‘Aggie’ White, Warrant Officer Aleck McCloskey and Warrant Officer Ray Barnes all received the Distinguished Conduct Medal; Captain Peter Shilston was awarded the Military Cross and Pat Beale the Distinguished Service Order. Pat Beale summed up the feelings of those who had risked it all and survived when they got back to Pleiku: Two nights after coming out of Dak Seang we sat around the pool at Pleiku detachment B Headquarters and celebrated our victory. In reality we celebrated our survival. Missing from the gathering was John Pettit, killed, three other Australians and five US Special Forces wounded, and nearly one hundred of our Montagnards dead or badly wounded and nearly as many again with light wounds who had kept fighting.A heavy toll for ten days of battle from an initial force of three hundred. First Battalion, 2 Corps Mobile Strike Force had performed well. We had taken on an enemy force many times our size: the 28th and 60th North Vietnamese Army Infantry Regiments and the 40th North
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Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment, essentially a division-sized force and, against all odds, not only had we survived but in achieving our objectives, could claim to have won the battle and raised the siege of Dak Seang. When a rocket attack on the city around midnight drove everyone else scurrying in their underwear and helmets to their sandbagged bunkers, we continued to sit there. We were immortal and bore the scars to prove it.17
President Nixon ordered a 150 000-man pullout from Viet Nam on 20 April 1970, which aimed to reduce the US force to 265 000 by May 1971. Australia was right behind them on the way out, as we had been on the way in. Prime Minister Gorton announced on 22 April, that Australia would not replace 8 RAR, whose withdrawal was planned for November. He also said that Australia would provide a number of ‘mobile army teams’ to train the Regional Force/Popular Force soldiers in Phuoc Tuy and the training would be provided by AATTV.What that simple statement did not and could not convey were the intricate and sometimes plainly embarrassing negotiations that took place behind the scenes to establish an Australian-sponsored centre. These matters are discussed in detail in chapter 16 of The Team written by Ian McNeill.18 The AATTV’s approved establishment went from 99, although there were in fact 105 on the ground at the end of March, to 207. Two men were wounded in April and Warrant Officer Jack Fitzgerald was killed on 17 April during a combat assault with 1/1 ARVN Battalion. Seven AATTV advisers were wounded in May, one of whom,Warrant Officer Class One Thomas Forde, was evacuated to Australia in June. In May 1/5 and 3/5 ARVN Battalions with Warrant Officers Gilbert Joyce and George Heath were involved in a major battle around Hiep Duc, a village area 30 kilometres west of Tam Ky. The battle was joined by the US 198th Infantry Brigade and on 9 May the cumulative results were 526 enemy killed, while the allies suffered 46 killed (19 US), 210 wounded (117 US) and 11 ARVN missing in action. Tom Forde, serving with 4/6 ARVN Battalion, was wounded in a subsequent attack upon his battalion, which was preceded by a mixed barrage of 82-mm mortar and 75-mm recoilless rifle fire. Also in May, AATTV withdrew its advisers with Provincial Reconnaissance Units at very short notice and, reportedly, without embarrassment to AATTV or
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the men. The manning of the AATTV with 2 Mobile Strike Force in Pleiku was reduced to five and only one would be left in July. The AATTV-sponsored Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol wing in III Corps finally closed down and a small AATTV headquarters element was established in Phuoc Tuy Province to administer the unit’s manning increase in that province. John Barnes replaced Jack Fitzgerald at all the ‘ones’—1st Battalion, 1st Regiment and 1st Division—in time for an enemy attack on them at Fire Support Base (FSB) O’Reilly, 18 kilometres west of Hue, on 27 May. The MACV Command History recorded the clash in this paragraph: FSB O’Reilly was attacked by the reinforced 5th Bn, 812th North Vietnamese Army Regt at 271730 May. [The battle was] fought for two hours before the enemy withdrew without penetrating the base. The ARVN . . . killed 74 enemy soldiers while suffering 3 KIA and 14 WIA.19
From June through to October there were numerous contacts with elements of the 324th and 324B North Vietnamese Army Divisions in the A Shau Valley and around O’Reilly that involved units of the 1st and 3rd Regiments,ARVN, with AATTV advisers. Following their incursion into the A Shau Valley, the battalions consolidated around O’Reilly in the second week of August. Warrant Officer Don Watts was with 1st Battalion/3rd Regiment until Arthur Lancaster took over in August. Warrant Officer Allen Clutterbuck was with 2nd Battalion/3rd Regiment and John Leal was with 3rd Battalion/3rd Regiment. Australians (all warrant officers) with the four battalions of the 1st Regiment in numerical order were: 1st, John Barnes; 2nd, Dave Powell, MM; 3rd, Graham King, and 4th, Ray Oliver, MM. They all took on ground attacks or received indirect fire and did it very well. John Barnes remembered one of the most frightening moments of it all when he was near FSB O’Reilly: I think the scariest situation that I experienced was a large-scale attack on our position. It was preceded by a walk-up barrage of mortars and then back through us before they assaulted our position. I only had a shell scrape dug, but I swear I dug that hole deeper with my belt buckle, and that with it still done up! It was before first light and my hoochie was still up, it got ripped to shreds. We took 200 in-coming 82-mm mortar, or so I was told later. I didn’t count them!20
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During June, combat action in the southern half of I Corps was less hectic. Most of the contacts were against squad-platoon sized enemy groups.A good example of the 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment with AATTV Captain Bernard McGurgan.This battalion had a series of small contacts from the end of May through to 10 June that cost them 11 dead and 68 wounded against 21 enemy killed. On 5 June, two companies of the battalion were attacked just west of the old Special Forces camp at Thuong Duc by an NVA company supported by 82-mm mortars.The ARVN suffered one killed and seven wounded. On the 9th, approximately 500 metres to the north of the previous attack, the ARVN found 41 enemy bodies thought to have been killed by airstrikes conducted on 7 June.21 The reported enemy order of battle in Military Region 1 (the titles changed from Corps Tactical Zone on 1 July) as at 15 August 1970 was, ‘83 manoeuvre battalions, which are supported by ten rocket/artillery battalions and six field artillery battalions.’22 In early September 1970, the ARVN 61st Ranger Border Defence Battalion, located in the Tra Bong camp, a significant place in AATTV’s history, was attacked. The camp no longer had any advisers and there was a breakdown in communications, which prevented any immediate support being provided to the defenders. The camp was heavily damaged and 39 Vietnamese Rangers were killed, with a further 56 wounded.The enemy left 52 dead on the battlefield. On 12 September a tactical emergency was declared at FSB O’Reilly. This had been preceded by a mortar attack and a ground assault was expected at any time.The base was attacked again on 13 September and there were several heavy mortar attacks on the defending units, one of which included CS gas. Patrols also clashed frequently in sweeps around the base and it was closed down on 7 October owing to bad weather and resupply difficulties. During the period 6 August to 7 October, 570 enemy soldiers were reported killed and the ARVN had lost 61 killed. The units of the 1st ARVN Regiment experienced 115 indirect fire attacks with a total of 2700 rounds of mixed calibre mortar, ranging up to 120 mm, fired against them. The allies had also used over 100 tactical air strikes and 19 B-52 missions in their defence.
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Lieutenant Colonel Clark wrote on 12 June, ‘considerable redeployment within AATTV would happen in the coming months and it would mean nearly all warrant officers would change their present employment to ensure the [Australian] Mobile Assistance Training Teams [MATT] were staffed with experienced personnel.’23 Corporals were approved to be deployed as part of AATTV operational teams for the first time, and some who had served in 1 ATF MAT came across to form the new Mobile Assistance Training Teams (MATT—some earlier files refer to Mobile Advisory Training Teams). A handful of those corporals were not posted to AATTV in an error that can only be described as an administrative stuff-up. The first two Training Team MATTs had started on 4 and 6 May 1970. The first New Zealander, Sergeant H. K.Karaka, joined AATTV in May and served with MATT 2. Corporal Ian Kuring, who went to Viet Nam in May 1970 with 2 RAR, volunteered to serve in the next batch of teams to be established: WO1 Ostara shook my hand and greeted me with words along the lines of, ‘Corporal Kuring, I know all about you, welcome to the Training Team, we are pleased to have you’. In over five years of military service this was the first time that anyone had said that they were pleased to have me. As I climbed into the Land Rover to go with him to Vung Tau I felt good. At Vung Tau I joined a group of more than twenty warrant officers and corporals who would make up the first four AATTV MATTs. We were flown to Saigon and then by truck to the United States Army Advisor School Viet Nam (USARV) at Di An, about eight miles north-east of Saigon, to do an adviser course.The 18-day training course was designed to educate and familiarise officers and noncommissioned officers about the MAT concept and working with the South Vietnamese territorial forces.The MAT Course included instruction covering the Vietnamese language and culture, weapons training, tactics, and aspects of American and South Vietnamese military organisation and administration. The course was not difficult or assessed, and apart from the language training and limited introductory training on a wide range of weapons, it was primarily theoretical. After the Adviser Course I became a member of the newly formed MATT 4.The composition of each Australian MATT was an officer or warrant officer as the team leader, a warrant officer as team 2IC [secondin-command] and four corporals. The team leader and team 2IC were from the combat arms and of the four corporals, one was a field
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engineer, one was a medical assistant and the other two corporals were from the combat arms with at least one being an infantryman. Each MATT was also allocated a Vietnamese interpreter, who held the rank of sergeant in the ARVN. Each Australian AATTV MATT was allocated to work with a South Vietnamese Regional Force Company in Phuoc Tuy Province in an attempt to improve their military capabilities as a part of ‘Vietnamisation’. While located with a Regional Force Company the MATT also worked with any Popular Force platoons and People’s Self Defence Force (PSDF) units working in the immediate area. The job was to provide military advice and training and to assist with the provision of operational support during operations. It was not the role of MATT members to take command of the South Vietnamese units during operations, although there were occasions when this may not have been a bad thing. MATT 4 lived and worked with 787 Regional Force Company in a small military compound at the village of An Ngai on the south-eastern side of the town of Long Dien. Apart from a two-month period with the Jungle Warfare Training Centre at Nui Dat, this was my home in Viet Nam. In MATT 4 much of our time was spent improving the standard of the defences of the military compound we lived in and operated from and conducting weapon training and tactical techniques courses for South Vietnamese territorial force soldiers. When the Vietnamese soldiers did go on combat operations, two or three members of the MATT would go with them to observe what went on, provide advice if necessary and assist with requests for the provision of fire support or medical evacuation and resupply.24
Three advisers were wounded in June 1970;Warrant Officers Thomas Waters and Stuart Birnie were at the battle of Tun Tavern with the 54th Regiment, and both of them were evacuated to Australia. Tun Tavern was a fire support base some 20 kilometres south-east of Khe Sanh, and an estimated enemy battalion used coordinated mortar fire during an assault on the elements of the 54th Regiment based there. Captain William Deane, who was at the fire support base for some of the battle, reported the following observations of the ordeal and the shameful behaviour of a few soldiers: The mortar fire was extremely accurate.The ARVN displayed a disgusting eagerness to medevac themselves, even with the slightest wound, and
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completely disregarded the more seriously wounded. Captain Deane and Warrant Officer Waters [tried to hold] back less seriously wounded getting on Dustoffs, but with little success. Several stretcher cases that may otherwise have survived died on the pad. Some people had smeared blood over themselves in an effort to show they were badly injured.25
Forty-three ARVN were killed and 88 reported wounded in that battle.
The expansion of MATT in Phuoc Tuy Province continued during June, four were in operation and a fifth was in training at Di An. Fourteen (13 teams and one attached to the Jungle Warfare Training Centre)26 would be in operation by the end of the year, as Corporal Ian Kuring remembered: By December 1970 the Australian Army had created a total of fourteen MATTs to work in Phuoc Tuy Province and as a result saturated the province to such an extent that most of the Australian MATTs became static rather than mobile. The Australian MATTs were numbered from 1 to 16; the exclusions being 10 because the term ‘number ten’ in Vietnamese meant bad or not good, and 13 was not used because of its Australian connection with being an unlucky number.27
For some Team members, who found themselves posted to the relative backwater of Phuoc Tuy Province after the high-tempo northern zones, there were difficulties. And although the challenges were overcome, the change of pace for some advisers coming from high adrenalin combat units played havoc with their nervous systems. To come from mortars, artillery, ground assaults and manoeuvre battalions, to arguments over basic logistics in static Regional Force and Popular Force camps, was bound to create some disagreements. It did, and some went home with an unnecessary black mark in their service record. Further afield a sense of resignation and apathy permeated some American units and those responsible for assisting in the Vietnamisation program as the US troop withdrawal gained momentum. Australia also wanted to get out ‘with honour’, but their expertise and professionalism was in demand. Major Bob Aitken, who had taken over as the senior
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Australian adviser in Danang, remembered being asked for more Australians: In 1970 when some AATTV members in I Corps were being redeployed without replacement to other duties in the South—General Jackson [Senior adviser HQ I Corps] called me into his office. He told me that he was concerned about the reduction in numbers of Australians in I Corps and asked me to make representations to Colonel Clark on his behalf to have the policy reversed. ‘I want more Australians, not fewer’, he said. General Jackson also mentioned to me that whenever he visited teams in the field, of which Australians were members, he specifically asked the AATTV members for their opinion of the situation because he knew they would ‘tell it as it was’, whereas the Americans would tell him what they thought he wanted to hear.28
Captain Doug Tear, Senior District Adviser at Phu Tu District, also told HQ AATTV in July that the Americans would appreciate an increase in Australians.‘This would . . . create a more balanced team as the present US MAT [is] lacking in drive and . . . goes about its work half-heartedly.’29 Warrant Officer Mick Rodger, who was allocated to 1/6 ARVN Battalion located in the area of Chu Lai, had travelled to Quang Ngai via Danang and then on to the Regimental HQ in June. This was his second tour: I travelled by Jeep north to Chu Lai and into the 6th ARVN Regiment Base at LZ Bayonet, where I met the US Senior Adviser of my regiment. We shook hands and he said,‘pleased to meet you, get your shit together and there will be a chopper here shortly to take you straight out to your battalion in the scrub’. So much for a reception, training and warm up.30
Mick’s regiment moved west in July, to an area of operations around camp Kham Duc, which was 75 kilometres west of Tam Ky and around 30 kilometres east of the Laos border. The camp had been overrun in 1968 and this was the first major (ARVN) occupation of it since it was abandoned. The battalions were airlifted out of Tam Ky and 1st Battalion/6th Regiment was the first battalion landed at LZ Kala: At 0500 hrs on 12 July 1970 we assembled at the Tam Ky strip and the entire battalion was picked up and flown west to Kham Duc.The Kham Duc area was mountainous, thick jungle covered terrain with no civilians
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living there. As we flew over the Kham Duc airfield, we could see the abandoned aircraft still on and around the airstrip. One of the most dangerous aspects of leaving the chopper and once on the ground (besides the enemy) is the door gunner on the US slicks . . . some of them don’t know when to stop firing. Apart from the friendly fire the LZ was ‘cold’ . . . until the last slick had unloaded and departed.We then began to take . . . mortar fire from a feature about 400 metres away and above our positions. We were lucky to be able to take some cover in the trenches and overhead cover that had been used by the US Special Forces. [An unknown number of 60-mm mortar wounded seven ARVN.]31
The 6th Regiment operated in the area until 27 August. Warrant Officer James Shaw was with 2/6 Battalion and James Nicholls with 3/6 Battalion, and the monthly report said there was a ‘slight’ increase in enemy activity while they were there.The casualties numbered 11 ARVN killed and 61 wounded against 87 enemy soldiers killed. Half of the enemy’s casualities were caused by 2/6 Battalion, which had its best success on a foray near to the border with Laos, where they killed 20 enemy in one action. The ARVN also found large quantities of uniform material and 2000 mortar rounds.32 Bob Aitken remembered one of Mick Rodger’s exploits for an entirely different reason: Mick had convinced his American counterparts that an important national event was forthcoming and that he would like to honour the occasion by staging a small ceremony at his compound. The US Army captain organised a flag orderly, a bugler and a small honour guard. Came the ‘day’ and all took their places as Mick prepared to march onto the parade ground. Mick halted in front of the flagpole; the honour guard presented arms as the Australian flag was raised, and the captain and Mick saluted. After a suitable period of reverence, the ceremony came to a close and all returned to their billet for a celebratory drink. After much pressing of the erstwhile Mick by his counterparts as to the identity of this national hero and, I suspect, after a little too much lubricant, Mick revealed that it was Ned Kelly’s birthday. Needless to say that when the true status of Ned was explained, a period of ostracism was inflicted on the hapless Mick.33
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Captain Peter Shilston was the only Australian with 2 Mobile Strike Force, Pleiku, in July and, as he was to go home in August, he would stay there until his departure date, but he would not be replaced. Corporal James Monk, working with MATT 3 at Baria, the provincial capital of Phuoc Tuy Province, was wounded slightly in July when a dog tripped a booby trap rigged by the Regional Force as part of their compound defence.Administrative difficulties also caused a few headaches during the month with the establishment and operation of an increased number of mobile advisory training teams in Phuoc Tuy. A system of contracts was started, which would define the responsibilities of the mobile advisory training teams to ensure the Vietnamese officers understood how to employ them. This was a behind-the-scenes bureaucracy, unknown to most who would have thought it was just go in, set up, train and fight. The Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT) concept in IV Corps was successful and the Commanding General of IV Corps requested the Team to train more Vietnamese officers in the techniques. As a result, the NOAT was divided into two teams, one with four warrant officers who would continue with the original training task, and the other would be called the Night Operations Training Team (NOTT) and have an officer and five warrant officers to conduct courses of fourteen days with 30 students. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Silverstone, the in-coming AATTV secondin-command, and Lieutenant Colonel John Sullivan, who was to be the Senior Adviser, Jungle Warfare Training Centre, arrived on 24 July, and at the start of August the Team strength was 135, but it was predicted to rise to 175 by early September. There were 97 significant incidents reported by units in Military Region 1 with AATTV advisers during August.The main clashes were around O’Reilly, Hai Lang District, Quang Tri, and Kham Duc in Quang Tin Province. Some of the new advisers wrote critical reports on their unit’s activities, which were a repeat of past observations by earlier advisers. Alex Clark said of the reports, ‘criticism of . . . tactics is really a criticism of US tactics, which all ARVN units employ.The use of fire
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support is relevant to a lot of ARVN units; however . . . noise and not always effect, plays a big part in ARVN morale.’34 Three Australian advisers were slightly wounded in September; all were in the northern provinces. Most of the activity continued to be around the fire support bases in the western region of MR1. The 1st Division indicated that its infantry units would continue to operate around O’Reilly during the wet season, which was not their normal tactic.They were to be supported with three batteries of artillery that were located at FSB Barbara, which was about eight kilometres to the north-west of O’Reilly, and the battery on O’Reilly was withdrawn. On 25 September, 5/2 ARVN Battalion, with Warrant Officer John Bouveng, conducted a combat assault using 101st Airborne Division helicopters in an area west of Cam Lo and north of Route 9.Ten troopcarrying slicks and one Cobra were forced out of action owing to enemy fire. New fire support bases were also to be established in the 2nd ARVN Regiment’s area of operations further west than was the normal practice, and sensors were to be deployed around these bases.Warrant Officer John ‘Cappy’ Kendall was the 1st Division’s senior adviser responsible for sensors35 and Major Bob Aitken was amazed by some of the responsibilities AATTV men had held: I am still in awe of Team members many of whom were like ‘Cappy’ Kendall, for example.‘Cappy’ was thrust into the job of head of 1 ARVN Division Sensor Section on departure of the US Army captain who had held the job. To my knowledge ‘Cappy’ had not had any experience in this field before joining this Section. But he was soon regarded as an expert in the field and was highly regarded by those with whom he worked.36
The Wheel Turns Planning for the establishment of a Jungle Warfare Training Centre by AATTV in Phuoc Tuy Province continued in September as the AATTV
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monthly report outlined to HQ AFV: ‘A program of instruction was prepared and the Vietnamese agreed to a six-week course aimed at instructing students in the techniques of jungle warfare at platoon level. Emphasis is given to the improvement of the standard of junior leadership.’37 The AATTV had almost turned full circle to one of the original prospects discussed in 1962 when deployment into Quang Ngai was considered. The challenges associated with the Jungle Warfare Training Centre’s proposed location were overcome, but it was moved later from the now vacated 8 RAR lines area at Nui Dat to Van Kiep—a move most Australians could not understand, especially those who had not worked closely with or were not conversant with how or why the Vietnamese made decisions. On 30 September 1970, 134 members and ex-members of AATTV paraded at Vung Tau to receive the United States Meritorious Unit Commendation, which was presented to the unit for its service between July 1962 and August 1969. General Creighton W.Abrams presented the Commendation.The Australian warrant officer who was selected to read the citation to commemorate the Kevin ‘Dasher’Wheatley VC Stadium at the indoor ceremony that followed the parade, was impressed by the effect he had on the gathered VIPs: I looked down at the crowd and my throat got a bit dry. Except when I searched for the Southern Cross, I had never seen so many stars gathered in one place. [The official guest list included 44 general rank officers.] As I started to speak, I might add I had practised this talk for weeks, I noticed everyone in the front rows suddenly sit up and pay attention. I thought, hey, this is really going over well. And then I realised that General Abrams had collapsed behind me and was in the process of being rushed off to hospital.38
Monsoon rains started in the northern provinces in late September and very heavy and continuous rain fell in October. Enemy activity dropped to a very low level, which was probably caused by the weather as well as the ARVN’s increased efforts in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces.
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However, ARVN units with Australian advisers reported 43 significant contacts in the five provinces during the month. In the south, word of the success that the night training programs had achieved in IV Corps attracted the attention of the Commanding General in II Corps, and it was decided that a similar school could be established at Pleiku. In III Corps, the Jungle Warfare Training Centre had progressed through its planning phase and the Joint General Staff issued a directive that the first course was to start in February 1971. Separate courses were to be conducted for officers and NCOs, and the students would come from all military regions. Seventy-six Vietnamese had been posted to the staff and a Regional Force company was allocated to defend the school. Four New Zealanders joined AATTV in October.They were: Captain Richard Mountfort who went to JWTC (Jungle Warfare Training Centre), Warrant Officers Class One Brian Roe and John Baird and Warrant Officer John Cootes. They were deployed in Phuoc Tuy Province teams along with Corporal Alan Cameron (who had arrived in September).Alex Clark was promoted to colonel and the team strength at the end of October was 26 officers, 109 warrant officers, seven sergeants and 63 corporals, for a total of 205. Warrant Officer Des Pryde, who arrived on 22 October, made his way up-country via Danang, Hue and Dong Ha on his way to Fire Support Base Fuller, which was 9 kilometres west of Cam Lo and around 6 kilometres south of the Demilitarised Zone. He remembered Warrant Officer Class One ‘Snow’ Lawrance’s advice and his arrival at Fuller : Snow treated us new arrivals to a high-speed lesson in survival. He would make us write down the call signs, and frequencies of DMZ Dustoff and other US support units and later over a beer in the bar would spring questions to make sure we remembered. Snow may have annoyed us at times but he did his very best to ensure our survival and good health. My introduction to the hostile atmosphere around the DMZ was almost immediate. I was to join 4th Battalion [2nd Regiment] at Fire Support Base [FSB] Fuller and after a handover and briefing, replace WO2 Alf Gee. Helicopters did not land at FSB Fuller as the base was perched on the top of a mountain [known as Dong Ha Mountain] and the North Vietnamese Army would fire on any stationary or near-stationary helicopter that could be seen. Below the base and to the south was a
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landing pad called ‘Medevac pad’ for obvious reasons. I landed at Medevac, and after speaking to Alf Gee on the radio, commenced the arduous ascent to the base. When I was just below the wire, Alf stuck his head above a sandbag wall and announced that I had better get a move on ‘as we are going to be mortared in ten minutes’. I laughed and struggled on. Immediately after gaining the relative security of the sandbag bunker, 120 mm mortar rounds started falling on the base. At that time the advisers’ main job was to organise and control US artillery and air support and arrange US medevac. The battalion commander had been fighting for over five years and had attended the Battle School in Malaya so there was little we could tell him about tactics. The 2nd Regiment was unusual as it had five battalions. The big difference from Australian tactics was that ARVN seldom deployed in platoon or section formations. The normal company formation was arrowhead of platoons in file. When I asked the battalion commander why, he said,‘Maybe if a Vietnamese soldier cannot see a friend in front and behind he might get frightened and run away.’ On a search and destroy operation near My Loc he once put the whole battalion into Australian type formations just to please me, but you could see he didn’t take it seriously.39
A Fire Support Base Fuller postscript: it was attacked on 24 June 1971 when the base was hit with 500 rounds of artillery, followed by another barrage of 800 rounds and then over a 30-hour period another 5400 rounds, which forced the ARVN to evacuate the hill.40 The northern region suffered very bad flooding in November that caused approximately 200 deaths although, when compared with the 1966 floods, the loss of life and damage was minimal. This time around, the Vietnamese flood relief program worked. The floods also stopped the enemy’s attacks on Thuong Duc, an unexpected military benefit from the harsh conditions. Despite the weather, there were 49 contacts reported for the month by ARVN units with Australian advisers, which were classified as ‘light’. The AATTV reported there was a noticeable increase in the training of ARVN Forward Air Controllers, medevac helicopters and artillery during the month that was thought to be in anticipation of the withdrawal of all unit advisory teams. Captain Barry Caligari and Warrant Officers William Butler, Arthur Lancaster and Allan West moved to the Montagnard
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Training Centre in Pleiku to open a new AATTV Night Operations Training Team (NOTT) for the first course to start on 7 December. Warrant Officers Byron Cox and Lawrence Jackson joined them in the new year. Barry Caligari recalled those formative days: The role of NOTT MR2 was to train selected students in night operational techniques. Team members were not to be committed to active operations inconsistent with the training role. In fact the opportunity to engage in any other offensive operations never arose.The limited time available to get established was frittered away by tardy staffs of different persuasions giving us the run around. While I wasted time scheming, planning, cajoling and threatening, other Team members ‘showed the flag’ to Pleiku units.Within a fortnight they had ‘secured’ two Jeeps and access to most of our urgent training requirements.The warrant rank impressed upon me that I should be thankful and not curious. The content of the courses was based on the successful formulae developed in the Delta and was ably built into the MR2 program by Bill Butler, posted to the Team from NOTT in MR4 for that purpose. The inclement climate of the highlands, and the student population being located along the coast, suggested the obvious. Colonel Leary was keen that a relocation and expansion of NOTT MR2 be implemented and assured me he would provide additional administrative support to assist with relocation and cater for the other proposed changes. True to his word, the Commander posted Brian Day in mid-June. Brian barely had time to grasp the administrative ropes in Pleiku, before departing several days later with Ron Cox in the advance party to organise arrangements at Phu Cat.The advance party was to take possession of the compound and relevant training facilities, establish communications with command and training staff, provide point of contact for AATTV, re-establish the resupply system and prepare for the reception of the Team and the new arrivals.The rest of the Team would finalise training and administrative arrangements in Pleiku and then report to Phu Cat.41
Meanwhile, the advisory effort in Phuoc Tuy had become a tangled mess.The MATT effort was intended primarily for the Regional Forces, but they had spent most of their effort with the People’s Self Defence Force (PSDF), which the Commanding Officer commented upon in his monthly report:
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The PSDF training is being directed primarily towards military subjects and yet it appears that the real training requirements should be in the political field. I am beginning to believe that there are far too many advisers in the province and the Vietnamese are starting to get fed up with all the so-called advice they are getting. This could have serious repercussions. [Due to the departure of the province senior advisor (PSA)] there will be further disruptions. In the eleven months that I have been in Viet Nam there have been two PSA and a stand-in PSA, four deputies, at least six S3 [captain, operations] advisers, at least two deputy senior advisers in each district and at least three reorganisations of the [establishment].42
Colonel Alex Clark finished off the November monthly report with a record of the flexibility shown by AATTV in 1970. He wrote, The percentage of the Team involved in the various types of employment has varied as follows: Jan 70 Dec 70 ARVN 44% 19% Training installations 6% 15% Special Forces 14% 0% Provincial Reconnaissance Unit 3% 0% RF/PF/PSDF 21% 53% Misc 2% 2%43
Two warrant officers in IV Corps received very slight wounds on 16 December. They remained on duty and they were the only battle casualties for the month. The level of activity in Military Region 1 remained low although there were 50 incidents recorded by units with attached AATTV personnel.These contacts were registered as low-level and ranged from indirect-fire attacks by the enemy to ambushes by the ARVN that resulted in up to ten deaths on either side. A new organisation of advisory teams in MR1 was agreed upon by the Allies to reduce the number of advisers with ARVN units, and it was to be implemented by June 1971.Australian advisers were to be redeployed into the new teams and they would be based initially in Quang Ngai. Captain Caligari reported that the first Pleiku Night Operations Training Team (NOTT) course was not treated seriously by most of the students, but the second course appeared to be going a bit better.
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In the southern military regions the problems of coordination and weaknesses in territorial force capabilities continued to frustrate the advisers. All of the training teams suffered one common problem: too few interpreters. In Military Region 4 the night training teams were reorganised and another new acronym was born: NAT—Night Assistance Teams. The previous NOTT and Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT) were to be disbanded and five teams with two warrant officers each would assist the Vietnamese teams who had been trained previously by AATTV in the night operations techniques. Colonel Geoffrey Leary arrived on 31 December to assume command of AATTV on 6 January 1971. The Team’s strength now stood at 203. Australia’s total military strength in South Viet Nam dropped to 6300 after 8 RAR returned home in November and they were not replaced. The number of US military personnel in Viet Nam was standing at 335 794.
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10 The bitterness of the end 1971 The bitterness of the end
The moratoriums (peace marches) in May and September of 1970, and the Australian government’s decision not to replace 8 RAR, which was announced in April 1970, was the tip of an iceberg. A zephyr of unease wafted through the allies as troop withdrawals and handover of responsibilities to ‘Vietnamisation’ gathered pace. Operationally, it was a quiet month until 30 January, when Operation Lam Son 719 began and the previous plans for a reduction in the advisory effort in Military Region 1 were finalised.The plans stated that all ARVN infantry unit advisory teams were to be redeployed by 1 July 1971 and a new team concept was to be adopted: Regimental Combat Assistance Teams (RCAT), which would consist of: 1 x lieutenant colonel, 1 x major, 1 x senior NCO and 1 x radio operator would be established by 1 July 71.The RCAT would also include two battalion liaison teams with one major, one captain and one senior NCO. Each of the tactical operation centres at corps, division and territorial force would also have advisory teams attached.1
MACV also announced that American mobile advisory teams would be withdrawn from around the country by 30 June 1972, but Australian MATTs in Phuoc Tuy Province were not mentioned in that plan. The 187
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Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support plan for Military Region 3 produced a phased withdrawal of teams that required a reduction to one team per district by December 1971, and then one per province and then none. The Team’s activities at the Jungle Warfare Training Centre continued with an aim to start the first course on 8 February. In IV Corps, AATTV was approved to open two schools, one at Bac Lieu and the other at Dong Tam, to train instructors in night operations. Warrant Officer Keith Charlton, who had arrived on Christmas Eve 1970, was allocated to Dong Tam to teach basic artillery procedures: My Christmas lunch consisted of a cold tin of Irish stew, and on Boxing Day I was put on a plane and headed for somewhere in the Delta. At the time I did not know where I was going or, in the confusion of things, had forgotten. About an hour-and-a-half later the plane landed at what seemed to me to be a remote strip somewhere in the Delta. I disembarked with great trepidation not knowing what to expect. Fortunately a Team member met me and we made our way into Can Tho to the Team House. After spending a couple of days there a group of us was sent to Dong Tam to train PF [Popular Force] instructors in night operations. The Team was housed in a building within the compound of 7th ARVN Division.The building was constantly water-logged during rainy periods and for weeks on end the floor of the building was up to eighteen inches under water.We were eventually allocated something on higher ground.2
Warrant Officer John Barnes, who had come down from I Corps to replace Chris McEvoy in the District Intelligence and Operations Centre, developed a healthy cynicism about the war’s progress in the Delta: My main objective was to visit the sixteen provinces of the Delta to check on enemy movements and incidents. I was also required to fill in a computerised set of forms each month for US Command HQ in Saigon. Information from these forms controlled the withdrawal of US troops, you know, the ‘Vietnamisation’ of the War. Ha, Ha! These forms never allowed the user to tell the whole truth, just boxes to tick yes or no and numbers, very clinical.The North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong controlled the Delta; it was as simple as that.3
The push into Laos along Route 9 through Khe Sanh by the ARVN (Operation Lam Son 719), was the most significant activity of the first
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quarter of the year. American forces were in support on a parallel operation named Dewey Canyon II, but the US ground troops were not permitted to enter Laos. Australian advisers were also prohibited from crossing the border. One can only imagine the gut-wrenching despair an adviser must have felt standing in the dust of the departing helicopters as his unit flew westward into what was to be a massive clash. Warrant Officer Des Pryde was one of them: No advisers were allowed to cross the border. It was hard seeing ‘my’ battalion loaded onto helicopters without me. The North Vietnamese Army hurriedly brought in AA [fire] and the helicopter support became virtually impossible. My unit, 4/2 ARVN [Battalion], went in with 400 fit troops, but by the end of the operation only 85 fit soldiers returned to Viet Nam. The CO was captured and the XO was believed killed. Much later I found out that he had been captured and spent ten years in prison camps before being released and escaping to the US.4
The operation ended in controversy, later generating numerous articles that provide comprehensive analyses and conclusions that will support a view of either success or failure. This early summary, taken from the MACV Command History, highlights some of the allies’ losses: ‘Killed in action 1764; wounded in action 6632; missing 689. Small arms lost totalled 2888; tanks destroyed 71; vehicles destroyed 441, and radios lost numbered 1577. One hundred and two helicopters were destroyed by enemy action (four others in accidents) and 601 were damaged.’ The statisticians went to work on this and one report justified the loss of helicopters by the number of sorties flown at 2400 for each aircraft lost; the MACV figure was 952 sorties per aircraft. One other fact buried in all of the figures was a comment on the inability of the armoured regiments to operate in the high elephant grass. But the most telling loss of all was the loss of trust and respect built up over many years between advisers and their units. Des Pryde suffered the humiliation of it all after the battle: I accompanied the new CO to visit the wounded in the military hospital in Hue. As we walked along the ward talking to the men in their beds one sergeant who had lost his lower leg said to me, ‘Where were you when we really needed you?’5
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Two AATTV men were wounded in February; Bombardier Charles Cavanagh remained on duty, but Captain J.J. ‘Jock’ Smith was evacuated to Australia on 7 March. Jock Smith was awarded a Bar to his Military Cross for heroism and calmness under fire during the action in which he was wounded on 21 February. Other AATTV activities throughout the country during the month remained unchanged. Operation Lam Son 719 continued to dominate all operational matters in the north throughout March and into early April. Lieutenant Colonel Pat Gowans replaced Bob Aitken at HQ I Corps in March, and Bob Aitken was a little concerned during his last helicopter flight during the final stages of his handover to Pat Gowans: We had been poring over the map of the area of the Demilitarised Zone, having just left Camp Carroll when my sixth sense warned me to stop referring to the map and to look about. To my dismay, I found the southern boundary fence of the DMZ disappearing below us as we headed north at 1500 feet! However, a sharp whack to the back of the pilot’s helmet soon remedied the situation. As it turned out, the pilot and copilot in question had only been in country for two weeks and were unaware of the requirement to fly no higher than 30 feet and no closer to the southern boundary fence than one mile. There was no question that their ability to read a map was sadly lacking.6
On 21 March Captain John Hartley was severely wounded in Phuoc Tuy Province and he was evacuated to Australia on 5 April. Although AATTV battle casualties had been light for the first three months, nonbattle injuries and illnesses that required hospitalisation jumped to 31 in the same period. A phase down of AATTV to eight teams in Phuoc Tuy had been discussed during March and Senior Adviser Major Ken Phillips pushed for a decision to be made soon that would allow for an orderly reduction. He also expressed some anger and frustration at the constant criticism by ‘expert’ advisers and others who felt ‘it was essential to interfere with or criticise every aspect of [an] operation’. He complained at one point
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that ‘there were 14 people (other than Vietnamese and excluding MATT) in the Battalion HQ base area’.7 In April 1971, withdrawal planning moved up another notch as preparations were made to reduce and then get out of all advisory teams. An AATTV report in April on Lam Son 720, a combined operation into the A Shau valley, contained this note: ‘101 Airborne Division has been reluctant to become heavily committed; withdrawal preparations are apparent.’8 Redeployment of advisers was an on-again off-again affair as ARVN units recovered from Lam Son 719 and administrative matters (for example, security clearances) now became a concern, which was a general indicator of the change from ‘active’ to ‘bureaucratic’.All ARVN advisers were to be cleared to Secret and those employed in Tactical Operations Centres could not get in without a Top Secret clearance. Nevertheless, AATTV units in Military Region 1 clashed with the enemy 35 times during April in actions that caused four killed or more on either side. Training assistance by AATTV continued in Pleiku, but it was now considered to be too wet and cold a location, and a new base was to be found on the coast in Binh Dinh Province. The mobile advisory teams in Military Region 3 suffered their first and only fatality in April when a helicopter was shot down and crashed on to Corporal Thomas Blackhurst during a medical evacuation. Ken Phillips wrote his last report as the Senior Australian Adviser in Phuoc Tuy in which he made it quite clear that there were too many mobile advisory teams in the province. His report contained cogent recommendations that he believed were imperative if the Vietnamese were to improve and survive. Again, amongst the seriousness of it all, there was humour (albeit black) as Corporal Dennis Manski remembered: One wet night at Binh Ba, one of our ambush parties close to the compound called for mortar illumination so we all raced down, pulled off the canvas tarp covering the 60-mm mortar, tore the charge bags off the bomb and dropped it down the tube. Nothing happened, no bomb on the way, so we did all the necessary drills but still no bomb on the way. The barrel was disconnected and the bomb slid out—nothing wrong with it—then down the barrel she went again without success and by this time the boys out at the ambush site were getting a bit annoyed
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as no light had been forthcoming.The next time we slid the bomb out of the tube a very concussed rat followed it out.9
Corporal Ray Pearson, who had arrived in late 1970, was deployed as a medical assistant at the Jungle Warfare Training Centre (JWTC) in 1971.While he believed it taught him a great deal and made him a better medic, he felt the experience left him deeply troubled: Snakes and centipedes were abundant in that place. Steve Boyd and I had quite a collection in well-sealed bottles, which we called the JWTC snake club. We wanted to bring them home, but we were out-ranked on that suggestion. Snakebite, wounds, delivering babies, and a small Vietnamese boy with a crushed hand are just a few of the incidents I had to attend to and treat. The odd night at ‘Vungers’ [Vung Tau], and the trips to the Street of Bars still remain a blur. I can recall being ‘rescued’ by the boys from JWTC, after being found declaring [taking] the local cowboys on. Lt Col Sullivan suggested I remain in Nui-Dat in future! I came home in September 1971. I arrived home at midnight, flew in on an American Pan Am flight, and caught a taxi home to Holsworthy Village. My wife didn’t know I was coming. I took my discharge in September 1976, but I found it hard to settle down. My marriage broke up, and I drifted around New South Wales and North Queensland for the next eight years. I was finding myself in trouble with the law, and I ended up doing a couple of short jail sentences in NSW. I got my life back on track in 1984 at the age of 42 and got back into the work force until I retired in 1995. I remarried in 2002, and I live happily on the NSW South Coast.10
Pearson’s story is not uncommon amongst veterans from the Viet Nam War from both within and outside the Team. There was no formal debriefing post-South Viet Nam service and many veterans found later in life that they were unable to cope with the stress of active service. Many suffered delayed shock, some of whem were later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.
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By the middle of 1971 the changes to the countrywide advisory effort started to bite. People were not being replaced at the end of their tour and basic equipment needs were not being filled. Some teams operated on a shoestring budget, especially in terms of vehicles and radios. In total contrast, ARVN operations increased in the northern provinces and AATTV units were involved in 117 clashes with the enemy during May. Also in May, the Australian MATT 23 that had trained Popular Force and People’s Self Defence Force in Tu Nghia District of Quang Ngai Province, was ordered to be withdrawn by the US senior adviser who considered warrant officers did not hold officer status and they would not be given a mission without an officer as team leader. Lieutenant Alan Kirwan (reposted leader) recommended to HQ AATTV ‘that in view of the Deputy Senior Adviser’s attitude, the Australian Team . . . be withdrawn and not replaced’.11 He emphasised that the relations between Australian and US personnel had always been very good. Although the District Senior Adviser was technically correct,Australian warrant officers previously had officer status and this non-acceptance by the DSA was a loss of face—a bad mistake. Increased enemy attacks against units in the ARVN 1st Division continued in June although things were not as hectic in the 2nd Division’s area, which was probably due to the lack of supplies caused by the recent Operation Lam Son battles.The continuing reduction of advisory teams moved ahead at a pace that was a little distasteful for some of those who had worked hard with their Vietnamese teams and watched as they grew in confidence and capability, but they now knew it was almost over for them. The move of the Night Operations Training Team from Pleiku was approved in June and Warrant Officer Ron Cox and Brian Day went as the advance party to Phu Cat on 22 June.The remainder moved down on 5 July with the first course due to start a week later. A second team was planned to be raised and commence training on 19 June. Lieutenant Colonel James Stewart, MC (Korea) arrived in late July to take over as second-in-command of the Team. Following his sharp learning curve and visits to the disparate locations in which AATTV served, he noted that the impending changes were significant:
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The decision by the Australian government to significantly reduce Australia’s commitment meant the progressive withdrawal of all the Team’s detachments from MR1, MR2 and MR4 to MR3, basically Phuoc Tuy Province and HQ Free World Forces in Saigon. Naturally, this decision was disappointing for those on the ground in the MATT, and the specialist teams, night operations, sensors, and those still attached to ARVN units and formations, and territorial force (TF) units, where rapport with their hosts had been firmly established, and tangible progress was being made. Some personnel would be redeployed in Viet Nam, but for others, it meant a shortening of their tour, with an earlier RTA date, a decision that was met with mixed responses. To come back from visits to advisers in MR1, MR4, the MATTs or the JWTC to the Bachelor Officer Quarters at the Brinks Hotel in downtown Saigon was a rather bizarre experience. Following a shower and change out of ‘greens’ into civvies to have dinner in the roof restaurant, and watch the flash and hear the crump of artillery or B-52 bombing while ‘enjoying’ a glass of Californian red wine was a rather strange sidelight to one’s operational service.12
Basically, the race was on to get out, which had an impact upon the logistic support provided to those who remained, especially the teams who were located with Regional Force, Popular Force and People’s Self Defence Force units.Arguments over helicopter support, artillery support, radios, arms and ammunition and basic accommodation punctuated some of the monthly reports sent to Saigon. The AATTV Military Region 1 report for August included observations on a newly constructed North Vietnamese Army road network and a significant increase in the number of enemy tracked vehicles that had moved to the west of Khe Sanh and also through the Ba Long Valley. A new ARVN tank squadron, the 20th, was raised during the month and two Australians, Warrant Officers Graeme Millington and William Noble, were posted in as instructors, but the total number of AATTV advisers in the region was now down to 25. Training activities continued in the other military regions although administration and logistics continued to plague their efforts. In Military
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Region 3 the Vietnamese viewed the planned total withdrawal of the Australian Task Force, announced in August, with considerable regret. One interesting by-product of the restrictions the Australian Task Force had placed on their operations in the province was the lack of operational experience the Vietnamese had in the area. Major Robert Musgrove said in his August report, ‘although the withdrawal of 1 ATF (at Nui Dat) was expected it appeared to come as a surprise’. And he pondered whether ARVN would provide the shield that ATF did, which would restrict territorial force development. He added,‘Any further restriction on their TF [Territorial Force] initiative and motivation could well lead to a marked deterioration of the TF as a whole’.13 Following on from the decision by the Australian government to withdraw all combat forces from Viet Nam, and to reduce the strength of AATTV, the number of MATT in Phuoc Tuy Province was to be reduced from eight to two in the period 1–31 October 1971. The two remaining teams were to be in position at the Jungle Warfare Training Centre and Sector HQ from 27 October. This decision was made in September and in the same month Central Training Command (Viet Nam) decided to move the Jungle Warfare Training Centre from Nui Dat to Van Kiep where they always wanted it to be. In December, AATTV advisers were taken out of Military Regions 1, 2 and 4 and concentrated in Vung Tau where their tasks, and those at the Jungle Warfare Training Centre, would be as was intended for the first deployment of AATTV in July 1962: a training role only. The Team had now gone full circle. The last men in the Delta were Majors John Hughes and Simon Hearder; Captain Bill McLaughlin; Warrant Officers Class One Des Wise and Ian Wall;Warrant Officers Jim Clarke, John Cousins, Reginald Couttie, Bruce Elphick and Brian Morrow. Lieutenant Colonel Pat Gowans said he was the last man out of Danang, but Captain Adrian Roberts and Warrant Officer Class One Lindsay Allen had gone not long before him.Adrian Roberts said,‘I felt like we had betrayed them.There was no warning. A few good-byes and we went’.14 In Quang Tri, Major Robert Donaldson and Warrant Officers Ian McPhail, Geoff ‘Smiley’ Jenkin and Neale Walters were the last listed in that province, and in Thua Thien Warrant Officer Ian Jewell and Ian ‘Grub’ McGrath were the last to leave. The last men in the Night Operations Training Team at Phu Cat were:
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Captains Jim Wieland and Kerry Gallagher, and Warrant Officers Brian Day, Derek Duffey, Brian Foster, Frank Lawler, Ian Ramsay, Jim Pratten, Steve Reid, Jim White, Brian Wilson and Jack Woods. Colonel Geoffrey Leary’s end-of-tour report told of a tumultuous year. It is summarised here: The Team strength has fluctuated during the year but has remained at approximately 200 all ranks, with a peak of 224 between 6 August 1971 and 9 August 1971. [Training AATTV replacements] Too much emphasis placed on operational rather than instructional training. During the last half of the year the majority of the Team has been engaged on instructional tasks. With the reduction of advisory effort in MR1 and MATT effort in Phuoc Tuy Province, replacement and surplus personnel were employed at the Jungle Warfare Training Centre (JWTC) and with a second Night Operations Team in MR2. For the period July 1971 to October 1971 the Team was deployed as follows: MR1—ARVN and RF adviser—15% of unit strength. MR2—Night Operations Training—7% of unit strength. MR3—MATTS and TF advisers—40% of unit strength. MR3—JWTC—25% of unit strength. MR4—Night Operations Training—8% of unit strength. HQ and administrative duties—5% of unit strength. At various times during the year and more particularly during the last three to four months it has been a constant task keeping the members gainfully employed. Invariably where members have had insufficient activity to keep them occupied there has been trouble, if only of a minor nature.The JWTC has been the biggest single problem during my tour.The initial decision to undertake the project was taken at a time when there were no doubts about security and no date for the withdrawal of 1 ATF had been set. The withdrawal of 1 ATF and the consequent loss of security at Nui Dat caused the location to be changed, but only after considerable effort had been expended in establishing the centre. [My] Training Recommendations.With the exception of those posted to specialist appointments all members should be capable of performing any task, for the same rank, in the Team. There has been a change of emphasis of AATTV employment from ARVN to Territorial Force advisory tasks.The majority of the Team will be involved in operations
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and/or training at the district or sub-sector level and will require a good working knowledge of District Advisory Team and sub-sector operations. Members will be required to work more closely with the Vietnamese and in many different appointments possibly without the support of US advisory teams. The majority of the Warrant Officer’s duties will be of an instructional nature at either JWTC or as members of a Special Project Team and will therefore need to be competent instructors. Tactical Operations Centre/Staff advisers will be required to teach and advise on the running of a TOC and also advise on the broader aspects of operational planning and the conduct of operations to Divisional level. All members excluding those in HQ appointments and the Corporals may be required to direct artillery and close air support and also arrange medical evacuation (Dustoff). There will be fewer sources from which information on the progress of the war can be gained. The value of reports from individual advisers could assume a greater importance than at present. Australian and US maintenance and repair facilities could be reduced and the team could become more reliant on individual maintenance of vehicles, generators and like equipment. It is recommended that consideration be given to the following. For majors: increased emphasis on TOC operations to include operational planning and the conduct of operations up to Divisional level. Inclusion, for captains and WOs: training in Night Operations, manned ambush and mechanical ambush (claymore mine) techniques. Training and practice in instructional techniques, using an interpreter, with more emphasis on shooting coaching. For majors and captains: a study of the Territorial Forces Evaluation System to enable these officers to understand the system and be capable of drawing valid conclusions from the published results. Inclusion of instruction on report writing techniques in order that all members may be capable of writing reports similar to those written by present AATTV senior advisers for inclusion in monthly reports. Increased instruction and practice in radio operating and voice procedure. Preparing reinforcements for working in small groups, under adverse living conditions for lengthy periods. Instruction on Vietnamese customs and culture in an effort to improve the members’ understanding of the Vietnamese and also to attempt to eliminate those prospective members who are unlikely to achieve success because of an antipathy towards the Vietnamese.15
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Lieutenant Colonel Jim Stewart assumed the position of Acting Commander of AATTV on 16 December 1971, and by the end of December Australia’s force totalled 2334 of which 86 were AATTV. American forces stood at 158 119.
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Six AATTV officers and 24 warrant officers joined the United States Army Vietnam Individual Training Group on 3 January 1972. Major Simon Hearder was the senior Australian officer with the group and he was located at Bien Hoa. Jim Stewart, Commanding Officer AATTV, was in Saigon and Lieutenant Colonel Keith Kirkland commanded the other 38.This included the 25 Australians and two New Zealanders at the Jungle Warfare Training Centre in Van Kiep as well as the remaining MATT and a Regional Force adviser. Jim Stewart recalled the deployment of the new teams into the Phuoc Tuy and Long Hai Training Battalions, which were on the western side of the Long Hai Hills on Route 44. The Long Hai Training Battalion was put in the old 3rd Mobile Strike Force camp and the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion1 was about two kilometres further away to the south-east in what had been a Popular Force training centre in the village of Long Hai: Following the withdrawal of 1 ATF from Nui Dat, security in Phuoc Tuy Province dramatically worsened, resulting in a directive from COMAFV that Team personnel were not to engage in operations where there was a possibility of casualties. This presented problems in the training of the Popular Force and of the Cambodians, particularly on 199
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field exercises, especially as they were within mortar range of the North Vietnamese Army in the Long Hai Hills. The FANK [Forces Armees Nationales Khmer] program also presented unique training experiences for Team members, who underwent a concentrated two-week MIT course before joining the program. Under Major Simon Hearder, who was situated with the US training program HQ at Bien Hoa, three officers and twelve WOs were attached to the Long Hai Training Battalion, and two officers and twelve WOs, to the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, on the west coast of the Long Hai peninsula. Up to seven battalions, of approximately 500 men could be trained at one time, four at the Long Hai, and three at the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion. Fleets of C-130s would deposit battalion groups, mostly untrained, ages ranging from sixteen to 60, organised on a battalion command structure, based on what appeared to be the village hierarchy from where they had been recruited. In twelve weeks, these motley assorted groups were trained to operate as a battalion, with organic support weapons and command and communications. Concurrently, unit and sub-unit commanders were trained in command and control of unit and sub-unit operations. Clearly, training and safety standards had to be compromised, and any success the program achieved is attributable to the quality of the Team instructors and the relative enthusiasm of the Cambodian officers and NCOs, who were dedicated, and were now more capable of fighting the Khmer Rouge on their return to Cambodia.2
The Cambodian courses were designed to train battalion officers and NCOs in a 12-week recruit program, and various specialist courses for radio operators, reconnaissance personnel, medics and battalion staff. Ranges and close training areas brought certain challenges, especially for the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, which had to push out into the foothills of the Long Hai to train. Although the enemy was active in Phuoc Tuy Province in February, it had been anticipated. Elements of the 18th ARVN Division clashed with the 274 Viet Cong Main Force Regiment between Xuyen Moc and Dat Do on 27 February, otherwise there were no other clashes of significance and none that involved Australians.A thirteen-man indigenous reconnaissance patrol out of the Long Hai Training Battalion was ambushed on 25 March in the area of the But Thien stream on the north-eastern side of the Long Hai. The ambush killed four of the patrol and wounded four. It brought a
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whole new meaning to the term ‘realism in training’. Medevac and gunships were requested and a 25-man reaction force that included three US personnel went in to assist with the patrol’s extraction.They got the patrol out without further loss. The Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam (AAAGV), commanded by Brigadier Ian Geddes, became the senior Australian headquarters on 6 March 1972. The AAAGV and AATTV were on different Army establishments, and although AAAGV commanded the Team, to be posted to AAAGV did not mean membership of the Team.Warrant Officer Class One John ‘Jock’ Gordon, who had served with the Team in 1965–66 and who is shown in The Team as the RSM of AATTV departing Viet Nam on 18 December 1972, was not posted to it; Jock was actually the RSM of AAAGV. The family tree of the remaining organisations is shown below. HQ 8 Offrs 21 OR
Guard and Escort PI 1 Offr 24 OR
AATTV
AFV Cash Office
JWTC 7 Offr (incl 1 NZ) 20 OR Incl 2 NZ
RF/PF Advisor 1 Offr - OR
MATTS - Offr 10 OR (incl 2 NZ)
198 Wks Sect RAE (less det)
Sig Det - Offr 17 OR
Brigadier Whitelaw, Director of Military Operations and Plans, penned this note to the AAAGV establishment proposal in November 1971: ‘AATTV [is] to be shown as a separate “group” within the establishment and Team Leader/Senior Adviser Jungle Warfare Training Centre indicated as Commanding Officer AATTV element.’3 A formal note to the final establishment confirmed the two were raised on separate authorities.The AATTV headquarters in Saigon was closed and command of the Team was passed to Lieutenant Colonel Kirkland on 27 February 1972. Brigadier Geddes’ main concern now was to ensure the Australians understood that their combat role had finished.Australians were permitted to go on field exercises with the Cambodians, but it was
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to be strictly in a training capacity, although the enemy had not been told that. The situation became quite bizarre in March when the North swept across the Demilitarised Zone in a full-scale conventional assault of the South. Even though this was well away from where the Australians were working, the number of enemy in Phuoc Tuy Province also increased to a dangerous level. Attacks happened around Xuyen Moc and Duc Thanh, and Baria and Dat Do were isolated. The Cambodian Forces Armies Nationals Kmer (FANK) camps were mortared and so was Van Kiep, as this story of the ‘great mortar attack’ will attest: The time is approximately 0415 hours. The place is Van Kiep National Training Centre. Those involved, Warrant Officers Ron Clancy, Des Cochrane, Clem Ebner, Ted Gason, Peter Hulsing, Frank Reid and Mick Shave. In the period leading up to H Hour, several advisers had been relaxing together after a trying day of being popular heroes at large and, in keeping with their simple way of relaxing while being ever vigilant, they had consumed a few lagers and eaten sparingly of a simple meal of crab, prawns and other local delicacies. Warrant Officer Shave and Clancy had retired to their room and engaged in an intense game of chess, played with very large, artistically shaped pieces, bought locally. The game was later reported as being drawn and abandoned at around 0030 hours.Warrant Officers Ebner and Reid, after a reasonably amicable discussion on the merits of allowing mongrel Pommy immigrants to enlist in the Australian Army, had gone to their rooms, written letters to their loved ones, and retired for the evening. Until H Hour—at 0415 hours—the whereabouts of Warrant Officers Gason, Cochrane and Hulsing are not known. At approximately 0415 hours on the morning in question, a mortar attack of some magnitude fell in the general vicinity of the AATTV compound at Van Kiep. Several things happened simultaneously—Ebner and Reid, after a very quick appreciation, rolled under their beds, attempted to locate essential items such as clothes, flak jackets and weapons, then settled down to out-wait each other getting out of the room.While considering how best to make the other get out from under the bed first, Ebner and Reid could overhear the conversation from the next room and were quite mystified as to some of the utterances.While not exactly verbatim, the conversation, spoken almost entirely by Ron Clancy, went something like this, ‘Christ! What the bloody hell is that?
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Where? Oh shit, I’ve hit another one. You bastard! You’ve spread the bloody stuff everywhere! You Pommy mongrel! I’ll kill you my bloody self.’ All the above was interspersed with oaths, which will not be repeated here. At about this point, Reid had managed to convince Ebner that he should leave the room first while Reid acted as a sentry. Driven by sheer terror, Ebner departed, thoughtfully slamming and locking the door after him. Reid, following hot on his heels, slammed into the locked door and his attempts to open it and his enquiries as to his mate Ebner’s whereabouts and welfare were quite loud. While all the above was occurring, a couple of smaller dramas were happening elsewhere in the compound. Des Cochrane had answered the call of nature some few moments before H Hour.Amidst the chaos of explosions and panic, Des, completely naked, was trying to return to the Team House, but each time he reached the door a fresh group dashing to the bunkers swept him outside again. He remained remarkably composed during it all and only several bruises and bite marks on his comrades were later testimony to his efforts. Meanwhile,Ted Gason, attempting to leave the Team House and rally armoured support, had been wounded and lay groaning in the door of the Team House, watched anxiously by Hulsing who was concerned that someone would render first aid before he got a chance to do the cutting and stitching. As Gason lay there, Ebner was racing down the hallway, hell bent on survival, when he spied Gason. His first reaction was to stop and give aid to his wounded comrade, but years of training prevailed. Having been told many times not to stop for the wounded but to press on with the battle, Ebner, at a dead run, hit the door, placed one foot on Gason’s behind and the other on his head, ran clean over him out into the bunker where he blessed himself and completed a rosary begun a few minutes before. In the light of day and cessation of hostilities, the after-action report was completed and the mysterious conversation in the room of Clancy and Shave was explained. After the aforementioned chess game was abandoned, Mick Shave had thoughtfully reset the board and left it, along with the odd empty fruit juice can and a crab shell or two, which he had dismembered, between the beds. When Clancy rolled out of bed he had landed in the lot! This has been an eyewitness account of a littleknown battle, the intervening years may have caused a detail or two to be overlooked, but that is how it happened, one early morning, in Vietnam.4
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The approved tasks for the Australians seemed to contract by the day and as the American withdrawal gathered pace there was less of everything available;Australia’s efforts in Viet Nam were now strictly a political nicety. At Van Kiep their usefulness was over, the Vietnamese controlled the training and there was simply nothing for the Australians to do. Army Headquarters in Canberra was aware of the impending morale problems and their potential to damage relationships between the Australians and the Vietnamese. Army raised these points in April 1972 with Defence, but no firm plan was made to stop the commitment.5 In June, AATTV was required to notify the Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam, in writing, the names and dates of members on field training exercises. What followed was a flurry of signals to name the personnel, dates and amendments every time an exercise was planned at the Phuoc Tuy and Long Hai training battalions and the Jungle Warfare Training Centre at Van Kiep that included Australians. During 1972 clashes between FANK battalions and the Viet Cong resulted in 15 enemy killed; 26 Cambodians were also killed as well as four US Special Forces personnel.6 There were no contacts with the enemy recorded officially by Australia in the concluding months. But Captain Terry Smith, who arrived in July 1972, kept a detailed diary of his activities in the last few months of Australia’s war. He submitted a ‘spot report’ (contact report) at 0950 hours on 31 October 1972 which stated that one enemy was killed and one wounded. That action was not recorded in Australian reports.7 Terry Smith remembered the last few months with FANK and the final days at Van Kiep: My service with AATTV was not in a combat role. We were first and always trainers in every sense.The Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion was to some extent a cocoon of relative calm and security outside which the war went on at varying tempos.We did, however, leave our compound and close training areas to venture into the field with the Cambodian battalions on their ‘field exercises’ in AO’s [Area of Operations] around Phuoc Tuy Province. We fought no big battles and suffered no battle casualties.Those who had served before us had set the bar for the standards
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we had to measure up to. We, along with the other little teams, our neighbours at the Long Hai Training Battalion, the two MATTs and the Jungle Warfare Training Centre mob at Van Kiep all worked pretty hard to do the job we were given to do to the best of our ability. While I would not presume to speak for them I think we could all honestly say we ‘persevered’ to the very last day. The Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion was a camp located at Ap Long Hai. It was a relatively new camp but built around an old Vietnamese training camp and so most of the buildings were quite old.The place where I lived was a double-storied brick building of French colonial design with verandas running completely around the building and shutters in lieu of windows. It overlooked a courtyard formed by the NCO quarters.The place was very much like an old fort and was surrounded by a berm in which were set bunkers and firing bays of somewhat dubious value. It was quite a large camp about 800 x 300 metres or so and was manned by some 100 round eyes [Australian and American] and 2000 indigenous troops. However I feel the bad guys could come down and take it any time at all if they wanted to.The village was built right up to one side of the wall. It was quite a large village and the people generally seemed to like us. Around here though it was difficult to believe there was any danger and you had to force yourself to remain alert, as it was easy to switch off.8
Captain Smith wrote regularly to Australia and he described some other aspects of life in the training battalion with not a lot of highly trained people to defend the camp: I still crap myself every time the 4.2-inch mortar goes off at night and there is always some goose firing his weapon for no apparent reason. A couple of hundred yards away is the sea and we look right across to the Vung Tau Peninsula and it is quite a nice view. In the Training Office we did all the normal stuff of running a course. Checked the syllabus, allocated instructors, ranges and training areas, planned the live firing exercises (squad to company level), supervised instructors (assessment) etc. In July/early August 1972 one of our battalions had a contact just around the ‘Point’ of the Long Hai (Hills). The word went out from HQ Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion for all US Special Forces without the Combat Infantry Badge [CIB] to report in.They ran a Jeep shuttle out to the Point and had the CIB aspirants crawl around the Point, remain under fire for about fifteen minutes and then crawl back so they could qualify. They invited me to join them but I politely declined.
