Minorities and Education in Multicultural Japan
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Minorities and Education in Multicultural Japan
This volume examines how Japan’s increasingly multicultural population has impacted on the lives of minority children and their peers at school, and how schools are responding to this trend in terms of providing minority children with opportunities and preparing them for the adult society. The contributors focus on interactions between individuals and among groups representing diverse cultural backgrounds, and explore how such interactions are changing the landscape of education in increasingly multicultural Japan. Drawing on detailed micro-level studies of schooling, the chapters reveal the ways in which these individuals and groups (long-existing minority groups, newcomers, and the ‘mainstream Japanese’) interact, and the significant consequences of such interactions on learning at school and the system of education as a whole. While the educational achievement of children of varying minority groups continues to reflect their places in the social hierarchy, the boundaries of individual and group categories are negotiated by mutual interactions and remain fluid and situational. Minorities and Education in Multicultural Japan provides important insights into bottom-up policy-making processes and consciously brings together English and Japanese scholarship. As such, it will be an important resource for those interested in education and minority issues in Japan. Ryoko Tsuneyoshi is a Professor of comparative education at the Graduate School of Education, University of Tokyo. Kaori H. Okano is an Associate Professor in the School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Australia. Sarane Spence Boocock is an Emeritus Professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology and the Graduate School of Education at Rutgers University.
Minorities and Education in Multicultural Japan An interactive perspective
Edited by Ryoko Tsuneyoshi, Kaori H. Okano and Sarane Boocock
First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2011 editorial selection and matter, Ryoko Tsuneyoshi, Kaori H. Okano and Sarane Boocock. Individual chapters, the contributor. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Minorities and multiculturalism in Japanese education: an interactive perspective edited by Ryoko Tsuneyoshi, Kaori H. Okano and Sarane Boocock. p. cm. 1. Children of minorities – Education – Japan. 2. Multicultural education – Japan. 3. Multiculturalism – Japan. I. Tsuneyoshi, Ryoko Kato. II. Okano, Kaori H. III. Boocock, Sarane Spence. LC3737.J3M56 2010 371.82900952 – dc22 2009051975
ISBN 0-203-84919-1 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN: 978–0–415–55938–6 (hbk) ISBN: 978–0–203–84919–4 (ebk)
Contents
List of illustrations Acknowledgements Notes on contributors 1
Introduction: an interactive perspective for understanding minorities and education in Japan
vii ix xi
1
KAORI H. OKANO AND RYOKO TSUNEYOSHI
PART I
Long-existing minorities 2
Long-existing minorities and education
27 29
KAORI H. OKANO
3
The schooling of buraku children: overcoming the legacy of stereotyping and discrimination
44
SARANE SPENCE BOOCOCK
4
Schooling and identity in Okinawa: Okinawans and Amerasians in Okinawa
77
NAOMI NOIRI
5
Ethnic Koreans in Japanese schools: shifting boundaries and collaboration with other groups
100
KAORI H. OKANO
PART II
‘Newcomer’ groups 6
The “newcomers” and Japanese society RYOKO TSUNEYOSHI
127 129
vi 7
Contents The ‘new’ foreigners and the social reconstruction of difference: the cultural diversification of Japanese education
149
RYOKO TSUNEYOSHI
8
Schools, communities, and ‘newcomer’ children: a case study of a public housing complex
173
MUTSUMI SHIMIZU
9
(Mis)managing diversity in non-metropolitan public schools: the lack of state-sponsored support for ‘newcomer’ children
191
CHRIS BURGESS
10
The kikokushijo: negotiating boundaries within and without
213
MISAKO NUKAGA AND RYOKO TSUNEYOSHI
11
Concluding remarks: implications for educational research and reform
242
SARANE SPENCE BOOCOCK
Appendix 1 Article 26 of the Constitution of Japan
259
Appendix 2 The Primary School Course of Study Guide 2008 (Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidōyōryō Kaisetsu, Sōsokuhen)
260
Appendix 3 Guide for foreign students to start school (Procedures for entering Japanese schools)
261
Index
263
Illustrations
Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 6.1 6.2 8.1
8.2 10.1 10.2 10.3 A3.1
Map of Japan and Taiwan, with cities discussed in this book Registered foreigners by nationality, 1989–2008 The number of foreign national students at school, 1991–2006 Number of pupils/students by mother tongue, 1999–2008 Number of children who require instruction in Japanese per school, 1999–2008 The number of participants in the ‘International elective’ subject by ethnic background, Shimofukuda Junior High School, 2000–05 Stand-By-Me newsletter, March 2008 Changes in the number of Japanese school-age children abroad, 1971–2008 Japanese school-age children abroad by place of residence and type of school attended, 2008 Returnees at Hayama Elementary by place of residence abroad, 2000 Guide for foreign students to start school (procedures for entering Japanese schools)
7 9 10 137 137
179 184 214 221 225 261
Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2 3.1 7.1 7.2
The estimated populations of the groups studied in the book Ainu children’s retention rate to upper secondary schools compared with their non-Ainu cohort, 1972–2006 Ainu children’s retention rate to universities compared with their non-Ainu cohort, 1979–2006 Preschools and elementary schools observed, 1995–96 The number of returnees (kaigai kikoku jidō seito) by ward, Kawasaki City, 2001 The number of foreign children by ward, Kawasaki City, 2002
6 34 34 55 159 159
viii Illustrations 7.3 8.1 9.1 9.2
The number of foreign children who require instruction in Japanese language by ward, Kawasaki City, 2002 The ‘International elective’ curriculum, Shimofukuda Junior High School, 2001 Registered foreigners in Japan and Yamagata by number, 1996–2006 Foreign students who need Japanese instruction, showing mother tongue and school level, Yamagata Prefecture, 2007
160 180 197 198
Acknowledgements
The idea of this volume arose when we organised a panel at the Association of Asian Studies annual meeting in Chicago in 2001, entitled, ‘Diversity and the experience of minorities and foreigners in Japanese schools: Toward a multicultural framework’. Gerald LeTendre chaired the panel, and Hidetaka Shimizu was our discussant. Since then we have moved far from our initial interpretation of education in multicultural Japan, as we have continued to research in our specific areas and to discuss our emerging interpretations. Initially, we had identified specific minority groups, laying out their characteristics, and analysed multicultural Japan in terms of the sum of these groups and ‘the Japanese’, as was customary in previous research. We have since moved towards a ‘multicultural interactive framework’. We have also welcomed into our discussion additional contributors who have extensive fieldwork experience in diverse settings. We would like to thank the many educators, administrators and students, from both minority and majority backgrounds, who have responded to each of the chapters. We also extend our appreciation to the following funding sources: Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) 21530873; the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Ministry of Education (Tsuneyoshi); the Japan Foundation Fellowship (which enabled Okano to research at Kobe University for a year) and research grants from La Trobe University (Okano); and the Rutgers Graduate School of Education (Boocock). Last but not least, we would like to thank our editor at Routledge, Stephanie Rogers, and Mark Selden for their assistance in bringing this book to fruition. Ryoko Tsuneyoshi (in Tokyo, Japan) Kaori H. Okano (in Melbourne, Australia) Sarane Boocock (in New Brunswick, USA)
Notes on contributors
Sarane Spence Boocock is an Emeritus Professor of sociology in the Graduate School of Education and the Department of Sociology at Rutgers University. Previously, she was a research scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation, taught at Yale University, University of Southern California, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and was a Fulbright Research Scholar in Japan. Her recent research and publications focus on the sociological study of children and childhood, changing patterns of family life, and cross-national comparisons of early childhood care and education. Chris Burgess completed his Ph.D. at Monash University, Melbourne, in March 2004. His thesis, entitled ‘(Re)constructing identities: international marriage migrants as potential agents of social change in a rapidly globalising Japan’, looked at how seventeen women of foreign origin grappled with and made sense of their identities after migrating to Yamagata, northeast Japan. He is currently Associate Professor at Tsuda College, Tokyo, where he teaches Japanese and Australian studies. His research focuses on migration, globalisation and multiculturalism in contemporary Japan. Naomi Noiri is an Associate Professor in the faculty of Law and Letters, University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa, Japan. She researches education for minority students in Japan, Amerasians in Okinawa, and life history interviews in ethnic studies. Her major publications include: ‘Two worlds: the Amerasian and Okinawan’ in Social Process in Hawaii: Uchinanchu Diaspora. Vol.42 (2007), University of Hawaii. Misako Nukaga is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology and Education, Wako University, Tokyo, Japan. Her research interests include multicultural education policy and practices, childcare in migrant families, and children’s identity formation in multicultural social spaces. She has published articles in the International Journal of Japanese Sociology and Journal of Contemporary Ethnography based on her fieldwork at multi-ethnic schools in Japan and America. She recently completed her dissertation in sociology at UCLA on transnational practices among Japanese families in Los Angeles.
xii
Contributors
Kaori H. Okano, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor/ Reader in the School of Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. She researches education and social inequality, multiculturalism, transitions to adulthood, and the impact of globlisation on education. Her major publications include: Young women in Japan: transitions to adulthood (Routledge, 2009), Language and schools in Asia (2006), Pendidikan modern Jepun: Ketaksmaan dan Kepelbagaian (ITNMB, 2004), Education in contemporary Japan (with M.Tsuchiya, Cambridge University Press, 1999) and School to work transition in Japan (Multilingual Matters, 1993). Mutsumi Shimizu is an Associate Professor in the teacher-training course, Tokyo University of Science, Chiba, Japan. She researches the process of adaptation of ‘newcomer’ children in Japan. Her major publications include: Nyūkamā no Kodomotachi (2006), Gaikokujin Seito no tame no Karikyuramu (with Kojima, 2006) and Icho Danchi hatsu! Gaikokujin no kodomotachi no chosen (with Stand-By-Me, 2009). Ryoko Tsuneyoshi is a Professor of comparative education at the Graduate School of Education, University of Tokyo. She has a Ph.D. in sociology from Princeton University. Her research includes cross-national comparisons of schooling, multicultural education, educational reform and fieldwork in educational settings. Major publications include: The Japanese model of schooling: comparisons with the United States (RoutledgeFalmer, 2001), Kodomotachi no mitsu no ‘kiki’ (The three ‘crisis’ of children, Keiso Shobo, 2008) and ‘Kyoiku hokai’ saisei e no puroguramu (Combatting educational failure, Tokyo Shoseki, 1999).
1
Introduction An interactive perspective for understanding minorities and education in Japan Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi
Culturally diverse groups are part of the landscape of all contemporary nationstates. We are now well aware that Japan has been a multi-ethnic and multicultural entity since pre-modern times, as studies have challenged the popular image of homogeneity and advanced what might be called a ‘multicultural Japan’ thesis (see, for example, Lie 2001). In the last two decades in particular, Japanese society has become increasingly diverse, with the arrival of guest workers and various types of foreigner. The aim of this book is to examine the ways in which the rapid diversification of Japanese society has affected the lives of minority children and their peers at school. In the face of this diversification, how are schools providing children with opportunities and preparing them for the adult world?
Beyond the ‘multicultural Japan’ thesis The image of Japan as culturally homogeneous (tanitsu bunka) has been promoted in a wide range of publications and media coverage. It is reflected in Ruth Benedict’s popular book, The chrysanthemum and the sword (1946), in other international bestsellers about Japanese society (Nakane 1970; Vogel 1979), and in statements by Japanese politicians. Scholarship in recent decades has been busy shattering the myth of Japanese homogeneity. A notable example can be seen in the crusade targeting the so-called nihonjinron – a controversial genre depicting what constitutes ‘Japaneseness’. The nihonjinron literature has been attacked by its critics for its alleged assumptions that Japanese society is homogeneous and unique (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; Befu 2001; Sugimoto 2009). Today, we might even venture to say that the opposite is in vogue, that is, that Japan is a multicultural society, and such assertions find many supporters inside Japan. Challenging the image of Japanese homogeneity, English-language books on multicultural Japan have tended to focus on certain minority groups or on describing Japanese society as consisting of certain relatively independent minority/foreigner groups. Early works of the former category include pioneering work on the buraku people (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1967; Shimahara 1971, 1984) and Koreans (Mitchell 1967; Lee and De Vos 1981). Since the 1980s, studies have enabled us to further understand specific groups, both in an individual sense
2 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi (see, for example, Shimahara 1971; Siddle 1996; Hicks 1997; Ryang 1997; Weiner and Hanami 1998; Fukuoka 2000; Roth 2002; De Carvalho 2003; Douglas and Roberts 2003; Goodman et al. 2003; Hein and Selden 2003) and collectively (including Mouer and Sugimoto 1986; Maher and Macdonald 1995; Maher and Yashiro 1995; Denoon et al. 1996; Lie 2000; Noguchi and Fotos 2001; Douglas and Roberts 2003; Weiner 2008; Wills and Murphy-Shigematsu 2008). Some works have focused specifically on education (Rohlen 1981; Hawkins 1983; Chapter 4 of Okano and Tsuchiya 1999). Inside Japan, too, while the post-war myth of homogeneity remains influential in popular and official thinking, many scholars and educators no longer find the ‘multicultural Japan’ thesis novel. There are now a fair number of books about multicultural education (tabunka kyōiku) or multicultural coexistence (tabunka kyōsei) (Kobayashi and Ebuchi 1985; Okuda and Tajima 1991, 1993; Watanabe 1995; Hirota 1996; Tanaka 1996; Nakajima 1998; Oguma 1998; Ehara 2000; Ebuchi 2001; Shimizu and Shimizu 2001; Shimizu 2006). There are also studies introducing multicultural education, multilingual education, intercultural education, and multiculturalism/multilingualism in other places, such as the United States (Hirasawa 1994; Tanaka 1996), Canada, Australia (Sekiguchi 1988; Nishikawa et al. 1997), Europe and elsewhere (Sakuma 1993; Hatsuse 1996; Amano 1997). Multicultural education is also discussed in relation to international students (Kurachi 1998) and to wider issues of the internationalization of Japanese society (Tsuneyoshi 1998, 2002). From our analysis of the existing literature on minorities and education in Japan, however, we take two observations as our point of departure. First, there is the tendency to discuss each minority group as a separate entity, placed individually or collectively in dichotomy to the ‘majority Japanese’. This contrast is based on characteristics such as nationality, ‘ethnic background’, ‘caste’, ‘race’, or any combination of them. We suggest that such a dichotomy is increasingly inadequate for understanding the present realities of Japanese society and education. There are now greater internal variations within and between minority/foreigner groups, and the boundaries are contested, as we shall show later in this chapter. This brings us to the second point. The existing literature does not pay sufficient attention to interactions among individuals of diverse cultural backgrounds and inter-group multicultural interactions. Such interactions, latent and manifest, influence how people identified as members of a certain group are treated, as well as the strategies adopted by those individuals who are so categorized. In a period of increasing diversification, boundaries of difference are being constructed and reconstructed through interaction. As Japan’s multicultural landscape becomes more complex as a result of recent immigration, there is growing need to focus on the interactive processes of the changing landscape (Lie 2000; Chan-Tiberghien 2004; Graburn et al. 2008; Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu 2008). One consequence of rapid change is that we often find it difficult to identify minority individuals and groups in terms of the categories already available in the public discourse. Some local governments have responded by creating new terms, such as ‘children with foreign roots’ (to refer to Japanese nationals of
Understanding minorities and education
3
foreign descent, newcomers/old-timers who have taken up Japanese citizenship, foreign nationals). Others choose to redefine the existing terminology and categorization. For example, the term ‘zainichi Korean’ is a legal category that denotes Korean nationals residing in Japan as a result of Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula, and was initially used as such. However, in the last two decades, many of them have acquired Japanese nationality, either through naturalization or as a result of mixed parentage. In spite of giving up Korean nationality, many still use the term as an identity category, rather than as a legal term. In view of this, many scholars in Japan and elsewhere follow the inclusive use of the term zainichi Korean.1 Advancing beyond the ‘multicultural Japan’ thesis, we focus on interactions between individuals of diverse cultural backgrounds and among multiple groups. With this emphasis on interactions both visible and latent, we try to de-emphasize a dichotomous framework of minorities versus the ‘majority Japanese’ (for example, a dichotomy between Koreans and Japanese and between burakumin and nonburakumin) and examine how such interactions are shaping the emerging landscape of multicultural Japan. We pose three questions at the outset: 1
2 3
How and why do individuals and groups representing diverse cultural backgrounds interact with one another in a rapidly diversifying Japanese society? To what extent has the diversification of Japanese society changed the lives of minority and majority peoples, and the relations among them? How well does the Japanese education system prepare all children to benefit from, and contribute to, Japanese society?
We uncover an interface among individuals of minority/foreign backgrounds in order to explore how such direct and indirect interrelations have shaped the context in which these groups exist. Before explaining what we mean by multicultural interactions, we clarify some of the main points that this book addresses.
Minorities, culture and education The minorities/foreigners that this book concerns are popularly defined with reference to the ‘majority Japanese’ (an elusive construct, which we discuss below). The popular understanding assumes that minorities and foreigners possess a ‘culture’ rooted in certain characteristics different from the ‘majority Japanese’, and they are considered to be marginalized because of the differences, although the nature of the marginalization and other accompanying features varies greatly (according to, for example, nationality, ethnicity, socio-economic background, physical characteristics). ‘Culture’ does not constitute some essential and primordial disposition, but rather shared ways of interpreting the world that are constantly created and modified in response to changing circumstances.
4
Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi
The boundaries of groups with distinctive cultures are created and redrawn – by the groups themselves in search of what they see as potential benefits, and/or by others (including by governments and (non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) – in changing circumstances. The term ‘newcomers’ emerged to refer to a wide range of peoples who began to arrive in the 1980s, in order to distinguish them from other, long-existing minority groups. A previously more uniform minority group, ‘ethnic Koreans’, now contains important boundaries within it, in terms of Japanese citizenship and whether or not they are ‘newcomers’. Japanese returnee children who have spent several years abroad may be a transient ‘cultural’ group, because, despite facing initial alienation and marginalization owing to their unfamiliarity with Japanese society, many of them settle into mainstream society within several years, assisted by well-resourced parents. The ‘majority Japanese’, against whom minorities/foreigners are often juxtaposed and defined, is an arbitrary and elusive concept. This becomes obvious when we learn that degrees of ‘Japaneseness’ can be measured by various factors, none of which hold up under scrutiny (see Sugimoto 2003). For example, Japanese returnees are likely to be considered closer to the majority Japanese than monolingual, Japanese-speaking, Japan-born, fourth-generation non-citizens of Korean descent; and the latter tend to be considered closer to the majority Japanese than newly arrived, Portuguese-speaking South Americans of Japanese descent or mixed parentage. Many would disagree with this view, and there would be even less consensus on how indigenous peoples such as Ainu are considered in their proximity to the ‘majority Japanese’. We can perhaps visualize the gradations of ‘majority Japanese’ on a continuum, with one end signifying those who would be popularly considered ‘the majority’: able, heterosexual persons born to middleclass parents who are Japanese nationals of ‘Japanese descent’ in mainland Japan. That said, and fully aware of the limitations, we use the term ‘majority Japanese’ as popularly, if vaguely, understood. For this reason, we maintain quotation marks throughout the volume. Used without quotation marks in this book, the Japanese refers to Japanese nationals. The minorities that this volume studies all possess (or claim and are regarded to possess) certain ‘cultures’ or characteristics, and are marginalized from the mainstream society, although the extent and duration of the marginalizations vary. They include: indigenous peoples such as the Ainu, Okinawans,2 descendants of Koreans and Chinese who arrived in Japan during colonial times, buraku people (descendants of former outcast groups), Amerasians (children of American soldiers and local women), South East Asian refugees, immigrants and guest workers who arrived from many Asian countries since the 1980s, so-called returnees from China (women and orphans of Japanese families who left north-eastern China at the end of the war and their descendants), so-called Japanese returnees (children of Japanese families who have returned from a long-term stay overseas) and South Americans of Japanese descent. Those from Europe and North America are not discussed in this book. This is because their children commonly attend international schools rather than mainstream schooling, which is the focus of this study.
Understanding minorities and education
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These distinctive cultures are popularly considered to derive from race, ethnicity and caste, in combination with socio-economic status. In keeping with current usage, we make the following distinctions on the basis of race, ethnicity, caste and socio-economic status, though it should be noted that these terms have been variously defined and that the boundaries between them are ‘not nearly as sharp and fixed as many people assume’ (McLemore 1994: 11). Race refers more or less to ‘a person’s or a group’s physical heritage, of which skin color, facial features and other characteristics of physical appearance are major indicators’, though which characteristics are noticed and how they are interpreted depends on the context; ethnicity refers mainly to a person’s or a group’s sociocultural heritage, based on such characteristics as common or shared national origin, language, religion, dietary preferences, dress and manners, and other traits that denote a common ancestry; caste refers to membership of a politically created group that does not necessarily have a distinctive physical or sociocultural heritage; outcast groups are defined by dominant members in the society as inferior, even sub-human, and are likely to be ostracized through enforced residential, occupational and social segregation; socio-economic status refers to a person’s or a group’s location in the social hierarchy, generally based on income, amount and type of education, and occupational level and prestige (Boocock and Scott 2005: 148–9, 163–4). As in the discussion about culture, we learn from the constructivist discussions that these categories are fluid, changeable and multilayered (Hall 1996; Jenkins 1997; Barth 1998 (1969); Brubaker and Cooper 2006; Nukaga 2008). The process of boundary-making is inevitably intertwined with social categorization, interpersonal and inter-group interactions, and power. We do not, however, dispense with the terms ethnicity, race, caste and identity altogether. This is because they are useful for understanding the diverse experiences of schooling by minority children, which are strongly affected by structural factors. The educational experiences and outcomes of children of various minority groups have been influenced by, and reflect, their places in a social hierarchy in which resources are unequally distributed (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999; Warikoo and Carter 2009). Keeping these studies of differential educational outcomes in mind, we look at how boundaries are obscured through interactions between individuals of varying backgrounds, and how diversity is created and evolves. Several chapters (Chapters 7, 8 and 10) focus squarely on the social context rather than on any specific group, because the actors from different groups intersect in complex ways. The groups studied in this book and their estimated sizes are provided in Table 1.1. The relevant locations of these groups are shown on the map (Figure 1.1). The data and their complexity are discussed in detail in the chapters that follow. Some of these groups include both Japanese and non-Japanese nationals. While government statistics of non-Japanese nationals comprising these groups are reasonably accurate, those for group members having Japanese nationality are not. This is because the Japanese government does not document information on the descent (heritage) of its citizens. Once a Korean, Chinese or Brazilian national takes up Japanese citizenship by naturalization or
Exact number unknown (3.93–5.70 million or moreo)
Exact number unknown (12,000 returned in 2008m) 2,152,973p
952,595 (including 316,967 Brazilians and 202,592 Filipinos)
593,489 (2007)
606, 889 (2007)
Non-Japanese citizens living in Japana
Notes: a Japan-Hōmushō-Nyūkoku-Kanrikyoku, Japan (2008). b Hokkaidō-chō. (2006) Ainu seikatsu jittai chōsa. Available online at: www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/sum/somuka/ainu/jittai.htm (accessed 1 June 2008). c Sjoberg (1993: 152) d Okinawa-ken (2008). e Taira (1997: 142) estimates Okinawans in other parts of Japan to be 300,000. f Chapter 4 in this volume. g Takagi (1991: 281). McLauchlan (2003: 24–30) explains the uncertainty in various statistics regarding buraku people. The government estimates their population to be 1.5 million while the Buraku Liberation League claims 3 million. h Duan, Yaozhong (2005:132). The figure estimated by the Chinese language newspaper with the highest circulation in Japan, Chūbun Dōhō (6 September 2007) is the minimum 100,000. Qiu (2010) estimates, based on Hōmushō statistics, that 73,084 Chinese nationals took up Japanese citizenship in 1989–2008. i Qiu’s (2010) estimation is based on Kōseirōdōshō jinkōdōtai tōkei figures. Also see Qiu (2005). j The figure of 1.2 million is provided by Zenkoku Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōiku Kenkyūkai, Kyoto (1993: 7). k The estimation by Zainihon Chōsenjin Jinken Kyōkai (2009:72–4), based on Hōmushō data and Kōseirōdōshō jinkkōdōtai tōkei (1 May 2009). Mindan’s figure for the same period is 296,168 naturalized (Mindan, 2010). l Ibid. m MEXT (2010). CLARINET e yōkoso. Available online at www.go.jp/a_menu/shotou/clarinet/220/00/htm. (accessed 10 May 2010). This is the MEXT figure for school-age children who returned during the 2008 school year from abroad, but the total kikokushijo population depends on its definition (see Chapter 10). n Based on the figures in this table, the total number of minority group members would be 5.78 million (minimum) to 7.85 million or more (maximum). Sugimoto (2010: 7, 191–5) suggests the figure to be 6 to 7 million as a conservative estimate, while emphasizing that the number would expand or contract depending upon whether minority groups are defined inclusively or exclusively. Lie (2001: 4) estimates the figure to be 4–5 million. o These minimum and maximum figures are based on the addition, respectively, of all the lowest and highest numbers in the column, Japanese citizens. p The number does not include unregistered foreign nationals.
Totals
n
Children of mixed descent where one parent is a Japanese citizen Japanese returnees
Registered foreigners – excluding Chinese and Koreans Naturalized Japanese citizens
Ethnic Koreansj
Amerasians in Okinawa People of buraku descent Ethnic Chinese
Exact number unknown (133,684 in 1952–2008, excluding ethnic Chinese and Koreansl) Exact number unknown
Exact number unknown (24,000 self-categorized in Hokkaidob; 300,000 in Japanc) Exact number unknown (1.37 million in Okinawa-prefectured; 300,000 in other parts of Japane) Exact number unknownf Exact number unknown (estimated 1.5–3 million)g Exact number unknown (88,123 naturalized 1972–2003h; 55,708 children of Chinese-Japanese marriages 1986–2005i) Exact number unknown (320,232 naturalized 1952–2008; 263,996 Korean-Japanese marriages 1955–2007; 133,253 children of Korean-Japanese marriages 1985–2007k)
Ainu (indigenous)
Okinawan
Japanese citizens
Minority groups
Table 1.1 The estimated populations of the groups studied in the book
Understanding minorities and education
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Figure 1.1 Map of Japan and Taiwan, with cities discussed in this book
marriage, he or she disappears into the category of ‘Japanese’, with no further reference to ethnic heritage. Children of mixed descent who have one parent who is a Japanese national gain Japanese citizenship at birth, but their numbers are not documented either. The children with dual nationalities have to make a choice at the age of twenty-one (as the Japanese government does not allow dual nationalities).
The actors in this book What we call long-existing minorities (as distinct from newcomers) in this book include Ainu, Okinawans, buraku people, and ethnic Koreans and Chinese whose ancestors arrived before the end of the Second World War. These groups were mainly created by the deliberate policies of the state (e.g. the caste system,
8 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi colonization and forced labour) and have been structurally marginalized in Japanese society. Although granted Japanese nationality, they held an inferior status to the mainstream Japanese, which restricted their entitlements. An exception is the ‘overseas Chinese’, who arrived to set up their own businesses. These days, the members of these groups are outwardly indistinguishable from the ‘majority Japanese’ in terms of physical appearance, language use and social interaction. All groups were subject to a pre-war schooling system that imposed assimilation. This led many to abandon their own language and to internalize the dominant Japanese view that they are inferior (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 110–40). Postwar ‘democratic’ schooling did not recognize the special needs of these groups, except to provide extra resources to buraku people and the Ainu so that they could catch up with the majority Japanese (See Chapter 2). Below, we briefly explain the various categories of minorities that this book examines, as detailed discussion follows in the overview chapters (Chapters 2 and 6). The first identifiable populations are the indigenous peoples of Hokkaido (the Ainu or Moshir), and the Okinawans. They were annexed in the late nineteenth century (Murphy-Shigematsu 2002) and now reside in their regions of origin and as a diaspora in metropolitan cities. The post-war US occupation of Okinawa until 1972 and the continuing existence of US bases since Okinawa’s return to Japan created another minority – the children of US servicemen and local women, popularly called Amerasians (see Chapter 4), who have counterparts around the world. Also discussed are those who are commonly called the ‘oldcomer’ ethnic Koreans and Chinese. They are the descendants of former colonial subjects who were brought or came voluntarily to Japan, some in pursuit of further education and employment, others as forced labour, during Japan’s colonial occupation of those territories. An interactive perspective, however, leads us to emphasize the diversity that is contained within a single category of ethnicity, as well as the variations in interaction patterns that surround it. The so-called ethnic ‘newcomer’ Koreans or Chinese who came to Japan for economic reasons in recent years as guest labourers, as well as those who married Japanese, are indicative of the diversification of ethnic categories that is occurring in Japan. With the increase in citizenship in recent years, there are said to be almost as many Japanese nationals of Korean (or mixed Korean) descent as Korean residents. The identification of nationality with ethnicity, a long-held assumption in post-war Japan, is therefore contested. Internal differences among those of Korean descent are also observed in terms of generation, affiliation with North and South Korean organizations, regions of residence and social class. As the official categorization continues to be based on nationality (not ethnicity), the number of Korean nationals has declined in recent years. The percentage of registered foreigners who are Korean nationals declined from 50 per cent in 1994 to less than 28 per cent in 2007 (see Figure 1.2), but the number of Japanese nationals of Korean descent increased in the same period. Another major category is the buraku people, descended from the outcasts of the feudal system. The institutional caste system was abandoned in the late
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Figure 1.2 Registered foreigners by nationality, 1989–2008 Source: Immigration Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Justice, Japan (2009) Heisei 20-nenmatsu genzai ni okeru gaikokujin tourokusha tōkei ni tsuite. Online. Available: www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/ 090710-1.html (accessed 10 September 2009).
nineteenth century, but prejudice and marginalization persist in employment and marriage. Civil rights movements initiated by buraku organizations have resulted in improvements in terms of living conditions and educational achievements of their young. Buraku activism has served as one prototype of human rights-oriented reform, as has the Korean movement in Japan (see Chapter 3). In addition to these long-existing minorities, we also discuss the new inflows that have diversified Japanese society since the 1980s. With the expansion of Japanese companies abroad, increasing numbers of Japanese families worked abroad and eventually returned with their school-age children, who became the kikokushijo (Japanese returnees). They are discussed in Chapter 10, alongside the ‘new’ foreigners. Returnees from China (war-displaced Japanese and their families from China) and Indo-Chinese refugees have formed small but identifiable groups in certain localities, which have often become increasingly multicultural with the emergence of new entrants. Japan’s economic boom also brought inflows of foreign labour from Asia and South America. A turning point for one group of foreign labourers was the implementation of the revised 1990 immigration law, which opened the door for descendants of Japanese migrants to South America to work in Japan legally as unskilled labour. South Americans make up the fastest growing group of ‘newcomers’. The South American Nikkeijin are the descendents of Japanese who left for South America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, backed by a government policy to alleviate Japan’s overpopulation at the time. The revision of the immigration law, allowing these South Americans to work legally as unskilled labour, created an exception to the general rule that the Japanese
10 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi government does not officially accept unskilled migrant workers. Japanese language classrooms have been erected for the Nikkeijin, but low achievement, dropping out and other educational problems are fast becoming marked in the Nikkei community (see Chapter 6). The major characteristic of ‘new’ foreigners is that they have come mostly as voluntary labour or immigrants, rather than populations recruited through direct colonization – though there are plenty of cases of exploitation, by brokers and employers. They are also more likely to come and go than the long-existing minorities. Some ‘newcomers’ remain in Japan permanently, including the Indo-Chinese refugees; others originally intended to return to their home countries with substantial savings after a few years working in Japan, but have ended up being long-term residents. Many are new to the country and do not speak Japanese. Thus, the service provided by schools to this population tends to focus on language assistance and adaptation to Japan. Again, the figures broken down by nationality obscure the diversity within a single nationality category. Figure 1.3 shows the number of foreigners in government schools; this number includes Japan-born ‘oldcomers.’ This brief illustration of minority diversity presents a picture of uncertain, complex and shifting categories. These categories and boundaries are constructed and negotiated by different agents, from authoritative institutions such as the national government at one end to the minorities (the categorized) and laypersons at the other, leaving local governments and NGOs somewhere in between, each with different degrees of power with which to impose their own categorizations on public discourse.
Figure 1.3 The number of foreign national students at school, 1991–2006 Note: Data were as of 1 May in each year. Bold and italicized numbers indicate the total numbers of students in each year. Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (2009) Kōritsugakkōni shūgaku suru gaikokujin jidōseito no suii. Online. Available: www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/ shotou/042/houkoku/08070301/009/002.htm (accessed 10 September 2009).
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The national government employs two main categorizations, based on (a) citizenship/nationality (and the legal status of residents) and (b) the requirement of assistance in Japanese language instruction. By providing figures on the number of registered foreigners (Figure 1.2) and the number of foreign children in government schools (Figure 1.3) through its classification scheme, the national government has framed the discussion on diversity in schools. Some local governments have chosen to create other categorizations, such as long-term residents (rather than permanent residents) and children with foreign roots (for Japanese citizens of ‘foreign’ descent, including fourth-generation ethnic Koreans). Or, at the school level, some educators use the term ‘students in the international class’, for example, to refer to Japanese returnees and ‘newcomers’. Non-government organizations may also create a category simply through the organization’s name. These terms have become official to differing degrees, in the sense that they become legitimate in the public’s perception. For example, the expression tabunka kyōsei (multicultural coexistence) emerged among residents in Kobe after the 1995 earthquake, when volunteers and activists discussed how to assist ethnic minority survivors; and an NGO, which started as the Foreigners’ Earthquake Information Center (Gaikokujin Jishin Jōhō Sentā), adopted the name Tabunka Kyōsei Sentā (Multicultural Coexistence Centre) (Takezawa 2008: 32–5). There are currently many organizations that have tabunka kyōsei in their names.3 The term tabunka kyōsei is now widely adopted in local and national government documents.4 However, exactly what is meant by the term tabunka kyōsei varies and is dependent on the interpretations of respective organizations. ‘Japanese’ laypersons use lay categories to refer to minority groups such as ‘residents in the eastern part of XYZ housing complex’ or ‘people from over there’ (mukō no hito). And, of course, the categorized themselves negotiate their own boundaries, as groups and as individuals. With all these agents involved, categorizations remain situational, but the negotiations about categorization do not occur on a level playing field. There are always differences in power. We see in the following chapters how this process plays out in schools.
Multicultural education and multicultural society in the Japanese context What is the dominant Japanese understanding of multicultural education? Although it is naturally diverse, as is the case elsewhere, we can identify some trends by looking at the terminology used in the nation-wide discourse. After briefly discussing multicultural education in the anglophone West, we analyse the Japanese debate in the global context. So-called multicultural education emerged when minorities questioned white, mainstream hegemony in anglophone industrialized countries (Banks 1994, 1997, 2001; Gollnick and Chinn 1998). ‘Multicultural’ education replaced the hitherto prevalent approaches of ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’ for dealing with diverse student populations, because assimilation and integrative approaches promoted cultural adaptation to the mainstream while remaining unconcerned about the mono-cultural nature of the curriculum. Cultural pluralism, which underpins multicultural education, on the other hand, celebrates diversity as a positive asset
12 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi for education of the young as a whole and advocates maintenance of the diverse cultures and heritages of different groups. This includes the addition of diverse minority perspectives and content to curriculum and after-school clubs, and the active promotion of teachers of diverse ethnic backgrounds. Under the broad banner of multicultural education, approaches to address diverse student populations varied in different countries (see Grant and Lei 2001). In all cases, support for multicultural education initially came from ground-level practitioners and minorities who questioned the fairness of an assimilationist approach, and it was subsequently taken up by local authorities. Canada and Australia are widely considered to have been most interventionist, in that federal legislation was enacted to enforce cultural pluralism in education. Over time, multicultural education has evolved into different forms, reflective of local context, and has come under closer scrutiny. Vocal critics of cultural pluralism and multicultural education have come from two directions. On one hand, conservative critics (for example, Schlesinger, 1992) have expressed concern that the ‘racial/ethnic’ elements of the curriculum have gone too far, to the extent of destabilizing national unity and distracting students from ‘core studies’. On the other hand, radical (that is, anti-racist) critics have accused multicultural education of not going far enough, as it leaves unchanged the place of the dominant culture in the curriculum, along with the structurally unequal relations within and outside schools (see, in the UK, Troyna 1993; Gillborn, 1995; in the US, Giroux 1993; McLaren 1995; Apple 1996; in Australia, Rizvi 1993). They charge, for example, that ‘benevolent multiculturalism’ advocates respect for the lifestyles of minority children but limits their access to opportunities (Gibson 1984). Worse still, it is said simply to appease minorities, in a form of palliative care, while doing little to enable minority children to learn to negotiate with dominant groups and to succeed in mainstream society (Bullivant 1986: 42). These radical critics’ arguments are persuasive, but they rarely spell out concrete alternatives to the practice of liberal multicultural education. Critiques of liberal multicultural education have evolved into debate about ‘critical multicultural education’, which continues to-date (Kanpol and McLaren 1995; May 1999; Ladson-Billings and Gillborn 2004). Multicultural education is a complex concept that is multidimensional and dynamic and involves a diverse range of practices specific to local circumstances. It cannot be expected to deliver the desired outcome in the short term and instead is likely to evolve in many different ways (Nieto 1999). These debates illuminate two central elements of multicultural education. One is the celebration of cultural diversity in a society and globally. The other is the pursuit of equity by individuals of diverse cultural backgrounds and the promotion of universal human rights. Understanding of equity varies, however: some argue for equal educational opportunity, while others go further, seeking changes to the existing system in order to achieve equal educational outcomes. These two elements of multicultural education are relevant to understanding what we see in Japan. As is explained later, the long-existing minorities initially demanded opportunities for better life chances in order to escape from discrimination (the
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equity and human rights elements), while education in districts with many ‘newcomers’ initially tended to emphasize the celebration of cultural difference (the former of the central elements). Current practice in districts across Japan encompasses both elements, but initial differences remain observable in terms of emphasis. Japanese terminology for multicultural education can generally be divided into three clusters. The first cluster centres on ‘international understanding education’ (kokusai rikai kyōiku), the umbrella term for education related to intercultural/ multicultural issues in Japan. This is used in such a flexible way today that it can contain almost anything. One line of practice with a long history, which we call ‘Olympic-style international understanding education’, adheres to the framework of the nation-state. In this context, inter-‘national’ understanding is just that – promoting understanding between Japanese and people of other nations, Olympic style, by learning about other nations, engaging in international exchange and inviting foreign visitors to talk about their country. This framework assumes that the ‘foreigners’ and ‘the Japanese’ are mutually exclusive. In general, the ‘foreigners’ whom Japanese nationals should get to know and coexist with in international society are assumed to be either in their own countries, or visiting Japan temporarily as guests. The framework of the nation-state assumes internal homogeneity within the country, and the perspective is outward looking. This line of thought is not the one we assume in this book, although ‘Olympicstyle’ international understanding has its strengths. Even less central to our discussions are the types of international understanding activity that focus on the acquisition of English. A prime example is the English activities (eigo katsudō) that have become very popular in Japanese primary schools with the introduction of the integrated studies period, which are practised as part of ‘international understanding’ (kokusai rikai). Besides, the assumption of internal homogeneity in the ‘Olympic-style’ international understanding has long been challenged in districts with a concentration of long-existing minorities or foreigners, such as the buraku population, Ainu and Koreans. Backed by activism, such districts remind the Japanese of something that most of them may be unaware of – the existence of minorities and foreigners within Japan who are permanent members of Japanese society. The second cluster of terminologies related to multicultural education includes ‘egalitarian/equity education’ (dōwa kyōiku), ‘emancipation education’ (kaihō kyōiku), ‘ethnic education’ (minzoku kyōiku) and the umbrella term, ‘human rights education’ (jinken kyōiku). These have emerged in districts where many longterm minorities reside. Activists in these districts have all advocated strong anti-discrimination messages and argued for the protection of human rights. Over the years, human rights education has to come to include other groups that suffer discrimination, for example, the disabled and women (Sakai et al. 1998; Ebuchi 2001). These categories favour education with a strong emphasis on the social equity and human rights elements of multicultural education. The third cluster of terms relates to the academic translation of multicultural education, tabunka kyōiku, and multiculturalism, tabunkashugi. We emphasize
14 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi that these terms are academic constructions that scholars in the field have employed (see Kobayashi and Ebuchi 1985; Nakajima 1998; Ehara 2000; Watado and Kawamura 2002). Japanese practitioners, schools, local governments, communities and NGOs prefer different terminology, such as ‘multicultural coexistence’ (tabunka kyōsei), ‘society for multicultural coexistence’ (tabunka kyōsei shakai) and ‘education for multicultural coexistence’ (tanbuka kyōsei kyōiku), when discussing internal diversity and the need to accommodate returnees and foreigners within their schools and communities. ‘Multicultural coexistence’ is most often adopted by schools or districts that have large populations of overtly different cultures. Typically, the new multicultural districts in this category have a concentration of so-called ‘newcomers’, such as foreign workers, Indo-Chinese refugees and spouses of Japanese. Some of these districts have little history of human rights activism by long-existing minorities. Districts with long-existing minorities have also taken up the terminology of multicultural coexistence (see Chapter 7). The three clusters of terms are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The relative emphasis of these three approaches varies, depending on districts and communities. For example, buraku activism, the zainichi Korean movement and the antidiscriminatory human rights messages they convey intersect with the calls for multicultural coexistence actively pursued in districts experiencing inflows of ‘newcomers’. Researchers of long-existing minorities/foreigners have made efforts to link, for example, dōwa education and multicultural education as human rights education (Sowa 2000), or to place the ‘oldcomer’ Koreans at the centre of concepts of multicultural education in Japan (Nakajima 1993). Indeed, education for multicultural existence in districts such as Osaka and Kawasaki (see Chapters 2 and 7), which have active buraku and/or Korean movements, follows this pattern, because the long-existing minorities/foreigners have set the tone. The chapters in this book each focus on how diversity is played out and evolving in key districts. In a book such as this, which examines the evolving landscape of diversity in Japan, it is especially important to come down to the local level. Compared with states that have adopted a multicultural framework at the national level, the Japanese education system has shown relatively little interest in addressing the needs of a diverse student population at the national level. It is the local governments, education boards, individual schools and communities that have taken initiatives to manage and benefit from diverse populaces, particularly in the areas where large minority/foreign populations live (see Chapter 7). Prefectural, metropolitan and municipal government policies for the education of minority groups attest to this (Okano 2006), as do the individual chapters to follow. It is at this level that visions of homogeneity have given way, and various actors are interacting daily, constructing a complex picture of multicultural Japan.
