THE NEW MIDDLE AGES BONNIE WHEELER, Series Editor The New Middle Ages is a series dedicated to transdisciplinary studie...
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THE NEW MIDDLE AGES BONNIE WHEELER, Series Editor The New Middle Ages is a series dedicated to transdisciplinary studies of medieval cultures, with particular emphasis on recuperating women’s history and on feminist and gender analyses.This peer-reviewed series includes both scholarly monographs and essay collections.
PUBLISHED BY PALGRAVE: Women in the Medieval Islamic World: Power, Patronage, and Piety edited by Gavin R. G. Hambly
Crossing the Bridge: Comparative Essays on Medieval European and Heian Japanese Women Writers edited by Barbara Stevenson and Cynthia Ho
The Ethics of Nature in the Middle Ages: On Boccaccio’s Poetaphysics by Gregory B. Stone
Engaging Words:The Culture of Reading in the Later Middle Ages by Laurel Amtower
Presence and Presentation:Women in the Chinese Literati Tradition by Sherry J. Mou
Robes and Honor:The Medieval World of Investiture edited by Stewart Gordon
The Lost Love Letters of Heloise and Abelard: Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France by Constant J. Mews
Representing Rape in Medieval and Early Modern Literature edited by Elizabeth Robertson and Christine M. Rose
Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault by Philipp W. Rosemann
Same Sex Love and Desire Among Women in the Middle Ages edited by Francesca Canadé Sautman and Pamela Sheingorn
For Her Good Estate:The Life of Elizabeth de Burgh by Frances A. Underhill Constructions of Widowhood and Virginity in the Middle Ages edited by Cindy L. Carlson and Angela Jane Weisl Motherhood and Mothering in Anglo-Saxon England by Mary Dockray-Miller Listening to Heloise:The Voice of a Twelfth-Century Woman edited by Bonnie Wheeler
Sight and Embodiment in the Middle Ages: Ocular Desires by Suzannah Biernoff Listen, Daughter:The Speculum Virginum and the Formation of Religious Women in the Middle Ages edited by Constant J. Mews Science, the Singular, and the Question of Theology by Richard A. Lee, Jr.
The Postcolonial Middle Ages edited by Jeffrey Jerome Cohen
Gender in Debate from the Early Middle Ages to the Renaissance edited by Thelma S. Fenster and Clare A. Lees
Chaucer’s Pardoner and Gender Theory: Bodies of Discourse by Robert S. Sturges
Malory’s Morte Darthur: Remaking Arthurian Tradition by Catherine Batt
The Vernacular Spirit: Essays on Medieval Religious Literature edited by Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Duncan Robertson, and Nancy Warren
The Texture of Society: Medieval Women in the Southern Low Countries edited by Ellen E. Kittell and Mary A. Suydam
Popular Piety and Art in the Late Middle Ages: Image Worship and Idolatry in England 1350–1500 by Kathleen Kamerick
Charlemagne’s Mustache:And Other Cultural Clusters of a Dark Age by Paul Edward Dutton
Absent Narratives, Manuscript Textuality, and Literary Structure in Late Medieval England by Elizabeth Scala Creating Community with Food and Drink in Merovingian Gaul by Bonnie Effros Representations of Early Byzantine Empresses: Image and Empire by Anne McClanan Encountering Medieval Textiles and Dress: Objects,Texts, Images edited by Désirée G. Koslin and Janet Snyder Eleanor of Aquitaine: Lord and Lady edited by Bonnie Wheeler and John Carmi Parsons Isabel La Católica, Queen of Castile: Critical Essays edited by David A. Boruchoff Homoeroticism and Chivalry: Discourses of Male Same-Sex Desire in the Fourteenth Century by Richard Zeikowitz Portraits of Medieval Women: Family, Marriage, and Politics in England 1225–1350 by Linda E. Mitchell Eloquent Virgins: From Thecla to Joan of Arc by Maud Burnett McInerney The Persistence of Medievalism: Narrative Adventures in Contemporary Culture by Angela Jane Weisl
Troubled Vision: Gender, Sexuality, and Sight in Medieval Text and Image edited by Emma Campbell and Robert Mills Queering Medieval Genres by Tison Pugh Sacred Place in Early Medieval Neoplatonism by L. Michael Harrington The Middle Ages at Work edited by Kellie Robertson and Michael Uebel Chaucer’s Jobs by David R. Carlson Medievalism and Orientalism:Three Essays on Literature,Architecture and Cultural Identity by John M. Ganim Queer Love in the Middle Ages by Anna Klosowska Roberts Performing Women: Sex, Gender and the Medieval Iberian Lyric by Denise K. Filios Necessary Conjunctions:The Social Self in Medieval England by David Gary Shaw Visual Culture and the German Middle Ages edited by Kathryn Starkey and Horst Wenzel Medieval Paradigms: Essays in Honor of Jeremy duQuesnay Adams,Volumes 1 and 2 edited by Stephanie Hayes-Healy
Capetian Women edited by Kathleen Nolan
False Fables and Exemplary Truth: Poetics and Reception of a Medieval Mode by Elizabeth Allen
Joan of Arc and Spirituality edited by Ann W.Astell and Bonnie Wheeler
Sacred and Secular in Medieval and Early Modern Cultures: New Essays edited by Lawrence Besserman
SACRED AND SECULAR IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CULTURES NEW ESSAYS
Edited by Lawrence Besserman
SACRED AND SECULAR IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CULTURES
© Lawrence Besserman, 2006. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–6732–6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sacred and secular in medieval and early modern cultures : new essays / [edited] by Lawrence Besserman. p. cm—(New Middle Ages) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–6732–6 (alk. paper) 1. Civilization, Medieval. 2. Literature, Medieval—History and criticism. 3. Secularism in literature. 4. Holy, The, in literature. 5. Christianity in literature. 6. Church and state—Europe—History— To 1500. I. Besserman, Lawrence L., 1945– II. New Middle Ages (Palgrave (Firm)) CB353.S155 2005 940.1—dc22
2005048705
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: February 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
For Judy
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CONTENTS
List of Contributors Acknowledgments Preface
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Introduction Sacred and Secular in Medieval and Early Modern Cultures: Issues and Approaches Lawrence Besserman
1
Part I Medieval and Early Modern Literature: Lyric, Narrative, and Drama 1.
2.
The Imitation of Hagiographic Formulas in Occitanian Vidas (Lives of the Troubadours) Cyril Aslanov
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“Quid Hinieldus Cum Christo?”:The Secular Expression of the Sacred in Old and Middle English Lyrics Thomas G. Duncan
29
3.
Reading Radical Metonymy in Pearl Alan J. Fletcher
4.
Purchasing Pardon: Material and Spiritual Economies on the Canterbury Pilgrimage Alastair Minnis
5.
Sacred and Secular in The Merchant of Venice Murray Roston
47
63 83
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Part II Medieval and Early Modern History: Church and State 6.
The Communal Body, the Corporate Body, and the Clerical Body:An Anthropological Reading of the Gregorian Reform Lior Barshack
101
7.
Sacred, Secular, and Impure: The Contextuality of Sensations Esther Cohen
8.
Secular and Sacred:The History of Rhetoric and Religious Community in the Middle Ages Rita Copeland
135
Sacred Authority and Secular Power:The Historical Argument of the Gesta Episcoporum Cameracensis Robert M. Stein
149
9.
10.
The Space of the Altar Miri Rubin
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167
Notes
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Index
227
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Cyril Aslanov is Associate Professor of French Language and Literature at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has published a study of André Chouraqui’s translation of the Bible (Pour comprendre la Bible: la leçon d’André Chouraqui, Monaco, Editions du Rocher, 1999) and a monograph on the fourteenth-century Provençal Jewish lexicographer Joseph Kaspi (Le provençal des Juifs et l’hebreu en Provençe: le dictionnaire Sharshot ha-Kesef de Joseph Caspi, Paris-Leuven: Peeters, 2001). Lior Barshack is a senior lecturer in legal and social theory at the Radzyner School of Law in the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel. He has written many articles on the place of legal rituals and fictions in civil religion. He is currently working on a book on civil religion and editing together with Peter Goodrich and Anton Schutz a collection of essays on the work of Pierre Legendre. Lawrence Besserman is Professor of English at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has taught at Harvard, New York University, and Columbia. His publications include The Legend of Job in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, MA, 1978), Chaucer and the Bible (New York, 1988), and Chaucer’s Biblical Poetics (Norman, OK, 1998). He has also edited The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives (New York, 1996); and he is the general editor of the first anthology of European medieval literature in Hebrew translation, An Anthology of Medieval Literature (Tel Aviv: Dvir-The Israel Council for Translation of the Classics, 1991). Esther Cohen is Professor of Medieval History at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her publications include The Crossroads of Justice: Law and Society in Late Medieval France (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993); Peaceable Domain, Certain Justice:Crime and Society in Fifteenth-Century Paris (Hilversum: Verloren, 1996); and “The Animated Pain of the Body,” American Historical Review 105 (2000), 36–68. Rita Copeland is Professor and Chair of Comparative Literature at the University of Pennsylvania. Her publications include Rhetoric, Hermeneutics,
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and Translation in the Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, 1991–95), Criticism and Dissent (Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Pedagogy, Intellectuals, and Dissent in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Her current work is focusing on medieval intellectual biography and the history of rhetoric. Thomas Gibson Duncan was educated at Glasgow University and Pembroke College, Oxford. He tutored at Oxford and was Assistant Lecturer in English Language at Manchester University before returning to Scotland as Lecturer in English Language and Medieval Literature at the University of St. Andrews. He is now an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the University School of English. His publications include two volumes of Middle English lyrics, Medieval English Lyrics: 1200–1400 (1995) and Late Medieval English Lyrics and Carols: 1400–1530 (2000), and (with Dr. Margaret Connolly) the first volume of an edition of the hitherto unpublished Middle English Mirror: Sermons from Advent to Sexagesima (2003). The year 2005 should see the publication of A Companion to the Middle English Lyric. Alan J. Fletcher teaches and researches late medieval and early Renaissance texts at Trinity College, Dublin. His publications include studies of Old and Middle English writings, and of medieval and early Renaissance drama, especially in its Irish dimension. He is a Member of the Royal Irish Academy. Alastair Minnis, Distinguished Humanities Professor at Ohio State University, formerly taught at the Universities of York and Bristol, and The Queen’s University of Belfast. His publications include Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages (1984, revised ed. 1988);The Oxford Guides to Chaucer:The Shorter Poems (1995, rpt. 2000); and Magister Amoris: The “Roman de la Rose” and Vernacular Hermeneutics (2001). Currently he is completing a monograph entitled, Fallible Authors: Chaucer’s Pardoner and Wife of Bath. Murray Roston holds a dual professorship, at Bar-Ilan University in Israel and at the University of California at Los Angeles. His main research has been placing literature in the context of changing contemporary movements in painting, architecture, and sculpture. His recent books include: Victorian Contexts: Literature and the Visual Arts (New York University Press, 1997), Modernist Patterns: In Literature and the Visual Arts (New York University Press, 2000), and The Search for Selfhood in Modern Literature (Palgrave Press, 2001). Miri Rubin is Professor of Early Modern History at Queen Mary college—University of London. She is the author of several books and articles, including Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture
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(Cambridge, 1991) and Gentile Tales:The Narrative Assault on Late Medieval Jews (London and New Haven, 1999). Her latest book is The Hollow Crown: A History of Britain in the Late Middle Ages (The Penguin History of Britain, 10) (London: Penguin Books, 2005). She is currently researching the figure of Mary in Christian cultures. Robert M. Stein is Associate Professor of Literature at Purchase College, SUNY and Adjunct Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University. Along with Sandra Pierson Prior he is the editor of Reading Medieval Culture: Essays in Honor of Robert W. Hanning (University of Notre Dame Press, 2005). His most recent book, Reality Fictions: Romance, History, and Governmental Authority 1025–1180 will appear in spring 2006, from University of Notre Dame Press.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
he essays gathered in this volume are, with two exceptions (Minnis and Stein), the fruit of a two-year faculty-student interdisciplinary seminar and two conferences on the theme of “The Sacred and the Secular: Conflict, Convergence, Coexistence,” held at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, from October 2000 to June 2002. I am grateful to the president of the Hebrew University, Professor Menachem Magidor, for the funding he provided from the Ring Fund, to enable the faculty–student interdisciplinary graduate seminar to take place. I am also grateful to the Academic Committee of the Center for Literary Studies and to the Center’s founding director, Professor Sanford Budick, for sponsoring conferences on the theme of the seminar in June 2001 and June 2002. Further support was provided by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 902/03). Two research assistants,Anna Narinsky and Victoria Prilutsky, helped along the way with myriad organizational and bibliographical details. Evelyn Grossberg did the initial copyediting of the entire manuscript with care and good commonsense. The following people at Palgrave have been most helpful and efficient: Bonnie Wheeler, academic editor of the New Middle Ages Series; Farideh Koohi-Kamali, in-house editor of the series; Lynn Vande Stouwe, the editor who actually shepherded the book from manuscript to print; Will Fain, Production Assistant; and Maran Elancheran and the rest of the outstanding team at Newgen Imaging Systems, Chennai, India, who provided major help with the Index and did an excellent job of producing the entire book. My greatest debt is too elliptically expressed on the dedication page. My wife, Judy Besserman, helped to iron out all the details in the planning and smooth running of the two conferences mentioned above, and her editorial labors have improved my contribution to the volume considerably.
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PREFACE
estern concepts and concrete manifestations of the sacred and the secular have always been fluid and complex. For an early and particularly striking instance of cross-pollination between secular and sacred realms, consider the fate of the word suffragium in Roman and Late-Antique political and ecclesiastical history.1 During the Roman Republic, in the secular sphere, the word suffragium meant ‘the vote of free people’; but then, by the end of the second century CE, it came to mean ‘the influence or patronage of a powerful man’; and finally, by the end of the fifth century, it had come to mean to ‘bribe’ (i.e., that which buys the influence of one’s powerful patron). Similarly, in a parallel series of developments in the sacred sphere, suffragium started out meaning ‘vote’ (referring, as early as the middle of the third century, to the election of bishops); then, by the fourth century, suffragium had shifted to mean ‘intercession’ (as when a Christian asked a saint to intercede in the divine realm); and finally, by the fifth century, suffragium was used to refer to the corrupt simoniac practices whereby bishoprics were being bought and sold. An even more fundamental instance of the imbrication of sacred and secular at the heart of Western values is the structuring of the traditional system of “the seven virtues,” offsetting the seven vices or deadly sins. Beginning in Late Antiquity and up until the present day, theologians and philosophers have routinely divided the virtues into a group of three that are religious or ‘theological’ (faith, hope, and charity) and a complementary group of four that are secular or ‘cardinal’ (prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice).2 These two instances of pagan and Christian cultural interdependence point to something still pervasive and profoundly important in our culture— yet something that, at present, many people choose to ignore or reject and most find perplexing at best. In the Introduction and in the essays by ten distinguished medieval historians and literary scholars that follow, my fellow authors and I seek to illuminate the methodological problems that a study of premodern sacred and secular cultural production entails, and we consider additional detailed instances of such interplay in major texts of
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premodern Western civilization. Here, however, I focus mainly on the modern period. By offering a proleptic glimpse at the future of the premodern world that is considered in the essays that follow, I hope to demonstrate how many of the issues and approaches that have dominated the field of modern sacred/secular studies are firmly anchored in the past. * * * Ever since the Enlightenment, people in the West have routinely used the word sacred in a way that implies the replacement of the Divine by a secular imperative.They speak of the sacred rights of the individual, the sacred work of volunteers in a charity clinic, and other such sacred activities. In a similar fashion, there are masses of people who routinely show the kind of reverence and awe formerly reserved for the domain of religion and the holy to secular symbols (the flag, national anthem, Constitution, Declaration of Independence, etc.). In addition, at communal secular events (e.g., the Olympics; football, basketball, or baseball games in the United States; and soccer games in Asia,Africa, Latin America, and Europe), spectators and participants engage in ritualized actions that similarly recall behavior restricted to the religious and sacred domain in earlier times.3 The modern sacralization of sport coincides with a view of the natural world as devoid of sacred content and available to be used for exclusively secular purposes. Weberian and related sociological explanations of when and why the “sacred” retreated and why and to what extent “secularization” has been successful in so many quarters in the West continue to roll from the presses.4 In the English-speaking world, Matthew Arnold, while not the first, was certainly the most influential modern critic and poet to announce that he was lowering his sights and looking for something other than the JudeoChristian “sacred” in poetry. “More and more,” as Arnold says in a characteristic passage, “mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us.”5 From the Victorians to the present day, Arnold’s words about the place of art in culture have usually been assumed to capture succinctly the common-sense meaning of a “secular” worldview—namely, one in which human beings find consolation and sustenance in their own works and through their own efforts, and reliance on the supernatural in the form of a personal deity is no longer felt to be a viable option. In the contemporary debate about the place of the sacred in the public sphere, the philosopher Richard Rorty has taken the position that getting over the sacred is a most worthy goal—and the sooner the better. In an article entitled “Religion as Conversation-Stopper,” in the journal Common
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Knowledge, Rorty takes strong issue with the views of the political philosopher L. Stephen Carter, whose book on public policy, entitled The Culture of Disbelief, argues that religious African Americans (and others of course) should not be deprived of their right to invoke their sense of divine duties and obligations when they take their stand on public issues (e.g., a Carter supporter might say, “I don’t want my money to go to support abortion clinics because God tells me that abortions are immoral”). Rorty’s answer is a resounding “No!” One may certainly not bring one’s ideas about sacred doctrine to the public sphere.The imperatives of one’s private sacred commitments, Rorty insists, are out of bounds in public discourse. But Carter’s position is equally uncompromising. As he and his supporters might say: “If you rule our religious convictions out of bounds for public discourse then you have abridged our rights as individuals and public agents.”6 The civility of the debate between Carter and Rorty belies the deadly passions that are frequently aroused by conflicts between sacred and secular claims on the duties and obligations of citizenship. To be sure, from its earliest beginnings—and in the familiar form of religious wars of centurieslong duration, past and ongoing—Western civilization has repeatedly been threatened by the clash of sacred beliefs: Judaism against Canaanite paganism, Christianity against Islam and Judaism, Islam against Christianity and Judaism.As Karl F. Morrison observes, at various times and in different regions throughout the Christian West (e.g., at the conversion of the Roman Empire, in the Carolingian era, and during the Investiture Conflict of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which pitted popes against emperors and bishops against kings and local lords—to name just a few of the peak events surveyed by Morrison) “Christians heard from the Gospel the same lordly call to transform the political order into an instrument of holiness.”7 In all of these early medieval instances of holiness politicized, as in similar instances throughout the centuries leading into the modern era, whenever secular authorities have co-opted the powers of the sacred or whenever sacred authorities have sought secular power, oppression and violence have followed. More recently, conflicts between the sacred and the secular have also involved oppression and violence: Marxist–Leninists against the Orthodox Church and other religious groups; Maoist and post-Maoist Communists against Buddhists and other religious groups, including, most recently, the widely publicized attempts of the Chinese authorities to suppress the Falun Gong. In the recent wave of violent acts committed in the name of the Islamic sacred, the targets that the attackers have considered to be legitimate have included both the sacred (Christian missionaries, Jewish yeshiva students), and the secular or profane (American soldiers in their barracks and sailors on shipboard; Israelis on buses, in markets, and at shopping malls; Indonesian
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citizens and foreign tourists in a discotheque). And for some Israeli Jews, the act of killing in defense of the “Holy Land” of Israel is considered quite different from the morally repugnant act of killing under most other circumstances. Similarly, the American-led response to the worldwide terrorist threat seems also, at times, to have taken on the character of a religious struggle. Punitive violence is threatened against “an axis of evil” consisting of individuals and groups who are marked as “the evil ones.” Their elimination is therefore implied to be a sacred duty. The present study of the shifting borders of the sacred and the secular in the medieval and early-modern centuries of Western cultural development is not likely to diminish the current level of violence being carried out in the name of the sacred. Still, it may prove helpful to recall that the borders between the sacred and the secular have always been permeable and constantly shifting. Even more helpful would be the realization that trying to impose one’s own ideas about what is sacred and what is secular, or about sanctification and profanation, on those who strongly believe otherwise has always been, and still is, a difficult, if not impossible, task; and moreover, that attempting to do so has always proven to be, at the very least, harmful to individual and communal peace and well-being. The intercalations of sacred and secular discussed above instantiate a much wider phenomenon in Western culture. Parallel phenomena are found in the major literary, historical, religious, and philosophical texts discussed in this collection. Each essay was written or adapted especially for this volume; most were presented at a conference on the theme of “The Sacred and the Secular: Conflict, Convergence, Co-existence” held at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem in June 2002, and the range of the subjects discussed is clear from the Contents. Rather than summarizing the essays or highlighting their original claims—a convention of essay collections that I find of minimal value—I shall let them all speak for themselves. Lawrence Besserman
INTRODUCTION SACRED AND SECULAR IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CULTURES: ISSUES AND APPROACHES Lawrence Besserman
Provides an overview of various manifestations of the theme of the sacred and the secular in Western culture, from its roughly simultaneous appearance in ancient Greece and among the Israelite tribes and later Jewish urbanites depicted in the Hebrew Bible, through its development in New Testament and patristic times, and on into medieval and early modern European civilization. The survey and analysis demonstrate that the categories of the “sacred” and the “secular” are and have always been in flux, and that the critical methodologies for studying sacred and secular phenomena are correspondingly varied. In premodern Christian Europe, despite the overarching claims of many clerical authorities, the border between the spheres of the sacred and secular was always shifting; and even when it seemed to be most fixed, it very often exhibited a surprising degree of permeability. Historians (at least since Weber) have discussed and debated the timing and processes of “secularization;” without calling the importance of the latter phenomenon into question, we also need to pay attention (especially now) to the less often noted but also ancient and still ongoing phenomenon of “desecularization.”