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At first the trainers were in a pooled cell, but the organisation at Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion changed later and all instructors were assigned to a battalion.We had two battalion teams each fully responsible for training and administration of their respective battalions. To carry out the training I had a team of sixteen people—three Australian warrant officers and thirteen Americans.9
Training Cambodian soldiers who were going to be in the front line immediately after graduating from the training centre was an eye-opener for Captain Smith. He wrote: The Cambodian battalion arrived here yesterday—completely disorganised and minus most of their equipment. They put a battalion through a company attack exercise using live fire. They are hopeless; the poor little bastards bunch up and fire their weapons every which way. They are terribly frightened of weapons and the only way to get them to move was to get out in front, which was not a recommended practice for obvious reasons. Wednesday we had a lucky escape from disaster . . . a mortar round exploded in the midst of a Cambodian platoon who were doing an attack exercise. One of our Australian warrant officers [Jack Martin] was wounded in the leg by a couple of pieces of shrapnel and we had three ‘Bodes’ injured. Cambodians are Buddhists. Most of them seemed to have two, three or more little Buddha strung around their necks. Whenever there was any hint of danger they would always pop their Buddha into their mouth. This was to get as close to Him as they possibly could for protection. The problem was you ended up with all these blokes with a mouthful of Buddha and string hanging out of their mouths like spaghetti, trying to shout orders or pass messages during live fire exercises and in the bush.10
The nature and location of their field training meant it was inevitable that FANK battalions would sometimes get involved in contacts, suffer casualties and occasionally inflict them.Terry Smith spoke of the problem in training on a ‘two-way range’: When I arrived at PTTB [Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion] in July the normal duration for an exercise was six to ten days. A battalion would normally do three or four of these ‘operations’ during its 12-week training
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cycle. We had three battalions in training and the Long Hai Training Battalion had another four so there was usually something happening. The duration shortened to about four to six days with a few of two or three from October due to resupply problems caused by enemy activity and the lack of water. We had also cut the training back to ten weeks. On 31 October, we came back from our last op having spent the last four days on search ops around the Nui Dat Two feature. It was a bastard being on this op, as no one felt like getting brassed just before the end of the war. It was true we were no longer in a combat role. It just so happens we trained in ‘Charlie’s’ back yard so there are contacts. This was not to be construed as a real war however, because officially we were not on operations but on field training exercises, just like back home.The only difference was that the bad guys were real and nobody bothered to tell them about it not being fair dinkum, so they usually bowl a couple of ‘Bodes’ over and shoot through. The Cambodians we trained seemed to me at the time to be the most un-warlike people you could ever imagine. They were also some of the happiest and friendliest people I have ever worked with.The Khmer Rouge behaviour in Cambodia told me there was a dark side to them I never saw. My biggest fear always was the Cambodians would cut and run and abandon their company advisers if they ever stumbled into something big. We would never deliberately let them walk into trouble. [There was a suspicion that some Americans actively pursued contact with the Viet Cong.] They were not there to do the ARVN’s work.Their standard of training, even on their final exercise was probably not good enough for a stand-up fight with a large dug in main force. Of course ‘Charles’ did not know these were the rules we were playing by. In army parlance these were two-sided exercises with an uncontrolled enemy! Contacts, where they occurred, tended to be fleeting. In November 1972, when we had finished the training, we took them down to the air strip at Vungers [Vung Tau]. I had to shake hands with everyone and they kept kissing my hands and face all the time.When I waved goodbye I could see a forest of hands waving inside the aircraft . . . very sad. They never let me down once and would always give their best.They are such a childlike people it was a shame they were in a war. I wished I could have gone with them as they would have a way to go
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before they learnt it all but perhaps we may have saved a few with our training.11
The combat situation when Captain Terry Smith was serving in the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion was a far cry from the halcyon days in I Corps (later Military Region 1) when there was firepower to burn in all forms and shapes and sizes. It was now best described as ‘precarious’. It was not for the faint-hearted and many of the old Team members would have been seriously unimpressed: By the time I arrived in Viet Nam most US and all Australian combat troops had been withdrawn. American air power was still considerable although most was used against North Viet Nam and in MR1 and MR2 in support of the ARVN.The lavish combat support my friends had seen and talked about was never in evidence when I was there.The few US logistics troops left were packing up to leave and being replaced by civilian contractors. In September, we drove up to the top of Nui Dat and got quite a good view of the layout. Most of the buildings were gone but you could see the roads and telegraph poles and looking into the rubber you could see old tables and things that had not been carted off. Nui Dat was occupied by a Regional Force company and they have a couple of 155-mm guns up on the crest. The large airstrip [Luscombe Field] was still in good condition and looked virtually new. We pinched a couple of street signs as souvenirs and I discovered the SAS area was relatively intact. Most of their bunkers were overgrown but the Vietnamese still use them as a part of their defences. All the signs are still there; 2 SAS Sqn I think was the unit and one large sign in the form of an upraised thumb and closed fist walking on two legs proclaimed ‘C Troop’. Nui Dat was a ghost town and Dat Do had been over-run and almost destroyed. The Viet Cong appeared to be able to come and go as they pleased. We no longer ‘owned’ the province.12
The end of what had been a highly professional unit operating in the most dangerous of environments was nigh. But Captain Terry Smith was now like many others who were watching the situation deteriorate and
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feeling absolutely helpless to stop the inevitable decay. He just wanted to finish his tour of duty: In November, there were only about 20 of us in the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion compound with about 100 or so security guards and it was due to close. The locals have been down bludging stuff and pinching everything that wasn’t nailed down. Speculation now was rife as to what was going to happen to us after November. Nothing official had come out other than we should make our plans for completing a full 12-month tour. By 15 November 1972, no decision has been reached about our future in the country.13
Terry Smith wrote in his diary about how uncertain the situation was. He spoke disparagingly about the overriding ‘mushroom syndrome’ that had enveloped the remaining Team members: 27 November 1972. Well this place is about finished now and we will all go to Van Kiep tomorrow and see if we can get a job. The original plan to send some of the men home has been quashed and there are some pretty unhappy people about. 6 December 1972. It seems we are to have a change of government for the first time in 24 years. Once again the unit is seething with rumours of what is to happen and whether or not peace will break out before Gough [Whitlam] gives the word.We are starting to thin out now—six men left last week for good and another five leave on Thursday. Also, all those on R and R are unlikely to come back. 8 December 1972. I just heard the news that we will all be withdrawn by the end of January. It looks as if I won’t be home for Christmas, but when I get home it will be for good. I went to Van Kiep for a week or two and the last field exercise I did was with two platoons of Regional Force or Popular Force trainees (cannot remember which) from the Jungle Warfare Training Centre.14
Many veterans have spoken about how ‘bad’ they felt when they left South Viet Nam.The job had not been finished and there was definitely no withdrawal with ‘honour’.When Terry Smith and his remaining staff were withdrawn it was with a feeling of guilt and he has never forgotten it: I do not know if I will ever really forget the shame I felt as an Australian soldier, nor my distaste for a system, which could allow it to happen, when we left two platoons of South Vietnamese in the scrub west of
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Nui Dat. Four of us accompanied the platoons and this must have occurred somewhere around 15 or 16 December 1972.This was allegedly a four-day job but we knew we would be pulled out soon.The reason we were with these platoons was part of a deception plan for AATTV’s tactical withdrawal from Phuoc Tuy to Saigon. This meant we kept up an air of normality until the last possible moment. We were picked up by two or three vehicles lead by the 21C of AATTV.We just left these two platoons to carry on without us. There was a hurried explanation and a quick farewell to the Vietnamese, we jumped in the Rovers and we were off—gone.15
On 8 December 1972 the newly elected Australian government ordered AAAGV to withdraw and return to Australia leaving only the Australian Embassy Guard.The AATTV departed Viet Nam on 18 December, which left 179 Australians in country and 24 000 Americans, almost where we had begun ten years previously.The AATTV was disbanded in Australia on 16 February 1973.
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Epilogue Epilogue
Viet Nam had been a war of many levels.The United States lost 1.8 per cent of its force each year. Australia was lower at 1.3 per cent, but the South Vietnamese lost 2.5 per cent or had a 1 in 40 chance of being killed each year. Statistics for the years 1960 through 1970 provided by the MACV Command History show the following figures for deaths by hostile action: US military 44 254; RVN military 132 685; and Australia–New Zealand 424. A pattern of allied combat deaths in South Viet Nam from 1967 through 1972 showed that five provinces accounted for 33 per cent of America’s combat casualties. The pattern was quite stable and the war in those five provinces was four times more active than it was in the other 39 provinces.Those five provinces were: Quang Tri, Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai and Dinh Tuong. The next worse were: Tay Ninh,Thua Thien, Kontum, Kien Hoa and Quang Tin with 18 per cent of the casualties. The five provinces of I Corps and the areas of Binh Dinh and Kontum were the regions considered to have been under Viet Minh control in 1954 and where the French fought hardest in South Viet Nam. The placement of the Australian Task Force in Phuoc Tuy was a sound military decision, as was putting advisers into the MACV system.These decisions matched Australia’s military skills and size to appropriate tasks. 211
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But how did the men feel about their role, the strategies and their allied counterparts? Major Colin Bannister, who served in 1964–65 with the Team at Duc My and then completed another tour of duty in 1969–70, offered these observations: I found it inevitable to compare both then and in my second tour in 1969 with HQ 1 ATF with what I had experienced with 3 RAR in the Malayan Emergency during 1957–59. In Malaya, there was a unity of command and control at all levels of government administration working with the benefit of a single intelligence network. A copybook counterinsurgency operation supported increasingly by a civilian population more and more estranged from the communist terrorists. In Viet Nam I found few similarities to make valid comparisons. The South Vietnamese government seemed to be self-serving and distracted by conflict with militant religious sects, while the US military effort seemed to become increasingly frustrated that the military might they could muster could not subdue a guerrilla force which grew, with North Vietnamese Army reinforcement, to formed units and formations. There was little indication of unity of command or coordination of US/South Vietnamese operations, while intelligence gathering had too many networks operating to provide accurate assessments. Basically, the Americans lacked the experience of the British colonialists in Asia to understand the thinking and attitudes of the people of the country. My final thought on Viet Nam is that I remain convinced that Australia should have committed troops to the conflict. During the early 1960s, the belligerent attitude of Sukarno led to Australian troops being involved in a shooting war with Indonesia in Borneo during Confrontation. There was apprehension in our country about a threat from Indonesia and Australia needed to ensure support against the threat by strengthening our ties with the USA.1
Warrant Officer Geoff Annett looked back on his time with 368 Regional Force/Popular force Independent Company and 2/1 ARVN battalion in Quang Tri in 1966–67:
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In retrospect and after such a long time, I have convinced myself that Viet Nam was a success and worthwhile.When I left I Corps in 1967, I was convinced that we were in front and it was just a matter of time. The North Vietnamese Army were on their knees and we had fewer contacts. When the time arrived to depart, I opted for a chopper ride to Hue and then onwards to Danang. Leaving Hue, I saw Peter Badcoe standing in the compound as I threw him his mail. He was resplendent in his slouch hat.The rest of my tour comprised a Saigon debrief then the trip home via Manila with QANTAS and finally my reunion with my family.The protests had started; I could not understand why nobody gave a damn about Viet Nam.What a waste of good people on both sides.2
On the subject of allies, Warrant Officer Barry Rust, who served in I Corps with the Mobile Guerrilla Force and later with 3/5 ARVN Battalion, spoke bluntly about the allies: I liked serving with the US Special Force members especially those with specialist tasks such as medics and radio operators.The Montagnards were very loyal and good soldiers but were pushed from post to post by the Vietnamese government.Although my service with the ARVN was short I did not have much time for the soldiers and its corrupt officers.3
On our American allies Geoff Annett had this to say about the US servicemen he served with: I have always admired the US military in general. In Viet Nam I have to say that the Marines were my choice, but they all got the job done and proudly so.American aircrew were outstanding, particularly helicopter crews. On the Vietnamese side, I was very impressed with the officers and NCOs of the ARVN, but I know this varied greatly between units. Good generals send it down the line and the 1st Division Commander had the confidence of his soldiers.4
Captain George Mansford had seen a few campaigns in his day, having served in Korea and at Duc My in 1966–67 and on operations with the 11th and 31st Ranger battalions in III Corps. He summed up his feelings about our allies, and more importantly of his association with the members of the Team: Needless to say, corruption at higher levels of the Vietnamese structure was rife and we too had our share of ghosts on the payroll. At times
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there seemed to be more women and children than soldiers in the position. Perhaps the highlight for me came at Binh Ba some time later, when on one memorable morning after stand-down, in what was now a wellprepared defensive position, Sooty Smith and his assistants—without any direction from me—conducted the very first formal company parade. Elements of the company in various forms of dress, armed with clean and oiled weapons formed up in three ragged lines. Following a poorly performed present arms by the soldiers on parade, the national flag of South Viet Nam was proudly raised on an improvised flagpole of bamboo. We had turned the corner.5
There is no doubt that the enemy were a worthy—if not totally honourable—foe. The use of terrorism remains as abhorrent today as it was then but was seen as a legitimate tactic by the National Liberation Front.Warrant Officer Mick Coffey, QC, who served in 1964–65 made some comments about the enemy he faced and the reason some of the ARVN didn’t fight well: The enemy were far better than what we had; the ARVN forces. Our people wouldn’t patrol. They left the night-time free for the enemy to do whatever they wanted to do. Once the end of the day came, that was the end of the war as far as they were concerned and of course the Viet Cong were completely different and they used to hit us at night. If our troops had put out night patrols or ambushes, this sort of thing would not have happened. I thought they should have been better troops as some of them had been in the Viet Minh that cleaned up the French. But my opinion of the French is the only fight they ever won was when Carpentier won the heavyweight title fight at Madison Square Gardens in 1926 [an unkind and severe criticism of the French forces of Indochina]. So maybe the Viet Minh weren’t such great soldiers. The enemy were fighting for something they wanted and with our troops their heart wasn’t in it.6
Major Vin Musgrave who served in I Corps in 1965–66 looked back on his time with mixed emotions:
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When my time was up, I left many good friends behind and had also lost some. In hindsight I should have extended my tour and contributed more. In my experience, I found the Americans I served with to be valorous, professional and generous to a fault.They were comrades whose values and attitudes were close to mine.The Vietnamese I advised were worthy allies and some were exceptional men. I will never forgive the ignorant western media and others for lumping them into a simplistic denigrated mass. Our Regional Force/Popular Force could fight their weight in bull ants.The enemy was not ten feet tall as portrayed by the media. They were professional and brave but suffered from lack of imagination and initiative, inflexibility and, sometimes, negative leadership. Their tactics were stereotyped and predictable. The conduct and achievements of my fellow AATTV members made me feel proud to be an Australian. I never ceased to wonder at their ability and bravery, regardless of corps, past experience or the situations they found themselves in.7
But eventually the end did come and former Team commander Ray Burnard was Military Attaché in 1973 and Australia, now under a Labor Government, had recently recognised North Viet Nam. Burnard recalled a poignant moment when the writing was well and truly on the wall that the North would eventually win out. He was speaking with the senior military at the time: The ARVN High Command felt a sense of betrayal, but in the provinces it was a different story. Major General Truong and Major General Toan who had commanded the 1st and 2nd ARVN Divisions respectively, and were now corps commanders, had a high regard for the Australians who had served with them.They commented to the Australian Ambassador, ‘It’s a great pity they are not here now!’8
When the Republic of South Viet Nam fell in 1975, it was felt with heavy hearts for many former members of the Team. Captain Barry Petersen, MC, who had spent two years plus in one tour of duty serving with the Team, recalled the bitter end: My saddest moment was in April 1975, ten years after leaving the Highlands. I was on loan for a couple of years to the Malaysian Army and I was following the communist advances in South Viet Nam.When Ban Me Thuot fell to the communists, I cried. I could only think of
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the absolute loyalty the Montagnard had shown me and that I was safe in Malaysia while they were being killed or faced capture.9
When Australia withdrew the AATTV, it was Australia’s most highly decorated unit with four Victoria Crosses and numerous other awards from the United States and the Republic of South Viet Nam. Not all the awards were for combat. Some were for service to the people of South Viet Nam and there is no better epitaph to the Australian Army Training Team’s service in Viet Nam than these words on Warrant Officer Class Two Keith Winbank’s concern for, and assistance to, a young injured Vietnamese girl at Tra Bong village in Quang Ngai Province: The last medical operation was to be the big one for Hanh. It was a success, but it looked as if Windy would never see the outcome, as he was due to go home in two weeks. However, sometimes the Gods smile on Samaritans like Keith, just four days before his departure for Australia, Hanh had her glass eye fitted. Windy would never forget the look on her face when she was given a mirror.To him it was a picture to behold, the look of wonder and joy that came over Hanh’s face was more rewarding to him than any medal he could have been awarded. When it was time to leave,Windy said his farewells to the parents, then turned to say goodbye to Hanh through his interpreter. Before he could speak, she looked him straight in the face and said, ‘Thank you Mr Windy’. It left him speechless and he had to turn away.10
Tra Bong entered the records of Australian military history when Warrant Officer Class Two ‘Dasher’ Wheatley won the Victoria Cross nearby. Australia would also be remembered in this small and isolated outpost through the efforts of a dedicated and compassionate soldier, a member of that unique organisation, the Australian Army Training Team Viet Nam.The last word comes from George Mansford:‘The memories of such comrades are forever lasting, and it was indeed an honour to have served at different times in different places with such magnificent bastards in a proud and unique unit.’11 These were the men who persevered.
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Appendix 1 Nominal roll of men posted To AATTV
This list is a guide to where men served with AATTV.This information has been collated from a variety of resources, but the principal documents used were the AATTV monthly reports. A location was decided by identifying where the main headquarters had been based. Further information was obtained through reports such as the MACV Command History, which provided after-action report details as well as showing where ARVN units were on operations.The ARVN 1st Division had its headquarters near Hue. The 2nd Division was located in Danang until May 1965 when it moved to Quang Ngai, and in 1972 it moved to Chu Lai.The 1st Division operated in the two provinces to the north of Danang and the 2nd Division in the two to the south of Danang. In the latter years, people were grouped by the AATTV report under a single heading of MATT; therefore, it was not possible to determine what team a person served with in those months. Those personnel shown as unallotted in their first month with MATT were probably at the Di An Advisers’ School. The dates of service with AATTV will differ from posted dates, as they are the recorded dates of arrival into and departure from Viet Nam.
217
ADDINGTON, Bertram Charles
AIKEN, Stanley Alan
AITKEN, Robert John
ALLAN, John Stewart
ALLEN, Lindsay Thomas
ALLEN, Robert John
ALMOND, Ronald Milton
41843
21290
33810
210826
21750
42576
24170
5.8.71– 6.8.72 16.3.72– 13.7.72 28.5.69– 7.5.70
WO1 WO1 WO1
2.4.70– 31.3.71
MAJ
11.3.68– 11.3.69
21.10.65– 11.10.66
WO1
WO2
4.8.70– 14.10.71
WO1
MID
17.2.65– 26.1.66
WO2
CORPS Other service in SVN General comments
RAINF. Deceased 11.9.96.
RACMP. 19.4.67– 22.4.68 AFV. Provost Unit. Deceased 30.5.95.
Jun–Jul 69, 4th ARVN Cavalry, Danang Base. Aug 69–Apr 70, 3/17 ARVN Cavalry, Hoi An, Quang Tin.
Mar 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Aug–Nov 71, Admin WO, AATTV Danang, Dec 71–Aug 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Mar–Aug 68, 1st Ranger Group and 21st Ranger Battalion, Danang, Hue, Hoi An, I Corps. Sep 68–Mar 69, CSD-PRU, II Corps Mobile Training Programme out of Pleiku & Nha Trang.
RAAC.
RAAMC. 1.5.67–8.5.68, 4 Fd Regt.
RASIGS.
RAINF.
Apr 70–Mar 71, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, RAINF. Senior Australian Adviser, HQ I Corps, Danang.
Nov 65–Jan 66, 3/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Feb–Sep 66, RSM Danang.
Aug 70–Oct 71, Phu Thu district, south-east of Hue, Thua Thien. RF/PF units.
Feb–Jun 65, Admin WO, Saigon. Jul–Sep 65, 5th RAASC. SFGA, Nung Coy, Danang. Oct 65–Jan 66, 5th HMAS Sydney (Army SFGA, C-1, S3-Air, Danang. Staff), 1971.
Area served AATTV
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ABIGAIL, William Henry
Name
12586
Army No.
First AATTV Service with Worn Honour Rank AATTV Award AATTV
218
31.3.66– 17.3.67
WO2 ANNETTE now ANNETT, Darold Geoffrey
RAINF.
RAASC. Deceased 30.3.77.
RAA.
RAE. 11.4.66–17.4.67, 17 Const Sqn. 29.10.71–24.2.72, 55 Engr Wksp Pk.
Apr–Jul 66, 368 RF/PF Independent Coy, Hoi An, Quang Nam. Aug–Sep 66, 1st Div Recon Coy, Hue. Nov 66–Mar 67, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri.
RAA.
Mar 67–Mar 68, Civil Affairs, Hoa Long, Phuoc RAASC. Tuy.
Aug–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71–Jan 72, RAA. 30.6.70–3.9.70 HQ AATTV, Saigon. & 22.9.70–4.11.70, 32 Small Ship Sqn. Deceased 19.7.77.
Oct 65–Feb 66, 3/3 ARVN, 1st Division. KIA 21 Feb 66 at Thanh Tan hamlet, approximately 20 km north-west of Hue on road 598, Thua Thien. Albany Creek Crematorium. Queensland Garden of Remembrance.
May 67, A&L Company, Baria. Apr–May 68, RF/PF, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 70, Di An Advisers’ School. Dec 70–Jan 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy. Feb–Jun 71, MATT 15, Long Son. Jul–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Aug–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
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219
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34992
23.3.67– 25.3.68
WO2
ANGUS, Peter
210340
4.8.71– 14.1.72
BDR
ANGELES, Charles Michael
7128
7.10.65– 21.2.66
WO2
ANDREWS, John Harker
211090
29.4.67– 11.6.68
WO2
ANDERSON, William Frederick
34930
19.11.70– 26.10.71
BDR
ANDERSON, John Robert
219959
5.8.71– 28.10.71
CPL
ANDERSON, Ian Keith
212922
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
ANSTEE, Maurice George
ARBLASTER, Stuart Alexander
ARMSTRONG, George Lancelot
ARNFIELD, Lawrence Howard
ARNOLD, Andrew John
ARTHUR, Bruce James
ASHFIELD, Rodney John
24366
3878
29410
26345
12561
216593
1731884
25.3.69– 25.2.70 7.10.65– 8.1.66 11.6.65– 15.5.66 22.5.68– 4.6.69 9.9.65– 7.8.66 30.4.66– 28.3.67 7.5.65– 29.4.66
10.8.70– 17.6.71
15.10.70– 15.10.71
WO2
WO2
WO2
WO2
WO1
WO2
CPL
CAPT
RAASC. 3.2.71–11.2.71 Det Z Com Post.Visit, 25.5.71–2.6.71. Deceased 23.6.85.
RASIGS. 16.4.67–5.2.68, 104 Sig Sqn.
RAINF. Deceased 4.2.01.
Oct 70–Mar 71, 3/54 ARVN, 1st Division, Phu Loc. Apr–May, 1st ARVN Regt, HQ, near Quang Tri. Jun–Jul, 4/1 ARVN, La Vang. Aug– Oct 71, 1st ARVN Regt, La Vang, Quang Tri.
Aug 70–Jun 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh District, Phuoc Tuy.
May–Sep 65, 5th SFGA C Team, Nung Coy, Danang. Oct 65–Jan 66,Van Thanh District, Thua Thien. Feb 66, Hue, Thua Thien. Mar– Apr 66, Hoa Cam, Quang Nam.
May 66, Admin WO Saigon then RF/PF Hoi An, Quang Nam.
RAINF.
RAE. 13.11.67– 12.11.68, 1 Fd Sqn. 17.6.70–9.8.70, 17 Const Sqn.
Deceased, no date.
RAINF.
RAEME. Deceased 13.3.94.
Sep–Nov 65, Dong Ha RF/PF Training Centre. RAEME. Dec 65–Apr 66, Gio Linh sub-sector Quang Tri. May 66, 1/3 ARVN, 1st Division.
Jun 65–May 66, Admin WO HQ AATTV Saigon. May–Jun 68, 2/51 ARVN, Danang. Jul 68–May 69, Admin WO, AATTV, Danang.
Oct 65–Jan 66, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai.
Mar–May 69, 1/3 ARVN, Hue, 1st Division. Jun 69–Feb 70, Admin WO, LRRP Wing,Van Kiep.
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ANSELL, Cyril Robert
436530
220
24.2.71– 12.8.71
BAIRD, Robert Alexander CAPT
53898
5.8.66– 7.4.67
RAE. 11.5.67–10.9.68, 17 Const Sqn.
RAAOC. 8.9.71– 27.2.72, 2AOD. Deceased 9.4.84.
RAEME. 20.11.67– 19.11.68, 55 Engr Wksp Pk.
RAINF. 13.5.69– 11.6.69, HQ AFV.
Mar–May 71, TOC–Fwd, 1st ARVN Div HQ, near Quang Tri. Jun–Aug 71, TOC, HQ 1st Div, Hue.
Jul–Dec 72, MATT 2,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 66, Sector Operations Officer, Thua Thien. Conducted operations in Phu Tu, Quang Diem and Huong Tra districts in Feb, Mar and Apr 67. Terendak Military Cemetery, Malaysia.
RASIGS.
RAINF. 15.6.66– 19.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn.
RAINF. KIA, 7.4.67, Huong Tra District, Thua Thien. 7.11.62–14.11.62,Visit.
Dec 68–May 69, platoon commander, 223 MSF RAINF. Coy, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. May 69, 21st Ranger Battalion near Danang. Jun–Jul 69, 39th Ranger WIA 6.5.69, shrapnel, Battalion. Aug–Oct 69, 37th Ranger Battalion. near Ban Me Thuot. Nov–Dec 69, 21st Ranger Battalion near Danang–Group HQ. Jul–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Sep 70 unallotted, Oct 70–Feb 71, MATT 9, Phuoc Loi. Mar–Aug 71, MATT 3, Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy.
Apr 66, Gio Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri and then Admin WO Danang.
Dec 70, unallotted, Jan–Jul 71, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy. Aug–Dec 71, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Mar 66–Feb 67, Trieu Phong, Quang Tri.
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221
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 221
19.7.72– 18.12.72
WO2
BAIN, Norman John
36179
VC
MAJ
BADCOE, Peter John
15.7.71– 26.10.71
41400
17.12.68– 17.12.69
MID
WO2
AYLETT, Ronald Desmond
36371
3.9.70– 2.9.71
CPL
AYLETT, Peter Charles
61647
15.4.66– 3.4.67
WO2
AUSTIN, Ernest George
52771
17.12.70– 16.12.71
CPL
ATKINS, Robert James
1201260
18.3.66– 15.2.67
CAPT
ASPINALL, Kevin Herbert
13769
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
BALCOMBE, Stanley
BANDY, Reginald Amos
BANNISTER, Thomas Colin
BARKER, John Edward
BARLOW, Kevin Winston
BARNES, John Thomas
52925
5288
235083
36292
61608
15942
5.8.64– 25.1.65 23.10.63– 8.10.64
16.5.64– 24.4.65
21.10.65– 17.4.66
WO2 WO2
MAJ
WO2
26.8.71– 23.8.72 14.5.70– 7.4.71
CAPT WO2
14.1.71– 26.10.71
20.8.68– 13.8.69
7.8.70– 21.3.71
CPL
May–Sep 70, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Oct–Dec 70, DIOCC, Cho Gao. Jan–Mar 71, Night Advisory Team 2, Can Tho.
Sep 71–Jan 72, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb 72, Adjutant, HQ AATTV,Van Kiep.
Oct–Dec 65, Dien Ban sub-sector, Quang Nam. Jan–Feb 66, S-3 Air, 5th SFGA C Team, Danang. Mar–Apr 66, Nung Force, Danang. Aug 68–Feb 69, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Gio–Linh area, 1969. Mar–Aug 69, 5/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Gio Linh area. Jan–May 71, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam. Jun–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
May 64–Apr 65, Senior Australian Adviser, Senior Training Adviser, Duc My, Ranger Training Centre. 13–27 Aug 64, visited Ranger Training Trung Lap near Cu Chi. 29 Aug–5 Sep, visited 37th Ranger Battalion.
Oct 63–May 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee, near Hue. Nov 63, observed TF 100 operation north of Hiep Khanh. Jun 64, Jungle, Mountain, Swamp School, Duc My Ranger Training Centre.
Aug 64 via 1st SFG B-410 to new 7th SFG A726 Ta Ko, western Quang Nam.
Aug 70–Mar 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF.
RAASC.
Deceased 18.5.94.
RAINF. Medevac, illness.
RAINF. 2.9.69–15.3.70, HQ 1 ATF. 16.3.70–3.9.70, HQ AFV.
17.2.70–10.3.71, 7 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 28.12.64. Medevac.
RAINF. 3.2.69–18.2.70, 5 RAR.
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BAKER, Paul Douglas
39689
222
BARRETT, Trevor William
BATISTE, Geoffrey
BAUDISTEL, Karl William
BAXTER, Allen John
BAXTER, William Montgomery
BAYLISS, Gregory Victor
52285
28416
17073
2410267
26033
243479
21.5.65– 5.5.66 3.1.67– 13.8.67
23.4.68– 23.4.69 11.9.64– 6.8.65
19.1.72– 6.9.72
WO2 CAPT
WO2 WO2
CPL
25.2.70– 25.2.71
7.5.65– 29.4.66
DCM
WO2
WO2
Jan–Sep 72,Vehicle mechanic, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Sep–Oct 64, SFG B Team Danang. Nov–Dec 64, 1st SFG team A-322 Kham Duc western Quang Tin. Jan–Feb 65, 5th SFGA, B Team Danang, Nung Training. Mar–Jul 65, 2/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Danang.
Apr 68–Apr 69, RF/PF Nam Hoa sub-sector south of Hue, Thua Thien.
Jan 67, CO, A-113 Mike Force, 5th SFGA, based at Marble Mountain near Danang. Albany Creek Crematorium. Queensland Garden of Remembrance.
May 65–Apr 66, 4/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri.
May–Jun 65, RF/PF, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Jul–Sep 65, 1/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Danang. Oct 65–Apr 66, RF/PF Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien.
Mar 70, platoon commander 212 Coy, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. May 70, company commander 211 Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Jun 70, platoon commander, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Jul 70–Feb 71, MATT 2, Dat Do, Phuoc Tuy.
RAEME. 4.9.71– 7.11.71, A Sqn, 3 Cav. 8.11.71–14.1.72, 102 Fd Wksp.
WIA, panji, 24.12.64.
RAINF.
RAA. Deceased 30.9.94..
KIA 13.8.67, Tien Phuoc, Quang Tin.
RAINF.
RAINF. Deceased 25.8.03.
RAE.
6.6.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:03 PM
223
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 223
BARNES, Raymond Alexander
1410972
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
CPL
38559 27.8.70– 26.8.71
RAAC. 24.4.67–19.12.67, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
Visit, 5.1.65–14.1.65.
RAINF.
RAE.
Sep 70–Apr 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy. May 71–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAAMC. 19.2.68–21.2.69, 8 Fd Amb.
RAINF. Oct 65–Apr 66, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. May–Sep 66, Ranger Group, Quang Nam. Jan–Apr 69, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Deceased 21.7.97. Tri. May–Jul 69, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division.
Apr–Sep 66, National Police Field Force Training Centre, Trai Mat near Da Lat. 10 Oct 66, S-4 Air, C Team, 5th SFGA, Marble Mountain, Danang.
Sep 70, unallotted. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 14, RAAMC. Long Dien District, Phuoc Tuy. May 71–Jun 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Sep 70–Mar 71, 3/7th ARVN Cavalry, Quang Tri. Apr–May 71, 11th Armoured Cavalry Regiment, Dong Ha. Jun–Aug 71, 3/11 ARVN Cav, La Vang, Quang Tri.
Jan 70 to Pleiku via Nha Trang and Hon Tre Training Facility. Feb 70, CO, 1st MSF Battalion, 5th SFGA. 28 Apr–May 70, RF/PF Baria. Jun–Jul 70, MATT coordinator, Baria. Aug 70, Assistant Senior Adviser, JWTC, Nui Dat.
14/7/05 1:04:03 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 224
BELCHER, William Alvin
7.10.65– 27.9.66
BEEZLEY, Herbert Henry WO2
12436
21.1.69– 23.7.69
14.4.66– 2.4.67
WO1
BEE, Russell
4710
7.9.70– 8.7.71
14.1.70– 14.1.71
CPL
BECK, Donald William
1732660
DSO
3.9.70– 2.9.71
BEATTIE, Francis James
19955
MAJ
WO2
BEALE, Patrick Wald
42042
224
1.10.68– 1.10.69
Oct 68–Mar 69, Adjutant, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Apr–Sep 69, 1/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, south of Danang, Quang Nam.
May–Sep 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Oct 71–Apr 72, MATT 1, Baria.
Mar–Oct 71, MATT 5, Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 65–Feb 66, RF/PF HQ, Danang. Karrakatta Cemetery, W.A.
Aug 69–Jun 70, 2/2nd ARVN, 1st Division, Dong Ha. Jul–Aug 70, RF NOAT, Cho Gao.
Feb 69 attached 1 ATF until late Mar 69. Apr– Nov 69, S3, Quang Tri Sector then Assistant Province (Military) Adviser. Senior Australian adviser, Quang Tri.
Apr–Jul 69, 2/2nd ARVN, 1st Division, Dong Ha, Quang Tri. Aug 69–Mar 70, LRRP Wing, Van Kiep.
6 Dec 69–Mar 70,VDAT, Ben Tranh District, Dinh Tuong. Apr–Jun 70, RF training, Dinh Thuong. Jul–Sep 70, 1/54, Hue. Oct–Nov 70, Admin WO, AATTV Danang.
RAINF.
RAINF. 26.5.65–1.6.66, 1 RAR.
RAAC.
RAINF. KIA 12.2.66, Hai Van Pass 10 km north of Danang.
RAA. 14.9.65–21.4.66, 105 Fd Bty. 22.4.66–28.9.66, 1 Fd Regt.
RAINF. 11.11.68–11.2.69, 1 RAR. Deceased 7.6.85.
RAINF. Deceased 6.3.98.
RAE.
14/7/05 1:04:03 PM
225
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 225
BENT, David George
CAPT
3173096
28.4.71– 20.4.72
BENNETT, Robert Irvine WO2
14474
24.2.71– 28.10.71
2LT
BENDEICH, John Anthony
2791605
4.11.65– 12.2.66
CAPT
BELLEVILLE, Graham Rhodes
54956
27.8.69– 27.8.70
WO2
BELL, Owen William
43309
12.2.69– 19.11.69
MAJ
BELL, Henry Lawrie
25627
25.3.69– 25.3.70
WO2
BELL, Francis Edwin
51975
3.12.69– 27.11.70
WO2
BELL, Douglas Barry
29290
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
BIRD, Dennis Russell
BIRKETT, William James
BIRNIE, Stuart Alan
BISHOP, Jack Reid
BLACK, Clem Laurence
217216
13214
35646
13927
17805
24.2.71– 28.10.71 7.10.65– 17.1.66 10.6.66– 7.9.67 25.2.70– 29.6.70 16.3.65– 19.2.66
30.7.69– 2.12.69
2LT WO1
WO2
WO2
WO2
27.8.70– 26.8.71
2.1.67– 18.12.67
WO2
Aug 69, Combat Orientation Course, Hon Tre Island off Nha Trang. Sep–Nov 69, platoon commander 211 Company, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Sep–Oct 70, 1/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Nov– Dec, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Jan 71, unallotted. Feb–May 71, MAT 22, Quang Ngai. Jun–Aug 71, Hoa Vang RF/PF, Quang Nam.
Mar 65, 1st SFG A-323 then 5th SFGA, team A-101 Khe Sanh, Quang Tri. Apr–Jun 65, 5th SFGA, team A-104 Ha Thanh (new), Quang Ngai. Jul 65–Feb 66, C Team, Air Movements, 5th SFGA Danang.
Mar–Jun 70, 4/54 ARVN, 1st Division, Phu Loc, Thua Thien.
7 Oct 65–17 Jan 66, CSD-CIA programme, Vung Tau. RF/PF, Quang Tri.
Mar–Oct 71, MATT 4, Hoa Loi, Phuoc Tuy.
Jan–May 67, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division. Jun–Dec 67, Duc My Ranger Training Centre.
10.6.66–1.9.66, 1 ARU. 2.9.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
RAINF. WIA 12.11.69, near Bu Prang, Medevac.
RAA. 14 Jan 66, injured when 500lb bombs exploded B-57 fire Danang strip. Deceased 9.10.93.
RAA. WIA 2.6.70, Tun Tavern Hill, Medevac. Deceased 25.4.86.
RAINF. 18.1.66–9.6.66 RSM 1 RAR.
RAA.
RAINF. 15.2.71– 16.10.71, 3 RAR. Deceased 10.5.00.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 226
BETTS, Brian Edward
28324
226
BLAIR, P. N. Now MCCARTHY, John Raymond
BLANCK, Wayne Allan
BOILEAU, Guy Francis
BOLITHO, Mervyn Richard
BOND, John Albert
217703
38033
335098
5411664
21977
2.7.63– 4.6.64 19.11.68– 5.11.69
CAPT
WO2
30.1.69– 25.4.69
10.3.67– 8.5.68
16.4.66– 20.9.66
WO2
WO2
14.7.72– 18.12.72
WO2
MID
22.10.70– 17.4.71
CPL
15 Mar, HQ I Corps. 16 May–Aug 67, 2nd/4th ARVN Cavalry Troop. Sep 67–Apr 68, AATTV Danang, Admin WO. Jan–Apr 69, 7th Cav Regt, Hue, Thua Thien. Northern Suburbs Crematorium, NSW.
Nov 68–Oct 69, Black Panther Coy, Hue, Thua Thien.
Jul 63–May 64, CSD programs, Danang Base– operations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai.
Apr–May 66, Nung Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. Traralgon Cemetery,Victoria.
Jul–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, Long Hai.
Nov 70–Feb 71, MATT 14, Long Dien. Mar– Apr 71, MATT 3, Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy. Last AATTV man KIA. Belmont South Cemetery, NSW.
RAAC. WIA 2.6.67 & WIA 15.7.67. KIA 25.4.69 Lang Vei 1 km south-west of former SF camp, Quang Tri.
RAINF. WIA 19.7.69, panji stake, A Shau Valley.
AUST INT.
RAINF. KIA 20.9.66, Thuong Duc A-109, 20 miles south-west of Danang, Quang Nam.
RAINF. 8.5.69–12.5.70, 6 RAR.
RAINF. 11.4.67– 16.4.68, 7 RAR. 20.1.70–27.2.70, 1 ARU. 28.2.70–21.10.70, 6 RAR. KIA 17.4.71, Phuoc Tuy.
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227
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 227
BLACKHURST, Thomas Douglas
19983
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
BOYCE, Ronald
WO2
10.3.67– 11.3.68
7.5.65– 17.4.66
15 Mar 67, 2/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, south of Danang, Quang Nam.
May–Sep 65, 3/2 ARVN, Hue. Oct 65–Apr 66, 5th SFGA, Nung Force, Danang.
Jul 70–Feb 71, 5/2 ARVN, Dong Ha. Mar–Jun 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. July–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion. Dec 72,Van Kiep.
Jun–Aug 68, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. 4 Sep–Dec 68, 5th SFGA, company commander 212 Coy, 1st Battalion, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Battalion CO two weeks in Nov 68.
Aug 70–Aug 71, Transport Supervisor, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau.
Jun–Aug, 3/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Feb–Mar 70,VDAT, Phong Dinh. Apr–May, AATTV RF Training Team, Dinh Tuong. Jun, NOAT, Dinh Tuong. Jul–Oct 70, 2/5 ARVN, Tam Ky. Nov 70–Feb 71, Chieu Hoi adviser, Baria.
Apr 69, 7th ARVN Cavalry, HQ Hue. May 69–Mar 70, 2/7th ARVN Cavalry, Hue & Quang Tri.
RAINF.
RAINF.
13.8.67–6.8.68, 1 ARU.
RAINF.
RAINF. 9.6.65–14.2.66, 1 RAR. 2.1.69–18.6.69, HQ 1 ALSG.
RAAC. 22.4.68–23.4.69, A Sqn, 3 Cav Regt.
Deceased 27.2.05.
RAINF. Sep 1969, illness, Medevac Australia.
RAAC.
Jan–Mar 66, CSD,Vung Tau. Apr–Jun 66, CSD RAA. Nung Force, Long Hai base protection. Jul–Dec 66, Gio Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri.
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 228
214218
BOWMAN, Edward James WO2
53050
25.6.70– 23.6.71 5.7.72– 18.12.72
WO2
BOUVENG, John Leslie
213656
18.6.68– 1.1.69
CAPT
BOURKE, James Raymond
18252
14.8.70– 12.8.71
CPL
BOOTH,Vernon John
216533
11.6.69– 8.9.69 25.2.70– 25.2.71
WO2
BOOTH, Samuel
14455
25.3.69– 25.3.70
WO2
BOOTES, Lester Noel
25761
6.1.66– 10.12.66
WO2
BONE, Alan William
34440
228
BOYLE, William David
BRADY, Frank William
BRADY, Kevin John
BRANSON, Francis Leonard
BRAY, Robert James
BRAY, Walter Edward
BREAKWELL, Tony Hunter
BRENNAN, William George
BREWER, Allan
365272
311585
36142
5620
13368
17882
29598
34623
1203194
22.10.70– 21.10.71 3.12.69– 6.12.70 6.12.66– 20.11.67 12.6.72– 3.12.72
WO2
WO2 CPL
20.11.67– 17.12.68
WO1
WO2
29.10.69– 1.4.70
WO2
11.9.64– 4.9.65
19.11.70– 16.12.71
CPL
WO2
13.10.70– 9.9.71
PTE
MID
29.10.70– 28.10.71
BDR
RAAC.
RAINF. Deceased 4.6.98.
RAINF. 31.5.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
RAE. 9.12.68–10.4.69, 17 Const Sqn. 11.4.69– 22.4.70, 1 Fd Sqn.
RAINF. Deceased 7.4.71.
RAA.
Jun–Oct 72, cook, HQ AATTV, Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Dec 66, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division then Admin WO Saigon.
Dec 69–Jul 70, 21st ARVN Ranger Battalion, near Danang. Aug–Dec 70, Phuoc Tuy Training Centre, Baria.
AACC. Medevac.
RAAC. Deceased 12.9.84.
RAINF. Deceased 12.9.99.
Oct 70–Mar 71, Recon Coy, 4th ARVN Regt, RAINF. 14.5.68– Quang Ngai. Apr–Sep 71, 4th ARVN Regt, 2nd 30.5.69, 4 RAR. Division, Mo Duc. Deceased 15.9.95.
Sep 64–Feb 65, 7th A-727 & 1st SFG A-323 teams at Khe Sanh western Quang Tri. March 65, Dong Ha, Quang Tri.
Nov 67–Apr 68, Cam–Lo sub-sector, Quang Tri. May–Dec 68, Chief Clerk, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Nov–Dec 69, 2/6 ARVN and Jan–Mar 70, 3/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
Nov 70–Dec 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Oct 70–Aug 71, Interpreter, JWTC, Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 70–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
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BOYD, Stephen Maurice
218029
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
BROADHURST, Robert Thomas
BROCK, Clifford John
BROCKETT, Richard John
BRODERICK, James
BRODZIAK, Mark Alan
BROWN, Gordon Vivian
BROWN, Philip James
3411970
311599
29465
35543
28078
13370
38871
1.6.70– 27.8.70 6.2.70– 1.6.70 30.4.70– 1.5.71
13.11.64– 15.5.66
23.9.66– 31.8.67 23.4.66– 3.4.67 11.6.69– 12.6.70 29.10.70– 7.1.71
CAPT
SGT
CAPT
2LT
WO2
WO2 MAJ CPL
Nov–Dec 70, NOAT, Cho Gao.
Jun 69–May 70, Nam Hoa District, near Hue.
Apr–Jun 66, CSD,Vung Tau. Jun 66–Mar 67, Ranger Group, Danang.
Oct 66–Aug 67, RF/PF combined action companies, Hoa Vang, near Danang, Quang Nam.
Nov–Dec 64, CSD not allocated. Jan–Jun 65, CSD, Peoples Action Teams Programme, Hoi An, Quang Nam. Jul–Nov 65, CSD, Hoi An, Quang Nam. Dec 65–May 66, CSD, Danang, Quang Nam.
May–Dec 70, 3/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st ARVN Div, Quang Tri. Jan 71, Adviser School, Di An. Feb 71, MAT 23, Quang Ngai. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 3, Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy.
Feb–May 70, LRRP Wing,Van Kiep, Training Centre.
No deployment information. Probably held against an AATTV position whilst doing civil affairs tasks with Aust. Embassy, Saigon.
RAINF. 26.9.67– 24.10.67, 1 ARU. 25.10.67–26.4.68, 7 RAR.
RAE.
RAINF.
RAINF.
10.5.67–18.4.68, 547 Sig Tp. Deceased 20.8.00.
AUST INT.
RAINF. WIA 25.5.70, Quang Tri.
RAINF. Medevac NBC. 21.2.69–6.2.70, 3 SAS Sqn.
RAE. 3.12.69–31.5.70, 1 Aust CA Unit–Aust. Embassy.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 230
BRICKNELL, Raymond Leo
29921
230
BUCHAN, John Graham
BUCHAN, Ross Stuart
BUCKLEY, Harold
1734914
57050
21371 22.10.70– 21.10.71
16.7.66– 2.7.67
MAJ
WO1
7.8.70– 24.12.70
CPL MID
23.9.66– 12.9.67
1.2.69– 23.2.70
WO2
MID
Nov–Dec 70, NOAT, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong. Jan–Jul 71, NAT 2, Dong Tam. Aug–Oct 71, Phuoc Tuy Sector, MATT.
Jul 66–Jul 67, Senior Australian Adviser I Corps Danang. I Corps G–3 Training Adviser, Senior Adviser I Corps Scout Dog & Sentry Dog Platoons.
Aug–Dec 70, Linguist, Baria, Phuoc Tuy Training Centre.
Sep 66, 5th SFGA, Training Officer then 13th Company, Mike Force, Danang and then RSM AATTV, Danang.
Feb 69, CO 2nd MSF Battalion, Pleiku. Mar 69–Feb 70, CO 1st MSF Battalion, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Jun 69 acted as Commander and Deputy Commander 2 MSF.
Mar–Jun 69, 2/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Quang Nam. Jul–Sep 69, Nam Hoa sub-sector, RF/PF, Thua Thien. Oct 69–Jan 70, attached 1 ATF, ARVN training, Nui Dat–Horse Shoe.
Apr 70–Feb 71, senior Australian adviser and Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security, CORDS, Can Tho.
Oct 68–Feb 69, ARVN CCS near Hue, Thua Thien. Mar–Jun 69, medical adviser, Hue.
RAE. Deceased 25.5.02.
Deceased 7.2.03.
RAA.
RAINF.
RAINF.
Visit, 22.1.63–31.1.63.
RAINF.
Deceased September 1999.
RAINF.
RAA. 14.9.65–20.9.66, HQ AAFV & AFV. 24.3.70–1.6.70, HQ AFV.
RAAMC.
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231
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 231
BRYSON, William John
1662
BRYDON, William Joseph MAJ
26344
25.2.69– 28.1.70
WO2
BRUCE, William James
51534
25.3.70– 4.3.71
MAJ
BROWNE, John Anthony
29062
1.10.68– 25.6.69
WO2
BROWN, William
36870
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
WO1
1.10.69– 1.10.70
Oct 69–Feb 70, 1/11 ARVN Cavalry, Quang Tri. Mar–Sep 70, 3/7 ARVN Cav Sqn, Quang Tri.
17 Feb 68, Commanding Officer AATTV Saigon.
Sep 69–Feb 70, 1/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Mar–Jul 70, Admin WO, Aust House, Danang.
Jul 71, AATTV, Saigon. Aug–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71–Jun 72, MATT 1, Baria.
Sep 70, MATT unallotted. Oct 70–Feb 71, MATT 12, Long Le and An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy. Mar–Jun 71, MATT 15, Long Son Island, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Apr–May 66, Nung Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. Platoon commander and company commander Mike Force, Danang. 28 Dec 66, 5th SFGA Detachment B-50, Project Omega, training & 2IC & sometimes CO-B-50 Mike Force Battalion, Nha Trang.
Aug–Oct 70, MATT 7, Ong Trinh, Phuoc Tuy. Nov 70, attached JWTC. Dec 70–Feb 71, MATT 15, Long Son Island. Mar–Jul 71, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy.
RAAC. Deceased 9.6.02.
RAINF.Visits, 6.9.66– 12.9.66. 12.3.67–18.3.67, 10.11.67–16.11.67. Defence & Military Attaché, Jan 73–Feb 75.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAE. 10.10.67–22.10.68, 1 Fd Sqn.
RAINF Deceased 11.4.89.
RAINF. 8.4.67–26.4.68, 7 RAR.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 232
BURNS, Eric Crawley
24434
6.2.68– 11.2.69
MID
LTCOL
BURNARD, Raymond Lewis
235022
27.8.69– 27.8.70
WO2
BURKE, Daniel
13765
30.6.71– 3.7.72
BURGESS, Donald Walter CPL
3.9.70– 2.9.71
2275850
CPL
BURGERHOF, Nicolaas Wouter
1200865
23.4.66– 3.4.67
MID
WO2
BULOW, Kenneth Allen
13520
7.8.70– 5.8.71
CPL
BUCKLEY, Leonard Gordon
214937
232
BURROWS, James Joseph
BURY, Robert
BUTLER, Malcolm John
BUTLER, William Edward
BYARD, Gary Philip
CAHILL, James George
235089
14432
215120
28217
64386
212518
23.4.66– 12.4.67 8.11.63– 15.10.64 21.1.69– 25.6.69 30.6.71– 9.8.71
28.1.70– 28.1.71
30.9.71– 28.1.72 27.8.67– 20.8.68
WO2 CAPT
WO2 WO2
WO2
CPL
WO2
Aug–Oct 67, platoon commander 12th Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFGA, Danang. Nov 67–Feb 68, 3rd MSF, B-36, Long Hai Camp, FOB Tay Ninh. Mar–Aug 68, Recondo School, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang.
Oct 71,Vehicle Mechanic, AATTV, Vung Tau. Nov 71–Jan 72, JWTC,Van Kiep Training Centre.
Jan–Mar 70,VDAT, Kien Hoa. Apr–Jul 70, RF Training, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong. Aug–Oct 70, NOTT, Dong Tam. Nov 70–Jan 71, NOTT, Pleiku.
Jul 71, NOTT, Team 1, Bac Lieu, IV Corps.
Jan–Jun 69, Admin WO, LRRP Wing,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 63–Jun 64, 1st SFGA B-420, Danang, S–2, S-3 & XO duties. Jul–Oct 64, USSF (Vietnam) (Provisional) C Team, Nha Trang.
May 66–Apr 67, Air Movements, 5th SFGA C Team, Danang.
RAINF.
RAEME. 18.5.71–23.9.71, 17 Const Sqn.
RAINF.
RAE. 15.4.66–16.4.66, ALSC. 17.4.66–5.7.66, 17 Const Sqn. Accidentally wounded 21.7.71, Bac Lieu. Medevac.
RAEME.
Deceased 1989.
RAINF.
RAASC.
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233
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 233
BURNS, Robert Jack
51964
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
CALCUTT, James Samuel
CALIGARI, Barry John
CALLANDER, Frederick Arthur
CAMERON, Donald George
12001
36587
33691
5410081
19.9.66– 2.6.67
MID
DCM
WO2
WO2
19.2.68– 18.11.68
21.10.65– 11.10.66
9.7.70– 29.7.71
CAPT
4.3.70– 4.3.71
WO1
MID
1.6.69– 23.2.70 Medevac & Return 30.4.70– 1.10.70
WO2
RAINF. Medevac–ear injuries, mortar fire, Con Thien.
RAINF. WIA 13.9.70. Visit, 3.8.65–17.8.65. 19.4.67–16.4.68, 7 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. Medevac illness.
Oct–Nov 65, Mo Duc sub-sector, Quang Ngai. RAINF. Dec 65, Tra Bong sub-sector, Quang Ngai. Jan 66, 5th SFGA C Team, Danang. Feb–Jul 66, Nung Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. 26 Aug 66 to Dalat for six weeks. Feb–May 68, platoon commander 11th Company, 1st Battalion, 5th SFGA MSF Danang. Jun 68, platoon commander 22nd Company, B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Jul–Sep 68, Training Company, 2 MSF. Sep–Oct 68, Medevac. company commander 211 Company, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Nov 68, Training Officer, 2 MSF.
Sep 66, 3/5 ARVN, Danang. Jan 67, 5th SFGA Company C, Mike Force, 11th Company, Danang.
Jul–Oct 70, 3/54 ARVN Regt, Phu Loc, Thua Thien. Dec 70–Jun 71, OC, NOTT, Pleiku and then Phu Cat from 5 July 71.
Mar–Jun 70, company commander, Training Company 2 MSF Pleiku, 5th SFGA. Jul 70–Feb 71, Admin WO, AATTV, Australia House Danang.
Jun 69–Feb 70,VDAT,Vinh Long, IV Corps. May–Jun 70, 4/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Jul–Sep 70, 4th Regt Recon Coy, Quang Ngai.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 234
CAIRNS, Robert William
1972
234
CARROLL, Christopher David
218155
12.3.72– 18.12.72 5.8.71– 1.8.72
SGT CPL
4.9.67– 20.8.68
Aug–Sep 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Oct 71, MATT 1, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Sep 67–Aug 68, 1/6 ARVN Battalion, Tam Ky, Quang Tin.
Jun 65–Aug 66, CSD program Kien Hoa and Kien Gang, IV Corps.
16 Jul 67, RF/PF, Danang. 13 Aug 67, 2nd/7th ARVN Cav, Thua Thien and then Quang Tri. Dec 67–Apr 68, HQ 1 ARVN Div, S-3 Assistant. May–Jun 68 detached 1 ATF.
May–Oct 70, Admin WO (Pay), HQ AATTV, Saigon. Nov 70, HQ, AATTV, Vung Tau.
Jun–Sep 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Oct–Dec 64, Thua Thien Sector RF/PF. Jan–May 65, 1st ARVN Division Recon Coy, Hue.
Feb–May 69, platoon commander 223 Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Jun–Jul 69, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Oct 69 returned to 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
RAE. 27.8.68–24.9.69, 17 Const & 1 Fd Sqn. Deceased 19.2.94.
RAINF. 21.5.68– 30.5.69, 4 RAR.
RAINF. Deceased 13.8.90.
RAINF. 7–16 Jan 64,Visit.
Deceased March 2005.
RAAC.
RAASC. 15.4.69–16.4.70, AFV Cash Office.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 6.5.69, Shrapnel leg wound, Ban Me Thuot area. WIA 2.8.69, Quang Ngai. 9.6.65–1.10.65, 1 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:05 PM
235
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 235
CARBONE, Bruno Joseph
42951
CAPEL, Ronald Frederick WO1
210018
18.6.65– 7.9.66
CAMPBELL, John Ernest
CAPT
29326
13.7.67– 18.6.68
CAPT
CAMPBELL, Donald Harvey
11947
15.5.70– 5.12.70
WO2
CAMPBELL, Desmond Ian
53939
25.2.69– 25.8.69 Medevac & Return 1.10.69– 18.2.70 19.6.64– 13.5.65
DCM
SGT
CAMM, Neal Clarrie
27270
WO2
CAMERON, Desmond Robert
214866
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
CASEY, Michael Patrick
CASSIDY, Dudley
CAVANAGH, Charles James
311451
21096
218738
10.6.67– 25.6.68 3.7.64– 11.4.65 3.9.70– 2.9.71
WO2
BDR
20.8.68– 14.5.70
16.6.64– 12.6.65
12.3.72– 2.10.72 16.10.72– 18.12.72
MAJ
WO2
DSM
11.8.64– 10.6.65 RAA.Visit, 16.3.65– 25.3.65. DSM awarded in End of War list. Deceased 30.7.01.
Deceased 17.4.95.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA, 30.3.68, near Dong Ha. Deceased 23.9.99.
Sep 70, MATT unallotted, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 5, Hoi My. May–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAA. WIA. 1.2.71.
Jul–Aug 64, Admin WO AATTV HQ Saigon. RAINF. Sep 64–Apr 65, Duc My Ranger Unit Training. 13.11.68–9.12.69, 9 RAR.
Jun–Dec 67, S-3, Thua Thien Sector. Dec 67–Jun 68, Senior Adviser Mai Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri.
RAINF. Jun–Sep 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Oct 64–Jun 65, 2/3 ARVN, 1st ARVN Division. WIA 16.10.68, shrapnel. Aug–Oct 68, 2/2 ARVN, 1st Division. Nov 68–Jan 69, 18th Division Training School, near A-1, Quang Tri. Nui Dat. Feb 69, attached 1 ATF. Mar–Jun 69, PRU, Sadec Province. Jul 69, PRU Nha Trang. Aug 69, PRU Phan Rang Bay, Ninh Thuan. Sep 69–Mar 70, PRU Dalat, Tuyen Duc. Apr 70, Admin WO, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Mar 72, RF/PF Advisor, Baria. Oct 72, S-3, Baria.
Aug–Dec 64, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd ARVN Div, Quang Nam. Jan–Jun 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Ranger Unit Training.
14/7/05 1:04:06 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 236
CARTER, Robert George
2410380
CARTER, Geoffrey David MAJ
17081
WO2
CARRUTHERS, Samuel James
13388
236
WO2
23.9.66– 5.9.67
Sep 66–Apr 67, RF Gio Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri. May–Sep 67, Admin WO Danang.
Feb–May 68, 2/51 Regt, Danang. May–Oct 68, RF/PF,Vin Binh and Nov–Feb 69, RD Training Cadre, Can Tho, IV Corps. Sep 70, Lam Son NTC, Duc My. Oct 70–Jan 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb 71, 4/6 ARVN & Mar 71, 2/6 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Apr 71, 3/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, Quang Tri. May 71, 54th Regt, near Hue. Jun–Aug 71, 3/54 ARVN near Hue.
Jul–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar–Jul 67, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Aug 67–Mar 68, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam.
Sep 70, Adviser School, Di An. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 11, Long Dien & Phuoc Hoa. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
RASVY.
WIA 6.5.68, shrapnel, Quang Nam.
RAINF.
RAINF. 4.6.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
RAA. Deceased 29.8.99.
RAINF.
Jul–Oct 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, RAINF. Tactics Committee. Attached 2/1 ARVN 11–28 Oct 64. Nov–Dec 64, 1st SFG A-322 Kham Duc, western Quang Tin. Jan–Apr 65, 1st SFG team A-323 Khe Sanh, Quang Tri. May 65, 5th SFGA A-103 Gia Vuc south-west Quang Ngai. Jul–Nov 65, 5th SFGA team A-101 Khe Sanh, Quang Tri.
14/7/05 1:04:06 PM
237
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 237
CHAMBERS, Samuel Arbuthnot
13135
27.8.70– 26.8.71
19.2.68– 11.2.69
WO2
CHAMBERS, Charles Alfred
13244
20.7.72– 19.11.72
WO2
CHAMBERLAIN, Royce William
54880
10.3.67– 11.3.68
WO2
CHALLENGER, James Frederick
10.9.70– 9.9.71
CHADWICK, Colin Peter CPL
44018
6353
12.7.64– 11.12.65
WO2
CERDA-PAVIA, Peter Michael
3782
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
CHAPMAN, Bruce Edward
CHAPPELL, Reginald Gordon
CHARLES, Howard Jock
CHARLTON, Keith David
CHERRY, Desmond Robert
CHESTER, Kenneth Gordon
213542
212690
26953
29868
210682
42421
10.3.67– 19.12.67 11.9.64– 20.3.65 24.12.70– 2.12.71
1.8.64– 3.5.65
WO2
WO2
WO2
WO2
WO2
23.1.65– 4.1.66
WO2
4.3.68– 25.2.69
7.1.71– 2.12.71
16.4.66– 3.4.67
WO2
RAINF. Deceased 16.8.80.
RAASC. Illness, December 1964. Medevac.
RAINF. NBC 23.10.67. End tour 11.3.68. Deceased 21.3.81.
Mar–May 68, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam. Jun 68–Feb 69, Cam Lo sub-sector, Quang Tri.
RAASC.
RAINF. Aug 64, Quang Tri Sector. Sep 64–Feb 65, Dong Ha sub-sector. Mar–Apr 65, Dong Da Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Attached 2/1 ARVN 11–28 Oct 64. Jan–Nov 71, JWTC, Deceased 12.10.02. Nui Dat.
RAA. Jan 71, Night Advisory Team, Can Tho. Feb– Jun 71, Night Advisory Team 2, Dong Tam. Jul–Nov 71, HQ, 2nd ARVN Div, Quang Ngai, Reconnaissance and Electronic Sensor Adviser.
Sep 64–Mar 65, RF/PF Thua Thien Sector.
Mar–Nov 67, RF/PF, Hoa Long. 19 Dec 67, Detached 1 ALSG acting CSM HQ Coy & Civilian Labour Officer.
RAAMC. Jan–Sep 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, medical adviser. Oct 65, attached HQ AATTV, Saigon. Nov–Dec 65, AATTV Danang, Medical Deceased 1989. Liaison Officer.
Apr 66, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri and then RF/PF Nam Hoa, Thua Thien.
14/7/05 1:04:06 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 238
CHANCE, Raymond Julian
18247
238
CHURCHIN, William John
CLANCY, Ronald Joseph
CLARK, Brian Donald
CLARK, Charles Fredrick
CLARK, John Alexander
CLARK, Lawrence George
2411791
13789
16181
214344
3483
1116
MAJ
3.8.62– 14.7.63
14.1.70– 7.1.71
LTCOL
OBE, MID
19.11.70– 18.11.71
CPL
19.9.66– 12.9.67
WO2
MM
16.4.66– 21.8.66 5.8.71– 6.8.72
WO2
13.3.64– 13.3.65
23.9.66– 10.4.67
DCM
WO2
WO1
Aug 62–Jul 63, Chief Training Adviser, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Nov 62, attached Trung Lap Ranger Training Centre near Cu Chi.
CO AATTV Saigon. OBE, postwar honours list for command of AATTV.
Nov 70, Advisers School Di An. Dec 70–Mar 71, MATT 2, Dat Do. Apr, MATT 4, Hoa Loi. May–Sep 71, MATT Van Kiep, Oct–Nov 71, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau.
Sep–Dec 66, 3/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Feb–Jun 67, 5th SFGA, Danang.
Aug 71–Jul 72, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep.
Apr 66, 2/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
CSD,Vung Tau then 1 Div Intelligence Coy, Hue.
Mar–Jun 64, Dong Da Training Centre, Weapons & Tactics Committees. 18–28 Apr 64, Attached 32nd Ranger Battalion. Jul–Nov 64, 7th SFG A-727 & 1st SFG A-323 teams at Khe Sanh, Quang tri. Dec 64–Mar 65, HQ 2nd ARVN Div Liaison WO, Quang Nam.
Original Team Member. RAINF. Deceased 7.11.03.
RAINF. 26.11.68– 9.12.68,Visit. Deceased 16.4.02.
31.5.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
RAE.
RAINF. Deceased 20.9.01.
RAINF. WIA shrapnel, Mo Duc, Quang Ngai, 21.6.66. Medevac. Deceased 4.6.03.
RAINF. Hospital 7.3.67, Medevac, 10.4.67. Deceased 4.7.92.
