The Caliphate Question: The British Government and Islamic Governance

The Caliphate Question The British Government and Islamic Governance

Sean Oliver-Dee

The Caliphate Question

The Caliphate Question The British Government and Islamic Governance

Sean Oliver-Dee

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, MD 20706 Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom Copyright © 2009 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Oliver-Dee, Sean, 1970– The caliphate question : the British government and Islamic governance / Sean OliverDee. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-3601-0 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-3603-4 (electronic) 1. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Middle East. 2. Middle East—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 3. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1901-1936. 4. Islam and politics—Great Britain—History—20th century. 5. Caliphate—Government policy— Great Britain—History—20th century. 6. Middle East—Politics and government—20th century. 7. Caliphate—History—20th century. 8. Islam and state—Middle East— History—20th century. 9. Islam and politics—Middle East—History—20th century. I. Title. DS63.2.G7O45 2009 327.4105609’041—dc22 2009018328 Printed in the United States of America

⬁ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American

National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

This book is dedicated to my loving and supportive wife Philippa, my children, Ethan, Bethany and Josiah who are a constant source of pride, my parents Richard and Wilma, and to the author and perfecter of us all.

Contents

Introduction Section I 1

The Concept and Execution of “Authority” in Islam: Theology and Political Theory

The Caliphate in Political Theory Introduction The Caliphate in the Qur’an Etymology of “Khalifah” Did Muhammad Intend to Name a Successor? What Was the Remit of the Caliphs and How Did It Develop? By What Right Did the Caliph Rule? Conclusions

Section II

2

1

11 13 13 14 16 19 21 22 32

The British Government Files and the Approach to Pan-Islamic Governance Section Introduction

41 41

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919 Historical Background An Overview of the Correspondence Key British Documents Foreign Language Documents in the Residence Files Postscript Conclusions

43 43 48 57 64 73 74

vii

viii

Contents

3

Post-War Part 1: Professor Arnold’s 1918 Letter Introduction The Immediate Post-War Phase Conclusions

91 91 93 102

4

Post-War Part 2: The Khilafat Discussions, 1920–1921 Lloyd-George and the Khilafat Delegation 1920 House of Commons Meeting, March 21st, 1921 Postscript Conclusions

109 109 117 119 119

5 Post-War Part 3: Government of India–India Office Correspondence 1922–1923 Historical Note “The Spiritual Powers of the Caliph” Conclusions 6

7

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War A Brief History of [the Intervening] Time Foreign Office Material on the Caliphate Post Peace Treaties–the Cold War Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions on the Nature of the Caliphate British Government and Islamic Governance 1914–1949: Conclusions A Final Word

125 125 126 136 141 141 145 154 163 163 166 171

Appendix A

Religio-political Authority in Islam

175

Appendix B

Table of Translations Q4:59

193

Appendix C

The Reporting of the Caliphate

195

Appendix D

Shi’ite Theory of the Imamate

201

Appendix E

A Brief Comparison between the Papacy and the Caliphate

205

Submission to the Lausanne Treaty Negotiators from the Armenian Delegation

209

Appendix F Bibliography

213

Index

231

About the Author

235

Introduction

Fear and suspicion of Muslims, a government meddling in Middle Eastern politics, and a backdrop of violence: sound familiar? It could be talking about now, but it’s certainly describing British foreign policy in the run-up to, during, and after World War I in connection to the issue of the Ottoman Caliphate. It is for this reason that the period is so useful to look at for some lessons on what to do, or not to do, as the West re-engages with issues of Islamic Governance. The prospect of doing a study that mixed the hitherto mutually exclusive fields of theology, history, and political science is a somewhat daunting one. Admittedly, history and political science do make for easier bedfellows, but, until very recently, the prospect of including theology in the same breath as the other two would have been laughable, even in fields of study such as the Reformation or international relations among Islamic states, which one might think would lend themselves more readily to including that perspective. The argument would be that history is too objective and international relations is too pragmatic to give even a cursory nod toward such an emotive perspective. However, whether irrational or not, religious adherence is a factor in determining actions for some people and, therefore, if for no other reason than that, is worthwhile being factored into any study that involves either individuals or peoples for whom that is an issue. To omit it would be to miss an element of the picture upon which the hypothesis or policy is being based. Thus, in certain circumstances, understanding the religious or theological perspective on specific issues becomes part of the pragmatics of policy-making. Jonathan Fox’s article in Blackwell Synergy published before the 9/11 attacks makes precisely this point:

1

2

Introduction

Religion is among the most overlooked factors in the study of international politics. Some reasons for this include a bias against the study of religion that dates to the origins of the social sciences, the influence on social scientists of classical liberal ideas that stress the separation of church and state, and the fact that religion is difficult to quantify.1

Fox suggests that Western scholars seem to have become prisoners of their own intellectual secularism, attempting to create patterns and models for behavior that seek to explain any given event or set of circumstances in economic, social, or political terms and ignoring the role of personal faith or religious doctrine even where that is applicable.2 This is not to say that economic, social, or political factors are not important facets in analyzing actions, determining responses, and planning long-term policies; rather, it is instead to suggest that the impact of personal faith or collective religious identity needs to be understood as equally important factors in seeking to deal with or respond to groups and nations where “religion” is an identifiable actor in the issue being analyzed. Grasping this point is become more, rather than less, important in the current age, for, as the American National Intelligence Council’s Globalization and Future Architecture: Mapping the Global Future 2020 Project suggested: religious adherence is growing globally, rather than receding.3 Nowhere is this more true than in the study of salafism, where the motives and goals of the participants are explained away purely in terms of powerpolitics, ignoring the aspirations that are rooted deep in some Muslims’ interpretations of the theology and doctrines of the faith.4 So part of the motivation of studying how Britain has engaged with issues of Islamic governance is found in the desire to find a case study around which to investigate how theology might be appropriately be brought into relevant aspects of policy-making. Further impetus for choosing to study this particular field is found in the desire to better understand evolving British policy toward the threat posed by salafists in the years since 9/11. This area of policy-making has become one of the British government’s key strategic priorities as defined in Foreign Office’s paper UK International Priorities published in 2003. That paper assessed the “nexus between radicalism and technology” to be the greatest threat to British interests and as a consequence, “managing relations with the Islamic world” was emphasized as one of the important instruments in combating this threat.5 The outworkings of this policy have manifested themselves in the war in Afghanistan and in elements of its counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST.6 However one of the concerns to arise from the document, as Paul Williams points out, is that it “did not spell out what engagement with the Islamic world would entail.”7 It is against the background of this concern that this book seeks to address

Introduction

3

the strengths and weaknesses of previous approaches to questions of Islamic governance with a view to furnishing present policy-makers, commentators, politicians, and advisors with an evidence based rubric for effective engagement in this vital area. As such, the natural starting point for this investigation becomes the last time that the British government engaged in questions of Islamic governance. That time was the period of World War I and the era of the peace treaties that followed it. I am well aware of two possible pitfalls inherent in a study of this nature: firstly it can be argued that there is an essential weakness in trying to form current policy on the basis of historical situations. Clearly the geopolitical map and cultural circumstances will have altered immeasurably between the 1914–1949 period which is the focus of this book and the present day. However this book sidesteps that criticism by avoiding any comment on the policies themselves and instead, critiques the approach of the officials and ministers responsible for the policy-making. Such an approach instead makes comments on the problems of cross-cultural policy formulation, in this case British Whitehall culture with Islamic religious culture, rather than the policies that come out of those perceptions. The second criticism is that, as an “outsider,” it is impossible to say whether any of the concerns raised in this book are relevant to current policy-making in this area. In reply I would say that this book deliberately avoids passing judgment on current policy for precisely that reason. Instead, it critiques the approach of previous governments, whose files are available, in the hope that present administrations evaluate their own policies in the light of the questions that it raises. For, as Bullock articulates so incisively: I would hardly suggest that there were lessons one could automatically extract from the past and directly apply them to the present. Rather than teaching lessons, the study of history and familiarity with it, provides useful insights which give public policymakers a perspective on almost all our problems.8

This book is therefore using history as a means of furnishing ourselves with appropriate questions about our current approach to be asking in the present. The theology serves to illuminate the critique of the history. The period itself has been extensively examined by a range of scholars engaged in trying to find the roots of the present problems in the Middle East. Among all these publications, six warrant special mention both to highlight their contributions and to explain how this book fills in some of what those scholars have left out. In the late 1990’s, Azmi Özcan produced a fascinating study of the interrelationship between the Ottomans and the Indians, relating it to the question of why the Indians particularly were so upset about the tenuous situation of

4

Introduction

the Ottoman Caliphate following World War I. The study provides fascinating historical insight and meticulous research; however, it concentrates upon investigating the nature of the links between the interrelationship between the Indians and the Ottomans from a primarily sociological perspective rather than taking on the theological questions around Pan-Islamism and how it related to the Indian–British–Ottoman triangle.9 Naseem Qureshi’s examination of the Khalifat Movement provides a similar perspective to that of Özcan. However, he works from a more internal Indian perspective.10 Once again, though, Qureshi concentrates upon the political maneuverings, rather than the important theological discussions that are contained within some of the documents he mentions in passing. Niemeijer’s detailed study on the same subject matter as that of Qureshi once again concentrates on the politics, rather than discussing and analyzing the theology that lies behind the perspectives he documents so meticulously.11 Between 2003 and 2007, three other publications have focused upon the British Government files from the World War I and Peace Treaty periods, producing detailed studies of the “Caliphate Question” from differing perspectives: James Barr’s history of the Arab revolt examines British policy on the Arabian Peninsula and beyond from the perspective of military planning and strategy.12 In this historical account, the question of the Caliphate is absorbed into the primary focus of the book, which is the military and diplomatic maneuverings that were attempted in order to counter the Ottoman-German threat. Published just prior to James Barr’s work, two other publications have focused on the “Caliphate Question” from a political perspective. Firstly, Stephen Cox’s doctoral thesis reports and analyzes British diplomacy in relation to the “Caliphate Question” in the post-war years, through to the abolition of the institution in 1923.13 His primary focus is in explaining British policy in the Middle East in relation to the Arabs and how that impacted upon the settlement that was eventually arrived at. Secondly, Timothy Paris’ parallel study concentrates upon the post-war years from 1920 to 1925, examining the British backing of the Sharif of Mecca as the alternative candidate to the Ottoman Caliph, reporting and explaining their backing of the Sharif as well as their change in policy, in relation to their wider goals in the Middle East.14 Each of these studies, while illuminating in their own right, did not engage with the fundamental question that is most revealing of the underlying attitudes and approach of the British to the question of Pan-Islamic governance: the issue of the legitimacy or suitability for the post of the prospective British Caliphal candidate. This book engages with that issue and in so doing reveals those underlying British attitudes to questions of Islamic governance that they displayed as they walked into some of the most sensitive areas of debate in the whole field of Muslim theories of government: issues such as

Introduction

5

whether Muhammad intended a Caliphate to succeed him and, if so, what its remit should be. Thus, in order to effectively do its ostensively historical analysis, it is necessary for this book to engage with issues that have dominated news coverage in this new millennium. For the goal of the jihadis and salafists who have been so frequently the subject of media attention has been the reinstitution of a transnational, even global, Islamic government under a Caliph.15 In doing so these elements have directly targeted Western institutions and have waged a concerted propaganda campaign to persuade fellow Muslims and non-Muslims alike that such a form of government is not only a relevant and viable system of governance, but that it is also the duty of those who call themselves Muslim to engage in the struggle to create such an institution.16 This goal is not quite so remote as one might at first instinctively believe as back in late 2006, Nibras Kazimi reported that the chief of Al-Qa’ida in “Mesopotamia” had declared his allegiance to a new Muslim leader, who was given the title “Caliph.” At present, the “Caliph” is only known by his pseudonym, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, but his inaugural speech was released upon several different jihādi websites17 on December 22nd, 2006.18 It is claimed that the new “Caliph” has Quraishi lineage (one of the main requirements for legitimate candidature as will be seen later), and that he has made Osama bin Laden his “Chief of the mujahadin.”19 In Kazimi’s opinion, he is being groomed for the universal leadership of the Muslim world. While one comparatively small group acknowledging such a leader could reasonably be seen as of only minor importance in relation to the major global actors, the growing power of the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan would seem to suggest that the dream of a Caliphate in some form within the next two decades would not be entirely unrealizable.20 Indeed the previously mentioned NIC Global Architecture 2020 report predicts that a Caliphate will be created within that time frame.21 It is therefore both to examine the nature of this highly significant post on its own terms and to provide a basis for the critique in the chapters that follow that that the book opens with an examination of the theology and political theory of the Caliphate. Contained within this chapter are investigations of the etymological roots of the term “Caliph,” an examination of the Caliphate in the Qur’an and Hadith as well as a discussion of central questions such as whether Muhammad intended to name a successor or not. It also looks at the legitimization of the Caliph and how his role evolved over time. The focus for the chapter is to provide an understanding of the issues and concerns that the British officials and ministers were grappling with over the period this study examines. Although there will be some analysis of sources and opinions, the

6

Introduction

primary goal of this chapter is to expose the reader to the viewpoints of respected Muslim and non-Muslim scholars working in this field. A brief historical overview of Britain’s relations with Muslim governance, notably the Ottoman Empire in the pre–World War I era, opens the second chapter which goes on to make an in-depth analysis of four key documents from the British wartime files in Cairo that illuminate the views and understandings of the wartime government machinery in the Middle East on the Caliphate itself. These documents show how the British went about trying to separate the Ottoman Caliph from a universal claim to head the Sunni Muslim world, and shed light upon the range and sources of advice they were receiving during this period. It also begins to develop and engage with one of the central themes of the files from this period: the belief of British officials that they needed to appease Muslim interests in order to help maintain the security of the Empire. The myriad correspondence in the post-war era has been divided between two chapters. Chapter three dwells upon correspondence within the Foreign Office, Cabinet Office, and the Colonial Office, with a little input from the India Office. The central focus of this chapter is an analysis of the input from Professor Thomas Arnold, requested by the India Office and Foreign Office, as well as input from the Indian Khalifat Delegation. This chapter highlights the impact of Professor Arnold’s cultural perceptions upon the advice he was inputting to senior Whitehall officials and ministers (along with the Italian scholar, Professor Nallino, in the previous chapter). At the same time, it also exposes some of the astonishing lengths that Prime Minister Lloyd-George was willing to go to in order to secure Muslim support and examines the possible pitfalls of his approach. Chapter four leads directly on from Lloyd-George’s discussion with the Khilafat Delegation and seeks to analyze the intricate and illuminating correspondence within Whitehall concerning the wording of the “spiritual powers of the Caliph” section in the Treaty of Lausanne. This correspondence serves to bring into sharp focus the problems for the British government, who naturally see religion as a private affair and who separate church and state, in dealing with a perception of a governmental system or culture which does not accept the same premise. The correspondence therefore both vividly displays the struggles of the various officials in coming to terms with this alien mentality, but at the same time highlights many of the issues raised by the opening chapter concerning the role of the Caliph himself. The following chapter analyzes the later material, starting with a brief historical overview that contextualizes the changing world in which the later correspondence is taking place. The primary focus of the chapter is to analyze whether British ministers and officials had learned from their previous

Introduction

7

engagement in this delicate arena. At the same time, the chapter also engages with the vexed issue of balancing the needs of potentially vulnerable people against state or transnational actors’ strategic interests. The concluding chapter pulls together the major themes and analysis from the previous chapters, drawing out conclusions on the nature of the Caliphate itself, but focusing primarily on the central themes of the book: the strengths and weaknesses of past British engagement with issues of Islamic governance. In so doing it outlines a series of questions to be asked by present policy-makers of their own approach to this area. It further seeks to propose a series of principals that need to frame an effective engagement between the British Government and Islamic governing institutions specifically and between Western governments and religious communities in a wider context. As was stated at the opening of this introduction, this book is not written with a desire to criticize current British policy. The level of information required to make such an analysis has not been available. However, what it instead does is to create a background understanding of past approaches which both present a window into historical Whitehall approaches to this issue and propose a framework within which a healthy and necessary engagement in this complex area can be negotiated, whilst avoiding some of the potentially disastrous mistakes of our forebears. It is hoped that this will be a constructive contribution to framing policy in this field.

NOTES 1. Jonathan Fox, “World Separation of Religion and State Into the Twenty-first Century” in Comparative Political Studies, Volume 39, June 2006, 537–69. This article has subsequently been expanded into the book A World Survey of Religion and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 2. Ibid, 57. 3. National Intelligence Council, “Globalization and Future Architecture: Mapping the Global Future 2020 Project,” November 2006, downloaded from www.nic .com, 33–35. The report opines that Western Europe is the possible exception to that general dynamic; however, if scholars such as Eric Kaufmann are to be believed, Europe is also becoming more religious, not through conversion, but because religious adherents are having more children than those who are not. Scholars have dubbed this the “Second Demographic Transition Theory.” See E. Kaufmann, “Breeding for God,” Prospect, November 2006, 26–30. 4. In her article in Foreign Policy Analysis, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd argued that the impact of Islamic resurgence upon the West was that it challenged the notion of the separation of religion and politics. Whilst one would agree with that assessment, it also misses the fact that political Islam is not simply a challenge to Western thinking, but that

8

Introduction

its aspirations are in conflict with the system of democratic politics that currently exists. Thus, the important observation that the West needs to re-think its way of engaging with a different cultural mindset should not divert attention from the attendant challenge that underpins their ideology. E. Shukman Hurd, “Political Islam and Foreign Policy in Europe and the United States,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 3, Issue 4 (2007), 345–67. 5. UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO (London: HMSO, 2003), 30–39. 6. The aims and remit of CONTEST are laid out at the British Home Office website: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/. 7. P. D. Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour 1997–2005 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 23. 8. P. J. Beck, Using History, Making British Policy: The Treasury and the Foreign Office 1950–1976 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 242, quoting A. Bullock, Has History a Future? (Aspen, CO: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, n.d.), 4. 9. A. Ӧzcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottoman Empire and Britain (1877–1924) (Leiden, New York, Koln: Brill, 1997). 10. M. N. Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1999). 11. A. C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919–1924 (Leiden: sGravenhage: Nederlandsche Boek–en Steendrukkerij and Smits, 1972). 12. J. Barr, Setting the Desert on Fire: T. E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918 (London: Bloomsbury, 2006). 13. S. Cox, The Idea of an Arab Caliphate in British Middle Eastern Policy in the Era of the Great War (Durham: Durham University Press, 2003). 14. T. J. Paris, Britain, The Hashemites, and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003). 15. Since the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent attacks in Europe and Bali, coverage of jihadi activity along with salafist ideology has dominated news broadcasts along with climate change and environmental issues. Statistical evidence for this is hard to find, but the brief analysis by John Robertson of news coverage between BB1, ITV, and Channel Four over two months in 2004 (at the height of the Iraq War) does provide some snapshot data which displays this phenomenon clearly. www.fifth-estateonline.co.uk/criticsm/illuminatingordimming.html. 16. Articles such as David Selbourne’s in The Spectator highlight this clearly. D. Selbourne, “The Islamists are Winning,” The Spectator, July 19th, 2006. 17. The term “jiha-di websites” is defined as internet sites that are either run by or sympathetic to the goals and ideology of terrorist or militant Muslim networks. This definition is based upon the understanding of the term as expressed by Stephen Ulph, Senior Research Fellow at the Washington based think-tank on terrorism The Jamestown Foundation on their website www.jamestown.org. 18. As reported on Nibras Kazimi’s blog www.talismangate.blogspot.com. Cited in Prospect Magazine, February 2007, 19.

Introduction

9

19. Osama bin Laden is not Quraishi and therefore could not claim the Caliphate for himself. This concept will be dealt with in far more detail in the section on theology and political theory that follows this introduction. 20. The Daily Times (a Pakistani English language paper) reported a rally in Islamabad organized by the “Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan” in which it called its members to establish a worldwide Caliphate beginning in Pakistan. Reuters, “SSP vows to Establish Caliphate Worldwide” Daily Times, April 8th, 2006. This was followed a month later by the news that Lebanon’s then Interior Minister, Ahmad Fatfat, had given clearance for Hizb ut-Tahrir to use Lebanon as a base from which to restore the Caliphate. As reported on www.beruitbeltway.com, accessed July 5, 2006. 21. NIC, Global Architecture 2020, 4–5.

Section I

THE CONCEPT AND EXECUTION OF “AUTHORITY” IN ISLAM: THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Chapter One

The Caliphate in Political Theory

This chapter is a study of the Caliphate which examines the origins of the office in the Qur’an and Hadith, before moving on to look at how it developed over the centuries. In order to do that, it focuses on the main scriptures that reference the Caliphate and analyzes what Muslim exegetes have said about them before turning to the later works of political theory. The aim of the chapter is to enable a firm grasp of the main issues that lie at the heart of the Caliphate as an institution as well as to understand its position in the place of the ummah both in its early phase, right through to when the British began to engage with it.

INTRODUCTION In the final death throes of the Caliphate in 1924, Mustafa Kemal sought to explain the nature of the direction he was taking with regard to the Caliphate in a speech before the newly inaugurated Turkish National Assembly: Our Prophet has instructed his disciples to convert the nations of the world to Islam; he has not ordered them to provide for the government of those nations. Never did such an idea pass through his mind. Caliphate means government and administration. A Caliph who really wants to play his role, to govern and administer all Muslim nations finds himself at a loss how to manage this. I must confess that in these conditions, if they appointed me as the Caliph, I would have immediately resigned. . . . The notion of a single Caliph exercising supreme religious authority over all the Muslim people, is one which has come out of books, not reality. The Caliph has never exercised over Muslims a power similar to that held by the Pope over the Catholics. Our religion has neither the same requirements, nor the same discipline as Christianity. The criticisms 13

14

Chapter One

provoked by our recent reform [separating the Caliphate from the Sultanate] are inspired by an abstract, unreal idea: the idea of Pan-Islamism. Such an idea has never been translated into reality.1

Shortly after this speech the Caliphate was abolished. In the same period the Turkish National Assembly produced a document that quotes extensively from the Hadith and Shaafi’ite shari’a in order to justify its abolition.2 Its main points follow the themes laid out by Atatturk above; firstly, that the Caliphate was not divinely ordained, simply designed to effectively administer. Secondly, that the real Caliphate lasted only thirty years after the death of Muhammad himself. Thirdly, that for the vast majority of Islamic history, there had been a “fictitious” Caliphate, based entirely on force and coercion; and fourthly, that the Caliphate had now outlived its usefulness so Muslims should be free to choose whatever new method of administration was deemed appropriate.3 This chapter will therefore serve two interconnected purposes: firstly, it will form a foundation to validate or refute the allegations made by Atatturk. Secondly, it will create an understanding of the nature of the Caliphate that will become the basis for the analysis of the British government files in subsequent chapters.

THE CALIPHATE IN THE QUR’AN According to the Concordance of the Qur’an Volume 1, there are nine uses of the masculine noun khalifah in the Qur’an,4 of which two, 2:30 and 38:26, are cited most often when discussing the nature of the Caliphate. This is perhaps because these two verses are the only two of the nine in which the term could be said to be applying to an individual, rather than a group.5 However, of these two it has been suggested that Q2:30 might also be talking generally about the human race, leaving Q38:26 as the sole āyah where the term is applied specifically to one person.6 Given that Q2:30 and Q38:26 are so frequently cited in analysis concerning the Caliphate, it is important to analyze their interpretation to ascertain what light the Qur’an itself throws onto the nature and remit of the Caliphate. Of the various translations and exegetical works on each of these two verses, opinion is broadly agreed that in Q2:30, the reference to Adam paints a negative picture of him and his successors insofar as the Angels fear the character and impact of God’s choice as His vicegerent on Earth: Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: “I will create a vicegerent on earth.” They said: “Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood?—whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)?” He said: “I know what ye know not.”7

The Caliphate in Political Theory

15

According to al-Tabari, who usefully bases his exegesis on the collected opinions of Ibn Abbas, Ibn Ishaq, al-Rabi, Ibn-Sabit, and Ibn Zaid, the general belief was not that Adam himself was corrupted, but that his successors would be.8 Al-Tabari himself finds this viewpoint hard to maintain, choosing to take the view that in creating Adam as His vicegerent Allah knew the possibility of either Adam or his successors becoming corrupted existed.9 This interpretation leaves open the possibility of both individual Caliphs, as well as having the whole of humanity being Caliphs. Ibn Kathir is certain that the verse is referring to humanity as a whole, rather than Adam specifically, and indeed goes so far as to specify that those who think that Adam alone is being described as Caliph must be wrong.10 It is interesting to note that in note four of his translator’s footnotes Daryabadi is keen to make absolutely clear that Allah did not intend humankind to be His vicegerents: rather He simply stated that humans with their failings would succeed one another and that those who ruled would do so under God’s law, rather than on His behalf.11 This interpretation is certainly supportable in the wording of the āyah. However, there is perhaps the whiff of scholarly self-interest in his exegesis here given the long-running struggle between the Caliphs and the Islamic jurists for dogmatic hegemony over the Islamic Empire that will be examined more fully later. In the modern era, both Muhammad Asad and Sayyid Qutb have also sought to explain the verse in the same terms, deploying the concept that Allah is handing over the headship of the earth to mankind in general, rather than to Adam and a specific line in particular.12 So from the exegesis outlined above, it seems that Q2:30 would be better placed with the other seven āyahs that also talk about mankind collectively as Caliphs as opposed to applying it as the doctrinal foundation for the legitimate headship of a single leader of the ummah. Indeed the picture of Adam’s descendents and the integrity of their vicegerency as understood from this āyah appears rather poor. The last remaining reference to a Caliph in the Qur’an however does appear to point to a special, divinely appointed post with a specific function at the head of the community; O David! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on earth: so judge thou between men in truth (and justice): Nor follow thou the lusts (of thy heart), for they will mislead thee from the Path of Allah: for those who wander astray from the Path of Allah, is a Penalty Grievous, for that they forget the Day of Account.13

More than any other Qur’anic reference, this āyah specifies the Caliphate not as a headship over nature for mankind in general, but rather as a post at the head of a human community with the specific task of acting as judge. It is important to note that there is no mention of the vicegerent having either military or administrative functions.

16

Chapter One

There is general agreement amongst the more modern commentators and translators that this āyah concerns David alone. This āyah is part of a passage in which David is being admonished for not performing the duties of a Caliph as a judge.14 So while the Caliph’s role as judge is divinely ordained by implication, those seeking to justify an explicitly articulated, divinely ordained geopolitical remit for the Caliphate will be disappointed as the āyah gives no further clues as to his functions. The omission of other functions such as defense of the faith and administrative issues does not imply absence of the function, rather, irrelevance to the situation that the āyah is speaking into. Therefore, those seeking to justify theocratic authority in the functions of the Caliph would need to look in different parts of Islamic scripture. While this modern interpretation is not unreasonable, the medieval exegete Ibn Kathir suggests a slightly different understanding. He argues this āyah is general advice to all Muslim rulers to rule with justice for fear of what will happen to them on the Day of Reckoning.15 That argument becomes the basis for his claim that the Caliph has a “higher calling by Allah,” thereby implying that the Caliph could not be judged by other men for his actions. In this hypothesis lie early hints at a doctrine of Caliphal infallibility.16 This brief survey seems to suggest therefore that the Qur’an does not give clear guidance on the position of the Caliph as the supreme leader of the ummah. What can be understood is that, when the Caliphate is being discussed in terms of single leadership, the role of judge is certainly involved. Within the context of the discussion of Q4:59 in Appendix A, these āyahs do not seem to offer any discernible link between “those in authority” and the Caliphate itself, nor do they offer any general guidance upon how the role of headship over the ummah is to be carried out. Thus, there is no discernable link in the Qur’an between the chain of command seen in Q4:59 and the specific role of the Caliph. Therefore, in the light of the paucity of scriptural foundation for the Caliphate in the Qur’an itself, it is necessary to examine other sources of evidence in order to fully understand the role of the Caliph. The first source is the etymology of the title itself, the analysis of which helps to develop an understanding of how early Muslims came to see the Caliphate as a legitimate source of leadership following the demise of Muhammad.

ETYMOLOGY OF “KHALIFAH” In his seminal Arabic dictionary published in the late nineteenth century, Edward Lane defines the meaning of the word “khalifah” (given in his diction-

The Caliphate in Political Theory

17

ary as “khaliyfatun”) as “successor and vice-agent, vice-gerent, lieutenant, substitute, proxy, or deputy”17 before going on to list all the possible interpretations of the word based upon Arab grammatical, poetic, and exegetical sources. He also explains why the meaning of the word must be masculine, even though it has a feminine ending.18 The fact that Lane arrives at no definite conclusion between the possibilities of either “successor” or “deputy,” even after his exhaustive research, is useful to bear in mind given the Crone and Hinds versus Goldziher and Paret discussions on the term outlined further on in this chapter. Turning to other notable Arabic dictionaries, Penrice and Wehr basically agree in their definitions for each of the verbal root forms although the variations between them perhaps show the changing cultural climates in which they were written. Penrice offers a freer translation of his Form I root: “To be behind, come after, to succeed” (although the final translation can only be made if “fî” is present). Wehr applies a narrower initial definition: “To be the successor,” which he follows with broader, cultural translations. This more modern and perhaps more directly political interpretation highlights the dynamic that can be seen in the translations of Q4:59 (Appendix B), where tighter, politically oriented definitions are used in modern Arabic translation in a way that earlier scholars were content to leave more open to individual interpretation. Having explained the Form I root, Wehr and Penrice then move on to define the other seven derived verb forms, attaching definitions for each which fundamentally agree although only Wehr includes “deputy” amongst his possible translations.19 Why Penrice omits this interpretation is unknown. In contrast to these grammarians and translators, Crone and Hinds have attempted to show that the only legitimate theological translation of the title must be “deputy” based upon the assertion that the earliest recorded use of the title in Arab culture is pre-Islamic, where the term “khilafa” denoted a “representative” or “deputy” of the sayyid.20 Their evidence, based upon historical record as well as Qur’anic reference (Q2:30 and Q38:26 given earlier), is impressive and is in line with the views of Watt, who bases much of his evidence upon pre-Islamic Arab poetry.21 However, Crone and Hinds go further than Watt appears prepared to do, concluding that the title was “Deputy of God,” right from the outset. Their evidence is based upon three main points: firstly, that the title is documented for all Umayyad Caliphs who ruled for more than one year; secondly, that it was the official designation for the Umayyad head of state; and thirdly, that it was well known what the title stood for, even when the word “Caliph” was used on its own.22 They further suggest that the title “Deputy of the Prophet of God” also begins to appear at this time.23

18

Chapter One

Rather than underlining the confidence they portray, the picture that emerges on the basis of their evidence is a loose understanding of “leadership” but with little real sense of whether that authority is derived from Allah or Muhammad. Crone and Hinds conclude that the Caliph inherited both the spiritual and temporal power of Muhammad. This conclusion is also in line with Tyan, who quotes from Ibn Khaldun24 and could be seen to be evidenced in Binder’s assertion that early Muslim writers did not engage with the question of power because the spiritual and temporal were interwoven so closely.25 The fact that the Sunni Caliphs later lost their spiritual power to the ‘ulamā and their temporal power to the Sultans does not, for Crone and Hinds, change the fact that this was not the way that the office began.26 An alternative view is offered by Goldziher and Paret who both claim that “successor” is the legitimate translation based upon its Qur’anic usage.27 However, the references they supply as evidence for their theory are by no means as clear as they suggest, particularly as they include Q2:30 and Q38:26 which were also cited by their opponents. Goldziher and Paret are not alone in their assertion, for Professor Arnold also takes the view that the title “Caliph” meant “successor,” based upon both the Qur’anic references already cited, but also upon three further references.28 Even in his apparent agreement though, it is important to note that he accepts that the references he cites are open to interpretation.29 However, Arnold’s contribution to the debate is most valuable in terms of the sources he uses to base his scholarly discussion upon, for he concentrates upon the extensive stories surrounding the Caliphate contained in the Hadith which other scholars only mention in passing.30 Between these two opposing groups of scholars, Bernard Lewis places himself outside of either school, electing instead to define “khalifa” as “deputy, replacement and successor,” from the verbal root “to pass on.”31 He is keen to point out the title’s pre-Islamic existence, citing the Arabic inscription which bears the title and which is also cited by Crone and Hinds.32 This evidence appears to provide ample proof that the notion of delegation or succession of authority pre-existed Islam in Arabic culture, although whether this in itself is enough evidence to support the notion of an intended succession following the death of Muhammad is questionable. In one sense, the extended discussion upon the exact meaning of the original Arabic word might be deemed obscure. However, a conclusive answer to the intended meaning of the word also speaks into the wider issue of legitimization. For if the title “Deputy” was indeed the common designation of the Caliphs, rather than “successor,” then the source of legitimization becomes different: the Caliph as “deputy” is responsible to whomever he is deputizing for, rather than the “successor” who simply follows on from his predecessor. Further, within the title “deputy” is the tension implied by “Deputy of God” against “Deputy of the Prophet of God,” which also suggests a lessening of

The Caliphate in Political Theory

19

the importance of Muhammad himself as a source of legitimacy: the deputy” of God is very different to the deputy of the Prophet of God. Given the volume of scholarship that has examined this etymological question over more than a century without being able to come to a clear opinion, it seems perhaps unreasonable to provide a definite answer here. However, given the fact that both Penrice and Wehr give the Kha-Lam-Fa root of the word as meaning “to follow on,” it would seem likely that the word “successor” should be the natural translation given that it displays a clear linguistic link between the root and the word “khilafah” itself. Other arguments for “deputy” are based upon cultural, rather than linguistic, understandings. What seems beyond question however is that whatever the early Muslims understood by the term “khilafah,” it came into usage in the ummah with an already known and accepted cultural understanding which pre-dated Islam. Thus, with the cultural and the linguistic strands interwoven, the notion that the Caliph was both following on from Muhammad and acting in the name of either Allah directly, or via Muhammad, seems unimpeachable. What is more open to interpretation is the centrality of Muhammad himself in the legitimization process. For it is only the context of the discussion on the Qur’anic revelations and their reference to the chain of command from Allah, through Muhammad to those “who were in authority,” at Appendix A that go some way toward satisfying this issue.

DID MUHAMMAD INTEND TO NAME A SUCCESSOR? Having teased out some kernels through etymological and Qur’anic investigation, it is time to turn to the central questions surrounding the Caliphate: did Muhammad intend to have a successor as head of the new community? Secondly, what parts of Muhammad’s role would the Caliph assume? These central questions have never been conclusively answered and much of the controversy surrounding the perceived necessity for the office has arisen because of this. The first of these questions can be examined by reference to the Hadith. Many of the traditions which deal with the Caliphate are recorded conversations with rashidūn Caliphs such as ‘Umar and Abu Bakr, leaving only one or two reports in the canonical collections that could be traced back to Muhammad himself. Given that we are trying to ascertain Muhammad’s personal feelings on the Caliphate, it is therefore only those reports that can be considered relevant as far as this study is concerned. This paucity of references on this subject seems somewhat surprising in light of the significance of the office. What is perhaps even more surprising, within that same context, is that Muhammad’s statements concerning the

20

Chapter One

Caliphate are fascinatingly ambiguous;33 for in each of the Hadith quoted below, there is no theological justification provided for the creation of the Caliphate. It appears from the wording that Muhammad is simply assuming that the Caliphate will come into existence and is giving direction as to its form: Narrated by Abu Huraira, “The Prophet said, ‘The Jews used to be ruled and guided by prophets: whenever a prophet died, another would take his place. There will be no prophets after me, but there will be Caliphs who will increase in number.’”34 Narrated by Ibn ‘Umar, “Allah’s Apostle said, ‘This matter (Caliphate) will remain with the Quraish even if only two of them are existing.’”35 Narrated by Abu Sa’id Al-Khudri, “The Prophet said, ‘Allah never sends a prophet or gives the Caliphate to the Caliph but that he (the prophet or Caliph) has two groups of advisors: A group advising him to do good . . . and the other group advising him to do evil. . . . But the protected person is the one protected by Allah.’”36

These Hadith are fascinating both because of what they say and what they leave out. For, on the one hand, Muhammad sees the need for a continuing leadership of the ummah, but he is apparently very careful to exclude from them the authority of prophethood, even though he suggests that the Caliph will be carrying on some form of leadership.37 No powers are defined, and no specification is made concerning who his successors might be, other than naming one source of legitimization for the Caliph: the need to be of the Quraishi line. The whole tone of these reports suggests that Muhammad has accepted that they will exist rather than deciding to create the institution in an Islamic context, setting out a remit and then enthusiastically endorsing the post. At the same time, this observation sits uncomfortably with the report found in Sir William Muir’s history of the Caliphate, which suggests that Muhammad had nominated Abu Bakr as Caliph when the former became ill, asking Abu Bakr to lead Friday prayers and, by implication, take over the leadership of the ummah.38 This account, while presenting problems of historicity, reveals a picture of a Caliphate that is endorsed and actively planned for by a dying leader. In the light of the difficulties encountered in trying to establish the Islamic origins of the post, many historians and scholars of Islam have chosen to avoid this question altogether. For example, in her part of the entry for “khilafa” in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Dominique Sourdel begins her article with the fact of Abu Bakr’s succession after the death of Muhammad

The Caliphate in Political Theory

21

in 632CE, adding the title which he took: “khilafat rasul allah” (Deputy of the Prophet of God) and noting the conventional Muslim account that he was acclaimed in the Great Mosque following his election by the other leading companions. She therefore chooses to avoid the issue of whether Muhammad ever named, or intended to name, a successor at all. Other scholars such as Rosenthal have felt able to state that Muhammad did not make provision for a successor, moving on to underline the fact that, as a consequence, the legitimate leadership of the Islamic community was a central issue.39 Rosenthal offers no reason for Muhammad’s inaction in this important area, although Lewis finds a possible explanation in the prevailing Arab leadership culture of the time: he suggests that Muhammad knew that the question would be decided after his death by those in charge of the ummah and, not wanting get embroiled in politics, or suffer the humiliation of having his nominee rejected, he chose to avoid the issue altogether.40 This very reasonable explanation is somewhat undermined by the evidence presented by Muir discussed earlier. However, Lewis’ assessment is in line with that of Madelung, who further adds that Muhammad did not name a successor because he either did not believe he was about to die or was expecting a revelation about who would take over from him, which never came.41 Whatever the truth may be, it is quite clear that the early Caliphs came to power in differing ways, although the common elements of acclamation and taking of the oath of fealty appear to be present in every account.42 This fact in itself would point to a lack of direction by Muhammad in regard to what would happen after his death, although could not be taken as conclusive proof as it could be argued that Muhammad did set out instructions which were either lost, ignored, or subsumed under the factional struggles that dogged the early Caliphate.43 The answer to the second question concerning what powers the Caliph is deemed to have inherited from Muhammad was the subject of extraordinary tension between the religious scholars and the Caliphs for several hundred years, an overview of which is examined below.

WHAT WAS THE REMIT OF THE CALIPHS AND HOW DID IT DEVELOP? In order to be able to answer the question, it is necessary to briefly mention what the role of Muhammad himself was. This is difficult due to the paucity of evidence, however, the following aspects of his leadership are broadly agreed upon by scholars, based upon evidence from the Constitution of Medina, Hadiths, and the Qur’an itself: Judge, Military Commander, Prophet,

22

Chapter One

Spiritual Guide and “Head.”44 It should be noted, however that it is by no means clear what aspects of these roles he took on at any given time. Some clues outside of sayings by Muhammad himself do provide a few insights upon how the earliest Caliphs saw their role.45 There are many instances in the Hadith of the rashidūn Caliphs fighting physically both against the infidel and apostasy thereby indicating that Muhammad’s leadership in battle and the right to declare war on behalf of the ummah appear to have been inherited by the Caliphs.46 Similarly, the fact that there are instances of Caliphs administrating justice and distributing land indicates that they inherited the administrative functions of running the ‘ummah from Muhammad (a right which has never been disputed by the ‘ulamā).47 It is also interesting to note that they appear to have been able to interpret and even add to some of the religious ritual that was instituted by Muhammad. A prime example of this would be the addition of sacrifices to the Hajj ritual that were not included in Muhammad’s rites.48 These nuggets seem to suggest that the early Caliphs inherited Muhammad’s administrative and military functions as well as being able to develop religious practice in relation to ritual. However, whether this ability to develop ritual could be said to constitute “religious authority” is hard to say. What is certain is that the Caliphs did not take any notions of prophethood to themselves.

BY WHAT RIGHT DID THE CALIPH RULE? This question has two facets: firstly, how was the notion of the Caliphate justified in Islamic political theory and, secondly, how was the right to succession developed and legitimized? How was the notion of the Caliphate justified in Islamic political theory? The theory of the Caliphate can be analyzed using Lambton’s part of the “khilafah” entry in the EI2. Lambton’s central argument is that the political doctrine of the Caliphate was developed in relation to opposition to it, either internal or external. The writings of those Muslim scholars Lambton cites are of fundamental importance in understanding how the Caliphate developed over the course of the centuries, both for their own sake and in terms of the British documents that follow, so it is worthwhile spending some time on them.

The Caliphate in Political Theory

23

The first name given is Ibn Muqaffa (d.756)49: according to Lambton his book kitab as-sahaba50 represents the first political treatise written in an Islamic context, although it could be argued that Hasan al-Basri’s qadar is in fact the first.51 However, scholars have dismissed al-Basri’s work on the grounds that it is almost exclusively theological, whereas Muqaffa writes to explore a contextualized approach within the parameters of the developing doctrines of the new religion.52 In Muqaffa’s book, written against the background of growing Abbasid power, he argues that the Caliph has the right to be obeyed even if he contradicts the Qur’an.53 The justification for this line of argument is hard to find, but Lambton suggests that Muqaffa’s argument was borne out of a need to create stability through strong leadership at the top.54 Given the fact that the Islamic Empire had been through a period of civil war, Lambton’s argument here certainly makes sense. However in relation to the discussion by British officials analyzed later, it is important to see that even at this early stage of Abbasid authority, the word of the Caliph begins to supersede the authority even of the Revealed Word. The many commentators who have noticed this dynamic attribute it to the influence of Persian culture, which was the geographical base of Abbasid power.55 This theory is not unreasonable given the obvious impact that was seen on dress, court etiquette, and administrative structure. Their argument, as detailed by Lambton and Watt, amongst others, is that, with the conquest of Persia, the strong pre-existent imperial culture of the conquered provided a place for the Caliphate to develop from the primarily Arabian tribal model under the Umayyads, which was unable to cope with the administrative requirements of an empire, to a Persian model, that was already developed and sophisticated in the art of imperial administration.56 In this context, so the argument goes, the noticeable increase in the “Islamization” of the Empire that the scholars also see happening is viewed as a replacement of Zoroastrian Cosmological Kingship, with a new Muslim style of headship in the style of a monarchy. Whether one accepts this very plausible theory as an explanation for the changing court culture or not, there can be little doubt that this era saw the Caliphate move into a period of “sovereign regalia” as it was endowed with a weighty imperial symbolism that, perhaps more than anything else, signified the fusion between Islamic leadership and Persian sovereignty. Arnold describes how the Sceptre and the Seal, along with the “Mantle of the Prophet,” became part of the Caliph’s official regalia.57 Sourdel adds in her historical section that the Caliphs began to wear and carry other symbolic regalia; principal amongst them were the first chains of office, the mantle, sceptre, high

24

Chapter One

bonnet, and a copy of the ‘Uthmanic Qur’an. At the same time, the practice of kissing the carpet when in audience with the Caliph was also brought in and the chief of police began to carry the “Lance of the Prophet.” Lambton suggests that the Caliph still retained spiritual authority through the reciting of the prayers in the Great Mosque and going on the Pilgrimage (going on pilgrimage was later delegated)58, and Sourdel ascribes him the title “guardian of dogma” which brought with it a leading role in the construction of doctrine59 as well as continuing to conduct campaigns against the infidel and rebels. However, he increasingly delegated these areas of authority to his Qadis. Thus, the neat picture of an end to Caliphal input into doctrine with the demise of the “rightly-guided Caliphs” supplied by the ‘ulamā seems somewhat at odds with the picture painted by the scholars here. It is against this background that the work of the next name on Lambton’s list is written: Abu Yusuf (d. 798)60. Her inclusion of his work kitab al-kharaj is presumably upon the basis that it is the first known book by a religious jurist. Two noteworthy points come out of this: the first is that it was commissioned by Harun al-Rashid.61 The very fact that the Caliph is asking for advice from a religious jurist is fascinating, for, as was mentioned earlier, the Caliphate and religious scholars had been in an almost continuous battle for control of dogma and theological control from the very earliest years of the Caliphate.62 The second interesting point feeds into the previous point, for Abu Yusuf uses the opportunity that his Caliph presents him to emphasize that the Caliph was accountable to Allah.63 At the same time, however, Yusuf dispenses with the need for election as one of the qualifications for the Caliphate, choosing to highlight instead the concept of “Divine Appointment.” Lambton suggests that this notion of divine appointment was one of the early catalysts for the later perception of the Caliph as “the Shadow of God on Earth.”64 Abu Yusuf’s discussion focuses upon questions of taxation and justice, linking the correct administration of both to the well-being of the Islamic state as a whole.65 The subtext to such a discussion clearly carries the notion that administration is the purview of the Caliph, while religious questions are for the jurists. This appears to be the first time that such an explicit defining of the relationship between Caliph and ‘ulamā is made. It is clear that later Abbasid Caliphs such as al-Ma’mun (d. 833) continued to take a very active role in ensuring the religious orthodoxy, setting up a state inquisition whose job it was to ensure the Caliph’s authority in religious ritual and doctrine.66 Therefore, to some extent, the Caliph’s role as head of the ummah must have continued in the ninth century at least in order for him to have been able to order a state inquisition to safeguard doctrine. The inclusion of al-Djahiz (d. 868)67 in Lambton’s list of important contributions to Muslim political theory perhaps betrays her own interest in the impact of Persian and Greek philosophies upon Muslim thinking. Djahiz sought to pull

The Caliphate in Political Theory

25

together Arab, Greek and Persian theories into a rounded treatise on the nature and responsibility of power at a time when the Caliph’s power was waning.68 It is in this context that Djahiz reiterated that the Caliph was very much under the authority of the scripture and law.69 This reiteration of the Caliph’s subordination to God seems to have been both a reference back to the early period of Islamic rule, in line with Q4:59, and also a jurist using his opportunity to push the scholars’ viewpoint. In this al-Djahiz can be seen to be in the same school of heavily Greek influenced Muslim scholars as al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rashd. This belief in the importance of the Greek influence is also shared by both Rosenthal and Arnold.70 However, in the realm of political theory at least, Watt is particularly keen to relegate the Greek influence to the sidelines.71 He bases his argument on the fact that, if the above named philosophers were so influenced by the Greeks, then they could not be termed “Islamic political thoughts.” In the general line of Lambton’s argument toward the adjustment of theory to adverse circumstances, the inclusion of al-Mawardi (d. 1058)72 seems questionable; for he was not writing at a time of crisis.73 That having been said, al-Mawardi was writing at a time when the Abbasid rulers were attempting to take back more power for themselves, struggling against the influence of the ‘ulamā and the growing power of individual Muslim ministers and princes. His argument in “al-ahkam al-Sultaniyya w’al-wilayat al-Diniyya” centers around the premise that authority was delegated by God to the Caliph and only he has the power to delegate it further.74 Thus the inclusion of alMawardi is not tangential, but rather another important facet in understanding Lambton’s core theme in this entry: the notion that Islamic political theory was developed in response to the geopolitical circumstance of the time. As for al-Mawardi himself, the importance of his work is reflected in the way this same theme recurs in Muslim political theory thereafter, a clear example of which is seen in the work of al-Ghazali (d. 1111)75. Al-Ghazali’s work is interesting insofar as he both echoes al-Marwardi, but adapts it for the altered circumstances he was writing in, for he deals with the existence of the Sultans as the new holders of supreme power through the concept that the Caliph was now the ultimate expression of the supremacy of the shari’a, whereas the Sultan was now the holder of “coercive power.”76 This is important for it shows clearly the pattern of reactive philosophy that Lambton described at the beginning of her article: the power of the Sultans could not be ignored and therefore the theorists sought to justify the reality rather than reiterating the ideal. At the same time al-Ghazali highlights the need for Muslim rulers, including the Sultan to acknowledge the symbolic headship of the Caliph. This reflected the need for Muslim rulers to be able to receive their legitimization in a clear line direct from Allah, through Muhammad, to his representative. This position is consistent with the concepts that are drawn out of the discussion upon Q4:59 in Appendix A.77

26

Chapter One

The final two names that Lambton lists, Ibn Djama’a (d. 1333)78 and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328)79, both wrote after Baghdad had fallen and their chief importance lies in the way that they sought to continue to justify the notion of Muslim obedience to non-Muslim authority, not through a reinterpretation of Q4:59, but through the adaptation of the “Doctrine of the Sword.”80 This change is significant insofar as they assert the right of non-Muslims to be obeyed by Muslims if the non-Muslim is the most powerful group and permit religious freedom, an ideological standpoint later used by David LloydGeorge as shall be seen later. Lambton’s history of Muslim political theory as outlined here seems both plausible and rigorous; however, any approach to the development of political theory that charts an intellectual history of ideas needs also to demonstrate that the theoretical impacted the actual. In the case of Mukaffa for example, if Goitein’s supposition is correct, it had the opposite effect to the one desired insofar as the advice was rejected and the author was executed. Does that therefore render Mukaffa’s inclusion void? Especially when the entire theory that Lambton is proposing is based upon the concept of justification after the fact, rather than the influencing of the way forward. This criticism is not unjustified, yet, at the same time, Ignaz Goldziher is able to cite specific instances of Caliph’s taking actions as a direct result of the theories outlined by the scholars outlined above.81 It seems therefore that Lambton’s intellectual history can be justified through the work of Goldziher. The Caliph was therefore not seen as being above the law, but rather, the leader of the community who was also bound by it; a philosophy which allowed for rebellion and overthrow if he was not obedient to it. This notion of contract could be seen in the bay’a, the oath of obedience between Caliph and community, but, as time and circumstance moved on, the relationship between Caliph and community was developed in the light of events. The classic defense of Abbasid authority, al-Mawardi’s Ordinances of Government, is a prime example of this dynamic.82 Frequently, the events through which the political theory was being worked out were adverse rather than positive, leading the critical observer to suggest that the theories were simply justifications after the fact, rather than theorist, theologians and jurists attempting to grapple with developing doctrine on its own terms. This accusation, while not perhaps inaccurate, ignores the other side of the same argument which is the practical understanding of any relationship and the interpretation of it being re-examined in the light of circumstances which were not part of the original scenario. The primary tension over the whole period up to the fall of Baghdad focused around the extent to which the Caliph was sovereign and/or spiritual leader, an issue over which they competed with the jurists and scholars for many centuries.

The Caliphate in Political Theory

27

How Was the Right to Succession Developed and Legitimized? In the early stage, other than the requirement for Quraishi lineage and the tradition of “election” and “acclamation,” legitimization of the Caliph’s rule seems to have been based upon the character of the candidate. There appears to have been little or no use of symbolic regalia.83 However, there are also tantalizing allusions in a few Hadith to the presence of a ring of office passed from Caliph to Caliph until it was lost down a well in the reign of ‘Uthman. Such symbols of office even at this early stage perhaps speak of an institution that was quickly passing from a caretaker leadership to a powerful office in its own right.84 Under that growing power, the murder of ‘Uthman posed a fundamental question for the new and increasingly powerful religio-political institution: could a Caliph be deposed for neglect of duty? For the Khawaridj Sect, the argument was very straightforward: the Caliph was responsible for his actions and must not deviate from ordinances of divine origin.85 However, Mu’awiya argued that arbitration was a legitimate tool of succession and validation. His precedent was followed by his Ummayad successors, who, once they were in power, sought to eradicate the notion of “moral justification” as the right to rule and succeeded in replacing it with a hereditary succession that incorporated the bay’a.86 Under this system, the successor was named by the Caliph, either a son or close male relative, who was then acclaimed by the nobility who then swore an oath to him.87 This later developed under Abd al-Malik, who replaced the bay’a with an ‘ali ‘l-‘ahd or electoral contract between the ruler and community. At the same time, the Umayyads began to increasingly legitimize their rule through familial connection to ‘Uthman and, ultimately, Muhammad himself.88 This attempt at legitimization through familial right fitted with their increasing move toward hereditary succession discussed above. However, at the same time, they moved to increase their theological authority, claiming direct connection to God himself and removing Muhammad as a link in the chain, for as the deputy or successor to Muhammad they could only work within the limits created after prophecy died. However, as leaders appointed by God, they were free to do the will of God as they saw fit. Sourdel translates a khutba of Hadjdjadj as an example of this: The amir of Believers, “Abd al-Malik is a leader whom God has chosen as his viceroy on earth and appointed imam for his creatures.”89

The Umayyad Caliphs were therefore successfully able to shorten the title to “khilafat allah,” removing “rasul” as a vital component for legitimization within the title, yet, at the same time, creating a link to Muhammad through hereditary right.90 This move effectively sidelined the potential power of the

28

Chapter One

scholars and throughout the period of direct political rule by the Caliphs, the intellectual arguments raged back and forth between the two camps, both of which had the potential to lead the Islamic world. Sourdel suggests that the ‘ulamā attempted to counter Mu’awiya and his successors by drawing a distinction between the earlier period of the rashidūn Caliphs and the later Caliphs, whom they characterised as monarchs. According to Sourdel, they were largely successful in this.91 With the advent of the Abbasids and the overthrow of the Umayyads in 750CE, the nature of legitimization was developed theologically under the influence of the Persian culture where the majority of its power was based. At the same time the Greek influence, brought into Muslim culture through their contact with the Byzantines and the translations of ancient Greek texts housed in Baghdad, became increasingly apparent in the nature of Muslim headship. However, while there is considerable argument over the extent of Greek influence upon the Caliph’s court, there is little doubt over the impact of the Persian influence, both in court etiquette and political theory.92 Sourdel suggests that the Abbasids also presented themselves as members of Muhammad’s family as a source of legitimacy, although controversy raged over whether descendents of Muhammad’s nephew al-Abbas or sons of Muhammad’s daughter Fatima had the better claim.93 Thus, the dynastic principle, begun under the Umayyads, continued under the Abbasids, usually involving naming a son as successor, and a second son as a backup. In some cases, if the first choice was deemed unsuitable, and in the absence of any formal mechanism for deposing lawfully due to the lapse in the bay’a and the notion of a contract, attempts were made to force him to abdicate in favor of the other successor with the result that violence frequently occurred. It was against this background that the notion of “right of the sword” was developed: the concept that God favored the claim of the victor insofar as this was proved by virtue of his victory.94 This doctrine itself was fascinating insofar as it had its roots in the theology of jihād.95 Whatever the motives for the changes and developments, Sourdel notes that the Caliph began to increasingly rule through ministers, chief amongst whom was the vizier. He took over many of the administrative functions and policy work, eventually including foreign affairs as well. To some extent this was inevitable given the size of the government. However, it was this voluntary separation of the Caliphate from his direct involvement in the lives of the ummah that allowed the rise of the Sultans, and the gradual decline in the status of the Caliphs. Thus, from the tenth century onwards, the relative power of the Caliph was dependent on his relationship with the Sultan: this varied enormously depending upon both incumbents.96 However, even though their actual power

The Caliphate in Political Theory

29

was eroded away, their theoretical status as head of the ummah continued far longer; indeed, it is impossible to say for certain whether it ever disappeared, even under the breakup of the Abbasid Empire and the increasing power of the independent Muslim rulers.97 Sourdel notes that, even in the Sultanate period, the Caliph retained the right to appoint and all power officially flowed from him.98 In such circumstances, it would not be unreasonable to describe his status as a constitutional head with the symbolic regalia of a sovereign. Such an analogy would be incomplete, however, without reference to the fact that he retained a wider, Pan-Islamic authority which, although ignored by many rulers for a few centuries, never completely died.99 This fact is vital to remember when the British papers are analyzed and surveyed in the following chapters. The final phase of the Caliphate is covered very briefly by Sourdel, as she reviews their relationship with the Seljuks and the eventual capture of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258. Her summary of the situation reiterates that, although real power had disappeared from the Caliphate many years ago, many Muslim rulers still stressed that their authority was derived from the Caliph. In this she is at odds with Lambton, who argues instead: “. . . when the Caliphate was destroyed in the thirteenth century, the temporal rulers did not have to adjust their theories since the Caliphate had almost become a redundant institution. Its destruction changed little or nothing for the temporal rulers in the other Muslim kingdoms.”100

On the surface, Lambton would appear to be correct: scholars have argued that the resurrection of the Caliphate by the Fatimids in Cairo saw the end of any real power and even Pan-Islamic status in the office.101 There were brief periods of increased power, frequently in times of dynastic squabbling and stalemate when the Caliph became a pawn to legitimize the power of the Sultans. During this time, it seems that even the Caliph’s right to khutba ended and the sultan frequently carried the insignia of the Caliph.102 The Caliph was not universally recognized and many rulers refused to seek legitimization from him, although many influential sultans, such as those in Delhi and Iraq, did.103 The Ottomans particularly began to use the title for themselves, Sourdel describing them as “repositories” of the Caliphate, although it was never mentioned in their official titles. At this time Ibn Khaldun declared that the Caliphate had ended after the first four Caliphs and that both the Umayyads and the Abbasids were merely sovereigns.104 This was endorsed by the Hanafi school and the Persians, such as Dawwani (d.1502)105, developed the theory that a Caliph was any sovereign defender of Islam. As such, it was a subtle shift from the implications of the leader of the ummah as “Commander of the Faithful” to “Defender of the Faith.”106

30

Chapter One

The period surrounding and following the capture of Cairo by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century is an important one in the light of the British discussions that follow: Sourdel suggests that when the Ottomans captured Cairo, the then Caliph was sent to Constantinople and treated without respect, further asserting that the eighteenth century view that the Caliphate was transferred from Cairo to Constantinople is false as there is no documentation to prove it.107 Indeed, Sourdel is confident that the only title that the Ottomans adopted following their capture of Cairo was that of the Mamluke Sultans. Even so, the Ottomans still attempted to claim sovereignty over the whole Islamic world, but the Mughals in India continued to call themselves “Caliph” and Delhi itself became known as “dar al-khalifa” until the death of Shah Alam II in 1760. It was shortly after this that the title appears in Ottoman documentation, notably in the treaty of Kucuk Kanyarca in 1774 which is cited by many Western scholars as the basis for the resurgence of Pan-Islamic idealism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.108 The final development prior to British involvement was the adoption of articles three and four in the 1876 Ottoman constitution, which saw the specific separation of the spiritual and temporal elements within the Caliph’s remit. Sourdel notes that the European powers, even after this cleaving, recognized the spiritual authority of the Ottoman Caliph.109 However, they failed to define what each of the terms, such as “spiritual authority,” actually meant to the framers, the wider Ottoman population, and to the Europeans who were engaged with the Ottoman Empire by this time. This was an important omission as will be seen in the discussion of the British Lausanne correspondence in chapters three and four. Thus, by the period in which the British become involved in the Caliphate question, the Caliphate had the distinct appearance of sovereignty, with the vague notion of Pan-Islamic spiritual authority lingering in the background.110 The position is neatly summarized in MacDonald’s assessment of the constitutional position of the Ottoman Caliphs in the early years of the twentieth century, for he consistently uses the term “sovereign” for the Caliph, citing the following marks of sovereignty and legitimacy: name on the coinage, prayers said for him in the Friday khutba, the right of the sword, election, nomination, possession of the sacred places, and possession of the sacred relics.111 MacDonald also noted the Ottoman Caliph’s lack of Quraishi lineage, but felt that this particular aspect of legitimization should not be a stumbling block to the Caliphate’s continued existence which, he felt, was necessary for the well-being of the ummah. So the picture of an institution in decay and decline even from the ninth century onwards, having lost its Pan-Islamic appeal, is compelling. However, it does not tell the whole story, for an investigation of the Delhi Sultanate in

The Caliphate in Political Theory

31

the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries reveals that the first Sultan of the new dynasty, Iltutmish, went to great lengths to have his rule validated by the Caliph, who, if historians are correct, would have only been a puppet of the Sultans by the early thirteenth century. An explanation for Iltutmish’s actions can be found in Pande, for he argues that the new Sultan, as the successor to Qutbuddin (who was still a slave when he began his rule in India and received his insignia of royalty not from the Caliph, but from Mahmud of Ghur his master), wanted investiture from the Caliph to validate the new kingdom’s status as an independent ruler in its own right.112 This theory fits with the idea of Iltutmish as an astute politician, who, on the back of a swift rise to power, wishes to validate not just himself, but his kingdom, under the direct rule of the Caliph, rather than as a client of Mahmud of Ghur. This need for validation appears to have continued on into the later dynasty, for Mujeeb shows later in his book that, when there was no apparent legitimate Caliph, it also undermined their own rule. For example, when Baghdad was destroyed in 1258 and the last Caliph was killed, the Delhi Sultan of the time, Muhammad bin Tughlaq, both suspended Friday prayers and had the title “Amir al-Mu’minin” stamped on his coins until an Abbasid claimant was found in Cairo, at which point the Friday prayers were resumed and the title “Sultan” was stamped on the coins.113 It is interesting to note that Tughlaq also had the opening of Q4:59 stamped on his coins, which Mujeeb interprets as showing the Sultan’s position. If this is true, then this would appear to reduce the Sultan’s dependence upon the Caliph for the source of his authority as he places himself directly in the chain under Muhammad without reference to the Caliph. However, Jackson states that the title “Auxilary of the Commander of the Faithful” was employed both by Iltutmish and his successors, which, contrary to Mujeeb and far more in line with the other evidence given above, shows the acknowledged fealty of a client ruler toward the source of his authority.114 So the evidence provided by the actions of the Delhi Sultans seems to point toward the conclusions drawn by Alam, who suggests that the Sultan had “constituent authority” but that his reign could only be legitimized by the Caliph.115 This in turn points to the fact that even though the temporal power of the Baghdad Caliphs was just a distant memory, their “spiritual prestige” remained and that it is this prestige which helps to maintain the notion of a single, global ummah. As such, although the Caliph was not always referred to for investiture, the notion appears to have persisted that the concept of the Caliph as the leader of the Islamic world was the ultimate, God-given authority that gave the disparate kingdoms of the ummah their source of legitimization. This is what drove the Muslim rulers to find a successor to the Caliphs of Baghdad when they were destroyed.

