Russia as a Great Power
After a period of relative weakness and instability during most of the 1990s, Russia is again ...
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Russia as a Great Power
After a period of relative weakness and instability during most of the 1990s, Russia is again appearing as a major security player in world politics, a shift that will have profound effects for regional and global stability and power relations. This book provides a comprehensive assessment of Russia’s current security situation, addressing such topics as the type of player the new Russia will be in the field of security, the essence of Russian security policy, the sources, capabilities and priorities of the country’s security policy, and its prospects for the future. One important conclusion to emerge is that, while Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin has become more pragmatic and responsive both to problems and opportunities, the growing lack of checks and balances in domestic politics makes political integration with the West very difficult and gives the president very great freedom in applying Russia’s growing power abroad. This book analyses both external and internal dimensions of security, along with so-called hard and soft security issues and the intricate interplay between them. This book will appeal to Russian and Eastern European scholars and academics looking for the most up-to-date and erudite analysis of Russia’s current security situation. Jakob Hedenskog is a researcher at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. He has published extensively on Russia and the CIS, including The Ukrainian Dilemma: Relations with Russia and the West in the Context of the 2004 Presidential Elections. Vilhelm Konnander coordinated the practical editing of the present volume. He currently works with security policy issues and those related to the Baltic Sea area in the Department for European Security Policy in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Bertil Nygren is an associate professor in political science at Stockholm University, and has published extensively on Russian domestic and foreign policy. Ingmar Oldberg is Deputy Director of Research at the Swedish Defence Research Agency and has published extensively on Russian foreign, regional and military affairs. Christer Pursiainen is Senior Research Fellow at the Nordic Centre for Spatial Development (Nordregio) in Stockholm and Chief Expert on EU–RF relations at the Russian–European Centre for Economic Policy (RECEP) in Moscow. His publications include Russian Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory.
BASEES/Routledge series on Russian and East European studies (formerly BASEES/RoutledgeCurzon Series on Russian and East European Studies) Series editor: Richard Sakwa, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent Editorial Committee: George Blazyca, Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Paisley Terry Cox, Department of Government, University of Strathclyde Rosalind Marsh, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath David Moon, Department of History, University of Strathclyde Hilary Pilkington, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham Stephen White, Department of Politics, University of Glasgow This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, highquality, research-level work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in humanities and social science subjects. 1 Ukraine’s Foreign and Security Policy, 1991–2000 Roman Wolczuk
6 Dostoevsky and the Idea of Russianness Sarah Hudspith
2 Political Parties in the Russian Regions Derek S. Hutcheson
7 Performing Russia – Folk Revival and Russian Identity Laura J. Olson
3 Local Communities and PostCommunist Transformation Edited by Simon Smith
8 Russian Transformations Edited by Leo McCann
4 Repression and Resistance in Communist Europe J. C. Sharman 5 Political Elites and the New Russia Anton Steen
9 Soviet Music and Society under Lenin and Stalin The baton and sickle Edited by Neil Edmunds
10 State Building in Ukraine The Ukranian parliament, 1990–2003 Sarah Whitmore
17 Soviet Dissent and Russia’s Transition to Democracy Dissident legacies Robert Horvath
11 Defending Human Rights in Russia Sergei Kovalyov, dissident and human rights commissioner, 1969–2003 Emma Gilligan
18 Russian and Soviet Film Adaptations of Literature, 1900–2001 Screening the word Edited by Stephen Hutchings and Anat Vernitski
12 Small-Town Russia Postcommunist livelihoods and identities: A portrait of the intelligentsia in Achit, Bednodemyanovsk and Zubtsov, 1999–2000 Anne White
19 Russia as a Great Power Dimensions of security under Putin Edited by Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen
13 Russian Society and the Orthodox Church Religion in Russia after communism Zoe Knox
20 Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940 Truth, justice and memory George Sanford
14 Russian Literary Culture in the Camera Age The word as image Stephen Hutchings
21 Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia Philip Boobbyer
15 Between Stalin and Hitler Class war and race war on the Dvina, 1940–46 Geoffrey Swain
22 The Limits of Russian Democratisation Emergency powers and states of emergency Alexander N. Domrin
16 Literature in Post-Communist Russia and Eastern Europe The Russian, Czech and Slovak fiction of the changes 1988–98 Rajendra A. Chitnis
23 The Dilemmas of Destalinisation A social and cultural history of reform in the Khrushchev era Edited by Polly Jones
Russia as a Great Power Dimensions of security under Putin
Edited by Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen
First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Editorial matter and selection, Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-415-35996-1(Print edition)
Contents
List of illustrations List of contributors Acknowledgements List of abbreviations
Introduction
ix x xiii xiv
1
PART I
Dimensions of external security
11
1
13
Russia as a great power IVER B. NEUMANN
2
Foreign policy priorities under Putin: a tour d’horizon
29
INGMAR OLDBERG
3
Russia and NATO: community of values or community of interests?
57
JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI
4
The logic of foreign and security policy change in Russia
81
METTE SKAK
PART II
Dimensions of regional security 5
What prospects for Russia in the Baltic Sea region? Cooperation or isolation? VILHELM KONNANDER
107
109
viii 6
Contents Filling ‘the gap’: Russian security policy towards Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova under Putin
130
JAKOB HEDENSKOG
7
Russia’s relations with Georgia under Putin: the impact of 11 September
156
BERTIL NYGREN
8
Understanding Russia’s foreign policy change: the cases of Central Asia and Iraq
182
LENA JONSON
PART III
Internal dimensions of security
201
9
203
Putin, the army and military reform ISABELLE FACON
10 Russian economic security in a medium-term perspective
227
ROLAND GÖTZ
11 Forming a new security identity in modern Russia
257
NIKITA LOMAGIN
12 Nuclear safety and environmental risks of north-west Russia: a source of cooperation and conflict
278
CHRISTER PURSIAINEN
PART IV
Terrorism: a new security threat
299
13 Russia’s approach to the fight against terrorism
301
EKATERINA STEPANOVA
14 Counter-terrorism as a building block for Putin’s regime
323
PAVEL K. BAEV
Conclusions and perspectives
345
Index
356
Illustrations
Maps 1 2
Russia and its neighbours Russia and its southern perimeter
xvii xviii
Figures 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5
The components of Russian GDP Oil and gas production forecast for Russia to 2090 Coal production, consumption, imports and exports: forecasts to 2020 Gas production, consumption, imports and exports: forecasts to 2020 Oil production, consumption, imports and exports: forecasts to 2020
229 231 248 249 250
Tables 3.1 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 10.11 11.1
Russian schools of thought and NATO: attitude matrix Population Determinants of population development Countries of the world, by population, 2003 Countries of the world, by population, 2020 Countries of the world, by population, 2050 Russian gross national income, 2000 Economic position of Russia in 2000 Rates of growth of the Russian economy Russia in 2010 under different scenarios Investment in Russia as a share of GDP Small and medium-sized enterprises in Russia, 2000 The hierarchy of environmental threats in north-west Russia
63 232 233 233 234 234 236 237 238 239 240 244 260
Contributors
Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher and the head of the Foreign and Security Policies programme at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and Head of Working Group 1 (International Dimensions of Civil Wars) at the newly created Centre for the Study of Civil War at PRIO. After receiving his Ph.D. in international relations from the Institute of USA and Canada, Moscow, in 1988, he worked in the Institute of Europe, Moscow until October 1992, when he joined PRIO. Isabelle Facon is a research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris and Seminar Director at the Collège Interarmées de Défense (Russian Geopolitics) and the Institut Catholique de Paris (World Politics), Paris. She was formerly a senior associate member of St Antony’s College, Oxford. A specialist in Russian defence and security policies, Facon is particularly interested in military reform and developments in civil–military relations in Russia. Jakub M. Godzimirski, Ph.D., was Acting Head of Section at the Department of Strategic Studies in the Polish Ministry of Defence, 1993–4, and has been a senior research fellow at the Centre for Russian Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), in Oslo since 1995. Godzimirski’s main research focus is on Russian foreign and security policy, but he also works on projects dealing with other aspects of Russian and East European politics. Roland Götz, Dip. Oec. Publ., is Head of the Russian Federation and CIS research unit at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. An expert on the economy of the former Soviet Union and the post-Soviet states, he has a special interest in the regional and sectoral structures and economic statistics of states in transition. His current research relates to the situation and development trends of the Russian economy, as well as the regional problems and energy sector of Russia. Jakob Hedenskog is a security analyst at the Department of Defence Analysis at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). He has
Contributors xi written The Ukrainian Dilemma: Relations with Russia and the West in the Context of the 2004 Presidential Elections (2004), and also published reports on Russian regions and military affairs. Holds an MA in political science and Slavonic languages from Uppsala University, Sweden. Lena Jonson, Ph.D., is Associate Professor and Senior Associate at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, where she heads the research programme on Russian National Security Strategies. Her work includes numerous publications, with a focus on Russian foreign and security policy, most recently on Russian policy in Central Asia. She has previously been affiliated to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. During 2002 she served with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Vilhelm Konnander coordinated the practical editing of the present volume for the Nordic Security Policy Research Programme. Educated at Uppsala University, Stockholm University, Moscow State University and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) between 1991 and 2001, he currently works with Security policy issues and issues related to the Baltic Sea area in the Department for European Security Policy in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He has held numerous board and executive positions within Swedish politics and non-governmental organizations, and is currently a board member of the Swedish branch of the International Council for Central and East European Studies (ICCEES). His main interests are in Russian and Baltic Sea affairs. Nikita Lomagin is Associate Professor of World Economy at St Petersburg State University, from which he holds degrees in history (Candidate of Science) and law. He has held various positions at the College of Europe, George Washington University, Washington, DC, and Harvard University. His research focuses on the new Russian foreign policy, soft security issues, international organizations and modern Russian history. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Iver B. Neumann, D.Phil. (Oxon), is Senior Researcher at NUPI, where he headed the Centre for Russian Studies from 1995 to 1997. He is currently writing the history of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its centenary in 2005. Among his 12 books are Russia and Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations (Routledge, 1996) and Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation (University of Minnesota Press, 1999). Bertil Nygren is Associate Professor at the Department of Strategy and Security Policy, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, where he heads a research programme on Russia and the CIS. He is also
xii
Contributors senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, where he has held various leading administrative positions. He has published numerous monographs, anthologies and articles, mostly on Soviet and Russian foreign policy, the most recent being an anthology co-edited with Yuri Fedorov, Russian Military Reform and Russia’s New Security Environment (Swedish National Defence College, 2003).
Ingmar Oldberg is Associate Director of Research and former project leader at the Department of Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). He has written many books, reports and articles on Russian and Soviet foreign policy, specifically with regard to the neighbouring countries to the west; on Russian regional policy, for instance, concerning Kaliningrad; and on Russian military affairs and environmental problems in Eastern Europe. In 2002 he was a guest researcher at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin. Christer Pursiainen is Senior Research Fellow at Nordregio – the Nordic Centre for Spatial Development – in Stockholm, and Chief Expert on EU–RF relations at the Russian–European Centre for Economic Policy (RECEP) in Moscow. A specialist in international relations theory and Russian affairs, he has initiated, led and participated in several international research and educational projects and programmes. Mette Skak is Associate Professor at Aarhus University, Denmark. She received an MA in Russian language and history in 1980, and a Ph.D. in 1989. Since then, she has been working at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University – from 1993 as Associate Professor. Skak’s main area of interest is Russian and Central and East European foreign and security policies, currently with a focus on Russia as an actor in the international system, as well as the fake dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 and its broader context. Ekaterina Stepanova is a senior researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow, where she chairs a research group on non-traditional security threats. Stepanova holds a Ph.D. in history from Moscow State University. In 2003 she was on leave from IMEMO to work as a researcher on armed conflict, terrorism and transnational crime at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Acknowledgements
Work on this book started with a conference on Russia’s security policy held in Stockholm in March 2003. It was organized jointly by the Russia research project of the Nordic Security Policy Research Programme (www.nnss.org), headed by Christer Pursiainen, and the Network Northwest Russia, headed by Bertil Nygren, and it was hosted by Nordregio, the Nordic Centre for Spatial Development. Most of the participants reconvened at a seminar in August 2003 to discuss additional papers and drafts. After that all papers were completed, revised and updated so as to cover developments up to the end of 2003. We are especially grateful to the institutions that have participated in financing the activities of both networks – the former by the Nordic Council of Ministries, and the defence ministries of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; the latter by the Swedish National Defence College. Thanks are also due to our eminent and diligent language editor Eve Johansson, without whom the texts would have been significantly less coherent in style and prose. The editorial board consisted of Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen. The main day-to-day responsibility has been in the hands of Vilhelm Konnander, who has borne the brunt of the editing and formatting of the present volume. Ingmar Oldberg read all the texts with particular incisiveness and pushed the work forward insistently. While the structure of the book has been planned collectively by all the editors, Christer Pursiainen (with Vilhelm Konnander) bears the main responsibility for the Introduction and Ingmar Oldberg (assisted by Jakob Hedenskog and Bertil Nygren) for the Conclusions. Our choice of language is UK English, whereas Russian names in transliteration follow the spelling of the original, letter by letter: for example, Rossiiskaia, Gorbachev and Andreev. Exceptions to this rule have been made to match the customary Western spelling found in the press and elsewhere of common names such as Chechnya and Yeltsin. Finally, it must be pointed out that the views expressed in this book are those of the respective authors only. The editors Stockholm, June 2004
Abbreviations
ABM AC AIDS AMEC APEC bcm BEAC CBSS CFE CFSP CIS CPSU CSBM CSCE CSTO
Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty) Arctic Council Auto-immune deficiency syndrome Arctic Military Environment Cooperation Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation Billion cubic metres Barents Euro-Atlantic Council Council of the Baltic Sea States Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Treaty) European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Communist Party of the Soviet Union Confidence- and security-building measure Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Collective Security Treaty Organization (Organizatsiia Dogovora Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti) CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EU European Union EurAsEC Eurasian Economic Community FEP Fund for Effective Politics FPS Federal’naia Pogranichnaia Sluzhba (Federal Border Service) FSB Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) G7 Group of Seven industrialized countries G8 Group of Eight industrialized countries GAN Gosatomnadzor (Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety) GDP Gross domestic product Goskomstat Gosudarstvennyi komitet statistiki (State Committee on Statistics) GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova HELCOM Helsinki Commission
Abbreviations xv HIV IAEA IEPP IMF IMU ISA KFOR KGB MD MFA Minatom MNEPR MoD MVD NATO NCM NDEP NGO NMD NNSS NPM NPP NPT NRC NVO OECD OPEC OSCE PCA PCM PFP R&D SCO SDPU-o SES SFOR SME SORT SPS STUK SVOP
Human immunodeficiency virus International Atomic Energy Agency Institute of Transition Economies International Monetary Fund Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan In-depth safety assessment Kosovo Force Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee on State Security) Military District Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia) Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme for Russia Ministry of Defence Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del (Ministry of the Interior) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nordic Council of Ministers Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership Non-governmental organization National Missile Defense (USA) Nordic Network for Security Studies Novoe politicheskoe myshlenie (new political thinking) Nuclear power plant Non-Proliferation Treaty NATO–Russia Council Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Partnership and Co-operation Agreement Partidul Comunistilor din Moldova (Communist Party of Moldova) Partnership for Peace Research and development Shanghai Cooperation Organization Social Democratic Party-united (Ukraine) Single Economic Space Stabilization Force Small and medium-sized enterprise Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty Soiuz Pravykh Sil (Union of Right Forces) Säteilyturvakeskus (Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority) Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike (Council of Foreign and Security Policy)
xvi Abbreviations SVR Tacis TFP UN VTsIOM WMD WTO
Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Total factor productivity United Nations Vserossiiskii Tsentr po izucheniiu obshchestvennogo mneniia (All-Russian Public Opinion Research Institute) Weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organization
Map 1 Russia and its neighbours.
Minsk
SYRIA
Yerevan
IRAQ
ARMENIA
Map 2 Russia and its southern perimeter.
ISRAEL
LEBANON
Ceyhan
TURKEY
Tblisi
CHECHNYA
Moscow
GEORGIA
Ankara
Black Sea
MOLDOVA
Chisinau
UKRAINE
Kyiv
BELARUS
Mediterranean Sea CYPRUS
GREECE
BULGARIA
ROMANIA
HUNGARY
SLOVAKIA
POLAND
Tehran
UZBEKISTAN
IRAN
Ashgabat
TURKMENISTAN
AZERBAIJAN
Caspian Sea Baku
RUSSIA
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Islamabad
TAJIKISTAN
CHINA
KYRGYZSTAN
Kabul
Dushanbe
Tashkent
KAZAKHSTAN
Astana
Introduction
Russia as a great power The motivation for this book is the need for a renewed analysis of Russia, which, after a period of relative weakness and instability during most of the 1990s, has again reappeared in world politics as a major security player, claiming the status of a great power. This is partly due to the fact that, with the advent of Vladimir Putin as president, Russia gained increased political stability, and partly because the Russian economy started to show steady growth. Russia made skilful use of the policy windows of opportunity that were opened to it as a consequence of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and, albeit in a different way, the war in Iraq in 2003. This new situation gives rise to questions such as: what kind of player is Russia in the field of security; what is the essence of its security policy; what are its sources, capabilities and priorities; and, not least, what are the prospects for the future? These questions, among others, are discussed at several levels and from many angles, combining empirical and theoretical analyses, by researchers from four Nordic countries, Russia, Germany and France, representing different disciplines and institutions.
The dimensions of Russia’s security policy Discussion of Russia’s security policy, in the context of the contemporary international system, is necessarily multidimensional. When trying to draw a comprehensive picture, the first question which arises is: what is ‘security’? During the Cold War, the literature and debates on the Soviet Union’s security policy were predominantly about traditional military security, overshadowed by the security dilemma between the two superpowers. While it is true that the security dilemma no longer dominates Russia’s relations with the West, the traditional military security matters have certainly not become irrelevant to consideration of Russia’s policies today. Although Russia’s military capacity, or its relative position, cannot be
2
Introduction
compared to that of the Soviet Union, it still remains a major military power by any measure. Many of the chapters of this book accept this traditional definition of security, connected to military and strategic matters, as a starting point. Even so, security policy cannot be discussed as an isolated field of activity without referring to overall foreign policy goals, economic capabilities and goals, domestic political constellations, and so on. What has happened is that, over the past decades, the traditional military threat-related concept of security has been ‘enlarged’. A more comprehensive conception of security first emerged in the academic debate at the end of 1960s or the beginning of 1970s as a reaction to the emergence of perceived threats that were not state-centred traditional military threats but rather global problems. In more recent debates, more and more nonmilitary threats and issues are regarded as part of security. These issues are sometimes discussed, as opposed to traditional military ‘hard security’ issues, in terms of ‘soft security’, including issues such as environmental problems, nuclear safety, illegal immigration, cross-border crime, the transport of dangerous materials, infectious diseases and minority problems. Thus it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security. The ongoing anti-terrorism campaign in the world community has proved how questions such as aviation security, money laundering, drug smuggling and the disposal of radioactive and other kinds of dangerous material have suddenly become essential elements in defining security in its traditional military meaning as well, or at least that they are closely connected to military security matters. The widened concept of security, or its more flexible use in recent academic debates and practical applications, is taken into account in this book. Russia is in many ways a perfect example of a country where security policy cannot rely on the traditional military threats only, but where security has to be understood more widely. A second dimension of security, and one which is very closely connected to the question of Russia’s identity, is the territorial or geopolitical dimension. During the time of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical and political entities that were mostly discussed in both the Western and the Soviet literature, in relation to Soviet foreign and security policy, were the West (including the USA and Western Europe), the Third World (including China as a special case), and the international communist movement (including both the socialist countries and the communist parties that were not in power). After the retreat of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical situation and environment of the new Russia looked quite different. Soon in Russian debates two concepts were introduced to reflect the new geopolitical identity and realities: the ‘near abroad’ as the particular sphere of Russia’s national interest, consisting of the former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic states); and the ‘far abroad’ for the rest of the world.
Introduction 3 In this book, however, a slightly different approach is chosen. Russia’s role in security matters is approached as that of a global security player or a great power, on the one hand, and as that of a regional power on the other. On the global level, Russia is trying either to ‘balance against’ or to ‘bandwagon with’ the other power centres. How Russia does this, and what motivates its policy choices, are the questions to be discussed. On the regional level, which here means the ex-Soviet space, Russia’s great power status compared to its neighbours is not contested. What are its motivations, goals and priorities, and what are the instruments it uses towards its neighbours? The chapters of this book will also show that there is an interesting interplay between the global and regional levels of great power policy. A third dimension of Russia’s security policy elaborated in this book is the distinction between the external and internal factors. In Soviet studies, the distinction between the external and internal/domestic contexts was adopted in the 1960s. The idea, against the background of so-called singlefactor theories that had dominated the field earlier, was that there are several factors, or sources of motivation, working at the same time and which explain the country’s foreign and security policy behaviour. While this general principle is still generally accepted in contemporary research, more attention has been paid recently to the linkages between the factors and levels. In this book, the external and internal factors are discussed separately or in combination in many chapters. External factors may include the overall balance of power of the international system, or other countries’ policies, or particular events such as those of 11 September 2001 (in the USA known as 9/11), and so on. These external factors may place some external limitations or restrictions on Russia or open up new opportunities, and they engage Russia in strategic-choice situations where it must assess the possible actions and reactions of others. Internal factors include the domestic political system, bureaucratic power struggles, ideologies or ‘schools of thought’ in Russian foreign and security policy thinking, military and economic structures and capabilities, and so on. This means that, for a full examination of Russia’s security policy, it is necessary to open the ‘black box’ of Russia and consider its policy not only as a result of a state’s rational choice. Taken together, these different factors help to explain Russia’s security policy as a result of the complex interplay of several structural and non-structural sources of motivation. Finally, one dimension that is a theme running through almost all the chapters is the temporal dimension. The focus is on both change and continuity of policy, and the explanations for the different features. Some chapters draw a long line from Russia’s history to the present; others note the importance of the Soviet legacy; some point to the difference between the periods of President Boris Yeltsin and President Putin. But in many cases the dividing line is literally 9/11. Obviously, this was a milestone
4
Introduction
event also from the point of view of Russia’s role in and approach to the global, regional and domestic arenas of security. But precisely how did this event affect Russia’s security policy thinking? What has changed and what has not, what is the underlying motivation for policy change in many security-related fields, and what are the future perspectives? These questions are dealt with in detail by many of the authors, and put into a broader perspective in the concluding chapter.
Previews The chapters of the book fall largely into four groups. The first and most general part deals with Russia as a global security actor. Iver B. Neumann starts this discussion by framing contemporary Russia’s security policy against a wide historical background. He argues that there is a line to be drawn from Ivan III (1482–1505) to Vladimir Putin; the motivation behind Russia’s security policy it is not only the country’s security as such but its striving for recognition as a great power by other great powers. However, here contemporary Russia faces a problem, since, according to Neumann, the international system of today, especially when it comes to Europe, is a ‘network system’, and the settings within which a country will or will not be recognized as an important player are quite different from those of the traditional state-based international system. Russia seems still to base its thinking on the concepts of states and sovereignty, while other European great powers base theirs rather on the concepts of societies and integration. If Russia continues in this way, Neumann argues, it will still be recognized as a great power from the traditional point of view, but ‘it will be a player of different kind’. Ingmar Oldberg continues the discussion of Russia’s great-power ambitions by reviewing its recent policies towards the most important geopolitical entities – the USA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), China and other major powers in Asia. He argues that, while the great-power motivation underlies the general foreign and security policy line, Putin’s Russia has conducted a differentiated policy, always carefully adapting to the conditions of each region and country. In his analysis, Oldberg shows, on the one hand, which the fields of cooperation are and, on the other hand, what the sources of potential competition and conflict with each of the foreign actors are. He concludes that Russia has adopted a very pragmatic line according to its own capacities and overall balance of power, which in practice has often meant rather cooperative security vis-à vis the West but neo-imperialist aspirations towards the direct neighbours in the CIS. Jakub M. Godzimirski also discusses the relations between Russia and the West, focusing especially on the Russian relationship with NATO. He reviews these relations from the obvious clash between Russia and NATO
Introduction 5 in 1999 in connection with the Kosovo war to the establishment of a warmer and more institutionalized relationship, especially after 11 September. Concluding that in the current situation NATO has somewhat declined in importance in Russia’s eyes, he also discusses Russia’s decision to side with the West against terrorism, with the temporary episode of Russia’s allying itself with France and Germany against the US–British positions on Iraq 2003. In explaining Russia’s stands, Godzimirski differentiates between four schools of thought – realists, geo-economists, Eurasianists and Atlanticists – while President Putin’s policy is treated as ‘pragmatic’, often balancing between the schools. From this perspective, Godzimirski considers whether a security community has been established between the USA, NATO and Russia against the common enemy – namely, terrorism. Mette Skak offers both a conceptual, theoretical and an empirical analysis of Russia’s foreign and security policy. Her main empirical point is that a more pro-Western policy has gained ground in Russia, based mainly on President Putin’s contention that this is necessary in terms of the country’s economic and overall modernization. The relative success of this process in the prevailing conditions of domestic anti-Westernism she explains by adapting Robert D. Putnam’s notion of the ‘two-level game’ to the Russian case. From this viewpoint, foreign policy is a game field where the audience consists of both the domestic and the international parts. Her argument is that in playing the game Russia’s leaders apply different orders of preference at different levels. For the domestic audience, Russia tends to be illiberal, neo-imperialist and anti-American; for the international audience, Russia is liberal and bandwagons with the USA. While the first part of the book is devoted to Russia’s efforts to play a global great-power role, the second part zooms in to discuss Russia as a regional security player. Vilhelm Konnander starts this discussion by analysing Russia’s approach to and role in Northern Europe, with special emphasis on the Baltic Sea region. He thus explores the Russian greatpower reflex reaction and how Russia is adapting – or not adapting – to a changed policy framework. In particular he discusses the Russian capacity to reorient its foreign policy goals, and how Russia has taken the opportunity which was fortuitously granted after 11 September 2001, once again to play the great-power game at which it is best, thus losing out on chances to participate in European integration. He argues that if its approach in the Baltic Sea region were to set a precedent, Russia is in for a tough ride in its relations with Europe. Jakob Hedenskog’s theme is Russia’s policy towards Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. He notes that these three countries constitute a ‘gap’ between Russia and the EU, and Russia’s intention is to fill it, mainly for economic but also for military–strategic reasons. Recent developments in Russia’s policy testify to an increasing priority being given to relations
6
Introduction
with Ukraine, at the cost of Belarus. However, all these countries remain important to Russia and, in trying to influence them, Russia uses several instruments in combination. The effectiveness of Russia’s economic power as a means of exerting influence varies from country to country, but energy especially has been used effectively as a means of exerting control over Ukraine. Russia’s military bases have been used to influence Moldova, while this has not been so notable in the case of the two other countries. Similarly, although all three countries have large Russianspeaking minorities, this instrument has been most useful in Moldova. Finally, Russia directly or indirectly controls a large part of the three countries’ information space. Bertil Nygren then focuses on Russia’s policy towards the Caucasus, especially Georgia, and on what kind of change has taken place as a result of Russia joining the US-led alliance against terrorism. He argues that relations between Russia and Georgia have seriously deteriorated since Putin came to power – along a ‘downward spiral’, as he puts it. In the autumn of 2002, Russia came closer than it had done at any time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union to using force in an international war. According to Nygren it was precisely the events of 11 September 2001, and the resulting US policy towards Afghanistan, that made it logically possible for Russia to use force against its closest neighbours in the name of the common war on terrorism. Taking into account that the USA has also increased its presence and influence in the region, Nygren concludes that there are all the ingredients for a potential drama for the decade to come. Lena Jonson concentrates on Central Asia, which Russia formerly treated as firmly belonging to its immediate sphere of interests. However, since 11 September 2001 Russia has accepted the US and NATO presence in the region. Why did this policy change take place? This puzzle she explains by deriving four possible explanations from the theoretical international relations literature. The international structure explanation would suggest that the change of Russian policy towards Central Asia is entirely the result of Central Asia becoming a global ‘front yard’, and Russia is adapting its policy to the new balance. The instrumental explanation sees the Russian policy change only as an instrument for increasing the country’s influence at the international level in general, by bandwagoning with the USA. The institutional rivalry explanation explains Russia’s policy change as the outcome of a contest between different domestic interest groups. The socializing explanation refers to a process whereby Russia finds it to be in its own interests to work within a shared framework of accepted international norms and rules of behaviour. Jonson concludes that the first two explanations apply best to the Central Asian case, while the socializing factor played a role in the Iraq case. The third part of the book is devoted to the internal factors that define Russia’s security policy. Isabelle Facon discusses the Russian military reform, starting by reviewing the present condition of the Russian armed
Introduction 7 forces. While she writes that the second Chechen war has shown that the army is not in total disrepair, she paints quite a grim picture of the state of Russia’s overall weapon systems and military personnel in terms of training and social conditions. The military reform has been a crucial question, but there have been several obstacles to real progress here. Facon points not only to the lack of financial support but also to the lack of coherent policy; instead of coherence there has been a great deal of inter-bureaucratic rivalry as well as differences of opinion concerning the basic solutions to the problem. However, Facon identifies a new start in this field in late 2001. Against the background of these developments, she discusses civil–military relations as well as the armed forces’ attitude towards President Putin’s international cooperation in the field of military security. She concludes by noting that there may be a contradiction between the Russian leadership’s effort to keep the military’s actions and ambitions in check and its attempts to reform and modernize the armed forces at the same time. Almost all the chapters previewed so far note that Russia’s security policy is closely interdependent with its economic capacity and economic interests. To further highlight this important aspect, Roland Götz gives a detailed and balanced analysis of Russia’s economic prospects in both the medium- and the long-term perspectives. He does not confine his analysis to the traditional economic factors and structural economic conditions, but includes Russia’s declining population and developments in its population structure, serious health problems such as HIV/AIDS, and environmental conditions. While the present economic situation in Russia is fairly favourable, thanks to growing oil and other energy exports, he concludes that only modest economic growth is to be expected in the medium-term perspective. The long-term effects of, for instance, growing health problems may be a serious obstacle on Russia’s road to economic growth. Thus Götz argues that Russia may try to play the role of a great power in world politics, but that this role will rest on very weak economic foundations for at least some time to come. Nikita Lomagin brings up the issue of hard security versus soft security, claiming that this is exactly where Russia may slowly be forming a new security agenda and identity. He shows first how public opinion regards soft security, and especially ecological, problems as real threats in Russia, and goes on to review the development of the soft security discourse from Soviet times to the present. He notes, however, that hard and soft security issues rarely go together, and the respective bureaucratic institutions often compete with each other. Looking at state and regional-level practices, especially in the allocation of resources, Lomagin concludes that there is great reluctance among the decision-makers to accept the new threats and corresponding new methods as important for Russia’s security, compared to the traditional hard security matters. In order for so-called soft security to become more important in determining Russia’s security agenda and
8
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identity, Lomagin proposes that an enlightened leadership should pay more attention to these crucial threat scenarios. A different kind of security dilemma is reviewed by Christer Pursiainen. He discusses the nuclear safety and environmental problems in north-west Russia. These problems are not exclusively internal to Russia, but constitute actual or potential threats for other countries as well. First, Pursiainen maps the risks and presents the main threat scenarios and the conditions that lie behind them. He notes that the risk perceptions vary from extreme alarmism to complete public neglect of the problems – the latter especially from the official Russian side, contributing to mutual suspicion and mistrust between the neighbouring countries and Russia. He goes on to depict Russia’s domestic policy-making in this field, and highlights the diminishing role, or total abolition, of the independent control organizations within the Russian environmental and nuclear administration during the Putin era, as well as the negative developments in the relations between the Russian state and civil society in these issue areas. These developments, being seen as negative in the West, may create additional obstacles to relations between Russia and Europe. Finally, Pursiainen discusses the international regime-building to solve these soft-security problems. He concludes that, while a degree of institutionalized cooperation on these issues has evolved, many sources of conflict also remain. The last part of the book looks in more detail at one of the new security threats, namely terrorism, which has largely dominated Russia’s security debates both before and after the events of 11 September 2001. Ekaterina Stepanova analyses the approach Russia has chosen to fight terrorism. She begins by showing how terrorism as a concept is rather flexible and includes several types of conflict. Russia is predominantly concerned about what she calls conflict-generated terrorism, closely connected to the war in Chechnya. Looking at the effect of 11 September on Russia’s approach, she notes that Russia has increasingly been imitating the US model of a fourfold policy: make no concessions, destroy terrorists or bring them to justice, isolate and put pressure on actors which sponsor terrorists and bolster the anti-terrorist capabilities of your allies. Stepanova concludes by differentiating between two approaches at the opposite extremes of a policy continuum – a short-term reactive approach and a long-term preventive approach. While she argues that Russia has mainly followed the first, reactive approach, at least before 11 September 2001, she goes further to suggest a mid-term anti-terrorist strategy. This would be based on efforts to support non-militant structures that nevertheless have the same aim as the terrorists, thus isolating and splitting the terrorists further, and at the same time efforts at the ideological level supporting the moderate Islamic groups in order to create a challenge for the radicals from within the Muslim community itself. Finally, Pavel Baev looks at the issue of terrorism from a different perspective, developing rather critical arguments against the Russian
Introduction 9 leadership’s way of using the current spirit of anti-terrorism for its own advantage. He notes that all the terrorist attacks in Russia are associated with one local conflict – in Chechnya. However, he points out the contradiction in Russia’s position in that, while it proclaims the Chechen conflict to be its own internal affair, it claims at the same time that its actions are part of the global war on terrorism. He then goes on to look at President Putin’s ‘pyramid of power’, consisting of several ‘clans’ with often clashing interests, and claims that terrorism is being used by the president very much as a ‘political technology’ to manage the rival bureaucracies and the public at large. In fact, Baev argues, the threat of terrorism serves much the same function as the threat of ‘imperialist aggression’ did for the leaders of the Soviet Union. Thus, the motivation of counter-terrorism is actually instrumental by nature: it is being used as a tool to control the domestic political space rather than to fight terrorism itself. This is apparent in the centralization of power to the president, the politicization of the Federal Security Service (Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB) and other special services, as well as in the manipulation of public opinion in support of the regime. The editors’ concluding chapter summarizes the above arguments and findings thematically, adding some updates and some perspectives, concerning in particular the internal security concept under Putin. A general conclusion is that, while Russian foreign policy has become more pragmatic and responsive both to problems and opportunities under Putin, the growing lack of checks and balances in domestic politics makes political integration with the West very difficult and gives the president great freedom in applying the growing Russian power abroad.
