THE ADAPTED MIND
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THE ADAPTED MIND
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THE ADAPTED MIND Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture
Edited by
Jerome H. Barkow Leda Cosmides John Tooby
New York
Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Kuala Lumpur Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland Madrid and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan
Copyright © 1992 by Oxford University Press, Inc. First published in 1992 by Oxford University Press, Inc., 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 First issued as an Oxford University Press Paperback, 1995 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press, Inc. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture / edited by jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, john Tooby. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-506023-7 ISBN 0-19-510107-3 (PBK) 1. Genetic psychology. 2. Cognition and culture. 3. Behavior evolution. 4. Sociobiology. I. Barkow, jerome H. II. Cosmides, Leda. III. Tooby, john. BF711.A33 1992 155.7-dc20 91-25307
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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Jerome H. Barkow thanks his wife Irma and his children Philip and Sarah for their patience and support during the never-ending preparation of this volume. Much thanks, too, to the Dalhousie colleagues who listened to ideas and made suggestions, and to Dalhousie University's Research Development Fund which provided some financial support. This volume was prepared, in part, while Leda Cosmides and John Tooby were Fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California, and they are deeply indebted to the Center's staff for their many kindnesses. They are grateful for the Center's financial support during this period, as well as that provided by the Gordon P. Getty Trust, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, and NSF Grant BNS87-00864 to the Center. In addition, they would like to thank NSF Grant BNS85-11685 to Roger Shepard and NSF Grant BNS9l57-449 to John Tooby for research support. The research and thinking ofCosmides and Tooby about the convergence between evolutionary biology, psychology, and the social sciences have been shaped and sustained by many friends and colleagues. Outstanding among these have been Donald Brown, David Buss, Martin Daly, Irven DeVore, Paul Ekman, Gerd Gigerenzer, Steven Pinker, Paul Romer, Paul Rozin, Roger Shepard, Dan Sperber, John Staddon, Valerie Stone, Donald Symons, George Williams, and Margo Wilson. Cosmides and Tooby are particularly grateful for the institutional shelter as well as the intellectual comradeship provided by Irven DeVore of Harvard University and Roger Shepard of Stanford University. The final stages of editing were completed at the Zentrum fUr interdiszipliniiire Forschung (ZiP) of the University of Bielefeld, and Cosmides and Tooby would like to thank Peter Weingart and the ZiF for their support and assistance. The editors owe a special debt of gratitude to Joan Bossert of Oxford University Press, whose encouragement and enthusiasm for this project have been extraordinary. We also thank Louise Page, Melodie Wertelet, and Constance Devanthery-Lewis who, together with Joan, have unflaggingly attended to all aspects ofthe production ofthis book. Thanks also to Larry and Michelle Sugiyama for their invaluable assistance in the final hours of preparation. Finally, the editors would like to express their heartfelt gratitude to the contributors to the volume, who labored far above and beyond the call of duty. The unusual plan for this volume and its chapters, involving the attempt to integrate levels ofexplanation within a single structured format (one that began with selection pressures, then moved to mechanisms and to cultural output) placed a heavy burden on the contributors. Their willingness to work with the editors, often through an extended series of drafts, in order to accommodate this conceptual organization is deeply appreciated.
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Contents
Contributors
xi
Introduction: Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration
3
Leda Cosmides, john Tooby, and jerome H. Barkow
I. THE EVOLUTIONARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1.
The Psychological Foundations of Culture
19
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides
2.
On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior
137
Donald Symons
II. COOPERATION 3.
Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange
163
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby
4.
Two Nonhuman Primate Models for the Evolution of Human Food Sharing: Chimpanzees and Callitrichids
229
w. C. McGrew and Anna T. C. Feistner
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MATING AND SEX 5.
Mate Preference Mechanisms: Consequences for Partner Choice and Intrasexual Competition
249
David M. Buss
6.
The Evolution of Sexual Attraction: Evaluative Mechanisms in Women
267
Bruce j. Ellis
7.
The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Chattel Margo Wilson and Martin Daly
289
viii
IV.
CONTENTS
PARENTAL CARE AND CHILDREN 8.
Pregnancy Sickness as Adaptation: A Deterrent to Maternal Ingestion of Teratogens
327
Margie Profet
9.
Nurturance or Negligence: Maternal Psychology and Behavioral Preference Among Preterm Twins
367
janet Mann
10.
Human Maternal Vocalizations to Infants as Biologically Relevant Signals: An Evolutionary Perspective
391
Anne Fernald
11. The Social Nature of Play Fighting and Play Chasing: Mechanisms and Strategies Underlying Cooperation and Compromise
429
Michael j. Boulton and Peter K. Smith
V.
PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE AS ADAPTATIONS 12.
Natural Language and Natural Selection
451
Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom
13.
The Perceptual Organization of Colors: An Adaptation to Regularities of the Terrestrial World?
495
Roger N. Shepard
14.
Sex Differences in Spatial Abilities: Evolutionary Theory and Data
533
Irwin Silverman and Marion Eals
VI.
ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS 15.
Evolved Responses to Landscapes
555
Gordon H. Orians and judith H. Heerwagen
16.
Environmental Preference in a Knowledge-Seeking, Knowledge-Using Organism
581
Stephen Kaplan
VII.
INTRAPSYCHIC PROCESSES 17.
The Evolution of Psychodynamic Mechanisms Randolph M. Nesse and Alan T. Lloyd
601
ix
CONTENTS
VIII.
NEW THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CULTURAL PHENOMENA 18.
Beneath New Culture Is Old Psychology: Gossip and Social Stratification
627
Jerome H. Barkow
Author Index Subject Index
639 657
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CONTRIBUTORS
Jerome H. Barkow Department of Anthropology Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 1T2 Canada Paul Bloom Department of Psychology University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721 Michael J. Boulton Psychology Section School of Health and Community Studies Sheffield City Polytechnic Sheffield S10 2TN United Kingdom David M. Buss Department of Psychology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Leda Cosmides Department of Psychology University ofCalifomia Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Martin Daly Department of Psychology McMaster University Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4Kl Canada Marion Eals Department of Psychology York University North York, Ontario M3J 1P3 Canada
Bruce J. Ellis Department of Psychology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Anna T. C. Feistner Jersey Wildlife Preservation Trust Trinity, Jersey Channel Islands Anne Femald Department of Psychology Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 Judith H. Heerwagen Departments of Architecture and Psychosocial Nursing University of Washington Seattle, WA 98195 Stephen Kaplan Department of Psychology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Alan T. Lloyd Fox Run Hospital St. Clairsville, OH 43950 Janet Mann Department of Psychology Georgetown University Washington, DC 20057 W.C.McGrew Scottish Primate Research Group Department of Psychology University of Stirling Stirling FK9 4LA Scotland
xii
CONTRIBUTORS
Randolph M. Nesse Department of Psychiatry University of Michigan Medical Center Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Irwin Silverman Department of Psychology York University North York, Ontario M3J IP3 Canada
Gordon H. Orians Department of Zoology and Institute for Environmental Studies University of Washington Seattle, WA 98195
Peter K. Smith Department of Psychology University of Sheffield Sheffield S10 2TN United Kingdom
Steven Pinker Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139 Margie Profet Divison of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology University of California Berkeley, CA 94720 Roger N. Shepard Department of Psychology Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305
Donald Symons Department ofAnthropology University of California Santa Barbara, CA 93106
John Tooby Department of Anthropology University of California Santa Barbara, CA 93106 Margo Wilson Department of Psychology McMaster University Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4Kl Canada
THE ADAPTED MIND
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Introduction: Evolutionary Psychology and
Conceptual Integration LEDA COSMIDES, JOHN TOOBY, AND JEROME H. BARKOW
The Adapted Mind is an edited volume of original, commissioned papers centered on the complex, evolved psychological mechanisms that generate human behavior and culture. It has two goals: The first is to introduce the newly crystallizing field of evolutionary psychology to a wider scientific audience. Evolutionary psychology is simply psychology that is informed by the additional knowledge that evolutionary biology has to offer, in the expectation that understanding the process that designed the human mind will advance the discovery ofits architecture. It unites modem evolutionary biology with the cognitive revolution in a way that has the potential to draw together all ofthe disparate branches of psychology into a single organized system of knowledge. The chapters that follow, for example, span topics from perception, language, and reasoning to sex, pregnancy sickness, and play. The second goal ofthis volume is to clarify how this new field, by focusing on the evolved information-processing mechanisms that comprise the human mind, supplies the necessary connection between evolutionary biology and the complex, irreducible social and cultural phenomena studied by anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and historians. Culture is not causeless and disembodied. It is generated in rich and intricate ways by information-processing mechanisms situated in human minds. These mechanisms are, in tum, the elaborately sculpted product of the evolutionary process. Therefore, to understand the relationship between biology and culture one must first understand the architecture of our evolved psychology (Barkow, 1973, 1980a, 1989a; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). Past attempts to leapfrog the psychological-to apply evolutionary biology directly to human social life-have for this reason not always been successful. Evolutionary psychology constitutes the missing causal link needed to reconcile these often warring perspectives (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). With evolutionary psychology in place, cross-connecting biology to the social sciences, it is now possible to provide conceptually integrated analyses of specific questions: analyses that move step by step, integrating evolutionary biology with psychology, and psychology with social and cultural phenomena (Barkow, 1989a; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). Each chapter in this volume is a case study of the difficult task of integrating across these disciplinary boundaries. Although it has been said that the first expressions of new and better approaches often look worse than the latest and most elaborated expressions of older and more deficient ones, we think these chapters are
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EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
illuminating contributions to the human sciences that stand up well against prevailing approaches. Nevertheless, readers should bear in mind that none ofthese chapters are meant to be the last word "from biology" or "from psychology"; they are not intended to definitively settle issues. They are better thought of as "first words," intended to open new lines of investigation and to illustrate the potential inherent in this new outlook.
CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION IN THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES Conceptual integration-also known as vertical integration I-refers to the principle that the various disciplines within the behavioral and social sciences should make themselves mutually consistent, and consistent with what is known in the natural sciences as well (Barkow, I980b, 1982, I989a; Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). The natural sciences are already mutually consistent: the laws ofchemistry are compatible with the laws of physics, even though they are not reducible to them. Similarly, the theory of natural selection cannot, even in principle, be expressed solely in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry, yet it is compatible with those laws. A conceptually integrated theory is one framed so that it is compatible with data and theory from other relevant fields. Chemists do not propose theories that violate the elementary physics principle ofthe conservation ofenergy: Instead, they use the principle to make sound inferences about chemical processes. A compatibility principle is so taken for granted in the natural sciences that it is rarely articulated, although generally applied; the natural sciences are understood to be continuous. Such is not the case in the behavioral and social sciences. Evolutionary biology, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, sociology, history, and economics largely live in inglorious isolation from one another: Unlike the natural sciences, training in one of these fields does not regularly entail a shared understanding ofthe fundamentals of the others. In these fields, paying attention to conceptual integration and multidisciplinary compatibility, while not entirely unknown, is unusual (Campbell, 1975; Hinde, 1987; Symons, 1979). As a result, one finds evolutionary biologists positing cognitive processes that could not possibly solve the adaptive problem under consideration, psychologists proposing psychological mechanisms that could never have evolved, and anthropologists making implicit assumptions about the human mind that are known to be false. The behavioral and social sciences borrowed the idea of hypothesis testing and quantitative methodology from the natural sciences, but unfortunately not the idea of conceptual integration (Barkow, I989a; Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). Yet to propose a psychological concept that is incompatible with evolutionary biology is as problematic as proposing a chemical reaction that violates the laws of physics. A social science theory that is incompatible with known psychology is as dubious as a neurophysiological theory that requires an impossible biochemistry. Nevertheless, theories in the behavioral and social sciences are rarely evaluated on the grounds ofconceptual integration and multidisciplinary, multilevel compatibility. With The Adapted Mind, we hope to provide a preliminary sketch of what a con-
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
5
ceptually integrated approach to the behavioral and social sciences might look like. Contributors were asked to link evolutionary biology to psychology and psychology to culture-a process that naturally entails consistency across fields. The central premise of The Adapted Mind is that there is a universal human nature, but that this universality exists primarily at the level of evolved psychological mechanisms, not of expressed cultural behaviors. On this view, cultural variability is not a challenge to claims of universality, but rather data that can give one insight into the structure ofthe psychological mechanisms that helped generate it. A second premise is that these evolved psychological mechanisms are adaptations, constructed by natural selection over evolutionary time. A third assumption made by most ofthe contributors is that the evolved structure of the human mind is adapted to the way oflife of Pleistocene hunter-gatherers, and not necessarily to our modem circumstances. What we think of as all of human history-from, say, the rise of the Shang, Minoan, Egyptian, Indian, and Sumerian civilizations-and everything we take for granted as normal parts of life-agriculture, pastoralism, governments, police, sanitation, medical care, education, armies, transportation, and so on-are all the novel products ofthe last few thousand years. In contrast to this, our ancestors spent the last two million years as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers, and, ofcourse, several hundred million years before that as one kind offorager or another. These relative spans are important because they establish which set of environments and conditions defined the adaptive problems the mind was shaped to cope with: Pleistocene conditions, rather than modern conditions. This conclusion stems from the fact that the evolution of complex design is a slow process when contrasted with historical time. Complex, functionally integrated designs like the vertebrate eye are built up slowly, change by change, subject to the constraint that each new design feature must solve a problem that affects reproduction better than the previous design. The few thousand years since the scattered appearance ofagriculture is only a small stretch in evolutionary terms, less than 1% of the two million years our ancestors spent as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. For this reason, it is unlikely that new complex designs-ones requiring the coordinated assembly ofmany novel, functionally integrated features-could evolve in so few generations (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b). Therefore, it is improbable that our species evolved complex adaptations even to agriculture, let alone to postindustrial society. Moreover, the available evidence strongly supports this view ofa single, universal panhuman design, stemming from our long-enduring existence as hunter-gatherers. If selection had constructed complex new adaptations rapidly over historical time, then populations that have been agricultural for several thousand years would differ sharply in their evolved architecture from populations that until recently practiced hunting and gathering. They do not (Barkow, 1980a, 1989a, 1990). Accordingly, the most reasonable default assumption is that the interesting, complex functional design features ofthe human mind evolved in response to the demands of a hunting and gathering way of life. Specifically, this means that in relating the design of mechanisms of the mind to the task demands posed by the world, "the world" means the Pleistocene world of hunter-gatherers. That is, in considering issues of functionality, behavioral scientists need to be familiar with how foraging people lived. We cannot rely on intuitions honed by our everyday experiences in the modern world. Finally, it is important to recognize that behavior generated by mechanisms that are adaptations to an ancient way of life will not necessarily be adaptive in the
6
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
modem world. Thus, our concern in this volume is with adaptations-mechanisms that evolved by natural selection-and not with modem day adaptiveness (Symons, this volume; see also Barkow, 1989a, 1989b). Aside from the two opening, orienting chapters and the concluding one, each chapter of The Adapted Mind focuses on an adaptive problem that our hunter-gatherer ancestors would have faced: a problem that affected reproduction, however distally, such as finding mates, parenting, choosing an appropriate habitat, cooperating, communicating, foraging, or recovering information through vision. We asked each contributor to consider three questions: (I) What selection pressures are most relevant to understanding the adaptive problem under consideration?; (2) What psychological mechanisms have evolved to solve that adaptive problem?; and (3) What is the relationship between the structure ofthese psychological mechanisms and human culture? We chose these three questions because there are interesting causal relationships between selection pressures and psychological mechanisms on the one hand, and between psychological mechanisms and cultural forms on the other. There is now a rich literature in evolutionary biology and paleoanthropology that allows one to develop useful models of selection pressures, and there have been for many decades in anthropology, sociology and other social sciences rich descriptions ofsocial and cultural phenomena. Using the above three questions, The AdaptedMind is intended to supply the missing middle: the psychological mechanisms that come between theories ofselection pressures on the one hand and fully realized sociocultural behavior on the other. By concentrating on evolved mechanisms, this collection represents a departure from both traditional anthropology and various evolutionarily inspired theories of culture and behavior. Although both of these fields recognize that culture and cultural change depend critically upon the transmission and generation of information, they have frequently ignored what should be the causal core oftheir field: the study of the evolved information-processing mechanisms that allow humans to absorb, generate, modify, and transmit culture-the psychological mechanisms that take cultural information as input and generate behavior as output (Barkow, 1978, 1989a; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). Our goal in this collection is to focus on these mechanisms in order to see where a more precise understanding oftheir structure will lead. Because an evolutionary perspective suggests that there will be a close functional mesh between adaptive problems and the design features of the mechanisms that evolved to solve them, each chapter of The AdaptedMind focuses on an adaptive problem, and each discusses what kind ofpsychological mechanisms one might expect natural selection to have produced to solve that problem. Evidence from the literatures of psychology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology was brought to bear on these hypotheses whenever possible. Many of the authors also addressed a few ofthe implications that the psychological mechanisms they studied might have for culture. The relationship between psychology and culture can be complex, and in some cases the psychological mechanisms are not yet sufficiently well-understood to make any meaningful statement. Nevertheless, in the interests of conceptual integration, the contributors to The Adapted Mind have tried, insofar as it has been possible, to bring data from cross-cultural studies to bear on their psychological hypotheses, to point out when the psychological mechanisms discussed can be expected to cause variation or uniformity in practices, preferences, or modes of reasoning across cultures, or to discuss what implications the psychological mechanisms concerned might have for various theories of cultural change.
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
7
BASIC CONCEPTS IN EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY
The organization of The Adapted Mind is unusual: Few works in psychology or the social sciences are organized around adaptive problems. The decision to do so was theoretically motivated. The first two chapters, "The Psychological Foundations of Culture," by Tooby and Cosmides, and "On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior," by Symons, as well as the last chapter, "Beneath New Culture Is Old Psychology," by Barkow, present the theoretical program that animates this volume (see also Barkow, 1989a, 1990; Brown, 1991; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Sperber, 1985; Symons, 1979; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989, 1990b). But because this volume is aimed at a broad social science audience, each discipline of which is familiar with different concepts and terms, it may prove helpful to begin with a brieforientation to what the contributors to this volume mean when they use terms such as mind, selection, adaptive problem, and evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology is psychology informed by the fact that the inherited architecture ofthe human mind is the product of the evolutionary process. It is a conceptually integrated approach in which theories ofselection pressures are used to generate hypotheses about the design features of the human mind, and in which our knowledge of psychological and behavioral phenomena can be organized and augmented by placing them in their functional context. Evolutionary psychologists expect to find a functional mesh between adaptive problems and the structure of the mechanisms that evolved to solve them. Moreover, every psychological theory-even the most doctrinairely "anti-nativist"-carries with it implicit or explicit evolutionary hypotheses. By making these hypotheses explicit, one can evaluate whether psychological theories are consistent with evolutionary biology and paleoanthropology and, if not, investigate which field needs to make changes. There are various languages within psychology for describing the structure ofa psychological mechanism, and many evolutionary psychologists take advantage of the new descriptive precision made possible by cognitive science. Any system that processes information can be described in at least two different, mutually compatible and complementary ways. If asked to describe the behavior of a computer, for example, one could characterize the ways in which its physical components interact-how electrons flow through circuits on chips. Alternatively, one could characterize the programs that the system runs-what kind of information the computer takes as input, what rules or algorithms it uses to transform that information, what kinds of data structures (representations) those rules operate on, what kinds of output it generates. Naturally, programs run by virtue of the physical machine in which they are embodied, but an information-processing description neither reduces to nor can replace a physical description, and vice versa. Consider the text-editing program "Wordstar." Even though it can run on a variety of different hardware architectures, it always has the same functional design-the same key strokes will delete a line, move a block of text, or print out your file. It processes information in the same way no matter what kind of hardware it is running on. Without an information-processing description of Wordstar, you Will not know how to use it or what it does, even if you are intimately acquainted with the hardware in which it is embodied. A physical description cannot tell one what the computer was designed to do; an information-processing description cannot tell one the physical processes by virtue of which the programs are run.
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EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
In psychology, it has become common to describe a brain as a system that processes information-a computer made out of organic compounds rather than silicon chips. The brain takes sensorily derived information from the environment as input, performs complex transformations on that information, and produces either data structures (representations) or behavior as output. Consequently, it, too, can be described in two mutually compatible and complementary ways. A neuroscience description characterizes the ways in which its physical components interact; a cognitive, or information-processing, description characterizes the "programs" that govern its operation. In cognitive psychology, the term mind is used to refer to an information-processing description of the functioning of the brain, and not in any colloquial sense. Behavioral descriptions can be illuminating, but manifest behavior is so variable that descriptions that capture and explain this variability inevitably require an explication of the psychological mechanisms and environmental conditions that generate it (see Symons, this volume). An account of the evolution of the mind is an account of how and why the information-processing organization of the nervous system came to have the functional properties that it does. Information-processing language-the language of cognitive psychology-is simply a way of getting specific about what, exactly, a psychological mechanism does. In this volume, most psychological mechanisms are described in information-processing terms, either explicity or implicity. Research in some areas of psychology is so new that it is too early to develop hypotheses about the exact nature ofthe rules and representations involved. Nevertheless, the contributors have focused on the kinds of questions that will allow such hypotheses to be developed, questions such as: What kinds of information are available in the environment for a psychological mechanism designed for habitat selection, or mate selection, or parenting to use? Is there evidence that this information is used? If so, how is it evaluated? What kinds ofaffective reactions does it generate? How do people reason about this information? What information do they find memorable? What kinds of information are easy to learn? What kinds of decision rules guide human behavior? What kinds ofcross-cultural patterns will these mechanisms produce? What kinds of information will they cause to be socially transmitted? One doesn't have to look far to find minds that are profoundly different from our own: The information-processing mechanisms that collectively comprise the human mind differ in many ways from those that comprise the mind of an alligator or a bee or a sparrow or a wolf. The minds of these different species have different design features: different perceptual processes, different ways ofcategorizing the world, different preferences, different rules of inference, different memory systems, different learning mechanisms, and so on. These differences in psychological design cause differences in behavior: Upon perceiving a rattlesnake, a coyote might run from it, but another rattlesnake might try to mate with it. Darwin provided a naturalistic explanation for the design features of organisms, including the properties of the minds of animals, not excepting humans. He wanted to explain how complex functional design could emerge in species spontaneously, without the intervention of an intelligent artificer, such as a divine creator. Darwin's explanation-natural selection-provides an elegant causal account of the relationship between adaptive problems and the design features of organisms. An adaptive problem is a problem whose solution can affect reproduction, however distally. Avoiding predation, choosing nutritious foods, finding a mate, and communicating with
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
9
others are examples of adaptive problems that our hominid ancestors would have faced. The logic of his argument seems inescapable. Imagine that a new design feature arises in one or a few members of a species, entirely by chance mutation. It could be anything-a more sensitive retina, a new digestive enzyme, a new learning mechanism. Let's say that this new design feature solves an adaptive problem better than designs that already exist in that species: The more sensitive retina allows one to see predators faster, the new digestive enzyme allows one to extract more nutrients from one's food, the new learning mechanism allows one to find food more efficiently. By so doing, the new design feature causes individuals who have it to produce more offspring, on average, than individuals who have alternative designs. If offspring can inherit the new design feature from their parents, then it will increase in frequency in the population. Individuals who have the new design will tend to have more offspring than those who lack it, those of their offspring who inherit the new design will have more offspring, and so on, until, after enough generations, every member ofthe species will have the new design feature. Eventually, the more sensitive retina, the betterdigestive enzyme, the more reliable learning mechanism will become universal in that species, typically found in every member of it. Darwin called this process natural selection. The organism's interaction with the environment-with "nature"-sets up a feedback process whereby nature "selects" one design over another, depending on how well it solves an adaptive problem (a problem that affects reproduction). Natural selection can generate complex designs that are functionally organizedorganized so that they can solve an adaptive problem-because the criterion for the selection of each design feature is functional: A design feature will spread only if it solves an adaptive problem better than existing alternatives. Over time, this causal feedback process can create designs that solve adaptive problems well-designs that "fit" the environment in which the species evolved. Random processes, such as mutation and drift, cannot, by themselves, produce complex designs that are functionally organized because the probability that all the right design features will come together simply by chance is vanishingly small. By definition, random processes contain no mechanism for choosing one design over another based on its functionality. Evolution by natural selection is the only presently validated explanation for the accumulation of functional design features across generations. The emerging field ofevolutionary psychology attempts to take advantage of Darwin's crucial insight that there should be a functional mesh between the design features of organisms and the adaptive problems that they had to solve in the enviroment in which they evolved. By understanding the selection pressures that our hominid ancestors faced-by understanding what kind ofadaptive problems they had to solve-one should be able to gain some insight into the design of the information-processing mechanisms that evolved to solve these problems. In doing so, one can begin to understand the processes that underlie cultural phenomena as well.
COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES TO FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS The most common approach that evolutionarily oriented behavioral scientists have taken is to start with a known phenotypic phenomenon, such as pregnancy sickness,
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EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION
language, or color vision, and to try to understand what its adaptive function waswhy that design was selected for rather than alternative ones. To do this, one must show that it is well designed for solving a specific adaptive problem, and that it is not more parsimoniously explained as a by-product ofa design that evolved to solve some other adaptive problem (Williams, 1966; Symons, this volume). This is a difficult enterprise, but a necessary one: Until one understands a mechanism's adaptive function, one does not have a fully satisfying, conceptually integrated account of why it exists and what it does. More critically, asking functional questions and placing the phenomenon in a functional context often prompts important new insights about its organization, opening up new lines of investigation and bringing to light previously unobserved aspects and dimensions of the phenomenon. A number of contributions to The Adapted Mind take this approach (e.g., Boulton & Smith, Nesse & Lloyd, Profet, Pinker & Bloom, and Shepard). Going from a known psychological phenomenon to a theory of adaptive function is the most common form ofconceptual integration between evolutionary biology and psychology. With equal validity, however, one can take the analysis in the opposite direction as well (see Figure 1.1). One can use theories ofadaptive function to help one discover psychological mechanisms that were previously unknown. When one is trying to discover the structure of an information-processing system as complex as the human brain, knowing what its components were "designed" to do is like being given an aerial map ofa territory one is about to explore by foot. Ifone knows what adaptive functions the human mind was designed to accomplish, one can make many educated guesses about what design features it should have, and can then design experiments to test for them. This can allow one to discover new, previously unsuspected, psychological mechanisms. Adaptive Problem
theories of adaptive function
hypotheses about the deSign of psychol0$icaI mechamsms
Psychological Mechanism Figure 1.1 The consideration of adaptive function can inform research into human behavior and psychological architecture in a variety of ways. The two most direct paths are schematized here. First, knowledge of the adaptive problems and ancestral conditions that human hunter-gatherers faced can lead to new hypotheses about the design of psychological mechanisms that evolved to solve them. Such heuristic analyses can supply crucial guidance in the design of experiments to discover previously unknown psychological mechanisms-investigations that researchers who neglect functional analysis would not have thought to conduct. Secondly, researchers can start with a known psychological phenomenon, and begin to investigate its adaptive function, if any, by placing it in the context of hunter-gatherer life and known selection pressures. The discovery of the functional significance of a psychological phenomenon is not only worthwhile in its own right, but clarifies the organization of the phenomenon, and prompts the discovery of new associated phenomena.
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Empirically minded researchers, distrustful of"theory" (by which they often mean facts or principles drawn from unfamiliar fields), frequently ask why they should bother thinking about evolutionary biology: Why not just investigate the mind and behavior, and simply report what is found? The answer is that understanding function makes an important and sometimes pivotal contribution to understanding design in systems that are otherwise bewildering in their complexity. This point is illustrated by a story from the engineering community about the utility of knowing something's function. Reportedly, at a conference, an engineering professor carried a relatively simple circuit around to the various participants, asking them each to guess what its function was. Despite many guesses, none ofthe assembled engineers was able to figure it out. Finally, on the last day of the conference, the professor went up to the podium and asked the audience members to sketch the design of a circuit that would be able to perform a function that he then named. Everyone was able to do this rapidly, and when they were finished they were surprised to see that they had just drawn a picture ofthe same circuit that he had been showing them, the circuit whose function they had been unable to guess. 2 Behavioral scientists have been nearly defeated by the complexity of the behavior they confront. Guidance as to function vastly simplifies the problem of organizing the data in a way that illuminates the structure of the mind. Our hominid ancestors had to be able to solve a large number ofcomplex adaptive problems, and do so with special efficiency. By combining data from paleontology and hunter-gatherer studies with principles drawn from evolutionary biology, one can develop a task analysis that defines the nature of the adaptive information-processing problem to be solved. David Marr (1982) called this kind of task analysis a computational theory. Once one understands the nature ofthe problem, one can then generate very specific, empirically testable hypotheses about the structure of the informationprocessing mechanisms that evolved to solve it. A number of contributors to The Adapted Mind adopted this research strategy (e.g., Buss, Cosmides & Tooby, Mann, Silverman & Eals). One virtue of this approach is that it is immune to the usual (but often vacuous) accusation of post hoc storytelling: The researcher has predicted in advance the properties of the mechanism. Using an eVOlutionarily derived task analysis to generate hypotheses about the structure of our cognitive processes can lead one to look for mechanisms that would otherwise have been overlooked. Silverman and Eals's chapter on spatial cognition is a good example. Research on spatial cognition has been proceeding for 1()() years without the benefit of an evolutionary perspective, and the only kinds of mechanisms discovered were ones that produced a male performance advantage. But by asking what kind ofspatial cognition a Pleistocene woman would have needed to be good at solving the adaptive problem offoraging for plant foods, Silverman and Eals were able to discover a new class of mechanisms involved in spatial cognition, which produce a 60% female advantage. Psychologists should be interested in evolutionary biology for the same reason that hikers should be interested in an aerial map of an unfamiliar territory that they plan to explore on foot. Ifthey look at the map, they are much less likely to lose their way.
THE HARVEST OF CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION Conceptual integration has been such a powerful force in the natural sciences not only because it allows scientists to winnow out improbable hypotheses or build aesthetically
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pleasing bridges between disciplines, but because it has been crucial to the discovery of new knowledge. For example, the atomic theory allowed chemists to see thermodynamics in a new way: The atomic theory was connected to Newtonian mechanics through the kinetic theory of heat, and thermodynamics was recast as statistical mechanics. When quantum theory was subsequently developed in physics, statistical mechanics was modified in such a way that it could explain not only the thermal and mechanical properties of matter, but its magnetic and electrical properties as well (Holton, 1973). The emergence ofMendelian genetics at the tum ofthe century solved a major puzzle in Darwinian theory. By showing that pre-Mendelian theories ofblending inheritance were false-i.e., that tall and short plants need not produce medium offspring, that red and white flowers need not produce pink flowers, and so on-Mendelian genetics showed that natural selection could, in fact, create new species, a proposition that theories of blending inheritance had called into question. Subsequently, the combination of Mendelian genetics, Darwinian theory, and newly developed approaches to statistics led to the Modem Synthesis, which in tum made possible a family of new sciences, from population genetics to behavioral ecology. Conceptual integration generates this powerful growth in knowledge because it allows investigators to use knowledge developed in other disciplines to solve problems in their own. The causal links between fields create anchor points that allow one to bridge theoretical or methodological gaps that one's own field may not be able to span. This can happen in the behavioral and social sciences, just as it has happened in the natural sciences. Evidence about cultural variation can help cognitive scientists decide between competing models of universal cognitive processes; evidence about the structure ofmemory and attention can help cultural anthropologists understand why some myths and ideas spread quickly and easily while others do not (e.g., Mandler et aI., 1980; Sperber, 1985, 1990); evidence from evolutionary biology can help social psychologists generate new hypotheses about the design features of the information-processing mechanisms that govern social behavior; evidence about cognitive adaptations can tell evolutionary biologists something about the selection pressures that were present during hominid evolution; evidence from paleoanthropology and hunter-gatherer studies can tell developmental psychologists what kind of environment our developmental mechanisms were designed to operate in; and so on. At present, crossing such boundaries is often met with xenophobia, packaged in the form ofsuch familiar accusations as "intellectual imperialism" or "reductionism." But by calling for conceptual integration in the behavioral and social sciences we are neither calling for reductionism nor for the conquest and assimilation of one field by another. Theories of selection pressures are not theories of psychology; they are theories about some of the causal forces that produced our psychology. And theories of psychology are not theories of culture; they are theories about some of the causal mechanisms that shape cultural forms (Barkow, 1973, 1978, I989a; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Sperber, 1985, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989, this volume). In fact, not only do the principles of one field not reduce to those of another, but by tracing the relationships between fields, additional principles often appear. Instead, conceptual integration simply involves learning to accept with grace the irreplaceable intellectual gifts offered by other fields. To do this, one must accept the tenet of mutual consistency amortg disciplines, with its allied recognition that there are causal links between them. Compatibility is a misleadingly modest requirement, however, for it is an absolute one. Consequently, accepting these gifts is not always
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easy, because other fields may indeed bring the unwelcome news that favored theories have problems that require reformulation. Inattention to the compatibility requirement has led to many conceptual wrong turns in the social sciences (Barkow, 1989a; Tooby & Cosmides, this volume) as well as in evolutionary biology (Symons, this volume; Tooby & Cosmides I990b). But fortunately errors can be avoided in the future by scrutinizing hypotheses in each field in the light of what is known in other fields. Investigators planning to apply such an approach will need to develop simultaneous expertise in at least two "adjacent" fields. Toward this end we hope that training in the behavioral and social sciences will move away from its present fragmented and insular form and that students will be actively encouraged to gain a basic familiarity with relevant findings in allied disciplines. In the final analysis, it is not unaided empiricism that has made the natural sciences so powerful, but empiricism wedded to the power of inference. Every field has holes and gaps. But when there are causal links that join fields, the holes that exist in one discipline can sometimes be filled by knowledge developed in another. What the natural sciences have discovered is that this is a process with positive feedback: The more that is known-the more that can be simultaneously brought to bear on a questionthe more that can be deduced, explained, and even observed. Ifwe, as behavioral and social scientists, change our customs and accept what mutual enrichment we can offer one another, we can be illuminated by the same engine ofdiscovery that has made the natural sciences such a signal human achievement.
NOTES I. The idea that two statements cannot contradict each other and both be true was old when Aristotle formalized it, and it is only a small step from that to the commonplace idea that claims from different scientific disciplines should not contradict each other either, without at least one ofthem being suspected ofbeing in error. Such a notion would seem too obvious to discuss were it not for the bold claims of autonomy made for the social sciences, accompanied by the institutionalized neglect of neighboring disciplines (Barkow, 1989c). It is, perhaps, one ofthe astonishing features of intellectual life in our century that cross-disciplinary consistency should be treated asa radical claim in need of defense, rather than asa routine tool of inference (Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). In any case, the central idea is simply one of consistency or compatibility across sciences, and conceptual integration and vertical integration are simply different names for this principle. The adjective vertical in vertical integration (Barkow, 1980b, 1982, 1989a) emphasizes, alongside the notion of mutual compatibility, the notion that certain disciplines exist in a structured relationship with each other, such as physics to chemistry, and chemistry to biology. Each field "lower" in such a structure deals with principles thatgovem more inclusive sets ofphenomena. For example, the laws of physics apply to chemical phenomena, and the principles ofphysics and chemistry apply to biological phenomena, but not the reverse. By the same token, however, each field "higher" up in the structure requires additional principles special to its more restricted domain (e.g., living things, humans) that are not easily reduced to the principles found in the other fields (e.g., natural selection is not derivable from chemistry). We will generally use the term "conceptual integration" to avoid the connotation that vertical relationships between disciplines imply some epistemological or status hierarchy among sciences. For example, Lord Kelvin's criticism of Darwinism was based on Kelvin's erroneous calculation ofthe age ofthe earth. This case demonstrates that when physics and biology conflict, it is certainly possible that physics is in error. Moreover, the array of modern disciplines (from
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geochemistry to astrophysics to paleodemography to neuropharmacology) makes heterarchical relationships often seem more natural than any vertical ordering. Sciences should learn from and strive for consistency with every other field, from those existing in a clearly vertical relationship, such as chemistry is to physics, to those standing in more complex relationships, such as paleontology to psychology. 2. Our thanks to Jim Stellar for passing on to us this parable about the usefulness offunctional approaches.
REFERENCES Barkow, J. H. (1973). Darwinian psychological anthropology: A biosocial approach. Current Anthropology, 14(4),373-388. Barkow, J. H. (1978). Culture and sociobiology. American Anthropologist, 80( I), 5-20. Barkow, J. H. (1980a). Biological evolution of culturally patterned behavior. In J. S. Lockard (Ed.), The evolution ofhuman social behavior, (pp. 227-296). New York: Elsevier. Barkow, J. H. (l980b). Sociobiology: Is this the new theory of human nature? In A. Montagu (Ed.), Sociobiology examined, (pp. 171-192). New York and London: Oxford University Press. Barkow, J. H. (1982). Begged questions in behavior and evolution. In G. Davey (Ed.), Animal
models of human behavior: Conceptual, evolutionary, and neurological perspectives. Chichester: John Wiley & Son. Barkow, J. H. (1989a). Darwin, sex, and status: Biological approaches to mind and culture. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Barkow, J. H. (1989b). The elastic between genes and culture. Ethology and Sociobiology, 10, 111-129. Barkow, J. H. (I 989c). Broad training for social scientists [Letter to the editor}. Science, 243(4894):992. Barkow, J. H. (1990). Beyond the DPIDSS controvery. Ethology andSociobiology, 11, 341-351. Brown, D. E. (1991). Human universals. New York: McGraw-Hili. Campbell, D. T. (1975). On the conflicts between biological and social evolution and between psychology and moral tradition. American Psychologist. 30, 1103-1126, Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1987). From evolution to behavior: Evolutionary psychology as the missing link. In J. Dupre (Ed.), The latest on the best: Essays on evolution and optimality, (pp. 227-306). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988). Homicide. New York: Aldine. Hinde, R. A. (1987). Individuals, relationships, and culture: Links between ethology and the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Holton, G. (1973). Introduction to concepts and theories in physical science (2nd ed.). (Revised by S. G. Brush.) Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Mandler, J. M., Scribner, S., Cole, M., & DeForest, M. (1980). Cross-cultural invariance in story recall. Child Development, 51, 19-26. Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processingofvisual information. San Francisco: Freeman. Sperber, D. (1985). Anthropology and psychology: Towards an epidemiology ofrepresentations.
Man (N.S.), 20, 73-89. Sperber, D. (1990). The epidemiology of beliefs. In C. Fraser & G. Geskell (Eds.), Psychological studies ofwidespread beliefs. New York: Oxford University Press. Symons, D. (1979). The evolution ofhuman sexuality. New York: Oxford University Press. Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1989). Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, part I. Theoretical considerations. Ethology & Sociobiology, 10, 29-49.
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Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (l990a). On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: The role of genetics and adaptation. Journal ofPersonality. 58. 17-67. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1990b). The past explains the present: Emotional adaptations and the structure of ancestral environments. Ethology and Sociobiology, 11. 375-424. Williams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and natural selection: A critique ofsome current evolutionary thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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I THE EVOLUTIONARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
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1 The Psychological Foundations of Culture JOHN TOOBY AND LEDA COSMIDES
INTRODUCTION: THE UNITY OF SCIENCE One of the strengths of scientific inquiry is that it can progress with any mixture ofempiricism, intuition, and formal theory that suits the convenience ofthe investigator. Many sciences develop for a time as exercises in description and empirical generalization. Only later do they acquire reasoned connections within themselves and with other branches ofknow1edge. Many things were scientificaIly known ofhuman anatomy and the motions ofthe planets before they were scientifically explained. -GEORGE WILLIAMS,
Adaptation and Natural Selection
Disciplines such as astronomy, chemistry, physics, geology, and biology have developed a robust combination of logical coherence, causal description, explanatory power, and testability, and have become examples of how reliable and deeply satisfying human knowledge can become. Their extraordinary florescence throughout this century has resulted in far more than just individual progress within each field. These disciplines are becoming integrated into an increasingly seamless system of interconnected knowledge and remain nominally separated more out of educational convenience and institutional inertia than because ofany genuine ruptures in the underlying unity of the achieved knowledge. In fact, this development is only an acceleration of the process of conceptual unification that has been building in science since the Renaissance. For example, Galileo and Newton broke down the then rigid (and now forgotten) division between the celestial and the terrestrial-two domains that formerly had been considered metaphysically separate-showing that the same processes and principles applied to both. Lyell broke down the distinction between the static present and the formative past, between the creative processes operating in the present and the geological processes that had operated across deep time to sculpt the earth. Maxwell uncovered the elegant principles that unified the many disparate electrical and magnetic phenomena into a single system. And, one by one, the many gulfs separating life from nonlife were bridged and then closed: Harvey and others found that the macrostructure of the body turned out to operate according to comprehensible mechanical principles. Wohler's synthesis of urea showed that the chemistries of the living and the nonliving were not forever separated by the occult operation ofspecial vitalistic forces. In Wohler's wake, the unraveling of the molecular biology of the gene and its regulation of cellular processes has shown how many of the immensely complex and functionally intricate mechanisms that constitute life are realized in molecular machinery: the elan vital turned out to be
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nothing other than this microscopic functional intricacy. Most critically, Darwin showed how even the intricately articulated functional organization ofliving systems (then only observable at the macroscopic level) could be explained as the product of intelligible natural causes operating over the expanse ofdeep time. In so doing, he conceptually united the living and the nonliving into a single system of principled causation, and the entire diversity of plant, animal, and microbial species into a single tree ofdescent. Darwin took an equally radical step toward uniting the mental and physical worlds, by showing how the mental world-whatever it might be composed of-arguably owed its complex organization to the same process of natural selection that explained the physical organization ofliving things. Psychology became united with the biological and hence evolutionary sciences. The rise ofcomputers and, in their wake, modem cognitive science, completed the conceptual unification of the mental and physical worlds by showing how physical systems can embody information and meaning. The design and construction of artificial computational systems is only a few decades old, but already such systems can parallel in a modest way cognitive processes-such as reason, memory, knowledge, skill, judgment, choice, purpose, problem-solving, foresight, and language-that had supposedly made mind a metaphysical realm forever separated from the physical realm, and humans metaphysically disconnected from the causal network that linked together the rest ofthe universe. These intellectual advances transported the living, the mental, and the human-three domains that had previously been disconnected from the body ofscience and mystified because ofthis disconnection-into the scientifically analyzable landscape ofcausation. One useful way to organize this knowledge is as a principled history ofthe universe. Starting with some characterizable initial condition (like the Big Bang), each successive state of the system is described, along with the principles that govern the transitions from state to state. To the extent that our scientific model is well-developed, we should be able to account for the types ofentities that emerge (pulsars, tectonic plates, ribosomes, vision, incest avoidance) and their distribution and location in the causal matrix. Such a history-in its broadest outlines-is well on its way to being constructed, from an initial quantum state, to the formation and distribution of particles during the early expansion, to the cooling and formation of atoms, the formation of galaxies, stellar evolution, the synthesis of heavier nuclei, and, of parochial interest to us, the local history of the solar system. This includes the formation of the sun and planets; the geochemistry of prebiotic earth; the generation of complex organic compounds; the emergence of the initial ancestral reproducing chemical system; the evolution of the genetic code and prokaryotic design; the emergence ofeukaryotic sexual organisms, multicellular plants, animals, and fungi; and the rest of the history oflife on earth. In this vast landscape of causation, it is now possible to locate "Man's place in nature" to use Huxley's famous phrase and, therefore, to understand for the first time what humankind is and why we have the characteristics that we do. From this vantage point, humans are self-reproducing chemical systems, multicellular heterotrophic mobile organisms (animals), appearing very late in the history of life as somewhat modified versions ofearlier primate designs. Our developmental programs, as well as the physiological and psychological mechanisms that they reliably construct, are the natural product ofthis evolutionary history. Human minds, human behavior, human
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artifacts, and human culture are all biological phenomena-aspects ofthe phenotypes of humans and their relationships with one another. The rich complexity of each individual is produced by a cognitive architecture, embodied in a physiological system, which interacts with the social and nonsocial world that surrounds it. Thus humans, like every other natural system, are embedded in the contingencies of a larger principled history, and explaining any particular fact about them requires the joint analysis ofall the principles and contingencies involved. To break this seamless matrix of causation-to attempt to dismember the individual into "biological" versus "nonbiological" aspects-is to embrace and perpetuate an ancient dualism endemic to the Western cultural tradition: material/spiritual, body/ mind, physical/mental, natural/human, animal/human, biological/social, biological/ cultural. This dualistic view expresses only a premodern version of biology, whose intellectual warrant has vanished. This expansive new landscape of knowledge has not always been welcome, and many have found it uncongenial in one respect or another. The intellectual worlds we built and grew attached to over the last 3,000 years were laid out before much was known about the nature ofthe living, the mental, and the human. As a result, these intellectual worlds are, in many important respects, inconsistent with this new unified scientific view and, hence, are in need of fundamental reformulation. These established intellectual traditions and long-standing habits of mind seem, to many, to be more nourishing, more comfortable and, therefore, more valuable than the alternative prospect of new and unfamiliar scientific knowledge. To pick a single example, the shift from a universe designed to embody a moral and spiritual order to a universe that is undesigned and is structured only by a causal order engendered an immeasurably greater cultural dislocation than that which occurred when Copernicus identified the sun rather than the earth as the center of the planetary orbits. Consequently, the demystifications that have taken place since 1859 have been painful and have precipitated considerable resistance to accepting these discoveries and their implications. With the appearance ofDarwinism, the fun scope ofthe emerging unified account was, for the first time, apparent. Therefore, much ofthe opposition has specifically revolved around evolution and its application to humans. Gladstone, for example, in a debate with Huxley, captured in his choice of language the widely shared, visceral sense of revulsion caused by the claim "that natural selection and the survival ofthe fittest, all in the physical order, exhibit to us the great arcanum ofcreation, the sun and the center oflife, so that mind and spirit are dethroned from their old supremacy, are no longer sovereign by right, but may find somewhere by charity a place assigned them, as appendages, perhaps only as excrescences, of the material creation" (Gladstone, quoted in Gould, 1988, p. 14). The dislocations in world view stemming from this process ofconceptual unification led to a growing demand for, and production of, conceptual devices and rationales to divorce the natural sciences from the human social and inner landscape, to blunt the implications of monism and Darwinism, and to restore a comfortable distance between the human sciences and the world of natural causation. To many scholarly communities, conceptual unification became an enemy, and the relevance ofother fields a menace to their freedom to interpret human reality in any way they chose. Thus, despite some important exceptions, the social sciences have largely kept themselves isolated from this crystalizing process of scientific integration. Although
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social scientists imitated many ofthe outward forms and practices of natural scientists (quantitative measurement, controlled observation, mathematical models, experimentation, etc.), they have tended to neglect or even reject the central principle that valid scientific knowledge-whether from the same or different fields-should be mutually consistent (see Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, this volume). It is this principle that makes different fields relevant to each. other, and part of the same larger system of knowledge. In consequence, this insularity is not just an accident. For many scholars, it has been a conscious, deeply held, and strongly articulated position, advanced and defended since the inception of the social sciences, particularly in anthropology and sociology. Durkheim, for example, in his Rules ofthe Sociological Method, argued at length that social phenomena formed an autonomous system and could be only explained by other social phenomena (1895/1962). The founders ofAmerican anthropology, from Kroeber and Boas to Murdock and Lowie, were equally united on this point. For Lowie, ..the principles of psychology are as incapable of accounting for the phenomena of culture as is gravitation to account for architectural styles," and "culture is a thing sui generis which can be explained only in terms of itself. . .. Omnis cultura ex cultura" (1917/1966, p. 25-26; p. 66). Murdock, in his influential essay "The science ofculture," summed up the conventional view that culture is "independent of the laws of biology and psychology" (1932, p. 2(0). Remarkably, while the rest of the sciences have been weaving themselves together through accelerating discoveries oftheir mutual relevance, this doctrine ofintellectual isolationism, which has been the reigning view in the social sciences, has only become more extreme with time. With passionate fidelity, reasoned connections with other branches of knowledge are dismissed as ignorant attempts at crude reductionism, and many leading social scientists now openly call for abandoning the scientific enterprise instead. For example, Clifford Geertz advocates abandoning the ground of principled causal analysis entirely in favor of treating social phenomena as "texts" to be interpreted just as one might interpret literature: We should "tum from trying to explain social phenomena by weaving them into grand textures of cause and effect to trying to explain them by placing them into local frames of awareness" (1983, p. 6). Similarly, Edmund Leach rejects scientific explanation as the focus of anthropology: "Social anthropology is not, and should not aim to be, a 'science' in the natural science sense. If anything it is a form of art Social anthropologists should not see themselves as seekers after objective truth " (Leach, 1982, p. 52). These positions have a growing following, but less, one suspects, because they have provided new illumination than because they offer new tools to extricate scholars from the unwelcome encroachments of more scientific approaches. They also free scholars from all of the arduous tasks inherent in the attempt to produce scientifically valid knowledge: to make it consistent with other knowledge and to subject it to critical rejection on the basis of empirical disproof, logical inconsistency, and incoherence. In any case, even advocates of such avenues ofretreat do not appear to be fully serious about them because few are actually willing to accept what is necessarily entailed by such a stance: Those who jettison the epistemological standards ofscience are no longer in a position to use their intellectual product to make any claims about what is true of the world or to dispute the others' claims about what is true. Not only have the social sciences been unusual in their self-conscious stance of intellectual autarky but, significantly, they have also been relatively unsuccessful as
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sciences. Although they were founded in the 18th and 19th centuries amid every expectation that they would soon produce intellectual discoveries, grand "laws," and validated theories to rival those ofthe rest of science, such success has remained elusive. The recent wave ofantiscientific sentiment spreading through the social sciences draws much of its appeal from this endemic failure. This disconnection from the rest ofscience has left a hole in the fabric of our organized knowledge of the world where the human sciences should be. After more than a century, the social sciences are still adrift, with an enormous mass ofhalf-digested observations, a not inconsiderable body of empirical generalizations, and a contradictory stew of ungrounded, middle-level theories expressed in a babel of incommensurate technical lexicons. This is accompanied by a growing malaise, so that the single largest trend is toward rejecting the scientific enterprise as it applies to humans. We suggest that this lack of progress, this "failure to thrive," has been caused by the failure of the social sciences to explore or accept their logical connections to the rest of the body of science-that is, to causally locate their objects of study inside the larger network ofscientific knowledge. Instead ofthe scientific enterprise, what should be jettisoned is what we will call the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM): The consensus view of the nature of social and cultural phenomena that has served for a century as the intellectual framework for the organization of psychology and the social sciences and the intellectual justification for their claims ofautonomy from the rest of science. Progress has been severely limited because the Standard Social Science Model mischaracterizes important avenues of causation, induces researchers to study complexly chaotic and unordered phenomena, and misdirects study away from areas where rich principled phenomena are to be found. In place ofthe Standard Social Science Model, there is emerging a new framework that we will call the Integrated Causal Model. This alternative framework makes progress possible by accepting and exploiting the natural connections that exist among all the branches of science, using them to construct careful analyses ofthe causal interplay among all the factors that bear on a phenomenon. In this alternative framework, nothing is autonomous and all the components of the model must mesh. In this chapter, we argue the following points: 1. There is a set of assumptions and inferences about humans, their minds, and their collective interaction-the Standard Social Science Model-that has provided the conceptual foundations of the social sciences for nearly a century and has served as the intellectual warrant for the isolationism of the social sciences. 2. Although certain assumptions of this model are true, it suffers from a series of major defects that make it a profoundly misleading framework. These defects have been responsible for the chronic difficulties encountered by the social sciences. 3. Advances in recent decades in a number ofdifferent disciplines, including evolutionary biology, cognitive science, behavioral ecology, psychology, huntergatherer studies, social anthropology, biological anthropology, primatology, and neurobiology have made clear for the first time the nature of the phenomena studied by social scientists and the connections ofthose phenomena to the principles and findings in the rest of science. This allows a new model to be
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constructed-the Integrated Causal Model-to replace the Standard Social Science Model. 4. Briefly, the ICM connects the social sciences to the rest ofscience by recognizing that: a. the human mind consists ofa set of evolved information-processing mechanisms instantiated in the human nervous system; b. these mechanisms, and the developmental programs that produce them, are adaptations, produced by natural selection over evolutionary time in ancestral environments; c. many ofthese mechanisms are functionally specialized to produce behavior that solves particular adaptive problems, such as mate selection, language acquisition, family relations, and cooperation; d. to be functionally specialized, many of these mechanisms must be richly structured in a content-specific way; e. content-specific information-processing mechanisms generate some ofthe particular content of human culture, including certain behaviors, artifacts, and linguistically transmitted representations; f. the cultural content generated by these and other mechanisms is then present to be adopted or modified by psychological mechanisms situated in other members of the population; g. this sets up epidemiological and historical population-level processes; and h. these processes are located in particular ecological, economic, demographic, and intergroup social contexts or environments. On this view, culture is the manufactured product ofevolved psychological mechanisms situated in individuals living in groups. Culture and human social behavior is complexly variable, but not because the human mind is a social product, a blank slate, or an externally programmed general-purpose computer, lacking a richly defined evolved structure. Instead, human culture and social behavior is richly variable because it is generated by an incredibly intricate, contingent set offunctional programs that use and process information from the world, including information that is provided both intentionally and unintentionally by other human beings.
THE STANDARD SOCIAL SCIENCE MODEL The Central Logic of the Standard Social Science Model But one would be strangely mistaken about our thought if, from the foregoing, he drew the conclusion that sociology, according to us, must, or even can, make an abstraction of man and his faculties. It is clear, on the contrary, that the general characteristics of human nature participate in the work of elaboration from which social life results. But they are not the cause of it, nor do they give it its special form; they only make it possible. Collective representations, emotions, and tendencies are caused not by certain states ofthe consciousnesses of individuals but by the conditions in which the social group, in its totality, is placed. Such actions can, ofcourse materialize only ifthe individual natures are not resistant to them; but
these individual natures are merely the indeterminate material that the social factor molds
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andtransforms. Their contribution consists exclusively in verygeneral attitudes. in vagueand consequently plastic predispositions which, by themselves, if other agents did not intervene, could not take on the definite and complex forms which characterize social phenomena. -DuRKHEIM,1895/1962, pp. 105-106, emphasis added.
Humans everywhere show striking patterns of local within-group similarity in their behavior and thought, accompanied by profound intergroup differences. The Standard Social Science Model (SSSM or Standard Model) draws its enduring persuasive power by starting with these and a few other facts, rooted in direct experience and common knowledge. It then focuses on one salient causal and temporal sequence: how individuals change over their development from "unformed" infants into complexly competent adult members of their local social group, and how they do so in response to their local human environment. The central precepts of the SSSM are direct and seemingly inescapable conclusions drawn from these facts (D. E. Brown, 1991), and the same reasoning appears in author after author, from perhaps its most famous early expression in Durkheim (1895/1962), to its fully conventional modern adherents (with updated conceptual ornamentation) such as Geertz (1973). The considerations that motivate the Standard Social Science Model are as follows: Step 1. The existence of rapid historical change and the multitude of spontaneous human "cross-fostering experiments" effectively disposes of the racialist notion that human intergroup.behavioral differences ofany significance are attributable to genetic differences between groups. Infants everywhere are born the same and have the same developmental potential, evolved psychology, or biological endowment-a principle traditionally known as the psychic unity ofhumankind. The subsequent growth of knowledge over this century in genetics and human development has given strong empirical support to the conclusion that infants from all groups have essentially the same basic human design and potential. Human genetic variation, which is now directly detectable with modern electrophoretic techniques, is overwhelmingly sequestered into functionally superficial biochemical differences, leaving our complex functional design universal and species-typical (Tooby & Cosmides, I990a). Also, the bulk of the variation that does exist is overwhelmingly inter-individual and within-population, and not between "races" or populations. By the nature of its known distribution, then, genetic variation cannot explain why many behaviors are shared within groups, but not between groups. That is, genetic variation does not explain why human groups dramatically differ from each other in thought and behavior. (Significantly, this is the only feature ofthe SSSM that is correct as it stands and that is incorporated unmodified into the Integrated Causal Model. Why it turns out to be true, however, depends on the existence of complex evolved psychological and physiological adaptations-something explicitly or implicitly denied by adherents ofthe 888M.) Step 2. Although infants are everywhere the same, adults everywhere differ profoundly in their behavioral and mental organization. These first two steps, just by themselves, have led to the following widely accepted deduction: Because, it is reasoned, a "constant" (the human biological endowment observable in infants) cannot explain a "variable" (intergroup differences in complex adult mental or social organization) the SS8M concludes that "human nature" (the
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evolved structure ofthe human mind) cannot be the cause ofthe mental organization ofadult humans, their social systems, their culture, historical change, and so on. Step 3. Even more transparently, these complexly organized adult behaviors are absent from infants. Infants do not emerge speaking, and they appear to lack virtually every recognizable adult competency. Whatever "innate" equipment infants are born with has traditionally been interpreted as being highly rudimentary, such as an unorganized set Of crude urges or drives, plus the ability to learn-certainly nothing resembling adult mental organization. Because adult mental organization (patterned behavior, knowledge, socially constructed realities, and so on) is clearly absent from the infant, infants must "acquire" it from some source outside themselves in the course ofdevelopment. Step 4. That source is obvious: This mental organization is manifestly present in the social world in the form of the behavior and the public representations of other members of the local group. Thus, the stuff of mental organization is categorizable according to its source: (I) the "innate" (or inborn or genetically determined, etc.), which is supplied "biologically" and is what you see in the infant, and (2) the social (or cultural or learned or acquired or environmental), which contains everything complexly organized and which is supplied by the social environment (with a few exceptions supplied by the physical environment and nonsocial learning). "[C]ultural phenomena ... are in no respect hereditary but are characteristically and without exception acquired" (Murdock, 1932, p. 200). This line of reasoning is usually supported by another traditional argument, the deprivation thought experiment: "Undirected by culture patterns-organized systems of significant symbols-man's behavior would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless" (Geertz, 1973, p. 46). Humans raised without a social or cultural environment would be "mental basket cases" with "few useful instincts, fewer recognizable sentiments, and no intellect" (Geertz, 1973, p. 49). Because, it is reasoned, an effect disappears when its cause is withdrawn, this thought experiment is believed to establish that the social world is the cause ofthe mental organization ofadults. Step 5. The causal arrow in this process has a clear directionality, which is directly observable in the individual's development. The cultural and social elements that mold the individual precede the individual and are external to the individual. The mind did not create them; they created the mind. They are "given," and the individual "findsthem already current in the community when he is born" (Geertz, 1973, p. 45). Thus, the individual is the creation ofthe social world and, it appears to follow, the social world cannot be the creation of"the individual." Ifyou are reading this chapter, you learned English and did not create it. Nor did you choose to learn English (assuming you are a native speaker) any more than any effect chooses its cause; this action of the social world on the individual is compulsory and automatic-"coercive," to use Durkheim's phrase. Adult mental organization is socially determined. Moreover, by looking at social processes in the vast modern societies and nation-states, it is obvious that the "power asymmetry" between "the individual" and the social world is huge in the determination ofoutcomes and that the reciprocal impact ofthe individual on the social world is negligible. The causal flow is overwhelmingly or entirely in one direction. The individual is the acted upon (the effect or the outcome) and the sociocultural world is the actor (the cause or the prior state that determines the subsequent state).
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Step 6. Accordingly, what complexly organizes and richly shapes the substance of human life-what is interesting and distinctive and, therefore, worth studying-is the variable pool of stuffthat is usually referred to as "culture." Sometimes called "extrasomatic" or "extragenetic" (e.g., Geertz, 1973) to emphasize its nonbiological origins and nature, this stuffis variously described as behavior, traditions, knowledge, significant symbols, social facts, control programs, semiotic systems, information, social organization, social relations, economic relations, intentional worlds, or socially constructed realities. However different these characterizations may appear to be in some respects, those who espouse them are united in affirming that this substance-whatever its character-is (in Durkheim's phrase) "external to the individual." Even so psychological a phenomenon as thinking becomes external: "Human thought is basically both social and public-... its natural habitat is the house yard, the marketplace, and the town square. Thinking consists not of 'happenings in the head' (though happenings there and elsewhere are necessary for it to occur) but ofa traffic in what have been called, by G.H. Mead and others, significant symbols-words for the most part ...." (Geertz, 1973, p. 45). "The individual" contributes only the infant's impoverished drives, unformed tendencies, and capacity to be socialized. These first six steps constitute the SSSM's account of the causal process whereby what is assumed to be an initially formless infant is transformed into a fully human (Le., fully cultural) being. The next important element in the SSSM is its approach to answering the question, "Ifculture creates the individual, what then creates culture?" Before describing the SSSM's answer to this question, however, we need to make an important aspect of the question explicit: Human life is complexly and richly ordered. Human life is not (solely) noise, chaos, or random effect (contra Macbeth). Although the substance of human life, like human speech, is various and contingent, it is still, like human speech, intricately patterned. Many attempt to capture this perCeption with the phrase that human cultures (e.g., human symbol systems) are "meaningful." Human conduct does not resemble white noise. In a way that is analogous to William Paley's argument from design in his Natural Theology, one must ask: Ifthere is complex and meaningful organization in human sociocultural life, what is the creator or artificer of it? Entropy, perturbation, error, noise, interaction with other systems, and so on, are always operating to influence culture (and everything else), so clearly not everything in culture is orderly. Equally, ifthese processes were all that were operating, complex order would never appear and would quickly degrade even ifit did. Just as finding a watch on the heath, already complexly organized, requires that one posit a watchmaker (Paley, 1828), finding out that humanlife is complexly ordered necessitates the search for the artificer or source of this order (see Dawkins, 1986, for an exceptionally lucid general analysis ofthe problem ofexplaining complex order, its importance as a question, and the extremely narrow envelope of coherent answers). So, the question is not so much, What are the forces that act on and influence human culture and human affairs? but rather, What is the generator of complex and significant organization in human affairs? Step 7. The advocates ofthe Standard Social Science Model are united on what the artificer is not and where it is not: It is not in "the individual"-in human nature or evolved psychology-which, they assume, consists of nothing more than what the infant comes equipped with, bawling and mewling, in its apparently unimpressive initial performances. Because the directional flow of the organization is from the outer world inward into "the individual," the direction toward which one looks for the
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source of the organization is likewise clear: outward into the social world. As Durkheim says, "[w]hen the individual has been eliminated, society alone remains" (1895/1962, p. 102). Step 8. The SSSM maintains that the generator of complex and meaningful organization in human life is some set of emergent processes whose determinants are realized at the group level. The sociocultural level is a distinct, autonomous, and selfcaused realm: "Culture is a thing sui generis which can be explained only in terms of itself.... Omnis cultura ex cultura" (Lowie, 1917/1966, p. 25-26). For Alfred Kroeber, "the only antecedents ofhistorical phenomena are historical phenomena" (Kroeber, 1917). Durkheim was equally emphatic: "The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of individual consciousness"; that is, phenomena at the sociocultural level are mostly or entirely caused by other phenomena at the sociocultural level (Durkheim, 1895/1962, p. 110). It must be emphasized that this claim is not merely the obvious point that social phenomena (such as tulip bulb mania, the contagious trajectory ofdeconstructionist fashions, or the principles ofsupply and demand) cannot be understood simply by pointing inside the head of a single individual. It is, instead, a claim about the generator of the rich organization everywhere apparent in human life. What is generated even includes individual adult psychological phenomena, which are themselves simply additional social constructions. For Durkheim (and for most anthropologists today), even emotions such as "sexual jealousy" and "paternal love" are the products of the social order and have to be explained "by the conditions in which the social group, in its totality, is placed." As Geertz argues, "Our ideas, our values, our acts, even our emotions, are, like our nervous system itself, cultural products-products manufactured, indeed, out of tendencies, capacities, and dispositions with which we were born, but manufactured nonetheless" (1973, p. 50). Similarly, Shweder describes "cultural psychology" as "the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, transform, and permute the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, selfand emotion" (Shweder, 1990, p. I). Step 9. Correspondingly, the SSSM denies that "human nature"-the evolved architecture of the human mind-can play any notable role as a generator of significant organization in human life (although it is acknowledged to be a necessary condition for it). In so doing, it removes from the concept ofhuman nature all substantive content, and relegates the architecture of the human mind to the delimited role of embodying "the capacity for culture." Human nature is "merely the indeterminate material that the social factor molds and transforms. [This] contribution consists exclusively in very general attitudes, in vague and consequently plastic predispositions which, by themselves, if other agents did not intervene, could not take on the definite and complex forms which characterize social phenomena" (Durkheim, 1895/1962, p. 106). As Hatch comments, the "view that the Boasians had struggled to foster within the social sciences since almost the tum of the century" was that the human mind is "almost infinitely malleable" (1973, p. 236). Socialization is the process of externally supplied "conceptual structures molding formless talents" (Geertz, 1973, p. 50). Social scientists who paid any attention to neuroscience, ethology, and cognitive psychology were increasingly, if uneasily, aware of the evidence that the nervous system was complex and not well characterized by the image ofthe "blank slate." Nonetheless, aside from paying some lip service to the notion that tabula rasa empiricism
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was untenable, this changed nothing important in the SSSM. The blank slate was traded in for blank cognitive procedures. 2 The mind could be seen as complex, but its procedures were still assumed to be content-free. As long as environmental input could enter and modify the system, as it clearly could, environmental input was presumed to orchestrate the system, giving it its functional organization. It doesn't matter if the clay ofthe human mind has some initial shape (tendencies, dispositions), so long as it is soft enough to be pounded by the external forces into any new shape required. Thus, for Geertz, who is attracted to the language if not the actual substance of cognitive science, the mind is not a slate, blank or otherwise (he dismisses this as a straw man position "which no one of any seriousness holds" or perhaps ever held [Geertz, 1984, p. 268]), but it is instead the tabula rasa's fully modern equivalent, a general-purpose computer. Such a computer doesn't come pre-equipped with its own programs, but instead-and this is the essential point-it obtains the programs that tell it what to do from the outside, from "culture." Thus, the human mind is a computer that is "desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms" or "programs" "for the governing of behavior" (Geertz, 1973, p. 44). This eliminates the concept of human nature or its alternative expression, the evolved psychological architecture, as useful or informative concepts. As Geertz puts it, "[t]he rise of the scientific concept ofculture amounted to ... the overthrow of the view of human nature dominant in the Enlightenment ...", that is, that "[man] was wholly of a piece with nature and shared in the general uniformity of composition which natural science ... had discovered there" with "a human nature as regularly organized, as thoroughly invariant, and as marvelously simple as Newton's universe" (Geertz, 1973, p. 34). Instead, the view entailed in the modem "scientific concept of culture" is that "humanity is as various in its essence as in its expression" (Geertz, 1973, p. 37). Geertz does not mean, of course, that infants vary due to genetic differences, but that all significant aspects ofadult mental organization are supplied culturally. As deeply as one can go into the mind, people here are different from people there, leading to "the decline of the uniformitarian view of man" (Geertz, 1973, p. 35). The conclusion that human nature is an empty vessel, waiting to be filled by social processes, removed it as a legitimate and worthwhile object ofstudy. Why study paper when what is interesting is the writing on it and, perhaps even more important, the author (the perennially elusive generative social processes)? Since there could be no content, per se, to the concept of human nature, anything claimed to be present in human nature was merely an ethnocentric projection ofthe scholar making the claim. Thus, attempts to explore and characterize human nature became suspect. Such efforts were (and are) viewed as simply crude attempts to serve ideological ends, to manufacture propaganda, or to define one way ofbeing as better and more natural than others. Step 10. In the SSSM, the role of psychology is clear. Psychology is the discipline that studies the process ofsocialization and the set of mechanisms that comprise what anthropologists call "the capacity for culture" (Spuhler, 1959). Thus, the central concept in psychology is learning. The prerequisite that a psychological theory must meet to participate in the 88SM is that any evolved component, process, or mechanism must be equipotential, content-free, content-independent, general-purpose, domaingeneral, and so on (the technical terms vary with movement and era). In short, these mechanisms must be constructed in such a way that they can absorb any kind ofcultural message or environmental input equally well. Moreover, their structures must themselves impose no particular substantive content on culture. As Rindos (1986, p.
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315) puts it, "the specifics that we learn are in no sense predetermined by our genes." Learning is thus the window through which the culturally manufactured pre-existing complex organization outside of the individual manages to climb inside the individual. Although this approach deprives psychological mechanisms of any possibility of being the generators of significant organization in human affairs, psychologists get something very appealing in exchange. Psychology is the social science that can hope for general laws to rival those ofthe natural sciences: general laws oflearning, or (more recently) of cognitive functioning. The relationship of psychology to biology is also laid out in advance by the SSSM: In human evolution, natural selection removed "genetically determined" systems ofbehavior and replaced them with general-purpose learning mechanisms or content-independent cognitive processes. Supposedly, these more general systems were favored by evolution because they did not constrain human behavior to be maladaptively inflexible (e.g., Geertz, 1973; Harris, 1979; Montagu, 1964). Neurobiology is the account ofhow these general mechanisms are instantiated in our nervous system. Consequently, the concepts oflearning, socialization, general-purpose (or contentindependent) cognitive mechanisms, and environmentalism have (under various names and permutations) dominated scientific psychology for at least the last 60 years. Skinnerian behaviorism, ofcourse, was one ofthe most institutionally successful manifestations of the SSSM's program for psychology, but its antimentalism and doctrinaire scientism made it uncongenial to those who wanted an account oftheir internal experience. More importantly, its emphasis on individual histories of reinforcement limited the avenues through which culture could have its effect. It proved an easy target when cognitive science provided precise ways of characterizing and investigating the mental as a system that processes information, a characterization that seemed to offer easier avenues for cultural transmission than laboriously organized schedules of reinforcement. Although cognitive psychologists threw out behaviorism's cumbersome antimentalism, they uncritically adopted behaviorism's equipotentiality assumption. In mainstream cognitive psychology, it is assumed that the machine is free ofcontentspecialized processes and that it consists primarily of general-purpose mechanisms. Psychologistsjustify this assumption by an appeal to parsimony: It is "unscientific" to multiply hypothesized mechanisms in the head. The goal, as in physics, is for as few principles as possible to account for as much as possible. Consequently, viewing the mind as a collection of specialized mechanisms that perform specific tasks appears to be a messy approach, one not worth pursuing. Anthropologists and sociologists easily accommodated themselves to these theoretical changes in psychology: Humans went from being viewed as relatively simple equipotentialleaming systems to very much more complex equipotential information-processing systems, general-purpose computers, or symbol manipulators (see, e.g., Sahlins, 1976a, 1976b). Within psychology there are, of course, important research communities that fall outside of the SSSM and that have remained more strongly connected to the rest of science, such as physiological psychology, perception, psychophysics, (physiological) motivation, psycholinguistics, much of comparative psychology, and a few other areas. Moreover, to explain how organisms remain alive and reproduce (and to make some minimal attempt to account for the focused substance of human life), psychologists have found it necessary to posit a few content-oriented mechanisms: hunger, thirst, sexual motivation, and so on. Nevertheless, the tendency has been to keep these elements restricted to as small a class as possible and to view them as external to the
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important centralleaming or cognitive processes. They are incorporated as, for example, reinforcers operating by drive reduction. Cognitive psychologists have, for the most part, labored to keep any such content-influenced elements extrinsic to the primary cognitive machinery. Indeed, they have usually avoided addressing how functional action-such as mate choice, food choice, or effort calculation-takes place at all. The principles of concept formation, of reasoning, of remembering, and so forth, have traditionally been viewed as uninfected prior to experience with any content, their procedures lacking features designed for dealing with particular types ofcontent. Modular or domain-specific cognitive psychologists, in dissenting from this view, are abandoning the assumptions of the Standard Social Science Model. Of course, readers should recognize that by so briefly sketching large expanses of intellectual history and by so minimally characterizing entire research communities, we are doing violence to the specific reality of, and genuine differences among hundreds ofcarefully developed intellectual systems. We have had to leave out the qualifications and complexities by which positions are softened, pluralisms espoused, critical distinctions lost, and, for that matter, lip service paid. This is inevitable in attempting so synoptic a view. In what is surely a graver defect, we have had to omit discussion of the many important dissident subcommunities in sociology, anthropology, economics, and other disciplines, which have sloughed offor never adopted the Standard Social Science Model. In any case, we simply hope that this sketch captures a few things that are true and important, to compensate for the unavoidable simplifying distortions and omissions. Most obviously, there are no pure types in the world, and scholars are quoted not to characterize the full richness of their individual views, which usually undergo considerable evolution over their intellectual development anyway, but rather to illustrate instances ofa larger intellectual system. It is the larger intellectual system we are criticizing, and not the multitude of worthwhile research efforts that have gone on inside its structure. We think the roofofthe Standard Social Science Model has collapsed, so to speak, because the overall architectural plan is unsound, not because the bricks and other building materials are defective. The detailed research efforts of hundreds of scientists have produced critically important knowledge that has transformed our understanding ofthe world. In this criticism, we are looking for an architectural design for the social sciences that is worthy ofthe intelligence and labor ofthose whose research goes on within their compass.
