The Changing Face of Evil in Film and Television
At the Interface
Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Nancy Mardas
Advisory Board Dr Alejandro Cervantes-Carson Professor Margaret Chatterjee Dr Wayne Cristaudo Dr Mira Crouch Dr Phil Fitzsimmons Dr Jones Irwin Professor Asa Kasher
Dr Martin McGoldrick Revd Stephen Morris Professor John Parry Professor Peter L. Twohig Professor S Ram Vemuri Revd Dr Kenneth Wilson, O.B.E
Volume 41 A volume in the At the Interface project ‘Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness’
Probing the Boundaries
The Changing Face of Evil in Film and Television
Edited by
Martin F. Norden
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2007
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-2324-6 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2007 Printed in the Netherlands
for Erika Paige
my favourite Cider House Rules urchin
Contents Introduction Martin F. Norden Chapter 1 The Bite at the Beginning: Encoding Evil Through Film Title Design Matthew Soar Chapter 2 Screening Evil in History: Rope, Compulsion, Scarface, Richard III Linda Bradley Salamon Chapter 3 The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock Mike Frank Chapter 4 Natural Evil in the Horror Film: Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds Cynthia Freeland Chapter 5 “The Devil Made Me Do It!”: Representing Evil and Disarticulating Mind/Body in the Supernatural Serial Killer Film Matt Hills and Steven Jay Schneider Chapter 6 Virtue, Vice, and the Harry Potter Universe Thomas Hibbs Chapter 7 Training Day and The Shield: Evil Cops and the Taint of Blackness Robin R. Means Coleman and Jasmine Nicole Cobb Chapter 8 The “Uncanny” Relationship of Disability and Evil in Film and Television Martin F. Norden
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1
17
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71
89
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Chapter 9 Comedy and the Holocaust in Roberto Benigni’s Life is Beautiful/La vita è bella Carlo Celli Chapter 10 On the Void: The Fascinating Object of Evil in Human Remains Garnet C. Butchart Chapter 11 The Perfidious President and “The Beast”: Evil in Oliver Stone’s Nixon John F. Stone
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Chapter 12 Televising 9/11 and Its Aftermath: The Framing of George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Politics of Good and Evil Gary R. Edgerton, William B. Hart, and Frances Hassencahl
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Bibliography
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Notes on Contributors
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Index
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Welcome to At the Interface/Probing the Boundaries By sharing insights and perspectives that are both inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary, ATI/PTB publications are designed to be both exploratory examinations of particular areas and issues, and rigorous inquiries into specific subjects. Books published in the series are enabling resources which will encourage sustained and creative dialogue, and become the future resource for further inquiries and research. The Changing Face of Evil in Film and Television is a volume which belongs to the research project Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness (www.wickedness.net). This wide ranging project seeks to explore issues connected with evil, suffering, pain and the consequences of human actions. It recognises that even the language of ‘evil’ is a problem, and attempts to find ways of beginning to make sense of human wickedness. Key themes that are central to the project include: x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
the language of evil the nature and sources of evil and human wickedness moral intuitions about dreadful crimes psychopathic behaviour; is a person mad or bad? choice, responsibility, and diminished responsibility social and cultural reactions to evil and human wickedness the portrayal of evil and human wickedness in the media and popular culture suffering in literature and film individual acts of evil, group violence, holocaust and genocide; obligations of bystanders terrorism, war, ethnic cleansing the search for meaning and sense in evil and human wickedness the nature and tasks of theodicy religious understandings of evil and human wickedness postmodern approaches to evil and human wickedness ecocriticism, evil and suffering evil and the use/abuse of technology; evil in cyberspace Dr Robert Fisher Inter-Disciplinary.Net www.inter-disciplinary.net
Introduction Martin F. Norden The film [Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone] is about the triumph of good over evil, and that is what people want right now. -Robbie Coltrane, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks 1 Evil, as Time writer Lance Morrow reminds us, is one of our most important words, invested as it is “with the dignity of mystery and theology.”2 Though we live in a relativistic age marked by ever-increasing secularity, the term is far from anachronistic. Despite our efforts to understand extreme antisocial behaviour from other than strictly theological viewpoints - via psychogenetics, for example - it still has the power to stir ancient primal beliefs. Small wonder, then, that this potent word has often been invoked to further a range of agendas, often highly political ones. History is littered with examples, but ones from the first years of the twenty-first century should suffice. Within two days of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Baltimore Sun spoke for many when it defined Osama bin Laden as “the face of evil.” In the months following the attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush stirred considerable controversy by labelling Iraq, Iran, and North Korea “the axis of evil.” In his first public statement on the sexual molestation cases that rocked the Roman Catholic Church in the U.S., the late John Paul II observed that some priests had succumbed “to the most grievous forms of the mysterium iniquitatis [mystery of evil] at work in the world.” In a 2004 essay on Iraqi terrorists’ video-recorded beheadings of western hostages, Harvard scholar Michael Ignatieff posed a poignant question: “Why can’t we just call [such] acts by their proper names and conduct ourselves accordingly? The name for this is evil.” In April 2007, a Virginia Tech student from South Korea named Cho Seung-Hui embarked on the deadliest shooting spree in U.S. history but somehow had the presence of mind in between the killings to send video recordings and photographs of himself to NBC News. Bloggers around the world wasted little time dubbing the ranting and weaponbrandishing Cho “the new face of evil.”3 Evil is unquestionably on many people’s minds these days, and this anthology confronts what may well be the primary means by which it is revealed to us in this age of high technology: moving-image media. There is more than a little truth to author Roy Baumeister’s assertion that people today “gain more frequent and vivid glimpses of the face of evil from movies than from religious writings.”4 I brought together this book’s essays in the belief that movies and television have strongly guided our thoughts about evil and will do so for the foreseeable future. As we ponder the evils of the past and grapple with those of the present - many of which we “know” only through mass media - this book will, I hope, shed much-
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needed light on a critical topic that touches us all. Though this anthology’s roots may be traced to a themed issue of the Journal of Popular Film & Television that I guest-edited in 2000, the book was driven largely by the unspeakable events of the following year and the frequent application of the good-evil dichotomy to them. Betty Burkes, Pedagogical Coordinator for the Hague Appeal for Peace, summarised well the immediate post-9/11 political climate fostered by the U.S. government: “Since September 11th, the rhetoric of good and evil has been used to pump up support for U.S. policies and patriotic fervour and preparing the American people for the U.S. government to invade Iraq and Afghanistan.” 5 Though the tactics of appealing to fear and demonising the “Other” are fairly standard rhetorical strategies,6 the period following 9/11 witnessed their elevation to a level unseen since the most frigid days of the Cold War. The dichotomous world-view promulgated by the Bush administration and its supporters was initially seductive for many in its historyeffacing, “feel-good” simplicity. As Burkes further noted, “We are comforted by the notion that we are good, and then we relinquish our authority to those in power who promise to protect us from what is evil.” Moreover, the strategy of characterising a person or even an entire people “as something horribly vile and inherently evil,” to quote Fordham University’s Robin Andersen, has hardly been limited to political leaders eager to justify armed invasions of other countries; it has also found frequent expression in movies, television programming, and other popular-culture forms. Commenting on the mediated instances of evil that have sprung up in the wake of 9/11, Murray Pomerance, editor of the 2004 anthology Bad: Infamy, Darkness, Evil, and Slime on Screen, noted the growth of verbal and visual references to evil across the post-9/11 landscape: “The invocation of malevolence in political and social life and in our popular cultural fictions has seemed to mushroom, to have spread everywhere, and it is understandable how any discussion of the proliferation of negativity onscreen might be thought inspired by those horrendous events [of 9/11] or aimed in response to them.”7 Though it might be tempting to regard national political rhetoric and film/TV entertainment as mutually exclusive areas, the construct of good and evil - or, more accurately, good v. evil - clearly undergirds both. In the public’s mind, they cannot help but be linked. According to Nancy Carlsson-Paige, a Professor of Education at Lesley University and cofounder of Lesley’s Peaceable Schools Center, this bipolar way of thinking is “a dominant perspective in the U.S. that saturates all of the media for every age group. And it gets people to think that there is an evil ‘Other’ out there that you have to exterminate.” Betty Burkes, who has noted the media’s “crucial role in both serving us misinformation and perpetuating this simplistic logic in its news reports, which are often indistinguishable from entertainment,” underscored the ancient dualism’s frequent structuring role in film and television: “The dichotomy between good and evil is a very popular theme in entertainment media. Since good guys are always fighting with evil, it gives filmmakers a great excuse to use violence.”
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When evil is ascribed to “Others,” it may make little difference to audiences if it occurs through government sound bites on network newscasts or the Fox network’s hit TV show 24 (2001-) and its ilk.8 Does the prevalence of such a dichotomous weltenshauung in film and television facilitate the ready acceptance of fundamental political rhetoric? In other words, have audiences in our media-saturated world become so conditioned to think along these rather simplistic lines that they are likely to be receptive to the latest like-minded pronouncements? Or do the media’s productions merely reflect a perspective that has long been woven into the fabric of society’s soul? I think few would quarrel with the idea that film/TV and society enjoy a mutually causal relationship, but that relationship remains a conundrum resistant to easy explanations. Though 9/11 will be remembered for many things, including its role as a major driving force behind numerous mediated representations of evil and discussions thereof,9 it is important to note that the interest in evil in popular culture is not tied to any particular time-period; it is nothing if not ongoing. Here is a set of examples that predates 9/11, drawn from my own experiences. In the spring of 2000, when I was guest-editing the themed issue of the Journal of Popular Film & Television on the movingimage representation of evil, I was struck by what seemed a heightened fascination with the topic. In 1999 and the first few months of 2000, for instance, members of the H-FILM internet mailing list (otherwise known as the H-NET List for Scholarly Studies and Uses of Media) had engaged in at least four extended discussions of evil in moving-image media.10 In 1999, the Boston Institute for Psychotherapy and the Counseling Psychology Division of Lesley University gave a Nietzschean twist to their annual “Psychology Goes to the Movies” film and discussion series by dubbing it “Beyond Good and Evil: The Villain Within.” In March 2000, Wickedness.net in association with Oxford University hosted “Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness,” a multinational, multidisciplinary conference that included sessions on media representations and that has since become an annual event. And my own call for papers for the JPFT issue generated countless inquiries from around the world and netted dozens of completed submissions. As pointed as these examples may be, however, it is likely that we could find similar expressions of interest throughout the history of moving-image media. In short, concerns about mediated evil may ebb and flow, but they are always present. These concerns have been prompted in part by the sheer number of films and television programmes that have trafficked in good and evil over the decades. There is no doubt that evil has proven a particularly serviceable abstraction for legions of media practitioners. They have changed the face of evil frequently, conflating the concept with just about every conceivable identity variable at one time or another and also associating it with a host of nonhuman subjects: animals, extraterrestrial aliens, even inanimate objects. In so doing, they have turned evil into nothing short of a ubiquitous commodity for our consumption. Perhaps more disturbingly, their actions and the motivations behind those actions have largely gone unquestioned.
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Despite our ongoing fascination with the concept of evil, what do we really know about it? Ervin Staub, a Holocaust survivor and author of such critical texts as The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence and The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults and Groups Help and Harm Others, has suggested that its essence “is the destruction of human beings. This includes not only killing but the creation of conditions that materially or psychologically destroy or diminish people's dignity, happiness, and capacity to fulfil basic material needs.”11 Evil as a general subject has long been an area of inquiry for theologians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists, amongst others, but it has attracted relatively little in-depth writing from film/television scholars. There are, of course, numerous studies of specific genres that trade heavily in evil, such as war, horror, and science fiction; it is the rare monograph or edited volume, however, that goes beyond generic boundaries or individual productions to take an overarching perspective on the moving-image construction of evil and connect the phenomenon to the substantial body of literature on evil per se. This collection of essays seeks to redress this situation, if in a limited way. The roles that film and television can play to get us to think analytically and critically about evil are certainly open to debate. Richard Woods in his Christian Identity Series book The Media Maze speculated that the voyeuristic nature of the viewing process insulates film audiences (and, by extension, their television counterparts) from any mediated evil they might witness even as they are tantalized by it. “Evil occupies a large portion of everyone’s experience of life,” he wrote. “It is inescapable, at least in its social effects. By portraying evil in the film, the artist enables his audience to delve experientially into the world of sin and guilt, but protected by the vicarious nature of the medium.” 12 Others have gone a step further by suggesting that moving-image makers have often unduly heightened the pleasure of what Woods has termed the “proxy-experience” of film and television when representing evil. Consider, for instance, the perspective of Jim Ware, co-author of Finding God in “The Lord of the Rings,” on this point. Shortly after the release of The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King (2003), Ware opined that, although J. R. R. Tolkien “didn’t make evil seem interesting or attractive at all” in his writings, the film may transform evil into something appealing merely because of the medium’s highly visual nature: I have a feeling that the movie may have the effect of glamorizing evil for certain viewers to a certain extent. I say this not because I think [Peter] Jackson’s film is a bad or propagandistic film, but simply because it is, in fact, a film. Movies are intended to impact us visually. We patronize the cinema because we want to see something. And showing audiences what they want to see is what movies do best. That’s what makes them so exciting. It’s in this bare, purely sensory way that I suspect Jackson’s work might end up making evil look more in-
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triguing than it actually deserves to look.13 Ware thus added his voice to a chorus of thinkers who have faulted the film/TV construction of evil out of hand. Others include Frank Cawson, author of The Monsters in the Mind: The Face of Evil in Myth, Literature and Contemporary Life, who bemoaned what he called “the escapist trivialisation” of embodied evil often found in popular culture, arguing that “it has to be accepted that the media must respond to public demand, that their explicit function is to entertain and divert, that selfrighteous moral lessons are self-defeating and unacceptable.” Claiming a distinction between “imaginary” and “real” evil, William Styron argued that the “evil portrayed in most novels and plays and movies is mediocre if not spurious, a shoddy concoction generally made up of violence, fantasy, neurotic terror, and melodrama.” Taking a less strident tone, Roy Baumeister suggested that “it is easy to be misled by fictional examples because of the distorting power of the myth of evil.” In What Evil Means to Us, C. Fred Alford offered a sweeping condemnation of the moving-image representation of evil. Essentially arguing that the media offer only pale imitations of “real” evil and fail to demonstrate strategies for containing it, Alford suggested that the representations may offer short-term stimulation “but in the long run can only desensitize us to evil.”14 In a cogent counterargument, Cynthia Freeland asserted that horror films - and, by implication, other films and TV programming that represent evil - can and do “offer rich, varied, subtle, and complex views on the nature of evil.” Drawing heavily on cognitivist film theory, she suggested that such productions are constructed to elicit responses both emotional and intellectual; in her words, they “prompt emotions of fear, sympathy, revulsion, dread, anxiety, or disgust. And in doing so, they also stimulate thoughts about evil in its many varieties and degrees: internal or external, limited or profound, physical or mental, natural or supernatural, conquerable or triumphant” [emphasis in original]. 15 For example, movies and TV programmes can help us understand what Lance Morrow has termed the “normality of evil.” This phrase, a corrective of Hannah Arendt’s far more familiar “banality of evil,” refers to a concept that has been the focus of considerable debate ever since the 1963 publication of Arendt’s coverage and analysis of the Adolf Eichmann trial.16 She made it clear that the horrific crimes of the Nazi era were not committed by wild-eyed maniacs or Satan's grinning minions but by alltoo-ordinary humans: The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied [that this new type of criminal] commits his crimes under circumstances that
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Writers in many fields have been drawn to this relatively new view of evil, and media practitioners have proven no exception. Robert Towne grappled with it in his screenplay for The Last Detail (1973), in which a naïve young sailor is escorted to a naval prison by two career seamen who are fully aware of the harsh realities that await him there. According to the Darryl Ponicsan novel on which Towne based his script, one of the career sailors feels so badly for the young man that he helps him escape. Towne disagreed with this development, believing that it makes the character, and people in general, more noble than they actually would be under such circumstances. “When it really comes down to hard decisions, people are not very courageous,” he said. “And I don’t mean it cynically. They try to be kind, but they don’t have the courage very often to back it up . . . People tend to fall back and say, ‘Gee, I’m just doing my job,’ whether it’s a German throwing Jews into an oven or [the career sailors] throwing the guy into the brig . . . Everybody falls back on that, and that’s the real evil . . . ‘I’m just doing my duty, you know,’ and I felt that, to take people who are essentially kind and funny and witty and charming and still in their own self-interest have to do something cruel, makes a better point.”18 The result of Towne’s deliberations is a powerful and gripping example of quotidian evil on screen. An interest in mundane evil can also be found in retellings of more traditional stories. In Merlin, a 1998 made-for-TV film based on the Arthurian legend, screenwriters David Stevens and Peter Barnes had arch villain Queen Mab utter the following line: “With evil all around me, I can do nothing but evil to survive.” Though Mab is unlike Eichmann and his cohorts in that she is quite able to see her actions and their context as evil (indeed, she is one of the most self-aware villains ever to have appeared on the screen), her line gives us some insight into the unspoken day-to-day evil that marked the era of the Third Reich. Alford’s rumination on the media treatment of evil contains other provocative statements. Some of the more astounding appear in the following passage: Culture is of no value when it mirrors the experiences that terrify us. When it does, culture is talking the language of the autistic-contiguous position, imitation without understanding or integration. The evening news is not culture, though it is the number-one source of the free informants’ examples of evil. Nor are most movies culture. A meaningful culture stands at a distance, connecting with our experiences but not becoming them . . . Are there cultural resources available for young people to construct their own narratives? Movies and TV do not seem to lend themselves to such active constructions, being experienced more passively, a parade of
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icons across the screen, like the shadows on the walls of Plato’s cave.19 In view of the substantial body of work of film theorists ranging from Hugo Münsterberg and Rudolf Arnheim during the first decades of the twentieth century to cognitivists such as Noël Carroll and David Bordwell, the “passivity” argument seems quaint at best and hardly worth debating. Alford’s rather idealistic and elitist view of a “meaningful culture” deserves attention, however, since it is at odds with the way that many people use media. First of all, films and TV programming are most assuredly a form of culture, though we may infer from Alford’s choice of words that he regards them as a “meaningless” or “valueless” culture. Such a view of media is dangerously short-sighted. As I and many others would argue, films and TV programmes are hardly simple mechanisms for reflecting reality; instead, they are the reality on which many viewers draw for ideas about the world around them. In other words, many spectators construct their views of the world in terms of the mass-produced, profitminded imagery that bombards them daily. Alford’s arguments are flawed for another, related reason: his implied view that evil is something distinct and readily lends itself to comparisons with its film/TV imitations. Evil is not simply a subject in our set of non-mediated “experiences”; it is a social construct, and it is well worth noting that the things we might regard as real-world instances of evil often come to us solely through mass-media forms: history books, newspapers, magazines, TV network newscasts, documentary films, etc. In her landmark book on the representation of the Holocaust, Indelible Shadows, Annette Insdorf underscored this point by suggesting that “the mass audience knows - and will continue to learn - about the Nazi era and its victims” primarily through motion pictures. Her views are echoed by postmodernist critic Jean Baudrillard, who has observed with customary hyperbole that “we forget a little too easily that the whole of our reality is filtered through the media, including tragic events of the past.” Instead of attempting to separate mediated evil and its “real-world” equivalent - a highly problematic dualism, to be sure - with the goal of conducting a comparative analysis, our time would be better spent if we worked toward a better understanding of three intertwined concerns: the types of extreme antisocial behaviour that have marked our world, regardless of the ways in which we ultimately achieve awareness of them; why certain ones continue to be emphasised in films and TV programming; and the strategies employed for their representation.20 For instance, the study of mediated evil can help us understand how and why moving-image makers continue to draw from, and thus perpetuate, ideas about evil found in national mythologies. The concept of evil is a highly conspicuous part of world mythology and its overlapping functions (to establish and preserve cultural norms, to impose order on an otherwise chaotic world, to explain phenomena that cannot otherwise be explained, to entertain, etc.), and we might argue that film/TV practitioners have pressed mythologised evil into service for two main agendas: to
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reinforce “gender, racial, moral, and ethnic hierarchies by punishing those who transgress socially prescribed boundaries,” in the words of historian Steven Mintz,21 and to further maintain the mainstream’s cohesion by inscribing extremely untoward qualities and behaviours onto “Others.” As an example (and as I argue in my own chapter), mainstream filmmakers and television producers have frequently borrowed from the ancient linkage of disease and disability with punishment and sinfulness in their representation of people with disabilities. Taking their cue from Biblical admonishments and such literary constructions as Shakespeare’s Richard III, Hugo’s Quasimodo, Stevenson’s Long John Silver, and Barrie’s Captain Hook, they created highly problematic imagery throughout the twentieth century. Needless to say, they have not stopped during the twenty-first. The chapters that follow, then, examine the construction of evil in select productions and from a variety of perspectives: amongst them, philosophical, psychoanalytic, auteurist, historical, and critical-cultural. Many of the “usual suspects” of philosophy and allied fields are invoked in these chapters: Plato, Descartes, Hobbes, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Sartre, Lacan, Bakhtin, Žižek, Baudrillard - in brief, a broad array of critical thinkers from Augustine to Zoroaster. The American mainstream (“Hollywood”) film is the dominant mode of discourse examined here, but it is by no means the only one; television dramas and network news programming are studied, as are international narrative films and a notable documentary. Though by no means a comprehensive history, this book offers something for just about everyone interested in the general topic. A word needs to be said about the ordering of this anthology’s chapters. Instead of separating them into discrete (and, perhaps, unduly limiting) sections or, worse, presenting them in haphazard order, I thought it best to arrange them so that a winding thread appears to connect them. That thread - which admittedly threatens to unravel at times - is adumbrated below. The first chapter, appropriately, examines items found at the beginnings of films: the titles. Taking the view that film title design is a relatively unexplored site of cultural production, Matthew Soar guides us through the encoding of evil in the opening title sequences of three key films: Psycho (1960), Se7en (1995), and American Psycho (2000). Though Soar barely mentions Psycho’s director, Alfred Hitchcock, his chapter is nevertheless a reminder that Hitchcock’s representations of good and evil continue to intrigue scholars; indeed, the “Master” looms large over a sizable portion of this book. Linda Bradley Salamon examines the historicising of larger-than-life murderous figures in Hitchcock’s Rope (1948) as well as in Richard Fleischer’s Compulsion (1959), Brian De Palma’s Scarface (1983), and Richard Loncraine’s Richard III (1995). Mike Frank studies a quartet of Hitchcock’s films released over four different decades - The Lodger (1926), Shadow of a Doubt (1943), Vertigo (1958), and Psycho - while arguing on behalf of a pluralistic critical approach for examining good and evil in the Hitchcock oeuvre. Cynthia Freeland examines the concept of natural evil in cinema, using The Birds (1963) as her primary exemplar.
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Freeland’s chapter marks a turn in the anthology from matters largely (but by no means exclusively) Hitchcockian to specific film/TV genres often associated with evil. Matt Hills and Steven Jay Schneider venture further into the world of the horror film - a world that surely claims The Birds’ Bodega Bay as one of its capitals - by exploring the relatively recent phenomenon of supernatural serial-killer films. Thomas Hibbs moves into the kindred realm of fantasy cinema with his examination of the Harry Potter movies and how their represented evil differs qualitatively from that found in films of the previous decade such as Cape Fear (1991) and The Silence of the Lambs (1991). Concentrating on two police dramas - Training Day (2001) and the FX television series The Shield (2002-) - Robin R. Means Coleman and Jasmine Nicole Cobb study the role of race in the construction of “evil cops.” Agreeing with Pedro Almodóvar’s observation that people with disabilities “have often been used in genre films, especially stories of terror, thrillers, or melodramas,” 22 I employ Freud’s famous essay “The Uncanny” and other works as a collective lens through which to examine the frequent conflation of evil and disability in film and television. In addition to their genre connections, these latter two chapters demonstrate how readily filmmakers and TV producers can take identity factors such as race and ability and infuse them with senses of villainy to suit their political agendas. Carlo Celli’s chapter, which investigates the contrast of Holocaust evils and the comedic surface story of Roberto Benigni’s Life Is Beautiful/La vita è bella (1997), embodies a final transition in the book: from evil-themed genre/identity studies to the exploration of evil as represented within the context of global events and national leadership from the World War II years onward. Basing his interpretations in part on the theories of Jacques Lacan, Garnet Butchart discusses the deftly minimalistic approach to representing evil in Jay Rosenblatt’s Human Remains, a 1998 documentary film ostensibly about the domestic lives of Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Stalin, and Mao. The evils of a U.S. president and the amorphous “beast” that surrounds him are the foci of John F. Stone’s study of Oliver Stone’s Nixon (1995). Finally, Gary R. Edgerton and colleagues William B. Hart and Frances Hassencahl examine the framing of good and evil on television in the days immediately following the horrific events of 9/11. I offer these authors my heartfelt thanks for their flexibility, openness to editorial suggestion, good humour, and willingness to go that extra mile with me to see this book through to completion. I also wish to thank the people who provided behind-the-scenes assistance in the preparation of this book: Ali Blacker, Margaret Breen, Agnes Curry, Rob Fisher, Daniel Haybron, Jay Rosenblatt, and the ever-helpful staff at Jerry Ohlinger’s Movie Material Store in Manhattan. I also offer thanks to Alicia Verlager and Julia Rodas for their suggestions, and to Gary R. Edgerton and Michael Marsden for allowing me to “test-drive” some film/TV/evil ideas on the pages of the Journal of Popular Film & Television. A special note of appreciation goes to Jack Shaheen, author of Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People and, in my not-so-humble view, one of the most wonderful people on this planet. I would also like to
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express my gratitude to the UMass-Amherst Communication Dept. for providing me with a base of operations and absorbing some of my expenses, and to the university’s Office of Faculty Development for allowing me the time and space to wrap up this project at a faculty writing retreat. Finally, my thanks to Kim, Toby, and Erika for their encouragement and support and for putting up with my varying degrees of distractedness. As the image of Virginia Tech killer Cho Seung-Hui stares back at us from behind the barrel of a handgun, it is all too clear that the essays contained in this book do not constitute the end of the discussion. They are, nevertheless, an important step toward a fuller understanding of evil as represented in film and television. I hope that they will serve as the basis for an ongoing dialogue on one of the most pervasive and, at the same time, least understood of human constructs. Marty Norden Amherst, Massachusetts USA
Notes 1. Cited in “Perspectives,” Newsweek, 12 November 2001, 21. 2. Lance Morrow, “Coming to Clarity About Guns,” Time, 3 May 1999, 46. See also his “The Real Meaning of Evil,” Time, 24 February 2003, 74. 3. For an analysis of Bush’s State of the Union speech, see Massimo Calabresi, “The Axis of Evil: Is It for Real?” Time, 11 February 2002, 30-31. Michael Ignatieff, “The Terrorist as Auteur,” New York Times Magazine, 14 November 2004, 54. See also Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004). For a typical blog report on Cho Seung-Hui, see
. 4. Roy F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1997), 63. 5. Burkes cited in Miguel Picker and Chyng Sun, Beyond Good and Evil: Children, Media, and Violent Times (Northampton, Mass.: Media Education Foundation, 2003), video recording. 6. See, for instance, Richard Paul and Linda Elder, The Thinker’s Guide to Fallacies: The Art of Mental Trickery and Manipulation (Dillon Beach, Calif.: Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2004), 28-29. 7. Burkes and Andersen cited in Picker and Sun; Murray Pomerance, “Introduction: From Bad to Worse,” in Bad: Infamy, Darkness, Evil, and Slime on Screen, ed. Murray Pomerance (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2004), 1.
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8. Carlsson-Paige and Burkes cited in Picker and Sun. Not so surprisingly, the Fox network’s news division has been highly supportive of George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. 9. For example, I think it highly unlikely that the bookseller giant Barnes & Noble would have created an “Evil” book series under its own imprint had it not been for 9/11. Begun in 2002, the series includes titles such as The Most Evil Men in History, The Most Evil Women in History, The Most Evil Men and Women in History, The Most Evil Mobsters in History, and The Most Evil Dictators in History. The word “Evil” on their covers is notably about five times larger than any of the other title words. 10. The H-FILM discussions may be found at the list’s searchable archive, located at this address: <www.h-net.org/~film>. 11. Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 25. 12. Richard Woods, The Media Maze (Dayton: George A. Pflaum, 1969), 83. 13. Jim Ware, online posting, Beliefnet, 12 December 2003 <www.beliefnet.com/study_groups/>. 14. Frank Cawson, The Monsters in the Mind: The Face of Evil in Myth, Literature and Contemporary Life (Sussex: Book Guild, 1995), 155; William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (New York: Random House, 1979), 149; Baumeister, 18; C. Fred Alford, What Evil Means to Us (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997), 13. 15. Cynthia Freeland, The Naked and the Undead: Evil and the Appeal of Horror (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 2-3. 16. As Morrow has noted, his corrective is related in part to Arendt’s own dissatisfaction with her oft-quoted phrase. See Morrow, “Real Meaning,” 74. 17. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 276. 18. Robert Towne, interview transcript, American Film Foundation, Santa Monica, California, 1981, 15-16. Towne’s line about “a German throwing Jews into an oven” is of course problematic (the Nazis used the crematoria for the disposal of their victims’ corpses), but his point is taken. 19. Alford, 87. 20. Annette Insdorf, Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), xvii; Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, 1993), 90. 21. Steven Mintz, “Film Wrestles with Evil,” H-NET List for Scholarly Studies and Uses of Media, 25 January 1999. <www.hnet.org/~film>. 22. Pedro Almodóvar, dustjacket notes for El cine del aislamiento: El discapacitado en la historia del cine, by Martin F. Norden (Madrid: Escuela Libre Editorial, 1998). My translation of Almodóvar’s notes may be found at .
The Bite at the Beginning: Encoding Evil Through Film Title Design Matthew Soar Abstract This chapter discusses the title sequences (a.k.a. opening credits) for three “evil” feature films: Psycho (1960), Se7en (1995) and American Psycho (2000). They are framed as designed artifacts - comprising images, lettering, and type - created by graphic designers working at arm’s length from the routines of movie production per se. A brief discussion of the function of film titles is followed by a problematisation of the creative choices and rationalisations (qua representational strategies) of the designers and filmmakers involved in creating “evil” titles - beyond the laudatory accounts that typify coverage of title design in the trade, and mainstream, press. The chapter concludes by noting that there is much that remains to be understood about the creative milieu of title design as an active and integral part of the circuit of culture; and, that further research is needed on the genre-specific roles of lettering and type in time-based media. Key Words: American Psycho, S. Bass, K. Cooper, M. McCarty, Psycho, Se7en, title design
1.
An Opening: The Lore of Film Title Design Critical writing on movie title sequences is a marginal, even parenthetic, activity within the larger projects of film and media studies. This is a factor I intend to exploit here in order to offer a novel perspective that treats film titles as designed artifacts: the products of an expanding support industry dominated historically by optical printing houses but increasingly colonised by graphic designers. Specifically, then, how do designers - as opposed to film directors - imagine evil? What visual and typographic strategies do they use to portray it? Is it coincidence that two of the title sequences that have historically garnered the most acclaim within the design profession are for “evil” films? Using textual analysis and interview data to explore this site of cultural production, I want to draw particular attention to two “evil” title sequences, namely Psycho (1960) and Se7en (1995), both of which have received exceptional plaudits for their technical and aesthetic innovations. 1 I will also discuss the titles for American Psycho (2000) as a contrast case. First, however, I would like to take a moment to debunk some of the more tenacious myths that have become part of the emergent lore of this hybrid practice. There are two key fallacies in most writing about film title design: the singular identification of one figure - Saul Bass - as the
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father (or “master”) of this particular design practice; and the conviction that the mid-century creative developments with which he was closely associated were wholly unprecedented. On these points, Deborah Allison has offered a much-needed corrective, arguing very persuasively that innovation and diversity [in film title design] did exist at some level within film titles of [the silent] period and . . . such an approach to title design was not purely a post-Carmen Jones (Otto Preminger, 1954) phenomenon. Such an interest in the possibilities of title sequence design has existed cyclically, not in a simple chronological progression. 2 Indeed, contradicting many of his own admirers, Bass once said that “there was a time when titles were very interesting, going back to the early 1930s or even the late 1920s. Then it got bogged down and became bad lettering produced by firms that ground out titles.” 3 In concert with Allison’s perspective, this chapter is an attempt to read around received ideas about film title design; to avoid reinforcing the “great man” approach and the tendencies towards teleology that underpin the bulk of writing on this subject. It is also implicitly premised on a commitment to acknowledging and analysing “cultural production” not as an homogenous entity but as a series of networks of creative labour that are neither free from, nor entirely subsumed by, the regimes of control and power under which these activities function. Indeed, film title design can in some ways be understood as the product of an enclave or “habitus” that enjoys a modest degree of creative autonomy. 4 2.
From Credits to Mini-Movies The opening credit sequences of feature films - evil-themed or otherwise - are, by and large, a practical and legal necessity. Most basically, they serve to identify a film by its name, along with other key information such as the studio, lead actors, director and producer(s). From a legal perspective, opening credits can be framed historically as the result of continual negotiations between studios and the unions representing, in particular, writers, producers, and directors. 5 The utility of an opening title sequence can also extend to the provision of “some back story, or it can repackage a film for a different market,” to quote title designer Kyle Cooper. It can even be deployed to fix an unforeseen problem with the movie itself. For example, the titles for Donnie Brasco (1997) were designed specifically to address a serious narrative flaw that came to light only during test screenings. 6 As this example suggests, over time, title sequences have often become insinuated into the fabric of the movies themselves. As Deborah Allison’s 2001 study of more than 2,500 movies has shown, this phenomenon has occurred temporally, in two senses. First, the average length of title sequences has gradually increased from around sixty seconds in the 1930s to around three minutes by the end of the 1990s. Second, titles have
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more often been placed after an initial narrative segment. This latter practice peaked in the mid-1970s, when almost half of the feature films produced in the U.S. included a “pre-title sequence.” 7 A prominent example of this tendency is the spectacular action sequences to be found at the very beginning of movies in the James Bond franchise. In terms of content and overall impact, titles have generally become more creatively elaborate and technically complex. Indeed, their contributions to the overall experience of film viewing - aesthetic, narrative, affective - have advanced considerably. On this account, film journalist David E. Williams has suggested that “an artful title sequence can set a tone or conjure a mood, utilising distinctly crafted images to purposefully prime both filmgoers and television audiences.” Independent film producer Christine Vachon put it this way: “Watching any great film, one should feel as if one is in the hands of somebody who is taking you somewhere you haven’t been before. And if those hands are deft and sure, it can be an incredible experience.” Furthermore, “a great title sequence is the first indicator that a film is prepared to do that for you.” According to Vachon, Todd Haynes, the writer/director of movies such as Safe (1995), Velvet Goldmine (1998), and Far From Heaven (2002), has the credits in mind when writing his opening scenes. For Haynes, then, “the way in which the text [i.e., words on screen] emerges marks - visually, aesthetically, and through reference - a series of expectations that the film is intentionally setting up. And I enjoy that manipulation, I enjoy that privileged moment - it’s almost like a curtain parting.” 8 At their most basic - and perhaps least imaginative - are contemporary film titles that merely deliver the requisite information with minimal intrusion. Woody Allen’s movies, for example, routinely open with a series of establishing shots over which the credits appear in a series of sober title cards - often rendered in the same typeface from film to film. As the examples discussed here illustrate, however, titles can and often do transcend this routine role, becoming, at their most sophisticated, thoroughly engaging, highly produced entities that can do much to support or augment a movie. 3.
Type, Typography and Lettering: Writing Evil
Kyle [Cooper] is the guru of main titles. He’s the Saul Bass of now. -Peter Frankfurt 9 A title sequence does not exist without text. And this is the key, perhaps, to understanding why graphic designers have become the preeminent creators of contemporary opening credit sequences; it is their specific understanding of how to orchestrate images and words, and their ready skill in selecting and manipulating lettering and type, that make designers particularly adept at title design. A key debate - at least in design and design education circles concerns the function of type. According to the transcript of a short speech made by Beatrice Warde in the early 1930s, called “The Crystal Goblet, or
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Printing Should Be Invisible,” type’s chief goal must be to convey, as transparently as possible, the content of a text to the reader; any form of interpretation, embellishment, or stylistic flourish is merely obstructive. As Warde said, “All good typography is modernist.” 10 This argument also serves to highlight the radically different design approaches behind the two title sequences I would like to discuss here. Designed (with significant technical and artistic support) by Saul Bass and Kyle Cooper, respectively, the titles for Psycho and Se7en have been widely praised: the former as a typically outstanding creation of one of the most lauded graphic designers of the twentieth century; the second as the career-making, “break-out” work of a contemporary graphic designer who immediately went on to form the highly successful motion graphics and titles company Imaginary Forces. Like the films for which they were designed, these “mini-movies” deliver dramatic explorations of the theme of serialised murder in about 120 seconds. This in itself is quite an achievement given the implicit legal constraints and the necessity of signalling genre, theme, period, and mood, without undermining the narrative integrity of the movie proper. For Psycho, Bass created an expressive type treatment through the use of two sans serif typefaces called Venus Bold Extended and News Gothic Bold rendered in all capitals. 11 The main title practically fills the middle of the screen, and is placed centrally; it is as if Bass wanted to draw our attention to the imminent typographic tricks he was about to show us, and nothing more. There is no depth to speak of here: no graphic tricks suggestive of three-dimensionality (e.g., shadows placed behind the type), no live-action juxtapositions. In other words, every element moves up, down, or from side to side, but never towards or away from us. The type is literally sliced up and choreographed to suggest the mindset of the main character Norman Bates: split, fragmentary, compartmentalised, misaligned, incoherent. The style of graphic presentation - flat blocks of uniformly tonal bars being moved around on a single, flat plane - is absolutely typical of Bass’s oft-repeated modernist mantra: “symbolize and summarize.” As Bass explained: In those days, I liked strong, clear, structural forms against which to do things. I liked giving more zip to Psycho because it was not only the name of the picture but a word that means something. I was trying to make it more frenetic and I liked the idea of images suggesting clues coming together. 12 It also bespeaks the technical capacities and limitations of film production at this time. Some of the bars were actually “six-foot-long aluminum bars . . . sprayed . . . black,” according to Harold Adler, the artist/technician who helped shoot them. Other elements, like the title word itself, were made from cut-up photostats. 13 Se7en’s title sequence could not be more different. Rather than “symbolize and summarize,” it consists of a busy and elaborate live action
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narrative that follows very closely the distinctive aesthetic developed for the movie. Film director David Fincher and his director of photography, Darius Khondji, have offered up many references to locate the “art” of the movie, including the films Klute (1971) and The French Connection (1971), with their downbeat, vérité-style conceptualisations of the city as hostile and soulless. Khondji has also cited Robert Frank’s iconographic The Americans, a highly influential photographic series that documented perhaps even equated - the mundane and the shocking in the anonymous, urban America of the mid-1950s. Critic Amy Taubin is amongst those who have pointed to the work of Joel Peter Witkin, a photographer whose subjects include various body horrors. 14 There are other highly plausible references, of course, such as the carnivalesque, sometimes grotesque, music videos of Fred Stuhr and Mark Romanek. Indeed, the latter created the promo for the Nine Inch Nails’ 1994 song “Closer,” a remixed version of which was used as the audio track for the Se7en title sequence. Finally, as a sequence that focuses only on the hands of a lead character poring over some eclectic personal possessions, Se7en’s titles compare favourably with those designed by Stephen Frankfurt for the film To Kill a Mockingbird (1962). The titles for Se7en provide something of a prelude to the movie proper; they offer a taut, claustrophobic glimpse of John Doe’s obsessive handiwork: the assembly of a set of notebooks filled with ghoulish images and manic writing. Shot at close quarters, the sequence foreshadows the impeccably orchestrated serial murders that follow. 15 Unlike Bass’s “reductive” type treatment for Psycho, 16 Kyle Cooper and his team used naïvely hand-rendered lettering for most of the credits, along with an all-caps sans serif for the title, the studio, and the identification of each production function. The use of semi-legible, poorly rendered, and carved/cut/scratched lettering is of course a staple design feature of movie titles, movie posters, and CD and book covers in the horror and thriller genres. It would appear that this style, however hackneyed, dependably conveys outsider status, psychic uncertainty and menace. Its seemingly random placement on the screen at haphazard angles and sizes adds to this sense. This is only part of the story, of course; Se7en’s type and lettering jitter, flicker, blur, and replicate themselves over and in between the live action shots in a manner highly reminiscent of the formal experimentation of filmmaker Stan Brakhage. 17 Indeed, this reflexive strategy supplies much of the aesthetic and affective drive behind Se7en’s titles. Consider Cooper’s commentary: You shine a light through the back of [the Kodalith, a film stock used extensively for film titles], and while filming it you shake the Kodalith, move the Kodalith, turn the camera off, take the film, open the gate, let light spill into the gate, throw it out of focus, bang the camera, any kind of experiment - move stuff, glass, in front of the lens, anything to distort the type. 18
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Compare it with Brakhage’s preferred methods: I suppose as I go on representing this in ways that are available to me, which have across the years . . . encompassed baking film in the oven; ironing it, photographing iron filings under magnetic [influence], and . . . using vibrations and powders; photographing brine shrimp herded into a small space to get the meatquivering sense of it, and largely painting [directly onto film stock]. 19 One could also venture that these techniques, along with the added stylistic tics - single frames with upside down, scratched-in words; snippets of Academy leader - provide a constant visual reminder that “this is a film” (even, “this is a film being made/projected by Doe right now, right here”) which, when rapidly and repeatedly juxtaposed with the intense live action, provides a kind of ontological titillation for the expectant cinema audience. Cooper’s creative approach has been described by Jessica Helfand as the paradigm exemplar of “the cult of the scratchy,” a highly fashionable look in graphic design in the mid-1990s: Scratchiness is everywhere. It is a kind of graphic design take on grunge chic - hand-scrawled type and scratch marks, messy and edgy, the antithesis of the hygienic purity of the machine age . . . Like the handheld camera-work that typified music videos in the mid80s, it thrives on jumpy cuts and skewed perspectives: it is as if the goal is to do anything but stand still. 20 It is certainly true that, in contrast to Psycho, the titles for Se7en are overburdened with “evil” signifiers. Though Bass’s titles may seem simplistic in hindsight, they work at a level of typographic abstraction and allusion that makes a feature of the credits but does not compete directly with director Alfred Hitchcock’s opening scenes. Cooper’s titles for Se7en, on the other hand, are so overwrought, so saturated with grotesquery and the evidence of filmmaking, that they warrant closer analysis. 4.