Part I
Dimensions of external security
1
Russia as a great power Iver B. Neumann
Since the early 1990s, Russia has struggled to find its role in the novel realities of international relations. In the various dimensions of Russian security policy, the concept of a great power stands out as a unifying formula for the conduct of affairs. This chapter presents some elements of what being a great power means to Russia. It uses a broad brush and compresses vast expanses of historical time. Given the outline of this book, it is also warranted to tackle the subject from a European perspective. Thus, when this chapter touches on such issues as Chechnya it does so to the extent that they interconnect with issues of European security. The chapter begins with an account of what in this author’s view is Russia’s great success in the arena of European security since 2001. It then asks how it was possible for Russia seemingly to improve its standing so rapidly in such a short time-span. In doing so, it draws on the concept of securitization. Drawing further on the concept of securitization, it then tells a second story: about Russia’s 500-year-long struggle for recognition as a European power. It concludes that Russia’s major problem in Europe in the years to come is not, first and foremost, a security problem but a general political problem that has repercussions for security policy.
Post-11 September During the 1990s, in most areas and from most angles, Russia was a mess. Security policy was no exception. Sergei Karaganov summed up the overall problem when he singled out the key problem for Russia as being ‘to get out of the no-man’s land it found itself in after the Cold War as a semi-partner semi-enemy of the West’.1 Discussions of its nuclear capacity concentrated on the state’s inability to guarantee adequate maintenance, on the possibility of terrorists pilfering materials, and on the brain drain of personnel. Its army was a mess and, for reasons to do mainly with the inherent inertia of organizations and the inability of the politicians to face up to a struggle with those organizations, reform proved unattainable. The navy spent most of its money on a huge platform that turned
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out to be a white elephant. The air force and the rocket defence suffered all the expected problems that are bound to arise when the hightechnology – and therefore capital-intensive – military branches can no longer rely on adequate funding. Military and social morale was, it seemed, at a low ebb. During the first half of the 1990s debate raged as to whether the Russian Federation would go the way of the Soviet Union. As late as 10 September 2001, bets were on as to whether Chechnya would actually be able to succeed in its attempt to be ‘the one that got away’. Seen from the perspective of the conglomerate of old communists and Russian nationalists that made up the main opposition to the ruling regime, the worst problem was that the state no longer commanded respect, either at home or abroad. Their programme for a strong state – gosudarstvennost’ – fastened on two things: first, the need for the state to be in command directly and decisively over ‘the people’ (not ‘society’: that is a liberal category that these people rarely used); and, second, the need for Russia to remain a great power – that is, a power that was ranked on a par with its historical European neighbours as well as with China and even the USA. Although the opposition was particularly vocal in making these demands, they were not necessarily qualitatively different from mainstream thinking. Allen Lynch was certainly not alone in commenting on Russia’s foreign relations overall in the 1990s that ‘most striking, perhaps, has been the Russian effort to maintain the appearance of great-power status abroad while most of the sinews of Russian power have withered into evanescence at home’.2 This is an ongoing concern.3 This was the situation when Vladimir Putin became president, and it presented a number of clearly defined issues which, in the Russian setting, were seen throughout the country as crying out for strong leadership. Putin’s strategy, as set out, for example, in his great Millennium speech in December 1999, was to build bridges from a position of strength. He tried to build a historical bridge from the present to the past without excluding the Soviet period – that is, to start developing a seemingly continuous identity in time for a country that felt itself to have had no continuous history. By acknowledging the need to look at Russia’s history as continuous, he also reached out to all those who sympathized with different parts of it – liberals who saw the changes of the 1990s as being to Russia’s benefit, communists who wanted recognition of the modernization of Russia that they felt had been achieved during the Soviet period, and oldstyle nationalists who wanted recognition of Russia’s long history as a strong state in Europe with interests in Asia. The major theme of the speech – and the major theme of Putin’s reign – has been to stress that Russia’s Westernization must be a Westernization of Russia’s own choosing and carried out in Russia’s own way. Putin simply co-opted the opposition’s stress on the importance of gosudarstvennost’ to Russian history as to its present:
Russia as a great power 15 The main thing is that Soviet power did not let the country develop a flourishing society which could develop dynamically, with free people. First and foremost, the ideological approach to the economy caused our country to lag increasingly behind [otstavanie] the developed states. It is bitter to admit that for almost seven decades we travelled down a blind alley, which took us away from the main track of civilization . . . The experience of the 1990s vividly shows that genuine and efficient revival of our Fatherland cannot be brought about on Russian soil simply by dint of abstract models and schemata extracted from foreign textbooks. Mechanically copying the experiences of other states will not bring progress. Every country, Russia included, has a duty to search for its own path of renewal. We still have not made much headway . . . Society has been in a state of schism [raskol] . . . Russia will not soon, if ever, become a replica of, say, the USA or Great Britain, where liberal values have deep-seated traditions. For us, the state, with its institutions and structures, has always played an exclusively important role in the life of the country and its people. For the Russian [rossiianin], a strong state is not an anomaly, not something with which he has to struggle, but, on the contrary, a source and a guarantee of order, as well as the initiator and main moving force of any change. Contemporary Russian society does not mistake a strong and effective state for a totalitarian one.4 Putin started to implement such a programme, to general acclaim in the West. The key problem in terms of security, however, was that very few people outside the communities of professional Russia-watchers and those interested in future energy resources really cared what Russia did. For a small state it may be a very nice existence to be overlooked, but if a larger power is overlooked it is impossible for it to be a great power. In order to be great you need the recognition of others, and in order to be recognized you need to be noticed and thought of on a regular basis. To be a great power is, among other things, to be present when absent – that is, to be taken into consideration by other powers as a matter of course and in issues that the power in question itself may not even know are being discussed. It is to have a droit de regard, even when you are absent in mind and body. Russia needed to be seen. Putin’s chance to be seen arrived with a bang when the twin towers collapsed in New York on 11 September 2001. He immediately – apparently against the express opinion of some of his key advisers – rushed to the side of his fellow president, George W. Bush. These acts of spoken solidarity were soon followed up with a whole string of other acts, the most important of which were probably the negative one of not protesting at (or even vetoing) a US military presence in Central Asia, a traditional Russian sphere of influence, and the positive one of playing the role of go-between. Russia was back in the thick of things, ostensibly as the USA’s ally in what
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the latter insistently but inaccurately refers to as the war against terror. The chapter by Bertil Nygren in this book analyses how Russia’s interests in Chechnya dovetailed with the interests that drove the United States’ Afghan campaign against the Taliban. The point here is simply that this dovetailing resulted in Russia regaining its visibility in the security field. Judging from the way in which Putin and other top Russian politicians have presented their participation in the Afghan campaign to domestic and foreign publics, it seems that the possibility and desirability of such an effect was key to President Putin’s choice of policy in the first place. Russia’s return to the global security arena did not come to a halt with the US Afghan campaign, however. The unilateralism that has been a consistent trait of US foreign policy since 11 September afforded Russia new opportunities to increase its visibility. Following what it proclaimed to be its success in Afghanistan, the USA changed its focus from Tora Bora to Baghdad, and mounted increasing pressure on the Iraqi regime. In so doing, it availed itself of international organizations and alliances only incidentally. As George Bush put it on 20 September 2001, in an address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, his opponents were evil incarnate, and everybody who was not with him in fighting them was against him: We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions – by abandoning every value except the will to power – they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies. [Applause.] . . . We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. [Applause.] From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime . . . This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us . . . The civilized world is rallying to America’s side . . . The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. [Applause.]5 The major theme here is the impossibility of remaining neutral in a fight between good and evil, and Bush elaborated on it in a series of speeches in
Russia as a great power 17 the following months – for example, in his ‘Rose Garden Speech’ of 4 April 2002: ‘Since September the 11th, I’ve delivered this message: everyone must choose; you’re either with the civilized world, or you’re with the terrorists. All in the Middle East also must choose and must move decisively in word and deed against terrorist acts.’ The US way of demanding unquestioning loyalty to the line that it defines at any given time, which is visible here, is a rather different way of approaching questions of security from that which is found in Europe. In the line-up before the Afghan campaign there were already clear signs that Europeans were unhappy with the US Alleingang, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty as an act of solidarity with the United States only to be told that its help was not needed. The USA has followed a similar line where the question of the relevance of the United Nations has been concerned: the UN has been welcomed as an arena where the United States may garner general support, but all US spokesmen, Secretary of State Colin Powell included, have been quite clear that if the UN Security Council does not reach the conclusion that the USA thinks it should reach, then the USA is ready to act alone. Again, this US line on the role of multilateral diplomacy in the area of security is at loggerheads with half a century of uninterrupted European tradition. This chapter is not about transatlantic relations, so it does not consider in detail the transatlantic configuration, such as the roles played by the United Kingdom (UK) or by the calendar of domestic German politics. The point here is that, as a result of US choices made in the run-up to the Afghan campaign and again during the run-up to the Iraq campaign, there was a split between the USA on the one hand and the two traditional key European Union (EU) players – France and Germany – on the other. Russian analysts who had followed the consolidation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, influenced by balance-of-power thinking in both its Soviet and its realist guises, had been biding their time in anticipation of a transatlantic tiff of one kind or another.6 A breach now opened up, and Putin was quick to step into it. In January 2003 the world was treated to newspaper front pages and newsreel that covered a joint press conference given by the heads of state of France, Germany – and Russia. Russia was once more not only clearly visible but right in the European eye of power. In the course of two years, then, Putin’s Russia has gone from being an overlooked presence in European security policy to becoming a highly visible player. This has happened without any major changes taking place in its power capabilities. This is, of course, not to deny the changes in economic and military policy that have indeed taken place; nor is it to deny that throughout the 1990s, and even now, Russia has been and is a formidable nuclear power. It still maintains a nuclear warheads production programme that involves ten closed cities with a total population of 760,000
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people, 130,000 of which work at nuclear facilities, and this is only part of Russia’s activities in this area.7 But such material factors cannot explain the sudden shift in policy, for what is relatively stable cannot explain something that suddenly shifts. We need to look elsewhere, to the way the actors concerned make sense of the world, in order to account for the change. This is where the concept of securitization is helpful. The inelegant verb ‘securitize’ refers to the elegant idea that something typically becomes a question of security when it is lifted out of the general political agenda and made into a question of life and death.8 As Barry Buzan has put it: The securitizing formula is that . . . threats require exceptional measures and/or emergency action to deal with them. Securitization classically legitimates the use of force, but more broadly it raises the issue above normal politics and into the realm of ‘panic politics’ where departures from the rules of normal politics justify secrecy, additional executive powers, and activities that would otherwise be illegal.9 What happened immediately after 11 September was that terrorism was securitized. It used to be a question of general policy, and as such it was first and foremost the responsibility of the police. Now it was made into a question that required exceptional measures and emergency action, by the military, on a global scale. Using another inelegant verb, terrorism was also ‘violized’ – that is, turned into a casus belli that called not only for exceptional measures in general but for war and so for large-scale loss of life.10 The USA’s securitization and violization of terrorism in the immediate aftermath of 11 September mirrored the securitization and violization of terrorism that had taken place in Russia over the Chechen question. It is this harmonization of the US and Russian political life-worlds that is of the essence, for it is here that the two parties created the preconditions for their alliance that was to follow and for the concrete actions taken by that alliance. Where Russia is concerned, a second factor has to be added here. One of the reasons why Russia’s visibility was so low during the 1990s was that the security agenda was to a high degree dominated by developments in sectors where Russia was peripheral. The ‘soft security’ debate presupposed a way of framing questions to do with power, and particularly with the appositeness of ‘soft power’, that did not easily fit in with traditional Russian ways of framing these questions. The debate over operations other than war (peace operations etc.) involved ways of conceiving of military operations that again did not chime with a traditional Russian agenda. Other ways of wielding security influence – economic, ecological, and so on – have to be bankrolled on a rather hefty scale. Russia did not have the resources to do that. The net result of all this was that the action in the
Russia as a great power 19 security field overall was where Russia was not, and vice versa. The Afghan campaign, on the other hand, meant that conventional warfare was back at the centre of the security agenda. Although Russia’s conventional capabilities were flagging compared to what they had been in Soviet days, besides its nuclear capability this was still the one sector where Russia could play a key role. Furthermore, the campaign was planned to play itself out in the one theatre Russia was still able to maintain as a sphere of influence – namely, Central Asia. As noted above, US policy since 11 September has not exactly been marked by a broad and multilateral co-optation of allies. Russia was welcomed because it rallied to the cause. Conversely, this meant that Russia did not have to invest heavily in the alliance. It seems that the result was a loose alliance between the two countries that was restricted to one security sector and one issue: namely, what both parties were happy to call the war on terror. The more recent move by Russia, when it distanced itself from the US line in the run-up to the Iraqi campaign in order to throw its weight in with France and Germany behind the UN track, demonstrates that Russia gives priority to expanding its room for manoeuvre and its visibility over its alliance with the USA. Throughout the Cold War it remained a Soviet priority to try to exploit transatlantic tiffs. The recent Russian move is a reminder that this priority was fuelled not only by communist ideology but also by classic balance-of-power thinking. What is new in the present situation is not Russia’s priorities but the fact that the USA no longer gives priority to its working relationship with its European allies, be that over Russia or over other challenges. Russia has simply harvested what has come its way. How far will Russian security policy be able to exploit this situation? The issue seems to be bound up with the debate that has been raging between neo-realists and constructivists on the future fate of NATO, and is perhaps best approached from that angle. Since the end of the Cold War, neo-realists have consistently argued that, since NATO is an alliance, and since alliances break down once the threat they were formed to withstand is gone or the gain they were formed to win is won or gone, NATO’s days were numbered.11 NATO’s demise would come about as a result of a systemically inevitable shift in the balance of power. Against this, neoliberals have argued that institutions such as NATO had their own weight, which might change the actors’ priorities. Constructivists went one better, and argued that NATO had survived against the odds since a Western selfunderstanding had evolved whereby membership of NATO had become a naturalized part of what it meant to be part of Western civilization.12 If NATO is now being shunted to one side – which is a distinct and perhaps even likely possibility – it now appears that this analysis was wrong. Neo-realists would argue that it was wrong because it underestimated the natural tendency of the system to induce balance-of-power thinking among its members. On the other hand, there are good reasons
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for concluding that the key factor is not the system’s automatic influence on the players. What needs to be analysed is not why all players abandoned NATO but why the USA gave higher priority to the need to fight its own wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and follow its own unilaterally determined foreign policy course overall, than it gave to fighting what it disparagingly calls ‘war by committee’ and maintaining NATO. One answer to this question would be that the US political leadership thought along the same lines as the neo-realists – that it was more important to maximize their immediate advantage than to risk cooperation that might lead nowhere. If this is the case, then neo-realist thinking generally, and its prediction about the demise of NATO specifically, will be seen to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may be more useful to see US foreign policy and neo-realist thinking as two symptoms of a specific way of conceiving the world, rather than to see them as distinct phenomena, with one being an explanation of the other. The importance of this to Russian security policy is potentially very high, for if the USA continues to act on such premises then its first priority will not be to maximize the benefits from an alliance between deep-rooted democratic regimes – which, according to all the NATO documents of the 1990s, was exactly what NATO was – but rather to maximize what are seen as the USA’s geopolitical interests. As pointed out already by George Kennan in his 1950 analysis of US foreign policy, a long-term thread in US policy is to see to it that no one power dominates Eurasia. As long as the Soviet Union was candidate number one for the role of dominant power in Eurasia, the thing to do would be to form an alliance with other powers – which was what duly happened during the Cold War: NATO was such an alliance.13 Here the much-debated relative weight of geopolitics and ideology for US NATO policy in the twentieth century is not relevant, for as long as the Cold War was on, these two factors pulled in the same direction. Now, the picture has become more complicated. At present, the EU has become the new candidate number one for this role. In geopolitical terms, it therefore makes eminent sense for the USA to ally itself with Russia as a possible counterweight. As long as Russia pledges allegiance to economic and political systems that are roughly in accordance with the models held up by the USA, ideology will not work against a US realignment with Russia. And even if Russia comes across as a little authoritarian, the USA may still find that geopolitics outweighs ideology. The US realignment away from the EU and towards Russia, the beginning of which can already be seen, is therefore likely to continue. This becomes even more likely the more strongly the EU resists US leadership and instead chooses to develop to the full its own political and economic models. All this means that the future looks very bright indeed for Russian security policy, for it means that US interest in Russia is not tied specifically to the war on terror but to the new constellation in European politics overall. This is a rather more stable base on which to build.
Russia as a great power 21 To this may be added a facilitating factor. Already before 11 September there was a marked difference between the EU and US policies towards Russia. The EU insisted on discussing the human rights situation, particularly with reference to the situation in Chechnya, and this focus was balanced by a constructive policy in the economic sector (with talks about the possible expansion of the Common European Economic Area being a key factor). The USA, on the other hand, was less involved in both sectors. After 11 September both the USA and Russia set aside other concerns such as the integrity of civil society and the rights of prisoners of war under international law in favour of state security with considerable ease. In their security thinking, both give priority to traditional concerns of sovereignty, rather than to the network-, institution- and integration-based multilateral approach favoured by most Europeans. If the USA and Russia are both playing a security game focused on the defence sector and on so-called hard security, while the EU is more even-handed in its approach to different sectors, then this may be a factor that facilitates US–Russian joint action in future contingencies over US–EU joint action. This factor will play directly into the US equation of how to balance its policies on Russia and the EU. As noted above, as seen from the US point of view, geopolitical arguments favour Russia, while the ideological arguments may go either way. If the USA and Russia find common ground in downplaying human rights specifically and soft security generally, while the EU maintains its policy, then a constellation of ideologies may well emerge quite quickly that favours enhanced Russian–US cooperation. To sum up, a string of factors help to explain why Russia’s visibility has increased so rapidly over the past two years. First, the US Afghan campaign meant that US securitization brought to the fore an area where Russian policy was already securitized, namely terrorism. Second, this development shifted security attention away from sectors where Russia was only a peripheral player towards one where it was well equipped to play a role – conventional warfare. Third, this conventional warfare was planned for and played itself out in a geographical area – probably the only geographical area – where Russia was eminently poised to participate. Fourth, the nature of the newly forged relationship with the USA was such that Russia still had enough room for manoeuvre to avail itself of a classic balance-of-power gambit whereby it threw its weight in with France and Germany against the USA in the run-up to the Iraqi campaign, thus further heightening its visibility by emerging from the shadow of the USA, which was without doubt its senior partner in the Afghan campaign. As seen from Moscow, things are going well for Russia in the area of security. And when things are going well it is always wise to heed Machiavelli’s advice: do not rest on your laurels, but prepare for the problems to come, for problems will indeed come. Here two problems may colour Russia’s, and therefore Europe’s, security horizon in the years to come. They may not be the most pressing, or the most talked about.
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Problem one: too much securitization The idea of securitization raises one general problem that in the opinion of this author has taken on new salience in the face of a war against a country which, for reasons that may seem paradoxical (but let us leave that aside), has considerable sympathy among the world’s one billion Muslims. The problem is how much to securitize. In the 1990s, this question was discussed as a question of the pros and cons of making, say, ecological questions part of the security agenda. The main argument in favour was that this would heighten the salience of ecological challenges in political life overall, and would therefore more likely than not lead to more resources flowing in the direction of this sector. The main argument against expanding the security agenda was that the kinds of solution that are key to that agenda – namely, the use of force – may not be very well suited to resolving issues of environmental security. But there is another aspect to this question: the danger of having our lifeworld swamped with security concerns. Swedish diplomat Torsten Örn recounts in his recently published book Varfö r diplomati? 14 how a Swedish agricultural attaché to the Soviet Union found himself on the wrong side of Soviet security policy for picking some wild flowers that he wanted to bring home to his sweetheart. The KGB accused him of intending to measure the radioactivity of the petals, which, they informed him, would be an act of espionage. The logic is reminiscent of that of US debates about the hazards of East–West trade during the Reagan area: if we sell the Soviets good X, the money that they save from buying it from us rather than make it themselves may be used to produce weapon Y. It follows that we should sell them nothing. These are two examples, trifling perhaps, of how everything can be securitized. In relaxed times, men and women of integrity may indeed treat this matter frivolously. But not all times are relaxed times. The logic on display here is potentially stifling, not only to global exchange but to social life in general. A fairly recent episode in Russian history illustrates this point. In the 1930s the number of individuals, institutions and whole countries that were appointed enemies of people increased exponentially. The number of issues that were securitized also exploded. At its peak, every single citizen of the Soviet Union save one, Stalin, was reduced to a potential dvurushnik – a two-hander. The expression is a more concrete variant on the Native American idea of speaking with two tongues; its meaning was that the two-hander could act in seemingly legitimate ways as it were with the right hand, while using the sinister or left hand to act in the interests of the class enemy. There is a general lesson here, for the idea of closing Soviet borders and closing working-class ranks was that everybody should feel secure in themselves. The result, however, was the opposite, that the almost total fixation on security and the need for ‘vigilance’ (bditel’nost’) gave way to an environment of insecurity, bordering on the paranoid.
Russia as a great power 23 There is an obsolete meaning of the English concept of security that may be good to think with in this regard. In Macbeth, ‘Security is mortals’ cheefest enemy’.15 We are damned if we do not heed challenges – but it has to be added that we are equally, if differently, damned if we become so vigilant that it threatens the very concept of social life itself. This, after all, was what happened to ‘the good Macbeth’; he learned that the hunt for total security was self-defeating, and that in the end not only social life but human life is simply risky. There are ditches on either side of every road; it is little use to stay away from the ditch of naivité only to drive into the Stalinist ditch of too much vigilance. In the wake of 11 September, possible securitization looms over a whole swathe of new areas. This is a challenge for Russia – but no more so than for the rest of Europe, and perhaps not as much as for the USA, where clear and present dangers are now suddenly spotted in ever new places. But we all seem to share an interest in trying to halt the securitization of ever new areas of social life.
Problem two: kinds of greatness This is a common challenge, but it is a particular challenge to Russia. In a stimulating paper, Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen16 argues that ‘post-Soviet Russia essentially is confronted with the same basic challenge in the international arena as was Gorchakov’, by which he means the challenge Alexander Gorchakov (Russian Foreign Minister from 1856 to 1882) had to face of rebuilding Russia’s standing when he took over after the defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, and that doing this involved consolidating domestically and gaining more visibility internationally. This was the challenge facing Putin.17 From the very outset of his tenure he signalled that this was at the heart of his programme, and he pursued policies that substantiated that programme. The discussion so far has suggested that since 11 September the change in the policy environment has facilitated Putin’s work, and that Putin was quick to spot and act on the new opportunities afforded him. As a result, Russia has had spectacular success in increasing its visibility. This is a precondition of achieving that explicit if elusive goal: to be recognized as a great power. It remains for Russia to consolidate domestically, of course, but much has been achieved in the course of the past year and a half. Looking further back in time than the Gorchakov era, there are examples from 500 years ago to show that gaining the recognition of the European powers is a theme that runs through Russian history in its entirety. Ever since the first continuous forerunner of today’s Russian state emerged on the European scene, this struggle has been waged.18 In 1486 ‘a noble knight by the name of Nikolai Poppel arrived in Moscow with a letter from Frederick III, but without any specific mission, purely out of curiosity’.19 It was only after this trip, the historian Nikolai Karamzin tells us, that the Holy Roman Empire came to know that
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Moscow was a power unto itself, ‘stronger than the Polish one’; up until then the Empire seemed to have thought that the Slavs to the east of Poland were vassals of the Polish–Lithuanian state. With the Reformation decades away, slotting into this European order was first and foremost a question of finding some kind of relationship to the Empire and the Emperor. Upon Poppel’s return, he started to spread the word about the Russian state and about the riches and power of its ruler. Here is the official Soviet diplomatic history’s version of what ensued: In 1489, Poppel returned to Moscow, now already as the official agent of the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. In a secret audience, he suggested to Ivan III that he should petition the Emperor to confer upon him the title of king. From the point of view of West European political thought, this would be the only means of legalizing a new state and introducing it into the common system of European states – and at the same time place it in a certain state of dependence on the Empire. But in Moscow, another point of view held sway. Ivan III answered Poppel with dignity: ‘By God’s grace, we are the ruler of our land from the beginning, from the first of our ancestors, it has been given us by God, and as it was for our ancestors, so it is for us.’20 Ivan III insisted on signing his written answer to the Emperor with the title ‘Great ruler of all of Rus’ by God’s grace’, and for the next three generations there ensued a tug-of-war between the Russian and Western courts regarding titles. As early as 1508, Ivan’s son Vasilii sent a letter to the Emperor asking for an alliance in his war against Lithuania. In 1514 Emperor Maximilian, somewhat belatedly, sent his envoy Georg Schnitzenpaumer back with an encouraging letter in German. Writing about this letter, Karamzin notes that ‘instead of the word tsar, he wrote Kaiser’.21 ‘Kaiser’ may be translated back into Russian as ‘imperator’, and so the letter was taken by the Russian court to mean that the Emperor acknowledged Vasilii as a fellow emperor. However, in Maximilian’s letter of 4 August 1514, where he confirms an alliance against the Lithuanian king, there is no mention of the Russian king being a ‘Kaiser’. The circumstances surrounding the letter brought by Schnitzenpaumer have been at issue in Russian–European relations ever since. Peter the Great referred to it as a precedent when, emerging victorious from the Great Northern War in 1721, he took the title ‘Imperator’. At a November 2002 conference in Vienna, celebrating the 200th anniversary of the establishment of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the status of the letter came up, with Austrian historians underlining that the use of the title had not been confirmed, and a Russian scholar insisting that it was a fully fledged document of international law.22 All this suggests that Russia’s main current problem in the European theatre may not be a question of security as such. As witnessed by last
Russia as a great power 25 year’s events in Vienna, the question of Russia’s status in relation to other European powers is still with us, and not only as a matter of putting the historical record straight. There is a line to be drawn from Ivan III’s 500year-old campaign to be recognized as the peer of the Holy Roman Emperor to Putin’s ongoing campaign to be recognized as the peer of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and President Jacques Chirac. This line is first and foremost to do with form, for the entities from which the now Russian head of state seeks recognition, the ground on which he seeks it, and the content for which he seeks it have all shifted. The imperative question now, however, is not about recognition but about recognition as what, by what. Literally for centuries, Russia has been recognized as a player in the security area; it has established itself as having the economic and military capabilities to pursue the steady and long-term aims it has set itself, and in most periods those long-term aims have been such that they have not threatened to overthrow the European and then the global system of states. There can be no reasonable doubt whatsoever that Russia has been a key member of that system, and remains so today.23 The problem, however (to put it in the form of the title of a recent James Bond film), is that when talk turns to Europe ‘the world is not enough’. In terms of European politics, it is no longer enough for Russia to be a respected global security player in order to be a regular European power, for European politics has shifted. European politics is in an everstronger degree emerging as more than a system of states, more even than a solidary society of states: it is more like a republic. It works on a network model, and is institutionalized in and around the European Union. What it takes to be recognized as a great power in such a setting is rather different from what it meant traditionally to be recognized as a great power in a system of states. Furthermore, the two kinds of recognition may be at loggerheads, for the more visibility and the more recognition Russia garners in the area of global security, where the name of the game is sovereignty and power politics, the greater becomes the distance between this kind of Russian policy and mainstream European policy, where the name of the game is integration. Of course, the two may be combined. As seen in the light of the last one and a half years, one precondition for Putin being a welcome third at a press conference with Schröder and Chirac was precisely that Russia had increased its visibility by means of its global security policy. Russian global policy may be converted to local European currency. But – and this is crucial – in this way Russia will continue to be in Europe, but not of Europe: it will be a player, but it will be a player of a different kind. This game may be taken quite far: as seen from Paris or even Berlin, it may be argued that a power such as the UK has been able to take a similar kind of game all the way into the EU. Still, there is a trade-off here beyond which it is not easy to go. Interestingly, it is not to do with security specifically but with politics generally. It concerns what kind of community Russia wants to be.