The Standard Social Science Model's Treatment of Culture This logic has critically shaped how nearly every issue has been approached and debated in the social sciences. What we are concerned with here, however, is the impact ofthe Standard Social Science Model on the development of modem conceptions ofculture, its causal role in human life, and its relationship to psychology. Briefly, standard views of culture are organized according to the following propositions (see also D. E. Brown, 1991, p. 146; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a): 1. Particular human groups are properly characterized typologically as having "a" culture, which consists of widely distributed or nearly group-universal behavioral practices, beliefs, ideational systems, systems of significant symbols, or informational substance of some kind. Cultures are more or less bounded entities, although cultural elements may diffuse across boundaries.
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2. These common elements are maintained and transmitted "by the group," an entity that has cross-generational continuity. 3. The existence of separate streams of this informational substance, culture, transmitted from generation to generation, is the explanation for human within-group similarities and between-group differences. In fact, all betweengroup differences in thought and behavior are referred to as cultural differences and all within-group similarities are regarded as the expressions ofa particular culture. Since these similarities are considered to be "cultural," they are, either implicitly or explicitly, considered to be the consequence of informational substance inherited jointly from the preceding generation by all who display the similarity. 4. Unless other factors intervene, the culture (like the gene pool) is accurately replicated from generation to generation. 5. This process is maintained through learning, a well-understood and unitary process, that acts to make the child like the adult of her culture. 6. This process oflearning can be seen, from the point of view of the group, as a group-organized process called socialization, imposed by the group on the child. 7. The individual is the more or less passive recipient of her culture and is the product of that culture. 8. What is organized and contentful in the minds of individuals comes from culture and is socially constructed. The evolved mechanisms ofthe human mind are themselves content-independent and content-free and, therefore, whatever content exists in human minds originally derives from the social or (sometimes) nonsocial environment. 9. The features of a particular culture are the result ofemergent group-level processes, whose determinants arise at the group level and whose outcome is not given specific shape or content by human biology, human nature, or any inherited psychological design. These emergent processes, operating at the sociocultural level, are the ultimate generator of the significant organization, both mental and social, that is found in human affairs. 10. In discussing culture, one can safely neglect a consideration of psychology as anything other than the nondescript "black box" oflearning, which provides the capacity for culture. Learning is a sufficiently specified and powerful explanation for how any behavior acquires its distinct structure and must be the explanation for any aspect oforganized human life that varies from individual to individual and from group to group. II. Evolved, "biological," or "innate" aspects of human behavior or psychological organization are negligible, having been superseded by the capacity for culture. The evolution ofthe capacity for culture has led to a flexibility in human behavior that belies any significant "instinctual" or innate component (e.g., Geertz, 1973; Montagu, 1968, p. 11; Sahlins, 1976a & b), which, ifit existed, would have to reveal itself as robotlike rigid behavioral universals. To the extent that there may be any complex biological textures to individual psychology, these are nevertheless organized and given form and direction by culture and, hence, do not impart any substantial character or content to culture.
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On the Reasonableness of the Standard Social Science Model There are, ofcourse, many important elements oftruth in the tenets ofthe 888M, both in its core logic and in its treatment of culture. The 888M would not have become as decisively influential ifit did not have a strong surface validity, anchored in important realities. For example: It is true that infants are everywhere the same. Genetic differences are superficial. There is within-group similarity of behavior and there are between-group differences, and these persist across generations, but also change over historical time. Highly organized socially communicated information exists outside of any particular individual at anyone time (in the cognitive mechanisms of other individuals), and over time this information can be internalized by the specific individual in question. And so on. Nevertheless, the 8tandard Social Science Model contains a series of major defects that act to make it, as a framework for the social sciences, deeply misleading. As a result, it has had the effect of stunting the social sciences, making them seem falsely autonomous from the rest ofscience (i.e., from the "natural sciences") and precluding work on answering questions that need to be answered ifthe social sciences are to make meaningful progress as sciences. After a century, it is time to reconsider this model in the light ofthe new knowledge and new understanding that has been achieved in evolutionary biology, development, and cognitive science since it was first formulated. These defects cluster into several major categories, but we will limit our discussion to the following three: I. The central logic ofthe 888M rests on naive and erroneous concepts drawn from outmoded theories of development. For example, the fact that some aspect of adult mental organization is absent at birth has no bearing on whether it is part of our evolved architecture. Just as teeth or breasts are absent at birth, and yet appear through maturation, evolved psychological mechanisms or modules (complex structures that are functionally organized for processing information) could develop at any point in the life cycle. For this reason, the many features of adult mental organization absent at birth need not be attributed to exposure to transmitted culture, but may come about through a large number of causal avenues not considered in traditional analyses. 2. More generally, the 888M rests on a faulty analysis of nature-nurture issues, stemming from a failure to appreciate the role that the evolutionary process plays in organizing the relationship between our species-universal genetic endowment, our evolved developmental processes, and the recurring features of developmental environments. To pick one misunderstanding out of a multitude, the idea that the phenotype can be partitioned dichotomously into genetically determined and environmentally determined traits is deeply ill-formed, as is the notion that traits can be arrayed along a spectrum according to the degree that they are genetically versus environmentally caused. The critique of the 888M that has been emerging from the cognitive and evolutionary communities is not that traditional accounts have underestimated the importance ofbiological factors relative to environmental factors in human life. Instead, the target is the whole framework that assumes that "biological factors" and "environmental factors" refer to mutually exclusive sets of causes that exist in some kind of explanatory zero-sum relationship, so that the more one explains "biologically" the less there is to explain "socially" or "environmentally." On the contrary,
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as we will discuss, environmentalist claims necessarily require the existence of a rich, evolved cognitive architecture. 3. The Standard Social Science Model requires an impossible psychology. Results out of cognitive psychology, evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, linguistics, and philosophy converge on the same conclusion: A psychological architecture that consisted of nothing but equipotential, general-purpose, content-independent, or content-free mechanisms could not successfully perform the tasks the human mind is known to perform or solve the adaptive problems humans evolved to solve-from seeing, to learning a language, to recognizing an emotional expression, to selecting a mate, to the many disparate activities aggregated under the term "learning culture" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a). It cannot account for the behavior observed, and it is not a type ofdesign that could have evolved. The alternative view is that the human psychological architecture contains many evolved mechanisms that are specialized for solving evolutionarily long-enduring adaptive problems and that these mechanisms have content-specialized representational formats, procedures, cues, and so on. These richly content-sensitive evolved mechanisms tend to impose certain types of content and conceptual organization on human mental life and, hence, strongly shape the nature ofhuman social life and what is culturally transmitted across generations. Indeed, a post-Standard Model psychology is rapidly coalescing, giving a rapidly expanding empirical foundation to this new framework. In fact, historically, most of the data already gathered by psychologists supports such a view. It required a strongly canalized interpretative apparatus to reconcile the raw data ofpsychology with the central theoretical tenets of SSSM psychology. Before examining in detail what is wrong with the SSSM and why the recognition of these defects leads to the formulation of a new model with greater explanatory power, it is necessary first to alleviate the fears of what would happen if one "falls off the edge" of the intellectual world created by the SSSM. These fears have dominated how alternative approaches to the SSSM have been treated in the past and, unless addressed, will prevent alternatives from being fairly evaluated now. Moreover, the Standard Model has become so well-internalized and has so strongly shaped how we now experience and interpret social science phenomena that it will be difficult to free ourselves ofthe preconceptions that the Standard Model imposes until its Procrustean operations on psychology and anthropology are examined.
THE WORLD BUilT BY THE STANDARD SOCIAL SCIENCE MODEL The Moral Authority of the Standard Social Science Model The Case Against Nativism The overwhelming success of the Standard Social Science Model is attributable to many factors of which, arguably, the most significant has been its widespread moral appeal. Over the course of the century, its strong stand against explaining differences between races, classes, sexes, or individuals by hypothesizing underlying biological differences has been an important element in combating a multitude of searing horrors and oppressions, from the extermination of ethnic groups and the forced sterilization
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of the poor to restrictive immigration laws and legally institutionalized sex and race discrimination. The depth ofthese tragedies and the importance ofthe issues involved have imbued the SSSM and its central precept, "environmentalism," with an imposing moral stature. Consequently, the positions of individual scholars with respect to the SSSM have been taken to imply allegiances with respect to the larger social and moral conflicts around the world. Thus, to support the SSSM was to oppose racism and sexism and to challenge the SSSM was, intentionally or not, to lend support to racism, sexism, and, more generally (an SSSM way ofdefining the problem), "biological determinism." If biological ideas could be used to further such ends, then ideas that minimized the relevance of biology to human affairs, such as the tenets of the SSSM, could only be to the good. In this process, all approaches explicitly involving nativist elements of whatever sort became suspect. In consequence, fundamentally divergent-even opposingprograms and claims have become enduringly conflated in the minds of20th-century social scientists. Most significant was the failure to distinguish adaptationist evolutionary biology from behavior genetics. Although the adaptationist inquiry into our universal, inherited, species-typical design is quite distinct from the behavior genetics question about which differences between individuals or sets of individuals are caused by differences in their genes, the panspecific nativism typical of adaptationist evolutionary biology and the idiotypic nativism ofbehavior genetics became confused with each other (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990a). Obviously, claims about a complexly organized, universal human nature, by their very character, cannot participate in racist explanations. Indeed, they contradict the central premises ofracialist approaches. Yet, despite this fact, adaptationist approaches and behavior genetics remain inextricably intertwined in the minds of the majority ofsocial scientists. The second strong moral appeal ofthe Standard Social Science Model derives from its emphasis on human malleability and the hope it, therefore, gave for social melioration or social revolution. The claim ofJohn B. Watson, the founder of behaviorism, exemplifies this optimism about the power of scientifically directed socialization (as well as the usual implicit conflation of idiotypic and panspecific nativism): Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take anyone at random and train him to become any type of SpeCialist I might select-doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless ofhis talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors (Watson, 1925, p. 82).
As D. E. Brown (1991, p. 61) comments, "In hindsight it is clear that this famous statement about the influence ofthe environment on individual differences is entirely compatible with the most extreme of the faculty or modular views of the human mindin which it comprises numerous innate and highly specific mechanisms." But this thought experiment was interpreted by the social science mainsteam, Watson included, as demonstrating that "people are the products oftheir societies or cultures." Therefore, "change society or culture and you change people.... Intelligent, scientific socialization can make us whatever we want to be" (D. E. Brown, 1991, p. 61). Moreover, "[t]he equation ofan arch environmentalism (including cultural relativism) with optimism about the practical aRplication of social science to the problems of society remains a force to the present" (D. E. Brown, 1991, p. 62). More critically, the belief that the mind is "almost infinitely malleable" (or, in more modem terms, is a general-
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purpose computer) means that humans are not condemned to the status quo, and need not inevitably fight wars, or have social classes, or manifest sex-differentiated roles, or live in families, and so on. If the "happy" ability of the mind to "quite readily take any shape that is presented" (Benedict, 1934/1959, p. 278) is the ameliorator's ideal because it is believed to be logically necessary to allow social change, then dissent from the SSSM tends to be framed as claims about "constraints" or limits on this malleability. This, in tum, is taken to imply a possible intractability to social problems-the stronger the biological forces are, the more we may be constrained to suffer from certain inevitable expressions of human darkness. Thus, the debate on the role of biology in human life has been consistently framed as being between optimistic environmentalists who plan for human betterment and sorrowful, but realistic nativists who lament the unwelcome inevitability of such things as aggression (e.g., Ardrey, 1966; Lorenz, 1966), or who (possibly even gleefully) defend the status quo as inevitable and natural (e.g., Goldberg, 1973, on patriarchy). These nativists are, in tum, "debunked" by the tireless opponents of "biological determinism" (e.g., Chorover, 1979; Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984; Montagu, 1968, 1978), who place each new biological intrusion onto social science territory in the context of the bitter lessons of the century. (Environmentalist holocausts are, ofcourse, edited out of this chronology.) This morality play, seemingly bound forever to the wheel of intellectual life, has been through innumerable incarnations, playing itselfout in different arenas in different times (rationalism versus empiricism, heredity versus environment, instinct versus learning, nature versus nurture, human universals versus cultural relativism, human nature versus human culture, innate behavior versus acquired behavior, Chomsky versus Piaget, biological determinism versus social determinism, essentialism versus social construction, modularity versus domain-generality, and so on). It is perennial because it is inherent in how the issues have been defined in the SSSM itself, which even governs how the dissidents frame the nature of their dissent. Accordingly, the language of constraint and limitation is usually adopted by biologically oriented behavioral scientists themselves in describing the significance oftheir own work. Thus we even have titles such as The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit (Konner, 1982), Biological Boundaries of Learning (Seligman and Hager, 1972), "Constraints on Learning" (Shettleworth, 1972), and "Structural Constraints on Cognitive Development" (Gelman, I990a). Biologically oriented social and behavioral scientists often see themselves as defining limits on the possible. Environmentalists see themselves as expanding the borders ofthe possible. As we will see, this framing is profoundly misleading. Wrong Diagnosis, Wrong Cure
Driven by these fears to an attitude that Daly and Wilson (1988) have termed "biophobia," the social science community lays out implicit and sometimes explicit ground rules in its epistemological hierarchy: The tough-minded and moral stance is to be skeptical of panspecific "nativist" claims; that is, of accounts that refer in any way to the participation of evolved psychological mechanisms together with environmental variables in producing outcomes, no matter how logically inescapable or empirically well-supported they may be. They are thought to be explanations of last resort and, because the tough-minded and skeptical can generate particularistic a1ter-
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native accounts for any result at will, this last resort is rarely ever actually arrived at. For the same reason, it is deemed to be the moral stance to be correspondingly credulous of "environmentalist" accounts, no matter how vague, absurd, incoherent, or empirically contradicted they may be. These protocols have become second nature (so to speak) to nearly everyone in the social science community. This hierarchy is driven by the fear of falling off the edge of the Standard Social Science Model, into unknown regions where monsters such as "biological" or "genetic determinism" live. What, in fact, is an environmentalist account? There are two brands of environmentalism: coherent environmentalism and incoherent environmentalism, which correspond approximately to environmentalism as defended and environmentalism as practiced. As Daly and Wilson (1988, p. 8) comment, "[alII social theorists, including the staunchest antinativists, seek to describe human nature at some cross-culturally general level of abstraction" and would be "distressed should their theories ... prove applicable to Americans but not to Papuans." Both Skinner (1957) and Chomsky (l975)-opponents in a paradigmatic case of an environmentalist-nativist debate-posit the existence of universal evolved psychological mechanisms, or what cognitive psychologists have called "innate mechanisms." As Symons (1987) points out, most of what passes for the nature-nurture debate is not about the need to posit evolved mechanisms in theories. Everyone capable of reasoning logically about the problem accepts the necessity of this. As Symons makes clear, what the debate often seems to be about is how general or content-specific the mechanisms are: Skinner proposes conditioning mechanisms that apply to all situations, while Chomsky proposes specialized mechanisms particularly designed for language. Consequently, coherent environmentalists acknowledge that they are positing the existence of evolved developmental or psychological mechanisms and are willing to describe (I) the explicit structure of these mechanisms, and (2) what environmental variables they interact with to produce given outcomes. By this standard, of course, Chomsky is an environmentalist, as was Skinner, as are we, along with most other evolutionary psychologists and evolutionarily informed behavioral scientists. Equally, all coherent behavioral scientists of whatever orientation must be nativists in this same sense, and no coherent and fully specified hypothesis about behavior can avoid making nativist claims about the involvement of evolved structure. Incoherent environmentalists, on the other hand, are those who propose theories of how environments regulate behavior or even psychological phenomena without describing or even mentioning the evolved mechanisms their theories would require to be complete or coherent. In practice, communities whose rules ofdiscourse are governed by incoherent environmentalism consider any such trend toward explicitness to be introducing vague and speculative variables and-more to the point-to be in bad taste as well. The simple act ofproviding a complete model is to invoke evolved design and, hence, to court being called a genetic or biological determinist. Given that all coherent (fully specified) models ofpsychological processes necessarily entail an explication of how environmental variables relate to the inherited architecture or developmental machinery, this attitude has the effect of portraying psychologists who are clear about all causal steps as more soft-minded and speculative than those who remain vague about the crucial elements necessary to make their theories coherent (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1989). (This criticism is, of course, fully symmetrical: Incoherent nativists are those scholars who talk about how evolution structures behavior
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without attempting to describe the structure of the evolved adaptations that link evolution, environment, and behavior in adaptively patterned ways; for discussion, see Symons, this volume; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b.) The problem with an epistemological hierarchy that encourages incoherence and discourages coherence (aside from the fully sufficient objection that it has introduced major distortions into the body ofscientific knowledge) is that it is completely unnecessary, even on its own terms. Not only is the cure killing the patient-social sciencebut also the diagnosis is wrong and the patient is not menaced by the suspected malady. In the first place, as discussed, models ofa robust, universal human nature by their very character cannot participate in racist explanations ofintergroup differences. This is not just a definitional trick ofdefining human nature as whatever is universal. There are strong reasons to believe that selection usually tends to make complex adaptations universal or nearly universal, and so humans must share a complex, species-typical and species-specific architecture ofadaptations, however much variation there might be in minor, superficial, nonfunctional traits. As long-lived sexual reproducers, complex adaptations would be destroyed by the random processes ofsexual recombination every generation if the genes that underlie our complex adaptations varied from individual to individual. Selection in combination with sexual recombination tends to enforce uniformity in adaptations, whether physiological or psychological, especially in long-lived species with an open population structure, such as humans (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). Empirically, of course, the fact that any given page out of Gray's Anatomy describes in precise anatomical detail individual humans from around the world demonstrates the pronounced monomorphism present in complex human physiological adaptations. Although we cannot yet directly "see" psychological adaptations (except as described neuroanatomically), no less could be true ofthem. Human nature is everywhere the same.
The Malleability of Psychological Architecture versus the Volatility of Behavioral Outcomes If the fear that leaving the Standard Social Science Model will lead to racist doctrines is unfounded, what of the issue of human malleability? Does a biologically informed approach necessarily imply an intractability of undesired social and behavioral outcomes and an inevitability of the status quo? After all, isn't the basic thrust ofbiologically informed accounts against malleability and in favor ofconstraints and limits on human aspirations? No. The central premise of an opposition between the mind as an inflexible biological product and the mind as a malleable social product is ill~formed: The notion that inherited psychological structure constrains is the notion that without it we would be even more flexible or malleable or environmentally responsive than we are. This is not only false but absurd. Without this evolved structure, we would have no competences or contingent environmental responsiveness whatsoever. Evolved mechanisms do not prevent, constrain, or limit the system from doing things it otherwise would do in their absence. The system could not respond to "the environment" (that is, to selected parts ofthe environment in an organized way) without the presence of mechanisms designed to create that connection. Our evolved cognitive adaptations-our inherited psychological mechanisms-are the means by which things are affirmatively accomplished. It is an absurd model that proposes that the potentially unfettered human mind operates by flailing around and is only given structure and direction by
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the "limits" and "constraints" built in by "biology." Instead, any time the mind generates any behavior at all, it does so by virtue of specific generative programs in the head, in conjunction with the environmental inputs with which they are presented. Evolved structure does not constrain; it creates or enables (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Given that we are all discussing universal human design and if, as Symons argues, all coherent behavioral scientists accept the reality of evolved mechanisms, then the modem nature-nurture debate is really about something else: the character of those evolved mechanisms (Symons, 1987). Does the mind consist ofa few, general-purpose mechanisms, like operant conditioning, social learning, and trial-and-error induction, or does it also include a large number of specialized mechanisms, such as a language acquisition device (Chomsky, 1975; Pinker, 1984; Pinker & Bloom, this volume), mate preference mechanisms (Buss, 1989, this volume; Ellis, this volume; Symons, 1979), sexual jealousy mechanisms (Daly, Wilson, & Weghorst, 1982; Wilson & Daly, this volume), mother-infant emotion communication signals (Fernald, this volume), social contract algorithms (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, this volume; Gigerenzer & Hug, in press), and so on? This is the point of separation between the Standard Social Science Model and the Integrated Causal Model, and it is the main focus of this volume. How, then, does the issue of the number and specificity of evolved mental mechanisms bear on the issue ofthe inevitability of undesired behavioral outcomes? As we will discuss and review later, the same answer applies: General mechanisms tum out to be very weak and cannot unassisted perform at least most and perhaps all of the tasks humans routinely perform and need to perform. Our ability to perform most of the environmentally engaged, richly contingent activities that we do depends on the guiding presence of a large number of highly specialized psychological mechanisms (Cosmides& Tooby, 1987; Rozin, 1976; Symons, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). Far from constraining, specialized mechanisms enable competences and actions that would not be possible were they absent from the architecture. This rich array of cognitive specializations can be likened to a computer program with millions oflines of code and hundreds or thousands of functionally specialized subroutines. It is because of, and not despite, this specificity of inherent structure that the output of computational systems is so sensitively contingent on environmental inputs. It is just this sensitive contingency to subtleties ofenvironmental variation that make a narrow intractability of outcomes unlikely. The image of clay, and terms such as "malleability," "flexibility," and "plasticity" confuse two separate issues: (I) the detailed articulation of human evolved psychological design (i.e., what is the evolved design of our developmental programs and of the mechanisms they reliably construct), and (2) the fixity or intractability of expressed outcomes (what must people do, regardless of circumstance). The first question asks what evolved organization exists in the mind, while the second asks what events will inevitably occur in the world. Neither "biology," "evolution," "society," or "the environment" directly impose behavioral outcomes, without an immensely long and intricate intervening chain ofcausation involving interactions with an entire configuration of other causal elements. Each link of such a chain offers a possible point ofintervention to change the final outcome. For this reason, computer programs present a far better model of the situation: The computer does nothing without them. they frequently involve superbly complex contingent branching and looping alternatives, they can (and the procedures in the human mind certainly do) take as input environmental
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variables that create cascading changes in subsequent computational events and final outcomes, and the entire system may respond dramatically and dynamically to direct intervention (for example, the alteration ofeven a single instruction) at any ofa great number oflocations in the program. Moreover, we know in advance that the human psychological system is immensely flexible as to outcome: Everything that every individual has ever done in all of human history and prehistory establishes the minimum boundary ofthe possible. The maximum, if any, is completely unknown. Given the fact that we are almost entirely ignorant of the computational specifics of the hundreds or thousands of mechanisms that comprise the human mind, it is far beyond the present competence of anyone living to say what are and are not achievable outcomes for human beings. It is nevertheless very likely to be the case that we will find adaptive specializations in the human mind that evolved to make, under certain circumstances, choices or decisions that are (by most standards) ethically unacceptable and often lead to consensually undesirable outcomes (e.g., male sexual proprietariness, Wilson & Daly, this volume; discriminative parental solicitude, Daly & Wilson, 1981; Mann, this volume). Ifone is concerned about something like family violence, however, knowing the details of the mechanisms involved will prove crucial in taking any kind of constructive or ameliatory action. "Solutions" that ignore causation can solve nothing. In any case, the analysis of the morality or practicality of intervention to prevent undesired outcomes-"ontogenetic engineering" (Daly, Wilson & Weghorst, 1982)is beyond the scope ofthis discussion. Our point here is simply that leaving behind the SSSM does not entail accepting the inevitability of any specific outcome, nor does it entail the defense of any particular aspect of the status quo. Instead, for those genuinely concerned with such questions, it offers the only realistic hope of understanding enough about human nature to eventually make possible successful intervention to bring about humane outcomes. Moreover, a program ofsocial melioration carried out in ignorance of human complex design is something like letting a blindfolded individualloose in an operating room with a scalpel-there is likely to be more blood than healing. To cure, one needs to understand; lamenting disease or denouncing the researchers who study its properties has never yet saved a life. At present, we are decades away from having a good model of the human mind, and this is attributable in no small measure to a misguided antinativism that has, for many, turned from being a moral stance into a tired way of defending a stagnated and sterile intellectual status quo. There are, ofcourse, no guarantees, and it is at least logically possible that understanding our complex array of evolved mechanisms will offer no way to improve the human condition. But, if that is the case, it will be the first time in history that major sets of new discoveries turned out to be useless. J The Empirical Authority of the Standard Social Science Model The Division of Labor: Content-Independent Psychology
One major consequence of the adoption of the Standard Social Science Model has been the assignment of a division oflabor among the social sciences. It gave each field its particular mission, stamped each ofthem with its distinctive character, and thereby prevented them from making much progress beyond the accumulation of particularistic knowledge. Anthropology, as well as sociology and history, study both the impor-
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tant and variable content of human life (the signal) and the more vaguely defined processes and contingent events that generated it (the artificer or author of the signal). Psychology studies the medium on which this socially generated content is inscribed, the process of inscription, and the mechanisms that enable the inscription to take place. (The 88SM also assigns to psychology and to psychological anthropology the task ofcataloging, at the individual level, the particularistic psychological phenomena that are created by the action of each culture on individuals; e.g., what do American college sophomores get anxious about?). In advance of any data, the Standard Model defined for psychology the general character of the mechanisms that it was supposed to find (general-purpose, contentindependent ones), its most important focus (learning), and how it would interpret the data it found (no matter what the outcome, the origin of content was to be located externally-for example, in the unknowably complex unobserved prior history ofthe individual-and not "internally" in the mind ofthe organism). Psychologists certainly were not forced by the character oftheir data into these types ofconclusions (e.g., Breland & Breland, 1961). Instead, they had to carefully design their experiments so as to exclude evolutionarily organized responses to biologically significant stimuli by eliminating such stimuli from their protocols (e.g., by using stimulus-impoverished Skinner boxes or the currently widespread practice ofeliminating "emotionally charged" stimuli from cognitive experiments). This was done in the name ofgood experimental design and with the intention of eliminating contaminating "noise" from the exploration ofthe content-independent mechanisms that were thought to exist.
The Division of Labor: Particularistic, Content-Specific Anthropology Even more than psychology, anthropology was shaped by the assumptions inherent in the SSSM's division of labor: A content-independent (or content-free) psychology symbiotically requires a content-supplying anthropology to provide the agent-culture-that transforms malleable generalized potential into specifically realized human beings. So anthropology's mission was to study the particular (Geertz, 1973, p. 52). Consequently, anthropology became the custodian ofthe key explanatory concept in the paradigm, "culture." Belief in culture, as a substance passed across generations causing the richly defined particularity ofadult mental and social organization defines one's membership in the modem social science community. The invocation ofculture became the universal glue and explanatory variable that held social science explanations together: Why do parents take care of their children? It is part of the social role their culture assigns to them. Why are Syrian husbands jealous? Their culture tied their status to their wife's honor. Why are people sometimes aggressive? They learn to be because their culture socializes them to be violent. Why are there more murders in America than in Switzerland? Americans have a more individualistic culture. Why do women want to look younger? Youthful appearance is valued in our culture. And so on. Although using culture as an all-purpose explanation is a stance that is difficult or impossible to falsify, it is correspondingly easy to "confirm." If one doubts that the causal agent for a particular act is transmitted culture, one can nearly always find similar prior acts (or attitudes, or values, or representations) by others, so a source of the contagion can always be identified. Culture is the protean agent that causes everything that needs explaining in the social sciences, apart from those few things that can be
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explained by content-general psychological laws, a few drives, and whatever superorganic processes (e.g., history, social conflict, economics) that are used to explain the particularities of a specific culture. Psychologists, then, need not explain the origin of complexly specific local patterns of behavior. They can be confident that anthropologists have done this job and have tracked, captured, defined, and analyzed the causal processes responsible for explaining why men are often sexually jealous or why women often prefer to look youthful. In defining culture as the central concept ofanthropology, the 888M precluded the development of the range of alternative anthropologies that would have resulted if, say, human nature, economic and subsistence activity, ecological adaptation, human universals, the organization ofincentives inside groups, institutional propagation, species-typical psychology, or a host of other reasonable possibilities had been selected instead. More critically, because ofthe way in which the 888M frames the relationship between culture and the human mind, anthropology's emphasis on relativity and explanatory particularism becomes inescapable, by the following logic: If the psyche is general-purpose, then all organized content comes from the outside, from culture. Therefore, if something is contentful, then it must be cultural; if it is cultural, thenby the nature of what it is to be cultural-it is plastically variable; if it is plastically variable, then there can be no firm general laws about it. Ergo, there can be no general principles about the content of human life (only the contentless laws oflearning). The conclusion is present in the premises. The relativity ofhuman behavior, far from being the critical empirical discovery of anthropology (Geertz, 1973, 1984), is something imposed a priori on the field by the assumptions of the 888M, because its premises define a program that is incapable of finding anything else. Relativity is no more "there" to be found in the data of anthropologists than a content-independent architecture is "there" to be found in the data of psychologists. These conclusions are present in the principles by which these fields approach their tasks and organize their data, and so are not "findings" or "discoveries" at all. The consequences ofthis reasoned arrival at particularism reverberate throughout the social sciences, imparting to them their characteristic flavor, as compared with the natural sciences. This flavor is not complexity, contingency, or historicity; Sciences from geology to astronomy to meteorology to evolutionary biology have these in full measure. It is, instead, that social science theories are usually provisional, indeterminate, tentative, indefinite, enmeshed in an endlessly qualified explanatory particularism, for which the usual explanation is that human life is much more complex than mere Schrooinger equations or planetary ecosystems. Because culture was held to be the proximate (and probably the ultimate) cause of the substance and rich organization of human life, the consensus was, naturally, that documenting its variability and particularity deserved to be the primary focus of anthropological study (e.g., Geertz, 1973). This single proposition alone has proven to be a major contributor to the failure of the social sciences (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a). Mainstream sociocultural anthropology has arrived at a situation resembling some nightmarish short story Borges might have written, where scientists are condemned by their unexamined assumptions to study the nature ofmirrors only by cataloging and investigating everything that mirrors can reflect. It is an endless process that never makes progress, that never reaches closure, that generates endless debate between those who have seen different reflected images, and whose enduring product is voluminous descriptions of particular phenomena.
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The Empirical Disproof of a Universal Human Nature
The view that the essence of human nature lies in its variousness and the corresponding rejection ofa complex, universal human nature is not advanced by anthropologists simply as an assertion. Instead, it is presented as a dramatic and empirically well-supported scientific discovery (Geertz, 1984) and is derived from a particular method through which the limits of human nature are explored and defined. This method, a logical process of elimination, "confirmed" that the notion of human nature was empirically almost vacuous. Since infants are everywhere the same, then anything that varies in adults can only (it was reasoned) be cultural and, hence, socially inherited and, hence, socially manufactured. The method depends on accepting the premise that behavior can only be accounted for in these two ways: (1) as something "biological," or inborn, which is, therefore, inflexibly rigid regardless ofenvironment and (because ofthe psychic unity ofhumankind) everywhere the same, or (2) as sociocultural, which includes everything that varies, at a minimum, and perhaps many things that happen by accident to be universal as well. Whenever it is suggested that something is "innate" or "biological," the SSSMoriented anthropologist or sociologist riffles through the ethnographic literature to find a report ofa culture where the behavior (or whatever) varies (for a classic example, see Mead's 1949 Male and Female). Upon finding an instance of reported variation (or inventing one through strained interpretation; see again, Mead, 1949), the item is moved from the category of "innate," "biological," "genetically determined," or "hardwired" to the category of"leamed," "cultural," or "socially constructed." Durkheim succinctly runs through the process, discussing why sexual jealousy, filial piety, and paternal love must be social constructions, despite claims to the contrary: "History, however, shows that these inclinations, far from being inherent in human nature, are often totally lacking. Or they may present such variations in different human societies that the residue obtained after eliminating all these differences-which alone can be considered of psychological origin-is reduced to something vague and rudimentary and far removed from the facts that need explanation" (Durkheim, 1895/1962, p. 106). Because almost everything human is variable in one respect or another, nearly everything has been subtracted from the "biologically determined" column and moved to the "socially determined" column. The leftover residue of"human nature," after this process of subtraction has been completed, is weak tea indeed, compared to the rich and engaging list of those dimensions of life where humans vary. No wonder Geertz (1973) finds such watered-down universals no more fundamental or essential to humans than the behaviors in which humans vary. Psychologists have, by and large, accepted the professional testimony ofanthropologists and have, as part oftheir standard intellectual furniture, the confidence that other cultures violate virtually every universal claim about the content of human life. (D. E. Brown [1991] offers a pivotal examination ofthe history and logic ofanthropological approaches to human universals, cultural variation, and biology, and this entire discussion is informed by his work.) Discovering Regularities Depends on Seleding Appropriate Frames of Reference
Because ofthe moral appeal of antinativism, the process ofdiscrediting claims about a universal human nature has been strongly motivated. Anthropologists, by each new
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claim of discovered variability, felt they were expanding the boundaries of their discipline (and, as they thought, of human possibility itself) and liberating the social sciences from biologically deterministic accounts of how we are inflexibly constrained to live as we do. This has elevated particularism and the celebration of variability to central values inside of anthropology, strongly asserted and fiercely defended. The most scientifically damaging aspect of this dynamic has not been the consequent rhetorical emphasis most anthropologists have placed on the unusual (Bloch, 1977; Goldschmidt, 1960; Symons, 1979; see, especially, D. E. Brown, 1991). As Bloch (1977, p. 285) says, it is the "professional malpractice ofanthropologists to exaggerate the exotic character of other cultures." Nor is the most damaging aspect of this dynamic the professionally cultivated credulousness about claims of wonders in remote parts of the world, which has led anthropologists routinely to embrace, perpetuate, and defend not only gross errors (see Freeman, 1983, on Mead and Samoa; Suggs, 1971, on Linton and the Marquesas) but also obvious hoaxes (e.g., Casteneda's UCLA dissertation on Don Juan; or the gentle "Tasaday," which were manufactured by officials of the Marcos regime). The most scientifically damaging aspect ofthis value system has been that it leads anthropologists to actively reject conceptual frameworks that identify meaningful dimensions of cross-cultural uniformity in favor of alternative vantage points from which cultures appear maximally differentiated. Distinctions can easily be found and endlessly multiplied, and it is an easy task to work backward from some particular difference to find a framework from which the difference matters (e.g., while "mothers" may exist both there and here, motherhood here is completely different from motherhood there because mothers there are not even conceptualized as being blood kin, but rather as the wife of one's father, etc., etc.). The failure to view such variation as always profoundly differentiating is taken to imply the lack of a sophisticated and professional appreciation of the rich details of ethnographic reality. But whether something is variable or constant is not just "out in the world"; it is also a function of the system of categorization and description that is chosen and applied. The distance from Paris to Mars is complexly variable, so is the location of Paris "constant" and "inflexible" or is it "variable?" In geography, as in the social sciences, one can get whichever answer one wants simply by choosing one frame of reference over another. The order that has been uncovered in physics, for example, depends on the careful selection ofthose particular systems ofdescription and measure that allow invariances to appear. These regularities would all disappear if physicists used contingently relative definitions and measures, such as their own heartbeat to count units oftime (the speed oflight would slow down every time the measurer got excited-"relativity" indeed). Other sciences select frameworks by how much regularity these frameworks allow them to uncover. In contrast, most anthropologists are disposed to select their frameworks so as to bring out the maximum in particularity, contingency, and variability (e.g., how are the people they study unique?). Certainly one ofthe most rewarded of talents inside anthropology is the literary ability to express the humanly familiar and intelligible as the exotic (see, e.g., Geertz's description of a raid by the authorities on a cock fight in Bali; Geertz, 1973; see D. E. Brown, 1991, for a lucid dissection of the role of universals in this example, and Barkow, 1989, on how Balinese cock fighting illustrates the conventional psychology of prestige). Anthropologists' attraction to
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frameworks that highlight particularistic distinctions and relationships has nearly precluded the accumulation ofgenuine knowledge about our universal design and renders anthropologists' "empirically" grounded dismissal of the role of biology a matter of convention and conjuring rather than a matter of fact.
Beneath Variable Behavior Lie Universal Mechanisms The social science tradition of categorizing everything that varies as "nonbiological" fails to identify much that is "biological." This is because anthropologists have chosen ill-suited frames of reference (such as those based on surface "behavior" or reflective "meaning") that accentuate variability and obscure the underlying level of universal evolved architecture. There may be good reasons to doubt that the "behavior" ofmarriage is a cross-cultural universal or that the articulated "meaning" of gender is the same across all cultures, but there is every reason to think that every human (ofa given sex) comes equipped with the same basic evolved design (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). The critical question is not, for example, whether every human male in every culture engages in jealous behaviors or whether mental representations attached to situations ofextra-pair mating are the same in every culture; instead, the most illuminating question is whether every human male comes endowed with developmental programs that are designed to assemble (either conditionally or regardless of normal environmental variation) evolutionarily designed sexual jealousy mechanisms that are then present to be activated by appropriate cues. To discern and rescue this underlying universal design out of the booming, buzzing confusion of observable human phenomena requires selecting appropriate analytical tools and frames of reference. Genetics, for example, had enormous difficulty making progress as a science until geneticists developed the distinction between genotype and phenotype-between the inherited basis ofa trait and its observable expression. We believe a similar distinction will prove necessary to the development of an integrated social science. We will refer to this as the distinction between the evolved (as in evolved mechanisms, evolved psychology, evolved architecture, etc.) and the manifest (as in manifest psychology, manifest behavior, etc.). One observes variable manifest psychologies or behaviors between individuals and across cultures and views them as the product of a common, underlying evolved psychology, operating under different circumstances. The mapping between the evolved architecture and manifest behavior operates according to principles of expression that are specified in the evolved developmental mechanisms and the psychological mechanisms they reliably construct; manifest expressions may differ between individuals when different environmental inputs are operated on by the same procedures to produce different manifest outputs (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989b). For example, some individuals speak English while others do not, yet everyone passes through a life stage when the same species-typical language acquisition device is activated (Pinker & Bloom, this volume). In fact, if an individual survives a childhood of aberrant social isolation she may never acquire a language and may be incapable ofspeaking; yet, she will have had the same species-typical language acquisition device as everyone else. So what at the behavioral level appears variable ("speaks English," "speaks Kikuyu"; or, even, "speaks a language," "does not speak any language") fractionates into variable environmental inputs and a uniform underlying design, interacting to produce the observed patterns of manifest variation. The fog
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enveloping most social science debates would blow away if aU hypotheses were completely spelled out, through analyzing each situation into environmental conditions, evolved architecture, and how their interaction produces the manifest outcome. Standard Model partisans have confidently rested their empirical case on what now appears to be uncertain ground: that manifest universality across cultures is the observation that evolutionary hypotheses about human nature require and that, on the other hand, cross-cultural variability establishes that the behavior in question is uncontaminated by "biology" and is, instead, solely the product of "culture" or "social processes." The recognition that a universal evolved psychology will produce variable manifest behavior given different environmental conditions exposes this argument as a complete non sequitur. From a perspective that describes the whole integrated system of causation, the distinction between the biologically determined and the nonbiologically determined can be seen to be a nondistinction. In its place, the relevant distinction can be drawn between what Mayr (among others) called open and closed behavior programs (Ma.yr, 1976). This terminology distinguishes mechanisms that are open to factors that commonly vary in the organism's natural environment and, hence, commonly vary in their manifest expression from those that are closed to the influence of such factors and are, consequently, uniform in their manifest expression. The human language acquisition device is an open behavior program whose constructed product, adult competency in the local language, varies depending on the language community in which the individual is raised. Certain facial emotional displays that manifest themselves uniformly cross-culturally (Ekman, 1973) may be examples of closed behavior programs. The Standard Social Science Model's method of sorting behavior by its cross-cultural uniformity or variability of expression into "biologically determined" and "socially determined" categories in reality sorts behaviors into those generated by closed behavior programs, and those generated by open behavior programs. In neither case can the analysis of the "determination" of behavior be made independent of "biology," that is, independent of understanding the participation ofthe evolved architecture. For this reason, the whole incoherent opposition between socially determined (or culturally determined) phenomena and biologically determined (or genetically determined) phenomena should be consigned to the dustbin of history, along with the search for a biology-free social science. The Search for the Artificer
Ifpsychology studies the content-independent laws of mind and anthropology studies the content-supplying inheritances of particular cultures, one still needs to find the content-determining processes that manufacture individual cultures and social systems. The Standard Social Science Model breaks the social sciences into schools (materialist, structural-functionalist, symbolic, Marxist, postmodemist, etc.) that are largely distinguished by how each attempts to affirmatively characterize the artificer, which they generally agree is an emergent group-level process of some kind. It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to review and critique these attempts to discover somewhere in the social system what is in effect a generative computational system. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the net effect ofthe central logic ofthe Standard Social Science Model has been to direct the quest for the ultimate cause or generator of significant mental and social organization outward away from the rich computational architecture of the human mind. It is there where sufficiently powerful ordering pro-
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cesses-ones capable of explaining the phenomena-are primarily to be found. As will be discussed later, it is there where the actual generators of organization are principally (though not exclusively) located and could be productively investigated. And understanding this architecture is an indispensible ingredient in modeling or understanding whatever super-individual processes exist. . This is not to say that there aren't many important phenomena and processes operating at the population level, which, for example, modify the nature and distribution of representations (for non-SSSM analyses, see, e.g., Sperber, 1985, 1990, on epidemiological approaches to cultural transmission; see also Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Campbell, 1965, 1975; Durham, 1991; and others, who examine analogs to natural selection operating at the cultural level). But because the traditional SSSM efforts to characterize these generative processes make them entirely external to "the individual" as well as independent ofspecies-typical psychology, these accounts tend to share a certain ineradicable indefiniteness oflocation and substance. The SSSM attempt to abstract social processes away from the matrix of interacting psychological architectures necessarily fails because the detailed structure of psychological mechanisms is inextricably bound up in how these social processes operate. One might say that what mostly remains, once you have removed from the human world everything internal to individuals, is the air between them. This vagueness of ontology and causal mechanism makes it difficult to situate these hypothetical generative processes with respect to our knowledge of the rest ofthe natural world (Sperber, 1986). Moreover, attempting to locate in these population-level processes the primary generator of significant organization has caused these processes to be fundamentally misunderstood, mystified, and imbued with such unwarranted properties as autonomy, teleology, functionality, organism-like integration, intelligence, intentionality, emotions, need-responsiveness, and even consciousness (see, e.g., Durkheim, 1895/1962; Harris, 1979; Kroeber, 1915; Marx, 1867/1909; Merton, 1949; Parsons, 1949; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952; see Harris, 1968, for review and discussion). Of course, the social system is not like a person or an organism or a mind, selfordering due to its own functionally integrated mechanisms. It is more like an ecosystem or an economy whose relationships are structured by feedback processes driven by the dynamic properties of its component parts. In this case, the component parts ofthe population are individual humans, so any social dynamics must be anchored in models ofthe human psychological architecture. In contrast, the customary insistence on the autonomy (or analytic separability) of the superorganic level is why there have been so few successful or convincing causal models of population-level social processes, including models ofculture and social organization (apart from those originating in microeconomics or in analogies drawn from population biology, which do not usually take SSSM-style approaches; see, e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Schelling, 1978). Rejecting the design ofindividuals as central to the dynamics is fatal to these models, because superorganic (that is, population-level) processes are not just "out there," external to the individual. Instead, human superindividual interactions depend intimately on the representations and other regulatory elements present in the head of every individual involved and, therefore, on the systems of computation inside each head. These govern what is selected from "out there," how this is represented, what procedures act on the representations, and what behaviors result that others can then observe and interact with in a population dynamic fashion (Sperber, 1985, 1986, 1990;
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Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a). These psychological mechanisms are primarily where there is sufficient anti-entropic computational power to explain the rich patterning of human life. The design ofthe human psychological architecture structures the nature of the social interactions humans can enter into, as well as the selectively contagious transmission of representations between individuals. Only after the description ofthe evolved human psychological architecture has been restored as the centerpiece of social theory can the secondary anti-entropic effects ofpopulation-level social dynamics be fully assessed and confidently analyzed. Hence, the study of population-level social and cultural dynamics requires a sophisticated model of human psychology to undergird it (see Barkow, 1989, this volume; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, this volume; Daly, 1982; Sperber, 1985, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a).
The Division of Labor: The Social Sciences versus the Natural Sciences The single most far-reaching consequence of the Standard Social Science Model has been to intellectually divorce the social sciences from the natural sciences, with the result that they cannot speak to each other about much of substance. Where this divorce has been achieved can be precisely located within the model. Because biology and evolved psychology are internal to the individual and because culture-the author of social and mental organization-is seen as external to the individual, the causal arrow from outside to inside logically insulates the social sciences from the rest of the natural sciences, making them autonomous and the natural sciences substantively irrelevant. This set ofpropositions is the locus ofthe primary break between the social and the natural sciences. Although there has been a causal flow across four billion years of evolutionary time, its ability to causally shape the human present is impermeably dammed at the boundaries of the individual-in fact, well within the individual, for evolution is thought to provide nothing beyond an account ofthe origins ofthe drives, if any, and of the general-purpose, content-free learning or computational equipment that together comprise the SSSM's minimalist model of human nature. Thus, whatever their empirical success may be, the claims made by (to pick some obvious examples) ethologists, sociobiologists, behavioral ecologists, and evolutionary psychologists about the evolutionary patterning ofhuman behavior can be simply dismissed out of hand as wrong, without requiring specific examination, because causality does not flow outward from the individual or from psychology, but inward from the social world (Sahlins, 1976a). Or, as Durkheim put it nearly a century before, "every time that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is false" (Durkheim, 1895/1962, p. 103). Organic evolution manufactured the biological substratum, the human capacity for culture-"the breadth and indeterminateness of [man's] inherent capacities" (Geertz, 1973, p. 45)-but otherwise reaches a dead end in its causal flow and its power to explain. Finally, it would be a mistake to think that the Standard Social Science Model reflects the views solely ofsocial scientists and is usually resisted by biologists and other natural scientists. It is instead considered the common sense and common decency of our age. More particularly, it is a very useful doctrine for biologists themselves to hold. Many ofthem vigorously defend its orthodoxies, adding their professional imprimatur to the social scientists' brief for the primacy of culture or social forces over "biology" (see, e.g., Gould, 1977a, 1977b; Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984). This does not happen simply because some are drawn to the formidable moral authority ofthe Standard
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Model and the mantle it confers. Even for those ofa genuinely scientific temperament, fascinated with biological phenomena for their own sake, such a doctrine is a godsend. The Standard Model guarantees them, a priori, that their work cannot have implications that violate socially sanctified beliefs about human affairs because the Standard Model assures them that biology is intrinsically disconnected from the human social order. The Standard Model therefore frees those in the biological sciences to pursue their research in peace, without having to fear that they might accidentally stumble into or run afoul of highly charged social or political issues. It offers them safe conduct across the politicized minefield of modem academic life. This division of labor is, therefore, popular: Natural scientists deal with the nonhuman world and the "physical" side of human life, while social scientists are the custodians of human minds, human behavior, and, indeed, the entire human mental, moral, political, social, and cultural world. Thus, both social scientists and natural scientists have been enlisted in what has become a common enterprise: the resurrection of a barely disguised and archaic physical/mental, matter/spirit, nature/human dualism, in place of an integrated scientific monism. THE EVOLUTIONARY CONTRIBUTION TO INTEGRATED EXPLANATION Rediscovering the Relevance of Evolutionary Biology
If the adoption of the Standard Social Science Model has not led to a great deal of natural science-like progress, that is surely not a good argument against it. Its convenience has no bearing on whether it is true. What, then, are the reasons for believing it is false? There are a number of major problems that independently lead to the rejection of the SSSM-some emerging from evolutionary biology, some from cognitive science, and some from their integration. We will discuss three of these problems, arguing that (I) the Standard Social Science Model's analysis of developmental or "nature-nurture" issues is erroneous; (2) the general-purpose, content-free psychology central to the SSSM could not have been produced by the evolutionary process and, therefore, is not a viable candidate model of human psychology; and (3) a psychology ofthis kind cannot explain how people solve a whole array oftasks they are known to routinely perform. For advocates of the Standard Social Science Model, evolution is ignored because it is irrelevant: The explanatory power of evolution ends with the emergence of the content-free computational equipment that purportedly constitutes human nature. This equipment does not impose any form on the social world, but instead acquires all of its content from the social world. The supposed erasure ofcontent-sensitive and content-imparting structure from hominid psychological architecture during our evolution is what justifies the wall of separation between the natural and the social sciences. If this view were correct, then evolution would indeed be effectively irrelevant to the social sciences and the phenomena they study. In contrast, proponents of the Integrated Causal Model accept that, in addition to whatever content-independent mechanisms our psychological architecture may contain, it also contains content-specific devices, including those computationally responsible for the generation and regulation of human cultural and social phenomena. These content-specific mechanisms are adaptations (as are content-independent mechanisms), and evolved to solve long-enduringadaptive problems characteristic of
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our hunter-gatherer past. Because of their design, their operation continually imparts evolutionarily patterned content to modem human life. Ifthis view is correct, then the specifics of evolutionary biology have a central significance for understanding human thought and action. Evolutionary processes are the "architect" that assembled, detail by detail, our evolved psychological and physiological architecture. The distinctive characteristics of these processes are inscribed in the organizational specifics of these designs. Consequently, an understanding ofthe principles that govern evolution is an indispensable ally in the enterprise of understanding human nature and an invaluable tool in the discovery and mapping ofthe species-typical collection of information-processing mechanisms that together comprise the human mind. The complex designs of these mechanisms are the main causal channels through which the natural sciences connect to and shape the substance of the "social" sciences. Thus, the relevance of evolutionary biology does not in the least depend on our being "just like" other species, which we obviously are not (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). Each species has its own distinctive properties stemming from its own unique evolutionary history. Evolutionary biology is fundamentally relevant to the study of human behavior and thought because our species is the product of naturalistic terrestrial processes--evolutionary processes--and not of divine creation or extraterrestrial intervention. However unusual our properties may be from a zoological point of viewand we have every reason to believe humans followed a unique evolutionary trajectory (Tooby & DeVore, I987)-we need an account ofhow they were produced in the natural world of causation over evolutionary history (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Such accounts are constructed from (I) the principles that govern the evolutionary process (such as natural selection and drift), (2) the designs of ancestral hominid species, and (3) the particular ancestral environments and contingent historical events hominids encountered during their evolutionary history. Reproduction, Feedback, and the Construction of Organic Design [T]hese elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being ... Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability ... and as a consequence ... Natural Selection.... -CHARLES DARWIN,
The Origin ofSpecies
While physicists tend to start their causal history with the Big Bang, biologists usually select a different, later event: the emergence of the first living organism. Life (or the instances we have so far observed) is a phenomenon that originated on earth three to four billion years ago through the formation ofthe first living organism by contingent physical and chemical processes. What is life? What defining properties qualified some ancient physical system as the first living organism? From a Darwinian perspective, it is the reproduction by systems of new and similarly reproducing systems that is the defining property of life. An organism is a self-reproducing machine. All of the other properties of living organisms-cellular structure, ATP, polypeptides, the use of carbon's ability to form indefinitely large chains, DNA as a regulatory element-are incidental rather than essential, and the logic of Darwinism would apply equally to selfreproducing robots, to self-reproducing plasma vortices in the sun, or to anything else that reproduces with the potential for inheritable change (mutation). From reproduc-
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tion, the defining property oflife, the entire elegant deductive structure of Darwinism follows (Dawkins, 1976; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; Williams, 1985). Very simple proto-bacteria emerged early in terrestrial history, as chemical machines that constructed additional chemical machines like themselves. Because reproduction means the construction of offspring designs like the parent machines, one could imagine this leading to an endless chain ofproliferating systems identical to the original parent. This is not what happened, of course, because mutations or random modifications are sometimes introduced into offspring designs by accident, with far-reaching consequences. Most random modifications introduce changes into the organism's organization that interfere with the complex sequence ofactions necessary for self-reproduction. But a small proportion of random modifications happen to cause an enhancement in the average ability of the design to cause its own reproduction. In the short run, the frequency ofthose variants whose design promotes their own reproduction increases, and the frequency ofthose variants whose design causes them to produce fewer (or no) offspring decreases. Consequently, one oftwo outcomes usually ensues: (1) the frequency of a design will drop to zero-i.e., go extinct (a case of negative feedback); or (2) a design will outreproduce and thereby replace all alternative designs in the population (a case of positive feedback). After such an event, the population of reproducing machines is different from its ancestors because it is equipped with a new and more functionally organized design or architecture. Thus, the fact that alternative design features give rise to reproductive performance differences creates the system of positive and negative feedback called natural selection. Natural selection guides the incorporation of design modifications over generations according to their consequences on their own reproduction. Over the long run, down chains of descent, this cycle of chance modification and reproductive feedback leads to the systematic accretion within architectures ofdesign features that promote or formerly promoted their own propagation. Even more importantly, the reproductive fates ofthe inherited properties that coexist in the same organism are linked together: What propagates one design feature tends to propagate others (not perfectly, but sufficiently for a coherent design to emerge; see Cosmides & Tooby, 1981). This means that traits will be selected to work together to produce the same outcomes and to enhance each other's functionality. Frequently, then, these accumulating properties will sequentially fit themselves together into increasingly functionally elaborated machines for reproduction, composed of constituent mechanisms-called adaptations-that solve problems that are either necessary for reproduction or increase its likelihood (Darwin, 1859; Dawkins, 1986; R. Thornhill, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; Williams, 1966, 1985). As ifby the handiwork ofan invisible and nonforesightful engineer, element after element is added to a design over generations, making it a more functional system for propagation under the conditions prevailing at the time each new element was added. At present, there is no extant alternative theory for how organisms acquired complex functional organization over the course oftheir evolution (Dawkins, 1986). What is most compelling about Darwin's approach is that the process of natural selection is an inevitable by-product ofreproduction, inheritance, and mutation. Like water running downhill, over generations organisms tend to flow into new functional designs better organized for effective propagation in the environmental context in which they evolved. There is, however, another method, besides selection, by which mutations can become incorporated into species-typical design: chance. The sheer
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impact of many random accidents may cumulatively propel a useless mutation upward in frequency until it crowds out all alternative design features from the population. Its presence in the architecture is not explained by the (nonexistent) functional consequences it has on reproduction, and so it will not be coordinated with the rest of the organism's architecture in a functional way. But despite the fact that chance plays some role in evolution, organisms are not primarily chance agglomerations ofstray properties. To the extent that a feature has a significant effect on reproduction, selection will act on it. For this reason, important and consequential aspects of organismic architectures are shaped by selection. By the same token, those modifications that are so minor that their consequences are negligible on reproduction are invisible to selection and, therefore, are not organized by it. Thus, chance properties drift through the standard designs ofspecies in a random way, unable to account for complex organized design and, correspondingly, are usually peripheralized into those aspects that do not make a significant impact on the functional operation of the system (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b). In short, evolution (or descent with modification, to use Darwin's phrase) takes place due to the action of both chance and natural selection, causing descendants to diverge in characteristics from their ancestors, down chains of descent. Over evolutionary time, this appears as a succession of designs, each a modification of the one preceding it. Generation by generation, step by step, the designs of all of the diverse organisms alive today-from redwoods and manta rays to humans and yeast-were permuted out ofthe original, very simple, single-celled ancestor through an immensely long sequence ofsuccessive modifications. Each modification spread through the species either because it caused its own propagation, or by accident. Through this analytic framework, living things in general and each species in particular can be located in the principled causal history of the universe. Moreover, the specific design features of a species' architecture can also be causally located in this history: they exist either because of chance incorporation or because they contributed to the functional operation ofthe architecture. The theory ofevolution by natural selection vastly expanded the range of things that could be accounted for, so that not only physical phenomena such as stars, mountain ranges, impact crater's, and alluvial fans could be causally located and explained but also things like whales, eyes, leaves, nervous systems, emotional expressions, and the language faculty. The modem Darwinian theory of evolution consists of the logically derivable set of causal principles that necessarily govern the dynamics of reproducing systems, accounting for the kinds of properties that they cumulatively acquire over successive generations. The explicit identification of this core logic has allowed the biological community to develop an increasingly comprehensive set of principles about what kinds of modifications can and do become incorporated into the designs ofreproducing systems down their chains of descent, and what kinds of modifications do not (Dawkins, 1976, 1982, 1986; Hamilton, 1964, 1972; Maynard Smith, 1964, 1982; Williams, 1966). This set of principles has been tested, validated, and enriched by a comprehensive engagement with the empirical reality of the biological world, from functional and comparative anatomy, to biogeography, to genetics, to immunology, to embryology, to behavioral ecology, and so on. Just as the fields of electrical and mechanical engineering summarize our knowledge ofprinciples that govern the design of human-built machines, the field of evolutionary biology summarizes our knowledge of the engineering principles that govern the design of organisms, which can be
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thought of as machines built by the evolutionary process (for good summaries, see Daly & Wilson 1984a; Dawkins, 1976, 1982, 1986; Krebs & Davies, 1987). Modem evolutionary biology constitutes, in effect, an "organism design theory." Its principles can be used both to evaluate the plausibility ofthe psychology posited by the Standard Social Science Model and to guide the construction ofa better successor psychology. The Peculiar Nature of Biological Functionality
In certain narrowly delimited ways, then, the spontaneous process of evolution parallels the intentional construction of functional machines by human action. But, whereas machines built by human engineers are designed to serve a diverse array of ends, the causal process of natural selection builds organic machines that are "designed" to serve only one very specialized end: the propagation into subsequent generations of the inherited design features that comprise the organic machine itself. Because design features are embodied in organisms, they can, generally speaking, propagate themselves in only two ways: (1) by solving problems that will increase the probability that the organism they are situated in will produce offspring, or (2) by solving problems that will increase the probability that the organism's kin will produce offspring (Hamilton, 1964; Williams & Williams, 1957). An individual's relatives, by virtue of having descended from a common ancestor, have an increased likelihood of having the same design feature as compared to other conspecifics, so their increased reproduction will tend to increase the frequency of the design feature. Accordingly, design features that promote both direct reproduction and kin reproduction, and that make efficient trade-offs between the two, will replace those that do not. To put this in standard biological terminology, design features are selected for to the extent that they promote their inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964). For clarity, we will tend to call this propagation or design-propagation. Selection, then, is the only known account for the natural occurrence ofcomplexly organized functionality in the inherited design of undomesticated organisms. Moreover, selection can only account for functionality of a very narrow kind: approximately, design features organized to promote the reproduction of an individual and his or her relatives (Dawkins, 1986; Williams, 1966). Fortunately for the modem theory ofevolution, the only naturally occurring complex functionality that has ever been documented in plants, animals, or other organisms is functionality ofjust this kind, along with its derivatives and by-products. Mammals evolved adaptations to produce milk to feed their own young, infectious micro-organisms mimic human biochemistry to escape immune surveillance so they can survive and reproduce, and plants produce oxygen as a waste product of feeding themselves through photosynthesis, and not for the pleasure of watching humans breathe or forests bum. Of course, human breeders artificially intervene, and one could easily imagine, as an alternative to a Darwinian world, a benevolent deity or extraterrestrial being creating the properties of living things in order to serve human convenience rather than the organisms' own reproduction. Wild horses could be born with saddle-shaped humps, luggage racks, and a spontaneous willingness to be ridden; chronic bacterial infections could jolt humans with caffeine every morning 45 seconds before they need to get up. Similarly, the nonliving world could be full of intricate functional arrangements not created by humans, such as mountains that naturally mimic hotels down to the details of closet hangers, electric wiring, and television sets. But this is not the world we live in. We live in a
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world of biological functionality and its derivatives, traceable originally to the operation of natural selection on reproducing systems (Darwin, 1859; Dawkins, 1976, 1986). To be able to understand the world ofbiological phenomena, one must be able to recognize this peculiar functional organization and distinguish it from the products of chance. Of course, the fact that living things are machines organized to reproduce themselves and their kin does not mean that evolutionary functional analysis focuses narrowly on such issues as copulation or pregnancy (things intuitively associated with reproduction) over, say, taste preferences, vision, emotional expression, social categorization, coalition formation, or object recognition. A life history of successfully achieved reproduction (including kin reproduction) requires accomplishing the entire tributary network of preconditions for and facilitations of reproduction in complex ecological and social environments. Of course, this includes all of the informationgathering, inference, and decision-making that these tasks entail. For this reason, humans display a diverse range of adaptations designed to perform a wide and structured variety ofsubsidiary tasks, from solicitation of assistance from one's parents, to language acquisition, to modeling the spatial distribution of local objects, to reading the body language of an antagonist. Finally, the behavior of individual organisms is caused by the structure of their adaptations and the environmental input to them; it is not independently governed by the principle of individual fitness maximization. Individual organisms are best thought of as adaptation-executers rather than as fitness-maximizers. Natural selection cannot directly "see" an individual organism in a specific situation and cause behavior to be adaptively tailored to the functional requirements imposed by that situation. To understand the role of selection in behavior, one must follow out all steps in the chain: Selection acting over evolutionary time has constructed the mechanisms we have inherited in the present, and it is this set of mechanisms that regulates our behavior-not natural selection directly. These mechanisms situated in particular individuals frequently-but by no means always-bring about a functional coordination between the adaptive demands of particular situations and associated behavioral responses. Thus, the biological concept of functionality differs from the folk notion of functionality as goal-seeking behavior. Although some ofour evolved psychological mechanisms probably operate through goal-seeking, surely none ofthem has fitness-maximization as a mentally represented goal (see Symons, this volume). Those goal-seeking mechanisms that do exist most likely embody proximate goals, such as "stay warm" or "protect your infant," rather than ultimate goals, such as "maximize your fitness" or "have as many offspring as possible." Indeed, goals of the latter kind are probably impossible to instantiate in any computational system (Symons, 1987, 1989, this volume; see also Barkow, 1989; Cosrnides & Tooby, 1987, 1992; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Irons, 1983, p. 200; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b. For somewhat contrary views, see, e.g., Alexander, 1979, 1987 and Turke, 1990). For this reason, an adaptationist approach does not properly involve explaining or interpreting individual behavior in specific situations as "attempts" to increase fitness (Symons, 1989, this volume; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). To make the distinction between these alternative views ofevolutionary explanation clear-humans as fitnessmaximizers (fitness-teleology) versus humans as adaptation-executors (adaptationism)-a brief example will serve. Fitness teleologists may observe a situation and ask
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something like, "How is Susan increasing her fitness by salting her eggs?" An adaptationist would ask, instead, "What is the nature of the evolved human salt preference mechanisms-if any-that are generating the observed behavior and how did the structure of these mechanisms mesh with the physiological requirements for salt and the opportunities to procure salt in the Pleistocene?" So, in viewing cases of behavior, the adaptationist question is not, "How does this or that action contribute to this particular individual's reproduction?" Instead, the adaptationist questions are, "What is the underlying panhuman psychological architecture that leads to this behavior in certain specified circumstances?" and "What are the design features ofthis architectureifany-that regulate the relevant behavior in such a way that it would have constituted functional solutions to the adaptive problems that regularly occurred in the Pleistocene?
