The Automotive Industry in an Era of Eco-Austerity
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The Automotive Industry in an Era of Eco-Austerity
This book is dedicated to Thaisa. Muito obrigado meu amor.
The Automotive Industry in an Era of Eco-Austerity Creating an Industry as if the Planet Mattered
Peter E. Wells Cardiff University, UK
Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Peter E. Wells 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009941410
ISBN 978 1 84844 967 1 (cased)
02
Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK
Contents List of abbreviations Preface: the era of eco-austerity Acknowledgements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
vi viii x
The automotive industry in crisis: economic and environmental failure Diversity and the industrial ecology metaphor Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility Emergent diversity in the global automotive industry: the policy agenda Alternative business models as the basis of a new industrial ecology of the automobile Enablers and limiters of change Conclusions
Bibliography Index
1 39 58 78 99 130 163 171 193
v
Abbreviations ACEA AEB AMP ASA ATS bbl BRIC CAFE CARS CAW CNG EBIT ELV EPA ERG EU EV FAPRI GMAC GMD HCNG HCV HFCs IEA JAMA KAMA LCV LPG M&A mbd MDI MFR mpg mtpa MY
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association Association of European Businesses Automotive Mission Plan (India) Advertising Standards Agency (UK) Automotive Transformation Scheme (Australia) Billion barrels Brazil, Russia, India and China Corporate Average Fuel Economy (US) Car Allowance Rebate System (US) Canadian Auto Workers Compressed natural gas Earnings before interest and taxes End of Life Vehicle Environmental Protection Agency (US) Electric Recharge Grids European Union Electric vehicle Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (US) GM Acceptance Corporation Gordon Murray Design Hydrogen compressed natural gas Heavy commercial vehicle Hydrofluorocarbons International Energy Agency Japan Automobile Manufacturers’ Association Korea Automobile Manufacturers’ Association Light commercial vehicle Liquid petroleum gas Merger and acquisition Million barrels per day Motor Development International Micro Factory Retailing Miles per gallon Million tons per annum Model Year (US) vi
Abbreviations
NAP NGO NGV NHTSA OECD OEM OICA OIE PBP ppm PSS RAC RNPO SMMT SNM TPS UAW UNECE V2G VSP WHO
vii
National Automotive Policy (Malaysia) Nongovernmental organization Natural gas vehicle National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (US) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Original equipment manufacturer Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles Office of Industrial Economics (Thailand) Project Better Place Parts per million Product service system Royal Automobile Club (UK) Renault Nissan Purchasing Organization Society of Motor Manufactures and Trades (UK) Strategic Niche Management Toyota Production System United Auto Workers United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Vehicle-To-Grid Voiture sans permit (France) World Health Organization
Preface: the era of eco-austerity Like a winter dawn creeping chill and grey over the land, the realization is growing that we are entering a new era. While the people of the world have endured previous periods of economic hardship, the new era is different. There is a real and justified fear as communities seek to comprehend the new language of crisis with its sub-prime borrowers, toxic assets, negative equity and quantitative easing, and somehow to trace cause and effect from the urban poor of America to the glittering bonus payments of the City of London. Factories and offices are closing their doors. It feels like the whole world economy has frozen solid with fear: investment has ground to a halt, sales have crumbled into bare minimalism, nobody is recruiting and nobody is selling a house. There is a collective holding of the breath while we wait for things to get back to normal. Only they will not go back to normal, if normal is what we have experienced in the last 20 years or so. This really is a new era. For a start, it will take many years to recover the losses of the last 12 months that have been witness to wealth destruction on an unprecedented scale. More fundamentally, we cannot allow a repetition of the fevered bubble of speculation upon which our economic lives floated – because in the end all bubbles burst. At the same time, the environmental challenges have not gone away. In fact, with every passing of a new scientific report or research project the evidence continues to accumulate: not only are things worse than we thought, they are also getting worse even more quickly than we thought. It is not just climate change. It is an entire package of disasters that threatens our very social existence that scientists are seriously discussing now. Be it water shortages or the decline in petroleum production, encroaching deserts or the loss of forests, species extinction or the collapse of fish stocks – everywhere the pressure of humanity on the planet is reaching critical levels. Until recently, we believed that we could face these challenges and had the economic power to overcome them, because we could afford to be green. Well, we don’t have the money any more, but we cannot afford not to be green. For us, this becomes a critical juncture in human history. A burgeoning global population is going to face a devastating economic slowdown at a time when the resource base is stretched to its limits. viii
Preface
ix
The era of eco-austerity sounds grim, and well it might be if we are not careful and imaginative. There is a very real danger that, under these circumstances, our future is one of an unremitting scramble for the dwindling resources of the planet. It is all too easy for a ‘green totalitarianism’ to emerge promising stronger government for a greener planet. An alternative scenario might be one of social implosion and global population collapse as we virtually return to the Stone Age. The truth is that none of us forecasters and analysts and visionaries really knows what the future will bring, because the rules have changed such that the old certainties have crumbled to dust around us. Governments are currently focused on trying to salvage what they can from the wreckage of the economy, and particularly the financial system. Large sums of money are being poured into vulnerable sectors like banking and the automotive industry in an attempt to return to the ‘growth’ that was a key factor behind the problems in the first place. This reaction is inevitable, but ultimately may be pointless or counter-productive – just pouring good money after bad. The era of eco-austerity is opening with a firestorm of creative destruction, which in turn creates the conditions for a radical transformation of our lives. The financial crisis has exposed the chronic lack of sustainability in our previous lifestyles, when we lived like there was no tomorrow – but tomorrow then arrived. Crises have always been the basis for opportunity, and now this is the case more than ever. The new era of eco-austerity may actually be one to be embraced and celebrated rather than confronted and overcome because now is the time for a radical change in our culture, in our social structures, in our political processes, in our lifestyles, in the very meaning of ‘wealth’ and ‘success’ and ‘growth’. Over the next few months and years, the shape of the new era will start to become evident. On the other hand, it is extremely challenging to translate this rhetoric into substantive action, particularly in an industry as problematic as the automotive industry and an activity as problematic as motorized personal mobility. This book is a modest attempt to provide an account of how we arrived at this point, and what the solutions might be. In so doing, the book has recourse to some key themes including diversity, flexibility, volatility, turbulence, localism, technological innovation, social and business innovation, and cultural change. Ultimately this is not about the search for the best single technology for a sustainable car – it is much more wide ranging than that. This book is about the search for and transition to multiple and diverse solutions to the provision of sustainable personal mobility.
Acknowledgements The research for this book was made possible through funding by the UK Economics and Social Research Council of the Centre for Business Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society (BRASS) at Cardiff University. I would like to acknowledge the support of Gareth Davies at AutomotiveWorld, Paul Nieuwenhuis and my fellow academics, PhD students and staff at BRASS, and the many members of the automotive industry, government and voluntary groups who have over the years provided information and funding. Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangements at the first opportunity.
x
1. 1.1
The automotive industry in crisis: economic and environmental failure WHEN IS A CRISIS?
In the realm of economics and business, a crisis is rarely a single event or a happening of short duration. When a company becomes bankrupt, or when an entire industrial sector collapses, there may be one or more pivotal moments, but crisis is generally a process or a sequence of events. So it is with the crisis that engulfed the global automotive industry in 2008 and 2009. While it might be said that the industry was the victim of circumstances beyond its control, as industry leaders have been wont to claim, this explanation neglects two important factors. First, the automotive industry was itself part of the ‘circumstances’ in so many ways; and secondly, while the financial upheavals unfolding from late 2007 onward might have been the proximate cause of market collapse and hence corporate crisis for vehicle manufacturers and suppliers, the underlying causes lie buried deep within the long-standing business practices of the industry. This book is not intended to be one of the growing numbers that seek to analyse the convulsions that rippled through the global economy from 2007 onward. There are already several insightful accounts (Shiller, 2008) and doubtless more will arrive. It should be recognized, however, that in so far as the global financial crisis had its roots in massive trade imbalances, and in consumers, governments and companies spending beyond their means, then the automotive industry was undeniably part of the problem. New car sales around the world were, up to 2007, booming as never before on the strength of freely available credit and a continuing surge in investment into new production capacity. Vehicle manufacturers were making cars like there was no tomorrow, and they were right! The idea that the leading vehicle manufacturers and the automotive industry as a whole are somehow blameless, passive and undeserving victims of external events is one of the key myths to be challenged in this book. Such an analysis inevitably leads to the conclusion that the crisis is temporary, has nothing to do with structural problems in the industry, and 1
2
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
can be resolved by government financial support until business as usual is possible and markets return to normality. On the contrary the crisis for the automotive industry derives from the inability of the industry to confront the twin threat of economic and environmental pressures. These two forces for change are not distinct but in fact are intimately connected one with the other, although some leading figures concerned with the issue of climate change have not embraced this perspective (Stern, 2009). For example, the burgeoning consumption of scarce raw materials by the automotive industry was one of the factors behind the surge in commodity prices that occurred just prior to the mid-2008 collapse. In a different but similar vein, the relentless consumption of petroleum by cars in use has been a key factor behind the growth in CO2 emissions to the atmosphere, and consequent global climate change, while simultaneously being a major feature in global trade imbalances. In this regard the automotive industry is one of the first in the world to truly face the reality that it is not sustainable. Being unsustainable is necessarily a temporary condition, but the automotive industry like many others appeared to be managed by those that believed that the day of reckoning could be postponed into the indefinite future.
1.2
THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
According to the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA), in 2005 if automotive manufacturing was treated like a country, it would be the sixth largest in the world with an equivalent turnover of €2 trillion (OICA, 2009). From the turn of the millennium vehicle production expanded significantly, and in the decade from 1995 to 2005 the industry expanded by some 30 per cent. Already the rather grand claims made by the industry appear to ring rather hollow, for example that ‘automobiles represent freedom and economic growth’ (OCIA, 2009). The estimated nine million direct jobs and 50 million indirect (supplier) jobs created by the industry worldwide are now dependent upon government hand-outs. The estimated US$400 billion contributed annually to government revenues worldwide also looks less attractive now as governments and society pick up the costs of closure and rationalization. Table 1.1 shows car and commercial vehicle production by country in 2000, while Table 1.2 shows car production by country for 2000, 2007 and 2008. It is recognized that data in this and other tables may not agree with other sources, chiefly due to differences in definitions and the difficulties of double-counting kit assembly. However, the data are broadly internally
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.1 Country
Total Source:
Car and commercial vehicle production by country, 2000 Cars
Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada China Czech Rep. Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Indonesia Iran Italy Japan Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Taiwan Thailand Turkey UK Ukraine USA Uzbekistan Others
3
Commercial vehicles
Total
Total change (%) 1999–2000
238 921 323 649 115 979 912 233 1 351 998 1 550 500 604 677 428 224 39 616 38 468 2 879 810 5 131 918 134 029 517 957 257 058 274 985 1 422 284 8 359 434 280 283 1 279 089 215 085 481 689 178 509 64 181 969 235 11 091 181 333 122 949 230 577 2 602 008 2 366 359 259 959 263 013 97 129 297 476 1 641 452 18 124 5 542 217 32 273 127 445
100 711 23 473 25 047 121 061 329 519 1 411 136 1 464 392 27 268 20 149 458 468 551 394 697 3 369 283 403 35 652 3000 316 031 1 781 362 2 547 656 438 52 234 23 283 68 215 13 984 236 346 1 649 450 0 126 787 512 990 666 515 41 384 109 600 314 592 133 471 172 442 13 131 7 257 640 0 63 204
339 632 347 122 141 026 1 033 294 1 681 517 2 961 636 2 069 069 455 492 59 765 38 926 3 348 361 5 526 615 137 398 801 360 292 710 277 985 1 738 315 10 140 796 282 830 1 935 527 267 319 504 972 246 724 78 165 1 205 581 12 740 181 783 122 949 357 364 3 114 998 3 032 874 301 343 372 613 411 721 430 947 1 813 894 31 255 12 799 857 32 273 190 649
11.4 14.6 1.2 1.6 24.5 −3.2 13.1 21.1 −21.4 13.2 5.3 −2.8 7.2 −2.1 228.9 132.8 2.2 2.5 11.3 24.9 −13.0 −12.2 −2.2 −26.9 3.1 141.8 43.3 4.1 12.6 9.6 6.3 20.2 5.6 27.6 44.7 −8.1 63.0 −1.7 −27.4 59.3
41 215 653
17 158 509
58 374 162
3.8
Derived from OICA.
4
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.2 Country Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada China Czech Rep. Egypt Finland France Germany Hungary India Indonesia Iran Italy Japan Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia South Africa South Korea Spain Sweden Taiwan Thailand Turkey UK Ukraine USA Uzbekistan Others Total Note: Source:
Car production by country, 2000, 2007 and 2008 Cars 2000
Cars 2007
238 921 323 649 115 979 912 233 1 351 998 1 550 500 604 677 428 224 39 616 38 468 2 879 810 5 131 918 134 029 517 957 257 058 274 985 1 422 284 8 359 434 280 283 1 279 089 215 085 481 689 178 509 64 181 969 235 11 091 181 333 122 949 230 577 2 602 008 2 366 359 259 959 263 013 97 129 297 476 1 641 452 18 124 5 542 217 32 273 127 445
350 735 283 348 199 969 789 674 2 388 402 1 342 133 6 381 116 925 778 67 149 24 000 2 550 869 5 709 139 287 982 1 707 839 309 208 882 000 910 860 9 944 637 347 971 1 209 097 61 912 695 000 134 047 234 103 1 288 652 8 236 571 071 174 209 276 018 3 723 482 2 195 780 316 850 212 685 315 444 634 883 1 534 567 380 061 3 924 268 170 000 429 430
46.8 −12.5 72.4 −13.4 76.7 −13.4 955.3 116.2 69.5 −37.6 −11.4 11.2 114.9 229.7 20.3 220.7 −36.0 19.0 24.1 −5.5 −71.2 44.3 −24.9 264.8 33.0 −25.7 214.9 41.7 19.7 43.1 −7.2 21.9 −19.1 224.8 113.4 −6.5 1997.0 −29.2 426.8 237.0
399 577 285 590 125 436 680 131 2 561 496 1 195 436 6 737 745 933 312 72 485 18 000 2 145 935 5 526 882 342 359 1 829 677 431 423 940 870 659 221 9 916 149 419 963 1 241 288 59 223 840 000 132 242 231 056 1 469 429 9 818 575 776 180 233 321 124 3 450 478 1 943 049 252 287 138 709 401 309 621 567 1 446 619 400 799 3 776 358 195 038 332 917
13.9 0.8 −37.3 −13.9 7.2 −10.9 5.6 0.8 7.9 −25.0 −15.9 −3.2 18.9 7.1 39.5 6.7 −27.6 −0.3 20.7 2.7 −4.3 20.9 −1.3 −1.3 14.0 19.2 0.8 3.5 16.3 −7.3 −11.5 −20.4 −34.8 27.2 97.9 −5.7 5.5 −3.8 14.7 −22.5
41 215 653
53 049 391
28.7
52 637 206
−0.8
USA excludes light trucks. Derived from OICA.
% change (2000–2007)
Cars 2008
% change (2007–2008)
The automotive industry in crisis
5
consistent and it is assumed that in net global terms any differences will be marginal. From Table 1.2 it can be seen that the automotive industry as a whole entered the new millennium with a robust growth rate overall in terms of cars and commercial vehicles produced. Although it is the markets of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) that often get the attention, Table 1.1 shows that the strongest growth in percentage terms at that time was in a variety of countries such as Ukraine, Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia and Serbia. Table 1.2 gives a clearer overview of the relative boom conditions since the millennium up to the global financial crisis of 2008. As can be seen, production output showed extraordinary growth in some countries including the BRIC countries. It is notable also that car production in the United States had fallen by 29 per cent by the end of 2007 and by a further 4 per cent in 2008 (though this figure excludes the ‘light truck’ category of vehicles that are often used as passenger cars in that market). Production also fell in other traditional locations during this time period, including Canada, Belgium, France, Italy, the UK and the Netherlands. Of the main traditional production locations, only Japan and Germany managed to show a growth in output in the period 2000 to 2007, indicative of a strong export performance rather than greater demand in the domestic market. In contrast, production in China soared to 6.3 million cars in 2007. Thus the overall growth of 28.7 per cent shown in car production for the period 2000 to 2007 masks some very strong variations at a national level as the ‘tectonic plates’ of the industry shifted. Indeed this geographic restructuring in terms of production is but one aspect of an underlying theme in this book – that of turbulence. Data for 2008 show major reductions in output from 2007 in countries such as Italy, France, Spain and Sweden even though at a global level output was virtually unchanged. In Table 1.3 the top 50 vehicle producing companies in 2007 are listed. Again the data are essentially pre-crisis in that they reflect the position prior to the major global financial events of 2008. The subsidiary brands owned by the various groups are not shown (e.g. the data for VW does not show the figures for Skoda, Audi, SEAT and the other brands held by the group). Neither do the data account for the complexity of the interlinkages and cross-shareholdings between various companies. Finally, the data do not show the many smaller companies active in niche markets such as Lotus. Still the data do show, for all the expectation of consolidation in the automotive industry in the search for ever-greater economies of scale, that the industry on the eve of the crisis remained significantly fragmented on a world scale. Overlaid on these national data are the investments and outputs of
6
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.3
Global vehicle production by company, 2007
Rank Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
GM Toyota Volkswagen Ford Honda PSA Nissan Fiat Renault Hyundai Suzuki Chrysler Daimler BMW Mitsubishi Kia Mazda Daihatsu AVTOVAZ FAW Tata Fuji Chana Automobile Isuzu Beijing Automotive Dongfeng Chery Others SAIC Brilliance GAZ Volvo Harbin Hafei Geely Anhui Jianghuai Mahindra Paccar Great Wall Jiangxi Changhe
Cars
LCV
HCV
Heavy Bus
Total
6 259 520 7 211 474 5 964 004 3 565 626 3 868 546 3 024 863 2 650 813 1 990 715 2 276 044 2 292 075 2 284 139 754 855 1 335 226 1 541 503 1 100 528 1 286 299 1 165 660 711 595 735 897 690 712 243 251 512 606 543 787
3 055 575 1 108 333 256 777 2 586 284 43 268 432 522 641 734 536 578 392 996 67 003 312 177 1 779 269 257 350 0 304 273 81 040 117 779 130 968 0 0 170 230 72 422 0
33 042 129 107 39 600 95 596 0 0 131 429 127 542 0 159 237 0 4 500 438 954 0 7 174 0 3 291 13 608 0 0 157 781 0 0
1 681 85 776 7510 0 0 0 7422 24 616 0 99 410 0 0 65 447 0 0 1991 0 0 0 0 16 896 0 0
9 349 818 8 534 690 6 267 891 6 247 506 3 911 814 3 457 385 3 431 398 2 679 451 2 669 040 2 617 725 2 596 316 2 538 624 2 096 977 1 541 503 1 411 975 1 369 330 1 286 730 856 171 735 897 690 712 588 158 585 028 543 787
0 454 272
49 810 0
478 535 0
3668 0
532 013 454 272
437 035 427 882 189 057 313 002 293 588 39 138 0 231 488 216 774 209 880
0 0 69 935 0 0 179 596 14 825 0 0 0
0 0 85 036 0 0 30 105 210 446 0 0 0
0 0 24 700 0 0 0 10 753 0 0 0
437 035 427 882 368 728 313 002 293 588 248 839 236 024 231 488 216 774 209 880
104 441 0 122 605 112 083
64 115 0 0 0
0 126 960 0 0
0 0 0 0
168 556 126 960 122 605 112 083
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.3
7
(continued)
Rank Group
Cars
40 41 42 43
107 170 0 100 376 100 202
0 4 586 0 0
0 97 323 0 0
0 4 984 0 0
107 170 106 893 100 376 100 202
0 0 84 138 0 31 869 68 160 65 790
0 0 0 0 40 293 0 0
92 485 70 839 0 71 017 0 0 0
5 956 15 919 0 7 314 0 0
98 441 86 758 84 138 78 331 72 162 68 160 65 790
56 301 121
12 775 910
2 685 200
416 245
72 178 476
44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Total Note: Source:
Porsche Hino BYD China National MAN Navistar Fujian Scania UAZ Shannxi Shangdong Kaima
LCV
HCV
Heavy Bus
Total
LCV = light commercial vehicle; HCV = heavy commercial vehicle. Derived from OICA.
multiple vehicle manufacturers engaged in a process of inter-market penetration facilitated and augmented by the creation of new manufacturing capacity – often with destabilizing results for the recipient economies (Changhoon and Clark, 2007). Table 1.4 shows similar data but for 2008, where the impact of reduced production can be seen as well as the shifting ‘league status’ of the companies – notably of course the ascent of Toyota to become the largest vehicle manufacturer in the world.
1.3
THE PROCESS OF DECLINE
At the outset it is to be admitted that corporate strategy at all levels is diverse and contextual, while the glib phraseology of ‘globalization’ does little to capture the reality of the industry over the last ten years or so (Freyssenet et al., 2003). The idea that there can be one best way (Womak et al., 1990) has been largely discredited. Despite this, the underlying business model that forms the basis of the Toyota Production System (TPS), or Fordism, or Sloanism, or Hondaism is technologically and structurally similar in all cases. Of course differences between these approaches are important, and can be the difference between profitable survival and
8
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.4
Global vehicle production by company, 2008
Rank Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Toyota GM Volkswagen Ford Honda Nissan PSA Hyundai Suzuki Fiat Renault Daimler AG Chrysler BMW Kia Mazda Mitsubishi AVTOVAZ Tata FAW Fuji Isuzu Chana Automobile Dongfeng Beijing Automotive Chery SAIC Volvo Brilliance Harbin Hafei Geely Anhui Jianghuai BYD GAZ Mahindra Proton Great Wall Paccar Chongqing Lifan
Cars
LCV
HCV
Heavy bus
7 768 633 6 015 257 6 110 115 3 346 561 3 878 940 2 788 632 2 840 884 2 435 471 2 306 435 1 849 200 2 048 422 1 380 091 529 458 1 439 918 1 310 821 1 241 218 1 175 431 801 563 489 742 637 720 552 096
1 102 502 2 229 833 271 273 1 991 724 33 760 463 984 484 523 85 133 317 132 516 164 368 929 330 507 1 356 610
251 768 24 842 46 186 68 715
114 877 12 871 9 840
134 033
8 416
151 759
104 774
135 658
23 303
395 123 7 000
68 578
83 159 105 754 128 233
1 344 2 302 5 567
160 966
128 169
19 388
64 401 47 101
488 488
3 221
Total
531 149
9 237 780 8 282 803 6 437 414 5 407 000 3 912 700 3 395 065 3 325 407 2 777 137 2 623 567 2 524 325 2 417 351 2 174 299 1 893 068 1 439 918 1 395 324 1 349 274 1 309 231 801 563 798 265 637 720 616 497 538 810 531 149
489 266 446 680
489 266 446 680
350 560 282 003
350 560 282 003 248 991 241 553 226 754 220 955 207 711
17 964
218 542
140 985 62 201 493
24 025
241 553 226 754 220 955 207 711 192 971 22 043 100 615 156 813 129 651
125 084 122 783
12 485
192 971 187 053 162 816 157 306 129 651 125 084 122 783
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.4
(continued)
Rank Group
Cars
40 41
107 422
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Total Note: Source:
9
MAN Jiangxi Changhe China National Porsche LUAZ Navistar Scania Shannxi Auto UAZ Ashok Leyland Kuozui
LCV 100 566
HCV
Heavy bus
7 487
108 053 107 422
106 377 96 721 88 316
106 377
2 232 76 302 72 067
13 962 7 807
41 228 1 019
50 539
19 927
63 827
1 792
2 272
55 130 574
10 741 629
2 292 188
75 220 30 953
Total
96 721 90 548 90 264 79 874 75 220 72 181 71 485 67 891
419 449
68 583 840
LCV = light commercial vehicle; HCV = heavy commercial vehicle. Derived from OICA.
financial collapse in the course of competition between companies within the same industry sector. Yet the industry tends towards an institutional isomorphism on the fundamental parameters of product design (all steel vehicles using internal combustion engines), process design (steel stamping and welding, body painting, trim and final assembly), and marketing approach (distributed network of franchised dealers, revenue streams generated by the sale of cars, multiple product brand ranges) premised on economies of scale and standardization (see Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007 and Batchelor, 1994 for an historical account of the emergence of this system). Industry observers have for some time been arguing that a new business model is needed (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 1997; Maxton and Wormold, 2004). Figure 1.1 illustrates the spiral of events that make the reversal of corporate decline so difficult (Wells, 2009c). The immediate cause of problems is of course a decline in sales, as has happened on an industry-wide basis since mid-2008. Inevitably, such a general crisis more profoundly affects the weaker companies – though the business studies literature tends to neglect the lessons to be learnt from failure (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Denrell, 2003). In the past this spiral of decline can be traced back to more individual events – the Ford Firestone case is a good
10
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity UNIT SALES FALL REVENUES FALL/ UNIT COSTS RISE
MARKET VALUE DECLINES
DEALERS LOSE CONFIDENCE
SUPPLIERS LOSE CONFIDENCE
INVESTOR RETREAT
DEALERS TAKE OTHER FRANCHISES STAFF MORALE FALLS TIME TO MARKET INCREASES INCREASED RISK OF TAKEOVER CUSTOMER SERVICE DECLINES PRODUCTS BECOME TOO OLD KEY COMPETENCIES LOST UNIT SALES FALL
PROFITABILITY DECLINES
Figure 1.1
The crisis spiral
illustration (O’Rourke, 2001; Moll, 2003; Noggle and Palmer, 2005), as is the problem Mitsubishi had with cover-ups over neglected vehicle recalls in Japan (Ito, 2006). Moreover, while much of the concern has been with crisis and resolution over a relatively short time period, it is also possible for ‘crisis’ to unfold inexorably over the years. Indeed, some aspects of the negative feedback process described here can take many years for the full effects to be felt by the company. For example, when a crisis hits a company key design staff may decide to leave and find employment elsewhere. This does not matter for the immediate product portfolio, or even for models largely developed but not in the market, but in a few years’ time when full replacements are due the quality of the new designs may not be up to the desired level. As the crisis deepens so the negative effects are found throughout the organization, and the negative feedback loops start to develop. For the vehicle manufacturers the following are important: ● ● ●
customers; financial community; franchised dealer networks;
The automotive industry in crisis ● ●
11
suppliers; internal resources and competences.