rom earliest times down to the present day, Jews, Christians, and Muslims have sought contact with “sanctity” or “holiness,” a quality or force inherent in the “sacred” or the “holy” and believed to derive from the Divine.1 Though Israelites, Jews, Early Christians, and Muslims were all hostile to
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pagan manifestations of the sacred, their own traditions provided tools and venues for its appropriation that were often similar to those of the pagans. As it was thought to come from the realm of the Divine, an encounter with the holy was deemed to require or entail at least a temporary, and in some cases even a permanent, separation from the domain of the profane or secular, and, of course, also a separation from anything polluted or impure. For our present purposes, the terms sacred, holy, and sanctified will be taken as roughly synonymous.Though in practice they are used differently (e.g., we refer to a “holy” man, not a “sacred” or “sanctified” man), all three terms are regularly employed interchangeably to refer to qualities associated with God or the gods. Among the ancient Greeks a tripartite schematization of sacred or holy, not-sacred or profane, and impure or polluted was the norm; and indeed (as we shall see shortly, though with important qualifications and with further exemplifications in the essays that follow), the same tripartite scheme appears to operate throughout most other cultures, and was certainly prominent throughout medieval and early modern Europe. In the Hebrew Bible, the words kadosh (holy as an adjective; Septuagint Gk. hagios; Vulgate Lat. Sanctus) and kodesh, kedushah (holiness as a noun; Septuagint Gk. hagios; Vulgate Lat. sanctitas) can refer to various things, including a “holy place,” “the (Tabernacle or Temple) sanctuary,” “a sacred offering,” a “holy person, object, or time.” Deriving from a Hebrew verbal root, k-d-sh, meaning “to separate, set apart,” the biblical Hebrew words for holy and holiness frequently refer to cultic matters, especially the ritual sacrifices in the Temple, for which a synonym is simply ha’kodesh “the holy (place).”2 In this cultic-sacrificial frame of reference, there is certainly some degree of overlap—but nothing like full congruence—between the bipolar concepts of holy/profane and pure/impure (or taboo). In a crucial verse of Isaiah, the prophet describes a vision in which a chorus of seraphim sing a hymn of praise that also expresses a credo affirming the essential nature of the divinity: “And one cried unto another and said: ‘Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory’ ” (6.3). Isaiah responds to this vision-with-sound by expressing fear for his life, because of his and his people’s unworthiness:“Then said I, woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts” (6.5).Apart from reflecting a belief in the dangers inherent in human–divine encounters, Isaiah’s response also implies that the holiness of God involves a moral dimension, as do the purification of Isaiah’s lips, the “purging” of his sin, and the taking away of his “iniquity” in the next two verses (6.6–7).3 Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible the terms kodesh (holy) and kedusha (holiness) refer to an attribute of the one true God as the God of justice and righteous actions. As God himself proclaims, kedusha is an
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attribute attainable by his Chosen People: “You shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Exod. 19.6).4 But as Isaiah’s fearful response to his vision demonstrates, in Israelite religion (as in other Near Eastern religions) the “holy” can be mysterious and even dangerous. Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible we discover that looking at a divine manifestation, or even seeing the sacred vessels when they are not in use, may cause death (Exod. 33.20; Num. 4.20; Judg. 13.22; cf. 1 Kings 19.13). The danger inherent in the sacred is also witnessed by the sudden deaths of Aaron’s sons, Nadab and Abihu, who violated the rules for sacrificing on God’s altar (Lev. 10.1–7); and, more perplexingly, by the sudden death of Uzzah, who—to King David’s confusion and dismay—was struck down by the Lord only because, while transporting the Holy Ark on his ox cart, he “put forth his hand to the ark of God, and took hold of it; for the oxen shook it” (2 Samuel 6.3–9). Their potential dangers notwithstanding, the holy and holiness are most often spoken about in the Hebrew Bible as if the way to experience them and to live comfortably in their presence were actually a simple and straightforward matter. In fact, holiness as a way of life is often depicted in the Hebrew Bible not only as “risk-free,” but also as salubrious in pointedly physical and material terms (see, e.g., Deut. 6–7).To become a “holy nation” (Heb. goy kadosh), Israel must obey the laws outlined in Leviticus 17–26, an early, and probably once-independent document that biblical scholars refer to as “the Holiness Code.”5 However, although seemingly simple and straightforward, the acquisition and retention of holiness are repeatedly proven to be beyond the capabilities of a backsliding and sinful people.Yet, in later Israelite religion, the gulf between the sacred and the profane is presumed to be only temporary. Particularly in the prophetic books, the ancient Levitical command to achieve holiness is combined with a vision of the universal worship of God in holiness and “the unification of human experience, the harmonizing of people with their universe, and of people with God.”6 Not surprisingly, ideas about the sacred in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament overlap significantly. In the Gospels, Jesus’ followers call him “the holy one of God” (Mark 1.24; Luke 4.34; cf. John 6.61–67), an epithet that echoes similar epithets for God in the Hebrew Bible (e.g., “the Holy one of Israel” [Isa. 1.4],“thy Redeemer, the Holy one of Israel” [Isa. 48.17], etc.).The authors of the Gospels highlight Jesus’ disputes with the rabbinic authorities over their ideas about holiness, and especially their idea of holiness centering on ritual purity (Matt. 15.1–20; Mark 7.1–8, 15; 11.17).7 As in the Pentateuch, in the New Testament the goal of achieving holiness is presented as a corporate endeavor involving the pursuit of moral perfection. Only now, in contrast, the achievement of holiness is presented as an
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endeavor in which Christ and the Church—an ekklesia or community of believers “Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all” (Col. 3.11)—have replaced the holy nation of Israel (Col. 1.22, I Pet. 1.15–16, 2.5; etc.). Yet, important continuities between the roles of the sacred (or holy) in the Old Law and the New Law persist.There are some eighty references in the Hebrew Bible to the “holy spirit” (ruah hakodesh) or its synonym the “spirit of God” (ruah Elohim), a manifestation of God working in the world, especially through human beings.8 In the Hebrew Bible, access to the sacred is usually said or implied to require Israelite birth and the observance of the laws of ritual purity and cultic ceremony, but moral behavior and belief in God can also open a channel to the sacred, made manifest when the holy spirit works through “the congregation of the Lord” (Deut. 23.2; Joel 2.16; etc.). In the New Testament the role of the Holy Spirit (or the synonymous “spirit of Christ” [Greek pneuma Christou; Vulgate Lat. Spiritus Christi]) increases considerably, being mentioned some 240 times. Its manifestation among the Church of believers is no longer conditioned on observance of ritual purity or cultic ceremony but rather exclusively on their moral behavior and belief in Jesus as the Son of God and the messiah (Rom. 8.9–11; 1 Pet. 1.11–12; etc.). At the same time, among Greek and Roman pagans, offerings at shrines, temples, and other holy places continued to constitute the major means of encountering the sacred. Priests and priestesses, sacred springs, groves, caves, and mountains were in plentiful supply. Encounters with the sacred were known to be potentially dangerous, but on balance they were regarded as desirable because they were an effective way to call down sacred beneficent effects or to ward off maleficent ones.9 As in the fictions of Homer and Virgil, so in “real life”: the ancient Greeks and Romans knew that personal encounters with gods and goddesses were reserved only for special individuals. However, as the historian Ramsay MacMullen explains, in the Roman Empire around the time of Jesus, the sacred was something that the average pagan encountered everywhere—in the form of sacred birds, fish, gardens, parks, picnic and dining facilities, museums, aviaries, zoos, botanical gardens, concert halls, and art galleries.10 In Jesus’ day, and for centuries thereafter, the interpenetration of the pagan sacred and the erstwhile secular was also witnessed by the fact that elected officials in Greek and Roman cities routinely “paid courtesy calls” on the local gods, while magistrates used “the porticoes of sacred enclosures for their business, in just the same way that votaries as such met freely in civic buildings.”11 As MacMullen further notes, “the honoring of sacred officials in secular settings, and vice versa; the prominence of the one or the other at each other’s ceremonies;
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the alternation of offices from sacred to secular in a given man’s career; and the confusing of aims and benefits in assemblies for the gods or for civic business—all reflect the closest relations.”12 Beginning in New Testament times, belief in Jesus as the Son of God introduced a blurring and often even an erasure of the boundaries between the inscrutable realm of the supernatural and sacred and the familiar realm of the human and secular. This blurring of the sacred/secular boundary, embodied in the ideas of Jesus as an Incarnation of God and the Hypostatic Union in Jesus of divine and human natures, has been a defining feature of most forms of Christianity from Late Antiquity to the present day. According to Max Weber, belief in God’s redemption of the secular realm by means of the Incarnation and Hypostatic Union was the most revolutionary claim of early Christian culture, ultimately contributing to the secularization and modernization of Western society. In a controversial but memorable reflection on this feature of Christianity, the French sociologist Marcel Gauchet modified Weber’s classic theory of Entzauberung (Disenchantment) in order to account for the split between the sacred and the secular realms in the postmodern world.13 Evidence in support of Gauchet’s counterintuitive assertion that the Incarnation brought about a split in Christianity between, on the one hand, the “invisible” Divine and “wholly other” and, on the other hand, the “visible” human and “terrestrial” realms is found throughout the premodern period.14 One finds it, for example, in the growth of eremitical and cenobitical monasticism, which separated a class of Christians living a completely sacred lifestyle from those living a worldly one; in the adoption by male clergy and female religious of celibacy, which separated Christians who were chaste from those who were sexually active; and, more generally, in a sharpening of the distinction between the sanctified lifestyle of the clergy and the secular lifestyle of the laity. Moreover all of the foregoing developments have been especially prominent in churches maintaining strong forms of the paradoxical doctrine of the Incarnation. In the first three centuries of the Common Era, while proponents of Christianity celebrated manifestations of the sacred in the acts of the martyrs inspired by the holy spirit, pagan cultic worship of the sacred continued to flourish.15 Pagans, Jews, and Christians all still shared the belief that a god could appear to a human being.16 Similarly—though we sometimes tend to forget it—Jews, Christians, and pagans also shared a belief in the causal link between morality and access to the sacred.17 In time, however, the Christian idea of the sacred diverged in many (but by no means in all) respects from Jewish and pagan ideas. Focusing on the sacred/secular dichotomy, the historian R.A. Markus has argued that “the end of ancient Christianity” was marked in Western
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culture by the triumph of a “tendency to absorb what had previously been ‘secular,’ indifferent from a religious point of view, into the realm of the ‘Sacred’; to force the sphere of the ‘secular’ to contract, turning it either into ‘Christian,’ or dismissing it as ‘pagan’ or ‘idolatrous.’ ”18 Markus attributes this “re-drawing of the boundaries” between the secular and the sacred to various factors, but he suggests that the most influential element was the “Constantinian revolution,” which led to “the eclipse of the ‘secular’ dimension in Christians’ consciousness” and “the absorption of the ‘secular’ in the ‘sacred’ as ascetic norms came to penetrate wide sections of Christian society and to colour aspirations far beyond the walls of the cloister. That ascetic take-over signals the end of ancient Christianity.”19 By the time of Gregory the Great, Markus asserts,“the massive secularity of John Chrysostom’s and of Augustine’s world” was gone: “There was little room for the secular in it. The Devil was close, always ready to swallow up the world and the flesh.”20 In his more recent work, Markus has drawn an even sharper black-and-white picture:“Questions about the value and purpose of the secular order and its institutions and the way they are related to human salvation such as had exercised Augustine no longer had any meaning in Gregory’s world.”21 This is of course an exaggeration. Unrelieved Christian asceticism would hardly have been able to accommodate poetry, painting, sculpture, and other arts in the service of religion.Yet, beginning in Late Antiquity and continuing throughout the “ascetic” medieval Christian centuries that are the focus of Markus’s analysis, sacred Christian formal and thematic elements are seen to pervade an impressive number of diverse and thematically complex artistic masterpieces that were ostensibly secular in origin and destination.Conversely, during the same period, religious works of significant poetic merit often made use of themes and motifs derived from pagan sources (e.g., the works of Prudentius,Aldhelm, and other Christian and secular Latin poets, and the anonymous Old English poems).An explanation for this phenomenon is not far to seek. Augustine and Jerome’s theoretical justifications for Christians to “use” pagan literature have been discussed frequently and analyzed from various points of view.22 Two of the most important passages in which Jerome and Augustine affirm the validity of pagan texts, and thereby accommodate sacred and secular elements in Western culture, must be noted here, albeit briefly. In an oft-cited passage, Jerome allegorically interprets the biblical figure of “the captive woman” (Deut. 21.10–13) in order to defend his use of, and his taking pleasure in, the rhetorical grace and stylistic elegance of pagan “secular” texts. Is it surprising that I, too, admiring the fairness of her form and the grace of her eloquence, desire to make that secular wisdom which is my
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captive and handmaid, a matron of the true Israel? [Quid ergo mirum, si et ego sapientiam saecularem propter eloquii uenustatem et membrorum pulchritudinem de ancilla atque captiua Israhelitin facere cupio?]23
Comparable in influence to Jerome’s “captive woman” trope was Augustine’s allegorical interpretation of the biblical figure of “the Israelites despoiling the Egyptians” (Exod. 11.2–3). In his magisterial pedagogical treatise, De doctrina christiana, Augustine informed Christian teachers that pagan texts—especially texts that happened to be Platonist in outlook— were like the gold and silver jewelry that the Israelites “borrowed” from their Egyptian neighbors.Though their origin might be suspect, pagan texts could contain wisdom and truth useful for Christian education. Usually, however, the usable Christian wisdom and truth in such texts had to be extracted from beneath the surface by allegorical interpretation.24 Jerome’s and Augustine’s attempts to recuperate the secular are often cited in the influential work of the late D.W. Robertson, Jr. and his disciples, for whom an axiomatic methodological assumption is that religious allegory is always applicable to seemingly secular medieval European texts. Ranging beyond the conventional dating of the end of the Middle Ages at around 1500, Robertson maintained that the pervasiveness of religious allegory persisted in European literature and art until at least 1750. Finding the sacred within the seemingly secular is thus a key to the proper understanding of works of art that, according to Robertson, have been persistently misinterpreted by modern critics. Medieval and Early Modern poets and artists, and their audiences, Robertson and like-minded critics assert, were trained to see below the surfaces of texts and images (the “chaff ”) in order to discover inner, sacred symbolic meanings (the “fruit”). Nowadays, few scholars are convinced by Robertson’s totalizing Christian-allegorical interpretations of medieval and later European literature and art. Yet, the issues raised by the Christian-allegorical approach remain fundamentally important for the study of European culture, not only in the Middle Ages but throughout the Renaissance and Reformation and beyond too. Strong, if indirect, evidence for the Christian-allegorical approach to premodern art may be found in the process of desecularization in Late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, a process much less studied, though no less important than, the more familiar and later process of secularization.25 In the City of God, Augustine contrasts the absolutely true sacra historia recorded in the Bible with the utterly mistaken, false,“profane,” and so-called sacra historia of Rome’s pagan past.26 By the time of Gregory the Great, the pressing need to explain secular power that had motivated Augustine was gone, for “in a significant sense ‘secular’ authority and institutions had vanished from Gregory’s world.”27 Gregory’s attitude toward
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the worldly power that his once-persecuted Church was now wielding over secular rulers might seem overly optimistic; yet, as Markus explains, Gregory’s optimism was combined with a drive away from worldliness and toward ever more stringent and ascetic Christian observance. For in Gregory’s world, “the boundaries of sacred, secular, and profane” had shifted dramatically from where they had been drawn in the Church of Augustine’s day.28 The sixth-century spread of Christian asceticism was adumbrated much earlier, with the rise in Late Antiquity of Christian veneration of holy places (often associated with the “relics” of holy persons).29 How Christians came to venerate holy places is all the more significant because there were powerful factors that should have precluded it. Markus has highlighted the paradoxical change that took place in early Christian attitudes to the idea of sacred places as follows: “In its first centuries Christianity was a religion highly inhospitable to the idea of ‘holy places’; by the end of the fourth century it had become highly receptive.”30 After all, in the New Testament Paul warned against thinking that God the Creator could “dwell in shrines made by man” (Acts 17.24); he also said that Christ’s followers were themselves “the temple of the living God” (2 Cor. 6.16).31 In the same spirit, Eusebius (ca. 260–340?) affirmed that it was pagans and Jews, not Christians, who needed holy places:“Moses had promised a holy land to the Jews; Jesus promised to his followers a much greater land, truly holy and beloved of God, not located in Judaea.”32 For Eusebius, if there was now any such thing as a holy city, it could only be the heavenly Jerusalem.33 A reversal of the Christian attitude to the notion of holy places, from generally hostile to entirely favorable, occurred in the years between Eusebius and the next generation. Completion of the transition is clearly seen in the case of Cyril, bishop of Jerusalem, who told his disciples: “Others merely hear, we see and touch.”34 As Markus and others have noted, the change in attitude toward holy places seems to have resulted mainly from a series of actions initiated by Constantine in the 320s and 330s. These actions, constituting what Markus calls “a genuine Constantinian revolution,” were followed by the ideological adjustment described above.35 The transition, however, was not entirely smooth.Thus, Gregory of Nyssa and Jerome continued to express their skepticism about “holy places”; while Augustine, the most influential among these early Christian thinkers, seems only gradually to have changed his attitude toward relics and the places where they were venerated. Indeed, Augustine was initially hostile to the notion of holy relics and said so in his writings at the beginning of the fifth century, but by his later years (in the early 420s) he had come to accept that miracles had been performed by the remains of St. Stephen, which had recently been discovered and brought to Africa.36
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As the historian Patrick J. Geary explains, communities as well as individuals that could obtain “the special protection” of a genuine saint’s relic would hardly be likely to pass up the opportunity.37 Moreover, as Geary further observes, monasteries and cathedrals were eager to own the relics of saints not only because they “inspired the laity both rich and poor to give alms,” but also because “the miracles performed to heal the sick reminded the unscrupulous that the same power could be used against those seeking to harm a saint’s chosen church.”38 By the time of the Carolingians, “the confluence of popular devotion, official Christianity, and RomanFrankish politics” had produced a brisk trade in relics; and with popes in Rome frequently approving the transfer of desirable sacred remains northward, the “foundation for their great role in the mass movements of later medieval piety” was being laid.39 Over the past several decades, innovative and influential studies of Late-Antique and Early Modern European responses to the paradoxes of the sacred/secular dichotomy have taken a markedly “anthropological” turn. Special attention has been paid to the symbolism of the body; food; death rituals; pilgrimage; the veneration of saints, relics, and holy places; and the role of gender in shaping all of the above.40 For example, applying a socio-anthropological approach, Jonathan Z. Smith posited the “locative” as opposed to “utopian” nature of early Christianity, revealed in the growth of rituals keyed to the sacred geography of Jerusalem; similarly, Gregory Dix documented an emphasis in the early Jerusalem church liturgy on the historicity of holy places—an emphasis that was then imitated in liturgies far from the Holy Land.41 As Markus observes, the mere availability of the buildings that Constantine and later emperors built cannot by itself account for these developments: “The growth of ritual around sacred sites that took place in the later fourth century seems to require more explanation than the mere availability of ritual space.”42 The answer Markus proposes is that late-fourth-century Christians felt the need to assert their connection with the persecuted church and the martyrs, a need and its fulfillment that are “dramatically displayed in the swamping of the liturgical calendar with martyrs’ festivals and the development of their liturgy.”43 According to this hypothesis,“[t]he sacredness of space was a reflex, a projection on the ground, of the sacredness of time.”As Markus concludes, a new sacred topography came gradually to organise the Christian perception of space and to overlay the old, pre-Christian meanings. Places became sacred as the past became localized in the present. It was always the past that really mattered, and it was the impact of past human action that gave places their significance:“You are here to kneel where prayer has been valid.”
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Even more unexpected than the rise of Christian holy places was the radical and concomitant change in Late Antiquity in the Christian treatment of the dead. As we have seen, veneration of the dead was entailed by, and in turn partially responsible for, liturgical celebrations centered on holy places. “In the Middle Ages as in other epochs,” as R.C. Finucane reminds us,“death ritual was not so much a question of dealing with a corpse as of reaffirming the secular and spiritual order by means of a corpse.”44 In the early Middle Ages, reaffirmation of the secular and sacred order by means of the dead took a decidedly magical turn. For, as Peter Brown demonstrated, what characterized the “cult of the saints” that arose and flourished in the third through the sixth centuries of the Common Era was the commonly held belief that the graves of the saints, fragments of their bodies, and even physical objects that had come into contact with these holy bodies, were “privileged places, where the contrasted poles of Heaven and Earth met.”45 This new way of relating to the dead marked a breakdown of long-standing, deeply rooted taboos. Suddenly, Christians were digging up remains and praying in cemeteries and other places that formerly “had been treated as antithetical to the public life of the living city. . .” and the removal of dead bodies from these formerly taboo places for reburial in new and formerly prohibited locations was even more extraordinary.46 As Brown further asserts, the new ritual practices surrounding the LateAntique cult of saints signaled “the end of a way of seeing the relation between the human dead and the universe, and, as an immediate consequence, a shifting of the barriers by which Mediterranean men had sought to circumscribe the role of the dead, and especially of those dead to whom one had strong links of kinship or place.”47 Today, as in Late-Antique Christianity, veneration of the saints continues to be practiced by countless millions of Christians around the globe. Whether or not contemporary Christians are similar to early medieval Christian devotees of the cult of the saints in all respects is certainly open to question (though I suspect that many if not most of them are). There is little doubt, however, that most of these early devotees, like their pagan contemporaries, were less interested in copying saintly models than in accessing the miraculous healing and miracle-working power of the saints’ holy relics.48 To be sure, in the last medieval centuries, saints’ lives frequently included fewer lists of miracles and more detailed accounts of holy living, and they may have been meant to provide the saints’ devotees with models of virtuous behavior for imitation. But as in its early years, as well as throughout its entire pre- and post-Reformation history, the Church undoubtedly fostered a belief in saints as potential intercessors and supernatural helpers.49
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Among the most dramatic changes characterizing the historical phenomenon that scholars call “Twelfth-Century Renaissance” was the emergence of a new Christian attitude toward the place of humanity in the secular world that was largely shaped by a rediscovered and Christianized Aristotelian philosophy.50 For Anselm of Bec, Alain de Lille, and other twelfth-century theologians and philosophers (as for Thomas Aquinas in the next century), God was now thought of as the Creator who had set the universe in motion according to rational laws. God had placed man in the center of the universe and endowed him with the faculty of reason. Reason made man capable of understanding the rules governing a “desacralized” nature and the provable truths of religion. Hence, there was no absolute need to adduce the confirmatory, parallel evidence of revelation.51 As Jacques Le Goff demonstrates in a landmark essay, a major social change that occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (enabled, if not directly caused by the latter intellectual innovations) was the “desacralization” of the vertical vassal–lord relationship and its replacement by a “horizontal and fraternal agreement” involving money.52 Le Goff shows how in the thirteenth century and after, the sacred ritual of a kiss on the mouth between lord and vassal became less and less commonly practiced. He correlates the disappearance of this symbolic ritual kiss with “the decline of feudalism.” With the kiss no longer part of the ritual of vassalage, secularization of social bonds—a defining characteristic of the modern era—was well under way.53 Artistic production in this period showed similar signs of a redrawing of borders. In lyric poetry, as in the new genre of versified romance narrative, Provençal and Northern French poets of the eleventh and twelfth centuries led the way in deploying a striking blend of sacred and secular motifs. Italian, German, and English authors soon followed suit. The blending of sacred and secular motifs, which reached its most intricate esthetic and theological form in the works of Dante, would characterize verbal art throughout the next two centuries and beyond.54 Though not without a certain amount of resistance from conservative bishops and theologians, many artists and sculptors in the High and Later Middle Ages began to depict a nurturing, maternal, and physically attractive Mary and a handsome, exposed, and visibly suffering Christ.The use of religious images to educate Christians (both the modestly learned as well as the illiterate) and to rouse them to religious devotion—or as they frequently say, to make invisibilia known and felt by means of visibilia—was sanctioned by authoritative Western churchmen from Gregory the Great, through Peter Lombard, Aquinas, Bonaventure, and others of similar stature and influence well into the seventeenth century.55
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In ancient art, icons of sexuality and fertility—erect penises, engorged breasts, and gaping vulvas—served a central, ritualized religious function.56 As Leupin reminds us, “la sacralisation du sexuel est partout dans la mythologie parce que le destin du monde entier dépend de la copulation réussie du mâle et de la femelle.”57 Christian artists for the most part may have repressed these earlier erotic impulses, but they also occasionally gave expression to the erotic impulses of a sanctified sexuality. In order to portray Christ as fully human, artists in the High and Later Middle Ages often depicted him as an infant; and sometimes, especially in the late-fourteenth century and after, even depicted his circumcised penis (viewers were expected to know that the blood Jesus shed at the Circumcision was a foreshadowing of the fully redemptive blood he would shed at the Crucifixion). Even more daringly, some artists went so far as to affirm the full humanity of Christ by depicting him on the cross with the suggestion of an erect penis under the covering of his traditional loincloth.58 In portraits of Mary, problems of the secular/sacred dichotomy could also become acute. Paintings that render Mary’s exposed breast as she nurses the infant Jesus provide the most dramatic instances of this new phenomenon, as the stylistic vocabularies of late-medieval artists depicting the beautiful goddess Venus or a goddess like courtly lady and artists depicting the Virgin Mary began to overlap.59 In his treatise on painting, Leonardo Da Vinci gives a striking account of how this blurring of boundaries could affect the artist’s audience. The painter, Leonardo asserts, can even induce men [to] love and fall in love with a picture which does not portray any living woman. It once happened to me that I made a picture representing a sacred subject which was bought by one who loved it, and who then wished to remove the symbols of divinity in order that he might kiss her without misgivings. Finally his conscience prevailed over his sighs and lust and he felt constrained to remove the picture from his house.60
From the late Middle Ages on, artists depicting Christ, Mary, and the saints often used shockingly secular motifs. But mindful of the fact that “the symbols of divinity” were able to restrain the transgressive desire of Leonardo’s client, we should not be too quick to assume that the difference between a wholly secular and a provocatively secular-seeming but identifiably sacred work of art was normally breached.The renewed philosophical and theological valorization of humanity and the human intellect that began in the twelfth century was accompanied by a wave of popular and highly emotional devotion directed toward the two principal human agents of salvation, the suffering Jesus and his gracious mother, the Virgin Mary.61
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In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the rise and rapid spread of the Franciscan order was aided by, and also helped to further, positive philosophical and religious attitudes toward the natural world and its human inhabitants. Accompanying this new attitude was an increasing devotional stress on the humanity of Mary and Christ. Dramatic evidence of this revaluation of the secular realm is seen in the rise of new forms of lay religious association and expression, exemplified in the thirteenth century by the devotio moderna (mainly but not exclusively in the Low Countries) and in the fourteenth century by the Wycliffites in England and the followers of Jan Hus in Bohemia (again, not exclusively). The devotio moderna and Lollardy are exceptional manifestations of the general tendency frequently referred to by students of late-medieval religion as the growth of “lay piety” and the “privatization of religion”—both names for various attempts by laymen and women to experience the sacred without clerical mediation. In England and on the Continent, new liturgical devotions, sermons, and miracle stories celebrating the accessibility of the Virgin Mary proliferated.62 Simultaneously, there was an outpouring of sermons, miracle stories, and liturgical innovations highlighting the salvific power of the Host and its miraculous transubstantiation from bread to Christ’s flesh.63 Undoubtedly the most significant of these innovations was the introduction in the mid-thirteenth century of the “Feast of Corpus Christi,” at which the Host was honored in a processional display. Supplementing the traditional liturgical hours and sacraments, the new sacramentals, feasts, miracle stories, and liturgical innovations celebrating or drawing upon the power of Mary and the Host opened up new avenues of lay access to the sacred.64 The lay-directed late-medieval revolution in religious ideas and practices was accompanied by widespread anticlericalism and the rise of heretical sects.A contentious question that seemed to follow inevitably from the new “rational” attitude toward nature and reason was,“If nature is not necessarily evil and if reason is sufficient to know God, then why must I submit to the sacerdotal authority of priests?”65 For Wyclif and his English followers, almost all aspects of the orthodox clergy’s ideology and practical control of the sacred—veneration of the saints and their relics; religious paintings, sculpture, jewel-encrusted crosses, and other devotional objects; pilgrimage; auricular confession and priestly absolution; elaborate masses for the dead and liturgical innovations of any kind; the so-called private religion of friars, monks, and canons; the papacy; and, last but not least, the very claim that there could sometimes be a need for priestly mediation—were considered to be corruptions of the true gospel faith.66 Yet, as several recent and expert surveys of Christian belief and practice in the High and Later Middle Ages all testify, a sacramental understanding
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of nature and a fundamental acceptance of some measure of priestly authority were alive and well among Western Christian believers of all genders and social stations.67 Otherwise, their continuing reliance on a host of ritual observances—sacraments (baptism, confession, marriage, last rites, etc.) and sacramentals (pilgrimage, blessing of candles, “magical” uses of the Eucharist or objects that had come in contact with the Eucharist, and other private devotional practices)—would be hard to account for. The rise of mysticism and the success of anticlerical sects in the High and Later Middle Ages indicate that, whatever the primary cause or causes may have been, there was a weakening of faith in a monopoly on access to the sacred controlled by the official Western Church. Cataclysmic events like the depredations of the Vikings, the victories of Islam in the Mediterranean periphery, the devastations of the Black Death, and the growing self-confidence of secular rulers were challenges to the authority and efficacy of the Western Church, which it overcame with only partial success.Yet, aside from a relatively small if vocal and determined number of heretics, the vast majority of premodern Christians were unwilling (as are their modern-day counterparts) to face life without the protections and consolations that the official Church provided, even if that meant believing that individual and communal sin were the cause of all their misfortunes and that their best defenses against the next catastrophe were repentance and prayer under the guidance of the clergy. It all depends on where one chooses to look. Whereas repentance and prayer within the existing Church were enough of an answer for some, others sought access to sacred power in new, and sometimes (from the establishment’s perspective) heretical ways.68 As Richard Trexler explains (in an essay on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Protestant iconoclasm, but with methodological and theoretical assumptions that are more widely applicable), for some religious seekers, the quest for the sacred sometimes finds expression in a surprisingly iconoclastic manner: Religions continually test the utility of their objects, and then apologise to the figure or relic; they change divine representations to increase their utility; they discard or store away those proved useless and, since objects harm as well as heal, these various modes of ongoing group iconoclasms are practised against both gods and devils to prevent harm as well as cause good.69
As Trexler also points out, in addition to the (somewhat dubious) influence of theological and philosophical arguments about where to draw the boundaries between the sacred and secular, there are always more immediate material bases that correlate with religious–ideological positions on such questions. In particular, as Trexler reminds us, “[p]roperty was and
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is secured within and in part through the sacred and profane behavioural classifications in a society, and iconoclasm is an historically widespread behaviour when societies redistribute property.”70 The crusades, the Spanish Reconquista, and the colonization of America all make it abundantly clear that in the Middle Ages and Early Modern periods a sacred imperative could motivate activities in the secular realm such as “just” wars and the staking of proprietary claims to lands that lay oceans and deserts away. Indeed, in this respect, true “modernity”—if by that we mean the separation of the sacred and the secular realms—has yet to arrive.
