MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE
European Societies Series Editor: Colin Crouch
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MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE
European Societies Series Editor: Colin Crouch
Very few of the existing sociological texts which compare different European societies on specific topics are accessible to a broad range of scholars and students. The European Societies series will help fill this gap in the literature, and attempts to answer questions such as: Is there really such a thing as a ‘European model’ of society? Do the economic and political integration processes of the European Union also imply convergence in more general aspects of social life, like family or religious behaviour? What do the societies of Western Europe have in common with those further to the east? The series will cover the main social institutions, although not every author will cover the full range of European countries. As well as surveying existing knowledge in a way that will be useful to students, each book will also seek to contribute to our growing knowledge of what remains in many respects a sociologically unknown continent.
Other titles in the series: Social Change in Western Europe Colin Crouch European Cities Patrick Le Gale`s Religion in Modern Europe Grace Davie
Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State A European Dilemma CARL-ULRIK SCHIERUP The National Institute for Working Life and Linko¨ping University, Sweden PEO HANSEN The National Institute for Working Life and Linko¨ping University, Sweden
STEPHEN CASTLES Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford
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3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York ß Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen, and Stephen Castles 2006 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn ISBN 0-19-828052-1 ISBN 0-19-928402-4 (Pbk.)
978-0-19-828052-1 978-0-19-928402-3 (Pbk.)
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
CONTENTS List of Figures
vi
List of Tables
vii
1 Understanding the Dual Crisis
1
2 The ‘Migration Crisis’ and the Genesis of Europe’s New Diversity
21
3 Migration, Citizenship, and the European Social Model
48
4 Transatlantic Convergence or Transatlantic Split? Elements for a Comparative Framework
81
5 Britain’s ‘Neo-American’ Trajectory
111
6 Germany: Immigration and Social Exclusion in a Declining Welfare State
137
7 Economic Miracle and Political Limbo: Italy and its ‘Extracommunitarians’
163
8 ‘Paradise Lost’? Migration and the Changing Swedish Welfare State
195
9 ‘Bloody Subcontracting’ in the Network Society: Migration and Post-Fordist Restructuring across the European Union
231
10 What Creed in Europe?
247
References
273
Index
307
LIST OF FIGURES 2.1 Annual migration into the EU 2.2 Foreign-born and foreign citizens in per cent of population in 20 OECD countries, 2002 4.1 Proportion of foreigners or foreign-born in total unemployment, relative to their share of the labour force, 2001–2 average 4.2 Labour market participation rate of foreigners by country or region of nationality, selected EU member states, 2002 5.1 Poverty rates in the EU, 1994 5.2 Unemployment rates, UK: by ethnic group and age, 2001–2 5.3 Self-employment, UK: by ethnic group 2001–2 7.1 Number of residence permits, 1992–2003 7.2 Total number of residence permits in Italy and per geographic region in 1993 and 2001 7.3 Young adults (25–29 years) living with their parents or in multigenerational families 7.4 Male and female employment rates in some European countries in 1994 7.5 Non-European Union legal migrant workers by region and economic sector, 1999 8.1 Reason for granting residence permits, 1980–2003 8.2 Age-standardized employment rates for foreign-born and native-born aged 16–64 according to gender, 1960–2000 8.3 Persons aged 16–64 under the Swedish poverty line (socialbidragsnormen) according to country of birth and length of residence 8.4 Total immigration and Swedish policy formation, 1946–2003
LIST OF TABLES 2.1 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2
Migrant population in selected Western European countries, 1950–75 Population of the UK by ethnic group, April 2001 Immigration and race relations legislation in the UK since 1962 Germany’s foreign population, 2001 Economically active foreign residents by employment status, Germany, 2000 7.1 Number of immigrants with residence permits by 1 January 2003 and legalizations granted during 2003 under Law L.D. 195/2002 7.2 Women as a percentage of the total number of (registered) migrants and among migrants from single countries of emigration in 1996 8.1 Foreign-born residents by country of birth: Swedish-born with foreign-born parents (in ’000), 1960–2003
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N a so-called global age, economic growth appears no longer to promote social
inclusion, political consensus, or attachment to the values and principles of liberal democracy. By the turn of the millennium the advanced North Atlantic economies were performing in a remarkably efficient way, from the perspective of corporate business. But this neither stopped the growth of poverty and social inequality nor arrested the crisis of liberal democracy and citizenship. This contrasts starkly with Western Europe’s ‘three glorious decades’1 after the Second World War, when steady economic growth was linked to the development of welfare states and the strengthening of social citizenship. A major symptom of this predicament is the protracted crisis and restructuring of the modern welfare state, which became manifest in the mid-1970s and intensified during the 1980s and 1990s. These processes have brought incremental and permanent exclusion of substantial population groups from the established social rights of citizenship in liberal democratic states. This ‘great exclusion’ (Jordan 1996) signifies, as Ralf Dahrendorf (1985) put it, that national citizenship is becoming an exclusive rather than an inclusive status. In line with its definition in the European Union’s Poverty Programme from the early 1990s, ‘social exclusion’ denotes ‘the negation of citizenship’: that is, the substantial negation of the right and actual ability to participate as a ‘full member of the community’ (Marshall 1950), as sanctioned by the edifice of citizenship and the type of social contract on which the liberal democratic national welfare state has typically been founded (Dahrendorf 1985). Social exclusion has assumed a plethora of new forms in response to globalization, new technology, economic restructuring, and the emergence of new flexibility demands and regimes in working life (Burrows and Loader 1994; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Rhodes and Me´ny 1998). The increased distress facing a permanently unemployed section of the population due to diminishing unemployment benefit schemes and shrinking social assistance, the growing category of the homeless, the feminization of poverty, the concentration of unemployment and poverty among the young, the concentration of the disadvantaged in segregated neighbourhoods, the expansion of low-salaried, so-called atypical jobs in deregulated or non-regulated sectors of the labour 1
Normally rendered in French ‘les trentes glorieuses’.
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market: these are only a few of many problems of the so-called new poverty that kept growing rather than receding in one of the world’s most powerful economic blocs during the last quarter of the twentieth century (Room, Lawson, and Laczko 1989; Teekens and Van Praag 1990). As depicted through the official policy idiom of ‘social exclusion’, this multiplex mise`re du monde2 is a shared contemporary concern of the European Union (EU). It has emerged alongside the growth of low-wage, informal urban enclave economies and the proliferation of ‘occupational ghettos’ (Feuchtwang 1982) on the margins of national labour market regulation and social security systems. It has been accompanied by urban unrest in socially polarized and segmented cities. Most contemporary practices of social exclusion are indisputably tinged by racialization or ethnification;3 practices and forms of exclusion which affect migrants and new ethnic minorities with their background in non-OECD countries in particular and which tend to be publicly rationalized and legitimized in ethnic, racial, and cultural terms. This helps, in effect, to engender and solidify a renegotiated social hierarchy across EU-Europe based on a combination of ‘racialized ethnicity’,4 class, and gender as a constituent of social stratification of growing importance. We therefore refer to these practices as ‘racialized exclusion’. We are referring here to all people of immigrant and ethnic minority background who become trapped in the fragmented occupational ghettos of casualized labour in the post-Fordist service industries and in deregulated municipal services. There are also the thousands of ‘European Others’, citizens of immigrant background subsisting on shrinking welfare in ethnically or racially segregated neighbourhoods in the big cities as the European welfare states go through deep processes of change and the dismantling of institutions and practices that were designed to sustain norms and policies of citizenship. There are the many categories of the working poor, from those dependent on 2 The title of a volume edited by Pierre Bourdieu (1993) exposing the multiplicity of contemporary forms of poverty and social exclusion in France. 3 The concept of ‘racialization’ has been particularly elaborated by Robert Miles (1989; 1993). The term ‘ethnification’ has been used as a concept of ideological and institutional practices which, contingent on political, economic, and cultural claims and relations of power, lead to the systematic, institutionally embedded exclusion of ethnic ˚ lund and Schierup 1991; Schierup 1993). Racialization might be a more minorities (A readily employable term within the British context given the particular historical and etymological anchoring and the still prevalent broad discourse on ‘race’ in the UK. In light of the generally very particular and narrow connotations of notions of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ outside the UK context, both historically and in current public and scientific discourse, racialization as a term perhaps cannot be transferred into common usage on the Continent. 4 A term used by, among others, Peter Kivisto (2002: 189) in the sense of discarding with ‘race as a category of analysis’ (Kivisto 2002: 18) while refocusing ‘our interpretive lenses by studying race as a ‘‘category of practice’’ ’. ‘An important part of this project’, Kivisto (2002: 18) suggests, ‘would involve the examination of racism as ideology, the racism of everyday life, institutional racism, and racialist social movements – all facets of the racialization of ethnicity’.