Customers Customers are of course vital in this process, be they corporate or private retail. If customers lose confidence in a brand, then it is bound to suffer. Damage to a brand can be difficult and expensive to repair; alternatively, building a brand image and reputation takes many years. There is a secondary impact on used car values that is also important. If the brand is seen to be weakened, residual values on used cars will fall, with some customers getting into the automotive equivalent of ‘negative equity’ whereby the actual value of a three-year-old car is significantly below the book value upon which a finance package has been arranged. In fact with the overall market crisis several vehicle manufacturers had to reduce the asset value of the cars that they had sold under finance packages, wiping many millions of Euros off their balance sheets (Mercedes lost €449 million in the third quarter of 2008 alone due to this problem according to Reiter, 2008). Financial Community A weaker share price that reflects the troubles a company is experiencing simultaneously makes a company vulnerable to external takeover, and less able to generate the resources to mount a defence. In order to shore up the balance sheet, a company may need to sell assets but at the same time the debt rating may be reduced, thereby making capital more expensive. True, speculations over takeovers of a weak company, hostile or otherwise, can act to drive up share price again but this does not in itself help with debt rating. For example, in 2008 one of the debt rating agencies, Standard and Poor, cut the then DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Americas limited liability company rating from CCC+ to CCC− (Isaiah, 2008b). Many of the global vehicle manufacturers suffered from a shortage of finance in the post-crisis environment from mid-2008. Governments had to step in to provide ‘soft loans’ and loan guarantees (Lampinen, 2009) because so many new car purchases are made via various finance schemes rather than outright purchase by customers. In the first half of 2009 the EU European Investment Bank provided €7 billion (US$9 billion) for vehicle manufacturers (Proctor, 2009a). For GM Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) in North America, new vehicle consumer financing contracts during the first quarter of 2009 fell significantly to US$3.4 billion from US$13.1 billion in the first quarter of 2008. At the end of 2008 new contracts had collapsed, and it was only with an investment from the US Treasury’s Troubled
12
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Asset Relief Program in late 2008 that GMAC expanded its new North American retail car financing activities (AutomotiveWorld, 2009a). Again it is significant that these processes may play out over differential time periods. Some, such as adjustments to share price, can happen quickly – indeed such adjustments are the short-term consequences of financial markets assessing the future implications of recent developments. On the other hand, selling off assets in order to generate funds and reverse the crisis spiral may take some time, and equally the more ‘distressed’ the position of the company the more likely it is that the full asset value cannot be realized because potential buyers know the seller is increasingly desperate to generate whatever revenues are possible. The automotive industry faces daunting investment costs into the future, in four main categories: the rationalization costs of closing unwanted capacity in saturated markets; the investment costs in opening up new capacity in growth markets; the development costs for new models; and the R&D costs of bringing to market alternative technologies to achieve environmental targets. With low or negative profitability, the required investment resources must come from outside. A key question is, therefore, can the automotive industry afford its own future? Franchised Dealer Networks The franchised dealer network is a key element in the mainstream business model for vehicle manufacturers, for without it the spatially extensive market could not be reached. These dealerships are independent, and employed precisely because of their sensitivity to changing market conditions. Over an extended period of time, the number of dealers in the mature markets has fallen. In the UK, for example, in the 30 years to 2007 the total number of franchised dealers decreased from 11 201 (1976) to 5273 (2007), almost a 50 per cent reduction (Sewells, 2008). As sales per outlet fall, so the confidence of the dealers falls. They might react by seeking to take another brand into the franchise or business; once a single-franchise operation becomes a multi-franchise outlet some sales that would previously have gone to the initial brand will go instead to the new brand, thereby reducing sales overall to the brand under crisis. This situation is made worse if entire brands are dropped (see the section on rationalization and cost reduction below), or if the vehicle manufacturer decides to reduce the number of dealers, thereby creating ‘gaps’ in network coverage. In the USA, GM informed around 1100 franchised dealers that it would not renew their contracts in October 2010 as part of its previously announced intention to reduce the total number of dealers by 42 per cent, from 6246 in 2008 to 3605 by the end of 2010 (AutomotiveWorld, 2009b). A similar
The automotive industry in crisis
13
42 per cent cut was later announced for Canada. When Chrysler went into bankruptcy in 2009 it too announced dealer reductions (789 in the USA as of May 2009), but also halted so-called wholesale financing to dealers (which enables them to hold stock at 0 per cent finance cost for a limited period), thereby reducing their operational flexibility. It is interesting to note that the GM Europe dealer network actually tried to buy a 10 per cent share in the vehicle manufacturer in May 2009, having raised some €500 million, when the proposed sale to Magna was being discussed. The claim is that having fewer dealerships will give higher sales volumes per dealer, and hence greater financial viability. With declines, however, franchised dealers may become reluctant to invest at former levels such that, for example, the physical fabric of the retail outlets declines, as does the skills level of the workforce due to lapses in training coverage. Once again, therefore, customer service levels will fall and so will sales, thereby accelerating the impetus to decline. Not surprisingly dealers may find it difficult to trust vehicle manufacturers. In mid-2008 GM issued a statement that there were no plans to remove any brands from its range other than Hummer (Murphy, 2008a), yet barely six months later Saab, Saturn and Pontiac were added to the list. Suppliers The large changes introduced with lean production included a series of new policies to manage the supply base. The number of direct suppliers was cut by a factor of ten while a degree of control was passed to the leading suppliers in terms of product development. The vehicle manufacturers became strongly interventionist, sending development teams to enhance the quality and productivity of their suppliers. Lean sourcing was not in itself enough, however. In addition the vehicle manufacturers have sought to capitalize on low production costs associated with emergent production locations, and so in reality the ‘shared destiny’ concept has not survived critical events and, if anything, leading suppliers are now seeking to exert market power to retain price levels. Table 1.5 provides a summary. Vehicle manufacturers are increasingly reliant on suppliers, but in a crisis vehicle manufacturers become vulnerable both to strategic choices by the supplier and indeed to that supplier simply going out of business. If suppliers start to reduce their investments to a particular vehicle manufacturer in product development then it is likely that the pace of new model development will slow and/or there will be some aspects of the new model that are not up to current standards. In either case the vehicle manufacturer is left competing in the market with products that are less than ideal, being either too old or insufficiently competent, or both. In
14
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.5
Transitions in vehicle manufacturers’ sourcing strategies Traditional
Lean
Extended enterprise
Neotraditional
Number of 2 000–3 000 suppliers per model or plant Geographic Local scope of supply base R&D capacity Work to of suppliers drawing
200–300
20–30
200–300
Regional
Regional
Global
Design to fit
Innovative solutions
Innovative, sometimes challenging to vehicle manufacturers
Contracts to suppliers
Short term; awarded on quoted cost basis
Model term; awarded on cost, quality, delivery basis
Renewed cost emphasis
Management of supply base
Remote; piece price focus
Structure of supply side
Fragmented; national focus High; captive suppliers for main subassemblies
Interventionist; quality, price, delivery focus; supplier performance optimization Tiered hierarchy; regional focus Reduced; captive suppliers seek external business
Model or platform term; awarded on ‘shared destiny’ basis Outsourced; value mapping; chain optimization; strategic focus Supply chain; regional focus Selective integration in strategic technologies; reduced integration elsewhere
Low-level integration emerging even in ‘core’ technologies
Vertical integration in the OEMs
Source:
Automated; reliance on external accreditation; material cost focus Supply chain; global focus
Wells, 2008a.
turn this will undermine sales and so take the decline spiral around a further iteration. Prior to 2007 there had already been multiple high-profile business failures in the automotive components industry, including Meridian, Tower
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.6
15
Some illustrative major supplier bankruptcies to late 2009
Supplier
Activity
Location
Event
JL French
Castings
US
Lear
Seating; world’s 11th largest supplier
US and Canada
Visteon
Multiple areas (ex-Ford captive supplier) Wheels
US
Declared bankrupt for second time in July 2009; 98% of business with GM, Ford and Chrysler Declared bankrupt in July 2009; total assets of about US$1.27bn and total liabilities of about US$4.54bn Declared bankrupt May 2009
Laser welded blanks Multiple areas
US
HayesLemmerz Noble International Visteon Plastal Holding
Edscha
Plastic automotive components Hinges and roof systems
Key Plastics
Plastic components
Contech
Aluminium and steel cast components Roof linings
Stankiewicz GmbH Delphi
Dana
Source:
Multiple areas (ex-GM captive supplier) Drivetrain components
US
UK Sweden
Germany (owned by US Carlyle Group) US
US
Germany US
US
Declared bankrupt May 2009 Declared bankrupt April 2009 April 2009 sought high court protection Declared bankrupt March 2009 along with German subsidiary Declared bankrupt in February 2009 Declared bankrupt in December 2008 with debts of more than US$100m Declared bankrupt in February 2009 Declared bankrupt in December 2008 Declared bankrupt in 2005; yet to emerge from this Filed for protection under Chapter 11 in 2006; eventually emerged February 2008
Compiled from http://www.automotiveworld.com news reports, 2006–9.
16
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Automotive, Cooper-Standard Holding, Collins and Aikman, Arvin Meritor, Dura Automotive Systems and Federal-Mogul. In fact Table 1.6 captures only part of the scale of losses, closures and restructuring underway in the period from 2007 in the automotive components industry. In early 2009 some reports were talking of up to 500 US suppliers being ‘at risk’ as the crisis unfolded. Internal Resources and Competences One area that is particularly difficult to measure in terms of the impact of the spiral of decline is that of internal resources and competences. Many vehicle manufacturers operate so-called labour banks whereby during busy periods workers provide over and above the contracted hours per week on the understanding that during slack periods the company will continue to pay them. This simple form of production smoothing is effective up to a point, but inadequate to withstand the structural forces unleashed in the economic crisis from mid-2008. All things being equal, there must be a strong incentive for those with the most marketable or portable skills to seek employment elsewhere, and for the company to start to struggle to recruit the best talent. Inevitably in turn this means that the ability of the business to compete into the future is more or less compromised.
1.4
THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL STRATEGY
Traditional strategies include mergers, acquisitions and consolidation, multibrand platforms, rationalization and cost reduction, expansion into new markets and extending the brand reach. It is worth noting that these strategies have not failed for every vehicle manufacturer. VW Group, for example, has been largely regarded as successful with its use of common platforms or vehicle architectures across several different brands and models. Equally it could be argued that the Renault-Nissan partial merger has been a success on most terms, even if many jobs were lost in Japan as part of the rescue process. Over time, however, two key issues have come to be important. First, the automotive industry as a whole has become a lot more complex, as have the operations of the major vehicle manufacturers. They have all, generally, expanded production facilities and brands and models, they have opened up into new markets, and entered into multiple supply arrangements alongside joint ventures or co-product agreements with other vehicle manufacturers. Hence the process of identifying the possible synergies in a merger, and of finding the areas where duplication can be removed, is more difficult. In
The automotive industry in crisis
17
addition such processes inevitably involve governments, trades unions and others with a vested interest in the outcomes and this can militate against the raw logic of business. Secondly, arising from the complexity, it takes longer to achieve change such that the benefits might not accrue fast enough. Mergers, Acquisitions and Consolidation Many of the traditional solutions in the form of rationalization, cost reduction and industrial consolidation have failed to yield the anticipated benefits; the most obvious case being the catastrophically executed merger between Daimler and Chrysler (Han and Kleiner, 2003; Weber and Camera, 2003). In 1998 Daimler paid US$36 billion for Chrysler, while in 2007 it sold the majority of the business (80.1 per cent) to Cerberus Capital for just US$7.4 billion, having endured major losses in the previous two years. Dieter Zetsche, Chief Executive of DaimlerChrysler at the time, reportedly said that ‘We obviously over-estimated the potential synergies’ (quoted in Gerlach, 2007). The failed merger was part of a wider strategy adopted by Daimler under the then Chairman Jürgen Schrempp in the mid1990s termed the ‘Welt AG’ plan under which the company would seek a dominating role in the key market regions of the world through a series of mergers and alliances including Chrysler, Mitsubishi and Hyundai. Paradoxically, the strong leadership of Schrempp could have been the cause of the merger failure (Stadler and Hinterhuber, 2005) as he took the company into a series of relationships that the rest of the management found difficult to make operational. While the major financial institutions and corporate lawyers, along with the senior management teams involved, tend to be well rewarded in the short term by mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in the longer term the corporate benefit is much more doubtful. In the case of the automotive industry there are sound reasons for taking the view that benefits would in any case take years to materialize. For example, the typical car model requires something like 36 to 48 months to bring to market if started from a ‘clean sheet’. It is then in production for say eight to ten years (with some mid-life facelifts possibly), and will be supported in the aftermarket for a further ten years with the supply of spare parts. Investments in plant and tooling, as well as supplier contracts, are generally put in place as the model is developed and put into production. Indeed reversal of consolidation, merger and acquisition strategies has proven expensive for GM buying out the ‘put’ option held by Fiat and selling Saab to Koenigsegg in mid-2009; BMW selling off MG Rover (Brady and Lorenz, 2001; Donnelly et al., 2003); Ford selling Land Rover and Jaguar to Tata after years of losses, unhappy ownership of the Norwegian electric vehicle brand TH!NK, and so on. Table 1.7 illustrates
18
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.7
Major restructuring changes in the global automotive industry, 2007 to 2009
GM GM GM
Bankrupt Sale of Saab Sale of GM Europe (Opel, Vauxhall) Sale of Hummer
GM GM Ford Ford Ford Porsche Chrysler
Chrysler LDV Source:
Sale of Saturn Sale of Jaguar/Land Rover Sale of Aston Martin Sale of Volvo Cars Attempted acquisition of VW Sold to Cererbus Financial Holdings by Daimler (retained 20%) Bankrupt Bankrupt
Bailed out by US government Purchased by Koenigsegg Initially agreed purchase by Magna and others; bids reopened later Purchase proposed by Chinese company Purchased by Penske Purchased by Tata Purchased by Prodrive No purchaser as of late 2009 Failed attempt. In July 2009 VW bought up Porsche Messy and not totally resolved by late 2009 Bailed out by US government Not bailed out by UK government
Compiled from http://www.automotiveworld.com news reports, 2007–9.
some recent attempts at industrial restructuring in the sector, where again results have been mixed. Table 1.8 details some changes to the contract vehicle assembly industry in the period 2007 to late 2009. Prior to this, early casualties had been Mayflower (UK), TWR (UK, but undertaking contract assembly for Volvo in Sweden) and Matra (France). Of the remainder, Magna (Austria) and Valmet (Finland) remained in business. A typical case for the contract manufacturers is Karmann, which previously built the Volkswagen Golf variant/wagon (previous generation), Chrysler Crossfire, Kia Sportage (previous generation), Audi A4/ S4 Cabriolet and Mercedes Benz CLK coupe. As with other contract assemblers, a combination of vehicle manufacturers putting more of the low-volume work in-house (in their increasingly flexible factories) and the loss of work on retractable roof systems has undermined its business. An early casualty was the automotive division of Matra, the company that built the earliest Renault Espace models and the ill-fated Aventine model. On the other hand, several of these contract assemblers might in the future produce electric vehicles in competition with their former customers, a point returned to later in this book. One of the main areas of benefit expected from M&A activity is that
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.8
Major restructuring changes in the contract assembly industry, 2007 to 2009 Problems started in mid-2006; bankrupt November 2007; bought by Argentum Motors, July 2008 Bankrupt April 2009
Heuliez (France)
Contract assembler; seat assemblies; retractable roof systems
Karmann (Germany)
Contract assembler; retractable roof systems
Bertone (Italy)
Contract assembler
Bankrupt November 2007; ‘sold’ January 2008 but sale blocked
Pininfarina (Italy)
Contract assembler
Net loss of €115m (US$176.68m) in 2007; rescued January 2009
Source:
19
In administration again, April 2009; two bids received; medium-term focus on own electric vehicles Concentrate on components; cut 1340 jobs; medium-term focus on own electric vehicles Interest expressed by First Auto Works (China) and Mahindra & Mahindra (India). Exited. Interest still expressed by Fiat Stopped contract assembly; sought to develop electric vehicle; net loss in 2008 €204.1m (US$275.4m)
Compiled from http://www.automotiveworld.com news reports, 2007–9.
of purchasing components and materials, though again this takes time to materialize. For example, the Renault Nissan Purchasing Organization (RNPO) was founded in 2001 as part of the more general partial merger of the two companies. In the 2002–03 fiscal year, RNPO purchased components worth US$21.5 billion (or 43 per cent of the total bought by Nissan and Renault). By January 2004 RNPO had increased the scope of its joint purchasing to include manufacturing equipment, such as press machinery and welding equipment, distribution, front-end modules, interior materials such as trim, and car audio equipment such that joint purchases increased by US$11.5 billion to US$33 billion (AutomotiveWorld, 2003). Such moves give greater purchase volumes on commodity items (tyres, glass, steel, etc.) and also allow the gradual removal of duplication in purchasing management staff.
20
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Multi-brand Platforms It is often claimed by vehicle manufacturers that one of the key areas for cost saving arising out of M&A activity is that multiple brands and models can be derived from a single ‘platform’, thereby saving resources in R&D and in tooling. This approach, often reduced to putting a different badge on essentially similar cars, has somewhat fallen out of favour to be replaced by so-called architecture strategies. With architectures, the common components are hidden from view for the consumer. The GM GMT-800 model, for example, is the blueprint for the company’s fullsize truck. This versatile architecture has spawned 63 variants of pickups and sport-utility vehicles, including the Chevy Suburban and Silverado, the Cadillac Escalade and the Hummer H2. The model list included (in 2008): ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Cadillac Escalade/Escalade ESV; Cadillac Escalade EXT; Chevrolet Avalanche; Chevrolet Silverado, HD, hybrid; Chevrolet Suburban; Chevrolet Tahoe; GMC Sierra, HD, hybrid; GMC Yukon Denali, Yukon Denali XL; GMC Yukon, Yukon XL; Hummer H2.
The engineering logic was quite compelling, with major aspects of development (such as integration of the powertrain with the chassis) effectively by-passed for new models derived from the same architecture. As a result development times are compressed, more products can be created and development costs per model are reduced. On the other hand, to take just one instance, the Hummer H2 was a poor pastiche of a car with only some superficial resemblance to the iconic Hummer military vehicle. It gained incremental sales for the Hummer brand while simultaneously destroying its integrity. In 2009 GM had to put the Hummer brand up for sale as part of the process of creating the New GM business. Rationalization and Cost Reduction Cost reduction to expand the market has been an industry staple strategy since the days of the Model T Ford. There is a clear danger that rationalization to achieve cost reduction might conflict with other elements of
The automotive industry in crisis
21
strategy, notably the expansion into new markets and extending the reach of a brand (by adding more models in more market segments to the brand range). Equally, however, it could be that rationalization is required in a mature (saturated) market while simultaneously new capacity is required in a new (expanding) market – indeed this has been a long-running problem for the industry over the last 20 years or more. In the context of the spirals of decline, however, rationalization may not be sufficient. For example, in mid-2002 GM announced plans to reduce the number of mid-size cars on sale in North America from 15 to 10 in a bid to reduce costs and focus marketing efforts. The company had already announced plans to drop the Oldsmobile brand by 2004. As with Chrysler dropping the Eagle brand in 1998 and the Plymouth brand in 2001, the measure did little to halt the decline in market share. In 2009, as part of the prebankruptcy reconstruction of GM, it was announced that GM was to sell the Saab, Saturn, Hummer and Pontiac brands (Isaiah, 2008b). In practice it is probably fair to say that the bulk of the effort in terms of cost reduction has been via increasingly aggressive procurement regimes, holistic purchasing strategies intended to off-load a greater share of development costs onto suppliers while simultaneously achieving year on year price reductions in per-unit bought in components and materials. Expansion into New Markets Russia is a typical example of a country into which the global automotive industry has sought to expand and capture market growth as economic liberalization proceeds. The Russian government put in place in 2007 a three-stage plan for the development of the automotive industry, but it is unclear how this plan has been affected by changes in the global macroeconomic environment. Under this plan the period 2008–10 was seen as one of consolidation in the industrial base for vehicle assembly and components serving domestic demand, leading to phase two (2011–15), which would be characterized by export-oriented facilities, and ultimately resulting in the third phase, where 70 per cent of production would be for domestic demand and 30 per cent for export. Up to 2008 the market in Russia had shown clear trends towards strong growth, and the replacement of ‘domestic’ brands with imported cars or sales of non-domestic brands manufactured in Russia. In 2004, out of total sales of 1 268 000, domestic brands accounted for 865 000 (68 per cent); by 2008 sales had been estimated to grow to 2 750 000 with domestic brands accounting for 700 000 (25 per cent). The expectation of market growth fuelled an investment boom in Russia as in other markets such as China, India, Thailand, Brazil and
22
Table 1.9
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
The estimated market in Russia, Q1 2008 and Q1 2009 (cars and light commercial vehicles)
Group Avtovaz GM Group Opel Chevrolet Cadillac Hummer Saab Ford Group Ford Volvo VW Group VW cars VW vans Audi Seat Skoda Nissan Group Infiniti Nissan Hyundai Toyota Group Toyota Lexus Renault Mazda PSA Peugeot-Citroen Peugeot Citroen Kia GAZ Group GAZ cars GAZ vans Sollers Group Fiat Isuzu Ssangyong UAZ Daewoo Honda Mitsubishi Suzuki
Q1 2009
Q1 2008
% change
88 720 43 102 11 945 30 268 472 309 108 32 697 29 956 2 741 25 761 10 935 1 406 3 302 292 9 826 24 804 1 877 22 927 21 391 20 816 19 356 1 460 15 011 13 176 13 175 9 981 3 194 13 710 12 987 2 339 9 748 11 720 3 915 22 2 063 5 720 11 692 9 218 6 042 4 407
144 777 83 157 23 479 58 594 308 191 681 45 737 41 499 4 238 22 455 7 507 1 754 3 880 232 9 082 38 355 1 102 37 253 44 054 38 530 35 825 2 705 24 303 17 094 10 403 8 403 2 000 21 101 32 298 5 297 27 001 19 534 4 515 0 3 000 12 019 23 941 15 445 21 296 9 890
−39.0 −48.0 −49.0 −48.0 53.0 62.0 −84.0 −29.0 −28.0 −35.0 15.0 46.0 −20.0 −15.0 26.0 8.0 −35.0 70.0 −38.0 −51.0 −46.0 −46.0 −46.0 −38.0 −23.0 27.0 19.0 60.0 −35.0 −60.0 −56.0 −64.0 −40.0 −13.0 0.0 −31.0 −52.0 −51.0 −40.0 −72.0 −55.0
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.9
(continued)
Group
Q1 2009
BMW Group BMW Mini Jaguar Land Rover Land Rover Subaru Mercedes Benz Mercedes Benz cars Mercedes Benz vans IZH Chery Geely Great Wall Lifan BYD Chrysler Group Chrysler Jeep Dodge Porsche Iran Khodro Alfa Romeo Source:
23
4 184 4 011 173 3 397 3 031 2 990 2 795 2 360 435 2 166 957 915 833 618 606 417 70 161 186 299 108 37
Q1 2008 4 211 4 009 202 4 897 4 612 4 296 4 118 3 388 730 5 628 5 361 0 2 607 662 920 2 139 406 795 938 390 681 74
% change −1.0 0.0 −14.0 −31.0 −34.0 −30.0 −32.0 −30.0 −40.0 −62.0 −82.0 0.0 −68.0 −7.0 −34.0 −81.0 −83.0 −80.0 −80.0 −23.0 −84.0 −50.0
Derived from AEB, 2009.
elsewhere. As Table 1.9 clearly shows, however, the market in Russia experienced precisely the same sort of collapse as other global markets. As a consequence the investments detailed in Table 1.10 appeared in 2009 to be surplus to requirements, with excess capacity once again the main structural problem faced by the vehicle manufacturers. As can be seen from Table 1.10, the years up to 2009 have been witness to a significant flow of inward investment from vehicle manufacturers eager to capture a share of the booming market in Russia. These plans were, however, in some cases put on hold in 2009, with for example Suzuki reportedly halting construction of its plant in St Petersburg. Nissan officially launched its new plant in June 2009, but with only one shift and 750 workers. Several plants had closures or production slowdowns announced in 2009 including Avtoframos, GAZ Siber production, Ford St Petersburg, IzhAvto, Toyota St Petersburg and Geely (Ural). In March 2009 Putin pledged more than US$1 billion in aid for the automotive industry in Russia.