32

Chapter One

A similar concept is found in the distant lands of Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century. For, even though there is evidence that the “Muslim Rulers” in the Malay Archipelago paid only lip service to their adopted Islamic religion, it is also clear that rulers in Java and in Aceh sought validation from a central Islamic authority.116 While it is true that there was some confusion evident as to who they should be addressing their requests to, the very fact that they were seeking legitimization from a centralized Islamic authority they understood to be the Caliph shows that the notion of a Pan-Islamic authority existed even after an easily recognizable Caliphate had disappeared.117 Anthony Reid’s working paper for the Southeast Asia Research Institute provides a useful insight into how the Malay rulers saw the Ottomans, for he proposes that it was a relationship of feudal overlordship and protection at a time when the Muslim Malay rulers were under pressure from growing European power.118 Whatever the reason for their desire to engage with the Ottomans, even though they were so far away, it does point to the fact that, even in this period of otherwise independent Muslim kingdoms, some notion of a broad Islamic community with the Caliph at its head remained. Thus, when the concept of a Pan-Islamic Caliphate was actively revived and encouraged in the nineteenth century, a fertile soil already existed into which these seeds of more active globalized “spiritual authority” could be sown.

CONCLUSIONS What are the essential questions, conclusions, and dynamics concerning the nature of caliphal authority that will be important when examining the government files in the following chapters? Firstly, that given the importance attached to the office in both its earliest and latest incarnations, the scriptural basis for the Caliphate seems remarkably small. This is seen in the surprisingly few references concerning its establishment and functions in the Qur’an and in the sketchy information to be found in the Hadith concerning both its role and qualifications for candidature. It is also seen in the lack of definitive evidence linking Muhammad to his successor, for, if the office was, as was suggested, central to the life of the post-Muhammadan community, one would naturally assume that a clearly defined set of qualifications and procedures for investment would have been documented by Muhammad, thus grounding the Caliphate at the heart of the ummah. This query could be countered with the notion that this was a largely illiterate culture which had no need to write many documents if any. However, the so-called “Constitution of Medina” has shown that certain vital

The Caliphate in Political Theory

33

documents were indeed written down and there can be little doubt that the question of succession could be considered vital to the ummah.119 Also, given that the sayings of Muhammad were being written down and recorded for the use of the community after he had gone, an event such as a formal nomination, while not necessarily signed by the participants themselves, could certainly have been recorded by another, as indeed happened with the historical documentation of the accession of Abu Bakr found in Muir.120 However, whether Muhammad desired a successor or not it is clear that the fledgling Islamic community desired a leader following Muhammad’s death. The second conclusion to be drawn from this section is that the title “Caliph” itself is perhaps best translated as both “deputy” and “successor.” The reason for this apparent indecision is based upon the fact that the title was used on the Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam in the context of a “second” negotiating or ruling on behalf of an absent leader. The question is what the context of that “absence” was? In pre-Islamic Arabia it seems to have been used for someone who deputised for a leader who was alive. However, the speed at which the title was adopted into the ummah following Muhammad’s death suggests that the use of the title in relation to a succession of power was also sufficiently well known to be accepted without alternatives being offered. Whether one could conversely argue for a supernatural doctrine of “deputy-ship” in regard to Muhammad being alive in Paradise and therefore the current leader of the community simply exercising authority on his behalf until Muhammad himself returned121 is perhaps stretching doctrinal debate to breaking point, but it does feed into the question concerning who the “deputy” or “successor” was “deputy” or “successor” to. This issue is given shape by Crone and Hinds’ evidence relating to the use of the titles “khilafat allah” and “khilafat rasul allah.” Clearly a definitive answer to this question would also help to provide illumination concerning the foundations of the office in relation to scripture and historical record. Thirdly, aside from these foundational questions and concerns, the qualifications and remit of the Caliph appear to have been defined with reasonable clarity in the Hadith. It is from the Traditions that we can glean that the candidate must be of the Quraishi tribe and of pious and worthy character, (although this second qualification appears to have been ignored from a reasonably early stage). His undisputed remit was the leadership of the community in worship as well as the defense of the ummah and the declaration of jihād. Of course, a long-running battle was fought over the question of religiolegal interpretation and there seems little doubt that the early rashidūn Caliphs as well as the Abbasids, for a brief period, held onto this aspect of the Caliph’s portfolio until the ‘ulamā eventually subsumed this to themselves over the course of several centuries.

34

Chapter One

This previous point is at the heart of the most important question surrounding the Caliphate in relation to the British discussions: namely, what constituted “religious” and what constituted “temporal” power when it came to the caliphal remit? Given what has been argued above, the logical conclusion is that it is impossible to separate the two for both of them were entirely intertwined in a way that was never seen in the Papacy.122 The Caliph was a ruler who, in his earliest incarnations, was able to regulate all aspects of the life of the ummah in conjunction with the later development of the shari’a; a position that the Shi’a Imams were able to maintain far more effectively than their Sunni brothers. The Caliph was always the head of the ummah, but by the tenth century, he ruled the whole community in name only, effectively becoming a figurehead until the Europeans enabled him to reassert his PanIslamic leadership in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, even as a figurehead, evidence from the Delhi Sultanate and the Malay Archipelago showed that he was clearly seen as the source of legitimization for the otherwise independent Islamic rulers. Thus, when viewed in relation to the criticisms made by Kemal Atatturk and “Le Souveranté Nationale” that were cited at the opening of this chapter, the analysis of the Caliphate in theology and history appears to suggest that two of the four points made by Atatturk—that the Caliphate was not divinely ordained, simply designed to effectively administer, and that for the vast majority of Islamic history there had been a “fictitious” Caliphate based entirely on force and coercion—could be cautiously affirmed although not entirely endorsed. While the other two points, that the real Caliphate lasted only thirty years after the death of Muhammad himself and that the Caliphate had now outlived its usefulness so Muslims should be free to choose whatever new method of administration was deemed appropriate, would be harder to argue for.123 The central issue for all the British officials and statesmen involved in the “Caliphate Question” was the extent to which the Caliph’s long-held status as the head of the ummah should be translated into realizable power.

NOTES 1. H. Enyat, Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shi’i and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century (London, New York: IB Taurus, 1982), 52–53, quoting A. Nallino, “La Fine del Cosi Detto Califfato Ottomano,” Oriento Moderno, vol IV (1924), 141–42. 2. “Califat et souveranté nationale,” Revue de Monde Musulmane, LIX (1925). See, for example, the extensive use of all these authorities at the opening to the conclusions chapter, 72–74. 3. Ibid, 3, 15–17, 22, 37–41, 104–8.

The Caliphate in Political Theory

35

4. H. E. Kassis, A Concordance of the Qur’an, Vol. 1 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1983), 687–89. 5. Kassis, EQ1, 688. 6. The other verses—Q6:165, Q7:69, Q7: 74, Q10:14, Q27:63 and Q35:39—all refer to humanity in general as Caliphs with Noah and his family singled out in one verse, Q10:73, specifically for the title as well. Ibid, 688. 7. Y. Ali, Qur’an, 15. 8. Al-Tabari, Commentary on the Qur’an, vol. 1, trans. J. Cooper (Oxford: OUP, Hakim Investment Holdings Limited, 1987), 209–12. 9. Ibid, 211. 10. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, Abridged English Version, trans. A. Daryabadi (Riyadh: Dar Ibn Kathir, 2004), 95–96. 11. Ibid, 96. 12. M. Asad, The Message of the S. Qutb, In the Shade of the Qur’an, Volume III, Surah 4, trans. and ed. A. Salahi and A. Shamis (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2001), 81. Qur’an (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), 8–9. 13. Y. Ali, Qur’an, 1324–25. 14. See, for example, Asad, Qur’an, 696–97; Ali, Qur’an, 1320. 15. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, vol. 8, 92–95. 16. Ibid, 93. Such a doctrine would stand at odds with the perception of the Caliphs implied by Q2:30. 17. Lane, Book I, 797–98. Further, Lane goes on to expand the scope of his dictionary’s definitions to include other fascinating cultural and historical variants from the “Khâ - Lâm - Fâ” root. Lane lists his authorities on pages xxx–xxxi as they are only given in abbreviated form in the entry itself. 18. Ibid, 798. 19. Penrice, Dictionary, 44; Wehr, Dictionary, 298. 20. Crone and Hinds, Caliph, 7–12. 21. W. M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1973), 84. 22. Crone and Hinds, Caliph, 7–12. They claim that the title “Commander of the Faithful” was used when talking about individual rulers, rather than the office itself, and that it was even in use for the Shi’as. 23. Ibid, 13. cf E. Tyan, Institutions du Droit Public Musulman, vol. i (Le Califat) (Paris: 1954), 447. Appendix C contains a brief analysis of the difference between the Papacy and the Caliphate which highlights their differences in origin while admiting their strong resemblance in the Medieval period. 24. EI2, 2, 389–91. 25. Tyan, Musalman, vol.1, 139; L. Binder, “al-Ghazali and Islamic Government,” in The Muslim World, xlv (1955), 230. 26. Crone and Hinds, Caliph, 19. 27. I. Goldziher, “Du Sens Propre des Expression Ombre de Dieu, Khalif de Dieu,” Revue de l’Histoire des Religions (1897), 337; R. Paret, “Signification coranique de Halifa et d’autres derives de la racine Halafa” Studia Islamica, No. 31 (1970), 211–17.

36

Chapter One

28. Q24:54, Q6:156, and Q7:67, 72. However, the references Arnold cites do not really lend weight to his argument: Q24:54 concerns obedience to God and Muhammad and, if that does not happen, accepting the consequences. In Q6:156, there is no evidence that it is talking about a single ruler. Q7:67, 72 talk about a state rather than a person. 29. Arnold, Caliphate, 43. 30. Ibid, 43–44. 31. B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 43. 32. Ibid, 44. cf Watt, Political Thought, 72. 33. Although significant concerns have been raised about the historicity of the Hadith accounts, there is not the space in this book to engage in this debate. Therefore, for the purpose of this book it will be assumed that the Hadith accounts do contain a reasonably accurate record of some of Muhammad’s sayings and deeds. 34. Bukhari, Sahih, vol. 4, Book 56, Hadith 661. 35. Ibid, vol 9, Book 89, Hadith 306. cf Bukhari, Sahih, Vol. 8, Book 77, Hadith 608. 36. Ibid, vol. 9, Book 89, Hadith 254. 37. See also, Paret, Studia Islamica, xxxi, 211–17; W. M. Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 32. 38. W. Muir, The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall from Original Sources (London: Religious Tract Society, 1891), 5–6. It should be noted that Muir bases his book almost exclusively upon the work of a German scholar rather than drawing the report direct from the original Arab sources himself. 39. E. I. J. Rosenthal, “Some Aspects of Islamic Political Thought,” in Islamic Culture, XXII (1948), 1. 40. B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 44. 41. W. Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 18. 42. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 937. 43. The suggestion that Muhammad’s instructions might have been lost is not as facetious as it sounds given the fact that it is reported that Muhammad’s ring, an important symbol of office, was lost down a well by Caliph ‘Uthman. See Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 83, Hadith 756. 44. See Serjeant, “Constitution,” 58–60; Watt, Muhammad, 36; Rodinson, Muhammad, 104. 45. Barthold takes some delight in pulling apart the notion of the first four Caliphs being seen as “Rightly Guided” in the early Muslim world. D.S. Doniach, “A Translation of V.V. Barthold, Khalif i Sultan,” in Islamic Quarterly, vii (1963), 119–22. 46. For example see Muslim, Sahih, Book 9, vol. 1, Hadith 35. 47. Ibid, Book 23, vol. 2, Hadith 3759 cf bid, Book 9, vol. 1, Hadith 4226. 48. Ibid, Book 20, vol. 3, Hadith 2812. 49. EI2, 7, 412–13.

The Caliphate in Political Theory

37

50. Groitein notes that the publication of the book might have caused the death of its author on the basis that he was a Persian nobleman giving unsolicited advice to an Arab Caliph. S.D. Groitein, “A Turning Point in the History of the Muslim State,” in Islamic Culture, xxiii (1949), 122. 51. See J. Oberman, “Political Theology in Early Islam: Hasan al-Basri’s Treatise on qadar,” in Journal of the American Oriental Society, lv, (1935), 138–62; A. K. S. Lambton, “Islamic Political Thought” in J. Schacht and C. E. Bosworth, eds. The Legacy of Islam, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1979), 403. 52. Lambton, “Khilafah,” 947. 53. Lambton in Schacht and Bosworth, 404. 54. Ibid, 408. 55. For example Lambton, “Quis,” 129. 56. See Lambton, “Quis,” 128–30; Watt characterizes the differences between the Umayyads and Abbasids thus : “ . . . The Umayyads ruled as Arabs rather than Muslims and the Abbasids, even though they were perhaps more autocratic, gave more ‘outward recognition to the Muslim religion.’” Watt, Political Thought, 39; Ch. Pellat, (trans. and ed.) Ibn Muqaffa’, mort vers 140/757, conseilleur du calife (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 1976) 137–138; E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: CUP, 1958), 69–74. 57. Arnold, Caliphate, 27. 58. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 940. 59. Ibid, 940. 60. Lambton, “Khilafah,” 937. 61. A. Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 25. 62. It is interesting to note that in his chapter on the relationship between the Caliphs and the ‘ulama- Muhammad Qasim Zaman suggests that the two authorities were in partnership during the Abbasid period, rather than in competition. M. Q. Zaman, “The Caliphs, the ‘ulama- and the Law: Defining the Role and function of the Caliph in the Early Abbasid Period,” Islamic Law and Society 4 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 36. 63. Black, Political Thought, 26. 64. In this she references one of her earlier works: Lambton, “Quis,” 125–48. 65. Ibid. 66. I. M. Lapidus, “Separation of State and Religion in Early Islamic Society,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 6 (1975), 379. 67. EI2, 3, 711–13. 68. Cf. Ch. Pellat, “L’imamat dans la doctrine de Djahiz,” in Studia Islamica 25 (1961), 23–52. 69. Lambton, “Khilafah,” 949. 70. Rosenthal, Medieval Islam, 114. 71. Watt, Political Thought, 103–4. 72. EI2, 7, 368–70. 73. Lambton, “Khilafah,” 948–49.

38

Chapter One

74. For a discussion of the contents and significance of al-Mawardi’s work see H. A. R. Gibb, “al-Mawardi’s theory of the Caliphate,” in S. J. Shaw and W. R. Polk, eds. Studies on the Civilisation of Islam (London: Hurst and Co., 1962). 75. EI2, 2, 1039. 76. Lambton, “Khilafah,” 949. 77. For further analysis see H. Laoust, La Politique de Gazali (Paris: École, 1970); L. Binder, “al-Ghazali and Islamic Government,” in The Muslim World, xlv (1955). 78. EI2, 8, 331–32. 79. EI2, 5, 415–16. 80. Much work on the influence and doctrines of these two has been done by Laoust. See H. Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Ibn Taimiya (Cairo: Imprint of l’instituit francais d’Archeologie Orientale, 1939). On the “Doctrine of the Sword” see Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 939. 81. Examples of this dynamic are quoted in the work of I. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 82. Ibid, 948. This is also observed in H. A. R. Gibb, “al-Mawardi’s theory of the Caliphate,” in S. J. Shaw and W. R. Polk, eds. Studies on the Civilisation of Islam (London: Hurst and Co., 1962), 154–55. 83. See Bukhari, Sahih, Vol. 6, Book 60, Hadith 188; On the ring see Ibid, Vol. 4, Book 53, Hadith 338. 84. Ibid, Vol. 7, Book 72, Hadith 767. 85. See H. A. R. Gibb, “The Evolution of Government,” in Studies on the Civilization of Islam (London: Hurst and Co., 1962), 61–74. 86. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 937 cf. Watt, Political Thought, 48–50; Imamuddin suggests this was common practice even before the advent of Islam. S. M. Imamuddin, A Political History of the Muslims, (Prophet and Pious Caliphs) (Dacca: Nijmah and Sons Ltd, 1965), 36–38. The whole question of hereditary succession is a very complex one and, although the general consensus of scholarship suggests that hereditary succession is not part of Sunni tradition, Madelung makes a powerful case to the contrary. 87. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 937. 88. See particularly Madelung “Introduction” in Succession, 1–27. 89. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 938. 90. Ibid, 938. cf E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: CUP, 1958) 78–82. 91. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 938. 92. Notable in this field is the compelling argument made by S. D. Goitein in “A Turning point in the History of the Muslim State,” in Islamic Culture, xxiii (1949), 120–35. In this he makes a similar line of argument to Watt in Islamic Thought, 48; however, while Watt is somewhat dismissive, Grotein takes the time to develop a well-articulated case. 93. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 938. 94. Ibid, 939. 95. For a discussion of the origins and roots of jiha-d see Lapidus, History, 22–27.

The Caliphate in Political Theory

39

96. See particularly Sharon’s “Notes on the Question of Legitimacy of Government in Islam,” Israel Oriental Studies, Vol. 10 (1980), in which he elucidates how the role of each post-holder varied enormously in the later stages of the Abbasid Caliphate. Although Lambton is more focused upon the inter-relationship between Persian and Arabic Muslim streams of thought, several of her articles are very illuminating in this area. See “Quis,” (SI5) 128–131; State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford: OUP, 1981), 34–51. Watt also has useful insights in this area in Political Thought, 38–43. 97. Examples are cited from the Delhi Sultanate and from Southeast Asia later in the chapter which take on precisely these points and it is therefore worthwhile leaving discussion with them. 98. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 939. 99. Ibid, 940. The significance of the continuation of the functions and symbolic regalia of the Caliphate will become clear in the chapters on the British government files, but it is important to say at this stage that the potency of the symbology right into the modern incarnation of the Caliphate was ever present. See particularly D. Sourdel, “L’autorite califienne dans le monde sunnite,” in G. Makdisi, D. Sourdel, and J. Sourdel-Thomine, eds. La Notion d’autorite au moyen age: Islam, Byzance, Occident (Paris: 1982), 104–12. 100. Lambton, “Quis,” SI5, 142. 101. See particularly the interesting discussion in Arnold, Caliphate, 149–51. 102. Ibid, 150. 103. Sourdel, “Khilafa,” 940. 104. Ibid, 940. 105. It is interesting that the British monarch Queen Elizabeth I, when requesting assistance from Sultan Suleiman in Constantinople against the Spanish Armada, used precisely that title when addressing him. 106. EI, 2, 174. 107. Sourdel, “Khilafa,” 940. 108. See Cox, Question, 33–34; Karsh and Karsh, Empires, 70–71; Lewis, What Went Wrong?, 23–25; Arnold, Caliphate, 165–66. It is interesting to note that not all the scholars agree as to the effect of the treaty. However, some suggest that the Ottomans did not gain anything under it, whereas others cite it as the basis for the Pan-Islamic resurgence. 109. Sourdel cites the example of the European recognition of the Caliph’s nomination of the Kadi of Libya as “sheikh al-Islam,” even though it was an Italian protectorate at the time. Sourdel, “Khilafah,” 946. 110. For a more in-depth analysis of the history of British involvement in the Caliphate through to the end of World War I see S. T. Cox, The Idea of an Arab Caliphate in British Middle Eastern Policy in the Era of the Great War (Durham: Durham University Press, 2003). 111. D. B. MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 56. 112. R. Pande, Succession in the Delhi Sultanate (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1990), 41.

40

Chapter One

113. Mujeeb, Muslims, 32. 114. Jackson, Sultanate, 45. cf. F. Thomas, Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi: Illustrated by Coins, Inscriptions and Other Antiquarian Remains (London: Trubner and Co., 1871), 255. 115. Alam, Languages, 28. 116. The competing views of Malay court culture can be seen in C. Muzaffar, Protector? An analysis of Leader-Led political relationships in Malay Society (Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Press, 1979), 28; R. O. Winstedt, A Malay-English Dictionary (Singapore: Kelly and Walsh, 1952), 97; A. T. Gallop, Malay Seal Inscriptions: a study in Islamic epigraphy from Southeast Asia (PhD thesis submitted to the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2002), 75 and 94; T. Ito, The world of the Adat Aceh. A Historical Study of the Sultanate of Aceh (Unpublished PhD thesis, Canberra: Australian National University, 1984), 207–15. 117. M. F. Laffan, “Dispersing God’s Shadows; Reflections on the translation of Arabic Political Concepts into Malay and Indonesian” a paper written for the project History of Translations into Indonesian and Malaysian Languages led by H. ChambertLoir and M. Zaini-Lajoubert at www.anu.edu.au/asianstudies/proudfoot/MCP/mmp/ laffan_apc.html, accessed January 14, 2006, 3–4. 118. A. Reid, Working Paper No. 36: The Ottomans in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, 2005) 4–5. 119. It should be noted that several scholars have raised questions concerning the dating of the “Constitution of Medina.” 120. As cited earlier in this chapter. 121. Eschatological questions are not a part of this discussion although they remain a useful adjunct to the issue of a rounded Sunni doctrine of state power. 122. There are several passing comparisons between the Papacy and the Caliphate within the British files. However, a lengthy analysis of the similarities and differences between the two was deemed not central to the general flow of the book and therefore has been included as “Appendix E” in order to enable critical analysis of British understanding in this area, without interrupting the thrust of the book. 123. Ibid, 3, 15–17, 22, 37–41, 104–8.

Section II

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FILES AND THE APPROACH TO PAN-ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE

SECTION INTRODUCTION The previous chapter examined the Caliphate as an institution. This will be the basis for the following three chapters which will move on to examine British theological understanding of these issues. The source material will be drawn from within the Cairo-based Middle Eastern military and diplomatic corps (who were the principal contact point for the developing strategy on the Caliphate Question) and the central government based on and around Whitehall. One might ask whether a High Commission or Embassy is a useful place to look for answers about questions of British policymaking insofar as they are away from the policymaking hub of central government. The justification comes in two parts: firstly, that the British High Commission in Cairo during the war years was the command center for British operations in the Middle Eastern theatre; therefore, it was at the heart of British policymaking on the “Caliphate Question.” Secondly, even though they are not in physical proximity to central government itself, the role that Embassies and High Commissions (known as “British Missions”) play in policy formation is still of central strategic importance. This perspective is endorsed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office itself, which currently defines the political and diplomatic roles of a “British Mission” as: . . . the eyes and ears of the British Government abroad. Posts are linked directly to Departments across Whitehall, providing vital information on developments abroad, and on the effects of decisions abroad in the UK, and vice-versa.1

41

42

Section II

This makes it an invaluable source, not just for finding out about the activities and priorities of the place and period, but also for revealing the attitudes of the government whose embassy it is. Improved communications have developed the speed at which communications are transacted between Whitehall departments and the British missions, but the basic concept of the relationship between central government and its embassies was the same in the period under examination. In the context of this book, therefore, the correspondence in these files tells us a great deal about official attitudes to the Islamic hierarchy and the British approach to investigative methodology on these issues. The analysis of the British documents is broken down into chapters, each covering one facet of government or era. Each chapter will have its own historical background in order to set the correspondence within its context. The reason for providing individual histories for each chapter, rather than creating a general overview at the beginning of the material, is principally for ease of reference and to mark out clearly the changing context of the correspondence. As was detailed in the introduction to the book, while this is not a general critique of all aspects of British foreign policy, the context in which the papers under discussion were written is an important factor in analyzing the opinions they hold. Thus, considerations such as the economic and political stability of the British Empire as a whole in the post-World War I years and perceived Soviet expansionism at the opening of the Cold War were important factors in the thinking of British officials when discussing aspects of the Pan-Islamic governance. Therefore, when analyzing and critiquing British attitudes in this particular field, it is important to recognize the wider strategic concerns; otherwise there is the danger that any criticisms made are not grounded within their appropriate context.

NOTE 1. www.fco.gov.uk, accessed September 12th, 2006.

Chapter Two

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

“If two fish are fighting, look for the Englishman.” A Gulf Proverb1

This chapter will open with a short historical background, following which it will provide an initial overview of the tone and content of the correspondence, flagging up key documents that will be examined separately after the overview. The second part will complete the picture of British officials’ understandings on the Caliphate and Pan-Islamic questions by examining several specific documents in detail. Two of those documents were written by senior British officials and two were written by scholars from other countries. The reason for their inclusion is to show the range of analysis the British were receiving from outside government circles during this period. The aim of this chapter is to explain how the British became involved in the issue and to begin to unpack some of the questions and concerns the material reveals that will ultimately provide an evidential foundation for the analysis in the concluding chapter.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The British Empire had been growing exponentially since the eighteenth century under the stimulation of population growth, technological development, and the search for new trading partners. Along with the other European nations, many of the lands that they had come to rule in North Africa and Asia had been annexed at the expense of their former Muslim rulers.2 The Muslim intelligentsia watched with mounting alarm as the Muslim empires that had 43

44

Chapter Two

once stretched from Spain to Indonesia were broken up and their pieces absorbed into new imperial powers. By the time that India was taken under direct British rule in 1858, Muslim thinkers in South Asia and the Middle East particularly were beginning the process of critical self-examination that began the modern Islamist movement. Central figures and movements in this Pan-Islamic awakening were Shah Waliullah,3 Jamal al Din al-Afghani,4 Mohammad Abduh,5 and the Wahhabis6. These men and groups had seen the hegemony of the Europeans grow with alarming speed, to the detriment of the divided and decaying Muslim empires. British attitudes to the Muslims within their empire could be neatly divided into two distinct phases around the turning point of the 1857 Mutiny in India; their pre-Mutiny attitudes could be best encapsulated by Hardy: Before 1857 British policies were, generally speaking, “community-blind”; Muslims were considered harmless, being members of a “fallen race” or, in George Campbell’s words, “the most gentlemanly and well-mannered of those seeking employment in the East India Company.”7

However, the British Governments of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods considered that the Muslims within the Empire represented the key internal threat to Imperial Security.8 Having made such an assessment, the British needed to formulate a response and they appear to have chosen to win over Muslims by treating them differently. This policy formed the basis for the Morley-Minto reforms of 1906–1909.9 At the same time however, the British had also attempted to use the growing Pan-Islamic influence to their own advantage, by getting the Caliph to issue a proclamation to Muslims worldwide supporting the British Imperial rule in 1882.10 Thus, wariness of the Muslim community became a key component of British Imperial thinking in the late Victorian period, for, as far as the British were concerned, the 1857–1858 events and the Mahdi Revolt in the Sudan had “proved” that Muslims actively desired the loss of British power.11 If Muslims were seen as the primary internal threat, the Russians and the rising power of Germany were seen as the primary external threat.12 The Russians were considered one of the primary threats because of their Asian expansion and attempts to destabilize the British in India, (immortalized in Rudyard Kipling’s Kim), and the Germans were considered as such for their imperial ambitions and increasing naval strength. The Ottomans, however, had been allies of the British in the Crimean War and the stability and friendship of the Ottoman Empire represented an important factor in the continuing stability of the British Empire as it was the home of the head of the Sunni Islamic world, as well as being the power that con-

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

45

trolled the Middle East, the important route east, to India and beyond.13 Consequently, the internal Ottoman struggles as they sought to update outmoded practices and institutions within an Islamic context were of great concern to the British14 (and the French, who invested considerable sums in the training and equipping of the Turkish military15). Internally, the tensions caused by the Tanzimat reforms and the ongoing theological and intellectual battles between the modernizers and the traditionalists within Ottoman society had created a state of paralysis within an administration that was unwilling to embrace democracy, but which understood the need for new direction.16 It also upset many Muslims within Turkey due to their loss of privileged status as was undermined with increased secularization.17 Many clerics encouraged the Caliph to move toward Islam at the expense of the West;18 thus, from the late 1870s onwards, Abdulhamid developed an emissarial programme to encourage Pan-Islamic unity and to strengthen the perception of the Ottomans as an important Imperial power.19 The delicate nature of Ottoman Imperial power was therefore of huge concern in Britain, for it both opened the way for other European powers to annex Ottoman territory, but also allowed Turkey to fall under the power of other interests who might be hostile to the British. It was in this light that alarm grew at reports that many Russian and German agents had been seen in Istanbul and that German influence at the Ottoman court was steadily growing.20 Thus, in 1900, when the Ottoman Sultan began to build the Hijaz Railway, the British ministers and officials were deeply divided about its aims and consequences. The concern was that the Caliph was trying to connect the seat of his temporal power with Mecca, the center of spiritual power, in order to enhance his standing within the global Islamic community, and in so doing, creating the possibility of divided loyalties within the British Imperial Muslim community.21 This fear may have been unfounded as the move may have been designed to neutralize growing Arab nationalism instead, which had been growing since the early nineteenth century; for Hourani believes that the desire for an independent Arab Caliph can be traced back to the 1850s.22 Whatever the truth, the building of the railroad came too late to save Abdulhamid himself from losing the Caliphate in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908–1909. The Young Turks attempted to force the Turkish state toward a modern, European foundation by reviving the defunct 1876 constitution.23 Indian Muslims particularly were suspicious of the Young Turks’ secularizing motives and wanted greater guarantees that the prestige of the Caliphate would remain intact.24 Since Indian financial assistance was desperately needed, it was their pressure that forced the Young Turks to mount a propaganda campaign to persuade Indian Muslims that the Caliphate would remain

46

Chapter Two

intact and that they were fully committed to it.25 The propaganda campaign was ultimately successful and the close links between Indian Muslims and the Ottomans were thus preserved through the changes; a cause of disappointment to the British who had been hoping that both the Caliphate and “Pan-Islamism” would die with the revolution.26 Pan-Islamism had been a growing issue for all the European empires as the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth began.27 There was a diversity of views within British political circles as to whether it represented a threat, or if it could be encouraged and even harnessed for their own purposes.28 However, with his increasingly German sympathies, the British were particularly concerned about the possibility that the Ottoman Caliph, with his newly enhanced spiritual authority, would use his position to be a disruptive influence on the Muslims living within the British Empire. The fact that many donations toward the cost of the railway came from Indian Muslims appeared to bear out their concerns.29 Indeed, Özcan has shown that there was a strong and ongoing relationship between the Ottomans and the Indians in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, with Mohamed Ali, Shaukat Ali and many others becoming more and more vociferous in their complaints against British treatment of the Ottomans.30 This culminated in the founding of the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka-ba and the Indian Branch of the “Ottoman Navy Society”: the former was dedicated to criticizing British treatment of the Ottomans and encouraging Indian Muslims to contribute financially toward the upkeep of the Empire, and the latter specifically raised money for ships to be built to safeguard the holy city of Mecca.31 The fact that the Anjuman particularly received widespread support from Indian Muslims from all over the country made the British realize the importance of Indian Muslim considerations in relation to their dealings with the Ottomans and Islamic issues in general.32 Thus, in November of 1914, when the Ottoman Caliph announced in specifically religious terms that he was joining the war with Germany against the Allies, Britain’s worst fears concerning the potential threat of Pan-Islamism to imperial stability appeared to be realized: Know that our state is today at war with the Governments of Russia, England and France and their allies, who are the mortal enemies of Islam. . . . The commander of the Faithful, the Caliph of the Muslims, summons you to the jihad.33

The Caliph had chosen to declare war invoking his Pan-Islamic authority, rather than as the Sultan, the monarch, that he also was. It was clear that the decree had been made in such terms as to deliberately undermine the loyalty of Muslims within the British Empire.34 That the language of the appeal resonated with Muslims in India particularly could be seen in the pamphlet

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

47

written by Maulana Mohamed ‘Ali entitled Choice of the Turks.35 Therefore, the British were very conscious of the delicate nature of the loyalty of their Muslim subjects throughout the war period. This loyalty was called into question with the discovery of the Silk Letter conspiracy and the Singapore Mutiny which both happened in the early years of the war.36 However, the British were able to secure the loyalty of the vast majority of Indian Muslims by announcing that the British Empire was the greatest Muslim power in the world and that it had been declared dar al-Islam by the Meccan‘ulama-.37 This politically adept move was also used by Lloyd-George in his discussions with the Khilafat Delegation, discussed further in chapter five. However, it had potentially far reaching implications which are discussed in the final chapter. Overall, even under such pressure, the Indian Muslim troops generally proved themselves loyal, fighting the Mesopotamian Campaign which helped to bring the Turkish Empire to an end.38 However, with the defeat of Turkey, the resulting treaty and the eventual abolition of the Caliphate, the views of Muslims throughout the Empire quickly turned against the British who, rightly or wrongly, they accused of manipulating the Caliphate question.39 In July of 1921 Maulana Mohamed ‘Ali proposed to the All-India Khilafat Conference that: . . . it is in every way religiously unlawful for a Muslim at the present moment to continue in the British Army, to enter the Army, or to induce others to join the Army. And it is the duty of the Muslims in general and the ‘ulamâ in particular to see that these religious commandments are brought to the home of every Muslim in the Army40

The resolution was adopted and at a stroke it signaled that the delicate loyalty that the British had sought to nurture through the war was gone.41 Britain and France had carved up the Middle East between them, but, under increased economic pressure and social upheaval at home and the disastrous failure of their policies in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, Britain was in a precarious position.42 The attempts to revive their policies and salvage what they could had forced Lloyd-George to create a new department, the “Colonial Office,” with Winston Churchill at its head, to try and bring order out of the humiliating mess the British had brought upon themselves.43 Essentially, the British were still playing the “Great Game,” with the Soviet Union, rather than Imperial Russia, trying to keep the Russians out of Asia, but failing to secure the support of either France, or, in the end, the Arabs themselves.44 The impact of Wilson’s idealistic self-determination and the separate Middle Eastern policies being run by the Foreign Office, the Government of India, the Arab Bureau in Cairo, and, later, the Colonial Office, ensured general chaos and lasting antagonism on all sides toward the British Empire.45

48

Chapter Two

It was against this background that the vexed question of what to do about finding a legitimate Islamic leader who would satisfy the legal-theological requirements for the Caliphate without dividing the loyalties of the Muslims in the Empire was considered. In the end, it was a question that was decided for them by a new Turkish leader who was believed to be strongly under the influence of the newly powerful and menacing Bolsheviks.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CORRESPONDENCE The natural starting point for such an overview of the material is the first folio in the file that has anything to do with the “Caliphate Question.”46 This choice is not simply predicated upon the fact that it is the first piece of material relating to the issue; it is also the document which sets the entire policy in motion. Therefore, while it does not contain any opinion or perspective that is directly applicable to our primary focus on theological and legal legitimization of Caliphal power, it is worthwhile examining insofar as its few lines contain the entire foundation for the voluminous correspondence that follows it. The first piece is an extract of the letter that was attached to a Foreign Office telegram and addressed to the Sharif of Mecca, offering support for an Arab Caliphate, and dated October 31, 1914.47 It was, therefore, sent before the Ottoman declaration of jihād, implying that the British had sources within the Ottoman government who were able to inform them of what was shortly to happen. There are several perhaps unanswerable questions that arise from the letter, the central one being how much advice on the content of the letter came from the Cairo Residence. Certainly, there is no record of any preceding correspondence on the file and the telegram that immediately follows it strongly suggests that the High Commissioner and his staff in Cairo were either not asked, or that their advice was ignored.48 This was true also of the India Office, who, realizing the implications for Indian Muslims, complained in the strongest possible terms at the contents of the telegram as well as the failure to include the India Office in the preparation of it.49 Lord Crewe, who was the President of the Council and also Secretary of State for India, attempted to calm feelings about the lack of consultation on this by stating that the telegram had been part of private correspondence, rather than official correspondence. However, this rather flimsy explanation did not satisfy his own officials or the Government of India and one would suspect that had it been offered as explanation to the Arabs, they also would not have seen the distinction.50 Nevertheless, in spite of the explicit disap-

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

49

proval of the India Office and the Government of India, the Egyptian High Commission continued throughout the war with the intrigues set in motion by Lord Kitchener.51 The High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Milne Cheetham, was perhaps unaware of the history and symbolism attached to the Caliphate, for he clearly made a request to his Director of Intelligence, Lt. Col. Clayton, sometime in late 1914 for background information on what the Caliphate was.52 In response Clayton attached two reports; one from Lt. Perie-Gordon and Lt. Lukach, containing a brief history of the Caliphate as an institution and suggesting what future attitudes and actions should be adopted toward it by the British government. The second was by Perie-Gordon alone and provided a political history of relations between Egypt and Syria.53 Their detailed analysis of the Caliphate is the first document selected for in-depth examination under the second heading “Key British Documents” because it is the first material from the machinery of government which can be said to provide an insight into the understandings and assumptions under which the Cairo Residence developed British policy on the “Caliphate Question.” The fascinating note which follows the reports from the Foreign Office in London to the High Commission in Cairo, and dated ten days after the reports, makes explicit what was to become British government official policy concerning the “Caliphate” from then on. For the author, who is not named, says that it is the government’s intention not to interfere in the Caliphate question.54 This clearly flies in the face of the earlier communication suggesting that the British would be happy to support an Arab claimant to the Caliphate. The dichotomy of this position could be explained in two ways; firstly, that the Foreign Office itself was at odds with another department (perhaps the War Office Intelligence division), concerning British policy in this area and secondly, that the Foreign Office had no desire to get involved in Arab politics. The fact that the letter was only “attached” to a Foreign Office telegram, rather than coming directly from it, could hint at this possibility.55 However, a more likely explanation is that the Foreign Office did know and was involved in the contents of the letter to the Sharif, but that it officially remained neutral on the question. The reason that this is the more likely explanation arises from the need (already discussed) for the British to undermine the power of the Turkish Caliph in the Muslim world, but at the same time, not upset a large and already uneasy minority within the Empire by openly dabbling in internal Muslim affairs. Thus, unofficial manipulation or encouragement without official recognition would seem to be the perfect solution. Aside from this pragmatic theory, there is some evidence that this is the approach adopted in the later part of a secret, internal memo which discussed

50

Chapter Two

the Egyptian position on the Caliphate and their reluctance to discuss it while Constantinople remained untaken: . . . At the same time it is generally agreed that an absolute neutrality tempered by assurances of ultimate goodwill to the successful candidate is the only possible policy for Great Britain, who has indeed everything to gain by the disunity that would be wrought in the world of Islam by the appearance of two or more claimants to the khalifate.56

The growing importance to the officials of an appropriate understanding of the issues surrounding the Caliphate is reflected in the widening field of comment over the course of the next few folios as Sir Reginald Wingate (the Sidar), Sir Milne Cheetham and Sir Mark Sykes (of Sykes-Picot Agreement fame) are drawn into the discussion on legitimacy and theology. It is at this point that Sir Ronald Storrs, Oriental Secretary to the British Agency and later Military Governor of Jerusalem, adds his own analysis to the discussion, and his report becomes the second document discussed under the “Key British Documents” heading, both because of the importance of the individual and his line of argument as compared to the first document. The scope of discussion is opened still further by the first filed opinion from an Arab nobleman, described by Reginald Wingate as the most powerful spiritual leader in the Sudan: Sayyid Ali Morghani.57 Wingate also attached a response from the India Office to the Morghani letter which is the first filed correspondence from the India Office upon this issue. The early inclusion of advice and input from the India Office was perhaps a reflection of the known concerns over Indian Muslim loyalties already mentioned and, therefore, their special interest in this question.58 Morghani was clearly regarded as a powerful and influential man whose opinions carried weight within the Muslim population of the Upper Nile. Therefore, while his views are not detailed enough to warrant separate treatment, it is nevertheless important to discuss them as they represent an opinion that would have carried weight both with the British and the Muslim peoples in the region. He suggests that any claim to the Caliphate that appears to be supported by Christians is bound to fail.59 Morghani is equally sure that the Sharif of Mecca also remains the best claimant, due to the respect he enjoyed from the other chiefs and Muslims worldwide, as the keeper of the Holy Places.60 Finally, he also suggests that tacit British military and material aid would be required to prop up the Caliphate, but done “behind a thick veil.”61 It is interesting to note that the vast majority of Morghani’s argument is founded upon pragmatic politics rather than theology, especially given that Morghani is seen as an important spiritual leader.62

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

51

Thus Morghani focuses upon the quasireligious authority the Sharif enjoyed as a result of his geographical position and the respect he enjoyed of the majority of the Muslim world. Universal agreement to the candidacy of the Sharif, Morghani believes, is not important so long as the majority are in favor; a position that could imply a passing reference to either shura or ijma, but is difficult to corroborate theologically.63 His encouragement to the British to pursue his proposals is the leakage of British assistance to a grateful Muslim world. In this, he misjudges both British motivations and Muslim opinion, for when suspicions of British involvement in the Caliphate question were aroused in the 1920s, Indian Muslims particularly reacted with great anger.64 He also contradicts his earlier assessment that British involvement should be a closely guarded secret. Even at this early stage, it seems that the British were aware of the strong opinions in the Indian Muslim community such action would generate, for the Secretary of State’s office in India urges unofficial encouragement to the Sharif but no material support, and further urges suspicion of Morghani’s motives.65 Clearly, word was spreading among the Arab elites that discussion of the Caliphate question was alive within British circles, for shortly after Morghani’s letter was received, another Arab notable (this time from Aden), also sent a letter into the High Commission.66 The desire of an Arab to express his opinion on the subject at such an early stage would perhaps suggest urgency and concerned interest in the outcome. This would be in line with Hourani’s understanding of the place of the Caliph in educated Arab thinking: The Sultan is the “de facto” Caliph to the learned Arabs; he is also Caliph “de jure.” As a matter of religious obedience they acknowledge and obey him.67

The Arab correspondent summarizes the political situation as he sees it, pointing out that even if Constantinople were to fall the Turkish Caliph would still be regarded as the most suitable Caliph on the basis of his possessions and perceived power.68 This is an interesting assessment of the Ottoman ruler’s perceived hold over Muslims insofar as the reasons that the Arab writer advances for continued loyalty to the Caliph are based far more upon monarchical prestige than spiritual authority. This would seem to suggest that Reid may be accurate in his characterization of Ottoman headship over the wider Islamic world as “feudal overlordship” rather than spiritual authority. However, the central issue regarding what constitutes “spiritual” and “feudal” authority and whether they can be separated in regard to the Caliphate remained.69 The Adenese writer does however point out that the Turkish Caliphs are not loved but the general opinion of Moslems in Arabia and India is that the extinction of the Turkish Empire is the extinction of Islam itself and that its break up would be most disasterous [sic] to Islam and Moslems.70

52

Chapter Two

A clearer warning of the depth of Muslim feeling could not be written and it is important to remember that, as has already been seen, the British were conscious of the delicate nature of the issue, although their perspective was tempered with concern about the possible impact on the Empire. The Adenese writer then moves on to suggest that the Sharif of Mecca would be a suitable alternative. His confidence is founded upon the Sharif’s lineage, the legal point of view,71 and his prestige among other Muslims as the Keeper of the Holy Places.72 It is interesting to note that his argument here is very much in line with Morghani’s letter already examined. However, he also opines that the Sharif would be too weak to rule effectively, and that other rivals would rise up to remove him from power.73 The Amir of Afghanistan is the only other candidate that he can advance, and he bases the Amir’s possible claim on the fact that Afghanistan has always been known as a place of high standing in the Islamic world, citing the Hadith book Sahih compiled by al-Bukhari, and a reference to a tradition (only half quoted and written in Arabic) which says that the “black flag to re-establish Islam would come from Khorassan”74. Thus, even though the Arab writer’s argument could be said to be lacking a strong doctrinal basis, in expressing his concerns he does accurately gauge the depth of feeling in the Muslim world, and his letter provides evidence of the lines of thinking among upper class Muslims upon this issue.75 The Arab correspondent finishes with two copied pages from Ibn Khaldûn in an attempt to provide some historical insight from an Arabic perspective.76 These two pages are a translation of an Arabic copy of the history. In the translation, he states that the word “khalif” should be translated “Successor to the Lawgiver,” before adding that the title should be Imam because he is a spiritual leader insofar as he leads the prayers.77 He is also a man who should be imitated by others and “khalif” because he “succeeds the Prophet among his nation.” He then moves into a quotation of Q4:59, in Arabic, although it is left unreferenced.78 The purpose of quoting this verse in particular is not made explicit in the portion of text the noble supplies. However, it appears likely that in quoting this particular verse, Ibn Khaldun was referring to the “Caliph” as “those in authority among you.” As has been seen in the earlier chapters, this assumption cannot be automatically inferred from the original text, and had only rarely been interpreted in this way.79 The viewpoint of the Adenese writer is very much tied into the fascinating report of a conversation between the Nizām of Hyderabad and Lt. General Edwin Docke Elliot in which the “Caliphate Question” was discussed in some depth in March 1916.80 The Nizām outlines the history of the early Caliphate, focusing on the circumstances surrounding the murder of Hussein at Kufa and

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

53

the subsequent accession of Mu’awiya to the Caliphate.81 During the course of the Nizām’s brief history he is reported as saying: Now the word “khalifa” is derived from “khalaf,” the significance of which is that the successor has all the qualifications of the predecessor . . .82

As was discussed in chapter one, his understanding of the etymology and the doctrine that flows from it is true to a point. That being said, however, the primary concern arising from this meeting in relation to this book is Lt. Gen. Elliot’s apparent inability to see that he was being given a Shi’a perspective on what was essentially a Sunni issue.83 Thus, should the Nizām’s comments have become part of British policy at the urging of Lt. Gen. Elliot, then there would have been enormous potential for an exacerbation of tensions between Sunni and Shi’as. For the Nizām’s comments were going straight to the upper ranks of the British military and being passed around senior officials in government, impacting on a government machine that was hoping to separate the Caliphate from its Pan-Islamic appeal.84 Theological discussion of all the issues raised by these two Muslim notables has already been examined in an earlier chapter, but it is worthwhile noting that both the correspondent from Aden and the Nizām were educated men earnestly seeking to speak into an issue upon which they felt they had a valid opinion. Thus, while the basis of this opinion is open to criticism and scrutiny, these are valuable documents from two perspectives; firstly, they express the opinions of powerful, learned Muslim men, with no apparent vested interest in the outcome.85 Secondly, as there is no record of any request for information having been made outside of British diplomatic or academic channels in the files, it shows that, even in 1915, news of British discussion on the issue had leaked out and that those that sent in their opinions were doing so of their own volition. It also provides the reader with an inkling of one of the essential weaknesses of British information gathering in regard to the Caliphate: their inability to understand the differing backgrounds and beliefs of those who were offering them advice. This vulnerability meant that they had no way of filtering the advice they were given, exposing them to possibly dangerous misconceptions. The widening field of intercommunication concerning the issue of the Caliphate is seen further in the increased correspondence from other embassies. This provided not only wider opinion on the “Caliphate Question” as an issue, but, from a British perspective, helped to widen the scope of intelligence gathering. Notable among the documents from the perspective of this book is correspondence concerning some intelligence received from the

54

Chapter Two

outgoing Dragoman at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople.86 He reports that a portion of the Muslim ‘ulama- in Turkey were considering removing the Ottomans from the Caliphate and holding elections for a new Caliph with the same remit as the Vatican.87 The details of this remit are not spelt out, but the Vatican is named in relation to giving the new Caliph the same, tiny, independent state as the Pope: a portion of the city of Constantinople or Damascus were suggested as possible locations.88 The notion of the Caliph as a Pope is one that crops up regularly in the nineteenth and twentieth century discussions on the nature and role of the Caliphate among Muslim intellectuals who had assimilated more to the Western mindset. Generally, these were Muslims who saw the Western model of governance as the goal for their own lands and Western Islamic scholars looking to explain the Caliphate to a Western audience.89 This secondhand viewpoint provides a rare glimpse in British files of one group of religious scholars within Turkey attempting to find a solution to the pragmatic problem of removing Ottoman influence, while retaining a spiritual head for the Muslim world. As such, this report would have been cause for alarm in British circles, given their desired objective. The clerics are not named in the report, but, given their views, it would seem likely that they were not members of any of the reform groups that had been present in Turkey for over fifty years. As Lewis states, even into the early years of the Kemalist period, the ‘ulam still controlled much of the state structure in Turkey, and therefore, their motivation in replacing the then Caliph and creating an election should be seen as an attempt to appease reformers, while reasserting their influence on a global level through the realigning of the office as a purely spiritual headship. 90 This viewpoint would also be historically in line with the aims and objectives of the Caliphate from the turn of the century onward as outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Within the earliest folios are some of the most in-depth British official discussion of the issues surrounding the Caliphate to be found in government documentation from the period. The reason for this is not hard to understand, for the British, having made an attempt to countermanipulate the Muslim world against the influence of the Turks (and by extension also, the Germans) needed to understand both what they were involved with and also gather any information which might be of use to them in the future. This requirement later changed to a more specialized knowledge in order to develop the language for the treaties of Lausanne and Sèvres. It is in this light that their later request for more detailed notes from Thomas Arnold and the foreign language documents on the nature of the Caliphate can be seen.91 Such information gathering is useful, but one might ask why it was not done in the run-up to war (especially given their ongoing concern since the turn of the

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

55

century) before the letter to the Sharif was sent, so that the British government might have understood the nature of what it was getting itself involved in. That question cannot be answered from the files, but it does point toward a government that was re-active, rather than pro-active. Many of the later folios in the file relate to the politics surrounding the proposition of an Arab Caliphate, during which the course and direction of official British policy surrounding the issue are refined and set down. Theological discussion becomes buried in the politicking that surrounds the end of the war and the subsequent peace agreements. Thus, the repeated line from officials is that it is not for the British to interfere in the Caliphate question; yet at the same time it also emerges that their concept of the Caliphate was that it should be for national aspirations only, rather than religious or PanIslamic purposes.92 However, having been alerted to the possible strength of Indian Muslim feeling, and wanting to secure a nationalist rather than religious Arab Caliph, further expert opinion is obtained from three academic sources, one requested and the others inserted into the file for information purposes. Professor Arnold’s requested advice is discussed in part II, but the other two, both non-British, form the central analysis for the third heading; “Foreign Language Documents in the Residence Files,” because each document (one by Professor Nallino and the other by Sheikh Tommara of Al-Azhar University), provides fascinating perspectives on the issue, which the British brought into their thinking. The major concern of the British through the rest of the war years and into the peace treaties was the opinion of Indian Muslims, particularly as the new nationalist government in Turkey moved towards the abolition of the Caliphate.93 This concern is reflected in the increasing body of material coming from the India Office in London and direct from the Government of India itself. Thus, while the policy itself remains reasonably settled, internal questions and concerns over reaction in India and elsewhere among Muslims reflect real uncertainty and fear concerning the possible effects of their policies.94 The opinion of Indians is brought to the fore in the file with the reported meeting of the Aga Khan with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His report, filed in late 1915, says that the Aga Khan believed that Indian Muslims would not accept the idea of an Arab Caliphate, and that it would be unwise for the British to be seen interfering in the issue.95 The Aga Khan did not set out his reasons for the view he expressed, or they were not recorded. However, given their support for the building of the Hijaz Railroad already mentioned, it could be that they still saw the Ottoman Caliph as the legitimate head of the ummah, even if he was fighting on the opposing side.96 Certainly, the later folios show the Indian Government officials to be very

56

Chapter Two

anxious about the issue and Indian Muslims becoming increasingly involved in attempting to maintain the Ottoman Caliph in power.97 The undersecretary’s reply was disingenuous, confirming an official policy of noninvolvement while appearing willing to help in any political or secular way. But in his report, he reiterates the possible dangerous consequences for British India should Britain be seen as manipulating Muslim politics for their own purposes, warnings that were particularly poignant given the mutiny of Indian Muslim troops in Singapore earlier that same year.98 However, the opinions of the Aga Khan were quickly dismissed by Clayton on the basis that the Aga Khan could not speak for the Sunni Muslims, given his Shi’a background, and lack of understanding of the history attached to the issue.99 This view is reiterated in a letter to Lord Grey at the Foreign Office early the following month and appears to suggest that low class Arabs were not really interested in the Caliphate issue at all.100 This was somwhat shortsighted attitude given what had been happening over recent history in India and Singapore and a rather stunning assumption to make given the known activities of PanIslamists such as the Wahhabis at this time and previously.101 As will be seen later, this is the only time in which the issue of personal perspective upon the nature of the advice is examined by the British. Ironically, it is perhaps the only time that it should not have been. Whatever the perceived deficiencies in the Aga Khan’s understanding, his remains the only recorded prediction of Pan-Islamic revival as a result of the Abolition in the file.102 It also, by default, reinforces the notion that the British did not understand the true nature of the Caliphate and its place in Islam insofar as they clearly failed to understand the depth of feeling among the grassroots Muslim community. However, if the reports in the file are to be believed, they might be forgiven for misunderstanding the importance of the institution to the Muslim masses given the very mixed signals they were receiving from the Muslim intelligentsia right through the Abolition.103 This, perhaps, is a failure of effective intelligence: acting on information and opinion received from only one (small) area of the community. Summary This general survey of the correspondence reveals that the British were receiving a broad range of opinions upon the Caliphate question, both from within the government machinery and also from an ever widening circle of interested parties including European academics, Arabs, and Indians. At the same time, these sources were all concentrated among the intelligentsia and governing elites, rather than lower levels of Muslim society. Other than this, the main concern, as revealed by lack of notation and comment in the mar-

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

57

gins, is the shallow understanding of the range of differing backgrounds and traditions that the opinions were drawn from. This opened the British officials up to the possibility of placing erroneous emphases on opinion that was not necessarily relevant to the situation that they were working in.