An interactive perspective Multicultural interactions occur both between individuals of diverse groups and between groups. In areas where there are few people from the same group,
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interactions in the community or the school are more likely to be understood as personal affairs. In those districts with a concentration of people associated with a certain minority category, there is likely to be a more group-based set of interactions. The visibility of multicultural interactions varies from the most direct and overt to the most indirect and latent. Interactions may be explicit and direct, as in the case of direct, face-to-face interactions. They may be explicit but indirect, as in the case of activists for ‘newcomer’ rights modelling themselves on the longexisting minorities’ activism, without having much direct interaction with the latter. Or multicultural interactions may be latent and indirect, in a manner that even the players themselves are not conscious of, seen, for example, in local policy implementation. Multicultural interactions occur at diverse sites. To facilitate our analysis, we tentatively distinguish between three types of multicultural interactive space: (A) spaces unintended for such interactions but where, nonetheless, interactions occur; (B) spaces deliberately designed for such interactions; and (C) policy spaces. In Type A spaces, although not created for multicultural interactions, shared needs, recategorizations and the like bring members of different groups together, most often by the increase or incorporation of a new minority group into a space that was formally created for and occupied by another. There are many examples of this. Japanese as a second language (JSL) classes in schools were initially created for Japanese returnees, but now serve two culturally different groups – Japanese returnees from local schools abroad and ‘newcomer’ foreign children with little Japanese language proficiency – if both are in the same school. The Japanese returnees were the first population to emerge as a target of remedial assistance and ‘adaptation’ (later to be replaced by a less assimilationist approach), but the model was later applied to the ‘newcomer’ children, albeit with an emphasis on the acquisition of Japanese language. Though these groups are dissimilar, they meet and interact in a common institutional space as a result of their overlapping needs and a recategorization that combines both ‘newcomers’ and returnees under the umbrella category of ‘internationalization’ (see Chapters 6 and 10). Another example is local schools in neighbourhoods with public housing complexes (kōei jūtaku). These complexes tend to have a mixture of culturally different, low-income populations. When a certain ethnic/national group becomes concentrated in a particular public housing complex, ethnic shops and restaurants tend to sprout. These spaces also start to meet the ethnic needs of the new entrants. We see this across Japan. Icho Housing, a prefectural housing complex in Kanagawa prefecture near a former settlement centre for refugees, is home to a large number of Indo-Chinese refugees, Chinese returnees and Nikkeijin (see Chapter 8). In Toyohashi City (Aichi prefecture), the Iwata Public Housing Complex is home to many Brazilians, who arrived to take up unskilled jobs in the automobile industry. In Ikebukuro in central Tokyo, many ‘newcomers’ reside in old wooden apartments that used to house single Japanese workers (Okuda and Tajima 1991). The Shinryōdai prefectural housing complex in Kobe City has a concentration of Chinese returnees, leading a local school to offer bilingual
16 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi JSL-Mandarin classes. In the eastern parts of Osaka prefecture, numerous small factories and cheap housing (both private and public) have attracted a large number of Indo-Chinese refugees, Chinese returnees and South East Asian guest workers. Such residential compositions are subsequently reflected in the increased number of minority children in local government schools. In a similar manner, free, community-based, adult Japanese literacy classes offer spaces where old minorities meet the ‘new’ minorities/foreigners, and ‘new’ minorities/foreigners meet each other. Districts with a concentration of Koreans have long offered Japanese literacy classes to first- and second-generation Koreans in their old age. Although many elderly Koreans speak Japanese fluently, some lack reading and writing skills as a result of leaving school prematurely owing to poverty and bullying. As the population of ‘new’ foreigners surged, these classes often experienced increased enrolments of these ‘newcomers’, such as Asian brides wanting to learn daily Japanese, as is the case in Kawasaki (see Chapter 7). Recognizing different needs, the public centre in Kawasaki separated classes and extended their resources. Where resources are abundant, the services can expand. Where they are lacking, the ‘newcomers’ can be regarded as competitors for limited resources. ‘Newcomers’ not only take places in Japanese literacy classes (shikiji gakkyū) initially set up for the Koreans, but also in similar classes for the other long-existing minority, the buraku population, many of whose members also missed out on formal schooling in their youth (Akuzawa and Enoi 1992: 131–2). We see a similar pattern at the evening junior high school, initially established for Japanese who were forced, by poverty, to abandon compulsory schooling for immediate employment. Enrolments went down as the society became gradually more affluent, but the school has now become a multicultural site comprising such diverse populations as returnees from China, elderly, firstgeneration Koreans and young Japanese students with day-school attendance problems. For the ‘newcomers’, the institution offers a place to study Japanese. For non-attending Japanese students (futōkō), it provides a second chance to receive schooling. Though their purposes differ, both come from the margins of Japanese education. Type B interactive space is that deliberately designed for multicultural interaction. Some spaces had such intentions from the start; others, although initially created for one particular group, later reinvented themselves to include other groups and now see the target population as being multicultural. Most players in such spaces are non-profit organizations (NPOs), NGOs and local civil movements. For the NGOs operating in districts where diversity is already a given condition, the target population might be multicultural from the start. Such organizations often have names such as ‘centre for multicultural coexistence’, which immediately signals a multicultural focus. The annual nation-wide meetings of ethnic schools, the Multi-ethnic Education Forum (Tabunka Kyōsei Foramu), which began in 2005, for example, targeted all minority groups from the outset. International schools in Japan might be said to offer such a space from their inception and differ from mainstream schools and schools associated with a certain ethnicity or nationality. Some schools, such as the Tokyo Metropolitan
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Kokusai High School, have been established in order to foster multicultural interaction. In many cases, however, local activist organizations and NGOs in support of a specific group interact with those of another group or decide to absorb the interests and concerns of another group by expanding the boundaries of its target population. This can result in empowerment of the organization or, alternatively, create internal conflicts. We see examples in the teachers’ professional organization for the education of Koreans deciding to take up the concerns of the ‘newcomers’ and renaming itself by replacing ‘Koreans’ with ‘foreign nationals’ (see Chapter 5); or in the Okinawan civil movement, which started in order to obtain Japanese citizenship for Amerasian children (who had held no nationality without paternal recognition). It later gained wider support, in particular from those who married foreign nationals (including ‘oldcomer’ Koreans and Chinese), and became a civil movement to replace the system of patrilineal inheritance of Japanese citizenship to children with a bilateral inheritance (see Chapter 4). One of the impacts of the revised Nationality Law was a sudden increase in Japanese nationals of (mixed) Korean and ‘newcomer’ descent. Buraku activism, which has waged the most powerful challenge to mainstream Japanese society to date, influenced how Korean activism took up their human rights issues (see Chapters 3 and 5). As established, long-existing, minority activism focused on human rights, rather than cultural diversity, the centres of such activism (including Kawasaki and the Kansai region) responded to ‘newcomers’ with a human rights-based discourse. This contrasts with most cases, where the discourse on the ‘newcomers’ tends to revolve around social problems (such as high Asian foreigner crime) or in education, intercultural themes of getting to know a different culture rather than human rights (see Chapter 10). This process of a space expanding its target population and becoming more inclusive is also observed in institutional spaces now designated for multicultural interaction. The local junior high school described in Chapter 8 created a multicultural space (class) in order to bring together foreigners (and children with foreign parents) and ‘majority Japanese’ in the same classroom. First, it brought Indo-Chinese and ‘majority Japanese’ together, and later diversified to include South Americans and returnees from China. Schools are designated by the locality or the ministry to cater for diverse student populations. These schools and others have special spaces for these students (for example, kokusai kyōshitsu) and develop the kind of curriculum that capitalizes on a diverse student population for the benefit of all students. Many metropolitan governments (including Kawasaki, Osaka, Kobe and Hiroshima) run a ‘centre for coexistence’ (a community centre designed to promote the harmonious coexistence of foreign nationals and Japanese). Many of them were initially created in response to the activism of long-existing minority groups, but later adapted to accommodate the needs of ‘newcomers’ as well (see Chapter 7). Type C interactive space is policy-making and implementation, where policies regarding minorities are addressed at national, local and school levels. Here, too, we see similar processes of an initial policy expanding its target population. The
18 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi policy framework guiding the education of Japanese returnees – language acquisition, adapting to Japan and, later, encouraging the child to maintain positive aspects acquired abroad – served as a major model to accommodate the returnees from China, as well as the JSL population. The Ministry of Education’s (MEXT) amended regulations for non-attending students later began to be applied to Amerasian children who refused to attend mainstream schools, in favour of the Amerasian school, an alternative school established by the community, which now allows Amerasian children to complete compulsory schooling without attending a mainstream school (see Chapter 4). Another central policy interaction involved the MEXT’s 2003 controversy over treatment of graduates of ethnic schools. Initially, it announced that it would allow respective national universities the discretionary power to grant eligibility for university entry to graduates from a list of ethnic or special schools (including international schools and some Brazilian ethnic schools), but excluded North Korean schools, despite their being the largest in number. The MEXT later included them, after professional organizations, intellectuals and the North Korean schools protested this decision. At the local government level, policies for one group expanded, or served as a reference for another. For example, policies regarding the education of Korean residents began to include ‘newcomer’ children, in the name of ‘foreign nationals’. The local policies were initially created for Koreans, based on those already existing for burakumin in Osaka in the 1970s. The human rights education units within local education boards collectively address the issues of buraku and Korean children (see Chapter 5). The nature of interactions can vary; individuals and groups may interact superficially without many mutual interests. This can be the case when people of diverse backgrounds first find themselves together in a place for a shared purpose, for example, at a local seminar on schooling. After the seminar, they may not meet again. Continuous interactions in a space can lead individuals and groups to cooperate and collaborate when they perceive a benefit in terms of instrumental gains and emotional support. On the other hand, interactions may involve conflictual relations, for example, when minority groups compete among themselves for limited resources. We are interested to see how the spaces of multicultural interactions are evolving. What are the consequences for those involved? How does adopting a multicultural, interactive perspective assist us to understand Japanese society? Specific questions that we ask are: What are the policies and practices regarding respective minority groups at the national, local and school levels? How has the education system served minority/foreign children, by promoting their life chances on one hand and cultural maintenance on the other? What are the sites where groups interact with one another? How, and by whom, are these sites chosen or created? In what ways do multicultural actors interact on the continuum of conflict– indifference–solidarity? What is the impact of such interactions on group boundarymaking, group and individual identities, and access to life chances (or power)? Schooling, as the centre of multicultural interplay for children, provides a special opportunity to explore these questions. Public schooling is an arena in which
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interactions between multicultural actors inevitably occur, as individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds are brought together artificially, and where families, educators and communities debate what is best for children. People of minority backgrounds may live quite separately from the ‘majority Japanese’ and those of other minority backgrounds, and they may rarely encounter each other directly, but schools bring the different populations together. Moreover, schools are designed to ‘educate’ in a group situation and, as such, necessitate intersection between what are considered the boundaries of groups. As sites of this interaction, schools are subject to diverse expectations. At the national policy level, the state is not responsible for providing education for foreign nationals (although this has been challenged by civil activist groups, on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child) (see Chapters 2, 6 and 8). From the position of the central government, remote from the everyday activities of the classroom, the distinction between a Japanese national and a ‘foreigner’ may be apparent. However, for educators, once foreign children are admitted to school, they are part of a class and in this sense are equal members requiring their attention. Thus, teachers encountering such diversity are led to respond to the individual needs of these populations at the grass-roots level (see Chapter 8). We have tried to make distinctive contributions in this book. First, we adopt a multicultural interaction framework to understand changes taking place in Japanese society that increasingly cannot fully be understood in isolation. Second, this book documents some of the initial stages of a society responding to a rapidly changing, multicultural landscape in certain locations. Many anglophone, post-industrial countries experienced this process earlier in history, when circumstances differed greatly from the present globalized world. Third, in examining what occurs at the local grass-roots level, the book provides insights into bottom-up policy-making processes and complements the existing literature of educational policy-making at the centre (see, for example, Schoppa, 1991; Hoods, 2001). Fourth, the book consciously brings together English and Japanese scholarship in the area and tries to bridge the gap between them. Lastly, our focus, schooling, is an extremely important arena for studying these processes because of the unique place it occupies in society. Schools are one of the few public institutions and spaces where children of various backgrounds in a neighbourhood are together on a daily basis for an extended period of time, involving all children of compulsory education age. It is where young people are socialized and prepare themselves for the adult world. Schools are expected to provide all children with opportunities to develop their potential. What schools teach is widely considered ‘legitimate’ by the public. What occurs in schools is expected to reflect the society and is a prism of social change. It is a place where many types of adult have an invested interest as parents, as members of the community, as policymakers and as educators. Thus, almost any problem pertaining to children is translated into an education problem. Our focus on the interplay among members of different groups, the reconstruction of boundaries and the consequences for individuals in Japanese schooling assists us to understand
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the multicultural changes occurring in contemporary Japanese society. With this focus, we explore concrete multicultural approaches that schools can pursue to help maximize the benefits that minority children gain from education.
Contributing chapters The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 covers the long-existing minority/ foreigner groups, and Part 2, ‘newcomer’ groups. Part 1 begins with Okano’s overview of the long-existing minorities in Japanese society. The chapters that follow it each provide detailed analysis of a particular minority group, with a view to how that group is situated in relation to other minority/foreigner groups and to Japanese society in this period of increased diversification. Specifically, in Chapter 3, Boocock focuses on the burakumin and their endeavours to end discriminatory practices through education. Such dōwa education efforts have paved the way for other human rights education. In Chapter 4, Noiri shows how Amerasians in Okinawa (in a sense, double minorities, as Okinawa itself is marginalized in Japanese society) have organized to better their education. This has had an impact on other unlikely groups, such as non-attending students and those children of mixed marriages, on a larger scale. In Chapter 5, Okano describes how the Korean movement for equality in educational opportunity has evolved, benefitting from the buraku movement, while at the same time providing an existing framework in some districts for ‘newcomers’. The framework within which the ‘oldcomer’ Korean population has been discussed – human rights, lack of citizenship and cultural maintenance in particular – provides a model for understanding the ‘newcomers’. The other framework is the discourse of ‘internationalization’ alongside the returnees in Part 2. In Part 2, Tsuneyoshi presents an overview of ‘new’ minorities/foreigners in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, she takes the example of Kawasaki, an urban district in Japan with a concentration of Koreans that is experiencing so-called internal internationalization with the emergence of the returnees and the ‘newcomers’, and she shows how the increase in diversity is pressuring existing boundaries of difference and how the society is responding. In Chapter 8, Shimizu presents a case study of one of the most famous ‘newcomer’ districts for Indo-Chinese refugees. Using an action-research approach, she illustrates how the successions of ‘newcomers’ – Indo-Chinese refugees, returnees from China and the Nikkeijin – have created a mutually dependent, multicultural landscape. In Chapter 9, Burgess studies an example of a well-known initiative in Japanese rural communities to recruit Asian wives. Ironically, such organized recruitment has ‘internationalized’ the most unlikely places – farm communities that are losing their youth to the cities. In Chapter 10, Nukaga and Tsuneyoshi examine the Japanese returnees in relation to other minorities. This group, though not a minority in the popular sense of the word, is deliberately included in this volume as it is a representative group associated with ‘internationalization’ in the Japanese context (others being the international students and the ‘newcomers’) and has served as a major reference point for how the other ‘international’ groups are addressed.
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The chapters in this volume collectively present a vision of Japanese society that is not a sum of different groups situated against the ‘majority Japanese’, but a vision in which such groups interact both directly and indirectly, constantly rewriting their boundaries and jointly constructing an evolving multicultural Japan. We offer this vision, drawing on our detailed observations of the microlevel practices of schooling and the surrounding districts that children experience daily. It is these children who will be Japan’s next generation of adults.
Notes 1
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3
4
For example, see Harajiri (1998: 5); Park (1999: 236); Kim (1999:6); Hester (2008:145); and John Lie (2008:169). This is partly because the terms ‘Korean–Japanese’ (kankokukei/ chōsenkei nihonjinn) and ‘Japanese national Korean’ (nihon kokuseiki kankokujin/ chōsenjin/ korian) have not yet gained popular currency. A more generic term, zainichi gaikokujin (foreign residents in Japan), is a legal and official category denoting all foreigners residing in Japan; but in this case the term is not inclusive of those who have gained Japanese citizenship. The notion of indigenous peoples remains tenuous. So does who constitutes Japan’s indigenous peoples and ‘Japanese’ (Oguma 1998). In 2008, the Japanese government officially acknowledged as indigenous the Ainu people, who resided in Hokkaidō before the modern Japanese state annexed the land. This recognition came after a series of Ainu lobbying and subsequent to its alliance with the international organization of indigenous peoples. To date, Okinawans do not hold such an official status. Kodomo Tabunka Kyōsei Center (its English name is Multicultural Children’s Centre): www.hyogo-c.ed.jp/~mc-center/; Tabunka Kyōsei Sentā (Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo): www.tabunka.jp/; Shinjuku Tabunka Kyōsei Puraza (its English name is Shinjuku Multicultural Plaza): www.shinjukubunka.or.jp/tabunka/japanese/index.html For example, see www.pref.gunma.jp/cts/PortalServlet;jsessionid=8ED5C954911 E273E03FA8FFC260B1EAA?DISPLAY_ID=DIRECT&NEXT_DISPLAY_ID=U000 004&CONTENTS_ID=4170 (Gunma prefecture), and www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/ s-news/2006/060307_2.html (Sōmu-shō).
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22 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi Benedict, R. (1946) The chrysanthemum and the sword: patterns of Japanese culture, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Boocock, S. S. and Scott, K. A. (2005) Kids in context: the sociological study of children and childhoods, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Brubaker, R. and Cooper, F. (2006) ‘Beyond “identity”’, Theory and Society, 29: 1–47. Bullivant, B. (1986) ‘Towards radical multiculturalism: resolving tensions in curriculum and educational planning’, in S. Modgil, G. Verma, K. Mallick and C. Modgil (eds), Multicultural education: the interminable debate, Lewes: Falmer Press. Chan-Tiberghien, J. (2004) Gender and human rights politics in Japan: global norms and domestic networks, Stanford: Stanford University Press. De Carvalho, D. (2003) Migrants and identity in Japan and Brazil: the Nikkeijin, London: Routledge. Denoon, D., Hudson, M., McCormack, G. and Morris-Suzuki, T. (eds) (1996) Multicultural Japan: palaeolithic to postmodern, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Douglas, M. and Roberts, G. (eds) (2003) Japan and global migration: foreign workers and the advent of a multicultural society, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Duan, Y. (2005) ‘Henyōsuru nihon no kajinshakai’ (‘Changes in the Chinese-Japanese community in Japan’), in Yamashita, K. (ed.), Kajin shakai ga wakaru hon (The ChineseJapanese community in Japan), Tokyo: Akashishoten. Ebuchi, K. (ed.) (2001) Kyōsei no Jidai o Ikiru (In the age of coexistence), Tokyo: Hōsō Daigaku Kyōiku Shinkō-kai. Ehara, T. (ed.) (2000) Tabuka Kyōiku no Kokusai Hikaku (International comparisons of multicultural education), Tokyo: Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppan. Fukuoka, Y. (2000) Lives of young Koreans in Japan, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press. Gibson, M. (1984) ‘Approaches to multicultural education in the United States: some concepts and assumptions’, Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 15: 94–119. Gillborn, D. (1995) Racism and antiracism in real schools, Buckingham: Open University Press. Giroux, H. A. (1993) Living dangerously: multiculturalism and the politics of difference, New York: Peter Lang. Gollnick, D. M. and Chinn, P. C. (1998) Multicultural education in pluralistic society, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill, an imprint of Prentice Hall. Goodman, R., Peach, C., Takenaka, A. and White, P. (eds) (2003) Global Japan: the experience of Japan’s new immigrant and overseas communities, London: RoutledgeCurzon. Graburn, N. H. H., Ertl, J. and Tierney, R. K. (eds) (2008) Multiculturalism in the new Japan: crossing the boundaries within, New York and Oxford: Bergahn Books. Grant, C. A. and Lei, J. L. (eds) (2001) Global constructions of multicultural education: theories and realities, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Hall, S. (1996) ‘Introduction: who needs “identity”?’, in S. Hall and P. du Gay (eds), Questions of cultural identity, London: Sage. Harajiri, H. (1998) ‘Zainichi’ toshiteno Korian (Koreans as ‘zainichi’), Tokyo: Kōdansha. Hatsue, R. (ed.) (1996) Esunishiti to Tabunkashugi (Ethnicity and multiculturalism), Tokyo: Dōbunkan. Hawkins, J. N. (1983) ‘Educational demands and institutional response: dōwa education in Japan’, Comparative Education Review, 27(2): 204–26. Hein, L. and Selden, M. (eds) (2003) Islands of discontent: Okinawan responses to Japanese and American power, Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield. Hester, J. T. (2008) ‘Datsu Zainichi-ron: An emerging discourse on belonging among ethnic Koreans in Japan’, in N. H. H. Graburn, J. Ertl and R. K. Tierney (eds), Multiculturalism in the new Japan: crossing the boundaries within, New York: Berghahn Books.
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Hicks, G. (1997) Japan’s hidden apartheid: the Korean minority and the Japanese, London: Ashgate. Hirasawa, Y. (1994) Amerika no Tabunka Kyōiku ni Manabu (Learning from multicultural education in America), Tokyo: Meiji Tosho. Hirota, Y. (ed.) (1996) Tabunkashugi to Tabunka Kyōiku (Multiculturalism and multicultural education), Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Hokkaidō-chō (2006) Ainu seikatsu jittai chōsa (Socioeconomic Survey of Ainu People), vol. 2008, Sapporo: Hokkaidō-chō. Hoods, C. (2001) Japanese education reform: Nakasone’s legacy, London: Routledge. Japan-Hōmushō-Nyūkokukanri-kyoku (2008) Heisei 19-nendomatsu Genzai ni okeru Gaikokujin Tourokusha Tōkei ni tsuite (Statistics on Registered Foreigners in 2007), Tokyo: Hōmushō. Jenkins, R. (1997) Rethinking ethnicity: arguments and explorations, London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Kanpol, B. and McLaren, P. (eds) (1995) Critical multiculturalism: uncommon voices in a common struggle, Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey. Kim, T. Y. (1999) Aidentitī Poritikusu o koete: Zainichichōsenjin no esunishitī (Beyond identity politics: the ethnicity of Korean residents in Japan), Kyoto: Sekaishisōsha. Kobayashi, T. and Ebuchi, K. (1985) Tabunka kyōiku no hikaku Kenkyū: kyōiku ni okeru bunkateki dōka to tayōka (A comparative study of multicultural education), Tokyo: Kyūshū Daigaku Shuppankai. Kurachi, A. (1998) Tabunka kyōsei no kyōiku (Education for multicultural coexistence), Tokyo: Keisō Shobō. Ladson-Bellings, G. and Gillborn, D. (eds) (2004) The RoutledgeFalmer reader in multicultural education, London: RoutledgeFalmer. Lee, C. and De Vos, G. (eds) (1981) Koreans in Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lie, J. (2001) Multiethnic Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lie, J. (2008) ‘The end of the road? The post-zainichi generation’, in S. Ryang and J. Lie (eds), Diaspora without homeland: being Korean in Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. McLaren, P. (1995) Critical pedagogy and predatory culture, New York: Routledge. McLauchlan, A. (2003) Prejudice and discrimination in Japan: the buraku issue, Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. McLemore, S. D. (1994) Racial and ethnic relations in America, 4th edn, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon. Maher, J. and Macdonald, G. (eds) (1995) Diversity in Japanese culture and language, London: Kegan Paul International. Maher, J. C. and Yashiro, K. (eds) (1995) Multilingual Japan, Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. May, S. (ed.) (1999) Critical multiculturalism: rethinking multicultural and antiracist education, London: Falmer Press. Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan) (2010) Tōkei. Online. Available: www.mindan. org/toukei.php (accessed 13 May 2010). Mitchell, R. H. (1967) The Korean minority in Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Mouer, R. and Sugimoto, Y. (1986) Images of Japanese society, London: Kegan Paul International.
24 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi Murphy-Shigematsu, S. (2002) Amerasian no Kodomotachi: shirarezaru minoriti mondai (The Amerasian children), Tokyo: Shūeisha. Nakajima, T. (1993) ‘Nihon no tabunka kyōiku to zainichi kankoku/chōsenjin kyōiku’, Ibunkakan Kyōiku, 7: 69–84. –––– (ed.) (1998) Tabunka kyōiku: kyōsei no tame no kyōikugaku (Multicultural education), Tokyo: Akasho Shoten. Nakane, C. (1970) Japanese society, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Nieto, S. (1999) The light in their eyes: creating multicultural learning communities, New York: Teachers College Press. Nishikawa, N., Watanabe, K. and McCormack, G. (eds) (1997) Tabunkashugi Tagengoshugi no genzai: Kanada, Osutoraria, soshite Nihon (The present state of multiculturalism and multilingualism: Canada, Australia and Japan), Tokyo: Junbun Shoin. Noguchi, M. G. and Fotos, S. (eds) (2001) Studies in Japanese bilingualism, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Nukaga, M. (2008) ‘The underlife of kids’ school lunchtime: negotiating ethnic boundaries and identity in food exchange’, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 37: 342–80. Oguma, E. (1998) Nihonjin no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made (Boundaries of Japanese people) Tokyo: Shinyosha. Okano, K. (2006) ‘The global–local interface in multicultural education policies in Japan’, Comparative Education, 42(2): 473–91. Okano, K. and Tsuchiya, M. (1999) Education in contemporary Japan: inequality and diversity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Okinawa-ken (2008) Okinawaken no Gaikyō (A snapshot of Okinawa), Vol. 2008, Naha: Okinawa. Okuda, M. and Tajima, J. (eds) (1991) Ikebukuro no Ajia-kei Gaikokujin: shakaigakuteki jittai hōkoku (Foreigners from Asia in Ikebukuro), Tokyo: Meken. –––– (1993) Shinjuku no Ajia-kei Gaikokujin: Shakaigakuteki jittai hōkoku (Foreigners from Asia in Shinjuku), Tokyo: Mekon. Park, I. (1999) Zainichi toiu Ikikata: Sai to Byōdō no Jirenma (Living as a zainichi: a dilemma between differences and equaltiy), Tokyo: Kodansha. Qiu, Xiaolan (2005) ‘1990 nendai igo nihon ni okeru kakyō kajin kyōiku no dōkō to tenkai: shinseiki terebi chūbun gakkō o chūshin ni’ (‘Trends in the education of ethnic Chinese in Japan since the 1990s’), Gakujutsu Kenkyū, 53: 29–41. —— (2010) Personal Communications. 17th and 23rd April 2010. Waseda University, Tokyo. Rizvi, F. (1993) ‘Children and the grammar of popular racism’, in McCarthy, W. (ed.) Race, identity and representation in education, New York: Routledge. Rohlen, T. (1981) ‘Education: policies and prospects’, in C. Lee and G. De Vos (eds), Koreans in Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Roth, J. H. (2002) Brokered homeland: Japanese Brazilian migrants in Japan, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ryang, S. (1997) North Koreans in Japan, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sakai, Y., Sato, M., Hamada, S. and Kurosaki, I. (eds) 1998 Kyōsei no kyōiku (Education of coexistence), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Sakuma, K. (1993) Igirisu no Tabunka/taminzoku Kyōiku: Ajiakei gaikokujin rōdōsha no seikatsu/bunka/shūkyō (Multicultural/multiethnic education in the United Kingdom), Tokyo: Kokudosha. Schlesinger, A. (1992) The disuniting of America: reflections on a multicultural society, New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Schoppa, L. J. (1991) Education reform in Japan: a case of immobilist politics, London: Routledge.
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Sekiguchi, R. (ed.) (1988) Kanada tabunkashugi kyōiku ni kansuru gakusaiteki kenkyū (An interdisciplinary study of multicultural education in Canada), Tokyo: Tōyōkan Shuppansha. Shimahara, N. (1971) Burakumin: a Japanese minority and education, Martinus Nijhoff. –––– (1984) ‘Toward the equality of a Japanese minority: the case of burakumin’, Comparative Education, 20: 339–53. Shimizu, K. and Shimizu, M. (eds) (2001) Nyūkamā to kyōiku (Newcomers and Education), Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Shimuzu, M. (2006) Gaikokujin seito no tameno karikyuramu: gakkō bunka no henkaku no kanōsei o saguru (Curriculum design for foreign students: the possibility of transforming school culture), Tokyo: Sagano Shoin. Siddle, R. (1996) Race, resistance and the Ainu of Japan, New York: Routledge. Sjoberg, K. (1993) The return of the Ainu: cultural mobilization and the practice of ethnicity in Japan, Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic. Sowa, S. (2000) Jinken kyōiku to shite no ‘dōwa’ kyōiku to tabunka kyōiku (dōwa education and multicultural education as human rights education), Tokyo: Akashi shoten. Sugimoto, Y. (2003) An Introduction to Japanese society. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. –––– (ed.) (2009) The Cambridge companion to modern Japanese culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (2010) An Introduction to Japanese Society. Third edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taira, K. (1997) ‘Troubled national identity: the Ryukuans/Okinawans’, in M. Weiner (ed.), Japan’s minorities: the illusion of homogeneity, London: Routledge. Takagi, M. (1991) ‘A living legacy of discrimination’, Japan Quarterly, 38(3): 283–90. Takezawa, Y. (2008) ‘The great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake and town-making towards multiculturalism’, in N. H. H. Graburn, J. Ertl, and R. K. Tierney (eds), Multiculturalism in the new Japan: crossing the boundaries within, New York: Gerghahn Books. Tanaka, K. (1996) Tabunka kyōiku no sekaiteki chōryū (Global trends in multicultural education), Tokyo: Nakashiya Shuppan. Troyna, B. (1993) Racism and education, Buckingham: Open University Press. Tsuneyoshi, R. (1998) ‘Nyūkamā no kodomo to nihon no kyōiku (Newcomer children and Japanese education)’, in M. Sato (ed.) Kokusaika jidai no kyōiku (Education in an age of internationalization), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. –––– (2002) ‘Kyōiku no kokusaika to tayō na ‘tabunka kyōiku: Nichibei no kyōshitsu kara (The internationalization of education and diverse models of multicultural education)’, in T. Kajita (ed.), Kokusaika to Aidentiti (Internationalization and identity), Tokyo: Mineruva Shobo. Vogel, E. (1979) Japan as number one: lessons for America, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vos, G. and Wagatsuma, S. (1967) Japan’s invisible race: caste in culture and personality, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Warikoo, N. and Carter, P. (2009) ‘Cultural explanations for racial and ethnic stratification in academic achievement: a call for a new and improved theory’, Review of Educational Research, 29(1): 366–94. Watado, I. and Kawamura, C. (eds) (2002) Tabunka kyōiku o hiraku: maruchikaruchuraku na nihon no genjitsu no nakade (Promoting multicultural education), Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Watanabe, M. (ed.) (1995) Dekasegi Nikkei Burajirujin (Japanese Brazilian labourers in Japan), Tokyo: Akasho Shoten.
26 Kaori H. Okano and Ryoko Tsuneyoshi Weiner, M. (ed.) (2008) Japan’s minorities: the illusion of homogeneity, 2nd edn, London: Routledge. Weiner, M. and Hanami, T. (eds) (1998) Temporary workers or future citizens? Japanese and U.S. migration policies, New York: New York University Press. Willis, D. B. and Murphy-Shigematsu, S. (eds) (2008) Transcultural Japan: at the borderlands of race, gender, and identity, New York: Routledge. Zainihon Chōsenjin Jinken Kyōkai (2009b) ‘Shiryō’, Jinken to Seikatsu, 29: 72–80. Zenkoku-zainichi-chōsenjin-kyōiku-kenkyūkai-Kyoto (1993) Zainichi no ima Kyōto-hatsu (Koreans in Japan), Kyoto: Zenkoku-zainichi-chōsenjin-kyōiku-kenkyūkai-Kyoto.
Part I
Long-existing minorities
2
Long-existing minorities and education Kaori H. Okano
This chapter opens Part 1 on ‘long-existing minorities’ by locating these groups in Japan’s modern history and in contemporary society, where they coexist with ‘new minorities’. By ‘long-existing minorities’, we mean minorities whose origin predates the end of the Second World War. The aim is to provide an overview as an aid to a better understanding of the specific groups discussed in the following chapters. We begin with the background social circumstances and describe the individual groups – indigenous Ainu, Okinawans, people of buraku descent, ethnic Chinese and ethnic Koreans. As Chapters 3–5, in Part 1, cover Okinawans, burakumin and Koreans in detail, in this chapter I provide a more expanded illustration of Ainu and ethnic Chinese. When modern nation-states started emerging in Europe, they came with an idealized notion of a state comprised of homogeneous people, but in reality many European nation-states contained peoples of diverse backgrounds. This was also the case with Japan. The geographical and territorial entity now called Japan had been inhabited by peoples of diverse backgrounds since pre-modern times (e.g. Macdonald 1995; Denoon et al. 1996; Maher and Weiner 1997; Oguma 1998; Lie 2000). Opening its door to the world in the mid nineteenth century, Japan allowed into port cities Chinese merchants and workers whose descendants remain ‘overseas Chinese’ (kakyō) to date. The subsequent creation of the modern Japanese state politically incorporated the indigenous peoples of Hokkaido (the Ainu) and Okinawans as Japanese subjects. As the Japanese empire expanded its territory, people living in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan also became imperial subjects, some of whom migrated to, or were mobilized for labour in, mainland Japan. I must emphasize at the outset that the exact number of individuals of these minority groups is uncertain, in particular in the case of the long-existing minority groups that Part 1 examines. This is because the Japanese census does not collect information on descent from Japanese citizens, unlike in some countries where the census seeks self-categorization of a person’s ethnic background. We know the population of self-proclaimed indigenous Ainu in Hokkaido, but many Ainu reside outside Hokkaido. Similarly, we know the population of Okinawa prefecture, but many people of Okinawan descent live outside Okinawa. Once a Korean, Chinese or Taiwanese national takes up Japanese citizenship, he or she is absorbed into the category of ‘Japanese’. His or her descendants are ‘the Japanese’.
30 Kaori H. Okano The lack of concrete data on diversity among Japanese citizens has had two outcomes. One is that discussion of domestic diversity is framed in the discourse of ‘foreigners in Japan’ (zainichi gaikokujin). For example, when the media discuss increasing ethnic diversity, they list the number of registered foreign nationals and their nationalities. Ethnic schools are called ‘schools for foreigners’ (gaikokujin gakkō) (that is, Korean, Chinese, Brazilian, Peruvian), even though these schools also accommodate many Japanese nationals of varying heritage (Okano 2008: 5–20). As the majority of ‘long-existing minorities’ are Japanese citizens (including indigenous peoples), such discussions make the presence of diversity among Japanese citizens more invisible in public discussions. Some local governments, including in Osaka prefecture, acknowledge the existence of Japanese citizens of minority descent and have begun to use expressions such as ‘children with foreign roots’ (gaikoku ni rūtsu no aru jidō) and ‘children with special relationships with foreign countries’ (gaikoku to tokubetsuna kankeino aru jidō). But again, the reference point is ‘foreign country’. The modern system of state education has had a profound impact on longexisting minorities: it has effectively forced children to abandon the languages and cultures of their parents, to learn to see the world in ways determined by the mainstream Japanese (including that they occupy an inferior status), and to conform to what has long been considered the ‘Japanese way’ (including nationalist ideology). Assimilation was imposed by the central government. However, at certain historical times, minorities themselves have actively promoted assimilation, as in the case of Okinawans. Resistance to this assimilation was countered by the establishment of ethnic schools, rather than by challenges to mainstream schooling. A challenge to mainstream schooling came from buraku activism, which demanded ‘fair’ treatment of their children, anti-discrimination measures and human rights. Gaining inspiration from radical buraku activism, both Koreans and Ainu later started to make similar demands. All these groups were marginalized, both in terms of institutions (such as employment and schooling) and interpersonal interactions, in many different ways. But minority groups began to mobilize themselves against this marginalization before the Second World War. Buraku activism emerged in the earliest stages and was able to achieve the greatest progress, through alliance with political parties on the left and the radical measures it took in the 1970s, thereby setting examples for other groups to follow. Indeed, both Ainu and ethnic Korean activism, separately, have adopted similar tactics since the 1980s. Buraku activism also targeted mainstream schooling as one of the most significant ways to challenge the status quo. Although these movements forged alliances with the left, ethnic Chinese activism has taken a different route, perhaps owing to differences in the class composition of this community, as I explain below.
Indigenous Ainu, and Okinawans Ainu and Okinawans both see themselves as indigenous peoples of Japan; just like other indigenous peoples in the first world, they experienced internal
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colonization, were dispossessed of their land, were mobilized as cheap labour and remain marginalized to this day.1 Such perceptions resulted from their participation in global indigenous peoples’ movements that emerged in the 1980s. Until forty years ago, they saw themselves quite differently. The Ainu people were perceived as a ‘dying race’. The trajectories of Ainu and Okinawan peoples since their integration into the Japanese state share many features with other indigenous peoples around the world, one of which is the role played by the state education system. As Chapter 4 closely examines Okinawans, here I offer a brief examination of Ainu people. The population of the self-claimed Ainu people in Hokkaido was approximately 24,000 in 2006 (Hokkaido-chō 2007). There are said to be many more people of Ainu descent in other parts of Japan, but the number is unknown, as the national census does not collect such data. The existence of Ainu organizations in metropolitan cities suggests a significant number of people of Ainu descent living outside Hokkaido. Active interactions between the ‘majority Japanese’ and Hokkaido Ainu began in the fifteenth century when many medieval fiefdoms fought over mainland territories. Trading settlements were created by ‘majority Japanese’ from the mainland in the southern part of Ezogashima/Hokkaido around that time. After a series of conflicts between these settlements and the Ainu, agreement was reached between the most powerful family and the local Ainu. This family was later to rule the Matsumae domain, a minor fiefdom of the Tokugawa regime in Tokyo (then called Edo), when the Tokugawa family consolidated its rule over the Japanese archipelago. Under this regime (which lasted 250 years), a large part of what is now called Hokkaido remained ‘foreign land’ (Ezochi – literally, barbarian’s land). The Matsumae domain profited from trading with the Ainu in the resource-rich land. Alarmed by Russian expansion southwards in the late eighteenth century, the Tokugawa regime annexed Ezochi and placed it under its direct control, later granting it to the Matsumae domain. This resulted in Ainu resettlement and forced labour mobilization. With the establishment of the modern Japanese state in the mid nineteenth century, Ezochi formally became a part of the Japanese state. The Kaitakushi (Development–Colonization Commission 1869) was to oversee the ‘development’ of what the state regarded as a terra nullius, rich in natural resources. A large number of migrants from the mainland settled in Hokkaido, which was then systematically ‘developed’. Ainu people (who until then had depended for their livelihood on the forests and waterways) were forced to resettle and seek employment as cheap labour for the migrants. Informed by the social Darwinist view of ‘race’ prevalent at the time, the government enacted the Hokkaido Native Protection Act (Dojin hō) in 1899. It was expected that Ainu people would become small farmers and ‘Japanese citizens’. To this end, the authorities provided Ainu children with what they believed was required for Ainu lives – rudimentary education in Japanese literacy and numeracy. With the Native Protection Act came the Rules on Native Education (Dojin Jidō Kyōiku Kitei). Ainu children initially attended ‘native Ainu schools’, separate from schools for children of mainland migrants, and received a shorter
32 Kaori H. Okano and lower level of school education. They also gradually lost their Ainu language and sense of identity (Ueno 2005: 293). Later, Ainu children were schooled with non-Ainu children, but records suggest that Ainu children suffered bullying and discrimination from both classmates and uninformed teachers. Such experiences, and family poverty, often led to children dropping out of school early (Ueno 2001: 46). This in turn meant that Ainu people were restricted from bettering themselves in mainstream society. It was not that Ainu people passively accepted their situation: activists took up the poor state of Ainu in the 1920s and 1930s, which resulted in the creation of the first Ainu organization, the Ainu Association (Ainu Kyōkai) in 1930. It operated with an assimilationist framework, in cooperation with local government. The Association renamed itself the Utari Association in 1961, since by then Ainu people felt that the term ‘Ainu’ had acquired a derogatory meaning. Ainu people were divided about what roles it should play, and debate continued among them. At the outset, the Utari Association, along with the government, saw welfare measures as central to solving the problems of Ainu people. The subsequent government’s measures to address Ainu issues also centred on welfare measures. In 1961, the Utari special welfare project was implemented to improve living conditions, and employment and education levels. When it was subsequently found that Ainu living conditions remained inferior to those of non-Ainu, another welfare package, the First Hokkaido Utari Welfare Measures, was implemented, at a cost of 12 billion yen over the period 1971–80 (Siddle 1996: 33). These measures resembled the ten-year Special Measures for Regional Improvement for buraku people (1969, and renewed in 1979 and 1989), as Ainu activists gained inspiration from what the Buraku Liberation League had achieved. The Utari Welfare Measures are still being implemented, having been repeatedly renewed since their initial implementation in 1971 (renewals took place in 1981–7, 1988–94, 1995–2001, 2002–8) (Hokaidō-chō-kankyōseisaku-bu 2008). Education has been considered one of the pillars for improvement of Ainu lives, and the measures taken have provided financial assistance to Ainu children to attend upper secondary schools and tertiary institutions. Ainu activism underwent significant changes in the 1970s. Young Ainu activists no longer accepted that assimilation and working within the government institutional structure (that is, the Utari Association) formed the most effective course of action. Influenced by left-leaning students, buraku and human rights movements at the time, they wanted to assert their Ainu identity and so created new organizations, such as the Ainu Liberation League and an urban-centred Tokyo Utari Association. The activists not only gained inspiration from the Buraku Liberation League (BLL), but also adopted the BLL’s strategies of an uncompromising stance, confrontation and denunciation (Siddle 1996: 38, 29). They were also able to gain support from political parties on the left (the Japan Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party), which enabled their activism to be seen as a mainstream civil movement. In the field of education, concerned teachers began to take the issue of teaching Ainu children seriously and produced a guidebook in 1982, entitled ‘Discussing
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minorities in Japan with students: the current situation and guides for teaching’ (Hokkaido-kōtōgakkō-kyōshokuin-kumiai (Hokkaido High School Teachers Union) 1982). Furthermore, the Research Association for Ainu Education was established within the Hokkaido Education Board in 1983, in response to lobbying by the Utari Association. First, the Association saw problems with some of the depictions of Ainu in school textbooks and readers, and it debated what should be taught, both in the classroom and in teacher training courses. Second, it also began to see ignorance, among teachers, of the reasons behind the bullying of Ainu students and their truancy. The Research Association involved academics and practitioners and produced two publications to guide teachers in the teaching of Ainu history in primary and middle schools (in 1984) and in senior high schools (in 1991) (Ueno 2001: 46–7). The 1980s saw Ainu activists connecting with other human rights movements in Japan, based on a shared concern for the human rights of minorities. Ainu activists attended buraku meetings (Siddle 1996: 39) and made alliances with indigenous people’s movements in other countries. They attended the Third World Conference of Indigenous People in Australia in 1981. As a globally recognized indigenous people, Ainu participated in the opening ceremony of the UN International Year of the World Indigenous Peoples in 1992. Such recognition and participation fostered Ainu self-perceptions as a culturally distinct group with a specific history of colonization and a distinct set of rights. This global alliance gave them a means to challenge domestic marginalization in the global arena, appealing to international covenants (Sjoberg 2006). Educational participation among Ainu children has increased over the years and in particular since the series of Utari Welfare Measures were instituted in 1971. Ainu children’s retention rates to upper secondary schooling (that is, beyond compulsory schooling) are gradually catching up to those of their non-Ainu counterparts, with a 5 per cent gap remaining in 1999 and 2006. However, there remains a significant difference in rates of entry into universities – in 2006, less than 18 per cent of Ainu students went on to university, whereas nearly 40 per cent of non-Ainu students took up tertiary study (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The difference can be explained by the relative poverty of Ainu families. The same 2006 survey on Ainu living conditions reports that 38.4 per cent of Ainu families receive the government living protection allowance (seikatsu hogo) for low-income families, compared with 24.6 per cent of non-Ainu families. Ainu parents want their children to receive education: for example, 43 per cent of parents want their children to complete tertiary education, and 45 per cent senior high school. The gap between parental aspirations and children’s achievements may be due to the children’s negative experiences with schooling, such as bullying and discrimination, which not only affect academic performance but also alienate them from school (Ueno 2005: 295). It may also be due to a relative lack of rolemodel adults who have built their careers on success at school. If the series of welfare measures have been addressing Ainu children’s access to life chances in the mainstream society through financial assistance and making school a more comfortable place for them, how and to what extent has cultural
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Table 2.1 Ainu children’s retention rate to upper secondary schools compared with their non-Ainu cohort, 1972–2006 Year
1972
1979
1986
1993
1999
2006
Ainu (%) Non-Ainu in the same township (%)
41.5 78.2
69.3 90.6
78.4 94.0
87.4 96.3
95.2 97.0
93.5 98.3
Source: Hokkaidō-chō, Kankyōseikatsu-bu (2006) Heisei 18-nendo Hokkaidō Ainu seikatsu jittai chōsa hōkokusho, Sapporo: Hokkaidō-chō.