24
Moscow Vsevolozhsk Togliatti Taganrog Izhevsk Nab. Chelni St Petersburg St Petersburg Kaluga St Petersburg Kaluga St Petersburg St Petersburg
Avtoframos Ford GM AVTOVAZ TagAz IzhAvto Sollers Toyota GM Volkswagen Nissan PSA–Mitsubishi Hyundai Suzuki Others
Source:
Kia, BMW, Hummer, Chevrolet, Others Renault Ford Chevrolet Hyundai Kia Ssangyong, Fiat Toyota Chevrolet, Opel VW, Skoda Nissan Mitsubishi, Peugeot Hyundai Suzuki
Brands
Derived from AEB, 2009; Bonchev, 2008.
Kaliningrad
Avtotor
Total
Location
1999 2002 2001 1997 2003 2006 2008 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2009
1994
Start date
Production facilities of non-domestic brands in Russia, 2009
Factory
Table 1.10
4 908
380 330 338 320 90 180 220 300 1 200 200 400 400 120
250
Capital cost (US$m)
459 000
70 000 70 000 55 000 80 000 50 000 21 000 0 6 000 2 000 0 0 0 0 1 000
106 000
Production 2007
1 645 000
160 000 150 000 60 000 155 000 120 000 90 000 100 000 180 000 140 000 80 000 60 000 80 000 30 000 60 000
130 000
Capacity 2012
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.11
25
Brand names, models, body styles and variants on the UK market, 1994 to 2009
Year
Brand names
Models
Body styles
Variants
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
54 56 57 53 54 52 57 58 57 56 62 54 63 64 59 57
205 211 218 225 231 240 262 260 263 257 351 323 356 344 304 310
300 309 321 318 382 332 357 351 387 370 397 376 415 397 366 376
1 303 1 580 1 624 1 611 1 637 1 759 1 931 2 042 2 472 2 743 3 042 3 155 3 219 3 323 3 291 3 637
Source:
Wells and Morreau, 2009.
Extending the Brand Reach Vehicle manufacturers have sought to capture or retain market share by increasing the number and variety of models and brands on offer in any one market, thereby hoping to align their product offering more closely with customer demand. Table 1.11 gives an indication of how this has resulted in market fragmentation, taking the UK as an example. Extending the brand, or indeed adding new brands, can both be means by which vehicle manufacturers are able to cover more of the market segments and potentially increase revenues per vehicle. Table 1.12 presents some data that show clearly that the market share of the top ten models in a number of European countries declined in the ten years between 1996 and 2006 – again indicative of market fragmentation. As Table 1.12 shows, in all cases the market share of the top ten models has fallen significantly no matter what the starting point. The rate at which that share has declined varies from case to case, with perhaps France and Sweden showing the most enduring reliance on the top ten models. Perhaps this is no accident, as in both cases the domestic manufacturers have retained a degree of competitiveness. Neutral markets, those with no
26
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.12
Market share of the top ten models, selected markets, 1996 and 2006
Market
1996 share (%)
2006 share (%)
38.30 33.58 41.45 35.32 42.90 48.88 57.11 40.50 44.23 45.54 49.90 50.84 41.93
27.51 27.74 28.84 21.83 32.76 41.69 36.05 30.90 34.07 37.39 34.70 41.86 31.89
Austria Belgium Denmark Netherlands Finland France Portugal Germany Spain Irish Republic Italy Sweden UK Source:
Derived from SMMT, 2007a.
domestic manufacturer, tend to highlight these trends even more strongly – perhaps because there is less residual loyalty to a domestic manufacturer. The consequences for vehicle manufacturers can be profound. In those core domestic markets critical volumes are lost. An example is the VW Golf. In 1996 VW sold 337 550 Golf/Vento models in the domestic German market, or 8.55 per cent of the total market of 3 946 320. In 2006 VW sold 236 980 Golf/Jetta models to claim 6.83 per cent of the total market of 3 467 961 (Society of Motor Manufactures and Trades (SMMT), 2007a). Put another way, it is a real challenge for the volume vehicle manufacturers to retain their domestic market share. Hence between 1996 and 2006 Renault domestic market share fell from 26.5 per cent to 23.6 per cent, while over the same time period Fiat domestic market share fell from 33.6 per cent to 23.3 per cent. The trend is not entirely universal, with for example VW managing to increase domestic market share in the same time period from 18.9 per cent to 19.8 per cent, but the overall thrust of these market developments is clear.
1.5
THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION
Not all of the ills of the world can be laid at the door of the automotive industry, but it is certainly worth considering the many and varied
The automotive industry in crisis
27
environmental challenges of the contemporary era if only as an antidote to the often myopic institutional focus on carbon emissions and climate change. Put in another way, a car with zero carbon emissions in use is not necessarily going to provide sustainable mobility. Not least, the automotive industry is again symptomatic of a broader problem: that as hitherto underdeveloped economies seek to emulate and indeed overtake the material wealth of the previously industrialized nations, so the latent unsustainability of the industrial nations is made apparent. The work of the ‘Factor X’ school of thought (Weiszacker et al., 1997) made this abundantly clear, building on the worthy tradition of the still influential and inspirational Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 1987) and the now neglected ‘limits to growth’ theories (Meadows et al., 1972). As the Factor X theorists eloquently put it, resource consumption (and the pollution that in turn ‘consumes’ fresh resources) is a function of population, technology and level of economic development, and all three are changing at a frightening rate. More recently the more populist concept of the ecological footprint (Wackernagel and Rees, 1998) has gained political purchase and provided us all with a graphic metaphor of the burdens we are placing on the planet. As Giddens (2009) argues, there is no cohesive politics of climate change and green parties are mostly marginal, while resurgent nation states in the wake of the failure of globalization may fatally undermine the ability to achieve collective action at the international level. Those burdens are many and varied (Brown and Starke, 1998; Millennium Ecological Assessment (MEA), 2005), and include crucial issues such as deforestation (Binswanger, 1991), habitat loss (Hoekstra et al., 2004), desertification (Schlesinger et al., 1990; Geist and Lambin, 2004), species extinction (International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 2009) and loss of species diversity, water shortages (Ward, 2002; World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 2008), over-fishing (Scheffer et al., 2005), and the looming exhaustion of many important organic and inorganic materials with extraction rates exceeding discovery rates or the ability of reserves to be renewed (Tilton, 2002). The automotive industry cannot reasonably be blamed for the problems associated with over-fishing in any direct manner, but the industry has long been seen by national governments as an engine of economic growth and an indicator of national prosperity and to that extent the automotive industry is very much part of the entire social project of modernism that has propelled us all along the path of increased material consumption. Moreover, some of the planetary burdens imposed by humanity can be attributed directly to the automotive industry and its products, in manufacture, use or disposal.
28
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.13
Total world materials consumption for all cars adjusted for material yield (mtpa)
Material
2010
2015
81.86 11.179 12.211 11.139 4.888 3.110 1.504 1.852 3.956
81.544 11.629 13.595 11.376 3.954 3.474 1.622 2.010 4.899
Steel Iron Aluminium Plastic Elastomer Glass Copper Zinc, etc. Other Source:
Change Change 2010–15 2010–15 (kg) (%) −0.241 −0.150 1.385 0.236 −0.935 0.364 0.118 0.157 0.943
−0.3 −1.3 10.2 2.1 −23.6 10.5 7.3 7.8 19.3
2020
93.321 12.372 18.381 14.492 4.612 4.111 1.982 6.396 7.185
Change Change 2015–20 2015–20 (kg) (%) 11.776 0.743 4.786 3.116 0.659 0.637 0.361 4.387 2.286
12.619 6.004 26.037 21.502 14.279 15.504 18.201 68.583 31.822
Wells, 2008a.
The construction of roads, for example, is itself contributory to the fragmentation of ecosystems and hence to the decline of biodiversity and ecological vitality. Roads create barriers to the movement of many living things, and bigger roads create bigger barriers. With roads come traffic, cars and trucks and other motorized transport that connect previously remote locations to other centres of population. Roads and vehicles are the instruments through which humanity is often able to extend its dominion over the land. The manufacture of cars demands vast quantities of materials, as Table 1.13 clearly illustrates. The automotive industry is heavily implicated in carbon emissions. In 2004 US cars and light trucks contributed an estimated 314 million metric tons carbon-equivalent. The USA has 5 per cent of the world population, 30 per cent of the world’s automobiles and contributes 45 per cent of the world’s automotive CO2 emissions (DeCicco et al., 2006). Greater understanding of anthropometric climate change (Lynas, 2007; World Energy Council (WEC), 2007) provides potent arguments for developing innovations that can reduce carbon emissions in vehicles for example, while the looming scarcity and uneven geographical distribution of oil provides an international context for developing alternatives to hydrocarbon fuels (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2008). In those nations that are particularly dependent on imported oil such as the United States the problem is viewed as acute and of national strategic importance (Aleklett, 2007), and for some is the basis for further global conflict (Heinberg, 2005). Of course the environmental and the economic
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.14
Sources of CO2 emissions in the UK, 2006
Source
Proportion (%)
Power generation Land transport Air/sea transport Business Other Source:
29
35.0 22.0 7.0 17.0 6.0
Adapted from SMMT, 2007b.
problems are frequently inter-twined. Becker (2009) forecasts that by 2030 electric vehicles could account for 64 per cent of US light vehicle sales and 24 per cent of the fleet in circulation. If this were to happen Becker further calculates: ●
●
● ● ●
US oil imports will be 18–38 per cent lower by volume by 2030 than would be expected if internal combustion engine cars took all the sales (even allowing for improvements in fuel efficiency); similarly, the annual US trade deficit attributable to importing oil could be between US$94 billion and US$266 billion lower by 2030; there would be a net employment gain of between 130 000 and 350 000 jobs by 2030; health care cost savings (due to reduced air pollution) of between US$105 billion and US$210 billion; greenhouse gas emissions of between 20 per cent and 69 per cent by 2030 when non-polluting sources of electricity are used compared with 2005 US light vehicle emissions.
The position in a country such as the UK shows that the automotive industry is somewhat less implicated in the overall picture on CO2 emissions, but still significant, as shown in Table 1.14. The SMMT (2007b) estimates that cars account for some 40 per cent of transport CO2 emissions in the UK, though this figure includes air travel and the UK has a particularly high CO2 emissions figure from air travel due to the disproportionate share of long haul flights. The science behind many of these issues is less than certain, as is the relative contribution of direct human agency or indirect feedback loops such as the impact of (probably anthropogenic) climate change on fish stocks that have already suffered from over-fishing. An almost universal
30
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
awakening among politicians globally has produced a newfound zeal to tackle these issues, imbuing legislators with a revolutionary ardour to, among other things, embrace new vehicle technologies and provide incentives for their introduction into the market. Petroleum, Carbon Emissions and Peak Oil The mainstream ‘Reference Scenario’ for the IEA forecast to 2030 (IEA, 2008) is typical of the mainstream of scientific opinion with respect to future trends on energy consumption, and concludes that: ‘The Reference Scenario, characterized by rising energy prices, increased import dependence, and rising greenhouse-gas emissions, is unsustainable: environmentally, economically, and socially.’ This is worrying news for the automotive industry because the Reference Scenario takes as its starting point government policies obtaining in mid-2008, along with petroleum prices that were somewhat higher than they became in the post-crisis era. In the view of the IEA, world primary energy demand will grow by an average of 1.6 per cent per annum, or 45 per cent between 2006 and 2030. Fossil fuels of all types will continue to retain an approximate 80 per cent share of primary energy demand, though within this the share of coal is expected to increase significantly. Under this scenario the expectation is that by the end of the twenty-first century there will be an approximate doubling of CO2 concentration levels in the atmosphere to about 1000 parts per million, which in turn may be expected to result in global temperature increases of around 6°C. While the area of global climate change remains an inexact science, these are indeed alarming figures. Obviously not all of the increase in CO2 emissions can be laid at the door of the automotive industry, but equally the implication is that huge changes are needed in all aspects of land transport and the impact it has on climate change (Ryan and Turton, 2007; Sperling and Cannon, 2007; Staley, 2008). Politically, the forecast poses a considerable challenge. Collectively the non-OECD countries account for 87 per cent of the anticipated growth in consumption to 2030. At the same time, power generation and transport are seen as the two key sectors driving growth in energy consumption. World oil demand is expected to grow at 1 per cent per annum to 2030, with net consumption rising from 85 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2007 to 106 mbd by 2030. Crucially the forecast on oil consumption assumes that currently prevailing subsidies in key markets such as China and India are removed, with the resulting price rises helping to curtail demand. About 75 per cent of the growth in oil demand worldwide is expected to derive from the use of cars and trucks, with the global population of cars expected to rise from 650 million (2005) to about 1.4 billion by 2030. Cars
The automotive industry in crisis
31
Table 1.15
Aluminium penetration in vehicle body applications, 2007 (%)
Application
Europe
North America
Asia
18 4 2 2 <1
8 1 1 0 0
3 <1 <1 2 <1
Bonnets Wings Doors and boot lids Entire body structure or front structure Roofs Source:
Derived from European Aluminium Association, 2008.
produce typically 85 per cent of life cycle CO2 emissions during their use phase, with about 10 per cent in manufacturing and 5 per cent in disposal (SMMT, 2007b), so clearly the use of cars is critical to the outcome. Meanwhile, the debate on so-called ‘peak oil’ is contentious but the view that it will occur soon is gaining currency (Deffeyes, 2001). Material Consumption A key theme highlighted in the original ‘Club of Rome’ report (Meadows et al., 1972) was that of the unsustainable rate of material consumption, a factor almost lost in the swelling tide of concern over global warming. The automotive industry is a major consumer of materials, particularly virgin materials rather than recycled materials. Table 1.13 illustrates some estimates for material consumption by the automotive industry based on growth in output to 100 million cars per year by 2020, and shows just how voracious the sector is in terms of consumption. The automotive industry is not the only sector served by the aluminium industry, but it is one of the most important in terms of volume, value and growth potential. As Table 1.15 indicates, by 2007 the penetration of aluminium into the vital vehicle body area (where high-value sheet is used) had reached significant levels, particularly in Europe – and there was good reason for optimism about growth prospects. A study by the European Aluminium Association found that aluminium use in cars in the region had grown from 50 kg in 1990 to 132 kg in 2005. A key question is: what impact will the crisis have on future growth prospects? Industry leaders have already indicated the most significant aspect of the crisis as far as the aluminium industry is concerned – the exposure of high-cost producers to unbearable pressures. By all the major indicators available in mid-2009 the sector faces a difficult time:
32
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity ●
●
●
Global demand was expected to fall from around 36 million tons per annum (mtpa) in 2008 to perhaps 28 mtpa in 2009, with the prospect of further falls in 2010. Stocks were at the highest level in more than two decades, and there could be a surplus supply in the market of around 1 billion tons in 2009. From a peak of just under US$3400 per ton in mid-2008, prices had fallen to US$1350 per ton by 2009 and were still facing downward pressure.
According to reports from Reuters, Oleg Deripaska, CEO of the largest aluminium producer in the world, United Company RUSAL, speaking at the 2009 Davos conference said: What I think is important for the industry is to really stop hoping and prepare for the worst . . . There is huge oversupply in aluminium . . . I believe in the next nine months we will see a completely different landscape for the aluminium industry, which will stay for the next seven to 10 years. (Faulconbridge, 2009)
The Human Cost of Automobility: Air Quality and Road Traffic Deaths and Injuries Much of the focus on the human health costs of automobility has been on urban air quality and toxic exhaust emissions. In 1998 the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that in the European Union there were some 80 000 premature deaths per year because of atmospheric pollution from cars, with an additional economic burden caused by hospitalization for respiratory and cardiovascular diseases and effects on patients with chronic bronchitis and asthma (WHO, 1998). The same source noted that in Europe, the proportion of the population exposed to traffic noise levels above 65 dB(A) increased from 15 per cent in the 1980s to 26 per cent in the early 1990s. These are, of course, very important issues but they have thrown into stark relief the relative neglect of the consequences of road traffic ‘accidents’ around the world. Of course this is a hugely difficult area because death and injury rates are not reducible to car technology alone, but are a factor of many issues including infrastructure design and maintenance, population mix, physical topography and climate, cultural attitudes, economic conditions, legal enforcement, the health system and much more. In Table 1.16 death rates are compared with car ownership levels. It is here that the vehicle manufacturers may find the real problem emerging, because it contains the basis for a significant ‘backlash’ against
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.16
Death rates and car ownership rates in selected countries
Country China Columbia Dominican Republic El Salvador Peru Nicaragua Kuwait US UK Sources:
33
Death rate/100 000 people (1998–2003 average)
Car ownership/1000 people (2004)
19.0 24.2 41.1 41.7 17.6 20.1 23.7 14.7 6.1
7 36 44 20 30 13 432 459 499
WHO, 2009.
motorization generally – especially in the markets where strong growth is anticipated. Table 1.16 illustrates some vital issues. First, reliable and accurate data are missing for a great many countries (such as India and many others in Asia or Africa), and in any case are not all that credible. At best, these figures can be said to represent the minimum position, with probable death rates rather higher. Secondly, in some countries the rate is extremely high, with the peaks generally occurring in South and Central America. Thirdly, and most worryingly, those countries with high death rates are generally those with low car ownership rates, but the case of Kuwait shows that high ownership rates do not automatically result in lower death rates. The worst-case scenario is that emerging markets retain their high accident rates with resultant deaths and injuries, but also rapidly expand car ownership rates. In an extreme case, if China were to have UK levels of car ownership then the car population would have to increase by 71 times. If the death rate were also multiplied by 71 times the result would be an annual toll of 13.5 million people killed (Wells, 2007a). While clearly unrealistic this does show the potential. The human, economic and social cost would be huge if anything like this figure were approached. At present, deaths and serious injuries are predominantly among young men in the 18–25 age range – a critically important segment of the economically active population. The WHO uses the concept of Disability Adjusted Life Years to calculate the total loss to society through road traffic accidents, because it is possible that some victims will suffer reduced capacity for economic activity for many years after (WHO, 2004).
34
1.6
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL REGULATION
Traditional regulation has been partially effective in ameliorating the worst of the negative consequences of car manufacturing, use and disposal. Formal regulation in terms of laws and standards enacted at national or international level tends to be slow, predictable and focused on the ‘art of the possible’ bearing in mind available technology and the business interests of the automotive industry. These comments apply to themes such as reducing the death and injury rate from vehicle collisions as well as improving rates of recyclability, reducing emissions of toxic gases or improving fuel economy. One feature to change with the financial crisis since mid-2008 is that the industry can no longer be assured of this level of deference and sympathy. While the industry remains a significant element of many economies, the need for widespread financial rescue has undermined independence. Hence with the new administration of Barak Obama in the USA have come both extensive bailout packages for the automotive industry and a renewed stringency and vigour for regulation. Indeed in March 2009 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration raised the light vehicle CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) standard to 27.3 mpg (30.3 mpg for cars and 24.1 mpg for light trucks) for application from Model Year (MY) 2011. Moreover in May 2009 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) started drafting rules under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act to limit vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. In particular the EPA drafted rules to cut light vehicle greenhouse gas emissions to 250 g/mile CO2 in MY 2016, with a gradual phase-in starting in MY 2012 (Graig, 2009). It could be argued that CO2 regulation in Europe, North America and elsewhere took a very long time to put in place, and has been too limited in its scope and severity. Terrorism and surging commodity prices (especially petroleum) were rather more effective in stimulating measures to promote energy diversity. Table 1.17 illustrates the major fuel economy regimes around the world as of 2007. A key thrust of industry efforts with regard to regulation has been to seek global standardization and harmonization – although this target has yet to be achieved. With respect to CO2 emissions, this problem is somewhat illustrated in Table 1.18, showing projected emissions rules of various countries adjusted to reflect the EU system of measurement. In some cases the new regimes are bringing greater complexity, as with the case of Japan illustrated in Table 1.19. Different regulatory authorities have grappled with the problem in different ways. By having multiple classes the Japanese system is sensitive to variations in model weight, but
The automotive industry in crisis
Table 1.17
35
Fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions regimes around the world, 2007
Country/ region
Standard Measure
Japan
Fuel
EU
CO2
China
Fuel
Canada
GHG
California GHG
United States
Fuel
Australia
Fuel
S. Korea
Fuel
Taiwan
Fuel
Structure
Target
Test cycle
Implementation
Weight based g/km Single standard l/100km Weight based 5.3 Mt Vehicle reduction class based g/mile Vehicle class based mpg Single standard (cars) l/100km Single standard km/l Engine size based km/l Engine size based
New cars New cars New cars In use and new New
JC08
Mandatory
NEDC
Voluntary
NEDC
Mandatory
New
US CAFE Mandatory
New
NEDC
New
US EPA Mandatory City US CAFE Mandatory
km/l
New
US CAFE Voluntary
US CAFE Mandatory
Voluntary
Note: GHG = Greenhouse gas; includes CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs), NEDC = New European Driving Cycle. Source:
Adapted from ICCT, 2007.
might in fact result in the counter-intuitive strategy of weight being added to a model in order to move up a class and hence benefit from less stringent emissions requirements. Of course, the policy environment is subject to change. As had been widely expected, US President Obama proposed on 19 May 2009 a national policy that set new fuel economy and greenhouse gas emissions standards for all passenger cars, light duty trucks, and medium duty passenger vehicles sold in the USA. The new standards apply to MYs 2012–16, and will require an average fuel economy standard of 35.5 mpg in 2016 (39 mpg for cars, 30 mpg for trucks), or CO2 limits of 250 g/mile. The CAFE programme established by the Bush administration 2007 legislation specified a minimum 35 mpg in 2020.
36
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 1.18
Actual and projected greenhouse gas emissions for new passenger vehicles by country, 2002, 2008 and 2014 (CO2 equivalent converted to EU NEDC test cycle; g/km)
Country/region
2002
2008
2014
Japan Europe USA California South Korea China
158 170 260 246 na 242
144 150 250 275 198 174
130 132 235 200 199 na
Note: Source:
NEDC = New European Driving Cycle. Adapted from ICCT, 2007.
Table 1.19
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Source:
Japanese fuel economy targets for 2015: light duty passenger cars Vehicle weight (kg)
Target (km/l)
<600 601–740 741–855 856–970 971–1 080 1 081–1 195 1 196–1 310 1 311–1 420 1 421–1 530 1 531–1 650 1 651–1 760 1 761–1 870 1 871–1 990 1 991–2 100 2 101–2 270 >2 271
22.5 21.8 21.0 20.8 20.5 18.7 17.2 15.8 14.4 13.2 12.2 11.1 10.2 9.4 8.7 7.4
Green Car Congress, 2007.