31.5.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR. Deceased 24.11.81.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:07 PM
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CHINN, George Ernest
3975
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
CLARKE, James
CLARKE, John Percy
CLARKE, John Royden
CLARKE, Kevin Leonard
CLARKSON, Murray John
CLEASBY, Alan Reginald
CLIVELY, Herbert Douglas
51389
22608
29593
213069
220906
36053
51316
3.8.62– 22.10.63 19.10.70– 20.1.71
24.6.72– 10.12.72 16.6.72– 20.11.72 12.7.63– 3.9.64
SGT
WO2 WO2 WO2
3.7.64– 13.5.65
WO2 LT
11.2.71– 11.2.72
WO2
QC
9.10.63– 3.9.64
CAPT
RAA. 2.12.68–10.12.69, Det 131 Div Loc Bty.
RAINF.
RAE. 24.2.70–15.10.70, DET 11 MC Gp. 22.1.71–26.2.71, HQ AFV.
Original Team Member. RAAC.
RAINF. 6.5.66–12.5.67, 5 RAR.
RAINF.
RAE. 7.10.71–21.10.71,Visit. 7.3.72–6.7.72, AAAGV. Deceased 19.10.78.
RAINF. Jul–Dec 63, Admin WO, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Jan–Feb hospital/recuperation. Mar–Apr 64, Jungle, Mountain Swamp School–Duc My. May 64, Admin WO, Saigon. Jun 64, SFG C Team 2.4.67–26.4.68, 7 RAR. Nha Trang. Jul 64, 1st SFG teams, A1/412B & A-414 A Ro, western region Quang Nam. Aug Deceased 12.10.82. 64 Saigon.
Jun–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Jun–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Oct 70–Jan 71, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Aug 62–Oct 63, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee.
Jul 64–May 65, CSD-Danang, Peoples Action Teams in Quang Ngai.
Feb–Nov 71, Night Advisory Team 1, Bac Lieu. Dec 71–AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Feb 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Oct 63–28 Aug 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee & Chief General Subjects Committee. 18–28 Apr 64 attached 32 Ranger Battalion, 1st ARVN Div.
14/7/05 1:04:07 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 240
CLARK, Rex
242633
240
COFFEY, Malcolm
COLBERT, Thomas James WO2
1965
41418 17.12.68– 10.12.69
11.8.64– 13.5.65
WO2
QC
3.8.62– 5.10.63
SGT
Dec 68–Apr 69, RF/PF Training Cadre, Baria. May–Nov 69, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Aug–Sep 64, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Nam. Oct 64–May 65 sub-sector Tam Ky, Quang Tin.
Aug 62, Weapons Committee & General Subjects Committee, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, near Hue. Observed 1st ARVN Division operations Jul 63.
Nov–Dec 69, not deployed, pre-extension leave, from 9 RAR. Jan–May 70, platoon commander 211 Coy, 1st MSF Battalion, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Aug 71, JWTC Nui Dat/Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 64–Aug 65, Administrative Officer, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Jul 70–Jun 71, 2/3 ARVN, 1st Division, near Hue.
11 Aug 62–15 Jun 63, senior Australian adviser, S-3, Dong Da National Training Centre, Phu Bai near Hue.
RAE. Deceased 31.3.03.
RAINF.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 10.3.69–11.3.70, 1 ARU. Deceased 17.10.04.
RAINF. WIA 12.7.69. Medevac, 19.5.70 NBC. 4.11.68–19.11.69, 9 RAR.
RAASC. Wounded, Brink BOQ bomb blast 24.12.64.
RAINF. 2.4.67–18.3.68, 7 RAR.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 16.2.69– 24.2.69, HQ 1 ATF. 17.11.69–5.11.70, 8 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:07 PM
241
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 241
COCHRANE, John
51149
19.11.69– 4.12.69 10.1.70– 19.5.70 5.8.71– 4.7.72
MM
WO2
COCHRANE, Desmond Stanley
17868
14.8.64– 22.8.65
CAPT
COCHRANE, Alexander Stewart
335135
25.6.70– 23.6.71
MID
WO2
CLUTTERBUCK, Allen Brian
311492
3.8.62– 21.6.63
CAPT
CLUNIES-ROSS, Adrian
335076
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
COLLEY, Sydney Clifford
COLLINS, John Edward
COLLINS, William Michael
COLLINSON, Reginald James
CONNOR, Charlie Stewart
28559
216757
13456
34393
27881
21.5.65– 5.5.66
WO2
2.5.67– 11.3.68 25.9.63– 24.9.64
BEM
MID
WO2
WO2
MAJ
29.10.69– 29.10.70
27.8.67– 20.8.68
WO2
11.3.68– 4.3.69
12.6.64– 11.4.65
WO2
Deceased no date.
WIA 3.7.68, near Tam Ky.
RAINF.
5.2.68–3.9.68, 2 SAS Sqn, Nui Dat.
RAINF.
Nov 69–Oct 70, Assistant Province Adviser (Military), Quang Tri.
Sep 63–Jan 64, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, General Subjects Committee. Feb–May 64, 7th SFG A-732 Kham Duc, Quang Tin. Jun–Jul 64, 1st SFG A-414 A Ro, Quang Nam detached from SFG A Shau valley. Aug 64, SFG, B Team Danang.
5 May 67–Feb 68, 1/51 ARVN, Quang Da Special Zone, Hoi An, Quang Nam.
RAAC.
Panji wound 19.6.64.
RAE.
RAE. WIA 11.2.68, shrapnel. Medevac. Deceased 11.4.97.
RAINF. Sep 67, 4/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Nov 67–Jan 68, 3/1 ARVN, Quang Tri. Feb–Mar 68, RF/PF, Phong Dien sub-sector, 25 km north of Hue. Apr–Aug 68, AATTV HQ, Danang. Deceased 9.2.05.
May–Sep 65, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Oct 65–Apr 66, 5th SFGA, Nung Force, Danang. Mar–Jul 68, 4/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai & Tam Ky. Aug–Oct 68, PRU Lam Dong District, Phan Thiet. Nov 68–Feb 69, 54th Regt, Hue.
Jun–Aug 64, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Ranger Unit Training. 13–27 Aug 64 visited Ranger Training, Trung Lap near Cu Chi. Sep 64–Apr 65, 11th Ranger Battalion, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Nam.
14/7/05 1:04:07 PM
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COLEMAN, John Henry
311251
242
CONWAY, Kevin George
CONWAY, Peter Reginald
COOK, Bruce John
COOK, Ronald William
COPE, Wallace Raymond
COPEMAN, James Vivian
CORKHILL, Maurice
13097
13921
312502
12983
14943
29672
53371
1.7.72– 5.12.72 15.11.63– 6.7.64
22.10.70– 21.10.71
4.2.71– 15.1.72 28.6.63– 14.5.64
23.9.66– 9.2.67 23.9.66– 12.9.67 27.5.72– 18.12.72
CPL WO2
WO2
CPL WO2
WO2
WO2
WO2
May–Dec 72, JWTC, Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy.
Sep 66, RF/PF Binh Ba and then National Police Field Force Training Centre, Trai Mat near Dalat.
Sep 66, 1st Division Intelligence Company.
Jul 63–Apr 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics & Weapons Committee. Attached 7th SFG team A-727 Khe Sanh, Nov 63. Also attached TF 100 briefly, Nov 63.
Feb 71–Jan 72, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Oct 70, 4/3 ARVN, 1st Division, Hue. Nov–Dec 70, NOAT Cho Gao. Jan 71, Night Advisory Team 1, Can Tho. Mar–Apr 71, NAT 1, Bac Lieu. May–Jul 71, Admin WO, Can Tho. Aug–Oct 71, NOTT 1, Bac Lieu.
Nov 63–May 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Jun 64, An Diem SFG camp detached to team A-726, 7th Special Forces Group, Nam Dong (Tarau), Thua Thien. Military Cemetery, Kranji Singapore.
Jul–Nov 72, MATT 1,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
RAASC. 7.5.67– 16.12.67, 176 Air Dispatch Company.
RAINF. Deceased 25.1.88.
RAINF. WIA 16.1.67, mine, Quang Dien near Hue, Medevac.
RAINF.
RAASC.
RAASC.
KIA, 6.7.64, Nam Dong Special Forces Camp.
RAINF.
RAINF. 3.2.69–10.3.70, 5 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:07 PM
243
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 243
CONROY, Noel Percival
39577
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
COUSINS, John Richard
COUTTIE, Reginald Denis
COUTTS, James Raymond
COVILL, Lee Wayne
COWAN, Peter George
COX, Byron Henry
CRAIG, Alexander Duthy
34464
374014
32183
15644
53419
16895
23805
17.2.65– 19.12.65
23.6.71– 26.10.71 24.3.67– 29.3.68 7.1.71– 25.11.71
WO2
WO2 WO2
WO2
17.8.63– 14.8.64
15.7.71– 7.3.72
WO2
WO2
28.4.71– 20.4.72
WO2
MID
22.7.71– 30.9.71
CPL
20 Sep 63–3 Aug 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons Committee.
Jan–Jun 71, NOTT Pleiku. 22 Jun–Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh.
Mar–Jun 67, Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. Sep 67–Mar 68, Recondo School, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang.
Jul–Oct 71, MATT 6, Phuoc Tuy.
Feb–Jun 65, Long Tho Training Centre, near Hue. Jul–Sep 65, 5th SFGA team A-102 A Shau. Oct–Nov 65, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong.
Jul–Sep 71, MATT 4, An Ngai village near Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy & HQ Baria. Oct 71, AATTV Saigon. Nov 71 NOTT 2, Dong Tam. Dec 71, AATTV,Vung Tau. Jan 72, attached 1 ATF, Vung Tau old ALSG site pack–up.
Apr 71, unallotted, Baria. May–Aug 71, MATT Team, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Oct 71, HQ AATTV, Vung Tau. Nov 71, NOTT 2, Dong Tam. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Apr 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Jul–Sep 71,Vehicle mechanic, AATTV, Vung Tau.
AUST INT. 10.9.65–1.10.65,Visit.
RAINF. 26.5.65–1.6.66, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
RAA.
RAAC. Medevac Australia, illness. Deceased 11.3.88.
RAINF.
Deceased October 1991.
RAINF.
RAEME. 30.9.71– 18.11.71, 17 Const Sqn Wksp.
14/7/05 1:04:08 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 244
COSTOLLOE, Rodney Kenneth
342950
244
DARCY, Mathew Bowman
DACOSTA, Jose Manuel
235179
240036
22.10.70– 21.10.71
19.2.66– 4.8.67 24.5.63– 12.4.64
WO2
CAPT MAJ
RAASC.
RASIGS.
Deceased 1.8.90.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 6.5.68, shrapnel, Quang Tri. Deceased 20.9.86.
7 Jun 63–5 Apr 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, senior Australian adviser, S-3 Adviser.
Feb 66, RF/PF HQ, Danang, I Corps.
Oct 70–Feb 71, 4/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Mar 71, 37 Ranger Battalion, near Danang. Apr–May 71, 3/51, Mui Bong–RHQ, Quang Nam. Jun–Aug 71, 51st Regt, Dai Loc, Quang Nam. Sep–Oct 71, 3rd ARVN Div, Quang Tri.
AUST INT. 4.12.64– 21.12.65, Assistant Naval–Military Attaché.
RAINF.
26.5.65–15.9.65, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
Jul–Oct 70, RQMS, AATTV,Vung Tau. Nov 70, RAINF. Advisers School Di An. Dec 70–Apr 71, MATT Deceased 25.8.91. 12, Long Le/An Ngai.
Sep 70–Aug 71, clerk, JWTC, Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy.
Apr–Nov 72, JWTC,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar 67, RF/PF Baria. Sep 67–Jan 68, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Sep 70–May 71, RSM, JWTC, Nui Dat. Jun– Aug 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, La Vang, Quang Tri.
Feb–May 68, 3/2 ARVN, Gio Linh area, 1st Division, Quang Tri. May–Aug 68,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Oct 68, RD, Can Tho. Nov 68–Jan 69, RF,Vin Binh.
14/7/05 1:04:08 PM
245
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 245
CURRAN, Robert James
213585
25.6.70– 12.5.71
CULLEN, Robert Thomas WO2
28888
10.9.70– 9.9.71
CROSS, Raymond Allan
2784737
CPL
CREWE, Ronald James
511160
3.9.70– 2.9.71
10.3.67– 11.3.68
WO2
19.4.72– 8.12.72
CRAPPER, Clarence William
33609
6.2.68– 28.1.69
WO2
CAPT
CRANSTON, Mervyn Bede
28119
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
29.10.69– 29.10.70
1.4.68–29.2.69, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. 9.6.65–8.11.65, 1 RAR. Deceased 7.6.99.
RAINF.
RAINF. 13.11.67–12.2.68, HQ AFV. KIA 25.4.68, near Dak Pek.
RAINF. Aug–Oct 67, 2/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Oct 67–Mar 68, 1/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Tam Ky, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. Apr 68, Course,Vung Tau. Apr–Aug 68, platoon commander, 23rd & 26th (223 & 206) companies and Recon Platoon 25th Coy, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF B-20 Pleiku. Nov 69–Jan 70, 2/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Feb–Apr 70, 4th ARVN Regt Recon Coy, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Apr 70, 26.5.65–1.6.66, 1 RAR. PF, Baria. May–Oct 70, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Feb–Nov 71, NAT 1, Bac Lieu. Aug 71 changed to NOTT 1, Bac Lieu, IV Corps.
Sep 70, Unallotted Phuoc Tuy. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 14, Long Dien. May 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Feb–Apr 68, company commander 22nd (202) Company, 5th SFGA, MSF B-20, Pleiku. Parkes Cemetery, NSW.
Feb 66, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri and RAA. then Police Field Force, Dalat.
Jun 63, Lam Son–Vung Tau orientation. 15 Aug 63–5 Jul 64, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Jungle, Mountain Swamp School.
14/7/05 1:04:08 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 246
24.8.67– 6.8.68
WO2
DAVIES, Bruce
37393
MID
11.2.71– 25.11.71
WO2
DATE, William Charles
37064
3.9.70– 2.9.71
DARLINGTON, Gregory WO2 James
17592
17.2.68– 25.4.68
MID
CAPT
DANILENKO, Anatoly
235250
3.2.66– 20.1.67
WO2
DALY, Kenneth James
26155
14.6.63– 5.7.64
WO2
DALTON, Donald Clarence
52074
246
DAVIES, Raymond George
DAVIES, Walter John
DAVIES, William Stanley
DAVIS, Bruce Frederick
DAVIS, Paul Henry
DAVIS, William
DAVISON, Graham Harold
216756
213992
310027
23083
36548
1411043
2790188
4.9.67– 13.8.68
WO2
11.6.65– 15.11.65 20.1.66– 15.5.66 23.4.65– 22.3.66 21.5.65– 17.4.66 18.7.65– 6.7.66 11.2.71– 18.11.71
21.5.69– 25.3.70
WO2
WO2
WO2 CAPT CPL
CPL
28.5.70– 26.5.71
31.7.70– 29.7.71
CPL
RAINF. WIA 25.1.68, near Tam Ky, casevac Chu Lai to 8 Fd Amb, returned mid-Feb 68. Deceased 10.1.81.
RAEME.
RAASC.
RAASC. Deceased 17.1.93.
RAE.
May 69–Mar 70, clerk, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
RAASC. 14.9.71–16.12.71, HQ 1 ATF.
Feb–Sep 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh. Oct–Nov 71 RAINF. HQ AATTV, Vung Tau. 11.3.66–4.6.66, 1 RAR. 5.6.66–3.3.67, 6 RAR. 17.3.68–28.2.69, 1 RAR.
Jul 65–Jul 66, Admin Officer, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
May–Sep 65, RF/PF Hoa Vang, Quang Nam. Oct 65–Apr 66, RF/PF Quang Tri Sector.
Apr–Sep 65, RF/PF, Van Thanh Centre, Thua Thien. Oct 65–Mar 66, platoon commander, 5th SFGA, Nung Force, Danang.
RAINF. Jun–Oct 65, 5th SFGA, C Team, platoon commander, Nung Force, Danang. Nov 65–Jan 66 detached HQ NCPD, Australia. Jan–May 66, platoon commander, Nung Force, Danang.
Sep, RF/PF, Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Dec 67, 4/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai. Jan–Mar 68, 2/5 ARVN, Tam Ky. Apr–Aug 68, PRU Phan Thiet, Bin Thuan. Jun–Aug 70, MATT 5, Sep 70–Feb 71, MATT 5, Apr–May 71, MATT 5, Baria/Phuoc Hai/ Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 70–Jul 71,Vehicle Mechanic, HQ AATTV, Vung Tau.
14/7/05 1:04:08 PM
247
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 247
DAVIES, Raymond Douglas
18792
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
DAY, Brian Raymond
DEANE, William Roger
DEANSHAW, William Lawrence
DEED, Raymond
DELAHUNTY, Noel Francis
215849
217209
35249
1921
52693
28.4.71– 19.4.72
23.7.69– 13.8.70
23.7.68– 6.8.69 25.6.70– 23.6.71
MID
MC
WO2
CAPT
WO2 WO1
CAPT
22.10.63– 24.10.64
28.5.70– 9.11.70
CPL
RAAMC. 11.11.69– 3.12.69, 1 ARU. 4.12.69–13.2.70, 5 RAR. 14.2.70–3.6.70, 1 Aust Fd Hosp.
Nov 63–Jan 64, Hiep Khanh Training Centre near Hue, Chief Tactics Committee. Feb–May 64, 1st SFG A-224 An Diem, Quang Nam. Jun 64–Aug 64 B Team, Danang. Sep 64 Saigon, HQ.
Jul 70, Admin WO, Phuoc Tuy Sector. Aug–Dec 70, PSDF, Baria. Jan–Apr 71, MAT 21, Quang Ngai. May–Jun 71, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, near Quang Tri.
Jul 68–Jul 69, ARVN, CCS, Quang Tri.
July–Dec 69, OC Montagnard Mobile Training Team for Provincial Recon Units, Nha Trang, responsible for Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac and Quang Duc. Dec 69–Jul 70 3/54 ARVN, Phu Loc, near Hue.
WIA, 24.4.64. Deceased 11.11.00.
RAA.
RAINF.
RAAMC.
AUST INT.
RAINF. Apr 71, unallotted Phuoc Tuy. May 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. 14–22 Jun 71, NOT, Pleiku. 23 Jun– Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Bin Dinh. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Apr 72, 28.1.67–9.1.68, HQ Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion. AFV.
Jun–Nov 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:08 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 248
DAWKINS, Michael
312760
248
DERMODY, Cyril David
DEVITT, James Howson
DICKEY, William Swan
DICKSON, Trevor Alexander
DIGGENS, Roland John
41909
14102
28643
41585
21336
23.9.66– 31.8.67
WO2
21.5.65– 1.11.66
WO2
6.1.66– 10.12.66 23.4.65– 31.10.65
WO2 WO2
31.7.70– 29.7.71
23.7.68– 23.7.69
13.11.64– 2.11.65
CAPT
28.1.70– 3.12.70
12.11.68– 26.11.69
CAPT
RAINF.
RAINF.
Apr–Aug 65, 3/3 ARVN, 1st Division, Hue. Sep–Oct 65, RF/PF Quang Tri Sector.
Jan–May 66, CSD, Training Centre,Vung Tau and then Duc My Ranger Training Centre.
RAINF.
RAAC. Medevac. Deceased 11.5.03.
RAINF. May–Sep 65, RF/PF, Nam Hoa, Thua Thien. Oct 65–Apr 66, 1/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. May 66, Police Field Force, Dalat. Aug 68–Feb 69, 4/5 ARVN, Tam Ky–Quang Ngai, 2nd Division. Mar–May 69, 2/6 ARVN, Quang Tin–Quang Ngai. Jun–Jul 69, HQ 6th ARVN Regt, Quang Ngai. Aug–Sep 70, Lam Son National Training Centre, Duc My. Oct–Dec 70, JWTC, Nui Dat. Jan–Mar 71, 3/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Quang Deceased 28.3.96. Nam. Apr–Jul 71, 1/3 ARVN, 1st Division, An Lo, near Hue.
Nov–Dec 64, CSD not allocated. Jan–Oct 65, CSD–PAT, Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh, II Corps.
Sep 66, 2/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. May 67, Mobile Guerrilla Force, Danang. Feb–Jul 70, 2/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, near Danang. Aug–Oct 70, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My. Nov 70, NOAT, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong, IV Corps.
Nov 68–Mar 69, 1/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Tam RAINF. Ky and Quang Ngai. Apr–Oct 69, Adjutant, Saigon.
14/7/05 1:04:09 PM
249
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 249
DENNIS, Glen William
4905026
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
DIXON, Ronald James
DODDS, Andrew John
DOLAN, Thomas Francis
DOLENSKY, Michael Peter
DOLLIN, George
DONALDSON, Robert Blair
DONKIN, Donald Wellow
1625
51199
14467
44965
2275700
51658
21398
7.10.65– 27.9.66
WO2
3.9.70– 2.9.71 29.7.72– 9.12.72
30.9.71– 26.3.72 30.7.63– 4.7.64
CPL
SGT
MAJ
WO2
MBE
31.7.70– 29.7.71
WO2
21.1.69– 20.10.69
16.4.66– 4.7.67
WO2
MID
15.4.66– 5.3.67
WO2
RAINF. WIA 2.10.69, mortar fire, Quang Ngai. Medevac. Deceased 8.10.72.
RAINF. WIA, mine blast, 30.9.70.
RAINF. Deceased 24.7.99.
RAAC.
Aug 63–Jan 64, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, General Subjects Committee, Oct–Nov 63 attached 7th SFG team A-727 Khe Sanh. Feb– Jun 64, attached 7th SFG, A-731, Khe Sanh.
Oct–Nov 71, 3rd ARVN Division, TOC, Quang Tri. Nov 71–Mar 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Jul–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
3.3.70–11.3.71, 4 Fd Regt.
RAA.
RAA. 13.5.68–21.8.68, 2 AOD.
RAINF. 9.12.68–6.8.69, 1 ARU. 7.8.69–12.12.69, 9 RAR.
Sep 70, MATT unallotted. Oct 70–Apr 71, RAAMC. MATT 9, Phuoc Loi and Dat Do. May–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Oct 65–Jan 66, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division. Feb 66, Admin WO Danang. Jan–Feb 69, 2/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Mar–May 69, 1/6 ARVN then Jun–Oct 69, 3/6 ARVN, both Quang Ngai.
Aug–Nov 70, MATT 3, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. Dec 70–Jul 71, MATT 2, Dat Do.
Apr 66, Hoa Cam, Quang Nam. Then RF/PF Hoi An.
Apr–Aug 66, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Sep 66–Feb 67, HQ I Corps, Training, Danang.
14/7/05 1:04:09 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 250
DILLOW, Robert Earnest
33306
250
DUNCAN, Albert Clifford
DUNN, Kenneth
3753
15045
May–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Sep 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, General Subjects Committee. Jan 66, attached HQ AATTV Saigon.
6 Apr 67, RF/PF, Trieu Phong District, Quang Tri. Sep 67 Admin WO AATTV Danang.
Aug–Nov 71, NOTT Team 2, Phu Cat. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Jun–Oct 67, CO, 11th MSF Battalion, 5th SFGA, Danang.
Mar–Apr 65, C Team Danang—Construction. May–Jul 65, 5th SFGA team A-104, Ha Thanh (new), Son Ha District, Quang Ngai. Aug–Dec 65, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong. Jan–Feb 66, C Team, Danang.
May–Jun 65, RF/PF, Dien Ban sub-sector, Quang Nam. Jul–Sep 65, Hoi An–PF Training Centre. Oct 65, 2/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Nov 65–Feb 66, 4/6 ARVN, 2nd Division.
Jul–Dec 72, MATT 1,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
RAINF. 28.12.67– 5.11.68, 3 RAR.
RAAMC. Deceased 14.10.86.
RAINF. WIA 12.8.67.
RAINF. 5.6.65–1.6.66, 1 RAR. Deceased 16.1.04.
RAINF. 18.11.66–11.6.67, HQ 1 ATF.
RAE.
27.1.69–5.3.70, 5 RAR. Deceased 12.10.96.
RAINF.
RAA. 31.5.68–1.6.68, Visit.
RAINF. 2.4.67–9.1.68, 7 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:09 PM
251
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 251
1.4.67– 26.2.68
WO2
DUMMETT, Raymond Ernest
26479
27.5.72– 18.12.72
5.8.71– 6.8.72
WO2
DUFFEY, Derek Arthur
3410197
WO2
11.6.67– 13.11.67
CAPT
DUDGEON, Noel Brian
311518
11.9.64– 8.3.66
16.3.65– 26.2.66
WO1
DOWSETT, Leslie James
23357
WO1
21.5.65– 19.2.66
WO2
DOUGLAS, Christopher Leonard
54224
MM
10.7.72– 18.12.72
WO2
DONNELLY, Thomas Michael
27999
9.7.72– 2.12.72
DONNELLY, Kevin James WO2
54526
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
DUNSTAN, William Leslie
DURRINGTON, John Thomas
DURY, Patrick Stephen
EADE, William Anthony
EATHER, David Welsey
242988
36485
1732955
52772
214603
5.8.71– 6.8.72 19.9.66– 28.12.67
CPL WO2
WO2
14.8.67– 30.5.68
WO2
2.7.69– 2.7.70
2.7.69– 4.2.71
29.10.69– 29.12.69
WO2
MID
14.8.70– 3.9.70
WO2
RAINF. 19.11.68– 25.2.69, 9 RAR.
KIA 30.5.68, near Thuong Duc south-west of Danang.
RAINF.
RAA. WIA My Lai village, 14.12.69, shrapnel, Medevac. 3.3.67–10.6.67, 1 Fd Regt. 11.6.67–8.8.67, 4 Fd Regt.
RAASC. Medevac.
Jul 69, 3/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Aug 69–Jun 70, 1/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
RAINF. Deceased 22.11.94.
RACMP. Sep 66, 3/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Sep 67, 3/3 ARVN, Dong Ha. Sep–Dec 67, 21st Battalion, 1st ARVN Ranger Group, Quang Nam. Jul–Nov 69,VDAT, Kien Hoa. 8 Dec 69–Feb 70,VDAT, Phong Dinh. Mar–Jul 70, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My. Aug–Sep 70, 4/3 ARVN, 1st Division near Hue. Oct 70–Jan 71, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam.
Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug–Nov 67, 2/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Dec 67–May 68, 5th SFGA, A-113, 2nd Battalion, 1st MSF Command, Marble Mountain, Danang. Springvale Cemetery,Victoria.
Nov–Dec 69, 4/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
Aug 70, Admin WO, Saigon.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 252
DUNN, Lionel William
61192
252
EDWARDS, Ian Leslie
EDWARDS, Kerry Allen
EGAN, Anthony Lynn
EGAN, Terence John
ELDRIDGE, Geoffrey Mark
53466
1200837
213982
2137410
2792860
5.12.67– 3.12.68
WO2
DCM
27.8.70– 23.6.71
SGT
CPL
WO2
5.12.67– 3.12.68
WO2
18.3.70– 4.3.71
26.9.67– 10.9.68
22.2.71– 26.10.71
27.8.70– 26.8.71
SGT
5.8.71– 6.8.72
28.4.71– 28.10.71
RAINF. NBC 15.1.68 broken leg. Deceased 28.12.84.
RAASC.
RAINF. 14.9.65–20.9.66, 161 Recce Flt.
9.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
Mar 70–Feb 71, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Oct–Dec 67, RF/PF Training Centre, near Hue. 19 Dec 67–Apr 68, 1st Division Recon Coy, Hue. May–Aug 68, RD Cadre Training Chuong Thien, IV Corps.
Dec 67–Aug 68, 1/3 ARVN, 1st Division, PK 17, near Hue. Sep–Nov 68, 21st Ranger Battalion, Hoi An, Quang Nam. Feb–Oct 71, JWTC Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy.
RAASC.
RAA.
RAINF. 6.1.71–17.2.71, 1 ARU. Deceased 6.9.90.
Aug–Sep 70, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Oct–Dec 70, RAINF. Admin Sgt NOTT Dong Tam. Jan–Jun 71, HQ AATTV, Vung Tau.
Dec 67–Mar 68, 3 MSF B-36 Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Long Hai. Apr–Jul 68,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing. Aug–Nov 68, 2 MSF B-20 Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Pleiku.
Aug–Oct 70, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Nov 70– Aug 71, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 71–Apr 72, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep. May 72, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy.
Apr 71, unallotted, Baria. May–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:09 PM
253
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EDDINGTON, Wayne Leslie
628745
EBNER, Clement Edward WO2
14264
WO2
EBERLE, Frederick Keith
38125
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
EVERETT, Walter Robert WO2
32358
WO2
7.5.65– 29.3.66
21.10.65– 11.10.66
RAINF.
RAINF. Medevac, knee surgery. Deceased 7.8.88.
Jun–Sep 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Sep 65–Jan 66, 2/2 ARVN, 1st Division. Feb– Mar 66, attached HQ AATTV Saigon.
Oct 65–Oct 66, 4/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Gio Linh area, Quang Tri.
Sep–Nov 67, HQ 3 ARVN Regt, Hue. Dec 67–Apr 68, 2/3 ARVN PK 17, near Hue. May– Aug 68, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My. Aug–Sep 70, Lam Son National Training Centre, Duc My. Oct 70–Aug 71, QM, AATTV, Vung Tau.
May–Sep 65, 2/3 ARVN, Hue, 1st Division. Oct 65–Apr 66, platoon commander, Nung Force, 5th SFGA, Danang.
RAINF.
RAINF. Hospital May 66.
Deceased 5.8.94.
WIA 22.2.68, Hue Citadel.
RAINF.
RAINF.
Feb–Sep 68, 11th Artillery Battalion, ARVN. RAA. Quang Tri area. Oct 68–Jan 69, Artillery School, Duc My.
Mar–Sep 67, 5th SFGA C Team, Danang. Oct 67, RF/PF, Binh Ba and Duc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy. Aug–Nov 71, NOTT 1, Bac Lieu. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Feb 72, Long Hai Training Battalion. Mar 72, JWTC, Van Kiep.
Mar–Jul 68, 5th SFGA, B-20 MSF, Pleiku, XO, 21st Company, platoon commander 22nd Coy. Aug 68, PRU–CSD, Pleiku. Sep–Nov 68, 54th Regt, Hue.
14/7/05 1:04:10 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 254
EVANS, Raymond George
13940
7.8.70– 19.8.71
4.9.67– 20.8.68
WO1
EVANS, Maxwell Arthur
24080
7.5.65– 29.4.66
WO2
EMERY, Charles Frederick
6775
6.2.68– 28.1.69
WO2
EMBERSON, Brian Charles
52985
5.8.71– 6.8.72
10.3.67– 27.11.67
WO2
ELPHICK, Bruce
212642
15.3.68– 16.12.68
WO2
ELKINS, John Ernest
210074
254
FERGUSON, Joseph Victor
35653
19.11.70– 30.9.71
25.8.64– 24.5.65
CPL
WO2
23.9.66– 12.9.67
RAE.
RAINF.
RAAMC.
RAINF.
Deceased 29.3.98.
RAINF.
RAAC. 29.1.68–7.2.68, Visit. 11.11.69–25.6.70, HQ AFV. 1.6.71–9.6.71,Visit.
Aug 64–Feb 65, 2/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, RAA. Quang Nam. Mar–May 65, Quang Nam Sector, Hoi An.
Nov 70, Advisers School, Di An. Dec 70–Feb 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 15, Long Son. May–Sep 71, MATT 1 An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy.
Sep 66–Mar 67, 4/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Apr–Sep 67, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam.
Sep–Dec 65, Commander 5th SFGA team A107, Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Jan 66, 5th SFGA, C Team, Danang. Feb–Apr 66, Nung Force, Danang. May 66, S-3, HQ 5th SFGA, Nha Trang.
Jun–Oct 70, Sector PsyOps, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Apr 66, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam, then RAINF. Deceased 1 ARU. 1.2.91.
Jun–Dec 67, National Police Field Force, Trai Mat Training Centre, near Dalat.
Dec 67–Nov 68, 2/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin.
14/7/05 1:04:10 PM
255
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 255
FELTON, Ian Neville
313039
FEATHERSTONE, Brian WO2 Michael
54330
16.9.65– 30.8.66
MC
CAPT
FAZEKAS, Felix
48049
26.6.70– 22.10.70
MAJ
FARMER, Miles Wilmot
17024
23.4.66– 15.9.66
WO2
FALK, Arthur Brian
28800
14.1.67– 8.1.68
WO1
FAIRFAX, Thomas Harry
23454
5.12.67– 3.12.68
WO2
FAHY, Edward John
51295
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
FISHER, William John
FITZERGERALD, Stephen Michael
FITZGERALD, Jack
FITZGERALD, Terence George
FITZGIBBON, Nigel Gordon, now GRANT, Gordon
FITZPATRICK, Barry Thomas
FITZPATRICK, Leo Thomas
15726
56055
27974
5411591
54338
212542
237563
17.8.72– 18.12.72 2.7.69– 17.4.70
7.8.70– 5.8.71
24.10.67– 15.10.68
CPL WO2
CPL
WO2
1.4.67– 9.4.68 3.8.62– 21.6.63
WO2 MAJ
2.10.72– 18.12.72
1.4.67– 11.3.68
WO2
MID
16.3.65– 19.2.66
WO2
Aug 62–Jun 63, Team administration, Saigon also employed Adjutant Division HQ, MAAG.
6 Apr 67–Mar 68, platoon commander, 11th Company, 5th SFGA, Mike Force, Danang.
Nov 67–Jun 68, medical adviser, Mai Linh subsector & ARVN CCS, Quang Tri City. Jul–Oct 68, medical adviser, Duc My. Oct–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Aug–Nov 70, MATT 6, Hoa Long. Dec 70– Feb 71, MATT 15, Long Son Island. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long. May–Jul 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul 69–Apr 70, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Wagga Wagga Cemetery, NSW.
Aug 72, HQ AATTV. Oct 72, HQ AAAGV,Van Kiep.
Apr 67, Civil Affairs, 1 ATF, Phuoc Tuy. Sep 67–Jan 68, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division. Feb 68, Danang recuperation.
Mar 65, RF/PF,Van Thanh Training Centre near Hue. Apr 65–Feb 66, Black Panther Coy, 1st ARVN Division, Hue.
Original Team Member. AUSTINT. Deceased 25.3.85.
RAINF.
RAAMC.
24.10.67–6.8.68, 8 Fd Amb.
RAAMC.
RAINF. 4.5.66–6.5.66, 1 RAR 6.6.66–8.6.66, 1 RAR. KIA 17.4.70.
RAASC.
RAINF. WIA 22.1.68, shrapnel, Gio Linh, casevac to 8 Fd Ambulance.
RAINF. Deceased 1991.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 256
FIRTH, Leonard Bruce
35799
256
FITZSIMMONS, Robert William
FITZSIMON, James Anthony
FLANNERY, Joseph
FLETCHER, Peter Lawrence
FOLBIGG, Athol Raymond
42995
216966
29707
2785271
213238
14.10.70– 31.3.71
3.8.62– 16.8.63
CAPT
SGT
17.8.72– 16.12.72 25.9.64– 6.8.65
CAPT WO2
1.7.67– 12.2.68
5.8.71– 14.1.72
CPL
MBE
11.6.65– 15.5.66
WO2
RAE.
Oct 64, 5th SFGA B Team, Danang. Nov 64–Jan 65, 1st SFG team A-324, Ta Ko, Quang Nam. Feb 65, 5th SFGA C Team Danang, Communications Officer.
Aug–Dec 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
4 Aug 62–12 Aug 63, jungle training, tactics committee, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Nov 62, attached Ranger Training Centre, Trung Lap near Cu Chi. Sep–Oct 67, XO Mike Force, B-50, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang. Nov 67, company commander, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA Pleiku.
Deceased 17.2.83.
RASIGS.
RAASC. To AAAGV.
Original Team Member. RAINF. WIA 27.12.67, Binh Thuan, shrapnel. Hospitalised with FUO. Visit, 13.1.71–16.10.71. Deceased 22.9.76.
Oct 70–Feb 71, JWTC, Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy. RAINF. 2.4.67– Mar 71, unallotted MATT, MR 1, Quang Ngai. 25.10.67, 7 RAR. 26.10.67–9.4.68, HQ 1 ATF.
Aug 71–Jan 72, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau.
Jun–Nov 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. RAINF. Dec 65, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Jan–May 66, Nung Force, Danang. Deceased 31.3.96.
14/7/05 1:04:10 PM
257
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FITZPATRICK, Trevor Joseph
11498
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
FOSTER, Brian
FOSTER, Murty Joseph
FOSTER, Robert William WO2
29542
36658
27105
30.6.71– 16.6.72 12.2.68– 18.1.69
WO2
WO2
3.2.66– 17.1.67
8.7.71– 18.11.71
CPL
Feb–May 66, 2/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Oct 66, RF/PF Phuoc Tuy.
Feb–Jun 68, HQ AATTV Saigon, Admin WO. Jul 68–Jan 69, 3/3 ARVN, 1st Division, Hue.
Jul–Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Jun 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Jul–Sep 71, MATT 7, Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Nov 71, AATTV Vung Tau.
Oct 68–Feb 69, RF,Vin Binh. Mar 69, CORDS, RD Training, Can Tho. Apr–Sep 69, VDAT, Kien Hoa. Sep/Oct 69, pre–extension leave. Oct 69–May 70, Black Panther Coy, 1st Division, Hue.
Apr–May 70, 4/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
Mar–May 67, Phuoc Tuy. Jun–Aug 67, Air Supply, 5th SFGA, Danang. Sep–Nov 67, HQ 3rd ARVN Regiment and various battalions, Hue. Dec 67, 3/3 ARVN, PK 17 north of Hue. Jan–Mar 68, PF Training Long Tho Centre near Hue. Jul–Oct 71, MATT 1, Duc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy.
RAEME.
RAASC.
RAINF. 6.1.67–29.5.67, 6 RAR. 30.5.67–6.9.67, 2 RAR.
RAE.
26.5.65–11.6.66, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 21.5.70. Medevac. Deceased 11.4.96.
Medevac 1971.
RAASC. NBC, Jun 67, knee injury, 8 Fd Amb. WIA 18.12.67, mine splinters, Thua Thien.
14/7/05 1:04:11 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 258
FORSYTH, Allan Robert
1202820
14.10.69– 14.5.70
1.10.68– 17.9.69
WO2
FORDEN, Keith William
53789
2.4.70– 15.6.70
15.7.71– 4.10.71
23.3.67– 25.3.68
WO1
FORDE, Thomas Joseph
310513
WO2
FORD, Desmond Francis
14150
258
FRANKS, Albert Herman
FRASER, Edward John
FRENCH, Alfred Douglas
FRENCH, William James
FRISBY, Robert Allan
FROST, Walter Douglas
13928
5885
6188
54110
54712
29574
11.6.65– 28.7.65 7.1.70– 7.1.71 26.5.71– 28.10.71 14.8.67– 6.8.68 20.7.72– 18.12.72 5.7.72– 18.12.72 20.8.68– 13.8.69
WO2 WO1
WO2 WO2 WO2
3.9.70– 2.9.71
22.5.68– 7.5.69
WO2
WO2
RAINF. Medevac–illness, 28.7.65.
RAINF.
RAA.
RAINF. WIA 5.2.68, grenade fragments. Deceased 20.12.87.
Aug–Nov 68, 1/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. RAINF. Dec 68–Aug 69, RF/PF Training, Heavyweight, 7.6.65–29.9.65, 1 RAR. Hoa Long, south of Nui Dat. 29.10.65–21.2.66, 1 RAR. WIA 9.1.66.
Jul–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Jul–Dec 72, MATT 1,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 67–Jul 68, Trieu Phong sub-sector, Quang Tri.
May–Oct 71, MATT 1, Duc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy. RAINF.
Jun–Jul 65, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Danang. Jan–Jun 70, 2/5 ARVN Tam Ky, 2nd Division. Jul–Aug 70 attached MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy. Sep 70 unallotted Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Dec 70, MATT 14, Long Dien.
RAINF. May–Aug 68, RD Training Cadre, Chuong Thien. Aug 68–Feb 69 platoon commander 211 Company, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Mar–Apr 69, 18th Division Training School near Nui Deceased 20.3.04. Dat. Sep–Dec 70, JWTC, Nui Dat. Jan–Apr 71, MR Assistance Team 21, Quang Ngai. May–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
14/7/05 1:04:11 PM
259
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FRANCIS, George Aubrey
214055
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
FUGE, John Robert
GABRIEL, Kevin Anthony
GADSDEN, Peter Michael
GALLAGHER, Kerry George
27483
22862
38096
17138
16.6.64– 11.4.65
WO2
10.9.70– 9.9.71
18.3.71– 11.2.72
CPL
CAPT
3.9.70– 2.9.71
2.4.68– 26.3.69 22.4.69– 19.11.69
10.2.66– 27.7.67
11.6.65– 15.5.66
WO2
MID
29.1.71– 30.9.71
CPL
Mar–Jun 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Jul–Nov 71, OC NOTT 2, Phu Cat. Dec 71–Jan 72, Adjutant, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Sep 70, Advisers School, Di An. Oct 70–Jan 71, MATT 12, Long Le. Feb–Apr 71, MATT 12, An Ngai. May–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Jun–Aug 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Sep 64–Feb 65, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Feb 66, Nung Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. Jan 67, 1/6 ARVN, 2nd Division. May 67, Mike Force, Danang. Apr–Jun 68, 2/2 ARVN, Quang Tri. 7 Jun 68– Nov 69, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. 10 Feb–19 Feb 69, Saigon. 20 Feb 69–1 Mar 69, 2/51 ARVN Regiment. Mar–Nov 69, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Sep–Dec 70, JWTC, Nui Dat. Jan–Aug 71, 3/1 ARVN, Quang Tri.
Jun–Nov 65, RF/PF Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien. Dec 65–May 66, 2/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
Jan 71 unallotted MATT Phuoc Tuy. Feb–Apr 71, MATT 5, Hoi My. May–Sep 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy.
RAASC.
RAAMC. 2.5.66–27.4.67, 2 Fd Ambulance. Deceased 5.5.02.
Deceased 15.10.93.
Injured 29.5.69, helicopter shot down.
WIA 24.7.67.
RAINF.
RAASC. 10.6.71–18.3.71. AFV Cash Office. Deceased 12.6.97.
RAAMC.
14/7/05 1:04:11 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 260
FUDGE, Geoffrey Lloyd
45202
260
GALLOWAY, Leslie Ernest
GARRIGAN, John
GASON, Edward William
GAUNT, Peter Stanyon
22578
310089
31440
53880
19.11.68– 27.12.68
22.5.68– 10.12.69
WO2
WO1
WO2
4.9.67– 20.8.68
WO1
29.10.66– 20.10.67
30.6.71– 25.1.72 21.2.72– 3.7.72
5.8.71– 6.8.72
BDR
Nov 66–Apr 67, Ranger Training Centre Duc My. 5 May 67, Advisory Team 4, Quang Tri, medical adviser.
May–Sep 68, ARVN 3/7 ARVN Cavalry, PK 17, north of Hue. Oct 68–Feb 69, 1/7 ARVN Cavalry Hue. Mar–Apr 69, ARVN Armoured School, Thu Duc near Saigon. May 69, on pre–extension leave. Jun–Aug 69, 14th ARVN Cavalry, Pleiku. Sep–Dec 69, Senior Adviser 1/14 ARVN Cavalry, Kontum. Jul 71–Jan 72, JWTC, Nui Dat and Van Kiep. Feb–Apr 72, RSM, HQ AATTV,Van Kiep. Apr–Jun 72, MATT 2, Baria.
Nov–Dec 68, Trieu Phong sub-sector, Quang Tri. Terendak Military Cemetery, Malaysia.
Sep 67–Jan 68, 3/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Feb, RF/PF Mai Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri, to Danang. Mar–Aug 68, PRU Centre near Vung Tau.
Aug–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71–May 72, MATT 2 Baria. .
RAAMC.
26.1.72–20.2.72, HQ 1 ATF. Deceased 8.10.04.
RAAC.
RAA. Drowned 27.12.68. APC hit object in subsidiary of Cua Viet River.
Deceased, no date.
RAINF.
RAA. 5.2.68–7.2.68, 1 SAS SQN. 8.2.68–26.2.68, 8 Fd Ambulance. 27.2.68–26.2.69, 2 SAS SQN.
14/7/05 1:04:11 PM
261
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GALLAGHER, Patrick Anthony
5411541
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
GEBBETT, Fredrick Charles
GEE, Alfred Edwin
GEEDRICK, James
GEIL, Peter John
GEORGE, Robert Ian
GHENT, Gary William
GHILOTTI, Joseph Frank
1201686
15727
1982
3176935
52396
57054
54262
27.8.70– 26.8.71 25.2.70– 24.12.70 22.5.68– 28.8.68
BDR WO2
WO2
11.2.71– 21.10.71
3.8.62– 31.10.63
19.7.67– 16.7.68 27.8.69– 27.8.70
CPL
CAPT
CAPT WO2
25.2.69– 27.8.69
2.9.71– 26.10.71
LCPL
Aug–Sep 69, 2/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Sep 69–Aug 70, 2/4th ARVN Cavalry, Quang Ngai.
Jul 67–Jul 68, CSD, PRU, Pleiku Base.
Aug 62–Oct 63, Dong Da, National Training Centre, Phu Bai near Hue, Chief Weapons Committee. 2–6 Aug 63, observer 2nd ARVN Division operation.
Feb 71, Phuoc Tuy unallotted. Mar–Oct 71, MATT 1, Binh Ba, & Duc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy.
May–Aug 68, 1/2 ARVN, Gio Linh area, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Feb 69, 2/2 ARVN, Gio Linh area, Quang Tri. Mar 69, 1/2 ARVN, Gio Linh area. Apr–Aug 69, HQ AATTV, Danang.
Mar–Oct 70, 4/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Nov–Dec 70, Phuoc Tuy National Training Centre.
Sep 70–Apr 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc. May– Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Sep–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
RAAC.
RAINF.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 31.5.68–28.2.69, 1 RAR.
RAINF. 11.12.67–2.12.68, 3 RAR. Deceased 5.4.00.
WIA 20.8.68, mortar shrapnel, north of Dong Ha, Medevac.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAA.
RAINF. 9.11.68– 26.11.69, 9 RAR.
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 262
GEALE, David Reginald
216911
262
GILL, Michael William
GILL, Terence William
GILLILAND, James David
GILLIVER, Trevor Edward
GLEESON, Peter Richard
14667
213172
48624
214076
17821
3.2.66– 17.1.67 18.6.70– 16.6.71 26.3.67– 26.3.68
22.10.70– 21.10.71
WO2
CAPT WO2
WO2
25.2.69– 6.5.69
WO2
MID
15.7.71– 12.7.72
WO2
Oct 70–Feb 71, 2/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Mar–Apr 71, 5th Regiment Reconnaissance Coy, Quang Ngai. May–Oct 71, 2nd ARVN Division, TOC, Quang Ngai.
Apr–Oct 67, B-50, Project Omega, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang. 10 Nov 67–Mar 68 platoon commander & acted XO, 23rd Company, B-20 MSF, Pleiku.
Jun–Sep 70, QM, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau. Oct 70–Jun 71, Adjutant, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Feb 66, Black Panther Company, 1st ARVN Division, Hue. Jul 66, 5th SFGA, Danang and then CSD, Baria, Phuoc Tuy and Vung Tau.
RAA.
RAINF.
RAEME.
AUST INT.
RASIGS. Mar 69, 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course, Nha Trang. Mar–May 69, A-203 and 232 Coy, platoon commander, 2 MSF B-20, 5th KIA 6.5.69, west of Ben Het. SFGA, Pleiku. Toowoomba Garden Crematorium, Qld. Queensland Garden of Remembrance.
RASIGS. Jul–Aug 71, MATT I, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Oct 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh. Nov 71, JWTC,Van Kiep. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Jun 72, Long Hai Training 26.4.66–1.5.67, 103 Sig Battalion. Sqn.
14/7/05 1:04:12 PM
263
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GIBSON, John Andrew
37079
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
GODDARD, Terence James
GOLLINGS, Ian John
GOOLEY now GROSSER, Michael John
GORDON, John
GORE, Ian Winn
54700
61097
4411102
1973
235059
10.9.70– 9.9.71
23.4.69– 16.4.70 3.8.62– 30.11.63
30.8.71– 6.9.72 17.2.65– 26.1.66
6.2.72– 18.12.72
CPL
WO2
LT
CPL
WO2
MAJ
Feb–May 72, HQ USARV, Ops/Training S-3, Bien Hoa Base, Bien Hoa. Jun–Dec 72, HQ FANK, XO, Bien Hoa.
Feb 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Mar–Jun 65, sub-sector Gio Linh. Jul 65, 5th SFGA, team A-102 A Shau, Quang Tri, Aug 65, A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Oct 65, Coy Comd, Nung Force, Danang.
Sep 71–Jan 72, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb 72, HQ AATTV,Van Kiep.
Aug 62–Nov 63, Hiep Khanh Training Centre near Hue, Tactics Committee. Observed 1st ARVN Division operations Jul 63. Attached RTC, Duc My, Oct 63.
Apr–Aug 69, 44th Battalion ARVN Artillery, Danang. Sep 69–Apr 70, 23rd Battalion, Quang Ngai.
Sep 70, Adviser School, Di An. Oct–Nov 70, MATT 11, Long Dien. Dec 70–Feb 71, MATT 15, Long Son Island. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 9. Phuoc Loi. May–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
RAINF.
16.10.72–18.12.72, AAAGV.
RAINF.
RAASC.
RAINF.
Original Team Member.
RAA. Deceased 29.3.05.
RAE. 20.6.67–8.1.68, 17 Const Sqn. 9.1.68–9.7.68, 1 Fd Sqn. Deceased 7.6.02.
14/7/05 1:04:12 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 264
GLOVER, Kenneth Peter
44096
264
25.8.64– 24.5.65
26.11.69– 26.11.70 16.7.65– 16.6.66
GRAHAM, Edward Hugh WO2
WO2
WO2
GREEN, Leo Braidwood
GREEN, William Colin
23808
21734
11621
Jul 65–Jan 66, 5th SFGA, C Team, Danang. 30 Jan–May 66, 5th SFGA Team A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Nov 69–Mar 70, A&L Company RF, Baria. Apr 70, PF, Baria. May–Aug 70, MATT 5, Baria. Sep–Oct 70, MATT unallotted.
Nov 69–May 70, 1st/14th ARVN Cavalry, Kontum. Jun–Nov 70, 3rd/17th ARVN Cav, Hoi An, Quang Nam.
Sep 64–Nov 64, 1st SFG, team A-414 A Ro western Quang Nam. Dec 64, CSD–CIA paramilitary, Ridge Camp,Vung Tau, demolition instructor.
May–Nov 68, 5th SFGA, Mike Force, Pleiku, platoon commander and company commander 223 Company. Dec 68–Apr 69, LRRP wing, Van Kiep.
Deceased 17.5.03.
RAASC.
RAAC. Deceased 3.1.05
RAE.Visits, 27.5.69–4.6.69, 25.11.69–3.12.69, 6.5.70–14.5.70, 22.7.70– 30.7.70.
RAINF. Deceased 24.8.69 SAS parachuting accident.
RAA. Mar–Jul 71, Assistant to Chief of Staff, HQ I Corps. Senior Australian Adviser I Corps. Aug–Nov 71, G–3 Training adviser, HQ I Corps, forming 3rd ARVN Division. Dec 71, Visit, 8.9.65–20.9.65. Commander AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau.
RAA. Mar–May 69, 11th ARVN Artillery Battalion, Quang Tri. Jun–Sep, 4/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Oct–Dec 69, attached 1 ATF ARVN Training Nui Dat, Horse Shoe. Jan–Mar 70, Admin WO, AATTV Danang.
14/7/05 1:04:12 PM
265
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 265
26.11.69– 6.11.70
30.4.68– 7.5.69
WO2
GRAFTON, John Malcolm
54223
11.3.71– 4.1.72
LTCOL
GOWANS, Patrick Thomas
57036
25.3.69– 25.3.70
WO2
GORMAN, Lyal Newton
27902
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
GRELCK, John Vincent
GREY, Garry Raymond
GRIFFITH, John Henry
GROGAN, William James
GRUBE, Ernest Pascoe
216922
2412589
28542
4609
22892
17.7.64– 11.7.65
19.7.72– 18.12.72
19.11.70– 18.11.71
3.9.70– 2.9.71 20.8.68– 6.8.69
17.12.68– 24.3.69
CAPT
WO2
CPL
WO2
WO2
WO2
RAINF. 24.2.67– 12.3.67, 1 ARU. 13.3.67–26.4.67, 5 RAR. 27.4.67–20.2.68, 7 RAR.
Dec 68–Feb 69, ARVN CCS, Can Tho.
Aug 68, RF,Vinh Binh. Sep–Nov 68, RF/PF, Can Tho. Dec 68–Mar 69, RF Vinh Binh. Apr–May 69, RF MAT,Vinh Binh. Jun–Jul 69, VDAT,Vinh Binh, IV Corps.
Sep 70, MATT unallotted, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 9, Phuoc Loi. May–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAAMC. Medevac, illness.
RAEME.
RAINF.
Nov 70, Advisers School, Di An. Dec 70–Apr RAE. 71, MATT 5, Hoi My. May–Sep 71, MATT Van Kiep, Oct–Nov 71, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau. 9.12.68–10.12.69, 17 Const Sqn.
Jul–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Jul–Oct 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, RAE. Chief Weapons Committee. Nov 64–Jan 65 1st SFG team A-322 Kham Duc, Quang Tin. Feb– Apr 65, 1st SFG team A-323, Khe Sanh. May 65, Camp Commandant HQ AAFV, Saigon.
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GREGG, Wilfred John
13343
266
GUEST, Robert Leslie
GUNDER, Warren Milton
GURNEY, Ronald Keith
HABERLEY, Albert Andrew
29776
129044
15221
21453
24.4.70– 14.4.71 25.2.69– 9.3.70
CAPT WO2
WO2
6.8.68– 30.7.69
CAPT
3.6.67– 11.6.68
30.8.71– 10.7.72
23.4.66– 10.10.67
WO2
Sep–Dec 67, OC 12th Coy, Mike Force, 5th SFGA Coy C, Danang. Jan 68–May 69, Adjutant, Mike Force, Danang.
Feb–Jun 69, 3/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri area. Jul–Oct 69, attached 1 ATF, 18th Division Training Centre Heavyweight near Nui Dat. Nov 69–Feb 70, RF Training Cadre, Baria. Sep–Nov 71, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Apr–Sep 70, 1/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Oct 70–Apr 71, JWTC Nui Dat.
Aug–Oct 68, 2/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Nov 68–May 69, AATTV cadre attached 1 ATF, 18 Div Training Centre near Nui Dat. Jun 69, HQ AATTV, Saigon, special orientation prior to RTA to Canungra.
Apr–May 66, Nung Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. Jun–Sep 66, Air Movements, C Team Danang. Oct 66–Apr 67, RF/PF Training Centre, Dong Ha and subsequently assisted CORDS integration of refugees new–Huong Hoa sub-sector, Quang Tri. 1–14 May, Saigon. 15 May–Jun, ARL Germany, mid-Jun–Jul 67, Cam Lo sub-sector. Jul–Aug 67, hospital Cam Ranh Bay. Aug–Sep 67, Cam Lo, Quang Tri.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. Visits, 3.3.64–12.3.64. 20.1.71–4.2.71.
RAINF. Injured NBC, cargo chain snapped. Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay, 25.7.67–19.8.67.
14/7/05 1:04:12 PM
267
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 267
GRUETZNER, Norbert
29670
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
HAGEAN, John Patrick
HAGERTY, Robert Edmund
HAGUE, Beverly Herbert
HAINS, Colin Phillip
HALL, Kenneth Anthony
42735
335096
29555
5716671
52555
3.8.62– 1.6.63
21.4.67– 20.10.67 3.8.62– 30.11.63
11.9.64– 24.7.65
4.6.70– 3.7.70
5.8.71– 13.11.71
SGT
WO2
CAPT
WO2
PTE
WO1
Original Team Member. RAAC. 26.5.66–15.1.67, 1 APC Sqn. 16.1.67–22.2.67, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
RAINF. Panji wound July 67. Medevac.
Original Team Member. RAINF. Died 1.6.63, observing 3/3 ARVN operations.
Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Nov 71, NOTT, Team 2, Dong Tam, IV Corps.
Jun 70, Driver, Phuoc Tuy Sector, Baria.
RAINF. Medevac illness. 26.5.65–27.6.66, 1 RAR.
RAINF. 27.11.69– 17.12.69, 1 ARU. 18.12.69–10.2.70, 5 RAR. 11.2.70–3.6.70, 8 RAR.
Sep–Oct 64, 7th SFG team A-728 Kham Duc, RAINF. western Quang Tin. Nov 64, 1st SFG team A323 Khe Sanh, western Quang Tri. Dec 64, 5th SFGA B Team, Nung Coy training Danang. Feb 65, 2/5 ARVN 2nd Division, Quang Nam. 8.4.67–16.4.68, 7 RAR.
Aug 62, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, near Hue, General Subjects Committee. Attached ARVN 4 Armd Regt, Oct 63.
Apr 67, platoon commander, 5th SFGA, Danang. Sep 67, LO, 5th SFGA, Mike Force, Danang.
Aug 62, Hiep Khanh Trg Centre, Weapons Committee. Sep 62–May 63, Tactics Committee. Springvale Cemetery,Victoria. Victoria Garden of Remembrance.
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 268
HACKING, William Francis
36448
268
HAMMER, John Laun
HAMMOND, Horace William
HANLEY, Maxwell Powell
HANLEY, Paul
HARDING, John Cameron
55155
212807
43593
219503
25629
3.7.64– 21.4.65 14.5.65– 11.6.65 6.12.66– 20.2.67 19.11.70– 30.9.71 18.9.64– 3.9.65
WO2
WO2
CPL MAJ
26.9.67– 30.5.68
23.8.70– 28.1.71
MID
CPL
WO2
RAAMC.
AUST INT. KIA 20.2.67, 5 km south-east of Ha Tanh.
RAINF. 2.3.67–27.2.68, 1 SAS Sqn. Medevac to Singapore, illness, RTU. Deceased 7.9.96.
RAINF. 16.12.67–28.11.68, 3 RAR. 5.7.69–6.8.69, 1 ARU. 7.8.69–10.2.70, 5 RAR. 11.2.70–24.7.70, HQ 1 ATF.
RAINF. 26.5.65–7.6.66, 1 RAR. WIA 8.12.67, mine, near Khe Sanh. KIA 30.5.68 southwest of Danang at Thuong Duc.
28 Sep 64–Jan 65, 1st SFGA B-410 then Jan 65, RAINF. 5th SFGA C-1 Danang, S-3 Air Officer. 24 Feb 65–Sep 65, Operations & Advisory Training Team, S-3, HQ I Corps. Liaison Australian personnel I Corps.
Nov 70–Apr 71, Medic MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy. May–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Dec 66–Feb 67, 12th MSF Coy, Nung, Marble Mountain, Danang. Terendak Military Cemetery, Malaysia.
Jul 64–Jun 65, CSD,Vung Tau, psychological warfare centre for village cadres.
Aug 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy. Sep 70–Jan 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh and Long Le, Phuoc Tuy.
Karrakatta Cemetery, W.A.
Oct 67–May 68, 5th SFGA, platoon commander, MSF companies, Danang.
14/7/05 1:04:13 PM
269
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 269
HAMERSLEY, Frederick George
54828
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
52525
Oct 67–Jan 68, 4/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Hue & Gio Linh area Quang Tri. Feb–Mar 68, 2/2 ARVN, Gio Linh area. Apr–Jul 68, RF/PF, Baria.
Aug–Nov 64, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Nam. Dec 64–Apr 65, 1st Division Panther Company, Hue.
Mar 69, Special Forces Combat Orientation Course Nha Trang and Hon Tre Island. Apr– May 69, 223 Company commander, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF Pleiku. Jun 69, Mike Force Battalion XO. Jul 69–Mar 70,Van Kiep, LRRP School.
Aug–Dec 64, Ngoc Ho and Long Tho, training centres near Hue. Jan–May 65, 3/3 ARVN, 1st Division, I Corps. Feb–Sep 66, 4/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, Oct 66 5th SFGA, Danang. Nov 66–Jan 67, Long Tho RF/PF near Hue.
Oct 70, 2/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Nov 70, Di An advisors school. Dec 70–May 71, MATT 15, Long Son Island, Phuoc Tuy.
Oct 66, RF/PF Phuoc Tuy. Jun 67, National Police Field Force Training Centre, Trai Mat near Dalat.
Jun 70–Jan 71, MATT 4, An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF.
RAAC.
RAINF. WIA 6.5.69, near Ban Me Thuot. WIA 27.6.69, gunshot Kontum. 66–67, 6 RAR.
Deceased 26.12.99.
RAINF.
RAA.
RAINF. WIA 30.8.67, blast and flying masonry. Satchel charge. Dalat. Deceased 28.6.01.
RAA. 3.2.70–11.6.70, 4 Fd Regt.
14/7/05 1:04:13 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 270
26.9.67– 23.7.68
HARRIS, Robert George
41335
HARRIS, Ronald William WO2
HARRIS, Peter John
242851
3.2.66– 17.1.67
1.8.64– 13.5.65
MID
WO2
11.8.64– 13.5.65
HARRIS, George David
3897
22.10.70– 5.6.71
WO2
WO2
HARKIN, Edward
53698
20.10.66– 12.9.67
WO2
11.3.69– 25.3.70
HARDY, Norman Erle
29613
24.5.70– 4.2.71
BDR
CAPT
HARDING, Phillip Highbourne
415485
270
HARROWER, James Nicol
HARTIGAN, Norman Douglas
HARTLEY, John Curtis
HARTMAN, Harold John
HARVEY, Ross John
HASLETT, Robert John
HATELEY, Peter
32219
219838
17105
16138
235381
446672
45278
9.4.68– 3.5.69 12.8.71– 13.10.71 24.4.70– 5.4.71 30.7.69– 30.7.70 21.4.72– 18.12.72 13.6.72– 26.6.72 10.9.70– 28.12.70
CPL CAPT
WO2 LT CPL CPL
25.2.69– 17.9.70
16.3.65– 7.9.66
WO2
WO2
RAAMC. Deceased 1985.
RAAC.
RAINF.
Sep 70, Advisers School, Di An. Oct–Dec 70, MATT 11, Long Dien.
Jun 72, Team HQ MAC–V Compound Van Kiep.
Apr–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Aug 69–Jul 70, medical adviser Can Tho.
RAAMC. Medevac NBC.
AACC.
RAINF.