What Adaptations Look Like For the reasons outlined above, the species-typical organization ofthe psychology and physiology of modern humans necessarily has an evolutionary explanation and an evolutionarily patterned architecture. This is not a vague speculation or an overreaching attempt to subsume one discipline inside another, but constitutes as solid a fact as any in modern science. In fact, this conclusion should be a welcome one because it is the doorway through which a very rich body of additional knowledge-evolutionary biology-can be brought to bear on the study ofpsychological architecture. At its core, the discovery of the design of human psychology and physiology is a problem in reverse engineering: We have working exemplars of the design in front of us, but we need to organize our sea ofobservations about these exemplars into a map ofthe causal structure that accounts for the behavior ofthe system. Psychology has never been limited by a lack ofobservations. Fortunately, the knowledge that humans are the product of evolution supplies us with a powerful set of tools-the concepts of evolutionary functional analysis-for organizing these observations into useful categories so that the underlying systems of order can be discerned. The most illuminating level ofdescription for organizing observations about living species is usually in terms of their adaptations (and associated evolutionary categories). This system of description has some warrant on being considered a privileged frame of reference because the complex functional organization that exists in the design of organisms was injected into them through the construction of adaptations by natural selection. Adaptations are the accumulated output of selection, and selection is the single significant anti-entropic or ordering force orchestrating functional organic design (Dawkins, 1986). So if one is interested in uncovering intelligible organization in our species-typical psychological architecture, discovering and describing its adaptations is the place to begin. To understand what complex adaptations "look like," it will help to begin concretely with a standard example, the vertebrate eye and its associated neural circuitry. (For its role in understanding adaptations, see Pinker & Bloom, this volume; for a discussion of color vision, see Shepard, this volume.) The eye consists of an exquisitely organized arrangement ofcells, structures, and processes, such as ( 1) a transparent protective outer coating. the cornea; (2) an opening. the pupil, through which light enters; (3) an iris, which is a muscle that surrounds the pupil and constricts or dilates the aperture, regulating the amount of light entering the eye; (4) a lens, which is both transparent and flexible, and whose curvature and thickness can be adjusted to bring objects
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of varying distances into focus; (5) the retina, a light-sensitive surface that lies in the focal plane ofthe lens: this multilayered neural tissue lining the inside back ofthe eyeball is, in effect, a piece ofthe brain that migrated to the eye during fetal development; (6) classes of specialized cells (rods and cones) in the retina that transform sampled properties of ambient light through selective photochemical reactions into electrochemical impulses; (7) the activation by these electrochemical impulses ofneighboring bipolar cells, which, in tum, feed signals into neighboring ganglion cells, whose axons converge to form the optic nerve; (8) the optic nerve, which carries these signals out of the eye and to the lateral geniculate bodies in the brain; (9) the routing ofthese signals to the visual cortex, into a series of retinotopic maps and other neural circuits, where they are further analyzed by a formidable array of information-processing mechanisms that also constitute crucial parts of the visual system. The dynamic regulatory coordination present in the operation of the eye is also striking: The variable aperture modulates the amount oflight entering the eye in coordination with ambient illumination; the eyes are stereoscopically coordinated with each other so that their lines ofvision converge on the same object or point ofinterest; the thickness and curvature ofthe lens is modulated so that light from the object being viewed is focused on the retina and not in front of it or behind it; and so on. Through a more detailed description, this list could easily be extended to include many thousands of specialized features that contribute to the functionality of the system (tear ducts, eyelids, edge detectors, muscle systems, specific photochemical reactions, and so on) through the orchestrated arrangement of hundreds of millions ofcells. This is even more true if we were to go beyond a taxonomically generalized description of the vertebrate eye and relate specific design features in particular vertebrates to the particular environments and visual tasks they faced. Frogs, for example, have retinal "bug detectors"; the rabbit retina has a variety of specialized devices, including a "hawk detector" (Marr, 1982, p. 32), and so on. It is important to appreciate that this organization is not just macroscopic, but extends down to the organized local relationships that subsets of cells maintain with each other, which perform such computations as edge detection and bug detection-and beyond, down into the specific architecture of the constituent cells themselves. Thus, rods and cones have a distinctive design and layout that includes specialized organelles that adjust the size and shape of the photoreactive regions; they have membranes that fold back on themselves to form sacs localizing the photoreceptive pigments; they have specialized chemistry so that light induces these pigments to undergo chemical changes that ultimately result in a change of membrane potential; they are arranged so that this change of membrane potential effects the release ofneurotransmitters to neighboring bipolar glion cells, and soon. Thus, the eye is an extraordinarily complex arrangement of specialized features that does something very useful for the organism. Moreover, this structure was originally absent from the ancestral design of the original single-celled founding organism, so the appearance of eyes in modem organisms must be explained as a succession of modifications across generations away from this initial state. It is easy to see how selection, through retaining those accidental modifications that improved performance, could start with an initial accidentally light-sensitive nerve ending or regulatory cell and transform it, through a large enough succession of increasingly complex functional forms, into the superlatively crafted modem eye (see, e.g., Dawkins, 1986). In
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fact, eyes (light-receptive organs) have evolved independently over 40 times in the history of animal life from eyeless ancestral forms (Mayr, 1982). Of course, there are certainly many nonselectionist processes in evolution by which descendants are modified away from ancestral forms-drift, macromutation, hitchhiking, developmental by-product, and so on. But selection is the only process that directs change by retaining variants that are more functional. Thus, selection is the only causal process that has a systematic tendency to propel the system in the direction of increasingly functional arrangements, instead of into the immeasurably larger array of nonfunctional arrangements that the system could move to at each of the innumerable choice points in the evolution ofdesigns. In contrast, nonselectional processes can produce functional outcomes only by chance because a new modification's degree offunctionality plays no role in determining whether nonselectional processes will cause it to be retained or eliminated. For this reason, evolutionary processes other than selection are properly classified as "chance processes" with respect to the evolution ofadaptive complexity. It would be a coincidence ofmiraculous degree ifa series of these function-blind events, brought about by drift, by-products, hitchhiking, and so on, just happened to throw together a structure as complexly and interdependently functional as an eye (Dawkins, 1986; Pinker & Bloom, this volume). For this reason, nonselectionist mechanisms of evolutionary change cannot be seen as providing any reasonable alternative explanation for the eye or for any other complex adaptation. Complex functional organization is the signature of selection. The eye is by no means a unique case. Immunologists, for example, have traced out a similar, immensely articulated architecture of complexly interrelated defenses (the blood monocytes, histiocytes, free macrophages, T-lymphocytes, B-Iymphocytes, spleen, thymus, and so on). In fact, virtually every organ that has been examined so far betrays a complex functionality unmatched as of yet by any system engineered by humans. More than a century of research and observation confirms that selection builds into organisms a complex functional organization of an eye-like precision and quality. Still, although many social and biological scientists are wil1ing to concede that the body is full of the most intricately functional machinery, heavily organized by natural selection, they remain skeptical that the same is true ofthe mind. Moreover, partisans of the Standard Social Science Model insist on the Cartesian distinction between the material world of anatomy and physiology and the mental world of psychology, vigorously resisting attempts to see them as different descriptions ofthe same integrated system, subject to the same organizing principles. Arguments by Chomsky and others that our psychological architecture should contain "mental organs" for the same reasons that the rest ofthe body contains physical organs (i.e., that different tasks require functionally different solutions) have yet to convince the majority ofpsychologists outside of perception and language (Chomsky, 1975; Marshall, 1981). Thus, Lewontin is expressing a thoroughly orthodox SSSM skepticism toward the idea that the human psychological architecture is functionally organized when he suggests that "[h]uman cognition may have developed as the purely epiphenomenal consequence ofthe major increase in brain size, which, in fact, may have been selected for quite other reasons" (Lewontin, 1990, p. 244). At least as numerous are those researchers who detect in human thought and behavior something more than the sheer accident that Lewontin sees, and yet who ask: Aren't psychological (or neurophysiological)
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mechanisms expected to be less well-engineered than physiological organs? High degrees offunctionality are all very well for eyes, intestines, and immune systems, but what about the constituent structures of the human psychological architecture? Are there at least any examples of well-engineered psychological adaptations that might parallel physiological adaptations? What is most ironic about this question is that perhaps the single most uncontroversial example ofan adaptation-an example that is conceded to be well-engineered by even the most exercised of the anti-adaptationists-is a psychological adaptation: the eye. As Epicharmus pointed out two and halfmillennia ago, "Only mind has sight and hearing; all things else are deafand blind." The eye and the rest ofthe visual system perform no mechanical or chemical service for the body; it is an information-processing adaptation. This information-processing device is designed to take light incident on a two-dimensional body surface and-through applying information-processing procedures to this two-dimensional array-construct cognitive models of the local three-dimensional world, including what objects are present, their shapes, their locations, their orientations, their trajectories, their colors, the textures oftheir surfaces, as well as face recognition, emotional expression recognition, and so on. Indeed, for those committed to a Cartesian world view, one could think ofthe eye as a tube that traverses metaphysical realms, one end ofwhich obtrudes into the physical realm, the other into the mental. For modem monists, however, these two realms are simply alternative descriptions of the same thing, convenient for different analytic purposes. The "mental" consists of ordered relationships in physical systems that embody properties typically running under labels such as "information," "meaning," or regulation. From this point of view, there is no Cartesian tube: both ends ofthe visual system are physical and both are mental. Because psychologists as a community have been resistant to adaptationist thinking, it was an enormous (although nonaccidental) stroke ofgood fortune that the visual system extrudes a "physical end" to the surface of the body and that this "physical end" bears a remarkable resemblance to the camera, a functional machine designed by humans. Selection has shaped the physical structure ofthe eye so that it reflects and exploits the properties of light, the geometry of the three-dimensional world, the refracting properties oflenses, and so on; the camera has a similar structure because it was designed by human engineers to reflect and exploit these same properties. These parallels between camera and eye were clues that were so obvious and so leading that it became a reasonable enterprise to investigate the visual system from a functionalist perspective. Researchers started with the physical end and followed the "Cartesian tube" upward and inward, so to speak, into the mind. In so doing, they have discovered increasingly complex and specialized computational machinery: edge detectors, motion detectors, shape detectors, depth boundary detectors, bug detectors (in the third neural layer of the retina of frogs), stereoscopic disparity analyzers, color constancy mechanisms, face recognition systems, and on and on. Hundreds of vision researchers, working over decades, have been mapping this exquisitely structured information-processing adaptation, whose evolutionary function is scene analysis-the reconstruction of models of real-world conditions from a two-dimensional visual array. As more and more functional subcomponents are explored, and as artificial intelligence researchers try to duplicate vision in computational systems attached to electronic cameras, four things have become clear (Marr, 1982; Poggio, Torre, & Koch, 1985). The first is that the magnitude of the computa-
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tional problem posed by scene analysis is immensely greater than anyone had suspected prior to trying to duplicate it. Even something so seemingly simple as perceiving the same object as having the same color at different times ofthe day turns out to require intensely specialized and complex computational machinery because the spectral distribution of light reflected by the object changes widely with changes in natural illumination (Shepard, this volume). The second conclusion is that as a psychological adaptation (or set of adaptations, depending on whether one is a lumper or splitter), our visual system is very well-engineered, capable ofrecovering far more sophisticated information from two-dimensional light arrays than the best of the artificially engineered systems developed so far. The third is that successful vision requires specialized neural circuits or computational machinery designed particularly for solving the adaptive problem of scene analysis (Marr, 1982). And the fourth is that scene analysis is an unsolvable computational problem unless the design features of this specialized machinery "assume" that objects and events in the world manifest many specific regularities (Shepard, 1981, 1984, 1987a; Marr, 1982; Poggio et aI., 1985). These four lessons-complexity of the adaptive information-processing problem, well-engineered problem-solving machinery as the evolved solution, specialization ofthe problem-solving machinery to fit the particular nature ofthe problem, and the requirement that the machinery embody "innate knowledge" about the problem-relevant parts of the world-recur thrOl,lghout the study of the computational equipment that constitutes human psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a, I990b; on language, see Chomsky, 1975; Pinker, 1989; on vision, see Marr, 1982; Poggio et al., 1985). These discoveries of superlative "engineering" in the visual system have been paralleled in the study ofthe other sense organs, which are simply the recognizable transducing ends of an intricate mass of psychological adaptations that consist of increasingly more complex and integrative layers of specialized neural processing. For a variety of reasons, the information-processing adaptations involved in perception have been the only psychological mechanisms that have been studied for decades and in depth from a functionalist perspective. Contributing factors include the fact that their functionality is obvious to all sensate humans and their scientific study was rescued from the metaphysical doubt that hangs over other psychological phenomena because their associated physical transducing structures provided a "materialist" place to begin. Arguably the most important factor, however, was that these were the only mechanisms for which psychologists had any good standards of what counted as biologically successful problem-solving. Unacquainted with evolutionary biology, few psychologists know that there are standards for successful problem-solving in other realms as well, such as social behavior. Unless one knows what counts as a biologically successful outcome, one simply cannot recognize or investigate complex functional design or assess the extent to which a design is well-engineered. Consequently, at present it is difficult to assess how well psychological adaptations measure up against the intricacy and functionality of other adaptations. We can only judge on the basis ofthe restricted set that have already been studied extensively from a functionalist perspective-the perceptual mechanisms. Of course, because the paradigmatic example ofa well-engineered adaptation, used for over 130 years in biology, is a psychological adaptation, we know that in at least some cases our evolved information-processing machinery incorporates complex functional design of the highest order. Indeed, when the eye does appear in debates over Darwinism, it is usually used
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by anti-Darwinians, who insist that the eye is far too perfect a mechanism to have been constructed by natural selection. In general, whenever information-processing mechanisms have been studied from an evolutionary functional perspective-human vision and audition, echolocation in bats, dead-reckoning in desert ants, and so onthe results have indicated that the brain/mind contains psychological adaptations at least as intricately functional as anything to be found in the rest of the body. One could perhaps argue that perceptual mechanisms are exceptional cases because they are evolutionarily older than those psychological adaptations that are distinctively human-specific, and so have had more time to be refined. There are many reasons to suspect this is not the case. But, even if it were, it would only suggest that purely human-specific adaptive problems, such as extensive tool use or extensive reciprocation, would have problem-solving adaptations less exquisite than vision, hearing, maternal care, threat-perception, motivational arbitration, mate selection, foraging, emotional communication, and many other problems that have been with us for tens of millions of years. It would not mean that we have no adaptations to human-specific problems at all. One reason the case oflanguage is so illuminating is that it speaks to exactly this issue ofthe potential for complex functionality in humanspecific adaptations. The language faculty is the only human information-processing system outside ofperception that has been studied extensively with clear standards of what counts as functional performance, and the facts of psycholinguistics weigh in heavily against the hypothesis that human-specific adaptations have had insufficient time to evolve the same highly elaborated, intricately interdependent functionality characteristic ofperceptual mechanisms (Pinker & Bloom, this volume). The language faculty has the same hallmarks ofoverwhelmingly functional complex design that the visual system does, and yet we know it is a recent and human-specific adaptation that evolved after the hominids split offfrom the (rest ofthe) great apes (Pinker & Bloom, this volume). The claim that language competence is a simple and poorly engineered adaptation cannot be taken seriously, given the total amount oftime, engineering, and genius that has gone into the still unsuccessful effort to produce artificial systems that can remotely approach-let alone equal-human speech perception, comprehension, acquisition, and production. Finally, behavioral scientists should be aware that functional organic machines look very different from the kinds ofsystems human engineers produce using planning and foresight. Human engineers can start with a clean drawing board, designing systems from scratch to perform a function cleanly, using materials selected particularly for the task at hand. Evolving lineages are more like the proverbial ship that is always at sea. The ship can never go into dry dock for a major overhaul; whatever improvements are made must be implemented plank by plank, so that the ship does not sink during its modification. In evolution, successive designs are always constructed out of modifications of whatever preexisting structures are there-structures linked (at least in the short run) through complex developmental couplings. Yet these short-run limitations do not prevent the emergence of superlatively organized psychological and physiological adaptations that exhibit functionality of the highest known orderhigher, in fact, than human engineers have been able to contrive in most cases. This is because the evolutionary process continues to operate over large numbers of individuals and over enormous stretches oftime, with selection relentlessly hill-climbing. To anthropomorphize, selection achieves its results through "tinkering," saving large numbers of frequently small and independent improvements cumulatively over vast
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expanses oftime (Jacob, 1917). Thus, chains ofsuccessive modifications may be very large indeed to arrive at an increasingly sophisticated "solution" or problem-solving mechanism. The fact that alternative modifications are randomly generated-and that selection at anyone time is limited to choosing among this finite set of actual alternatives-means that the evolutionary process might by chance "overlook" or "walk by" a specific solution that would have been obvious to a human engineer, simply because the correct mutations did not happen to occur. The fact that evolution is not a process that works by "intelligence" cuts both ways, however. Precisely because modifications are randomly generated, adaptive design solutions are not precluded by the finite intelligence of any engineer. Consequently, evolution can contrive subtle solutions that only a superhuman, omniscient engineer could have intentionally designed. So, although organisms are functionally designed machines, they look very different from the machines that humans build. For this reason, the science ofunderstanding living organization is very different from physics or chemistry, where parsimony makes sense as a theoretical criterion. The study oforganisms is more like reverse engineering, where one may be dealing with a large array of very different components whose heterogeneous organization is explained by the way in which they interact to produce a functional outcome. Evolution, the constructor ofIiving organization, has no privileged tendency to build into designs principles ofoperation that are simple and general. Evolution operates by chance-which builds nothing systematic into organisms-and by selection-which cumulatively adds modifications, regardless of whether they add complexity. Thus, psychologists are not likely to find a few satisfying general principles like MaxweU's equations that unify aU psychological phenomena, but instead a complex pluralism of mechanisms. Satisfying general principles will instead be found at the next level up, in the principles of evolutionary functionalism that explain the organization of these mechanisms. At an engineering or mechanism level, knowledge wiU have to be constructed mechanism by mechanism, with the organization ofthe properties ofeach mechanism made intelligible by knowing the specific evolved function ofthat mechanism. Thus, the computational mechanisms that generate maternal love, grammar acquisition, mate selection, kin-directed assistance, or reciprocation can be expected to parallel Ramachadran's characterization of perceptionas, essentially a "bag oftricks;"that through millions ofyears oftrial and error, the visual system evolved numerous short-cuts, rules-of-thumb and heuristics which were adopted not for their aesthetic appeal or mathematical elegance but simply because they worked (hence the "utilitarian" theory). This is a familiar idea in biology but for some reason it seems to have escaped the notice of psychologists, who seem to forget that the brain is a biological organ just like the pancreas, the liver, or any other specialized organ (Ramachadran, 1990, p. 24).
Adaptations, By-products, and Random Effects The most fundamental analytic tool for recognizing an adaptation is its definition. Stripped ofcomplications and qualifications, an adaptation is (I) a system ofinherited and reliably developing properties that recurs among members of a species that (2) became incorporated into the species' standard design because during the period of their incorporation, (3) they were coordinated with a set ofstatisticaUy recurrent structural properties outside the adaptation (either in the environment or in the other parts ofthe organism), (4) in such a way that the causal interaction ofthe two (in the context
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ofthe rest of the properties ofthe organism) produced functional outcomes that were ultimately tributary to propagation with sufficient frequency (i.e., it solved an adaptive problem for the organism). (For a more extensive definition of the concept of adaptation, see Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). Adaptations are mechanisms or systems of properties crafted by natural selection to solve the specific problems posed by the regularities of the physical, chemical, developmental, ecological, demographic, social, and informational environments encountered by ancestral populations during the course ofa species' or population's evolution (for other discussions ofadaptation, see Pinker & Bloom, this volume; Symons, 1989, this volume; R. Thornhill, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a; Williams, 1966, 1985; see Dawkins, 1986, for his discussion of adaptations under the name adaptive complexity). Thus, chance and selection, the two components of the evolutionary process, explain different types ofdesign properties in organisms, and all aspects ofdesign must be attributed to one of these two forces. Complex functional organization is the product and signature ofselection. Reciprocally, the species-typical properties oforganisms attributable to chance will be no more important, organized, or functional than can be attributed to chance. The conspicuously distinctive cumulative impacts of chance and selection allow the development ofrigorous standards ofevidence for recognizing and establishing the existence of adaptations and distinguishing them from the nonadaptive aspects oforganisms caused by the nonselectionist mechanisms ofevolutionary change (Pinker & Bloom, this volume; Symons, this volume; R. Thornhill, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; Williams, 1966, 1985). Complex adaptations are usually species-typical (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a); moreover, they are so well-organized and such good engineering solutions to adaptive problems that a chance coordination between problem and solution is effectively ruled out as a plausible explanation. Adaptations are recognizable by "evidence of special design" (Williams, 1966); that is, by recognizing certain features of the evolved species-typical design of an organism "as components of some special problem-solving machinery" (Williams, 1985, p. 1) that solve an evolutionarily long-standing problem. Standards for recognizing special design include factors such as economy, efficiency, complexity, precision, specialization, and reliability, which, like a key fitting a lock, render the design too good a solution to a defined adaptive problem to be coincidence (Williams, 1966). Like most other methods ofempirical hypothesis testing, the demonstration that something is an adaptation is always, at the core, a probability assessment concerning how likely a situation is to have arisen by chance. The lens, pupil, iris, optic nerve, retina, visual cortex, and so on, are too well coordinated both with each other and with environmental factors-such as the properties of light and the reflectant properties of surfaces-to have arisen by chance. In addition to adaptations, the evolutionary process commonly produces two other outcomes visible in the designs of organisms: (1) concomitants or by-products of adaptations (recently nicknamed "spandrels"; Gould & Lewontin, 1979); and (2) random effects. The design features that comprise adaptations became incorporated into the standard design because they promoted their own frequency and are, therefore, recognizable by their organized and functional relationships to the rest of the design and to the structure of the world. In contrast, concomitants of adaptations are those properties of the phenotype that do not contribute to functional design per se, but that happen to be coupled to properties that are, and so were dragged along into
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the organism's design because of selection on the design features to which they are linked. They may appear organized, but they are notfunctional/y organized. The explanation for any specific concomitant or spandrel is, therefore, the identification ofthe adaptation or adaptations to which it is coupled, together with the reason why it is coupled. For example, bones are adaptations, but the fact that they are white is an incidental by-product. Bones were selected to include calcium because it conferred hardness and rigidity to the structure (and was dietarily available), and it simply happens that alkaline earth metals appear white in many compounds, including the insoluble calcium salts that are a constituent of bone. From the point of view offunctional design, by-products are the result of"chance," in the sense that nothing in the process ofhow they came to be incorporated into a design other than sheer coincidence would cause them to be coordinated solutions to any adaptive problem. For this reason, by-products are expected not to contribute to the solution of adaptive problems more often or more effectively than chance could explain. Finally, ofcourse, entropic effects of many types act to introduce functional disorder into the design of organisms. They are recognizable by the lack ofcoordination that they produce within the architecture or between it and the environment, as well as by the fact that they frequently vary between individuals. Classes of entropic processes include mutation, evolutionarily unprecedented environmental change, individual exposure to unusual circumstances, and developmental accidents. Of course, one can decompose organisms into properties (or holistic relations) according to any of an infinite set of alternative systems. But, unless one applies a categorization system designed to capture their functional designs or adaptations, organisms will seem to be nothing but spandrels, chemistry, and entropy.
Recognizing Psychological Adaptations: Evolutionary, Cognitive, Neural, and Behavioral Levels of Analysis Capturing Invariance in Functional Organization: Behavioral, Cognitive, and Neuroscience Descriptions If the psychological architectures of organisms are infused with complex functional organization, this is not always easy to see. Precisely because functional organization may be very complex, and embedded in an even more bewildering array of variable and intricate by-products, it may appear to the unaided intellect to be indistinguishable from chaos or poor design. Unless one knows what to look for-unless, at the very least, one knows what counts as functional-one cannot recognize complex functionality even when one sees its operation. Sciences prosper when researchers discover the level of analysis appropriate for describing and investigating their particular subject: when researchers discover the level where invariance emerges, the level of underlying order. What is confusion, noise, or random variation at one level resolves itselfinto systematic patterns upon the discovery ofthe level ofanalysis suited to the phenomena under study. How, then, should the psychological architectures oforganisms be described so as to capture a level ofunderlying functional order? Three different languages for describing psychological phenomena are commonly used: the behavioral, the cognitive, and the neurobiological. Each language has strengths and weaknesses for different scientific purposes. For the purpose ofdiscovering, analyzing, and describing the functional
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organization of our evolved psychological architecture, we propose that the information-processing language ofcognitive science is the most useful. In the first place, this is because the evolutionary function ofthe brain is the adaptive regulation of behavior and physiology on the basis of information derived from the body and from the environment. Alternative design features are selected for on the basis of how well they solve adaptive problems-problems whose solution affects reproduction. How an organism processes information can have an enormous impact on its reproduction. It is, therefore, meaningful to ask what kind of cognitive design features would have constituted good solutions to adaptive information-processing problems that persisted over many generations. Evolutionary biology and huntergatherer studies supply definitions of the recurrent adaptive problems humans faced during their evolution, and cognitive psychology describes the information-processing mechanisms that evolved to solve them. By combining insights from these two fields, the functional organization of the mind can be brought into sharp relief. Second, adaptations are usually species-typical. Consequently, to capture evolved functional organization, one needs a language that can describe what is invariant across individuals and generations. This process ofdescription is key: By choosing the wrong descriptive categories, everything about an organism can seem variable and transitory to the extent that "plasticity" or "behavioral variability" can seem the single dominant property of an organism. In contrast, well-chosen categories can bring out the hidden organization that reappears from individual to individual and that, consequently, allows psychological phenomena to be described both economically and precisely. Purely behavioral categories are seldom able to capture meaningful species-typical uniformity: Are humans "aggressive" or "peaceful," "pair-bonding" or "polygynous," "rational" or "irrational?" With much justice, Geertz, echoing Kroeber, dismissed large and vague behavioral universals, such as marriage and religion, as "fake" (1973, p. 101). Human phenomena accurately described and categorized solely in terms ofbehavioral outcomes appear endlessly variable; they seem to manifest a kaleidoscopic welter of erratic and volatile phenomena, which makes any underlying uniformity-let alone functional design-difficult to see. Exceptions, such as reflexes and fixed action patterns, occur in the very few cases where the mapping between stimulus and behavior is simple and immediate. Behavioral characterizations ofanything much more complicated rapidly become so watered down with exceptions that, at best, one ends up with vague portrayals employing terms such as "capacity," "predisposition," "urge," "potential," and so on-things too murky to be helpful either in describing adaptations or in predicting behavior. Perhaps more important, however, is that behavior is not a phenomenon sui generis. It is the product of mechanisms that process information. Mechanisms that produce behavior can be usefully studied on a variety of different descriptive and explanatory levels. Neuroscientists describe the brain on a physical level-as the interaction ofneurons, hormones, neurotransmitters, and other organic aspects. In contast, cognitive psychologists study the brain as an information-processing system-that is, as a collection of programs that process information-without reference to the exact neurophysiological processes that perform these tasks. A cognitive description specifies what kinds of information the mechanism takes as input, what procedures it uses to transform that information, what kinds of data structures (representations) those procedures operate on, and what kinds of representations or behaviors it generates as
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output. The study ofcognition is the study of how humans and other animals process information. To understand subsequent arguments clearly, it is important to keep in mind exactly what we mean by the cognitive or information-processing level. Like all words, "cognitive" is used to mean many different things. For example, some researchers use it in a narrow sense, to refer to so-called "higher mental" processes, such as reasoning, as distinct from other psychological processes, such as "emotion" or "motivation"; that is, to refer to a concept that corresponds more or less to the folk notion of reasoning while in a calm frame of mind. In contrast, we are using the word cognitive in a different and more standard sense. In this chapter, we use terms such as cognitive and information-processing to refer to a language or level of analysis that can be used to precisely describe any psychological process: Reasoning, emotion, motivation, and motor control can all be described in cognitive terms, whether the processes that give rise to them are conscious or unconscious, simple or complex. In cognitive science, the term mind refers to an information-processing description ofthe functioning ofan organism's brain and that is the sense in which we use it. (For a more detailed discussion of the nature of cognitive explanations, see Block, 1980; Fodor, 1981; or Pylyshyn, 1984.) For example, ethologists have traditionally studied very simple cognitive programs. A newborn herring gull, for instance, has a cognitive program that defines a red dot on the end ofa beak as salient information from the environment, and that causes the chick to peck at the red dot upon perceiving it. Its mother has a cognitive program that defines pecking at her red dot as salient information from her environment, and that causes her to regurgitate food into the newborn's mouth when she perceives its pecks. These simple programs adaptively regulate how herring gulls feed their young. (Ifthere is a flaw anywhere in these programs-i.e., ifthe mother or chick fails to recognize the signal or to respond appropriately-the chick starves. If the flaw has a genetic basis, it will not be passed on to future generations. By such feedback, natural selection shapes the design ofcognitive programs.) These descriptions ofthe herring gull's cognitive programs are entirely in terms of the functional relationship among different pieces of information; they describe two simple information-processing systems. Moreover, precise descriptions of these cognitive programs can capture the way in which information is used to generate adaptive behavior. Ofcourse, these programs are embodied in the herring gull's neurobiological "hardware." Knowledge ofthis hardware, however, is not necessary for understanding the programs as information-processing systems. Presumably, one could build a silicon-based robot, using chemical processes completely different from those present in the gull's brain, that would produce the same behavioral output (pecking at red dot) in response to the same informational input (seeing red dot). The robot's cognitive programs would maintain the same functional relationships among pieces of information and would, therefore, be, in an important sense, identical to the cognitive programs of the herring gull. But the physical processes that implement these programs in the robot would be totally different. Although all information-processing mechanisms operate by virtue ofthe physical processes that implement them, cognitive descriptions and physicalist ones are not equivalent, but complementary. They cannot be reduced to each other. For this reason, the information-processing descriptions ofcognitive science are not merely metaphors in which brains are compared to computers. Their status as an independent
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level of psychological explanation can be established by considering the fact that the same information-processing relationships can be embodied in many different physical arrangements. The text-editing program Wordstar, for example, can run on machines with many different kinds of physical architectures, but it always has the same functional design at an information-processing level-the same key strokes will move the cursor, delete a word, or move a block oftext. And the robot "gull" will still peck at a red dot, even though its programs are embodied in silicon chips rather than in neurons. These relationships can be described independently of their physical instantiation in any particular computer or organism, and can be described with precision. Thus, an information-processing program, whether in an organism or in a computer, is a set of invariant relationships between informational inputs and "behavioral" outputs. Moreover, from the point of view of the adaptive regulation of behavior, it is the cognitive system of relationships that counts. Given that the correct information-processing steps are carried out, selection pressures on psychological mechanisms are "blind" to the specific physical implementation oftheir informationprocessing structure (except insofar as different physical implementations may vary in factors such as metabolic cost). Because the primary function ofthe brain is the adaptive reguiation of behavior and physiology in response to information, natural selection retains neural mechanisms on the basis oftheir ability to create functionally organized relationships between information and behavior (e.g., the sight of a predator activates inference procedures that cause the organism to hide or flee) or between information and physiology (e.g., the sight ofa predator increases the organism's heart rate in preparation for flight). The mechanism is selected to create the correct information-behavior or information-physiology relationship and, so long as the physical implementation produces this relationship, its particular form is free to vary according to other factors. Indeed, at certain points in development, injury to the human brain can sometimes be "repaired" in the sense that different neurons re-create the same ordered relationship between information and behavior that the damaged ones had implemented prior to the injury (Flohr, 1988). When "rewiring" of this kind occurs, the information-processing relationship is preserved, not its physical instantiation. In short, it is primarily the information-processing structure ofthe human psychological architecture that has been functionally organized by natural selection, and the neurophysiology has been organized insofar as it physically realizes this cognitive organization. Because the function ofthe brain is informational in nature, its richly organized functional structure is only visible when its properties are described in cognitive terms. Much of great interest can be learned by investigating the brain in neurobiological terms, but its adaptive dimension will remain invisible unless and until its mechanisms are described in a language that is capable ofexpressing its informational functions. For these reasons, the invariant functional organization of complex psychological adaptations is more likely to be captured by cognitive descriptions than by neuroscience ones. 4 Just as mathematics is an indispensable language for describing many scientific phenomena, information-processing language is a precise descriptive vehicle for capturing how complex systems functionally interact with complex environments. What mathematics is for physics, cognitive descriptions can be for a science of psychology and behavior. The use of information-processing language is not enough, however. Alone, it is no more useful for discovering invariances in functional organization than any other
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descriptive language. Unless one knows what counts as functional, one cannot recognize complex functional design even when one sees its operation. Is friendship functional? Is anger? Is joining a group? Is pregnancy sickness? Unless one knows what adaptive problems a species encountered during its evolutionary history and what would have counted as solutions to these problems, these questions are unanswerable. To discover invariances in the functional organization of the human mind, the language and methods ofcognitive science must be used in concert with principles drawn from evolutionary biology.
Where Evolutionary Biology and Cognitive Psychology Meet Conceptual systems, models, and theories function as organs of perception: They allow new kinds ofevidence and new relationships to be perceived (Popper, 1972). As Einstein remarked, "it is the theory which decides what we can observe" (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 63). The tools ofevolutionary functional analysis function as an organ ofperception, bringing the blurry world ofhuman psychological and behavioral phenomena into sharp focus and allowing one to discern the formerly obscured level of our richly organized species-typical functional architecture. Theories about selection pressures operating in ancestral environments place important constraints on-and often define-what can count as an adaptive function. Indeed, many theories ofadaptive function define what would count as adaptive information-processing. Consider, for example, Hamilton's rule, which describes the selection pressures operating on mechanisms that generate behaviors that have a reproductive impact on an organism and its kin (Hamilton, 1964). The rule defines (in part) what counts as biologically successful outcomes in these kinds ofsituations. These outcomes often cannot be reached unless specific information is obtained and processed by the organism. In the simplest case of two individuals, a mechanism that produces acts of assistance has an evolutionary advantage over alternative mechanisms ifit reliably causes individual i to help relative j whenever C i < rijBj • In this equation, C i = cost to i of rendering an act of assistance to j, measured in terms of foregone reproduction, BJ = benefit to j of receiving that act of assistance, measured in terms of enhanced reproduction, and rij = the probability that a randomly sampled gene will be present at the same locus in the relative due to joint inheritance from a common ancestor. Other things being equal, the more closely psychological mechanisms reliably produce behavior that conforms to Hamilton's rule, the more strongly they will be selected for. Under many ecological conditions, this selection pressure defines an information-processing problem that organisms will be selected to evolve mechanisms to solve. Using this description of an adaptive problem as a starting point, one can immediately begin to define the cognitive subtasks that would have to be addressed by any set of mechanisms capable of producing behavior that conforms to this rule. What information-processing mechanisms evolved to reliably identify relatives, for example? What criteria and procedures do they embody-for example, do these mechanisms define an individual as a sibling ifthat individual was nursed by the same female who nursed you? What kind of information is processed to estimate rij, the degree of relatedness? Under ancestral conditions, did siblings and cousins co-reside, such that one might expect the evolution of mechanisms that discriminate between the two? After all, ri,fuJl$ib = 4ri' jim CVlUm' What kind of mechanisms would be capable of estimat-
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ing the magnitudes ofthe consequences ofspecific actions on one's own and on others' reproduction? How are these various pieces of information combined to produce behavior that conforms to Hamilton's rule? And so on. This example highlights several points. First and most important, it shows how knowledge drawn from evolutionary biology can be used to discover functional organization in our psychological architecture that was previously unknown. Hamilton's rule is not intuitively obvious; no one would look for psychological mechanisms that are well-designed for producing behavior that conforms to this rule unless they had already heard of it. After Hamilton's rule had been formulated, behavioral ecologists began to discover psychological mechanisms that embodied it in nonhuman animals (Krebs & Davies, 1984). Unguided empiricism is unlikely to uncover a mechanism that is well-designed to solve this kind of problem. Second, this example illustrates that one can easily use the definition ofan adaptive problem to generate hypotheses about the design features of information-processing mechanisms, even when these mechanisms are designed to produce social behavior. It allows one to break the adaptive problem down into cognitive subtasks, such as kin recognition and cost/benefit estimation, in the same way that knowing that the adaptive function ofthe visual system is scene analysis allows one to identify subtasks such as depth perception and color constancy. Third, the example shows how knowing the ancestral conditions under which a species evolved can suggest hypotheses about design features of the cognitive adaptations that solve the problem. For example, co-residence is a reliable cue ofsib-hood in some species, but other cues would have to be picked up and processed in a species in which siblings and cousins co-reside. Fourth, Hamilton's rule provides one with a standard of good design for this particular problem. Such standards are an essential tool for cognitive scientists because they allow them to identify whether a hypothesized mechanism is capable of solving the adaptive problem in question and to decide whether that mechanism would do a betterjob under ancestral conditions than alternative designs. This allows one to apply the powerful methods ofleamability analysis outside of psycholinguistics, to adaptive problems involving social behavior (see pp. 73-77, on evolutionary functional analysis). Fifth, this example illustrates how insights from evolutionary biology can bring functional organization into clear focus at the cognitive level, but not at the neurobiologicalleveI. Hamilton's rule immediately suggests hypotheses about the functional organization of mechanisms described in information-processing terms, but it tells one very little about the neurobiology that implements these mechanisms-it cannot be straightforwardly related to hypotheses about brain chemistry or neuroanatomy. Once one knows the properties of the cognitive mechanisms that solve this adaptive problem, however, it should be far easier to discover the structure ofthe neural mechanisms that implement them. The intellectual payoff of coupling theories of adaptive function to the methods and descriptive language of cognitive science is potentially enormous. By homing in on the right categories-ultimately adaptationist categories-an immensely intricate, functionally organized, species-typical architecture can appear, with perhaps some additional thin films of frequency-dependent or population-specific design as well (e.g., McCracken, 1971). Just as one can now flip open Gray's Anatomy to any page and find an intricately detailed depiction of some part of our evolved species-typical
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morphology, we anticipate that in 50 or 100 years one will be able to pick up an equivalent reference work for psychology and find in it detailed information-processing descriptions of the multitude of evolved species-typical adaptations of the human mind, including how they are mapped onto the corresponding neuroanatomy and how they are constructed by developmental programs. The Impact of Recurrent Environmental and Organismic Structure on the Design of Adaptations
Organisms transact the business ofpropagation in specific environments, and the persistent characteristics of those environments determine the dangers, opportunities, and elements the organism has to use and to cope with in its process of propagation. Consequently, the structure of the environment causes corresponding adaptive organization to accumulate in the design of the organism (Shepard., 1987a; Tooby & Cosmides, I990b). For example, the design ofeyes reflects the properties oflight, objects, and surfaces; the design of milk reflects the dietary requirements of infants (and what was dietarily available to mothers); the design ofclaws reflects things such as the properties of prey animals, the strength of predator limbs, and the task ofcapture and dismemberment. This functional organization in the organism-its set ofadaptationsis designed to exploit the enduring properties of the environment in which it evolved (termed its environment ofevolutionary adaptedness, or EEA) and to solve the recurring problems posed by that environment. Adaptations evolve so that they mesh with the recurring structural features of the environment in such a way that reproduction is promoted in the organism or its kin. Like a key in a lock, adaptations and particular features of the world fit together tightly, to promote functional ends. Moreover, from the point of view ofany specific design feature or adaptation, the rest ofthe encompassing organism itselfconstitutes an enduring environmental structure as well. New adaptations or design features will be selected for on the basis ofhow well they productively coordinate with the persistent characteristics of this internal environment, as well as with the external environment. This is why adaptations evolve to fit together with each other within the organism so well. Thus, the adaptive mesh between tendon, muscle, and bone is no different in principle than the adaptive mesh between foraging mechanisms and the ecological distribution offood and cues reliably correlated with its presence (Real, 1991). Obviously, therefore, adaptations may solve endogenous adaptive problems and may improve over evolutionary time without necessarily being driven by or connected to any change in the external environment. Long-term, across-generation recurrence of conditions-external, internal, or their interaction-is central to the evolution ofadaptations, and it is easy to see why. Transient conditions that disappear after a single or a few generations may lead to some temporary change in the frequency ofdesigns, but the associated selection pressures will disappear or reverse as often as conditions do. Therefore, it is only those conditions that recur, statistically accumulating across many generations, that lead to the construction of complex adaptations. As a corollary, anything that is recurrently true (as a net statistical or structural matter) across large numbers ofgenerations could potentially come to be exploited by an evolving adaptation to solve a problem or to improve performance. For this reason, a major part ofadaptationist analysis involves sifting for these environmental or organismic regularities or invariances. For example, mental states, such as behavioral intentions and emotions, cannot be directly observed. But if there is a reliable correlation over evolutionary time between the
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movement ofhuman facial muscles and emotional state or behavioral intentions, then specialized mechanisms can evolve that infer a person's mental state from the movement of that person's facial muscles (Ekman, 1973, 1984; Fridlund, in press). Indeed, evidence drawn from cognitive neuroscience indicates that we do have mechanisms specialized for "reading" facial expressions of emotion (Etcoff, 1983, 1986). To begin with, a cognitive adaptation can, through exploiting the world's subtle statistical structure, go far beyond the information it is given, and reconstruct from fragmentary cues highly accurate models oflocal conditions by exploiting these relationships (e.g., self-propelled motion is correlated with the presence of an animal; a sharp discontinuity in reflected light intensity is correlated with the presence of an edge). This evolutionary Kantian position has already been richly vindicated in the fields of perception and psychophysics (see, e.g., Marr, 1982; Shepard, 1981, 1984, 1987a, this volume), where the representations that our evolved computational systems construct go far beyond what is "logically" warranted solely by the sensory information itself, usually settling on single preferred interpretations. Our minds can do this reliably and validly because this fragmentary information is operated on by evolved procedures that were selected precisely because they reflect the subtle relationships enduringly present in the world (e.g., shading cues that are correlated with shape and depth, time-location relationships that are correlated with the most probable kinematic trajectories followed by natural objects). These mechanisms supply a privileged organization to the available sense data so that the interaction ofthe two generates interpretations that usually correspond to actual conditions in the external world. In the absence ofspecialized mechanisms that assume and rely on certain relationships being characteristic of the world, recovering accurate models ofthe external world from sense data would be an insoluble computational problem (Marr, 1982; Poggio et al., 1985). Parallel ideas form the centerpiece of Chomskyan psycholinguistics: Children must be equipped with specialized mechanisms ("mental organs") that are functionally organized to exploit certain grammatical universals of human language. Otherwise, language learning would be an unsolvable computational problem for the child (Chomsky 1957, 1959, 1975, 1980; Pinker 1979, 1982, 1984, 1989; Wexler & Culicover, 1980). The discovery and exploratory description ofsuch universal subtle relationships present in the "world" of human language is a primary activity of modern linguists and psycholinguists. Proposed mechanisms for language learning that do not include specialized procedures that exploit these relationships have been repeatedly shown to be inadequate (e.g., Pinker 1989, 1991; Pinker & Prince, 1988). As in perception, adaptations for grammar acquisition must mesh with the enduring structure of the world. But in this case, the recurrent structure to be meshed with is created by the species-typical design of other (adult) human minds, which produce grammars that manifest certain relationships and not others. Due to common evolutionary ancestry, the living world of plants and animals is structured into species and other more inclusive units that share large sets ofproperties in common: Wolves resemble other wolves, mammals other mammals, and so on. Living things occur in so-called natural kinds. This is another enduring set ofrelationships in the world that our minds evolved to exploit. Ethnobiologists and cognitive anthropologists such as Atran and Berlin have shown that the principles humans spontaneously use in categorizing plants and animals reflect certain aspects ofthis enduring
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structure, and are the same cross-culturally as well (Atran, 1990; Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973). In the last decade, the field of cognitive development has been revolutionized by the discovery that the principles ofinference that infants and children bring to the tasks of learning are organized to reflect the particular recurrent structure of specific problem domains, such as object construal and motion, the differences between artifacts and living kinds, physical causality, and so on (see, e.g., Carey & Gelman, 1991). These evolved, domain-specific cognitive specializations have been shown to be specialized according to topic and to develop in the absence ofexplicit instruction. For example, contrary to the Piagetian notion that infants must "learn" the object concept, recent research has shown that (at least) as early as 10 weeks-an age at which the visual system has only just matured-infants already have a sensorily-integrated concept of objects as entities that are continuous in space and time, solid (two objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time), rigid, bounded, cohesive, and move as a unit (e.g., Spelke, 1988, 1990, 1991). Indeed, when infants of this age are shown trick displays that violate any ofthese assumptions, they indicate surprise-one could almost say in such cases that the object concept embodied in their evolved mechanisms causes them to "disbelieve" the evidence of their senses (Leslie, 1988). By 27 .weeks, infants already analyze the motion of inanimate objects into submovements and use this parsing to distinguish causal from noncausal relationships (Leslie, 1988; Leslie & Keeble, 1987). Needless to say, these are all relationships that accurately reflect the evolutionarily long-enduring structure ofthe world. A. Brown (1990) has shown that early causal principles such as "no action at a distance" guide learning about tool use in children as young as 18 months; these children categorize tools for use according to functional properties (e.g., has a hooked end for pulling) over nonfunctional properties (e.g., color). In contrast, the same children have great difficulty learning how to use a tool when its mechanism ofaction appears to violate one oftheir concepts about physical causality-concepts that mirror certain aspects of Newtonian mechanics. Very young children also make sharp distinctions between the animate and inanimate worlds. Throughout our evolutionary history, being an animal has been reliably-if imperfectly-correlated with self-generated motion, whereas inanimate objects rarely move unless acted upon by an outside force. Recent research suggests that young children use this cue to distinguish the animate from the inanimate worlds, and make very different inferences about the two (Gelman, 1990b; Premack, 1990). More generally, experiments by Keil (1989) and others indicate that the kind of infer~nces children spontaneously make about "natural kinds," such as animals, plants, and substances, differ sharply from those they are willing to make about human-made artifacts. Natural kinds are viewed as having invisible "essences" that bear a causal relation to their perceptual attributes, whereas artifacts are defined by how their perceptual attributes subserve their (intended) function. In an important series ofexperiments, Gelman and Markman (1986, 1987; Markman, 1989) found that natural kinds were a powerful organizer of inference in young children. In general, being a member ofa natural kind carries more inferential weight than being perceptually similar. In addition, children give more weight to natural kind membership when reasoning about traits that actually are more likely to vary as a function of membership in a natural kind, such as breathing, than when reasoning about traits that are more likely
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to vary as a function of perceptual similarity, such as weight or visibility at night (for summary, see Markman, 1989). These principles apply far beyond these few simple cases. The world is full oflongenduring structure, and the mind appears to be full ofcorresponding mechanisms that use these structural features to solve a diverse array ofadaptive problems: geometrical and physical relationships that shape the probability of various trajectories (Shepard, 1984), biomechanically possible and impossible motions (Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990), momentum effects on trajectories (Freyd, 1987), correlations between the ingestion of plant toxins and teratogenesis (Profet, 1988, this volume), privileged relationships between the gravitational field and the orientation ofobjects in the world (Triesman, 1977), and on and on. It is only for expository convenience that we have mostly focused on mechanisms bearing on categorization and inference ("knowledge"), rather than on motivation, emotion, and decision making ('·value"). The structure of the world is reflected in the nature of behavior-regulating systems as well because the long-term statistical structure ofthe world systematically creates relationships between choices and adaptive consequences. (For a discussion of how emotional adaptations reflect the relationship between decisions and the detailed structure of ancestral conditions, see Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b.) Mind/world relationships extend all the way from the ease with which people acquire fears of spiders and snakes (Marks, 1987; Seligman, 1971), to the more subtle impact that aesthetic factors have on habitat choice and wayfinding (Kaplan, this volume; Orians & Heerwagen, this volume), to the relative unwillingness ofadults to have sex with people with whom they co-resided for long periods during childhood (McCabe, 1983; Parker & Parker, 1986; Pastner, 1986;Shepher, 1983; Westermarck, 1891; Wolf, 1966, 1968; Wolf & Huang, 1980; N. W. Thornhill, 1991), to the intensity with which parents and children may come to love each other (Bowlby, 1969), to the often violent passions humans exhibit when they discover the existence ofspousal infidelity (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Wilson & Daly, this volume). For those who study psychological adaptations, the long-enduring structure ofthe world provides a deeply illuminating source of knowledge about the evolved architecture of the mind. As Shepard has so eloquently put it, there has been the evolution of a mesh between the principles ofthe mind and the regularities of the world, such that our minds reflect many properties ofthe world (Shepard, 1987a). Many statistical and structural relationships that endured across human evolution were "detected" by natural selection, which designed corresponding computational machinery that is specialized to use these regularities to generate knowledge and decisions that would have been adaptive in the EEA. Because the enduring structure ofancestral environments caused the design of psychological adaptations, the careful empirical investigation of the structure of environments, from a perspective that focuses on adaptive problems and outcomes, can provide powerful guidance in the exploration of the mind. The long-term structure of the ancestral world is worth knowing, worth studying, and worth relating to psychology. This realization vastly widens the scope of information that can be brought to bear on questions in psychology: Evolutionary biology, paleoanthropology, hunter-gatherer studies, behavioral ecology, botany, medicine, nutrition, and many other fields can be mined for information that suggests specific hypotheses, guides one toward productive experimentation, and informs one about the broad array offunctionally specialized mechanisms that are likely to be present. The stuffof
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the mind is the stuff of the world, and so the investigation of the rich structure of the world provides a clearly observable and empirically tractable-if not royal-road into the hidden countries of the mind.
THE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS Approaching the coordination between the structure of the ancestral world and the design features of adaptations with an engineering sensibility is what gives empirical specificity and inferential power to evolutionary functional analysis. The following are five structured components that can be fit together in such an analysis. I. An adaptive target: a description ofwhat counts as a biologically successful outcome in a given situation. Out of the infinite set of potential behavioral sequences, which small subset would count as a solution to the adaptive problem? Here, one wants to know which behavioral outcomes will have the property of enhancing the propagation of the psychological designs that gave rise to them. For example, out of all the substances in the world, which should the organism eat and which should it avoid? With whom should the organism mate? How much parental care should it devote to each offspring? When should the organism join a coalition? What inferences should be drawn on the basis of the retinal display about the location of various surfaces? In defining an adaptive target, the goal is to ascertain whether the proposed behavioral outcome, in combination with all the other activities and outcomes produced by the organism, will enhance design propagation under ancestral conditions. 2. Background conditions: a description of the recurrent structure ofthe ancestral world that is relevant to the adaptive problem. One wants to know what features ofthe ancestral world were sufficiently stable to support the evolution ofa design that could produce an adaptive target. This could be a part ofthe external environment, another part ofthe standard design ofthe organism, or a combination ofthe two. This includes the information available to solve the problem, the environmental and endogenous obstacles to solving the problem, and so on. So, for example, the regular spatial orientation of human eyes with respect to each other, the face, and the ground constitute background conditions for the evolution of face recognition mechanisms in infants. Often, but not always, the ancestral world will be similar to the modem world (e.g., the properties of light and the laws of optics have not changed). However, one needs to know something about hunter-gatherer studies and paleoanthropology to know when ancestral conditions germane to the adaptive problem diverge from modem conditions. Ofcourse, when there is a difference between the two, ancestral conditions are the applicable ones for the purpose ofanalyzing the functional design ofan adaptation because they are the cause of that design. Modem environments are relevant to the analysis of the ontogeny of mechanisms and their calibration. It is important to keep in mind that a mechanism that was capable ofproducing an adaptive target under ancestral conditions may not be capable of doing so under modem ones. Our visual system fails to maintain color constancy under sodium vapor lamps in modem parking lots (Shepard, this volume), and attempting to understand color constancy mechanisms under such unnatural illumination would have been a major impediment to progress. 3. A design: a description of the articulated organization of recurrent features in the organism that together comprise the adaptation or suspected adaptation. A design
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description ofthe eye, for example, would include a specification of its species-typical parts and the manner in which they interact to produce an adaptive target. The design-or even the existence-of a proposed information-processing mechanism is frequently unknown. Indeed, an appropriate functional description of a design is often what one is trying to discover. When this is the case, this step in an evolutionary functional analysis would be the construction of a hypothesis about the existence and design features of a psychological adaptation. This might include what environmental cues the mechanism monitors; what information it draws from other mechanisms, how it categorizes and represents this information, what procedures or decision rules transform the informational input, what kinds of representations or behaviors it produces as output, which mechanisms use its output for further processing, how its output is used by other mechanisms to generate behavior, and so on. The more causally explicit one can make the design description at the cognitive level, the better. Eventually, one hopes to have a description of the neurobiological implementation of the adaptation as well. 4. A performance examination: a description of what happens when the proposed adaptation mechanistically interacts with the world. What range ofoutcomes does the design actually produce? Like putting a new aircraft prototype in a wind tunnel, what one is looking for is a good causal or "engineering" analysis ofhow the proposed design actually performs under conditions that are representative ofsituations our ancestors routinely faced, and how it performs under present conditions as well. For a proposed language acquisition device, for example, one wants to model how its informationprocessing procedures perform when they encounter normal linguistic environments, in order to see whether the interaction of procedures and environment assembles an increasingly elaborated computational system capable of producing intelligible and grammatical sentences. Similarly, one wants to model how psychological mechanisms in women or men interact with their social and informational environments to produce mating preferences. We want to emphasize that we are looking here for a mechanistic or causal description of how the system generates output given input. Statements like, "the human child learns its culture through imitation and generalization" are not models of how input generates output. They are too unspecified to qualify as hypotheses or explanations; we should have ceased treating them as such a long time ago. 5. A performance evaluation: a description or analysis of how well (or how poorly) the design, under circumstances paralleling ancestral conditions, managed to produce the adaptive target (the set ofbiologicaUy successful outcomes). The better the mechanism performs, the more likely it is that one has identified an adaptation. It is just as important, however, to see whether the proposed mechanism produces the behaviors one actually observes from real organisms under modem conditions. If it does, this suggests that the researcher is converging on a correct description of the design ofthe mechanisms involved, whether they are producing behavior that is currently adaptive or not. The Westermarck incest avoidance mechanism, for example, passes both tests. It produces adaptive outcomes under ancestral (and many modem) conditions (e.g., distaste for sex between siblings who co-resided as children), and it also explains the nonadaptive outcomes that are observed under certain modem conditions (e.g., distaste for sex between kibbutz creche mates who co-resided as children [Shepher, 1983]; distaste for sex with spouses who were adopted into one's family at a young age and with whom one was raised [Wolf & Huang, 1980]).
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In short, an evolutionary functional analysis consists of asking a series of engineering questions: Would the proposed design have interacted with properties of the ancestral world to produce target adaptive outcomes? Does the proposed design interact with properties of the modern world to produce outcomes that one actually observes in real organisms, whether these outcomes are adaptive or not? Is there an alternative design that is better able to generate adaptive targets under ancestral conditions? Ifso, then are there any background conditions that one has overlooked that would have prevented the alternative design from evolving? And so on. Natural selection is the process that shapes biological form to match function, and this link between form and function has been a critically illuminating relationship in thousands of applications. Ever since Harvey's question about why there were valves in the veins led him to discover the circulation ofthe blood, functional questions about organismic design have been a powerful engine for the discovery of new knowledge (Mayr, 1983). Those even distantly connected to organismic biology have become aware of the spectacular functionalist revolution that has transformed the field over the last 30 years, placing adaptationism on a new and far more rigorous foundation (Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1982; see, especially, Williams, 1966). The reason why Lewontin and Gould's accusation (famous among social scientists) that adaptationism consists of post hoc storytelling has so resoundingly failed to impress practicing evolutionary biologists is that they saw on a daily basis that adaptationism was anything but post hoc (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; for discussion, see Pinker & Bloom, this volume). Simply put, an explanation for a fact by a theory cannot be post hoc if the fact was unknown until after it was predicted by the theory and if the reason the fact is known at all is because ofthe theory. Functionalist analysis in biology has motivated thousands ofpredictions about new and critical phenomena, whose subsequent discovery confirmed the productivity of the emerging paradigm. Lewontin and Gould's critique has primarily impressed those outside ofevolutionary and organismic biology who have not been exposed on a professional basis to the flood ofnew findings that were both generated and economically organized by the newly emerging functionalist principles. When they are linked together, the five components outlined above not only provide a framework for the explanation offacts that are already known; they also form a powerful heuristic system for the generation ofnew knowledge. Depending on which questions you need answered and what information you already have, you can put these relationships to a number of richly productive alternative uses. For example, if you are trying to discover the structure of unknown psychological mechanisms, you first need to integrate steps I and 2 together into a definition ofan adaptive problem (what Marr called a computational theory or task analysis; Marr, 1982). You need to determine things such as what information was routinely available in the environment and in the organism to solve the problem (step 2), and what outcomes constituted a successful solution to the problem (step I). From this, you can begin to develop hypotheses about the nature of the information-processing mechanisms that might have evolved to solve the problem, and then empirically test for their presence. (For a discussion of this approach, see Marr, 1982, and Cosmides & Tooby, 1987. For some applications of this approach to specific psychological problems: on vision, see Marr, 1982; on mechanisms specialized for reasoning about social exchange, see Cosmides, 1989, Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, this volume, and Gigerenzer & Hug, in press; on mechanisms regulating parental solicitude, see Mann, this volume, and Daly & Wil-
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son, 1988). In short, by using steps 1 and 2, one can create a hypothesis about function that leads to the discovery ofform. This use ofthe elements ofevolutionary functional analysis guides the researcher step by step from a definition ofan adaptive problem to the discovery and mapping ofthe mechanisms that solve it. An alternative starting point is step 3: a well-specified candidate hypothesis about the structure of an information-processing mechanism. So, for example, you might hypothesize that operant conditioning explains the acquisition of natural language grammars. To proceed with an evolutionary functional analysis, you would then need to develop a description of the relevant environmental features (step 2) and define what counts as a successful outcome (step 1). You would then proceed to steps 4 and 5-performance examination and evaluation. If your hypothesis about design is correct, then the step 4 performance examination will reveal that the design's interaction with the relevant environment features is at least capable of producing a successful outcome. The performance evaluation of step 5 will allow you to determine whether the design hypothesized in step 3 is better at producing adaptive outcomes than alternative designs. We will refer to the application of steps 4 and 5 as the solvability criterion: To be correct, a cognitive adaptation must be capable of solving the proposed problem or generating behavior that we know humans routinely perform and of doing so given the relevant background conditions. Although this may seem like an obvious step, theories in psychology are rarely evaluated in this way, which has allowed entire research communities to labor under the impression that, say, associationism or imitation constitute effective explanations of the phenomena they studied. Such tests of computational performance-or leamability analyses as they are called when applied to learning tasks-were pioneered in psycholinguistics by Pinker and colleagues (1979, 1984, 1989, 1991; Pinker & Prince, 1988; Wexler & Culicover, 1980) in order to evaluate which theories oflanguage acquisition could actually account for the fact that children learn the language of their local community. By using this method one can, in fact, rule out entire classes oftheories as inadequate, without having to empirically test each one ofan inexhaustible set of trivial variants. Because there are an infinite number of alternative theories, empirical falsification is not by itselfa practical research strategy; it must be combined with other sources of valid inference if one is to be able to draw larger and more interesting conclusions. For psychologists, the analysis of computational performance is one way ofdoing this. Yet another approach to evolutionary functional analysis begins with noting the existence ofa complexly articulated and recurrent phenotypic pattern-for example, eyes, teeth, pregnancy sickness, or sexualjealousy-and investigating whether it might be the expression of an adaptation (Williams, 1966, p. 10). In such cases, one is following the logic in yet another direction: Given a known phenotypic structure (step 3), one dissects the environment (step 2) and the requirements for reproduction (step 1), to find out whether they compose a well-defined adaptive problem for which the reliable outcomes ofthe design (step 4) constitute a well-engineered solution (step 5). Profet's proposal that pregnancy sickness constitutes an adaptation to limit maternal ingestion ofteratogens during the most vulnerable phases ofembryogenesis is an excellent application of this approach (Profet, this volume). It should be stressed that this is the only type offunctionalist analysis to which Gould and Lewontin's accusation of post hoc storytelling could possibly apply, even in principle, since it is the only one that works backward from known facts about phenotypic design. Yet, even here, the
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critique could only apply if all facts about the environment, the other parts of the organism, and the structure believed to be an adaptation were known in advance. In practice, this is never the case. This form-to-function approach is just as productive as the others because it leads to the prediction and organization of previously unknown facts, usually about additional design features of the organism as well as about the recurrent structure ofthe world. For example, the study ofthe visual system has profited immensely from the fact that scientists knew that the eye exists and that the visual system's function is to perform scene analysis given data transduced by the eye. Indeed, the functionalist approach to the study of vision has generated one ofthe most sophisticated and least ad hoc bodies ofknowledge in psychology. As Mayr put it, summarizing the.historical record in response to accusations that adaptationist research was simply post hoc storytelling, "The adaptationist question, 'What is the function of a given structure or organ?' has been for centuries the basis for every advance in physiology" (1983, p. 32). Adaptationist principles can provide equally powerful guidance for research in psychology as well. Even if every aspect of a mechanism were already known, examining the detailed transactions between selected features of the environment and selected parts of the mechanism would clarify many features of its functional organization, such as which aspects ofthe design perform the work (e.g., which aspects ofpregnancy sickness cause the mother to avoid ingesting teratogens) and which are functionless or even harmful side effects (such as calorie reduction during the first trimester). Naturally, the formto-function approach does include the risk of answering the post hoc "why" question that Gould and Lewontin so disdain; that is, ofexplaining why already known features of biological designs came to be as they are. But even physics and geology run the "risk" ofaddressing such Kiplingesque post hoc questions as why Mercury has an orbit that deviates from the predictions of Newtonian mechanics, why Asia has the Himalayas, or why the universe has its present set offour interactions, temporal asymmetry, background radiation, and particle distribution. In science, this is usually called "explanation."
TOWARD A POST-STANDARD MODEL VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT
Development from an Adaptationist Perspective The recognition that organisms are integrated collections of problem-solving mechanisms organized to propagate their designs brings with it an adaptationist framing of development. An adaptation is, by its nature, an improbably good organization ofelements and so will not often spontaneously come into existence merely by chance. Instead, for adaptations to exist, they must be specifically constructed from the materials present in evolutionarily normal environments. Accordingly, the developmental programs and machinery responsible for assembling an adaptation correctly are also adaptations. As adaptations, they themselves have complex structures that assume and require recurrent features ofthe world, and that interact with this recurrent structure to produce biologically functional targeted outcomes. Hence, the primary function or target of developmental adaptations (which include the genes) is to reconstruct in offspring the evolved functional organization that was present in their parents, which is predominantly species-typical design. The
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genes and the mechanisms of genetic transmission are, of course, adaptations to the problem of faithfully replicating into the offspring critical infonnation necessary to reconstruct this design. The genes come embedded in a matrix of cellular and developmental machinery constituting an additional set ofadaptations that use the genetic structure as regulatory elements to institute and to guide embryogenesis and subsequent development along species-standard pathways. For this reason, it is useful to think of the genes together with the developmental machinery as one integrated suite ofadaptations-the developmental programs-and to distinguish the minor idiosyncratic features of an individual's genes and zygotic machinery from the recurrent or species-typical dimensions that have endured long enough to have been organized by natural selection. The latter specify the species-standard physiological and psychological architecture visible in all humans raised in nonnal environments, whereas the former specify the usually minor perturbations within that architecture (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). Why do we so often connect complex adaptations or evolved architectures with concepts such as species-typical, human universal, species-standard, recurrent, and so on? This is because when humans are described from the point of view of their complex adaptations, differences tend to disappear, and a universal architecture stands out in stark relief. This is both empirically the case (nearly everyone has two eyes, two hands, the same sets of organs, and so on) and theoretically expected to be the case if organisms are primarily collections of complex adaptations. The logic is straightforward (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a; see also Tooby, 1982): 1. A species is a group of organisms with a common history of interbreeding and a continuing ability to interbreed to fonn offspring who can typically reproduce at least as well as their parents. 2. To survive and reproduce in a complex world, organisms need complex problem-solving machinery (complex adaptations). 3. Complex adaptations are intricate machines that require complex "blueprints" at the genetic level. This means that they require coordinated gene expression, involving hundreds or thousands of genes to regulate their development. 4. Sexual reproduction automatically breaks apart existing sets of genes and randomly generates in the offspring new, never before existing combinations of genes at those loci that vary from individual to individual. 5. If genes differed from individual to individual in ways that significantly impacted the developed design ofthe component parts ofcomplex adaptations, then existing genetic combinations whose developed expressions had fit together into complex adaptations would be pulled apart by sexual recombination. Equally, new combinations would be thrown randomly together, resulting in phenotypes whose parts were functionally incompatible. This is because parts in any complex machine are functionally interdependent: If you tried to build a new car engine out of a mixture of parts from a Honda and a Toyota, the parts would not fit together. To build a new engine whose component parts fit together, you would have to salvage parts from two "parents" that were of the same make and model. 6. Because sexual recombination is a random process, it is improbable that all of the genes necessary for a complex adaptation would be together in the same
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individual if the genes coding for the components of complex adaptations varied substantially between individuals. 7. Therefore, it follows that humans, and other complex, long-lived, outbreeding organisms, must be very nearly uniform in those genes that underlie our complex adaptations. 8. By the same token, sexually reproducing populations of organisms freely tolerate genetic variation to the extent that this variation does not impact the complex adaptive organization shared across individuals. To return to our car engine example, the color ofthe parts is functionally irrelevant to the operation of the car and so can vary arbitrarily and superficially among cars of the same make and model; but the shapes of the parts are critical to functional performance and so cannot vary ifthe "offspring" design is to function successfully. These constraints on variation apply with equal force to psychological adaptations: Even relatively simple cognitive programs, "mental organs," or neurological structures must contain a large number of interdependent processing steps, limiting the nature of the variation that can exist without violating the functional integrity ofthe psychological adaptation. The psychic unity of humankind-that is, a universal and uniform human nature-is necessarily imposed to the extent and along those dimensions that our psychologies are collections of complex adaptations. Therefore, it is selection interacting with sexual recombination that tends to impose near uniformity at the functional level in complex adaptive designs (as well as in whatever is developmentally coupled to complex functional structure). It is selection that is responsible for what we have been calling our universal evolved psychological and physiological architecture. There is no small irony in the fact that Standard Social Science Model hostility to adaptationist approaches is often justified through the accusation that adaptationist approaches purportedly attribute important differences between individuals, races, and classes to genetic differences. In actuality, adaptationist approaches offer the explanation for why the psychic unity of humankind is genuine and not just an ideological fiction; for why it applies in a privileged way to the most significant, global, functional, and complexly organized dimensions ofour architecture; and for why the differences among humans that are caused by the genetic variability that geneticists have found are so overwhelmingly peripheralized into architecturally minor and functionally superficial properties. If the anti-adaptationists were correct (e.g., Gould & Lewontin, 1979) and our evolved architectures were not predominantly sets of complex adaptations or properties developmentally coupled to them, then selection would not act to impose cross-individual uniformity, and individuals would be free to vary in important ways and to any degree from other humans due to genetic differences. If the world were, in fact, governed by nonselectionist forces, then the psychic unity of humankind would simply be a fiction. Modern geneticists, through innovative molecular genetic techniques, have certainly discovered within humans and other species large reservoirs ofgenetic variability (Hubby & Lewontin, 1966; Lewontin & Hubby, 1966; see reviews in Ayala, 1976, and Nevo, 1978). But it is only an adaptationist analysis that predicts and explains why the impact ofthis variability is so often limited in its scope to micro-level biochemical variation, instead of introducing substantial individuating design differences. The
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study of the operation of selection on complex mechanisms makes it difficult to see how more than a tiny fraction of this variation could be constitutive of complex psychological or physiological adaptations. S Thus, human design resolves itself into two primary tiers: First, an encompassing functional superstructure of virtually universal, complexly articulated, adaptively organized developmental, physiological, and psychological mechanisms, resting on a universally shared genetic basis; and, second, low level biochemical variation creating usually slight individuating perturbations in this universal design due to the existence of a reservoir of genetic variability in the species. There may also be some thin films ofpopulation-specific or frequency-dependentadaptive variation on this intricate universal structure (see, e.g., Durham, 1991; McCracken, 1971), but for a number ofreasons these will be very small in magnitude next to the complex structure ofa universal human nature (for discussion, see Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a, 1990b). The primary function of developmental adaptations is to reconstruct in each new individual this complex, functional architecture, and the primary focus ofadaptationists is the study of this universal structure. The fact that humans in ordinary environments reliably develop a clearly recognizable species-typical architecture should in no way be taken to imply that any developed feature ofany human is immutable or impervious to modification or elimination by sufficiently ingenious ontogenetic intervention. Nothing about humans could possibly be immune from developmental intervention, simply because we are physical systems open to contact and manipulation by the rest of the world; we are not something made unalterable by inexorable supernatural predestination. People frightened ofthe myth that biology is destiny can be reassured (just as others may be alarmed) by the fact that there are no limits to what could be done, especially by evolutionarily novel measures: Deliver the right quanta to the right ribosomes or other locations at the right times and anyone or anything could be successively modified into a watermelon or an elephant. In contrast, Standard Social Science Model advocates, such as Gould, tend to equate evolved biological design with immutability without any logical or empirical warrant. As Gould expresses his rather magical belief, "If we are programmed to be what we are, then these traits are ineluctable. We may, at best, channel them, but we cannot change them either by will, education, or culture" (Gould, 1977c, p.238). In actuality, the very openness of development to intervention poses a critical set ofadaptive problems for developmental adaptations. Their primary function is to successfully reconstruct each functionally necessary detail of our species-typical architecture, including the tens or hundreds ofthousands ofspecific components and arrangements that endow us with a lens, a retina, an optic nerve, language, maternal attachment, emotions, retinotopic maps, ten fingers, a skeleton, color constancy, lungs, a representational system embodying the implicit theory that others have minds, an ability to cooperate, spatial cognition, and so on. Each of these adaptations constitutes a very narrow target ofimprobably good functional organization. Because the world is full of potential disruptions, there is the perennial threat that the developmental process may be perturbed away from the narrow targets that define mechanistic workability, producing some different and nonfunctional outcome. Developmental adaptations are, therefore, intensely selected to evolve machinery that defends the developmental process against disruption (Waddington, 1962). Profet (this vol-
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ume) provides an elegant analysis of a psychological adaptation designed to defend against just such threats to adaptive development, protecting embryogenesis from the potentially disruptive plant toxins in the mother's diet through modifying her dietary decisions during pregnancy. More generally, developmental programs are often designed to respond to environmentally or genetically introduced disorder through feedback-driven compensation that redirects development back toward the successful construction of adaptations. Thus, developmental processes have been selected to defend themselves against the ordinary kinds ofenvironmental and genetic variability that were characteristic ofthe environment ofevolutionary adaptedness, although not, ofcourse, against evolutionarily novel or unusual manipulations. Ofcourse, unlike human-built machines that have a static architecture until they break down, organisms are systematically transformed by developmental adaptations over their life histories from zygote to senescence. Thus, the task facing developmental adaptations is not to assemble a machine of fixed design, but rather to assemble and modify the set of expressed adaptations according to a moving target of age, sex, and circumstance-dependent design specifications. For example, adaptive problems are often specific to a particular life stage, and so the organism must be developmentally timed to have the necessary adaptations for that stage, regardless of whether, as a side effect, they happen to appear before or persist after they are needed (e.g., the placenta, fetal hemoglobin, the sucking reflex, the ability to digest milk, the fear of strangers, ovulation, the ability to be sexually aroused, milk production, and so on). Hence, the Standard Model assumption-critical to its logic-that the mental organization present in adults but absent from newborns must be "acquired" from the social world has no conceptual foundation and is, in many cases, known to be empirically false. In the worldview of the SSSM, biological construction goes on in the uterus, but at birth the child is "biologically complete" except for growth; at this point, it is surrendered into the sole custody of social forces, which do the remainder of the construction of the individual. This, of course, reflects folk biology, captured in the two dictionary definitions of innate as "present from birth" and as "intrinsic." Social constructivist arguments frequently take the form that because thus-and-such is absent at birth, or doesn't appear until after age seven, or until after puberty, it is obviously "learned" or "socially constructed." As a result, a common, but generally irrelevant feature of "nativist" versus "environmentalist" debates is over what is "present from birth." This confuses (among other things) the question of whether something is expressed at the time ofbirth with whether there exists in the individual evolved developmental mechanisms that may activate and organize the expression ofan adaptation at some point in the life cycle. Developmental processes continue to bring additional adaptations on line (as well as remove them) at least until adulthood, and there is an increasing amount ofevidence to suggest that age-driven adaptive changes in psychological architecture continue throughout adulthood (see, e.g., Daly & Wilson, 1988). Thus, just as teeth and breasts are absent at birth and develop later in an individual's life history, perceptual organization, domain-specific reasoning mechanisms, the language acquisition device, motivational organization, and many other intricate psychological adaptations mature and are elaborated in age-specific fashions that are not simply the product ofthe accumulation of"experience." Consequently, psychological adaptations may be developmentally timed to appear, disappear, or change operation to mesh with the changing demands ofdifferent age-specific tasks, such as parenting,
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emotional decoding of the mother's voice, language acquisition, species-appropriate song learning, and so on (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Fernald, this volume; Marler, 1991; Newport, 1990). Equally, although most human psychological and physiological adaptations appear to be sexually monomorphic, some are obviously sexually differentiated to address those adaptive problems whose task demands were recurrently disparate for females and males over evolutionary time (e.g., Buss, 1987, 1989, 1991, this volume; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Ellis, this volume; Silverman & Eals, this volume; Symons, 1979; Wilson & Daly, this volume). For any particular gender difference, many psychologists are interested in whether it was caused (I) by sexually monomorphic psychologies encountering differential treatment by the social world, or (2) by sexually differentiated developmental mechanisms· encountering treatment from the social world, whether that treatment was uniform or differential. As interesting as this question may be, however, the fact that an expressed gender difference may first appear after birth, or even late in life, is evidence neither for nor against either ofthese views. For these reasons, one needs to distinguish an organism's evolved design or speciestypical architecture from its "initial state" (Carey, 1985a); that is, its state at whatever point in development one chooses to define as "initial" (birth, conception, fetus prior to gonadal or neural sexual differentiation, puberty, or whatever). Not all features of evolved human design are or can be present at anyone time in anyone individual. Thus, the genetically universal may be developmentally expressed as different maturational designs in the infant, the child, the adolescent, and the adult; in females and males; or in individuals who encounter different circumstances. Pregnancy sickness is arguably a feature of our evolved universal design, but it does not appear in males, children, or women who have never become pregnant; it is only present in sexually mature women while they are pregnant. Thus, when we use terms such as "evolved design," "evolved architecture," or even "species-typical," "species-standard," "universal," and "panhuman," we are not making claims about every human phenotype allor even some ofthe time; instead, we are referring to the existence ofevolutionarily organized developmental adaptations, whether they are activated or latent. Adaptations are not necessarily expressed in every individual. They only need to have been expressed often enough in our evolutionary history to have been targets of selection, and, hence, to have been organized by selection so that they reliably develop under appropriate circumstances. For this reason, adaptations and adaptive architecture can be discussed and described at (at least) two levels: (1) the level of reliably achieved and expressed organization (as, for example, in the realized structure of the eye), and (2) at the level ofthe developmental programs that construct such organization. To avoid cumbersome expressions, we do not usually bother to terminologically distinguish successfully assembled expressed adaptive architecture from the more fundamental developmental adaptations that construct them. Context usually makes obvious which is being discussed. Selection Regulates How Environments Shape Organisms
Many social and biological scientists have labored under the false impression that only certain things are under the "control," or "influence," or "determination" ofthe genes or of biology. According to this view, evolutionary approaches are only applicable to those traits under such "genetic control," and the greater the environmental influence
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or control, the smaller the domain of things for which evolutionary analyses properly apply (e.g., Sahlins, 1976a; Gould, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c; note, especially, Gould's Standard Model contrast of"genetic control" with the "purely cultural"). In this dualistic conception, the genes are "biological" and evolved, while "the environment"including the social environment-is nonbiological and nonevolved. In consequence, the environment is held to be something that not only can attenuate, nullify, or even reverse "genetic forces" but may break the causal chain entirely, liberating human affairs from the causal patterning ofevolution. For proponents of the SSSM, it is selfevident that the causal forces ofevolution and "biology" are located solely inside the organism and are expressed in an unadulterated form only at birth, ifthen. In contrast, the causal forces of the environment are seen as external to the organism, as having their own independent causal history, and as having no particular reason to act on the organism in such a way as to preserve or elaborate the organism's initial biological organization. In short, the environment is conceptualized as obviously nonbiological in character. Development is consequently portrayed as a process in which the newborn organism-usually seen as a passive clay-like object with some initial biologically given form-is pounded or sculpted by the active and nonbiological environment according to its accidents, structure, or agenda. It follows from this view that biology can only express itself in human life if it is unalterable or at least rigid enough to resist the pounding forces of the environment-a bombardment that begins at birth. One might think ofthe stubbornly biological aspects of human life as the hardened part of the clay, while the more plastic parts are easily shaped by the environment and quickly lose their initial biological form. Consequently, even if advocates of the SSSM do not want to dichotomize traits cleanly into two sets (e.g., hardened versus wet clay), they could array them by this criterion as more or less biologically determined; that is, as more or less environmentally influenced. Despite its tenacity in the social sciences at large, this Standard Model view of development has been abandoned by many cognitive scientists and by biologists because it rests on a series of fallacies and misconceptions. To begin with, despite the routine use of such dualistic concepts and terms by large numbers of researchers throughout the social and biological sciences, there is nothing in the real world that actually corresponds to such concepts as "genetic determination" or "environmental determination." There is nothing in the logic of development to justify the idea that traits can be divided into genetically versus environmentally controlled sets or arrayed along a spectrum that reOects the relative influence ofgenes versus environment. And, most critically, the image of"the environment" as a "nonbiological" causal inOuence that diminishes the "initial" evolved organization of humans rests on the failure to appreciate the role that the evolutionary process plays in organizing the relationship between our species-universal genetic endowment, our evolved developmental processes, and the recurring features ofdevelopmental environments. In the first place, every feature of every phenotype is fully and equally codetermined by the interaction of the organism's genes (embedded in its initial package of zygotic cellular machinery) and its ontogenetic environments-meaning everything else that impinges on it. By changing either the genes or the environment any outcome can be changed, so the interaction of the two is always part of every complete explanation ofany human phenomenon. As with all interactions, the product simply cannot be sensibly analyzed into 'separate genetically determined and environmentally determined components or degrees of inOuence. For this reason, everything, from the
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most delicate nuance of Richard Strauss's last performance of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony to the presence ofcalcium salts in his bones at birth, is totally and to exactly the same extent genetically and environmentally codetermined. "Biology" cannot be segregated off into some traits and not others. Nevertheless, one could understand and acknowledge that all human phenomena are generated by gene-environment interactions, yet believe that the existence and participation ofthe environment in such interactions insulates human phenomena from interesting evolutionary patterning. After all, if only our genes evolved, whereas the form of the environment is generated by other processes (such as geology, cultural transmission, epidemiology, and meteorology) then the gene-environment interaction seems to blunt the organizing effects evolution might otherwise have on human life. Although this view seems quite reasonable, a close examination of how natural selection actually adaptively organizes gene-environment interactions over time leads to a very different conclusion, which might be summed up by the counterintuitive claim that "the environment" is just as much the product ofevolution as are the genes. To understand why this is so, one needs to distinguish "the environment" in the sense of the real total state of the entire universe-which, of course, is not caused by the genes or the developmental mechanisms of any individual-from "the environment" in the sense of those particular aspects of the world that are rendered developmentally relevant by the evolved design ofan organism's developmental adaptations. It is this developmentally relevant environment-the environment as interacted with by the organism-that, in a meaningful sense, can be said to be the product of evolution, evolving in tandem with the organism's organized response to it. The confusion of these two quite distinct senses of "environment" has obscured the fact that the recurrent organization ofthe environment contributes a biological inheritance parallel to that of the genes, which acts co-equally with them to evolutionarily organize the organism throughout its life. The assumption that only the genes are evolved reflects a widespread misconception about the way natural selection acts. Genes are the so-called units of selection, which are inherited, selected, or eliminated, and so they are indeed something that evolves. But every time one gene is selected over another, one design for a developmental program is selected over another as well; by virtue of its structure, this developmental program interacts with some aspects of the environment rather than others, rendering certain environmental features causally relevant to development. So, step by step, as natural selection constructs the species' gene set (chosen from the available mutations), it constructs in tandem the species' developmentally relevant environment (selected from the set ofall properties ofthe world). Thus, both the genes and the
developmentally relevant environment are the product ofevolution. Even more crucially, by selecting one developmental program over another, the evolutionary process is also selecting the mechanisms that determine how the organism will respond to environmental input, including environmental input that varies. A developmental mechanism, by virtue ofits physical design, embodies a specification for how each possible state of the developmental environment is to be responded to, if encountered. This is a central but little understood point: There is nothing "in" the environment that by itself organizes or explains the development, psychology, morphology, or behavior ofany organism. "The" environment affects different organisms in different ways. We find the smell of dung repellent; dung flies are attracted to it. Temperature at incubation determines the sex of an alligator, but not of a human
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(Bull, 1983). A honeybee larva that is fed Royal Jelly will become a queen bee rather than a sterile worker, but Royal Jelly will not have this effect on a human baby. Many bats navigate by sound echoes that humans cannot even hear. Rats have an elaborate sense of smell, which their food choice mechanisms use, but their navigation mechanisms ignore smell cues entirely in favor of geometric cues (Gallistel, 1990). Indeed, this last example shows that the developmentally relevant environment is not just organism-specific, it is mechanism-specific. In other words, the actual relationship between environmental conditions and developmental outcomes is created by the design ofthe developmental procedures that exist in the organism and, within the limit of the physically possible, mechanisms could be designed into the system to create a causal relationship between any imaginable environmental input and any imaginable output. In principle, genetic engineers could build honeybee larvae that develop into workers if, and only if, they are exposed to recitations of Allen Ginsberg's "Howl." Aside from physical necessity, then, it is the evolved design ofthe organism that decides what organized consequences the environment can have on it. The rules that govern how environments impact the developing organism have themselves evolved and have been shaped by selection. Consequently, the evolutionary process determines how the environment shapes the organism. Over evolutionary time, genetic variation in developmental programs (with selective retention of advantageous variants), explores sampled properties out of the total environment potentially available to be interacted with. This process discovers which recurrent features are useful in the task of organizing and calibrating psychological adaptations and which recurrent features are unreliable or disruptive. It renders the latter irrelevant to development. A natural response is to claim that although the genes are highly stable, replicated with few mutations from generation to generation, the environment is volatile, rendering any developmental process coordinating the two ineffectual. Once again, however, our intuitions are not a privileged perspective from which one can declare the world to be either stable or variable. Whether the world is "stable" or "variable" depends on the categorization system used or, to put it another way, on which parts of the world are selected to be processed by a mechanism. Consider, for example, the following thought experiment. Imagine that an identical pool shot is set up every generation on a rather odd pool table. Three of the four cushions wobble continuously and unpredictably, but one happens to be stable. The "genes" determine the exact direction the cue ball is hit each time, while the "environment" (Le., the angle ofthe cushions when struck) determines how the shot will be reflected back. Whether a particular shot successfully sinks the target ball in a pocket (Le., whether it achieves the adaptive target) is determined by the interaction of the direction ofthe shot and the orientation ofthe cushion at the time the ball hits it (Le., the interaction ofgenes and environment determine the outcome). Assume also that there is variation in the direction of the shot (i.e., in the "genes") and that successful shots cause genes to be retained. Over the long run, feedback-driven selection will come to determine which direction the ball is hit. In determining this direction, it wiD also end up selecting the stable cushion for the bank shot, and not the wildly oscillating ones. It will end up directing the shot at exactly that spot along the stable cushion from which the shots are stably successful. Similarly, selection will design developmental adaptations that respond to those
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aspects ofthe world that have a relatively stable recurrent structure, such that the mesh between the two will reliably produce design-propagating outcomes. Just as selection has acted on genetic systems to keep mutations to tolerable levels, selection has acted to "choose" the more stable parts ofthe environment to render developmentally relevant, such that these aspects ofthe environment stably mesh with developmental programs to produce reliably developing adaptive architectures. The Standard Model framing says that the world pre-exists and is not caused by the organism, so that the world's effect on the organism will have no particular tendency to organize the developing organism according to any evolved or adaptive pattern. Equally, the pool-table cushion pre-existed each shot and was not created by them, and the laws of physics determined how each shot would be reflected back. So, in a static SSSM analysis, it is self-evident that the outcome is the mixture oftwo factors, one "biological" and one "nonbiological," with the nonbiological diluting, obliterating, or even reversing the biological. In contrast, an evolutionary analysis points out that the shot, through its careful targeting, picked out the particular cushion hit and the exact location hit. Over time, the selective retention of successful shots will organize the effect that the pre-existing environment had on the. trajectories of the shots and the outcome of the game. The pre-existing structure of the world was exploited to impose an organization on the outcome that it would not otherwise have had. In this same fashion, the evolutionary process explores and sifts the environment for aspects that will usefully organize the developing organism. The evolutionary process puts to work sources of organization and information anywhere they are unearthed, whether in the genes or in the environment, in a mother's smile or in a companion's expression of surprise. Selection has crafted the design of the developmental programs so that organisms tap into these reservoirs of information or hook themselves to environmental forces that help to construct them. Thus, the genomes of organisms have evolved to "store" organization and information that is necessary or helpful for development in the structure of the world itself. For example, for a developing child, the information in the minds of other humans, properly used, is a very useful source of information to use in their development, as are the linguistic patterns encountered in the local language community and patterns in local social behavior. Natural selection has intricately orchestrated developmental mechanisms so that things in the developmentally relevant world have been assigned an appropriate causal role, from gravity, plants, and three-dimensionality, to language, mothers, and social groups. Evolution shapes the relationship between the genes and the environment such that they both participate in a coordinated way in the construction and calibration of adaptations. Thus, evolutionarily patterned structure is coming in from the environment, just as much as it is coming out from the genes. Accordingly, "biology" is not some substance that is segregated or localized inside the initial state of the organism at birth, circumscribing the domain to which evolutionary analyses apply. It is also in the organization of the developmentally relevant world itself, when viewed from the perspective imposed by the evolved developmental mechanisms of the organism. Thus, nothing the organism interacts with in the world is nonbiological to it, and so for humans cultural forces are biological, social forces are biological, physical forces are biological, and so on. The social and cultural are not alternatives to the biological. They are aspects of evolved human biology and, hence, they are the kinds of things to which evolutionary analysis can properly be applied.