KEY BRITISH DOCUMENTS Perie-Gordon and Lukach’s report on the Khilafah The report opens with some brief etymological and theological explanation, before launching into a very brief history of the office, which is geared mainly toward the Ottoman period. There is no referencing of authorities, which is not surprising given the fact that it is a government paper rather than an academic one. However, this is a shame and one is left wondering whether their information was book based, or founded solely upon local Arab experts. Whatever the truth, the report contains, in this early stage, a series of inaccuracies and generalizations which are disingenuous, undermining the strength of Perie-Gordon and Lukach’s later argument concerning the validity of different candidates: The word “Khalif” means successor, Lieutenant or Vicar, and was first used to denote the person who, on the death of Muhammad succeeded to the spiritual and temporal monarchy which the Prophet had created. The essence of this monarchy, in the early stages of its history, was that it embraced all Moslems, and that the Khalif (successor) of the Prophet, who in the course of time was also proclaimed as Vicar of God and Shadow of God upon the earth in his spiritual capacity, and Emir al-Muminin Commander of the Faithful, in his temporal capacity, was both Pope and King.104

The etymology of the word “Khalı˘fa” has already been examined in the previous chapter, where it was seen that the definition of “deputy” was actually of primary theological importance for understanding the true nature of the Caliphal legitimization, particularly in the rashidūn and early Umayyad periods.105 Moreover, Perie-Gordon and Lukach’s description of the early Caliphate as a “monarchy” should be amended to “leader,” or “one in authority,” as shown by Lambton.106 They also fail to acknowledge the divisions and confusion that have arisen over the titles that they mention in the second sentence, for the Shadow of God upon the Earth came in with the Sultanates in the later Umayyad and Abbasid periods and the title Amı-r al Mu’minin predates that of the Shadow of God. 107 All of these titles were wrestled over between the Sultan and the Caliph right into the Ottoman period, and display,

58

Chapter Two

right at the very opening, Perie-Gordon and Lukach’s seemingly shallow understanding of the complexity of the issues involved.108 The next pages, which provide a purely historical account of the creation and destruction of the Umayyads in Spain, the Fatimids in Egypt, and the role of Salah ud-Din, do not need to be discussed other than to highlight the fact that their historical account focuses upon the divisions and political maneuverings, rather than trying to get to the heart of the Caliphate’s place in Islam. However, Perie-Gordon and Lukach (who references his own work), make two points of particular interest for this book insofar as they highlight the role of Cairo as a source of purely spiritual Islamic authority, after the destruction of Baghdad in 1258: A Moslem Papacy bereft of its Temporal Power, maintained by and under the protection of Moslem Kings.109

What is interesting here is this fine example of “leading the audience”: the purpose of the report is important to remember here; that of building a case for an Arab Caliphate, rather than an Ottoman one. The authors have rushed through the cultural high points of the Baghdad Caliphate, when the Caliph ruled directly and then increasingly under the power of the Sultans, the time of Harun al-Rashid and the Arabian Nights, and have moved to dwell upon a time when Egypt was the spiritual center of the Islamic world, with various Muslims ruling autonomously. The implicit message here is clear. The final stage of the theohistorical argument continues to drive home the developing message of illegitimacy in the modern Caliphate: for, in a very articulate paragraph, Perie-Gordon and Lukach attempt to demonstrate that its modern doctrines are the exact reverse of those upon which it is founded: In the beginning the elective successor of Muhammad was the primary Imam of the Moslem theocracy, and as such temporal ruler (commander of the Faithful) of the Moslem people. In the second stage the holder of the Khalifate, which had become hereditary, was reduced to accepting the protection of the strongest Moslem dynasty of the day, the princes of which were nominally invested by the Supreme Imam with the function of discharging temporal sovereignty. In the third stage the Khalifate became an appanage of the principal Moslem monarchy in virtue of the new doctrine that the chief Prince in Islam must of necessity also be the Chief Imam, the exact reverse of the doctrine which had originally constituted the Chief Imam as supreme temporal Emir al Muminin.110

This paragraph is very important, because in it are displayed some of the shallow conceptual understandings that the British were attempting to engage with. At each of the “stages” they divide the history into, simplistic assumptions are displayed, based on erroneous understandings.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

59

They conclude their history, bringing the story up to date, focusing on the idea that the notion of the Caliphate had, in Ottoman eyes, all but died, before alluding to its revival as part of the Pan-Islamic ideology.111 As part of their assessment, they include a very interesting set of “qualifications” they believe to be necessary to fulfil Sunni criteria for Caliph at that time, to which they later add the principle of leadership belonging to the strongest ruler.112 It is frustrating that the qualifications they outline are not given a source, for they revolve very much around possession of key Islamic places and symbols.113 The only common ground is the priority of “election” over hereditary right. What is shown is that the British understandings of what makes a legitimate Caliph are simply a reflection of the Arab advice already seen, and shows therefore the extent to which the Muslim elites had taken on the modern monarchical notions of legitimacy already discussed in the preceding section. The importance of symbolic regalia in the later Abbasid period was discussed in chapter one, and it is important to note that, in British eyes, this “symbolic legitimacy” appears to have completely taken the place of the original qualifications in the last Caliphal period. This is perhaps a sign of how far the office had fallen into decline from its high original ideals. The final four pages of the document provide a summary of the strengths of the claim for each of the Muslim leaders alive at that time. The Ottoman Caliph, Shah of Persia (dismissed in one sentence), Sultan of Morocco, Sultan of Egypt, Nazim of Hyderabad, Imam Yehia and the Sharif of Mecca.114 Each of them is examined as a possibility, using a mixture of theology and political pragmatism in their approach. Thus, while the Iman Yehia is dismissed as a possibility because he does not possess any of the Holy Places, the Sultan of Morocco, even though he is called “Caliph” by his own people, is rejected on the grounds that Morocco is under French and Spanish influence and therefore is undesirable due to the influence he could potentially have within the British Imperial Muslim population. This same pragmatic-theological approach is seen in Perie-Gordon and Lukach’s recommendation of the Sharif as the potential candidate, due not just to his respect within the Arab world, but also his possession of the Holy Places and his Quraishi lineage. Thus, in these final sentences can be seen an encapsulation of the whole British approach to the issue: the needs of power brokering and politics outweighing their shallow theological considerations. This report is a valuable document, not just because of what it demonstrates about British understanding of the issues surrounding the Caliphate, but also because its style and approach seem to become a foundation, or blueprint, upon which all future consideration of the Caliphate is founded. There is no record of a copy being passed to the Foreign Office in London. Even so, it is still important insofar as it represents the understanding of the “Caliphate”

60

Chapter Two

that both the High Commissioner and the Director of Intelligence at the Cairo war office were operating under. As their advice fed into the wartime and later peacetime strategies for the Middle East, it can therefore be reasonably assumed that it was a hugely influential report. It could be legitimately argued by the authors that the criticisms of their work are academic and pedantic, especially given the nature of the high pressure situation they were compiling their report in. They could also say that their aim was simply to provide a brief background note for their superiors in order for them to understand the basis of the recommendations they were making later in the report. However, while these arguments are not unreasonable, the lack of wider understanding upon such a crucial issue could be seen as a serious failing given the nature of what the British were attempting to do: manipulate a political situation through theological means in order to create a new, (favourable) political reality. A lack of proper understanding of the issues and background to the Caliphate meant that, in the years and decades to come, the growth of Pan-Islamism, with its strong “khilafah ideology,” could not be seen for the potential threat that it posed. Such a statement is clearly much easier to make with the benefit of hindsight. However, intelligence files which were highlighting the activities of Pan-Islamists, their propaganda,115 and the unrest of the Indian Muslims were known at this time. Therefore, the criticism of imprudent action through lack of proper understanding can be legitimately levelled at the British Foreign Office through the corroborative evidence contained in other files of the time. The Storrs Memo116 Ronald Storrs’ memo, which develops his discussion of Egyptian reluctance to discuss the Caliphate question, provides a fascinating discussion of the theology of the Caliph and the historical requirement for the office. He translates the word “Caliph” as “successor” and discusses its appearance in the Qur’an in relation to Adam and David, (although he does not discuss the other Qur’anic references to it in relation to mankind in general117) before going on to reference what he describes as “all Sunni Mohammadan books”118 for his authority as to the requirements for a Caliph: . . . a man, an adult, a sane person, a free man, a learned divine, a powerful ruler, a just person and one of the Quraish.119

Of all these attributes, the one of greatest importance, as far as Storrs is concerned, is the last, for he points out that it is upon that point that the Ottoman claim diminishes and that the Sharif of Mecca’s becomes strong. He

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

61

then moves on to an historical explanation of how the Ottomans’ claim to the Caliphate falls down, starting with the origins of Osman himself. He reports the story of the legitimization of his rule through his obtaining the Caliphate in the will of the last Abbasid ruler in Egypt. This fact he couples with his understanding that there is no hereditary right for leadership in Islam, a precedent which he uses to underline the lack of legitimacy in the claim in the Ottoman Caliphate.120 Much of this follows the earlier argument advanced by Perie-Gordon and Lukach, and is as much a testament to the influence of their report upon the power brokers in the upper echelons of the Foreign Office as it is a reflection upon the thinking of Storrs himself. There are however a number of points upon which Storrs differs from the Perie-Gordon and Lukach report, not simply in style, but in the thrust of the argument. The most significant of these is in the underlying focus of his discussion; for, whereas Perie-Gordon and Lukach discuss rival claimants in view of the practical necessity of having an alternative on the assumption that the present Caliph is unsuitable, Storrs appears to revel in the lack of legitimization that the Ottoman Caliphs have in relation to Islamic scripture and precedent: The Ottoman Sultans thus aggregate to themselves the title Khalifa and Successors to the Prophet. It is however a mere assertion; for the title and office being elective and not hereditary, it was not in the power of any Khalifa to transfer it to any other. There is no authority nor any single man of learning known who attempts to prove that the Sultans of Turkey are the rightful Khalifs; for the assumption of the title by anyone who is not of the Quraish tribe is undoubtedly illegal and heretical, . . .121

As was seen in the theological chapter, his confident assertion concerning the Quraishi lineage is correct in one sense, although, as has been seen, this requirement was later subsumed under other pragmatic considerations. Moreover he fails to acknowledge that the Caliphate had had a large hereditary element ever since the days of the Baghdad Caliphate; as a result, it is therefore hard to justify such a line of argument without questioning the legitimacy of any candidate from the Abbasid period onwards. Storrs then moves on to deploy two (unreferenced) Hadiths as evidence to support his argument that the Sultans of Turkey are not “true” Caliphs, the second of which does not appear in any of the canonical Hadith, and therefore leaves open concerns surrounding its legitimacy.122 Even accepting the premise that Storrs’ Hadith are both valid, his source selection can be criticized as highly selective, for he omits the other Hadith that do not require Quraishi leadership of the Islamic community.123

62

Chapter Two

He then touches upon the history of the Wahhabis, drawing out their belief in the Ottoman Caliph’s legitimacy, a history lesson that undoubtedly had political motivation insofar as many of the Arabs under Ibn Sa’ud, and further afield on the Arabian Peninsula, were also Wahhabi.124 However, he fails entirely to discuss Wahhabi attacks upon the Ottomans in the early nineteenth century; a significant failure given the historical parallels between Wahhabi aspirations and goals in both periods.125 Interestingly, he moves on to hint at the recent move toward Pan-Islamic recognition, although it is never discussed by name, as he acknowledges that there had been more khutbahs said in Indian mosques for the Caliph in recent years.126 Although the point is not developed, it seems reasonable to suggest that it shows that he understood that the potential Pan-Islamic element of the Caliph’s leadership represented a serious threat to British interests in India, and that this fact was informing his thinking about the issue in general. Rather like Perie-Gordon and Lukach, he then lists the bases for Caliphal legitimacy as he understands them. He includes the three components seen in their report but he adds two more: “nomination” and “the right of the sword.”127 His inclusion of these two other qualifications is fascinating, for, as he grudgingly admits, “nomination” was set as precedent back in the Caliphate of ‘Umar, when he nominated ‘Uthman as Caliph after he was dead.128 Its inclusion for consideration in this report undermines his earlier argument concerning the invalidity of Osman’s succession, for he has effectively admitted that the Ottomans were nominated, thereby being able to claim that they had indeed followed the precedents for succession laid out from the earliest times. Interestingly, unlike Perie-Gordon and Lukach, he dismisses the possession of the sacred relics as mere superstition for the illiterate masses. This somewhat offhand dismissal is rather inconsistent insofar as he did not dismiss the guardianship of the Holy Places which had similar symbolic value, and which has already been discussed in connection with the Perie-Gordon and Lukach report.129 Storrs completes his report highlighting the necessity for there to be a Caliph. This is something that Perie-Gordon and Lukach did not discuss at all, but Storrs appears to feel the necessity of justifying the existence of the institution theologically, founding his argument upon the “sharhu l-muwaqif” and a saying attributed to Abu Bakr.130 His choice of authorities here is interesting for there are several Hadith in Bukhari and Muslim, as well as the account in Muir, which would provide far stronger evidence.131 Why he chose these references is difficult to ascertain as there are no clues in his memoirs or other official papers. It may simply be that he has quoted from the information he had to hand, or that was fed to him by those who were advising him.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

63

Therefore there can be little doubt that he was of the opinion that the Caliphate was not a bad institution in and of itself, but rather that it needed an alternative incumbent to the Ottoman Caliph, with a more legitimate claim to the Caliphate. However, although he makes a case for the ending of Ottoman rule, his reasoning is undermined by his application of a generalized argument to one specific dynasty. His analysis would have carried more weight had he focused on specific grounds for grievance against the Ottomans rather than taking some general remarks about authority and legitimacy in Islam and applying them directly to the Ottomans. It is interesting to note that, in his memoirs, published during the Second World War, Storrs makes no reference to his perspective on the question of the Caliphate. Instead, he chooses to dwell upon the political aspects of the issue, setting a rather bombastic tone, and reserving his comments for the Sharif’s ultimate lack of political clout and not mentioning his original proposal of Hussein as a nominee for the Caliphate.132 Summary The two key British documents present their views in the light of both history and theology. Both deploy almost matching sets of criteria when it comes to discussing the parameters within which the basis for legitimization should be sought and, for both, the information is directed toward a particular viewpoint: this is truer of the Storrs memo than the Perie-Gordon and Lukach report perhaps, but there is a clear directing of thinking both towards the removal of the Ottoman Caliph and the matching conclusion regarding the suitability of the Sharif of Mecca. The Storrs memo concentrates more upon history as the basis for its arguments and there is a strong accent upon the principle of power resting with the one who controls the holy places and relics, developed in later Islamic political theory. While Perie-Gordon and Lukach also cite this as a means of legitimization, they also spend time discussing the early Caliphate as precedent in developing criteria for legitimization. Storrs however, while briefly mentioning the early Caliphate, also injects Qur’anic references into his discussion, but fails to discuss their implications. The papers are both most revealing for what they leave out; for neither deals with the more religious remit inherent in the Caliphate such as leadership of the Prayers and the bay’a, whose pledge formed an inviolate link between Allah, Scripture, Muhammad and the Caliph.133 The absence of these factors in the thinking of these officials perhaps contributed to their understanding of the Caliphate as a national monarchy (signalled by their concentration on the symbols of power when discussing legitimization).

64

Chapter Two

There is fleeting mention of some legal and theological aspects of the post, but these are not dealt with in sufficient detail as to provide a rounded view of what the Caliphate was. Their failure to engage in the issue from a Muslim perspective meant that they were not able to establish an authoritative set of parameters upon which to create a Caliphate that both fulfilled their requirement for an Anglo-friendly Muslim leader and pacified their restless Muslim subjects. There is not the space to evaluate whether any candidate available at that time would have been able to fulfil that requirement. However, what these two documents reveal is that their lack of proper understanding of the nature of the issues that they were dealing with rendered them dangerously ill-equipped to deal effectively with the legitimate grievances of Indian and other Muslims in the post war years. This failure to engage with the Muslim perception of who would make an acceptable Caliph is seen clearly in the list of candidates they consider as compared to the candidates discussed by the Adenese Noble. He suggests that the Amir of Afghanistan would be a suitable candidate precisely because he is seen as an independent Islamic ruler, therefore making him more acceptable to them. However, the British officials miss this key element in their thinking and try to satisfy the religiomonarchical requirements for any claimant as they understand them, forgetting that any candidate would have to be seen as independent from European influence to be acceptable to the Muslims.134

FOREIGN LANGUAGE DOCUMENTS IN THE RESIDENCE FILES While this book concentrates on the British perspective, it is important to remember that the French and the Italians also had significant interest in the “Caliphate Question”: the French from the point of view of superpower politics,135 and both of them in the light of the implications of Pan-Islamism for their North African possessions.136 Indeed, it appears that they were more concerned about Pan-Islamism than the British were.137 It is therefore interesting to read the two other European documents contained in the file that are not written in English, for they provide useful insight into the Caliphate question from a non-British standpoint, as well as providing evidence on the widening sources of advice they were receiving as the war progressed and the peace negotiations began. Italian Document The first of them, “Appunti sulla natura del ‘Califfato’ en genere e sul presunto ‘Califfato Ottomano’,” was published from within the Italian Colonial

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

65

Ministry in 1917 by Professor Nallino.138 This famous document shows, even in its front cover, that the Italians were indeed very interested in the Caliphate question and the issues of Pan-Islamism for themselves.139 The thrust of the title also displays the aim of the paper: to present evidence of the illegitimacy of the current Caliphs.140 It was subsequently published in his Raccolta di scritti editti e ineditti in 1941 and its findings have been used extensively as a valued reference and discussion document by scholars.141 However, given its clear anti-Ottoman bias, it seems slightly surprising that its sources and findings have not been more closely questioned. Much of the factual content (which closely mirrors that of the British documents) has already been discussed; what will be examined here is the nature of Professor Nallino’s argument and his use of evidence. This approach is taken in order to better understand the British viewpoint,142 critiquing the more academic material on the Caliphate issue they were receiving late in the war and post-war period and analyzing its possible impact on British thinking. In his opening chapter, Nallino outlines his understanding of the theological and historical basis for the Caliphate. The central thrust of his argument is to define the foundations of legitimization for the office and to describe its nature in the rashidūn and early Imperial ages. Muhammed had founded a religion and state at one and the same time; during his lifetime both had the same territorial extension. In his capacity as Prophet and Apostle of God he was the only religious authority. In his own conception and that of his followers, this function admitted no delegation of spiritual or other powers, nor of the transmission of such powers after his death by inheritance. Divine revelation, says the Koran, definitely closed with Muhammed, . . . To find anything which in the least degree resembles the spiritual powers of the Greek, Catholic or Protestant clergy, one must search among those late developments of Islam which occurred some six centuries after Muhammed, that is to say, in religious confraternities.143

He then moves on to quote from a tradition or history which states that on the day of Muhammad’s death, those in the community met and argued, eventually deciding to appoint a successor, with the title “Khalifa.”144 His argument here is that the notion of a “successor” only came after the death of Muhammad and was based upon the pragmatic necessity of having a leader for the newly developed community. This argument has been extensively examined in the theology section, and it is interesting to see that Nallino places himself within the scholastic opinion of Arnold et al who suggest that Muhammad died without naming a successor. This runs contrary to the sources found in Muir’s history who suggest that, in fact, a ruler had indeed been nominated and that the succession was relatively smooth.145 Given the general tone of

66

Chapter Two

his piece, one can only assume that Nallino’s choice was predicated upon his own research (which he does not cite) and on his essential desire to erode the foundations of legitimacy right from the outset. He then moves on to outline the parameters of the Caliph’s remit, arguing that it was always essentially political and not spiritual, proposing that the spiritual nature of the office, such as it was, lay in the defense of the community from would-be attackers, while questions of doctrine and dogma were ruled upon by the developing body of the “ulama.”146 The Caliph, under this system, therefore, had no right to legislate, for all legislation was also a matter of religious doctrine and judges were deliberately kept separate from government. However, differing opinions among scholars highlighted in the theology chapter show that, at the very least, Nallino has no reason to sound so confident in his assessment here. It should also be clear that, whatever might have been laid down in the rashidūn era, the earliest Umayyad period saw the Caliphs using legislative powers in widely varying areas of law.147 Thus, the picture of the Caliph as simply the military protector of the community and propagator of the word, who has the power of designation of secular authority, is somewhat misleading. His rendering of the Caliphal remit omits the vital role of leadership in the khutba, the earliest symbol of legitimization in the ummah and the key mark that defines the office as both spiritual and secular head.148 Nallino appears to have fallen into the trap that he accuses others of finding: attempting to create a separation between the secular and spiritual. This dynamic is an integral part of the Western political psyche, but is entirely artificial when applied to Islamic political theory. It would also appear that he has confused later medieval and Ottoman Caliphal headship with the principles laid down in the early period, for he quotes a passage from the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 which lists what the Sultan may or may not do, but suggests that this had always been the functions of the Sultan rather than the Caliph. As was seen in the earlier chapter, this does not accurately reflect the historical development of the relationship between Caliph and Sultan.149 Indeed, all the functions that he lists were, at some time or other, part of the Caliphal remit. Thus, his first chapter appears to drive a wedge between Muhammad, the rashidūn, and the other Caliphs based upon an apparent separation of spiritual authority from secular power after the death of Muhammad. His purpose is clear: laying the groundwork for an attack upon the Caliph’s Pan-Islamic claims. The chapter that follows makes some very useful points on Western perceptions of the Caliphate as preparation for the analysis he makes in the subsequent chapters. He quotes (although does not cite) the passage in the “Treaty of Kucuk Kanyarca,” which enshrined the Western conception of the spiritual power of the Caliph from that point on.150 The mistake, as Nallino sees it, was

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

67

seeing the Caliph’s role as parallel with the Pope’s. One might argue that this is not an unreasonable point given the fact that the Papacy had been recently confined to the Vatican, removing his temporal power completely, whereas, even with the Caliph confined to Istanbul or Damascus the nature of the post would have still allowed him to appoint judges and issue decrees that would have had the force of law within the state.151 However, he might have been better advised to argue instead that the geopolitical environment meant that the remit of the post had simply disappeared. Therefore, the institution was simply irrelevant, rather than the Ottomans themselves illegitimate. The rest of the chapter is a discussion of the history of the Ottoman Caliphate: an account which takes pains to point out any piece of information which might lessen the Ottomans as rightful rulers.152 Many of the points he makes, such as the “inheritance of the title” from the last Abbasid in Egypt, had been made by Perie-Gordon and Lukach, and Storrs. He also makes several other valid points concerning Western perceptions of the office and how they had raised the Caliphate back up to a position that they had not even assumed in the days of Suleiman.153 This point was very much in line with the reference to the treaty of Kucuk Kanyarca made earlier. He then moves on to an analysis of the current situation and factors affecting it. His conclusions, (employing a wider field of evidence) are broadly those of the British officials already seen. This paper must have been an encouragement to the British officials to downplay the importance of Pan-Islamic sentiment and to pursue the Caliphate for use as a political instrument as they had already been doing. The central criticism of Nallino’s arguments throughout the paper is that the evidence is selective in nature and omits contrary arguments such as the evidence from the Southeast Asian sultanates, and the issue of the leadership of the khutba. Thus, while he makes valuable points concerning the inflated Western perception of Ottoman power and offers some incisive assessments of the issues as he saw them, they are all based upon incomplete evidence and tarnished by the clear desire to unseat the Caliph. Egyptian Document in French From a theological point of view the final significant document in the file is a very revealing paper by the Imam to the Egyptian delegation in Washington concerning the Caliphate question.154 According to the covering note, the paper was written in response to a question from a professor at the Sorbonne who was collecting views on the Caliphate. It is for “private circulation only,” and came into the file by way of a friend of the author (the author is Sheikh Muhammed Hilmi Tommara), who passed it to the British High

68

Chapter Two

Commission for their information. This fascinating document has never been thoroughly examined before, which is astounding given that it is a rich seam of information and opinion coming from a learned man, educated at the most renowned seat of learning in the Sunni Islamic world, Al-Azhar. It is also invaluable because it is clearly laid out, using headings, subheadings, and a writing style that involves using rhetorical questions and answers to provide incisive analysis and opinions. This is in sharp contrast to the other theological critique of the period from within the Islamic world, “Le califat et souverainté nationale,” produced by the Turkish ‘ulamā as justification for the eventual abolition of the Caliphate in 1924.155 Their obscure and tortuous arguments lack the sharp analysis produced by Tommara.156 Clearly, Aceille Sikaly, who passed the document to the British with a covering note, felt that the Imam’s opinions were worth listening to, for he describes Tommara as a young, clever, and modern thinker with an impeccable education and a sharp intelligence.157 The reason for his covering note is obviously to lend weight to the opinions that were about to be read. Before moving into discussion of the contents itself, it should be said that the document has not been translated into English before. Thus, the translated quotations that appear in this chapter have been given with footnoted reference to alternative renditions where necessary. It could be said that the core of Tommara’s argument is contained in the first two lines, which are a quote from the fifteenth century thinker alQalkashandi’s “Subh al-a’sha”158: The Caliph is the image of the Prophet after his death in the heart of the Islamic community.159

This is a strong, fascinating statement, for it goes beyond the customary renderings for Caliph as “successor” and even “deputy,” to the implication of divine authority. Such a definition seems remarkably out of step with the rest of commonly held scholarship and places the Caliph on a par with Muhammad himself. However, given what is said in the course of the document that follows this extraordinary statement, the likelihood is that Tommara is perhaps guilty of linguistic error. What is clear though is Tommara’s absolute belief in the inseparability of the office and the faith: the community requires a leader and to remove it would be to “remove its heart.” He follows his strong opening statement by moving into a discussion of the role of Muhammad himself, describing him as an “intermediary between God and Man” and highlighting his dual role as both Prophet and civil leader, choosing to focus upon Muhammad’s role as legislator as he transformed the community into a nation.160 At the foot of his first page Tommara asks one

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

69

of the two central questions that were discussed in chapter three on the issue of the Caliphate: “Which of these two roles was applied to his representative?”161 By way of answer, he seeks to rule out various elements of Muhammad’s role until he comes to those elements he believes were passed on to the Caliphs who ruled after him. These, he opines, were solely the safeguarding of the community and civil administration of it; a classic Sunni position that is broadly agreed by Nallino who is discussed in the previous section.162 If this is what he believes, one might ask why he was so adamant that the community needed a Caliph, rather than simply a civil servant? His reply is deceptively simple: Islam was unique insofar as it not only created a belief, but it also created a nation and the nation required a leader.163 The question of legitimacy in Islamic leadership has already been examined in the previous chapter. However, Tommara’s line of argument at this point does not concern this issue; rather, he suggests instead that it is a question of necessity. Thus, for Tommara, the question of correct lineage or mechanic of succession is far less important than understanding the nature of Sunni Islam itself; and it is in this light that his views on the necessity of the Caliphate are based. The whole thrust of the Sheikh’s article has followed the theme of his opening statement: that the Caliphate is inseparable from the faith. This is important because the other documents discussed already hint at its necessary existence simply by implication; never assuming a world without it. Here Tommara provides a single sentence that justifies the continued existence of a Caliphate, not on the ground of political or theological legitimacy, but on the grounds of pragmatic necessity and founding principles. This is fascinating insofar as he had clearly had theological training, and therefore would be able to provide references in scripture to support his arguments, although he does not.164 Perie-Gordon and Lukach, Storrs, and Nallino all argue around who has the right to rule and upon what their political legitimacy is founded. Tommara instead bypasses historical arguments around hereditary right and theological precedence and goes instead to the nature of the faith at its inception and adopting a position in the light of that. Effectively, his argument is that Islam requires a political head in order to retain control over what Muslims believe. Tommara’s sharp analysis is backed up with a dissection of the differing perspectives within the Islamic tradition. He focuses on three traditions: the Sunnis, Shi’a and Kharijites, outlining the position of each, before concluding with his opinions and summary. The major doctrinal differences between the Shi’a and Sunni in relation to the Caliphate were examined in chapter three of this book. However, it is worthwhile spending a little time examining Tommara’s perspective as it feeds into his conclusions.

70

Chapter Two

As a Sunni himself, he is keen to point out the validity of the Sunni perspective which, he believed, said that Muhammad never designated a successor.165 To lend weight to his position, he cites two Hadith from Bukhari, which give Muhammad’s reasons for not designating a successor.166 He then moves on to suggest that the designation of a successor was the work of the Muslim leadership in the immediate aftermath of Muhammad’s death. He gives a detailed account of the division of viewpoints within the ummah before coming to the conclusion that the eventual designation of Abu Bakr was a question of necessity: the community requiring a leader, evidencing his earlier statement.167 Tommara’s account, which is referenced back to an uncited Hadith of Bukhari, is perhaps a reference to the account found also in Madelung, which is based on the earliest known tradition concerning the succession given by Ibn al-Abbas.168 According to Ibn al-Abbas, there was a dispute between the native Medinans and the emigrants who had fled with Muhammad concerning their loyalty upon Muhammad’s death. Abbas suggests that during Muhammad’s lifetime, ‘Umar got word that the Medinans planned to end loyalty to the ummah with the death of Muhammad. ‘Umar confronted them about this and managed to win them round, but at the same time, became conscious of the fact that a successor to Muhammad would have to be appointed as soon after Muhammad’s death as possible to maintain the unity of the new nation. Arnold and Muir however, suggest that this same event happened only after the death of Muhammad and resulted in election by acclamation the following day in the mosque.169 Tommara follows his account of the succession with a dissection of Abu Bakr’s style of leadership: was he an absolute monarch, or a heavenly administrator for the affairs of the world?170 In order to examine the question, he unwraps the political history of Abu Bakr, referencing statements that are attributed to him. Central to his understanding of Abu Bakr’s position is the phrase that he quotes at the opening to his discussion of Abu Bakr’s political history: Obey me if I am obedient to God: if I resist the divine way, you do not have to obey me any longer.171

This quote fits with the essentially contractual nature of obedience discussed in the theology chapter. However, as there is no citation for this, or any other quotation in this section, it is difficult to assess its validity.172 Throughout his discussion of Abu Bakr, Tommara is at pains to point out both his humanness and hold him up as an example of Muslim leadership. Indeed, one might say that if Muhammad was the Apostle, according to Tommara, Abu Bakr models the example for Muslim leadership that all future

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

71

Caliphs should follow. The Sheikh makes sure that Abu Bakr’s Caliphate becomes anecdotal for teaching good leadership. In order to highlight this, he cites Qur’anic verses which advocate the very practices which, according to Tommara, Abu Bakr employed.173 This close connection between the leaderships of Muhammad and Abu Bakr are not surprising given that, according to Madelung, the latter wished to be seen as acting in the name of Muhammad and ultimately lead as a civil administrator only.174 However, Tommara translates Abu Bakr’s title “khalifat rasul Allah” as the “Successor to the Emissary of God,” suggesting that the people invested the Caliph with an authority which could not be commensurate with the role of merely a civil administrator.175 Thus the Sheikh is effectively arguing that the Caliph’s designation was a mistake: that Abu Bakr should not have been given that title, but was given it to lend sufficient weight to his leadership.176 This is a remarkable argument from a Muslim cleric, and one that is not even found in Western scholarship.177 Tommara’s acceptance of flawed humanity and strong empathy for the pragmatism of the fledgling ummah is one of the consistent themes of his discourse and his unfettered perspective allows for fresh understandings in a debate that had become largely weighed down in technicality. Tommara then spends considerable time discussing more legal issues which, though fascinating, do not carry the same clarity and incisiveness which was the hallmark of his earlier discussion. Included in this section is a discussion of the role of nomination and the bay’a, again in reference to the Caliphate of Abu Bakr.178 He focuses on the fact that when it came to Abu Bakr’s succession, he nominated ‘Umar in a letter, which was then ratified by the people in a shura at which the bay’a was also given.179 In moving on to the Shi’ites, Tommara becomes noticeably briefer.180 While he is trying to present the claims of the Shi’ites as clearly as possible, he cannot help but criticize their perspective. Thus, the Shi’ite perspective is given with a commentary that was not present in the Sunni discussion and which makes obvious the sympathies of the author. Tommara focuses upon the Shi’a belief for hereditary succession through the family of Muhammad to underpin Caliphal legitimacy, reporting Hadith of Bukhari in which ‘Ali is named successor and highlighting ‘Ali’s role as exemplar in the same way that he promoted Abu Bakr earlier.181 His notes reflect the understandings of the Shi’a position as presented by Lambton, Sachedina, and Vaezi as described in chapter three earlier. However, there is lack of discussion of the differing streams of thought within Shi’ism.182 Indeed, the final sections before the conclusion have a strong feeling of tokenistic treatment, followed by rapid dismissal. Finally, the perspective of the Kharijites is covered in only one page before the conclusions and is discussed in relation to the Shi’ite position, drawing

72

Chapter Two

out the points at which they differ, rather than highlighting the Kharijite belief that both women and non-Muslims could be Caliph.183 He is quick to point out in a footnote that this goes against the understanding of all other Muslims, although he further adds that the Muslim world is divided upon the issue of the necessity for Quraishi heritage for the Caliph.184 Tommara’s conclusions reiterate his central argument: Muhammad died without a successor. The role of the Caliph was purely civil and not spiritual (apart from the leading of public prayers), and his authority was limited or restricted; he held his office at the behest of the Islamic nation, but that ultimate authority rested with the nation itself.185 This interesting perspective perhaps shows his progressive viewpoint; indeed, one might argue that his conclusions bear a close relationship to a Western democratic perspective, rather than the Islamic centered argument surrounding the nature of the Caliph as the implementer of the “Law of God” discussed in chapters two and three. Certainly there are strong echoes of French Enlightenment philosophy in his explanations, for his placement of the Caliph as the leader of the nation, but with a mandate, rather than a divine right, strongly echoes the Rousseauian principle of the leader as the incarnation of the Will of the People.186 Tommara uses a series of didactic arguments to bring the reader to his conclusions. He creates a strong argument for the perspective that he clearly believes; however, he never questions the validity of Islamic sources he deploys, nor presents alternative viewpoints to the one he holds. The central weakness of his entire discussion, however, is that he does not engage with the question of how the issue of Caliphal authority and the wider application of Islamic headship could be worked out in the geopolitical situation in which he was writing. Clearly, as he was not writing with the concept that Western government officials would be viewing his work, he had no reason to comment on the current situation. However, Tommara knew that he was being asked for his opinion because it was one of the important issues of the time, so it is somewhat surprising that he does not conclude his paper with some remarks upon the present situation. Thus, while his explanations are invaluable in terms of theory and precedent, they provide only principles, rather than using them as a basis to discuss the needs of the time. For the British officials that read it however, it should, at the very least, have highlighted the extreme delicacy of the issue in the Muslim world. Summary The two documents analyzed in the foreign language portion of this chapter come from widely differing perspectives. On the one hand, Nallino’s es-

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

73

sentially politically driven analysis seeks to approach the Caliphate with the explicit desire for change. Tommara, however, shows a lively academic interest in the “Caliphate Question” as an interested party in the most pressing religio-political current affairs issue of the era. As a consequence of their perspectives, the Tommara analysis ultimately becomes the more valuable of the two, both because it is written by a Muslim at the most prestigious religious school in the Sunni world and because it takes a far more rounded approach to the issue. This is not to say that Nallino’s criticisms and analysis are invalid or even erroneous, but rather that his writing needed to be understood in its proper context. Unfortunately, as with the rest of the papers and letters submitted from unofficial sources in the file, there is no record of such caveats being applied to the material. POSTSCRIPT A document not found in the Cairo residence files, but in the India Office records, provides an excellent summary of the position of the British Government in Egypt during the war. It is a secret bulletin, produced by the Arab Bureau and circulated in April 1917 detailing the issues surrounding the Caliphate and exploring possible ways forward.187 As there is no distribution list, there is no way of telling whether those officials such as Storrs, Cheetham, and Wingate ever saw this, although, given his role as Head of Intelligence, Lt. Col. Clayton would almost certainly have seen it. It is written by a Major Cornwallis and the general tone and thrust of the paper can be clearly seen in the opening paragraph: It is agreed that neither the nomination nor the establishment of a Caliph is any business of a Christian power; but we are virtually committed by a message sent through the Emir to the Arab people . . . to “approve” an Arab Caliphate . . . 188

Major Cornwallis seems to be suggesting that, in his opinion, the whole issue is a mess, not of the Arab Bureau’s making. Given the fact that, by their very title, the Arab Bureau would naturally be assumed the experts in this field, it strongly suggests that the message of support for an Arab Caliphate discussed at the beginning was not seen or approved by them. This would lend further backing to the observations of Barr, Paris, and Cox who all agree that there was more than one foreign policy being run in the War period and, indeed, after it as well.189

74

Chapter Two

What is most telling is the admission of the ambiguity of the British position, and the position of “official fiction” that they are placed in with regard to the Caliphate: The only possible justification of that negative attitude of ours in India [the notion that the Indian Muslims can still say the khutba for the Ottoman Caliph even though India is under British rule] and elsewhere resides in our official pretence that the Caliphate is only spiritual headship, no longer implying temporal dominion over Moslems in general.190

He then moves on to briefly explain why this is “a pretence,” suggesting that only the Imamate was purely spiritual and that the Caliphate has always been a mixture of both spiritual and temporal, quoting from Snouck Hurgronje to drive home the nature of the “stakes” involved in the issue: A Western State, that admits any authority of a Khalif over its Mohammedan subjects, acknowledges not the authority of a pope of the Moslem Church, but in simple ignorance is feeding political programmes which, however vain, always have the power of stirring Mohammedan masses to confusion and excitement.191

The central question therefore to come out of this is why the senior ranks of the British hierarchy did not listen to the opinion of the experts within its ranks. Clearly, there are times when, for the sake of political expediency, expert advice from officials may have to be weighed against the needs of national interest. However, one would have to question whether this was one of those situations. Clearly, a case could be made on both sides, but this bulletin shows that the expertise on the question of the Caliphate was available. What is concerning is that the opinions of those who were most capable of formulating a more effective policy appear to have been passed over.

CONCLUSIONS The material within the Cairo residence file reflects the two premises that the whole British discussion is based upon: firstly, that there should be a Caliph and secondly, that he should not be Ottoman. It reflects, in large part, the information and opinions which eventually become official British policy, and further reveals the strength in areas of expertise in relation to the host nation. Much of the material written by British officials reflects evidence of reading and conversations with local clerics and Muslim notables and as such, there appears to be a reasonable understanding of the basic framework of legiti-

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

75

macy (theological, legal and historical) within which the issue of suitability could be discussed. However, the majority of the discussion is focused upon later historical and symbolic developments, for Storrs, Perie-Gordon and Lukach, and Nallino all concentrate their arguments upon the doubtful claims of legitimacy around the founding of the Ottoman Caliphate and the lack of correlation between the necessity of “election” in the rashidūn period and the inherited dynastic quality of the current Caliphs. These initial perceptions were built upon by Nallino, who highlighted the lack of spiritual authority invested in the office outside of Western perception until the recent past. Other, non-Western opinions, such as Morghani, Adenese Noble and the Nazim of Hyderabad never sought to question the wisdom of removing the Ottoman Caliph; rather, they assumed that he would go, and sought to influence opinion in that new reality. Although doubts were cast over Morghani’s motives, there is no evidence of British officials questioning the perspective of the advice they were being given. Their shallow understanding of the differing traditions and schools of thought within Islam prevented them from filtering the opinions and analyzing all views before considering a course of action. Thus, their belief in the indifference of the Arab and wider Muslim community on the question of who should be Caliph prevented them from seeing the strength of Muslim public opinion until it was too late. Indeed, one might argue that, even had they known, they would have probably continued on their course anyway given that their major concern was the removal of Turkish influence over the Middle East and an end to the Pan-Islamic appeal of the Caliph. Against this general tone, the two voices of moderation and insight that emerge are those of the Aga Khan (whose views are quickly dismissed), and Sheikh Tommara (whose influence is impossible to gage). The Sheikh’s brilliant dissection of the central issues in the Caliphate question mark it out as a document of genuine importance, both for the period in which it was written and in the modern re-examination of the question. He is unfettered by the same assumptions that underpin the opinions of the other contributors; instead, he provides a detailed theoretical evaluation of the Caliph’s place within Islam. While he clearly portrays a primarily Sunni perspective, his refreshing and articulate argument for the centrality of the Caliph in the ummah displays an excellent grasp of the issues discussed in the previous two chapters. Apart from its clear Sunni bias, the main criticism of his discussion is that he kept it theoretical, rather than engaging in discussing his understanding in relation to the Caliphate in current affairs. Even so, had his work been properly examined it would have provided a far deeper understanding of the complexity of the issue and probable depth of feeling that

76

Chapter Two

would be aroused in the Muslim world as a result of British interference. It is a shame, therefore, that his views were clearly passed around for interest, but seemingly failed to be taken into consideration when it came to policy development. Overall, an opportunity to question the necessity for the existence of the Caliphate at all, in a geopolitical climate that now had Muslims in a relatively powerless minority for the first time since its very earliest years, was missed. Even so, having assumed its continued existence, the essentially theocratic nature of the post in its original form was lost in the discussion of later symbolic legitimization. Perhaps this is not surprising given that they wanted a Caliph who was a figurehead, rather than exercising real power and clearly, political necessity played an understandably large part in the discussion of particular candidates. However, as was seen in the historical overview at the opening of this chapter, the British had desired to appease Muslim interests ever since the 1857 Mutiny. Thus, even if it was just a figurehead that they desired, a more detailed examination of the requirements for leadership may have produced a candidate that ultimately placated their Muslim subjects and allowed them to exercise the control they wanted, without causing the antagonism it eventually did. While there is no reason for government officials to have a detailed understanding of the transformation of the early Caliphate into its later model of Persian kingship, it can be argued that the important differences between the Caliphate and sovereignty, for example, would be necessary. A good example of this omission would be the central role of leadership of the khutba, already discussed in the previous chapter; this is not examined by any of the officials and had it been known a far better understanding of the Pan-Islamic role of the Caliph would have been possible. Fundamentally; having missed the foundational understandings of the nature of the Caliphate, their discussion was therefore predicated on an incomplete picture, which increased the opportunity for error.

} So far we have focused particularly on the Cairo Residence correspondence in order to explore the understandings of the men who were directly involved in the planning and execution of British policy on the Caliphate question. The following chapters will move on to examine the issue from a different perspective; they will show the later development of these theological understandings by examining correspondence within the context of the Peace Treaties, and will examine further the views of those at the center of power in Whitehall itself.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

77

NOTES 1. As cited in Hincliffe’s Valedictory Despatch Number Two: Or what’s wrong with the Arabs Mark II, Despatch from Amman to FCO, no date. 2. See B. Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (London: Pheonix, 2002), 7–19. Cf. on the effect of the European Empires in general, V. G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–1960 (London: Leicester University Press in Association with Fontana, 1982). On the British Empire particularly N. B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (London: Belknapp Press, 2006), 24–31. 3. See J. M. S. Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shah Wali Allah Dilhawi 1703–1762 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 47–56; A. Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Sub-Continent (Leiden-Koln: E. Brill, 1980), 153–60; U. Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India, Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870–1920 (Delhi: OUP, 1999), 32. 4. See N. R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani” (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), 47–51; Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, “Jinsiyah wa al-Din al-Islamiyah,” Al-Urwah al al-Wurthqa, No. 2, March 20th, 1884, in R. G. Landen, trans. and ed., The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Readings (New York: Van Nostrand Reihnold Company, 1970), 108; I. Goldziher, “Djamal al-Din alAfghani,” in the Encyclopedia of Islam New Edition, Volume II, C-G, B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht, eds. (Leiden and London: E. J. Brill and Luzac and Co., 1965); A fascinating theory on the particular attraction of al-Afghani’s message for Muslims in India is given in A. Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850 (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 188–89. 5. See M. A. Z. Badawi, The Reformers of Egypt (London: Croom Helm, 1976), 35–95; Black, Political Thought, 304–5; Abduh developed much of al-Afghani’s ideology and they have been analyzed together by E. Kedourie, Afghani and ‘Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam (London: FrankCass, 1966). 6. They will be examined in more detail in Part II in relation to a Foreign Office report from the early twenties on their beliefs and practices. Although a general introduction to Wahhabi ideology can be found in N. J. Delong-Bas, “Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad,” Journal of Islamic Studies, Issue 17 (2006), 371–72, there has been a surprising lack of scholarly material published concerning their beliefs. 7. P. Hardy, The Moslems of British India (Cambridge: CUP, 1972), 60. 8. Popplewell argues that, although there were many elements of the British government and media which did not believe that the Muslims were responsible, the fact that it was the Mughal Sultan Bahadur Shah that the mutineers had attempted to place on the throne made the British see Muslim elements as the natural motivators behind such actions. However, there was continued concern over the activities of the Wahhabis leading to active suppression during the 1860s and 70s. Popplewell,

78

Chapter Two

Intelligence, 15–17; J. C. Ker, Political Trouble in India (Calcutta: Editions Indian, 1973), 306–7. 9. See L. James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London: Abacus, 1998), 3–79, cf K. P. Mitra, Indian History for Matriculation (Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1933), 246–61; D. Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London: Fontana Press, 1997), 66, Hardy, Moslems, 62. 10. H. Enyat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Basingstoke: MacMillan Education, 1982), 57. 11. Cox, Caliphate, 36–41; Paris, Sherifian, 27–32. 12. See R. Albrecht Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe (London: Methuen, 1965), 67–90; M. Beloff, Imperial Sunset: Britain’s Liberal Empire, 1897–1921 (London: Methuen, 1969), 84–93; V. G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–1960 (London: Leicester University Press in Association with Fontana, 1982), 132–46; J. Lowe, The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Question 1865–1925 (London: Routledge, 1994), 224–37; K. M. Wilson, Empire and Continental Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880s to the 1st World War (London: Mansell, 1987), 182–93 and The Policy of Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914 (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), 138–69; Fromkin, Peace, 26–27. 13. The strategic importance of the Ottomans to the British in this period is discussed in R. Searight, The British in the Middle East (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 34–40. Indeed the British government acknowledged that one of the decisive factors in containing the 1857 Mutiny was the support of the Ottoman Caliph for the British. Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 17. 14. For a general overview of European perspectives on Ottoman reform see S. J. Shaw, “The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1970), 51–84. 15. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 3rd ed. (New York, London: OUP, 2002), 56–59. 16. See Lewis, Turkey, 124–28; K. H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State (New York: OUP, 2002), 348–71. 17. A. L. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire 1908–1923 (London: Longman, 1998), 14–16. 18. Z. N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near-East (Beruit: Khayats, 1966), 55. 19. J. M. Kramer, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 6. 20. H. Corrigan, “German Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of War in 1914,” Past and Present, 36 (1967), 144–52. 21. For example, see remarks made by V. Chirol, “Pan-Islamism” (London: Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 1906), 2; Barr, Desert, 2; W. Ochsenwald, The Hijaz Railroad (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980), 57–73.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

79

22. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), 268. 23. Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (London: Perenniel, 1977), 583–85. cf Lewis, Turkey, 213–27. 24. Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 129. 25. Qureshi provides an excellent overview of the particular relationship between the Indians and the Ottoman from the beginnings of the 19th century onwards. M. N. Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1999), 25–45. 26. Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 130. 27. Analysis of the impact of Pan-Islamic ideology in relation to the British Empire has been discussed in detail by A. Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 148–72. There is an interesting discussion of the etymology of the term “Pan-Islam” in Landau, which suggests that the term was coined in Britain and Germany simultaneously in the 1870s, before being brought into Arabic by Afghani and Abduh in their 1884 publication. Landau, Pan-Islam, 2–3. 28. As shall be seen in the chapter on the opening of the Cold War, the question of harnessing surfaced once again during that period. 29. See India Office File IOR/LP/PS/10 Piece12, F30. 30. See Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 159–62. 31. Ibid, 138–58. 32. See James, Raj, 444–45. 33. G. Lewis, “The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad in 1914,” Arabic and Islamic Garland: Historical Educational and Literary Papers Presented to Abdul Latif Tibawi (London, 1977), 159–65. 34. That this was the undoubted intention is underlined by the fact that the proclamation was immediately sent to Berlin for translation into “Arabic and Indian” for propaganda purposes. See U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914–1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 117; F. Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), 126. 35. ‘Alî was subsequently interned for its publication. M. Mujeeb, Indian Muslims (George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966), 434. 36. For an interesting contextualization of both these events within the field of Middle East–Indian relations see M. E. Yapp, “‘That Great Mass of Unmixed Mohomedanism’: Reflections on the Historical Links between the Middle East and Asia,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1992), 3–15. An Indian Muslim perspective is supplied as background in M. N. Qureshi, “The ‘Ulema’ of British India and the Hijrat of 1920,” Modern Asian Studies Vol. 13, No. 1 (1979), 41–45. cf. S. Kuwajima, Indian Mutiny in Singapore, 1915 (Kolkota: Ratna Prakashan, 1991); H. Miller and R. W. E. Harper, Singapore Mutiny (Singapore: OUP, 1984). 37. Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 175. Fromkin cites Trumpener to support his statement that “the Jihad was a dud that failed to explode.” Fromkin, Peace, 109, citing Trumpener, Ottoman Empire, 118. 38. Qureshi, Pan-Islam, 88–91.

80

Chapter Two

39. Ibid, 91. 40. R. Gopal, The Indian Muslims (Mombai: Asia Publishing House, 1959), 148–49. 41. See Qureshi, Pan-Islam, 261–68; A. C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919–1924 (s-Gravenhage: Nederlandsche Boek–en Steendrukkerij and Smits, 1972), 141. 42. E. Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921 (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), 176–80. For the situation in Britain see K. O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918–1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 43. M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol 4: 1916–1922, The Stricken World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 483–85. 44. Fromkin, Peace, 493–511. The nature of Britain’s policies in relation to Russia and the Soviet Union in this period are analyzed in R. H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, Vol. 3: The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 353–54. 45. Some additional notes will be given in the opening to the following chapter concerning the impact and background of the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne. As the discussion in the next chapter deals with documents for Lausanne in particular, it seemed prudent to discuss this more fully at that point although it needs to be highlighted at this stage in light of the period which the documents contained in this chapter cover. 46. Folios 1–47 in FO 141/587 Piece 2 contain correspondence concerning the status of foreign nationals of various nationalities caught in Egyptian and Sudanese territory at the start of the war. 47. FO 141/587 Piece 2 (Hereafter cited as 141/587/2) Folio 48. 48. Telegram from the High Commission in Cairo to Whitehall reporting that Izzet Pasha is encouraging an Arab Caliphate, but that the High Commission is against the idea and requesting advice. FO 141/587/2, F49 49. Kedourie, Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, 30. 50. Fromkin, Peace, 106. 51. Ibid, 110. 52. The very fact that this request was made seems to point to a lack of communication between London and Cairo concerning the implications of the Foreign Office’s incendiary telegram. For, had Cheetham been involved in the discussions which preceded the telegram, his request for information would have been made much earlier. 53. FO141/587/2, F50–57 dated April 4th, 1915. 54. 141/587/2, F58. 55. Many of the historians and political scientists who have published studies in this field have commented upon the lack of coordination between the various departments on this question. See Barr, Desert, 56; Cox, Caliphate, 81; Paris, Sherifan, 38; Fromkin, Peace, 78. 56. Ibid, F59, signed by Ronald Storrs who was then Oriental Secretary at the British High Commission until 1917, when he became the Military Governor of Jerusalem.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

81

57. Letter from Khartoum to the Residence in Cairo dated 15th May 1915, FO141/587/2, F79–80. Morghani came from a powerful Sudanese family and his opinion mattered greatly in that country. For brief background on him and his family history see I. Friedman, “The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1970), 83-122; Freidman, Palestine, xxi; C. W. Wilson, “On the Tribes of the Nile Valley, North of Khartum,” Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 17, 1888 (1888), 3–25. 58. FO 141/587/2 F72. Both Morghani’s letter and the India Office letter are attachments to a letter dated 30/6/1915 from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Edward Grey to Lt. Col. McMahon who passed it to Col. Clayton. 59. FO 141/587/2, F128. Sir Reginald Wingate to Lord Balfour dated January 6th, 1918. 60. As the letter is not given a folio number, page numbers for the letter will be used as reference points instead: Morghani, 2. 61. Ibid, 3. 62. What is interesting about this particular correspondence is the fact that Wingate also received other opinions from eminent Muslim scholars in Sudan, including a detailed argument on the Caliphate from Mustafa al-Maraghi, the Chief Qadi in the Sudan and later the Rector of the al-Azhar School, who became instrumental in the later attempt by King Faruq of Egypt to claim the Caliphate for himself in 1937–1938. Details of this later incident are examined in the chapter entitled “Caliphate Policy: Post Abolition – The Cold War.” However, it is curious that Wingate chose only to pass on Morghani’s advice, rather than include Maraghi’s as well. See Kedourie, Chatham House Version, 178–79. The full text of Maraghi’s letter is given as an appendix at 208–12. 63. This could be a reference back to the Hadith already cited concerning the need for election as a means of legitimizing a Caliph, or the principle that became the foundation for Shaafi’ite law; the belief that there had once been a Hadith that could be traced to Muhammad himself which said “My people will never disagree in error,” thus making consensus the basis for all shar ’a development. See McDonald, Jurisprudence, 104–5. However, it seems more likely, given the pragmatic tone of the rest of the letter, to be an opinion based purely in political necessity. 64. For good overviews of the Khilafat movement in historical and philosophical context see M. Hasan, Islam and Indian Nationalism: Reflections on Abdul Kalam Azad (New Delhi: Manohar, 1992); S. H. H. Navdi, Islamic Resurgent Movements in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries: A Critical Analysis (Durban: Academia, the Centre for Islamic, Near and Far Eastern Studies, planning publication, 1987); M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1967); A. Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980). More in-depth studies are: N. M. Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1999); S. R. Bakshi, ed., Documents of Muslim Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement (New Delhi: Criterion Publications, 1989); G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia

82

Chapter Two

University Press, 1982); A. A. Aziz, The Khalifat Movement in India, 1915–1933: A Documentary Record (Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1972); A. C. Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919–1924 (s-Gravenhage: Nederlandsche Boek–en Steendrukkerij and Smits, 1972). 65. FO 141/587/2 F76–78. 66. Ibid, F79–81. 67. Hourani, Arabic Thought, 266–67. 68. FO 141/587/2, F80. 69. While it is accepted that Reid is talking about Ottoman suzerainty in Southeast Asia before and during World War I, he is referenced in relation to the dynamic he is describing in his article which seems to strongly echo the sentiments being expressed here by the Arab noble. This issue of what constitutes “spiritual authority” will be examined in chapter five. A. Reid, Working Paper No. 36: The Ottomans in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, 2005). 70. FO 141/587/2, F83. 71. It seems likely that this is a reference to the Sharif’s Quraishi lineage rather than the issues discussed in the previous chapter. 72. FO 141/587/2, F84. 73. This happened even though the Sharif became king rather than Caliph, pushed out by Ibn Sa’ud. For general histories and British involvement see histories already cited and S. K. Aburish, A Brutal Friendship, The West and the Arab Elite (London: Cassell Group, 1997), 308–12; The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of The House of Saud (London: Bloomsbury, 1994 (Paperback, 2005)), 20–22. 74. This tradition is hard to establish as fact. It could not be found in any of the canonical Hadith books. Interestingly though, these sentiments were to be echoed by Osama bin Laden in his declaration of war in 1996. Text found at www.washington post.com/ac2, accessed June 18th, 2005. 75. The perspective that underscores the Adenese Noble’s approach to the issue certainly appears to follow the dynamic of aristocratic secularization versus rising proletarian and agrarian Pan-Islamic sentiment described by Hourani in his introduction to the history of the modern Middle East that he co-edited. A. Hourani, P. Khoury, and M. C. Wilson, eds. The Modern Middle East, Second Edition (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004). 76. Although cited loosely, it seems likely that he was using Volume 1 of Ibn Khaldûn’s famous Maqaddimah, an English translation of which has been provided by Franz Rosenthal: Ibn Khaldûn, The Maqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 3 Vols., trans. F. Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 77. FO 141/587/2, F85. 78. Ibid, F86. 79. See chapter two. 80. Handwritten notes, undated, written by Lt. Gen. Sir Edwin Docke Elliot, FO 141/587/2 F103–15 81. Ibid, F108–11. 82. Ibid, F109. 83. See previous section, particularly the discussion of Lambton’s section in the “Khalifa” entry in the EI2.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

83

84. See footnote 55. 85. Although the Nizām was one of the candidates for the Caliphate proposed after the abolition of the Turkish Caliph, in the run-up to the Cairo Conference in 1926. 86. FO/141/587/2, F71: Signal dated 5/7/1915 from Mark Sykes to Consul General in Ramleh. 87. Ibid, F72. 88. See Appendix E on the validity of such comparisons. 89. Muslim reformers such as Maududi, Qutb, and Abduh did not describe the Caliphate in non-Muslim terms. See S. Oliver-Dee, Islamic Citizenship and the Ummah: A Survey of Indian Muslim Scholarship from 19th Century to the Present (Unpublished MTh Book, London School of Theology, 20. 06), 75–94. 90. See Lewis, Turkey, 230–75, and A. Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray, 1992), 191–201 and 235–48. 91. See India Office File IOR/L/PS/18, Piece B307 dated December 28, 1918 and Piece B373, dated May 1st, July 1st and August 1922. His correspondence with the India office is discussed in Part II. 92. See FO 141/587/2 F95: Letter from Govenor General’s Office in Khartoum to High Commission in Cairo dated December 1, 1915. Subsequently repeated in later folios as a matter of policy; F 99, 103–5, 215, with the attendant concern that spiritual wording in the treaties might lead to the Turkish Caliph attempting to re-create his Pan-Islamic appeal. 93. Even without the official concerns already expressed, the depth of Indian Muslim feeling on the issue can be plainly seen in the large number of books defending the Caliphate published by Indians in the years preceding its abolition. See S. Mahmud, The Khalifat and England (Patna: Imtayaz, 1921); S. M. Muhammad, An Essay Towards a Better understanding of the Caliphate (Delhi: Khan Sahib, 1920); S. A. Ali, The Caliphate: An Historical and Judicial Sketch (S. I.: s. n., 1919); M. M. Barakatullah, The Khalifat (London, New Delhi: Luzac, 1924); cf sources named at footnote 44. 94. The remaining one hundred and fifty folios in the file concerning the Caliphate issue are principally filled with correspondence dealing with its abolition, and reaction to it in Turkey, the Middle East, and India. 95. FO 141/587/2, F87–88, Letter from the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affaires to Lt. Col. McMahon at the War Office in Cairo dated November 2nd, 1915. 96. The Indian Congress Party supported Britain in the First World War, sending troops to fight on the Western front, and against the Ottomans in Mesopotamia. See James, Raj, 439–45. 97. See FO141/587/2, F225–27, 273–74, in which Indian delegations in Angora become heavily involved with political discussions. 98. The British were certain that Pan-Islamic feeling had played an important part in stirring the mutiny. For a more detailed account of the events and analysis of the implications see Kuwajima, Indian Mutiny, 82–91; Miller and Harper, Singapore Mutiny, 27–38; Popplewell, Intelligence, 262. 99. Letter from Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo to High Commission Cairo, dated November 25, 1915. FO 141/587/2 F89–90. 100. Unsigned letter from the High Commission in Cairo to Lord Grey at the Foreign Office dated December 5, 1915. Ibid, F91–93.