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PART 1 MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN LITERATURE: LYRIC, NARRATIVE, AND DRAMA
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CHAPTER 1 THE IMITATION OF HAGIOGRAPHIC FORMULAS IN OCCITANIAN VIDAS (LIVES OF THE TROUBADOURS) Cyril Aslanov
Demonstrates the influence of the Golden Legend by Jacob de Voragine on the genre of troubadour vidas. It also seeks to reassess the textual status of these short biographical sketches in the framework of the compilation of Provençal lyric poetry. Conceived as paratexts that consist of biographical material on the troubadour whose selected songs they precede, these secular vidas—modeled on saints’ lives—were eventually to function as full-fledged texts in their own right, and later they would also provide a basis for further elaborations of this biographical material.
n the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the transmitters of Occitanian lyric poetry compiled collections of the poems of the troubadours in songbooks known as cansoniers, adding brief sketches of the lives of the troubadours.These brief lives, known as vidas, also included commentaries (razos or reasons) on specific poems.1 Recently,William E. Burgwinkle has suggested a postmodern, materialistic reading of the razos subcorpus.2 The present study focuses on the vidas themselves, and shows in what way these profane texts describing the lives of secular singers and poets, written in the vulgar language of the masses, nevertheless display significant affinity with sacred literature written in Latin.
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Indeed, these biographical sketches have at times a narrative structure that is similar to hagiographic epitomes, especially those found in Jacobus de Voragine’s compilation, Legenda Aurea (“The Golden Legend”).Although the epitomes are longer and have a more elaborate structure, the vidas are nonetheless quite reminiscent of the saints’ biographies, not only in literary terms,3 but also from historical and geographical perspectives. Interestingly enough, the compilers of the troubadours’ poetry began writing the vidas at approximately the same time that de Voragine completed his work (generally accepted as 1263–67).4 Furthermore, sponsored by local aristocrats, the Occitanian transmitters composed the first vidas in Northern Italy. It should be noted that de Voragine came from the same area (Voragine/Varagine is the re-Latinization of the toponym Varazze, a small town on the Ligurian Riviera). It is thus plausible to assume that the short hagiographic sketches in the Golden Legend served as the literary model for troubadours’ vidas. One possibility, of course, is that both the troubadours’ vidas and the short hagiographies independently reflect the prevailing style of mid-thirteenth century Northern Italy. However, even if this is so, these biographical sketches are an important instance of the interaction between sacred and secular literary works in the Middle Ages. It seems unlikely that the hagiographic accounts in the Golden Legend were influenced by the troubadours’ vidas. Indeed, the latter seem to have been an innovative thirteenth-century literary form (although, according to some scholars, oral or semioral vidas existed during the creative phase of troubadour poetry in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries).5 In contrast, Latin hagiographies, which date back to Late Antiquity, also served as the basis for saints’ lives in Romance vernacular languages, especially in Occitania and northern France.6 Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that the hagiographic accounts influenced the troubadours’ vidas, rather than vice versa. To illustrate the proposed links between sacred hagiography and the secular vidas, this essay highlights the similarities between the Golden Legend and the vidas in two areas: diction (especially in the incipits) and narrative patterns. Another feature of the vidas reminiscent of sacred texts is the relationship between the biographic texts and quotations from the troubadours’ songs. The vidas include interpolations of pseudoautobiographical allusions from the songs. Thus, quoting verses or strophes from the songs authenticates the biographical sketches. Including verses from these poems imbues the vidas prose with a quasi-canonical aura that may well have affected their status as well as that of the razos. Such a relationship between the quotation from the lyric corpus and the biographic sketches is akin to that between the Bible and its associated commentaries (the troubadours’ songs corresponding to the sacred text and the vidas to the exegetical or homiletic paratext). In addition, through reutilization of these texts by
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Dante Alighieri and Ezra Pound, the troubadours’ vidas were later to achieve literary renown in their own right. In this context, the vidas are not merely dependent paratexts, but rather full-fledged poetic texts, imparting quasi-hieratic respect to Ezra Pound’s macaronic Cantos. Narrative Patterns in the Golden Legend and the Vidas Immediately after the usual (pseudo-)etymological introduction in which the origin of the saint’s name is explained, many hagiographic sketches in the Golden Legend record the saint’s geographic and social origins. Similarly, the vidas open with the troubadours’ geographic and sociological backgrounds. However, whereas the saints in the hagiographies usually came from the higher social classes, many troubadours were born in poverty. Despite this difference, the biographers in both cases stress the contrast between the social status of both at the beginning and end of their lives. In hagiographies, pagan aristocrats often lost their social preeminence after converting to Christianity. This narrative pattern appears in sections describing various devout characters, including St. Nicholas, St. Lucy, St. Anastasia, St. Vincent, St. Paula, St. Julian, St. Agatha, St. Gregory the Great, St. Secundus, St. Pancratius, St. Qiricus, and St. Julitta. It is also evident in the epitomes dedicated to St.Theodora, St. Alexis, St. Christina, St. Nazarius and St. Celsus, St.Abdon and St. Sennen, as well as St. Bernard, St. Augustine, St. Savinianus, St. Savina, St. Giles, St. Gorgonius and St. Dorotheus, St. Protus and St. Hyacinthus, St. Euphemia, St. Jerome, St. Margaret, St. Chrysanthus and St. Daria, St. Cecilia, St. Clement, and St. James the Dismembered.These saints are presented as former members of the nobility who abandoned their privileged social status and suffered as martyrs or spent their lives in contrition. The authors of the vidas describe a reverse process: the troubadours’ rise from poverty to social recognition. Despite being impoverished at birth, the troubadours eventually became celebrities appreciated for their artistic skill. In both the vidas and the Golden Legend’s epitomes, social mobility is the primary focus, but the movement is downward in the saints’ hagiographies and upward in the vidas. Some troubadours, however, were aristocratic by birth. In such cases, the similarity between the vidas and the hagiographic model is even more striking.Thus, Jaufre Rudel’s bitter destiny is described in a way reminiscent of the hagiographic epitomes:“Jaufres Rudels de Blaia si fo molt gentils hom, princes of Blaia. . .” [ Jaufre Rudel, Prince of Blaye, he was a very noble man].7 The Occitanian word gentils [noble] is the vulgar counterpart of the Latin adjective nobilis, which often occurs in the incipits of the Golden Legend’s epitomes. Since Rudel renounces the mundane joys of life when he goes to Syria, his biography may be viewed as a
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kind of ascetic withdrawal, or retreat from the world, similar to the accounts of conversion found in the hagiographic epitomes of the Golden Legend. This impression is strengthened by the fact that after Rudel’s death in Tripoli, the Countess of Tripoli put on a veil, thereby forgoing earthly glory, and retrospectively imbuing Rudel’s striving to reach his distant love with new significance. Other successful poets eventually take the path of Christian asceticism, forsaking material joys and retiring to monasteries, as seen, for example, in the vidas of Bernard de Ventadorn, Bertran de Born, Raimon de Miraval, and Perdigon.8 Such sharp transitions from the top to the bottom of the social order, from the carnal world to monastic retreats, also characterize hagiographic epitomes. It should also be noted that, as well as being moral and religious edifying texts, the hagiographies were and still are read for entertainment at communal meals in monasteries and convents.Thus, both the hagiographies and the vidas are written texts intended for public reading: the vidas to aristocratic laymen and the hagiographies to monks and nuns. The authors, therefore, strove to make these short texts more attractive by sharpening the contrast between the beginning of the narrative and its end.
The Quasi-Canonical Status of the Troubadours’ Poems Since the vidas are primarily based on information in the songs themselves, it is hardly surprising that verses from them are quoted by the authors as textual evidence, or loci probantes.9 Marcabru’s vida, as transmitted in MS K (Paris BN fr. 12473), is a classic example of this:10 Marcabruns si fo de Gascoingna, fils d’una paubra femna que ac nom Marcabruna, si com el dis en son chantar: Marcabruns, lo fills Na Bruna, Fo engendraz en tal luna Qu’el saup d’amor cum degruna. . . [As for Marcabru, he was from Gascony, son of a poor woman called Marcabruna, as he says in his song: Marcabru, the son of Lady Bruna was begotten under such a moon that he knew how love is picked off. . .]
Curiously, the quotation does not indicate that Marcabru’s mother was called Marcabruna. Rather, she is referred to as Na Bruna, that is, “Lady Bruna.” However, in another version of this poem, the verse “Marcabruns, lo fills Na Bruna” [Marcabru, the son of Lady Bruna] reads “Marcabrus, fills Marcabruna” [Marcabru, the son of Marcabruna], supporting the
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biographer’s assertion.Thus, the vida only makes sense with the assumption that the quotation comes from the second version of the poem, in which Marcabrus refers to himself as “fills Marcabruna” [the son of Marcabruna]. The transmitter’s preference for the second version seems to suggest that he did not understand the purpose of this quotation in the specific context of this vida. Such doubt about the exact formulation of the locus probans seems to contradict the postulated quasi-canonical status of quotations in the vidas. However, in light of what are now widely accepted theories regarding the essential fluidity (mouvance, variance) of medieval texts written in the vulgar tongue,11 the suggestion that this quotation may not be accurately formulated seems irrelevant. Quoting a particular verse, all the more so for an inappropriate formulation, implicitly includes the full scope of possible readings, and the more fitting variant, “Marcabrus, fills Marcabruna” [Marcabru, the son of Marcabruna] could be easily reconstructed by those familiar with the troubadour corpus.Thus, the canonical dignity of the text, on the one hand, and its plasticity, on the other, can be attributed to the rather flexible approach to sacred texts in the Christian tradition. Unlike writers in the Jewish or Muslim traditions, who assign paramount importance to exact formulation of canonical texts in the original language (Hebrew for the Bible and Arabic for the Koran), Christian authors were more likely to use primary or even secondary translations of the Bible into vernacular languages, introducing significant variations in quotations from the Holy Writ.This was also characteristic of transmission of the Latin text of the Bible, beginning with St. Jerome’s revision, which was further complicated by the numerous further recensions. Thus, as with biblical quotations in patristic sources, a quotation of a verse from troubadour poetry need not be exactly word-for-word in order to fulfill the role of locus probans. Despite differences between the original and quoted verses, their resonance would be palpable to the reader. The recurrence of a verse creates a kind of circularity between the text of the poem and its paratext.Thus, authors of vidas (paratexts) strove to authenticate their accounts by quoting verses from the troubadours’ poems. However, such quotations, resurfacing in the context of the vidas, acquired additional allusiveness, confirming the reference to a real episode in the troubadour’s career. According to Schutz,12 this resonance was even more effective when vidas were read aloud before the song was performed. From a pragmatic point of view, the texts of the vidas—a rewriting in prose of the biographical passages contained in the poems—did not enjoy equal status with the original verse.13 A parallel development is found in the thirteenth-century practice of rewriting courtly romances originally composed in verse in prose form—a process that apparently involved a change
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in attitude toward the pragmatic status of the text.14 This is particularly clear in various hybrid texts, such as Philippe de Novare’s Estoire de la guerre des Ibelins contre les Imperiaux, in which prose and verse appear simultaneously.15 The Occitanian songbook or collection of lyrics (cansonier) is actually another such hybrid text. In the early printed editions of the troubadours’ poetry, the alternation of verse and prose was not as clear because the verse was often presented in a continuous form, without paragraphs, with the contrast a result of content rather than form. However, since vidas are in very simple prose, verses quoted often appear as encoded text and may pose riddles to the reader.This intrinsic contrast between the plain vidas texts and the encoded poetry reflects the essential distinction between the “truth value and referentiality” of the prose, giving rise to a lack of ontological consistency in the verse.16 Indeed, the first known troubadour,William of Aquitaine, affirmed that verse deals with mere vanity, as he says in his well-known song, “Ferai un vers de dreit neant” [I’ll do a song about nothing at all].17 This clearly recalls the previously mentioned analogy between the sacred texts of Christianity and the troubadours’ corpus. Whereas the Bible is endowed with supreme ontological value, the troubadours’ verses entirely lack such standing.The quasi-canonical aura that radiates from the troubadours’ songs does not necessarily imply ontological value or reliability. But with respect to the distinction between prose as truthful and poetry as fanciful, the vidas surely do carry more ontological weight than the verses paraphrased; by being quoted in the context of a prose text, the verse acquires ontological importance. Furthermore, moving from a lyrical to a narrative genre implies an upgrading of the ontological status of the discourse.Whereas the former, in the first-person singular, is allegedly self-effusive, the prose narrative, in the third person, is presumed to be inherently more objective.The hagiographic epitome also has a lyrical/musical counterpart, namely, a prayer to the saint whose life story the hagiography relates.The latter, unlike the troubadours’ lyrical cansons, is in the second person, using the imperative form ora pro nobis [pray for us]. However, moving from the objectivity of the vidas to the intersubjectivity of the prayer does not call the invocation’s ontological importance into question. On the contrary, such prayers can be considered as illocutionary speech-acts with the postulated ability of modifying extralinguistic reality. Despite these pragmatic and ontological differences, there is a reverse symmetry between the lyrical vidas, on the one hand, and the hagiographic epitomes, on the other. In the troubadours’ songs, the lyrical first person addresses a potentially wide audience, whereas the invocations appeal to a unique saint figure.
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Transformation of a Paratext into a Poetic Text It is reasonable to assume that verse rewritten as prose, while gaining ontological weight, suffers a corresponding loss in poetic power. Applying the standards prevailing in the Middle Ages, this is certainly arguable, since the sophisticated encoding of messages is the essence of medieval poetics, and the vidas are merely plain and almost tedious accounts of the salient events in the troubadours’ lives. However, authors from Dante Alighieri to Ezra Pound, including Jehan de Nostredame, Heinrich Heine, Ludwig Uhland, Robert Browning, and Giosua Carducci incorporated narrative material from the vidas (especially from Jaufre Rudel’s vida) into their own literary work, showing how easy it is to recross the boundary between text and paratext, including sophisticated encoding. Thus, when other writers recycled them into new poetic frameworks, the vidas acquired a new kind of canonicity. This shift in status of paratext, which an author can reuse as a source of inspiration for a new text, finds a precedent in early Christian literature, namely, the Gospels.These New Testament narratives may be considered as closely related to Rabbinic Midrash or Pesher (the form of exegesis practiced by the Dead Sea sectarians), since they recast the Old Testament prophets in such a way that there is a distinction between the canonical aura of Old Testament prophecy and the paratextual status of the New Testament narratives applied to the Old Testament quotations. For example, Matthew’s description of the massacre of the Holy Innocents quotes Jeremiah 31:14 as a paratext.18 However, when other writers cite this verse of Jeremiah as it is quoted by Matthew,19 it takes on the role of a canonical text, as opposed to the new, noncanonical paratext in which it is integrated. Similarly, Dante’s description of Bertran de Born’s torments in hell20 also illustrates this process, in which a paratext attains the status of a full-fledged text once another writer quotes or refers to it in a new text.The following passage may be considered as an interpolation of the last sentence of de Born’s vida: “E s’il aguen patz ni treva, ades se penet ab sos sirventes de desfar la patz e de mostrar com cascuns era desonratz en aquella patz. E si n’ac de grans bens e de grans mals.”21 [And if they had peace and truce, immediately he would strive by means of his political songs to undo the peace and to show how much ashamed everybody was by this peace. Hence he got great goods and great evils].
The author of this vida did not explicitly mention de Born’s eternal damnation. He merely relied on the polemical verses about the troubadour,
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depicting him as a bellicose knight who eventually paid for his intrigues. Dante read this paratextual interpolation in light of his interpretation of the vague formula de grans mals (great evils) as referring to the pain of hell. Viewing this vida as paratextual packaging of the troubadours’ verses to be reutilized in a new poetic context is even more striking since, according to another paratextual version of this vida, de Born followed Bernard de Ventadorn’s example and ended his days in repentance in the Cistercian abbey of Dalon. However, Dante chose the version presenting the troubadour as a sinner doomed to damnation. By deliberately ignoring the alternative version in which de Born is given a second chance, the author of the Divine Comedy imparted a particular kind of canonical authority to one particular version of the rather plastic material of the troubadours’ biographies. Some of Ezra Pound’s compositions prominently portray the changing status of the vida: from a paratext into a quasi-orthodox text recycled in the framework of a new paratext.Whereas Dante relied only implicitly on de Born’s vida to describe the bellicose troubadour’s pain, Pound quotes the original version of Sordello’s vida verbatim.22 Pound’s methodology demonstrates a posteriori how a prose paratext that surrounds the poetry in the framework of a medieval cansonier could eventually assume the character of the poetic text from which it is derived. Once transposed in the new context of modernist American poetry, the essential difference between prose and poetry becomes blurred. In Canto 6, the obfuscation is so efficient that Pound sequentially quotes a fragment of Sordello’s vida and two verses by the well-known troubadours, William of Aquitaine and Arnaut Daniel. In Canto 36, he combines another quotation from Sordello’s vida with a fragment from a charter signed by Charles of Anjou, King of Naples, in which the King endowed the troubadour with an estate. In this way, Pound adroitly elevates a nonliterary document to the level of literary texts or paratexts. Reduced to the dimension of a mysterious fragment, excerpted from a context that is in all likelihood unknown to the average reader of American poetry, the vida no longer serves the role of an informative message, but becomes an opaque and foreign element embedded in the context of new English verse.The obscurity arises from the deliberately fragmentary nature of the quotation and the preservation of the Occitanian formulation in the new context of Pound’s poetry. For the average modern English-speaking reader, Occitanian is no more understandable than such liturgical languages as Latin and Hebrew. However, as the French romanticist Chateaubriand remarked, the very use of an unfamiliar language in the framework of religious worship extends an aura of mystery to the divine cult.23 By inserting quotations in Old Occitanian into the framework of his Cantos, Pound seems to have applied Chateaubriand’s observation to his secular poetic
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endeavor.Although Occitanian served to create a whole corpus of medieval secular poetry, when Pound recycled it in the framework of twentiethcentury American verse, he was apparently putting it to use as a semisacred language.Thus, he not only managed to promote this medieval language to the status of a hieratic language, but also transformed leaden prose into a golden poetic discourse. Reproducing the Golden Legend’s formulas and narrative patterns, the troubadours’ vidas seem to be a kind of secularized hagiography. In this secularization process, hymns to literary glory replace the accounts of martyrdom (most of the Golden Legend’s saints are martyrs). But this significant step is not the only mark of convergence between the secular and the sacred spheres. As we have seen, even the way in which a vida paratext connects with its related poetic text is reminiscent of the link between a paratextual commentary and its related biblical text. Moreover, the troubadours’ songs themselves often crossed the boundary between the sacred and the secular domains. Even their melodies have close bonds with church music.24 The hypothesis of the clerical origin of Provençal lyric is also corroborated by the borrowing of rhythmical patterns from liturgical or paraliturgical poetry written in Latin.25 Theories ascribing a clerical origin to the troubadours’ songs only reinforce the impression that, even in its formative and creative periods, the troubadours’ lyric served as the secularized vulgar counterpart to liturgical poetry written in Latin. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the trend of following the model of sacred literature reappeared during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in the postclassical phase of troubadour poetry, when the primary goal was no longer to create new songs, but to compile the extant ones.