From Storyboard to Celluloid If, as Cooper and Fincher suggest, the titles for Se7en are to be understood as having been made by Doe himself, it seems safe to conclude that all of the imagery in the sequence has been “selected” by him and is representative of his interests and obsessions. After all, the sequence offers a fairly straightforward narrative; Doe is actively assembling his scrapbooks (literally stitching stories together) out of the detritus, medical follies, and physical and mental miseries of modern human existence. And yet, if this is indeed the case, these insights simply don’t mesh
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Publicity materials for Se7en such as this poster can only hint at Kyle Cooper’s brilliant title design. Copyright ¤ 1995 New Line Productions.
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with what we learn about the character over the next two hours. What we have, instead, is a hotchpotch of images and ideas that have been gathered by Cooper and his crew with the unbridled intention of evoking the notion of a deeply troubled - and troubling - personality. That the specific visuals changed as the title project advanced through preproduction and into production is obvious when one views the storyboards for the title sequence. These sketches are reproduced in Andrea Codrington’s 2003 book Kyle Cooper and also appear as “animatics” on the New Line Platinum DVD. 21 What they show are key elements that certainly appear in the finished sequence, more or less exactly as they had been conceived: the word “God” being cut out of a dollar bill, a razor blade being used to slice off a fingerprint, a teabag being lowered into a cup, etc. However, as for evidence of people, the storyboards chiefly show a rather ordinary picture of a woman in stockings, rendered in and out of focus. If her presence is suggestive of anything, it is nothing more than a rather quaint, even insipid eroticism. All of the above-mentioned still images appear in the animatic on the DVD, along with Doe’s hands passing over, or deleting, passages from books on pregnancy and sexual disorders. 22 That said, the final version of the title sequence shows not the woman in stockings, but a series of images that are so self-consciously “disturbing” as to be trite and, in sum, rather incoherent: photographs of medical procedures (an autopsy, a lobotomy), medical curiosities (a pair of severely disfigured hands), and medical subjects (a boy’s face, a partially undressed boy perhaps standing in a doctor’s office, a very small child lying on a bed or on the floor). The most direct inferences, then, are that Doe is a ghoulish, transsexual, bisexual paedophile, whereas the storyboards only suggest that he is heterosexual and mildly voyeuristic. Given what we learn about Doe in the movie proper, the latter clues seem to be rather more accurate. Richard Dyer has noted that, in the movie, there is actually only the vaguest suggestion that Doe is homosexual, and even this is highly ambiguous. 23 There is certainly nothing to suggest he is at all sexually unusual, despite the taunts of Brad Pitt’s character, Detective Mills. Indeed, Doe notes with disdain that one of his own victims had been a “pederast,” although it was for his sloth that Doe killed him. Se7en’s titles, then, are a mélange of largely inaccurate references; they represent not Doe’s mindset but a vessel for every received (even clichéd) idea about aberrant behaviour that Cooper - “a true-believing Christian,” in Codrington’s words - could come up with. 24 This conflation clearly doesn’t matter in the sense that the filmmakers are basically interested in telegraphing the fact that the person poring over the notebooks is “fucked up,” as Fincher puts it on the New Line Platinum DVD of Se7en. However, it does matter if we are concerned about the consequences of misrepresentation, and the slapdash pathologising that is actually at odds with the specific details of the movie it is designed to support. 25 If “evil” is, in essence, the thing that we are not, then the Se7en titles work hard to delimit this distinction. Whatever we might encounter
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as “evil” in the story itself in terms of actions and events, the titles take a much broader purview; they become a vessel into which every received idea about non-normative behaviour can be pictorially represented. This tendency towards universalisation is apparent in Cooper’s comment about his work in this genre: “Why deny the existence of evil? Let’s all look at it for what it is.” 26 Our revulsion (and non-identification) is assured, given the way Doe’s ghoulish fixations are manifested. Clive Piercy, a Santa Monica-based graphic designer who was commissioned to create the notebooks that ended up playing such a central role in the titles, suggested that John Doe wasn’t kinky in a normal way; he was even kinkier than the kinky guys, in a kind of straight way. I don’t have another way of putting that, but I definitely felt that way, that we couldn’t use sexy pornographic pictures; he got turned on by mutilated limbs and decapitated people, and people whose fingers had been sawn off. That to me is what he found sexual. 27 It is only when listening to the various audio tracks on the special DVD relating to the design of the books that one discovers that Piercy and his own designers were under significant pressure to make the content of the books as viscerally unpleasant as possible - to the point that they included a genuine suicide note. Here’s the exchange between Piercy and his associate John Sable, which is worth repeating in full: SABLE: Clive kept saying “you’ve got to make it more real”; he kept pushing me because he was being pushed to go there; that way. And I was really getting fed up, and I’d keep going back through these files . . . there was this one file - the guy committed suicide; there was a letter in there, the actual suicide letter, and I thought PIERCY: Oh, yeah! That’s in! [i.e., in the notebooks and the final version of the title sequence] SABLE: I put it in! The guy killed himself, and Clive looked at this letter and he goes, “wow, how did you write this thing?” And I said “it’s real” . . . Let the film makers, for pushing us this far, let the film makers deal with “is this real or not?” 28 Ultimately, the note may (or may not) be real, but the concern with upping the ante in terms of shock value is still striking. It remains unclear how the presence of the note in Doe’s workspace adds any coherence to an already muddy psychological profile.
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The Titles for American Psycho I would now like to contrast the titles for Psycho and Se7en, and the milieu that produced them, with a rather different take on the notion of evil. American Psycho (2000) is based on the notorious Bret Easton Ellis novel of the same name and was directed by Mary Harron, whose credits also include I Shot Andy Warhol (1996) and episodes of the TV shows Oz (1997-2003) and Homicide: Life on the Street (1993-99). While it features Hollywood stars such as Christian Bale, Reese Witherspoon, and Willem Dafoe, American Psycho and, by extension, its titles are the product of a different creative milieu. In basic terms, its overall production budget, based on published figures, was $8 million - about a quarter of the budget for Se7en. Similarly, while Se7en’s titles alone had a budget of $50,000, those for American Psycho were $5,000, at least initially. 29 Unlike Psycho and Se7en, the titles for American Psycho (also running to about two minutes) anticipate - and then confound - audience expectations; they dwell on what appears to be the most clichéd iconography of murder (dripping blood, a monstrous knife), only to reveal that these visual cues are actually the stock-in-trade of a restaurant kitchen. The “blood” is raspberry sauce; the falling knife lands on a piece of exquisitely prepared meat, not a hapless human victim. The sequence was designed by Marlene McCarty, a New York-based artist, designer, and activist long associated with the “new queer cinema.” 30 Often working with very limited budgets, McCarty created the title designs for such films as Swoon (1992), Office Killer (1997), Velvet Goldmine (1998), Safe (1995), Hedwig and the Angry Inch (2001), The Safety of Objects (2001), and Far from Heaven (2002). McCarty’s career as a title designer is of interest here because it does much to undermine the received history that has sprung up around the practice of film title design. McCarty generally works alone or occasionally with a small ad hoc crew, creating titles for movies typically outside the mainstream in terms of, for example, budgets, personnel, and subject matter. Given the very limited funding that is generally available, her working methods are of necessity highly resourceful. 31 According to director Harron, she and McCarty shot the titles for American Psycho using a specialised camera more commonly found in the production of commercials, where extreme close-ups are often required (e.g., the froth and condensation on a glass of soda). The camera was able to deliver a very bright, “advertising-looking” feel and also allowed her to shoot in extreme slow motion. She and McCarty were then able to pick and choose the most appropriate shots of the viscous red liquid falling through the frame, marrying these to the appearance of each credit. The advertising look is absolutely appropriate, given the parodic level of the lead character’s conspicuous consumption, including his endless invocation of brand names, from bathroom products to formal wear. The central conceit of the movie is of course that the film’s title character, homicidal Wall Street yuppie Patrick Bateman, is merely the sum total of his consumption habits and little else.
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The type treatment for the American Psycho titles is very restrained and, in this sense, compares favourably with Psycho. The formal sans serif in this case is Copperplate Gothic, created by the type designer Frederic Goudy in 1905. The font is very widely kerned (i.e., letter spaced) to make use of the width of the screen. The second word of the title, and the last name of each actor and crew member, are rendered in a bold version of the face. The type is placed according to a fairly rigid grid system. For example: ranged right and placed to left of screen; ranged left and placed in the centre of the screen; or, centred on the screen but placed strategically below the horizontal centre line. According to Harron, production designer Gideon Ponte suggested the typeface because he remembered seeing it used for a well-known, downtown New York art gallery during the period in which the movie is set. Copperplate Gothic is in fact a ubiquitous font with banking and business concerns, and is an authoritative, highly formal, and thoroughly impersonal typeface (it has no lowercase letters, just “small caps”). It’s also especially popular with title designers because its not-quite-serifs help the font’s letterforms to hold their shape and maintain legibility when rendered in very small sizes. 32 Once it has been revealed in the title sequence that we are witnessing the preparation of a nouvelle cuisine platter, rather than an act of atrocious violence, the credits carry us seamlessly into a high class restaurant scene; the white background becomes a linen tablecloth, and we are introduced to a series of sycophantic waiters reciting elaborate menus from memory, and a clientele of Armani-suited young men and their frosted-hair, taffeta-clad dates. Ultimately, then, the precision and restraint of the American Psycho sequence stands in stark contrast to the highly produced titles for Se7en but, by the same token, can be compared favourably to Bass’s titles for Psycho. It also manages to convey a great deal of accurate and highly evocative information about the social and cultural milieu of the protagonist. The pathological acts of violence have been neatly alluded to, but it is left to the film’s director to fill these out - and for the audience to encounter them without too many preconceived ideas about the protagonist. That said, the titles for the two most recent films are especially true to their lead characters: like Bateman, the titles for American Psycho are stark and vacuous, filled only with the signifiers of murder and indulgence; Se7en’s titles, on the other hand, suggest that Doe is troubled yet methodical, complex yet depraved. 6.
Discussion/Conclusions My goal in this short chapter has been to introduce a discussion about film titles as a site of cultural production that operates at a modest distance from the larger routines associated with movie production per se. An analysis of the production of the titles for Psycho, Se7en, and American Psycho suggests that, regardless of the ways in which titles have become integrated into the narratives of movies themselves, inconsistencies inevitably occur across these narratives due, at least in part, to the differential investments and interpretations of each distinct crew. Much of this
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mismatch has been overlooked in the enthusiastic reception of Se7en and its opening sequence. The design of Se7en’s titles also provides a concrete illustration of the “borrowing” of earlier, experimental modes of filmmaking. At the limit, this borrowing produces little more than a fresh stylistic conceit. It must be added that the morbid imagery found in Se7en’s titles was collected, assembled, shot, and even reproduced on various collateral promotional materials without any mention of the ethical issues involved: the identity of the photographed individuals, the source(s) of the images (including the “real” suicide note), the matter of permissions for their reproduction, and the potential inappropriateness of reproducing them, period. These questions are, again, subsumed in the conspiratorial pleasures of the filmmaking enterprise, especially in its mythologisation on the special DVD. Finally, it is clear that there is a dearth of critical writing on film title design and of critical explorations of typography and lettering. An approach that can treat graphic design as a distinct set of practices may offer one avenue of productive enquiry, a way to account for creative choices qua representational strategies.
Notes My thanks to Will Straw, Sarah Kozloff, Lesley Husbands, Scott Prentice, the members of the type discussion forum at <www.typofile.org>, and, finally, to Marty Norden for a valuable opportunity to write about graphic design in a scholarly context. 1. Psycho (1960) was remade - practically shot for shot - by Gus Van Sant and released in 1998. The titles were remade in colour by another well-known title designer, Pablo Ferro. Ferro has designed the titles for, amongst other films, Dr. Strangelove (1964), To Die For (1995), and Men in Black (1997). 2. Deborah Allison, “Promises in the Dark: Opening Title Sequences in American Feature Films of the Sound Period” (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of East Anglia, 2001), 115. Allison’s dissertation is an exceptional statistical and textual analysis of over 2,500 film titles. 3. Cited in Steven Heller, “Saul Bass,” in Graphic Design in America: A Visual Language History, ed. Mildred Friedman and Phil Freshman (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 1989; New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1989), 19. See also Peter Hall, “Opening Ceremonies: Typography and the Movies, 1955-1969,” in Architecture and Film, ed. Mark Lamster (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2000), 129-39. 4. See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). 5. See Allison.
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6. Cooper cited in Pat Soberanis, “Making Movie Magic: WellDesigned Title Sequences Unify Feature Films,” How 12, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 72; David E. Williams, “Initial Images,” American Cinematographer 79, no. 5 (1998): 98. It became apparent towards the end of postproduction on Donnie Brasco that, according to Kyle Cooper, “the test audiences weren’t understanding that Johnny Depp’s cop character had spent a lot of time - before the movie started - waiting and studying these criminals. We had to set that idea up, and had very little time and money to do it.” Cooper cited in Williams, 98. 7. Allison, 106, 25. 8. Williams, 92; Christine Vachon, telephone interview by author, September 2003. 9. Frankfurt cited in Julie Prendiville Roux, “Imaginary Forces: A Los Angeles Design Firm That’s Made Its Mark with Film Titles.” Communication Arts 43, no. 1 (2001): 80. 10. Beatrice Warde “The Crystal Goblet, or Printing Should Be Invisible,” in Looking Closer 3: Classic Writings on Graphic Design, ed. Michael Bierut et al. (New York: Allworth Press, 1999), 52. 11. See Stephen Rebello, Alfred Hitchcock and the Making of Psycho (New York: Dembner, 1990). In a thread initiated by me on <www.typophile.com> (a site that includes a discussion board dedicated to the identification of mystery typefaces), it was suggested that, if Bass had indeed used Venus Bold Extended, he must also have slightly modified some of the letters. 12. Bass cited in Rebello, 139; see also Williams, 92. 13. Adler cited in Rebello, 140; see also Rebello, 141. Today, the same sequence could probably be produced in no time on a laptop using a programme such as Macromedia Flash. 14. Amy Taubin, “The Allure of Decay,” Sight and Sound 6 (January 1996): 22-24. 15. In fact, we learn from the commentaries on the Platinum Series DVD of Se7en that the planned opening scenes of the movie were dropped; both involve Morgan Freeman’s character Somerset, a humane but thoroughly jaded detective in the sunset of his career. The first, during which Somerset is shown around a ramshackle country house by a realtor, was actually shot and edited, and appears as one of many supplementary features on the DVD. The second, involving Somerset’s journey back to his current home and his job in the city aboard an Amtrak train, was not shot due to budget restrictions (thereby rendering the first scene redundant). This second scene was also to be the one that carried the titles. As Fincher searched around for another way to deliver the credits, his conversations with Kyle Cooper ended up centring on Doe. Fincher comments that it was Cooper who suggested using the notebooks that had already been created as movie props at a cost of $15,000. 16. See Heller, 19. 17. Brakhage, who died in 2003, produced a number of works that could be seen as direct progenitors of Cooper’s work on Se7en and
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The Bite at the Beginning
Mimic (1997). See, for example, Brakhage’s The Act of Seeing With One’s Own Eyes (1971) and Mothlight (1963). 18. Cooper cited in Se7en Platinum Series DVD (Los Angeles: New Line Home Entertainment, 2000), videorecording. 19. Brakhage cited in By Brakhage: An Anthology (New York: Criterion Collection, 2003), video recording. 20. Jessica Helfand, Screen: Essays on Graphic Design, New Media, and Visual Culture (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2001), 98. On the Se7en Platinum Series DVD, the actor Brad Pitt, who played the young detective Mills in Se7en, underscored the sudden ubiquity of this look: “I’ve seen that - some version of these opening credits in eight million different commercials, seventeen different films following [it], and it’s extremely beautiful and at the same time it’s a bit terrifying.” 21. An animatic is a very rough rendering of a particular sequence using storyboard images; movement is suggested using the simplest zooms and pans. Animatics are often used in film- and commercialmaking to approximate the timing of shots and the sequence overall, to check the pace of the editing and the effective development of the story, and to allow for the introduction of audio elements. However, these items may well simply be written as captions next to the storyboard or as speech bubbles next to the characters. 22. The hands actually belong not to Kevin Spacey, the actor who plays Doe, but to a hand model. 23. Richard Dyer, Seven (London: British Film Institute, 1999), 38-39. 24. Codrington, 7. 25. See Dyer’s The Matter of Images: Essays on Representation, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 2002). 26. Cooper cited in Codrington, 10. 27. Piercy cited in Se7en Platinum Series DVD. 28. Piercy and Sable cited in Se7en Platinum Series DVD. 29. See the Internet Movie Database <www.imdb.com> for the budgetary information on American Psycho and Se7en. The Se7en Platinum Series DVD cites the $50,000 figure for that film’s titles. In a September 2003 telephone interview with the author, Harron cited the $5,000 figure for American Psycho’s titles and noted that they ended up asking for more money to shoot the credit sequence. 30. See B. Ruby Rich, “Reflections on a Queer Screen,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 1, no. 1 (1993): 83-91. 31. Her techniques have included: using cheap drinking glasses as “refracting lenses” to achieve the type distortions in the opening credits for The Ice Storm; using students hidden under a table, rather expensive motion control devices, to manoeuvre the handmade figures that appear at the beginning of The Safety of Objects; and painting the title card for Far From Heaven herself. For more information on McCarty’s work, see Matthew Soar, “Cinematic Shorthand: Commitment and Brevity Inform the
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Film Titles of Marlene McCarty,” Eye: The International Review of Graphic Design 50 (Winter 2003): 18-29. 32. Lewis Blackwell, 20th Century Type Remix (Corte Madera, Calif.: Gingko Press, 1999), 19. It should be noted that there is also a humorous scene in American Psycho in which elitist city slickers, Patrick Bateman amongst them, show off their lavishly designed business cards to one another, each of them dropping in references to the typefaces, card stock, and printing method used.
Screening Evil in History: Rope, Compulsion, Scarface, Richard III Linda Bradley Salamon Abstract If set in the past, filmed evil is easier to depict, to explain - and to name; committed filmmakers can also use historical evildoing to reflect on the immoralities of their own times. Taking murder as the index of evil, and after briefly assessing the value of historicising, this chapter analyses the representations in four visually and verbally striking films that encompass a half-century of film history. Rope and Compulsion, made around mid-twentieth century as the Cold War and its hysteria emerged, use the 1924 Leopold/Loeb child-killing case to denounce the atmosphere around wealthy, cosmopolitan, godless, intellectual elites as conducive to psychopaths. From the 1980s and ‘90s, Scarface and Richard III turn to 1970s anti-Castroism and the “war on drugs” and to the threat of British fascism in the 1930s to suggest the capacity of late capitalism and of Thatcherite hegemony to produce sociopaths with a relentless drive for murderous power. Key Words: Cold War, Compulsion, drugs, fascism, history, A. Hitchcock, intellectuals, Leopold/Loeb case, Richard III, Rope, Scarface
In high culture of the postmodern era, the very word “evil” has sounded, ever since Hannah Arendt linked it to banality, religio-moralistic, unsophisticated. The poststructuralist critique of the Enlightenment project made almost impossible the identification, and the condemnation as morally wrong, of another subject’s willed desire to pursue “inhuman” acts. For us who live in post-1968 mass culture, drenched in the “overproduction of . . . signs [and] messages,” postmodern cultural critic Jean Baudrillard suggests that the ability to speak evil has been lost in non-judgmental positivity. 1 We may recognise the Ayatollah Khomeini (or Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden) as “the negation of all western values - of progress, rationality, political ethics, democracy and so on,” he writes in The Transparency of Evil. We must ruefully acknowledge, however, that such a figure’s “power exists by virtue of its symbolic ability to designate the Other, the Enemy, what is at stake, what threatens us, what is Evil.” 2 Thus, intellectuals are made uneasy by the appellation “axis of evil,” with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea at one end; the designation grants to “Saddam” or “Osama” a specious control of the western imagination. And “Evil Empire,” as the Soviet Union recedes into history, carries an ever-more dated tone. But it was not always so.
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Screening Evil in History
Evil has a history of its own in American film, reaching back at least to The Birth of a Nation (1915); like that film, moreover, the movies have often located evil within history - in events and processes of the past. 3 Directors and writers have chosen to make villainy palpable, indeed all too human, by setting their films in a significant moment of an earlier era when (at least in modern construction) values were clearer, ethical lines more sharply drawn. As an icon for motives and actions that viewers will accept as cosmically immoral, in western culture the traditional artistic choice in many media has been, since Cain in Genesis, the irrevocable act of murder. The finality of murder can be intensified into certain evil made “vile,” in current legal language - if the killings are multiple or committed in cold blood. Deliberate, violent killing by a somehow largerthan-life figure (who himself then usually dies violently) is a central code for evil conduct, endlessly reproduced and complicated in visual and written texts. It is that traditional marking of murder as the culmination of human evil, together with the historicising of recent human horrors (thrillkilling, Nazism, “wars” on drugs and crime) first presented in older texts and genres, that I want to explore in Alfred Hitchcock’s Rope (1948), Richard Fleischer’s Compulsion (1959), Brian De Palma’s Scarface (1983), and Richard Loncraine’s Richard III (1995). Inevitably, I also gaze at changing cinematic representations across a half-century. These films all dramatise events and characters that are rooted in reality - a past reality. From the perspectives of 1948 and 1959, Hitchcock and Fleischer examine 1924; from 1983 De Palma looks bifocally at 1980 and the 1920s; from 1995 Loncraine views the late 1930s in the mirror of the 1480s. What is the appeal of recreating historical versions of evil? Conventionally, films about the past - costume dramas - are flavoured with romance; those expectations can be both met and subtly subverted in serious explorations of history’s darker side. Next, as L. P. Hartley memorably observed in 1953, “The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.” That distance in space-time makes history unthreatening; a filmmaker can present horrendous acts at a safe distance, palatable to viewers’ complacency in an undoubtedly wiser present. Finally, in popular conceptions of history the narrative of the past has already been written, most contingencies eliminated, the appropriate conclusion - the defeat of evil, of course - achieved and accepted. In such images of the past, the uneasy ambiguities and tensions of present-day life need not be directly addressed. In the hands of thoughtful filmmakers, however, displacement into history offers insight into contemporary concerns. As for historical evils, Tony Barta points out that “pathological eruptions have always been favoured by social and historical analysts for the entry they open to normality.” Thus, a film about evil sited in a well-known historical event can at once unsettle, satisfy, and challenge. 4 The screenplay for each of the films I explore is adapted from another cultural production, even another medium: Rope and Richard III draw upon stage plays, one world-famous (and Richard III, I will argue, on the genre of Scarface as well); Compulsion, written by Richard Murphy, is based on former news reporter Meyer Levin’s 1955 “I was there”
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docu-novel; Oliver Stone’s Scarface script pays homage to Howard Hawks’s like-titled film of 1932. Partly in consequence, the verbal shimmer of each script is powerful, and the director’s task is to find a visualisation to match the words and animate a meaning for his own era. Each film, too, is centred on the performance of a single star (they are, after all, Hollywood films aiming for commercial appeal): respectively, Jimmy Stewart, Orson Welles, Al Pacino, Ian McKellen. The cinematic vocabulary used across these highly dramatic films adds to their intertextuality. But despite their similarity, the four films - spanning almost fifty years - reflect the changing face of evil in the cultural consciousness of those decades. Rope and Compulsion dramatise the story of the 1924 almostrandom killing of 14-year-old Bobby Franks by Nathan Leopold and Dickie Loeb, all three sons of prominent Chicago families. The case was made notorious by the press and by a (first, prematurely named) “trial of the century”: in reality, a sentencing hearing after a guilty plea tactically chosen by celebrity defence lawyer Clarence Darrow. The murderers were precocious University of Chicago students with few friends beyond each other who set out to commit the perfect crime and, of course, get away with it. At the time, the paramount question about their much-meditated murder was “How could they?” or, legalistically, “Why did they?” The two films, most visible amongst a half-dozen dramatisations of the case, use different strategies to resolve the question and thus to provide a return to comfortable social order and a release of dramatic tension. What Coleridge named, in Iago, “motiveless malignity” 5 found no more place in the imaginaries of the post-World War II period than it had a quarter-century before; for the then-new horror of child-killing, there must be a reason. The films’ explanation, like the discourse of 1924, starts from psychopathology of a rare and thrilling kind; only Freud’s final illness prevented him from attending the hearing. But the attempt to medicalise the legal case into a case of psychiatric deviance failed; the two films turn viewers’ attention instead to different issues in their contemporary culture. Rope was made after the initial euphoria of victory over dark forces in World War II had receded. 6 The happy return to family life of the 1950s took place in an atmosphere of growing American fear of the Soviet Union and its international aspirations, thought to be reaching like tentacles around the globe. The resulting defensive anxieties were floridly expressed in the House Committee on Un-American Activities under its chair, Rep. Martin Dies, whose paranoia would shortly be appropriated by Sen. Joseph McCarthy. Although the worst excesses of witch-hunting lay several years in the future, 1947 had seen the Committee’s first hearings, including the refusal of the “Hollywood 10” to name names. Construction of ruthless enemies from European shadowlands behind the Iron Curtain, now threatening America, was growing in the culture, fertilised by films such as Foreign Correspondent (1940), directed by Hitchcock, and The Third Man (1949), starring Welles. Compulsion, on the other hand, was filmed in 1959 as the tide of American politics - in hindsight, a strongly rising tide - turned more liberal, initially in the civil rights movement. The election of John Kennedy was imminent. A growing critique of capi-
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Screening Evil in History
tal punishment, on both intellectual and moral grounds, was led by liberal jurists, political activists, and Protestant churchmen; Compulsion entered that discourse at an early point. Orson Welles, associated with progressive causes since his direction of “the Negro Macbeth” for the Federal Theatre Project and of Native Son, lent his voice to a new one - and to a juicy cameo, for which he shared the 1959 Best Actor award at Cannes. The consequences of these different climates, a decade apart, went far to shape the notably different representations of a single factual past. Of the two filmic attempts to explore strange young men, Rope more thoroughly fictionalises - in fact, sanitises - the circumstances of the killing. Names, site, murder weapon, and other circumstances are radically changed; most significantly, the victim is altered from the adolescent of fact to a more acceptable 20-ish contemporary of the murderers. (In contrast, Compulsion cut so close to the bone that Leopold initially sued writer, producers, publicists, and theatre-owners for breach of privacy; only careful analyses of precedent overturned the initial summary judgment in his favour.) Avowed leftist Arthur Laurents based the Rope screenplay on an adaptation of Patrick Hamilton’s well-made play by Hitchcock’s friend Hume Cronyn, and the result of this many-voiced production is theatrical, even literary. Rope is widely remembered as having been made in a single take with brief cuts to black indicating the length of a single reel of film, quickly changed - a concept initially encouraged by Hitchcock himself but long since exploded. 7 Though this cineaste myth is inaccurate, a single camera-eye within the enclosed space of an apartment’s single-room-and-foyer nonetheless creates heightened intensity. Tension is increased by the artificial acceleration of “real time,” as night visibly falls onto the Manhattan skyline in the distance, 8 and whiskey releases the anxiety of the second murderer, Philip Morgan (Farley Granger). A hothouse atmosphere is also evoked in the domestic-interior mise-enscène of Compulsion, but this film is basically a “police procedural” narrative with a Law & Order twist. It offers first a pursuit across wealthy Chicago neighbourhoods by dogged police and eager news reporters, always a step or two ahead of the rational but incompetent murderers, and then a classic courtroom scene. Despite the jazzy 1920s soundtrack, the killing in Compulsion is made more heinous when the 14-year-old is repeatedly reduced to “little Paulie,” his “poor little dead body” (sounding about nine) tossed in a ditch. Each film opens (to the degree the Hays Code permitted at the time) with an evocation of the foundational crime; suspense for both audiences comes from awaiting the consequences for the murderers. Both make clear that the killing was cold, callous, vicious - in a word, evil. In Rope, the murder of David Kenting constitutes the first scene after the credits: 9 a stifled cry from a black screen, followed by a stylised image of the last moments of a strangulation in a darkened room, with the brightest spots the white cuffs, then collars, of the killers, their ties and pocket squares neatly in place. They place the unseen body of the murdered man in an antique chest that becomes an ominous prop in the cocktail party that almost immediately follows. Shut away, however, the body is less present
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than the inscribed personality of David, whom the party guests invoke as alive but unaccountably absent. The centre of the film’s attention is the party’s chief host, the first murderer Brandon Shaw (John Dall) who, given enough rope by his own narcissistic ego, in due course hangs himself. Compulsion opens - before the credits - with a nighttime, climbingout-the-window theft of a portentously emphasised typewriter from a fraternity house, but the prankish tone disappears in a hit-and-run nearvehicular manslaughter forced by the eerily laughing Artie Straus (Bradford Dillman). Though the primary crime has not yet occurred, the pictured elements - including the eyeglasses of Judd Steiner (Dean Stockwell) - are key to its ultimate solution. Tight focus on a car and its careening headlights not only presages the site of the murder in a rental car and the collapse of an alibi based on a Stutz Bearcat; it speaks as well to the postwar American love affair with cars into which this film was released. With the cruel nature of the pointless crime established, the films then explore the murderers’ previous lives and thought-processes. Another element of Rope widely “known” amongst film buffs is the gay relationship between the murderers, and the historical Leopold and Loeb were indeed closeted homosexuals. 10 To post-Stonewall viewers, the indications within the film are obvious, and even in 1948 the gay sensibility was certainly clear to sophisticated urban filmgoers who could “read” Cole Porter. 11 Nevertheless, code and self-censorship demanded a gingerly treatment of homosexuality at the time, as the popular press makes clear. Bosley Crowther’s negative New York Times review on August 17, 1948 ignores the matter entirely; Thomas Pryor’s Times article on November 21 titled “Censorship Ties ‘Rope’ in Knots” cites only its violence as unwholesome, though an acute reader might suspect more; Time’s reviewer cleverly remarks that the characters have been changed from the “effeminate aesthetes” of Hamilton’s play to “more conventional types.” For the average moviegoer, the young men’s attention to antiques and crystal was not so easily decoded. After all, Brandon used to date the victim’s girlfriend Janet (Joan Chandler), and the film’s trailer enacts David’s marriage proposal to her. Who in Middle America could see Brandon’s “jealous” verbal sparring with her as a beard? These two young men are indeed depicted as queer, but to the broad audiences at Rope’s initial screening who are my concern in this chapter, “queer” had a different meaning. The representation in Compulsion is far more candid, a change again apparent in popular reviews; Time makes clear that homosexuality was emerging from the celluloid closet in 1959, and Variety in its February 4, 1959 issue reported the “courageous” producers’ satisfaction with “what they got away with.” Visual indications begin in the opening dialogue, with both men filmed in the same frame in tight close-up, their mouths almost contiguous. The comments of other characters, though not unambiguous to the casual viewer of the period, gradually gather weight. Judd’s older brother Max declares, “I think Artie’s a dirty, evilminded . . .” while a police officer and a reporter snidely label them “powder puffs” and “degenerate.” But Compulsion also conceals its cards with heterosexual touches, in Artie’s boasts of a “little black book” of
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Screening Evil in History
forty or fifty dates and in the manufactured alibi of picked-up girls. As their criminal career slips out of control, Judd attempts to rape sweet Ruth Evans (Diane Varsi) - girlfriend of Sid, the Meyer Levin stand-in - a character that screenwriter Murphy adapted from a girl whom Leopold actually dated at the time: platonic lunch and French poetry only. 12 Moviegoers have privileged knowledge, however, that Judd makes the fraught attempt only under Artie’s goading - “You ditchin’ me for some girl?” - in order to “explore all the possibilities of human experience.” When he can’t go through with the violation and cries, “I’m so ashamed,” viewers may decide for themselves the reason for his failure, and for his shame. Although gay identity had to be veiled in the ‘50s era of intense interest in “personality” in relation to society, 13 the abnormality of Leopold and Loeb is floridly displayed. In Compulsion, for instance, Judd has obsessively mastered ornithology, and Artie’s manic desire to be life-ofthe-party carries with it a hip-flask hidden in a teddy bear. Attempts at explaining the emotionally stunted murderers within the films’ scripts go far beyond quirkiness, however. In the heyday of American fascination with Freud, the cocktail party chatter in Rope includes its commonplaces, beginning with the brittle Janet’s glib, “Freud says there’s a reason for everything.” When a suspicious Rupert Cadell (James Stewart) returns to
“Perhaps it was God who made you drop your eyeglasses”: Judd Steiner (Dean Stockwell) and his incriminating eyewear in Compulsion. Copyright ¤ 1959 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
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the party site on the excuse that he has forgotten his cigarette lighter, he pointedly muses, “A psychoanalyst would say I didn’t forget it, I unconsciously left it behind because I wanted to come back.” And the cathexis between David and his mother is highlighted. Summoning popular psychoanalytic stereotypes in Compulsion, Judd announces to Ruth that his mother died when he was eight and that he has “nothing in common” with his father; Artie, in contrast, is ambivalently dependent on his “Mumsie.” This discourse invites assessment of the central characters’ potential pathology, and both films diagnose - in language, images, and action - the dominant/submissive relationship that can be readily derived from historical fact. In Rope Phillip, who cannot stomach killing “in the sunlight,” commits murder only under coercion from Brandon and immediately begins to regret it. Brandon manages Philip’s musical career, coldly scorns his pain as “sentimental,” and teases him viciously about killing chickens; under his fierce scrutiny, Philip’s fragile nerves fray into self-injury. Again, Compulsion is more forthright; the pre-credit sequence establishes the nature of their partnership with portentous stares and overt words: “You said you could take orders, you wanted me to command you.” “Please, Artie, I’ll do anything you say!” And Judd abets a murder only on Artie’s strong compulsion. Psychiatric assessment is made an aporia in the trial scene, which closely follows the Leopold-Loeb transcript. Defence attorney Jonathan Wilk (Welles) decries the cold, brutal, inexcusable, even fiendish killing as “the mad act of sick boys.” But the defence’s psychiatrists hedge their opinions - a tendency to schizophrenia, a possible paranoia - and never reach consensus. The state’s doctors pronounce sanity from a ten-minute observation and denounce all other claims as “poppycock”: just the young men’s habitual lying and fantasising, or a neurotic feeling of being disliked. Despite the outraged use of “crazy” in its idiomatic sense in both films, the public’s representative in each version rejects a psychiatric excuse for the palpable evil of childkilling. 14 Beyond crippled psyches, however, both films dramatise in pointed ways other significant features of the Leopold-Loeb milieu. Before the widespread prosperity of the 1950s was on the horizon, the characters in Rope are all visibly, effortlessly rich, and the film carries a note of class satire left from the 1930s. In Brandon’s penthouse, even for a modest occasion paté and champagne are on offer, and a servant takes furs and, portentously, a man’s monogrammed hat. The absent David is thought to be playing tennis at “the club,” an all-purpose code for the leisured class. Moreover, all four young men in the screenplay went to prep school together and are now students at that upper-class bastion, Harvard, at a time when, under the G.I. Bill, the doors of colleges were just beginning to open to most Americans. The plutocratic Mr. Kentley (Cedric Hardwicke), father of the victim, collects first editions, and the ostensible purpose of the cocktail party is Brandon’s transfer to him of valuable books kept in the infamous chest. 15 Compulsion emphasises the Steiners’ and Strauses’ large, over-decorated houses and the capacity of the killers’ fathers to employ the most expensive legal counsel available. Poor Sid has
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Screening Evil in History
to pick up the tab for a splashy, heartless evening of Charleston dancing at a speak-easy, just hours after the murder. In the final scene, Wilk’s speech turns the tables by explicitly attacking class warfare; wealth is “the great misfortune in the case” because it has brought notoriety and public clamour that obscure defendants would not face. Somewhat defensively, this 1924 Johnnie Cochran says that “to deny the rich the same kind of justice as the poor” would lead to virtual lynchings. These young men are privileged in every way. The original name for Meyer Levin’s novel was Compulsion and Free Will, 16 a binary that highlights choice and points to a different explanation for the death of Bobby Franks. Leopold’s intellectual inspiration was in fact the philosophy of Nietzsche, avant-garde in the 1920s though brought to broader consciousness in analyses of the roots of Nazism that began in the late 1940s. The two young men arrogantly cast themselves as Nietzsche’s Übermenschen, far superior to the conventions that constrain mediocre people, and empowered to act by their own sheer will. The representation of Nietzsche in Compulsion is early and academic; wearing a Phi Beta Kappa key on his watch-chain, Judd offers a classroom exposition of superior intellects “detached from such human emotions as anger, greed, lust, and the will to power” as he challenges the claims of a benign liberal professor that history’s great lawgivers themselves respected the law and the rights of the individual. “All men are bound by the law, Mr. Steiner, and had Nietzsche been a lawyer instead of a German philosopher, he would have known that, too.” The killers’ sense of superiority in intellectual, as well as class, terms leads directly to their downfall. Their [historical] high I.Q.s, prowess in fourteen languages, and “brilliant” planning are exposed by bulldog-like District Attorney Harold Horn (E. G. Marshall) - his voice dripping with sarcasm - when they are “trapped by us poor specimens.” In Rope the Nietzschean perspective is still more pervasive, indeed a donne from the opening minutes. In life, Leopold’s jejune grasp of this intense philosophy made a lethal mix with the detective-story-obsessed Loeb’s determination to commit the perfect crime. To establish a single evil mastermind who can be blamed for the murder, Rope merges the crime fan with the pseudo-Nietzschean into the single character of Brandon. He haughtily expresses the disdain of superior men for those inferior people who just “take up space” and so do not deserve to live, and for their bourgeois standards in judging those who rise beyond good and evil. For nature’s noblemen, murder is not a crime but a privilege. The wealthy, educated men in the talky screenplay of Rope, that is to say, can easily be read as effete intellectuals, cosmopolitan - indeed outright European - in their reading and thinking. Such men are inherently suspect to red-blooded Americans, and the script presses that point. “Good Americans usually die young on the field,” Brandon sneers over David’s murdered body. When he suggests that Rupert Cadell is “too fastidious,” lacking the courage to commit an acte gratuit, the oblivious housekeeper snaps, “He proved his courage in the war.” These young men with foreign ideas are not only marginal to the post-war American milieu; with the rise
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of HUAC shadowing Hollywood, they might even be inimical. Certainly they are godless, 17 as Brandon’s glee at making David’s coffin a ceremonial altar to serve the funeral baked meats indicates; like other suspect intellectuals, they might easily be communist, too. The role of vile ideas in the crime drives strongly toward the conclusion of each film, which exposes the murderers to the community and to their fate. At the end of each, the marquee star takes over - in Rope to reveal the as-yet-unknown murderer, in Compulsion to save the all-toonotorious murderers from a death sentence. Evil might thus appear to receive opposite treatments - roughly, condemnation v. comprehension - in the two films. But viewers who can resist the requirement, in the 1940s and 50s, that evil must be punished by good (in the form of Jimmy Stewart and Orson Welles) may see things differently. Stewart plays a Leo Strauss-like prep school housemaster whom Brandon - finding jouissance in risk - has invited to the party as an ideal audience, “the one man who might appreciate [the murder] from our angle.” Sure enough, starting from Philip’s visible unease (and the discord in the Poulenc tune he picks at on the piano), Cadell observes all the signs of what viewers already know. In the film’s most cinematic move, Stewart’s voice re-creates the stillhypothetical killing with remarkable accuracy; the camera, gazing with Cadell’s eyes (and pulling the viewers’ along) pans across empty furniture and around the room as his imagination leaps. He can imagine, and mentally participate in, exactly what happened, in much greater detail than the film’s opening scene of the actual murder. When Brandon cries, “You have to understand, you have to,” Cadell - who insists on his own pure logic and superior intelligence - obviously does. In a unique action sequence at the film’s melodramatic end, he struggles with Philip to retrieve a gun, then fires it out the elegant window so hoi polloi below will summon the police. Poisonous, fascistic ideas drive Brandon Shaw, but he did not adopt Nietzschean thinking on his own; he learned it at an impressionable age, in the highly charged site of late-night bull sessions at school, sitting at Cadell’s feet. (A long-term bachelor, Cadell provided a model as well as lessons; to knowing viewers he may have led Brandon in more directions than one.) This discipleship is not just Brandon’s claim; as the guests arrive he recounts Cadell’s ideas about murder, and a half-hour later his mentor re-presents those ideas, incorporating the same words. Cadell’s exposition, to be sure, aims at wit and irony, playing on everyone’s occasional exasperation with theatre-ticket sales clerks, maîtres d’, and even W. C. Fields’s “small children.” When all is revealed, however, a resistant Cadell attempts to repudiate any connection to Brandon’s act: “Something deep inside you lets you . . . something deep inside me wouldn’t let me.” “You’ve thrown my words back in my face,” he yells, “given my words a different meaning.” But Brandon, even though he remarked early on that “You often pick words for their sound rather than their meaning,” has taken Cadell’s teacherly words exactly at face value, and their insincere orotundity has had vicious consequences. When Cadell cries, at the film’s climax, “By what right do you dare to say that there’s a superior few to
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Screening Evil in History