84

Chapter Two

101. The activities and rise of Pan-Islamic sentiment were well known in government circles at this time. Several books (already noted) on the subject had been published in the years leading up to the war and the activities of Pan-Islamists were a constant source of concern, especially when the fledgling Bolshevik government attempted to fan the flames of Islamic sentiment through targeted propaganda in the later part of the war and early twenties. Intelligence files from the period reveal widespread alarm at their activities and show also the extensive resources that were devoted to intelligence gathering in this field, highlighting their importance. See IOR L/PS/11 Piece 166; IOR L/PS/11 Piece 112; IOR/L/PS/8 Piece 77; FO 141/440 Piece 2; FO 608/115 Piece 1; FO 141/671 Piece 4; FO 141/477 Piece 4. 102. FO 141/587/2, F220. Note to Mr Kerr reporting the Aga Khan’s predictions. Undated. 103. Clear examples of this can be seen at Ibid, F 217–18, dated November 15th, 1922 and F221–22 dated November 9th, 1922. The second report is particularly interesting because it suggests that even al-Azhar is split on the Caliphate issue; an important point given the foreign language document examined later. 104. FO 141/587/2, F57. 105. See previous section, particularly references to Arnold, Caliphate, 16–20; Crone, God’s Rule, 75–89; Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, 17–32; Galston, Politics and Excellence, 47–52; Goldziher, Islamic Theology and Law, 231–33; Laoust, les doctrines, 86–88. 106. A. K. S. Lambton, “Quis Custodiet Custodes? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government” SI 5 and 6 (1956), 125–27; See also Binder on the development of the notion of Kingship under the Abbasids, L. Binder, “al-Ghazali and Islamic Government,” in The Muslim World, xlv (1955), 229–30. 107. See Black, Political Thought, 22–27; A. K. S. Lambton, “Khilafah” entry in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. IV (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952–), 795–98; “Islamic Political Thought” in J. Schacht and C. E. Bosworth (eds.) The Legacy of Islam, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1979), 404–24; State and Government in Medieval Islam (Oxford: OUP, 1981), 214–19; G. E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam (Chicago: CUP, 1953), 161–75; H. A. R. Gibb,”The Evolution of Government,” in Studies on the Civilization of Islam (London: Hurst and Co., 1962), 322–41; T. W. Arnold, The Caliphate, with a final Chapter by S. Haim (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1965), 24–31, 63–71; W. Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 67, 73–78. 108. See E. Tyan, Institutions du Droit Public Musulman, vol. i (Le Califat) (Paris: 1954) and vol. ii (Le Sultanat et Le Califat) (Paris: 1956); W. M. Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 69–113; Crone and Hinds, Caliph, 75–81. 109. FO 141/587/2, F53. 110. Ibid, F54. 111. This is an interesting point, for, as will be seen when discussing Nallino’s article later, Western perceptions of the Caliphate were mostly responsible for maintaining the notion of spiritual authority, rather than Pan-Islamic Muslim understandings before the late nineteenth century.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

85

112. FO 141/587/2, F55 and F57. 113. Qualifications are: 1) election by the Assembly of the Faithful. 2) the possession of the sacred relics, which consist of the Prophet’s Mantle (khirqa –i-sherif) and standard (sanjaq –i-sherif), some hairs of his beard and two of his teeth, and the turban of Khalif Omar; 3) the possession of the holy cities of Islam (Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem) and of the most powerful Moslem throne. Ibid, F55. 114. Ibid, F55–58. 115. See files IOR/L/PS/11 Piece 112; IOR/L/PS/8 Piece 77; FO 141/773 Piece 6. 116. In the file it is F63–69. 117. See the discussion of Q38:26 in Chapter Three. 118. FO 141/587/2, F63. 119. Ibid, F63–64. 120. Ibid, F65. 121. FO 141/587/2, F65. 122. Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 1, Book 4, Hadith 254. 123. For example see Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 1, Hadith 147 in which the future of the Caliphate is discussed in relation to the impending death of ‘Umar. 124. The relationship between the Saud family and the Wahhabi is well documented. See S. Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa’ud from Tradition to Terror ( New York: Doubleday, 2002), 94–103; B. Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani (New York: CUP, 2003), 63–79. 125. There are many historians that have touched upon the Wahhabi rebellion against the Ottomans; notable among them are Cox, Caliphate, 11–13; Paris, Hashemites, 17–19; Delong-Bas, “Wahhabi,” 373–75; Karpat, Reconstructing Identity, 342–43. 126. FO 141/587/2, F66. 127. Ibid, F66–67. 128. As reported in Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 5, Hadith 326. 129. He fails to see the importance of such symbols in legitimizing power, a power seen later in the Taliban wars in Afghanistan when Mullah Omar is said to have clothed himself in the cloak of Muhammad and appeared before a rapturous crowd who proclaimed him “Commander of the Faithful.” A. Rashid, Taliban: The story of the Afghan Warlord (London: IB Tauris and Co. Ltd., 2000, re-published by Pan Books, 2001), 42. 130. These are unreferenced, but the sharhu l-muwaqif he cites is almost certainly that by al-Jurjani, a philosophical treatise written at the start of the 15th century as a reply to the Mu’tazilites. 131. See previous section on theology, authority, and legitimization where all these are discussed in detail. 132. Storrs, Orientations, 165–69. 133. See previous section, particularly in reference to Rosenthal, “Political Thought,” 2–5; Lambton, “Political Thought,” 405–6; Kister, “Notes of the Shura,” 320–21; Doniach, “Barthold, Khalif i Sultan,” 119–20; Arkoun, “Concept of Authority,” 24–26. 134. According to Saikal, Amanullah, the Afghani monarch, strongly considered taking the Caliphate in 1919–1920 precisely because both the Ottomans and the

86

Chapter Two

Sharif were considered too close to the British. A. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I B Tauris, 2004), 264 footnote 14; cf A. Olesen, Islam and Politics in Aghanistan (London: Curzon Press, 1995), 104–18; L. W. Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900–1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley: University of California Press), 92–97; Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 78. 135. The French were concerned about Britain extending her influence in the Middle East. See the books below. 136. There are a number of books and articles which examine the French and Italian positions on the Caliphate question. Within the FO 141/587 itself, F273–74 are particularly illuminating in this area. Cf C. M Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion (London: Thames and Hutchenson, 1981); W. I. Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East: The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon 1900–1914 (Madison: University of Wisconson Press, 1976); D. R. Watson, Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974). For French perspective, the memoirs of General Brémond, involved in the Middle Eastern front, provide fascinating primary insight into the Caliphate Question: E. Brémond, Le Hidjaz dans la guerre mondiale (Paris: Payot, 1931); J. Fisher, “The Rabegh Crisis, 1916–1917: “‘a comparatively trivial question’ or ‘a self-willed disaster,’” Middle Eastern Studies (July 2002). 137. M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations (London: McMillan, 1966), 102–4. 138. Original Italian version at FO 141/587/2, F135–52, subsequent translation at F162–212. 139. There have been several histories of the Italian Imperial expansion in North East Africa, among them P. Palumbo, ed., A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present (Los Angeles, Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 2003), 279–90; C. Seton-Watson, “Italy’s Imperial Hangover,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1980), 169–79; R. L. Hess, “Italian Imperialism in Its Ethiopian Context,” International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1973), 94–109. 140. Translated title of the paper reads: The Nature of the Caliphate in general, and of the so called “Ottoman Caliphate.” Ibid, F135 and F162. 141. See comment and analysis by E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, Vol. IV (Cambridge: CUP, 1937) 24–36; A. E. Moudden, “The Idea of a Caliphate between Moroccans and the Ottomans in the 16th and 17th Century Maghrib,” Studia Islamica, Vol. 2, No 82 (1995), 105; Crone and Hinds, Caliph, 1. 142. The distribution list on the document shows that it was read at the highest levels of the High Commission. FO 141/587/2, F152. 143. Opening statements of the first chapter entitled “The Nature of the Caliphate.” Ibid, F153. As was mentioned earlier, Nallino’s opening here opens him up to criticism from the point of view of attempting to define one faith in terms of another. 144. The source of this history or tradition is not cited, but there is good reason to believe that it is the same as that discussed by Perie-Gordon and Lukach.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

87

145. For example, see the delegation of Friday prayers to Abu Bakr by Muhammad while still alive, with its attendant understanding of designation after death in Muir, Caliphate, Original Sources, 1–3. 146. FO 141/587/2, F154–55. 147. These included succession, marriage, and manumission. See Black, Political Thought, 19. 148. As highlighted in the previous section, the French scholars have particularly involved discussions on the importance of the Khutba. See Sourdel, “L’autorité califienne,” 12–15; Laoust, les doctrines, 35–50; Tyan, Institutions, vi, 121–48. 149. Ibid. 150 “Article 3 [ of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarca] had a lasting significance, for it confirmed the pontifical status assumed by the Sultans . . . Over the following century and a half, respect for the spiritual pretensions of the Ottoman Caliphate increased as the territorial extent of Ottoman sovereignty contracted.” Palmer, Ottoman Empire, 46. 151. See discussion in Appendix E. 152. For example see F161–65. 153. Ibid. 154. Signature not legible, passed around the High Commission. Date stamped January 14th, 1924. Ibid, F235–98. 155. There have been two analyses of “Le califat et souveraineté nationale”: Sylvia Haim’s in the final chapter to Arnold, Caliphate, 205–44; H. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shî’î and Sunnî Muslims to the Twentieth Century (London, New York: IB Taurus, 2005 (First Published 1982)), 55–56. 156. Although the document remains valuable because of who wrote it, as it opens a window into the theological justification for Atatturk’s actions from within the Turkish Muslim clergy. 157. FO 141/587/2, F237–38. 158. al-Qalkashandi completed “Subh al-a’sha,” his great chancery encyclopedia, in 1412. Patricia Crone discusses him in relation to Ibn Khaldun. P. Crone, “Even an Ethiopian Slave: The Transformation of a Sunni Tradition,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1 in honour of J. E. Wansbrough (1994), 59–67 and he is referenced by many others in relation to matters of administration in medieval Saharan culture such as N. Levitzon, “The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Kings of Mali,” Journal of African History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1963), 346; J. L. Bacharch, “The Dinar versus the Ducat,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1973), 81. Tommara also gives Ibn Khaldun’s definition for the Caliph already examined in the theology and legitimacy section. 159. FO 141/587/2, F238. The choice of the word “image of” in translation is important here, for the French word “représentation” can mean representative. However, in the context given here, something stronger seems to be implied and “image of” would certainly be a usual translation. See B. T. Atkins, A. Duval, and R. C. Milne, French Dictionary (Glasgow: Collins, 1978), 5th ed., 1048. 160. FO 141/587/2, F238–39.

88

Chapter Two

161. The other question would be whether Muhammad ever designated or intended a successor and what remit was envisaged for him. 162. For example see Oberman, “Political Theology,” 24; Sharma, Caliphs and Sultans, 12; Tyan, Institutions, vi, 15–18; Gibb, “Evolution of Government,” 19–23. 163. FO 141/587/2, F238. There is not the space to critically examine the truth of this statement; however, a study of comparisons between the Islamic state and the ancient Hebrew state would prove fascinating on this issue. 164. Tommara’s paper contains only two Qur’anic references, neither of which are Q2:30 or Q38:26, the main Qur’anic references for the Caliphate. 165. FO 141/587/2, F240. 166. Ibid., F241. 167. Ibid, F242–43. 168. Madelung’s discussion of the validity of the tradition that follows the account is particularly interesting. Madelung, Succession, 30–33. 169. Arnold, Caliphate, 19–20; Muir, Caliphate, 3–4 already discussed in chapter 3. 170. FO 141/587/2, F244. 171. This is a translation of the quote in FO 141/587/2, F246. 172. He does sometimes bring in alternative versions of differing traditions, such as those concerned with Abu Bakr’s successor, quoting from al-Tabari. Ibid, F247. 173. See Qur’anic citation on the need for consultation in leadership. Ibid. 174. Madelung points this out as a counter to Crone and Hinds’ claim that the title khalîfa meant “Viceregent of God” from the beginning. Madelung, Succession, 45–46. 175. The translation of this title is based on the rendering of the French “l’envoyé.” See Atkins, Duval, and Milne, Dictionary, 340. 176. FO 141/587/2, F248. 177. This claim is based upon the books listed in the bibliography. 178. FO 141/587/2, F251–57. 179. For a discussion of the facets and role of nomination/succession process see previous “The Caliphate in Law” in the theology section. Tommara provides extensive footnotes upon the subject of the bay’a. 11. 180. Compare his five pages (23–28) on the Shi’ites to the twenty on the Sunni (3–23). 181. Cf. footnote 42. 182. Lambton, “Khilafah,” 795; Sachedina, Shi’ite Islam, 26–40; Vaezi, Shia, 41–46. 183. On Kharijite beliefs see E. A. Salim, Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1956); J. Wellhausen, Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam, R. C. Ostle, trans. (Amsterdam, Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975). 184. FO 141/587/2, F273–74. 185. Ibid, F275. This statement is based upon the translation of footnote 6. 186. See J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Ware: Wordsworth, 1998), 105–7. 187. IOR L/PS/18/B258, Arab Bureau Bulletin 49, dated April 30th, 1917, signed by Major Cornwallis, Director of the Arab Bureau.

The Cairo High Command and the “Caliphate Question,” 1914–1919

89

188. Ibid, 191. 189. See Barr, Desert, 27; Paris, Sharifan, 34, 42; Cox, Caliphate, 18. This will become more apparent when the material in the following section cencerning the London and Indian perspectives are examined. 190. IOR L/PS/18/B258, 191. 191. Ibid, 192.

Chapter Three

Post-War Part 1: Professor Arnold’s 1918 Letter and the Khilafat Delegation Meetings 1918–1922

This chapter moves on to examine how the British approach to the Caliphate issue developed into the post-war period as circumstances and political needs changed. In order to contextualize the analysis, the chapter opens with a very brief historical outline of the changing circumstances, before beginning its examination of several key documents from within the Whitehall machinery. Later in the chapter, the focus moves into exploring the negotiating stance of Lloyd-George in his discussion with the Khilafat delegation, before finishing with a discussion of a fascinating submission to the Lausanne Conference by the Armenian Delegation. Conclusions on this chapter will be held over and included with those of the next chapter as the correspondence forms one whole picture.

INTRODUCTION Before moving into the material itself, it is worthwhile outlining the reasons for the choice of documents to be included. The Choice of Documents The Government of India’s correspondence with Professor Arnold has been selected as the initial point of entry and the final selection of documents to be examined. The reason for this lies in the importance of the correspondents and the way that their communications portray how the Caliphate policy was deployed and interpreted in a differing geographical and political situation. The Government of India had a special interest in the “Caliphate Question” in relation to its sizable Indian minority Muslim population. Professor 91

92

Chapter Three

Arnold’s involvement in the correspondence not only highlights his standing as Britain’s leading academic of the time on political Islam, but also provides an opportunity to examine his advice in the context of his academic work on the Caliphate, which was examined in chapter two. Between these two sets of correspondence, five other main documents provide the source materials for the analysis of British perception and policy in this “Peace Treaty” phase: firstly, there is the Foreign Office handbook prepared in 1919 on the “Caliphate Question.” This document enables the historian to be able to see what understandings of the issue were present at the heart of the government machinery itself.1 Secondly and thirdly, there are two meetings between Lloyd-George himself and the Indian Khilafat delegation in 1920 and 1921 respectively that are excellent illuminators of both the Indian Muslim perspective and also the British engagement with Muslim theological issues. The fourth document provides a very interesting foil to the Indian Muslim arguments as it is written by the Armenian Delegation at the peace negotiations, and therefore, understandably, argues the exact opposite of what the Khilafat Delegation is demanding. The final set of documents is the correspondence on the wording of the Lausanne Treaty which focuses around the India Office, but which also includes many other departments. These are particularly useful for showing the confusion in terminology and underlying fears and concerns that the British government was operating under at this time. Thus, when all this documentation is brought together, it can be reasonably said that it provides a comprehensive basis for analyzing British perceptions during this period and a wide body of evidence from which conclusions on the British approach to engaging with Pan-Islamic governance can be drawn. Before coming to the correspondence itself, however, it is useful to briefly reiterate how British relationships with the Muslim Diaspora had been affected by the late war and early peace-treaty period, so that the context of the documents can be properly understood. Historical Context The satisfaction of Muslim interests had became one of the primary pillars of British Imperial policy. And, as the British approached the signing of the peace treaty with Turkey that became known as the Treaty of Sèvres, they were acutely aware of the fragile nature of Muslim loyalty to the Raj. The wording of the treaty, therefore, had both to satisfy British desire for the Turkish Caliph to be removed, without being seen to be encouraging interference in Muslim issues and, return the Caliphate to a local monarchy thereby shedding its Pan-Islamic nature. The correspondence in FO 141/587/2 con-

Post-War Part 1

93

sistently reiterated the need for the Caliphate, whomever the new incumbent might be, to remain Arab nationalist, rather than Pan-Islamic, in character. The placation of Muslim interests served therefore not simply to maintain stability within the Empire, but also to allow Lloyd-George and the British Government to pursue their land interests in the Middle East. The Treaty of Sèvres, which caused consternation among Indian Muslims, was the outworking of these post-war ambitions. Given its centrality in the documents to be analyzed below, it is worthwhile providing Article 139, which was the main source of anger, here for ease of reference: Turkey formally renounces any rights of sovereignty or jurisdiction of any kind over Muslims who are subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other state. No power shall be exercised directly or indirectly by any Turkish authority whatever in any territory detached from Turkey.2

As “the Turkish authority” of the time was still the Caliph, the clear intention of the article was to sever the Pan-Islamic links between the Caliphate and the Middle Eastern territories that were now in the British Empire. It was also a clear attempt to remove any Pan-Islamic authority from places such as India where “Muslims . . . [were] subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other state.”3 However, even within this aggressive piece of legislation, the possible loopholes for Pan-Islamic exploitation were huge4 and, in one sense, one might argue that the Khilafat Movement might have been better advised to shy away from agitation and focus on exploiting those loopholes. On the other hand, the cause became a useful political weapon against British Imperialism and, therefore, was worthwhile pursuing for that reason alone. It is against this evolving post-war background that the material contained in the India Office files and the Arnold advice need to be considered. THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PHASE The complex diplomatic maneuverings of Lloyd-George in relation to French, Italian, and American interests in the region are not vital to the discussions here, but it is important to emphasize the delicate nature of British influence in the region and their desire to grasp it more fully.5 Because of this, the negotiations surrounding the issue of the person and powers of the Caliph had been going on almost without ceasing, from December 1918, within a month of the end of the war itself. Indeed the entire protracted debate on the “spiritual authority” of the Caliph can be seen to have begun with a very brief telegram from the Foreign Office to Reginald Wingate in the Middle East notifying Wingate of a proposal from Baghdad to encourage the Turkish

94

Chapter Three

Government to abandon “spiritual authority” both in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East: Chief Political Officer at Baghdad has suggested that when Turkish Government abandon temporal Sovereignty over Iraq they should at the same time renounce all claim to spiritual authority, for example, in regard to pre-war functions of sheikh-ul-Islam.6

He then goes on to request Wingate’s opinions on the matter which are forthcoming two weeks later; Wingate agrees with the sentiment and provides some interesting historical background on the history of the Sheikh-ul-Islam post in Egypt, at the same time as opining that the “spiritual sovereignty” of the Sultan of Turkey could only be ended by his renunciation of the Caliphate.7 The central concern that arises from this brief note is that, because of their understanding of the Caliphate being one of the subtitles of the Sultan, the Caliphate could be removed from the Sultanate without having to destroy the Sultanate itself.8 It is this misconception into which the first of Professor Arnold’s advisory notes speaks.9 Professor Arnold’s Initial Letter of Advice 1918 Professor Arnold begins with an assessment of the nature of the Caliphate in terms of its perceived remit, providing a list of qualifications of the officeholder.10 His definition of the Caliph as successor or representative is certainly in line with the etymological discussions in chapter one; however, the duties of a Caliph, which he outlines in the lines following his categorical opening statement, display Arnold’s belief in the purely administrative function of the office.11 This understanding is further revealed in the following sentence, for he comments: . . . there is no reference to any spiritual authority, nor, in fact has the Caliph ever possessed any spiritual authority whatsoever. Muslim technology makes the same distinctions between secular, religious and spiritual, as are current in Europe, and the corresponding words dunyawi, dini and ruhani are found in Arabic, Persian and Turkish.12

As has been seen previously Arnold’s confident assertions here as regards the “religious status” of the Caliph are not as clear as he implies.13 However, the central point for this discussion is the definition he gives the words “rūh,” “dunyawi” and “dīn,” for Arnold points out that the use of these words is of vital importance in any final documentation as they have very precise meanings for Muslim cultures, meanings not found in the West. Professor Arnold

Post-War Part 1

95

has therefore highlighted a vital area for possible misconception and it is therefore important to explore the definitions that he attaches to the three terms because the solution he applied provides a window into the understandings that the senior British officials in the India Office were working with throughout the period of the peace treaties.14 The Meaning of “dunyawi” Professor Arnold’s definition for “dunyawi” is “secular,” but this definition is somewhat at odds with the understanding presented by Tritton’s entry in the EI2 where it can be literally translated “nearer or nearest.”15 It is when it is combined with the notion of “life” that it draws closer to Arnold’s translation insofar as it has the sense of being “worldly.”16 Tritton cites Noldeke to lend weight to his claim that this notion pre-dated Islam in Arabia. He finishes by opining that the true understanding of the word carries with it the sense of not permitting the things of the world to get in the way of seeing the work of Allah.17 One might therefore say that is an oppositional word setting up a contrast between the desire to follow God on the one hand, or the desires of the world on the other. This sense of the word is captured by Wehr in his dictionary.18 His definition suggests the notion of “everyday considerations” rather than the separation of church and state which would run contrary to a cultural mindset that entwines state and religion together.19 The Meaning of “dı-n” and Cultural Language The Western understanding of this word, as Arnold uses it here, is perhaps the prime example of the difference in cultural outlook that exists between the West and the Muslim world. Professor Arnold defines “dīn” to mean “religion,” in the sense of separating the religious from the secular.20 However, Gardet’s extensive entry under “dīn” suggests three possible meanings: judgment or retribution, custom and religion.21 These differing meanings are derived from the choice of root language the scholar is developing their translation from, for the notion of judgment is derived from the Aramaic-Hebrew root; custom from the Arabic for debt and religion from the Pelhevi word for revelation or religion.22 Gardet dismisses the Pelhevi root meaning on the grounds that the concept of “religion” in Islam is not similar to that of Mazdaism, finding that the combination of the Aramaic-Hebrew meaning with the Arabic meaning gives an accurate understanding of how the word should be understood.23 He concludes that the true sense of the word is “obligation, submission, judgment.” In the most general sense this could be understood as “religion,” however, a more accurate understanding is a “life of faith” which goes beyond the dogmatic practice of ritual to what Gardet describes as “the radiance or essence of faith.”24

96

Chapter Three

This sense is captured by both Watt and Penrice where Watt translates the word as “way of life,”25 and why Penrice’s entry includes “custom, institution, the true faith, obedience and judgment.”26 Thus, while Arnold’s definition bears a surface resemblance to the Arabic perception of the meaning, it attempts a division (between religious and secular) that would find little echo in the perception of Muslims themselves, unless they had been Westernized in the manner described by Esposito.27 Definition of ru-h and the “spiritual powers” of the Caliph Arnold gives his definition thus: As in Christian literature, so in Islamic literature, the word “spirit” (ruh) is used in two distinct references (i) psychological, for the soul of man, and (ii) religious, as in such phrases as ruh ul-qudus (“the Holy Spirit”).28

Professor Arnold’s translations are in line with other scholarship in this area, for in the EI2, I. R. Netton states that in the Qur’an, “nafs” is used to mean the soul and “rûh” to mean an angelic messenger, although this changes in post-Qur’anic usage insofar as both words become used to denote the human spirit, angels, and jinn.29 Penrice specifically quotes Q16:104 where the same word is translated as “the Holy Spirit” when talking about the angel Gabriel following his discussion of the root meaning.30 At the same time however, it is interesting to note that Lane’s extensive discussion on the meaning of “rūh” does not cite “spirit or soul” among its primary meanings, instead, he focuses on the “wind” or “fanning” as the two main meanings.31 However, one potential source of serious misunderstanding is seen in Arnold’s translation of “the Holy Spirit” insofar as he does not identify the fact that this term, for many Muslims, is an angel, sometimes specifically Gabriel, whereas, for Christians, is one part of the triune person of God Himself.32 Should the British officials reading his advice have been unaware of the difference themselves, the danger of imposing a Christian understanding of “Holy Spirit” onto a Muslim context would have been very real. Thus, in light of the fact that some of his definitions did not render an adequate understanding of the terms he was defining, it is therefore unsurprising that Professor Arnold’s conclusions could be open to challenge when examined in the context of the chapter on the “Nature of the Caliphate”: It is only in the second sense that the word could have had any application, when the “spiritual authority” of the Caliph is spoken of. But in no Muhammadan writing could such a phrase be employed and it has only come to be used by European writers through a false analogy with the institutions of Christianity. . . . But such comparisons are entirely misleading, for the Caliph has, at no time been

Post-War Part 1

97

held to be the depository of divine truth; he can promulgate no religious dogma, or even issue a definition of one; he cannot forgive sins or exercise any sacerdotal function; his relation to religion is merely that of a protector. Any spiritual powers that have ever been claimed to exist in the Muslim world have been attributed to the prophets or to a very few of the greatest saints, but never to the Caliph.33

Lambton and Sourdel’s discussion, examined in chapter one showed that, at various points in its history, the Caliph had indeed exercised religious authority relating to decrees on dogma as well as judgments. While this was only explicitly documented in the rashidūn and early Abbasid periods in the Sunni Caliphate before the jurists finally won the right to be the repository of dogma, both scholars, along with evidence from the research of Madelung and Crone, produce a body of evidence to mount a strong challenge to Arnold’s confident pronouncement here.34 Indeed, one might argue that, over very short periods, in the early years of either the Caliphate or the Imamate, the leadership structure and philosophy of both Sunni and Shi’a bore a close resemblance to each other. However, by the mid-Abbasid era control over dogma appears to have passed to the ‘ulamā in the Sunni tradition, while the Shi’a Imams were able to retain their hold over “spiritual authority” far more effectively.35 Following this discussion on the Caliphate, Arnold moves into an analysis of the artificial distinction in the Muslim world between the religious and civil legal codes as a preface to discussing the position of the Sheikhul-Islam within the Muslim hierarchy.36 As the nature and position of the Sheikh-ul-Islam lie outside of the purview of this book, only two comments on Professor Arnold’s explanation should be made: firstly, that Arnold’s passing point concerning the superiority of law over that of the Caliph fits with the analysis of the theory in Appendix A but that, in practice, this was subsumed by theorists such as al-Mawardi to the need for strong centralized leadership.37 The importance of this principle of superiority of the Law and the conditional nature of a Muslim’s obedience to his ruler were seen once again in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when, with the advent of increasing Pan-Islamic feeling during the nineteenth century, the notion of accountability of the Caliph under the law was revived, precipitating the removal of three Ottoman Caliphs over the course of the century.38 Arnold’s highlighting of the superiority of the Law over the ruler was therefore timely. However, it might have been useful, in the context into which he was writing, to have linked the historical application of this principle into an observation concerning its revival within a growing Pan-Islamic movement. Such an observation would have had the benefit of reminding Sir Arthur Hirtzel and his colleagues about possible Indian Muslim reaction to the plight of the Caliph.

98

Chapter Three

The second noteworthy point that comes out of this letter is that Professor Arnold clearly understood and agreed with the policy that the government was attempting as far as the separation of the Caliph and Sultan roles were concerned.39 However, while Arnold agreed with the aims of the policy, he was fully aware of the fact that, even though they might be able to separate the two on paper, this would change little in terms of Sunni Muslim perceptions of the Caliph’s role. This is expressed in his final comment concerning the Caliph being named in the khutba in Mesopotamia: It may be added that if both the Sultan of Turkey and the Sheikh-ul-Islam (the Mufti of Constantinople) renounce all authority in Mesopotamia, this will constitute no obstacle to the people of Mesopotamia praying in the mosques for the sultan as Caliph, just as present Indian Muhammadans pray for him as Caliph, even though he exercises no jurisdiction in India nor does his sheikh-ul-Islam.40

Summary Professor Arnold’s note is important both because it shows clearly the basis of the British government’s approach to Pan-Islamic governance in the context of the Lausanne agreement and it demonstrates many of the concerns about linguistic misunderstandings that will be discussed more fully in the final chapter. The fact that the British were so desperate to increase their own share of the land available in the Middle East and therefore eager to reduce the hold the Caliph-Sultan had over those lands led them to delve into theoretical areas which had not really been tackled by a Western power before. Had they understood better the complexities of the situation, they might not have made the attempt (especially as Britain ultimately gained very little from all this planning). However, the letters show that Professor Arnold himself must take a share in the blame for the questionable perceptions of the officials. For their reliance on his authority was expressed in the note attached to the end of Arnold’s paper, in which Sir Arthur Hirtzel opines that no further discussion on the subject would be necessary due to Arnold’s pre-eminence in the field.41 So in addition to its impact on senior British officials, Arnold’s letter throws into sharp focus a school of scholars who engaged with the Islamic polity in Western terms, rather than attempting to access understandings of the terminology through an engagement with Islam on its own cultural terms. Thus, the advice that he was able to offer was at once insightful, yet dangerously flawed in key areas. India Office Handbook on the Rise of Islam and the Caliphate, 1919 Having observed and critiqued available evidence on the British approach to questions of Islamic governance through the Cairo High Commission mate-

Post-War Part 1

99

rial and through the lens of outside expert opinion they were receiving, it is important to spend some time examining any material within the Whitehall files which could provide some evidence of the Whitehall view of the issue. This would serve to present a fuller picture of government attitudes in broad terms, as well as being able to examine the views at the heart of the Imperial government itself and at the same time seeing if it varied at all from the views expressed in the Cairo files. This is important in its own right, but also because the following chapter goes on to look at the correspondence concerning the Lausanne Treaty and, in order to understand the views that are expressed in that correspondence, evidence of baseline conceptual understandings within Whitehall should be established. Thankfully, a document exists that can provide a measure of definitive evidence of official understanding within Whitehall, for a handbook, circulated within the government apparatus in January 1919, and prepared by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, sets out what it sees as the prime issues with regard to the Caliphate.42 The Origin and Meaning of the Title “Khalifah”: A Comparison with the Cairo File In general, as one might expect, the handbook takes a very similar line of argument to that found in the Storrs memo and the Perie-Gordon and Lukach report. However, there are some subtle differences which are worth noting. Firstly, in the Foreign Office Handbook, there is very little Qur’anic referencing in the same way that was found in the Storrs Memo; the Qur’an is simply mentioned in passing as the “basis of statecraft,” without alluding to any specific passages, such as Q4:59. Instead, the accent is upon explaining the various titles that the Caliph has, making a conscious effort to show that the Caliph was both spiritual and temporal leader in the early years, an admission that those in the Cairo file were also briefly able to bring themselves to.43 However, the Foreign Office handbook spends far more time on this than the Cairo officials do, and also spends far more time listing the qualities and qualifications for Caliphate candidature than the Cairo officials.44 The lengthier list in the handbook might well have something to do with the fact that the Foreign Office historians compiled their list from the later Caliphate period, citing such jurists as al-Mawardi for their authority. A glance at the list found in the Storrs memo as compared to that in the handbook strongly suggests that the basic requirements found in the Storrs memo, gleaned from early sources, had been developed extensively by the time of the eleventh century.45 What the handbook does have, which is not present in either of the early British reports, was a list of the duties of the Caliph. This list is interesting because it is clearly obtained from the later period as the list of qualifications was, for it does not include any of the religious duties that appear to have

100

Chapter Three

formed elements of the rashidūn and a few of the Umayyad and Abbasid portfolios.46 For example, the most noticeable omission is the leadership of Friday prayers. Officials in central government looking at this list would therefore be forgiven for thinking that the Caliph was a monarch in all but name, rather than a leader with not just a “religious role” but a “spiritual role” which he in fact was. This persistent misunderstanding can therefore be seen not just in Cairo, but at the heart of the Whitehall apparatus. The Foreign Office handbook also brings in the notion that, although it varied from Caliph to Caliph, the advent of the Abbasids returned the Caliphate to a religious centrality and piety that had been largely lost under the Umayyads.47 At the same time, the Handbook reasserts the ‘ulamā’s role as the keeper of doctrine following a protracted struggle with the Sunni Caliphs.48 As chapter one outlined, this version of the historical development and perception of the role of the Caliph, even in the later period, was not clear cut as the Foreign Office historians seem to have believed. What is significant about the way this history is written, in contrast to earlier British memos and reports, is that it appears to be more willing to accept the Caliphate as an ongoing institution which has both highs and lows. This stands in sharp contrast to both the Storrs memo and the Perie-Gordon and Lukach report, both of which are at pains to show the Caliphate in continued decline from the earliest period. This change in tone and content could be attributed to the publication’s departmental context. For an historical division might feel more able to merely report what it understands to be impartial historical truth. At the same time, it could also be attributed to the times in which it was written, given that the war was now won which meant that there was less of a need to plot urgent strategies. When it comes to the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphs themselves, the handbook again appears to take a far more balanced approach than the earlier British reports. This is seen in its discussion of the apparent perception that to have a Caliph is a requirement for the Islamic faith, which they base upon Q4:59 as well as mentioning the case of Iltutmish specifically, when discussing the “shadowy dignity” of the later Caliphate.49 The handbook also gives a list of Ottoman claims to the Caliphate, assessing that their central claim rested upon the requirement for a strong Muslim leader to defend Islam, while also acknowledging the importance of guardianship of the Holy Places and Relics, election and nomination by the last Abbasid Caliph (although they do relate the story of the will with a hint of skepticism apparent in the tone) in establishing the validity of their claim.50 This list is almost identical to those of Perie-Gordon and Lukach, as well as Ronald Storrs, although the former both omit the “Doctrine of the Sword” and nomination by the Abbasid Caliph and the latter pours scorn on the story of the nomination.51

Post-War Part 1

101

As with the earlier reports, it briefly discussed other claimants, specifically mentioning the King of the Hijaz, but it is very lukewarm about encouraging this on the grounds that the Indian Muslims were very much against him.52 This line of argument is interesting from several points of view, among which is the fact that it shows the extent to which the British government had cooled in its support of the King in the later war and post-war period as we have already seen. It also reflects the concerns of central government with the “wider policy concerns” insofar as the Cairo files did not focus themselves upon Indian opinion because it was not part of their job to do so, whereas, at the heart of government, the impact of Indian public opinion would be felt much more through the India Office. Toward the end of the article in the handbook it makes two further points of interest: firstly, in common with widely held Sunni belief, it states that the “true Caliphate” came to an end in about 30 A.H.53 Little more needs to be added to this other than noting that this perspective also feeds in to the juristic interpretation that was already so inculcated within the British view of the issue. However, the second point is worthy of greater attention, for the same sentence about the “true Caliphate” goes on to add that it was revived by Haji Ismaili Khan.54 This fascinating little nugget is not expanded upon at all; however, the implications of giving the Safavid Immamate that level of legitimacy in relation to a Sunni question are huge. For what is essentially being hinted at is that the Safavids would also make possible legitimate heads of the Sunni Muslim ummah. This would have been more than a little unpalatable for the Arabs and indeed the Turks.55 Evidence for this was seen in the Cairo file for the Aga Khan was mentioned as a possible claimant, but was quickly dismissed. However, one wonders whether the Khan’s emissaries and agents might have been quietly lobbying behind the scenes for his claim. The Cairo file shows that the Aga Khan himself had ready access to high levels of government,56 but there is no proof that the historians compiling the handbook at the Foreign Office were directed toward this line of argument. The final sentence implies in both words and tone the British desire that the whole issue might disappear, for, with the war won and the wrangling over the spoils about to begin, the British were keen to distance themselves from King Hussein and to accommodate increasingly vociferous Indian Muslim demands:57 It may become clear that the Caliphate as an institution is as dead as the Holy Roman Empire—vox et praeterea nihil.58

This quotation clearly indicates that the writer believed the institution had run its course, yet, given the fact that the handbook had already stated that the

102

Chapter Three

office was central to the Muslim faith it provides a somewhat contradictory message for the reader. Summary This handbook is therefore useful both because of its time and place of publication insofar as it shows the subtly different views that were circulating in central government as well as showing how British thinking had shifted in the later period on subjects such as the candidature of King Hussein for the Caliphate. Its tone is more balanced, even if it does fall prey to orienting the Caliphate toward a religious monarchy and its references for the nature of the Caliphate are mainly drawn from a later period. What it also shows, in relation to the Cairo material, is that there was little or no coordination with regard to policy, for it is clear that the British reports in the Cairo file based their advice on one set of sources, while the Foreign Office based theirs on slightly differing material. While this did not lead to major differences of opinion, the opportunity for confusion, particularly when the advice being received from Professor Arnold, Professor Nallino, and other vested interests such as Morghani and the Aga Khan is also taken into account, was great. No parameters were set as regards the background of sources, such as having to be from Sunni origin. The potential danger of this lack of parameter setting was seen in the inclusion of the Safavid claim in the Foreign Office handbook. In the absence of concrete direction, the British officials were pursuing their own avenues which had the potential to lead to widely differing policies coming from different parts of the administration.

CONCLUSIONS In the post-War era, the “Caliphate Question” had turned from an important wartime counter-Ottoman strategy to a vexing and fraught issue. The Foreign Office handbook was expressing the probable desire of many—that the problem would simply disappear now that the strategic considerations that required it had ended. This point highlights an obvious, yet perhaps not learned lesson: that shortterm strategies may very well have long-term consequences and that the greater the ignorance, the more chance of unforeseen issues and problems arising become. As far as the wartime British operation was concerned, Islamic Governance and the “Caliphate Question” in particular presented a very useful strategic lever at a vital moment, but the lack of knowledge of what they were delving into caused them many additional years of difficulty. Of course, there

Post-War Part 1

103

can be no way of knowing whether the British, even if they were in fuller possession of the issues on the Caliphate, still would have gone ahead with the operation. But it might have made them think a little more about alternatives first, or even think harder about their choice of candidate for a new Caliphate. The growing realization of the depth of the issues concerning the Caliphate meant that senior officials and ministers clearly welcomed the expert outside advice of Professor Arnold, for in the Arnold-Hirtzel correspondence comes the first signs that the officials were beginning to wake up to the problem of accurate definition of terms when discussing the remit of the Caliph. So, in addition to the need for long-term thinking even in short-term strategizing, the accurate cultural understanding of the terminology when working crossculturally is highlighted clearly in this correspondence. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the officials did seek outside expert help and, therefore, increased their chances of arriving at the agreement or settlement they were wanting. Finally, the handbook shows that it is possible to come to different conclusions on the same subject when the parameters for decision making are not carefully thought through. In the case of the handbook, the fact that their perceptions of the Caliphate were being based upon later models means that their perception of who the Caliph was was based upon more on a monarchy model than the writing of Perie-Gordon–Lukach and Storrs were. This might have led to differing solutions being proposed. While this was potentially difficult, the suggestion that a Shi’a solution might be found for a Sunni problem was frankly dangerous and highlights the need to have more than simply a surface understanding of the issues if major problems like that are to be avoided.

} This chapter has examined the Whitehall material from the early post-war period in the Foreign Office and India Office. The following chapter will look specifically at Prime Minister Lloyd-George’s engagement with the Khilafat Delegation in order to draw out some important points in relation to crosscultural engagement in its own right, as well as to provide the background to the discussion of the “spiritual authority of the Caliph” after it, as the second meeting between the Prime Minister and the Delegation was the principal catalyst for that discussion.

NOTES 1. Justification for this statement is given at the opening of the analysis of the document itself.

104

Chapter Three

2. Treaty of Sèvres, Dated August 10th, 1919, Political Section, Article 139, IOR/L/E/7/1202, File 380. 3. Ibid. 4. For example, one might argue that the Caliphate was not part of “the Government of Turkey,” only the Sultanate was, and therefore, while the Sultan could not rule over non-Turkish territory, the Caliph could exercise his spiritual authority over it instead. 5. Lloyd-George’s maneuverings and manipulations, as well as outside influences that had a bearing on his actions, are admirably reported and analyzed in the work of Fromkin, Peace, 383–401; J. Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 1918–1922 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1981), 11–14; P. C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919–1920 (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1974), 26–30; J. Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920 (London: Athlone Press, 1969), 103–5. 6. IOR/L/PS/10/853 Part 4, F202 (Hereafter cited as IOR/L/PS/10/853/4). 7. Ibid. The Sheikh-ul-Islam post in Cairo had long been appointed by the Ottomans, even when the British controlled the country. As such, this provides a clear example of underlying British policy in relation to what constituted the spiritual powers of the Caliph. Elie Kedourie has made an extensive study of the relationship between the Ottomans and Egyptians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which includes an excellent description of the powers and functions of the Sheikh-ulIslam. Kedourie, Chatham House, 25–40. 8. This is precisely what Atatturk achieved for a brief period, before finally abolishing the Caliph-Sultanate in 1923. See Enyat, Political Thought, 56–57. 9. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F 202–3. (As the note on the file is double sided, future references to this correspondence will use the page numbers on the correspondence rather than the folio numbers. Hence Professor Arnold’s note covers pages 1–2 on F202 and 3–4 on F203). 10. Ibid, 1. 11. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F202, 1. The list of ten functions that he supplies are either civil, military, or judicial. There is no mention even of the leading of Friday prayers, which even the jurists did not dispute. See “What was the Remit of the Caliphs and how did it Develop” section in chapter three. 12. Ibid. 13. Arnold appears to take the ‘ulam’s version of the Caliphate’s function without exploring the inconsistencies in their “history” that were examined in chapter three. 14. Later folios in the file show that Sir Arthur Hirtzel must have passed on Professor Arnold’s letters to other senior officials, both within his department, and in the Foreign and Colonial Offices. See for example IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F198 and F112–15. 15. A. S. Tritton, “Dunyā,” EI2, Vol. 2, 626. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid.

Post-War Part 1

105

18. Wehr, Dictionary, 340–41. 19. Ibid. 20. In this, he is joined by Lewis in more recent times. See Lewis, Political Language, 33. 21. L. Gardet, “Dīn,” EI2, Vol. 2, 293–96. 22. Ibid, 293. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid, 295 25. Watt, Political Thought, 29. However, Watt goes on to suggest that “religions, strictly speaking, have no political concepts attached to them. What is found is that a religion sometimes favors the political concepts attached to them.” With regard to Islam, this is harder to argue. Cf. “Role of Muhammad” in the “Nature of the Caliphate” section. 26. Penrice, Dictionary, 50. Cf. Lane, Lexicon, vol. 3, 943–45. 27. Esposito, Middle East, 26–27. 28. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F202, 2. 29. Ibid, 880. 30. Penrice, Dictionary, 60. 31. Lane, Lexicon, vol. 3, 1178–81. 32. A survey and explanation of the Christian doctrine of the “Holy Spirit” can be found in H. Lockyer, All the Doctrines of the Bible; A Study and Analysis of Major Bible Doctrines (Grand Rapids, MI; Zondervan Publishing House, 1964), 59–120. For the explanation of Gabriel as the “Holy Spirit” in Muslim theology see O. Lizzini, “Islamic Angelology: Revelation, Tradition and Philosophical Elaboration, Some Brief Observations,” Encounter, No. 227 (August–September 1996). C. F. A. Jeffrey, ed., Islam, Muhammad and His Religion (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), 111–21. 33. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F202, 2. 34. See “Remit of the Early Caliphs” and “The Development and Political Theory” subsections in chapter one. Compare, for example, his history of the Caliphate in The Caliphate, with that of Madelung in his Succession to Muhammad. It should be said that the same criticism could be leveled at Watt and Muir, and it is only more recent scholarship that has begun to question the validity of the traditional versions as supplied by the jurists. 35. Cf. discussion under the heading “Shi’a theory of the Caliphate” in Appendix E. 36. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F202, 2. 37. Cf. Discussion on “By What Right did the Caliph Rule” discussion in chapter three. 38. Indeed one might ask whether their deposition was due to the centuries old power struggle between the Caliph and jurists for ultimate power in the land. Kinross, Lewis, and Finkel, as well as Özcan, suggest that the depositions were due to antireformism in the cases of Salim III and Abdul Aziz, but due entirely to political maneuvering and treacherous plots by Abd-al-Hamid. See Kinross, Turkey, 475, 514, 576. 39. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F202, 3. In the final two complete paragraphs of page 3 Arnold suggests that the British and French governments would be against the form

106

Chapter Three

of treaties completed recently with Italians, Bulgarians and Greeks as they are ratified by government departments, rather than with the Caliph as spiritual leader. Such a concern appears to contradict the whole nature of the discussion, their essential desire being to destroy the power of the Caliph as spiritual Pan-Islamic leader, rather than undermine his temporal power. However, it is made clear in the understanding that their prime concern was to end the Turkish empire, including the Caliph’s perceived power to appoint Cadis in areas outside of Turkey. 40. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F202, 4. 41. Ibid. 42. The handbook was produced by the Foreign Office Historical Division. The copy cited here is that found in the India Office Files although it is also found in the other departmental archives, hence why it is given an India Office file classification rather than a Foreign Office one: IOR/L/PS/20/G77, Handbook 96 a & b. entitled “The Rise of Islam and the Caliphate. The Pan-Islamic Movement.” 43. See FO 141/587/2, F50 and F63. 44. IOR/L/PS/20/G77, F38, 43. 45. The Storrs Memo gives the qualifications as “a man, an adult, a sane person, a free man, a learned divine, a powerful ruler, Quraishi lineage,” which is very basic, whereas the handbook, working from the later jurists, lists the qualifications as “pure character, knowledge of the law, knowledge of rhetoric, sound hearing, sight and speech, intelligence, courage for Holy War, descended from the Qureish.” The second list has the strong feel of having been built from the first. Ibid, 43, and FO 141/587/2, F63. 46. The duties are listed as: “defense of the faith, legal dispute settling, preservation of public safety, punishment of wrongdoing, defense of frontiers, warring against those who refuse to accept Islam or to submit to Muslim rule, payment of salaries, appointment of officials and attention to the detail of government.” Ibid, F43. The foundation for the list is not cited, but as al-Mawardi is mentioned by name, it seems likely that his Ordinances of Government is indeed the source. Should this be the case, the earlier characterization of the book in the chapters on “Political Theory” as a work that essentially espoused centralization and absolutism would appear to be justified. 47. IOR/L/PS/20/G77, F40. Cf. discussion in chapter three. 48. Ibid, F40–41. 49. Ibid, F43. Due to differing verse numbering systems, the handbook gives what we have today as Q4:59 as Q4:62, however, it is clear from the discussion around it that they are talking about the same verse. 50. Ibid, F44. 51. FO 141/587/2, F54 and F67–68. 52. IOR/L/PS/20/G77, F45. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the handbook states that the claim to the universal Caliphate was only resurrected once more under the Sultanate of Abdulhamid II. As has been seen already, he certainly sent emissaries around the Muslim world advocating a return to centralized universal authority, but, as Nallino pointed out, the universal Caliphate could be traced back far earlier to the treaty of Kucuk Kanyarca in 1774.

Post-War Part 1

107

53. Ibid, F44. 54. Ibid, F45. 55. Sectarian divisions between these nations are discussed in M. Kramer, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 21–47. 56. See for example FO 141/587/2, F83–86, which is an account of a meeting between the Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office and the Aga Khan on the November 2nd, 1915. 57. This dynamic was seen clearly in the later and post-war correspondence reviewed in the Cairo files. 58. IOR/L/PS/20/G77, F45. The Latin translates: “voice but no substance,” a saying attributed to Seneca but according to Brewer goes back to the occasion when a Lacedemonian plucked a nightingale after hearing the voice, but seeing the body was so little. www.bartleby.com/81/17199.html, accessed August 22nd, 2007.

Chapter Four

Post-War Part 2: The Khilafat Discussions, 1920–1921

Two documents frame the central discussion in this chapter. They are the minutes of the two meetings between the Prime Minister and the Indian Khilafat Delegation in 1920 and 1921.1 The importance of these meetings is that they effectively tied the various government agencies dealing with the Caliphate issue to a promise that was very hard to keep. As such, it is important to understand the nature of what Lloyd-George promised and also, to understand the implications of differing cultural and linguistic interpretations that came out of those meetings.2

LLOYD-GEORGE AND THE KHILAFAT DELEGATION 1920 The first of the Khilafat Delegation’s meetings with the Prime Minister took place in Downing Street in the middle of March 1920. Among the British officials present along with the Prime Minister was the MP, H.A.L. Fisher, who had received the delegation on behalf of Lord Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, two weeks previously.3 From the tone of the discussion it is clear that the Prime Minister was prepared for the content of the discussion, but it will be seen that he was apparently unaware of the implications of what he promised in the course of the second of them.4

109

110

Chapter Four

Downing Street 1920: The Nature of the Caliphate as Defined by Mohamed Ali The first meeting opened with the Prime Minister asking Mohamed Ali, the leader of the Delegation, to briefly state his case. He duly did so essentially giving the classic definition of dini that was described earlier: . . . we have come in connection to a religious question which is of the greatest importance to us. . . . we desire to point out what is the connection of Indian Mussulmans with the Khilafat. Islam as we understand it, is not a set of doctrines or dogmas; it is a complete outlook on life, a moral code and a social polity. It recognises no lacerating and devitalising distinctions between things spiritual and things temporal, between church and state . . . 5

Having established the foundations or nature of the faith, Mohamed Ali moved on to the position of the Caliph within that overarching context: The personal centre [of Islam] is the Caliph, or the Khalifa, as we call him, the successor of the Prophet. Because the Prophet was the personal centre of Islam, his successors . . . continue his tradition to this day. The Khalifa is the Commander of the Faithful in all matters for which Islam provides divine guidance, and his orders are to be obeyed by all Mussalmans as long as they do not conflict with the Commandments of God and the Traditions of the Prophet.6

Ali’s definition certainly places his understanding of the position of the Caliph in the school of classical Sunni jurist political theory, putting the Caliph at the heart of the community, but, along with others, under the law of God. This position is clear, however, what is less clear is what precisely was included in the phrase “ . . . continue his tradition . . .”7 and his definition of “Commander of the Faithful.” For as was seen in chapter one, the exact boundaries of the Caliph’s remit were a source of ongoing struggle for the best part of eight hundred years. Thus, even though his statement here exactly mirrors that of Sheikh Tommara, and exemplifies the consistency of the Sunni Muslim position on the place of the Caliph in their tradition in two differing geographical areas, it does not specify what Ali feels the Caliph’s remit to be within that broad framework. Ali’s follow-on argument for the retention of the Caliphate in its current imperial form highlights the difficulty for any modern Muslim attempting to define the power of a Caliph in a world where many Muslims no longer live under direct Muslim rule.8 For the defence of the Faith, the Commander of the Faithful must always retain adequate territories, naval and military forces, and financial resources, all

Post-War Part 2

111

of which can be summed up in the expression “temporal power” . . . All that a Moslem is and a Moslem has are part of a Divine Trust. A Moslem cannot, without betraying that trust, hold anything back if it is required for the defence of the faith and the purposes of God . . . Since the world still relies on force, the Khalifa cannot dispense with temporal power.

Later on, when the nature of the Caliphate becomes the focus of discussion once again in relation to what title the King of the Hijaz should have, Mohamed Ali returns to this same theme through a question the Prime Minister asks concerning the meaning of “Commander of the Faithful”:9 . . . he commands them within the law of Islam and on behalf of God. He does not aggregate to himself a kingly function . . . the doctrine of the Khilafat is the doctrine of a Republic. [Gives some detail of the coronation ceremony] . . . Islam required temporal power for the defence of the Faith, and for that purpose, if the ideal combination of piety and power could not be achieved, the Moslems said “let us get hold of the most powerful person, even if he is not the most pious, so long as he places his power at the disposal of our piety.” That is why we agreed to accept Moslem Kings . . .10

Clearly this was said in a time when the thought of Islam without a head had never been contemplated before. Even so, trying to pick one’s way through the intricacies of the argument in these last two quotations is not easy. Effectively, what Ali seems to be arguing is that, when Russia attacked the Turks in the 1850s and 1870s, the war was religious insofar as any attack on Muslim land is therefore an attack on the faith itself.11 There certainly appears to be reference to the notion of fighting in defense of Islam, along with those who are too weak to defend themselves, but the doctrine of requirement for a standing military force can only be inferred from little nuggets in the Hadith.12 Further insight may be gained from reading the explanation of jihād found in the “Introduction” to Muslim, Sahih, “Book on jihād and Expedition.”13 However, the doctrine is not as explicit as Ali is making out and, should Lloyd-George have had some expert opinion in with him at the meeting, a few questions would have revealed this to him. This would have helped him to have taken far more effective steps toward achieving his goal of ending the Caliph’s Pan-Islamic authority. Other than the points outlined above, there seem to be two central weaknesses in Ali’s argument; firstly, what is considered to be “adequate” when attempting to define the Caliph’s power? Ali’s concern is that the borders of the Ottoman Empire had been shrunk so much already that the functions of the Caliph he outlined could no longer be performed. Hence, the demand that he makes immediately following this preamble: that Ottoman territories be restored to their pre-Balkan War state.14 It is unclear how the addition

112

Chapter Four

or reduction of these territories straddle the line between adequacy or inadequacy; perhaps the request is based on strategic considerations. Secondly, he is effectively saying in the second quotation that the Ottoman Caliphate is not legitimate and that a Caliphate reminiscent of the rashidūn period would be far more preferable.15 This hardly seems ideal grounds for the maintenance of the Ottoman Caliphs; it does however point to why the Caliphate was offered to Kemal Atatturk himself once he had abolished the office.16 In his turn, Ali offers constitutional reform in Turkey so as to guarantee “security of life and property and opportunities of autonomous development of all communities, whether Moslem, Christian or Jewish . . .”17 What right he has to make such an offer is not immediately obvious, either from the perspective of wielding the power to push through such reforms, or guaranteeing such rights for minority groups under a shari’a rather than a civil code. However, the offer itself shows at least two clear facts: firstly, that implicit in his words are the tacit acknowledgement that reform of the Caliphate is needed. Secondly, that there was desperation to maintain the Caliphate, even in its imperfect form. Given the fact that Mohamed Ali knew, along with the rest of the world, Britain’s desire for Middle Eastern territory, he must have realized that his pleas for the reinstatement of territory and arms were likely to fall on deaf ears. Also, there must be very few victorious powers in the world that are willing to so fully reinstate their fallen opponents.18 Nevertheless, Mohamed Ali’s argument carries some force simply because of whom he represents, for, as has been mentioned already, the British government was very worried about the situation in India, (exacerbated by the Amritsar Massacre the previous year). Clearly the Delegation realized this and attempted to use it in the discussion.19 The Prime Minister understood the importance of what these men represented and therefore attempted to reassure them. Even so, if Lloyd-George’s central aim was to reassure Muslims through the Delegation at the same time as trying to extinguish the lighted fuse that was Pan-Islamic ideology, his line of argument seems badly chosen for he focused on the apparent barbarity of the Ottoman troops toward the Armenian Christians.20 One might argue that pointing out such an act would reduce the moral foundations of the Caliphate, however, the Delegation could have pointed out the Amritsar Massacre, which undoubtedly reduced the prestige of the Empire. A far more effective negotiating tool already existed: for the British knew that the Ottoman Sultan was missing Quraishi lineage and knew the importance of it.21 If desired, this would have provided them with an excellent counterargument to the Delegation. Clearly it was not in the interests of the delegation to discuss the lack of Quraishi lineage. However, the very fact that they chose to ignore this fundamental problem in their desire to see the final great Muslim power remain powerful is an indication of both their

Post-War Part 2

113

desperation to see the Caliph remain and the depth of feeling between the Indians and the Ottoman Caliph.22 One might argue that the Khilafat Delegation could claim the “Right of the Sword” in the defense of the Ottoman Caliphs. However that would have opened them up to the British counter argument that they were now the most powerful Muslim power in existence as they had been declared Dar al-Islam by several high Muslim jurists and therefore the Caliphate could pass to them. So the Prime Minister, when dealing with issues of legitimization, sought to combat ideology with evidence of wrongdoing. Such an argument had little chance of achieving his objectives. Downing Street, 1920; The Impact of “Self Determination” Within the Ottoman Ummah The other main aspect of the discussions in Downing Street was the possibility of various Arab states themselves breaking away from Ottoman rule.23 In many ways, this discussion is very much part of the previous section on the power of the Caliph and his right to rule. However, it is useful to treat it separately because it is important to see how the delegation dealt with the issue of “self-determination” as defined by President Wilson in the context of a belief in the geopolitical unity of all Muslims.24 For Mohamed Ali, the requirement to keep the lands within the Ottoman Empire was based both on the principle of the unity of the ummah and his belief in the special place of the land of Arabia within Islam: the “Island of Arabia” should remain inviolate and entirely in Moslem control. This is based on the dying injunction of the Prophet himself.25

This statement from Mohamed Ali almost certainly relates to a Hadith, attributed to Ibn Abbas, which is found in several places in the Bukhari and Muslim collections. As it is one of the central bases for Ali’s desire for continued Ottoman control, it is worthwhile reproducing the shortest version here below: The ailment of Allah’s Apostle became worse (on Thursday) and he said, fetch me something so that I may write to you something after which you will never go astray.” The people (present there) differed in this matter, and it was not right to differ before a prophet. Some said, “What is wrong with him ? (Do you think) he is delirious (seriously ill)? Ask him (to understand his state).” So they went to the Prophet and asked him again. The Prophet said, “Leave me, for my present state is better than what you call me for.” Then he ordered them to do three things. He said, “Turn the pagans out of the Arabian Peninsula; respect and give

114

Chapter Four

gifts to the foreign delegations as you have seen me dealing with them.” (Said bin Jubair, the sub-narrator said that Ibn Abbas kept quiet as regards the third order, or he said, “I forgot it.”).26

The reference appears to connect with the right time as far as Muhammad’s phase of life is concerned. However, this version does not specifically mention Christians and Jews, rather it enjoins Muslims to clear the peninsula of pagans.27 The version of the Hadith that is found in Muslim’s collection changes the word “pagans” to “polytheists.” If this version were correct, then he could be seen to be targeting Christians, as Muhammad accused them of polytheism for their trinitarian beliefs. Indeed, another Hadith, narrated by ‘Umar b. al-Khattib, records Muhammad saying that he would drive the Jews and the Christians from the Arabian Peninsula.28 Therefore, the position of the Khilafat Delegation with regards to the requirement for Arabia to remain in Muslim hands seems correct. However, this does not necessarily tie into their desire to maintain Ottoman control, for, so long as Arabia was in the hands of Muslims, under Arab leadership, it would be. Indeed, Mohamed Ali made the point himself in the course of the discussions: A religious requirement . . . requires that there at least [Arabia] there shall be exclusively Moslem control. It does not specify that it should be the Khalifa’s own control.29

The final sentence seems to be a calculated move in order to create the openings for negotiation. For it appears rather disingenuous to suggest that Arabia should be under Muslim control and separating that issue out from the Ottoman Caliphate, when the entire reason for their agitation was the maintenance of the Ottoman rule under the banner of the unity of the ummah. Thus, the issue is effectively divided into two: firstly, why should it be Ottoman and not Arab headship of the ummah,30 and secondly, could Wilson’s “self-determination,” under which the Indians were increasingly calling for an independent India, be reconciled to this doctrine? The first question has been dealt with extensively, through the analysis of the documents contained in the Cairo High Commission file. These arguments do not need to be rehearsed once again. However, it is important to note that theologically speaking, there was no reason why an Arab could not lead the whole ummah from Mecca or Medina. As to the question of the unity of the ummah in relation to the question of national self-determination, on first inspection, the two would appear to be polar opposites. However, reconciliation could be effected by reference to history, rather than theology. For chapter one showed that there seemed to be

Post-War Part 2

115

a clear convention within even the later Muslim Empire, that the power of individual rulers was given and received on behalf of and at the behest of the Caliph as the head of the community. Thus, even though the Sultans in India or, later, in Aceh acted independently in all matters, they were seen to be holding their power on behalf of the Caliph and in the name of Islam. The difference in this situation, however, was that part of the territory that the Delegation called Arabia-Syria and Mesopotamia was passing out of Muslim hands into Christian dominion as India and Southeast Asia had done before them. Thus, within the framework of this aspect of the discussions, the problem of Arabian independence from the Ottomans was not so much Arab control of the Peninsula, but rather possible Christian control over parts of the Fertile Crescent. However, Mohamed Ali seems to forget that India was already under non-Muslim rule and that the Caliph had continued to exercise influence there, although the extent of that influence or power was never formally agreed between the British and the Ottoman Caliph. A similar situation was present in Egypt where a nominally independent Egypt was directly ruled by a non-Muslim power, but, at the same time, still had its chief religious officials appointed from Constantinople.31 Again, the Prime Minister did not engage Mohamed Ali on this issue, but rather implicitly conceded the force of the argument, presenting the Delegation with the opportunity to press for concessions in a situation where, with some advice and a little probing, the discussion could have tackled the core of the issue.32 The essential problem for the delegation was interpreting Muslim doctrines in a setting that was vastly changed from the situation that the faith was formulated in, for there was no need to differentiate between the geographical and spiritual boundaries of the faith in the period of the rashidūn and Imperial Ages as they were one and the same.33 It was for this reason that many of the Delegation’s arguments, which have been shown to be based solidly on early exegesis extracted from Islamic scripture, were found wanting. This was not because the principles themselves were wrong, but because they were being applied in a situation where any attempt to adequately define the way that the doctrines could be put into effect in their particular circumstances and their understanding of the place of the Caliph in Islam fell short of the ideals they were espousing.34 The fact that the Prime Minister was not able to point this out in the course of the meeting meant that he was forced to choose other, more politically motivated issues, with which to counter the aura of moral authority that the Delegation had managed to create for their position. Ultimately, it meant that the meeting was unfruitful for either side as the important points at issue were not properly discussed. This opened the Prime Minster to possible accusations of filibustering from a Muslim perspective

116

Chapter Four

insofar as he failed to either acknowledge the strength of the Delegation’s arguments and propose a course of action in that light, or provide effective reasons why the Delegation’s wishes should not be adhered to. Accusations of anti-Islamic Bias With so large a Muslim population within the British Empire and with the agitations on behalf of Caliph that were causing unrest in India already, Mohamed Ali’s accusation that the British were dealing more harshly with the Ottomans than they were with the Germans or Austrians must have been of enormous concern to the Prime Minister.35 He therefore spent some considerable time explaining that the Ottomans were being treated no differently than their defeated colleagues, citing the fact that the Austrian Empire was completely dismantled and that Germany “has had justice—pretty terrible justice.”36 His conclusion is a rhetorical question: Why should Turkey escape? . . . . Is there any reason why we should apply a different measure to Turkey to that which we have meted out to the Christian communities of Germany and Austria? I want Mohammadans in India to get well into their minds that we are not treating Turkey severely because she is Mohammadan; we are applying exactly the same principle to her as we have to Austria, which is a Christian community.37

Essentially, the Ottomans lost and have to take the consequences. In the power politics of the day, this is not an unreasonable point, however, his message is tempered with the fact that he needs the Indian Muslim population onside. Consequently, while he is keen to make the points about Turkey as a defeated power, who were also responsible for a massacre, he also takes care to reiterate that they are being heard and dealt with fairly. First Meeting Summary Prime Minister Lloyd-George’s engagement with the Khilafat Delegation in this first meeting reveals both an opportunity lost and one taken. For, he accepts the Delegation’s version of the Caliphate without question; a perspective that was far more open to alternative interpretation that he was led to believe. At the same time, he was able to counter the dangerous perception of anti-Muslim bias effectively. So, while he got his point across on evenhanded dealings, his passive acceptance of the Delegation’s view on the place and situation of the Caliph meant that he could not win the wider argument concerning whether the Caliphate should continue—an argument that would have had far more effective long-term consequences for the dismantling of

Post-War Part 2

117

Ottoman rule than the rather inconsistent, even hypocritical argument concerning “self-determination” that he in fact deployed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS MEETING, MARCH 21ST, 1921 The second of Lloyd-George’s meetings with the Khilafat Delegation occurred almost exactly a year after the first, this time at the House of Commons. What is interesting in this discussion is the different tone adopted by the Prime Minister himself toward the Delegation. The reasons for this new approach could perhaps lie in the changed circumstances that the British now found themselves in over many parts of the Middle East as well as the extraordinary pressure being exerted at home in the press, fuelling ill-concealed frustrations and resentments across many differing parts of the social spectrum.38 No longer was Lloyd-George the triumphant leader of a victorious nation, but an embattled Prime Minister under pressure both at home and abroad. Perhaps he saw the second meeting with the Delegation as an opportunity to placate some Muslim sentiment allowing him more room for maneuver in the ongoing discussions on redrafting the Treaty of Sèvres (which eventually lead to the Lausanne agreement).39 At the same time, it is worth noting that the Delegation themselves had been somewhat undermined by the significant differences between the Delegation’s perception of what the Ottoman position as regards the Caliph should be and what the Turks themselves were proposing.40 Also, the work of Quraishi reveals that there was growing dissatisfaction with the lack of progress among the wealthy Indians that had financed the Delegation’s trip due to the expenses they were incurring.41 Thus, one could argue that, for different reasons, both sides in the discussions at the House of Commons needed something from the meeting to help their own causes, and because of this, the discussions were held in a more conciliatory manner. It is this requirement for results that perhaps pushed the Prime Minister further than his officials would have wanted him to go. The discussions in the meeting essentially revolved around the redrafting of clause 139 of the treaty of Sèvres which sought to remove the Caliph’s spiritual hold over the Muslim peoples of the Middle East, spiritual power which translated into temporal influence through the appointment of senior religious officials and judges.42 Thus, while the discussions were very much along the same lines as those in the previous meeting, these were far more focused upon specific understandings of terms and perceptions, rather than the previous meeting that had examined general principles. In view of the religio-legal terminology being discussed, it is therefore unsurprising that

118

Chapter Four

one of the religious scholars in the Delegation, Hasan Imam, was the chief spokesman for the Delegation this time and begs the question of why there was not anyone present on the British side with a better understanding of the complexities being discussed.43 The meeting opened with Hasan Imam elucidating the prime reason for their second meeting: the Khalif’s suzerainty may be recognised over those portions of the territories that recently constituted the Ottoman Empire.44

Lloyd-George clarified the statement as concerning the “religious suzerainty” of the Caliph. In one sense though, this clarification could only serve to confuse further, for it was his religious suzerainty which gave the Caliph precisely the temporal influence that they were attempting to deny him. As has been highlighted repeatedly throughout this book, such a separation was entirely artificial anyway.45 There then followed an interesting exchange concerning whether the religious authority of the Caliph could be equated with that of the Popes, so recently deprived of wider secular authority by removing their petty kingdom and confining them to the Vatican City.46 The discussion then moved on to possible solutions to the impasse that the two groups found themselves in and it was in this spirit that the Delegation proposed that the wording of the treaty made between the Ottomans and Italians in the years before the outbreak of World War I could provide a possible solution to the issue.47 In that treaty, the Italians took over Tripoli, but specifically stated that the Caliph would retain “religious authority” over it.48 Lloyd-George appeared to be happy to look into this as a possible way forward and, having seen the Delegation propose a possible way forward, he is clearly impatient for the meeting to end and it is at this moment that he makes the offhand comment, “to check on this for the final draft,”49 as he drew the meeting to a close. Whatever he may have understood himself to be saying by this statement, the Delegation clearly felt that they had gained an assurance that the Caliphate would therefore retain its “religious authority.”50 Clearly therefore the issue now became what constituted “religious authority.” This is the question that was fiercely debated between the India Office and Government of India. Second Meeting Summary The second meeting was characterized by a changed style of dialogue, focusing far more on technical theological wording in an atmosphere that was substantially different to that of the first meeting. Both sides needed something from

Post-War Part 2

119

the meeting due to external pressures and ultimately, both sides went away with less than they desired, for Lloyd-George wanted the Delegation to spread the word that the British Empire was not an enemy of Islam, and the delegation wanted concrete assurances that the Caliphate would retain its pre-war status in every way. In one sense, both sides needed from each other what neither could, or desired to, give and as such had placed themselves in jackets of their own making. However, what the Delegation could not have known was the alarm within government that Lloyd-George’s implied promise had created. Had they known this, they might have counted their meeting more of a success.