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Social scientists need to recognize that humans have evolved to expect, rely on, and take advantage of the richly structured participation of the environment-including the human social and cultural environment-in the task of adaptive development. Our developmental and psychological programs evolved to invite the social and cultural worlds in, but only the parts that tended, on balance, to have adaptively useful effects. Programs governing psychological development impose conceptual frameworks on the cultural and social worlds; choose which parts of the environment are monitored; choose how observations and interactions are categorized, represented, and interrelated; decide what entities to pursue interactions with; and, most importantly, determine what algorithms or relationships will organize environmental input into developmental change or psychological output. Consequently, the study ofdevelopmental adaptations is a central branch ofevolutionary psychology. Understanding these adaptations will make visible the subtly stable structure of the developmentally relevant world and illuminate the evolutionary patterning in how human beings respond to smiles, to language, and to the cultural knowledge in others' minds. Each human, by expressing his or her species-typical architecture, contributes to the environmental regularities that others inhabit and rely on for their development. For these reasons, it is a complete misconception to think that an adaptationist perspective denies or in the least minimizes the role of the environment in human development, psychology, behavior, or social life. Environmentalists have been completely correct about the importance of environmental input in the explanation of human behavior. Humans more richly and complexly engage the variable features of the environment than any other species we know of. It is this perception that has maintained environmentalism as the predominant viewpoint in the social sciences, despite its crippling inadequacies as an analytic framework. The terms "culture," "socialization," "intelligence," and "learning" are labels for poorly understood families of processes that reflect this complex and overwhelming human engagement with environmental inputs. Any viable theory ofthe evolved architecture of humans must reflect this reality and must be environmentalist in this sense. As discussed, the incoherence of Standard Model environmentalism stems from (I) the widespread failure to recognize that environmental responsiveness requires a complex evolved design (expressible as either a set ofdevelopmental adaptations or as a reliably developing psychological architecture; (2) the refusal to investigate or specify the nature of this architecture or these programs; and (3) the failure to recognize that the regulatory structure ofthese programs specifies the relationship between environmental input and behavioral, developmental, or psychological output. For social scientists, of course, this recognition requires a radical change in practice: Every "environmentalist" explanation about the influence of a given part of the environment on humans will-if it is to be considered coherent-need to be accompanied by a specific "nativist" hypothesis about the evolved developmental and psychological mechanisms that forge the relationship between the environmental input and the hypothesized psychological output. All "environmentalist" theories necessarily depend upon and invoke "nativist" theories, rendering environmentalism and nativism interdependent doctrines, rather than opposed ones. For post-Standard Model researchers, these incoherent traditional dichotomies (genetic/environmental, biological/social, nativist/environmental) are being abandoned, as is reflected, for example, in the title of a recent article, "Learning by instinct" (J. Gould & Marler, 1987).
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The Impact of the Recurrent Structure of Human Life and Human Culture on the Design of Psychological Adaptations
The evolved mesh between the information-processing design ofhuman psychological adaptations, their developmentally relevant environments, and the stably recurring structure of humans and their environments is pivotal to understanding how an evolutionary psychological approach to culture differs from that of the Standard Social Science Model. For traditional anthropologists, cultures vary from place to place, and there is nothing privileged about a conceptual framework that categorizes human thought and action so as to capture underlying patterns of cross-cultural uniformity, as against the infinite class of perspectives by which human thought and behavior appear everywhere different (Geertz, 1973, 1983, 1984; see D. E. Brown, 1991, for a critique ofthis view). Nevertheless, from the "point ofview" ofnatural selection, such uniformities-however subtle and unimportant to professionally neutral anthropological minds-are indeed privileged, and for a very simple reason. However variable cultures and habitats may have been during human evolution, selection would have sifted human social and cultural life (as well as everything else) for obvious or subtle statistical and structural regularities, building psychological adaptations that exploited some subset of these regularities to solve adaptive problems. (As we will discuss, one of the problems that had to be solved using regularities was the problem of learning "culture" itself.) Thus, Geertz's starting point, that humans have evolved to use culture, is obviously true (although not in the slavish sense he envisions). But the next step in his logicthat humans don't have general cultures, only particular ones, and so evolved to realize themselves only through cultural particularity-is the error of naive realism. No instance of anything is intrinsically (much less exclusively) either "general" or "particular"-these are simply different levels at which any system of categorization encounters the same world. When you meet Roger Shepard you are, at one and the same time, meeting both a particular (and distinctive) individual and a manifestation of humanity in general, embodying innumerable species-typical characteristics. So it is with cultures. Selection operated across ancestral hominid populations according to what were, in effect, systems ofcategorization, screening cross-cultural variability for any recurrent relationships that were relevant to the solution ofadaptive problems. To be thoroughly metaphorical, natural selection scrutinized the structure ofhuman cultural and social environments, searching for regularities that could be used to engineer into our evolved architecture effective techniques for adaptive problem-solving. Thus, the issue is: During the Pleistocene, were there any statistical and structural uniformities to human life from culture to culture and habitat to habitat, from any perspective-no matter how subtle or abstract or unobservable-that could have been used by species-typical problem-solving machinery for the adaptive regulation of behavior and physiology? Geertz sees (modern) cultures as irredeemably particularized, confidently dismissing talk ofmeaningful human universals as nearly vacuous. Did natural selection "see" the human world the same way? The answer is obvious, once the question is asked. Anthropological orthodoxy to the contrary, human life is full ofstructure that recurs from culture to culture, just as the rest ofthe world is. (Or, if one prefers, there are innumerable frames of reference within which meaningful cross-cultural uniformities appear, and many ofthese statistical uniformities and structural regularities could potentially have been used to solve
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adaptive problems.) Exactly which regularities are, in fact, part ofthe developmentally relevant environment that is used by our universal architectures is a matter to be empirically determined on a mechanism by mechanism, case by case basis. Such statistical and structural regularities concerning humans and human social life are an immensely and indefinitely large class (D. E. Brown, 1991): adults have children; humans have a species-typical body form; humans have characteristic emotions; humans move through a life history cued by observable body changes; humans come in two sexes; they eat food and are motivated to seek it when they lack it; humans are born and eventually die; they are related through sexual reproduction and through chains of descent; they tum their eyes toward objects and events that tend to be informative about adaptively consequential issues; they often compete, contend, or fight over limited social or subsistance resources; they express fear and avoidance of dangers; they preferentially associate with mates, children, and other kin; they create and maintain enduring, mutually beneficial individuated relationships with nonrelatives; they speak; they create and participate in coalitions; they desire, plan, deceive, love, gaze, envy, get ill, have sex, play, can be injured, are satiated; and on and on. Our immensely elaborate species-typical physiological and psychological architectures not only constitute regularities in themselves but they impose within and across cultures all kinds ofregularities on human life, as do the common features ofthe environments we inhabit (see D. E. Brown, 1991, for an important exploration of the kinds and significance of human universals). Human developmental mechanisms have been born into one cultural environment or another hundreds of billions of times, so the only truly long-term cumulatively directional effects ofselection on human design would have been left by the statistical commonality that existed across cultures and habitats. Consequently, the sustained impact of these cross-culturally recurrent relationships sculpted the problem-solving mechanisms ofthe human mind to expect and exploit the common structure of human cultures and human life; that is, natural selection constructed adaptations specialized to mesh with the detailed structural regularities common to our ancestral cultural environments. For this reason, not only does natural selection privilege frames of reference that reveal patterns of universality in human life but our evolved psychological architecture does also. Embedded in the programming structure of our minds are, in effect, a set of assumptions about the nature of the human world we will meet during our lives. So (speaking metaphorically) we arrive in the world not only expecting, Geertzian fashion, to meet some particular culture about whose specifically differentiated peculiarities we can know nothing in advance. We also arrive expecting to meet, at one and the same time, and in one and the same embodiment, the general human culture as well-that is, recognizably human life manifesting a wide array of forms and relations common across cultures during our evolution (or at least some set out ofthe superset). Thus, human architectures are "pre-equipped" (that is, reliably develop) specialized mechanisms that "know" many things about humans, social relations, emotions and facial expressions, the meaning ofsituations to others, the underlying organization ofcontingent social actions such as threats and exchanges, language, motivation, and so on. To take only one example, humans everywhere include as part of their standard conceptual equipment the idea that the behavior ofothers is guided by invisible internal entities, such as "beliefs" and "desires"-reflecting what Dennett calls "the intentional stance" (1987). Of course, this way of thinking seems so natural to us that it is
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difficult to see that there is anything to explain: It is tempting to think that beliefs and desires are "real" and that, therefore, humans everywhere simply learn to see the world as it really is. Side-stepping the complex question of whether this panhuman folk psychology is an accurate way of capturing "real" human psychology (i.e., whether it is a true or a complete description), we simply want to point out that things such as beliefs and desires are inherently unobservable hidden variables used to explain observations that could be explained by any of an infinite set of alternative theories (in fact, psychologists have come up with many such theories). Therefore, a belief in beliefs and desires cannot be justified by observations alone, so the fact that it is conventional among humans to "theorize" about others in this fashion is not inexorably mandated by their experience or otherwise required by the structure of the external world. For the same set of nonmandated ideas to have emerged everywhere on earth, our developmental programs or cognitive architectures must impose this way ofinterpreting the world of other humans on us. In fact, an intensive research effort in the field of cognitive development has recently provided substantial support for the hypothesis that our evolved psychological architecture includes procedures that cause very young children to reliably develop a belief-desire folk psychology-a so-called "theory of mind" (e.g, Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Leslie, 1987, 1988; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Developmental psychologists have been finding that even 2- and 3-year-olds make different inferences about "mental entities" (dreams, thoughts, desires, beliefs) than about "physical entities." Moreover, children typically "explain" behavior as the confluence of beliefs and desires (e.g., Why has Mary gone to the water fountain? Because she has a desire for water (i.e., she is thirsty) and she believes that water can be found at the water fountain). Such inferences appear to be generated by a domainspecific cognitive system that is sometimes called a "theory of mind" module (Leslie, 1987). This module consists of specialized computational machinery that allows one to represent the notion that "agents" can have "attitudes" toward "propositions" (thus, "Mary" can "believe" that "X," "Mary" can "think" that "X," and so on). Between the ages ofJ and 5 this domain-specific inferential system develops in a characteristic pattern that has been replicated cross-eulturally in North America, Europe, China (Havell, Zhang, Zou, Dong & Qui, 1983), Japan (Gardner, Harris, Ohmoto & Hamazaki, 1988), and a hunter-gatherer group in Camaroon (Avis & Harris, in press). Moreover, there is now evidence suggesting that the neurological basis of this system can be selectively damaged; indeed, autism is suspected to be caused by a selective neurological impairment of the "theory of mind" module (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Leslie, 1987, 1988; Leslie & Thaiss, 1990). This research indicates that a panhuman "theory of mind" module structures the folk psychology that people develop. People in different cultures may elaborate their folk psychologies in different ways, but the computational machinery that guides the development oftheir folk notions will be the same, and some ofthe notions developed will be the same as well. Humans come into the world with the tendency to organize their understanding of the actions ofothers in terms ofbeliefs and desires, just as they organize patterns in their two-dimensional retinal array under the assumption that the world is three-dimensional and that objects are permanent, bounded, and solid. Thus, not only do evolved mechanisms assume certain things will tend to be true ofhuman life but these specialized procedures, representational formats, cues, and categorization systems impose-out ofan infinite set ofpotential alternatives-a detailed
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organization on experience that is shared by all normal members ofour species. There is certainly cultural and individual variability in the exact forms of adult mental organization that emerge through development, but these are all expressions ofwhat might be called a single human metaculture. All humans tend to impose on the world a common encompassing conceptual organization, made possible by universal mechanisms operating on the recurrent features of human life. This is a central reality of human life and is necessary to explain how humans can communicate with each other, learn the culture they are born into, understand the meaning of others' acts, imitate each other, adopt the cultural practices of others, and operate in a coordinated way with others in the social world they inhabit. By metaculture, we mean the system of universally recurring relationships established and constituted by (1) our universal evolved species-typical psychological and physiological architectures, (2) the interaction ofthese architectures with each other in populations, (3) their interaction with the developmentally relevant recurrent structure of human natural and cultural environments, and (4) their patterned standard impact on human phenomena. Social scientists have traditionally considered there to be a tension or explanatory competition between human universals and transmitted cultural variability: the more of one, the less of the other (D. E. Brown, 1991). However, careful causal analysis of the information-processing tasks required to learn transmitted culture leads to what is very nearly the opposite conclusion. In fact, it is only the existence of this common metacultural structure, which includes universal mechanisms specialized to mesh with the social world, that makes the transmission of variable cultural forms possible. To make this clear, consider the question of how it is possible for pre-linguistic children to deduce the meanings of the words they hear when they are in the process of learning their local language for the first time. The child's task of discovering the meanings of words involves isolating, out of an infinite set of possible meanings, the actual meanings intended by other speakers (e.g., Carey, 1982, 1985a; Quine, 1960). Children can infer the meanings ofmessages in the local, but unknown language only because they, like cryptographers, have a priori statistical knowledge about likely messages, given the situational context. To solve the problem ofreferential ambiguity, the child's procedures for semantic analysis must depend on the fact that our universal evolved psychological architectures impose on the world enough standard and recurrent interpretations between speaker and listener to make the deduction of a core lexicon possible. Since the infant is new to the culture and ignorant of it, these shared interpretations cannot be supplied by the culture itself, but must be supplied by the human universal metaculture the infant or child shares with adults by virtue of their common humanity. (In contrast, the Standard Model's initially content-free general process child mind would share no common interpretations with local adults and could rely on no necessary imposition of common event construals by both speaker and listener.) Thus, the system for assigning correct semantic meanings to culturally arbitrary signs necessarily relies on the presence of species-typical cognitive adaptations and on the nonarbitrariness of meaning systems that inhabit these cognitive adaptations. These mechanisms reliably identify evolutionarily recurrent situations (such as threat, play, or eating) in such a way that the participants have similar construals ofthe situation and responses to it, including things likely to be said about it. For example, children who are just learning their local language interpret novel words using Markman's "whole object assumption" and her "taxonomic assumption." The whole object assumption causes them to interpret the novel word "cup" as
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referring to a whole cup, and not to its handle, the porcelain it is made of, a cup on a saucer, a cup of tea (and so on); the "taxonomic assumption" causes them to interpret "cup" as referring to all objects of the same type, and not to the particular cup being pointed to at that moment (Markman, 1989; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984). Of course, the operation of these assumptions depends, in turn, on interpretations generated by the kinds of domain-specific inferential systems discussed earlier, which define what entities and relations count as whole objects, animals, plants, people, natural kinds, artifacts, taxonomic categories, and so on (Carey & Gelman, 1991). Still other domain-specific reasoning procedures may privilege certain interpretations of social relations. Thus, social contract algorithms have both intrinsic definitions for the terms used by their procedures and cues for recognizing which elements in recurrent situations correspond to those terms (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, this volume). Consequently, these evolved reasoning specializations may sometimes function as nuclei around which semantic inference is conducted. Emotional expressions also function as metacultural cues that assign standardized meanings to the contingent elements of situations (see Fernald, this volume; Tooby'& Cosmides, 1990b). For example, ifsomeone reacts with fear, others interpret this as a reaction to danger and attempt to identify in the situation what the dangerous entity is, re-evaluating various stimuli. They may scan the local environment, organizing their search by a categorization system that privileges some things (e.g., snakes) over others (e.g., flowers) (Cook, Hodes, & Lang, 1986). Thus, we have the surprising result that it is the shared species-typical mechanisms and common metacultural framings that make it possible for a child to learn what is culturally variable: in this case, the meanings ofwords in the local language. This argument, in fact, generalizes beyond language: The variable features of culture can be learned solely because of the existence ofan encompassing universal human metaculture. The ability to imitate the relevant parts of others' actions (Meltzoff, 1988), the ability to reconstruct the representations in their minds, the ability to interpret the conduct of others correctly, and the ability to coordinate one's behavior with others all depend on the existence of human metaculture. Sperber and Wilson (1986) have written at length about how, for successful communication to be possible, both sender and receiver must share a great many assumptions about the world. The less they mutually assume, the more difficult it is to communicate until, in the limiting case, they cannot communicate at all. The child arrives in the culture free ofany knowledge about its particularities, and so the only way the child initially can be communicated with is through what is mutually manifest between the child and the adults by virtue of their common humanity (e.g., Fernald, this volume). The same is true, ~ Sperber (1982) concisely points out, ofethnographers: The best refutation ofcultural relativity is the activity of anthropologists themselves, who could not understand or live within other human groups unless the inhabitants of those groups shared assumptions that were, in fact, very similar to those of the ethnographer. Like fish unaware of the existence ofwater, interpretativists swim from culture to culture interpreting through universal human metaculture. Metaculture informs their every thought, but they have not yet noticed its existence. So the beginning ofthis section, in which we discussed how natural selection sifted cultural variability throughout the Pleistocene for uniformities, gave only a one-sided analysis of how, despite cultural variability, universals still existed. It is even more important to realize that contentful human universals make possible the very exis-
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tence of transmitted cultural variability (what is usually called "culture"), which would otherwise be impossible. Therefore, the development of increasing cultural variation throughout the Pleistocene was made possible by the evolution of psychological specializations that exploited the regularities ofhuman metaculture in order to learn the variable features of culture. To return to a position William James stated a century ago, to behave flexibly, humans must have more "instincts" than other animals, not fewer.
THE TRANSITION TO POST-STANDARD MODEL PSYCHOLOGY
The Decline of Standard Model Psychology The progression from Standard Model psychology to post-Standard Model psychology was driven largely by the emergence of new and more rigorous standards that psychological theories are now expected to meet. As the field grew more sophisticated, various communities of psychologists began insisting on causal accounts of how hypothesized Standard Model mechanisms produced their effects: What are the networks of cause and effect that, step by step, lead from input to output? In the social sciences, no model of the human psychological architecture seemed impossible when its proponents didn't have to specify by what methods it generated human behavior. The cognitive revolution, with its emphasis on formal analysis, made clear that theories needed to be made causally explicit to be meaningful, and it supplied psychologists with a far more precise language and set of tools for analyzing and investigating complexly contingent, information-responsive systems. When examined from this perspective, most traditional theories turned out to be both incomplete and incapable of accounting for large classes of observed phenomena. Indeed, most no longer seemed to qualify as hypotheses at all. For example, "learning" ceased to be seen as an explanation for behavior, but instead was recognized as a label for a loosely defined class of phenomena generated by as yet unknown procedures. For modem psychologists the key question became: What is the explicit description ofthese procedures? Over the last three decades, the hard work of discovering procedures that could actually account in detail for observed behavior and competences has led to the widespread conclusion that our evolved psychological architecture must include a large set of mechanisms of a very different character than Standard Model psychologists had envisioned. The most fundamental shift from Standard Model to post-Standard Model psychology has been the abandonment ofthe axiom that evolved psychological mechanisms must be largely-or exclusively-general-purpose and free of any contentful structure not put there by experience (e.g., Carey & Gelman, 1991; Chomsky, 1975;Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1992; Gallistel, 1990; Gigerenzer, 1991b; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Hermstein, 1977; Pinker, 1984; Rozin, 1976; Rozin & Schull, 1988; Shepard, 1984, 1987a; Symons, 1987). Many psychologists have been forced by their data to conclude that both human and nonhuman minds contain-in addition to whatever general-purpose machinery they may have-a large array of mechanisms that are (to list some of the terms most frequently used) functionally specialized, content-dependent, content-sensitive, domain-specific, context-sensitive, special-purpose, adaptively specialized, and so on. Mechanisms that are functionally specialized have been called (with some differences in exact definition) adaptive specializations by
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Rozin (1976), modules by Fodor (1983), and cognitive competences or mental organs by Chomsky (1975, 1980). Consequently, the core ofthe debate is not really about whether the reliably developing design of the mind evolved-the answer to that question can only be yes. The debate is, instead, over whether our evolved psychological architecture is predominantly domain-general (Symons, 1987). Did the human mind evolve to resemble a single general-purpose computer with few or no intrinsic content-dependent programs (e.g., Gould, 1979)? Or does its evolved architecture more closely resemble an intricate network of functionally dedicated computers, each activated by different classes of content or problem, with some more general-purpose computers embedded in the architecture as well (e.g., Chomsky, 1975, 1980; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Gallistel, 1990; Gazzaniga, 1985; Rozin, 1976; Symons, 1987)? In other words, does the human mind come equipped with any procedures, representational formats, or content-primitives that evolved especially to deal with faces, mothers, language, sex, food, infants, tools, siblings, friendship, and the rest of human metaculture and the world?
Solvability and the Formal Analysis of Natural Competences Thirty years ago, Noam Chomsky inaugurated a new era in the behavioral sciences when he began to explore psychological questions by analyzing the capacities of wellspecified computational systems (Chomsky 1957, 1959). His approach was distinctive. To evaluate existing psychological theories, he first made their underlying assumptions about computational mechanisms explicit. He then tested the ability of these computational mechanisms to solve real, natural problems that humans were known to be able to solve. In his first application of this method, he attempted to evaluate the adequacy of behaviorist accounts of language, particularly as presented in Skinner's then recently published book, Verbal Behavior (1957). When Chomsky examined the behaviorist account oflanguage in the light of these criteria, he found that it suffered from a series of difficulties that precluded it from being a persuasive explanation for human linguistic competence. Chomsky's research program brought the serious deficiencies of the Standard Model into plain view because it combined two key ingredients: ( I) the study of tasks related to a natural, complex, real-world competence that humans were known to have, and (2) the use offormal solvability analyses to explore the actual computational capacities ofmechanisms hypothesized to generate explicitly defined outcomes. A theory about the design of a mechanism cannot be correct if, under the relevant conditions, that design cannot solve the problem or generate the performance that the theory claims it can; this can be determined using a solvability analysis, as outlined in pp. 73-77. Language was a pivotal choice for a test of domain-general accounts of behavior because language-particularly syntax-involved complex but clearly specifiable patterns ofbehavior that humans were already known to be able to produce under natural conditions without elaborate experimental manipulations. Within this domain, one could precisely and unambiguously define criteria for recognizing what behavioral patterns humans could and did routinely produce (grammatical versus ungrammatical sentences). Therefore, one could define what output any mechanism hypothesized to account for tht:se behavioral patterns had to produce as well. In contrast, no one could tell whether associationist mechanisms or general-purpose symbol-processing
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mechanisms could account for phenomena such as "religion," "marriage," or "politics" because no one had an unambiguous empirical definition ofhuman performance in these spheres. By specifying what counts as the production of grammatical utterances or the acquisition of the grammar ofa human language, psycholinguists working within the Chomskyan research tradition have been using solvability analyses to show that a task routinely mastered by four-year-old children is too richly structured to be accounted for by any known general-purpose mechanism operating in real time (Chomsky, 1975, 1980; Pinker, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1991; Pinker & Bloom, this volume; Wexler & Culicover, 1980). Despite three decades of intensive efforts by Standard Model psychologists to get general-purpose cognitive machinery to learn grammar, their theories have fared no better than did their behaviorist predecessors. To take a recent example, through careful solvability analyses, Pinker and Prince were able to show that newly proposed domain-general connectionist and associationist models were computationally insufficient to solve even so narrow a problem as the acquisition ofthe past tense in English (Pinker, 1991; Pinker & Prince, 1988). These mechanisms failed precisely because they lacked computational machinery specialized for the acquisition ofgrammar. Thirty years of such findings have forced many cognitive psychologists, against their inclination, to accept domain-specific hypotheses about language learning-to conclude that humans have as part of their evolved design a language acquisition device (LAD), which incorporates content-dependent procedures that reflect in some form "universal grammar" (Chomsky, 1975, 1980; Pinker, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1991; Wexler & Culicover, 1980). In this view, the architecture ofthe human mind contains content-specialized mechanisms that have evolved to exploit the subtle cross-culturally recurring features of the grammars of human language communities-one facet of human metaculture (Pinker & Bloom, this volume). The introduction ofsolvability analyses and the increasing demand for well-specified information-processing models have exposed the deficiencies ofStandard Model theories in other areas of psychology as well (see, e.g., Carey & Gelman, 1991; Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, this volume; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Keil, 1989; Leslie, 1987; Markman, 1989). Standard Model theories are usually so underspecified that one cannot make their underlying assumptions about computational mechanisms procedurally explicit. To the extent that they can be evaluated, however, when they are faced with real world tasks that humans routinely solve, they consistently perform poorly or not at all. In fact, the large-scale theoretical claims of Standard Model psychology never had a strong empirical base. Limited empirical support could be produced for Standard Model domain-general theories, but only so long as research was confined to the investigation ofexperimenter-invented, laboratory limited, arbitrary tasks. The occasional matches between domain-general theories and data sets have been chronically weak and experimentally fragile. These restricted empirical successes depended on carefully picked experimental venues, such as pigeons isolated from conspecifics pecking for food in stimulus-depauperated environments or humans learning lists ofnonsense syllables. Standard Model theories ofmechanisms have maintained themselves as empirically credible primarily through pretheoretical decisions concerning what kinds of experiments were considered meaningful and through assumptions imposed a priori on the class of hypotheses that would be entertained. For humans and nonhumans
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alike, exposure to biologically significant stimuli and natural tasks elicits complexly patterned performances that Standard Model theories are unable to predict or explain. So, to keep behavioral phenomena in line with theory, Standard Model psychologists had to keep humans and other species outside of ecologically valid circumstances, away from any biologically significant stimuli, and test them on artificial problems that subjects would not have had to solve in their environment ofevolutionary adaptedness (for discussion, see Beach, 1950; Breland & Breland, 1961; Herrnstein, 1977; Lockard, 1971). Although these weaknesses have now mostly been abandoned in the study of other species, they unfortunately remain endemic in many areas of human psychology. Once animal behavior researchers let the pigeon out of its barren artificial cage, a rich flock of behavioral phenomena appeared, and questions inevitably arose about the mechanisms that guide the animal to do all the different things it needs to do in natural environments to survive and reproduce. Thus, ethology (or behavioral ecology, sociobiology, or animal behavior) played an important corrective role by providing examples of the tasks organisms solve and the complex performances they exhibit in more natural conditions (Daly & Wilson, 1984b; Krebs & Davies, 1984; Lorenz, 1965; Rozin & Schull, 1988; Tinbergen, 1951; Wilson, 1975). These fields carefully documented functionally interpretable behaviors that lie far outside anything that Standard Model psychology and a short list ofdrives could explain. Researchers investigating the now well-known selection pressure expressed by Hamilton's rule (see pp. 67-68) documented an enormous array of kin-directed assistance in nonhuman animals-behaviors completely undreamed of in Standard Model psychology (Hamilton, 1964; Williams & Williams, 1957; for review, see Krebs & Davies, 1984). Infant macaques become emotionally attached to immobile cloth figures even though they nurse ("are reinforced") on another structure entirely (Harlow, Harlow, & Suomi, 1971). There are reports from an entire range of species-from langurs to lions to rodents-of newly resident males killing the unweaned infants of their predecessors, thereby accelerating ovulation in their new mates (Hrdy, 1977; Hausfater & Hrdy, 1984). Ring doves may expend considerable effort to monitor the sexual behavior of their mates (Erickson & Zenone, 1976). There was the discovery of the complex patterns offood reciprocation in vampire bats-phenomena difficult to account for using traditional notions of general-purpose cognition, conditioning, and drive reduction (e.g., Wilkinson 1988, 1990). From echolocation to parental care, to celestial navigation, to courtship, to coalitional action in chimpanzees, to seasonal migration, to decoying predators away from nests, to communication in bees, to "friendship" and dominance in baboons, nonhuman behavior is full of tasks and organized behaviors that do not remotely fit into Standard Model psychology. This burgeoning body of phenomena caused many animal behavior researchers to break away from the narrow experimental paradigms and narrow questions ofthe Standard Social Science Model. In human psychology, the observational basis for Standard Model theories was equally circumscribed, but escape from its narrow experimental paradigms has been more difficult than in nonhuman psychology. Standard Model psychologists had no salient reason for suspecting that different psychological mechanisms would be activated by different kinds of tasks. Human activities appeared to be so variable-both between cultures and among individuals within a culture-that the notion that some tasks and problems might be more "natural" than others did not seem conspicuously sensible. Although most psychologists were faintly aware that hominids lived for mil-
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lions of years as hunter-gatherers or foragers, they did not realize that this had theoretical implications for their work. More to the point, however, the logic of the Standard Social Science Model informed them that humans were more or less blank slates for which no task was more natural than any other. Until the emergence of a community ofChomskyan psycholinguists, mainstream psychology had been overwhelmingly dominated by general-purpose learning and cognitive theories. In consequence, the same processes were assumed to account for learning and action in all domains of human activity, from suckling at the breast to incest avoidance, language learning, and alliance negotiations among Dani warriors. By questioning the assumption that all tasks were created equal, Chomsky exposed how narrowly chosen Standard Model research topics had actually been and how overreaching the extrapolation had been from these topics to the rest of human thought and action. The rise of Chomskyan psycholinguistics constituted a decisive turning point in the development of human psychology because it introduced the subversive idea that some tasks might awaken associated competences that were more "natural" than others: more functionally specialized, more complex, more reliably developing, more species-differentiated, and, therefore, more worthy ofdetailed exploration (Marr & Nishihara, 1978).
The Rise of Domain-Specific Psychology The Chomskyan revolution in the study of language slowly began to legitimize the exploration ofmodels of our evolved psychological architecture that did not assume a priori that all tasks are solved by the same set of content-independent processes. In diverse subcommunities, the gradually expanding freedom to consider domain-specific hypotheses alongside more orthodox ones has led to their increasing acceptance. Performance in virtually every kind of experimental situation is sensitive to the content and context ofthe task, and domain-specific hypotheses tend to organize, account for, and predict this performance better than their Standard Model predecessors. Although social and behavioral scientists outside ofcognitive, comparative, and physiological psychology still routinely assume a domain-general human mind, within the community of psychologists who rigorously study mechanisms this view is in retreat and disarray. Standard Model psychology has been able to persist only in those research communities that avoid formal analysis entirely or that avoid using it to study performance on ecologically valid, natural tasks. 6 Thus, researchers who ask hard questions about how organisms actually solve problems and who focus on the real performance of organisms on natural tasks have had to abandon the idea that the mind is free of content-specialized machinery. Researchers who study color vision, visual scene analysis, speech perception, conceptual development in children, mental imagery, psychophysics, locomotion, language acquisition, motor control, anticipatory motion computation, face recognition, biomechanical motion perception, emotion recognition, social cognition, reasoning, and the perception and representation ofmotion, for example, cannot account for the psychological phenomena they study by positing computational mechanisms that are solely domain-general and content-independent (see, e.g., Bizzi, Mussa-Ivaldi, & Giszter, 1991; Carey & Gelman, 1991; Etcoff, 1986; Freyd, 1987; Kosslyn, 1980; Liberman & Mattingley, 1985, 1989; Lindblom, 1986, 1988; Maloney & Wandell, 1985; Marr, 1982; Pinker, 1984, 1989; Poggio et al., 1985; Proffitt & Gilden, 1989; Shepard, 1981,
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1984, 1987a; Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990; Spelke, 1988, 1990). In fact, the reality has always been that every field of psychology bristles with observations of content-dependent phenomena. Freedom from the axiom that all psychological phenomena must be explained by content-independent machinery has allowed psychologists to move ahead to explore-and to view as meaningful-the rich content-sensitive effects that permeate psychological phenomena (e.g., Astington et al., 1988; A. Brown, 1990; Carey, 1985b; Carey & Gelman, 1991; Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, this volume; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Gigerenzer& Hug, in press; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Keil, 1989; Manktelow & Over, 1991). Formerly, these omnipresent content effects were considered an embarrassment to be explained away or else dismissed as noise. Now they are considered to be primary data about the structure ofthe mind. Outside of cognitive psychology, the emergence of post-Standard Model approaches derived their impetus from branches ofevolutionary biology. In the 1950s and I960s, the successful application of evolutionary approaches to animal behavior in ethology and its successor disciplines provided evidence of domain-specific mechanisms that was difficult to ignore (e.g., attachment, emotion, phobias, mating, foraging, navigation). This trend was accelerated by the rapid advances in evolutionary biology over the last three decades, which made the previously clouded connection between evolution and behavior somewhat clearer. These advances included (I) more coherent approaches to the nature-nurture issue, (2) a more rigorous foundation for the theory of natural selection (Williams, 1966), (3) formal analyses ofwhat behaviors would be favored by selection in a variety of newly explored domains (e.g., Charnov, 1976; Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1982; Stephens & Krebs, 1986; Trivers, 1971, 1972, 1974; Williams, 1966), and (4) a cascade ofsuccessful applications ofthese theories to animal behavior (Alexander, 1974; Daly & Wilson, I984b; Krebs & Davies, 1984; Wilson, 1975). Just as in the case of nonhuman behavior, evolutionarily informed studies of human choice, motivation, emotion, and action also bristle with documented phenomena that cannot be accounted for with content-independent architectures and a short list ofdrives, rewards, or reinforcers (the chapters in this volume are a small sampling ofsuch cases). For example, ever since the Harlows demolished the myth that an infant's love for its mother was a conditioned response to food rewards, the rich collection of co-adapted mechanisms in the mother and infant has been a productive focus of psychological investigation (e.g., Bowlby, 1969). Profet (this volume) identifies a maternal psychological adaptation for the protection ofthe fetus during embryogenesis. Fernald (this volume) explores the communicative adaptations mothers have to the infant's perceptual limitations. Moreover, cross-cultural regularities in fall-rise patterns of maternal fundamental frequency provide an elegant illustration that a child and adult initially communicate by virtue ofwhat they share through their common human metaculture. Communication through such human universals is a precondition for the child's acquisition of the culturally specific. Facial expressions of emotion represent another evolved modality through which humans communicate situation-construals, and the cross-culturally stable features of emotional expression provide another critical foundation for human metaculture. Ekman and his colleagues have established one of the earliest and most sophisticated traditions ofevolutionary psychological research, and these studies of emotional expression represent a major achievement in modem psychology (e.g., Ekman, 1973, 1982, 1984; Ekman & Frie-
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sen, 1975; Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983). Etcoff( 1986) has marshalled substantial neuropsychological evidence that humans have mechanisms specialized for the identification ofemotional expression-an adaptation to an important, stable feature ofancestral social and cultural environments. Indeed, ever since Darwin (1871, 1872), emotions have been seen as the product of the evolutionary process and usually, although not always, as functional adaptations (e.g., Arnold, 1960, 1968; Chance, 1980; Daly, et al., 1982; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975; Ekman, 1982; Frijda, 1986; Hamburg, 1968; Izard, 1977; Otte, 1974; Plutchik, 1980; Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; and many others). Functional or not, the emotions collectively provide a dense and pervasive network of domain-specific phenomena that have consistently resisted assimilation into any Standard Model theory. However, in contrast to their Standard Model reputation as crude and indiscriminate responses, on close scrutiny each specific emotion appears to be an intricately structured information-sensitive regulatory adaptation. In fact, the emotions appear to be designed to solve a certain category ofregulatory problem that inevitably emerges in a mind full of disparate, functionally specialized mechanisms-the problem of coordinating the menagerie of mechanisms with each other and with the situation being faced (Tooby, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, I990b; Nesse, 1990). Daly and Wilson have been exploring the evolved complexity and functional subtlety of the human motivational system. They have produced a substantial body of findings supporting specific hypotheses they derived from a broad array ofadaptationist theories (Daly & Wilson, 1981, 1982, 1984b, 1987a, 1987b, 1988; Daly, et al., 1982; Wilson & Daly, 1985, 1987, this volume). Their particular interest has been the evolved motivational systems that regulate parental care, spousal relations, sexualjealousy, sexual proprietariness, and risk-taking. By using behavioral phenomena such as violence and homicide as dependent measures, they have been able to investigate many aspects of these evolved motivational systems-including how their operation is affected by factors such as gender, age, kinship, reproductive value, number of children, and other situational variables (see also Mann, this volume). Similarly, in the area of human mate choice and sexuality, the work ofSymons, Buss, and many others shows that the construct of a "sex drive" is completely inadequate to cope with the structured richness ofthe situational factors processed by the differentiated sexual psychologies of men and women across cultures (e.g., Buss, 1987, 1989, 1991, this volume, in prep.; Ellis, this volume; Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987; Symons, 1979; Townsend, 1987). These studies indicate that existing theories ofmotivation will have to be replaced with theories positing a far more elaborate motivational architecture, equipped with an extensive set ofevolved information-processing algorithms that are contingently sensitive to a long list ofsituational contents and contexts. Thus, the examination of even a small sampling of non-Standard Model behavioral studies by a handful of researchers such as Bowlby, Daly and Wilson, Ekman, Fernald, Marks, Buss, and Symons leads to the conclusion that the human mind contains evolved emotional and motivational mechanisms that are specifically targeted to address adaptive problems involved in parenting, emotional communication with infants and adults, kinship, mate choice, sexual attraction, aggression, the avoidance of danger, mate guarding, effort allocation in child care, and so on. That is, humans have psychological adaptations that contain contentful structure specifically "about" their mothers, "about" their children, "about" the sexual behavior of their mates, "about" those identified by cues as kin, "about" how much to care for a sick child, and
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so on, and these contents are not derived exclusively from either a short list of drives or from culturally variable, socially learned "values." In short, the central tenets of Standard Model psychology are contradicted by results from a large and rapidly growing body ofresearch on humans and nonhumans from the cognitive community, from the evolutionary community, from the behavioral ecology community, and from other research communities as well (for example, much of psychobiology, comparative psychology, and neuroscience). Content-independent mechanisms simply cannot generate or explain the richly patterned behaviors and knowledge structures that appear when one's research focus is widened beyond arbitrary laboratory tasks to include the complex performances orchestrated by natural competences on real world tasks. Moreover, unlike most Standard Model theories and results, these kinds of studies and hypotheses withstand cross-cultural scrutiny and indicate that a great deal of the substance of social life attributed to "culture" around the world is in fact caused by the operation ofcontingently responsive domainspecific mechanisms. These converging results are accumulating into a strikingly different picture than that provided by the Standard Social Science Model. They indicate that a universal, evolved psychological architecture that is filled with contingently responsive mechanisms infuses distinctively human patterns into the life of every culture.
The Frame Problem and the Weakness of Content-Independent, DomainGeneral Mechanisms From Flexibility to Adaptive Flexibility In the passage from Standard Model to post-Standard Model psychology it seems fair to say that the greatest reversal lay in how content-independence and domain-generality came to be regarded. Many modem researchers recognize that content-independent, general problem-solvers are inherently weak in comparison to content-specialized mechanisms. From a traditional point of view, however, it seemed sensible to regard generality as an enhancement of the capacity of a system: The system is not prevented from assuming certain states or kept from doing what is adaptive (or desirable) by a "rigid" or "biased" architecture. Generality of application seems like such an obvious virtue and content-independence seems like such an obvious road to flexible behavior, what could possibly be wrong with them? As Marvin Harris puts this line of reasoning, "Selection in the main has acted against genetically imposed limitations on human cultural repertoires" (1979, p. 136). Why rigidly prevent the system from engaging in certain behaviors on those occasions when they would be advantageous? Moreover, why not have an "unbiased" architecture in which the actual structure of local circumstances impresses a true picture of itself in a free, objective, and unconstrained way? In this view, content-specificity in evolved psychological design is imbued with all the legendary attributes of"biology"-rigidity, inflexibility, and constraint. It is viewed as preventing the system from achieving advantageous states that would otherwise naturally come about. So what, after all, is so wrong with domain-general systems? Why do cognitive psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers consistently find them too weak to solve virtually any complex real world task? Why isn't "flexibility" in the form ofcontent-independence a virtue? The answers to these questions emerge from one clarifi-
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cation and from two basic facts. The two facts have already been touched on many times: (1) possibilities are infinite; and (2) desirable outcomes-by any usual human, evolutionary, or problem-solving standard-are a very small subset ofall possibilities. The clarification concerns the kind of plasticity and flexibility that are implicitly being referred to. Literally, plasticity, or flexibility, is the simple capacity to vary in some dimension. The more dimensions of possible variation, the greater the "plasticity." Hence, a lump of clay is very plastic with respect to shape (although not with respect to substance, density, and so on). Similarly, there is an infinite number ofways that humans and other animals could potentially act. The difficulty lies in the fact that the overwhelming majority of behavioral sequences would be lethal in a few hours, days, or weeks. The set ofbehaviors that leads even to temporary individual survivallet alone to reproduction or design-propagation-constitutes an extremely miniscule subset ofall possible behavioral sequences. Thus, the property offreely varying behavior in all dimensions independent of conditions is not advantageous: It is evolutionarily and individually ruinous. Accordingly, to be endowed with broad behavioral plasticity unconnected to adaptive targets or environmental conditions is an evolutionary death sentence, guaranteeing that the design that generates it will be removed from the population. Designs that produce "plasticity" can be retained by selection only if they have features that guide behavior into the infinitesimally small regions of relatively successful performance with sufficient frequency. In reality, terms such as flexibility or plasticity are implicitly used to mean something very different from the simple "capacity to vary." They are implicitly used to mean the capacity to adjust behavior (or morphology) as a coordinated response to the specifics oflocal conditions so that the new behavior is particularly appropriate to or successful in the specific circumstances faced. This narrowly specialized form of flexibility requires three components: (1) a set of mechanisms that define an adaptive target (such as finding food, finding home, or finding a mate); (2) a set ofmechanisms that can compute or otherwise determine what responses are most likely to achieve the adaptive target in each specific set of circumstances that one is likely to encounter; and (3) the ability to implement the specific response once it is determined. Plasticity in the "lump of clayjcapacity to vary" sense refers only to the third component: If an organism has correctly computed what it is advantageous to do, then (and only then) is it disadvantageous to be inflexibly prevented from implementing those changes by some fixed element of the system. In fact, plasticity (e.g., variability) tends to be injurious everywhere in the architecture except where it is guided by well-designed regulatory mechanisms that improve outcomes or at least do no harm. It would be particularly damaging ifthese regulatory mechanisms were themselves capriciously "plastic," instead of rigidly retaining those computational methods that produce advantageous responses to changing conditions. Thus, plasticity is only advantageous for those specific features of the organism that are governed by procedures that can compute the specific changes or responses that will be, on average, more successful than a fixed phenotype. Adaptive flexibility requires a "guidance system" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby, 1985). The most important conclusion to be derived from this line of reasoning is that adaptive flexibility can only evolve when the mechanisms that make it possible are embedded within a co-evolved guidance system. Consequently, the expansion of behavioral and cognitive flexibility over evolutionary time depended acutely on how well-designed these computational guidance systems became. There is nothing in the
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ability to vary per se that naturally leads systems to gravitate toward producing successful performances. It is the guidance system itselfthat is doing the bulk ofthe interesting regulation ofoutcomes, with the "potential to vary" component explaining very little about the situation. Thus, Gould's (1977a, 1979) faith in the explanatory power of the SSSM concept of generalized human "biological potential" depends either on (I) an unjustified teleological panglossianism (e.g., unguided processes, such as accidental brain growth, just happen to "work out for the best," giving humans the desire to care for their children, to defend themselves when attacked, to cooperate; the ability to recognize faces, to find food, to speak a language ...), or (2) the unacknowledged existence of co-evolved cognitive adaptations that guide behavioral plasticity toward the achievement of adaptive targets. It is the necessary existence of these co-evolved guidance systems that has, for the most part, escaped the attention of Standard Model advocates. In fact, the SSSM ediface is built on the conflation of two distinct notions of flexibility: (I) flexibility as the absence ofany limits on responses, and (2) flexibility as the production ofcontextually appropriate responses. Advocates of the SSSM imagine that flexibility in the first sense-an absence of limits on variation-is easy to computationally arrange (just remove all "constraints"). But they also assume this is the same as-or will automatically produce-flexibility in the second sense: adaptive, successful, or contextually appropriate behavior. Post-Standard Model psychology rests on the recognition that flexibility in this second sense is not something that is teleologically inevitable once constraints are removed, but is, instead, something very improbable and difficult to achieve, requiring elaborate functionally organized machinery. The Weakness of Content-Independent Architectures If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as it is, infinite. -WILLIAM BLAKE
Ifplasticity by itselfis not only useless but injurious, the issue then becomes, what kind of guidance systems can propel computational systems sufficiently often toward the small scattered islands ofsuccessful outcomes in the endless expanse ofalternative possibilities? Attempts over the last three decades to answer this question have led directly to two related concepts, called by artificial intelligence researchers and other cognitive scientists combinatorial explosion and the frame problem. Combinatorial explosion is the term for the fact that with each new degree of freedom added to a system, or with each new dimension of potential variation added, or with each new successive choice in a chain ofdecisions, the total number ofalternative possibilities faced by a computational system grows with devastating rapidity. For example, ifyou are limited to emitting only one out of 100 alternative behaviors every successive minute (surely a gross underestimate: raise arm, close hand, toss book, extend foot, say "Havel," etc.), after the second minute you have 10,000 different behavioral sequences from which to choose, a million by the third minute, a trillion by six minutes, and 10 120 possible alternative sequences after only one hour-a truly unimaginable number. Every hour, each human is surrounded by a new and endless expanse of behavioral possibility. Which leads to the best outcome? Or, leaving aside optimality as a hopelessly utopian luxury in an era ofdiminished expectations, which sequences are nonfatal? The system could not possibly compute the anticipated outcome ofeach alternative and compare the results, and so must be precluding without
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complete consideration the overwhelming majority of branching pathways. What are the principles that allow us to act better than randomly? Combinatorial explosion attacks any system that deals with alternatives, which means any system that is flexible in response or has decisions to make. The more flexible the system, the greater the problem. Even worse, knowledge acquisition is impossible for a computational system equipped only with the limited information it can gain through its senses; this is because the number of alternative states of affairs in the world that are consistent with its sense data is infinite. For example, ifcognitive mechanisms are attempting to infer the meaning of an unknown word, there is an infinite set of potential meanings. If perceptual mechanisms are trying to construct a three dimensional model of the local world from a visual array, there is an infinite number of different ways to do it that are all consistent with the array. For any finite sample of sentences encountered, there exists an infinite number of alternative grammars that could have generated them. If one is making a decision about how to forage there is, practically speaking, an infinite number of possibilities. Moreover, random choice is not a general solution to the problem because for most adaptive or humanly defined problems the islands of success are infinitesimal next to the illimitable seascapes of failure. And for biological systems, success and failure are not arbitrary. The causal world imposes a nonarbitrary distinction between detecting in one's visual array the faint outline of a partly camoufliged stalking predator and not detecting it because of alternative interpretive procedures. Nonpropagating designs are removed from the population, whether they believe in naive realism or that everything is an arbitrary social construction. The inexhaustible range of possibilities latent in behavior, categorization, interpretation, decision, and so on, is a not just an abstract philosophical point It is an implacable reality facing every problem-solving computational system. Each prelinguistic child trying to learn her own language or to induce new knowledge about the world is faced with this problem; so is every artificial intelligence system. In artificial intelligence research, it is called the "frame problem" (Boden, 1977); in linguistics, this problem is called the "poverty of the stimuli" (Chomsky, 1975); in semantics, it is called the problem of "referential ambiguity" (Gleitman & Wanner, 1982); in developmental psychology, it is called the "need for constraints on induction" (Carey, 1985a); in perception, they say that the stimulus array "underdetermines" the interpretation. Any design for an organism that cannot generate appropriate decisions, inferences, or perceptions because it is lost in an ocean of erroneous possibilities will not propagate, and will be removed from the population in the next generation. As selection pressures, combinatorial explosion and the frame problem are at least as merciless as starvation, predation, and disease. With this as background, the converging results from artificial intelligence, perception, cognitive development, linguistics, philosophy, and evolutionary biology about the weaknesses ofdomain-general content-independent mechanisms are not difficult to fathom. One source of difficulty can be sketched out quickly. If a computational system, living or electronic, does not initially know the solution to the problem it faces then its procedures must operate to find a solution. What methods do contentindependent systems bring to problem-solving? To describe a system as domain-general or content-independent is to say not what it is but only what it lacks: It lacks any specific a priori knowledge about the recurrent structure of particular situations or problem-domains, either in declarative or procedural form, that might guide the sys-
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tern to a solution quickly. It lacks procedures that are specialized to detect and deal with particular kinds of problems, situations, relationships, or contents in ways that differ from any other kind of problem, situation, relationship, or content. By definition, a domain-general system takes a "one size fits all" approach. To understand the importance ofthis, consider the definition ofan adaptation. An adaptation is a reliably developing structure in the organism, which, because it meshes with the recurrent structure of the world, causes the solution to an adaptive problem. It is easy to see how a specific structure, like a bug detector in a frog's retina, in interaction with bug trajectories in the local environment, solves a feeding problem for the frog. It is easy to see how the Westermarck sexual disinterest mechanism combines with the co-residence cue to diminish the probability of sex between close relatives (Shepher, 1983; Wolf & Huang, 1980). When the class ofsituations that a mechanism is designed to solve is more narrowly defined, then (I) the situations will have more recurrent features in common, and therefore (2) the mechanism can "know" more in advance about any particular situation that is a member of this class. As a result, (3) the mechanism's components can embody a greater variety of problem-solving strategies. This is because mechanisms work by meshing with the features ofsituations and, by definition, narrowly defined situations have more features in common. Our depth perception mechanism has this property, for example: It works well because it combines the output of many small modules, each sensitive to a different cue correlated with depth. In addition, (4) the narrower the class, the more likely it is that a good, simple solution exists-a solution that does not require the simultaneous presence of many common features. The frog can have a simple "bug detector" precisely because insects share features with one another that are not shared by many members of more inclusive classes, such as "animals" or "objects." In contrast, the more general a problem-solving technique is, the larger the range ofsituations across which the procedure must successfully apply itself. When the class ofsituations that a mechanism must operate over is more broadly defined, then (I) the situations will have fewer recurrent features in common, therefore (2) the mechanism can "know" less in advance about any particular situation that is a member of this class. Because (3) broadly defined situations have so few features in common for a mechanism to mesh with, there exist fewer strategies capable of solving the problem. This result is logically inevitable. Every kind of problem-solving strategy that applies to a more inclusive class also applies to every subset within it; but not every strategy that applies to a narrowly defined class will apply to the larger classes that contain it (e.g., all insects are objects, but not all objects are insects). By identifying smaller and smaller problem domains on the basis ofan increasing set ofrecurrent similarities, more and more problem-solving strategies can be brought to bear on that set. Conversely, by widening the problem domain that a mechanism must address, strategies that worked correctly on only a subset of problems must be abandoned or subtracted from the repertoire because they give incorrect answers on the newly included problems in the enlarged domain. As problem domains get larger and more broadly defined, a smaller and smaller set of residual strategies is left that remains applicable to the increasingly diverse set ofproblems. At the limit ofperfect generality, a problemsolving system can know nothing except that which is always true ofevery situation in any conceivable universe and, therefore, can apply no techniques except those that are applicable to all imaginable situations. In short, it has abandoned virtually anything that could lead it to a solution.
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This weakness ofdomain-general architectures arises not because all relatively general problem-solving techniques are useless; indeed, many are very useful-the ability to reject propositions because they are contradicted, the ability to associate, and the ability to recalibrate based on the consequences ofactions, for example. The weakness arises because content-sensitivity and specialization are eliminated from the architecture. By definition, a content-independent architecture does not distinguish between different problem-domains or content classes; therefore, it is restricted to employing only general principles of problem-solving that can apply to all problems. In contrast, a content-dependent domain-specific architecture does identify situations as members of specific problem domains and content classes. Because of this, it can maintain a repertoire of specialized problem-solving techniques that are only activated when they encounter the delimited domains to which they are applicable (e.g., snakes, sex with kin, grammar, falling in love, faces). At the same time, a pluralistic architecture can simultaneously activate every other problem-solving technique appropriate to the larger and more inclusive classes that contain the problem encountered (for faces: face recognition, object recognition, association formation, and so on). Thus, a domain-specific architecture can deploy every general problem-solving technique at the disposal ofa domain-general architecture and a multitude ofmore specific ones as well. This sensible approach to organizing a problem-solving architecture is exactly what is ruled out by SSSM advocates of a content-independent mind whose procedures operate uniformly over every problem or domain. To put it in adaptationist terms, what does the work of adaptive problem-solving for organisms is (I) the recurrent structure of the world relevant to the problem, in interaction with (2) the recurrent structure of the adaptation. The more broadly defined the problem domain is (I) the less recurrent structure can be supplied by the world (because more diverse situations have less recurrent structure in common), and (2) the less recurrent structure can be supplied by the adaptation in the form of problem-solving procedures that are solution-promoting across a diverse class ofsituations. The erosion of both sets of problem-solving structures-those in the adaptation and those in the world-increasingly incapacitates the system. This can sometimes be compensated for, but only through a correspondingly costly increase in the amount of computation used in the attempt to solve the problem. The less the system knows about the problem or the world to begin with, the more possibilities it must contend with. Permutations being what they are, alternatives increase exponentially as generality increases and combinatorial explosion rapidly cripples the system. A mechanism unaided by domain-specific rules of relevance, specialized procedures, "preferred" hypotheses, and so on could not solve any biological problem of routine complexity in the amount of time the organism has to solve it, and usually could not solve it at all. It is the perennial hope of SSSM advocates within the psychological community that some new technology or architecture (wax impressions, telephone switching, digital computers, symbol-processing, recursive programming languages, holograms, non-von Neumann architectures, parallel-distributed processing-a new candidate emerges every decade or so), will free them to return to empiricism, associationism, domain-generality and content-independence (where the SSSM tells them they should go). Nevertheless, the functional necessity ofcontent-specificity emerges in every technology because it is a logical inevitability. Most recently, researchers are establishing this all over again with connectionism (e.g., Jacobs, Jordan, & Barto, 1990; Miller &
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Todd, 1990; Pinker & Prince, 1988; Todd & Miller, 1991a, 199Ib). Combinatorial explosion and the frame problem are obstacles that can only be overcome by endowing computational architectures with contentful structure. This is because the world itself provides no framework that can decide among the infinite number of potential category dimensions, the infinite number of relations, and the infinite number ofpotential hypotheses that could be used to analyze it. The Necessity of Frames
Artificial intelligence research is particularly illuminating about these issues because explicitness is demanded in the act of implementing as programs specific hypotheses about how problems can be solved. By the program's operation, one can tell a great deal about the adequacy ofthe hypothesis. Moreover, artificial intelligence researchers became interested in getting computers and robots to perform real world tasks, where, just as in evolutionary biology, action is taken in a real, structured, and consequential environment. As a result, artificial intelligence researchers can tell unambiguously whether the decisions the system makes are a success or a failure. The range of problems studied in artificial intelligence widened beyond cognitive psychology's more traditional, philosophy-derived concerns, to include problems such as the regulation of purposive action in a three-dimensional world. To their great surprise, artificial intelligence researchers found that it was very difficult to discover methods that would solve problems that humans find easy, such as seeing, moving objects or even tying shoelaces. To get their programs to handle even absurdly simplified tasks (such as moving a few blocks around), they were forced to build in substantial "innate knowledge" of the world. As a practical matter, this "knowledge" was either in the form of (I) content-dependent procedures matched closely to the structural features of the task domain within which they were designed to operate, or (2) representations (data structures) that accurately reflected the task domain (i.e., "knowledge ofthe world"). To move an object, make the simplest induction, or solve a straightforward problem, the computer needed a sophisticated model ofthe domain in question, embodied either in procedures or representations. Artificial intelligence research demonstrated in a concrete, empirical form, the long-standing philosophical objections to the tabula rasa (e.g., Hume, 1977/1748; Kant, 1966/1781; Popper, 1972; Quine, 1960, 1969). These demonstrations have the added advantage ofbracketingjust how much "innate" structure is necessary to allow learning to occur. Artificial intelligence researchers call the specific contentful structures that problem-solving systems need to be endowed with frames. For this reason, the consistent inability of systems without sufficiently rich and specialized frames to solve real problems is called the frame problem (e.g., Boden, 1977; F. M. Brown, 1987; Fodor, 1983). A frame provides a "world-view": It carves the world into defined categories ofentities and properties, defines how these categories are related to each other, suggests operations that might be performed, defines what goal is to be achieved, provides methods for interpreting observations in terms ofthe problem space and other knowledge, provides criteria to discriminate success from failure, suggests what information is lacking and how to get it, and so on. For example, one might apply a spatial/object frame to a situation. In such a frame, the local world is carved into empty space and objects, which are cohesive, have boundaries defined by surfaces, and move as a unit. They have locations and orientations with respect to each other. They have trajectories and, ifsolid, cannot pass through one another (unless they change the shape of the object
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passed through), and so on. In such a framing, humans are simply objects like any other and are not expected to pass through other solid objects. Alternatively, one might have a coalitional framing (present, for example, in a football game or a war), in which humans are a relevant and differentiated entity and are construed as animate goalseeking systems that are members of one of two mutually exclusive social sets; the members ofeach set are expected to coordinate their behavior with each other to reach goals that cannot be mutuaUy realized for both sets; the goal of each set is to thwart the purposes of the other, and so on. In our own work, we have attempted to sketch out some ofthe framing necessary for humans to engage in social exchange (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, this volume). Very general mechanisms have frames as well: In the formal logic of the propositional calculus, the problem-space is defined syntactically in terms of sets of propositions, truth values, and rules of inference such as modens ponens and modus tollens. In this frame, the content of the propositions is irrelevant to the operation of the rules of inference. The solution to the frame problem and combinatorial explosion is always the same whether one is talking about an evolved organism or an artificial intelligence system. When the information available from the world is not sufficient to allow learning to occur or the problem to be solved, it must be supplied from somewhere else. Because the world cannot supply to the system what the system needs first in order to learn about the world, the essential kernals ofcontent-specific framing must be supplied initially by the architecture. For an artificial intelligence system, a programmer can supply it. For organisms, however, it can only be supplied through the process of natural selection, which creates reliably developing architectures that come equipped with the right frames and frame-builders necessary to solve the adaptive problems the species faced during its evolutionary history. Because oftheir survival into the present, we know for a fact that living species can reliably solve an enormous array of problems necessary to consistently reproduce across thousands ofgenerations in natural environments. Moreover, the signal lesson of modern evolutionary biology is that this adaptive behavior requires the solution of many information-processing problems that are highly complex-far more complex than is commonly supposed (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1989). If one bothers to analyze virtually any adaptive problem human hunter-gatherers solve, it turns out to require an incredible amount of evolved specialization (see, e.g, Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, this volume). Given (I) the complexity of the world, (2) the complexity of the total array of adaptive tasks faced by living organisms, and (3) the sensitive framedependence ofproblem-solving abilities, the psychological architecture ofany real species must be permeated with domain-specific structure to cause reliable reproduction in natural environments. Current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence indicates that Standard Model theories are far too frame-impoverished to solve even artificially simplified computational problems (e.g., identifying and picking up soda cans in the MIT artificial intelligence laboratory), let alone the complex information-processing problems regularly imposed by selective forces operating over evolutionary time. Our minds are always automatically applying a rich variety of frames to guide us through the world. Implicitly, these frames appear to us to be part ofthe world. For precisely this reason, we have difficulty appreciating the magnitude, or even the existence of, the frame problem. Just as the effortlessness ofseeing led artificial intelligence researchers to underestimate the complexity of the visual system, the automatic and
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effortless way in which our minds frame the world blinds us to the computational complexity ofthe mechanisms responsible. When anthropologists go to other cultures, the experience of variation awakens them to things they had previously taken for granted in their own culture. Similarly, biologists and artificial intelligence researchers are "anthropologists" who travel to places where minds are far stranger than anywhere any ethnographer has ever gone. We cannot understand what it is to be human until we learn to appreciate how truly different nonhuman minds can be, and our best points of comparison are the minds of other species and electronic minds. Such comparisons awaken us to an entire class ofproblems and issues that would escape us ifwe were to remain "ethnocentrically" focused on humans, imprisoned by mistaking our mentally imposed frames for an exhaustive demarcation of reality. When we examine electronic minds that truly have no frames and then try to give them even a few of our own real world capacities, we are made forcefully aware ofthe existence ofthe immensely intricate set of panhuman frames that humans depend on to function in the world, to communicate with one another, and to acquire additional frames through social inference from others (i.e., to "learn culture"). Geertz's (1973) studies in Bali acquainted him with some of the culturally variable frames that differ between Bali and the United States, but, as his writings make clear, they left him oblivious to the encompassing, panhuman frames within which these variable elements were embedded (D. E. Brown, 1991). If he had widened his scope to include other animal species, he would have been made strongly aware of this dense level ofuniversal and human-specific metacultural frames-a level that should interest every anthropologist because it permeates and structures every aspect of human life. Indeed, if Geertz had widened his scope still further to include electronic minds as points ofcomparison, he might have come to realize the sheer magnitude ofwhat must be supplied by evolution to our psychological architectures for us to be recognizably human. Perhaps he might also have come to recognize that he and the "simple" Balinese fighting cocks he watched even shared many frames lacking from artificial intelligence systems (about things such as space, motion, vision, looming threats, pain, hunger, and, perhaps, conflict, rivalry, and status changes after fights). Biology, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence research comprise a new form of ethnography, which is revealing the previously invisible wealth of evolved frames and specialized framebuilders that our evolved psychological architecture comes equipped with.