whom you belong? Did you think you were God?” the unanswered questions reverberate back at him. Precisionist about the literal meaning of words that Cadell demonstrably is, he still cannot grasp that the potent words rejecting ordinary morality that he has poured into young boys’ ears have had as much impact as any action. His guilt-free, accusatory final comment - “You’re going to die, both of you!” - should be chilling; two more of his students could meet their deaths as a result of his amoral teachings. Condescending intellectuals like Cadell are seen as what the inarticulate Dies Committee claimed: a terrible influence on American youth. 18 In fact, Leopold and Loeb did not die, and Compulsion enacts their rescue. When, at the height of District Attorney Horn’s triumphant press conference, the camera cuts to Welles, the film takes a left turn far sharper than the discontinuity of Stewart’s role in Rope. The trajectory of Compulsion is clear; parallel to the discovery of clues, which are rapidly traced to the arrogant grad students, runs their mutual recrimination. They are filmed together in ever-fewer scenes, as bow-tied Artie hangs ingratiatingly around the police and Judd is isolated. Viewers realise ahead of Judd that the clues all point to him and that Artie - after casually ruining two teachers’ lives by naming them as suspects - is a Judas, perfectly capable of betraying Judd by lying about his own guilt. Once the crime is officially solved, moreover, Artie and Judd virtually disappear from the film. After some courtroom sparring, 19 in another long take attorney Wilk - in words drawn directly from the summation by Clarence Darrow, convincingly impersonated by Welles - argues for life imprisonment as the penalty for kidnapping and murder. Capital punishment is presented as cool, premeditated, judicial murder driven by public outcry, the choice before the judge as a test of civilisation v. the bloodthirsty revenge of beasts in the jungle. The summation naturally includes legal arguments like deterrence and precedents, but it pleads to “a Christian community” for charity, for mercy, for love. The famous voice gives a bravura performance, and - within the film - the argument works; evil is displaced from the murder of a young boy to capital punishment, a collective, statesponsored murder. As in Rope, the more potent evil is evaded. The ideological conflicts in the background of the films based upon the Leopold/Loeb case were overwhelmed by the social and cultural climate of “the Sixties,” what Baudrillard calls “after the orgy” of 1968. Interest in the intrapsychic conflicts of Freud gave way to the populartherapeutic culture of “closure” and “healing,” in which victims are admonished to move on with their lives. Hence Baudrillard’s dry query in 1989, “Do we now ever describe a mad person as ‘mad’?” “Evil,” until very recently, was at least as rare. The tectonic shifts of the late 60s and 70s, however, opened up new possibilities for candid social and political commentary in all media, along with new artistic tonalities - including a self-conscious reliance on irony. 20 The films I wish now to examine emerge from sharp postmodern intelligences that use the past with a wink and a nod at their own moment. They comprise not two takes on a single event, but images of a single
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character-type at work and play in two very different historical settings. When Scarface opened in 1983, the Cold War, though not over, was receding, and a bracing critique of unregulated capitalism - in the early days of Ronald Reagan’s “morning in America” - was common amongst progressive thinkers and artists. And when Richard III appeared in 1995, Britain was sleeping off the excesses of the Thatcher years, its political culture the farthest right it had been in a century: manufacturing in ruins, public services recklessly privatised, unions emasculated, police empowered to control by force, nouveaux riches strivers in power. In each case, immorality could readily be ascribed to state-sponsored power-grabs; thus, the eponymous anti-heroes of these films move within extreme social movements characterised by violence, partisan ideology, and gripping struggles. Like Leopold and Loeb, they do evil because they want to; they commit not one murder but serial killings, and no nobler soul arrives to condemn or save them. In a 1968 interview, Jean-Luc Godard said, “When I made Breathless [in 1959] I thought I was doing something very precise . . . I thought I was making The Son of Scarface or The Return of Scarface, and I discovered I’d made Alice in Wonderland, more or less.” 21 In a halcyon climate for U.S. business unexampled since the 1920s, Brian De Palma did make [Son of] Scarface, more or less, in a film that has become a cult classic for two generations of young men. His re-vision, with a screenplay by Oliver Stone, begins in the Mariel boatlift of 1980, when Fidel Castro emptied Cuban jails and sanatoria to augment (by as much as 25 percent) some 3,500 dissidents that the U.S. had agreed to accept; Castro contemptuously invited South Floridians to come - in any boats available - and get them. In De Palma’s fictional version of the Cold War debacle that followed, the refugees welcomed to Miami as survivors of communism include the facially scarred Cuban gang member Tony Montana (Al Pacino). In a clever updating of Howard Hawks’s Prohibition-driven criminals, Montana progresses from detainee in “Freedomtown,” to dishwasher in a taco stand, to muscle for a drug lord, to international drug kingpin with his own entourage and beach estate. A good American now, he milks free enterprise for all it’s worth, in a witty riff on what James Loehlin has defined as the gangster-film “rise-and-fall archetype.” 22 De Palma thus reenergises a powerful code for the edifying vagaries of ambition and fate that extends, to literary-minded viewers, back to the Roman Plutarch - and forward to the pretensions of an imperial presidency that made an ally of any anti-communist “leader.” To modern audiences in the Anglo-American world, meanwhile, Shakespeare is theatrical history with a vengeance, and Richard III has always been, in Stephen Greenblatt’s words, “weirdly and compellingly attractive to generations of play goers.” 23 The play’s protagonist - the second-largest role in Shakespeare’s oeuvre after Hamlet - embodies evil as relentless desire. By tradition more than historical fact a hunchback, Richard is a blindly ambitious, fratricidal Machiavellian with no visible redeeming social importance. As Duke of Gloucester and then king, Richard in Shakespeare’s representation is a consummate transgressor who knows
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his society’s mores and calmly flouts them; legendarily, he uses a henchman to smother the little princes, his own nephews, in the Tower of London. At the end of the play, he summons a tiny modicum of selfknowledge, yet urges his army to the defence of his England and dies unhorsed (unmanned?), confounded, and alone. 24 Ian McKellen had starred in a much-praised 1990 London production of the play conceived by Richard Eyre, set in an England of the late 1930s that had putatively succumbed to the fascism of Oswald Mosley and, at minimum, made peace with Germany; the victorious Yorkists were represented, in uniforms and in décor, as thorough-going Nazis. 25 This cheeky conception, simply by visualising the possibility that England might not have fought on the beaches, etc., challenges the nation’s political and historical mythology. When Richard Loncraine directed the 1995 film that, with McKellen’s energetic leadership, recaptured his stage portrayal, the location of fascism was brought home to viewers who know London and its environs by filming in and around well-known monuments. Shakespeare is linked not only to the brief reign of Edward VIII but, by clever bricolage, to Margaret Thatcher’s domain. For both 1938 and 1995, disenchantment about the fate of personal autonomy was a rational attitude; mirroring an evil public power that could hypnotise an entire community made artistic sense. And in 1995 communism was, at last, not even in the picture. When one looks at these two films together, the McKellen/Loncraine Richard III is clearly “The Return of Scarface.” Contemporary viewers enjoy looking for nods to the Godfather series in this Richard, and its relation to American gangster films of the 1930s and 40s has been well elucidated by James Loehlin, whose “’Top o’ the World, Ma’” essay draws upon the close parallel between the flaming self-immolations that bring an end to both McKellen’s Richard and Cody Jarrett (James Cagney) in Raoul Walsh’s White Heat (1949). Though Loehlin cites Howard Hawks’s original Scarface only briefly, the cinematic influence of that film on Loncraine’s is pervasive - much greater, for instance, than Laurence Olivier’s once-iconic filmed Richard III (1955), an almost sentimental portrayal that psychologises the miserable hunchback in 1950s mode. The parallel images and plot developments are many - some are drawn from Hawks or even Shakespeare (Richard’s habitual gnawing of his lip, for instance) - but in these two films they are given new, explicitly visual emphasis. The resonance that history brings to the portrayal of evil is especially apparent in Pacino’s Tony Montana and McKellen’s Richard, two villain-heroes whose frustrated abilities surpass the ruptured circumstances in which they find themselves. Both are near-loners, sharp observers of their ideologically transformed territories, who assert their egos as self-fashioners within the paths open to them in drug-ridden South Florida and the fascist hegemony. Unquenchable desire drives both men as they claw their way to the top of their respective worlds, Montana marked as a climber even by his name. Richard, of course, by eliminating three family
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members who precede him in the line of succession, moves from quirky youngest ducal brother to King of England. As readers of this chapter may expect, the first act of personal agency in these films is a covert murder. In the initial violence of Scarface, Montana has already been identified as an assassin by gang tattoo; asked to perform, he chuckles, “I kill communists for fun; for a green card, I’ll carve ’em up real nice.” A full-scale riot in the Marielitos’ detention camp, complete with firehouses and attack dogs, gives Tony cover to knife from behind a suddenly opened door - a former Fidelista trying to escape. During the title sequence of Richard III, meanwhile, a tank crashes into an army dining room, and a gas-masked assailant slaughters his deshabille target, subtly identified as the sitting king, with a shot between the eyes. The shooter lifts his mask, and McKellen smiles complacently. These killings - purposeful, remorseless - are filmed in brutal close-up and cut to create sudden shocks. Both films are carefully historicised; words on the screen first locate viewers in 1980 Miami or in a civil war in England. In Scarface, titles that create a semi-documentary effect continue for more than ten minutes, as “Three months later” and “August 1980” flash past. Following a brief prose statement of the immediate past, De Palma and Stone offer a lengthy establishing sequence: rusty tubs docking; noisy refugees marshaled by armed police power; disgruntled arrivals in a littered, sun-baked compound; fake credentials of anti-communism. These scenes visually constitute the dispossessed and the criminal. Richard III does not pause so long over details that modern viewers will never recognise. The film begins with a telegraphic ticker carrying the news; after the murder (which is not depicted in Shakespeare’s play text), it jumps to the faux glamour of a 1930s victory celebration, complete with bias-cut dresses and the big-band sound of a supper club chanteuse. The spoken text of the play, with McKellen as Goebbels-like toastmaster, does not begin for almost ten minutes. In both cases, evil is in the air, barely hidden beneath the driving salsa blasting from loudspeakers or the champagne-imbued foxtrot. The tumultuous political moment, whether fascist or anti-communist, fashions the man who stands on the sidelines of these rhinestone worlds. Although “Why?” is not the primary question raised by either of these films, following both cinematic history and their immediate sources they do present the primary motive that drives both Tony and Richard: envy or, in Milton’s diagnosis of Satan, “sense of injured merit.” 26 Richard, effective general for his brother’s winning army, is by that victory infinitely distanced from the crown; in his resentment, no reward can satisfy him. 27 Before his rise, Tony Montana watches a man to whom women flock and asks his best friend Manny Ray (Steven Bauer), “What’s he got that I don’t have?” (The answer: “Look at the way he dresses, man - that’s style, flash, pizzazz . . . and a little coke money doesn’t hurt nobody, no?”) When he has climbed halfway up the mountain and Manny asks what he thinks he “has coming to him,” Tony responds, “The world, chico, and everything in it.” That is the same “world” that McKellen’s Richard mounts just before his final fall. The two resentful men simply want more.
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The dark side of the American Dream: Al Pacino as Tony Montana, the murderous kingpin of Scarface. Copyright ¤ 1983 Universal City Studios. They have an insatiable need to be stronger, higher, faster than their rivals, real or imagined. Like their sources, the two films signify an inner wound by a physical abnormality 28 (arguably the equivalent of Leopold and Loeb’s homosexuality). Shakespeare provides a Richard born with severe deformities and a mother who hated him from birth and a physical presence repellent to the women he approaches, all of whom curse him. For modernity’s less melodramatic tastes, McKellen and Loncraine significantly reduce the character’s freakishness. Their Richard has no real hump, and his paralysed arm - scarcely more disfiguring than Tony Montana’s eponymous facial scar - leads to visual feats of one-handedness that represent him as anything but disabled. Compared to Olivier’s version, his limp is so modest that he can execute a gleeful little Hitlerian skip when he has persuaded Anne, his victim’s widow (Kristin Scott Thomas), to wear his ring; despite Shakespeare’s words, the action of the film moves quickly to show that he can “prove a lover” by winning her, even in a morgue, over the corpse of her husband. From Richard’s first monologue, which in Shakespeare establishes his marginality and alienation, McKellen cuts the most despairing lines about ugliness, downplays the remainder, and adds lines from Henry VI, Part III that represent Richard’s plan of controlled hypocrisy, “fram[ing] a face to all occasions.” (The screenplay even enlarges his already-large part: the Duke of Richmond, who in Shakespeare’s play leads the army that defeats Richard and becomes the next
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king, is virtually effaced from the film.) Both these villains are marked men, but they are not physical monsters. Their scars - as likely to result from fighting as from birth defect - are not handicaps, certainly not codes for feelings of inferiority that govern their acts. The role of mother in the lives of these men, although by the 1980s a hackneyed explanation for maladjustment, is still interrogated by both films, as it is by Compulsion and, at one degree removed, by Rope. When Tony Montana turns up in South Florida, his immigrant mother is hostile, forbids him her house, and wishes him gone. Her healthy anger is based on his delinquent past and on a justified fear of his potential threat to the sister with whom he is obsessed - perhaps incestuously so. 29 In the Loncraine/McKellen film, not only is Richard’s repulsiveness dramatically reduced from Shakespeare’s text, but so is the multiplicity of women who seethe with hatred of him. Annette Bening plays the central role of Queen Elizabeth more like a suburban mom than avenging nemesis, while Richard’s mother, the Duchess of York, is portrayed by Maggie Smith with an icy hauteur that seems to loathe him out of social embarrassment, rather than from moral rejection. Common as mother/son relationships may be in the gangster-film genre, 30 they are delimited in these films by social reality - a mature woman’s rational dislike of an evildoing man and not by psychological torment. In the long run, the motives of Richard and Tony do not matter; these men are serial killers - but sociopaths, not psychopaths. To represent the callousness with which they discard other lives, each is shown responsible for the death of an appealing sibling: Tony’s flirtatious younger sister, Gina (Mary Elizabeth Mastrantonio), Richard’s gullible brother and the family photographer, the Duke of Clarence (Nigel Hawthorne). Most attention goes to the killing of the one man who has been shown, over the course of the film, to be in the villain-hero’s confidence. In an act comparable to Loeb’s betrayal of Leopold, Tony and Richard each bring about the death of the close associate - Manny Ray, the Duke of Buckingham (Jim Broadbent) - who has known his secrets, paved his way, but finally asked for more in recompense than the grasping anti-heroes are ready to surrender. The second-in-command dares to query the god-like status that the leader has achieved in his own mind; that pride goes before a fall and prefigures the leader’s own fall. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, murder was no longer the only code for evil; sociopathic conduct could express itself in the culture in other acts. In part to meet the demands of a mass audience, the screenplays for Scarface and Richard III each include a central female character whom the protagonist marries: strikingly similar relationships that De Palma/Stone invent for Pacino (and cast with Michelle Pfeiffer) and Loncraine/McKellen build well beyond the Shakespearean text. In Montana’s case, the slim, elegant blonde is the eye-candy of the drug lord he serves, then succeeds; in Richard’s, the wife of the previous heir to the throne that he covets. Each ignores his prize in images that reveal the superior value to them of narcissistic male bonding: Tony preening in a nightclub called Babylon, seeing in his wife only the refusal to eat, Rich-
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ard preferring to watch film clips of his past successes rather than follow a negligée-clad Anne upstairs. Once they achieve power, they are no longer interested in women - in Richard’s case, arguably distracted by men, 31 in Tony’s by drugs. Both prefer the mirror to any sexual object. Each wife sinks solitarily into drug abuse: a vacant-eyed Pfeiffer sniffing a line of coke, a smartly veiled Scott Thomas injecting a needle into an ivory thigh. Each is driven to this sad self-immolation by her husband in a gratuitous demonstration of power, a gesture of contempt spit into the eye of society. Soon after these cruel humiliations, both films reach the only possible end in the defiant victim’s suicidal last stand, outnumbered by dozens of his society’s policing force, falling in an endless firefight down a gaudy staircase or diving from a flaming scaffold. No expert defence, no “healing” is possible; these men are not weak or pathetic - they are evil. Brian De Palma and Richard Loncraine represent evil for the postmodern era, as do Hitchcock and Fleischer for the mid-century, by using historically vibrant genres to recreate historical events that have significant valence for their own eras. The four films summon main currents of Anglo-American life: the all-too-roaring, out-of-control 1920s (and, in America, Prohibition), the excesses of Cold War anti-communism, the financial and moral corruption of drugs, the continuing threat of extreme right-wing ideologies. From the opening titles, viewers are drawn into worlds both excitingly new and strangely resonant. By their choice of sources from their own and other media, the directors and their writers have elected murderous killing as the primary image of evil: not mass, anonymous death for which there is collective guilt of several sorts, but specific, individual deaths for which one or two figures bear responsibility. Rope and Compulsion focus on the psychic state that lets individual men kill in private life; Scarface and Richard III assess cultural contexts that turn killers loose, whether greed-driven clandestine war on ordinary society or socio-political upheaval that results in hegemonic power. The murderers all share characteristics that do not surprise any student of the sad history of twentieth-century killing: relative isolation, defensive selfconsciousness from an early age, habitual lying, uncertain sexuality, resentment of others’ success, total incapacity for imagining the interior life of others. These peculiarities - together with the distancing of history make them not-us, Others, objects for our gaze. Neither personal weaknesses nor political culture fully determine any of these figures’ driven ambitions, of course - to say nothing of justifying them. The more hopeful films of mid-century assume that evil can be identified in individuals and punished; even that society may make progress. With a longer perspective on the century’s authoritarianisms, the later films see evil defeated only by its own over-reaching.
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Notes My work on this essay was greatly assisted by Los Angeles film critic Adam B. Vary. 1. Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, trans. James Benedict (London: Verso, 1993), 3. Through the 1970s and 80s, Baudrillard claims, postmodernity drifted into a transparent state of affairs “by casting off the negative, by disseminating the energies of everything condemned by society within a simulation entirely given over to positivity and factitiousness.” In such a pseudo-ironic stance, “violence is whitewashed, history is whitewashed, all as part of a vast enterprise of cosmetic surgery.” See Baudrillard, 44-45. 2. Ibid., 82. 3. In the last fifteen years - as social history has recognised the role of specific micro-perspectives in constructing the past - a relationship between history and film that goes well beyond documentaries and concern for accuracy has become an increasing focus for scholars, especially in Australia where LaTrobe University sponsors a programme in Film and History. (The U.S. has a Film and History League that has recently emphasised American politics.) See, amongst others, Tony Barta, ed., Screening the Past: Film and the Representation of History (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 1-17; Robert A. Rosenstone, Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to Our Idea of History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1995); Vivian Sobchack, ed., The Persistence of History: Cinema, Television, and the Modern Event (New York: Routledge, 1996); and the journal Film & History. 4. L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953), 9; Tony Barta, “Screening the Past: History Since the Cinema,” in Barta, 6. See also Sue Harper, “The Scent of Distant Blood: Hammer Films and History,” in Barta, 109-15. 5. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Vol. 5.2: Lectures, 1808-1819, on Literature, ed. R. A. Foakes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1987), 315. 6. In an often-compelling article, E. W. Smith suggests the influence on the film of Hitchcock’s editing work, in the summer of 1945, on footage recorded by Allied forces that liberated camps. Smith sees “the ghost of the Holocaust” in David, the victim who was called “Ronald” in the original West End play. But the Holocaust, rarely so named in 1948, had not yet achieved the major significance in American culture that began in the 1970s; “David” may be just an American-guy choice, after all no other characters’ names were changed in Rope, and the stone-cold killers were also Jews. See E. W. Smith, “Thereby Hangs a Tale: Rope in the Hands of Plautus, Porter, and Hitchcock,” Arachne V (1998): 70-72. 7. David Miller’s brilliant essay not only dissects the (false) technical experimentation but, starting from Truffaut’s account, connects it to pointed connotations of a homosexuality that could not be directly repre-
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sented in the 1940s. See David A. Miller, “Anal Rope,” Representations 32 (1990): 114-34. 8. Antonio Damasio, “How Hitchcock’s Rope Stretches Time,” Scientific American 287 (September 2002): 70. 9. Christopher Morris’s deconstructive essay explores the precredit “dumbshow” of a policeman guiding boys across the street as a marker of the film’s multiple “undecideability.” See Christopher D. Morris, “Ro/pe,” Film Criticism 24 (1999): 21-22. 10. The enormous literature on Hitchcock’s oeuvre attended relatively little to Rope until the rise of queer studies; newer scholars offer interesting readings, including pointing to the erotic exhilaration of the opening strangling. In a subtle discussion of what could and could not be said at the time, for instance, Robin Wood recognises in Brandon the homophobic stereotype of the “murderous gay.” In addition, Vito Russo cites Hitchcock amongst early representers of predatory homosexuals. See Robin Wood, Hitchcock’s Films Revisited, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), 349-57; and Vito Russo, The Celluloid Closet: Homosexuality in the Movies, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 92-95. See also Richard Allen, “Hitchcock, or The Pleasures of Metaskepticism,” in Alfred Hitchcock: Centenary Essays, ed. Richard Allen and S. IshiiGonzalèz (London: British Film Institute, 1999), 221-37; Robert J. Corber, “Hitchcock’s Washington,” in Hitchcock’s America, ed. Jonathan Freeman and Richard Millington (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 99121; Thomas Hemmeter, “Rope’s Fable of Meaning,” in Hitchcock’s Rereleased Films: From Rope to Vertigo, ed. Walter Raubicheck and Walter Srebnick (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1991), 256-65; and Amy Lawrence, “Jimmy Stewart is Being Beaten: Rope and the Postwar Crisis in American Masculinity,” Quarterly Review of Film and Video 16 (1996): 48-51. 11. One inscription already visible in 1948 deserves note: Brandon and Philip’s dandyish pleasure in crystal, pictures, and antiques, Philip’s musical talent, and Brandon’s remark about it, “I wish I had creative power.” Criminality is aestheticised when Brandon lauds “murder as a work of art” and claims that not to give the party so they can mock their guests with their secret knowledge would be “like painting a picture and not hanging it.” Needless to say, neither film mentions the nudity and acid disfigurement of Bobby Franks’ genitals, which Leopold and Loeb used in an attempt to mask his identity. See Hal Higdon, Leopold and Loeb: The Crime of the Century, rev. ed. (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1999), 104. 12. Higdon, 49, 67, 72. 13. See, amongst others, David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950); Allen Wheelis, The Quest for Identity (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958); Robert W. White, Lives in Progress; A Study of the Natural Growth of Personality (New York: Dryden Press, 1952), and much of the work of Erik Erikson.
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14. “Psychopath,” the preferred term in the 1940s, names Leopold and Loeb as monstrous, which they did not appear to be. Although the criteria are not dissimilar, today they would probably be diagnosed with Personality Disorders (both with Cluster B Anti-social disorders; Leopold - Phillip/Judd - with elements of Cluster C Anxious disorders, as well). The characteristics are extreme variants of normal feelings that many people experience in milder degree. These disorders often cause no distress in those who exhibit them; pervasive disregard for others, and absence of remorse, are major signifiers. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2000); and David Barlow and Mark Durand, Abnormal Psychology: An Integrative Approach (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1995), 515-18, 527-31. 15. While the chest is a focal point, the books become central when Brandon mischievously ties them with the same piece of rope (“an ordinary household item”) with which David was strangled; the crime begins to unravel with the poorly tied package - this film’s “MacGuffin,” a role heavy-handedly assigned to Judd’s glasses in Compulsion. 16. Higdon, 316. 17. One marginalised position in the case is virtually erased in Rope and substantially elided in Compulsion: Leopold and Loeb were secular Jews. Hitchcock codes Brandon and Philip as Jewish only by casting actors with long faces, aquiline noses, and dark hair, in notable contrast with the broad-browed, golden blond Anglo-Saxon appearance of the victim and of Ken, his living stand-in as innocent foil. The script summons the horrors of Hitler’s regime in a contextually appropriate way with its citation of “nine million dead.” Compulsion, which makes a greater claim to historical accuracy, uses German-Jewish surnames and, as part of its liberal aura, includes a brief shot of a cross-burning surrounded by Klan-clad figures. For a report on the many-layered Chicago Jewish community’s reaction to the case, especially to the arrest of Leopold and Loeb, see Higdon, 115-17. 18. Stewart, reportedly unhappy with his work in the film, almost brings off the pious accusations; almost any other actor would make my reading unavoidable (see Lawrence). Alan Sinfield offers a shrewd reading of the relationships amongst designation as un-American/communist, diagnoses of psychopathology, and homosexuality in the culture of the Cold War period. See Alan Sinfield, Cultural Politics - Queer Reading (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 40-47. See also Corber. 19. The understanding - if not sympathy - and forgiveness that make Wilk’s summation possible (and the hearing’s outcome plausible) derive from the casuistic testimony he elicits from Ruth. Historical fact, here, was not sufficiently credible, so special pleading had to be supplied. The scene would be ludicrously outrageous after the rise of feminism, but in 1959 that movement was more than five years in the future. 20. Baudrillard, 3, 82.
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21. Jean-Luc Godard, Jean-Luc Godard: Interviews, ed. David Sterritt (Jackson: Univ. Press of Mississippi, 1998), 29. 22. James Loehlin, “’Top of the World, Ma’: Richard III and Cinematic Convention,” in Shakespeare, the Movie: Popularizing the Plays on Film, TV, and Video, ed. Lynda E. Boose and Richard Burt (New York: Routledge, 1997), 72. 23. Stephen Greenblatt, “Introduction” to Richard III, in The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 507. 24. In 1592, Shakespeare was choosing to write a “victor’s history” that treats - in highly ideological fashion - events from 1478-85 that brought to the throne the grandfather of his own sovereign, Elizabeth I; in that choice he demonised Richard for all time. See Greenblatt. 25. As Susan Sontag identified in “Fascinating Fascism,” Hitler himself began the use of visual images of Nazism as natural propaganda, some of them glamourised by Riefenstahl; subsequently, steely jaws and masculine SS uniforms have become, in American movies, an overdetermined code for “the Touch of Evil, and its horrendous drive to destruction,” in the words of Tony Barta. The association of Nazis with sexual deviance, ever since the SA, is also pertinent. See Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” New York Review of Books 22, no. 1 (6 February 1975); and Tony Barta, “Film Nazis: The Great Escape,” in Barta, 130-31. 26. Paradise Lost, I.98. 27. Richard resents what he sees as his brother’s ingratitude; he rebukes his sister-in-law Elizabeth thusly: Ere you were queen - ay, or your husband king I was a packhorse in his great affairs, A weeder-out of his proud adversaries, A liberal rewarder of his friends. To royalize his blood, I spent mine own. (1.3.121-5) 28. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder cite Richard III as a literary exemplar for an ideology that represents the “unnatural” body as in itself an adequate motive for social disruption, even moral corruption. They shrewdly note both the “dual pleasures of fascination and repulsion” and the openness of disability to caricatured satire. See David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, The Body and Physical Difference (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1997), 13-18, 80. Editor’s note: see also “The ‘Uncanny’ Relationship of Disability and Evil in Film and Television,” included in this volume. 29. Laurent Bouzereau, The De Palma Cut: The Films of America’s Most Controversial Director (New York: Dembner, 1988), 123-24. 30. Loehlin, 73-74. 31. Shakespeare’s text provides both misogyny and a sense of hag-ridden doom that could suggest either psychosexual impotence or homosexuality. Loncraine and McKellen were totally free to visualise suggestions of homosexuality, and McKellen’s portrayal certainly has its fey moments.
The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock Mike Frank Abstract Academic Hitchcock criticism was, in its early years, shaped by the theological-ethical preoccupations introduced by Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol in the first detailed exploration of Hitchcock as a serious artist/auteur. For that criticism the dominant theme in Hitchcock was human evil and original sin. More recently, especially under the influence of Laura Mulvey’s landmark “visual pleasure” essay, serious Hitchcock criticism has emphasised the gender elements in the films in general. Critics in this tradition place sexual desire and the politics of patriarchy at the centre of Hitchcock’s work. By and large, these strains of critical thought have remained separate. It is possible, however, to see them as two aspects of a larger Hitchcockian vision, one that sees sexuality both as necessary and as inevitably the source of much human evil. Key Words: guilt, A. Hitchcock, Jansenism, The Lodger, monism, morality, Psycho, Shadow of a Doubt, Vertigo, Zoroastrianism
1.
Also Zarathustra
When it comes to mapping the moral universe, most of us are, by temperament, Zoroastrians. For philosophers and theologians in the monotheistic traditions that have dominated western thought, the existence of evil in the world has been a besetting problem. If there is but one god responsible for all creation, and that god is a good god, where does evil come from? Ancient Zoroastrianism famously avoided that dilemma by positing a world shaped by two opposed deities, a god of good and a god of evil. The appeal of this formulation is obvious enough; evil exists and we need to account for it. Unless we want to jettison completely our faith in a pervasive good - a good identified with a divine principle - the simplest way out of the dilemma is to posit something outside the good, something radically other than the good, as the source of evil. The resulting cosmology is radically dualistic. Of course, few of us actually believe in an independent divine but evil power contending with the benevolent god of our shared religious traditions. But while our convictions, if they allow any space at all for the divine, may be monotheistic, our moral sense often turns out to be as highly dualistic as anything a Zoroastrian might believe. We imagine a world in which something called evil exists, and, furthermore, that this evil is somehow different from us, foreign, radically other. In our dominant mythology, evil is something that is not us. Unfortunately this dual-
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The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock
ism aligns poorly with our monotheistic, hence monistic, theological posture. This is a problem. There is another way of conceiving of good and evil, one that, without altering the central meaning of the terms, shifts their relationship dramatically. If we imagine evil not as opposed to the good in some Manichean way, but as an aspect of the good that nevertheless brings disaster in its wake, a good that somehow ends up causing human unhappiness, then we have a radically different kind of mythology, less nihilistic and, potentially, more tragic. In this mythology, good and evil are not demarcated as binary opposites; they are instead seen as in themselves radically compromised and contradictory concepts. Our Zoroastrian intuitions notwithstanding, this view has a central - if submerged - place in our cultural history. It is the informing mythos of the biblical account of creation and plays a central role in Greek tragedy. It is also, moving to the modern world, a central idea shaping much of the work of Alfred Hitchcock which may help explain his continued popularity and critical esteem. On the following pages I propose to consider this radically monistic and tragic perspective as an informing principle in a number of Hitchcock’s richest films - Shadow of a Doubt (1943), The Lodger (1926), Vertigo (1958), Psycho (1960) - and to place those films in the context of the view of human life implied by the story of the Garden of Eden in Genesis. The fifty-year history of Hitchcock criticism has, from the start, been sensitive to the presence of evil as a shaping force in the drama of his films. For roughly half that time, critics emphasised ethical matters often seen in the context of a theological idea of guilt. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, feminist criticism dominated Hitchcock criticism, and gender issues came to occupy the centre of gravity in the conversation. Sexism replaced guilt as the source of moral drama in Hitchcock. For the most part, these two critical discourses remained separate. But they need not be. By looking at the relationship between guilt and sex in these films, and by seeing good and evil as intertwined, especially in the sexual arena, we can see how both concerns are central to Hitchcock and how his films can provide a valuable dramatic model of a monistic ethics. 2.
The Drama of Dualism A sense of the world as somehow divided between two forces, one good and one evil, is spoken especially vividly in the stories we tell each other. Our novels, songs, tabloids, and, of course, movies often exploit our disposition to see the world in terms of good guys and bad guys, white hats and black hats, even an occasional evil empire. As we willingly suspend our disbelief in certain formal conventions in order to participate in the illusion of film or theater, so the innocent pleasure of moral clarity leads us to suspend our disbelief in the reductive and schematic morality of popular entertainments. Of course, when we do indulge ourselves in this kind of morality play, it is with a clear sense of how more complex and ambiguous moral issues actually are. Often that leads us to admire films and other fictions that speak to this sense of complexity and ambiguity. The idea that the
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character we most admire or identify with is morally compromised in some way gives us a sense that the ethical universe we see represented speaks to and for the one in which we live. In our critical discourses, “moral complexity” and “moral ambiguity” become terms of praise. But this impulse toward moral complexity does not typically entail a radical reconceptualising of the relationship between good and evil. The crucial ethical question is not whether good and evil may both be found in a single person or act, but whether we want to accept the very categories of good and evil as antipodal terms. It is certainly possible to see all of creation as contaminated by some evil stain while nevertheless maintaining that the stain comes from a source different from the source of the good and, in fact, the notion of original sin does exactly that. The widespread resistance to Hannah Arendt’s argument that evil, examined closely, could at its core be very far from monstrous suggests a continued impulse to mark off evil as special. Even in representations that give us deeply flawed heroes and morally ambiguous villains, the categories themselves often remain intact. Our willingness to see our heroes as tainted may suggest an awareness of the complexity of these matters, but it doesn’t in itself speak for a monistic ethics in which good and evil are not only intimate but also dialectically interrelated. More important, characterising evil as essentially other precludes any possible attempt to really come to grips with it; insofar as evil is imagined as ontologically different, it is inaccessible to our understanding. In short, what I have called our temperamental inclination toward a Zoroastrian ethics makes real moral inquiry impossible. These issues play out vividly in Hitchcock’s films and the critical discourses that have developed around that work; they shape both the films and the way we read them. But to see them clearly, we need a lens that allows us to see what is special about Hitchcock. By his own account Hitchcock is, like many mainstream filmmakers, more interested in the rhetoric of the fiction than in its subject matter. Faced with questions about psychological or moral themes, Hitchcock tended to respond by talking about technique, about what he called “pure cinema.” In the many extensive interviews that he gave about his work, most especially the book-length interview with François Truffaut, he repeatedly pointed out that what matters most is keeping the audience intrigued, entertained, and in suspense. Moral issues matter within this sort of narrative economy only to the extent that they motivate the audience to invest emotional energy in the story. To enlist audience sympathy with the quest of the “hero,” a narrative will provide an ostensive “enemy.” In this kind of narrative - the James Bond films are a convenient example - the actual character of these enemies matters little if at all. What matters about, say, Auric Goldfinger, is only that he is evil enough to make him worth the attention of James Bond, and thereby of the audience as well. What we have here, then, is a representational system which recapitulates our Manichean ethics; evil is other, discontinuous with the good, something not to be explored but to be eliminated. It is a safe bet that the popularity of such narrative structures comes in part from their reinforcing of our comfortable ethical perspectives.
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The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock
All of this is pretty formulaic. If Hitchcock is widely considered a “great” filmmaker when other popular filmmakers who employ these virtually ubiquitous strategies are not, we need to ask what Hitchcock adds to the formula that might account for the difference. Of course, there is in Hitchcock an uncommon degree of craftsmanship. There is also the quirky Hitchcock sensibility that complicates his films in ways that appeal to the modern critical predisposition toward complexity, irony, and ambiguity. More importantly, at least since the pioneering 1957 study of the films by Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol, it has been taken for granted that this complexity and ambiguity are not merely a matter of plot manipulation but have a morally significant thematic function that gives the films a moral centre missing from most popular entertainments. Rohmer and Chabrol identified this moral centre as the “exchange” or “transfer of guilt,” as Hitchcock’s tendency to show that “evil” is not isolated in the villains but somehow contaminates the heroes as well; they saw the theme as essentially religious, one that “finds its most noble expression in the idea of the interchangeable guilt of all mankind.” 1 One need not buy Rohmer and Chabrol’s claim about the religious character of the films to recognise that the moral scheme represented here differs radically from the good guys/bad guys dichotomy that shapes the conventional thriller. Nevertheless, if the shared guilt in Hitchcock derives from what Raymond Durgnat, discussing the Rohmer-Chabrol book, calls “a grimly punitive view of human depravity” which sees the individual as helpless to escape from the guilt which is the common inheritance of all mankind, 2 then the opportunities for meaningful moral action are seriously diminished. Moral drama presumably requires that some acts be seen as inherently more ethically desirable than others. Moreover, the Hitchcock of Rohmer and Chabrol shares a common moral intuition with the conventional thriller; in both, innocence and guilt, good and evil remain fundamentally, ontologically opposed. No doubt a Jansenist view would see evil as a far more serious threat than that presented by the cartoonish villains of popular entertainments. Nevertheless, this view, in ascribing evil as a matter of definition to the work of Satan, gives us few insights into the way in which evil may actually work within us. Moral theology of this kind would seem to foreclose the possibility of moral psychology, and if that were true of Hitchcock’s films they would presumably be reduced to the level of moral fables. In these moral fables, the evil often comes disguised as the good, may be more appealing than the good, or may be seen as much more pervasive than we imagine, making the view of the universe sufficiently gloomy to satisfy sophisticated modern tastes. This is striking in Richard Schickel’s filmed interview with Hitchcock in which Hitchcock, sounding like Uncle Charlie in Shadow of a Doubt, talks without apparent irony about the pervasiveness of evil: “Today, to a great extent, evil has spread,” and again “the world today is full of brutality.” Hitchcock adds that “evil and good are getting closer together today . . . you can barely tell one from the other.” Yet crucially, despite the way evil comes disguised as good, despite its charm and appeal, despite its pervasiveness so that at best all one can do is get out of
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the way and hope for the best - another point Hitchcock makes in the Schickel interview - despite all of this, evil remains ontologically distinct. 3 Writing a decade after Rohmer and Chabrol, Robin Wood modified their argument in ways that begin to move beyond the simple Manichean dualism. Wood largely accepts the Rohmer-Chabrol moral frame of reference, but since he rejects as reductive their claims about “the essentially Catholic nature of [Hitchcock’s] work,” 4 he can’t fall back on some version of original sin as simply a given that has to be acknowledged, not interrogated. In Wood’s view, “themes of profound and universal significance” are what gives art the power to disturb and in Hitchcock the source of this power is a “complex and disconcerting moral sense, in which good and evil are seen to be so interwoven as to be virtually inseparable, and which insists upon the existence of evil impulses in all of us.” 5 This interweaving of good and evil is obviously like the “transferred guilt” of Rohmer and Chabrol. It differs in that it posits evil not as being merely something seductive that might trap us but as already being part of us. Evil is depicted not as circumstantial but as essential, as emerging not from any characteristics of an enemy one happens to confront, but from some quality inherent in the protagonist. Stories about an evil that is “out there” lend themselves to simple manipulation and reductive moralising; stories that posit an evil within have a moral seriousness because they evoke an evil that the audience cannot easily disavow. Wood’s limited appropriation of Rohmer and Chabrol begins to get us closer to the ethical core of Hitchcock. But the move Wood makes that finally gives us a clear insight into the human (as opposed to metaphysical) nature of this evil is his insistence on seeing it in relationship to questions of sexuality, especially in later editions of his often amplified study. Hitchcock criticism was, in its early years, shaped by RohmerChabrol’s theological-ethical preoccupations. This understanding of Hitchcock, which may in fact have been the way Hitchcock understood his own work, was so pervasive, even taken for granted, that in the 1973 Schickel interview, aimed at a mass audience, the voice-over narrator can talk about the theme of “original sin” in the films. Remarkably, the sequences from the films chosen to illustrate these comments are often blatantly sexual in content. Yet the commentary, whether in the voice-over or by Hitchcock himself, pointedly ignores the sexual dimension entirely in favour of a discourse of good and evil, as if Hitchcock the artist knows about something that Hitchcock the commentator is unable to face. Since the mid-1970s, however, the focus of serious Hitchcock criticism has, particularly under the influence of Laura Mulvey’s landmark essay on “visual pleasure,” changed dramatically and gender concerns have taken centre stage. Most of the time, however, these two critical discourses have remained largely separate and incommensurate. Ethical critics, if they noted sexuality at all, saw it merely as a marker of original sin and not of any inherent interest; critics concerned about gender issues, ignoring any moral claims the films might have, focused instead on Hitchcock’s ostensible sexism, either attacking him as monstrously patriarchal or, in
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The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock
Wood’s phrase, arguing that “Hitchcock [can] be saved for feminism,” 6 that his films can be read as fair and sympathetic to women. Wood’s work is extraordinarily significant in seeing the themes of guilt and sexuality as reciprocal. For all of this, Wood accepts one problematic claim advanced by Rohmer and Chabrol. Like them, he sees good and evil in Hitchcock as diametrically opposed. Rohmer and Chabrol apparently found this opposition in Hitchcock because they found it in the world and saw in Hitchcock a mirror of their ethical universe. Wood emphatically rejects this as a valid view of the world but is convinced that Hitchcock was unable to do the same. He therefore calls “Hitchcock’s vision nearer the nihilistic than the tragic,” and he supports this characterisation by adducing Hitchcock’s “inability to conceive of repressed energies as other than evil” and arguing that any “concept of the liberation of the instincts . . . Hitchcock must always deny.” 7 3.