In Europe, by 2005, it was clear that the compromise agreed in the mid-1990s on a European Community strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from new cars was not going to work. Initially this strategy envisaged an industry average goal of 120 g/km CO2 new car emissions by 2005, a
The automotive industry in crisis
37
figure that would have represented a 25 per cent reduction on 1995 average levels. In 1998 the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) made a voluntary agreement with the European Union to reach an average new car target of 140 g/km by 2008, with the 120 g/km target moved out to 2012. JAMA (Japan) and KAMA (Korea) made similar commitments with the target deferred one year – an important consideration when it is claimed that jobs will be lost in the ‘domestic’ European industry if tougher measures are enforced. Faced with the certainty that the leading vehicle manufacturers in Europe were not going to achieve the voluntary target, and with 2006 averages about 160 g/km on new cars, the European Commission was faced with a difficult policy problem, not least because it has long been clear that failure to meet the target would result in legislation. Within the Environment and Energy Directorates there was a strong lobby for stringent measures, notably a cap of 120 g/ km for new cars from 2008. The EU Regulation on CO2 from new passenger cars was published in the Official Journal of the EU (5 June 2009, EC No. 443/2009). The Regulation stated it would enter into force three days after publication (i.e. on 8 June 2009). A target of 130 g/km of CO2 is to be phased in from 2012 to 2015. For the purposes of determining each manufacturer’s average specific emissions of CO2, the following percentages of each manufacturer’s new passenger cars registered in the relevant year will be taken into account: ● ● ● ●
65 per cent in 2012; 75 per cent in 2013; 80 per cent in 2014; 100 per cent from 2015 onwards.
In calculating the average specific emissions of CO2, each new passenger car with specific emissions of CO2 of less than 50g CO2/km (e.g. battery electric cars) is to be counted as the fleet equivalent of: ● ● ● ● ●
3.5 cars in 2012; 3.5 cars in 2013; 2.5 cars in 2014; 1.5 cars in 2015; 1 car from 2016.
Overlaid on these regimes are other national measures that are highly variable, and of course a burgeoning number of sub-national (mostly city authority) measures aimed at air quality, carbon emissions and congestion. In the UK, for example, the annual vehicle licence payment is
38
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
structured according to CO2 emissions categories and so is taxation on company cars, while the City of London transport agency (Transport for London) has defined a low-emissions zone based on CO2 emissions around the central city area. In 2006 some 771 urban areas participated in European Mobility Week, along with 1019 in the International Car Free Day – surely an indication of a groundswell of underlying support for greater restrictions on car use in cities (Wells, 2008b). About 80 per cent of the population in Europe lives in cities, with an estimated 300 000 premature deaths per annum arising from emissions-related illnesses. The (admittedly biased) International Association of Public Transport estimates that congestion has an economic cost in Europe of €63 billion per annum (Wells, 2088b). London has thus been followed by cities such as Stockholm, Berlin, Oslo, Rome, and most recently Milan. Stockholm is interesting because the measures were voted in following a referendum and a trial period where citizens could assess for themselves the costs and benefits of the measures. Initially, over 70 per cent of residents were opposed to the plan. During the trial period charges were levied according to the time of entry into the zone at a rate of between €1 and €2.10 up to a maximum fee of €6.5 per day. During the trial period traffic entering the zone fell by 22 per cent and CO2 emissions by 14 per cent in the central city area. Other benefits included a reduced accident rate and faster travel times.
1.7
CONCLUSIONS
Given the economic and environmental troubles surrounding the existing automotive industry it is unsurprising that there is a frantic search for solutions and alternatives, with the need for answers getting ever-more pressing. It is a case study example of a more general problem: societal survival (Diamond, 2005). Regulatory controls are liable to become more stringent still, but beyond this is the more fundamental conclusion – the existing automotive industry no longer meets social needs relative to the costs it imposes. Economically and in terms of business profitability, the industry has failed itself. Environmentally and in terms of the wider social burden of automobility, the industry has pushed up against all the limits. Business as usual is, therefore, not an option.
2. 2.1
Diversity and the industrial ecology metaphor THE THEME OF DIVERSITY
In this chapter the argument is advanced that one aspect of industrial ecology that has not been given sufficient attention is the theme of diversity. Briefly it is argued that natural systems gain resilience and resistance from species diversity and the adaptation of species to the specific requirements of local environments. At a global level distinct ecosystems and sub-systems have emerged. In contrast, monocultures are often inherently unstable, and in agricultural terms at least are ‘imposed’ on the physical environment through the application of power, energy and technology. If this metaphor is applied to the economic realm, then it is argued that there are strong policy motivations to encourage technological and business structure diversity alongside a better ‘fit’ to the particularities of locality. Diversity has been used in the economic and regional literature before of course, and subject to critiques (Wagner, 2002). Often, however, these critiques are couched in traditional terms with respect to whether diversity is good or bad for economic growth, particularly for regions. There are strong theoretical and empirical grounds for the view that diversity within a region has economic benefits, but paradoxically so has diversity between regions (Dissart, 2003). Here the concept is advanced for somewhat different advantages more to do with complexity, resilience and stability rather than growth, and to extend beyond a narrowly economic interpretation of the value of diversity. These themes are also picked up later, for example in Chapter 4. Diversity here means an enrichment of social and economic life along with the ability to withstand external economic shocks, and can apply equally well to, say, different forms of ownership and organization (family firms, charities, multinational companies, not-for-profit enterprises, state institutions, etc.) as to different sectors of economic activity. Such diversity strategies are already emerging in some spheres of economic and political life, most notably with respect to the US policy to reduce dependency upon imported petroleum. This chapter will explore the meaning of diversity as a socio-technical strategy, with the emphasis on technological differentiation and small-scale decentralized economic 39
40
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
structures. As such this chapter takes the view that industrial ecology can be a powerful metaphor, particularly when contemplating the future of social and technological change. While the emphasis here is on the concept of diversity, inevitably there is also coverage of related themes such as carrying capacity, evolutionary processes and innovation.
2.2
INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY AND THE METAPHOR OF DIVERSITY
The emergent discipline of industrial ecology is composed of, and drawn from, two essentially opposing philosophical perspectives and, as with the great intra-disciplinary battles of the past, the threat of epistemological schism looms. For some industrial ecology is an empirical, quantitative and fundamentally positivist science whose architectural substance is defined by the tools and techniques employed; it is about objectively measured truth derived from the analysis of a given reality (Bey, 2001). For others, in contrast, industrial ecology is about discourse, and to this extent the metaphor that lies at the heart of the discipline is not a technique as such, but an inspirational insight: literally a different way of looking at the world. This part of the book explores the dualism that lies within industrial ecology. It seeks to expose the strengths and weaknesses of both positions; from the reductionism that pervades the hard industrial ecology approach to the naive idealism of the conceptual and qualitative approach. In so doing the purpose is not to set one faction against another, nor to promote one truth as more self-evident than another. Rather it is to conclude that industrial ecology can be neither purely hard science nor gentle inspiration. There is a sense that there is a struggle for the soul of the discipline, between those who see industrial ecology as essentially a quantitative science bringing tools and methodologies to bear upon the analytical process, and those who see industrial ecology as essentially a metaphor to provide insight, understanding and reflexive discourse. Industrial ecology as hard science without the softening of critical qualitative analysis could all too quickly degenerate into technocratic elitism along with an inherent social conservatism. A great example of this is the book on the industrial ecology of the automobile by Graedel and Allenby (1998). This is a marvellous piece of scholarship that provides an exacting account of the environmental life cycle burdens of the car. On the other hand, the corporate and business model status quo ante, indeed the very notion of our consumption of automobility, is not questioned. Thus there is a danger that in the hard science vision of industrial ecology, the
Diversity and the industrial ecology metaphor
41
emphasis is on data manipulation methodologies wherein it is all too easy to become enmeshed in the beauty of the technique and lose sight of the purpose. Equally, without proper scientific methods, industrial ecology as gentle inspiration is little more than an idea, with no convincing proofs to persuade others to make change happen. With the need for change in the automotive industry becoming more compelling by the day, there is a strong case for saying that time and effort should not be wasted on internecine strife, but rather it should be invested in a joint effort in taking this important discipline forward. It is important, however, to understand these differences of opinion in the discipline within the wider context, such that while industrial ecology is itself a relatively new discipline the world as a whole has changed greatly over the last 20 years – and this has a bearing on the discipline itself. In particular there are three aspects worthy of note for this book: the general proliferation of knowledge and information; the specific proliferation of knowledge within academia; and the substantive deterioration of performance in terms of the automotive industry as measured by many key indicators. The general proliferation of knowledge and information is observable in many respects. More information is being created than ever before, and is accelerated through information economies faster than ever before. It is a process that is still unfolding, but key indicators could include the number of television and radio stations, the number and coverage of magazines, number of Internet sites, blogs, Myspaces, Facebooks, and so on, the number of patents awarded, and the apparently continuous acceleration of technical change bringing in whole new sciences. We are overwhelmed by information, and yet seem unable to distinguish that which is important from the growing level of background noise. Within academia information proliferation is driven by related issues in information technology, but also by for example a growing concern to tie career progression to the ‘publish or perish’ mantra. There are many more academic journals than in the past, all vying for attention, and many more academics trying to get published in them. In effect the time period of the Kuhnsian discipline paradigm is bound to compress under these circumstances as multiple new entrants push against discipline boundaries and seek to define their own place in the pantheon of academic achievement. This problem is most acute in those areas of research that instinctively or inevitably cross traditional boundaries, for example with respect to sustainability. It is, however, evident in all disciplines. It is also evident that whatever the specific merit of engineering solutions to environmental problems, in aggregate and on most indicators with respect to sustainability the situation is getting worse not better. In other
42
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
words the classic eco-efficiency approach has not delivered the desired results. Many of the explanations for this failure lie within the realm of the social, the political, the behavioural and the cultural. In simple terms it seems as if the gains of eco-efficiency are swamped by rebound effects and by the growth in consumption generally arising from higher populations and greater economic wealth. In the case of the automotive industry, a US study found that 20 per cent of the CO2 reductions from efficiency gains were negated by increases in the distances travelled (Greene et al., 1999). Industrial ecology therefore is inevitably under pressure from these three forces. As an essentially pragmatic discipline concerned with making the world a better place it attracts participants with a lively interest in getting things done. Hence there is a growing sense of urgency, but also of the notion that now is not the time to be ‘precious’ about the discipline but to embrace both the qualitative vision and the quantitative robustness that collectively characterize the discipline. It must be admitted that there are many within the realm of industrial ecology that would take exception to the manner in which the discipline is used here, particularly with regard to the concept of diversity. Some critics have argued that diversity is a bad metaphor because there is no process equivalent to natural selection in the social realm. That is to say, under natural conditions the process of evolution is driven by natural selection of emergent diversity. As random diversity appears, offering new and different characteristics, so some may be selected by sheer survival because the characteristics mean that the living organism in question is better adapted in one way or another to prevailing conditions or changes in those conditions. In the socio-economic realm the opposite seems to hold in the sense that a premium is placed on standardization and elimination of diversity. Diversity is sacrificed at the altar of least economic cost. In turn, this increases barriers to entry or results in an inability of the socio-technical system to accommodate change. There is something of a tautology in the view that there has been no natural selection and therefore the concept of diversity is not useful in understanding socio-economic or technical change. The problem here is of course that such a criticism fails to take account of the failures that are an integral part of the diversity process. Within the subject of concern in this book, the automotive industry, there have been many examples of failed attempts at what might be considered ‘mutations’ or new ways of designing and organizing the business model with its underlying business technology. These failures are to be expected, for they indicate that the mutated forms emerged but did not survive because the time and place were not right. There is an equally important issue of the relationship between theory and empirical evidence. Generally speaking, the approach in industrial
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ecology is similar to that in the world of business literature in that a theoretical position is advanced, which is then proven or disproven with the available evidence. Hence there is a general tendency for social science research to be more or less ‘history’, and for this problem to be compounded by the length of time required to undertake academic endeavours. It is not uncommon that the process from initially forming a research idea, to putting in a proposal, getting accepted for funding, hiring appropriate people, undertaking the actual research, writing up the results and then getting them published in a suitably prestigious peer review journal can literally take years. Given that speed is of the essence when it comes to addressing issues such as climate change, and that in any case socioeconomic events can unfold at a much greater pace (as the global financial crisis has shown), there is some merit in rethinking aspects of this working model in academia. In particular, there is surely much more room for academics to be pro-active, not just in the currently popular ‘action research’ sense, but to use their insights and knowledge to create solutions that do not yet exist. When the concept of Micro Factory Retailing (MFR) was first developed in 1999, academic journals were not interested in publishing what was seen as a purely theoretical concept with no ‘case study evidence’. The very good reason for the lack of evidence was that no such example of the concept then existed in the world, but it was argued that it could exist if the automotive industry were to be reconstructed with the principles of sustainability. In fact this work was first published in industry rather than academic journals (see Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2000). As is argued later in this book (Chapter 5), the example of Riversimple, a company that launched its first product in 2009, is one of several to embody multiple characteristics of MFR that have emerged since the concept was first aired. In this respect, industrial ecology has enormous potential as a design tool and source of inspiration on the resolution of acute social and environmental problems. The traditional academic methodology, alternatively, appears rather inadequate to the task.
2.3
CARRYING CAPACITY
All populations, be they people, coniferous trees, iPods or cars, have logical limits. In many natural systems, rapid population growth towards some defined peak is often followed by an equally rapid collapse back down to background or normal levels. In addition in natural systems there are defined limits that determine what might be termed the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for any given species. Hence a stretch of savannah can carry a specific number of wildebeest, and in turn a specific number
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of lions, based on the available pasture, water and other resources and on competition from other species. If environmental conditions change then it is possible that the carrying capacity will also change upwards or downwards. In dynamic systems such as those in nature there will always be some degree of fluctuation of species populations over different time scales, and indeed it might be difficult to calculate the ‘true’ sustainable population of a species because of these fluctuations. Humanity has shown that it is possible to change environmental conditions to the benefit of a species, but the point has arrived at which it might be said that the human population has exceeded the carrying capacity of the planet (Wackernagel and Rees, 1998). To this extent the ‘problem’ of cars is but one manifestation of the larger problem of humanity and the carrying capacity of the planet. For all sorts of reasons it is clear that the population of cars in the world cannot be treated as if it were the result of being a species in a natural system, but equally it must be possible to identify the parameters that will determine the final population likely to be achieved, and by extension the size of the annual replacement market for new cars. The 2009 world car fleet of about 700 million units (i.e. excluding various categories such as auto-rickshaws and commercial vehicles) compares with a world population of six billion. As a simple example it could be argued that the maximum potential population of cars in the world would be established when all countries had the same population per capita as the current highest country (the USA) and when the world human population peaks. So if the US human–car ratio is 0.75, then if world populations peak in 2080 at ten billion the theoretical world car population peak will be 7.5 billion: ten times the current levels (Wells, 2007b). The ultimate carrying capacity must of course be considerably less than this, with one estimate giving two billion cars by 2025 (Sperling and Gordon, 2008), and with a middle-ground industry view of about three billion by 2050. There are a great many limiting factors that prevent all societies adopting the level of motorization of the USA. In a heavily motorized society such as the United States (that contributes about 25 per cent of all global carbon emissions) about 41 per cent of emissions are attributable to combustion of petroleum products, of which 25 per cent is attributable to automobiles (Environmental Defense Foundation (EDF), 2002). If other countries adopted USA levels of automobility, greenhouse gas emissions would rise accordingly worldwide. Other factors such as material availability could be considered limitations (rubber supply is an interesting case (Wells, 2008c)), as could socio-spatial factors such as population density and infrastructure availability. One aspect that is often neglected in this respect is the potentially disastrous consequences for
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deaths and injuries arising from automobiles in countries that are rapidly motorizing. There are further limitations on the supply side, particularly in terms of whether the automotive industry can actually afford the investments required in new capacity when profitability is so poor. A new fullsize car plant requires at least US$1.5 billion in investment, while each new model generation (i.e. at the level of vehicle architecture) requires a further US$1 billion. Similar sums would have to be spent by the supply base to expand the availability of materials and components. Even with generous help from recipient locations, the industry is going to struggle to afford its own future. The peak of world car populations is thus a considerable unknown, but even a doubling of existing levels is difficult to envisage, as is a similar growth in new car sales – at least with existing production and consumption practices. Given that the basis of the business model in the automotive industry is the continued expansion of the market, the long-term prognosis is clearly not good. Moreover the idea of carrying capacity has within it the possibility for populations to be revised downwards, not just upwards. While the automotive industry has perhaps accepted that there will be scant growth in new car sales in saturated markets such as those in the EU, there has been little or no discussion of the possibility that car populations in these countries will actually go into reverse. That is to say, the environmental conditions that have supported the current level of car ownership are already changing in multiple respects, and in most of those respects it is reasonable to expect that the result will be fewer cars. Socio-technical transformations need not just be understood as ‘growth’ scenarios in that sense. They also contain the dynamic of decline, not least because such transformations imply the displacement of certain technologies and social practices by other, newer versions.
2.4
SOCIO-TECHNICAL TRANSFORMATIONS
At the macro-economic and policy scale one productive approach has been to use the concept of Strategic Niche Management (SNM) and ‘transition’ theory as a unifying mechanism for policy formulation that will enable the nascent sustainable activity to be nurtured into one of substantive scale (Kemp, 1997). Transition management is not so much about instruments but more about different ways of interacting, the mode of governance and goal seeking. Innovation and learning are important aims for transition management (Rennings et al., 2003). Through transition management the endeavour towards more sustainable systems is institutionalized. Transition management helps to increase the chance of
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achieving a transition towards more sustainable systems, in energy, transport, agriculture and food, and helps to achieve greater socio-technical diversity (Vellema and Loorbach, 2006). The end-state is not fixed but open ended (Rennings et al., 2003). The SNM approach, first described by Rip (1992) and later elaborated by Schot et al. (1996) and Kemp (1997), is an approach to induce and manage technological regime shifts (Kemp et al., 2001) and is used to explain the success or failure of promising technologies. Through SNM concepts one can systematically document the initial activities and processes that lead to the eventual adoption and broad diffusion of new technologies in society, and with which one can take stock of important stimulating and constraining factors in that process (Kemp et al., 1998, 2001; Weber et al., 1999; Hoogma et al., 2002; Elzen et al., 2004; Raven, 2004, 2005). Eijck and Romijn (2008) used SNM as a principal analytical tool to analyse how the scope for an energy transition is influenced by factors at three societal levels: the overarching ‘landscape’, the sectoral setting or ‘regime’, and the ‘niche’ level where innovation develops and diffuses (Schot and Geels, 2008). Bruckner et al. (1996) developed an elementary evolutionary model to understand the conditions that lead to technological substitution. They demonstrated the difficulty for a new technology to take over the market, even when the new technology is technically superior to the existing technology. Faber and Franken (2008) are of the view that when a critical mass of adopters simultaneously switches to a new technology through some form of co-ordination, all others will follow and adopt the new technology as well in a form of institutional isomorphism (Hoed, 2004). They claim that in such environments, new technologies can be introduced in niche markets when a user group is willing to pay a significant premium for the superior characteristic. After introduction, users will begin to introduce subsequent improvements. Such a gradual process allows the technology to diffuse through niches (Levinthal, 1998; Geels, 2002). The impact of heterogeneity of preferences on technological change has been studied extensively in evolutionary models of technology adoption using a variety of modelling approaches, including diffusion models with increasing returns (Dalle, 1997), co-evolutionary models of users and producers (Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998, 2005; Janssen and Jager, 2002) and extensions of the Nelson and Winter model (Jonard and Yildizoglu, 1998; Malerba et al., 2007). These models reiterate the fact that niches are important for technological transitions to take place, as the new technology can be developed within the niche before being introduced in the mass market. Agent-based modelling provides a good framework for the evaluation of interaction among various links in the supply chain, which
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are individually attributed with heterogeneous characteristics, preferences and abilities (Janssen and Jager, 2002; Windrum et al., 2008). Such models conceptually support policy measures and regulations intended to help environmental technologies mature in niche markets, a notion that has been recognized in the policy concept of SNM (Schot et al., 1994; Kemp et al., 1998). Clearly the concept of SNM has a close link with that of path dependency, and both are highly relevant for a consideration of the future of the automotive industry. In essence path dependency first came to prominence as an explanation for evolutionary, historically grounded, economic change (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The idea is that once, for whatever reason, a technology gains a degree of ascendency then that lead tends to become self-reinforcing over time. There is a process of positive feedback in which so-called bandwagon effects or network effects come into play, leading to a technological lock-in from which it is difficult to escape. With bandwagon effects consumers and other actors in the market may multiply an initial market share advantage even where there is no obvious technical reason. For example, in the frequently cited case of Betamax versus VHS it is claimed that once VHS had an initial lead, the manufacturers of video tape players switched to VHS production because it was anticipated that any future industry standards would be centred on VHS technology not Betamax. At the same time there were network or infrastructure effects such as that shops stocked VHS players and tapes in preference to Betamax, ultimately resulting in the loss of the Betamax format (Cusumano et al., 1992). Hence path dependency becomes established from the dual action of market acceptance and regulated industrial standards. Once an initial lead is established, the costs of switching become prohibitively high at the personal and/or social level and companies find it ever harder to break through. The Betamax example is relatively limited in scope and social cost implications compared with the broad issues addressed in socio-technical paradigm change but the principle is the same. Interestingly the automotive industry has long demonstrated that in fact more than one pathway is possible and once embarked upon it can be difficult to change. One simple example is the division of world markets into right-hand drive and left-hand drive vehicles. There have been instances in which markets have changed (most notably Sweden from driving on the left to driving on the right) but generally markets have retained one rule or the other. Vehicles would cost less per unit if they were all left-hand drive around the world, because of simple economies of scale, but the social inertia that has accumulated around right-hand drive in markets such as the UK is all but insurmountable. Not only is there a huge stock of
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vehicles in circulation that are right-hand drive, but many other features have been designed around this assumption. This includes, obviously, the road network itself along with all the associated signage, but also features such as the ticket machines on entrances to car parks, drive-through restaurants, toll-booths, and so on. Moreover the actual changeover period would be chaotic. Path dependency need not be inefficient, as indeed the example of leftor right-hand drive vehicles illustrates. Cars are as efficient in either form, as is the production of cars, although it is the case that the design changes that must be made to a car in order to convert it from one side to the other affect about 15 per cent of the engineering cost of the car. Implicit within the concept of path dependency is the notion that switching is difficult; this is indeed the point made by path dependency analysis. Path dependency becomes stronger and more reinforced as a technology becomes more pervasive, and as it requires more (sunk cost) infrastructure. Some technologies, such as television, require relatively modest infrastructures such that the cost of switching (e.g. to digital or high definition) is relatively low. Similar statements could be made about, for example, the switch from portable CD players to solid-state audio devices. Other technologies such as sewage systems or railways (Puffert, 2002) demand a significant physical infrastructure that is difficult and expensive to change across society as a whole. At a social level it is clear that we have a built environment that is predicated upon widespread individual person mobility in the form of the car, and that these spatial structures are relatively enduring or slow to change. Alternatively within this very broad societal level of path dependence upon individual motorized mobility there are varying degrees of specific lock-in with respect to the dominant technologies of automobility. This path dependency on automobility is not just attributable to infrastructures and physical costs, but there is also a cultural path dependency in the sense that lifestyles and expectations are to some degree also shaped by the prevailing socio-technical paradigm. Attention has also been drawn to the ways in which regions and industries accumulate path dependency. Indeed this may be argued to be one of the outcomes from the (beneficial and efficient) concentration of specific industries in specific regions and to this degree it is a manifestation of spatial agglomeration economies. A location comes to accumulate a supportive milieu or network of labour skills, educational establishments, specialist companies and the like around specific industries and this process acts to reinforce the dependency of a location upon those industries. Institutional isomorphism may come into force here, in a process whereby companies and other organizations mimic each other as a risk-avoidance strategy (Hoed, 2004). Moreover the concept has also been applied within
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individual organizations to examine the ways in which routines, practices and behaviours can be established – a notable example being the TPS (Driel and Dolfsma, 2009). In this regard policies designed to attract and incubate clusters of new technology industry can be understood as attempts to set up a (benign) path dependency along what is anticipated to be a beneficial growth route. Hence for the automotive industry the situation is emerging in which there is a destabilizing combination of forces at play. First there is a general presumption towards technological diversity in order to meet the challenges of sustainability; and secondly, there is the tendency for this diversity to become more or less embedded over time. In turn this may lead to the expectation that the global automotive industry will become more diverse and fragmented over time, not less as the neo-classical economic theorists would have it. Alternatively it is unlikely that in the near future there will be ‘one best way’ for the socio-technical trajectory of the automotive industry. These themes are elaborated in more detail in Chapter 6.
2.5
THE LIMITS TO DIVERSITY
It is possible to identify several imperatives for increased localism that underpin the transition to greater diversity, though it must be accepted that these imperatives will not be equally developed in all cases. These include: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
politics . . . re-emergent regionalism and devolution; culture . . . re-discovering identity; technology . . . enabling decentralization; economics . . . primacy of diseconomies of scale; mobility . . . increasing cost of travel; language . . . revival of small languages and dialects; social changes . . . downshifting and celebratory minimalism; energy . . . micro heat and power, especially renewable; business . . . rise of self-employment and small businesses.