The Evolvability Criterion and Standard Model Architectures In a solvability analysis, the researcher asks whether a proposed architecture is capable of generating a behavior that we know humans (or the relevant species) regularly engage in, whether adaptive or not. But one can also evaluate a proposed architecture by asking how it would fare in solving the actual adaptive problems a species is known to have regularly confronted and solved during its evolutionary history. Because nonhuman and human minds-Le., the computational systems responsible for regulating behavior-were produced by the evolutionary process operating over vast expanses of time, tenable hypotheses about their design must be drawn from the class of designs that evolution could plausibly-or at least possibly-have produced. To be adequate, proposed designs must be able to account for the solution ofthe broad array ofdistinct problems inherent in reliable reproduction over thousands ofgenerations under ances-
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tral conditions. In short, a candidate design must satisfy the evo/vabi/ity criterion. In essence, designs that are more plausible according to criteria drawn from evolutionary biology are to be preferred over designs that are less plausible. Some rules for evaluating hypotheses by the evolvability criterion are as follows: I. Obviously, at a minimum, a candidate architecture must be able to perform all of the tasks and subtasks necessary for it to reproduce. It can have no properties that preclude, or make improbable, its own reproduction across multiple generations in natural environments. Just by itself, this is a difficult criterion to meet. No known Standard Model psychological architecture can solve all or even very many of the problems posed by reproduction in natural environments. 2. Given that human minds evolved out ofprehuman primate minds, a hypothesis should not entail that an architecture that is substantially inferior at promoting its own propagation (its inclusive fitness) replace an architecture that was better designed to promote fitness under ancestral conditions. There is now known to be an entire range of competences and specialized design features that enhance propagation in a large array of other species. A candidate architecture should be at least roughly comparable to them in their ability to solve the classes of adaptive problems humans and other primate species mutually faced. For this reason, it is not sufficient to incorporate into a general-purpose system a few drives that account for why the organism does not die ofthirst or hunger in a few days. Even though some psychological architectures ofthis kind might conceivably manage their own reproduction under artificially protected circumstances, they contain nothing that would solve other obvious propagation-promoting tasks that have called forth adaptive specializations in innumerable other species. Thus, to be plausible, a proposed human architecture should cause individuals to help relatives more or less appropriately, to defend sexual access to their mates, to forage in a relatively efficient way, and so on. The SSSM view that human evolution was a process oferasing "instincts" violates the evolvability criterion unless it can be shown that for each putatively "erased" adaptive specialization, the general-purpose mechanism that is proposed to have replaced it would have solved the adaptive problem better (Tooby, 1985; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). To our knowledge, no general mechanism operating under natural circumstances has ever been demonstrated to be superior to an existing adaptive specialization. 3. A candidate architecture should not require the world to be other than it really is. For example, models of grammar acquisition that assume that adults standardly correct their children's grammatical errors do not meet this condition (Pinker, 1989). Nor do socialization models that require children to be taught where their own interests lie by individuals with conflicting interests-for many domains, this class even includes the child's own parents and siblings (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1974). An architecture that was completely open to manipulation by others, without any tendency whatsoever to modify or resist exploitive or damaging social input would be strongly selected against. For this reason, cognitive architectures that are passive vehicles for arbitrary semiotic systems are not plausible products of the evolutionary pro-
cess. 4. In a related vein, a candidate theory should not invoke hypotheses that require assumptions about the coordinated actions of others (or any part ofthe environment) unless it explains how such coordination reliably came about during Pleistocene hunter-gatherer life. For example, if the model proposes that people acquire certain adaptive skills or information from others through, say, imitation or conversation,
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that model needs to explain how these others reliably obtained the (correct) infonnation and where the infonnation originated. If the blind lead the blind, there is no advantage to imitation. Consequently, acceptable models should not employ shell games, such as the venerable "adaptive knowledge comes from the social world." 5. A candidate model must not propose the existence of complex capacities in the human psychological architecture unless these capacities solve or solved adaptive (design-propagative) problems for the individual. That is, social scientists should be extremely uneasy about positing an improbably complex structure in the system with the capacity to serve nonbiological functional ends, unless that capacity is a by-product offunctionality that evolved to serve adaptive ends. Selection builds adaptive functional organization; chance almost never builds complex functional organization. So positing complex designs that serve the larger social good, or that complexly manipulate symbolic codes to spin webs ofmeaning, or that cause one to maximize monetary profit, all violate the evolvability criterion unless it can be shown that these are side effects of what would have been adaptive functional organization in the Pleistocene. Similarly, one should not posit the existence of complex functional designs that evolved to solve adaptive problems that emerged only very recently. Complex functionality requires time to evolve and, therefore, can arise only in response to longstanding adaptive problems (Dawkins, 1982, 1986; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). Over the course of their evolution, humans regularly needed to recognize objects, avoid predators, avoid incest, avoid teratogens when pregnant, repair nutritional deficiencies by dietary modification, judge distance, identify plant foods, capture animals, acquire grammar, attend to alann cries, detect when their children needed assistance, be motivated to make that assistance, avoid contagious disease, acquire a lexicon, be motivated to nurse, select conspecifics as mates, select mates ofthe opposite sex, select mates of high reproductive value, induce potential mates to choose them, choose productive activities, balance when walking, avoid being bitten by venomous snakes, understand and make tools, avoid needlessly enraging others, interpret social situations correctly, help relatives, decide which foraging efforts have repaid the energy expenditure, perfonn anticipatory motion computation, inhibit one's mate from conceiving children by another, deter aggression, maintain friendships, navigate, recognize faces, recognize emotions, cooperate, and make effective trade-offs among many of these activities, along with a host of other tasks. To be a viable hypothesis about human psychological architecture, the design proposed must be able to meet both solvability and evolvability criteria: It must be able to solve the problems that we observe modern humans routinely solving and it must solve all the problems that were necessary for humans to survive and reproduce in ancestral environments. No existing version of Standard Model psychology can remotely begin to explain how humans perfonn these tasks. Over the course of this chapter, we have touched on how domain-specific mechanisms are empirically better supported than domain-general mechanisms, on why domain-general mechanisms cannot give rise to routinely observable behavioral perfonnances, on why domain-specific architectures are usually more functional than domain-general architectures, and, especially, on why it is implausible or impossible for predominantly content-independent, domain-general computational systems to perfonn the tasks necessary for survival and reproduction in natural environments. The main arguments that we have reviewed here (and elsewhere; see Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b) are as follows:
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I. In order to perform tasks successfully more often than chance, the architecture must be able to discriminate successful performance from unsuccessful performance. Because a domain-general architecture by definition has no built-in content-specific rules for judging what counts as error and success on different tasks, it must have a general rule. Unfortunately, there is no useable general cue or criterion for success or failure that can apply across domains. What counts as good performance for one task (e.g., depth perception) is completely different from what counts as good performance for other tasks (e.g., incest avoidance, immune regulation, avoiding contagion, imitating, eating). The only unifying element in discriminating success from failure is whether an act promotes fitness (design-propagation). But the relative fitness contribution ofa given decision cannot be used as a criterion for learning or making choices because it is inherently unobservable by the individual (for discussion, see Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). Consequently, our evolved psychological architecture needs substantial built-in content-specific structure to discriminate adaptive success from failure. There needs to be at least as many different domain-specific psychological adaptations as there are evolutionarily recurrent functional tasks with different criteria for success. 2. As discussed at length, domain-general, content-independent mechanisms are inefficient, handicapped, or inert compared to systems that also include specialized techniques for solving particular families ofadaptive problems. A specialized mechanism can make use ofthe enduring relationships present in the problem-domain or in the related features ofthe world by reflecting these content-specific relationships in its problem-solving structure. Such mechanisms will be far more efficient than generalpurpose mechanisms, which must expend time, energy, and risk learning these relationships through "trial and possibly fatal error" (Shepard, 1987a). 3. Many problems that humans routinely solve are simply not solvable by any known general problem-solving strategy, as demonstrated by formal solvability analyses on language acquisition (e.g., Pinker, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1991; Pinker & Prince, 1988). We think that the class of such problems is large and, as discussed above, includes at a minimum all motivational problems. 4. Different adaptive problems are often incommensurate. They cannot, in principle, be solved by the same mechanism (Chomsky, 1980). To take a simple example, the factors that make a food nutritious are different from those that make a human a good mate or a savannah a good habitat. As Sherry and Schacter point out, "functional incompatibility exists when an adaptation that serves one function cannot, because of its specialized nature, effectively serve other functions. The specific properties of the adaptation that make it effective as a solution to one problem also render it incompatible with the demands of other problems" (1987, p. 439). 5. Many adaptive courses ofaction can be neither deduced nor learned by general criteria alone because they depend on statistical relationships that are unobservable to the relevant individual. For a content-independent system to learn a relationship, all parts of the relationship must be perceptually detectable. This is frequently not the case. Natural selection can "observe" relationships that exist between a sensory cue, a decision rule, and a fitness outcome that is inherently unobservable to the individual making the decision (Tooby & Cosmides, I 990b), as in the case ofpregnancy sickness (Profet, 1988, this volume) or the Westermarck incest avoidance mechanism (Shepher, 1983; Wolf & Huang, 1980). This is because natural selection does not work by inference or computation: It took the real problem, "ran the experiment," and
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retained those designs whose information-processing procedures led over thousands of generations to the best outcome. Natural selection, through incorporating contentspecific decision rules, allows the organism to behave as if it could see and be guided by relationships that are perceptually undetectable and, hence, inherently unlearnable by any general-purpose system. 6. As discussed, the more generally framed problems are, the more computational systems suffer from combinatorial explosion, in which proliferating alternatives choke decision and learning procedures, bringing the system to a halt. If it were true that, as Rindos (1986, p. 315) puts the central tenet ofthe Standard Social Science Model, "the specifics that we learn are in no sense predetermined by our genes," then we could learn nothing at all. 7. Everything a domain-general system can do can be done as well or better by a system that also permits domain-specific mechanisms because selection can incorporate any successful domain-general strategies into an architecture without displacing its existing repertoire of domain-specific problem-solvers. Without further belaboring the point, there is a host of other reasons why contentfree, general-purpose systems could not evolve, could not manage their own reproduction, and would be grossly inefficient and easily outcompeted if they did. Equally important, these arguments apply not simply to the extreme limiting case of a completely content-free, domain-general architecture but to all Standard Model architectures, as conventionally presented. The single criterion that any proposed human psychological architecture must solve aU the problems necessary to cause reliable reproduction under natural conditions is decisive. When taken seriously and considered carefully, it leads to the conclusion that the human psychological architecture must be far more frame-rich and permeated with content-specific structure than most researchers (including ourselves) had ever suspected. The Content-Specific Road to Adaptive Flexibility
The ability to adjust behavior flexibly and appropriately to meet the shifting demands of immediate circumstances would, of cour:se, be favored by selection, other things being equal. What organism would not be better offif it could solve a broader array of problems? Moreover, the psychologies of different species do differ in the breadth of situations to which they can respond appropriately, with humans acting flexibly to a degree that is zoologically unprecedented. Humans engage in elaborate improvised behaviors, from composing symphonies to piloting aircraft to rice cultivation, which collectively indicate a generality of achieved problem-solving that is truly breathtaking. Although many human acts do not successfully solve adaptive problems, enough do that the human population has increased a thousandfold in only a few thousand years. Ifgeneral-purpose mechanisms are so weak, how can the variability ofobserved human behavior be reconciled with its level of functionality? As discussed above, there is little in content-independent, domain-general strategies of problem-solving that by themselves can account for functional behavior, whether it is flexible or not. In contrast, specialized mechanisms can be very successful and powerful problem-solvers, but they achieve this at the price of addressing a narrower range of problems than a more general mechanism. If these were the only two alternatives, organisms would be limited to being narrow successes or broad failures, and the human case of broad adaptive flexibility could not be accounted for.
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The solution to the paradox of how to create an architecture that is at the same time both powerful and more general is to bundle larger numbers ofspecialized mechanisms together so that in aggregate, rather than individually, they address a larger range ofproblems. Breadth is achieved not by abandoning domain-specific techniques but by adding more ofthem to the system. By adding together a face recognition module, a spatial relations module, a rigid object mechanics module, a tool-use module, a fear module, a social-exchange module, an emotion-perception module, a kin-oriented motivation module, an effort allocation and recalibration module, a child-care module, a social-inference module, a sexual-attraction module, a semantic-inference module, a friendship module, a grammar acquisition module, a communication-pragmatics module, a theory of mind module, and so on, aD architecture gains a breadth of competences that allows it to solve a wider and wider array of problems, coming to resemble, more and more, a human mind. The more a system initially "knows" about the world and its persistent characteristics, and the more evolutionarily proven "skills" it starts out with, the more it can learn, the more problems it can solve, the more it can accomplish. In sharp contrast to the Standard Model, which views an absence of content-specific structure as a precondition for richly flexible behavior, the analysis of what computational systems actually need to succeed suggests the opposite: that the human capacity for adaptive flexibility and powerful problem-solving is so great precisely because of the number and the domain-specificity of the mechanisms we have. Again, this converges on William James's argument that humans have more "instincts" than other animals, not fewer (James, 1892; Symons, 1987). Moreover, there are many reasons to think that the number of function-general mechanisms and function-specific mechanisms in an architecture are not inversely related in a zero-sum relationship, but are positively related (Rozin, 1976). Contentspecialized mechanisms dissect situations, thereby creating a problem space rich with relevant relationships that content-independent mechanisms can exploit (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, under review; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage & KleinbOlting, 1991; Shepard, 1987b). Thus, the more alternative content-specialized mechanisms an architecture contains, the more easily domain-general mechanisms can be applied to the problem spaces they create without being paralyzed by combinatorial explosion. Although domain-general mechanisms may be weak in isolation, they can valuably broaden the problem-solving range ofan architecture if they are erpbedded in a matrix ofadaptive specializations that can act as a guidance system (Rozin, 1976). For example, humans have powerful specialized social inference mechanisms that reflect the contentful structure of human metaculture, allowing humans to evaluate and interpret others' behaviors. This provides a foundation for the human-specific ability to imitate others (Galef, 1988; Meltzoff, 1988), greatly increasing the range of situations to which they can respond appropriately. Therefore, what is special about the human mind is not that it gave up "instinct" in order to become flexible, but that it proliferated "instincts"-that is, content-specific problem-solving specializations-which allowed an expanding role for psychological mechanisms that are (relatively) more function-general. These are presently lumped into categories with unilluminating labels such as "the capacity for culture," "intelligence," "learning," and "rationality." It is time for the social sciences to tum from a nearly exclusive focus on these embedded, more function-general mechanisms to a wider view that includes the crucial, and largely neglected, superstructure of evolved functional specializations. Equally, we need to explore how the two
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classes of mechanisms are interwoven so that their combined interactive product is the zoologically unique yet evolutionarily patterned breadth of functional behaviors.
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE The Pluralistic Analysis of Human Culture and Mental Organization Malinowski maintained that cultural facts are partly to be explained in psychological terms. This view has often been met with skepticism or even scorn, as if it were an easily exposed naive fallacy. What I find fallacious are the arguments usually leveled against this view. What I find naive is the beliefthat human mental abilities make culture possible and yet do not in any way determine its content and organization. -DAN SPERBER (1985, p. 73)
A large and rapidly growing body ofresearch from a diversity ofdisciplines has shown that the content-independent psychology that provides the foundation for the Standard Social Science Model is an impossible psychology. It could not have evolved; it requires an incoherent developmental biology; it cannot account for the observed problem-solving abilities of humans or the functional dimension of human behavior; it cannot explain the recurrent patterns and characteristic contents of human mental life and behavior; it has repeatedly been empirically falsified; and it cannot even explain how humans learn their culture or their language. With the failure ofStandard Model psychology, and the emergence ofa domain-specific psychology, the remaining logic ofthe Standard Social Science Model also collapses. In this chapter, we have limited ourselves to analyzing some ofthe defects of the Standard Social Science Model, concentrating on the untenability of the psychology that forms the foundation for its theory ofculture. Along the way, we have touched on only a handful of the changes that an evolutionary psychological approach would introduce into the theoretical foundations of the social sciences. These and the remarks that follow should not, however, be mistaken for a substantive discussion of what a new theory of culture that was based on modern biology, psychology, and anthropology would look like. Still less should they be mistaken for a presentation of the mutually consistent conceptual framework (what we have been calling the Integrated Causal Model) that emerges when the various biological, behavioral, and social science fields are even partially integrated and reconciled. Because our argument has been narrowly focused on psychology, we have been unable to review or discuss the many critical contributions that have been made to this embryonic synthesis from evolutionary biology, anthropology, neurobiology, sociology, and many other fields. These must be taken up elsewhere. In particular, readers should be aware that the ideas underlying the Integrated Causal Model are not original with us: They are the collaborative product of hundreds of individual scholars working in a diverse array of fields over the last several decades. 7 Indeed, the collaborative dimension of this new framework is key. The eclipse of the Standard Model and the gradual emergence of its replacement has resulted from researchers exploring the natural causal connections that integrate separate fields (see, e.g., Barkow, 1989, on the importance of making psychology consistent with biology and anthropology consistent with psychology). The research program we and others are advocating is one of integration and consis-
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tency, not ofpsychological or biological reductionism. (See Atran, 1990; Daly & Wilson, 1988; and Symons, 1979, for examples of how such integrative approaches can be applied to specific problems.) What does the rise ofdomain-specific psychology mean for theories ofculture? By themselves, psychological theories do not and cannot constitute theories of culture. They only provide the foundations for theories of culture. Humans live and evolved in interacting networks that exhibit complex population-level dynamics, and so theories and analyses ofpopulation-level processes are necessary components for any full understanding of human phenomena. Nevertheless, increasing knowledge about our evolved psychological architecture places increasing constraints on admissible theories of culture. Although our knowledge is still very rudimentary, it is already clear that future theories of culture will differ significantly in a series of ways from Standard Social Science Model theories. Most fundamentally, if each human embodies an evolved psychological architecture that comes richly equipped with content-imparting mechanisms, then the traditional concept of culture itself must be completely rethought. Culture has been the central concept of the Standard Social Science Model. According to its tenets, culture is a unitary entity that expresses itself in a trinity of aspects. (1) It is conceived as being some kind of contingently variable informational substance that is transmitted by one generation to another within a group: Culture is what is socially learned. (2) Because the individual mind is considered to be primarily a social, product fomied out of the rudimentary infant mind, all or nearly all adult mental organization and content is assumed to be cultural in derivation and substance: Culture is what is contentful and organized in human mental life and behavior. (3) Humans everywhere show striking patterns oflocal within-group similarity in their behavior and thought, accompanied by significant intergroup differences. The existence of separate streams of transmitted informational substance is held to be the explanation for these group patterns: Cultures are these sets of similarities, and intergroup or cross-location differences are called cultural differences. In the absence of a content-free psychology, however, this trinity breaks into separate pieces because these three sets ofphenomena can no longer be equated. We have already sketched out why the human mind must be permeated with content and organization that does not originate in the social world. This breaks apart any simple equivalence between the first two meanings of "culture." Nevertheless, even for those who admit that the mind has some content that is not socially supplied, the distribution of human within-group similarities and between-group differences remains the most persuasive element in the Standard Model analysis. These salient differences are taken to confirm that the socially learned supplies most ofthe rich substance ofhuman life (see "The Standard Social Science Model", pp. 24-34). Because Standard Model advocates believe that a constant-our universal evolved architecture-cannot explain what varies, they can see no explanation for "cultural differences" other than differences in transmitted information. Although this conclusion seems compelling, a simple thought experiment illustrates why it is unfounded. Imagine that extraterrestrials replaced each human being on earth with a state-of-the-art compact disk juke box that has thousands of songs in its repertoire. Each juke box is identical. Moreover, each is equipped with a clock, an automated navigational device that measures its latitude and longitude, and a circuit that selects what song it will play on the basis of its location, the time, and the date.
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What our extraterrestrials would observe would be the same kind of pattern ofwithingroup similarities and between-group differences observable among humans: In Rio, everyjuke box would be playing the same song, which would be different from the song that every juke box was playing in Beijing, and so on, around the world. Each juke box's "behavior" would be clearly and complexly patterned because each had been equipped with the same large repertoire ofsongs. Moreover, each juke box's behavior would change over time, because the song it plays is a function of the date and time, as well as of its location. Juke boxes that were moved from location to location would appear to adopt the local songs, sequences, and "fashions." Yet the generation ofthis distinctive, culture-like pattern involves no social learning or transmission whatsoever. This pattern is brought about because, like humans, the juke boxes (1) share a universal, highly organized, architecture, that (2) is designed to respond to inputs from the local situation (e.g., date, time, and location). All humans share a universal, highly organized architecture that is richly endowed with contentful mechanisms, and these mechanisms are designed to respond to thousands of inputs from local situations. As a result, humans in groups can be expected to express, in response to local conditions, a variety of organized withingroup similarities that are not caused by social learning or transmission. Of course, these generated within-group similarities will simultaneously lead to systematic differences between groups facing different conditions. To take a single example, differences in attitudes toward sharing between hunter-gatherer groups may be evoked by ecological variables (for discussion, see Cosmides & Tooby, this volume). Thus, complex shared patterns that differ from group to group may be evoked by circumstances or may be produced by differential transmission. For this reason, the general concept of "culture" in the Standard Model sense is a conflation of evoked culture and transmitted culture (as well as of metaculture and other components). Given that the mind contains many mechanisms, we expect that both transmitted and evoked factors will play complementary roles in the generation of differentiated local cultures. The operation of a richly responsive psychology, plus the ability to socially "learn," can jointly explain far more about "culture" and cultural change than either can alone. For example, when members ofa group face new and challenging circumstances (drought, war, migration, abundance), this may activate a common set offunctionally organized domain-specific mechanisms, evoking a new set of attitudes and goals. The newly evoked psychological states will make certain new ideas appealing, causing them to spread by transmission, and certain old ideas unappealing, causing them to be discarded. In contrast, the Standard Model "do what your parents did" concept of culture is not a principle that can explain much about why cultural elements change, where new ones come from, why they spread, or why certain complex patterns (e.g., pastoralist commonalities) recur in widely separated cultures. Ofcourse, many anthropologists implicitly recognize these points, but they need to make the links between the cultural processes they study and the underlying evolved contentorganizing psychology they are assuming explicit. For example, economic and ecological anthropology, to be coherent, necessarily assume underlying content-specialized psychological mechanisms that forge relationships between environmental and ec0nomic variables and human thought and action. It is especially important for post-Standard Model researchers to recognize that the environmental factors that cause contentful mental and behavioral organization to be expressed are not necessarily the processes that constructed that organization. In the
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case of the juke box, it would be a mistake to attribute the organized content manifest in the music to the environmental stimuli (i.e., the location, date, and time) that caused one song to be played rather than another. The stimuli did not compose the music; they merely caused it to be expressed. Similarly, our psychological architectures come equipped with evolved contentful organization, which can remain latent or become activated depending on circumstances and which may vary in its expression according to procedures embodying any degree of complexity. Because our psychological architecture is complexly responsive, the Standard Model practice of equating the variable with the learned is a simple non sequitur. The claim that some phenomena are "socially constructed" only means that the social environment provided some of the inputs used by the psychological mechanisms of the individuals involved. In short, observations of patterns of similarities and differences do not establish that the substance of human life is created by social learning. In any specific case, we need to map our evolved psychological architecture to know which elements (if any) are provided by transmission, which by the rest of the environment, which by the architecture, and how all these elements causally interact to produce the phenomenon in question. Admittedly, the juke box thought experiment is an unrealistically extreme case in which a complex, functionally organized, content-sensitive architecture internalizes no transmitted informational input other than an environmental trigger. But this case is simply the mirror image of the SSSM's extreme view of the human mind as a content-free architecture where everything is provided by the internalization of transmitted input. Our central point is that in any particular domain of human activity, the programming that gives our architecture its ability to contingently respond to the environment mayor may not be designed to take trans~itted representations as input. Ifit does, it may mix in content derived from its own structure and process the resulting representations in complex and transformative ways. The trinity of cultural phenomena can no longer be equated with one another. Our complex content-specific psychological architecture participates in the often distinct processes of generating mental content, generating local similarities and between-group differences, and generating what is "transmitted." Indeed, it also participates in the complex process of internalizing what others are "transmitting."
Inferential Reconstruction and Cultural Epidemiology The Standard Social Science Model has been very effective in promulgating the unity of the trinity. The socially learned, the set of within-group commonalities and between-group differences, and the contentful organization of human mental and social life have been so thoroughly conflated that it is difficult to speak about human phenomena without using the word culture. For this reason, we will use culture to refer to any mental, behavioral, or material commonalities shared across individuals, from those that are shared across the entire species down to the limiting case ofthose shared only bya dyad, regardless of why these commonalities exist. When the causes of the commonality can be identified, we will use a qualifier, such as "evoked." So things that are cultural in the sense of being organized, contentful, and shared among individuals may be explained in a number of different ways. Within-group commonalities may have been evoked by common circumstances impacting universal architectures. An even larger proportion of organized, contentfuI, and shared phenomena may be explained as the expression of our universal psychological and phys-
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iological architectures in interaction with the recurrent structure of the social or nonsocial world-what we earlier called metaculture. Metaculture includes a huge range ofpsychological and behavioral phenomena that under Standard Model analyses have been invisible or misclassified (D. E. Brown, 1991). Because the Standard Model attributed everything that was contentful and recurrent to some form ofsocial learning, it misinterpreted phenomena such as anger upon deliberate injury, griefat a loss, the belief that others have minds, treating species as natural kinds, social cognition about reciprocation, or the search for food when hungry as socially manufactured products. Nevertheless, after the evoked and the metacultural have been excluded, there still remains a large residual category of representations or regulatory elements that reappear in chains from individual to individual-"culture" in the classic sense. In giving up the Standard Social Science Model, we are not abandoning the classic concept of culture. Instead, we are attempting to explain what evolved psychological mechanisms cause it to exist. That way we can get a clearer causal understanding of how psychological mechanisms and populational processes shape its content, and thereby restrict its explanatory role in social theory to the phenomena that it actually causes. This subset ofcultural phenomena is restricted to (I) those representations or regulatory elements that exist originally in at least one mind that (2) come to exist in other minds because (3) observation and interaction between the source and the observer cause inferential mechanisms in the observer to recreate the representations or regulatory elements in his or her own psychological architecture. In this case, the representations and elements inferred are contingent: They could be otherwise and, in other human minds, they commonly are otherwise. Rather than calling this class ofrepresentations "transmitted" culture, we prefer terms such as reconstructed culture, adopted culture, or epidemiological culture. The use of the word "transmission" implies that the primary causal process is located in the individuals from whom the representations are derived. In contrast, an evolutionary psychological perspective emphasizes the primacy of the psychological mechanisms in the learner that, given observations of the social world, inferentially reconstruct some ofthe representations existing in the minds of the observed. Other people are usually just going about their business as they are observed, and are not necessarily intentionally "transmitting" anything. More precisely, an observer (who, for expository simplicity, we will call the "child") witnesses some finite sample of behavior by others (e.g., public representations, such as utterances or other communicative acts; people going about their affairs; people responding to the child's behavior). The task ofthe mechanisms in the child is to (I) reconstruct within themselves on the basis of these observations a set of representations or regulatory elements that (2) are similar enough to those present in the humans she lives among so that (3) the behavior her mechanisms generate can be adaptively coordinated with other people and her habitat. Thus, the problem ofleaming "culture" lies in deducing the hidden representations and regulatory elements embedded in others' minds that are responsible for generating their behavior. To the extent that the child's mechanisms make mistakes-and mistakes are endemic-and reconstruct the wrong underlying representations and regulatory elements, she will not be able to predict other people's behavior, interpret their transactions with one another in the world, imitate them, communicate with them, cooperate with them, help them, or even anticipate or avoid their hostile and exploitive actions.
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Why did ancestral hominid foragers evolve mechanisms that allowed them to reconstruct the representations present in the minds of those around them? Leaving aside the question oftheir costs and limitations, the advantage ofsuch mechanisms is straightforward. Information about adaptive courses of action in local conditions is difficult and costly to obtain by individual experience alone. Those who have preceded an individual in a habitat and social environment have built up in their minds a rich store ofuseful information. The existence ofsuch information in other minds selected for specialized psychological adaptations that were able to use social observations to reconstruct some ofthis information within one's own mind (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). By such inferential reconstruction, one individual was able to profit from deducing what another already knew. When such inferential reconstruction becomes common enough in a group, and some representations begin to be stably re-created in sequential chains of individuals across generations, then the structure of events begins to warrant being called "cultural." As discussed earlier, this task ofreconstruction would be unsolvable ifthe child did not come equipped with a rich battery of domain-specific inferential mechanisms, a faculty of social cognition, a large set of frames about humans and the world drawn from the common stock of human metaculture, and other specialized psychological adaptations designed to solve the problems involved in this task (see, e.g., Boyer, 1990; Sperber, 1985, 1990; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a). Consequently, epidemiological culture is also shaped by the details of our evolved psychological organization. Thus, there is no radical discontinuity inherent in the evolution of"culture" that removes humans into an autonomous realm. Mechanisms designed for such inferential reconstruction evolved within a pre-existing complex psychological architecture and depended on this encompassing array of content-structuring mechanisms to successfully interpret observations, reconstruct representations, modify behavior, and so on. Solving these inferential problems is not computationally trivial, and other species, with a few possible minor exceptions, are not equipped to perform this task to any significant degree (Galef, 1988). Moreover, outside of contexts ofcompetition, knowledge is not usually devalued by being shared. Consequently, to the substantial extent that individuals in a huntergatherer group had interests in common and had already evolved mechanisms for inferential reconstruction, selection would have favored the evolution of mechanisms that facilitated others' inferences about one's own knowledge (as, for example, by communicating or teaching). The mutual sharing of valuable knowledge and discoveries has a dramatic effect on the usefulness ofmechanisms that attempt to adaptively adjust behavior to match local conditions (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). Because of combinatorial explosion, knowledge of successful local techniques is precious and hard to discover, but relatively cheap to share (once again, ignoring the cost ofthe psychological mechanisms that facilitate or perform such sequential reconstruction). Within limits, this creates economies of scale: The greater the number of individuals who participate in the system ofknowledge sharing, (I) the larger the available pool of knowledge will be, (2) the more each individual can derive from the pool, (3) the more advantageous reconstructive adaptations will be, and (4) the more it would pay to evolve knowledge-dependent mechanisms that could exploit this set of local representations to improvise solutions to local problems. This collaborative information-driven approach to the adaptive regulation ofbehavior can be thought of as the "cognitive niche" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). The mutual benefit ofsuch knowl-
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edge sharing led to the co-evolution ofsets ofadaptations, such as language, elaborated communicative emotional displays, and pedagogy that coordinate specialized processes of inferential reconstruction with the specialized production of behaviors designed to facilitate such reconstruction (e.g., Ekman, 1984; Freyd, 1983; Fridlund, in press; Pinker & Bloom, this volume; Premack, in prep.; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Because reconstructive inferences are often erroneous and what others "know" is often of dubious quality or irrelevant, such inferential processes could not have evolved without adaptations that assessed to some degree the value of such reconstructed knowledge and how it fits in with knowledge derived from other sources. If a representation is easy to successfully reconstruct and is evaluated positively, then it will tend to spread through inter-individual chains of inference, becoming widely shared. If it is difficult to reconstruct or evaluated as not valuable, it will have only a restricted distribution or will disappear (Sperber, 1985, 1990; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This evaluation process gives sequentially reconstructed culture its well-known, if partial, parallels to natural selection acting on genes; that is, the selective retention and accumulation offavored variants over time (e.g., Barkow, 1989; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Campbell, 1965, 1975; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Dawkins, 1976; Durham, 1991; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981). Moreover, these psychological mechanisms endow sequentially reconstructed culture with its epidemiological character, as a dynamically changing distribution of elements among individuals living in populations over time. As Sperber says, "Cultural phenomena are ecological patterns ofpsychological phenomena. They do not pertain to an autonomous level ofreality, as antireductionists would have it, nor do they merely belong to psychology as reductionists would have it" (1985, p. 76). The more widely shared an element is, the more people are inclined to call it "cultural," but there is no natural dividing point along a continuum of something shared between two individuals to something shared through inferential reconstruction by the entire human species (Sperber, 1985, 1990). The Standard Model practice offraming "cultures" as sets of representations homogeneously shared by nearly all members of discrete and bounded "groups" does not capture the richness of the ecological distribution of these psychological elements, which cross-cut each other in a bewildering variety of fractal patterns. Language boundaries do not correspond to subsistence practice boundaries, which do not correspond to political boundaries or to the distribution of rituals (for discussion, see Campbell & LeVine, 1972). Within groups, representations occur with all kinds of different frequencies, from beliefs passed across generations by unique dyads, such as shamanistic knowledge or mother-daughter advice, to beliefs shared by most or all members ofthe group. The belief that sequentially reconstructed representations exist primarily in bounded cells called "cultures" derives primarily from the distribution of language boundaries, which do happen to be distributed more or less in this fashion. As Pinker and Bloom (this volume) point out, communication protocols can be arbitrary, but must be shared between sender and receiver to be functional. The benefit oflearning an arbitrary linguistic element is proportional to how widely it is distributed among a set of interacting individuals. Therefore, well-designed language acquisition mechanisms distributed among a local set of individuals will tend to converge on a relatively homogeneous set of elements: It is useful for all local individuals to know the same local language. Although there are other reasons why reconstructed elements may show sharp coordinated boundaries (e.g., ethnocentrism, common inheritance, sharp
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habitat boundaries, geographical barriers, and so on), most classes of representations or regulatory elements dynamically distribute themselves according to very different patterns, and it is probably more accurate to think of humanity as a single interacting population tied together by sequences of reconstructive inference than as a conection of discrete groups with separate bounded "cultures." Finally, the reconstruction ofregulatory elements and representations in a psychological architecture should not be thought of as a homogeneous process. Given that our minds have a large set ofdomain-specific mechanisms, it seems likely that different mechanisms would be selected to exploit social observations in different ways and have quite distinct procedures for acquiring, interpreting, and using information derived from the social world. Certainly, the language acquisition device appears to have its own special properties (e.g., Pinker, 1989), and many other domains appear to follow their own special rules (Carey & Gelman, 1991). It seems unlikely in the extreme that the different modules underlying mate preferences (Symons, 1979; Buss, in prep.), food preferences (e.g., Galef, 1990), display rules for emotional expression (Ekman, 1982), fears (Cook et al., 1986) and so on, process social observations according to a single unitary process. Moreover, to the extent that there may exist a large, potentially interacting store of representations in the mind (see, e.g., Fodor 1983), nothing in the psychological architecture necessarily segregates off representations derived through "epidemiological culture" from representations and regulatory elements derived from other sources. This briefsketch suggests a few ofthe features future theories ofculture may incorporate, once the Standard Model concept oflearning is discarded. These are organized by two themes. First, what is presently attributed to "culture" will come to be pluralistically explained as metaculture, evoked culture, epidemiological culture, and individual mental contents that are internally generated and not derived through inferential reconstruction (see table below). Second, with the fall of content-independent learning, the socially constructed wall that separates psychology and anthropology (as wen as other fields) will disappear. The heterogeneous mechanisms comprising our evolved psychological architecture participate inextricably in all cultural and social phenomena and, because they are content-specialized, they impart some contentful patterning to them. Indeed, models of psychological mechanisms, such as social exchange, maternal attachment, sexual attraction, sexual jealousy, the categorization ofliving kinds, and so on, are the building blocks out of which future theories of culture will, in part, be built (Sperber, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a). By no means do
Table 1.1
Decomposing the Traditional Concept of Culture
Metaeulture Mechanisms functionally organized to use crosscultural regularities in the social and nonsocial environment give rise to panhuman mental contents and organization.
Evoked culture
Epidemiological culture
Alternative, functionally organized, domainspecific mechanisms are triggered by local circumstances; leads to within-group similarities and between-group differences.
Observer's inferential mechanisms construct representations similar to those present in others; domain-specific mechanisms influence which representations spread through a population easily and which do not.
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we deny or minimize the existence of emergent phenomena, such as institutions, or the fact that population-level processes alter the epidemiological distribution of cultural contents over time. The point is simply that cultural and social phenomena can never be fully divorced from the structure of the human psychological architecture or understood without reference to its design.
The Twilight of Learning as a Social Science Explanation Advocates of the Standard Social Science Model have believed for nearly a century that they have a solid explanation for how the social world inserts organization into the psychology of the developing individual. They maintain that structure enters from the social (and physical) world by the process of"learning"-individuals "learn" their language, they "learn" their culture, they "learn" to walk, and so on. All problemswhether they are long-enduring adaptive problems or evolutionarily unprecedented problems-are solved by "learning." In the intellectual communities dominated by the SSSM, learning has been thought to be a powerful explanation for how certain things come about, an explanation that is taken to refer to a well-understood and wellspecified general process that someone (i.e., the psychological community) has documented. For this reason, "learning," and such common companion concepts as "culture," "rationality," and "intelligence," is frequently invoked as an alternative explanation to so-called "biological" explanations (e.g., sexual jealousy did not evolve, it is learned from culture; one doesn't need to explain how humans engage in social exchange: They simply used their "reason" or "intelligence"). Of course, as most cognitive scientists know (and all should), "learning"-like "culture," "rationality," and "intelligence"-is not an explanation for anything, but is rather a phenomenon that itself requires explanation (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). In fact, the concept of "learning" has, for the social sciences, served the same function that the concept of "protoplasm" did for so long in biology. For decades, biologists could see that living things were very different from nonliving things, in that a host of very useful things happened inside of living things that did not occur inside ofthe nonliving (growth, the manufacture ofcomplex chemicals, the assembly of useful structures, tissue differentiation, energy production, and so on). They had no idea what causal sequences brought these useful results about. They reified this unknown functionality, imagining it to be a real substance, and called it "protoplasm," believing it to be the stuffthat life was made of. It was a name given to a mystery, which was then used as an explanation for the functional results that remained in genuine need ofexplanation. Ofcourse, the concept of protoplasm eventually disappeared when molecular biologists began to determine the actual causal sequences by which the functional business of life was transacted. "Protoplasm" turned out to be a heterogeneous collection of incredibly intricate functionally organized structures and processes-a set of evolved adaptations, in the form of microscopic molecular machinery such as mitochondria, chloroplasts, the Krebs cycle, DNA transcription, RNA translation, and so on. Similarly, human minds do a host ofsingularly useful things, by which they coordinate themselves with things in the world: They develop skill in the local community's language; upon exposure to events they change behavior in impressively functional ways; they reconstruct in themselves knowledge derived from others; they adopt the practices ofothers around them; and so on. Psychologists did not know what causal
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sequences brought these useful results about. They reified this unknown functionality, imagining it to be a unitary process, and called it "learning." "Learning" is a name given to the unknown agent imagined to cause a large and heterogeneous set offunctional outcomes. This name was (and is) then used as an explanation for results that remained in genuine need ofexplanation. We expect that the concept oflearning will eventually disappear as cognitive psychologists and other researchers make progress in determining the actual causal sequences by which the functional business of the mind is transacted. Under closer inspection, "learning" is turning out to be a diverse set of processes caused by a series of incredibly intricate, functionally organized cognitive adaptations, implemented in neurobiological machinery (see, e.g., Carey & GeIman, 1991; Gallistel, 1990; Pinker 1989, 1991; Real, 1991). With slight qualifications about the exact contexts of usage, similar things could be said for "culture," "intelligence," and "rationality." The replacement of the concept of protoplasm with a real understanding ofthe vast, hidden, underlying worlds ofmolecular causality has transformed our understanding of the world in completely unexpected ways, and we can only anticipate that the same will happen when "learning" is replaced with knowledge.
NOTES I. Philosophers and historians of science sometimes use the phrase "unity of science" as a term of art to refer to an axiomatized reductionistic approach to science. We are not using it in this sense, but rather in its common sense meaning of mutual consistency and relevance. 2. For a very illuminating discussion of how various "tools" (from wax tablets to generalpurpose computers to methods ofstatistical inference) have served as metaphors for the structure of the human mind, see "From tools to theories: A heuristic of discovery in cognitive psychology" by Gerd Gigerenzer (1991a). 3. Nevertheless, given the sorry history of the social sciences, in which every new research program has loosed a deluge ofhalf-baked nostrums and public policy prescriptions on generally unconsenting victims, an important caution is in order. The human mind is the most complex phenomenon humans have encountered and research into it is in its infancy. It will be a long time before scientific knowledge of the aggregation of mechanisms that comprise the human psychological architecture is reliable enough and comprehensive enough to provide the basis for confident guidance in matters of social concern. 4. Finding invariances in cognitive architecture should, in turn, help neuroscientists in their search for the neural mechanisms that implement them. In neuroscience (as everywhere else), researchers practicing unguided empiricism rapidly become lost in a forest ofcomplex phenomena without knowing how to group results so that the larger scale functional systems can be recognized. The evolved functional organization ofcognitive programs offers an independently discoverable, intelligible and privileged system for ordering and relating neuroscientific phenomena: The brain itself evolved to solve adaptive problems, and its particular systems of organization were selected for because they physically carried out information-processing procedures that led to the adaptive regulation of behavior and physiology. S. In fact, the actual distribution and character ofgenetic variation fits well with theories that explain it as mutations, selectively neutral variants (Nei, 1987), quantitative variation and, especially, as the product of parasite-driven frequency-dependent selection for biochemical individuality (see e.g.• Clarke, 1979; Hamilton & Zuk, 1982; Tooby, 1982). Briefly, the more biochemically individualized people in a community are, the more difficult it is for disease micro-organisms adapted to one individual's biochemistry to contagiously infect neighboring humans. Thus, so long as this variation doesn't disrupt the higher level uniformity offunctional
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integration in complex adaptations, selection will favor the maintenance of individualizing low level protein variability in the tissues attacked by parasites, generating a large reservoir of a restricted kind of genetic variability (Tooby, 1982; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). 6. Researchers in phenomena-oriented fields, such as personality and social psychology, usually avoid formal analysis, so one is never sure what kind of computational mechanisms are hypothesized to generate performance. And, although many who do mainstream cognitive research on memory, problem-solving, and decision-making make formal models, these are devised to predict performance on artificial, evolutionarily unprecedented tasks, such as chessplaying or cryptarithmetic. Naturally, the phenomena-oriented researchers reject the latter's formal analyses as sterile and irrelevant to their interests, whereas those who do rigorous analyses of artificial tasks regard the phenomena-oriented researchers as wooly headed and unscientific. But neither community considers the possibility that the assumptions ofthe SSSM might be the problem. 7. See, for example, Alexander, 1979; Atran, 1990; Barkow, 1973, 1978, 1989; Berlin & Kay, 1969; Boyer, 1990; Bowlby, 1969; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; D. E. Brown, 1991; Buss, 1989, 1991; Campbell, 1965, 1975; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Chagnon, 1988, Chagnon & Irons, 1979; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Chomsky, 1959, 1975, 1980; Cloak, 1975;Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1979; Crawford & Anderson, 1989; Crawford, Smith, & Krebs, 1987; Daly & Wilson, 1981, 1984a, 1987a, 1988; Dawkins, 1976, 1982, 1986; Dennett, 1987; Dickemann, 1981; Durham, 1991; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975; Ekman, 1982; Fodor, 1983; Fox, 1971; Freeman, 1983; Freyd, 1987; Fridlund, in press; Galef, 1990; Gallistel, 1990; Garcia, 1990; Gazzaniga, 1985; Gelman, I990a; Ghiselin, 1973; Glantz & Pearce, 1989; Hamilton, 1964; Hinde, 1987; Hrdy, 1977; Irons, 1979; Jackendoff 1992; Kaplan & Hill, 1985; Keil, 1989; Konner, 1982; Krebs & Davies, 1984; Laughlin & d'Aquili, 1974; Lee & DeVore, 1968, 1976; Leslie, 1987, 1988; Lockard, 1971; Lorenz, 1965; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981; Marr, 1982; Marshall, 1981; Maynard Smith, 1982; Nesse, 1991; Pinker, 1989; Real, 1991; Rozin, 1976; Rozin & Schull, 1988; Seligman & Hager, 1972; Shepard, 1981,1984, 1987a; Shepher, 1983; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; Spelke, 1990; Sperber, 1974, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1990; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Staddon, 1988; Symons, 1979, 1987, 1989; N. W. Thornhill, 1991; R. Thornhill, 1991; Tiger, 1969; Tinbergen, 1951; Trivers, 1971, 1972; Van den Berghe, 1981; de Waal, 1982; Williams, 1966, 1985; Wilson, 1971, 1975, 1978; Wilson & Daly, 1987; Wolf & Huang, 1980; Wrangham, 1987.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We are deeply indebted to Jerry Barkow, Don Brown, David Buss, Nap Chagnon, Martin Daly, Lorraine Daston, Irven DeVore, Gerd Gigerenzer, Steve Pinker, Roger Shepard, Dan Sperber, Don Symons, Valerie Stone, and Margo Wilson for many enlightening discussions ofthe issues addressed in this chapter. We are especially grateful to Jerry Barkow, Lorraine Daston, and Steve Pinker for their incisive comments on prior drafts. This chapter was prepared, in part, while the authors were Fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We are grateful for the Center's support, as well as that provided by the Gordon P. Getty Trust, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, NSF Grant BNS87-00864 to the Center, NSF Grant BNS9 I57-449 to John Tooby, and the McDonnell Foundation. We would also like to thank Peter Weingart and the Zentrum fur interdisziplinaire Forschung (ZiF) ofthe University ofBielefeld, Germany, for its support during the latter phases ofthis project. We gratefully acknowledge the many late course corrections supplied by Rob Boyd, Bill Durham, Peter Hejl, Hans Kummer, Sandy Mitchell, Peter Molnar, Pete Richerson, Neven Sesardic, Joan Silk, Nancy Thornhill, Peter Weingart, and the rest ofthe ZiF community. Most importantly, we would like to thank Ranoula, Gerd, Thalia, Aubri, and Nancy, without whom this paper might never have been completed.
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2 On the Use and Misuse of Darwinism in the Study of Human Behavior DONALD SYMONS A biological explanation should invoke no factors other than the laws of physical science, natural selection, and the contingencies of history. GEORGE C. WILLIAMS
DaIWin's theory ofevolution by natural selection answered one ofthe great existential questions: "Why are people?" (Dawkins, 1976). But once we know why people are, a second question immediately suggests itself: "What ofit?" (Medawar, 1982). Had such tough-minded thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Johnson been apprised of DaIWin's discovery, says Medawar, they might well·'have demanded to know what great and illuminating new truth about mankind followed from our realisation of his having evolved" (p. 191). This essay is a meditation on the question, "What ofit?" One ofthe major aims ofthis essay is to critically analyze the following hypothesis, which many scholars believe to be entailed by the proposition that human beings are the products of natural selection: Human behavior per se can be expected to be adaptive (i.e., reproduction-maximizing), and hence a science of human behavior can be based on analyses of the reproductive consequences of human action. My critique of this hypothesis perhaps can be introduced most easily by way of an example. Because I wrote a book about the evolution of human sexuality (Symons, 1979), I am sometimes invited to lecture on this topic. During such lectures, I present various hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms that underpin human sexual behavior and about the selective forces that shaped these mechanisms. For example, I claim that, other things being equal, men tend to be more strongly sexually attracted to women with whom they have never had sexual relations than they are to women with whom they regularly have sexual relations. This phenomenon results, I argue, not from a generalized tendency to become bored by familiarity, but from the operation ofa specialized psychological mechanism. Now, there is nothing in the laws ofphysical science that can account for the existence of this mechanism; nor does it somehow follow as an inevitable consequence ofbiological law or sexual reproduction; nor does such a mechanism exist universally in male animals (indeed, many scientists, including some evolutionists, implicitly deny its existence in human males). This mechanism, I argue, was produced by natural selection during the course of human evolutionary history because opportunities sometimes existed for males to sire offspring at little '·cost" (a trivial amount of sperm, a few moments of their time) by copulating with new females. Also, opportunities often existed for males of high status or excep-
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tional competitive abilities to acquire multiple mates. In such circumstances, even if only a tiny fraction of sexual impulses could be consummated, over the course of thousands of generations males with a roving eye, a taste for partner variety, and the ability to discriminate low- from high-risk opportunities produced more offspring, on the average, than did males with different psychological characteristics. After the lecture I am often asked some version of the following question: "Since polygamy is illegal, and modem women generally practice contraception, a roving eye currently doesn't seem to make much reproductive sense; so why do men still have it?" My usual answer is this: Natural selection takes hundreds or thousands of generations to fashion any complex adaptation. The brain/mind mechanisms that constitute human nature were shaped by selection over vast periods oftime in environments different in many important respects from our own, and it is to these ancient environments that human nature is adapted. Because modem contraceptive technology has existed for an evolutionarily insignificant amount oftime, we have no adaptations specifically designed to deal with it, and a roving eye may be less adaptive (i.e., less reproduction-maximizing) today than it once was, or perhaps maladaptive (even in the ancestral environments in which human nature evolved, no doubt some males met early deaths as a direct consequence of their roving eyes). Indeed, if all women began practicing perfectly effective contraceptive techniques, chose to be impregnated only by their husbands, never married polygynously, and never married divorced men, over the course of several thousand years sele<,tion might eliminate the human male's rovingeye. Although the questioner generally seems satisfied with this answer, the subsequent discussion almost invariably reveals that a fundamental conceptual error, which motivated the question in the first place, remains unresolved. That error-which is almost as pervasive among behavioral scientists as it is among laymen-is to assume that if life's machinery was designed by natural selection-i.e., by nonrandom differential reproduction-then this machinery ought to incarnate or instantiate some sort ofgeneralized reproductive striving. In other words, the error is to confuse the general process that produces adaptations with the adaptations themselves (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a). The human brain/mind is an integrated bundle of complex mechanisms (adaptations). Each mechanism was designed by natural selection in past environments to promote the survival of the genes that directed its construction by serving some specificfunction-Le., by performing some specific task, such as regulating blood pressure, perceiving edges, or detecting cheaters in social exchanges. No mechanism could possibly serve the general function of promoting gene survival because there simply is no general, universally effective way ofdoing so (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). What works in one species may not work in another; what works in the infant ofthe species may not work in the adult; what works in the female of the species may not work in the male; what works in a given species at one time may not work at another time; what works in solving one kind of biological problem may not work in solving another. And, in every case, "what works" is determined in the crucible ofevolutionarytime. One source ofconfusion is that we are used to thinking ofhuman behavior as being uniquely flexible and responsive to environmental variation. Human behavior is flexible, ofcourse, but this Oexibility is of means, not ends, and the basic experiential goals that motivate human behavior are both inOexible and specific. For example, assume that we, along with many other primates, possess a specialized gustatory mechanism
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underpinning the sensation of sweetness. This mechanism was shaped by natural selection in ancestral populations because a sugar-producing fruit is most nutritious when its sugar content is highest, hence individuals who detected and liked sugar produced, on the average, more progeny than did individuals who could not detect sugar or who actually preferred the taste of green or overripe or rotten fruit. Since human behavior is so flexible, we have been able to develop virtually an infinite number of ways of obtaining sugar; but the goal ofeating sugar remains the same-to experience the sensation of sweetness. In modem industrial societies, where refined sugar is abundantly available, the human sweet tooth may be dysfunctional, but sugar still tastes sweet, and the goal of experiencing sweetness still motivates behavior. That's how we're made. We can decide to avoid refined sugar, but we can't decide to experience a sensation other than sweetness when sugar is on our tongues. Ifwe decide to forgo the pleasure ofsweetness in order to reduce the risk oftooth decay, this conscious decision will be in the service of other specific goals (probably related to material cost, physical attractiveness, and pain). In summary, although human behavior is uniquely flexible, the goal ofthis behavior is the achievement of specific experiences-such as sweetness, being warm, and having high status. Our flexibility of means and our inflexible experiential ends are underpinned by an array of psychological mechanisms that is universal among Homo sapiens (sex and age differences excepted) and finite (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). By contrast, the behaviors that these mechanisms produce are not universal (species-typical movement patterns such as walking, suckling, and frowning excepted) and are infinitely variable. We possess the particular array of psychological mechanisms that we do, not because there is anything inherent in physical or biological law that makes them inevitable, but because in ancestral populations selection favored certain variants ofeach mechanism over the available alternatives, and genes specifically for each psychological mechanism became established in the human gene pool. (There are, however, no genes specifically for human behaviors-species-typical movement patterns excepted.) In short, human beings, like all other organisms, have been designed by selection to strive for specific goals, not the general goal of reproduction-maximizing: There can be no such thing as a generalized reproduction-maximizer mechanism because there is no general, universally effective way to maximize reproduction. Thus, there is no reason to expect whatever psychological mechanisms underpin our unique flexibility of behavior to maximize reproductive success in evolutionarily novel environments: These mechanisms merely make possible novel behavioral means to the same old specific ends. My primary goal in this essay is to convince the reader that because Darwinism is a theory ofadaptation it illuminates human behavior only insofar as it illuminates the adaptations that constitute the machinery of behavior. In other words, the link between Darwinian theory and behavior is psychology (Barkow, 1984, Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). I proceed as follows: First, I describe the adaptationist program in biology. Second, I try to show how this program can be applied fruitfully to human psychological adaptations, using the perception of sexual attractiveness as an example. Third, I illustrate how social scientists, whose goal is to illuminate phenomena that are not themselves adaptations, can use evolutionary psychology to guide their research. And fourth, I argue that no approach to human behavior can be simultaneously psychologically agnostic and genuinely Darwinian.
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THE ADAPTATION 1ST PROGRAM The goal ofthe adaptationist program in biology is "to recognize certain of[the organism's] features as components ofsome special problem-solving machinery" (Williams, 1985, p. I). As Mayr (1983) notes, the study of adaptation long antedates Darwin: "The adaptationist question, 'What is the function of a given structure or organ?' has been for centuries the basis for every advance in physiology" (p. 328). But it was Darwin who provided the first and only scientifically coherent account of the origin and maintenance ofadaptations: evolution by natural selection (Darwin, 1859; Dawkins, 1986). To most evolutionary biologists, to say that a structural, behavioral, physiological, or psychological trait is an adaptation is to say that the trait was designed by selection to serve a specific function (Thornhill, 1990; Williams, 1966). Since one can arbitrarily partition phenotypes in an infinite number of ways-the overwhelming majority of which will be useless for any sort ofbiological analysis-the identification of adaptations is central to the study of the phenomena of life: By identifying adaptations one carves the phenotype at its natural, functional joints. "The study of adaptation is not an optional preoccupation with fascinating fragments of natural history, it is the core of biological study" (Pittendrigh, 1958, p. 395). To claim that a trait is an adaptation is thus to make a claim about the past: "The one thing about which modern authors are unanimous is that adaptation is not teleological, but refers to something produced in the past by natural selection" (Mayr, 1983, p. 324). It is also to make a claim about design: Natural selection is not mere differential reproduction, it is "differential reproduction in consequence of. .. design differences" (Burian, 1983, p. 307). When one claims that a feature of an organism is an adaptation, "one is claining not only that the feature was brought about by differential reproduction among alternative forms, but also that the relative advantage of the feature vis-a-vis its alternatives played a significant causal role in its production" (Burian, 1983, p. 294). Finally, given modern understandings of the genetical basis of reproduction, to claim that a trait is an adaptation is to make a certain kind of claim about genes. There has been much confusion on this point because the question, "Are there genes for trait X?" can be a question about anyone of three entirely differentyet often confused-subjects: ontogeny, heritability, and adaptation. When people ask whether there are genes for a given trait, they generally have some version ofthe adaptationist question in mind, and yet the answer they are given usually assumes that they were asking the ontogenetic or the heritability question. The ontogenetic question is, Did genes playa role in the development of trait X? The answer is always yes, no matter what trait X is-adaptation or pathology, idiosyncrasy or species-typical organ-since every part ofevery organism emerges only via interactions among genes, gene products, and myriad environmental phenomena. And because the answer to the ontogenetic question is always yes, it is uninformative. Second is the heritability question: Is any of the population variance in trait X caused by genetic variance? This rather specialized question is asked primarily by population and behavior geneticists, personality psychologists, medical researchers, and plant and animal breeders. For example, if trait X is milk production in a particular population of cows, and if the answer is no (i.e., if the heritability is zero), then the dairy farmer knows that attempts to increase milk production via selective breeding would be futile. The heritability question can be asked aoout any phenotypic trait,
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whether or not the trait is an adaptation, and the answer will reveal little about the evolutionary past. In particular, a yes answer to this question is not evidence that trait X is an adaptation, and a no answer is not evidence for the opposite conclusion. The ability to lactate obviously is an adapation, whether or not any of its aspects are currently heritable. In fact, since selection tends to use up genetic variation, strong and consistent selection pressures favoring trait X usually drive its heritability to zero. Third is the adaptationist question: Was trait X per se designed by selection to serve some function; i.e., is it an adaptation? When people ask whether there are genes for trait X, this is the question whose answer they are usually seeking. Small wonder, then, that they are perplexed when the useless, inevitably-affirmative answer to the ontogenetic question is palmed off on them, or they are told that the answer depends on the outcome of heritability studies! Evidence that there are genes for trait X in the adaptationist sense (Le., evidence that trait X is an adaptation) comes from the study of phenotopic design. Design can be demonstrated by comparative studies of evolutionary convergences and divergences (Curio, 1973; Mayr, 1983) and by "engineering" analyses, in which it is recognized in the precision, economy, efficiency, constancy, and complexity with which effects are achieved (Curio, 1973; Dawkins, 1986; Thornhill, 1990; Williams, 1966, 1985). The adaptationist program applied to the study of the human brain/mind has come to be called "evolutionary psychology" (see Barkow, 1980, 1984, 1986; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Daly & Wilson, 1984, 1986, 1988; Symons, 1987b, 1989; Tooby, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989a, 1989b). In the following section, I try to illustrate the usefulness ofthe evolutionary psychological approach by considering briefly a single topic, the perception ofsexual attractiveness.
THE EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL ATTRACTIVENESS Since Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is the only viable explanation of the origin and maintenance of the machinery of life (Dawkins, 1982, 1986), it is a powerful heuristic tool for investigating the phenomena of life: It "provides a guide and prevents certain kinds oferrors, raises suspicions ofcertain explanations or observations, suggests lines of research to be followed, and provides a sound criterion for recognizing significant observations on natural phenomena" (Lloyd, 1979, p. 18). Selectional thinking (Le., thinking informed and inspired by Darwin's theory) can provide a guide to the study of human sexuality, not because it typically inspires startling or counterintuitive hypotheses (although some day it may do so), but because it leads one to expect that an array of specialized (specifically "sexual") psychological mechanisms underpins human sexual behavior. To explain why this is so, and why this expectation differs so profoundly from the psychological assumptions implicit in most social science accounts ofhuman sexual behavior, requires an introductory digression. Every theory of human behavior implies a human psychology. This includes theories that attribute human behavior to "culture": Ifhuman beings have culture, while rocks, tree frogs, and lemurs don't, it must be because human beings have a different psychological makeup from that of rocks, tree frogs, and lemurs. And every psychological theory implies a human nature; that is, every psychological theory implies that the brain/mind comprises mechanisms that are typical of Homo sapiens as a species, in the same sense that having arms rather than wings is typical of Homo sapiens. The
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phrase "human nature" thus does not imply the existence of a mysterious essence or Platonic ideal but rather the possibility ofevaluating scientifically alternative hypotheses about brain/mind mechanisms: The brain/mind either is or is not sexually dimorphic; it either does or does not contain mechanisms specialized for detecting and preferring landscapes of certain sorts (Orians & Heerwagen, this volume), and so forth. Historically, there have been two basic conceptions of human nature: the empiricist conception, in which the brain is thought to comprise only a few domain-general, unspecialized mechanisms; and the nativist conception, in which the brain is thought to comprise many, domain-specific, specialized mechanisms. It is no accident that Darwinians typically favor some version of the latter: The adaptationist program entails thinking in terms offimction, and the brain clearly has many varied functions; that is, it has been designed by natural selection to solve many different kinds ofproblems. Each kind of problem is likely to require its own distinctive kind of solution. It is no more probable that some sort of general-purpose brain/mind mechanism could solve all the behavioral problems an organism faces (find food, choose a mate, select a habitat, etc.) than it is that some sort of general-purpose organ could perform all physiological functions (pump blood, digest food, nourish an embryo, etc.) or that some sort of general-purpose kitchen device could perform all food processing tasks (broil, freeze, chop, etc.). There is no such thing as a "general problem solver" because there is no such thing as a general problem. Now consider in this light the question of the brain/mind mechanisms that are responsible for human perceptions of sexual attractiveness. Anthropologists (indeed, most social scientists) typically attribute such perceptions to "culture." In doing so, they surely imply that this perception is merely one by-product of some-necessarily general-purpose-"capacity-for-culture" mechanisms, which underpin the myriad phenomena that are attributed to culture (kinship systems, pottery styles, religious beliefs, etc.). In essence, to attribute the perception of sexual attractiveness to culture is to deny, implicitly, that human beings possess specialized psychological mechanisms underpinning this perception; that is. it is to deny that this perception exists as an independent psychological phenomenon with its own distinctive rules and principles. Similarly, to attribute the perception of sexual attractiveness to "learning" is to imply that this perception is merely one by-product of some sort of general-purpose "learning mechanism." Selectional thinking and comparative data on nonhuman animals should arouse deep suspicions of"cultural" and "learning" explanations of the perception of sexual attractiveness. Most Darwinists expect that human beings will be found to possess domain-specific, specialized mechanisms underlying this perception. The adaptationist rationale for this expectation applies not only to human beings but to all complex, sexually reproducing animals: Finding a mate represents a crucial adaptive problem, and all objects in the environment are not equally valuable as potential mates, just as all objects in the environment are not equally valuable as potential food. Thus, selection has produced brain/mind adaptations specialized to detect conspecifics of the opposite sex who evidence high "mate value," just as selection has produced adaptations specialized to detect objects that evidence high nutritional value. There is nothing inherent in eucalyptus leaves that makes them tasty or not tasty: Like beauty, tastiness is in the adaptations ofthe beholder. Eucalyptus leaves are tasty to koalas but not to human beings because the two species have different feeding adaptations. Similarly, the psychological mechanisms that underpin the perception ofsex-
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ual attractiveness among koalas must differ from the mechanisms that underpin koala food choice because, historically, there would have been no reproductive payoff for koalas in choosing to mate with eucalyptus leaves. Ofcourse, in a given species many ofthe same psychological adaptations are likely to be involved in both food and mate choice: basic mechanisms of visual perception, for example. But the central evaluative mechanisms must be different because the qualities that make for nutritious food are not the qualities that make for a good mate (though we may link the two with such metaphors as "sweet"). In short, just as specialized, distinctively sexual anatomy exists below the neck, so the Darwinist expects it to exist above the neck. If the perception of sexual attractiveness were the product of some sort of generalized "capacity-for-culture" mechanisms, then standards of sexual attractiveness would vary capriciously cross-culturally and would be impossible to predict in advance for a heretofore unknown people. But ifthe evolutionary psychological argument outlined above is approximately correct, and specialized adaptations are responsible for human perceptions ofsexual attractiveness, then fundamental cross-cultural regularities in standards of sexual attractiveness would exist, cross-cultural variation in these standards would be explicable largely in terms of universal, specialized psychological mechanisms operating on varied inputs, and standards ofsexual attractiveness among a heretofore unknown people would be predictable in advance with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Available evidence overwhelmingly favors the evolutionary psychological expectation (Daly & Wilson, 1983, Symons, 1979, 1987a). For example, human males universally seem to be maximally sexually attracted, other things being equal, to certain physical correlates offemale nubility, Le., to certain physical characteristics indicative of a human female who has recently begun fertile menstrual cycles and who has not yet borne a child. In the human environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA)i.e., the Pleistocene environment in which the overwhelming majority of human evolution occurred-such a woman probably would have been between 15 and 18 years of age. In modern contracepting societies women can maintain a relatively youthful appearance far longer than was possible in the EEA, hence in these societies the effect ofage on women's sexual attractiveness is much less marked than it was in the past or is today among band-level peoples (whose environments in some respects resemble the EEA). Nevertheless, I'll hazard the prediction that no society will be found in which most men perceive 38-year-old women as more sexually attractive than 18-year-old women (see Symons, 1979, 1987a). As a second example, available evidence indicates that women are maximally sexually attracted, other things being equal, to men who exhibit signs of high status (Symons, 1979; Daly & Wilson, 1983). I predict that this preference will be found universally and that it will be as characteristic of high-status women as it is oflow-status women. The particular correlates or indexes of male status do, ofcourse, vary; what is invariant is the psychological adaptation that specifies the rule "prefer signs of high status." These predictions about male and female sexual preferences have two sources: First, the hypothesized psychological mechanisms that inform the predictions make excellent adaptive sense; and, second, the existence ofsuch psychological mechanisms is strongly implied by the available data on sexual attractiveness (Symons, 1979; also see Buss, 1989; Daly & Wilson, 1983; Ellis, this volume; Symons, 1987a, 1987b; Townsend, 1987, 1989). Although selectional thinking is an important source ofinspi-
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ration for the evolutionary psychologist, nature always gets the last word. For example, it would seem to make excellent adaptive sense for human males to be able to detect female ovulation and to find ovulating females most sexually attractive; but the preponderance ofevidence is that no such adaptation exists (Doty, 1985). Because the goal of evolutionary psychology, as noted above, is to discover and describe adaptations, evolutionary psychological hypotheses are necessarily hypotheses about the past, including the nature ofthe EEA (Tooby & DeVore, 1987), about phenotypic design, and about genes, in the adaptationist sense. The hypothesis that human males evolved specialized female-nubility-preferring psychological mechanisms thus entails the following assumptions: (a) During the evolutionary past, heritable variation existed among ancestral males in tendencies to be sexually attracted to certain physical correlates offemale nubility; (b) males who preferred nubile females outreproduced, on the average, males with different sexual preferences, specifically because of the former's preference for nubility; (c) selection designed at least one psychological mechanism specifically for nubility-preferring; and (d) genes for nubilitypreferring thus became established in human gene pools. Since the brain/mind mechanisms that collectively constitute human nature were designed by natural selection in the EEA, they must be described solely in terms of phenomena that existed in the EEA; but the kinds ofdata that can be used to evaluate evolutionary psychological hypotheses are potentially limitless, and evolutionarily novel phenomena can be just as informative as phenomena that existed in the EEA, or more so (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989b). As Daly and Wilson (1986) note, "You're starting to get a real handle on how the hunger mechanism works ... when you know how to get a stuffed rat to eat or a starved one to abstain" (p. 189). Human activities in modern industrial societies can be looked upon as unplanned experiments on human nature, analogous to the planned experiments on nonhuman animal nature with which ethologists supplement their field studies. The sugar, salt, and fat served in fast food restaurants tell us at least as much about the nature and evolution of the mechanisms that underpin our appetite as hunter/gatherer menus do. In evaluating the hypothesis that human males evolved specialized female-nubility-preferring mechanisms, here are some ofthe kinds ofdata that might prove to be relevant: observations of human behavior in public places, literary works (particularly the classics, which have passed the tests of time and translation), questionnaire results. the ethnographic record, measurement of the strength of penile erection in response to photographs of women of various ages, analyses of the effects of cosmetics, observations in brothels, the effects ofspecific brain lesions on sexual preferences, skin magazines, and discoveries in neurophysiology. But surely the most compelling tests of this hypothesis, at least at present, would be cross-cultural studies designed specifically for that purpose. Cultural anthropologists are uniquely well situated to conduct research on psychological universals, since cross-cultural comparisons are the cornerstone ofanthropology. Furthermore, anthropological research among band-level peoples (supplemented by the findings ofarchaeology and paleoanthropology) provides insight into the human EEA not obtainable from any other source. Cross-cultural data also can inspire evolutionary psychological hypotheses. For example, it was empirical evidence in the ethnographic record (rather than selectional thinking) that led van den Berghe and Frost (1986) to hypothesize that human males evolved a specialized psychological mechanism to prefer females with a skin tone somewhat lighter than the female average.
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Now it might be argued that the human male's taste for nubile females is hardly front page news, that the existence of multibillion dollar industries producing cosmetics designed to make post-nubile women look younger is common knowledge, and that insofar as evolutionary psychologists emphasize such phenomena they merely belabor the obvious. There are two rejoinders to this argument. First, there has been essentially no systematic psychological research on variation in female sexual attractiveness with age. Are human males really most strongly sexually attracted to nubile females? Ifso, by what specific cues is nubility detected? Systematic changes in women's skin texture with age are obvious candidates, but are there perhaps also subtle changes in facial proportions that men unconsciously detect and respond to? Is the age of maximal female sexual attractiveness in some degree a function of the age or status of the male who is doing the evaluating? Academic psychology is silent on such matters. The human visual system "obviously" includes mechanisms designed to maintain size, color, and shape constancies, yet the obviousness of perceptual constancies quite properly has not prevented psychologists from investigating them. To the extent that evolutionary psychology focuses attention and inspires research on neglected but important topics, such as the perception ofsexual attractiveness, it is valuable indeed. Second, whenever a social scientist attributes something like the human male's sexual attraction to nubile females to cultural conditioning, social learning, socialization, etc., and whenever a social scientist begins a discussion of such matters with the phrase "In our culture ..." (gratuitously implying that things are different elsewhere), he implicitly rejects a nativist conception ofhuman nature and embraces an empiricist conception. As long as social scientists continue to make assumptions about human nature that have essentially no chance ofbeing correct, even seemingly mundane findings of evolutionary psychology will be scientifically significant. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
Even though the goal ofmost social scientific research is to illuminate phenomena that are not themselves adaptations, social scientists can sometimes use evolutionary psychology as a guide. For example, Chagnon's (1988) investigation of kin term manipulation among the Yanomamo, an Amazonian tribal people, was inspired by his basic evolutionary psychological assumption that selection has designed each human being to have some goals that are achievable only at the expense ofother human beings. This assumption implies that competition must always have permeated human affairs (Alexander, 1975), which, in turn, led Chagnon to suspect that among a people like the Yanomamo, where kinship classification has profound social ramifications and where there often exists enough ambiguity about the "correct" classification to provide scope for strategic manipulation, people are unlikely to be mere passive acceptors of their kinship system, as anthropologists have usually assumed. Rather, people are likely to be active critics and manipulators oftheir kinship system. And this is precisely what Chagnon found to be the case among the Yanomamo; for example, a Yanomamo man may begin calling a particular young woman in his village by a kin term that transfers her from a category in which she was ineligible to marry his son to a category in which she is a potential daughter-in-law. If this reclassification becomes generally accepted, it will inevitably harm some people's interests, and fights often erupt over such attempts to manipulate the kinship system (also see Chagnon, 1968, p.65).
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Now, Chagnon did not claim that his data point to the existence of a heretofore undreamed of psychological mechanism specialized for kin term manipulation (i.e., he did not argue that kin term manipulation per se is an adaptation). In fact, he did not claim that these data shed light on human psychology at all (although surely they do bolster his basic assumptions about human nature). Rather, he realized that traditional anthropological views of kinship and kin term usage are informed by a conception of a human nature that is, to a Darwinian, highly implausible. Although he did not form a specific hypothesis about psychological mechanisms, Chagnon's general selection-minded assumptions about human nature inspired both suspicions of traditional anthropological views of kinship and the collection of data on kin term manipulation (which few other anthropologists had thought to collect). As this example illustrates, evolutionary psychology is useful to social scientists, at least at present, not because it typically inspires startling or counterintuitive hypotheses (as soon as one understands the social ramifications of kin classification among the Yanomamo, one immediately empathizes with the temptation to manipulate the system), but because it leads to the questioning ofthe basic assumptions about human nature that are implicit in traditional social scientific research and theory. From evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith's (1982) vantage point outside the social sciences, it may seem trivial to demonstrate "that human behaviour is influenced by kinship, and that kinship has something to do with genetic relationship, because surely, despite some very odd remarks by anthropologists, that is uncontroversial?" (p. 3). From a vantage point within the social sciences, however, these "odd remarks" are, alas, the very warp and weft ofaccepted theory: Kinship often is thought to be independent of genetic relationship, hence the importance of an evolutionary psychological perspective on human nature.
DARWINIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE In contrast to social scientists who use evolutionary psychology as a guide to research, some evolution-minded scholars seek to construct a psychologically agnostic science of human behavior based on the hypothesis that human beings are reproduction (or inclusive fitness) maximizers. This approach has been variously called human sociobiology, human behavioral ecology, evolutionary biological anthropology, and, by me, Darwinian anthropology (Symons, 1989). I'll refer to it here as "Darwinian social science" (since not all ofits practitioners are anthropologists) and use the abbreviation DSS to mean both Darwinian social science and Darwinian social scientist. In referring to someone as a DSS I mean to imply only that he wears a DSS hat in the specific context under discussion, not in all his research. (And it should not be inferred that all research classified as human sociobiology, human behavioral ecology, or evolutionary biological anthropology is DSS.) For examples of DSS see Chagnon and Irons (1979) and Betzig, Borgerhotr Mulder and Turke (1988). In this section I describe DSS; in subsequent sections I critically analyze it. I will attempt to show that DSS is not genuinely Darwinian and that the reproductive data DSSes have collected rarely shed light on human nature or the selective forces that shaped that nature. The central DSS hypothesis is that "evolved behavioral tendencies" cause human "behavior to assume the form that maximizes inclusive fitness" (Irons, 1979, p. 33). Turke and Betzig (1985) put it this way: "Modem Darwinian theory predicts that
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human behavior will be adaptive, that is, designed to promote maximum reproductive success (RS) through available descendent and nondescendent relatives" (p. 79). The research of Crook and Crook (1988) is a typical example of DSS. Crook and Crook collected reproductive data on Tibetans who did and who did not marry polyandrously and concluded, from an analysis ofthese data, that polyandry is adaptive (i.e., fitness-promoting) in certain highly unusual environmental conditions that some Tibetans have encountered in recent times. Now, polyandry, like all human activities, results from the operation ofsome array ofbrain/mind mechanisms; but polyandry is an adaptation only if at least one of these mechanisms was designed by selection specifically to produce it. In other words, it is an adaptation only if at least one psychological mechanism owes its form to the greater reproductive success ofindividuals who married polyandrously, in certain circumstances, in ancestral populations. Ifno such specialized mechanism exists, polyandry is not an adaptation, even though it may currently be adaptive-i.e., fitness-promoting-in certain modem environments. Since the specific environmental features to which Tibetan polyandry is adapted, according to Crook and Crook, include agricultural estates, animal husbandry, primogeniture, monasticism, artistocrats, landlords, governments, and taxation, none of which existed in the human EEA, there is no reason to suppose that polyandry is an adaptation. The research of Crook and Crook differs from Chagnon's investigation ofYanomamo kin term manipulation in the following way: Chagnon's goal was to illuminate an important anthropological problem, the nature of kin term usage. He realized that traditional anthropological views of this matter are based on assumptions about human psychology that are almost certainly wrong. Thus, he became suspicious of these traditional views and was inspired to collect novel data on kin term manipulation. The result was a major contribution to the study of kinship, a subject of interest to anthropologists and to many other people. By contrast, Crook and Crook did not use evolutionary psychology to question previous views ofpolyandry. There is no reason to suppose that their assumptions about human nature differ from the assumptions made by other students of polyandry; i.e., there is no reason to suppose that Crook and Crook's reproductive data will-or should-prompt other students of polyandry to question or to modify previously held assumptions about human psychology. Indeed, there is no particular reason to suppose that Crook and Crook's reproductive data have any bearing on the anthropology of polyandry; they simply argued that polyandrous marriages are fitness-promoting in certain highly unusual circumstances. Crook and Crook believe that the scientific significance of their reproductive data lies in the fact that these data test the following prediction: "The central prediction made in a Darwinian perspective," they write, "is that humans are endeavouring consciously or unconsciously to optimize their reproductive success. It is then a matter of research to discover whether individuals marrying in contrasting ways in different contexts are in fact showing behaviour that does promote their genetic fitness" (p. 98). To understand the scientific significance ofthis or ofany prediction, one needs to know what theory, hypothesis, or assumption would be called into question by the prediction's disconfirmation. Since Darwin's theory of adaptation through natural selection is "the only workable theory we have to explain the organized complexity of life" (Dawkins, 1982, p. 35), there is no known scientific alternative to the theory that human nature is the product of natural selection. This theory is not on trial, and it
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obviously would not have been called into question-even in the slightest degree-by the disconfirmation of Crook and Crook's prediction about the adaptiveness of Tibetan polyandry. Williams (1985) points out that "predictions are tested to check on the truth of an understanding of the phenomena investigated. This understanding always includes special assumptions in addition to those ofthe major theory, and it is these that are confirmed or modified according to the outcome of an investigation" (p. 18). To evaluate the scientific significance ofDSS research, such as that of Crook and Crook (1988), it is therefore necessary to discover and to evaluate the "special assumptions" (i.e., assumptions in addition to the theory that human nature is the product of natural selection) that underlie the DSS prediction that human behavior will be adaptive.