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In the nineteenth century, in the wake of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, Russia opted for a similar dilemma when it decided to maintain an ancien régime while other European powers went for modernization. In the twentieth century, in the wake of the First World War, Russia again parted ways with other European powers by trying to implement a socialist future while the others hung onto their bourgeois present. In the twenty-first century, Europe seems to be set on a course of integration. If Russia wants to repeat its former pattern it should hang onto its sovereign present while others forge ahead. The problem, however, is that this will without doubt entail a whole swathe of interesting challenges of incompatibility. Russia has deftly exploited the mounting transatlantic tensions and played its cards so well that any geopolitician would applaud. If it wants to make further headway in European politics, however, it is not the imperatives of the geopolitician’s world scene that should be the most pressing. It is the European scene, where the game is not only evolving around states and sovereignty but also around societies and integration. Russia may remain a transatlantic balancer, or it may begin to integrate with Brussels-based Europe.
Acknowledgement I would like to thank Helge Blakkisrud, Geir Flikke, Jakub Godzimirski and Ingmar Oldberg for comments to a previous draft that was presented in Stockholm on 7 March 2003.
Notes 1 Quoted in Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Paper no. 60, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003, p. 29. 2 Allen C. Lynch, ‘The realism of Russia’s foreign policy’, Europe–Asia Studies, 53(1), 2001, p. 7. 3 See e.g. Andrei Kokoshin, ‘What is Russia: A superpower, a great power or a regional power?’, International Affairs, 48(6), 2002, p. 122, where a case is made for Russia’s great-power status on the grounds that it has nuclear weapons and is still able to play a constructive role globally, for example, in relations between India and Pakistan. 4 See http://www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru/data/news_print.html?he_id⫽15&news_id⫽ 53. 5 See http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/rm/2001/5025.htm. 6 Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, ‘Explaining Russian endorsement of the CFSP and the ESDP’, Security Dialogue, 33(4), 2002, pp. 443–56. See e.g. the October 1999 document Strategiia i razvitiia otnoshenii Rossiiskoi federatysii s Evropeiskim Soiuzom na srednesrochnuiu perspektivu (2000–2010 gg) [Strategy and the developments in the relations of the Russian Federation with the European Union in a medium-term perspective (2000–2010)] (http://www.eur.ru). 7 See Oleg Bukharin, ‘The changing Russian and US nuclear warhead production complexes’, SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2002, p. 587.
Russia as a great power 27 8 Ole Wæver, ‘Securitisation–desecuritisation’, in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. 9 Barry Buzan, ‘The logic of regional security in the post-cold war world’, in Fredrik Stjärnfeldt and Tim Shaw (eds), The New Regionalism: A Reader, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. See also Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998, chapter 2. 10 See Iver B. Neumann, ‘Identity and the outbreak of war: Or why the Copenhagen School of Security Studies should include the idea of “violisation” in its framework of analysis’, International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(1), 1998, pp. 7–22. 11 John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15, 1990, pp. 5–56; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1993. 12 Mike Williams and Iver B. Neumann, ‘From alliance to security community: NATO, Russia and the power of identity’, Millennium, 29(2), 2000, pp. 357–87. 13 The key question, as will be seen, becomes whether in US thinking NATO was, and remains, only such an alliance. 14 Torsten Örn, Varfö r diplomati? Ett kulturhistoriskt perspektiv [Why diplomacy? A cultural history perspective], Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2002. 15 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act III, scene v, v. 32. 16 Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, ‘Past and future meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian foreign policy’, Europe–Asia Studies, 54(3), 2002, p. 384. 17 This historical parallel was being officially invoked as far back as 1996. See Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, p. 12, note 11. 18 The importance of Rus’ to European medieval history is duly noted: the point here is simply that this was ancient and interrupted history by the end of the fifteenth century. 19 Nikolai Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo [History of the Russian state] (1818–26), Vol. 6, chapter 5, Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004. 20 Zorin, V. A. et al. (eds), Istoriia diplomatii [A history of diplomacy], 2nd edn, Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959, p. 262. 21 Karamzin, Istoriia, Vol. 7, chapter 2. 22 I thank Andreas Kappeler for this information. 23 For example, when Putin picked Russia’s membership in Europe’s system of states as the baseline for his 25 September 2001 speech to the German Bundestag (http://eng.bundesregierung.de/top/dokumente/Artikel/ix_57912.htm? template⫽single&id⫽57912&script⫽1&ixepf⫽_57912), press coverage throughout Europe did not problematize it.
Bibliography Books and journals Bukharin, Oleg, ‘The changing Russian and US nuclear warhead production complexes’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2002, pp. 583–97. Buzan, Barry, ‘The logic of regional security in the post-Cold War world’, in Fredrik Stjärnfeldt and Tim Shaw (eds), The New Regionalism: A Reader, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
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——, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998. Karamzin, Nikolai, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo [History of the Russian state] (1818–26), Moscow: Olma-Press, 2004. Kennan, George F., American Foreign Policy 1900–1950, New York: New American Library, 1951. Kokoshin, Andrei, ‘What is Russia: A superpower, a great power or a regional power?’, International Affairs, 48(6), 2002, pp. 100–25. Lynch, Allen C., ‘The realism of Russia’s foreign policy’, Europe–Asia Studies, 53(1), 2001, pp. 7–31. Lynch, Dov, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Paper no. 60, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003. Mearsheimer, John, ‘Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15, 1990, pp. 5–56. Neumann, Iver B., ‘Identity and the outbreak of war: Or why the Copenhagen School of Security Studies should include the idea of “violisation” in its framework of analysis’, International Journal of Peace Studies, 3(1), 1998, pp. 7–22. Örn, Torsten, Varfö r diplomati? Ett kulturhistoriskt perspektiv [Why diplomacy? A cultural history perspective], Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 2002. Splidsboel-Hansen, Flemming, ‘Past and future meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian foreign policy’, Europe–Asia Studies, 54(3), 2002, pp. 377–96. ——, ‘Explaining Russian endorsement of the CFSP and the ESDP’, Security Dialogue, 33(4), 2002, pp. 443–56. Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitisation–desecuritisation’, in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1993. ——, ‘The emerging structure of international politics’, International Security, 18, 1993, pp. 44–79. Williams, Mike and Iver B. Neumann, ‘From alliance to security community: NATO, Russia and the power of identity’, Millennium, 29(2), 2000, pp. 357–87. Zorin, V. A. et al. (eds), Istoriia diplomatii [A history of diplomacy], 2nd edn, Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959.
Media and Internet Bush, George W., ‘Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people’, 20 September 2001 (http://www.state.gov/coalition/cr/rm/ 2001/ 5025.htm). Putin, Vladimir, ‘Millennium speech’, December 1999 (http://www.pravitelstvo. gov.ru/data/news_print.html?he_id⫽15&news_id⫽53). ——, Speech at the German Bundestag, 25 September 2001 (http://eng.bundesregierung.de/top/dokumente/Artikel/ix_57912.htm?template⫽single&id⫽57 912&script⫽1&ixepf⫽_57912).
2
Foreign policy priorities under Putin A tour d’horizon Ingmar Oldberg
Introduction Even if Russia’s days of superpower status faded away with the Soviet Union, there is a rare consensus in the country that it has been, is and must remain a great power. The problem, which concerns Russians as well as their neighbours and other states, is by what means and to which concrete ends this status is to be maintained. Russian foreign policy is often analysed by distinguishing between military or security-political means and aims, on the one hand, and economic ones on the other – the latter being seen as conducive to peaceful cooperation and integration with the West.1 When analysing President Boris Yeltsin’s foreign policy in the 1990s and making scenarios for the future, the Russian political scientist Sergei Medvedev discerned four alternative policy lines in order of ‘benevolence’: liberal internationalism, minimalist cooperation with the West, obstruction of Western policy (‘damage limitation’) and, finally, confrontation amounting to isolationism and neo-imperialism.2 Similarly, Medvedev’s Finnish colleague Henrikki Heikka distinguishes three strategic options: cooperative security, including integration into European structures; multipolar ‘balancing’ to maximize independence; and anti-Western great-power (derzhava) neoimperialism.3 In general, Russia’s foreign policy is defined by its relationship to Europe. Using these distinctions, this chapter will examine President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy priorities since 2000 by analysing Russian policy in different geographic areas – namely, the United States, European states and organizations, the former Soviet republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the major states in Asia. Some comparisons with Yeltsin’s foreign policy are inevitably made. Throughout, the reasons for the policy choices and the responses they encounter will be examined.4 Policy is here conceived as including both statements and actions. The chapter focuses on the president and his officials, since they dominate Russian foreign policy-making both formally and in reality. This has been the case especially under Putin, who has restored central control after
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Yeltsin’s divide-and-rule regime.5 However, some attention will also be paid to other domestic Russian actors in cases where they have influenced the decision-makers.6
Russian US policy When Vladimir Putin took over the Russian presidency from Yeltsin on 31 December 1999, Russian policy towards the United States, the only remaining superpower, was concerned about the advancing US plan to build a National Missile Defense (NMD) against so-called problem states and to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia staged an international campaign against this plan, which was seen as a threat to strategic stability and to Russia itself. Relations were further strained when George W. Bush succeeded Bill Clinton as US president in January 2001, partly because he took the final decision to implement the project. However, Russian–US relations improved after the presidents met at their first summit in June 2001, and the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 led to a breakthrough.7 While some Russian experts wanted to make support for the USA conditional on concessions concerning the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Putin immediately and wholeheartedly endorsed the US declaration of war on international terrorism and the creation of an anti-terrorism coalition. The obvious reason was that Putin already saw Russia as fighting such a war in Chechnya and that the resumption of this war in 1999 had greatly contributed to his accession to power. Russia thus supported the US-led attack against the Taliban regime and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, partly by intensifying its own provision of supplies to the Northern Alliance troops, partly by offering intelligence cooperation and overflight rights. Despite internal opposition, Putin also accepted the establishment of US bases in Central Asia to back up the fight against terrorism.8 Russia hailed the success of the war, and some commentators even claimed that Russia had been a more useful ally for the United States than its NATO allies.9 In exchange for the Russian support, the USA softened its criticism of the war in Chechnya, which it called an internal affair. Another sign of rapprochement was the Russian decision in the autumn of 2001 to close down its military bases in Cuba and Vietnam, which had long burdened relations with the USA. The strategic relationship was further strengthened as Russia toned down its campaign against the US NMD project, partly because the ABM Treaty actually allowed abrogation, partly because Russia realized that its strategic capability was not seriously threatened and that the project could not be stopped anyway. At a summit meeting in Moscow in May 2002, Russia and the USA signed the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (SORT), which provided for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons by two-
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 31 thirds by 2012 and replaced the second Russian–US Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (SALT-2). Professing a will for ‘genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, confidence, openness and predictability’, the treaty also expressed a common interest in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.10 After this, Putin concluded that Russia and the USA have a special responsibility for global stability and that the confident partnership between them has a positive impact on the whole international system.11 Russia and the United States also agreed about crisis management in some conflicts – for example, to avoid war between the nuclear powers India and Pakistan; Russia also supported the USA’s so-called Road Map for peace between Israel and a future Palestinian state. Through a frequent exchange of visits and meetings, Putin’s relations with Bush developed into what seemed like personal friendship.12 Putin also strove to develop Russia’s economic relations with the United States, the world’s biggest economy and importer with a major influence in the international financial institutions on which Russia is dependent for investment and for handling its large debts. In particular Russia stressed its potential as the world’s leading oil exporter (in 2002) which allegedly was able to meet the USA’s growing needs more reliably than the Middle East oil nations and at prices independent of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). An energy dialogue started, which in 2002 resulted in the first Russian oil deliveries to the USA and a decision to build a terminal at Murmansk for such exports.13 The Bush administration responded by recognizing Russia as a market economy (rather than an economy in transition) and promising support for Russian membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). American companies increased their investments in Russia, especially in the energy sector, and in 2002 they held the biggest share of accumulated foreign investments in Russia. However, there were also several problems and diverging interests in the relationship between Russia and the USA. Concerning economic cooperation, Russian oil exports to the United States are still negligible, and enormous investment and considerable time will be needed before Russia can play any real role in US imports of energy. Even though the parties may need each other, Russia is principally interested in high prices, whereas the USA wants low prices based on competition. As for foreign investment in Russia, there are still many restrictions and the legal framework for investment is changeable and uncertain. Membership of the WTO for Russia requires market reforms, which might threaten domestic stability in Russia.14 As for security policy, Russia opposed US policy on the so-called axis of evil, including Iraq, Iran and North Korea – countries which the USA viewed as threats to its security. Russia doubted the USA’s reasons for attacking Iraq, namely Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and support for al-Qaida. Together with France,
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Russia recommended the continuation of weapons inspections under the United Nations (UN) mandate and threatened to veto a resolution in the UN Security Council. When the USA and the United Kingdom went to war in Iraq in March 2003 without a UN mandate, Putin called it a great political mistake and wanted an end to the war, and the State Duma postponed ratification of SORT. After the war Russia pleaded for a speedy transfer of power to the Iraqi people and for a significant UN influence over the process.15 However, Russia still wished to maintain good relations with the United States. Before and during the Iraq war Putin spoke out against starting an anti-US campaign and stated that Russia was not interested in a US defeat; and after the war he hailed Saddam Hussein’s removal.16 Russia accepted a UN resolution on the lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq which also gave the UN a role in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Duma ratified SORT in May 2003. This reconciliation was helped by the USA also showing an interest in maintaining its ties with Russia. Before the war, Congress had ratified SORT, and during and after it top officials had visited Moscow. Putin welcomed Bush’s presence at St Petersburg’s tercentennial celebrations in June, declaring that the Russian–US partnership was unshakeable and ‘conducive to uniting the international community in the face of new threats’, and the parties agreed to strengthen strategic cooperation and expand communication channels.17 The post-war stabilization of Iraq proved to be a problem of staggering dimensions for the USA, but for Russia the war meant a foreign policy defeat and a loss of economic influence in Iraq. Another effect of the Iraq war was intensified US pressure on Iran and North Korea with regard to their nuclear programmes. Russia continued to provide nuclear technology to Iran and maintained ties with North Korea, but made concessions so as to meet US concerns. Its partnership with the USA was also disturbed by the USA’s keeping its military bases in Central Asia and by US support for Georgia and Azerbaijan against Russian pressure. Putin’s Russia is thus clearly striving for partnership with the US superpower, partly because this would serve to give it a special status ahead of other great powers, and partly because the two countries have common interests concerning the fight against terrorism, the spread of WMD, and international stability. However, Russia’s power ambitions and economic interests, particularly in regions close to Russia, often collide with the USA’s actions. Russia’s US policy is thus a mix of growing cooperation with the remnants of former hostility and competition. Russia is obviously not as important for the United States as the United States is for Russia.
Russian policy towards Europe: the NATO dimension Considering itself a part of Europe, Russia has always striven to play an important role in shaping its security. Ever since Soviet days, NATO, as a
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 33 military organization dominated by the United States, has been seen as a problem. In the 1990s the Russian leadership advocated its dissolution, since the main opponent, the Warsaw Pact, had been dissolved, and the strengthening of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – an organization involving all the countries of Europe and in which Russia is the equal of all the other members. However, when the NATO states instead chose to maintain and transform NATO for new tasks while developing cooperation with Russia and other non-members, Russia accepted this and in 1997 signed a Founding Act on consultation and security cooperation with NATO. In 1999, however, Russia severed its official relations with NATO when the latter, under US leadership, undertook a so-called humanitarian intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on account of Kosovo, which Russia saw as a violation of the UN Charter and the principle of territorial integrity. NATO’s adoption of a Strategic Concept that widened its responsibility to areas beyond the North Atlantic was perceived by Russia as legitimizing NATO interventions in the former Soviet space.18 Yet Yeltsin helped NATO to broker peace and force Yugoslavia to withdraw its troops from Kosovo, and Russia participated in NATO’s peacekeeping force. Putin continued that policy. In early 2000 he decided to restore official relations with NATO, even though criticism of the war was upheld, and he even talked about Russia joining NATO – if its national interests were heeded. Russia later felt justified in its opinion when NATO intervened in Macedonia in 2001, this time to support the government against Albanian separatists. Putin also took steps to restore relations with individual NATO states – for example, the UK, France and Germany. One motive for this was to exploit resistance in Europe to the US NMD plans. As an alternative, Putin proposed a common Russian–European missile defence. His military and foreign policy doctrines of 2000 still mentioned NATO as a problem, but made a distinction between the USA and Europe. The idea of Yeltsin’s foreign minister, Yevgenii Primakov, of a multipolar world system in which the USA does not dominate, was still being mentioned in this connection.19 However, when the European NATO states proved not to be keen on such cooperation with Russia, which excluded the US ally, and Russia’s relations with the USA improved, as shown above, the concept of multipolarity was mentioned less frequently. The war against terrorism after September 2001 also improved Russia’s relations with NATO. In May 2002 a new common council, the NATO–Russia Council (NRC), was formed, in which Russia became one of the 20 members. Its goal was to promote cooperation concerning not only the fight against terrorism but also in crisis management, nonproliferation, arms control, regional air defence, rescue operations and emergency situations. In this connection Putin concluded that NATO was changing into a more political and less military organization, and that
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relations between it and Russia had reached a new level and quality.20 The creation of a NATO response force to buttress the strategic concept became a new test for Russia, and it remains to be seen whether Russia can cooperate with it. Putin’s main concern with regard to NATO since 2000 has been to stop its enlargement eastwards. Russia had earlier opposed NATO membership for the former Warsaw Pact states Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and called for guarantees that no NATO troops or nuclear weapons would be stationed in these countries. Thus, when these countries became full members of NATO in 1999, they made efforts to improve relations with Russia, and NATO exercised restraint concerning the stationing of NATO bases in the new member countries. Gradually Putin accepted the fact. He paid a visit to Warsaw in January 2002, declaring that Russia’s relations with Poland were now free from political problems and emphasizing economic cooperation.21 Relations were also normalized with the Czech Republic and Hungary. NATO membership for the three Baltic countries was still more difficult for Russia to tolerate because they had until recently been part of the Soviet Union.22 More importantly, it was seen as increasing the military threat near Russia’s own borders and resulting in the encirclement of the Kaliningrad region. Since NATO had made the resolution of all outstanding territorial and ethnic issues a condition for membership, Russia intensified its campaign against the ‘discrimination’ against the Russianspeaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. It refused to sign border agreements with Estonia and Latvia and to ratify the border treaty with Lithuania that Yeltsin had signed in 1997. Political relations with these states also remained on a low level. The Russian military threatened to strengthen Russia’s military positions in the Baltic region. These measures also satisfied nationalist interest groups in Russia. However, as the NATO decision on enlargement in November 2002 drew closer, and as the leading NATO states seemed intent on admitting the Baltic countries regardless of Russian objections, Putin chose to accept this fact too.23 Already in early September 2001 he declared that, even if the enlargement was unnecessary, since there was no threat to the Baltic states, Russia respected their independence and would not start any ‘hysterical campaign’ which could only make the situation worse.24 Russia’s improved relations with the United States and NATO after 11 September 2001, which gave it a greater role as a partner, obviously made it easier for Russia to accept the new NATO enlargement. The Baltic states welcomed this rapprochement, modified their description of Russia as a threat, and called for improved relations with Russia. When NATO took the decision to admit the Baltic countries and four other states, namely Russia’s former Warsaw Pact allies Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria plus Slovenia, while calling for intensified cooperation with Russia, Russia took no military countermeasures and maintained its exchange with NATO.
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 35 True, Russia was very slow to normalize its relations with Estonia and Latvia. It continued for a long time to refuse to sign border treaties with them and to attack their minority policies. An exception was made for Lithuania. In May 2003 the Russian Duma finally ratified the border treaty with Lithuania. The explanation for this may be that Russia remains dependent on Lithuania for transit to Kaliningrad, and there is no Russian minority problem there. Russia’s relations with NATO were also affected by the recent war in Iraq. While the UK and several other states, including the new East European and Baltic members, supported the USA, Russia sought cooperation with the opponents of the war and, together with France, threatened to veto a UN resolution legitimizing a war. When visiting France in February 2003 Putin claimed that Russia and France had the same view of the future world architecture, which ought to be multipolar.25 During the war Putin invited the French and German leaders to Russia, and they agreed on stressing the role of the UN in Iraq.26 Later, during a visit by British prime minister Tony Blair, Putin underlined that the world community should not only serve the interests of one member (which has to be seen as an attack on the USA), and again mentioned the concept of multipolarity. At the same time, however, this concept was defined as strategic partnership between the United States, Europe, Russia and China.27 Thereafter Russia’s cooperation with the opponents of the Iraq war in NATO lost some momentum, as all parties tried to mend fences with the United States, and vice versa. In sum, Putin strove to improve Russia’s relations with NATO and even to secure influence on its decisions, though Russian membership of NATO was not possible. Exploiting the differences among the NATO members, Russia sought to establish closer political ties with France and Germany, and normalized relations with the new Central and East European members, whereas it made little effort to do so with the former Soviet republics Estonia and Latvia.
Russian policy towards Europe: the EU dimension Obviously, Russia’s European policy is increasingly formed by its economic interests and the role of the European Union (EU). The EU is basically seen as an economic counterweight to the military organization NATO, which is dominated by the USA. This has been stressed especially when Russia’s relations with the latter have been tense, as they were before September 2001. Thus Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov once stated that Europe must stand united in order to play an independent role and to contribute to a multipolar world, and that close cooperation between Russia and the EU would give Europe a dignified role in world politics.28 In his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly in May 2003 Putin described ‘broad rapprochement and real integration with Europe’ as
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Russia’s historical choice, while mentioning the United States only once in the context of fighting terrorism.29 Russia thus signed a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) with the EU in 1994, and Putin has developed this cooperation. As prime minister, he launched a medium-term strategy to this end in October 1999, and he has participated in summits with the EU. Putin applauded the EU Northern Dimension initiative launched by Finland in 1999 in order to integrate north-western Russia into European structures. Russia also showed a positive interest in the emerging security and military structures of the EU, including the creation of a rapid reaction force. In October 2001 an agreement on regular consultations in security matters was signed, which Russia viewed as a step towards a common security policy. At the same time, Russia expected the EU to ‘coordinate’ its policy in the CIS space with Russia and wanted to bar the EU crisis management force from being used there. Russia realizes that the EU force is dependent on NATO resources, and that most EU states are also NATO members. To the extent that Russia improves its relations with NATO and the NATO response force develops, Russian interest in the military dimension of the EU may weaken. Concerning some international issues, such as the Israel–Palestine conflict and the war in Iraq, Russia has stood closer to the EU and key EU members such as France and Germany than to the United States. It has also intensified its cooperation with the EU concerning terrorism. At the tenth EU–Russia summit meeting in November 2002 a joint declaration was issued condemning terrorism in all its forms, and there was talk of a strategic partnership over terrorism.30 However, Russia resents the fact that the EU and its members, particularly France and the Nordic countries, are much more critical of Russia’s war against terrorism in Chechnya than the United States is. Russia’s main interest in the EU and its member states is obviously in the economic sphere. Since the 1990s, the EU member countries together have become Russia’s biggest trading partner and investor, ahead of the CIS countries and far ahead of the USA, and this share is bound to grow with EU enlargement. Russia’s debts are also mainly to European states and institutions. Russia’s exports (which exceed its imports) are dominated by energy products such as oil and gas. This is important to EU countries, too, especially Germany, although Russia’s share in the EU’s total imports and foreign trade is small.31 An energy dialogue developed into an energy partnership which included many common projects and investments in Russia.32 When Russia complained at an EU summit that the EU states set an upper limit for energy imports from any non-member state, the European Commission stated that such a limit was not needed and expressed an interest in long-term gas contracts and the building of pipelines.33 In 2002, the EU also recognized Russia as a market economy, and Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi could even envisage Russia as a member of the EU.34 In 2003 Russia and the EU decided to create four
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 37 common ‘spaces’ – on the economy; on freedom, security and justice; on external security, and on research and education – which were to be handled by a joint Permanent Partnership Council. Still, there were many problems.35 First, Russia criticized the EU’s protection of its industrial and agricultural producers (at the same time as it wanted to protect its own markets). It was reluctant to reform the monopolistic gas sector, which subsidized Russian consumers, and to provide sufficient legal guarantees for foreign investors.36 Second, the EU’s enlargement to include the Baltic countries and several Central European states was a special problem for Russia. True, Russia basically took a positive view of the process, partly because EU membership was proffered as an alternative to NATO membership. Some Russian economists pointed out that instead of their present bilateral agreements with Russia the new members would be covered by the EU PCA with Russia, which would mean lower customs fees for Russian exports to and transit through these states. The Russian border regions would also receive more support. In 2001 the EU and Russia agreed that the enlargement should lead to increased Russian trade with both the old and the new EU members.37 Moreover, Russian companies with a presence in the new (and old) member states would get access to the whole EU market. The adaptation of their economies to EU market rules could also benefit Russian companies. Gradually, however, the Russian leaders realized that EU enlargement also had disadvantages. Generally, it meant that former allies and former Soviet republics would be fully integrated into Western Europe – not only militarily integrated through NATO – and thus definitively decoupled from Russia. Also, Russian diplomats feared that because of their negative experiences of Russia these new members would influence EU Russian policy in such a way as to make it more critical of Russia. Third, the reorientation of the future EU members’ trade away from Russia to their EU partners, which has been going on throughout the 1990s, will be reinforced. To counteract this, Russian state and private companies have made efforts to maintain and expand their positions by new investments, especially in the energy sector, where these states remain dependent on Russia. For example, in 2002 the private oil company Yukos bought a majority share in Lithuania’s major refinery (from an American company). When Latvia wanted to sell shares in the Ventspils oil terminal, the Russian state-controlled Transneft acted aggressively by stopping oil deliveries to it, evidently so as to reduce the price of shares. At the same time Russia took steps to reduce its own dependence on Baltic transit (for example, by opening new oil terminals on the Gulf of Finland), and a new gas pipeline to be laid across the Baltic Sea to Germany was proposed. Thus, EU enlargement did not hinder Russia from using the economic levers at hand against the prospective EU members.