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CHAPTER 2 “QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”:THE SECULAR EXPRESSION OF THE SACRED IN OLD AND MIDDLE ENGLISH LYRICS Thomas G. Duncan
The expression of the sacred in the heroic mode of Old English literature through the exploitation of secular Germanic images and concepts is examined in the representation of Christ as a young warrior in “The Dream of the Rood.” A contrasting picture is encountered in Middle English lyrics reflecting Anselm’s new doctrine of salvation centered on love. Now, in the interplay of the secular and the sacred, the divine is presented in unreservedly intimate human terms, Christ as child and as man, Mary as a loving and suffering mother.The gap between secular and sacred narrows to a vanishing point.
hat has Ingeld to do with Christ?”Alcuin’s celebrated question in a letter of 797, probably addressed to a “Mercian bishop concealed behind the by-name Speratus,”1 rather than, as hitherto supposed, to Bishop Hygbald of Lindisfarne, clearly invited the answer “nothing whatsoever.”A definitive boundary is set between the heroic world of Germanic tradition and the realm of Christianity—between Ingeld and Christ:
“W
The house is narrow and has no room for both.The Heavenly King does not wish to have communion with pagan and forgotten kings listed name by name: for the eternal King reigns in Heaven, while the forgotten pagan king wails in Hell.2
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Both in sentiment and in manner of expression the great Northumbrian scholar was, at the end of the eighth century, following in a tradition established by earlier Christian writers. By the end of the second century CE,Tertullian had already asked,“What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”3 Some two centuries later, Jerome followed with, “What has Horace to do with the Psalter,Virgil with the Gospels and Cicero with Paul?”4 Tertullian and Jerome had in mind pagan classical authors; for his part, Alcuin was concerned with a literature typified by Ingeld, a pagan Germanic hero best known to us from the Old English epic Beowulf. There were, of course, other Christian writers who were eager to justify the reading of classical literature. Albeit the work of pagan authors, classical texts were nevertheless, in Christian understanding, part of God’s creation and as such were to be regarded as potential vehicles of spiritual truth as understood through allegorical and typological interpretation. Notably Virgil’s fourth Eclogue came to be viewed as prophetic of the birth of Christ, and the hero of the Aeneid as a type of Christ.5 Even so, it is clear that Alcuin, unlike some twentieth-century scholars, would never have dreamed of finding Christian allegory in Beowulf. Moreover, if he had no notion of discovering spiritual truths in tales of a pagan Germanic past, nor, perhaps, did he realize the potential role of such pagan Germanic traditions in expressing the emergent Christian culture of Anglo-Saxon England. However, if, as reported by Bede, Pope Gregory instructed Augustine not to destroy English heathen temples but to convert them to Christian use by the sprinkling of holy water, the building of altars, and the installation of relics, so too Old English writers in prose and poetry were not slow to exploit secular Germanic images and concepts in the expression of the new faith.6 Nowhere in Old English literature is just how much Ingeld had to do with Christ more strikingly apparent than in The Dream of the Rood. This is immediately evident from four characteristic features of this poem. The first concerns the presentation of Christ, who is here depicted as a young warrior, a hero, strong and steadfast, stripping himself to do battle on the cross. At the end of the poem he is still a hero, a warrior, triumphant, mighty, and successful in his final mission, the Harrowing of Hell.The second is essentially a significant aspect of the first.The emphasis on the suffering of the crucifixion in this poem is registered not through Christ but through the cross—the personified, speaking cross: it is the cross that is pierced with dark nails, the cross that is drenched with blood. Christ at the conclusion of the crucifixion scene, far from being pictured as a victim suspended in agony, continues to be represented as a hero, now as a warrior described as resting, exhausted after a great battle. Third, the man–lord relationship, that relationship so fundamental to heroic society, is also fundamental to this poem. Here it is the relationship of the personified cross and Christ. The cross, however, cannot defend his lord, Christ, as a true retainer should;
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ironically, it dare not, contrary to its lord’s command, bend, or break, or fell His enemies. Likewise, in the second half of the poem, the relationship of dreamer and cross also becomes that of man and lord, as the dreamer honors and serves the cross and the cross becomes his protector.7 Finally, it is to be noted that Heaven, like the hall of any earthly lord, is imagined in terms characteristic of the heroic life, that is, as a place of banqueting. The Dream of the Rood is expressed in a heroic idiom, in terms and concepts familiar to an Old English audience from the literature of the pagan, secular world of Ingeld. However, it should be noted that the poem’s emotive power derives not from the Christ figure but from the immediacy with which the experiences and emotions of the dreamer and of the personified rood are presented, in some measure paradoxically, via the Germanic man–lord relationship. Christ is here recognizably a Germanic hero as he does battle on the cross for mankind and, at the end of the poem, triumphantly completes his final expedition, the Harrowing of Hell, bringing a host of souls to dwell in glory in his heavenly home. This heroic Christ, however, remains a remote figure. What a contrast was to emerge in English devotional poetry within three centuries of the Vercelli MS version of The Dream: Swetë Jhesu, king of blisse, Min hertë love, min hertë lisse, Thou art swetë mid y-wisse, Wo is him that thee shal misse.
[heart’s love, my heart’s joy] [sweet indeed ] [who will lose you]8
How completely foreign to Old English religious poetry, alike in sentiment as in expression, are these opening lines of a thirteenth-century Middle English devotional lyric! Here we encounter the mood and sensibilities of a new age where, as in Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo?, the doctrine of salvation earlier conceived of as a cosmic battle between Christ and the Devil is now focused on love: Christ out of love for man becoming man to suffer for man. A heroic contest had become a metaphorical fight for love, a conception superbly expressed in Love me broughte, a lyric found in John of Grimestone’s late-fourteenth–century Commonplace Book: Love me broughte, And love me wroughtë, Man, to be thi ferë; Love me fedde, And love me ledde, And love me lettëd herë. Love me slow, And love me drow,
[created ] [companion] [nourished] [kept me here] [slew] [drew, stretched out]
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And love me leyde on berë; Love is my pes, For love I ches Man to byen derë.
[laid on a bier] [peace] [chose] [buy (i.e., redeem) at a cost]
Ne dred thee nought, I have thee sought, Bothen day and night; To haven thee, Wél is me, I have thee wonne in fight.
[won]9
Love triumphs, but it does so paradoxically through suffering: Love me slow, [slew] And love me drow, [drew, stretched out] And love me leyde on berë. [laid on a bier]
In Middle English religious lyrics reflecting this new doctrine of salvation the interplay of sacred and secular is now seen in the presentation of the Divine in unreservedly intimate human terms: the gap between human and divine, the secular and the sacred, so great, even absolute in some religious traditions, narrows to the disappearing point.True, in the earlier version of Christian salvation represented in the Old English Dream of the Rood, Christ indeed became man but, as noted earlier, only as a rather remote hero in that poem, virtually untouched by the suffering endured by the personified rood. By contrast, Christ as man, not hero, his suffering vividly depicted, is the immediate subject of several early Middle English lyrics including the following, one of the various renderings into Middle English verse of a passage beginning Candet nudatum pectus from John of Fecamp’s Liber Meditationum: Whyt was hys naked brest and red of blod hys side, Bleyk was his fair andléd, his woundës dep and wide, And hys armes y-streight, hey upon the rode; On fif stedes on his body the stremës ran o blode.
[white] [red with blood ] [pale, fair face] [deep] [stretched ] [high upon the cross] [five places] [the streams of blood ran ]10
More telling and affective are the second and third stanzas of “Worldës blissë, Have God Day”:11 Ha, Jesu! thin holi heved With sharpë thornës was by-wevëd,
[holy head ] [encircled ]
“QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”
Thi fairë neb was al bi-spet, With spot and blod meynd al by-wet; Fro the crounë to the to Thi body was ful of pine and wo, And wan and red.
[ fair face; spat upon] [spittle; mingled; drenched ] [ from the crown to the toe] [ pain and woe] [wan and red]
Ha Jesu! thi smartë ded Be my sheld, and minë red From develes lorë Ha, swéte Jesú, thin orë! For thinë pinës sorë, Tech min herte right lovë thee Whos hertë blod was shad for me.
[Ah Jesu! your painful death] [may it be; help] [ from the Devil’s promptings] [have mercy]
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[to love you properly] [heart’s blood was shed ]
The verbal realization of the suffering of God as man is accompanied in some later Middle English manuscripts by graphic illustrations.The fifteenthcentury lyric O man unkynde12 is written down the left side of the manuscript page. To the right of the text is a drawing of Christ, with blood pouring from the nail holes in his hands and feet and, especially, from the gash in his side.13 This is the popular fifteenth-century iconographic imago pietatis, the “image of pity”—not specifically a crucifix (with Christ hanging from the cross), but the timeless image of the wounded Christ as the Man of Sorrows. In one moving fifteenth-century complaint lyric, Wofully araide, Christ appeals to man in terms of the sufferings he endured on the cross. These agonies are partly described in the present tense: Thus naked am I nailed, O man, for thi sake. I love the, thenne love me— why slepest thu? Awake!14
[(marked by) nails]
However, the tenses of the poem are mainly past: Thus wàs I defasëd, Thus wàs my flesh rasëd, And I to deth chasëd; Like a lambe led untò sacrefise, Slayëne I was in most cruell wise.15
[disfigured ] [torn] [hounded ]
[slain]
This address from the cross is one of a number of Middle English lyrics that echo the text O vos omnes, Old Testament words from Lamentations 1.12, originally a lament for Jerusalem, that were used as an antiphon at Laudes
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on Holy Saturday with reference to Christ’s agony. Here in Wofully araide a vivid depiction of Christ crucified begins to merge with the timeless image of the Man of Sorrows. Indeed, in the Harley manuscript version a small drawing of the imago pietatis appears above the first stanza of the poem. Nowhere, perhaps, in Middle English lyrics is God more fully portrayed as man than in another fifteenth-century complaint poem, Brother, abyde, I the desire and pray, a poem that reflects the medieval practice of dwelling in the imagination on the events and details of Christ’s earthly existence as a form of spiritual exercise. This devotional mode, already advocated by St. Anselm and St. Bernard, promoted the production of such largely fictional accounts of the life of Christ as the Meditationes Vitae Christi, a work long attributed to St. Bonaventura (ca. 1217–74).The style of this narrative is simple, the emphasis throughout being on the Franciscan values of humility and poverty. Particular attention is paid to the infancy of Jesus (the Virgin’s gentle, motherly care of her child is lovingly described), to Christ’s boyhood, and to the events of the Passion. Details and episodes unrecorded in the Gospels or in such traditional sources as the writings of the Church fathers, the Glossa ordinaria, and the Legenda aurea, are vividly and sympathetically supplied by the author. Several English translations of parts of this text were made in the fourteenth century, and the complete fifteenthcentury translation by Nicholas Love, The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesu Christ, became one of the most popular books of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is from this literary and devotional tradition that the vivid details and human touches of Brother, abyde derive. Christ’s appeal is not focused solely on his sufferings at the crucifixion but on a review of his entire life—a life of poverty and sacrifice. At one point Christ recalls his boyhood as a youth playing with children in the street dressed in such poor clothes as his mother could make or spin: I lede my youth wyth children in the strette, Poorly arayed in clothës bare and thyne, Suche as my mother for me dyde make and spyne.16
[street] [dressed]
One may compare this last passage with the detailed account in the Meditationes Vitae Christi of the Virgin spinning and sewing in order to clothe herself and her child, and of the child Jesus acting as her messenger as she sewed for others to earn a living.17 At another point Christ is like an idealized Franciscan, wandering barefoot and bareheaded, suffering so much from hunger, thirst, and cold that even his own mother did not know him. Thus longe I lyved, passyng frome place to place, Barefotyd, caplese, wythout sylver or gold.
“QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”
Payne of my traveylle aperëd in my face, Men myght perceyve yf thei listed to behold. Watch and grett labur, sharpe honger, thurst and cold
35
[if they wished ] [wakefulness and great exertion]
Full ofte me brought so feble and so lowe, That myne owne mother sum tyme dyd me not knowe.18
If the Divine is expressed here in so radical a realization of Christ’s humanity, in other Middle English lyrics, divine love was manifested primarily in terms of the archetypal human relationship of parent and child. This, of course, was nothing new: “Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him”—the words of the Psalmist immediately spring to mind.19 It is, therefore, not surprising that Middle English lullaby lyrics with the Virgin and her infant child and crucifixion lyrics with an anguished mother at the foot of the cross offer the most moving attempts at expressing the divine paradox of love and suffering. It is worthwhile pausing for a moment to consider the marked contrast Old English literature presents in this regard.The Blessed Virgin is referred to only once in The Dream of the Rood.The cross asserts that God had caused it to be honored above all trees as He honored Mary above all women: Hwæt, me Qa geweor5ode ofer holmwudu, swylce swa he his modor eac, ælmihtig God geweor5ode ofer eall wifa cynn.20
wuldres Ealdor heofonrices Weard, Marian sylfe, for ealle menn
There is no mention in The Dream of the Rood of the Virgin grieving at the foot of the cross. Still less is there any vestige in Old English of the mother-and-child lullaby poems found later in Middle English. Probably the most noteworthy appearance of the Virgin in Old English poetry is in the Advent Lyrics of the Exeter Book, formerly known as Christ I. Here one finds a remarkable dialogue with Joseph where she explains why he should put aside his anguish and his shame. Yet, although the main emphasis in these poems is on the purity of the young maiden Mary and the miracle of the Virgin Birth and Mary is addressed here in terms reflecting such traditional patristic and liturgical titles as “Bride of Christ,” “Queen of Heaven,” and “Empress of Hell,” she is also spoken of as “holy Mary, ever triumphant.”21 From this latter description it would seem that not only Judith, the archetypal biblical heroine of Old English literature, but even the Blessed Virgin was conceived of in a manner more characteristically heroic than womanly. It is hardly surprising that in a period in which Christ could appropriately be depicted in Ingeldian terms there was little place for a
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Virgin of tenderness and compassion. Indeed, it may be supposed that there could have been no role of any great significance for the Virgin in the heroic world of Old English poetry. However, in the post-Anselmian world of Middle English literature, the situation is totally different. It requires no great exercise of the imagination to understand how, in many Middle English lyrics, especially lullaby and crucifixion lyrics, the Virgin came to be a central figure in the expression of the tenderness and compassion inherent in the new theology of divine love. Some lullaby lyrics express the joy of that maternal love, as in the words: “Lullay, myn lyking, my dere sone, myn sweting, Lullay, my dere herte, myn owyn dere derling’
[beloved ] [sweet one] [darling]
—the burden of a tender lullaby carol to the infant Jesus that begins: I saw a fair maiden sitten and singe, She lullëd a litel child, a swetë lording.
[sweet lord] 22
The Virgin, like any earthly mother, suckles her child and sings him to sleep: Whan it gan wepe, Qat child so swete, Sho stilled him with mylk of tete; Sho clipte hym ofte and keste also, Gret was Qe ioye be-twene hem to. Pat 3onge child whan it gan wepe, WiQ song she lulled him a-slepe; Pat was so swete a melody hyt passet alle mynstralcy; Pe nyghtyngale sang also, Hure wois is hors and noght Qer-to.23
Often, however, joy is mingled with sorrow, as in the following lines picturing the nativity in the later-medieval manner, with manger, ox, and ass: Jhesu, swetë sonë dere, In porful bed thou list now here, And that me grevëth sore; For thi cradel is as a bere, Ox and assë ben thi fere, Wepe may I therfore.
[dear] [on a pitiful bed you lie] [ grieves me bitterly] [byre] [are your companions] [weep]24
“QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”
37
Although lullaby lyrics dwell on the tender human relationship of mother and child, it is precisely because this mother is the Virgin and Christ the child that, characteristically in these lyrics, one encounters the coexistence of love and suffering. Frequently the Virgin is gripped by ominous premonitions of what lies ahead for her child.Thus, in one such lyric Mary is unable to sing at her child’s request “as do mothers all”: The maiden wolde withouten song Hire child o slepë bringe; The child thoughtë she dide him wrong, And bad his moder singe. Lullay, lullay, etc. “Sing now, moder,” seide that child, “What me shal befalle Here after whan I come to ild, So don modrës alle. Lullay, lullay, etc.25
[wished ] [to put her child to sleep]
[what is to happen to me] [come to maturity] [as do]
The Virgin can only offer what—not least, in the light of other lullaby lyrics—is a rather ironic excuse for not being able to sing to her child of his future: she claims only to know what she learned from the Angel Gabriel at the Annunciation: “Swetë sonë,” seydë she, “Wherof sholde I singe? Wist I never yet more of thee But Gabrieles gretinge. Lullay, lullay, etc.26
[of what] [knew I ] [than Gabriel’s greeting]
Indeed, in one fifteenth-century lullaby poem, the weeping Christ child’s account of his coming crucifixion draws from the Virgin, almost as from one who feels herself a victim of deception, an exceptionally candid, rueful, and (with its double negative) emphatic comment: “A! sone, that is a heyvy cas: [sad plight] When Gabrell cnelled before my face, [knelt before me (lit. before my face)] And sayd,‘Heylle! Lady, full of grace,’ He never told me noothing of this.”27
Most anguished of all are the crucifixion lyrics in which Mary, standing at the foot of the cross, beholds the agonies of her son and, as a mother, suffers accordingly. One of the best known of these lyrics takes the form of a dialogue between Christ and Mary. Jesus appeals to his mother to put her
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sorrow aside and be joyful: “Stond wel, moder, under rodë, [stand well, mother, under the cross] Bihold thi child wyth gladë modë, [ gladsome heart] Blythë moder might thou be.” [a happy mother you may be]28
This request is repeated throughout the dialogue with various supporting arguments of a theological nature. Inevitably this makes Christ seem detached and less than wholly sympathetic as motherly grief is in counterpoint with theological rationale. The Virgin’s anguish remains unassuaged as she continues to behold her crucified son: “Sone, how may I blithë stonden? I se thin feet, I se thin honden, Naylëd to the hardë tre.”29
[be (lit. stand) happy] [hands]
Christ begs Mary not to weep; her tears, He says, cause Him greater grief than His own death. But how, asks Mary, can she possibly restrain her tears in the face of the blood streaming from Him, her son. Christ persists with various reasons why He must die; Mary’s grief remains undiminished until, in the second last stanza, Christ’s mention of His resurrection provides the cue for the turning point in the poem, which, in its final stanza, briefly celebrates the triumph of Easter and Mary’s final joy as Queen of Heaven: Blissed be thou quen of hevenë, Bring us out of hellë levenë Thurgh thi derë sonës might. Moder, for that heighë blodë That He shadde upon the rodë, Led us into hevene light. Amen.
[Hell’s flames] [noble blood ] [shed ] [Heaven’s light]30
In later Middle English lyrics the expression of aspects of the Divine through the figure of the Virgin develops in two contrasting directions. In one remarkable poem, a fifteenth-century complaint of the Virgin addressed to “all women that ever were born,” the humanity of the Virgin as a mother is movingly evoked in a context of domestic detail.31 Poignant comparisons are developed between Mary, who holds her dead son on her lap, and other mothers, who dance their children merrily on their knees. The scene so vividly depicted here was clearly inspired by the characteristically fifteenth-century iconographic representation of the Virgin, the pietà, the image of the Virgin with the dead Christ on her lap. In this lyric, one of the mothers addressed is pictured as happily combing her child’s hair: Mary meanwhile picks thorns from her dead son’s head; such a mother
“QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”
39
takes pleasure in making a garland of flowers for her child; Mary’s child has a garland of thorns. O woman, a chaplet chosyn thu has [ garland (of flowers); you have] Thy childe to were, hit dose the likyng, [(for) thy; wear; it gives you pleasure] Thu pynnes hit on, grete joye thou mas; [you make] And I sitte with my son sore wepyng, His chaplet is thornys sore prickyng, His mouth I kys with carfull chere— [in sorrow] I sitte wepyng and thu syngyng, For now liggus ded my dere son dere. [lies dead my dear, dear son]32
In particular, one should note how the descriptions of motherly affection in this complaint recall the detailed accounts of Mary and the infant Jesus so lovingly dwelt upon in medieval lives of Christ. In this regard, this lyric may be compared with Brother, abyde with its imaginative depiction of details from the life of Christ. However, in this poem it is not the maternal joys of the Virgin herself that are recounted but those of other mothers, presented here in ironic contrast to the Virgin’s bitter sorrows. If aspects of the Divine may thus be expressed in scenes of ordinary domestic life, they are also portrayed in a wholly different context in lyrics on the Assumption and Coronation of the Blessed Virgin, themes that came into prominence in the fifteenth century.As noted earlier, Mary was already being addressed by her traditional title “Queen of Heaven” in the Old English poem Christ I. However, it is only in the fifteenth century that this role is fully realized in English lyrics. Now, at a time when Christian devotion focused in ever more detail on Christ’s humanity, Mary, the human mother of lullaby and crucifixion lyrics, is raised to quasi-divine status in lyrics celebrating her Coronation. In a sense, the sacred in the secular is enhanced as Mary, human advocate, icon of womanly compassion, reaches virtual apotheosis as Queen of Heaven. It is interesting to note that in contrast to the simple style characteristic of the best of earlier Middle English devotional lyrics, fifteenth-century Coronation lyrics were more frequently written in a “high” style. One such begins as follows: The infinite power essenciall, Me thoght I sawë verrement, Procedyng from his trone celestiall To a dere damsell that was gent. Songes melodious was in their tent, Of angells synging with gret solemnyté Before a quene whiche was present. Ecce Virgo, radix Jessé.
[absolute] [truly] [throne] [dear; noble, beautiful ] [were the concern]
[behold the Virgin, the root of Jesse]33
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This high or “aureate” style, often associated with the fifteenth-century poet Lydgate, was characterized by a copious use of words derived from Latin, many recently or even (in some poems) newly adopted into English. Medieval opinion, however, frequently viewed the high style as vain and even worldly and advocated a plain style for sacred subjects. Indeed, as Douglas Gray observes in this regard, “there are so many references to plainness and simplicity of style that one feels that it was almost a stylistic ‘imitation’ of Christ.”34 The simple style appropriate to devotional literature is sometimes contrasted with the high style used by pagan writers of antiquity. Dante’s description of Beatrice’s manner of speaking as “soave e piana”35 prompted Benevuto da Imola, a late-fourteenth-century commentator, to remark:“Well he says this, for the divine speech is sweet and plain, not high and proud like the speech of Virgil and the poets.”36 What, then, was the appeal of the high, aureate style to writers of fifteenth-century Coronation lyrics? Presumably, it was, in the first place, the sound of long Latinate words—their sonority and rhythm. Such words normally carried at least two stresses, ending with the rhythmic pattern / x /. When they occurred in rhymes, the combination of the weight of stressing with the repetition of like sounds maximized sonority. Resonance was sometimes enhanced by alliteration, which was often used to link Latinate words in aureate verse. If this kind of writing is read with sympathy, confidence, and rhythm, the original appeal of these Latinisms as part of the music of poetry may still be felt. Significant, also, was a traditional social function of high style defined by Chaucer’s Host in the following words to the Clerk: Youre termës, youre colours, and youre figures, Keepe hem in stoor til so be ye endite Heigh style, as whan that men to kyngës write.37
If appropriate for kings, was not such a style suitable for poems addressed to the Queen of Heaven? It is not difficult to understand the appeal of an elevated Latinate vocabulary to fifteenth-century poets as, in poems on the Coronation of the Virgin, they attempted to express the almost baroque splendor of ornate celestial settings, with Mary, suffused with resplendent light, enthroned as Queen of Heaven and surrounded by angelic hosts. So far this discussion of the sacred and the secular in Middle English lyrics has focused on the expression of the Divine in human terms, of divine love in Christ the man, of divine compassion in Mary the mother, conceptions of love rooted in a theological and devotional background stemming from Anselm and Bernard. Meanwhile, in the same period an equally novel understanding of the role of love, the idea that love is noble
“QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”
41
and ennobling, was emerging in secular literature.Viewed in one way or another, such a notion would not have surprised Plato,Virgil, St. Paul, or St. Augustine. But the belief that the proper object of love should be a woman and that unqualified devotion to a woman was the true inspiration of refined and noble conduct would indeed have astonished them. This, however, was the troubadours’ creed. In many Middle English secular love poems, poets languished and made urgent and repeated appeals to their ladies for “pity,” for “mercy.”Typical is the opening stanza of secular love lyric from the British Library MS Harley 2253, perhaps the most famous of all surviving medieval English lyric manuscripts: With longing I am lad, On molde I waxë mad, A maidë marrëth me. I grede, I grone, unglad, For selden I am sad That semly for to see.
[I go (lit. am led)] [on earth I am going mad] [distresses] [cry out; groan; anguished ] [seldom; tired ] [that fair one; of seeing (lit. to see)]
Lady, thou rewë me, To routhe thou hast me rad, Be bote of that I bad, My lyf is long on thee.
[have pity on me] [to grief; brought] [be the remedy for which I have prayed ] [my life is dependent ]38
This poet’s very life depends upon his lady; troubadour ideals had truly arrived in English literature. If in the eighth century Alcuin could ask what Ingeld had to do with Christ, now that the heroic age had given way to the era of courtly love, a twelfth-century descendant of Alcuin might likewise have asked what troubadours had to do with Christ. That is, he might have asked were it not for the fact that the exploitation of the modalities of later-medieval secular love poetry in Middle English religious literature was so manifestly widespread, and not least so through the influence of the Franciscans, as to render such a question absurd. The conventions of the new secular love poetry most readily found employment in a sacred context in Marian lyrics. Not infrequently, the Virgin is addressed in the very manner of medieval lovelorn poets addressing their ladies.Take, for example, the following lines addressed to the Virgin in a thirteenth-century Marian lyric Edi be thou, hevene queen:39 On thee hit is wel eth-senë Of allë women thou havest the pris. My swetë Levedy, her my benë, And rew of me yif thi wille is.
[very evident] [you are supreme] [lady, hear my prayer] [have pity on me if ]
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Nis non maide of thinë hewë, So fair, so shene, so rudy, so bright; Swetë Lady of me thou rewë And have merci of thin knight.
[complexion] [so fair, so beautiful, so rosy] [have pity on me]
Ladi mildë, softe and swotë, Ich crie thee merci, Ich am thy mon, Bothe to hondë and to fotë, On allë wise that Ich con.