RAAMC. Deceased 1.9.89.
Apr–Aug 70, Adjutant HQ AATTV, Saigon. Sep RAINF. WIA, 11.3.71, 70–Mar 71, RF/PF–PSDF–MATT, Baria. Medevac. 8.5.66– 12.5.67, 5 RAR.
Aug–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Apr–Dec 68, 2nd/4th ARVN Cav Regt, Danang. Jan–Feb 69, 4th ARVN Cav Regt, Danang. Mar 69, Admin duties, Can Tho.
Mar–Aug 65, 1/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Nam & Quang Ngai. Sep–Nov 65, RF/PF Nghia Hanh sub-sector, Quang Ngai. Dec 65, Tra Bong sub-sector, Quang Ngai. Jan 66, 5th SFGA, C Team, Danang. Feb–May 66, Nung Force, Danang. Feb–Apr 69, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd division, Quang Ngai. May 69, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam.
14/7/05 1:04:13 PM
271
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 271
HARRIS,Victor Lewis
15628
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
HAWKSWORTH, Donald Ian
HAYES, Robert John
HAZEL, Geoffrey Alan
HEALY, John Boyd
HEARD, Kenneth Walter
35572
5240
216419
335092
35856
7.5.65– 29.4.66
25.2.67– 6.8.68
WO2
WO1
10.9.70– 9.9.71
3.8.62– 17.9.63
1.10.69– 18.1.70
CPL
CAPT
WO2
22.10.70– 21.10.71
27.4.72– 8.12.72
WO2
Oct–Dec 69, 3/5 & 2/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Tam Ky area.
Aug–Sep 62, A-727A training camp Hoa Cam near Danang. Oct 62–Sep 63, CSD–CIA paramilitary organisation, Danang, Special Projects.
Sep 70, Advisers School, Di An. Oct 70–Jan 71, MATT 11, Long Dien. Feb–Mar 71, MATT 11, Phuoc Hoa. Apr 71, MATT 3, Long Dien. May–Sep 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy.
3 Mar 67, RF/PF Gio Linh, Quang Tri. Oct 67, 4/1 ARVN, Quang Tri. Feb–Aug 68, HQ Quang–Da Special Zone, Hoi An. Oct 70–Feb 71, Phuoc Tuy/Van Kiep National Training Centre. Mar–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
May–Aug 65, 5th SFGA Danang, C Team Danang, Nung Company. Sep 65–Mar 66, 2/3 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Apr 66, AATTV, Danang, unallotted.
Apr–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
RAINF. Commissioned, RTA.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 1.6.65–5.6.66, 1 RAR. Deceased 3.11.94.
12.12.67–19.11.68, 3 RAR.
RAINF.
WIA 26.12.67, B-40 rocket splinters casevac via US hospital Phu Bai and Danang to 8 Fd Amb Vung Tau.
RAA.
RAINF. WIA, 13.5.65, aircraft hit by ground fire A Loui SF camp. 8.5.69–16.5.70, 6 RAR.
RAINF. 7.6.65–17.7.65, 1 RAR. WIA 12.7.65 Medevac.
14/7/05 1:04:14 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 272
HAUPT, Graeme Michael
43363
272
HEDGES, Donald Frederick
HEENAN, Denis Frederick
HEMERIK, Jan Nicolaas
210503
36394
54063
3.8.62– 21.6.63 13.8.69– 13.8.70
30.7.69– 16.7.70
2.1.67– 18.12.67
WO2
WO2
WO2
WO2
26.11.69– 10.12.70
Jan–Apr 67, 3/5 ARVN Tam Ky, Quang Tin. May–Aug 67, 2/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Sep– Dec 67, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam.
Aug 69–Apr 70, 2/54 ARVN, Hue/Phu Loc, Thua Thien. May 70, MATT 3, Phuoc Tuy. Jun–Jul 70, MATT 4, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 69–Feb 70, 4/3 ARVN, Hue, Thua Thien. Mar–Apr 70, Admin WO, LRRP Wing,Van Kiep. May–Aug 70, Phuoc Tuy National Training Centre.
6 Aug 62–25 Jun 63, Tactics Committee, Dong Da, National Training Centre.
Dec 69–Jul 70, 3/3 ARVN near Hue, Thua Thien. Aug–Dec 70, Phuoc Tuy National Training Centre.
Mar 70–Feb 71, 1/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Tam Ky.
Mar–Aug 71, MATT 3, Long Dien. Sep–Oct 71, AATTV, Saigon and Vung Tau. Nov 71, NOTT 2, Bac Lieu. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, AATTV–ITG Long Hai training contingent.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 17.11.69– 12.11.70, 8 RAR.
RAA.
RAINF. Deceased 20.7.02.
Visit, 14.4.65–22.4.65.
RAA.
14/7/05 1:04:14 PM
273
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 273
HEBBLEWHITE, Kevin James
24189
HEATHCOTE, Raymond WO2 Ernest
214382
25.2.70– 25.2.71
MM
WO2
HEATH, George Donald
52119
25.3.71– 11.2.72
MAJ
HEARDER, Simon Roblin
335137
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
HENNESSY, Allan James
HERBERT, Desmond Arthur
HERSCHELL, Gordon Lionel
HESLIN, Patrick Joseph
HEWSON, Edward Berkley
HEWTON, Denis Albert
2791915
22803
11308
53212
28735
1202840
10.3.67– 16.12.67
5.10.70– 2.6.71 31.7.70– 19.11.70 30.4.70– 1.5.71
25.3.69– 15.10.70
21.10.65– 11.10.66 14.8.70– 12.8.71
WO2
PTE
WO2 WO2
WO2
WO2 BDR
Aug–Oct 70, Driver, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau. Nov 70–Jan 71, Transport Supervisor, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Oct 65–Apr 66, CSD–CIA,Vung Tau and then 1/51 ARVN, Quang Nam.
Mar–Jul 69, 3/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Quang Nam. Aug 69–Jan 70, HQ AATTV, Danang. Mar–Oct 70, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam.
May–Jul 70, AATTV RF Training, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong. Aug–Dec 70, NOAT, Cho Gao. Jan 71, Night Advisory Team 1, Can Tho. Feb 71, NAT, Bac Lieu.
Aug, two weeks 2/54 ARVN, then NOTT, Dong Tam. Sep, NOAT Cho Gao, IV Corps.
Oct 70–May 71, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Mar 67, Civil Affairs, 1 ATF. Killed in road ambush with Ron Seiler on the Duc Thanh– Binh Ba road, Baria District, Phuoc Tuy. Karrakatta Cemetery, W.A.
RAA.
RAINF. Deceased 25.7.69.
RAE.
RAINF. WIA 9.5.70, Dinh Tuong. Deceased 1989.
RAINF. Deceased August 1986.
RAASC. 9.12.69–5.10.70, HQ AFV.
KIA 16.12.67
RAAOC.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 274
HENDERSON, Malcolm Austin
51286
274
HILL, William James
HILTON, Charles George
HINCHLIFFE, Douglas Reginald
HINDE, Raymond Christopher
HINSON, Alfred George
HOAD, Lawrence
26744
14875
3797936
213536
3972
27343
16.4.66– 2.4.67 5.7.72– 8.11.72 17.4.71– 15.10.71 4.6.68– 28.5.69
16.7.65– 16.6.66
11.9.64– 11.4.65
WO2
PTE CAPT
WO2
WO2
30.4.68– 30.4.69
3.7.64– 11.4.65
WO1
WO2
Sep 64–Apr 65, RF/PF, Quang Tri Sector.
Jul–Sep 65, 2/51 Ranger Battalion, I Corps. Oct–Nov, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Dec 65–Mar 66, RF/PF, Phu Loc, Thua Thien. Apr 66,Vung Tau R&C Centre. May– Jun 66, attached 17 Construction Sqn.
Jun–Oct 68, company commander, (23 & 26) 223 and 206 companies, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Nov 68–May 69,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy
Apr–Oct 71, Driver, AATTV, Vung Tau.
Jul–Oct 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Apr–Oct 66, CSD,Vung Tau and then RF/PF Trieu Phong, I Corps.
Jul 64–Jan 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons and Tactics Committees. Feb– Mar 65, 1st ARVN Division Recon Coy, Hue. May–Aug 68, 3/2 ARVN Gio Linh, A-1, Quang Tri. Sep–Dec 68, 11th ARVN Artillery Battalion, Quang Tri area. Jan–Apr 69, ARVN Artillery School, Duc My.
RAA. Deceased 15.12.01.
RAE. 22.4.69–30.4.70, Det 55 Engr Wksp. 8.9.71– 19.2.72, 198 Wks Sect.
RAINF.
16.12.70–16.4.71, 1 ARU.
RAAMC. 30.6.67–21.5.68, 1 CA Unit.
RAINF. 12.2.71– 9.10.71, 3 RAR. Deceased 9.7.82.
RAA.
14/7/05 1:04:14 PM
275
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 275
HILL, Douglas George
34515
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
HODGSON, George Ian
HOFMAN, John Robert
HOGG, now MACLAINE, Thomas Raymond
HOLFORD, David Edward
HOLLAND, James Travers
29537
52628
39096
335119
39037
10.11.64– 6.8.65
25.6.70– 25.1.71 11.12.67– 12.8.68 24.5.70– 7.4.71
9.6.72– 18.12.72 30.6.71– 28.10.71
WO1
WO2
WO2
CPL
MAJ
LT
Jul–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
JWTC,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
May 70, MATT 3, Phuoc Tuy. Jun 70–Apr 71, MATT 4, An Ngai & Hoa Loi, Phuoc Tuy.
Dec 67–Jul 68, 5th SFGA, B-52 Project Delta, 91st Ranger Battalion attached to B-52. Also S-2 Assistant, 5th SFGA HQ Nha Trang.
Jul 70, 2/2 ARVN, Quang Tri. Aug 70, MATT 5, Hoi My. Sep, MATT, unallotted. Oct 70–Jan 71, MATT 9, Phuoc Loi, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 64–Jan 65, Dong Da Training Centre, Admin WO/ Tactics Committee. Feb 65, 2nd ARVN Division Liaison WO. Mar–Jul 65, RSM AATTV, Danang.
RAA. 8.1.68–14.4.68, 4 Fd Regt. 15.4.68–29.10.68, 12 Fd Regt. 30.10.68–26.11.68, 1 ARU. 10.6.70–4.1.71, 1 Aust CA Unit.
RAINF. 4.5.66–31.5.67, HQ 1 ATF. 27.1.71–4.2.71,Visit.
RAE. 4.3.68–25.2.69, 1 Fd Sqn. 2.9.69–3.6.70, 17 Const Sqn.
RAINF. NBC 8.3.68. Medevac.
RAA. Medevac NBC.
RAEME. Hospital Nha Trang illness, 17– 30.12.64. Deceased 1.12.74.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 276
HODGART, William Donald
34563
276
HOLMES, Christopher John
HOLMES, Donald Garry
HOLT, John Verner
HONOUR, Graeme John
HOOLIHAN, John Thomas
HOOPER, George Thomas
3411750
2243335
35464
2791922
14906
1410754
17.7.64– 3.5.65
22.7.71– 30.9.71 15.4.66– 3.4.67
29.10.70– 21.12.71 1.10.70– 7.4.71 11.6.69– 12.6.70
9.7.72– 10.12.72
WO2
CPL WO2
WO2
BDR WO2
CPL
RAINF. 8.4.67–16.4.68, 7 RAR. Deceased 24.6.02.
RAINF. WIA 15.7.66, booby trap east Danang area. 13.5.71–20.12.71, 4 RAR. Deceased 27.2.83.
RAINF. 10.3.68– 15.2.69, 1 ARU.
RAA. 4.5.67–25.1.68, HQ AFV. 31.1.68–16.4.68, HQ AFV. 24.3.70–18.3.71, HQ AFV. Deceased 17.11.95.
Jul–Nov 72, MATT 2,Van Kiep.
Jun–Aug 69, platoon commander 211 Coy, 1st Battalion, 2 MSF B-20 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Sep–Nov 69, Training Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Nov 69–Apr 70, LRRP Wing,Van Kiep. May 70, National Training Centre,Van Kiep.
RAINF. 8.5.67–4.3.68, 2 RAR.
RAINF.
Oct 70, Driver, JWTC, Nui Dat. Nov 70–Mar RAA. 71, Transport Supervisor HQ AATTV,Vung Tau.
Nov 70–Dec 71, RQMS, HQ AATTV, Vung Tau.
Apr–Oct 66, Nung Force 5th SFGA Danang and then RF/PF Hue.
Jul–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Nov 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Dec 64, Admin WO, HQ AATTV Saigon.
14/7/05 1:04:14 PM
277
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 277
HOLLAND, Kenneth Charles
22444
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
HORNE, Geoffrey St
HOWARD, Terence William
HOWELLS, Daryl Lloyd
HOYNE, Patrick John
HUDSON, Harvey Francis
HUDSON, John Phillip
1963
37943
12655
53302
29908
214378
19.11.70– 14.6.71 19.11.68– 10.12.69
21.5.65– 5.5.66 21.2.70– 11.2.71 11.6.65– 27.1.66
1.8.64– 3.5.65
26.5.71– 22.5.72
CPL
WO2
WO2
WO1 WO2
WO2
SGT
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 3.6.71. Long Dien. Medevac. 4.11.68–4.3.69, 9 RAR.
Jun–Oct, JWTC, Nui Dat. Nov 71–May 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Jul 64–Feb 65, battalion 1st ARVN Div, Quang Tri. Mar 65, Dong Da Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Apr 65 1/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Nam.
Jun–Sep 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, General Subjects Committee. Oct 65–Jan 66, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai.
Feb–Jul 70, Admin WO, HQ AATTV Saigon. Aug 70–Feb 71, RSM AATTV, Saigon.
RAINF. 5.6.65–7.2.66, 1 RAR. Accidentally wounded 10.11.71. Deceased 15.5.00.
Deceased 24.6.96.
RAINF.
RAA. Medevac to Singapore then Australia, illness. Deceased 9.1.04.
RAINF.
May–Sep 65, RF/PF, Son Tinh district, Quang RAINF. Ngai. Sep 65–Apr 66, 3/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, 16.2.70–14.1.71, Quang Ngai. 7 RAR.
Nov 68, RF,Vinh Binh. Dec 68–Feb 69, RF, Kien Hoa. Feb–Mar 69, RF MAT, Kien Hoa. Apr 69,Vinh Long Sector. May–Aug 69,VDAT, Vinh Long. Sep–Nov 69, 4/5 ARVN Tam Ky, 2nd Division.
Nov 70, Advisers School, Di An. Dec 70–Apr 71, MATT 4 An Ngai. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:15 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 278
HORE, Gary Raymond
4410564
278
HUGHES, John Garth
HULSING, Peter
HUMPHREYS, John Barry
HUNNISETT, Robert John
HUNTER, Alfred Kevin
HUSBAND, James
17038
16685
311180
61387
35348
26275
30.6.71– 3.7.72 23.4.66– 13.4.67 14.1.71– 26.11.71
11.3.68– 11.3.69
14.4.64– 11.4.65
WO2
WO2 WO2
WO2
SGT
28.1.67– 9.10.67
11.2.71– 12.2.72
MC
MAJ
MAJ
RAE.
RAAMC. 20.6.67–21.2.68, 1 CA Unit.
RAA.
RAE. WIA 12.8.67, evacuated to USS Sanctuary, to Australia 9.10.67. Deceased 19.5.74.
Apr–Aug 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Sep 64–Mar 65, 1/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Nam.
Mar–Jun 68, 3/7 ARVN Cavalry, PK 17 north of Hue. Jul–Sep 68, 2/7 ARVN Cavalry, PK 17. Oct 68–Mar 69, Armoured School, Thu Duc, near Saigon.
16.2.70–10.3.71, 7 RAR.
RAINF.
RAAC.
RAINF. Jan–Feb 71, MATT 12, Long Le/An Ngai. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 3 Long Dien. May–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Nov 71, 3rd ARVN Division, Quang Tri.
Apr 66, RF/PF Nam Hoa sub-sector Thua Thien and then Civil Affairs Phuoc Tuy.
Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep.
Feb–Nov 71, Assistant to Chief of Territorial Security, Can Tho. Senior Australian adviser IV Corps. Dec 71, AATTV Training group, Vung Tau. Jan–Feb 72, USARV–ITG, AATTV Component, Bien Hoa HQ.
Feb 67, Trieu Phong District, Quang Tri.
14/7/05 1:04:15 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 279
HUGHES, John Fox
235117
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
IRVINE, George David
IRVINE, James
ISON, Charles Joseph
JAAGO, Leonard
JACKSON, Brian
235110
4581
27722
216001
129298
23.9.66– 19.7.67
MID
CAPT
23.4.65– 11.10.66 24.9.68– 28.5.70
WO2
27.10.70– 8.7.71
19.9.66– 31.8.67
WO2
WO2
14.8.63– 5.11.64
CAPT
BEM DSM
28.5.68– 28.5.69
WO2
Sep 66–Jul 67, Intelligence Officer, 5th SFGA, Project Omega, B-50, Nha Trang.
Nov 70, MATT 2, Dat Do. Dec 70–Apr 71, MATT 1, Binh Ba. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Apr 65–Oct 66, 1st ARVN Division, Recon Coy, Hue. Sep 68, 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Unit, Hue. 11 Feb 69, Provincial Recon Unit, Phuoc Long. Jun 69, PRU, Phuoc Tuy, Baria base. 18 Sep–18 Oct 69, pre-extension leave. Oct 69, PRU, Rung Sat Special Zone,Vung Tau Base. Apr 70, Assistant Intelligence WO Dinh Tuong. 3 May 70, RF Training, My Tho.
Sep 66–Jan 67, 5th SFGA, platoon commander 12th Company Mike Force, Danang and then 2nd ARVN Division.
Aug 63, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Chief General Subjects. Feb 64 Chief Tactics Committee. Mar 64 Chief Basic Ranger Committee. Jun 64, 1st SFG A-224 An Diem and Jul 64, 1st SFG A-412B A Ro, both Quang Nam.
May–Nov 68, platoon commander, 223 Coy, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Dec 68–Feb 69, RF Vin Binh. Mar 69, CORDS, RD Training, Can Tho. Apr–May 69, Admin duties AATTV, Can Tho.
RAINF.
RAINF. 6.1.67–13.12.67, 1 ARU. 8.7.70–26.10.70, 1 ARU.
DSM awarded in End of War List.
RAINF.
RAINF. Deceased 8.12.67.
RAINF.
8.4.67–6.9.67, 7 RAR.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:15 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
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HYLAND, John Samuel
15891
280
JACKSON, John Charles
JACKSON, Lawrence
JACKSON, Oliver David
JAMES, Maurice John
JAMIESON, George Yorkston
235153
5411189
2111
38538
36246
23.7.68– 23.7.69
WO2
10.3.67– 11.3.68
7.10.65– 27.9.66
WO2
WO2
5.12.67– 4.5.70
22.1.65– 3.5.66
COL
MID
13.11.64– 2.11.65
CAPT
3.9.70– 2.9.71
18.11.65– 1.11.66
WO2
Oct 65, 2/51 ARVN, Quang Nam. Nov 65–Sep 66, 3/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Dec 67–Dec 68, 3/5 ARVN, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai. Jan–Oct 69, Mobile Training Team, PRU Central Highlands, Nha Trang base. Nov 69–Apr 70, 5th SFGA, platoon commander, 2nd MF Battalion, Pleiku.
15 Mar 67, RF/PF 5th SFGA Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. 11 Apr 67, 5th SFGA, detachment B-50 (S-4), Nha Trang. Nov 67, Mike Force platoon commander, Pleiku.
1 Feb 65–1 May 66, Commander AATTV. Commander AAFV 5.5.65–2.5.66.
Jul 68–Jan 69, platoon commander, 212th Coy, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Feb 69, 54th Regiment, Hue. Mar–Jul 69, 3/54, Hue. Sep 70–Jan 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb–Jun 71, NOTT Pleiku. Jul–Aug 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh.
Nov 64–Sep 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, Chief Weapons Committee. Sep–Oct 65, RF/PF I Corps HQ.
WIA 8.4.70, WIA 11.4.70 Medevac.
Wounded accidentally, grenade, 13.8.66.
RAINF.
RAINF.
ASC. 3.5.66–6.1.67, Comd 1 ATF. 1.5.69–8.5.69,Visit. Deceased 7.5.04.
Deceased 21.2.74.
RAINF.
RAAC.
Nov 65–May 66, RF/PF Quang Tri Sector. Oct RAAMC. 21.10.70– 66, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. 21.10.71, 1 Aust Fd Hosp. Deceased no date.
14/7/05 1:04:15 PM
281
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JACKSON, Geoffrey Walter
52586
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
JARRETT, Kenneth Gordon
JENKIN, Geoffrey Colin
JENKINSON, David William
JENNINGS, Terry John
15892
4410549
29794
313275
30.6.71– 3.7.72
22.10.70– 21.10.71
14.7.72– 9.10.72
WO2
WO2
LCPL
3.9.70– 2.9.71
CPL
MID
8.11.63– 19.11.64
CAPT
4.11.68–26.11.69, 9 RAR.
RAINF.
Deceased 24.8.93.
RAINF.
RAAC.
Jul 72, JWTC and MATT Phuoc Tuy.
RAE. 2.12.69–8.12.70, 17 Const Sqn.
RAINF. Oct–Dec 70, 1/54 ARVN, Hue. Jan 71, unallotted MATT, MR–1. Feb–May 71, MATT 5.6.65–3.6.66, 1 RAR. 23, Quang Ngai. Jun 71, operations advisor, Hac Bao Coy, Hue. Jul–Aug 71, NOTT 2, Phu Deceased 4.12.92. Cat, Binh Dinh.
Jul–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Nov 71, 3rd ARVN Division, Quang Tri. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Sep 70, MATT unallotted, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 70, MATT 9, Phuoc Loi. Nov–Dec 70, attached to JWTC, Nui Dat. Jan–Aug 71, Driver, Phuoc Tuy Sector, AATTV MATT HQ, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 63–Jan 64, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, Chief Weapons Committee. Feb 64, Temporary duty Admin Officer, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Mar 64 detached to observe armoured operations in IV Corps. Apr 64, CSD Danang detached CSD Vung Tau. Aug 64 posted Vung Tau Psychological Warfare Centre, Special Political Cadres.
14/7/05 1:04:15 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 282
JARRATT, Peter Charles
28703
282
JEWELL, Ian Joseph
JOHNSON, Gregory Kenneth
JOHNSTON, Francis Colin
JOHNSTON, Norman
JOHNSTON, Peter Thomas
13446
2412457
235062
5411075
337629
22.10.70– 21.10.71
30.5.72– 18.12.72
LTCOL
8.2.69– 30.4.70
MAJ WO2
5.8.71– 28.10.71
CPL
MBE
25.6.68– 9.7.69
WO2
30.8.71– 14.3.72
19.11.68– 26.11.69
WO2
WIA 12.1.69, 20 miles south-west of Danang.
RAINF.
Jun–Dec 72, CO AATTV, HQ Van Kiep.
Oct 70, 3/5 ARVN Tam Ky and Nov 70, 4/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Jan–May 71 4/5 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Jun–Oct 71, 5th ARVN Regt, Tam Ky, Quang Tin.
Feb 69–Apr 70, G–3 Training, HQ I Corps, Danang.
Aug–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF. Deceased 13.5.85.
RAINF. WIA Aug 71, Hiep Duc. 9.6.65–29.11.65, 1 RAR.
RAINF. Deceased 8.8.88.
RAINF. 7.10.68– 12.11.68, 1 ARU. 13.11.68–7.5.69, 4 RAR.
Jun–Sep 68, platoon commander (23 & 26) 223 RAINF. & 206 Coy, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Sep 68, Recon Coy, OC reaction teams, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Jan–Jun 69, Recondo School, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang. Sep 71, 3rd ARVN Division, Quang Tri. Oct–Nov 71, 1st ARVN Division, Hue. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Mar 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Nov 68–Jan 69, 21st Ranger Battalion, Hoi An, Quang Nam. Feb–Mar 69, 37th Ranger Battalion, Hoi An. Apr–May 69, HQ 1st Ranger Group, Danang. Jun–Nov 69, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My.
14/7/05 1:04:16 PM
283
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 283
JENSEN, Matthew Thomas
29543
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
JONES, David Ivor
JONES, William Thomas
JOYCE, Allan Joseph
JOYCE, Gilbert Keith
JUDD, Colin Baxter
KALEMBA, George Joseph
219816
1201661
14011
3166040
29313
44659 5.5.70– 8.10.70
7.1.70– 7.1.71
WO2
PTE
21.1.69– 14.8.70
WO2
11.9.64– 4.9.65
27.8.69– 13.8.70
WO2
WO2
3.9.70– 23.6.71
WO2
MM
25.6.70– 2.6.71
WO2
RAINF.
Medevac NBC. Deceased 22.12.95.
RAINF.
RAINF.
May–Sep 70, MATT 2, Phuoc Tuy.
RAAMC. Medevac. 16.2.70–3.6.70, 7 RAR.
RASIGS. Sep–Dec 64, Dong Da Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Jan–Mar 65, 1st SFG team A-414 A Ro, western Quang Nam. Apr 65 joined A5/331 later A-104 Ha Than, Son Ha district, Quang Ngai. May 65, Admin WO 2nd ARVN Div and HQ AATTV Danang.
Jan–Sep 70, 3/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, 2nd Division HQ Quang Ngai. Oct–Dec 70, Admin WO, AATTV, Danang.
Jan–Apr 69, 3/3 ARVN, Hue. May–Dec 69, Phuoc Tuy Sector, RF Training Cadre, 18th Division Training School near Nui Dat. Jan–Mar,VDAT, Ba Tri in Kien Hoa, IV Corps. Apr–Aug, Cam Lo–Hai Lang sub-sectors, I Corps.
Sep 69–Aug 70, 3/51 ARVN Regiment, Mieu Bong, Quang Nam.
Sep–Dec 70, NOAT, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong. Jan RAINF. WIA 16.12.70, 71, NAT, Can Tho. Feb–Jun 71, NAT 2, Dong Dinh Tuong. Tam, IV Corps. Deceased 8.4.00.
Jul 70, NOTT, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong. Aug–Sep RAINF. 70, NOTT, Dong Tam. Oct–Dec 70, Admin WO, Can Tho. Jan–May 71, CORDS, Admin WO, Can Tho. May 71, Saigon.
14/7/05 1:04:16 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 284
JONES, Allen Kenneth
36958
284
KEALY, Clement Roy
KEAN, Raymund Anthony
KEECH, David Derek
KEIOSKIE, Colin Francis
13163
35237
311588
13973
12.6.70– 26.5.71 7.10.65– 25.3.67
LBDR
WO2
23.7.68– 4.3.70
3.9.70– 2.9.71
WO1
21.1.69– 17.12.69 13.1.70– 14.8.70
1.8.64– 13.5.65
WO2
MID
16.3.68– 11.3.69
WO2
RAINF.
Oct 65, Hoi An sub-sector, Quang Nam and then HQ AATTV, Saigon. Jul 68–Jan 69, 2/51 ARVN, Danang. Feb–Apr 69, HQ, AATTV, Saigon. May 69–Feb 70, 2/51 ARVN, Danang/Mieu Bong, Quang Nam.
Jun–Dec 70, MATT 5, Baria/Phuoc Hai/Hoi My. Jan–May 71, MATT 9, Phuoc Loi.
Sep 70–Mar 71, 2/4th ARVN Cavalry Regiment, Hoa Vang, Quang Nam. Apr 71, 4th ARVN Cavalry, Dong Ha, Quang Tri. May 71, 7th ARVN Cav, Dong Ha. Jun–Aug 71, 3/7th ARVN Cavalry, Dong Ha.
RAASC. NBC 15.12.66.
RAA. 3.6.70–11.6.70, Det 131 Div Loc Bty. Deceased 8.12.99.
RAAC.
Jul 64–Jan 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, RAINF. Ranger Basic Training, Jungle, Mountain, Swamp School. Feb 65, 5th SFGA B Team, Danang, Nung Training & Operations. Jan–Mar 69, LRRP Wing,Van Kiep Centre, Phuoc Tuy. Apr–Oct 69, 18th ARVN Div Training School near Nui Dat. Nov 69, RF Training Cadre, Baria. Dec 69, PF advisory team, Baria. Dec–Jan pre-extension leave. Jan– Aug 70, PF advisory team, Baria.
Mar–Jul 68, 4/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Gio Linh area, Quang Tri. Aug–Dec 68, platoon commander, 223 Coy, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Jan–Feb 69, Coy D, 5th SFGA, Ha Tien camp, Kien Giang, IV Corps.
14/7/05 1:04:16 PM
285
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KAPP, Leslie Alfred
29945
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
KELLY, John William
KELLY, Maxwell
KENDALL, John
KENNEALLY, William
KENNEDY, Robert Allan
KENNEDY, Raymond George
5716069
13013
210839
13571
219438
335080
26.10.70– 5.5.71 20.5.68– 13.8.69
4.9.67– 20.8.68
CPL WO2
WO2
4.9.67– 3.12.68 3.9.70– 2.9.71
2.8.63– 11.6.64
WO2
BDR
MAJ
25.6.70– 23.6.71
25.2.69– 18.5.69
WO2
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 1.6.69, enemy mortar. 18.7.67–19.5.68, 1 ARU. Deceased 6.5.03.
RAASC. 1.7.69– 26.10.70, HQ AFV.
RAINF. WIA 11.5.69, gunshot, Kontum, Medevac.
Aug 63–Jun 64, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, senior Australian adviser, Chief Training Adviser. Nov 63, observed operations in Pleiku area.
RAINF.
RAA. Sep 70, MATT unallotted. Oct 70, MATT 14, Long Dien. Nov 70–Jan 71, MATT 1, Binh Ba. Feb–Apr 71, MATT 12, An Ngai. May–Aug 71, Deceased 13.12.82. MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Sep 67, 4/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Hue. Oct 67–Jan 68, Quang Da Special Zone, Hoi An. Feb–Nov 68, 1/51 ARVN, Quang Nam.
Sep 67–May 68, platoon commander, 12th & 16th Company, 5th SFGA, Danang. Jun–Aug 68, Training Officer, Hoa Cam National Training Centre, near Danang. Jun 70–Jun 71, HQ 1st ARVN Division, Hue, sensor advisor.
May 68–Aug 69, 2/3 ARVN, 1st Division, PK 17 north of Hue, Thua Thien.
Oct 70–Apr 71, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Mar 69, 5th SFGA, Combat Orientation Course near Nha Trang. Late Mar–May 69, 231 Coy, 3rd Battalion, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
14/7/05 1:04:16 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 286
KELLY, Andrew Martin
18235
286
KENNEDY, William Desmond
KENT, Stanley Thomas
KERR, David Noel
KILLION, Donald Gordon
KIMBERLEY, James Francis
KING, Graham Hugh
13116
12128
235124
214400
5410989
37752
29.7.62– 7.11.63
MBE
DCM
SGT
WO2
16.9.65– 21.11.65 9.12.65– 7.9.66 2.7.69– 9.7.70 12.6.70– 27.11.70 14.5.70– 12.5.71
CAPT
WO2
SGT
WO2
16.3.65– 1.3.66
10.11.64– 26.11.65
WO2
RAAMC.
RAINF. Visit, 23.8.63–31.8.63. 12.2.71–8.10.71, 3 RAR. Deceased 21.7.77.
RAINF.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 15.6.66– 24.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn. 3.2.69–18.2.70, 3 SAS Sqn. Deceased 11.12.02.
RAAC.
May–Dec 70, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jan–May 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
RAINF. 3.6.65–1.6.66, 1 RAR.
Jun 70, MATT 5, Baria. Jul 70, MATT 5, Phuoc RAE. Hai. 27.11.69–1.6.70, 17 Aug–Nov 70, MATT 5, Hoi My. Const Sqn.
Jul 69–Jun 70, medical adviser, Hue, Thua Thien Sector and administrator AATTV hut in advisers’ compound, Hue.
Sep–Dec 65, Senior Australian Adviser Dong Da National Training Centre, Thua Thien. Jan– Feb 66, RF/PF Hue, Thua Thien Sector. Mar 66, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien.
Mar–Sep 65, RF/PF, Quang Tri. Oct 65–Feb 66, RSM AATTV Danang.
Aug 62–Oct 63, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Attached 2nd ARVN Div observer in Sep 63. MBE awarded 12.6.71 for service in Vietnam with AATTV.
Nov 64–Jan 65, Dong Ha, RF/PF Sector, Quang Tri. Feb–Apr 65, Cam Lo sub-sector, Quang Tri. May–Nov 65, RF/PF, Quang Ngai/ Binh Son sub-sector.
14/7/05 1:04:17 PM
287
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 287
KENNEDY, Robert John
29494
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
KIRWAN, Alan John
KNOWLES, Kenneth William
KOLARIC, Joseph Jerzey
KRASNOFF, Stan
53498
42577
1201724
15742
31.3.71– 11.2.72 18.2.71– 26.10.71 26.7.72– 18.12.72
12.6.70– 14.1.71 5.12.67– 26.11.68
WO2 LT
WO2
CPL CAPT
8.7.71– 2.6.72
19.2.68– 10.12.69
18.11.65– 10.12.66
RAAMC. Deceased June 2003.
RAINF. 4.5.68– 15.12.68, 4 RAR. 23.12.68–30.5.69, 4 RAR. Deceased 10.12.98.
RAINF. 15.6.66–26.1.67, 3 SAS Sqn.
RAASC.
RAINF. 25.5.65–3.6.65, Visit. Deceased 9.2.99.
Deceased 9.5.95.
RAINF.
Dec 67–Feb 68, 5th SFGA, 3rd MSF B-36, HQ RAINF. Long Hai, FOB Tay Ninh. Feb–Mar 68, B35–HQ, Duc Hoa camp, training and garrison defence A-351/352 at Duc Hue & Tra Cu Camps, Duc Hue District, Hau Nghia. Apr– Nov 68,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy.
Jun–Jul 70, MATT 5, Baria. Aug 70–Jan 71, MATT 5, Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy.
MATT 1,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Feb 71, unallotted MATT, Quang Ngai. Mar– Apr 71, MATT 23, Quang Ngai. May–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Apr 71–Feb 72, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Jul 71–Jan 72, Senior Adviser, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb–May 72, CO AATTV,Van Kiep.
Nov 65–May 66, RF/PF Quang Tri Sector, Trieu Phong sub-sector. Jun 66, 1 ATF Civic Action Duties. Feb 68–Jan 69, 4/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri area. Feb–Apr 69, CORDS, RF MAT Vinh Binh. May 69,VDAT,Vinh Long Sector. Jun–Dec 69,VDAT,Vinh Binh Sector.
14/7/05 1:04:17 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 288
KIRSCH,Vitali
42743
KIRKLAND, Keith Henry LTCOL
235027
WO2
KING, Robert Malcolm
29822
288
KURING, Ian Arthur
LAGALLE, Winston Archibald
LAKE, Jack William
LANCASTER, Arthur William
LANE, Arnold James
LANGRIDGE, Irwin John
LAPTHORNE, William John
3173905
37491
213825
214222
22715
1410127
28010
11.9.64– 26.9.65
WO2
15.5.64– 13.3.65
25.6.70– 30.6.71
WO2
WO2
23.9.66– 28.8.67
WO2
16.3.65– 26.2.66
18.8.66– 4.8.67
CAPT
WO2
24.5.70– 19.5.71
CPL
MBE
25.6.68– 25.6.69
CAPT
RAINF.
RAINF. 13.5.71–27.7.71, 4 RAR.
May–Jun 64, Da Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Jul–Aug 64, RF/PF Training Centre Ngoc Ho & Sep 64–Mar 65, Long Tho training centre both southwest of Hue.
Mar–Sep 65, 5th SFGA team A-102, A Shau, Thua Thien. Oct 65–Feb 66, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Sep 64–Jan 65, 5th SFGA B Team Danang. Feb–Aug 65, C Team, Danang.
Jul–Oct 70, 1/3 ARVN near Hue, 1st Division. Nov 70–Jun 71, NOTT Pleiku.
Sep 66–Mar 67, 5th SFGA team A-107, Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Apr 67, 1 Ranger Group HQ, Danang. May–Aug 67, 39th Ranger Battalion, Danang.
RAINF. 16.12.67–2.12.68, 3 RAR. Deceased 21.11.00.
RAA.
RAASC.
RAINF. 21.5.68–30.5.69, 4 RAR.
RAINF. Medevac. 27.1.69–5.3.70, 5 RAR.
Aug–Oct 66, 5th SFGA, Project Omega, B-50, RAINF. Nha Trang. Nov 66–Jan 67, Danang, Nung Coy. Feb–Jul 67, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My.
May–Jun 70, Din An Advisers’ Course. Jun– Nov 70, MATT 4, Phuoc Tuy/Long Dien/An Ngai. Dec 70–Jan 71 MATT attached JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb–May 71, MATT 4, Hoa Loi.
4 Jul–Oct 68, 2/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Nov 68–Jun 69, CSD–PRU Training Centre near Vung Tau.
14/7/05 1:04:17 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 289
KUDNIG, Franz Martin
213144
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
LATHAM, Kevin Graham
LAVELL, Alexander James
LAWLER, Frank
LAWRANCE, Brian Randall
LAWRENCE, George Henry
LAWSON, Robert Dauglas
LEAL, John Frances
61264
34042
213003
5286
23971
311297
26599
19.9.66– 22.5.67 15.7.71– 7.7.72
2.4.70– 11.3.71 21.10.65– 19.2.66 11.2.71– 26.10.71 2.4.70– 25.3.71
WO2
WO2
WO1 WO2 WO2
WO2
17.12.68– 10.12.69
WO2
MID
7.1.71– 25.11.71
WO1
Apr–May 70, Nam Hoa district, Thua Thien. Jun 70, 1st ARVN Division, Hue. Jul 70, Phu Tu District, Thua Thien. Aug 70–Mar 71, 3/3 ARVN near Hue.
Feb–Apr 71, MAT 21, Quang Ngai. May–Oct 71, 1st ARVN Division, Hue.
Oct 65–Feb 66, 4/3 ARVN, 1st Division, I Corps.
Apr–Dec 70, medical adviser, Quang Tri, Dec 70–Mar 71, Admin WO, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Jul–Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Sep 66, Police Field Force, Trai Mat Camp near Dalat.
Dec 68–May 69, platoon commander, 212 Coy, 1st Battalion & Coy 2IC, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Jun–Aug 69, 5th SFGA Recondo School, Nha Trang. Sep–Dec 69, LRRP Wing, Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Jan–Jul 71, PSDF, Baria. Aug–Nov 71, NOTT Dong Tam, IV Corps.
RAA.
RASIGS. 14.9.65–20.9.66, 527 Sig Tp.
RAINF. Medevac NBC.
RAAMC. Deceased 28.4.01.
RAINF. 26.5.65–7.6.66, 1 RAR. Deceased 4.4.04.
RAINF. Medevac NBC illness. Deceased 7.12.69.
RAINF. WIA 24.5.69, gunshot, Ben Het, north-western Kontum. Deceased 16.11.04.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:17 PM
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LARSSON, Leonard Frederick
52317
290
LEE, Ian Laurence
LEES, Ronald Victor
LEFEL, John Mari
LEGGETT, John Anthony
LENNON, Ronald
1202139
26182
134504
213146
1200661
16.7.65– 13.1.66
7.1.70– 7.1.71
19.9.66– 28.12.67
11.2.71– 28.10.71
WO2
WO2
CAPT
WO2
31.12.70– 16.12.71
20.2.71– 16.9.71
MID DSM
BDR
COL
RAA. KIA 13.1.66, between Hoi An–Mui Bong, Route 1, Quang Nam.
RAA. 23.9.70–20.2.71, 4 Fd Regt.
ASC. Visits: 22.1.63–31.1.63, 18.2.69–21.2.69, 4.3.69–13.3.69, 12.2.70–25.2.70. DSM awarded in End of War List. Deceased 4.4.91.
Feb 71, 2/6 ARVN and Mar 71, 1/6 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Apr–Aug 71, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Sep–Oct 71, 3rd ARVN Division, Quang Tri.
Sep 66–Dec 67, CSD, Case Officer, Baria. Revolutionary Development Cadres, Provincial Recon Unit, Census Grievance Teams,Vung Tau and Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF. 5.8.66–12.5.67, 1 ARU. 5.11.68–26.11.69, 9 RAR.
RAAC.
Jan–Aug 70, 3/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, RAINF. Quang Tri. Sep 70, Di An Advisers’ School. Oct–Dec 70, MATT 11, Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Sep 65, 2/6 ARVN Tien Phuoc, Quang Tin. Oct 65–Jan 66, 3/51 ARVN, Quang Nam Special Sector. Terendak Military Cemetery, Malaysia.
Mar–Apr 71, MATT 12, An Ngai. May–Jul 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Aug–Sep 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jan–Dec 71, Commander AATTV Saigon.
14/7/05 1:04:17 PM
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LEARY, Geoffrey John
648
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
LEVER, Ian Charles
LEWIS, Eric Graham
LEWIS, Warren Frederick
LIND, Owen Stephen
LING, Anthony Paul
LLOYD, Eric Manuel
LLOYD, Russell David
LOCKHART, Gregory
35751
41738
212797
38049
54506
15887
57015
235351
13.4.72– 10.12.72 19.2.72– 8.7.72 2.8.72– 18.12.72
8.10.70– 30.9.71 28.1.69– 28.1.70
WO2 CAPT WO2
LCPL LTCOL
21.9.72– 18.12.72
28.4.71– 4.2.72
WO2
CAPT
16.3.68– 11.3.69
WO2
OBE
22.10.70– 21.10.71
WO2
Sep–Dec 72, MATT 2,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
10 Feb 69–26 Jan 70, Commanding Officer, AATTV, Saigon
Oct 70–Sep 71, storeman, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Aug 72, MATT 1,Van Kiep.
Feb 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Apr–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Apr 71, unallotted, Baria. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Sep 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Oct 71–Jan 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Apr 68, unallotted, Saigon. May–Jul 68, Admin WO, Saigon. Aug 68–Feb 69, Admin WO, LRRP Wing Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Oct–Dec 70, 1/1 ARVN near Quang Tri, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jan–May 71, Admin WO Quang Tri Sector. Jun–Oct 71, PSDF, Quang Tri.
RAAOC. AEG Pl, Saigon, 19.12.72–31.3.73.
RAINF. Visits: 24.7.67–2.8.68 and 8.4.68–20.4.68.
RAINF.
RAINF. 26.5.65– 21.2.66, 1 RAR. 16.12.67–11.9.68, 3 RAR.
RAINF. M/O AAAGV. 7.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR.
RAA.
RAINF.
RASVY.
7.6.65–7.11.65, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:18 PM
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LESUEUR, Bernard Lancelot
37235
292
LONG, Barry Gerald
LORD, Donald Henry
LOUND, Edgar Darcy
LOVELOCK, Harold David
LOWE, Richard William
LUCAS, Franklyn James
54386
13604
1381
17056
53093
23420
27.4.67– 30.4.68
26.2.66– 15.2.67 11.5.67– 30.4.68 2.1.67– 5.9.67
21.10.65– 11.10.66
WO2
WO1
MAJ
WO2
WO2
19.2.68– 18.2.69
3.9.70– 2.9.71
WO2
MM
1.10.69– 1.10.70
WO2
Oct 65–Apr 66, platoon commander, Danang Nung Force, 5th SFGA. May 66, CSD,Vung Tau. Feb–May 68, platoon commander, Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. May 68, platoon commander, 212 Coy, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Aug 68–Feb 69, 5th SFGA, Recondo School, Nha Trang.
Jan–Apr 67, RF/PF Phuoc Tuy. 4 May 67, RF/PF Long Tho centre near Hue. 6 Sep 67 detached to HQ 1 ALSG, Civilian Labour Officer.
May 67–24 Jun 67, Thua Thien Sector. 25 Jun 67–Apr 68, G-3 (Training) HQ, I Corps, Danang.
Feb–Oct 66, C Team, 5th SFGA, Danang— S-4 Air. Oct 66–Feb 67, National Police Field Force, Trai Mat Training Centre, near Dalat.
29 Apr 67–Apr 68, at first with Montagnard Company and then variously company and platoon commander, 11th Coy Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Danang.
Sep–Dec 70, 2/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jan–Apr 71, MAT 21, Quang Ngai. May–Aug 71, 3/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, Dong Ha, I Corps.
Oct 69–May 70, 4/1 ARVN, Quang Tri. May 70–Sep 70, MATT 3, near Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Deceased 21.4.96.
RAINF.
RAEME.
RAINF.
Deceased 23.11.03.
RAE.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. 2.4.67–18.3.68, 7 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:18 PM
293
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LOGAN, George MacLauchlan
36649
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
LYDDIETH, Trevor
MACARTNEY, John Herbert
MACARTNEY, Milton Crawford
MACDONALD, Donald Richard
MACDONALD, James Alexander
MACKENZIE, Kenneth William
MACKENZIE, Robert Powell
26832
21038
23345
16842
53283
36373
36853
14.1.71– 28.10.71 31.7.70– 18.2.71
21.1.69– 4.2.70 19.2.66– 3.2.67 14.8.67– 10.11.67 17.11.67– 19.5.68 11.6.65– 7.2.66
2.10.64– 8.10.65 28.7.72– 8.12.72
WO2 WO2
WO2 WO1 WO2
WO2
CAPT
WO2
MATT 1,Van Kiep.
Oct 64–Oct 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, Chief General Subjects Committee.
Jun–Nov 65, RF/PF Training Centre, Long Tho near Hue. Dec 65–Feb 66, 1/3 ARVN, 1st Division, I Corps. Rookwood Crematorium, NSW. NSW Garden of Remembrance.
Aug 67–Jan 68, 2/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Dong Ha and Gio Linh areas. Feb 68, 4/2 ARVN, Quang Tri. Mar 68, hospital. Apr 68, Course, Vung Tau.
Feb 66, Hue, Thua Thien Sector.
Jan–Nov 69, A & L Coy, RF, Baria. Dec–Jan 71, VDAT,Vinh Long.
Northern Suburbs Crematorium, NSW.
Jul 70–Feb 71, MATT 6, Hoi My and Hoa Long.
Jan–Apr 71, MATT 4, An Ngai and Hoa Loi, Phuoc Tuy. May–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAAC. 2.4.67–19.12.67, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
RAA. 19.8.70–5.5.71, 4 Fd Regt.
KIA, 7.2.66, 17 km south of Quang Tri City.
RAE.
RAASC. 20.5.68–23.7.68, 1 ARU. Deceased 16.12.03.
RAE. Deceased 25.4.83.
RAASC.
RAASC. Accidentally killed Vung Tau, 18.2.71. 18.3.66–19.5.66, ALSC. 20.5.66–3.3.67 HQ AFV.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:18 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 294
LUCKMAN, Raymond Arthur
17817
294
MACPHERSON, Kevin John
MAHER, Bernard Leslie
MALONE, John Trevor
MALONE, Terence Francis
MANN, Adrian Smith
MANN, John Williamson
3789
29093
26165
27757
2285
310048
3.8.62– 21.6.63 19.11.68– 20.10.69
LTCOL
WO1
25.8.64– 19.12.65
WO2
23.7.68– 31.1.69 9.3.69– 24.10.69
14.1.71– 25.11.71
WO2
WO2
21.5.65– 5.5.66
WO2
QC
30.6.71– 3.7.72
CPL
RASIGS.
RAINF.
Nov 68, RF,Vinh Binh & Dec 68–Aug 69, RF, Kien Hoa both IV Corps. Sep–Oct 69, Admin WO AATTV Danang.
Aug 62, Deputy Commander, and Commanding Officer AATTV. US Army Training Inspection Team HQ MAAG.
Jul 68–Jan 69, 2/4th ARVN Cavalry Regt, Hoi An. Feb pre-extension leave. Mar–Apr 69, 11th ARVN Cavalry, Hoi An, Quang Nam. May–Oct 69, Thu Duc Vietnamese Armoured School, near Saigon.
Sep 64–Mar 65, Sector HQ advisory team, Danang, Quang Nam. Apr 65, 5th SFGA teams A-113 and A-103 Gia Vuc Quang Ngai.
RAINF. Medevac. Deceased November 2002.
Original Team Member. RAINF. Deceased 16.12.99.
RAAC. Son KIA, returned voluntarily. Deceased 12.10.86.
Deceased 24.3.76.
RAA.
Jan–Feb 71, MATT 11, Long Dien/Phuoc Hoa. RAA. Mar–Jul 71, MATT 3, Long Dien. Aug–Nov 5.5.69–30.5.69, HMAS 71, NOTT, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh, II Corps. staff.
Jun 65, 5th SFGA A-104 Ha Thanh, Son Ha District, Quang Ngai. Jul 65, C Team Danang, 5th SFGA. Aug 65, 5th SFGA A-107 Tra Bong. Oct–Dec 65, Dien Ban sub-sector, Quang Nam. Jan–Apr 66, 5th SFGA, Danang, Air Movements.
Jul 71,Van Kiep waiting allocation. Late Jul, MATT 6, Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71–Jun 72, MATT 2, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:18 PM
295
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MACKRILL, Royce Gordon
3176997
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MANSKI, Dennis Noel
MARGETTS, Rodney James
MARTENS, Hans Ernest
MARTIN, Andrew David
MARTIN, Edward Harrison
MARTIN, Gary Robert
MARTIN, John Desmond
175509
2792099
53595
28160
34788
28311
51724
5.3.66– 17.1.67
19.11.70– 30.9.71
2.4.72– 18.12.72 9.4.70– 7.4.71
6.8.67– 6.8.68 19.11.68– 5.11.69 19.2.72– 8.12.72 27.5.72– 18.12.72
CAPT
CPL
2LT CAPT
WO2 WO2 WO2
WO2
May–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Feb 72, JWTC,Van Kiep. Oct 72, RSM AATTV,Van Kiep.
Nov 68–May 69, 1/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Quang Nam. Jun–Oct 69,VDAT, Dinh Tuong.
Aug 67–Aug 68, medical adviser, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My.
Apr–Jun 70, 2/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Jul–Oct 70, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division near Quang Tri City. Nov 70–Mar 71, JWTC Nui Dat.
Apr–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Nov 70, Advisers School Di An. Dec 70–Feb 71, MATT 1, Binh Ba. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long. May–Sep 71, MATT 4 An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar 66, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, operations with 11th Ranger battalion. Also attached 31st Ranger battalion. August 66, RF/ PF Binh Ba.
RAINF. Wounded accidentally 3.8.72.
RAINF. 16.12.67– 5.11.68, 3 RAR. Deceased 10.3.95.
RAINF. Deceased 28.2.01.
RAAMC. Deceased 1990.
65–66, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. 6.1.69–16.3.69, 1 ARU. 18.3.69–13.5.69, 4 RAR. 14.5.69–16.6.69, HQ 1 ATF. 17.6.69–5.12.69, 9 RAR.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:18 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 296
MANSFORD, George Lyon
52028
296
MASSINGHAM, Albert Charles
MATHEWS, Norman Frank
MAVIN, Keith Henry
MCCALLUM, Malcolm Cass
MCCLOSKEY, Aleck Bruce
MCCLYMANS, Dennis Arthur
36695
5316
213262
311452
29779
52316
16.3.68– 9.9.68 3.2.66– 17.1.67 13.8.69– 13.8.70
12.9.67– 10.9.68 2.7.69– 29.6.70
DCM
MID
WO2
WO2 WO2
CAPT
WO2
WO2
27.8.67– 20.8.68
27.8.67– 20.8.68
CAPT
RAINF. WIA 24.6.70, Thua Thien, casevac. 19.4.66–12.5.67, 5 RAR. Deceased 5.12.83.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 22.8.68, mortar, Hill 10, west of Quang Ngai, Medevac.
Aug 67, company commander, Mike Force, B-50, 5th SFGA, Nha Trang. 10 Nov 67–Mar 68, company commander, 22nd Coy, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Apr–Aug 68, Training Officer, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
Jul 69–Mar 70, platoon commander, 223 Company, 2nd Mike Force Battalion, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Apr–Jun 70, Training Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
Deceased 29.7.80.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 17.1.70, grenade. Deceased 17.5.96.
Sep 67–Mar 68, company commander 16th RAINF. Company, Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. Apr–Sep 68, HQ 1st ARVN Division, S-3, Hue.
Aug–Oct 69, platoon commander, 223 Company, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Nov 69–Jan 70, company commander, 2 MSF. Feb–Aug 70, 4/3 ARVN near Hue, 1st Division.
Feb–Jun 66, Admin WO, Saigon. Jul 66, 3/1 ARVN, 1st ARVN Division, Quang Tri.
Mar–May 68, 2/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Jun–Aug 68, 4/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai.
Aug 67–Feb 68, HQ AATTV, Adjutant. RAA. Mar–Aug 68, G-3 (Ops), HQ I Corps, Danang. Attached Mike Force Danang 11–18 March 68.
14/7/05 1:04:19 PM
297
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MASON-JONES, Nicoll
54422
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MCCOURT, John Sutherland
MCDERMOTT, Michael Keith
MCDONAGH, Charles Lindsay
MCDONALD, Bruce Thomas
MCDONALD, Keith Francis
52385
235352
28358
44675
27583
26.7.63– 9.7.64
2.6.71– 2.12.71 7.6.63– 12.2.64 21.2.64– 5.11.64 30.6.71– 3.7.72 11.8.64– 10.6.65
SGT
CAPT
CAPT
CPL WO2
31.7.70– 29.7.71
7.1.71– 26.10.71
WO2
Aug 64–Jan 65, 1/5 Battalion, 2nd ARVN Div, Quang Nam. Feb–May 65, Admin WO HQ 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Nam. Aug–Sep 70, Lam Son, NTC, Duc My. Oct 70–Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jul 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. Aug 71–Jun 72, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep.
Jun 63–Oct 64, Administrative Officer, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Jun 71, HQ 2nd Division, TOC, Quang Ngai. Jul–Nov 71, 5th ARVN Regt, Tam Ky, Quang Tin.
Jul–Nov 63, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Oct 63, visited forward artillery troop positions Quang Nam. Dec 63 temporary duty, Saigon, HQ. Jan 64 Hiep Khanh Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Feb 64, 1st SFG A-224 An Diem, Quang Nam. Mar–Jun 64 detached to 7th SFG A-726 Tarau (Nam Dong), Quang Nam.
Jan 71, unallotted MATT. Feb–Apr 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc. May–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
5.11.67–29.10.68, HQ 1 ATF.
RAINF.
RAAMC. Deceased 1997.
RAASC.
RAINF. 8.8.69–18.12.69, 1 ARU. 5.9.69–10.3.70, 5 RAR.
WIA 20.3.64, panji stake into foot.
RAINF.
RAINF. 18.4.67–26.4.68, 7 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:19 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 298
MCCOOMBE, Eric Lindsay
15979
298
MCEVOY, Christopher Norman
MCEWAN– FERGUSON, John
MCFADDEN, Warwick Martin
MCFADZEAN, James Hughes
42374
27467
212870
6420 23.4.65– 22.3.66
WO2
25.8.64– 10.6.65
23.9.66– 12.9.67
QC
WO2
WO2
25.5.67– 19.11.68
WO2
26.11.69– 27.11.70
14.8.64– 22.8.65
CAPT
WIA 6.4.68, mortar– artillery fire north of Dong Ha.
RAINF.
21.2.67–4.3.67,Visit.
RAE.
Apr–Jul 65, Nung Training, 5th SFGA C Team, Danang. Aug–Sep 65, 5th SFGA team A-107, Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Oct 65–Mar 66, company commander Nung Force, Danang.
Sep 66–Mar 67, RF/PF Phuoc Tuy. Feb–May 67, 2/6 AVRN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Jun–Sep 67, 5th SFGA, platoon commander, 11 MSF Coy, Danang.
26.2.68–24.2.69, 2 SAS Sqn. Deceased 21.9.04.
RAINF.
RAINF. 26.5.65–18.8.65, 1 RAR.
Sep–Nov 64, Quang Nam Sector. Nov 64–Feb RAE. 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, General Subjects & Weapons Committees. Mar 65, Recon Coy, 1st ARVN Division. Apr 65, 1st ARVN Div Engr Coy and attached 1st ARVN 4.5.67–23.4.68, HQ Division Engineer Battalion, Quang Tri. AFV.
27 May 67–Jan 68, platoon commander, 14th Company, 5th SFGA, Mike Force, Danang. Feb 68–Apr 68, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Gio Linh–Dong Ha area, Quang Tri. May–Nov 68, RF/PF,Vinh Binh, IV Corps. Nov 69–Mar 70,VDAT,Vinh Binh. Apr–Jun 70, RF Training, DIOCC representative, Din Tuong. Jul 70, NOAT, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong. Aug–Nov 70, DIOCC, Din Thuong. District Intelligence Committee, IV Corps.
Aug 64, Dong Da, National Training Centre, Chief General Subjects Committee. Sep 64– Aug 65, CSD Vung Tau, Psychological Warfare Centre.
14/7/05 1:04:19 PM
299
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MCDOWELL, Donald William
212766
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MCGEE, Gregory Francis
MCGEECHAN, Mervyn Leonard
MCGLASHAN, Lachlan
MCGRATH, Brian Francis
MCGRELLIS, Patrick Brian
MCGURGAN, Bernard Francis
MCILWRAITH, Bruce
2949
12576
41600
37738
51451
216493
242946
25.3.70– 25.3.71
19.9.66– 12.9.67
WO2
11.2.71– 4.8.72
WO2
CAPT
27.4.67– 30.4.68
WO2
11.6.65– 15.5.66
11.6.65– 6.11.65
WO2
WO2
7.5.65– 29.4.66
WO1
MID
1.8.64– 10.7.65
WO2
Sep 66–Feb 67, RF/PF Quang Nam. 23 Feb– Sep 67 Admin WO, Saigon.
Mar–Aug 70, 1/51 ARVN, Quang Nam, Hill 55, near Dai Loc. Sep–Dec 70, OC NOTT and NOAT Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong. Jan–Mar 71, OC, Night Advisory Team, Bac Lieu.
Jun–Nov 65, 1/3 ARVN, Hue, 1st Division. Dec 65–May 66, RF/PF Long Tho, near Hue.
Feb–Mar 71, 1/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Apr 71, MAT 23, Quang Ngai. May 71, 54th ARVN, near Hue. Jun–Jul 71, 4/54 Hue. Aug–Nov 71, 54th Regt, Hue. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Dec 67–Apr 68, A & L Company, Financial Adviser, Baria.
Jun–Oct 65, RF/PF Gio Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri.
May 65, ARVN battalion, Quang Tin. Jul–Aug 65, Tam Ky Sector, Quang Tin. Oct 65, CSD, Vung Tau. Dec 65–Feb 66, CSD, Dalat. Mar– Apr 66, National Police Field Force Training Centre near Dalat.
Aug–Dec 64, 5th SFGA, B Team, Danang. Jan 65, CSD Ban Me Thuot.
RAASC.
RAINF. WIA 8.4.70.
RAINF. Deceased 30.10.03.
3.6.65–5.6.66, 1 RAR. 9.11.68–17.6.69, 9 RAR.
RAINF.
RAASC. Deceased 15.11.90.
RAINF. Medevac. Deceased 21.12.00.
RAINF.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:20 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 300
MCGARRY, Lawrence George
26988
300
MCINTOSH, Lee Francis
MCKENNA, John
MCKENNER, John Francis
MCKEOWN, Ian Geoffrey
MCLAUGHLIN, Sidney James
MCLAUGHLIN, William Millen
MCLEAN. Trevor Anthony
17917
1201844
38124
335054
216917
2789318
213777
2.4.70– 31.3.71 9.7.70– 23.6.71
11.2.71– 18.11.71 30.7.69– 9.7.70 20.3.64– 2.3.65
3.4.69– 11.3.70 8.4.71– 13.5.72
2.4.67– 19.3.68
WO2
WO2
BDR WO2 MAJ
WO2
CAPT
WO2
6 Apr 67–Feb 68, 5th SFGA, MSF, S–4, Company C, Danang.
Apr–Aug 71, Phuoc Tuy Sector, Baria. Sep 71, OC NOTT 1 Bac Lieu. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–May 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Apr 69, 5th SFGA, Combat Orientation Course, Nha Trang. May 69–Mar 70, Training Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
March–Nov 64, Dong Da National Training Centre. Dec 64–Feb 65, HQ I Corps, Danang, G-3 and Liaison Officer Australian Advisers 1st and 2nd ARVN Divisions.
Aug 69–Jun 70, 2/3 ARVN, Hue, Thua Thien.
Feb 71, Di An course. Mar–Aug 71, MATT 2, Dat Do. Sep–Nov 71, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau.
Jul–Nov 70, MATT 4, Long Dien/An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy. Dec 70–Jan 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long. Feb 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Mar–Jun 71, NOTT 2, Dong Tam.
Apr–Oct 70, 4th ARVN Regt Recce Coy, Quang Ngai. 11.7.70–6.8.70 Hospital. Nov 70–Mar 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
RAASC.
RAA. 27.5.69–26.6.69, 1 Fd Regt. 27.6.69–7.10.69, 1 ARU. 8.10.69–8.3.70, 1 Fd Regt. 9.3.70–4.6.70, 4 Fd Regt.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. Deceased 28.7.02.
RAA.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 18.4.70, panji stake, Quang Ngai.
14/7/05 1:04:20 PM
301
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 301
MCINERNEY, William John
14423
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MCNAMARA, John Chester
MCNAMARA, Russell George
MCNEE, Thomas
MCNEILL, Ian Graham
MCPHAIL, Ian Stuart
14400
2270
5745
335073
37153
28.6.63– 19.5.64
LTCOL
19.9.66– 5.9.67 29.10.69– 12.3.70 14.8.65– 7.8.66 5.8.71– 6.8.72
WO2
MAJ
WO2
6.12.65– 15.2.66
5.8.71– 5.11.71 20.12.71– 6.8.72
WO2
OBE
27.8.70– 26.8.71
CPL
Visit, 4.4.66–13.4.66. Deceased 19.5.92.
RAINF.
RAINF. 5.11.71–19.12.71, HQ AFV.
RAINF. 3.6.69–5.6.69, HQ AFV. 6.6.69–14.7.69, 1 ARU. 15.7.69–14.1.70, 6 RAR/NZ.
Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Sep–Nov 71, 3rd ARVN Division, Quang Tri. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–May 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Aug 65–Jul 66, G–3, HQ I Corps, Danang.
16.12.67–19.11.68, 3 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. 21.11.62– 27.11.62,Visit. Deceased 3.10.98.
RASIGS. Sep 66–Mar 67, Phuoc Tuy, RF/PF team. 22 Mar–Aug 67, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien. Medevac illness. Nov 69–Feb 70, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien.
Deputy Commander, and Commanding Officer AATTV, Saigon. Also Adviser Org & Training Division (US). 6.12.65–13.2.66, Deputy Commander, and Commanding Officer AATTV, Saigon.