Table 2.2 Ainu children’s retention rate to universities compared with their non-Ainu cohort, 1979–2006 Year
1979
1986
1993
1999
2006
Ainu (%) Non-Ainu in the same township (%)
3.8 31.1
8.1 27.4
11.8 27.5
16.1 34.5
17.4 38.5
Source: Hokkaidō-chō, Kankyōseikatsu-bu (2006) Heisei 18-nendo Hokkaidō Ainu seikatsu jittai chōsa hōkokusho, Sapporo: Hokkaidō-chō.
maintenance or revitalization been addressed? I would suggest that very little has been done, but the 1997 Ainu Culture Act (Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the Ainu and the Ainu Culture) offers the potential to progress these goals (Siddle 2006). The vast majority of Ainu children speak Japanese as their first language. Those wanting to learn the Ainu language must attend classes organized outside school. The number of students is increasing, in part owing to the new Ainu Culture Act and to a general ethnic revitalization. The 2006 survey suggests that a significant number of Ainu maintain an interest in learning the Ainu language. The debates on the new Act and the Ainu’s identification with global indigenous peoples’ movements have domestically promoted public recognition of Ainu, which has prompted more schools to include aspects of Ainu culture and issues in subjects across the curriculum – in history, civics, Japanese, arts and social studies (Ueno 2001: 45). With the introduction of a compulsory integrated study subject in 2002 under the national curriculum reforms, more students are likely to learn about Ainu issues, in particular in schools in Hokkaido and in schools that adopt themes such as human rights, diversity and globalization (Ueno 2005: 299). The homepages of the Ainu Bunka Shinkō Kenkyū Kikō (The Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture), the Hokkaido Education Board and the Hokkaido Utari Association all offer a wide range of relevant teaching materials. Ainu people have not mobilized themselves for the education of the young, as the burakumin and ethnic Koreans have done. The buraku civil movements have centred on improvement of material conditions and human rights without asserting ‘differences’. The ethnic Koreans fought for access to both education and life chances in mainstream society, focusing on their lack of citizenship, and for
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cultural maintenance through the provision of ethnic education, offered in separate ethnic schools and in government schools. Though they have established themselves as Japan’s indigenous people, it remains to be seen what Ainu people decide they want for their children’s education and what strategies they devise to achieve them. They now have more resources than ever before. People of Okinawan descent (the topic of Chapter 4) currently reside across Japan. The population in Okinawa prefecture, formally called the Ryukyu Islands, was 1.37 million in 2008 (Okinawa-ken 2008). The exact extent of Okinawan diaspora in other parts of Japan is not known, although we know that a large number of Okinawans live in Osaka’s Taisho ward and in nearby Amagasaki City in the Hyogo prefecture. There are also associations of Okinawan people (Okinawa kenjinkai) in many prefectures, and we know that many Okinawans left for South America as migrants, some of whose descendants have now returned to Japan as guest workers. Okinawa was once the independent kingdom of Ryukyu. The kingdom maintained trading relationships with China, South East Asia and mainland Japan. In the early seventeenth century, when the Tokugawa regime established its rule over most of the Japanese archipelago, one of the minor fiefs at the southern tip of Kyushu, the Satsuma domain (han), absorbed the Ryukyu Islands. The Satsuma domain deliberately maintained these islands as a kingdom in order to benefit from its trade with China and South East Asia. The Meiji government officially annexed the kingdom in 1879 (at about the same time that the Ainu faced a similar fate in the north) and adopted an assimilationist policy. The modern system of education ensured that locals learned Japanese and the imperial ideology. Although the locals initially saw little value in this imposed assimilation and resented it, Japan’s victory over China in 1894 led them to see some desirability in an alliance with Japan. Local leaders (including school teachers) then began an assimilation movement from below, in the belief that it would eventually benefit the local population. Okinawans were actively involved in Japan’s colonization of Taiwan as Japanese subjects. The end of the Second World War saw the Ryukyu Islands come under American rule, which meant that the Okinawans’ post-war trajectory was quite different from that of the Ainu. Local teachers were unhappy with what they saw as the American occupation authority’s lack of enthusiasm for schooling (although it tried to design an Okinawa-centred curriculum) and the widening gap in academic achievement and subsequent life chances between Okinawan and mainland children. Teachers again initiated an assimilation education movement and demanded that Okinawan children receive the same education as mainland children. Thus, American rule heightened their grass-roots desire to become ‘Japanese’. With the continued existence of many US bases on the island after its return to Japan in 1972, Okinawans have developed an identity distinct from ‘majority Japanese’, in which they see themselves as victims of the state policies and the attitudes of the majority. Okinawa’s post-war experience has produced another minority, Amerasians (the children of American soldiers and local women). Chapter 4 examines both Okinawans and Amerasians in more detail.
36 Kaori H. Okano
People of buraku descent People of buraku descent (the topic of Chapter 3) are estimated to number 3 million and to maintain 6,000 communities across the country. The origin of the burakumin dates back to medieval times, when they were engaged in certain occupations popularly considered undesirable, for example, tanning and leatherwork, and lived in specified areas. With the hereditary class system institutionalized by the Tokugawa regime in the early seventeenth century, these groups of people were treated as outcasts, located at the bottom of the hierarchy. The class system was abolished in 1871 by the Meiji government as part of modernization initiatives, at around the same time that both Ainu and the Okinawans were formally incorporated into the Japanese empire. Despite this, buraku marginalization continues to this day. During the post-war period, the BLL pursued the elimination of discrimination against burakumin and improvement in their social and material conditions. In response to activism, the government implemented the ten-year Special Measures for Regional Improvement in 1969, to improve housing, employment, education and welfare. This was renewed in 1979 and 1989 for two more decades. The 1969 measures put Dōwa Education programmes (literally, egalitarian education), which had been pursued by the BLL, on the national agenda and had the national government fund it. It has been popularly held that buraku people do not form an ethnic group, as they cannot be identified by outwardly distinctive features associated with what is commonly understood to be ethnicity, such as language, religion or dress. Do burakumin then possess a distinctive ‘culture’? If we understand ‘culture’ to be a package of values, beliefs and ways of seeing the world, as well as distinctive characteristics such as language use, activities and customs, then we can say that they have a distinctive ‘culture’, which has developed as a result of their historical experiences of specific material and social conditions (including poverty and limited occupational opportunities) and exclusion from mainstream society. This includes particular diet, language use and marriage patterns, for example, as documented by Wagatsuma and De Vos (1984). In relation to institutional schooling, burakumin have tended to see schooling in a negative light. For example, schooling was considered to be a luxury before the Special Measures raised their living conditions, because the young needed to earn a living rather than attend school. School learning and qualifications were considered to be irrelevant or unnecessary, as burakumin faced discrimination in the mainstream employment market and eventually gained jobs in their own communities. Schooling was also alienating and oppressive, with frequent bullying. It is because of the distinctive nature of buraku culture that one of the buraku community preschools (studied in Chapter 3) adopted a particular philosophy to make school more conducive to children’s learning. Buraku activism, however, has not asserted a particular buraku ‘culture’. It has continuously adopted the universal language of human rights since the beginning of their activism in the early twentieth century, arguing that they deserve equal treatment because they are also ‘Japanese’.
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Ethnic Chinese There are important divisions between ethnic Chinese residing in Japan. As in other parts of the world, a distinction exists between Japanese nationals of Chinese descent (called kajin) and those who are citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Taiwan (called overseas Chinese, kakyo) (Guo 1999: 7). There are no reliable data for the number of kajin, for reasons already mentioned. Among Chinese residents themselves, a further distinction is made between old ethnic Chinese (rō-kakyō) and new ethnic Chinese (shin-kakyō). The latter arrived in Japan after Japan’s normalization of relations with the PRC in 1972 (Guo 1999: 9) and display greater internal variations than old ethnic Chinese – ranging from established, professional, permanent residents to illegal workers. ‘Newcomer’ Chinese are examined in more detail in Part 2. Chinese traders had resided in port towns in Japan since the sixteenth century. Under the Tokugawa regime’s isolationist policy, Chinese traders were allowed to reside in Nagasaki, the only port open to the outside world, from the beginning of the seventeenth century. With the opening of Japan to the West in 1853, Europeans started to arrive in several ports designated for international trading. As employees of these European traders, more Chinese workers arrived, which in turn led to chain migration through family and provincial reunions. At the same time, long-established Chinese traders in Nagasaki moved to other port cities in pursuit of expanded opportunities. The ethnic Chinese population in Japan has fluctuated over time, responding to ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. These included Japanese government policy, and economic conditions and employment opportunities in both countries. For example, the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) led to a reduction in the number of resident Chinese. The Japanese authorities initially discouraged unskilled labour migration for fear of opium use among the Chinese, which resulted in the relatively middleclass nature of the Chinese community (Vasishth 1997: 125). Japan’s colonization of Taiwan in 1895 increased the Taiwanese population in Japan, from 2,400 in 1922 to 7,000 in 1942 (Tsurumi 1984: 125). The Taiwanese received Japanese schooling at modern schools established by the colonial authorities (Tsurumi 1977), and some of these graduates went on to universities in Japan. During and prior to the Second World War, forced labour conscripts arrived from Korea and north-eastern China, although to a lesser extent than those from Taiwan. There is significant evidence of exploitation of Chinese labourers during this time. After the end of the Second World War, both Taiwanese and Chinese were repatriated by the occupation authority. About half of the 28,000 Taiwanese decided to remain in Japan. In 1948, the total number of Chinese residents was 34,000, of which 40 per cent were of Taiwanese descent (Vasishth 1997: 131). Compared with other countries, there has always been a relatively large proportion of Taiwanese among Chinese residents of Japan. The Taiwanese were more educated and did not face Japanese language problems, which meant that they were able to enter a wider range of occupations in post-war Japan (Vasishth 1997: 132–3).
38 Kaori H. Okano When Japan normalized its relations with the PRC in 1972, a large number of Taiwanese took Japanese citizenship. When the PRC began to allow its citizens to study and work in Japan, the number of ‘newcomer’ Chinese increased rapidly, changing the internal composition of the overseas Chinese community. In 1974, those from Taiwan numbered 24,000 and accounted for just over half of the Chinese residents in Japan. The corresponding figures are 33,000 and 48 per cent in 1984, and 39,000 and 13 per cent in 1997 (Guo 1999: 60–1). By 2001, almost four in five Chinese residents in Japan were newcomer Chinese from the PRC (Qiu 2004a: 128). The increasing dominance of these among Chinese residents in Japan was brought about by, not only a large number of new arrivals, but also an increase in the number of Chinese marrying Japanese nationals. Almost 90 per cent of Chinese marriages are with Japanese citizens, and their children are born with Japanese citizenship (Qiu 2004a: 128). Chinese children had two options for schooling – mainstream Japanese schools and full-time ethnic schools. The first modern, ethnic Chinese school was established by Chinese merchants in Yokohama in 1897, before the government of Qing China established its own school system in 1901, modelled on the modern system of education in Meiji Japan (Yen 2002: 178–9). The school was also the first modern, overseas Chinese school in the world and was later a model for overseas Chinese schools in South East Asia (Qiu 2004a: 128). Similar schools were subsequently established in Kobe, Osaka, Tokyo and Nagasaki, and numbered ten by the end of the Second World War. After the war, the schools replaced provincial languages with Mandarin Chinese as the medium of instruction, creating a sense of solidarity in Chinese communities. The division of the PRC and Taiwan led most schools to choose affiliation, except for the Kobe ethnic Chinese school, which made a conscious decision to accommodate both. The 1970s saw a decline in the demand for Chinese schooling, with many residents taking up Japanese citizenship. Currently, five schools operate as full-time ‘ethnic’ schools, offering locally relevant curricula (including Japanese and English), with Mandarin as the medium of instruction. In 1948, about 70 per cent of school-age Chinese residents attended one of the ethnic Chinese schools (Qiu 2004b: 216). The current figure is 10 per cent; the great majority of Chinese children attend mainstream Japanese schools (Qiu 2004b: 225). There have been few studies on ‘old Chinese’ children at mainstream schools. I suspect that this is partly because they perform well, and because the transition from ethnic Chinese middle school to mainstream high school has been a smooth one for many. In recent years, ethnic Chinese schools have gained a reputation for providing a more rigorous academic education (especially given the opportunity to learn three languages) than local government schools and have attracted non-Chinese children. The nature of ethnic Chinese schools has changed over the years, in particular from the 1990s, when ethnic Chinese communities became more diverse. Studies of five Chinese schools suggest that they all see their mission as teaching Chinese language and academic achievement comparable with mainstream Japanese schools, as well as the promotion of trilingualism (Chinese, Japanese and English),
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and an ‘international education’, something akin to that offered by Englishmedium international schools (Qiu 2004b: 216–22). Since the 1990s, the predominance of old Chinese among the student population has changed; for example, the majority of the Yokohama Chinese school enrolment is newcomer Chinese children, which has prompted it to institute JSL classes. The number of students with no Chinese background also increased, accounting for 22 per cent and 11 per cent of students in schools in Yokohama and Kobe, respectively (Qiu 2004a: 128–9). Old ethnic Chinese (who arrived before 1972) have established a network of organizations. There are thirty-seven main organizations for those from the mainland, represented by a peak national body. Most of them exclude those who have taken Japanese citizenship. Old ethnic Chinese from Taiwan are represented by thirty-four major organizations and a peak national body, which also welcome naturalized members. Among them, the Kobe Chinese organization (Kobe Kakyō Sōkai) is an exception in that it accommodates members regardless of their origins (Guo 1999: 68). Other than these, there exist many other associations based on such features as provinces of origin, occupations and commerce. Newcomer Chinese generally do not have meaningful interaction with these old ethnic Chinese and their organizations (Vasishth 1997: 135–6; Guo 1999: 212), and they depend on NGOs and NPOs established for newcomers. So, we have old ethnic Chinese who are established, educated and relatively wealthy on the one hand and, on the other, newcomer Chinese with little Japanese language proficiency who face challenges similar to newcomers from other parts of the world. Interactions such as occur between old Chinese and newcomer Chinese deserve further study.
Ethnic Koreans Like ethnic Chinese, ethnic Koreans exhibit internal variations. A major division exists between ‘old-timer’ Koreans, who are the descendants of those who arrived in Japan before the end of the Second World War as imperial subjects, and ‘newcomer Koreans’, who arrived during the post-war period. ‘Old-timer’ ethnic Koreans were granted special permanent residency, but an increasing number of them are now Japanese citizens. Korean residents in Japan number 600,000, and an almost equal number of Japanese citizens of Korean descent are said to live in Japan. Although a small number of Koreans lived as artisans working for pre-modern domains in Japan, the number of Korean arrivals jumped after Japan’s colonization of the Korean peninsula in 1910. A large number of peasants, having had their land taken by the colonial authorities, migrated to Japan to work in low-paid employment in factories, mines and construction work during the country’s rapid industrialization (Weiner 1994). Later, from 1939, labour conscription led to further Korean immigration. Their predominantly working-class background distinguished them from ethnic Chinese migrants. Korean children attended Japanese schools, but, with the end of the war, many ethnic schools sprang up in order to prepare them for repatriation to Korea. Those
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families who decided to remain in Japan had the choice of sending their children to either North Korean ethnic schools or mainstream schools. Since the early 1990s, almost 90 per cent of school-age Korean children attend mainstream schools. As Chapter 5 reveals, studies of Korean students in mainstream schools suggest that their experience of schooling has become quite comfortable, but that the national policies do not address the needs of Koreans who do not outwardly display ‘difference’. It is at the level of local government that policies are developed to address ethnic Korean needs. In recent decades, these policies have been adjusted to address the needs of newcomer minority children as well.
Education and long-existing minorities All long-existing minority groups have been incorporated into the modern Japanese state as marginalized groups. Except for the early Chinese merchants, the incorporation was imposed. Although some people migrated from the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and north-eastern China to Japan, it was because they lost their livelihoods after the colonial authorities had expropriated their land. Despite divergence in the processes of incorporation, there are shared characteristics among the long-existing minorities. For a start, all now have Japanese as their dominant language. Language is not a barrier in the educational and employment spheres. There has not been the pressing need to adapt to the ‘Japanese lifestyle’, as there is for new minorities. Furthermore, all groups maintain long-established associations and social networks to meet the needs of the community and promote their interests. In terms of legal entitlement to education, however, the position of foreignnational Korean children differs from that of the other long-existing minority children (Ainu, Okinawans and buraku) who are Japanese citizens. There is continuing debate over foreign nationals’ entitlements to education and the national government’s duty to provide it. On one hand, the post-war Japanese constitution, in employing the term kokumin (literally, Japanese citizens) refers exclusively to Japanese citizens in relation to education (Article 26), which has led to an interpretation that foreign nationals are not entitled to education and that the government has no duty of provision. Such an interpretation is not, however, conveyed in the English language version of the Constitution provided on the government homepage (Appendix 1). This translated version is misleading, in particular in light of recent civil movements that have demanded that the term kokumin be replaced with nanibito (people) in order to ensure every child’s entitlement to education, regardless of his or her nationality. It was because of this constitutional restriction on the education of foreignnational Korean children that, in 1953, 1965 and 1991, the national government issued circulars regarding their education (see details in Chapter 5). The current legal stance, which derives from the 1965 circular, is that foreign-national children are entitled to the same free education and financial assistance as Japanese children. In the 1991 circular, the ministry softened its prior insistence that government schools not provide any special treatment based on ethnicity and
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acknowledged the value of after-school ethnic classes for Koreans (which had long existed in schools in Osaka). It also stated that this would also apply to newcomer foreign-national children, for the first time drawing a link between ‘oldtimer’ Koreans and newcomer children in education. We see a further change in the ministry's position in the new Primary School Course of Study (announced in 2008 but yet to be implemented), when it acknowledged the benefits that they bring to learning in mainstream classes (see Appendix 2). There are several important matters to highlight in relation to education and long-existing minorities. The first concerns the roles of long-established minority groups’ associations and networks. These associations have long taken initiatives to promote the education of their children in negotiation with local and national governments and other interest groups. Interactions among these associations have a basis in a shared language of human rights. A large number of the NGOs and NPOs that have emerged in more recent years accommodate multiple groups, including new minorities. In this increasingly complex picture of activism, we ask, what roles do each of the long-existing minorities’ associations and activist groups play, both independently and collectively, in promoting children’s education? The second point is the relative emphasis on access to life chances, or cultural maintenance/revitalization. These groups’ earlier concerns about schooling have leaned more towards improving access to life chances in mainstream society than to cultural maintenance/revitalization. Seeing their children receive ‘inferior’ schooling and the gap in achievement in education and employment relative to the mainstream, they pursued improvement through scholarships, affirmative action, government funding and special educational programmes. They also challenged what they considered inappropriate and discriminatory practices at mainstream school. Cultural maintenance and revitalization were left to ethnic schools (operating outside the mainstream schools), which were available from pre-war times for ethnic Chinese and from the late 1940s for ethnic Koreans. Later initiatives, influenced by identity politics in the 1970s, involved asserting their differences and arguing for cultural maintenance through mainstream schooling. More parents began to lobby mainstream schools (which now accommodate 90 per cent of school-age children of Chinese and Korean descent) to address the special needs of their children and to educate ‘majority Japanese’ children about diversity. The fact that educated minority young people increasingly choose to assert their minority identity rather than deliberately ‘passing’ as mainstream Japanese suggests intergenerational change. Third, Ainu and Okinawans now possess greater potential than ever to assert the special status of indigenous peoples and their distinctive entitlements, by forging alliances with the global indigenous peoples’ movements and citing international conventions. How indigenous minority groups strategically align with other long-existing minorities to promote their interests remains to be seen. Interactions of this kind have occurred, such as an Ainu representative giving a speech at a buraku conference and the broadcasting of Hokkaido Ainu radio programmes in regular timeslots on Kobe’s multilingual FM radio. Buraku
42 Kaori H. Okano activism has provided inspiration and guidance for practical strategies to Ainu and Korean activism. Korean organizations have conducted educational seminars on indigenous peoples and burakumin. The potential for collaboration among individual groups to have an impact on mainstream schooling deserves attention. The next three chapters illustrate the contemporary situations of three longlasting minority groups: burakumin, Okinawans and ethnic Koreans. We also see how these groups with a long-standing presence in Japan have interacted with each other before and since the arrival of newcomers.
Note 1
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the notion of indigenous peoples remains tenuous. So does the issue of who constitutes Japan’s indigenous peoples and the ‘Japanese’ (Oguma 1998). Although the Ainu people are now officially recognized as indigenous by the Japanese government, Okinawans do not currently hold such a status.
References Denoon, D., Hudson, M., McCormack, G. and Morris-Suzuki, T. (1996) Multicultural Japan: palaeolithic to postmodern, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guo, F. (1999) Zainichi kakyō no aidentitei no henyō: Kakyō no tagenteki kyōsei (The changing identity of Chinese in Japan: their multidimensional acculturation), Tokyo: Toshindo. Hokkaidō-cho (2007) Keizaiteki shakaiteki chii no kōjō o hakarutameno sōgōtekina sesaku no suishin. Available online at www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/sum/soumuka/ainu/ suishinhousaku.html (accessed 4 June 2007). Hokkaidō-chō-kankyōseisaku-bu (2008) Heisei 18-nendo Hoddaidō Ainu seikatsu jittai chōsa hōkokusho. Available online at www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ks/sum/somuka/ainu/ jittai.htm. (accessed 10 June 2008). Hokkaidō-Kōtōgakkō-kyōshokuin-kumiai (Hokkaido High School Teachers Union) (1982) Seito to tomoni kangaeru nihon no shōsū minzoku: sono genjō to shidō no tebiki (Discussing minorities in Japan with students: the current situation and guides for teaching), Sapporo: Hokkaidō-Kōtōgakkō-kyōshokuin-kumiai. Lie, J. (2000) Multiethnic Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Maher, J. and Macdonald, G. (1995) Diversity in Japanese culture and language, London: Kegan Paul International. Oguma, E. (1998) Nihonjin no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made (The boundaries of Japanese), Tokyo: Shinyosha. Okano, K. (2008) ‘Interactions amongst ethnic minority groups in schooling in Japan: the global–local interface’, in T. Hamashita, P. Kent, A. Iwatani and A. Uya (eds), Changing identities and networks in the globalising world, Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies, Ryukoku University. Okinawa-ken (2008) Okinawa-ken no gaikyō, Okinawa-kencho, Naha. Qiu, X. (2004a) ‘Kakyō kajin kyōiku no henyō ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu: Nihon to indoneshia o chūshin ni’, Waseda Daigaku Daigakuin Kyōikugakukenkyūka Kiyō, 11 (March): 127–37.
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–––– (2004b) ‘Nihon shakai niokeru kakyō kyōiku no jittai nitsuite: Zen-nissei kakyōgakkō o chūshin ni’, Waseda Daigaku Daigakuin Kyōikugakukenkyūka Kiyō, 12 (September): 215–26. Siddle, R. (1996) Race, resistance and the Ainu of Japan, New York: Routledge. –––– (2006) ‘The making of Ainu moshiri: Japan’s indigenous nationalism and its cultural fictions’, in N. Shimazu (ed.), Nationalisms in Japan, London: Routledge. Sjoberg, K. (2006) ‘Redefining the past, taking charge of the present, appropriating the future: the Hokkaido Ainu case’, in B. Sautman (ed.), Cultural genocide and Asian state peripheries, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Tsurumi, P. (1977) Japanese colonial education in Taiwan 1895–1945, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. –––– (1984) ‘Colonial education in Korea and Taiwan’, in R. Myers (ed.), The Japanese colonial empire 1895–1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ueno, Masayuki (2001) ‘Ainu minzoku o meguru kyōiku ni kansuru ichikōsatsu’, Waseda Daigaku Daigakuin Kyouikugaku Kenkyūka Kiyō, 9: 45–56. –––– (2005) ‘Ainu minzoku to kyōikuken no hoshō nitsuiteno kōsatsu’, Waseda Daigaku Daigakuin Kyouikugaku Kenkyūka Kiyō, 13: 293–303. Vasishth, A. (1997) ‘A model minority: the Chinese community in Japan’, in M. Weiner (ed.), Japan’s minorities: the illusion of homogeneity, London: Routledge. Wagatsuma, H. and De Vos, H. (1984) Heritage of endurance: family patterns and delinquent formation in Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press. Weiner, M. (1994) Race and migration in imperial Japan, London: Routledge. –––– (1997) Japan’s minorities: the illusion of homogeneity, London: Routledge. Yen, C. (2002) The ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: business, culture and politics, Singapore: Times Academic Press.
3
The schooling of buraku children Overcoming the legacy of stereotyping and discrimination Sarane Spence Boocock You know, I am poor in school performance. Because my grandpa and grandma didn’t go to school, and my pa and ma barely graduated middle school. I am their child. So, I can’t be smart in school. Buraku ninth grader I am a buraku person and I am not proud of my position. But I hope to be more proud after listening to other buraku people. Knowing about people in weaker positions and doing something for them is important for us. As a burakumin I can relate to other minorities and I can understand their position . . . I would like everyone to know about my worries for my future but I fear that I will be discriminated against. Buraku middle-school student Buraku kids can’t concentrate. Elementary school principal Buraku liberation begins and ends in education. Buraku Liberation Research Institute (Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūjo)
The buraku people, or burakumin, constitute one of Japan’s largest discriminated against minority group.1 Like indigenous peoples discussed in this book, the buraku people are neither newcomers nor oldcomers—their residence in Japan parallels that of majority Japanese. Nor are they a distinct racial or ethnic group— they do not differ from majority or mainstream Japanese in skin color, facial features, or any other characteristics of physical appearance, nor do they share a distinctive language, religion, or other characteristics of sociocultural heritage. Yet, as George De Vos, the American anthropologist who conducted some of the first in-depth studies of buraku communities, has pointed out, “nonvisible features can be used with equal force to segregate off a portion of a society as essentially inferior, or in religious terms, ‘impure’” (De Vos and Suarez-Orozco 1990: 171). Many social scientists regard burakumin as members of a politically created caste, or outcaste, group, though some (for example, Shimahara 1984) argue that, lacking a distinctive culture, contemporary burakumin do not meet all criteria of
The schooling of buraku children 45 outcaste status. Racial, ethnic, and caste definitions and classifications can, of course, be highly subjective, and boundaries between groups are rarely clear and fixed. Failing to find a “neat and simple” definition, the author of a review of research on buraku origins and issues concluded that the “only consistent identifying feature of burakumin is that they are discriminated against” (Su-LanReber 1999: 4). Not surprisingly, the educational accomplishments of buraku children, the subject of this chapter, reflect their status as members of a group that was for centuries treated as a pariah sub-population. Thus, I’ll begin with a brief overview of the history of the buraku people and the most pressing problems that continue to impede their social mobility and wellbeing. The next section contains a review of educational trends, including efforts by government agencies and buraku activists to reform the Japanese educational system and statistics tracing the scholastic progress of buraku children compared with that of their counterparts in other groups, majority and minority. This review will serve as background for my discussion of findings from a long-term research project conducted in one of Osaka’s largest buraku communities. My assignment was to study the preschools attended by buraku children and the transition from preschool to elementary school. Although my small sample of schools precludes systematic data analysis and generalization, the data offer glimpses into school life as it is experienced by students that point to some of the sources of the persisting inequalities in the Japanese educational system and the factors that promote or hinder children’s academic performance. In the discussion that ends this chapter, I’ll consider the implications of my research for educational policy and practice in an increasingly diverse society.
Historical overview The history of the buraku people is long and complicated, and there appears to be no single, agreed-upon explanation of their origins, though it is clear that they have suffered from ostracism and severe discrimination since at least the beginning of the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), when they were designated as eta (literally, abundant filth) and/or hinin (non-human), assigned to occupations that not only placed them at the bottom of the social hierarchy, but were considered polluted and polluting because they involved direct contact with blood, death, or dirt (for example, butchering, leather work, grave digging, and sewage removal). Excluded from mainstream society, these outcastes were also subject to government regulations prescribing their place of residence (usually segregated slums, villages, or settlements), clothing and hair styles (to distinguish them from “real” or “human” Japanese), freedom of movement, and relations with others (for example, exchanges of money and goods had to be managed in such a way as to preclude physical contact). Even after the Meiji government, in the Emancipation Edict of 1871, abolished the status of eta and declared them emancipated “new commoners” (Shin-Heimin), and they came to be known by the less derogatory if euphemistic appellation Buraku-min (literally, people of the buraku, or village),
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they continued to be regarded as inferior to “real” Japanese, and discrimination continued almost unabated.2 Though spontaneous protests erupted from time to time, organized resistance by buraku activists did not emerge until the twentieth century. The Suiheisha (Levelers Society) was created in 1922 with the aim of achieving full emancipation by exposing all forms of discrimination. A highly controversial tactic introduced by Suiheisha was denunciation and retribution (kyūdan tōsō), which forced perpetrators of hate speech and injurious acts toward burakumin to apologize and offer compensation. After World War II, new organizations arose that tended to favor a “tactical shift from individual retaliation to attack on the broader issues of social and economic inequality,” by gaining government support for improved living conditions and elimination of specific discriminatory practices in housing, education, and employment (Shimahara 1984: 341). Since the 1990s, buraku activists have been lobbying for a comprehensive national law on buraku rights and cooperating with international organizations and networks fighting for minority rights worldwide. It should be kept in mind, however, that the buraku liberation movement is not encompassed in a single monolithic organization, but is more accurately viewed as a collection of organizations that share a commitment to ending discrimination against buraku people but are highly diverse in: •
•
•
ideology: disagreements continue to arise over whether anti-buraku discrimination should be broadly or narrowly defined, and should be viewed as a caste-based or class-based problem; strategy: disagreements continue to arise over whether it is more advantageous to work through regular government channels and seek legal remedies to specific problems or to use more aggressive tactics and seek “a transformation of Japanese society that will liberate all oppressed Japanese” (Su-Lan Reber 1999: 34); membership: organizations differ considerably in the social status of members, the number of non-buraku members, and the political affiliation of members (some welcome members who also belong to communist or socialist parties, others explicitly exclude them).3
The status of burakumin today Although anti-buraku discrimination has been officially abolished, and widely held beliefs about the inferiority of burakumin have been discredited by scientific research since the 1970s, prejudice is difficult to eradicate. A New Zealand scholar who engaged in extensive ethnographic research in a buraku community in Osaka argues that the belief that there is something inherently “wrong” with burakumin and something shameful about having buraku ancestry remains strong and continues to be transmitted from one generation to the next among many mainstream Japanese and some burakumin as well (McLauchlan 2002: 91–2). Another scholar concluded that “discrimination has not so much disappeared as taken on new, more subtle forms” that continue to relegate burakumin to inferior
The schooling of buraku children 47 social status and limit their opportunities (Monnet 2001: xi). Among the constraints on social mobility and wellbeing, often referred to collectively as buraku mondai, the following are perhaps the most tenacious. Living conditions Many buraku communities today bear little physical resemblance to the ghettoes of the past (see, for example, the photographs of dilapidated housing and unkempt inhabitants, and verbal descriptions of drunkenness and violent behavior in De Vos and Wagatsuma’s Japan’s invisible race (1967), an ethnographic study conducted during the 1960s). Since passage of the Special Measures Laws of 1969, substantial infusions of government funds into designated buraku communities have produced impressive improvements in housing and communal facilities— though, at the end of the twentieth century, approximately a thousand buraku communities had yet to be officially recognized as such and thus become eligible for financial assistance. Still, the visibility of improved living conditions in many communities has generated resentment and claims of reverse discrimination, especially among less affluent majority Japanese who have not benefited either from Japan’s rapid economic growth or from minority entitlements, and these entitlements are now being phased out (Kitaguchi 1999: Chapter 6; Su-Lan Reber 1999: 46–7; McLauchlan 2002: 91–2, 2003: 36–7). Employment Though employment rates and wages have gone up since the 1970s, buraku adults are still twice as likely as majority adults, to work in dangerous, insecure and dirty areas of demolition and construction, more than twice as likely to be unemployed, only half as likely to work for the “bigger and better” companies with 300 or more employees on the payroll, only half as likely to receive promotion, and almost forty per cent less likely to be earning above national average pay rates. (McLauchlan 2002: 88) Their wages may have gone up, but so have everyone else’s, the latter usually more. They’re still more likely to be hired on a “last on, first off” basis, and the ratio of buraku welfare recipients to non-buraku welfare recipients has remained about 6:1 since the 1970s (McLauchlan 2003: 53–4, 62). Marriage On the one hand, the number of mixed marriages increased steadily and substantially throughout the twentieth century, from around 3 percent of all buraku marriages in 1919, to 34 percent in 1963, and 57.5 percent in 1993, with marriages between non-buraku men and buraku women averaging two to three times those
48 Sarane Spence Boocock between buraku men and non-buraku women. On the other hand, surveys taken during the 1980s and 1990s indicated that acceptance of such marriages was far from universal: a 1993 study of mixed marriages in Kyoto prefecture showed, for example, that a third of these marriages had been opposed by parents, siblings, and/or other relatives, and that only about two-thirds of the couples visited their parents regularly after the marriage (McLauchlan 1999: 8–10). Burakumin may experience rejection from other minorities as well as from majority Japanese. A buraku parent interviewed by McLauchlan (2003: 139) recalled receiving a phone call from the parents of a Korean man their daughter was dating, who told them, “I’m sorry to say this but we are quite proud of our Korean ancestry so we would never allow our son to marry a buraku girl.” An indicator of the persistence of anti-buraku discrimination in employment and marriage is the extensive availability and use of chimei sōkan, directories listing the names and addresses, and sometimes occupations and other background information, of burakumin throughout Japan. Though illegal since 1969, chimei sōkan continue to be compiled and to be used by corporations and families for background checks of potential employees and marriage candidates (Su-Lan Reber 1999: 13). Family and temple registers are also used to screen potential marriage candidates, though this too is illegal. Since the late 1990s, ordinances prohibiting businesses from using discriminatory criteria when hiring new employees have been passed in Osaka and in several prefectures, though it is too soon to assess their effectiveness (McLauchlan 1999: 7). Discriminatory acts and attitudes Investigations of anti-buraku discrimination in the Osaka area carried out in the late 1990s showed an increase in the total number of discriminatory public statements, as well as threatening graffiti, posters and stickers, and harassing telephone calls, letters and Internet messages. A report published in the Buraku Kaihō Shimbun included photographs of graffiti and posters with the following messages: “Burakumin cause AIDS,” “Drop atomic bombs on burakumin neighborhoods,” and “Die eta filth.” Remarks posted on the Internet included: “Kill all the buraku people” and “Put buraku people into poison gas cells and liquidate them.” Though the reports concluded that incitement to abuse of burakumin has been increasing in many parts of Japan, it is unclear from the evidence available whether there has been an actual increase in discriminatory acts or an increase in the reporting of such acts as a result of recent legal prohibitions (Ishikawa 2001; McLauchlan 2003). In a 1993 nationwide survey of some 24,000 people that included questions designed to measure mainstream attitudes toward buraku and awareness of buraku mondai, it was found that over a third of the respondents were unaware that buraku people and communities were politically created, though awareness varied by region (from 95 percent in the Kinki region, to 73 percent in the Kantō region, to only 41 percent of those living in Hokkaidō and Tōhoku). About 10 percent of majority Japanese claimed never to have come into contact with a buraku
The schooling of buraku children 49 person, and a similar proportion believed that burakumin differ racially from other Japanese. When asked how they would react to learning that a close neighbor came from a buraku community, nearly all (88 percent) claimed, “I wouldn’t care and I would preserve our close relationship,” but less than half said that they would “respect the will of my child” if that child were to marry someone from a buraku community. Ironically, residents of regions with the highest proportion of residents who were well informed about buraku issues had the most negative attitudes toward intermarriage—knowledge per se did not appear to erase prejudice. Finally, only about one-fourth of the respondents felt positive toward teaching about buraku issues in schools (Su-Lan Reber 1999: 39; Akuzawa 2003; McLauchlan 2003: 12). If many mainstream Japanese are unaware of buraku mondai, many others believe (or prefer to believe) that they will eventually solve themselves or simply disappear, as a result of social change and greater tolerance of diversity, and as burakumin become more like “real” Japanese. The view that the buraku problem is best left alone is encapsulated in the often-quoted phrase: Neta ko wa sono mama (Don’t wake a sleeping baby). The implication is that further discussion of the inequalities suffered by burakumin and further actions designed to rectify them “only serve to perpetuate a problem which, if ignored, would disappear” (Neary 1997: 63). Coping with buraku mondai Faced with the limitations and stresses associated with their minority status, burakumin have tended to adopt one of the following strategies: •
•
•
Strategy 1: Stay in the buraku community and seek security among relatives and friends (“self-segregation” or “protective cocoon” strategy). Among the buraku residents interviewed by McLauchlan (2003) and Shimahara (1995), the most common reasons for staying there were variations of the following: “I feel safe,” “I belong here,” “We have a community where close relations are maintained,” or “I could make my way on the outside, but it is so much easier here.” Su-Lan Reber (1999: 57) found that: “Many parents do not want their children to enter the outside world for fear that they will have to face the harsh realities of discrimination.” Strategy 2: Embrace buraku identity and take an active part in the liberation movement for full emancipation (“activist” or “tōsō” (struggle) strategy). Buraku activist groups are generally concerned with improving social as well as material conditions, though, as noted above, there are disagreements between groups over the most effective tactics to combat discriminatory practices and attitudes. Strategy 3: Abandon buraku identity and relocate someplace where people don’t know or don’t care about one’s former identity (“passing” strategy). McLauchlan (2003: 26) believes that the numbers of burakumin who have passed successfully into mainstream society are substantial and increasing
50
Sarane Spence Boocock rapidly, though he acknowledges that, given the secrecy associated with this strategy (people attempting to pass are by definition reluctant to reveal their identity to potential employers or marriage partners, or to researchers), the data needed to test this claim do not exist. A second form of passing is emigration to another country, where the disadvantages suffered in their home country may decrease or disappear altogether. John Ogbu points to the relative success of burakumin in the United States as an example of the benefits of voluntary migration: “no longer overwhelmed by the traditional prejudice and discrimination associated with caste status, (buraku immigrants) have as much opportunity as the other Japanese immigrants to improve their social and occupational status through individual efforts” (Ogbu 1978: 320). He goes on to argue that this finding discredits theories that attribute the gaps between burakumin and mainstream Japanese to genetic or cultural differences. This argument is, however, weakened by the fact that it is based primarily upon a single study carried out in the 1960s, with a very limited sample (Itō 1967).4
Given the lack of comparable empirical evidence, one can only speculate on the numbers of burakumin who have chosen each of these strategies and their relative effectiveness. Since the 1980s, moreover, the status of burakumin has been further complicated by increasing within-group social stratification, which has bifurcated many buraku communities into a two-tiered class structure, with a few at the top who have been able to advance by taking advantage of new economic, educational, and occupational opportunities, and a much greater number, some very poor, at the bottom who lack the economic or cultural capital to advance (Ikeda 2001; Hawkins 1989). Dōwa education Under the slogan “Buraku liberation begins and ends in education,” the BLL has sought a variety of reforms under the general rubric of dōwa education.5 Originally conceived as a vehicle for eliminating discrimination and poverty by informing children about their own history, as well as enhancing their cognitive abilities and social skills, dōwa education today is an umbrella concept covering a wide range of educational initiatives, by governmental agencies as well as by the buraku liberation movement, though the two institutions tend to define the problem somewhat differently and propose somewhat different solutions. Government policies and programs have generally focused on: • •
improving facilities and services and schools attended by buraku children, including assigning additional teachers to provide compensatory education; distributing curricular materials about buraku history and government measures to overcome discrimination against burakumin (though these materials are generally offered in special classes for buraku children, rather than being required for all students);
The schooling of buraku children 51 • •
providing financial aid to buraku students; supporting community activities for buraku children and youth.
For the buraku liberation movement, dōwa education is defined more broadly, from attaining parity in education achievement and in rates of enrollment in secondary and post-secondary educational institutions, to the ultimate goal of “democratizing the whole society to attain true equality of opportunity for buraku and other oppressed populations” (Hirasawa and Nabeshima 1995: 3; italics added). All schools, including but not limited to, those attended by buraku children should: • • • •
•
develop the learning capacities of all students and ensure that all achieve the level of literacy expected of citizens of a highly developed industrial nation; deepen students’ knowledge about the history of the buraku people and the nature of anti-buraku discrimination; cultivate caring and cooperative relations among children; develop human rights awareness and sensitivities among children so that they regard the issue of eradicating discrimination, not as someone else’s responsibility, but as their own concern; promote community involvement in setting the school agenda.
Embedded in dōwa goals and teaching practices is the concept of inclusiveness. All minority students, not just buraku students, are to be enabled to succeed in school, and all students, not just minority students, are to be sensitized and informed about the history and extensiveness of discrimination and ways to fight it. Achievement of these objectives clearly requires fundamental changes in teaching principles and practices and in curriculum. Thus, buraku activists in one school district demanded district-wide adoption of a set of texts, compiled and edited by Buraku Kaihō Dōmei, containing readings on a broad range of human rights issues and including poems and essays authored by buraku children. Many dōwa educators are opposed to any form of tracking that divides children on the basis of test scores or other so-called “objective” measures of ability or merit, or that separates children with physical or mental disabilities from their age mates, arguing that multiple intelligences and diverse potentials of students should be acknowledged and accommodated in all classrooms (Hawkins 1989: 205; Hirasawa and Nabeshima 1995: 21–2, 59–60). In the next section, we’ll turn to a brief consideration of the major shifts in educational outcomes since the introduction of dōwa education.
Educational trends: progress and problems As educational opportunities for buraku children have opened up nationwide, there have been concomitant improvements in their educational performance. At the same time, they continue to lag behind majority Japanese students on virtually all measures of academic attainment and achievement, to manifest more
52 Sarane Spence Boocock psychological and behavior problems, and to be negatively stereotyped by other kids, as well as by teachers and other adults. Educational enrollment The overall picture is of improved school attendance, with total years of schooling and levels of literacy increasing with each successive generation of buraku children. Yet the rate of persistent, long-term absenteeism among buraku children is almost twice the national averages from primary through junior high school. Overall, the entry of buraku children into senior high school is close to that of the mainstream, 91.8 percent, compared with over 96 percent for the non-buraku samples, but high school drop-out rates, although declining since the 1970s, remain two to three times as high as for majority children. Similarly, access to higher education has improved considerably, but still only half as many buraku as non-buraku students (about 20 percent and 40 percent, respectively) advance to university or college.
Educational achievement Here, too, there has been significant progress since the 1970s, to the extent that: “Average discrepancies in statistics in educational achievement between burakumin and mainstream society are mostly well below 10 percent.” At the same time, “there are almost no recorded situations where the statistics for buraku education surpass, or even match those of mainstream society” (McLauchlan 1999: 16). Moreover, the discrepancy between buraku and majority students becomes greater as they progress through the school system—analysis of data from three large-scale projects carried out during the 1990s in the Osaka area showed that, the higher the grade, the greater the gap in test scores and other performance indicators (Neary 1997: 70–1; Ikeda 2001; McLauchlan 2003: 38–43). Emotional problems Although the achievement gap remains stubbornly resistant to recent efforts to erase or at least reduce it substantially, differences between buraku and majority students on indicators of low self-esteem, high anxiety and other emotional disturbances, and negative relationships with teachers and classmates, all significantly greater among buraku children at the elementary school level, became less evident at the middle school level and insignificant by adolescence. Moreover, the correlation between self-esteem and academic achievement, also substantial at the elementary level, was no longer significant among middle school students. Ikeda attributes the buraku adolescents’ relatively high self-esteem to peer group support that may “nullify the negative effects of their school experience” (Ikeda 2001: 89–91).