[ gentle and sweet] [your servant] [both hand and foot] [in every way I know]
Ich am in thine love-bendë.
[love-bonds]
There is, of course, little to be surprised at in this use of the language of secular love in religious contexts, as, in some measure, in secular lyrics poets echoed religious language and imagery in addressing their mistresses. In the fifteenth-century verse epistles came to play a considerable part in the ritual of paying court to a lady, and several lyrics of this kind began with variations of the formula “Go little bill.”This convention is exploited in a remarkable Marian lyric beginning: Goe, lytyll byll, and doe me recommende Unto my lady with godely countynaunce— For trusty messanger I the sende.40
[letter] [as a trusty servant I thee send]
This lady is thought of in thoroughly courtly terms: She restëth in my remembraunce, Day other nyght wherso I be; It ys my specyall dalyaunce For to remembyr hur bewté; She is enprented in ych degree With yftes of nature inexplicable And eke of grace incomparable.
[remains in my thoughts] [day or night] [special intimate delight] [her beauty] [endowed in every respect] [ gifts; inexpressible] [and also41]
Up until the end of the fourth stanza, where the poet’s feyrest paramour (line 25) is suddenly referred to as Most soverayne medyatryce (line 27), there is hardly a hint that the lytyll byll is, in this instance, being sent to the Virgin herself. Especially interesting is the thirteenth-century lyric Now I se blosmë sprynge: Now I se blosmë sprynge, Ich herde a foulës song, A swetë love-longinge Myn hertë thurghout sprong,
[blossom flourish] [I heard a bird’s song] [throughout; has sprung up]
“QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”
That is of lovë newe, That is so swete and trewe, Hit gladëth al my song; Ich wot al mid y-wisse My lyf and eke my blysse Is al theron y-long.
43
[about a new love] [so sweet and true] [it gladdens] [know with certainty] [and also] [dependent42]
The opening references to springtime here are, of course, conventional and characteristic of not a few secular love lyrics, in which, as here, the sight of blossoms and the sound of birds singing move a poet to speak of a “swete love-longinge” (line 3) that “gladeth al [his] song” (line 7) and upon which his life and joy depend. However, a modern reader experiences no little astonishment that the second stanza of this same lyric begins: Of Jhesu Crist I synge, That is so fayr and fre, Swetest of allë thynge, His owne Ich owe wel be.
[noble] [of all beings] [His own I ought indeed to be]43
Not only does the cause of the poet’s “love-longing” turn out to be Christ, but the very language used for Christ—Christ “so fayr and fre,” Christ “swetest of allë thynge,” “Jhesu, lemman softe”—is none other than that typically used for the beloved in many a secular love lyric. In this lyric, however, if the language and conventions of secular love poetry are used, the situation of the secular lyric is reversed. Here the true lover and sufferer of love’s anguish is not the poet himself but his beloved, the crucified Christ. For all his professed “love-longing,” the poet admits that, compared with Christ, he is incapable of love:“Of love ne can I nought” (line 37). He therefore implores Jesus, his lemman softe, his “gentle beloved,” to give him the strength to succeed in the true service of love: Jhesu, lemman softe, Thou yif me strengthe and might, Longinge sore and ofte To servë thee aright.44
[ give me] [yearning sore and often]
The lover poet of this devotional lyric is thus humble and contrite; he has nothing of the secular lover’s self-indulgent anguish. Nor is Christ, his beloved, remote and distant like the typical lady of a secular lyric. Just as the conventions and language of Middle English secular love poetry are used in lyrics in which the Virgin or Christ is the object of the lover-poet’s love-longing, so too the conventions of chivalric romance make their appearance in Christ as the Lover-Knight. In a seminal discussion
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of this theme, Rosemary Woolf attributed its popularity to the “exceptional fitness” of “the story of the knight who dies for the sake of his lady. . .in order to win her love” for expressing “the dominant idea of medieval piety: that Christ endured the torments of the Passion in order to win man’s love.”45 As a version and precursor of the story of a knight who returns to his lady to find her gates hard-heartedly barred against him recorded in the fourteenth-century Fasciculus Morum,Woolf quoted the following brief but moving lyric found in a late-thirteenth-century manuscript: Alas! alas! wel evel I sped! For sinne Jesú fro me ys fled, That levely fere. At my dore He stant alone And calleth “Undo!” with rewful mone, On this manere: “Undo, my leef, my dowvë dere! Undo! Why stond I steken out here? Ich am thi make! Lo, mi lokkes and ek myn heved Are al with blody dropes bywevëd For thinë sake.46
[very ill have I fared ] [dear companion] [at my door He stands] [with pitiful lament] [my beloved, my dear dove] [stand I shut out] [your spouse] [my locks and also my head ] [covered]
It is precisely because sin has banished the lover, Jesu, from his lady’s heart that she now hard-heartedly excludes Him. This lyric evocatively recalls the biblical texts, Revelation 3.20 (“Behold, I stand at the door and knock”) and Song of Songs 5.2 (“Open to me, my sister, my love”). In a grimly ironic manner it also echoes the last half of the latter verse (“my head is filled with dew, and my locks with the drops of the night”) in the description of Christ’s bloodstained head—“Lo, mi lokkes and ek myn heved / Are al with blody dropes bywevëd”—blood this knight has shed in doing battle for the sake of this lady. The image of Christ as Lover-Knight is also found in a longer lyric of some wit and sophistication, In a vaile of restles mynd, one of two fine Middle English Quia amore langueo poems.47 In this lyric different representations of Christ—Christ as king, knight, lover, brother, mother, and husband— emerge and merge. In particular, the image of Christ as Lover-Knight searching for and ready to sacrifice himself in the service of his beloved, here, Man’s soul, comes into play in the following lines: “My faire love, and my spousë bright, I saved hyr fro betyng, and she hath me bet; I clothed hyr in grace and hevenly light, This blody surcote she hath on me set.
[beating; beaten] [surcoat]
“QUID HINIELDUS CUM CHRISTO?”
For longyng love I will not let; Swetë strokës be thes, lo! I have loved ever as I het, Quia amore langueo. “Loke unto myn handës, man! Thes gloves were given me whan I hyr sought; They be nat white, but rede and wan, Embroudrëd with blode (my spouse them bought!); They wyll not off—I leve them nought! I wowe hyr with them where ever she go. Thes handes full frendly for hyr fought, Quia amore langueo. “Marvell not, man, though I sitt styll; My love hath shod me wonder strayte. She boklëd my fete, as was hyr wyll, With sharp nailes (well thou mayst waite!). In my love was never dissaite, For all my membrës I have opend hyr to; My body I made hyr hertës baite, Quia amore langueo.48
45
[because of lovelonging; give up] [ promised ]
[discolored ] [embroidered ] [come off; discard them not] [woo her; goes] [so lovingly]
[shod me wondrously tight] [buckled] [may see] [deceit] [limbs] [bait for her heart]
Here we have the usual late-medieval representation of Christ’s sufferings and the instruments of His Passion as His knightly armor.49 His scourged and bleeding back becomes His “bloody surcoat,” a garment worn over armor. His nail-pierced hands are gloves embroidered with blood. “Sharp nails” are likewise the buckles of His shoes. But, with the bitterest of ironies, this surcoat, these gloves, and these buckles in this poem are none other than the cruel “presents” Christ, the Lover-Knight, receives from his beloved, Man’s soul. The foregoing discussion of the expression of the sacred via the secular in Old and Middle English lyrics has centered on two themes: first, the use of the language and conventions of secular literature in religious lyrics, and, second, the expression of aspects of the Divine in human terms.Two brief qualifications may be added by way of conclusion. First, it may seem somewhat cavalier to associate Ingeld with troubadours and chivalric knights as representatives of the secular. Even if the pagan Ingeld is so to be viewed, such an equation may seem questionable in the case of the latter, who, in real life, were doubtless Christians. Indeed, the companions of the Round Table, according to the author of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, were no less than the most renowned knights under Christ
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himself.50 However, as exponents of courtly love in lyrics and romances, troubadour poets and chivalric knights may, for the purposes of this discussion, be counted as representatives of a secular literature.They were certainly so viewed by St. Bernard, who had little love for the troubadour entourage of Eleanor of Aquitaine and by the homilist Robert de Gretham, who composed sermons for his patroness, Dame Aline, as an antidote to pernicious romances.51 Second, whereas in Middle English lyrics aspects of the Divine were certainly expressed in terms of Christ in his earthly life and Mary as an earthly mother, it is to be noted that such representations were selective, partial, and, to a degree, metaphorical.The Christ of the Nativity lyrics may be a cold, weeping, vulnerable baby, but, unlike any other baby, this child can speak, is aware of His identity and destiny, and is able to share this knowledge and concomitant emotions with His mother and, by extension, with the reader. As Caroline Bynum observes: “There are all sorts of homely scenes within which Jesus is not located, all sorts of childish actions that are not attributed to the baby God.”52 A medieval equivalent of Max Ernst’s 1926 painting of Mary spanking the infant Jesus is inconceivable.53 Just as alien to modern sensibilities, however, at least until recently, is another version of the medieval “humanation” of the Divine, the concept of Jesus as mother.54 This image appears at line 107 of In a vaile of restles mynd, where Christ the lover becomes a tender mother: My babe shall suffer no disese, I may not here my dere childe wepe, For with my pappe I shall hyr kepe.
[distress] [ for close to my breast]
No wonder though I tend hyr to— Thys hole in my side had never ben so depe But quia amore langueo.55
Later-medieval theologians found it uniquely appropriate to express the Divine in terms of equating the wound in Christ’s side with a breast and the blood that flowed from it with mother’s milk.Writers from Anselm to Julian of Norwich (not least the latter) dwelled on the theme of Jesus as mother and especially as nursing mother. Addressing Christ, the twelfth-century theologian William of St. Thierry wrote: “. . .it is your breasts, O eternal Wisdom, that nourish the holy infancy of your little ones. . . .”56 But what the author of The Dream of the Rood or, indeed, Alcuin might have made of this is hard to imagine, and however expressive of Christ it may be, it is certainly all a far cry from Ingeld.
CHAPTER 3 READING RADICAL METONYMY IN PEARL Alan J. Fletcher
Argues that the Middle English poem Pearl repays study of its treatment of the linguistic trope of metonymy for two chief reasons: first, metonymy is radical to its project in the sense that not only is it deployed pervasively throughout Pearl, but second, and more interestingly, that it offers a unique point of access to the understanding of the poem’s aesthetic and cultural dynamics. Via metonymy, Pearl can be conceived as a poetic dimensioning of imperatives powering the culture of contemporary exegesis; in that culture, hermeneutic principles may be encountered in the raw that are reconfigured in Pearl as poetry.Thus, the poet’s assimilation of such cultural resources helps to define his position, and that of his text, within the wider continuum of late-fourteenth century English cultural practice.
he subject of this essay is Pearl, and the object is to go through a door into this late-Middle English poem that has been left ajar but hitherto not really opened. Pearl is gone into here via the access of metonymy, one of language’s foundational tropes, as Roman Jakobson termed it,1 and also one whose energies are dynamically and pervasively active in the poem. Hence the appropriateness of taking metonymy as my point of departure. As we shall see, metonymy’s presence in this poem may be said to be radical in the simple sense that its deployment is fundamental to the poem’s project and in a more complex and culturally interesting sense that, in one of its manifestations, it ceaselessly displaces and alternates the products of its own procedures.Through metonymy, the object figured is at once absent and present
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in the moment of its figuring.2 A classic definition characterizes metonymy as “a figure of speech whereby the name of one entity e1 is used to refer to another entity e2 that is contiguous to e1.”3 From the humble to the exalted, the procedure is the same: thus a “boiling kettle” elides its “water,” while a “crown appointment” elides the monarch who authorizes it.To contribute a famous medieval example,Thomas Aquinas, early in the Summa Theologiae, said that when we read in the Bible that God’s arm was displayed, the expression does not mean that the Deity had some literal limb that might be laid bare; rather, it means that God displayed his effective power.4 This particular example chosen by Aquinas of a figurative biblical language that can be decoded to discover its literal sense provides, in fact, an applied hermeneutic reading of a biblical metonymy—although, of course,Aquinas did not use that term—and for him, metonymy’s successful decryption accessed both the sensus litteralis, the literal sense of scripture, and the intentio auctoris, the intention of the author.5 The commendable task of lifting any veils or integuments of figurative speech that might be hiding the sensus litteralis similarly uncovered what the author intended to convey. Yet, the way in which the metonymic thrust of the presenting image moves away from the image itself toward the literal sense in which it should properly ( proprie) be understood—that is, the presenting image is installed simply as a point of departure toward what matters,namely,the literal sense—is a procedure whose ramifications are worth reflecting on within the context of latemedieval hermeneutics. For these hermeneutics furnish an important circumstance in which to try to understand Pearl, as Ian Bishop perceived as far back as 1968, though he perceived it not quite in the ways that I pursue here. The metonymic thrust of which I speak, as meaning drives away from point A toward point B, resembles, though is not completely commensurate with, the way in which things that may be understood in the literal sense in Scripture are themselves capable of gesturing away from themselves and toward a spiritual sense.The difference in the procedures might be phrased like this: in the exegesis of Scripture, one may quit and abandon metonymy’s presenting image for what it signifies in the literal sense; and one may quit, but not abandon, the literal sense for what it signifies in the spiritual sense.To express this more graphically, the trope of metonymy as resolved by the exegetes may discard the vehicle in which meaning drives toward a destination or tenor in the literal sense, whereas the literal sense, as the vehicle for reaching the spiritual sense, is a valued and indispensable mode of transport: in this case, the traveling is just as important as the arriving. One might even wish to distinguish a dual kind of metonymic process, one that is exhausted in the act of signifying (metonymy as commonly understood) and another that as it signifies constantly recycles itself (quasimetonymy), where multiple possibilities have equal value. Thus, while my
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distinctions are modern, they may help us approach two related semiotic processes also known, albeit less formally, in medieval exegesis. In scriptural hermeneutics, then, figurative language use of the sort metonymy designates might be resolved into a literal sense, and that literal sense, increasingly considered in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to be of fundamental importance, might nevertheless disclose a spiritual sense (that was itself variously classifiable, although most usually into the three familiar species of tropology, allegory, and anagogy).6 The spiritual sense could thus always finally be anchored in the primacy of the sensus litteralis. It even became possible to speak of a duplex sensus litteralis, a twofold literal sense,7 which embraced, on the one hand, the surface, literal sense expressed in the words of a text—the primary or “proper” literal sense— and, on the other, a secondary or “figurative” literal sense. In other words, the spiritual sense that was accessed when the surface meaning of the words were read figuratively nevertheless always folded back into the literal sense and thus could be called a figurative literal sense. Since the figurative literal sense was cousin to the “proper” literal sense, the figurative literal sense was also understandable as an (secondary) authorial intention. Complex exegetical negotiations like these, in which the exfoliation of senses generated commerce between different departments of signification, surround, and I believe, inform (though by no means in any crudely deterministic way) the writing of Pearl. As the linguistic trope of metonymy in Pearl is a natural point of departure into the poem’s constitutive exegetical hinterland,8 analysis of its metonymies helps calibrate this theologically dense text’s relationship to particular aspects of the contemporary exegetical enterprise; it thus raises into consciousness some of the medieval habits of thought that underlie its composition. A relatively neglected dimension of Pearl awaits further exploration.9 Moreover, the course of the exploration may broach issues concerning the cultural work that Pearl accomplishes. But before I proceed further with this twin task of situating Pearl and considering what its cultural work may be, let me cite some empirical reasons to justify the first part of it, the attempt to gauge exactly how Pearl relates to its surrounding exegetical culture. Not only should these reasons endorse the opinion of many critics concerning the intellectual formation of the Pearlauthor, but also, more importantly, they should help qualify a significant observation Bishop made about the poem. Critics have universally acknowledged the fact of the Pearl-author’s exposure to the currents of clerical culture—so evident is this that many also considered him a cleric by profession,10 a view that I share—but apart from expounding his poem’s theology and its topicality in his time, most critics have been less aware of the clerical textual practices and characteristic procedures that prompted him as he composed.11 While the indisputable evidence for his acquaintance with this
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particular clerical province clusters only locally in the poem (at lines 185, 793–960),12 its very appearance is most suggestive: it establishes his familiarity (whether prolonged or passing seems unknowable, but is in any event unimportant to the present argument) with the technical thought processes of scriptural exegesis that I outlined earlier. Bishop’s observation that the exegetical passage on the Lamb and on Jerusalem between lines 793 and 960 is the “one passage in Pearl that affords indisputable evidence that the author was familiar with the ‘method of the theologians’ (i.e., with the methods of exegesis)”13 can be endorsed and its supporting evidence amplified. First, its endorsement. Much earlier in the poem, at line 185, when the jeweler has caught sight of the Pearl-maiden for the first time, he says of the vision:“I hoped that gostly watz that porpose.”14 Here, it has generally gone unheeded that the collocation “ghostly purpose” was also a commonplace in the discourse of vernacular preaching, used to signal to the audience that the matter was capable of releasing a spiritual sense.15 (The earliest use of the collocation of which I am currently aware is in Walter Hilton’s Scale of Perfection, not itself a sermon, though since Hilton was an Augustinian canon, he was a member of an order with a strong preaching tradition.)16 Thus by having his jeweler say this, the Pearl-author betrays his awareness of sermon discourse, where exegesis, albeit usually of a relatively modest and pastorally applied sort, was often conducted. Second, its amplification. The passage between lines 793 and 960, as Bishop has shown, could be analyzed as playing with literal, allegorical, and anagogical senses of the word “Jerusalem.”17 Here, we might simply pause to note in addition the sheer frequency of Jerusalem as an exegetical topic.18 Since Jerusalem was a locus classicus for illustrating the senses that could be expressed from Scripture beyond the literal, the clerically connected Pearlauthor doubtless had ample opportunity to encounter Jerusalem as an exegetical topic in some shape or form. So common was it, in fact, that he could conceivably even have heard its fourfold exegesis rendered in song.19 However, we can hazard a guess as to that shape or form. Pearl’s Jerusalem exegesis has not been lifted wholesale from that typically expounded by the exegetes; there, Jerusalem is often used mechanically to crank out and illustrate the four traditional senses of Scripture. In Pearl, rather, Jerusalem exegesis is selectively and carefully tailored to the poem’s requirements. The poem speaks of three Jerusalems, two literal and one spiritual: the first literal one, that in Old Testament times, the city of King David, which the jeweler first identifies (line 919); the second literal one, that in New Testament times, the city in which Christ died, which the Pearl-maiden identifies (lines 804–05, 816–17, 828–29, 941); and the spiritual one, that at the end of time, the Apocalyptic Jerusalem, which she also identifies (lines 792, 840–41) as her eternal home and which the jeweler comes to glimpse toward the end of the poem (line 987).
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Commenting further on these three, the Pearl-maiden also classifies the two literal historical Old and New Testament Jerusalems of Judea together as “Old Jerusalem,” naming the Apocalyptic one, after biblical precedent, as the “New Jerusalem” (lines 937–44).This triadic distinction of “Jerusalems” is also interwoven with a triadic exegesis of biblical uses of the word “Lamb.” In the threefold Jerusalem, the Pearl-maiden’s “lemman swete” was similarly thrice taken for a Lamb (note his explicit reference in lines 830–34 to three different biblical uses of Lamb). I suspect that the way the poet makes his awareness of thinking in sets of three perfectly clear here may provide a telltale clue either to the kind of source that was influencing him or within whose terms he was accustomed to think. The Pearl-maiden’s “lemman swete” was the sacrificial victim whom Isaiah likened to a lamb in his messianic prophecy, the victim dumb like a lamb before his shearer (“And, as lombe that clypper in hande nem, / So closed he hys mouth fro vch query,” lines 802–03, based on Isaiah 53.7); her “lemman swete” was also the Lamb identified by St. John the Baptist (“Lo, Godes Lombe as trwe as ston”; line 822, based on John 1.29) when St. John baptized Jesus in the Jordan River; and her “lemman swete” was the wounded Lamb of the Revelation of St. John the Divine, the Lamb worthy to open the seven seals on the librum scriptum intus et foris (“Lesande the boke with leues sware / There seuen syngnettes wern sette in seme”; lines 837–38, based on Revelation 5.1). It is possible that the Pearl-author’s triadic exegesis was suggested by, if not indeed directly derived from, some distinctio on Jerusalem combined with another on Lamb.20 (Although I have found no exact candidate yet, more work remains to be done; I note, for example, that Rabanus Maurus––an early authority, but one still being read and copied in the fourteenth century— associated these three Lambs in one of his homilies.)21 Thus distinctiones, those taxonomies that were the characteristic currency of exegetical culture, may either have contoured the way in which the Pearl-author thought, and thus explain his arrangement of this passage, or indeed have provided his material directly.Alternatively, he may have derived it not from some distinctio collection but from some other kind of text, such as a sermon, in which Jerusalem and Lamb distinctiones may have already been worked up and drawn together.22 Of course, should it prove that his poem at this point was not quite as derivative as my source-hunting speculations might seem to imply and that he alone was responsible for constructing the Jerusalem/Lamb nexus from received materials, he did his job so deftly that it argues a close sympathy with this particular quarter of clerical culture, whose value as an interpretative framework for the poem I am interested in exploring further. So, on the basis of such empirical evidence, I submit that we have a good formal warrant for deeper reflection on how Pearl might situate in relation to the hermeneutic practices that typically orbit biblical exegesis, at whatever level, and for considering how this situation bears upon the poem’s
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cultural work.23 While not single-mindedly systematic in the way of the high practitioners of scriptural hermeneutics—Pearl is, after all, not a dedicated hermeneutic treatise but a poem free to cannibalize several literary genres and procedures including the exegetical24—it is a poem that has nevertheless connected with the tradition of the exegetes beyond ways already acknowledged and drawn strength from it. So much so, I wish to argue, that we are justified in building a platform from which to view Pearl that is constructed from practices of textual engagement contemporary with the poem and that the poem demonstrably draws upon. Further to my opening reflection on metonymies old and new, we discover a conflict and a convergence in the coexisting conditions that constitute metonymy: the constituents of any metonymy are not in themselves what they signify (hence a conflict), yet they nevertheless at once associate in some way with what they signify (hence a convergence).When we turn to Pearl with the linguistic/exegetical trope of metonymy in mind—and recall that we have distinguished in biblical hermeneutics a dual aspect to the metonymic process, metonymy and quasi-metonymy—we find it active at central junctures of the poem.The sacred and the secular in Pearl engage together in a dialectic, as the value systems of earth contend with those of Heaven, the spokesperson for each system, respectively, the jeweler and the Pearl-maiden, trying to control the metonymic consequences of the figuration of the other.As each speaks to the other, each constitutes her/his identity and that of the other relationally from specific sets of metonymic significances. To anticipate one of my conclusions: part of the cultural work of Pearl is to identify exegetical practice, whether it be faultless (the Pearl-maiden’s) or faulty (the jeweler’s), as constituting the ground of personal identity, our very sense and construction of selfhood proceeding from correct or incorrect ways of exegetical seeing. This being so, the correction of what is exegetically incorrect may thus accomplish a remedial personal, social, and spiritual reorientation.All that need happen is that the authoritative exegetical tuition vouchsafed in the poem be taken to heart.Admittedly, its lesson may be a hard one and learned at considerable human cost, a cost that may entail no less than the abandonment of one’s prior sense of identity.25 Moreover, as we recall that the internal dynamic of metonymy is itself dialectical, a play between presence and absence, it becomes apparent that the overarching macrodialectic of Pearl, registering on its narrative surface in the (unequal) debate between the jeweler and the Pearl-maiden, aptly mimes the microdialectic internal to each of the various metonymies and quasi-metonymies that inhabit the poem. Pearl’s surface structure—to some extent reminiscent of the altercatio or scholastic disputatio, established medieval genres of literary and academic discourse to which the (multigeneric) text of Pearl alludes26—makes a fitting formal counterpart to the dialectical
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seesaw signifying inherent in metonymy. Here the signified, as we have seen, is present through being absent and, in the case of quasi-metonymy, the metonymically signified is simultaneously present with the literally signified, both having a more or less equal status. However, more than being merely fitting, it is, arguably, from such a strenuously and richly inflected dialectical texture that the poem’s cultural work emerges, as it seeks to redimension exegesis practically and in a pastoral application to a distressing set of human circumstances, namely, bereavement of a peculiarly affecting kind. Ordinarily, the tension of dialectic in any form yearns toward resolution—just as nature abhors a vacuum, so nature is similarly uncomfortable about living with tension.That resolution may happen at the local, linguistic level of a figurative expression that resolves into a sensus litteralis,27 as in Thomas Aquinas’s example of how a biblical metonymy should be read, or at the overarching, narrative level of a debate pro and contra that yearns to resolve into a determination or synthesis. Pearl’s sophisticated levels of dialectic paradoxically both resolve one kind of tension by determining in favor of the maintenance of another: that is, the dialectical tension in the poem’s debate disperses in a settlement that yet upholds the necessity of retaining the dialectical tension by which metonymy and quasi-metonymy are powered, figures which themselves are mobilized to help drive the debate along.This means that the debate in Pearl is potentially never-ending, waiting to happen over and over for its readers. Caught in that eternal debate between earth and heaven, which will continue as long as the earth survives and prove as enduring as the ontological divide imaged by the river separating the two realms that the jeweler tries vainly to ford near the end of the poem, singular identity may yet find grace, if exegesis can help it, to die into multiple identity. Indeed, the watchword of this poem might be that provided by the Scripture paraphrased early on at lines 31–32: “For vch gresse mot grow of graynes dede; / No whete were elles to wones wonne” [For every grass must grow out of the death of its grain; otherwise no wheat would be won to harvest home].28 In this paraphrase of the gospel image of the grain that dies into new life is an allegory in little of what I think this poem could be striving to achieve in its own medieval terms as it recruits into itself the strategies of exegesis. The death of singular identity into multiple identity, one of the stakes in the contest that the poem stages between the values of earth and heaven, is mediated in the context of an arbitration of what is exegetically right and proper. In practical terms, as far as Pearl is concerned, the individual who becomes a good exegete learns her/his true significance in heaven’s sanctioned teleology. For the good exegete, the damage inflicted by the grief of human loss is repairable, and the distress caused by turbulent human affect can be calmed.