Where’s Charlie? Wood sees Hitchcock as Puritanical in his refusal to face “instincts.” Yet Puritanism can hardly account for Hitchcock’s habitual acknowledgement, even celebration, of the power of eros. The story his films repeatedly tell is not about the denial of the erotic but about the price of accepting it. The fullest and most profound telling of this story in the Hitchcock canon occurs in Vertigo, a film that is increasingly seen as his “masterpiece.” But the clearest expression of the idea that informs this repeated story occurs in Shadow of a Doubt, where it assumes almost emblematic form. A distinctive feature of Hitchcock’s telling the story of the cost of eros is the trope of doubling - of characters, events, images - through which the innocent and the guilty are linked. In Shadow of a Doubt, this doubling reaches its most extreme articulation. The two main characters a mature, male, serial killer, and his innocent, virginal, teen-age niece - are marked as doubles in multiple ways, most explicitly by their both being named Charlie. In giving the “hero” and the “villain” the same name, Hitchcock insists on their congruence, on their being two versions of the same principle. This is emphasised by many details of Hitchcock’s narration, the most celebrated of which is the introduction of each character in a series of rigorously rhyming shots. In Shadow of a Doubt, shared names, parallel framing, and an array of diegetic details all support the idea of a shared or exchanged guilt. The question is, what to make of it? If the formal and thematic rhyming of the two Charlies is anything more than a parlor trick, what exactly does it propose? For Rohmer and Chabrol, it seems to be the Jansenist or Calvinist view of “the interchangeable guilt of all mankind,” a guilt shared even though the two figures are clearly marked as hero and villain. Of the uncle, Rohmer and Chabrol say that “the opprobrium with which he covers [the world] splashes onto the soul, previously pure, of his niece . . . It is with the discovery of the innate defect of the universe - of the problem of evil . . . that the innocent simultaneously loses his innocence.” 8 The innocent, it seems, participates in the
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shared guilt only by virtue of discovering it in others or by virtue of being a fallen human. Free of taint as a human agent, the hero shares in a purely metaphysical guilt, and evil is once again relegated to an alternative transcendent principle, remaining firmly other. But in the introduction of the two characters there is one deviation from strict parallelism, and it is an extremely important one. Each introduction ends with an almost identical shot of the character lying, fully clothed, on a bed; only the positions of the hands are different. Uncle Charlie’s hands are folded over his crotch, holding a cigar. The image, unmistakably phallic, suggests that sometimes a cigar is not only a cigar. His niece, by contrast, holds her hands behind her head, leaving her body in a position of sexual readiness, as open and receptive as her uncle’s is aggressive. For all her innocence, and the film’s unmistakable placement of her as the moral centre of the story, she, too, is a sexual creature. This is clear not only in her symbolic function as the secret sharer of her uncle’s guilt, but in the actual unfolding of the story, where her awakening sexuality leads to a dissatisfaction with the tranquil, asexual domesticity of her home, to an infatuation with her charming, worldly, but clearly dangerous uncle, and, ultimately, to a series of moral compromises. By the Rohmer/Chabrol account, the source of young Charlie’s evil is simply the general human condition. But Shadow of a Doubt makes it clear that her guilt is not merely a human given, independent of any specific personal history. Instead, her guilt - if that’s the right word for it - is a direct function of her personal history and the choices and desires it leads to, choices and desires that will emerge as the figure in the Hitchcockian carpet. 4.
Trouble in Paradise Shadow of a Doubt limns an evil somehow connected to sexuality. Rohmer and Chabrol, meditating on Hitchcock in the light of a Jansenist sensibility, see young Charlie’s guilt as existential; sexuality is simply not to be found in their ethical map. Instead they find in the story of the fall of man and original sin a model for a universal guilt that permeates all of Hitchcock. Yet the biblical passages at the heart of the view of humankind as fallen are themselves haunted by - if not obsessed with - sexuality. They also offer a more detailed and nuanced account of the connection between sexuality and evil than one that simply posits a blanket “interchangeable guilt of all mankind.” What I want to suggest is that the biblical account of the creation of Eve, and what Christianity has come to call “the fall of man,” establishes a paradigm different in significant ways from the commonly accepted one, a paradigm in which evil and good are not antipodal but are functions of the same mode of being, mediated by sexuality. Since this paradigm conceives good and evil as ontologically of a piece, the implied ethics are congruent with the metaphysics of western religion in having a single founding principle. The Zoroastrian impulse
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The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock
“Two versions of the same principle”: Uncle Charlie (Joseph Cotten) greets his namesake niece (Teresa Wright) in Shadow of a Doubt. Copyright ¤ 1943 Universal Pictures. toward dualism that we seem to prefer in our moral fictions is subverted and we are compelled to confront the extent to which good and evil function as dialectically connected or reciprocal. In making the hero and villain of Shadow shadows of each other, Hitchcock provided a striking emblem of this dialectic. How his other films develop this monistic ethics is a crucial matter to which we will return. First, it is necessary to look at the biblical moment which may be seen as establishing a normative monism in the ethical sphere. This is obviously not the place for an extended reading of the relevant biblical passages, particularly chapters two and three of Genesis, which chronicle the placement of Adam in Eden, the subsequent creation of woman and the eating from the tree of knowledge, and the expulsion from Eden. A few details, however, will prove very useful. 9 Throughout the first account of the creation of the world in Genesis I, the biblical text reiterates that God sees all of creation as good; the phrase “it was good” appears six times, capped by the assertion that creation as a whole was “very good.” There is no reference at all to evil in
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this chapter. The first allusion to the possibility of evil - the first introduction of the very concept of evil - comes only with reference to the tree of knowledge, identified as “the tree of knowledge of good and evil.” It may be important to note, however, that the original Hebrew may actually suggest an apposition, in which case the phrase is best translated as “the tree of knowledge, which is both good and evil.” Whatever we may make of that tree, it should have no immediate impact on the life of Adam who finds himself in a garden that provides all he needs. Yet immediately after commanding Adam to not eat from the tree of knowledge, God observes that “it’s not good that the man should be alone” - the first time that word “good” is used along with its negation. The Hebrew here is often translated as “It is not good for man to be alone,” suggesting the common understanding of the phrase as describing the unhappiness of the male without female companionship. Given our own situation in a post-Edenic, sexually differentiated world, we find such a reading intuitive. Yet nothing in the logic of the story requires us to see man alone as an undesirable thing, and nothing in the language requires that we read the problem as being Adam’s. Given the bible’s insistence on the unique character of the one god, solitariness - the quality of being the only instance of something - may well be something reserved only for God. By this account, if man’s being alone is bad - “not good” - it is bad not for man himself but for God. Because only God can have the quality of singleness, humankind has perforce to be dual rather than single. God proceeds to create a woman, using part of the man’s body in the process and thereby making the man, by definition, incomplete. The wholeness that the text attributes to the man alone - a divine wholeness? is lost even before the woman is formed. When the man sees the woman, he immediately recognises her as a part of himself. The next verse reads as follows: “Therefore a man will leave his mother and father and cling to his woman and they will become one flesh.” Though God imposes duality on humankind, the male of the species seems unable to abide that and immediately takes action to restore the unity that he knew before, to once again become “one flesh.” By the time woman has been created and desired, man is already “fallen,” not in any specifically theological sense but in that he is and knows himself to be incomplete. Moreover, in desiring to remake unity out of diversity, he is out of step with what he intuits as the divine or cosmic agenda. His eating from the tree of knowledge is then merely a different mythic articulation of the ontology already in place. His desire for woman leads him to become one flesh with her, which the bible pointedly refers to as “knowing” her - as if sex is another version of what the tree of knowledge provides. Finally, we learn that after eating from the tree of knowledge, humankind becomes ashamed of its nakedness, knowledge here equated with shame. If there’s any truth to Freud’s sense that guilt as opposed to remorse - is anxiety about what one’s actions are likely to bring, we may say that what the tree of knowledge provides, through the instrumentality of the woman, is guilt.
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The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock
The idea that man - perhaps woman too - is like God must have come early in our history. After all, the idea that there is a god comes from, or at the very least implies, an awareness of some power or authority that one strives for, envies, but is cut off from. God - whether real or imagined - thus inevitably represents one horizon of human aspiration. The sense that this god-ness lies just beyond our grasp - like the moon in various fables or heaven in Browning's famous verse - carries with it, as a flip side of the same coin, the sense that we are somehow or almost like god, what the bible calls created “in his image.” But, in this same history, this claim to divine semblance is an illusion quickly shattered by the inescapable discovery of the acute limitations of human power. To be like God is precisely not to be God, and - even worse: the tragic flaw that makes us human - to be always aware of the space that separates you from the divine, a space that, like the distance between Tantalus and his water, becomes more infuriating as it seems to get smaller. Perhaps the archetypal plotting of these tragic coordinates comes, at least for men, in the sex act. The sense of phallic potency; the authority (even to, like God, authoring new life); the sense of rising to the occasion and being adequate to it - all of these may represent (or embody), more than any other organic experience, the omnipotence that, if permanent, becomes the mark of God. But for the human male, it is all too impermanent, and where there was the illusion of potency, there remains, in the aftermath, only the shameful recognition of the potency of illusion. To know that you are like God, and then to know how much you are not like God, is surely to know good and evil in its most foundational form. For the bible, sexuality is the primal scene of human knowing, and the instrument of this knowing is woman. The woman, in her separation from man, quite literally embodies the impossibility of his wholeness; by virtue of being the sign for his completeness, she is simultanously the mark of his incompleteness. This myth, like all myths, is rich in ambiguity, as the variety of different meanings it has assumed in different theological systems will attest. Still, it seems safe to venture that what we have here is an articulation of a male sense that men are incomplete without women, but that the attempt to achieve completeness through woman is destined to fail and leads not to wholeness but to guilt. The first part of this proposition - that men need women in some meta-sexual way, that women are not only necessary as sexual partners for men or as what the bible calls their “helpmeets” - is conventional to the point of cliché; it is the old “ewig weibliche” keeping us going. Less frequently noted is how this myth proposes that the pursuit of wholeness through the feminine is itself the source of human evil. 5.
What’s Planted in Hitchcock’s Garden This same profoundly ambivalent view of the feminine pulses like a bloodstream through the body of work called Hitchcock. It is already there in The Lodger, generally taken to be the first true Hitchcock
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film. The Lodger is of special interest in that, while being told primarily from the viewpoint of a woman, it nevertheless places male desire at the centre of its explorations, and in so doing articulates a way of thinking about male and female sexuality. Although a great many Hitchcock films present a woman’s desire as the immediate source of dramatic conflict, the films never present anything inherently problematic in that desire; by the evidence of the films, what makes this desire problematic is only what it means and how it works in the arena that we have come to call patriarchy. In Hitchcock, women’s sexuality is no problem for women but a major problem for men. The character of this problem is, remarkably, already there in the very opening shots of The Lodger, which propose almost schematically a moral equation about male desire that informs almost all of Hitchcock’s work. Later films will provide richer and most explicit articulations of this equation, but it’s already there at the start. The very first shot of this film is an extreme close-up of a woman screaming, a look of horror on her face. The shot is entirely without context. Since it shows nothing except the horrified face, we don’t know who the woman is, where she is, or what might be causing her horror. What then does this one shot, taken alone (which, of course, shots in films never are) tell us? What’s clear is that we’re in the presence of evil, that it is evil perpetrated upon a woman, and that it is evil with a human face. There are non-human forces in the world of human affairs that are “bad” in that they create distress for humans. The existence of such forces may pose serious problems for theologians who have to account for the presence of the bad in a world shaped by a benevolent or good God. But these forces - disease, famine, natural disasters of all kinds, even death itself - do not elicit horrified screams. The object of dread implied by that very first shot is rather a malevolent human force. In the absence of context, we know nothing else. The context necessary for turning image into statement, for opening up the possibility of predication, comes in the film’s second shot. This shows a black screen on which the phrase, “TO-NIGHT-GOLDENCURLS,” flashes four times. Since The Lodger is a silent film, we can’t tell whether what we’re seeing is a diegetic image or merely a title card outside the diegesis. By itself, this shot is even more enigmatic than the first. We don’t know what it means or refers to, and we’re not even sure what reading strategy to use in trying to make sense of it. And indeed, though this same shot is used as an insert a number of times throughout the early part of the film, Hitchcock does not place it in context until the film’s very last shot, only then allowing us to see how the pieces are meant to fit together. Nevertheless, here too we can - and most viewers probably do - draw some reasonable inferences. The sign seems to advertise or offer something, either to someone within the diegesis or to the audience or - as is consistent with one of Hitchcock’s favourite manoeuvres - to both simultaneously, thereby engaging the audience as secret sharers with the characters. We can also guess that what’s being offered or promised is female and is in some way attractive or appealing, golden
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The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock
being literally a reference to hair colour or figuratively to something very precious; again, both meanings seem to coalesce. All in all, two very enigmatic images. Yet taken together - because taken together, because when spliced together, they evoke the principle of montage, the idea that cinematic images must be understood in the light of their reciprocal implications. In other words, they define a significant pattern. Shot one depicts violence against women; shot two depicts both the appeal of women and the exploitation of that appeal for commercial purposes. Hitchcock’s montage tells us that these two are connected. There is, then, a kind of initiating proposition here for us to consider, an emblem under which the rest of the film - and maybe all of Hitchcock’s films - will unfold. The proposition, in its least tendentious form, is that there is a connection of some kind between the appeal of the feminine and violence against women; an alternative reading would see the connection as causal. The dialectic of sexual desire and sexual guilt, of lust and violence, of love and death runs through The Lodger. The title character is, like Uncle Charlie, a mysterious and attractively dangerous man who appears suddenly and rents a room in the family home of Daisy, the innocent heroine. Both characters and audience are led to suspect that he may be the notorious “avenger,” a serial killer of attractive blondes (“golden curls”), a suspicion that is not alleviated until the last minutes of the film. He claims that the avenger murdered his sister and that he, like the police, is searching for the avenger. But to the extent that he is trying to avenge the death of his sister, he too is an avenger and his impulses mirror those of his criminal doppelgänger. The combination of desire and guilt, of approach to and avoidance of the feminine, is most emblematic when the lodger turns the photos of blondes in his room to face the wall, as if to repress the promise, that runs throughout the movie, of golden curls. Yet he pursues - and at the end of the film marries - the very blonde Daisy. And when he does so, Hitchcock leaves us with a deeply disturbing image of their union. The “TO-NIGHT-GOLDEN-CURLS” sign appears repeatedly early in the film but is always enigmatic and never diegetically motivated. Only in the very last shot does Hitchcock finally place the image. The lodger has welcomed Daisy to his palatial home and the camera isolates the two of them embracing in front of a picture window in the cliché of a happy ending. But through the window, in the distance, we can see the blinking sign, “TO-NIGHT-GOLDEN-CURLS.” All this tells us, diegetically, is that the sign we’ve been seeing is a marquee or billboard of some kind, advertising a performance in which blonde women appear for the pleasure of the presumably male audience. Thematically, though, it does very much more than that; it positions the union of the lodger and Daisy quite literally under the sign of what throughout the film has been the marker of the tension between the appeal of the feminine on the one hand and violence against women on the other. The ostensibly happy ending - rare enough in Hitchcock - is here qualified by the very impulse that has generated it: the pursuit of a feminine figured as “golden curls,” suggesting an eros undermined by some aspect of its own nature. This view of
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sexuality - male sexuality, we have to remember - as internally divided against itself is reinforced by Hitchcock’s testimony that he would have preferred to make the lodger guilty - to tell a story in which the lodger is the avenger - but was prevented from doing so by market forces. For Hitchcock, it seems, eros was, from the very start, both hero and villain, the paradigm of good and the paradigm of evil. 6.
From Theme to Rhetoric Hitchcock’s films lend themselves to - but clearly don’t depend on - careful, complex, sometimes contradictory readings. Their complexity and ambiguity may account for their success with critics and scholars. But their continued broad appeal to the general public reminds us that, despite Robin Wood’s sense that Hitchcock “leaves a nasty taste in the mouth,” 10 you can easily watch them for their “entertainment” value. The guilt that earlier critics found in Hitchcock, and the sexism that more recent criticism has uncovered, the profound ambivalence toward sex, may all be there, but perhaps only in ways that require close critical readings of the sort attempted here - to bring them out. Hitchcock was always very interested in popular success and extraordinarily canny about what would appeal to a large audience. It is hardly surprising, then, that any nastiness is so often obscured by a variety of rhetorical devices calculated to fascinate and please. Of these, the two most widely recognised are crafty suspense and impish humour, both of which are virtually synonymous with Hitchcock’s name in the popular imagination. Because of the way these devices are used, most of us, watching Hitchcock films for pleasure or interest rather than as objects of formal study, are not likely to feel the guilt with which, the critics tell us, the audience is complicit. This is not to say that Hitchcock did not intend - or, more correctly, that his films do not intend - to blame the audience. The end of Easy Virtue (1928), for one example, where the device of the title card allows Hitchcock to address the audience directly with an accusation aimed ostensibly at characters within the diegesis, serves to make this point. There are many other such moments in Hitchcock, and if we are sensitive to them we can see how the films invite us to recognise the way in which the shared guilt extends to us as well. But a cinematic rhetoric that forces audience members to participate in the evil and then recognise what they have done is much rarer. This is what Vertigo does. That may be why it is increasingly recognised as Hitchcock’s masterpiece. Given a cool reception when it first appeared - perhaps because it does not let the audience off the hook, because the nasty taste it leaves is close to inescapable - it has achieved increasing respect and even adulation. Indeed, it finished second only to the inevitable Citizen Kane (1941) in Sight and Sound’s 2002 poll to determine the greatest films of all time. With that status has come an enormous amount of critical commentary, all of it earned, much of it admirable. It is a film that repays the most careful attention, and it would be easy to extend the present essay to twice its length simply adducing details from Vertigo. What’s most important, though, is how the rhetoric of this film - the way it
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positions the audience - quite forces the viewer to participate in the evil that is the film’s centre of gravity. Like so many other Hitchcock films, Vertigo represents the conjunction of male desire and female suffering; it’s the way the story is told that sets it apart. The first two-thirds of the film, in which the protagonist, Scottie (James Stewart), pursues the beautiful but mysterious Madeleine (Kim Novak), limit us almost exclusively to what Scottie knows and frequently to his visual point of view as well. This is especially true in the long wordless sequences in which we see Madeleine with Scottie instead of being pursued by him; in these sequences, Hitchcock’s camera regularly gives us extended point of view shots. The effect of this is not so much to show us Scottie being enticed by Madeleine’s beauty but to entice the audience as well. A striking case in point is the scene in which Scottie first sees Madeleine. Seated at the bar in a restaurant while she and her husband dine at a table, Scottie looks in their direction. At that point we expect an eye-line match and a POV shot. Instead of this Hitchcock gives us our own elegant, teasingly slow, carefully choreographed shot of the gorgeous Madeleine. Only after we have been afforded our own private view does he allow us Scottie’s own POV, thereby suturing our view and his view into one - a powerful connection that will remain in place until it is violently torn apart two thirds of the way through the film. The restaurant sequence, no more than a couple of minutes long, dissolves to a shot of Scottie at the wheel of his parked car. It is broad daylight and he is looking out the car window. Charles Barr’s admirable extended treatment of this sequence, in his study of Vertigo, puts it this way: “He has, then, taken the job and we don’t need to be told that he has done so, or why. His first look at her has been decisive.” 11 But not just his first look at her; the reason we know exactly what Scottie is up to is that our own first look has been equally decisive. We, too, are intrigued by this woman. The next half hour of the film lets us, with Scottie, follow Madeleine as she visits a graveyard and a museum, seemingly under the spell of some ghostly force. With Scottie we want to know who she is, what she is up to. Here narrative desire and romantic intrigue coalesce to create a powerful effect. As viewers we want to know what the story is about; as men - or as women watching the film as men, engaging in a kind of transvestitism not uncommon in responding to fictions - we want Madeleine. And then Madeleine dies. As viewers, we experience the loss in the familiar vicarious way of registering fictional losses; Scottie, not having that option, experiences it more profoundly, even excessively. Here. though we are sympathetic to his grief, we can’t share his emotion and Hitchcock craftily films this sequence largely without POV shots. Instead a somewhat remote camera frames both Scottie and the world he surveys as he goes about pathetically looking for his lost love. Hitchcock’s crucial rhetorical move occurs after Scottie’s first meeting with Judy. Until this point in the film we have learned almost nothing except what Scottie knows. Here, in a brief but powerful deviation from that pattern, Hitchcock gives us Judy’s thinking and we find out that
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The haunted and the hunted: Scottie (James Stewart) and Judy/Madeleine (Kim Novak) in Vertigo. Copyright ¤ 1958 Paramount Pictures Corp. there never was a Madeleine in the first place - while Scottie continues to believe that there was one. This is more than merely a way of increasing dramatic irony. While Scottie goes on believing in the actuality of the woman who will finally fulfill him and make him whole again - that is, in the “ewig weibliche” - Hitchcock forces us back into the conventional disbelief that we’ve suspended for the pleasures of the fiction. We have no choice but to accept that the enchanting image of woman we have been experiencing has been doubly deceitful, an illusion created by the husband within the diegesis, and by the director within the theater. For us, this move may be more painful than the death of Madeleine. The death of a romantic heroine - a Juliet, a Camille, a Karenina - does not deprive us of the illusion of transcendent femininity; if anything, it supports that illusion by eliminating the need for the heroine to be answerable to the mundane circumstances of everyday life. That’s precisely the illusion that Hitchcock denies us. He makes sure we know that the appeal of “golden curls” (Madeleine is of course blonde) is illusory, and not only illusory but a figment of the male imagination, a lie told by men to control other men. In
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short, we are made in retrospect to see just how foolish was the pleasure we had taken in the figure of Madeleine. This narrative move wrenches us from Scottie’s position; though we sympathise with him, we can no longer want what he wants. So as he, brutally and blindly, tries to remake Judy into the lost Madeleine, we cannot help but wish that he would leave her alone, that he would accept her for who she is. Because we ourselves have been seduced by Madeleine, we can understand why he would want Madeleine back; because we understand who Judy really is and how she came to be victimised by both men, we see all too clearly how brutal and vicious Scottie’s treatment is of her. Like Hitchcock from the very start, we have been awakened from the dream of Madeleine to the awareness that the promise of golden curls, of a return to pre-lapsarian wholeness, leads to death. Scottie is still pursuing that dream, and we have no choice but to watch him as he follows it to its inevitable tragic conclusion. The peripeteia comes, as it should, after Scottie has “successfully” remade Judy into Madeleine. There is a moment of ecstatic bliss, followed by the obligatory fade out that would have signaled the sex act in 1958. We then fade in to Scottie, reveling in his dreamy post-coital satisfaction, and looking at peace for the first time in the film. But then, just as Adam having eaten from the tree of knowledge recognises that he is naked and feels shame, Scottie notices the necklace that Judy (or Judy as Madeleine) is wearing, and he suddenly understands everything. But of everything that he understands, the most important by far is that there was no Madeleine and that therefore his “love” for her meant nothing. Her death allowed him his love if not hers; the truth deprives him of the very illusion that gave his life meaning. And so he has to cause Judy as Madeleine to be killed because she is the agent, if not the cause, of his anguish. Of course it is Madeleine who has to be killed, not Judy, or - more precisely - what has to be killed is the Madeleine in Judy. To the extent that Judy does not drive Scottie crazy (a colloquial term that turns out to be singularly apt), she is hardly worth killing. To the extent that she promises or proffers Madeleine, she is the siren to be pursued at all costs. To the extent that she can never be Madeleine - no one can be Madeleine - she speaks the impossibility, futility, vanity, of male desire; she is thus the very signifier of male shame, and it is that that has to be killed. The equation that is already there in the very first Hitchcockian montage is finally here brought home to the viewer through a remarkable cinematic rhetoric that, as Mulvey points out, exposes the male viewer or male viewing position as complicit in the violence against women. 7.
Where’s Hitchcock? It has been the burden of this essay to demonstrate the extent to which the pathology called Hitchcock is already inscribed in that version of human history chosen by western civilisation as one of its foundational myths, a history in which one thing - call it sex or call it knowledge, they turn out to be the same - is the source of both good and evil. Still, one may wonder whether Hitchcock was aware of this pathology or simply a victim
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of it. Here Hitchcock’s famous cameo appearances may suggest some answers since they often serve as a kind of meta-textual commentary on the films’ drama. His Psycho cameo is singularly revealing in this respect. The second sequence in Psycho takes place in the real estate office where Marion Crane (Janet Leigh) works and ends with her being asked to deposit forty thousand dollars in the bank, money that she then steals, setting the plot in motion. The money comes from a man named Cassidy who is depicted as the archetypal male chauvinist, arrogant and insensitive. He’s also a hypocrite, on the one hand protective of the wellbeing of his daughter, who’s about to be married, and, on the other, eager to exploit the vulnerable sexuality of Marion, another young woman who wants to be married. He simultaneously supports and violates the institution of marriage when it serves his own interests. He is, in short, a virtual poster-boy for the worst contradictions of patriarchy. The full implications of this contradiction become apparent when, as the film’s image track follows Marion on her trip out of town with the stolen money, the soundtrack provides us with a conversation between her boss and Cassidy about the money that has by this time been discovered to be missing. In this conversation, Cassidy says that he’ll have the money back from her and that “if any of it is missing I’ll replace it with her fine soft flesh . . . she sat there while I dumped it out; never even looked at it.” It doesn’t take much stretching to read the first half of this as analogous to the Genesis story in which the woman’s flesh is seen as what the man is missing; it takes less stretching than that to see the second part of it in explicit sexual terms as the fury born of a man’s post-coital depression with an underlying pattern of male desire, male climax, male rage. Though this conversation is, arguably, just Marion’s fantasy of what must be happening in her absence, the movie certainly invites us to share Marion’s insight into the kind of man Cassidy is - the sort of man that Marion, the beautiful Hitchcock blonde, has no doubt encountered all too many times before. Viewed in this way Cassidy becomes the perfect exemplar of the contradiction embodied in the first two shots of The Lodger; Marion embodies the promise of “tonight golden curls” and thereby ends up the object of male murderous rage. What makes Hitchcock’s cameo especially striking is that in it he wears the same ten-gallon hat that Cassidy wears. The iconography of the cameo, then, explicitly aligns Hitchcock with Cassidy, an alignment emphasised Hitchcock’s casting his own daughter, Pat, in the part of Marion’s co-worker, a very “plain” young woman who appeals neither to Cassidy nor to the audience. Hitchcock’s camera, like Cassidy, is free to enjoy Marion’s sexuality and then kill her, while protecting his own daughter from either the male gaze or male rage. Cassidy, then, is a kind of doppelgänger for Hitchcock himself, the character who manifests an evil only latent in the filmmaker. But, in explicitly identifying himself with Cassidy, Hitchcock shows us - using the devices of pure cinema - that he is on to Cassidy, that he knows what kind of man Cassidy is, and that he knows that he himself is also, in part, such a man. There is, though, the crucial difference that, unlike Cassidy,
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Hitchcock is aware of this evil, this tree of sexual knowledge that is both good and bad, and that provides a knowledge of the most exquisite of human experiences and - for the same reasons - the most awful. From the very start, Hitchcock has known and explored what the bible’s myth of creation suggests, that the desire for the eternal feminine will inevitably take the form of sexual knowledge, that this knowledge will always be knowledge of incompleteness and mortality, and that the result of this knowledge will be guilt and pain. Like the bible, the Hitchcock oeuvre shows not only that but how it is that good and evil, at least one crucial version of good and evil, are not opposites but inescapably reciprocal versions of each other, and how the world as we know it depends on the presence of both. Of course this world is a patriarchal world, and this dialectic of love and death is a male dialectic. It is difficult to say whether a different sort of world with a different paradigm of knowledge and of sexuality thus of good and evil - is possible; after all, the stories in both Hitchcock and the bible are boys’ stories.
Notes I would like to thank Rachel Yurman and Marty Norden for their expert and invaluable help in the preparation of this essay. 1. Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol, Hitchcock: The First FortyFour Films, trans. Stanley Hochman (New York: Ungar, 1979), 149. 2. Raymond Durgnat, “The Strange Case of Alfred Hitchcock, Part Three,” in Focus on Hitchcock, ed. Albert J. LaValley (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), 91. 3. Richard Schickel, Alfred Hitchcock: Master of Suspense (New York: Winstar Home Entertainment, 1999), videorecording. 4. Rohmer and Chabrol, 25. 5. Robin Wood, Hitchcock’s Films Revisited, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), 67. 6. Ibid., 375. 7. Ibid., 302. 8. Rohmer and Chabrol, 73-74. 9. In what follows all translations of the biblical text are my own. 10. Wood, 67. 11. Charles Barr, Vertigo (London: British Film Institute, 2002), 10.
Natural Evil in the Horror Film: Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds Cynthia Freeland Abstract In this chapter I discuss horror films whose monsters are natural creatures, focusing on Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963). When a bird or a cat is the villain of a horror film, Noël Carroll’s well-known theory of horror does not apply, since natural creatures cannot be monsters in his view. I have argued that horror films offer unique visions of evil. The Birds resists framing within a modern agent-centred conception of evil. Interpretations (including psychoanalytic ones) go wrong by seeking to account for what happens here in terms of just punishment for repressed, now-released desires. But The Birds offers a more profound vision of cosmic structures that are evil or indifferent. By disrupting our sense of the world’s basic nature, this film creates a powerful sense of dread and horror. The universe may not conform to human plans or expectations, including the hope for rational explanation of dire events. Key Words: animals, The Birds, N. Carroll, A. Hitchcock, horror, nature
In this chapter I will discuss the appeal of horror films that locate evil somewhere “out there” in nature. 1 My primary example will be Alfred Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963). We can divide horror films about nature into broad types, “Landscape Horror” and “Creature Horror.” The Birds falls into the second category. In the first group are films that explore places that are uncanny and threatening. They vary from the cold Rockies of The Shining (1980) to the hot prairies of The Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974), and from the dark Maryland woods of The Blair Witch Project (1999) to the fog-bound Jersey mansion of The Others (2001). The actual nature of the place does not seem to matter so much as how the filmmaker depicts and uses it to generate effects of unease and suspense. Nature in these movies becomes creepy and ominous. Such films evoke a feeling that philosopher Noël Carroll has described as “art-dread.” 2 The second type of film, which I turn to here, associates natural evil instead with a specific natural creature or creatures. There are almost endless examples of films that build upon our natural fears and aversions for creepy-crawlies like snakes, insects, flies. Some feature fierce predators such as the various beasts of King Kong (1933), the shark of Jaws (1975), or the giant lizards of Komodo (1999). But in some films the familiar becomes strange, as typically harmless animals like dogs, cats, and birds turn upon us. 3 The Birds is such an instance, since the birds that become monstrous attackers are not pterodactyls or raptors, but harmless
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everyday types like sparrows, chickens, and gulls. Hitchcock said, “I think if the story had involved vultures, or birds of prey, I might not have wanted it. The basic appeal to me is that it had to do with ordinary, everyday birds.” 4 A term that has been used to describe this kind of turnabout, in which the familiar seems strange, is “the uncanny.” Freud developed an account of this notion in discussing certain eerie stories. 5 He used the German term “unheimlich” (“un-home-like”), explaining that the uncanny “is something familiar that has been repressed and then reappears.” 6 I will employ this notion to explore why a film like The Birds is so unnerving. Watching it, we feel strange and displaced; our sense of the world and its basic structures, and our ordinary ways of dividing things into good or evil, become unhinged. 7 Such a feeling is at the core of why the film belongs to the horror genre. To feel we are not at home in the world, or to glimpse the truth that it might be evil in its core, is horrifying. It is challenging for philosophers to explain why horror movies so often present natural creatures as a source of horror. In his 1990 book The Philosophy of Horror, Noël Carroll tried to explain the special, paradoxical pleasure we take in this genre. He proposed that we enjoy following the plot with its quasi-intellectual investigations, even though to do so we must confront things we find unnatural and repulsive: namely, monsters. Carroll defines monsters as entities “whose existence is denied by contemporary science.” 8 To evoke horror, monsters must be threatening, repulsive, and disgusting, typically through being impure or categorially mixed. 9 Audiences withstand repulsive monsters in order to experience the pleasure of the genre, “art horror,” which is primarily grounded in appreciation of plot. However, if a natural creature like a bird or house cat is the villain of a horror film, Carroll’s theory of horror cannot apply. Such creatures are not monsters in his view, because Nature, by definition, cannot be unnatural. Recognising this problem, Carroll is forced to say, for example, that the shark in Jaws is supernatural; it has powers, intelligence, and aims going beyond those of any real shark. It is a demonic creature, not a fish. Perhaps Carroll is right. The frightening plants and animals of many horror films often do have supernatural powers, intentions, and agency. This is true of the accidentally nuclear-altered ants of Them! (1954), the alien seed pods cloning humans in The Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), the dog in Cujo (1983), and the genetically altered, smart giant cockroaches of Mimic (1997). But some creatures in horror films seem ordinary and not supernatural. Must we really say that the gulls in The Birds are demonic and supernatural, like the great white shark in Jaws? This seems to deny the very nature of what makes this movie horrific: that the ordinary things around us could become so threatening. My own account of horror is different from Carroll’s, because I associate the appeal of this genre with its unique way of exploring the nature, effects, and attractions of evil. 10 Horror movies can be interesting because they ponder the nature of evil, tracking how humans confront, conquer, or succumb to it. In discussing art-dread, I have argued that films
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of landscape horror films associate evil with something in Nature in a deep and strange way. 11 They depict a belief or hypothesis that there may be a vague externalised source of cosmic evil “out there” in the world. Signs (2002), for example, uses the sudden crop circles all over our planet as “signs” of an apocalyptic alien invasion associated with the hero’s loss of faith in God. There are also glimpses of cosmic struggle in many films that explore landscape horror: for example, in certain scenes of The Shining and The Blair Witch Project. Other fine examples are in Peter Weir’s two films The Last Wave (1977) and Picnic at Hanging Rock (1975). 12 These films prominently feature Australian aboriginal people and invoke their distinctive picture of the cosmos. The Last Wave in particular presents an awesome, fearful visualisation of a cosmic apocalypse. Many philosophers would hold that fears about strange places reflect “primitive” or animistic thinking (like that of Weir’s aborigines), according to which things in the world presage larger forces of cosmic agency that can become malevolent. But in the twenty-first century, we do not call even the worst disasters of nature, like floods, volcanic eruptions, or horrific diseases, “evil.” Evil requires an agent. Our paradigms of evil now are human-caused events like African slavery or the Holocaust, and the associated human agents such as Simon Legree or Hitler and Eichmann. Thus, for example, political philosopher C. Fred Alford in his 1997 book What Evil Means to Us argues that our modern concept of evil presupposes an assignment of agency and intentionality. He defines evil as “pleasure in hurting and a lack of remorse.” 13 It has not always been so. In her fascinating book Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, Susan Neiman reports that as recently as the 1700s, a natural disaster like the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which killed thousands, was taken to be a paradigm of evil. 14 It posed a challenge that was much discussed by theologians and philosophers, because it threatened the newly rising scientific world-view that was displacing theological conception of the cosmos. Religious authorities argued that the earthquake should be construed as a punishment for evils of various sorts: in particular, for new rationalism, commerce, foreign trade, etc. But rationalistic philosophers like Voltaire explained that it was not a sign of God’s punishment but simply a chance occurrence in nature and, as such, not truly evil. Thus the earthquake served to loosen the grip of dominant religious views, prompting a new account of evil. On the modern conception, evil requires agents who are malevolent, acting with both intentions and knowledge. In sum, before the modern era, natural disasters like plagues, droughts, or earthquakes were seen as evil, but as allowing for certain kinds of explanation. Either they were cases of appropriate divine punishment for human sin, or they were not, in which case the problem of theodicy arose - explaining away their evil as illusion, or explaining its necessity along Leibniz’s lines as contributing to a greater whole. Neiman says that such approaches to natural evil are now dismissed by educated citizens and scholars as ludicrous, even incoherent.
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However, Neiman goes on to show that the modern conception of evil as intentional harming is itself breaking down, undermined by twentieth-century events like the horrors of the Holocaust and nuclear war. Hannah Arendt’s famous treatment of the “banality of evil” in Eichmann in Jerusalem argued that, while Eichmann was clearly responsible for acts resulting in great evils, he did not fulfil the usual requirements for an evildoer; he did not particularly care about results of his deeds, was not an anti-Semite, and did not think of himself as a killer. 15 He was evil but was not malevolent. His evil was ordinary and “banal,” since he was just a man too focused on his own promotions and vanity and not on some sadistic path of evildoing. Arendt says Eichmann was not a monster but a clown. Neiman sees cases like Eichmann’s as increasingly prevalent, exemplified in other twentieth-century diffusions of evil intentions that occur in, say, the Hiroshima atomic bomb or the use of “smart missiles” that create “collateral damage.” We now face a major breakdown of the modern view of evil, since its key elements - knowledge and intentions to harm - are not always present in agents who nevertheless do cause evil results to happen in the world. Given such a breakdown of a long-standing definition of evil, I contend there is ample room for contributions to be made by horror films in particular, those about very diffuse natural evils associated with creatures that seem incapable of having evil intentions, like the birds in Hitchcock’s movie. But we cannot keep open minds about the contribution to be made by a movie like The Birds if we approach it from within the constraints of the modern conception of evil, seeking an interpretation that construes the evil in this film as a punishment or the aim of a malevolent agent. How then can it be construed? Of course, The Birds, like many other Hitchcock films, has been much discussed by scholars. I think that critical analyses have gone wrong by providing reductive accounts of the source of its horror, and, hence, of its deep exploration of evil. 16 This applies to psychoanalytic critics of this film, who tend to posit that the attacking birds in Hitchcock’s movie are an externalised representation of the danger posed to a small community and family by the presence of a sexually transgressive woman. But a psychoanalytic reading that construes the dire effects of bird attacks in the film as justified punishment fits too neatly into the traditional, modern account of good and evil. In doing so, it diffuses the true mystery and power of this film; it explains away what is uncanny. To say that, in effect, Melanie has been “bad” and must be “punished” is simply to fit the film neatly into the ordinary categories of western (patriarchal) theology. I seek instead to remain open to accounts of evil in creature horror movies like The Birds that are more true to their originality of vision, and not dismissive of their depth and ambiguity. The horror genre can challenge both our contemporary adherence to standards of scientific explanation and our assumption that we know how to apply accepted categories of good and evil to our world. Films of natural evil can offer a
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uniquely unsettling vision of an irreducible, inexplicable, and unconquerable evil that lurks out there in nature. 1.