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A fourth and important problem with EU enlargement that worried the Putin administration was the fact that the new members had to adopt the Schengen agreement, which meant a strict visa regime for people from non-EU member countries. This meant special problems for the Kaliningrad region, which threatened to become more isolated from the rest of Russia. Its inhabitants, who had enjoyed visa freedom in Lithuania and Poland since 1992, were also heavily dependent on trade with these countries. The Russian leadership reacted especially to the introduction of visas for transit between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. In May 2002 Putin claimed that it would violate Russia’s territorial integrity and citizens’ human right to visit a part of their own country, and made the whole of its relations with the EU contingent on this vital issue. Instead of transit visas, he proposed the same type of transit across Lithuania as people from West Berlin had enjoyed across East Germany during the Cold War (disregarding the difference that there was little risk of their defecting at the time). Other officials proposed transit in closed trains, transit also across Poland and Latvia, and ‘corridors’. The latter especially upset the Poles for historical reasons. Instead of demanding free visas to Poland and Lithuania only for Kaliningraders, Putin proposed a visa-free regime for all of Russia to the EU. In the end, at the November 2002 summit with the EU, Putin accepted a compromise instituting ‘facilitated transit documents’, which were to be approved by Lithuania, and agreed to sign agreements on the readmission of refugees, to allow the expansion of foreign consulates in Kaliningrad, and to speed up the printing of Russian passports. In return, Lithuania promised to accept internal Russian passports until 2005 and the EU to investigate the possibility of rapid transit trains across Lithuania and of visa freedom with Russia in future.38 In 2003 new problems occurred when Russia refused to extend its partnership agreement with the EU to the new members without prior negotiations on compensation for economic losses, and when it hesitated to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions, which needed Russian support before it could enter into force. However, just before the enlargement took place on 1 May 2004, Russia consented to the extension of the PCA in return for compensation regarding tariffs and quotas. At the following summit an agreement was reached on bilateral market access, including Russian reforms in the energy sector, which was seen as paving the way for Russian membership of the WTO. In response to this Russia again vowed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. To conclude, Russia under Putin is striving to develop its partnership with the EU and its members, partly for political and partly for economic reasons, since it depends on the EU countries for trade and assistance – more so than on the United States. Sometimes the concepts of multipolarity and ‘balancing’ appear in this connection. However, Russia does not
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 39 hesitate to use its economic power in the energy field, especially with respect to the new EU members which still depend on Russia for energy supplies. Russia’s sheer size, its power ambitions and its remaining structural problems prevent real integration into Europe. Indeed, it would probably be easier for Russia to join NATO than to join the EU.
Russia and the CIS states Even if Putin’s Russia has increased its cooperation with the United States and the European countries, the CIS and its member states are still considered to be the most important area in Russian foreign policy statements. (The concept of the ‘near abroad’, in which the Baltic states were once included, is now rarely used.) Putin, in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2003, mentioned the fact that they are neighbours with many centuries of historical, cultural and economic ties as reasons for this. There is mutual dependence, and tens of millions of Russians live in the CIS countries. Russia considers the CIS space a sphere of strategic interest but, according to Putin, is also interested in stability and economic progress there.39 This is, moreover, the area where Russia has the most influence and also sees the biggest threats to its security. Similarly, Putin’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 stressed the importance both of military–political cooperation against extremism and terrorism and of economic cooperation, including the ‘rational common use’ of natural resources.40 These are code words, respectively, for the perceived threats from Muslim fundamentalism in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the ambition to keep control over oil and gas resources (for instance, in the Caspian Sea region). Another obvious ambition is to keep foreign influence out of the area, especially from the USA and its allies, as will be shown in the following. For these purposes Putin has continued to develop the CIS, which was originally created in 1991 as a substitute for the Soviet Union. To make it more efficient, cooperation between the members’ security councils was instituted. Russia’s ‘peacekeeping’ forces in the Caucasus and Central Asia operate under the aegis of the CIS, as do many military exercises. However, Russian officials admit that the CIS is an amorphous organization which is unable to take binding decisions because of the diverging interests of its members, and they complain that Russia has to bear almost all the costs.41 The Russian government therefore downgraded the CIS ministry to a commission in 2001, and at its 2002 summit meeting the CIS decided to reduce the size of its structures by one-quarter. Russia also has to fight the efforts of the other members of the CIS to increase cooperation among themselves and seek support in the West. Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova thus formed their own organization (GUUAM), which received some US support. However, because these states also have economic problems, depend on Russia, and
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have diverging interests, the organization proved inefficient, and Uzbekistan and Moldova downgraded their participation in 2002. In practice Russia has concentrated its efforts on more limited, regional organizations in certain fields. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 stated that integration should proceed at different paces and to different degrees, and that Russia’s relations with each country should develop according to their willingness to respect Russian interests, including the rights of Russian minorities. In the military field, this has meant particularly the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, of which the current signatories are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia.42 On its tenth anniversary, the grouping was made into an organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).43 It was to be registered in the UN as a regional organization and aimed to conduct peacekeeping operations together with NATO. A ‘coalition staff’ was formed and subordinated to the Russian General Staff. The organization also created three regional joint commands and a rapid reaction force in 2001, and joint exercises were held.44 To support Tajikistan against incursions from Afghanistan, Russia has maintained troops in Tajikistan ever since 1991. When Uzbek Islamist guerrillas made incursions from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Fergana Valley in 1999 and 2000, Russia increased its military support to these states. With Belarus Russia has developed the closest military cooperation, including large-scale exercises, a common air defence system, a strategic radar station, and integration of the defence industries. The two states have created the Russia–Belarus Union with a common State Council, a union parliament, a union citizenship, and so on. Belarus even more than Russia perceives NATO and its expansion as threats.45 Moreover, Russia puts military pressure on some CIS states that are not in the CSTO. It keeps a naval base at Sevastopol in Ukraine. In Moldova it maintains forces (although reduced) in the Transnistria region and supports the separatist regime there against the government, even after a proRussian communist became president in 2001.46 It supports Armenia, which continues to occupy vast areas around the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in Azerbaijan, and retains a strategic radar station in Azerbaijan. In the weak Georgia, Russia has gone on supporting the separatist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia against the central government with ‘peacekeeping’ forces, and refused to leave three of its four military bases, in violation of international agreements. On 11 September 2002 Putin issued an ultimatum demanding that Georgia take measures against the Chechen ‘terrorists’ seeking refuge there and pressed it to agree to cooperation against them.47 However, these military activities also encounter problems. The CSTO is totally dependent on Russian forces, since the other partners cannot afford to contribute, and the maintenance of these forces has become a
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 41 heavy burden on Russia’s armed forces, which have been much reduced since the early 1990s and have been preoccupied with the new war in Chechnya since 1999.48 When the US-led war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan started in 2001, the CIS rapid reaction force was not ready. The Sevastopol base depends on Ukrainian supplies, and the Russian naval base there can only be moved at huge cost.49 Another problem is that Russia cannot prevent the CIS states – all of which are under more or less authoritarian leaders – from seeking support from the West and NATO, nor can it prevent the latter from providing it. Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan have talked openly of NATO membership, participated in NATO exercises and supported the US operation in Iraq. The USA sent military advisers to help Georgia fight terrorists – a step which the Russian military condemned but Putin then had to condone. Even if a US deputy foreign minister on the eve of the Iraq war found it hard to criticize Russia’s preventive measures against terrorists in Georgia, the USA continued to support Georgia, established an airbase, and started reconnaissance flights over Georgia during the Iraq war. The USA supported the Western-oriented Mikhail Saakashvili to take power and assert central control over the autonomous province of Ajaria, which had also enjoyed Russian support. Again Russia had to acquiesce. When Russia attempted to take control over the Kerch Strait controlling the Azov Sea, Ukraine reacted strongly and turned to the West for support, so that Russia had to stop.50 The establishment of NATO bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in connection with the war in Afghanistan in 2001 obviously strengthened their bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia, so that they could demand and in fact got payment for the Russian bases.51 The Russian military and others therefore worried about Russia’s loss of influence in Central Asia, but Putin pointed out that the victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan together with the USA radically reduced the threat to Central Asia and Russia in a way that Russia could not do alone. The Islamist guerrilla activities around the Fergana Valley currently seem to have ceased. The Russian leadership now appears to be hoping that the US presence in Central Asia will be temporary. In order to show that Russia retains interests in the region, it established a new airbase in Kyrgyzstan near the US one in November 2002, and Putin himself inaugurated it.52 Besides exercising military influence, Russia has increasingly striven to resume economic integration with the CIS states, which remain to a great extent dependent on Russia as a market as well as on transport ties with Russia. In 2000, Putin’s government transformed the customs union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into a more fully fledged organization, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). The imposition of visa regimes on non-member states became a powerful means of putting pressure on them because many people depended on work and travel in Russia. In Georgia, however, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were
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exempted from visas, which hardly pleased the government in Tbilisi. In September 2003, EurAsEC was superseded by the creation of a Single Economic Space (SES) including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It aimed at forming a free trade zone without restrictions, established common bodies, and was open to more members. However, the problem with these organizations was that they, too, lacked powers and their activities were largely declaratory. The SES also envisages gradual integration at different levels and speeds in each member state. Ukraine made its membership conditional on its constitution and international obligations being respected.53 Obviously, if such economic integration really is achieved it would complicate integration with the EU and even the WTO, which are major objectives especially for Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s most powerful means of pressure is the dependence of the other CIS states on its energy resources, the transport of energy and other goods across its territory to Europe, and the huge debts owed to Russia. In order to recover these debts, Russia is trying to take over key companies in many countries and thus get control of their economies from the inside. In Ukraine, for instance, Russian companies have gained control over oil refining and other industries. While Western states have criticized the market situation and political corruption in Ukraine, Putin improved relations with the regime of President Leonid Kuchma and even signed a border treaty in early 2003. With regard to Belarus, which is totally dependent on trade with Russia since unlike the others it shuns integration with the West, the 1999 Union Treaty with Russia foresees the introduction of a common currency, the rouble, to be issued by a single national bank in Moscow, in 2005. In 2002, Putin even wanted to introduce the common currency one year earlier.54 Russia and its companies have from time to time reduced deliveries of oil and gas and can play Belarus and Ukraine off against each other over prices and the construction of new pipelines. In order to keep Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states dependent on Russian pipelines for export in the western direction and to prevent Western energy companies from gaining influence, Russia has expanded and modernized its own pipelines to the West. It tried for a long time to stop the construction of the oil pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan via Georgia to Ceyhan in Turkey, which enjoyed US support, and opposed the building of a connecting pipeline from Kazakhstan across the Caspian Sea as well as a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, which would feed into a projected gas pipeline running parallel to the Baku–Ceyhan oil pipeline. Following a similar deal with Uzbekistan, in April 2003 Russia signed an agreement with Turkmenistan which secured the export of huge amounts of Turkmen gas to Russia for a 25-year period, to be paid for at half the West European price and with Russian goods. This kept Turkmenistan dependent and out of the European market, relieved Russia of large gas
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 43 commitments to Ukraine, and enabled it to resell the gas at world market prices.55 Having the advantage of more favourable economic development than its CIS partners, Russia has thus increasingly used the economic means at its disposal, which looked more acceptable than raw military and political pressure but could be at least equally efficient. However, there are limits to this power too. Integration with CIS states runs the risk of entailing Russian subsidies to them, besides opportunity costs. Russia itself is dependent on transit westwards through Ukraine and Belarus for the energy exports that play such a vital role in its economy. Economic integration with Belarus and the takeover of energy companies there are hindered by the fact that the Belarusian economy remains largely state-owned and under the control of the all-powerful president Aleksandr Lukashenko. When Russia raised customs duties on oil exports to support its agriculture in early 2003, companies boosted deliveries of crude oil to refineries in Belarus. As Belarus then reduced its export duties to the West, its re-exports of Russian oil surged.56 Furthermore, Russian energy companies often lack capital and technology to compete with their Western counterparts, for instance in Central Asia, partly because the exploitation and transport of energy resources in Russia also require increasing amounts of investment. Russian companies have therefore entered into cooperation with Western companies at home, in the West, in Central Asia and in Azerbaijan. Thus Lukoil even showed an interest in the Baku–Ceyhan oil pipeline. Russia and Ukraine have signed a contract on creating a gas consortium intended to include German partners. The CIS area is thus the one where Russia has the greatest power ambitions. In its relations with the weakest states this has sometimes led to it resorting to military pressure that smacks of neo-imperialism. Being the strongest country in the CIS by far, Russia is striving to maintain and develop the old integration ties in all fields and to form a bloc on a par with those existing in the West. As the multilateral mechanisms have proved ineffective, Russia is focusing on bilateral relations and partnership with each state. Political cooperation is facilitated by the fact that Russia makes little fuss about authoritarian rule and human rights violations in most CIS states, whereas this is a concern especially for European states. However, Russia’s power ambitions are thwarted by the fact that the CIS states are independent and their authoritarian leaders to varying extents cooperate with and seek support from the West. Uzbekistan aspires to a leading role for itself in Central Asia. Sensitized by its economic crisis throughout the 1990s, Russia has also discovered that integration and power entail costs. Increasingly, Putin has relied on the economic levers available to it, especially in the energy field. Even so, since its CIS partners are weaker and less developed, Russia has switched its trade from them to the West, and the CIS partners are trying to do the same. The CIS region is thus gradually being differentiated and oriented towards the
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West, although Russia maintains significant influence. In this region, Russia faces a difficult choice between power and profit.
Russian policy in Asia Even if Putin’s Russia is mainly oriented towards the West and has greatpower ambitions in the CIS area, his Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 accorded great and growing importance to Asia. The greater part of Russia lies in Asia and, since it has more nuclear weapons than any other Asian state, Russia is also a major military power there. Putin has shown great interest in cooperation with the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization and offered Russia as a bridge to Europe. One reason for this is to develop the Asian parts of Russia, which, despite their rich natural resources, are poorer than the European parts.57 Russia is paying special attention to China, the world’s most populous state, which is armed with nuclear weapons and has a fast-growing economy.58 Putin continued Yeltsin’s policy of strategic partnership with China, which was launched in 1996 as a reaction to NATO enlargement. During one of their frequent meetings, the parties concluded a Treaty on Good-neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001, including strategic cooperation, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, a commitment not to make territorial claims on each other or to enter into alliances against each other, and on consultations in the event of threats to peace.59 They agreed on the value of the UN and multipolarity, the ABM Treaty, NATO enlargement, condemned the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, opposed US hegemony, and supported each other’s territorial integrity against terrorists and separatists (for example, in Chechnya, Tibet and Taiwan). Putin worked to develop the Shanghai Forum grouping into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with China and four of the Central Asian states.60 This served not only to solve common problems, such as border disputes and terrorism, but also the mutual interest in keeping the USA out of Central Asia. China, too, felt threatened by the new US bases in the Central Asian region. Russia also wished to increase trade with China. In the 1990s China became the biggest market for Russia’s arms exports, which played a vital role in sustaining the Russian defence industry when the Ministry of Defence was starved of funds for procurement. The border trade was very important for the Russian Far East, which suffered especially from the economic slump in the 1990s, and big projects were launched involving the exploitation and export of oil and gas. In 2001 the Russian and Chinese governments signed an agreement on building an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing in Manchuria, which would supply China with 20 million tonnes every year starting in 2005.61 China is in desperate need of oil imports. However, there are several problems and, here again, divergent interests.
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 45 First, even if the Russian leaders rarely speak about it publicly, they fear China, with which the Soviet Union had tense relations for 30 years. This resulted in armed clashes in 1969 and a military build-up of huge standing forces along the border. While both sides have reduced their conventional forces in the border area and withdrawn them from the border itself, the Russian military edge over China has shrunk since the 1990s. For this reason, and in order not to provoke the United States too much, Russia has not exported the most modern weapons to China. Second, both states are more dependent on trade with third parties than on trade with each other, and the share of their mutual trade in the total foreign trade of each country is still below 5 per cent. In 2002 Putin fretted that China (excluding Hong Kong) had eight times more trade with the USA than with Russia.62 Moreover, while the Russian economy was in recession for most of the 1990s and has only grown since 1999, the Chinese economy has grown steadily to become the second-largest in Asia thanks to the market reforms that gave China WTO membership in 2001. In particular, Russia is worried that the lively border trade will lead to mass migration from China to Russia’s thinly populated Far Eastern provinces and eventually lead to a complete Chinese takeover. The border regions, which once belonged to China, have seven million inhabitants and over 100,000 Chinese immigrants, whereas the adjacent Chinese regions have 70 million people; this discrepancy is growing. Russia therefore controls the border strictly and maintains a visa regime. Significantly, in 2003 Russia did not allow a Chinese company to buy shares in the Slavneft oil company, while soon after this BP was permitted to buy a large share in another company.63 Third, Russia and China have competing interests in third countries, where many Chinese industrial goods have become more competitive than Russian ones. The Russian recession allowed Chinese business to enter Central Asia, and China may become a strong claimant to the energy resources there if Russia does not satisfy its needs. The Chinese have regained economic dominance in Mongolia, long allied with the Soviet Union, and Putin has therefore taken steps to revive the ties with Mongolia. Thus, it should be noted that the friendship treaty did not speak of a formal alliance and that it made a point of not being directed against third parties. Nothing was said about mutual, let alone military, assistance. Moreover, both states have friendship treaties and strategic partnerships with several other states. Hence, the treaty can at best be seen as a negative security guarantee which could also be used as a means to balance and exact favours from others. Interestingly, when Putin talked about multipolarity in China in 2002 he explained that it presupposes a dialogue with third parties and that crises in Asia should be met by an axis of stability consisting of leading states such as China, Russia, Western Europe and the USA.64
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As shown above, the treaty with China did not hinder Russia from improving relations with the USA, accepting NMD, signing SORT, tolerating NATO enlargement and forming the NATO–Russia Council. In fact, these measures can be seen as counterbalancing China. China, too, managed to improve its relations with the United States, even though it remained critical of US support for Taiwan and an East Asian missile defence system. Balancing China, Putin also continued Yeltsin’s policy of developing relations with Japan, the biggest economy in Asia, by means of official visits, military exchange and increased trade. Unlike China, Russia backed the idea of giving Japan a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and Japan supported Russian membership in the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries (the G7), in which China is not involved.65 In particular, Russia wanted Japanese investments in Siberia and the Russian Far East, and in 2000 the parties agreed on a deal worth US$9.6 billion to build gas and electricity bridges from Sakhalin to Japan. In 2002 Russia started to negotiate with Japan about laying the Angarsk pipeline inside the Russian border to Nakhodka, with only a branch into China. Although longer, this alternative has the advantage of opening up a wider market. Japan, for its part, has become more interested in reducing its heavy dependence on oil from the unstable Middle East, and it can offer more capital investment than China.66 However, there are definite limits to Russia’s partnership with Japan. Japan is safely anchored in a defence alliance and vital trade links with the United States, and its distrust of Russia is deep by tradition. As a condition for a peace treaty and various agreements, Japan demands the return of all the four Kurile Islands which Russia occupied at the end of the Second World War. Russia has proposed compromises, reduced its forces, and opened the islands for visits and fishing, but it has refused to cede all the islands and in 2000 launched a federal programme to develop them. The trade in and exploitation of energy resources are also hampered by structural and technical problems, mainly on the Russian side. Concerning Sakhalin, Russia prefers to involve Western companies and to export oil and gas to several countries, including South Korea and China. It should also be kept in mind that Japan has far more trade with China than with Russia. Concerning Korea, President Putin changed Yeltsin’s policy of focusing on trade with South Korea and withdrawing support from North Korea, the old communist ally. In 2000, Putin was the first Russian head of state ever to visit Pyongyang. A new friendship treaty was signed, and arms exports from Russia were resumed. In 2001, North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il paid a return visit, by train, which lasted several weeks. Russia doubted that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons but recommended international security guarantees, including guarantees from the USA, to North Korea in exchange for closure of its nuclear weapons programme.
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 47 However, Russia shared the concern of the USA and the regional powers about North Korea’s plans to develop nuclear weapons and its abrogation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2002. Putin extracted a promise from Kim in 2000 not to proceed with the missile programme – news which he was pleased to disclose at a meeting of the G8.67 He was deceived: Kim soon dismissed the promise as a joke. A primary Russian goal was to be admitted to the multilateral negotiations on security on the Korean Peninsula with the United States, Japan and China. When Russia was allowed to participate in a six-nation conference in Beijing in August 2003 it spoke out against nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and held military exercises off its coast with US, Japanese and South Korean ships.68 Russia was also disappointed by North Korea’s resistance to the building of a railway connection from Russia to South Korea. In South-East Asia, Putin strengthened ties with the old communist ally Vietnam, and a treaty on strategic partnership was signed during his visit there in 2001. If this caused alarm in the USA or China it was probably soothed by Russia’s decision to leave the Cam Ranh naval base. In general, Russia concentrated on trade with the fast-growing economies in this region, irrespective of political orientation, and especially – and with some success – promoting its arms exports.69 Putin further continued Yeltsin’s policy of developing relations with India, the second great power in Asia after China armed with nuclear weapons. Visiting India in October 2000, Putin elevated the relationship by signing a treaty on strategic partnership. Russia is interested in developing trade and military ties with India, which is its biggest recipient of arms exports after China. The parties were united in opposing the US NMD programme, ‘humanitarian interventions’ like that in Kosovo and, later, the war in Iraq. They upheld each other’s territorial integrity against terrorists and separatists in Chechnya and Kashmir, respectively.70 As a counterweight to NATO Russia has long proposed a triple alliance with China and India, and that India should join the Shanghai Six nations in which all members would be united against terrorism. This aim has so far failed because India and China have been traditional enemies, who even fought a border war in 1962. China has also supported India’s worst enemy, Pakistan, and probably helped it construct nuclear weapons. Russian trade with India (and many other states) fell drastically in the 1990s, while India’s trade with the West grew and the USA became its most important trading partner. In Western Asia, Putin maintained relations with the old allies Iraq and Syria. As for Iraq, before the 2003 war Russia opposed the UN sanctions on Iraq and intensified its trade with Iraq. It became Iraq’s main trading partner, acquired a significant role in the Iraqi energy sector, and in August 2002 signed a deal worth some US$40 billion. Consequently, the US-led war and occupation were a big blow to Russian influence in the country. In order to recover its losses, Russia strove for a stronger UN role and a speedy transfer of power to the Iraqi people.
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Putin further developed Yeltsin’s good relations with Iran, including the export of heavy weapons and nuclear power technology. This, however, brought Russia into conflict with the United States, which claimed that Iran was constructing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorism. As in the Iraq case, Russia doubted the first claim, but after the war in Iraq it decided to take back spent nuclear fuel and agreed to stricter control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) being imposed on Iran.71 Besides, Putin continued Russia’s efforts to boost business interests in Arab states, which were more or less critical of US influence, and indeed managed to sell weapons there as well. Trade agreements were signed, for example, with Saudi Arabia, whose hitherto close relations with the United States were disturbed after 11 September.72 In October 2003, Putin participated as an observer in the Organization of Islamic States’ conference in Kuala Lumpur.73 Concerning the Israel–Palestine conflict, Russia has long tried to play a mediating role of its own and, unlike the USA, retained contact with Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. On the other hand, Putin has also improved relations with Israel since Yeltsin’s time because of the rising wave of terrorism in both countries and the great number of Russian immigrants in Israel. Russia participated in the quartet of mediators with the USA, the UN and the EU, and supported the USA’s Road Map, designed to result in a peace agreement in three years between Israel and an independent, democratic Palestine. A final example of Putin’s active foreign policy pragmatism is the relationship with Turkey, a traditional enemy of Russia and a NATO member which hosts US bases on its territory. In Yeltsin’s time Turkey was lambasted for its support to Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Turkic Central Asian states, its support for the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline project and its restrictions on Russian transport through the Bosporus. However, Putin found common interests with Turkey in the fight against terrorism and separatism (of the Chechens and Kurds, respectively), resistance to the US-led war in Iraq, and increased trade. In 2003, the Blue Stream pipeline across the Black Sea for the export of Russian gas to Turkey was opened, and the export of Russian arms to Turkey is under discussion.74 Summing up, Putin has made attempts to find counterweights to NATO in Asia by means of strategic partnerships with the great powers China and India. He has revived relations with old allies like North Korea and Vietnam, and developed ties with Iran and Iraq, and exports of Russian arms and nuclear technology have played an important role in this. However, it has been impossible to create anti-US blocs, since some allies are at odds with each other and they too have growing ties with the West. China poses a future threat to Russia, and partnerships with countries like Iran and Syria strain Russia’s relations with the United States. Here as well Russia has increasingly put its stakes on peaceful economic coopera-
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 49 tion, especially in the energy sector, which has opened the door to old US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Conclusions Russian foreign policy under Putin has become more active compared with what it was under Yeltsin, who in his last years was quite tired and ill, and Putin has not committed blunders and faux pas on the international arena as Yeltsin did. Putin has travelled to and received visits from many more countries, resuming relations with old allies and states, such as those in Eastern and Central Europe, North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam, as well as making new friends. He has shown an ability to take initiatives and seize opportunities, for instance, to improve relations with the United States since September 2001 and to intensify energy cooperation with the EU. The analysis in this chapter also shows that Putin has conducted a differentiated foreign policy, adapted to the conditions and changes in each region and country. With regard to the United States, the only superpower and the biggest economy in the world, Putin is striving for a special strategic partnership built on common security interests – mainly in fighting terrorism and the proliferation of WMD and in international stability – and on the prospect of energy exports to the vast American market. This strategic aim, based on Russia’s possession of a huge nuclear arsenal, its problems with Chechen terrorism, its geographic size and location, and its rich energy resources, places Russia ahead of the other great powers and members of the UN Security Council and the G8. However, the USA’s involvement in the CIS area and its offensive policy in the Middle East, for instance, sometimes clash with Russian political and economic interests there, which adds an element of competition or obstruction to Russian policy towards the USA. In relation to Europe, Putin’s Russia wants not only partnership but also integration. Naturally, this interest is based on geographic location, the concentration of the Russian population west of the Urals, cultural affinity and historical tradition; however, it is increasingly based on economic needs and advantages as well. Russia is thus a member of several European (or European-centred) organizations and has many agreements with the EU. Most of Russia’s trade goes to EU member countries, and some EU member countries and candidate countries are dependent on Russian energy supplies. When relations with the United States have turned sour, as they did over the war in Iraq, Putin, like Yeltsin before him, has also tried to establish closer relations with like-minded great powers in Europe, such as France and Germany, while talking about multipolarity and balancing US hegemony. Nevertheless, there are clashes of interest here too. Russia opposes NATO enlargement to and activities among its former allies and former
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Soviet republics – most recently the Baltic states – because this is seen as a threat to its security and as damaging to its prestige. Most European states prefer maintaining ties with the USA to forging new ones with Russia. Furthermore, the European governments were generally more concerned than the US leadership about the war in Chechnya and about democracy and human rights in Russia. Even though Russia accepted EU enlargement eastwards (partly as an alternative to NATO), it opposed the adoption of Schengen visas and the introduction of other restrictions by the new members, which may curtail trade and travel, above all for the Kaliningrad exclave. Russia’s sheer size and economic structure preclude real integration into Europe until a far-distant future. This, together with Russia’s power ambitions vis-à-vis its close neighbours, thus restricts its European policy to one of growing cooperation mixed with elements of competition. Concerning the CIS area, Russia seeks to maintain and develop integration under its leadership, which can be seen as neo-imperialism in some newly independent states, and to form organizations matching those in the West – the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty and the Common Economic Space. Russian power here rests on centuries-old bonds, overwhelming military power, conflicts in and between the other states, and – not least – their economic weakness and dependence on Russia for trade and transport, especially with regard to energy. However, Russian dominance-cum-integration in the CIS is undermined by nationalism and the vested power interests of the political elites in the other states, their search for support from Western powers, and the willingness of the latter to provide it. Because of Russia’s own economic decline in the 1990s, Russian leaders do not want the CIS states to become a heavy burden, hampering profitable trade with more developed states in the West. Asia, finally, is the continent where Putin, like Yeltsin, under the banner of multipolarity has sought most eagerly to balance the United States and NATO, for example, by forming strategic partnerships with the great powers China and India. Relations with old allies such as North Korea and Vietnam have been revived, and ties with Iran and Iraq developed. However, the creation of an anti-US bloc has proved impossible since some allies are at odds with each other and also have growing ties with the West. Russia also fears China becoming a threat in the future, and its relations with North Korea and Iran cloud those with the USA. Russia’s influence in Iraq was destroyed by the US-led invasion. In Asia, too, Russia has increasingly chosen peaceful economic cooperation, especially in the energy sector, thus opening the door to old US allies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. A common feature in policy on all these different directions seems to be that the Putin administration is putting growing emphasis on developing the Russian economy, which is seen as a prerequisite for a strong state, rather than maintaining military ambitions abroad at any price. Russia has
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 51 also realized its strength in the energy sector and used it with some success against its dependent neighbours. Economic means may in fact be more efficient and compelling than military or political pressure. Summarizing Putin’s foreign policy by using the options mentioned in the introduction, it seems to fit best Medvedev’s option of limited (minimalist) cooperation with the West mixed with some obstruction and with tendencies towards neo-imperialism vis-à-vis Russia’s immediate neighbours. In Heikka’s terms, Putin can be said on the whole to have preferred cooperative security with the West to multipolar balancing and neoimperialism. It comes as no surprise that in real life the options are combined and adapted differently in different directions. The concept of multipolarity is sometimes redefined from one of balancing US hegemony to one of dialogue among major powers, for example, in the UN Security Council or the G8. This does not at all exclude occasional conflicts among the members. It thus seems justified to characterize Putin’s foreign policy as pragmatic, as both foreign analysts and Putin himself often describe it. The Australian political scientist Bobo Lo labels Putin as a ‘strategic opportunist’ on the following grounds: He is not fixated on ideology, geopolitics or cultural and civilizational categorizations. He has shown that he is prepared to be whoever and whatever depending on context and timing. Thus, he is European in Europe, transcontinental ‘strategic partner’ when dealing with the USA, Asian or Eurasian in Asia, and cautiously integrationist in the CIS. At the same time he does not subscribe to the infantile view that cooperation with the West must necessarily be at the expense of good relations elsewhere.75 Putin’s strategic aim and fundamental belief still appear to be that Russia was, is and will be a great power, special and different from the other, largely regional, great powers in Europe. Imperial thinking dies hard and may influence Russian foreign policy for many years to come. The UK and France also needed a long time to give up their empires, but they are now safely embedded in peaceful, democratic integration in Europe.