Aug–Sep 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71, HQ AATTV Vung Tau. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Jul 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Sep 70–Apr 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy. May–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:20 PM
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MCMILLAN, Kevin Roy
2788395
302
MCRAE, John Alexander
MCTAGGART, Kevin John
MEAD, David John
MELLIER, Roy Charles
METHERALL, Murray Stanley
METZROTH,Vincent Frederick
23465
18251
1201164
2230015
35455
13563
15.7.71– 31.8.72 30.9.71– 22.6.72 30.6.71– 28.10.71 29.1.68– 28.6.68 11.2.71– 7.1.72
CAPT CAPT BDR CAPT
WO2
20.8.68– 30.7.69
1.8.64– 10.6.65
WO2
MID
18.8.70– 4.3.71
CAPT
Feb–Dec 71, Admin WO AATTV Saigon.
Feb–Jun 68, Adjutant AATTV Saigon.
Jul–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Oct 71–May 72, JWTC,Van Kiep. To AAAGV 23.6.72.
Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep.
Sep 64–Feb 65,Van Thanh Training Centre. Mar 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Aug 68–Feb 69, 1/3 ARVN PK 17 near Hue, 1st Division. Mar–Jul 69, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien.
Aug–Sep 70, Adjutant, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Oct 70–Feb 71, 2/1 ARVN, Quang Tri, 1st Division.
RAINF.
RAAEC. 2.7.68–21.1.69, HQ AFV.
RAA.
RAINF. 27.1.69– 11.7.69, 5 RAR.
RAINF. 19.5.67– 26.6.68, 2 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. 16.6.66– 20.12.66, HQ AFV (LO) AATTV from Jun to Oct 66. 21.12.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR. 7.1.70–17.8.70, HQ AFV Saigon.
14/7/05 1:04:21 PM
303
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 303
MCQUIRE, Ian William
2178342
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MILLER, Eric Francis
MILLER, Kevin Thomas
MILLER, Ronald Frederick
MILLETT, Peter John
MILLIE, David Raymond
MILLINGTON, Graeme Leslie
28886
15630
218662
423360
335123
54211
3.9.70– 2.9.71 30.8.71– 24.2.72
14.5.68– 7.5.69
BDR
CPL
MAJ
7.1.71– 25.11.71
26.7.72– 4.12.72
WO2
WO2
7.5.65– 29.4.66
WO2
MBE
19.11.69– 3.12.69 13.1.70– 9.7.70
SGT
Jan 71, unallotted MATT MR III. Feb–Apr 71, MATT 9, Phuoc Loi, Phuoc Tuy. May–Jul 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. Aug–Nov 71, 20th Tank Sqn instructor, Quang Tri.
May 68, Quang Tri Sector near Quang Tri City. Jun–Aug 68, Adviser District Chief, Mai Linh, Quang Tri. Sep–Apr 68, S-3, Quang Tri Sector.
Sep 71–Feb 72, HQ AATTV Saigon.
Sep 70, unallotted MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 9, Phuoc Loi. May–Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
May–Sep 1/4 ARVN, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai. Oct 65–Apr 66, RF/PF Hoi An subsector, Quang Nam.
Nov 69, pre-extension leave. Jan–Jun 70, platoon commander, 1st Battalion, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
RAAC. 11.2.68–17.6.68, C Sqn 1 Armd. 18.6.68–19.8.68, FWD Del Tp. 20.8.68–21.2.69, A Sqn, 3 Cav.
RAINF.
RAINF. Medevac. 4.11.68–26.4.69, 9 RAR. 2.5.69–9.12.69, 9 RAR.
RAA.
RAINF. 8.6.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
RAINF. WIA 8.9.65. 17.11.69–12.11.70, 8 RAR.
RAINF. WIA 18.5.70. 4.11.68–19.11.69, 9 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:21 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 304
MILLER, Allan John
364459
304
11.6.69– 2.12.69
30.4.69– 30.4.70 22.12.70– 2.12.71
MOFFITT, Frank Mitchell WO2
CAPT CPL
MOGRIDGE, Anthony John
MOLDRE, Urmas
14000
43089
216281
RAEME. 19.4.66–8.5.67, 101 Fd Wksp. Deceased March 2003.
RAINF.
Dec 70–Nov 71, Linguist, Phuoc Tuy Sector/ MATT, Baria.
May 69–Apr 70, 2/6 ARVN, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Ngai.
Jun–69, company commander 223 Company, 2nd Battalion and Jun–Nov 69, coy comd 211 Company 1st Battalion, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF B20, Pleiku. Apr 70, attached Quang Tri RF/PF orientation. May 70, MATT 4, Phuoc Tuy. Jun 70, MATT 3, Phuoc Tuy. Jul 70, attached MATT 2, Dat Do. Aug 70, MATT 2.
RAINF. 2.6.68–28.8.68, Visit.
RAINF.
9.5.67–21.5.68, 2 RAR.
WIA 12.11.69, Bu Prang area, Medevac.
RAINF.
Apr–May 68, platoon commander, Company C, RAINF. 5th SFGA, Danang. Jun 68, 3/6 ARVN Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Jul–Feb 68, LRRP Wing,Van Kiep, Deceased 12.9.86. Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF. 14 Feb 66–1 May 66, Deputy Commander, and Commanding Officer AATTV Saigon. May 66–Feb 67, Commanding Officer AATTV, Deceased 18.12.93. Saigon.
Jul 70–Jan 71, 3/54 ARVN, Phu Loc, Thua Thien. Feb–Jun 71, Phuoc Tuy Sector, Chieu Hoi adviser, Baria.
Jun–Sep 63, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, near Hue.
Sep 66–Sep 67, Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:21 PM
305
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 305
24.4.70– 1.10.70
30.4.68– 4.3.69
WO2
MITCHELL, Kevin Joseph
34067
3.2.66– 28.2.67
LTCOL
MILNER, Andrew John
628
25.6.70– 23.6.71
WO2
MILLS, Robert Edward
29352
7.6.63– 10.10.63
WO2
MILLS, Colin Christmas
1337
19.9.66– 12.9.67
WO2
MILLISS, Leslie George
213059
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MONK, James Colin
MONKHOUSE, Ronald Albert
MOODY, James Carleton
MOON, Oliver Charles
214411
41217
12587
15277
24.5.70– 26.5.71
25.8.64– 6.8.65
3.7.64– 12.7.65
3.9.70– 23.6.71
CPL
WO2
WO2
CPL
MID
7.4.64– 4.4.65
LTCOL
RAINF. NBC 26.7.70, shrapnel. 7.6.65–8.6.66, 1 RAR. 17.11.69–3.6.70, 8 RAR. Deceased 23.6.91.
Deceased 7.4.97.
RAAC.
Sep 70 unallotted MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 14, Long Dien. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF. 21.5.68–15.5.69, 4 RAR. 16.5.69–4.6.69, HQ AFV. 1.7.69–8.10.69, 1 ARU. 9.10.69–17.1.70, HQ 1 ALSG.
Jul–Dec 64, Dong Da National Training Centre RAINF. near Phu Bai, Thua Thien, General Subjects and Tactics Committees. Jan–Jul 65, 3/6 ARVN, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Ngai. Deceased 25.7.82.
Sep–Nov 64, 7th SFG team A-728 and 1st SFG RAINF. team A-322, Kham Duc western Quang Tin. 20 Dec 64–Mar 65, 5th SFGA C-1 Team Danang, Assistant S-3 Air. Apr–30 Jul 65, 5th SFGA C-1 Hospital Nha Trang Team Danang, Adjutant Nung Reaction Force. 6–17.12.64, illness.
May 70, MATT 4, Phuoc Tuy. Jun 70–Feb 71, MATT 3, Baria/Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy. Mar– May 71, MATT 14, Long Lieu/An Ngai.
Apr–Aug 64, Deputy Commander, and Commanding Officer AATTV, Saigon. Sep 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Senior Adviser.
14/7/05 1:04:22 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 306
MONAGHAN, John Graham
1117
306
MORGAN, Denis Noel
MORRIS, Alec Henry
MORRIS, Antony James
MORRISON, Edward John
MORRISON, Lawrence Ivan
3411003
12840
6709468
31967
29273
WO2
25.9.64– 11.6.65
WO1
21.1.69– 18.5.69
18.11.65– 1.11.66
17.12.68– 10.7.69
16.6.71– 16.12.71
2LT Bar DCM
5.8.64– 12.7.65
WO2
15.4.66– 3.4.67
5.8.71– 6.8.72
WO2 DCM
23.4.66– 12.4.67
WO2
Nov 65–Oct 66, RF/PF Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam. Jan–Mar 69, 1/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Mar–May 69, RF/PF Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam.
Sep–Dec 64, 3/3 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tin. Jan 65, Dong Da National Training Centre detached to 1st Division. Feb 65, Dong Da, demonstration platoon & admin duties. Mar– May 65, Dong Da, RSM. Dec 68, 2/6 ARVN Tam Ky, Quang Tin. 2nd Division. Jan 69, 1/5 ARVN Danang. Feb–May 69, 1/5 ARVN Quang Ngai & Tam Ky. Jun 69, 1/51 ARVN, Quang Nam.
Jun–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Nov 71, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Aug–Oct 64, 7th SFG A-726 Ta Ko, western Quang Nam. Nov–Dec 64, 1st SFG A-122 Gia Vuc, southwest Quang Ngai. Jan–Mar 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Jungle, Mountain, Swamp School. Apr–Jul 65, 5th SFGA C Team Danang–Nung Training. Apr 66–Apr 67, 5th SFGA, Danang.
Aug–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71, MATT 2, Baria.
Apr–May 66, RF/PF Long Tho near Hue. Feb 67, 2/51 ARVN Regiment, Quang Nam.
WIA 11.5.69, enemy grenade, Medevac.
RAINF.
Deceased 19.9.99.
RAINF. WIA 8.12.64, grenade. Hospital Nha Trang. Medevac.
RASIGS.
17.11.69–29.6.70, 8 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. 8.5.67–14.5.68, 2 RAR.
RAINF. Deceased 10.1.01.
14/7/05 1:04:22 PM
307
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 307
MORAN, Keith
21771
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MOYLE, Robert John
MUIR, Bazil Ivor
MUIR, Maxwell Robert
MULLIGAN, Kevin Wayne
MULLINS, Trevor Paul
47020
33193
61567
61764
218923
5.8.71– 6.8.72 5.10.63– 10.12.64
3.9.70– 2.9.71 7.5.70– 5.5.71
22.6.72– 2.12.72 19.11.70– 28.10.71
WO2
CAPT
WO1
WO2
CPL BDR
Nov 70, Advisers School Di An. Dec 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba. Jan–Apr 71, MATT 2, Dat Do. May–Jul 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Aug 71, AATTV Saigon.
Jun 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
May–Jun 70, RQMS, AATTV,Vung Tau. Jul– Aug 70, Admin WO, Can Tho. Sep 70, Admin WO AATTV Danang. Oct 70, MATT 12 Long Le, Phuoc Tuy. Nov 70, attached JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb–Apr 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long.
Sep–Oct 70, 2/4 ARVN and Nov 70, 4/4 ARVN, both Quang Ngai. Dec 70–Aug 71, Admin WO AATTV, Danang.
Oct 63–Sep 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Chief Weapons Committee and Tactics Committee. Nov 63, observed TF 100 operations north of Hiep Khanh. Oct–Nov 64 attached 4th Armoured Regiment.
Aug–Nov 71, NOTT 2 Dong Tam. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
RAA.
RAAMC. 8.2.69– 10.3.70, 5 RAR.
RAINF. 3.5.67–2.4.68, HQ 1 ATF. 6.5.70–7.5.70, 1 ARU. Deceased no date.
RAINF.
RAAC.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:22 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 308
MORROW, Brian
13038
308
MURPHY, John Matthew
335048
MAJ
WO1
28.8.63– 17.9.64
25.3.69– 4.3.70 1.4.70– 22.10.70
23.4.66– 24.3.67
4.7.72– 2.12.72
23.7.68– 23.7.69 26.8.69– 11.2.70 10.3.70– 9.9.70
11.9.64– 12.9.65
Aug 63–Jan 64, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, senior Australian adviser, Operations officer (S-3). Feb–Apr 64, USSF B team Danang. May–Sep 64, SF HQ, Nha Trang.
Apr 66, HQ Ranger Group, I Corps, Quang Nam. Aug 66, Hospital Danang, then 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Admin WO, Saigon. Apr 69–Feb 70, Admin WO, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Apr–Sep 70, Admin WO, AATTV, Danang.
Sep 64–Jun 65, 1st SFG team A-113 then 5th SFGA team A5/334 A Shau later A-102, Thua Thien. Jul–Sep 65, C Team, Danang. Jul 68, RD Cadre Training, Chuong Tien. Aug 68, RD Cadre,Vin Binh. Sep 68–Feb 70, RD Cadre, Can Tho. Mar 70, RD Cadre, Can Tho. Apr 70,VDAT, Vinh Long. Aug–Sep 70,VDAT,Vinh Binh Sector. Jul–Sep 72, Long Hai Training Battalion. Oct– Nov 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
RAINF. 16.6.66–25.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn.Visits: 10.11.67–16.11.67, 26.3.68–1.4.68, 17.12.68–21.12.68, 3.7.69–7.7.69, 14.11.69– 19.11.69, 4.6.70–11.6.70 & 21.1.71–4.2.71. Deceased 29.7.92.
WIA 30.5.70, Quang Nam. Deceased 20.3.87.
RAINF.
RASIGS.
14/7/05 1:04:23 PM
309
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 309
MUNT, Gordon Selwyn
MUNRO, Geoffrey Ernest WO2
24466
212744
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MURRELL, Leslie Thomas
MUSGRAVE, Marvin John
MUSGROVE, Robert Victor
MYERS, Kenneth Noel
NEAGLE, Robert Anthony
54324
335093
335127
213556
4587
10.1.66– 1.11.66
31.7.70– 29.7.71 19.2.65– 7.2.66
28.4.71– 2.4.72
28.4.71– 14.8.71
31.7.70– 14.6.71
CAPT
WO2
MAJ
MAJ
CPL
WO2
RAINF.Visit, 7.1.64– 16.1.64. 18.11.69–14.5.70, 8 RAR. 15.5.70–17.9.70, HQ AFV.
Aug 70–Mar 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh. Apr–Jun 71, Admin WO, AATTV Danang.
Apr 71, unallotted, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. May–Jul 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy.
Apr 71, Baria, Phuoc Tuy Sector. May–Sep 71, Territorial Security Adviser, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71–Mar 72, RF/PF Adviser Phuoc Tuy.
Feb 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, Thua Thien. Mar–Sep 65, senior Australian adviser, Dong Da. Oct 65–Jan 66, Nam Hoa and Huong Thuy sub-sectors, Thua Thien.
RAINF. Medevac.
RAINF. 15.8.71– 20.12.71, 4 RAR. Deceased November 1996.
18.3.66–4.6.67, HQ AAFV/AFV.
RAAC.
RAINF.
Aug–Oct 70, 29th Ranger Battalion, near RAINF. Danang. Nov 70–Jul 71, 37th Ranger Battalion, 2.3.67–2.8.67, 1 SAS near Danang. Sqn.
Jan 66, National Training Centre, Dong Da. Feb 66, Asst S-3, HQ 5th SFGA, Nha Trang. May–Oct 66, Nung Force, Danang.
14/7/05 1:04:23 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 310
MURPHY,Vincent Noel
36075
310
NELSON, John Peter
NESBIT, William Alexander
NESBITT, Adrian Galvin
NEVILLE, Daniel John
43310
53045
235180
11448
18.7.65– 22.11.66 9.8.63– 10.12.64
CAPT
WO2
6.12.66– 4.6.68
3.9.70– 2.9.71
WO2
DCM
14.5.69– 14.5.70
20.8.68– 13.8.69
21.10.65– 19.9.66
CAPT
WO2
17 Aug 63–21 Jul 64, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Basic Ranger Training, Unit Training. Nov 63 temporary attached Ranger Training Unit, Trung Lap near Cu Chi. Aug–Nov 64, 5th SFGA, A-113, A team A Shau, western region Thua Thien. Jan–Nov 67, 5th SFGA, B-50 ready reaction element, battalion XO, Nha Trang. Nov 67– Mar 68, company commander, 26th Coy, MSF, B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Apr–May 68, Training Officer, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku.
Jul 65–Nov 66, CSD–CIA, Saigon. Operated in Kien Phong & Kien Tuong provinces, IV Corps.
Sep 70–Jan 71, 4/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Feb–Aug 71, HQ, 2nd ARVN Division, Sensor Adviser.
May–Jun 69, G–3 Ops, HQ I Corps, Danang. Jul–Sep 69, 2nd ARVN Division TOC, Quang Ngai. Oct 69–Feb 70, 1/4 ARVN, 2nd Division. Mar–May 70, attached HQ, I Corps, Danang.
Oct 65–Mar 66, 2/1 ARVN, 1st ARVN Division, Quang Tri. Apr–Sep 66, 5th SFGA, Nung Force, Danang. Aug–Dec 68, 1/6 ARVN, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai. Jan–Feb 69, 54th Regiment, Hue. Mar– Apr 69, Regimental Recon Coy, 54th Regt, Hue. May–Aug 69, 2/54 ARVN, Hue.
Deceased 3.9.81.
10.2.70–10.3.71, 7 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. Deceased 12.10.87.
RAA.
RAINF. 19.4.66–11.12.66, 5 RAR. Deceased 1987.
WIA 22.9.68.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:23 PM
311
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 311
NEITZ, Graham Charles
17692
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
NICHOLLS, James Thomas
NICHOLSON, Laurence Percy
NIELSON, Gordon Lawrence
NOBLE, William John
NOLAN. John Edward
NORRIS, Maxwell ThomasJ
210125
5680
17738
35974
37939
216405
24.4.70– 21.4.71 30.4.66– 12.4.67 20.7.72– 2.12.72 19.11.70– 18.11.71
12.3.72– 18.12.72 9.4.68– 2.4.69
WO2 WO2 WO2
WO2 MAJ
15.7.71– 17.7.72
23.9.66– 31.8.67
WO2
WO2
Apr 68–Oct 68, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien. Nov 68–Mar 69, Coordinator Phoenix Programme Hue.
Mar–Nov, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Nov 70–May 71, 3/17th ARVN Cavalry Regiment, Hoi An, Quang Nam. Jun–Jul 71, 2/17th ARVN Cav, Duong Son, south of Danang, Quang Nam. Aug–Nov 71, 20th Tank Sqn instructor, Quang Tri.
Jul–Nov 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
May 66, Hospital Saigon. Unit not known, Quang Tri then RF/PF Phuoc Tuy.
Apr 70–Oct 70, 3/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Nov 70–Apr 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Sep 66–Mar 67, commander 2 CRP platoon, 5th SFGA, Mike Force Danang. Apr–Aug 67, S-3, B-50, Ready Reaction Coy, Nha Trang. Jul–Sep 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Oct 71–Apr 72, MATT 1, Baria. May 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
AUST INT.
RAAMC. 12.4.67–16.4.68, 1 ARU.
Deceased 2000.
RAAC.
RAINF. 7.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
RAA. WIA 23.5.70, Quang Tin. Deceased 7.12.91.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:24 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 312
NICHOLAS, Edward Allen
3166072
312
O’DONNELL, John Matthew
O’HARA, Raymond Arthur
OLIVER, Raymond Ivan
O’NEILL, Barry Joseph
O’NEILL, Terence Anthony
34922
36680
28916
28413
311615
30.7.69– 9.7.70 22.6.67– 18.6.68
WO2
WO2
7.1.71– 16.12.71 26.8.72– 18.12.72
MAJ
CPL
26.11.69– 27.11.70
21.1.69– 28.1.70
WO2
MM
6.2.68– 24.9.69
WO2
NBC 12.9.68. WIA 20.8.69, mortar, Quang Tin. Deceased 11.7.98.
RAE.
Aug–Dec 72,Vehicle Mechanic, HQ AATTV, Van Kiep.
Jan–Feb 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Mar 71, Baria, Phuoc Tuy Sector. 12 Apr 71–Jul 71, DSA, Long Le. Aug–Dec 71, DSA, Xuyen Moc.
Jun–Oct 67, 3/5 ARVN Tam Ky, 2nd Division. Nov 67–Jun 68, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. 8 Dec 69–Mar 70,VDAT, Phong Dinh, IV Corps. Apr–Nov 70, 4/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri.
Aug–Dec 69, 4/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division. Jan–Mar 70,VDAT, Kien Hoa. Apr– Jun 70, RF Training, Dinh Tuong, IV Corps.
RAEME.
RAA.
WIA 16.2.70, Phong Dinh.
RAASC.
WIA 6.1.70.
RAINF.
Jan–Sep 69, Cam Lo sub-sector, Quang Tri. Oct RAAOC. 69–Jan 70, Admin WO, AATTV, Danang.
Feb–Mar 68, S-4, Company C, 5th SFGA, Danang. Apr 68, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam. May 68–Feb 69, 2/5 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Mar–May 69, Trieu Phong sub-sector, Quang Tri. Jun–Sep 69, 4/5 ARVN Tam Ky, 2nd Division.
14/7/05 1:04:24 PM
313
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 313
O’BRIEN, Ronald John
52495
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
OSBORN, Leslie Daniel
OSTARA, Ernest Barrington
52506
21406
MM
DCM
WO2
WO1
CAPT
29.7.67– 24.7.70
10.11.64– 10.7.66
22.5.67– 5.2.68 20.10.69– 8.7.71
25.8.64– 24.7.65
16.4.70– 21.4.71
12.5.66– 15.10.68
7.10.66–14.5.67, HQ 1 ALSG. 24.6.69–20.10.69, 1 Aust CA Unit. Deceased 14.8.99.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. Nov 64–Jan 65, Dong Da Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Feb 65–Jun 66, CSD,Vung Tau. 1 Aug 67–Mar 68, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien. Apr 68, PRU, Pleiku Base. May 68, PRU, Dalat, Binh Thuan. Jun 68–Mar 1970, PRU, stationed Qui Nhon. Apr 70, RF/PF Admin WO Baria. May 70, RF/PF Admin,Vung Tau. Jun–Jul 70, Admin WO, HQ AATTV Vung Tau.
Aug 64–Feb 65, Admin WO, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Mar 65–Jul 65, 1/3 ARVN, 1st Division, I Corps. May–Oct 67, RF/PF, Quang Da Special Zone, Hoi An. Nov 67–Jan 68, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Oct 69–Jun 71, Revolutionary Development Cadre, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
May 66, CSD, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. 4 Feb–Jul 67, Trail Watch/Provincial Recon Units, Kontum, Darlac, Quang Duc, Pleiku. Aug–Sep attached Market Time patrol, Danang. 26 Sep–Oct leave, Nov 67–2 Sep 68, CSD, PRU Training Centre,Vung Tau. 4 Sep–Oct 68, Rung Sat Special Zone, PRU. Apr–May 70, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jun 70, MATT 3, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. Feb 71, MATT 3, Long Dien. Mar–Apr 71, Phuoc Tuy Sector.
14/7/05 1:04:24 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
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OPIE, Leonard Murray
439150
314
PALMER, Donald Maxwell
PALMER, Frank Edwin
PARFITT, Leslie Lloyd
PARKER, Donald Gordon
PARKER, Russell Arnold
PARRELLO, Antonio
PARRY, Winston Oliver
14999
43719
1735548
42937
26575
36337
16704
MID
CAPT
19.11.68– 1.1.69 4.9.67– 1.2.68
WO2 WO2
5.5.70– 26.11.70
29.10.69– 9.10.70
WO2
CPL
14.1.71– 26.10.71
CPL
MID
7.10.65– 8.1.66 28.1.70– 9.12.70
MID
WO2
1.7.67– 18.6.68
1.7.68– 17.12.68
CAPT
May–Nov 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy.
Sep–Dec 67, RF/PF Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy. Jan 68, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, Baria District, Phuoc Tuy. Botany Cemetery, NSW.
Nov–Dec 68, 30th ARVN Artillery Battalion, Quang Nam.
Nov 69–May 70, 1/54 ARVN, Phu Loc, Thua Thien. Jun–Oct 70, NOAT/NOTT, Dinh Tuong, IV Corps.
Jan–Oct 71, Mess Supervisor, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jul–Nov 67, S-2, 5th SFGA, B-50, Project Omega, Nha Trang. Dec 67–Jun 68, Operations Officer Company B, MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku.
Oct–Dec 65, 5th SFGA A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Feb–Apr 70, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. May 70, MATT 4 RF Company Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Dec 70, MATT 4, Long Dien/An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Dec 68, Commander Mobile Training Team, Montagnard, PRU Pleiku, II Corps area.
RAINF. 17.11.69– 3.5.70, 8 RAR. 19.5.67–9.1.68, 2 RAR.
KIA, Baria 1.2.68.
RAINF.
RAA.
RAINF. 26.5.65–11.6.66, 1 RAR.
AACC.
AUST INT.
Medevac, broken leg.
RAINF.
RAINF. HQ AFV, 24.10.67–5.6.68. Deceased 25.3.98.
14/7/05 1:04:25 PM
315
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 315
PALMER, Brian William
143781
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
PASHEN, James Edward
PATCH, Harold Edward
PAUL, David Frederick
PAVLENKO, Paul Joseph
PAXTON, George Edward
11359
23561
235220
2411062
41942
16.4.66– 2.5.67 1.8.64– 10.6.65
WO1
WO2
26.5.69– 14.5.70
28.5.70– 26.5.71 25.6.70– 23.6.71
CAPT
WO2
WO2
23.7.68– 7.4.69
19.11.70– 30.9.71
BDR
Jul–Oct 70, 5/54 ARVN, Phu Loc, Thua Thien. Nov 70–Jan 71, MATT JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb– Jun 71, MATT 5, Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy.
May 70–May 71, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My.
Jun–Sep 69, 3/3 ARVN, 1st Division, Hue. Oct 69–Apr 70, 5th SFGA, company commander, 1st Battalion, 2 MSF, Pleiku. May 70, attached HQ, AFV, Saigon.
Aug 64, Quang Tri, Dong Ha, An Dong PF training centres. 18 Sep 64–1 Oct 64 attached 1/1 ARVN, 1st Div. Dec 64–Mar 65, 1st SFG team A-414 A Ro, western Quang Nam. Apr 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Jul–Aug 68, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Sep–Oct 68, Trieu Phong sub-sector, Quang Tri. Nov 68, 2/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Dec 68–Mar 69, RD Cadre Training, Can Tho.
Apr–May 66, 1/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai, and then RSM Danang.
Nov 70, Advisers School, Di An. Dec 70–Apr 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh. May–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Deceased 19.8.81.
RAINF.
RAINF. 15.6.66–19.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn.
3.6.65–28.5.66, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
Medevac, illness–IV Corps April 1969. Deceased 14.12.92.
29.12.65–19.5.66, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF.Visits, 2.7.70– 9.7.70, 3.9.70–10.9.70. Deceased 20.2.02.
RAA. 8.4.68–11.3.69, 12 Fd Regt. Deceased 1.12.78.
14/7/05 1:04:25 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 316
PARTRIDGE, Michael Herbert
215438
316
PEACH, Jesse Alfred
PEARCE, Donald
PEARSON, Raymond John
PEDLER, Rodney Gage
PEEL, John Reginald
PENMAN, Robert John
PENNINGTON, Albert Victor
312667
26215
219475
53985
243149
29893
29408
22.10.70– 24.9.71 18.8.64– 4.1.66
WO2
WO2
31.7.70– 29.7.71
30.4.66– 29.10.66
WO2
WO2
19.11.70– 17.9.71
CPL
MM
29.10.70– 21.10.71
WO2
25.2.69– 22.9.69
5.5.70– 17.9.70
VC
CPL
WO2
Aug–Dec 70, 3/51 ARVN, Quang Nam. Jan–Feb 71, MATT 3, Baria–Long Dien. Mar 71, MATT 11, Phuoc Hoa. Apr 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh.
Aug 64, 2/2 ARVN, Feb 65, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. May–Dec 65, CSD Danang–Quang Ngai.
Oct 70–Jul 71, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, La Vang. Aug–Sep 71, 1st Regiment, 1st Division, La Vang, Quang Tri.
May 66, Hieu Duc sub-sector, Quang Nam. Aug 66, Duc Tan sub-sector, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 70, Advisers School, Di An. Dec 70 Sep 71, Med Asst, JWTC, Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 70–Oct 71, HQ, AATTV, Saigon.
May–Sep 70, MATT 1, Baria–Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar 69, 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course, Nha Trang. Mar–May 69, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF Pleiku, company commander, 212 Coy, 1st Battalion. Jun–Aug 69, Training Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
RAA.
RAINF.
RAE. 26.6.66–26.10.66, 32 Small Ship Sqn.
RAAOC. 10.2.69–7.1.70, 2 AOD.
RAAMC.
RAASC.
RAE. 16.9.69–3.6.70, 1 Fd Sqn.
RAINF. WIA 24.5.69, Ben Het. Medevac Sep 69 to Australia, illness.
14/7/05 1:04:25 PM
317
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 317
PAYNE, Keith
12222
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
PHILLIPS, Arthur Curnow
PHILLIPS, Donald Bradman
35702
41192
6.2.68– 25.2.69 9.4.68– 2.4.69
WO2 WO2
28.1.70– 4.4.70
22.5.68– 24.2.69
Original Team Member. RAINF. 24.3.71–31.3.71, HQ AFV,Visit.
RAAOC.
KIA 4.4.70, Dak Seang.
RAINF. WIA 21.7.66, east Danang area. Medevac 7.8.66. Medevac, Feb 69, NBC.
RAINF. 3.6.65–5.6.66, 1 RAR.
Apr 68, RF/PF, Mai Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri RAASC. Sector. May–Jul 68, 2/2 ARVN, Gio Linh area, Quang Tri. Aug–Oct 68, 54th Regt, Hue. Nov 68–Mar 69, Admin WO, AATTV, Danang.
Feb 68–Jan 69, RF/PF, Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy.
Feb–Apr 66, 2/4 ARVN, 2nd Division. May–Jul 66, Nung Force, 5th SFGA, Danang. May–Aug 68, RF/PF,Vinh Binh, IV Corps. Sep 68–Feb 69, LRRP wing,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy. Jan–Apr 70, platoon commander, 211 Company, 1st Battalion, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. MT Thompson Crematorium, Queensland.
Jul 71, Sector HQ, Long Dien and MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF. Aug 63, Danang, CSD–CIA. 25 September, CSD, Ban Me Thuot operational area. Armed Propaganda and Intelligence Teams, Truong Son Force-1000 Montagnard, Tiger Men, Darlac. 29.4.70–1.6.71, 2 RAR. Although held against AATTV strength until December 1965 he left Vietnam in October to Singapore and Borneo.
Aug 62–Jul 63, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, near Hue, Sergeant Major of Centre & General Subjects Committee.
14/7/05 1:04:26 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 318
3.2.66– 7.8.66
WO2
PETTIT, John Gordon
13824
MID
15.7.71– 28.10.71
WO2
PETERSON, Gordon Hewat
28.8.63– 23.10.65
37267
MC
PETERSEN, Arthur Barry CAPT
3.8.62– 12.7.63
13668
WO2
PERKINS, Ronald Edmund
51255
318
PHILLIPS, Maxwell Leslie
PHILLIPS, Thomas Dudley
PHIPPS, Kenneth Roy
PINCOTT, Ronald Percy
48683
42352
26662
22907
1.7.72– 18.12.72
3.8.62– 17.8.63
WO2
SGT
7.10.65– 20.3.66
MID
WO2
28.5.70– 12.5.71
27.8.70– 26.8.71
MID
CPL
MAJ
29.9.67–8.10.67,Visit.
RAAC.
10 Aug 62–12 Aug 63, Tactics Committee, and demonstration platoon, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, near Hue.
Jul–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Oct–Nov 65, RF Coy, Nghia Hanh sub-sector, Quang Ngai. Dec 65, Son Ha sub-sector. Jan 66, Nghia Hanh sub-sector. Mar 66 with 236 and 423 RF Companies 15 kilometres south of Quang Ngai City near Mo Duc. Terendak Military Cemetery, Malaysia.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 7.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR. 27.3.68–28.2.69, 1 RAR. Deceased 29.5.82.
RAINF. 26.5.65–1.6.66, 1 RAR. 27.3.68–28.2.69, 1 RAR.
Died of Wounds 20.3.66, Danang.
WIA 18.3.66.
RAAC.
RAE. Sep 70, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Nov 70, MATT 4, An Ngai. Dec 70–Apr 71, MATT 11, Long Dien. May–Jun 71, MATT, 4.3.68–4.3.69, 17 Const Sqn. Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
May–Jul 70, 2IC, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Aug 70–Jan 71, MATT Coordinator, Baria. Feb– May 71, Territorial Security, Baria, responsible for MATT and PSDF.
14/7/05 1:04:26 PM
319
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 319
PHILLIPS, Kenneth Roy
17050
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
POIRRIER, Ronald Francis
POLKINGHORNE, Graham Mitchell
POLLARD, Reginald Lance
POOLE, Maxwell John
215819
35345
335087
215692
9.5.65– 29.4.66 8.9.63– 10.12.64
19.11.68– 19.11.69
WO2
CAPT
WO2
22.7.71– 5.5.72
5.8.71– 18.11.71
3.9.70– 2.9.71
3.2.66– 17.1.67
CPL
WO2
Nov–Dec 68, 1/4 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Jan–Oct 69, 2/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Jul 71, 3/3 ARVN, An Lo near Hue, Thua Thien. Aug–Sep 71, 3rd Regiment, An Lo. Oct 71, 2nd ARVN Division, TOC, Quang Ngai. Nov 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Apr 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Sep 63–Jun 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Chief Tactics Committee. Jul–Oct 64, 7th SFG A727 and 1st SFG A-323 teams Khe Sanh, Quang Tri. Nov 64, Saigon.
May–Sep 65, RF/PF Hoi An Sector, Quang Nam. Sep 65–Apr 66, Hieu Duc sub-sector, west of Danang, Quang Nam.
Aug–Nov 71, storeman, HQ AATTV,Vung tau.
Feb 66, Medic, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My. Then deployed to Quang Tri as a medical adviser. Sep–Oct 70, medical adviser, Quang Ngai Sector. Nov 70–Apr 71, medical adviser, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Ngai. May–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
2.4.67–24.5.67, 7 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAE.
RAINF. 10.5.66– 30.4.67, 5 RAR. Deceased 4.7.02.
RAAMC.
14/7/05 1:04:26 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 320
PIRANI, Emest John
52941
320
11.2.71– 11.2.72
PRATTEN, James William WO2
213474
RAAC.
Feb–May 71, MAT 22/21/23, Quang Ngai. Jun RAINF. 71, 3/3 ARVN An Lo, 1st Division, Thua Thien. Jul–Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. 7.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR. Jan–Feb 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Sep 64–Jun 65, Tam Ky PF Training Centre, Quang Tin.
RAINF. WIA 15.1.70. WIA 11.9.70. Deceased 1.2.02.
15 Mar 67, 2/2 ARVN, Dong Ha–Gio Linh, 1st RAINF. Division, Quang Tri. 26 Sep 67–Feb 68, HQ Phong Dien District, near Hue, Thua Thien. WIA minor shrapnel, 16.7.67.
14/7/05 1:04:27 PM
321
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 321
11.9.64– 15.6.65
WO2
PRATT, Robert Denzil
Nov 69–Oct 70, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri.
29.10.69– 29.10.70
36261
Sep 66, RF/PF Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam and then 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri & Thua Thien.
19.9.66– 5.9.67
MM
WO2
POWELL, David Thomas
16230
11.3.67– 11.3.68
WO2
POWELL, Albert Norman
16067
RAINF. 6.6.66–9.6.66, 6 RAR. 10.6.66–17.1.67, 1 ARU. 18.1.67–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
Mar 68, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien. Apr RAINF. 68–Feb 69, HQ I Corps, G-3 Training, Danang.
4.3.68– 4.3.69
MAJ
PORTEOUS, Ian Guildford
335066
Aug–Oct 64,Van Thanh RF training centre near Hue. Nov–Dec 64, CSD, Ban Me Thuot. Jan–Jul 65, battalion 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Nam.
1.8.64– 12.7.65
WO2
POPE, Harold
11230
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
PRIOR, Kenneth John
PROPERJOHN, Terence John
PROSPER, Bruce Micheal
PRYDE, Kenneth Desmond
PURTELL, Edward John
PURTON, Raymond Allen
27747
61808
213959
860139
3410859
6852
15.10.70– 15.10.71 19.9.66– 5.9.67
CAPT
WO2
22.10.70– 15.10.71 14.8.70– 12.8.71 19.2.68– 11.2.69
WO2
CPL WO2
7.1.71– 18.11.71
26.11.70– 18.11.71
WO2
MM
19.3.65– 1.12.65
LTCOL
Feb–Jun 68, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri area. Jul–Aug 68, RF/PF, Trieu Phong subsector, Quang Tri. Sep 68–Jan 69, 1/1 ARVN, Quang Tri area.
Aug 70–Aug 71, storeman, AATTV Vung Tau.
Nov 70–Jul 71, 4/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Aug–Oct 71, 2nd ARVN Regiment, Dong Ha, Quang Tri.
Sep 66, 5th SFGA, Danang, Nung MSF and platoon commander 1st Company, Mobile Guerrilla Force, Montagnard. Jan–Nov 71, NAT/NOTT 2 Dong Tam.
Oct–Dec 70, 1/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Jan–Oct 71, JWTC Nui Dat.
Dec 70, unallotted Phuoc Tuy. Jan–Feb 71, MATT 15, Long Son Island. Mar–Nov 71, NAT/NOTT 1 Bac Lieu.
19 Mar 65–Jul 65, Deputy Commander AATTV, Danang. Aug–Nov 65, Saigon, Commanding Officer. Brigadier Jackson remained overall Commander, CO commanded day-to-day activities.
WIA 13.5.68, Quang Tri.
RAINF.
RAAC.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. 12.12.67–2.12.68, 3 RAR.
RAINF. 5.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR. Deceased 11.8.96.
RAINF. 2.12.65–4.6.66, 1 RAR, CO. 14.5.69–13.8.69, HQ AFV. 29.10.69–10.12.69, HQ AFV.Visits, 30.9.70– 10.10.70, 18.7.72– 23.7.72.
14/7/05 1:04:27 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 322
PREECE, Alexander Vogler
1113
322
QUICK, Denis Richard
RAE, Graham Wesley
RAFFEN, Francis Lindsay
RAMSAY, Ian Ronald
RAMSDALE, Kevin William
RANSOME, Leslie Alfred
3411754
214113
4186
54864
31951
51194
3.8.62– 18.6.63
7.8.70– 5.8.71 7.8.70– 5.8.71
31.7.70– 7.8.70
30.6.71– 3.7.72
15.5.64– 13.3.65 5.8.71– 6.3.72
WO2
CPL
CPL
WO2
WO2
WO2 CAPT
Aug–Oct 71, QM, AATTV,Vung Tau. Nov 71–Feb 72, QM AATTV, Saigon.
May–Dec 64, Admin WO, AATTV, Saigon. Jan–Feb 65, 5th SFGA, C Team Danang.
Jul–Aug 71, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Sep–Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Feb 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Centennial Park Crematorium. South Australia Garden of Remembrance.
Aug 70, 4/3 ARVN, near Hue.
Aug 70, MATT 7, Ong Trinh. Sep–Nov 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba. Dec 70–Jan 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb–Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Aug–Sep 70, MATT 3, Baria. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc. May–Jul 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 62–Jun 63, Hiep Khanh Training Centre. Weapons Committee. Dec 62, attached 1st SFG team A-132 Khe Sanh, Quang Tri.
RAE. 7.3.72–11.8.72, AAAGV.
RAASC. Deceased 27.1.04
26.2.68–23.2.69, 2 SAS Sqn.
RAINF.
RAINF. Heart attack, 7.8.70. 20.1.67–17.5.67, 1 ARU. 18.5.67–6.2.68, HQ AFV.
RAINF. 12.12.66– 2.1.67, 1 ARU. 3.1.67–30.5.67, 6 RAR. 31.5.67–13.12.67, 7 RAR.
RAE. 10.2.67–25.10.67, 1 Fd Sqn.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 10.5.67–9.1.68, 161 Recce Flt.
14/7/05 1:04:27 PM
323
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 323
QUEE, Brian Michael
4637
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
29.7.67– 23.7.68
15.4.66– 3.4.67 15.10.70– 14.10.71
14.8.67– 26.2.68
CAPT
WO2 MAJ
WO2
RAY, Peter John
REARDON, Gerald
REDMAN, Kenneth James
REEMAN, Laurence George
61199
53696
35478
32548
RAA. Medevac.
RAA. 20.5.66–3.5.67, 1 Fd Regt. 23.4.69–7.5.70, 1 Fd Regt. Deceased 6.10.86.
RAINF.
Aug 67–Feb 68, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
RAASC. 9.3.67, AFV Cash Office to AATTV.
RASIGS. Oct–Nov 70, Assistant Provincial Adviser, Quang Tri. Dec 70–Jun 71, Assistant Security Adviser/Territorial Security Adviser, Quang Tri. Jul–Sep 71, Assistant Chief of Staff, Territorial Security, Quang Tri.
Apr 66, 1/6 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Dec 66, 5th SFGA, C Team, Air Resupply, Danang.
RAINF. Jul 67, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My. Aug 67, sub-sector, Mai Linh, Quang Tri. Sep 67, company commander, 14th Coy, 5th SFGA, A-112, MSF, Marble Mountain, Danang. Nov 67, CO 1 MSF, Danang. Jan 68, Deputy Commander 1 MSF, Danang. Feb–Apr 68, RF/ PF, Baria. May–Jul 68, Attached 1 ALSG, GSO3, Vung Tau.
Feb 66, RF/PF Tam Ky, Quang Tin and then CSD,Vung Tau.
Jul–Dec 72, MATT 2,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:28 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 324
3.2.66– 8.12.66
WO2
RAWLINS, Stephen Harold
13555
19.7.72– 18.12.72
RANSON, Brian Franklin SSGT
14976
324
21.10.71– 6.3.72
4.12.64– 4.9.65
Oct 71, RQMS, AATTV,Vung Tau. Nov 71– Feb 72, RQMS, AATTV, Saigon.
Dec 64, Quang Tri Sector. Jan 65, Detached 51st Regt. Mar–Aug 65, 3/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Danang.
Dec 66–May 67, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Jun–Nov 67, 1/7 Cavalry Squadron, Tanks and 3/7 Cavalry, near Hue.
Aug 70–Jul 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh, Phuoc Tuy.
May–Oct 71, medical adviser, 1st ARVN Division, Hue.
Sep 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Oct 71–Feb 72, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Jul–Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh. Dec 71–Jun 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Oct 67, company commander, 14th Coy, Company C, MSF, 5th SFGA, Danang. Nov 67, Commander, MSF, Company C, 5th SFGA, Danang. Jan 68, Deputy Commander MSF, Danang.
RAINF. 7.3.72–20.4.72, AAAGV.
RAINF. Deceased 9.6.99.
RAAC.
RAAMC. 18.2.68– 1.4.68, 8 Fd Amb. 2.4.68–21.2.69, 1 Aust Fd Hosp.
RAAMC. 24.5.66–29.4.67, 2 Fd Amb.
RAAMC. 7.3.72–6.9.72, AAAGV.
RAE. 17.3.67–12.12.67, 17 Const Sqn.
NBC 5.2.68, Quang Ngai, Medevac.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:28 PM
325
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 325
RIEDEL, Anselm Ehrhardt WO2
4237
WO2
RICHARDSON, Noel Eugene
25455
6.12.66– 5.12.67
MM
WO2
RICHARDS, Kenneth Alfred
42924
4.8.70– 5.8.71
CPL
RHODES, Peter Gordon
43882
28.4.71– 26.10.71
WO2
REYNOLDS, Wayne Lloyd
42537
31.8.71– 6.3.72
LCPL
REMYNSE, Peter Hans
432541
30.6.71– 3.7.72
WO2
REID, Stephen Frank
311523
26.9.67– 21.2.68
CAPT
REID, Peter McAllister
235274
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
RILEY, Frank William
RILEY, John Hugh
RISSEL, Barry Charles
ROBARTS, Thomas John
ROBERTS, Anthony Trevethan
ROBERTS, Francis Adrian
ROBERTS, Malcolm Thomas
28910
2789172
213524
313360
217048
54548
15827
28.4.71– 26.10.71
11.8.64– 12.7.65 24.5.70– 17.12.70 15.6.66– 12.4.67 31.8.71– 28.10.71 24.2.71– 26.8.71
28.4.71– 19.4.72
7.8.70– 30.6.71
BDR
WO2
CPL
CAPT CPL CPL
CAPT
WO2
Aug 70–Feb 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc. Mar– Jun 71, 3/3 ARVN, near Hue, 1st Division.
Apr–Jul 71, HQ 1st ARVN Task Force (Special Brigade), Hoa Vang, Quang Nam. Aug–Nov 71, 1st Armd Brigade HQ, Danang. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Apr 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Feb–Aug 71, Driver, Baria.
Sep–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
HQ AATTV, Saigon, Admin Officer.
May 70, MATT 4, Phuoc Tuy. Jun–Sep 70, MATT 3, Baria. Oct–Dec 70, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Aug 64–Feb 65, 2nd ARVN Division, Danang. Mar–Jul 65, Dong Da Training Centre, Tactics Committee.
Apr 71, unallotted, Baria. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Aug 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Oct 71, AATTV,Vung Tau.
RAINF. WIA 4.6.71, Dong A Tay, shrapnel, Medevac. 2.3.67–27.2.68, 1 SAS Sqn.
RAAC. 30.4.66–15.1.67, 1 APC Sqn. 16.1.67–3.3.67, A Sqn, 3 Cav Regt.
RACMP. 26.2.68–21.2.69, 2 SAS Sqn. 27.1.70–14.1.71, AFV Pro Unit.
RAAMC.
RAASC.
RAAMC. 13.1.70–3.6.70, HQ AFV.
RAINF. Deceased 23.6.02.
RAA.
14/7/05 1:04:28 PM
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RIGBY, Bretton Mark
138338
326
ROBERTSON, Arthur James
ROBERTSON, Donald Graham
ROBERTSON, Ian
ROBERTSON, William Arthur
ROBINSON, Arthur
2411510
52153
31932
53297
2412487
27.4.67– 5.12.67
16.4.65– 29.9.65 23.10.65– 29.3.66 3.9.70– 2.9.71
11.2.71– 23.8.71
11.12.67– 3.12.68
WO2
MAJ
WO2
WO2
WO2
DCM
7.10.71– 8.11.72
WO2
RAINF. WIA 12.8.71, Cam Lo. Medevac, 23.8.71. 4.6.68–30.5.69, 4 RAR. Deceased 13.11.99.
RAINF.
RAINF.
Died 3 Fd Hosp, Saigon, malaria, 5.12.67.
RAINF.
RAA.
RAA (Special List). Dec 67–Jan 68, 11 Battalion ARVN Artillery, Quang Tri. Feb–Jul 68, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri area. Aug–Nov 68, Duc My Ranger Training Centre.
Feb 71, MAT 23, Quang Ngai. Mar–May 71, Hai Lang sub-sector, Quang Tri. Jun–Aug 71, Cam Lo sub-sector, Quang Tri.
Sep 70–Jan 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Jan–Apr 71, RSM AATTV, Saigon. May 71, 1st ARVN Division, TOC Forward, near Quang Tri. Jun– Aug 71, 1st ARVN Div, TOC, Hue.
Apr–Sep 65, Senior Australian Adviser/Training Adviser, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Oct–Nov 65, Quang Tri Sector. Dec 65–Mar 66, Trieu Phong sub-sector Senior Adviser, I Corps.
29 Apr–Oct 67, platoon commander, 16 Coy, MSF, 5th SFGA, Danang. Nov 67, Det B-36, Coy A, 5th SFGA, Long Hai Camp. Frenchs Forest Cemetery, NSW.
Oct–Nov 71, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
14/7/05 1:04:29 PM
327
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 327
ROBERTS, Ronald
42539
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
RODGER, Michael Graham
ROE, Ian Watt
ROGERS, William Barry
ROLLINSON, Phillip John
ROLPH, Don
42683
217879
214091
57086
27987
8.7.72– 18.12.72 26.11.69– 27.11.70
CAPT WO2
3.9.70– 2.9.71
2.1.67– 18.12.67
WO2
28.5.70– 1.5.71
11.12.67– 3.12.68
3.8.62– 15.8.63 20.8.68– 13.8.69
7.8.70– 5.8.71 DCM
MID
CPL
WO2
SGT
Dec 69–Jun 70, 4/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, 2nd Division. July–Nov 70, Phuoc Tuy National Training Centre, Baria.
Jul–Dec 72, Adjutant HQ AATTV,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Jan 67, 5th SFGA, platoon commander, 11th Company, Danang. Apr 67, 5th SFGA Nha Trang. Jun–Dec 67, Police Field Force Training Centre near Dalat. Sep–Dec 70, 3/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jan 71, unallotted MAT Military Region 1. Feb–Mar 71, MAT 22, Quang Ngai. Apr–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Aug 70–Apr 71, MATT 5, Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy. May–Jul 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Dec 67, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Hue. Jan–May 68, Admin WO, AATTV, Saigon. Jun–Sep 68, RF/PF, Can Tho. Oct–Nov 68, RF/PF Vin Binh, IV Corps. Jun 70–Jan 71, 1/6 ARVN, Chu Lai, 2nd Division. Feb–Apr 71, HQ AATTV, Danang.
Aug 62–Aug 63, Dong Da National Training Centre, Heavy Weapons Committee. Aug 68–Aug 69, 4/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Gio Linh area, Quang Tri.
RAINF. Deceased 18.11.97.
RAAC. 2.2.71–7.7.72, HQ AFV.
Deceased 25.10.84.
Hospital April 1967.
RAINF.
RAINF. 3.2.69–10.3.70, 5 RAR. Deceased 15.12.98.
RAEME.
Original Team Member. RAINF. Wounded, shrapnel friendly air, 1.5.69, Quang Tri. 8.4.67–26.4.68, 7 RAR.
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ROBINSON, Raymond Ensely
41580
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RONEY, Ronald Victor
ROONEY, Robert Emmet
ROSENBERG, Stanley Douglas
ROTHWELL, Dale
ROUGHAN, William Francis
61161
14249
33887
26931
16811
SGT
3.6.70– 7.1.71
28.5.68– 28.5.69
CAPT
MID
30.4.69– 25.3.70
2.7.63– 11.6.64
SGT
WO1
30.4.69– 16.4.70
WO2 BEM
7.8.70– 23.6.71
CPL
RAINF. Deceased 1.2.02.
AUST INT. 4.3.66–8.5.66, HQ AAFV/AFV. 9.5.66– 19.7.66, HQ 1 ATF. Deceased 11.8.94.
RAAMC.
RAE. 10.3.69–13.10.69, 17 Const Sqn. 14.10.69– 27.3.70, 1 Fd Sqn.
Jun–Dec 70, clerk, Baria, Phuoc Tuy Sector.
RAA. 18.9.66–12.6.67, 1 Fd Regt. 27.1.70–10.6.70, 4 Fd Regt. Deceased no date.
RAINF. Jun–Sep 68, Adjutant, Saigon. 19 Oct 68–Mar 69, company commander 223 Coy, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Mar–May 69, Asst S-3, 5th SFGA HQ Nha Trang. May 69, operational visit 9.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR. 3rd MSF Battalion near Kontum.
May–Sep 69, 1/2 ARVN, Dong Ha. Oct 69– Mar 70, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My.
Jul 63–Feb 64, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Feb–May, 7th SFG team A-731 Khe Sanh.
May 69–Apr 70, medical adviser, Quang Tri.
Aug 70–Apr 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long. May–Jun 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:29 PM
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RONALDSON, John Thomas
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NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
ROWE, David John
ROWE, Kevin John
ROWE, William George
ROY, John Davidson
43585
41451
3793562
310057
11.2.71– 31.3.71 3.7.64– 10.12.66
CPL WO2
25.3.69– 24.7.69
24.9.68– 14.6.69
WO2
14.5.69– 14.5.70
CAPT
MID
23.7.63– 9.7.64
SGT
RAINF. WIA 27.6.69. 10.5.66–16.2.67, 5 RAR.
6.6.66–21.12.66, 6 RAR. Deceased 19.1.84.
RAINF.
Jul 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. 9.9.64–2.10.64 attached 1/1 ARVN. Nov 64–Feb 65, Quang Nam Sector, Danang. Mar–Jun 65, 2/51 ARVN. Jul– Oct 65, CSD Ban Me Thuot, Nov 65–Jan 66, company commander, 5th SFGA Nung Force, Danang. Feb–May 66, 2/51 ARVN, Hoi An, Quang Nam. Date not known, CSD Phuoc Tuy. Mar 69, CORDS, RD Cadre Training, Can Tho. Apr–Jun 69,VDAT, Dinh Tuong then attached 1 ATF in July.
Feb 71, unallotted, Phuoc Tuy.
Transferred to 1 ARU 17.9.69. Deceased no date.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAAC. Oct 68–Jan 69, 2/7th ARVN Cav Regt, PK 17, Hue. Feb 69, 11th ARVN Cavalry, Hoi An. Hospitalised May, Mar–May 69, 4/5 ARVN Tam Ky, 2nd Division, Medevac 14.6.69. Quang Ngai.
May 69, Battalion XO, temporary duty then Jun–Oct 69, company commander 223 Coy, 2nd Battalion, MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Oct 69–May 70, Adjutant HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Jul–Nov 63, Dong Da then Hiep Khanh Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Oct 63, visited forward artillery troop locations Quang Nam. Dec 63, attached 7th SFG team A-727 Khe Sanh, Quang Tri. Also briefly with TF 100. Jan 64, Hiep Khanh Training Centre. Feb–Jul 64, 1st SFG team A-434, A Shau detached from An Diem, Thua Thien.
14/7/05 1:04:30 PM
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ROUGHLEY, John William
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RULE, Benjamin Roy
RULE, Clarence Lloyd
RUST, Barry John
RUTHERFORD, Robert Boyd
RYAN, Brendan Maurice
447535
3111552
3169801
18237
133904
25.9.64– 4.9.65 30.4.68– 7.4.69
23.9.66– 25.3.68
19.9.66– 31.8.67
7.1.71– 26.10.71 7.1.70– 7.1.71
WO2
WO2
CAPT
WO2
WO2
WO2
RAAC.
Medevac illness. Deceased 28.2.77.
RAINF.
RAINF. Deceased March 1998.
RAINF. 4.6.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
Jan–Aug 70, 1/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division. RAINF. Sep 70, Adviser School, Di An. Oct–Dec 70, MATT 12, Long Le.
Jan 71, unallotted MATT, MR III. Feb–Apr 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long. Mar–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF. Sep 66–May 67, platoon commander, 5th SFGA, A-113 MSF & A-100 –Mobile Guerrilla Force, Danang. June 67 3/5 ARVN, Tam Ky and Aug 67, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. WIA 19.3.67.
Sep–Dec 66, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. Jan 67–May 67, Operations Officer, MACV Advisory Team 89, Phuoc Tuy. May 67–Mar 68, Long Dien District, Phuoc Tuy, District Senior Adviser.
May–Sep 68, 1st ARVN Division, Recon Unit, Hue. Oct 68, CSD–PRU, Ban Me Thuot. Nov 68, CSD–PRU, Kien Tuong & Dec 68–Feb 69, CSD–PRU, Sa Dec Province both IV Corps.
Sep 64–Mar 65, 3/1 Battalion, 1st ARVN Division, I Corps. Apr–Aug 65, RF/PF Hoi An sub-sector, Quang Nam.
14/7/05 1:04:30 PM
331
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RUDD, Keith John
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NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
RYAN, Ricky Raymond
SANDERSON, Peter Nicholas
SAVAGE, David George
SAXBY, Barry Lesley
1200581
42728
17684
29701
5.8.71– 10.10.71
26.8.71– 21.12.71
25.2.70– 22.5.70
13.8.68– 6.8.69
21.1.69– 28.1.70
CPL
SGT
WO2
CAPT
WO2
Jan–Feb 69, RF/PF Trieu Phong sub-sector, Quang Tri. Mar–Jul 69, 2/5 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Aug 69–Jan 70,VDAT, Kien Hoa, IV Corps.
13 Aug 68–26 Aug 68, 5th SFGA, OC 212 MSF Coy, Pleiku. 26 Aug–early Sep 68 hospitalised, US hospital and 1 Aust Fd Hosp. 23 Sep 68–Jan 69, S2, Pleiku Mike Force. Feb 69–25 Apr 69, 1st ARVN Div Recon Coy, Gio Linh. 26 Apr 69–7 Aug 69,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar 70, 5th SFGA, platoon commander, 211 Company, 1st Battalion, 2 MSF B-20, Pleiku.
Aug–Sep 71, Admin Sgt,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Dec 71, Clerk, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Aug–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Deceased 18.3.98.
RAE.
10.5.66–3.8.66, 2 SAS Sqn.
RAINF. WIA 24.8.68, bullet wound, right arm, Duc Lap.
RAINF. WIA, 3.4.70. Hospital 71 Evac and 1st Aust Fd Hosp, Medevac. 2.4.67–26.4.68, 7 RAR.
RAASC. 20.4.67–22.10.67, Det 1 Div Post. 23.10.67– 20.2.68, Det 1 Comm Z Postal. 22.12.71–5.1.72, HQ AFV.
RAE. 25.5.66–16.2.67, 1 Fd Sqn. 11.10.71–20.10.71, 21 Engr Spt Tp. 21.10.71–1.2.72, 17 Const Sqn. 2.1.72– 5.2.72,Visit.
14/7/05 1:04:30 PM
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RYAN, Philip John
1200574
332
SCALLY, Glenn
SCHEELE, David Willem
SCHMIDT, Edward Maxwell
SCHMIDT, Lloyd Garry
SCHNEIDER, Amic
52744
54901
16353
215160
5717082
25.6.70– 23.6.71
28.1.70– 28.1.71 24.5.70– 1.5.71
WO2
PTE
27.3.69– 24.9.69
SGT
WO2
11.6.65– 8.1.66
WO2
DCM
16.10.65– 8.10.66
LT
May 70, MATT 3, Phuoc Tuy. Jun 70–Apr 71, MATT 4, An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy.
Feb–Jul 70, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Aug 70–Jan 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Oct 70, 4/5 ARVN Tam Ky, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Nov–Dec 70, 5th ARVN Regt Recon Coy, Tam Ky. Jan 71, unallotted MAT, Military Region 1. Feb–Jun 71, MAT 23, Quang Ngai.
Mar–Apr 69, 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course, Nha Trang. May–Aug 69, platoon commander 223 Company & Aug–Sep, Training Company, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku.
Jun–Dec 65, 2/5 ARVN, Quang Ngai then 5th SFG A-107 Tra Bong, 1 week.
Oct 65–Feb 66, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My. Mar–May 66, CSD, Quang Ngai and later Phuoc Tuy.
RAAMC. 28.4.70–22.5.70, 5 Coy RAASC. 23.5.70–2.6.70, HQ 1 ATF.
RAINF. 7.6.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR.
19.5.67–13.6.68, 2 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. 26.2.68–24.2.69, 2 SAS Sqn. 20.1.71–17.2.71, 1 SAS Sqn. 18.2.71–11.10.71, 2 SAS Sqn.
RAINF. 12.2.71–6.10.71, 3 RAR.
RAAC. 25.11.70–21.1.71, B – A Sqn, 3 Cav. 22.1.71– 30.9.71, C Sqn, 1 Armd.
14/7/05 1:04:31 PM
333
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SCALES, John
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NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
SCHULTE, Peter Carle
SCORSE, John William
SCOTT, Geoffrey James
SCOTT, Ronald Allan
SCOWCROFT, Lachlan Brian
1202692
35400
13006
213006
213399
21.10.65– 27.9.66 16.3.65– 10.9.65
27.8.69– 20.4.70
WO2
WO2
12.1.67– 8.1.68
WO2
WO2
5.8.71– 14.4.72
CPL MID See remarks.
31.8.70– 2.6.71
CPL
RAE. Commendation for Distinguished Service with AATTV, awarded in End of War List.
RAAC.
RAAMC. 6.5.70–2.6.71, 1 Aust Fd Hosp.
10.9.65, Died of wounds at Chu Lai.
RAINF.
RAINF. 29 Aug–9 Sep 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course, Nha Trang. Sep–Oct 69, platoon WIA 7.4.70, Dak Seang, commander, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Nov 69–Mar 70, Training Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Apr 70 Medevac. replaced Pettit, who was killed at the Battle of Dak Seang.
Mar–Jun 65, 2/4 ARVN Tam Ky, 2nd Division. Jul–Sep 65, 3/6 ARVN Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Master Sergeant Eugene Jordan brought Scott’s body to Australia for burial. This changed the policy so that all Australians who died were brought home. Rookwood Cemetery, Sydney.
Oct–Nov 65, 5th SFGA, team, A-107 Tra Bong, RAINF. Quang Ngai. Dec 65–May 66, Duc My Ranger Training Centre and then CSD,Vung Tau. Deceased 27.1.69.
Jan 67–Jan 68, RF/PF Van Kiep National Training Centre, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 71–Jan 72, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep, Feb–Apr 72, storeman, HQ AATTV,Van Kiep.
Sep 70, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 70–Feb 71, MATT 2, Dat Do. Mar–May 71, MATT 3, Long Dien.
14/7/05 1:04:31 PM
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SCHRAVEN, Gabriel Martin
3796533
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SEILER, Ronald
SELMES, John Neville
SELVA, Anthony Sebastian
212909
1423
12464
WO2
21.5.65– 2.4.66
WO1
25.8.64– 12.7.65
14.8.67– 6.8.68
18.2.67– 16.12.67
26.2.66– 7.9.66
11.9.64– 5.9.65
WO2
WO2
RAINF.
11.11.69–6.11.70, HQ 1 ALSG. Deceased 14.5.05.
RAINF. WIA 18.3.66, gunshot, Quang Ngai, Medevac.
RAE. Sep–Dec 64, battalion 1st ARVN Division. Jan 65, Dong Da Training Centre, detached to 1st ARVN Division. Feb 65, detached to 51st Regt. Mar–May 65, attached HQ 2nd Regiment, 1st Deceased 2.7.86. Division.
May–Sep 65, RF/PF Dien Ban sub-sector, Quang Nam. Oct–Nov 65, RF/PF Mo Duc sub-sector, Quang Ngai. Dec 65, Son Ha subsector. Jan–Mar 66, Son Tinh sub-sector, Quang Ngai. Aug 67–Feb 68, Gio Linh sub-sector, Quang Tri. 22 Feb 68–Aug 68, RSM, AATTV Danang.