The Birds The plot of The Birds tracks the heroine Melanie Daniels (Tippi Hedren) as she starts a love affair with Mitch Brenner (Rod Taylor), whom she has met in a pet shop in San Francisco. 17 She brings a pair of lovebirds into his home village of Bodega Bay as a birthday gift for his young sister. During Melanie’s visit, bird attacks begin and then rapidly increase in intensity and ferocity. Early on, Melanie is wounded by a gull as she drives a boat back from delivering the birds to Mitch’s sister. In Bodega Bay, Melanie also encounters a possible rival, Annie Hayworth (Suzanne Pleshette), the town’s schoolteacher and Mitch’s former lover. But this rivalry is abruptly ended when the birds kill Annie. Melanie then faces a deeper rivalry with Mitch’s distant cold mother, Lydia (Jessica Tandy), who tells Melanie straight out that she is not sure she likes her. Mrs. Brenner is brittle and neurotic, a lonely widow mired in self-pity. Annie explains to Melanie that the real problem in dealing with Mrs. Brenner is not her jealousy about losing her son’s affection but the fear that he will abandon her if someone proves abler to love him than she herself has. Mitch’s sister Cathy (Veronica Cartwright) attaches herself to Melanie - when she gets sick during one of the bird attacks, it’s Melanie, not Mrs. Brenner, to whom she turns for comfort. In the last scene, Mitch drives slowly away from his mother’s home through unsettling flocks of birds that have massed and are momentarily quiet. But they are restless, waiting only for the inner cue that will send them on the attack once more. The Birds offers no explanation for the sudden predatory attacks by its feathered villains. Films of uncanny horror are often like this, and they also often end negatively with an implied triumph of evil. Whatever the evil is due to, it has not been dispatched or dealt with, only (at best) fled from. The film’s literary source is a short story published in 1952 by Daphne du Maurier, doyenne of twentieth-century female Gothic. (Another du Maurier work, Rebecca, was the basis for one of Hitchcock’s best-known films.) Du Maurier’s story, set in a fishing village in Cornwall, and supposedly based upon accounts of a real-life bird attack, 18 is a chilling and apocalyptic tale imbued with the horror of England’s invasion by enemies in World War II. Significant revisions were made in the transition from du Maurier’s story to Hitchcock’s film - revisions the author reportedly disliked. Hitchcock modified the story in two key ways. First, he switched the locale to northern California and thus set the human/bird conflict within the broader context of American society, downplaying the wartime atmosphere of the original. Second, he altered the protagonists from a husband and wife to a pair of potential lovers, providing for more romantic suspense and a sharp focus on the new character of Melanie, a wealthy blonde socialite. This enabled him to complicate the plot by weaving together two threads, one about what we would now call a dysfunctional family and the other about a romantic triangle.
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The Birds, like other uncanny films, presents a generalised evil of mood or dislocation. 19 We confront a threat with no clear, obvious explanation. Even though the monstrous evil seems localised in the birds, it is not clear that these are true horror film monsters. Rather, they appear to be harbingers of apocalypse, of some darkness or evil that cannot be captured by literary elements like plot and character. The dark or uncanny feeling of the film is created by the medium as a whole. Hitchcock used music, sound, setting, acting, and visual effects to create and sustain an atmosphere of intense dread. First, the film employs striking and memorable visual representations, enabling us to see an evil that cannot be named or dealt with. Vision affords a kind of “proof” or “evidence” of things that cannot be explained or accounted for. For example, in a well-known scene. crows gather a few at a time on the playground equipment at a school behind the unsuspecting heroine, until suddenly we are shown hundreds of them massed ominously together. The sheer massing of birds is a memorable visual spectacle: often here, birds are almost literally piled up on top of one another, restless, waiting, hundreds of them. We observe great flocks of white geese migrating, gulls circling, sparrows twittering, or the crows on the jungle gym. Their massing is “unimaginable,” according to Miss Bundy the ornithologist, who points out that birds of different species never flock together. Nature has become completely unnatural. The bird spectacles are a cinematic tour de force, prompting viewers to shift from fearful suspense into wonder about how on earth this film was made - how were all these birds collected or trained? Are they real? Answers to these questions are interesting: some of the birds were trained and some mechanical; scenes of the crow attacks involved optical printing and combining negatives; in the bedroom scene, the birds were attached to Hedren’s clothing by invisible threads so that they could not fly far away. But knowing the answers doesn’t really diminish the movie’s visual impact. 20 The bird attacks are uncanny because they are so unnatural. Ordinarily birds’ flying is something we envy, offering them grace and a lofty overview. But here, when the camera adopts a bird’s-eye viewpoint, it becomes very ominous. 21 This is especially true after the explosion at the gas station, when our perspective suddenly shifts to an aerial view of the town and the big fire burning below. Gulls swoop suddenly into the frame and out of it; they gradually gather until these circling birds seem ready to bring Armageddon with them down onto earth. Flying in this movie is a source of danger from an unexpected quarter - above our heads, where we don’t usually look. Birds in this movie personify some pervasive force of evil and enmity. Ordinarily, a bird is a small, fragile creature that a human could kill with ease. But here the birds here don’t just fly past; they dive in like missiles, too fast to catch or fight. They shriek and screech like marauders. Their loud cries and flapping wings disorient people, making Cathy physically ill and leaving Mrs. Brenner and Melanie stunned and incapable of action. Judith Halberstam is right to note that much of this film’s power rests upon “fear inspired by noise.” 22 The sound track emphasises eerie
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Melanie Daniels (Tippi Hedren) fights off a feathered foe in The Birds. Copyright ¤ 1963 Universal Pictures. noises; for example, Hitchcock added a low electronic sound in the bedroom scene. 23 Sometimes loud bird cries are juxtaposed with sheer silence when we might expect screaming, and this is also eerie. Some scenes are dominated by an odd whirring sound, others by high-pitched siren-like wailing. The characters hold their heads and try to plug their ears against the assault of noise. We should also consider which birds are involved and who their targets are. Both are quite mundane. The natural becomes unnatural; the known becomes strange. The attackers are neither aliens nor huge predators like eagles and hawks, but ordinary sparrows, swifts, crows, or gulls, suggesting that the threat is everywhere, all around us. Their targets are not just the alleged phallic aggressive/outsider woman Melanie, but also the town’s usual inhabitants: small children, a fisherman, a travelling salesman, Annie the teacher, an old farmer in his house. Of course, gulls and crows are primarily scavengers eating carrion, suggesting that we humans are somehow “dead” or decayed. But these birds seem uninterested in devouring their prey. 24 Rather, their goal is to drive humans away and take possession. Their victory seems assured at the film’s conclusion when the birds are shown sitting or perching densely packed. They shuffle and flutter about, snapping, squawking, quiet but menacing. It is not hard to imagine in the final scene that the crows in the trees are cackling hap-
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pily and the gulls on the ground are jumping for joy. But why do the birds desire to take possession? For what end? We are not told; they just do. 2.
Interpretations It’s almost inevitable that we try to interpret what the birds “mean” in Hitchcock’s film. Though the film offers no explanation for their attacks, every critic wants to explain what the birds are a metaphor for: human female sexual aggression, tribalism v. the nuclear family, communism, the effects of DDT upon the environment, and on and on. David J. Hogan resists such interpretations, writing that, “in truth, The Birds is Hitchcock’s most sustained use of the MacGuffin. The film does not make any literal sense, nor should it have to.” But even he succumbs to offering his own account: “[The movie] is not really concerned with birds at all, but with stupid and complacent human beings. Hitchcock was never more sardonic.” 25 Given the obviousness of the issue of sexuality, it is not surprising that The Birds has been mined to exhausting depths by psychoanalytic interpreters. They have applied, variously, Freud’s theory of paranoia, the associations of gender, gazing, and castration anxiety, and scenarios of punishment for certain kinds of female desire. These are in turn related to the film’s visual logic: its structured exchange of “gazes” or the editing of its shot/reverse shot structure. In most of these readings, a certain message about the theme of aggressive female sexuality predominates. Some psychoanalytic interpretations have become quite extravagant. For example, Halberstam thinks that “the birds very literally represent the power that could potentially be released by the spectacle of different species of women (or different classes or races) flocking together.” 26 In her view, the birds are breaking down structures of heterosexual desire to replace them with a female homosociality. She also refers to the “domestic tranquility” (!) that the birds destroy. Surely this perspective misses many key facts that the movie does more or less assert in what I have called the dysfunctional family subplot. Alternative interpretations construe the birds as representatives of 1960s urban concerns with threats of invasion by new races and lower classes. But this seems unsupported by the film itself. Hence, the birds’ flocking together can be interpreted to represent “the supposed horror of the masses coming together to assault the cozy existence of the middle classes,” in Halberstam’s words. 27 But Bodega Bay in this film is a rundown Portuguese fishing community, featuring no chic boutiques or yacht clubs. It is only what Annie calls “our little hamlet” and “a collection of shacks on a hillside.” It has family houses, an old-fashioned one-room school, a tiny post office and gas station, and one small restaurant that resembles a diner, complete with a resident alcoholic. Even the seemingly well-off Mrs. Brenner runs a poultry business, drives a truck, and worries about mundane matters of chicken feed.
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3.
My View What is finally chilling about the evil in this movie is that it is not defeated. This film does not employ the plot of a tragedy tracking the downfall of a good person brought about by a tragic flaw or mistake (in Greek, hamartia). The family leaves - but to where? We have already seen large flocks of gulls heading toward Santa Rosa. Will they indeed be safe, or are the bird attacks spreading everywhere? At the start of the movie, gulls were massing above San Francisco. We should keep in mind the sheer numbers of birds, handily summarised by the smug ornithologist: “8,650 species in the United States alone, 5 billion 750 million in the U.S. and over 100 billion birds in the five continents.” These figures justify her grim prediction that if the birds massed together, “humans wouldn’t stand a chance.” Thus, this movie ends differently from many other nature-run-amok films like Them! in which the giant ants are ultimately defeated, flamed into oblivion. Whereas that film brought in the military, the FBI, the Department of Agriculture, and the police to wipe out the unnatural ants, here the policeman is baffled and ineffective, and no scientific expertise seems relevant - quite the contrary. The newsman says that a military operation is being considered but that “no decision has yet been made.” The one heroic male in the story, Mitch, urges the townspeople to “do something.” But the best he can do is board up the house and drive away, abandoning it to the birds that wait restlessly for the humans to leave. 4.
The Lovebirds The Birds itself foregrounds one obvious symbol: namely, the lovebirds with which the story opens. Lovebirds typically represent love and sexuality, but here they are also discussed in several scenes that raise issues about being free or caged. While we could work with these themes to propound our own interpretation (and it seems Hitchcock thought of them this way), I think it is wrong to provide a reading of the symbol of the lovebirds in an effort to explain away the uncanny birds in this film. Even if the symbol is effective, I doubt that it alone works so as to reduce the “meaning” of birds here into a clear, straightforward message. Rather, the film’s power resides in its ambiguities and strangeness. For example, we can easily generate quite disjunctive accounts of the film’s ending scene. As the family drives off, they take the lovebirds along, since Cathy pleads “they haven’t done anyone any harm.” On the surface this is true, but their arrival did launch things. Just before birds first swoop down the Brenners’ chimney to attack, Cathy asks “What’s the matter with those lovebirds?” and her mother retorts, “What’s the matter with all the birds?” Their involvement as members of the attacking force is recognised by Mrs. Brenner who then will not keep them in the same room; “They’re birds, aren’t they?” she snaps at Cathy when she pleads to save them. By carrying the caged pair away, the Brenners may be transporting small microbe-like particles of a vast contagious affliction. The lovebirds’ presence hints that there may not be any safe, bird-free, haven.
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On the other hand, we can read the lovebirds as a promise of some kind of hope for love and reconciliation at the movie’s end. This was apparently Hitchcock’s own view, as we can see from this dialogue with François Truffaut: TRUFFAUT: It was very ingenious to have that dialogue in the opening scene in the bird shop about the lovebirds because later on the whole film revolves around hatefilled birds. Throughout the picture the lovebirds were used in various ways to punctuate the irony of the content. HITCHCOCK: Aside from the touches of irony, that was necessary because love is going to survive the whole ordeal. At the end of the picture the little girl asks “Can I take my lovebirds along?” That little couple of lovebirds lends an optimistic note to the theme. TRUFFAUT: They convey a double meaning to several scenes, including one with the mother and another with the schoolteacher. HITCHCOCK: It all goes to show that with a little effort even the world “love” can be made to sound ominous. 28 There is a similar ambiguity in the film’s treatment of issues of sexuality. Events of the plot are triggered by Cathy’s eleventh birthday party, when she receives the lovebirds as a gift from Melanie. This age marks the onset of adolescence or puberty, the emergence of sexuality in a young girl (perhaps assisted as here by a sexually active and pretty older woman). Bird sexuality is used right from the start as a metaphor for that of humans when Mitch tells Melanie, whom he pretends to mistake as a shop girl at the pet store, that he wants a pair of lovebirds but hopes they will not be too demonstrative, given the tender age of the gift’s recipient. Hitchcock’s view that the ending is optimistic, however, suggests the film ends with the hope of sexual fulfilment and familial love. Perhaps we should note that, by the end of the film, it is Mrs. Brenner who comforts the shivering and silent Melanie. Melanie clings to her in the back seat of the car as Mitch drives off slowly so as not to provoke yet another attack from the hordes of birds that surround them. Perhaps the humans have won a kind of victory through their bonding, despite losing their territory. The most important thing to notice about my construals, however, is that they leave out the evil that resides in the birds themselves. We still must try to grapple with this notion and its implications. Readings of the film’s key metaphors of wild and tame will lead to similar ambiguities. Which condition is good, and which evil? This is never made clear. We cannot be sure whether the ending endorses or denounces the birds’ freedom and the humans’ apparent defeat through re-
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striction to the “cage” of their car. The film begins with the scene in the pet store. Mitch asks Melanie if she thinks it is right to keep “having all these poor little innocent creatures locked up in cages.” Early on we learn that he is a lawyer who has seen her in court and thinks she deserved to be put in jail for her prank that led to breaking a plate glass window. Hence, Melanie remarks to Cathy that Mitch thinks that she (Melanie) belongs in a cage. He implies as much when he puts the canary back and remarks, sotto voce, “Back in your gilded cage, Melanie Daniels.” In these scenes, the film strongly hints that Melanie is herself a sort of bird who resembles the bright golden canary she accidentally releases in the pet store. She has inhabited a gilded cage of wealth from which she has tried to escape with her “wild” exploits in a “wild” crowd. Would it really be good for her to be put in a cage? Since Melanie’s “wildness” connects her to the birds, she appears somehow connected to the danger that lurks in the birds. There is truly something uncanny about Melanie, as played by Hedren. She is too wealthy, beautiful, blonde, and self-confident, too adept at driving cars and boats (both of them very fast). She goes after Mitch too self-confidently. Yet despite this evidence of her drive and desire, Hedren’s Melanie has a strange blankness. Like the birds, she is all wildness with no clear aim. In conversation, Melanie sometimes simply gazes back at people like a very pretty empty-headed bird, sometimes tilting her head to the side. Her acting (under Hitchcock’s direction, we presume) intensifies the film’s strangeness. What can we conclude about the virtues of being wild or tame? If Melanie attracts Mitch, will he become tame and move into her cage - so that the couple will resemble the lovebirds? By the film’s end, it appears that humans need to stay in cages, like a house or a car, for protection. 29 The birds are all free, since they appear to have “gone wild” with a kind of driven viciousness. But neither alternative - being tame and caged or being free and wild - seems very desirable. This verdict resists Hitchcock’s remarks to Truffaut about the film’s “optimistic” ending as disingenuous. In emphasising the ambiguities of the film, along with the essential and unexplained strangeness or uncanniness of both Melanie and the birds, I disagree with critics who interpret the birds in this film as a metaphor. In saying that the bird attacks represent a punishment for human stupidity or for female sexual aggression, or that they symbolise white upper-class fear of dark-skinned urban lower-class hordes of invaders, critics in effect seek to rationalise the movie and deny its uncanniness. But The Birds insists on not giving an explanation for what has happened to make the birds attack. These birds are simply and literally an attacking force of nature, monstrous “proof” of an inexplicable evil. In seeing them and what they do, we see “evidence” of nature going awry, not behaving in predictable ways. Even ordinary chickens don’t eat their feed, although as Mrs. Brenner puts it, “chickens are always hungry” and “the chickens don’t seem sick at all - they just won’t eat.” The film presents an extended vision of humans passive in the face of an unexplained evil nature. It shows how humans might respond to such a changed and no longer reliable everyday reality, how they deal with a situation of meaningless at-
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tacks and suffering. How would humans react to this challenge? Well, we can see this in the film. One thing humans do is speculate endlessly. They offer a plurality of explanations: it’s the end of the world, the birds were just after some fish, the children bothered them, they have somehow been confused by a fog bank, they were attracted by the light. It is obvious that none of these is adequate. The British-accented ornithologist avoids speculation and rests her opinion on the authority of her scientific knowledge, declaring positively that Melanie’s report of a bird attack on children is “impossible.” The impossible has happened, yet many people in the film refuse to accept it, since what these birds are doing makes no sense. People in The Birds exhibit a second horror movie response to monstrous evil; they seek help from authorities. But the local police chief is completely impotent and he admits it. The townspeople of Bodega Bay are frustrated that their news is not being reported on more seriously, or that the gravity of their danger is not recognised in the “outside world” which seems to go on indifferently. Mrs. Brenner keeps searching to find news from the outside world by the TV or car radio. It is as if the reality of what they are undergoing must be validated by the authorities, who will then come to provide explanations and solutions. None of this occurs. Melanie is a key link here because her father owns a newspaper; she tries phoning him to persuade him of the truth of her unlikely story. Yet we have already learned that newspaper reporting is not objective; the paper that publicised her Roman escapade did so because it was owned by her father’s rival. Even a strong and wealthy paternal authority figure will not believe you, let alone protect you. Another thing humans do is simply barricade themselves against the threat, thus turning their fear and hostility against one another. In this respect the film shows a scenario surprisingly similar to George Romero’s subsequent classic Night of the Living Dead (1968). Here, too, humans suffer from the unpredictable but relentless attacks of an unexplained and unnatural force. They barricade themselves inside a house and seek to escape in a car. Neither film’s ending is a clear resolution that defeats the monstrous deviations of nature to restore order. There are some significant differences, though. Romero’s vision on the surface at least seems darker. In Night of the Living Dead, the people trapped together in the house have no previous connections, and differences in race or class (plus the plurality of males in the story) create havoc by exacerbating people’s inability to cooperate or trust one another. The family dynamics are far more disastrous; none of the heroes of Romero’s movie escapes. Though this all does sound bleaker, perhaps, than The Birds, we can argue that actually the monstrousness in the later film is less frightening, in part because the zombies are more ludicrous and unrealistic. Their origin is frustratingly unexplained, but they are still less alien to us (they have human form after all). And the main point to notice is that their behaviour has a clear and simple explanation. We know what they want, because humans are their food. They want to eat us. But we just don’t know for sure what the birds “want.” They are mindlessly evil and invincible forces.
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Conclusion A key question about The Birds and other creature horror films is: why they are enjoyable? Since they lack monsters, we cannot invoke Noël Carroll’s hypothesis about what interests us about horror. Recall he thinks that this fundamentally involves monsters, because learning about them and the possibility of confronting them challenges our intellectual comprehension in a pleasurable way. This sort of explanation can’t work if these conditions are frustrated from the start by a film’s lack of a monster and illogical plot. Some interpreters appear to find The Birds satisfying because it narrates a tale of justice exacted in exchange for some kind of evildoing. Perhaps either Melanie, or she and Mitch, or all of the humans in The Birds are somehow “guilty” and in need of the punishment meted out by an impersonal cosmic agent. But I disagree. This kind of approach in effect attempts to rationalise the film's plot. Many psychoanalytic attempts take a similar line, in construing the story as a tale about the revenge of the repressed. However, as described above, I find such attempts misguided; to construe the world-view of the movie in this way is to refuse to entertain seriously its ultimate resistance to logic. Such accounts insist that there is after all some rightness to the cosmic order or scheme of things, but this is something I believe the film itself rejects. Such rejection is central to its uncanniness or mood, and central to what makes the story intriguing. To show this has been my point in reading the film: some films can present a world-view along very bleak lines. Some fascinating cases of natural evil in horror films, like The Birds, fit neither Carroll’s account of monsters as supernatural and repulsive nor the key requirements of the modern conception of evil as described by Alford and Neiman. These horror films do not personalise nature by treating it as a quasi-theological, nor do they represent creatures as agent-like monsters. Rather, they show nature, either in landscapes or in creatures, as creepy, other, inexplicably ominous - and evil. In them it is the cosmos that as a whole is implacably against us in a fundamentally incomprehensible, insoluble way. Perhaps, then, some horror films present a view of evil that might seem strange to us because it is very different from prevailing western legal and moral views, which were shaped by both Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian religious thought. But there have always been alternatives to this western approach, ones that conceive of cosmic good and evil as equal, ever-struggling forces, neither of which is destined to “win out” in the end. I am thinking here for instance of Taoism, Gnosticism, and Zoroastrianism. 30 In these views there is a struggle or a balance of good and evil in the world, symbolised by the Chinese images of yin and yang yoked together. The struggle is not yet finished, as the outcome is never fixed. We can find ideas like this in the western tradition, too. Some religious pictures of Satan approach such a picture, and we can look back to very early Greek philosophers like Heraclitus to find pictures of a world always in flux and precarious, with periodic cosmic conflagrations that
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wipe out humanity and provide a fresh start, another setting for the struggle to occur or the drama to be played out.
Notes 1. I exclude disaster movies about fires and floods, though they are, obviously, not irrelevant; see Stephen Keane, Disaster Movies: The Cinema of Catastrophe (London: Wallflower Press, 2001). 2. See Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror; or, Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: Routledge, 1990). 3. “Creature horror” movies include Willard (1971), Dogs (1976), Ben (1972), The Pack (1977), Night of the Lepus (1972), and many more. 4. François Truffaut, Hitchcock, rev. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 285. 5. Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 121-62. 6. Ibid., 152. 7. I rely here on Curtis Bowman’s analysis of the uncanny using the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger to discuss ontological displacement. See Curtis Bowman, “Heidegger, The Uncanny, and Jacques Tourneur’s Horror Films,” in Dark Thoughts: Philosophic Reflections on Cinematic Horror, ed. Steven Jay Schneider and Daniel Shaw (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 65-83. 8. Carroll, 40. 9. Ibid., 40-41. 10. Cynthia Freeland, The Naked and the Undead: Evil and the Appeal of Horror (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000). 11. Cynthia Freeland, “Horror and Art-Dread,” in The Horror Film, ed. Stephen Prince (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 2004), 189-205. 12. Other movies in this sub-genre are Long Weekend (1978), Don’t Look Now (1973), and A Passage to India (1984). 13. C. Fred Alford, What Evil Means to Us (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997), 21. 14. Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002). 15. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 22, 25, 276-77. 16. See Ken Mogg, “Will and Wilfulness: Recent Commentary on Hitchcock’s The Birds,” Screening the Past, 1 March 2001. . 17. David J. Hogan calls Melanie “the most unprepossessing” of Hitchcock’s heroines and “immaculate to the point of prissiness” but is matched by Mitch’s “stolid dullness.” Hogan also remarks that “The Birds
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lets us know that if Armageddon comes at all, it will come because of our own foolishness. In Hitchcock’s view, the birds revolt because humans have lost touch with reality.” See David J. Hogan, Dark Romance: Sexuality in the Horror Film (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1986), 199, 201. 18. Oddly, some accounts of The Birds still credit the story’s source as stemming from a certain real-life bird attack on the California coast. Hitchcock commented, “Yes, these things do happen from time to time and they’re generally due to a bird disease, a form of rabies” (cited in Truffaut, 286). See also Donald Spoto’s chapter on The Birds in his The Art of Alfred Hitchcock: Fifty Years of His Motion Pictures, 2d ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 1991). 19. See my “Uncanny Horror” in The Naked and the Undead, and “Horror and Art-Dread.” 20. According to Spoto, the technical challenges required three years of preparation and that Ray Berwick was “responsible for training over a thousand gulls and crows.” See Spoto, 329. 21. Hitchcock explained that he used space to compress actions in time. See Truffaut, 292-94. 22. Judith Halberstam, Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Technology of Monsters (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1995), 182. 23. See Truffaut, 297. 24. Halberstam’s statement that the movie is about “the horror of nature becoming nature, (birds becoming predatory)” [emphasis in original] is absurd. It is simply not in the nature of sparrows to be or become predatory. See Halberstam, 127. 25. Hogan, 199. 26. Halberstam, 135. 27. Ibid., 137. 28. Truffaut, 288. 29. Hitchcock pointed out in particular the way Melanie is trapped in the glass cage of the phone booth during the scene where the birds attack and the explosion occurs at the gas station. See Truffaut, 288. 30. Editor’s note: see Mike Frank’s “The Radical Monism of Alfred Hitchcock,” which precedes this chapter.
“The Devil Made Me Do It!”: Representing Evil and Disarticulating Mind/Body in the Supernatural Serial Killer Film Matt Hills and Steven Jay Schneider Abstract In this chapter we explore the changing fictional representations of serial killers and consider the ways that supernatural horror and the serial killer subgenre have been hybridised in Hollywood films such as Shocker (1989), Fallen (1998), and Frailty (2001). We divide supernatural serial killer films into three categories: 1) those featuring “franchise killers” such as Jason Voorhees and Michael Myers; 2) those featuring human killers who return from the grave as supernatural forces, as in Shocker; and 3) those featuring human killers possessed by demons, as in Fallen. We examine representational differences across and within these categories, arguing that such films nevertheless share key properties. Supernatural serial killers are typically “othered” as inhuman and their evil treated as metaphysical rather than psychological. A philosophically “dualist” view of mind/body is consistently expressed in these films, with the killers’ evil “souls” persisting after bodily death and/or leaping from “host” body to body. Key Words: Cartesian dualism, Fallen, Frailty, Friday the 13th, The Frighteners, Halloween, serial killers, Shocker, supernatural forces
The figure of the serial killer, both real and imagined, has become one of the pre-eminent “monsters” of contemporary culture, achieving this status, in Philip Simpson’s words, “largely through textual strategies that relocate the monstrous face behind the human one - the skull fleetingly visible through Norman Bates’s features in the final moments of Psycho.” 1 Representations of the serial killer offer up one potent cultural site where concepts of evil can be articulated and narrativised. 2 The serial killer’s image has, from Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960) onwards, frequently formed part of commercially successful horror/thriller films, both within and beyond what has been termed the “stalker cycle” of 1970s and 80s horror movies. 3 And yet the serial killer’s role in horror fictions has been subject to scholarly controversy. At least one major theorist in the field, Noël Carroll, has defined horror so as to rule out, as bona fide texts of the genre, those fictions dealing with human, existent “monsters”: “for our purposes, “monster” refers to any being not believed to exist now according to contemporary science.” 4 For Carroll, serial killers are not quite genuine horror monsters; they might be thought of as metaphorical monsters - as sci-
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entifically possible, human analogues of supernatural creatures such as the blood-thirsty vampires, hard-to-detect shape-shifters, etc., so familiar to us from nightmares and eras past. Carroll’s stance has occasioned much criticism. Cynthia Freeland, for example, has argued for the need to consider what she terms “realist horror”: [Carroll] seems to see in the psychotic killer a sort of falling away from an essence of horrific monstrousness. So he is forced to discount a film like Psycho as horror . . . because the monster in it is naturalized . . . Yet realist horror is a prevalent and important subgenre of horror. Psycho and Peeping Tom, both released in 1960, initiated a significant shift in the horror genre. They chillingly depicted “ordinary” men who were unable to connect with the reality around them. Due to traumas of childhood and sexual repression, so the story went, they become mad slashers. 5 In this chapter, we want to plot one path through academic approaches to the fictionalised serial killer. Rather than viewing the serial killer as a new monster for our times - akin to Freeland’s “significant shift in the horror genre” argument - or addressing the serial killer as a naturalised monster that fails to live up to the horror genre’s supernatural evils, we want instead to consider a series of texts that confuse the supernatural/realist horror opposition put in place by the likes of Carroll and Freeland. 6 The changing face of evil that concerns us is, therefore, not simply that of the human serial killer who supplants the vampire or shapeshifter. Rather, it is the diegetic hybridisation of serial killer and supernatural force that we want to examine as a further shift in generic sensibility. We will focus on a number of Hollywood films in which the serial killer in question is presented as literally inhuman in one way or another. Examples discussed shall include Angel Heart (1987), Child’s Play (1988), Shocker (1989), The Frighteners (1996), Fallen (1998), and Frailty (2001). Arguably, this manifest eschewing of serial killer representational norms signals a desire to capitalise on and transcend the traditional serial killer narrative. 7 By exploiting audience familiarity with the “realist horror” subgenre, in particular viewer assumptions concerning the naturalistic biology and determinable, if opaque, psychology of the serial murderer, the above-mentioned films serve a variety of purposes. We will hence argue that these films work to: 1) “other” the killer as inhuman and as a force beyond human morality, accountability and social norms; 2) play on fears that the serial killer could be anyone, and that this class of killer might lack any visual or other identifier; and 3) persistently play out a type of popularised Cartesian dualism, in which mind and body are separable, and in which the killer’s evil force or “soul” has an immaterial essence which ultimately betrays its self-identity, de-
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spite occupying a range of embodied “masks.” By dualism, we mean the view, summarised here by Christopher Falzon, “that the human being is composed of two very different kinds of things, an immaterial soul or mind, and a material body . . . In modern thought the best-known proponent of this way of understanding ourselves is Descartes.”8 We are suggesting, then, the supernatural serial killer is represented in somewhat contradictory and dualistic ways in these films. Supernatural killers both threaten to exceed bodily identity - potentially lurking “behind” any seemingly human face - and simultaneously possess transcendent markers of their pure self-identity and evil “soul.” This repeated emphasis on evil as an immaterial force accords with Falzon’s point that “there is no reason on the [philosophically] dualist view why the mind or soul needs to be associated with any body at all, why it should not be able to wander around in a completely disembodied form,” 9 or why it should not be able to jump from body to body. We will proceed by laying out a basic taxonomy of the “supernatural serial killer film,” analysing textual patterns across such movies and their mind/body dualist representations of serial killing evil. To date, these films have only infrequently been analysed as a textual class or group. David J. Russell refers in passing to what he terms the “supernatural deviant” horror monster in his own taxonomical genre study, offering the Nightmare on Elm Street and Child’s Play series as examples of films whose “psychokiller monsters . . . actually have supernatural powers.” 10 Similarly, one of us has remarked in an earlier taxonomy of horror monsters on “recent trends in horror cinema [such as] the creative merging of realistic serial killers with demonic, other-worldly forces.” 11 It is hence the purpose of the current discussion to zero in on the body of films to which both Russell and Steven Schneider allude but do not explore in detail. In Philosophy Goes to the Movies, Falzon suggests that “dualism is . . . a fundamental presupposition of the entire genre of ghost movies,” 12 while Mary M. Litch’s Philosophy Through Film similarly notes that Cartesian dualism “fits in most easily with the widespread belief in the possibility of an afterlife.” 13 Yet, by hybridising the serial killer subgenre with supernatural and ghostly elements, the class of films considered in this chapter also draws heavily on dualist assumptions, as we will demonstrate. Killers take on an ability to leap from one body into another, supernaturally changing faces at will, and, as Thomas Morawetz has commented, threatening our cultural equation of self-identity with the face. 14 1. Towards the “Dualist” Supernatural Serial Killer: Mind/ Body and Bodies-as-Masks First, we must call attention to a class of serial killer films that traffic in the supernatural or paranormal but are not the true subject of this study. These are films in which some sort of psychic or telepathic link is established between the protagonist and the killer. Most often this link is cashed out as a form of extra-sensory perception on the protagonist’s part, one that allows for remote visualisations of the killer’s crimes, either before or while they are taking place. Variations on this basic theme can be
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found in several 1970s network TV movies, including Baffled (1972), The Eyes of Charles Sand (1972), and Visions (1972), before it made its way to the big screen in Irvin Kershner’s The Eyes of Laura Mars (1978), scripted by a pre-Halloween John Carpenter and starring Faye Dunaway as a fashion photographer with the uncanny ability to see through the eyes of a killer. Subsequent examples of what ultimately amount to clairvoyant murder mysteries include Double Exposure (1981), Fear (1990), Sensation (1994), Hideaway (1995), After Alice (1999), In Dreams (1999), and The Gift (2000). Although these films are clearly in the realm of the fantastic, they typically centre on the other-worldly powers of the protagonist-hero: powers which simultaneously serve as the antagonist’s Achilles heel, ultimately putting an end to his serial killing ways. The first “legitimate” category of the supernatural serial killer film that we will consider has, to date, been used primarily for its narrative convenience and to allow for sequels. Although audiences may not typically think of Michael Myers and Jason Voorhees as serial killers, if the films in which they appear were instead constructed as mystery/thrillers with an unknown murderer on the loose, then that is very likely how they would be perceived, both within and outside the diegesis. In Halloween (1978), Friday the 13th (1980), and many of their stalker cycle descendents, the main plot device is to grant the serial killing fiend powers that can only be considered superhuman: Michael, Jason, and their brethren stalk and slash young men and women like the most dangerous real-life psychopaths, only with the added bonuses that they are apparently ageless, somehow impossible to outrun, and practically impervious to harm. The apparent indestructibility of such slashers is linked to the seriality of “their” horror franchises, given that these monsters are typically the only recurring element that works to secure a franchise’s identity. 15 Despite the Halloween sequence of films coming to be equated with Michael Myers, or the Friday the 13th franchise with Jason Voorhees, it should be noted that neither Halloween nor Friday the 13th began their initial filmic outings by positing a supernatural serial killer; it is only the ending of each film that moves definitively into the terrain of hybridised realist/supernatural horror, as Michael Myers vanishes despite having been shot from close range, and as the dead/alive Jason Voorhees emerges from Camp Crystal Lake in a shock ending (Jason not actually having been the murderer in the first Friday, as the killer-cum-slasher-film-fanatic in 1996’s Scream famously points out). If not diegetically identified as “serial killers,” Michael and Jason can certainly be thought of as franchise “serialisation killers.” That they are “supernaturalised” predominantly in order to secure and guarantee franchise iterations suggests from the outset that combinations of supernatural/realist horror can operate in a variety of ways. This type of hybridisation hardly operates so as to play with audience expectations of realist horror, nor does it radically rearticulate concepts of evil. Instead, Michael and Jason are both represented as implacable, impersonally masked, and dehumanised forces. They are almost wholly “othered” from
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Jason Vorhees (top) and Michael Myers of the respective Friday the 13th and Halloween film franchises have wreaked havoc on screen for more than a quarter of a century. Copyright ¤ 1980 Paramount Pictures Corp. and ¤ 1978 Falcon International Productions.
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human characters by way of their near-mechanical portrayals and seemingly motiveless repetitions of murder. Mind/body dualism is less central to this type of supernatural serial killer film than the others we will explore later, but even here such dualism begins to appear across the development of these franchises. For example, Jason emerges from his grave sparked back to life - in Friday the 13th: A New Beginning (1985) and develops the ability to transfer his “soul” from body to body in Jason Goes to Hell: The Final Friday (1993). Michael Myers also develops a supernatural back-story of his own, being manipulated and driven to kill by a pagan cult in Halloween 5: The Revenge of Michael Myers (1989) and Halloween 6: The Curse of Michael Myers (1995). Here, serial-killing evil becomes immaterial, either being capable of jumping from body to body or being “possessed” by forces of black magic. In each case, however, such narrative shifts arguably occur primarily in order to sustain the franchises’ iterations. This type of “franchise” supernatural serial killer film links supernatural motifs, whether diegetically, reflexively, or extra-diegetically (i.e., at the level of a franchise’s endurance), to connotations and performances of serialisation itself. The Halloween and Friday the 13th series are perhaps as widely known for their movie counts as for their narratives’ body counts. That is, the seriality and seriousness of victims’ diegetic deaths are partly displaced here by an emphasis on the serialisation of the fictional texts themselves. A “safer” mode of serialisation hence comes to contain or surmount a far more culturally threatening and diegetically represented form of murderous seriality. These film franchises are, of course, well known for the diegetic fact that their supernatural, masked serial killers cannot be conventionally killed by protagonists. As Philip Simpson has argued, this edges such figures closer to folkloric status: The supernatural image of the human/monster hybrid is . . . central to the project of rendering the serial killer into a proper folklore demon. As Lutz Rohrich writes, “in . . . legend the demon is timeless and permanent; it existed before humans and will outlast them. At the legend’s end, the demon can remain a threat to the future” (24-5). Yet in an age where metaphysical evil has been largely dethroned by notions of psychological dysfunction . . . it is not easy to preserve the dark grandeur reserved for folkloric monsters. 16 Although it may be tempting to view films such as Halloween and Friday the 13th as lacking in sophistication when compared to “realist horror,” 17 or even when compared to other types of supernatural serial killer films, we would argue that these texts nevertheless work in ways that are structurally related to their taxonomic relatives. They attempt to engineer “the serial killer into a proper folklore demon” by emphasising their killers’ immortality and metaphysical, if not philosophically dualist,
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transcendence of bodily manifestations. At the same time, they also distinctively re-connote seriality by displacing diegetic body counts with extra-diegetic franchise-entry counts. A second, and more clearly dualist, type of supernatural serial killer narrative emerges in films where the spirit of a deceased killer returns from the grave in a vastly different and distinctly non-human form. In Tom Holland’s Child’s Play (1988), the mind and soul of a justdeparted serial murderer animate the plastic body of a two-foot-tall doll named Chucky. Plausibility is not particularly important for what ensues thereafter, but we learn that Brad Dourif’s human strangler received his doll’s life as a result of taking voodoo lessons from a practitioner of the black arts. After being shot by a cop and left for dead in a toy store, he gathers enough energy to utter a voodoo incantation, after which ominous clouds form in the sky and “magical” lightning strikes the store. Similarly lacking in narrative rationalisation is Wes Craven’s Shocker, released the year after Child’s Play in 1989. Here, a convicted serial killer named Horace Pinker (Mitch Pileggi) is sentenced to die in the electric chair. But instead of killing him outright, the chair somehow transforms Pinker into a high-voltage electronic bogeyman who can zap from body to body, stealing souls along the way in a game of psycho tag. 18 Eventually Pinker is able to float through television sets, a true phantom of the airwaves. The narrative premise of Shocker may seem weak, but Jeffrey Sconce has argued that it is in fact a logic of “transmutable flow” that allows Shocker to make sense to its audiences: “overall, the film follows an incredibly ‘liquid’ narrative logic, one governed by a metaphysics that can effortlessly convert flows of electricity, consciousness, television signals and programming into interchangeable analogues.” Supporting Sconce’s observations, Christopher Falzon uses Shocker to discuss how dualism has been represented in popular movies: “We might be inclined to think of the mind as some kind of energy, perhaps electrical in character, that energises a body . . . That is a view we find . . . in Wes Craven’s Shocker [where] an executed criminal manages to live on after death, as an energy capable of ‘possessing’ bodies.” 19 This type of back-from-the-grave supernatural serial killer film also emphasises shifted connotations of serialisation, but in Shocker, as in Fallen, this is not the serialisation of a successful franchise. It is instead internal to single texts and their diegetic worlds. The realist, human serial killer’s seriality arises solely through the claiming of victims, usually within a pattern that has to be hermeneutically solved and recognised by detectives in order to reveal the method in the killer’s madness. By contrast, this type of supernatural serial killer definitively raises the matter of seriality to a metaphysical level. This serial metaphysics concerns the dualist persistence of the killer’s identity or immaterial soul as he moves from host body to body, with these bodies being treated as thoroughly interchangeable masks for the killer’s enduring evil and self-identity. In this type of films, supernatural serial-killing evil is once again articulated as “folkloric” in its timeless, transcendent, and seemingly omnipotent nature, but it is also viewed as limited and fragile in specific
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ways. Although Horace Pinker can move from body to body, occupying women and a little girl across the narrative’s events, his self-identity is partly preserved at the physical level; each body that Pinker occupies is made to carry his own initially embodied limp. There is thus not a clean and clear separation of body and spirit; Pinker’s bodily weakness is represented as he shifts between otherwise interchangeable, unrelated bodies. Pinker therefore remains physically and visually identifiable as being “within” different host bodies; his body betrays itself semiotically, its limping gait becoming a crucial signifier for those on the killer’s trail. However, via its representations of a philosophically dualist view, Shocker simultaneously literalises the notion that serial killers cannot be visually identified and that anyone, even the most ordinary-looking and ordinary-seeming, outwardly respectable figure, could be an embodiment of inexplicable rage and evil. As J. K. Muir has observed, the “evil Pinker becomes ‘respectable’ by jumping into the bodies of middle-class citizens throughout the film. He is able to use these bodies like suits” to deceive others into assuming his innocence. 20 Pinker often wears others’ bodies as masks to culturally connote respectability and/or innocence, and he therefore possesses authority figures such as a cop and a school football team coach, as well as inhabiting children’s bodies. The contradiction that structures Shocker is that its supernaturalised serial killer is both immediately visually identifiable - when rendered as himself, Pinker is invariably a snarling cliché of violent, gibbering lunacy - and simultaneously interchangeable with markers of embodied cultural respectability, thereby becoming relatively invisible. It is the supernatural aspect of this film narrative that allows it to function in such a way, demarcating evil both as semiotically coded via Pinker’s damaged body and as semiotically masked within the non-self-identity of bodily Others. This form of supernatural serial killer film, along with the next type discussed below, hence fantastically literalises the realist serial killer’s culturally assumed “invisibility.” Both these types of supernatural serial killer film act as global “figurative expressions” where “something which has . . . been presented as just an image in words is then interpreted literally,” to quote Yvonne Leffler. 21 An image of the serial killer’s invisibility or could-be-anyone status is made supernaturally and literally present in films such as Shocker and Fallen, despite the fact that these films can be distinguished according to whether they involve human killers operating supernaturally beyond the grave, as in Shocker, or human killers diegetically possessed by demons, as in Fallen. Richard Tithecott has used and reinforced the serial-killer-asinvisible trope when discussing the realist serial killer: One of his greatest assets is his invisibility. For the serial killer “on the loose” this is what separates him from the average murderer. Invisibility gives him the status of being “lost,” of being threateningly “free.” In an age in which the value of images perhaps exceeds the value of
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words, the search for the serial killer is the search for visual identification rather than explication. 22 This commentary requires partial modification in relation to the supernatural serial killer; here, the killer is sought visually and explication is also sought, although this diegetic explanation occurs at the level of fantastic metaphysics rather than in relation to psychology. Shocker’s protagonists must primarily come to understand Pinker’s modus operandi rather than his psyche, hence foregoing rationalist or materialist worldviews in favour of apprehending the serial killer as a dualist mind/body entity whose immaterial soul or energetic essence can jump from body to body, hence becoming a folkloric monster and a “metaphysical evil” of “dark grandeur,” in Philip Simpson’s words. 23 The metaphysical serialisation of Pinker’s possessed bodies also displaces attention from the human, realist serial killer’s brand of seriality, while preserving connotations of the serial killer’s evil as a transcendent, unbounded, and near-omnipotent force. Pinker’s nemesis and son, Jonathan Parker (Peter Berg), is unable to kill Pinker while he is in another’s body, because by doing so he would simultaneously be claiming an innocent life. Supernatural serial killers of this type hence raise specific moral questions as to how they might be battled; the death penalty is initially shown to be ineffective - Pinker’s escape into another body is partly generated thanks to his “execution” by electrocution - but so too is the notion of then conventionally killing the killer-on-the-loose so as to terminate the threat posed. When thinking about director Wes Craven’s work in the context of humans-turned-supernatural-serial-killers, it is worth recalling that even a film as manifestly fantastic in its premise and effects as A Nightmare on Elm Street (1984) presents us with a dream-inhabiting monster, Freddy Krueger, who began his career as an all-too-human murderer of children. But probably the most convoluted example in this category is Peter Jackson’s The Frighteners, in which Michael J. Fox plays a paranormal investigator, Frank Bannister, who scams haunted homeowners by employing a trio of ghoulish yet harmless spirits. As with Shocker, Christopher Falzon once again uses The Frighteners as an example of the presence of dualist views in many horror movies, suggesting that it too dwells “on the various ways in which an ethereal, spiritual entity might interact with the physical world.” 24 The Frighteners’ Frank Bannister is pressed into action when the Grim Reaper himself, cloaked and armed with a scythe, turns up in town and starts claiming victims. Near the end of the film, we learn that the Reaper is connected to the spirit of an executed serial killer, Johnny Bartlett (Jake Busey). Much is made here of serial killers’ body counts; Frank sees a glowing, supernatural sequence of numbers ghosted on peoples’ foreheads, indicating that the spectral Bartlett and his living accomplice intend to claim these folks as victims. The sequence of this serial killer’s murders is thus represented as pre-ordained or mystically determined, something which the film eventually undermines through Bartlett’s defeat.