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‘workfare’ to those in the new ethnic ‘sweatshops’ produced by outsourcing and lean production strategies in the ‘network society’. Propelled by state policies designed to combat unemployment and lighten the burdens of the public welfare system, the widely hailed new category of ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ has emerged, with long working hours and low remuneration but without adequate social protection; shops ‘full of dreams’(Collins et al. 1995) run by unpaid family labour; the so-called ‘new proletariat’ (bel Habib 2001), a term illustrating the hidden dynamics of post-Fordist restructuring. There are the armies of underpaid, non-protected and undocumented migrant workers on EU-Europe’s building sites and in agriculture, deprived of essential civil, political, and social rights, joined, as it were, by the ‘black’ housemaids from the global ‘south’ servicing middle-class homes and by the trafficked sexworking women on display in the red light districts of the metropolises. There are the new contract labourers, a substitute for the old guest workers, always kept at arm’s length from inclusion in national frameworks of citizenship. There are the asylum seekers of recent times, forced into detention camps or clandestine jobs, as conditions of protection and reception in the so-called ‘host countries’ deteriorate. These different categories of the excluded are found to various degrees in different member states of the EU. But they have everywhere become a common political concern and they are among the most conspicuous manifestations of the crisis of the welfare state in Western Europe. Intimately connected with the crisis of the welfare state and the permanency of multiple forms of racialized exclusion is a second main dimension of our current great transformation: the political and cultural crisis and transformation of the nation and established national identities. This lends to most current social struggles an indisputable character of cultural politics, expressed through idioms of ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’, or ‘religious difference’. The most conspicuous manifestation of this crisis of the nation has been the upturn of new nationalist, racist-populist political movements centred on the ‘problem of immigration’. Social crisis and the breakdown of established identities and solidarities, focused on social rights of citizenship, have to varying degrees been exploited by the nostalgic and reactionary populism that proposes ‘cultural difference’ as the rationale for excluding all those who do not belong to ‘the Nation’. This culturally argued so-called new racism (Barker 1981) has been tacitly instrumentalized by political and institutional pragmatism (Collinson 1993). The fear of the ‘Muslim invasion’ has merged in the lore of nationalist-populist movements with a perceived threat towards established national identities represented by the ongoing supranational processes of integration within the Union, and is thus exacerbated. This has happened differently in each of the EU member states in line with its particular history, constitution, and political situation. At the turn of the millennium the alliance between Austria’s conservative ¨ rg Haider’s post-Fascist Freedom Party sent shock political establishment and Jo waves through the EU. But soon this sort of coalition should become a normal order of things. In autumn 2001 Pia Kjærsga˚rd’s openly racist Danish People’s
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Party (Dansk Folkeparti) enjoyed an astounding electoral success and gave conditional backing to a fiercely xenophobic government coalition of conservatives and liberals. In Italy the neoliberal Berlusconi government came to power in the same year in coalition with the racist-populist Lega Nord and the post-Fascist Alleanza Nazionale. In France Jean Marie Le Pen emerged as a threat to the political establishment in the presidential campaign of 2002, in spite of the fact—or maybe rather for the very reason—that the mainstream parties had already adopted essential ingredients belonging to the populist political manifesto of his defamed party, Front National. We can see similar trends, more or less explicit, right across the Union. This includes countries like the Netherlands, the UK, and Sweden, where policies of ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘diversity’ have for decades been more consistently promoted than in other parts of the EU, and which have been distinguished by legislation, national institutions, and actual practices targeted at combating racism and discrimination. Also in these countries mainstream political parties have adopted some of the most vote-winning messages invented by the new populist right; ideas which a few years back were considered beyond the pale. The changes in the political sphere connected with the new right populist upsurge may eventually jeopardize the whole project of European integration. The current tightening up of European regimes of immigration and asylum and of the societal incorporation of immigrants obviously reflects such concerns. The moral and political panic surrounding the whole issue of international migration is used, among other things, to justify the maintenance of barriers to free labour mobility, at least temporarily, between most of the ‘old’ member states of the EU-15 and the new (post-2004) European member states in the former Soviet sphere. This new-old ‘wall’—today meant to keep Eastern Europeans out rather than in—is supposed to protect regulated labour markets and welfare states in the West against wage and welfare ‘dumping’ or so-called welfare tourism.5 It is also supposed to stem the rise of new nationalist, racistpopulist political movements centred on the ‘problem of immigration’ and the associated alleged threat to the welfare and identity of state and nation. Simultaneously, however, influential employers, politicians, and civil servants continue repeatedly to voice the need for low- and high-skilled migrant labour as a short-term remedy for acute bottlenecks in the labour markets, but from a longer-term and wider perspective perceived as a necessary large-scale cure for Europe’s imminent ‘demographic deficit’.
A European Dilemma The complexity of this dual crisis (of the welfare state and the nation) presents the EU with a delicate dilemma centred on the racialization of social relations. 5 ¨ ran Persson, in connection with A term coined by the Swedish Prime Minister, Go political debates on the terms of accession for the new EU member states in 2004.
Understanding the Dual Crisis
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It has important similarities with the American dilemma of race, class, and democracy described by the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1944). This emerging ‘European dilemma’ (see also Schierup 1995) can no longer be dealt with by recourse to the defensive strategies through which European governments have endeavoured to appease populist parties and movements; that is, by adopting increasingly restrictive immigration policies and asylum regimes in an apparent shift from policies of multiculturalism towards revamped assimilationist policies and practices in several countries, or by devising new ‘guest worker’ systems designed to keep the ‘problem’ away from the core institutions of society altogether. Faced with increasingly sizeable migrant populations and their offspring, with growing social tensions connected with the racialization of labour markets, society, and polity, and with the apparent likelihood of a persistent, large-scale, and economically motivated immigration from third countries, issues of discrimination and ethnic diversity have moved into the foreground. In the ongoing battle for the consolidation of European integration, an official rhetoric of citizenship and solidarity faces multiple and increasingly racialized processes of social exclusion of which the leading political elites are well aware. It expresses a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the very future of the European project of integration is dependent on the successful framing of new inclusive modes of citizenship and broad forms of social solidarity. On the other hand, taking this task seriously inevitably means confronting powerful political and economic interests. These interests are embedded in the structural features, power relations, and social and cultural life belonging to that ‘Great Transformation’ (Polanyi 1944) of new times, which we have habitually come to represent through the multifaceted catchword of ‘globalization’. An increasingly essential feature of this global transformation of contemporary capitalism is the growth of global migration. Characterizing the dilemma thus, we can conclude with Castells (1992: 7) that the EU must now ‘cope with its new global economic role while accommodating to a multi-ethnic society that emerges from the same roots that sustain the global economy’. Contemporary migratory movements are the result of, among other things, a continued (allegedly creative) destruction of economies and societies exposed to power constellations belonging to a new form of unequal global division of labour or produced by the ostensibly ‘ethnic’ wars and imperial so-called humanitarian interventions that this unequal global regime gives rise to (Schierup 1999b; Hardt and Negri 2000; Duffield 2001; Castles 2004). These global movements of economically and politically forced immigration gravitate towards the concentrations of capital and centres of management control in global cities and power blocs like the USA and the EU, where strongly voiced demands for new labour multiply alongside social exclusion internally and increasingly sophisticated, but inefficient, measures of immigration control externally. Following the shattering of the former strongly assimilating power of Fordist economic regimes (Grillo 2000) and ostensibly
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monistic national welfare states, immigration turns the member states of the EU into a novel type of multi-ethnic society. The resultant crisis of identity, citizenship, and established welfare regimes has motivated the urgent development of new local and supranational modes of governance, below and above the nation state (Geddes and Benington 2001), even though the nation state remains the focus of popular legitimacy and the prime foundation of political authority and democratic accountability. This configuration of the dilemma of migration, welfare, and citizenship of a still multinational and increasingly multiethnic United States of Europe in spem is indeed more complex than the American Dilemma of Myrdal’s time and also than the changing but still present racial dilemma of the USA of recent times (Hochschild 1984). Against the background of their unique histories, political philosophies, and institutional cultures, European states have followed a range of nationally unique paths in their approach to immigration. Unwilling to pay the social costs of effectively addressing the basic causes of ‘integration failure’, the different member states of the EU have adopted policies that tend to run, each in its unique historically path-dependent way, into the stalemate of ‘a de facto policy inactivity and laissez-faire’ (Favell 1998: 252). This is, as somewhat caustically expressed by Favell, coupled with ‘a great deal of grand and pretty theorising about citizenship and the political cultural ˚ lund origins of national community’. Nationally specific paradoxes emerge (A and Schierup 1991) as, notwithstanding their often contrasting ‘philosophies of integration’ (Favell 1998), they end up in their own versions of a deep ethnic dilemma (Glazer 1983) centred on the incremental social exclusion of immigrants and ethnic minorities. It is largely this deadlock at the national level that forms the background to the emergence of a wider ‘European Dilemma’ (Miller 1981; Schierup 1995; Favell 1998): a writing on the wall that threatens to shatter visions of citizenship and ‘social cohesion’ in the EU and poses a major challenge to the forging of a more open and inclusive multinational/multi-ethnic ‘social Europe’. The resultant ‘European Concert’—to recall a grand vision of Jacques Delors, former head of the European Commission—does at times resemble more a cacophony of discordant voices than a harmonious ‘symphony of civilisation’.6 As dealt with in detail in the following chapters, dynamics at the supranational level of the Union tend, in turn, to deepen the stalemate at the national level. But they may also offer new wider vistas, openings, and paths of action, at least if the EU’s celebrated directives and trans-national programmes at the turn of the millennium for combating racism, discrimination, and social exclusion are backed by genuine political will and by a reshaped institutional capacity to breach the gap between inclusive rhetoric and exclusive realpolitik. 6 The famous metaphor of Horace Kallen (1924), envisaging the making of an orchestrated ‘cultural pluralism’ in the USA a century ago.