Feb 67, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri and RAINF. then mid-67, RF/PF Baria District, Phuoc Tuy. KIA ambush on the Duc Thanh–Binh Ba road KIA 16.12.67, see Henderson. on 16 Dec 67. Rookwood Military Cemetery, NSW.
Sep–Dec 64, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Ranger Unit Training. Jan–Feb 65, 1st SFG team A-122 Gia Vuc, Quang Ngai. Mar–Apr 65, 1st SFG team A-324 Ba To, Quang Ngai. May 65, 5th SFGA, C Team, Nung Company, Danang. Feb–Apr 66, 11th Ranger Battalion, AO to the south of Danang. May 66, attached 1 ATF, CA duties.
14/7/05 1:04:31 PM
335
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SEAL, Alfred James
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NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
SHANAHAN, Richard Phillip
SHARPLES, Melvyn Francis
SHAVE, Michael John
SHAW, James Ian
SHEARWIN, Leigh
3798179
61251
1201583
42267
45040
19.11.69– 3.12.69
WO2
25.2.70– 25.2.71 24.2.71– 28.10.71
WO2 2LT
22.7.71– 21.7.72
6.1.66– 10.12.66
WO2
31.7.62– 1.2.65
15.5.71– 15.10.71
DSO
PTE
COL
Feb 71, Phuoc Tuy. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc. May–Oct 71, MATT 6, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar 70–Feb 71, 2/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
Not deployed, hospitalised on pre-extension leave coming from 9 RAR. Jul 71, JWTC Nui Dat–Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Jan–Dec 66, Nung Force, 6 months operations, 6 months training and administration, 5th SFGA, Danang.
May–Oct 71, AATTV, Saigon.
31 Jul 62–Feb 65, Commander AATTV and counterinsurgency adviser to Commander MACV. Relinquished command 1.2.65. Subsequently detached to work with US agencies, (USOM) USAID with Police Field Force. Also involved with PRU. Placed on ARAR list 31.8.68, honorary brigadier. Note dates of visits.
RAAC.
RAINF. Deceased 7.5.84.
9.11.68–19.11.69, 9 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. 6.1.71–15.5.71, 1 ARU.
Original Team Member. ASC. Visits, 7–15.4.62, 3.6.62–16.6.62. DoD Special Duties, 30.3.65– 24.12.65 & 28.12.67– 30.8.68. Visit, 23.1.66–7.12.66, 18.12.66–19.12.67. Deceased 1.10.02.
14/7/05 1:04:32 PM
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SERONG, Francis Phillip
3102
336
SHELTON, Arthur Trevis
SHENNAN, Wayne Edward
SHEPHERD, Allan John
311517
61333
17993
7.10.65– 27.9.66
WO2
WO2
25.2.69– 18.2.70
SGT
4.3.68– 25.2.69
29.10.70– 5.8.71
3.2.66– 26.2.66
WO2
RAINF. WIA 22.5.69, shrapnel, casevac to 1 Aust Fd Hosp.
RAINF. WIA 12.2.66, booby trap. Medevac Butterworth 26.2.66 to Australia 7.3.66. 17.2.65–13.8.65, 1 SAS Sqn. 14.8.65–5.10.65, HQ AAFV.
Mar 68–Feb 69, A and L Coy, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. RAASC. Deceased 26.2.01.
Oct 65, 2/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. RAINF. Nov 65–Apr 66, 2/51 ARVN, Quang Nam Special Sector. May 66, National Police Field Force Training Centre, Trai Mat, near Dalat. Nov 70–Jul 71, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, LRRP Wing.
Feb–early Mar 69, 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course, Nha Trang. Mar–May 69, platoon commander, 2 MSF, B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Jun–Aug 69, LRRP Wing, Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy. Sep 69–Feb 70, platoon commander, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku.
Feb 66, 11 Ranger Battalion, Danang, Quang Nam.
14/7/05 1:04:32 PM
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SHEEHAN, John Neil
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NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
SHILSTON, Peter John
SHORTT, Howard Donald
SHOVELLER, Norman Robert
SIGG, Ronald Francis
SIGGERS, Anthony Peter
25415
1200270
2149688
33889
216455
3.7.64– 12.7.65
19.9.66– 21.8.67
WO2
WO2
22.10.70– 21.10.71
WO2
See remarks.
18.2.70– 20.4.70
CAPT
28.2.70– 27.8.70
CAPT
MC
17.9.69– 17.9.70
CAPT
RAINF. Medevac NBC. 4.6.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR.
RAINF. 26.8.69–28.2.70, HQ AFV, Saigon. Deceased 30.8.93.
WIA 18.5.70, Dinh Tuong.
RAINF.
Sep 66, 5th SFGA, Danang. 1st Company, Mobile Guerrilla Force, Montagnard. Northern Suburbs Crematorium, NSW.
Jul–Oct 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. 18 Sep 64–1 Oct 64, attached 3/1 ARVN. Nov–Dec 64, 1st SFG team A-414, A Ro, western region Quang Nam. Jan–Jun 65, 5th SFGA team A-102 A Shau, Thua Thien.
RAINF. WIA 20.4.67. Killed accidentally, Air America crash 21.8.67, near Tam Ky.
RAINF. 18.4.67–18.3.68, 7 RAR. 16.2.70–10.3.71, 7 RAR. Deceased 31.1.03.
Oct 70, 3/54 Regt, Phu Loc, HQ, Thua Thien. RAINF. Commendation Dec 70–Oct 71, MATT 4, An Ngai village, near for Distinguished Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy. Service with AATTV, awarded in End of War List.
Feb–Mar 70, 3/3 ARVN, Hue, 1st Division.
Mar 70, company commander, 211 Coy and Apr 70, battalion commander, 1 MF Battalion, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Last AATTV soldier out of Pleiku, 26 August 1970.
Sep 69–Mar 70, 1/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Regt HQ, Quang Nam. Apr–May 70, OC RF Training Team, Dinh Tuong. Jun 70, OC NOAT, Dinh Tuong west of My Tho. Jul 70, NOAT, Cho Gao. Aug 70, NOAT, Dong Tam, IV Corps.
14/7/05 1:04:33 PM
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SHEPPARD, Walter
37893
338
SILVERSTONE, William Maxwell
SIMPSON, Rayene Stewart
SIMS, Geoffrey Owen
SINCLAIR, Malcolm
57023
217622
44340
28315
3.8.62– 14.7.63
SGT
18.3.71– 6.9.71 4.2.67– 29.1.68
CPL WO2
1.8.64– 16.9.64 4.5.67– 9.4.70
24.7.70– 29.7.71
LTCOL VC, DCM
20.11.67– 25.6.68
WO2
8 Feb–Jun 67 Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Danang, then RF/PF, Xuyen Moc, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar–Aug 71, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Aug 62–Jul 63, Phu Bai Training Centre Dong Da, Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Special Subjects. 29 Oct–29 Nov 62 attached SFG team 1st SFG A1/131, Khe Sanh, Quang Tri. Aug 64–Sep 64, 7th SFG team A-728, Kham Duc, Quang Nam. Nov 67, PRU, Kontum. Dec 67–Jun 68, PRU, Pleiku base. Jul–Oct 68, PRU Mobile Training Team, based Ban Me Thuot. Nov 68, platoon commander, 232 company commander, 3 MSF Battalion, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Leave 10 Nov 68– 22 Jan 69. Mar 69, company commander, 231 Company, 3rd Battalion. May–Jun 69, platoon commander, Training Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Leave 11 Jul 69–12 Aug 69. Aug–Sep 69,VDAT, Dinh Tuong Sector, IV Corps. Oct 69–Mar 70, PSDF, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul 70–Jul 71, Deputy Commander, AATTV Saigon.
RAINF. 8 Fd Amb, 30 Jun 67. Deceased 14.12.82.
RAASC. Medevac NBC.
Deceased 18.10.78.
Original Team Member. RAINF. WIA bullet wound leg, 7th SFG A-726, Ta Ko, western Quang Nam. 16.9.64, evacuated to Japan for convalescence 20.10.64 to Zama Hospital. Discharged Zama 14.5.65, emplaned Tokyo 16.6.65 deplaned Sydney 17.6.65.
RAA. Defence Attaché Feb–Apr 75.
Nov 67, HQ 1 ARVN Ranger Group, Danang. RAINF. Dec 67, unit retraining at Duc My. Jan 68, Ranger Group, Danang then Feb–Mar 68, Hue. Apr–Jun 68, Duc My, Ranger Training Centre.
14/7/05 1:04:33 PM
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SILK, Barry Stewart
214831
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
SKARDON, Geoffrey Charles
SKOWRONSKI, Alexander
SMEATON, Sydney John
SMITH, Brian Cyril
SMITH, George Thomas
SMITH, Joseph James
212824
38218
25066
15495
61242
311557
16.10.64– 8.10.65
7.8.70– 26.4.71
21.5.65– 26.11.65 27.4.67– 6.11.67 23.7.68– 2.7.69
16.7.70– 7.3.71
CAPT
CPL
WO2 WO2 WO2
CAPT
Bar MC
2.1.67– 22.4.67
WO2
RAA. Medevac, NBC foot injury. 8.2.69– 5.3.70, 5 RAR.
Jul–Aug 70, 1/6 ARVN, Chu Lai. Aug–Dec 70, 1/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Quang Nam. Jan 71, unallotted MATT, Military Region 1. Feb 71, MAT 22, Quang Ngai.
Jul 68–Jan 69, platoon commander 212 & 211 companies, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Feb–Jun 69, Ranger Training Centre, Jungle-MountainSwamp Course, Duc My.
29 Apr–Oct 67, 5th SFGA, Mike Force, China Beach, Danang.
May–Nov 65, RF/PF Binh Son sub-sector, Quang Ngai.
Aug–Dec 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba. Jan 71, MATT 8, Xuyen Moc. Feb 71, MATT 15, Long Son. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 4, Hoa Loi.
RAINF. WIA 25.2.71, Nghia Hanh, Medevac. 18.3.68–22.2.69, 1 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. Medevac.
RAAOC.
RAE. 21.3.67–5.12.67, 17 Const Sqn. 27.4.71–24.5.71, 17 Const Sqn. 25.5.71–5.8.71, 1 Fd Sqn.
Oct 64–Feb 65, Dong Da National Training RAINF. Centre, Chief Tactics Committee. Mar–Jul 65, 5th SFGA Detachment C1, Danang, S-3 Air. Aug–Sep 65, Commander 5th SFG team A-107 1970, 7 RAR. Tra Bong, Quang Ngai.
Jan 67, RF/PF, Long Tho Centre, near Hue.
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SIZELAND, William Johnson
36538
340
SMITH, Leonard Michael
SMITH, Noel
SMITH, Robert David
SMITH, Russell Leigh
SMITH, Terence John
SMITH, Terence Ross
SMITH, Thomas William
242871
39120
52550
38323
276640
216638
2411409
8.1.68– 23.12.68 22.10.70– 21.10.71
3.2.66– 20.1.67
WO2 WO2
WO2
9.4.69– 25.3.70 4.7.72– 18.12.72 23.9.66– 12.9.67 22.9.67– 4.6.68
CAPT
CAPT WO2 WO2
29.10.69– 29.10.70
1.7.72– 18.12.72
WO2
Sep 67–May 68, platoon commander, 16th Company, Mike Force, 5th SFGA, Danang.
Sep 66, CSD,Vung Tau and then RF/PF Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, Long Hai. Dec 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Apr 69–Nov 69, 1/5 ARVN, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Dec 69–Mar 70, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri.
Feb–Apr 66, RF/PF Hoa Vang, Quang Nam. May 66–Jan 67, Civil Affairs, Phuoc Tuy. Nov 69–Mar 70,VDAT, Dinh Tuong, IV Corps. Apr 70, MATT, Baria. May–Jun 70, MATT 2, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Oct 70, MATT 7, Ong Trinh, Phuoc Tuy.
Oct 70–Feb 71, 4/54 ARVN Regt, Phu Loc, Thua Thien. Mar–Apr 71, 3/54 ARVN Regt, Phu Loc. May 71, MAT 23, Quang Ngai. Jun 71, TOC, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Ngai. Jul–Oct 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh.
Jan–Dec 68, RF/PF, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion. Dec 72,Van Kiep.
RAINF. 9.6.67–21.9.67, 1 ARU. 13.5.71–17.12.71, 4 RAR.
RAINF. Deceased October 1997.
RAINF.
RAE. WIA 5.9.69, booby trap, Quang Tin.
Deceased 21.2.00.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAE.
RAINF. 3.3.67–25.4.67, 5 RAR. 26.4.67–8.3.68, 7 RAR.
14/7/05 1:04:34 PM
341
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SMITH, Keith Omond
34578
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
SMITHERS, Colin John
SMITHSON, Raymond Patrick
SNELLING, Ernest William
SNOOK, Graham Bruce
SPARKE, Raymond Stuart
SPEECHLEY, Stanley
37884
217596
42076
42011
39439
36524 2.7.69– 29.6.70
27.11.67– 19.11.68
WO2
WO2
23.7.68– 23.7.69
WO2
10.9.70– 9.9.71
5.5.70– 25.2.71 PO dated 3.6.70
CPL
CPL
6.3.72– 18.12.72
WO2
MID
23.9.66– 5.9.67
WO2
RAAC. WIA 24.5.68, mortar.
RAINF.
RAINF. 16.2.70–25.2.71, 7 RAR.
RAASC. 22.7.69– 23.7.70, HQ AFV. 4.9.71 AFV Cash Office, Nui Dat.
RAASC.
Jul 69–Jun 70, 3/54 ARVN, Phu Loc, Thua Thien.
RAEME. Wounded accidentally 8.4.70. Deceased 26.11.85.
Sep 70, Advisers School Di An. Oct 70–Apr 71, RAINF. MATT 12, Long Le. May–Sep 71, MATT 4, An 9.11.68–26.11.69, Ngai, Phuoc Tuy. 9 RAR.
Nov 67–Jul 68, 3/7 ARVN Cavalry, 1st Division near Hue. Aug–Nov 68, Admin WO, Danang.
26 Jul 68–27 Nov 68, 3/1 ARVN, La Vang, Quang Tri. 3 Dec 68–31 Jan 69, RF patrolling school co–located With 18th ARVN Div Training Centre near Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy. 4 Feb–Apr 69, 3/1 ARVN, Quang Tri. May–Jul, 1/1 ARVN, Quang Tri.
May–Dec 70, MATT 2 Dat Do, Phuoc Tuy. Jan–Feb 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar–Dec 72, AATTV Saigon detached to AAAGV. .
Sep 66, Battalion S–1, 5th SFGA, reaction element B-50 Project Omega, Nha Trang, then attached 1 ATF, Phuoc Tuy.
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SMITH, Wilfred Cecil
213257
342
16.3.65– 8.2.66
Mar–Aug 65, RF/PF Thua Thien. Oct 65–Jan 66, General Subjects Committee, National Training Centre, Dong Da.
Feb–Apr 69, 4th ARVN Cavalry Regt, Danang. May–Sep 69, 2/4th ARVN Cav Regt, Quang Ngai. Oct 69–Feb 70, ARVN Armoured School, Thu Duc near Saigon.
May 71–Feb 72, RSM, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
Sep 71–Jan 72, JWTC, Nui Dat. Feb–Mar 72, HQ AATTV Van Kiep.
Apr–Jul 65, Admin WO HQ AATTV Saigon. Aug 65, Acting RSM AATTV, Danang. Oct 65–Mar 66, RF/PF Thua Thien.
Sep 68–Feb 69, 3/2 ARVN, Gio Linh area, 1st Division. Mar–Aug 69, Admin WO, Danang.
Feb–Apr 71, MATT 11, Phuoc Hoa. May–Jun 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Aug–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
May–Jun 68, Sector HQ, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. Jul– Dec 68, Staff G-3 Ops, HQ I Corps, Danang. Jan 69, 3/51 ARVN, Danang. Feb–May 69, 1/ 51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Quang Nam.
RAEME.
Deceased 5.6.79.
RAAC.
RAINF. 7.3.72–20.4.72, AAAGV. Deceased 27.8.97.
RAINF. 26.5.65–13.3.66, 1 RAR.
RAE. Deceased 29.10.68.
RAINF. Deceased 22.9.86.
RAAMC.
RAE.
14/7/05 1:04:34 PM
343
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 343
STEELE, Leslie
WO1
1635
25.2.69– 18.2.70
STAUNTON-LATIMER, WO1 John Barrie
32199
5.5.71– 6.3.72
WO1
STANLEY, Arthur George
21116
30.8.71– 13.3.72
WO1
STANFORD, Leslie John
26886
23.4.65– 29.3.66
WO1
STAHL, Donald Matthew
21934
24.9.68– 11.9.69
WO2
STACK,Vivian Maxwell
13168
29.1.71– 30.9.71
CPL
SPRINGETT, Michael George
44810
9.5.68– 21.5.69
CAPT
SPENCER, Cameron Francis
17111
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
STEIGER, Maxwell Roy
STEPHENS, James
STEPHENS, Leslie
STEVENSON, Ola Sever
STEVENSON, Raymond Paul
STEWART, James David
24026
1410219
37466
16273
3762
235018
23.4.66– 4.7.67
WO2
16.7.72– 2.12.72 27.8.69– 27.8.70
21.4.67– 5.12.67 22.7.71– 26.2.72
CPL WO2
WO1
LTCOL
29.10.69– 29.10.70
25.6.70– 16.6.71
WO1 MM
1.8.64– 8.3.65
WO2
Jul–Nov 71, 2IC AATTV, Saigon. Dec 71–Feb 72, Acting Commander AATTV, Saigon.
27 Apr 67, 5th SFGA, Mike Force, Danang. Sep–Nov 67, Adjutant, Coy C, 5th SFGA, Danang.
29 Aug 69–9 Sep 69 attended 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course Nha Trang. Sep–Dec 69, platoon commander, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Jan–Apr 70, LRRP Wing Van Kiep Training Centre. May–Aug 70, Phuoc Tuy National Training Centre.
Jul–Nov 72, Driver, HQ AATTV Van Kiep.
Apr–May 66, RF/PF Dong Ha, Quang Tri. Nov 66, 1/5 ARVN Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Nov 69–Mar 70, Cam Lo sub-sector, Quang Tri. Apr 70, MATT, Baria, May–Oct 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul 70–May 71, medical adviser, 1st ARVN Division, Hue. Jun 71, Saigon.
Aug–Oct 64, Dong Da Trg Centre, Admin WO. Nov 64–Jan 65, Dong Ha, Quang Tri. Feb 65, Hai Lang sub-sector.
RAINF.
RAINF. Commissioned LT–May 67. Deceased 7.9.99.
14.2.67–2.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn. 3.3.67–27.2.68, 1 SAS Sqn.
RAINF.
RAAC. Deceased 25.11.78.
Deceased 31.5.05.
RAASC.
RAAMC. Deceased 26.1.87.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:35 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 344
STEEN, John Henry
52362
344
STEWART, Joseph Clyde
STEWART, Robert
STICPEWICH, Keith Edmund
STOCKLEY, Kevin Duncan
STOCKWELL, Noel
STOKER, Kenneth William
24602
311295
28361
23450
12769
24980
3.8.62– 30.9.63
23.3.65– 8.3.66 15.4.66– 3.4.67 7.10.65– 21.8.66
CAPT
WO2 WO2 WO2
DCM
30.6.71– 3.7.72
WO2
20.8.68– 20.8.69
17.4.64– 13.3.65
10.11.64– 5.5.66
MID
WO2
SGT
8.5.66–1.9.66, 5 RAR. Deceased 25.3.94.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF.
Oct 65–Apr 66, 1/5 ARVN, Quang Tin. May 66, Trai Mat, Police Field Force Training Centre near Dalat.
RAINF. WIA mortar shrapnel 8.12.65. Medevac. Deceased 13.8.76.
Apr 66, RF/PF Quang Tin Sector and then 1/2 RAA. ARVN, Quang Tri.
Mar–Jul 65, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Aug 65–Feb 66, Admin WO Danang.
6 Aug 62–30 Sep 63, Dong Da National Original Team Member. Training Centre, Chief Tactics Committee. RAINF. 12.2.71– Observed 1st ARVN Division operations Jul 63. 16.10.71, 3 RAR. Deceased 7.10.02.
Jul–Sep 71, MATT 6, Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Nov 71, NOTT 1, Bac Lieu. Dec 71–Feb 72, JWTC, Van Kiep. Mar 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Nov 64–Mar 65, battalion 2nd ARVN Division, RAINF. Quang Nam. Apr–Nov 65, CSD Vung Tau. Dec 65–Apr 66, CSD, Quang Ngai. Deceased 24.11.01.
Apr–Jun 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Jul–Sep 64,Van Thanh Training Centre. Oct 64–Mar 65, 2nd & 3rd battalions 3rd Regiment, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Aug 68–Jan 69, platoon commander, 2 MSF B-20, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Feb 69, Security Company commander, Pleiku. Mar–Aug 69, company commander, Training Coy, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
14/7/05 1:04:35 PM
345
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STEWART, John Robertson
28878
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
STONE, John Maxwell
STONEHOUSE, Walter John
STORAN, Laurence John
STRACHAN, Duncan Alfred
53326
39001
3172683
51612
7.1.70– 1.10.70 29.10.69– 29.10.70
WO2
WO2
MM
5.8.71– 28.10.71
LCPL
19.9.66– 19.4.67
WO2
MID
8.9.63– 11.2.65
SGT
RAINF. Medevac NBC.
RAINF. 8.5.67–4.5.68, 2 RAR. 7.10.69–2.11.69, 1 ARU. 13.11.69–8.3.70, 6 RAR. 19.3.70–8.10.70, 8 RAR. Deceased 31.10.01.
RAINF. Nov 69–Jan 70, 1/2 ARVN Dong Ha, 1st WIA 6.1.70. Division, Quang Tri. Jan–Mar 70,VDAT,Vinh Deceased 14.10.94. Binh. Apr–Jun 70, AATTV RF Training, Dinh Tuong. Jul–Oct 70, NOAT, Cho Gao, IV Corps.
Jan–Jun 70, 5/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jul–Sep 70, MATT 1, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy
Aug–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Sep 66–Apr 67, 5th SFGA, Danang. Nung MSF RAINF. & platoon commander Mobile Guerrilla Force, Montagnard. Karrakatta Cemetery, WA. KIA 19.4.67 in A Shau Valley.
RAINF. Sep–Dec 63, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, Weapons Committee. Jan 64, Dong Da Training centre, Weapons Committee. Feb–Mar 64, 1st SFG team A-421 A Shau, Thua Thien. Apr–Jun 26.5.65–1.6.66, 1 RAR. 64, An Diem detached A Shau. Jul 64–Feb 65, Ban Me Thuot, CSD Montagnard Force with CAPT Petersen.
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STOKES, Bevan
213760
346
STUART,Vivian Peter
STURGESS, Scott Charles
STUTTARD, Henry John
SULLIVAN, Barry James
SULLIVAN, John William
SUTHERLAND, Bruce William
1200457
1735257
311013
22424
235038
36266
24.2.71– 26.2.72
12.6.70– 7.1.71
4.7.70– 24.12.70 19.11.68– 26.11.69
24.5.63– 4.4.64
24.7.70– 8.10.70 22.10.70– 15.7.71 16.3.65– 26.2.66
CAPT
CPL
PTE WO2
WO2
LTCOL
WO2
Mar 65–Feb 66, 11 Ranger Battalion, Quang Nam & Quang Tin, I Corps.
Jul 70–Jul 71, Senior Adviser, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jun–Nov 63, Tactics Committee, Hiep Khanh Training Centre. Dec 63, attached 7th SFG team A-727 Khe Sanh. Jan–Mar 64, Tactics & Weapons Committees, Hiep Khan Training Centre.
Nov–Dec 68, 7th ARVN Cavalry Regiment, PK 17 near Hue. Jan–Apr 69, 11th ARVN Cavalry, Quang Tri area. May–Nov 69, 1/11th ARVN Cavalry, Quang Tri area.
Jul–Dec 70, Driver, Baria, Phuoc Tuy Sector.
Jun 70, MATT 5, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. Jul 70, MATT 5, Phuoc Hai. Aug–Dec 70, MATT 5, Hoi My.
Feb–May 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Jun–Nov 71, Adjutant AATTV, Saigon. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Feb 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
RAINF. 9.11.68–9.12.69, 9 RAR.
RAINF. 10.9.69–17.9.69,Visit.
RAINF.
RAAC. WIA, 24.3.69, mine, Quang Tri.
RAINF. 17.3.70–3.7.70, 1 ARU.
RAINF. 9.5.67–13.6.68, 2 RAR. 17.5.70–11.6.70, 2 RAR.
Deceased 19.12.79.
RAASC.
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347
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 347
STRAKER, Bruce Michael
17146
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
SWAIN, Colin Andrew
SWANSON, John Cooper
SWANTON, Ronald James
SYKES, Frank
SZAJNER, John David
335140
32128
13841
36720
64276
25.6.70– 4.5.71 1.1.71– 2.12.71
21.6.63– 14.5.64
7.5.65– 13.11.65
31.7.70– 23.6.71 29.4.67– 9.4.68
WO2
MAJ
WO2
WO2
WO2
WO1
2 May 67, Engineer, camp defences, 5th SFGA, Mike Force, Danang. Jul 67, detached HQ AFV, Clerk of Works.
Aug 70–Feb 71, 2/51 ARVN, Mieu Bong, Quang Nam. Mar–Jun 71, 37th Ranger Battalion, near Danang.
MT Thompson Crematorium, Qld.
May–Oct 65, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Nov 65, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai.
Jul 63, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Nov 63, observed TF 100 operation north of Hiep Khanh. Jan–May 64, Admin WO, Saigon.
Jan–Nov 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jul 70, AATTV RF Training, Cho Gao, Dinh Tuong. Aug–Apr 70, NOTT, Dong Tam, IV Corps.
RAE. Deceased October 1994.
RAINF. 2.3.67–27.2.68, 1 SAS Sqn.
RAINF. KIA 13.11.65 vicinity 3 km south of Tra Bong stream in Nhan Hoa valley.
RAE.
RAINF. Visit, 17.3.64–26.5.64. 12.12.67–4.3.68, 3 RAR. 5.3.68–23.7.68, HQ 1 ATF. 24.7.68–10.12.68, 1 ARU.
RAINF. WIA 21.4.71, Dong Tam, Medevac.
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SUTHERLAND, Gary John
53130
348
TARGETT, Donald Stephen
TAYLOR, David Christopher
TAYLOR, Derek
TAYLOR, Edward Ackroyd
TAYLOR, Rex Peter
62040
1480
29595
13091
28373
24.5.70– 27.11.70
29.9.72– 16.12.72 15.1.68– 6.8.68 30.4.66– 13.4.67 23.7.68– 23.7.69 1.10.70– 30.9.71 30.7.69– 16.7.70 31.7.70– 29.7.71
CPL
CPL WO2
WO2
WO2
WO2
RAAOC. 27.9.72– 2.10.72, 1 OFP.
RAINF. 10.12.65–11.6.66, 1 RAR. 17.11.69–3.6.70, 8 RAR.
RAINF.
Deceased 21.12.95.
RAAOC.
RAA. Aug 70–Feb 71, Hai Lang sub-sector RF, Quang Tri. Mar–Apr 71, MAT 22, Quang Ngai. May 71, MATT 12, Quang Ngai. Jun–Jul 71, HQ AATTV, Danang.
Aug–Dec 69, 5/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jan–Jul 70, ARVN training Nui Dat, Horse Shoe.
Apr 66, Civil Affairs, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Sep 68, Hoi An, Quang Nam Sector. Oct 68–Jan 69, 59 RF Battalion, Hoi An. Feb–Jul 69, MAT RF/PF, Moc Bai, Quang Nam. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 11, Long Dien. Feb 71, Phuoc Hoa, Phuoc Tuy. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Sep 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jan 68, 3/4 ARVN Cavalry, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. RAAC. Feb–Jul 68, 2/4 ARVN Cavalry, Hoi An. 13.8.67–15.1.68, HQ 1 ALSG.
Oct 72, Storeman Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Jun 70, MATT 3, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Nov 70, MATT 6, Hoi My/Hoa Long, Phuoc Tuy.
14/7/05 1:04:36 PM
349
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TALBOT, Michael Noel
212990
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
TEAGUE. Peter William
TEAR, Windsor Douglas
TEMPLE, Peter
TEUMA, Paul Joseph
THOMAS, Albert Ronald
THOMAS, William David
43155
54329
15781
312742
2273781
311610
28.5.68– 30.7.68 2.8.70– 30.8.70
22.5.71– 16.9.71 29.5.71– 30.9.71
PTE
CAPT MAJ
22.10.69– 22.10.70
CAPT
WO2
22.10.70– 21.10.71
WO2
MBE
17.4.64– 11.11.65
CAPT
Oct 70–Sep 71, Phuoc Tuy Sector PsyOps, Baria. Attached in May then posted to AATTV.
May–Aug 71, OC NAT 1 / NOTT 1, Bac Lieu, IV Corps.
Aug 70, MATT 4, three weeks.
May–Jul 68, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, Pleiku, platoon commander, A-201–212 Coy.
Nov 69–Mar 70, 3/3 ARVN, 1st Division, Thua Thien. Apr–Jun 70, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Oct 70, Senior District Adviser Phu Tu District, Thua Thien.
Oct 70–May 71, 3/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Jun–Aug 71, 6th Regt, 2nd Division, Chu Lai. Sep–Oct 71, 3rd ARVN Division, Quang Tri.
Apr 64–Nov 65, Revolutionary Development, CSD Danang Group, responsible for Quang Ngai Combat, PsyOps, Civic Action Teams. Renamed Peoples Action Teams in 1965. Coordinator national PAT program May–Nov 65, I, II and IV Corps.
RAA. 1.10.70–28.9.71, HQ AFV, LO.
RAINF.
RAAMC. 24.6.70– 30.7.70, 1 ARU. 1.9.70–12.5.71, 1 Aust Fd Hosp.
RAINF. Medevac. Deceased 2.7.92.
RAINF.
RAINF.
RAINF. 12.11.65–2.12.65, FARELF. 3.12.65–10.12.65, HQ AFV. 27.1.70–3.12.70, 1 SAS Sqn.
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TEAGUE, Ian Charles
35803
350
THOMPSON, Michael Miles
THOMPSON, Terence Roche
THOMPSON, Wallace Talbot
THOMSON, Ian Alexander
THORBURN, James Lawrence
52764
215476
28609
24652
28662
16.10.64– 22.2.65 20.3.65– 12.6.65 3.8.62– 11.11.63 13.9.72– 9.12.72 11.8.64– 13.5.65
6.1.66– 7.6.66 9.7.72– 18.12.72
CAPT
CAPT
WO1
WO2
WO2
WO2
Jul–Dec 72, MATT 1,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Jan–May 66, Air Movements, 5th SFGA, C Team, Danang.
Aug 64–Feb 65, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Nam. Mar–Apr 65, RF/PF Hoi An, Quang Nam.
Sep–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Aug 62–Nov 63, Weapons Committee, Hiep Khanh Training Centre, near Hue. Attached School of Artillery, Duc My, Oct 63.
RAINF. 15.6.66–19.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn.
RAASC. Medevac, unknown illness. Deceased 12.10.00.
RAINF. 27.3.68–28.9.68, 1 RAR. 4.10.68–29.10.68, 1 RAR. 13.5.71–17.12.71, 4 RAR.
RAAMC. 15.4.69–23.4.70, 1 Fd Hyg Coy.
RAA.
Original Team Member.
Oct–Dec 64, CSD–CIA Danang, not allocated. RAINF. Jan 65, Peoples Action Team, Tuy Hoa–Phu Yen. 13.6.65–23.11.65, Pre–extension leave. Mar–May 65, CSD, Tuy 1 RAR. Hoa–Phu Yen, II Corps.
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 351
THOMPSON, Alan George
57056
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
THORP, Anthony John
TILLETT, Wilbur Eddie
TILLEY, Peter Leach
TILLEY, Roger
35544
53138
235133
212536
3.7.64– 11.4.65
15.4.66– 3.4.67
WO2
WO2
16.10.65– 4.10.66 21.5.65– 8.1.66
CAPT
WO2
25.2.69– 29.8.70
10.9.70– 9.9.71
CPL
Deceased no date.
RAAMC.
May–Sep 65, RF/PF Trieu Phong sub-sector, Quang Tri. Oct–Dec 65, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri.
Oct 65–Sep 66, CSD–CIA paramilitary organisation, Qui Nhon.
Apr 66, RF/PF, Phu Loc, Thua Thien then 2/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Feb–May 69, 4/1 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jun–Aug 69,Vinh Binh Sector, IV Corps. 9.7.70–6.8.70 Hospital. Sep 69–Jan 70,Vinh Binh,VDAT. 6 Feb 70–Aug 70, 2/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai.
RAINF. Medevac illness to Butterworth 8.1.66, Australia 7.3.66.
RAINF. 12.2.71–16.10.71, 3 RAR.
WIA 7.7.66, gunshot. Deceased 11.1.80.
RAINF.
Jul 64–Jan 65, Duc My Ranger Training Centre. RAINF. Ranger Unit Training/Ranger Basic Training. Feb–Apr 65, 11th Ranger Battalion, Quang Nam & Quang Tin.
Sep 70, Adviser School Di An. Oct–Jan 70, MATT 3, Baria. Feb 71, MATT 3, Long Dien. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 2, Dat Do. May–Jun 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
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THORNTON, Robert Leslie
56004
352
TINNING, Noel Edward
TOGHILL, Antony Charles
TOLLEY, Barry
TOMLINSON, William Arthur
TOWNSEND, David Stanley
TRESISE, Wallis David
TRIPP, Martin Terence
34767
210105
53714
11891
123299
374177
590
5.8.71– 18.11.71 27.4.71– 19.4.72 13.2.67– 19.2.68
CPL
CAPT LTCOL
OBE
23.4.66– 11.4.67
WO2
25.6.68– 25.6.69
WO2
DCM
3.8.62– 4.8.63
WO2
3.8.62– 17.9.63
2.1.67– 21.8.67
MBE
WO1
CAPT
26.5.71–23.6.71,Visit.
Original Team Member. RASIGS.
CO AATTV Saigon.
Apr 71–Apr 72, JWTC, Nui Dat/Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug–Sep 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Oct–Nov 71 AATTV Vung Tau.
Apr–Oct 66, 2/6 ARVN, 2nd Division, Tam Ky. Oct 66, paramilitary Police Field Force, Trai Mat near Dalat.
Jun 68–Jun 69, 5th SFGA, company commander 211 MSF Coy, 1st Battalion, Pleiku & platoon commander 212 MSF Coy.
6 Aug 62–5 Aug 63, Dong Da Training Centre, Tactics and Light Weapons committees. Observed 1st Division operations Jul 63.
RAAC. WIA 12.8.67.
RAINF. 17.4.67– 16.4.68, 7 RAR.
RAINF. 9.11.68–26.11.69, 9 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 21.5.68–30.5.69, 4 RAR.
Jan 67, Quang Tri Sector then Duc My Training RAAMC. Hospital April Centre. 1967.
10 Aug 62–11 Sep 63, Hiep Khanh Training Centre near Hue, Tactics Committee then S3 Operations & Training.Visited USSF camp Khe Sanh. Aug 63, studied signals equipment and techniques J-6, MAC–V. Apr 63 visited 22 ARVN Division, Kontum, to repair 510 radio sets.
14/7/05 1:04:37 PM
353
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 353
TINKLER, Barry Ross
235076
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
TRUELOVE, Derek Raymond
TUCKER, Peter John
TUDMAN, Dudley John
TURNER, Cedric Clarence
TURNER, John Robert
UPTON, Clarence Raymon
213563
5411684
14119
213277
1411287
213207
25.3.69– 23.11.69
24.9.68– 11.9.69 5.8.71– 28.10.71
23.4.66– 13.4.67 20.11.67– 3.12.68
20.10.72– 18.12.72
10.3.67– 11.9.67
WO2
WO2 CPL
WO2
WO2
WO2
WO2
RAAC. 9.12.69–10.12.70, Fwd Del Tp.
RAINF. 3.3.67–18.3.67, 1 ARU. 19.3.67–29.5.67, 6 RAR. 30.5.67–5.3.68, 7 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. Died, pneumonia, 3rd Surgical Hospital, Bin Thuy near Can Tho, 23.11.69.
15 Mar 67, 5th SFGA, 11th Coy, Mike Force, Danang. 26 May 67, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, I Corps.
Oct–Nov 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
RAINF. 30.6.67 illness, Medevac 8 Fd Amb and 36 Evac US, Australia. Deceased 3.3.05.
RAINF. 21.1.67– 17.7.67, 1 ARU. 18.7.67–26.4.68, 7 RAR.
Nov 67–Apr 68, B-52 Project Delta, 5th SFGA, RAINF. Nha Trang. 91st Ranger Battalion attached as MSF to B-52. May–Aug 68,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy. Sep–Nov 68, Black Panther Coy, 1st Division, Hue.
Apr 66, 2/1 ARVN, Quang Tri then sub-sector HQ, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug–Oct 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy.
Sep–Dec 68, 4/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai. Jan–Aug 69, 1/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai.
Mar–Jul 69, 4/3 ARVN Hue, 1st Division. Aug–Nov 69,VDAT,Vinh Long, IV Corps. Lismore Cemetery, NSW. NSW Garden of Remembrance.
14/7/05 1:04:37 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 354
TROY, Kevin John
22696
354
VAN BAKEL, Thomas Petrus
VANDYKE, Max
VERCOE, Raymond Frederick
VERKUYLEN, Peter
16469
29156
22599
3411186
2.4.68– 26.11.69
2.1.67– 8.1.68
3.2.66– 20.1.67 5.8.71– 9.10.71 18.12.71– 8.5.72
WO2
WO2
WO2
7.1.71– 5.5.71
26.3.69– 17.7.69 23.7.69– 29.10.69
6.2.68– 11.2.69
WO2
WO2
Aug–Oct 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–May 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Feb–May 66, 3/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri then CSD,Vung Tau.
Jan 67, Civil Affairs 1 ATF, Phuoc Tuy. 9 Mar 67, 2/1 ARVN, Quang Tri. Sep–Dec 67, 11th ARVN Artillery Battalion, Quang Tri.
Apr–May 68, 1/5 ARVN Danang. Jun–Aug 68, 1/4 ARVN, Danang. Sep–Oct 68, 1/4 ARVN, Quang Ngai & Tam Ky. Nov 68–Mar 69, Chief Clerk, AATTV, Saigon. Mar–Apr 69 pre-extension leave. Apr–Nov 69, 3/3 ARVN, Hue, 1st Division.
Feb–Apr 68, company commander, 27th Coy, MSF, Pleiku. Apr 68, toured USSF Recon Schools,Vietnam. May–Dec 68, Recon Coy, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, B-20, Pleiku. Jan 69, Ranger Training Centre, LRP Wing, Duc My. Feb–Mar 69, pre-extension leave. Mar 69, attached Ha Tien, 5th SFGA, Coy D, IV Corps, instructor. Apr–Jun 69,Van Kiep LRRP wing, Baria. Jul– Oct 69, Training Coy, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Jan–May 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
RAA. 27.5.68–11.5.69, 12 Fd Regt. 10.10.71–17.12.71, HQ AFV. Deceased 13.9.96.
RAE. Deceased 19.8.04.
30.4.71–20.12.71, 12 Fd Regt.
RAA.
RAASC.
RTA, Commissioned.
16.6.66–23.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:37 PM
355
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 355
URQUHART, Ashley Graham
213214
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
WADE, Brian
WADE, Edward Robert
57044
28829
30.6.71– 2.11.71 3.8.62– 5.9.63
16.3.65– 26.2.66
WO2 CAPT
WO2
9.4.68– 2.4.69
RAE.Visit, 11.9.65– 20.10.65. 22.4.66–18.5.66, HMAS staff. 25.5.66–5.7.66, HMAS staff. 9.4.68–11.9.68, Det 30 TML Sqn.
RAA. Involved logistic support to Dak Seang force, 3–9 Apr 1970, from Ben Het.
Original Team Member. RAINF.
Mar–Sep 65, 2/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Oct 65–Feb 66, RF/PF Hoa Vang subsector, Quang Nam.
Aug 62, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, Jungle, Swamp, Mountain School. Attached: Ranger Training Centre, Trung Lap near Cu Chi and then PF Training Centre,Van Thanh, and 51st Regiment.
RAINF. Deceased 15.11.99.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 23.11.67–7.12.67,Visit. 5.2.68–23.2.69, 2 SAS Sqn.
Jul 71, 1/3 ARVN Regt, An Lo near Hue. Aug– RAINF. Oct 71, 3rd ARVN Regt, An Lo, Thua Thien. Medevac.
Apr 68, 2/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. May 68–Mar 69, Hoa–Vang sub-sector HQ, RF/PF, Quang Nam.
Jun 69, 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course, Hon Tre Island off Nha Trang. Jun–Sep 69, platoon commander, 223 Coy, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Sep 69–May 70, Training Company, 2 MSF, Pleiku.
Aug 62–Aug 63, HQ AATTV, Saigon. Also employed HQ MAAG.
14/7/05 1:04:37 PM
THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 356
VOGELE, David Bruce
1200116
VINCENT, Kevin Thomas WO2
213310
28.5.69– 14.5.70
WO2
VINCENT, John Roderick
29581
3.8.62– 13.8.63
WO2
VEZGOFF, Joseph
23661
356
10.11.64– 8.10.65 14.8.67– 13.10.67 22.10.67– 6.8.68
RAINF.
RAINF. 9.11.68–23.4.69, 9 RAR.
RAE. 8.4.68–12.11.69, 17 Const Sqn.
RAINF. Nov–Dec 64, Dong Da National Training Centre, Tactics Committee. Jan–Apr 65, 1st Division. May–Sep 65, CSD Vung Tau. Aug 67–May 68, 3/6 ARVN Battalion, Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Jun–Jul 68, 54th Regt, Hue.
May 66, 2/5 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. RAASC. WIA 17.9.66 near Mo Duc, Quang Ngai. Medevac.
Jun–Nov 71, Admin WO Can Tho. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Nov 70, Advisors School. Dec 70–Jun 71, MATT 6, Hoa Long & MATT Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Sep 70, unallotted. Oct 70–Apr 71, MATT 14, Long Dien, Phuoc Tuy. May–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
RAAC. Nov–Dec 64,Van Thanh District Training. Jan–Feb 65, Dong Da National Training Centre, detached to 1st Regt, 1st ARVN Div, battalion. 9.11.70–6.1.71, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt. Mar 65, posted 1st ARVN Division. 7.1.71–18.11.71, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.
14/7/05 1:04:37 PM
357
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 357
WALLNER, David John
14451
WO2
30.4.66– 26.9.66
WO2
WALLACE, Kevin John
6948
MID
16.6.71– 9.6.72
WO1
WALL, Ian Charles
35211
19.11.70– 26.10.71
WALKER, Malcolm Brian CPL
39561
3.9.70– 2.9.71
CPL
WALKER, Alan James
18829
10.11.64– 8.10.65
WO2
WADE, Robert Barrie
36664
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
MAJ
34387 14.1.71– 16.12.71
4.8.71– 4.8.72
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA, 10.9.64. Deceased no date.
RASIGS. Deceased 16.1.97.
RAINF. WIA 2.6.70, Tun Tavern Hill. 25.5.66–5.7.66, HMAS staff.
Deceased 9.3.82.
RAINF.
KIA 27.6.69 at Ben Het.
RAINF.
Jan–Feb 71, HQ, AATTV, Saigon. Mar 71, DSA, RASIGS. Duc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy. Apr–May 71, DSA, Xuyen Loc. Jun–Jul 71, Xuyen Moc. Aug–Sep 71, Long Le. Oct–Dec 71, Duc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug–Sep 71, Phuoc Tuy Sector. Oct 71–May 72, MATT 2, Baria, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 64–May 65, 4th Regiment, 2nd ARVN Division, Quang Nam.
Aug 69–Jun 70, 1/3 ARVN, Hue, 1st Division.
29 Nov 69–Mar 70,VDAT, Kien Hoa, IV Corps. Apr–2 Jun 70, 2/54 ARVN Regt, Phu Loc, Thua Thien.
May–Aug 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Sep–Nov 71, 3rd ARVN Division, Quang Tri. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Detached Jan–22 May 72, RQMS, 1 ALSG site Vung Tau.
Mar–Apr 69, 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course, Nha Trang. Apr–Jun 69, platoon commander, 232 Coy, 3rd MSF Battalion, and 223 Coy, 2nd Battalion, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Rookwood Crematorium, NSW.
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 358
WEBB, Roland Paul
WEASE, Grahame Edward WO1
11332
11.8.64– 13.5.65
WO2
WATTS,Victor Anthony
210581
30.7.69– 9.7.70
WO2
WATTS, Donald Ernest
1668
26.11.69– 29.6.70
WO1
WATERS, Basil Thomas
51427
25.3.69– 27.6.69
26.5.71– 27.5.72
MM
WO2
WALTERS, Neale George
35671
WO2
WALSH, Brian
214468
358
WELLS, Ian Murray
WELLS, Michael
WELLS, Sydney Robert
WELSH, Alexander Albert
WEST, Allan Robert
57062
2243275
54132
36359
18558
12.5.66– 31.1.67
4.3.68– 25.2.69 27.8.70– 26.8.71 17.12.68– 10.12.69 29.10.70– 5.8.71
CAPT
WO2
WO2 WO2
2.4.68– 24.2.69
26.3.66– 14.3.67
3.8.62– 17.6.63
19.9.66– 12.9.67
BEM
CAPT
SGT
RAINF.
RAE. Deceased 11.12.00.
WIA panji stake, 16.2.69, Kontum, Medevac.
Original Team Member. RAINF.
Nov 70, NOAT, Dinh Thuong. Dec 70–Jun 71, NOTT Pleiku. Jul 71, NOTT–2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh, II Corps.
RAE. 24.5.66–3.4.67, 1 Fd Sqn.
Dec 68–Mar 69, CORDS RD Cadre, Can Tho. RAE. Apr–5 Dec 69,VDAT, Dinh Tuong, IV Corps.
RAASC. Mar 68–Jun 68, 3/3 ARVN, Hue, Thua Thien. Jul 68–Feb 69 HQ AATTV, Saigon, Admin WO. Sep 70–Feb 71, 1/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Dong Ha, Quang Tri. Feb–Aug 71 JWTC, Nui Dat.
15 May 66, Orientation tour Danang, Hue, and Quang Tri. 1 Jun 66–Jan 67, S3 Operations & Training, Baria, Phuoc Tuy, with dual responsibilities to report to 1 ATF as well as adviser duties.
Sep 66, CSD–Chieu Hoi program near Vung Tau, also attached 1 ATF.
5 Aug 62–6 Jun 63 Swamp Camp, Duc My Ranger Training Centre, small boat handling and watercourse operations. Oct 62 visited 20 Special Battalion (Ranger), Kontum area. Mar–May 66, Nung Force Danang. Aug 66, approximately, National Police Field Force, commander Nung guards, Trai Mat near Dalat. Apr 68, B-36 Long Hai. Apr–Nov 68,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy. Dec 68–Feb 69, Training Officer, 2 MSF B-20 5th SFGA, Pleiku.
14/7/05 1:04:38 PM
359
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 359
WEIR, Roy Leslie
52636
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
WHEAT, Garth Leonard
WHEATLEY, Kevin Arthur
WHIPP, Albert John
WHITE, Alan George
WHITE, Donald Sydney
WHITE, James Rex
156474
29890
217134
16071
22870
29160
13.4.72– 2.12.72 15.7.71– 27.2.72
WO2 WO2
22.4.72– 8.7.72
28.1.70– 6.1.71
WO2
DCM
26.7.72– 18.12.72
16.3.65– 13.11.65
WO2
WO2
5.8.71– 18.10.71
WO2
VC
30.7.69– 30.7.70
WO2
Jul–Oct 71, AATTV, Danang. Nov 71, NOTT– 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Feb 72, CSM, 1 ALSG site,Vung Tau.
Apr 72, QMS, AATTV,Van Kiep.
Feb–Apr 70, platoon commander 212 Company, 1st Battalion, 2 MSF, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. Apr–Jun 70, MATT 1, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Dec 70, MATT 6, Hoi My/Hoa long. May 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
MATT 2,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
Mar–Oct 65, 1/1 ARVN, 1st Division. Nov 65, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong, north-west of Quang Ngai. Pine Grove Memorial Park, NSW. NSW Garden of Remembrance.
Aug–Oct 71, MATT 7, Ong Trin and Long Le, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug–Dec 69, 3/2 ARVN, Dong Ha, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jan–Jul 70, HQ AATTV, Saigon.
RAINF.
RAINF. 10.2.70– 14.1.71, 7 RAR.
RAINF. 4.5.66–6.9.66, HQ 1 ATF. 7.9.66–14.6.67, 6 RAR. Deceased 4.9.02.
RAINF. 10.10.67– 1.10.68, 1 ARU.
RAINF. KIA 13.11.65, see Swanton.
RAINF. 18.11.68–13.8.69, 1 ARU. 14.8.69–19.11.69, 5 RAR. Medevac.
RAINF.
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WEST, Leslie Arthur
32361
360
WHITE, Percy
WHITESIDE, Cahill James
WHITWAM, Terence James
WIELAND, James Eric
WIGG, John William
2887
31279
38651
14910
36387
20.1.67– 6.9.67 26.5.71– 1.2.72 22.7.71– 15.7.72
21.1.69– 21.1.70
WO1
CPL
CAPT
WO2
24.3.67– 30.4.68
WO2
DCM
19.2.68– 11.2.69
MID
RAINF.
Jan–Mar 69, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, platoon commander, Pleiku. Apr 69–Jan 70,Van Kiep, LRRP Wing, Phuoc Tuy.
Jul–Nov 71, OC NOTT 1, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh, II Corps. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–Jul 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
May–Oct 71, MATT Phuoc Tuy. Nov 71–Jan 72, AATTV HQ, Saigon.
Jan–Aug 67, Phu Vang sub-sector, Thua Thien. 4 Sep–20 Oct 67, detached to 1 ATF, CSM, TFAA.
RAINF. Injured, 1.3.69. WIA, 3.3.69, mine, near Ban Me Thuot. 15.6.66–31.8.66, 3 SAS Sqn.
7.5.69–23.4.70, 6 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF. 4.11.68–26.11.69, 9 RAR.
RAE. WIA 16.5.67. End tour 20.10.67. Deceased 29.6.96.
27 Mar 67, 3/6 ARVN Tam Ky, Quang Tin. Sep RAAC. 67–Jan 68, 2/4 ARVN Cavalry Regiment, Hoi WIA 30.1.68, shrapnel. An. Feb 68, toured US arranged by US Army. Deceased 15.3.03.
Feb–May 68, Commander 11th Mike Force Coy, 5th SFGA, Danang. May–Aug 68, Commander 22/202 Company, B-20, 2 MSF, Pleiku. Nov 68–Feb 69, Asst S-3, HQ 5th SFGA, Nha Trang.
14/7/05 1:04:38 PM
361
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 361
WHITE, John Ernest
17093
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
WILKINSON, Malcolm Thomas
WILLIAMS, Alan Stewart
WILLIAMS, Barry Raymond
WILLIAMS, Leonard Albert
WILLIS, Barry
37497
44040
2789641
26631
43461
29.10.69– 29.10.70
11.2.71– 1.6.71 3.8.62– 3.6.63
5.5.70– 5.12.70 14.10.71– 8.11.72
WO2
CPL
WO2
CPL
4.6.68– 28.5.69
17.8.66– 12.2.68
DCM
CAPT
WO2
May–Nov 70, MATT 2, Dat Do, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat and Van Kiep. Oct 72 (known) Long Hai Training Battalion.
Aug 63–Jun 63, Tactics Committee, Hiep Khanh Training Centre near Hue.
Feb–May 71, MATT 12, An Ngai, Phuoc Tuy.
Nov 69–Mar 70, platoon commander, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF B-20, Pleiku. Apr 70, MATT, Baria. May–Oct 70, MATT 2, Dat Do, Phuoc Tuy.
Aug 66, CSD briefing, Saigon. Sep 67–Feb 68, CSD based Hoi An, Quang Nam. Duties, RD teams, District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centre, and Provincial Intelligence Coordinating Centre. Attached to AATTV Feb 68 on ARL.
RAE. 29.5.66–3.4.67, 1 Fd Sqn. 16.12.69–4.5.70, 17 Const Sqn.
Original Team Member. RAINF. 29.4.70–1.6.71, 2 RAR. Deceased 13.12.04.
RAINF. Medevac NBC. 17.2.69–10.3.70, 5 RAR.
RASIGS. 15.6.66–23.3.67, 3 SAS Sqn.
RAA.
Jun–Nov 68, 5/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Gio Linh RAINF. area, Quang Tri. Dec 68–May 69, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF B-20, platoon commander and acting company commander, 223 Company, 2nd Deceased 28.1.03. Battalion, Pleiku.
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WILKES, Peter Duff
2411081
362
WILSON, Brian Graham
WILSON, David Charles
WILSON, Gregory Lloyd
WILSON, Neville John
WINBANK, Keith Owen
WINTER, Mark
WINZAR, Gordon Vincent
WISCHUSEN, Ian Edward
217063
43075
313659
335120
35461
218391
18337
37903
4.7.72– 18.12.72 26.5.71– 22.5.72
1.10.69– 23.12.69 26.8.72– 8.12.72 2.4.67– 25.3.68 30.4.66– 13.4.67 31.8.71– 18.9.71
22.10.70– 22.7.71 15.10.70– 20.9.71
CAPT WO2
WO2 CPL CAPT
WO2 CPL
WO2
CAPT
Oct 70–Sep 71, Phu Tu district south-east of Hue, Thua Thien.
Oct–Dec 70, NOAT, Cho Gao, Din Tuong. Jan 71, NAT, Can Tho. Feb–Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
No deployment details.
May–Dec 66, 5th SFGA A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Feb 67, Mike Force Danang.
Apr–Sep 67, Adjutant HQ AATTV, Saigon. Sep–13 Dec 67, Mai Linh sub-sector. Dec 67– Mar 68, Nam Hoa sub-sector, Thua Thien.
Sep–Nov 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
Oct–Nov 69, 2/5 ARVN Tam Ky, Quang Tin.
May–Oct 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Dinh. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan–May 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
MATT 1,Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy.
RAINF. 26.2.68–3.3.69,Visit.
RAINF. WIA 16.12.70, 8.11.68–9.12.69, 9 RAR.
RAE. 18.11.68–19.11.68, 17 Const Sqn. 2.11.71– 24.2.72, 55 Engr Wksp Pk.
RAASC. Deceased 17.10.90.
RAINF. WIA 12.9.67.
RAAMC.
RAINF. Medevac, injured, NBC.
16.12.67–2.12.68, 3 RAR.
RAINF.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:38 PM
363
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 363
WILMORE, Desmond John
38935
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
WITCHARD, Gordon Rex
WITTEN, Ralph Harrington
WOODEN, Peter Allan
WOODFORD, Arthur Joseph
WOODRUFF, Gerard William
27667
22032
25778
14508
55223
8.1.68– 23.12.68 16.12.65– 10.12.66 11.12.67– 1.7.68 21.4.67– 23.4.68
19.11.70– 30.9.71
WO2
WO2
WO2
CPL
5.8.71– 21.3.72
12.5.67– 8.5.68
WO2
WO1
Deceased 30.10.03.
RAA. Visit, 6.6.66–8.6.66.
Deceased no date.
RAINF.
RAINF. WIA 12.6.68, shrapnel, Medevac 1.7.68.
RAINF. WIA, 13.8.66, near Tra Bong.
RAAMC. Nov 70, Advisers School Di An. Dec 70–Feb 71, MATT 11, Long Dien. Mar–Apr 71, MATT 2, Dat Do. May–Jun 71, MATT, Phuoc Tuy. Jul 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Aug–Sep 71, MATT, 10.5.67–21.5.68, HQ Phuoc Tuy. 1 ATF.
Apr–Nov 67, 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company & Divisional Intelligence Centre, Hue. Dec 67–Jan 68, RF/PF, Binh Ba. Feb–Apr 68, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My.
Dec 67–Mar 68, Hoa Vang sub-sector, Quang Nam. Apr–Jun 68, RF/PF, Cam Lo sub-sector, Quang Tri.
Dec 65–Oct 66, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong, Quang Ngai. Nov 66, AATTV, Danang.
Jan 68, RF/PF, Binh Ba, Phuoc Tuy. Feb–Apr RAE. 68, Asst S4, 5th SFGA, Pleiku. May–Dec 68, RF, Deceased 27.3.87. Vin Binh, IV Corps.
19 May 67, 2/1 ARVN, 1st Division. Nov 67– Apr 68, Ranger Training Centre, Duc My. Aug–Nov 71, NOTT 1, Bac Lieu. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group,Vung Tau. Jan 72, Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
14/7/05 1:04:39 PM
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Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 364
WISE, Desmond Edward
13468
364
25.9.64– 4.9.65
Sep 64–May 65, 3/2 ARVN, 1st Division, Quang Tri. Jun–Aug 65, RF/PF Hoa Vang subsector, Quang Nam.
Sep 70, unallotted, Baria. Oct 70–Jan 71, MATT 5, Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy. Feb 71, JWTC, Nui Dat. Mar–Aug 71, NAT 2, Dong Tam, IV Corps.
May–Jul 69, platoon commander, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, Pleiku, A-201, 212 Coy.
Oct 70–Sep 71, Territorial Forces, Military Region III, Bien Hoa.
Aug–Sep 71, MATT 7, Phuoc Tuy. Oct 71, AATTV,Vung Tau. Nov 71, NOTT 2, Phu Cat, Binh Din. Dec 71, AATTV Training Group, Vung Tau. Jan 72, Long Hai Training Battalion.
RAA.
RASVY.
RAINF. 26.2.68–4.3.69, 2 SAS Sqn. 29.4.69–29.4.69,Visit. 17.2.71–11.10.71, 2 SAS Sqn.
RAEME.Visit, 12.5.64– 21.5.64. Deceased 12.1.04.
8.5.67–14.5.68, 2 RAR.
RAINF.
14/7/05 1:04:39 PM
365
Bh1009T-PressProofs.indd 365
YENCH, Douglas Gordon WO2
33057
3.9.70– 2.9.71
WO2
WRIGHT, Harry James
31186
30.4.69– 29.7.69
SGT
WRIGHT, Daniel Henry
55362
8.10.70– 7.10.71
LTCOL
WOOLSTON, William Angus
235016
5.8.71– 6.8.72
WO2
WOODS, Jack
213636
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
YOUNG, Arthur Albert
YOUNG, Barry Leon
YOUNG, Peter Raymond
YOUNG, Thomas Campbell
31707
61818
240217
15417
8.1.69– 18.2.70
3.8.62– 17.7.63
28.4.71– 2.12.71
LT
CPL
16.10.64– 15.2.65
3.8.62– 5.9.63
27.8.70– 29.4.71
6.12.66– 5.12.67
WO2
SGT
WO2
Apr 71, unallotted Baria. May–Nov 71, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Aug–Sep 62, 7th SFG team A-727A Training Camp Hoa Cam west of Danang. Oct 62 CIACSD village defence project. CSD HQ Danang, Special Projects.
Jan–Feb 69, platoon commander, 5th SFGA, 2 MSF, B-20, Pleiku. Mar–Jul 69, LRRP Wing, Van Kiep, Phuoc Tuy. Aug 69, 3/4 ARVN, 2nd Division, Quang Ngai. Pre-extension leave 10 Sep–1 Oct 69. Oct 69–Feb 70, 3/1 ARVN, 1st Division, near Quang Tri City.
Aug 62–Sep 63, Dong Da National Training Centre, General Subjects and Light Weapons Committees. Oct–Nov 64, Saigon, not allocated. Dec 64, Dong Da, General Subjects Committee. Jan 65, Long Tho near Hue.
RAE. 29.8.68–1.10.68, 1 Fd Sqn.
Original Team Member. AUST INT. 3.8.65–18.8.65,Visit. 29.11.65–27.5.66,Visit. 12.6.66–2.12.67, Asst Mil Attaché.
16.12.67–2.12.68, 3 RAR. Deceased 5.8.94.
RAINF.
Deceased 14.7.93.
Original Team Member. RAINF.
Dec 66–Jul 67, 5th SFGA team A-107 Tra Bong RAINF. Injured ankle 2.2.67. RF/PF. Feb–Mar 67 employed MSF, Danang (injured ankle). Jul 67, Civil Affairs, 1 ATF, Dat Do. Aug 70, Advisers School, Di An. Sep–Nov 70, 29.4.71–2.9.71, 1 ARU. MATT 1, Binh Ba. Dec 70–Feb 71, MATT 3, Baria and Long Dien. Mar 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh. Transferred to 1 ARU.
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
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YOUL, Michael Ernest
35060
366
ZINKE, Heinz Herbert
BRIERS, Norman William
BURNS, Philip Russell
BYRNE, Michael Barry
EADE, Albert Johnson
GREEN, Lindsay Douglas
216955
57556
57038
217393
2785175
3797304
PTE
CPL
CPL
MAJ
MAJ
8.11.71– 8.5.72
SGT
Nov 71–Apr 72, Sergeants’ Mess supervisor– Cook, JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jul–Oct 71, MATT Van Kiep.
8.3.71– 12.3.71
5.5.70– 25.2.71
24.5.70– 13.8.70
27.6.66– 11.6.67
13.12.66– 16.10.67
RAA. 25.6.66–11.6.67, HQ AFV.
12.12.66–23.10.67, HQ AFV.
AACC. 11.11.68–26.2.69, 85 Tpt Pl. 27.2.69–12.11.69, 1 Fd Sqn. 15.9.71–5.11.71, AFV Amenities.
RAE. 4.2.69–7.1.70, 17 Const Sqn. Deceased 4.8.84.
RAINF. 24.2.70–25.2.71, 7 RAR. Attached from 1 ALSG probably for a function. 23.9.70–5.8.71, 1 ALSG.
May–Oct 70, MATT 2, Dat Do, Phuoc Tuy. Nov 70–Feb 71, attached JWTC, Nui Dat.
Jun 70, MATT 3, Baria, Phuoc Tuy. Jul–Aug 70, RAE. Medevac. 19.8.69– MATT 6, Hoi My, Phuoc Tuy. 13.8.70, 1 Fd Sqn.
Jun 66, USAID Chieu Hoi program, Can Tho.
Attached from AFV for Chieu Hoi program.