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The question is, how to become a good exegete: how to see properly what the real value of the integumental veils covering meaning may be.The poem offers some implicit direction on the matter, but first, it will be helpful to substantiate these conceptually dense propositions by a series of concrete illustrations. I begin by considering the metonymic maneuvering of the jeweler, then that of the Pearl-maiden, and finally that of the poem’s author, for his identity, too, is implicated in a wider metonymic figuration. The jeweler’s central metonymy can be expressed as follows:“I have lost a highly prized pearl.” As far as he is concerned, this resolves into the following sensus litteralis:“I have lost in death a highly prized infant girl.”The sensus litteralis, to recall Thomas Aquinas, reveals the intentio auctoris, or in the case of the jeweler we might distinguish this instead as the intentio narratoris, reserving the idea of the intentio auctoris to the clerical Pearl-author himself. (The distinction may be useful because later I suggest what his intentio auctoris may have been or, at the least, suggest that his writing implicates him in a wider metonymy in which his own identity was also caught up and was at stake.) It quickly becomes quite clear that the narrating jeweler’s lost pearl serves him as a metonym and that, beneath its presenting image, he is really lamenting the loss in death of a precious literal female infant. As he sees it, for “lost pearl” read “dear dead baby girl.” It is the intentio narratoris to treat his pearl image as a conventional metonym that exhausts into something literal, in his case an emphatic statement of personal grief and loss. But is the sensus litteralis that he distills a sound one? Aquinas considered that the sensus litteralis, when clearly perceived, might in turn be made permeable by a sensus spiritualis.Yet, this is precisely the exegetical step at which the jeweler falters: the private sensus litteralis that his metonymy arrives at shuts down meaning into a single possibility, into a singularity and a stability of reference that, in the human sphere, are also routine concomitants to private possession and personal ownership. The idea that “You are what you own” (i.e., “your possessions define you”) bears as much existential weight as the modern maxim “You are what you eat” bears a physiological and psychological one (in Pearl, note the frequent use of possessive adjectives that characterizes the jeweler’s discourse as he clutches his values to his chest). The jeweler’s very identity, then, is constituted from his sense of ownership, and this includes the ownership of meaning.29 In possessing meaning he possesses his identity, an existential apperçu no less true in the fourteenth century than in the twenty-first. However, the fact that his private sensus litteralis shows itself incapable of admitting a public sensus spiritualis may be an index of the flawed nature of his exegetical practice and its faulty way of seeing. (I describe the sensus spiritualis as “public” because its admission pluralizes meaning beyond the total simultaneous access of any single
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individual, and thus it broadens the grasp of meaning’s totality beyond mere individuals and out into an interpretative community. In short, no single individual can do justice to multiple, simultaneous meanings, especially where those meanings are technically and paradoxically equivalent.) The jeweler’s exegetical practice is, in fact, earthbound, but since he is a layman, perhaps we should not be too surprised at this shortcoming in the context of late-fourteenth century arguments as to who were the best exegetes, arguments in which the Pearl-author has implicitly taken sides.30 What if the jeweler’s metonymic figuration were to be adjusted, as the Pearl-maiden is determined to adjust it? “No,” she says,“you have not lost a pearl at all; what you lost was a rose.” We can take it on her authority as one of the illuminated who “thurghoutly hauen cnawyng” [have complete understanding] (line 859) that this is the right metonym for the dead infant girl, a metonym appropriately used up in the process of signifying and discarded: the perishable rose fittingly serves as a perishable metonym for what the jeweler believes he has lost, that is, a dead baby girl. Again, it is likely that it was clerical culture that provided the Pearl-author with his metonymic image here.31 “What you grieve for in fact is a rose,” she says, a dead-end metonym. For in speaking of an enduring pearl, the jeweler has come closer to apprehending the truth than he recognizes; his error is simply the misrecognizing of it and the unheeding coercion into a finite metonymic reading of a figure whose status, if judged rightly, is quasimetonymic. His missing pearl is not a metonym for the child; rather, it is the quasi-metonym for the child because while the pearl is the child, the child in her heavenly reality—the only one that matters—is also the pearl. While pearls may be an aspect of the jeweler’s private earthly reality, part of his stock-in-trade, which causes him to think in terms of them (among other gems), pearls also existed as the common property of the iconography of heaven before he was born. Moreover, they had an ancient public significance that exceeded his private control and ownership (in the same way that all words preexist their users and have a preexistent public significance that may escape the confinement of their users’ intentio). Pearls were always already a traditional point of commerce between the earthly and the heavenly.The paradoxically animate pearl of the jeweler’s presenting image has, in fact, a transcendent reality that he has uttered but cannot fully comprehend. He has spoken more truly than he understands. After the poem’s opening in praise of the pearl, this pearl, after a couple of lines, is swiftly feminized by the application of a familiar, gender-specific lexis of contemporary courtly love poetry, through which its dual identity is intimated. It is from this application that we get our first hint that there is more afoot here than simply a jeweler regretting a lost pearl.32 Note the startling collision, from the point of view of earthbound human logic, of
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the animate and inanimate pronouns settled by the jeweler on his pearl in adjacent sentences: “Allas! I leste hyr in on erbere; / Thurgh gresse to grounde hit fro me yot.” [Alas, I lost her in an arbor; it slipped from me through the grass into the ground] (lines 9–10). Two humanly incompatible identities exist in tension in his figuration. But when we eventually see the Pearl-maiden in heaven that is precisely how she is, a diverse unity. She is enclosed in pearls.The jeweler recognizes her through a frame of them, making her at once familiar yet strange to him.33 A prize pearl is centered on her breast, making her flesh its setting. Pearls, then, are intrinsic to her eternal reality. So there is, in fact, a rightness within his opening figuration of the Pearl-maiden that must be salvaged from his misinterpretation. It will be salvageable for the poem’s readers, who are after all the only people who really matter in that they are the ones who stand to be materially altered by their consumption of this text,34 if they can be led to see that the jeweler needs to abandon his monopolizing, monological literalism, impervious as it is to any democratizing, dialogical sensus spiritualis. It is toward this vantage point that the poem guides them, as well as the jeweler, the Pearl-maiden leading the way. Thus, the rightness within the jeweler’s opening imagery is salvageable if exegetical figurations are embraced that uphold multiple—from the limited human point of view potentially incompatible—truth claims. This, then, is the Pearl-maiden’s heavenly level of existence, in a narrative and exegetical multiplicity that is at once also a community, not in some private singularity. In the narrative, the Pearl-maiden belongs to the Lamb in common as a member of the community of the 144,000 virgins; but her status can also be conceived hermeneutically, for she similarly exists now in the fluidity of properly conducted exegesis, where senses commute in transit between each other, no one more authoritative than the next, perplexing though that may be from a human perspective. In heaven, there are indeed no “supplantores” (line 440), either political or exegetical.This is the egalitarian community emphasized not only in the circumstances of the poem’s narrative,35 but also in the community of the exegetical senses when they work harmoniously together, and in whose ceaseless oscillation she now has her being.Egalitarian community is the distinctive quality of quasi-metonymy, the figure that structures and hatches her transcendent identity.36 It is the figure, if we prefer, that helps breed the spiritual communism of the exegetical senses. If we turn now from the jeweler to consider the metonymic figurations of the Pearl-maiden, we can see her to be more perfectly enmeshed than he within figurations that I have distinguished as quasi-metonymic.37 As a corollary to this, she, unlike him, can discriminate accurately between a singular, private metonymy and a plural, public quasi-metonymy. Witness
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how she adroitly exchanged the first for the second when she substituted the jeweler’s (inappropriate) pearl metonym for the dead baby girl with the (appropriate) metonym of the ephemeral rose. In short, she is by far the more adept exegete and knows her way better than he through the integumental veils covering the sensus litteralis. Just as we summarized the jeweler’s identity-defining figure of speech as a private, singular metonymy, “I have lost a prized pearl,” so we may summarize the Pearl-maiden’s as a public, plural quasi-metonymy,“I belong as a bride to the New Jerusalem Lamb.” Like the jeweler’s metonym, the Pearlmaiden’s quasi-metonym also resolves into a sensus litteralis: “I am wedded to Christ in Heaven.” The difference between his sensus litteralis and hers is that his shuts down into the private singularity of possessive meaning, inexpressive of any possibilities other than its own earthbound intention, whereas hers opens up into a public communality, into the sort of sensus spiritualis with which Aquinas thought the sensus litteralis, correctly perceived, might be permeated. The Christ implicit in the literal sense of her quasi-metonymic figure is in a spiritual sense simultaneously the Lamb; exactly how this is so is a matter carefully expounded in the threefold Lamb distinctio that I described earlier. Indeed, in Pearl, the presentation of Christ’s literal manhood is relatively underplayed, bucking the trend of the affective style in which his manhood is usually presented in contemporary vernacular texts, especially those relating his Passion.38 More strikingly foregrounded by the poem than his literal manhood is his spiritual identity as the wounded and perpetually bleeding sacrificial Lamb, who,“Thagh he were hurt and wounde hade, / In his sembelaunt watz neuer sene, / So wern his glentes gloryous glade” [Though he was hurt and wounded, it was never apparent in his countenance, so gloriously glad were his glances] (lines 1142–44). The spiritual sense, of course, always had to be capable of being folded back into the literal sense. In Pearl, this requirement is more usually met in the way the spiritual reality is often allowed to shine through the literal one, thereby disrupting the familiar and mundane logic by which the literal is normally governed. In artistic terms, this results in the poem depicting a terrain where nothing has a homely and familiar feel and its inhabitants are constructed to match. In heaven, all the hermeneutic senses are simultaneous in the way that quasi-metonymy respects. Several instances could be cited of the heavenly simultaneity that impinges at so many places in this poem, but specifically in relation to the Pearl-maiden we might note her multiple ways of figuring the Lamb.The Lamb is figured in a chain or garland of related possibilities, as one sense perpetually slides into another, defying earthbound human inclinations to arrest and settle upon a determinate meaning: He is her destiny (line 758); her Lamb (lines 407, 795), her lord
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(lines 407, 795), her jewel (line 795), her joy and bliss (line 795), her noble, sweet “lemman” (lines 796, 805, 829); and underlying all this is the literal sense that He is her Christ. The heavenly simultaneity of the senses in which the Pearl-maiden participates perfectly also finds frequent poetic manifestation at the level of individual lexical items and compounds.39 Among several examples, a striking one is the compound word “lombelyght” (line 1046), used to describe the illumination of the heavenly Jerusalem. Revelation 21.23 says that this city needs no sun or moon, because the claritas Dei shines in it, et lucerna eius est Agnus [and the Lamb is its lamp]. So the Pearl-author’s “lombelyght” compound works perfectly (lamp light/Lamb light). Since the words “lamb” and “lamp” were probably homophones in the Pearl-author’s dialect, this compound condenses alternative meanings effortlessly into itself.40 I propose that this condensation is the poem’s equivalent at the individual, lexical level to the exegetical plenitude that it celebrates generally as the condition of clear-sightedness and, indeed, in the end, of consolation.41 But if becoming a good exegete, like the Pearl-maiden, requires the embrace of simultaneous multiplicity, it can only come at a cost in human terms. Allowing oneself to be dispossessed of singularity in its various vestures, and particularly in this poem, of the sense of possession that is a constituent of selfhood, is one of the highest prices that Pearl exacts. For we have seen that what the narrating jeweler is lamenting is not only his loss through bereavement but also the loss of himself, the dispossession of his own identity, and that is just as hard to part with. Yet paradoxically, that dispossession proves a consolation, in that human grief is also part of the confined identity that he is relinquishing and from which, by grace, he may come to be estranged. “For vch gresse mot grow of graynes dede; / No whete were elles to wones wonne” (lines 31–32). These early lines are in some ways its watchword; they emblematize the death of identity as the condition of life, both at the level of the remedial human process that the course of the poem’s narrative works out and exemplifies and at the level of the exegetical process with which the human one is to be correlated.42 So radical is Pearl’s exegetical lesson of dispossession, or perhaps we could express it analogously as Pearl’s exegetical displacement of the responsibility for interpreting meaning from a private to a public sphere, that its consequences also arguably touch the Pearl-author.And so now to his metonymy, the one that implicates the Pearl-author himself. He stands, I suggest, in a set of metonymic relations to his own text. If these relations can be decoded into a sensus litteralis, we also have access, theoretically, to the intentio auctoris. My case runs as follows. Who is the exegetically flawed, narrating jeweler of Pearl?43 He is evidently not cast in any easily recognizable likeness of the poem’s author, whose
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real-life profession we can justly infer was clerical, not secular. Nevertheless, he might yet represent something of the real-time writing author metonymically. We recall metonymy’s basic procedure, whereby one entity stands in for another contiguous to it. Arguably, the jeweler stands in for the author in some way, and one formal metonymic point of contact between them could be their joint citizenship within the first-person pronoun, “I”: “I” is the author who writes and “I” is the jeweler who narrates.They are, in that formal sense, contiguous (and we might circumstantially note that it has often been remarked on other grounds that in medieval dream poetry, there is traditionally “some degree of historical correspondence between the narrators and authors of dream poems”).44 This may also be true in the Pearlauthor’s case, though we need a sophisticated way of arriving at what that historical correspondence might conceivably be.While the narrating jeweler apparently cannot stand in for the writing author in terms of profession, he may yet do so in terms of function; that is, he may indeed through his role help us to access the author’s literal sense, his authorial intention. The function of the jeweler in the poem, by this logic, may provide another metonymic point of contact with the role of the real-time author. The jeweler’s function, then, is to represent fallen, if natural and understandable, human responses to a familiar human predicament (grief at the infant’s death) and to the nature of its heavenly resolution (incredulity at the sheer, postmortem altitude of the infant’s exaltation). Further, it is to carry those responses into the presence of an alternative, authoritative reality in whose light they are seen from a new perspective and differently. So the jeweler’s function is to stand in for the fallen responses, whether real or imagined, of the author in his humanity, or for those of his living associates, or indeed for those of us modern readers.Through the jeweler, the author has brought himself, his community, and his posterity into the righting presence of heaven. Yet necessarily, the jeweler’s function does not exist outside the context of his relationship to the Pearl-maiden.They are twin halves of one august event. So the metonymic enterprise that implicates the author in the existential consequences flowing from his own writing is not completely grasped until we ask a question of the Pearl-maiden similar to the one we asked of the jeweler. Therefore, who is the exegetically perfect Pearl-maiden? This time there is, of course, no possible formal metonymic point of contact with the author via a first-person narrating persona, but there is a contact again at the level of role and function. For the Pearl-maiden’s function is to introduce fallen human responses to their correction through perfect exegesis. As exegete, she stands in for, mimes metonymically, the exegetical role that we seem justified in assuming the Pearl-author himself was required to discharge professionally elsewhere in real time (whether that
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was in a highbrow academic or workaday pastoral context or even, as here, in a hybrid, literary one). So the Pearl-maiden’s function is to stand in for the author in his exegetical capacity, however exercised in reality.Through the Pearl-maiden, the author, by personifying and giving his own role a voice, has addressed himself, his community, and his posterity, applying his professional mediation of the righting perspective of heaven to each. Thus, the authorial intention of the Pearl-author seems deducible from his own metonymic bilocation in the text in the persons of jeweler and Pearl-maiden. His authorial intention is reciprocally an exegetical aim, and just as the commerce among the various exegetical senses, correctly apprehended, implied the idea of community, so too his exegetical aim gathers the persons and situations that it targets, himself included, into a community of interpretation. In Pearl, the solitary sense, like the solitary individual fastened within his private solipsism, is weak and unreliable (or as Ecclesiastes 4.10 memorably figured it,“Vae soli, quia cum ceciderit, non habet sublevantem se” [Alas for the solitary person, for when he falls, he has no one to raise him up]). Strength is to be found, rather, in a sanctioned community, one that is of its nature multiple, whether that be the egalitarian community of heaven or the earthly, organic community set out in the figure of the body and its members (lines 457–68). Both find an analogy in, are apprehended in, and are intimated by the community of the ever-circling senses of exegesis. After waking his jeweler once more into time and history at the end of the poem, the Pearl-author offers through him a final metonymy that, via one of life’s regular, daily moments, gives a practical shape to this salvific community of exegesis in which heaven and earth are brought into right relation.The last stanza of the poem imagines the community of the faithful focused on the consecrated body and blood of Christ: Ouer this hyul this lote I laghte, For pyty of my perle enclyin, And sythen to God I hit bytaghte In Krystes dere blessyng and myn, That in the forme of bred and wyn The preste vus schewes vch a daye. He gef vus to be his homly hyne Ande precious perles vnto his pay.45
All gazes meet in this common cynosure, those of the faithful, the jeweler’s, and ours. They, he, and we associate in a community directed toward and construed within the Eucharistic elements, elements whose sensus litteralis, we might say, is the body and blood of Christ. It is worth pointing out the emphatic orthodoxy of the Pearl-author’s formulation in this last
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stanza: the priest delivers Christ in form of bread and wine.This is the standard orthodox phraseology for asserting the transubstantiated nature of the elements, reiterated with some frequency at a time when, in some (heretical) quarters, the doctrine of transubstantiation was being contested.46 What you saw with your eyes, if you were orthodox, was not the whole story, for after the prayer of consecration and elevation, the transubstantiated reality, the sensus litteralis beneath the integumental veils of the accidents of bread and wine, was now Christ’s very body and blood. Eucharistic theology, yes, but the signifying movement of this sacrament reads like a metonym, a crowning one saved by the Pearl-author to the end to gather all the others into itself. Conversely, the theological failure of contemporary heretics to read this literal sense could, from the orthodox perspective, also be thought a compound failure, since it was also a failure in terms of traditional exegesis. The heretics’ dead-end literalism cannot see the bread and wine for anything other than bread and wine; it cannot tolerate heavenly simultaneity. Yet such simultaneity is precisely what Pearl celebrates, not only here, but in so many other places as well along its route.The pearl of great price on the Pearl-maiden’s breast is the reward of the Kingdom of Heaven, which in turn is the penny paid to the laborers in the parable of the vineyard, which in turn is the elevated Host, which in turn is the sacrificial Lamb, and so on and on, as simultaneity rules in its endless circular garland of meaning. I do not pretend to enclose the rich suggestiveness of Pearl within this reading of its radical metonymy. That would be to attempt a containment as shortsighted and presumptuous as that attempted by the jeweler. However, what I insist on is respect for Pearl’s volatile exegetical richness, and one way of honoring that is to trace the nature of the exegetical processes that the Pearl-author invoked, which helped to call his poem into being. In doing so, we take initial steps toward connecting ourselves with the value systems that crisscross and power his text, and necessarily begin to read our way into the cultural stakes with which its processes of signification wagered.
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CHAPTER 4 PURCHASING PARDON: MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL ECONOMIES ON THE CANTERBURY PILGRIMAGE Alastair Minnis
Many generations of medieval theologians struggled to explain the difficult and dangerous relationship between the two economies, the material and the spiritual. The makers and distributors of ‘pardons’ or indulgences were especially problematic: were such people engaged in some sort of market-economy which demeaned the whole notion of posthumous reward and punishment by confusing earthly with heavenly matters, and, worse, created the impression that salvation was up for sale? This anxiety is explored with reference to the plenary indulgence associated with Canterbury, Richard Godmersham’s ardent defense of its authenticity and power being contrasted with Erasmus’s criticisms of the way in which Becket’s shrine was actually run. But Erasmus does not attack the value of indulgences as such—and neither does Chaucer, in presenting that figure who is the most blatantly immoral among all his Canterbury pilgrims, the Pardoner.The poet’s point rather seems to be that this inveterate sinner is exaggerating and exploiting shamelessly whatever limited spiritual authority he may have, all the better to make money from his credulous clients. Kittredge’s description of the Pardoner as a ‘lost soul’ is quite appropriate by the moral standards of Chaucer’s time; his obsession with the material economy has utterly subverted any chance he may have of profiting from the spiritual economy.