POSTSCRIPT In an extraordinary postscript to the discussions analyzed above, there is a telegram on the British files from the Khilafat Delegation to the National Assembly and Kemal Atatturk congratulating them on their approach to the Caliphate dated early January 1923, two months before the post was abolished.51 Their happiness is based on the perception that the National Assembly’s maneuverings were designed to bring the Caliphate back to its early period. Even though there is some logic in their telegram, it still sits somewhat at odds with the general tenor of their remarks to the Prime Minister, particularly as they were not simply protesting the treatment of the Caliphate as an office, but defending particularly the Turkish Caliphate.

CONCLUSIONS The two meetings between the British Prime Minister and the Indian Khilafat Delegation highlight several important issues in relation to religious engagement. Firstly, there was the passive acceptance of the Sunni juristic interpretation of the powers and history of the Caliphate by the Prime Minister. While this in itself is not wholly unreasonable, it also fed into a failure to point out the multiple ambiguities in the position of both the Ottoman Caliphate itself and the arguments of the Khilafat Delegation. This meant that British officials, including the Prime Minister, were effectively conceding the validity of the arguments being made to them when a few more directed questions could have exposed gaping flaws and thereby producing a more fertile ground for lasting resolution. The second point connects with the first: the Prime Minister attempted to undermine the political or moral authority of the Ottoman Caliphate itself

120

Chapter Four

through the highlighting of the Armenian massacres, in order to gain political leverage. This response was misguided insofar as it failed to tackle Muslim grievances effectively, leaving them frustrated. In the end, this angle of attack only allowed the Delegation to claim, rightly, that their grievances had not been effectively answered and further meant that Lloyd-George could not get what he wanted to secure at the meeting: the end to potential dual loyalism. In order for effective long-term solutions to be found, concerns and issues have to be engaged with directly, rather than circumnavigated and avoided. Some of the other points, such as the importance of making sure common definitions of terms such as “democracy,” which change definition across cultural boundaries, are properly defined, are not confined to the LloydGeorge Delegations alone and have been made elsewhere. So there is little point in doing so here. However, the important final point to come out of these meetings concerns the necessity of having appropriate expertise available on hand, particularly when more technical terms and issues are being discussed as in the second meeting. Clearly this principle is not peculiar to questions of religious engagement, this was, at that time, a relatively new area for the British government to be working in; the necessity is heightened and highlighted.

} This chapter has brought the analysis of British documents on the “Caliphate Question” from Cairo into Whitehall and from the war period into the era of the Peace Treaties. The following chapter will close out the examination of the World War I period with an analysis of documents relating to the Lausanne Correspondence from within the India Office.

NOTES 1. Meeting at Downing Street dated March 19th, 1920, IOR/L/PS/18/B371. Meeting at House of Commons dated March 24th, 1921, IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F360–72. 2. It is important to note that Naeem Qureshi briefly discusses what transpired at both of these meetings. However, his focus, along with Özcan, is far more on Lloyd-George’s perceived attitude toward the delegation and is generally dismissive of any of the Prime Minister’s arguments, preferring instead to concentrate on LloydGeorge’s clear anti-Turkish bias. However, while not disputing the Prime Minister’s attitude, his points cannot be dismissed so easily. The focus of this book means that an in-depth counterargument to Qureshi’s points would take away from the flow of the analysis, but it is worthwhile observing that his otherwise excellent study is undermined by the desire to attack the man rather than constructively counter his argument. Qureshi, Khilafat, 144–48, 278–79. Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 188–89.

Post-War Part 2

121

3. The discussion, which is recorded in IOR/L/PS/18/B370, covers exactly the same ground as the Prime Ministerial discussion a fortnight later. What is particularly important is the explanation of the “holistic” approach to the place of faith in Islamic culture, explained to Fisher very clearly (page 2) and explained again to the Prime Minister in the meeting under discussion. Thus, it is the failure to appreciate the difference in cultural approach to faith which causes the Prime Minister’s erroneous promise in the second of his meetings with the delegation at the House of Commons. 4. Lloyd-George sets a very aggressive tone in the discussions, seeking to undermine the delegation’s moral authority through a persistent reference to the Turkish perpetrated Armenian massacres before highlighting the freedom of religion that Muslims enjoyed under British rule. 5. IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F1. 6. Ibid, F1. 7. His general line is classically Sunni, although this phrase could be interpreted in a more mystical sense if desired. However, within the context of the rest of Ali’s discussion it seems clear that he would have excluded any notion of prophethood being inherited, although whether he would have included the right to give opinion on dogma, etc., is purely a matter of conjecture. Ali was clearly giving the opinions of the whole group, for a brief glance at the biographical detail on each of the Delegation shows that they all came from the same Sunni opinion. See Qureshi, Khilafat, 462–75. 8. With the events over the last decade, this argument more than any other has gained an extraordinary significance both for the West and the “Muslim world.” A number of works have attempted to address this issue although a definitive answer to the problem may have to lie in the hands of individual Muslims and their interpretations of relevant scriptures. See Oliver-Dee, Islamic Citizenship; O. Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst and Company, 2002); and the collection of Muslim writings brought together in M. Moaddel and K. Talattof, Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 9. IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F7. 10. Ibid, F7. The contradiction in this statement is clear for he is at once describing the Caliphate as both republic and monarchy. However, although it is perhaps not explained very well, it is not necessarily wrong, for he is essentialy describing the transformation from what the Caliphate originally was, to what it became. See chapter three. 11. There is not the space to discuss the intricacies of jiha-d theory given that the prime focus of the book is the Caliphate as an institution and Britain’s relationship to it. Many books in Western scholarship already exist on jiha-d, among them are: J. T. Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997); J. Kelsey, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming); G. Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I B Tauris, 2006). There are also many books on jiha-d in specific areas of the world such as the Middle East and Europe.

122

Chapter Four

12. Some insight may be gained from Muslim, Sahih, Book 48, Vol. 18, Hadith 4718. This same Hadith is found in Abu Dawud. 13. Muslim, Sahih, “Introduction to Book 19: The Book of jiha-d and Expedition.” 14. IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F1. 15. In expressing this desire, Mohamed Ali places himself firmly in the philosophical stream of al-Afghani, Maududi, Abduh, and Qutb, whose writings are full of the same longings. 16. See previous chapter on Cairo High Commission files. 17. Ibid, F2. 18. Lloyd-George himself makes this point very succinctly in his closing remarks at the end of the meeting. See Ibid, F9. Clearly this concept has changed over the intervening period, and the post-war reconstruction of Japan and Germany by the Allies following World War II would be classic examples of this fundamental shift. 19. IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F8. 20. IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F3–4. 21. See both the discussions on the “Perie-Gordon and Lukach report” and the “Storrs memo” earlier in this book. 22. For the links between India and the Ottomans see the historical background to the opening of the Cairo correspondence as well as the more in-depth histories supplied by Özcan and Qureshi in their books. 23. IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F2–3, F6–8. 24. Clearly self-determinism had major implications for the British Empire and it is interesting the Delegation do not make that point to the Prime Minister, even though he makes it himself about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. LloydGeorge does deal with it, but in a round-about way through talking about applying the principle to “ . . . those countries which oppressed subject peoples and provoked war to destroy liberty throughout the world,” tacitly implying that they had lost some “moral authority” to rule and therefore could have the self-determinism principle applied to them. Ibid, F9–10. It is a neat argument, although one which even he might have had difficulty in convincing himself of. 25. Ibid, F2. 26. Bukhari, vol. 1, Book 59, Hadith 716. It is also found in Bukhari vol. 1, Book 59, Hadith 393 and vol. 1, Book 59, Hadith 288. 27. Muslim, vol. 6, Book 7, Hadith 4014. 28. Muslim, vol. 4, Book 21, Hadith 4366. However, as was discussed earlier in regard to the question of whether the Caliphate was intended, it is surprising that these questions of state leadership and remit, in a faith that explicitly connects the practice of faith to the state system, should leave the believer or theologian to spend considerable time trawling through many differing references in order to arrive at the answer. 29. IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F2. 30. Given the fact that the central requirement for the Caliphate in the early years was that the incumbent be of Quraishi lineage, Arab headship would not simply be an alternative, but a desired necessity. See chapter three.

Post-War Part 2

123

31. Lewis, Turkey, 331–42; P. K. Hitti, A History of the Arabs (London: Macmillan, 1979), 315–20; Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 522–30; Karsh and Karsh, Empires, 42–68, 269; Kinross, Ottoman, 233–35. 32. Evidence for Islam as a single community is not hard to find in scripture. Whether that community is to be bound in a single geopolitical entity is far less clear. The main reference for this would be Q49:10, which enjoins the community not to split, but to be a brotherhood under a single leader. However, how this is worked out in practice is less clear, for brotherhood could refer to Muslims as a community spread over a diaspora, without the need for a physical set of boundaries. See chapter three. 33. See discussion of Q4:59 in the “Theological” section. Cf. chapter three. 34. It would be interesting to see how an interpretation of the place of the Caliph would be seen today, given the fact that the vast majority of present-day Muslims have no recollection of living with the existence of a Caliph. 35. See IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F5. 36. Ibid, F8–10. 37. Ibid, F10. 38. The British had faced rebellion in Egypt, the success of Atatturk’s campaign in Turkey, and serious reversal in Mesopotamia as well as having to cave in to French demands for Syria and Lebanon. At home there had been riots and strikes while the press increasingly criticized the cost of British ventures in the Middle East. See the references at footnote 2 in this chapter. Cf. F. Halliday, International Relations in the Middle East (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 75–83; L. Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 23–28; R. Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (London, New York: Routledge, 2004 (First Printed 1994)), 5–22. 39. Indeed, early in the discussion the Prime Minister states once again that the question of the Caliph’s role is for Muslims themselves to decide without interference from the British Government. 40. IOR/L/PS/853/4, F360–61. It is clear from Lloyd-George’s probing that he was enjoying the growing ambiguity of the Delegation’s negotiating position. 41. Qureshi, Khilafat, 271. 42. See historical background at the opening to this section on the British documents. Cf. the repeated statements concerning British policy removing the Caliph’s Pan-Islamic influence, without being seen to be so doing. 43. In his brief reference to the discussion in his study of the Khilafat Movement, Qureshi suggests that there were many British experts in Islam present. Evidence for this is hard to find for there is no record of them in any of the minutes of the meeting. Indeed, had such experts been present, it is doubtful that the Prime Minister would have been allowed to make the error that he did. Qureshi, Khilafat, 278–79. 44. IOR/L/PS/18/853/4, F361. 45. It is useful to note that Professor Arnold’s comments upon this meeting, which are seen in the course of the correspondence with the India Office in 1922, are discussed in chapter three of this section. Arnold’s comments are useful and it is logical to hold discussion on the theological merits of this point until his comments are analyzed.

124

Chapter Four

46. Lloyd-George’s enquiry here cannot have been as innocent at it appears in the minutes, for he would have been made aware of the discussions that were seen in the Cairo High Commission file as to whether the Caliph should be removed to a city state like the Vatican, based instead in Damascus. 47. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F365. 48. How this would be worked out in practice was not made clear, however it seems likely that the arrangement would perhaps be similar to the one that was already functioning in Egypt where the Cadi was still appointed by the Ottomans, but the country was under European control. 49. IOR/L/PS/18/853/4, F 361. 50. Niemeijer, Khilafat, 72. However, Qureshi feels that the meeting was a complete failure and that the Delegation went away from it very frustrated and depressed. Had the Delegation been aware of the alarm felt by the government departments involved at what Lloyd-George had said or implied, they might have taken far more heart from what they had apparently achieved. Qureshi, Khilafat, 274. 51. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F119. Telegram is contained in a dispatch from the Viceroy’s Office to the India Office dated January 7th, 1923.

Chapter Five

Post-War Part 3: Government of India–India Office Correspondence 1922–1923

The chapter examines British documents from the India Office relating to what became Article 25 of the Lausanne Treaty. This presents the opportunity both to see how the British officials tried to come to terms with the whole concept of “Religious Authority,” while also being able to analyze the particular concerns of the British toward Indian Muslims. The conclusions that end the chapter bring together the material in chapters three and four to draw out points concerning the broad Whitehall, post-conflict approach to issues of Islamic governance.

HISTORICAL NOTE The scale and implications of the dismantling of the old European order and the protection of the interests of the Allies meant that the question of what to do about the position of the Ottoman Caliph was still being discussed into 1922. By this time, Kemal Atatturk was making his own sweeping changes to the whole social structure of Turkey following his successful resistance to the Allied armies seeking to remove him following his coup. Their desire to remove him must have been based both upon their perceived understanding of him as a Bolshevik and also, upon the fact that he was attempting to do the opposite to what they were attempting to do; for he was enacting legislation, that same year, that would remove the Caliph as sovereign, but maintain his spiritual role.1

125

126

Chapter Five

“THE SPIRITUAL POWERS OF THE CALIPH” The first piece of correspondence in the file demonstrates the depth of feeling in India in the early 1920s and the pressure that the government was feeling. For, it is a covering note from the India Office to the Undersecretary of State for India requesting that the Lausanne agreement be favorable for the Turks and attaching a letter from the London Muslim League making representation on behalf of the Caliph.2 The fact that this first folio is followed by a deluge of others, all of which are either urgent requests to produce a favorable settlement from within the administration, or further representations from the Muslim League, shows both the strength of feeling among Muslims, but also the intense pressure that the government felt.3 It is from that point on that officials begin to discuss the impact of the Prime Minster’s pledge to the Delegation in the light of the agitation from the Indian Muslims that they see. Initially the tone of their discussion was one of mild unconcern for there was only a passing reference to the fact that the meeting had occurred, followed by suggestion that the word “temporal” would seem to be the most suitable term for use in the article.4 Shortly after that note disquiet over the Prime Minister’s apparent promise began to grow. This is reflected in another note, quoting Arnold’s memo from 1918, already discussed, and the further correspondence that Hirtzel was having with Arnold at the time of writing.5 This memo is useful because it clearly spells out the India Office’s understanding of the issues involved in the “Caliphate Question” and Lausanne drafting issues in general and also provides detailed notes on the India Office’s response to the issue to that point.6 The central issue as far as the India Office was that the spiritual authority of the Caliphate is (as in the modern Papacy) separate from its temporal authority. . . .7

It seems clear from this quotation that the unknown official here was either not party to, or had not understood properly, what Professor Arnold had been saying in his advice to Sir Arthur Hirtzel.8 Despite its lack of informed opinion however, the note remains valuable, not just because it is a snapshot of British understanding on the position of the Caliph in a different department, but also because it raises the alarm within the department over what LloydGeorge actually promised in the course of the meeting. For while summarizing the central points of the minutes for his colleagues in the Government of India in Delhi, the official reports that the wording of the Italian treaty (made in 1912) was seen as the way forward as far as the Delegation was concerned and that the Prime Minister had, as already reported, strongly implied that nothing would interfere with Muslim governance.9 The writer therefore asks

Post-War Part 3

127

how to keep this implied promise and follows his own question with the suggestion that a separate clause should be inserted which allows the Turks and Arabs to negotiate these relationships for themselves.10 On the face of it, this seems to be an eminently sensible solution. However, in the light of British policy in the region, the idea was unworkable for it did not allow for the British to control the extent of the Caliph’s hold over Arabia, which they wanted for themselves.11 A few days after this report was written, in the Whitehall branch of the Indian administration, a detailed memo arrived from the Government of India, replying primarily to the Foreign Office draft article although expanding from there to discuss the central issues in more detail from an Indian Government perspective. This memo is fascinating because it is the first document in the file that lays out, in detail, that department’s viewpoint on this issue.12 Its central point shows a general inclination to disagree with the notion of the Caliph as a spiritual suzerain: Neither from the history of the Khalifa, nor from the utterances of present day authorities on Muhammedan law and tradition does it appear that the khalifa can be regarded as the spiritual suzerain.13

It is unfortunate that such a bold, confident statement does not come with any evidence-based argument to buttress the claim it makes; yet it points to the fact that they had a Sunni juristic notion of the Caliphate. The fact that there was ample evidence to contradict their conclusions was either not known or ignored by them. Nevertheless, it should be said that, in the light of the example of Arnold’s memo earlier, it is probable that they had no reason to disbelieve what they were being told, given the authority of those reaching a similar conclusion. The India Office correspondence continues with input now being sought from Professor Arnold once again. His comments, which both appear in this file and also as a separate set of correspondence, begins to dominate the views and discussions of the officials.14 That said, there are clearly great reservations about the possible political implications of what Arnold is suggesting, with concern being expressed by both the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary of State that the Professor’s advice might lead to Britain giving away more rights to the Caliph than they desire.15 This concern is more than a little ironic given the fact that Arnold is expressly telling them that their own current wordings would do precisely that. However, the respect with which his advice is obviously held in is clearly apparent both in the fact that it is referenced by almost every official who writes on the subject subsequent to Arnold’s remarks and also in the acceptance of the Professor’s comments on any Islamic matter as true, without reference to any other authority.16

128

Chapter Five

The Arnold-Hirtzel correspondence focused on advice on the rewording of the amended treaty of Sèvres Article 139. Arnold was not included in the discussion on the political implications of the correspondence between the Foreign Office, India Office, Colonial Office, and Government of India.17 His input was solely designed to illuminate possible areas of ambiguity and misunderstanding in the new article for the Lausanne Treaty. For this purpose, Hirtzel had sent Arnold five alternative wordings for a new clause, of which Arnold’s preferred wording was option five: Nothing in this treaty affects in any way the exercise of any purely religious functions in accordance with the tenets of the Moslem religion.18

However, while this was his preferred option, he suggests substantive changes to the wording in order to leave open the possibility of a wide range of interpretations: Nothing in this treaty shall be held to interfere with the privileges assigned to the Caliph by the consensus of the Moslem world.19

The wording in Arnold’s phrase places far more emphasis on the consensus of other Muslims in relation to the power of the Caliph.20 This has both advantages and disadvantages: the principal advantage is that the stated policy of being seen not to be interfering, and allowing Muslims to choose the nature of their leadership themselves, is fully realized. The central disadvantage from a British perspective springs from that advantage; that there would be no boundaries to the remit of the candidate, either in terms of temporal or spiritual power. From this perspective, the wording of Hirtzel’s suggestion would provide far more control over the scope of the candidate’s portfolio. Arnold spends the remainder of this comparatively short letter explaining the reasons behind his wording. His first two reasons show that he clearly knew and understood government policy in regard to the Caliphate, for he suggests that the new wording will allow the Muslims to make their own choices regarding the Caliphate and to the Caliph maintaining control of the Holy Places.21 At the same time, the Turkish Caliph is not explicitly named (as in the Hirtzel suggestions), therefore allowing for another candidate. There is no explicit agreement with the policy in Arnold’s wording, neither is there any form of criticism. The main strength of his wording, as far as Arnold is concerned, is its reliance on the Islamic legislative principal of ijmā and he cites Abdur Rahim concerning its use as the principal basis of Caliphal succession in the legal code.22 He argues that the historical deposition of four Caliphs by fatwa of the Sheikh al-Islam shows that the principle of election was still strong and

Post-War Part 3

129

that the use of ijmā enables all Muslims to place whatever powers they desire upon the office. In this, he suggests, the demands of Indian Muslims for a “spiritual” Caliphate will be satisfied. Furthermore, they would, in Arnold’s view, have to ignore the body of Islamic law to object to the wording of such a clause. Arnold’s confidence in this principle as the answer to satisfying the needs of all sides is perhaps over-optimistic; he fails to reveal the nuances, brought out by Crone and Lewis with reference to other factors such as nomination and Madelung’s qualification of election within the scope of clan ties.23 However, it does very much fit with Arnold’s own views as expressed in “The Caliphate” and Muir’s reading of the nature of succession.24 Although Arnold does not cite him, it seems very likely that his views were based upon the work of MacDonald, whose seminal book on the development of Muslim legal and theological theory had been available for many years before World War I.25 In it MacDonald boldly states that The community of Islam may have disputed over the individual to be appointed, but they never doubted that the maintenance of the faith in its purity required a leader, and that it was, therefore, incumbent on men to appoint one. The basis is Ijma, not Scripture or tradition from Muhammad or analogy based on these two.26

He goes on to propose that the doctrine of ijmā was ultimately enshrined in law under al-Shafi’i as a solution to the notion that many Muslim practices that had grown up in the years since Muhammad’s death had wandered from the original. Thus, al-Shafi’i’s remedy used the principal of consensus to formalize the concept that whatever the Muslim people as the community of God decided to do at that moment was of God. However, this principle was qualified in later years by Joseph Schacht’s work on Islamic Law which sought to draw a line between the notion of “consensus of the scholars,” and general agreement of the whole Muslim community.27 The consensus of the scholars, Schacht believes, was very much limited both geographically, in terms of the scope of their ruling, and legally, in terms of the fine points of law that were being examined. As the name suggests, the “general agreement of the whole Muslim community” was not geographically limited, but tended to be at a very vague and generalized level. If Arnold was aware of the distinction, it seems likely that it was the latter principle to which he was referring. The real weakness of ijma is that it could undermine any other theological doctrine and legal principle ever adopted. In its purest form, it could be a recipe for chaos; on the other hand, it allowed for adaptability in the face of changing circumstances. At the base level, it seems that, however faithfully the principle was applied, its application to such a sensitive issue, while allowing the British to place the burden of decision purely in Muslim hands,

130

Chapter Five

seemed to be a rather unstable basis for the formation of a new Caliphate. Far more effective tools, such as the requirement for Quraishi lineage in conjunction with the principle of nomination and election, were available and it is therefore slightly mystifying that Arnold did not suggest a more specific wording that still allowed for interpretation, but on much firmer legal and doctrinal precedent.28 Arnold concludes the note with the opinion that the first option suggested by the Foreign Office might be a way of safeguarding Arab independence, and argues for its insertion along with the lines he had earlier proposed. He also suggests that the wording of the first option be amended to read “Turkish Government” rather than Turkey, whom, Arnold believes, would be seen as talking about the Caliph by other Muslims: Turkey hereby renounces in favor of the independent Arab rulers concerned all rights and titles which she could claim on any ground.29

This final change also had the added benefit of removing the Government of India’s proposed use of the word “temporal” from the clause. Here Arnold emphasizes that the use of such an explicitly limiting phrase, although desired by all the correspondents, would only serve to enflame opinion on the subcontinent. However, a fascinating telegram from the Viceroy’s Office to the Secretary of State for India states that the Jamiat ul-Ulema in Delhi reported that it could not accurately give a response on the separation of temporal and spiritual powers of the Caliphate. In fact, it seems that many Indian Muslims actually welcomed the removal of powers as it would strengthen their hand. Many other prominent Indians expressed similar ideas and were keen that the Turkish National Assembly should pick a new Caliph for the Muslim world.30 Perhaps, in this case, Professor Arnold was more sensitive to Muslim sensibilities than the Muslims themselves were. Arnold seems to be suggesting that the Muslims (presumably high ranking ones) in India generally welcomed the idea of the Caliphate being limited to a monarchy as it permitted them more freedom to go their own way theologically. Certainly, they did not appear interested in a Pan-Islamic Caliphate, if this report is to be believed, but it goes against strong evidence (such as the gift of monies for the Hijaz Railway and the raising of funds for a navy to defend the Holy Places cited earlier) to the contrary. Although, the essential loyalty of the Indian troops fighting in Mesopotamia against the Caliph’s interests would perhaps serve as confirmation of the British perspective. What is undoubtedly true is that Indian Muslims were strongly against an Arab Caliphate.31 The second note from Professor Arnold to the Government of India and the Foreign Office on the proposed wording of the treaty follows two fresh

Post-War Part 3

131

options for the clause advanced by a Mr. Wakely, which takes into account Arnold’s first letter.32 Arnold raises no objections to the first option, which incorporates his wording and, he feels, meets the concerns of the Government of India: Nothing in the treaty purports to affect, or shall be held to affect, any spiritual privileges assigned to the Caliph by the tenets of the Moslem religion.33

His chief concern is refuting the wording of the second option. To this end, much of the remainder of his lengthy letter is spent on this and it is worthwhile spending some time on its detail as it provides an excellent evaluation of the theological implications of what the British officials were proposing. As the discourse relates to one particular phrase, it is reproduced here for ease of reference: . . . any authority in the sphere of religion assigned to the Caliph by the tenets of the Moslem faith.34

Arnold eloquently points out the inherent dangers of this phrase which focuses on the fundamental concept of the inseparability of the “Church” and “State”: the office of Caliph covers both. Obedience to him [the Caliph] as the head of the State is a civic duty and at the same time a religious duty, and when he declares Jihad, every adult male Moslem is bound by Moslem law to obey the summons, not merely as a believer, but also as a member of the Moslem qaum, ummat (nation, state, community), which is organized on the basis of a common faith.35

Given the lengthy discussions upon the issue that we observed taking place in the Cairo Embassy file already, the fact that this basic point seems to have been missed by the peace brokers would appear to suggest a lack of coordination between the various elements of government involved in drawing up the treaty and those who had previously been involved in the issue during the wartime.36 Leaving these concerns to one side however, one of the fascinating aspects of Arnold’s analysis of the position of the Caliph within the Muslim community is his reading of the nature of the Caliphate which is based upon the early model. His perception of what the Caliphate was in this historical period was based upon its founding principles and early exemplars, rather than the longterm view of how the office eventually developed, a fact that he acknowledges in the sentence that follows the quotation, but which he dismisses as irrelevant given that he is discussing theory, rather than practice.37 However, as was seen in the previous section, the position of the Caliph in regard to the obedience of the ummah is not as clear as he implies.38

132

Chapter Five

Ultimately, this correspondence reveals Arnold as a pragmatist, for, in outlining the theoretical position, he also dismisses the demands for Pan-Islamic authority for the Ottoman Caliph by Indian Muslims as unrealistic in the current geopolitical position. He then moves on to cite historical situations in which the power of the Caliphs has varied enormously, but, he argues, the theoretical position never changed.39 Thus, as Arnold correctly points out, the central issue was whether the ummah could change and reinterpret its doctrines in the light of the circumstances they were currently in, or would they instead cling to theories that they themselves had thrown out in practice centuries before.40 In the final few lines of his letter, Arnold asserts that the only time a Caliph could use his Pan-Islamic authority was when he was declaring a general jihād against unbelievers. This point the British knew only too well following the Ottoman Caliph’s declaration of war in 1914. For authority, Arnold here quotes Charles Hamilton’s eighteenth-century translation of the Hedaya.41 He also stresses the importance of language being interpreted differently according to cultural background; his point is focused on the minutes of the meeting that was analyzed earlier, between the Prime Minister and Hasan Imam at the House of Commons, in which the issue of “spiritual authority” was discussed. Arnold was keen that the Prime Minister should have probed Hasan Imam further on what he understood the remit of the Caliph should be and is concerned that what the Prime Minister said to Hasan Imam would have had a very different meaning for the listener than for the speaker. He enlarges upon this point in the course of further explaining the reasons for his choice of wording: . . . the pledge of the Prime Minister that there is no intention to interfere with the “spiritual power” of the Caliph [was used] in the only sense in which a European statesman can use this phrase; for by Christians “spiritual power” can only be taken to compromise such influence as can be exercised independently of any temporal power; in Christendom “spiritual power” or “spiritual authority” cannot be understood as synonymous with “temporal authority.” That Moslems give to this phrase an entirely different interpretation. . . . does not alter the intention and purpose of the Prime Minister’s pledge. But the language of the proposed formula avoids the use of a phrase that is capable of contrary interpretations . . . [that] might lead to demands . . . which the British Government would be unable to satisfy, and which could not have been in the mind of the Prime Minister when he used these phrases.42

Arnold’s second point concerning the alternative clause is the belief that the phrase “authority in the sphere of religion” has a second interpretation which would impact upon the independence of sovereign Muslim states. In

Post-War Part 3

133

many ways, it is the same objection as his first point, but, whereas the first dealt with the British concerns over Pan-Islamic implications, the second deals with other Muslim rulers’ worries about the phrase inhibiting their independence. Arnold is convinced that the phrase has been inserted at the request of the Khilafat Delegation and is designed to force the Sharif of Mecca into a subordinate position to the Ottoman Caliph through having to gain his appointment at the Caliph’s hand: . . . the Telegram of the Government of India . . . clearly contemplates the re-establishment of the “formal confirmation by the Sultan Caliph, by virtue of his spiritual authority, of Arab rulers on their succession as hereditary guardians and managers of holy places.” . . . The Turkish Sultans, since they assumed the Caliphate, have not always found it an easy matter to insist on the acceptance of their nominee as Amir of Mecca, and only the presence of Turkish troops in Mecca has made it possible. But surely it is not contemplated so to interfere with the sovereign rights of the king of the Hejaz as to compel him to admit Turkish troops into his capital.43

It is interesting to note that Arnold uses the word “re-establishment” when discussing the mechanism for formal legitimization of a Muslim sovereign, for the brief analysis of the Delhi Sultanate and Southeast Asian rulers in chapter one show that, even at the depth of the Caliph’s powerlessness, the independent Muslim rulers still frequently sought formal recognition of their right to rule. However, allowing a legal clause which permitted such authority to be taken if desired would certainly have alarmed Muslim rulers who were used to their independence and, indeed, saw the Caliphate as largely irrelevant to them.44 Thus, the choice of phrasing contemplated by the British officials displays their poor understanding of the issues involved, for, not only would their wording have not achieved the limitation of Pan-Islamic authority they were attempting to create; it would have had the effect of extending the Caliph’s power with legal backing. At the very least, Arnold’s comments and criticisms reveal the danger inherent in the lack of appreciation of alternative cultural interpretations of words and phrases that are perhaps familiar and well defined in all cultures, but have widely varying meanings. In the context of the discussion here, the words “sovereign authority” form one such phrase; in the context of Christian and Muslim countries, the interpretation of these words depends very much upon theopolitical tradition from which it has come. The British failure to grasp the nature of the differences in political culture permitted them to propose a phrase that would have effectively done the opposite to what they were trying to achieve. The same theme is also brought out in the second half of this note and in his final note.45 Much of the second half of his second note is a defense of

134

Chapter Five

his proposed choice of wording, but it also provides comment upon another proposal which displayed the lack of understanding of British officials on the Muslim perspectives; for one of the draft clauses of the treaty called for all Muslim rulers to name the Caliph at the opening of Friday prayers.46 Arnold echoes Shafi’s point that the reading of the khutba in the name of a Muslim ruler does indeed constitute a public recognition that the named sovereign holds the office of Caliph. This is true in one sense; however, as was seen in chapter one, the public recognition, to which both Shafi and Arnold are referring could be either the early use of acclamation in the Mosque to seal the election of the new Caliph in the rashidūn period (although even this varied), or the later recitation of the Caliph and the sovereign in the course of Friday prayers. Later in that same paragraph he notes that the formula used in Friday prayers may include both the Caliph and the Sovereign and includes the interesting point that the Sharif of Mecca, even when he was at war with Turkey, still named the Caliph first in his public prayers, thereby implying that religious acknowledgement of leadership does not have to translate to political headship. However, such a stance, as has been seen already, would be dangerous to say the least, for, if a Caliph were permitted the khutba in a state not directly under his control, the nature of the religio-political Islamic faith would mean that it could be used to exert political influence. On the strength of Arnold’s argument, the Foreign Secretary’s Office clearly become so concerned about the possible pitfalls of the whole issue, that they make the suggestion that the clause and any reference to it should be completely dropped from the Lausanne Treaty.47 This sentiment is echoed by the Viceroy’s Office who also comment upon Professor Arnold’s advice, the wording of which clearly demonstrates the extent to which Arnold’s point about the different interpretation of language in different cultures had been noted by the officials.48 It is at this moment that Winston Churchill as Secretary of State for the newly created Colonial Office weighs in with the view that the word “spiritual” ought to be removed from the clause completely and substituting it with the phrase “no political, legislative or administrative rights.” The spiritual rights, Churchill suggests, would remain by implication.49 Here the disadvantage of having so many government departments with their own agendas involved in such a complex question becomes more apparent, for Churchill’s suggestion goes back over ground that has been covered and dismissed in the previous months. Unfortunately, rather than expressing this, the India Office begins another round of correspondence discussing Churchill’s suggestion, and attempting to tortuously remove the Caliph’s power in law, without doing so explicitly.50 At the same time, the India Office is clearly aware that what

Post-War Part 3

135

Atatturk, now firmly in control of Turkey, was doing in his National Assembly would possibly remove all the need for further discussion anyway. As the discussions in Lausanne moved toward the final phases in 1923, British officials continued to play with various wordings of the former clause 139. The consensus of the correspondence moves toward the removal of the phrase “spiritual authority” completely.51 Instead, a more convoluted and perhaps even more ambiguous proposed wording appears in a copy of the initial draft of the treaty, translated from the French original and passed to the Foreign Office by Lord Curzon in Lausanne: No power of jurisdiction in political legislation or administrative matters will be exercised by the government or authorities of Turkey for whatever motive and especially for reason of belief . . . It is understood the present treaty does not prejudice spiritual prerogatives of religious authorities of different beliefs.52

Such an ambiguous and unwieldy statement, while clearly attempting to cut down the possibility of undesirable interpretations, in fact does little to facilitate this: for by the time this wording had been worked out, the Turkish government had effectively removed the Sultanate from the Caliphate53 and therefore, the Caliph could legitimately claim that he had no part in the government or authorities of Turkey, in which case, the clause did not apply to him. Unsurprisingly, the draft was met with universal disapproval from both other government departments and Professor Arnold, who was in Venice at the time.54 Interestingly, the Turkish representatives at Lausanne were generally happy to pass the draft more or less in the form that was given above. However they did want to add the phrase “exercise outside of Turkey for . . .” after “religious,” which was rejected by the British on the grounds that it might have been used to nominate Cadis and curtail the rights of Christians. In the end, the final wording of the Treaty (Article 25) was resolved as: Il demeure qu’il n’est pas porté atteinte aux attribuâtes spirituelles des autorités religieuses musalmanes.55

According to the British documents, this version was accepted by all the Allies and by the Turks.56 On one level the fact that the Turks agreed to this is not surprising given the fact that, despite the expert advice and painstaking discussion over nearly two years, the door to Pan-Islamic authority had been left wide open. However, it is more surprising given the fact that the new Turkish government were themselves attempting to deny the Caliph any kind of power or influence. They therefore had no interest in leaving the Caliph the sort of influence that was allowable under that wording.

136

Chapter Five

Summary Having criticized his comments in the 1918 correspondence examined initially, it is only fair that, while it could be said that some of the same issues of “Western perspective” could be seen in the 1922 correspondence, the advice that Professor Arnold renders as to the specific wordings here is far more helpful. His main concern—how the language is used by various British officials, the Prime Minister, and the draft Treaty—is both valid and valuable and, although one might argue that the entire correspondence was rendered irrelevant by events in Turkey itself, Arnold’s letters remain a useful source for understanding Western scholarly interpretations of Islamic culture and institutions of the time. At the same time, it reinforces the point already made in connection to the meetings between the Prime Minister and the Khilafat Delegation; the need for accuracy in cross-cultural language.

CONCLUSIONS Of all the correspondence from within the British government in relation to the Caliphate Question, it is this correspondence upon the wording of Article 25 that is the most directly theological in focus. For it is in their attempts to create a form of words that will enable them to achieve their foreign policy goals in the Middle East that the full realization of the complexity of the issue they are dealing with is finally apparent to them. The overarching theme that comes out of the material is the deep-seated attachment to a Eurocentric perspective that could not seem to overcome the natural tendency to separate the secular and religious. Had the officials been able to see Islam as dīn, rather than “religion,” their approach to the issue may well have had a far greater chance of producing a satisfactory policy although it is hard to see how they could have retained the title “Caliph” at all, without leaving the door to Pan-Islamic authority open. For, even though it is clear that some officials were starting to get an inkling of the problems inherent in the nature of the title itself, the final wording still gave the Caliph, in law, exactly the kind of authority that they wanted to remove from him. Essentially, the problem was in the inherent nature of the title itself. They could not seem to see that the only way of ending the Ottoman Caliph’s PanIslamic authority was to remove the title “Caliph” and make him “Sultan,” as he already was. Clearly this was not an option given the strength of feeling in India and so, even though they were deeply antagonistic toward Kemal Atatturk, the British government should rather have been very pleased with him for doing the work of dismantling the Caliphate that they were not able to do.

Post-War Part 3

137

Thus, the correspondence in this chapter is a stark reminder of one of the running themes over the course of the whole of the British files: the need to be fully aware of the nature of the issue, particularly relating to terminology, that is being engaged with.

} The chapter that follows gives a brief account of developments that took place on the issue of the Caliphate in the years that followed the signing of the Lausanne treaty in order to create an historical lens through which the lessons that come out of the correspondence on the “Caliphate Question” can be viewed in the twenty-first century.

NOTES 1. See Enyat, Political Thought, 57–59; Fromkin, Peace, 238–41; Lewis, Turkey, 142–48; Finkel, Osman, 311–12. 2. Dated January 6th, 1922, IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F433–39. 3. The next sixty folios are all in the same vein as the first and demonstrate a rising concern within government machinery. 4. Ibid, F352. 5. Hirtzel’s correspondence with Arnold is dealt with separately in the third part of this section on the Lausanne Correspondence. 6. Note from an unnamed India Office official dated April 7th, 1922, IOR/L/ PS/853/4, F353–55. 7. Ibid, F353. 8. See also previous discussions on the differences between the Papacy and the Caliphate in Appendix E. 9. IOR/L/PS/18/853/4, F354. 10. Ibid, F355. 11. See Fromkin, Peace, 110, 138–42. 12. Ibid, F340–48. It is dated April 13th, 1922 and titled: “States of Arabia, comments on the F. O.’s suggested amendments.” 13. Ibid, F340. 14. IOR/L/PS/18/853/4 F202–5 and IOR/L/PS/18/B373. 15. Ibid, F213–18. 16. There are numerous examples of this dynamic throughout the file, but F190 and F188 are among the clearest. 17. This can be deduced by the lack of reference to any other inter-departmental correspondence within Arnold’s notes. 18. Note from Arnold to Hirtzel dated May 1st, 1922, IOR/L/PS/18/B373 F1. 19. Ibid.

138

Chapter Five

20. Although he does not mention it, Arnold’s emphasis upon ijma as an instrument of implementing policy in the Muslim world was entirely in line with the doctrine of Shaafi’ite Law developed under the auspices of the Hadiths “whatever the Islamic community has agreed at any time and place, under their circumstances, must be of God,” which in turn applied “My people will never disagree in error.” 21. IOR/L/PS/18/B373, F2–3. 22. Ibid, F1. Arnold is keen that the word “privileges” rather than “powers” be used, presumably with the underlying concern that the insertion of the latter could be eventually translated into legislative authority. This feeds into the discussion in the previous section upon the exact remit of the Caliph’s role. 23. Crone, Political Thought, 332–38; Lewis, Political Language, 63–65; Madelung, Succession, 122–24. 24. Arnold, Caliphate, Muir, Caliphate. 25. MacDonald, Muslim Theology, 50–64. 26. Ibid, 58. However, he forgets that he had just mentioned that the Kharajites saw no need for the Caliphate. 27. J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 30–31. 28. This was fulfilled in Hussein, who appeared to be the most suitable candidate from the British perspective anyway. 29. IOR/L/PS/18/B373, F1. 30. Telegram dated 16/11/1922. IOR/L/PS/10/895, F315–25. 31. See the copy of an article from the Bombay Chronicle dated April 25th, 1921 which contains an interview with King Hussein and his son, Faisal, in which they bitterly complain at Indian Muslim opposition to King Hussein’s candidature for the Caliphate. IOR/L/PS/10/895, F416. 32. Note, dated July 1st, 1922. IOR/L/PS/18/B373, F1–4. 33. Ibid, F1. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid, F1–2. 36. This lack of co-ordination is highlighted by the fact that the Cairo Embassy file contains a note from Major Garland (Head of the Arab Bureau) dated September 3rd, 1919 stating that the main desire of His Majesty’s Government is to prevent Turkey regaining influence over Arab states and preventing the re-creating of an Imperial Muslim Empire. Therefore, any spiritual wording in the treaties needs to be avoided. FO 141/587/2, F215. 37. IOR/L/PS/18/B373, F2. 38. See particularly Schacht’s and Lewis’ discussions on Caliphal remit and the duty of the Muslim community to him. Schacht, Islamic Law, 76–85; Lewis, Political Language, 91–116. 39. His quotation from the fifteenth century legalist Khatil b. Shahin who proclaims the unimpeachable power and command of the Caliph who was, at the time, a virtual prisoner of the Mameluks in Cairo makes his point particularly well. IOR/ L/PS/18/B373, F2.

Post-War Part 3

139

40. This struggle between those who seek to re-interpret Muslim political theory upon the early models of the Imperial Caliphate and those who wish to adapt to circumstances was examined in Oliver-Dee, Citizenship and the Ummah, 49. 41. IOR/L/PS/18/B373, F2. Charles Hamilton had produced a translation of alHiddaya al-marghinani, the Hanafi Law text, in two volumes in 1791, dedicating it to Warren Hastings, the Governor General of Bengal. This interpretation is confirmed by MacDonald, Jurisprudence, 246. 42. IOR/L/PS/18/2, F3. He also acknowledges that the Government of India had seen the potential danger from this point of view in their telegram of April 22nd, 1922. 43. Ibid, F2. 44. See report on attitudes to the Caliphate at FO 141/587/2, F221–22. 45. IOR/l/PS/18/B373, F2–4. Final note dated August 23rd, 1922, F4. 46. IOR/L/PS/10/853, F190–95, already discussed under 2. 2 on the India Office correspondence. 47. Ibid, F118–19, Internal Foreign Office Memo dated July 7th, 1922. 48. Ibid, F180, Viceroy to India Office dated July 25th, 1922. 49. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F149. Churchill’s idea is set down secondhand, by the Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office to the India Office dated October 20th, 1922. 50. Ibid, F140–20. Correspondence comes in from a wide range of departments, little of which makes any constructive point based upon cultural, religious, or linguistic terminology. 51. Ibid, F110–18, various letters and memos from the principal departments dated between January 5th and January 8th, 1923. 52. Ibid, F123, Lord Curzon to India Office dated January 12th, 1923. 53. These reforms are covered in Sylvia Haim’s chapter at the end of Arnold, Caliphate, 205–44, as well as by Enyat, Political Thought, 50–54; Black, Political Thought, 312–14; Watt, Political Thought, 108–9; Tyan, Institutions, vol. 1, 285– 99. 54. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F13–89. The bulk of the correspondence argue against the phrase “especially for reasons of belief” which looks generally anti-religious. Professor Arnold is of the opinion that, given the Treaty is in French, the word “religious” might be better. 55. This phrase, translated using Atkins, Duval, and Milne, Dictionary, is rendered “It remains understood that this does not affect the spiritual attributes of Muslim religious authorities.” 56. IOR/L/PS/10/853/4, F2, Rumbold (Lausanne Delegation) to the Foreign Office dated May 26th, 1923.

Chapter Six

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

The past four chapters have been focused upon the British High Commission Cairo, Foreign Office, Colonial office, India Office and Cabinet Office files in the period 1914–1923 in order to analyze British governmental perceptions on and to critique the approach to policy-making to the issue of the “Caliphate Question.” In the course of the analysis it has become clear that there are many lessons that can be drawn out, both positive and negative, from the way our forebears attempted to grapple with this most delicate of issues. These will be discussed in the final chapter, but before doing that, it is useful to see whether the files contain any discussion of the issue in the intervening time between then and now in order to see if the approach to questions of this nature has changed. Material is sparse indeed, however, two incidents do present an opportunity to study British engagement in this field in a later period. The first was the attempt by the Egyptian monarchy to claim the title in the late 1930s following the death of the exiled Caliph. The second is the early “Cold War” period, when the Pakistanis, with British encouragement, attempted to create an “Islamic Bloc.” As shall be seen, both incidents reveal that officials had indeed learned some lessons from the 1920s, but still had some of the same concerns as well. It also throws up some rather concerning new features.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF [THE INTERVENING] TIME A brief history of the period that is now to be discussed is included as a means of providing a clear picture of the changing international and national circumstances Britain has found herself in. This history is deliberately expressed on 141

142

Chapter Six

two levels: firstly global, partly because of the nature of the events being outlined, but also in order to give a full understanding of the place of the British Caliphate policy in relation to a changing global situation. The second level is Islamic, insofar as the primary events and issues that affected Muslims in this period are outlined against the backdrop of the global events unfolding around and, sometimes, through them. The Global Arena The era of World War I and the Peace Treaties had seen the beginnings of a new world order taking place: the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, after a very shaky start, had cemented its power over Russia by defeating the “White Armies” sent to crush it, and had begun to look to extend its influence overseas.1 This action helped produce an equal and opposite reaction: the rise of fascism, first in Italy, then throughout much of Western Europe.2 In the East, Japan’s program of economic and military modernization under its ancient imperial political system culminated in the attempt to create its own empire at the expense of a backward China and other Far Eastern neighbors.3 Its pursuit of imperial gain contrasted with the relative decline in the fortunes of the European empires which, by this time, were facing increasingly strident calls from their colonies for either dominion status or complete independence.4 At the same time, however, this period saw the first experiment with global security in the shape of the League of Nations.5 That this initial experience ultimately failed under crushing pressure from aggressive regimes cannot take away from the importance of the fact that the major powers, notably the rapidly rising American superpower, saw collective accountability and global democracy as the key to lasting peace and security.6 In the pre–Second World War period, the other event of major world significance, and, in many ways, the catalyst for the circumstances that created the war, was the Wall Street Crash of 1929.7 The economic privations in Germany particularly pushed a large enough percentage of the voting public to turn to extremism for answers propelling the Nazis into power. At the same time the rush to stabilize internal economic problems that resulted from the Crash meant that the superpowers of the time who otherwise might have been able to nip fascist aggression in the bud were more concerned about getting their own economic house in order than they were keeping an eye on international developments.8 Although it should also be noted that even had there not been such an economic catastrophe, the sympathy for the harshness of the treatment of the Germans at the Treaty of Versailles, and a sneaking regard for Nazi policies in Britain, particularly appears to suggest that the Crash cannot be blamed entirely for the failure to blunt fascist aggression.9

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

143

If World War I had destroyed the old world order, then the Second helped remodel it into the shape it took for the vast majority of the remaining century, for, by the time the war, and the economic impact of it, was ended, the old European Empires were either gone or nearly gone and the geopolitical global map had split into the American, Non-Aligned, and Communist Blocs.10 Within these three umbrella groups, localized international economic and security collectives developed: NATO, SENCO. For the next forty years, the Cold War was fought by diplomacy and bullet all over the world, with its all-consuming ideology incorporating or suppressing the developing ethnic and religious tensions that bubbled throughout the period. These tensions boiled over with the collapse of the Soviet regime in the early 1990s. At the same time, the end of World War II also brought in the second, enduring attempt at global security and democratic process through collective accountability: the United Nations. For, whatever one might argue in terms of 11 its perceived benefits and shortcomings, the very fact of its existence was a testament to the impact of President Wilson’s ideological desire for a global forum for the discussion of problems, rather than the use of weapons to settle the disputes. It has been the very existence of the United Nations, along with rapid advances in communications over the last forty years, that has ushered in the concept of “globalized humanity.” The impact of this way of thinking has reached into many disparate societies, but it has had a particular impact in the Muslim world. Islam and the Muslim World As was seen in the previous chapter, the period between the end of World War I and the abolition of the Caliphate had seen enormous internal debate, particularly on the Subcontinent, around the issue of the place of Islam within political life.12 However, with the end of the Caliphate and the creation of the mandated territories, the discussions and dialogues among Muslim intellectuals moved into new areas. Of all the developments and events in the Muslim world in the interwar years, three movements are noteworthy for their longterm impact: the inauguration of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, the growing calls for a Muslim homeland on the Indian Subcontinent from 1930 onwards, and Pan-Islamic agitation by the Mufti of Jerusalem.13 With the War over, Muslim attention was focused upon the creation of Pakistan and its conflict with India over Kashmir, and the creation of the state of Israel.14 With these two virtually concurrent historical issues, Muslim self-examination and doctrinal debate took on a new dimension; for no longer was the accent solely upon a critical reevaluation of previous interpretation in the light of a changed world order. It was now a physical struggle based around specific grievances: grievances that could be turned into political

144

Chapter Six

capital through providing a leitmotif for the scriptural reinterpretation that was beginning to gain wider credence.15 At the same time, the size of the oil reserves in the area meant that, in the context of the Cold War, the Middle East remained a primary focus of economic, diplomatic, and surreptitious military activity for both blocs. This was very much a two-edged sword, for, on the one hand, the financial resources for the previously impoverished region became incalculable almost overnight. On the other hand, however, the region therefore remained strategically vital to both superpowers who consistently interfered and propped up otherwise unacceptable regimes. Thus, while this meddling produced a stability of sorts, it also provided another cause célèbre for Islamists who wished to see regime change on the basis of Islamic impurity. Britain in the Geopolitical World The twentieth century saw Britain shed her Empire and, instead, seek economic stability and political influence through membership of the new international bodies.16 That having been said, after the economic low of the late 1960s and 70s, the latter part of the twentieth century and the early part of the twenty-first century have seen a revival in her economic fortunes as the country has changed from a manufacturing based economy to a center for design technology, with strong input from the wealth created in the London Stock Exchange.17 In the area of foreign policy, her close alliance with the United States and her slow absorption into the European Union has given her influence rather than real power. In particular relation to the Middle East, however, this influence would seem to be very limited indeed although the “War on Terror” since 2001 has helped to raise her profile in the region once more.18 Summary The twentieth century has therefore seen an enormous shift in world order, with the end of individual European actors playing the Great Power politics of the nineteenth century, the rise of the United States, and the realization of new transnational alliance networks. Within this, British foreign policy has undergone a significant change in how it has attempted to engage with the rest of the world. As for the Muslim Diaspora, waves of immigration to the West, along with unrest within a significant number of the Islamic states themselves, have helped to create consensus issues around which the ideology of Islamic revival and salafı-s has been able to garner support among some sections of the Muslim population.

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

145

FOREIGN OFFICE MATERIAL ON THE CALIPHATE POST PEACE TREATIES – THE COLD WAR A Word about the Sources The introduction to this book highlighted the fact that the sources available for the later years, particularly post–World War II, become very meager indeed due to the Caliphate’s long-term abolition. However, enough material exists to be able to make some useful observations concerning British policy with regard to Muslim aspirations to reestablish the Caliphate. The main portion of material comes from the years leading up to World War II when the death of the exiled Ottoman Sultan in 1937 triggered discussions concerning a possible successor. This incident and the British attempts to engage with it are interesting to draw out as it provides an opportunity to see if the new generation of Cairo diplomats had learned from the approach of their predecessors. It also provides an opportunity to assess whether the British government’s perception of the Caliphate as an issue had changed over the intervening fifteen years. The materials drawn from the post–World War II period center on documents which primarily contain only hints at British views on the Caliphate. Even so, the brief scraps of opinion and perspective still throw light on a period when the Islamist cause, in common with so many others, played second fiddle to the ideological battle between capitalism and Communism. In particular, they provide anecdotes upon British government priorities when balancing the needs of policy objectives, Muslim issues, and minority interests. The Late 1930s The main British files on the question of the Caliphate center around the “371” series in the Foreign Office, because this denoted the Cairo Embassy.19 The correspondence is begun by a dispatch from Sir Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador in Egypt, entitled “Aspiration of King Faruq of Egypt to claim the title ‘Caliph.’” The dispatch reports senior Egyptian officials tentatively probing those around them, apparently at the behest of the King himself, upon the question of whether King Faruq might be able to claim the universal Caliphate without opposition. Lampson was writing to ask advice as to what response to give if any.20 The very fact of Lampson’s early reporting of this to London would suggest that, in the first instance, there was an encouraging degree of cooperation among officials on this issue in this period that was lacking in the period of the “Caliphate Question.”