Of course in many respects people live their lives on an increasingly accessible world stage, and in this respect ties to place are probably weaker than they once were. Hence there are contradictory forces at work in all of the above factors. For example, critics can point to increased integration and the erosion of independence with respect to issues such as world trade and political groupings. Hence the European Union has expanded on several occasions and now encompasses 25 Member States, yet simultaneously the
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UK and other Member States have been witness to increased pressure for political devolution, some of which has borne fruit. An interesting example of these long-term trends, and their contradictory nature, is that of brewing beer, though other parallel (but different) cases could be made for steel production, printing, bread making and many more. There is a dynamic tension between the economic incentives towards eroding diversity and other (often non-economic) pressures to increase diversity. In the case of beer the industry of course started as one of small scale, often indeed limited to a single public house (or inn) or to the confines of a particular village or town. With the industrial revolution came the technology to make beer on a larger scale, and to transport it at low financial cost to more distant destinations. Along with changes to consumption habits and tastes (see Fuess (2006) for a fascinating account of the beer industry in Japan), cheap transport premised on cheap hydrocarbon fuel sources enabled the centralization of production and the triumph of manufacturing economies of scale. Local brewers were decimated, unable to compete with the low price and consistent character of massproduced beers, and the industry consolidated over time. Interestingly, however, this process has shown signs of being reversed – at least in terms of production if not in terms of the concentration of ownership. US microbrewers and brew pubs started to emerge in the late 1970s, just as in the UK campaigns started that sought to save ‘real ale’. Despite the premium price, the desire to celebrate and enjoy diversity enabled the growth of these niche producers and a re-emergence of a degree of localism. While arguably relatively superficial or marginal, localism is emerging in many diverse areas from music and TV production to school meals, and farmers’ markets to restaurants resurrecting local cuisine. In addition there are themes such as ‘food miles’ and food security that have caught the public imagination and emerged onto the policy agenda. A key problem that frequently emerges in the social sciences is that of measurement, in that concepts such as diversity are relatively easy to formulate but difficult to give empirical precision in a socio-technical setting (see Stirling, 1998, 2007 for a quantitative methodology example using complex systems theory). This in turn leads to rather empty arguments as to what constitutes radical technology, or even what constitutes development within a system or some more dramatic evolution of that system. Those interested in business strategy like to talk in terms of ‘disruptive’ innovation, where the innovation in question tends to refer to a new technology that changes the terms of competition or opens up a new market space. Disruptive innovations can also refer to new business models, which can be as powerful as a new technology in making new markets appear (as is further discussed in Chapter 5). Interestingly a combination
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of new or innovative practices, organizational forms and strategies with new product technologies and new production systems can be said to represent the most ‘disruptive’ of actions because it combines and transcends existing approaches. On the other hand, it could be argued that there is no innovation in a social or organizational sense in the sense that this is still just capitalist business. Disruptive innovations that are simultaneously able to challenge the power of capitalist forces are few and far between, though again there is some justification in thinking that as the sustainability challenges to contemporary society increase so those non-capitalist alternatives may become more attractive, pervasive and enduring. The stance adopted here is that such debates are difficult to conduct without grounding in specific instances, and to that extent are only able to be revealed empirically. While this is a book about the automotive industry, in this regard the underlying theme is that this particular industry is emblematic of many others even if the actual empirical outcomes will be unique and distinct. Moreover disruption is a relative rather than an absolute category, and the largest scale at which disruption can occur is at the level of the socio-technical system. There may be instances of disruptive innovation below this level, where the impact is felt by particular subsectors, or product types, or companies (and hence of course particular locations). The disruption of the entire automotive industry socio-technical system is a huge undertaking. In other words, innovation (and diversity) can operate at different levels in a sort of hierarchy, from the level of a component of a product or a material that goes into a product, right the way through to socio-technical shifts. Diversity can be highly superficial, in for example the personalization of a mobile telephone ring tone or the appearance of one’s computer screen. Diversity further has a temporal and spatial component, both of which again are highly contextual. In combination therefore there are levels of innovation and degrees of innovation, along with different velocities of innovation and rates of spatial extension. All of these characteristics mean that the measurement of diversity in the social domain becomes rather more complex and contentious than that of the natural domain. Overlaid on these distinctions is the question of geographic scale, with in particular much debate over the question of regional diversity. There is a difference between economic diversity within a region (perhaps measured by the number of different sectors of economic activity and their relative share of employment within a region) and diversity between regions that probably results from relatively high levels of economic specialization within a region compared with another. On the other hand, natural diversity can perhaps provide the metaphor with which to think about socio-technical diversity and innovation. In natural systems there is, even within a single species and single variety, a
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‘background’ level of diversity. A field full of sheep may look the same to you and me – but to a lamb the face, the smell and the bleat of its mother are quite distinctive. This is perhaps the first level of diversity, confined to the superficial and to parts of the whole. Then there is the diversity within a species, which may be conceived as the diversity of varieties. In natural systems, different varieties retain the theoretical ability to inter-breed as the basic defining characteristic of a species. This is the next level of diversity. Then there is the level of different species and genera, as respectively more elevated levels of diversity. Perhaps then the greatest level of diversity in natural systems (in the absence of alternative life forms beyond the Earth) is that at the level of the ecosystem. It is useful to ask how much diversity is a society able to support. There are strong counteracting forces that tend towards uniformity, conformity and similarity acting at the economic and cultural levels. For example, vernacular architecture tends to result in domestic accommodation that follows a pattern of broad similarity within geographically proximate regions that share characteristics. This makes intuitive sense: given the same starting materials requirements, tools and skills, then populations will tend to come up with the same set of solutions. There is also an emotional comfort in having objects in common with others, and thus in looking and behaving like others. Conformity brings with it a sense of belonging and group identity. We imbue objects with cultural meaning, and in a world of infinite diversity those objects would lose much of their ability to transmit cultural messages about our status, interests, associations, attributes and so forth. Economists have long identified one of the more important forces for uniformity, namely the reduced cost per unit that comes with standardization and economies of scale. As in the world of fashion, there is a kind of dynamic tension between the level of standardization and cost. In the automotive industry, then, the notion of diversity can have multiple levels of meaning in parallel with natural systems. It is quite clear that in terms of the economics of production the least-cost solution is the mass production of entirely uniform products over a very long time. When motorization was first becoming established in markets such as the USA, France, Germany, Italy and the UK then the balance of the equation favoured the emphasis on least cost. As a consequence, cars stayed in production almost unchanged for a very long time, and were produced in virtually identical units. An initially high level of diversity with many different producers of vehicles rapidly evolved to a situation where there were only a few producers, with very high levels of more or less standardized output. As those markets became saturated, however, so the nature of the balance shifted more towards (higher cost or lower profit) incremental
Diversity and the industrial ecology metaphor
Table 2.1
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Levels of diversity in the automotive industry
Nature
Natural system example
Automotive industry
Automotive industry example
Species and varieties
Corgi
Genus
1.6 petrol LX saloon, black Focus
Family Order
Canine familia Canine Carnivora
Body styles; varieties Model Brand ICE/ASB
Ford Almost all cars are in the same order
Class Phylum Kingdom Domain
Mammalia Chordate Animal Eukarya
Automobile Transport Machines Human artefacts
Note: ICE = internal combustion engine; ASB = all-steel body; there are other systems of classification of the natural system.
differentiation. Mass customization in this respect can be understood as differentiation at the superficial level. Table 2.1 provides a crude approximation of the way in which the natural system of the hierarchy of life can be translated into the automotive industry. It is of course accepted that the automotive industry is not a natural phenomenon and that this metaphor can be criticized on a number of grounds. On the other hand, it is intended to illuminate the idea that the contemporary diversity of the automotive industry has much room for further development. The problem of lack of variety can be put in another way. If the contemporary automobile (in this case the Ford Focus 1.6 petrol LX saloon in black) is considered then there is a high degree of variety at the level of the species – as was illustrated in Table 1.11 in Chapter 1. On the other hand, at the level of the order then it is apparent that virtually all cars are of a single fundamental technology: the internal combustion engine and the all-steel body. Moreover, at the level of the class of personal transportation, in the advanced industrial economies it is evident that the automobile is again the dominant form. More diversity is exhibited in emerging markets with, for example, auto-rickshaws and greater use of bicycles and motorcycles, but in heavily motorized societies the automobile has virtually excluded other forms of personal transport. If the automotive industry is overlaid on Table 2.1 then it can be seen that it covers the levels from species and varieties, up to the phylum of
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transport and in some cases the kingdom of machines (e.g. Mitsubishi and Hyundai have broad-ranging interests in many manufacturing and service sectors). The majority, however, particularly in recent times, have tended to become concentrated in the class of automobiles to the exclusion of other activities. To put this in another way, with a few notable but marginal exceptions at the level of the order then all automobiles are the same. There is a chronic lack of variety. A consumer can buy any car that he or she likes, so long as it has an internal combustion engine and an all-steel body. Similarly at the levels of the class and phylum, then again there is a chronic lack of variety. Mass customization is about increasing diversity at the levels below the family, by offering more models and variants, with trim choices and optional equipment, but is actually achieved by reducing the underlying level of diversity by using common platforms or architectures for the vehicles. The achievement of this sort of diversity is expensive for traditional capital-intensive, high-throughput mass-production factories but is done in order to cater for a market demand to be ‘the same but different’. In other words there are strong forces that militate against monoculture or lack of diversity, just as there are for limits to diversity. For individual vehicle manufacturers this translates as a finite appetite for specific models and varieties even when the underlying demand for automobility remains strong. Hence it is increasingly difficult to retain specific models in production for extended periods. The quest for sustainability, it is contended here, demands taking diversity to much higher levels as defined in Table 2.1, and thereby to change the underlying technologies of the automobile along with our culturally embedded notions of what automobility is about, and the business models required to be successful at this new sort of automobility (see also Nieuwenhuis (2008b) for a provocative alternative insight using the metaphor of industrial ecology).
2.6
SCALE AND ECO-INDUSTRIALISM
Those seeking to understand and implement eco-industrialism have tended to do so at the local scale, where the spatial resolution is very small. In part perhaps because it allows the ‘problem’ of industrial ecology to be contained within a manageable level of complexity, the idea of eco-industrial parks has found favour with academics and policy-makers alike. Ecoindustrialism is in this sense the science of industrial ecology made real, most famously of course with the paradigm example of Kalundborg. Ecoindustrial parks (Wallner, 1999; Lambert and Boons, 2002; Deutz and
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Gibbs, 2004) seek to deploy the metaphor of industrial ecology such that unsustainable industrial systems come more closely to resemble sustainable ecological systems – primarily by ensuring that the waste-flows out from one process or business entity become the input or ‘raw’ materialflows into others. In addition, some social ends may be served, for example by directing waste heat to local communities. Although a few prototypical examples exist, the deeply embedded replication of those examples has proven somewhat elusive (Deutz and Gibbs, 2004; Gibbs et al., 2005). This narrow spatial focus is slightly unfortunate in that it tends to bypass the issue of economic scale and whether the entire (spatial) economy could comprise a series of eco-industrial complexes or whether some other form might be required. Ever since the pioneering work of Schumacher (1973) there has been an interesting alignment or convergence of interests in those concerned with devolved democracy, local control, self-reliant development, sustainable economics and appropriate technology. The Schumacher approach was in deliberate contradistinction to the ‘big is best’ philosophy of traditional neo-classical economics, the legacy of which is still often seen in arguments in favour of economies of scale in the automotive industry. In terms of spatial organization, the seemingly relentless trend of urbanization in most societies of the world has long been a facet of the concept of agglomeration economies of scale, but intriguingly scant attention has been paid to the energy foundations of such urbanization processes and the economic benefits that centralization confers. Perhaps with decentralized (and renewable) energy then the case for urbanization becomes less compelling; our great megacities are constructed on oil, with all the consequential environmental burdens that entails. Distributed economies (Johansson et al., 2005; Mirata et al., 2005) consider the spatial structure of a networked economy of small firms. This is where ‘a diverse range of activities are organized in the form of small-scale, flexible units that are synergistically connected with each other and prioritize quality in their production’ (Johansson et al., 2005: 971). The literature on distributed economies makes two essential claims: the first is that small-scale, flexible and high-quality businesses are the basis for a more robust economy with a range of environmental benefits that potentially includes reduced material intensity; the second is that of emancipation, whereby local communities have a greater vested interest in production and consumption patterns, greater control over their own destiny and greater levels of reinvested wealth. Sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystems (Cohen, 2006) extend the cluster concept that is usually premised on specific industrial sectors (Porter, 1998). Entrepreneurial ecosystems may be defined as ‘an interconnected group of actors in a local geographic community committed to sustainable
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development through the support and facilitation of new business ventures’ (Cohen, 2006: 3). The intended outcomes are broader in that the aim is to create social, environmental and economic value including, for example, improved health and a reduction in poverty. Despite the broader aims, the focus of analysis is very much on the wealth-generating linkage between innovation and entrepreneurship, albeit in technologies that are considered to be of environmental benefit (examples cited include solar powered traffic light systems for instance). Regenerative eco-localism (Bristow and Wells, 2005) encompasses but is not limited to traditional profit-maximizing business ventures, in that it further seeks to integrate social enterprises. Thus there is a posited combination of what might be termed ‘vernacular industry’ (industry embedded in and reflective of its locality) and a wide range of intermediate organizational forms that in various ways bridge the public–private divide. A similar concept to that of regenerative eco-localism, namely sustainable local enterprise networks, has been developed by Wheeler et al. (2005). Their research has highlighted, in a developing country context and in antithesis to the multinational-centric approach of Hart (2005), the pivotal part played by local, not-for-profit organizations integrating with business. These are then ‘relatively dense communities of for-profit businesses, local communities, not-for-profit organisations, and other actors working in a self-organising way to create value in economic, social, human and ecological terms’ (Wheeler et al., 2005: 53). There have been others that have argued for a return to localism, on a variety of grounds including social stability, economic resilience and political autonomy (Douthwaite, 1996; Hines, 2000; Desai and Riddlestone, 2002; McIntosh, 2002), and it is likely that the arguments in favour of reversing global economic integration will be stronger in the future as a consequence of the financial crisis. There is a difference between economic diversity as a form of self-reliance and regional specialization that can actually result in greater vulnerability to external economic events (Desrochers and Sautet, 2004). At best this is suggestive of a tension between the concepts of diversity, and those of economic decentralization and self-reliance. Perhaps in a sustainable world places are actually more like each other in an economic sense, because each place is more likely to require a full range of economic activities to be self-supporting, rather than relying on comparative advantage and trade as the means of fulfilling needs. These sorts of tensions are not conducive to resolution except through practice. As Chapter 3 goes on to illustrate, the use of the concept of diversity as applied to the automotive industry is not entirely straightforward. In particular, there are some forces that appear to act to increase or at least
Diversity and the industrial ecology metaphor
57
retain a high level of diversity, while there are others that act in the opposite direction to decrease diversity. In a sense, this dilemma can be viewed as the tension between the demands of the (economic) production system for standardization and the demands of the local social and cultural structures for differentiation. There is unlikely to be a permanent and stable resolution of such tensions, but rather there will always be a flux towards one direction or the other, subject to wider forces of change such as available wealth and the state of concerns over environmental issues.
3. 3.1
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility INTRODUCTION
The contemporary automotive industry actually exhibits more diversity than might at first be suspected given the comments in the preceding two chapters. Many analysts and academics tend to conceptualize the industry as being essentially global and uniform in character when in many important respects it is not – particularly in terms of the interface with the market. As a consequence, there have been several critiques of the crude ‘globalization’ concept (Rugman and Hodgets, 2001; Edensor, 2004). What these critiques have tended themselves to ignore is the rather more nebulous dimension of automobility cultures that can be quite distinct around the world, and in the future could play an important part in shaping the emergence of a more sustainable industry and sustainable mobility. This chapter therefore seeks to show that there is already a level of diversity in the industry in terms of the business structures and market structures that can be collectively described under the concept of cultures of automobility. Evidence will be provided to show that markets and cultures of automobility vary in an enduring and significant manner, and this undermines the ability of the automotive industry to achieve standardization. On the other hand, this cultural diversity could help provide the basis for multiple innovative pathways to sustainability in the future. Indeed attempts at producing a ‘world car’ have manifestly and repeatedly failed, as have attempts at producing global multi-brand conglomerates. The re-emergence of the ‘value car’ segment offers some potential for a global commodity car, but only to a few companies. Similarly there has already been a proliferation of new underlying technologies in cars as products (including fuel systems), albeit with relatively minor levels of market penetration to date. Thus this chapter seeks to argue that upon closer examination there is already a ‘seedbed’ of latent diversity in this industry as in many others. As the hegemony of production economies of scale is eroded, so the scope for that latent diversity to be realized grows. 58
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility
59
This latent potentiality will be translated as a further fragmentation of the market for new cars, thereby undermining the scope for economies of scale still further. The automotive industry, like many others, of course seeks some salvation in the form of standards and other regulatory mechanisms to counteract the tendency towards difference. Economic hegemony likewise is instrumental in reducing the chaotic inclinations evident in markets: dominant companies are able to impose their own technical standards on the market. To some degree standardization has been achieved in a technical sense: a good example is that of the European Union where there is now a single common Type Approval process where previously individual countries had their own. At the same time, however, this example only serves to exemplify further the point that differences at the level of the market, which are deeply embedded in and arise out of the socio-cultural differences of places, are extremely resistant to standardization. Thus to date it has not been possible for the European Union to arrive at a common policy on vehicle taxation and fiscal policies between the various Member States. These differences can result in important market distortions. Similarly, there remain (even with the relatively integrated structure of the EU) differences between such issues as speed limits, drink-driving laws and approaches to car insurance. Some resilient differences, such as the French market for voiture sans permit (VSP) vehicles, have been rather awkwardly accommodated by other Member States. In France it has long been acceptable for young people to drive low-powered cars without a full driving licence but this practice is not acceptable in, say, Germany. It is interesting to note that in Canada experiments are being conducted to allow the use of electric vehicles on the road even though they do not meet all the normal safety requirements of standard vehicles. This is an example of new regulatory liberalism at a local level, suggesting that such differences between places are not just historical baggage but constantly re-emerging.
3.2
LATENT DIVERSITY AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
Many analysts of the industry, and indeed industry insiders, take the view that repeated bouts of consolidation are inevitable under the inexorable pressure to achieve greater economies of scale. Under this logic there would be five or six major groups, each with an output of about ten million units per annum around five main platforms (giving optimum production economies of scale of two million units per annum per platform).
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The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
This pattern has manifestly failed to emerge, for two main reasons. First, existing attempts at consolidation have foundered (as outlined in Chapter 1) and secondly, new contenders have emerged to join the ranks of the automotive industry. Hence there has been a distinct phasing of the process of consolidation in the automotive industry. In the very earliest years when there were many craft-scale producers the process of consolidation was relatively rapid, particularly once all-steel technology was developed (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007). This consolidation happened in the period just before and after the 1939–45 war, and was conducted within each of the industrial countries. Ultimately this process gave rise to vehicle manufacturers that were relatively dominant within their own national boundaries, and of course to various forms of ‘national champion’ state-owned companies. Then, from the 1980s, a further phase developed with the integration of previously distinct national markets – most obviously of course in Europe. This was the era of so-called triad globalization (Ohmae, 1985), which saw increased consolidation between vehicle manufacturers from North America, Europe and Japan – and can be argued to have found its ultimate expression in the form of the DaimlerChrylser combine that included share ownership in Mitsubishi and Hyundai. The opening up of new markets in Russia, India, China and elsewhere, however, put increasing strains on the automotive industry as a whole, while simultaneously providing the conditions for new entrants to reshape the industry in a further round of consolidation and, crucially, fragmentation. Thus just as new groups are being formed so some of the existing ones are being broken up, with the result that the degree of concentration remains significantly below what would be anticipated in a purely economic analysis. Companies such as Hyundai (South Korea), Tata (India) and SAIC (China) enjoyed the protective embrace of virtually closed markets while they developed sufficient scale and competence to enter full competition with existing vehicle manufacturers. Table 3.1 shows the contemporary consequences in the case of China. It is notable that Brazil, in contrast, was unable to develop and then protect its own industry in the way that occurred in places such as Russia, China, India and much of the rest of Asia. The result is similar to that presented in Table 1.10 in that the market is highly fragmented with about 50 brands competing for a share. In addition to this latent diversity in terms of industrial structure there are differences in terms of what might be termed regimes of automobility culture. These regimes comprise the myriad rules, regulations, norms of behaviour and attitudes, economic possibilities and even topographical and climatic realities which are combined to result in characteristically
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility
Table 3.1
61
Passenger vehicle sales in China, 2007 and 2008 by major brand
Brand BAW BMW Brilliance BYD Auto Changan Group Changfeng Changhe Chery Chrysler CMC Soueast Dongfeng Europestar FAW Fiat Ford (incl. Volvo) Foton Fuqi Geely Group GM Buick GM Cadillac GM Chevrolet Great Wall Guihang Haima Harbin Aircraft Ind. Honda Hyundai Hyundai (Kia) Isuzu JAC Jiangnan Lifan Auto Mazda Mercedes Benz Mitsubishi Nanjing Auto New Dadi Auto Nissan PSA Citroen PSA Peugeot SAIC
2007
2008
10 163 32 249 126 571 100 126 322 296 25 758 7 295 379 261 9 277 7 729 22 196 0 210 603 15 525 180 476 1 717 294 220 832 330 726 4 384 193 150 64 732 8 130 988 167 165 422 345 243 989 101 436 1 257 48 114 5 444 30 099 91 366 6 882 41 475 371 14 472 281 520 115 036 92 219 19 680
12 063 35 164 103 737 170 882 276 519 26 886 8 294 356 093 11 200 11 849 23 611 107 228 454 – 161 758 3 470 88 221 151 279 238 2 633 203 674 73 030 – 96 099 148 673 470 033 308 155 142008 671 58 237 13 099 33 112 112 711 14 356 21 170 – 27 147 361 015 101 933 76 375 35 208
% change 18.7 9.0 −18.0 70.7 −14.2 4.4 13.7 −6.1 20.7 53.3 6.4 – 8.5 – −10.4 102.1 −70.1 0.1 −15.6 −39.9 5.4 12.8 – −26.6 −11.1 11.3 26.3 40.0 −46.6 21.0 140.6 10.0 23.4 108.6 −49.0 – 87.6 28.2 −11.4 −17.2 78.9
62
Table 3.1
The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
(continued)
Brand
2007
2008
Shuguang Auto Suzuki Toyota VW VW Audi VW Skoda Wuling Zhongxing Motor
7 108 160 849 455 140 755 489 92 197 30 902 464 118 6 971
4 881 178 853 543 106 822 314 100 782 60 340 545 239 6 126
−31.3 11.2 18.8 6.0 9.3 95.3 17.5 −12.1
6 072 000
6 491 544
6.9
Total
% change
Source: Wells and Magalhaes, 2009 using data adapted from Automotive News Europe/ JATO Dynamics.
distinct ‘carscapes’. As Table 3.2 illustrates, these carscapes are potentially quite different from place to place. At a finer level of spatial disaggregation there are even more quirky distinctions. It is commonplace for example for vehicle manufacturers to have enhanced sales in their local area, such that in Trollhatten, for example, there is a very high concentration of Saab models just as around Sunderland there is a very high concentration of Nissan models. Equally one can find surprisingly high concentrations of Saab models in some States in the USA such as Colorado where conditions in some respects mirror those found in Sweden. Similarly it is difficult to say whether the inclination towards ‘pimping’ a car in the USA (i.e. customizing with a very visible display of wealth) arises out of the more general ‘bling’ culture (Henderson, 2005) or helped to create it. Among other distortions of local carscapes, the influence of used cars is an interesting dimension. Some locations have historically been recipients of large numbers of used cars, including New Zealand and Ireland (both with many Japanese used cars), Eastern Europe and Africa (with cars from Western Europe) and the Middle East (with cars from North America, particularly light trucks). Obviously this makes for a relatively aged stock of cars in circulation. This observable difference in carscapes may be an indicator of both existing differences in car cultures and in the scope for acceptance of alternatives to the mainstream car, and hence to innovation and more sustainable automobility. It could be the case that the automobility regimes that arise out of distinct cultures of automobility (and these cultures are themselves an aspect or manifestation of broader cultural differences between
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility
Table 3.2
63
Distinct carscapes around the world: some examples
Location
Feature
Comment
North America
Large market share for ‘light truck’ segment, peaking at about 50% of new passenger vehicle sales in 2007/08
United States
‘Pimped’ cars – highly customized, usually older models with e.g. expensive music systems Large market share for ‘kei’ class of very small passenger cars Tiny market share for imports
Now under threat from changes to fiscal regime and CAFE but still echoes notions of the frontier spirit. Also a feature of e.g. Thailand Often not legal in other markets but a key element of the ‘bling’ culture of America
Japan
Japan
Korea Australia
Tiny market share for imports Large, rear-wheel-drive cars
Europe
Diesel cars with around 50% market share
Europe
Car-derived vans
Germany
Large cars with high power outputs
UK
Large market for imports (over 70% of new car sales)
UK
Cherished cars
Suits the congested conditions of urban Japan, bolstered by tax and other measures Reflects a strongly nationalist car-buying tradition and inability of other vehicle manufacturers to produce cars to Japanese tastes and values Reflects a strongly nationalist car-buying tradition Served by e.g. Holden brand (GM) and other vehicle manufacturers with models just for this market Even higher in France (over 70%). In other markets diesel is reserved for commercial vehicles Used by many small businesses, almost equivalent to the pick-up truck in North America Wealth plus autobahn system supports bias towards these cars from Audi, BMW and Mercedes Lack of a domestic champion plus market-centric approach from consumers support high level of imports The UK has an unusually large number of car enthusiast clubs
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The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 3.2
(continued)
Location
Feature
Comment
France
VSP models
Cuba
Cars from the late 1950s
India
Auto-rickshaws and models from the 1950s
China
Three-wheel vehicles
World
Left-hand drive/right-hand drive
Vehicles of small size and very low power and restricted use, primarily for drivers without a full licence Once Cuba was isolated from the world due to trade restrictions, the carscape became frozen in time Most famously, the Hindustan Ambassador (formerly the Morris Oxford) and the Padmini Fiat – both used largely as taxis Often used in light commercial applications, with crude twostroke diesel engines Approximately 25% of new cars are right-hand drive
societies) are actually time-lagged more or less. Thus the automobility regime is relatively slow to change even in the face of changing cultural attitudes to automobility, and these regimes can become a hindrance to change. Automobility regimes can thus be understood as the framework for car ownership and use that has emerged as a historically and spatially specific set of formal laws, regulations and infrastructures, and around which distinct cultures of automobility accrete. A characteristic feature of automobility regimes is that they are relatively slow to change, and hence the process of convergence of regimes is also inevitably slow. As a result visible islands of difference in carscapes remain in the global automotive industry, and are manifestations of enduring symptoms of underlying structural differences.