The schooling of buraku children 53 Behavior problems In recent years, the phenomenon of gakkyū hōkai (breakdown of classroom order resulting from students refusing to follow rules or instructions, fighting among themselves, and insulting, threatening, or even assaulting their teachers) has been increasing throughout Japan, affecting as many as 10 percent of elementary and middle schools in some regions. Although gakkyū hōkai is now viewed as a national problem, buraku students, especially boys, account for a disproportionate amount of disruptive and delinquent behavior in and outside of school. In one of the two elementary schools where I did fieldwork in 1996, buraku students had collectively defied their teachers, creating such chaos in one fifth-grade class that the teacher, a man with many years of teaching experience, was forced to turn over the class to another teacher in the middle of the school year (Ikeda 2001: 84). Discrimination (sabetsu) and stereotyping (kimetsuke) Buraku children today are unlikely to experience the kind of rejection that was still fresh in the memory of a woman now in her thirties. Arriving at school the day after her buraku origins had been revealed to a non-buraku classmate, she found that: My desk had been pushed into the corridor and all my pencils and things had been tipped out on the teacher’s desk. From that day on, I was teased until I became completely isolated. I was never prevented from going to school as such, but I really hated it . . . I would leave home each day and say I was going to school, but I didn’t go. (McLauchlan 2003: 127) While such blatant, overt discrimination may be largely a thing of the past, more subtle forms persist. Shimahara (1980, Chapter 4) and McLauchlan (2003, Chapter 5) both report examples of teachers’ reluctance to participate in dōwa or other human rights education programs. I was unprepared for the extent of stigmatizing of buraku kids by teachers and administrators and their readiness to shift the blame for students’ school failures to their homes and communities. Within the first few minutes of our introductory meeting with the principal of an elementary school in which about 40 percent of the students were burakumin, we were told that the problem with the buraku children was that they run around a lot, make too much noise, and can’t concentrate. Among the non-buraku teachers and day care personnel I interviewed, the most frequent complaints were that parents (or grandparents) spoiled the kids, failed to provide adequate supervision and discipline, didn’t feed them properly, let them stay up too late and watch too much television, and didn’t get them to school on time. Poor childrearing was also attributed to the parents’ drinking too much and spending too many evenings in karaoke bars.
54 Sarane Spence Boocock Buraku leaders are more likely to view continuing discrimination rather than shortcomings in buraku families and culture as the source of school problems. Kimetsuke (stereotyping), a key concept in dōwa educational theory, came up often in my conversations with dōwa educators and researchers, who believe that it is an important factor in children’s personal development and relations with others, that it begins in infancy, and that it explains buraku kids’ greater likelihood of being discriminated against and their greater likelihood both to be bullied and to bully other kids. Another indicator of continuing discrimination is ekkyō (literally “going beyond the border”), the tendency of majority parents to transfer their kids to schools with few or no buraku or other minority students, a phenomenon that continues despite passage of a law requiring children to attend their neighborhood schools. Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that, even in a rich society such as Japan, problems associated with poverty remain and are not evenly distributed, and that buraku children are still more likely than majority children to suffer from malnutrition and a variety of other health problems that interfere with their school performance (Hirasawa and Nabeshima 1995). Ikeda reminds us, however, that, owing to the growing status gap among burakumin, variations in all educational outcomes are as great among buraku students as are the differences between buraku students and majority students: “In spite of the fact that discrimination persists, we commit the error of oversimplifying the present state of buraku children and youth if we do not take social diversification into account” (Ikeda 2001: 79).
The Kanda Project6 The Osaka metropolitan area is home to the largest concentration of buraku people in Japan (about 12 percent of the total population of Osaka) and relatively large numbers of several other minorities as well. Most of the following discussion is based upon an in-depth study of one of Osaka’s largest buraku communities. In physical appearance, Kanda does not differ noticeably from neighboring communities, and a visitor unfamiliar with the area’s history might not be aware that they were in a formerly segregated, outcaste community. Government subsidies in support of housing, employment, education, community facilities, and health care have raised the standard of living, though average household income remains somewhat lower than that of the surrounding majority communities. In the 1990s, a relatively high proportion of burakumin were employed in the public sector, and more than half the residents lived in public housing units that could be passed on from one generation to their children, an entitlement not available to non-buraku public housing residents. There is a well-established local branch of the BLL, which maintains close relationships with the schools in the community, as well as offering a variety of recreational and educational activities for children and their families. Despite various forms of government support to the dōwa preschools and the elementary school in Kanda, the academic performance of the buraku students
The schooling of buraku children 55 continued to be lower than that of their non-buraku counterparts, and they also accounted for a disproportionate number of behavior problems, including the incident mentioned earlier in which a fifth-grade teacher lost control of his class and was forced to quit midyear. In an effort to address the difficult educational problems they were facing, Kanda educators and officials of the BLL local office sought the advice of Professor Hiroshi Ikeda and colleagues at Osaka University, which had since the 1980s been a center for research on the education of buraku and other Japanese minority children, resulting in a collaborative project between the university and the community. A small group of researchers at the Rutgers University Graduate School of Education, headed by Nobuo Shimahara, joined the project during the late spring and early summer of 1995 and 1996. As a member of the Rutgers research team, I focused on early childhood care and education and the transition from preschool to elementary school. Table 3.1 lists the sites where my observations were made. Schools that had been designated as dōwa schools or programs and were thus eligible for government entitlements enabling them to hire extra staff and maintain smaller class sizes are indicated with a b. In my first year of fieldwork, I spent several hours a day, three or more days a week, in Preschool A, a dōwa hoiku-sho (day care center) in which all of the children currently enrolled were burakumin. For purposes of comparison, I made Table 3.1 Preschools and elementary schools observed, 1995–96 Preschoolsa
Elementary schoolsa
Preschool A: Kanda Dai-2 Hoiku-shob Ages: 3–5 Buraku enrolment: almost 100%
School A: Kanda Elementary Schoolb Grades: 1–6 Buraku enrolment: about 40%
Preschool B: Kanda Yōchien Ages: 3–5 Buraku enrolment: 5% or less
School B: Tomita Elementary School Grades: 1–6 Buraku enrolment: 5% or less
Preschool C: Kanda Dai-1 Hoiku-shob Ages: 0–2 Buraku enrolment: almost 100% Preschool D: Shiawase Hoiku-shob Ages: 0–5 Buraku enrolment: almost 100% Preschool E: Tokiwa Yōchienb Ages: 5 Buraku enrolment: 100% Preschool F: Hotaru Hoiku-shob Ages: 0–5 Buraku enrolment: 5–10% Notes: a All names of schools and communities are pseudonyms. b Designated dōwa educational programme.
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briefer observations at Preschool B, a yōchien (kindergarten) in the same community that was not a dōwa preschool but that enrolled children of the same age range as Preschool A, including a few buraku children.7 I also visited Kanda’s dōwa day care center for children from infancy through age two (Preschool C). In my second year of fieldwork, I focused upon the two first-grade classes at Kanda Elementary School (School A), where some of the children I had observed in Preschool A the previous year were now enrolled. For comparison, I spent several days in an elementary school (School B) in a neighboring community. I also visited three preschools elsewhere in the Osaka area, chosen to provide variation in the proportion of buraku children enrolled and the extent to which the curriculum and modes of teaching incorporated dōwa educational principles and practices. At the end of the second year, I revisited the Kanda day care centers and met with their staff to exchange ideas about strengthening their programs. In both years, I also interviewed teachers and caretakers, school principals and preschool directors, and community leaders. Background information about buraku educational issues and dōwa early childhood care and education was obtained through interviews and informal conversations with staff members of the Buraku Liberation Research Institute, in Osaka, and through use of their library. Daily life in two preschools McLauchlan notes that buraku children are more than twice as likely as their majority counterparts to be placed in hoiku-sho, a difference he attributes to a higher proportion of dual-working parents among burakumin, but that is also undoubtedly because, unlike majority Japanese, they are entitled to enroll their children in government-subsidized day care even if both parents are not employed outside the home (another buraku entitlement now being phased out). This was certainly the case in Kanda, where nearly all of the kids in the dōwa day care program were buraku and nearly all the kids in the kindergarten were non-buraku. McLauchlan goes on to argue that, by attending full-day hoiku-sho rather than the more expensive, though mainly half-day, yōchien, buraku kids are “thereby missing out on the Japanese kindergarten emphasis on curriculum and formal learning” (McLauchlan 2003: 39; italics added). While my observations in these two preschools did not allow a systemic test of McLauchlan’s supposition, it did stimulate me to explore what children gain and lose in each type of preschool. Kanda Dai-2 Hoiku-sho (Preschool A) was a two-storied, L-shaped building that occupied a corner lot of a quiet residential street a couple blocks from Kanda’s main thoroughfare. The ground floor contained, in addition to classrooms, the administrative offices and a kitchen where the children’s lunches were prepared. On the second floor was a gymnasium, large enough to hold the entire student body and staff, and storage and laundry rooms. The building and grounds were surrounded by a fence with a single entrance gate. The space between the building and the entrance provided a large outdoor play area. At the outer corner of the property, surrounded by another metal fence with a padlocked gate, was
The schooling of buraku children 57 the swimming pool, essentially a large wading pool, where each class went for about thirty minutes on days when the weather permitted. As a dōwa preschool, Kanda Dai-2 Hoiku-sho received extra public funding that enabled it to have a high teacher-to-child ratio. In 1995, there was one class each of three-year-olds (twenty-five children), four-year-olds (twenty-four children), and five-year-olds (twenty-one children), each of which had two fulltime hobo-san. Two of the six hobo-san were burakumin. A few blocks away and bordering on Kanda Elementary School was Kanda Yōchien (Preschool B), a single-storied, L-shaped building. From the administrative office at one end near the building entrance, a corridor led to the gymnasium/ all-purpose room, and past that a right turn led to a row of classrooms. Like Preschool A, Preschool B had one class each of three-, four-, and five-year-olds, but here class size was between thirty and thirty-five children, with a single teacher for each class. Preschool B now enrolled “a few” buraku children, though there has apparently been no systematic effort on the school’s part to recruit more. In contrast to my Rutgers colleagues observing in Kanda Elementary School, who often returned from a day of fieldwork disheartened by what they saw, my days at the preschools were enjoyable as well as engrossing. For the most part, the daily routines I observed were familiar, similar to those I had seen elsewhere in Japan and in other nations as well. As I spent more time in Preschools A and B, however, I began to notice differences in the two environments, particularly with respect to: 1.
2.
the relative emphasis placed upon good interpersonal relationships (taijin kankei) and harmonious group life (shūdan seikatsu), as opposed to preparing children to succeed academically in school (junbi kyōiku); the relative effort devoted to avoiding all forms of discrimination (sabetsu) and stereotyping (kimetsuke) and including all children in the daily routines of preschool life.
Shūdan seikatsu versus junbi kyōiku The general atmosphere at Dai-2 Hoiku-sho could be characterized as warm, cheerful, and comfortable. “Correct” or “good” behavior was seldom taught in a formal way; rather, the hobo-san drew upon what seemed an endless repertoire of singing games and other enjoyable ways to teach personal habits such as brushing teeth and changing clothes. They often played with the kids rather than just supervising their play, and they orchestrated the lengthy day by alternating periods of vigorous physical activity with interludes of quiet play, listening to stories, and rest (each child had her own futon and blanket and changed into pajamas for a post-lunch nap). Little time was spent in disciplining children. Kids were not scolded for mishaps such as spilling paint or food; in most cases they cleaned up after themselves with little or no adult supervision. Fights were rare, and I saw no temper tantrums or bullying (ijime), the latter acknowledged to be a problem in Kanda Yōchien as
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well as in the elementary school. Crying children received prompt attention and comforting, with no effort to identify and punish a culprit. In most of the activities I observed, there seemed to be greater emphasis on having a good time with one’s classmates than on developing specific physical or cognitive skills. For example, the daily sessions at the “swimming” pool began and ended with a few minutes of free play, during which most of the kids simply milled about in the water screaming happily. There was no formal swimming instruction. Hobo-sans sometimes provided informal coaching on arm or leg movements, but I never saw a child actually swim more than a few tentative strokes. Group activities might require children to work in pairs or teams—for example, walking across the pool and back holding hands with a partner, or joining with teammates to retrieve colored plastic disks thrown into the pool by a hobo-san— but none required actual swimming, and there were no winners or losers. Kids who were awaiting or had finished their turn were led by the hobo-san in yelling encouragement to the kids in the water and applauding them when they completed their task. The sessions sometimes ended with a brief ritual—for example, in one class, children and hobo-san joined hands and circled in the water, chanting in unison and ending with a cheer. Most of the arts and crafts periods I observed were informal. Children were seldom given a topic or any technical instruction. For example, in one drawing session in the age-four class, children picked up a sheet of paper from a pile and chose their own workspace, some at tables, others on the floor, a few on a bench in the hall outside the classroom. One boy circulated with a can of magic markers that were shared by all. Most of the girls drew pictures of girls, some with detailed renderings of facial expressions, clothing, and jewelry, a few showing considerable skill. Most of the boys’ drawings were more rudimentary renderings of spacecrafts, military vehicles, and explosions. Finished drawings were taken to a hobo-san, who wrote the artist’s name on the drawing and usually said something like “Well done,” but did not provide further comment or evaluation. The children appeared to be enjoying themselves, and many chatted as they worked. No one complained about the limited resources, and there was no squabbling over space or materials. By comparison, at Kanda Yōchien (Preschool B), the priorities seemed to be reversed. Though the director of Kanda Yōchien denied that they engage in junbi kyōiku, in the class for five-year-olds that I observed, the teacher led her thirtythree students through a series of counting songs and chants, during which kids were called upon to form groups of varying numbers. She then displayed and discussed a series of colorful paintings, which, I later learned, had been created by the kids working in han (more or less permanent classroom groups of five or six children who worked together on numerous tasks). Each of the paintings illustrated an episode from an obake (ghost) story that had been read to the class, and the children were preparing to use the paintings in a re-enactment of this story at an all-school assembly. The difference in expectations and levels of accomplishment was evident when the five-year-olds from Kanda Yōchien visited their age-mates at Dai-2 Hoikusho, and each of the two classes provided an entertainment for the other. While
The schooling of buraku children 59 both groups performed routines that involved vigorous bodily movements done in time to recorded music with a disco beat, the yōchien performance was longer, involved more complicated moves, and had the kind of polish that suggested it had been thoroughly rehearsed. The hoikyu-sho kids were more self-conscious about performing before an audience, some seemed barely familiar with the routine, and a few dropped out before the end. Although good group life was also a stated goal of Kanda Yōchien, I observed more misbehavior and less attention to the quality of interpersonal relations than in Preschool A. During classroom clean-up times, shifts from one activity to another, and passage to and from assembly, there was a lot of pushing and shoving and a few fights. The all-school assembly where the five-year-old class re-enacted the obake story was chaotic: the room was so noisy it was difficult to hear what was going on. Kids in the back of the room talked and fooled around throughout the program, and roughhousing by several pairs of boys had to be broken up by an adult staff member. Though I did not myself observe any instance of ijime, when I asked the director whether bullying was a problem, she said that it happened and that it was usually directed against a child who cried a lot, had an unusually small or weak body, or was otherwise “different.” Avoiding stereotypes, encouraging inclusiveness The effects of downplaying gender differences, a basic principle of dōwa education, were especially evident on the few occasions when I could compare Preschool A kids and Preschool B kids directly, for example, on the day the Preschool B five-year-olds visited Preschool A. During a period of outdoor play, I stationed myself near the sandbox area where a group of about fifteen kids from both preschools were constructing an ambitious mountain landscape surrounded by a moat, under the supervision of a hobo-san, a buraku woman who is a wellknown lecturer and writer about dōwa early childhood care and education as well as a full-time caretaker-teacher at Preschool A. At first, boys and girls alike dug vigorously and took pleasure in using the hose to spray each other as well as to fill the moat, but the girls from the yōchien soon withdrew to one side of the sandbox, where they sat down in pairs or small groups and spent the rest of the time creating play meals using some of the sandbox toys as dishes. I asked the hobo-san whether the girls and boys she taught engaged in the cross-sex avoidance and teasing that is reported in research on American preschools and elementary schools (for example, Paley 1984; Thorne 1993; Scott 2002, 2003). She seemed puzzled by the question and could not recall any such incidents. When I later asked the director of Preschool B the same question, she acknowledged that boys and girls tended to play separately, and characterized girl–boy relations from about age four as “exclusionary.” Some other practices designed to avoid gender stereotyping were more subtle, and I might have missed them had they not been pointed out to me by Professor Ryoko Kimura, a specialist in gender studies who accompanied me on several preschool visits. For example, at Kanda Dai-2 Hoiku-sho, the toothbrushes, cups,
60 Sarane Spence Boocock and other personal items provided by the school were all of the same color, rather than differentiating girls’ and boys’ items by color. At role call, children’s names were called in alphabetic order, instead of all boys’ names being called before girls’ names, as was formerly the custom in most Japanese classrooms. Sex segregation at lunchtime was avoided by assigning kids to tables that mixed girls and boys. During outdoor free play, I observed no instances of groups of one sex teasing or chasing kids of the opposite sex or calling them names. Older boys tended to chase each other, grouping and regrouping constantly, though they did not prevent girls from joining them. I frequently saw boys jumping rope with girls. The dōwa principle of inclusiveness meant, among other things, that the entire group, children and adults alike, were responsible for the wellbeing of all group members. During my second year of fieldwork, I observed two striking examples of the application of this principle to teaching practice. The first occurred during a visit to Hotaru Hoiku-sho (Preschool F), which had been identified by the specialist in dōwa preschool education at the Buraku Liberation Research Institute as the best preschool in Osaka at which buraku children were enrolled. (Ironically, Hotaru Hoiku-sho, a dōwa preschool that had “integrated,” now enrolled more non-buraku than buraku children.) When I entered the age-four class, the kids were seated in a circle engaged in the morning “conversation,” except for one little girl who was crying. Getting no response to her asking what was wrong, the hobo-san (a twenty-one-year-old woman in her first year of teaching) went to sit behind the girl, putting her arms around her. She then asked the group why they thought their friend was crying and what they might do about it. A number of suggestions were offered. One boy went to the sink, wet a towel, brought it back, and wiped the crying girl’s face. Finally, two girls suggested that their classmate might feel better if she could play in her favorite place and, with the hobo-san’s permission, they led her off to the play-house corner. The crying stopped almost immediately, and the rest of the group was released to their various activities. I was impressed by the skill with which a relatively inexperienced teacher involved the whole group in seeking a solution to the problem, encouraging them to empathize with an unhappy friend while making no effort to establish blame. Children with disabilities were few in number in any of the preschools I observed. At Preschool A, government funds provided for an assistant to aid in the care of a girl in the age-four class who was not able to walk or speak and a special buggy that enabled her to accompany her classmates on their daily round of activities. At nap time, the children in charge of laying out the futons and blankets placed hers in the center of the group so that she would be surrounded by her classmates during their rest period. The most impressive efforts at inclusiveness that I witnessed occurred during a visit to Preschool E, a yōchien for thirty-six five-year-olds located in an old and still largely segregated buraku neighborhood. As the rainy weather did not permit outdoor play, the kids were engaged in free play in the gym/multipurpose room, which had been turned into a kind of open classroom with a variety of play areas. Immediately upon the arrival of a very small girl whose disabilities have severely retarded her physical
The schooling of buraku children 61 development, two of her classmates came up to her, took her by the hand, and, talking all the while, led her to the “store” they had organized in one corner of the room. A little later, a teacher supervising play on the gymnastic equipment laid the girl gently on the trampoline, and several boys who had been jumping vigorously took turns bouncing gently so that she might share in their play without fear or injury. At no time during the morning was she without companions. Over lunch, I complimented the director and teachers on their success at integrating the girl into the daily life of the yōchien. They looked pleased and agreed that they have worked hard to accomplish this. The director said that, even though the girl does not speak yet and they don’t know whether she understands what is said to her, they feel that they can at least communicate with her emotionally. She also emphasized that all the students benefited from being a playmate to a disabled classmate. Summary of findings Though similar in many respects, the preschools I observed differed in the weight given to socializing young children to treat each other decently and play together harmoniously, versus preparing them for the next stage of their educational careers, where cognitive skills and the ability to work independently would be required. It’s difficult to assess the extent to which the differences I observed reflect differences in (a) curriculum and modes of teaching; (b) class sizes and student-to-teacher ratios (much higher in the yōchien); and/or (c) composition of the student body. While nearly all of the children enrolled in the Kanda Hoikusho were buraku whose parents were employed in working-class or low-level civil services occupations, the few buraku children enrolled in the yōchien generally came from higher-status families; their parents were more likely to have middleclass occupations and incomes and less likely to identify with, or associate much with, the buraku community in Kanda.8 Daily life in two elementary schools Kanda Elementary School (School A), my primary research site in 1996, is a threestory building housing two classes each for grades 1–6, plus administrative offices, a teachers’ room with a desk for each teacher (a desk was also made available to me for the duration of my fieldwork), a large gymnasium, a number of multipurpose rooms (for meetings as well as for music and other special classes), and a kitchen where the lunches for students and their teachers were prepared (to be wheeled to each classroom and distributed by a pair of students assigned to the task). Though considerably larger than the Kanda preschools I had studied the previous year, the building was similar in construction and general appearance. The school grounds contained playing fields and several playground areas equipped with slides, swings, jungle gyms, and parallel bars. Most of my time in School A was spent in the two first-grade classes, each of which had a total enrollment of twenty-eight students, with eleven buraku children
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in one class and nine in the other. As in the previous year, I also visited a second school in the vicinity for comparative purposes. Tomita Elementary School (School B) enrolled a small number of buraku children but had not been designated as a dōwa school or program. As Preschool A is a feeder school for School A, I was able to observe how some of the kids I had gotten to know in the Dai-2 Hoiku-sho age-five group were getting along in first grade. Although only a few blocks separated Preschool A and School A, in many ways they seemed worlds apart, and it appeared that the transition from preschool to elementary school was not going smoothly for some of the buraku children. By the third month of first grade, when I began my observations, a few of the boys were already considered to have serious behavior problems. The girls, who had seemed so lively and sociable at Dai-2 Hoiku-sho, were now virtually silent and frequently inattentive in class. Although many factors may have contributed to the striking differences between life in preschool and life in elementary school, it seems noteworthy that, for most of the buraku kids, entering first grade at School A meant encountering for the first time: 1. 2. 3.
an unchallenging curriculum, with mainly isseijugyō (whole-class) and drillfocused modes of teaching; a frequently chaotic learning environment (gakkyū hōkai), requiring considerable time to be devoted to disciplining students; awareness of their status as members of a minority group that is not well regarded by many majority Japanese.
As we’ll see, School A also differed from School B with regard to these three factors—indicating that they are not universal or inevitable aspects of elementary school life. Curriculum and teaching methods Although a government-approved, uniform curriculum for all Japanese elementary schools is mandated by the Ministry of Education, comparisons of Kanda Elementary School and Tomita Elementary School revealed striking differences in curriculum and modes of teaching and classroom management. My notes on School A contain frequent references to the “barebones” curriculum, lack of stimulating tasks, and slow pace of instruction. The Kanda first graders spent much of the day seated at their desks facing front, being drilled on a pair of hiragana (phonetic characters of the Japanese syllabic alphabet) and a pair of numbers. In both classes, the teachers worked hard to make their presentations clear and lively, and they sometimes enlisted a student to assist them in pantomiming a word or picture that used that day’s hiragana or numbers, but the students’ role was largely passive—they answered questions when called upon, worked individually in workbooks or on handouts from the teacher, and waited for their written work to be checked. Boys frequently broke the class rule against shouting answers without
The schooling of buraku children 63 being called upon or got into trouble for fighting or horsing around. The girls, who rarely misbehaved, received less of the teacher’s attention. The lessons were boring, and time dragged. I often had a hard time staying awake. In general, I saw little use of the much-vaunted Japanese practice of smallgroup (han) work, with the exception of a project in which students working in teams jointly created a large mural of the sea featuring a variety of fish and underwater plant life. This was one of the few occasions when most of the kids seemed thoroughly involved in their work, and their obvious pride in the outcome (the mural was incorporated into class discussions for several days and then hung in the hall) made me wonder why more of their class work was not structured in this way. As part of the effort to reduce the gap in academic competence between buraku children and non-buraku children, a director of dōwa education was employed at Kanda Elementary School. Though a few buraku students were now in the top third of their class, the school had not succeeded in narrowing the gap overall, and the director took issue with those: who suggest that when we maintain the same level of gap it is an accomplishment of the school. It is extremely difficult to say what the school has accomplished through dōwa education. I can say that perhaps buraku children’s school achievement would have deteriorated without our efforts. I cannot really suggest that buraku children have gained significantly in terms of school achievement. (Shimahara, interview with Director of dōwa education, Kanda Elementary School, July 25, 1995) All they could claim to have done, she concluded, was to maintain the status quo. Just a few blocks away, the first graders at Tomita Elementary School, which enrolled a small number of buraku children whose identity was not known to all the school personnel, were enjoying a far richer educational environment. By the time of my visits, they had learned all of the hiragana and were already reading stories (when I left in early July, the Kanda first graders had not yet progressed from simple, mainly two-syllable, words to sentences, let alone stories). In one class, the students recited the entire hiragana syllabary in the form of a song, after which four of them were asked to stand up and, one by one, repeat the song solo. At the end of each solo, the teacher asked the rest of the class for its assessment of the performance, and only after it agreed that the song had been correctly rendered did she give the signal to applaud the singer. During my second visit to School B, the other first-grade class was in the midst of a reading lesson on two stories of three or four pages each. For the first story, the teacher had individual students read a passage aloud, emphasizing that they should speak loudly (ōkina koe de) and clearly (hakkiri) and asking those who spoke softly or inaudibly to repeat the passage. The second story was acted out by the students. One scene called for a monkey character to leave the room and come back carrying a large ring of keys. This pantomime appeared to be a favorite
64 Sarane Spence Boocock with the students, and they were allowed to repeat it several times with different kids in the monkey role. The teacher took time to work individually with a handicapped boy (who was also assigned a classroom aide) on his part in the pantomime and gave him a big hug when he performed it successfully. The lesson ended with a dictation exercise in which the student and teacher roles were reversed—students read out sentences from the monkey story, and the teacher wrote them on the board. Finally, he asked me to tell the class the English words for some of the words in the story and had the students repeat them after me ōkina koe de. Chaotic classrooms (gakkyū hōkai) The buraku children who had attended a dōwa preschool moved from an environment in which good behavior and pleasant interpersonal relations were the norm to an environment in which students disrupted their classes, bullied and fought each other, and left the classroom or school building without permission. Owing to its reputation as a “difficult” school, few of the teachers at Kanda Elementary School had chosen to teach there; in the past years, three teachers had taken leave from the school in the middle of the academic year owing to fatigue and stress. Although student misbehavior was not considered as problematic in the lower grades as the higher ones, in both first-grade classes I observed, considerable class time was spent maintaining order and disciplining students. In both classes, the noise level was sometimes high enough to give me a headache, and fights occurred almost daily among boys (most, though not all, buraku). Both first-grade teachers impressed me as hard-working and committed professionals, but they seemed to lack effective strategies for dealing with the problems they confronted, and both looked exhausted by the end of the school day. The school’s director of dōwa education regularly patrolled the school corridors and sometimes dropped in to the class I was observing. She generally hovered behind the back row of seats, stepping in to monitor the behavior of boys who were not sitting correctly or paying attention and occasionally to break up a fight. The misbehavior of a few children and the disproportionate amount of teacher time and attention directed to them caused me for some time to overlook the fact that most of the children were behaving well—if behaving well is defined as not making trouble. Indeed, I was impressed, though also saddened, by the stoicism with which they endured the long school day and repetitive tasks set for them. On one particularly discomforting occasion, the female teacher spent half an hour trying (unsuccessfully) to get one boy to confess to hitting another boy and calling him insulting names, throughout which the other children sat in silence, almost motionless, staring into space. The atmosphere was palpably different in School B, where almost no class time was spent disciplining students—perhaps because there were frequent breaks throughout the day during which the kids were allowed to let off steam by running up and down the corridors, yelling, banging on an old upright piano, and joking
The schooling of buraku children 65 with the teachers. I saw no fights, and the kids returned to their classrooms after each break with scant adult intervention. Awareness of minority status From being virtually 100 percent of the enrollment in the dōwa hoiku-sho in Kanda, the buraku children who entered Kanda Elementary School now constituted a minority, albeit a sizeable one. Parents interviewed by Shimahara (1995) believed that their children had not encountered the kinds of prejudice they themselves had experienced. At the same time, they worried that kids today lacked confidence in themselves as buraku and courage to fight discrimination. One parent recalled that her children not only concealed their identity, but discouraged their parents from attending parent–teacher meetings at their school for fear they would reveal their buraku origins. Kanda as a community was criticized, by BLL officials as well as by school personnel, for allowing its children “to stay wrapped in the cocoon of the community,” and thereby failing to prepare them for the world outside. Research in other buraku communities has documented the difficulties kids experience when they leave the cocoon. Okano and Tsuchiya (1999: 127) found that buraku children living in segregated villages or neighborhoods may be unaware of anti-buraku attitudes and discrimination until they enter schools, where for the first time they “come into direct contact with the dominant culture.” Bondy (2004) posited a discontinuity between life in buraku communities where the liberation movement has been especially active and residents have become accustomed to subsidized housing, guaranteed jobs, and other affirmative action perks, and mainstream Japanese educational institutions, which are unlikely to embrace buraku liberation goals and values. Similarly, Nishida (1992) concluded that the kind of upbringing that enables buraku kids to “acquire a positive identity within a protective setting” may render them more vulnerable to discrimination once outside that setting—and may, eventually, motivate them to take the “easier” path of passing into majority society. From his in-depth studies of ninth-grade buraku boys, Ikeda proposed a more nuanced conceptualization of their social development and educational performance. In contrast to Ogbu’s cultural reproduction theory, which postulates that children of an “involuntary minority” develop an “oppositional culture” that is an inevitable outgrowth of their cultural background, Ikeda’s reinvention theory underscores the diversity, or non-homogeneity, among buraku boys (as among burakumin generally), which he views as an inevitable result of the increasing social differentiation between and within buraku communities. As their economic conditions and social environment have changed, including the appearance of class stratification based on income, solidarity within the buraku community has gradually broken down. Social consciousness among buraku people has accordingly begun to diverge, and likewise, the response of the buraku youth to school culture has varied as well. (Ikeda 2001: 82)
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A typology developed by Ikeda classified boys according to the following four categories: 1.
2.
3.
4.
Delinquent boys, who are often truant from school, are likely to be members of gangs that engage in reckless or deviant behavior (e. g., speeding on motorcycles), and do not aspire to go on to senior high school. Corner boys, who are more interested in and better at sports than academics, do not openly rebel against school and teachers but may harbor ill feelings toward them. College boys, who perform well in school and intend to go on to college, are generally from relatively affluent families and do not socialize much with other buraku boys, either at school or in the community. Liberatory boys, who are active in the children’s group activities at the buraku community center (often their parents work for or are otherwise active in the BLL), do not excel academically but attend school regularly and do not engage in disruptive behavior.
While granting their shared history of oppression as a “common denominator” for all buraku kids, Ikeda maintains that: It is only one of the essential attributes that influence their social perspectives. Their identities are not mere reflections of their history and their community culture. Instead, their self-concepts are relatively autonomous, created through their encounters with school culture. Minority youth reinvent themselves in their own ways. (Ikeda 2001: 95; italics added) While Ikeda’s typology focused on the school experiences of buraku boys, my observations indicated that girls too were affected by their shift from majority to minority status. If the boys tended to respond to their new environment with disruptive behavior, the girls became more passive. They talked less than the boys in class and made no trouble during the tedious classroom drills, even when they had already mastered the material covered (it was only when I accompanied the class on a trip to the local library that I discovered that several of the girls knew how to read). The discussion periods that ended the school day (owari-no-kai), supposedly led by the student monitors, one male the other female, for that week, tended to be male dominated, especially in the class with a male teacher. In one owari-no-kai, the girl monitor, one of the smaller kids in the class, strove to give girls who raised their hands a chance to speak, but her voice was drowned out by boys who spoke out of turn or simply ignored her. The teacher overlooked most of the boys’ violations of the class rule against speaking out of turn and, on one occasion, called on a boy after the girl monitor had already recognized a girl—in effect taking over the monitor’s role as well as over-ruling her decision. Teachers and other school personnel did not appear to notice either the accomplishments of individual girls or their disengagement from classroom life.
The schooling of buraku children 67 For example, when I asked about a buraku girl who did outstanding art work, finished most seatwork assignments ahead of her classmates (and thus spent a fair amount of time waiting for the rest of the class to catch up), and clearly outperformed them on the playground apparatus (she was the only one who could jump over a row of barrels or swing across the parallel bars quickly, rhythmically and without pause), they did not seem much interested. The most thoughtful response I received was from a buraku official who acknowledged that, although dōwa ideology emphasizes equality for everyone, in fact, women remain subordinate to men in the liberation movement as well as in Japanese society, and that school life undoubtedly reflects this. The resilience of stereotypical beliefs Some recent ethnographic research in American elementary schools documents stereotyping of African American and Latina children similar to the stereotyping of buraku children I observed in Kanda. In one California elementary school, Ann Ferguson (2000) found the low-track classes in which the African American boys were routinely placed mind-numbingly boring. Students never initiated activities, and the tasks assigned were simplistic and repetitive, encouraging rudimentary levels of thinking and allowing no creative efforts by the students. The teachers’ low expectations, negative stereotyping, and disrespectful treatment of many of these boys set them apart from other students on a path that led inexorably toward school failure. In another school, Amanda Lewis (2003) found that Latina girls were also stereotyped, in the opposite direction from the African American boys, but, she felt, with equally damaging consequences. Lewis’s description of the Latina girls’ demeanor also seems applicable to the buraku girls in Kanda Elementary School: Latinas expressed their alienation from school as silently as African American boys did loudly. In many ways their silence was just as potent and destructive as the negative attention black boys got: these girls’ needs still were not recognized or addressed [and their] silence went beyond good behavior to a particular kind of nonparticipation, a pattern that did not receive much attention because the girls were not interrupting or getting in anyone’s way. (Lewis 2003: 80) According to Ferguson, the school personnel she studied used stereotyping to create “a powerful seamless story that reinforced a ‘natural’ connection between certain groups of children and certain outcomes,” a story, she adds, that was based more on hearsay than on first-hand evidence (Ferguson 2000: 45). I heard similar stories about the buraku children of Kanda. Like their counterparts at the preschool level, teachers and administrators at Kanda Elementary School tended to explain the academic problems of the buraku students in terms of cultural deficits in their families and communities. Again and again, I was told about parents who did not value education, who spoiled
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their children, and who failed to take responsibility for their misbehavior. By keeping its children “wrapped in the cocoon of the community,” Kanda failed to offer them sufficient inducements to become self-reliant. Evidence that contradicted the “seamless story” tended to be overlooked. For example, upon examining the sign-in sheets for parents’ visiting day, I discovered that all first graders except one sick child were represented by at least one relative, usually the mother, though a few fathers and grandparents were also in attendance, and several younger brothers and sisters accompanied their parents or grandparents. As far as I could tell, the adults not only attended visiting day but also stayed to the end (mid-afternoon), certainly not an indicator of parental disinterest and irresponsibility. Summary of findings Like the preschools I observed in 1995, the elementary schools I observed in 1996 differed in curriculum, classroom organization, modes of teaching, and composition of the student body. In first-grade classes with relatively high proportions of buraku students from relatively low-status families, there was more rote learning, less time in han activities, more disorderly behavior, and more time spent on disciplining students than in first-grade classes with relatively fewer buraku students. Clearly, the transition from preschool to first grade was not a smooth one for many of the buraku children of Kanda, and a disproportionate number of boys already had serious learning and behavior problems. Interviews with teachers and other school staff at Kanda Elementary School revealed that many held low expectations for buraku children and attributed their low achievement to deficient upbringing. The emphasis on happy group life that was the centerpiece of dōwa educational and recreational programs was also viewed by some as problematic. A thoughtful assessment of the continuities and discontinuities experienced by buraku children moving from a dōwa preschool into a mainstream elementary school was provided by the director of dōwa education: From the time they are born they are placed in the daycare center, the school, and the Youth center. In other words, they are constantly in group settings. [Because] they are together in the same setting for a long time, they seem to develop common characteristics, which are reflected in their behavior when they are enrolled in first grade. These characteristics are both positive and negative. For example, a good characteristic is that because they know each other they readily offer assistance to each other when it is needed . . . they are very sensitive, friendly and affectionate [hito natsukoi]. [On the other hand, they] tend to lack confidence in defining their own self and abilities [jiko ninshin] [and] have difficulty deciding how to behave as individuals. (Shimahara, interview with director of dōwa education, Kanda Elementary School, July 25, 1995)
The schooling of buraku children 69
Discussion How could two elementary schools just a few blocks apart provide such profoundly different educational environments, with commensurate differences in outcomes? And why did extensive preschool experience, which is positively correlated with subsequent school success in virtually all nations for which data are available (Boocock 1998), not seem to reap similar benefits for the buraku children of Kanda? Explanations for these differences tend to emphasize one of the following: (1) inadequate parenting; (2) systemic or societal inequalities; or (3) outmoded or ineffective teaching practices. Inadequate parenting Many of the people interviewed in connection with the Kanda Project viewed the buraku children’s lack of school success as a buraku problem—that is, as caused by shortcomings in buraku homes and communities. Parents did not socialize their children adequately and failed to take sufficient responsibility for their educational performance. The solution according to this perspective is kateino kyoikuryoku, or greater parental responsibility and accountability. In keeping with this perspective, a manual advising parents on how to improve their parenting skills, produced by the Kanda branch office of the BLL, was being distributed in the summer of 1996. Similar arguments have been made in the United States and other countries in support of efforts to abolish or scale back affirmative action programs and to shift responsibility for children’s achievement and wellbeing “back to the family.” Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these initiatives is scarce. Evaluations of “Responsible Parenthood” and other intervention programs targeted primarily at low-income and minority families have indicated that the most effective programs are too costly to reach most of the parents who might benefit from them, and, furthermore, that policies designed to enforce parental “involvement” and “accountability” are unlikely to have the desired results as long as they (a) sidestep the thorny issue of the vast differences in families’ social resources and power, and (b) fail to accommodate alternative forms of “involvement”—in particular, the kinship networks through which many working- and lower-class families exchange information and assistance (Lareau and Shumar 1996; Ambert 1997). Systemic inequalities Critics of the kateino kyoikuryoku approach are likely to point to the detrimental effects of inequalities in the educational system. Just as Thomas Rohlen (1983) found a clear rank ordering of Japanese high schools that was strongly associated with the composition of the student bodies, so differences in the quality of preschools and elementary schools attended by buraku children tended to reflect differences in students’ social backgrounds. Thus, the academic problems of Kanda first graders cannot be understood without taking into account that the
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elementary school they attend is at or near the bottom of the educational ladder, at least in part because a substantial and growing proportion of the students’ parents are both buraku and lower- or working-class. By comparison, Tomita Elementary School enrolled more students from higher-status families, and the buraku children who attended, though few in number, were likely to benefit from the higher educational expectations and outcomes characteristic of a school higher up on the educational ladder. Solutions based upon a systemic or contextual perspective would require addressing the great inequalities in social status and the distribution of social capital in Japanese society and, increasingly, among burakumin themselves. It would also require attacking the stereotyping that underlies anti-buraku discrimination; in particular, discrediting the “seamless stories” many educators and policymakers tell themselves and each other to explain buraku students’ failure to close the academic achievement gap. Until then, disproportionate numbers of buraku children will continue to suffer a kind of double jeopardy when they enter the mainstream educational system. Coming from families that possess less of the educational, occupational, income, and other kinds of social capital that are associated with school success, they will continue to be relegated to schools low on the educational ladder, where the unchallenging curricula and monotonous modes of instruction will dampen their academic aspirations and accomplishments and narrow their future opportunities. If they are not likely to encounter the overt discrimination experienced by their parents, buraku kids are also unlikely to escape the more subtle, less visible forms of discrimination still pervasive enough in the culture of their schools to make them reluctant or unwilling to reveal their identity as burakumin.9 Ineffective teaching A third way of explaining the differences between the two elementary schools is that they embody two divergent pedagogical models. Tomita Elementary School fits in most respects what has come to be known as the Japanese model of schooling. As explicated by Tsuneyoshi (2001, Chapter 2) and C. Lewis (1995, Chapters 3 and 4), this is first and foremost a “whole child” or “child-centered” model, the most important elements of which are: •
• •
•
equal importance of academic and non-academic pursuits (the latter to include not only art and music classes, but “civic” activities such as class meetings, lunch and cleaning duties, and school-wide activities such as Arts Day, Tanabata Festival, and overnight field trips); group—especially han, or small group—activities as the heart of classroom life; a spirit of communalism that engenders a sense of belonging or “togetherness” (issei-taisei), close, empathic interpersonal relations (omoiyari), and ‘voluntary cooperation’ (jihatsuteki no kyoryoku); individual behavior governed by the values of friendliness, helpfulness, persistence, and responsibility.
The schooling of buraku children 71 In combination, these elements can be expected to create “eager, motivated learners and caring, responsible citizens” in a system that “is likely to connect all children positively to schooling” (Lewis 1995: 71–2). Lewis acknowledges that this model of schooling gives way to “monotonous lectures and authoritarian control” in many Japanese middle schools, a shift that appeared to have occurred much earlier in Kanda Elementary School, which bears less resemblance to the Japanese ideal than to the daily grind model of schooling proposed by Philip Jackson (1968). Like the American elementary school students on which Jackson based his model, the Kanda first graders sat for long periods of time listening to their teacher, doing repetitive deskwork, or simply waiting—to have their work checked; for the teacher to finish disciplining someone; for school to be over. Not surprisingly, Jackson concluded that the most useful quality a student can acquire is patience, a quality that many Kanda first graders seemed to have mastered within the first few months.10 From this perspective, the solution would be greater adherence to the Japanese model of schooling, allowing more children—especially minority children—to benefit from the “whole child” approach to education. Thus, it seems ironic that the dōwa educational principles and practices that seem most congruent with the Japanese ideal of schooling are viewed as part of the problem. The director and other staff members of the Kanda office of the BLL we interviewed felt that the original purpose of dōwa day care—to provide total care in a safe, pleasant group setting for children from deeply impoverished homes, who might otherwise have to accompany their parents while they labored at physically draining jobs in substandard, often dangerous workplaces for substandard pay—no longer coincided with the needs of children and their families. They favored a shift in focus, with less emphasis on group life, more emphasis on preparing children to adapt to the more cognitively oriented and highly competitive educational settings that are viewed as a necessary prelude to success in contemporary Japan. This shift in orientation was evident in my 1996 revisits to the Dai-2 Hoikusho, where a year-long effort to revise the curriculum had resulted in more activities designed to strengthen children’s cognitive competence (gakuryoku) and self-awareness (shisei). In the four-year-old class, the hobo-san went around the room accompanied by a cute doll who tapped kids on the head as a signal for them to carry chairs to one side of the room and arrange them in three rows. She then led them briskly through a twenty-minute lesson on colors and shapes—holding a batch of colored papers behind her back and bringing them out one at a time, asking: Is this an orange circle? Is this a yellow square? And so on. To the kids’ delight, she purposely misidentified some of the papers—for example, holding up a red circle, asking, “Is this an orange square?”, and allowing them to shout out the correct answer. Each child was also assigned a “personal” color and shape and given a notebook with her name and logo on the cover. The children’s response to these new “lessons” certainly contradicted the pervasive stereotype of buraku children as uninterested in learning and unable to concentrate well enough to master academic tasks. Moreover, the addition of
72 Sarane Spence Boocock school readiness activities seemed to have been accomplished without foregoing other important aspects of dōwa education—in particular, its emphasis on cultivating caring and cooperative relations among young children, qualities that often seemed to be missing in Kanda Yōchien and Kanda Elementary School. Buraku activists, among the first to challenge the “official” vision of Japan as an ethnically homogeneous society, were also pioneers in showing how diversity could be accommodated in the schools. Curricula developed by dōwa educators provided the first teaching materials designed to deepen students’ awareness of the extent of discrimination suffered by various oppressed peoples in Japan and to show how it could be eradicated. Whether an educational model originated by and for descendants of an outcaste minority group that is still held in low regard by many Japanese can enter the educational mainstream and be applied to the educational problems of other minority children remains to be seen.