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Nevertheless, Bartlett’s victims become entries in what he conceptualises as a competitive tally, as he aims to beat the “scores” of real-life serial killers John Wayne Gacy and Ted Bundy. This extremely black-comedic take on the supernatural serial killer represents Bartlett’s killing from beyond the grave as a continuation of his previous exploits, the implication being that he is compelled to go on murdering as long as other serial killers have attained higher body counts. Serialisation is thereby made the reflexive focus of this film, knowingly converted into a numerical contest carried out between serial killers. The threat and evil of realist horror’s serial killers are once again partly conserved - Bartlett dehumanises his victims as pure numbers in a mathematical sequence - and partly displaced in favour of a re-connoted serialisation, coded as fantastic excess. Rather than utilising the dualist, bodypossessing representations of evil in Shocker, The Frighteners deploys rather more absurdist representations of mind/body dualism, and of evil as parodically competitive, to generically displace the cultural threat of the realist serial killer. As mentioned above, a third species of the supernatural serial killer film can be discerned; the murderer is, diegetically speaking, an actual demon residing in the body of a human subject or series of subjects. In the case of Alan Parker’s Angel Heart, for example, it is seemingly Lucifer himself (played by Robert De Niro) who repeatedly manipulates the murderous actions of Harold Angel (Mickey Rourke). This type of supernatural serial killer film most directly links the figure of the serial killer to a “metaphysical evil” which dualistically, or even theologically, transcends the body. Such a device allows this representational type of serial killer to be wholly othered from human identification, as well as becoming both threateningly “invisible” to those diegetically enforcing the law, and dualistically splitting into possessed body shells and an essential self or “soul/force” that is innately evil. Where realist serial killer films at least make some effort to engage with theories of psychological dysfunction, these films displace psychology with metaphysics. By so doing, they tend to produce a changed face of evil that is actually rather regressive in its dualist and Manichean implications. Regardless of similarities to the previously discussed type, this “demonic” strategy shouldn’t be confused with that of movies like Child’s Play and The Frighteners, in which the original killer is in fact mortal before getting into the possession racket. Perhaps the most prominent example of this third form of supernatural/serial killer hybrid is Fallen, in which a mythical dark angel named Azazel hops dualistically from body to body, murdering and wreaking havoc at will. This reign of terror intensifies when Azazel is freed from the body of a convicted serial killer, Edgar Reese (Elias Koteas), who whistles the Rolling Stones’ song “Time Is On My Side” while awaiting execution. Undoubtedly other examples of this type of supernatural serial killer film could be given and analysed, but we will focus here on a comparison of Fallen and Frailty, which are intriguingly similar in aspects of their narrative structure even while their
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demon-possessed and demon-hunting killers are somewhat differently represented. Fallen poses the same moral question as Shocker via its horrorthriller dualist philosophy: how can a killer be stopped if he is able to jump from possessed body to body? Unlike Shocker, however, Fallen’s cop protagonist John Hobbes (Denzel Washington) is actually induced to kill an innocent man, a schoolteacher who has been inhabited by Azazel for the very purpose of entrapping Hobbes. Yet like Shocker, it is Azazel’s literalised, supernaturally facilitated “invisibility” - his ability to hide behind a multiplicity of bodies used as masks - that exercises Hobbes’s powers of detection. As a demon, Azazel does not offer up any visual self-identification through the bodies that it occupies. It is possibly this lack of any visual signifier of the demon’s presence that causes director Gregory Hoblit to make pervasive use of subjective, “demon’s-eye” POV camera shots. These green-tinged, stretched, and distorted images are interspersed throughout the film, confirming the diegetic appearance of Azazel for the viewer. This high frequency of monstrous, subjective POV shots also links Fallen to the conventional stalker film, representing its protagonists as almost continuously under threat and as objectified by the supernatural serial killer. Lacking any visual signifier of self while possessing a human body, Azazel instead tauntingly makes its presence known to Hobbes by repeating the tune that Reese had been obsessed with, the all-tooappropriate “Time Is On My Side.” This melody and its lyrics come to exemplify what Yvonne Leffler has termed “context-dependent signals which anticipate something specific because they are repeated in connection with a specific phenomenon or occurrence.”25 Such anticipatory repetitions cue Hobbes and the audience to the appearance of Azazel, the tune’s meaning also being appropriated and varied when, late in the movie, Hobbes himself offers up a rendition. Fallen is a film told in flashback, with voice-over narration from Denzel Washington. As such, it works to suture its audience into identification with Hobbes; although we share a privileged vision of Azazel’s POV, we are positioned with Hobbes in his struggle to make sense of the demon’s modus operandi. Azazel’s movements from body to body occur by touch, and lack the visual signifiers of body-swapping that are given in Shocker via its use of “electrical” sparking. As Tanya Krzywinska has written, Azazel “moves through people at a rapid rate . . . they are in a sense his mode of transport as well as being his prosthetic tools.” 26 Fallen makes pronounced use of camera movement and character movement within the frame to convey Azazel’s body-jumping, with the camera following the movement of one character that we suppose contains Azazel before markedly shifting direction and focalisation to immediately track a new host body. One bravura sequence also has Hobbes being taunted by a whirl of different Azazel-bodies as crowds of people jostle and bump into one another on the street. Another sequence takes the notion of a series of possessed bodies to its most excessively literalised and visualised point by having Azazel “jump” along a line of people, each of whom passes the
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demon on by reaching out to touch the person in front of them. This demon-tag is spatially oriented, via continuity editing, from left to right, almost as if the viewer is reading a sentence of demonic body-swaps. Filmically, then, Fallen is a formal meditation on the supernatural and dualistic serialisation of interchangeable bodies, its literalising focus on Azazel’s ability to be anyone, free and “invisible,” being repeatedly brought home to the viewer. It achieves this “figurative expression” far more forcefully and artfully than Shocker, partly through its withholding of external, visual signifiers of Azazel such that the serial killer’s evil is less obviously semiotically coded and rather more masked. Fallen, along with variant supernatural serial killer films like Shocker and Jason Goes to Hell: The Final Friday, works by playing on the anxieties that haunt popular dualistic philosophy. For, if the body and mind can be disarticulated, then although our “soul” may reassuringly persist, the dark side of this viewpoint is that our own bodies could also be invaded and lost to our spiritual control. As Stanley Cavell has written, “Horror is the title I am giving to the perception of the precariousness of human identity, to the perception that it may be lost or invaded, that we may be, or become, something other than we are.” 27 Fallen promotes its thematic focus on dualism and the insecurity of embodied identity to the level of its framing narrative. We assume that the voice that begins and continues the film’s voice-over - seemingly looking back on the film’s events, as these are given in flashback - is that of Hobbes, but by the film’s conclusion, this same voice belongs to Hobbespossessed-by-Azazel. The staunchly moral and incorruptible detective figure is not only defeated by this demon, he is ultimately invaded and commandeered by it. Through this twist, recognisable moral coordinates are thrown out of alignment, and so too is the film’s semiotic order and legibility, for if Hobbes begins the backwards-looking narration, then how can Azazel conclude it? And whose voice is it that carries us through the narrative? Are we identifying with John Hobbes the good man, or AzazelHobbes the hidden demon that destroys people’s lives as a kind of game? By the film’s end, character identity cannot be safely recognised and secured by the viewer, just as Azazel cannot be recognised by Hobbes. The cop’s defeat is thus also, in a sense, the viewer’s defeat. Both he and we have fallen into an interpretative failure where evil is represented as thoroughly omnipotent and transcendent, and where human self-identity cannot be made legible, having been overwritten and made something other than it is by demonic forces of pure evil. Bill Paxton’s Frailty also concerns the tracking of demons that dualistically invade and possess human bodies. This time, the story we are told is that of the Meiks family who are seemingly assigned a divine task. The father and head of the family (Paxton) receives a message from God telling him that he and his two sons, Adam and Fenton Meiks (Jeremy Sumpter and Matt O’Leary), are to act as God’s hands, systematically locating and destroying demons that exist in human form. One son, Adam, accepts and assists his father’s task, while Fenton assumes that his father must have gone mad. The same moral question framed by Shocker and
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Fallen thus returns: are the family members actually killing innocent people or are they terminating demons? And how can they, or we, tell the Manichean difference? Unlike Shocker and Fallen, Frailty acts for much of its running time as an exercise in what Tzvetan Todorov calls “the fantastic”; that is, the film obliges its audience to “hesitate between a natural and supernatural explanation of the events” depicted. 28 We are not given enough narrative information to be able to determine whether the family’s quest is a divinely sponsored mission, or mad and murderous folly. This ambiguity is maintained since, unlike Shocker and Fallen, we are given neither objective-camera indications of a monstrous presence (as in Shocker) nor subjective POV shots to confirm the existence of demonic entities (as in Fallen). Instead, until the film’s near-conclusion, whenever the father lays his hands on a “demon,” supposedly seeing its sinfulness and evil, all that the audience witnesses is a reaction shot in which Meiks Sr. convulses manically, intercut with the demon’s, or victim’s, fearful face. Where we would expect to be shown a flashback - or a supernatural vision rendered filmically in over-exposed brightness to conventionally connote “second/divine sight” - in order to corroborate the existence of a demon, we are pointedly deprived of any such device. Given this problem of filmic evidence, the disagreement between Adam and Fenton over their father’s sanity thus dialectically dramatises the audience’s hesitation. Of all the films considered here, Frailty arguably holds out the most radical possibilities for unsettling Manichean oppositions between “good,” “innocent” people and the “dark grandeur” of “transcendent,” folkloric evil demons as supernatural serial killers. Even more so than Fallen, Frailty holds out the possibility of entirely disrupting semiotic and cultural legibilities of good/evil such that it becomes, at least for a time, unclear whether we are being asked to identify with a father-son team of realist serial killers or with a divine mission to unfailingly apprehend demons responsible for crimes of murder and child molestation. Structurally echoing Fallen, Frailty too is told in flashback and with accompanying voice-over narration, this time supposedly from a grown-up Fenton (Matthew McConaughey). Offering a more developed present-tense framing narrative than Fallen, Frailty depicts a character identifying himself as Fenton visiting FBI Agent Wesley Doyle (Powers Boothe) to tell the tale of his brother’s family mission as the God’s Hand Killer. Again, the narrator’s identity and account are shown to be unreliable. The character we are led to assume is Fenton as an adult, especially through the way that the voice-over interacts with what we are shown in flashback sequences, is finally revealed to be the adult Adam who is himself a supernatural serial killer. By the film’s conclusion, Adam is confirmed as having the “gift” of divine sight; he knows that Agent Doyle has murdered his mother, something that he could not be aware of other than through supernatural means. Furthermore, Adam’s face does not show up on CCTV cameras, and we are also finally presented with an objectivecamera flashback sequence that records the crimes of the first two demons killed by Meiks Sr.
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Despite a raft of structural similarities, this twist ending acts in an inverse manner to the ending of Fallen. Whereas the interchangeability of Hobbes and Azazel problematises the audience’s ability to recognise and identify man and demon, good and evil, the substitution of Adam for Fenton, and Frailty’s eventual resolution into a tale of demon-hunting, works to reinforce the opposite conclusion. Here, a divine order can legibly separate out man and demon, while God and his agents can omnisciently observe otherwise unseen crimes. The final scene which reveals Adam as a Sheriff is thus a dark joke of sorts, since it is his character, rather than FBI Agent Doyle, whom the film finally nominates as a moral arbiter, legislator, and dispatcher of ultimate justice. Frailty’s long-held refusal to grant its characters and audience a firm set of moral coordinates thus appears to collapse, at the last, into exactly that which has been held off and denied for most of the movie, as if the ambiguity created by the film has become too culturally threatening. The serialisation of killings that is here represented by means of lists of names - pre-ordained rather like the sequence of numbers mystically appearing to Frank in The Frighteners - is thus diegetically justified via theological means, and contained via notions of divine order. Only demons are killed, not innocent humans, with the possible exception of Fenton’s presumably mistaken killing of his father. The fantasy of dualist transcendence that is offered here is not one of demons moving from body to body, free and invisible. This film is less concerned with fantastically literalising the serial killer’s anonymous, could-be-anyone status, and more interested in mediating a divinely omnipotent order that transcends ordinary human knowledge. Once again, awkward questions of the realist serial killer’s psychology are gestured towards but displaced in favour of a narrative puzzle or Barthesian “hermeneutic code” that deals with the killer’s modus operandi and metaphysical explication in place of psychological investigation. These killers, Meiks Sr. and Adam, operate as specific, supernaturalised - if not theologised - versions of the “depsychologised subject.” 29 2.
Conclusion We have argued in this chapter that the supernatural serial killer film draws on a popularised dualist or Cartesian philosophy. Serial killers are repeatedly and diegetically represented as forces of supernaturalised, pure evil that can persist after bodily death, and/or move from body to body. Alternatively, these killers are immaterial, demonic “souls” who lurk behind disposable bodily “masks” and so invade human characters. Evil is rendered as metaphysical and folkloric via narrative devices such as Godly lists, mystical numerical sequences, and possessed bodies. In so clearly conflating the real with the fantastic, the films in question serve to detach cinematic serial killers from their real-life counterparts, thereby negating one of the genre’s most interesting and provocative features: namely, the manner in which fictional and non-fictional serial killer texts “feed off each other in such a way that they become indistinguishable from each other in the public imagination.” 30 One need only consider the early 2000s wave of serial killer biopics, including Ed Gein
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(2000), Dahmer (2002), Ted Bundy (2002), Nightstalker (2002; about Richard Ramirez), The Crawl Space (2003; about John Wayne Gacy), and Monster (2003; about Aileen Wuornos). Amongst other things, metaphysical serialisation acts to displace the more culturally threatening and less culturally explicable serialisation of realist and real serial killers’ victims. However, considering the fact that the supernatural serial killer films under discussion here were made between the years 1987 and 2001, it may well be more accurate to label these films a cycle rather than a subgenre. Philip Simpson has identified one “face” of the fictional serial killer as that of demonic messenger or punisher, both of transgressive individuals and civilisations: “The demonic serial killer functions as an agent of a catastrophic form of apocalypse that has lost much of its millennial optimism and instead is characterized by despair.” 31 While Simpson has in mind such relatively realistic serial killer movies as Se7en (1995), Kalifornia (1993), and Natural Born Killers (1994), this face describes the killers of films like Fallen even more accurately, since here the process of demonisation is taken all the way. Yet even while the supernatural serial killer film seems especially geared towards exploiting and intensifying pre-millennial pessimism and anxiety, it also seems capable of comforting us in a way that many other films in the genre, realist horror included, have a much harder time achieving. After all, precisely because the killers in these movies are literally inhuman, they are also literally Other; they are definitely not us. The standard difficulties involved in determining motive in serial killer films are neatly sidestepped, since these murderers are often basically natural born demons. Ultimately, we would suggest that the films in question are an instructive example of what Richard Tithecott has viewed as our culture’s denial of responsibility when it comes to the production of violence in society, a denial symptomatised in extreme form by the coding of the serial killer as a paranormal monster. Of course, this otherwise totalising conclusion needs to be tempered by the recognition that supernatural serial killer films vary within their textual class. We have identified three such variants here: the killer whose supernatural attributes are primarily a way of ensuring franchise iterability; the human-turned-supernatural killer; and the demon-possessed killer. And even within these types, there is also scope for further variation. Some supernatural serial killer films may, like Fallen, less clearly reinforce Manichean separations of good/evil and man/demon, while others - Frailty being a useful case in point - may seem to radically challenge moral co-ordinates and legible notions of good/evil, only to ultimately reproduce what they have previously resisted. Nevertheless, as we have argued, these films generally appear to share at least the following characteristics: 1) they play out a type of popularised Cartesian dualism, in which body and mind can be disarticulated, and in which the killer’s evil force or “soul” represents an immaterial essence of evil; 2) by so doing, they “Other” the killer as inhuman/demonic/ghostly; and 3) by portraying serial killers as a metaphysical evil unlimited by embodied markers of self-identity, these films play on
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cultural anxieties that the figure of the serial killer may indeed be unidentifiable by semiotic means, and could appear to be, on the face of it, perfectly normal.
Notes 1. Philip Simpson, Psycho Paths: Tracking the Serial Killer Through Contemporary American Film and Fiction (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 2000), 3. 2. See Philip Jenkins, Using Murder: The Social Construction of Serial Homicide (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1994), especially Chapter 4; Elana Gomel, Bloodscripts: Writing the Violent Subject (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 2003), Chapter 2. 3. See Vera Dika, Games of Terror (Toronto: Associated Univ. Presses, 1990); and Vera Dika, Recycled Culture in Contemporary Art and Film: The Uses of Nostalgia (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), 207-15. 4. Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror; or, Paradoxes of the Heart (New York: Routledge, 1990), 27. 5. Cynthia Freeland, “Realist Horror,” in Philosophy and Film, ed. Cynthia Freeland and Thomas E. Wartenberg (New York: Routledge, 1995), 127-28. See also Cynthia Freeland, The Naked and the Undead: Evil and the Appeal of Horror (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000), 161-90. 6. For a related argument, see Deborah Knight and George McKnight, “American Psycho: Horror, Satire, Aesthetics, and Identification,” in Dark Thoughts: Philosophic Reflections on Cinematic Horror, ed. Steven Jay Schneider and Daniel Shaw (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 212-29. 7. Although it should be noted that this process can also occur without recourse to supernatural serial killers, as arguably happens in American Psycho (2000). See Knight and McKnight; and Sarah Cardwell, “American Psycho: Serial Killer Film?” Film Studies: An International Review 3 (2002): 730-84. Editor’s note: see also Matthew Soar’s “The Bite at the Beginning,” included in this volume. 8. Christopher Falzon, Philosophy Goes to the Movies (New York: Routledge, 2002), 60-61. 9. Falzon, 62. 10. David J. Russell, “Monster Round-Up: Reintegrating the Horror Genre,” in Refiguring American Film Genres, ed. Nick Browne (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1998), 249. 11. Steven Jay Schneider, “Monsters as (Uncanny) Metaphors: Freud, Lakoff, and the Representation of Monstrosity in Cinematic Horror,” in Horror Film Reader, ed. Alain Silver and James Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 2000), 176. 12. Falzon, 62.
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13. Mary M. Litch, Philosophy Through Film (New York: Routledge, 2002), 79. See also Ilkka Mäyrä, Demonic Texts and Textual Demons: The Demonic Tradition, the Self and Popular Culture (Tampere: Univ. of Tampere Press, 1999), 47. 14. See Thomas Morawetz, Making Faces, Playing God: Identity and the Art of Transformational Makeup (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 2001), 5, 47-76. 15. Paul Budra, “Recurrent Monsters: Why Freddy, Michael and Jason Keep Coming Back,” in Part Two: Reflections on the Sequel, ed. Paul Budra and Betty A. Schellenberg (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1998), 195. 16. Simpson, 3. 17. For an examination of this type of argument, see Jeffrey Sconce, “Spectacles of Death: Identification, Reflexivity, and Contemporary Horror,” in Film Theory Goes to the Movies, ed. Jim Collins, Hilary Radner, and Ava Preacher Collins (New York: Routledge, 1993), 103-19. 18. This anticipates later variants like Fallen (1998) and itself follows such sci-fi/horror hybrids as The Thing (1982) and The Hidden (1987), in both of which aliens are capable of moving between and “possessing” human host bodies. See Brian J. Robb, Screams and Nightmares: The Films of Wes Craven. London: Titan Books, 1998), 137-38. 19. Jeffrey Sconce, Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2000), 199; Falzon, 65. 20. J. K. Muir, Wes Craven: The Art of Horror (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1998), 155. 21. Yvonne Leffler, Horror as Pleasure: The Aesthetics of Horror Fiction (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 2000), 183-84. 22. Richard Tithecott, Of Men and Monsters: Jeffrey Dahmer and the Construction of the Serial Killer (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 5-6. 23. Simpson, 3. 24. Falzon, 62-63. 25. Leffler, 190. 26. Tanya Krzywinska, “Demon Daddies: Gender, Ecstasy and Terror in the Possession Film,” in Silver and Ursini, 263. 27. Stanley Cavell cited in Stephen Mulhall, On Film (New York: Routledge, 2002), 17-18. 28. Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1975), 33. 29. Roland Barthes, S/Z (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974), 19; Mark Seltzer, Serial Killers: Death and Life in America’s Wound Culture (New York: Routledge, 1998), 159. 30. D’Cruz cited in Simpson, xiv. 31. Simpson, 24.
Virtue, Vice, and the Harry Potter Universe Thomas Hibbs Abstract As Andrew Delbanco has observed, our society suffers from an impoverished moral vocabulary and lack of compelling and complex narratives about good and evil. The attendant cultural vacuum is especially problematic for our youth, who suffer an atrophying of the moral imagination. In the place of fertile, complex, and hopeful stories about the battle in the human soul between good and evil, there are tales that make goodness simplistic and evil complex and alluring. Indeed, strains of nihilism have become particularly pronounced in film, TV, and popular music. Young persons are thus deprived of a vocabulary, a stock of images and stories that could inspire and guide them in light of which to conceive their own lives and imagine their futures. The Harry Potter books and films, however, constitute a powerful countervailing force in the culture of American youth. In Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone (2001), we find a rich depiction of the battle between good and evil, one that captures both the surface allure of evil and its ultimate banality. It also depicts goodness in terms of a shared appreciation of a set of virtues. Key Words: Cape Fear, Harry Potter books and films, Lord of the Rings, morality, F. Nietzsche, J. Rowling, September 11, Silence of the Lambs, J. Tolkien, youth
On the topic of evil in contemporary culture, the historian and cultural critic Andrew Delbanco has written that “a gulf has opened up in our culture between the visibility of evil and the intellectual resources for coping with it . . . The repertoire of evil has never been richer. Yet never have our responses been so weak. We have no language for connecting our inner lives with the horrors that pass before our eyes in the outer world.”1 From the late 1970s well into the 1990s, Hollywood, the dominant shaper of popular culture in America, was preoccupied with demonic anti-heroes who stand beyond good and evil and inspire terror and awe in audiences or just plain entertain them. In the wake of the terrorist atrocities of September 11, Hollywood initially exhibited the sort of self-absorption for which it has become notorious. Various studios pulled or delayed projects now deemed too sensitive for the viewing public; scenes of Spider-Man scaling the Twin Towers in Manhattan were removed from the first Spider-Man film. Hollywood narcissism reached its zenith when director Robert Altman insisted that Hollywood movies must have been the inspiration for the terrorist plots.2 Yet, almost in spite of itself, Hollywood has made significant contributions to our post-September 11 culture. For the year 2002, for example, the biggest
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box office successes included Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers, Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, Spider-Man, the second of the Star Wars prequels - all fantasy films that feature a grand battle between good and evil and that have identifiable heroes and villains. The continuing box office successes of the LOTR trilogy, and the Harry Potter and SpiderMan sequels indicate that there is an appetite amongst American audiences for films that have something to say about the necessity and nobility of fighting evil for the sake of justice. The very popularity of such fantasy films makes certain cultural critics uneasy, however. In The Myth of the American Superhero, John Shelton Lawrence and Robert Jewett argue that the myth of the American superhero, who deploys violence to purge society of easily identifiable evils, permeates our popular culture. Lawrence and Jewett argue that this monomyth embodies a simplistic dualism of good and evil, a naïve faith in human heroes endowed with miraculous powers, and an affirmation of violence as the only effective means of purging society of evil. It also fosters spectator democracy. 3 The worry is that the very popularity of these films, far from being evidence of a healthy appetite amongst Americans, signals an American retreat from the complexities of world politics into the comforts of fantasy, the great temptation of which is to see all opposition to America’s virtuous aims as constituting a demonic other. Delbanco bemoans the fact that, into the cultural vacuum we have created on the topic of good and evil, evil often returns as a “demonized other.”4 Whatever might be the case with the Spider-Man and Star Wars series, the LOTR and Harry Potter films certainly do not lapse into simplistic, dualistic conceptions of good and evil. Although there is a settled consensus about Tolkien’s artistic and ethical success in depicting a cosmic battle between good and evil, some, notably Christians, have voiced reservations about J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series, especially about the role of magic in the books. To my mind, these objections are absurdly wide of the mark and none of the critics that I have encountered gives evidence of having read the books with care.5 In fact, I would argue that Rowling’s series is not only not part of the problem, it is part of the solution to what ails our popular culture, especially our youth culture. In the aftermath of September 11, the books are remarkably timely, offering precisely the sort of lessons and examples young persons need to help them begin to think with imagination and rigor about life in a nation at war with the evil of terrorism. The danger of our popular culture for our youth is not so much that excessively violent films will create a nation of Columbine killers, a thesis that is reductionistic in its assumptions both about culture and human choice. The real danger is the atrophying of the imagination of the young. In the place of fertile, complex, and hopeful stories about the battle in the human soul between good and evil, there are tales that make goodness simplistic and evil complex and alluring. Young persons are thus deprived of a vocabulary, a stock of images and stories in light of which to conceive their own lives and imagine their futures. In a culture where demonic evil is reduced either to a pointy-headed comic-book figure (think
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Jon Lovitz as Satan on Saturday Night Live) or to a sinister but ultimately playful aesthete (think Hannibal Lecter), the Harry Potter films offer a credible figure of diabolical evil: Lord Voldemort, traitor, murderer of Harry’s parents, and Harry’s enduring nemesis. As is true in our world, so too in Harry’s: evil often seems more attractive and complex than goodness. As Voldemort makes clear to Harry, the logical term of the pursuit of evil is a raw will to power: “There is no good and evil; there is only power and those too weak to seek it.” The nihilistic, Nietzschean proclamation of a will to power as the truth about existence presupposes the bankruptcy of all existing moral codes, which are deemed merely conventional, human constructs. The fundamental drive in human life is “to have and to want to have more,”6 as Nietzsche himself put it. “A living being wants above all else to release its strength; life itself is the will to power, and selfpreservation is only one of its indirect and most frequent consequences.”7 Nihilism means that the “highest values devaluate themselves,” that the “aim is lacking,” and the question “‘why?’ finds no answer.”8 In place of the traditional moralities devised by Jews and Christians, Nietzsche proposed the establishment of a new rank ordering of values; indeed, he proposed an endless creation or revaluation of values. We want to restore an “order of rank according to strength.”9 It is a “measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing, the merely apparent character” of the world and “the necessity of lies.”10 This is precisely the insight and strength of will that Voldemort arrogates to himself. On the issue of nihilism and its overcoming, Nietzsche’s thought becomes embroiled in a series of contradictions. He wanted to encourage the spread of nihilism precisely because it would undermine faith in any transcendent standard of good and evil. While the advent of nihilism would further erode the confidence of the many - the petty masses of humanity who follow what Nietzsche called a slave morality - it will embolden the few: the active, rather than the passive, nihilists.11 In society’s confrontation of nihilism, the war of the many against the few, of the resentful levelling instincts of democracy against the aristocratic tastes of the few, can be reversed. The few now see possibilities for the transcendence of the petty codes of the many, for operating beyond good and evil. This position involves a kind of aesthetic self-fashioning, wherein both good and evil, as these are regarded from the perspective of slave morality, become instruments of artistic creation. With his repudiation of any shared, objective standard of good and evil, Nietzsche would seem to have deprived himself of any basis whatsoever for judgment or discrimination. Yet, he insisted upon introducing a new standard, a new rank of higher and lower. The problem is that, after nihilism, any way of life seems equally valuable (and of course equally bankrupt). Nietzsche’s remedy for nihilism would seem to exacerbate the situation, to immerse us more fully in meaninglessness. In the early 1990s, American film witnessed an onslaught of quasi-Nietzschean anti-heroes who stand beyond good and evil; these characters awe, terrify, and entertain those still beholden to conventional
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moral codes. In 1991, The Silence of the Lambs and Martin Scorsese’s remake of Cape Fear featured Nietzschean characters; indeed, in Cape Fear, a film that turns the morality of the original film inside out, the bad guy Cady (Robert De Niro), takes breaks from his crusade of vengeance, which includes maiming, raping, and torturing victims, to read Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra in a public library. Time spent in prison for conviction on rape has made Cady see the arbitrariness of the law; in addition to training himself in the law, he reads philosophy and trains himself physically so that he might “become more than human.” In marked contrast to the 1962 original, Scorsese’s version depicts Cady as a sort of superman who sees what the other characters do not have the courage to face. The original film does not advocate a crude contrast between lawabiding and law-violating. In that film, the Bowden family, which Cady (Robert Mitchum) terrorises, is indeed innocent at the outset, but the father, a lawyer (Gregory Peck), realises that the law is insufficient to protect his family from Cady’s threats. He must therefore go outside the law, indeed to the edge of civilised America, to the sparsely populated coastal town of Cape Fear. At this point, there is some question about whether anyone is on the side of the law. Bowden neutralises Cady but, instead of performing the act of vengeance on his own and thus blurring the line between himself and Cady, he returns him to civilisation and the courts for punishment. By contrast, the remake depicts the Bowden family itself as rife with conflict, animosity, and infidelity. Alternately repulsed and attracted by Cady, Mrs. Bowden (Jessica Lange) wonders aloud, “I’d like to know how strong we are or how weak.” Cady is thus depicted, not as a petty, vengeful coward, but as a sort of prophet of nihilism. The film also ends at Cape Fear but, in a heavily symbolic note, the coastal area is enduring a hurricane. Instead of a return to nature that allows for a reaffirmation of, and return to, the order of law, the remake depicts the truth about nature as a vortex, a swirling sea of disordered passions, an arbitrary and impersonal will to power. The Silence of the Lambs features a more refined aesthete, Hannibal Lecter (Anthony Hopkins), whose cannibalistic ways offend civil society. An ironic contrast runs through the entire film, between, on the one hand, the FBI careerists who presume that evil can be traced and reduced to some sort of psychological or chemical disorder and, on the other, Dr. Lecter, more talented at sizing up serial killers than any of the FBI agents but who transcends any case study. That Lecter should be understood as turning evil into a form of aesthetic self-creation is made palpable in the scene where he is being kept in a makeshift jail and watched by two armed guards. Lecter manages to steal a guard’s nightstick and then uses it to kill the two guards. As he splatters blood, he wields the nightstick in the manner of a symphonic conductor. The musical accompaniment - Bach’s Goldberg Variations - reinforces our sense of Lecter’s superior aesthetic sensibilities. Indeed, the theme of transformation pervades the film, especially in the mysterious symbolism of a serial killer’s trade-
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mark of placing Death’s-head moth pupae in the mouths of his victims. The film’s advertising posters featured these very moths. But Lecter’s embodiment of the amoral will to power leads nowhere, teaches no great lesson, and reveals no deep mystery. The Lecter of Silence terrifies and tantalises in part because we see so little of him. He is on screen for a paltry sum of minutes. Even here, however, the aesthetics of evil cannot sustain its own gravity. Indeed, the modern horror genre can easily succumb to the aesthetics of evil, to a competition between filmmakers to outdo their predecessors or their own films by improving the quality and increasing the quantity of scenes of torture, maiming, murder, and sexual assault. The problem is that the same audience that was once terrified by The Exorcist (1973) or even by The Silence of the Lambs soon becomes jaded and begins to anticipate the surface mechanisms of terror. Thus does the horror genre turn from grave terror to jaded comedy. The Scream trilogy, which makes explicit the rules of the horror film, its sequel and the trilogy, is an apt and instructive spoof of the dramatic and logical trajectory of the modern horror genre, which trivialises evil in direct proportion to its trivialisation of goodness. Such a trajectory is already anticipated in the sardonic ending of The Silence of the Lambs, which depicts a dressed-for-vacation Hannibal in the Bahamas calling Clarice to complement her on solving the serial killer case. When she asks about his plans, he deadpans, “I’m having an old friend for dinner.” For all their ability to wreak havoc, to spread a culture of death (Voldemort’s very name means “death wish”), evildoers in the Potter universe are either pathetic, weak sycophants or malevolent beings who rule through fear, hatred, and preying upon the innocent. Indeed, the very act of attempting to kill the infant Harry (an attack that left Harry with his trademark lightning-bolt scar) backfires on Voldemort, rendering him impotent, barely alive, forced to lead a vicarious life, feeding off and inhabiting the very bodies of others, hoping desperately to regain his power. The attraction and power of evil are present, but evil is never glorified as an end itself; indeed, it is shown to be empty. The world of Harry Potter does not leave us with the banality of goodness and evil; instead, it confirms Hannah Arendt’s thesis that “only the good has depth,” that goodness is fundamentally more captivating and more complex than evil. 12 The plot of the first Harry Potter film hinges upon a philosopher’s stone, a magical source of money, power, and endless life, that is hidden and guarded in Hogwarts, the school for wizards that Harry (Daniel Radcliffe) attends. Harry and his friends, Hermione Granger and Ron Weasley (Emma Watson and Rupert Grint), have strong suspicions that Voldemort is trying to secure the stone to reinvigorate his life and power, which had been depleted in his attempt to murder an infant Harry after having already killed his parents. In the climactic scene, Harry confronts Professor Quirrell (Ian Hart), a stuttering, apparently innocuous professor and secret servant of Voldemort. Quirrell unwraps his turban to reveal a visage emerging from the back of his head: Voldemort’s face. “You see what I’ve become? See what I must do to survive? Live off another. Be a parasite.” Unicorn blood has kept him alive but it cannot provide him with a “body”
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of his own. In an echo of the culminating scene of Star Wars, Voldemort invites Harry to join him. “Together we’ll do extraordinary things,” he promises. The last words recall an early scene in the film, in which Mr. Ollivander (John Hurt), the wand seller in Diagon Alley, helps Harry select a wand suitable to him. They eventually settle on a wand, or rather the wand settles on Harry, since the custom is for the wand to choose its owner, not the reverse. Harry is “destined” for a wand made from the same material out of which Voldemort’s was constructed. The wand seller then tells Harry that he expects great things from Harry, since “He-Who-MustNot-Be-Named did great things - terrible, yes, but great.” Harry repudiates Voldemort’s offer. “Never,” he shouts. Voldemort responds with cynical detachment: “Bravery. Your parents had it, too.” The film touches here upon the complex connection between virtue and power. Earlier in the film, in the forbidden forest, Harry had confronted a dark, hooded creature feeding on the blood of a unicorn. A centaur, Firenze (Ray Fearon), arrives and explains to Harry that the blood of a unicorn can keep someone alive but at a terrible cost. Destroying something so pure allows the attacker to lead only “a half-life, a cursed life.” Here we see evil, not as a demonic other, but, in the Augustinian terms deployed by Delbanco, as “a pocket of nothingness in a good world.” 13 Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, known in the states as Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, not only avoids simple-minded, dualistic conceptions of good and evil, but it also contains a critique of the vices that can attend fantasy. The most powerful guard over the philosopher or sorcerer’s stone is the Mirror of Erised, peering into which reveals to the viewer the “deepest and most desperate desires of our hearts,” as Dumbledore (Richard Harris) explains to Harry, who had managed to discover the Mirror and to see in it an image of his parents smiling happily back at him. Appearing at just the moment when Harry most needs instruction, Dumbledore tells Harry that the “happiest man on Earth would look into the Mirror and see only himself - exactly as he is.” But he proceeds with a grave warning to Harry. The Mirror “gives us neither knowledge or truth,” he says. “Men have wasted away” staring into the Mirror and “gone mad.” He concludes by observing that “it does not do to dwell on dreams and forget to live.” Of course, the ability to dream plays a crucial role in the Potter universe; indeed, it is constitutive of the Potter universe. The film itself begins in a setting designed to introduce us to a world of great mysteries. Late at night, as the music of chimes play, a tall, bearded man in a long cloak appears on a dark, suburban street. The juxtaposition of magical and muggle or non-magical worlds suggests that there are mysteries and adventures in our midst. Some muggles, such as Harry’s relatives, the Dursleys, lack the imaginative sympathy to perceive this magical world. So afflicted are they with a kind of bourgeois pettiness that they are habitually blind to the magical world; when they are forced to confront it, they label it abnormal, dangerous, and evil. The Dursleys are a sort of community of Nietzsche’s “last men,” the pusillanimous individuals whose lives are consumed in the enjoyment of petty pleasures and whose opinions are deter-
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mined by the common herd. If the film invites us to transcend the narrow conventions of good and evil, as folks such as the Dursleys understand it, it does not promote a Nietzschean transcendence of the categories of virtue and vice, of all notions of good and evil. As we have seen, the film repudiates the identification of virtue with sheer power or greatness understood exclusively in terms of the magnitude of one’s control over external events and individuals. This is precisely the sort of control promised by the Philosopher’s Stone, an alchemical stone that can turn base metals into pure gold. It also contains the Elixir of Life, providing immortality to those who consume it. Dumbledore had been saving it for his friend, Nicolas Flamel, who is near death. After Harry’s altercation with Voldemort, in which Voldemort came very close to seizing the stone and thus restoring himself to full power, Dumbledore explains to Harry the reason the stone came to him and not to Quirrell or Voldemort. Dumbledore had set things up so that “only a person who wanted to find the stone - find it but not use it - would be able to get it.” He then pauses, smiles wryly, and adds, “That is one of my more brilliant ideas, and, between you and me, that is saying something.” He tells Harry that the stone is no longer a threat because Dumbledore, after consulting with Flamel, decided to destroy it. In the book, there ensues an explanation from Dumbledore that death is nothing to fear, as least for the “well-organised mind”; instead, it is the “next great adventure.” In fact, it is not death itself, but the disorganisation of our lives, through the inordinate desire for money and utter deathlessness - the two promises of the stone - that we should fear, especially because we have a “knack for choosing” precisely what is “worst” for us. The film preserves none of this philosophical teaching of Dumbledore, although he does frankly and without the least hint of panic admit that the destruction of the stone means that his friend Flamel must soon die. By contrast, in the film, the conversation immediately moves to a consideration of a mystery greater than that concerning the power of the stone or the human desires for money, endless life, and power. There is mystery of why Quirrell’s attack of Harry - at Voldemort’s instigation - failed; indeed, each time Quirrell tried to touch Harry, his hands began to burn. Then, as Harry began to fight back against Quirrell, the fused team of Quirrell and Voldemort burn and disintegrate. Dumbledore explains that what protected Harry was his mother’s love, which is precisely what had repelled Voldemort’s attack on him as an infant, leaving him with his trademark scar. He is and continues to be “the boy who lived,” as the title of the opening chapter of the book proclaims, because of his mother’s love, exemplified in her willingness to “sacrifice herself” for Harry’s sake. “That kind of act leaves a mark,” Dumbledore concludes. Although the Harry Potter stories, in both book and film forms, are always clear about the difference between good and evil, the contrast is never simplistic. There is a spectrum of character types, embodying a host of virtues and vices. Even those who are on the side of good can find themselves tempted by vice, momentarily uncertain whether their path is the right one. So struck is Harry by certain unsettling similarities between
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himself and Voldemort that he begins to doubt his destiny. As he often does in times of trouble, Harry turns to Dumbledore, the wise headmaster at Hogwarts, whose courage and force (he’s repeatedly said to be the only wizard Voldemort fears) remains concealed behind his gentle, avuncular visage. Harry continues to be troubled by the fact that the Sorting Hat, a magical hat that in a public ritual assigns each student to a particular school within Hogwarts, at first wanted to put Harry into Slytherin, the school that produced Voldemort and many of his followers. Harry wonders out loud about the “similarities” between himself and Voldemort. Dumbledore suggests that, in the initial attack, Voldemort must have “transferred some of his powers” to Harry. Aghast, Harry concludes that the “Sorting Hat was right. I should be in Slytherin.” In the film version of this exchange, the musical soundtrack moves back and forth between eerie, nervous notes as Harry speaks and calm, harmonious tones as Dumbledore offers reassuring clarifications. Dumbledore responds calmly, “It’s true, Harry. You possess many of the qualities that Voldemort prized . . . determination, resourcefulness, and, if I may say so, a certain disregard for rules.” To Dumbledore’s question, “Why then did the Sorting Hat place you in Gryffindor?” Harry responds, “Because I asked it to.” A relieved Dumbledore concludes enthusiastically, “Exactly, Harry. Exactly. Which makes you very different from Voldemort. It is not our abilities that show what we truly are. It is our choices.” The film affirms in multiple ways the complex interconnections amongst choice, habit, character, and destiny. Indeed, those who criticise the presence of magic in the books fail to see the way the stories underscore the inherent limitations to magic. Those who stand with the truth will at times find themselves at a disadvantage in their battle against those who believe that the use of any means is justified so long as serves the end of their own aggrandisement and power. But this means that those who fight against dark forces must be ever vigilant in their exercise of the virtues of courage, loyalty, prudence, and justice. It also means that the virtuous must be willing to die in the service of the common good, especially to defend the innocent. The film does a very good job, especially in its culminating scenes, of exhibiting the scale and sophistication of the obstacles facing Ron, Hermione, and Harry as they attempt to solve mysteries and protect the innocent. Before they can gain access to the stone, they must traverse a sort of labyrinth; they must pass a ferocious, huge, three-headed dog, whom Hagrid (Robbie Coltrane) has fondly named Fluffy, then avoid the Devil’s Snare - an intricate web of roots that attempt to strangle any who enter into its trap - and finally pass a life-size chess board, on which loss may mean death. The film captures nicely the way the sheer size of the chessboard characters dwarfs the children; effective use is also made of sound, as in the thunderous crashing of the giant chess pieces, and high and low camera angles, as in the scene where the children plummet into the room beneath Fluffy’s chamber and directly into the grasp of the Devil’s Snare. In the case of Fluffy and the Snare, Hermione’s learning enables the children to outsmart the threatening creatures. The practical
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Hermione Granger, Ron Weasley, and Harry Potter (Emma Watson, Rupert Grint, Daniel Radcliffe) encounter deadly chess pieces in Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone. Copyright © 2001 Warner Bros. relevance of Hermione’s book learning indicates that libraries contain a forgotten wisdom about good and evil and offer a vicarious training for battle against the threats that pervade the adult world. But intellectual training is insufficient and not just because it could, in the wrong hands, be put to evil use. The role of moral, in addition to intellectual, virtue is on display in the various challenges the threesome of Harry, Ron, and Hermione must confront and overcome in their path to finding the stone. In the most striking scene, Ron takes the lead (“I’ll be a knight”) in helping them win the chess match. At a crucial juncture in the competition, Ron realises that the only way for them to win the game is for him to sacrifice the character he’s riding. “Once I make my move, the Queen will take me.” When Harry explains to Hermione that Ron is “going to sacrifice himself,” she screeches, “No, you can’t! There must be another way.” But there is no other way, and, as his chess figure is destroyed, Ron collapses in a heap on the ground. Hermione starts to move toward him but Harry urges her: “Don’t move. Don’t forget - we’re still playing.” Harry then announces the final move of the match and “checkmate.” He now must proceed on his own, without Ron or Hermione’s assistance. When he commends Hermione, she responds, “Me! Books and cleverness. There are more important things - friendship and bravery.” Her response indicates
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that she possesses these virtues and others, such as prudence and even a dose of humility. As if to underscore the importance of the public and communal recognition of virtue, the first film ends with the entire school of Hogwarts gathering for its annual closing academic banquet and the awarding of the House Cup to the school within Hogwarts that has accumulated the most points in a variety of competitions during the year. Dumbledore begins by noting the current score, which has Slytherin comfortably in the lead and Gryffindor at the bottom of the rankings. But then he states that more points to be awarded in light of the recent events at Hogwarts. Hermione receives points for the “cool use of intellect when others were in grave peril”; Ron, for the best played game of chess in the history of the institution; and Harry, for “pure nerve and outstanding courage.” The points given to Gryffindor now place them in a tie with Slytherin for the House Cup. In a sort of democratic affirmation of the multiple contributions to the common good, not all of which can be construed in straightforwardly heroic terms, Dumbledore awards points to Neville Longbottom (Matthew Lewis), the brunt of many jokes and the schoolmate Hermione had to petrify momentarily to keep from coming on the final quest with them. “It takes a great deal of bravery to stand up to your enemies, but a great deal more to stand up to your friends.” While introducing us to the central characters and dramatic contests of the Potter universe, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone also offers compelling accounts of evil and goodness. There is an important lesson here for Hollywood, which will no doubt be eager to mimic the success of the Potter films, a lesson not just about the popularity of magic and fantasy but also about the dangers in Hollywood’s fascination with malevolence and nihilism. The chief dramatic lesson of the Potter films is that evil can be taken seriously only if goodness is, too.