3.3
AUTOMOBILITY CULTURES
Cars have long been more than just a means of transport (Urry, 2004). From the earliest days of car ownership and use, there has been an association with status and, more nebulously, with statements about the self and one’s place in society. Cars are cultural objects, imbued or attributed
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility
65
with values and meanings by those that own them and those that look upon them. Similarly the way in which we use cars is not entirely reducible to the performance properties of the car or indeed to such matters as the legal framework, the physical infrastructure or the conditions within which cars are being driven. Equally there can be little doubt that the car features strongly in modern cultures around the world, and notably in many and various sub-cultures, as diligently chronicled by the Hollywood film industry over many years. For some critics the industrialized societies as typified by the United States have become in thrall to the car (Williams, 1991), and the populism and idealism that underpin the attitude of such societies to the car do not bear close examination compared with the empirical reality. Yet these cultural associations are resilient to change. It is worth noting, for example, that in the USA approximately 35 000 people per annum die as a result of road traffic incidents, an order of magnitude greater than the number who died as a result of the attacks on the World Trade Center, but there has been no corresponding ‘war on cars’ as a result. The established industrial nations have, however, had the opportunity to develop in tandem with the car and increased motorization over a period of decades. There is an inherent circularity in the relationship between the available vehicle population and cultural attitudes to transport and mobility that has been somewhat conditioned by the set of possibilities presented by the automotive industry (Urry, 2007; Staley, 2008). That is, car cultures are a neglected aspect of the automotive industry that shape, and are shaped by, the characteristic form of automobility evident in different spatial locations (Hagman, 2003; Wright and Curtis, 2005). In those countries that underwent industrialization at the time that the automotive industry was being established, cultural aspects of the car developed relatively slowly along with the industry. In turn this has allowed a process of adjustment and understanding of the multiple facets of motorization including the issue of road safety. In these locations, the car as a product developed alongside its practical use, and alongside the cultural expectations of what constituted a car. In the early years of the industry there was scant control over the use of cars, their design or their maintenance; the resulting loss of life and limb on the roads in countries such as America was hardly surprising but at a social level somewhat acceptable. Ultimately as the social costs rise so attempts to mitigate those costs gain primacy and lead to regulation over many aspects of the car. Indeed this process is ongoing. Hence along with increased car ownership has come a hard and soft infrastructure of roads, parking facilities, service stations, retail outlets, traffic police, driving instructors, ambulance services, insurance companies, and of course laws governing car use.
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The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Moreover motorization has been accompanied by, in general, increased personal wealth and in many countries a managed transition that meant the carless did not have to walk on the roads used by vehicles. In countries undergoing rapid motorization, the adjustment processes are too slow with respect to almost every aspect of automobility culture and this is one of the most important factors behind the high social costs associated with automobility (congestion, poor air quality, deaths and injuries, etc.). It is probably not necessary to belabour the point that the automobile is a powerful cultural object, items whose many and varied attributes carry significant meanings for the societies in which they are used. Cars are objects of great passion for some people, as evidenced by the plethora of ‘owners’ clubs’ in many countries, organizations dedicated to the celebration of a particular brand or model of car (Nieuwenhuis, 2008a). In the UK there is a distinct enthusiast culture in which there are a great many car clubs dedicated to specific brands and models, and an historic interest in many forms of motor sport. As Nieuwenhuis (2008a) argues, one interesting aspect of these car clubs and the broader enthusiast sub-culture is that cars are cherished and car longevity is valued. In turn this has potential implications for ‘long-life’ cars (Nieuwenhuis, 1994) based on an emotional attachment that transcends economic rationality. The significance of product longevity is often overlooked by environmentalists and indeed policy-makers, where innovation, newness and the replacement of existing products tend to be prioritized (Cooper, 2005). However, as Chapman (2005) has cogently argued, developing a durable emotional bond between product and consumer is a key strategy in the more general attempt to shift from a high-consumption, materialist and throw-away culture into something more sustainable. Moreover, as is noted in Chapter 6, vehicle manufacturers such as Morgan which develop a close business relationship with their customers are simultaneously able to nurture a strong emotional attachment to the product, thereby increasing its financial value as well as the prospects for enhanced product longevity. It is not even necessary that cars given such treatment are objectively ‘good’ in performance or aesthetic terms compared with others: in the UK there is a Morris Marina Owners’ Club (http://www.morrismarina.org.uk) even though most experts would agree it was one of the worst cars ever produced in the country (by British Leyland in the nadir of that company’s existence) and less than half of one per cent of all the models produced still survive. The car has also been, for many years, the symbolic and real manifestation of individual freedom. The many forms of advertising, and the treatment of motoring in movies, songs and other cultural forms of expression, have tended to reinforce this status and emphasized the idea of the freedom of the open road. Moreover as the car market developed
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility
67
in sophistication, so the car became one means of asserting personal taste, wealth and lifestyle choices. Over time in the established markets at least, the cultural position of the car has changed with a stronger emphasis on the car as a protected personal space within which to traverse an implicitly hostile urban environment. Along with greatly enhanced levels of personal comfort and more robust security systems, the emphasis on the passive and dynamic safety features of a car has helped to foster an image of virtual impregnability – and probably strengthened the bond individuals feel that they have with the machine. The strong association of the car with America in the early phases of mass motorization, when America was also associated with the emergent mass media, further served to underline the cultural status of the car as a sign of economic power at both the national and individual levels. Hence the car industry became one of the most potent and substantial of all industries of the post-1945 era, both in America and in other industrial nations and the car became a potent visible manifestation of economic power. Simultaneously the nations that were early adopters of mass motorization were inevitably the nations that started to build their social and economic fabric around the car and its use. Arguably no nation went as far as America in this regard but many others created a built environment predicated upon car ownership and use. The dispersed, low-density pattern of urbanization typified by cities such as Los Angeles was made possible by the widespread ownership of cars, and further accelerated car ownership because for many people it was barely practical to live in such a city without a car. Hence societies in America and elsewhere generated a form of path dependency upon the car as a mode of transport, thereby bringing together the cultural and practical significance of the car (Sperling and Gordon, 2008). Cars became necessary to support an entire suburban lifestyle because of the spatial separation of work, employment, habitation, leisure and much more – a feature often formalized in zoning approaches to urban planning. There are negative associations or consequences with distinct automobility cultures. In the USA, for example, there has long been an ambiguous attitude to the state by a substantial portion of the population with a tendency towards libertarianism. Perhaps as a result there has been a long history of at least some Americans being unwilling to wear seatbelts or, when on motorbikes, wear helmets. Vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers developed air bag systems to protect American drivers from themselves in this sense, and also to avert potentially expensive litigation. In the US automobility culture, therefore, there has been a strand in which the occupants of cars do not regard their safety in the event of an incident
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The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
as being their own responsibility, it is down to the vehicle manufacturers to provide ‘safe’ vehicles. Meanwhile those occupants wanted the personal freedom to choose whether or not to wear a seatbelt. Similarly, as in the epic film Easy Rider, a proportion of motorcyclists do not want their personal freedom constrained by having to wear a helmet, despite all the evidence that to do so vastly decreases their risk of death or serious injury. In contrast there is little doubt that China is a strange market to those used to conditions in the saturated markets of the West. For a start it is a market where about 85 per cent of car purchasers are buying a new car for the first time – indeed it is a nation of learner-drivers. It is also the case, as is shown in Table 3.1, that it is a market with an unusual mixture of over 50 brands in which the dominant group (VW) has less than 13 per cent market share. In terms of car culture, it is a country that offers vehicle manufacturers almost a ‘clean slate’ upon which to attempt to write their concepts and values. Expectations about cars are less developed than might be the case elsewhere, a feature that has interesting possibilities for the establishment of values centred on sustainable mobility. There is an argument to say that positive attitudes to the car and to automobility are slowly eroding away in Western societies as utility declines and control increases. In terms of technology the trend has been to remove control over the car from the driver to the car itself or indeed to some sort of external controlling infrastructure (Table 3.3). Not all of the new technologies shown in Table 3.3 are concerned with safety, though many of them are. There is a general trend to move towards increasingly complex ‘driver assistance’ technologies that convey information and sometimes intervene directly to help the driver. Collectively these technologies make the contemporary car more complex, more expensive and more likely to intervene in instances of inappropriate driver behaviour. The proliferation of these technologies is not absolutely certain. There are remaining issues concerning cost, weight, reliability, longevity and customer acceptance. It may be that in the current climate of financial stringency and fuel consumption awareness the penetration rate of some of the above technologies will be reduced. Overlaid on these technologies concerned with the vehicle dynamics are an increasing array of technologies that might be described as ‘infrastructural’. Early indications of this sort of technology include the London congestion charging scheme that uses image recognition cameras to detect car licence numbers and hence to ensure compliance with the payment of the fee to enter the central area. Alternatively in the USA there has been much interest in the concept of ‘platooning’, whereby individual cars are electronically linked together to form a sort of train, all travelling at the same speed and in the same direction and thereby reducing the chances of
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility
Table 3.3
69
New collision avoidance technologies
Item
Example
Comments
Parking sensor systems
Multiple applications
Collision avoidance and mitigation systems Intelligent speed/ cruise systems
Emergent technology with Mercedes
Stability control systems (mandatory soon in Europe and North America)
Very widespread
Driver awareness systems
Rearward cameras
Nissan is developing some applications here, e.g. vision monitoring systems Volvo is developing some applications here. Already some aftermarket products available Mandatory in many markets for mobile phone users while driving, although enforcement efforts as yet incomplete Emergent, e.g. Mercedes
Help to avoid low-speed impacts that result in body panel repairs The ultimate target is a car that does not get involved in accidents Ensures drivers keep a safe distance from the car in front when on motorways Reduce the severity of accidents, which may actually aid the body repair sector by helping turn an event that would normally lead to a write-off into an event that leads to a repairable car Could help to reduce the incidence of accidents caused by drivers losing concentration These prevent the car being used if the driver is impaired by alcohol
Blind-spot warning systems
Emergent, e.g. Mercedes S Class
Driver interlock systems (alcohol sensors)
Hands-free telephones
Again an emergent technology
Supposedly helps the driver to maintain concentration, hence reduces the rate of accidents
Used to fill in ‘blind spots’ and hence reduce accidents, e.g. on motorways Can use other systems to detect objects in the blindspot area. The Mercedes system uses six radars in front and rear bumpers
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The automotive industry in an era of eco-austerity
Table 3.3
(continued)
Item
Example
Comments
Active throttle
Emergent, e.g. Continental AG
Night vision systems
Mercedes
Pressure-sensing tyre systems
Multiple examples
Run-flat tyre systems
Emergent examples, as used e.g. on some BMW models Nissan, for example; many others under development
Provides an alternative source of information to the driver when a danger emerges Uses infrared systems to reveal living objects that might be missed by normal lighting systems Can provide advance warning of a problem, hence allowing the driver to take action before it is too late Allows the driver to retain control in the event of a catastrophic tyre failure Intended to warn the driver of accidental drifting out of lane, hence reduces accidents
Lane departure warning systems
Source:
Compiled from a range of company and news sources.
an accident. In the future the external infrastructure might control vehicle speed, or enforce the switch to zero emissions mode when entering an urban area, or even de-activate a car when it is used to enter a prohibited zone. All of these measures in one way or another reduce individual control over the car, and contribute to the erosion of the ‘freedom’ offered by the car – and hence constitute a further dilution of the real mobility offered by the car.
3.4
VALUE-FOR-MONEY VEHICLES AND THE EROSION OF DIVERSITY
The antithesis of the car as an object of desire and strong emotional bonds is the notion that the car is simply a means of transport, or a way of getting from one point to another. It is probably fair to say that many environmental critics of the car consider that it is more or less a material object
Contemporary global diversity and cultures of automobility
71
with all the inherent excitement and aesthetic appeal of a microwave oven. Seen from a perspective of rationality and logic it is apparent that cars are grotesquely inefficient devices, and the sensible way forward is to control and constrain them to minimize the excessive social costs and externalities. For individual consumers the strangulation of automobility freedoms coupled with decreasing functionality and increasing costs may find their expression in a rejection of pro-automobile culture. This is a key dilemma for many in contemporary society: people need the car but perhaps do not really want it and certainly do not love it. In other words people are compelled to be drivers by circumstance and are unwilling accomplices of the automotive industry. This is a rather different set of circumstances from those surrounding the nascent mass automobility of countries such as India, but the interesting result is that from these very different starting points it is possible to arrive at the same conclusion: a growing market for high-utility, low-cost, value-for-money motoring. Recent years have been witness to the entry onto global markets of models that have been explicitly aimed at the ‘value for money’ segment of the new car-buying public: notable examples could be said to include the Fiat Palio, Renault Logan and of course the much anticipated Tata Nano. Those with longer memories of the automotive industry will recall that there has long been a portion of the market for new cars accounted for by ‘cheap and cheerful’ brands. In Western Europe many of these brands were based in the formerly Communist Eastern Europe (e.g. Moskvitch, Wartburg, Trabant, Skoda, FSO) while more recent years have seen the emergence of minor brands such as Proton, Daewoo, Ssangyong, and Mahindra and Mahindra with varying degrees of permanence and success. Going even further back, it could be argued that the humble Volkswagen Beetle and indeed even the Model T Ford represented deliberate (and highly successful) attempts to capture the market for low-cost or valuefor-money motoring. Two questions follow from this. First, now that economic circumstances are changing around the world, is the ‘value car’ about to make a large-scale comeback? Secondly, if the value car does make a comeback, what does this mean for environmental concerns and the possible suppression of diversity? Consumers have several choices when contemplating the purchase of a car, including the choice of whether or not to buy new or used. Given that in mature markets the average car can lose 50 per cent of its value over three years, but retain a high proportion of the total expected lifetime mileage, there is some merit for the value-conscious consumer to buying a used car. It has been common practice for vehicle manufacturers to sell highly discounted cars into the daily rental sector, often with agreed buyback rates, and then recycle the cars through their own franchised dealer
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networks, thereby providing dealerships with useful showroom traffic and additional sales volume. These ‘nearly new’ cars are usually issued with some form of warranty and are described as ‘assured’; these cars therefore represent a specific category of value-for-money motoring. Similarly in mature markets such as the UK, Germany and the Netherlands a large share of the new car market is accounted for by company car sales, again with high levels of discount for large fleet buyers. These cars become ‘offlease’ after three to five years and again represent a specific category of choice for consumers. Additionally many cars are sold to employees and their families, to suppliers to vehicle manufacturers and to other categories that obtain some degree of discount on the full new price. Indeed in many mature markets cars sold new, for full price, to retail consumers, are actually a minority category. Not surprisingly, it is rather difficult to gain a precise idea of the size and monetary worth of the value sector of new cars in markets around the world. In the case of many markets in Asia it seems as if the motorcycle represents the first step in automobility, despite the obvious difference in characteristics compared with cars. Notwithstanding this problem, some estimates may be made for mature markets at least. Typically, marginal brands competing on little more than price (and often with previous generation versions of models produced by the existing dominant companies) could never claim more than 1 per cent of the market each, with less than 5 per cent of the whole market occupied by all such brands. This reflects a more general truth, that value brands are often new entrants and inherently rather weak compared with the entrenched opposition: the task then usually is to move the brand up-market. In part this is about issues such as the coverage of dealerships in a given market area, or indeed simple consumer awareness. Still, it can take many years to move the brand upwards in terms of market perceptions. Added to this share, there have traditionally been another few percentage points occupied by the entry-level versions of mainstream models, while these vehicle manufacturers from time to time will keep an old model in production as a ‘classic’ offered at a much lower price than the new replacement model. Over time, the received wisdom has been that the mature, established markets have become less receptive to value models and brands, symbolized perhaps by the manner in which the ‘specialist’ BMW 3 Series now outsells the ‘mass produced’ Ford Mondeo in Europe. Equally there has been a perception that the emergent markets have a stronger demand for more basic products shorn of needless luxury and suited to the more rugged road conditions to be found in these markets; a line of thinking that resulted in the Fiat Palio for instance. Put this equation in another way, and it is apparent that as a
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generalization contemporary cars designed for existing, mature markets are more or less unsuitable for emergent markets with a stronger valuefor-money orientation. These observations do not necessarily apply to the more elite consumer segments in the automotive industry – it is plainly the case that in many emergent markets there are plenty of fabulously wealthy individuals able to purchase whatever new car they care to own. Countries such as Brazil, India and increasingly China exhibit a markedly uneven distribution of income such that the middle classes are only now gaining sufficient wealth to join the ranks of car ownership. Indeed the trio of world value models of the recent era (Fiat Palio, Renault Logan and now Tata Nano) are testimony to this fact. All three were designed for the emerging markets and with the idea that they would not be sold in significant numbers in the established markets. It is possible to distinguish a variety of strategies being adopted by vehicle manufacturers or groups as they seek to create value offerings in established and emerging markets. These strategies include: ●
●
●
Create a new brand. It is difficult to reconcile the expense of creating a new brand with the aim of developing a value proposition. It makes more sense for up-market brands such as Lexus (Toyota) where the higher margins can absorb the enormous marketing and advertising costs involved. This route is also only viable as a longterm strategy. A good example is the GM Saturn brand in the USA, which reportedly never actually made a profit and in 2009 was sold off as part of the wider GM restructuring. Revitalize an existing brand. This strategy has been one of the most successful over the years, as long as the vehicle manufacturer group has a suitable brand within its portfolio. To date the best example has been Skoda under the umbrella of the Volkswagen Group. Others that have worked reasonably well include Renault (with Dacia) and GM with respect to Chevrolet, effectively taking over the Daewoo name in most global markets and extending the Chevrolet as a worldwide value brand. An advantage here is that the infrastructure of dealerships and so on is already in place. Continue production of ‘classic’ models. As noted above, previous generation models may be continued (often in lower-cost production locations) as ‘classic’ models that co-exist in the product range with the new (replacement) models. With tooling costs already amortized and no major efforts at facelifting the vehicles, extra production can be squeezed out at relatively little marginal cost although this strategy generally has a limited life-span of a couple of years and is often used just to clear excess stock.
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●
Introduce a value model. This is what Renault has done with the Logan, and of course Tata with the Nano. Existing vehicle manufacturers may have trouble reconciling the value model positioning against their aspirations for the brand values for the rest of the range, and the value model will almost certainly steal some sales from other models in the range. Introduce a ‘value’ sub-brand. In effect this is what several vehicle manufacturers are already doing with their green sub-branding strategies, because the low-CO2 emissions variants so branded often have the smallest engines and are de-contented to reduce vehicle mass. The issue of sub-branding in the context of environmentally friendly models is discussed further in Chapter 6.
The received view that the established markets have moved on from value segments has never been entirely accurate, not least because nearly new cars have tended to perform this function. A combination of recessionary conditions in the established markets, along with a new generation of brands with the potential to become the value propositions of the new era, has altered these comfortable assumptions. Additionally there are Chinese brands anxious to enter European and other markets – most likely with very low-priced models. It is true that with the Logan Renault never quite achieved the €5000 car it had intended to achieve; just as with the Tata Nano the ‘1 lakh’ (100 000 rupees or about £1300) target only applies to the most basic version. Interestingly, both the Fiat Palio and the Renault Logan were not initially intended for mainstream markets in Europe, not least because of concerns over the impact of such models on the rest of the range. However, the demand evidentially existed and was sufficiently strong to warrant action. Providing that local regulatory standards can be met (and this has been an issue with some potential value imports that are unable to meet prevailing emissions or safety norms), it would appear that there is potential for a significant convergence of interests here, leading to a global value segment that will embody the highest growth and the tightest margins. Herein is the challenge of course. Established vehicle manufacturers with their expensive manufacturing footprint have escaped cost competition in a variety of strategies including added-value technological sophistication. If, as appears to be the case, the new era is going to be one of engineering minimalism then much of that expensive overhead is under threat. Hitherto value segments might have occupied around 5–10 per cent of the total market for new (and nearly new) cars in established markets; in the current conditions this share could increase to nearer 15 per cent or even more.
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The case for value for model motoring is clear enough in this era of eco-austerity: that the only way to keep consumers and win new ones is to reduce the cost of the car, a process that results in incremental technology change, least-cost materials and an emphasis on manufacturing price rather than, for example, product longevity or indeed loyalty to established production locations. The car becomes a truly global commodity. Right now, vehicle manufacturers must do all within their power to lure buyers back into the market, and value models appear to be one way of achieving this – but only the least-cost producers will make any profit from the segment. With this approach to the market, the car becomes rather like the contemporary ball-point pen, ubiquitous, un-remarked, cheap, disposable and unloved. Suppliers are inevitably banished to the least-cost locations of the world. This might become a car sold outside the franchised dealerships, via supermarkets or the Internet perhaps, such is the need to achieve market volumes. In other words, the danger with this strategy is that the car could lose its ability to act as a social and cultural status symbol and become again a mere thing – the car as ‘white good’. With no emotional bond, the car becomes an object to be discarded all too readily (Nieuwenhuis, 2008a). Other vehicle manufacturers are already following the template of the Tata Nano, while others have anticipated the development (with for example the Renault/Dacia Logan or the earlier Fiat Palio) in somewhat less successful executions of the value segment concept. Dunford (2009) ascribes the failure of the Fiat Palio to the lack of liberalization in key emergent markets. The Toyota IMV (International Multi-purpose Vehicle) project launched in 2002 is also typical, in that it sought to create several different vehicle configurations from the one platform in order to access multiple world markets, with production in Thailand, Indonesia, South Africa and Argentina (Johri and Petison, 2008; Toyota, 2009). In contrast, the Tata Nano is simply one design, produced in one main location. While the approach of Toyota is claimed to enable global knowledge creation and hence add value to the corporation (Ichijo and Kohlbacher, 2007), the added design and managerial complexity of these multi-location strategies (see for example Iijima and Sugawara, 2005) probably also add to the cost. There are distinct limits to the growth prospects for car sales in the market in India, and these are not just economic or attributable to the level of personal wealth in the country. A critical factor is looming infrastructural collapse under pressure from relentless urbanization and population growth. The road building programme appears mired in political, financial and technical problems and is proceeding at a much slower rate than
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Table 3.4
Vehicle sales, 2003–04 to 2008–09 in India (units)
Item
2003–04
2004–05
2005–06
2006–07
2007–08
2008–09
902 096
1 061 572
1 143 076
1 379 979 1 549 882
1 551 880
Passenger vehicles Commercial vehicles Three-wheelers Two-wheelers
260 114
318 430
351 041
284 078 5 364 249
307 862 6 209 765
359 920 7 052 391
Grand total
6 810 537
7 897 629
467 765
490 494
384 122
403 910 364 781 7 872 334 7 249 278
349 719 7 437 670
8 906 428 10 123 988 9 654 435
9 723 391
Source: Society of Indian Automotive Manufacturers, http://www.siamindia.com/script/ domestic-sales-trend.aspx (accessed 9 January 2010).
anticipated or indeed needed. The next two years are going to be critical for the market because this period will provide the test of whether the Tata Nano concept, that motorcycles can be replaced by cars, really holds water. As can be seen from Table 3.4, about eight million motorcycles and three-wheelers combined were sold in India in 2008–09, compared with about 1.5 million cars sold.