ADAPTATION AND ADAPTIVENESS In describing the DSS enterprise, Irons (1979) writes, "The statement that a particular form ofbehavior is adaptive to a particular environment is a statement about its effect on survival and reproduction and nothing more" (p. 38; also see Dunbar, 1988). But the statement that a particular form of behavior is an adaptation to a particular environment does not imply the current existence of beneficial effects on survival and reproduction; it implies that during the course of evolutionary history selection produced that particular form ofbehavior because that form served a specific function more efficiently than available alternative forms did (Thornhill, 1990, Williams, 1966). The focus ofDSS research thus is not adaptation but rather what Betzig (1989) calls "adaptiveness." Studies of adaptiveness are not unique to DSS. They have been pursued for three reasons: First, to shed light on adaptations. For example, Lack (1954) collected evidence that songbirds producing clutches that are smaller or larger than average typically fledge fewer offspring than do conspecifics producing average-size clutches, and he argued that these data support the hypothesis that producing the average-size clutch is an adaptation. (Even though Lack did not describe specific physiological mechanisms, his hypothesis was that the songbird species in question possesses at least one physiological mechanism specialized to produce the average-size clutch.) Although studies of adaptiveness may sometimes playa role in the adaptationist program, it would be a non sequitur to conclude that measurements of differential reproduction illuminate adaptations from the premise that adaptations are produced by differential reproduction. For a number ofreasons, correlating individual variation in the expression of a trait with reproductive success is normally an ineffective or ambiguous way to study adaptation. For example, one reason is that such correlations generally are superfluous. That the lens of the vertebrate eye is adapted to focusing light on the retina is unambiguously manifested in the eye's design. Comparing the fertility ofliving individuals whose lenses focused light behind, on, and in front oftheir retinas would be pointless (such comparisons could not undermine the evidence of design no matter what results were obtained). A second reason is that the expression of an adaptation designed to cope with fitness-threatening exigencies might often correlate negatively with reproductive success. If, say, fever in mammals functions to combat pathogen infection, then individuals with the highest fevers might typically have fewer offspring than individuals without fevers (who were not infected in the first
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place) and individuals with lower fevers (who were infected less severely or who happened to have more efficient immune systems). A third reason is that an adaptation that is genetically fixed in population (i.e., with a heritability ofzero) might vary capriciously with environmental variation, and, hence, its expression probably would not be correlated with reproductive success. Fourth, correlations too small to detect may have great selective significance over evolutionary time. Fifth, a given trait may covary with reproductive success merely because both are correlated with a third variable. Sixth, a given trait may promote fitness-and hence correlate positively with reproductive success-because it currently produces some effect other than its evolved function. Seventh, the hypothesis that trait X is an adaptation does not imply that trait X is currently adaptive (e.g., the human sweet tooth is an adaptation whether or not it is currently adaptive). As Hailman (1980) remarks, "Correlation ofindividual variation with reproductive success ... is a mental briar patch that scratches all who enter" (p. 189). The measurement of reproductive differentials has always been a problematical tool in the adaptationist program because such measurement, in and ofitself, "simply does not measure degree offitness or adaptedness in any ofthe senses relevant to evolutionary theory-all of which have something to do with systematic or designed fit with the environment, with causally mediated propensities to reproductive success" (Burian, 1983, p. 299; also see Thornhill, 1990). The hypothesis that human males evolved specialized female-nubility-preferring psychological mechanisms, for example, does not imply any ofthe following: (a) that selection is currently favoring a sexual preference for nubile females; (b) that variation in the phenotypic expression of this preference is correlated with male reproductive succes; and (c) that comparing the reproductive success of males who are and who are not sexually attracted to nubile females (other things being equal) would illuminate either male psychology or the evolutionary processes that produced that psychology. The second reason for studying adaptiveness is that such investigations may sometimes shed light on the selective forces that maintain an adaptation when these differ from the forces that produced it. For example, the mottled pattern of black-headed gulls' eggs strongly implies a camouflage function. Since experiments have shown that parent birds sit better on normal than on artificially solid-colored eggs, however, the mottled pattern may be maintained by selection not only because mottled eggs are more cryptic but also because they provide a more effective sitting stimulus for parents (Tinbergen, 1967). (This does not imply that a function of mottling is to provide an effective sitting stimulus: That parents prefer mottled to solid-colored eggs reveals something about the design of black headed gulls' brains, not their eggs.) Third, Caro and BorgerhoffMulder (1987) argue that studying the adaptiveness of current human activities might make it possible to predict the future course of evolution. To accurately predict that selection will favor currently adaptive activity X, however, one would have to know that the tendency to perform X is heritable; that selection pressures on the X-producing psychological and physiological mechanisms in other contexts will not counter or simply wash out any tendency for selection to favor the performance of X specifically; and that the relevant environmental conditions will persist for an evolutionarily significant span oftime. The likelihood ofknowing these things strikes me as being sufficiently remote to rule out a prognostic rationale for studying the adaptiveness of human activities. DSSes study adaptiveness for yet another reason: They assume that such investi-
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gations provide the raw material for building a science of human behavior. This assumption, however, is a conceptual muddle. DSSes invoke such notions as "Darwinism," "modem evolutionary theory," "natural selection," "sexual selection," "kin selection," and "inclusive fitness" to justify their inquiries into the adaptivenss of human behavior, but evolutionary fact and theory can be logically coupled to the study of human behavior only via adaptations (Barkow, 1984; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Except for such species-typical behavioral patterns as walking, running, smiling, and crying, human behavior per se was not designed by selection; rather, most human behavior is the product ofthe interaction of myriad psychological mechanisms, and it is these mechanism that were designed by selection. To the extent that DSSes' descriptions of human behavior are agnostic with respect to psychological mechanisms, they are adaptation-free, past-free, and gene-free, and, therefore, not logically coupled to evolutionary fact and theory. Dawkins (1982) elaborates this point in the following anecdote about a seminar he attended in which a DSS interpreted human polyandry in terms of kin selection: Though fascinated by the information he presented, I tried to warn him ofsome difficulties in his hypothesis. I pointed out that the theory of kin selection is fundamentally a genetic theory, and that kin-selected adaptations to local conditions had to come about through the replacement of alleles by other alleles, over generations. Had his polyandrous tribes been living, I asked, under their current peculiar conditions for long enough-enough generations-for the necessary genetic replacement to have taken place? Was there, indeed, any reason to believe that variations in human mating systems are under genetic control at all? The speaker, supported by many of his anthropological colleagues in the seminar, objected to my dragging genes into the discussion. He was not talking about genes, he said, but about a social behavior pattern. . . . I tried to persuade him that it was he who had 'dragged genes in' to the discussion although, to be sure, he had not mentioned the word gene in his talk.... You cannot talk about kin selection, or any other form of Darwinian selection, without dragging genes in, whether you do so explicitly or not. By even speculating about kin selection as an explanation ofdifferences in tribal mating systems, my anthropologist friend was implicitly dragging genes into the discussion. It is a pity he did not make it explicit. because he would then have realized what formidable difficulties lay in the path of his kin selection hypothesis: either his polyandrous tribes had to have been living, in partial genetic isolation, under their peculiar conditions for a large number of centuries, or natural selection had to have favoured the universal occurrrence ofgenes programming some complex 'conditional strategy.' (pp. 27-28)
According to Irons (1979), the DSS focus on human behavior rather than psychology has a distinctively Darwinian justification: "It is actual behavior which influences reproductive success directly" (p. 9). This argument, however, should be stood on its head: Darwin's theory of natural selection is a theory ofadaptation, a historical account of the origin and maintenance of phenotypic design. In the study of adaptation, the key issue is whether differential reproductive success historically influenced the design ofa given trait, not whether the trait currently influences differential reproductive success. In short, nothing in the theory of evolution by natural selection justifies an adaptation-agnostic science of adaptiveness. As J. Tooby (personal communication, 1989) notes, the study ofadaptivenss merely draws metaphorical inspiration from Darwinism, whereas the study of adaptation is Darwinian. The tendency of DSSes to focus on adaptiveness stems in part, I believe, from their assumption that the social science Rosetta stone, the key to deciphering the deep structure ofhuman affairs, is reproduction.
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REPRODUCTION MINDEDNESS Not only did Darwin's theory ofnatural selection account for adaptation and function, it gave them more precise meanings. Adaptations are designed to promote reproduction in specific environments-in modern tenns, to promote the survival of genes. "Reproduction mindedness" thus can be useful to students of adaptation. The function of the peacock's tail, for example, would never be discovered by someone who assumed that the tail was designed to promote the survival of peacocks (rather than to promote the survival of peacock genes). Reproduction mindedness, however, is no conceptual magic carpet, capable of soaring over questions of adaptation. Consider, for example, Alexander's (1987) reproduction-minded discussion ofhuman male sexuality. Alexander argues that "for men much of sexual activity has had as a main (ultimate) significance the initiating of pregnancies" (p. 216). "This argument," he says, "does not predict, for example, that men win never wish to use contraceptives or have vasectomies (both evolutionary novelties), but it does predict that most males will be reluctant to do the first and exceedingly reluctant to do the second" (p. 218). He continues: It wilI probably be necessary to defend part ofthe above argument further. Thus, some men will undoubtedly assert that they are more interested in sex if there is no possibility ofpregnancy, or that they are only interested in sex when contraceptives are used. Although it is not the principal theme ofthis essay, what is required is a review ofthe interplay ofproximate and ultimate mechanisms. A man behaving so as to avoid pregnancies, and who derives from an evolutionary background ofavoiding pregnancies, should be expected to favor copulation with women who are for age or other reasons incapable ofpregnancy. A man derived from an evolutionary process in which securing of pregnancies typically was favored, may be expected to be most interested sexually in women most likely to become pregnant and near the height of the reproductive probability curve. This means that men should usually be expected to anticipate the greatest sexual pleasure with young, healthy, intelligent women who show promise of providing superior parental care. (p. 218)
Whether or not Alexander's predictions about male responses to contraceptives and vasectomies are correct, his justification for these predictions is at best incomplete. Neither the fact that men derive from an evolutionary process in which securing pregnancies was favored nor the fact that men typicaJly fancy young, healthy women justifies the prediction that most men will be reluctant to use contraceptives. As discussed above, the psychological mechanisms that underpin the human male's perception of female sexual attractiveness were designed by natural selection in the EEA to assess specific correlates of mate value; for example, the human male's predilections for young and healthy women presumably reflect the operation ofspecialized psychological mechanisms: in ancestral populations, men with heritable tendencies to be sexuaJly atttracted to certain physical correlates of youth and health typically outteproduced men whose tastes ran to physical correlates of old age and disease. (Since an inteJligent mate may often have been a better mate, Alexander's assumption that men evolved a sexual taste for intelligent women is a psychological hypothesis worth investigating.) To be logically justified, a prediction about male sexual responses to evolutionary novelties, such as modern contraceptive technology, must necessarily be based on specific knowledge or assumptions about the psychological machinery of sexual attraction. In the absence of such psychological knowledge or assumptions, infonna-
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tion about the probable reproductive consequences ofsexual intercourse with a given woman (e.g., information about her use oforal contraceptives) provides no basis whatever for predicting her sexual attractiveness. Merely knowing that male psychology is the product of natural selection is not enough.
PREDICTION AND KNOWLEDGE The obsession with falsifiable prediction and quantification that is endemic in the social sciences may in part account for the emphasis in DSS on the testing of predictions about differential reproduction. Yet the history of the social sciences stands as a monument to the proposition that testing falsifiable predictions and acquiring scientifically significant knowledge are not synonymous. All predictions that have some minimal empirical content and are not excessively vague are falsifiable, but falsifiability per se is no guarantee of scientific significance. The key question with respect to any prediction is this: If it is disconfirmed, what theory, hypothesis, or assumption is thereby called into question? The more precisely a student ofadaptation characterizes phenotypic design the less ambiguous his predictions will be and the more likely it is that testing these predictions will illuminate adaptation. Similarly, the more precise an evolution-minded social scientist's assumptions are about human nature, the more closely coupled his predictions will be to evolutionary fact and theory, and the more likely it is that testing these predictions will be scientifically significant. To illustrate this point, I will contrast two predictions made by Betzig (1988) in her evolution-inspired ethnographic research on Ifaluk, an atoll in the Western Caroline Islands. Her first prediction is that Ifaluk chiefs will profit materially from their high status. This prediction, I believe, is based on definite, albeit implicit, assumptions about phenotypic design (human nature). Despite evidence in the ethnographic record that in many pre-state societies high-ranking individuals control the distribution of resources and skim offthe fat for themselves and their relatives, Betzig argues that two theoretical positions-substantivism ..;tnd Marxism-hold that in pre-state societies there is always plenty ofeverything, and, hence, those in power distribute resources in a disinterested, nonexploitive fashion. Evolutionary psychological assumptions made Betzig suspicious of these theories. She investigated the matter and found that "the material advantage in sharing food on Ifaluk is not on the subordinates' side.... Nor, in this respect, is access to these life sustaining resources equal.... Rather, consistent with the Darwinian prediction, chiefs appear to gain productively by their positions" (Betzig, 1988, p. 55). Had Betzig's "Darwinian prediction" been disconfirmed, certain assumptions about human nature might have been called into question. Conversely, the confirmation of her prediction may undermine the-admittedly vague-assumptions about human nature that have led some social scientists to romanticize pre-state peoples and to grossly exaggerate cultural variability. As Betzig notes, in essence she has demonstrated that the relationship between power and access to material resources is the same on Ifaluk as it is in the societies most of use are familiar with (presumably because human nature is the same on Ifaluk as it is elsewhere). Furthermore, whether Ifaluk chiefs do or do not obtain a disproportionate share of material resources is potentially relevant to long-standing anthropological questions about the relationship between political power and resource acquisition, questions also of interest to other
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social scientists, historians, and people in general. In this respect, Betzig's research is analogous to that of Chagnon (1988), discussed above, on Yanomamo kin term manipulation.· Now consider a second Betzig prediction: high-ranking Ifaluk men and their male successors will have higher fertility than low-ranking men. What assumption would be called into question if this prediction were to be disconfirmed? It is extremely unlikely that any assumption about the psychology of status or the evolution of that psychology would be affected. That human beings everywhere pursue status-indeed, that "status" is universally a meaningful psychological category-implies that in ancestral populations high-status individuals typically outreproduced low-status individuals (a proposition supported by many studies of nonhuman animals [Wilson, 1975] and band-level human societies [Symons,1979]). There is no known or suspected alternative explanation for the existence of the human status motive. Indeed, Vining (1986) notes that the correlations between status and reproductive success in modem Western societies is typically inverse, yet few, if any, of the many commentators on Vining's article seem to believe that such data can test any significant hypothesis about the psychology of status striving or the selective forces that produced that psychology. Furthermore, since no competing social science theory predicts anything at all about the relationship between status or material resources and reproductive success, the outcome of a test of Betzig's second prediction cannot contribute to the resolution ofany theoretical issue in the social sciences. Nor is it likely that assumptions about human nature implicit in other social science theories would be called into question by the confirmation of Betzig's prediction. But Betzig's reproductive prediction most likely was not intended to test assumptions about human nature or the selective forces that produced that nature, nor was it intended to undermine rival social science theories. Rather, it was probably intended to test the central DSS hypothesis that human behavior is designed to maximize inclusive fitness. Betzig did confirm her reproductive prediction; does this confirmation support the DSS hypothesis? Not necessarily. The question "Are human beings inclusive fitness maximizers?" can be met only with another question: "Compared with what?" One approach (which Betzig did not pursue) is to compare the behavior of ethnographic subjects with an imaginary social engineer's ideal design for inclusive fitness-maximizing behavior. Given the particular circumstances in which the ethnographic subjects find themselves, and given the range of options open to them, how closely does their behavior approximate the engineering ideal? Kitcher (1985) uses this approach to analyze several of DSS's most famous ethnographic examples, and he concludes that the ethnographic subjects' behavior does not closely approximate the social engineering ideal. Kitcher's criterion may, however, be too stringent: Probably no DSSes actually believe that human behavior achieves some unconstrained ideal of fitness maximization. For one thing, DSSes are aware ofthe many factors that can prevent natural selection from achieving optimal phenotypic design. For another, most DSSes probably would admit that since human behavior per se was not designed by selection, it might for that reason alone fail to achieve the social engineering ideal. And finally, DSSes know that current human environments differ in many respects from the EEA. Alexander (1979) sums up the DSS hypothesis this way: "I have not suggested that culture precisely tracks the interests ofthe genes-obviously this is not true-but that, in historical terms, it does so much more closely than we might have imagined" (p. 142).
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DSS's central hypothesis thus appears to be something like the following: Modem Darwinian theory predicts that human behavior will be surprisingly adaptive. The special assumptions that this hypothesis seems to entail (in addition to the uncontested assumption that human nature is the product of natural selection) are that (a) patterns perceivable in mechanism-agnostic descriptions of human behavior approximate fitness-maximizing designs to a surprising degree; (b) evolutionarily novel environments cause human behavior to deviate from the path offitness maximization less than one might have imagined; and (c) the accumulated measurements ofthe reproductive consequences of human behavior will lead to a deep understanding of human affairs. The central DSS hypothesis-and the special assumptions it comprises-can be evaluated by considering the following questions: (a) Is the hypothesis really derived from Darwinian theory? (b) Is it accurate? (c) Are tests of its accuracy scientifically significant? With respect to the first question, since Darwin's is a theory ofadaptation, not adaptiveness, the DSS hypothesis is not clearly derived from the theory of evolution by natural selection. Even if DSSes had time machines and could conduct research in the EEA, there would be no Darwinian justification for an adaptation-free study of adaptiveness. The problems become acute, however, when human behavior is observed, as it always is, in evolutionarily novel environments. In fact, since the adaptations that underpin human behavior were designed by selection to function in specific environments, there is a principled Darwinian argument for assuming that behavior in evolutionarily novel environments will often be maladaptive. But no Darwinian argument justifies the assumption that such behavior will be more adaptive than one might have imagined. In addition, the hypothesis entails comparing the adaptiveness of human behavior with people's expectations about adaptiveness, and it is unclear how a prediction about people's expectations could be derived from Darwinian theory. The next question is whether the DSS hypothesis is accurate. Strictly speaking, we can't really be sure because we don't know how adaptive people generally imagine human behavior to be (we don't know, for example, whether people are likely to be surprised by Betzig's reproductive data). No rival social science theory predicts anything at all about adaptiveness per se, and it is probably a subject to which most people have never given a moment's thought. In the EEA, human behavior presumably was as adaptive as that of any other animal species in its EEA, although whether it was surprisingly adaptive is anybody's guess. As I have argued elsewhere (Symons, 1987c), however, in modem industrial societies human behavior is so poorly designed to maximize fitness, given the available reproductive opportunities, that it is hard to imagine anyone being surprised by how adaptive it is. Consider, for example, the reproductive opportunities available in the United States today to a healthy white woman who wanted to maximize her fitness: She could bear a baby every year or two, from nubility to menopause, and give it up for adoption, confident that it would be cherished by a middle-class family. A reasonably young male member of the Forbes' 400 could use his fortune to construct a reproductive paradise in which women and their children could live in modest affluence and security for life (as long as paternity was verified). Such a man might well sire two orders of magnitude more offspring than the current average for male members of the Forbes' 400. In a world in which people actually wanted to maximize inclusive fitness, opportunities to make deposits in sperm banks would be immensely competitive, a subject ofendless public scrutiny and debate, with the possibility of reverse embezzlement by male sperm bank officers an ever-present
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problem. It is difficult to picture clearly a modem industrial society in which people strive to maximize inclusive fitness because such a society would have so little in common with our own. Finally, there is the question of the scientific significance of tests of the DSS hypothesis: If certain human behaviors were shown to be surprisingly adaptive, some ofthe demonstrations ofadaptivenessmigltt inspire novel hypotheses about the nature or evolution of the human brain/mind (Betzig, 1989; Thornhill, 1990); but it is difficult to see how a science of human behavior could be based on the demonstrations themselves. In fact, the possibility ofa mechanism-agnostic science ofhuman behavior of any sort-Darwinian or otherwise-is by no means a matter of universal agreement. It is often argued that the history ofthe social sciences (which are characteristically mechanism-agnostic) is a history offailures to establish reliable and useful bodies of knowledge and theory (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979, Murdock, 1972, Rosenberg, 1980, Ziman, 1978). "A good rule ofthumb to keep in mind," quips Searle (1984), "is that anything that calls itself'science' [e.g., Christian Science, military science, library science, social science] probably isn't" (p.11). In summary, the hypothesis that human behavior is surprisingly adaptive does not derive from Darwinian theory and is almost certainly wrong in modem industrial environments. This hypothesis is presumably falsifiable, but that does not necessarily imply that testing it is scientifically significant. The accumulated measurements ofthe reproductive consequences of human behavior are unlikely to lead to a deep understanding ofhuman affairs because such measurements merely demonstrate that various activities either are or aren't adaptive; they do not constitute new knowledge about human nature or the evolutionary processes that produced that nature (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989b).
CONCLUSION
The adaptationist program, whose goal is to recognize certain features oforganisms as components of some special problem-solving machinery (Williams, 1985), has been the foundation ofbiology for centuries. Darwin's theory ofevolution by natural selection added to this program a scientifically coherent account of the origin and maintenance ofadaptations as well as a powerful heuristic tool: Darwinism provides a guide to research on phenotypic design, prevents certain kinds of errors, and raises suspicions ofcertain explanations and theories. The subject matter ofthe adaptationist program is structural, physiological, behavioral, or psychological phenotypic features that have been shaped by selection to serve some function. Although adaptations are produced by differential reproduction, studying differential reproduction does not necessarily illuminate adaptations. As Williams (1966) remarks, "Measuring reproductive success focuses attention on the rather trivial problem of the degree to which an organism actually achieves reproductive survival. The central biological problem is not survival as such, but design for survival" (p. 159). Current effects of phenotypic features-including beneficial effects on reproduction-thus are relevant to the adaptationist program only insofar as the study of such effects illuminates adaptations. Evolutionary psychology is the application of the adaptationist program to the study of the human brain/mind. Evolutionary psychologists assume that the brain/ mind has many functions-i.e., that it has been designed by selection to solve many
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different kinds of problems, each of which is likely to require its own distinctive kind of solution-and, therefore, that the brain/mind comprises many domain-specific, specialized mechanisms. For example, selectional thinking leads to the expectation that human perceptions ofsexual attractiveness are underpinned by many specialized mechanisms (which operate according to their own distinctive rules and principles) rather than by some sort of generalized "learning" or "capacity-for-culture" mechanisms. Cultural anthropologists are uniquely well situated to investigate evolutionary psychological hypotheses because the cornerstone of anthropology is cross-cultural comparison and because anthropological reseach among band-level peoples provides insight into the human environment ofevolutionary adaptedness. Social scientists can use evolutionary psychology as a guide to research. For example, evolutionary psychological assumptions made Betzig (1988) suspicious of Marxist and substantivist claims about the relationship between political power and resource acquisition in prestate societies. She investigated the matter on Ifaluk, and her findings are significant both with respect to questions of human nature and with respect to long-standing issues in the social sciences. On the other hand, her psychologically agnostic demonstration that high-ranking Ifaluk men and their male successors have higher fertility than low-ranking men does not seem to me to be scientifically significant because these data do not bear on questions of human nature or the selective forces that shaped that nature, nor do they have any apparent relevance for issues in the social sciences. In sum, Darwin's theory of natural selection sheds light on human behavior only insofar as it sheds light on the adaptations that constitute the machinery of behavior: A science of human behavior cannot be simultaneously psychologically agnostic and genuinely Darwinian. Although great and illuminating new truths about human beings may not follow automatically from the realization that we evolved, Darwinism can be a guide and source of inspiration for students of human nature.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank Jerome Barkow, Donald Brown, Napoleon Chagnon, Leda Cosmides, Bruce Ellis, Kalman Glantz, Yonie Harris, Sarah Hrdy, Randy Thornhill, John Tooby, and Richard Wrangham for their careful and thoughtful readings ofvarious drafts ofthis essay and for their many insightful comments; I'm particularly grateful to Margie Profet, who made it shorter, sweeter, and more comprehensible-even to me. Thanks too to Alexander Robertson and John Tooby for "personal communications."
NOTE I. There are two potential objections to Betzig's interpretation of these data. First, it is an open question whether those who consider themselves to be substantivists and Marxists would agree that their theoretical positions imply that Ifaluk chiefs can be expected not to skim otfthe fat for themselves and their relatives (A. Robertson, personal communication, 1989). Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that there is a widespread belief that people in non-state societies are nicer and less self-interested than people in state societies, and it is to this beliefthat Betzig's data speak. Second, Alexander ( 1988) argues that Betzig does not reaIIy demonstrate that Ifaluk chiefs exploit their subordinates: Chiefs may acquire material resources from those beneath them as
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fair compensation for services rendered, just as a highly paid CEO may be worth her salary. This cogent argument does not materially affect the moral I wish to draw from Betzig's research: Betzig's prediction implies a cynical view of human nature-which she takes to be the Darwinian view-in which people in pre-state societies, like people in state societies, often will exploit one another when the opportunity arises and the cost is not prohibitive (whether or not they are actually doing so in this particular case).
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Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1984). A sociobiological analysis ofhuman infanticide. In G. Hausfater & S. B. Hrdy (Eds.), Infanticide (pp. 487-502). New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1986). A theoretical challenge to a caricature ofDarwinism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 189-90. Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988). Homicide. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin ofspecies by means ofnatural selection. or the preservation of favoured races in the strugglefor life. London: Watts and Co. Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker. New York: W.W. Norton. Doty, R. L. (1985). The primates III: Humans. In R. E. Brown & D. W. Macdonald (Eds.), Social odours in mammals (Vol. 2) (pp. 804-832). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dunbar, R.I.M. (1988). Darwinizing man: A commentary. In L. Betzig, M. BorgerhoffMulder, & P. Turke (Eds.), Human reproductive behaviour: A Darwinian perspective (pp. 161169). New York: Cambridge University Press. Hailman, J. P. (1980). Fitness, function, fidelity, fornication, and feminine philandering. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 189. Irons, W. (1979). Natural selection, adaptation and human social behavior. In N. Chagnon & W. Irons, (Eds.), Evolutionary biology and human social behavior: An anthropological perspective(pp. 4-39). North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press. Kitcher, P. (1985). Vaulting ambition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lack, D. (1954). The natural regulation ofanimal numbers. New York: Oxford University Press. Lindblom, C. E., & Cohen D. K. (1979). Usable knowledge. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lloyd, J. E. (1979). Mating behavior and natural selection. The Florida Entomologist, 62, 1734. Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Introduction. In King's College Sociobiology Study Group (Ed.), Current problems in sociobiology (pp. 1-3). New York: Cambridge University Press. Mayr, E. (1983). How to carry out the adaptationist program? The American Naturalist, 121, 324-334. Medawar, P. (1982). Pluto's republic. New York: Oxford University Press. Murdock, G. P. (1972). Anthropology's mythology. Proceedings ofthe Royal Anthropological Institute ofGreat Britain and Irelandfor 1971 (pp. 17-24). Pittendrigh, C. S. (1958). Adaptation, natural selection, and behavior. In A. Roe & G. G. Simpson (Eds.), Behavior and Evolution (pp. 390-416). New Haven: Yale University Press. Rosenberg, A. (1980). Sociobiology and the preemption ofsocial science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Searle, J. (1984). Minds, brains and science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Symons, D. (1979). The evolution ofhuman sexuality. New York: Oxford University Press. Symons, D. (1987a). An evolutionary approach: Can Darwin's view ofIife shed light on human sexuality? In J. H. Geer & W. O'Donohue (Eds.), Theories ofhuman sexuality (pp. 91125). New York: Plenum Press. Symons, D. (l987b). If we're all Darwinians, what's the fuss about? In C. B. Crawford, M. F. Smith, & D. L. Krebs (Eds.), Sociobiology andpsychology: Ideas, issues, andapplications (pp. 121-146). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Symons, D. (1987c). Reproductive success and adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10, 788-789. Symons, D. (1989). A critique of Darwinian anthropology. Ethology andSociobiology, 10, 131144. Thornhill, R. (1990). The study of adaptation. In M. Bekoffand D. Ja'llieson (Eds.), Interpretation and explanation in the study ofanimal behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 31-62). Boulder, CO: West View Press. Tinbergen, N. (1967). Adaptive features of the black-headed gull. In D. W. Snow (Ed.), Pro-
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ceedings ofthe XIV International Ornithological Congress (pp. 43-59). Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications. Tooby, J. (1985). The emergence of evolutionary psychology. In D. Pines (Ed.), Emerging syntheses in science (pp. 1-6). Santa Fe, NM: Santa Fe Institute. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1989a). Evolutionary psychologists need to distinguish between the evolutionary process, ancestral selection pressures, and psychological mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12,724-725. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (l989b). Evolutionary psychology and the generation ofculture, part I: Theoretical considerations. Ethology and Sociobiology, 10, 29-49. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1990). On the universality of human nature and the uniqueness of the individual: The role of genetics and adaptation. Journal ofPersonality, 58, 17-67. Tooby, J., & DeVore, I. (1987). The reconstruction of hominid behavioral evolution through strategic modeling. In W. G. Kinzey (Ed.), The evolution ofhuman behavior: Primate models (pp. 183-237). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Townsend, J.M. (1987). Sex differences in sexuality among medical students: Effects ofincreasing socioeconomic status. Archives ofSexual Behavior, 16,425-441. Townsend, J. M. (1989). Mate selection criteria: A pilot study. Ethology and Sociobiology, 10, 241-253. Turke, P. W., & Betzig, L. L. (1985). Those who can do: Wealth, status, and reproductive success on Ifaluk. Ethology and Sociobiology, 6, 79-87. van den Berghe, P. L., & Frost, P. (1986). Skin color preference, sexual dimorphism, and sexual selection: A case ofgene-culture co-evolution? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 9, 87-113. Vining, D. R. (1986). Social versus reproductive success: The central theoretical problem of human sociobiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 167-187. Williams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and natural selection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Williams, G. C. (1985). A defense ofreduetionism in evolutionary biology. Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology, 2, 1-27. Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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II COOPERAliON For many people, Darwin's view of life conjures up images of a Hobbesian war of all against all, where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," and of a "nature red in tooth and claw." Indeed, in popular discourse, to call something "Darwinian" is intended to convey the image of ruthless and exploitative competition, where individuals pursue their own interests regardless of what costs this inflicts or consequences it has on others. But for the community of evolutionary biologists, the persistence of these popular stereotypes into the 1990s is paradoxical. Far from being preoccupied with the study of competition and aggression, for more than a quarter of a century evolutionary biologists have been keenly interested in understanding such phenomena as altruism and cooperation. The desire to understand the conditions under which organisms can be expected to help one another, cooperate with one another, share with one another, and even sacrifice themselves for one another has generated some of the most important recent advances in evolutionary biology, such as Hamilton's (1964) inclusive fitness theory, Williams and Williams's (1957) work on "social donorism," Trivers's (1971) reciprocal altruism theory, and Axelrod and Hamilton's (1981) work on the evolution of cooperation. Prior to this work, most standard analyses of the evolutionary process led biologists to expect that it would be difficult or impossible for altruism to evolve, and that organisms were indeed designed to be "selfish." However, these theoretical advances have transformed our understanding both of how natural selection operates and of what kinds of adaptations it can be expected to produce. Instead of the traditional view that selfishness is "natural" and altruism is only imposed socially against natural inclination, evolutionary biology has discovered that altruism and cooperation can be as natural as selfishness. In fact, these analyses have shown that Hobbes was quite wrong: Cooperation can emerge in the absence of a Leviathan, and adaptations for the expression and regulation of cooperation and altruism are expected design features of social organisms. The chapters in this part focus on investigating some of the adaptations that govern cooperation in humans and other species. Evolutionary biologists have analyzed the conditions under which adaptations for engaging in cooperative behavior can be expected to evolve. These analyses show that cognitive mechanisms for engaging in cooperation can be selected for only if they solve certain com plex information-processing problems. To solve these problems efficiently, the cognitive mechanisms involved must have certain specific design features. Cosmides and Tooby review experiments that have been conducted to see whether these predicted design features actually exist. The results of these experiments strongly suggest that they do. The human cognitive architecture appears to contain algorithms that are well designed for reasoning about coop-
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eration and that cannot be explained as the by-product of more general-purpose cognitive processes. In other words, we seem to have information-processing mechanisms that are adaptations for reasoning about cooperation. Cosmides and Tooby used theories about selection pressures to generate hypotheses about the human cognitive architecture. In contrast, McGrew and Feistner used evidence about the adaptations governing cooperation in different primate species to generate hypotheses about the selection pressures that shaped those species. Game-theoretic analyses in evolutionary biology had already shown that some selection pressures are species-general: They apply to any species that has evolved the ability to engage in cooperation. But other selection pressures are necessarily species-specific. A species's ecology and its prior phenotypic structure can profoundly affect the design of any newly arising adaptation. Although the adaptations governing cooperation in different species show some strking commonalities-commonalities that reflect species-general selection pressures-they also differ in some rather interesting ways. These differences should reflect species-specific histories of selection. McGrew and Feistner's goal was to reconstruct some of the selection pressures that shaped cooperation in the human line. To this end, they compared food sharing in chimpanzees, callitrichids, and humans to see whether cooperation in these species differs merely in degree or in kind. They then examined the relationship among food sharing, tool use, and the ecologies of these different species, in an attempt to shed light on the unique configuration of selection pressures that caused the human line to diverge so profoundly from that of our primate cousins.
REFERENCES Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution ofcooperation. Science, 2 J J, 1390-1396. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 7, I-52. Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review ofBiology, 46, 3557. Williams, G. c., & Williams, D. C. (1957). Natural selection ofindividually harmful social adaptations among sibs with special reference to social insects. Evolution, 17, 249-253.
3 Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange LEDA COSMIDES AND JOHN TOOBY
INTRODUCTION Is it not reasonable to anticipate that our understanding ofthe human mind would be aided greatly by knowing the purpose for which it was designed? GEORGE C. WILLIAMS
Research Background The human mind is the most complex natural phenomenon humans have yet encountered, and Darwin's gift to those who wish to understand it is a knowledge of the process that created it and gave it its distinctive organization: evolution. Because we know that the human mind is the product of the evolutionary process, we know something vitally illuminating: that, aside from those properties acquired by chance, the mind consists ofa set ofadaptations, designed to solve the long-standing adaptive problems humans encountered as hunter-gatherers. Such a view is uncontroversial to most behavioral scientists when applied to topics such as vision or balance. Yet adaptationist approaches to human psychology are considered radical-or even transparently false-when applied to most other areas of human thought and action, especially social behavior. Nevertheless, the logic ofthe adaptationist postion is completely general, and a dispassionate evaluation of its implications leads to the expectation that humans should have evolved a constellation ofcognitive adaptations to social life. Our ancestors have been members of social groups and engaging in social interactions for millions and probably tens of millions of years. To behave adaptively, they not only needed to construct a spatial map ofthe objects disclosed to them by their retinas, but a social map of the persons, relationships, motives, interactions, emotions, and intentions that made up their social world. Our view, then, is that humans have a faculty of social cognition, consisting of a rich collection of dedicated, functionally specialized, interrelated modules (i.e., functionally isolable subunits, mechanisms, mental organs, etc.), organized to collectively guide thought and behavior with respect to the evolutionarily recurrent adaptive problems posed by the social world. Nonetheless, if such a view has merit, it not only must be argued for on theoretical grounds-however compelling-but also must be substantiated by experimental evidence, as well as by converging lines of empirical support drawn from related fields such as neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. The
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eventual goal is to recover out of carefully designed experimental studies "high-resolution" maps of the intricate mechanisms involved. Such an approach is intended to exploit the signal virtue of cognitive psychology: With its emphasis on mechanisms, cognitive approaches allow causal pathways to be precisely specified through reference to explicitly described algorithms and representations. Toward this end, we have conducted an experimental research program over the last eight years, exploring the hypothesis that the human mind contains algorithms (specialized mechanisms) designed for reasoning about social exchange. The topic of reasoning about social exchange was selected for several reasons. In the first place, as we will discuss, many aspects ofthe evolutionary theory ofsocial exchange (also sometimes called cooperation, reciprocal altruism, or reciprocation) are relatively well developed and unambiguous. Consequently, certain features ofthe functional logic of social exchange can be confidently relied on in constructing hypotheses about the structure ofthe information-processing procedures that this activity requires. In the second place, complex adaptations are constructed in response to evolutionarily long-enduring problems, and it is likely that our ancestors have engaged in social exhange for at least several million years. Several converging lines of evidence support this view. Social exchange behavior is both universal and highly elaborated across all human cultures-including hunter-gatherer cultures (e.g., Cashdan, 1989; Lee & DeVore, 1968; Sharp, 1952; Wiessner, 1982)-as would be expected ifit were an ancient and central part ofhuman social life. Ifsocial exchange were merely a recent invention, like writing or rice cultivation, one would expect to find evidence ofits having one or several points of origin, of its having spread by contact, and of its being extremely elaborated in some cultures and absent in others. Moreover, the nearest relatives to the hominid line, the chimpanzees, also engage in certain types of sophisticated reciprocation (de Waal, 1982; de Waal & Luttrell, 1988), which implies that some cognitive adaptations to social exchange were present in the hominid lineage at least as far back as the common ancestors that we share with the chimpanzees, five to ten million years ago. Finally, paleoanthropological evidence also supports the view that exchange behavior is extremely ancient (e.g., Isaac, 1978; McGrew & Feistner, this volume; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). These facts, plus the existence of reciprocation among members of primate species that are even more distantly related to us than chimpanzees-such as macaques and baboons (Packer, 1977; de Waal & Luttrell, 1988)-strongly support the view that situations involving social exchange have constituted a long-enduring selection pressure on hominids. The third reason we selected reasoning about social exchange as the focus of this experimental series was that theories about reasoning and rationality have played a central role in both cognitive science and the social sciences. Research in this area can, as a result, function as a powerful test of certain traditional social science postulates. An adaptationist approach to human psychology is often viewed as radical or false not because ofgaps in its logic or any comparative lack ofevidence for its hypotheses, but because it violates certain privileged tenets ofthis century's dominant behavioral and social science paradigm-what we have called elsewhere the Standard Social Science Model (see Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). According to this view, all ofthe specific content ofthe human mind originally derives from the "outside"-from the environment and the social world-and the evolved architecture of the mind consists solely or predominantly ofa small number ofgeneral-purpose mechanisms that are contentindependent, and which sail under names such as "learning," "induction," "intelli-
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gence," "imitation," "rationality," "the capacity for culture," or, simply, "culture." On this view, the same mechanisms are thought to govern how one acquires a language and how one acquires a gender identity. This is because the mechanisms that govern reasoning, learning, and memory are assumed to operate uniformly across all domains: They do not impart content, they are not imbued with content, and they have no features specialized for processing particular kinds of content. Hypotheses that are inconsistent with this content-free view of the mind are, a priori, not considered credible, and the data that support them are usually explained away by invoking as alternatives the operation of general-purpose processes of an unspecified nature. Strong results indicating the involvement ofdomain-specific adaptations in areas such as perception, language, and emotion have sometimes-though grudgingly-been accepted as genuine, but have been ghettoized as exceptional cases, not characteristic of the great majority of mental processes. In this dialogue, reasoning has served as the paradigm case of the "general-purpose" psychological process: It has been viewed as preeminently characteristic ofthose processes that are purportedly the central engine of the human mind. Even vigorous advocates ofmodularity have held so-called central processes, such as reasoning, to be general-purpose and content-independent (e.g., Fodor, 1983). Consequently, we felt that reasoning about social exchange offered an excellent opportunity to cut to the quick ofthe controversy. Ifeven human reasoning, the doctrinal "citadel" ofthe advocates of content-free, general-purpose processes, turns out to include a large number ofcontent-dependent cognitive adaptations, then the presumption that psychological mechanisms are characteristically domain-general and originally content-free can no longer be accorded privileged status. Such results would jeopardize the assumption that whenever content-dependent psychological phenomena are found, they necessarily imply the prior action ofcultural or environmental shaping. Instead, such results would add credibility to the contrary view that the mind is richly textured with content-specialized psychological adaptations. Evolutionary biologists have developed useful criteria for establishing the existence of adaptations (e.g., Dawkins 1982, 1986; Symons, this volume; Thornhill, 1991; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b; Williams, 1966, 1985), and these crtieria are helpful in evaluating experimental evidence that bears on these two positions. Adaptations can be recognized by "evidence of special design" (Williams, 1966)-that is, by recognizing that features ofthe evolved species-typical design ofan organism are "components ofsome special problem-solving machinery" that solves an evolutionarily long-standing problem (Williams, 1985, p. 1). Standards for recognizing special design include factors such as economy, efficiency, complexity, precision, specialization, and reliability, which-like a key fitting a lock-render the design too good a solution to an adaptive problem to have arisen by chance (Williams, 1966). For example, the eye is extremely well suited for the detection and extraction of information presented by ambient light, and poorly designed as an orifice for ingesting food or as armor to protect the vulnerable brain from sharp objects. It displays many properties that are only plausibly interpreted as design features for solving the problem of vision. Moreover, the properties of an adaptation can be used to identify the class of problems, at the correct level ofspecificity or generality, that the adaptation was designed to solve. The eye allows humans to see hyenas, but that does not mean it is an adaptation that evolved particularly for hyena detection: There are no features that render it better designed for seeing hyenas than for seeing any of a far larger class of comparable
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objects. These principles governing adpatations can be developed into a series ofmethods for empirically arbitrating the dispute between traditional and domain-specific views of1he mind. The Standard Social Science Model and evolutionary psychological approaches differ most strongly on the grounds of functional specialization, of content-specificity, and of evolutionary appropriateness (Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). According to the evolutionary psychological approach to social cognition outlined here and elsewhere (Cosmides, 1985, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987, 1989; Tooby, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989, 1990b), the mind should contain organized systems of inference that are specialized for solving various families of problem, such as social exchange, threat, coalitional relations, and mate choice. Advocates of evolutionary views do not deny that humans learn, reason, develop, or acquire a culture; however, they do argue that these functions are accomplished at least in part through the operation of cognitive mechanisms that are content-specialized-mechanisms that are activated by particular content domains and that are designed to process information from those domains. Each cognitive specialization is expected to contain design features targeted to mesh with the recurrent structure of its characteristic problem type, as encountered under Pleistocene conditions. Consequently, one expects cognitive adaptations specialized for reasoning about social exchange to have some design features that are particular and appropriate to social exchange, but that are not activated by or applied to other content domains. In contrast, the Standard Social Science Model predicts that the reasoning proced ures applied to situations ofsocial exchange should be the same reasoning procedures that are applied to other kinds of content. On this view, reasoning is viewed as the operation of content-independent procedures, such as formal logic, applied impartiallyand uniformly to every problem, regardless ofthe nature ofthe content involved. There should be nothing in the evolved structure of the mind-no content-sensitive procedures, no special representational format-that is more appropriate for reasoning about social exchange than about hat racks, rutabagas, warfare, Hinayana scripture, turbulence, or textuality. In other words, the standard view is that the faculty of reasoning consists of a small number of processes that are designed to solve the most inclusive and general class of reasoning problems possible-a class not defined in terms of its content, as the class includes all potential contents equally. On this view, any variability in reasoning due to content must be the product of experiential variables such as familiarity or explicit instruction. For these reasons, the questions of interest for this experimental program include the following: Do patterns of performance on problems that require reasoning about social exchange reflect content-general rules oflogic? Do patterns of performance on social exchange content, as compared with other contents, show systematic differences? Ifso, can these differences be explained through invoking general-purpose variables such as familiarity? Does the complexly articulated performance of subjects on social exchange problems have the detailed properties predicted in advance by an evolutionary analysis of the design features required for a cognitive adaptation to social exchange? By answering these and related questions, building from one experimental result to the next, the functional structure ofhuman cognitive adaptations for reasoning about social exchange can begin to be delineated, and the adequacy ofthe Standard Social Science Model can be assessed.
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Standard Analyses of the Evolution of Altruism
Natural selection is a feedback process that is driven by the differential reproduction ofalternative designs. Ifa change in an organism's design allows it to outreproduce the alternative designs in the population, then that design change will become more common-it will be selectedfor. Ifthis reproductive advantage continues, then over many generations that design change will spread through the population until all members ofthe species have it. Design changes that enhance reproduction are selected for, those that hinder reproduction relative to others are selected against and, therefore, tend to disappear. This ongoing process leads over time to the accumulation of designs organized for reproduction. Consider, then, a design change that appears to decrease the reproduction of an individual who has it while simultaneously increasing the reproduction of other individuals. How could such a design change possibly spread through the population? At first glance, it would seem that a design feature that had this property would be selected against. Yet many organisms do engage in behaviors that decrease their own reproduction while enhancing that of others. One chimpanzee will endanger itself to help another in a fight (de Waal, 1982). A vampire bat will feed blood that it has collected from its prey to a hungry conspecific (Wilkinson, 1988, 1990). A ground squirrel will warn others ofthe presence of a predator by emitting an alarm call that can draw the predator's attention to itself (Sherman, 1977). Among many species of social insects, workers forgo reproduction entirely in order to help raise their sisters (Wilson, 1971). People sometimes put themselves at great peril to help their fellow human beings, and carry out innumerable acts on a daily basis whose purpose is to help others. Ifa psychological mechanism generates such behavior on a regular basis, how could it possibly have been selected for? Evolutionary biologists call this the "problem of altruism." An "altruistic" design feature is an aspect of the phenotype that is designed to produce some effect that enhances the reproduction of other individuals even though it may cause the individual who has it to reproduce less. The question is, how can designs that generate such behavior spread through a population until they become universal and species-typical? So far, evolutionary biologists have provided two answers to the problem of altruism. The first, kin selection theory (or inclusive fitness theory), was proposed by W. D. Hamilton in 1964 (see also Maynard Smith, 1964; Williams & Williams, 1957). Imagine a design change that causes an individual to increase the reproduction ofthat individual's relatives, but that decreases the individual's own reproduction. There is some probability, r, that the kin member who receives the help has inherited that very same design change from a common ancestor. Therefore, the design change-through helping the relative to reproduce-may be spreading new copies ofitselfin the population, even though it is simultaneously decreasing the rate at which it creates new copies of itselfthrough the individual it is in, by slowing the reproduction ofthat particular individual. Whenever a design change affects both direct reproduction and kin reproduction, there is a trade-off between these two different avenues by which a design change can be reproduced. The fate of the design change will be determined by how much it helps (or harms) the relative, how much it harms (or helps) the helper, and the probability the relative shares the design change by virtue of their sharing common ances-
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tors. By using what was, in effect, mathematical game theory, Hamilton showed that a "helping design" can spread through the population if it causes an organism to help a kin member whenever the cost to the organism's own reproduction is offset by the benefit to the reproduction ofits kin member, discounted by the probability,r, that the kin member has inherited the same helping design. Although helping under these circumstances decreases the helper's personal reproduction, through its effect on other individuals it causes a net increase in the reproduction of the helping design itself in the population. Consequently, if C; and B; refer to costs and benefits to an individual i's own reproduction, then an altruistic design change can be selected for ifit causes i to help j whenever C; < r;JJj. Any design change that causes an individual to help more than thisor less than this-would be selected against. This constraint is completely general and falls out ofthe logic ofnatural selection theory: It should be true ofany species on any planet at any time. A species may be solitary, and individuals may have no social interactions with their relatives; but if members of a species consistently interact socially with their relatives in ways that affect their reproduction, then they will be selected to evolve information-processing mechanisms that produce behavior that respects this constraint. Because it suggested a rich set ofhypotheses about phenotypic design, kin selection theory allowed animal behavior researchers to discover a flood of new phenomena. They began to find that the altruistic behavior of many species shows the design features that one would expect if their information-processing mechanisms had been shaped by kin selection. For example, ground squirrels are far more likely to give an alarm call ifa close relative lives nearby (Sherman, 1977), and they have psychological mechanisms that allow them to discriminate full siblings from halfsiblings from unrelated individuals (Hanken & Sherman, 1981; Holmes & Sherman, 1982). Similarly, kinship is a major predictor of whether a vampire bat will share its food with a particular individual (Wilkinson, 1988, 1990). Most strikingly, kin selection theory (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Williams & Williams, 1957) finally explained the existence of the sterile worker castes in the eusocial insects that had so troubled Darwin, providing an elegant set of hypotheses concerning how eusocial insects should allocate their reproductive effort among sisters, half-sisters, brothers and offspring, which have since been tested and confirmed (e.g., Frumhoff & Baker, 1988; Frumhoff & Schneider, 1987; Trivers & Hare, 1976). The realization that a design feature can make copies ofitselfnot only by affecting the reproductive success ofits bearer, but also by affecting the reproductive success of its bearers' kin, led to a new definition ofthe concept offitness. Previously, evolutionary biologists spoke of a design's "Darwinian fitness": its effect on the number of offspring produced by an individual who has the design. But since Hamilton, one speaks of a design's "inclusive fitness": its effect on the number of offspring produced by an individual who has the design plus its effects on the number of offspring produced by others who may have the same design-that individual's relatives-with each effect discounted by the appropriate measure ofrelatedness, often designated by r (Dawkins, 1982; Hamilton, 1964). Above, we used C and B; to refer to effects on a design's Darwinian fitness; henceforth, we will use these variables to refer to effects on a design's inclusive fitness. I Kin-directed helping behavior is common in the animal kingdom. But on occasion, one finds a species in which individuals help nonrelatives as well. How can a
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design feature that decreases one's own inclusive fitness while simultaneously increasing that of nonrelative be selected for? Although rare compared to kin-directed helping, such behavior does exist. For example, although kinship is a major predictor of food sharing in vampire bats, they share food with certain nonrelatives as well. Male baboons sometimes protect offspring not their own (Smuts, 1986). Unrelated chimpanzees will come to each other's aid when threatened (de Waal & Luttrell, 1988). Williams (1966), Trivers (1971), Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), and Axelrod (1984) provided a second approach to the problem of altruism, reciprocal altruism theory, which in effect draws on the economist's concept oftrade. Selection may act to create physiological or psychological mechanisms designed to deliver benefits even to nonrelatives, provided that the delivery of such benefits acts, with sufficient probability, to cause reciprocal benefits to be delivered in return. Such social exchange is easily understood as advantageous whenever there exist what economists call "gains in trade"-that is, whenever what each party receives is worth more than what it cost to deliver the reciprocal benefit to the other party. Ecologically realistic conditions, however, seldom provide opportunities in which two parties simultaneously have value to offer each other. For this reason, biologists have tended to focus on situations of deferred implicit exchange, where one party helps another at one point in time, in order to increase the probability that when their situations are reversed at some (usually) unspecified time in the future, the act will be reciprocated (hence the terms reciprocal altruism, reciprocation, or, as we prefer for the general class, social exchange). Ifthe reproductive benefit one receives in return is larger than the cost one incurred in rendering help, then individuals who engage in this kind of reciprocal helping behavior will outreproduce those who do not, causing this kind of helping design to spread. For example, if a vampire bat fails to find food for two nights in a row it will die, and there is high variance in food-gathering success. Sharing food allows the bats to cope with this variance, and the major predictor of whether a bat will share food with a nonrelative is whether the nonrelative has shared with that individual in the past (Wilkinson, 1988, 1990). Reciprocal altruism is simply cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit, and it is variously known in the literature as social exchange, cooperation, or reciprocation. Design features that allow one to engage in reciprocal altruism can be selected for because they result in a net increase in one's own reproduction or that of one's relatives and, consequently, in the reproduction of the design features that produce this particular kind of cooperative behavior. For example, according to reciprocal altruism theory, cognitive programs that generate food sharing among nonrelatives can be selected for only if they exhibit certain design features. By cataloging these design features, Wilkinson (1988, 1990) was able to look for-and discover-heretofore unknown aspects of the psychology and behavior of female vampire bats. Reciprocal altruism theory guided his research program: I needed to demonstrate that five criteria were being met: that females associate for long periods, so that each one has a large but unpredictable number ofopportunities to engage in blood sharing; that the likelihood of an individual regurgitating to a roostmate can be predicted on the basis oftheir past association; that the roles of donor and recipient frequently reverse; that the short-term benefits to the recipient are greater than the costs to the donor; and that donors are able to recognize and expel cheaters from the system. (Wilkinson 1990, p.77)
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Like kin selection theory, reciprocal altruism theory suggested a host ofhypotheses about phenotypic design, which allowed animal behavior researchers to discover many previously unsuspected phenomena. Recently, it has done the same for those who study social exchange in humans. Reciprocal altruism theory has allowed researchers to derive a rich set of hypotheses about the design features ofthe cognitive programs that generate cooperative behavior in humans. We will examine some of these hypotheses and the evidence for them. This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part (Selection Pressures) we explore some ofthe constraints reciprocal altruism theory places on the class ofdesigns that can evolve in humans. These "evolvability constraints" (see Tooby & Cosmides, this volume) led us to develop a set of hypotheses about the design features ofthe cognitive programs that are responsible for reasoning about social exchange. In the second part (Cognitive Processes) we review research that we and others have conducted to test these hypotheses and show that the cognitive programs that govern reasoning about social exchange in humans have many of the design features one would expect if they were adaptations sculpted by the selection pressures discussed in the first part. In the third part (Implications for Culture) we discuss the implications ofthis work for understanding cross-eultural uniformities and variability in cooperative behavior.
SELECTION PRESSURES Natural selection permits the evolution of only certain strategies for engaging social exchange. To be selected for, a design governing reasoning about social exchange must embody one of these strategies-in other words, it must meet an "evolvability criterion" (see Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). By studying the nature ofthese strategies, one can deduce many properties that human algorithms regulating social exchange must have, as well as much about the associated capabilities such algorithms require to function properly. Using this framework, one can then make empirical predictions about human performance in areas that are the traditional concern of cognitive psychologists: attention, communication, reasoning, the organization of memory, and learning. One can also make specific predictions about human performance on reasoning tests, such as the ones we will discuss in Cognitive Processes (following). In this part, we explore the nature of the selection pressures on social exchange during hominid evolution-the relevant evolvability constraints-and see what these allow one to infer about the psychological basis for social exchange in humans.
Game-Theoretic Constraints on the Evolution of Social Exchange The critical act in formulating computational theories turns out to be the discovery of valid constraints on the way the world is structured. (Marr & Nishihara, 1978, p. 41)
In Evolution and the Theory ofGames, John Maynard Smith (1982) pointed out that natural selection has a game-theoretic structure. Alternative designs are selected for or not because ofthe different effects they have on their "own" reproduction-that is, on the reproduction of all identical designs in the population. Some designs will outreproduce others until they become universal in the population; others will be selected out. Using game theory, one can mathematically model this process with some pre-
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cision. This is true whether one is describing the alternative designs anatomically, physiologically, or cognitively. For example, it is irrelevant to the analysis whether one describes a design change in a particular region of the brain anatomically-as an increase in the density of serotonin receptors in that region-physiologically-as an increase in the rate of serotonin uptake (which was caused by the increased receptor density)-or cognitively-as a difference in how the individual who has the increased receptor density processes information. All that matters to the analysis is what effect the design change-however described-has on its own reproduction. Because our concern in this chapter is the evolution of the information-processing mechanisms that generate cooperative behavior, we will describe alternative designs cognitively, by specifying the different rules that they embody and the representations that those rules act upon. To see how a game-theoretic analysis works, consider how one can use it to understand the ramifications of reciprocal altruism theory for the evolution of social exchange between unrelated individuals. Designs reproduce themselves through the reproduction of the individuals who embody them. Given an individual, i, define a benefit to i (B;) as the extent to which any act, entity, or state of affairs increases the inclusive fitness ofthat individual. Similarly, define a cost to i (Cj ) as the extent to which any act, entity, or state of affairs decreases the inclusive fitness of individual i. Let OJ refer to any act, entity, or state of affairs that has no effect on i's inclusive fitness. A cognitive program that causes a decrease in its own inclusive fitness while increasing that of an unrelated individual can evolve only if it has design features that embody the evolvability constraints of reciprocal altruism theory. A game-theoretic analysis allows one to explore what these constraints are. For ease of explication, the two interaetants in a hypothetical social exchange will be designated "you" and "I," with appropriate possessive pronouns. Reciprocal altruism, or social exchange, typically involves two acts: what "you" do for "me" (act I), and what "I" do for "you" (act 2). For example, you might help me out by baby-sitting my child (act I), and I might help you by taking care of your vegetable garden when you are out oftown (act 2). Imagine the following situation: Babysitting my child inconveniences you a bit, but this inconvenience is more than compensated for by my watering your garden when you are out oftown. Similarly, watering your garden inconveniences me a bit, but this is outweighed by the benefit to me of your baby-sitting my child. Formally put: I. Your doing act I for me benefits me (Bme) at some cost to yourself(Cyou)' 2. My doing act 2 for you benefits you (Byou) at some cost to myself(C",..). 3. The benefit to you of receiving my act 2 is greater than the cost to you ofdoing act I for me (Byou of act 2 > Cyou of act I). 4. The benefit to me of receiving act I from you is greater than the cost to me of doing act 2 for you (B",.. of act I > C me of act 2). Ifthese four conditions are met-if acts I and 2 have this cost/benefit structure-then we would both get a net benefit by exchanging acts 1 and 2. Social exchange, or reciprocal altruism, is an interaction that has this mutually beneficial cost/benefit structure (see Table 3.1). At first glance, one might think that natural selection would favor the emergence ofcognitive programs with decision rules that cause organisms to participate in social exchange whenever the above conditions hold. After all, participation would result, by
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Table 3.1
Sincere Social Contracts: Cost/Benefit Relations When One Party Is Sincere, and That Party Believes the Other Party Is Also Sincere" My offer: "If you do Act I for me then I'll do Act 2 for you."
Sincere offer I believe:
You do Act 1 You do not do Act 1 1 do Act 2 1do not do Act 2 Profit margin
Sincere acceptance You believe:
Bm, O... C...
C_ D_ BJ"II
B...
C_
0...
O_
C...
0...
0_
0...
positive: B... >C...
positive: BJ"II>CJ"II
positive: B... > Cm,
BJ"II OJ"ll positive: B_>C_
Translation ofthe offer into the value systems of the participants: My terms "IfB... then C..." Your terms "lfC_then BJ"II"
"lfB... then C..." "IfCJ"II then BJ"II"
benefit to X; ex = cost to x; Ox = no change in x's zero-level utility baseline. The zero-Ievel utility baseline is the individual's level of well-being (including expectations about the future) at the time the offer is made, but independent ofit. Benefits and costs are increases and decreases in one's utility, relative to one's zero-level utility baseline.
aBx =
definition, in a net increase in the replication ofsuch designs, as compared with alternative designs that cause one to not participate. But there is a hitch: You can benefit even more by cheating me. If I take care of your garden, but you do not baby-sit my child-i.e., if I cooperate by doing act 2 for you, but you defect on the agreement by not doing act 1 for me-then you benefit more than if we both cooperate. This is because your payoff for cheating when I have cooperated (B)'Oo) is greater than your payoff for mutual cooperation (B_ - C_>you have benefited from my taking care of your garden without having inconvenienced yourself by baby-sitting for me. Moreover, the same set of incentives applies to me. This single fact constitutes a barrier to the evolution ofsocial exchange, a problem that is structurally identical to one of the most famous situations in game theory: the one-move Prisoner's Dilemma (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Boyd, 1988; Trivers, 1971).2 Mathematicians and economists use game theory to determine which decision rules will maximize an individual's monetary profits or subjective utility. Consequently, they express payoffs in dollars or "utils." Such currencies are inappropriate to an evolutionary analysis, however, because the goal of an evolutionary analysis is different. Evolutionary biologists use game theory to explore evolvability constraints. The goal is to determine which decision rules can, in principle, be selected for-which will, over generations, promote their own inclusive fitness. For this purpose, units of inclusive fitness are the only relevant payoffcurrency. Other assumptions are minimal. The organism need not "know," either consciously or unconsciously, why the decision rule it executes is better or worse than others, or even that the rule it executes is better or worse than others. To be selected for, a decision rule must promote its inclusive fitness better than alternative rules-and that's all. It doesn't need to make one happy, it doesn't need to maximize subjective utility, it doesn't need to promote the survival ofthe species, it doesn't need to promote social welfare. To be selected for, it need only promote its own replication better than alternative designs.
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you C
D
me:R=+3
me: S =-2
you: R = +3
you: T = +5
C
me
=0
me:T= +5
me: P
you: S =-2
you: P = 0
D
C D R T S P
= Cooperate = Defect = Reward for mutual cooperation = Temptation to defect = Sucker's payoff = Punishment for mutual defection
Constraints: T > R > P > S; R> (T +S )/2*
-For an interated game, R > (T + 5)/2. This is to prevent players from "cooperating" to maximize their utility by alternately defecting on one another.
Figure 3.1
Payoff Schedule for the Prisoner's Dilemma situation in game theory.
Mathematicians and economists have used the Prisoner's Dilemma to understand how cooperation can arise in the absence ofa "Leviathan," that is, a powerful state or agency that enforces contracts. Evolutionary biologists have used it to understand the conditions under which design features that allow individuals to cooperate can be selected for. It is a game in which mutual cooperation would benefit both players, but it is in the interest ofeach player, individually, to defect, cheat, or inform on the other. It is frequently conceptualized as a situation in which two people who have collaborated in committing a crime are prevented from communicating with each other, while a district attorney offers each individual a lighter sentence ifhe will snitch on his partner. But the payoffs can represent anything for which both players have a similar preference ranking: money, prestige, points in a game-even inclusive fitness. A possible payoff matrix and the relationship that must exist between variables is shown in Figure 3.1. Looking at this payoffmatrix, one might ask: "What's the dilemma? I will be better off, and so will you, ifwe both cooperate-you will surely recognize this and cooperate with me." If there is only one move in the game, however, it is always in the interest ofeach party to defect (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). That is what creates the dilemma, as we will show below. Figure 3.2 shows that the cost/benefit structure of a social exchange creates the same payoff matrix as a Prisoner's Dilemma: (B;) > (B; - C;) > 0 > C; (i.e., T > R > P > S); and (B; - C;) > (B; - C ;)/2 (i.e., R > T + S/2). In other words, if I cooperate on our agreement, you get B,.,., for defecting, which is greater than the B,.,., - C,.,., you would get for cooperating (Le., T > R). If! defect on our agreement, you get nothing for defecting (this is equivalent to our not interacting at all; thus P = 0 and R> P), which is better than the C,.,., loss you would incur by cooperating (i.e., P > S). The payoffs are in inclusive fitness units-the numbers listed are included simply to reinforce the analogy with Figure 3.1. In actuality, there is no reason why C"'" must equal C,.,., (or B"", = B,.,.,); an exchange will have the stucture ofa Prisoner's Dilemma as long as mutual cooperation would produce a net benefit for both of us. Now that we have defined the situation, consider two alternative decision rules: Decision rule I: A/ways cooperate. Decision rule 2: A/ways defect.
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you
c
c
D
me:R=B me -C me = +3
me: S = C me =-2
you: R = B you - C you = + 3
you: T = B you = + 5
me me: T = B me = +5
D
you: S = C you = -2
Figure 3.2
to i, OJ
° 0you= °
me: P = Orne =
you: P =
Social exchange sets up a Prisoner's Dilemma. Bj
= i's inclusive fitness is unchanged.
= Benefit to i, C; = Cost
An individual with cognitive programs that embody decision rule I would be an indiscriminate cooperator; an individual with cognitive programs that embody decision rule 2 would be an indiscriminate cheater. Now imagine a population of organisms, most of whom have cognitive programs that embody decision rule I, but a few ofwhom have cognitive programs that embody decision rule 2.3 Then imagine a tournament that pits the reproduction ofdecision rule I against that of decision rule 2. In this tournament, both sets of individuals face similar environments. For example, one might specify that both types of organisms are subject to the same payoff matrix, that each organism participates in three interactions per "generation," and that these three interactions must be with three different individuals, randomly chosen from the population. After every organism has completed its three interactions, each organism "reproduces" and then "dies." "Offspring" carry the same decision rule as the "parent," and the number of offspring produced by an individual is proportional to the payoffs it gained in the three interactions it participated in in that generation. This process repeats itselfevery generation. Using this tournament, one can ask, After one generation, how many replicas of rule I versus rule 2 exist in the population? How many replicas ofeach rule exist after n generations? If one were to run a computer model of this tournament, one would find that after a few generations individuals who operate according to rule 2 ("Always defect") would, on average, be leaving more offspring than individuals operating according to rule I ("Always cooperate"); the magnitude of the difference between them is rule 2's "selective advantage" over rule I. This magnitude will depend on what payoffand opportunity parameters were specified in the program used, as well as the population composition. After a larger number of "generations," rule l-"Always cooperate"-would be selected out. For every interaction with a cheater, rule I would lose two inclusive fitness points, and rule 2 would gain five. Consequently, indiscriminate cooperators would eventually be selected out, and indiscriminate cheaters would spread through the population; the number of generations this would take is a function of how many cheaters versus indiscriminate cooperators were in the initial population. In practice, a population of "cheaters" is a population of- individuals who never participate in
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social exchange; if you "cheat" by not doing act I for me, and I "cheat" by not doing act 2 for you, then, in effect, we have exchanged nothing. And an indiscriminate cooperator in the midst of defectors is, in practice, always an "altruist" or victim, continually incurring costs in the course ofhelping others, but receiving no benefits in return. So, after n generations, where n is a function ofthe magnitude ofrule 2's selective advantage in the tournament's "environment" and other population parameters, one would find that rule 2 had "gone to fixation": Virtually all individuals would have rule 2, and, regardless of the population's absolute size, a vanishingly small proportion of the individuals in it would have rule 1. 4 By using this kind oflogic, one can show that if a new design coding for rule 2"Always defect"-were to appear in a population that is dominated by individuals with rule I-"Always cooperate"-it would spread through the population until it became fixed, and it would not be vulnerable to invasion by rule I (see, e.g., Axelrod, 1984). In a tournament pitting indiscriminate altruists against indiscriminate cheaters, the cheaters will come to dominate the population. One might object that real life is not like a Prisoner's Dilemma, because real-life exchanges are simultaneous, face-to-face interactions. You can directly recognize whether I am about to cheat you or not (provided you are equipped with cognitive equipment that guides you into making this discrimination). IfI show up without the item I promised, then you simply do not give me what I want. This is often true in a twentieth-century market economy, where money is used as a medium of exchange. But no species that engages in social exchange, including our own, evolved the information-processing mechanisms that enable this behavior in the context of a market economy with a medium of exchange. Virtually any nonsimultaneous exchange increases the opportunity for defection, and in nature, most opportunities for exchange are not simultaneous. For example, a drowning man needs immediate assistance, but while he is being pulled from the water, he is in no position to help his benefactor. Opportunities for simultaneous mutual aid-and therefore for the withdrawal of benefits in the face of cheating-are rare in nature for several reasons: The "items" of exchange are frequently acts that, once done, cannot be undone (e.g., protection from an attack and alerting others to the presence of a food source). The needs and abilities of organisms are rarely exactly and simultaneously complementary. For example, a female baboon is not fertile when her infant needs protection, yet this is when the male's ability to protect is of most value to her. On those occasions when repayment is made in the same currency, simultaneous exchange is senseless. Iftwo hunters both make kills on the same day, they gain nothing from sharing their kills with each other: They would be swapping identical goods. In contrast, repayment in the same currency can be advantageous when exchange is not simultaneous, because ofdeclining marginal utilities: The value of a piece of meat is larger to a hungry individual than to a sated one. Thus, in the absence of a widely accepted medium of exchange, most exchanges are not simultaneous and therefore do provide opportunities for defection. You must decide whether to benefit me or not without any guarantee that I will return the favor in the future. This is why Trivers (1971) describes social exchange in nature as "reciprocal altruism." I behave "altruistically" (i.e., I incur a cost in order to benefit you) at
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one point in time, on the possibility that you will reciprocate may altruistic act in the future. If you do, in fact, reciprocate, then our "reciprocally altruistic" interaction is properly described as an instance ofdelayed mutual benefit: Neither of us has incurred a net cost; both of us have gained a net benefit. A system of mutual cooperation cannot emerge in a one-move Prisoner's Dilemma because it is always in the interest of each player to defect. In fact, the argument is general to any known, fixed number ofgames (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). But selection pressures change radically when individuals playa series of Prisoner's Dilemma games. Mutual cooperation-and therefore social exchange-can emerge between two players when (a) there is a high probability that they will meet again, (b) neither knows for sure exactly how many times they will meet,S and (c) they do not value later payoff's by too much less than earlier payoff's (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Ifthe parties are making a series ofmoves rather than just one, then one party's behavior on a move can influence the other's behavior on future moves. If I defect when you cooperated, then you can retaliate by defecting on the next move; ifI cooperate, then you can reward me by cooperating on the next move. In an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, a system can emerge that has incentives for cooperation and disincentives for defection. The work ofTrivers (1971), Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), and Axelrod (1984) has shown that indiscriminate cooperation (Decision rule 1) cannot be selected for when the opportunity for cheating exists. But selective cooperation can be selected for. Decision rules that cause one to cooperate with other cooperators and defect on cheaters can invade a population of noncooperators. Consider, for example, Decision rule 3: Decision rule 3: Cooperate on the first move; on subsequent moves. do whatever
your partner did on the previous move. This decision rule is known in the literature as TIT FOR TAT (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Ifrule 3's partner cooperates on a move, rule 3 will cooperate on the next move with that partner. If rule 3's partner defects on a move, rule 3 will defect on the next move with that partner. It has been shown that rule 3 can invade a population dominated by indiscriminate cheaters (individuals who behave according to decision rule 2: "Always defect"). Using the payoff matrix in Figure 3.2, it is clear that rule 3 would outreproduce rule 2: Mutual cooperators (pairs of individuals who behave according to rule 3) would get strings of + 3 inclusive fitness points, peppered with a few - 2s from a first trial with a rule 2 cheater (after which the cooperator would cease to cooperate with that individual). In contrast, mutual defectors (pairs of individuals who behave according to rule 2) would get strings of Os, peppered with a few + 5s from an occasional first trial with a rule 3 cooperator (after which the cooperator would never cooperate with that individual again). Game-theoretic analyses have shown that a decision rule embodying a cooperative strategy can invade a population of noncooperators if, and only if, it cooperates with other cooperators and excludes (or retaliates against) cheaters. If a decision rule regulating when one should cooperate and when one should cheat violates this constraint, then it will be selected against. Axelrod ( 1984) has shown that there are many decision rules that do embody this constraint. All else equal (an important caveat), any of these could, in theory, have been selected for in humans. Which decision rule, out ofthis constrained set, is embod-
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ied in the cognitive programs that actually evolved in the human lineage is an empirical question. But note that to embody any ofthis class of decision rules, the cognitive programs involved would have to incorporate a number ofspecific design features: I. They must include algorithms that are sensitive to cues that indicate when an exchange is being offered and when reciprocation is expected. 2. They must include algorithms that estimate the costs and benefits of various actions, entities, or states ofaffairs to oneself. 6 3. They must include algorithms that estimate the costs and benefits of various actions, entities, or states ofaffairs to others (in order to know when to initiate an exchange). 4. They must include algorithms that estimate the probability that these actions, entities, or states ofaffairs will come about in the absence ofan exchange. 5. They must include algorithms that compare these estimates to one another (in order to determine whether Bi > C j ). 6. They must include decision rules that cause i to reject an exchange offer when Bj C j (and other conditions are met). 8. They must include algorithms with inference procedures that capture the intercontingent nature ofexchange (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, pp. 81-84). 9. They must include algorithms that can translate the exchange into the value assignments appropriate to each participant. 10. They must include algorithms that can detect cheaters (these must define cheating as an illicitly taken benefit). II. They must include algorithms that cause one to punish cheating under the appropriate circumstances. 12. They must include algorithms that store information about the history of one's past exchanges with other individuals (in order to know when to cOOJ}erate, when to defect, and when to punish defection). 13. They must include algorithms that can recognize different individuals (in order to do any ofthe above). 14. They need not include algorithms for detecting indiscriminate altruists, because there shouldn't be any. Not all ofthese algorithms need to be part of the same "mental organ." For example, because algorithms that can do 2, 3, 4, 5, and 13 are necessary to engage in social interactions other than exchange-such as aggressive threat-these might be activated even when the algorithms that are specific to social exchange are not. Design features I to 14 are just a partial listing, based on some very general constraints on the evolution ofsocial exchange that fallout ofan examination of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. These constraints are general in the sense that they apply to the evolution ofreciprocal altruism in almost any species-from reciprocal egg trading in hermaphroditic fish (Fischer, 1988) to food sharing in humans. Other, species-specific constraints on the design ofsocial exchange algorithms can be derived by considering how these general selection pressures would have manifested themselves in the ecological context of hominid evolution. For example, the sharing rules that are applied to high-variance resources, such as hunted meat, should differ in some ways from those that are applied to low-variance
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resources, such as gathered plant foods (Kaplan & Hill, 1985; see also Implications for Culture, this chapter). This raises the possibility that human exchange algorithms have two alternative, context-specific modes of activation. Both modes would have to satisfy the general constraints listed above, but they might differ considerably in various details, such as whether one expects to be repaid in the same currency (e.g., meat for meat), whether one requires reciprocation before one is willing to help a second time, or whether one is quick to punish suspected cheaters. Another example of how ecological context can place species-specific constraints on design concerns the kind of representations that exchange algorithms can be expected to operate on. For example, exchange algorithms in humans should operate on more abstract representations than exchange algorithms in vampire bats. The reciprocation algorithms of vampire bats could, in principle, operate on representations of regurgitated blood, because this is the only item that they exchange. But item-specific representations ofthis kind would not make sense for the exchange algorithms ofhumans. Because our ancestors evolved the ability to make and use tools and to communicate information verbally, exchange algorithms that could accept a wide and ever-changing variety ofgoods, services, and information as input would enjoy a selective advantage over ones that were limited to only a few items ofexchange. To accommodate an almost limitless variety ofinputsstone axes, meat, help in fights, sexual access, information about one's enemies, access to one's water hole, necklaces, blow guns, and so forth-representations of particular items of exchange would have to be translated into an abstract "lingua franca" that the various exchange algorithms could operate on. This constraint led us to hypothesize that an item-specific repesentation of an exchange would be translated into more abstract cost-benefit representations (like those in the last two lines of Table 3.1) at a relatively early stage in processing, and that many ofthe algorithms listed earlier would operate on these cost-benefit representations (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). Because some of these species-specific constraints on the evolution of social exchange in humans have interesting implications for cultural variation, we will defer a discussion of them to the third part of this chapter (Implications for Culture), where we discuss social exchange and culture. David Marr argued that "an algorithm is likely to be understood more readily by understanding the nature ofthe problem being solved than by examining the mechanism (and the hardware) in which it is embodied" (1982, p. 27). This is because the nature of the problem places constraints on the class of designs capable of solving it. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is an abstract description ofthe problem of altruism between nonrelatives. By studying it, one can derive a set of general constraints that the cognitive problems of virtually any species must satisfy to be selected for under these circumstances. By studying the ecological context in which this problem manifested itself for our Pleistocene ancestors, one can derive additional constraints. All these constraints on the evolution of social exchange-those that apply across species and those that apply just to humans-allow one to develop a task analysis or, to use Marr's term, a "computational theory" of the adaptive problem of social exchange. Cosmides and Tooby (1989) used some of these constraints to develop the beginnings of a computational theory ofsocial exchange, which we call "social contract theory." So as not to repeat ourselves here, we refer the reader to that article for details. By constraining the class of possible designs, this theory allowed us and others to make some predictions about the design features of the algorithms and representations that
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evolved to solve the problem ofsocial exchange in humans. Design features 1-14 listed earlier are a small subset of those predictions. The computational theory we developed has guided our research program on human reasoning. We have been conducting experiments to see whether people have cognitive processes that are specialized for reasoning about social exchange. The experiments we will review in the following part were designed to test for design features 1,9, 10, and 14, as well as some other predictions derived from the computational theory. We have been particularly interested in testing the hypothesis that humans have algorithms that are specialized for detecting cheaters in situations of social exchange.