Notes 1. Andrew Delbanco, The Death of Satan: How Americans Have Lost the Sense of Evil (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1995), 3. 2. Associated Press, “Altman Faults Films for Terror,” 17 October 2001. 3. John Shelton Lawrence and Robert Jewett, The Myth of the American Superhero (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2002). 4. Delbanco, 231. 5. For a thoughtful response to these criticisms, see Alan Jacobs, “Harry Potter’s Magic,” First Things: The Journal of Religion, Culture, and Public Life 99 (January 2000): 35-38. 6. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 77.
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7. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. and ed. Marion Faber (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 15. 8 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 9. 9. Ibid, 38. 10. Ibid, 15. 11. Ibid, 17-18. 12. Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, ed. Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove Press, 1978), 251. 13. Delbanco, 231.
Training Day and The Shield: Evil Cops and the Taint of Blackness Robin R. Means Coleman and Jasmine Nicole Cobb Abstract The police detectives of Hollywood’s Training Day (2001) and cable television’s The Shield (2002-), Alonzo Harris and Vic Mackey, represent the newest face of evil in entertainment media. Harris and Mackey are menacing, rough cops who rule their urban beats like the street gangs and criminals who co-exist in the same cement terrain. Training Day and The Shield utilise a discourse that emphasises racial signifiers and class positioning to portray a social environment that justifies the presence of such troublesome policing. Through a critical, cultural analysis of these figures, we explore these sociopolitical themes while expounding upon definitions of evil that begin with describing a war between light and dark, black and white. Our analysis is informed by James McDaniel, St. Augustine, and Nietzsche’s definitions of evil. We argue that, by definition, only the Alonzo Harris characterisation, portrayed by a Black body, in contrast with that of a white Vic Mackey, can be considered truly evil in nature by virtue of his undivided emersion in the “dark” - morally and racially. Key Words: African Americans, Augustine, ethnicity, F. Nietzsche, police, race, The Shield, stereotyping, Training Day, whiteness
1.
Introduction
Racial images in the mass media are infused with color-coded positive and negative moralistic features. -Jannette L. Dates and William Barlow 1 The dawn of the twenty-first century brings with it a new face of evil in entertainment media. This evil comes in the form of a breed of police detectives who are highly corrupted, often motivated by greed rather than by a sense of justice, and murderous. These cops often wreak far greater counts of bloody havoc on the communities they are to serve and protect than these populations would normally witness amongst their own criminal element. They also prey exclusively upon communities that are poor, urban, populated by people of colour (African Americans, Latinos, Asians, Africans), and teetering on the brink of collapse because of disenfranchising sociopolitical issues. Their general lawlessness permits them to take command of and prey upon such gritty, marginalised neighbour-
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hoods with great ease. Additionally, these cops participate in the distribution of illegal drugs, a practice that works to further debilitate the populace. Evil cops, too, know how to work the system; they are adept at exploiting the notion that the justice and legal system, often bound by reelection politics, are ethically compromised to maintain an image of peace-keeping and control, even when none is present. Such cops, then, are a far cry from sunny Mayberry’s charming “peace officers” of The Andy Griffith Show (1960-68) or the straight shooting (literally, and only if they must use a gun), three-piece suit wearing team of Elliot Ness’ Untouchables. Evil cops are not simply “loose cannon” iconoclasts who are willing to compromise the tenets of the law, and even risk their careers, for the more ennobling goal of ridding society of a criminal evil that the justice system seems ill-equipped to handle, as embodied in characters such as Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry, Nick Nolte’s Jack Cates of 48 Hours (1982), and Dennis Franz’s Andy Sipowicz of NYPD Blue (1993-2005). These bad-cop portrayals are also very different from the traditional urban cop portrayals embodied by Jack Vincennes of L.A. Confidential (1997) and Frank Pembleton of the series Homicide: Life on the Street (1993-99), and also from Helen Mirren’s Jane Tennison of Prime Suspect (intermittent since 1991) and Robbie Coltrane’s “Fitz” of Cracker (1993-95). These more commonplace cop characterisations are defined by heroism, yet without hero worship. They are intuitive and skilled, rather than raw and reckless. They all possess a victim-centred desire for justice. This quest for justice, at times in an unjust society where bad guys sometimes win, makes the traditional cop principled and dedicated, human, and notably humane. For the evil cop (and he is always male), his transgressions are far worse than hotheadedness and a quick trigger finger. His inner conflicts are never tied to upholding the principles symbolised by his badge or meting out a “special” form of justice for the most abhorrent amongst us: the pedophile, the child murderer, the serial killer of doting middle-class moms, and the like. Instead, such cops are depicted as utterly vile, with their wickedness heightened by pitiless immorality and the virtual impunity that their badges afford. The police detectives of Hollywood’s Training Day (2001) and cable television’s The Shield (2002-) portray evil, rough cops who rule their urban beats much like the street-gangs and criminals that are represented as co-existing in the same cement terrain. Michael Chiklis is the actor who, until starring in The Shield, was best known as the teddy bear cuddly, amicable police commissioner Tony Scali on the television series The Commish (1991-95). Denzel Washington, whose filmography includes memorable roles in Glory (which earned him an Oscar for best supporting actor), Philadelphia (1993), Malcolm X (1992), and The Hurricane (1999), is one actor who until Training Day did not deviate from the heroic cop with a heart of gold role in films such as The Mighty Quinn (1989), Virtuosity (1995), and Fallen (1998). Together, Chiklis’ and Washington’s celluloid alter egos Vic Mackey and Alonzo Harris, respectively (henceforth, Mackey and Alonzo, as they are identified in their
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roles), are, as Mackey puts it in the premier episode of The Shield, “a different kind of cop.” Indeed, Alonzo and Mackey are different kinds of cops who relish the no-holds-barred torture of criminal suspects, and even innocent witnesses, who require goading to help solve crimes. To illustrate, Alonzo takes great delight in a sort of ad hoc castration of a Black male rape suspect. (Race, it will soon be evidenced, plays an important role in Training Day.) Likewise, Mackey demonstrates how handy he can be with an impossibly thick Los Angeles telephone book against a child abduction suspect. Though a departure from most popular police portrayals, the emergence of the lauded evil cop - Washington was awarded a Best Actor Oscar for Training Day and Chiklis’ performance on The Shield landed him an Emmy - is not entirely unexpected. The long-running Fox reality series Cops (1989-) has been painting a picture of the urban landscape as inherently dangerous, while desensitising television audiences to police brutality for well over a decade. Cops pits “bad boy” criminals, most often the disenfranchised - the poor, addicts, prostitutes, people of colour, who do things like grow marijuana in their backyards, drink too much, and who cannot get along with their girl/boyfriends - against police officers (most often White males) who, “when they come for you,” do things like chase down, tackle, wrestle, and then liberally beat suspects. In his study on media violence, W. James Potter cites research in which the police of Cops are shown being aggressive 51 percent of the time v. 19 percent of the time on the part of the criminals. 2 That Cops does not include any post-arrest narrative on how the cases are adjudicated, be the arrestees set free and/or filing police brutality charges, leaves its audience with the message that the police behaviours, including high-speed chases ending in horrific crashes, are all within the law and warranted. Like Cops, Training Day and The Shield utilise a discourse that emphasises racial signifiers and class positioning to explain the social factors that would allow the rise of such troublesome police. Constructions of the poor and “the coloured” as inherently morally deficient precede the portrayal of the evil cop and thereby justify his excessive use of force. By focusing on and offering a critical, culture analysis of Training Day, and by contrasting it with The Shield, this chapter seeks to explore these sociopolitical themes while expounding upon definitions of evil that begin with describing a war between light and dark, black and white. Specifically, Nietzsche and St. Augustine are used to provide commentary on, with James McDaniel offering a vocabulary for, a portrayal of evil. We argue that, by definition, only the Alonzo Harris characterisation, portrayed by a Black body, in contrast with that of a White Vic Mackey, can be considered truly evil in nature by virtue of undivided emersion in the “dark” - morally and racially. These moral and racial constructions are intrinsically dichotomous, with the evil dark body also suffering from a dark racial body as well. Fundamentally, the argument here is that the authentically evil individual popular today is perpetuated through the “brutal buck” image, a Black male stereotype that, here, 1) constitutes a credibly evil cop, and 2) sustains our social interpretation of (impure)
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black bodies requiring control, and if need be, destruction enacted by (pure) white bodies. 2.
Training Day: “If You’re Black, Get Back” Training Day’s setting is present-day Los Angeles, California. Alonzo Harris has been assigned police officer-turned-detective in training Jake Hoyt (Ethan Hawke), a White male. The film takes place over a single, sun-up-to-sun-down day in the life of the “traditional cop” trainee. Jake quickly discovers that his career and very life are in the hands of a “wolf” who views L.A.’s disenfranchised, and ultimately Jake himself, as sheep to be, at best, herded and, at worst, slaughtered. The existence of a cop like Alonzo in the popular, though repulsive, is highly specious in the real. As the film’s director Antoine Fuqua intimates, “it is not a movie that everyone is going to accept because it’s the truth. It’s a hard reality.” Training Day is offered up within the real-life context of the Rampart Division scandal (subtly referenced in the film) that revealed members of the Los Angeles Police Department had gang affiliations, framed suspects, killed others, stole, dealt drugs, and otherwise engaged in a myriad of serious crimes and misbehaviours. The film is also informed by the similar misdeeds of an LAPD “gang” of officers who called themselves the Oakland Riders. The Riders were a clan of cops that were easily identified by their gang-style tattoos and rolled-up shirt sleeves revealing bulging biceps. The Riders terrorised and reaped the benefits of misconduct until finally being exposed by a rookie informant. In Training Day’s plot line, Alonzo, who often succumbs to fits of rage, beats a Russian mobster to death during a visit to Las Vegas. Alonzo is given one week to compensate the dead mobster’s cronies with one million dollars. Failure to pay means his death. Thus, Alonzo concocts an elaborate scheme to kill his drug lord friend and steal his money to repay the Russians. Alonzo needs the assistance of his trainee, Jake, and it is revealed that for a week prior to their training day together, Alonzo has given careful thought to a plan which entails manipulating Jake to secure his trust and then ensnaring him in a series of crimes that ends, as planned, in the murder of the drug-dealing friend. Unbeknownst to Jake, Alonzo has also planned Jake’s murder. Within the real context of the LAPD, this storyline sounds mundane rather than far-fetched because, additionally, in the real, LAPD officers have been investigated for their involvement in the revenge killing of New York/East Coast rapper the Notorious B.I.G., a.k.a. Biggie Smalls, in retaliation for the murder of California/West Coast rapper Tupac Shakur. Theories have been presented in films and documentaries that focus on members of the LAPD with gang affiliations (the Bloods) as having carried out the murder of the Notorious B.I.G. These scandals supported a rhetoric of Reagan/Bush-era politics that proffered the idea that a different kind of cop was needed in America’s poorer, urban, largely Black and Brown areas that were fraught with crime due to drug territory wars. It was reasoned: who better to contain such threats from spilling into more illustrious neighbourhoods than toughs born from those purported battlefields, or tough outsider cops who
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seemed to come with a set of prejudices and contempt for the communities they were assigned to? If there were skeptics, then George H. W. Bush reminded us of what would happen if the law went soft on just one part of the criminal element; Willie Horton was going to get you. Willie Horton was a dark-skinned African American male who was incarcerated for the lethal stabbing and robbery of a gas station attendant. He served eleven years before he was furloughed from prison on a work-release programme supported by then-presidential candidate Michael Dukakis. While away from the prison, Horton committed another crime, torturing and murdering a man who was waiting for his fiancée to return home. When she finally arrived, hours later, Horton beat and raped the woman, then finally fled the scene in the couple’s vehicle. Bush used the Horton case, and, more importantly, the Horton image - a multitude of Hortons rotating out of a fast-moving revolving door - to strike fear in the hearts of Americans. The campaign implied, “if you don’t vote for me, you will have hundreds of these scary Black men in your neighbourhoods.” The imagination did the rest; Willie Horton was coming to rape and pillage. Big, Black, and brutal, Willie Horton was scarier than Freddie Krueger. The Willie Horton ad campaign drew upon a long-instituted stereotype used to describe the Black male: the brutal buck. D. W. Griffith’s 1915 epic The Birth of a Nation is (dis)credited with being one of the first films to feature the brutal buck, a stereotype associated with the African American male that would forever adversely define Black men in the popular, and in many’s imagination. The brutal buck is depicted as big, black (the darker, the scarier), physically intimidating, and violent. Donald Bogle, author of Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies, and Bucks, presents a seminal analysis of the brutal buck stereotype as it emerged from The Birth of a Nation. Bogle writes that brutal bucks are always big, baadddd niggers, oversexed and savage, violent and frenzied as they lust for white flesh. No greater sin hath any black man . . . Griffith played on the myth of the Negro’s high-powered sexuality, then articulated the great white fear that every black man longs for a white woman . . . Traditionally, certain black males have been drawn to white women because these women are power symbols, an ideal of the oppressor. But Griffith attributed the attraction to an animalism innate in the Negro male . . . Griffith played hard on the bestiality of his black villainous bucks and used it to arouse hatred. 3 Thus, the brutal buck stereotype is characterised by specific, identifiable tropes. The brutal buck is innately savage, animalistic, hypersexual, destructive, and criminal. Alonzo Harris can be defined by this quintet of interrelated dispositions. First, he is innately savage, and this savagery is confirmed in several scenes in the film, where to evidence the depth of Alonzo’s cruelty, children are used as fodder for his barbarism. For example, in one
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scene a schoolgirl is being sexually assaulted in an alley by two men and while Jake rushes to the rescue, Alonzo, annoyed that Jake is taking the time to help the child, passively looks on. Without Alonzo’s backup, Jake endures a beating by the rapists, but in the end he is able to safely send the girl on her way - an act of caring and heroism that would later save Jake’s life, spoil Alonzo’s plan to murder him, and, ultimately, cost Alonzo his own life. Alonzo, unmoved by the girl’s plight, wholly ignores the welfare of the child. In another example, Alonzo dupes Jake into taking part in stealing a cache of money Crips gang members have stashed away in a home occupied by a woman and her young son. Alonzo has little concern for the boy as the child is held at gunpoint, while Alonzo ransacks the house. Later, as Alonzo’s escape from the house is hampered by Crips members alerted to the robbery, Alonzo is inattentive to the presence of the boy as he engages the gang in an explosive gun battle in front the child’s house. This theme of pitiless disregard for children’s lives within the context of warlike cruelty is accentuated when Alonzo, in the home of his mistress, engages in a gun battle with Jake, while Alonzo’s own son, Alonzito, is caught in the crossfire. Alonzo shoots up the home, imperiling his child and thereby forcing Jake to protect the boy. Alonzo, in making his escape from the home, never checks on his son; he simply flees. Second, the brutal buck is associated with animalism. Here the animal allusions are far from subtle in Training Day. Early in the film Alonzo self-identifies as a wolf. He then proceeds to howl, and in a bit of manipulation, teaches Jake how to howl properly - a deep, resonating, fear-inducing howl - as well. Alonzo explains that it takes a wolf to rule (“I’m in charge of this piece”) these streets or what he terms the “jungle” because “they’re all animals” whom Alonzo believes will “kill themselves . . . God willing.” Hence, the streets of L.A. become a wild sans the rules and laws of civil societies. This, then, is a land of the untamed and savage, a land that Alonzo is more apt to conquer and rule over because he is, after all, a predatory and powerful wolf. Alonzo brings this final point home when, having a draining battle with Jake and sustaining a shot in the buttocks (a humiliating “comic negro” scene), Alonzo defiantly spews, “King Kong ain’t got shit on me!” Alonzo overtly declares his innate animalism and insists that he is more animal-like than all the other animals of the “jungle,” where he stakes his claim. Additionally, Training Day features specific manipulation of camera angles when Alonzo is philosophising his approach to the “jungle.” In these instances, the viewer hears Alonzo’s voice but sees only his eyes as they appear in the rear-view mirror. The shots portray Alonzo’s eyes as severed from the rest of his face and create an animal-like, primal stare. Such framing invokes Nietzsche’s “evil eye,” which in On the Genealogy of Morals evidences the “hypnotic gaze of the sinner,” or “the ‘jaundiced eye’ for all activity.” Such an eye, belonging to the “abominable beast,” thrives on all that is ill and loathsome. And when viewers are subjected to these angles, they are also subjected to Alonzo’s view of the world, characterised by “the will to misunderstand suffering” - in this case
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Alonzo Harris (Oscar-winner Denzel Washington) surveys his domain in Training Day. Copyright ¤ 2001 WV Films II. Black/Brown suffering. 4 Alonzo declares his animalistic nature and the cinematography supports the notion. Third, and closely related to such animalism, is the brutal buck’s unchecked sexual desire. In one infamous scene from The Birth of a Nation, a Black brutal buck, Gus (Walter Long), stalks a young White woman, intent on raping her. Gus is predatory and unrestrained in his pursuit, forcing the woman into a horrific suicide plunge off of a cliff. Nearly one hundred years after Gus, the brutal buck’s threat has evolved in popular culture to pose a more wide-ranging danger. As bell hooks has written of the white-dominated mass media’s collective representation of black
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youth culture, “it’s a contemporary remake of Birth of a Nation - only this time we are encouraged to believe it is not just vulnerable white womanhood that risks destruction by black hands, but everyone.” 5 In Training Day, Alonzo is defined not only by his remorseless savagery but also by an equally volcanic sexual identity. In one scene, Alonzo stops by his mistress’ house for a mid-day tryst. He never asks for sex; rather, he expects she be at the ready whenever he stops in. Alonzo’s sexual appetite seems insatiable, as his sexual encounter is depicted as lasting for such a long period that Jake, who is waiting for Alonzo in the living room with Alonzo’s son, eats a meal and watches Alonzito complete a video game and exhaust a television show before eventually falling asleep. They awake to Alonzo emerging from the bedroom, his gun now in hand. The gun remains ominously in the frame, clearly noticeable to his child until Alonzo and Jake prepare to leave. A scene deleted from Training Day’s theatrical release but included as an extra cut on the DVD accentuates the director’s vision of Alonzo Harris as a hypersexual brutal buck. The scene features Alonzo, in the presence of Jake, ogling two young women as they walk down the street. He yells to them, “I’ll lock you up! I’ll give you ten kids!” Here, Alonzo’s “gaze” becomes all the more troublesome when coupled with a contemporary version of the brutal buck stereotype that views Black men’s unchecked libido as the driving force behind many of his problems. On the matter of such a gaze, Liesbet van Zoonen offers, “a core element of Western patriarchal culture is the display of woman as spectacle to be looked at, subjected to the gaze of the (male) audience . . . This common feature of popular and high culture alike . . . suggests that in Western society to be looked at is the fate of women, while looking is reserved to men.” This scene also supports, according to Stuart Hall, a troubling fantasy: that Black men are really better than White men - more endowed, more sexually powerful - read, more masculine. However, Hall observes, “it would be improper and racist to express the . . . sentiment openly; but the fantasy is present all the same” that says that Black men are “aggressive, over-sexed and over-endowed.” Defining the Black male in this manner - as a buck - works to link a specific race’s gender with the aberration of violent hypermasculinity. Thus, according to Sean Nixon, Blackness, Black men’s perceived robust sexuality, and their physical presence are all pathologised. 6 Fourth, brutal bucks are not only savage and animalistic but also destructive. Morally bankrupt, the brutal buck destroys, physically, bodily, and emotionally, all that he comes in contact with, including, eventually and requisitely, himself. Alonzo does quite a bit of physical damage in this single day. He trashes the Crips’ stash house, leaving it in ruins. Bullets riddle Alonzo’s car - a seemingly expensive, fully tricked-out low-rider that completes his pimp persona - as he flees the house. Likewise, Alonzo leaves behind a shot-up neighbourhood. Next, Alonzo, along with a special crew of crooked cops he recruited to help him rob his drug lord friend, takes a chainsaw to his buddy’s kitchen floor to unearth a stash of money. A shootout instigated by Alonzo, too, leaves his mistress’ home damaged
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by gunfire. Bodily, the damage is equally multitudinous. There is a flurry of other destructive behaviours: the castration-by-gun of a rapist in an alley, the paralysing of small-time drug dealer, the murder of his friend, the beating of Jake, and even the purposeful non-lethal shooting of one of his crew to deflect attention away from a murder that is part of the money stealing scheme. Finally, there is also the emotional destruction that Alonzo manifests. There is Jake’s horrid realisation that he has been a pawn in a deadly game. More emotionally taxing for Jake is the realisation that, though he is being used, he must continue to conspire with Alonzo in order to spare his own life. Here, Alonzo is a seductive trickster as he reels Jake in, bonding with him, only to destroy him by calling for the trainee’s murder. Alonzo subjugates Jake in much the same way he abuses and exploits the Bloods gang members, who must suppress their rage and hate for Alonzo because LAPD retribution can bring jail or worse. This intimidation is akin to an icon of terror such as the brutal buck. Nietzsche explains that “the ‘evil’ person evokes fear” and may even be characterised by “power and dangerousness, a certain fearinducing, subtle strength that keeps contempt from surfacing” - even Jake’s contempt, initially. Certainly, one of the things that makes the brutal buck most dreaded is not what he actually does, because the brutal buck most often is not actually afforded the opportunity to rise up and lash out (against Whiteness). Rather, it is the fear of the brutal buck’s violence that is enough to make others dread him and ultimately hunger for his demise. The mere potential for destruction symbolised by the brutal buck intimidates those around him. Indeed, Alonzo produces fear amongst a number of groups and is also savvy enough to dupe Jake, the young “virgin,” “baby nuts” trainee - notably through sexual and phallic disparagement - and thereby keep him under control. Alonzo keeps Jake in check by using his influence as a superior officer and by subjecting Jake to unfamiliar spaces and territory from which Jake needs Alonzo to safely extract him. Alonzo is therefore in accord with Nietzsche’s concept of evil: “Everything that raises an individual above the herd and causes his neighbour to fear him is henceforth called evil.” Through this manipulation - this employing of hierarchy to rise above the herd - Alonzo is able to dominate Jake, not only because he is above Jake, but because Jake accompanies him out of fear. Indeed, Jake is initially simply quite frightened of Alonzo, a man who embraces the thug image (wave cap, black leather, large chain necklaces with medallions, low-rider, and thug talk), is heavily armed, protected by his badge and rank, and easily displays animalistic, criminal, destructive, self-serving behaviours. St. Augustine surmises that evil only affects the unsettled, irresolute individual, “and, even then, the harm done bears witness to the goodness of the natures which suffer, for, unless they were good, they could not suffer the wounds of a lack of goodness.” Because of Alonzo’s evil nature, evidenced by his power and intimidating persona, Jake, as good, suffers not only physically, but emotionally and perhaps even spiritually as well. 7 The terrifying dangerousness that stems from Alonzo’s evil nature is then buttressed by the emotion denied on the part of Alonzo as he
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ignores his son, has little regard for his unseen wife and four children, and as he sexually consumes his mistress with no doting or care. His disaffection renders the citizens as faceless, meaningless objects rather than people who have needs that may stand in the way of his own. In the end, what is known about Alonzo is that he is so destructive that not even his own person is off limits, as he drinks, does drugs, brings financial ruin home, and ultimately, secures his own bloody, fatal defeat. The final typology is far from mutually exclusive from the previous four: brutal bucks are criminally inclined. In the case of Training Day, Alonzo’s whole day is not only criminal but also predicated on earlier felonious activity, putting him at odds with likewise stereotypical Russian gangsters. Alonzo terrorises a group of White youths, holding them at gunpoint, to steal their recently purchased marijuana. Later, he surreptitiously laces the confiscated contraband with PCP and bullies Jake, at gunpoint, into smoking the spiked marijuana. Alonzo partakes of a sixpack of beer and also imbibes in liquor several times during the day. Alonzo is so reckless that he also does an “in the field” pumping of a disabled drug dealer’s stomach by sticking an ink pen down his throat, forcing him to vomit some swallowed drugs. The incident is pure harassment, as Alonzo leaves the drugs and the suspect behind. 3.
The Brutal Buck as Evil Though wholly problematic, the question remains: does the brutal buck truly represent evil? Does a brutal buck figure such as Alonzo necessitate an evil component? James McDaniel in his essay, “Figures of Evil, A Triad of Rhetorical Strategies for Theo-Politics,” argues that the notion of evil is not under the single purview of theology, even though it is a theological construct. Rather, it is also political and complex. McDaniel advises that we should avoid becoming overly reductive in moralising or theologising the struggle between good and evil, as this can result in a world-view that is “at once too narrow and too ambitious to allow for authentically democratic public determination.” In an effort to extend the civic discourse around notions of evil, McDaniel draws on Sartre’s notion of Being and Nothingness as a template, shifting from Sartre’s theorisings of being, such as being-in-itself or being-for-others to theorising around evil: evil-in-itself or evil-for-others. According to McDaniel, such a shift “re-describes Evil rhetorically without sacrificing the option of also redescribing it morally.” Toward re-describing, McDaniel provides a tripartite elaboration of evil, with, “all three rhetorics of evil operat[ing] simultaneously to compose a complex triad.” 8 First, McDaniel observes, there exists “evil-in-itself.” Evil-initself represents supreme deficiency. It exists, but its existence defies reason as it cannot be logicised or rationalised. It is, according to McDaniel, “a mode of desire we rational beings can’t comprehend except in glimpses.” Those who come in contact with and/or approach understanding such evil are thought to be “touched by evil” or corrupted (e.g., as Jake is by Alonzo and as Mackey is by the brutal buck from his trainee days, discussed below). For Jake and Mackey, their proximities to and
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relationships with evil taint both men but do not consume them. Still, few are touched by evil, and what makes evil-in-itself most dangerous is that a failure to understand such evil will make one be ineffective in countering it. McDaniel provides exemplars for such evil, from moral monstrosities such as the character Hannibal Lecter of The Silence of the Lambs (1991) to actual monsters like the Thing in The Thing (1982) or the alien from Alien (1979). These monsters, all, stand out of the reach of good or evil, and beyond such value judgments. They are beyond such reason, McDaniel argues, because they are simultaneously intelligent but unintelligible to us. That which is evil-in-itself cannot be managed because it cannot be approached in comprehensible terms. 9 Alonzo is not a full embodiment of evil-in-itself; nevertheless, some traits are present. He certainly is not a monstrosity beyond reason and understanding, or one that cannot be negotiated with. Rather, Alonzo rests securely within the realm of reason. He is an intelligent, self-serving man facing life-threatening trouble. He has long been a brutal buck (e.g., “you’ve gone too far this time”). However, the level of destruction Alonzo embarks on this day must be co-signed upon by his three White male superiors (a.k.a. the Three Wise Men). Hence, he does not stand outside of the reach of judgment. Alonzo needs some form of approval from these Wise Men before he can complete the largest part of his money heist. The link between evil and taint, however, is clearer. Jake is, at least initially and temporarily, corrupted by Alonzo’s evil. And, like those who are touched by evil (e.g., Clarice Starling by Hannibal Lecter), he can come to understand it. We may conclude that this intimate understanding of evil can lead to evil’s defeat. Evil figures like Lecter often go undefeated, however, because of the more practical, profit-seeking machinations of the film industry. In addition, Lecter lives because he is refined and charismatic, though aberrant. Importantly, he is not ensnared in a double-bind relationship to darkness through race and behaviour. This bind demands Alonzo’s demise but allows similar evil figures to exist for some time. Still, on this day, Alonzo seems to lean a bit toward evil-initself; he cannot be rational or reasoned with because he is motivated by self-preservation and a fear of a more powerful criminal element that he cannot play wolf to. This aspect of his action provides an implicit justification for his actions. Alonzo’s reason or rationale is a self-centred one. He is evil for his own sake; thus he acts with reasons that are not entirely knowable to others. In this way, he is what McDaniel theorises as “evil-for-itself.” This evil is quite the opposite of evil-in-itself in that those that possess it are aware of their evil. Further, such an evil is recognisable and even logical to others, even as it is wicked. Evil-for-itself, in contrast to evil-initself, which is too morally opaque to be reflective and therefore less culpable, may be regarded as far more bodeful due to its purposefulness. Evil-for-itself is rationally reflective about its behaviour and character because there is a sequence of motives that culminate in an ultimately intended deed. For example, when Jake challenges Alonzo about his view that the citizens of L.A. should simply kill each other, Alonzo replies,
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“God willing.” Such evil, then, may be seen as worse than evil-in-itself because, though both cannot be reasoned with effectively, evil-for-itself consciously refuses to participate in reason as it stands too much to gain from having a private form of reason - one that others do not entertain. According to McDaniel, evil’s behaviour as such is “motivated by selfish calculation and greed” (e.g., stealing to cover a murder) via a “disregard for universal ethical principles” and with no “moral injunction.” 10 Standing outside of well-known, “universal” principles, the evilfor-itself persona will assuredly represent an unpopular comportment based on the selfish motivations that accompany evil actions. So, Alonzo spends his day double-dealing and covering the unreasonable plots that he designs because they are primarily self-serving, greedy endeavours. Additionally, unlike evil-in-itself, whose motivations are a symptom of its primal monstrosity, evil-for-itself is born out of increasing unchecked behaviour: “the uncoupling of close communal ties, increasing mobility and intensifying tension among classes,” in McDaniel’s words. 11 Alonzo’s evil is also predicated on the fact that he is a solitary figure. His Las Vegas trouble is his alone. Further, it is necessary for both Alonzo and Jake to find themselves negotiating this day virtually alone. Alonzo, it appears, typically patrols the habitat of his “sheep” by himself and without impunity. The film offers no sense that he rides with a regular partner, and no one restricts or governs his behaviour. The film also supports the import of mobility. Alonzo’s “office” is his car, which affords him immediate access to a wide stretch of his territory in a day. Sans fellowship, Alonzo’s solitude in his evil permits boundlessly destructive behaviours, as evidenced in part by his trip to Las Vegas. He rarely operates in situations that require him to regard others humanely; when he is given the opportunity, as with training Jake, his own motives supersede any concern for others. Finally, according to McDaniel, there is “evil-for-others.” This evil, if it can be concluded that it is evil at all, may be seen in the more traditional cop characterisations. This is an evil fully bound by morality in “a condition of awareness,” and an evil employed when interpreted as being necessary on the behalf of others but not the self. By virtue of this kind of selflessness, and in its service to others, purveyors of this evil possess an activated moral compass, though the exact location of morality is elusive. Unlike evil-in-itself where morality is absent, or in evil-for-itself where such a barometer is willingly ignored, evil-for-others’ behaviours are open to a broad interpretation of what is vile and evil, due to the absence of selfhood. This brand of evil necessarily invokes the views, and consequently, well being, of other individuals. As McDaniel explains, there is a “breakdown of ontological-moral difference on which the judgment of good or evil depends . . . It is an image of progress, though not a pretty one.” It is the absence of this kind of selfless evil that, too, marks Alonzo. He is purely selfish in his motivations. There is no amount of self-doubt about the slippage toward evil that he embraces. In fact, there can be no questioning or negotiating his evil as he chooses to ignore good, that is, or Alonzo cannot slip away from someplace he never rested. 12
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White is Might Good and evil, and the brutal buck, and even Whiteness are necessarily juxtaposed, even as they are part of a co-dependant relationship. That is, evil - the evil of Blackness - is best revealed when set against its opposite. This relationship organises a teleological dichotomy between Jake and Alonzo, where each man’s body portrays his nature, and his nature is a natural effect of his body (Alonzo’s Black body symbolises his evil and is the cause of his evil). To the extent that Alonzo’s harm demonstrates Jake’s goodness, Jake’s impressionability signifies Alonzo predatory, wolf-like wickedness. Jake is not powerful; he is a trainee. Jake is not dangerous. In his subordinate position, he will not challenge Alonzo. Nor is Jake feared; rather, he is trapped in a situation he has no control over and has no cavalry to call upon for help. Therefore, Jake does not comprise Nietzsche’s standard of evil. He is truly good because he is harmed in the way that St. Augustine describes good being affected by evil. Each man’s nature certifies the other individual’s opposing nature. In the end, Alonzo’s evil ensures Jake’s goodness and Whiteness, while Jake’s goodness corroborates Alonzo’s evil and Blackness. It is important to note that the brutal buck is seen as most dangerous when he, the dark wolf, preys upon the white sheep. If the brutal buck stays within the Black community, he is of little concern. One savage cannot be overly forceful, or brutal, to other savages. We know that Alonzo has brutalised before. He admits to Jake that he once permanently paralysed a Black male, leaving him in a wheelchair. But in killing a Russian, killing his White friend for his drug money, and planning the murder of his White trainee, Alonzo has gone too far. Hence, there are a number of reasons that, in the end, Alonzo must die. Racially, the brutal buck is never victorious against Whiteness. That is, quite simply, it is not permissible in either the real or in the popular imagination for a Black man to abuse and/or kill Whites. Those brutal bucks who dare to must be brought down with a great showing of White might. The public nature of the brutal buck’s downfall is of great import (e.g., public lynchings, floggings) as to send a message to other Blacks that Whiteness must not be crossed, not ever. Nietzsche provides another reason for the necessary death of Alonzo, and thereby this evil. In his Will to Power, Nietzsche argues that “everything good is the evil of former days made serviceable,” 13 and this serviceability may also be interpreted as permissible regardless of its damaging effects. Hence, the evil of former days does not become good but, instead, allowable. Evil may prevail as long as it is useful in some capacity. Moments of evil in cops - police brutality, attacks on a superior officer, cover-ups, etc. - have been known to prevail because in the end these tactics have been useful or for the greater good in some capacity. For example, brutality may bring to justice an even greater evil that the “system” is ill-equipped to handle with care. In the case of Alonzo, his evil is neither serviceable, because it does not prove useful in some capacity, nor permissible, because it actually proves harmful to Whiteness. Thus, in the end, the goodness of Whiteness is upheld and emphasised by its perseverance and triumph over Black evil.