n idiom concerning the “purchasing” of “pardons” or indulgences was well established in Middle English, as these representative instances attest:
A
Swa mykel pardoun may a man Purches here, Qat he may Qan
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In purgatory qwyte alle Qe dett Prick of Conscience, 3918–20 I will passe in pilgremage Qis pas vnto Rome, To purchese me pardonne of the pape selfen Morte Arthure, 3497 Treuthe herde telle herof, and to Piers sente To taken his teme and tilien the erthe, And purchaced hym a pardoun a pena et a culpa For hym and for his heires for everemoore after. . . Piers Plowman, B VII. 1–41
“Purchasing” of “pardons” was a catchy phrase, the alliteration irresistible. But a considerable, and potentially misleading, simplification of theological doctrine is involved here if purchasing is understood to mean “buying” with money or some other form of collateral, instead of bearing the vaguer sense—well attested by the MED—of “acquiring,” “obtaining,” or indeed “earning,” which allows the possibility of acquisition by nonmonetary means. Not all acquisitions of indulgences involved money changing hands; some of them functioned as inducements to prayer or pilgrimage. Moreover, even in those cases where money was involved, it is incorrect to speak of buying a pardon: the recipient was making a donation to some charitable cause. A fixed price was not necessarily required, for the donation could vary in relation to the circumstances of the donor.True, an indulgence was issued in connection with the acceptance of the gift, but the system of exchange involved was rather more complicated than the one that most of us are used to, wherein we acquire the full use and enjoy the total benefit of a purchased item. For money of whatever amount was not enough to acquire the total benefit of an indulgence. In order to have any hope of that, the sinner had to do his or her best to remove the taint of moral guilt (culpa) through sincere and full participation in the sacrament of penance. If and only if this had been achieved could the indulgence take effect: part or all of the sinner’s debt of punishment (pena) was then remitted—or, more precisely, paid out of the vast spiritual treasury of merit, as filled superabundantly and inexhaustibly with the merits of Christ and his saints.2 Generations of theologians struggled to explain the difficult and dangerous relationship between the two economies, the material and the spiritual. Over and over again, the deeply disturbing thought presented itself: were the makers and distributors of indulgences engaged in some sort of market economy that demeaned the whole notion of posthumous reward and punishment by confusing earthly with heavenly matters and, worse, created the impression that salvation was up for sale? Among many others, the great
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Dominican master Albert the Great (d. 1280) worried about the spiritual arithmetic—it seemed as if an enterprising sinner could get a great deal for a mere obolus (meaning a very small monetary unit, and hereafter translated as “halfpenny”): Let us suppose that a fast of seven years was enjoined on someone, and that he comes on one day seven times to a church that has from the Pope the power of granting an indulgence of one year, and each time he makes an offering of a halfpenny. Therefore that man is absolved on one day, for seven halfpennies, from the seven years of penance justly enjoined upon him! It would be amazing if even infidels did not laugh at this state of affairs.3
The point of that last sentence seems to be that if even infidels can laugh at this situation, how much more ridiculous must—or should—it seem to believers.Albert’s answer is that “there is no delusion in the truth.” It is not simply a matter of the Church receiving a meager offering,“as those mockers believe.”4 The sinner’s own material means and spiritual situation must be considered, along with the extraordinary powers of the Church, which can act generously in a manner beyond earthly measure. William of Auvergne (d. 1249) employs the same monetary metaphor, in reporting the ridicule of those who say that for a single penny, or even an egg given to a church, a man might obtain remission of a third of the penance that had been imposed on him.Thus it seems that God is defrauded, since two years of penance are commuted with some paltry offering.5 Furthermore, long and severe penances can be bought off with little effort, and lightly, a penny or halfpenny being reckoned as equal to a third part of remission and penance. Those who hold such stupid opinions think that divine grace is being made venal. No matter how gravely men sin, they can obtain remission in a way that is facile and ridiculous, a trivial gift being put on a par with pilgrimage to Jerusalem or any other major undertaking against the enemies of the faith. People would be crazy to endure long penances and laborious pilgrimages when they could get the same result with three eggs or three halfpennies! William counters this stultitia opinionis with the argument that venality is not involved since the prelate who gives an indulgence of the type under discussion is acting not for money but for the honor of God and the benefit of souls. A church is built not on account of money ( propter pecunia) but by money ( per pecuniam), and without money the building could not be undertaken. Similarly, an indulgence is issued not for money but solely for the glory of God, although money is not absent from the transaction. William proceeds to offer a comparison with the sacrament of baptism. Here remission of sins is achieved not for water [ pro aqua] but by water [ per aquam] and not without water [non sine aquam]. Just so, indulgences function
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not on account of money [non pro pecuniam] but by money [ per pecuniam] and not without money [non sine pecuniam]. As for the concern that one and the same price or cost [pretio] will pay for both major and minor penances: people who talk in that way reveal their ignorance of the strength [virtus] of God and the power of the keys, as bequeathed by Christ to St. Peter and his successors in perpetuity: “I will give you the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and whatever you bind on earth will be bound in Heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in Heaven” (Matt. 16.19). For, just as a greater remission of sin is not gained by the person who has been baptized with more rather than less water, so the person who offers more money does not have greater remission than the person who offers less.This is so because, just as in baptism, remission comes not from water but from divine virtus, so in the case of indulgences remission comes not from the giving or from the gift but from the keys and the ministration of prelates. William proceeds to argue that prelates are perfectly entitled to augment or diminish the satisfaction due for the sins that a penitent has acknowledged in confession. However, could the sale of indulgences not be regarded as a kind of simony, which is to be understood as the exchange of a spiritual for a temporal thing? Thomas Aquinas O.P. (ca. 1225–74) asserts that indulgences are granted not “for the sake of temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to spiritual things,” such as the suppression of the Church’s enemies, “the building of a church, of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving.”Therefore,“there is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged,not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.”6 Albert the Great also answers with a firm negative: what we are dealing with here is not a mere purchase of some commodity but rather an exercise of the bounty of the Church, which encourages her children to good.7 There was some discussion of the actual sources of that bounty, the exact constitution of the spiritual treasury.The Alexandri summa (begun by Alexander of Hales O.F.M. and supplemented by others after his death in 1245) focuses on the merits of the united church and of its head, who is Christ;8 Albert the Great says that it comprises the wealth of the merits and the Passion of Christ, and of the glorious Virgin Mary, and all the apostles, martyrs, and saints both living and dead.9 Thomas Aquinas initially emphasizes the unity of the “mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts,” and hence much surplus merit is available to those who are in need of it, but he soon identifies the preeminent source as the merits of Christ, who acts through his sacraments yet is in no way obliged to operate exclusively through them: “So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment.” There is no danger whatever, it would seem, of those vast resources running out.10
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An even more eloquent affirmation of the merits of Christ is found in the Clement VI’s papal bull Unigenitus, which at last (as late as 1343) proclaimed as dogma the existence of an infinite treasury of merits: “Christ shed of His blood not merely a drop, though this would have sufficed. . .to redeem the whole human race, but a copious torrent,” thereby “laying up an infinite treasure for mankind.This treasure He neither wrapped up in a napkin nor hid in a field, but entrusted to Blessed Peter, the key-bearer, and his successors, that they might, for just and reasonable causes, distribute it to the faithful in full or in partial remission of the temporal punishment due to sin.”11 But what was a “just and reasonable cause”? Albert the Great suggested that the cause moving the maker of an indulgence should be not private but public [non privata, sed publica]. There are two types of public causes, he explains, which involve legitimate exigency [necessitas] and public advantage [utilitas], respectively.12 Examples of the former include the liberation of the Holy Land and perils that threaten the faith; of the latter, relieving poverty, hearing the word of God, and visiting relics. St. Bonaventure (ca. 1217–74) compares the spiritual treasury with those of earthly kings. In political matters and human affairs a state’s resources are deployed for two main reasons: the glory of the prince and the good of the community or because of what is necessary for it, as when something strikes at the state stipends and donations are produced in order that its soldiers may go out to fight. Similarly with the church, there is a twofold cause for dispensing from the treasury. First is the praise of God and His saints, which is done through the construction and visitation of churches in their honor and the commemoration of their virtues in sermons. Second, the general good of the church involves the defense of the Holy Land, the defense of the faith, the promotion of study, and suchlike. Bonaventure concludes that indulgences are appropriately directed toward such ends.13 These points (and many others concerning penance and indulgences) are made in almost identical terms in the Alexandri summa—a reminder of the fact that this highly influential treatise was completed by Alexander’s pupils after his death.14 It is asserted that the place of Christ’s Passion must not be bartered away to the infidels; the memory of the Passion must not slip from the minds of the faithful. Indulgences may reasonably be made by the pope if the necessity of the Church requires it, and especially for the defense of the faith.15 The schoolmen were engaged in a major effort of retrospective rationalization: indulgences had been and were being issued, and their efficacy had to be maintained.The Universal Ruler of the Church is believed to be infallible, declares Albert the Great, particularly with regard to those things that the whole Church receives and approves. Since he has ordered indulgences to be preached, they must be valid.16 Likewise, Aquinas is confident
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that “the universal Church cannot err”; if it approves and grants indulgences, it may be assumed that they must “have some value.”17 Everyone admits this, he continues,“for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain.” Above all else, the conviction that what God’s Church on earth unbinds is also released in heaven was consistently affirmed, the schoolmen being anxious to make the point that there was no risk of deception. Bonaventure attributes to “some” unnamed men of straw a dangerous distinction “between God’s tribunal and the Church’s tribunal” and the belief that “relaxations do not take place in, nor are they understood of, God’s tribunal, but only of the Church’s tribunal.”18 This opinion, declares Bonaventure, is destructive of the very concept of relaxation, for if the earthly Church relaxes what God does not relax, it must be adjudged “a deception rather than a relaxation, and it must be called cruelty rather than piety, since by lessening the penance in this life it induces sufferings more severe in the life to come” (the pains of purgatory being more acute, according to common belief, than anything that one could experience in this life).The same point is made in almost identical terms in the fourth and final part of the Alexandri summa.19 Relaxatio cannot be made solely in the tribunal of the Church; God alleviates what the Church alleviates. These comments of Bonaventure’s form part of his quaestio on the issue of whether indulgences really have the value that they are credited with in preaching.20 The Pope (who has commanded such preaching) is certainly not given to lying, Bonaventure declares, offering the standard vote of confidence.21 Despite this, he subjects the economics involved to rigorous analysis, engaging in arithmetical reductio ad absurdum of a kind reminiscent of Albert’s. Given that in certain indulgences a third of the due repentance is involved, then if first one denarius is given and then another and finally a third, it would appear that a person who had committed a thousand sins would be completely freed for three halfpennies or denarii––which would not only be false but would be judged as ludicrous by all those of right mind. Furthermore, if a sinner who owes nine years has three years remitted, on the same reckoning those who owe thirty have a third part remitted (thus a ten-year period is remitted): it would seem that his sinfulness is being regarded as a commodity.Then again, is it fair that a person who lives near a church should get the same benefit as the person who lives a long way away and expends considerable effort to visit it? And that a rich man, in paying his, should get the same benefit as a poor woman, for whom that money means a lot more? Bonaventure responds with what “is said generally according to the doctors,” that in order for indulgences or relaxationes to be effective, there must be a twofold condition on the part of the giver and a twofold condition on
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the part of the receiver. The giver must have the appropriate power and a cause that is honest and reasonable.The recipient must have confessed with true contrition and have faith with true devotion, so that he is truly repentant and confident that the pastor’s indulgence will be valid for him. “Others say,” continues Bonaventure, that in absolute terms indulgences are worth what they are said to be worth because their conferral is not adjudged a purchase but rather an exercise of the Church’s liberality, and this is allotted equally to all those who dispose themselves to receive it. A rich man, going to a tavern, receives the same wine as does a poor old woman (vetula paupercula); should not the acquisition of indulgences be understood in the same way? Bonaventure explains that this seems to be making “too great a market of indulgences” [magnum forum facere de indulgentiis], which results in their vilification rather than their praise. He suggests that the person who actually gives the indulgence to the recipient must consider the cause for which the indulgence was issued; to the extent, more or less, that the recipient approaches near that cause, he can participate more or less in the indulgence. For example, in the case of the stations of Rome there are set indulgences instituted by the holy fathers, who were mindful of pilgrims who came from remote places; they did not estimate a person living near the church to be worthy of such grace, and hence he receives a lesser indulgence. Bonaventure may not have been wholly comfortable with the idea that a given indulgence is not worth the same to everyone but must be calibrated with reference to what the recipient has done or has to do. He declares that it is “not becoming” to teach this doctrine openly, because all the faithful should believe in their hearts that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are given with equal value for all. Thomas Aquinas took issue with Bonaventure’s discussion.The argument that a man may “obtain remission in whole or in part” according as he approached near to “the cause for which the indulgence was granted” simply does not explain “the custom of the Church,” he declares, that assigns “now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause.”22 The Pope may grant “now a year’s indulgence, now one of only forty days” to people visiting one and the same church on different occasions.The effective cause of the remission of pena,Aquinas continues,“is not the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient,” or indeed “the cause for which the indulgence was granted.” We cannot, therefore, estimate the quantity of remission by any of these but “solely by the merits of the Church—and these are superabundant.” In other words, the scope and scale of an indulgence depend not on man but on God, whose liberality is dispensed by His authorized representatives on earth. Hence, “we do not have too great a market of the divine mercy”—a clear allusion to Bonaventure’s statement as quoted above.
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Aquinas proceeds to argue that a person who lives near the church, along with its priest and clergy, gains the associated indulgence “as much as those who come perhaps a distance of a thousand days’ journey, because the remission. . .is proportionate not to the toil, but to the merits which are applied.” His desire to celebrate the vast riches of the spiritual treasury and the generous operation of the divine mercy is evident. Of course, caveats and conditions must be admitted. It is duly noted that sometimes a distinction may be expressed, as when the Pope specifies that an indulgence of five years may be granted “to those who come from across the seas,” but one of only three years “to those who come from across the mountains,” that is, to people who have made a shorter and less arduous trip.23 Furthermore, when an indulgence is given in a general way to anyone who helps toward the building of a church, this must be understood as meaning “a help proportionate to the giver.” Consequently, “a poor man by giving one (denarius) would gain the full indulgence,” but “not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work.” The difference, as it were, here is assumed within the original grant of the indulgence and is wholly in accord with the giver’s intention. In sum, the indulgence has the full value as set by the individual who makes it, and this may accommodate certain distinctions (as just illustrated) or changes (say, from one time period to another). Of himself the recipient does not have the power to maximize or minimize that value, to alter it in accordance with the degree of effort he may have put into attaining the indulgence—the point being that the merit involved comes not from him but from the spiritual treasury. Thus, Aquinas cum suis sought to reconcile the two rival economies, secular and sacred—to bridge the gap between human giving and divine grace—bringing together deficient sinners and superendowed saints in a business transaction that was to the spiritual advantage of the former and the material advantage of those who presumed to manage the immaterial resources of the latter. In the century after Aquinas’s death the situation became even more complicated, as the popular demand for indulgences grew, and more outlets were created, generating an inflationary spiral. Every major shrine, hospital, or church wanted one or more indulgence, which is hardly surprising, given the power, influence, and retail opportunities that the possession of a prestigious pardon could bring. Competition was fierce. As Ben Nilson says, “It was more difficult to obtain indulgences (from the pope) as a shrine aged, partly because the site lost novelty value but also because new competitors for indulgences were always springing up.”24 New institutions could also experience difficulty, a good example being afforded by St. Bridget of Sweden’s arduous efforts to gain the greatest possible indulgence for her convent in Vadstena—despite her having
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received a vision in which Christ himself had declared that Urban V should sanction it.25 Furthermore, it was not just the loss of “novelty value” that presented difficulties for established shrines: the papacy tended to raise the price (or more accurately, the amount of the requisite offering) for the renewal of a lucrative pardon. Moreover, rival interests—not to say religious dissenters—could call into question the value of even the most venerable of indulgences. An excellent case in point concerned the authenticity of the plenary indulgence associated with the shrine of “the holy blissful martyr,”St. Thomas à Becket,at Canterbury,one of the most popular shrines in Geoffrey Chaucer’s time26 and the destination of his fictional pilgrimage. A Latin treatise written shortly after the fifth Canterbury jubilee (1420),27 perhaps the work of Richard Godmersham, a canon lawyer whom Thomas Arundel appointed head of Canterbury College in 1403, argues vociferously that the indulgence granted by Honorius III on the occasion of the translation of the martyr (7 July 1220) was indeed a plenary one, valid in each successive jubilee year.28 In fact, the evidence for this is very dubious. Godmersham (supposing for the moment that he is indeed the author we are dealing with) assumes that a forged bull of Honorius III (Quanto venerabilis martyr) is genuine, but even that document does not include a clear description of a plenary indulgence, and in any case such grants were still very rare at the beginning of the fourteenth century, when Boniface VIII granted one to those who visited the basilicas of St. Peter and St. Paul. True, in 1216, Honorius III was supposed to have given St. Francis a particularly valuable indulgence in respect of his church of the Portiuncula,29 and hence one might have expected him to have shown similar generosity to St.Thomas à Becket’s shrine just a few years later. But, once again, the exact terms of the original bequest are a matter of scholarly controversy; the so-called Portiuncula indulgence is almost certainly a later elaboration of what—if anything— Honorius had actually given.30 No trace of such skepticism troubles the surface of Godmersham’s treatise: a robust defense of Canterbury’s honor is mounted, with the reader’s consent being demanded rather than invited. General principles already familiar from our initial discussion are applied to the specific case of Becket: his martyrdom acquired many supererogatory merits for the Church (a major contribution having been made to the spiritual treasury), and the Canterbury Jubilee is supported by the figures and significations of the Old Testament jubilees. However, there is much ad hoc argument that is remarkable for its aggressiveness rather than its logic. Godmersham begins by affirming that the indulgence conceded to Becket’s shrine by Honorius III is not inferior to the crusade indulgence, as given by the previous pope, Innocent III.31 Furthermore, the Canterbury indulgence fulfills the conditions of validity laid down by St. Thomas Aquinas in his
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Sentences commentary.32 There it is explained that indulgences are indeed worth what they are said to be worth, providing that he who grants them has the requisite authority, that the recipient has charity, and that, as regards the cause, there is piety that includes the honor of God and the profit of our neighbor. All these conditions are met by the indulgence in question, Godmersham argues, and therefore it does have the efficacy that preachers profess, which has been claimed for it on many occasions, five jubilees having elapsed without rejection of the belief that it is genuinely a plenary indulgence. Furthermore, affirmation of the value of this indulgence is a true and healthful thing; and since we are not dealing here with a matter of opinion or something that is deniable, it follows that anyone who argues the opposite is not a faithful Christian. Godmersham then goes so far as to say that the Canterbury indulgence derives from the authority of the Church on the same basis as does the Gospel; thus every faithful person should believe in this indulgence just as he believes in the most authoritative books of the Bible. The plenitude of papal power is then invoked.The pope grants indulgences not in propria persona but rather in the person of Christ, from whom his power derives, as is intimated by the words of St. Paul: “I have pardoned, if I have pardoned any thing, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ” (2 Cor. 2.10). The Glossa ordinaria explains that Paul’s pardons are as valid as if Christ Himself had done the deed. Therefore what Pope Honorius III conceded was given as if Christ had given it; for his part, the pope would not have dispensed this indulgence had not Christ first given his promise prophetically to the blessed martyr. While living in exile in France, Becket experienced a vision at Pontigny in which the Lord Jesus appeared to him and said, “Thomas,Thomas, my Church will be glorified in your blood.”33 Here a prophetic promise is to be understood according to mystical and spiritual understanding (in other words, this text is worthy of the same prestigious hermeneutic scrutiny as Holy Writ), because He who is the sum of truth and cannot lie promised that his Church—the congregation of the faithful—would be glorified, that is, justified and given grace by the plenary remission of sins and the grace and merit mediated by the blood of the blessed martyr. Such remission is a great glory for the Church Triumphant. Presumably part of the point here is that, through Becket, Christ wished to glorify the Church Triumphant every bit as much as he wished to glorify the Church Militant: if a pope (Innocent III) can grant an indulgence that glorifies the latter in promoting a crusade, then it seems utterly appropriate that his successor (Honorius III) should grant an indulgence that glorifies the former. From all these arguments it is brilliantly clear, Godmersham concludes, that Pope Honorius III did not grant the aforesaid indulgence merely from
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himself alone (ex se) but rather from divine inspiration, and he prescribed that it be granted by the universal Church; thus a promise first made by Christ was gloriously implemented by the pope.Therefore Honorius could say with the apostle Paul:“Yet not I” alone have given or conceded this plenary indulgence of sins,“but the grace of God with me” (cf. 1 Cor. 15.10). The truth of the indulgence is therefore clear to all faithful believers—and those who attack it are sinning against the Holy Spirit, the sin that Christ inveighs against in Matthew 12.32,“it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come.” According to the doctors, to attack acknowledged truth is a sin against the Holy Spirit. This indulgence is acknowledged as true because it has always been preached as catholic truth, it has consistently been authorized by the Church and never revoked, and the universal Church has selected it and made it law.Therefore anyone who attacks it attacks acknowledged truth and sins against the Holy Spirit. Such people have much to fear: the wrath of God will come upon them and they will go down alive to hell (cf. Ps. 77.31, Num. 16.30). Godmersham certainly thought of Wycliffe’s followers in those terms: at one point he denounces those who are “infected with the execrable dogma of the carping Lollards.”34 More generally, here is a treatise that brooks no dissent, the tone of the discussion being very different from that found in the Sentences commentaries and summae from which I quoted above, despite the occasional vestiges of sic et non debating technique. Refusal to believe in the Canterbury pardon is not an option, its truth being placed on a par with that of Holy Writ, and with St.Thomas à Becket being afforded the same honor as God showed to St. Peter and St. Paul. Maybe Godmersham’s vehemence is a reflex of insecurity. At least the literal truth of the matter was taken out of contention by Pope Paul II, who declared unequivocally that a plenary indulgence was on offer during the jubilee year of 1420. One wonders what visitors to Canterbury in the previous jubilee year of 1370 thought they were getting; I see no reason to doubt that they expected a plenary indulgence. Certainly the 1370 jubilee was a highly successful one for the shrine,35 a fact that Chaucer may well have been aware of during the gestation of his Canterbury Tales.The issue of plenary indulgences apart, Canterbury did very well in respect of pardons of shorter duration, receiving awards from Nicholas IV in 1291, John XXII in 1328, and Boniface IX in 1395. Chaucer could have imagined his characters returning home well satisfied with their spiritual acquisitions. Some of the poet’s contemporaries were less sanguine about what Canterbury had to offer, as is evident from Godmersham’s contemptuous reference to “carping Lollards.” The eighth of the Wycliffite “Twelve Conclusions” holds that the matter of St. Thomas “were no cause of martyrdom” and William Whyte (who was burnt at Norwich in 1429) was
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credited with a similar view.36 One of Whyte’s followers, Margery Baxter, is reported as having said at her trial (again in 1429) that “St. Thomas of Canterbury was a false traitor and is damned in Hell because he injuriously endowed churches with possessions, and he prompted and encouraged many heresies in the Church which deceive the simple people”; furthermore, far from dying “patiently before the altar,” as “a false, foolish traitor he was killed as he fled in the doorway of the church.”37 Of such extremism there is, of course, not a trace in the Canterbury Tales, and (to the best of our knowledge) neither did Chaucer share the Lollard distaste for pilgrimage in general. He was quite willing to include “himself ” among the Canterbury party, and several of his major characters are veteran pilgrims—including the Wife of Bath, who has been to Jerusalem three times and also visited Rome, Boulogne, Compostella, and Cologne(I[A] 463–67); and the Pardoner himself, of course, who has just been to Rome(I[A] 671).The issue of whether the Wife is supposed to have gained much spiritual benefit out of these travels—“She koude muchel of wandrynge by the weye”—is of course a different matter. The practice of pilgrimage itself remains uncontested, and the Parson—who, had he been a genuine “Lollere” (cf. II[B1] 1173) would not have been on pilgrimage in the first place—zealously anticipates the group’s arrival in Canterbury with a tale of “moralitee and vertuous mateere,” while putting their earthly enterprise in its true spiritual perspective with reference to the “parfit glorious pilgrymage / That highte Jerusalem celestial” (X[I] 50–51). Chaucer’s construction of a Canterbury pilgrimage—an expedition that, of course, we never see arriving in Canterbury—is also a far cry from Erasmus’s thinly fictionalized account of a visit to Canterbury that he made sometime between late 1512 and the summer of 1514.The church itself is said to rise “to the sky so majestically that it inspires devotion even in those who see it from afar.”38 Despite this, the keepers of Becket’s shrine become the butt of vigorous satire. Erasmus explained later that he was drawing attention “to those who exhibit doubtful relics for authentic ones, who attribute to them more than is proper, and basely make money by them.”39 The colloquy itself recounts how a large quantity of bones was brought before Erasmus’s party,“skulls, jaws, teeth, hands, fingers, whole arms; all of which we adored and kissed.” His companion “Gratian Pullus” (to be identified with John Colet) looked “rather disgusted” when he was presented with an arm “with the bloodstained flesh” still attached, and shrank from kissing it.40 That disgust becomes even more apparent when “Pullus” is offered a very special present, one of the rags with which,“they say, the holy man wiped the sweat from his face or neck, the dirt from his nose, or whatever other kinds of filth human bodies have.”41 Something of the same disgust pervades Chaucer’s text when the relics that the Pardoner carries