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An Invigorating Paradox ‘There is a Negro Problem in the United States, and most Americans are aware of it’, Myrdal (1944: xlv) stated in the introduction to An American Dilemma. Myrdal takes his point of departure in the contradiction between a liberal ‘American creed’ professing values of equity and universal human rights and a deeply compromised social reality. It was a reality marked by white supremacy, rigid racial barriers, violence, and harassment. For African-Americans the USA of the 1940s was, surely, a world of socio-economic segregation, cultural stigma, and political exclusion. Myrdal’s basic idea was that powerful liberal elites in the USA at the time were well aware of, and indeed deeply concerned with, the racial inequality that disfigured American society. ‘The American Negro problem is a problem in the heart of the American’, he claimed (Myrdal 1944: xlvii). But to build a politics which would resolve ‘the Negro problem’ it was necessary, Myrdal maintained, to appeal to the common creed that all citizens of the USA regarded as theirs: to enforce political reform by appeal to the basic principles of equal opportunity and human dignity laid down in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In choosing what he called ‘the American creed’ as the moral-political anchor for his work, Myrdal adopted the position of a general ‘humanistic universalism’ (Wallerstein 1991a:82) represented by the American Constitution and its emphasis on equality of opportunity and political democracy. His argument was that, paradoxically and notwithstanding the enormous gap between ‘creed’ and actual practice, values of democracy and equity proclaimed in the American constitution did appear to be shared by almost everybody, independent of race, region (North or South), and class: by the ‘oppressors’ as well as by the ‘oppressed’, as Myrdal put it. The American creed constituted the most general, and maybe the only, common denominator for the American nation, the nucleus of a shared public culture. That is (in line with the argument of Habermas (1994)) a ‘constitutional patriotism’, making possible the negotiation of compromises that would constitute the necessary basis for any reform project. This overall ‘creed’ represented widespread values with their roots in the European Enlightenment. But against this level of general values, Myrdal observed, stood many specific values, rooted in particular cultures, ethnic or racial groups, local communities, classes, and interest groups. The Myrdal dilemma is, from this perspective, nothing but a crucial restatement of Rousseau’s notion of the ‘conflict between the general and the particular wills’, or so Wallerstein (1991a: 83) argues in his treatment of the Myrdal legacy. It is, as such, a theme which, in terms of the conflict between universalism and particularism, has been repeatedly examined by critical academics concerned with issues of race, ethnicity, citizenship, and nation (Taylor 1992; Habermas 1994; ¨ ck and Rundell 1998). Silverman 1992; Tagueiff 1987; Highham 1993; Baubo
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Phrased in this general ethical-philosophical way—as a choice between pursuing the universalist promise of the ‘American Creed’ and continuing to give in to the particularist ethno-racist doctrines of much of white conservative America—the classical ‘American Dilemma’ facing the white US liberal elites of the 1940s, to whom Myrdal’s study was meant to appeal, represented most definitely an overall moral-political dilemma. However, Myrdal’s characterization of the dilemma can, in another and perhaps more robust sense, be seen as rooted not only in conflicting moral-political world views but equally in political and material exigency. This is, in fact, a continuous subtext that can be read throughout Myrdal’s work on the American ’Negro Problem’. The American creed was and is so much more than simply a creed. It has been the indispensable charter for one of the most remarkable undertakings of nation building and political integration in a complex multi-ethnic state (Habermas 1994): in a huge, immensely differentiated and rapidly changing society moulded by extensive and consecutive waves of immigration from all corners and cultures on earth. In fact the historical realism of this project appears, as noticed by John Higham (1993) in his critical exposition on ‘multiculturalism and universalism’ in the USA, to be rooted in what he calls the ‘invigorating paradox’ of the American universalistic tradition. ‘What was theoretically and potentially universal in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’, he admits, ‘indeed soon came to be understood as the very lynchpin of identity. . . of a peculiar people’ (Highham 1993:198). However, ‘the coupling, in national icons’, Higham continues, of a ‘distinctively American bird of prey with a transnational symbol of freedom cannot be fully understood as a smokescreen or a delusion’. It reflects ‘the inescapable locatedness of any universalistic perspective’. This displays, more specifically, an enduring tension in American universalism ‘between closure and openness, between separateness and inclusion’. From the time of the American Revolution and Independence, ‘a principled way of managing this tension has been to extend the circle of those who are acknowledged as makers of an American nationality and to project each incremental addition as a promise of still wider inclusiveness’ (Highham 1993:198). It is this ’enduring tension’ in American universalism that constitutes one crucial fault line in the dilemma. The racial stigmatization, discrimination, and social exclusion represented by the so-called Negro problem contradicted the central values embodied in the universalistic political mythology of the USA and had indeed, by the 1940s, become a growing threat to the cohesion of the nation. However, continued white supremacy and oppression was challenged not only by growing African-American political awareness and organization. With the growing importance of black labour in expanding economic sectors, the continued preservation of, as Myrdal described it, a ‘caste’-like social order— supported by, among others, many white workers and unions—was starting to harm the interests of influential liberal business elites. This also signified seg-
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mentation and conflicts within business itself, reminiscent of earlier deep conflicts between North and South during the American history of race and class. Seen from the perspective of the ‘new economy’ of those days and the new society of the ‘New Deal’—that is, Fordist industrialism and an emerging American welfare state—if dominant white liberal elites continued hiding their heads in the sand they would jeopardize economic progress. But if they were to seize the dilemma by its horns they would provoke serious confrontations with numerous and still powerful white conservative interest groups and trigger serious political turbulence. For the ‘Negro problem’ represented a problem of the dominant relations of power in American society. This ‘problem’ could not be confined to the segregated spaces of America, where the ‘negroes’ lived—so Myrdal summarized his massive investigation for the Carnegie Foundation. The ‘Negro problem’ was essentially a ‘white problem’; ‘an integral part of, or a special phase of, the whole complex of problems in the larger American civilization’ (Myrdal 1944: liii). It existed because forces and conditions in American society as a whole made African-Americans a problem. It was a problem of American history and of the condition of the American economy and society; a problem historically produced and perpetuated by and in a society and a civilization where the actually existing day-to-day practices of the dominant political, legal, educational, and economic institutions were geared to serving traditionally vested white interests and a white ideological and political hegemony. Hence the other fault line of the dilemma was indeed a very tangible one, concerned with political economy, differentiated class interests, and established institutions. This intersection of the moral-political dimension of racism, concerns about social cohesion, and the importance of dealing with the ‘Negro problem’ was crucial for the exigency of setting in motion a large-scale economic and social transformation. It brings to mind the configuration of other major historical moments of social and economic transformation—such as the abolition of the British slave trade,7 the American civil war, and the fall of apartheid––in all of which the confrontation with the issue of ‘race’ was contingent on the interaction of moral politics, anxiety about social cohesion, and corporate interests concerned with structural barriers to economic change. It reveals that Myrdal’s adoption of the complex of beliefs that he named ‘the American creed’ as a value framework for research meant so much more than simply a humanitarian moral stand provoked by the indignation felt by a Swedish social democrat and social engineer confronted with the social inequality and horrid race relations in the USA of the 1940s.8 7 See, for example, Eric Williams’ (1944) discussion of British abolitionism, the successes of which, he argues, must be seen in the context of a major shift in British global commercial and industrial interests of the time. 8 For an interpretation of Myrdal along these lines, see Jackson (1990). See also Platt’s (1992) critical review of Walter A. Jackson’s book, Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience.