Attached or listed with AATTV
8.7.71– 28.10.71
LCPL
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ZEGENHAGEN, John Michael
137535
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
HARKNESS, Alexander
KAY, Stephen Roy
MCINTYRE, Malcolm Neil
RIDDLE, Richard Julian
SALAS, Robert Godfrey
TEMPLETON, Graham Muir
MATHESON, Murdo
215085
218306
1410588
335043
61630
237688
210091
WO2
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
CPL
CPL
MAJ
CPL
28.7.63– 3.8.63
8.5.68– 23.4.69
15.5.66– 19.12.66
19.5.67– 25.6.68
5.5.70– 1.8.70
5.5.70– 2.6.70
2.4.69– 9.4.70
00.8.66– 00.2.67
Movement assistance during changeover 1963.
May–Oct 68, Assistant senior adviser, Can Tho. Nov 68–Apr 69, CORDS, Assistant to chief of territorial security, Can Tho.
Attached from HQ AFV for duty with Chieu Hoi/USAID program.
May 67–Jun 68, HQ AFV for duty with Chieu Hoi.
May–Jul 70, MATT 1, Phuoc Tuy.
Matt Team. Medevac NBC.
Apr 69–Mar 70, CORDS, Assistant to Chief of Security and Senior Australian Adviser, Can Tho.
No documentation, attached as interpreter, Binh Ba.
Attached from Singapore.
RAAC. HQ AFV 7.5.68–23.4.69 for Chieu Hoi program.
Aust Psych Corps. 15.5.66–20.12.67, HQ AFV.
No AATTV record of deployment.
RAINF. 9.7.65–9.6.66, 1 RAR. 17.11.69–5.5.70, 8 RAR. 1.8.70–5.11.70, HQ 1 ATF. Deceased June 2003.
RAAMC. 2.12.69– 3.6.70, 8 Fd Amb.
RAA. 1.4.69–9.4.70, HQ AFV.
1 ATF interpreter.
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
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HENRY, Michael John
213626
368
CPL WO2
WO2
WO2 SGT WO1 CAPT CAPT WO1 WO1
CAMERON, Alan T.
CASKEY, Ian C.
COOTES, John J.
HALL, Graham J.
KARAKA, Limo
MORRISON, David
MOUNTFORT, Richard M.
SHERRIFF, John R.
SAMUELS, Toko R.
ROE, Brian G.
22.10.70– 2.10.71
21.10.71– Oct 72
21.10.71– Oct 72
22.10.70– 26.10.71
21.10.71– Oct 72
24.5.70– 5.9.70
21.10.71– Oct 72
22.10.70– 2.10.71
11.11.70– 2.10.71
13.9.70– 22.2.71
22.10.70– 2.10.71
RNZIR.
RNZIR.
RNZIR.
RNZIR.
RNZIR.
RNZIR.
Oct–Dec 70, MATT 3, Baria. Jan 71, MATT 14, Long Dien.
Oct 71, MATT 2, Baria. Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.
Oct–Dec 71, NAT 2 Dong Tam. Dec 71, JWTC.
RNZIR. Deceased no date.
RNZIR. Deceased no date.
RNZIR.
Oct 70–Feb 71, JWTC. Mar 71, NAT 2, Dong RNZIR. Tam.
Oct 71–Dec, JWTC,Van Kiep. Dec 71, JWTC. RNZIR.
May 70, MATT 3 then 2.
Oct 71–Feb 72, MATT 1, Baria. Mar 72, JWTC,Van Kiep.
Oct 70–Feb 71, MATT 7, Ong Trinh. Mar– Jun 71, MATT 3, Long Dien. Jul 71, NAT 1/2 Bac Lieu & Dong Tam.
Nov–Dec 70, NOAT, Cho Gao. Jan–Feb 71, NAT 1, Can Tho. Mar–Jun 71, NAT 1 Bac Lieu. Jul 71, HQ AATTV,Vung Tau.
MATT 12, Long Le.
MATT 1, Binh Ba.
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WO1
BAIRD, John A.
New Zealand Members
NOMINAL ROLE OF MEN POSTED TO AATTV
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Appendix 2 Foreign awards to the members of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam 1962–72 Foreign awards to the members of the aattv This list was compiled from Australian War Memorial files R445/4/34, 445/1/10 and AWM103 with assistance from the Directorate of Honours and Awards, Department of Defence, Canberra. This list shows the known and officially recognised awards. Should a person have evidence of other awards they may obtain advice from Honours and Awards on how to have them documented.
United States Military Awards Distinguished Service Cross K. Payne
Silver Star P.J. Badcoe with Oak Leaf Cluster J.E. Barker W.J. Brydon F. Callander 370
K.G. Conway B. Davies R.E. Dummett W.L. Dunstan D.W. Eather
J. Fitzgerald M.P. Hanley J.F. Hughes F.M. Moffitt D.J. Neville
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FOREIGN AWARDS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AATTV
A. Parrello K. Payne B.M. Prosper A. Robinson
R.E. Robinson R.S. Simpson O.S. Stevenson B.Tolley
C.R. Upton K.A.Wheatley P.White P.D.Wilkes
Soldiers Medal R.J. Collinson
M.T. Jensen
Bronze Star for Valour (with ‘V’ Device) S.A. Aiken R.D. Aylett J.T. Barnes T.W. Barrett S.A. Birnie J.A. Bond L.N. Bootes F.L. Branson T.H. Breakwell J.G. Cahill R.W. Cairns D.R. Cameron G.E. Chinn B.D. Clark R. Clark D.S. Cochrane J.H. Coleman R.J. Collinson C.S. Connor C.W. Crapper R.J. Curran B. Davies W.R. Deane G.W. Dennis
W.S. Dickey T.F. Dolan W.A. Eade D.W. Eather I.L. Edwards J. Fitzgerald R.W. Foster J. Geedrick M.W. Gill G.D. Heath D.G. Hill A.G. Hinson L. Jackson K.G. Latham B.L. Maher A.C. Massingham K.H. Mavin A.B. McCloskey B.F. McGrath E.F. Miller A.J. Mogridge J.C. Moody L.M. Opie
L.D. Osborn K. Payne R.J. Penman G.M. Polkinghorne D.T. Powell R.A. Purton D.G. Robertson M.G. Rodger D.G. Savage D.W. Scheele A.T. Shelton R.S. Simpson G.T. Smith G.B. Snook J. Stephens P.W.Teague C.C.Turner C.R. Upton K.J.Wallace B.Walsh B.Walsh P.White P.D.Wilkes
Air Medal for Valour (with ‘V’ Device) W.J. Brydon G.E. Chinn R. Clark with Cluster R.J. Curran N.G. Fitzgibbon
K.W. Forden P.H. Harding J.C. Hartley G.D. Heath G.K. Joyce
R.D. Lloyd J.A. McRae R.I. Oliver D.M. Palmer R.J. Penman
371
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
S.D. Rosenberg K.E. Sticpewich I.C.Teague P.W.Teague B.T.Waters
Army Commendation Medal for Valour (with ‘V’ Device) C.L. Black G.E. Chinn R.J. Curran N.G. Fitzgibbon K.W. Forden P.H. Harding J.C. Hartley
G.D. Heath G.K. Joyce R.D. Lloyd J.A. McRae R.I. Oliver D.M. Palmer R.J. Penman
S.D. Rosenberg K.E. Sticpewich F. Sykes P.W.Teague R.F.Vercoe B.T.Waters
R.J. Collinson J.M. Da Costa D.C. Dalton B.R. Day G.W. Dennis D.W. Donkin D.A. Duffey E.J. Fahy B.M. Featherstone K.A. Gabriel J. Garrigan E.W. Gason T.J. Goddard W.J. Grogan J.C. Harding A. Harkness V.L. Harris J.N. Harrower P.J. Heslin P.J. Hoyne F.C. Johnson G.K. Joyce F.M. Kudnig C.F. Keioskie
R.G. Kennedy G.J. Leary A.S. Mann N. Mason-Jones J.H. Macartney with Cluster A.B. McCloskey B.F. McGurgan B. McIlwraith J.F. McKenner I.G. McKeown S.J. McLaughlin R.G. McNamara I.G. McNeill E.F. Miller D.R. Millie R.E. Mills A.J. Mogridge K. Moran V.N. Murphy D.J. Neville L.P. Nicholson R.J. O’Brien
Legion of Merit F.P. Serong
Bronze Star for Service J.H. Andrews R.D. Aylett G. Batiste A.J. Baxter H.L. Bell D.G. Bent J.R. Bishop M.R. Bolitho L.N. Bootes J.L. Bouveng F.L. Branson J. Broderick W.J. Brydon K.A. Bulow J.J. Burrows R.W. Cairns B.J. Caligari D.R. Cameron S.J. Carruthers J.F. Challenger B.E. Chapman R. Clark J.A. Clark W.M. Collins
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FOREIGN AWARDS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AATTV
J.M. O’Donnell R.I. Oliver L.M. Opie E.B. Ostara H.E. Patch M.J. Poole I.G. Porteous A.V. Preece B.M. Prosper
D.G. Robertson M.G. Rodger J. Scales E.W. Snelling J.B. Staunton-Latimer O.S. Stevenson J.R. Stewart K.W. Stoker H.J. Stuttard
D.C.Taylor G.M.Templeton (HQ AFV) A.G.Thompson N.E.Tinning K.J.Troy M.Wells J.E.White M.T.Wilkinson
Army Commendation Medal for Service B.C. Addington R.J. Aitken R.M. Almond R.A. Baird J.T. Barnes F.J. Beattie D.B. Bell O.W. Bell C L. Black J.L. Bouveng T.H. Breakwell C.J. Brock E.C. Burns R.W. Cairns B.J. Carbone A.B. Clutterbuck J.H. Coleman C.S. Connor W.R. Deane W.S. Dickey D.A. Duffey W.A. Eade R.G. Evans K.W. Forden K.A. Gabriel A.E. Gee I.W. Gore P.T. Gowans L.B. Green J.C. Hartley G.D. Heath
D.F. Heenan J.G. Hughes G.C. Jenkin G.K. Joyce J. Kendall D.N. Kerr D.G. Killion G.H. King A.W. Lancaster J.F. Leal J.M. Lefel B.L. Lesueur H.E. Martens R.J. Margetts K.H. Mavin J.H. Macartney M.K. McDermott B.F. McGrath B.F. McGurgan J.F. McKenner T. McNee I.W. McQuire G.L. Millington R.E. Mills G.E. Munro L.T. Murrell R.V. Musgrove J.T. Nicholls W.J. Noble J.E. Nolan R.I. Oliver
P.J. Pavlenko G.E. Paxton K.R. Phillips R.P. Pincott M.J. Poole D.T. Powell K.J. Redman F.A. Roberts R. Roberts M.G. Rodger K.J. Rudd D.G. Savage L.G. Schmidt W.E. Shennan W. Sheppard S. Speechley J.B. Staunton-Latimer M.R. Steiger B. Stokes F. Sykes I.C.Teague W.D.Thomas B.T.Waters I.C.Wall G.E.Wease M.Wells A.G.White I.E.Wischusen W.A.Woolston B.L.Young
373
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Air Medal for Service R.A. Bandy J.J. Burrows with Oak Leaf Cluster
R. Clark L.M. Opie I.C.Teague with Cluster
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Awards The National Order of the Republic of Viet Nam P.J. Badcoe (Knight) K.G. Conway (Knight)
F.P. Serong (Officer) K.Wheatley (Knight)
Legion of Merit 2nd Class G.J. Leary
A.G. Nesbitt
National Police Honour Medal 3rd Class R.G. Carter
Fouragere of National Order of the Republic of Vietnam W.R. Deane
Military Medal P.R. Burns (HQ AFV) J.T. Malone
L. Steele R.J. Swanton
K.A.Wheatley
Fouragere of Military Merit Medal P.J. Heslin
B.F. McGurgan
Army Distinguished Service Order P.T. Gowans
Cross of Gallantry with Palm P.J. Badcoe J.A. Clark K.G. Conway
B.R. Day W.J. Noble R.J. Swanton
K.A.Wheatley
Cross of Gallantry (with Gold Star) R.J. Aitken P.J. Badcoe J.E. Barker H.L. Bell S.A. Birnie
T.H. Breakwell J.A. Browne W.J. Brydon J.J. Burrows G.E. Chinn
J.A. Clark R. Clark R.J. Curran W.R. Deane R.E. Dillow
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FOREIGN AWARDS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AATTV
R.B. Donaldson G.D. Harris R.G. Harris I.J. Jewell R.D. Lloyd G.M. Logan
A.C. Massingham R.I. Oliver D.M. Palmer R.J. Penman T.J. Properjohn A. Robinson
375
J.D. Stewart F. Sykes I.C.Teague I.E.Wischusen
Cross of Gallantry (with Silver Star) J.S. Allan R.M. Almond D.G. Annette R.J. Ashfield P.J. Badcoe J.E. Barker R.W. Cairns with Cluster B.J. Caligari D.H. Campbell with Cluster A.B. Clutterbuck C.S. Connor W.R. Cope C.W. Crapper R.J. Curran W.R. Deane D.W. Eather T.J. Egan with Cluster B.C Emberson M.A. Evans L.B. Firth K.W. Forden A.D. French K.A. Gabriel with Cluster E.W. Gason J. Geedrick with Cluster R.K. Gurney R.G. Harris V.L. Harris J.F. Hughes A.K. Hunter J. Husband
C.J. Ison with Cluster N. Johnston W.T. Jones C.F. Keioskie M. Kelly W. Kenneally S.T. Kent G.H. King R.M. King F.M. Kudnig B.G. Long T.F. Malone H.E. Martens E.H. Martin M.K. McDermott K.F. McDonald C.N. McEvoy B.F. McGrath J.F McKenner I.W. McQuire R.E. Mills A.J. Mogridge L.T. Murrell G.C. Neitz W.A. Nesbit W.J. Noble J.M. O’Donnell R.I. Oliver L.M. Opie L.D. Osborn E.B. Ostara D.M. Palmer J.R. Peel
A.B. Petersen with Cluster M.J. Poole I.G. Porteous D.T. Powell K.D. Pryde R.A. Purton K.J. Redman F.A. Roberts R.E. Robinson M.G. Rodger with Cluster D.J. Rowe C.L. Rule D.G. Savage A.S. Selva J.I. Shaw W. Sheppard G.T. Smith E.W. Snelling C.F. Spencer J.B. Staunton-Latimer L. Steele D.C.Taylor I.C.Teague P.W.Teague W.D.Tear W.T.Thompson B.Tolley M.T.Tripp T.P. van Bakel D.J.Wallner M.Wells P.White D.E.Wise B.L.Young
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
Cross of Gallantry (with Bronze Star) L.T. Allen R.M. Almond D.G. Annette A.J. Baxter F.J. Beattie C.L. Black M.A. Brodziak R.W. Cairns N.C. Camm R.G. Carter with two Clusters M.P. Casey J.F. Challenger S.C. Colley M.B. Cranston R.J. Curran W.S. Dickey with Cluster T.F. Dolan R.E. Dummett W.A. Eade R.G. Evans J. Fitzgerald A.H. Franks W.J. French K.A. Gabriel L.N. Gorman N. Gruetzner W.J. Grogan J.F. Ghilotti with Cluster R.K. Gurney
G.D. Harris R.E. Heathcote P.J. Heslin D.G. Hill R.C. Hinde C.J. Ison with Cluster G.W. Jackson L. Jackson G.Y. Jamieson G.C. Jenkin D.W. Jenkinson I.J. Jewell G.K. Joyce L.A. Kapp C.R. Kealy R.M. King R. Lennon C.N. McEvoy B.F. McGrath W.J. McInerny I.S. McPhail D.R. Millie E.J. Morrison J.P. Nelson M.T. Norris R.A. O’Hara R.I. Oliver with Cluster E.B. Ostara with Cluster K. Payne D.B. Phillips
M.J. Poole D.T. Powell J.W. Pratten R.A. Purton N.E. Richardson W.A. Robertson A. Robinson R.E. Robinson S.D. Rosenberg D. Rothwell K.J. Rowe B.L. Saxby D.W. Scheele G.T. Smith N. Smith A.G. Stanley J. Stephens with Cluster H.J. Stuttard F. Sykes E.A.Taylor R.P.Taylor A.G. Urquhart M.Vandyke E.R.Wade D.J.Wallner N.G.Walters J.R.White P.D.Wilkes
Life Saving Medal J.A. Leggett
Armed Forces Honour Medal 1st Class R.M. Almond D.G. Annette T.C. Bannister H.L. Bell L.N. Bootes J. Broderick M.A. Brodziak
J.A. Browne R.S. Buchan K.G. Chester J.A Clark R. Clark A. Clunies-Ross M.B. D’Arcy
T.J. Egan B.C. Emberson E. Fahy B.M. Featherstone A.D. French P.T. Gowans A. Harkness
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FOREIGN AWARDS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AATTV
G.D. Harris J.N. Harrower R.J. Hayes D.F. Heenan J.N. Hemerik D.G. Hill G.S. Horne M.T. Jensen F.M. Kudnig G.J. Leary
J.H. Macartney M.C. Macartney T.F. Malone N. Mason-Jones I.G. McNeill M.J. Musgrave G.C. Neitz E.B. Ostara I.G. Porteous K.J. Redman
F.A. Roberts W.M. Silverstone C.F. Spencer J.D. Stewart W.D.Tear G.M.Templeton (HQ AFV) W.D.Thomas I.E.Wischusen W.A.Woolston
Armed Forces Honour Medal 2nd Class B.C. Addington L.T. Allen R.A. Bandy F.J. Beattie T.H. Breakwell J. Broderick E.C. Burns R.F. Capel C.A. Chambers K.D. Charlton G.E. Chinn R.B. Donaldson
J.F. Ghilotti L.B. Green G.D. Jenkin D.W. Jenkinson I.J. Jewell W. Kenneally S.T. Kent B.L. Lesueur B.F. McGrath I.S. McPhail L.I. Morrison L.T. Murrell
M.J. Poole K.J. Redman K.A. Richards A.E. Riedel W.A. Robertson R.V. Roney A.G. Stanley M.Vandyke D.B.Vogele N.G.Walters J.R.White
Staff Service Medal 1st Class I.W. Gore R.P. Webb Staff Service Medal 2nd Class R.D. Aylett K.D. Charlton
J. Kendall B.G. Long
K.D. Pryde
Technical Service Medal 2nd Class D.G. Killion
A.D. Martin
M.R. Steiger
Training Service Medal 1st Class P.W. Beale B.J. Caligari J.A. Gibson
K.G. Gallagher R.C. Hinde S. Krasnoff
F. Lawler J.W. Sullivan J.E.Wieland
Training Service Medal 2nd Class C.R. Ansell R.A. Bandy B.H. Cox B.R. Day
D.A. Duffey B. Foster T.J. Goddard D.F. Hedges
L. Jackson D.W. Jenkinson B.L. Maher T.F. Malone
377
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THE MEN WHO PERSEVERED
B.F. McGrath J.W. Pratten I.R. Ramsay S.F. Reid
S.D. Rosenberg W.E. Shennan N. Smith O.S. Stevenson
A.R.West J.R.White B.G.Wilson J.Woods
Civil Actions Medal 1st Class G.V. Brown
ARVN Armour Badge F.J. Beattie
W.J. Noble
Certificates of Outstanding Achievement and Commendation have not been included. Civilian awards are also not shown.
Republic of Cambodia Military Awards National Defence Medal with Silver Star Forces Armies Nationales Khmer (FANK) I.W. Gore R.J. Harvey S.R. Hearder O.S. Lind
R.J. Margetts W.M. McLaughlin F.A. Roberts T.J. Smith
B.M. Straker J.E.Wieland
National Defence Medal with Bronze Star R.J. Allen J.L. Bouveng J. Clarke J.R. Cousins B.R. Day D.A. Duffey B. Elphick B. Foster J.A. Gibson R.K. Gurney G.C. Jenkin
I.J. Jewell F. Lawler W.F. Lewis J.D. Martin B.F. McGrath J.C. McNamara I.S. McPhail B. Morrow E.A. Nicholas J.E. Nolan K.R. Phipps
National Defence Medal with Broze Star Supplementary Non-FANK D.G. Hill
R. Roberts
M.J. Poole J.W. Pratten I.R. Ramsay R. Roberts K.O. Smith R. Stewart P.Verkuylen I.C.Wall B.G.Wilson D.E.Wise J.Woods
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FOREIGN AWARDS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AATTV
379
Unit Commendations AATTV was awarded the United States Meritorious Commendation from 31 July to August 1969. Note that the citation does not give an end date by day although it is generally accepted that the date is 31 August 1969. All members who served with AATTV during the cited period are entitled to wear the commendations. AATTV was awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm unit citation for service between 31 July 1962 and 31 October 1971. All members who served with AATTV during the cited period are entitled to wear the commendation.
Presidential Unit Citation The Presidential Unit Citation was awarded to the 5th Special Forces Group for service between 1 November 1966 and 31 January 1968. Members of AATTV who served with the 5th SFG between those dates are entitled to wear the citation.
Other Commendations The Valorous Unit Award was granted to B-20, 1st Mobile Strike Force Battalion for service between 3 and 11 April 1970. A few AATTV are entitled to this award. UTIG/FANK was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for service between 24 February 1971 and 30 November 1972. Members of AATTV who served with the Long Hai and Phuoc Tuy Training Battalions should be entitled to this commendation. The Meritorious Unit Commendation was also awarded to the 5th SFG for service between 31 January and 31 December 1968.
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Glossary of terms and acronyms Glossary of terms and acronyms
2IC AAFV AATTV AFV AHQ Air America
ANZAC ANZUS APC ARVN ASIS ATF AWOL 380
Second-in-command Australian Army Force Vietnam Australian Army Training Team Vietnam Australian Force Vietnam Army Headquarters, Canberra An airline wholly owned by the CIA through which it conducted its diverse and widespread operations throughout Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia Australian New Zealand Army Corps, a combined unit Australia, New Zealand and United States of America security treaty Armoured personnel carrier, the M113, a 10tonne, tracked vehicle Army of the Republic of Viet Nam, the South Vietnamese Regular Army Australian Secret Intelligence Service Australian Task Force, Nui Dat Absent Without Leave
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
B-40
B-52 B-57 BAR BOQ BRIAM CA
CAB
CAR-15 Caribou CB CGS CH-34 CH-46
Charlie Chieu Hoi ChiNats CIA CIB
381
Also known as the RPG-2, a rocket-propelled grenade, there was also a larger rocket-boosted version known as the RPG-7 Strategic US jet bomber Canberra jet bomber Browning Automatic Rifle, .30 calibre Bachelor Officer Quarters, US forces British Advisory Mission in Viet Nam Civil Affairs or Civic Action. Those matters undertaken by the military to influence the attitude of the local populace and gain support of the people to lessen the terror and influence of the Viet Cong/NVA. Involved the philosophy known as ‘winning hearts and minds’ (WHAM) Covert Action Branch, a section of the Combined Studies Division of the CIA, which controlled a very small number of Team members A shortened carbine version of the M-16, 5.56 mm C-7, short range, twin-engine, tactical transport aircraft Companion of the Order of the Bath, British honour Chief of the General Staff, Australia Choctaw utility helicopter made by Sikorsky Sea Knight, United States Marine Corps, smaller version of the CH-47 Chinook helicopter Viet Cong, taken from the phonetic sounding of VC, or Victor Charlie enemy soldiers who defected Chinese nationalist forces, Taiwan Central Intelligence Agency Combat Infantry Badge, also known in the US Army as the ‘Davy Crockett’ badge
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CIDG CINCPAC CG Claymore CMF CO Cobra COMAAFV COMUSMACV Contact CORDS
CPO CSD CTZ
DCM DMZ DSO Dustoff FANK FARELF Flareship FSB
Civilian Irregular Defence Group Commander in Chief Pacific (Command) Civil Guard, later to be known as Regional Force an anti-personnel mine Citizen Military Forces, militia Commanding Officer, usually a lieutenant colonel in rank AH-1, attack helicopter armed with cannon, machine gun and rockets Commander Australian Army Force Vietnam, Saigon Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam To engage in a battle with the enemy Civil Operations and Revolutionary (Rural, 1970) Development Support, organisation, coordinated all civil and military advisory effort under Military Assistance Command,Vietnam Chief Petty Officer Combined Studies Division, a department of the CIA (Corps Tactical Zone), the zones were numbered I through to IV, viz: I Corps, later known as Military Region 1 (MRs) Distinguished Conduct Medal, a gallantry award second only to the Victoria Cross Demilitarised Zone, a ten-kilometre buffer zone around the 17th Parrallel Distinguished Service Order helicopter casualty evacuation Forces Armees Nationals Khmer, Cambodia’s Army Far East Land Forces Fixed wind aircraf used to drop illumination fire support base, usually established in the field
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383
General of the Army A five star general (US), Field Marshal equivalent GSM General Service Medal Gunship a helicopter, normally an Iroquois mounted with rockets and machine guns HMAS Her Majesty’s Australian Ship, Royal Australian Navy Hoi Chanh former enemy soldiers who had defected and then worked with the allies HQ headquarters HQAFV Headquarters Australian Force Vietnam, Saigon Huey Iroquois helicopter In country Viet Nam, to be in Viet Nam JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA JTC Jungle Training Centre, Canungra, Queensland JWTC Jungle Warfare Training Centre (Phuoc Tuy Province, South Viet Nam) KBE Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire, honour KIA Killed in Action LLDB Vietnamese (ARVN) Special Forces LOH Light observation helicopter, a Sioux or Bell OH-58 Kiowa or Hughes OH-6 Cayuse LRRP Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol, sometimes known as LRP LZ Landing Zone M-48 Medium tank M-50A1 Ontos, ground support weapon system MAAG Military Assistance and Advisory Group MACV Military Assistance Command,Vietnam Market Time patrols designed to intercept the enemy along the Vietnamese coastline MAT Mobile Advisory Team, American forces MATT Mobile Assistance Training Team, sometimes referred to as ‘Advisory’, Australian forces MBE Member of the British Empire, honour
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MC
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Military Cross, the US Silver Star was equivalent MGF Mobile Guerrilla Force MIA Missing in Action MID Mentioned in Despatches Mike Force multi-purpose reactionary—reconnaissance units who were also used in conventional combat operations Minister (diplomat) Senior diplomat, a rank below ambassador MM Military Medal, the US Bronze Star (V) was equivalent Mobile Strike Force see Mike Force Montagnards Hill tribes people also known as ‘Yards’, recruited into the CIDG MOU Memorandum of Understanding MO9 another name for ASIS MR Military Region, the military regions were numbered 1 to 4, from the DMZ to the Delta, they replaced the CTZs MSF Mobile Strike Force MVO Member of the Victorian Order, British honour NAT Night Assistance Teams NCO Non-commissioned officer NOAT Night Operations Advisory Team NOTT Night Operations Training Team Nungs Chinese mercenaries resident in Viet Nam, descendant from Chinese warrior class NVA North Vietnamese Army OBE Order of the British Empire, honour OC officer commanding, usually a sub-unit commander and major in rank (Aust) or captain (US) or lieutenant (ARVN) OSS Office of Strategic Studies, planned and executed covert operations during World War II PAT People’s Action Team, supported local village infrastructure, designed to counter Viet Cong operations
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
PAVN PF PFC PFF PR PRU
PSDF PX QANTAS QC RAAF RAE Rangers
RAR RD Cadre
RF RPG RSM RVN S2 S3 SAS
385
People’s Army of Viet Nam, the military arm of North Viet Nam, also known as the NVA Popular Force, formerly Self Defence Corps Private First Class, US Forces, a senior private soldier Police Field Force Public Relations Provincial Reconnaissance Units, covert civilian-based intelligence gathering organisation People’s Self Defence Force, the latter stage of the village hamlet protection program Post Exchange, a duty free store and commissary for soldiers Australia’s national airline, Queensland and Northern Territory Airline Services Queen’s Commendation, bravery award, not for battle action Royal Australian Air Force Royal Australian Engineers Infantry forces trained in conducting reconnaissance and surveillance operations and lightly equipped for ground mobility operations Royal Australian Regiment, straight leg infantry Revolutionary development cadre, forces designed to bolster defence of hamlets and villages Regional Force, formerly Civil Guard rocket-propelled grenade, a squad level rocket launcher, see B-40 Regimental Sergeant Major, WO1, the most senior NCO in a unit Republic of (South) Viet Nam captain, intelligence (US Army) captain operations (US army) Special Air Service
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SDC SEATO sector SF SFG Slick SLR SOG SOIC Spooky
SSGT Strikemaster sub-sector T-28 TCN TOC Uc Da Loi Up country USAID USARV USIS USMC
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Self Defence Corps—later to be known as Popular Force South-East Asia Treaty Organisation a province, see endnotes Special Forces Special Forces Group a troop-carrying helicopter, usually an Iroquois or ‘Huey’ 7.62 mm, self-loading rifle, semi-automatic, also known as the FN Studies and Observation Group, highly secret Special Forces patrols Sector Operations and Intelligence Centre C-47, fixed wing, close air support gunship, also known as Puff the Magic Dragon, which evolved through several types: Shadow, Stinger and Spectre in C-119 and C-130 airframes Staff Sergeant Trainer, ground attack aircraft, made by British Aerospace equivalent to a district within a province Trojan, a propeller-driven trainer, later models were employed in a ground attack role Third-country nationals, any third group other than the Vietnamese and US forces Tactical Operations Centre, command post a Vietnamese term meaning people from the great southern land (Australians) to go to the northern sectors of South Viet Nam United States Aid for Internation Development (previously USOM) United States Army,Vietnam United States Information Service, a department of the US Embassy, Saigon The United States Marine Corps, the forces from the Department of the US Navy designed
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
USOM
USS USSR VB VC
VCI VD VDAT Vegemite Viet Minh
WIA WO1 WO2 XO
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to establish a bridgehead on a beach for later military operations by the army United States Operations Mission, a department of the US Embassy, Saigon (redesignated USAID, Jan 1966) United States Ship Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Victoria Bitter, beer Viet Cong, a derivative of Viet Nam Cong San. The term Viet Cong (communists) was invented by the United States Information Service in the late 1950s to rename the Viet Minh, a term they thought was too close to nationalism Viet Cong Infrastructure, the communist ‘cell’ system Venereal Disease Village Defence Advisory Team a vegetable-extract spread requiring an acquired taste A contraction of Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi. The term applied to the Vietnamese resistance fighters from the First Indochina (French) War Wounded in Action Warrant Officer Class One, usually a regimental sergeant major, the senior NCO in a battalion Warrant Officer Class Two, a rank below WO1, usually a company sergeant major Executive Officer, second-in-command of a military unit
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Notes Notes
Prologue 1 Indochina consisted of the colony of Cochin-China and the protectorates of Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia and Laos. Annam and Cochin became South Viet-Nam and Tonkin the North. 2 Department of State Report, Gallagher Papers, General Philip Gallagher to General R.B. McClure, 20 Sep 1945. 3 Department of State, Research and Intelligence Service, ‘Biographical Information on Prominent Nationalist Leaders in French Indochina’, 25 Oct 1945. 4 Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945–1969, Robert Thompson, Secker and Warburg, London, 1970. 5 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, vol. I, Document 3,‘Memorandum from General Omar Bradley’, 10 Apr 1950. 6 Joseph Dodge Papers, Detroit Public Library, ‘Statement of Charles E. Bohlen Before the Voorkeers Group’, 3 Apr 1950. 7 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, vol. I, Document 8,‘Press Release by President Truman Announcing Military Assistance to Indochina’, 27 Jun 1950. 8 US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 14 Jan 1965 (Washington, 1965), p. 137. 9 Australian Foreign & Defense S E Asia Policy in the wake of 1999–2000 East Timor Intervention, Peter Chalk, Rand Organisation, Chap 2. 10 DO letter 1/62, Serong to Pollard: first proposal a small team with MAAG in Viet-Nam; second proposal return to Burma if Maung Maung came back; and third to attend National War College in the US, 20 Feb 1962. 388
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389
1 To Viet Nam 1 Summary: Minutes, Department of External Affairs meeting 14 December 1961, at which officers from DEA, Defence, Navy, Army and Air attended. 2 The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,The JCS and War in Vietnam 1960–1968, Part I, Historical Division Joint Secretariat, JCS, Chap 4. 3 Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, vol. I,Vietnam, 1961, various entries. 4 The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I, Chap 4. 5 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. II,Vietnam 1962, Document 16. 6 ibid., p. 67. 7 Brennan note, NAA: A1838, 696/8/4, dated 27 Mar 1962. 8 News conference given by the Minister for External Affairs at Parliament House, 9 May 1962. 9 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. I, 1961, various entries and DEA cablegrams 117 of 5 May 1962 and 170 of 14 May 1962. 10 Inward cablegram No. 303, Department of External Affairs, dated 7 Aug 1962. 11 Hansard, House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Australia, Answers to Questions, dated 20 Oct 1964. 12 Cablegram from Hill to Brennan, NAA 221/1/4/1/5, dated 13 Nov 1962. 13 The Advisor, issue 3/2000, p. 23. 14 A.H. Loomes’ Minutes, External Affairs,TS 656/8/4 Part 1, dated 15 May 1962. 15 Report prepared by R.F. Osborne: ‘Situation in South Vietnam’, External Affairs file 696/8/4, dated 5 Dec 1961, and summary of meeting COSC and Head BRIAU 28 March 1961, file 3018/2/1/1 dated Apr 1962. 16 Foreign Relations of the United States, Document 159, dated 12 October 1961. 17 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. II, 1962, Document 209, dated 4 Jun 1962. 18 Various cablegrams from Australian Embassy Saigon, especially 200 and 206, dated 29 and 31 May 1962. Also, Sir Garfield Barwick’s detailed letter to Mr Townley, Minister for Defence, dated 1 Jun 1962 in Hong Kong. 19 Australian Embassy Cablegram 211 dated 2 Jun 1962. 20 R.L. Harry’s, FAS Division IV, note dated 11 May 1962, highlighted Vinh Long Province (Delta) as an ‘agreed’ province for Australian aid. 21 Australian Embassy Cablegram 213, dated 4 Jun 1962. 22 Various cablegrams from Australian Embassy Saigon, dated June 1963, especially numbers 222, 223, 228 and 229. 23 Serong letter to CGS file 248/4/57, dated 5 Jun 1962, folio 129. 24 Notes on Defence Committee Agendum No. 54/62, dated 10 Jul 1962. 25 Serong report to CGS, dated 21 Jun 1962 in answer to Chiefs of Staff Agendum 29/1962. 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 26 The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I, Chaps 2 and 3. 27 Report by the Defence Committee, Department of Defence, Canberra, dated 11 Jul 1962.
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34 35
36 37 38 39
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
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Cablegram No. 213 from Australian Embassy, dated 4 Jun 1962. Cablegram No. 213 to Australian Embassy, dated 23 Jun 1962. Australian Embassy Saigon Cablegram No. 258, dated 27 Jun 1963. Ted Serong, Anne Blair, p. 77. ibid. Defence Committee Minute 45/1962, and Defence NAA:A1945, 248/4/66, dated 29 Jun 1962, and Department of External Affairs inward Cablegram No. 241 (from Saigon), dated 14 Jun 1962. Australian Embassy Saigon Savingram No. 5, dated 29 Jan 1962. Pentalateral Agreement between the United States of America, Cambodia, France, Laos and Viet Nam for Military Defense Assistance in Indochina signed 23 Dec 1950. Correspondence, Ian Gollings, dated 7 Mar 2004. Letter, Joe Vezgoff, dated 3 Feb 2004. Eastern Command Raising Instruction 1/62 vide AHQ 41/441/69, dated 21 Jun 1962, and AHQ 41/441/69, dated 12 Jul 1962. Directive to Commander, AATTV, dated July 1962, and Hansard, House of Representatives, dated 18 Oct 1962, p. 1663, and CGS letter 42/62 to Secretary of 2 July 1962. Ian Gollings, op. cit. National Security Action Memorandum No. 57, and Secretary of Defense Honolulu meeting, dated July 1962. Although awarded the GSM with clasp Malaya, he was detached to HQ Aust Army Force FARELF for duty in Burma to lecture senior officers. Joe Vezgoff, op cit. ibid. Correspondence, Ron Perkins, dated 19 Apr 2004. Joe Vezgoff, op. cit. Ian Gollings, op.cit. Correspondence, Peter Young, dated 9 Apr 2004. Correspondence, Barry Tinkler, dated 30 Apr 2004. Ian Gollings, op. cit. AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 95, 1/2/4, dated Sep 1962. Correspondence, Bob Hagerty, dated 7 Mar 2004. ibid. Joe Vezgoff, op. cit. AATTV Commander’s, AWM 95, 1/2/7, dated Dec 1962.
2 Defeat, doubt and death 1 2 3 4
Correspondence, Ron Perkins, dated 19 Apr 2004. Correspondence, Ian Gollings, dated 7 Mar 2004. Secret-GP-3 Message, Saigon, 882 to State, dated 5 Apr 1963. Recorded in Saigon Embassy file 221/1/4/5, and in Savingram No. 49, dated 6 May 1963.
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NOTES
5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
391
Secret Memo, NSC Staff Assistant Forrestal for the President, dated 25 Jan 1963. Recorded in Saigon Embassy file 221/1/4/1/5, op. cit. Correspondence, Donald Dalton, dated 21 Jul 2004. Memorandum No. 573/63, Australian Embassy Washington, dated 29 May 1963. Correspondence, Bob Hagerty, dated 7 Mar 2004. Court of Inquiry report, dated 27 Nov 1963, Saigon. Various letters kindly provided by Ms Kathleen Ginnane and Mr Wally Hacking, written between Aug 1962 and May 1963. All signficant parts of Sergeant Hacking’s medical file made available to National Archives have been destroyed (NAA, DA 94/185, Box 1). Donald Dalton, op. cit. Ninety-seven men did two tours with AATTV. Eight did three (some were extended tours) and WO Gabriel did four tours with AATTV.WO Ostara did the longest single tour of 36 months. Most months of service in AATTV (in Viet Nam) were: Gabriel, 58; Ostara, 56; Simpson, 56; Munro, 43; Dickey, 42; Opie, Jamieson and Osborn, 41, and Roy, 36. External Affairs Minute, Kirtley to Hamilton, dated 30 May 1961. Message (TS), Saigon 375 to State, dated 29 Aug 1963. External Affairs Minute, Kirtley to Hamilton, dated 30 May 1961. AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 1/2/16, dated Sep 1963. Message, State 243 to Saigon, dated 24 Aug 1963. See: Special Assistance for Counter Insurgency and Special Activities (SASCA), Chronology, Aug 1963 (S); and CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968, Harold P. Ford, Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1998. AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 95, 1/2/17, dated Oct 1963. Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee, file 3018/2/1/1, dated 28 Mar 1962. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, op. cit. Correspondence, Barry Petersen, dated 16 Feb 2004. A full account can be read in Tiger Men, Barry Petersen with John Cribben, Macmillan, Australia, 1988. Paul D. Harkins letter as attachment to AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 95, 1/2/19, dated Sep 1963. AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 95, 1/2/19, dated Dec 1963. MACJO1, signed by Paul D. Harkins, dated 18 Dec 1963. Minute to H.E. Australian Ambassador from Col F. P. Serong dated 18 Dec 1963. AATTV Commander’s Diary, op. cit.
3 Doom and gloom 1 2 3 4 5 6
The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chap 8. Correspondence, Donald Dalton, dated 21 Jul 2004. AATTV Commander’s Diary, Report 20, AWM 95, dated Mar 1964, p. 3. AATTV Commander’s Diary, Report 21, AWM 95, dated Apr 1964, p. 2. Anderson letter to Tange, dated 29 Apr 1964. USOM and USIS were US agencies that were involved in the pacification program.
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7 Correspondence, Ian Teague, dated 19 Mar 2004. 8 VNQDD was the Vietnamese Nationalist Party that was formed in 1927 based upon the Chinese nationalist Kuomintang. 9 Ian Teague, op. cit. 10 ibid. 11 Letter, Serong to Jackson, dated 10 Dec 1965. 12 Correspondence, James Devitt, dated 12 Mar 2004. 13 ibid. 14 Correspondence, Colin Bannister, dated 1 Apr 2004. 15 Press release No. 552, Canberra, dated 8 Jun 1964. 16 AATTV Commander’s Diary, Report on Nam Dong camp assault,AWM 95, dated Jul 1964. 17 ibid. 18 AATTV Commanders Diary, 8 Jul 1964, AWM 95. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. 65 dated 2/8/1962 and the Defence Act 1903–1956, members were on ‘war service’ and subject to the Army Act Australian Manual of Military Law (1941 Edition). See citations for WO1 G. Chinn and Captain N. De La Hunty. 19 MACV Command History 1964, p. 19. 20 AATTV Comds Diary, AWM 95, dated 9 Jul 1964. 21 AATTV file, NAA: A1838, 215/4/2, dated 30 Jul 1964. 22 Previous to this, Sergeant Hacking’s body was brought home at public expense in 1963, but after that Australians were to be interred in regional war cemeteries. Australia was embarrassed by the action of US Master Sergeant Eugene Jordan who brought WO2 Ronald Scott (DOW 10 Sep 1965) to Australia for burial. This changed the policy to all Australians being brought home. Badcoe, who was killed after, was buried in Terendak, but it was his personal wish. 23 The French created Regional/Popular Forces in 1953. Regional Forces were organised into 120-man companies and Popular Forces were deployed in 40-man platoons. Following the defeat of the French, the territorial forces were largely ignored when the MAAG took over the training of the ARVN. Diem reorganised and renamed the PF/RF into the Civil Guard and Self Defence Corps (Force). In 1964 the CG became the RF and the SDC the PF. 24 Correspondence, Malcolm ‘Mick’ Coffey, dated 15 Aug 2004. 25 ibid. 26 AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 95, dated 6 Aug 1964. 27 Correspondence, Ron Monkhouse, dated 22 Nov 2002. 28 Gazette No. 65, dated 2 Aug 1962. 29 Mick Coffey, op. cit. 30 Letter, Johnson to Menzies, The White House, Washington, dated 12 Dec 1964. 31 Mick Coffey, op. cit.
4 Outside the wire 1 History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chap 17, p. 17-2, and MACV Command History 1965, p. 14
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393
2 ‘The Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam—in 1965 and early 1966’, Australian Army Journal, issue Aug 1973, and letter O.D. Jackson, dated 31 Oct 2003. 3 History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chap 17, p. 17-17,The Pleiku Attack—a turning point. 4 Special DIA IB (S-NOFORN), dated 14 Jan and 1 Feb 1965. 5 DIA, SIS-267-65 (S-NOFORN-GP 1), dated Jul 1965. 6 AATTV Commander’s Diary, Report 31, AWM 95, dated Feb 1965, p. 2. 7 Cabinet Minutes, Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Canberra, Decision No. 675 (FAD), dated 18 Jul 1965. 8 Asian Alternatives, Garry Woodard, Melbourne University Publishing, Melbourne 2004, p. 110 A full analysis of this decision is available in Garry Woodard’s Asian Alternatives, although he believes the decision to send a battalion was taken in December 1964. 9 Correspondence, Alex Preece, dated 21 Feb 2003. 10 AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 95, dated 29 May 1965. 11 Excerpts from monthly reports AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated Jul–Dec 1965. 12 ibid. 13 Correspondence, Geoff Skardon, dated 19 May 2004. 14 ibid. 15 ibid. 16 ibid. 17 ibid. 18 Green Berets at War, Shelby Stanton, p. 117. 19 Correspondence, Barry Petersen, dated 16 Feb 2004. 20 The difference between a commander and a commanding officer is one of legal powers as defined in the Australilan Military Regulations. In general, a commander has wider responsibilities than a commanding officer whose powers are limited only to his unit.
5 Walking the tightrope 1 Various DIA bulletins (TS-NOFORN), dated Jan and Feb 1966. 2 Sectors was the military term for a province and sub-sectors was the term for a district. 3 Ontos was a lightweight tracked AFV designed in the 1950s as a tank destroyer. It had six 106-mm recoilless rifles mounted on its chassis. 4 Correspondence,Vin Musgrave, dated 4 Apr 2004. 5 Correspondence, Kevin Aspinall, dated 9 Oct 2004. 6 Correspondence, Geoff Annett, dated 10 Feb 2003. 7 Military Working Agreement—CGS Australia and COMUSMACV, dated Mar 1966, and COMUSMACV Command History 1966. 8 Correspondence,Vin Murphy, dated 18 Mar 2004. 9 Correspondence, Norm Matthews, dated 28 Jun 2004. 10 AATTV Commander’s Diary, AWM 95, dated 15 May 1966. 11 Correspondence, Barry Rust, dated 9 Apr 2004.
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6 Business as usual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14
15 16
Correspondence, George Mansford, dated 3 Feb 2003. Correspondence, Ron ‘Jack’ Boyce, dated 5 Dec 2002. Correspondence, Geoff Annett, dated 10 Feb 2003. Correspondence, Harry Lovelock, dated 18 Mar 2004. ibid. Personal recollection, author Bruce Davies. Correspondence, Sam Chambers, dated 14 Mar 2003. Reports Danang Area, 1 Jan–10 Nov 1967;WO2 A.N. Powell, 2/2 ARVN, dated 24 Aug 1967; R273-10-1 [Part1], AWM 293. Appendices to AFV Monthly Reports 1967, (AWM 98) [585]; and Appendix 4 to Annex B to Part B of HQ AFV Monthly Report, dated 31 Aug 1967. Reports Danang area, Appendix 5, op. cit. This division was activated in Quang Nam on 20 Oct 1965. It was based on Regiment 1 PLAF (VC), PAVN (NVA) Regiment 21 and Battalion 70, which consisted mainly of regroupees. Correspondence, Len Opie, dated 22 Sep 2004. Monthly report June 1967, file R273-1-35 [Part 1], AWM 98. The Tri-Border area is where the three national boundaries of Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam join. It is approximately 70 kilometres north-west of Kontum and due west of Ben Het on the western edge of Kontum Province. A Navy and Coast Guard patrol operation designed to prevent infiltration and resupply from the South China Sea. Rapid Fire AA report, and correspondence, Ray Burnard, dated 14 Feb 2003.
7 The beginning of the end 1 Personal recollection, author Bruce Davies. 2 Free World Military Forces comprised troops from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. The Republic of China (Taiwan) also provided a small number of military assistance personnel. There were more than 30 other nations included in the Free World Assistance Program under which they sent technical and economic aid. 3 Correspondence, Ray Burnard, dated 28 Dec 2002. 4 Correspondence, Graham Snook, dated 2 Feb 2004. 5 MACV Command History 1968, vol II, Annex A; Tet Offensive in Retrospect; and AWM 98, R723/1/35 [Part 2], Monthly Report Feb 1968. For a full account from a Marine perspective see Battle for Hue:Tet 68. 6 AATTV Monthly Report, dated Feb 1968 and Jungle Tracks, pp. 167–9. 7 Correspondence, Clarry Rule, dated 10 Feb 2003. 8 AATTV Monthly Report, dated Feb 1968, op. cit. 9 Warrant Officer Gabriel did four tours of duty in Viet Nam and he served the longest cumulative period in Viet Nam, a total of 58 months.Warrant Officer Ray
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19
20 21
22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
395
Simpson is incorrectly recorded as having served 60 months, but from Oct 1964 until Jun 1965 he was recovering from a wound in Japan. Ray Burnard, op.cit. ibid. AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated Apr 1968,Annex B, Report on Death of Capt Danilenko AWM 95, 1/2/52. Ray Burnard, op. cit. AATTV Commander’s Diary, Annex D, op.cit. Graham Snook, op. cit. Ray Burnard, op. cit. Some senior officers gained their experiences in units during World War II and Korea under commanders who did not believe in decorations as they were considered to be divisive. The AWM 103 series contains many files with debates on honours and awards that include arguments, for example, on the award of the DSO to officers who had not been in combat. AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated May 1968,Annex C,After Action report Ngoc Tavak, AWM 95, 1/2/53. The Americal (23rd) Division was reactivated from Task Force Oregon on 25 Sep 1967. Its name came from an American division that was raised in New Caledonia during World War II. Green Berets at War, p. 165. Developed in 1967 by the CIA, Operation Phoenix combined all the existing counterinsurgency programs into one.The object of the program was to ‘neutralise’ the VC infrastructure. Ray Burnard, op. cit. ibid. CORDS was organised by Robert Kramer in 1967 to coordinate the pacification aspects of America’s support for Viet Nam, and it brought all of the programs of several agencies into one. Ray Burnard, op. cit. AATTV Monthly Report, dated Jun 1968, Annex C, AWM 95, 1/2/54. COMUSMACV Command History 1968, entry for 16 Jun 1968. AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated Aug 1968, Annex D, AWM 95, 1/2/56. Through the Wire, David Savage,Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999; Mike Force website <www.mikeforcehistory.org> AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated Oct 1968, Annex E, AWM 95, 1/2/58. ibid. ibid. AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated Nov 68, Annex H, AWM 95. A Hoi Chanh was a person who defected to the South Vietnamese Government under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program. AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated Oct 1968, AWM 95. AATTV Monthly Report, dated Dec 1968, AWM 95, 1/2/60.
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8 Valour and Vietnamisation 1 Correspondence, Ray Burnard, dated 28 Dec 2002 2 Excerpt from The Team—a five-part oral history, Army History Unit, Trg Comd video. 3 Denis Warner started reporting on South-East Asia from Singapore in the early 1950s. He is an internationally renowned journalist and author. Denis also served in the AIF in the Middle East and as a war correspondent for American forces in the Central Pacific during World War II. 4 Ray Burnard, op. cit. 5 AATTV Monthly Report, dated Feb 1969, Annex D, AWM 95, 1/2/62. 6 ibid., Annex B. 7 AATTV Commander’s Diary, dated Mar 1969, Annex G, AWM 95, 1/2/63. 8 The PT-76 is a light amphibious tank developed by the Soviet Army.The vehicle entered service in 1954. The tank carried a 76-mm main gun. 9 Correspondence, Peter Harris, dated 18 Mar 2004. 10 ibid. 11 AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 95, 1/2/63, dated Mar 1969. 12 Monthly Report, Annex L, AWM 95. 1/2/64, dated Apr 1969. 13 ibid, Annex F. 14 Army History Unit video, op.cit. 15 ibid., and Pleiku Monthly Report, dated 26 May 1969. 16 232 Company (Simpson) report to 3 Bn, 2 MSF, AWM 293, dated 18 May 1969. 17 AATTV Pleiku Monthly Report, AWM 293, dated Aug 1969. 18 AATTV Monthly Report,Annexure 2 to Annex C,AWM 95, 1/2/65, dated May 1969. 19 Dung, Van Tien, Senior General NVA, Great Spring Victory, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, vol. 1, pp. 18–19. 20 ibid., Annexure 3. 21 Personal recollection, author Bruce Davies. 22 Correspondence, Russell Smith, dated 18 Feb 2003. 23 AATTV Monthly Report, Annex B, AWM 95, dated Jun 1969. 24 Correspondence, Bill Brown, dated 1 May 2004. 25 ibid. 26 AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 95, dated Jun 1969. 27 AATTV Monthly Report, Annex E, AWM 95, dated Jul 1969. 28 Correspondence, John Vincent, dated 18 Mar 2004. 29 AATTV Monthly Report, dated Jun 1969, op.cit. 30 The History of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and MACV Command Histories, dated 1969. Vietnamization 31 AATTV Monthly Report, Annex C, AWM 95, dated Jul 1969. 32 ibid., Annexure 3 to Annex D and Attachment. 33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35 AATTV Monthly Report, Aug 1969, 1/2/68, AWM 95. 36 ibid., Annexure 5 to Annex D.
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37 ibid., Annex G. 38 AATTV Monthly Report, Annexure 4 to Annex D, AWM 95, 1/2/69, dated Sep 1969. 39 AATTV Monthly Report, Annex E, AWM 95, 1/2/70, dated Oct 1969. 40 AATTV Monthly Report, Annex B, AWM 95, 1/2/71, dated Nov 1969. 41 ibid. 42 ibid. 43 ibid. 44 Personal recollection, author Bruce Davies, and website
and Four Hours in My Lai—A War Crime and its Aftermath, Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim. 45 AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 95, 1/2/72, dated Dec 1969. 46 ibid. 47 ibid. 48 ibid. 49 The Studies and Observation Group (SOG), was a classic military misnomer that was used in an attempt to disguise the real purpose of a unit. SOG teams conducted special operations and reconnaissance missions in South Viet Nam and across national borders. 50 Correspondence, ‘Abe’ Green, dated 26 Oct 2004.
9 The bleak times 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Personal recollection, author Bruce Davies. Report included in correspondence, Don Killion, dated 5 Apr 2004. ibid. Don Killion, op. cit. ibid. AATTV Monthly Report, Annex F, AWM 95, /1/2/73, dated Jan 1970. ibid., Annex G. ibid. ibid., Annex K. AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 293/10, Part 2, dated Feb 1970. AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 293/11, dated Mar 1970. ibid. ibid. Operation Orders, Pat Beale, DSO, MC,Australian Army History Unit and Australian Military History Productions, 2003. AATTV Monthly Report, AWM, 293/12, dated Apr 1970. ibid. Operation Orders, op. cit., p. 94. The Team, Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam, 1962–1972, Ian McNeill. MACV Command History, dated May 1970. Correspondence, John Barnes, dated 12 Feb 2003.
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21 MACV Comm and History, op. cit. and AATTV Monthly Report May/June 1970. AWM 293. 22 AATTV Monthly Report, Aug 1970, Annex B, AWM 293/16. 23 AATTV Monthly Report, May 1970, AWM 293/13. 24 Correspondence, Ian Kuring, dated 13 May 2004. 25 AATTV Monthly Report, Jun 1970, Annex F, AWM 293/14. 26 AATTV monthly Report, Dec 1969, AWM 95 1/2/72. 27 Ian Kuring, op. cit. 28 Correspondence, Bob Aitken, dated 16 Mar 2004. 29 AATTV Monthly Report, Jul 1970, Appendix 4 to Annex B, AWM 293/15. 30 Correspondence, Mick Rodger, dated 27 Apr 2004. 31 Ibid., and AATTV Report July 1970, Appendix 1 to Annex B, op. cit. 32 AATTV Monthly Report, Annex B, AWM 293/16, dated Aug 1970. 33 Bob Aitken, op. cit. Ned Kelly was Australia’s most famous bushranger (outlaw). He was hanged at Melbourne Goal on 11 Nov 1880. 34 AATTV Report, Aug 1970, op. cit. 35 Sensors were a variety of electronic devices that were capable of detecting enemy ground movement. 36 Bob Aitken, op. cit. 37 AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 293/17, dated Sep 1970. 38 Personal recollection, author Bruce Davies. 39 Correspondence, Des Pryde, dated 2 Apr 2003. 40 MACV History and Where we were in Vietnam, Michael P. Kelly. 41 Correspondence, Barry Caligari, dated 4 Dec 2004. 42 AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 293/19, dated Nov 1970. 43 ibid.
10 The bitterness of the end 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
AATTV Monthly Report, AWM 293/21, dated Jan 1971. Correspondence, Keith Charlton, dated 5 Dec 2002. Correspondence, John Barnes, dated 12 Feb 2003. Correspondence, Des Pryde, dated 2 Apr 2003. ibid. Correspondence, Bob Aitken, dated 16 Mar 2004. AATTV Monthly Report, Annex C, AWM 293/23, dated Mar 1971. AATTV Monthly Report,Annex B,AWM 103, R723/1/97/32, dated Apr 1971. Correspondence, Dennis Manski, dated 2 Apr 2004. Correspondence, Ray Pearson, dated 27 Nov 2002. AATTV Monthly Report, Appendix 5 to Annex B, AWM 103 R723/1/57/33, dated May 1971. Correspondence, Jim Stewart, dated 27 Mar 2004. AATTV Monthly Report, op. cit., Annex D. Telecon Adrian Roberts/Bruce Davies, 2 Dec 2004. AATTV Monthly Report, Annex B, AWM 293/31, dated Nov 1971.
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11 The final torment 1 Contrary to logic, the Long Hai Training Battalion (LHTB) was not in Long Hai village, but the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion was. This happened because B-36 Special Forces camp was previously based in what was to become the LHTB and they picked up the name of the nearest village. 2 Correspondence, Jim Stewart, dated 27 Mar 2004. 3 Note to Col (Plans) 15/11 from Brig Whitelaw DMO&P, 9 Nov 1971. 4 The Advisor, Edition 8, dated Mar 1985. 5 AWM, CGS Nos. 60/1972 and 61/1972, CGS working file,AAAGV withdrawal. 6 A Historical Study:The US Army Vietnam, Individual Training Group (UTIG) Program 1971–73. 7 Correspondence,Terry Smith, dated 18 Aug 2003, which included detailed copies of notes and maps sent to his wife in 1972. 8 ibid. 9 ibid. 10 ibid. 11 ibid. 12 ibid. 13 ibid. 14 ibid. 15 ibid.
Epilogue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Correspondence, Colin Bannister, dated 1 Apr 2004. Correspondence, Geoff Annett, dated 10 Feb 2004. Correspondence, Barry Rust, dated 9 Apr 2003. Geoff Annett, op. cit. Correspondence, George Mansford, dated 3 Feb 2003. Correspondence, Malcolm ‘Mick’ Coffey, dated 15 Aug 2004. Correspondence,Vin Musgrave, dated 4 Apr 2004. The Team in Pictures, p. 173. Correspondence, Barry Petersen, dated 16 Feb 2004. Article, ‘Thank you Mr Windy’, The Advisor, Issue 4/87. George Mansford, op. cit.
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Bibliography Bibliography
Unpublished government records Australian War Memorial The core elements of this book come from AATTV reports written by its commanders and some men in the field. The Australian War Memorial holds those reports in the following series: AWM 95, AWM 98, AWM 103 and AWM 293. Foreign awards to members of the Australian Defence Force for Service in Viet-Nam 1962–73 were obtained from Australian War Memorial Files R445/4/34, 445/1/10 and AWM 102.
Central Army Records Office, Melbourne AATTV personnel list printed 1979.
National Archives of Australia (NAA) References to Colonel Serong’s service in Burma, its connection with his going to South Viet-Nam, Australia’s assistance to South Viet-Nam and some official correspondence on AATTV are found in the following National Archives files: NAA:A1209, 1962/531; NAA:A1838, 215/4/2; NAA:A1838, 3014/2/1 Part 23; NAA:–––, 221/1/4/1/5; NAA: A1838, 3014/7/1 Part 2; NAA: A1838, 3014/10/15/1 Part 2; NAA: A1838, 696/8/4 Part 2; NAA: A1838, 696/8/4 Part 400
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5; NAA: A1945, 248/2/4; NAA: A1945, 248/4/66 Part 1; NAA: A4940, C4643 Part 1; NAA:A6840, 1.
Other National Archival Sources Department of State, Research and Intelligence Service, ‘Biographical Information on Prominent Nationalist Leaders in French Indochina’, 25 Oct 1945.
Published government records Australia Commonwealth Gazette, 2 Aug 1962. Hansard, House of Representatives, Government Printer, Canberra,Answers to Questions, 20 October 1964.
United States of America Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. I and II, Department of State, Washington, D.C. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relatives, 14 Jan 1965 (Washington 1965), p. 137.
Private records Sergeant William Francis Hacking’s letters to his brother Mr W. Hacking, and friend Ms Kathleen Ginnane.
Personal correspondence with the authors Letters and emails Robert Aitken, 16 March 2004. Ronald Almond, 5 April 2004. Geoffrey Annett, 10 February 2004. Kevin Aspinall, 9 October 2004. Colin Bannister, 1 April 2004. John Barnes, 12 February 2003. Ron Boyce, 5 December 2002. William Brown, 1 May 2004.
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Ray Burnard, 28 December 2002, and 14 February 2003. Barry Caligari, 4 December 2004. Samuel Chambers, 14 March 2003. Keith Charlton, 5 December 2002. Alan Cleasby, 17 March 2003. Malcolm Coffey, 15 August 2004. Peter Cowan, 1 September 2004. Donald Dalton, 21 July 2004. Brian Day, 12 May 2003. William Deane, 22 November 2002. James Devitt, 12 March 2004. Noel Dudgeon, undated. William Dunstan, 3 February 2003. Brian Foster, 5 February 2004. Peter Gaunt, 23 November 2003. Frank Ghilotti, 22 March 2004. Terry Gill, 9 February 2003. Terence Goddard, 2 February 2003. Ian Gollings, 7 March 2004. Ian Gore, 1 December 2002. ‘Abe’ Green, 26 October 2004. Ronald Grey, 16 March 2004. Norbert Gruetzner, 1 June 2003. Warren Gunder, 29 March 2004. Robert Hagerty, 7 March 2004. Stephen Hanley, 29 November 2002. John Harding, 12 March 2003. Peter Harris, 18 March 2004. Robert Haslett, 3 February 2003. Donald Hawksworth, 5 April 2004. Garth Hughes, 4 October 2003. Peter Hulsing, 22 November 2002. Brian Jackson, 1 September 2003. Oliver Jackson, 31 October 2003. Maurice James, 26 April 2003. Colin Judd, 22 November 2002. Donald Killion, 5 April 2004. Ian Kuring, 13 May 2004. Ian Lever, 19 January 2004. Harold Lovelock, 18 March 2004. George Mansford, 3 February 2003. Dennis Manski, 2 April 2004. Norman Mathews, 28 June 2004. Christopher McEvoy, 14 July 2003. Warwick McFadden, 26 March 2003. Bernard McGurgan, 30 December 2002. Bruce McIlwraith, 9 December 2002.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kevin McMillan, 3 December 2002. Murray Metherall, 1 December 2002. Peter Millett, 16 January 2004. David Millie, undated March 2003. Ronald Monkhouse, 22 November 2002. David Morrison (NZ), 9 December 2002. Vincent Murphy, 18 March 2004. Marvin Musgrave, 4 April 2004. Graham Neitz, 8 February 2003. Edward Nicholas, 12 February 2003. John Nolan, 2 January 2003. Leonard Opie, 22 September 2004. Chris Parrello (son of Antonio), 22 November 2002. Raymond Pearson, 27 November 2002. Victor Pennington, 22 November 2002. Ronald Perkins, 19 April 2004. Barry Petersen, 16 February 2004. Alexander Preece, 21 February 2003. Bruce Prosper, 21 March 2003. Desmond Pryde, 2 April 2003 Peter Ray, 10 June 2003. Adrian Roberts (telecom), 2 Dec 2004. Donald Robertson, 3 September 2004. Arthur Robinson, 21 January 2003. Raymond Robinson, 25 March 2004. Michael Rodger, 27 April 2004. Peter Rothwell, 19 March 2003. Clarence Rule, 10 February 2003. Barry Rust, 9 April 2003. Ricky Ryan, 20 December 2002. David Savage, 22 May 2003. John Scorse, 23 November 2003. Geoffrey Skardon, 19 May 2004. Russell Smith, 18 February 2003. Terry Smith, 18 August 2003. Ernest Snelling, 22 November 2002. Graham Snook, 2 February 2004. James Stewart, 27 March 2004. Bruce Sutherland, 17 March 2004. John Swanson, 11 February 2003. Ian Teague, 19 March 2004. Roger Tilley, 31 March 2003. Barry Tinkler, 30 April 2004. William Tomlinson, 22 January 2004. Clarence Upton, 27 July 2003. Joseph Vezgoff, 3 February 2004. John Vincent, 18 March 2004.