Acknowledgements Support for this research from the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Rutgers Graduate School of Education is gratefully acknowledged. During the project that is the main source of empirical data for this chapter, I was privileged to work with two renowned scholars, both of whom did pioneering research on the buraku people. Professor Nobuo Shimahara, a Rutgers colleague and friend of many years, has been an invaluable source of advice and encouragement since the mid 1980s when I began my first studies of early childhood care and education in Japan. Accompanying him on informal walks through Kanda as well as on our more formal school visits afforded me an unparalleled opportunity to observe a master ethnographer at work. Professor Hiroshi Ikeda, under whose leadership Osaka University became a center of research on the education of Japanese minority children, and who initiated and oversaw every aspect of the Kanda Project, ensured that our research group was welcomed in the community and given free access to the schools. Professor Ikeda’s untimely death in 2004 was a great loss to the field. This chapter is dedicated to both of them.
Notes 1 The exact number of buraku people is unknown, with current estimates ranging from 1 million to over 3 million. These discrepancies stem from multiple causes that are themselves related. First, population estimates depend upon who is doing the counting. Government estimates tend to be considerably lower (less than half on average) than those made by buraku organizations, and, according to McLauchlan (2002): “Both sides could be equally accused of using those statistics which best suit their own agenda” (84). Second, there is no consensus about who is a buraku, and definitions can be vague; for example, those people “who are believed to be burakumin by nonburaku people,” or, more inclusively, those people who were born, brought up and living in buraku; those who were not from burakumin family but came to live in buraku in the recent past; or those who are living outside buraku but have blood relationship with burakumin. (Hirasawa and Nabeshima 1995: 5)
The schooling of buraku children 73
2
3 4
5
6 7
Note that the latter definition implies not only a fluctuating membership but also a contamination effect—you can become buraku just by living in close proximity with burakumin. Third, an unknown but believed-to-be substantial and growing number of burakumin have sought to better their life chances by “passing” into mainstream society, in Japan or elsewhere. The status of burakumin has been compared to that of other minorities whose subordinate social position has been justified on the grounds of their alleged physical, mental, or cultural inferiority, such as Korean-Japanese or African-Americans. In origins and the descent-based discrimination they have experienced, the buraku people of Japan are probably most comparable to the Untouchable castes of India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, now often referred to as Dalit, Harijan, or other alternative terms thought to be less insulting, more morally neutral. Though not a distinct racial group, Indian Untouchables, like their Japanese counterparts, have been defined as permanently polluted people largely as a result of the “unclean” work they perform, such as butchering, skinning animal carcasses, tanning leather and making shoes, removing human waste, washing clothes, and preparing bodies for cremation—basically the same kinds of defiling occupation associated with burakumin and their social ostracism. Legislation that abolished segregation in public schools and established caste-based quotas for admission to some federally financed university programs and some jobs in the public sector has enabled a few Untouchables to rise to middle-class status, but disproportionate numbers remain at the lowest levels of their society (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 2000, Chapter 1). It is also noteworthy that, of the twenty nations identified in an international review as practicing “descent-based caste discrimination,” only two—Japan and India—called for exclusion of this topic from the deliberations of the 2000 International Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Human Rights Watch 2001; Gill 2004). For fuller accounts of buraku origins and history, including the movement for buraku liberation, see Shimahara 1980, 1984; Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho 1991; Kitaguchi 1999; Okano and Tsuchiya 1999; Su-Lan Reber 1999; Ikeda 2001; McLauchlan 2002, 2003. Similar findings have been reported with regard to Korean-Japanese, who, like burakumin, are discriminated against in Japan and whose kids do poorly in Japanese schools, but whose accomplishments in the US equal or surpass those of other Americans (for example, Lee 1991). The term “dōwa” combines the two kanji for “same” (dō) and “harmony” (wa). Dōwa education is generally translated as equalitarian or assimilation education. Some buraku activists prefer the term “Kaihō Kyōiku” (liberation education) (Hawkins 1989: 195, 210; Hirasawa and Nabeshima 1995: 2). The name of this community is a pseudonym, as are the names of all the schools and preschools discussed in this chapter. Hoiku-sho, which are under the authority of the Ministry of Welfare, offer full-day care for the infants and young children of working parents. Yōchien, under the authority of the Ministry of Education, combine elements of American nursery schools and kindergartens. Most are half-day programs, though many now have optional afternoon activities. Both kinds of facility may be public or private; all that meet government licensing standards are eligible for government support. Most yōchien teachers and hoiku-sho caretakers (known as hobo-san) are credentialed professionals who have graduated from a demanding two-year training program and are paid at levels comparable with other civil service employees. Although day care was originally intended for the children of poor or working-class families, and nursery schools for children from middle- or upper-class families, in recent years, the educational component of the former has been expanded, and the social class distinctions between the two types of preschool have diminished if not disappeared. (For more comprehensive discussions on the Japanese preschool system, see Boocock 1991; Peak 1991; Holloway 2000.)
74 Sarane Spence Boocock 8 Similar patterns have been found in recent American research. For example, a major finding of an ethnographic study comparing family life, childrearing practices, and academic achievement in an affluent suburb and a lower-income one is that social class explained more of the differences than race—that is, higher-income African American families were more similar to higher-income White families than to lowerincome African American families (Larau 2003). 9 Mendelsohn and Vicziany reached similar conclusions regarding the extent to which educational equity for outcaste groups has been achieved in India: Even now that desegregation of the schools is substantially complete, it is not possible to conclude that all school-based discrimination against Untouchables has disappeared. There remain serious questions about equal treatment in terms of the appropriateness of the curriculum and the sensitivity and diligence of teachers towards their Untouchable students. And there is also the matter of how caste Hindu children treat their Untouchable class fellows. Do they play with them in the schoolyard? And, if the discriminatory attitudes of adults are enacted by their children, is this from the earliest years of schooling or only later once they have thoroughly learnt the culture of Untouchability? There is insufficient research on these questions [but] clearly, in many respects India is still far away from possessing an appropriately democratic and rigorously non-discriminatory system of education. (2000: 126) 10 I do not mean to imply that schools with high proportions of buraku or other minority children are the only ones to deviate from the Japanese model of schooling. A Japanese writer who attended a mainstream fourth-grade class for several months found himself counting the minutes until recess when he could get a drink of water, play tag with his “classmates,” and regain enough energy “to endure the next 45 minutes in class.” In contrast to Lewis’s upbeat analysis, Jiro (1999) concluded facetiously that: “It is really due to the incredible patience of children that the Japanese educational system has somehow survived to this day” (85).
References Akuzawa, M. (2003) Dōwa education and reforms in human rights education in Japan: access, content, and what’s beyond, Osaka: HuRights Osaka. Ambert, A.-M. (1997) Parents, children and adolescents: interactive relationships and development in context, New York: Haworth Press. Bondy, C. (2004) “Hide and seek: gaining a buraku identity and the process of passing.” Paper presented at Japan Studies Graduate Seminar Series, Japan Cultural Center, University of Hawaii, November 4, 2004. Boocock, S. S. (1991) “The Japanese preschool system,” in E. R. Beauchamp (ed.), Windows on Japanese education, New York and London: Greenwood Press, pp. 97–125. –––– (1998) “Long-term outcomes in other nations,” in W. S. Barnett and S. S. Boocock (eds), Early care and education for children in poverty: promises, programs, and longterm results, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 45–76. Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho (Buraku Liberation Research Institute) (1991) The reality of buraku discrimination in Japan, Osaka: Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho. De Vos, G. A. and Suarez-Orozco, M. (1990) Status inequality: the self in culture, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. De Vos, G. A. and Wagatsuma, H. (1967) Japan’s invisible race, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
The schooling of buraku children 75 Ferguson, A. A. (2000) Bad boys: public schools in the making of black masculinity, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Gill, T. (2004) “Executive Summary,” International Consultation on Caste-Based Discrimination, Kathmandu, Nepal, November 29 to December 1. Hawkins, J. N. (1989) “Educational demands and institutional response: Dōwa education in Japan,” in J. J. Shields (ed.), Japanese schooling: patterns of socialization, equality, and political control, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 194–211. Hirasawa, Y. and Nabeshima, Y. (1995) Dōwa education: educational challenge toward a discrimination-free Japan, Osaka: Buraku Kaihō Kenkyūsho. Holloway, S. D. (2000) Contested childhood: diversity and change in Japanese preschools, New York and London: Routledge. Human Rights Watch (2001) “Racial discrimination and related intolerance,” in Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 1–13. Ikeda, H. (2001) “Buraku students and cultural identity: the case of a Japanese minority,” in N. K. Shimahara, I. Z. Holowinsky, and S. Tomlinson-Clarke (eds), Ethnicity, Race, And Nationality In Education: A global perspective, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 77–96. Ishikawa, Y. (2001) “Rights activists and rights violation: the burakumin case in Japan.” Paper prepared for Global Conference against Racism and Caste Based Discrimination, New Delhi, India, March 1–4, 2001. Itō, H. (1967) “Japan’s outcastes in the United States,” in G. A. De Vos and H. Wagatsuma (eds), Japan’s invisible race, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 200–21. Jackson, P. (1968) Life in classrooms, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Jiro, S. (1999) “Grownups should listen to kids,” Japan Quarterly, 46: 83–8. Kitaguchi, S. (1999) An introduction to the buraku issue: questions and answers, trans. A. McLauchlan, Folkenstone, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press. Lareau, A. (2003) Unequal childhoods: class, race, and family life, Berkeley: University of California Press. Lareau, A. and Shumar, W. (1996) “The problem of individualism in family-school policies,” Sociology of Education, Extra Issue: 24–39. Lee, Y. (1991) “Koreans in Japan and the United States,” in M. A. Gordon and J. U. Ogbu (eds), Minority status and schooling: a comparative study of immigrant and involuntary minorities, New York and London: Garland, pp. 131–67. Lewis, A. (2003) Race in the schoolyard: negotiating the color line in classrooms and communities, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Lewis, C. C. (1995) Educating hearts and minds: reflections on Japanese preschool and elementary school education, New York: Cambridge University Press. McLauchlan, A. (1999) “Introduction,” in S. Kitaguchi, Nyumon Buraku Mondai: Ichimon ittō, Osaka: Japan Library, pp. 1–38. –––– (2002) “Mainstream attitudes towards burakujumin,” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 4: 84–118. ——(2003) Prejudice and discrimination in Japan: the buraku issue, Lewiston, NY, Ontario, Canada, and Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press. Mendelsohn, O. and Vicziany, M. (2000) The Untouchables: subordination, poverty and the state in modern India, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Monnet, J. (2001) “Introduction,” in S. Sumii, My life: living, loving, and fighting, trans. Ashi Translation Society, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Japanese Studies, pp. ix–xix.
76 Sarane Spence Boocock Neary, I. (1997) “Burakumin in contemporary Japan,” in M. Weiner (ed.), Japan’s minorities, London: Routledge, pp. 50–78. Nishida, Y. (1992) “Identity in identity politics: analysis of life histories of buraku people,” Soshiorojī, 37: 3–19. Ogbu, J. (1978) Minority education and caste: the American system in cross-cultural perspective, New York: Harcourt-Brace. Okano, K. and Tsuchiya, M. (1999) Education in contemporary Japan: inequality and diversity, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Paley, V. (1984) Boys and girls: superheroes in the doll corner, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Peak, L. (1991) Learning to go to school in Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Rohlen, T. P. (1983) Japan’s high schools, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Scott, K. A. (2002) “You want to be a girl and not my friend? African-American girls’ play activities with and without boys,” Childhood, 9: 397–414. –––– (2003) “In girls, out girls, and always Black: African-American friendships,” Sociological Studies of Children and Youth, 9: 179–207. Shimahara, N. (1980) Oppressed Japanese: burakumin, Tokyo: Yachiyō Press. –––– (1984) “Toward the equality of a Japanese minority: the case of burakumin,” Comparative Education, 20: 339–53. ——(1995) Interviews with Buraku parents (July 7) and Director of Dōwa Education, Kanda Elementary School (July 25). Su-Lan Reber, E. A. (1999) “Buraku mondai in Japan: historical and modern perspectives and directions for the future,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, 12: 1–59. Thorne, B. (1993) Gender play: girls and boys in school, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Tsuneyoshi, R. (2001) The Japanese model of schooling, New York and London: RoutledgeFalmer.
4
Schooling and identity in Okinawa Okinawans and Amerasians in Okinawa Naomi Noiri
Okinawa is currently one of Japan’s 42 prefectures and consists of numerous small islands located in the southernmost part of the country. Prior to their annexation by Meiji Japan in the late nineteenth century, the islands formed an independent kingdom, the Ryūkyū kingdom, which had its own language and culture and an independent trading relationship with China. Okinawa was thus internally colonised by modern Japan and shared its plight with another indigenous people, the Ainu of northern Japan. The indigenous people of Okinawa were forced to assimilate to mainland Japan under the pre-Second World War government. The area suffered greatly in the Battle of Okinawa at the end of that war, and, even after Japan regained sovereignty, remained under the rule of the US occupation, which developed extensive military bases on the islands. Even after Okinawa’s return to Japan in 1972, its people remained marginalised in Japanese society and have maintained a strong Okinawan identity, as distinct from Japanese. Okinawans are thus a minority group in Japan. Within this minority group, however, there exists a further minority group, Amerasians, who are children of American soldiers (including ex-soldiers) and local women – a direct consequence of the US bases that are disproportionately concentrated in Okinawa. This chapter focuses on these two minorities: Okinawans and Amerasians in Okinawa. The aims of this chapter are threefold. First, it examines how schooling, until recently, has acted as a powerful tool to marginalise Okinawans in Japan; how and why this process was assisted and/or countered by local grass-roots activism; and how the process has influenced the formation of an ambivalent Okinawan identity. Second, the same questions are asked about Amerasians in relation to the Okinawan society. Third, the connections between the two groups, as well as the implications for other minorities, are uncovered, and the possibility of schooling as a source of empowerment is explored. I contend that pre-war Okinawa internalised the imposed Japanese state ideology, and that schooling played an important role in this process. Although the pre-war assimilation was initially enforced from above, locals later learned to accept it, and furthermore willingly promoted it, through education. Okinawans under the post-war US rule initiated their own grass-roots activism to promote assimilationist education, which they saw as necessary for integration into mainland Japan. In this process of promoting assimilation to mainland Japan, first
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imposed and later voluntary, Okinawans seem to have internalised Japan’s view of Okinawa as marginalised, and developed ambivalent identities. Later, after Okinawa’s return to Japan, locals were sympathetic to ‘stateless’ Amerasians, who were excluded from Japanese citizenship, and organised a grassroots activism to ensure that all mixed-race children obtained Japanese citizenship. When this was achieved, however, interest in Amerasian children diminished, despite their continued marginalisation in schooling and beyond. This drove concerned parents to establish the AmerAsian School of Okinawa specifically for Amerasian children. Bureaucratic difficulties faced by these parents reveal the attitude of the Okinawa Department of Education, as well as the notion of ‘difference’ that official discourse adopts. I consider the accommodation of Amerasians in local schools to be one of the most challenging tasks faced by Okinawa’s government schools, and that such coexistence is most likely to be achieved once local people reflect on their own experience of marginalisation, both past and present, both institutionalised and otherwise, and relate this to that of Amerasians. In revealing the intra-group diversity of Okinawans, this chapter underscores the changing nature of Okinawan identity over time, in response to political and social circumstances. The study is important in that it reveals another, seldom examined aspect of Japanese schooling. Although Okinawa recently emerged as a much-discussed topic, and various aspects of Okinawan society have been studied (e.g. Johnson 1999; Nakasone 2002; Hein and Selden 2003; Hook and Siddle 2003), the schooling experienced by Okinawans (including Amerasians in Okinawa) has received scant attention. For example, the pre-war assimilation policy in education was studied by Rabson (1999), and Allen’s ethnography of an outer Okinawan island community (2001) mentions a considerable autonomy that local education boards maintained from the central ministry. This chapter shows how schooling has historically responded to perceived ‘differences’, what the consequences of this were, and how grass-roots activism has influenced schooling processes. It thus assists us to understand current educational policies and practice in responding to newly defined differences brought by immigrant children and to long-standing differences maintained by older, culturally distinct groups of indigenous people and ethnic Koreans/Chinese. This chapter begins by examining how Okinawans experienced modern schooling over three distinct phases: subordination to pre-war Japan, the US occupation, and after Okinawa’s return to Japan. Second, it studies Amerasian children’s experience of schooling during the latter two phases in relation to that of other Okinawans, including the effective civil movement to save ‘stateless children’. Last, the discussion shifts to the continuing marginalisation of Amerasian children, even after the civil movement ensured Japanese citizenship to all Amerasian children,1 and to the process leading to the establishment of the AmerAsian School. The connection between the two minority groups in question is explored in terms of their shared experience and the potential this implies.
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Schooling under Japanese colonial rule: the first subordination The existence of a single shared language has long acted as a powerful justification for the claim that Japan is an ethnically homogeneous nation-state (Yoshino 1992: 24–5). Linguistics studies, however, suggest that the Ryukuan language is not so much a dialect as a separate language, and that the difference between the Japanese language and the Ryukuan language is like that between German and English and between French and Italian (Matsumori 1995: 20). Contemporary young Okinawan people do not have functional knowledge of the Ryukuan language. The shift in their language use was swift. Kawai, an author born in 1950, recalls that the generation before hers was able to think in the Ryukuan language and write in the Japanese language, but that generations younger than hers are no longer able to even think in the Ryukuan language (Kawai 2003). This section examines two of the factors that contributed to the language loss: schooling and identity (others being government and patriarchy). The annexation of the Ryūkyū kingdom to mainland Japan was not a sudden action by the expansionist Japanese state; it occurred gradually from the beginning of the seventeenth century. At that time, in mainland Japan, many fiefdoms, after a period of fighting among themselves, finally came under the rule of the family located in Tokyo. Fiefdoms became domains (hans), maintaining relative autonomy in their internal management but expected to be loyal to the Tokugawa family. In 1609, the Satsuma domain (the present Kagaoshima prefecture located at the south end of Kyushu Island) placed the Ryūkyū islands under its rule. Prior to this, the Ryūkyū kingdom was an independent entity that maintained an emissary relationship with China. The Tokugawa Shogunate successfully ruled the country until modern Japan emerged in the mid nineteenth century. The Satsuma domain kept the name of the Ryūkyū kingdom and let it continue its trade with China. This was a strange arrangement in that the kingdom maintained loyalties to both Satsuma and China until its integration into modern Japan, but served the interests of the Satsuma domain, which wanted to exploit the taxation potential of the Ryūkyū kingdom’s trade. Iha (1928: 28–31) suggests that this was the beginning of the Okinawans’ ambivalent identity. The Satsuma authorities maintained a deliberate policy of keeping indigenous Okinawans distinct from mainland Japanese by prohibiting them from adopting Japanese-sounding names and wearing Japanese clothes, although some locals wanted to assimilate. The Satsuma authorities even took the Ryūkyū king and his servants, dressed in Chinese-looking clothes, to the capital, Edo, in order to display the Satsuma’s power to the Shōgun. The Ryūkyū people became confused about their identity in relation to Chinese and Japanese (Iha 1928: 29). They had a more favourable feeling towards China, which only wanted a voluntary emissary relationship; China had no intention of annexing the islands by fighting against the Satsuma. After losing the Opium War in 1840, China had no power do to so, in any case. After modern Meiji Japan was established in the mid nineteenth century, the Ryūkyū kingdom remained under the control of Kagoshima prefecture
80 Naomi Noiri (previously Satsuma), a new local administrative unit. Its integration into modern Japan was considered too costly for the few perceived benefits to be gained by such an action (Oguma 1998:20). In 1879, the Ryūkyū kingdom was officially integrated into Japan and became the Okinawa prefecture. The Japanese government then started seeing the Ryūkyū Islands as geopolitically important. Okinawans were thus unilaterally made ‘Japanese’ subjects by the Japanese government in order to serve its expansionist interests in Asia, in particular the colonisation of Taiwan. The central Japanese government established primary and middle schools and teachers’ colleges in Okinawa in order to promote ‘Japanese’ modern schooling. It realised that many locals did not understand the standard Japanese language and the notion of the emperor, and was concerned that this might threaten national security. Teachers’ colleges were given photographs of the emperor and the empress. Students were taught the ideology of the divine emperor and loyalty to this, as well as standard Japanese language. The authorities wanted locals to cultivate a Japanese identity. Initially, Okinawans saw little value in schooling provided from above. They mocked schools, and few were willing to send their children to learn standard Japanese, which was seen as locally useless. Their reluctance was reflected in the school attendance rate in the 1880s: only 3 per cent, compared with the national average of 40 per cent. As the people still sought their spiritual foundation in China and disliked Japan for dissolving their kingdom, China’s defeat in the SinoJapanese War in 1894 had a profound influence on Okinawan identity. At that point, people realised that they could no longer depend on China in reviving their own kingdom. Meanwhile, the patriotism of the Japanese Empire reached the islands. By 1901, primary school attendance had reached 70 per cent, and 90 per cent in 1906 (Ōta 1976: 79). The Japanese authorities continued to adopt the policy of assimilation and of deliberately not nurturing leaders among local inhabitants; the same policy was later applied to other colonised peoples, such as in Taiwan. Higher education institutions were not established in Okinawa (teachers’ colleges were not considered higher education at the time). Even though some locals successfully learned to be assimilated by believing in the imperial ideology and speaking perfect standard Japanese, the rulers of Okinawa were nevertheless dispatched from mainland Japan. Okinawans could not become members of parliament until 1912, and even after that could not become prefectural governors. Okinawans were forced to become ‘Japanese’, but were to be discriminated as ‘Okinawans’, a contradiction that led to identity confusion. The government discouraged indigenous language and cultural practices. School authorities considered the local language a shameful, primitive dialect and prohibited its use; students who spoke the local language were given a card called a ‘dialect placard’ (hōgenfuda) to place around their necks as a punishment (Yamashiro and Sakuda 1983: 404–5), a similar tactic in relation to a minority language to that adopted in France (Giordan 1987 (1984)). Local cultural practices were also denigrated as barbaric under the slogan ‘Improve Customs Movement’
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(fūzoku kairyō undō). When national conscription started, Okinawan males were instructed to abandon their traditional hair style (Iha 1928), and the traditional custom of tattooing women’s hands was also prohibited. It was an imperial policy to control the bodies of its subjects: namely, men were to be able soldiers and women to be producers of soldiers. Okinawans initially resisted what they considered to be a discriminatory educational policy from above. For example, local students were outraged when the Syuri Middle School Japanese principal removed English from the school curriculum on the grounds that English was a luxury for the locals, who, he claimed, should first learn the standard Japanese language. Students boycotted classes and demanded the principal’s removal, which resulted in the subject’s return to the curriculum (Kerr 2000: 442). The principal and students involved in the boycott were also removed from the school. On the other hand, Okinawans gradually learned to see value in assimilation, especially after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese war, which made locals favour Japan over China. Noting that Okinawans in mainland Japan suffered from discrimination, at least partly because of their dialect, some Okinawans began to think that mastering standard Japanese might bring fairer treatment and better life chances (Rabson 1999). This led to what I call a voluntary assimilation movement initiated by local teachers. The bottom-up assimilation movement led to Okinawans’ transferring their own oppressive experience onto Taiwan, which became a Japanese colony in 1895. In relation to Taiwan, Okinawans held superior power as the ruling Japanese. The Japanese government promoted Okinawans, an old ruled people, to colonise the Taiwanese, a new ruled people, by sending Okinawan teachers, government officials, army officers and police officers there (Matayoshi1990). It seems that the Empire used Okinawans as disposable foot soldiers of colonial governance in Taiwan. Okinawans were still looked down on by the Japanese and the Taiwanese in Taiwan. This status of ‘double minority’ (Arasaki 2000: 38) contributed to identity conflicts for many Okinawans. Meanwhile, Okinawan government officers were sent to areas where local resistance against Japanese colonialism was strongest and where they faced heavy casualties. Okinawans volunteered for the mission of transforming local Taiwanese, whom they considered less civilised than themselves, into Japanese subjects. They believed that ‘Okinawa along with Taiwan was the important south gate to the Empire’, a phrase that emphasised the unique contributions that the two could make to the Empire. Events during the Second World War also troubled Okinawan identity. On landing, the American army found many civilian dead – forced to commit suicide by the Japanese army. Twice as many Okinawans as Japanese soldiers were killed in the Battle of Okinawa (James and Tamamori 1995).
Schooling under the US occupation: the second subordination The US occupation remained on the island even after Japan regained sovereignty in 1951. The American army shared the Japanese authorities’ view that Okinawans
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were distinct from the Japanese people (Tozzer 1996: 4); General MacArthur mentioned that Okinawans were not against the American occupation of Okinawa, unlike Japan, as they were not ‘Japanese’ (Nakano 1969: 4). The USA gained Pacific islands formerly under Japanese rule as its trust territories; in gaining Okinawa it acquired extensive military bases from the Far East to the Pacific. The fortification of Okinawa was subsequently important in the Cold War and during the Vietnam War. The US Military Government of the Ryūkyū Islands became the US Civil Administration in 1950. American commissioners dominated the administration, decision-making and judiciary. A letter from the Far East Command to the Ryūkyūs Command in 1950 proclaimed that ‘the Ryukyuan people will be guaranteed, as far as is consistent with the military occupation, the basic liberties of democratic countries’ (Gekkan Okinawasha 1983: 54). In the early 1950s, the American Army started taking over land in order to build military bases. Locals were forced to agree to rent their lands to the Army below market price, ‘equivalent to one bottle of coke for twenty years rental’ (Nakano and Arasaki 1976: 75). Local farmers had no choice but to work as construction workers or employees of the base, or alternatively to become small-shop owners serving American soldiers. With American products entering Okinawa without duty, manufacturing industry did not develop. Thus Okinawa’s unique state of heavy economic dependence on the bases soon emerged and has remained to the present. The American authorities had no intention of making Okinawa a US territory and granting its people American citizenship. Okinawans were therefore neither American nor fully Japanese. The self-governing body’s police officers could not charge an American soldier who failed to stop at a traffic light and killed a young Okinawan boy.2 Okinawans were not granted voting rights and could not travel freely to mainland Japan. They thus experienced a process whereby Okinawa became dependent on the US bases. This affected their identity formation. As for schooling for locals, the American authority in Okinawa showed little enthusiasm, in contrast to mainland Japan where the American GHQ was keen to establish a democratic system of schooling. The 1945 announcement by the US authority in Okinawa merely mentioned that the new schooling would promote local language, history and art. Education policies formed a part of the ‘disassimilation’ campaign that military intelligence and propaganda embarked on in order to convince Okinawans that they were not Japanese (Rabson 1999: 145). Radio programmes in the Ryūkyūan language were funded but soon discontinued owing to the lack of Ryūkyūan-speaking broadcasters. The 1946 Primary School Act passed by the US military government suggested that schools teach American and Okinawan culture and celebrate Okinawans’ achievements. The curriculum in the same year included the history of Okinawa and oriental and occidental history centred on Okinawa (Okinawa-ken Kyōiku Iinkai 1977: 23). The emphasis on the unique nature of Ryūkyū culture was seen by locals as an American attempt to justify the separation of Okinawa from Japan. Many Okinawan teachers resisted the ‘Ryuky-ization’ campaign. Many teachers also left teaching owing to inadequate salaries.
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The American authority’s wish to consolidate their rule in the islands by separating Okinawans from Japanese was also seen in its attempt to produce proAmerica elites in Okinawa. The US authority established the system of offering scholarships to local youth to study in America, and created local elites who were preferentially appointed to the government in Okinawa on their return. It was often said: ‘Unless you studied in the US, you go nowhere in this government.’ The University of the Ryūkyūs, established in 1950, was also aimed at producing proAmerican elites (Yamashiro and Sakuda 1983: 125). In contrast to the poor conditions of local primary and secondary schools, the university provided free education in English through American lectures, with American books donated by the government as texts. Graduates of this university, however, later played crucial roles in Okinawa’s civil movement to demand a return to Japan. Primary and secondary schools, which the American authority showed little interest in, had to be rebuilt by local people. In 1946, ninety primary schools were operating, with 65,000 students. Because facilities had been destroyed during the war, teachers and students sat on the beach, substituting the sand for a blackboard. One year later, the number of students had increased to 156,000, but the old, prewar system of eight years in primary and four years in senior high school was still in operation. It was only in 1948 that the new system of six–three–three (three years in primary, three years in middle school and three years in senior high school) was introduced, following the mainland practice (Warner 1972: 43). The place of English was extensively debated in the curriculum for these schools. It looked as if the American rule was to be permanent. However, lengthy discussion resulted in the decision that the medium of instruction would be Japanese, and that English would be a compulsory subject from grade 1 (Okinawaken Kyōiku Iinkai 1977: 42–3). Why was this? First, local teachers were dissatisfied with the American Army’s policy of funding education only for proAmerican elites, and with what the teachers understood to be a policy of divide and rule by strengthening Ryūkyūan consciousness. Second, local teachers realised that the new system of education in mainland Japan was well funded, that the occupation authorities on mainland Japan showed much more enthusiasm for rebuilding the education system, and that Okinawa would benefit more from following the Japanese system. In 1959, the Okinawa Association of School Principals took a consensus request to the American Army that Okinawan schooling follow the mainland Japanese practice and that schools raise a Japanese flag (which the US authority prohibited at the time) and have the same national events as Japan. Although the request was rejected, local educationalists started studying the new schooling system of mainland Japan. Local movement for assimilationist schooling: ‘Kokumin kyōiku’ Local teachers thus became determined to promote assimilationist Japanese schooling. This was called ‘Kokumin kyōiku’ and involved cultivating an awareness of being a Japanese citizen in, and teaching standard Japanese language to, their students. A question emerges from this: Why did Okinawans so desperately
84 Naomi Noiri want mainland Japan’s schooling for their children? This is surprising when we recall that locals felt betrayed by Japan – they had been left under US rule despite the war casualties that they had suffered and their pre-war display of loyalty. Who were the main players in this movement, and what did they achieve in the end? The most significant reason was that the American Army, which in theory liberated them from Japan, did not show interest in local schooling, which, locals believed, led to poor academic performance by their young people. In the 1950 academic performance test, the Okinawan primary school mathematics average mark was less than 50 per cent, and the middle school English test average mark was just over 50 per cent. Okinawan government officials listed three reasons for the poor performance: increased use of dialect; decreased interest in Japanese culture due to different lifestyles; and inadequate facilities (Warner 1972: 86–7). The 1952 meeting of school principals also proposed an emphasis on standard Japanese and two other major goals: construction of school buildings and the establishment of an education act (Okinawa-ken Kyōiku Iinkai 1977: 57–8). Some local teachers took the risk of illegally sailing to Japan in order to study the new 6–3–3 system of schooling and to bring home textbooks. This movement later came to involve teachers in a wider civil movement, the ‘Return to Japan’ movement. The movement’s insistence on raising the Japanese flag at schools had two purposes. One was to request the Japanese conservative party in power to provide financial resources for educational facilities. The other was to stabilise Okinawan identity, which teachers feared suffered from confusion under the US rule of the islands. The Okinawa Teachers’ Union encouraged parents to raise the Japanese flag on New Year’s Day and bought from mainland Japan a large quantity of flags to sell to parents. The most important task for educationalists in Okinawa at the time was to establish something equivalent to the Fundamental Education Law (1947), which was in force in mainland Japan, and to declare that Okinawan schooling should follow the Japanese legislation. Drawing on the preamble to the Fundamental Education Law, the Okinawa Teachers’ Union drafted its own version of the law and submitted this to the US commissioner. It was rejected twice because of the wording ‘We as Japanese citizens’. Undeterred, Chobyo Yara, the union president, took the matter to the CIA headquarters, and in 1958 the Okinawa Fundamental Education Law was established (Okinawa-ken Kyōiku Iinkai 1977: 140). This was extremely significant for the ‘Return to Japan’ movement. Yara later recalled: ‘I thought that the Japanese government would have no choice but to acknowledge the Law which described Okinawans as being “Japanese citizens”’ (Yamashiro and Sakuda 1983: 668). It was a public announcement, both to the Japanese government and to the American authority, of Okinawans’ wish to return to Japan. Yara later became the first Okinawa prefectural governor after its return to Japan. At the classroom level, teachers encouraged the use of the standard Japanese language and cultivated the idea that students were Japanese. The 1957 primary school curriculum guidelines for Japanese stated that all students should be able to speak standard Japanese by the end of grade 2, and that grade 3 students should
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learn to notice infantile expressions, dialect and unacceptable accents in their speech.3 Teachers conducted surveys of standard Japanese language use among students and attempted to discourage the use of ‘unacceptable expressions’. Dialect placards, which had been used during pre-war times, re-emerged in classrooms (EDGE 2002: 69). Okinawan children learned to speak standard Japanese, even with some ‘unacceptable’ dialectical expressions. Some children learned to be silent or avoid communication altogether for fear of disgracing themselves with their ‘unacceptable’ expressions (EDGE 2002: 52). Such examples suggest that assimilationist schooling was more severely imposed, not by the Japanese authority as during the pre-war period, but by local Okinawan teachers themselves. These teachers believed that standard Japanese language would enable Okinawan children, not only to develop Japanese identity, but also improve their academic performance to the level of mainland Japanese children. The assimilationist schooling movement connected to the ‘Return to Japan’ movement was abandoned in the late 1960s. By then, the Japanese government had revealed concrete directions regarding Okinawa’s return to Japan, including the prospect that American bases would remain after the return. Okinawans’ wish that they would obtain the peace and prosperity enjoyed by mainland Japanese was shattered. The Okinawa Teachers’ Union decided to drop from its educational tasks the cultivation of Japanese identity and the promotion of the standard language. However, the legacy of a fifteen-year assimilationist education remained: a generation that no longer spoke the Ryūkyūan language. ‘Catch up with mainland Japan’ narrative and victimhood identity Okinawa returned to Japan in 1972. The return was made possible by Japan’s rapid economic growth and partly by the US’s failed involvement in Vietnam. The US wanted an affluent Japan to shoulder the military cost of maintaining the US bases. Okinawans who had wished that the post-war Japanese constitution would remove the US military bases were disappointed. Seventy per cent of the US military bases in Japan remained in Okinawa. Okinawa had 22,720 US soldiers in 2007 (Okinawa-ken-kichi-taisaku-ka 2007). The Japanese government employed a narrative emphasising the ‘gap between Okinawa and the mainland’ and justified measures to bring Okinawa to mainland standards. The three Okinawa Promotion and Development Plans enabled the central government to provide special financial resources until Okinawa had achieved development equivalent to mainland Japan. These measures could be seen as the government’s attempt to compensate Okinawa for being required to accommodate a disproportionate number of US bases. Okinawa prefecture has received $350 billion through this channel, which has, nevertheless, not achieved the goal (Arasaki 2000: 93). Okinawa’s unemployment rate remains twice the national average, and the prefecture has the lowest income level in the country. As long as the gap exists, however, the government will provide financial resources.
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Okinawans themselves contributed to fostering the gap narrative while also attempting to close the gap. The first Okinawa Prefectural Department of Education after Okinawa’s return to Japan set out to achieve academic performance equivalent to that in mainland Japan (Motohama 2002: 25–9). Although this was immediately criticised by the Okinawa Teachers’ Union for being biased towards narrow academic achievement, the goal was widely accepted. Teachers and students shared the view that Okinawans were poor academic achievers, as measured by uniform criteria such as retention rates or nationally available scores, and assessed their progress in terms of the extent to which they narrowed the gap. This resembled the post-war assimilationist schooling discussed above. I would suggest that teachers’ and students’ efforts stemming from this narrative quite inadvertently contributed to the maintenance of an Okinawan inferiority complex towards mainland Japan, although the attempts were driven by well-intentioned local teachers who strove to improve students’ academic achievement. Okinawans’ view of themselves as victims was, I suggest, influenced by the gap narrative. People developed a self-perception that they were unique victims in a prosperous and peaceful Japan. They were shown the continuing gap between Okinawa and the mainland in many aspects of their lives, despite the central government’s continued financial assistance. They were told of Okinawa’s unique and sad history of experiencing the battle and the resulting destruction, and of taking an unfair burden of US military bases for the US–Japan security treaty, which prevented local economic development. I would further suggest that the narratives of gap and victimhood have also retarded Okinawa’s ‘indigenous’ development. The narratives may have made it more difficult for Okinawans to recognise Amerasians as a marginalised minority among themselves (MurphyShigematsu 2002: 201). This victimhood view partially arose from, or was strengthened by, the special (sacred) place accorded to Okinawa in contemporary peace education in Japan. Many Japanese students on school overnight study trips and general tourists visit Okinawa to learn about the Battle of Okinawa and the effects of the US bases (Figal 2003). It is now a place of pilgrimage for peace education and attracts more visitors than Hiroshima or Nagasaki. The project ‘Peace Appeal from Okinawa’ has been taken up repeatedly by local and national media. In the peace education narrative, Okinawa, which suffered the most in the past and is still suffering from US bases, is best equipped to convey the cruelty of war and the values of peace. Another factor contributing to the victim self-perception is the fact that Okinawans have not questioned their own assailant roles in Japan’s expansionist policy and practices, for example in Taiwan (Matayoshi 1990). In contrast to mainland Japan, where some public servants and teachers were purged of their responsibility for war deeds, the Okinawan parliament, after the end of the war, resolved that ‘All Okinawans were victims of the Second World War’ and did not purge any public servants (Shinjō 2001: 240). They have thus failed to question their own responsibility in promoting a post-war assimilationist education. We have seen the Okinawans’ lasting inferiority complex towards mainland Japan, their pride in appealing for peace and their self-perception as victims.
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Okinawans also struggled to form an identity in relation to Japan and the US army. Okinawans and Amerasians in Okinawa thus share a minority status. How have the former responded to the latter?