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To speak of a current ‘European dilemma’ in the spirit of the Myrdal legacy presupposes, in consequence, that there is a genuinely common and shared dilemma extending across the EU as a whole—a dilemma involving clashes of values at different levels, general and particular, but all connected with vital stakes in the building of this emerging transnational community of nations and particular ethnic and other increasingly differentiated cultural and social identities. This presupposes, in turn, that there is some shared creed in Europe, some genuinely inclusive communal moral conviction to be invoked. To be a meaningful foundation for inquiry, such a presumed European creed must possess an ingrained quality of historical and path-dependent realism relating to vital European political traditions and institutions capable of gaining public legitimacy and inspiring social mobilization. It must also, in consequence, be capable of relating in realistic and complex ways to the multifarious transformation of the present, manifest in economic-technological change, novel forms of democratic governance and institutional frameworks, as well as new modes of culture and identity.
What Creed in Europe? Indeed, many Europeans like to think of their minor outgrowth from the Asian continent as the ‘birthplace of universal values and cultural patterns, hopefully to become shared by all and given worldwide consensus’ (Balbo 1993: 1). These qualities are commonly seen to be contained in the Enlightenment faith in liberal democracy and rights of citizenship. They include, Du Bois (1985 [1900]: 185) reminds us, the dimensions of social solidarity and social responsibility: These ideals differ in no respect from the ideals of that European civilization of which we all today form a part. And therefore our watchword today must be Social Solidarity, Social Responsibility.
This statement by one of the twentieth century’s great African-American intellectuals and political champions is important to remember when, in an age of the alleged ‘end of history’, democracy and rights of citizenship are becoming increasingly subsumed within the gospel of individual economic rationality, incarnated in the ever-present ‘market’. Du Bois was of course fully aware of the idiosyncratic political and cultural contingencies that colour the dominant interpretations of these allegedly universal European ideals and of the exclusionary social and institutional practices that limit their actual achievements. But he would not reject the possibility that their interpretation and the scope of their attainment could be modernized and thereby also universalized. In line with this—as in the lecture in Louisville, quoted above, which he gave to an audience of African-American educationalists at the dawn of the twentieth century—he urged the black population of the USA to take
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these values seriously, to embrace them politically, to fill them with substantial social and cultural meaning, and to actualize them through concerted action. After two world wars and today’s advance of an ethnically segmented Europe, and given that other tangible historical reality of European ‘cultural patterns’ like slave trading, colonialism, imperialism, racism, and genocide, the American Du Bois’ appeal to what he called ‘the spirit of modern Europe’ may, for some, appear naive, just as the European Myrdal’s appeal to the ‘American creed’ may. Later on, for sure, even Du Bois came to feel so deceived by white Eurocentric politics in the USA that he would advocate a markedly separate course for black struggles. Among Europeans, the philosopher Agnes Heller (1992: 20–21) voices succinctly the cynicism of the betrayed, and demonstrates with great clarity how people other than African-Americans or US ethnic activists would become disillusioned with actually existing Europeanness: [I]n modernity only those institutions can be stabilized that allow for accumulating political experience as well as for continuous appeals to greater social and political justice. . . . But apart from the technological version there is no longer a futureoriented social fantasy in the lands of Europe. Grand narratives of another, better future in politics, social questions, or anything else, are no longer forged there. Redemption is deemed undesirable, and sociopolitical progress ridiculed. . . . The old Europe resembles a corpse whose hair and nails, wealth, and cumulative knowledge are still growing, but the rest is dead.
But although a critical reception of the distinctive optimism expressed by a younger Du Bois concerning universalist appeals to social responsibility and solidarity in the name of Europeanness is certainly justified, it is still necessary to try to realize what happens if we conclude the analysis at this point. For intellectuals simply to stop there and announce, with Agnes Heller (1992: 2021), the death of what there ever was of a vision of a political democracy and of a creative social fantasy in the lands of Europe leads nowhere but to resignation or to libertine postmodern social fragmentation coupled with the actually existing universalism of a hegemonic ‘invisible hand’ (Naı¨r 1992). But it would also be to read the sentence of death for a project that is, after all, still openended. ‘Europeanness’ has indeed, argues Philip Schlesinger (1992b: 14) remained a ‘cultural battlefield’ where the continued ‘salience of national identity confutes the view that the grand narratives are passe´, and that there are no compelling tales of solidarity to tell’. Quite evidently, Schlesinger (1992b: 14) continues, ‘both the emergent nation-states of the old East, and the supranationalising European Community are heavily dependent upon convincing us that tales of solidarity within bounded communities are both plausible and desirable’. One trend in the search for a common European identity—most markedly represented by the visions and political practice of Jacques Delors (1992a; 1992b; Ross 1995)—emphasizes the necessity of including the mandate of social solidarity and responsibility within any idea and institutions for supranational integration that may be expected to enjoy public legitimacy.
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Understanding the Dual Crisis
However, the EU still primarily constitutes one huge single transnational market for commodities, capital, labour, and entrepreneurship. This market is sheltered by the umbrella of a ramified technocratic-bureaucratic political and administrative apparatus. There is, so far, no powerful common social dimension. The proposed EU Constitutional Treaty offered no convincing charter pertaining to basic rights of social, civil, and political citizenship. There is, moreover, unlike in the USA, no positive historically rooted and common popular political ‘creed’ in the EU which goes beyond the individual nation states and on which the legitimacy of claims for such rights can be based (Shore and Black 1994). Finally, there are as yet (given the still weak status of democratic bodies like the European Parliament and the predominantly national basis of social movements and political parties) no broadly accessible and powerful democratic political institutions or agencies through which to struggle for their possible foundation at the supernational level. There is, as argued by E´tienne Balibar (1991), ‘no state in Europe’ in the established liberal democratic sense of the concept. So far, this has largely left the initiative in the contemporary battle over Europeanness to the European Commission and its political and administrative bodies. We may, in this sense, compare the present situation concerning the creation of supranationalizing institutions and a common European identity to the Italian Risorgimento or to the nineteenth-century Prussian efforts to build a unified and powerful German state from above, centralizing and remoulding the multifarious economic, social, and cultural landscapes of smaller pre-existing political communities. But, like these precedents in the state-formation process, contemporary Europeanists are faced with intricate dilemmas concerning the cultural and ideological sources of the common identity, political legitimacy, and social solidarity they seek to create. Like much of the conspicuous upsurge of nationalism in Europe today— from the ethnic-nationalist claims of new political elites in former Yugoslavia and other parts of post-Communist Europe to the nationalist-populist antiimmigration movements of Western Europe—various contemporary EU initiatives are boosting a nascent European cultural and political identity in exclusionary cultural or ethnic terms (Martiniello 1994; Hansen 2000a; Shore 2000). This is representative of a traditionalist or primordialist version of the definition of Europeanness. A ‘European creed’, in this version, is symbiotic with and tries to profit from the ethno-nationalist surge in the individual member states, and thus nourishes, rather than challenges, a divisive national chauvinism. It excludes by definition ‘numerous immigrants from the South and the East of the world already living in Europe, but also among those potential migrants who arrive in Europe as asylum seekers or of those already within the family reunification process’; one should be ‘above all preliminary ‘‘culturally European’’—to be allowed to profit from the relative economic European well-being . . . [an] ethno-racial conception of European
Understanding the Dual Crisis
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society which could account for all the exclusionary practices suffered by the non-members of that European society’ (Martiniello 1994: 38). Other attempts to deal with today’s European dilemma are based on overtly universalist and modernist assumptions. From this point of view the cultural construction of Europe is perceived as related to a parallel process of economic reconstruction and backed by anti-discriminatory and anti-racist policies, and poses the problems of identity and citizenship within the context of a global understanding of the EU’s social problems, changing political predicaments, ¨ ck 1994; Schierup 1995, 2003; R. Hansen and multicultural character (Baubo 1998; Hansen 2000a; Balibar 2004; Castles 2004). This goes beyond the more usual bias of the extensive debate on citizenship which is a conspicuous feature of social science conferences all over Europe; a debate that tends to concentrate on fairly abstract discussions of the merits and drawbacks of legal-political ideal types, but which in general pays less attention to questions of social inequality, political-cum-economic power, and global change. What is needed are not reductive or simplifying models but, on the contrary, a debate and institutional practices that allow space for the complexity of our present situation. It is also from this perspective that Myrdal’s approach is still relevant. Its complex perspective—reconnecting issues of power, culture, and democracy with concerns of racial discrimination, and this together with matters of political economy and class—can still provide guidance to research on the dilemmas of ethnically composite societies and to political action.9 Seen from this position, a contemporary European creed must, by virtue and by necessity, be more elaborate and inclusive than the idea of Europe shared by most of today’s Europeanists following in the footsteps of Saint Simon, Dahrendorf, and Delors. It is nowhere near enough to plea for a transplantation of the essentials of an enlightened national bureaucratic welfare compact to a supranational level. There is real social distress within the EU, connected with a pronounced structurally and institutionally embedded racism. While still carrying the weight of European powers’ colonial history (Hansen 2002), contemporary European racism is contingent on North–South polarization, on a segmented and unequal global ‘division of labour’, and on the dualization of those large European cities which are the main targets for today’s many forms of (economically and politically) forced mass migration. An exclusionary ‘Commonwealth of Ethnocentrism’ (Schmid 1992) may prefer to detach itself from the distressing challenges represented by North–South tensions, the ‘globalization of poverty’ (Chossudovsky 1997), continuous immigration, and an exclusive ethnically divisive European society, as well as from the underlying political 9 Immanuel Wallerstein (1991a) provides an elucidating review of the Myrdal legacy, arguing for the important contemporary relevance of its complex and multi-disciplinary theory and method.