403
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Michael Wells, 21 July 2003. Sydney Wells, 25 November 2002. Allan West, 3 October 2003. Terence Whitwam, 2 February 2003. Peter Young, 9 April 2004. Although not every piece of correspondence is included in this book, every piece helped to put together a complex jigsaw of names, places and dates.
Unit histories McNeill, Ian, The Team,Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam, 1962–1972, Australian War Memorial, 1984. Military Assistance Command,Vietnam: Command Histories 1964–1973 (Sanitised). Stanton, Shelby L., Green Berets at War: U.S. Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956–1975, Presidio Press, Novata, CA, 1985. The Team, Australian Army Training Team Vietnam Association, South Australian Branch, Gillingham Printers, Adelaide, 1967.
Official histories The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam 1960–68, Part I and Part II, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 July 1970. The Team—a five part oral history, Army History Unit, Trg comd video.
Books and monographs Beale, Pat, Operation Orders, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, 2003. Bilton, Michael and Sim, Kevin, Four Hours in My Lai—A War Crime and its Aftermath, Viking, 1992. Blair, Anne, Ted Serong, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2002. Blair, Anne, There to the Bitter End, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001. Chalk, Peter, Australian Foreign & Defence SE Asia Policy in the wake of 1999–2000 East Timor Intervention, Rand Organisation, Chap 2. Fall, Bernard B., Street Without Joy, Pall Mall Press, London, 1964. Ford, Harold, P, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962–1968, Centre for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1998. Guest, Robert, The Team in Pictures, Canberra Printing Services, 1992. Kelley, Michael P., Where we were in Vietnam, Hellgate Press, Oregon, 2002.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
405
McKay Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks—Australian Armour in Viet Nam Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001. Nolan, Keith William, Battle for Hue:Tet 68, Presidio Press, California, 1983. Palmer,Alexander M., Vietnam Veterans Honours and Awards,Army, Military Minded, Perth, 1995. Petersen, Barry, with John Cribben, Tiger Men, MacMillan, Australia, 1988. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition 1 to 4, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Savage, David, Through the Wire, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999. Woodard, Garry, Asian Alternatives, Melbourne University Publishing, Melbourne, 2004
Select list of journal articles and chapters Australian Army Journal, Issue Aug 1973, and Issue 4/87, Dec 1987. The Advisor, AATTV Association, Queensland Branch, Issue 3/2000 and Issue 4/87, Dec 1987. Fazekas, Felix, The Spider and the Fly, Australian Army Journal, 205, June 1966.
Papers and official documents Joseph Dodge Papers, Detroit Public Library, Statement of Charles E Bohler Before the Voorkers Group, 3 Apr 1950. After Action Report, Operation Rapid Fire V (08 Dec 1967–24 Jan 1968), dated 25 Jan 1968. Bourra, Kenneth. R., US Army, A Historical Study:The US Army Vietnam, Individual Training Group (UTIG) Program 1971–73, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1991.
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Index Index
AATTV (throughout): arrival, 10; birthday, 18, 20; command and control, 20, 54, 165; commanders, 16, 198; commanding officers, 18, 20, 159–60, 166–7, 201; deployment, 15, 34, 85, 160; redeployment, 168, 173; disbandment, 210; establishment (manning), 68, 160, 165, 171–2, 173, 185, 196, 201; formation, 18; HQ, Saigon, 162, 177, 193;Van Kiep, 201; role, 18, 21, 24; title 66, 173; RSM, 65, 105, 201;Team 1, 35;Team 2, 40; training, 18, 34, 168–9; (Uc) House, Danang, 65, 69, 91–2, 100, 105 Abigail, W.H. ‘Bill’, WO1, 74 Abrams, Creighton W., Gen, 128, 188 A Bright Shining Lie, 168 Agroville, 27 Aiken, ‘Curly’, WO1, 91 Air America, 69, 111 Aitken, Bob, Maj, 176, 178, 180, 190 Alamo, MSgt, US Army, 52 Allan, John, WO2, 127, 133 Allen, Lindsay, WO1, 195 Allen, Sgt, US Army, 71 Almond, Ron, WO1, 155, 158, 167 ambush, ambushing, 23, 81, 112, 118, 122, 156, 185, 197 American War, 76 Amstein, Sam, MSgt, US Army, 54 Anderson, H. David, Ambassador, 44–5, 57–8, 69 An Diem, 43 Andrews, John, WO2, KIA, 85 An Hoa, District, 108 Annamite Chain, 169 Annett, Geoff, WO2, 91, 101, 212–13 An Ngai, 175 ANZAC, Bde, 82; Day, 105, 121 ANZUS, 9–10
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Ap Bac, 28 Army of the Republic of Viet Nam, ARVN: 6, 24, 27, 28–30, 31, 67, 85, 87–8, 91–2, 94, 96, 101, 109, 114, 131–2, 144–5, 153, 155–7 passim, 160, 166–7, 170, 172–3, 174–5, 179–82 passim, 183, 185, 187, 193–6, 207–8, 214; High Command, 215; casualties, 37, 62, 66, 70–2, 97, 108, 113, 115, 118, 122, 136–7, 143, 146, 150, 152, 170–3, 176, 178, 189; RVN military total, 211 Units: I Corps, HQ, 69, 145, 190; 1 Div Regional Hospital, 163 1st Division, 64–5, 67, 104, 119, 128; HQ, 23, 87, 158, 163, 168, 172, 180, 193, 213, 215 1st Regiment, 122, 167, 172–3; 1/1 ARVN Bn, 107, 130, 150, 158, 171–2; 2/1 ARVN Bn, 71, 102, 107, 119, 145, 172, 212; 3/1 ARVN Bn, 94, 130, 158, 172; 4/1 ARVN Bn, 71, 108, 122, 158–9, 172; 1 Div Recon Coy, 101; Black Panther Coy, 117, 168 2nd Regiment, 122, 167, 180, 183; 1/2 ARVN Bn, 107, 120, 137, 140, 145, 151, 155; 2/2 ARVN, Bn, 89, 107, 117, 120; 3/2 ARVN Bn, 144, 152, 168; 4/2 ARVN Bn, 114, 145, 150, 182, 189; 5/2 ARVN Bn, 137–8, 143, 145, 155, 180 3rd Regiment, 114, 167, 172; 1/3 ARVN Bn, 70, 85, 172; 2/3 ARVN Bn, 54, 72, 117, 172; 3/3 ARVN Bn, 61, 85, 150, 153, 158, 172 2nd Division, 67, 70, 91, 115, 119, 145, 158, 168, 193; 4th ARVN Regt, 152, 155, 158; 1/4 ARVN Bn, 70, 155, 158–9; 2/4 ARVN Bn, 137, 145, 155, 157; 3/4 ARVN Bn, 155, 159; 5th
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Regt, 70, 152; 1/5 ARVN Bn, 72, 145, 171; 2/5 ARVN Bn, 70, 159, 168; 3/5 ARVN Bn, 171, 213; 4/5 ARVN Bn, 128, 151, 155, 164 6th Regiment, 177–8; 1/6 ARVN Bn, 72, 145, 159, 177; 2/6 ARVN Bn, 131, 145, 156, 178; 3/6 ARVN Bn, 97, 109, 178; 4/6 ARVN Bn, 171; 6 Regt Recon Coy, 159 7th Division, 28, 188; 18th Div, 149, 200; 25th Div, 30–1; 49th Regt, 30; 51st Indep Regt, 164; 1/51 Indep Regt, 101, 108, 136, 165, 173; 2/51 Indep Regt, 100, 164; 3/51 Indep Regt, 84; 54th Indep Regt, 167, 175; 2/54 ARVN Bn, 150 7th ARVN Cavalry, 120, 122; 2/4 ARVN Cav, 113; 3/7 ARVN Cav, 117; 17th ARVN Cav, 167; 3 Tp, 17 Cav, 155, 158, 167; 20th Tank Sqn, 194 Marines, 117 Rangers, 34, 166–7, 170; 11 Ranger Bn, 70, 72, 85, 213; 20 Special Bn, 25; 21 Ranger Bn, 127, 134, 156, 158; 31 Ranger Bn, 213; 32 Ranger Bn, 44; 37 Ranger Bn, 167; 39 Ranger Bn, 70, 167; 61st Ranger Border Defence Bn, 173 Special Forces, (LLDB), 51, 57, 73, 81, 111, 123, 128 Central Training Command, 120, 151, 195 Hiep Khanh Training Centre, 23–4, 37, 39, 43 Jungle Warfare Training Centre, Nui Dat, 175, 179–81, 182, 188, 192;Van Kiep, 181, 195–7, 199, 204–5, 209 National Training Centre,Van Kiep, 167–8 Ranger Training Centre: Duc My, 15, 26, 37, 42, 49–50, 65, 68, 85, 98, 160, 212–13 Jungle Camp (School), 34–5, 50; Mountain Camp (School), 34–5, 50; Swamp Camp (School), 32, 35, 50; Trung Lap, 50 Recondo School, Nha Trang, 111, 119–20 Arnold, Andrew, WO2, 73 A Ro camp, 58, 60 A Shau,Valley, 43, 44, 68, 96, 137, 150, 167, 172, 191 Asia, 2 Aspinall, Kevin, Capt, 89 Astaire, Fred, 50 Australia: 4, 7, 9, 26, 156, 169, 175 Chiefs of Staff Committee, 12, 38; Defence Committee, 14–15, 31; Department of Defence, 59, 93;
407
Department of External Affairs, 36; Embassy, Saigon, 3, 10, 31, 110; Minister for the Army, 105; Legation, Saigon, 3 casualties, 62, 97, 161, 210, 211 military forces in Viet Nam, 27, 30, 62, 66, 82, 97, 106, 112, 161, 171, 186, 198 Australia Day, 43 Australian Army: Assistance Group Vietnam (AAAGV), 201, 204, 210 Bases and Installations: South Head, Pers Depot, 115; Training Command, 141; Intelligence Centre, Middle Head, 17; JTC Canungra, 9, 18–19, 34, 54, 65, 93, 105, 153; Battle Wing 9 Units: Australian Army (Training) Component Vietnam, 18 AHQ, 26, 37, 52–4 passim, 59–60, 204, CGS, 51, 134, Military Secretary, 51, 119 Australian Army Element FARELF, 20, 53 1 ATF, 92, 94, 98, 113, 123, 154, 156, 174, 195–6, 199, 211; HQ 212 1 APC Sqn, 94; 1 RAR, 26, 64, 69, 82, 92, A Coy, 34; 2 RAR, 64, 127, 174 3 RAR, 212; 4 RAR, 127; 5 RAR, 149, 161; 6 RAR, 161, D Coy, 94; 7 RAR, 106; 8 RAR, 157, 171, 181, 186–7; 9 RAR, 149, 161; 8 Fd Amb, 113; SAS Coy, 17; 2 SAS Sqn, 208; Director of Infantry, 51, 64; Directorate of Military Intelligence, 35 Australian Army Force Vietnam (AAFV), Commander (COMAAFV), 69, 82 Australian Force Vietnam (AFV), 106, HQ, 110, 127, 129, 139, 156, 181 Commander (COMAFV), 119, 126, 135–7, 139, 141, 148, 199 Australian Broadcasting Commission (Corporation), 50 Australian Embassy Guard, Saigon, 210 Australian Embassy, Saigon, 15 Awards (Imperial), 40, 80, 97, 102, 113, 117, 118, 121,123, 126, 136, 141,142–3, 151, 164, 170, 190; AATTV, 216; foreign awards, 40, 52, 53; United States Meritorious Unit Commendation, 181 Aylett, Des, WO2, 138,1 56 B-50, operations, see Special Forces B-52, bombers, bombing, 72, 173, 194 Bachelor Officers’ Quarters: Brink, 62, 194; Victoria, 91
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Bac Lieu, 188 Badcoe, Peter, Maj, 101, 213, KIA, 102, 104, awarded VC, 102 Ba Gia, 70 Baird, John, WO1, NZ, 182 Balcombe,Vic, 57 Ba Long,Valley, 44, 71, 194 Ban Me Thuot, 36–8, 45, 68, 140, 216 Bannister, Colin, Maj, 49, 212 Bao Dai, 2, 3 Baria, (Phuoc Le), 117, 179, 202; A & L Coy, 118 Barker, John, WO2, 137, 143 Barnes, John, WO2, 172, 188 Barnes, Ray, WO2, awarded DCM, 170 Barrett, Trevor, WO2, 86 Barwick, Sir Garfield, 9, 10, 12–14 Batiste, Geoffrey, WO2, 71 Ba Tri, 139, 166 Baudistel, Karl, Capt, 103 Baxter, Bill, WO2, 72 Beale, Pat, Maj, 169, awarded DSO, 170 Bee, Russ, WO1, 93 Beezley, Herb, WO2, 71 Bell, Douglas, WO2, 166 Belleville, Graham, Capt, KIA, 85 Ben Cat, 26, 37 Ben Hai, 106 Ben Het, 137–8, 140, 148, 152, 160, 165, 167 Ben Trinh District, 168 Ben Tuong, Hamlet, 37 Berlin, 165 Bien Hoa, airbase, 60, 62, 82, 92, 199–200 Binh Ba, 98–9, 112–13, 191, 214 Binh Dinh Province, 48, 132, 160, 191, 211 Binh Gia, 62 Binh Son, 145 Birnie, Stuart, WO2, WIA, 175 Bishop, Jack, WO2, 72 Black, Clem, WO2, WIA, 156 Blackhurst, Thomas, Cpl, KIA, 191 Black Teams, see also Peoples’ Action Teams, 46 Blair, Anne, 32 Blanck, ‘Snowy’, WO2, KIA, 95 Bohlen, Charles, 2 Boileau, Guy, Capt, 35–7, 39, 41, 46 Bond, John ‘Chesty’, WO2, 105, KIA, 140 Bouveng, John, WO2, 180 Boyce, Ron ‘Jack’, WO2, 100 Boyd, Steve, Bdr, 192 Bradley, Omar, General of the Army, 2 Brady, Kevin, WO2, 156 Breakwell, Tony ‘Kiwi’, WO2, 158 Brennan, Bill, Sgt, 19, 107 Brink, see Bachelor Officers’ Quarters
Brinsley, Wg Cdr, 12 Britain, British Advisory Mission (BRIAM), 7, 13, 31, 37, 93 British Commonwealth Occupation Force (Japan), 19 British Embassy, Saigon, 62 British General Service Medal, see General Service Medal British Jungle Warfare School, Malaya, 18 Brockett, David, 2Lt, 47 Brown, William, WO2, 146–7 Brumfield, Lou, Lt Col, 83 Brydon, Bill, Maj, 152, 154, 156 Bryson, Bill, WO2, 95 Buchan, Ross, Maj, 104 Buddhist, 32, 36, 38; beliefs, 87, 206; demonstration, 31, 91–2; immolations, 32, 36 Buon Enao (village) group, 59 Bu Prang, 156, 165, 167 Burke, Daniel, WO2, 155, 158–9 Burma, 2, 4, 16, 19 Burnard, Ray, Lt Col, 112, 115, 118, 120–21, 123, 125–7 passim, 131, 134–5, awarded MID, 136, 139, 215 Burns, Creighton, 135 Burns, Philip, Maj, 94 Bussey, David, Lt, US Army, 73, 76 Butler, William, WO2, 166, 183–4 Butterworth, 115 But Thien, 200 Cahill, Jim,WO2, 112, 119 Caligari, Barry, Capt, 183–5 passim, Callander, Fred, WO2, 103 Calley, Jr., William, Lt, US Army, 157 Cambodia, 4, 24, 92, 111–12, 128, 153, 156; FANK, 199–202, 206–7; casualties 204 Cameron, Alan, Cpl, NZ, 182 Cameron, Don, WO2, 120, 124 Cameron, Robert ‘Bob’, WO2, 138, WIA, 151, 155, 159; awarded DCM 151 Cam Lo, 105, 155, 167, 180, 182 Camp Carroll, 167–8, 190 Canberra, ACT, 26, 52–3, 59–60, 115, 204 Can Tho, 126, 132, 134, 139, 157, 188 Canungra, see also Australian Army bases, 18–19 Cao Bang, 100 Caravelle, Hotel, 50 Carr, Rick, xiv, Carter, Robert, WO2, WIA, 130, 154 Casey, Michael, Maj, 121 Casey, R.G., Minister for External Affairs, 12 Cassidy, Dudley, WO2, 53 Catholic, 31–2, 58, 91–2, 116, 163
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Cat Lo, 47 Cavanagh, Charles, Bdr, WIA, 190 Central Highlands, xiii, 37, 39, 111, 140, 160 Challenger, James, WO2, 107 Chalmers, Capt, US Army, 70 Chambers, Sam, WO2, 106 Chan, Lt Col, ARVN (former Viet Minh), 48 Chance, Ray ‘Shorty’, WO2, 94 Change Alley, 20 Charlton, Keith, WO2, 188 Chase, Jack, Capt, US Army, 116 Chau Doc Province, 132 Chieu Hoi, 94 China, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 144; Nationalist Party/Kuomintang (KMT), 4 Chindits, 8 Chinn, George, WO2, 44 Cholon, 114–15, 122 Chu Lai, 177, hospital, 90, 151–2 Chuong Thien Province, 127 CIA, 1, 6, 11, 15, 19, 35–6, 38–40, 85, 125; CIDG Program, 37 see also Special Forces; Combined Studies Division (CSD), 15, 27, 35–7, 43, 45–7 passim, 65, 68–9, 111–12; Head of Station, 58; OSS, 1, 8; Detachment 101, 8 CIDG, see Special Forces, Citizen Military Forces (CMF), 110 Civic Action Groups, 27 Civil Affairs, 112 Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), 126, 154, 188 Clancy Ron, WO2, 202–3 Clark, John (Alex), Lt Col, 166, 168–9, 173, 177, 179, 182, 185 Clarke, Brian, WO2, 105, awarded MM, 97 Clarke, Jim, WO2, 195 Clarke, John, WO2, 46–7, 61 Clark, Rex, Capt, 44 Clunies-Ross, Adrian, Capt, 25 Clutterbuck, Allen, WO2, 172 Cochrane, Alex, Capt, 62 Cochrane, Des, WO2, 202–3, awarded MM 170 Coffey, Malcolm (Mick), 54–56 passim, 60–1, 63, 214 Colley, Sydney, WO2, 128 Collins, Bill, WO2, 101, 108 Colombo Plan, 26 Combat Infantry Badge US, (CIB), 205 Combat Orientation Course, 138 Confrontation (Konfrontasi), 3 Con Thien, 103, 106–07, 140 Continental, Hotel, 50
409
Conway, Kevin, 40, 52, 59; KIA, 51–2; burial, funeral, 52–3 Cook, Ron, Sgt, 19 Cootes, John, WO2, NZ, 182 Corps Tactical Zones: I Corps, 25, 40, 45, 60, 73, 92, 102, 114, 126, 132–4, 140, 143, 145, 150, 152–3, 158, 167–8, 173, 177, 188, 208, 211, 213, 215; II Corps, 126, 132, 138, 148, 152. 156, 167, 182; III Corps, 151, 166, 172, 182, 213; IV Corps, 28, 126, 132, 134, 139, 149, 151, 153–7, 160, 164, 166–8, 179, 182, 185, 188 Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW); 132 Counter Terror Teams, 48 Cousins, John, WO2, 195 Couttie, Reginald, WO2, 195 Cowan, Peter, WO2, 103, 111 Cox, Byron ‘Ron’, WO2, 184, 193 Cramer, J.O., Min for Army, 18 Cross of Gallantry with Palm, (RVN), 52 Cua Viet, 133 Cuban Missile Crisis, Blockade, 3 Cu Chi, 50 da Costa, Joe, Maj, 30, 44 Dai Viet party, 58 Dak Pek, 120 Dak Seang, 165, siege of 169–71 Dak To, 111, 148, 160, 169 Dalat, 93, 154, 156, 160 Dalton, Don, WO2, 32, 34–5, 42 Daly, Sir Thomas, Lt Gen, 105, 134–5 Dam, Lt, ARVN, 25 Danang, 14, 19, 25, 27, 35–7, 51, 54, 56, 59–60, 65, 68, 84–5, 88, 91–2, 95, 100, 104–5, 111–12, 126, 134, 136, 146, 167, 177, 182, 213; East, 91–2 Dao, Capt, ARVN, 104 Dardanelle, 31 Darlac Province, 39–40 Danilenko, Anatoly ‘Tony’, Capt, 105, 120, KIA, 121, awarded MID, 121 Darwin, NT, 104 Dat, Capt, ARVN, 86–7, 89 Dat Do, 200, 202, 208 Davies, Bruce, WO2, 155, 157, 159, 162, 181 Day, Brian, WO2, 184, 193, 196 Deane, Bill, Capt, 154, 159, 175 De La Hunty, Noel, Capt, 43 Delta Pacification Plan, 27 Delta, The see Mekong Delta Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), 29, 65, 86, 106–07, 114, 118, 128, 130, 140, 182, 190, 202 Devitt, Jim, Capt, 47–9 passim Di An, 174, 176
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Dickey, Bill, WO2, 72, 86, 93 Diem, see Ngo Dinh Diem Dien Bien Phu, 3, 24, 35, 57, 88 Dien Binh River, 127 Dinh Tuong Province, 28, 139, 166, 168, 211 Distinguished Conduct Medal, 61, 113, 117, 123, 141, 151, 170 Distinguished Service Order, 170 District Operations & Intelligence Centre, 46, 188 Dolan, Tom, WO2, 145, WIA, 154 Donaldson, Robert, Maj, 195 Dong Ha, 89–90, 107, 122, 128, 130, 133, 182 Dong Phu, 75, 81 Dong Tam, 188 Donlon, Roger, Capt, US Army, 52, awarded Medal of Honor, 52 Donovan, Gen, 8 Dowsett, Les, WO1, 73 Duc Hoa, 119–20 Duc Hue, 120 Duc Lap, CIDG camp, 128–30 Duc My see also Training Centres, 26, 34, 42, 49–50, 65, 68, 85, 98, 212–13 Duc Pho, 155 Duc Thanh, 202 Duffey, Derek, WO2, 196 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 1 Dummett, Ray, WO1, 105, MM, 109 Dunstan, William, WO2, WIA, 159 Durrington, John, WO2, 125, KIA, 126 Dutch West New Guinea (West Irian), 3 Dustoff, 113, 141–2, 176, 197 Eade, Bill,WO2, 107, 166 Eather, David, WO2, 159 Ebner, Clem, WO2, 202–3 Eckhardt, Maj Gen, US Army, 126 Ede (Rhade) tribal group, see Montagnards Eden, Anthony, 1 Edwards, Ian ‘Sonny’, WO2, 112, 119–20 Egan Terry, WO2, 105, awarded DCM, 117 Elphick, Bruce, WO2, 195 Enoggera, QLD, 64 Europe, 1, 2 Evans, Max, WO2, 117 Fairfax,Thomas,WO2, 94 Fall, Bernard, KIA, 99 Fazekas, Felix, Capt, 79–80 Felt, Harry D., Adm, 7, 9 Fewell, Capt, US Army, 81 Fire Support Bases: A-1, 130, 144; A-2, 145; Barbara, 180; C-1, 145; Fuller, 182;
O’Reilly, 172–3, 179–80; PK17, 23, 116–17 Fitzgerald, Jack, WO2, 158, KIA, 171, 172 Fitzpatrick, Leo, Maj, 18, 20–1 Flannery, Joe, Sgt, 25–6, 111 Forde, Thomas, WO1, WIA, 171 Forden, Keith, WO2, 168 Forsyth, William, Ambassador, 3 Foshee, Edgar, SSgt, US Army, 73, 76, 78 Foster, Bob, WO2, 89 Foster, Brian, WO2, 196 Four Corners (TV program), 50 Four Power Trusteeship, 1 France, (French) 2, 3, 24, 37–8, 42, 54, 73, 87, 95, 157, 163, 205, 211, 214 Francis, George, WO2, 19 Franks, Bert, WO2, 71, 169 Free World Forces, 7, 84, 132; casualties, 115, 118, 155–6, 170; HQ Saigon, 194 French War, 2 Frost, Walter, WO2, 149 Furey, Bart, Capt, US Army, 86 Gabriel, Kevin ‘Shaky’,WO2, 119 Gallagher, Kerry, Capt, 196 Garrigan, John, WO2, drowned, 133 gas attack, 173 Gason, Ted, WO2, 202–3 Geddes, Ian, Brig, 201 Gee, Alf, WO2, 182 Geedrick, Jim, WO2, WIA, 128, 140 General Service Medal, British, with Clasp South Vietnam, 59 Geneva, 4, 6–7; Accords, 2, 3 Geographic boundaries: 16th Parallel, 1; 17th Parallel, 8; 38th Parallel, 2 George, Robert, Capt, 23 Gia Vuc, 68, 96 Gibbons, Denis, 146 Gill, Michael, WO2, DOW, 140–01, awarded MID, 141 Gilliver, Trevor, WO2, 111 Gio Linh, 106–07, 120, 130, 144–5, 150 Gollings, Ian, Lt, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29 Gordon, John ‘Jock’, WO2, WO1, 73, 201 Gorton, John, Rt Hon, PM, 157, 171 Gowans, Pat, Lt Col, 190, 195 Graham, Stuart, Col, DMI, 12 Green, Capt, US Army, KIA, 141, 152 Green, L.B. ‘Abe’, WO2, 160 Greggs, Capt, 53 Griff, Ted, Col, 105 Guam, 72 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 62 gunship, 114 Gurney, Ron, WO2, 144, 152
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Hacking, Bill, Sgt, 33; death, 33; court of inquiry, 33 Hagerty, Bob, Capt, 24–5, 33 Hague, Bert, WO2, 70 Hai Lang, District, 108, 179 Hai, Maj, ARVN, 34 Hai Van pass, 85 Halberstam, David, 32 Hamersley, Fred, WO2, 125, KIA, 126, awarded MID, 126 Hanh, 216 Hanley, Max, WO2, KIA, 99 Hanoi, 49, 66, 84, 86, 122 Harding, John, Maj, 69 Harkins, Paul D., Gen, US Army, 11, 13, 15–16, 21, 38, 40–1, 42 Harkness, Alexander, Maj, 139, 166 Harris, Peter, Capt, 138, WIA, 148, 151 Harris, Ron, WO2, 117 Harris, Stewart, 135 Harris,Vic, WO2, 71 Harrison, Maj Gen, AAG, 59 Hartley, John, Capt, WIA, 190 Ha Thanh, 68, 99, 124 Hawaii, 49 Hawksworth, Don, WO2, 72 Hay, R. A., Maj Gen, 137 Hayes, ‘Jack’, WO2, 108 Healy, John, Capt, 19, 22–3, 27 Heard, Kenneth, WO2, 159 Hearder, David, xiv Hearder, Simon, Maj, 195, 199–200 Heath, George, WO2, 171 Heathcote, Raymond, WO2, 158 Henderson, Mal, WO2, 112 Henry, Michael, Cpl, 98–9 Hiep Duc, 72, 171 Hiep Khanh, see also Training Centres, 14, 40, 42 Hill-10, 128 Hill-52, 125 Hill-159, 61 Hill-162, 143 Hill, Brian, Ambassador, 26, 41, 52 Hinde, Ray, Capt, 136 History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 66 Hoa Binh, 150 Hoa Cam, see also Training Centres, 15 Ho Chi Minh, 1, 2, 153; Trail, 160 Hoi An, 68, 71, 84, airfield, 91, 101, 108, 127, 155, 164 Hoi Chanh, see also Chieu Hoi, 132 Holland, Ken, WO2, 53 Holsworthy Village, 192 Holyoake, Keith, Prime Minister, 9 Homberg, SSGT, US Army, 142
411
Hon Doat, 79 Hong Kong, 43 Honolulu, 9, 51, 67, 157 honours, see awards Hon Tre Island, 133, 138 Horne, Geoffrey, WO2, 140, 155 Hue, Citadel, 117, 119, City, 14, 21, 31, 33, 56, 65, 85, 87, 91, 99, 104, 114, 116–18, 135, 146–7, 162, 172, 182, 189, 213 Hughes, John, Maj, MC, 109, 195 Hulsing, Peter, WO2, 202–3 Hunter, Al, WO2, 120 Huong Thuy, 86, 88 Husband, Jim, WO2, 70 India, 2 Indochina, 1, 2, Indonesia, 2, 13, 67, 212 Irvine, George, Capt, 58 Ison, Charles ‘Chicka’, WO2, 154 Israel, 8 Jackson, Gen, US Army, 177 Jackson, Laurie, WO2, 129, 184 Jackson, O.D., Col, 47, 51, 63–4, 70 James, Maurice, WO2, 111 Jamieson, George, WO2, 154, WIA, 170, awarded MID, 170 Japan, 1, 2, 4, 18, 59, 157 Jarai, tribal group, 39, 40 Jarratt, Peter, Capt, 43 Jenkin, Geoff ‘Smiley’, WO2, 195 Jensen, Matthew, WO2, WIA, 134 Jewell, Ian, WO2, 195 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, President, 62, 135 Johnston, Francis, Maj, 145, 150, 152, 155 Joyce, Allan, WO2, 149, 166 Joyce, Gilbert, WO2, 171 Jungle Training Centre, see Australian Army units Karaka, H.K. Sgt, RNZIR, 174 Karnow, Stanley, 99 Kealy, Clem, WO2, 72, 149 Keioskie, Colin, WO2, 164 Kelly, Andrew ‘Jock’, WO2, WIA, 141–2, 152 Kendall, John ‘Cappy’, WO2, 180 Kennedy, Bill, Sgt, 25, 38 Kennedy, John F., President, 8, 32, 38; Administration, 4, 11 Kennedy, Robert, 135 Kennedy, William, Sgt, 25 Kent-Hughes, Sir Wilfred, 30 Kevin ‘Dasher’ Wheatley,VC Stadium, 181 Kham Duc, SF camp, 43, 57–8, 68, 95, 121, 123–4, 177–9
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Khanh, Gen, ARVN, 57 Khanh Hoa, 160 Khe Sanh, 25, 28, 41, 43, 68, 96, 106, 140, 175, 188, 194 Khe Tre, 70 Khiem, Gen, ARVN, 57 Kien Giang Province, 132, 153 Kien Hoa Province, 139, 160, 166, 211 Killion, Don, WO2, 162–4 King, Bob, WO2, 89, 122 King, Graham, WO2, 172 King, Martin Luther, 135 Kinh, Maj, ARVN, 48 Kirkland, Keith, Lt Col, 199, 201 Kirwan, Alan, Lt, 193 Khmer Rouge, 207 Knight of the National Order, (RVN), 52 Kontum, city, 140; Province, 25, 37, 110, 142, 160, 169, 211 Kopke, Col, US Army, 54 Korchek, Robert L., Capt, US Army, 27 Korea, also South Korea, 18, 19, 54, 64, 121, 213 Kota Tinggi, 31 Kramer Compound, 157 Kranji Military Cemetery, 53 Krasnoff, Stan, Capt, 112, 119–20 Krulak,Victor, Gen, USMC, 32, 67 Kudnig, Franz, Capt, 131, 133, 136 Kuring, Ian, Cpl, 174, 176 Labor Government, 215 Lac Thien District, 40, 81 Ladd, Col, US Army, 126 Laird, Melvin, US Sec of Defense, 150, Lao Bao, 25 Lam Gen, ARVN, 104 Lancaster, Arthur, WO2, 172, 183 Lang Vei, 140 Laos, 3, 4, 9, 25, 43, Solution 28, 59, 89, 123, 150, 169, 177–8, 188–9; Pathet Lao, 4 Lansdale, Edward, Brig Gen, 8 Lawler, Frank, WO2, 196 Lawrance, ‘Snow’, WO1, 182 Leal, John, WO2, 172 Leary, Geoffrey, Col, 184, 186, 196 Lees, Ron, WO2, KIA, 84–5 Lefel, John, WO2, 168 Lemnitzer, Lyman, Gen, 7 Limieux, Jim, SSgt, 101 Lloyd, Russell. D.F., Lt Col, 134, 136, 139, 141–2, 153–4, 156–7, 159 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador, 36, 38, 41 Logan, George, WO2, 158–9 Long An Province, 41 Long Dien, 175
Long Hai, 119, 205; Hills, 112, 199–200; Training Battalion, 199–200, 204–5, 207 Long Range (Reconnaissance) Patrol (LRRP) program, 154; LRRP Wing,Van Kiep, 120, 136, 149, 151, 166–8, 172 Long Tan, battle, 94, 100 Lovelock, Harry, Maj, 104 Lucas, Frank, WO2, 120, 123–4 Luscombe Field, Ly Tin, 56–7, 60 LZ Bayonet, 177 LZ Kala, 177 Macadie,T.F.P., Brig, 18 Mac Dinh Chi (Saigon) cemetery, 53 MacDonald, A.L., Maj Gen, 120, 123, 137 MacDonald, Don, WO2, 114 MacDonald, James, WO2, KIA, 85 MacNamara, Robert, Sec of Defense Malaya, 2, 3, 8, 9, 13, 19, 39, 93, 183, 212; Malayan Emergency, 212 Malaysia, 215–16 Malone, John, WO2, 61, 73, 77 Manila, 110, 213 Mann, Adrian ‘Joe’, Lt Col, 18, 20–1 Mansford, George, Capt, 98, 213, 216 Manski, Dennis, Cpl, 191 Marble Mountain, 91 Market Time, patrols, 111 Martin, Jack, WO2, WIA, 206 massacre, My Lai, massacre, 106, 157; Tet 1968, 119, 163, Massingham, Albert ‘Rocky’, WO2, 128 Mathews, ‘Snow’, WO2, 94 Maung Maung, Maj, 4 McCloskey, Aleck, WO2, WIA, 165–6, awarded DCM, 170 McClymans, Dennis, WO2, 111 McCourt, John ‘Jock’, 43 McDonagh, Capt, 53 McDonald, Ranald, 106 McEvoy, Chris, WO2, 120, 166, 188 McEwan-Ferguson, John, WO2, 61 McFadden, Warwick ‘Blue’, WO2, 103 McFadzean, Jim, WO2, 72–3, 77–8 McGarr, Lionel C., Lt Gen, US Army, 7, 8, 9, 12 McGarry, Larry, WO2, 40 McGrath, Ian ‘Grub’, WO2, 195 McGurgan, Bernard, Capt, 173 McKeown, Ian, Maj, 61 McLaughlin, Bill, Capt, 195 McLaughlin, Sidney, WO2, 143 McNamara, Robert, 6, 102 McNamara, Russell, Lt Col, 49, 83 McNeill, Ian, 171
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McPhail, Ian, WO2, 195 McPherson, Kevin, WO2, 73, 78 Medal of Honor, 52 Medical evacuation (medevac), 156, 159, 170–1, 175 Mekong Delta, 15, 28, 118, 126–7, 151, 156, 160, 184, 188, 195 Melbourne,Vic, 19, 34, 54 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 12, 14, 16–17, 82 Mentioned in Despatches (MID), 102, 118, 121, 123, 126, 136, 141, 170 Menzies, Robert, PM, 62 Merrill’s Marauders, 8 Mieu Bong, 84, 100 Military Cross, 123, 170, 190 Military Medal, 97, 123, 164, 170 Military Regions: see also South Viet Nam; MR 1, 173, 179–80, 185, 187, 191, 194–6, 208; MR 2, 184, 194–6, 208; MR 3, 188, 191, 194–6; MR 4, 184, 185–6, 194–6 Miller, Eric, WO2, 70 Millington, Graeme, WO2, 194 Milner, Andrew John, Lt Col, 85 Mike Force, see Mobile Strike Force Minh, Gen, ARVN, 39, 57 Mnong, people, 40 MO9 (ASIS), 11, Mobile Advisory Team (MAT), 132, 156–7, 160, 165, 171, 173–4, 177 Mobile Assistance Training Teams (MATT), also Mobile Advisory Training Teams, 174, 176, 184, 187, 191, 194–6, 199, 205; MATT 2, 174; MATT 3, 179; MATT 4, 174–5; MATT 23, 193 Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF), 95, 213; Task Force 768, 96, see also Special Forces Mobile Strike Force (MSF), 72–3, 103, 109, 111–12, 119, 120–21, 123–6, 130, 134, 140, 148, 152, 154, 156, 165–6; 1 Bn, 152, 156, 169–70; 2 Bn, 137, 152; 4 Bn, 169–70; 11th Coy, 124; 12th Coy, 124; 2 MSF, 129, 139, 166, 172, 179; 1 Bn, 166; 3 Bn, 166; 202 Coy, 129; 203 Coy, 129; 204 Coy, 129; 212 Coy, 142; 223 Coy, 138; 232 Coy, 140; 3 MSF, 199 Mo Duc, 90, 95, 155 Moffitt, Frank, WO2, WIA, 156 Mogridge, Tony, Capt, 156 Monaghan, John, Lt Col, 49, 50, 53, 59 Monk, James, Cpl, WIA, 179 Monkhouse, Ron, WO2, 57 Montagnard, Commandos, 31; Mobile Training Team, 153; scout program, 27; soldiers, 36–7, 39–40, 95–6, 129, 139, 141–2, 152, 156, 169–70, 184, 213, 216;
413
Trail Watch patrols, 111; Truong Son Force, 81 Ede (Rhade) tribe, 39, 40, 95; Jarai tribe, 39, 40; Katu, people, 51; revolt, 59 tribal groups, 40 Montagnard Training Centre, Pleiku, 184 Mornington Peninsula,Vic, 57 Morris, Alec, WO2, 72 Morrison, Jack, WO2, 56, 61, 121, 145 Morrow, Brian, WO2, 195 Moratorium, marches, 187 mortar attacks, 108, 155, 170–3, 175 Moscow, 2 Mountfort, Richard, Capt, NZ, 182 Munck, Harry, US Army, 48–9 Munro, Geoffrey, ‘Derby’, WO2, 72, 140 murder, 48, 87, 157 Murphy, John, Maj, 49, 50 Murphy,Vin, Capt, 92 Musgrave, ‘Vin’, Maj, 85, 215 Musgrove, Robert, Maj, 195 My Lai, massacre, 106, 157, village/hamlet, 157 My Loc, 183 My Tho, 139 Nam Dong, SF camp, 51, 59, 70, 96 Nam Hoa, 85–6, 88–9, 119, 164 National Geographic, 18 National Liberation Front (NLF), 118, 214 National Pacification Plan, 49 Ned Kelly (civ dvr HQ, AATTV) 116; (Bushranger) 178 Neitz, Graham, WO2, 71, WIA, 130 Nelson, John, Capt, 158–9 Neville, Daniel, Sgt, 19, 40, 111 New Guinea, 67; Pacific Islands Regiment, 104 New South Wales (NSW), 192 New Zealand, 9, 10, units, soldiers, 97, 174, 182, forces, 161, casualties, 211 Nghia Hanh, District HQ, 113, 137 Ngoc, 2Lt, ARVN, 162 Ngo Dinh Diem, President, 3, 7, 9, 11, 21, 30–1, 37–8; government, 36, 39, 49 Ngo Dinh Khoi, 31 Ngo Dinh Nhu, 30 Ngok Tavak, 121, 123–4, 126 Nguyen Cao Ky, 58 Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Asst Minister for National Defence, see Thuan Nguyen Khanh, Maj Gen, ARVN, 42, 57 Nguyen–Portuguese alignment, 1 Nhan Hoa, 81 Nha Trang, 38, 50, 59, 92, 111, 120, 129, 133, 138
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Nicholas, Ed, WO2, 95 Nicholls, James, WO2, 178 Night Assistance Teams, 186 Night Operations Advisory Team (NOAT), 179, 186 Night Operations Training Team (NOTT), 179, 184–6, 193, 195–6 Ninh Hoa, 32 Nixon, Richard, M., President, 150, 171 Noble, William, WO2, 194 North Korea, 2 North Vietnam(ese), 3, 4, 64; Democratic Republican Government, 2 NVA Units, see also People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN), 64, 84, 90, 155, 158, 163–4, 168, 169, 173; 302 NVA Div, 123; 304(?) NVA Div, 52; 305 NVA Div, 168; 308 NVA Div, 1st Bn, 36 Regt, 125; 324 NVA Div, 172; 324B NVA Div, 172; 675 Bde, 150, 27 NVA Regt, 151; 28 NVA Regt, 170; 40 NVA Arty Regt, 170–1; 60 NVA Regt, 170; 66 NVA Regt, 137; 812 NVA Regt, 172; 5th Bn, 172; casualties, 72, 84, 103, 108, 115, 117–18, 136–8, 143, 146, 151–2, 155, 164, 167–8, 172–3, 178; military zone: Tri-Thien-Hue, 150 Nui Dat, 98, 104, 106, 127, 175, 192, 195–6, 199, 208, 210 Nui Dat Two, 207 Nung, soldiers, 51, 58, 74–6 passim, 80, 92–3, 123 O’Brien, Ron,WO1, 130,WIA, 151 O’Dowd, Ben, Maj, 9 Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), see CIA O’Hara, Ray, WO2, 166, WIA, 164 Okinawa, 38 Oliver, Ray, WO2, 166, WIA, 166–7, 172 Operations: Chinook II, 99; Dewey Canyon II, 189; Hung Quang 1/38, 127; Lam Son 79, 108; Lam Son 277/1, 143; Lam Son 719, 187–8, 190–1; Lam Son 720, 191, 193’ Lien Ket, 152; Phoenix, 132, 159; Quyet Thang 492, 70; Rapid Fire V, 112; Switchback, 19, 35; Operation Orders, 169 Opie, Len, Capt, 110–11, 125 Osborn, ‘Ossie’, WO2, 58, 70–1 Ostara, Ernest ‘Ossie’, WO2, 125, 132, WO1, 174 Palmer, Brian, Capt, 133 Palmer, Frank, Capt, 111 Paltridge, Shane D., Senator, 49, 51 Pan Am, 20, 57, 192 Paris, 122, 148, 153
Parrello Antonio, WO2, KIA, 117, awarded MID, 118 Paul, David, Capt, 150, 153 Payne, Keith, WO2, 142, awarded VC, 143 Pearson, Ray, Cpl, 192 Pentalateral Agreement, 17 Pentropic, organisation, 109 People’s Action Teams, 45–8 passim People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN), 52, 90 Viet Cong formations and units, 22, 26, 29, 66, 159, 163–4; 2 VC Div, 109; V.25 Main Force Bn, 155; 70 VC Bn, 109; 72 VC Bn, 109; 274 VC Main Force Regt, 200; 406th Sapper Bn, 113; D445 Bn, 118 People’s Self Defence Force (PSDF), 151, 154, 159, 166, 175, 184–5, 193–4 Perkins, Ron, WO2, 21, 28 Petersen, Barry, Capt, 19, 36–7, 39, 45, 59, 69, 81, 215 Petersen, M. John, Sgt, 19 Pettit, John, WO2, KIA, 170, awarded MID, 170 Phan Rang airbase, 106 Phan Van Dong, Gen, ARVN, 52 Pha Tam Giang, 99 Philippines, 2, 7, 9 Phillips, Ken, Maj, 190–1 Phillips, Tom, WO2, DOW, 90 Phoenix program, 125, 159 Phong Dinh, 166 Phu Bai, see also Training Centres, Dong Da, 14, 23, 25–6, 30, 39, 44, 46, 59, 68–9, 86, 147 Phu Cat, 184, 193, 195 Phuc, Capt, ARVN, 54 Phuoc Ha, 72 Phuoc Tuy Province, xiii, 62, 92, 94, 98, 112, 117, 127, 154, 156, 159–60, 166, 171–2, 175–6, 179–80, 184, 187, 190–1, 194–6, 199–200, 202, 204, 210–11 Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, 199–200, 204–6, 208–9 Phuong Hoang (Phoenix), see also Operation Phoenix, 132 Phu Trach, 72 Phu Tu, District, 177 Pincott, Ron, Sgt, 25 Pleiku, airfield, 66, SF Camp, 111, 126, 128, 134, 137, 140–1, 148, 160, 165, 170, 172, 179, 182, 191, 193, Province, 27, 37, 133, 184 Plei Trap Valley, 111 Pleiyit, 27 Polei Kleng, 111 Pollard, Reginald, Lt Gen, 5, 9, 18
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Poole, Max, WO2, 137 Pope, Harry, WO2, 40 Popular Force, see Territorial Forces post traumatic stress disorder, 192 Potsdam, 1 Powell, Dave, WO2, WIA, 164, 172 Powell, Albert ‘Dick’, WO2, 107 Pratten, Jim, WO2, 196 Preece, Alexander, Lt Col, 67, 73, 83 Prihar, Col, IDF, 8 Project Delta, 111 Project Omega, 111 Prosper, Bruce, WO2, 96 Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), 111, 125, 132, 133, 154–5, 159, 171 Pryde, Des, WO2, 182, 189 PT-76, tank, 137 ‘Puff the Magic Dragon’, 102 QANTAS, 19, 57, 115 Quang Duc Province, 128 Quang, Lt, ARVN, 79–80 Quang Nam Province, 59, 68, 113, 125, 133, 160, 168–9, 211 Quang Ngai, city, 15, 22, 46–7, 60, 70, 90–1, 111, 113, 115, 128, 131, 137, 145, 158, 177; Province, 12–14, 30–1, 45, 47, 60, 68, 73, 113–14, 145, 155, 157, 160, 181, 185, 193, 211, 216 Quang Tin Province, 57, 60–1, 68, 72, 110, 113, 120, 128, 131, 145, 160, 179, 211 Quang Tri, City, 44, 65, 71, 85, 91, 99, 118, 121, 130, 145; Province, 68, 71, 89, 103–4, 106–08, 128, 153, 160, 167, 179, 181, 195, 211–12 Queen’s Commendation (QC), award, 61 Queensland, 192 Que Son, 155 Qui Nhon, 68, 125, 160 Radio (station) 3LO, 107 Ramsay, Ian, WO2, 196 Ramsdale, Kevin, WO2, 53 Rand Corporation, 51 R and R, 209 Rangoon, 11 Ray, Peter, Capt, 109 refugees, 118 Regimental Combat Assistance Teams (RCAT), 187 Regional Force, see Territorial Forces Reid, Frank, WO2, 202–3 Reid, Steve, WO2, 196 Renouf, Alan, Minister, 44 Republic of South Viet Nam, xiii, 3, 155,
415
157; Armed Forces (RVNAF), 11; military strength, 31 Revolutionary Development, Cadres, 102, 132, 154, 166; strategy, 119, 159 Rhade, 39, 40, 95 Roberts, Adrian, Capt, 195 Robertson, Arthur, WO2, death, 112 Rockpile, the, 130 Rodger, Mick, WO2, 177–8 Roe, Brian, WO1, NZ, 182 Rolph, Don, WO2, 164 Roosevelt, President, 1 Rosenberg, Stan, WO1, 151 Rostow, Walt, 6 Rothwell, Peter, Capt, 141 Roughley, ‘Jack’, Sgt, 19 Routes: Route (Highway) 1, 60, 84, 86, 88, 99, 101, 164; Route 4, 100; Route 9, 25, 167, 180, 188; Route 14, 123, 160, 169; Route 44, 199; Highway 512, 160; Route 555, 99; Road 598, 85 Rowe, David, Capt, WIA, 148, 152 Roy, John ‘Jock’, WO2, 40 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), 12, 57, 59, 69 Royal Australian Navy, (RAN), HMAS Hobart, 128; HMAS Sydney, 69 Rule, Clarry, Capt, 118 Rung Sat, Special Zone, 111, 154–5 Rusk, Dean, Sec of State, 9 Rust, Barry, WO2, 95–6, 213 Ruthazer, Maj, USMC, 86 Sabah, 3 Sa Dec, 139 Saigon, 15, 18, 21, 26, 38–9, 41, 54, 57, 59, 62–3, 69, 86, 91, 94–5, 100, 104, 114, 115–16, 118–20, 122, 136, 147, 154, 160, 174, 194, 199, 213 Salas, Robert, Maj, 94 Sanderson Peter, WO2, WIA, 170 Sarawak, 3 Savage, David, Capt, WIA, 128–30, 149, 151 Scheele, Dave, Sgt, 138, awarded DCM, 141 Scherger, Sir Frederick, 67 Schungel, Lt Col, US Army, 126 Scowcroft, Lachlan ‘Lachie’, WO2, WIA, 170 Sea Knight, CH–46, 124 Seal, A.J. ‘Alf ’, WO2, 74 SEATO, 3, 10 Second Indochina War, see American War Sector and sub-sector, 85 Sector Operations and Intelligence Centre (SOIC), 45–6 Seiler, Ron, WO2, 107, KIA, 112 Selmes, Jack, WO2, 90
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sensors, 180, 194 Serong, F.P. (Ted), Col, 4, 8, 9–11, 12–19 passim, 20–1, 23, 25, 28, 30, 32, 35–8, 40–1, 43–5, 47, 49, 51–4 passim, 57–8, 60, 62–3, 93–4 Sershen, Sgt, US Army, 80 Seven-Mountains, 153 Sharp, Ulysses S., Adm, USN, 67 Shave, Mick, WO2, 202–3 Shaw, James, WO2, 178 Sheehan, John, WO2, WIA, 85 Shennan, Wayne, WO2, 93 Sheppard, Wally, Capt, 164 Shilston, Peter, Capt, 179, awarded MC, 170 Siggers, Tony, WO2, 96, NBC, 105 Silverstone, Bill, Lt Col, 179 Simpson, Lloyd, Sgt, US Army, 86 Simpson, Ray, WO2, 25, 27, 110; WIA 58, 121, 140, 141; awarded Distinguished Conduct Medal, 58–9, 141; awarded Victoria Cross, 142, 143 Sinclair, Malcolm, WO2, 103 Singapore, 3, 19–20, 53, 57 Skardon, Geoff, Capt, 73, 76–8 Skinner, Lt, US Army, 61 Small Wars Manual, USMC publication, 67 Smith, Brian, WO2, 103 Smith, George ‘Geoff ’, WO2, 129 Smith, J.J. ‘Jock’, Capt, 190, WIA awarded Bar to MC, 190 Smith, Robert ‘Sooty’, WO2, 99, 166, 214 Smith, Russell, Capt, 145 Smith, Terry, Capt, 204–6, 208–9 Snelling, Ernie, WO2, 130 Snook, Graham, WO2, 116–17, 122 Song Cau Do, 100–01 Soviet Union, See USSR South-east Asia, 4 South Korea, 9, 18, 19, 33 South Viet Nam (throughout); Embassy, Canberra, 10; Khanh, Government, 51 Military Regions: I Corps, xiii, 28, 42, 70, 91–2, 94, 99, 106, 119–20, 128, 130, 132–4, 140, 143, 145, 150–1, 152–3, 155, 158, 164, 167–8, 173, 177, 188, 208, 211, 213, 215; HQ, 61, 68, 104, 145, 155; II Corps, 111, 126, 132, 138, 148, 152, 156, 167, 182; II Field Force Viet Nam, 92; III Corps, xiii, 151, 166, 172, 182, 213; IV Corps, 126, 132, 134, 139, 149, 151, 153–7, 160, 164, 167–8, 179, 182, 188; Police Field Force (PFF), 93–4, National Police Surete, 39 Special Air Service (SAS), 17, 120, 208 Special Activities Training Centre, see Training Centres
Special Warfare units, 6 Spencer, Cameron, Capt, 136 ‘Spooky’, gunship, 124 Springvale Cemetery,Vic, 33 Stevenson, Ray ‘Gunner’, WO1, 103 Stewart, James, Lt Col, 193, 198–9 Stoker, Ken, WO2, 72, 93 Stokes, Bevan, WO2, 40, 59 Stone, John, WO2, 96; KIA, 102; awarded MID, 102 Strachan, Duncan, WO2, 155, WIA, 164, awarded MM, 164 Strategic Hamlet Program (Plan), 11, 27, 31, 49, 102; Hamlets of the New Life, 49; policy, 49 Strathern, Clifford, CIA, 36 Street Without Joy, 99 Strong Village Concept, 8 Studies and Observation Group (SOG), 160 Sukarno, 3, 212 Sullivan, Barry, WO2, 30 Sullivan, John, Lt Col, 179, 192 Sutherland, Bruce, WO2, 72 Swanbourne, W.A., 17 Swan Island, 34 Swanton, Ron ‘Butch’, WO2, 71, 79–80; KIA, 79–80 Sydney, city, 104; harbour, 17 Sydney Morning Herald, newspaper, 106–7, 146 Ta Ko, 59–60 Tam Ky, 61, 70, 72, 97, 109, 111, 115, 123, 128, 151, 155, 171, 177 Tang Capt, ARVN, 87 Tange, Sir Arthur, 44 Tan Son Nhut, 104, 110 Ta Rau (Nam Dong), 43, 59 Task Force Linh, 148 Task Force Oregon, 106 Taylor, Maxwell D., Ambassador, 67, 149 Taylor, Edward, WO2, 155, 166 Tay Ninh, 112, 114, 211 Teague, Ian, 45–8 passim, 60, 69 Tear, Doug, Capt, 177 Ted Serong, 32 Templeton, Graham ‘Curly’, Maj, 127, 139 Territorial Forces, 174, 194–7; Catholic Youth, 31; Civil Guard, 6, 13, 24, 27, 28, 31, 42; Force Populaire, 31; Hamlet Militia, 31; Popular Force, 54, 56, 68–9, 87–90, 101, 112, 118, 139, 158–9, 166, 171, 175–6, 188, 193, 199, 209, 212, 215; Regional Force, 54, 56, 68–9, 75, 87–90, 98, 101, 112, 118, 122, 139, 149, 154, 156–7, 159, 166–7, 171, 175–6, 179, 182,
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184, 199, 208–9, 212, 215; 161 RF Coy, 155; 236 RF Coy, 90; 368 RF Indep Coy, 212; 423 RF Coy, 90; 787 RF Coy, 175; Republican Youth, 31; Self Defence Corps (SDC), 6, 27, 31 terrorism, 88, 118 Tet, holiday, 166; Offensive (1968), 114–18 passim, 122, 135–6, 164, massacre 163 Thailand, 2, 4 Thang Binh, 72 Thanh Tan, 85 The Best and the Brightest, 32 The Team, 171, 201 Thi, Gen, ARVN, 65 Third Country National/s (TCN), 7, 8 Tiger Men, 81 Tillett, Wilbur, WO2, 166 Thompson, Allan, Capt, 7, 47 Thompson, Sir Robert, 7, 8, 12–14, 37–8, 93; Delta Plan, 8 Thompson, Wally, WO2, 63 Thorp, Anthony, WO2, 70 Thuan, Nguyen Dinh, Asst Minister for National Defence, 12–13 Thuan, Sgt, ARVN, 162 Thua Thien Province, 21, 104, 132, 160, 181, 195, 211 hospital, 163, sector 86, 163 Thuong Duc, 92, 95–6, 125, 173, 183 Time, magazine, 135 Times of Viet Nam, 38 Tinkler, Barry, Capt, 23, 27, 33 Toan, Maj Gen, ARVN, 215 To Chau, 139 Toghill, Tony, WO2, 25 Tolley, Barry, WO2, 129 Townley, Athol, Minister for Defence, 13–14 Tra Bong, 73–9 passim, 92, 96, 173, 216 Tra Cu, 120 Trai Mat, 93 Training Centres, see also ARVN; Dong Da, 14, 23, 25, 37, 39, 46, 59, 68–9, 86; Duc My, 34, 37, 42, 49–50, 65, 68, 85, 98, 160, 212–13; Heavyweight, 149, 152, 156, 159; Hiep Khanh, 14, 21, 25, 30, 33, 37, 39–40, 42–3; Hoa Cam, 15; Special Activities Training Centre,Vung Tau, 68, 133, 136 Tra Voi, stream, 80 Tri-Border area, 111, 137, 169 Trieu Phong, District, 108–09, HQ, 89 Trinh-Dutch Alliance, 1 Tripp, Terry, Lt Col, 99, 116 Troy, Kevin, WO2, NBC, 157 Troy, Sgt, USMC, 116 Truc, Chief of Surete, 39 Truman, President, 2 Trung Lap, 50
417
Truong, Maj Gen, ARVN, 215 Tu Nghia District, 193 Tun Tavern, battle, 175 Turner, Cedric ‘Shorty’, WO2, 111 Tuyen Duc Province, 154, 160 Tuy Hoa, 68 Typhoon Bessie, 130 United Kingdom, 3, 7, 67; 1/7 Duke of Edinburgh’s Ghurkha Rifles, 49 United States, (Country), 2, 3, 4, 6, 17, 155, 157 CINCPAC, 7, 9, 67; COMUSMACV, 13, 21, 38, 40, 44, 54, 64, 82, 128; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2, 165; Chairman, 2, 12; Special Group, (Counter Insurgency), 32; USCOM, 188; Department of State, also State Department, 2, 7, 12, 16, 38, 83; Embassy, Saigon, 12, 39, 47; USAID, 94; USIS, 46; USOM, 6, 46, 60 Army, 131; Advisor School Viet Nam (USARV), 174; Individual Training Group (Vietnam), 199; Infantry School, Ft Benning, 17; Ft Bragg, 30, 38; MAAG, 6, 7–8, 9, 11, 14, 20–1, 27, 41, 42, 44, 49, 53; Training Inspection Team, 21 MACV, 13, 16, 27, 38, 49, 53, 57, 59–60, 84, 91, 116, 120, 130, 154, 156, 164, 166, 187, 211 Command History, 172, 189, 211; Americal Division, 106, 124–5; 4th US Inf Div, 156; 25th US Inf Div, 114; 101st Airborne Div, 180, 191; 173rd Airborne Bde (Separate), 82, 92, 111; 198th Inf Bde, 171 Special Forces, 15, 19, 25, 30, 35, 37, 41, 43, 50–1, 58, 69, 73, 85, 112, 123–4, 128, 133, 138, 140, 142, 148, 154, 167, 169–70, 178, 205, 213; HQ, 5th SF Gp, Nha Trang, 39, 49, 92, 111, 126, 141; A Team: Det A-100, 95; Det A-107, 73, 79; Det A-131, 27; Det A-113, 99; B Team: Det B-20, 129; Det B-35, 119; Det B-36, 112, 119; Det B-50, 111; Det B-52, 111: C Team, 58; Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG), 19, 31, 43, 51, 57, 73–81 passim, 96, 103, 123, 128, 137, 166; 137th CIDG Coy, 124; 144th CIDG Coy, 81; Green Berets, the, 126 3rd US Surgical Hospital, 156 Navy, ships, USS C Turner Joy, 62; USS Edwards, 62; USS Maddox, 57, 62; USS Morton, 62; USS New Jersey, 130 Marines (USMC), 67, 86, 88–90, 101, 123–5, 130, 149, 213; III Marine
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Amphibious Force, 132; 3rd US Marine Div, 153; 9th Marine Expeditionary Bde, 66; 3rd Bn, 4th Inf Regt, 86; 1st Bn, 7th Regt, 100; 9th Regt, 137; USMC Combat Information Bureau, 106 United States personnel, casualties, 62, 66, 72, 91, 97, 103, 115, 118, 134, 156, 170–1, 178; dependents, 62, 65; deployed forces (military strength in Viet Nam), 27, 30, 62, 66, 82, 97, 154, 161, 171, 186, 198, 210 Upton, Clarrie, WO2, 103 Urquhart Joe, WO2, 120 USSR, 2, 3, 4, 140 Utz, Sgt (USSF), 121 Van Kiep, 120, 136, 156, 168, 202, 204–5, 209 Vann, John P., Lt Col, US Army, 28; Mr, 168 Vezgoff, Joe, WO2, 17–18, 20–21, 26 Victoria Cross, 80, 102, 142, 143 Viet An, 70 Viet Cong, see also PAVN: atrocities, 48, 119; casualties, 72, 84, 109, 113, 115, 117–18, 122, 136, 143, 145–6, 152, 155, 164, 167, 171, 173; Infrastructure, 159; Units, see PAVN; Main Force, see PAVN Viet Minh, 1, 31, 54, 87, 157, 211, 214 Viet Nam: A History, 99–100 Viet Nam, Associated States of, 2; Central Government, 2 Vietnamisation, 150, 175–6, 187–8 Village Defence Advisory Teams (VDAT), 139, 149, 151, 154, 156, 160, 166, 168; VDAT 1, 166;VDAT 2, 166;VDAT 3, 166; VDAT 4, 166;VDAT 5, 166 Vincent, John, WO2, 148 Vinh Binh Province, 127, 139, 166 Vinh Long, Province, 139–40, 160 Vinh Son, 81 Vu Gia, River, 108 Vung Tau, 43, 111–12, 115, 125, 133, 136, 159, 167, 174, 181, 192, 195, 205, 207; Psywar Centre, 43
Walters, Neale, WO2, 195 Warfe, George, Col, 9, 93 Warner, Denis, 135 War Zone D, 15 Washington, 36, 38, 64, 122 Washington Post, 30 Waters, Thomas, WO2, 166, WIA, 175–6 Watts, Don, WO2, 172 Wayne, John, 56 Weaver, Bob, Lt Col, US Army, 126 Wells, Mike, Capt, 94, 110 Weir, Roy, Sgt, 26, 120 West, Allan, WO2, 183 West Irian, see also Dutch West New Guinea, 3 Westmoreland, William, C., Lt Gen, US Army, 44, 49, 52, 63, 67, 70, 127 Wheatley, Kevin ‘Dasher’, WO2, 79–80, 216, KIA, 80, awarded VC, 80 Wheeler, Earle G., Gen, Chairman JCS, 62 White, A.G. ‘Aggie’, WO2, awarded DCM, 170 White, Jim, WO2, 196 White, John ‘Jed’, Capt, 123–4 White, Peter, Maj, 123 White, Percy, WO2, 113, awarded DCM, 113 Whitelaw, John, Brig, 201 Whitlam, Gough, PM, 104, 209 Wieland, Jim, Capt, 196 Wilde, James D., Spec, US Army, 73, 76 Wilkes, ‘Wallaby’ Peter, WO2, 138 Williams, Samuel T., Lt Gen, 12 Wilson, Brian, WO2, 196 Wilson, Jasper, Col, US Army, 42 Winbank, Keith, WO2, 81, 216 Wingate, Orde, 8 Wise, Des, WO2, WO1, 107, 195 withdrawal of troops, announcement, 157, 171 Witten, Ralph, WO2, 81 Woods, Jack, WO2, 196 World War II, 1, 88 Xuyen Moc, 200, 202
Wall, Ian,WO1, 195 Wallner, Dave, WO2, 109 Walsh, Brian, WO2, 141, KIA, 148 Walt, Lewis W., Maj Gen, USMC, 67
Youl, Mick,WO2, 81 Young, Barry, WO2, 158 Young, Peter, Lt, 19, 22, 27, 35