Amerasians: a minority within Okinawa In Okinawa, the term Amerasian gained currency when parents started a civil movement for their Amerasian children’s rights to education after 1997. Until then, Amerasian children were variously called ‘mixed-race children’, ‘international children’ or ‘stateless children’. The Amerasian experience of schooling, the success of the movement to save stateless children, and the continued marginalisation of Amerasian children in Okinawa are discussed in the following section. ‘Mixed-race children’ prior to Okinawa’s return to Japan The US government was concerned that Asian women, and Amerasian children born as a result of the women’s relationships with American soldiers, would gain American citizenship after the war. When Congress allowed Asian women to enter the US as spouses in 1947, the first official marriage between an American soldier and a local woman took place in Okinawa. Sources reported varying figures for mixed-race children in Okinawa, in part owing to inconsistent definitions of mixedrace children. The Ministry of Welfare reported 5,013 based on its survey of gynaecologists (1952); the Ministry of Education reported 2,401 based on its survey of students (1950); and the US World and World Report 11,000 (1955) (Namihira 1970: 80). During this period, local women’s relationships with American soldiers were based on subordination factors such as violence, economic dependence, rape, prostitution and extra-marital affairs. Some local women who gave birth to mixedrace children were blamed by their own relatives and local community and were often excluded from interdependent support networks. In particular, local women and their mixed-race children who were abandoned by American soldiers were viewed as a negative image of Okinawans: under the American Army’s rule but neither American nor Japanese, and deprived of human rights. Although international relationships and marriages became more common, the social stigma attached to mixed-race children and their mothers continued in Okinawa. Support for these local women and their children was provided by the International Social Service (ISS). The ISS was a non-government social welfare body established in 1958. The American Women’s Welfare Association (AWWA) on the US base provided funding and was initially headed by an American priest (Kokusai Fukushi Sōdansho 1983). In 1961, a local Okinawan became its deputy director. Its main activities included counselling regarding international relationships, marriage and divorce, and the adoption of mixed-race children by American couples. The ISS arranged 699 adoptions to American couples in the period 1958–1968 (Kokusai Fukushi Sōdansho 1983: 151). However, the number
88 Naomi Noiri of abandoned children was so large that most Amerasian children grew up in Okinawa. After the return to Japan, the ISS became a social welfare corporation, International Social Assistance Okinawa Inc. (ISAO), and received funding from the Okinawan prefectural government. It continued to arrange the adoption of mixed-race children while shifting its emphasis to assistance to children who were growing up in Okinawa. This is where the movement to save stateless children started. ‘Save stateless children’ movement before 1985 With the 1972 return of Okinawa to Japan, the Japanese Immigration Act and the Nationality Act began to be applied to Okinawans. These acts resolved the contentious legal status of those Okinawans who were not American citizens despite being under US army rule and who had not received the benefits of the post-war Japanese constitution. However, many Amerasian children could not gain Japanese citizenship, or, worse still, had no nationality at all, as the pre-1985 Nationality Law had adopted the patrilineal system whereby mixed-race children did not gain Japanese citizenship by birth to a Japanese mother. The number of mixed-race children in Okinawa was estimated to be 3,000 according to ISAO’s 1970 survey. Of these, 80 per cent were in single-mother families, and 10 per cent were being brought up by someone other than their own parents (often relatives and friends). Amerasian children who did not hold Japanese citizenship were not eligible to receive social welfare and education. This contributed to poverty and was also exacerbated by their fathers’ abandonment. For example, these families were unable to access the national health insurance scheme and were not entitled to a parenting allowance offered to single-mother families, nor to a special parenting allowance for disabled children. Amerasian children without Japanese citizenship were not notified by local government about entry into primary schools, were required to pay for school textbooks (which were free to citizens) and for local government health check-ups and vaccination, and were not eligible to enter the national pension scheme. Consequently, mothers faced an increased financial burden, which often forced them to seek employment in the entertainment industry (for American soldiers). Thus, mixed-race children became stigmatised for their mothers’ participation in the entertainment industry (water trade) and for not having both parents. Their lives were associated with poverty. If local women legally married American soldiers, their children gained American citizenship but lost their eligibility for Japanese nationality. If a local woman gave birth outside wedlock, the child gained Japanese nationality but was officially recorded as an ‘illegitimate child’ in the family registration (koseki) (See Sugimoto 2003: 156–63), which also carried a social stigma. The worst case was when these children became what were known as ‘stateless children’ through failure to gain American citizenship at birth from their fathers. This situation resulted from several scenarios: for example, if American fathers failed to report the birth to the American Consulate, or if recently naturalised
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fathers had not lived in the US for the length of time required to give American citizenship to their children. If a local woman married an American man but was abandoned and later gave birth to a child with a local man, the child was still stateless, as that child was considered to have American citizenship from the stillvalid marriage. There were cases where births were unreported to local councils; as a result, the children’s names were not even entered on the resident cards maintained by local governments (jūminhyō). Faced with the plight of these children, Okinawa began a civil movement to save them after the return to Japan. This lasted until 1985, when the Nationality Act was finally revised. This civil movement involved ISAO, the Okinawa Prefectural Department of Education and the Association of Lawyers (bengoshi rengōkai), and focused on saving Amerasian ‘stateless children’. It successfully persuaded cities, towns and villages in Okinawa to issue local ordinances that entitled mothers of mixed-race children without Japanese citizenship to receive a single-mother parenting allowance. It also emphasised the problem of ‘stateless children’ as a human rights issue resulting from the concentration of US bases in Okinawa, and vigorously lobbied for the revision of the existing Nationality Law. The core revision that they sought was to guarantee all ‘mixedrace children’ Japanese nationality at birth from either Japanese mothers or fathers (Ōshiro 1979). Okinawans, having recently experienced the US Army rule, were sympathetic to these children’s plight and showed strong support for the movement. The movement focused on Japanese citizenship as a means to secure the welfare of these children, partly owing to the American authorities’ lack of interest. American soldiers often did not contribute maintenance costs, a problem about which the US Army could do little. The army did, however, establish a family service centre and started holding monthly preparation courses for international marriage. Soldiers and their local fiancées were required to attend a course, where army priests, social workers and legal workers lectured on both emotional and legal preparation. The course is still offered, but, to date, has not functioned as a deterrent to soldiers’ abandonment of their wives and children. Japanese courts were unable to extract maintenance from American soldiers under the Japan–US Status Agreement. The US Army provided soldiers with family allowances, but there was no way to ensure that this money would reach the family. Once soldiers had left Okinawa, the abandoned women and their children had no way to trace them. Annette Eddie-Callagain started working towards obtaining maintenance from US soldiers in the 1990s. However, there has been no US–Japan agreement regarding child support. In 1977, a court case was launched in Tokyo to request Japanese nationality for ‘stateless children’. The appeal from Okinawa gained support from the women’s liberation movement and human rights movements and evolved into an effective civil movement. In the end, in response to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and an international agreement to dismantle gender inequality, the Nationality Law was revised in 1985. It enabled children of a Japanese parent (father or mother) to receive Japanese nationality. ‘Mixed-race
90 Naomi Noiri children’ often possess dual nationalities until they decide on one at the age of twenty or twenty-two. The revision of the Nationality Act affected the state of another minority group—the Koreans in Japan. Since the majority of Koreans in Japan marry Japanese nationals, this led to an increase in the number of ‘Japanese’ nationals of Korean descent, as the child of the mixed marriage could now acquire Japanese citizenship from either parent, not just the father. On the one hand, this has presented a dilemma for those in the Korean civil rights movement who see Korean identity in terms of not holding Japanese nationality. One the other hand, others, especially many young Japan-born Koreans, saw this as a welcome opportunity to reconsider the nature of Japanese citizenship and Japan-born Korean identity (Okano’s Chapter 5 in this volume). Okinawan people were proud of their achievement. I suspect that the enthusiasm and commitment displayed by locals in the movement arose at least partially from their own marginalised experience: They had suffered from similar legal status during the US occupation and used to travel to mainland Japan with passports issued by the government of the Ryūkyū Islands. Even after the return to Japan, Okinawans were forced to accommodate US military bases. The ‘stateless children’ movement was initiated by the marginalised for the sake of the even more marginalised within Okinawan society and connected two marginalised groups: Okinawans in relation to mainland Japan, and stateless children in relation to Okinawan society. Continued marginalisation after gaining Japanese citizenship The civil movement to support mixed-race children quickly dissolved after the 1985 revision of the Nationality Act. Surveys of Amerasian schooling, which had been conducted frequently in the 1970s, were no longer conducted after the 1981 Japan Federation of Bar Associations presented a report. In 1990, the ISAO ceased to exist owing to financial difficulties. After that, there were no agencies for Amerasians in Okinawa until 1998, when the AmerAsian School in Okinawa was established. I suggest that, because of its narrow focus on the visible and tangible issue of the acquisition of Japanese citizenship, Okinawans felt that their mission had been accomplished. However, Amerasians continued to be marginalised in their daily experiences of schooling and beyond. Why was this? ‘International children’ (kokusai-ji) – as they started to be called in the 1980s – and their mothers still faced marginalisation within Okinawan society. They continued to suffer from harassment, verbal abuse and exclusion, for example being excluded from family asset inheritance and being denied burial in family graves (Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai 1981: 19). In particular, Amerasians with Afro-American background faced constant bullying at school and outside (Fukuchi 1980: 45–6). While activists fought for stateless children to gain Japanese nationality, the general public failed to see the unfairness in the Amerasians’ daily lives. The 1981 survey by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations revealed that, when respondents reported cases of bullying of Amerasians by other children, for
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example, being called ‘American!’, such bullying was considered normal (Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai 1981:20). It seems that, in 1981, people took the situation faced by Amerasian children for granted. Teachers also failed to recognise the seriousness of the problem of marginalised Amerasians at the level of classroom interaction. The same survey posed the question to schools: ‘Do you have difficulties for teaching international children in your schools, and if so how have you responded to date?’. Major responses were: (1) Okinawan children have few discriminatory attitudes, which is educationally desirable; (2) when international children notice their unique background in senior years of primary school, they develop an inferiority complex; and (3) schools provide individualised guidance, and try to nurture the idea of human rights that everyone is equal (Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai 1981: 20). Forms of marginalisation suffered by Amerasian children at local schools varied. Besides general bullying based on visual differences, they also experienced unpleasant actions triggered by lessons in peace education, for example on the anniversary of the ending of the Battle of Okinawa. A mother explained: My child’s teacher showed a video on the Okinawa Battle. Kids saw that Americans dropped bombs and killed many people in Okinawa. Other kids started saying, ‘Bang Bang Yankees go home’ pretending to shoot my child. My kid started crying and didn’t want to go to school any more. I talked to his teachers, who said ‘It may be better for him to go to American school.’ I felt she didn’t care. (TBS 1998) The anti-American feeling, in particular the antipathy towards the American military bases, was another source of unpleasant experiences for Amerasian children. This feeling was escalated by incidents such as the sexual assault of a local girl by US marines in 1995. When civil movements questioned the US bases in Okinawa, Amerasian children and their families faced antagonism in their daily lives. A woman commented: We used to visit this bar very often. Then suddenly we were told that we couldn’t go there anymore. I said, ‘Why? My husband is not a soldier but a teacher.’ They said, ‘I’m sorry. Americans are Americans.’ (TBS 1998) The family of the abovementioned boy who was bullied on the Battle of Okinawa anniversary eventually disintegrated after the 1995 incident. The father could no longer bear the hostile environment and returned to the US with his elder son. Thus, even after the revised legislation granted all Amerasian children Japanese citizenship and ‘legal equality’, the children continued to be marginalised in Okinawan society. Discriminatory comments and unpleasant treatment were triggered by peace studies classes about the Battle of Okinawa and by US soldiers’ crimes against locals. In this context, Amerasians represented ‘Yankees’, who
92 Naomi Noiri killed Okinawans and made Okinawa suffer. Parents of Amerasian children did not think that local teachers in government schools sufficiently problematised the state of their children in their classrooms. This is one of the reasons that drove mothers to initiate a movement to establish the AmerAsian School. Why did the organised civil movement for Amerasian children fail to go beyond the acquisition of Japanese citizenship? Given the past experiences of marginalisation that they had suffered, Okinawans were in a better position to understand the plight of Amerasian children. The organised civil movement for Amerasian children failed to contemplate how Amerasian children would manage their difficulties after gaining Japanese citizenship. This was precisely the question that Okinawans failed to raise about themselves during the post-war civil movement for Okinawa’s return to Japan, and during the post-war assimilationist schooling movement: How should they manage their own marginalised status after obtaining what they had wanted, that is, legal status as Japanese? I share the view that Okinawans’ ongoing perception of themselves as victims has made it difficult for them to recognise their own prejudice against others and to consider that others could be victims, too (Murphy-Shigematsu 2002). Continuing to perceive themselves as victims and as oppressed, they seemed to be content when Amerasian children were officially considered equal to them. Subsequently, after the revision of the Nationality Act, the voices of Amerasians were silenced for thirteen years, until a school for Amerasians was established.
The AmerAsian School in Okinawa: grass-roots activism The majority of Amerasian children currently attend local government schools. Some attend the Department of Defense Dependents School (DoDDS) on the US base, and a small number now attend the AmerAsian School in Okinawa (henceforth called the AmerAsian School), a non-government school established in 1998. The two capitals in the school’s title symbolise its ideal: respecting the American and Asian cultures equally and offering ‘education for doubles’. An examination of the AmerAsian School, the grass-roots activism leading to its establishment, and the Okinawa prefectural government’s response to Amerasians in its system of education reveals the government’s perception of Amerasians. This perception is also discussed in relation to the history of marginalisation of Okinawans in general. The AmerAsian School was established by five mothers of Amerasian children as a community-based alternative school. In 2009, its enrolment was thirteen in kindergarten, fifty-four at primary school level and fourteen at middle school level. Its establishment was triggered when eighty students left a private missionary international school when a serious environmental hazard was discovered in the school grounds. There were also some American children, especially those who had no access to the DoDDS on the US base and whose parents wanted them to receive schooling in the English language medium. Those children did not want to transfer to local government schools, perhaps because they knew some of their friends were being harassed or were unable to keep up with lessons conducted in
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the Japanese language. These children then started attending small alternative schools in English or receiving home schooling. Such measures were unsatisfactory. They were expensive and, more seriously, did not make the children eligible to proceed to higher schooling, because the schools were unregistered. Parents formed a group and requested the Okinawa Prefecture Department of Education to establish ‘international classes’ in government schools (Terumoto 2001).4 Parents wanted these classes to offer education in the English language medium for Amerasians who had been schooled in English. The department replied that it could not immediately offer special education for foreigners in government schools. Most Amerasian children possessed Japanese citizenship (including dual citizenship), but the authorities, realising that these children had been schooled in English, were reluctant to provide special programmes for them. The parent group then asked the US government, through the Okinawa prefecture governor, that all Amerasian children be entitled to free education at the DoDDS on the base, but received the response that the US government could not make exceptions for Amerasians in Okinawa. Parents thus learned that Amerasians did not enjoy the benefits of having American citizenship either. While lobbying, the parent group started to use the term ‘Amerasian’. First, they felt that ‘international children’ (kokusai-ji) did not represent those children accurately. Amerasian children could be Japanese citizens or American citizens or both. The term ‘international children’ had the nuance, in the public’s perception, that the children were not Japanese but foreign citizens and tended to exclude Amerasian children of Japanese citizenship. The term, the parent group felt, did not adequately reflect the nature of children who were living in two societies (Japan and the US). Second, by adopting the term Amerasian, the parent group hoped that their children would be able to develop solidarity with Amerasians overseas. ‘Amerasian children’, in Okinawa, implied not only a minority group in Japan but also a global minority group existing in different parts of Asia. Indeed, the AmerAsian School started an exchange programme with an Amerasian Christian Academy in South Korea in the third year of its operation. The parent group thus defined itself as the ‘Study Group for AmerAsian’s Educational Rights’ (Amerashian no kyōikuken o kangaeru kai) and started to prepare for the establishment of the school. Parents wanted their children to grow up to be proud of their double cultures rather than see themselves as ‘a half (person)’ – the term used to describe a mixed-race child with only half of each culture – and thus marginalised. Education for ‘double children’ was intended to raise their self-esteem. Many of the mothers were sole parents, but their lifestyles and financial situations had become diverse compared with the 1970s. Core members of the parent group were professional, bilingual women, who negotiated with the Okinawa prefectural government and the central Ministry of Education. Symbolism of English language proficiency The language spoken by students of the AmerAsian School varies. Some of them have English as their strongest language, but can use Japanese in daily life. The
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school operates four groups: kindergarten, lower grade, middle grade and higher grade, up to the end of middle school (age fifteen). Approximately 80 per cent of the subjects are taught in English by American homeroom teachers, with teaching materials developed in the Department of Defence Dependents School and their own materials. The school uses English as the medium of instruction in language, art, mathematics, science, social studies, physics and ESL, and Japanese as the medium of instruction in Japanese, social studies (Japanese history and society), integrated studies (environment, human rights, Okinawa), information technology and JSL. The school also has three full-time Japanese teachers and several volunteer teachers, often local university students. It also offers supplementary classes for those who intend to proceed to local high schools.5 The emphasis on English language at the school is deliberate. English language proficiency has a particular meaning for these children, in that it ranks Amerasians into two groups in Okinawan society. This significance is derived from characteristics of Okinawan society. First, local people in Okinawa often equate foreigners with Americans, and with American soldiers in particular, as only 8,914 foreigners and 48,490 American army staff and their families resided in Okinawa prefecture in 2007 (Hōmu-shō 2007; Okinawa-ken-kichi-taisaku-ka 2007). Unlike many other prefectures, Okinawa has very few foreign labourers, as it has little viable manufacturing industry. The second largest ethnic group is Taiwanese, many of whom have taken up Japanese citizenship and assimilated into mainstream Okinawan society. The third group is female Philippine dancers in the entertainment district, who are on transient visas and do not interact with locals. Second, locals have maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the US base and the US in general. While having anti-US base feelings, locals also maintain a kind of yearning and envy for the English language and for the material affluence observed at the base. For example, some locals are eager to obtain American products, sold only on the base, through their friends who work there. Expressions such as ‘Are you a hāfu (Amerasian)? Lucky you can speak English’ are often uttered. However, this envy and yearning can be turned against Amerasian children who do not have English language proficiency. English language proficiency for Amerasian children is not only a communication skill and a valuable asset in the labour market (this applies to everyone), but is also a form of cultural capital in the sense that Bourdieu (1984) suggests. It acts as an indicator of family background and circumstances. Those with English language proficiency are assumed to live with both parents, to have free access to the US base and to have the future prospect of living in the US. In contrast, those without English language proficiency are often assumed to have been abandoned by American fathers, to live in a poor, single-mother family and to have no access to the US base and no connection with the US. The latter are sometimes pejoratively called ‘an island half’ (shima hāfu), which implies that they do not have the positives of being Amerasian. Whenever Amerasians are introduced to new people or are interviewed for employment, they are asked if they speak English. Upon responding negatively, they notice disappointment and sympathy. Because of this, the emphasis on the English language in the AmerAsian
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School is aimed at promoting Amerasian children’s self-esteem and at giving them both the skills to communicate with their relatives and also an asset in the labour market. Response from the Okinawa’s educational administration The parent group faced challenges in its attempt to establish the AmerAsian School. These challenges and difficulties reveal the nature of both the educational administration and the Okinawan society. The most difficult task was to have children’s attendance in the AmerAsian School recognised as attendance in compulsory schooling. As the school was an unregistered, alternative institution, students who completed nine years of schooling there could not receive a certificate of completion of compulsory schooling, nor were they eligible to sit an entrance examination to senior high school. The parent group appealed to the Okinawa Prefectural Department of Education, to local education boards (at city, town and village level) and to individual government schools, and achieved a new arrangement for Japanese citizens for 1999 and for American citizens in 2001. Under this arrangement, the number of days that students attend the AmerAsian School is reported to a local government school at which the students are registered; the AmerAsian School term reports are also forwarded to the government school. Based on this arrangement, attendance at the AmerAsian School is counted as attendance at the government school, and students receive a graduation certificate from the government school and become eligible to sit entrance examinations to local senior high schools (Terumoto 2001). This new arrangement had been originally set up by the central Ministry of Education for children who suffered from long-term school nonattendance (futōkō). The instances of school nonattendance in mainstream schools increased in the 1990s for various reasons (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999: 194–207). To manage this, the Ministry of Education decided to allow certain private, unregistered educational institutions to provide these children with schooling if their normal schools were unable to offer suitable programmes, the aim being that the children would eventually return to the mainstream schools (Gakkō futekiō taisaku chōsa kenkyū kyōryokusha kaigi 1999). Following this guideline, the Okinawa Department of Education officially acknowledged the AmerAsian School as a non-governmental educational institution that would temporarily accept ‘ill-adjusted children’ who do not attend school and those who were unlikely to adjust to mainstream schooling. To equate Amerasian children with school nonattendance was problematic, in that it contradicted the aim of the AmerAsian School to foster the potential of double cultures, but the bureaucratic recognition was convenient. Here we see how both central and local government defined the schooling needs of Amerasian children. Comparison with government responses to ‘newcomer’ migrant children (see Tsuneyoshi’s Chapter 5 in this volume) is helpful for understanding this. ‘Newcomer’ immigrant children have been officially seen as possessing different language backgrounds and therefore different cultural backgrounds and are accordingly categorised as ‘students who require Japanese
96 Naomi Noiri as a second language teaching’. The public education system provides this language assistance to targeted groups. Neither Amerasians nor long-standing ethnic Koreans and Chinese receive such group-specific recognition and treatment equivalent to those given to newcomer children. The government policy neither institutionally values the fact that Amerasian children have another language, nor promotes their language proficiency. It seems that government schools continue to provide education for children so that they grow up to be ‘Japanese’. Those who do not, or do not wish to, do so are considered as ‘ill-adjusted’ in relation to mainstream schooling. When the new arrangement was implemented, the Okinawa prefectural government agreed to provide assistance to the AmerAsian School by sending two Japanese language teachers. However, as the Okinawa Department of Education opposed this assistance on the grounds that it could not offer special treatment to the AmerAsian School only, the prefectural government decided to treat the case as a women’s problem arising from the US base, and to have its Women’s Centre dispatch the teachers. Just as treating the Amerasian children’s case as school nonattendance was problematic, so did the prefectural bureaucratic process of dispatching teachers underscore the complicated and peculiar nature of the AmerAsian School in the hands of the Okinawa prefecture’s educational administration. The central government offered a one-off funding for development in local areas where the US bases were concentrated. With this funding, the AmerAsian School shifted its site from a family house to the first floor of the Ginowan City Human Development Centre, which enabled the school to increase its intake. The costs of maintenance and teaching materials have never been funded by either the central government or the Okinawa prefecture. It seems that the Okinawa Department of Education, while diligently following the central government’s directions, failed to understand the educational needs of local Amerasian children. This picture reminds us of the ‘Kokumin kyōiku’ promoted in the 1950s and 1960s, in which the Okinawans desperately attempted to become ‘Japanese’ and yet failed to gain their wish – Okinawa’s return to Japan without the US bases. While the annual provision of the central government’s development fund to Okinawa has raised Okinawans’ standard of living and consumption, they remain marginalised in Japanese society – as least that is how locals perceive it. The existence of the Amerasians continues to pose a peculiar problem for Okinawans: they conform neither to the conventional category of ‘Japanese’ (even less so than do Okinawans) nor to the victimised view of Okinawans who sacrificed so much for the sake of Japan.
Conclusion We have seen that pre-war Okinawa internalised the Japanese state ideology and contributed to the latter’s expansionist policy, and that schooling played an important role in this process. Post-war Okinawa, in contrast, did not respond in the same way to the new schooling devised by the US authorities, which led local teachers to organise a grass-roots movement for assimilationist schooling. While
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promoting assimilation to mainland Japan, first imposed and later voluntary, locals seem to have internalised Japan’s view of Okinawa as marginalised and developed ambiguous identities. This shared sense of marginalisation and of identity uncertainty made locals sympathetic to stateless Amerasians and led to a civil movement to ensure that all mixed-race children be granted Japanese citizenship. Once the movement had succeeded in 1985, however, the grass-roots activism in support of Amerasian children diminished. I contend that this was because of the movement’s limited focus on Japanese citizenship and also because locals maintained a victimhood view of themselves to a large extent. The voluntary assimilation education movement in post-war Okinawa might have also contributed to Okinawan’s intolerance of diversity within Okinawa. In the face of the lack of support for Amerasian children, a parent group finally established the AmerAsian School thirteen years after the 1985 Nationality Act Reform. The group faced difficulties in gaining support from government and adopted strategies to circumvent them, both of which aspects illuminate the attitude of the Okinawa Department of Education in relation to Amerasians. One of the urgent challenges facing local schools in Okinawa is the effective accommodation of Amerasians. I suggest that this accommodation is most likely to be achieved when locals reflect on their own experience of marginalisation, both past and present, both institutionalised and otherwise, and relate this experience to that of Amerasians. Only then will the narratives of Okinawans as a marginalised group in Japan and of Amerasians as a marginalised group within Okinawa again make a meaningful connection. This will, I suspect, also act to empower both groups, just as the movement to save stateless children did. By focusing on the experiences of Okinawans, an indigenous population that underwent subjugation to two rulers (Japan and the US), and of Amerasians in Okinawa, the chapter highlighted how the official discourse of schools has variously construed ‘difference’ in student populations. By revealing how governments at various levels have devised ways of responding to perceived differences, how grass-roots activism has affected schooling, and what the consequences of these various actions have been, it was hoped to further our understanding of the relative autonomy of schooling at school level. While the new diversity has been extensively discussed both in the public and policy arenas, we are reminded of the diversity that has long existed in Japan, how this diversity has been addressed in schools, and what the long-term consequences have been.
Notes 1
2
The 1985 reform of the Nationality Act did not resolve all cases. For example, if Amerasian children (with a US soldier or serviceman father) born outside Japan are not registered at a Japanese consulate within three months, they face serious difficulty in obtaining Japanese citizenship. In 1963, a US army truck ran over middle school students walking on a pedestrian crossing with a green light. The truck driver was arrested by the Military Police and court-martialled. Three months later, he was declared not guilty (Arasaki 2000: 79).
98 Naomi Noiri 3 4 5
The details are described in the proceedings of the third research conference of the Okinawa Teachers’ Union ‘Okinawa Kyōiku’ (volume 5, 1957). They are reproduced in EDGE’s publication (2002: 52). See for details of the process leading to the establishment of the school, see Terumoto (2001). See for further discussion on the school’s curriculum, see Noiri (2000).
References Allen, M. (2001) Identity and resistance in Okinawa, Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield. Arasaki, M. (2000) Profile of Okinawa, Tokyo: Techno Marketing Center. Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: a social critique of the judgment of taste, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bourdieu, P. and J.-C. Passeron (1977) Reproduction in education, society and culture, London: Sage. EDGE (2002) Sōzō no kyōdōtai nihon: Okinawa no kora wa dono yō ni nihonjin ni nattaka, Naha: Art Produce Okinawa. Figal, G. (2003) ‘Waging peace on Okinawa’, in L. Hein and M. Selden (eds), Islands of discontent, Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield. Fukuchi, H. (1980) Okinawa no konketsuji to haha tachi, Naha: Aoi-umi Shuppan. Gakkō futekiō taisaku chōsa kenkyū kyōryokusha kaigi (1999) Minkan-shisetsu ni tsuite no gaidorain, Ministry of Education. Gekkan Okinawasha (ed.) (1983) Laws and regulations during the U.S. administration of Okinawa 1945–1972, Naha: Ikemiya Syōkai. Giordan, H. (1987) Shitagerareta gengo no fukken, Tokyo: Hihyosha (translated from Par les langues de France (1984), Centre Georges Pompidou). Hein, L. and Selden, M. (eds) (2003) Islands of discontent: Okinawan responses to Japanese and American power, Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield. Hōmu-sho (2007) Todōken betsu gaikokujinn tourokushasū. Available at www.e-stat.go.jp/ SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001031723 (accessed on 1 September 2009). Hook, G. and Siddle, R. (eds) (2003) Japan and Okinawa: structure and subjectivity, London: RoutledgeCurzon. Iha, F. (1928) Okinawa yo doko e, Tokyo: Sekaisha. James, J.C. and Tamamori, T. (2000) Okinawa: society and economy, Naha: Bank of the Ryūkyū International Foundation. Johnson, C. (1999) Okinawa: cold-war island, Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute. Kawai, T. (2003) ‘Naha onna to iu watashi: Kotoba o ryakudatsu sareta daishō to shite’, Okinawa Times, 24 April. Kerr, G.H. (2000) Okinawa: The history of an island people, Boston: Tuttle Publishing (original print in 1958). Kokusai Fukushi Sōdansho (1983) Kokusai fukushi sōdansho sōritsu 29 shunen kinenshi, Ginowan: Shakai funkushi hōjin kokusai fukushi kai. Matayoshi, M. (1989) ‘Taiwan ryōyū to okinawa’, in Ryūcyū rekishi kankei kokusai gakujyutsu kaigi jikkō iinkai (ed.), Dai nikai ryūcyū rekishi kankei ronbun shū, Naha: Ryūcyū rekishi kankei kokusai gakujyutsu kaigi jikkō iinkai. –––– (1990) Nihon shokuminchika no taiwan to okinawa, Ginowan: Okinawa Aki Shobō. Matsumori, A. (1995) ‘Ryūkyūan: past, present and future’, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 16: 19–44.
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Motohama, H. (2002) ‘Gakuryoku-kakusa to shite no kokugo’, in EDGE (ed.), Sōzō no kyōdōtai nihon: Okinawa no kora wa donoyōni nihonjin ni nattaka, Naha: Art Produce Okinawa. Murphy-Shigematsu, S. (2002) Amerasian no kodomotachi: Shirarezaru mainoritī mondai, Tokyo: Shūeisha. Nakano, Y. (ed.) (1969) Sengo shiryō okinawa, Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha. Nakano, Y. and Arasaki, M. (1976) Okinawa sengoshi, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Nakasone, R. (2002) Okinawan diaspora, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Namihira, I. (1970) ‘Konkentsuji no kenkyū, No. 1’, Okinawa kokusai daigaku ronshū, 10(1): 77–160. Nihon Bengoshi Rengōkai, dai 6-ji okinawa chōsadan (1981) Okinawa mukokusekiji mondai chōsa hōkokusho, Tokyo: Nihon bengoshi rengōkai. Noiri, N. (2000) ‘Okinawa no amerasian’, in M. Yamamoto (ed.), Nihon no bairingaru kyōiku, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Oguma, E. (1998) Nihonjin no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Shōsen, shokuminchi shiahai kara fukki undō made, Tokyo: Shinyōsha. Okano, K. and Tsuchiya, M. (1999) Education in contemporary Japan: diversity and inequality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Okinawa-ken-kichi-taisaku-ka (Military Base Affairs Division, Okinawa prefectural government) (2007) Okinawa no Beigunn oyobi Jieitai Kichi Tōkeishiryōshū Heisei 21 nendo. Available online at www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/view/contview.jsp?cateid=14&id= 19687&page=1 (accessed 1 September 2009). Okinawa-ken Kyōiku Iinkai (ed.) (1977) Okinawa no sengo kyōikushi, Naha: Okinawaken kyōiku iinkai. Ōshiro, Y. (1979) Kokusai jidō nen: Okinawa kara no teigen. Quoted in Kokusai fukushi sōdansho (1983) Kokusai fukushi sōdansho sōritsu 29 shūnen kinenshi, Ginowan: Shakai funkushi hojin kokusai fukushikai. Ōta, C. (1976) Okinawa kensei 50 nen, Naha: Ryuon kokako (Original print in 1932). Rabson, S. (1999) ‘Assimilation policy in Okinawa: promotion, resistance, and “reconstruction” ’, in C. Johnson (ed.), Okinawa: cold-war island, Cardiff, US: Japan Policy Research Institute. Shinjō, T. (2001) Ryūkyū okinawa shi, Ginowan: Tōyō Kikaku. Sugimoto, Y. (2003) An introduction to Japanese society, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. TBS (1998) ‘Mō hitotsu no okinawa no genjitsu: Amerasian’, Tsukushi Tetsuya no Nyūsu 23 (aired on 13 August). Terumoto, H. (ed.) (2001) AmerAsian School: Kyōsei no chihei o okinawa kara, Tokyo: Fukinotō Shobō. Tozzer, A. (1996) ‘Ryūkyū rettō no okinawa-jin’, in Okinawa kenritsu toshokan shiryō henshū shitau (ed.), Okinawa ken shi shiryō ni, Naha: Okinawa-ken kyōiku iinkai. Warner, G. (1972) History of education in postwar Okinawa, Tokyo: Nihon bunka kagakusha. Yamashiro, Z. and Sakuda, S. (eds) (1983) Okinawa koto hajime: Sesōshi jiten, Naha: Gekkan Okinawasha. Yoshino, K. (1992) Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan, London: Routledge.
5
Ethnic Koreans in Japanese schools Shifting boundaries and collaboration with other groups1 Kaori H. Okano
The Koreans are one of the largest ethnic minority groups in contemporary Japan. They are diverse in terms of citizenship and residential status, length of stay in Japan, political affiliation, reasons for arrival, generation and social class. Building on the preceding chapters on long-existing minority groups viewed collectively (i.e. indigenous groups, ex-colonial subjects of Korean and Taiwanese descent, and buraku peoples), I now turn specifically to ethnic Koreans. (In ‘ethnic Koreans’, I include Japanese citizens with Korean ethnic background, as well as non-citizens.) The focus is on those Koreans in mainstream Japanese schools, that is, the majority (almost 90 per cent) of school-age ethnic Koreans (Okano and Tsuchiya 1999). Although ethnic schools play a significant role in shaping the futures of ethnic Koreans (in particular, North Koreans), I shall leave that discussion to other studies (e.g. Ryang 1997). This chapter aims to examine the interactions and collaborations of ethnic Koreans with other minority groups and the majority Japanese, the consequences of these, and the fluid group boundaries that result at least partially from such interactions. I suggest that the central government’s policies to address the special needs of Korean children in government schools have been minimal, but that local governments with large numbers of Korean residents have responded to grassroots demands, eventually formulating policies for the education of Koreans from the early 1970s. Seen as ‘multicultural education policies’, these policies display two distinctive features: a main focus on human rights (rather than celebration of cultural diversity) and the use of the term ‘foreigners’. Classroom-level experience reveals that schools are more willing to accommodate special needs of Koreans in mainstream schools, and that Korean students now experience schooling more positively than did their parents’ generation. At least partially because of changes at school, the nature of the ethnic Koreans’ relationship with schools has undergone a significant transformation, and these changes continue to have a long-term influence on students’ and the Korean community’s beliefs about mainstream schools. While the use of the terms ‘foreign nationals’ or ‘Korean residents’ in public discourse illuminates the dominant categorization of peoples based on mono-ethnic Japanese citizenship, students create their own, more inclusive, understanding of being ‘Japanese’, based on the daily interaction among peers. Ethnic Koreans collectively present an ambiguity that challenges the existing
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dominant categorizations of difference. Japan-born Korean residents do not quite fit the perceived category of ‘foreigners’, while Japanese citizens with Korean background fail to meet the dominant perception of Japanese citizenship. Young people, along with local governments and community activism (which have displayed relative autonomy from the central government in responding to the education of Koreans), may pave the way to a multi-ethnic understanding of Japanese citizenship in schools. This chapter’s significance is threefold. First, it underscores the importance of the less-publicized grass-roots activism that has sustained school-level activities for the education of ‘invisible’ ethnic minorities, and the considerable independence displayed by local governments. Second, it uncovers hitherto unstudied ‘multicultural education’ goals in the local policies. Third, it reveals how changing perceptions of group boundaries in the student population (beyond the foreigner versus Japanese dichotomy) have developed in Japanese schools in recent years. The study draws on central and local government policy documents, several surveys on ethnic Koreans and foreign nationals in Japan, and my own fieldwork observations. Beginning with a brief description of the diversity of ethnic Koreans, I examine policies regarding the education of Koreans in Japanese government schools at the central government level, and then at local levels in relation to grass-roots activism. My focus then turns to micro-level experience of mainstream schooling in government schools (Korean students’ interaction with teachers and with non-Korean students, the school–employment link, academic achievement and the meaning of schooling, and ‘ethnic classes’). I shall then explore how ‘differences’ are attached to ethnic Koreans in relation to cultural/ethnic differences, Japanese citizenship, residential status (permanent or otherwise) and marginalized status.
Diverse Koreans Korean nationals numbered 589,239 in 2008 (Japan, Hōmu-shō 2009). When naturalized ethnic Koreans, their descendants, and Japanese nationals with a Korean parent are included, the number is said to be approximately 1.2 million (Zenkoku Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōiku Kenkyūkai Kyoto (ZZCKKK) 1993: 7). Among these 1.2 million ethnic Koreans, considerable diversity exists. This diversity is a significant factor when studying their educational choices. The first aspect of the diversity is the difference between ‘oldcomers’ and ‘newcomers’. The oldcomers, the majority of ethnic Koreans, are the descendants of Koreans who have resided in Japan since the time of Japan’s colonization of the Korean peninsula (1910–45) and who hold special permanent resident status (tokubetsu eijūsha). In 2007, there were approximately 430,000 Koreans with such status (Japan, Hōmu-shō 2008: 19). They have popularly been referred to as ‘zainichi kankoku chōsenjin’ (zainichi, in short). The newcomers were born and mostly educated in South Korea and came to Japan for economic reasons in recent years. The existence of the oldcomer Koreans in contemporary Japan is a
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direct result of Japan’s colonization of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945. As with other peoples newly integrated into the Japanese Empire, Koreans in both Korea and Japan were Japanese nationals. The original Koreans fled to Japanese cities in pursuit of employment after being dispossessed of their farming lands by the Japanese colonial authorities, or, from 1937, were shipped to Japan as forced labour to fill an acute shortage of workers in the war economy (Lee and De Vos 1981). The Korean population in Japan at the end of the Second World War was almost 2.3 million, but about three-quarters of them returned to Korea within a year of the end of the war (Tanaka 1991: 57). For those who stayed on longer in Japan, repatriation became more difficult with the division of Korea in 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War. After a period of ambiguous citizenship status, when Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, Koreans living in Japan suddenly and unilaterally became foreign nationals. They were subsequently forced to choose either South Korea or North Korea as their homeland. Among oldcomer Koreans, further divisions exist between Japanese citizens and non-citizens. The number of ex-Koreans who were naturalized in the period 1952–96 is estimated to be over 200,000 (Jyung 2000: 63). The younger generations have been more willing to take up Japanese citizenship (Youn 1992: 135–6). Marriages between Japanese and Koreans have increased over time and now account for over 80 per cent of marriages involving Koreans (Fukuoka 2000: 35). Bilineal inheritance of Japanese nationality replaced patrimonial inheritance in 1985 owing to the revision of the Nationality Law. The revision resulted from a civil movement to protect Okinawa’s Amerasian children of American soldiers and local women who did not hold citizenship of any country (see Noiri’s chapter in this volume). When this change took effect, children of such mixed marriages who were under the age of twenty were able to gain Japanese nationality upon their parents’ application. This change has, and will in the future, increase the number of Japanese nationals with a Korean background. Among non-Japanese citizens, differences are observable in terms of political affiliations. Each group is represented by an organization acting as the centre of each community: the South Koreans by Mindan, and the North Koreans by Chongryun. The North Korean organization operates newspapers, banks and other businesses, as well as a network of schools, in order to meet the needs of its members. In 2005, these North Korean schools consisted of sixty-five primary schools, forty-one middle schools, twelve high schools and one university (Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōikukai 2005). As ‘miscellaneous schools’, they are not required to comply with the central government regulations for registered schools, and they maintain the autonomy to conduct bilingual teaching in the Korean language and foster a North Korean ethnic identity among their students (Ryang 1997; Motani 2002). The curriculum supports the Pyongyang regime, and until recently was based on the assumption that the students would eventually return to a united Korea rather than see Japan as a place of permanent residence (see Ryang 1997, for more details). In contrast, South Korean schools (only four exist) conduct lessons in Japanese, only teaching Korean for several hours a week.
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Since the late 1980s, less than 15 per cent of school-age Koreans have been enrolled in ethnic schools (Son 2000: 90; Sugitani 1993: 43). In 1986, 86 per cent of school-age Korean nationals (which included a small number of South Korean expatriates’ children) attended Japanese schools, 13 per cent North Korean schools, and 1 per cent South Korean schools (Fukuoka 2000: 26). The enrolment in North Korean schools has been in decline, and now reportedly attracts less than 10 per cent of school-age Korean residents (Park 1999: 232). Explanations of the decline in enrolment in North Korean schools vary. First, the schools do not provide their students with full access to Japanese universities and to scholarships (ZZCKKK 1993: 33–4).2 Second, existing students and their parents feel uncomfortable with the ideological schooling aimed at producing loyal followers of Kim Il Sung, and think that it ill-prepares the graduates for participation in Japanese society (Lee 1998: 126; Park 1999: 232–3). Although the schools introduced changes to the curriculum to address these concerns in the 1990s (Ryang 1997), the relative benefits of North Korean schools (e.g. provision of a protective environment and peer group, encouragement of ethnic pride, fostering of the language) are an ongoing topic among Koreans. Changes over generations are observable. The younger generations are more willing to take up Japanese citizenship. Among those Koreans naturalized in 1987, over three-quarters were in their 20s and 30s (Youn 1992: 135–6). Marriages between Japanese and Koreans have increased. Whereas just over 30 per cent of Korean marriages involved Japanese partners in 1960, in 1995 the figure was 82.2 per cent (Fukuoka 2000: 35). The increasing incidence of mixed marriage will produce more Japanese nationals with a Korean ethnic background. With this internal diversity, debate has continued over what it means to be ethnic Korean in Japan. The majority of second- and third-generation Koreans neither have functional Korean language skills (Kanehara et al. 1986; Lim 1993: 64), nor do they use their Korean names in daily life (e.g. Osaka-fu Kyōiku Iinkai 2000: 5). This has led, according to Kajita, a leading Japanese sociologist, to argue that zainichi Koreans are ‘sociologically Japanese’ (1998: 131). Many Koreans, however, consider that they practise ‘the Korean way of life’ (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 37–9) and have maintained their ‘ethnicity’ as defined by themselves. As the proportion of Japanese nationals of Korean heritage has increased within the general Korean population, some Koreans have argued for the use of a new, hyphenated identity category, ‘Korean-Japanese’ (Kaneko 1996; Kawa 2001; Tei 2001), and have urged more Koreans to take up Japanese citizenship, as this new category would allow for a separate identity among Japanese nationals. In spite of this, the term ‘Korean-Japanese’ still seems to remain an academic construct and is not widely employed by Koreans themselves. On the other hand, others argue for a more inclusive definition of zainichi Korean (Kim 1999; Jyung 2000) that would include Koreans with Japanese citizenship, building on this widely used, existing identity category. At the ground level, in the late 1980s, many parents already distinguished between Korean ethnicity and Korean nationality and were more concerned that their children maintain their ethnicity ahead of their Korean nationality (Nakajima and Hong 1990: 46).
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Policies for the education of ethnic Koreans Significant differences continue to exist between the national government and local governments in their policies for the education of ethnic Koreans. Central government policies: continuity from Koreans to newcomers While Koreans in Japan were required to attend Japanese schools as imperial subjects during the colonial period, as soon as they were ‘liberated’, they organized schools to teach the Korean language and culture throughout Japan, in order to prepare for repatriation to Korea. These individual efforts later received support and guidance from the League of Koreans in Japan, which was established in October 1945 to protect Korean interests. At the end of 1946, 525 Korean schools were operating throughout Japan (Mitchell 1967: 113). Initially, the Ministry of Education allowed prefectural governments to register Korean schools. In 1948, however, the Ministry ordered that school-age Korean children receive compulsory education specified by the 1947 School Education Law, and that Korean ethnic schools comply with the 1947 School Education Law if they wished to continue offering full-time schooling (Monbu-shō Gakkō Kyōikukyokuchō tsūtatsu, Chōsenjin setsuritu gakkō no toriatsukai ni tsuite 24/1/1948). It further ordered the closure of Korean schools that did not comply (Chōsengakkō heisarei, 24 March 1948). These orders severely restricted Korean children in receiving Korean ethnic education, which prompted protests, conflict and negotiations among interested parties (including the League). In the end, fearing communism, the Japanese authorities dissolved the League, which had by then publicly supported the Pyongyang regime. The closure of Korean schools forced Korean children to attend Japanese government schools. Although ethnic schools re-emerged when the Association of North Koreans in Japan (Chongryun) created their own schools and had them approved as ‘miscellaneous schools’ in 1955, the majority of ethnic Korean children have attended local Japanese schools, including over 85 per cent of school-age Koreans since the mid 1980s (Sugitani 1993: 43; Son 2000: 90). Extensive protests against the forced closure of the ethnic Korean schools resulted in an agreement between the Osaka prefectural governor and an ethnic Korean organization in 1948. This agreement allowed government schools with Korean students representing 30 per cent or more of the school population to employ full-time or fractional teachers funded by the prefecture to teach ethnic classes as well as other subjects. The subsequent central government policy (Chōsenjin no gimukyōiku shōgakkō eno shūgaku ni tsuite, 11 February 1953) stated that Korean permanent residents were to be treated in the same way as Japanese students: schools were to accept them with the provision that the Korean students follow Japanese laws, and that they pay school fees (which did not apply to Japanese nationals). Free compulsory schooling for Koreans came in 1965. After an agreement between Japan and South Korea, the Ministry of Education issued a circular (28 December 1965) to prefectural education boards to the effect that Korean residents must receive the
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same financial assistance as Japanese students (i.e. school fees for compulsory education and subsidized text books), and that government schools were not to give any special treatment based on their ethnicity (28 December 1965). Although most Japanese schools did not actively take the presence of Koreans into consideration and treated them in the same way as Japanese children, many teachers, in particular at schools with a large number of Korean students, soon questioned this simple equality principle, and have long supported such activities as ethnic lessons and Korean cultural study clubs, as I shall discuss later. The Ministry remained silent on the education of Koreans in Japanese schools for the next twenty-five years until 1991, when it sent out another circular to local education boards. In it, for the first time, the Ministry formally acknowledged that ethnic classes for Koreans existed at government schools under local government discretion and approved their continuation, stating that ‘ethnic classes during extracurricular hours are exempt from the no special treatment clause in the 1965 circular’. It also suggested that local governments send the parents of Korean children of school starting age a letter informing them about local school entry, as was the practice for their Japanese counterparts. The circular also stipulated that this approach be extended to other foreign nationals, including newcomer children, as we shall see in Part 2. The central government’s responses to Koreans have thus been minimal in comparison with those aimed at addressing the special needs of new immigrant and guest workers’ children.3 Local activism: continuity from buraku to Koreans to newcomers Despite the Ministry’s policy of ‘treating all in the same way’, Korean parents and organizations and concerned teachers questioned this policy; teachers initiated various activities at the classroom level, for example, volunteering to conduct after-school ethnic classes and providing guidance specific to Korean children. These individual classroom-level activities resulted in the formation of inter-school professional groups, later recognized by local governments, which began to provide financial assistance for such activities. Below, I shall examine specifically a grass-roots activist and professional group, the National Association for Research into the Education of Resident Koreans in Japan, local government education bodies and local education board policies for the education of foreign children in government schools. While after-school ethnic education existed in Japanese mainstream schools, those involved did not actively seek public recognition of ‘difference’ until the 1970s. For example, Korean ethnic classes were conducted at government schools in Osaka prefecture under the 1948 agreement, and, by the late 1960s, concerned parents and teachers in schools with large numbers of Korean students in neighbouring prefectures had begun to run similar classes. Local and school level policy and practice in relation to education for Korean residents underwent profound changes in the 1970s. These came from two directions. On the one hand, a series of civil movements and court cases regarding education in the 1960s caused lively discussion about students’ rights to education and teachers’ rights
106 Kaori H. Okano to oppose what was considered to be central government intervention. On the other hand, the powerful activism of a minority organization, the Buraku Liberation League, and the subsequent installation of dōwa education programmes (Hawkins 1983) forced schools to re-examine their hitherto taken-for-granted assumptions and educational practice in relation to first buraku, and later Korean, students. Subsequently, dōwa education covered the human rights of students generally, including newcomers and those with disabilities. This movement brought about acceptance of the principle of ‘no discrimination’ that was actively taught in schools through dōwa education by schools, students and society in general. A grass-roots activist and professional group, Zenkoku Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōiku Kenkyūkyōgikai (ZZCKKK) (National Association for Research into the Education of Resident Koreans in Japan) was formed by practitioners engaged in school-based ethnic classes (often on a voluntary basis) (Nakajima 2004). In the late 1960s, concerned parents and teachers in mainstream schools with large numbers of Korean students in Kyoto and Osaka began to implement programmes such as after-school ethnic education classes and consultations. Wishing to exchange ideas on practice and develop new strategies, these practitioners held their first annual conference in 1979, established ZZCKKK as the organizer of these meetings in 1983, and started involving practitioners from other regions. The association became an important agent in disseminating knowledge about education for Koreans and in illuminating the situation of Koreans in Japanese schools and their special needs. In the late 1990s, the association held lengthy discussions and eventually decided also to be an advocate for newcomer children, a point I elaborate later. Concerned teachers initiated inter-school bodies in order to support the ethnic education of ‘foreign nationals’ (most of whom were Koreans), around the time that dōwa education was gaining legitimacy in the policy discourse. The first of these bodies, the Osaka City Committee for Research in the Education of Foreign Nationals (Osaka shi gaikokujin kyōiku kenkyū kyōgikai, or Osaka Shigaikyō), was formed in 1972 by interested teachers as the city education board’s research body (kenkyū itaku kikan) (Sugitani 1993: 44). All government primary and middle schools in Osaka City participate in this body, which over the years has created a series of supplementary texts (salam) for teaching Japanese students about Korea. These texts have been used at 80 per cent of the schools in Osaka City (Sugitani 1993: 46). Similar bodies were created by other local governments in the 1990s. Local government multicultural education policies: Koreans, buraku and newcomers As of 2007, about eighty local governments have announced ‘policies for the education of foreign nationals (mainly Koreans) in Japanese schools’ (zainichi gaikokujin kyōiku hōshin or shishin) (Zenkoku Zainichi Gaikokujinn Kyōiku Kenkyū Kyōgikai 2007: 26–8). How and why did these policies come to be formulated by local governments, despite the Ministry’s policy of ‘treating all in
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the same way’? I examine the local policies issued by forty-seven local governments4 in four respects: background to the formulation of the policies; the naming of the target groups (Koreans or foreign nationals or both); the effectiveness of the policies; and major shared elements. In 1970, the Osaka City Education Board was the first to create its own policy for the education of foreign children in government schools (with special reference being made to Koreans) (‘Zainichi Gaikokujin Kyōiku Hōshin Shishin’), in response to demand from teachers, and later with assistance from the Osaka City Committee for Research in the Education of Foreign Nationals. The policy has been revised several times since then to respond to changing needs. It focuses on human rights, maintenance of Korean ethnic identity, and promotion of Japanese understanding of Koreans, and has encouraged individual schools to develop policies regarding foreign national students. Twelve local governments followed with similar policies in the 1980s, thirty-three in the 1990s, and two since 2000. Many of these areas have ethnic-Korean populations. The naming of these policies reveals the essential assumption that prevails about Japanese citizenship – mono-ethnicity (Okano 2006). Citizenship in this case is not conceived of as independent of one’s ethnicity. There are four types of wording for these policies: 1 2 3 4
‘foreign nationals in Japan (mainly Korean nationals)’ (twenty-seven cases); ‘foreign nationals in Japan’ (thirteen cases); ‘Korean nationals in Japan’ (six cases); and ‘Korean nationals (foreign nationals) in Japan’ (one case).