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Understanding the Dual Crisis
and economic predicaments. But, in spite of increasingly restrictive measures of immigration control, many of the uprooted contemporary helots (Cohen 1987) of the South and the East will, also in the future, find their way to the metropolises of the EU. Excluding the voices of ethnic minorities from the political process and barring an increasingly substantial population of migrant origin from emerging post-national identities and rights of citizenship in the EU would inevitably become one of the important factors jeopardizing what many Europeans continue to see as the most essential long-term objective for European integration. This is to build an inclusive and multifaceted postnational political democracy in an age when the dual forces of globalism and localism have made new frameworks for political articulation and integration imperative. These new forms of democracy will, in turn, require new forms of social solidarity and social responsibility at a time when the nation states have become increasingly barred from carrying universalizing claims.
A Dilemma Within a Dilemma However, the EU continues, so Prue Chamberlayne (1997) argues, to pivot ‘uneasily on the central contradiction between economic and political goals— between adjustment to the economic imperatives of capitalism and global competition and the task of generating a new European identity based on a sufficiently potent and integrative notion of citizenship’. During the 1990s, the fracturing of the fault lines of this contradiction between economic exigency in market economic terms and a necessary commitment to social solidarity and social welfare became a central and increasingly politically explosive dilemma for the Union (Chamberlayne 1997:2; Williams 1991). This is manifested not only in public attitudes and in voting behaviour confirming support for a strong welfare state (Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999), but also in strikes, demonstrations, and other public manifestations. The political elites of the Union would, indeed, have to pay a high cost if any serious commitment to develop the so-called social dimension of the EU should be abandoned. A one-sided emphasis on economic exigency at the expense of social solidarity would profoundly jeopardize the much propagated urgency of ‘social cohesion’ and political stability in the enormously heterogeneous multinational and multi-ethnic cultural conglomerate of Europe.10 Ultimately, even major corporate interests will depend on the overall objective of an integrated community. This contradiction in the EU’s current trajectory between capital-driven processes of integration on the one hand and the exigency of social redistribution on the other (Williams 1991) lies at the heart of a contemporary European dilemma of social solidarity versus corporate economic interest. Indeed, it resembles the basic contradiction which 10
For discussion of the issue of ‘social cohesion’ see, for example, Vertovec (1997).
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represented the point of departure for, among others, T. H. Marshall’s (1950) thinking on the modern national welfare state, but also the logic behind Karl Polanyi’s (1944) sweeping analysis in The Great Transformation, as topical a work today as ever (Schierup 1999b; Hettne 2004). In the contemporary EU, the ethnic and ‘racial’ component of the dilemma has, at the same time, become more and more obvious as the ‘social dimension’ and the ‘immigrant problem’ have become increasingly tightly interrelated. As the most conspicuous forms of social inequality of our time tend to become articulated in terms of (immigrant) ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, and ‘race’, and as the ethnic division of our economies, cities, and societies intensifies, EU institutions become challenged by a contradiction similar to that which was revealed when the proper dimensions of the so-called Negro problem were laid bare for American liberal reformists by Myrdal in the USA of the 1940s. In the words of Immanuel Wallerstein (1991a: 92), ‘[f]rom the perspective of those who hold power’, solving and not solving the dilemma of racism are ‘equally unpleasant alternatives’. Today the prospects of the EU boosting its competitiveness in the context of globalization is seen by influential proponents of capital, major unions, liberal analysts, and politicians across the Union as premised on the long-term and large-scale import of immigrant labour. Politically powerful interests groups will, most probably, continue to have an interest in the immigration of menial labour and in an ethnically segmented labour market populated by ‘foreigners’ who are bereft of occupational choice and who are spatially and politically isolated. The racialized minorities of our time are socially and politically marginalized, but essential cogwheels serving the much-hailed flexibility of production and labour regimes and the new service economies characteristic of current processes of restructuring. Yet the emergence of a growing population of socially excluded minorities represents not only a ubiquitous blind spot in terms of a democratic self-understanding but a growing threat to ‘social cohesion’. Continued immigration has given the large cities of Western Europe a distinctive poly-ethnic character. Like North American cities, these poly-ethnic urban conglomerates—nodal points of the global economy with information technology (IT) as their dynamic force—have increasingly become ‘dual cities’ (Castells 1992). At one pole there is a cosmopolitan elite at the centre of the informational economy, living in continuous communication with all parts of the globe, economically, socially, and culturally. At the other is the ‘tribalism of local communities, retrenched in their spaces that they try to control as their last stand against the macro-forces that shape their lives out of their reach’ (Castells 1992: 17). These areas are marked by high unemployment and social marginalization, containing as they do labour reserves for a substantial new low-wage, largely de-unionized, service sector which represents the functionally necessary counterpart to the urban informational economy.
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Understanding the Dual Crisis
During the 1980s and 1990s, the contemporary urban unrest which first became obvious in the UK in the 1980s has, contingent on this economic and social dualization, found different forms of expression in cities all across Europe. There are the disorganized urban so-called riots. There are the problems of drug abuse, the everyday criminalized violence, and the ongoing ‘neotribal’ warfare between rival gangs. But there are also alternative social movements mobilizing ethnically and racially defined minorities in protest against racial harassment, in defence of their local neighbourhoods or ethnic communities faced with discriminatory actions of local government. These movements also raise key issues of education, culture, employment, and rights of citizenship to the national agendas in different countries (Miller 1981; Gilroy ˚ lund 1996, 2003). But they are, in 1987; Rex and Drury 1994; Ireland 1994; A turn, often taken as a provocation by populist movements and parties and by a plethora of ‘neo-Nazi’ youth groups. There is indeed a growing consciousness concerning the articulation of this emerging dilemma of migration and racism with Europe’s overall dilemma of social cohesion and the market (Hansen 2001) among leading political elites. Following the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, an impressive EU reform agenda has been developed. A new manifest anti-discrimination orientation has been turned into mandatory directives and large-scale transnational development programmes, which require member states to combat discrimination and social exclusion. But new actually emerging policy frameworks for positive action may in turn be jeopardized by the character of the wider normative and institutional frameworks upon which they are contingent, twisting in the process the moral-political premises of the overall dilemma. The shifting reference in EU political discourse of the concept of ‘social exclusion’ and its positively charged opposite of ‘social inclusion’ is an important indicator. At the beginning of the 1990s, an association of the meaning of the couplet ‘exclusion/inclusion’ with a broad conception of citizenship and social welfare was basic to the European Community’s programme on poverty and social exclusion. Here social inclusion was understood as preconditioned by civil, political, and, in particular, social rights of citizenship, sanctioned by the overall political compact of the welfare state. This also implied the reality of a substantial citizenship11 contingent on the existence or establishment of overall institutional and social conditions that would facilitate the actual exercise of these rights by exposed individuals and social groups, and thus their actual participation as full and equal members of society. Social exclusion was, conversely, seen as signifying exclusion from citizenship in the broad sense of blocking actual opportunities for individuals to exercise full and fundamental social, political, and civil rights in a liberal-democratic welfare society. But this original association of the couplet ‘exclusion/inclusion’ 11 We refer here to the habitual distinction between formal and substantial citizenship as defined and discussed by, among others, Castles (1994a).
Understanding the Dual Crisis
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with a broad notion of substantial citizenship has been subsequently narrowed to the connotation of exclusion from or inclusion in paid work or selfemployment. This goes hand in hand with current tendencies to dismantle social rights of citizenship and with the aim of removing barriers to the establishment of ‘the market’ as the dominant form of regulating economy and society. The general movement is from one type of European political coalition and discourse to another; that is, from a conservative-social democratic coalition attempting to merge differential political concerns with ‘social order’ and ‘equality’, to a neocommunitarian–neoliberal coalition concerned with reconciling ‘social cohesion’ with ‘market efficiency’. Given the overrepresentation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the lower ranks of the social hierarchy, it is in this context of changing conceptions of ‘social exclusion’ and the continuous hollowing out of social rights of citizenship that the prospects for the EU’s anti-discrimination policies must be analysed and assessed.