COGNITIVE PROCESSES Differential reproduction of alternative designs is the engine that drives natural selection: Ifhaving a particular mental structure, such as a rule of inference, allows a design to outreproduce other designs that exist in the species, then that mental structure will be selected for. Over many generations it will spread through the population until it becomes a universal, species-typical trait. Traditionally, cognitive psychologists have assumed that the human mind includes only general-purpose rules ofreasoning and that these rules are few in number and content-free. But a cognitive perspective that is informed by evolutionary biology casts doubt on these assumptions. This is because natural selection is also likely to have produced many mental rules that are specialized for reasoning about various evolutionarily important domains, such as cooperation, aggressive threat, parenting, disease avoidance, predator avoidance, object permanence, and object movement. Different adaptive problems frequently have different optimal solutions, and can therefore be solved more efficiently by the application of different problem-solving procedures. When two adaptive problems have different optimal solutions, a single general solution will be inferior to two specialized solutions. In such cases, a jack-of-all-trades will necessarily be a master of none, because generality can be achieved only by sacrificing efficiency. Indeed, it is usually more than efficiency that is lost by being limited to a general-purpose method-generality may often sacrifice the very possibility of successfully solving a problem, as, for example, when the solution requires supplemental information that cannot be sensorily derived (this is known as the "frame problem" in artificial intelligence research). The same principle applies to adaptive problems that require reasoning: There are cases where the rules for reasoning adaptively about one domain will lead one into serious error if applied to a different domain. Such problems cannot, in principle, be solved by a single general-purpose reasoning procedure. They are best solved by different special-purpose reasoning procedures. For example, the rules of inference ofthe propositional calculus (formal logic) are general-purpose rules ofinference: They can be applied regardless ofwhat subject matter one is reasoning about. Yet the consistent application of these rules of logical reasoning will not allow one to detect cheaters in situations of social exchange, because what counts as cheating does not map onto the definition of violation imposed by the propositional calculus. Suppose you and I agree to the following exchange: "Ifyou give
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me your watch then I'll give you $20." You would have violated our agreement-you would have cheated me-if you had taken my $20 but not given me your watch. But according to the rules ofinference ofthe propositional calculus, the only way this rule can be violated is by your giving me your watch but my not giving you $20. 7 Ifthe only mental rules my mind contained were the rules of inference of the propositional calculus, then I would not be able to tell when you had cheated me. Similarly, rules of inference for detecting cheaters on social contracts will not allow one to detect bluffs or double crosses in situations of aggressive threat (Cosmides & Tooby, in prep., a). What counts as a violation differs for a social contract, a threat, a rule describing the state ofthe world, and so on. Because ofthis difference, the same reasoning procedure cannot be successfully applied to all of these situations. As a result, there cannot be a general-purpose reasoning procedure that works for all of them. Ifthese problems are to be solved at all, they must be solved by different specialized reasoning procedures. Given the selection pressures discussed earlier, we can define a social contract as a situation in which an individual is obligated to satisfy a requirement of some kind, usually at some cost to him- or herself, in order to be entitled to receive a benefit from another individual (or group). The requirement is imposed because its satisfaction creates a situation that benefits the party that imposed it. Thus, a well-formed social contract expresses an intercontingent situation ofmutual benefit: To receive a benefit, an individual (or group) is required to provide a benefit. Usually (but not always) one incurs a cost by satisfying the requirement. But that cost is outweighed by the benefit one receives in return. Cheating is a violation of a social contract. A cheater is an individual who illicitly benefits himselfor herselfby taking a benefit without having satisfied the requirement that the other party to the contract made the provision of that benefit contingent on. In this section, we review evidence that people have cognitive adaptations that are specialized for reasoning about social contracts. We will pay particular attention to the hypothesis that people have inference procedures specialized for cheater detection. Adaptations are aspects of the phenotype that were designed by natural selection. To show that an aspect ofthe phenotype is an adaptation, one must produce evidence that it is well designed for solving an adaptive problem. Contrary to popular belief, developmental evidence is not criterial: Adaptations need not be present from birth (e.g., breasts), they need not develop in the absence of learning or experience (e.g., vision, language-see Pinker & Bloom, this volume),8 and they need not be heritable (Tooby & Cosmides, I990a). In fact, although the developmental processes that create adaptations are inherited, adaptations will usually exhibit low heritability. Differences between individuals will not be due to differences in their genes because adaptations are, in most cases, universal and species-typical-everyone has the genes that guide their development. The filter of natural selection does not sift designs on the basis of their developmental trajectory per se: 9 It doesn't matter how a design was built, only that it was built, and to the proper specifications. To say that an organism has cognitive procedures that are adaptations for detecting cheaters, one must show that these procedures are well designed for detecting cheaters on social contracts. One must also show that their design features are not more parsimoniously explained as by-products of cognitive processes that evolved to solve some other kind of problem, or a more general class of problems. We approached this question by studying human reasoning. A large literature already existed that showed that people are not very good at detecting violations of conditional rules, even when
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these rules deal with familiar content drawn from everyday life. To show that people who ordinarily cannot detect violations of conditional rules can do so when that violation represents cheating on a social contract would constitute evidence that people have reasoning procedures that are specially designed for detecting cheaters in situations ofsocial exchange.
The Wason Selection Task One ofthe most intriguing and widely used experimental paradigms for exploring people's ability to detect violations of conditional rules has been the Wason selection task (Wason, 1966; see Figure 3.3, panel a). Peter Wason was interested in Karl Popper's view that the structure ofscience was hypothetico-deductive. He wondered ifeveryday learning was really hypothesis testing-i.e., the search for evidence that contradicts a hypothesis. Wason devised his selection task because he wanted to see whether people are well equipped to test hypotheses by looking for evidence that could potentially falsify them. In the Wason selection task, a subject is asked to see whether a conditional hypothesis of the form IfP then Q has been violated by anyone of four instances represented by cards. A hypothesis ofthe form IfP then Q is violated only when P is true but Q is false: The rule in Figure 3.3, panel a, for example, can be violated only by a card that has a D on one side and a number other than 3 on the other side. Thus, one would have to turn over the P card (to see ifit has a not-Q on the back) and the not-Q card (to see if it has a P on the back)--D and 7, respectively, for the rule in Figure 3.3, panel a. Consequently, the logically correct response for a rule of the form IfP then Q is always P & not-Q. Wason expected that people would be good at detecting violations of conditional rules. Nevertheless, over the past 25 years, he and many other psychologists have found that few people actually give this logically correct answer (less than 25% for rules expressing unfamiliar relations). Most people choose either the P card alone or P & Q. Few people choose the not-Q card, even though a P on the other side ofit would falsify the rule. A wide variety of conditional rules that describe some aspect of the world ("descriptive rules") have been tested; some ofthese have expressed relatively familiar relations, such as "Ifa person goes to Boston, then he takes the subway" or "Ifa person eats hot chili peppers, then he will drink a cold beer." Others have expressed unfamiliar relations, such as "Ifyou eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell" or "If there is an 'A' on one side ofa card, then there is a '3' on the other side." In many experiments, performance on familiar descriptive rules is just as low as on unfamiliar ones. For example, rules relating food to drink, such as the hot chili pepper rule above, have never elicited logical performance higher than that elicited by unfamiliar rules, even though the typical sophomore in such experiments has had about 22,000 experiences in which he or she has had both food and drink, and even though recurrent relations between certain foods and certain drinks are common-eereal with orange juice at breakfast, red wine with red meat, coffee with dessert, and so on. Sometimes familiar rules do elicit a higher percentage of logically correct responses than unfamiliar ones, but even when they do, they typically elicit the logically correct response from fewer than half of the people tested. For example, in the Wason selection task literature, the transportation problem-"Ifa person goes to Boston, then he takes the
a. Abstract Problem Pan of your new clerical job at the local high school is to make sure that student documents have been pr0cessed correctly. Your job is to make sure the documents conform to the following alphanumeric rule:
"If a person has a 'D' rating. then his documents must be marlred code ·3·... (If P /hen Q )*
You suspect the secretary you replaced did not categorize the students' documents correctly. The cards below have information about the documents of four people who are enrolled at this high school. Each card represents one person. One side of a card tells a person's letter rating and the other side of the card tells that person's number code. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the documents of any of these people violate this rule.
_D_"_F _II_3_11_7_ (P)
(no/-P)
(Q)
(no/-Q)
b. Drinking Age Problem (adapted from Griggs & Cox, 1982)
In its crackdown against drunk drivers. Massachusetts law enforcement officials are revoking liquor licenses left and right. You are a bouncer in a Boston bar. and you'll lose your job unless you enforce the following law: "If a person is drinking beer. then he must be over 20 years old." (If P /hen Q ) 1lJe cards below have information about four people sitting at a table in your bar. Each card represents one person. One side of a card tells what a person is drinking and the other side of the card tells that person's age. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these people are breaking this law. L---:'':';;;;'_--' L_":':";';""---'
(P) C.
(no/-P)
125 years old 11
16 years old
(Q)
I
(no/-Q)
Structure of Social Contract Problems
It is your job to enforce the following law: Rille 1· Standard Social Conttact: "If you take the benefit, then you pay the COSt" (If P /hen Q ) Rille 2· Switched Social COntl1lCt: ''If you pay the cost, then you take the benefit" (If P /hen Q )
The cards below have information about four people. Each card represents one person. One side of a card tells whether a person accepted the benefit and the other side of the card tells whether that person paid the cost. Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these people are breaking this law.
a~:~ Rille 1 Rille 2
(P) (Q)
cost paid (no/-P) (fW/-Q)
(Q) (P)
I
cost not paid
I
(nol-Q) (no/·P)
·The logical categories (Ps and (8) marked on the rules and cards are here only for the reader's benefit; they never appear on problems given to subjects.
Figure 3.3 Content effects on the Wason selection task. The logical structures of these three Wason selection tasks are identical: They differ only in propositional content. Regardless of content, the logical solution to all three problems is the same: P & not-Q. Although <25% of college students choose both these cards for the abstract problem in panel a, about 75% do for the drinking age problem (panel b)-a familiar "standard" social contract. Panel c shows the abstract structure of a social contract problem. Cheater detection algorithms should cause subjects to choose the "benefit accepted" card and the "cost not paid" card, regardless of which logical categories they represent. These cards correspond to the logical categories P & not-Q for the "standard" form in rule 1, but to the logical categories not-P & Q for the "switched" form in rule 2.
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subway"-is the familiar descriptive rule that has the best record for eliciting logically correct responses, and performance on this rule was consistently higher in Cosmides's (1989) experiments than in most others. Even so, it elicited the logically correct P & not-Q response from only 48% ofthe 96 subjects tested. Recently, Stone and Cosmides (in prep.) tested rules expressing causal relations; the pattern ofresults is essentially the same as for descriptive rules. Humans do not appear to be naturally equipped to seek out violations of descriptive or causal rules. When subjects are asked to look for violations of conditional rules that express social contracts, however, their performance changes radically. Consider the "drinking age problem" in Figure 3.3, panel b. It expresses a social contract in which one is entitled to receive a benefit (beer) only if one has satisfied a requirement (being a certain age ).10 The drinking age problem elicits the logically correct response, P & not-Q, from about 75% of subjects (e.g., Griggs & Cox, 1982; Cosmides, 1985). On this rule, it is very easy to see why one needs to check what the 16-year-old is drinking (the notQ card) and the age of the person drinking beer (P), and it is equally obvious why the 25-year-old (Q) and the coke drinker (not-p) need not be checked. Experiments with the drinking age problem and other familiar social contracts show that human reasoning changes dramatically depending on the subject matter one is reasoning about. Such changes are known as "content effects." Figure 3.3, panel c, shows the abstract structure of a social contract problem. To detect cheaters on a social contract, one would always want to choose the "benefit accepted" card and the "cost not paid" card, regardless of what logical category these cards happen to correspond to. For the drinking age problem, these cards happen to correspond to the logical categories P and not-Q. Consequently, a subject who was looking for cheaters on a social contract would, by coincidence, choose the logically correct answer. But, as this figure also shows, there are situations in which the correct answer if one is looking for cheaters is not the logically correct answer. This point is important, and we will return to it later. When we began this research in 1983, the literature on the Wason selection task was full ofreports ofa wide variety ofcontent effects, and there was no satisfyingtheory or empirical generalization that could account for these content effects. When we categorized these content effects according to whether they conformed to social contracts, a striking pattern emerged. Robust and replicable content effects were found only for rules that related terms that are recognizable as benefits and cost/requirements in the format ofa standard social contract-i.e., in the format of Rule I in Figure 3.3, panel c (see Cosmides, 1985, for a review). No thematic rule that was not a social contract had ever produced a content effect that was both robust and replicable. Moreover, most of the content effects reported for non-social contract rules were either weak, clouded by procedural difficulties, or had some earmarks ofa social contract problem. All told, for non-social contract thematic problems, 3 experiments had produced a substantial content effect, 2 had produced a weak content effect, and 14 had produced no content effect at all. The few effects that were found did not replicate. In contrast, 16 out of 16 experiments that fit the criteria for standard social contracts-i.e., l00%-elicited substantial content effects. (Since that time, additional types of content have been tested; evolutionarily salient contents have elicited new, highly patterned content effects that are indicative of additional cognitive specializations in reasoning.)ll Special design is the hallmark of adaptation. As promising as these initial results
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were, they were not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an adaptation for social exchange. First, although the familiar rules that were social contracts always elicited a robust effect, and the familiar rules that were not social contracts failed to elicit a robust and replicable effect, this was true across experiments; individual experiments usually pitted performance on a familiar social contract against performance on an unfamiliar descriptive rule. Because they confounded familiarity with whether a rule was a social contract or not, these experiments could not decide the issue. 12 Familiarity could still be causing the differences in performance in complex ways that varied across different subject populations. Second, even ifit were shown that familiarity could not account for the result, these experiments could not rule out the hypothesis that social contract content simply facilitates logical reasoning. This is because the adaptively correct answer, if one is looking for cheaters on the social contracts tested, happened to also be the logically correct answer. To show that the results were caused by rules of inference that are specialized for reasoning about social exchange, one would have to test social contract rules in which the correct "look for cheaters" answer is different from the logically correct answer. Below, we review evidence addressing these, and other, hypotheses. Our goal will be twofold: (a) to show that the reasoning procedures involved show the features of special design that one would expect ifthey were adaptations for social exchange, and (b) to show that the results cannot be explained as by-products ofother, more generalpurpose reasoning procedures.
Did the Social Contract Problems Elicit Superior Performance Because They Were Familiar? Familiar social contracts elicited high levels of apparently logical performance. Could this result be a by-product ofthe familiarity ofthe social contract rules tested? Suppose we have general-purpose reasoning procedures whose design makes us more likely to produce logically correct answers for familiar or thematic rules. Then high levels of P & not-Q responses to familiar social contract rules could be a by-product of the operation of these general-purpose mechanisms, rather than the result of algorithms specialized for reasoning about social exchange. The first family of hypotheses that we tested against was the availability theories of reasoning, which are sophisticated and detailed versions ofthis "by-product" hypothesis (Griggs & Cox, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1982; Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Pollard, 1982; Wason, 1983; for a detailed review, see Cosmides, 1985). These theories come in a variety of forms with some important theoretical differences, but common to all is the notion that the subject's actual past experiences create associational links between terms mentioned in the selection task. These theories sought to explain the "now you see it, now you don't" results common for certain familiar descriptive rules, such as the transportation problem. Sometimes these rules elicited a small content effect; other times they elicited none at all. This was in spite ofthe fact that the relations tested-between, for example, destinations and means of transportation or between eating certain foods in conjunction with certain drinks-were perfectly familiar to subjects. This meant that a general familiarity with the relation itselfwas not sufficient to explain the results. The proposal, therefore, was that subjects who had, for example, gone to Boston more often by cab than by subway would be more likely to pick "Bos-
COGNITIVE ADAPTATIONS FOR SOCIAL EXCHANGE
185
ton" and "cab"-i.e., P & not-Q-for the rule "Ifone goes to Boston, then one takes the subway" than those who had gone to Boston more often by subway (Q). According to the availability theories, the more exposures a subject has had to the co-occurrence of P and Q, the stronger that association will become, and the easier it will come to mind, i.e., become "available" as a response. A subject is more likely to have actually experienced the co-occurrence of P and not-Q for a familiar rule, therefore familiar rules are more likely to elicit logically correct responses than unfamiliar rules. But whether a given rule elicits a content effect or not will depend on the actual, concrete experiences ofthe subject population tested. Despite their differences, the various availability theories make the same prediction about unfamiliar rules. If all the terms in a task are unfamiliar, the only associationallink available will be that created between P and Q by the conditional rule itself, because no previous link will exist among any of the terms. Thus P & Q will be the most common response for unfamiliar rules. P & not-Q responses will be rare for all unfamiliar rules, whether they are social contracts or not. The fact that a social-contract-type relation might be familiar to subjects is irrelevant: Previous results had already shown that the familiarity of a relation could not, by itself, enhance performance. We can test against this family ofhypotheses because social contract theory makes very different predictions. If people do have inference procedures that are specialized for reasoning about social contracts, then these ought to function, in part, as frame or schema builders, which structure new experiences. This means they should operate in unfamiliar situations. No matter how unfamiliar the relation or terms ofa rule, if the subject perceives the terms as representing a rationed benefit and a cost/requirement in the implicational arrangement appropriate to a social contract, then a cheater detection procedure should be activated. Social contract algorithms need to be able to operate in new contexts if one is to be able to take advantage of new exchange opportunities. Therefore, the ability to operate on social contracts even when they are unfamiliar is a design feature that algorithms specialized for reasoning about social exchange should have. Social contract theory predicts a high level of P & not-Q responses on all "standard" social contract problems, whether they are familiar or not. It is silent on whether availability exerts an independent effect on non-social contract problems. A standard social contract is one that has the abstract form, If you take the benefit, then you pay the cost (see Rule I, Figure 3.3, panel c). In the first set of experiments, we pitted social contract theory against the availability family oftheories by testing performance on an unfamiliar standard social contract-a problem for which the two hypotheses make diametrically opposite predictions (for details, see Cosmides, 1989, Experiments I and 2). Each subject was given four Wason selection tasks to solve: an unfamiliar social contract, an unfamiliar descriptive rule, a familiar descriptive rule (the transportation problem), and an abstract problem (as in Figure 3.3, panel a). Problem order was counterbalanced across subjects. The abstract problem was included because it is the usual standard for assessing the presence of a content effect in the Wason selection task literature; the transportation problem was included as a standard against which to judge the size of any social contract effect that might occur. Rules such as, "If you eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell," or, "If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face," were used for
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the unfamiliar problems; we felt it was safe to assume that our subjects would not have associative links between terms such as "cassava root" and "no tattoo" stored in longterm memory. An unfamiliar rule was made into a social contract or a descriptive rule by manipulating the surrounding story context. For example, a social contract version ofthe cassava root rule might say that in this (fictitious) culture, cassava root (P) is a much prized aphrodisiac whereas molo nuts (not-P) are considered nasty and bitter, thereby conveying that eating cassava root is considered a benefit compared to eating molo nuts, which are the alternative food. Having a tattoo on one's face (Q) means one is married; not having a tattoo (not-Q) means one is unmarried. As subjects know that marriage is a contract in which certain obligations are incurred to secure certain benefits (many ofwhich involve'sexual access), being married in this story is the cost/ requirement. Finally, the story explains that because the people ofthis culture are concerned about sexual mores, they have created the rule, "Ifa man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face." The four cards, each representing one man, would read "eats cassava root," "eats molo nuts," "tattoo," and "no tattoo." Other story contexts were invented for other rules. The descriptive version ofthe unfamiliar rule would also give meaning to the terms and suggest a meaningful relation between them, but the surrounding story would not give the rule the costjbenefit structure of a social contract. For example, it might explain that cassava root and molo nuts are both staple foods eaten by the people of the fictitious culture (i,e., there is no differential benefit to eating one over the other), but that cassava root grows only at one end ofthe island they live on, whereas molo nuts grow only at the other end. Having a tattoo on your face or not again indicates whether a man is married, and it so happens that married men live on the side of the island where the cassava root grows, whereas unmarried men live on the side where the molo nuts grow. Note that in this version, being married has no significance as a cost/requirement; it is merely a correlate of where one lives. The story then provides a meaningful relation to link the terms of the rule, "If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face," by suggesting that it simply describes the fact that men are eating the foods that are most available to them. Subjects who were given a cassava root version of the social contract rule were given a duiker meat version of the descriptive rule, and vice versa, so that no subject encountered two versions of the exact same unfamiliar rule. The availability theories predict low levels of P & not-Q responses on both unfamiliar rules, whether they are portrayed as social contracts or not. Social contract theory predicts high levels of P & not-Q responses for the unfamiliar social contract, but not for the unfamiliar descriptive rule. The predictions of the two theories, and the results of two different sets of experiments, are shown in Figure 3.4. The results clearly favor social contract theory. Even though they were unfamiliar and culturally alien, the social contract problems elicited a high percentage ofP & notQ responses. In fact, both we and Gigerenzer and Hug (in press) found that the performance level for unfamiliar social contracts is just as high as it usually is for familiar social contracts such as the drinking age problem-around 75% correct in our experiments. Unfamiliar social contracts elicited levels of P & not-Q responses that were even higher than those elicited by the familiar descriptive transporation problem. From our various experiments, we estimated the size ofthe social contract effect to be about 1.49 times larger than the size of the effect that availability has on familiar descriptive problems.
COGNITIVE ADAPTATIONS FOR SOCIAL EXCHANGE
Availability Predicts:
.
187
Social Contract Theory Predicts:
100
100
50
50
CI
'0
I:
~ t:\.t
-5
,----. I I ,
, , I
~
Social
Descriptive Abstract
...contract
.,
Familiar descriptive
Social
...contract
Unfamiliar
Descriptive Abstract Familiar descriptive .,
-
Unfamiliar
Results, Experiments 1 and 2 CI ,
100
'0 I: ~ t:\.t
-5
100
75
71
50
~
t:\.t
Figure 3.4 Social contract theory versus availability theory: Predictions and results for standard social contracts (from Cosmides, 1989, Experiments 1 and 2).
Familiarity, therefore, cannot account for the pattern of reasoning elicited by social contract problems. Social contract performance is not a by-product offamiliarity.
Does Social Contract Content Simply Facilitate Logical Reasoning? In the experiments just described, the adaptively correct answer if one is looking for cheaters happens to be the same as the logically correct answer-P & not-Q. Therefore, they cannot tell one whether performance on social contracts problems is governed by rules of inference that are specialized for reasoning about social exchange or by the rules of inference of the propositional calculus. Although we can think of no reason why this would be the case, perhaps social contract content simply facilitates logical reasoning. Ifso, then social contract performance could be a by-product ofa logic faculty. Two different sets ofexperiments show that this is not the case. The first involves "switched" social contracts (Cosmides, 1989, Experiments 3 and 4), and the second involves perspective change (Gigerenzer & Hug, in press).
Switched Social Contracts. The propositional calculus is content-independent: The combination of P & not-Q violates any conditional rule of the form If P then Q. no matter what "P" and "Q" stand for. The proposed social contract algorithms are not content-independent: Cheating is defined as accepting a benefit without paying the
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required cost. It does not matter what logical category these values happen to correspond to. For example, although the same social contract is expressed by both of the following statements, the proposition "you give me your watch" corresponds to the logical category P in the first rule and to Q in the second one. Rule I: "If you give me your watch, I'll give you $20" (standard form). Rule 2: "If! give you $20, you give me your watch" (switched form). No matter how the contract is expressed, I will have cheated you ifI accept your watch but do not offer you the $20, that is, ifI accept a benefit from you without paying the required cost. Ifyou are looking for cheaters, you should therefore choose the "benefit accepted" card (I took your watch) and the "cost not paid" card (I did not give you the $20) no matter what logical category they correspond to. In the case of Rule 1, my taking your watch without paying you the $20 would correspond to the logical categories P and not-Q, which happens to be the logically correct answer. But in the case of Rule 2, my taking your watch without giving you the $20 corresponds to the logical categories Q and not-Po This is not the logically correct response. In this case, choosing the logically correct answer, P & not-Q, would constitute an adaptive error: If I gave you the $20 (P) but did not take your watch (not-Q), I have paid the cost but not accepted the benefit. This makes me an altruist or a fool, but not a cheater. The general principle is illustrated in Figure 3.3, panel c, which shows the costbenefit structure ofa social contract. Rule I ("If you take the benefit, then you pay the cost") expresses the same social contract as Rule 2 ("Ifyou pay the cost, then you take the benefit"). A person looking for cheaters should always pick the "benefit accepted" card and the "cost not paid" card. But for Rule 1, a "standard" social contract, these cards correspond to the logical categories P and not-Q, whereas for Rule 2, a "switched" social contract, they correspond to the logical categories Q and not-P. Because the correct social contract answer is different from the correct logical answer for switched social contracts, by testing such rules we can see whether social contracts activate inference procedures ofthe propositional calculus, such as modus ponens and modus tollens, or inference procedures that are specialized for detecting cheaters on social contracts. The design of the following experiments was similar to that just described. Each subject solved four Wason selection tasks, presented in counterbalanced order: an unfamiliar social contract, an unfamiliar descriptive problem, a familiar descriptive problem, and an abstract problem. The only difference was that in this case the terms ofthe two unfamiliar rules were "switched" within the "If-then" structure ofthe rule. For example, instead of reading, "If you eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell," the rule would read, "Ifyou have found an ostrich eggshell, then you eat duiker meat." This was true for both the unfamiliar social contract and the unfamiliar descriptive rule. For the social contract rules, this switch in the order of the terms had the effect ofputting the cost term in the "If' clause, and the benefit term in the "then" clause, giving the rule the structure ofthe switched social contract shown in Rule 2 of Figure 3.3, panel c. The predictions ofsocial contract theory and the availability theories are shown in Figure 3.5, along with the results of two experiments. Not-P & Q is an extremely rare response on the Wason selection task, but social contract theory predicts that it will be very common on switched social contracts. That is exactly what happened. In fact, as
189
COGNITIVE ADAPTATIONS FOR SOCIAL EXCHANGE
Social Contract Tbeory Predicts:
Availability Predicts: CI
100
100
50
50
~ t:l. I
g
j Social Descriptive Abstract Familiar :ontraet , descriptive
Social Descriptive Abstract Familiar contract descriptive
......
L
......
,
Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
Results, Experiments 3 and 4 CI
100
100
~
75
67
t:l. I
g
50
'5
i
4
o
o
o
o
o
Figure 3.5 Social contract theory versus availability theory: Predictions and results for switched social contracts (from Cosmides, 1989, Experiments 3 and 4).
many people chose not-P & Q on the unfamiliar switched social contracts as chose P & not-Q on the standard social contract problems described above. Ifsocial contract content merely facilitates logical reasoning, then subjects should have chosen P & not-Q on these switched social contract problems. The fact that they chose not-P & Q-a logically incorrect response-shows that social contract performance is not caused by the activation ofa logic faculty. This is, however, the response one would expect if humans have rules of inference that are specialized for cheater detection. Table 3.2 shows individual card choices for matching sets of experiments with standard versus switched social contracts, sorted by logical category and by social contract category. The results for non-social contract problems replicate beautifully when sorted by logical category. But not the results for the social contract problems. These results replicate when sorted by social contract category, not by logical category. This shows that the content-dependent social contract categories, not the logical categories, are psychologically real for subjects solving social contract problems. This confirms another predicted design feature of the social contract algorithms: They define cheating in terms ofcost-benefit categories, not in terms of logical categories. Manktelow and Over (1987) have pointed out that even when words such as "must" or "may" are left out of a social contract, one tends to interpret a standard social contract as meaning, "If you take the benefit, then you (must) pay the cost," whereas one tends to interpret a switched social contract as meaning, "If you pay the
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Table 3.2 Selection Frequencies for Individual Cards, Sorted by Logical Category and by Social Contract Category· Unfamiliar Social Contract Unfamiliar Descriptive
Logical Category P not-P Q not-Q Social Contract Category: Benefit accepted Benefit not accepted Cost paid Cost not paid
Abstract Problem
Familiar Descriptive
Standard
Switched
Expo
Expo
Expo
Expo
Exp.
Exp.
Expo
Exp.
1&2
3&4
1&2
3&4
1&2
3&4
1&2
3&4
43 9 20 18
40
46 10 15 21
46
46
II
I
23 25
8 23
45 2 6 32
43 3 0 39
3 36 44 3
43 3 0 39
44 3 3 36
11
23 20
"Experiments I and 2 tested standard versions of the two unfamiliar rules, whereas Experiments 3 and 4 tested switched versions ofthese rules.
cost, then you (may) take the benefit." This is, in fact, a prediction of social contract theory: A cost is something one is obligated to pay when one has accepted a benefit, whereas a benefit is something that one is entitled to take (but need not) when one has paid the required cost. Thus, the interpretive component of the social contract algorithms should cause subjects to "read in" the appropriate "musts" and "mays," even when they are not actually present in the problem (three out of four of the standard social contracts had no "must," and none of the switched social contracts had a "may"). Could it be that subjects are in fact reasoning with the propositional calculus, but applying it to these reinterpretations of the social contract rules? No. In the propositional calculus, "may" and "must" refer to possibility and necessity, not to entitlement and obligation. On the Wason selection task, the logically correct answer for the rule, "If you pay the cost, then it is possible for you to take the benefit," is to choose no cards at all. Because this rule admits only of possibility, not of necessity, no combination of values can falsify it. The fact that most subjects chose not-P & Q, rather than no cards at all, shows that they were not applying the propositional calculus to a rule reinterpreted in this way. 13 To choose not-P & Q, one would have to be following the implicational structure of social exchange specified in Cosmides and Tooby (1989).
Perspective Change. Gigerenzer and Hug (in press) have conducted an elegant series of experiments that test another design feature of the proposed social contract algorithms, while simultaneously showing that the results cannot be explained by the propositional calculus or by permission schema theory, which is discussed later. They gave two groups ofsubjects Wason selection tasks in which they were to look for violations of social contract rules such as, "If an employee gets a pension, then that employee must have worked for the firm for at least 10 years." The only difference between the two groups was that one group was told "You are the employer" whereas the other group was told "You are the employee."
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In social contract theory, what counts as cheating depends on one's perspective. Providing a pension is a cost that the employer incurs to benefit the employee, whereas working to or more years is a cost that the employee incurs to benefit the employer. Whether the event "the employee gets a pension" is considered a cost or a benefit therefore depends on whether one is taking the perspective of the employer (= cost) or the employee ( = benefit).The definition ofcheating as taking a benefit without paying the cost is invariant across perspectives, but the theory predicts that which events count as benefit and cost will differ across actors. From the employer's perspective, cheating is when an employee gets a pension (the employee has taken the benefit) but has not worked for the firm for at least 10 years (the employee has not paid the cost). These cards correspond to the logical categories P & not-Q. From the employee's perspective, cheating is when an employee has worked for at least to years (the employer has taken the benefit), but has not been given the pension that he or she is therefore entitled to (the employer has not paid the cost). These cards correspond to the logical categories not-P & Q. In other words, there are two different states ofaffairs that count as cheating in this situation, which correspond to the perspectives of the two parties to the exchange. What counts as cheating depends on what role one occupies; cheating is a well-defined concept, but its definition is preeminently content- and context-dependent. In contrast, whether one is cued into the role ofemployer or employee is irrelevant to the content-independent propositional calculus. The correct answer on such a problem is P & not-Q (employee got the pension but did not work 10 years), regardless of whether the subject is assigned the role ofthe employer or the employee. Gigerenzer and Hug conducted four experiments using different social contract rules to test the perspective change hypothesis. The predictions of both social contract theory and the propositional calculus are shown in Figure 3.6, along with the results. The results are as social contract theory predicts: Even though it is logically incorrect, subjects answer not-P & Q when these values correspond to the adaptively correct "look for cheaters" response. The hypothesis that social contract content simply facilitates logical reasoning cannot explain this result. The perspective change results and the switched social contract results show that social contract performance is not a byproduct of the activation of a logic faculty. In light of these results, it is interesting to note that although schizophrenic individuals often perform more poorly than normals on problems requiring logical reasoning, deliberation, or seriation, Maljkovic found that their reasoning about social contracts is unimpaired (Maljkovic, 1987). She argues that this result makes sense if one assumes that the brain centers that govern reasoning about social contracts are different from those that govern logical reasoning. To show adaptation, one must both eliminate by-product hypotheses and show evidence of special design for accomplishing an adaptive function. Algorithms specialized for reasoning about social exchange should have certain specific design features, and the switched social contract and perspective change experiments confirm three more predictions about those design features: I. The definition of cheating embodied in the social contract algorithms should depend on one's perspective. The perspective change experiments confirm the existence of this design feature. 2. Computing a cost-benefit representation of a social contract from one party's
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o
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Employer Perspective: "pension". "wolked eight years" (P & not-Q) Employee Perspective: "no pension", "worked ten years" (not-P & Q)
Figure 3.6 Perspective change experiments. Social contract theory versus logic facilitation hypothesis and permission schema theory: Predictions and results. Three separate experiments were conducted, testing the predictions of the theories against one another. The results of the three experiments are indicated by circles, squares, and triangles. Filled versus unfilled represents versions otherwise identical, except that the perspective (e.g., employer versus employee) is reversed (from Gigerenzer & Hug, in press).
perspective should be just as easy as computing it from the other party's perspective. There are two reasons for this prediction: First, to successfully negotiate with others, one must be able to compute the conditions under which others would feel that you had cheated them, as well as the conditions under which they had cheated you. Second, being able to understand what counts as cheating from both perspectives facilitates social learning; by watching other people's exchanges one can gather information about the values, and perhaps about the trustworthiness, ofpeople one may interact with in the future. Ifpeople are just as good at translating a social contract into the values of one party as the other, then they should be just as good at detecting cheaters from one perspective as the other: There should be just as many P & not-Q responses to the "employer" version as there are not-P & Q responses to the "employee" version. This was, in fact, the case. 3. The implicational structure of social contract theory mandates that the statement "Ifan employee gets a pension, then that employee must have worked for the firm for at least to years" be taken to imply "If the employee has worked for to years, then the employer must give that employee a pension." This is
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because when the employee has fulfilled his obligation to benefit the employer, the employer is obligated to benefit the employee in return. Ifsubjects draw this implication, then they should choose not-P & Q in both the switched social contract experiments and in the employee version ofthe perspective change experiments. The fact that they did confirms this design feature ofthe proposed social contract algorithms.
Is There a Cheater Detection Procedure, or Are People Simply Good at ReasoningaboutSodalConuacts? Social contract theory posits that the mind contains inference procedures specialized for detecting cheaters and that this explains the high percentage of correct social contract answers that these problems elicit. But maybe social contract problems simply "afford" clear thinking. Perhaps they are interesting, or motivationally compelling, in a way that other problems are not. Rather than having inference procedures specialized for detecting cheaters, perhaps we form a more complete mental model ofa problem space for social contract problems, and this allows us to correctly answer any question that we might be asked about them, whether it is about cheating or not (for descriptions of mental model theories of reasoning, see Evans, 1984; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Manktelow & Over, 1987). Although it would be difficult to reconcile the perspective change data with this hypothesis, it is still worth considering. No one has presented any independent criteria for judging what kinds ofproblems ought to be "interesting," "motivationally compelling," or "easy to understand," which makes this hypothesis nebulous. Nevertheless, it can be tested by studying performance on reasoning problems in which the rule is portrayed as a social contract, but in which the subject is not asked to look for cheaters. Two sets of experiments did just that. One set asked subjects to look for altruists in a situation of social exchange; the other asked subjects to look for violations of a social contract rule in a context in which looking for violations did not correspond to looking for cheaters. Ifpeople are good at detecting cheaters merely because social contract problems are easy to understand, then performance on such problems should be just as good as performance on cheater detection problems. 14 But ifpeople are good at detecting cheaters because they have inference procedures specialized for doing so, then such problems should elicit lower levels ofperformance than social contract problems that require cheater detection.
Are People Good at Lookingfor Altruists? The game-theoretic models for the evolution of cooperation that could be reasonably applied to the range of population structures that typified hominid hunter-gatherers require the existence ofsome mechanism for detecting cheaters or otherwise excluding them from the benefits of cooperation. This is because the capacity to engage in social exchange could not have evolved in the first place unless the individuals involved could avoid being continually exploited by cheaters. But most models do not require the existence of a mechanism for detecting "altruists"-individuals who follow the strategy of paying the required cost (thereby benefiting the other party), but not accepting from the other party the benefit to which this act entitles them. IS Indeed, because individuals who were consistently altruistic would incur costs but receive no compensating benefits, under most plausible scenarios they would be selected out. Because they would not be a long-enduring feature of the adaptive landscape, there would be no selection pressure for "altruist detection"
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mechanisms. Thus, while we did expect the existence of inference procedures specialized for detecting cheaters, we did not expect the existence of inference procedures specialized for detecting altruists. In contrast, ifpeople are good at detecting cheaters merely because social contract problems afford clear thinking, then performance on altruist detection problems should be just as good as performance on cheater detection problems. The mental model ofthe social contract would be the same in either case; one would simply search the problem space for altruists rather than for cheaters. To see whether this was so, we tested 75 Stanford students on some of the same social contract problems that were used by Cosmides (1985, 1989), but instead ofasking them to look for cheaters, they were asked to look for altruists (the procedure was the same as that described in Cosmides, 1989, for Experiments 5 through 9). Each subject was given one social contract problem, and this problem required altruist detection. There were three conditions with 25 subjects each; a different social contract problem was tested in each condition. The first two conditions tested problems that portrayed a private exchange between "Big Kiku" (a headman in a fictitious culture) and four hungry men from another band; the third condition tested a problem about a social law. The first group's problem was identical to the cheater detection problem tested by Cosmides (1989) in Experiment 2, except for the instruction to look for altruists (see Figure 3.7 for a comparison between the cheater detection version and the altruist detection version). The problem in the second condition was essentially the same, but instead ofportraying Big Kiku (the potential altruist) as a ruthless character, he was portrayed as having a generous personality. The third condition tested the social law, "If you eat duiker meat, then you have found an ostrich eggshell" (see Cosmides, 1989, Experiment I). The instructions on this problem were suitably modified to ask subjects to look for altruists rather than cheaters. 16 Because altruists are individuals who have paid the cost but have not accepted the benefit, subjects should choose the "benefit not accepted" card (not-P) and the "cost paid" card (Q) on these problems. These values would correspond to the "no tattoo" card and the "Big Kiku gave him cassava root" card for the first two problems, and to the "does not eat any duiker meat" card and the "has found an ostrich eggshell" card for the social law problem. Table 3.3 shows that the percentage ofsubjects who made this response was quite low for all three altruist detection problems. Is it possible that Stanford students simply do not know the meaning ofthe word "altruistic"? We thought this highly unlikely, but just to be sure, we ran another 75 Stanford students (n = 25 per condition) on problems that were identical to the first three, except that the word "selflessly" was substituted for the word "altruistically." The word "selfless" effectively announces its own definition-less for the self. Ifthere are inference procedures specialized for detecting altruists-or if social contract prob-
Table 3.3 Altruist Detection: Percent Correct (not-P & Q) Personal Exchange Ruthless Altruistic Selfless
Law
Generous
28
8
40
36
8 12
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lems merely afford clear thinking-then surely subjects should be able to perform as well on the "selfless" problems as they do on cheater detection problems. Table 3.3 shows that this was not the case. Although performance was a bit higher on the problems that used "selfless" than on the problems that used "altruistic," performance was nowhere near the average of74% that Cosmides (1989) found for comparable cheater detection problems. 17 In fact, performance on the selfless versions of the altruist detection problems was no better than performance on the familiar descriptive transportation problem (reported earlier). This indicates that people do not have inference procedures specialized for detecting altruists on social contracts, which is just what social contract theory predicted. More important, it casts doubt on the hypothesis that cheater detection problems elicit high levels of performance merely because social contracts afford clear thinking.
Are People Good at Looking for Violations ofSocial Contracts When These Do Not Indicate Cheating? Gigerenzer and Hug (in press) conducted a series ofexperiments designed to disentangle the concept of cheater detection from the concept of a social contract. The opportunity to illicitly benefit oneselfis intrinsic to the notion ofcheating. But one can construct situations in which the reason one is looking for violations ofa social contract rule has nothing to do with looking for individuals who are illicitly benefiting themselves-Le., one can construct situations in which looking for violations is not tantamount to looking for cheaters. Gigerenzer and Hug gave subjects Wason selection tasks in which all rules were framed as social contracts, but which varied in whether or not looking for violations constituted looking for cheaters. Here is an example using the rule, "If one stays overnight in the cabin, then one must bring a load of firewood up from the valley." In the "cheating" version, it is explained that two Germans are hiking in the Swiss Alps and that the local Alpine Club has cabins at high altitudes that serve as overnight shelters for hikers. These cabins are heated by firewood, which must be brought up from the valley because trees do not grow at this altitude. So the Alpine Club has made the (social contract) rule, "If one stays overnight in the cabin, then one must bring along a bundle of firewood from the valley." There are rumors that the rule is not always followed. The subject is cued into the perspective of a guard whose job is to check for violations of the rule. In this version, looking for violations of the rule is the same as looking for cheaters. In the "no cheating" version, the subject is cued into the perspective ofa member ofthe German Alpine Association who is visiting a cabin in the Swiss Alps and wants to find out how the local Swiss Alpine Club runs the cabin. He sees people carrying loads of firewood into the cabin, and a friend suggests that the Swiss might have the same social contract rule as the Germans-"If one stays overnight in the cabin, then one must bring along a bundle of firewood from the valley." The story also mentions an alternative explanation: that members ofthe Swiss Alpine Club (who do not stay overnight in the cabin) bring wood, rather than the hikers.To settle the question, the subject is asked to assume that the proposed social contract rule is in effect, and then to look for violations of it. Note that the intent here is not to catch cheaters. In this situation, violations ofthe proposed social contract rule can occur simply because the Swiss Alpine Club never made such a rule in the first place. In both versions, the rule in question is a social contract rule-in fact, exactly the same social contract rule. And in both versions, the subject is asked to look for violations of that rule. But in the cheating version, the subject is looking for violations
Cheater version: You are an anthropologist studying the Kaluame, a Polynesian people who live in small, warring bands on Maku Island in the Pacific. You are interested in how Kaluame "big men" - chieftains - wield power. "Big Kiku" is a Kaluame big man who is known for his ruthlessness. As a sign of loyalty, he makes his own "subjects" put a tattoo on their face. Members of other Kaluame bands never have facial tattoos. Big Kiku has made so many enemies in other Kaluame bands, that being caught in another village with a facial tattoo is, quite literally, the kiss of death. Four men from different bands stumble into Big Kiku's village, starving and desperate. They have been kicked out of their respective villages for various misdeeds, and have come to Big Kiku because they need food badly. Big Kiku offers each of them the following deal: "If you get a tattoo on your face, then I'll give you cassava root."
Cassava root is a very sustaining food which Big Kiku's people cultivate. The four men are very hungry, so they agree to Big Kiku's deal. Big Kiku says that the tattoos must be in place tonight, but that the cassava root will not be available until the following morning. You learn that Big Kiku hates some of these men for betraying him to his enemies. You suspect he will cheat and betray some of them. Thus, this is a perfect opportunity for you to see first hand how Big Kiku wields his power. The cards below have information about the fates of the four men. Each card represents one man. One side of a card tells whether or not the man went through with the facial tattoo that evening and the other side of the card tells whether or not Big Kiku gave that man cassava root the next day. Did Big Kiku get away with cheating any of these four men? Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to tum over to see if Big Kiku has broken his word to any of these four men.
A.I
c.1
got the tallOO
B.
nntannn
D.
Big Kiku gave him nothing
Big Kiku gave him cassava root
Figure 3.7 Both problems describe a social contract rule, but the problem on the left asks the subject to look for cheaters (individuals who took the benefit without paying the cost), whereas the problem on the right asks the subject to look for altruists (individuals who paid the cost but did not take the benefit to which this entitles them).
Altruist version: You are an anthropologist studying the Kaluame, a Polynesian people who live in small, warring bands on Maku Island in the Pacific. You are interested in how Kaluame "big men" - chieftains - wield power. "Big Kiku" is a Kaluame big man who is known for his ruthlessness. As a sign of loyalty, he makes his own "subjects" put a tattoo on their face. Members of other Kaluame bands never have facial tattoos. Big Kiku has made so many enemies in other Kaluame bands, that being caught in another village with a facial tattoo is, quite literally, the kiss of death. Four men from different bands stumble into Big Kiku's village, starving and desperate. They have been kicked out of their respective villages for various misdeeds, and have come to Big Kiku because they need food badly. Big Kiku offers each of them the following deal: "If you get a tattoo on your face, then I'll give you cassava root."
Cassava root is a very sustaining food which Big Kiku's people cultivate. The four men are very hungry, so they agree to Big Kim's deal. Big Kiku says that the tattoos must be in place tonight, but that the cassava root will not be available until the following morning. You learn that Big Kiku hates some of these men for betraying him to his enemies. You suspect he will cheat and betray some of them. How-
ever, you have also heard that Big Kiku sometimes, quite unexpectedly, shows great generosity towards others - that he is sometimes quite altruistic. Thus, this is a perfect opportunity for you to see first hand how Big Kiku wields his power. The cards below have infonnation about the fates of the four men. Each card represents one man. One side of a card tells whether or not the man went through with the facial tattoo that evening, and the other side of the card tells whether or not Big Kiku gave that man cassava root the next day. Did Big Kiku behave altruistically towards any of these four men? Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if Big Kiku has behaved altruistically towards any of these four men.
Aol
got the IaltOO
B.
Big Kiku gave him nothing
Col
no IaltOO
D.
him cassava root
Big Kiku gave
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Social Contract Theory Prediction Results 90 80 70 Cheating
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Cheating Cheating
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Figure 3.8 Is cheating necessary? Predictions and results. In these experiments, both conditions tested social contract rules, but in the "no cheating" condition looking for violations did not correspond to looking for cheaters. Social contract theory predicts a different pattern of results from both permission schema theory and the hypothesis that social contract content merely affords "clear thinking." Four separate experiments were conducted, testing the predictions of the theories against one another. The results of the four experiments are indicated by filled and unfilled triangles, and filled and unfilled circles (from Gigernzer & Hug, in press).
because he or she is looking for individuals who are illicitly benefiting themselves, whereas in the no cheating version the subject is looking for violations because he or she is interested in whether the proposed social contract rule is in effect. Ifsocial contract problems merely afford clear thinking, then a violation is a violation is a violation: It shouldn't matter whether the violation constitutes cheating or not. 18 In contrast, if there are inference procedures specialized for cheater detection, then performance should be much better in the cheating version, where looking for violations is looking for illicitly taken benefits. Figure 3.8 shows the predictions and the results of four such experiments. On average, 83% of subjects correctly solved the cheating version, compared with only 44% on the no cheating version. Cosmides and Tooby (in prep. b) conducted a similarly designed experiment, with similar results. In both problems, it was stipulated that a social contract rule was in effect and that the people whose job it was to enforce the rule may have violated it. But in one version violations were portrayed as due to cheating, whereas in the other version violations were portrayed as due to innocent mistakes. We found 68% ofsubjects correctly solved the cheating version, compared with only 27% ofsubjects on the "mistake" (no cheat-
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ing) version. Thus, using a different "no cheating" context in which it was stipulated that the social contract rule was in effect, we were able to replicate the difference that Gigerenzer and Hug found between their cheating and no cheating versions almost exactly (39 percentage points in Gigerenzer and Hug; 41 percentage points in Cosmides and Tooby). These data indicate that social contract problems do not merely afford clear thinking. In addition, these results provide further evidence against the availability theories and the hypothesis that social contract content merely facilitates logical reasoning. The results of these experiments are most parsimoniously explained by the assumption that people have inference procedures specialized for detecting cheaters: individuals who have illicitly taken benefits. Because these procedures operate on the cost-benefit representation of a problem, they can detect a violation only if that violation is represented as an illicitly taken benefit. They would not be able to detect other kinds of violations, nor would they detect altruists. These results provide further confirmation of a proposed design feature of the social contract algorithms: This bundle of cognitive processes appears to include inference procedures specialized for cheater detection.
Are Cost-Benefit Representations Necessary, or Are Subjects Good at Detecting Violations of Any Rule Involving Permission1 The social contract algorithms should contain decision rules that govern when one should engage in an exchange. A proposed contract should not be accepted unless the costs one incurs by providing a benefit to the other party are outweighed by the benefits one receives by engaging in the exchange. Consequently, the first stage of processing must be the assignment of cost-benefit weightings to the "benefit term"-the event, item, or state of affairs the contract entitles one to receive-and to the "cost term"the event, item, or state of affairs that the other party requires of one. We have been calling these terms the "benefit" term and the "cost" term for ease of explication; we do not mean to prejudge the actual values that the parties to the exchange assign to these terms. For example, satisfying the requirement may actually benefit the person who satisfies it-the offerer's belief that the benefit she is requiring the other party to provide represents a cost to that party may be erroneous. But the offerer would not propose the contract in the first place unless she believed that the state of affairs she wants to bring about would not occur in the absence ofthe contract-it would be silly to offer you $20 for your watch if I believed you were going to give it to me anyway. Similarly, the offerer may be mistaken in her beliefthat she is offering a benefit to the other party, in which case her offer will not be accepted-you might value your watch more than you would value having an extra $20. In social contract theory, costs and benefits are defined with respect to the value systems of the participants, and relative to a zero-level utility baseline that represents how each party would behave in the absence ofthe contract. (The cost-benefit conditions that should adhere for an offerer to offer and the acceptor to accept a social contract are spelled out in Cosmides., 1985, and Cosmides & Tooby, 1989.) Once the contract has been translated into cost-benefit terms, the decision rules for acceptance or rejection can operate on that representation. The cheater detection procedures should also act on that representation, causing one to investigate individuals who have not fulfilled the requirement specified in the cost term and individuals who have taken the benefit offered. By operating on this relatively abstract level ofrepre-
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sentation, the cheater detection procedures can detect cheaters no matter what the actual items of exchange are. Because humans are a technological species capable of exchanging a wide array of items, we hypothesized that human cheater detection procedures would operate on this abstract cost-benefit level of representation, rather than be tied to any particular item ofexchange, as discussed earlier in this chapter. In other species, the constraint that cheaters must be detected might be implemented by algorithms that operate on other levels ofrepresentation (as discussed for the vampire bat). Thus, a predicted design feature of human social contract algorithms is that they cause one to assign cost-benefit representations to a social contract, one for each party to the interaction. The presence ofthis design feature was confirmed by the perspective change experiments. Another predicted design feature is that cheater detection procedures operate on cost-benefit representations. Indeed, it is difficult to see how they could do otherwise, given that cheating is defined as accepting a benefit one is not entitled to. Technically, a violation that does not illicitly benefit one is not cheating. If cheater detection algorithms operate on cost-benefit representations, then they should not be able to operate on rules that are similar to social contracts but that have not been assigned a cost-benefit representation. To test this prediction, we investigated Wason selection task performance on permission rules that did not afford the assignment ofa cost-benefit representation. Permission rules are prescriptive rules that specify the conditions under which one is allowed to take some action. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) define them as "regulations ... typically imposed by an authority to achieve some social purpose" (p. 398). Their "permission schema theory" proposes that people have a schema for reasoning about permissions that consists of the following four production rules: Rule 1: Rule 2: Rule 3: Rule 4:
If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied. Ifthe action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be satisfied. If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken.
On a Wason selection task in the linguistic format of rule 1, the first production rule would cause one to choose the "action has been taken" card (P), and the fourth production rule would cause one to choose the "precondition has not been satisfied" card (not-Q). Rules 2 and 3 would not cause any card to be chosen. If a Wason selection task presented a rule in the linguistic format of rule 3 (a cognate to our switched social contracts), then the same two cards would be chosen for the same reason, but they would now correspond to the logical categories Q and not-Po Cheng and Holyoak (1985) and Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986) also propose the existence of "obligation schemas." These have the same implicational structure as permission schemas (and hence lead to the same predictions), but their representational format is "If condition C occurs, then action A must be taken." Because in any concrete case it is difficult to tell a permission from an obligation, we will refer to both kinds of rules under the rubric of permission schema theory .19 All social contracts are permission rules, but not all permission rules are social contracts. Social contract rules that have the form "Ifone takes the benefit, then one must pay the cost" are subsets of the set of all permission rules, because taking a benefit is just one kind of action that a person can take. Taking a benefit always entails taking an action, but there are many situations in which taking an action does not entail taking a benefit.
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Permission schema theory has already been falsified by the experiments ofGigerenzer and Hug, described earlier. In permission schema theory, a permission rule has been violated whenever the action has been taken but the precondition has not been satisfied. It should not matter why subjects are interested in violations. Whether one is interested in violations because one is interested in finding cheaters or because one is interested in seeing whether the rule is in effect is irrelevant to permission schema theory. As long as the subject recognizes that the rule is a permission rule, the permission schema should cause the "action taken" and the "precondition not met" cards to be chosen. Consequently, permission schema theory would have to predict equally high levels of performance for the cheating and the no cheating versions of the social contract rules tested by Gigerenzer and Hug, as Figure 3.8 shows. Yet, even though both problems involved looking for violations ofthe same (social contract) permission rule, the cheating version elicited much higher performance than the no cheating version. Gigerenzer and Hug's perspective change experiments also falsify permission schema theory, and for a similar reason. Only one combination ofvalues-"action taken" and "precondition not satisfied"-violates a permission rule in permission schema theory. What counts as a violation does not change depending on one's perspective; indeed, permission schema theory has notheoretical vocabulary for discussing differences of perspective. Yet the subjects' definition of violation depended on what role they were cued into, the employer's (P & not-Q) or the employee's (not-P & Q). Permission schema theory can account for the P & not-Q response, but not for the not-P & Q response. 20 Permission schema theory and social contract theory differ in yet another way: The permission schema operates on the more abstract and inclusive action-precondition level of representation, whereas social contract algorithms construct and operate on the somewhat less general cost-benefit level of representation. Consequently, permission schema theory predicts that all permission rules will elicit high levels of performance, whether they have the cost-benefit structure ofa social contract or not. In contrast, social contract theory does not predict high levels ofperformance for permission rules that do not afford the assignment ofa cost-benefit representation. This is because cheating is defined as an illicitly taken benefit; where there are no benefits, there can be no cheating. By comparing performance on permission rules that do and do not afford the assignment of the appropriate cost-benefit representation, we can both test the prediction that cheater detection algorithms require a cost-benefit representation to operate and provide yet another test between social contract theory and permission schema theory. In the first series of experiments (reported in Cosmides, 1989), we used the same research strategy as before: Wason selection tasks using rules whose terms and relation would be unfamiliar to our subjects, surrounded by a story context that either did or did not afford the assignment ofthe cost-benefit structure of a social contract to the rule. But in these experiments, the non-social-contract rule was a permission rule, not a descriptive rule. Let us illustrate the difference with an example: the school rule. The school rule tested in both conditions was "If a student is to be assigned to Grover High School, then that student must live in Grover City." In the social contract version, the story explained that Grover High School is a much better high school than Hanover High, with a good record for getting students into college. Citizens ofGrover City pay higher taxes for education than citizens ofthe town ofHanover, which is why Grover High is the better school. The story surrounding the rule thus portrays going
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to Grover High as a rationed benefit that must be paid for through higher taxes. Volunteers, some ofwhom are mothers with high-school-age children, are processing the school assignment documents, and it is rumored that some might have cheated on the rule in assigning their own children to a school. The subject is cued into the role of someone who is supervising these volunteers and must therefore look for cheaters. In the non-social-contract version, the same permission rule is used, but the surrounding story did not afford a cost-benefit interpretation of the terms of the rule. Grover High is not portrayed as any better than Hanover High, nor does the story mention any greater cost that is incurred by living in Grover City rather than J:Ianover. It is, however, explained that it is important that this rule for assigning students from various towns to the appropriate school district be followed, because the population statistics they provide allow the board ofeducation to decide how many teachers need to be assigned to each school. If the rule is not followed, some schools could end up with too many teachers and others with too few. Thus the story context gives the rule a "social purpose." The subject is cued into the role of a person who is replacing the absent-minded secretary who was supposed to follow this rule in sorting the students' documents. Because the former secretary frequently made mistakes, the subject must check the documents to see if the rule was ever violated. Although this rule is a permission rule-stating the conditions under which one is allowed to assign a student to Grover High School-nothing in the story affords the assignment of the cost-benefit structure of a social contract to this rule. There is no benefit to assigning someone to Grover rather than to Hanover High, and no cost associated with living in one city rather than the other. Moreover, there is no apparent way that the absent-minded secretary could have illicitly benefited from breaking the rule. Thus her mistakes would not constitute cheating. By hypothesis, cheater detection algorithms should not be able to operate on this problem, because they would have no cost-benefit representations to attach themselves to. Social contract theory, therefore, predicts a lower percent ofcorrect responses for this version than for the social contract version. In contrast, permission schema theory predi<;:ts high levels of the correct responses for both rules, because both are permission rules: Both have the action-precondition representational format that permission schema theory requires. (For both theories, the "correct" response is P & not-Q for standard rules and not-P & Q for switched rules.) The predictions and results of four experiments-two with standard rules, two with switched rules-are displayed in Figure 3.9. Across the four experiments, 75% of subjects chose the correct answer for the social contract permission rules, compared with only 21 % for the non-social-contract permission rules. Using unfamiliar rules with a long story context has the advantage of giving the experimenter some control over the subject's mental model of the situation. The disadvantage of this method, however, is that it is difficult to create matching stories in which only one element varies. In the matched school rules, for example, two elements that distinguish permission schema theory and social contract theory varied: (a) whether the rule was given a cost-benefit structure, and (b) whether the potential violator was portrayed as a cheater or as a person who might have broken the rule by mistake. So we tackled the question ofwhether the rule must have a cost-benefit structure in another way as well: We tested minimalist problems that varied only in whether the subjects' past experience would cause them to interpret the antecedent of the rule as a benefit (Cosmides & Tooby, in prep., b). These problems had virtually no context:
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Figure 3.9 Are cost-benefit representations necessary? Social contract theory versus permission schema theory: Predictions and results (from Cosmides, 1989, Experiments 5, 6, 8, and 9).
They simply explained that among the Kalama (another fictitious culture) the elders make the laws, and one ofthe laws they made is, "Ifone is going out at night, then one must tie a small piece of red volcanic rock around one's ankle." The subject was then asked to see ifany offour individuals had violated this law. The rule was based on one developed by Cheng and Holyoak (1989), but the context gave the rule no rationale or "social purpose." We tested three versions ofthe rule that differed in only one respect: how much of a benefit the antecedent would seem to be. Among undergraduates, going out at night is a benefit: It represents fun, dating, adventure, and so on. Staying home at night is not as much fun, and taking out the garbage is even less so. Consequently, we compared performance on the "going out at night" rule to performance on two other rules: "If one is staying home at night, then one must tie a small piece of red volcanic rock around one's ankle" and "If one is taking out the garbage, then one must tie a small piece ofred volcanic rock around one's ankle." Ifpermission schema theory were correct, then all three ofthese permission rules would elicit equally high levels of P & notQ responses. 21 But ifsocial contract theory is correct, and the rule must have the costbenefit structure of a social contract to elicit the effect, then performance should decline as the value ofthe antecedent declines. The more difficult it is to interpret the
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antecedent as a benefit, the more difficult it should be to see how one could illicitly benefit by breaking the rule. The predictions and results are depicted in Figure 3.10. Performance decreases as the size of the benefit in the antecedent decreases, just as social contract theory predicts. Figure 3.10 also depicts the results of another, similar experiment with the socalled "Sears problem." As we removed the cost-benefit structure of the Sears problem, performance decreased. This experiment is also described in Cosmides and Tooby (in prep., b). Manktelow and Over (1990; scenarios Band C) tested two obligation rules that lacked the cost-benefit structure of a social contract, with similar results. Cheng and Holyoak's theory predicts that both of these rules will elicit a high percentage of P & not-Q responses, yet they elicited this response from only 12% and 25% of subjects, respectively. These experiments eliminate yet another by-product hypothesis: They show that reasoning on social contract problems is not a by-product of inference procedures for reasoning about a more general class of problems, permission problems. Permission rules elicit the effect only if the cost-benefit representation of a social contract can be assigned to them and if violating the rule would illicitly benefit the violator. These results confirm another predicted design feature: They show that cheater detection algorithms do not operate properly unless the appropriate cost-benefit representation can be assigned to the rule. Will Any Rule That Involves the PossibilityojPositive or Negative Payoffs Elicit Good Performance on the Wason Selection Task? Mankte10w and Over (1990) were interested in this question when they designed the experiments just described. Their obli-
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Figure 3.10 Are cost-benefit representations necessary? Social contract theory versus permission schema theory: Predictions and results (from Cosmides & Tooby, in prep., b).
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gation rules lacked the cost-benefit structure of a social contract and, therefore, the property that one could illicitly benefit by cheating. But in both scenarios a person would receive high payoffs for following the rule. Violating the rule would cause a person to incur a cost; a small one in the case of one of the scenarios, a large one in the case ofthe other. They found that the possibility ofpayoffs, either positive or negative, was not sufficient to elicit high levels of P & not-Q responses. We found similar results in experiments testing rules concerning the possibility that a food was poisonous (Cosmides & Tooby, in prep., c), rules such as "If a person eats the red berries, then that person will vomit." These experiments eliminate another by-product hypothesis: They show that the possibility of a payoff is not sufficient to elicit good performance on the Wason selection task and, therefore, not sufficient to explain the social contract effect. To be good at detecting violations ofa social contract rule, the violation has to represent an illicitly taken benefit. The possibility of payoffs is not sufficient to explain the social contract effect. But heuristically, it is an important dimension to consider when one is trying to discover specialized inference procedures. An evolutionary approach would lead one to investigate domains in which our foraging ancestors would have experienced positive (fitness) payoffs for "correct" reasoning and negative (fitness) payoffs for "incorrect" reasoning. We place "correct" and "incorrect" in scare quotes because these notions are defined with respect to the adaptive problem to be solved; "correct" does not necessarily mean the· logically correct P & not-Q. just as it did not in many of the social contract experiments reported here. In addition to social contracts, there is now experimental evidence suggesting the existence of specialized inference procedures for two other domains, both of which involve large fitness payoffs: precautions (prudential obligations) and threats. Manktelow and Over (1990; scenario A) were the first to uncover the possibility of precaution schemas for rules of the general form "If one enters a hazardous situation, then one should take the appropriate precaution," and Cheng and Holyoak (1989) and we (Cosmides & Tooby, in prep., b) have provided evidence in support ofthe existence ofprecaution schemas. But the experiments to be reported in Cosmides and Tooby (in prep., b) also show that precaution rules are processed differently from social contract rules, in accordance with a different adaptive logic appropriate to that problem. This is also true of threats. Our tests of threat rules show that people are very good at detecting bluffs and double crosses in situations of threat, but again, the reasoning involved does not map on to cheater detection in social contract situations (Cosmides & Tooby, in prep., a).