All policies start with reference to Korean residents in Japan in their main texts. The earlier policies tended to refer only to ‘Koreans’; but in the 1980s we started seeing ‘foreign nationals (mainly Koreans)’, a shift from the Korean-only reference to ‘foreigners’. I suspect that this resulted from a compromise to appease all parties involved. The policies were initiated by local and professional activism for the education of Korean residents, and Korean residents remain the majority among foreign residents. Local governments would have been obliged to acknowledge in the policies the Koreans’ desire that their special place be recognized in relation to new immigrants, in that the Koreans’ existence and marginalization resulted directly from the state’s colonial policies. The effectiveness of these policies for the education of foreign residents in Japan is difficult to measure and is dependent on how individual schools implement them. Parents can always report concerns about their children to teachers and school authorities, but the institutionalization of policies by education boards is expected to assist the process. With such policies in place, teachers feel that their activities for the education of Koreans (e.g. participation in various workshops and professional organizations) are more legitimate as professional development. There are seven common elements in most of the forty-seven policies that I examined. The first four elements concern the education of all students (both ‘foreign’ and Japanese); the next two specifically give consideration to ‘foreign’
108 Kaori H. Okano students in Japanese schools; and the last addresses the professional development of teachers implementing the first six elements. All policies start with the premise that the task of educating Koreans and other foreign nationals in Japanese government schools necessarily involves the whole school, not just those minority students. This requires the dissemination of accurate knowledge about Korean residents in contemporary Japan, how Japan’s past colonial policies resulted in the present existence of Korean residents, and how they have long suffered from marginalization by the dominant society. In explaining Korean marginalization in Japan, schools are urged to reflect on the pre-war social Darwinist idea that Asian people and civilizations are inferior to their Western counterparts, and that the Japanese are somehow superior to other Asians. According to these policies, this idea still has some currency in Japan, not only in relation to Koreans, but also to other newcomer foreigners, many of whom come from the Third World. The third element is respect for cultural and language differences. Fourth, all policies advocate the need to cultivate greater awareness of human rights among all students. Here, the Japanese constitution, the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights and dōwa education principles of the 1970s are variously mentioned. Schools are expected to address the special needs of Korean and foreign students by nurturing ethnic pride through creating opportunities for them to learn ethnic languages and family histories. In relation to Korean residents, most policies urge schools to encourage Koreans to adopt ‘real (Korean) names’ (instead of Japanese names), and to create the kind of school environment and subculture that would enable Korean students to feel comfortable in doing this. In addition, schools are required to recognize the disadvantages that Korean and foreign students face at school, in obtaining employment and in the wider society, and to devise teaching and learning in both academic and social fields, as well as guidance for life after school, that reflect this recognition. In this context, some policies refer to one of the dōwa education slogans, ‘Guidance for life-after-school is the ultimate culmination of what schools can do for these children’s future – safely placing them in the adult world’. Schools with considerable numbers of Korean students implement such policies to ensure that all minority students obtain permanent full-time jobs (Okano 1997). Local education boards often conduct surveys of post-high school destinations for Korean residents (e.g. Osaka-fu 2000). The education of other foreign nationals (new immigrants) features in seven of the local government policies, but remains supplementary. New immigrants are described as needing specific Japanese as a second language instruction. For example, Mie prefecture’s policy for the education of foreign nationals in government schools (2003) has a separate section on new immigrants and identifies three specific needs that schools need to address: JSL, adaptation to the Japanese school environment, and maintenance of the mother tongue. The Mie prefectural education board has developed JSL materials and employs JSL teachers and Portuguese-speaking counsellors. Osaka municipal government policy (1994 version) states that the principles for the education of Korean residents are
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applicable to new immigrants in its preamble, and urges schools not to repeat the ‘mistake’ made with Korean students of treating them in the same way as their Japanese peers. A later document (2003) lists more effectively the distinctive needs of immigrants. These seven shared elements are widely observed in so called ‘multicultural education’ goals elsewhere (Australian Schools Commission 1979; Mitchell and Salsbury 1996; Banks 2004: 5) and can be considered to be multicultural education policies. These policies display two distinctive features: their focus on human rights, and the use of the term ‘foreigners’. I shall take this up in a later discussion on perceived ‘differences’.
Ethnic Koreans’ classroom experience of schooling The majority of Korean pupils in Japanese schools are said to become aware of their Korean background by grade 3, mostly from their parents. Fifty-seven per cent know about their ethnicity before entering primary school (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 31). Many Korean children use their Japanese names at school and elsewhere. For example, among those who attended Japanese government primary and middle schools in Osaka City in 1999, only 13.8 per cent used Korean names (Son 2000: 88). In a survey undertaken in urban parts of Hyōgo prefecture, 20 per cent used their Korean name, and this percentage rose among families headed by university graduate fathers (29 per cent) (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 39, 155). Korean students with Japanese names in Japanese schools are overtly invisible to a casual observer (e.g. Rohlen 1981; Okano 1993, 1997; Miyauchi 1998). This is partly because these Koreans, having grown up in Japan, possess mannerisms, mores and a physical appearance that are not distinctive from those of their Japanese peers. In the case of schools with very few Koreans, the invisibility is partly because Korean students are skilful in concealing their ethnicity from their Japanese classmates. In the case of schools with a considerable number of Koreans, such as the two schools I studied in Saki City (a pseudonym to maintain anonymity), the invisibility derives from the fact that Japanese students behave as if all their classmates were Japanese, in spite of knowing that particular classmates are Korean, and they try not to touch on that aspect of the student, assuming that Korean students want it that way. Korean students’ interaction with teachers Teachers vary in their knowledge of, and commitment to, minority issues, both across schools and within their own schools. Most teachers obtain guidance in relation to minority students from their schools’ committees for the promotion of dōwa education (dōwa kyōiku suishin iinkai). Every Saki City high school has such a committee, including the schools in which I conducted fieldwork. This committee implements the school’s policy on human rights and minorities, which include students from buraku, Korean and sole-parent families; tries to raise awareness of human rights issues among students; and encourages minority
110 Kaori H. Okano students to apply for various scholarships available specifically for them. Often, the teacher in charge of the Korean cultural study club is a member of the committee. The level of activities within a school is influenced by the membership of the committee and the head teacher; that is to say, the characters of the teachers in charge make a significant difference. At both schools in Saki City, teachers were generally sympathetic about the disadvantages that Korean students face in society. Korean students’ interactions with teachers were amicable and no different from those of their Japanese counterparts. When Korean students talked about being Korean, for example in relation to employment, they did so in private with the teachers that they considered approachable and trustworthy. Often it was their homeroom teachers, with whom they felt the closest association, whom they consulted. When students were active in sports clubs, their club teachers played a similar role. The head teacher and experienced members of the above-mentioned committee were often consulted by homeroom teachers. Special treatment of Korean students was thus not noticeable to casual observers, but did take place. Besides affirmative action policies and protective arrangements that the two schools had instituted in relation to job acquisition, Korean students were informed of the assistance or guidance available within the school from the outset. At one school that I studied, homeroom teachers of Korean students and the Korean cultural study club teacher together visited students’ homes and encouraged families to apply for Korean scholarships, as well as city scholarships and tuition exemption, which were extended to include Koreans in the mid 1970s owing to active civil movements. They also invited the students to join the Korean cultural study club. At the other school in my fieldwork, the dean normally gathered new Korean students together soon after they entered the school and advised them that, although they would be treated equally with the Japanese cohort while at school, they should be aware that they would face ‘reality’ when applying for jobs. The dean further recommended various ways to cope with this reality, by accumulating good academic marks and aiming for university study. Korean students’ interaction with Japanese students To what extent Korean students are open about their ethnic origin varies considerably, depending on the culture of each school. Even between the two schools that I studied there was a noticeable difference. Whereas none of the Korean students at one school concealed their Korean identity (in spite of adopting Japanese names), at the other school some students chose to conceal their identity completely. The relative openness at the former school could have been due to a larger number of Korean students (5.9 per cent, as opposed to 2.9 per cent); and/or to the prevalence of girls, who tend to discuss their identity more frequently (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 48, 81). Many Korean students with Japanese names confess their ethnic identity to their Japanese friends. In the 1994 survey, 65 per cent of Korean students with Japanese names directly revealed their identity to their Japanese friends (Tsujimoto
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et al. 1994: 48). After doing so, Korean students responded that 24 per cent of their Japanese friends had already known about their Korean identity through other sources (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 49). Tomoe is a third-generation Korean twelfthgrader: I haven’t publicly announced at school that I’m Korean, but I’ve never tried to hide it. I know some Korean students at other schools completely hide it. But eventually people will find out about your Korean background. If that happens and your friends start to discriminate against you, then they’ll no longer be your friends. I’m not embarrassed about being a Korean, and haven’t felt any kind of pressure because it. (Interview, 1 December 1989) Many Japanese students at the two schools knew the Korean backgrounds of their classmates. The 1994 survey revealed that 56 per cent of Japanese students had experienced classmates directly revealing their ethnic identity to them (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 219), and that only 15 per cent of the Koreans with Japanese names considered that no classmates knew their ethnic identity (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 47). Korean students at the two schools all had close Japanese friends. All belonged to different friendship groups made up of Japanese and Korean students. Having close Korean friends seemed to influence Japanese students in one way or another. Koemi had been close to her classmate Asako, a Korean girl, since her first year at high school: Before I became close to Asako and came to know about her Korean background, I had hardly known about zainichi people. I’d never thought about it. One day she said to me ‘Actually I am a Korean’. I wasn’t sure how to respond, but I think I only said ‘Is that so?’ It didn’t change our friendship. Since then she has talked about her experience of being zainichi and zainichi problems in general, and took me to the Korean cultural study club. There I listened to gaiseki (foreign national) boys, and have learned a lot. I thought I had a great friend. She opened my eyes to an unknown world. (Interview, 4 December 1989) The Korean students at both schools claimed that they felt comfortable being at school and had not experienced direct discrimination there. But they were also aware of differences across schools, either through their own experiences or from what they had heard from their friends. Below is a conversation between three Korean girls. Noshie:
Orie:
When you’re living in Sakura-ward, where Koreans are concentrated, you don’t notice the barrier (between zainichi and Japanese). But once you are outside, it’s another story. Exactly. When I was living in [Matsu-town] (of Saki City), there were a few Koreans. I never talked about being Korean in the
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Akemi:
Noshie:
classroom at [Matsu] Middle School. In fact it is incredible that we are talking like this. I hear that in Momo-ward, there is on average only one Korean student in each class. Then you can’t talk about it at all. You just hide the fact that you are Korean. That’s why people don’t move out of Sakura-ward. It’s more comfortable to live in a Korean-concentrated area. (Fieldnotes, 19 January 1990)
Positive comments made by Korean students on the two schools did not, however, preclude incidents where Korean students were hurt by Japanese classmates’ actions. Some of the Japanese students made insensitive and derogatory utterances in relation to Koreans in the presence of Korean students, often without malicious intent. The following extract from an essay that was displayed by the Korean cultural study club at the school’s cultural festival day highlights such an interaction: I again heard the term ‘chonko’ (a derogatory term for a Korean) in our classroom. I hate hearing it. I know these classmates are not referring specifically to me, but I feel that they are. I was very disappointed since I hadn’t thought they would use the term, knowing that I am Korean. I was frightened, in particular, to see my friend also using the term. I felt angry and wanted to tell them not to use it, but I couldn’t. Because I was afraid of losing friends, afraid that they may no longer like me. Are they my friends? Do I want to see them when I leave school? Perhaps not many of my classmates. But I need to be with them for the rest of the year, and I don’t want to have awkward relationships with them. When I talked about this to my parents, they said, ‘Don’t get upset so much by such a trivial thing. The world outside the school is even worse. You need to learn to live with it – ignore it’. I want to keep on good terms with my classmates, but I can’t respect people who use that word. (Fieldnotes, 19 November 1989) The Korean students’ understanding of, and attitudes towards, their Japanese classmates are thus constructed through daily interactions with Japanese students and differ from those of their parents and grandparents. Similarly, the Japanese students’ understanding of, and attitudes towards, Koreans also differ from those of their parents and grandparents. Korean students often have close Japanese friends, as was shown at the two schools. The 1994 survey reveals that one-quarter of students had close ‘foreign’ friends, over 60 per cent of whom were Korean (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 219), and that the real proportion of Japanese students with ethnic Korean friends was higher, as many Japanese students did not consider that Japan-born ethnic Koreans were foreigners. Nor did Japanese students object to Koreans using Korean names. Over 20 per cent of them considered it appropriate for Koreans to adopt Korean names at school, while 53 per cent felt that either
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way was acceptable (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 256). Having Korean friends seems to influence how Japanese students see Koreans. The Japanese students who have close Korean friends are more likely than those without to maintain positive attitudes towards, and a healthy curiosity about, Koreans and Korea (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 241–53). Based on daily interaction with Korean students, young Japanese students’ understanding of nationality is inclusive and defies the official one. For example, two-thirds of the students believed that birth in Japan confers Japanese nationality, while 40 per cent selected ‘residence in Japan’ as qualifiying people for Japanese nationality (they were asked to choose two out of seven options) (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 241). I have suggested that the relative comfort that Korean students now feel among less hostile Japanese classmates, and the relatively better understanding that Japanese schools show towards the needs of Koreans, contribute to transforming Koreans’ relationship with Japanese schools. Another contributing factor to this transformation is the Koreans’ ‘instrumental beliefs about schooling’, the perception that the qualifications gained from school have some value in the adult world, a point that I now turn to. School–employment link Japanese schools protect minority students from blatant discrimination by regulating the employee recruitment process through a school-based job referral system (Okano 1997). Under this system, each school develops and maintains a long-term social network with employers throughout the year, receives recruitment cards for available positions from employers in July, processes the employment data, and then provides market contacts and relevant data to all its students. The system enables the school to provide job opportunities and related information equally to all students, regardless of their family backgrounds (Okano 1997). In this process, schools actively intervene in the Korean students’ decisions about, and acquisition of, employment by offering a system of protection, practical assistance and affirmative action, with the goal of ensuring that Korean students obtain jobs at mainstream Japanese companies. Survey results show that 61 per cent of Korean high school students obtained jobs through school referrals (Osaka-fu Kyōiku Iinkai 2000: 13), and that they felt that school-based job referral protected them from discrimination (Osaka-fu Kyōiku Iinkai 2000: 27). Those who entered the workforce via school referral were less likely to quit their first job than those who did not, and school referral is used more extensively by Korean students these days than by their fathers’ generation (Zainichi Kōrai Rōdōsha Renmei 1992: 14). This suggests that Korean students have come to derive greater benefit from Japanese schools in their entry into the workforce. When school intervention enables a Korean student to obtain the same kind of position as a Japanese counterpart, this is not only a triumph for the individual Korean student concerned; it has a more lasting significance in two ways. The first is the positive impact on the Korean community’s belief about the instrumental
114 Kaori H. Okano value of Japanese government schooling, what Ogbu and Simons (1998: 156) call ‘instrumental beliefs about schooling’; that is, possessing school qualifications accords them the same benefits in obtaining employment as mainstream Japanese. The second is the positive impact on the Korean community’s perception of their relationship with schools and those in authority – ‘relational beliefs about schooling’ in Ogbu and Simon’s words (1998: 156). Having experienced school intervention and its success, the parents are more likely to see schools as offering pragmatic care for their children’s specific needs and to trust schools and teachers. Academic achievement and the meaning of schooling There are some very successful Koreans, but, overall, Korean young people have performed less well compared with their Japanese counterparts. The available survey results suggest that a gap between Korean and Japanese students exists but has decreased over the last decade (Rohlen 1981: 194–7). In Kyoto, 84.9 per cent of Korean students (in comparison with the city average of 92.5 per cent) went beyond compulsory schooling in 1978; in 1990 the respective figures were 89.7 per cent and 95.3 per cent (Nakajima 1994: 33). The most recent 1993 survey on zainichi South Koreans (aged eighteen to thirty) reveals that the education level of those surveyed is not significantly different from the Japanese average. Further analysis suggests that this result derives from a combination of two opposing effects. First, a smaller proportion of zainichi children of parents in professional and managerial positions went on to tertiary education than their Japanese counterparts (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 20), suggesting that tertiary-educated zainichi parents who did not receive meritocratic benefits based on their academic qualifications did not encourage their children to proceed to university as much as did their Japanese counterparts. Next, a larger proportion of children of zainichi parents in manual labour, relative to similarly situated mainstream Japanese children, went to university (Fukuoka and Kim 1997: 20), suggesting that parents encouraged their children to gain further education that they had been denied owing to economic circumstances. The former is a typical pattern exhibited by Ogbu’s involuntary minority, whereas the latter represents the pattern frequently observed among Ogbu’s immigrant (voluntary) minority (Ogbu 1987: 320–1). The finding suggests that oldcomer Koreans, who were once exclusively considered to be an involuntary minority, have become a more diverse group. The educational level of zainichi fathers is a significant factor in guiding their children’s education. Universityeducated fathers tend to want their children to use their Korean names at school and have higher expectations of what Japanese schools can arrange in terms of ethnic education and enlightening the Japanese students about zainichi issues (Tsujimoto et al. 1994: 149, 165–8). Schools’ adoption of the simple equality principle of treating Korean and Japanese children in the same way has not meant that Korean students obtain the same benefit from schooling as their Japanese counterparts. While schools espouse the meritocracy and achievement ideology (hard work and good education leading
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to reward in the adult world) and egalitarianism, Korean children have learnt from their direct experience of schooling (including interaction with other children) and from their community members that what schools preach does not necessarily apply to themselves in either the workforce or the marriage market. Some Korean children have learnt, through schooling processes, that being Korean is negative, and decide to hide their Korean identity (Fukuoka 2000: 45). The curriculum assumed that students were Japanese citizens of Japanese lineage and did not acknowledge the existence of Korean children. Many Korean extracurricular clubs were not funded by the government until 1992, which may have sent a message that such clubs were not worthwhile activities. Thus, it is understandable that the Korean community developed an ambivalent feeling towards, and attached a different meaning to, Japanese schools. Ethnic education within mainstream schooling There have been efforts to promote Korean children’s ethnic education within mainstream schooling. Typically, schools with a reasonable number of ethnic Korean students take up such programmes. There are: (1) school-based ethnic classes or ethnic Korean clubs; (2) community-based Korean clubs; and (3) high school Korean cultural study clubs. Although these programmes often have a lasting impact on individual participants (e.g. Fukuoka 2000), I shall argue that their most important aspect is their positive influence on the Korean community’s perception of schools. First, minzoku gakkyū (ethnic classes) or minzoku kurabu (ethnic clubs) are offered for Korean students at primary and middle schools with a relatively large number of Koreans. As of April 1999, such activities were offered at eighty-one government schools in Osaka City (Son 2000: 106). The origins and forms of these classes vary, from highly organized lessons to more informal clubs where Korean students and community members meet and have discussions. For example, an Osaka primary school where half of the students are Korean provides highly systematic ethnic education in the form of weekly classes after school, at all grades for all Korean students, delivered by a Korean instructor (Son 2000: 106–19). The curriculum covers language and Korean history and society and includes equal opportunity and related human rights issues. The school also runs kokusai rikai kyōiku lessons (literally, ‘education for international understanding’) for Japanese students. In other schools, ethnic classes are extracurricular activities where Korean students meet other Koreans to learn about their culture and explore their identities (Suzuki 1997: 115). Many schools with an insufficient number of Korean students to organize such a school-based programme join a regional programme catering for several schools in the area. There are three types, based on the differing processes of their establishment, their financial arrangements and the employment status of the teachers. •
Type 1: Based on a 1948 agreement between the Osaka prefectural governor and an ethnic Korean organization that resisted the central government’s order
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•
•
to close ethnic schools, schools with a large number of Korean students (30–65 per cent of the student population) employ full-time or fractional teachers who are funded by the prefecture to teach ethnic classes as well as other subjects. Some of these teachers are in charge of coordinating foreign students within the school and are, in theory, fully integrated in the daily operation of schooling and policy development (Usui 1998: 97). Type 2: Since 1972, in the context of dōwa education at schools with a large number of buraku children, concerned Japanese teachers, as well as volunteer Korean parents and Korean community members, have run ethnic classes. In 1992, Osaka began paying these volunteers as sessional club instructors (kurabu shidōin). The Type 2 approach has been more successful than Type 1 in involving the whole school, despite the sessional status of the ethnic education teachers, because Type 2 schools, having already committed to dōwa education, were more able to integrate ethnic education programmes into teaching across the curriculum (Usui, 1998: 104–7). Type 3: In 1992, the Osaka City government started funding club instructors, in response to the 1991 Ministry of Education circular mentioned earlier (Usui 1998: 98).
Second, other than school-based ethnic clubs, some communities formed clubs for their Korean children (chiiki kodomokai). For example, community members created the Mukuge Club in a Korean-dense area of Takatsuki City in the 1970s and expanded their activities to other areas. These children’s club activities are now financially supported by the city (Kim 1999: 137–91). Third, high schools with a substantial number of Korean students often have Korean cultural study clubs (chōbunken). The club provides a place where Korean students share their experience of being Korean and learn about the Korean language, culture, zainichi history and human rights, often under the leadership of a teacher committed to equality issues. Commonly, only a few zainichi students (always senior students) join the club, as joining means ‘coming out’. Nonetheless, the clubs’ influence on individual members can be enormous: such clubs have helped some young Koreans come to terms with their Korean identity and to use their real (Korean) name in public. The process of ‘coming out’ involves courage and determination on the part of those concerned (ZZCKKK 1993). The immediate impact of these efforts is difficult to measure in terms of the students’ awareness, their zainichi identity and their academic performance. The most important impact of these programmes, however, is symbolic. Korean children and parents see that the school acknowledges the existence of ethnic Korean children and what they bring to school from home. The existence of government-funded ethnic teachers, for example, may suggest to the Koreans that government schools take their existence more seriously than before, as may teachers encouraging zainichi students to use their Korean names. Seeing schools taking some interest in the Korean culture and language and in zainichi history, the Korean community is likely to develop a belief that schools are not about rejecting or undermining their Korean identity. Ogbu and Simon call this ‘symbolic
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beliefs about schooling’ (1998: 156). This in turn affects the community’s perception of its relationship with schools. They may place more trust in schools and those in authority and see schooling less as a process of subordination (Okano 2004).
Koreans’ interactions with other minorities, and understanding differences I have suggested earlier that Japanese local multicultural education policies have two distinctive features: their focus on human rights and the use of the term ‘foreigners’. Taking up these features again, I now discuss how ethnic Korean activism has interacted with other minorities, and how boundaries of ‘differences’ continue to shift. All these local education boards’ policies are presented in the framework of human rights education. Respect for, and acceptance of, other ethnic cultures are briefly mentioned, but remain marginal to human rights. In this regard, these policies differ from multicultural education policies initially developed elsewhere, for example in Australia in the 1970s, the focus of which was the celebration of the cultural differences of immigrants and their benefit to the whole community (Welch 1996: 105–10). Indigenous peoples were not included in the national multicultural education policy (Australia, Schools Commission Committee on Multicultural Education 1979) because, according to Hill and Allan (2004: 980), indigenous leaders wanted to emphasize their peoples’ special place in Australian society. This exclusion of the most disadvantaged might have contributed to the focus on cultural difference rather than human rights. The dominant focus on human rights in the Japanese policies has, I suspect, two reasons. First, rather than seek recognition of difference, many Korean residents have long chosen to not assert or display their ethnicity markers in order to pass as Japanese. This was initially because many saw their stay in Japan as temporary (before they would eventually return to their homeland) and formed their ethnic identity in terms of their allegiance to their homeland (North or South Korea). The Japanese government also saw Koreans as transient residents and differentiated Koreans from Japanese citizens. Given the physiological similarities and the continued marginalization in employment and social relations, many Koreans judged this strategy to be more effective for avoiding discrimination. Subsequently, the majority of Korean residents in Japan do not have a functional knowledge of the Korean language and have acquired Japanese mannerisms and lifestyles, but we cannot interpret this as willing assimilation. Second, and more importantly, activism for the education of Koreans was influenced by the long-existing push for the education of buraku people in the 1970s. Most of the Japanese teachers active in the promotion of buraku education became sympathetic to the cause of education for Koreans in Japanese schools. Activism for buraku people began in the late nineteenth century when the buraku people realized that the Meiji abolition of the class system had not ended the marginalization. The first organization was formed in 1922. Post-war activism
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for buraku people (the BLL was formed in 1955) sought to remove marginalization and social stigmatization by asserting their Japaneseness (rather than differences) and focused on human rights, in order to counter continuing allegations of their racial, ethnic and language distinctiveness. The active dōwa education movements influenced the push for the education of Koreans in three ways: 1 2 3
through the voluntary creation of ethnic classes at the individual school level; via the process of local policy formulation; and through local policy implementation mechanisms.
It was in the context of dōwa education that the second wave of Korean ethnic classes was started in 1972, by concerned Japanese teachers as well as volunteer Korean parents and Korean community members, at schools with a large number of buraku children in Osaka. (The first wave of ethnic classes in Japanese government schools resulted from the 1948 agreement between the Osaka prefectural governor and an ethnic Korean organization, after the central government order to close ethnic schools.) The third wave of ethnic classes started in 1992, when the Osaka City government began funding club instructors, in response to the 1991 Ministry of Education circular mentioned earlier (Usui 1998: 98). The ethnic classes that thus emerged at dōwa education-active schools were more successful in involving the whole school than those established during the other waves mentioned above. This was because these schools, having already committed themselves to dōwa education, were more able to integrate ethnic education programmes into teaching across the curriculum (Usui 1998: 104–7). Second, when participants were formulating policies for the education of Korean and foreign nationals, they looked to dōwa education policies for reference. Some local policies now state specifically that the education of foreign nationals is based on the local government’s existing framework of ‘human rights education policies’. Following their formulation locally, the policies were implemented through institutional mechanisms and infrastructure that had already been established for dōwa education at the local government and individual school levels. For example, teachers generally obtain guidance in relation to minority students from their school’s committee to promote dōwa education (dōwa kyōiku suishin iinkai). The head of each school’s committee is a member of a city-wide professional organization, in this case the Saki Municipal High School Dōwa Education Study Society. This organization is active in disseminating the latest information on scholarships and on national and local level policies affecting minority students, through regular publications to schools, and through opposing or supporting changes in policies and lobbying local governments and other institutions. The continued use of the term ‘foreign residents in Japan’ in these local policies by government ministries and the media has long signalled particular boundaries that have led to grouping Japan-born ethnic Koreans and newcomers together and distinguishing them from indigenous peoples and buraku people. Although most Japanese would associate the term ‘foreign residents’ with someone born outside
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Japan and residing temporarily in Japan, until 1990 the majority of foreigners residing in Japan comprised permanent resident ethnic Koreans born in Japan, with Japanese as their first language. Therefore, there was an assumption that schools with relatively large numbers of foreigners would have many ethnic Koreans enrolled. Conversely, schools without foreigners would not necessarily have ethnically homogeneous student populations, because there are large numbers of ethnic Koreans who have taken up Japanese citizenship and children of Japanese–Korean marriages. These terms exclude ‘ex-foreigners’, who have taken up Japanese citizenship, and children of Koreans and/or foreigners who are granted Japanese citizenship at birth. Once a foreigner takes up Japanese citizenship, he or she simply disappears into the Japanese citizen category. His or her ethnic background ceases to exist in the official discourse. However, an increasing number of ethnic Koreans now possess Japanese citizenship through naturalization or as a result of mixed marriages, an outcome of the 1985 revision to the Nationality Act. Although, officially, they have ceased to be Korean, a sense of ethnic identity and marginalization continues to exist. The term ‘foreign nationals’ also excludes indigenous peoples (Okinawans and Ainu) who are Japanese citizens. There are no official documents detailing the ethnic composition of the Japanese population nationwide. This contrasts with, for example, a country such as Australia, which collects such information in each national census. The use of these terms in the policies does not acknowledge the diverse ethnic ancestry of Japanese citizens. Only a few local governments recognize multi-ethnic citizenship in the student population and advise that the same policies be applied to Japanese nationals with nonJapanese ethnicity. It is in this shared experience of being non-Japanese citizens that Japan-born ethnic Koreans and newcomers interact in non-governmental organizations as well. For example, the National Association for Research into the Education of Resident Koreans in Japan (Zenkoku Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōiku Kenkyūkai) is a grass-roots activist and professional group that has studied and discussed the situation of Koreans in Japanese schools since the 1970s. Its responses to newcomers have been mixed and have revealed how teachers who were long involved in ethnic Korean activities reacted to the new situation. The association’s members were initially cautious and had mixed opinions regarding the public treatment of the issue of newcomers’ education. On the one hand, some were cynical about the sensational media coverage of newcomers’ ‘problems’, the sudden ‘discovery’ of ‘ethnic diversity’ in Japanese schools, and the central government’s measures to address the ‘problems’ faced by newcomers. They felt that these responses reinforced the myth that Japanese schools had previously had homogeneous student populations. Others felt that the public discourse trivialized the issues and the promotion of the education of Korean students that they had long pursued as human rights matters (Matsunami 2004: 182). The overt nature of the public’s and the central government’s responses to newcomers, in contrast to those towards ethnic Koreans, is often attributed to the fact that Koreans have no JSL needs and are invisible in the eyes of many (Matsunami 2004: 182). I suspect that it also
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derives from the fact that the public, as well as the central government, does not feel as uncomfortable discussing newcomers as it does ethnic Koreans, a minority created by the state and marginalized by society. On the other hand, presenters at the association’s annual meetings were convinced that, having been actively involved in the education of Koreans since the 1970s when the issue was silenced in the public discourse, they had something to offer. Papers on newcomers emphasized the danger of assimilating them. According to a paper presented in 1993: We cannot allow the children to be deprived of their ethnic cultures when placing a priority on their JSL teaching. We have learned this lesson from our past experiences with Koreans. We need to constantly check what we do when teaching newcomers, to make sure that our teaching is not about ‘cultural adaptation’ which ends up forcing ‘assimilation’ . . . On the other hand, oldcomer Koreans and newcomer children differ in terms of the reasons for their arrival in Japan and the social background. Their needs are different. (Quoted in Matsunami 2004: 185) These teachers seem to value the potential to learn about the differences and similarities in the needs of oldcomer Koreans and newcomer students, and see the potential for fruitful interaction between the two. In 2002, the association renamed itself Zenkoku Zainichi Gaikokujin Kyōiku Kenkyūkyōgikai (National Association for Research into the Education of Resident Foreigners in Japan), by replacing ‘Koreans’ with ‘resident foreigners’ (Nakajima 2004: 8). This change not only reflects the focus of the annual conferences, which increasingly have included papers on newcomers, but also signals the association’s intention to focus officially on the issues of both groups. The change was cautiously finalized after careful debate: it initially adopted a transitory name, which inserted ‘foreigners’ after ‘Koreans’ in 1997, and debated the matter until 2002. Papers on newcomers were first presented at the 1992 annual meeting, and their number has gradually increased to account for half the papers in the 2002 conference (Matsunami 2004).
Conclusion The chapter deliberately adopted the term ‘ethnic Koreans’ in the most inclusive sense, in response to the changing demography of ethnic Koreans in Japan. They include Japanese citizens with ethnic Korean background, non-citizens and new migrants. The former group is now denoted as ‘students with Korean roots’ by some local education administrations, as distinct from ‘foreign nationals’ (gaikokuseki) (Okano 1993). The central government’s policies to address the special needs of Korean children in government schools have been minimal, in comparison with those for new migrants. Grass-roots activities for ethnic Koreans in mainstream schools demanded that local governments with large numbers of Korean residents assist
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in such activities, which resulted in local education boards not only providing financial assistance but also formulating policies for the education of Koreans. I have suggested that they are ‘multicultural education policies’, as observed elsewhere, but that these policies display two distinctive features: a focus on human rights (rather than the celebration of cultural diversity) and the use of the term ‘foreigners’. At the classroom level, ethnic Korean students now experience schooling more positively than did their parents’ generation, and their relationship with schools has undergone a significant transformation, at least partially because of more accommodating schools. I suspect that the changing nature of the relationship will continue to have a long-term influence on the beliefs of students and the Korean community about mainstream schools. Although the public discourse’s use of the term ‘foreign resident in Japan’ reinforces the notion of mono-ethnic Japanese citizenship, students, through daily, personal interaction in classrooms, create their own, more inclusive understanding of being ‘Japanese’. Along with local governments and activism, which have displayed relative autonomy from the central government, these young people may contribute to the cultivation of a multi-ethnic understanding of Japanese citizenship in schools. The human rights focus in local policies for the education of Koreans in government schools is a legacy of ethnic Korean activists’ long interaction with buraku activism. Korean education movements were influenced by the more established buraku movements, which asserted ‘Japaneseness’, and were implemented at schools through the administrative channels and infrastructures already in place for the latter. With the arrival of new migrants, who bring visibly distinctive cultural and language differences, and the central government’s responses to address these visible differences, ethnic Koreans now seem more willing to assert their cultural and ethnic differences. New migrants, on the other hand, are drawing on what ethnic Korean movements have struggled to achieve, as can be seen in the decision by the Association for Research into the Education of Resident Koreans in Japan to include new migrants under its umbrella, and in the inclusion of new migrants in some of the local policies for the education of Koreans. How effectively the three parties (ethnic Koreans, buraku and new migrants) will collectively enhance their power to pursue their interests remains in their hands and those of educational practitioners. Students’ awareness of human rights and cultural diversity in mainstream schooling will no doubt be raised by the parties’ collaboration in making their presence known and in pursuing their rights.
Notes 1 2
Some sections of this chapter have appeared in the following publications: Okano (2004, 2006). In mid 2003, the central government overturned the existing policy and permitted national universities to accept graduates from what had been designated ‘miscellaneous schools’ (e.g. American-style international schools, ethnic schools for South American migrants of Japanese descent, and North Korean ethnic schools). North Korean schools
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were at first excluded from this new arrangement, but public protests eventually led to their inclusion. This is an example of globalization favourably impacting on a longexisting minority group. The Ministry of Education’s first response in 1991 was to start conducting a survey of ‘foreign students who require JSL’. This survey was subsequently conducted every two years until 1999, when it became annual. Besides the regular survey, to date the central government has instituted ‘measures to respond to the special needs of foreign students and returnee students from China’ (Kikoku Gaikokujin Jidōseito Kyōiku ni kansuru Shisaku) (Japan, Monbukagaku-shō 2004). For example, it started funding JSL teachers in 1992, and in 1993 began conducting in-service professional development courses in JSL for teachers and members of local education boards with responsibility for these students (Gaikokujin jidō seitonado nihongo shidōkōshūkai). In 1999, the Ministry started a specialized counsellor dispatching programme (Gaikokujin jidō seito sōdanin haken jigyō), funding educational counsellors with proficiency in the students’ mother tongue in designated local areas (e.g. seventy-one areas in 2004). The Ministry established the Committee for Research in the Education of Returnee and Foreign Students (Kikoku Gaikokujin Jidō Seito Kyōiku Kenkyū Kyōgikai) in 2001, where local practitioners and education board members discuss and research practice and policies. (This body resembled a committee formed by Osaka City as far back as 1972 to support ethnic Koreans, as discussed.) In the same year, the Ministry started the Internationalization of Education Promotion District Programme (Kikoku Gaikokujin Jidō Seito to Tomoni Susumeru Kyōiku no Kokusaika Suishin Chiki jigyō). Selected schools in designated districts (to date, fifty-six) study and implement measures to promote education for international understanding through interaction between returnee/foreign students and local students. Individual education board reports on this project reveal details of undertakings at schools with substantial numbers of newcomer children. Building on five series of JSL teaching materials that it had published since 1989 (including a multimedia set), the Ministry launched an extensive curriculum development of JSL in 2003. In addition, published guidelines and manuals on ‘cultural adaptation’ were created for teachers involved with returnee and foreign students (Japan, Monbukagaku-shō 2004). In addition to those included in Chung’s volume (Chung et al. 1996), I examined three policies that I found on the Internet: Midokoro City (Midokoro-shi Kyōiku Iinkai 1995), Mie prefecture (Mie-ken Kyōiku Iinkai 2003) and Hyōgo prefecture (Hyogo-ken Kyōiku Iinkai 2002).
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Part II
‘Newcomer’ groups
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The “newcomers” and Japanese society Ryoko Tsuneyoshi
The following chapters, in Part 2, deal with the inflow of the so-called “newcomers”—foreign workers, foreign spouses of Japanese, Indo-Chinese refugees, and others who have come to Japan since the late 1970s to the 1980s. Japan today presents an interesting case for observing the process of social diversification and the negotiating of boundaries from this angle, as it is a society with a homogeneous self-image, but is now being pushed to recognize the diversity within. Now, there is something ironical about introducing official categories of the “newcomers” in a section that looks at interaction between multicultural actors and how boundaries of difference are, in reality, fluid. However, this section, as well as Chapter 2, lays out such officially defined categories of difference to familiarize the readers to the point of reference for most policymakers, educators, and indeed, researchers in this field on Japan to date. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these official categories are subject to change, that the official categories are not necessarily those that are used in everyday interactions, and that individuals can manipulate such categories in their daily life (Brubaker et al. 2004: 35), as some of the following fieldworks illustrate. Now, in the United States, and other countries where “race” and “ethnicity” are major axes of defining boundaries, one’s perceived “race” and/or “ethnicity” has been discussed widely in relation to how minorities see themselves, the interactions they experience, and what it means to be categorized as a certain “race” and/or “ethnicity.” In present-day Japan, the counterpart of “race” in this sense is nationality, and “ethnicity” is also used. States are powerful social categorizers, as they can impose their categories on other agents, and the official discourse influences policymaking as well as the allocation of resources (Jenkins 1997: 69; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). In the Japanese context, the state statistics most often categorize according to nationality. Thus, one is a “Japanese” national or a “Korean,” “Chinese,” or a “Brazilian.” In fact, the lack of other categories, such as selfprofessed ethnicity, as mentioned in Chapter 2, means that a Korean in Japan (“oldcomer”) and a Brazilian (“newcomer”) both disappear into the official category of “Japanese” if they acquire a Japanese nationality. Furthermore, the non-Japanese nationals are clustered together as “foreigners” (gaikokujin).
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Thus, if we take such officially defined categories as the starting point, and were asked who the “newcomers” were, we could very generally describe them as follows. First, for the most part, “newcomers” are nationals of Asian countries. The foreign population itself is largely Asian. In 2007 (Nyūkan Kyōkai 2008), there were 2,152,973 registered foreigners in Japan, constituting 1.69 percent of Japan’s total population, up 45.2 percent from a decade ago, and a record high (this does not include those who reside without legal status). Of these, 74.5 percent are from Asia, and another 18.3 percent are from South America, together constituting over 90 percent of the registered foreign population in Japan. For the first time in 2007, those with Chinese nationality (28.2 percent of the registered foreigners) surpassed those with a Korean nationality (27.6 percent), followed by Brazilians (14.7 percent). Those with a Korean nationality had long been Japan’s largest registered foreign nationality population, but the percentages in the total have been going down for more than a decade and fell below 50 percent in the mid 1990s. This figure naturally does not include ethnic minorities with Japanese nationality. Second, compared with the political and historical reasons associated with the presence of long-existing minorities/foreigners as colonized populations in Japanese society, economic reasons are more marked with the “newcomer” populations. The Japanese government has played a major role in transforming the multicultural composition of Japan in this sense, through changes in its immigration policies. For example, with the 1990 implementation of the revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, the South Americans of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin) increased as foreign laborers, and their children emerged as the single largest “newcomer” group in Japanese schools. The consequences of such policies, however, were multifaceted, surfacing in ways that were not predicted by even the officials implementing the policies (e.g., high non-attendance).
The background How did the “newcomers” start to appear in Japanese society? Who exactly are the “newcomers”? Today, more than sixty years have passed since the end of World War II. For the post-war generation of Japanese, the presence of the longexisting minorities/foreigners in their midst was something they might have learnt about in school, or seen on TV, but possibly remember little of, except if they were brought up in districts where minority/foreign populations are concentrated (which I call diversity points). It was against this background of hidden or forgotten diversity that the “new” foreigners started to emerge; hidden, in the sense that the presence of the longexisting minorities/foreigners was hidden from the public eye except in diversity points (e.g., becoming visible through activism, surfacing in everyday interaction, etc.); and forgotten, because there was a conscious and perhaps unconscious post-war effort to create a vision of ethnic homogeneity (Oguma 1995; Lie 2001, Chapter 5).