Outline of the Book ‘Citizenship’ remains, however, the prime moral-political watchword among policymakers and enlightened administrators across Europe, including the European Commission itself, as well as the privileged critical theoretical concept and analytical tool among scholars who approach contemporary issues of immigration, ethnicity, and race. The crisis of the nation state has spawned a search for new theories on ‘transnational’, ‘post-national’, ‘global’, or supra¨ ck 1994; Soysal 1994; national ‘European’ citizenship (Habermas 1994; Baubo Favell 1998; Held et al. 1999; Balibar 2004), to account for the challenges of the profound restructuring of economy and society embedded in globalization. Claims have been made that a widening post- or transnational space for the institutionalization of extended human rights or rights of citizenship offers fresh perspectives on persistent national ‘ethnic dilemmas’. These theories draw the force of their argument from new moral-political conditionality and institutional opportunities seen to be latently present in emerging forms of supra- or transnational integration. This is due to the opportunities they are perceived to offer for venturing beyond the ethnocentrism of traditional national regimes of citizenship and their distinctive politics of closure concerning immigrants and ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, when one takes note of the recent and, indeed, heightened interest in the relationship between the EU level and the problems and dilemmas addressed here, it is of utmost importance to remember that such a relationship has existed since the onset of European integration in the 1950s. Although the impact of the EU level has become more marked, visible, and subjected to public debate as a result of its expanding competence since the mid-1980s, matters concerning migration, citizenship rights, and identity (regional, national, racial, ethnic, or other) are, as such, in no way novel to
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Understanding the Dual Crisis
the EU project. They should, rather, be seen as having had a crucial bearing on the very constitution and logic of European integration as it started in the aftermath of the Second World War. Of particular importance are the reiterated debacles of the efforts to equip the Community with a substantial ‘social dimension’. This has continued to impose important limitations on its capacity to actually implement proclaimed policies against racism and discrimination, specifically affecting the leeway for practising humane asylum policies and the actual potential to develop socially inclusive policies of immigration. What possible scenarios may we project? Will the result be a dual society on the contemporary neo-American (US) model, marked by unbounded fragmentation of social solidarity, with increasing masses of new poor controlled by police and prisons and with racialist policies instrumentalized to block social movements for change? Will the challenges of new immigration, social exclusion, urban crisis, and ethnic diversity continue to propel the retreat into defensive authoritarian-nationalist regimes seeking to conserve what remains of the traditional European welfare policies as ethnic preserves for entrenched national majorities? Or could we, conversely, discern in embryonic new flexible forms of governance a revived inclusive social compact, a ‘rainbow coalition’ across a ‘Europe of citizens’ which could include the increasing differentiation of identity, of tales of cultural belonging, and of political allegiance displayed in new–old ethnic, racial, or religious idioms? Might we even, as some project, beyond the Union’s present state of an ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (van Apeldoorn 2003), come to see the retreat of national and of Eurocentric hegemonies in favour of a grander regime of transnational or global citizenship; that is, a further crystallization of international norms, laws, institutions, and political sanctions embedding claims for diversity and social rights in a truly cosmopolitan framework? Could we imagine such an overarching cosmopolitan framework being matched by new forms of local democracy and social solidarity reintegrating socially polarized cities and sealed-off urban ghettoes? These and other imagined European scenarios or projections, which we encounter in current debates within the social sciences, are all enmeshed within developments at a global level, like explosive financial crises and deteriorating North–South relationships. But a central dynamic determinant remains in the politics and policies of national, supranational, and local polities belonging to the EU itself and in the kind of overall self-understanding of the European project that circumscribes them. In this aspect, the contemporary European dilemma is no different from its past or present American counterparts; but the primacy of political philosophy and moral values, and of scrutinizing the political responsibility or lack of concern reflected in actual choice and strategy, is often neglected in academic enquiry. Departing from these premises, the central issue, the heart of present dilemmas of race, class, and democracy, and the focus of this book, is whether a sustainable policy targeted at equal opportunities can actually succeed without the precondition that some form of a broad social compact on citizenship
Understanding the Dual Crisis
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and social welfare is still valid in terms of normative political consensus and strong institutions beyond and complementary to the market. Chapter 2 surveys post-Second World War migratory trends and the formation of new ethnic minorities in Western Europe. Against this background Chapter 3 retrieves contingencies of EU policy development concerning matters of migrant integration, labour migration, and asylum on the threshold of the twenty-first century. A particular emphasis is placed on an analysis of the incongruous constitution of the EU and on the ambiguity of its new policies of migration, asylum, migrant ‘integration’, and anti-racism as expressed in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and its aftermath. Indeed, since the problems addressed in this book are so intrinsically bound up with the historical as well as the current development of the EU, their solution, as well as their protracted aggravation, are equally bound up with the future trajectory taken by the EU. Or—in another formulation—with half a century of a European integration process that has effectively limited and, in some respects, even pre-empted ‘the problem-solving capacity of national political systems’ (Scharpf 1999) in areas of welfare, immigration, labour market policy, and macroeconomic policymaking it becomes increasingly important to assess and analyse the capacity, or perhaps incapacity, for problem-solving in these areas at the level of the EU. In Chapters 4–8 we move to a comparative perspective. Based on a synthesis of theoretical propositions within US research on ethnicity, race, gender, and class, and with insights from European comparative sociological studies on welfare regimes, we venture into in-depth analysis of national cases. A discussion of the UK, Germany, Italy, and Sweden reveals a complex interplay between path-dependent institutional strategies and multiple tendencies of convergence in the direction of a neo-American strategy of globalization and its characteristic forms of ‘advanced marginality’. Yet individual societies continue, in line with their particular welfare regimes, their institutionalized economic and political frameworks, and their particular modes of organization of civil society, to cope with forces of globalization as well as processes of racialized exclusion in importantly different ways and with importantly different results. While these country studies analyse the articulation of different modes of marginality and exclusion in particular countries, Chapter 9 focuses on one particular type of process of organizational change observed across a selection of countries. We discuss the so-called subcontracting so characteristic of new strategies of corporate economic management in the network society structuring new ethnic divisions of labour in different national settings. At this point it is also necessary to draw attention to what has not been covered in our discussion. We have not been able to cover all the immigration countries. In Western Europe we have paid little or no attention to France, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland, all of which have had significant immigration and their own policies and approaches. Our account of Scandinavia has focused only on Sweden, and that of southern Europe chiefly on Italy. However, we believe that much of what is said about the
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Understanding the Dual Crisis
cases discussed does apply to other immigration countries. More serious is the omission of the new immigration countries of eastern and central Europe. The end of the cold war has turned countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary from mainly areas of emigration, first into transit countries for people moving to the west and then into new areas of entry and settlement. Since these countries have now joined the EU, their models of immigration and settlement are clearly important to our theme. However, to include them here has simply not been possible for reasons of time and space. In all of the member states of the EU, the relations between the declared ideals of citizenship and the actual exclusion of ethnic or racial ‘Others’ from civil, political, and social rights result in moral-political dilemmas. But the specific forms which these dilemmas take vary immensely among the member states, as do the political-ideological terms in which they are understood and the institutional policies through which they are dealt in day-to-day practice. This is related to different European societies’ historical paths of development as well as to the particular ways in which these paths are still guiding contemporary political struggles and compromises in the particular member states of the EU. It is, among other things, this powerful path dependence that, from a transatlantic perspective, makes the European Union’s dilemma still different from its US-American counterpart, despite a number of contemporary processes of convergence. But path dependence, as it relates to different historical traditions, philosophies, and institutionalized practices, is also what makes it particularly difficult to advance concerted and consistent approaches to the emerging overall dilemma that issues of immigration, ethnicity, and ‘race’ have today come to represent for the EU as a whole. In light of this, the concluding Chapter 10 reviews the overall predicaments of the European dilemma as the EU faces the double challenge of national-ethnic diversity and social crisis. We focus on the issue of European moral-political identity and the future of a multinational–multi-ethnic democracy, and ask which moral-political values and institutional strategies may actually guide the future integration of one of the world’s most powerful economic and political blocs.