Notes 1 A good recent example is Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Malden: Blackwell, 2003, pp. 51ff. 2 Sergei Medvedev, Russia’s Futures: Implications for the EU, the North and the Baltic Region, Helsinki and Berlin: Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für europäische Politik, 2000, pp. 64ff. 3 Henrikki Heikka, Grand Strategies and the Northern Dimension of European Security, Helsinki and Berlin: Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für europäische Politik, 2003, pp. 19–25.
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4 This chapter builds on the author’s chapter in Jan Leijonhielm et al., Rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv [Russian military capacity in a ten-year perspective], Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2003, pp. 67ff. News items from Russian media are mainly taken from BBC Monitoring, Global Newsline, Former Soviet Union Political File (e-mail subscription). 5 For more detail on this see Lo, Vladimir Putin, pp. 9ff. 6 For more on domestic factors, see the chapters by Mette Skak, Lena Jonson and Pavel Baev in this volume. 7 On this see also the chapters by Mette Skak and Jakub Godzimirski in this volume. 8 On this see also the chapters by Lena Jonson and Pavel Baev in this volume. 9 Kommersant, 22 May 2002. 10 Russian President, ‘Rossiisko-amerikanskaia vstrecha na vysshem urovne’ [Top-level Russian–US meeting], 24 May 2002 (http://www.president. kremlin.ru/summit8, retrieved 31 May 2002). 11 Russian President, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 12 July 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears, retrieved 4 November 2002). 12 BBC Channel One television, 27 September 2003. 13 US White House, ‘Joint statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin’, 22 November 2002 (http://www.whitehous.gov/news/ releases, retrieved 25 November 2002); and Prime-TASS, 22 September 2003 (BBC Monitoring). 14 On economic problems, see the chapter by Roland Götz in this volume. 15 Russian President, ‘Zaiavlenie dlia pressy . . .’ [Statement for the press], 11 April 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/t4xt/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003); and ‘Sovmestnaia press-konferentsiia . . .’ [Joint press conference], 29 April 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/text/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003). 16 Russian President, ‘Zaiavlenie dlia pressy . . .’ [Statement for the press], 3 April 2003, (http://194.226.82.50/text/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003). See also the chapter by Mette Skak in this volume. 17 RTR (Russian television channel), 1 June 2003 (BBC Monitoring). 18 On relations between NATO and Russia, see also the chapter by Jakub Godzimirski in this volume. 19 Bertil Nygren, ‘Russia and Europe or Russia in Europe?’, in Yuri Fedorov and Bertil Nygren (eds), Russia and Europe: Putin’s Foreign Policy, Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2002, pp. 18ff. 20 Russian President, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 28 May 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events, retrieved 31 May 2002). 21 Russian President, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 16 January 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events, retrieved 4 February 2002). 22 On this see also the chapter by Vilhelm Konnander in this volume. 23 See also Ingmar Oldberg, Reluctant Rapprochement: Russia and the Baltic States in the Context of NATO and EU Enlargements, User Report, FOI-R0808-SE, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), February 2003, pp. 23ff. 24 Russian President, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 3 September 2001 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events, retrieved 12 October 2001). 25 Russian President, ‘Otvety prezidenta . . .’ [Replies by the president], 11 February 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/text/appears, retrieved 19 March 2003). 26 Russian President, ‘Zaiavlenie dlia pressy . . .’ [Statement for the press], 11 April 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/t4xt/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003). 27 Russian President, ‘Sovmestnaia press-konferentsiia . . .’ [Joint press conference], 29 April 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/text/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003).
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 53 28 Quoted in Nygren, ‘Russia and Europe’, p. 26. 29 RTR, 16 May 2003 (BBC Monitoring). 30 European Commission, ‘Tenth EU–Russia summit: Joint statement on the fight against terrorism’, 11 November 2002 (http://www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit, retrieved 13 November 2002). 31 Boris Ye. Frumkin, ‘The economic relationship between Russia and Europe: Current situation and emerging trends’, in Fedorov and Nygren, Russia and Europe, pp. 97ff. 32 Frank Umbach, Globale Energiesicherheit: Strategische Herausforderung [Global energy security: Strategic challenge], Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003. 33 European Commission, ‘The EU–Russia energy dialogue’, 11 November 2002 (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit, retrieved 13 November 2002). 34 ITAR–TASS, 27 August 2003. 35 On ecological problems, see also the chapters by Nikita Lomagin and Christer Pursiainen in this volume. 36 Frumkin, ‘The economic relationship between Russia and Europe’, pp. 100ff. See also the chapter by Roland Götz in this volume. 37 Frumkin, ‘The economic relationship between Russia and Europe’, pp. 109ff. 38 European Commission, ‘Tenth EU–Russia summit: Joint statement on transit . . .’, 11 November 2002 (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit, retrieved 13 November 2002). 39 RTR, 16 May 2003 (BBC Monitoring). 40 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 11 July 2000. 41 V. Trubnikov, ‘Tenth anniversary of the Commonwealth of Independent States’, International Affairs, 1, 2002, pp. 18, 24. 42 When the treaty was prolonged in 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan left it. 43 In Russian the Organizatsiia Dogovora Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti (ODKB). 44 Hannes Adomeit and Heidi Reisinger, Russia’s Role in Post-Soviet Territory, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2002, pp. 6ff. 45 On Belarus, see also the chapter by Jakob Hedenskog in this volume. 46 On Moldova, see also the chapter by Jakob Hedenskog in this volume. 47 TVS, Interfax, 11 September 2002; and ITAR–TASS, 8 October 2002 (BBC Monitoring). On Georgia, see the chapter by Bertil Nygren in this volume. 48 On this, see the chapters by Isabelle Facon and Ekaterina Stepanova in this volume. 49 Moscow News, 32, 2003. 50 On Georgia and Ukraine, see the chapters by Bertil Nygren and Jakob Hedenskog in this volume. 51 Wall Street Journal Europe, 22–24 August 2003. On this topic see also the chapter by Lena Jonson in this volume. 52 Wall Street Journal Europe, 8–10 August 2003. 53 ITAR–TASS, 17 September 2003; Interfax-Ukraine, 18 September 2003; Interfax, 19 September 2003 (BBC Monitoring); and Russian President, ‘Soglashenie o formirovanii edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva’ [Agreement on the creation of a Single Economic Space], 19 September 2003. 54 See also the chapter by Jakob Hedenskog in this volume. 55 Izvestiia, 21 August 2003 (BBC Monitoring); and Vladimir Socor, ‘Caspian Great Game’, Wall Street Journal, 23–25 May 2003. 56 Moscow News, 35, 2003. 57 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 November 2000. 58 On this relationship until 2001, see also Ingmar Oldberg, ‘Towards alliance?
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59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
Ingmar Oldberg Russia’s relations with China in an international context’, in Ingolf Kiesow (ed.), From Taiwan to Taliban: Two Danger Zones in Asia, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2002, pp. 24ff. Xinhua, 16 July 2001 (BBC Monitoring 17 July 2001). The members of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Aleksandr Lukin, ‘Russia, US, China and the Iraqi conflict’, International Affairs, 3, 2002, p. 18. Russian President, ‘Interviu prezidenta . . .’ [Interview with the president], 4 June 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears, retrieved 18 December 2002). Lukin, ‘Russia, US, China and the Iraqi conflict’, p. 19. Russian President, ‘Interviu prezidenta . . .’ [Interview with the president], 4 June 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears, retrieved 18 December 2002). The Group of Seven became the Group of Eight (G8) when Russia joined it in 1997. Lukin, ‘Russia, US, China and the Iraqi conflict’, pp. 18ff.; Interfax, 29 April 2003 (BBC Monitoring 30 April 2003); ITAR–TASS, 3 June 2003 (BBC Monitoring); and Russian Ministry of Energy, ‘Energeticheskaia strategiia Rossii na period do 2020 goda’ [The Russian energy strategy for the period up to 2020], p. 70 (http://www.mte.gov.ru/files/103/1354.strategy.pdf). The missile North Korea fired across Japan in 1998 became a major reason for the US NMD programme and the Japanese endorsement of a regional missile defence. On the G8, see note 65. ITAR–TASS, 1 September and 28 August 2003; Interfax, 27 August 2003; NTV, 25 August 2003 (BBC Monitoring); and Washington Post, 27 August 2003. On Indonesia, for example, see Interfax-AVN military news agency, 27 August 2003 (BBC Monitoring). Russian President, ‘Zaiavlenie prezidenta . . .’ [Statement by the president], 4 December 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears, retrieved 6 December 2002); and Moscow News, 48, 2002. Interfax, 27 August 2003; ITAR–TASS, 26 August (BBC Monitoring); and Washington Post, 27 August 2003. Interfax, 27 August 2003; and Moscow News, 33, 2003. Dagens nyheter, 13 October 2003. Interfax, 24 December 2002 (BBC Monitoring, 25 December 2002); and Turkish Daily News, 24, 25 December 2002. Lo, Vladimir Putin, p. 131.
Bibliography Books and journals Adomeit, Hannes and Heidi Reisinger, Russia’s Role in Post-Soviet Territory, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2002. Fedorov, Yuri and Bertil Nygren (eds), Russia and Europe: Putin’s Foreign Policy, Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2002. Frumkin, Boris Ye., ‘The economic relationship between Russia and Europe: Current situation and emerging trends’, in Yuri Fedorov and Bertil Nygren (eds), Russia and Europe: Putin’s Foreign Policy, Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2002, pp. 97ff.
Foreign policy priorities under Putin 55 Heikka, Henrikki, Grand Strategies and the Northern Dimension of European Security, Helsinki and Berlin: Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für europäische Politik, 2003. Leijonhielm, Jan et al., Rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv [Russian military capacity in a ten-year perspective], Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2003. Lo, Bobo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Malden: Blackwell, 2003. Lukin, Aleksandr, ‘Russia, US, China and the Iraqi conflict’, International Affairs, 3, 2002. Medvedev, Sergei, Russia’s Futures: Implications for the EU, the North and the Baltic Region, Helsinki and Berlin: Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für europäische Politik, 2002. Nygren, Bertil, ‘Russia and Europe or Russia in Europe?’, in Yuri Fedorov and Bertil Nygren (eds), Russia and Europe: Putin’s Foreign Policy, Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2002. Oldberg, Ingmar, ‘Towards alliance? Russia’s relations with China in an international context’, in Ingolf Kiesow (ed.), From Taiwan to Taliban: Two Danger Zones in Asia, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2002. ——, Reluctant Rapprochement. Russia and the Baltic States in the Context of NATO and EU Enlargements, User Report, FOI-R-0808-SE, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2003. Trubnikov, V., ‘Tenth anniversary of the Commonwealth of Independent States’, International Affairs, 1, 2002. Umbach, Frank, Globale Energiesicherheit: Strategische Herausforderung [Global energy security: Strategic challenge], Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003.
Media and Internet BBC Monitoring Global Newsline, Former Soviet Union Political File (e-mail subscription, hereinafter referred to as BBC). BBC, Channel One television, 27 September 2003 (BBC). Dagens nyheter, 13 October 2003. European Commission, ‘Tenth EU–Russia Summit: Joint statement on the fight against terrorism’, 11 November 2002 (http://www.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/ russia/summit, accessed 13 November 2002). ——, ‘The EU–Russia energy dialogue’, 11 November 2002 (http://www. europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit, accessed 13 November 2002). ——, ‘Tenth EU-Russia Summit: Joint statement on transit . . .’, 11 November 2002 (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ russia/summit, accessed 13 November 2002). Interfax, 24 December 2002, 29 April 2003, 27 August 2003 and 19 September 2003 (BBC). Interfax-AVN military news agency, 27 August 2003 (BBC). Interfax-Ukraine, 18 September 2003. ITAR–TASS, 8 October 2002, 3 June 2003 and 26 August 2003 (BBC). ITAR–TASS, 27 August 2003, 28 August 2003, 1 September 2003 and 17 September 2003. Izvestiia, 21 August 2003 (BBC).
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Kommersant, 22 May 2002. Moscow News, 48 (2002), 32 (2003), 33 (2003) and 35 (2003). Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 November 2000. NTV, 25 August 2003 (BBC). Prime-TASS, 22 September 2003 (BBC). Rossiiskaia gazeta, 11 July 2000. RTR (Russian television channel), 16 May 2003 and 1 June 2003 (BBC). Russian Ministry of Energy, ‘Energeticheskaia strategiia Rossii na period do 2020 goda’ [The Russian energy strategy for the period up to 2020], p. 70 (http://www.mte.gov.ru/files/103/1354.strategy.pdf). Russian President, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 3 September 2001, available on the official website of the President of the Russian Federation (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events, retrieved 12 October 2001). ——, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 16 January 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events, retrieved 4 February 2002). ——, ‘Rossiisko-amerikanskaia vstrecha na vysshem urovne’ [Top-level Russian–US meeting], 24 May 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/ summit8, retrieved 31 May 2002). ——, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 28 May 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events, retrieved 31 May 2002). ——, ‘Interviu prezidenta . . .’ [Interview with the president], 4 June 2002 (http://www.President.kremlin.ru/text/appears, retrieved 18 December 2002). ——, ‘Vystuplenie prezidenta . . .’ [Speech by the president], 12 July 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears, retrieved 4 November 2002). ——, ‘Zaiavlenie prezidenta . . .’ [Statement by the president], 4 December 2002 (http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears, retrieved 6 December 2002). ——, ‘Otvety prezidenta . . .’ [Replies by the president], 11 February 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/text/appears, retrieved 19 March 2003). ——, ‘Zaiavlenie dlia pressy . . .’ [Statement for the press], 3 April 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/text/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003). ——, ‘Zaiavlenie dlia pressy . . .’ [Statement for the press], 11 April 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/t4xt/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003). ——, ‘Sovmestnaia press-konferentsiia . . .’ [Joint press conference], 29 April 2003 (http://194.226.82.50/text/appears, retrieved 3 June 2003). ——, ‘Soglashenie o formirovanii edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva’ [Agreement on the creation of a Single Economic Space], 19 September 2003. Socor, Vladimir, ‘Caspian Great Game’, Wall Street Journal, 23–25 May 2003. Turkish Daily News, 24 and 25 December 2002. TVS, Interfax, 11 September 2002. US White House, ‘Joint statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin’, 22 November 2002 (http://www.whitehous. gov/news/releases, retrieved 25 November 2002). Wall Street Journal Europe, 8–10 August 2003 and 22–24 August 2003. Washington Post, 27 August 2003. Xinhua, 16 July 2001 (BBC, 17 July 2001).
3
Russia and NATO Community of values or community of interests? Jakub M. Godzimirski
One needs the enemy. T. S. Eliot1 His opponents never knew which side he would come at them from. It was always difficult to second guess him. Anatolii Rakhlin, young Putin’s judo coach.2
Introduction One of the most intriguing changes of the past few years is what many observers have called a new beginning in relations between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Only four years ago, when NATO decided to resort to arms in order to put an end to ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and launched a 78-day air campaign in March 1999 against Slobodan Milosevic’s abuses in Kosovo, relations between Russia and the Western alliance sank to their lowest point in the post-Soviet period. NATO’s Kosovo operation was accompanied by another highly symbolic step: in March 1999, after two years of preparation, NATO opened its doors to three new members and former (albeit unwilling) Soviet allies – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The alliance’s decision on enlargement and then its implementation in the first weeks of the Kosovo operation meant that Russia – at least, this was the Russian reading of the situation – found itself facing a new geopolitical challenge. An apparently aggressive Western military alliance at war with one of Russia’s traditional allies in the Balkans was approaching Russia’s borders, and at a time when Russia was still struggling to cope with the consequences of the August 1998 economic collapse that had revealed the naked truth about the real state of affairs in the country. In this situation, any notion of this aggressive NATO enlarging again, not only closer to Russia’s borders but even to countries that only ten years earlier had formed part of the Soviet inner empire, was seen as justification for rethinking the whole Russian policy towards the alliance and the opening of what in the Russian political discourse was sometimes referred to as an era of ‘cold peace’.
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By contrast, when NATO decided at its Prague meeting in November 2002 to invite more new members, including three former Soviet republics, no loud protests were heard from Moscow. This is not to say that the Russian authorities necessarily welcomed the decision, but their reactions were mild in view of the salvos Russia had fired against the enlargement only a few years earlier. What happened in the time between Kosovo and Prague to make Russia tone down its criticism of NATO and accept the alliance’s decision to enlarge? Finding a satisfactory answer to this intriguing and crucial question, and giving some interpretations of the shift in Russia’s attitude towards NATO, is the main aim of this chapter.
Russia, NATO and Kosovo: reaching the nadir On a list of the issues that have had the most negative and disturbing impact on relations between Russia and the West over the past ten years, the question of NATO enlargement would be near the top. NATO’s 1997 redefinition of its strategic goals and the implementation of the new ideas through intervention in European conflicts also definitely contributed to the souring of relations between Russia, which was in search of a new state identity, and the West, which was seeking a new formula for its relations with the former arch-enemy in the East. Several more or less successful attempts have been made to help Russia and the West to gloss over their differences,3 but NATO’s decision to resort to arms in defence of basic human rights in Kosovo in 1999 seemed to put an effective end to cooperation between these two important pillars of European security. The then Russian prime minister, Yevgenii Primakov, decided to make a literal U-turn over the Atlantic when, on a flight to Washington, learning that NATO was about to launch attacks on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he ordered the pilot to turn back to Moscow. This was a highly symbolic move signalling the willingness of the Russian elite to confront the West on this issue and to cut all formal contacts with NATO.4 Although the weakened Russia was not prepared to intervene militarily, some Russian leaders called for serious measures to be taken to put an end to what was seen as an aggressive war against Russia’s traditional Balkan ally. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was interpreted by most of the Russian political elite and by the Russian public as a clear confirmation of the alliance’s aggressive designs.5 An important source of discord in relations between Russia and NATO was the way in which the two approached the realm of international relations. For NATO its Kosovo mission was a clear and ultimate manifestation of a value-driven policy of defence of the basic human rights and democracy with the help of military means; from the Russian point of view the intervention in Kosovo was a manifestation of an interest-driven policy of the West and a clear attempt by the West to encroach on Russia’s regional and global interests. However, Russia soon realized that it was in
Russia and NATO 59 its own interest to play a more constructive role. The country’s authorities realized that confronting the West on Kosovo would be too costly an option and decided that Russia was to serve first as an intermediary who was to initiate the peace process in the Balkans and then as a partner in the post-conflict settlement. The role given to former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as a peace mediator in the conflict and the decision to send Russian peacekeepers to Kosovo were the most visible Russian contributions in this respect. These decisions were also a visible sign that it was possible to find a modus vivendi with NATO, even in a situation where the gap between what the alliance presented as a value-driven policy and what Russia interpreted as an interest-driven policy choice was as wide as it was in the case of Kosovo. This could also be seen as a signal that Russia, although frustrated by the West’s apparent disregard for Russia’s interests, was willing to adopt a more pragmatic policy towards the alliance and to seek cooperation with it. Over the next two years Russia’s relations with NATO evolved in a direction that was almost unthinkable at the moment of cessation of hostilities in Kosovo. What seemed to be irreparable damage to Russia’s relations with the West became seemingly less important when both the West and Russia only two years later faced what they both saw as the same dangerous enemy. There were three important factors that helped Russia and the West to open what is sometimes interpreted as a new chapter in their relations. The first was the re-emergence of the conflict in Chechnya on the Russian domestic and international agenda (August–September) 1999; the second was the fact that this conflict – and Boris Yeltsin’s evident inability to continue as Russia’s president – catapulted to power as prime minister a fairly unknown KGB colonel turned St Petersburg democrat, Vladimir Putin; the third was the terrorist attack on the USA in September 2001, which resulted in a complete redrawing of the ‘interest map’ of the only remaining superpower and gave Russia a unique opportunity to reposition itself on the new global power map. The immediate result was a partial convergence of the West’s value-driven and Russia’s interest-driven policy on the international arena: Putin’s Russia seemingly decided to redraw its own mental interest map and the West decided to rethink the ‘value basis’ of its own policy. All these three factors, although in different ways, have had a direct bearing on relations between Russia and NATO. The first period of the second Chechen war boosted Russia’s self-confidence and its belief that military means alone could solve difficult political and social problems. NATO’s action in Kosovo seemingly inspired the Russian leadership. On the first, paradoxically enough, the Russian operation in Chechnya, which was so heavily criticized by the whole civilized world, helped to reestablish a sort of parity in relations between Russia and NATO. On the one hand, at least in the first phase of the second Chechen war, the
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Russian military managed to get rid of their inferiority complex vis-à-vis their Western counterparts. They believed they proved capable of launching what they saw as a successful military campaign with minimal losses to their own forces and wiping out all organized military resistance in the war-torn republic. They also believed that their action was justified in the light of what NATO had undertaken in Kosovo only months earlier – they could reject any Western criticism of their action in Chechnya by referring to NATO’s action in Kosovo. At the end of 1999 it might have seemed that there was a draw in the contest between the West and Russia. The West had had its own small victorious war in Kosovo, and Russia was launching its own victorious war in Chechnya – a war that was also to play a central role in the redrawing of Russia’s political map. On the second factor, as it is widely believed that the war in Chechnya played a decisive role as a launching-pad for the political career of the relatively unknown Putin,6 who in March 2000 was elected the new president of Russia, this war also resulted indirectly in bringing a new and important actor to the international stage – an actor who was seemingly willing to adopt a new, more pragmatic approach to both the domestic and the foreign and security policy of Russia. Putin’s decision to call US president George W. Bush immediately after the 11 September attacks on the USA placed Russia on the USA’s post-11 September strategic map as an important partner. Putin was also able to persuade the Russian political elite that this pro-Western choice best served Russia’s short- and mediumterm interests. Grigorii Yavlinskii’s account of the results of the meeting between Putin and 21 Russian political heavyweights witnesses that there was no mood among Russia’s elite for closer cooperation with the West. When Putin asked his guests what kind of policy Russia should adopt ‘one participant advocated support for the Taliban, while 18 participants proposed that Russia remain neutral in the fight between America and the terrorists. Only two said that Russia should participate in the antiterrorist coalition.’7 Third, Putin’s decision to call Bush on 11 September not only opened a new chapter in the Russian–US dialogue; it also helped Russia to adopt a more flexible and sophisticated policy towards a NATO that had visible problems with finding a proper place in the new post-11 September world.
Russia and NATO: schools and attitudes The fact that the new ruler in the Kremlin came from the former Soviet intelligence community added a special flavour to speculations as to Russia’s choice of its future path. The question ‘Who is Mr Putin?’ and what sort of Russia this former spy was about to build dominated the Western agenda in the first months after his ascent to power. That Putin was willing to put his own personal mark on both Russia’s domestic policy and its foreign policy was proved beyond any doubt when he launched
Russia and NATO 61 many domestic reforms and ordered the revision of the whole set of Russian official doctrines outlining Russia’s security, defence and foreign policy. Before analysing the content of the official doctrines signed by Putin in the first year of his presidency, it is worth recalling the main lines of the pre-Putin Russian discourse on NATO. Although NATO has been portrayed in the Russian official discourse first and foremost as a military alliance and a power factor, it is not the purely power-related issues but Russian representations of NATO and the Russian ‘reading’ of the nature of international relations that have played the decisive role in shaping Russian attitudes towards the alliance. Russia’s main problem with NATO was more of a mental than of a purely military and technical character. To understand Russia’s swings in policy towards NATO it is necessary to reconstruct its representation of the world and place NATO on Russia’s mental map. What were the main ideas on the world and NATO expressed by the milieux representing different schools of thought on Russia’s place in the world?8 The realists. NATO has been perceived as a relic of the bipolar competitive world by those who tend to read the international system in purely realist terms. The very fact that NATO survived the dissolution of the Soviet pole of the bipolar world system surprised them and is treated as an anomaly because its survival contradicted what could be labelled ‘realist common sense’. According to the realist reading, alliances whose main purpose is the protection of their members against the aggressive designs of other powerful members of the anarchic global system are doomed to disappear once the threat is no longer there. NATO, however, has not only survived but also seemed to find a new niche and decided to enlarge. It has also decided to flex – and use – its military muscle by intervening in European ‘hot spots’ where Russia traditionally also had some stakes and wanted to play a more active, prominent and independent role. NATO’s more or less successful interventions, combined with the decline of Russia’s realist capabilities and Russia’s growing realization of its military and political weakness, have only added to the list of concerns shared by the proponents of the realist school of thought. The geo-economic school. A ‘softer’ version of realism with a strong spatial component is the ‘geo-economic’ approach to the question of security, with a focus on the economic rather than the military instruments of achieving the goals of national strategy. Michel Foucher notes that today the world may be witnessing the end of the classical geopolitical thinking on international relations, as what is decisive for a country’s international position is not its control of territory and military power (the central ideas in traditional geopolitical thinking) but rather its economic performance. One of the first to theorize on the geo-economic paradigm was the American specialist on strategy Edward Luttwak,9 and his views
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have gained ground in Russia as well.10 The geo-economic approach results in a redefinition of national goals: according to this school, the world is still an arena of competition, but the actors are much more interdependent. They tend to pursue their goals through economic competition rather than annihilation, as waging war on each other is ruled out from the arsenal of means available to achieve geo-economically defined goals.11 Since not military but rather economic means and strategies are important to achieve ‘geo-economic’ goals, the proponents of this school do not have any special attitude towards NATO; rather they see it as irrelevant for the formulation and implementation of the ‘geo-economic’ strategy for Russia. The Eurasianists. The Eurasianists – the proponents of a Messianic version of realism with strong elements of ‘identity-based’ (and biased) politics – claim that Russia is not part of Western civilization but rather a bridge between West and East. Because of its unique Eurasian location, the country has a special mission that can be fulfilled first of all through cooperation with the former Soviet republics (within the Commonwealth of Independent States, the CIS) and other powers with strong interests in Eurasia. China and India are often mentioned in this context, but Japan, South Korea and some Islamic countries are also listed as important partners. For them NATO is as much a power factor as an expression of Atlantic values which they see as a threat to Russia’s ‘ideological’ exceptionalism. They fear NATO not only as a potential source of military threat to Russia (a view they share with pure realists) but also as an institutional ‘bearer’ of certain values that could threaten Russia’s very ideological foundations if imported into the country by the new leadership embarking on the policy of Westernization. The Atlanticists/Democrats. The Atlanticists/Democrats are those who preach Russia’s return to what could be described as ‘democratic normalcy’. They see in NATO not a military organization but rather an institutional expression of the values and norms which Russia in their opinion should also follow in order to modernize and narrow the civilizational gap. In addition, they can see some positive effects the existence of NATO has had on the international system, as the alliance has functioned as a provider of security and stability not only to those who were already in but also to those who lived in its immediate neighbourhood and were in need of help, or wanted to join the alliance and thus had to live up to its normative requirements. When addressing the issue of NATO, the Russian elites had to deal with at least three dimensions of the alliance. NATO could be seen as a power factor, as an institutional factor and as an identity factor. For realists, for instance, the identity dimension of NATO was not relevant at all as in the ‘realist vocabulary’ there is no place for ‘identity considerations’. What matters for realists is that NATO represents a certain military potential and that the future intentions of those who have this potential at their dis-
Russia and NATO 63 posal are unknown and uncertain, although in the view of most realists power tends to be used in a predatory way in order to get the upper hand in relations with other, weaker actors. In a similar way, for those who had a positive attitude towards NATO and approached the alliance in a ‘constructivist (and constructive) way’, the most important thing about NATO was not the number of its soldiers, tanks and aircraft (threatening Russia, in the realists’ view) but the intentions of those who had this arsenal at their disposal – intentions that were to a very great extent a result of their attitudes towards the outside world; attitudes that in turn were shaped by their mental maps and the values and norms forming the ideological basis of the alliance. As Russian Atlanticists/ Democrats represented a liberal–institutional approach to international relations, they saw NATO as also being important within the framework of the institutional paradigm: NATO was one of a number of institutions that made the surrounding world a safer place because it based its actions on the consensus principle and was an arena on which one could deal in a constructive way with latent, potential and actual conflicts threatening peace in Europe. After a brief period of pro-Western, Atlanticist policy pursued by the first Russian minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, in 1992 Russian policy towards the alliance came to be marked by a profound scepticism and an openly expressed fear of being marginalized and confronted with the alliance’s military might approaching Russia’s western borders. One of the most important official statements on foreign policy in the first years of Russia’s independent statehood was the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, published in January 1993.12 The document gave some important clues as to Russia’s attitude towards NATO, and especially NATO’s planned activities in the traditional Russian sphere of interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Without mentioning NATO in that context, the document stated clearly that ‘we [Russia] cannot allow the Western powers to force Russia out of the East European region, which is already becoming a reality’. On 3 November 1993, only three weeks after the Russian military had
Table 3.1 Russian schools of thought and NATO: attitude matrix School
NATO as a power factor
NATO as an institutional factor
NATO as an identity factor
Realism Geo-economics Eurasianism Atlanticism
⫺ 0 ⫺ ⫹
⫺ 0 ⫺ ⫹
0 0 ⫺ ⫹
Key ⫹ ⫽ positive attitude; ⫺ ⫽ negative attitude; 0 ⫽ no attitude.