146

Chapter Six

It is not easy to find a foundation upon which the King might pursue such a claim, other than the fact of his nomination by the dying ex-Caliph. According to the dispatch, there is some suggestion that he had been nominated by virtue of “the Right of the Sword.”21 If this was true, then it is fascinating to see that, even in a situation where the Caliph or the Caliphate no longer had any official recognition, the ancient rituals of succession still appear to have been observed. Not only that but the Egyptian King obviously felt the exCaliph’s nomination to be sufficient grounds to actively pursue a claim, more than ten years after the post had been abolished. Perhaps this itself provides an insight into the esteem still attached to the office within the Sunni Muslim world. However, this assessment should be balanced by the observation that reports of the time suggest that there was a certain satisfaction at the abolition of the Caliphate among Arab circles, and that the Indians quickly lost interest in the issue, refusing to even send a delegation to Caliphate Conference in Cairo, three years after the abolition.22 In his chapter which deals specifically with the Egyptian claims to the Caliphate from the opening of the Middle Eastern front in World War I to the beginning of the Republic, Elie Kedourie provides extensive evidence of a long-held aspiration to the Caliphate dating back to Faruq’s father Fa’ud Sultan (1917–1922), then King (1922–1936) of Egypt.23 This historical perspective is useful insofar as it illuminates the reasons for King Faruq’s energetic pursuit of the Caliphate, placing them not simply in the context of a desire to claim what he had been bequeathed, but rather, in the context of a long-held family desire.24 The fact that his close associate was el-Maraghi, the rector of the al-Azhar University, who had already been involved in the “Caliphate Question” from his days as the Qadi of the Sudan, only served to fuel the drive toward the title.25 As the British had been having dealings with Faruq’s father and el-Maraghi over the course of twenty years upon this subject, they would have known how seriously the matter would be pursued by the King and his advisors. It is therefore not surprising that, from the gist of the correspondence that followed, it seems that the British were keen to avoid being officially drawn into the issue because of their concerns about Indian Muslims.26 At the same time however, they were well aware that Nazi agents were attempting to rouse Muslim feeling against the British and French in North Africa in an attempt to destabilize their influence in the region.27 Therefore the suggestion that some kind of discussion about Arab unity might be quite useful to British interests in the region was initially advanced but quickly rejected.28 As a result of this internal discussion, the British diplomats advised the Egyptian Palace against making such a claim on the grounds that it would stir up trouble with other Muslim rulers (especially as they saw him as a British pawn) in the area and that there was no legitimate reason for the

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

147

King to claim it.29 In addition, Ambassador Kelly particularly expressed further concern about the reaction of both the Turkish government and Ibn Saud family, the latter of whom would have strongly countered the idea, given their earlier involvement with the question.30 Further, the Foreign Office had suggested that an approach be made to other Muslim leaders pointing out that this was what King Faruq was planning and that he had no backing at all from His Majesty’s Government in this.31 This last piece of information demonstrates that the British government was still very concerned about the possible effects of Muslim feeling. This concern was not simply part of longterm Imperial policy however, it was also contextual insofar as the Nazis could have used growing anti-British feeling through much of the 1930s, and, as the prospect of war grew ever closer, Britain was once more needing to secure the loyalty of her Muslim subjects against this new threat.32 Not only that, but, by the late thirties, anti-Imperial agitation had begun in earnest in India, and so Britain could no longer guarantee support from a large portion of her Imperial subjects. However, what is particularly fascinating is the confident assertion in the course of the correspondence that Viscount Halifax is correct in his earlier dispatch to say that no Muslim leader today has the orthodox qualifications to be the Caliph, but that apparently Sheikh al-Maraghi has in mind the kind of regional Caliphates created after the fall of Baghdad.33

Chapter one demonstrated that the “post-Baghdad Caliphates” which Lord Halifax describes were not as “regional” as he suggests. Further, given al-Maraghi’s previous energetic pursuit of a universal Caliphate based in Egypt, his claim that he was now simply pursuing a regional Caliphate appears misleading at best. If true, then the only possible explanation would be a calculated attempt to achieve some more realistic target and use that as the basis for a move toward the final goal of universalism.34 The British would clearly have been more sympathetic to this more modest goal for it was far more in line with the original intent of the British for the “Caliphate Question.” However, it seems that, as the post had been abolished for fifteen years by this time, the British had come to the conclusion that the issue was one that they should avoid any further engagement with.35 As was suggested earlier in the chapter, there would certainly have been advantage to British interests in pursuing the creation of a new Caliphate under British control, particularly as a counterpoise to growing Nazi activity. However, it seems that their concerns over Muslim reaction in India and elsewhere outweighed their desire for a “controllable Caliph.”36

148

Chapter Six

The British government was therefore keen to prevent King Faruq from continuing this policy, without appearing to be interfering in internal Muslim affairs. Given the delicacy of the situation, it seems that the Foreign Office attempted to dissuade King Faruq by planting an article in the magazine “Great Britain and the East” entitled “Islam does not need another Caliph.”37 The article argued that Islam was in a very strong state and that having a Caliph would add nothing to the status which, according to the author, it enjoyed at that time. Unfortunately, this ploy does not seem to have worked, either because the paper was not read by Egyptian officials, or because they chose to ignore its line of argument. For, only a few weeks after the article was published, Ali Maher Pasha (Senior Minister in King Faruq’s Palace) wanted to know what the British position was on their aim of a universal Caliphate.38 Sir Miles Lampson further reported that his response was that he thought it unwise to raise the question, although he does not express his reasons for that advice.39 Whether the palace officials realized the Foreign Office’s complicity in the article by Kenneth Williams or not, they attempted to counter it with an article, based around an interview with Prince Muhammad Ali, appearing in the paper Egyptian Gazette.40 In the course of the interview, the prince was asked whether the revival of the Caliphate was possible, to which he replied that no Muslim nation at that time had the power to claim the title to protect all Muslims, but that Egypt, with the Al-Azhar school training Muslims throughout the Muslim world, would have the strongest claim to it if ever the question arose.41 This was a clever answer, for it reminded Muslim readers of the “Doctrine of the Sword” (which must have been the basis of the King’s claim as he had none of the other qualifications examined in the “Nature of the Caliphate” section earlier), as well as both highlighting that Islam was not in a strong position politically and that the main Sunni center for doctrine was already in that country. Presumably, the palace hoped that the article would generate a desire to restore Islam geopolitically by the revival of the Caliphate, with the King as the Caliph.42 There is nothing more about King Faruq’s pursuit of the Caliphate until the beginning of the following year, when a letter on his behalf to the editor of The Times categorically denies that the King was ever going to be proclaimed “Caliph,” even though he had been proclaimed as such by a crowd in Cairo earlier that same month.43 This turnaround seems extraordinary on one level, given his apparent desire to take the title. However, on another level, it allowed the suggestion to be aired without being formally proposed, thereby permitting the Egyptian hierarchy to gauge any reaction before deciding whether to proceed any further. This caused a great stir in Turkey, with the Republican government repeating the claim that the Caliph had only ever had

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

149

civil rather than religious authority in the early years and since they had abolished the Caliphate some years back, they had no further interest in the matter.44 Their response is noteworthy for two reasons; firstly, because they had been the recognized holders of the office until 1924, a point they made when specifically mentioning the fact that they had abolished the office. Secondly, they made a point of stating that the Caliph’s power had only ever been civil rather than religious. This, as has been seen, is by no means accurate. However, it must be assumed that their reason for saying so revolved around an underlying desire to state at the earliest opportunity that, should the Caliphate be revived under King Faruq, they would not owe him any loyalty. Nothing further appears on any file concerning the King’s claim. Whether Sir Miles Lampson had a quiet word with one of the senior Egyptian Ministers suggesting the whole matter be ended, or whether the strongly worded message from Turkey had been enough to end the King’s hopes of instituting another Caliphate, can only be a matter for supposition. However, having built up some impetus on the issue over the course of more than a year, it is surprising that the matter should have faded away without apparent resolution. Some clue as to the reasons for it may be found in both Kedourie’s book on the Egyptian claim to the Caliphate, and Qureshi’s book on the Khilafat Movement, where Qureshi mentions the Egyptian king’s claim in a manner that suggests that the issue had passed into history as far as the Indians were concerned.45 Their support could have been a decisive factor in the revival of any Caliphal claimant, and the fact that they took no interest in King Faruq’s claim, due to an understanding that the question was simply for the Arabs themselves to consider, perhaps showing the extent to which the Indians had disengaged from the issue, effectively ended the feasibility of the King’s claim.46 Summary This relatively brief incident therefore has several useful points worth highlighting, both in terms of the British approach to Pan-Islamic governance in a new era (the primary focus of the book), but also in revealing attitudes among the Egyptian Muslim elite to the same issue, fifteen years after the end of the Caliphate as an institution. On the Muslim side, the central point of interest lies in the fact that, even though the post had been abolished, the Caliphate still retained an important place in the psyche of those who had lived with it. This is evidenced in the fact that the exiled Ottoman Caliph was able to nominate a successor without any recognized legal mechanism for doing so, and to have that claim taken seriously by both the claimant and his opponents. Clearly, it can be argued

150

Chapter Six

that the reason the bequest, or nomination, was taken so seriously was that it presented an excellent opportunity for the King to seize the leadership of the Islamic world; an opportunity that had been long desired by his predecessor. At the same time, it represented evidence of continuing, if limited, Islamic governance even within the stifling context of European Imperialism. Indeed, one might argue that the incident presents evidence of Islam attempting to function as a state system independently of any other superimposed system.47 For the British, their handling of the incident clearly demonstrates that the essential philosophy of special regard for Muslim interests, seen in the previous two chapters, remained unchanged. Strategically, this policy was essentially pragmatic as it was based upon the real threat of Arab antiBritish sentiment, coupled with growing Nazi aggression and non-cooperation in India among the majority of the indigenous population. Aside from this overarching policy approach, the British officials had learned from the 1920s insofar as the flow of information and degree of coordination between London and Cairo was much improved. It is interesting to note that at no time did they attempt to discuss the question of the King’s legitimacy, as in the original “Caliphate Question” correspondence, for there was an apparent willingness to assume the validity of the claims and instead concentrate on the political issues surrounding it. This lack of questioning suggests that the assumption of truth in the claim or perspective being made by a Muslim remained strong and therefore, this critical weakness in their approach to questions of this nature seems to have remained unchanged since the World War I era. The Opening Phase of the Cold War The years following the end of World War II saw Britain begin to divest itself of its imperial possessions as the standoff between the Soviets and the West began.48 Thus the late 1940s saw the creation of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall, the Civil War in Greece, the Communist takeover of China, as well as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. As the world divided along ideological grounds that incorporated both the rich and developing nations, Britain, aligning itself wholeheartedly with the United States, began to explore how Soviet expansionism and Communism as an ideology might be contained through a system of new alliances.49 The formation of NATO was an important constituent part of that global network. However, the traditional Islamic heartlands, as well as the newly independent South Asian states, represented key possible areas for Soviet expansionism.50 Clearly, Britain had exhausted her capacity to defend these areas militarily, but the construction of

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

151

a network of alliances that were based around common culture and aspiration that was hostile to the Soviet Union was seen as a viable alternative.51 It was in this connection that the “Caliphate Question” was raised once again in the British files in 1949.52 The first mention in the files of a revived Caliphate in some form being used as a buttress against the Soviets is in a letter from Sir John Troutbeck in early September of 1949. In the course of the letter he reports that the Pakistanis had been advocating a new “Pan-Islamic bloc,” about which he advises caution.53 His argument is that, on the one hand, the revived Caliphate would have the benefit of having “Islamic cooperation as a bulwark against the spread of Communism.”54 However, his continued caution about the implementation of such a policy is explained in his following line; for he was convinced of the fact that should Pan-Islamists ever become a power in their own right, they would be more likely to “train their guns against Western Imperialism” and that they would fail to protect the interests of Jews and Christians particularly.55 Sir John Troutbeck’s concerns about the nature of Pan-Islamism at this time are reflective of a general suspicion, but not general antagonism, toward the movement within the Foreign Office as a whole. Indeed, it seems that the leaders of the Muslim world themselves were similarly cautious, but ultimately unconcerned about Pan-Islamism. This was seen in the quarterly report on the Islamic world prepared by the Foreign Office research department in October 1949, who appeared convinced that Islamic revivalism was a myth.56 The fact that Troutbeck felt the idea even worth considering, even in the light of his misgivings and suspicions about the nature of Pan-Islamism, should come as a great surprise. As has been seen in the discussions of World War I and post-war files, the British had both experienced the potency of Pan-Islamic feeling when it was stirred up against it, and had also seen the enormous benefits that it had reaped from its successful manipulation of Muslim sensibilities in the same period.57 Examples of both dynamics can be found in the problems caused by the Khilafat Movement on one hand and the success of the Ottoman and Meccan fatwas in the nineteenth century as methods of controlling truculent Muslim populations in India particularly on the other.58 Even outside of Troutbeck’s concerns, however, there is evidence of problems with the concept even within Muslim circles, (apparently bearing out one of John Troutbeck’s original concerns), for Chapman Andrews in Alexandria reported that there was Egyptian opposition to the creation of an “Islamic Bloc” on the grounds that it would be a British pawn.59 He also referred to a September 9th telegram and reports that there had been talks between the

152

Chapter Six

Shah of Iran and King Abdullah on this subject and that the Arabs seem to be under the impression that the British would be in favor of such a bloc.60 In this they are showing themselves to be well informed because Troutbeck’s concerns are overruled by his superiors in Whitehall. Senior Whitehall staff argued the need for a “Muslim bloc” against Soviet expansion outweighed the needs of the minorities, and proposed that if Pan-Islamism was the only way to bring Muslims together against the Soviet Union, then it should be used in this way.61 Policy-wise, it seems then that the Foreign Office had not learned from their problems at the beginning of the century. Aside from the issue of the overarching policy, the same note contains one further point of particular interest: that all talk of a “Caliphate” disappears after the original message from Troutbeck. Written evidence of a directive against the use of the word “Caliphate” could not be found, but, given the concerns expressed about Pan-Islamism in the earlier memo, there would be good grounds for surmising that the use of the word “Caliphate” was considered too imbued with emotive and symbolic meaning for the term to be safely used with regard to reinstituted Islamic geopolitical power. Should this indeed have been the thinking of British officials at this time, then it would point to them perhaps learning from their previous approach, and attempting to free the notion of a religious institution from a unified body of Muslim states.62 The constitution of a “Muslim Bloc” could be molded upon the lines desired by the powers involved in its formation without any need to reference previous tools of legitimization. The reinstitution of a Caliphate represented a far greater problem with regards to its theological and historical functions as well as its Pan-Islamic remit being reconciled with the modern day requirements of the post. Evidence that the British were happy for it to be known within Muslim diplomatic circles that they were in favor of a “Muslim Bloc” is seen in the telegram from a Mr. Lawford (stationed in Tehran) that is entitled “HMG’s attitude to a Pan Islamic Movement as conveyed to the Persian Minister of Court.”63 Lawson briefly reports that he had officially notified the Persian court of their position and goes on to say that the same view had been expressed to other Muslim governments in the area.64 It is interesting to note that the report mentions in passing that other states expressed concern over the role of Turkey and that Lawson’s reply had been that Turkey had not ever tried to act on the grounds of religion, but rather from a security and economic viewpoint.65 Mr. Lawson’s viewpoint is rather shortsighted here, for he appears either unaware, or has failed to understand, that the Persian and Mesopotamian concerns would have revolved around the issue of Turkey’s former preeminence in the Muslim world and the concern that any “Muslim

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

153

Bloc” should not to be dominated by that formerly preeminent Pan-Islamic power.66 Their concerns also serve as a reminder that the British were attempting to encourage the creation of a “Muslim Bloc” that drew together both Sunni and Shi’a nation states. This was a potentially crippling problem as one would have been very unlikely to agree to be dominated by the other, especially given the fact that the Shi’a Imamate was still in existence at this time, whereas, the Sunni Caliphate had been dead over twenty-five years.67 Yet, for all their concern, the memos and reports that follow from Lawson’s telegram make it clear that, far from being against the idea of a “Muslim Bloc” these Muslim states appear to be strongly in favor of it, sending envoys all over the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, to create support for it.68 Given the Persian support for the “Muslim Bloc,” it must be assumed that the fact that the word “Caliphate” or “Imamate” having been removed from the idea allows the possibility that both the British and the Muslim nations themselves were not thinking in terms of creating a bloc specifically based around the theopolitical concept of the ummah.69 Rather they were thinking in terms of a purely strategic affiliation based around the shared geopolitical concerns. Had the term “Caliphate” or “Imamate” been used, such a strategy would have been impossible to pursue because of the theological and historical issues that would have had to have been resolved. Whether practically workable or not as a purely strategic bloc, without any form of “religious identity” it was doomed to failure due to the apparent lack of interest from Turkey, who wanted instead to remain within the existing treaties with the Americans and British. The non-participation of so vital a member of the strategic partnership put an effective stop on the ambitions of the Persians who seem to have been thinking about leading the whole Islamic world.70 However, a new perspective upon the reasons for the failure of the “Muslim Bloc” is found in the Eastern Section’s Quarterly Review of Islamic Affairs dated January 26th, 1949,71 which said that the failure of the Arab nations to unite against Israel had put a temporary end to Pan-Islamic notions, although the Afghan minister to Iraq called for the formation of a Muslim league which would command respect from the West.72 Summary The documents show that the British were attempting to use their old colonial ties to encourage the idea of a “Muslim Bloc”: an idea that had originated in newly independent Pakistan. They showed that, although Sir John Troutbeck had serious misgivings about allowing or encouraging the spread of PanIslamic ideas, the civil servants in Whitehall felt that, in spite of the possible threat to the minorities that could arise from such a scheme, the benefits of a

154

Chapter Six

“Muslim Bloc” as a bulwark against Communism outweighed those considerations. Indeed, there seemed to be a belief in the lack of potency in Islamic revival as a political and cultural force. In relation to the British encouragement to create a Muslim Bloc, the omission of the word “Caliphate” from any discussion was an adroit move and perhaps showed them learning from the entanglements that they had encountered when engaging with the question in World War I and its immediate aftermath. What is interesting about this correspondence also is the lack of usage of the word “Caliphate” (or Imamate) in the Muslim discussions. This is strongly suggestive of Islam being expressed as a form of cultural or political identity, rather than a more salafī desire to recreate a theocratic state under a Caliph. However, the correspondence here does leave one rather uncomfortable question concerning how officials in the Foreign Office at the time weighed balancing the interests of religious minorities against the strategic requirements of the time.

CONCLUSIONS As the British continued to exert both influence and limited power in the period between the wars and shortly after, the material in the files appears to suggest that they had learned some lessons from their policy in World War I era insofar as they were far more cautious about becoming involved in any kind of power struggle in the Muslim world. At the same time, strategic necessity dictated that some level of engagement with the issue of Islamic governance was required. In the late 1930s, this took the form of imperial protection against primarily fascist insurgency. After World War II it was focused around the containment of Communism.73 In such circumstances therefore, it is unsurprising that the files show that the British were keen to remove themselves from the “Caliphate” issue when the question arose in the late 30s following the death of the last Caliph. From a Muslim standpoint, the incident shows both the continued desire for the revival of the post, even after a twenty-year absence, as well as the divisions within the Muslim world that prevented the scheme from progressing. The most fascinating aspect of that was the fact that, even without official recognition, the ex-Caliph was able to make a bequest that was taken seriously by other Muslim leaders, therefore suggesting that, whatever was or was not officially recognized by the non-Muslim world about the position of the Caliphate as an institution, its impact on Muslim life could still be measured by the response to its pronouncements from within the Muslim community. Examining the “Caliphate” issue in the 1930s from a British standpoint, the incident showed that, while the British had learned about the dangers of attempting to manipulate the candidature of such an eminent and symbolic post

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

155

from the World War I period, this did not prevent them from cautiously exerting their remaining influence in the area for new global strategic interests. In the early Cold War period, the documents relating to the “Muslim Bloc” highlight, the heavy influence of continuing Pan-Islamic ideology is seen in the interest generated by the “Muslim Bloc” concept, even with the heavy symbolism of the “Caliphate” or “Imamate” titles removed from the proposal. The fact that an ostensibly Sunni proposal could find, not only agreement, but enthusiasm from a leading Shi’a nation is testament to the Pan-Islamic ideal. This finding appears to run contrary to much of the analysis concerning the relationship between the political and theological in Islam; however, with the removal of the theocratic symbolism attached to a Caliphate, this seems to have become more possible in the eyes of Muslim nation states during this period. The explanation for this apparent contradiction appears to lie in the accent upon Arab nationalism, rather than Islamic identity. Hamid Enyat has analyzed in some detail the different outworkings and impacts of this movement which centered around the end of colonial rule. Within this philosophical system, Islamic revivalism became subsumed within the politics of identity that surrounded the ending of the Imperial rule in the Middle East and the creation of Israel.74 One would therefore suggest that, given the way that salafı- ideology has become so much more prevalent in the twenty-first century, any attempt to create a “Muslim Bloc” in the same fashion, removing the theocratic elements as was attempted during the early Cold War period, would be far harder today than it was then. The documents examined and analyzed in this chapter therefore present British policy in the area of Islamic governance as reasonably consistent with that of its antecedents in the early part of the twentieth century and back into the nineteenth. It shows Britain still with a limited awareness of the dangers posed by Pan-Islamic revivalism, but, at the same time, a desire to use it for their own needs, even at the expense of the interests of the minority groups within the Muslim polity.

NOTES 1. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, British officials and agents were strongly of the opinion that Bolshevik agent provocateurs were behind many of the actions of Kemal Atatturk. See also the attempted communist uprising in Weimar Germany in 1919 and the activities of Comintern. See A. J. P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War (London: Penguin, 1970), 84–96; E. Wiskemann, Europe of the Dictators 1919–1945 (London: Fontana (Harvester Press), 1970), 11–32. 2. There can be little doubt that the fear of the consequences of the achievement of power for the Bolsheviks aided the rise of Mussolini and Hitler, allowing them

156

Chapter Six

to create political platforms based upon the fears of the middle and upper European classes. See Taylor, Origins, 102–12; Wiskemann, Europe, 48–53. 3. See W. G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 17–34 and Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); J. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan: An Introductory History Since 1853 (London: Longman, 1989), 38–54; H. P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (London: HarperCollins, 2000). 4. Some of this is dealt with in the following historical section on Islamic issues. 5. See F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, Volumes 1 and 2 (Oxford: OUP, 1952); E. Bendiner, A Time for Angels: The Tragicomic History of the League of Nations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975). 6. For an assessment of the philosophy and impact of Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” see J. Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 50–106; J. S. Barkin and B. Cronin, “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter 1994), 107–30; B. M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 9–11. 7. Excellent summaries of the consequences of the crash are given in J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929 (London: Houghton and Mifflin, 1997), 128–67; E. N. White, “The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), 67–83. 8. The impact of the depression diplomatically is discussed in H. James, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 187–99; P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY): Cornell University Press, 1986), 181–218. 9. See G. C. Webber, “Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 19, No. 4, Reassessments of Fascism (October, 1984), 575–606; D. S. Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur: Mosley, Fascism and British Society 1931–1981 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). 10. See P. W. Preston, Political/Cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1997); A. Hurrell and L. Fawcett, Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (New York: OUP, 1996). 11. For a good general history see E. Luard, A History of the United Nations (London: Macmillan, 1989). Useful discussions on the development and role of the United Nations can be found in W. H. Reinicke, Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance (London: IDRC, 2000), 9–14; P. F. Diehl, ed., The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2005), 18–36. 12. Cf. Oliver-Dee, Citizenship, 52–71. 13. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan have had many volumes written on them from political, historical, and theological perspectives. Among these,

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

157

the following stand out for their clarity and insight: R. P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (New York: OUP, 1993); B. Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement, 1928–1942 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998); J. Walsh, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Understanding Centrist Islam,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, 2003. On Pakistan as an ideology and goal see S. Mujahid, Ideology of Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 2001; A. Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1966). However, there has been little written about the ideological motivation of the Grand Mufti in the 1930s, a gap that needs filling, for his agitation across the Middle East fanned the flame of pan-Islamism when it appeared to be dying out in that area. For general overview of his life and work see R. Brock, “Report From the Middle East,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, The National Interest Alone or With Others? (Jul. 1952), 64–68; P. Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Z. Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti- Haj Amin Al-Hussani—Founder of the Palestinian National Movement (London: Frank Cass, 1993). 14. There have been many books written on both of these issues. However, only a very few have grounded themselves within the wider context of Islamic scriptural re-interpretation. See J. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 3–21, 71–94. 15. Ibid, 18. 16. Hain argues that Britain has had to revive her fortunes through trans-national networks, rather than as a nation state insofar as it no longer has the capacity to form effective policy as a nation state. See P. Hain, The End of Foreign Policy: British Interests, Global Linkages and Natural Limits (London: Fabian Society, Green Alliance, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001). 17. Although Hain’s argument is essentially sound, it could be argued that it does not place enough emphasis on the renewed economic stability and growth the UK has achieved over the last twenty to thirty years. 18. In his book on the Middle East, Peter Mansfield suggests that Britain’s role in the area appeared strong on the surface in the decade after World War II, but, in reality, her power was rapidly declining throughout the period, being replaced by the United States. P. Mansfield, A History of the Modern Middle East (London: Penguin, 1992, 2nd ed. 2003), 249. Cf. C. M. Woodhouse, British Foreign Policy since the Second World War (London: Hutchinson, 1961), 124–41. 19. There was also some brief correspondence in 1933 relating to the claim of an Armenian citizen named Peter Hagop to be descended from the Fatimid Caliphs. The claim was investigated, but nothing appears to have been resolved. The principal interest in this incident as far as this book is concerned derives from the fact that interest in the Caliphate as an institution remained long after its demise. FO 141/705/7. 20. See FO371/22004, F328 dated April 4th, 1938. 21. Ibid. As was seen in chapter three, bequeathed nomination had been enough to validate the claim of Ottoman dynasty in the sixteenth century. The only further

158

Chapter Six

claim they had, which King Faruq did not, was to the ownership of the Holy Places and Relics. 22. See FO 141/587/2, F269. 23. Kedourie, Chatham House Version, 177–98. Kedourie’s history is extremely valuable as a tool for understanding the internal Egyptian situation. However, he shies away from exploring the British perspective on the issue. 24. Ibid, 203. Even apart from the Caliphal claim in the late 1930s, Cairo had been the setting for the post-Abolition Pan-Islamic conference which, in the end, quickly dissolved with acrimonious infighting. Even though the end result was somewhat disastrous, the incident serves to highlight the desire of the Egyptian court to become the new leader of the Islamic diaspora. British perspectives on the conference’s organization and objectives are found in FO 141/587/2, 269–358. There are one or two fascinating nuggets of information concerning Italian and French perspectives on Pan-Islamism particularly. 25. Ibid, 179. 26. India was at the height of its Gandhian “Free India” Campaign and the British were increasingly turning to Indian Muslim interests as a way of de-railing the unity of purpose that had been developed over the nineteen years since the Mahatma’s arrival from South Africa. 27. FO/J/2269/2269/16, F1, From: M Charbonniere (French Embassy) to French Government, Subject: Report made by French Resident General at Rabat on activities of Pan-Islamists in N. Africa – Left with M. Bentinck at Egyptian Emb. And passed on by him to the Foreign Office. F2 from the same file reports the use that the German agents were making of Pan-Nationalist activities. Notably Chekib Arslan and his paper “La Nation Arabe” and the editor of the journal el-Fatah – Mohib el Khatib had substantial backing from the Berlin government. Cf. Hourani, Arab Peoples, 331. 28. FO371/22004, F354. Letter from the British Ambassador in Baghdad to the Ambassador in Cairo dated June 28th, 1938, states that the Alim of Najaf has been to see him about the possible re-introduction of the Caliphate. He has been in correspondence with al-Maraghi (Rector of the al-Azhar). Suggested that Alim thought that conference to bring about closer Muslim unity might be worthwhile and that the revived Caliphate might be the way to achieve it. 29. Ibid, Viscount Halifax to Kelly, Ambassador to Egypt, dated April 9th, 1938, F325–26. 30. Ibid, F326. Indeed Kedourie, quoting al-Jundi’s biography of al- Maraghi (al-Imam al-Maraghi), mentions that al-Maraghi went on a trip to Arabia to meet with Ibn Saud “on matters pertaining to the Caliphate.” Kedourie, Chatham House Version, 425. 31. Ibid, F324. 32. Hourani, Arab Peoples, 331. 33. Ibid, F329, letter to Viscount Halifax from Kelly, Ambassador to Egypt dated April 22nd, 1938. 34. Should that prove to be the case such a move would not be without precedent within the Muslim diaspora at that time, for it was Muhammad Iqbal’s

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

159

realization that a geopolitical homeland for all Muslims was unachievable that led directly to his calls for Pakistan as a compromise measure. See M. Munawwar, “Allamah Muhammad Iqbal” in Waheed-Uz-Zaman and M. Saleem Akhtar, eds., Islam in South Asia (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993), 381. 35. Ibid., F328, Egyptian High Commission Internal Memo dated April 14th, 1938. 36. Ibid., F327, Kelly to Halifax dated April 15th, 1938. 37. Ibid., F333, Letter to Foreign Office, Eastern Department from the Chancery dated June 19th, 1938 in which “they wonder if they see your hand in the recent article in ‘Great Britain and the East’ by Kenneth Williams.” The author had traveled extensively in the Middle East from the middle of the 1920s onwards and would therefore have had credibility as the author of such an article. 38. Ibid., F343, Telegram from Miles Lampson to the Foreign Office classified “Secret” dated July 11th, 1938. 39. Ibid. Although he does not give reasons at this point, it would be logical to assume that the British government’s objections to such action would be based around the tensions that it would raise in the Arab world (and further afield) at a time when Britain was desperately re-arming with the expectation of war looming. Within this, the fact that Nazi agents were so active in the area stirring up resentment against the British, coupled with King Faruq’s known British sympathies, would have meant that such a move could drive Arabs further toward Nazi influence. See Hourani, Arab Peoples, 331. 40. Reproduced with a memo attached at FO371/22004, F349, July 9th, 1938. 41. Ibid. 42. F376 in the same file, a secret Foreign Office report on the state of Egypt in Autumn 1938, shows that the country was in such a state of ferment that the palace’s hopes were not without foundation. 43. Letter is F374 on the file and was published in “The Times” on January 25th, 1939, after the proclamation by the crowd on January 20th. There is a further report contained at FO371/22004, F383 dated February 3rd, 1939 from Sir Miles Lampson in Cairo, talking about the scene in Cairo when King Faruq proclaimed Caliph (which he specifically states was organized by Palace). He further reports that Ali Maher Pasha has encouraged the King in this but that Prince Seif el Islam Hussein and Emir Feisal both objected to the proclamation. 44. Ibid., F379, letter dated January 29th, 1939 from the Ambassador in Angora to Viscount Halifax at the Foreign Office. 45. Kedourie, Chatham House Version, 194. 46. Qureshi, Khilafat Movement, 328–29. 47. See for example Islam in Britain: The British Muslim Community in February 2005 by The Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (Pewsey, UK: Isaac Publishing, 2005), 13–14. 48. This transitional phase in discussed in depth in W. R. Loius, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, OUP, 1988). See also

160

Chapter Six

Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: An Introduction to British Foreign Policy since 1945 (Basingstoke : Macmillan Education, 1990), 74–92. 49. For British Foreign Policy objectives following the Second World War see J. Frankel, British Foreign Policy, 1945–1973 (Royal Institute of International Affairs) (London: Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1975). Cf. G. P. Gooch and J. H. B. Masterman, A Century of British Foreign Policy (Council for the Stud,y of International Relations) (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971) E. Goldstein, and B. J. C. McKercher, Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865–1965 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 50. Ibid, 35–51. Cf. Sanders, Losing Empire, 65–81. 51. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 148–49. 52. It was reported that the Soviets had in fact accused Britain of engaging in this policy, but that, by the time they had done so, the policy had been abandoned for reasons that will be explored shortly. FO371/75047 File No. 1019, Third Quarterly Report on Islamic World, Eastern Section, October 1949. 53. FO 371/1781, F2. His caution is based upon the belief that Muslims are incapable of co-operation with each other, that they would not agree on any decisive form of action, and thirdly, that minority interests would not be protected. 54. Ibid., F5. 55. Ibid. Troutbeck said that he had spoken to Azzam Pasha (Egyptian Minister) on September 11th about Pan-Islamism, saying that he distrusted it, unless it was confined to the cultural plane. Apparently Azzam agreed. A similar concern is expressed by Major Dickson in his Intelligence report entitled “Notes on the ‘Akhwan’ Movement” in 1922. FO 141/477/4/B340. 56. FO371/75047 File No. 1019 Eastern Section, October 1949. This same view appeared alive and well over twenty years later as is seen in a letter from Armitage at the British Embassy in Jedda to McGregor of Arabian Dept of the Foreign Office dated July 14th, 1971. In this short letter Armitage makes several fascinating points: firstly, through Saudi contacts in Egypt, Saudis seem to think that, even with the relaxation on the Brotherhood by Sadat, there is “no revival.” Also confident that President Sadat will re-assert control over the Muslim Brotherhood in the near future. Secondly, apparently Feisal (a Saudi contact) went to see President Sadat in June, reporting that the President had said in the course of the meeting: “Religion is good, but religious power to secure and control political power is bad . . . Any revival of the Brotherhood should be confined to religion alone.” Finally, there is a short note at the top of the page which reads “The Saudis clearly take the same view we do.” FO 39/970, F3. 57. See previous chapters on “The Question of the Caliphate”: Selected Documents from British Diplomatic Correspondence in the Middle East and India during World War I and the Era of Peace Treaties, and “The Lausanne Treaty and the ‘Spiritual Powers of the Caliph’ Correspondence.” 58. See “Historical Background” sections in each of the chapters named above. 59. FO 371/1781, F10, From Alexandria Chapman Andrews to Clement Attlee dated September 16th, 1949. One might argue instead however, that King Faruq,

Caliphate Policy: Post-Abolition–Cold War

161

whose desire for the Caliphate was examined in the previous section, is more likely to have been upset at the possibility of the Caliphate being revived without himself at the head. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., F30–33. It is worthwhile noting that in order for such a position to have become known outside of the Foreign Office itself, an informal indication of the British position must have been given; it is therefore interesting, given the history of British desire to be officially disassociated from the Caliphate issue, that they were willing to become involved at this time. 62. See previous chapter on the “Lausanne Treaty and the ‘Spiritual Powers of the Caliph’ Correspondence.” This would also have been an excellent time politically to develop this idea as the ruling elites of these newly independent Muslim nations were Socialist-Democratic in orientation rather than “Muslim.” 63. FO 371/1781, F16. As the Foreign Office is being sent a report of this nature, it seems safe to conclude that the approach to the Persians was made at London’s behest. 64. The British seem to be happy to openly articulate their reasons for wanting a “Muslim Bloc,” but in a way that hid their enthusiasm for the idea: “ . . . . Britain was not against the idea of a Pan-Islamic state to act as a bulwark against possible Russian aggression.” Ibid., F16. 65. Ibid., F17. 66. See Michael Bishku’s interesting discussion on Iranian-Turkish relation in the Cold War, which omits discussion of these events, but nevertheless, provides some fascinating insights into the strained relationship between the states, analyzing some of the reasons for them. M. B. Bishku, “Turkey and Iran during the Cold War,” Journal of Third World Studies (Spring, 1999). 67. FO 371/1781, F23. 68. See F24 from Chancery, Baghdad to Foreign Office Eastern Department which talks about the visit of a senior cleric Persian official to the Saud royal family. No information about the conversation is given, but the note suggests that it “is part of the Persian move to create an ‘Islamic Bloc. ’” Cf. F28 from Chancery Baghdad to Foreign Office reporting the proposed visit of Chaudury Khaliquzzaman on tour round Middle East to promote idea of “Muslim Bloc.” 69. The focus here is on the period marked by the dominance of Pan-Arabism rather than Pan-Islam. So it is not so strange that the Caliphate/Imamate concepts were not to the fore. 70. Ibid., F64 concerns Turkey’s attitude to Pan Islamic bloc reported by telegram from N. Charles Istanbul to the Foreign Office dated October 24th, 1949. Apparently the Turkish officials had told him that they could not act in this with US and UK approval being locked into them through treaties and that their view on the whole thing was the same as HMG. 71. FO371/75047 File No. 1019 Eastern Section 1949. 72. Ibid, 5–8. As a matter of interest these folios also report that, following disturbances earlier in the year, the Egyptian government has banned the Muslim Brethren

162

Chapter Six

as a political group and that in Indonesia, the renewed fighting with the Dutch had increased republican support and had also drawn support from Pakistan. Taken together, these events strongly indicate that the resurgent notion of Pan-Islamic unity against the West was evident nearly fifty years before Osama Bin Laden declared his jiha-d against the United States, its allies, and the Muslim governments that were not Islamic enough. 73. While it is accepted that the containment of Communism was the prime motivating factor behind British interest in and appeasement of fascism in the thirties, the question of the Caliphate and Islamic governance was the prime area for British concern in relation to Nazi activities in North Africa. 74. Enyat, Political Thought, 50, 56–58, 113–20. Cf. Hitti, Arabs, 92–103. Both Ruthven and Roy argue that rather than Pan-Islamism becoming more dominant, Islamic nationalism is becoming the more dominant force in the Muslim world once again. The evidence they present is persuasive; however, in their selection, both scholars are guilty of viewing the global Islamic situation from the viewpoint of International relations, where it is perfectly natural that Muslim nations should behave as other nation states, protecting themselves and attempting to develop their national interests; unfortunately, such a perspective takes no account of the activities of groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and other salafı-s organizations in its analysis. Ruthven, Islam, 393; Roy, Globalised Islam, 62–67.

Chapter Seven

Conclusions

Any lessons gleaned from previous approaches to engagement with Islamic governance cannot be applied to the present without an intimate knowledge of current British policy. In the absence of that “insider access,” these conclusions therefore seek to summarize the strengths and weaknesses of British engagement with Islamic governance up to the opening years of the Cold War, leaving questions of proximity to current British governmental methodologies in engaging with the Muslim Diaspora to those with access to the appropriate sources. The points set out below will therefore highlight the conclusions drawn from each chapter, enlarging upon and developing certain key dynamics where it is felt necessary to do so. This will be done in two sections, the first looking at the conclusions drawn from the background chapter on the Caliphate. The second section will draw out the conclusions arrived at in the chapters examining the British involvement in the Caliphate issue from 1914–1949. This will be followed by a final brief section which outlines the desired consequences of this book and brings it back to the point at which it began in the “Introduction.”1

CONCLUSIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE CALIPHATE The opening chapter of the book explored the nature the Caliphate in theology and history as a basis for examining the British files in the main body of the book.

163

164

Chapter Seven

The Foundations of the Caliphate Given the fact that the political and the theological were entwined into the fabric of Muhammad’s newly created community and that the Caliphate had a pivotal role in the early period of the ummah along with an important symbolic role through much of its history, the scriptural basis for its establishment and purview is surprisingly sketchy.2 Indeed, it was perhaps this lack of defined prerogative that led to the struggle for the leadership of Islamic dogma between the Caliph and the ‘ulamā that continued for centuries. It is from this inherent weakness that the difficulties in defining what constitutes the Caliph’s “religious” authority and his “temporal” authority, extensively discussed by the British in regards to the Lausanne correspondence, are seen.3 A prime example of this confusion would be the problem of maintaining the Caliph’s prerogative to lead the Friday prayers, which was never rebutted by the ‘ulamā (a function that one would assume to naturally fall under the category of “religious authority”), while at the same time arguing against his right to interpret scripture and draw out law in the Sunni tradition.4 This issue is also entwined with the discussion concerning whether, as the British clearly believed, the Caliphate could be characterized as a “monarchy.”5 In this connection, the overview of the development of the Caliphate in political theory and history provided by Lambton and Sourdel showed that, while the Caliphate increasingly took on the regalia of monarchy from the Umayyad period onwards, such trappings did not remove the “religious” authority from the office. Thus, the Abbasid Caliphs, even though their Persianized court displayed all the trappings of a sophisticated Imperial monarchy, also gained more dogmatic control than had been enjoyed under many of the Umayyad Caliphs.6 Essentially, the Caliphate retained some measure of Pan-Islamic religious authority, that varied greatly in differing periods, right from the inception of the office, through to its revival in the late Ottoman dynasty under European influence. The Pan-Islamic Authority of the Caliph The Pan-Islamic authority of the Caliph varied over the centuries, but even into the seventeenth century, there is evidence of some measure of symbolic legitimization from the Caliph being sought from Muslim rulers even in the farthest reaches of the Muslim Imperial Diaspora. Rulers in both the Delhi Sultanate and Banten had their own political motivations for seeking recognition of their rule from the Caliph. However, the core concept of the Caliph being seen as the highest earthly source of authority in these otherwise independent kingdoms highlighted the continued centrality of the Caliphate as the source of legitimization in the Islamic world.7 On the basis of this evidence,

Conclusions

165

one might therefore argue that the Caliph’s symbolic place at the head of the Sunni Muslim community remained almost intact throughout its history. What altered dramatically was its executive powers of authority. In this sense, a strong parallel with the history of the Papacy could be drawn. However, the comparative discussions between the two offices also showed that, although there were many similarities in their development and history, the origins of the two offices had very different roots within their own religious traditions. These differences could perhaps be best seen in the religio-political power wielded by the Caliphs from the outset, as compared to the Papal rise on the basis of doctrinal arbitration.8 The “Religious” and “Temporal” Nature of the Caliphate The description by the ‘ulamā, and later, the British officials, of the Caliphate as a “monarchy” can be laid open to criticism.9 The remit and symbolic regalia attached to the person of the Caliph certainly developed as the empire grew, with the qualifications for any claimant to the Caliphate similarly experiencing an enormous metamorphosis.10 However, even with all its change and imperial adornments, as well its loss of control over dogma to the religious scholars, the Caliphate still continued to be the legitimizer of all other Muslim rulers. It also continued to lead Friday prayers and appoint Qadis throughout the Empire while almost continuously being mentioned in the khutba all over the Sunni Muslim world right up to its abolition in 1924. It must therefore be concluded that the Caliph retained a measure of Pan-Islamic authority that raised it above the level of an Imperial monarchy right into the modern period.11 One would therefore suggest that the differences between any Imperial monarch and the Caliph lay not in the position they held, but in the origins and unifying identity of the forces which they marshaled and, over time, the unifying identity of the Empire they created. The Caliphate originated from a group of disparate tribes, whose common link was their set of beliefs or their political alliance, whereas other Imperial rulers brought an ethnic group to prominence, perhaps paying homage to their gods for the victory, but not in order to expand their community. Aspiration versus Reality Whatever the theoretical position of the Caliph within the life of the ummah, the reality of attempting to recreate his executive authority in a wholly changed geopolitical world places an unreal burden of expectation upon those Muslims who would wish to see the Caliphate instituted anew. The difficulties that this Pan-Islamic theology creates were observed in the discussions

166

Chapter Seven

between the British Prime Minister and the Indian Khilafat Delegation. The discussions in those two meetings served as a powerful illuminator of the gap between theory and practice in this field; issues such as the Caliphal remit as “Commander of the Faithful,” which highlighted the impracticability of the Caliph’s theoretical role in this regard, as against its implementation in relation to the geopolitical situation at that time.12 Perhaps more seriously from a Muslim perspective was the extent to which the place of Law itself had been appropriated by a non-Muslim power, in this case, Great Britain, who was able to have its claim to be Dar al-Islam substantiated by both the Ottoman Caliph himself and the Meccan ‘ulamā.13 The argument outlined above points toward the central problem at the heart of all the discussion concerning the Caliphate from the period of European colonization onwards, perhaps even from the fall of Baghdad in 1258; that the foundations upon which the Caliphate and, indeed, any form of Muslim authority convened under the “Law of God” were laid upon the assumption of Muslim headship over Muslims.14

BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE 1914–1949: CONCLUSIONS It seems clear that, in the light of the theological and theoretical analysis that comes before it, there are several key principles for British governmental engagement with issues of Islamic governance that can be drawn out from the approach of their predecessors. Pan-Islamic Manipulation The first point to be drawn from the British files through to the late 1940s was the inherent danger in attempting to manipulate the Caliphate and Pan-Islamic sentiment across the Muslim Diaspora to Britain’s political advantage.15 It must be accepted as global geopolitical reality that national and transnational actors will use any tool they think might be feasible to achieve their goals.16 From this perspective, Britain’s use of Arab nationalism as a counterthrust to Ottoman attempts to erode Muslim loyalty in the Empire at the opening of World War I can be considered a legitimate harnessing of resources.17 At the same time however, it is important that a policy that seeks to manipulate circumstances in a field that engendered so much emotive feeling requires a clear strategy and an expert understanding of the issues being engaged with. Both the Cairo files and the later India Office correspondence demonstrated that neither was the case; opinion and advice

Conclusions

167

were sought from a wide range of sources without apparent analysis of the perspectives, motives, or validity of their advice.18 There appeared to be no understanding of whether they were being given Shi’a or Sunni perspectives and this lack of background understanding had the potential to give rise to questionable policies.19 Aside from the background of the advisors, there were even dangers arising from the expert advice they received from those such as Professor Arnold and Sheikh Tommara, whose lack of cultural understanding or sectarian prejudice once again produced an incomplete or weighted view of the issue. Security versus Giving Away the House The second point concerns the British government’s apparent desire to satisfy Muslim interests in the Empire above those of other ethnic and religious groups. It seems that the policy was based upon a widely held belief that was articulated by (among others) Lieutenant Colonel Wilson in a covering note to a report on Pan-Islamic issues written by a Captain Bray in 1917. For in the course of the note that he was forwarding to Sir Reginald Wingate and the British High Command Wilson states he expressed: Pan-Islamism is by no means dead and I personally believe that issue to be of first importance to us as an Empire, with our millions of Muslim subjects, dependent upon how the Mohammedan question is dealt with in the near future.20

The report ends with what Bray feels to be the appropriate course of action for the British government in relation to Muslim Pan-Islamic feeling: It is therefore imperative for us to control as many as possible of the Mohammedan peoples and by a policy of help and a few needed concessions to those of them who are our own subjects, prevent the possibility of their seeking support elsewhere.21

It was this fear of Muslim attitudes and actions drove the British government to place the concerns of all other religious and ethnic interests within the Empire beneath the necessity of securing Muslim loyalty.22 Clearly this was written in the midst of a war in which the Ottomans, backed by the Germans, had attempted to undermine that loyalty through the declaration of a jihād. However, it fed into fears concerning the Muslim community that already existed, which were perhaps based upon the memories of the 1857–1858 rebellion in India and the discovery of the so-called “Silk Letter Conspiracy” in 1912.

168

Chapter Seven

Therefore, even though it should be emphasized that the British Empire faced internal security threats from many Hindu activists as well as from ethnic groups elsewhere in the Empire, such as the Boers in South Africa, what focused British attention upon Islam was perhaps the geographical spread of Muslims across the Empire, coupled with the apparent susceptibility of some Muslims to the aspirations of any leader who proclaimed violent jihād in order to create a Muslim homeland.23 In the light of the fact that the Imperial rulers appeared to have a suspicion of the Muslim communities within their Empire, the question that naturally flowed from this concept concerned whether the policy of focusing upon Muslim interests that they pursued was the most effective method of dealing with that perceived threat. Clearly one might argue that such a policy could be employed on a short-term basis while awaiting a hoped-for integration into wider society. However, it could also serve to increase ethnic and religious divisions within multicultural societies where the other minority groups might feel that their interests were being subverted, deepening suspicion and antagonism further.24 Minority Groups Connected to this concern about the satisfaction of Muslim interests above others is the apparent lack of interest by the British government of the time, in protecting the needs of minority groups in a situation where Islam is the dominant power.25 It is in several memos replying to John Troutbeck’s memo in 1949 that this lack of concern regarding the position of minorities under a Muslim government is seen, for several of the respondents opine that firstly, Muslim rulers are usually tolerant of their minorities and that secondly, their interests are less important than the necessity of creating the “Muslim Bloc.”26 The essentially pragmatic nature of the “Realism” underpinning the second point is entirely in keeping with the policymaking culture within the Foreign Office at the time.27 However, in what could perhaps be seen as an attempt to justify ignoring the status of minorities in the pursuit of their policy, the characterization of Muslim governments as occasionally, even frequently, “tolerant” of their religious minorities appears to be a somewhat questionable line of argument. Two immediate faults with such reasoning are apparent: firstly, just because something happened historically does not mean the same dynamic will be present once again and secondly, there is a significant difference between “tolerance” and “equality.”28 Thus, the focus of concern here is not so much the manipulation of existent aspirations and dynamics, but the apparent lack of compunction about fail-

Conclusions

169

ing to protect the needs of minority interests. It might be argued that those affected were no longer British citizens, whether Imperial or indigenous, and so their needs should not be part of any calculation upon the direction of British Foreign Policy. If this was indeed a justification for such a policy then one might conclude that it was not an unreasonable position. The problem with such a hypothesis is that such sentiments were not expressed in any of the memos at the time. Consequently one is confronted with uncomfortable questions concerning the British government’s treatment of its own minorities should such issues have arisen within the Empire (or Commonwealth) or her own borders, especially when analyzed in relation to the “satisfaction of Muslim interests’ concerns” already raised. Use of Language The fourth point concerns the use of language and terms which have different connotations dependent upon the cultural background of the user. This issue was clearly highlighted in the correspondence relating to the Lausanne Treaty, the meetings between the Prime Minister and the Khilafat Delegation, and the Cairo discussions, where the importance of a mutual understanding of the terms being deployed was displayed.29 In this connection, Professor Arnold’s somewhat questionable definition of some key terms in the course of his advice to Sir Arthur Hirtzel acts a call to any Western historian, theologian, or analyst (who otherwise has an excellent grasp of the relevant theory, history, and development of an issue) to avoid assuming Western definitions of common terms. Explanations of terms need to be culturally, as well as linguistically, common before any substantive agreement or concord can be made. An appropriate understanding of the term dīn, for example, provides a window into a mindset in which religious observance and faith are not simply the domain of personal life, but a comprehensive lens through which one’s entire relationship with one’s neighbors, surrounding culture, and global view are understood.30 In a similar vein the word “democracy” has many different definitions depending upon one’s cultural and political standpoint. Specific Points Arising from the Lloyd-George–Khilafat Delegation Meetings The meetings between Prime Minister Lloyd-George and the Khilafat Delegation contain several further points which are particular to the nature of the event and it is worthwhile highlighting them separately from the flow of the conclusions already expressed.

170

Chapter Seven

Effective Debate The Prime Minister did not seek to contest, or debate, the particular points of concern that were presented to him both in relation to the validity of the Delegation’s understanding of their own doctrines and the failure to point out the obvious deficiencies in the line of argument that the Delegation was pursuing.31 Instead, he chose to attack propaganda that was suggesting that the Ottomans were being treated far worse than the defeated Christian powers.32 Clearly this was not a perspective that Lloyd-George could allow to go unchallenged with such a large Muslim population in the British Empire. However, rather than spending so long defending the government’s position, he could have usefully attacked the suppositions at the heart of the Delegation’s demands and engaged in a more fruitful dialogue that might have exposed the inconsistencies of their position.33 For, while the Prime Minister’s counterarguments achieved the desired result as far as he was concerned, the rebuffing of any demands in relation to the power of the Caliph, it simply left the Delegation frustrated, still believing in the righteousness of their cause and with the added grievance that their concerns had not been adequately dealt with. Thus, Lloyd-George’s strategy could only have ever had limited, shortterm success, which ultimately could have led to greater problems within the Imperial Muslim community. Thus, although perhaps uncomfortable at the time, an effective engagement on the specific perceptions that underlined the Delegation’s demands would, longterm, have probably forced the Delegation and wider Muslim hierarchy into a useful internal discussion on the possible inconsistencies in their position. Cause and Consequence The second point concerns the lack of foresight engendered in LloydGeorge’s positioning of the British Empire as Dar al-Islam. One might argue that this point is also closely related to points “2.1” and “2.2” insofar as it is criticizing the British Government’s use of politics in such a delicate and emotive arena. In this instance, the reason for disquiet with regard to such maneuverings is that they are rather short-term instruments which can cause long-term difficulties. For what is either not understood, or simply ignored, is the long-term consequences of Lloyd-George’s use of the rulings of the Meccan ‘ulamā and other Muslim religious bodies in order to suggest that Britain was not simply friendly toward Muslims, but in fact was Dar al-Islam, for such a stance could be used by those Muslims who might desire it as a means of introducing aspects of Islamic law and culture into Britain itself.34

Conclusions

171

Points From the Second Meeting The second meeting between Lloyd-George and the Khilafat Delegation brings to light three important points in relation to meetings where more technical religious language is being discussed. Available Experts The first is clearly the requirement for both sides to be evenly matched in terms of having expertise available to illuminate points of contention: the Khilafat Delegation had exchanged Mohamed Ali’s leadership in the first meeting, which talked in terms of general principles, for Hasan Imam’s in the second, which discussed finer points of religio-legal language and its implications.35 Politics versus Statesmanship A number of the points already made have highlighted possible difficulties that can arise from taking short-term positions in order to gain political leverage, without thinking through the possible long-term implications. The second point that arises from this second meeting also details a similar concern, this time in relation to the impact of changed circumstances in the geopolitical arena. Lloyd-George had seen his Middle Eastern policy fall apart under pressure from disaffected populace at home, a successful Turkish counterattack under Mustafa Kemal, and shortsighted policies in Mesopotamia.36 The cumulative effect of these reversals was the need to achieve some kind of success in another policy area, hence his willingness to give away more than he might otherwise have desired to the Delegation for the sake of political expediency. Such prioritizing was questionable and highlights the need for politicians to be statesmen rather than purely politicians once a position of power has been achieved. Time Pressure The final point to come out of this meeting is a very simple one and is not specific to this issue at all: the Prime Minister was attempting to hold delicate discussions in a situation where he was very time pressured and open to distraction (in this case the Division Bell calling him to vote).37 The dangers inherent in such a situation are clear and do not need to be labored.

A FINAL WORD This book began by suggesting that the most desirable outcome of this study would be the launching of an internal review of the current approach to policymaking within the British government departments that have the main remit for engagement with issues of Islamic governance: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Local Communities and

172

Chapter Seven

Government. Such a review would be most timely in relation to the strategic objectives outlined by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its UK International Priorities paper. Pronouncements by ministers in relation to this issue suggest that some of the same approaches adopted by their predecessors a little under a century ago maybe being adopted once again. If this is so then, for the reasons this book has highlighted, the matter needs to be looked at again.

NOTES 1. Rather than reusing previously cited footnotes, all footnotes in this chapter which simply contain a reference to another part of the book will be styled “T, 1, 2, 3 . . .” which shall be short for “Book, 1, 2, 3 . . .” referring to the page in the book which is being alluded to in the “Conclusions.” 2. Appendix D. 3. T, chapters 5 and 6. 4. Ibid, 74–76 and 81–92. 5. See, for example, the discussions of the two key British documents contained between T, 132–45. 6. See the discussion around the articles of Lapidus and Grotein. 7. Ibid. 8. See Appendix E. 9. The implications of this understanding for the British officials is detailed in the subsection which follows this one. 10. See background discussion at T, 81–92 and British documents at T, 132–45. 11. A fascinating and useful discussion on the place of the monarch within the developing British institutions can be found in V. Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 20–41. This would make a fascinating article upon which to base a comparative study between what eventually became an imperial monarchy and the Caliphate. 12. T, 192–206. 13. T, 194. 14. See Appendix A 15. See, for example, T, 110–11. 16. Christopher Hill’s discussion on the “Spectrum of Means” attempts to construct, through both diagram and written analysis, a quantified set of “means” for foreign policymakers in the modern world. While the discussion and the diagrams are illuminating, they simply express the broad principle outlined above: that any policymaking body on the international stage will use whatever means they feel appropriate to achieve their objectives. Hill, Foreign Policy, 134–38. 17. The historical background provided at the opening of the chapter on the Cairo files expressed this dynamic. However, for a fuller analysis and discussion of the utilization of interest groups in maintaining internal and external security in rela-

Conclusions

173

tion to Britain see Popplewell, Intelligence, 332–33. The strengths and weaknesses of subversion as a foreign policy instrument are discussed by Hill, Foreign Policy, 145–46. 18. See, for example the analysis of the meeting between the Nizām of Hyderabad and Lt. General Edwin Docke Elliot. T, 124–26. 19. Ibid. 20. FO141/773, File 4671 Report by Capt NNE Brey entitled “On the Mohammedan Question” dated March 25th, 1917. 21. Ibid., 23. 22. Many scholars have commented upon the fact that Muslim elites in India chose to turn their back on the opportunities for advancement within the Imperial apparatus that the Hindus in India embraced, following the British East India Company’s political takeover of the Subcontinent. The notable exception to this introverted reaction was Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his Aligarh School. See M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1967), 218–20; M. ul-Haq, Muslim Politics in Modern India, 1857–1947 (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1970), 112; J. Baljon, Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949), 241–43; James, Raj, 295–96; A. Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), 188. 23. The incidents of the Mahdi in the Sudan, the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate and, in the mind of the British Imperialists of the time, the 1857–1858 rebellion itself could be cited as examples of this dynamic and, in the minds of the British rulers of the time, ample evidence, should it be desired, of apparent Muslim refusal to accept non-Muslim authority. See Judd, Empire, 92–103. 24. An argument could be made for the theory that Pakistan itself was the ultimate outworking of this appeasement policy, where the interests of Muslims were used as a means to divide opposition to British rule in India, but at the same time pushed the British Indian Government into the Shari’at Act (1937), which imposed the harshest form of Islamic law in India that had been seen since the time of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. See Schacht, Islamic Law, 96–97. 25. This concern is somewhat difficult to articulate without leaving oneself open to the legitimate criticism that the first point in this section excused (while nevertheless criticizing) British manipulation of Arab nationalism on the grounds of pragmatic necessity while this point potentially criticizes that same pragmatism with regard to ignoring the plight of minorities such as Christians and Jews in order to achieve strategic advantage over the USSR through the creation of a Muslim Bloc. In order to avoid such an accusation the point should be made that the creation of an Arab Caliphate could be seen as a purely political maneuver, which did not change the status of the minorities in those lands and considerably improved the status of Arabs in relation to Ottoman rule. The use of nationalist sentiment in this way did not even need to have impinged on the status of the Ottoman Sultanate insofar as it simply removed symbolic headship of the ummah from Istanbul to Mecca, without necessarily removing Ottoman imperial control (such as it was) over the Arabian Peninsula. What would have happened in such a case is that technically, the Ottomans would have become vassals of the Meccan Caliphs and indeed could have been appointed official

174

Chapter Seven

military leaders in the manner of the earliest Caliphs who delegated their military leadership to generals, while maintaining control over the affairs of the ummah and directing jiha-d from either Mecca or later Damascus. T, 259–60. 26. See FO 371/1781, F21–32. 27. David Saunders explains the defining principles of “Realism,” (which he asserts as the dominant principle of Foreign Policy makers post–Second World War) as: “Rejecting the notion that there is or ever can be, a global harmony of interests, Realism is founded upon the assertion that, in the absence of a single ‘world government’, the nation-state can never be sure that it is safe from external threat. . . . In these circumstances, . . . the overriding objective of a given state’s foreign policy must be the achievement and maintenance of its security. This need to ensure security in turn requires both a strong defensive posture and the construction of alliances with other states which share similar security fears.” Sanders, Losing Empire, 12–13. 28. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “tolerance” as “forbearance” and “equality” as “condition of being equal.” When applying these terms in the context of citizenship, the first term does not guarantee status or rights, whereas the second term engenders a sense of all people or groups having the same access to all facilities of the law and benefits of citizenship. Thompson, Concise Dictionary, 1219, 350. 29. T, 198–201; 120–25. 30. It is accepted that, as Ruthven argues, “for any normative description of faith, belief and practice there exists important variants and considerable diversity . . .,” however, as Ruthven goes on to say, “one can be culturally Muslim, as one can be culturally Jewish, without subscribing to a particular set of beliefs . . .” and it is in the inheritance of Islam as din that one would suggest that the dynamic described above continues. One might also go on to suggest that this inherited cultural understanding also once existed in a Christian West, but has been largely lost. Ruthven, World, xviii. 31. T, 203–6. 32. Ibid. 33. See section 1. 5 in this chapter. 34. One would suggest that in the period under discussion this notion would have seemed far removed from the boundaries of possibility; whether the same could be said of Britain in the twenty-first century is perhaps less certain. 35. Qureshi opines that there were a raft of British experts in Islam present; if this was the case then they were strangely silent, surprisingly unhelpful, and not recorded among those present at the meeting in the minutes. Qureshi, Khilafat Movement, 312. 36. T, 206–7. 37. T, 211.