TWO
The ‘Migration Crisis’ and the Genesis of Europe’s New Diversity
E
UROPE’S ‘migration crisis’ is generally perceived as starting around 1989 (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994: 7). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist states led to instability in central Europe and undermined many of the barriers that had kept population mobility in check. It was expected that ‘floods’ of millions of desperate migrants would ‘swamp’ West European welfare systems and drag down living standards (Thra¨nhardt 1996). But by the mid-1990s it was clear that the ‘invasion’ was not going to take place. East–West movements did increase, but they were mainly of members of ethnic minorities moving to ancestral ethnic so-called homelands, where they had a right to entry and citizenship: ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) to Germany (Thra¨nhardt 1996: 237; Levy 1999), Russian Jews to Israel, Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, and Pontian Greeks to Greece. Millions of people moved within and between the successor states of the former Soviet Union (UNHCR 1995: 24–5). Russia thus became a major country of immigration, with around two million ethnic Russians leaving or being displaced from the Baltic states, new central Asian states, and other parts of the former Soviet ¨ nz 1996: 206). Movements of Poles, Russians, and other East Union (Mu Europeans to Western Europe in search of work also increased, but never reached extreme levels. Nonetheless, the period at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was a crucial turning point in European migration and ethnic community formation, above all in the way these events were perceived by both political elites and the general public. It also marked an upsurge in social scientific interest in the subject, with a sudden burgeoning of research projects, conferences, publications, and university courses. What were the new aspects of immigration that shaped perceptions and policies in the 1990s? The most immediate were the upsurge in asylum-seeker entries and irregular migration, which were seized upon by populist parties and the media to create a climate of panic. Asylum-seeker entries to European OECD countries peaked at 695,000 in 1992 in response to the Yugoslav civil
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The Migration Crisis
wars and then declined, but reached new peaks by the late 1990s. During the 1990s, substantial numbers of migrants also came from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (while Latin America became a less significant source than it was in the era of the military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s). Economic transformation, political upheavals, ethnic conflicts, and environmental disasters all triggered migrations, whether of refugees, asylum seekers, or undocumented workers. The result was an evergreater diversity in the geographical, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds of migrant populations. By the turn of the millennium, immigration had become a key political issue throughout the EU. In the UK politicians and some sections of the media did their best to create a siege mentality. In the Netherlands undocumented immigration triggered the populist movement and party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn. In Denmark a liberal-conservative party rehearsed the earlier experience of Austria by forming a government by relying on the support of a populist party whose main aim was to put a stop to immigration. Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece (King and Lazaridis 2000), which had formed labour reserve countries for north-western Europe in the first decades after the Second World War, had now themselves become immigration countries. Most of this immigration was undocumented. In spite of these countries’ shorter histories of immigration, populist movements centred on immigration became politically influential, in particular in Italy, where the neoliberal government of Silvio Berlusconi came to power on the basis of alliances with the populist regional party Lega Nord and the post-fascist party Alleanza Nationale. By the mid-1990s new immigration areas were emerging in eastern and central Europe (Wallace and Stola 2001). Countries whose economies stabilized and started growing soonest— the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic states—pulled in migrants from further east or from Asia and Africa. Some of the migrants were using these countries as transit routes to the EU member states, but many stayed on as undocumented migrants exploited in a large informal sector of the economy. European countries experienced new needs for both highly skilled and lowskilled workers. International labour markets for scarce skills in such areas as corporate management, IT, research and development, medicine, and the media led to the introduction of recruitment schemes and privileged entry rules for professionals. Low-skilled service workers were needed in areas unattractive to local workers, like catering, cleaning, housework, health services, the building industry, and garment manufacturing. Demographic factors—the decline in fertility and the increasing share of the population aged over 65— led to calls for recruitment of migrants for aged care work. Since governments generally did not want to admit low-skilled migrant workers, labour was more and more often provided by undocumented workers, asylum seekers, ethnic minority women, and youth. But new temporary ‘guest-worker’ schemes were also developed, first in Germany and subsequently in other EU member states.
The Migration Crisis
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Weak legal status, ethnic discrimination, social exclusion processes, and gender bias all combined to produce a new reserve of racialized labour, which formed the bottom rung in an increasingly polarized workforce. But perhaps the most important shift of the 1990s was the increasing awareness that the migrations of the 1945–73 boom period, together with new migrations since the 1980s, were leading to large-scale settlement and ethnic community formation. This had been obvious to some observers for many years (e.g. Castles, Booth, and Wallace 1984). In certain countries (notably the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands), official ‘multicultural’, ‘minority’, or ‘diversity’ policies were developed in the 1970s and 1980s. In other immigration countries official policies and popular ideologies were largely based on a politics of denial until the late 1990s. Politicians of the major parties continued to declare that Germany was ‘not a country of immigration’ until the federal election of 1998, when power was taken over by Social Democrats in coalition with Germany’s Green Party. But the opposition Christian Democratic Union (CDU) continued to resist change (e.g. Green 2004) and accentuated a xenophobic and increasingly Islamophobic rhetoric. France still pursues its ‘Republican model’ of ‘insertion’ (Hollifield 2004), which effectively means cultural assimilation. Policymakers in Switzerland, Austria, and many newer immigration countries still do not officially recognize the reality of permanent settlement and community formation among immigrants and their descendents. But by the early 1990s, public authorities, social service agencies, civil society organizations, and large sections of the public had become well aware of the changes occurring in social and cultural life, and were beginning to respond in various ways—often positively and negatively at the same time, revealing the controversial and disruptive character of ‘immigration’. Often local governments and administrations were much more realistic, flexible, and far-sighted than official national ideological statements and policies (e.g. Favell 1998). In view of all of these factors, it is no exaggeration to say that 1989 was a major turning point, marking a shift in the character of migration and settlement in Europe as well as in the self-awareness of European societies, as we discuss at length in Chapter 3 on the EU. Since the 1990s ideologies of ethnically homogeneous national populations and monocultural identities have become unsustainable. It is the central argument of this book that this shift has coincided and been closely linked with a fundamental change in the character of welfare states and class relations in Europe. This has all happened simultaneously with globalization and regional integration, which bring into question the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation state. In this chapter we look at important turning points in the migratory process in order to understand how and why immigration and settlement took place, and to examine the policies and assumptions that underlay these important changes. Two previous turning points can be identified (although their exact
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The Migration Crisis
timing varies among countries): the beginnings of post-Second World War migration (1945–50 in most Western European countries, but somewhat later in West Germany), and the stopping of labour recruitment (1973–4 in most cases, but considerably earlier in the UK), which set the scene for largely unexpected processes of settlement. The current period, starting about 2000, can also be seen as a significant turning point. It is characterized by a hesitant admission that Europe needs immigrants for both demographic and economic reasons, by a growing realization that border control alone cannot achieve effective migration realization, and by new (and often emotionally charged) discourses on security and identity. We discuss all these turning points here. We ask why settlement took place and describe the underlying assumptions on migration and ethnic and cultural differences that were built into the diverging national frameworks for the incorporation of migrants.
The Historical Context The second half of the twentieth century brought dramatic change in all aspects of social life. It was a period of decolonization as well as of major demographic and economic changes, which brought into question Europe’s historical pre-eminence in world affairs. The loss of vast overseas empires and the relative decline in international significance were perceived as threats to national identity in countries like the UK, France, and the Netherlands. Again, immigrants were a visible symbol, portrayed by the far right as colonized peoples ‘flooding in’ to take a sort of ‘historical revenge’ (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1982). The turbulent history of European nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries left a legacy of racism and ethnocentrism, which provided an unpropitious climate for the reception of immigrants. The extreme case is Germany, where the Nazi regime had just attempted to physically eliminate its minorities. Now Germans found themselves unexpectedly confronted with new ones. In general, feelings of superiority to and suspicion of other peoples are deeply rooted in European culture (Goldberg 1993). But the devastating experience of Fascism had also led to a widespread desire to do away with war and racism (e.g. Le´vi-Strauss 1971 [1950]). Although the post-1945 migrations to Europe had many new features, they were not without historical precedents. All European nation states are the result of historical processes of incorporation of culturally distinct peoples, either through the territorial expansion of states or through flows of population across borders. Over long historical periods such experiences of conquest, absorption, and cultural assimilation helped shape ideas and policies dealing with minorities (Lequin 1988; Noiriel 1988; Brubaker 1992; Moch 1992). To some extent, it is possible to speak of distinct ‘national models’ for dealing with migrant incorporation in the various European nation states. Often these
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models consisted of refined and modified versions of approaches adopted in the colonies of the major European powers. The welfare state has been a crucial factor in shaping responses to immigration and settlement (Jayasuria 1992; Faist 1993a, 1995a; Kloosterman 1994; Bommes 1995). In most west European countries, social safety nets were introduced between 1945 and the early 1970s, while similar measures came somewhat later in southern Europe. The aim was to eliminate the mass insecurity and poverty previously characteristic of industrial capitalism. These social evils were construed as the roots of the Fascist and Communist movements. Full employment, adequate working-class incomes, and a welfare safety net were seen as vital for maintaining the popular legitimacy of, and mass loyalty to, a liberal democratic political system. Moreover, Europe’s war economies had been based on a much greater involvement of the state in economic and social affairs, which, after 1945, led to nationalization of key industries and a high measure of market regulation. This social-Keynesian welfare model played a major part in post-war reconstruction and subsequent economic growth based on mass consumer demand and the concentration of production in the older industrial centres. From the early 1970s, however, the welfare state was challenged by the shift of investment strategies to a global level, with capital chasing the lowest production costs in new, low-wage industrial areas. The economic and financial regulatory model of the post-war period was displaced by a new emphasis on monetary policy, deregulation of markets, and global free trade, which suited the interests of transnational corporations. These changes were embodied in neoliberal ideology which was the basis for an attack on the welfare state, initially in the USA and the UK, and then more generally. They were made feasible by the new information technologies, the extension of global communication networks, and the development of economic infrastructure and qualified human capital resources in an increasing number of economic growth zones across the globe (Froebel, Henricks, and Kreye 1980; Castells 1996; Castles 2000). These changes in the welfare state will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. However, here it is important to note their relevance to policies on the incorporation of immigrants into society. Again, the picture is not simple. Welfare policies can lead both to inclusion and to exclusion of immigrants. Where immigrants were citizens from the outset (such as colonial immigrants in the UK), welfare systems initially played a positive part in their incorporation into society. Where immigrants had a legal status that denied them normal welfare rights, they were excluded and marginalized. In such cases, immigrants either had severely limited mainstream welfare rights or were included in special immigrant welfare systems that generally afforded inferior entitlements and segregated services. Welfare policies could lead to closure in another way too: where immigrants did automatically obtain the right to welfare access, this may have motivated governments to prevent legal
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immigration (Bommes and Halfmann 1998). An important background to this, during the 1980s and in particular the 1990s, was pressure from populist parties arguing that unemployed immigrants represented a burden on the welfare system that was seen to undermine the rights and privileges of national majorities (Schierup 1993).