3.5
CONCLUSIONS
As was argued in Chapter 2 the automotive industry does not show a great deal of diversity where it matters, in terms of different underlying technologies. The tendency of the industry is to reduce technical diversity in order to reduce costs. Despite this tendency, as this chapter has sought to show, there remains an undercurrent of diversity in cultures of automobility. There is a dynamic tension to the situation in that the logic of the industry is to keep pushing towards standardization and yet market and other pressures conspire to prevent uniformity being achieved. What is less clear is whether divergent automobility cultures are a good thing or not from the perspective of sustainability. The value of divergent cultures is that they may provide the seedbed for locally specific and appropriate automobility solutions to emerge. Actually, strong cultural affinity for the car, long bemoaned by environmentalists, might also provide the basis for a more benign form of automobility because such affinity may include important values such as the primacy given to product longevity. Furthermore, connectivity with the car could encourage innovation by consumers-owners to enhance sustainability – thereby greatly increasing the number of intelligent and interested minds being used rather than just
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relying upon the R&D departments of vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers. There is nothing to match the ingenuity of people! On the other hand, the imposition of automotive minimalism in the form of the Nano and similar products could be a critical means of breaking the often negative aspects of contemporary cultures of automobility. All too often in these cultures there is a delight in wastefulness and profligate behaviour, in designs that concretize over-engineering and that celebrate noise, pollution and pointless resource consumption. Ultimately the innovative business models that are a feature of Chapter 5 in this book need to define and capture new forms of automobility culture, and thereby help to create new regimes of automobility that are more sustainable. Thus there needs to be a resonance with both the technological form of the car, the business model that brings it to market, and the cultural understanding of car ownership and use. In effect, there is a need to tap into latent sub-cultures of would-be green motorists and to make these marginal sub-cultures the mainstream.
4.
4.1
Emergent diversity in the global automotive industry: the policy agenda INTRODUCTION
This chapter will look at localities and their differences in terms of the recent history of emergent diversity of the automotive industry. Chapter 6 will consider the future prospects for change, including in policy terms. The essence of the discussion is to argue that not all places are equal: they have different problems with respect to automobility, different cultures of automobility and differing degrees of scope in terms of fostering alternatives. Hence at a simple level sugarcane ethanol is possible in Brazil but not in Finland, where cellulose-derived fuels may make more sense. The chapter will show that there are myriad examples of local initiatives with respect to novel automotive technologies, usually involving state intervention, and that these initiatives intersect with other aspects of state intervention such as cluster policy, low-carbon programmes, local economic development initiatives, strategic energy independence, and so forth. It is often thought that localities are in this sense in competition with each other (Bristow, 2005), but in fact this need not be so. Indeed the more that independent, self-reliant development is able to prosper, the less are locations in competition with each other. More recent analyses appear to support this stance with, for example, an emphasis placed on the recursive quality of the relationship between local economy development and skilled labour migration suggesting that individual places develop unique dynamics (Storper and Scott, 2009). At the basic level the argument is that sustainability requires sensitivity to local context. Hence the ‘one size fits all’ approach cannot be enforced in all places simultaneously. Neither can success in one location simply be emulated in another. Indeed to do so may entail substantive ecological and economic inefficiencies through the failure to capture the potentialities of place (Desrochers and Sautet, 2004). Future transport transformations are more likely to depend upon the co-evolution of niche developments, and on diversity (Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2007). Rather sustainability is 78
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more likely to emerge out of multi-agency networks that can orchestrate pathways towards sustainability (Malmborg, 2006) rather than seek a quantum leap to such a state. This chapter is mainly concerned with a selection of automotive industry policies at the national level by various governments around the world. There is no particular logic in this selection other than a concern to illustrate briefly the theme of diversity that seems likely in the search for sustainability. The basic premise is that it is worth highlighting positive examples that, in their context, make a lot of sense. One of the best examples is that of Brazilian bio-ethanol derived from sugarcane, for which a more extensive case study is provided. In other respects it might be argued that the policy framework around which the automotive industry has to work is already rather diverse and likely to become more so – particularly with respect to environmental measures; an example being the proliferation of car-free zones, low-emission zones and related measures in some major cities. In what follows there are some cameos of individual country policies, all of which really would merit much greater study in depth. Space precludes such an exhaustive analysis, but it is hoped that even this relatively superficial sweep across the automotive industry policy landscape will be sufficient to convey the very different underlying assumptions and aspirations for policy in each case.
4.2
POLICY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
All the major countries and many of the lesser ones have policies for the development of ‘their’ automotive industry and in total these plans are incompatible, in that not every one can succeed on their own terms. In this respect the automotive industry is a classic illustration of the madness of inter-locality competition on a global scale. The automotive industry is also often given privileged status as an inward investor because it is seen as a vital contributor to economic growth and social aspirations to materialism and mobility. Hence such inward investors, even where they are unable to attain financial control of enterprises within the host country, can avail themselves of many tax benefits, incentives, soft loans, and so on. This kind of development is thus often wasteful of economic resources. As Humphrey (2003) explains, economic liberalization and the opening up of economies such as India and Brazil to inward investment were shaped by the desire of those and other countries to capture a higher share of economic value added; there was no desire to support
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so-called ‘screwdriver’ factories or indeed assembly plants that essentially put together kits of cars that were actually manufactured elsewhere. As a result, not only did vehicle manufacturers arrive with large investments, so too did their suppliers or, where possible, local suppliers were cultivated and developed. If the wider policy arena is expanded to include sustainable mobility then to some extent the same considerations apply, but the results are less malignant because policies concerned with local economic development that are also tied with local transport policy, the available industrial base, R&D resources and the desired outcomes in terms of innovation and growth necessarily need to relate to the established local capacity in these terms. Put simply, localities have to play to their strengths and this inevitably leads to myriad solutions according to place. This phase marks a decisive moment for the emergent automotive industry of some countries, because the pursuit of a local environmental agenda or ‘green car’ strategy may not resonate so clearly with the international vehicle manufacturers which remain the dominant economic entities. As is noted below, countries such as Malaysia, Australia and Thailand do not all recognize the imperative that in order to retain an automotive industry of any sort, there is a growing requirement to align industry development policy with wider environmental and sustainability goals. India In the case of India, as articulated by the Automotive Mission Plan (AMP) 2006–16 released in 2006, the intention is no less than to become a global automotive hub offering not just to support local demand but to generate a substantial export business (Wells and Sadana, 2007). In this regard the AMP is not greatly dissimilar to the strategy adopted by the government in Russia outlined in Chapter 1. The main features of the AMP discussion are: ● ● ●
● ●
delineation of the separate roles of government and industry; support for green vehicles in terms of alternative fuels (notably biofuels) and hybrids; and of small cars; support for inward investment that not just meets the needs of the local market but provides a platform for exports, possibly through the use of Special Economic Zones or special taxation treatment; multilateral or bilateral trade agreements with selected countries and regions to establish export markets; identification and removal of barriers to growth in the local market;
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promotion of three key export hubs in Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata with suitable dedicated facilities; support for technology development in India.
The largely unwritten agenda is of course competition with China, the only really comparable country in terms of domestic market size, market growth, inward investment levels and national ambition for a place in the global industry. Indeed, China has something of a head start on India. According to the AMP China has a cost advantage of 23 per cent over India on a like-for-like basis, largely attributable to differences in taxes. The AMP included some ambitious targets that may not subsequently be met, including: ● ● ● ● ●
a 16 per cent per annum growth rate for the next ten years; industry turnover to reach US$145 billion up from the current US$34.6 billion; creation of an additional 25 million jobs; doubling of the share of GDP from 5 per cent to 10 per cent; growth in component exports from US$1.8 billion to US$25 billion by 2015.
Not surprisingly, in turn the growth hoped for can only be achieved via a step-change in levels of corporate investment in the country, estimated at up to US$40 billion to 2016. The government is doing its part with, most importantly, a substantial programme of investment in automotive R&D and testing facilities. India has been at the forefront of adopting compressed natural gas (CNG) as a fuel, for commercial vehicles (buses, taxis and rickshaws) and more recently for cars. The strategy is premised on the need to improve air quality in the 12 major cities in India, and has helped to create a small but growing market for CNG vehicles (Ritch, 2009). Leading vehicle manufacturers had been coping by fitting cars with conversion kits, though in mid-2009 Maruti Suzuki announced it was to provide a factory-fit CNG option from 2010 – probably on the Alto model. Malaysia Malaysia has had a National Automotive Policy (NAP) since 2006, as with the case of India. In 2008, however, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was reportedly considering reviewing the NAP to address ‘certain unresolved issues’ and re-tabling it to the cabinet by the end of 2008 (Isaiah, 2008c). The NAP was conceived in rather traditional terms to provide
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protection for those vehicle manufacturers active in Malaysia (Menteri, 2005) and hence was not widely supported by those importing into the market. In contrast to other instances of national automotive industry policy, the NAP adopted by Malaysia does not appear to go beyond seeking to position the country as a regional automotive manufacturing and assembly hub and to be ‘progressive and dynamic’ for the long term. What is notable, in fact, in the 2006 policy is the absolute lack of environmental issues in the policy; only a concern for the fate of the largely national vehicle manufacturing industry and rather weak domestic suppliers (Rosli and Kari, 2008) in the face of global rationalization. The government still uses what it terms the Industrial Adjustment Fund to support the local producers, Proton and Peruda, which would otherwise be unlikely to withstand international competition. In the case of Malaysia the primary competition is with Thailand, seen as an exemplar of successful strategy with respect to becoming a global export hub. In this regard it is perhaps unsurprising that in September 2009 the entire NAP was up for review, with critics pointing out that protection of a ‘national’ industry had left Malaysia uncompetitive compared with Thailand, despite having a larger domestic market. The 9th Malaysia Plan (2005 to 2010) included the development of a hydrogen fuel cell vehicle, though it has yet to materialize. It is likely that the revised NAP will incorporate environmentalism at some level, at least in terms of promoting R&D links with universities to help develop new technologies, but equally it does not appear it will be all that imaginative. Thailand The Thai automotive industry dates back to the early 1960s when the first domestic component manufacturing operations were established. Over a period of about 40 years to the early 2000s the central thrust of policy was import substitution (Office of Industrial Economics (OIE), 2002). Thereafter in response to the growing climate of trade and investment liberalization, Thailand shifted policy in an attempt to create an export hub in the country (Techakanont, 2008). For some mainstream analysts, the removal of local content requirements was the vital step allowing the country to develop as an export hub for vehicles (Kohpaiboon, 2008); the local market for pick-up trucks helped the country develop a specialization in this area that has served as the basis of the export platform since then. Between 1989 and 2006 production capacity in Thailand grew from 160 000 units per annum (and 10 vehicle manufacturers) to 1 576 000 (and 12 vehicle manufacturers). Moreover, the lack of an indigenous vehicle manufacturer meant that there was no ‘national’ motor industry to protect, as was the case in Malaysia, which arguably gave policy-makers more latitude.
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Aware of significant shifts in the requirements of key export markets, and particularly the trend towards low-CO2 emissions vehicles, Thailand announced its ‘eco-car’ strategy in mid-2007 as a deliberate attempt to expand upon the comparative success already enjoyed with the pick-up and light truck segment. Under the rules of the eco-car strategy qualifying investments must: ● ● ● ●
have a production capacity of at least 100 000 units per annum from the fifth year of operation; the car should not consume more than 5l/100 km petrol (or 120 g/ km CO2 emissions); meet or better EURO IV emissions standards; meet UNECE regulations on passenger safety for front and side impact.
To stimulate local demand for eco-cars the Thai Finance Ministry offered a 17 per cent excise tax rate on eco-cars that have engines smaller than 1300 cc for petrol engines and 1400 cc for diesel engines. This compares with the standard excise tax rate of between 30 per cent and 50 per cent, reportedly equivalent to reducing retail prices for buyers by US$2000 compared with standard passenger cars. In practice the eco-car project appears to have struggled given overall financial conditions (Badenoch, 2009). By July 2009 it was being reported that the Thai government was under pressure to provide support and stimulus to the programme and its automotive industry more generally. As a result tax exemptions were introduced to apply to automotive components that are currently not produced in Thailand and would have to be imported by the carmakers, specifically for the eco-car project. Atchaka Brimble, Secretary-General of the Board of Investments, announced that tax reductions were expected to lower the tariff cost of importing parts by 90 per cent for the eco-car project and would be in effect for two years. She added that this would allow carmakers to reduce the cost of producing the eco-car by Baht 100 000 (US$2940). Six vehicle manufacturers had publicly announced their commitment to the eco-car project – Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Tata, Toyota and Suzuki. However, with the economic downturn several vehicle manufacturers had suggested delays or expressed some concerns about the project itself. Tata in 2009 commented that it would be asking the Thai government to waive the minimum 100 000 annual output threshold for the eco-car project. Thailand has also been promoting natural gas vehicles (NGVs) as an alternative to mainstream fuels. The primary mechanism has been manipulation of the import duties, which were reduced in 2008 for NGV
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equipment and components (Badenoch, 2008). At the same time PTT, the state-owned gas and oil company, announced that it would continue to support its NGV business, despite continued losses. The company recorded cumulative losses over the three years to April 2009 of Baht 6.4 billion (US$183m) in its NGV business, but committed to expanding its NGV gas stations to 450 from the current 355 by mid-2010. The company plans to have 1000 NGV gas stations by 2015 and predicts that NGVs in Thailand will reach 400 000 units by 2013, from 122 576 in 2008. Australia Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced on 10 November 2008 an AUS$6.2 billion (US$4.3 billion) plan to make the automotive industry in Australia more economically and environmentally sustainable by 2020. The plan featured an expanded AUS$1.3 billion Green Car Innovation Fund which will provide government funding for companies to design and sell environmentally friendly cars. The Australian government will match industry investment in green cars by providing 25 per cent funding for approved projects. The ‘New Car Plan for a Greener Future’ plan is expected to generate AUS$16 billion in investment in the Australian automotive industry over the 13-year life of the project. The overall plan will provide the following: ●
●
●
●
● ● ●
A better-targeted, greener, AUS$3.4 billion assistance programme, the Automotive Transformation Scheme (ATS), running from 2011 to 2020. Changes to the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme in 2010, consistent with the recently published Bracks review proposals, to smooth the transition to the ATS (AUS$79.6 million). AUS$116.3 million to promote structural adjustment through consolidation in the components sector and to facilitate labour market adjustment. AUS$20 million from 2009–10 to help suppliers improve their capabilities and their integration in complex national and global supply chains. AUS$6.3 million from 2009–10 for an enhanced market access programme. A new Automotive Industry Innovation Council, bringing key decision-makers together to drive innovation and reform. An AUS$10.5 million expansion of the liquid petroleum gas (LPG) vehicle scheme, to start immediately, that doubles payments to purchasers of new vehicles using LPG technology.
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The government announced that besides funding initiatives, automotive tariffs would be cut to 5 per cent, giving Australia the third-lowest tariff regime among economies with a well-developed automotive industry. The government said, ‘Australia will continue to pursue a free trade agenda because the future of the industry lies in innovation and global integration, not industry protection with old fashioned quotas and tariffs’ (Carr, 2008). Australia has been one of the countries to give an early welcome to Project Better Place (PBP), an initiative to accelerate the introduction of electric vehicles through the co-ordinated deployment of vehicles and infrastructures (see Chapter 5 for more details), and is working with Renault-Nissan to achieve similar aims. Renault-Nissan formed a partnership with the government of Victoria in mid-2009; Canberra signed an agreement with PBP in mid-2008 and had been selected to initiate an electric vehicle infrastructure in Australia because of its size and high vehicle density. Canberra has a high proportion of two-car households and households with garage parking suitable for home-based overnight recharging. Iceland Since the 1990s Iceland has nurtured the possibility of geothermal power providing the fundamental energy source to support a hydrogen fuel cell network. The first commercial hydrogen refuelling station was established in 2003, to refuel a fleet of three Mercedes fuel cell buses run by Straeto, the local bus company. An industry–government consortium called Icelandic New Energy (including Shell, Norsk Hydro, Daimler, Iceland National Power Co., Reykjavik Energy and the University of Iceland) was established as part of a wider strategy to encourage the transition to becoming the first hydrogen economy in the world (Árnason and Sigfússon, 2000; Sigfússon, 2007). In 2007 two Icelandic energy companies, Nýorka and Vistorka, planned to import 30 hydrogen vehicles to Iceland and were talking in confident terms of hydrogen cars competing on the market within five to ten years. The first fuel cell car running in Iceland was a converted Mercedes A-Class F-Cell, in 2007. Despite a promising start the programme by mid-2009 was all but moribund according to reports in the New York Times (NYT, 2009). This pattern reflects a more general position with respect to hydrogen fuel cells and the wider concept of the hydrogen economy on a global basis (Hellman and Hoed, 2007). In the late 1990s the hydrogen fuel cell appeared to offer technological salvation, particularly in terms of zero emissions cars. Ten years later the prospects are not nearly as appealing. In most cases (and Iceland was an exception) a major concern was the need
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to generate hydrogen using fossil fuel or nuclear sources. For the automotive industry the technical complexities of hydrogen use, and particularly storage on the vehicle, allied to the issues regarding infrastructure have also been challenging. As has been identified, vehicle manufacturers will not offer fuel cell vehicles unless there is an adequate infrastructure, while infrastructure providers have no incentive to do so until there are sufficient cars (Schwoon, 2006). As is discussed in the case of Vancouver below, a pattern of co-development is required. Attempts at so-called hydrogen highways have been made elsewhere, notably in California (see Ogden, 1999 for an early study), but again the relative lack of progress is palpable. In any case, in a global survey Solomon and Banergee (2006) conclude that serious questions about the sustainability of hydrogen can be raised, while McDowall and Eames (2007) concluded that for the UK the hydrogen economy was not automatically the most sustainable option. Still, Iceland represents an interesting case because of the enormous potential of geothermal energy and the contained nature of an island (Deschenes and Chertow, 2004) that offers some advantages from a policy perspective. Vancouver and British Columbia Vancouver is arguably the best-case example of a cluster based on hydrogen fuel cells, and as a result the location has long been associated with attempts to bring the automotive industry into the hydrogen economy. Interestingly the city has long had a source of waste hydrogen, a byproduct of a sodium hydrate plant in North Vancouver, that has been estimated as being able to supply 20 000 vehicles every year if used in internal combustion engines. The efforts in British Columbia and Vancouver to nurture the fuel cell industry go back a long way, and have included support from the national government. For example, on 9 October 2003 Canada announced a research programme of C$215 million (US$159.1 million) on the hydrogen economy, with the emphasis very much on demonstration projects and the industrialization of the technology (Wells, 2003). Introducing the funding, Herb Dhaliwal, Minister of Natural Resources said, ‘We want the world to turn to Canada when looking for the technology needed to address climate change’ (Industry Canada, 2003). Fuel Cells Canada and the National Research Council Canada Fuel Cell Institute have been particularly instrumental in creating the infrastructure to allow the fuel cell industry to prosper in Vancouver. The entire approach is premised on the understanding that Canada can only compete on the world stage by partnership, networks and pooling of
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resources. Hence the Canadian approach explicitly seeks to bring together the various government departments and agencies, higher education institutions and many aspects of the industrial base. The region has, however, equally been pursuing other low-carbon and zero-emissions technology options, particularly in terms of public transport, with experimental trials. In 2004, for example, Westport Innovations announced that it and a consortium of partners had secured a funding commitment (subject to contract completion) of more than C$5.8 million (US$4.3 million) from Sustainable Development Technology Canada to develop and demonstrate hydrogen technology in energy and transportation applications. The Vancouver-based project includes the proposed demonstration of up to five transit buses fuelled with a blend of hydrogen and compressed natural gas known as HCNG. According to the agency, the buses use a blend of 80 per cent CNG and 20 per cent hydrogen, obtained through the Integrated Waste Hydrogen Utilization Project (IWHUP). This results in the engine producing 40 per cent fewer nitrogen oxides, 20 per cent fewer hydrocarbons and 11 per cent fewer greenhouse gas emissions, compared with using CNG alone. The local transit company, TransLink, has run a range of different buses including blended bio-diesel, diesel-electric hybrids, hydrogen fuel cell, ultra-low sulphur diesel and pure CNG. In this respect, there has not been a narrow focus on the hydrogen fuel cell. In 2008 Vancouver also passed legislation to allow the use of low-speed electric vehicles on the roads, on a three-year trial basis, even though these vehicles may lack the full range of safety features found on standard cars. The pivotal company in the region as far as automotive fuel cells are concerned had long been Ballard. However, in 2007 Ballard agreed to sell its automotive fuel cell assets to Daimler and Ford in exchange for all of the 34.3 million Ballard shares held by the two vehicle manufacturers. These shares, valued at US$168 million, were then cancelled, leaving Ballard with US$95–105 million on the transaction. In news reports, John Sheridan, Ballard President and Chief Executive said: ‘This transaction will enable Ballard to concentrate on growth in fuel cell applications which provide clean energy solutions in commercial markets. It also lowers Ballard’s risk profile by addressing the realities of the high cost and long timeline for automotive fuel cell commercialisation’ (In Tech, 2007). A new private company, Automotive Fuel Cell Cooperation, was set up at Ballard facilities while Daimler and Ford contributed US$60 million to the new company and Ballard also invested US$60 million, leaving the company 50.1 per cent Daimler, 30 per cent Ford and 19.9 per cent Ballard. Daimler’s history with Ballard goes back to the mid-1990s, when the first trial fuel cell buses were running. At that time, the company view
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was that the fuel cell had the best possibility of competing with the internal combustion engine (Panik, 1999). Indeed Daimler became a driving force behind the surge of interest in fuel cell vehicles. In other words, the risks and the long-term nature of the investments required to break into the automotive industry in the end became too onerous for Ballard alone, and the participation of major vehicle manufacturers was required. In turn, this suggests that the nascent fuel cell cluster around Vancouver is also vulnerable, which is hardly surprising given the lack of market penetration for fuel cell technologies and the more recent prioritization of pure electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids as being more likely to yield rapid reductions in CO2 and toxic emissions. Other locations continue to pour money into hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and infrastructures. For example, on 14 October 2008 the EU and European industry and research partners formally launched plans to make fuel cells and hydrogen one of Europe’s leading new strategic energy technologies. The European Commission, with 60 industrial partners and more than 60 research members, collectively created a public–private Joint Technology Initiative to invest together nearly €1 billion (US$1.46 billion) over six years in fuel cells and hydrogen research, technological development and demonstration. The Vancouver/British Columbia case suggests that pouring research money in alone is insufficient. Denmark Denmark offers a somewhat different prospect with a potential for windpower electric vehicles. Denmark does not have an indigenous vehicle manufacturer, and for many years has operated a punitive new vehicle taxation scheme to restrict car ownership and use. In 2008 the Danish (stateowned) energy company Dong Energy signed an agreement with PBP to establish an electric vehicle recharging infrastructure (of some 50 000 points) with the specific advantage of being able to store (on the vehicles recharging overnight) the unstable wind-generated electricity in a manner that allows the turbines to be used at maximum efficiency. The concept of using battery electric vehicles as energy reserves has been examined before (Kempton et al., 2001), though the wind-generation context is different (Jorgensen, 2008). So-called Vehicle-To-Grid (V2G) systems offer the potential for vehicle owners to sell back electricity to the providing utilities in periods of peak demand, and can actually offer a valuable peaksmoothing facility (Turton and Mourab, 2008; Guille and Grossa, 2009). It is not clear at this stage whether PBP proposes such re-sale of electricity back to the grid, a strategy which may involve regulatory and technical innovation (Pillai and Bak-Jensen, undated; Kempton and Tomić, 2005;
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Tomić and Kempton, 2007). Crucially then, the overall finding is that V2G can greatly improve the economics of the electric vehicle system, and thus help mitigate some of the higher initial purchase costs and battery renewal costs evident in electric vehicles. Interestingly, a study by Jacobson (2009) for the US case found that of all the potential energy source, fuel and vehicle technology options to reduce CO2 emissions, wind-generated electricity and battery electric vehicles came out as the best choice, and also offered the best option for reducing mortality from air pollution and for least impact on wildlife. In 2009 Dong Energy joined a group of investors backing a local company called Lithium Balance, a specialist in systems to enable the optimum interaction between electrical systems (including electric cars) and batteries. This sort of development is an interesting illustration of the sort of local economic advantages that may emerge around the fragmentation of the existing automotive industry. It is equally illustrative that although PBP partnered with Renault-Nissan to bring electric vehicles to Denmark, the Chinese company Build Your Dream chose the country to be the first European market for their electric vehicles from 2011 onwards (Proctor, 2009d). Build Your Dream cited the favourable tax regime for electric vehicles as being a key factor in its decision to start European sales in Denmark, though probably the lack of a locally dominant competitor had also guided the decision. Israel In the case of Israel the basis of a future sustainable automotive industry and automobility may well be solar-powered battery electric vehicles. In January 2008 it was announced by the Israeli government that it had entered an agreement with PBP to bring a fleet of electric vehicles to market. The infrastructure to support this fleet would be built by PBP. The initial stage was expected to cost US$200 million, which the firm has so far managed to raise. An additional US$800 million was required to be raised for further infrastructure and vehicles. The plan calls for the establishment of 500 000 recharging points and battery-swap stations for electric cars to be set up within 18 months. The Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, said at the time the plan was launched that it would reduce Israel’s oil imports by 50 per cent within just a few years. By building solar energy generation plants, the country could eventually stop importing oil altogether. According to calculations by PBP, if Israel’s two million cars were all electric, they would require 2000 MW of electricity a year. This electricity could be generated by a one-off investment of US$5 billion in solar plants. Moreover, because Israel is a compact country the average
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daily distance driven is small which, allied to the benign climatic conditions, reduces the energy demand on the batteries in electric vehicles. In mid-2008 Israel Corporation (a holding company with diverse interests including Quantum) announced plans to increase investments in PBP. To date, the concept of Solar-To-Vehicle (S2V) energy is relatively underdeveloped, though it has some potential in the right locations including California (Birnie, 2008) and of course Israel. The technology in terms of placing panels on cars is relatively undeveloped, notwithstanding the vehicles shown in the Solar Challenge (http://www.wsc.org.au/), and cumbersome (Letendre, undated). It is notable that the third-generation Toyota Prius launched in 2009 could be obtained with a roof-mounted solar panel. An optional Solar Pack for the new Toyota Prius T Spirit models provides independent cooling of the vehicle cabin when parked. The Solar Pack option in the UK cost £1450, including 15 per cent VAT, when launched in 2009. As a sign of increasing market preparedness, in mid-2009 Renault showed the Fluence EV based on the Megane car. The Fluence had been specifically configured for the PBP battery-swap system that will be branded ‘Quick Drop’ according to reports. The battery is located behind the rear seat with an opening beneath the boot for swift unloading/ reloading. At the same time, Renault showed two other versions of the Fluence EV’s battery recharging system. The first of these used a standard 220 volt/10 or 16 amp socket and would require six to eight hours to charge the battery pack fully at the user’s home. The second is intended to be a 400 volt industrial recharge unit with a three-phase, 32 amp socket, to be located in factories, offices or dedicated recharging stations, which would be capable of an 80 per cent charge in 30 minutes.