Appendix A

Religio-political Authority in Islam

INTRODUCTION This appendix examines the principal doctrines that form the basis for religiopolitical authority in Islam. In order to do so it focuses upon scriptural sources and etymological discussions, which include a lengthy examination of the key Qur’anic ayah on Muslim authority: Q4:59.

AUTHORITY Before getting into the discussion of Q4:59 itself, it is important to establish at the opening of this chapter exactly what is meant by “authority” in Islam and the broad scriptural principles that govern a Muslim’s relationship to it. In her entry in the Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, Jane McAuliffe seeks to define and explain the nature and concept of “authority” in Islam with reference to several Arabic words which are all used at different times in the Qur’an. According to McAuliffe, the Arabic word for “authority,” “sulta” does not occur in the Qur’an,1 although “sultan” does,2 even though it only occasionally seems to signify “authority.”3 This perspective is somewhat at odds with Edward Lane, who, in his monumental lexicon, gives the primary meaning as “prevailing,” “overcoming” or “established in superior power or force.”4 Clearly the definitions are related insofar as Lane’s explanation could be seen as a development of the definitions given by McAuliffe in the sense that the “proof” of power could be evidenced by “overcoming” another power and “establishing” a new authority.5 If accurate, this observation is

175

176

Appendix A

useful insofar as its articulation begins to reveal something of the nature of what “authority” is understood to be within Islamic theology and how that has manifested itself through Muslim history. However, while this etymological discussion on sultan is fascinating and important, the word is used only occasionally in Muslim scripture. The more frequently used words when denoting authority are “mulk” (sovereignty), “Hākim” (judgment), “quwwa” (power), “walī” (“ruler,” also “exercise of power”) and “amr” (command).6 Of these, the most frequently used term in relation to the ultimate authority of God Himself is “mulk”7 and it is the application of this word in relation to the nature of the authority of God and the delegation of His authority that will be explored below. The Divine Delegation of Authority Qur’anic references to Allah delegating His authority to an earthly being are largely to be found in relation to the work of the Prophets, where the individual prophet is given authority to make pronouncements on behalf of God,8 pronouncing judgments, preaching war, or simply delivering a word to a group or individuals.9 Within this context, obedience to prophets as the messengers of God is also stressed.10 Prophetic authority under Allah is therefore a clear, established principle in the Qur’an. Reference to the delegation of authority to other individuals is only found in four other places in the Qur’an. Two of them, Q2:30 and Q36: 28, relate specifically to the Caliphate and will therefore be discussed in the following chapter. The other two are Q3:26 and Q2:247. Q3:26 is a generalized statement focusing on the authority of God to delegate power to whomever He wills: Say: “O Allah! Lord of Power (And Rule), Thou givest power to whom Thou pleasest, and Thou strippest off power from whom Thou pleasest: Thou enduest with honor whom Thou pleasest, and Thou bringest low whom Thou pleasest: In Thy hand is all good. Verily, over all things Thou hast power.11

Even though Yusuf Ali has used the word “power” in his translation, the original Arabic does not use the term “quwwa” which was cited earlier as meaning “power”; instead it uses “mulk.”12 However, this translational ambiguity aside, the essential meaning of the text, that all sovereign authority rests with Allah and that He delegates that authority to whomever He desires, remains intact. This general principle of the sovereignty of God found in Q3:26 is developed in Q2:247, which is focused around the complaints of the people concerning Allah’s choice of sovereign over them:

Appendix A

177

Their Prophet said to them: “Allah hath appointed Talut as king over you.” They said: “How can he exercise authority over us when we are better fitted than he to exercise authority, and he is not even gifted, with wealth in abundance?” He said: “Allah hath chosen him above you, and hath gifted him abundantly with knowledge and bodily prowess: Allah granteth His authority to whom He pleaseth. Allah careth for all, and He knoweth all things.”13

This is interesting for two reasons: firstly, because it is explicitly stated that the ruler, a monarch in this case, was chosen by Allah and equipped by Him for the role that he was given. Thus, the choice of leader is God-ordained, even though the people are not very happy about God’s choice. This concept of the imperfection of human authority, even though chosen and equipped by God, is also seen in the discussion of Q2:30 in the following chapter, where the angels complain about God delegating His authority to Adam. The Qur’an therefore tends to see human authority as flawed but, even with the knowledge of its imperfect rule, God has chosen mankind, whether individuals or as a race, to be His delegated leaders over His creation.14 Secondly, the people complain to “their prophet,” who calls them to obey Allah’s choice. This is interesting in terms of understanding the nature of delegated earthly authority because the supplication of the people to their prophet carries the implied principle that although delegation to sovereign human authority takes place, the authority for it comes from God as relayed by His prophet and the authority of the Prophet himself as the conduit of God’s Will is emphasized once again. In the light of this verse, one could therefore conclude that an obedience to authority which is rooted in God and delegated to any earthly authority via the medium of a prophet is established in the Qur’an. In the Hadith, the word “mulk” occurs in a variety of situations, most frequently to do with the question of who should lead the ummah.15 In this the Traditions appear to be in line with the Qur’an, for the explicit assumption present in all the reports is that God has delegated his authority to a human being, and as such loyalty is owed to the leader by virtue of his appointment by Allah and through the authority of Muhammad as a Prophet.16 Conditional or Unconditional Obedience? All the evidence presented thus far therefore appears to point toward the establishment of the principle of unconditional obedience in relation to earthly authority under the caveat that those who are in authority will be questioned about their errors and transgressions once they have died. This appears to establish the principle of accountability from above, through judgment after

178

Appendix A

death, but no accountability to the subject.17 On the surface, this principle remains consistent throughout the Qur’an with the exception of Q76:24, in which Allah, after showing His followers a vision of their future rewards, calls them “to obey neither a sinner nor a disbeliever among them . . .”18 As this ayah would appear to be at odds with so much of the rest of the Qur’an, its categorical statement appears on the surface to be somewhat contradictory. However, one possible explanation for the apparent contradiction could be that in the ayahs that appear to enjoin unconditional obedience, an assumption of Muslim headship is made. The Hadith are more explicit on the question of conditional obedience; several reports, attributed to Muhammad himself and found in Bukhari, Muslim, and Abu Dawud, call Muslims to obey rulers conditionally: Narrated by ‘Abdullah: The Prophet said, “A Muslim has to listen to and obey

(the order of his ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders involve not one in disobedience (to Allah), but if an act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed one should not listen to it or obey it.”19 “Obey ruler except if his order involves disobedience to Allah.”20 “One should not obey orders leading to sinful deeds—only those leading to good deeds.”21

Thus, the concept of conditional obedience is inextricably entwined with the ruler’s obedience to the Law of God, making itself the ultimate repository of God’s delegated authority on earth. This brief survey therefore suggests that the legitimacy of any human authority is predicated firstly upon ordination by Allah and secondly its implementation of the Law of God.22 The natural question arising from this concerns whether there are any guidelines as to the nature and background of those humans called to rule under the Law of God. Q2:247 and Q3:26 express the ordination of human headship by Allah, but they cover only a generalized understanding of its existence, rather than the specific explanation of what constitutes human rule under the Law of God.23 It is in this context that an examination of the translation and exegesis of Q4:59 becomes important, for in doing so, a possible answer to the question posed above is illuminated while narrowing the focus down from the broad principles discussed to this point, to a concentration upon the Caliphate itself.

ÂYAH TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Q4:59 is the ayah cited most frequently in relation to Islamic political power, for it is quoted in numerous websites and publications.24

Appendix A

179

Therefore, in light of the enormous importance attached to this verse, it is worthwhile spending some time examining the main English translations available and discussing the exegesis, making clear the grammatical nuances and explaining the choices on offer to the translator. As will be seen, much of the significance of the verse comes from how one key phrase contained in the verse is interpreted; for it is in the changing interpretation of this phrase that the theological justification for Pan-Islamic and salafīs calls for Islamic self-rule can be found.25 In order to begin to develop an understanding of the differing choices available to the translator and the implications of the choices they make, a table of current English language translations of Q4:59 is provided at Appendix B.26 The presence of the translations in this tabulated form highlights the potential change in translation and exegetical choice available to the scholar, particularly in reference to the key phrase “those in authority among you,” for it is in the rendition of this phrase that the translator is faced with the choice of vital political import. It is therefore important to spend some time analyzing both the potential translation and the exegetical interpretations of the ayah that have been offered from among eminent Muslim scholars over the centuries. Transliterated Arabic Rendition of Surah “Al-Nisa,” Ayah 59 In order to provide a reference point for the discussion that follows, the Arabic text of the ayah is provided. The key portion of the text from the political perspective is highlighted in boldtype.

Ya- ayyuha- al-ladhiina amanu- atı-‘u- alla-ha wa atı-‘u- ar-rasu- la wa u-lii al-a-mri minkum fa’in tana-za‘tum fi shay’in faruddu-hu ila alla-hi wa ar-rasu-li ‘in kuntum tu’minu-na billa-hi wa al-yawmi al-a-khiri dha-lika khayrun wa ahsanu ta’wı-la-n

As can be seen from the table there has been a change in the way that this important phrase has been translated into English over the centuries. Right from Sale through to Arberry, the British translators have generally left their renditions of u-lı- al-a-mri minkum open to interpretation with the phrase “those in authority among you.” However, with the notable exception of Yusuf Ali’s translation, the rendition has been altered by the modern Muslim translators to “those in authority from among you.” Or the more explicit use of the word “Muslim” used in place of the “from,” with either word bracketed in several of the translations.

180

Appendix A

This is important because the insertion of the word “from” significantly alters the verse’s possible interpretations, for, without the “from” the phrase appears to suggest that Muslims need to obey whoever is in authority over them, whether Muslim or not, yet when the “from” is added, that interpretation becomes impossible. The earlier discussion on the general principles of “authority” in the Qur’an and Hadith showed that apparent contradictions between differing texts could only be explained if an assumption of Islamic authority over Muslims are made. One could argue therefore that this explanation renders any further discussion of the nature of “those in authority over you” irrelevant. However, as such an explanation is simply a convenient explanatory tool, rather than a clear doctrine with solid scriptural foundation, it seems reasonable to explore all possible interpretations, especially in the light of the fact that Muslim exegetes have differed among themselves over the centuries concerning who “those in authority among you” might be. There are therefore two essential issues that should be dealt with in order to satisfactorily render an accurate translation of the phrase; the first is grammatical, focused around whether it is possible to give an exact English equivalent to the Arabic word transliterated minkum, which is made up of two morphemes: min and kum. The second issue is interpretive and will be dealt with as exegesis. minkum Turning first to the translation of min and kum; apart from Lane’s monumental work, the two primary works on English-Arabic translation are John Penrice’s Qur’anic Dictionary,27 produced in the later Victorian period, and Hans Wehr’s post–Second World War Arabic-English dictionary.28 Penrice’s and Wehr’s approaches to the language are entirely different in perspective: Penrice is concerned with using the Qur’an as a basis for understanding Arabic as a language.29 In contrast, Wehr used periodicals, journals, private papers, belles lettres, and official documents from all over the Arab-speaking world in order to arrive at an understanding of the language in its modern form.30 These alternative approaches are important to bear in mind when examining the definitions that each offers. Penrice defines min as: . . . a preposition signifying origin, composition, explanation, commencement or separation; in its ordinary acceptation it is equivalent to of, from, or out of; or, when following a comparative, than; but it may occasionally be rendered on, by, by reason of, some or a portion of, of the same kind as, after the manner of, etc. . . .31

Appendix A

181

And he explains kum with the brief statement, affixed masc. pronoun of the second pers. Plur. You, Your; . . .32

Wehr’s translations of min are generally the same as Penrice’s, the only difference being that, in modern Arabic, its idiomatic usage has hugely expanded its possible renderings.33 The word kum appears in his dictionary with the same translations as those of Penrice.34 It seems clear therefore that the word kum presents a straightforward rendering; “you” plural is the only possibility (as all the translators have agreed). However, given the wide selection of possible translations for min it would seem necessary to look elsewhere in the verse for grammatical clues as to how the word should be translated. The proper use of the word min is from, when it follows from a place or an active verb, neither of which occurs in this phrase. However, when it is governing a pronoun, it changes meaning to among; thus rendering the phrase among you, rather than from you. One must therefore question why those translators who have done so have chosen to add in from, while retaining the among, which cannot be correct. ‘u-lii al-‘a-mri One of the earliest exegetes, Muqatil b. Sulayman al-Balkhi (d.767),35 suggests that the whole phrase ‘u-lii al-‘a-mri minkum was given with reference to Khalid b. al-Walid, a military commander, who had a disagreement with his sub-commander, ‘Ammar b. Yasir, over the status of prisoners of war.36 Apparently Khalid admonished ‘Ammar for insubordination, and when the two returned to Medina, Muhammad understood why ‘Ammar had done what he had, but upheld Khalid’s charge of insubordination, at which ‘Ammar angrily left. Muhammad told Khalid to follow and apologize, but ‘Ammar refused to listen, at which point, according to Muqatil, what is now Q4:59 was given.37 This military interpretation is further evidenced by al-Bukhari (d.870)38; however, he relates that it was given instead to ‘Abd Allah b. Hadhafa, when he was sent on a military campaign by Muhammad.39 Both versions of this story are found in al-Tabari’s (d.923)40 commentary on Q4:59, along with two alternate versions of the Hadhafa story. The first states that all the Companions were sent on the expedition whereas the other does not name the individual who was sent campaigning.41 In his seminal work on shari’a, the Risala, al-Shaafi’i (d.820), reported that the military interpretation had found favor with many scholars of the time and, moreover, that the phrase “those in authority” refers to the commanders of Muhammad’s army.42 Interestingly though, the translator of the Risala

182

Appendix A

also includes al-Tabari and al-Baydawi’s (d. 1286)43 broader interpretation, which moves away from the exclusively military concept of authority, to the “leaders in matters of religion and law,”44 although al-Baydawi continues to reiterate the necessity for the leader to be “in the way of truth” in order for the community to follow him.45 An alternative early explanation for this phrase comes from the tafsīr of Ibn Mujahid (d.721)46 who explains that the verse was given with reference to those with critical insight, opinion and virtue and that the u-lii al-‘a-mri were learned scholars, the ‘ulamā.47 This view is shared by Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanani (d. 805)48 who also refers to Mujahid for authority and quotes a Hadith of Abu Hurayra in which Muhammad explains Q4:59: Whoever obeys me obeys God; whoever disobeys me disobeys God, and whoever obeys my commander obeys me, and whoever disobeys me disobeys my commander.49

Al-Tabari also provides an extensive list of scholars whose interpretations are in line with those of Mujahid and who also believed that the verse referred to the Companions specifically.50 However, other reports are specific to one or other of the Companions, rather than being generalized. Only one of al-Tabari’s reports (attributed to the Companion Ubayy b. Ka’b) shows the meaning of the phrase to be “political rulers” (as-salatin). This is a somewhat suspect Hadith however, given that the title Sultan did not come into usage until well after the period of the Companions.51 As with al-Zamakshari (d.1144),52 al-Tabari does not divulge which interpretation he agrees with. However, al-Razi (d.1209),53 writing about three centuries later, lists the same interpretations as al-Tabari, before moving on to a discussion of his own understanding. Al-Razi appears convinced that the verse referred to neither the Companions, scholars, military commanders, nor political leaders, but to the jurists.54 His interpretation is centered on the concept of the “ahl al-hal wa-l-‘aqd” (people that loosen and bind), which in Muslim judicial literature refers to the jurists alone as having the potential to create the nature of the community.55 His argument is founded upon the idea that only the jurist can command and prohibit on the basis of religious law; therefore, it is they who must be obeyed, since it is they who have the benefit of theological knowledge and insight.56 This interpretation is important in relation to the theo-political and historical discussion concerning the primacy of the Caliphs and the ‘ulamā over doctrine in the following chapter. The exegete, Ibn Kathir (d.1373),57 writing in the fourteenth century, also recorded the traditions of Al-Bukhari, Abu Dawud, Abu Hurayrah, and Mujahid when discussing this verse.58 He again records the various military, judicial, political, and scholarly interpretations. However, he also allows spe-

Appendix A

183

cifically for non-Muslim leadership. This departure from the other interpreters should be understood in the historical context of when it was written. For it was a period during which rapidly advancing Mongol hordes and internal squabbling among rival Islamic rulers were producing a crisis which threatened the very existence of the Caliphate. This new interpretation provided for Muslim compliance toward non-Muslim rule at a time when many Muslim lands were beginning to experience just that. The important question here is whether Ibn Kathir is drawing out an interpretation that was always feasible, or whether it was a purely expedient understanding. In one sense, the question is unanswerable without his personal papers, however, given the fact that this appears to be the first time this interpretation has been suggested, it seems likely that it was not one that had been in circulation previously. If true, this embellishes the case for assumed headship when interpreting the verse. As with the other exegetes discussed already, the traditions that Ibn Kathir reports give some background as to the possible circumstances in which the verse was handed down and the interpretation (through secondary sources) of Muhammad himself. What is particularly fascinating about Ibn Kathir’s explanations is a little nugget thrown in at the end of the tradition related by ‘Ali, in which it is reported that Muhammad said, “Obedience is only in righteousness.”59 This intriguing comment appears to highlight and further expose the conditional nature of loyalty within the early ummah; a principle which is elucidated further through another tradition recorded by Ibn Kathir on the authority of Abu Dawud: A Muslim is required to hear and obey what he likes and dislikes, unless he is commanded to sin.60

This Hadith was also given at the time of a military expedition and is qualified by another, recorded by Al-Bukhari, in which Muhammad is recorded as saying that even a slave should be obeyed, if he were appointed over them.61 In the modern period, there have been several differing interpretations of the verse by both Arabic and Indian scholars: notable among them are Rashid Rida (d.1935)62 and Muhammad Abduh (d.1905)63 in their Tafsı-r al-manar, Sayyid Qutb’s (d.1966)64 In the Shade of the Qur’an, and Sayyid Abul ‘Ala Maududi’s Towards Understanding the Qur’an. It is worthwhile spending some time evaluating their opinions as the writers noted above represent prominent reformist Muslims of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as well as all originating from either Egypt or India, the principal areas of analysis for this book other than Britain. Qutb applies a generalized statement when dealing specifically with the interpretation of this phrase. For him the basic principle is that anyone from within the Muslim community who has been given authority needs to be

184

Appendix A

obeyed.65 This interpretation is echoed in the work of Rida and Abduh. Rida and Abduh open up Razi’s narrow interpretation of “the people that loosen and bind” to include military and political leaders although their interpretation is more defined than Qutb’s.66 However, in one sense they still place the jurists at the uppermost points of the authority pyramid insofar as the other political rulers are bound by the legal opinions handed down by the jurists.67 Thus for Qutb, the supremacy of the “Law of God” became personified in the person of the jurist whose job it is to expound and judge matters based upon it. As shall be seen, this posed a serious question for the Caliph and any would-be candidates. For Maududi, as for Qutb, “those in authority” are simply people who have authority over Muslims and are “entrusted with directing Muslims in matters of common concern.”68 He is clear that Muslims owe a duty of obedience to all such people. However, he specifies that “those in authority” need to be Muslims and that they must be obedient to God themselves.69 In elucidating this principle, he appears to be very much in line with the doctrines already established in the examination of the Qur’an and Hadith references discussed earlier. Indeed, within the confines of the parameters he lays out, the leaders of the Islamic community to whom obedience is owed include groups that would have been recognizable to the original seventh century ummah. These included tribal chiefs, local administrators, judges and local representatives.70 However, for Maududi’s South Asian compatriot, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898),71 the interpretation of “those in authority” is far different: for he broadens out the concept of obedience to authority to include non-Muslims in authority over Muslims as well.72 In this, he follows the lead of Ibn Kathir and one might remark on the similar circumstances that might have fed into their tafsīrs, for Ibn Kathir was writing under the threat of imminent Mongol conquest and his interpretation permitted Muslims to adapt to the new conditions they found themselves in. This is also true of Sayyid Ahmad Khan who was also living at a time when the British hold on the Subcontinent was at its height. His interpretation might be said to have accomplished for Indian Muslims in the Raj what Ibn Kathir’s did for medieval Persian Muslims. In the modern era, those Western scholars who have examined this verse have shied away from a full exegetical explanation, but instead have chosen to highlight what they believe the purpose of the verse to be. For example, Bernard Lewis avoids any discussion of the original meaning of the Arabic, even though he displays his clear knowledge of the language elsewhere, choosing instead to opine that the intention of the verses’ revelation was both to bind the ruler to God and the Law as well as the subject to God and Law.73 In making this chain of links, Lewis then points out that civil disobedience

Appendix A

185

becomes not only illegal, but sinful. This obvious and yet easily overlooked dynamic suggests remarkable parallels with the medieval European “Golden Chain” theory of social harmony.74

CONCLUSIONS An understanding of the concept of “authority” in Islam should take close account of the doctrine of the overarching sovereignty of God made explicit in ayahs such as Q23:88 and Q24:42.75 From that fundamental basis the central issue revolves around whom God delegates his authority to and the power they hold within that context. Q3:26 suggests that all human authority on earth was ordained by Him, yet at the same time, there appears to be an emphasis within the Qur’an upon the authority of God being delegated to prophets, both pre-Muhammad and through the medium of Muhammad himself. This delegation of authority to prophets is not done simply in order to convey messages from God to man, but is also done for the purpose of allowing prophets to act as judges over fellow humans as seen in Q2:213. It also permits the prophet to become part of the link in the “chain of authority” that stretches from God, through the prophet via His law to any earthly ruler.76 Given that fact it is therefore slightly inconsistent to not include the “Law of God” in the chain of command found in the opening of Q4:59. At the same time Q2:247 shows that obedience is owed to the earthly authority, which is not specified as either Muslim or non-Muslim, because God has ordained that that ruler should be in power.77 However, it seems clear that, with the injunctions both in the Qur’an and Hadith concerning disobedience to those who do not rule by the Law of God, what at first appears to be unconditional obedience to any authority becomes instead conditional obedience to those who rule by the Law of God. This became the founding principle for the Muslim reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth century: The Islamic state must, therefore, be founded upon God’s laws delivered through the Prophet. Prescriptions or proscriptions laid down by rulers and governments will bear authority and be legitimate only to the extent that they rest directly upon what God has decreed or follow from it. If a government disregards the law revealed by God, its authority will not be binding upon Muslims.78

From the discussions outlined above it is clear that the question of who “those in authority” might be has enormous significance. For most of the period of interpretation, the exegesis was written under the umbrella of Muslim authority and the assumption of Muslim headship in the interpretations of

186

Appendix A

the early and medieval exegetes seems clear. However, as soon as that preeminence was threatened by non-Muslim power, the interpretation changed to include non-Muslim authority as well. This dynamic of the exegetical interpretation of “political scriptures” being in line with the circumstances of the time can be seen all through the history of Islamic political theory (as shall be seen in the next chapter with specific relation to the Caliphate). What has changed in modern reformist Qur’anic exegesis was that the context of the interpretations no longer became the framer of the interpretation, rather, it became the medium through which the ideology of struggle could be developed insofar as the context of the exegesis became the “cause célèbre,” rather than the parameters of it. Thus, the exegesis was given either without regard to the circumstances of the time or with the express desire of creating dissatisfaction with those circumstances and therefore, making the exegetical literature itself a catalyst for political activism. With the accurate interpretation of Q4:59 and the other āyahs discussed in this chapter being of such significance and yet difficult to unequivocally define, the ultimate understanding of this doctrine of obedience to Muslim and non-Muslim leadership could be seen to rest outside of the interpretation of the words themselves, within an accurate placement of when the various ayahs were given. Bukhaari’s Hadith, as well as the interpretations of Muqatil and al-Tabari, state that the verse was given in connection with military leadership; if this was indeed the case, then it would seem reasonable to suggest that this must have happened after Muhammad’s hijra at a time when his military strength was growing, placing it therefore sometime around or after the Battle of Badr.79 This would be in line with Watt’s opinion that it was in this period that the majority of the verses containing the phrase “Obey God, Obey the Messenger . . .” were given.80 Should this be proved accurate then this would suggest that “those in authority” assumed Islamic headship. If, however, it could be shown that the verse was handed down in the pre-hijra phase, when Muhammad was under persecution in Mecca, then the implicit assumption of Islamic headship would be far harder to argue. Therefore, while the headship of Muslims over Muslims can be reasonably implied when analyzing and interpreting an Islamic scriptural understanding of the relationship between God, Muhammad, the Law, and human rulers, it cannot be regarded as unassailable. Indeed, it has been shown that, when the geopolitical situation has demanded it, an explanation of the nature of “those in authority among you” which omits an implicit understanding of the necessity of Muslim headship over Muslims becomes feasible, providing that it can be shown that the non-Muslim ruler is ruling according to the “Law of God.” However, the pivotal question of what constitutes the “Law of God” cannot be answered from scripture, leaving open the possibility that any judicial system which is based upon the “Law of God” could be legitimate.

Appendix A

187

NOTES 1. See J. McAuliffe, “Authority,” Encyclopedia of the Qur’an, Vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 188. Penrice defines the root salita as “to be hard.” J. Penrice, A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran (New Delhi: Low Price Publications: 1873), 71. 2. McAuliffe, “Authority,” 188; Lewis highlights the frequency of the use of wâli in the Qur’an and Traditions. B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 34. 3. McAuliffe suggests that it usually denotes “proof” or “argument.” McAuliffe, “Authority,” 188. 4. E. W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon: Derived from the Best and the Most Copious Eastern Sources, Book 1, Vol. 4 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1893), 1405–1406. 5. This supports the notion of the proof of the superiority of one god over another being expressed in battlefield success and conquest as suggested by Patricia Crone in her recently published book, Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 366–67. 6. McAuliffe, “Authority,” 188. 7. For example see Q3:26; Q5:40; Q9:116. Lane defines mulk as “Dominion, sovereignty, kingship, rule, mastership, ownership, possession, right of possession, authority, sway.” Citing the grammarian Murtada az-Zibîdî for authority. Lane, Lexicon, Book 1, Vol. 8, Supplement. The use of the term “sovereignty” in connection to the powers of the Caliph following the Ottoman defeat in World War I is covered in detail in the chapter entitled “The Lausanne Conference and ‘the spiritual powers of the Caliph’ Correspondence.” 8. This delegation is frequently accompanied by proof: Q11:96; Q4:114. 9. See Q5:44; Q8:64–65; Q8:70; Q9:61; Q22:52; Q23:23; Q33:28; Q33:45; Q33:59; Q43:6. 10. For example Q3:32; Q3:132 and Q4:80. 11. Ali, Qur’an, 146. 12. It is interesting to note that al-Hilali and Shakir both translate the same word “kingdom” in their renditions, while two British scholars Pickthall and Rodwell are more divided with Pickthall using “sovereignty” and Rodwell using “power.” al-Hilali, M., Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur’an in the English Language: A Summarized Version of At-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with comments from Sahih Al-Bukhari (Maktaba: Dar-us-Salam, 1993); M. H. Shakir, The Holy Qur’an (Qum: Al-Ansarian Publications, 1974); M. Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Qur’an: Text and Explanatory Translation (Illinois: Library of Islam, 1970); J. M. Rodwell, The Koran, Translated From the Arabic (London and New York: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd, 1909). 13. Y. Ali, The Holy Qur’an, Translation and Commentary (Lahore: Islamic Propagation Centre International, 1934), 111. 14. With the lack of “Original Sin” and “Free-Will” Doctrines, the reason why Allah would choose to operate in this fashion is difficult to understand. 15. See for example Bukhari, Sahih, Vol. 4, Book 56, Hadith 822; Vol. 5, Book 59, Hadith 645.

188

Appendix A

16. A detailed exegesis of Q4:59 which discusses precisely this point will form the second part of this chapter. However, other verses such as Q3:26 already mentioned and Q3:32, Q3:132, Q5:91, Q8:1, Q8:20, Q8:24, Q8:46, Q9:74, Q24:54, Q33:33, Q47:33, Q48:14, Q58:13, Q64:12 also highlight this dynamic. 17. This dynamic is seen in a Hadith in Bukhari, Sahih, Vol. 1, Book 5, Hadith 176: “Narrated by Ibn Abbas: The Prophet said, ‘Whoever disapproves of something done by his ruler then he should be patient, for whoever disobeys the ruler even a little will die as those who died in the Pre-Islamic Period of Ignorance.’” See also Vol. 1, Book 50, Hadith 50; Vol. 1, Book 3, Hadith 661. 18. Al-Hilali, Qur’an. 19. Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 261, Hadith 258. 20. Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book 128, Hadith 203; Muslim, Vol. 3, Book 1022, Hadith 4535; Abu-Dawud, Vol. 3, Book 1180, Hadith 4236. 21. Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 271, Hadith 363. 22. This principle was established by the first Caliph Abu Bakr, who, when he was appointed, called on the ummah to obey him as long as his leadership was in line with the teachings of Muhammad. See Arnold, Caliphate, 32. 23. For a more in-depth discussion of this area see M. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 24. Its importance is reflected in Muslim literature from Sayyid Ahmad Khan in his pamphlet The Truth about the Khaliphat, Ahmad Khan, comp. (New Delhi: Khosla Bros, 1920), 6. Further examples can be found on current Caliphatist websites such as www.amanah.com; www.Caliphate.co.uk; www.khalifah.com, all of whom cite it with frequency, as does the Muslim Brotherhood website, www.ikhwanweb .com. 25. It should also be noted that general issues around the central theme of Islamic government, such as the question of whether the Islamic notion of “shura” is the same as that of Western democracy, or whether it is the duty of Muslims to fight to create the Caliphate, lie outside of the purview of this book. The single focus of this chapter is the delegation of divine authority, the establishment of Muslim scriptural justification for Pan-Islamic governance, and the duty of obedience of the subject to their ruler. 26. See also Oliver-Dee, Islamic Citizenship, 33–36. 27. J. Penrice, A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1873). 28. H. Wehr, Arabic-English Dictionary, Compacted Version, J. M. Cowan, ed., (Ithaca, NY: Otto Harrassowitz KG, 1994). 29. As stated in his preface, Penrice, A Dictionary and Glossary, 3. 30. Wehr, Arabic-English Dictionary, vi. 31. Penrice, Dictionary, 140. 32. Ibid., 127. 33. Wehr, Dictionary, 1084–85. 34. Ibid., 982. 35. EI2, 1, 212–13. 36. I. Ghuldfild, Kitab tafsı-r al-Khams mi’at ayah min al-Qur’an ‘an Muqatil Ibn Sulayman (Shafa’Amr, Israel: Tubi’a fi Ma. tba’at Dar al-Mashriq, 1980), 246.

Appendix A

189

37. Both Rippin and Versteegh express doubts about the quality and accuracy of Muqatil’s tafsı-r. Versteegh criticizes Muqatil’s lack of rigorous scholarship and Rippin includes Muqatil’s work in his discussion of the historicity of the early tafsı-r texts. See K. Versteegh, Landmarks in Linguistic Thought III; The Arabic Linguistic Tradition (London: Routledge, 1997), 12–16; A. Rippin, “Al-Zuhri, ‘Naskh al-Qur’an’ and the Problem of Early ‘Tafsir’ Texts,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1984), 22–43. 38. EI2, 1, 284–86. 39. al-Bukhari, Vol. 6, Book 170, Hadith 376. Cf. slight variant of this Hadith at Vol. 8, Book 78, Hadith 619. 40. EI2, 7, 359–62. 41. Al-Tabari, Commentary on the Qur’an, Vol. 4 (Abridged Translation with Introduction and Notes by J. Cooper) (Oxford: OUP, Hakim Investment Holdings Limited, 1987), 150–51. Walid Saleh in his book on the formation of tafsı-r is critical of al-Tabari’s methods and findings. However, he does admit al-Tabari’s tafsı-r as the first comprehensive version of the Sunni tradition. W. A. Saleh, The Formation of the Classical Tafsı-r Tradition: The Qur’an Commentary of al-Tha’labi (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 133, 156. 42. Al-Shafi’i, Risala, trans. M. Khaddari (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1987), 112–13. 43. EI2, Vol. 1, 189–91. 44. Ibid. 112. Footnote 5. Baydawi’s tafsı-r is also published in its own right as Tafsir al-Baydawi al-musamma Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrar al-Ta’wil, Five Vols. (Beruit: Dar al-Fikr, 1996). His commentary on Q4:59 is to be found in Vols. 2, 605–6. 45. Tafsir al-Baydawi, Vol. 2, 606. 46. EI2, 6, 112–15. 47. Tafsir Ibn Mujahid, Vol. 1, 162–63. Yeshayahu Goldfeld explores Ibn Mujahid’s contribution to the development of early exegesis; this useful article tends to take for granted, however, the authenticity of Ibn Mujahid’s work, along with the other exegetes, omitting the questions posed in Rippin’s article. Y. Goldfeld, “The Development of Theory on Qur’anic Exegesis in Islamic Scholarship,” Studia Islamica, No. 67 (1988), 5–27. Cf. Rippin, “Problem of Early ‘Tafsīr’ Texts,” 28–31. 48. EI2, 5, 92–93. 49. tafsı-r ‘Abd al-Razzaq, Vol. 1 (Beruit: Dar al-Fikr, 1999), 464–65. The report of ‘Abu Hurayrah is found at two different points in Bukhari’s Hadith collection: Vol. 1, Book 4, Hadith 204, and Vol. 9, Book 254, Hadith 251, with the former saying “chief” and the later “ruler.” Perhaps this apparently slight discrepancy could be due to a later translation where, with the increased sophistication of Islamic government, “ruler” seemed more applicable than “chief.” Harald Motzki used the example of al-San’ani work in order to re-examine the contentions of Goldziher and Schacht that the early collections of Hadith could not be relied upon as historical resources, concluding that the work of al-San’ani showed a far greater integrity that Schacht and Goldziher were willing to credit the early exegetes in general. H. Motzki, “The Musannaf of Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanani as a Source of Authentic Ahadith of the First Century A. H. ,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1991), 1–21.

190

Appendix A

50. Al-Tabari, Vol. 4, 152. 51. This will be discussed later in the “Nature of the Caliphate” section which follows. 52. Zamakshari’s commentary on Q4:59 can be found in al-Kashshaf ‘an haqa’iq al-tanzil wa ‘uyun al-aqawil, Vol. 1 (Beruit: Dar al-Fikr, n. d. ), 536–37. 53. EI2, 3, 231–33. 54. Cf. Yasin Ceylan who quotes extensively from al-Razi’s monumental exegetical work “‘al-Tafsı-r al-Kabir” throughout his discussion of al-Razi’s work in Theology and Tafsı-r in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1996), which is primarily concerned with al-Razi’s metaphysical views, but which also briefly discusses the interpretation of this verse in relation to the authority of Allah. 231–32. 55. See J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 110; D. B. MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory (New York: Clarendon Press, 1903), 23. 56. Ibid. The struggle between the ‘ulama- and the Caliphs over control of religious interpretation is dealt with in the following chapter within the context of a historical development of Islamic political theory. 57. EI2, 8, 391–94. 58. Ibn Kathir, Tafsı-r, Abridged English Version, trans. A. Daryabadi (Medina: Dar Ibn Kathir, 2004), 92–94. Firestone makes some interesting observations on Ibn Kathir’s exegetical approach in the course of his article on the Qur’anic teachings on war. R. Firestone, “Disparity and Resolution in the Quranic Teachings on War: A Reevaluation of a Traditional Problem,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 56, No. 1 (1997), 1–19. 59. Ibid., 92. 60. Ibid., 93. 61. Ibid., 94. 62. EI2, 8, 446–47. 63. EI2, 1, 179–82. 64. EI2, 9, 117–18. 65. S. Qutb, In the Shade of the Qur’an, A. Sahahi and A. Shamis, trans. and ed. (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 2001), 196–97. 66. Qutb’s commentary on this surah is surprisingly vague. He seeks to apply the general principle of leadership within al-hakimiyya. For more in-depth discussion of Qutb’s theories in this area see S. Khatab, “Hakimiyya and jahiliiyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb,” Middle Eastern Studies, January 2002. 67. R. Rida and M. Abduh, Tafsı-r al-Manar, Vol. 5 (Beruit: Dar Ehia al-ma’roof bitafsir al-manar, 2002), 150. The contribution of this tafsı-r to the development of the modern Islamic reform movement is discussed by Nasr Abu Zayd although he appears disinclined to engage with the issue of “pragmatism” in the ideas of this tafsı-r and those of Maududi and Qutb. N. A. Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 27–31, 37–40. 68. A. Maududi, Towards Understanding the Quran, Vol. 2, Z. Ansari, trans. and ed. (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1989), 51.

Appendix A

191

69. Ibid. 70. Ibid, 53. 71. EI2, 5, 357–60. 72. Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s tafsı-r is only available in Urdu. However, his views can be reasonably inferred from an article he published in the Aligarh Institute Gazette of February 2, 1889 in which he said, “I hope that the people who call themselves Wahhabi . . . will also be very strict in the doctrine that one can never oppose a government of which one is a subject—whether that government is represented by Christians or by Jews, or by Pagans—as long as it does not interfere in religious matters.” As quoted in J. M. S. Baljon, Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sayyid Ahmed Khan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949), 20. 73. B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), 91. 74. This notion is examined in S. H. Nasr, Islamic Cosmological Traditions, revised ed. (Bath: Thomas and Hudson, 1978), 66–74. 75. See also Hadith such as Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 33, Hadith 621. 76. Seen in Q2:247 pre-Muhammad and numerous times, such as Q4:59 in relation to Muhammad. 77. This includes the injunction to obey even the Ethiopian slave if he becomes a ruler. Bukhari, Vol. 9, Book 192, Hadith 256 and 258; Vol. 1, Book 376, Hadith 664; Muslim, Vol. 3, Book 1021, Hadith 4525. Cf. P. Crone, “Even an Ethiopian Slave: The Transformation of a Sunni Tradition,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 57 No. 1 In honour of J. E. Wansbrough (1994). 78. C. J. Adams summarising Maududi’s “Islamic Law and Constitution” in “Maududi and the Islamic State” in J. L. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (New York, Oxford: OUP, 1983), 115. Cf. on the Shi’a tradition: Imam R. Khomeini, The Necessity for Islamic Government,” in Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 40, H. Algar, trans. although it can be argued that its origins were laid in the period of cod ification under the early Abbasids which therefore suggests that the reformers were re-discovering old formulas and doctrines that had become buried under the mass of interpretation that had built up over the intervening centuries. See I. M. Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1975), 382–83. 79. A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah (Karachi: OUP, 1955), 167–75. 80. W. M. Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 24. Bell makes the interesting observation that this verse was not originally part of the surah, that it was dropped in at a later date. R. Bell, The Qur’an Translated Volume I (London: T and T Clark, 1937), 122.

Appendix B

Table of Translations Q4:59

Translation 1

Sale

Rodwell2

Arberry3

Dawood4

Al-Hilali5

Yusuf Ali6

Q4:59 O true believers, obey God and obey the apostle, and those in authority among you: and if ye differ in anything, refer it unto God and the apostle, if ye believe in God and the last day: this is better, and a fairer method of determination. O ye who believe! obey God and obey the apostle, and those amoung [sic] you who are invested with authority: and if in aught ye differ, bring it before God and the apostle, if ye believe in God and in the latter day. This is the best and fairest way of settlement. (62) O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. If you should quarrel on anything, refer it to God and the Messenger, if you believe in God and the Last Day; that is better, and fairer in the issue. Believers, obey Allah and the Apostle and those in authority among you. Should you disagree about anything refer it to Allah and the Apostle, if you truly believe in Allah and the Last Day. This will in the end be better and more just. O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger (Muhammad) and those of you (Muslims) who are in authority. (And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you believe in Allah and in the Last Day. That is better and more suitable for final determination. O ye who believe! obey Allah and obey the Apostle and those charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves refer it to Allah and His Apostle if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: that is best and most suitable for final determination. (continued)

193

194

Appendix B

Translation 7

Palmer

Asad8

Shakir9

Q4:59 (62) O ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle and those in authority amongst you; and if ye quarrel about anything, refer to God and the Apostle, if ye believe in God and the Last Day; that is better and fairer as a settlement. (59) O you who have attained to faith! Pay heed unto God, and pay heed unto the Apostle and unto those from among you who have been entrusted with authority: and if you are at variance over any matter, refer it unto God and to the Apostle, if you [truly] believe in God and in the Last Day. This is the best [for you], and best in the end. O you who believe! obey Allah and obey the Apostle and those in authority from among you; then if you quarrel about anything, refer it to Allah and the Apostle, if you believe in Allah and the last day; this is better and very good in the end.

NOTES 1. G. Sale, The Koran, Translated into English from the Original Arabic, With Explanatory Notes from the Most Approved Commentators (London and New York: Frederick Warne and Co. Ltd., 1734). 2. J. M. Rodwell, The Koran, (London: Phoenix, 1992 (First Published: Everyman, 1909)). 3. A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (London, New York, Karachi: OUP, 1964). 4. N. J. Dawood, The Koran: Translated with Notes, (London: Penguin, 1999 (First Published 1956)). 5. M. al-Hilali and M. Khan, Interpretion of the Meanings of The Noble Qur’an in the English Language: A Summarized Version of At-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with comments from Sahih Al-Bukhari (Maktaba: Dar-us-Salam, 1993). 6. Y. Ali, The Holy Qur’an, Translation and Commentary (Lahore: Islamic Propagation Centre International, 1934). 7. E. H. Palmer, The Koran (Qur’an), Translated (London: OUP, 1900). 8. M. Asad, The Message of the Qur’an, Translated and Explained (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980). 9. Shakir, Holy Qur’an (Qum: Al-Ansarian Publications, 1974).

Appendix C

The Reporting of the Caliphate

It is worthwhile spending a few moments looking at how the issue raised by the Western politicians and salafists has been reported in the media as a way of following on from the concerns raised by David Selbourne’s article on the propaganda war. In order to be able to make a rigorous analysis, a broad cross section of internet and print media was selected, from a range of online journals and blogs as well as newspapers from both Britain and America. Media from local press on both sides of the Atlantic was excluded in order to limit the scale of the study. The media approach to the issue generally fell into three broad categories; firstly, articles in which the writer clearly felt there was an immediate and potent threat to the way of life enjoyed in the West posed by the salafists and the possible reintroduction of the Caliphate.1 These articles are predicated upon the notion that the culture that exists in the West at present is worth preserving. From this premise flows their concerns: firstly, that they believe that the salafists do not want to create a superstate to cover present day Muslim countries, but to cover the whole of the world eventually. One of the clearest examples of this idea was the Spiegel article that included the phased al-Qa’ida plan to reintroduce the Caliphate by the year 2020.2 Secondly; the attendant prospect of the imposition of shari’a within that superstate and the destruction of civil liberties they believe would inevitably follow.3 The vast majority of this style of article have certain common elements: firstly, the starting point is an interview with “sources close to al-Qa’ida,” or members of “Hamas,” “Hizb ut-Tahrir” or the “Muslim Brotherhood.” The main weakness of this approach is that the articles are based upon known “Caliphate” supporters, without being able to test whether these people are in a majority or minority within the wider Islamic world.4 Secondly, they concentrate on sound 195

196

Appendix C

bites from terrorist sources and have little or no historical contextualization (unless connecting to fascism).5 The second group, the “moderates,” generally take a historical perspective and are inclined to dismiss a possible threat from a “Muslim Superstate” on the grounds that it cannot possibly happen in the foreseeable future due to the geopolitical climate, and perceived lack of popular support within the wider Muslim world.6 These articles rarely contain interviews with Islamic militants and tend to be “editorial” in style: commenting on the notion of Caliphate reinstitution through historical lens, frequently citing Islamic history, and perhaps suggesting a certain inevitability about the conflict in which the West now finds itself.7 The intellectual influence of Samuel Huntingdon’s conclusions mentioned earlier upon the journalist’s writing, whether deliberate or not, is seen clearly in the analysis they provide.8 Three points are generally made by these articles: firstly, that the Islamist resurgence has its roots right back at the beginning of the twentieth century; La Guardia, Vick, and Furnish all make the point that the destruction of the Caliphate as an institution in 1924 left a power gap in the Muslim world that has led to today’s problems.9 Consequently the current violence is viewed as an internal Islamic struggle about finding a new head of the Muslim world, with the candidates pressing their claim by fighting Britain and the United States in order to gain support in the Muslim world, rather than the destruction of Western power and culture being the end in itself.10 This theme is developed by others such as Porteous and Stern, who cite the influence of the early Muslim reformist ideologues such as Qutb, Maududi, Abduh, Rida, and al-Afghani and the influence of movements such as the Wahhabis or the Muslim Brotherhood, lending weight to the notion of a slowly building internal reformation accompanied by widespread sectarian and external violence.11 Secondly, they generally take a Muslim perspective on Western dealings with Islamic countries.12 Thus, the violence against Western targets is the direct result of Western imperialism and neocolonialism.13 At first, this second argument appears, in part, to contradict the first. However when the first argument is made in the light of fact that much of the ideological basis of the reformation was written in the colonial period, the two strands of argument can be viewed as interlinked, rather than parallel, or even contradictory. Thirdly, there is a strong sense that the threat is exaggerated for other political purposes, such as the proposal of new domestic legislation.14 In this area, the difference in personal experience of the writer is very probably a decisive factor: for whilst those who are seeking to raise alarm in the West about the danger posed by salafists base their concerns on face-to-face interviews, the more moderate writers appear to lack that intimacy, making their assessments from a distance.

Appendix C

197

There is a sense in which all the writers of these apparently more considered articles, whilst fearing the backlash, have sympathy for the Muslim’s viewpoint. The tone of their writing is suggestive of a general sympathy of any apparently downtrodden and disempowered group and one would suggest that similar pieces involving blame of Western policy would be written about any disempowered group. However, their historical perspective and measured tone make them valuable contributions to the public debate insofar as they highlight that the current desire, amongst some sections of the Muslim population, for a reinstituted Caliphate is not a new issue, but rather, it comes from a centuries-long aspiration. Amongst the few Muslim journalists and commentators writing in the Western media a generally apologetic tone is set, questioning the authority of non-Muslim writings on the Caliphate and producing a new interpretation of what the Caliphate would look like should it ever be brought back.15 Both in these pieces, and in the websites through which many more Muslim groups communicate with non-Muslim audiences, their desire appears to be to counter the vision of the Caliphate painted by journalists and politicians from the first group.16 The essential difference between those articles written in the newspapers and those on Muslim websites is the style of the content; the message remains the same across both.17 The Muslim articles have a common, or very similar, content and tone to each other which incorporates many of the points made by the second group outlined above. However, whereas the journalists in the second group were somewhat cautious about the possibility of creating another Caliphate, the Muslim writers are clearly in favor of the concept.18 Amongst these kinds of writings, Ahmad Afsaruddin’s piece in the National Catholic Reporter is a classic example of the content and style of their articles and, as such, is a useful piece through which to explore the arguments advanced by Muslim writers.19 Afsaruddin’s opening remarks examine the current media interest in the terms “Jihad,” “shari’a” and “Caliphate,” seeking to re-educate his non-Muslim audience through providing alternative definitions for these terms and historical anecdotes concerning their nature in order to counter the negative understanding that these terms have for Western politicians.20 His central argument is that Radical Islamists have appropriated these terms for their own political ends, but that their interpretations of these terms are misleading. Instead, he paints Islam as a religion of tolerance and democratic process, with a view to making the reader believe that Islam is almost a parallel culture.21 He also argues that history has painted Islamic rulers as intolerant and unjust, when many of them were not so according to contemporary sources.22 He finishes with an impassioned plea to welcome what is going on in the Islamic world:

198

Appendix C

Rather than causing goosebumps, a responsible and critical engagement with the past, including the Caliphate, on the part of reform-minded, forward-looking Muslims should be a cause for optimism.23

Whilst making some valuable points, there are several concerns about his line of argument; firstly, his perspective as a Muslim is not acknowledged. This is a fact that can be quickly discovered, however, in the context of the article that he is writing—a defense of various Islamic concepts and institutions— something that needs to be made explicit so that the reader is not under the illusion that objective analysis is being provided. Secondly, his argument and his deployment of historical material is very selective and clearly presented to refute the arguments made by those Western commentators who were more alarmist in tone.24 For example, he does not discuss at all the difference between “tolerance” and “equality” in relation to the historical treatment of minority groups in Muslim lands and, whilst the treatment of minorities by Muslim leaders through the medieval period could be characterized as “tolerant,” dhimmi status of the “People of the Book” is something that needed highlighting and explaining.25 Nevertheless, Afsaruddin does make some valuable points, the principal one being that the use of alarmist language by some Western commentators takes away from a more informed debate about the subject. Conclusions The articles examined from print and internet-based media show a broad range of views that reflect, in large part, the views expressed in books and lengthier scholarly articles. Overall, although their approach to the subject matter varies, the Western journalists remain suspicious of a reinstituted Caliphate, despite Muslim attempts to counter the negative understanding of the terms propagated by politicians such as Dick Cheney and Tony Blair discussed at the opening of this “Introduction.” Amongst the non-Muslim writers, there is a clear delineation in the approach to the issue based primarily upon proximity to the salafists, for those who expressed most alarm at the apparent potency of the threat were those who had had direct personal contact with them. Those who had not were more inclined to dismiss the potential potency of the threat and instead use their analysis of the upheavals in the Muslim world as an opportunity to berate Western governments for their policies. Thus, the first group were not able to adequately assess the scope of the perceived threat, whilst the other group appeared to view any potential threat as both distant and irrelevant and chose instead to concentrate on making political capital from the issue.

Appendix C

199

NOTES 1. R. Ehrenfeld, “The Caliphate is Coming,” article dated January 31st, 2006 on www.frontpagemagazine.com, accessed July 3rd, 2006. 2. Musharbah, al-Qa’ida Wants. 3. Ehrenfeld, Caliphate; Bumiller, Threat. 4. For example see J. Brandon, “The Caliphate: One nation, under Allah, with 1. 5 Billion Muslims,” Christian Science Monitor, May 10th, 2006; Pipes, D., “What Do the Terrorists Want? [A Caliphate],” New York Sun, July 26th, 2005. 5. See all articles already referenced, particularly Bumiller, Threat. 6. For example: T. Porteous, “The Caliphate Myth,” in www.TomPaine.com Posted February 13th, 2006, accessed July 5th, 2006; K. Vick, “Reunified Islam: Unlikely but not Entirely Radical,” Washington Post January 14th, 2006; H. Fitzgerald, “Caliphate? Pah.” Posted on www.jihadwatch.com June 25th, 2006, accessed July 9th, 2006. 7. For example see A. La Guardia, “Caliph’s Return.” 8. See Huntingdon, Civilisation, 22–34. 9. La Guardia, “Caliph’s Return”; Vick, “Not Entirely Radical”; Furnish, “Bin Laden.” 10. This is not a new perspective; John Buchan’s famous Greenmantle (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1916), deals with exactly this issue and it was written in World War I. 11. Porteous, “Caliphate Myth”; J. Stern, “Caliphate of Terror,” Harvard Magazine Online, www.harvardmagazine.com, accessed June 23rd, 2006. 12. Stern, “Caliphate of Terror,” represents a strong example of this dynamic. In the article, the author spends more time criticizing White House policy than it does exploring the issues surrounding the Caliphate as its title would suggest. 13. Ibid. 14. For example see Fitzgerald, “Caliphate? Pah.” 15. A. Afsaruddin, “Setting the Record Straight on the Caliphate,” National Catholic Reporter, April 14th, 2006; O. Saeed, “The Return of the Caliphate” The Guardian, November 1st, 2005; M. Bose, “British Muslims forgetting their Roots,” August 23rd, 2005 on www.telegraph.co.uk, accessed August 27th, 2005. 16. Ibid. 17. A comparison of the arguments deployed in Saeed and Afsaruddin’s articles with those found on www.khalifah.com or www.amaarat.com would clearly demonstrate this dynamic. 18. For example see O. Saeed, “The Return of the Caliphate” The Guardian, November 1st, 2005; M. Bose, “British Muslims forgetting their Roots,” August 23rd, 2005 on www.telegraph.co.uk, accessed August 27th, 2005. 19. A. Afsaruddin, “Setting the Record Straight on the Caliphate,” National Catholic Reporter, April 14th, 2006. 20. Ibid., 1. 21. This point was also made by Hiro, Jihad, 23.

200

Appendix C

22. He cites the example of Tabari’s description of Caliph Umar in Jerusalem not wanting to pray in the Church of the Resurrection because he feared it might be turned into a Mosque. According to Afsaruddin, the character of Caliph Umar was changed into a harsh intolerant in about the eleventh century, in more troubled times. He parallels this with Western treatment of the Muslims. 23. Afsaruddin, “Caliphate,” final paragraph. 24. It is accepted that this accusation could be leveled at the vast majority of articles covered here. 25. Bat Ye’or has been recognized as a pioneer in the field of dhimmi research. Of her many books and articles perhaps the most relevant to this study is The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude, Seventh–Twentieth Century (Madison: NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996). Ye’or’s theme of incremental subjugation is picked up and applied to modern Europe in Bruce Thornton’s Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide (New York: Encounter Books, 2007).

Appendix D

Shi’ite Theory of the Imamate

The fascinating aspect of Shi’ite theory is how it has chosen to define itself; for, if Lambton’s hypothesis that the Sunni dynamic of “theoretical development in the light of adverse circumstance” holds true, then the Shi’ite theory of the Imamate might be defined as “the doctrine of disagreement.” For, after the initial Shi’a–Sunni divide over the Caliphal succession, Shi’a doctrine has developed as conscious opposition to Sunni theory. Hamid Enyat brilliantly expresses this concept in the opening chapter of his book on Islamic thought in the modern world: . . . perhaps the most outstanding feature of Shi’ism is an attitude of mind which refuses to admit that the majority opinion is necessarily true or right, and—which is its converse—a rationalized defense of the moral excellence of an embattled minority.1

This insightful statement is followed by a list of Shi’ite authors and Qur’anic verses which clearly demonstrate the author’s earlier statement.2 Central to the doctrine of the Imamate is what Corbin describes as the concept of “the Sanctuary of Islamic esotericism.”3 In this theory, the Imam becomes the successor to Muhammad, not simply in administration and religious leadership, but also as the executor of Muhammad’s revelations, both while he was alive and also after his death. Thus, communication between Prophet and ummah is ongoing through the medium of an Imam who therefore becomes the direct conduit for Allah to continue to communicate His Will through Muhammad, to the Imam who in turn passes it on to the ummah. Sachedina credits the Imamate of Ja’far al-Sadiq as the birthplace of the notion of the ‘Alid Imam as the “sole legitimate authority.”4 This concept allowed him to interpret scripture on the basis that he was an infallible leader 201

202

Appendix D

and therefore considered able to be the foundation stone of an Islamic state. For the early and late Sunni Caliphs, as with the Shi’a Imams, this entitled them to be both scriptural interpreter, legal authority, and leader of the Friday prayers.5 Thus, in a way that was lost to their Sunni counterparts, the Shi’a Imam retained absolute authority over his people through the mechanism of “infallibility.” The Sunni Caliphs fell back on prestige and the Doctrine of the Sword in the later period when Muslim rulers acted more or less independently. There was no suggestion, right into the Ottoman period, that the Sunni Caliphs had the right to interpret scripture. However, for the Shi’as, the Imam retained all the functions enjoyed by the earliest Caliphs. At the same time as the Ottomans were rising to prominence in much of the Middle East, in Persia during the same period, the “state” and “church” were once more reunited under the Shi’i Safavids as the Imamate was designated “God’s Shadow on Earth.”6 However, while this designation had surface parallels with Sunnis in the Abbasid period particularly, the Safavids saw themselves as the representatives of Muhammad and the Hidden Imam rather than a direct link to God Himself.7 This difference seems to have been part of a definitive policy of differentiating themselves; imposing Shi’ism as a means of creating national identity against the Ottomans.8 Lambton argues that the perpetuation of the notion that the ruler was the representative of the Hidden Imam allowed them to maintain the tendency toward absolutism.9 In so doing, it almost raised the Shah himself to the divine, although defeat by the Ottomans at Chaldiran in 1514 punctured this belief.10 This approach to Islamic leadership had echoes of the ancient Persian Cosmological Kingship, whose influence upon the Abbasid Caliphs’ approach to Islamic headship is seen clearly in the work of Lambton.11 At the same time, it brought back to the head of the Shi’a Islamic community the kind of authority over all aspects of administration and doctrine not seen since the days of the rashidūn Caliphs.12 Later, the mujtahids took over the mantle of the Hidden Imam and, by the time of the constitutional reforms of the early twentieth century, the clergy was independent of the ruler with the people being recognized as a political body under the headship under the mujtahids, rather than the ruler.13 One might argue that this dynamic represented almost a reinvention of the early Islamic bay’a, with its previous autocratic character under the Law of God being replaced by the Muslim ummah in a world that had moved toward representation by the people as the foundation for accountable government. Thus, by the time that the British government became involved in the question of Pan-Islamic governance, they were politically involved in geographical locales that had both Sunni and Shi’a traditions of Islamic rule to engage with. Whether they understood both the differences and the implications of those differences on their policymaking are examined in chapters four, five, and six.

Appendix D

203

NOTES 1. Enyat, Islamic Thought, 19. 2. Ibid. 20–21. Particularly telling is the allusion to the religio-political sentiment surrounding the murder of Husayn and his companions in 680 CE. 3. H. Corbin, En Islam Iranien, Vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard,1971), 181. 4. A. Sachedina, The Just Ruler in Shi’ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence (Oxford: OUP, 1988), 89. 5. Sachedina quotes al-Husayn as saying that the leadership of the Friday service was the right of the Caliphs alone, before going on to move into the polemical statement that is inferred, rather than explicitly said by al-Husayn, that the Umayyads were therefore effectively practicing heresy by taking the Caliphate and saying the Friday Prayers without prior nomination by the predecessor. This argument is hard to sustain for, as was seen in the previous section on the Sunnis, there is little evidence that any of the rashidu-n Caliphs were named by their predecessors, even Abu Bakr. Therefore, what justification for such a strong statement is there? Sachedina, Just Ruler, 89. 6. Black, Political Thought, 221–26. 7. Lambton, “Quis,” SI6, 125. 8. Ibid., 126. 9. Ibid. 10. See J. J. Reid, Tribalism and Society in Islamic Iran 1500–1629 (Malibu, CA: Undena, 1983), 27, cited by Black, Political Thought, 222. 11. See particularly Lambton, “Quis,” SI 5 and 6. 12. See H. Halm, Shiism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), 84–86. However, Watt remains unconvinced about the lasting impact of the Safavid doctrines. See Political Thought, 112. 13. See E. G. Browne, A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia (London: Hurst and Company, 1909), 48–52; Enyat, Political Thought, 75–81.