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The 1970s was a turning point, and the media started to depict images of Japanese society internationalizing within: Asian women in the entertainment industry, foreign workers, the Islamic population during the terrorist attacks on the United States, alienated “newcomer” youth joining gang groups . . . Sometimes, owing to a strange twist of events, certain images of the “foreigners” suddenly emerged, such as the fascination of Japanese with South Korean movie stars (called the hanryū boom) in the 2000s. This brought unlikely Japanese visitors (e.g., middle-aged women) to areas with a concentration of Korean shops. These images of the “foreigners” within Japanese society were sparse and wide apart, yet, they periodically reminded Japanese, at least the ones that noticed, that Japanese society was diversifying. As we saw in earlier chapters, the so-called “oldcomers” have lived in Japan for generations (Japan colonized Korea in 1910). After Japan’s defeat in World War II, a segment of this population remained and, eventually, was deprived of its Japanese citizenship with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Koreans thus became Japan’s largest foreign population, foreign nationals although they were permanent residents of Japanese society. However, such “oldcomer” Koreans (and, one might add, the Chinese) were, according to sociologist Kajita (1998), “sociologically Japanese,” as they looked “Japanese,” spoke “Japanese,” most used Japanese names, and acted no differently from “Japanese.” The long-existing foreign children were indistinguishable from the majority, even in the classroom. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the majority of long-existing foreigners marry Japanese nationals—their children acquiring Japanese nationality. This was not the case with the “new” types of foreigner that started to flow into Japan from around the late 1970s to the 1980s. Sometimes, the “new” foreigners stood out visibly, owing to physical differences (e.g., skin color) or characteristic customs (e.g., practice of Islam). In most cases, an alien language set them apart. For the long-existing foreigners, Japanese is their daily language. However, most “new” Koreans and Chinese would be speaking in their mother tongue if they had come to Japan recently, and messages to them in their native language, in department stores, on the platforms, or in banks, started to remind the Japanese of the existence of “foreigners” in their midst. These new inflows were linked in the Japanese mind with Japan’s labor shortage, bubble economy, and its aftermath, Japan’s relative affluence compared with its Asian neighbors, and with so-called internationalization in general. Though, for the post-war Japanese generation, such changes in Japanese society may seem entirely novel, scholars stress that the recent inflow of foreign labor is actually not that new. Yamawaki (2000), for example, argues that it is important not to forget that there were quite a number of migrant workers from Korea and China by the turn of the nineteenth century to the twentieth, before the forced labor began—a point that is lost in most discussions of the recent foreign laborers. Pre-war Japan was an imperial colonizer, and, as Lie sums it up, “whatever else empires may be, they are not monoethnic” (2001: 122). As was mentioned in Chapter 2, there are well-established China towns in certain locations (e.g., Yokohama and Kobe). It might also be added that, though the image of “Japanese
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overseas” in the Japanese mind may be the post-war businessmen families stationed abroad, historically speaking, there were also a number of emigrants to South America and other regions. In a way, the present inflow of the descendents of these Japanese immigrants into Japan as foreign laborers is an awakening for Japanese society to the fact that there are persons of Japanese origins (Nikkeijin) in other continents who are not temporary businesspersons. The year 2008 was the one-hundredth anniversary for Japanese immigration to Brazil, the country that boasts the largest number of Nikkeijin outside of Japan. Most of the English literature on minorities in Japan is written by researchers in countries where ethnicity and race are central social issues. On the other hand, post-war Japan is characterized by an ideology of homogeneity. For example, observers have noticed that Japanese teachers often maintain that children are all the same, wherever they come from, whether they are Japanese or Chinese, and thus should be treated “the same” (Tsuneyoshi 1995; Shimizu and Shimizu 2001; Shimizu 2006). Unlike western countries that colonized societies very different from themselves, thus creating visible minorities, observers of Japanese society have often noted that the minorities in Japan do not “stand out.” The theme of the “invisible” minorities has been advanced in relation to the buraku poplation (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1967), the Koreans (Nakajima 1993), and now, even to the East Asian “newcomers” (Shimizu and Shimizu 2001, Chapter 1). In any case, the illusion of homogeneity and the assimilationist ideology underlining it have managed to continue; the fact that minorities may require different treatment (e.g., teaching about their ethnic background) in order to enjoy equal educational opportunity is forgotten. It is against this background of hidden diversity that the following “newcomers” emerged.
The inflow of the “newcomers” In this section, some major categories of the “newcomers” in the official sense will be introduced to pave the way for the individual chapters that follow. New inflows into society, whether because of colonization, migration, etc., change the multicultural composition of a society and challenge existing boundaries. Now, preceding the wave of “newcomers,” the returnees emerged as symbols of “internationalization” (kokusaika) in Japan. Japan’s high economic growth period from the 1950s to the 1970s signaled a new economic era; Japanese companies expanded their activities abroad, and more Japanese school-age children were educated in other countries. The education of the children of Japanese employees sent abroad, and their education upon re-entry into Japanese society, thus became newly problematic. The Japanese returnees, especially those coming back from countries where the child had been educated in a local school, were the first group of culturally (e.g., language, behavior) different children that teachers of the post-war generation, outside of the traditional, long-existing minority/foreigner districts, came in touch with. The emergence of this “international” population encouraged many teachers to take an interest in international understanding education. The government started
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sending teachers to Japanese schools abroad, and those who returned are often active in promoting international understanding education in Japan. The returnees are not a historically discriminated-against group, but were included in this book because of the way they have been linked to the “newcomers” via the concept of internationalization. The two have been put together in official categories (see Chapter 10), as well as in practice. For example, the nationwide NPO for practitioners in international understanding education, the All Japan International Educational Research Conference (Zenkoku Kaigaishijyokyōiku Kokusairikaikyōiku Kenkyū Kyōgikai, translation by the NPO), literally translated as “the national research association for the education of Japanese children overseas and international understanding education,” which was established in 1974, first did not have the “international understanding education” in its title, but renamed itself with its present title in 1992, widening its target population; today, it not only focuses on the Japanese overseas and returnees, but also on the foreign children and their Japanese language education.1 The fieldwork in Chapter 10 illustrates how the boundaries of difference between the returnee “newcomers” and “Japanese” are challenged as the “newcomers”—more “different” from the majority than the returnees—enter the scene. Identification with the returnee category is multilayered and situational (Nagel 1994: 155), and the returnee status is renegotiated in relation to the “newcomers.” Because nothing sets them apart from other Japanese except the fact that they were raised abroad, the returnees are in a strong position to utilize their returnee category strategically compared with many others in our book. On the other hand, in cases of stigmatized categories, the category may basically be imposed on individuals by more powerful others, and the categorized may try to reconstruct the category in the process of empowerment. The war-displaced orphans The first group of “newcomers” discussed here are the war-displaced Japanese and their families from the northeastern parts of China. The official definition of the war-displaced Japanese stands for those who were led to remain in China because of the confusion following the entry of the Soviet Union into World War II on August 9, 1945. Of this population, those approximately under thirteen years of age at that period, those who cannot identify their Japanese family origin, were classified as the “Chūgoku zanryū koji” (war-displaced orphans in China), and those that were thirteen or over, mostly women, were classified as “Chūgoku zanryū fujin,” and others (war-displaced women in China and others) (Kōseirōdoshō 2005). At the end of World War II, most of the young Japanese men in the area were taken by the army, and so those left behind were largely the elderly, women, and children. In 1945, with the sudden entry of the Soviet Union into the war, many of these Japanese fled in confusion. In the midst of this chaos, many Japanese children became orphans, or were taken in by Chinese families; some of the Japanese women were led to remain in China and married Chinese. The former
134 Ryoko Tsuneyoshi are the war-displaced orphans in China, and the latter are the war-displaced women in China. Including some others who were also left behind, these groups became categorized jointly as the “Chūgoku zanryū hōjin” (war-displaced Japanese). After 1972, with the normalization of relationships between Japan and China, these war-displaced Japanese and their families (including school-age children) started to return to Japan. Among the policies taken up to support these returnees from China was priority for public housing, and the population is clustered in these housing complexes. Indo-Chinese and South Americans also tend to be overrepresented in public housing, and the public schools within public housing districts became center schools for these populations (see fieldwork in Chapter 8). In education, just as the government designated schools to research Japanese returnees, certain schools were designated to focus on the returnees from China. Japanese interpreters were sent by the board of education, teaching materials were developed, and additional teachers (kahai) were sent to schools with a number of such students. Japanese as a second language classrooms were erected, and some high schools and colleges started to make special provisions for entrance, as they had for the returnees, such as extending the test time and offering special slots (tokubetsu waku) (Kōseishō Engokyoku 1987). This pattern was repeated with other new arrivals from abroad. The readjustment promotion center in Tokorozawa (Chūgoku Kikokusha Teichaku Sokushin Senta), a center where the returnees from China are sent in the initial period of their entry to Japan, provides information on the availability of special admissions. Most prefectures answer that they have adopted some kind of special measure for the returnees from China, but the contents vary. Such prefectures also tend to have similar provisions for foreign students in general.2 As of February 1, 2008, a total of 6,363 war-displaced Japanese had returned to Japan permanently, assisted by the Japanese government after the normalization of China–Japan relationships. Among these, 2,523 were war-displaced orphans who had permanently returned to Japan, and 3,840 were the war-displaced women and others, the total including family members was 20,382 persons. Another 5,644 (9,381 including family members) have visited Japan temporarily.3 The survey of war-displaced persons conducted by the government in 2003–4 included both the war-displaced orphans and the war-displaced women (a total of 5,208, excluding those who had died); 4, 094 responded, and the figures confirmed what previous studies had already indicated—the population was aged, dependent on welfare, and struggling, both economically and socially. The average age of the war-displaced orphans was 61.5; that of the war-displaced women and others was 70.0. The majority, 61.4 percent of war-displaced orphan households, depended on public assistance (seikatsu hogo); for the war-displaced women and others, the percentage was 55.2. In addition, 64.6 percent of the war-displaced orphan households answered that “they were economically struggling” (kurushi) or “somewhat struggling” (yaya kurushi); 82.1 percent of the surveyed households were in public housing (Kōseirōdoshō 2005). This group, with the assistance of lawyers, citizen’s groups, and the media, sued the Japanese government (kokka baishō) in various localities, accusing it of
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neglecting its duties. More than 2,000 war-displaced orphans were involved in the suits. Though individual suit results differed, the movement succeeded in creating public support for the betterment of the lives of the war-displaced Japanese, and, in 2007, the revised law (the original law was issued in 1994) for assisting the lives of the war-displaced Japanese passed the Congress.4 This law promised full national pensions (rōrei kiso nenkin) and other measures to assist this population; the system started in January 2008 (Kōseirōdoshō n.d.). The handful of war-displaced Japanese from Karafuto (Karafuto zanryū hōjin) form a similar group, and assistance includes this group. Chinese nationals constitute the largest registered foreign nationality group in Japan today, and it is a group with “oldcomers” as well as “newcomers,” so there are many variations to the nationality theme. The war-displaced Japanese and their families are associated with the concept of “returning,” like the otherwise very different Japanese “returnees” and the South Americans as “return” labor. For the first-generation war-displaced Japanese, Japan may be perceived as their homeland. But what is Japan for the later generations, their children, their grandchildren? The nationalities of the returnees from China differ, challenging the dichotomous category of Japanese versus foreigner. So, are later generation returnees from China more Chinese compared with the “oldcomer” Chinese? How about compared with the “newcomer” Chinese child of a foreign worker, or the child of a mixed marriage with a Chinese parent? Such questions are indicative of the increasing complexity of boundaries in multicultural Japan today. The alienation of second- and later-generation returnees of China from Japanese society has been sensationalized by reports on crime—to take an example, the establishment of a youth gang consisting mainly of returnees from China, the ‘doragon,’5 and their likely future as members of the underworld in Japan. The Indo-Chinese refugees In 1975, the political turmoil in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos led a number of people to leave these areas, and, in the same year, the first boat people landed on Japanese shores temporarily. In 1978, the Japanese government decided to permit permanent residence (teijyū) for Vietnamese refugees (later to others), and, from 1978 to 2006, the government accepted 11,319 Indo-Chinese refugees. In recent years, those entering are mostly family members reuniting with their families.6 There is now a generation of children of Indo-Chinese refugees growing up in Japan who do not have difficulty in using daily Japanese. However, studies show that their Japanese vocabulary and achievement levels still tend to lag behind those of the majority Japanese children.7 Unlike the foreign workers, the Indo-Chinese permanently reside in Japan. A district where the Indo-Chinese refugees are overrepresented, and a famous spot among scholars in the field, is the Icho Housing discussed in Chapter 8. The Icho Housing is a large public housing complex extending from the Izumi ward to the Yamato ward in Yokohama City. Characteristic of these diversity points is the existence of NGOs.
136 Ryoko Tsuneyoshi In areas where the “newcomer” populations cluster, it is now commonplace to find many support groups, intersecting with each other (Roberts 2003). In 1998, three years after the Hanshin earthquake triggered new interest in the activities of NGOs and NPOs, the NPO Act (Tokutei Hieirikatsudō Sokushin-hō) was put into place.8 The emergence of the Indo-Chinese refugees was a turning point for Japanese international cooperation-oriented NGOs, and, in the 1980s, many NGOs were erected; this was also a time when international NGOs with their headquarters in the West opened Japanese branches or formed partnerships with Japanese NGOs. At the end of the 1980s, the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), a network of NGOs, was formed.9 During this period, those associations that had focused solely on developing countries started to notice that “Asia” was not just in some other continent, but was also within Japan itself. These NGOs and NPOs now coexist in complex ways and are an important part of the Japanese multicultural landscape (Numao 1996; see also Chapters 7 and 8). Other “newcomers” and their children The war-displaced Japanese and the Indo-Chinese refugees were closely followed by an increasing number of Asian foreign workers and, especially after 1990, the South Americans of Japanese descent—the Nikkeijin. In 1990, the revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act opened the door for younger generation Nikkeijin to take unskilled work legally in Japan. This led to a visible increase in the number of South Americans. There were other identifiable types of foreign national, such as foreign spouses of Japanese and children of intermarriages (see Chapter 9). The Ministry of Education started to compile data from 1991 on “foreign pupils and children who need Japanese language instruction,” one year after the revised immigration law. The definition of a student who requires instruction in the Japanese language is as follows: Pupils or students who have not mastered everyday conversation, or who can manage everyday conversation, but who lack terms necessary for study at the grade level, and thus have trouble participating in learning activities, and who require instruction in the Japanese language. (Monbukagakushō 2009a) According to government, in 2008 (Monbukagakushō 2009a), there were a total of 28,575 foreign children in Japan’s public primary or secondary schools who needed instruction in the Japanese language; 19,504 are at the primary level, 7,576 at junior high school, and 1,365 are in high school; the remainder are in other types of school. Of these children, 39.8 percent are those whose mother tongue is Portuguese, 20.4 percent Chinese, 12.7 percent Spanish. In other words, those whose mother tongue is Portuguese or Spanish, the South Americans, total more than half (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2).
Figure 6.1 Number of pupils/students by mother tongue, 1999–2008 Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (2009a).
Figure 6.2 Number of children who require instruction in Japanese per school, 1999–2008 Source: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (2009a).
138 Ryoko Tsuneyoshi All of these groups, distinguished by their nationality and language, are building blocks of a society where diversity is becoming more visible in a growing number of districts. The Nikkeijin The South Americans of Japanese descent (the Nikkeijin) are representative of the emerging groups of “newcomers.” Brazilians are the third largest foreign nationality group in Japan overall, following Chinese and Koreans (Nyūkan Kyōkai 2008). Most of the South American laborers come from Brazil, indeed, it is a country with the most Nikkeijin; about 1,500,000 Nikkeijin are estimated to live in Brazil, constituting about 60 percent of all Nikkeijin abroad.10 Upon “returning” to Japan, they have become Japan’s most visible “newcomer” group. The pre-war Japanese emigration to North America was followed at the turn of the century by that to South America. After the end of World War II, emigration to South America was resumed, until the last group of Japanese immigrants left in the early 1970s (Befu 2002; De Carvalho 2003). In the last several decades, a reverse flow from South America to Japan has been evident, with inflation and economic hardship in South America, the huge wage gap between South America and Japan, and Japan’s labor shortage. There had already been some Nikkeijin coming into Japan in the 1980s among the first generation who had a Japanese nationality or among those who had dual citizenship, but the flow of Nikkeijin increased visibly after the implementation of the revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990, which opened the door to later-generation Nikkeijin. Brokers stood between the workers and the employers, constructing a broker business. Nikkeijin communities started to emerge in locations where there were manufacturing companies (e.g., subcontractors of automobile companies), such as Toyota City and Toyohashi City in Aichi prefecture, Oizumi and Ōta in Gunma prefecture, and Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka prefecture. As the second and third generations came to Japan, the nikkei population diversified. The fact that Nikkeijin were more likely to come in family units than the other “newcomers” meant that schools in districts where there was a concentration of the Nikkeijin found that they were suddenly faced with a number of children who could not speak Japanese. These are not the same regions/schools that had a high proportion of the Koreans in Japan, though districts with longexisting minorities/foreigners are also experiencing “newcomer” inflows (see Chapter 7). The adaptation of the Nikkeijin to Japanese society has been far from easy. In the Nikkeijin districts, there is a similar pattern of alienation from Japanese schooling. The Nikkeijin child is sent to a public elementary school, and his/her parents say that they are returning to their country in a few years. But, for various reasons, the several years become extended. The child grows up in Japan and he/she reaches adolescence, unsure where he/she belongs, unsure of the future. The child graduates from elementary school and, if lucky, from junior high and
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enters high school, but, somewhere after that, the child disappears from the public school scene. Academic difficulties (e.g., learning the subject in Japanese), especially if the child came to Japan after fifth grade, the confusion of not being able to plan one’s future, as it is unclear to the child how long he/she will stay in Japan, economic hardship, family problems, no sense of belonging, lack of information, and structural problems are routinely cited (Gunmaken Oizumichō 2003; Osaka Daigaku et al. 2003; Shimizu 2008). Structural problems commonly cited include, for example, the fact that compulsory education is not compulsory for foreigners, but is granted on request, that the status of many Brazilian schools as private juku (shijyuku) is weak and prevents them from receiving public funding, and that outdated rules such as that the board is not required to accept those over the compulsory education age (fifteen) do not fit the reality of the “newcomers” (Miyajima and Ōta 2005). Just passing the exam to high school is an accomplishment; getting into a “good” high school seems out of reach of most of the Nikkeijin students (Sakuma 2006). There are now a number of Brazilian schools in Nikkeijin districts, but these require fees. Imazu and his team in Nagoya University, for example, have undertaken an investigation of the state of these Brazilian schools in the Tokai district (around Toyota, etc.), and, according to their report (Imazu and Matsumoto 2001), the monthly fees (from 30,000 to 40,000 yen in 2002) are not a small amount for many Brazilian families. Imazu et al. note that the first Brazilian school in the district opened in 1995, and the numbers attending these schools rose after it became known in the local newspapers that the Brazilian government had started to license these schools, so that their graduates would have the same qualifications as a graduate from their counterpart in Brazil. However, many face financial difficulty, and, with Japan’s economic recession, according to a Ministry of Education survey, there were ninety Brazilian schools in December 2008, but eighty-six in February 2009, and the number of Brazilian students (the equivalent of Japanese elementary–high school) attending Brazilian schools fell 34.9 percent from 6,373 to 3,881 during this period (Monbukagakushō 2009b). Compulsory education is not “compulsory” for non-Japanese nationals, and, being a transient population, South Americans often move without notice; thus, the number of South American school-age children who are not attending school is not accurately understood. Moreover, though the South American case is most discussed, the non-attendance problem is common to other “newcomer” groups. The data are as yet scarce, based on inconsistent methods of computation, and differ by locality. Especially problematic is the fact that a large proportion of students cannot be located in the first place. Despite such ambiguities, localities and NGOs agree on one thing—non-attendance among “newcomer” students is serious. To give some examples, the Japanese government asked localities with large numbers of “newcomers” to provide data on non-attendance. According to the 2005–6 figures, excluding students who were attending either a public school or a school for foreign children from the total number of registered foreign children
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of compulsory school age, the percentages that the localities could identify as non-attendant are low (several percentages), but adding those that cannot be contacted, the percentages can rise to over 20–30 percent, depending on the locality.11 The 2003 (two different periods) study of Kani City in Gifu prefecture shows a similar pattern: though less than 10 percent could be identified as truly not in school, when the figures for those who could not be located were added, the percentage goes up to above 30 percent—the city has implemented policies to combat non-attendance (Osaka Daigaku 2003; Gaikokujin Shūjyūtoshi Kaigi 2006: 8). In Oizumi City, where 14.5 percent of the residents were foreigners (mainly Brazilian) by 2003, a door-to-door investigation was conducted in 2002–3. Again, though those identified as non-attendant formed less than 6 percent, when those that could not be contacted were added, the percentages were over 30 percent (Gunmaken Oizumichō 2003). One of the reasons that such a situation is problematic to the Nikkeijin community is that it makes it difficult for the child to acquire the knowledge and abilities to find his/her place in either Japan or his/her country of origin. The South American youth is suspended in a limbo position, unable to find a place he/she can feel a part of, a place where he/she can be at home. This state seems to be one reason why, as was the case with the returnees from China stated previously, some Nikkeijin youth have been attracted to gangs and delinquency. Trying to fill in the gap, in Nikkeijin diversity points, there has emerged a network of concerned citizens ranging from local government officials, to local business, to NGOs. Being a transient population, and with long working hours, it is difficult for the Nikkeijin community to provide a stable environment for their children (Sekiguchi 2003: 137). Studies addressing the so-called “identity crisis” in various groups of people considered different from the majority include, in recent years, both the “oldcomers” and the “newcomers”: for example, research on the identity of returnees (Minoura 1984), Koreans (Fukuoka 1993), Chinese (Guo 1999), Amerasians (Murphy-Shigematsu 2002, Chapter 4), as well as Brazilians (Sekiguchi 2003) Now, the issue of identification is complex for Nikkeijin. Japan is the homeland of their ancestors, there is “Japanese” blood in them, but many observers have noted that often the image the first generation holds of Japan is more “Japanese” than Japan is today; thus, for them, Japanese reality comes as a cultural shock (De Carvalho 2003: 62). As for the younger generation, ironically, as Roth (2002: 5) points out, the process of rediscovering the “Brazilian” in themselves is taking place at the same time that Japan is becoming their extended country of residence. Some have also noted that the Nikkeijin find that they are, in the Japanese image, all “dekasegi” (foreign workers), regardless of what they did in Brazil. In a similar line of thought, Sekiguchi (2003) compares the image Japanese have of Japanese returnees (mostly children of businessperson families) and the Nikkeijin, and notes that, though both are linked to Japanese roots, the former are identified more with “a first world image,” “English,” and an “international elite” (e.g., active, smart, progressive), while the latter are identified with the image of a “developing country,” “Portuguese,” and “foreign workers” (Sekiguchi 2003: 92–3). There is, in other words, a clear status difference.
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Nikkei immigrants have had to face enormous changes in South America— they experienced the war and the defeat of their homeland and were eventually led to accept the reality that they were never to return to Japan (Smith 1979). Today, there is another twist to the Nikkei identity theme—that of the “return” laborer. Observers have commented on the first generation’s idealized memories of Japan, the image later-generation Brazilians have of Japanese society (e.g., the image they have heard from their grandparents, First World country), and the stark difference from the realities they face as marginalized foreign labor in Japan. In Brazil, Nikkeijin were “Japanese”; in Japan they are “gaijin” (foreigners), different in both (Linger 2001; De Carvalho 2003: 148). Another twist to the Nikkeijin identity theme is that of the Okinawan Nikkeijin. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Okinawa’s past as an independent kingdom, the American occupation, and the continued presence of the American Army in Okinawa set it apart from the mainland (Arakaki 2002). Since Okinawa sent many Nikkeijin abroad, Okinawa and Nikkeijin intersect, both addressing similar issues of marginalization and empowerment (see Chapter 7).
The “newcomers” and the changing context To summarize, some factors that influence the nature of the interaction between “newcomers” and “newcomers,” and “newcomers” and others, are worth mentioning here. First, it goes without saying that the national government and local governments play important roles in altering the existing multicultural landscape, as well as the interactions that occur within it. Immigration policies are one example; local initiatives are another. To give an example, in Ōta City in Gunma prefecture, previously cited, the local government supported the inflow of South American labor to combat a labor shortage, thus turning it into a representative Nikkei diversity point (Onai and Sakai 2001). To give another example, the official categories introduced in this chapter (e.g., the definition of who is a returnee from China), have important consequences for the categorized, not least because they are linked to the allocation of resources; thus, they influence the behavior of the categorized. “Newcomers” are clustered in certain districts, and it is no surprise that localities with large numbers of “newcomers” (diversity points) have been pushed to adopt more progressive policies than the government. For example, the Ministry of Education started the project to combat non-attendance in foreign students from 2005 (fushūgaku gaikokujin jidōseito shien jigyō), but, as seen previously, local governments in “newcomer” diversity points had been pushed to respond years earlier. In 2001, a network of cities with a concentration of the “newcomers” (Gaikokujin Shūjūtoshi Kaigi) was established in Hamamatsu City (counting twenty-eight cities in April 2008). Brazilian residents topped the list of the breakdown by nationality in all cities, followed by Filipinos, Chinese, and Koreans (presumably mostly “newcomer”). A key theme was to build “a society for
142 Ryoko Tsuneyoshi multicultural coexistence” (tabunka kyōsei shakai) as equal partners, as “foreigners and Japanese share the same rights and responsibilities as residents” (community unit 3, Gaikokujin Shūjyūtoshi Kaigi, Toyota sengen, 2004). This is different from the national context in which nationals and non-nationals are in markedly different positions. This association has issued a series of statements and requests to the government, local government, and to the business world. Messages issued from various documentation include calling for the need: to make education compulsory for foreign children in order to protect their rights; to establish a basic statement for the education of foreign children and to include that in the national Course of Study; to require learning about Japanese language instruction and education for multicultural coexistence as part of the requirements for becoming a teacher; to keep track of foreign households when they move; to strengthen the status of schools for foreigners so that public (both national and local) assistance can be provided, etc. (Gaikokujin Shūjyūtoshi Kaigi 2004, 2006). The basic factor influencing the nature of such multicultural negotiations is that there are now groups of “newcomers” and their families—notably the foreign spouse and children of mixed marriages, the war-displaced Japanese and their families, the Indo-Chinese refugees and their families, and the Nikkeijin—who are either in Japan to stay, or whose stay is extending (teijyuka) (Komai 1995; Jiyū Jinken Kyōkai 1997). New terms, such as “children who are linked to foreign countries” (gaikoku ni tsunagaru kodomo tachi) are being adopted, as was noted in Chapter 2, to overcome the dichotomous understanding of foreigners and Japanese as the multicultural population diversifies. As the children move through the Japanese educational system, the “newcomers” or “newcomer”-related children (e.g., parent is a “newcomer,” but child has Japanese nationality), are losing the language and culture of their parent(s)’ country of origin, struggling to define who they are, and are forced to face the realities of the Japanese examination system. Compulsory education ends at junior high in Japan, but almost all Japanese, over 97 percent, go onto high school, and high schools are ranked according to the standard deviation scores of the students. Passing the high school of one’s choice entails gathering information, attaining decent grades in junior high (public high schools look at junior high grades), and scoring sufficiently on written Japanese entrance examinations. The majority of junior high school seniors attend juku (cram schools), which offer assistance for a fee (Mongukagakushō 2007). It is hard enough for Japanese families; it goes without saying how difficult this process is for “newcomer” families who often do not have the means (e.g., financial ability to pay the cram school fees; Japanese language skills to assist homework and gather exam information) to help their children. Yet, with the exception of anecdotes, very few data are available; the percentage of “newcomers” going on to high school is nonexistent for most localities, and whatever is available varies so much that it is hard to be conclusive at this point (Inui 2008). In general, however, non-attendance and dropping out, as mentioned previously, have become major problems for practitioners in “newcomer” areas (Miyajima and Ōta 2005; Sakuma 2006), and scholars have
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begun to focus on “newcomers” in high school and how failure can be avoided (Shimizu 2008). Chapter 8 illustrates how junior high school teachers and citizens in a diversity point for “newcomers” have come to acknowledge the need to meaningfully convey information on why the child was relocated to Japan from his/her family’s country of origin, in an attempt to break the cycle of delinquency and alienation from Japanese schooling. The rise of civil society in such areas is also a consistent pattern. As parts of the “newcomer” population become permanent or long-term residents of Japanese society, and are, in effect, no longer new to Japanese society, the issues they raise overlap with those of the “oldcomers.” The sphere of interaction for the “newcomers” is thus inevitably expanding from the parents’ workplace, to family, to community, to the schools, and back to the workplace, this time the workplace of the next generation(s) of “newcomers.” Language is another factor influencing the nature of interaction that “newcomers” experience. The newly entering “newcomers” (not the long-time residents) have difficulty with the Japanese language. Thus, Japanese language instruction, together with help with their adjustment to Japan, is the form of assistance most frequently provided to these students by Japanese schools. This brings “newcomer” families in contact with not just the child’s classroom teacher and classmates, but other actors as well, such as the JSL teacher, interpreters, and other students being pulled out for JSL assistance (see Chapter 10). As for those “newcomers” who have grown up in Japan, the children lose the language of their parents in varying degrees, which gives rise to communication difficulties within the home. This is seen as linked to identity issues. Thus, there are various efforts by the civil society to teach the mother tongue and the culture of one’s origin. “Newcomers” were also subjected to various levels of recategorization. At the official level, there have been government attempts to categorize the returnees and foreigners together, as is seen in Chapters 7 and 10. “Newcomers” in particular are seen as sharing at least three characteristics with Japanese returnees—the need for the acquisition of the Japanese language (Nihongo shidō), unfamiliarity with Japanese ways (tekiō shidō), and, as “international” populations, both are resources for international understanding. The education of returnees has served as one model for the education of the “new” foreigners (Mabuchi 2002: 92), and, in 2001, when the Ministry of Education was reorganized, the unit for the education of Japanese children overseas and the Japanese returnees (Kaigai shijyo kyōiku ka) was reorganized under the international education unit (Kokusai kyōiku ka). Today, there is more emphasis on the fact that the foreigners and returnees are both assets for promoting international understanding education, and Chapter 10 provides a specific example. However, international understanding education (kokusai rikai kyōiku), Japan’s most mainstream education dealing with multicultural/intercultural issues, continues to be criticized for its inability to fully incorporate the experience of the long-existing minority/foreign populations in Japan (Nakajima 1988). These latter groups have rather been linked to human rights education, dōwa education (see Chapter 3), and other categories of practice that have a strong human rights
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focus, as compared with the “new” foreigners who have been more easily incorporated into the framework of understanding other nations and responding to “internationalization.” The reincorporation of Japanese returnees into society is seen as accomplished by: the acquisition of the Japanese language, readjusting to Japanese society, retaining the strengths of what they learnt abroad, and giving them a positive role in internationalizing Japanese society. As these returnees are usually middle-class Japanese nationals who have experienced another country, this framework worked well. When one applies this to the Nikkeijin, the framework has difficulty in incorporating issues related to ethnicity, nationality, and social class. Indeed, the situation of the Nikkeijin child may improve with the acquisition of the Japanese language, adapting to Japanese society, and valuing the Nikkeijin child’s experience abroad following the returnee model. But the model does not account for the discrimination that occurs in Japan based on ethnic background and nationality, nor does it take into consideration the fact that such foreign laborers tend to be at the bottom of Japanese society. The Southeast Asian case is similar in this sense, and one might add two other factors difficult to explain based on the returnee model—legal status (as there are many who lack legal status) and gender in the case of the Asian women. This is naturally problematic from the viewpoint of human rights education, as it is these areas (e.g., nationality, social class, gender) in which the problems these “newcomers” face are most serious. The rise of civil society also affects the interaction surrounding the “newcomers.” Though the involvement of Japanese citizens in assisting the rights of minorities is not limited to the “newcomers,” compared with the long-existing foreigners who have their historically established organizations and core members that are rooted in Japanese society (see Chapter 2), the “newcomers” are often not in a position to organize themselves. For example, in the case of foreign workers, they are often transient, as can be seen in the difficulty localities have in tracking down the addresses of “newcomer” students not in school. This has left a vacuum to be filled by civil society. In every “newcomer” diversity point, there are efforts by NGOs to organize and address the problems of the new entrants. Some groups are gender-specific, some target foreign workers specifically, and others are wider in their scope. In any case, such developments bring the Japanese and various “newcomers” together in a new context. In some cases, NGOs have found the need to support instruction of the mother tongue, as well as to provide Japanese language instruction to the parents. Chapter 9 shows how language is being targeted. There are more efforts by the “newcomers” themselves to organize, often assisted by Japanese (see Chapter 7). The rise of special schools for the foreigners also affects the context of multicultural interaction. The emergence of Brazilian schools is a prime example (Imazu and Matsumoto 2001). Though they separate “newcomer” children from Japanese society, they also provide an alternative for those who can pay the fees.
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With the Japanese recession, there have been efforts by concerned Japanese citizens to offer aid to struggling foreign families in an attempt to keep the foreign children in school.12 Brazilian schools highlight certain issues that overlap in part with the schools for long-existing foreigners. The representative schools for the long-existing foreigners are the North Korean schools. They do not qualify as regular schools (ichijōko) in Japan, and their presence has long questioned the meaning of public education in Japanese society through various themes: ethnicity and mother tongue education, segregation, assimilation and inclusion, and the meaning of national education and nationality. For the Brazilians in the Brazilian schools, the general assumption is that they will return, eventually, to their home country. However, the message that such schools send to Japanese society overlap in part with the messages that the “oldcomer” schools have long been posing to Japanese society. Many of the issues that are highlighted in studies or accounts of the “newcomers” are related to their status as relatively new entrants into Japanese society (e.g., the language issue), their mode of entry (e.g., entry to Japan as foreign labor, as spouse of Japanese), and their relationship with Japanese society (e.g., as laborers that were recruited by Japanese companies, as married to Japanese, etc.). These various threads loosely link the diverse group of foreigners (or those with total/partial foreign roots) to each other as “newcomers.” The situation of the “newcomers” differs by locality; therefore, the role of the local government is crucial. Indeed, as the Japanese government has played a major role in changing the composition of the national multicultural landscape, local governments have initiated, or at least responded to, changes in the local multicultural composition. Each chapter, like the parts of a puzzle, depicts a landscape of multicultural Japan that is diversifying, and shows where the relationship between the actors is undergoing change. Each population has a reason to exist in that area. In the traditional, rural Japan that Burgess describes in Chapter 9, a most unlikely site for foreign nationals, there was a conscious effort by the locality to recruit foreign wives. Metropolitan Kawasaki, in Chapter 7, shows the usual urban pattern of diversification—“newcomers” entering to find jobs. In each case, there is a renegotiating of boundaries, sometimes with the long-existing minorities/ foreigners, sometimes within “newcomers,” and always with the Japanese, whoever they may be. The interaction is often not visible at first sight, may not even be direct, but is present. It is a crucial component in making sense of the evolving landscape of multicultural Japan—a point that is made repeatedly within a specific context in the following chapters.
Acknowledgements Funding was provided by the Grants-in-Aid, Ministry of Education, kiban C, 21530873 (Nihonban torakkingu no kokusai hikaku kenkyū—kyōiku ni okeru kyōsei to shakaiteki kōsei no kōsatsu).
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Notes 1 See the Zenkaiken homepage: www.zenkaiken.net/ (accessed August 2009). 2 From the Center’s homepage: www.kikokusha-center.or.jp/joho/shingaku/daigaku/ shijowaku.htm (accessed May 2009). 3 From the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare: www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/engo/ seido02/index.html (accessed May 2009). 4 From the Congress homepage: www.shugiin.go.jp/ itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/honbun/ houan/g16801004.htm (accessed April 2008). 5 For example, “ ‘Tokyo wa osoroshi’ Ibaragi no shone gurupu shūgeki, bōsozoku hachinin o taiho,” Sankei Newspaper(digital), March 6, 2009. Available at http:// sankei.ji.msn.com/affairs/crime/090306/cfm0903061157007–n1.htm (accessed August 2009). 6 Gaimushō (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan): www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ namin/main3.html (accessed May 2009). 7 2003 study by the Nanmin Jigyō Honbu (Refugee Assistance Headquarters, RGQ) entrusted by the government to promote the resettlement of refugees. Available at www.rhq/gr.jp (accessed April 2005). 8 See the governmental Naikakufu (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan) NPO homepage: www.npo-homepage.go.jp/data/pref.html (accessed May 2009). The NPO Hojin database listed 37,198 submissions as given license from December 1, 1998 to March 31, 2009. 9 The Kokusai Kyoryoku NGO Senta (JANIC), Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation: www.janic.org/faq/faqngo/index.php#q6 (accessed May 2009). 10 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/brazil/ kankei.html (accessed August 2009). 11 The government homepage on returnees and foreigners: www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/ shotou/clarinet/003/001/012.htm (accessed May 2009). 12 For example, a Nagano coalition of business, local government, citizens: www.anpie. or.jp/santa_project/data.htm (accessed August 2009).
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Murphy-Shigematsu, S. (2002) Amerajian no kodomotachi: shirarezaru mainorit, Tokyo: Shueisha. Nagel, J. (1994) “Constructing ethnicity: creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture,” Social Problems, 41: 152–76. Nakajima, T. (1988) “‘Kokunai rikai’ to ‘kokusai rikai’,” Ibunkakan Kyōiku, 2: 58–67. –––– (1993) “Nihon no tabukna kyōiku to zainichi kankoku/chōsenjin kyōiku,” Ibunkakan Kyōiku, 7: 69–84. Numao, M. (ed.) (1996) Tabunka kyōsei o mezasu chiiki zukuri—Yokohama, Tsurumi, Shiota kara no hokoku, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Nyūkan Kyōkai (Japan Immigration Association) (2008) Zairyu gaikōkujin tōkei Heisei 20 nen ban (Statistics on the foreigners registered in Japan, 2008), Tokyo: Nyūkan Kyōkai. Oguma, E. (1995) Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen—“Nihonjin” no jigazō no keifu, Tokyo: Shinchōsha. Onai, T. and Sakai, E. (2001) Nikei Burajirujin no teijyūka to chiiki shakai: Gunma-ken Ōta/Oizumi chiku o jirei to shite, Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo. Osaka Daigaku Daigakuin Ningenkagaku Kenkyuka et al. (2003) Heisei 15 nendo Kōseirōdoshō rhōdokagaku kenkyuhi hojyokin kodomo katei shōgo kenkyū jigyhō “taminzoku bunka shakai ni okeru boshi no kenko ni kansuru kenkyū.”. Available at http://square.umin.ac.jp/boshiken/repo15/no8.1.pdf (accessed May 2009). Roberts, G. (2003) “NGO support for migrant labor in Japan,” in M. Douglass and G.S. Roberts (eds), Japan and global migration: foreign workers and the advent of a multicutural society, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. Roth, J.H. (2002) Brokered homeland: Japanese Brazilian migrants in Japan, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press. Sakuma, K. (2006) Gaikokujin no kodomo no fushūgaku, Tokyo: Keisō Shobō. Sekiguchi, T. (2003) Zainichi Nikkei Burajirujin no kodomotachi: ibunkakan ni sodatsu kodomo no aidentiti keisei, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Shimizu, K. (ed.) (2008) Kokō o ikiru nyūkama: Osaka furitsu kokō ni miru kyōiku shien, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Shimizu, K. and Shimizu, M. (eds) (2001) Nyūkama to kyōiku: gakkō bunka to esunisiti no kattō o megutte, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Shimizu, M. (2006) Nyūkama no kodomotachi: gakkō to kazoku no hazamano nichijyō sekai, Tokyo: Keisō Shobō. Smith, R. (1979) “The ethnic Japanese in Brazil,” The Journal of Japanese Studies, 5: 53–70. Tsuneyoshi, R. (1995) “Kyoshitsu to shakai—nyūkama no kodomo ga Nihon no kyōiku ni teiki surumono,” in M. Sato (ed.), Kyōshitsu to iu basho, Tokyo: Kokudosha. Yamawaki, K. (2000) “Foreign workers in Japan: a historical perspective,” in M. Douglass and G. Roberts (eds), Japan and global migration: foreign workers and the advent of a multicultural society, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.
7
The ‘new’ foreigners and the social reconstruction of difference The cultural diversification of Japanese education1 Ryoko Tsuneyoshi
Introduction From the viewpoint that stresses the socially constructed nature of categories such as ethnicity and race, they are characterized by social boundaries that are constantly negotiated through interaction (Nagel 1994; Jenkins 1997; Barth 1998 (1969)). History suggests that the inflow of newcomers into a society has often been accompanied by a realignment of the relationships between existing groups and the redefining of social categories by various agents. For example, with the influx of the Irish, eastern, southern, and central European immigrants into the United States in the 1800s, the formerly unchallenged category of Whiteness became problematic, as the new white immigrants were defined as different, and furthermore as inferior, to the existing populations of whites (Oakes 1985; Fass 1989). According to Fass (1989): In the early twentieth century, analysts and journalists emphasized that immigration had become newly problematic because the sources of immigration had changed as Italy, Poland, Russia, and the Balkans replaced the British Isles, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries as the home of the majority of the newcomers. The groups composing the so-called ‘new immigration’ were portrayed as more alien, more transient, from more autocratic societies, less family-oriented, less skilled, less literate. In addition, they were often visibly darker and rarely worshipped any recognizably Protestant God. (Fass 1989: 16) However, this differentiation among whites disappeared in the twentieth century, and a single social category of ‘white’ emerged, as Whiteness now came to be understood in opposition to Blackness (Banks 2001, Chapter 8). Migrants sometimes find that they are aligned with others that they were previously not associated with. Winston (1996) shows that the Caribbean migrants to Britain find that, in their host country, the hierarchy that existed between the delicate differences in shades of skin in their homeland loses its meaning, and they are all regarded monolithically as ‘black’, ‘coloured’, etc.
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The arrival of newcomers challenges boundaries of ‘we’ and ‘them’. New categories, with differing degrees of stigma or privilege, are constructed and deconstructed, from the informal level of everyday interaction to the official categorization of the state (Buriel 1987). Such categories are significant, as they reflect how the boundaries of difference are being negotiated in a society. Categorization may differ by context, and the categorized does not necessarily have to accept these categories. However, as in the case of the nation-state placing certain individuals into categories that might then be linked to the acquisition or denial of resources, these categories carry consequences for individuals. Therefore, though ethnicity (and other similar categories) are subject to negotiation, ‘individual choices are circumscribed by the ethnic categories available at a particular time and place’ (Nagel 1994: 156), and for those placed in stigmatized categories, the choice may, in effect, be imposed on them. One characteristic aspect of our globalizing and increasingly multicultural world is that, even those societies that have held on to very homogeneous national/ethnic identities have been challenged to recognize the diversity within. In western countries, for example, inflows of foreign labour and/or new immigrants have renewed debates on multicultural coexistence. The examination of how these newcomers are understood shed light on our understanding of the social construction of difference. Japan is an interesting example in this sense, as it has long held on to either monolithic (e.g. Japanese) or dichotomous (e.g. foreigners versus Japanese) categories of the culturally different, and yet, with the diversification of Japanese society – dubbed ‘internal internationalization’ (uchinaru kokusaika) – new social categories are being constructed, as Japanese society attempts to situate the ‘different’ in the larger societal landscape. Needless to say, such boundary construction is interactive; thus, the process can be seen from both the side of the categorizers and that of the categorized. It is useful to note here that the purpose of this chapter is to understand how the ‘majority Japanese’ are responding to diversification; thus the emphasis is on the reasoning of the categorizers, albeit in an interactive context. The process of negotiation by the categorized would require a different type of approach (see Chapter 10). This chapter will explore this ongoing process of the social construction of categories of difference in Japan, as the society experiences its phase of ‘internal internationalization’, understood as the diversification of people within (Hatsuse 1996; Komai and Watado 1997). How is ‘internal internationalization’ challenging former social categories of difference? What role are the ‘new’ foreigners playing in this process? What implications does this have for a larger understanding of how social categories of difference are constructed in Japan? The chapter will explore these issues in the larger Japanese context, as well as in an urban diversity point – Kawasaki City.
Diversity points Japan is diversifying. But its diversification is not taking place across the board – at least not visibly. Japan may indeed be a multicultural society, but it is a
The cultural diversification of education 151 multicultural society where patches of visibly diverse districts (which I call ‘diversity points’) are scattered amidst a vast sea of seeming homogeneity. The total of Japan’s foreign registered population is below 2 per cent of the population. The fact that even Japan’s largest long-existing ethnic minority, the Koreans in Japan, is visibly indistinguishable from the ethnic Japanese, is under pressure to assimilate, has often adopted Japanese names, and speaks Japanese is symbolic of the fact that the cultural heterogeneity that exists in the Japanese context is often not of the visible sort that one can identify at a glance, thus adding to an illusion of homogeneity. However, there are some places in Japan – which I call ‘diversity points’ – that the dominant society acknowledges as diverse, because of a visible concentration of certain foreigners/minorities, or because the foreigners/minorities have acquired a voice that makes their presence visible. The diversity points in Japan provide insights into the dynamics of how a society built on images of homogeneity is facing cultural diversity. If one were to map out very generally the diversity points in Japan, first, there would be the distr