4.3
BRAZILIAN BIO-ETHANOL: AN EXAMPLE OF LOCAL POLICY DIVERSITY FOR INCREASED SUSTAINABILITY
One of the best-developed examples of local sustainability in terms of renewable fuels for vehicles is probably Brazil. The use of sugarcane ethanol as a fuel for cars in the country goes back several decades, and the original motivation for such usage was certainly not environmental. The case of Brazil also raises intriguing questions in the contemporary era, most notably as to whether the most recent developments in the sugarcane ethanol sector can be considered as a deepening of sustainability or a negation of it (Wells and Faro, 2009). As an example of local diversity, notwithstanding the remaining concerns over the use of ethanol
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in internal combustion engines or indeed the wider social and environmental costs of the car, Brazil is interesting because it shows just how much can be achieved when local need is matched to local capabilities (Nardon and Aten, 2008; Zapata and Nieuwenhuis, 2009). The case is presented in rather more detail than the others listed above; they too would merit similar treatment to elucidate in detail the complex interplay between technological innovation, social and political circumstance, environmental potential and business strategy. Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space available. In 1990 the future of the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol industry and its ‘alcool’ programme for pure ethanol-powered cars looked bleak. The policy initiated after the 1973 oil shock had initially been successful, and Brazil had led the world in alternative fuel production and use. But then a combination of falling oil prices and rising sugar prices created the conditions for a switch away from ethanol production and left motorists with pure ethanol-powered cars stranded. As a consequence, sales of ethanolpowered cars fell from 92 per cent of the total in 1985 to just 20 per cent in 1990. By the pre-crisis era of the mid-2000s the world had changed again. Oil prices were beyond US$100 per barrel and seemed unlikely to fall in the face of burgeoning global demand and seemingly unstoppable economic growth; concerns over global warming had underpinned the motivation for the creation of a huge domestic and export market for sugarcane ethanol; and, crucially, automotive technology had been created to allow ‘flexifuel’ vehicles able to run on either ethanol or petrol or a combination of the two. Flexifuel cars in 2008 constituted over 85 per cent of all new car sales in Brazil, meaning that consumers were no longer locked into a single source. One of the reasons for the continued success of the Brazilian ethanol industry is that there has been continuous improvement in production processes (Goldemberg et al., 2008). On an index basis, production costs per litre are half that of US corn ethanol and one-third that of ethanol produced in the EU. Moreover, it is intended to phase out the practice of crop burning in Sao Paulo State where 75 per cent of Brazilian cane sugar is produced (which is mainly used where manual harvesting is still adopted and one of the least environmentally friendly aspects of canederived ethanol) by 2017 at the latest and by 2014 for areas with mechanized production. The production of ethanol from cane is in any case more cost effective than, say, corn but it is also the case that in all stages of the process greater efficiencies have been achieved. According to UNICA (the Brazilian Union of Sugar Cane Industries) about 54 per cent of the 415 million metric tons of 2007/08 sugar cane production was turned into
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ethanol, yielding around 18.8 billion litres (see http://www.unica.com. br/). All phases of the production process are subject to innovation and change. Indeed this was one of the defining features of the sector in the early 1990s. The main process steps are: ●
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Washing. The cane must be clean before going into the process. Traditionally done with water, the cleaning process generated problematic liquid waste. Consumption has fallen from 21 000 litres of water per metric ton of cane, to less than 5000 litres. An innovation here is cleaning by air and agitation, which produces less waste. Fragmentation. Here the cane is chopped between blades to produce many small fragments. Crushing. Crushing involves squeezing the chopped cane between heavy rollers with teeth that squeeze out the cane liquid. This is an aggressive environment for machinery, and the rollers need to be re-machined every year. A new approach is to use a tunnel structure (120m × 2.5m × 2.5m), along which the chopped cane is moved with warm water. At the end of the tunnel, a smaller roller squeezes out the juice (called Garapa). This extracts more saccharose than normal crushing, but can introduce some impurities and enzymes into the liquid that make it unsuitable for sugar production. Fermentation. The liquid is fermented in special yeast for 24 to 36 hours. The yeast is kept live and returned to the process. New yeasts recently developed will sediment out from the liquid, thus avoiding the need to use a centrifugal action to separate the yeast from the liquid. Yeast used to be discarded; it is now re-used. Distillation. The final main process step is to distil the liquid to extract the alcohol. A by-product is vinhaça, 93 per cent water, 6 per cent organic matter, 1 per cent mineral salts, which constitutes 7 parts by volume for each 1 part of alcohol produced and is used as a liquid fertilizer.
The crushing process results in a solid waste called bagaçe. This material is used for co-generation of power for the plant to operate. The bagaçe is sent to a furnace where it produces vapour for the distillery and electric power. In fact not all the waste is used. The Minister responsible recently estimated that 14 400 MW of electricity could be generated from unused bagaçe. Another alternative under exploration is to use hydrolysis to turn the bagaçe into methane. Alongside the technical developments, the economic and political processes of constructing a growing industry and market have proceeded
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apace. Brazil has been assiduous in winning export markets in the EU (notably Sweden) and most importantly in Japan. Brazil has a target to double exports of ethanol in the next ten years. In 2005 the estimated world ethanol output (fuel and industrial) was: ● ● ● ● ●
Brazil 16.1 million k/l; USA 16.2 million k/l; China 3.8 million k/l; EU 2.2 million k/l; India 1.7 million k/l.
These countries constituted over 90 per cent of global production according to the Japan Institute for Energy Economics (see http://eneken.ieej. or.jp/en/). Advanced industrial nations like Japan, dependent upon imported petroleum and keen to reduce their national CO2 emissions, are beating a path towards Brazilian ethanol. Japan has a target to reduce fossil fuel dependency by 20 per cent by 2030. The country uses some 60 million k/l of petrol each year; by contrast in 2006 actual ethanol production was just 30 k/l. In July 2007 Japan and Brazil reached an agreement to expand output and exports of ethanol to Japan, with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation funding new ethanol plants, storage tanks, pipelines, port facilities and tankers to export the bio-fuel to Japan. Behind these inter-governmental initiatives, corporations have also taken steps. One such case is that of Mitsubishi Corporation, which in 2007 signed a 30-year contract for the supply of bio-ethanol with a subsidiary of Grupo Sao Martinho of Brazil, one of the world’s largest producers of sugarcane and ethanol. This one agreement would be large enough for 15 per cent of Japan’s ethanol needs each year. Similarly, both Mitsui and Itochu Corp. (both of Japan) signed separate deals with the Brazilian monopoly supplier Petrobras to import large quantities of ethanol back to Japan. Moreover Brazil has instigated a deliberate strategy to promote sugarcane ethanol as a global commodity product with endeavours to encourage production in other countries. One example is that of the Congo, where an agreement was reached in December 2007 to provide finance, expertise and technology in sugarcane and palm oil use for bio-fuels. Similar discussions are reportedly underway with South Africa and various countries with suitable tropical or sub-tropical climates. While this all looks very promising for Brazil, some caution is needed. At a global level recipient countries are already concerned at the relative paucity of supply both now and in the future: of the leading producers only
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Brazil has a decent prospect of export surpluses. Although some analysts fear over-supply, the emerging situation may result in over-demand at the global level. Secondly, Brazilian consumption is still growing. In 2009 a threshold was passed in Brazil in that more than 50 per cent of petrol consumption by cars had been substituted by ethanol. The trouble is that strong export and local demand will drive up prices to the detriment of consumers in Brazil. By 2020 Petrobras expects domestic demand to reach 29 million kl, and exports to reach 16.5 million kl (interview with UNICA representative, Sao Paulo, 13 December 2008). In anticipation, Petrobras has created an ethanol production subsidiary and also bought into more than 40 distilleries. Moreover, foreign ownership started to become significant in the Brazilian ethanol sector during the 2000s – with uncertain consequences. The spectre emerges of local production of cane-derived ethanol controlled by foreign multinationals and exported out of the country to markets where consumers will pay more. Brazilian government energy policy clearly has a delicate path to tread to make the most of what is widely regarded as one of the most sustainable fuel sources around today. Initially, the economic convulsions sweeping much of the world economy from 2007 appeared to have passed by Brazil as a whole and the sugarcane ethanol business in particular. There had been one or two high-profile casualties; most notably Novamerica and Santaelisa Vale – one of the largest companies and one that by 2008 was reportedly seeking to re-negotiate US$300 million debts (interview with UNICA representative, Sao Paulo, 13 December 2008). Oil prices did not fall below the critical US$40 per barrel that would have rendered sugarcane ethanol uncompetitive and domestic demand remained sufficiently robust to absorb the majority of output. A key problem, however, remains that of investment from 2009 onward. Investment in new capacity, updating technology and simple maintenance all have to go on while cash flow is reduced – financing that cash flow with working capital might be a bigger problem from 2009 compared with previous years due to the global financial crisis. The previous three years had been witness to a long boom in the sector, with over 200 new projects announced according to UNICA (interview with UNICA representative, Sao Paulo, 13 December 2008). Less than half actually started, but still these operations represent investments of US$33 billion through to 2012. The short-term danger is that capacity will expand faster than demand, and thus it is unsurprising that a brake has been put on investments. The interest of multiple parties in the future of Brazilian ethanol is being driven by the fundamentally sound future prospects for the sector – both in terms of demand and supply. Ethanol production in Brazil has a foundation demand in the domestic market, virtually assured by the total
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dominance achieved by flexible fuel vehicles in new car sales. The Brazilian Automotive Manufacturers’ Association estimates that by 2017 pure ethanol or flex-fuel vehicles could account for 80 per cent of the total fleet of 37 million cars in Brazil (and even the petrol sold in Brazil is a mix with 25 per cent ethanol; interview with senior representative from the Centre for Strategic Management and Studies, Brasilia, 8 December 2008). In addition Brazil is a vital test-bed for the use of ethanol in buses, with Scania running a trial fleet of converted diesel engine buses in 2009 under a programme part-funded by the European Union (BEST – BioEthanol for Sustainable Transport). Demand from outside Brazil is likely to remain more problematic, particularly as the global recession may have the consequence of reducing carbon emissions, and hence of the necessity for some key countries to import bio-ethanol as a means of reaching Kyoto targets by 2012. By mid-2009 Sweden consumed about 800 million litres of ethanol per annum, with half supplied by Brazil. Other important markets are also in the EU, Japan and the United States. From the supply side increased production is largely expected to derive from higher yields rather than turning new land over to sugarcane. Outturn ethanol production in Brazil in 2008 is estimated to have increased by 15 per cent to 19 per cent, reaching as much as 27.4 billion litres. Exports were estimated to rise more than 23 per cent, to 4.2 billion litres in 2008, but could reach 8.3 billion litres by 2017 according to the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI, 2008). This growth in exports is indicative of the possible transformation of the sector. Indeed, the sector stands on the threshold of a new era of professionalization characterized by: ● ●
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scientific agriculture bringing new varieties, novel crop management techniques and optimization of yields; mechanization of harvesting. In 2008 some 50 per cent of the total crop was mechanically harvested, a figure that should rise to 70 per cent by 2010. innovation in milling, fermentation and distillation technologies including power generation from the waste products; further innovation with second-generation cellulose-processing technology; higher-volume distilleries, up to 7 mtpa (crushing capacity); higher-volume distribution infrastructures including pipelines, export terminals and purpose-designed shipping; global integration via trading partners and agencies; venture capital and other investment vehicles bringing contemporary business management philosophies.
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In many respects, the size of the potential sugarcane ethanol industry is considerably greater than that shown in Brazil alone. There are well over 100 countries producing sugar and more or less able to enter the sugarcane ethanol business. In the medium term, FAPRI (2008) expects global production to grow from 61.84 billion litres in 2007 to reach 122.39 billion litres by 2017. Researchers at Imperial College, London have estimated that in favourable circumstances bio-ethanol of all types could replace up to 20 per cent of global demand for petrol by 2030, equivalent to some 566 Gl (Walter et al., 2008). Obviously this is a contested process and views differ on the extent of the potential – but companies that seize a share of the activity in Brazil are going to be well placed to capture these emergent opportunities also. Brazil has mounted a concerted and largely successful campaign to refute claims that sugarcane bio-ethanol has contributed to food price inflation, and indeed to present a strong case for the environmental credentials of the fuel. The country has about 330 million hectares of arable land, of which just 7.8 million hectares in 2008/09 will be given over to sugarcane production. Thus far, the country has been less successful in breaking the many trade restraints (e.g. tariffs imposed by the USA and Europe) or achieving technical standardization for bio-ethanol, but over time free international trade will be a pre-requisite for the widespread adoption of the fuel. The immediate competition is for control over the linear supply from the plantation onwards to the pumps supplying consumers. For many reasons, this is essentially an area of business open to influence from a wide range of potential parties including: ●
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existing sugarcane plantation owners, who also have distilleries. These are often relatively small-scale, single-plant operations but have the advantage of economies of scope and greater flexibility of operation than the bigger operations; sugar producers that want to expand into ethanol, including producers from outside Brazil; the emergent consolidators such as Cosan that are seeking economies of scale by purchasing smaller, less efficient businesses, and driving up per unit revenues by capturing more of the downstream operations (in April 2008 Cosan purchased Exxon’s assets in Brazil for US$826 million); traditional petroleum businesses that want to diversify their portfolios and leverage their expertise and assets in distribution and retailing. These include the investment of US$60 million by British Petroleum to create Tropical BioEnergia with joint venture partners
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Santaelisa Vale and Maeda Group, and the entry by the state monopoly petrochemical company Petrobras; equipment and production process consultancy companies, that in some cases can now offer a turnkey operation to those wishing to enter the sector for the first time; investment vehicles, banks, hedge funds and venture capitalists, often motivated by the twin aims of high returns and sustainability, and that act either as consolidators or bring into being new capacity; scientific agriculture companies from the bio-technology sector (such as the US group Amyris Biotech joint venture with Crystalsev to produce sugarcane diesel, and global leaders such as Monsanto), exploiting the fact that compared with other agricultural products sugarcane is relatively under-represented with such approaches; international trading houses such as Mitsui and Itochu, that have sought to secure long-term supply by entering into joint venture investments and other arrangements; international agri-business companies such as the American giants ADM and Cargill, that see sugarcane ethanol as having the potential to be a new world commodity; chemicals and plastics companies such as Solvey and Dow, that are just bringing onstream major new investments that will turn ethanol into plastic, mostly for sale at a premium to Japan, Europe and the USA. The automotive industry is a significant potential market for bio-plastics.
In mid-2008 there were some 387 distilleries in Brazil, and about 30 more are being added each year. The majority are single-distillery businesses. The former market leader, Cosan, has just 9 per cent of the total business while the top five suppliers control less than 20 per cent. In 2007 the co-operative group Copersucar became a limited liability company, and secured for itself the leading position in the sector – with aggressive expansion plans. Copersucar (in 2008) was responsible for 33 mills, accounting for 14 per cent of all the sugar and 14 per cent of all the ethanol sold in Brazil in 2008. The company also buys sugar and ethanol from independent producers, a business model of quasi-consolidation that is becoming more widespread in the sector. Some uncertainty remains in the minds of potential investors, not least because there may be new restrictions placed on foreign land ownership. In addition, international attention will ensure close scrutiny of new land brought into sugarcane production – already Sao Paulo State has
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introduced land zoning policies to restrict the expansion of land given over to the crop. Experts in the sector in Brazil, such as the renowned physicist Jose Goldemberg, are adamant that the entire global bio-ethanol sector cannot be regarded as offering a solution for automobility with zero carbon emissions, and that in any case Brazil alone cannot constitute a global supply base (Goldemberg, 2008). Brazil has already started to export some of its technology to other markets, most notably some in equatorial Africa; meanwhile China is steadily expanding its own sugarcane ethanol production capacity, and with diversity of supply the prospects for internationally traded ethanol are becoming much brighter. Other solutions, including the widespread adoption of hybrid cars and other fuel efficiency measures, will be vital. However, the sugarcane ethanol sector has the potential to make a substantial contribution over the medium term, which in turn will further enhance the prospects of the internal combustion engine remaining in use. In the longer term, the real commercial prize may be with ethanol as a materials feedstock to many sectors, not just the automotive industry.
4.4
CONCLUSIONS
Several countries or locations have been put forward in this chapter as offering potential examples of diversity with respect to the automotive industry, sustainability and policy. The list was by no means intended to be exhaustive, but should serve to illustrate that the fragmentation of the industry is likely to be a feature for some time. This is not to forecast unrelenting diversity any more than it is to refute the possibility of convergence. Rather, the conclusion to be drawn is that in the quest for sustainability, including the goal of economic benefits, then different places may arrive at different policy solutions and priorities. In turn, as was intimated in the case of Brazil, there may be widespread changes in industrial structure and business strategy as different interests compete for the emergent market opportunity. This idea is carried on into Chapter 5, which looks more explicitly at the question of designing radical business models that more adequately correspond with the requirements of the era of eco-austerity. Again the approach is not prescriptive. Rather, the intention is to illustrate some of the possibilities. Indeed it is to be anticipated that multiple innovations will occur with respect to business models, not least because of the need to be sensitive to the differences between localities.
5.
5.1
Alternative business models as the basis of a new industrial ecology of the automobile INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains why new business models are needed as the mechanism for the delivery of a sustainable automotive industry. As such, it will draw on a range of existing examples including Tata Nano, Project Better Place, Gordon Murray Design, the MDI Air Car and Riversimple to demonstrate the scope for different approaches to the manufacture and use of cars. It will further argue that innovative technologies may create the space within which alternative business models can prosper, while the crisis that has engulfed the mainstream industry may significantly reduce the ability to retain barriers to entry. The core idea here is that ‘technology’ as such is not the problem. The technologies that could underpin sustainable automobility and a sustainable automotive industry are there, or nearly so; the problem lies in finding an economic incentive and structure for businesses to benefit from these technologies. It is notable that a significant report on the adoption of electric vehicles in the USA highlighted that the twin business model innovations of switchable batteries and pay-per-mile contracts would be the key to the rapid expansion of the market share of these vehicles (Becker, 2009). The creation of alternative business models requires a degree of fit with prevailing cultures of automobility, but also in many cases changes to such cultures, probably resulting in a much-reduced reliance on the car. The first half of this chapter is primarily concerned with elaborating the meaning of alternative business models while the second half provides a range of automotive industry examples.
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ALTERNATIVE BUSINESS MODELS AND SUSTAINABILITY
The role of business models in the achievement of sustainability has been relatively neglected. This is something of a paradox, given that one of the three ‘legs’ of sustainability has traditionally been ‘economic’, by which we may include business. The focus of effort has been on the ‘greening of industry’ in a general sense in search of eco-efficiency and in the environmental improvement of functional operations in a more specific sense, with the development of sub-disciplines such as green marketing, green logistics, green accounting, and so on. Some research has shown that the lack of organizational sustainability (in business) may undermine technological sustainability (Hoverstadt and Bowling, 2005) or, to put it another way, that technology alone cannot ensure sustainability. The key to understanding business models as discussed here is the viable and enduring creation and capture of added value (Stabell and Fjelstad, 1998; Adner and Zemsky, 2006) through differing configurations of the value system. The business model can be understood as applying to a single corporate entity, and is nested between the more nebulous idea of the business concept and the more specific operational articulation of the business plan. The business model therefore defines the operational norms and practices of the business in broad terms (Walters, 2004). It should describe how the firm adds value but also how the firm competes in capturing value against other firms (Voelpel et al., 2004) or how it articulates its core competence (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990). Following an early interest in the innovative business models in e-commerce and the Internet (Dubosson-Torbay et al., 2001), Osterwalder et al. (2005: 5) arrived at the following broad definition: A business model is a conceptual tool containing a set of objects, concepts and their relationships with the objective to express the business logic of a specific firm. Therefore we must consider which concepts and relationships allow a simplified description and representation of what value is provided to customers, how this is done and with which financial consequences.
Inevitably, the business model in a manufacturing sector is informed by (and equally is itself strongly influential on) issues such as choice of product or service offering, product technology (including materials), production technology, established market practice (including routes to market) and consumer expectations, legal, fiscal and regulatory issues, financial constraints, and many other related matters. Neither is the business model simply interchangeable with strategy – though clearly they are closely linked. The business model does not emerge in a vacuum but out
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of contingent possibilities, as was most obviously the case when a surge of innovative business models appeared seeking to exploit the specific commercial potential of the Internet (known widely as the dot com boom). As a result, in a mature sector such as the automotive industry there tends to be an overall convergence of the business model employed by all firms around a quasi-formulaic notion of ‘this is how we do business in this industry’. That is, often the overall business model becomes essentially implicit and unchallenged, except perhaps with respect to a specific aspect of the model that might be subject to innovation. This is, of course, precisely the territory described by Bower and Christensen (1995) in the concept of disruptive technology, a theme which is returned to below. The business model need not be entirely static, indeed a degree of change over time is endemic in most industry sectors, and in time a new orthodoxy may emerge that is evidentially different from that which preceded it. Despite this, there is also a strong case for arguing that a successful business model within a company may actually constrain the search for new, alternative models (Christensen, 1999; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002) and hence a business can become stranded with an outdated business model when circumstances change sufficiently. With respect to the automotive industry, such a transition could be argued to have occurred over the period from the 1990s as a result of the application of the ideas of lean production (Womak et al., 1990), leading to a new but ultimately modest revision of the prevailing business model. In the same way, it is not always straightforward analytically and empirically to define a new, revolutionary or radical business model. A business model might be ‘new’ to a certain sector of economic activity, or new to a certain place, or new in parts. At issue is the relative scale and pace of change