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and exploits for material gain are attacked (I[A] 699–703;VI[C] 347–84, 943–55); we are left in no doubt that they are fakes. However, the authenticity and valence of the relics that await Chaucer’s fictional pilgrims at Canterbury are never called into question; there is no suggestion whatever that the spiritual treasures of Becket’s shrine are in any way “doubtful” or have more attributed to them than is proper.42 Neither does Chaucer call indulgences themselves into question—not even those dispensed by his highly dubious Pardoner;43 the poet’s point rather seems to be that this inveterate sinner is exaggerating and shamelessly exploiting whatever limited spiritual authority he may have, all the better to make money from his credulous clients. Here a clear parallel may be drawn with Erasmus’s attitude toward the subject. The colloquy on rash vows (De votis temere susceptis, first printed in 1522) presents “Arnold” telling “Cornelius” of how, on pilgrimage to Rome and Compostella, two of his companions died and another was left behind at Florence, terminally ill. Although this man was “a complete good-for-nothing,” he “had a purse bulging with the most generous indulgences.” Therefore, the two of them mockingly conclude, he’s now safe in heaven. In the edition of this text that was published in August 1523 Erasmus has “Arnold” spell out his intention as follows: I certainly don’t disparage indulgences, but I laugh at the foolishness of my fellow drinker. Though in other respects the most foolish trifler, he pinned his whole hope of salvation, so to speak, on a piece of parchment instead of on a moral life.44
This passage was almost certainly added in face of the reaction of Nicholaas Baechem, prior of the Carmelites in Louvain, who found heresy in De votis temere susceptis on the grounds that it mocked religious vows. Erasmus’s defense was that it mocked only rash, drunken vows. In any case, he was hardly at risk, having enlisted powerful allies against his detractor: two popes in succession, Adrian VI and Clement VII, afforded him their protection. However, in his De utilitate colloquiorum Erasmus felt obliged to make his position even clearer: Nor do I condemn papal indulgences or briefs ( pontificias indulgentias aut diplomata) there [i.e., in De votis temere susceptis], but I do reprove the utterly frivolous man who, without even a thought of amending his life, puts his whole hope in human pardons (in condonationibus humanis). If, in this connection, a person but reflected on how much men’s devotion is impaired, partly by the fault of those who hawk papal indulgences ( prostituunt pontificias indulgentias), partly by the error of those who receive pardons otherwise than as they should, he will admit it is worth while for youth to be warned about this matter.45
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Here, and in the passage quoted previously, Erasmus seems to be expressing views quite similar to those found at the end of Passus VII (B-text, 174–95) of Piers Plowman. Langland’s dreamer declares that while the efficacy of pardons must be believed (“This is a leef of our bileve”),nevertheless on the day of judgment trust in such things “is noght so siker [sure] for the soule. . .as is Dowel [do-well].” “A pokeful [bagful] of pardon,” “indulgences doublefold” and membership in all the fraternities of friars may be rated as worth a mere piecrust if Dowel does not help you, if your good works are insufficient. The similarity is hardly surprising, given that both writers are operating well within the bounds of an orthodox theology of indulgences that ( by Erasmus’s time) had been developing for at least two centuries. If people are impenitent, how can giving them indulgences be defended, particularly in view of St. Paul’s assertion that before Christ’s tribunal each one will receive what he has won, according to his works, whether good or evil (2 Cor. 5.10)? The answer to this question provided in the Provinciale seu constitutiones angliae of William Lyndwood (ca. 1375–1446), bishop of St. David’s and right-hand man of Archbishop Chichele in his proceedings against the Lollards, is quite typical.46 While sinners retain their guilt (culpa) it is impossible to remit their punishment ( pena). Now, the power of binding and loosing was handed down to ministers for edification and not for destruction: but does not an indulgence, which is a gratuitous remission of sin, tend to destruction, because by this process sin remains unpunished? Indeed, it could be said that the facility of pardon encourages men to sin: it is very easy to obtain an indulgence, so why worry? In response to these arguments Lyndwood stresses the importance of contrition on the part of the penitent, which relates to justice, and the satisfaction that is rendered through the Church’s communication of the merits of the saints, which relates to mercy. Hence both justice and mercy are given their due in the process. Mere possession of pardons—even plenary pardons—does not make one immune from divine punishment. The recipient has to be in the correct spiritual state and devoutly carry out the designated spiritual activities. Lyndwood emphasizes that people should beware of neglecting good works in the future simply because they have obtained indulgences.47 They may think themselves immune, but they can still be “bound” or convicted on charges of negligence and contempt. Proper satisfaction has to be made; penitence that has been enjoined must be performed. Neither Langland nor Erasmus would have quibbled with that. Neither, I believe, would Chaucer. His satire is directed not at the system of indulgences but rather at the individual who is bringing into disrepute his profession of quaestor,48 fundraiser for charitable causes. In view of the bad press indulgences had long received, that may seem a surprising claim. But it is high time, I believe, that we recuperated the idealism that marks the
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foundational theology of indulgences, its affirmation of divine love and valence of religious communality and mutuality—no small task, given generations of Protestant devaluation49 and the recent (quite credulous, in my view) tendency to privilege proto-protestant polemic as the premier repository of social wisdom and religious insight in the age of Chaucer. St. Bonaventure is one eloquent witness among many others who saw in indulgences an endorsement of the recommendation of Galatians 5.2 to “bear one another’s burdens.” Taking these “burdens” as spiritual ones, he suggests that if a heavy penance is imposed on a person, it is quite possible for someone else to “bear it for him in part or in whole.”50 A comparison is offered with what happens in nature. In the case of the animal body, one member may expose itself to mitigate the hurt that threatens another member, as when the arm seeks to shield the head.Assuming “there is a connection and likeness between the mystical body and the natural body,” it seems that one member of the mystical body, which is the Church,“can and should bear the burdens of the other.” Furthermore, Christ “was punished and by His punishment He made satisfaction”—not, of course, for his own sin, but for another’s.Thus, Christ afforded satisfaction for us. Since “we are all one in Christ and are His members, we ought also to be imitators of Him.” Following His example, one individual can and should make satisfaction for another. Here, then, is a humane rationale for the dispensation of merit from the thesaurus mysticus, that vast repository of spiritual wealth that may be distributed in relation to the needs and capabilities of all its beneficiaries, whether they be rich or poor in material terms.This doctrine assumes a solidarity that is at once natural, human, and Divine, an inclusiveness that derives from our shared membership of the savior’s mystical body. Such lofty sentiments are quite lost on Chaucer’s Pardoner, who feels no human or spiritual kinship whatever for his victims: I wol have moneie, wolle, chese, and whete, Al were it yeven of the povereste page, Or of the povereste wydwe in a village, Al sholde hir children sterve for famyne. VI[C] 448–51
Bonaventure saw indulgences as a leveling device that brought their recipients together in terms of the value of the spiritual benefits received, despite any differences in material wealth: the conferral of a pardon was not a purchase but rather an exercise of the Church’s liberality. He applied the metaphor of how a rich man, going to a tavern, receives the same wine as does a poor old woman, in making the point that the pardon is worth the same to both. In the Pardoner’s view, however, that vetula paupercula is a
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professional challenge—a sort of acid test of his powers of persuasion and extortion. He is far more interested in what he gets than in what he gives; the Church’s spiritual liberality has receded before the quaestor’s material greed. Here is no compassion, no recognition of human mutuality or Christian solidarity. So insatiable is the Pardoner’s greed that it has become a driving force that is no respecter of persons; the amount of money he gains seems less important than the pleasure he takes in exacting it. He is rather reminiscent of the greedy merchant castigated in the Roman de la Rose immediately before the critique of the immoral preacher, which is generally recognized as one of the major sources of the Pardoner’s Prologue. Here is a man whose passion for acquiring the property of others is like trying to drink the Seine dry: he “will never be able to do it, because there will always be some left.” The more he has the more he wants, and the more he longs for what he lacks; thus an “agonizing conflict tears at his vitals and tortures him” (Rose, 5049–59).51 Something of that obsessiveness has gone into Chaucer’s character. More specifically, the Pardoner has perverted the traditional justification of preaching pro questu, as may be illustrated with reference to Thomas of Chobham’s treatment of the question, does a preacher sin mortally in preaching for alms?52 It would seem so, Chobham postulates, because preaching is spiritual work, and it is not lawful to use spiritual work to acquire temporal reward; Scripture frequently condemns those preachers who “seek the things that are their own: not the things that are Jesus Christ’s” (Phil. 2.21). On the other hand, St. Paul declares that by all means Christ may be preached, and he rejoiced and will rejoice in this (Phil. 1.18). Furthermore, the Lord affirms that the laborer is worthy of his hire (Luke 10.7). Besides, if it was forbidden to preach to acquire gifts, a lot of churches would be in trouble—for in time of necessity they have sent out their preachers to obtain alms from the faithful. Chobham seeks to resolve this problem by arguing that the obtaining of temporal reward is not the final cause [causa finais] as such but rather the consequence of the actual final cause, which is devotion. Devotion is the preacher’s true motivation in preaching; from this quite impeccable final cause follows the collection of alms and the advantage of the church.The preacher must preach to excite the devotion of the faithful, Chobham explains, but because devotion cannot be proved better than by making offerings and donating gifts, a good man’s preaching pro questu may be justified because he is preaching on account of devotion, from which temporal reward follows. Therefore, when one speaks of preaching “for” ( pro) alms, that “for” does not indicate the final cause itself, but rather the consequence of the final cause—because the devotion of the faithful is
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the final cause of the preaching, from which follow almsgiving and the advancement of the church.53 If someone preaches in order to collect alms for the renewal of the church or the construction of bridges or the maintenance of the poor, the principal intention [ principalis intentio] must be that the hearts of the faithful are stirred to devotion, while the secondary intention may be that the faithful are seen offering and giving alms on account of this preaching, because such behavior affords clear evidence that the hearts of the faithful have been appropriately excited. That noble principalis intentio is flagrantly violated in The Pardoner’s Prologue and Tale: But shortly myn entente I wol devyse: I preche of no thyng but for coveityse. Therfore my theme is yet, and evere was, Radix malorum est Cupiditas. . . . But though myself be gilty in that synne, Yet kan I maken oother folk to twynne From avarice, and soore to repente. But that is nat my principal entente; I preche nothyng but for coveitise. VI[C] 423–33
The gratification of personal “coveitise” is the Pardoner’s professed principal entente, while making other folk turn away from avarice is a possible secondary intention. He is preaching pro questu in the worst possible sense of the term, with temporal reward as his real final cause and devotion (as induced in the faithful) merely being a possible consequence. Here, then, is a grotesque reversal of the proper order of things.54 The Pardoner is also a disgrace to his profession in other ways.As I have argued elsewhere, he far exceeds the statutory obligations and authorized duties of a licensed dispenser of indulgences in two crucial—and quite damning—ways, in claiming extensive powers of absolution and the right to preach (the officium praedicatoris).55 Indeed, the Pardoner’s actions and his very demeanor are an affront to common belief, a shocking (but not, alas, atypical) deviation from pious ideals that were shared by high and low, learned and lewd. The structural significance of the Pardoner’s self-exhibition within the project of Chaucer’s fictional pilgrimage is crucial.This character threatens to travesty, bring into ridicule, and reduce to absurdity every major spiritual reason for the expedition to Canterbury, where the pilgrims can expect to acquire substantial indulgences, offer to the authentic relics of St.Thomas à Becket, and hear good sermons from godly men (a major improvement on the Pardoner’s
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deficient vita, which undermines his fine verba). Forgiveness for this degree of deviancy would be hard to find. George Kittredge memorably pronounced the Pardoner as the greatest sinner among the group—“an abandoned wretch” and “the one lost soul among the Canterbury Pilgrims.”56 Yet, almost in the next breath Kittredge found some signs of grace in him, at least at the point at which the Pardoner admits to his audience that Jesus Christ’s “pardoun” is the best,“I wol yow nat deceyve” (VI[C] 916–18).57 But that could merely be the timeless ploy of the skilled salesman who assures his clients that he is utterly sincere in urging them to buy, for instance, this particular used car, despite its limitations—for what can you get for that amount of money these days? Besides, even if the Pardoner had some awareness of the spiritual risks he was running concerning the fate of his immortal soul, his contemporary judges in the tribunal of penance would have been a lot less sentimental than Kittredge and Patterson, far slower to forgive—if forgiveness were an option at all. For they were robust in their condemnation of the preacher who, even though his holy words could help others, failed to help himself. Generations of theologians cited God’s demand of the sinner, “Why dost thou announce my justice?,” together with His terrifying response,“I will accuse you and stand against your face” (Ps. 49.16, 21).True, following the Pardoner’s downfall, he and the Host do kiss and make up—but the kiss of peace may be (and certainly is in this instance) a very superficial gesture, not indicative of any fellow-feeling or frisson whatever. The appearances are saved, the social decorum restored. But there is no reason to infer any sort of authorial absolution for the Pardoner for his many crimes and misdemeanors. It may be enlightening to subject the Pardoner’s claim that he does good in spite of himself— though myself be gilty in that synne, Yet kan I maken oother folk to twynne From avarice, and soore to repente
––to moral analysis of the kind generally practiced by the schoolmen. Thomas of Bailly, who served as Chancellor of the University of Paris from 1316 until his death in 1326, presents himself as an excellent guide, because of the particularly full answer he gives to the standard question utrum predicans tenetur facere omnia que predicat.This includes an exploration of the possibility that a preacher who does not practice what he preaches may nevertheless be of some benefit to others, and in the process may earn some sort of credit for himself, even though he is living in mortal sin.58 Thomas fully endorses St. Gregory’s dictum that a preacher whose words differ from
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his actions plants a seed that another eats, even though he himself does not feed on it. So, the Pardoner seems to be right on that score; his own viciousness does not destroy any benefit that an audience may receive from his preaching (and, it may be added, from his indulgences). But, in spiritually helping others does he help himself ? Little if any support is offered here for Kittredgean latitude. Thomas explains that an immoral person who helps others may possibly merit de congruo, for example, by giving alms or indeed by preaching. In such a case, where only an inferior type of merit may be earned (on which, more later), contrition is not necessary: attrition will suffice. Attrition may be understood as “imperfect contrition” concerning one’s wrongdoing, what Aquinas calls a definite “but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed,”59 a feeling that has its principal source in “servile fear.”60 There is nothing to suggest that the Pardoner has such a feeling. Furthermore,Thomas of Bailly imagines his attrite preacher as being motivated to preach to others by natural piety. Chaucer does not seem to have bestowed that motivation on his character. It would appear, then, that the Pardoner can hardly hope for even this inferior version of merit—and congruent merit is precisely that, a feeble thing as compared to merit in the fullest and best sense of the term, that is, merit de condigno, which cries out to be rewarded. Thomas envisages only the possibility of mere congruent merit for his sinful preacher, and actions that are meritorious in this weaker sense have far less of a claim on God’s grace.While it would be unjust for condignly meritorious actions not to be rewarded, to withhold reward for a congruently meritorious deed involves no violation of right; what matters is how generous the rewarder (i.e., God) decides to be.61 Furthermore, He can be as generous or as punitive as He wishes. In sum, even if Chaucer’s character did have some feelings of natural piety or attrition, that would not necessarily earn or purchase any part of Jesus Christ’s pardoun, or affect his status as a “lost soul.” Any reward he might theoretically receive is entirely up to God; the Pardoner himself has done little if anything to further his case—and much to diminish it. Pace Kittredge and Patterson, there are no apparent grounds for optimism concerning his redemption. If this despicable figure has no sympathy for his fellow-Christians, why should God have any sympathy for him? The Pardoner’s obsession with the material economy has utterly subverted any chance he might have of profiting from the spiritual economy. True, the medieval system of indulgences was fraught with confusion, and a humble quaestor could be excused for not having grasped the complexities with the insight of, say, an Aquinas or a Bonaventure. But the Pardoner’s rapacious greed is inexcusable, as is his failure to act on the foundational truth of the whole system: indulgences were instituted so that the spiritually rich could help the poor, sharing with them their abundant merit in acts of
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Christian love and communion. Far from working to ensure that the grievous penitential burdens of his clients are borne by others, Chaucer’s character acts in a way that increases their burdens by relieving them of their material wealth and undermining their opportunities to lay up wealth in Heaven. More generally, he has made a market of the divine mercy, thus realizing some of the schoolmen’s worst fears. I cannot believe that the poet is offering any excuses for such behavior. At this moment on the road to Canterbury, the spiritual economy is in the ascendant, being allowed its full value and ultimate power.
CHAPTER 5 SACRED AND SECULAR IN THE MERCHANT OF VENICE Murray Roston
Suggests that the basic theme of the The Merchant of Venice is the clash between the precepts of Christianity denouncing financial acquisition and the demands of the burgeoning world of commerce, a conflict that Shakespeare brilliantly confronts by merging two disparate figures in the character of Antonio—the contemporary merchant engaged in profit-making with the ascetic Christ-figure, in a play reenacting the Crucifixion in a contemporary setting. By that device, Shakespeare attempted to validate his own current commercial ventures. Recognition of that purpose reveals a profound unity between the main plot and such seemingly peripheral elements as the casket scene and the exchange of rings.
lthough Bakhtin restricted his dialogic theory to the novel, his perception that there exists a tension between text and countertext applies no less effectively to drama.The tension arises, he argued, from a conflict between the “centripetal” element reinforcing traditional assumptions and the “centrifugal” impulse serving to resist or modify them.1 The mingling of sacred and secular in The Merchant of Venice conforms closely to that distinction, the sacred impulse in the play reinforcing inherited notions of behavior while the secular impulse contests or modifies them in accordance with urgent contemporary needs. The prevalence of the sacred aspects is indicated by a fact long noted— that The Merchant of Venice contains more biblical allusions than any play
A
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in the Shakespearean canon, echoing passages from the Gospels, from Ecclesiasticus, from Corinthians, and, if less frequently, from other books in the Old Testament.2 To an Elizabethan audience, familiar with the Bible from regular readings both in church and in the family setting, those allusions would have created a complex of connective filaments and associations, both verbal and thematic.The scriptural element is not obtrusive in a play so dramatically energized and variegated, containing as it does Bassanio’s journey to the magical world of Belmont, the contract theme building up to the tensions of the trial, the comedy of the clown Gobbo, and the amusing exchange of rings with which it concludes. But the plethora of scriptural allusions, however latent, signals the existence of a subdued yet pervasive concern with some religious or sacred theme. Shakespeare was no pietist; the religious element in his plays generally referring not to matters of doctrinal or sectarian dispute but only to the broadest moral principles of Christianity, the ideals of compassion, altruism, and forgiveness of one’s enemies, evidenced in such characters as Cordelia, Edgar, and Desdemona. Even the plays dealing most prominently with those Christian virtues lack the proliferation of biblical references that distinguish The Merchant of Venice, including as it does among numerous other elements a dispute over the theological lesson to be drawn from Jacob’s increase of his flock, the reiterated hint of whited sepulchres, the parody of Isaac’s blessing when Gobbo meets his father, and the evocation of “a Daniel come to judgment.” In that last connection, only an audience familiar with the story of Susanna and the Elders in the Old Testament Apocrypha would grasp the irony of Shylock seeing himself in the role of the innocent, vindicated Susanna while the audience perceives him more accurately as one of the corrupt elders of the story, hence empathizing with Gratiano’s triumphant echo of the phrase as Portia reverses the court’s ruling. First, then, to the centripetal. In a justly admired article, Barbara Lewalski identified many years ago the underlying theme of the play as being the victory of the New Law over the Old.3 Antonio, embodying the Christian ideals of selflessness, generosity, and love, fulfills in his loan to Bassanio the Gospel injunction: “Give to every man that asketh of thee. . .do good and lend, looking for nothing in return and your reward shall be great” (Luke 6.30–35) In that context, Shylock, associated by his Jewish ancestry with the Old Testament, represents the antithesis of Christian generosity, demanding his pound of flesh in reliance upon the lex talionis. One should add that he does not represent the Old Testament itself but the Pharisee of the New Testament, the Jew viewed in the Gospels as the perverter of the divine covenant. Within the Old Testament, God is not only the arbiter of justice and executor of vengeance but also the source of divine love and mercy. But the transfer of those more amiable qualities to Jesus left God the Father with the
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harsher function of imposing Law and exacting revenge, attributes imposed in the Gospels upon the rabbis or Pharisees. There, they stand accused of bigotry, insisting upon the letter of the law to extract the maximum penalty from transgressors rather than granting forgiveness and love. Hence Shylock’s reliance on the precise wording of his contracts, his sole response to Portia’s query whether he has provided a surgeon to stop Antonio’s wound being the sharp rejoinder:“Is it so nominated in the bond?. . .I cannot find it, ’tis not in the bond.” Lewalski explores this theme in some detail, tracing many of the scriptural allusions to their source. But there is a problem in her reading of the play, which she herself acknowledges. For if Antonio embodies Christian virtues in the matter of the loan, he is, she points out, sadly lacking in a further and no less fundamental principle—the injunction to turn one’s cheek to the smiter:“Love your enemies” the book of Matthew enjoins,“bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which hurt and persecute you” (Matt. 5.39–44).Antonio, in contrast, spurns his enemy Shylock, calls him a dog, voids his rheum upon him, and when charged with such persecution, declares stubbornly that he will continue to do so: I am as like to call thee so again, To spet on thee again, to spurn thee too.
That, Lewalski recognizes, is a flaw, a moral blemish, which she assumes, he needs to correct by the end of the play, as he does when he waives the fine imposed on Shylock. If she is right and Antonio does learn forgiveness in the course of the play, that spiritual amelioration is, we should note, in no way prepared for, no hint of remorse on his part being suggested that would make such moral change believable. This apparently minor factor has, I believe, profound implications for an understanding of the play. For the assumption that Antonio’s harsh treatment of Shylock is un-Christian prevents Lewalski, as it has prevented later critics, from perceiving what seems to me to be the major mythological underpinning of the play. The Christian, it is true, was enjoined to turn his cheek, to submit patiently to abuse, to love and forgive those who smite him; but there was one notable exception. He was to reach no such accommodation with the Devil, as Jesus exemplified in his rejection of Satan’s temptations in the wilderness. On the contrary, with the Devil the Christian was to be ever on his guard, hostile to any approach, firm in his resistance. “Put on the whole armour of God,” the Gospels warn,“that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the Devil” (Luke 6.11). Since it has become customary in our own day to view Shylock sympathetically as the wronged member of an oppressed minority—a reading that
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does not accord with his identification as figuring the Devil—it may be necessary to spend a moment or two on that point before turning to my main theme.The sympathetic reading, understandable as it may be in a postHolocaust era, in a generation that has learned to deplore racism, ignores the fact that the Christian characters term him such repeatedly, with no hint of hesitation or modification. His own daughter Jessica detests him. Moreover, an Elizabethan audience, familiar with the mystery cycles and morality plays still being acted in their day, would, as Michelson notes, have immediately seen in Gobbo the comic Vice traditionally accompanying his master—the Devil.4 Lest the point be missed, Jessica remarks to Gobbo as he leaves his master’s service that their house is hell “. . .and thou, a merry devil, / Didst rob it of some taste of tediousness.” Quite apart from the numerous descriptions of Shylock, whether as a devil citing scripture for his purpose or, in Gobbo’s garbled phrase, as “the very devil incarnation,” no attempt to soften his character can mute the horror of the scene where he maliciously sharpens the knife upon his leather shoe in preparation for excising the pound of flesh, an action that prompts Gratiano’s choric protest: Not on thy sole, but on thy soul, harsh Jew, Thou mak’st thy knife keen; but no metal can— No, not the hangman’s ax—bear half the keenness Of thy sharp envy.
Sympathetic readings of Shylock’s character have, of course, based themselves upon the famed “Hath not a Jew. . .” speech, expressing his understandable resentment of the treatment meted out to him. But Shakespeare, we should recall, characteristically allows such moments of insight even into the most villainous of his characters without detracting from our ultimate sense of their villainy. Richard III, in his opening speech, confides to us his grievance against heaven for having made him a hunchback; but as he proceeds on his evil path, the crimes he commits leave no room for further compassion. Shylock’s complaint does indeed seem momentarily warranted, evoking a degree of empathy; but in a drama contrasting Christian forgiveness with Old Testament reprisal or vengeance, the chilling conclusion of his speech would scarcely have won commiseration from an Elizabethan audience: “. . .and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?” One may add that those who see Shylock as a merely contemptible figure, relying on the vision of him as running through the streets crying incoherently, “My daughter! O my ducats. . .” forget that those are not Shylock’s words.They are Solanio’s parody of Shylock, who himself never behaves so ludicrously upon the stage.
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To return, then, to Lewalski’s reading, if Shylock is a devil-figure and Antonio fully justified in spitting on his gabardine, her perception of a failing in his character falls aside, leaving him as a flawless embodiment of the Christian idea. Once that point is made, the mythological subtext becomes apparent—the play being in the fullest sense a reenactment of the Crucifixion story within the setting of the city of Venice, as the Jew attempts to shed the blood of an innocent Christ-figure. In this version there is, of course, a happy ending, constituting what Freud calls wish-fulfillment, Christ’s death replaced by the more congenial scene of a last-minute reversal of judgment. But the basic tale remains the same, together with the lessons intended to be derived from it, the text repeatedly confirming the parallel. Antonio, long before he knows of the clause in Shylock’s contract, follows Jesus in declaring himself ready to offer his body for his friend’s salvation, to sacrifice for Bassanio “. . .my purse, my person, my extremest means.” Preparing for death, he echoes the words and images associated with his forebear, opposing his “patience” to Shylock’s fury and describing himself, with hints of the Lamb of God, to be a “tainted wether of the f lock / Meetest for death.” That reading, apart from its major corollaries, illumines a facet of the play that has long proved puzzling to critics—Antonio’s unexplained melancholy in the opening scene.5 His exchange with Salerio and Solanio assures us that his sadness derives neither from financial cares nor from unrequited love; but no reason for the melancholy is proffered. Once he is seen as a Christ-figure, however, the reason becomes evident.Alone among the leading male characters, he is, like his celibate counterpart, segregated from romantic love.6 In the midst of the clowning of Gobbo, the comic exchange of rings, and the love-affairs being pursued around him, he remains grave and aloof as befits his shadowy role: I hold the world but as the world, Gratiano— A stage, where every man must play a part, And mine a sad one.
Shylock, in that reenactment of the Crucifixion, emerges as more than the devil-figure with which he is so frequently equated. For he functions, as so often in medieval drama (in conformity with the New Testament itself ), as a conflation of the Devil and Judas Iscariot. “Have not I chosen you twelve,” Jesus remarked to the disciples,“and one of you is a devil?” ( John 6.70). Hence it is that, upon Shylock’s condemnation in court, Gratiano, recalling the fate of Judas in the Gospel account, gleefully offers him a rope to hang himself. Such parallels between the Crucifixion and Shylock’s contract are pursued throughout the play, the shedding of the drop of blood on
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which the court reversal is based offering a clear hint of both the Eucharist and the Holy Grail. The ramifications of this underpinning are extensive. Recurring throughout the play’s imagery as well as its plot a