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helped President Boris Yeltsin to do away with the opposition in the Russian parliament, the country’s leadership adopted a new official Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation13 addressing issues relevant to relations with NATO. Also in November 1993, the so-called Primakov Report on the negative consequences of NATO enlargement was published in Moscow. It discussed many issues crucial for Russia’s security in the light of NATO’s (then still unclear) enlargement plans.14 In January 1994, Russia seemed to be appeased by NATO’s proposal for the creation of a new framework for cooperation between the alliance and the countries of the former Soviet bloc. The Russian policy-making community saw the Partnership for Peace (PFP) as a clear sign that NATO was reckoning with Russia’s reservations and as an alternative to enlargement. Russia was offered special treatment by NATO within the PFP framework. On 31 May 1995, Russia officially accepted its Individual Partnership Programme under the PFP and the document on Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO–Russia Dialogue and Cooperation. On 26 September 1995, NATO presented a draft proposal of a Political Framework for NATO–Russia Relations. However, only two days later the alliance released the conclusions of its Study on Enlargement in which it formulated clear entry criteria to be met by potential new members.15 The publication of the study meant that NATO was entering a new, more practical phase in its preparations to enlarge. In January 1996, Yevgenii Primakov was appointed Russia’s new minister of foreign affairs, and with this appointment an advocate of a more assertive Russian foreign policy came to put his personal mark on the Russian approach to NATO. The Primakov period in Russian foreign policy was characterized by a return to thinking in terms of balance of power. However, Primakov was aware that Russia lacked a sound power basis and decided therefore to launch a purely realist policy of counterbalancing the West by seeking closer ties with other global centres of power – China and India.16 This multipolar approach did not prevent a setback in relations with NATO. On 27 May 1997 the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in Paris. Then, only a fortnight later, NATO decided to invite three former Soviet vassals – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – to join the alliance in 1999. Although Russia was again given special treatment by the alliance, and a new political channel was opened between NATO headquarters and Moscow, the decision to enlarge was seen in Russia as a setback in realist terms – as a defeat of Russian foreign and security policy and as a slap on the face. The most important single reason why Russia felt betrayed was that the country’s elite defined NATO enlargement as the most important challenge, and not only politicized but also strongly securitized the issue. Once Russia’s prestige was put to the test in this single case, the failure to stop enlargement had automatically to be seen as
Russia and NATO 65 a humiliating defeat, although there were no traceable signs that NATO had any real aggressive designs and the alliance decided to open a new phase of dialogue with Russia in connection with this enlargement move. This feeling of being ignored and overlooked came to dominate Russia’s official attitude towards NATO in the period between the alliance’s decision to enlarge and its decision to go to war in Kosovo. It was therefore not so surprising, taking into consideration Russia’s primordial instincts where NATO was concerned, that the official Russian reaction to these two ‘watershed events’ – NATO enlargement and what was seen by Russia as the alliance’s military action against a sovereign European state and Russia’s traditional close ally – was full of anger and frustration.
Putin and NATO: words and deeds Putin has always had a rather ambiguous attitude towards NATO. In an interview with two Russian journalists on the eve of presidential election in Russia in March 2000 he gave the following description of NATO as he had perceived it during his time as a spy in Germany: ‘We were working from the territory of Eastern Germany. We were interested in all information on our main enemy, and our main enemy was NATO.’17 At the same time, when he was still the secretary of the Russian Security Council and head of its counter-espionage organization the Federal Security Service (Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB), he showed visible restraint and sobriety when he had to deal with the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. He was critical of NATO’s action but stated that Russia should avoid any confrontation with it over the issue because the country was simply too weak to play this confrontational game: ‘Russia must not get involved in an exchange of strikes. Russia cannot engage in any military action, specifically in its present state. I am feeling that we are being pushed to that. But nobody will succeed in that.’18 This ambiguity in Putin’s attitude – which was a mixture of the probably deeply rooted elemental Soviet mistrust of NATO, a sober assessment of NATO’s actual military and political might, and the realization that Russia was at that stage unable to confront it – was a characteristic trait of his policy towards the alliance in the period between his ‘appointment’ as acting president on 31 December 1999 and 11 September 2001, when he adopted an apparently more pro-Western line. In order to identify the evolution of Putin’s attitude towards NATO, this chapter now looks first at how the official documents on Russia’s security, foreign and defence policy, which Putin signed in the first year of his presidency, approach the question of relations with NATO and then at Putin’s own statements on NATO in the period between December 1999 and September 2001. This section focuses only on what could be termed the more extreme expressions of the Russian president’s attitudes towards NATO.
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One of the first legal acts of the new acting president was the signing of the new version of the National Security Concept on 10 January 2000. On 21 April 2000 the new version of the Military Doctrine was adopted by the Russian Security Council and signed by Putin, now the elected president. Then, on 28 June 2000, Putin approved the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.19 There is, of course, room for debate about whether the official doctrines are really a guiding tool for the actual formulation and implementation of the country’s policy, but it cannot be denied that they are the best tools available to enable us to learn more about and get a better insight into the mental world of the Russian policy- and decision-making community. No matter how general, self-contradictory, incoherent, misleading, deceptive and obscure these doctrines may appear, and no matter how limited the impact they have on actual policy-making, they are the sole officially accepted and standardized expressions of the official views on the country’s position in the international setting. To learn more about the official Russian understanding of NATO under Putin it is therefore quite natural to start by taking a look at how these official documents define NATO and then look at how – and whether – these official views are translated into the actual policy choices made by the Russian decisionmakers. The National Security Concept 2000 placed NATO in a broader context, mentioning its plans to enlarge among other threats to Russia’s security. It identifies one of the most important sources of threat as ‘the strengthening of military–political blocs and alliances, above all NATO’s eastward expansion’, and adds: Elevated to the rank of strategic doctrine, NATO’s transition to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare. The National Security Concept also states that a major source of tension in the international system is the attempt to ‘create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law’. NATO is not specifically mentioned here but it is obvious that it and the USA are the main culprits intended here. The Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 calls for cooperation with NATO, because this would serve security and stability on the continent of Europe.
Russia and NATO 67 This cooperation should be based on a realistic assessment of the role of the alliance, and existing documents – first of all, the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security – should serve as the legal framework for this interaction. The Foreign Policy Concept presents a list of conditions to be fulfilled before Russia can cooperate. These are: ‘compliance with key clauses of this document [Founding Act], primarily those concerning non-use or threat of force, and non-deployment of conventional armed forces groupings, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the territories of the new members’. In addition, it contains a list of Russian grievances with respect to NATO. The most important of these are ‘the provisions of NATO’s new strategic concept, which do not exclude the conduct of use-of-force operations outside the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council’, and the alliance’s enlargement plans, towards which Russia retained its negative attitude. At the same time, the document identifies four NATO countries – the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France – as particularly important for Russia’s defence of its national interests in European and world affairs, and for the stabilization and growth of the Russian economy. The last of this triad of official documents, the Military Doctrine of 2000, does not mention NATO by name. However, it is obvious that many provisions of the document were ‘inspired’ by NATO’s very existence. The document mentions several external threats to Russia’s security, and many of them can be directly related to NATO’s actual or thinkable activities. A glance at the list of external threats to Russia’s military security reveals the potentially negative role NATO can play in this context. NATO, although not named directly, is still seen more as a potential source of strategic threat to Russia’s security than as an opportunity. Of the 12 main external threats enumerated in the new Military Doctrine, NATO has a positive role to play only in one case – the fight against international terrorism, which only one year later was to become the real glue of Russia’s cooperation with the West – while in all other cases the alliance seems to be still seen as at least a potential source of danger. This rather negative perception of NATO is closely linked to more general, traditional perceptions of the nature of NATO as a vehicle and instrument of the USA’s policy of building a hegemonic, unipolar world system, with a special role assigned to itself.20 Putin probably shared this predominantly negative perception of NATO. In the period between his nomination in December 1999 and 11 September 2001 he was sending rather confusing signals on his intentions towards cooperation with NATO. He decided to re-establish official contacts with NATO and met NATO’s secretary-general, Lord Robertson, on his first post-Kosovo visit to Russia on 16 February 2000.21 On 5 March 2000, in his famous BBC interview, he sent a shock wave when he said that Russia could join NATO.22 During the interview Putin was asked whether
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Russia viewed NATO as a potential partner, or rival, or an enemy. He answered that Russia is a part of European culture and that Russia cannot be isolated from Europe and from the civilized world. He added that this was also one reason why he could not regard NATO as an enemy. He stated that Russia wanted a situation in which it would be treated as an equal and trusted partner, accused the West of introducing new rules of engagement in international politics, and repeated that Russia was striving for equal cooperation and partnership and was even interested in reaching higher levels of integration with NATO. The real bomb went off when Putin gave a positive answer to the next question, on potential NATO membership for Russia. He said that the possibility should not be ruled out, but that Russia’s interests would have to be taken into account, and that Russia would have to be treated as a fully fledged partner. After adding a fairly standard Russian negative assessment of the consequences of the eastward expansion of the alliance, Putin concluded on a more constructive note and said that, notwithstanding the problems in relations with NATO, Russia was not ready to slam the door and embark on a policy of self-isolation. Although Putin had plenty of opportunities to discuss various forms of cooperation openly with NATO, he continued to send confusing signals. He met Lord Robertson in Moscow again on 19 February 2001 and agreed to open a NATO Information Office in the Russian capital; then he outlined Russia’s policy towards NATO in his annual State of the Nation speech in April 2001, in which he formulated conditions for Russia’s cooperation with the alliance.23 Finally, only a few weeks before the 11 September attacks, during his first-ever press conference organized in Moscow on 19 July 2001, Putin repeated his proposal that NATO be disbanded.24 Answering a question on measures Russia could take if NATO decided to enlarge again, he outlined various scenarios for developing a new security architecture that would meet the new challenges better than NATO, which he described as a Cold War relic. The first option would be the disbandment of NATO; the second to include Russia in NATO; and the third to create a new pan-European security organization as a substitute for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The fourth possibility would be the continuation of today’s situation with a ‘European security system on many levels’ in which ‘we shall continue to distrust each other’. Putin decided, however, to clarify that ‘we [Russia] do not view NATO as a hostile organization and do not see its existence as a tragedy – although we don’t see the need for it either.’ As can be seen from the statements quoted above, Putin lacked a clearcut policy towards NATO, and considered and discussed many possible options, ranging from Russian membership of the alliance to its disbandment. Now for the first time, on 11 September 2001, he had to make an unambiguous choice. When he learned of the attacks on the United States he could have taken one of three courses of action: remaining neutral,
Russia and NATO 69 adopting a confrontational line, or choosing a cooperative approach. In the weeks after the attacks on the USA, Putin in fact made two important decisions. The first, of a highly symbolic character, was made on 11 September, 45 minutes after the attacks on the USA, when he decided to call President Bush and offered his condolences. The second, of a strategic character, was taken on 22 September when he ordered the Russian power structures to cooperate fully with the USA and requested Russia’s allies in Central Asia to do the same. However, after Bush’s statement that those who were not with the USA in its fight against the threat of international terrorism were on the side of the terrorists, remaining neutral was no longer a viable option for Russia. The real choice was between joining the antiterror coalition the USA was forming or siding – directly or indirectly – with the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. For Putin the pragmatist, the choice was simple: he decided to use this window of opportunity to improve Russia’s international standing and sided with Washington unconditionally.
Interpreting Putin’s post-11 September choices A staunch realist, for whom the question of power parity between the two state actors involved is perhaps the most important gauge by which he measures the action and defines the quality of the emerging relationship, could describe Putin’s choice as nothing more than classic bandwagoning which the Russian leadership wanted to disguise and ‘sell’ to its domestic public as a strategic partnership in a fight against a common enemy and as the re-emergence of a US–Russian global concert of powers. From a realist perspective, Putin’s choice of this strategy was a wise move: by putting Russia on the USA’s post-11 September agenda he was able to establish a direct link with the most important power factor and actor in the transatlantic community. From that perspective NATO became to a certain extent irrelevant for Russia. So long as Russia could retain a special and privileged position on the US interest map, and have direct access to the US policy-makers, it did not need NATO as an ‘institutional’ intermediary; this was especially so after the US–British action in Iraq in 2003 when the links between the USA and two of its European allies (Germany and France) were severed by their criticism of the way the USA has been pursuing its goals in the confrontation with Iraq. In the Russian realist reading, all important real and realist decisions are taken in Washington. Establishing what was presented as a strategic partnership with the USA, and strengthening this partnership even in a situation where some other US European allies were airing doubts about the goals and methods of the USA’s post-11 September policy, was the best way of securing Russia’s influence in a situation where the sole superpower seemed no longer willing to play the multilateral game. Russia, in contrast to some traditional US allies, had the interest, the will and the incentives to embark on a policy of strategic rapprochement with Washington.
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Putin’s policy of establishing close cooperation with the USA had, however, a strong institutional–liberal component as well. Having recognized that the world had changed after 11 September and that Russia had to focus on domestic reforms as the most important means of improving its international position, he embarked on a policy of building a new institutional framework for the future and a new functional regime that could help Russia solve its problems and promote its interests in close cooperation with the most influential global actors. As Putin focuses first and foremost on the economic revival of Russia, understanding that only a strong economic performance can help the country overcome its structural problems, he is interested in strengthening Russia’s cooperation with the economic institutions of the Western world, such as the G8 (the Group of Eight industrialized countries) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the global economy Russia wants to become a part of, those economic forums are much more important for Russia than NATO is. Putin also realizes that the West does not pose a real threat to Russia’s ‘hard’ security and no longer sees NATO, a Western military alliance set up to defend the Western values which Russia is also – at least in a declaratory sense – willing to follow, as a hard security challenge. In the post-11 September setting the alliance is doomed either to pursue goals that are consistent with the Russian hard security objectives or to disappear as a viable instrument of transatlantic cooperation. NATO therefore has a certain, if rather marginal, role to play in Russia’s attempts to build a new, post-11 September institutional setting. The NATO–Russia Council (NRC) set up in May 2002 is useful as a forum for discussion, and the alliance has a role to play in Russia’s designs. However, NATO should be treated not exclusively as a Western defence alliance – which was its original role and a source of concern for Russia so long as Russia had its doubts about the strategic intentions of the West – but as a military tool that could be used wherever and whenever it is necessary from the point of view of the new anti-terrorist coalition in which Russia hopes to play first fiddle by strengthening its institutional strategic partnership with the USA (which happens also to be the most powerful of the NATO allies). The other developed countries in the G8 should, in Russia’s view, join the US–Russian strategic partnership, which should become the cornerstone of the new international system based on the idea of the concert of ‘democratic powers’ opposing the fundamentalist forces of chaos threatening the entire world. In the Russian, and to a large extent Western, interpretations, the forces of chaos confronting Russia in Chechnya and the West elsewhere stem mainly from the Muslim world. This fact gives what could be labelled a strong additional ‘constructivist’ flavour to the cooperation between Russia and the West after 11 September. In addition to establishing a strategic partnership with the USA (or bandwagoning with the USA, as a realist would say), setting up new institutions and contributing to the cre-
Russia and NATO 71 ation of a new functional regime (as a liberal institutionalist would claim), cooperation between Russia and the West has been cemented by the emergence of a new and dangerous Islamic ‘Other’.25 Until 11 September this Islamic Other featured mainly in the Russian discourse as a bearded Wahhabite representing the Islamic international in Chechnya. The whole Russian official discourse on Chechnya between the launching of the second Chechnya war in August 1999 and the 11 September 2001 attacks on the USA had been based on this image of an ‘Islamic Other’ threatening Russia and ‘hijacking’ the cause of the Chechen national liberation movement. The war in Chechnya was not a conflict between Chechen separatists and the central authorities in Moscow, the Russian authorities claimed; it was Russia’s contribution to the fight against the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. In Russia’s view, the West had been too preoccupied with the problem of violations of human rights during the Chechnya war and, instead of joining Russia in its fight against the forces of chaos, it had turned a blind eye to these Russian claims.26 In Russia’s reading the West was now punished for its naivety on 11 September when the USA was attacked by the same forces Russia had fought in Chechnya. These attacks ‘helped’ the West to understand the gravity of the situation and forced it – as many Russian analysts, not without satisfaction, claimed – to join Russia in its ‘anti-terror operation’. The attacks on the USA helped Russia to complete the construction of the ‘threat bridge’ to the West.27 After 11 September, Russia and the West had to face not only a common threat but also a common enemy. Putin apparently decided to grasp this opportunity to change the perception of Russia as the Other.28 The immediate Russian and Western reading of the post-11 September situation was that Russia and the West were facing the same Islamic Other, symbolized by Chechen field commanders Shamil Basaev and Khattab (in Russia’s case) and Osama bin Laden (in the case of the West). This ‘commonality of enemy’ was to become a major building block of the new Western–Russian partnership. It was deliberately brought into play by NATO’s secretary-general, Lord Robertson, as well. Two weeks after 11 September he announced at a press conference: ‘Today the West and Russia have a common cause that they didn’t have two weeks ago.’29 Two months later, at a press conference in Moscow, he reiterated this point: ‘At the moment we are involved with the issue of terrorism, a kind of terrorism that might be seen as an area where we already have got a common enemy.’30 After signing the documents on the creation of the NRC in Rome, Lord Robertson also referred to the common enemy as a reason why Russia and the West should work together: ‘And if we need a reminder of why [NATO and Russia have to cooperate], then there is a simple answer. There is a common enemy out there.’31 By this clear delineation of the boundaries of the post-11 September Other, and by assigning the role of the Other to the Islamic fundamentalists, both Putin and the
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West established the distinction between Friend and Enemy that Carl Schmitt has labelled ‘the specifically political distinction on which political actions and purposes are based’.32 Although there were many other reasons behind Putin’s decision to call Bush on 11 September, a major motive was probably to seize the opportunity to dispel the image of Russia as the West’s most important Other by pointing at other ‘Others’ who posed a more direct threat to both the West and Russia. This strategy could be described as the strategy of redrawing the boundaries of ‘Otherness’. In the post-11 September situation, Russia, though still different from the West, has become an Other who is less ‘other’ than the other Others and more like ‘Us’ than Others, especially those other Others who pose a direct existential threat to both Us and ‘Our Russian Others’. The choice of the cooperative path could therefore be seen as a sort of filling in and submitting of a membership application to the Western club of nations. Putin could also hope that by submitting this ‘application’ at a time when both the West and Russia were facing the same ‘civilizational’ threat (Islamic fundamentalism) he could persuade the West to lower the threshold and give Russia access to the Western club, even if the country still had some problems with meeting all the formal entry criteria.33 By joining the Western club, Russia would be able not only to save money it would otherwise have to spend on building strategic parity (or at least a credible and sufficient anti-Western defence) but also to secure its place under the Western (for which read US) umbrella that could protect it against other global civilizational (Islam) and strategic economic and demographic (China) threats.34 Putin’s post-11 September policy could be described as the adoption by Russia of a three-step value-based policy towards the West. The first step – civilizational self-identification resulting in the Western willingness to widen the definition of Us to encompass Russia as well – served to place Russia on the Western side of the post-11 September front line. As Russia was engaged in a military conflict with what it had presented to the West as the same enemy, this was a relatively easy task, especially in a situation in which the world, after 11 September, came to be perceived again in binary terms: either you are with Us against the Islamic Others or you are against Us and join those whom We define as Others. Notwithstanding all its shortcomings and its arguments with the West, Russia defined itself as belonging to the civilization of the Christian world that was confronted by Islamic fundamentalism. The second step was to anchor Russia in the West by establishing new or strengthening existing institutional networks to bind Russia with the West and give Russia some influence on the decisions of the West. By responding positively to this Russian attempt, the West recognized indirectly that Russia was adhering to, or at least was trying to show that it was willing to adhere to, certain basic Western values, and could be accepted
Russia and NATO 73 as a member of the enlarged Western economic and security community. In that way Russia not only defined itself as belonging to the West, but also managed to get itself defined as ‘Western’ by the West. The third step in this value-driven policy was perhaps the most important one, as the new situation compelled the West to see Russia as a reliable and serious economic partner. The new situation, caused by the 11 September attacks on the one hand and Russia’s economic revival on the other hand, together with a skilful ‘rebranding’ of the country’s image, has contributed to making Russia an attractive economic partner, producing ‘added economic value’ inseparably linked with the ‘political and identity value’ choices made by Putin after 11 September. Thus, metaphorically, prior to 11 September Russia had made an effort to construct a rather narrow ‘threat bridge’ to the West by presenting its war in Chechnya as a front line in the war between the West and the Islamic fundamentalists. Then, when the West itself came under attack from that same enemy, Russian political ‘engineers’ skilfully widened the bridge and used it to establish institutional and economic bridgeheads on the Western side, from which they launched a political offensive that was to give them unquestionable economic and political benefits. However, the events of late 2002 and early 2003 revealed that this could be something more than a simple pro-Western alignment in Russian policy, and that Russia was in fact on the way back to the realist multipolar game that seemed forgotten and irrelevant in the months after Putin chose a pro-Western path on 11 September. From Moscow’s realist perspective it may suddenly have seemed that it was possible to drive a wedge into the transatlantic community and even indirectly contribute to the demise of the Western defence alliance which had been a thorn in the side of first Soviet and then post-Soviet military and political planners for many decades. It seemed that the institutional foundation of transatlantic cooperation, NATO, was being shaken by the dispute over the choice of strategy towards Iraq between the USA and the UK, on the one side, and those whom post-Soviet Russia used to treat as the country’s traditional European partners, Germany and France, on the other.35 On his visit to Paris in February 2003 Putin signed a joint statement on Iraq with his French and German counterparts and called the move ‘the first brick in the construction of a multipolar world’.36 Later on, during the visit to Moscow by President Hu Jintao of China on 27 May 2003, Putin signed a similar statement on the creation of a multipolar world system.37 In his conversation with Russian journalists on the same day, he also elaborated on Russia’s role in the new multipolar world system and the strategic importance of Russia for Europe. ‘If Europe wants to be independent and a fully-fledged global power centre, the shortest route to this goal is good relations with Russia.’38 The fact that he signed the statements on the creation of a multipolar world and invited Europe to cooperate more closely with Russia to achieve the same goal is a clear hint as to
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whom he treats as Russia’s potential partners in what could be interpreted as an attempt to counterbalance the US hegemony. In a speech to Russian officers given on 21 February 2003, Putin presented a rather dramatic view on the situation in the world: The current geopolitical situation in the world is complicated and the global correlation of forces is visibly imbalanced. A new international security configuration has yet to be created. We cannot overlook the increasing aggressiveness of very influential forces in some countries of the world and the diminishing effectiveness of international security and conflict-resolution institutions. This is a cause for concern.39 Putin’s attempts to strengthen the work on the construction of a multipolar world, through cooperation with other influential actors (Germany, France, China and the European Union) – a cooperation that could counterbalance these unnamed ‘increasingly aggressive and very influential forces in some countries’ that both Russia and its potential partners seem to treat as a threat to the existing international order – may be seen as Russia’s response to the new situation in which the multilateral bodies are no longer effective as an arena of discussion and decision-making. However, in order to establish a closer cooperation with at least Russia’s European potential ‘brothers in multipolarism’, something had to be done about the institutional anchor binding Germany and France with the global hegemon and a source of concern for Russian realists. The internal crisis in NATO could therefore be seen as a good opportunity for Russia to ‘help’ Europeans cut – or at least weaken – their transatlantic link. Russian realists could interpret the situation surrounding Iraq and the dispute between the USA and the UK, on the one hand, and Germany and France on the other, as the emergence of a deep split between the traditional Western allies. The situation could provide Russia with a good opportunity to achieve one of the strategic, long-term goals of its policy at relatively low cost to itself. It may have seemed at that moment that Russia only needed to wait and see others do the job of dismantling NATO. Getting rid of NATO as an effective instrument of transatlantic cooperation at no cost to Russia could be tempting, not only from the realist point of view but also from the pragmatic one advocated by Putin. This could also explain why Putin decided to side with Chancellor Schröder of Germany and President Chirac of France, and seemingly reentered the traditional ‘divide and rule game’ in relations with the West. The only remaining pragmatic problem was that Russia had neither any long-term strategy for what to do if the ‘NATO disappearance dream’ came true nor effective means to fill the possible post-NATO vacuum with new, viable institutional solutions. Russia could simply be risking NATO’s disappearance and a US withdrawal from Europe, causing more harm than good to its own long-term strategic interests in a situation when the
Russia and NATO 75 country was still too weak to impose its will on the ‘strategic neighbourhood’. Having realized that, Putin seems to have decided to withdraw to his position before the Iraq conflict and to have used the St Petersburg summit meeting with President Bush in May 2003 to signal that Russia was again a reliable partner of the whole West. The summit was described as a ‘fencemending’ exercise and a show of good personal chemistry between Putin and Bush. However, as Lilia Shevtsova said in her interview with the Washington Post, ‘personal chemistry cannot replace the substance’.40 The lack of substance, resulting to a great extent from the lack of common values and a common interest platform, is seen by many observers as the main challenge in relations between Russia and the West. It may therefore seem that even the emergence of a common enemy in the aftermath of the 11 September attack on the USA has not yet resulted in the establishment of a functioning security community encompassing both Russia and the West. The commonality of short- and even medium-term interests is not the only precondition for a security community to be established: the most important basis of a security community is the mutual trust stemming from community of values and norms regulating relations among its members and their perception of the international environment. Over the past ten years the ‘value gap’ between Russia and the West has been narrowing, but it still seems too wide for the West unconditionally to accept Russia as a real member of the Western security community – of which NATO is still the most visible institutional manifestation.
Notes 1 T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, London: Faber and Faber, 1948, ch. 3. 2 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/1156020.stm. 3 One of the best accounts of the development of relations between NATO and Russia can be found in J. F. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 4 For details see Vladimir Kozin, ‘The Kremlin and NATO: Prospects for interaction’, International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 46(3), 2000, pp. 12–20. 5 For more on the Russian public and Kosovo see Vladimir V. Serebriannikov, ‘Voina v massovom soznanii’ [The war in the mass consciousness], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 9 April 1999; and ‘Znakovoe sobytie ukhodiashchego veka: Agressiia NATO protiv Iugoslavii v zerkale sotsiologii’ [The defining event of the past century: NATO’s aggression against Yugoslavia in the mirror of sociology], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 16 April 1999. 6 The well-known Russian political commentator Lilia Shevtsova summed this up as follows: ‘For the first time in Russian and Soviet history the leader was raised to power on the wave of war’ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ correspondent/1156020.stm). 7 Quoted from William Safire, ‘Testing Putin on Iran’, New York Times, 23 May 2002.
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8 This presentation of Russian schools of thought is based to a great extent on the work of Alexander Sergounin (see the Bibliography) and Aleksander Rahr and J. Krause, Russia’s New Foreign Policy, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationale Politik, no. 91, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1995. 9 Edward N. Luttwak, ‘From geopolitics to geoeconomics’, The National Interest, Summer 1990; and ‘The theory and practice of geoeconomics’, in Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds), The International System after the Collapse of the East–West Order, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 220–36. 10 One of the most consistent analysts to use the ‘geo-economic approach’ in Russia is Sergei Rogov, who has underlined the importance of the economic basis for Russia’s foreign and security policy and advocates its adaptation to the new realities. Sergei Rogov, ‘Rossiia i SShA na poroge XXI veka’ [Russia and the USA on the threshold of the 21st century], Svobodnaia mysl’, 4 and 5, 1996; and ‘Vektory bezopasnosti 2001 goda’ [The vectors of security in 2001], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 12 January 2001. 11 See Luttwak, ‘The theory and practice of geoeconomics’, pp. 220, 229–30. 12 The Russian text of the doctrine was published in Diplomaticheskii vestnik, vypusk spetsialnyi, January 1993. An English translation was published in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, FBIS-USR-93-037, 25 March 1993. 13 The first draft of the new Russian military doctrine had already been published in 1992 in a special issue of Voennaia mysl’, May 1992, pp. 4–7. For an article commenting on this proposal, see Aleksandr Vladimirov, ‘Eta systema mogucha i dostatochno zla’ [This system is powerful and evil enough], Rossiiskaia gazeta, 22 September 1992. The first official military doctrine was adopted by the Russian Security Council on 3 November 1993, and an English text was published in Jane’s Intelligence Report, January 1994. An in-depth analysis of the document can be found in Charles Dick, ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 7(3), 1994, pp. 481–506. 14 The report was presented by Yevgenii Primakov at a press conference on 25 November 1993 and was discussed in Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 November 1993. 15 The text of the study is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl9501.htm. 16 For more detail on this doctrine see Aleksei Pushkov, ‘The “Primakov Doctrine” and a New European Order’, International Affairs (Moscow), 44(2), 1998, pp. 1–13. 17 Vladimir Putin, Ot pervogo litsa [In the first person], Moscow: Vagrius, 2000. 18 ITAR–TASS, 30 March 1999. 19 An overview of the official Russian documents on the country’s security, foreign and defence policy is available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website at http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd. 20 For more details on this reading see, for instance, Vladimir Chernega, ‘Budushchie vzaimootnoshenii Rossiia–NATO’ [Future relations between Russia and NATO], in The First Anniversary of the NATO–Russia Founding Act: Appraisal and Outlook, Documents on the International Conference, Moscow, 19–20 June 1998, Moscow: INION RAN, 1999. 21 For the Joint statement on the visit, see the NATO website at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p000216e.htm. For a Russian view on the importance of the visit and the future of Russia–NATO relations see Vadim Solovev, ‘NATO i Rossiia otkryvaiut novuiu stranitsu sotrudnichestva’ [NATO and Russia open a new page of cooperation], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,
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22 23 24 25
26
27
28
29 30 31
32
33
2 June 2000; and ‘Pochemu by Rossii ne vstupit v NATO’ [Why Russia will not be joining NATO], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 2 June 2000. The text of the interview can be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ static/audio_video/programmes/breakfast_with_frost/transcripts/putin5.mar.txt. The text of Putin’s State of the Nation speech was published in Johnson’s Russia List, 5185, 4 April 2001. Associated Press, ‘Highlights of Putin news conference’, 19 July 2001. Another translation is also available at http://www.strana.ru, a website created by Putin’s close aide Gleb Pavlovskii as a sort of propaganda channel. For the Russian reading of the importance of the Islamic factor, see Aleksandr Ignatenko, ‘Ot Filippin do Kosovo: Islamizm kak globalnyi destabiliziruiushchii faktor’ [From the Philippines to Kosovo: Islam as a global destabilizing factor], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 October 2000 (http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2000-10-12). The Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, believed to be ‘number two’ in Putin’s Russia, tried to convince the West that Russia had a special civilizational mission in the Caucasus and in Central Asia when he said: ‘Russia, a front-line warrior fighting international terrorism in Chechnya and Central Asia, is saving the civilized world from the terrorist plague, in the same way that it saved Europe from the Tartar–Mongol invasions in the 13th century. And we pay for it, in suffering and privation.’ See UPI, 4 February 2002. In his televised speech on 25 September Putin expressed this in a very direct way: ‘We also believe that the events in Chechnya cannot be seen out of the context of the struggle against international terrorism’; quoted from Boris Piadyshev, ‘After the terrorist attacks’, International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 47(5), 2001, p. 6. On Russia as Europe’s most important ‘Other’, see Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe, London: Routledge, 1996; Iver B. Neumann, ‘The geopolitics of delineating “Russia” from “Europe”: The creating of the “Other” in European and Russian tradition’, in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Einagel (eds), Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity, London: Sage, 1997, pp. 147–73; and Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation, Borderlines 9, Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Reuters, ‘US attacks draw NATO, Russia together: Robertson’, 25 September 2001. See http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122b.htm. See http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/05-may/e0528a.htm. Having a common enemy may, however, not necessarily be a strong enough basis for the development of a true partnership. As Angela Stent wrote concerning Russian–US relations, ‘This partnership, however, needs fresh impetus. Without a more forward-looking agenda, it could stagnate or deteriorate, if the United States and Russia continue to disagree over issues involving Russia’s ties to Iraq, Iran and North Korea. US–Russian ties must have a stronger foundation than a common enemy. There are several areas where Russia and the United States have compelling reasons to cooperate, areas that could provide a firmer basis for a partnership based on mutual interest.’ Angela Stent, ‘Whither the US–Russian partnership?’, Moscow Times, 27 November 2002. Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [The concept of the political], Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, [1932] 1991, p. 26. For more on the role of the Enemy in establishing a political and not least a security community, see also Reinhart Koselleck, Feindbilder [Enemy images], Göttingen: Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung, Jahrbuch, 1993, p. 83, and passim. These problems included deficiencies in the Russian market economy, problems with the freedom of the press and the functioning of democratic institutions, and human rights abuses in Chechnya.