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Black annihilation and White victory manifest quite sensibly. Intersections across theological, moral, political, and historical discussions of good as light and evil as dark construct easily communicable symbols of good and evil. However, this symbolic element of evil, according to Training Day, is also racialised; it is not just darkness but Blackness. In offering such a presentation, the brutal buck image is solidified as the ultimate evil. The implication is that within Blackness - especially, Black masculinity - evil is heightened and thereby requires all of our might to replace/restore the light. While the film resorts to a more clichéd battle good (Jake) v. evil (Alonzo) - Alonzo as representing evil, specifically evil-for-itself, is best revealed when placed alongside a purported evil cop within Whiteness, that of Vic Mackey. 5.
The Shield: ”White is Right” Mary Ann Watson, in her book Defining Visions: Television and the American Experience Since 1945, offers a historical chronicling of the battle between law enforcement agents and criminals. Watson recounts that, as World War II drew to a close, Americans were still able to walk down most streets in the U.S. without fear and leave their front doors unlocked. In popular culture, the 1940s Western hero came to the rescue when trouble did arise. As Watson writes, “early Western heroes carried a gun, but didn’t shoot to kill, [they would only] shoot to wound.” This would all soon change, however, as the violent component of “shoot to wound” justice began to multiply exponentially. By the 1950s, when Americans were no longer illusioned by an “age of innocence,” the rise of civil rights movement reminded them that violence was right outside their front doors. Moreover, television brought it right into their homes. Western heroes, too, lost their innocence in their quest for justice, as they shot bad guys without impunity (e.g., The Rifleman, Have Gun Will Travel). The 50s decade ended on a high note of violence as the location for crime shifted back to the urban, and a new breed of law enforcement arose in the form of blood-spilling good guys such as the Untouchables. The 1960s, marked by Vietnam protests and the deaths of John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, evidenced the need for a different kind of cop in a different kind of America. “The villain’s defeat,” according to Watson, “never proved that brutality was wrong, only that the good guys eventually managed to dish it out in greater force. The real lesson was that violence is the surest solution to the conflict and that might makes right.” 14 Indeed, justified extreme aggression became the template for succeeding generations of law enforcers, such as television’s Kojak and film’s Dirty Harry of the 1970s and John McClane of the Die Hard films that began in the 1980s. It was also during this period that gangster worship re-emerged in such films as Scarface (1983), The Untouchables (1987), and King of New York (1990), with Tony Montana (Al Pacino), Al Capone (Robert De Niro), and Frank White (Christopher Walken) becoming instant cult film icons. Mackey, too, is that cult gangster figure, but with a police badge.
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Mackey, however, is not a cowboy struggling to dish out justice in an untamed land. Nor is he a Dirty Harry, forced to operate outside the law because the justice system ties his hands in dealing with those who have no fear of the law. Instead, Mackey takes more than a little glee in beating suspects, planting evidence, stealing from criminals, taking payoffs, setting up his fellow officers to take the fall for his crimes, and playing ring-around-the-rosy with investigators seeking to uncover his misdeeds; he even lovingly seduces one investigator. And yet, there are a significant number of moments in Mackey’s life where he is driven more by the need to catch the bad guy at all costs than by selfishness. There are plenty of evil-for-others storylines in The Shield for Mackey. For example, he is willing to participate in theft in an effort to get his strike team buddies some loot, even as he does not particularly desire it at that moment for himself. In another theft scheme, Mackey desperately wants ill-gotten money, but for the purpose of sending his autistic son to a special school and getting him a skilled tutor. It should be recalled that this is a denial of self that Alonzo does not evidence as he portrays evil-for-itself. While, socially, the climate is right for the evil cop depiction, the success of (or blame for) The Shield may be directly attributed to Training Day. Airing on cable television’s FX, which permits a level of violence, attitude, language, and nudity that network television does not, The Shield is the Dirty Harry quintet meets Training Day as a weekly television series. According to Peter Liguori, chairman and chief executive of FX, when “Training Day opened to good reviews and box office revenues, “we saw there was an audience out there who wanted to see a fully dimensionalized representation of the police.” 15 Set in the Black, Brown, and Beige inhabited ghettoes of L.A., the series, which was originally titled Rampart, focuses on the daily escapades of Mackey and his strike team who regularly break the law, often in evil-for-others moments. While The Shield is the next generation of the crime drama (as Mackey says, “good cop and bad cop have left for the day”) and homage to Training Day’s cruelty, Vic Mackey is not, by any stretch of the imagination, Alonzo Harris. As Judith Grant has observed: True, like Vic Mackey, the lead character in Training Day . . . is both a vigilante and an outright criminal. However, he is not held up as the hero (or even a true antihero) the way that Vic Mackey is on The Shield. The hero in Training Day is an honest rookie cop . . . who upends Denzel’s criminal career . . . In contrast, the honest rookie cop in The Shield is not the hero. He is portrayed as an uptight bible-thumper who is also, by the way, a closeted gay, black man. He has a conscience, but his own struggle with being a gay, which he believes to be a sin, places him dramatically as merely a different kind of hypocrite with a psychological axe to grind. 16
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Hence, it is such an imagination, facilitated by nearly a century of media reminders of the complexion and sexual boundaries of evil that does not allow Vic Mackey to ever approach the evil-of-itself that is Alonzo, the brutal buck. Nor does it allow the Black gay cop, Julien Lowe (Michael Jace), achieve hero status as the White heterosexual Jake does. While Mackey does commit crimes and does not enforce the law to the fullest extent in some cases, his actions are typically tempered by a higher calling of some perceived greater good or, post-dirty deeds, are tinged with remorse. For example, he executes a fellow police officer; that behaviour is evil. That Mackey does so because the officer was planted on his team by a boss that cares largely about a coming election and the great publicity that a “dirty cop” arrest would bring to his campaign - that execution is suddenly (sort of) good. Later, Mackey is haunted by the killing, which sets him up as not evil but vulnerable and, oddly, even righteous. Nietzsche and McDaniel would agree that this quality makes Mackey complex, beyond good and evil. Moreover, what sets Mackey apart from Alonzo is the balancing act between good and evil that Mackey must play - an act that Alonzo doesn’t see the need to do in the struggle for Jake’s soul. As one reviewer writes, “on film [cops are] represented as being wholly good or wholly bad, and ne’er the twain shall meet. That is the key to The Shield, to explore the ambiguity.” 17 Chiklis describes Mackey as “a guy whose philosophy and attitude have been galvanized from knocking down the worst doors, going into the worst areas and dealing with the lowest common denominator.” 18 However, that does fully reveal Mackey’s initial exposure to, or taint by, evil which is much like that of Jake’s. Joe Clarke (Carl Weathers), an African American training officer with a propensity for exacting extreme brutality on suspected criminals of colour, too, schools Mackey on the ways of the jungle. The similarities between Alonzo and Joe do not stop there. Like Alonzo, Joe has a virulent, violent temper that is displayed through fearsome beatings. Joe, it is revealed, is no longer a member of the police force because of a beating he gave a young Latino and suspected drug dealer. The beating earned the victim a sizable settlement against the LAPD. In the storyline, Joe’s rage against the victim can only be quelled once the young man is dead - a murder that Joe forces Mackey into committing, and an act that Mackey must suffer for. Therefore, unlike Alonzo, and now Joe, Mackey’s crimes are never purely self-serving as he eventually expresses some remorse about the manner in which he has to, or is forced to, to conduct law enforcement. Additionally, Mackey is tempered by his fellowship with his strike team, colleagues, and other more forthright detectives. In the end, it is Mackey’s allegiance to others - his sense of fellowship - that requires him to consistently choose what he believes is the good that serves others rather than himself. Taken together, the depictions of Vic Mackey and Jake Hoyt in contrast with Alonzo Harris and Joe Clarke suggest an inescapable racial essence with Blackness distinct from Whiteness and, thus, the causal element in making sense of each character’s relationship with evil. Mackey is constructed as a bad cop with good intentions, while Jake is a good cop
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trying to remain so in the face of evil (Alonzo). And Alonzo and Joe are bad cops, with no good intentions. They are not only invested in evil, but, as argued here, can be read as the face of evil. Symbolically, the root of Alonzo’s evil stems directly from his Blackness and within his Black body. No other explanation is offered. Put beside Jake, and with no other explanation offered in the Training Day text for Jake’s virtue, goodness seems to just spring from Jake’s White body and out of his Whiteness. Similarly, Mackey, as ruthless and hateful as he is, is represented much like Jake, as unable to enter into evil in the manner that Alonzo has. Mackey is corrupted, largely by Joe, but not completely ruined. Therefore, Alonzo cannot be good because he is not White, and more importantly, his evil becomes far more recognisable beside Jake’s Whiteness, and Mackey’s possession of friends, care for consequences, and sense of remorse. Blackness is used, then, in both The Shield and Training Day as evidence of the root of evil, and each man’s racial construction is offered as a way to facilitate our recognition of goodness or wickedness. Alonzo is wholly evil because of his wholly Black (evil) nature, enveloped in a Black body, while Jake and Mackey are predominately good because of the Whiteness (good) that defines them. Each man’s racialised body symbolises his essence and that essence provides reason for his actions. Jake and Alonzo’s imagery, their identities, are clearly separable. So, too, are those of Alonzo and Mackey. If Mackey were to be Alonzo (or if Chiklis were to replace Washington in the role), much of the plot of Training Day would have to be rewritten to create a believable character within a credible scenario. The race-tinged animal imagery in the film loses its function as well if Alonzo is White. King Kong came from an African jungle, and he preyed on Whites. King Kong’s ultimate destruction (much like Alonzo’s), according to Gail Dines, works to remasculinise the White man. Therefore, “representations of Black men and White men are not isolated images working independently.” 19 The efficacy of terming the ghetto the jungle, Alonzo howling like a wolf, and Jake’s initial inability to identify with the wolf are all uniquely tied to a Black-body situation; none of these conjunctions is applicable to Mackey or a White body. Moreover, if Alonzo were White, he would not be naturally adept in dealing with the savage criminals of the “jungle.” He would not speak the language of the streets and, in one important moment, could not speak a very specific bit of language: “my nigger,” which Alonzo does say. Within Whiteness, the carnal destruction of a brutal buck is no longer required. In fact, the manner in which Alonzo is executed would be unwarranted, even unsettling, if Mackey were to experience such a fate. For example, in the “Partners” episode of The Shield, Mackey is shot by the young Latino who had won a police brutality lawsuit against Mackey’s training sergeant, Joe Clarke (Mackey, at the urging of his mentor, had been involved in a new harassment of this young man). The narrative is one of sadness over the shooting, and though the sergeant is not the person
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“A bad cop with good intentions”: Michael Chiklis as Vic Mackey in The Shield. Copyright ¤ 2002 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. who had shot Mackey, the blame is placed on his shoulders. Viewers are moved to breathe a sigh of relief when Mackey, after summoning his wife and kids to his side, survives the shooting. Though Mackey has done much wrong, he has not committed deeds so severe that they merit death. Hence, a White Alonzo, if attempted, becomes a poor imitation, even unbelievable, of what the popular imagination says “authentic” evil should look like. Enacting such an imitation would result in great confusion: are not cops, unless they are brutal bucks, at heart supposed to be good, or, at worst, conflicted? How can goodness possibly resemble evil so closely? And, if it does, how are we to know good from evil if they occupy the same space, the same colour, and even the same light? Whiteness, likewise, cannot become Blackness. For example, Jake’s character cannot be depicted as being Alonzo’s Black partner for the training day. According to the rules of the popular, the language barrier is removed as only Black people get to call others “nigger,” and the like. Speaking of the Blaxploitation movies of the 70s, but evidencing a link between race and place that can be seen today, Donald Bogle wrote, “the tenements as well as the talk, the mannerisms, and the sophistication of the streets . . . appeared to mark a life lived close to one’s black roots. Ghetto residents seemed to have a greater ethnic identity. Eventually, poverty and ghetto life . . . were frequently idealized and glamorized.” 20 Also removed is the gimmick of the trainee’s unfamiliarity with and fear of this
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racially Black and Brown environment. With popular characterisation so over-simplified, a Black partner likely would not be in the completely subjective position of being naïve and unschooled himself. In the imagination of Hollywood, a Black man could not be so “green” about “his” people. There is the assumption that a Black man would likely be intimately familiar with the jungle and its inhabitants, rather than come from outside of the class and urban defined world. Blackness, therefore, is also defined by its inherent connection to the ghetto. Alternately, if Mackey were not White but Black, he, too, could not be a hero; he would instead simply be the wicked training sergeant. Mackey, within Whiteness, is able to skirt evil when next to Joe, symbolically; Mackey becomes kinder, lighter, Whiter. Whatever goodness Mackey is able to bring forth, in spite of his bad deeds when in the presence of taint and evil, is a consequence of his White body. There is no other explanation, as Mackey and his sergeant would otherwise be the same. Mackey, then, must be White to substantiate the plot and goodness. In the classic allegory of good and evil, Blackness cannot taint other Blackness because the other Blackness is already unclean, impure, and evil. 6.
Conclusion “The great thing,” writes one reviewer, “is race isn’t just a cliché in Training Day. It is the climate of opinion, a toxic haze” so in sync with the popular understanding of Black masculinity that Alonzo Harris is completely credible. 21 Applicable, too, is McDaniel’s analysis that the purest of evil - that which cannot be reasoned with, controlled, or changed - are those “other” worldly beings driven by morally unchecked impulses. Black men are regularly “othered” in popular media as their evil, too, is depicted as being from an unreasonable, unsalvageable place - a Black world and Black body savage and untamable, different and wholly deficient. Worse, they are motivated by an evil for their own personal pleasure. What may be more frightening is the possibility that the hypersexual, pleasure-seeking nature of this evil will multiply, or procreate, thereby producing new evils. The evil cop, it may be argued, has reached a pinnacle, if one delineates the characterisation by race. The evil cop as embodied by Denzel Washington is presented with the same mastery - and troubling content and social implications - as The Birth of a Nation’s own good-and-evil narrative. Each set a bar that few, if any, have ever been able to reach. There will certainly be many more brutal bucks who will likely be the bane of existence to the Black and the Brown, and whose dark/Black evil will have to fall to the light/White purity. It is important to note, however, that this Black v. White scenario will have to play out in mainstream Hollywood movies, as a Black v. Black plot line falls under the rubric of “Black” cinema or neo-Blaxploitation, a film genre that is consumed less by non-African Americans. Of course, there is the other real evil, that a black film truncates the audience and therefore, from a marketing perspective, the profitability of a film. In such an instance, the White-saviour rhetoric that reassures society that threatening Black men can be con-
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trolled and/or disposed of is replaced by a “let the savages kill themselves” message, so long as the violence remains Black on Black - as in, for example, New Jack City (1991), Menace II Society (1993), and Jungle Fever (1991). Therefore, the survival of Black actors often depends on portrayals that feature Blackness destroyed by Blacks, or Blackness controlled or destroyed by Whites. Within Whiteness, evil often come in the form of some taint or infection - e.g., vampirism in the countless versions of Dracula, invasions of body snatchers, demonic possession such as in The Exorcist (1973). In the role of the innate evil-in-itself, as seen in brutal buck characterisations, Whiteness fails the plausibility test as evidenced by the poor reviews and reception of the film Dark Blue (2002), starring Kurt Russell as Eldon Perry. Dark Blue, written by Training Day screenwriter David Ayer, focuses on Perry, a corrupt cop. However, the role fails, coming off as nonsensical because the corruption of Whiteness by a purported evil demands a reasonable explanation. In Dark Blue, the source of taint is not fully revealed until the final scenes of the movie. It is explained that Perry comes from a long family line of dreadfully racist cops; indeed, these family members gave Perry his first African American kill at the age of eight. In the movie, though an African American officer and his large Black and Brown staff are seeking to bring Perry down, the African American officer is depicted as being unable to touch Perry figuratively and literally. In the end, Perry repentantly ends his own racist corruption. The film concludes by casting Perry as a tragic hero, not a racist murderer, with his estranged wife and son’s support assured. In this sense, Perry and Mackey are similar; though both are wicked and their moral compasses at times malfunction, they are still heavies with hearts of gold. Moreover, what makes Mackey so uniquely and delightfully wicked (i.e., that gangster worship) is that he is such a novelty. He is not expected to be evil, for that is brutal buck territory. Thus, there may be more Mackeys in television and film, but their evil will be limited by their Whiteness, and their presence will be read as a bit of a rip-off in the same way that Dark Blue tried, but failed, to be Training Day. The brutal buck, then, continues to instill and reinforce troubling definitions about Blackness in general and Black men in particular. And it is this problematic definition that calls into question the awarding of the Oscar to Denzel Washington for this role. Indeed, some have speculated that Washington did not win for Training Day, but that 2001 was the year that the Academy finally decided the actor had been overlooked long enough for past (and more positive) roles. This theory presupposes that those who did not deem Washington worthy of the Best Actor award (even for his work in The Hurricane) suddenly had a change of heart. Therefore, the emphasis is on politics amongst Academy voters. Not entirely discounting this argument, an alternate theory may be that the Academy voted for the role, the portrayal of a Black man, that they thought was Oscar worthy. The Academy may have viewed Alonzo not as novel or a stretch for Washington, but that Alonzo was the authentic characterisation that they knew was in the actor all along - after all, who best, or most au-
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thentically, can present the darkest side of evil than an authentic “darkey” himself? Following this theory, Washington won for exuding what, purportedly, may come naturally for a Black man, rather than for being a skilled actor who performed - according to Robert Toll’s observation of such roles for Black men - a White-centred stereotype of Black males. 22 The Oscar, then, became the Academy’s collective sigh of relief that all was indeed right with the (racial) world’s hierarchy as they had come to know it. As for Chiklis’ Emmy, it was a nod to the rarity of such a performance and the great stretch it must be to play a Vic Mackey. The lesson to be taken away from this discussion is that evil should not be singularly measured by its proximity to, or absence of, purity, or the presence of God. Rather, evil may be defined as being perpetuated by a certain kind of body - either bodies that are Black or, in the case of Mackey, that are infected with the taint of Blackness via proximity (yes, even riding in a police car with a Black trainer can have deleterious effects). Moreover, in the case of the purest evil that resides in the Black male body, only a great deal of destruction can rid society of its spoil. For Alonzo Harris, this came in hail of close range automatic weapon fire delivered, not by the Black Crips and Bloods gangs that he so abused, but by Whiteness in the form of the Russians to whom he owed money. Alonzo’s fate was secured within Whiteness when Jake returned to the “light side” of goodness and purity. By contrast, when Vic Mackey is shot by a Latino (a Brown body), the shooting is not a victory over evil; moreover, it brings Mackey closer to his family and crew. Alonzo’s lone violent execution is marked by his animalistic grunts as he works to cling defiantly but futilely to life, as well as the laughter of the Russians watching the spectacle of evil’s demise. There is no empathy for Alonzo’s many families: his wife and four children, his mistress and their son, or his family of police officers. Instead, there is only the harmonious enjoyment of the destruction of Black evil. To be sure, Alonzo and Mackey are different kinds of cops. They both are wolves that could do a much better job of protecting the sheep rather than having a regular diet of mutton; only one of them is far more fearsome and loathsome than King Kong, however, and that is Alonzo Harris. King Kong was destroyed, but films such as Training Day may prompt the nagging fear in some, when seeing a Black male in the real, that the Russians/Jake/Whiteness have not gotten rid of all the evil. Consequently, the ability to conquer - or more specifically, for good to conquer evil - is a necessary source of tension between Alonzo and Jake. Nietzsche believes that the ability to conquer is an attribute of powerful men. In the end, while evil/Blackness is powerful, those who conquer it the good/Whiteness - remain the most powerful of them all.
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Notes 1. Jannette L. Dates and William Barlow, Split Image: African Americans in the Mass Media (Washington, D.C.: Howard Univ. Press, 1990), 4. 2. W. James Potter, On Media Violence (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 52. 3. Donald Bogle, Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies, and Bucks: An Interpretive History of Blacks in American Films, 4th ed. (New York: Continuum, 2001), 13-14. 4. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. Douglas Smith (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), 118. 5. bell hooks, Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations (New York: Routledge, 1994), 115. 6. Liesbet van Zoonen, Feminist Media Studies (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 87; Stuart Hall, “The Spectacle of the ‘Other,’” in Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, ed. Stuart Hall (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 263; Sean Nixon, “Exhibiting Masculinity,” in Representation, 7. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. and ed. Marion Faber (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998), 156, 88; Augustine, The City of God, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1958), 247. 8. James McDaniel, “Figures of Evil, A Triad of Rhetorical Strategies for Theo-Politics,” (unpublished manuscript, Univ. of Colorado-Boulder, 2003), 2, 9. 9. Ibid., 3. 10. Ibid., 7 11. Ibid., 8. 12. Ibid., 6. 13. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 530. 14. Mary Ann Watson, Defining Visions: Television and the American Experience Since 1945 (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1997), 84, 86. 15. Liguori cited in Bernard Weinraub, “Police Show Has Humans, Not Heroes,” New York Times, 3 April 2002, E4. 16. Judith Grant, “The Shield,” Picturing Justice: The On-Line Journal of Law and Popular Culture, 22 May 2002. . 17. “The Face of Evil,” The Age, 3 July 2003. , 2. 18. Chiklis cited in “Face of Evil,” 1. 19. Gail Dines, “King Kong and the White Woman: Hustler Magazine and the Demonization of Black Masculinity,” in Gender, Race, and Class in the Media: A Text-Reader, 2d ed., ed. Gail Dines and Jean M. Humez (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 453. 20. Bogle, 236.
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21. Tim Appelo, “The Thin Blue Line,” review of Training Day (Warner Bros. movie), Nation, 19 November 2001, 36-38. 22. Robert C. Toll, “Behind the Blackface: Minstrel Men and Minstrel Myths,” American Heritage 29 (1978): 92-105.
The “Uncanny” Relationship of Disability and Evil in Film and Television Martin F. Norden Abstract Taking their cue from such literary texts as the Bible, Shakespeare’s Richard III, Melville’s Moby-Dick, and Barrie’s Peter Pan, filmmakers and TV producers have often associated evil with disability in their works. This conflation has led to a particularly odious stereotype: the “Obsessive Avenger,” a character (almost always an adult male) who in the name of revenge relentlessly pursues those he holds responsible for his disablement, some other moral-code violation, or both. Appearing in numerous productions throughout the history of moving-image media, this monomaniacal figure reinforces mainstream society’s most deeply entrenched negative beliefs about disabled people. In the hope of exposing the forces behind this most insidious of disability-related stereotypes and the ways it has been received, the current chapter examines the film/TV linkage of disability and evil through the lens of Freud’s “The Uncanny” and related works. Key Words: disability, S. Freud, J. Huston, Moby Dick, psychoanalysis, stereotyping, “The Uncanny”
We are so terrified of Evil, so greedy for euphemisms to denote the Other, misfortune, or other irreducibles, that we no longer can even refer to a cripple as such. -Jean Baudrillard1 A wheelchair-using man known as “Dead Legs” spends eighteen years on a bizarre revenge scheme to do in the man who had pushed him off a balcony and run off with his wife. A disfigured shepherd recruits the Frankenstein monster to help him murder the jurors who had sentenced him to the gallows. A cartoon pirate plots against the sprite who cut off his hand and fed it to a crocodile. A handless scientist seeks revenge on the U.S. government by using nuclear energy to topple its space programme. A disabled Vietnam veteran plays a deadly game of cat-and-mouse with two young people staying on his rental property. A sniper hunts down the policemen he holds responsible for the loss of his hands during a bungled bank robbery. A disabled ex-cop plants a bomb that will detonate if the bus to which it is attached falls below a speed of fifty miles per hour. A man paralysed from the neck down quietly takes revenge on his cheating wife and brother while bamboozling the courts. The films and television programmes suggested in the above collage of word-images reflect one of the more despicable tendencies found
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in mainstream moving-image media: the demonisation of people with disabilities. Moreover, these particular productions - in order, West of Zanzibar (1928), Son of Frankenstein (1939), Peter Pan (1953), Dr. No (1962), To Kill a Clown (1972), Hawaii Five-O’s “Hookman” episode (1973), Speed (1994), and The Practice’s “Burnout” episode (2003) - constitute just a small sampling of this trend. As indicated in the list of productions appended to this chapter, the conflation of evil and disability stretches from the earliest years of narrative moving-image media to the present. Some filmmakers and TV producers might simply claim in their defence that the highly visual nature of their media requires, or at least strongly encourages, them to employ physical markers to indicate some character trait - be it evil or something else - to their audiences. Indeed, disabled movie/TV characters are typically created with a high degree of “to-be-looked-at-ness,” to borrow film theorist Laura Mulvey’s awkward but compelling term,2 and are thus set up to receive such coarse treatment. Consider the following example offered - and readily endorsed - by Syd Field, the world’s most famous screenwriting teacher: Pictures, or images, reveal aspects of character. In Robert Rossen’s classic film The Hustler, a physical defect symbolizes an aspect of character. The girl played by Piper Laurie is a cripple; she walks with a limp. She is also an emotional cripple; she drinks too much, has no sense of aim or purpose in life. The physical limp underscores her emotional qualities - visually [emphasis in original text].3 These imagemakers might argue further that they are merely doing what their peers in the other arts have done since time immemorial. Indeed, Field’s primary justification for admonishing fledgling screenwriters to maintain this tendency is its sheer longevity: “Physical handicap - as an aspect of characterization - is a theatrical convention that extends far back into the past. One thinks of Richard III.”4 It suffices to say that Field is hardly alone in his belief that film/TV practitioners should use “physical defect[s]” to symbolise aspects of character. The reasons for perpetuating this tendency are nothing if not highly problematic, particularly when we consider the impact of the resulting productions. Stephen Dwoskin, whose 1992 documentary film Face of Our Fear traced the evolution of disability imagery in western culture, has argued that such films and programmes do little but reinforce mainstream society’s prevailing negative views of disabled people. “The disabled images become a dramatic shorthand and are readily accepted as that,” he wrote, adding that the symbolic or metaphoric use of disability imagery “is far more dangerous and maintains the stigma more subversively” than productions such as Johnny Got His Gun (1971) and Coming Home (1978) that use disability as a central theme. Communication scholar Alison Hartnett, citing Althusser’s contention that the media shape our views of the world, has written that we as media consumers need to examine more
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Joseph Wiseman as the lethal title character of Dr. No, the first James Bond movie. A double amputee whose half-German, half-Chinese ethnicity invoked then-recent enmities, Dr. No is one in a long line of disabled villains in movies and television. Copyright © 1962 Eon Productions, Ltd. critically the linkage of disability and evil in particular: “If we look at the portrayals of disability that embody evil in a physical disfigurement, or any of the other stereotypes, there seems just concern as to what they say to disabled and able-bodied people about disability. When disabled children see close screen connections between evil and their physical condition, [these representations] cannot contribute to a positive self-image.” As fellow communication expert Marilyn Dahl put it, “To see oneself labelled and cast always in the role of the villain, helpless dependent or victim is not an enviable fate.” Such stereotyped images, according to Dwoskin, can contribute to a denial of selfhood with far-reaching consequences.5 Consider, for example, the case of David Roche. A professional performer born with extensive cavernous hemangioma resulting in severe facial disfigurement, Roche is quite aware of the negative meanings that society has affixed to his physical difference and how they have affected his self-image. “My face does not belong to me; it belongs in a catalogue of symbols,” he wrote. “As a performer, I am a metaphor for disability. The facially disfigured person is the most hackneyed symbol in cinema and theatre, commonly standing for something that has gone dreadfully wrong. No other metaphor is so overused as a portent of despair and evil.”
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Roche underscored the redoubtable ancient beliefs with which disabled people have historically been burdened: “In our western culture, we have inherited the dogma that we are innately evil, born with the birth defect of original sin.” His views echo those of Marilyn Dahl, who has noted the “convention of all literature and art that physical deformity, chronic illness, or any visible defect symbolizes an evil and malevolent nature and monstrous behaviour.”6 The desire to use physical difference in such ways is motivated to a large extent by a complex set of deep-seated and often unarticulated fears. I find a strong ring of truth to the following assertion by Richard Exell, Disability Policy Officer for the U.K.’s Trades Union Congress: “On the basis of my professional activities, personal experience, discussions with other disabled people and reading, I believe that fear of impairment and of disabled people themselves is one of the [main] forces involved in the construction of disability.”7 Though Exell wasn’t necessarily referring to movies or television, his words have strong relevancy here. The complex of fears to which Exell alludes reaches its zenith in the form of the most vivid and enduring of the many disability images developed by the mainstream film/TV industry: the so-termed “Obsessive Avenger,” exemplified by the characters described at the beginning of this chapter.8 Based partially on a number of literary antecedents - principally, Richard Crookback of Richard III and two earlier Shakespearean plays, Quasimodo of Notre-Dame de Paris, Captain Ahab of Moby-Dick, and Captain Hook of Peter Pan - this embodiment of evil is almost always an adult male who in the name of revenge relentlessly pursues those he believes responsible for his disablement, some other moral-code violation, or both. A monomaniacal figure “filled with diseased lusts,”9 to use Anne Finger’s phrase, the Obsessive Avenger reinforces two of mainstream society’s most deeply entrenched beliefs about disabled people in general and disabled men in particular: “deformity of the body is a sure sign of deformity of the soul” and “disabled people resent the nondisabled and would, if they could, destroy them,” in the words, respectively, of Joanmarie Kalter and Paul Longmore.10 As a means of better understanding this seemingly deathless image and its ramifications, I propose to interpret them in light of psychoanalytic theory, principally Sigmund Freud’s 1919 article, “The Uncanny.” This landmark essay, first published at a time when concerns about the disabling consequences of war were taking centre stage, is rife with references to disability that have direct bearing on this movie image. An examination of Freud’s concepts as developed in this essay and other works may help expose the forces that have shaped this variant of disability imagery and the ways it has been received. 1.
Disability as Symbolic Disempowerment Freud, who during the 1890s had made a name for himself in the field of neurology by publishing a series of investigations into cerebral palsy, paralysis, and aphasia,11 famously imputed a symbolic dimension to disability in “The Uncanny.” Drawing heavily on E. T. A. Hoffmann’s
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“The Sand-Man,” an 1814 story about a young man who fears the title character’s reputation for tearing out children’s eyes and feeding them to his bird-like offspring, Freud equated the fear of becoming blind with a repressed boyhood dread: castration anxiety. “The study of dreams, fantasies and myths has taught us . . . that anxiety about one’s eyes, the fear of going blind, is quite often a substitute for the fear of castration,” he wrote, further observing a “substitutive relation between the eye and the male member that is manifested in dreams, fantasies and myths.”12 Several commentators have criticised Freud’s eye-penis ersatzbeziehung as problematic and overly simplistic,13 but an alternative reading that allows for a broader perspective may lead us to a very different conclusion. Freud emphasised blindness over other disabling circumstances in “The Uncanny” (many adults “fear no physical injury so much as one to the eye,” he categorically stated), but a closer reading of the essay suggests a pan-disability perspective. Freud noted, for instance, that “a particularly strong and obscure emotion is aroused by the threat of losing the sexual organ, and that it is this emotion that first gives such resonance to the idea of losing other organs.” In addition, he suggested that such phenomena as “severed limbs” and “a hand detached from the arm . . . have something highly uncanny about them” and concluded this latter observation by stating that “this species of the uncanny stems from its proximity to the castration complex.”14 If we take a cross-disability psychoanalytic perspective, it suffices to say that, generally speaking, any major violation of typical bodily integrity, whether genetic or acquired, is tantamount to symbolic disempowerment and stirs the deepest dread. What relationship can be drawn between this Freudian reading of disability and the movie/TV world’s deep-seated interest in disabled characters? Moving-image practitioners have long been aware of the dramatic and commercial potential of disability-related issues, as evidenced by the hundreds upon hundreds of productions with disabled characters that have flickered across screens since the 1890s.15 In 1925, a film reviewer for the trade journal Variety spoke for many in the industry by opining that “the natural tragedy of blindness overtaking a person provides a splendid theme for dramatic situations, whether in fiction, plays or [moving] pictures.” In a related matter, many able-bodied actors relish the opportunity to “play disabled” in the belief that such roles will provide a showcase for their performing skills. As Jim Gullo noted sans irony in a 1991 Premiere article on movie actors who have played disabled characters, “the showier the affliction, the better the chances” are for an Oscar.16 Intuitively aware of able-bodied people’s “paradoxical repulsion-attraction for those with disabilities” - to quote sociologists George Henderson and Willie Bryan - and the disempowering quality of disability to which Freud alluded, filmmakers and TV producers have dealt with the able-bodied fear of disability by developing a set of stereotypes: disabled men who stir up trouble for themselves or others in the name of humour; pitiable children and young women whose goodness often leads to a “miracle cure” and a reversal of the disempowerment; courageous, largerthan-life people whose post-disablement deeds are meant to inspire awe;
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and disabled war veterans who undergo a symbolic resexualisation to demonstrate that patriarchal values have not been permanently weakened. For the most part, these images - perpetuated on behalf of the able-bodied majority’s needs - attempt to mitigate the memento mori status bestowed on disabled people by society and the fear that, from a Freudian perspective, seems to arise automatically. The Obsessive Avenger image, however, represents a different strategy entirely; far from vitiating the fear, it magnifies it - much to audiences’ apparent delight. As psychoanalyst Daniel Birger has noted, the movie/TV industry has pandered to its audiences’ evident desire to consume this image by supplying a steady stream of such characters for decades: “The universal fascination with that image has been exploited by the film industry. Horror movies often contain maimed or deformed figures who send chills and thrills to the hearts of millions, keeping them coming to watch such films since the earliest days of the movies, from the phantom of the opera to Darth Vader.” 17 2.
A Freudian View of the Obsessive Avenger If it is true, as Marilyn Dahl has asserted, that most characters on screen are stereotypes packaged to appeal to as many viewers as possible while representing commonly held socio-cultural beliefs,18 we cannot help but ask why filmmakers and TV producers continue to breathe life into such a hateful figure. How can this distressingly durable image be considered appealing to audiences? Are these imagemakers consciously attempting to arouse repressed feelings in audience members? Or do they merely subscribe to the view that this image has “worked” in previous cultural expressions, and that its potency is due mainly to its sheer repetition? As a start toward answering these questions, I suggest we take a closer look at “The Uncanny” and Freud’s primary concern expressed in it: “the quality of the fear that is elicited,” in the words of French feminist theorist Hélène Cixous.19 It seems obvious to state that moving-image practitioners trafficking in Obsessive-Avenger imagery are attempting to generate at least two dimensions or types of fear: the fear of becoming disabled, and the fear of disabled “Others.” In a sense, the former is a pre-disablement concern and the latter a post-disablement one. Put another way, the first is an imaginary fear based on the possibility of disablement, while the second arises as a result of actually seeing (as opposed to imagining) the appearance and actions of a person already disabled. The differences amongst and connections between these types of fear become more apparent if we move from Freud’s first “ingredient” for an uncanny experience - the arousal of the repressed boyhood fear of castration - to the second: the repetition-compulsion, or powerful drive to repeat unpleasant, even painful, experiences. Freud developed the idea of repetition-compulsion after working with people traumatised by events of World War I; he discovered that his patients often returned in their dreams to these highly distressing events. These revisitations, he learned, afforded the patients no enjoyment and therefore went beyond his celebrated “pleasure principle.” As Neil Hertz has suggested, the forces arising from the compulsion to revisit painful personal episodes are mysterious and
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formidable: “The invisible energies are thought of as those of the repetition-compulsion, and the glimpses one gets of them are felt as disturbing and strange.”20 As we shall see, they constitute a major source of the Obsessive Avenger’s frightening quality. Another point that Freud discovered about the repetitioncompulsion phenomenon is that people seem to take pleasure in others’ traumatic episodes. “The artistic play and artistic imitation carried out by adults, which, unlike children’s, are aimed at an audience, do not spare the spectators (for instance, in tragedy) the most painful experiences and can yet be felt by them as highly enjoyable,” he wrote. It is a point intuitively, and thoroughly, understood by moving-image makers. Consider, for example, the point of view expressed by John Barrymore, the legendary actor who played that renowned Obsessive Avenger, Captain Ahab, in two movies: The Sea Beast (1926) and Moby Dick (1930). Commenting on a graphic scene in the latter film that showed Ahab’s agony during the cauterisation of his bloody stump of a leg, Barrymore said, “Give them more torture. The public loves torture.” 21 Since the replay of “painful experiences” is very much at the heart of the typical Obsessive-Avenger tale, a consideration of the way that tale unfolds may prove helpful here. As noted above, the story centres on an adult male who is disabled at the start of the film's narrative (either as the result of a genetic disorder or an accident) or who becomes disabled shortly after the narrative has commenced. This character, who from a Freudian perspective is thus castrated, develops an irrational and overwhelming desire to repeat the experience. Instead of merely returning to the traumatic episode in his dreams, however, the character transforms this desire into vengeful action by seeking to disempower the figure(s) he holds responsible for this moral-code violation, some other, or both. In other words, his sense of revenge is inextricably bound up with the desire to repeat. Audience members thus witness an exaggerated playing-out of a character’s repetition-compulsion, triggered by the memory of an earlier moral-code violation - usually, that character’s disablement. Birger summarised well the contradictory impulses underlying this figure’s behaviour by suggesting that the “maimed avenger,” to use his phrase, is a complex construct, a result of condensation of the imagery of oedipal phase castration fantasies. It is an image that represents the wish to castrate father as well as the terror of his anticipated retaliation. In addition, the maimed avenger represents the child feeling castrated and powerless but nevertheless driven by an overwhelming compulsion to acquire the power that will grant him the fulfilment of the oedipal wishes.22 This “overwhelming compulsion” to repeat the experience by inflicting it on someone else accounts in large measure for the sense of uncanniness and fear generated by the Obsessive Avenger, in that it makes this disabled character appear to be possessed by evil, terrifying spirits. As
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Freud argued in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, a 1920 book he developed concurrently with “The Uncanny,” the arousal of a repressed fear may unleash seemingly preternatural forces capable of possessing that person: “The manifestations of a compulsion to repeat (which we have described as occurring in the early activities of infantile mental life as well as among the events of psycho-analytic treatment) exhibit to a high degree an instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give the appearance of some ‘daemonic’ force at work.” He further noted that “when people unfamiliar with analysis feel an obscure fear - a dread of rousing something that, so they feel, is better left sleeping - what they are afraid of at bottom is the emergence of this compulsion with its hint of possession by some ‘daemonic’ power.” 23 Freud’s view of diabolic possession is a key to understanding the fearsome quality that the Obsessive Avenger represents. In “The Uncanny,” he established a kinship between people we might label as “evil” and people with disabilities - a kinship based on animistic beliefs: We can also call a living person uncanny, that is to say, when we credit him with evil intent. But this alone is not enough: it must be added that this intent to harm us is realized with the help of special powers . . . The uncanny effect of epilepsy or madness has the same origin. Here the layman sees a manifestation of forces that he did not suspect