Summary of Experimental Findings Virtually all the experiments reviewed above asked subjects to detect violations of a conditional rule. Sometimes these violations corresponded to detecting cheaters on social contracts, other times they did not. The results showed that we do not have a general-purpose ability to detect violations ofconditional rules. But human reasoning is well designed for detecting violations of conditional rules when these can be interpreted as cheating on a social contract. Based on our computational theory of social exchange, we predicted that reasoning about social contracts would exhibit a number ofspecific design features. The results of the experiments reviewed above confirm the
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existence of many of these design features and do not falsify any of them. They show the following: 1. The algorithms governing reasoning about social contracts include inference procedures specialized for cheater detection. 2. Their cheater detection procedures cannot detect violations that do not correspond to cheating (such as mistakes). 3. The algorithms governing reasoning about social contracts operate even in unfamiliar situations. 4. The definition of cheating that they embody depends on one's perspective. 5. They are just as good at computing the cost-benefit representation of a social contract from the perspective of one party as from the perspective of another. 6. They cannot operate so as to detect cheaters unless the rule has been assigned the cost-benefit representation ofa social contract. 7. They embody implicational procedures specified by the computation theory (e.g., "Ifyou take the benefit then you are obligated to pay the cost" implies "If you paid the cost, then you are entitled to take the benefit"). 8. They do not include altruist detection procedures. Furthermore, the highly patterned reasoning performance elicited by social contracts cannot be explained as a by-product ofany ofthe more general-purpose reasoning procedures that have been proposed so far. The following by-product hypotheses were eliminated: 1. That familiarity can explain the social contract effect. 2. That social contract content merely activates the rules of inference ofthe propositional calculus. 3. That social contract content merely promotes, for whatever reason, clear thinking. 4. That permission schema theory can explain the social contract effect. 5. That any problem involving payoffs will elicit the detection of violations. 6. That a content-independent formal logic, such as the propositional calculus, quantificationallogic, or deontic logic can explain the social contract effect. These findings strongly support the hypothesis that the human mind includes cognitive procedures that are adaptations for reasoning about social exchange. IMPLICAliONS FOR CULTURE Cultural Forms Are Structured by Our Universal, Evolved Psychology
Wherever human beings live, their cultural forms and social life are infused with social exchange relations (e.g., Malinowski, 1922; Mauss, 1925/1967). Such relations appear in an enormous range of different guises, both simple and highly elaborated, implicit and explicit, deferred and simultaneous, practical and symbolic. The magnitude, variety, and complexity of our social exchange relations are among the most distinctive features ofhuman social life, and differentiate us strongly from all other animal species (Tooby&DeVore,1987). Antiquity, universality, and cross-cultural elaboration are exactly what one expects of behaviors that are the expression of universal, evolved information-processing mechanisms. From the child who gets dessert if her plate is cleaned, to the
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devout Christian who views the Old and New Testaments as covenants arrived at between humans and the supernatural, to the ubiquitous exchange ofwomen between descent groups among tribal peoples, to trading partners in the Kula Ring of the Pacific-all of these phenomena require, from the participants, the recognition and comprehension of a complex set of implicit assumptions that apply to social contract situations. Our social exchange psychology supplies a set ofinference procedures that fill in all these necessary steps, mapping the elements in each exchange situation to their representational equivalents within the social contract algorithms, specifying who in the situation counts as an agent in the exchange, which items are costs and benefits and to whom, who is entitled to what, under what conditions the contract is fulfilled or broken, and so on (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). Without social exchange and the underlying constellation ofcognitive adaptations that support it, social and mental life in every culture would be so different as to be unrecognizable as human life. If one removed from our evolutionary history and hence from our minds the possibility of cooperation and reciprocity-of mutually contingent benefit-benefit interactions arrived at through mutual consent-then coercion and force would loom even larger as instruments ofsocial influence, and positive relationships would be limited primarily to self-sacrificial interactions among kin. Such conditions do, in fact, typify the social life of most other animal species. What psychological mechanisms allow humans to behave so differently? According to the Standard Social Science Model, "culture" builds all concepts as sophisticated and as content-specific as social exchange from scratch, using only content-free general-purpose mental processes (see Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). Yet the experiments reviewed herein have shown that no general-purpose process so far proposed can produce the sophisticated pattern ofreasoning needed to engage in social exchange. Moreover, these experiments cast serious doubt on the claim that contentfree general-purpose mechanisms were responsible for building the content-specific social contract algorithms. Although we have reasoning procedures elaborately tailored for solving this ancient adaptive problem, these experiments have demonstrated that we do not have reasoning procedures that are similarly specialized for solving many familiar problems that are routinely encountered in the modem social worldsuch as detecting whether someone has made a mistake, detecting whether someone has broken a prescriptive rule that is not a social contract, and detecting whether a situation exists that violates a descriptive rule. Yet, if we did have a content-free psychology that could build the necessary reasoning mechanisms "as needed," then one would expect to find elaborate reasoning procedures specialized for solving such problems. Procedures specialized for solving ancient adaptive problems, such as social exchange, would be no more likely to develop than procedures specialized for solving the many evolutionarily novel problems posed by life in a modem, postindustrial culture. Evaluating a scientific hypothesis about the effects of dietary cholesterol, detecting whether someone has misfiled a document, and following the string of "if-then" directions on one's tax returns would be as effortless-and require as little explicit instruction-as detecting cheaters in a situation of social exchange among members of an unfamiliar tribal culture who value cassava root and facial tattoos. The claim that our only evolved psychological mechanisms are general-purpose and content-free, and that "culture" must therefore supply all the specific content of our minds, is exactly the issue on which evolutionary psychological approaches diverge most sharply from more traditional ones. In our view, instead of culture man-
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ufacturing the psychology of social exchange de novo, content-specific, evolved psychologies constitute the building blocks out of which cultures themselves are manufactured (Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). These psychologies evolved to process information about ancient and important adaptive problems, such as social exchange, sexual jealousy, kin recognition, language acquisition, emotion recognition, and parenting. On this view, the social environment need not provide all ofthe (hypothetical) properties needed to construct a social exchange psychology from a set ofcontent-free mental procedures (assuming this is possible at all), because the evolved architecture of the human mind already contains content-specific mechanisms that will cause a social exchange psychology to reliably develop in every normal human being. Because every human being will develop the same basic set of social contract algorithms, cultural forms that require their presence can emerge: traditions, rituals, institutions, linguistic conventions, symbols, and so forth can develop that rely on the stable features of this psychology, and that simply supply the specifics that activate and deploy it in each new situation. Thus, there is an immediate difference between evolutionary psychological approaches and approaches that maintain that everything involving social interaction is "socially constructed." An evolutionary psychological perspective suggests that the universal evolved architecture of the human mind contains some content-specific algorithms that are shared across individuals and across cultures, and that, therefore, many things related to social exchange should be the same from place to place-as indeed they are. In contrast, a Standard Social Science Model approach would, ifthoroughgoing, maintain that social exchange is culture-specific and historically contingent, existing in some places and not in others. Moreover, the Standard Model would have to predict that wherever social exchange is found to exist, it would have to be taught or communicated from the ground up. Because nothing about social exchange is initially present in the psychology ofthe learner, every structural feature of social exchange must be specified by the social environment as against the infinity oflogically alternative branchings that could exist. It is telling that it is just this explicitness that is usually lacking in social life. Few individuals are able to articulate the assumptions that structure their own cultural forms-to do so usually requires considerable effort and is accompanied by the awareness that one is doing something unusual and artificial (Sperber, 1975). We suggest that social exchange is learned without explicit enumeration of the underlying assumptions. The surface forms are provided by specific cultures, but they are interpreted by content-specific information-processing devices containing implicit assumptions and procedures that evolved for exactly this purpose. The issue of explicitness is particularly instructive. As Sperber and Wilson (1986) point out, if two individuals have no shared assumptions about the world, communication between them is impossible. The explicit part of the communicative process concerns those features ofa situation that are known to the sender but not yet known to the receiver, but such transmissions are only interpretable because ofwhat is already mutually understood. This point is particularly relevant to understanding human culture, because the learning of a culture itself in effect consists ofsuccessful communication between members of the culture and the individual who is learning about it. Consequently, for someone ignorant ofa culture to learn it in the first place, it is necessary that she already share many assumptions with those from whom she is learning the culture. Ifhuman minds truly were initially tabula rasas, with no prior contentful structure, then no anthropologist or immigrant to a culture could ever learn about it
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(Quine, 1969). More to the point, all children are immigrants,born into the world with no culturally specific knowledge at all. Ifthe evolved architecture of the child's mind contained no meaningful content at all-that is, if it were truly content-free-then children could never learn the culture they are born into: They would have no reliable means of interpreting anything they saw and hence of placing the same construction on it that members oftheir culture do. We suggest that domain-specific reasoning procedures such as social contract algorithms (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989) supply what is missing from traditional accounts of the acquisition of culture: that is, the necessary preexisting conceptual organization, which provides the shared assumptions humans need to interpret unfamiliar behavior and utterances and, in so doing, to acquire their culture. Such domain-specific algorithms embody both intrinsic definitions for the representations that they operate on (e.g., benefit, requirement, cheater) and cues for recognizing which elements in ontogenetically unfamiliar but evolutionarily recurrent situations correspond to those representations. This is why humans can barter or even form friendships where no common language is spoken. It is for this reason that we tested our subjects' ability to apply social contract algorithms to unfamiliar situations: Indeed, they did so as easily as they apply them to familiar contents. For all of the above reasons, we argue that such content-sensitive cognitive adaptations are a critical element in the process ofcultural transmission. Culture would not be possible without them. In any case, the way in which such a universal psychology would lead to cultural universals is straightforward, and the enumeration of cases of social exchange found cross-culturally would add little to furthering the discussion. For that reason, we would like to focus on two more interesting issues: (a) Assuming there is a universal, evolved psychology ofsocial exchange, how might one explain and organize our understanding of cultural differences? That is, how can an underlying universal psychology express itselfdifferently in different cultures? And (b) How can the ethnographic record inform us about additional aspects ofour social exchange psychology, beyond those fewalgorithms and representations that have already been explored experimentally? Intergroup Differences: Evoked Culture and Transmitted Culture
Human thought and behavior differs in an organized fashion from place to place, and these differences are typically termed "cultural" variation. In fact, it is considered a tautology by many to attribute this variation to the operation of culture-that is, to social transmission. Nevertheless, there are two complementary explanations for the existence of these within-location similarities and between-location differences in thought and behavior (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989, this volume). The traditional explanation is that these systematic differences are caused by what is usually called transmittedculture. that is, the process whereby the thought and behavior ofsome individuals (usually from the preceding generation) is passed on to other individuals, thereby causing the present pattern. Indeed, we have already touched on how domain-specific cognitive adaptations make cultural traIISmission possible. There is, however, a second way in which such local similarities can be brought about. Our universal, evolved information-processing mechanisms should be sensitively context-dependent: Different informational inputs should evoke different representational and behavioral outputs. Humans share the same evolved information-
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processing mechanisms, but they do not all live under the same circumstances. People living in the same location are likely to experience somewhat similar circumstances, which should evoke the same kind of response from each individual; people living in different locations are likely to experience somewhat different circumstances, which should evoke different responses from each individual. To take an obvious example, people in tropical forest environments all around the world tend to be at most only lightly clothed, something that has less to do with parental example than with heat load. The more complex the set of species-typical psychological mechanisms, the more sensitively dependent behavior may be on local circumstances. This means that cultural forms may exist that are not primarily generated by cultural transmission at all. We call similarities triggered by local circumstances evoked culture (Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). Of course, these two explanations are by no means mutually exclusive and usually operate together to shape the distribution of human similarities and differences. The evolutionary psychology of social exchange shapes both evoked culture and transmitted culture, and the exploration of a few of these issues serves to illustrate how an evolutionary psychological approach to culture can diverge from traditional anthropological approaches. Open Questions in the Psychology of Social Exchange
Before proceeding to discuss how an evolved, universal psychology can generate cultural variation, it is necessary to emphasize the limited nature of what we have done so far. We have tested only a small number of hypotheses about one mode of social exchange out of many. We have not discussed, much less experimentally explored, the rest of the intricate and complex psychology of social exchange. Anyone examining his or her own human experience will immediately identify large areas of the psychology ofsocial exchange, such as the psychology offriendship, that are not captured well by the models introduced so far. More important, the other components of our evolved faculty of social cognition-for example, the psychological mechanisms that govern sexual relations, coalitional partnerships, status, revenge, threat, and parenting-will have to be mapped out and integrated with the psychological mechanisms governing social exchange before social exchange can be fully unraveled. Each component of the faculty of social cognition can be only incompletely understood when taken in isolation. The computational theory that we have developed specifies certain contractual relationships and implicit inferences that people can be expected to make in social contract situations (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). It is, however, very far from a complete computational theory ofsocial exchange and should not be mistaken for one: Instead, it is only an initial exploration of some of its major features. Many crucial questions were left unaddressed-questions that must be answered ifwe are to understand social exchange in all its various forms across cultures, or even within a single culture. For example, how many instances of cheating should the decision rule tolerate before it activates mechanisms causing one to sever one's relationship with an individual? Under what conditions should one cooperate with a person on a short-term basis, as opposed to a long-term basis? Should one's willingness to tolerate cheating differ in short-term versus long-term relationships? Will variance in the acquisition of the resources being exchanged affect the ways in which they are shared? What are the other
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bases for sharing, assistance, and friendship? What role do groups and coalitions play in shaping patterns ofassistance? What is the role ofaggression, retaliation, and status? We expect that further evolutionary analyses will support the claim that different decision rules will be favored for long-term versus short-term relationships, for highversus low-variance resources, and for other variations in conditions that we have not considered here. Ifthis turns out tok true, then although some decision rules governing social exchange should be common across situations, others will differ in ways that are sensitively dependent on context. In other words, the social contract algorithms might contain different situation-specific modes ofactivation. For example, we expect the rules governing social exchange among close friends to differ somewhat from the rules governing social exchange among strangers. Given an evolved architecture with a design ofthis kind, one can develop a coherent conceptual framework for understanding the ecological distribution ofmental representations and expressed behaviors having to do with social exchange, both within and between groups (Sperber, 1985). Although the analysis of individual and cultural variation within the context ofa universal human nature is too complex to review fully here, extended discussions can be found in Cosmides and Tooby (1987), Tooby and Cosmides (1989, 1990a), and Brown (1991). Briefly: I. By virtue of being members of the human species, all humans are expected to have the same adaptive mechanisms, either at the level of developmental programs, which govern alternative developmental pathways, or (more likely in the case ofsocial exchange) universally developing cognitive specializations. 2. In consequence, certain fundamental ways of thinking about social exchange will be the same everywhere, without needing to be socially transmitted. 3. As is standardly believed, social transmission may indeed shape social exchange. But it does so not by manufacturing the concept of social exchange de novo. Instead, there are probably certain specific avenues through which social transmission can act: for example, by influencing the valuation placed on items or actions, by providing information that helps one identify appropriate partners, or by providing information that allows one to identify appropriate contexts. 4. Our social exchange psychology should be highly context-dependent. Consequently, many dimensions along which social exchange varies, both within and between cultures, may be instances of evoked culture. The presence or magnitude of certain cues, conditions, or situations should cause mechanisms within our social exchange psychology to be calibrated; to be activated or inhibited; or to be switched into alternative modes of activation. When local circumstances trigger a particular mode of activation of the social contract algorithms, for example, this may cause a highly structured, multi-individual behavioral outcome. Therefore, when one sees similar patterns of social exchange in widely different parts ofthe world, one cannot assume that the similarity is determined primarily by social transmission; the similarity may instead by an instance of evoked culture. One simple illustration of evoked culture involves the decision rules governing reciprocity in food sharing. As we describe below, a contextual variable-the presence or absence ofuluck" in food acquisition-appears to activate different decision rules governing food sharing.
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Luck and Sharing
One finding from the literature of evolutionary ecology on optimal foraging is that different kinds ofsharing rules benefit the individual in different situations (see Kaplan & Hill, 1985). For example, when the variance in foraging success of the individual is greater than the variance for the band as a whole, band-wide food sharing buffers the variance. This can happen when one individual's success on a given day is unconnected to that ofanother. Luck, skill, and effort all affect whether an individual finds food on a given day, but for certain food sources, luck is much more important than skill and effort. When success in finding food randomly varies a great deal from day to day, consider what would happen to a person who ate only that which he or she individually acquired. Some days that person would be starving; other days that person would have more to eat than he or she could possibly consume. It would be a feast or famine kind of life. Moreover, the temporary famines hit harder than the feasts can make up for. This is because (a) there is a zero point with food-death by starvation-and (b) the law of decreasing marginal utilities applies because we can only metabolize so much at one time-consequently, the fifth pound of meat eaten is far less valuable than the first pound. Under these circumstances, one is better offindividually ifone can redistribute food from periods of feast to periods of famine. There are two ways of doing this: through food storage or through pooling resources with others. Food storage is not an option for many hunter-gatherers, but pooling resources is: Iftwo people average their returns, the variance decreases-one buys fewer periods of privation at the price of fewer periods of superabundance. By adding more individuals to the risk-pooling group, the variance may continue to decrease, making band-wide sharing an attractive system for hunter-gatherers facing certain conditions. Thus, situations involving a random and frequent reversal of fortune can create substantial payoffs for cooperation. In effect, an individual can store food in the form of social obligations-by accepting food, others obligate themselves to reciprocate in the future. I may sacrifice by giving you some of my food today, but tomorrow I may be the one who is empty-handed and in need. For situations involving frequent, chance-driven reversals of fortune, the favored strategy involves sharing, from individuals who have food to those who do not. Luck plays an important role in hunting; consequently, hunter-gatherers frequently distribute game relatively equally to everyone in the band, no matter who found it or made a particular kill. Because it is a relatively high-variance activity, hunting may have been a particularly important driving force in the evolution of cognitive adaptations for social exchange (see Tooby & DeVore, 1987, for discussion). By the same token, when variance in foraging success for an individual is low, the average long-term payoffs to sharing are less. Ifeveryone reliably has access to the same goods, there is no particular benefit to sharing-one gains nothing by swapping the same goods at the same time. In this circumstance, an individual may be better off sharing just within his or her family, in accordance with kin selection, mating, and parenting principles. Under low-variance conditions, not only might there be no benefit to sharing, there may be definite costs. When luck is eliminated as a factor, skill and effort remain. The smaller the role played by chance, the more differences between individuals in amount of food foraged will reflect differences in skill and effort. Under such circumstances,
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band-wide food sharing would simply redistribute food from those who expend more effort or are more skilled, to those who expend less effort or are less skilled. Sharing under these circumstances offers few-if any-intrinsic payoffs for those who have acquired more food. Without chance creating reversals offortune, there is little reason to expect that the future will be different from the present and, therefore, little reason to expect that those with less food now will be in a better position to reciprocate in the future. Under these circumstances, then, one expects that (a) potential recipients will welcome sharing, but (b) potential donors will be more reluctant to share. Consequently, the degree and source variance in resource acquisition were selection pressures that should have shaped the evolved architecture ofour social exchange algorithms. Information about variance in foraging success should activate different modes of operation of these algorithms, with high variance due to chance triggering a psychology of sharing. To modem social scientists, factors such as variance in food acquisition may seem arcane and implausible because of their lack of connection to modem (middle-class) experience. But for our ancestors, food acquisition was a daily problem, as consequential as breathing. Daily decisions with respect to sharing had an unremitting impact on their lives and reproductive success, over hundreds of thousands of generations. In consequence, it is hard to see how our social psychology would not have been shaped by factors of this kind. Obviously, this analysis ofselection pressures is restricted to factors internal to foraging success. There are, of course, many other selection pressures that have shaped human social psychology over evolutionary time and hence many other factors that may lead to food sharing other than simple social exchange-kinship, love, parenting, sex, coercion, and status, for example. Moreover, even within the context of social exchange, the return on sharing food may be something other than food. Selection may have produced psychological mechanisms that cause highly productive foragers to share food without expecting any return offood, if, for example, by so doing others valued them highly and were therefore more disposed to render them aid when they were threatened, protect their children, grant them sexual access, and so on (Kaplan & Hill, 1985). Complicated though it may be, a more comprehensive understanding of social exchange eventually can be built up, element by element, by examining each selection pressure in tum and seeing whether our psychological mechanisms have the design features these selection pressures would lead one to expect. In other words, the selection pressures analyzed in optimal foraging theory are one component of a task analysis, or, in David Marr's terms, a "computational theory," of the adaptive problem offoraging. It defines the nature of the problem to be solved and thereby specifies constraints that any mechanism that evolved to solve this problem can be expected to satisfy. In this case, optimal foraging theory suggests (a) that we should have content-specific information-processing mechanisms governing foraging and sharing, and (b) these mechanisms should be sensitive to information regarding variance in foraging success, causing us to prefer one set ofsharing rules for high-variance items and another set for low-variance items.
The Ache: Within-Group Evidence for Evoked Culture Kaplan and Hill's (1985) study ofthe Ache, a hunter-gatherer group living in eastern Paraguay, provides a particularly elegant test ofthe hypothesis just described, because it controls for "culture." Meat is a very high-variance food item among the Ache: On
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any given day, there is a 40% chance that a hunter will come back empty-handed (Kaplan, Hill, & Hurtado, 1990). Collected plant foods, in contrast, are very low-variance items. Kaplan and Hill found that the Ache engage in band-wide sharing of meat, whereas they share plant foods primarily within the nuclear family. Thus the same individuals, in the same culture, engage in different patterns of sharing for different foods, depending on the variance they experience in obtaining them. The fact that meat is such a high-variance item also creates problems in cheater detection. If a man brings back no meat for seven days in a row, has he just had a run of bad luck, or has he been shirking? An Ache man's life and the life of his family depend on the long-term reciprocity relationships he has with the other hunters in his band. To accuse someone ofcheating and ostracize him from the reciprocity network is a very serious matter. If the charge is false, then not only will the ostracized man's survival be jeopardized, but each member ofthe band will have lost a valuable reciprocation partner. Ifone is not sure, or ifthe suspected cheater is providing a net benefit even though it is less than he could provide if he tried harder, it might be better to continue the relationship. The anthropologists who study the Ache know who the best hunters are, because they have recorded and weighed what each man brings back over long periods oftime. Presumably, the Ache know also. But H. Kaplan (personal communication, 1991) reports that when he and his colleagues ask Ache men who the beSt hunters are, the question makes them very uncomfortable and they refuse to answer. 22 This is not due to a general cultural prohibition against accusing others of cheating. When the Ache are staying at a mission camp, acrimonious arguments erupt over whether various individuals are doing their fair share ofwork in the garden. Gardening, however, provides a low-variance source offood, making the punishment ofcheaters less risky, and it occurs in a well-defined, observable location, making it easy to monitor who is, and who is not, cheating.
!Kung San Versus / /Gana San: Between-Group Evidence for Evoked Culture Resource variance can also explain differences between groups, evoking different cultures in response to different, variance-related local circumstances. For example, Cashdan (1980) found variance-related differences in sharing between groups ofKalahari San that mirror those found within Ache culture. The Kalahari San are well known in anthropological circles for their economic and political egalitarianism. For example, the !Kung San, who experience extreme variability in the availability offood and water, have very strong social sanctions that reinforce sharing, discourage hoarding (calling someone "stingy" is a strong insult), and discourage displays of arrogance and authority. For example: The proper behavior of a !Kung hunter who has made a big kill is to speak of it in passing and in a deprecating manner ... ; if an individual does not minimize or speak lightly of his own accomplishments, his friends and relatives will not hesitate to do it for him. (Cashdan, 1980,p.116)
But it turns out that some San bands are more egalitarian than others, and their degree of egalitarianism is related to variance in their food supply. The / /Gana San of the northeastern Kalahari are able to buffer themselves from variability in the food
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and water supply in ways that other San cannot, through a small amount offood cultivation (including a kind of melon that stores water in the desert environment) and some goat husbandry. In contrast to the !Kung. the //Gana manifest considerable economic inequality, they hoard more, they are more polygynous, and, although they have no clear-cut authority structure, wealthy, high-status //Gana men are quick to claim that they speak for others and that they are the "headman"-behavior that would be considered unconscionable among the !Kung. Again, even though the !Kung and the //Gana are culturally similar in many ways-they share the same encompassing "meme-pool," so to speak-their social rules regarding sharing and economic equality differ, and these differences track the variance in their food and water supplies. Local Conditions and Evoked Culture It is difficult to explain these phenomena simply as the result ofcultural transmission, at least in any traditional sense. Among the Ache of Paraguay, the same individuals share food types with different variances differently. Half way around the world, in Africa, two different groups of Kalahari San manifest what appear to be the same differential sharing patterns in response to the same variable-variance. A parsimonious explanation is that these social norms and the highly patterned behaviors they give rise to are evoked by the same variable. Because foraging and sharing are complex adaptive problems with a long evolutionary history, it is difficult to see how humans could have escaped evolving highly structured domain-specific psychological mechanisms that are well designed for solving them. These mechanisms should be sensitive to local informational input, such as information regarding variance in the food supply. This input can act as a switch, turning on and offdifferent modes ofactivation of the appropriate domain-specific mechanisms. The experience of high variance in foraging success should activate rules of inference, memory retrieval cues, attentional mechanisms, and motivational mechanisms. These should not only allow band-wide sharing to occur, but should make it seem fair and appealing. The experience of low variance in foraging success should activate rules ofinference, memory retrieval cues, attentional mechanisms, and motivational mechanisms that make within-family sharing possible and appealing, but that make band-wide sharing seem unattractive and unjust. These alternative modes of activation of the domain-specific mechanisms provide the core knowledge that must be mutually manifest (see Sperber & Wilson, 1986) to the various actors for band-wide or within-family sharing to occur. This core knowledge can then organize and provide points of attachment for symbolic activities that arise in these domains. Ifthis notion ofevoked culture is correct, then one should not expect cultural variation to vary continuously along all imaginable dimensions. The free play of human creativity may assign relatively arbitrary construals to elements in some areas of life, such as the number of gods or the appropriate decoration on men's clothing. But in other areas oflife one might expect there to be a limited number ofrecurring patterns, both within and across cultures. For certain domains of human activity, people from very different places and times may "reinvent" the same kinds ofconcepts, valuations, social rules, and customs (see Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). In short, such alternative modes ofactivation in psychological mechanisms can create alternative sets of complexly patterned social rules and activities. These will emerge independently, that is, in the absence ofdirect cultural transmission, in culture after culture, when the indi-
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vidual members are exposed to the informational cues that activate these alternative modes. Cross-<:ultural studies of social exchange by Fiske provide support for this notion (Fiske, 1990, 1991a). Based on his field studies of the Moose ("Mossi") of Burkina Faso and his review of the anthropological literature, Fiske argues that the human mind contains four alternative implicit models of how sharing should be conducted, which are used to generate and evaluate social relations. These models are implicit in the sense that they are acted on unreflectively and without conscious awareness; indeed, they may never have been explicitly stated by any member ofthe culture. Nevertheless, "these shared but unanalyzed, tacit models for Moose social relations allow them to generate coordinated, consistent, and culturally comprehensible interactions offour contrasting types" (Fiske, 1990, pp. 180-181). For example, one ofFiske's four models is communal sharing ofthe kind used by the Ache in distributing hunted meat; another is "market pricing"-the kind of explicit contingent exchange that occurs when two people explicitly agree to trade, say, honey for meat or money for milk. Varieties of Hunter-Gatherer Exchange
Whether or not Fiske's specific taxonomy of four categories is exactly the correct way to capture and characterize the limited set of modes whereby humans engage in social exchange, we very much agree with this general framework for conceptualizing cultural variation in social exchange. If human thought falls into recurrent patterns from place to place and from time to time, this is because it is the expression of, and anchored in, universal psychological mechanisms. Ifthere is a limited set ofsuch patterns, it is because different modes of activation of the algorithms regulating social exchange solved different adaptive problems that hunter-gatherers routinely faced. Consequently, clues as to how many modes ofactivation the social contract algorithms have, what the structure ofeach mode might be, and what kinds ofcircumstances can be expected to activate each mode can be found by investigating the various forms of social exchange that hunter-gatherers engage in, as well as the conditions under which each form ofexchange arises. Despite the common characterization of hunter-gatherer life as an orgy of indiscriminate, egalitarian cooperation and sharing-a kind of retro-utopia-the archaeological and ethnographic record shows that hunter-gatherers engaged in a number of different forms ofsocial exchange (for an excellent review ofhunter-gatherer economics, see Cashdan, 1989). Communal sharing does not exhaust the full range of exchange in such societies. Hunter-gatherers also engage in explicit contingent exchange-Fiske's "market pricing"-in which tools and other durable goods are traded between bands, often in networks that extend over vast areas. A common form oftrade is formal gift exchanges with carefully chosen partners from other bands. For instance, aboriginal Australians traded tools such as sting ray spears and stone axes through gift exchanges with partners from neighboring bands. These partnerships were linked in a chain that extended 620 km, from the coast, where sting ray spears were produced, to the interior, where there were quarries where the stone axes could be produced. Here, environmental variation in the source of raw materials for tool making allowed gains from trade based on economic specialization, and the laws ofsupply and demand seemed to operate: At the coast, where sting ray spears were common, it took more ofthem to buy an ax than in the interior, where spears were dear and axes cheap
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(Sharp, 1952). Similarly, the !Kung of the Kalahari desert engage in a system of delayed reciprocal gift giving called "hxaro" (Weissner, 1982; Cashdan, 1989), through which they trade durable goods such as blankets and necklaces. Unpredictable variation in rainfall and game makes access to land and water resources another important "item of trade" between hunter-gatherer bands and creates situations in which a kind of implicit one-for-one reciprocity prevails (Fiske's "equality matching"). For instance, a !Kung band that is caught in a drought will "visit relatives" in a band that is camped in an area that is experiencing more rainfall (Cashday, 1989). Indeed, hxaro partners are chosen carefully, not only for their ability to confer durable goods, but also to provide alternative residences in distant places during times oflocal scarcity (Weissner, I982). And before using another band's water hole or land, the !Kung are expected to ask permission; reciprocity in access to water holes is extremely important to the !Kung, who live in a desert with few permanent sources ofwater. Although formal permission is almost always granted, as the implicit rules of one-for-one reciprocity require, if the hosts really don't want to accommodate their guests, they make them feel unwelcome, thereby subtly encouraging them to leave (Cashdan, 1989). Although authoritarian social relations are unusual among the few remaining modern hunter-gatherer groups, this is probably a by-product of their having been pushed into marginal environments by the peoples ofagricultural and industrial cultures. Variance in the food supply is high in harsh environments like the Kalahari desert, and band-wide communal sharing is advantageous for high-variance resources. But as variance is buffered, as in the //Gana San example discussed earlier, more inequality and more authority-ranking relationships develop. This process was, for example, quite pronounced in the hunter-gatherer societies of the Pacific Northwest. The Paqfic Northwest was so rich in fish and game that the hunter-gatherers living there could afford to be relatively sedentary. These people developed stable, complex societies that were so hierarchical that some ofthem even included a slave class formed from prisoners of war (Drucker, 1983; Donald, 1983). Of course, the distribution of goods and services that occurs between individuals of different rank is often determined by an uneasy mixture ofcoercion, threat, and exchange. This is not the place to attempt a full computational theory of the various modes of activation of the social contract algorithms. But even these brief examples drawn from hunter-gatherer life provide some hints as to what might be relevant variables in such an analysis: variance in the food supply; degree ofkinship; status or rank; whether a relationship is long- or short-term; whether one is in daily contact (communal sharing; implicit deferred reciprocity) or only rare contact (explicit contingent exchange); whether storage is possible; whether the group is sedentary enough for inequalities in wealth to accumulate; whether gaining a resource requires close, interdependent cooperation; whether people are trading different resources or dividing the same resource; whether an external, consensual definition of "equal portion" is feasible; whether an individual can control access to a resource, and thereby "own" it; and so on (see also McGrew & Feistner, this volume). To understand social exchange in all its various forms, the adaptive problems that selected for different decision rules must be precisely defined in the form of computational theories. The computational theories can then be used to generate hypotheses about the design features that characterize the different modes of activation of the social contract algorithms. Psychological experiments of the kind described earlier in
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this chapter would allow one to test among these hypotheses and thereby develop a detailed map of the situation-specific cognitive processes that create these different modes ofactivation. Once we know what situational cues activate each set ofdecision rules, we should be able to predict a great deal ofcultural variation. Interpreting Other Cultures and Understanding Cultural Change
Significant aspects of cultural variation in social exchange can be readily reconciled with a universal human nature through applying the concept of evoked culture. The various sets of decision rules governing social exchange will be universal, but which sets are activated will differ from situation to situation within a culture, as well as between cultures. For example, in American middle-class culture different exchange rules apply to different aspects ofa dinner party (Fiske, 1991b). Invitations are sometimes governed by one-for-one reciprocity-an implicit rule such as "If you had me to your home for dinner, then at some point I must invite you to dinner." But food sharing at the party is governed by the same kind ofcommunal sharing rules that characterize Ache meat sharing. Obtaining the food that is served is governed by explicit contingent exchange at a grocery store, and seating at the dinner table is sometimes determined by rank or status (as for example, at diplomatic dinners, birthday parties, or in certain traditional families). The point is that communal sharing, explicit contingent exchange, equality matching, and so on, are not unique to American culture: The same sets of decision rules appear in other cultures as well, but local circumstances cause them to be applied to different situations (Fiske, 1990, 1991a). Whereas all food at an American dinner party is shared communally, this is not true on Ache foraging trips: Meat is shared communally at the level ofthe entire band, but plant foods are not. In many cultures, men engage in explicit contingent exchange to procure wives: One man will buy another man's daughter (see Wilson & Daly, this volume). In other cultures, men do not buy wives, but instead can engage in explicit contingent exchange with a woman to gain temporary sexual access to her. In still other cultures, the use of explicit contingent exchange is illegal in both circumstances (but may still be understood and occasionally practiced). Fiske argues that in relatively stable, traditional societies there is a tacit consensus about which decision rules to apply in which situation. To apply the wrong decision rules to a situation can be uncomfortable, insulting, or even shocking: At the end of an American dinner party, one does not pull out a wallet and offer to pay the hosts for their services. Similarly, when Americans are sitting with friends or co-workers, they might spontaneously offer to split a sandwich, but they almost never spontaneously pull out their wallets and offer money. Indeed, figuring out which decision rules a culture applies to which situations is part ofwhat it means to understand another culture (Fiske, 1990). On this view, "interpreting another culture" is not usually a matter of absorbing wholly new systems of culturally alien semantic relations. Instead, interpreting another culture is a matter of learning how the evolved set of meanings that we have come to assign to one set of objects or elements in a situation are, in another culture, assigned to a different set. New events ofall kinds, from migrations to natural disasters to new technologies, create culturally unprecedented circumstances in which there is no within-culture
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consensus about which exchange rules are appropriate. In the United States, for example, there is a vigorous debate over which form of exchange should apply when a woman wants to be a surrogate mother for an infertile couple. Many women prefer explicit contingent exchange in which they are paid money for their labor (so to speak). But other Americans argue that surrogacy should occur-ifat all-only among close friends and relatives who participate in informal communal sharing relationships and that women should be legally prohibited from granting access to their wombs on the basis ofexplicit contingent exchange. Where do the impulses-or, more accurately-the decision rules come from that lead individuals or entire cultures to reject an existing practice or to invent or adopt something new? Transmission models can account for stable transmission ofexisting attitudes and cultural forms but intrinsically have no way to account for cultural change, or indeed any nonimitated individual act. The existence of a species-typical evolved psychology fills in this missing gap. It provides a basis from which one can interpret individual action, minority dissent, and the emergence of a new consensus. Dramatic new circumstances may evoke new attitudes overnight, as when the Battle of Britain changed the attitudes and sharing practices of Londoners, or when depictions of earthquakes and other natural disasters prompt people to donate food and other assistance. Even where one is dealing with the spread of new cultural forms through transmission, however, the dynamics are powerfully structured by our content-sensitive evolved psychology (for a lucid discussion of the "epidemiology" of beliefs and other representations, see Sperber, 1985, 1990). Consider the political and moral debate concerning the homeless in the United States. Those with opposing postures concerning how much to help the homeless frame their positions in ways that exploit the structure ofthis evolved psychology. One persistent theme among those who wish to motivate more sharing is the idea of "there but for fortune, go you or I." That is, they emphasize the random, variance-driven dimensions ofthe situation. The potential recipient ofaid is viewed as worthy because he or she is the unlucky victim of circumstances, such as unemployment, discrimination, or mental illness. On the other hand, those who oppose an increase in sharing with the homeless emphasize the putatively chosen or self-caused dimensions of the situation. Potential recipients are viewed as unworthy ofaid because they "brought it on themselves": They are portrayed as able-bodied but lazy, or as having debilitated themselves through choosing to use alcohol and other drugs. The counterresponse from those who want to motivate more sharing is to portray drug use not as a choice, but as a sickness, and so on. If cultural meanings were truly arbitrary, then, cross-culturally, donors would be just as likely to view people as "worthy of assistance" when they have "brought it on themselves" as when they have been "the victims ofbad luck." Indeed, ifall were arbitrary, somewhere one should find a culture in which potential donors are most eager to help those who are more fortunate than themselves, merely because the potential recipients are more fortunate (and not, say, because they hope for something in return). Finally, although our cognitive mechanisms evolved to promote adaptive decisions in the Pleistocene, they do not necessarily produce adaptive decisions under evolutionarily novel modern circumstances (see Symons, this volume). For example, if individual variance in obtaining alcohol is greater than group variance for homeless
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alcoholics who camp out in the same alley, this circumstance might activate decision rules that promote communal sharing of alcohol, even though these people's mutual generosity would be slowly killing them.
CONCLUSIONS Human reason has long been believed to be the paradigm case of the impartial, content-blind, general-purpose process. Further, it has been viewed as the faculty that distinguished humans from all other animals, and the very antithesis of "instinct." But ifeven reasoning turns out to be the proouct ofa collection offunctionally specialized, evolved mechanisms, most of which are content-dependent and content-imparting, then this has implications far beyond the study of reasoning. The presumption that psychological mechanisms are characteristically general-purpose and content-free would no longer be tenable: Such hypotheses should no longer be accorded the privileged status and the near-immunity from question that they have customarily received. Instead, domain-general and domain-specific hypotheses should be given equal footing and evaluated solely on their ability to be turned into genuine, well-specified models that actually account for observed phenomena. Guided by such tenets, we may discover that the human mind is structurally far richer than we have suspected and contains a large population of different mechanisms. We have used as a test case the intersection of reasoning and social exchange. The results of the experiments discussed herein directly contradict the traditional view; they indicate that the algorithms and representations whereby people reason about social exchange are specialized and domain-specific. Indeed, there has been an accumulation of "evidence of special design" (Williams, 1966), indicating the presence of an adaptation. The results are most parsimoniously explained by positing the existence of "specialized problem-solving machinery" (Williams, 1966)-such as costbenefit representations and cheater detection procedures-that are well designed for solving adaptive problems particular to social exchange. Moreover, they cannot be explained as the by-product of mechanisms designed for reasoning about classes of problems that are more general than social contracts, such as "all propositions," or even the relatively restricted class of "all permissions." In addition, the pattern of results indicate that this specialized problem-solving machinery was not built by an evolved architecture that is general-purpose and content-free (see Implications for Culture, this chapter, and Cosmides, 1989). In other words, the empirical record is most parsimoniously explained by the hypothesis that the evolved architecture of the human mind contains functionally specialized, content-dependent cognitive adaptations for social exchange. Such mechanisms, if they exist, would impose a distinct social contract conceptual organization on certain social situations and impart certain meanings to human psychological, social, and cultural life. We suggest these evolved algorithms constitute one functional subunit, out of many others, that are linked together to form a larger faculty of social cognition (e.g., Jackendoff, 1991). The results of the experiments discussed herein undermine two central tenets of the Standard Social Science Model (Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). First, they undermine the proposition that the evolved architecture ofthe human mind contains a single "reasoning faculty" that is function-general and content-free. Instead, they support the contrary contention that human reasoning is governed by a diverse col-
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lection ofevolved mechanisms, many of which are functionally specialized, domainspecific, content-imbued, and content-imparting (see Tooby & Cosmides, this volume). According to this contrary view, situations involving threat, social exchange, hazard, rigid-object mechanics, contagion, and so on each activate different sets of functionally specialized procedures that exploit the recurrent properties of the corresponding domain in a way that would have produced an efficacious solution under Pleistocene conditions. On this view, the human mind would more closely resemble an intricate network of functionally dedicated computers than a single general-purpose computer. The second tenet that these results undermine is the proposition that all contentful features ofthe human mind are "socially constructed" or environmentally derived. In its place, this research supports the view that the human mind imposes contentful structure on the social world, derived from specialized functional design inherent in its evolved cognitive architecture. The conceptual integration of evolutionary biology with cognitive psychology offers something far more valuable than general arguments. The analysis of the computational requirements of specific adaptive problems provides a principled way of identifying likely new modules, mental organs, or cognitive adaptations, and thereby opens the way for extensive empirical progress. By understanding these requirements, one can make educated guesses about the design features of the information.,.processing mechanisms that evolved to solve them. Turning knowledge ofthe adaptive problems our ancestors faced over evolutionary time into well-specified computational theories can therefore be a powerful engine of discovery, allowing one to construct experiments that can capture, document, and catalog the functionally specialized information-processing mechanisms that collectively constitute much (or all) of our "central processes." In effect, knowledge of the adaptive problems humans faced, described in explicitly computational terms, can function as a kind of Rosetta Stone: It allows the bewildering array ofcontent effects that cognitive psychologists routinely encounter-and usually disregard-to be translated into meaningful statements about the structure of the mind. The resulting maps ofdomain-specific informationprocessing mechanisms can supply the currently missing accounts of how the human mind generates and engages the rich content of human culture, behavior, and social life. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Jerry Barkow, David Buss, Martin Daly, Lorraine Daston, Gerd Gigerenzer, Steve Pinker, Paul Romer, Roger Shepard, Don Symons, Phil Tetlock, Dan Sperber, Valerie Stone, and Margo Wilson for productive discussions ofthe issues addressed in this chapter or for their useful comments on previous drafts. This chapter was prepared, in part, while the authors were Fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We are grateful for the Center's support, as well as that provided by the Gordon P. Getty Trust, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, NSF Grant BNS87-Q0864 to the Center, NSF Grant BNS85-11685 to Roger Shepard, and NSF Grant BNS91·57449 to John Tooby.
NOTES I. For example, if C; and B; refer to decreases and increases in ts reproduction, then a decision rule that causes i to perform act Z if, and only if. C; ofdoing Z < 0 would promote its own
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Darwinian fitness, but not its inclusive fitness. In contrast, a decision rule that causes i to perform act Z if, and only if, (C; ofdoing Z) < (Bjofi'sdoing Z) X rij would promote its inclusive fitness, sometimes at the expense of its Darwinian fitness. The first decision rule would be at a selective disadvantage compared with the second one, because it can make copies of itself only through its bearer, and not through its bearer's relatives. For this reason, designs that promote their own inclusive fitness tend to replace alternative designs that promote Darwinian fitness at the expense of inclusive fitness. Although this example involves helping behavior, kin selection theory applies to the evolution of nonbehavioral design features as well, for example, to the evolution of aposematic coloration of butterfly wings. In principle, one can compute the extent to which a new wing color affects the reproduction of its bearer and its bearer's kin, just as one can compute the extent to which an action affects the reproduction ofthese individuals. 2. Other models of social exchange are possible, but they will not change the basic conclusion of this section: that reciprocation is necessary for the evolution of social exchange. For example, the Prisoner's Dilemma assumes that enforceable threats and enforceable contracts are impossibilities (Axelrod, 1984), assumptions that are frequently violated in nature. The introduction of these factors would not obviate reciprocation-in fact, they would enforce it. 3. Following Marr, 1982, we would like to distinguish between the cognitive program itself and an abstract characterization of the decision rule it embodies. Algorithms that differ somewhat in the way they process information may nevertheless embody the same decision rule. For example, the algorithms for adding Arabic numerals differ from those for adding Roman numerals, yet they both embody the same rules for addition (e.g., that A + B = B + A) and therefore yield the same answer (Marr, 1982). 4. These selection pressures exist even in the absence of competition for scarce resources. They are a consequence ofthe game-theoretic structure ofthe social interaction. 5. The game "unravels" if they do. If we both know we are playing three games, then we both know we will mutually defect on the last game. In practice, then, our second game is our last game. But we know that we will, therefore, mutually defect on that game, so, in practice, we are playing only one game. The argument is general to any known, fixed number ofgames (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). 6. The cost-benefit values that these algorithms assign to items of exchange should be correlated with costs and benefits to fitness in the environment in which the algorithms evolved; otherwise, the algorithms could not have been selected for. But these assigned values will not necessarily correlate with fitness in the modern world. For example, our taste mechanisms assess fat content in food and our cognitive system uses this cue to assign food value: We tend to like food "rich" (!) in fat, such as ice cream, cheese, and marbled meat. The use ofthis cue is correlated with fitness in a hunter-gatherer ecology, where dietary fat is hard to come by (wild game is low in fat). But in modern industrial societies, fat is cheap and plentiful, and our love of it has become a liability. The environment changed in a way that lowered the cue validity offat for fitness. But our cognitive system, which evolved in a foraging ecology, still uses it as a cue for assigning food value. Given the long human generation time, and the fact that agriculture represents less than 1% ofthe evolutionary history ofthe genus Homo, it is unlikely that we have evolved any complex adaptations to an agricultural (or industrial) way oflife (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). Our ancestors spent most of the last 2 million years as hunter-gatherers, and our primate ancestors before the appearance of Homo were foragers as well, ofcourse. The very first appearance ofagriculture was only 10,000 years ago, and it wasn't until about 5,000 years ago that a significant fraction of the human population was engaged in agriculture. 7. Interpreting the statement as a biconditional, rather than as a material conditional, will also lead to error. Consider a situation in which you gave me your watch, but you did not take my $20. This would have to be considered a violation ofthe rule on a biconditional interpretation, but it is not necessarily cheating. Iff had not offered you the $20, then I would have cheated.
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But if I had offered it and you had refused to take it, then no cheating would have occurred on either ofour parts. In this situation, your behavior could be characterized as altruistic or foolish, but not as cheating. Distinctions based on notions such as "offering" or intentionality are not part of the definition of a violation in the propositional calculus. 8. Indeed, one expects learning under certain circumstances: The genome can "store" information in the environment ifthat information is stably present (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990a). 9. Of course, if two developmental trajectories have different reproductive consequences, one will be favored over the other. 10. The drinking-age problem is also a social contract from the point of view of those who enacted the law. Satisfying the age requirement before drinking beer provides those who enacted the law with a benefit: People feel that the roads are safer when immature people are not allowed to drink. Although satisfying the requirement in a social contract will often cause one to incur a cost, it need not do so (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1989). The requirement is imposed not because it inflicts a cost on the person who must satisfy it, but because it creates a situation that benefits the recipient, which the recipient believes would not occur ifthe requirement were not imposed. Consider the following social contract: "If you are a relative of Nisa's, then you may drink from my water hole." A hunter-gatherer may make this rule because she wants to be able to call on Nisa for a favor in the future. A given person either is, or is not, Nisa's relative; it would therefore be odd to say that being Nisa's relative inflicts a cost on one. Nevertheless, it is the requirement that must be satisfied to gain access to a benefit, and it was imposed because it creates a situation that can benefit the person who imposed it. This is why Cheng and Holyoak's (1989) distinction between "true" social exchange, where the parties incur costs, and "pseudo" social exchange, where at least one party must meet a requirement that may not be costly, constitutes a misunderstanding of social contract theory and the basic evolutionary biology that underlies it. Social exchange is the reciprocal provisioning of benefits, and the fact that the delivery ofa benefit may prove costly is purely a by-product. II. So far, the evidence suggests that we also have specialized procedures for reasoning about threats and precautions, for example. 12. No criticism of the experimenters is implied; these experiments were not designed for the purpose oftesting social contract theory. 13. What if people read in a "may" that refers to obligation, rather than to possibility? That is, after all, a prediction ofsocial contract theory. Logicians have tried to create "deontic logics": rules of inference that apply to situations of obligation and entitlement. Social contract theory is, in fact, a circumscribed form ofdeontic logic. But could subjects be using a generalized form of deontic logic? Manktelow and Over (1987) say that the answer is not clear because deontic logicians do not yet agree: According to some, no cards should be chosen on the switched social contracts; according to others, not-P & Q should be chosen. Because the rules of inference in social contract theory include the concepts ofentitlement and obligation, it can be thought ofas a specialized, domain-specific deontic logic. But we doubt that people have a generalized deontic logic. Ifthey did, then non-social contract problems that involve obligation should elicit equally high levels of performance. But this is not the case, as will be discussed later in the chapter. 14. Even if this hypothesis were true, one would still have to explain why social contract problems are easier to understand, or more interesting, than other situations. After all, there is nothing particularly complicated about the situation described in a rule such as "Ifa person eats red meat, then that person drinks red wine." Social contract problems could be easier to understand, or more interesting, precisely because we do have social contract algorithms that organize our experience in such situations. Consequently, showing that social contract problems afford clear thinking about a wide variety ofproblems would not eliminate the possibility that there are social contract algorithms; it would simply cast doubt on the more specific claim that this set of algorithms includes a procedure specialized for cheater detection. 15. We would like to point out that the relationship between psychology and evolutionary biology can be a two-way street. For example, one could imagine models for the emergence of
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stable cooperation that require the evolution ofa mechanism for altruism detection. Ifthe selection pressures required by these models were present during hominid evolution, they should have left their mark on the design of our social contract algorithms. Finding that people are not good at detecting altruists casts doubt on this possibility, suggesting altruists were too rare to be worth evolving specialized mechanisms to detect, and hence gives insight into the kind ofselection pressures that shaped the hominid line. 16. For example, instead of asking subjects to "indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see ifany ofthese boys have broken the law," the altruist version asked them to "indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see ifany ofthese boys have behaved altruistically with respect to this law." 17. Indeed, on the altruist detection problems in which the rule was a social law, more subjects detected cheaters than detected altruists! (This result was 64% in the altruist version; 44% in the selfless version.) It is almost as if, when it comes to a social law, subjects equate altruistic behavior with honorable behavior-i.e., with the absence ofcheating. (This may be because for many social laws, such as the drinking age law, "society"-Le., the individuals who enacted the law-benefits from the total configuration of events that ensues when the law is obeyed.) This was not true of the personal exchange laws, where it is easy to see how the other party benefits by your paying the cost to them but not accepting the benefit they have offered in return. (For the private exchange problems, only 16% ofsubjects chose the "look for cheaters" answer in the two altruist versions; 8% and 4%, in the selfless versions.) 18. Manktelow and Over (1987) point out that people do understand what conditions constitute a violation of a conditional rule, even when it is an abstract one. Hence the failure to perform well on the no cheating version cannot be attributed to subjects' not knowing what counts as a violation. (This fact may seem puzzling at first. But one can know what counts as a violation without being able to use that knowledge to generate falsifying inferences, as the failure to choose P & not-Q on abstract Wason selection tasks shows. Two separate kinds of cognitive processes appear to be involved. An analogy might be the ease with which one can recognize a name that one has been having trouble recalling.) 19. It is difficult to tell a permission from an obligation because both involve obligation and because there are no criteria for distinguishing the two representational formats ("If action is taken, then precondition must be satisfied" versus "If condition occurs, then action must be taken"). "Conditions" and "preconditions" can, after all, be "actions." The primary difference seems to be a time relation: If the obligation must be fulfilled before the action is taken, it is a permission. If the obligation can be fulfilled after a condition (which can be an "action taken") occurs, then it is an obligation. A social contract of the form, "If you take the benefit, then you must pay the cost" would be considered a permission if you were required to pay the cost before taking the benefit, but an obligation if you had first taken the benefit, thereby incurring the obligation to pay the cost. 20. To choose not-P & Q. one would have to interpret "If an employee gets a pension, then that employee must have worked for the firm for at least 10 years" as also implying "If an employee has worked for the firm for at least 10 years, then that employee must be given a pension." Social contract theory predicts that the one statement will be interpreted as implying the other, but permission schema theory does not. In fact, its translation rules (the four production rules) bar this interpretation. The rule presented to subjects--"If an employee gets a pension, then that employee must have worked for the firm for at least I0 years"-has the linguistic format ofrule I ofthe permission schema-"Ifthe action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied." Rule I can be taken to imply rules 2, 3, and 4, bl}t not other rules. By rule 3, the rule stated in the problem would translate to "Ifan employee has worked for the firm for at least 10 years, then that employee may be given a pension"-not that the employee must be given a pension. 21. Or equally low performance. Cheng & HolyOak have provided very little theory concerning what elements in a situation can be expected to activate the permission schema.
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Although they have suggested that the provision ofa rationale or social purpose helps, they have never defined what counts as such, and there are (social contract) permission rules that lack rationales that nevertheless produce the effect (Cosmides, 1989). The problems that we tested here clearly stated that the rule is a law made by authorities, which ought to clarify that they are permission rules and prevent subjects from interpreting them as descriptive rules. Ifthis is sufficient to activate a permission schema, then performance on all three problems should be equally high. But none ofthe problems contains or suggests a rationale. So ifone were to claim that rationales are necessary, then performance on all three problems should be equally low. Either way, performance should not vary across the three problems. 22. This is the kind of situation that Nesse and Lloyd (this volume) suggest might call for benevolent self-deception. Although one memory module may be keeping an account of the other person's failure to contribute his fair share, this information might not be fed into the mechanisms that would cause an angry reaction to cheating. By preventing an angry reaction, this temporary encapsulation ofthe information would permit one to continue to cooperate with the suspected cheater. This situation would continue as long as one is still receiving a net benefit from the other person, or until it becomes sufficiently clear that the other person is cheating rather than experiencing a run ofbad luck. At that point, the accounts kept by the one module would be fed into other modules, provoking an angry, recrimination-fiIled reaction.
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Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (in prep., c). Is the Wason selection task an assay for production rules in mentalese? Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. San Francisco: Freeman. Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker. New York: Norton. Donald, L. (1983). Was Nuu-chah-nulth-aht (Nootka) society based on slave labor? Ecology and political organization in the Northwest coast of America. In E. Tooker (Ed.), The development ofpolitical organization in native North America (pp. 108-119). Washington, DC: American Ethnological Society. Drucker, P. (1983). Ecology and political organization in the Northwest coast of America. In E. Tooker (Ed.), The development ofpolitical organization in nativeNorth America (pp. 8696). Washington, DC: American Ethnological Society. Evans, J.St.B.T. (1984). Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning. British Journal ofPsychology, 75,457-468. Fischer, E. A. (1988). Simultaneous hermaphroditism, tit-for-tat, and the evolutionary stability of social systems. Ethology and Sociobiology, 9, 119-136. Fiske, A. P. (1990). Relativity within Moose ("Mossi") culture: Four incommensurable models for social relationships. Ethos, 18, 180-204. Fiske, A. P. (1991 a). StnKtures ofsocial life: Thefour elementaryforms ofhuman relations. New York: Free Press. Fiske, A. P. (1991 b, June). Innate hypotheses and cultural parametersfor social relations. Paper presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, San Francisco, CA. Fodor, J. A. (1983). The modularity ofmind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Frumhoff, P. c., & Baker, J. (1988). A genetic componentto division oflabour within honey bee colonies. Nature, 333, 358-361. Frumhoff, P. c., & Schneider, S. (1987). The social consequences of honey bee polyandry: The effects of kinship on worker interactions within colonies. Animal Behaviour, 35, 255262. Gigerenzer, G., & Hug, K. (in press). Reasoning about social contracts: Cheating and perspective change. Institut fUr Psychologie, Universitiit Salzburg, Austria. Griggs, R. A., & Cox, J. R. (1982). The elusive thematic-materials effect in Wason's selection task. British Journal ofPsychology, 73, 407-420. Hanken, J., & Sherman, P. W. (1981). Multiple paternity in Belding's ground squirrel litters. Science, 212,351-353. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. Parts I, II. Journal ofTheoretical Biology, 7, I-52. Holmes, W. G., & Sherman, P. W. (1982). The ontogeny of kin recognition in two species of ground squirrels. American Zoologist, 22, 491-517. Isaac, G. (1978). The food-sharing behavior of protohuman hominids. Scientific American, 238, 90-108. Jackendoff, R. (1991, June). Is there a faculty of social cognition? Presidential address to the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, San Francisco, CA. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1982). Thinking as a skill. Quarterly Journal ofExperimental Psychology,
34A, 1-29. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science oflanguage, inference and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kaplan, H., & Hill, K. (1985). Food sharing among Ache foragers: Tests ofexplanatory hypotheses. Current Anthropology, 26, 223-239. Kaplan, H., Hill, K., & Hurtado, A. M. (1990). Risk, foraging and food sharing among the Ache. In E. Cashdan (Ed.), Risk and uncertainty in tribal and peasant economies. Boulder: Westview Press. Lee, R., & DeVore, I. (Eds.). (1968). Man the hunter. Chicago: Aldine.
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Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey. New York: Wiley. Malinowski, B. (1922). Argonauts ofthe Western Pacific. New York: Dutton Press. Maljkovic, V. (1987). Reasoning in evolutionarily important domains and schizophrenia: Dissociation between content-dependent and content-independent reasoning. Unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, Department of Psychology, Harvard University. Manktelow, K. I., & Evans, J.St.B.T. (1979). Facilitation ofreasoning by realism: Effect or noneffect? British Journal ofPsychology. 70.477-488. Manktelow, K. I., & Over, D. E. (1987). Reasoning and rationality. Mind & Language. 2, 199219. Manktelow, K. I., & Over, D. E. (1990). Deontic thought and the selection task. In K. J. Gilhooly, M.T.G. Keane, R. H. Logie,&G. Erdos (Eds.), Lines ofthinking (Vol. I). London: Wiley. Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual infonnation. San Francisco: Freeman. Marr, D., & Nishihara, H. K. (1978, October). Visual infonnation processing: Artificial intelligence and the sensorium of sight. Technology Review, 28-49. Mauss, M. (1925/1967). The gift: Forms andfunctions ofexchange in archaic societies. (I. Cunnision, Trans.). New York: Norton. Maynard Smith, J. (1964). Group selection and kin selection. Nature. 201. 1145-1147. Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory ofgames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Packer, C. (1977). Reciprocal altruism in Papio annubis. Nature, 265. 441-443. Pollard, P. (1982). Human reasoning: Some possible effects of availability. Cognition. 10.6596. Quine, W.V.O. (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press. Sharp, L. (1952). Steel axes for stone age Australians. Human Organization, II, 17-22. Shennan, P. W. (1977). Nepotism and the evolution ofalann calls. Science. 197, 1246-1253. Smuts, B. (1986). Sex andfriendship in baboons. Hawthorne: Aldine. Sperber, D. (1975). Rethinking Symbolism (A. Morton, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sperber, D. (1985). Anthropology and psychology: Towards an epidemiology ofrepresentations.
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4 Two Nonhuman Primate Models for the Evolution of Human Food Sharing: Chimpanzees and Callitrichids W. C. McGREW AND ANNA T. C. FEISTNER
INTRODUCTION: FOOD SHARING IN HOMINIZATION Scenarios for the evolutionary transition from apes to humans, that is, for hominization, almost always include food sharing as a component (Goodall & Hamburg, 1974; Isaac, 1978; McGrew, 1979, 1981, 1992; Tanner, 1981, 1987; Tooby&DeVore, 1987; Wrangham, 1987-; Zihlman, 1981). However, hypotheses on the nature, timing, and extent of food sharing in hominization vary greatly from one theory to the next. Only the late Glynn Isaac, as far as we know, made food sharing the keystone of the process, so it is worth exploring his system in detail (see Figure 4.1). It is a threestage sequence: His starting point is an ancestral hominoid, resembling a chimpanzee (Pan), which shows small-scale hunting that leads to "tolerated scrounging" of meat. Simple tool use is present but is independent ofthe hunting and scrounging. The middle stage of hominization involves food sharing as the integrator of hunting and gathering, which are organized in terms of home bases and division oflabor. Supporting all ofthis is an infrastructure oftool making and tool using. This stage was present in the Plio-Pleistocene era of about 2 million years ago. The third stage is what now exists in modern human societies, each with their varied versions and socioeconomic elaborations. The infrastructure includes all of technology, from milking pails to vending machines. An all-embracing superstructure of culture overlies all such food sharing, from potlatches to fast-food outlets. Isaac's evidence for behavior was necessarily circumstantial, since only artifacts, and not actions, persist. He inferred the practice food sharing in the middle stage on the basis of concentrations of stone tools that could have been used for processing meat, found with a large mammal's fossilized bones. Stronger inference came from concentrations oftools found with the remains ofseveral large mammals, which might indicate mass or repeated transport ofprey. Why should hunters do this ifnot to share the proceeds? There are alternative explanations such as parallel scavenging (e.g., Shipman, 1986) or accumulated individual processing (e.g., Potts, 1987), but Isaac's explanation remains a possibility. What is missing from Isaac's account is the catalyst for adaptation: Integrated systems such as his middle stage do not spring full-blown (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). Two
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B '" HUNTING
-
-."
HOME BASES
TOLERATED
SCROUNGING
HUNTI~ERI"'G
~ OIVISION OF LABOR
/
USE OF EOUIPMENT
Figure 4.1
TECHNOLOGY
Isaac's (1978) three-stage sequence of the role of food sharing in hominid
evolution.
types ofexplanation for the transition, one socia/and one technological, exemplify the two main strands of his argument. Lovejoy (1981) placed the start of food sharing in the origins of the sexual pairbond, 4 million years ago in the Miocene. More precisely, he outlined the likely enhancement of reproductive success that would follow from a male's provisioning his mate. By improving her physical condition, early hominid parents could shorten the birth interval between offspring and increase the likelihood oftheir survival. (How foraging males could enforce fidelity and ensure paternity while away hunting is not clear, however. For an alternative view that stresses the importance of food sharing at the earlier stage ofcourtship, see Parker, 1987). From the more technological viewpoint, Parker and Gibson (1979) suggested that food sharing arose as a secondary adaptation from tool use. To be more exact, it was an adaptation for "extractive foraging," that is, the acquisition of embedded food items, which requires advanced sensorimotor and symbolizing intelligence. In their scheme, sharing such acquired solid food was more efficient for a mother than sharing food through the more energetically costly means of lactation. Sharing patterns thus created could generalize to other relationships. (Why chimpanzees, who are excellent extractive foragers, have not taken food sharing further in the hominid direction is not clear.) To tackle these issues relating to the transition from nonhuman to human primate food sharing, we will proceed in stages: First, we will summarize briefly current knowledge of food sharing in other primates. Second, we will focus on the two types of primates who engage in habitual food sharing-chimpanzees and callitrichids (marmosets and tamarins). Third, we will use Isaac's (1978) 10 features of food sharing to contrast Homo sapiens with our nearest living relations and to contrast chimpanzees and callitrichids. These features will be reordered, modified, corrected, and updated, whenever necessary, in an effort to say whether the human-nonhuman contrasts are ones of kind or only ofdegree. Finally, we will return to the themes of the social and the technological, in an attempt at synthesis.
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FOOD SHARING IN NONHUMAN PRIMATES In another article, we reviewed the literature on food sharing by primates (Feistner & McGrew, 1989). Overall, we found that transfer of food items between individuals has been reported in many species of simians. However, most of these records are anecdotal or are based on a few occasional events. Except for the chimpanzees and callitrichids, there is no convincing evidence that such transfer offood is important, much less essential for survival. This contrasts markedly with several species of social carnivores, especially in the Canidae (e.g., wolves), Felidae (e.g., lions), and Hyaenidae (hyenas), in which the provisioning of mates and young is crucial to successful reproduction (e.g., Kuhme, 1965). Ofthe orders ofmammals, the Carnivora present a more basic and consistent range of food sharing adaptations, such as reciprocal exchange, than do the Primates, humankind excepted. When food sharing does occur commonly in nonhuman primates, it almost always takes the form of "tolerated scrounging" from parents, usually the mother, by youngsters. That is, infants orjuveniles usually take leftovers, with little resistance offered by the parent. This parental tolerance may function in the weaning ofoffspring from milk to solid food. There is some indication that food sharing is most developed in monogamous primates such as gibbons (Hylobates spp., e.g., Schlesser & Nash, 1977) and titi monkeys (Callicebus spp., e.g., Starin, 1978). However, no one has done an experimental study of its importance, nor have observational studies kept track of such basic variables as intake, calories, energetic or nutritional trade-offs, and so on. For these reasons, we will focus on the chimpanzees and callitrichids, as they are the only primates in which food sharing is both important and well studied.
Chimpanzee Life The common chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes, Pongidae) is among the most-studied of nonhuman primates, with ongoing field studies lasting over 30 years at sites across Africa. Studies ofchimpanzees in captivity go back even further, and the settings vary from laboratories to zoos to human homes. Chimpanzees studied in captivity have ranged from those confined alone in small cages to mixed groups in naturalistic enclosures. (Neither ofthese generalizations applies to bonobos or pygmy chimpanzees, Pan paniscus, about whom little is yet known, e.g., there are as yet no empirical data on food sharing in captivity.) There is a remarkable consensus about chimpanzee nature from these varied studies (Nishida, 1989). In the wild, the apes live in loosely structured communities or "unit-groups." Rarely, ifever, are all members together. Instead, parties ofvarying size and composition fonn and break up over hours or days. It has been said that the only lasting subgrouping is that of a mother and her dependent young (Goodall, 1968). Parties are not random, however. Adult males (who are often related) form bonds with each other and travel together to patrol the edges ofthe community's home range in xenophobic vigilance. Adult females and their offspring range less widely and spend less time together. There are no lasting sexual bonds and most mating is "promiscuous," although most conceptions occur in nonrandom, temporary consortships
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(Tutin, 1979). In short, males compete for access to mates, and females compete for resources for their matrilineal kin. Males stay in their natal communities, but females move out, sometimes more than once. Communities displace or avoid one another, but do not defend set territorial boundaries. There may be much overlap between the ranges of neighboring groups, especially seasonally, and some females may transfer membership between communities. In captivity, when space and facilities permit, social life shows many of the same patterns (e.g., de Waal, 1982). Chimpanzee Food Sharing Observations offood sharing in the wild are available only from populations ofchimpanzees that are well used to humans at close range. Most come from two sites: Gombe (Goodall, 1968; McGrew, 1975; Silk, 1978) and Kasoje (Nishida, 1970), both in western Tanzania. The only nearly comparable data on bonobos are from Wamba, in Zaire (Kano, 1980; Kuroda, 1984). Observations of food sharing in captivity are fewer, despite the ubiquity of the behavioral pattern, with Silk's (1979) being the most detailed. Until recently, experimental studies were contrived or limited (Lefebvre, 1982; Nissen & Crawford, 1936), but de Waal (1989) has rectified this. The following generalizations can be made: 1. Most food sharing of everyday plant foods is from mother to dependent offspring, and it is tolerated scrounging (see Figure 4.2). 2. Next most common is sharing by adult males with adult females, but there are not yet enough data to know ifthere are regular partner preferences (see Figure 4.3). 3. The nature of the food item affects the pattern of its distribution. Prized foods in short supply (e.g., meat, sugar cane) lead to high rates ofinteraction over food and more aggression. Common but hard-to-process foods increase mothers' sharing with infants. 4. Patterns of meat sharing are the most complicated, being influenced by age (with older individuals receiving more meat), kinship (with higher rates ofsharing within matrilines), and reproductive state (with estrous females receiving more than anestrous ones). 5. The causation of transfer of food varies widely. An individual may coerce another to hand over food or, more rarely, may donate food without prompting. Most cases, however, follow on from various forms ofbegging by the eventual recipients, and so can be termed responsive rather than spontaneous. 6. Chimpanzees give a special call that alerts others at a distance to the presence of food. As such, this is food sharing of sorts, but it need not be interpreted as charitable. A caller faced with more than enough food will lose nothing by sharing it and may benefit later when another chimpanzee reciprocates (Wrangham, 1977). 7. The overall pattern for bonobos is apparently the same as for common chimpanzees, but age and sex differences are less clear-cut. 8. Finally, patterns of food sharing, whenever examined so far, followevolutionarily predictable lines in terms ofparent-offspring conflict, nepotism, and intersexual competition. For example, mothers share food with offspring, but come into conflict when offspring seek to continue receiving parental investment
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Figure 4.2
An infant chimpanzee (left) tries to scrounge sugar cane while his mother (right) eats (at Kasoje).
beyond the point when it is in the mother's interest to redirect it to future offspring (Trivers, 1974).
Callitrichid Life The Callitrichidae are one of the two main families of New World monkeys (Platyrrhini). They make up about 20 species in four genera: marmosets (Callithrix, Cebuella) and tamarins (Leontopithecus, Saguinus). The two types differ in teeth and diet, but all callitrichids have much in common, hence the collective use ofthe family name here. Unlike chimpanzees, the marmosets and tamarins are as yet little known in the wild, especially in terms of their social life. Some species have not been studied at all, and of those that have, few have had identified individuals studied in the long term. Of the two species best known for food sharing, the endangered cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus oedipus) of northwestern Columbia has been studied in the wild only little (Neyman, 1978). The highly endangered golden lion tamarin (Leontopithecus rosalia), now reduced to a few relic populations in the Atlantic coastal forests of Brazil, is
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Figure 4.3
An adult male chimpanzee (right) hands over a banana to an adult female (left) (at Combe).
only now being studied in the field (Kleiman, 1981). Much more is known of both species in captivity. What follows is a generalized description based on a synthesis of what is known across several species. As more knowledge of differences between taxa accumulates, it is harder and harder to present a "typical" callitrichid, but brevity demands it here. Callitrichids live in families usually made up ofa single breeding female, one or more mates, and their offspring, adult as well as immature. The reproductive system is impressively efficient, largely because it is cooperative. The father(s) and older siblings do most of the infant rearing, leaving the mother to concentrate on gestation and lactation. The result is large neonates, twinning, and postpartum conception, which means that the mother may carry two fetuses while suckling two infants at the same time. Offspring are reproductively suppressed in the intact natal family, and incest is avoided. Family life is largely peaceful. Callitrichids are largely arboreal and limited to forests. The families are fiercely territorial, defending small home ranges, which contain a few key resources. They resist incomers, and offspring appear to delay dispersing until "vacancies" come up in nearby territories.
Callitrichid Food Sharing As with other aspects ofsocial behavior, our knowledge offood sharing in callitrichid monkeys is virtually confined to a few studies in captivity. For a welcome exception,
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see Ferrari's (1987) study of buffy-headed marmosets, Callithrix flaviceps, in Brazil. The following generalizations are based mainly on golden lion tamarins (Brown & Mack, 1978; Hoage, 1982) and cotton-top tamarins (Feistner & Price, 1990) about whom the most is known: 1. Most food passes from parents or older siblings to weanling infants, within the family. Often it is active sharing, with possessors offering food items without any noticeable prompting. 2. Less commonly, food is shared between other family members, with the recipient being the mother, or ajuvenile, or an older offspring carrying an infant. 3. Sharing rates are higher with live animal prey than with plant or artificial food items. For a few weeks in early life, infants depend upon others for food, even when they could get food directly for themselves. 4. Within the family, the network offood distribution is diffuse, with all possible combinations of age and sex categories having been seen to share. However, there are age and sex differences: Sexually mature older siblings share more than do immature older siblings (Feistner & Price, 1990), and brothers share more than do sisters (Wolters, 1978), at least in cotton-top tamarins. 5. Transferred food items are not leftovers, i.e., those no longer wanted by others who are sated. Instead, the highest rates ofsharing occur soon after food is made available, and highly preferred foods are shared more than less desirable ones (Feistner & Chamove, 1986). 6. Callitrichids give a characteristic vocalization that invites sharing and accompanies offering offood. Infants quickly respond to this encouragement. 7. Food sharing is a key part of the adaptive package of cooperative breeding, along with carrying and protecting the infants. Patterns ofsharing often cannot be predicted simply by degree ofrelatedness, since in nuclear families all but the parents are related by r = 0.50. Instead, patterns of sharing seem to reflect the maximizing of inclusive fitness by donors. Sexually mature older siblings waiting for breeding opportunities can recoup some oftheir lost reproductive value by investing in their younger siblings. Similarly, the breeding female seems to get food in accordance with the cyclical physiological demands of her reproductive state.
HUMAN VERSUS CHIMPANZEE FOOD SHARING Many authors have used the chimpanzee as a model for early human evolution (see the list ofbehavior patterns mentioned earlier). Ofthese, Isaac (1978) dealt most comprehensively with food sharing. He presented a set of features that were.meant to be unique to human beings, although in some cases chimpanzees show a rudimentary version ofthe behavioral pattern. These 10 features are given in the left-hand column ofTable 4.1, where they are summarized and reordered to suit this article. The middle column gives the contrasting position for the chimpanzee, as stated or implied by Isaac, although in a few cases we have amplified the contrast to make it clear. The righthand column gives extra information gained since Isaac's paper was published or relevant knowledge that he did not cite. What follows is a paragraph-by-paragraph reconsideration of Isaac's 10 points:
Table 4.1 Isaac's (1978) Hypothesized Major Differences Between Homo and Pan in Food Sharing and Related Activities with Updated Comments Humans I.
2.
Hunting and fishing, prey may weigh more than IS kg Travel bipedally, carry possessions
3.
Complex, made tool kit to obtain food
4.
Prepare food for eating
5. Postpone eating of gathered foods 6. Home base as focus of ranging 7. Long-term mating bond, economic reciprocity 8. Kinship categories regulate relations
9.
Language regulates relations
10. Active food sharing, family as crucial node in larger network
Chimpanzees Less hunting, no prey weighs more than IS kg Travel quadrupedally, possessions not carried Only simple tools
No prepared food
Eat food when and where found No home base No mating bonds Kinship influences relations
Complex communication but no language Tolerated scrounging of meat, no plant sharing
Comments No real difference (Teleki, 1973) Chimpanzees carry hammers and nuts (Boesch & Boesch, 1983) Tanzanian chimpanzees' tools not different from Tasmanian aborigines' (McGrew, 1987) Chimpanzees use hammer and anvil to smash open nuts (Boesch & Boesch, 1983) Real difference Real difference Sex differences in feeding (McGrew, 1979), consortship (Tutin, 1979) Seems impossible to disprove mental representation by chimpanzees of kinship relations Syntax and semanticity in natural "language"? (Menzel, 1976) Both share natural and artificial plant foods (McGrew, 1975)
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I. Human beings in nonagricultural societies devote much time and energy to seeking high-protein food (Kaplan & Hill, 1985). This takes the form of hunting or fishing, often cooperatively, for vertebrate prey. Ofthe primates, only Homo hunts big game, that is, prey weighing over 15 kg. This has dire