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34 See, for instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books, 1997. 35 Sergei Karaganov presented a rather grim picture of the situation of the alliance as a consequence of bad choices in the past: ‘NATO, a traditional security organization, has found itself in a rather difficult situation. As its historical mission was fully completed by the early 1990s, there were calls for reform; the organization needed to be remade as a viable tool for countering new threats. If NATO had wisely followed that line and established a solid alliance with Russia, it would have given birth to an entirely new security system. But inertia and old habits prevailed, and NATO chose to simply expand and initiate useless cosmetic reforms. Numerous problems eventually emerged in its relations with Russia, and much energy was spent in unfruitful discussions. In the long run, NATO came to a position where it is now – overlooking the backwater of world politics.’ Sergei Karaganov, ‘The chances and challenges of the New World’, Russia in Global Affairs, 2, 2003, pp. 8–18. 36 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RFE/RL Newsline, 12 February 2003. 37 RFE/RL Newsline, 28 May 2003. 38 RFE/RL Newsline, 28 May 2003. 39 RFE/RL Newsline, 24 February 2003. 40 Washington Post, 1 June 2003.
Bibliography Books and journals Black, J. F., Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books, 1997. Chernega, Vladimir, ‘Budushchie vzaimootnoshenii Rossiia–NATO’ [Future relations between Russia and NATO], in The First Anniversary of the NATO–Russia Founding Act: Appraisal and Outlook, Documents on the International Conference, Moscow, 19–20 June 1998, Moscow: INION RAN, 1999. Dick, Charles, ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 7(3), 1994, pp. 481–506. ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, Diplomaticheskii vestnik, vypusk spetsialnyi, January 1993. Foucher, Michel, ‘La fin de la géopolitique? Réflexions géographiques sur la grammaire des puissances’ [The end of geopolitics? Geographical reflections on the grammar of powers], Politique étrangère, 1, 1997, pp. 19–31. Godzimirski, Jakub M., ‘Russian national security concepts 1997 and 2000: A comparative analysis’, European Security, 9(4), 2000, pp. 73–91. Jane’s Intelligence Report, January 1994. Karaganov, Sergei, ‘The chances and challenges of the New World’, Russia in Global Affairs, 2, 2003, pp. 8–18. Koselleck, Reinhart, Feindbilder [Enemy images], Göttingen: Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung, Jahrbuch, 1993. Kozin, Vladimir, ‘The Kremlin and NATO: Prospects for interaction’, International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 46(3), 2000, pp. 12–20.
Russia and NATO 79 Luttwak, Edward N., ‘From geopolitics to geoeconomics’, The National Interest, Summer 1990. ——, ‘The theory and practice of geoeconomics’, in Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds), The International System After the Collapse of the East–West Order, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 220–36. Neumann, Iver B., Russia and the Idea of Europe, London: Routledge, 1996. ——, ‘The geopolitics of delineating “Russia” from “Europe”: The creating of the “Other” in European and Russian tradition’, in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Victoria Einagel (eds), Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity, London: Sage, 1997, pp. 147–73. ——, Uses of the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation, Borderlines 9, Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Piadyshev, Boris, ‘After the terrorist attacks’, International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, 47(5), 2001, pp. 1–15. Pushkov, Aleksei, ‘The “Primakov Doctrine” and a New European Order’, International Affairs (Moscow), 44(2), 1998, pp. 1–13. Putin, Vladimir, Ot pervogo litsa [In the first person], Moscow: Vagrius, 2000. Rahr, Aleksander and J. Krause, Russia’s New Foreign Policy, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationale Politik no. 91, Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1995. Rastopshin, Mikhail M., ‘Vstrechat tanki NATO nechem’ [Nothing to encounter NATO’s tanks with], Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, 13 August 1999. Rogov, Sergei, ‘Rossiia i SShA na poroge XXI veka’ [Russia and the USA on the threshold of the 21st century], Svobodnaia mysl’, 4 and 5, 1996. ——, ‘Vektory bezopasnosti 2001 goda’ [The vectors of security in 2001], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 12 January 2001. Schmitt, Carl, Der Begriff des Politischen [The concept of the political], Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, [1932] 1991. Serebriannikov, Vladimir V., ‘Voina v massovom soznanii’ [The war in the mass consciousness], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 9 April 1999. ——, ‘Znakovoe sobytie ukhodiashchego veka: Agressiia NATO protiv Iugoslavii v zerkale sotsiologii’ [The defining event of the past century: NATO’s aggression against Yugoslavia in the mirror of sociology], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 16 April 1999. Sergounin, Alexander, Russian Foreign Policy Thinking: Redefining Conceptions, COPRI Working Paper no. 11/1993, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), 1993. ——, ‘Russian domestic debate on NATO enlargement: From phobia to damage limitation’, European Security, 6(4), 1997, pp. 55–71. ——, Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms, COPRI Working Paper no. 4/1997, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), 1997. ——, Russia: Long Way to the National Security Doctrine, COPRI Working Paper no. 10/1998, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), 1998. ——, ‘Russia and the world: Changing paradigms of Russian foreign and security policy under Yeltsin and Putin’, Paper presented at NUPI’s Conference The
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Russian Federation – Ten Years of Statehood: What Now?, Oslo, 23–24 August 2001. Solovev, Vadim, ‘NATO i Rossiia otkryvaiut novuiu stranitsu sotrudnichestva’ [NATO and Russia open a new page of cooperation], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 2 June 2000. ——, ‘Pochemu by Rossii ne vstupit v NATO’ [Why Russia will not be joining NATO], Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 2 June 2000. Stent, Angela, ‘Whither the US–Russian partnership?’, Moscow Times, 27 November 2002. Vladimirov, Aleksandr, ‘Eta systema mogucha i dostatochno zla’ [This system is powerful and evil enough], Rossiiskaia gazeta, 22 September 1992.
Media and Internet Associated Press, ‘Highlights of Putin news conference’, 19 July 2001. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, FBIS-USR-93-037, 25 March 1993. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000 (http://www.ln. mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd). Ignatenko, Aleksandr, ‘Ot Filippin do Kosovo: Islamizm kak global’nyi destabilizirushchii faktor’ [From the Philippines to Kosovo: Islam as a global destabilizing factor], Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 October 2000 (http://www.ng.ru/ideas/ 2000-10-12). ITAR–TASS, 30 March 1999. Johnson’s Russia List, 5185, 4 April 2001. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 21 April 2000 (http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd). National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, 10 January 2000 (http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd). NATO, Study on Enlargement, 1995 (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ enl9501.htm). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RFE/RL Newsline, 12 February 2003; 24 February 2003; 28 May 2003. Reuters, ‘US attacks draw NATO, Russia together: Robertson’, 25 September 2001. Safire, William, ‘Testing Putin on Iran’, New York Times, 23 May 2002. Shevtsova, Lilia, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/ 1156020.stm. UPI, 4 February 2002. Voennaia mysl’, May 1992, pp. 4–7. Washington Post, 1 June 2003. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p000216e.htm. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/1156020.stm. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/breakfast_with_fr ost/transcripts/putin5.mar.txt. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122b.htm. http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/05-may/e0528a.htm.
4
The logic of foreign and security policy change in Russia Mette Skak
Introduction In 1999 it was possible to frame analyses of Russia in terms of drastic scenarios such as chaos and conflict. Russia had barely recovered from the August 1998 economic meltdown, and the political scene in Moscow was more or less paralysed by the rapid succession of prime ministers and President Boris Yeltsin’s deteriorating health. In the spring Russia opposed NATO’s war on Yugoslavia over the fate of Kosovo, and in October 1999 the second Chechen war began. Later the mood changed to one of cautious optimism concerning Russia and its foreign and security policy. This can be seen from titles such as ‘reluctant rapprochement’ with respect to relations between Russia and the Baltic countries in the context of the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).1 This change is part of a larger trend for a reappraisal of Russia’s standing in world affairs, which in turn has to do with actual policy changes in Moscow. Clearly, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 upon the United States, the world’s only superpower, play into this as the watershed event for Russian foreign and security policy as well.2 Yet even before 11 September analysts had already begun to downplay scenarios of state collapse and the dismemberment of the Russian Federation, and to point instead to Russia’s emerging consolidation as a highly regionalized and pluralistic but nevertheless viable state entity.3 Predictions of civil war and warlordism as likely consequences of the regionalization of the Russian armed forces are now receding into the background.4 Together with these structural developments towards recovery, and economic growth (due not only to Russia’s windfall gain from higher oil prices but also to the reforms of the preceding years),5 – the coming to power of a new, vigorous president, Vladimir Putin, must be mentioned. Such personal factors matter because of the very strong powers the Russian constitution vests in the president, including power over foreign policy (Article 86) and hence security policy. Certainly not everything Putin stands for is to be welcomed. Amid the
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generally positive reappraisal of Russia’s standing in world affairs there are voices expressing concern about a backlash for democracy in Russia. Putin carries political responsibility for the continuing brutality of Russia’s armed forces and secret services in Chechnya, and his ‘war on terrorism’ appears to include a return to Stalinist practices of using informers in Moscow.6 Restrictions on the media, for instance in their coverage of the upcoming elections, and a worsening human rights situation are often mentioned, and Putin’s own visions do include oxymorons such as ‘managed democracy’ and ‘dictatorship of the law’, suggesting a bias towards authoritarianism. Consequently, one must be careful to specify exactly in which areas and in what way it makes sense to speak of a turn for the better in Russia. While it may be necessary to speak of negative trends for democracy with respect to Russia’s home front, it is possible to speak of an emerging democratic peace7 between Russia and some of its neighbours, namely its neighbours to the west. Thus, it is the contention of this chapter that the Baltic Sea region, and in particular the three Baltic states and Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic coast, is a net winner from Russia’s recent policy reorientation, along with the Balkan region. Specifically, (a) Russia has been able to accept NATO’s eastward enlargement, including a tacit but concrete acceptance of the fact that the Baltic states will be members of NATO by May 2004; and, equally significant, (b) Russia has been able to compromise on the issue of a transit regime for Kaliningrad in the face of its neighbours’ (Poland and Lithuania) accession to the Schengen regime in connection with their entry into the EU.8 The implication of this is a further improvement of the security situation of the Nordic countries, at least as far as issues of hard security are concerned. The concluding section of this chapter will return to this. Even without these changes in Russia and Russia’s policy, the foreign and security policy of post-Soviet Russia merits discussion on account of the unique turbulence of its foreign policy scene, in contrast to other postcommunist states where a broad consensus of pursuing integration with the Western world for the sake of consolidating the breakaway from Moscow’s control established itself quickly.9 The key difference between Russia and its post-communist neighbours which explains this pattern is that Russia, or to be more precise, Moscow was the centre of the Soviet empire – something that has translated into a syndrome of imperialistic political culture resurfacing in the policy positions of today’s Russian policy-making elite.10 This has brought frustration and cynicism about the volatility of foreign policy decision-making in Russia, even among Western academic experts on Russia.11 It is therefore worthwhile to relate the recent developments in Russian foreign and security policy to its evolution since Russia gained independence in late 1991. The topic for consideration here is the overall dynamics of foreign and security policy in Russia – the logic behind foreign policy change, so to speak.
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 83 To investigate this, the analysis in this chapter takes three basic steps. First, there is a conceptual clarification of what ‘national interest’ and ‘security’ mean in the Russian context, or, rather, how they have come to be understood by the Russian political elite and what room for manoeuvre that leaves for the country’s political leadership. The second, theoretical part of the analysis presents Robert D. Putnam’s two-level games framework for foreign policy analysis and his concept of win-sets as a fruitful way to capture the contradictory logic of Russian foreign and security policy throughout the past decade or so. The third, empirical part of the analysis examines the clash between the domestic win-set of derzhavnik12 anti-Americanism and neo-imperialism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the external win-set of liberalism and ‘bandwagoning’ with the USA as the avenue for restoring Russia’s state capacity. The point is Putin’s efforts to reconcile these opposing win-sets through his platform of an ‘enlightened derzhavnik’, hereby learning from the political fate of Mikhail Gorbachev and later Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s first minister of foreign affairs, as well as from the policy failure of Kozyrev’s successor, Yevgenii Primakov. Finally, some conclusions are drawn, among other things in terms of security in the Nordic countries and the policy implications for the West in the broad sense. The idea behind this chapter is thus to place the recent foreign policy reorientation of Russia, which is commonly linked to the terror attacks of 11 September, in a more historical context, highlighting the interplay of domestic and international political forces around Russia. The method is one of macro-analytical interpretation, including references to secondary literature, rather than the meticulous tracking of developments in a particular area of Russian foreign policy and detailed documentation of sources.
‘National interest’ and ‘security’: what do they mean in Russia? Here, ‘national interest’ is used as shorthand for what foreign policy is about and ‘security’ as shorthand for what security policy is about – the twin concepts from the headline for this section. Without going into the details of the Copenhagen school of security studies,13 it is safe to say that Soviet political culture suffered from an excessive ‘securitization’ of issues which continues to haunt Russia.14 One of the challenges facing Russia today is thus to ‘desecuritize’ most of what used to be securitized in Stalin’s and Brezhnev’s days – and in addition to this to begin, if not to securitize, then at least to take seriously, mundane issues of ‘soft security’ such as the human rights, dignity and welfare of the individual citizen. Clearly, the collapse of the Soviet Union also meant the collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a frame of reference for foreign and security policy, and so post-communist Russia had to embark upon a definition of its ‘national interest’ and real national security concerns.
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A key problem in this, however, is the overly narrow ‘possession goal’15 realism which Russian analysts and decision-makers display in their approach to Russia’s national security. All too often ‘security’ has come to be understood as synonymous with ‘empire’, as Hannes Adomeit observes.16 Against this background it was of little help that Primakov used the occasion of his first interview as minister of foreign affairs to spell out his wish ‘to strengthen the foreign ministry’s efforts to protect Russia’s national interests’, which he identified as being a great power and having a policy reflecting that status.17 Primakov may or may not have identified with his supporters’ neo-imperialistic designs for his country’s post-Soviet neighbourhood, dubbed the ‘near abroad’.18 The fact remains that he presided over a foreign policy based on the hawkish 1993 Foreign Policy Concept with its emphasis on neo-imperialism and a hostile international environment.19 He actively contributed to the offensive turn of Russian conduct by singling out NATO enlargement as a threat to national security in late 1993.20 The stress on the open-ended, maximalist early Russian consensus on the understanding of ‘security’ is deliberate. It was Kozyrev’s unwillingness to let ‘national interest’ and ‘security’ translate into what came to be known as the ‘Monrovski’ doctrine for the near abroad as an exclusive sphere of Russian influence that led to his dismissal as foreign minister.21 Then came a reality check – the disastrous invasion of Chechnya (1994–6) when the Russian military had to face defeat. In all likelihood, it was a war of misperception and thus an unnecessary war – a war that might have been averted.22 The shock of Chechnya appears to have been the catalyst for the strikingly sober 1997 National Security Concept, which is mostly forgotten now. This document dropped the neo-imperialistic ‘backyard’ terminology of the ‘near abroad’, stating that: An analysis of the threats to the national security of the Russian Federation shows that the main threat at present and in the foreseeable future will not be military, but predominantly internal in character and will centre on the internal political, economic, social, ecological, information and spiritual spheres . . . The development of a qualitatively new pattern of relations with the leading world states and the political absence of the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia, while it preserves its nuclear deterrent, makes it possible to redistribute the resources of the state and society to address . . . internal problems.23 In other words, this is a threat perception focused on internal threats, whereas there is a perception of a benign international milieu, notably as far as the ‘leading world states’ are concerned – an unmistakable reference to the United States. This is no minor detail: the launching of this assess-
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 85 ment of Russia’s security happened to coincide with the culmination of Russia’s campaign against NATO enlargement as far as the Central European applicants were concerned. The 1997 National Security Concept leaves one with the impression that Russia was merely constructing a security concern over NATO enlargement all along. This conclusion finds support in the instructive analyses by Leon Aron and Coit D. Blacker.24 Aron sees the great-power mania of Russia, including the hostility to NATO, as a fairly innocent Gaullism; that is, a nonrevisionist bargaining game of insisting upon Russia’s place in the concert of great powers.25 Similarly, Blacker sees Primakov’s anti-US strategy of pursuing multipolarity by courting China and other power rivals to the USA as basically one of bluffing; that is, a game seeking to build up credibility around Russia’s willingness to defect from cooperation with the Western world.26 In Blacker’s apt phrase, it was a ‘strategy of driving west while feinting east’.27 His point about cultivating the option of jumping ship – of defecting from one camp to another in order to heighten one’s leverage in international games of bargaining – is also central to Robert D. Putnam’s model of two-level games. Already this introduction to Russian national security thinking and practice in the 1990s suggests that Russia is often caught in self-defeating games of manipulating its own interests and security. Up to this point, this chapter has said nothing about Russia’s embrace of the general idea of transition; that is, building up a democracy and market economy in Russia – something of a leitmotif in all official Russian foreign and security policy thinking. All the more paradoxical, then, are the many games of pretence and actual moves towards removing Russia from the track of state recovery through normal, peaceful cooperation with both its ‘near abroad’ and the ‘far abroad’. Meanwhile, Russia found itself unable to prevent either NATO’s enlargement – never an initiative emanating from NATO itself, but originating from the applicant countries because of their fear of Russian revanchism, a fear aggravated by personalities like Vladimir Zhirinovskii and by the war in Chechnya – or NATO’s 1999 air war punishing Serbia for its brutality in Kosovo. This brought a mood of bitterness in Russia which found its way into the next round of foreign policy and national security concepts adopted in 2000. The 2000 guidelines include a new military doctrine, and may be considered ‘Putin guidelines’ as they can be presumed to have guided foreign policy during his first years in power; that is, their explicit anti-Americanism reflects the mood in Russia prior to 11 September 2001.28 According to the 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept, ‘new challenges and threats to the national interests of Russia are emerging in the international sphere. A trend is growing toward the establishment of a unipolar power structure that would be dominated by the United States economically and through force.’29 The Finnish political scientist Henrikki Heikka rightly observes double standards in Russia in this document:
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‘Russia thus rejects the right of NATO to conduct out-of-area humanitarian interventions for promoting democracy, while itself claiming the right to defend the “rights and freedom” of compatriots30 in the near abroad.’31 He notices the great distance between the Russian paradigm as of the 2000 guidelines and the EU Common Strategy on Russia, aiming at Russia’s transition into a law-abiding democracy and integrating Russia into a ‘common European economic and social space’.32 Heikka concludes by detecting a grimmer and more militarized world-view in Russia and an increasingly nationalistic and assertive Russian grand strategy – in sum a consensus on the imperative to counterbalance Western power.33 No multipolarity as bluffing and feinting here!
Putnam’s model of two-level games Many writings on international relations and the foreign policy of individual countries remain stuck in the mostly far too abstract systemic paradigms of neo-realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism, thereby overlooking the fruitful frameworks and insights within the field of foreign policy analysis. One such framework is Robert D. Putnam’s model of twolevel games where foreign policy is viewed as a Janus head facing the domestic and the international arenas simultaneously. For Putnam it is futile to debate whether domestic politics really determines international relations or vice versa, as the arrow of causality may go both ways depending upon the empirical case.34 It makes more sense to look at interstate relations as bargaining going on at two levels of game boards: At the national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.35 Putnam stresses the dynamic nature of two-level games whereby ‘clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives’. In this sense, 11 September can be interpreted as one such move capable of triggering realignments and Putin’s role as that of the clever player here. This is basically what is meant by Putnam’s term ‘synergistic linkage’; that is, creating policy options across nations and states – transnationally, to use political science jargon. Putnam’s key concept is that of the ‘win-set’; that is, the set of all possible international bargaining outcomes that might win majority backing
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 87 on the home front of a given player or government.36 He uses the term primarily for the Level II game board, which is the domestic political configuration of preferences. Yet, in view of the challenge to Russia – of joining the international team of players capable of helping Russia towards consolidation as a state, democracy and market economy – it makes sense to perceive Russia’s external foreign policy game as one of joining the winning coalition of great powers and states – the Level I winset as it were. Another point in Putnam’s reasoning is ‘ratification’ in the broadest sense of the word, from voting rules for passing laws to any configuration of power required to endorse a given agreement or decision.37 As mentioned above, credibility and defection play an important role in his approach – for instance, the credibility of the option and threat of defection, since it may be difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary defection as strategic negotiators may want to misrepresent what goes on at home.38 Putnam introduces the colourful term ‘kinky winsets’ about win-sets that are easily upset – in other words crying wolf, which negotiators often do. Both Kozyrev and Yeltsin occasionally threatened the advent to power of the ‘red–brown coalition’, the ‘war party’, and so on, if Russia were pressed further. Allen C. Lynch therefore plays down the confusion and weakness of Russian foreign policy makers, preferring to portray them as skilfully exploiting openings which the outside world created.39 Nevertheless, even if the Russian foreign policy-making elite can be seen as partly professional in its handling of the international milieu, it stands to reason that the fluidity of the domestic scene – an unavoidable outcome of the collapse of Soviet power and Russia’s transition from a closed to an open society, combined with a political culture of empire and zero-sum reasoning – has created tremendous barriers in building domestic win-sets conducive to bringing about the desired changes in Russia. The argument so far can therefore be formulated into two basic hypotheses: •
•
H(1) As for Level II – the domestic game board – the hegemonic winset in Russia tends to be an illiberal one of derzhavnik anti-Americanism and neo-imperialism, but not extremist. H(2) As for Level I – the foreign policy game board – the relevant win-set is one of liberalism that accepts the unique power of the USA and hence implies bandwagoning, not ‘balancing’.40
Admittedly, this differs somewhat from the micro-analysis of more restricted cases of international negotiation that Putnam has in mind, but he does refer to broader cases of a historical nature and evidently sees his work as more or less universally applicable. The brief empirical analysis below returns to the chronological macro-analysis of the evolution of foreign and security policy in Russia, this time as a logic of two-level
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games. First, however, mention must be made of Andrew Moravcsik’s addition to the variables and dimensions of two-level analysis presented here; namely, a government’s or leader’s option of manipulating domestic win-sets and building winning coalitions by shaping institutions, controlling information, mobilizing selectively or colluding with the other government to enhance its own standing.41 Already in his 1988 work,42 Putnam focuses on the options available for the chief negotiator – in this case the president of Russia who, as noticed from the outset, holds large powers in his hands. The chief negotiator may enhance his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources, anticipating the results and popularity of an international agreement, shifting the balance of power at Level II towards policies which he prefers, or simply by pursuing his own perception of the national interest – a risky venture at times, it must be said.
The evolution of Russian foreign and security policy: a two-level game Given the empirical case of Russia, a dramatically weakened and territorially shrunken power, but a nuclear power of tremendous geopolitical weight and unused – even often destroyed – potential, the two-level approach becomes all the more pertinent. Thucydides distinguished between the power of the strong and the weak. Indeed, much of Russia’s drama of transition is one of a continued Level II insistence on Russia’s strength – absolutely blind to the implications of the implosion of the Soviet Union and Russia’s need to build itself up from scratch relying on the relevant Level I win-set cited in H(2). Fortunately, neither Level II win-sets nor two-level games as such are static over a longer time perspective. Processes of learning, for instance, through trial and error,43 may be of importance and hence an important issue for analysts to consider. The Gorbachev era, 1985–91 Gorbachev’s insight was that Soviet attempts to build up alternatives to the relevant Level I win-set led nowhere; moreover, whatever grip on power the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had at home as a working Level II win-set, the Soviet Union was eroding its power from within precisely because of CPSU policies. So Gorbachev launched perestroika, demokratizatsiia and novoe politicheskoe myshlenie (new political thinking, NPM), a foreign policy doctrine for reconciling the Soviet Union with the relevant Level I win-set. As Robert G. Hermann argues, however, some of the ostensible architects behind NPM were only superficial converts to Gorbachev’s doctrine,44 a case in point being Primakov. In other words, Primakov personifies Soviet recidivism (although in Russia
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 89 he is by no means extremist). The occasionally contradictory experiment of Gorbachev ended in the August 1991 putsch, followed by Yeltsin’s peaceful conquest of power using Russia proper as a Level II win-set. The early Yeltsin era, 1992–3 Originally Yeltsin and Kozyrev reacted to the August putsch – the epochmaking episode of Soviet recidivism – by sharpening the foreign and security policy implications of NPM, calling NATO Russia’s true ally, and so on. Soon it turned out that Russia’s Level II win-set was too kinky for Kozyrev’s continuance of NPM (now dubbed Atlanticism), as witnessed in the abrupt cancellation of Yeltsin’s visit to Japan in mid-1992.45 Kozyrev was politically and bureaucratically weak, and Yeltsin himself often defected from him for the benefit of the mainstream Level II win-set as depicted in H(1); that is, illiberal derzhavnik anti-Americanism and neoimperialism. Several of Yeltsin’s presidential advisers played their own foreign policy games and were instrumental in torpedoing the win-set around Kozyrev – prominent figures like Yevgenii Ambartsumov, Andranik Migranian and, last but not least, Sergei Karaganov, then and now heading the influential Council of Foreign and Security Policy (Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike, SVOP).46 Already in early 1993, Russian foreign and security policy thus took a decisive turn towards Eurasianism,47 possession goal realism48 and derzhavnik assertiveness. Even Kozyrev changed. The mid-Yeltsin era, 1993–7 As the section on Russian foreign and security policy thinking makes clear, this was a traumatic and turbulent period for the newly established Level II win-set – its formative years, perhaps, in a more benign sense of learning as well. There was the rise to prominence of the lunatic fringe of Russian politics – for instance, Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), following the December 1993 elections; another factor was the shock of the first Chechnya war (1994–6). Both these factors only served to strengthen the resolve of the Baltic and Central and South-East European applicants for membership of NATO.49 Russia’s counterproposal to NATO enlargement, launched at the December 1994 summit meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – placing NATO under the OSCE together with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)50 – amused no one because of Chechnya. NATO did try to turn enlargement into a win–win game for Russia through the NATO–Russian Permanent Joint Council of 1997, and Russia had in any case no choice but to acquiesce. It was important for Russia to capitalize on its own relations to NATO. Yet Primakov in his new capacity as Russian foreign minister continued to pursue multipolarity.51 China and
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Russia drew closer by 1996–7, while Russia joined the Contact Group, a great-power concert to coordinate policy in the wars in the former Yugoslavia; however, the US administration under President Bill Clinton began to have second thoughts about Russia.52 The Russian mass public was almost indifferent to NATO enlargement – in stark contrast to the elitist Level II win-set that consolidated itself through Kozyrev’s removal.53 The late Yeltsin era, 1998–9 As mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, this was a depressing time in Russia. On the foreign policy scene Russia faced several defeats: first (and minor, given the NATO–Russia accord of 1997), the accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999; second, the Baltic states’ presence on NATO’s agenda for a possible second round of enlargement through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) programme of 1999; and, third, the reaction to Russia’s interventionist but otherwise utterly impotent policy among CIS countries – the formation of the proNATO group of GUUAM countries in 1999.54 The long-term effect of developments in and around Russia by 1999 was to pull the carpet from under Eurasianism or, to use Putnam parlance, pull the carpet from under the Level II win-set. Compare the key argument of the Russian analyst Dmitri Trenin: The harsh reality is that with Poland already in NATO, the Baltic states aspiring to join, and the GUUAM countries leaning toward the Alliance, there is no Eurasia left for Russia to return to. Russia simply cannot withdraw again into some kind of ‘splendid isolation’ à la the USSR. It can decide to become marginalized, but even then it can no longer hope to have a protective shell around it.55 Trenin goes on to discuss Eurasianism with empathy as a psychological reaction, or grudge against the United States, rather than a coherent strategy. Yet his conclusion is clear: neither this nor similar strategies of multipolarity will translate into viable – that is, relevant – Level I win-sets: ‘Disappointment with Eurasianism, however, is certain. No Russian-led Orthodox bloc surrounded by a buffer of Muslim states, as envisioned by Huntington is likely to emerge.’56 The Far Eastern and South Asian option of aligning with China, Japan and India is also not credible, except, of course, as a game of bluffing about defection.57 On top of all this came NATO’s Kosovo war – another defeat for Russia because of its inclination to support President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and to oppose NATO. Russia retaliated desperately through the surprise seizure of Pristina airport in June 1999 and then went on to cooperate over stabilizing Kosovo. The fact that the EU actu-
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 91 ally upgraded its relationship with Russia by launching the pioneering Common Strategy on Russia in June 199958 was largely overlooked. In August 1999 Chechen forces headed by Shamil Basaev made incursions into neighbouring Dagestan, paving the way for a new Russian war in Chechnya – and for Putin’s rise to power. On 31 December 1999 Yeltsin stepped down. The early Putin era, 2000 to 10 September 2001 Putin personified the power ministries and marketed himself as a strong man and derzhavnik by calling for the restoration of Russia’s great-power status.59 He thus immediately attracted support from communists and the entire ‘centrist’ Level II win-set. As discussed, this period was characterized by more hawkish foreign and national security policy doctrines, even if rhetoric on the CIS returned to Kozyrev’s original phrase of ‘forming a belt of good neighbourliness’. In a way, Putin’s main accomplishment at this time was to improve the image of Russia and its president by signalling new vigour. His foreign policy was activist and pragmatic, courting all centres of power from the EU to China, Cuba and even North Korea and Mongolia (a message to China). What is more, Putin swiftly restored relations with NATO.60 Partly for economic reasons he wanted to make the European part of the multipolarity equation a priority, but this was a non-starter as Russia was perceived as playing games of divide and rule between the EU and the USA, exploiting European scepticism towards the US project of a missile defence system.61 As for the USA itself, Condoleezza Rice, later national security adviser to President George W. Bush, saw widespread ‘Russia fatigue’.62 Rice later revealed a preference for cultivating ties to India – in effect opening the scenario of the USA defecting, not Russia! Originally, the Bush administration was thus deliberately neglecting Russia,63 whereas in the ‘spies war’ of spring 2001 top analysts from both countries called nervously for dialogue to avert a new Cold War.64 Interestingly, prominent Russian political entrepreneurs like Karaganov began to criticize the preceding years’ Russian foreign and security policy under Primakov and his successor as foreign minister, Igor Ivanov. Instead of calling for enlightened post-imperialism, using Russians living abroad as a Trojan horse for Russian influence,65 Karaganov now urged Russia to cease pursuing a foreign policy that smacked of the superpower policies of the Soviet Union. He pleaded for confrontation to be avoided, ‘particularly with the countries on which global development depends’, and went on to portray the pursuit of multipolarity as misguided: ‘We are only an instrument wielded by China . . . and it’s time we recognized it.’66 He was not alone in this,67 but it apparently took a personality like Karaganov and an institution like SVOP for this reassessment, even if only indirectly, to find its way into official writings:
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Mette Skak Some Russian analysts see any attempt to create multipolarity as uneconomical given Russia’s limited resources. They also feel that ‘to a certain extent it deprives Russia of its independence, almost automatically driving Russia into opposition with the United States and sometimes with the West as a whole’. It is difficult to agree with this position. Our choice in favour of a multipolar system is conditioned above all on our national interests. It is within the framework of collective global security that Russia has the best chance of finding its deserved place among the world community.68
Ivanov here rejects, yet quotes, the SVOP 2000 Strategy for Russia69 which raised some of Putin’s themes, such as the restoration of the ‘power vertical’ (restoring central authority). SVOP thus proved a dissenting voice of some influence. SVOP identified Bosnia, Iraq in 1998 and Kosovo as fiascos for the protagonists of multipolarity.70 Putin actually changed the tenor of Russian foreign policy towards internal balancing,71 warning against ‘being lured into costly global undertakings while we are heavily in debt and cannot even afford to pay wages to our own people’.72 He concluded: ‘It is high time to understand our place in the world, our wealth and our new rights depend on how successfully we meet our own internal challenges.’73 In other words, because of the perceived policy failure of Primakov’s Level I strategy of multipolarity and its concomitant (balancing against US interests), the illiberal Level II win-set of Russia was now being challenged, resulting in some defection towards the relevant Level I win-set. A process of learning appeared to be going on, although Putin was far from benign in his war against Chechnya, dubbed a struggle against ‘international terrorism’. Even if this term is often misused, Russia and its Central Asian and Transcaucasian CIS partners were indeed facing growing instability and security problems. In May 2000, Russia issued warnings to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan about possible Russian raids into the territory of Afghanistan if it continued to supply arms and manpower to the Chechens.74 Islamism had crept into the Caucasian and Central Asian regions.75 Prior to 11 September 2001 Russia found itself in a curious ‘security dilemma’ of not wanting outsiders to help it stabilize the situation in its volatile southern neighbourhood, while at the same time it was not able to deter the threats and deliver security on its own. It is against this background of growing security problems and militarized answers that the Australian analyst Bobo Lo76 characterizes Putin’s foreign policy before and after 11 September as one of ‘securitization’, implying Soviet recidivism. Yet, in view of the crisis of the mainstream Level II policies and the attempts of Putin and others to distance themselves from it through a platform of ‘enlightened derzhavnik’ internal balancing and bandwagoning, Lo’s assessment is too simplistic.