Appendix E

A Brief Comparison between the Papacy and the Caliphate

The title outlined above could easily be a thesis in its own right and the concern for this student focuses around containing the discussion so that it provides sufficient background material to permit an informed analysis of the British allusions to the issue in the main body of the thesis. There have already been two journal articles that have examined this area already, however, in each case, the differences were explored either through a wider cultural lens, or through a administrative perspective.1 Thus, while both of these studies remain valuable, they shy away or avoid the discussion of the theological foundations that have already been examined for the Caliphate and shall be here briefly discussed concerning the Papacy. As with the Caliphate in the Qur’an, scriptural foundation for the existence and pre-eminence of the Papacy in the Bible is hard to find. Essentially, the authority for the office comes from two gospel scriptures: You are Peter and on this rock I will build my Church , and the gates of Hades shall not overcome it.2

This text is said to be fulfilled in Jesus’ promise to Peter in the gospel of John where the apostle is commissioned to “Feed my Lambs. . . . Look after my sheep.”3 This has become the basis for doctrine of Papal authority over that of other Bishops: a doctrine that is supported by modern Catholic scholars.4 The intricacies of the theological debate can be found in the work of Brown et al., Kung as well as Rahner and Ratzinger’s articulate defense of Papal primacy.5 While there is not the space to analyze these discussions in the same way as those for the Caliphate, what can be said is that these two texts were enough for a developing Bishopric in Rome to claim and be increasingly recognized as the head of the Church.6 He was formally recognized as 205

206

Appendix E

such in the fourth century on the basis of being called in by other bishops to mediate disputes and settle questions of doctrine. As such, his assumption of leadership can be seen as a gradual rise both through and accompanied by tacit recognition of headship by consent.7 The doctrinal embodiment of the Pope’s right to headship can, in this respect, be seen as an emerging dynamic whereas the Caliphate was proclaimed as the leadership of the ummah from the death of Muhammad.8 In terms of the Papal remit, it seems that the Popes confined themselves very much to doctrinal issues in the early centuries, however, as their prestige grew and the continent of Europe increasingly converted to Christianity, their prestige began to turn into power as more and more kings sought recognition from them to legitimize their own claims to monarchy. In many ways much of this mirrors the state of affairs in the ummah, however, one might argue that Papal authority in fact grew in parallel to monarchical power, rather than being intrinsically intertwined with the monarchs of Europe. Indeed, for much of its life, the Papal states were under the feudal headship of the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, they were head of the Church at the same time as being feudal vassals of a monarch. Sometimes they were even forced into armed conflict to defend their territory in the later Middle Ages and Reformation periods.9 Therefore, one might argue that the eventual destruction of the Papal states with the Piedmontese conquest of Italy that lead to unification in 1865 enhanced the standing of the Pope in the eyes of many, for, while he was confined to the Vatican, he was able to shake off the label of petty monarch and become purely head of the Church in his own right.10 It is perhaps no accident therefore that the doctrine of Papal infallibility was proposed just five years later, at the first Vatican Council.11 Thus, it has been argued by many scholars of the Papacy that the ending of Papal monarchy has recreated the Papacy as the arbiter of disputes over doctrine as in its early days and imbued it with a claim to purely spiritual headship that was impossible while it still retained geopolitical dominion.12 Conclusions The comparisons outlined above demonstrate the many parallels between the Papacy and the Caliphate: much of their similarity is based around the medieval period where the two institutions were certainly performing very similar functions. However, the differences are important, for, while the Caliphate’s position as head of the ummah was clearly present from the moment of Muhammad’s death, the Popes only emerged as leaders of the Christian polity over the course of a number of centuries.

Appendix E

207

One could justifiably argue that both offices had very little basis in their scriptures, however, it is clear that the notion of centralized leadership in the Muslim world was far more indelibly intertwined in Islam than in Christianity and consequently, whereas the outworkings of their leadership appeared almost identical on the surface, the basis of that leadership and the journey to it remained critically different. NOTES 1. J. R. Strayer, “The State and Religion: An Exploratory Comparison in Different Cultures: Greece, and Rome, the West, Islam,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Oct. 1958), 38–43; S. R. Jordan, “Situating Administrative Responsibility: A Comparison of Medieval Christian and Medieval Islamic Administrative Thought,” Public Administration, Vol. 84, Issue 3 (August 2006), 563–81. 2. Matthew 16: 18, Holy Bible, New International Version (London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 1436. 3. John 21: 15–17, Ibid., 1606. 4. See P. Granfield, “Papacy” entry in The Encyclopaedia of Religion, Vol. 11 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987), 171–82. Elsewhere in the New Testament, for example Ephesians 2:20, the work of apostles and prophets in general is cited as the foundation of the Church. 5. R. E. Brown et al., Peter in the New Testament (Minneapolis: Wipk and Stock, 2002); H. Kung, ed., “Papal Primacy in the Church,” Concilium, Vol. 64 (1962); K. Rahner and J. Ratzinger, The Episcopate and the Primacy (New York: Burns and Oaks, 1962). 6. For the history of the development of the office see the works cited above as well as J. F. Broderick, “Papacy” entry in The New Catholic Encyclopaedia, Vol. 10 (New York, St. Louis, San Francisco, Toronto, London, Sydney: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 959–70. 7. According to Tillard, two of the earliest church fathers, Ignatius and Irenaeus, both allude to the elevated status of the Bishopric of Rome. J. M. R. Tillard, The Bishop of Rome (London: SPCK, 1983), 24–28. 8. See “Did Muhammad Intend to Name a Successor” in chapter three. 9. Granfield, “Papacy,” 175. Cf. S. Z. Ehler, Church and State Through the Centuries (London: Biblio and Tanners Booksellers and Publishers, 1988), 524–27. 10. Strayer, “The State and Religion,” 41. 11. Hales has an interesting perspective on exactly what scriptural basis the doctrine of infallibility was based upon. E. E. Y. Hales, The Catholic Church in the Modern World: A Survey from the French Revolution to the Present (Garden City, New York: Hanover House, 1958), 273–91. 12. See for example C. Falconi, The Popes in the Twentieth Century: From Pius X to John XXIII, M. Grindrod, trans. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), 325–28.

Appendix F

Submission to the Lausanne Treaty Negotiators from the Armenian Delegation

This submission is very interesting for it is clearly designed to be a counterargument to the points being made by the Khilafat Delegation all over Europe and, in terms of the overarching focus of the book, it provides both a further glimpse of the differing types and sources of advice the British were receiving.1 Given the fact that it was submitted back in 1920 and that there is no record of it having been seen by Lloyd-George, it is unfortunate that no one thought to check the files for such useful material before his meeting with the Delegation.2 One could legitimately point out that because the Armenians had a clear vested interest in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, their anti-Caliphate stance would weaken their argument because of its clear bias. Two points would need to be made in reply to such accusations: firstly, if such an accusation was to be leveled at the Armenians, then the same accusation on the opposite side would have to be made for the Khilafat Delegation. Secondly, what is being analyzed is a submission, not an academic paper or a piece of work purporting to be “historical analysis.” Thus “bias” cannot be an issue.3 The submission is a two-pronged attack both on the Turkish right to rule in Armenia and what they perceive as Indian interference in a question they have no business being involved in. As part of this process, they point out the ambiguity of the argument that the Khilafat Delegation are making: It ill behooves men who have made national self-determination their slogan in the terrific struggle of the last five years to lend their support now to this conception of religious solidarity as a factor in the settlement of Peace . . . 4

The point is a valid one, tying in closely to the question of self-determination previously examined. It could be argued theologically that the two issues should 209

210

Appendix F

be seen separately: Muslims arguing for the rights of their Caliph alongside Indians challenging foreign hegemony in their own land. However, for such an argument to be validated, the intrinsic link between religion and the state in Islam would have to be ignored or subordinated under a new philosophical position adopted for the times, as the medieval defenders of Caliphal power such as al-Mawardi had done.5 The Armenians take on the Khilafat Delegation’s description of the place of the Caliphate within Islam, specifically countering the notion that the Caliphate was inseparable from temporal power: It is true that the Caliphate, at its origin, was invested with spiritual as well as temporal power over all Moslems when the latter lived under one and the same rule. But this authority, according to the doctrine of Islam was based on the voluntary allegiance of the Faithful; it was neither hereditary nor transmissible. Later on, it became the prize of conquerors who seized it by force of arms, imposed allegiance and bequeathed their authority to their successors.6

In this, it seems that the doctrine of “obligation” may have been misapplied, for as was seen earlier in the discussion of Q4:59, the injunction to obey those in authority was very clear. What was less clear was not whether obedience should be rendered, but rather, who constituted “those in authority.”7 Perhaps the Armenians have applied Q2:256 “There is no compulsion in Religion . . .” in this situation. However, it seems clear from al-Zamakhshari that this verse is talking about the choice of whether to become a Muslim or not, rather than freedom within the faith itself.8 This argument is followed by a brief history of the civil war in which Mu’awiya fought ‘Ali for the right to be Caliph, continuing to develop the notion that the civil war ushered in two illegitimate and increasingly fragmented dynasties: the Umayyads and the Abbasids, which were finally swept away by the Mongol hordes. They then explain the story of the apparent bequest which enabled the Ottomans to take the Caliphate following their conquest of Egypt and Constantinople, concluding with the accusation that Pan-Islamism is a modern-day invention; according the Caliph the kind of recognition that he had never received even in the earliest days.9 Conclusions Essentially therefore, their argument is consistent with many of the points made by the British officials already examined and, in the same way as those officials made their case mostly on the basis of historical fact, the Armenians also employ the same technique. However, because of the fact that the Khilafat Delegation argue upon the basis of scriptural foundation and

Appendix F

211

the application of idealized principles rather than historical reality, the Armenian Delegation’s arguments fall short of countering the Indian Muslims arguments although, at the same time, illuminating some legitimate concerns about the Delegation’s position and argument.

NOTES 1. A Delegation of Indians, different to that of The Khilafat Delegation was permitted an audience with all the major powers at the Peace Conference: Britain, France, America and Italy, which Lloyd-George is at pains to remind them of in their meeting at Downing Street IOR/L/PS/18/B371, F. According to Qureshi and Özcan they were not given a fair hearing. Whether this is true or not, they seem to have failed to achieve any influence over the discussion. Qureshi, Khilafat, 110–11; Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 187. 2. Memo dated January 21, 1920 enclosing a copy of some reflections on the Caliphate question from the Armenian delegation sent to Lord Curzon. No response is seen. 3. They are stating a case, not providing an historical paper. Even then when a piece of historical writing is clearly biased, such as the Nallino paper discussed in the Cairo High Commission file, the points themselves must be shown to be erroneous, or at least, shown to have strong counterargument not included. The argument needs to be countered, not the writer undermined. 4. FO 608/273, F277. 5. See “By What Right Did the Caliph Rule?” in chapter three. 6. FO 608/273, F278. 7. See the discussion of Q4:59 in the chapter on the theology of authority. 8. H. Gätje, The Qur’an and its Exegesis: Selected Texts with Classical and Modern Muslim Interpretations (Oxford: Oneworld,1996), 215–16. 9. FO 608/273, F278–79. Their points very much follow the same lines as the Perie-Gordon and Lukach report and the Storrs memo analyzed in the section on the Egyptian High Commission.

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES Document Files and Collections Foreign Office Files: FO 141 Series FO 608 Series FO 371 Series FO 39/970 FO 24/489 Colonial Office Files: CO 323 Series CO 1030/1193 India Office Files: IOR L/PS/18 IOR L/PS/20 IOR/R/20/A/3906 Brémond, E. Le Hidjaz dans la guerre mondiale. Paris: Payot, 1931. Chirol, V. “Pan-Islamism.” London: Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 1906. Clayton, F. An Arabian Diary. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Ware: Wordsworth, 1997, First Published: 1935. Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. Documents on British Foreign and Security Policy. London: Stationery Office, n.d. Storrs, Ronald. Orientations. London: Watson, 1937. Sykes, Mark. The Caliph’s Last Heritage: A Short History of the Turkish Empire. London: Macmillan, 1915. UK International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO. London: HMSO, 2003.

213

214

Bibliography

Islamic Theology Ali, A., trans. and ed. The Holy Qur’an. Isfahan: Tahriki, Tarsih Quran Inc, 1988. Ali, Y. The Holy Qur’an: Translation and Commentary. Lahore: Islamic Propagation Centre International, 1934. Asad, M. The Message of the Qur’an. Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980. Baljon, J. M. S. Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sayyid Ahmed Khan. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949. Baydawi, N. D. Abi Sa’id al-, Tafsir al-Baydawi al-musamma Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrar al-Ta’wil, vol. 1. Beruit: Dar al-Fikr, 1996. Bell, R. The Qur’an Translated, volume 1. London: T and T Clark, 1937. Ceylan, Y. Theology and Tafsir in the Major Works of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1996. Dawood, N. J. The Koran. London: Penguin Books, 1956. Firestone, R. “Disparity and Resolution in the Quranic Teachings on War: A Reevaluation of a Traditional Problem.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 56, no. 1 (1997). Gätje, H. The Qur’an and its Exegesis: Selected Texts with Classical and Modern Muslim Interpretations. Oxford: Oneworld, 1996. Ghuldfild, I. Kitab Tafsir al-Khams miat ayahmin al-Qur’an ‘an Muqatil Ibn Sulayman. Shafa’Amr, Israel: Tubi’a fi Ma.tba’at Dar al-Mashriq, 1980. Goldfeld, Y. “The Development of Theory on Qur’anic Exegesis in Islamic Scholarship.” Studia Islamica, no. 67 (1988). al-Hilali, M. and Khan, M. Interpretation of the Meanings of The Noble Qur’an in the English Language: A Summarized Version of At-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with comments from Sahih Al-Bukhari. Maktaba: Dar-us-Salam, 1993. Imain Ayahtullah, S. et al. An Enlightening Commentary into the Light of the Holy Qur’an. Isfahan: Imam Ali Islamic Research Center, 2000. Jeffrey, A., ed. Islam: Muhammad and His Religion. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1958. Kassis, H. E. A Concordance of the Qur’an. Berkley: University of California Press, 1983. Kathir, Ibn. Tafsir: Abridged English Version. Trans. A. Daryabadi. Riyadh: Dar Ibn Kathir, 2004. Khan, S. A. Tafsir al-Quran. Agra: Mufidi ‘amm Press, 1903–1906. Lizzini, O. “Islamic Angelology: Revelation, Tradition and Philosophical Elaboration, Some Brief Observations.” Encounter August-September, no. 227 (1996). Maududi, A. Towards Understanding the Quran. Trans. and ed. Z. Ansari. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1989. Motzki, H. “The Musannaf of Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanani as a Source of Authentic Ahadith of the First Century A. H.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 50, no. 1 (1991). Qutb, S. In the Shade of the Qur’an, Volume III, Surah 4. Trans. and eds. A. Salahi and A. Shamis. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2001. ———. Milestones. Trans. S. Badrul Hasan. Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1988.

Bibliography

215

Rida, R. and Abduh, M. Tafsir al-Manar, volume 5. Beirut: Dar Ehia al-ma’roof bitafsir al-manar, 2002. Rippin, A. “Al-Zuhri, ‘Naskh al-Qur’an’ and the Problem of Early ‘Tafsir’ Texts,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 47, no. 1 (1984). Rodwell, J. The Koran. London: Everyman, 1909. Paperback edition published Phoenix 2001. Sale, G. The Koran, Translated into English From the Original Arabic. London: Frederick Warne and Co. Ltd, 1734. Saleh, W. A. The Formation of the Classical Tafsir Tradition: The Qur’an Commentary of al-Tha’labi. Leiden: Brill, 2003. Al-Shafi’i. Risala. Trans. M. Khaddari. Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1987. Shakir, M. H. The Holy Qur’an. Qum: Al-Ansarian Publications, 1974. Al-Tabari. Commentary on the Qur’an, volume 1. Trans. J. Cooper. Oxford: OUP, Hakim Investment Holdings Limited, 1987. Zamakshari, A. al-Kashshaf ‘an haqa’iq al-tanzil wa ‘uyun al-aqawil, volume 1. Beruit: Dar al-Fikr, n.d. Zaman, M. Q. “The Caliph’s, the ‘Ulama and the Law: Defining the Role and function of the Caliph in the Early Abbasid Period.” Islamic Law and Society 4, Leiden: Brill, 1997. Zayd, N. A. Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006.

SECONDARY SOURCES Foreign Policy and History Anderson, M. S. The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations. London: Macmillan, 1966. Andrew, C. M. and Kanya-Forstner, A. S. France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion. London: Thames and Hutchenson, 1981. Aburish, S. K. A Brutal Friendship, The West and the Arab Elite. London: Cassell Group, 1997. ———. The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of The House of Saud. London: Bloomsbury, 1994. Paperback edition published 2005. Adams, R. J. Q. British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935–1939. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993. Albrecht Carrié, R. A Diplomatic History of Europe. London: Methuen, 1965. Aldred, J. British Imperial and Foreign Policy, 1846–1980. Oxford: Heinemann Educational, 2004. Beloff, M. Imperial Sunset: Britain’s Liberal Empire, 1897–1921. London: Methuen, 1969. Barr, J. Setting the Desert on Fire: T. E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918. London: Bloomsbury, 2006.

216

Bibliography

Beasley, R. K. Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002. Bishku, M. B. “Turkey and Iran during the Cold War.” Journal of Third World Studies Spring (1999). Blackwell, M. Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993. Bogdanor, V. The Monarchy and the Constitution. Oxford: OUP, 1995. Corrigan, H. “German Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of War in 1914.” Past and Present 36 (1967). Cox, S. T. The Idea of an Arab Caliphate in British Middle Eastern Policy in the Era of the Great War. Durham: Durham University Press, 2003. Daly, D. W. The Sirdar: Sir Reginald Wingate and the British Empire in the Middle East. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1997. Darwin, J. Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 1918–1922. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1981. Dickie, J. The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004. Dirks, N. B. The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain. London: Belknapp Press, 2006. Fawcett, L. International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: OUP, 2005. Fischer, F. Germany’s Aims in the First World War. New York: W.W. Norton, 1967. Fisher, J. Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916–1919. London: Frank Cass, 1999. Fisher, J. “The Rabegh Crisis, 1916–1917: ‘A Comparatively Trivial Question’ or ‘A Self-Willed Disaster.’” Middle Eastern Studies July (2002). Friedman, I. Palestine, A Twice Promised Land. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000. Frankel, J. British Foreign Policy, 1945–1973. London: Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, 1975. Fromkin, D. A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. London: Phoenix Press, 2000. Gelb, L. A. and Rosenthal, J. A. “The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy: Reaching a Values Consensus.” Foreign Affairs (2003). Gilbert, M. Winston S. Churchill, volumes 3–5. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973– 1981. Gooch, G. P. and Masterman, J. H. B. A Century of British Foreign Policy. (Council for the Study of International Relations) Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1971. Goldstein, E. and McKercher, B. J. C. Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865–1965. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Hain, P. The End of Foreign Policy: British Interests, Global Linkages and Natural limits. London: Fabian Society, Green Alliance, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001. Halliday, F. International Relations in the Middle East. Cambridge: CUP, 2005.

Bibliography

217

Hasan, M. Islam and Indian Nationalism: Reflections on Abdul Kalam Azad. New Delhi: Manohar, 1992. Heller, J. British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914. London: Cass, 1983. Helmreich, P. C. From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919–1920. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1974. Herman, M. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge: Royal Institute of International Affairs, CUP, 1996. Hess, R. L. “Italian Imperialism in its Ethiopian Context.” International Journal of African Historical Studies 6, no. 1 (1973). Hourani, A. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939. Cambridge: CUP, 1983. Huneidi, H. A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920– 1925. London: I. B. Tauris, 2001. James, L. Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India. London: Abacus, 1998. Judd, D. Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present. London: Fontana Press, 1997. Karpat, H. The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State. New York: OUP, 2002. Karsh, E. and Karsh, I. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 178 –1923. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. Kedourie, E. The Chatham House Version and other Middle Eastern Studies. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970. ———. England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921. Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978. ———. In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon–Huseyn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914–1939. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Kent, M. Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy, 1900–1940. London: Frank Cass, 1993. Kiernan, V. G. European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–1960. London: Leicester University Press in Association with Fontana, 1982. Kinkel, C. Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923. London: John Murray, 2005. Kinross, Lord. Atatturk: A Biography of Mustapha Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey. New York: William Morrow, 1965. ———. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. London: Perennial, 1977. Kuwajima, S. Indian Mutiny in Singapore, 1915. Kolkota: Ratna Prakashan, 1991. Leifer, M. Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy. (Acton Society Studies 2), London: Allen and Unwin, 1972. Loius, W. R. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, OUP, 1988. Lowe, J. The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German Question 1865–1925. London: Routledge, 1994.

218

Bibliography

Macfie, A. L. The End of the Ottoman Empire 1908–1923. London: Longman, 1998. Mahmud, M. The Khalifat and England. Patna: Imtayaz, 1921. Mansfield, P. A History of the Modern Middle East. London: Penguin, 1992, 2nd ed. 2003. Martin, L. and Garnett, J. C. British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-First Century. London: Pinter [for the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1997. May, A. and Bosco, A., The Round Table: The Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy. London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1997. Mead, W. R. “God’s Country?” Foreign Affairs, September/October, (2006). Miller, H. and Harper, R. W. E. Singapore Mutiny. Singapore: OUP, 1984. Monroe, E., ed. Britain’s Moment in the Middle East: 1914–1971. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Morgan, K. O. Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918–1922. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Navdi, S. H. H. Islamic Resurgent Movements in the Indo-Pak Subcontinent During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: A Critical Analysis. Durban: Academia, the Centre for Islamic, Near and Far Eastern Studies, Planning publication, 1987. Nevakivi, J. Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920. London: Athlone Press, 1969. Northedge, F. S. Freedom and Necessity in British Foreign Policy: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered 14 October 1971. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson [for] the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1972. Ochenwald, W. The Hijaz Railroad. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980. Olesen, A. Islam and Politics in Aghanistan. London: Carson Press, 1995. Otter, T. G. The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. Ovendale, R. The Influence of United States and Dominion Opinion on the Formation of British Foreign Policy, 1937–1939. Oxford: Oxford Faculty of Modern History, 1972. Owen, R. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2004. Ӧzcan, A. Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottoman Empire and Britain, (1877– 1924). Leiden: Brill, 1997. Palmer, A. The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. London: John Murray, 1992. Palumbo, P., ed. A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from PostUnification to the Present. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Paris, T. J. Britain, The Hashemites, and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Penson, L. M. The Colonial Background of British Foreign Policy. London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd, 1930.

Bibliography

219

Popplewell, Richard J. Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904–1924. London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1995. Prasad, B. Our Foreign Policy Legacy: A Study of British Indian Foreign Policy. Delhi: People’s Pub. House, 1965. Reynolds, P. A. British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years. London: Longmans, Green, 1954. Rousseau, Jean J. The Social Contract. Ware: Wordsworth, 1998. Saikal, A. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. London: I B Tauris, 2004. Sanders, D. Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: An Introduction to British Foreign Policy Since 1945. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1990. Shaw, S. J. “The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 1, no. 1 (1970). Shukman Hurd, E. “Political Islam and Foreign Policy in Europe and the United States.” Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 4 (2007). Schwartz, S. The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa’ud from Tradition to Terror. New York: Doubleday, 2002. Searight, S. The British in the Middle East. New York: Atheneum, 1970. Seton-Watson, C. “Italy’s Imperial Hangover.” Journal of Contemporary History 15, no. 1, (1980). Shorrock, W. I. French Imperialism in the Middle East: The Failure of Policy in Syria and Lebanon 1900–1914. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976. Smith K. E. and Light, M. eds. Ethics and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: CUP, 2001. Spalding, E. E. “Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy: Are Times Changing?” Heritage Foundation January, no. 985 (2007). Taylor, A. J. P. Origins of the Second World War. London: Penguin, 1970. Theakston, K. British Foreign Secretaries since 1974. London: Routledge, 2004. Trumpener, U. Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914–1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Ullman, R. H. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, vol. 3. The Anglo-Soviet Accord. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. Wallace, W. and Tugendhat, C. Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s. London, New York: [Published for] Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Routledge, 1988. Watson, D. R. Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography. London: Eyre Methuen, 1974. Watt, D. C. Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1965. Wenstrate, B. The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East 1916–1920, Penn State Press, 1992. Williams, Paul. British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

220

Bibliography

Wilson, C. W. “On the Tribes of the Nile Valley, North of Khartum”[sic], Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 17 (1888). Wilson, K. M. Empire and Continental Studies in British Foreign Policy from the 1880’s to the 1st World War. London: Mansell, 1987. ———. The Policy of Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914. Cambridge: CUP, 1985. Wilson, M. C. King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan. Cambridge, New York: CUP, 1987. Wiskemann, E. Europe of the Dictators 1919–1945. London: Fontana (Harvester Press), 1970. Woodhouse, C. M. British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War. London: Hutchinson, 1961. Woodward, E. L. British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. London: H.M.S.O. 1962. www.fco.gov.uk. Accessed September 12th, 2006. Yapp, M. E. “‘That Great Mass of Unmixed Mohomedanism’: Reflections on the Historical Links between the Middle East and Asia,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 1 (1992). Zeine, Z. N. The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With a Background Study of ArabTurkish Relations in the Near-East. Beruit: Khayats, 1966. Zins, M. J. and Boqerat, G. India in the Mirror of Foreign Diplomatic Archieves [sic]. New Delhi: Centre de Sciences Humaines, 2004.

The Caliphate and Islamic Political Theory al-Afghani, J. D. “Jinsiyah wa al-Din al-Islamiyah,” Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa, no. 2 (March 20th, 1884), in R. G. Landen, trans. and ed. The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Readings. New York: Van Nostrand Reihnold Company, 1970. Ali, S. A. The Caliphate: An Historical and Judicial Sketch (S.I.: s.n. 1919). Arkoun, M. “L’ethique Musalmane d’apres Mawardi.” Revue des Etudes Islamiques 31 (1963). ———. “The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought,” in Islam: State and Society, ed. K. Ferdinand and M. Mozaffari. London: Curzon Press, 1988. Arnold, T. W. The Caliphate, with a Final Chapter by S. Haim. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1965. Aziz, A. A. The Khalifat Movement in India, 1915–1933: A Documentary Record. Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1972. Bacharch, J. L. “The Dinar versus the Ducat.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 4, no. 1 (1973). Bakshi, L., ed. Documents of Muslim Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement. New Delhi: Criterion Publications, 1989. Badawi, M. A. Z. The Reformers of Egypt. London: Croom Helm, 1976. Baljon, J. M. S. Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949.

Bibliography

221

———. Religion and Thought of Shah Wali Allah Dilhawi 1703–1762 Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986. Barakatullah, M. M. The Khalifat. London, New Delhi: Luzac, 1924. Black, A. The History of Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001. Binder, L. “al-Ghazali and Islamic Government.” The Muslim World xlv (1955). Browne, E. G. A Literary History of Persia, Four Volumes. Cambridge: CUP, 1902–1924. Cook, M. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge: CUP, 2000. Corbin, H. En Islam Iranien. Paris: Gallimard, 1971. Crone, P. Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004. ———. “Even an Ethiopian Slave: The Transformation of a Sunni Tradition.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 57, no. 1 (1994). Crone, P. and Hinds, M. God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the first centuries of Islam. Cambridge: CUP, 1986. Coulson, N. J. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964. Dawood, A. H. A Comparative Study of Arabic and Persian Mirrors for Princes from the Second to the Sixth Century A. H. (Unpublished PhD thesis) London: London University, 1965. Delong-Bas, N. J. “Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad.” Journal of Islamic Studies 17 (2006). Doi, A. R. I. Shariah: The Islamic Law. London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1984. Doniach, N. S. “A Translation of V.V. Barthold, Khalif i Sultan.” Islamic Quarterly vii (1963). Enyat, H. Modern Islamic Political Thought. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1982. Esposito, John L., ed. Voices of Resurgent Islam. New York, Oxford: OUP, 1983. Fakhry, M. A History of Islamic Philosophy. London: Longman; New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed. 1983 Finkel, C. Osman’s Dream; The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923. London: John Murray, 2005. Gibb, H. A. R. “al-Mawardi’s theory of the Caliphate.” In Shaw, S. J. and Polk, W. R. eds. Studies on the Civilisation of Islam. London: Hurst and Co. 1962. ———. “The Evolution of Government.” In Studies on the Civilization of Islam, London: Hurst and Co. 1962 Goldziher, I. “Du Sens Propre des Expression Ombre de Dieu, Khalif de Dieu.” Revue de l’Histoire des Religions (1897). ———. Muslim Studies, volume 2. Ed. S. M. Stern. Chicago: Aldine and Atherton, 1971. ———. Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981

222

Bibliography

———. “Djamal al-Din al-Afghani.” In Encyclopedia of Islam New Edition, Volume II, C-G. Ed. B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht. Leiden: E. J. Brill and Luzac and Co. 1965. Gopal, J. The Indian Muslims. Mombai: Asia Publishing House, 1959. Guillaume, A. The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah. Karachi: OUP, 1955. Goitein, S.D. “A Turning point in the History of the Muslim State.” Islamic Culture, xxiii, (1949). von Grunebaum, G. E. Medieval Islam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946. ———. Classical Islam. London: Allen and Unwin, 1963. Halm, H. Shiism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991. Hardy, P. The Moslems of British India. Cambridge: CUP, 1972. Haykel, B. Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani, New York: CUP, 2003. Hitti, P. K. A History of the Arabs. London: Macmillan, 1979. Hodgson, G. S. The Venture of Islam. Three Volumes. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974. Imamuddin, S. M. A Political History of the Muslims (Prophet and Pious Caliphs). Dacca: Nijmah and Sons Ltd, 1965. Jalal, A. Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850. London: Routledge, 2000. Johnson, J. T. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1997. Karpat, K. H. The Politization of Islam. Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman Period. Oxford: OUP, 2001. Keddie, N. R. An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani.” Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Kedourie, E. Afghani and ‘Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam. London: Frank Cass, 1966. Kepel, G. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. London: I B Tauris, 2006. Khatab, S. “Hakimiyya and Jahiliiyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb.” Middle Eastern Studies (January 2002). Khomeini, R. “The Necessity for Islamic Government.” In Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, trans. H. Algar. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981. Kister, M. J. “Notes on an Account of the Shura Appointed by ‘Umar b. Al Khattab.” Journal of Semitic Studies 9 (1964). Kramer, M. The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation. Oxford: Clarendon, 1990. Lambton, A. K. S. “Quis Custodiet Custodes? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government.” Studia Islamica 5 and 6 (1956). ———. “Justice in the Medieval Theory of Kingship.” Studia Islamica 17 (1962). ———. “Islamic Political Thought.” in J. Schacht and C. E. Bosworth, eds. The Legacy of Islam. 2nd ed. Oxford: OUP, 1979.

Bibliography

223

———. State and Government in Medieval Islam. Oxford: OUP, 1981. ———. “Khilafa.” entry in Encyclopaedia of Islam. Volume IV, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952–. Lapidus, I. M. “Separation of State and Religion in Early Islamic Society.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1975). Laoust, H. Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Ibn Taimiya. Cairo, 1939. ———. La Politique de Gazali. Paris: École, 1970. Levtzion, N. “The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century Kings of Mali.” Journal of African History 4, no. 3 (1963). Lewis, G. “The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad in 1914.” In Arabic and Islamic Garland: Historical Educational and Literary Papers Presented to Abdul Latif Tibawi. London, 1977. Lewis, B. The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. ———. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response. London: Phoenix, 2002. ———. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 3rd ed. New York, London: OUP, 2002. Lia, B. The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1942. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998. MacDonald, D. B. Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory. New York: Darf Publishers,1903. Madelung, W. The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate. Cambridge: CUP, 1997. Minault, G. The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Moaddel, M. and Talattof, K. Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Muir, W. The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall from Original Sources. London: Religious Tract Society, 1891. ———. The Life of Mahomet. London: Religious Tract Society, 1858. Mujeeb, M. Indian Muslims. George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966. Munawwar, M. “Allamah Muhammad Iqbal.” In Waheed-Uz-Zaman and M. Saleem Akhtar, eds. Islam in South Asia. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993. Nasr, S. H. Islamic Cosmological Traditions. rev. ed. Bath: Thames and Hudson, 1978. Nellino, C. A. “Appunti sulla natura del ‘Califatto.’” In Raccolta di Scritti editi e inediti. Volume III, Rome: FCO Publications, 1941. Niemeijer, A. C. The Khilafat Movement in India 1919–1924. s-Gravenhage: Nederlandsche Boek–en Steendrukkerij and Smits, 1972. Oberman, J. “Political Theology in Early Islam: Hasan al-Basri’s Treatise on qadar.” Journal of the American Oriental Society lv (1935). Oliver-Dee, Sean R. Islamic Citizenship and the Ummah: A Survey and Analysis of Indian Muslim Scholarship (Nineteenth Century–Present). London: Unpublished Masters Thesis, London School of Theology, 2005.

224

Bibliography

Paret, R. “Signification coranique de Halifa et d’autres dérivés de la racine Halafa.” Studia Islamica 31 (1970). Pellat, Ch. “L’imamat dans la doctrine de Djahiz.” Studia Islamica 25 (1961). ———. “La Nabita de Djahiz, un document important pour l’histoire politico-religieuse de l’Islam,” Annales de l’Institut des Etudes Orientales, Algers X (1952). ———, trans. and ed. Ibn Muqaffa’, mort vers 140/757, conseilleur du calife. Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 1976. Peters, F. E. Muhammad and the Origins of Islam. New York: State University of New York Press, 1994. Qureshi, M. N. “The ‘Ulema’ of British India and the Hijrat of 1920.” Modern Asian Studies 13, no. 1 (1979). ———. Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924. Leiden: Brill, 1999. Reid, A. Working Paper No. 36: The Ottomans in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, 2005. Rosenthal, E. I. J. “Some Aspects of Islamic Political Thought.” in Islamic Culture, XXII (1948). ———. Political Thought in Medieval Islam. Cambridge: CUP, 1958. Rodinson, F. Mohammad. Trans. A. Carter, London: Penguin, 1961. Schacht, J. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Sachedina, A. The Just Ruler in Shi’ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence. Oxford: OUP, 1988. Salim, E. A. Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1956. Serjeant, R. B. “The Constitution of Medina.” Islamic Quarterly 8 (1964). Sharma, S. S. Caliphs and Sultans: Religious Ideology and Political Praxis. New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2004. Sharon, M. Black Banners from the East. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1983. ———. “Ahl al-bayt–People of the House.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 8 (1986). ———. “The Ummayyads as ahl al-bayt.” JSAI 14 (1992). ———. “Notes on the Question of Legitimacy of Government in Islam.” Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980). Sourdel, D. “L’autorité califienne dans le monde sunnite.” in G. Makdisi, D. Sourdel and J. Sourdel-Thomine, eds. La Notion d’autorite au moyen age: Islam, Byzance, Occident. Paris: 1982. Tyan, E. Institutions du Droit Public Musulman, Volume I (Le Califat), Paris: 1954; and Volume ii, (Le Sultanat et Le Califat), Paris: 1956. Vaezi, A. Shia Political Thought. London: Islamic Centre of England, 2004. Watt, W. M. Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968. ———. Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman, London: OUP, 1961. ———. The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 1973. Wellhausen, J. Religio-Political Factions in Early Islam. Trans. R. C. Ostle. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975.

Bibliography

225

Yashater, E. “Persian Presence in the Islamic World,” in R. G. Hovannisian and G. S. Sabagh, eds. Persian Presence in the Islamic World. Cambridge: CUP, 1998.

Caliphate in Current Affairs Afsaruddin, A. “Setting the Record Straight on the Caliphate: Early Islamic History carries the Seeds for Contemporary Reforms.” National Catholic Reporter (April 14th, 2004). Bodansky, Y. Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America. Roseville, CA: Prima Publishing, 2001. Bumiller, E. “White House Letter: Twenty-first Century Warnings of a Threat Rooted in the Seventh.” New York Times (December 12th, 2005). Burke, J. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. New York: I. B. Taurus, 2003. Brandon, J. “The Caliphate: One nation, under Allah, with 1.5 Billion Muslims.” Christian Science Monitor (May 10th, 2006). Cook, D. Understanding Jihad, Berkley: University of California Press, 2005. Corbin, J. The Base: In Search of Al-Qaeda–The Terror Network that Shook the World. London: Simon and Schaster, 2002. Ehrenfeld, R. “The Caliphate is Coming.” January 31st, 2006. www.frontpagemaga zine.com. Accessed July 3rd, 2006. Firestone, R. Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam. Oxford: OUP, 1999. Fitzgerald, H. “Caliphate? Pah.” June 25th, 2006. www.jihadwatch.com. Accessed July 9th, 2006. Furnish, T. R. “Bin Laden: The Man who would be Mahdi.” Middle East Quarterly Spring (2002). Fregosi, P. Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998. Gunaratna, R. Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. London: Hurst and Company, 2002. Hiro, D. The War Without End: The Rise of Islamic Terrorism and Global Response. London: Routledge, 2002. Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (ISIC). Islam in Britain: The British Muslim Community in February 2005. Pewsey: Isaac Publishing, 2005. Kepel, G. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Trans. A. F. Roberts. London: I. B. Taurus, 2002. La Guardia, A. “Fanatics Around the World Dream of the Caliph’s Return.” Daily Telegraph (August 1st, 2005). Lewis, B. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. London: Phoenix, 2003. Musharbash, Y. “What al-Qaida Really Wants.” English Language Version of the German Paper. www.spiegalonline.com. Accessed July 2nd, 2006. Palmer, M. and P. At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists and America’s War on Terrorism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004. Pipes, D. “What Do the Terrorists Want? [A Caliphate].” New York Sun (July 26th, 2005).

226

Bibliography

Porteous, T. “The Caliphate Myth.” February 13th, 2006. www.TomPaine.com. Accessed July 5th, 2006. Rashid, A. Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlord. London: I B Tauris and Co. Ltd. 2000; republished by Pan Books, 2001. ———. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002. Riddell, P. G. and Cotterell, P. Islam in Conflict: Past Present and Future. Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 2003. Riddell, P. G. “Themes and Resources in Christian Muslim Relations.” Anvil 23, no. 2 (2006). Robinson, A. Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist. Edinburgh, London: Mainstream Publishing, 2001. Saeed, O. “The Return of the Caliphate.” The Guardian (November 1st, 2005). Scheuer, M. “‘The Pious Caliphate Will Start from Afghanistan’: Is al-Qaeda’s LongHeld Afghan Strategy Now Unfolding?” Terrorism Focus (Jamestown Foundation) 2, no. 12 (2005). ———. “Bin Laden Seizes Opportunities in his June and July Speeches.” Terrorism Focus, (Jamestown Foundation) 3, no. 26 (2006). Sookhdeo, P. Understanding Islamic Terrorism, Pewsey: Isaac Publishing, 2004. Stern, J. E. “Caliphate of Terror.” www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/070480.html. Accessed July 4th, 2006. ———. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. London: Ecco, 2004. Ulph, S. “Mujahideen to Pledge Allegiance on the Web.” Terrorism Focus, (Jamestown Foundation) 3, no. 22 (2005). ———. “The ‘Voice of the Caliphate’ Looks Beyond Iraq.” Terrorism Focus, (Jamestown Foundation) 2, no. 22 (2005). Vick, K. “Reunified Islam: Unlikely but not Entirely Radical.” Washington Post (January 14th, 2006). www.beriutbeltway.com/beruitbeltway/2006/05/is_the_lebanese.html. Accessed July 5th, 2006. www.caliphate.co.uk/caliphate.htm. Accessed July 4th, 2006. www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen1.htm. Accessed July 5th, 2006.

Anonymous Sources on Current Affairs “Bin Laden Offers Americans Truce.” January 19th, 2006. www.english.aljazeera. net. Accessed January 19, 2006. “FAQ About Hizb ut-Tahrir.” August 31st, 2005. www.khilafah.com. Accessed July 3rd, 2006. “Muslims in Britain Must Counter the Propaganda Against Islam and the Khilafah.” June 20th, 2006. www.khilafah.com. Accessed July 6th, 2006. “SSP Vows to Establish Caliphate Worldwide.” Daily Times (Pakistan) (April 8th, 2006).

Bibliography

227

“The Caliphate Organisation Chart Series: How the Caliphate will work.” www. caliphate.co.uk. Accessed July 2nd, 2006. “What is the Khilafah?” November 25th, 2001. www.khilafah.com. Accessed January 2nd, 2005.

Caliphate-Papacy Comparisons and Papal Histories Broderick, J. F. “Papacy” entry in The New Catholic Encyclopaedia, vol. 10. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. Brown, R. E., et al. Peter in the New Testament. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 2002. Carlyle, A. J. and Carlyte, R.W. A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, 6 Vols. London: William Blackwood, 1903–1936. Creighton, M. A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome. London: Kessinger Publishing, 2005, first published, 1899. Ehler, S. Z. Church and State Through the Centuries. London: Biblio and Tanners Booksellers and Publishers, 1988. Empie, P. C. and Murphy, T. A. Papal Primacy and the Universal Church. Minneapolis, Augusburg: Augusburg Publishing House, 1974. Falconi, C. The Popes in the Twentieth Century: From Pius X to John XXIII. Trans. M. Grindrod. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967. Granfield, P. “Papacy” entry in The Encyclopaedia of Religion, Vol. 11, New York: MacMillan Publishing Company; London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1987. ———. The Papacy in Transition. New York: Doubleday, 1980. Hales, E. E. Y. The Catholic Church in the Modern World: A survey from the French Revolution to the Present. Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1958. ———. Pope John and his Revolution, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1965. Jalland, T. G. The Church and the Papacy. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1944. John, E., ed. The Popes: A Concise Biographical History. London: Burns and Oats, 1964. Jordan, S. R. “Situating Administrative Responsibility: A Comparison of Medieval Christian and Medieval Islamic Administrative Thought.” Public Administration 84, no. 3 (August 2006). Kung, H. “Papal Primacy in the Church.” Concilium 64 (1962). Martin, M. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Church. London: Secker and Warburg, 1982. Rahner, K. and Ratzinger, J. The Episcopate and the Primacy. New York: Burns and Oaks, 1962. Strayer, J. R. “The State and Religion: An Exploratory Comparison in Different Cultures: Greece, and Rome, the West, Islam.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 1, no. 1 (Oct. 1958). Tillard, J. M. R. The Bishop of Rome, London: SPCK, 1983.

228

Bibliography

Delhi Sultanate Alam, M. The Languages of Political Islam: India 1200–1800, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004. Aziz, A. M. Political History and Institutions of the Early Turkish Empire of Delhi. Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1949. Chandal, L. S. Early Medieval State: A Study of the Delhi Sultanate. London: Commonwealth Publishers, 1989. Imamuddin, S. M. “Some Persian Literary Sources on the Afghan History of India.” Islamic Culture I (1959). ———. “The Nature of Afghan Monarchy in India.” Islamic Culture 32 (1958). Jackson, P. The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History. New York: CUP, 1999. Khan, A. U. S. and Habib, M. The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate. Delhi, Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, n.d. Nizami, K. A. “Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate.” Medieval India Quarterly No. 2 (1970). Pande, R. Succession in the Delhi Sultanate. New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1990. Quraishi, N. The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi. New Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint Corporation, 1996. Rathor, S. L. “A Plea Against the Charge of Usurpation by Sultan Iltutmish.” Islamic Culture 32 (1958). Srivastava, M. J. The Succession to Rule under Delhi Sultans, New Delhi, India: Commonwealth Publishers, 1990. Srivastava, A. L. Society and Culture in Medieval India (1206–1707). Allahabad: Chugh Productions, 1975. Thomas, E. Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi: illustrated by Coins, Inscriptions and Other Antiquarian Remains. London: Trubner and Co. 1871.

Southeast Asia van Bruinessen, M. “Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question.” Studia Islamika, 2-3 (1995). Buyong bin Adil, H. The History of Malacca during the period of the Malay Sultanate. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1974. De Graaf, H. J. “De Regering van Sultan Agung, vorst van Mataram, 1613–1645, en die van zijn voorganger Panembahan Seda-ing-Krapjak, 1601-1613. ‘s-Gravenhage 1958. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor TaalLand—en Volkenkunde. Vol. 23’ in G.Th. Pigeaud, Literature of Java, Vol. II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967. Hall, D. G. E. A History of Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan, 1955. Hashim, M. Y. The Malay Sultanate of Malacca. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982.

Bibliography

229

Hasjmy, A. Iskandar Muda. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1975. Hooker, M. B., ed. Islam in South-East Asia. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988. Laffan, M. F. “Dispersing God’s Shadows; Reflections on the translation of Arabic Political Concepts into Malay and Indonesian.” For the project History of Translations into Indonesian and Malaysian Languages led by H. Chambert-Loir and M. Zaini-Lajoubert at www.anu.edu.au/asianstudies/proudfoot/MCP/mmp/laffan_apc. html. Accessed January 14th, 2006. ———. Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds. London: Routledge Curzon, 2003. Muzaffar, C. Protector? An analysis of Leader-Led political relationships in Malay Society. Penang: Aliran Kesedaran Press, 1979. Osman, M. T. “The sultan in Malay Government.” For International Seminar on Islamic Civilisation in the Malay World, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1-5 June 1989. Bandar Seri Begawan: Ministry of Religious Affairs, Negara Brunei Darussalam, 1989–. Pigeaud, G. T. Islamic States in Java 1500–1700. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Proudfoot, I. Concordance to Hikayat Inderaputra: A Complete Lemmatized Concordance with Indexes and Frequency tables, from the text edited by S. W. R. Mulyadi. Canberra: Malay Concordance Project, Australian National University, 1990. Reid, A., ed. Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. ———, ed. The Making of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 27. Clayton, Australia: Aristoc Press Pty, 1993. ———. An Indonesian Frontier: Acehense and other histories of Sumatra. Singapore: University of Singapore Press, 2004. ———. Working Paper No. 36: The Ottomans in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, 2005. ———. “Sixteenth Century Turkish influence in Western Indonesia.” Journal of Southeast Asian History 10, no. 3 (1968). Ricklefs, M. C. A History of Modern Indonesia: c.1300 to the Present. London: Macmillan and Company, 1993. Riddell, P. G. Islam and the Malay-Indonesian world: Transmission and Responses. London: Hurst and Company, 2001. ———. “Aceh in the sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: ‘Serambi Mekkah’ and Identity.” In A. Reid, ed. Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2006. Snouck Hurgronje, C. “Le khalifat du Sultan de Constantinople.” Questions diplomatiques et coloniales 5, no.106 (1901). ———. The Achehnese I and II. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1906. Winstedt, R. O. “The Advent of Muhammadenism in the Malay Peninsular and Archipelago.” Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 77 (1917). ———. “Sejarah Melayu.” Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 16, Pt. III (1938). ———. “Kingship and Enthronement in Malaya.” Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 20 (June 1947). ———. Malaya and its History. London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1953.

230

Bibliography

LINGUISTIC REFERENCES Atkins, B. T., Duval, A., and Milne, R. C. French Dictionary. 5th ed. Glasgow: Collins, 1978. Lane, E. W. Arabic-English Lexicon: Derived from the Best and the Most Copious Eastern Sources, Book 1, Vol. 4. London: Williams and Norgate, 1803. Penrice, J. A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran. Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1873. Wehr, H. Arabic-English Dictionary, Compacted Version. Ed. J. M. Cowan. Ithaca, NY: Otto Harrassowitz KG, 1994. Thompson, D., ed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary. 9th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Versteegh, K. Landmarks in Linguistic Thought III: The Arabic Linguistic Tradition. London: Routledge, 1997.

Index

Abduh, Mohammad, 44, 183 Abbasids, 23, 25–26, 28–29, 31, 33, 37ff, 39ff, 57, 61, 67, 97, 100, 164, 203, 210 Aga Khan, 55–56, 75, 84ff, 101–102, 107ff Ali, Mohamed, 46–47, 110–15, 122ff, 171, 173ff Ali, Prince Muhammad, 148 Arab, 21, 23, 25, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 59, 62, 73, 75, 82ff, 95, 101, 113, 114, 115, 127, 133, 138ff, 146, 149, 150, 152, 153, 159ff, 161ff, 173, 183 Arab Bureau, 47, 73, 88, 138ff. See also Government, British Arab Caliphate, concept of, 48, 49, 55–56, 58, 73, 80ff, 122, 130, 173 Arabic language, 17, 18, 52, 79, 94, 95, 175, 176, 180, 181, 184 Arab nationalism, 45, 93, 113, 130, 155, 166, 173, 202; vs Islamic identity, 155 Arnold, Professor Thomas, 6, 18, 23, 36ff, 38ff, 54–55, 65, 70, 91–98, 102, 104ff, 105ff, 123ff, 126–36, 137ff, 138ff, 169

Asad, Muhammad, 15; Qur’anic translation, 194 Atatturk, Mustafa Kemal, 14, 34, 87ff, 104ff, 112, 119, 123ff, 125, 135, 136, 155 bay’a, 26, 27, 63, 71, 88ff, 202 British High Commission, Cairo, 41, 48–49, 51, 60, 68, 80ff, 83ff, 86ff, 87ff, 98, 114, 122, 124, 141, 159ff, 211ff Caliphate; Muslim scriptural discussion of 14–16, 19–22; in political theory, 22–32, 163–66; British perception of, 43–64, 72–162, 166–71. See also Abbasids, Egyptian monarchs, Khilafah, Khilafat Delegation, Ottomans, Umayyads Cheetham, Sir Milne, 48, 49, 50, 59, 73, 80ff Clayton, Lt. Col. G. F., 49, 56, 73, 87ff Cold War, The, 42, 79ff, 81ff, 141–44, 150, 155, 161ff, 163 Colonial Office (British), 6, 47, 104ff, 128, 134, 141, 153. See also Government, British

231

232

Index

Delhi Sultanate, 29, 30, 31, 34, 39ff, 40ff, 133, 164 Egypt, 49, 50, 58, 60, 61, 67, 73, 80, 94, 104, 115, 123ff, 124ff, 141, 151, 158ff, 159ff, 161, 183, 210 Egyptian monarchs, 145–48. See also Faruq Faruq (King of Egypt), 145, 149, 158ff, 159ff fatwa, 128, 151 Foreign Office (British), 2, 6, 41, 47, 48, 49, 56, 59, 60, 61, 80ff, 81ff, 83ff, 92, 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104ff, 106ff, 107ff, 127, 128, 130, 134, 135, 139ff, 141, 145, 147, 148. See also Government, British France, 46, 47, 211ff French, 45, 59, 64, 72, 86ff, 87ff, 93, 105ff, 123ff, 146, 158ff Government: British (Whitehall), 1–4, 6, 7, 8ff, 13, 14, 34, 39ff, 41, 42, 44–47, 49, 51–62, 64–67, 72–76, 77ff, 78ff, 83ff, 91–93, 95, 96, 98, 101–103, 104ff, 105ff, 109, 112, 115, 116, 118–20, 121ff, 123, 125, 126, 127–36, 138ff, 141, 145–55, 158, 159, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170–73, 202, 205; India, 47–49, 55, 91–96, 118, 127–31, 133, 139ff. See also Arab Bureau, British High Commission Hadith, 5, 13, 14, 18, 19, 52, 177, 178, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186; Caliphate in, 18–21, 27, 32–33, 36ff, 61, 62, 111, 113, 114, 138ff; question of succession, 70–71, 81ff, 82ff Hirtzel, Sir Arthur, 97, 98, 103, 104ff, 126, 128, 137ff, 169 Iltutmish, 31, 100. See also Delhi Sultanate

India, 44, 45, 51, 55, 56, 62, 64, 74, 83ff, 89ff, 93, 98, 101, 112, 114, 115, 116, 126, 136, 147, 150, 151, 158ff, 160ff, 167, 173ff, 183. See also, Mughals, Subcontinent India Office 6, 48–50, 55, 73, 79ff, 81ff, 83ff, 92, 93, 95, 101, 103, 106ff, 109, 118, 120, 123ff, 124ff, 125–30, 134, 137ff, 139ff, 141, 166. See also Government, British Indian Muslims, 3–4, 6, 30–31, 47, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 74, 77ff, 79ff, 83ff, 91, 97, 98, 101, 109, 110, 115–17, 125, 126, 128, 130, 132, 138ff, 139ff, 143, 146, 149, 158, 183, 184, 209, 210, 211; relations with Ottomans, 45–46, 51, 79ff, 122ff Iqbal, Muhammad, 159ff Iran, 47, 152, 161 Islam. See religious authority, spiritual Authority Islamic bloc, 141, 151–55, 161ff, 173 Islamic Governance, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 42, 92, 98, 102, 125, 126, 149, 150, 154, 155, 162ff, 163, 166, 171, 188ff, 202 Italy, 142, 206, 211ff Italian Government, 39, 64–65, 86ff, 93, 106ff, 118, 126, 158ff Jihad, 46, 77, 79, 121, 131, 197, 199, 200 Jihadi, 5, 8 Jurist (Islamic), 15, 24, 25, 97, 99, 101, 104, 105, 106, 110, 113, 119, 127, 182, 184. See also ‘ulama Khilafah, 19, 22, 36ff, 37ff, 38ff, 57, 60 Khilafat, 21, 27, 33; Khilafat Delegation, 6, 8, 47, 81ff, 91, 93, 103, 109–20, 133, 136, 166, 169–71, 209, 210, 211ff Kucuk Kanyarca, Treaty of, 30, 66, 67, 87ff, 106ff

Index

Lampson, Sir Miles, 145, 148–49, 159ff Lausanne, Treaty of, 6, 30, 54, 80ff, 91, 92, 98, 99, 117, 125–36, 139ff, 160ff, 161ff, 164, 169, 187ff, 209 Lloyd-George, David, 6, 47, 91–93, 103, 104; and the Khilafat Delegation, 109–20, 169–71, 209, 211 Maududi, Maulana Sayyid Abdul ‘Ala, 83ff, 122ff, 183, 184, 190ff, 191ff, 196 Morghani, Sayyid Ali, 50–52, 75, 76ff, 102 Mughals, 30, 77, 173. See also Indian Muslims Muhammad, Prophet, 5, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19–21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36ff, 58, 63, 65, 66, 68, 70, 70, 71, 72, 81, 85, 88, 114, 129, 164, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 185–86, 188ff, 191ff, 201, 202, 206 Nallino, Professor, 6, 34ff, 55, 65, 67, 72–75, 84ff, 86ff, 102, 106ff, 211ff Nazim of Hyderabad, 52–53, 59, 75 Ottomans, 1, 3, 4, 6, 29–30, 32, 39ff, 44, 45, 46, 48, 51, 54, 55–62, 66–67, 74, 75, 78ff, 79ff, 82ff, 85ff, 86ff, 87ff, 97, 100, 102, 104ff, 111–19, 122ff, 124ff, 125, 132–33, 136, 145, 149, 151, 158ff, 164, 166, 167, 170, 173ff, 187ff, 202, 209, 210 Pan-Islam, 4, 14, 29–30, 32, 39, 41–46, 53, 56, 59, 60, 62, 64–67, 75–76 79ff, 80ff, 82ff, 83ff, 84ff, 92, 93, 97, 98, 106, 111, 112, 123ff, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 143, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157ff, 158ff, 160ff, 161ff, 164–67, 179, 188ff, 202, 210 papacy, 34, 35ff, 40ff, 58, 67, 126, 137ff, 165, 205–206, 207ff

233

pope, 13, 54, 57, 67, 74, 118, 206 Perie-Gordon–Lukach Report, 49, 57– 63, 69, 75, 92ff, 99–100, 211ff Prime Minister (British), 126, 132, 136, 166. See also Lloyd-George, David Qur’an, 5, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 32, 60, 63, 99, 187ff, 190ff, 201; and the Caliphate, 14–16, 205; and Islamic Governance, 175–86 Quraishi (tribe), 5, 9, 19, 27, 30, 33, 82; as Caliphal lineage, 59–61, 72, 106ff, 112, 122ff, 130 Qutb, Sayyid, 15, 83ff, 122ff, 183, 184, 190ff, 196 Rashidun, 19, 22, 24, 28–29, 36ff, 57, 65–66, 75, 97, 100, 112, 115, 136, 202 religious authority, concept of, 13, 16, 18–19, 22–25, 27, 31–34, 51, 60–61, 65, 71–74, 93, 97, 102, 106ff, 118, 125, 131–36, 149, 164–66, 175–86, 188ff, 190ff, 201–202, 203ff, 205– 206, 210. See also spiritual authority Sèvres, Treaty of, 54, 92, 93, 104, 117, 128 shari’a, 14, 25, 34, 112, 181, 195, 197; Shariat Act (1937), 173ff Salafi, 2, 5, 8, 195, 196, 198 al-Sa’ud, Abdul Aziz (King of Saudi Arabia), 62 82ff, 147, 158ff Sharif of Mecca, 4, 48–52, 55, 59, 60, 63, 82ff, 86ff, 133–34 Shi’a, 34, 35ff, 53, 56, 69, 71, 88ff, 97, 103, 153, 155, 167; political theory, 201–205 Southeast Asia (and Islamic Governance), 32, 39, 67, 82ff, 115, 133. See also Islamic Governance spiritual authority, concept of, 6, 18, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 45–46, 51–54, 57, 58, 65–66, 74–75, 82ff, 84, 93–94,

234

Index

96–100, 103, 104ff, 106ff, 110, 117, 125, 126–135, 138ff, 139ff, 161ff, 187ff, 206, 210. See also religious authority Storrs, Ronald, 50; Storrs Memo, 60–63, 67, 69, 73, 75–76, 85, 99–100, 103, 122, 211 Subcontinent, 143, 173ff, 184. See also India Sykes, Sir Mark, 49, 83ff Theology, 34, 50, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 70, 85ff, 87ff, 105ff, 114, 176, 211ff; and Political Science, 1–5, 9, 34; Theological, 17, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 41, 45, 48, 51, 53, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 87ff, 92, 114, 118, 123ff, 129, 130, 131, 136, 152, 153, 155, 157ff, 163, 164, 165, 166, 179, 183, 205, 209; Theologians, 26, 122, 169

Troutbeck, Sir John, 151–53, 160ff, 168 Tommara, Sheikh Hilimi, 55, 67–73, 75, 87ff, 88ff, 110, 167 Turkey, 45, 47, 54–55, 61, 83ff, 93, 94, 98, 104, 106ff, 112, 116, 123, 125, 130, 134–36, 138ff, 148, 149, 152, 153, 161 ‘ulama, 37ff, 47, 54, 165, 190ff Umayyads, 17, 23, 27, 28, 29, 37, 57, 58, 66, 100, 164, 203, 210 Ummah, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 55, 66, 70, 71, 75, 101, 113, 114, 121, 132, 139, 153, 164, 173, 174, 177, 183, 184, 188, 201, 202, 206, 223 Wingate, Sir Reginald, 50, 73, 87, 93–94, 167 Yehia, Imam, 59

About the Author

Sean Oliver-Dee is currently associate research fellow at the London School of Theology and associate researcher for the Anglican Representative to the European Union. He has written several papers for NGOs and think-tanks and is currently engaged in writing another book as well as developing a research and consultancy project on the nature of Theocratic systems for the London School of Theology. He has lived in Northamptonshire with his wife and their three children since they returned from living in India in 2003.

235