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 93 The current Putin era, 11 September 2001–3 The terror that hit the USA was a shock and a unique diplomatic opportunity for Russia, which Putin seized. He aligned himself firmly with the US war on terrorism.77 This was not just a question of gaining US backing for continued war in Chechnya as instability and terrorism to the south were getting out of control, as has just been argued. It was a double chance to get relief through security policy cooperation with the USA and to bring Russia’s foreign economic policy finally into step with the relevant Level I win-set comprising the Western world as a whole. Putin had learned that the EU could not be courted through balancing and bypassing the USA: this alienated the Europeans, who remain the real geopolitical target for Putin’s Westernization.78 Compare Trenin: ‘Joining Europe, however, will have to be based on accepting post-Cold War realities, such as America’s current global preponderance.’79 Putin accepted a US presence in Central Asia and Georgia, and later made Russia’s policy on the CIS more sophisticated, upgrading economic links.80 He went as far as tacitly to accept the entry into NATO of the three Baltic countries, and thus seemed to have passed the litmus test for Russia’s good intentions, in the words of former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. Russia’s change of policy towards viewing NATO enlargement and its own cooperation with NATO as a win–win game was officially confirmed by its behaviour at the NATO summit meeting in Prague in 2002 when the entry into NATO of the Baltic countries and others was confirmed.81 Analysts worry about the fragility of the Level II win-set behind Putin’s foreign policy reorientation: according to them, only Putin and a couple of Kremlin insiders were behind it. This is partly true, but (in contrast to Yeltsin’s era) partly irrelevant because of Putin’s efficient use of his constitutional powers over foreign policy to exercise leadership. In this way, his derzhavnik platform is turned against critics to the extreme left and the chauvinist right, while he continues to enjoy amazingly broad support at the mass level. Given the genuine electoral dimension of Russian politics, this makes his platform a powerful Level II win-set of its own, in line with Putnam’s and Moravcsik’s points about how leaders may change and strengthen domestic win-sets.82 In an interview in the spring of 2002, Trenin argued that Putin is staunchly committed to his Westward orientation not because Russian foreign policy experts have convinced him of its wisdom but because of the influence of Putin’s economic team. Their counsel is that the only way Putin can address his central security concern – Russia’s economic revitalization – is through close relations with the West on all matters.83 The advent of this economic win-set of Russian biznesmeny is significant on its own; moreover, it begins to look as if Putin’s Westernization has consolidated, judging from the diverse analyses and comments reflecting the fact that the basic Russian foreign and security policy premise of today is an inclusive outlook on cooperation with the
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USA, NATO and the EU as well as with individual countries like China and Germany.84 Indeed, 11 September was a reality shock for Russia’s Level II win-set. In sum, Karaganov’s defection is by no means trivial. It marks a broader, critical reappraisal of Russia’s contradictory and often fatal foreign and security policy under Yeltsin – an era when power slipped to various foreign policy entrepreneurs, resulting in a counterproductive practice of balancing against the USA under the banner of Eurasianism and multipolarity. Karaganov speaks for other people besides himself when he argues that ‘every Russian nationalist now . . . must be a Westerner and must do everything possible to integrate Russia with NATO and the EU’.85 His vision is one of a grand coalition against Muslim terrorism uniting the entire Western world, including ‘Israel, Japan, and even China’. Although not everyone will feel comfortable about this, or about his view of conflict pitting the rich world against the poor and his insistence on a ‘clash of civilizations’ fault line, it is perhaps needed in the Russian context in order to clarify real as opposed to imagined issues. True, Karaganov is less upbeat in his comment on the acrimony over Iraq in early 2003; still, his reasoning leaves the impression that this spectacular controversy need not divert Russia from its current pro-US strategy, but may fuel it. He writes: Preservation of the UN and its successful reorganization are impossible without the United States. Making the UN an instrument of the struggle with Washington, Moscow is but playing into the hands of the forces intent on doing away with the UN altogether . . . Moscow once again recalled the multipolar world concept (viewed as antiAmerican), took the stand in the UN Security Council that was a carbon copy of France’s . . . whereas China indicated its fundamental position on the issue but refrained from moving into the forefront . . . I do not think by the way that any vital interests of Russia were encroached on in Iraq . . . Rapprochement with Europe should remain a priority, particularly in the sphere of economic, social, and human contacts . . . As for the strategic alliance with the European Union, it is not very productive for the time being. This is the sphere where Europe will probably become relatively weaker . . . The course for the closest possible relations with the United States should not mean abandonment of economic interests, either fundamental or specific economic ones . . . As for the UN, we should not be trying to make problems for the United States particularly since the United States overcomes them with such ease . . . The long-term destabilization of the Middle East . . . offers Russia a unique chance. For at least two decades the country may rely on acceptable oil prices and the role of the global ‘energy stabilizer’. Smart use of this factor offers Russia a source of income for modernization of the country and ups its geopolitical influence.86
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 95 His comment reflects the crisis in relations between Europe and the USA, which is weakening the EU and NATO as security policy actors worldwide; yet there are also strong trends of recovery and innovative cooperation – for instance, the quartet of the EU, Russia, the UN and the USA as the powers behind the Middle East Road Map for peace.87
Conclusion: change for the better within foreign and security policy The analysis above has depicted the painful evolution towards a proWestern stance in Russian foreign and security policy by first looking into the Russian penchant for maximalist definitions of its national interest and security concerns and then applying the framework of two-level games in a chronological overview of the Russian leadership’s two-front struggle between the actor dynamics on the domestic political scene – the Level II win-set of anti-US and neo-imperialistic, illiberal derzhavnik forces – and the structural forces on the external arena, creating a single relevant Level I win-set which encompasses all the Western powers, above all the USA. An important point in the argument here is the dynamics of learning through trial and error, for instance, Putin having learned from the political fate of Gorbachev and Kozyrev, as well as from the reality shocks for Russia’s Level II win-set in the shape of the military tragedy of the first Chechen war, the defection of the GUUAM countries among the CIS members, and NATO enlargement, which in the end included the Baltic countries. By 2000 and early 2001 the USA itself was signalling defection and cold war amid an escalation of security dangers for Russia on its southern perimeter. September 11 was seized upon by Putin as a move on the Level I game board that was capable of bringing Russia into step with the Western world, thereby breaking the deadlock around Russia. Prior to this a winset that was more based on economic arguments and more popular had emerged around Putin. This, combined with Karaganov’s defection from the Primakov doctrine of pursuing multipolarity through balancing the USA (Karaganov representing Russia’s political class), helped to bring about the consolidation of Putin’s foreign policy reorientation. Russia’s new attitude draws strength from its domestic economic recovery and political stabilization, implying that Russia has something to offer beyond its geographic location. The new intimate relationship between Russia and the USA survived the Iraq acrimony, as it was the French and German stance which infuriated the USA. In October 2003, Russia broke the deadlock in the UN by signalling its willingness to endorse a Security Council mandate for managing the interim period in Iraq until the transfer of power to the Iraqis. As for the curious persistence of the Primakov jargon of multipolarity – for instance, in the joint Sino-Russian declaration signed by Putin and Hu Jintao, the latter visiting Russia in his new capacity as
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China’s president in May 200388 – it seems to be maintained mainly for reasons of convenience, as a term covering Russia’s switch to a consistently inclusive pro-US bandwagoning approach to concert building. As pointed out above, not everything about Putin is rosy. To some extent it may be argued that the victims of his improved room for manoeuvre within foreign and security policy are the Russian rule-of-law institutions, such as human rights and the freedom of the press. Critics cite his efforts to neutralize those who challenge his grip on power, including several of the oligarchs. At any rate, it is difficult to distinguish whether Putin is fighting the seven Russian Berlusconis or whether it is he who is pursuing ‘Berlusconization’ of Russia’s political system. Be that as it may, Putin’s declared goal is a Russia ‘with a developed civil society and a stable democracy’, which guarantees ‘full human rights, civil liberties, and political freedom’.89 He is in the unenviable position of presiding over a tall order of reform throughout the vast Russian Federation – a country that is also more pluralistic than ever before in Russia’s long, sad history. Let me briefly return to the introductory thesis of an improved security situation in the Baltic Sea region and raise the policy implications of the analysis here. Among the net winners from Russia’s policy reorientation, Kaliningrad and the Baltic states were mentioned, the latter because Russia now accepts their entry into NATO. This change stems from Russia’s reassessment of threats as emanating from its southern, not western, environment, as was already argued in the 1997 National Security Concept, which coincided with the escalation of Russia’s anti-NATO campaign.90 Developments related to 11 September reinforced this threat perception, which is helping to ‘desecuritize’ Russia’s relations with the Baltic Sea region and the Western world. The only outstanding issue was Russia’s demand that the Baltic countries accede to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, as a precondition for their joining NATO. As for Russia’s ability to compromise on Kaliningrad, the actual outcome is telling for the prominence of long-term economic considerations in the Kremlin and its current Level II win-set, as Ingmar Oldberg argues.91 Russia is thus beginning to perceive both the EU and NATO as partners in long-term win–win games. This and other developments following 11 September mark a truly novel turn in Russian political thinking away from its morally arid possession goal realism. It is premature to speak of a genuine milieu goal orientation, but attitudes in Moscow are not static. This opens further room for manoeuvre and for constructive, proactive diplomacy on the part of other actors in the Baltic Sea region, where Lithuania has more than once proved its capacity for creative overtures towards Russia – most recently in furthering the compromise on Kaliningrad.92 Finland deserves praise for having placed the Northern Dimension (for which read Russia Dimension) on the EU agenda during its EU presidency in 1999 – a development scheme that includes EU spon-
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 97 sorship of projects involving Kaliningrad. In the opinion of Andrew A. Michta, ‘one “old NATO/EU” country, Denmark, has played a catalyst role, often working behind the scenes to develop a new set of relations in the Baltic region’.93 He refers to Denmark’s role in placing the Baltic countries on not just the EU’s but also NATO’s enlargement agenda, accompanied by the practical assistance it has given the Baltic countries in preparing for EU and NATO membership. Together with Germany, Denmark launched the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, consisting of these two countries along with Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden, plus the European Commission as an observer. The CBSS is a multilateral forum to which Russia attaches some significance because Germany is a member, hereby adding great-power prestige to the CBSS. The Kremlin’s pursuit of great-power concert building as the essence of its narrow milieu goal orientation in international affairs throughout history has to be taken into account in diplomacy, but without compromising the norms of equality and multilateralism, for instance, within the CBSS. Apart from that, the end of the Cold War and of bipolarity is significant for the new room for manoeuvre and, by implication, responsibility in world politics which it opens up for medium-sized and small states alike. The Baltic countries’ entry into the EU and NATO should increase their proactive, constructive diplomacy towards Russia. Russian voices can now be heard expressing concern over EU enlargement as isolating Russia – illuminating, incidentally, the myopia of the obsession with NATO. The perception of being isolated need not translate into reality. There is a need for a mix of assertiveness and empathy in Western policy towards Russia, as is demonstrated by NATO’s arrival at an inclusive enlargement policy for the benefit of the Baltic countries accompanied by the upgrading of relations between NATO and Russia to Russian semimembership of NATO through the new NATO–Russia Council. The Baltic states must now find ways to reciprocate without compromising their legitimate concerns. Michta’s point about Germany and Poland resurfacing as core powers in Baltic Sea affairs is important in more than one sense. In terms of identity, the post-Cold War Baltic Sea region will be less influenced by Nordic social democratic Keynesianism as the dominant alternative to Soviet Marxism and more by ‘Atlantic’ liberal and continental European Christian Democratic values. To some extent, the Baltic states and Russia proper are also exponents of this.
Notes 1 Ingmar Oldberg, Reluctant Rapprochement: Russia and the Baltic States in the Context of NATO and EU Enlargements, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), User report, FOI-R-0808-SE, February 2003.
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2 Stephen Blank, ‘The conditions for US–Russian partnership’, Orbis, Fall 2002, pp. 661–87. 3 Lars Poulsen-Hansen and Niels Erik Rosenfeldt (eds), Regionernes Rusland [The Russia of the regions], Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 2001. 4 Poulsen-Hansen and Rosenfeldt, Regionernes Rusland, pp. 315ff.; and AnneKristin Jørgensen, ‘The military sector: Federal responsibility, regional concern’, in Geir Hønneland and Helge Blakkisrud (eds), Centre–Periphery Relations in Russia: The Case of the Northwestern Regions, Aldershot: Gower, 2001. 5 Martin Nicholson, ‘Putin’s Russia: Slowing the pendulum without stopping the clock’, International Affairs (London), 77(4), October 2001, pp. 867–84. 6 Los Angeles Times, 27 July 2003. 7 The theory of democratic peace holds that democracies, as the open societies they are, do not fight wars against one another; in other words, democracies tend to form security communities. Neither Russia nor its post-communist neighbours are full-blown and stable democracies, which according to some political scientists means a temporary danger of aggressive foreign policies. (Jack Snyder, ‘Democratization, war and nationalism in the post-communist states’, in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 21–40.) Even so, it is of long-term significance that Russia and the European post-communist states are breaking away from their authoritarian past in a process of democratization and economic liberalization. 8 Cf. Oldberg, Reluctant Rapprochement, pp. 23–8, 64–8. True, the Russian Ambassador to Estonia continued to lecture Estonia about not overestimating the possibility for improving relations with Russia via NATO, but he went on to say that in 10–15 years Russian–Estonian relations will be like those between Finland and Russia today. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), RFE/RL Newsline, Part II, 77, 23 April 2003. As for the Balkans, the otherwise hawkish communist, Gennadii Seleznev, speaker of the Russian State Duma, declared in Sofia that ‘Russia does not favor NATO enlargement’ but that ‘every nation has the right to determine its own life and choose what alliances to join, and Bulgaria has apparently made its choice’ (RFE/RL Newsline, Part II, 4 March 2002). Similarly, Romanians are very enthusiastic about Putin and his foreign policy (the author’s own observations from a research trip to Romania under the aegis of the Danish Foreign Policy Society in 2002). 9 Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy: Postcommunist Foreign Policy and International Relations, London: Hurst & Co, 1996. 10 Ibid. 11 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; Leszek Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996; Stephen Blank, ‘Is there a future for Russian relations with Southeast Asia?’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, XIII(1), Spring/Summer 1999; and Mette Skak, Back in the USSR? Russia as an Actor in World Politics, Working Paper no. 7, Copenhagen: Danish Foreign Policy Institute (DUPI), 2000. Bobo Lo sees Russian foreign policy as reflecting ‘the perversity of human nature. Far from exhibiting an underlying if specific pragmatism, Moscow’s relations with the outside world have been liberally streaked with irrationality’, and he goes on to speak of ‘the politics of sectionalism and personalities’, ‘illusion and mythmaking’ (Lo, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 1). He coins the apt term ‘Potemkinization’ for Russia’s various ostensibly coherent foreign policy doctrines (ibid., pp. 66ff.). Leszek Buszynski characterizes Russia’s foreign policy as one of disorientation
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(Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy, pp. ixff.), and Stephen Blank’s writings often expose the idiosyncrasies of Russian foreign policy-making. The word derzhava means ‘power’ in the sense of ‘great power’ (velikaia derzhava) in Russian, hence derzhavnik has come to be serve as an umbrella category for anyone wanting to restore Russia’s capacity as state and/or its role as great power in world affairs (cf. Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 2; and Leon Aron, ‘The foreign policy doctrine of postcommunist Russia and its domestic context’, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998, pp. 24, 33). A notorious figure, Aleksandr Rutskoi, an instigator of the October 1993 showdown, later founded a party simply called Derzhava. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London and Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999. See also the chapters by Iver Neumann, Pavel Baev and Nikita Lomagin in this volume. Following the Swiss–American political scientist Arnold Wolfers, it is possible to distinguish two different approaches to national security: (a) the pursuit of possession goals, i.e., goals relating to the protection and expansion of the power of the individual state and its territory – corresponding to what is generally understood by realism, and (b) the pursuit of milieu goals; that is, the pursuit of order, stability and/or justice in world affairs – for instance, building strong international institutions and organizations. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, pp. 73–4. Likewise, other proponents of the socalled English school of international relations distinguish between narrow raison d’état as opposed to broad considerations of raison de système (Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis, London: Routledge, 1992). As the present author has argued elsewhere (Skak, Back in the USSR?), the hegemonic political culture of Russia is mostly devoid of real milieu goal considerations: they are manipulated into mere possession goals. Hannes Adomeit, ‘Russian national security interests’, in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (eds), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 33–49. Reuters, 12 January 1996. See also Iver Neumann’s chapter in this volume. In Nezavisimaia gazeta’s coverage of his first interview he stressed the importance of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to Russia as the highest priority and saw a need to strengthen CIS integration and stabilize the region with regard to armed conflict. See Lena Jonson, ‘Russia and the “near abroad”: Concepts and trends’, in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (eds), The Baltic States in World Politics, London: Curzon, 1998, p. 116. Aron, ‘The foreign policy doctrine of postcommunist Russia’, pp. 27ff.; Skak, From Empire to Anarchy, pp. 144–64; and Rolf H. W. Theen, ‘Quo vadis Russia? The problem of national identity and state-building’, in Gordon B. Smith (ed.), State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenges of the Future, New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 48–54. Skak, From Empire to Anarchy, p. 140. Adomeit, ‘Russian national security interests’. Gail W. Lapidus, ‘Contested sovereignty: The tragedy of Chechnya’, International Security, 23(1), 1998. ‘Kontseptsiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ [Concept of national security of the Russian Federation], Rossiiskaia gazeta, 26 December 1997. Aron, ‘The foreign policy doctrine of postcommunist Russia’; and Coit D.
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Blacker, ‘Russia and the West’, in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The New Russian Foreign Policy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998, pp. 167–93. Aron, ‘The foreign policy doctrine of postcommunist Russia’, pp. 31–3. Blacker, ‘Russia and the West’, pp. 182–8. Ibid., p. 188. A post-11 September security doctrine on the new type of war – on terrorism – seems to have been developed in 2003 (RFE/RL Newsline, 210, 6 November 2002; and Interfax, 30 January 2003). In October 2003, Putin announced a Russian doctrine on preventive military strikes. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 14 July 2000, reprinted in Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy, Washington, DC: Nixon Center and Brookings Institution Press, 2002. If anything Russia’s zeal to ‘securitize’ the lot of its ethnic brethren living as national minorities in the new states neighbouring Russia has served to reduce their security. Henrikki Heikka, Beyond the Cult of the Offensive: The Evolution of Soviet/Russian Strategic Culture and Its Implications for the Nordic–Baltic Region, Helsinki and Berlin: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für europäische Politik, 2000, p. 78. Ibid., p. 85. Ibid. Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games’, International Organization, 42(3), Summer 1988, p. 427. Ibid., p. 434. The approach of Putnam matches the liberal–pluralistic paradigm of international relations whereby states are not treated as monolithic ‘unitary actors’ but as a medium for various political forces in a society – political parties, lobbies, bureaucracies, and so on. However, the classical realist Hans J. Morgenthau had already seen a dilemma between democracy as a political system and foreign and security policy. See also Kjell Goldmann (with Sten Berglund and Gunnar Sjöstedt), Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Case of Sweden, Aldershot: Gower, 1986. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics’, p. 437. Ibid., p. 436. Ibid., p. 439. Allen C. Lynch, ‘The realism of Russia’s foreign policy’, Europe–Asia Studies, 53(1), 2001, pp. 7–31. ‘Bandwagoning’ and ‘balancing’ are the basic opposing categories of balanceof-power strategies within neo-realism (Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill and Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Whereas balancing means opposing a dominant power by aligning with weaker powers, bandwagoning is the small state’s option of seeking protection from the dominant power – a widespread pattern under the current conditions of unipolarity because of the overwhelming power, including soft power, of the United States (Joseph N. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990). However, what may amount to bandwagoning on the external scene is often designed – and carries significance – as strategies of internal balancing; that is, concentrating on building up power at home. It is usually overlooked that Kenneth N. Waltz, the godfather of neo-realism, saw this strategy as superior to balancing in 1979! (see Waltz, Theory of International Politics). Cf. the author’s analysis of Putin’s internal balancing in Mette Skak, ‘Russian security policy after 9/11’, Paper for the CEISA/ISA International Convention, Budapest, Hungary, 26–28 June 2003 (can be downloaded from www.ps.au.dk: click on ‘Staff/scientific’. To be published in a forthcoming volume edited by Roger E. Kanet).
Foreign and security policy change in Russia 101 41 On Moravcsik’s reformulation, I am indebted to Sten Rynning who as far as I know pioneered the application of two-level games to the study of Russia. Sten Rynning, ‘A balancing act: Russia and the Partnership for Peace’, Cooperation and Conflict, 31(2), 1996, p. 215. 42 Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics’, p. 457. 43 George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds), Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. 44 Robert G. Hermann, ‘Identity, norms and national security: The Soviet foreign policy revolution and the end of the Cold War’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 271–316. 45 Skak, From Empire to Anarchy, pp. 181–91. 46 Ibid., pp. 141–81. 47 It was a Yeltsin adviser, Sergei Stankevich, who spearheaded the assault on Kozyrev’s Atlanticism, contrasting it to his favoured line of Eurasianism. As stated, Kozyrev ignored not the ‘near abroad’, as his critics claimed, but their calls for neo-imperialism. 48 See note 15. 49 Roland Dannreuthner, ‘Escaping the enlargement trap in NATO–Russian relations’, Survival, 41(4), Winter 1999–2000, pp. 148ff. 50 Oldberg, Reluctant Rapprochement, p. 19. 51 This is not an original concept, but one invented by China. Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization, Washington, DC and Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, p. 275. Cf. Yi Xiaxiong, ‘Ten years of China–South Korea relations and Beijing’s view on Korean unification’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, XVI(2), Fall/Winter 2002, pp. 315–51. 52 Robert Legvold, ‘Russia’s unformed foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs, 80(5), September/October 2001, pp. 62–75. 53 William Zimmermann, The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993–2000, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. Analysts argue that the reason why Russia’s democratic leadership lost control over foreign policy was its ‘socialization’ into the petrified Soviet system, leaving it unprepared for dissent and unable to manage it skilfully. Yeltsin’s enthusiasm for the Level II win-set was mainly a function of its capacity for forming consensus, and Primakov personified the win-set, as seen in the unanimous support for him in the Duma, in the ‘power ministries’, and so on. 54 GUUAM is Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Lo sees the ‘near abroad’ policy of the Yeltsin years as primarily defensive: ‘Few things united the disparate elements of the ruling elite so much as Western attempts to develop closer links with the [former Soviet Union]’ (Lo, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 116). Much more than ‘neo-colonial US ambitions’, however, it was the mixture of Russian arrogance and economic weakness that eroded Russia’s monopoly on CIS foreign economic and security policy (otherwise termed the ‘enlightened post-imperialist strategy’ by Sergei Karaganov). In the mid-1990s the CIS countries diversified their economic and security policy links, for example, through their bilateral participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme (Lo, Russian Foreign Policy, p. 117). In 2002 Uzbekistan left GUUAM, turning it into just GUAM. Although the GUUAM states’ prospects of joining NATO are meagre, the political significance of their attendance at NATO’s 1999 summit and their mutual policy coordination were not wasted on Russia: it was only then that Russia began to upgrade CIS cooperation (Dannreuthner, ‘Escaping the enlargement trap’) or, to be more accurate, take its bilateral links to these countries seriously.
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55 Trenin, The End of Eurasia, p. 275. 56 Ibid., p. 277. 57 Blacker, ‘Russia and the West’. Heikka interprets Russia’s upgrading of its strategic partnership with China through massive arms sales since 1998 as earnest; that is, ‘another dimension in Russia’s attempts to bring the multipolar system into balance’. Heikka, Beyond the Cult of the Offensive, p. 89; see also p. 90. 58 See ‘Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia’, Official Journal of the European Communities, L157, 24 June 1999. 59 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 30 December 1999. 60 Skak, Back in the USSR?, p. 7. 61 Anne de Tinguy, ‘Vladimir Poutine et l’Occident: l’heure est au pragmatisme’ [Vladimit Putin and the West: time for pragmatism], Politique Étrangère, 3, 2001, pp. 515–33. 62 Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the national interest’, Foreign Affairs, 79(1), 2000, pp. 45–62. 63 Legvold, ‘Russia’s unformed foreign policy’. 64 Graham T. Allison and Sergei Karaganov, ‘US–Russian dialogue is needed to head off a new Cold War’, International Herald Tribune, 3 April 2001. 65 Skak, From Empire to Anarchy, p. 172. To be fair to Karaganov and SVOP, mention must also be made of the 1994 version of a ‘Strategy for Russia’ which dismissed the coercive approach of the ‘ultra-nationalists’ (by implication the Level II win-set: MS) towards the CIS as a threat to stability (ibid., p. 161). SVOP here