Immigration and Settlement Since 1945 Western Europe as a Labour Magnet: 1945 to the 1970s In the immediate post–Second World War years, it was widely believed that Western Europe was ‘overpopulated’. In the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the devastation of the war, millions of people sought to emigrate, mainly to North and South America and Oceania. At the same time, millions of ‘displaced persons’ forced out of their homes by the hostilities and forced labour recruitment, and then by the beginning of the cold war, had to be absorbed. Many of these were ethnic minorities returning to their socalled ancestral homelands. The most significant influx was of some 12 million people into West Germany from the former eastern areas of Germany annexed by the Soviet Union and Poland, and from the Soviet zone of Germany (the later German Democratic Republic). In addition, through the 1950s and 1960s, independence of former colonies led to an exodus of large numbers of former colonists and administrators, such as the ‘pieds noirs’ who migrated from Algeria to France, Dutch colonists and people of mixed ethnic background heading for the Netherlands from newly independent Indonesia, and British settlers bound for the UK from newly independent African, Asian, and Caribbean territories. Despite these population increases, economic growth was so buoyant that labour shortages began to appear by the 1950s.12 The response by employers and governments was to recruit migrant workers. This labour migration was of two main types. First, virtually all West European countries employed foreign workers. Some came of their own accord, but in many cases they were recruited as temporary labour (or ‘guest workers’). The legal and administrative arrangements varied (Castles and Kosack 1973). Some countries, like France, the UK, and Sweden, were relatively open to family reunion and long-term stay. Others, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Austria, and Switzerland, went to great lengths to prevent settlement, through ‘rotation’ of workers, that is, a constant circulation of short-term migrants. Germany established the most sophisticated guest worker system, with a high 12 Some economists argue that economic growth was actually in part due to the additional labour provided by the displaced persons. Thus, Germany’s ‘economic miracle’ was partly to be explained by the very large labour reserves available at the time. See Kindleberger (1967); Castles and Kosack (1973: 384–93).
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degree of state control of the recruitment, working conditions, and rights of the migrants. Southern Europe, North Africa, Turkey, Finland, and Ireland served as labour reserves for the accumulation of capital and the building up of the extensive welfare states of the economically dominant areas of Europe during this period. Italy had been a major source of both overseas and intraEuropean migration since unification in 1861. In the 1950s Italy became for a while the main labour reserve for both Western Europe and Australia (e.g. Castles 1994b). Second, certain countries used labour from colonies or former colonies. Areas of origin included the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent for the UK, North and West Africa for France, and the Caribbean and Indonesia for the Netherlands. Generally there was no official recruitment: knowledge of work opportunities in the former metropolis, together with the legal right of entry, was sufficient to start migratory chains, which grew in volume in the 1950s. In the colonial period certain colonized peoples had been granted citizenship (or, in the British case, the status of ‘subjects’ of the Crown) as a form of ideological integration. This now facilitated the entry of much-needed labour, but it also meant that the colonial workers could bring in dependants and settle. By the 1960s, in the light of economic and political decline and growing community relations problems, the authorities of the three former colonial powers were having second thoughts, and introduced restrictive laws to stop immigration from former colonies. From then on, there was a convergence in status between guest workers and immigrants from former colonies. By 1970 there were over 12 million immigrants in Western Europe, and the process of ethnic minority formation had become irreversible (Castles, Booth, and Wallace 1984). But the 1973 oil crisis precipitated a reorientation of migration policies. All the old labour-importing countries of north-western Europe stopped recruitment between 1972 and 1974, except the UK, which had done so earlier due to economic stagnation and concerns about ‘race relations’. The subsequent recession of the mid-1970s was a major economic turning point, marking the beginning of the end of the Fordist system of industrial mass production in the old industrial countries. Labour inflows were being replaced by capital outflows to new industrial areas in the south. Large-scale immigration to Western Europe seemed to be over, merely a brief interruption to a long history of European emigration to the rest of the world. Governments expected guest workers to depart—a convenient way to export unemployment. But things turned out differently. Another type of immigration grew rapidly: family reunion; that is, the entry of spouses, children, and other relations of earlier migrants. Between 1974 and the mid-1980s immigrant groups that had come to Western Europe to work were demographically normalized (Castles, Booth, and Wallace 1984; Castles and Miller 2003). The old predominance of young men waned, new families were formed, and the original immigrants aged. The consciousness of many immigrants changed from that of temporary
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sojourners to that of permanent residents. Social, cultural, and political associations were established, and networks of ethnic businesses and services emerged. At the same time larger groups of refugees periodically entered Western Europe during the 1970s and early 1980s, connected with major political crisis and the subsequent repression of political opponents of authoritarian regimes. Immigrant families needed social infrastructure in the form of housing, schools, medical services, and other public amenities. Despite governmental reluctance to face up to settlement, educational authorities, social welfare agencies, and other local authorities began to respond to new needs and problems. The guest worker system was dead, even where this was not acknowledged officially. European policymakers reluctantly had to wake up to the unplanned emergence of the need to permanently incorporate millions of migrants into their social, political, and cultural institutions. This happened even in Germany, which had systematically endeavoured to avoid settlement. A complex conjunction of circumstances impeded any massive repatriation of migrants (as discussed in Chapter 6). Table 2.1 gives an idea of the increase in immigrant stocks in some of Western Europe’s main receiving countries from 1950 to 1975. As the notes to the table indicate, the differing definitions and categories for immigrants in various countries make it extremely hard to make statistical comparisons. The figures show how immigrant and minority populations grew and stabilized in these countries over the period. No comparable data are available for southern European countries since they were still emigration areas at this time. TABLE 2.1. Migrant populationa in selected Western European countries, 1950–75 (1,000 and per cent) (1) (2) (3) Migrant population
(4) Total population
Countries
1950
1960
1974
(1974)
Col. (3) as % of Col. (4)
Belgium France Germany (FRG) UK Netherlands Swedenb Switzerland
354 2,128 548 1,573 77 124 279
444 2,663 686 2,205 101 191 585
775 4,043 4,127 2,274 297 424 1,065
9,800 52,500 62,100 56,100 13,500 8,277 6,376
7.9 7.7 6.6 4.1 2.2 5.1 16.7
a Figures for all countries except the UK are for foreign residents. They exclude naturalized persons and immigrants from the Dutch and French colonies. UK data are Census figures for 1951, 1961, and 1971, and estimates for 1974. Data are for overseas-born persons and exclude children born to immigrants in the UK. b Figures for Sweden in column III and IV are for 1978.
Source: Castles, Booth, and Wallace (1984: 87–8) and Cohen (1987: 112), where detailed sources are given.
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The Diversification of Migration from the 1980s By the mid-1980s new forms of immigration were beginning to emerge. The southern European countries—the labour reserve for Western Europe, North America, and Australia for over a century, not to speak of the paramount importance of the Iberian Peninsula for immigration and settlement in South America—were experiencing a ‘migration transition’. Economic growth, combined with a sharp fall in birth rates, led to serious labour shortages (Corkill 2001; Muus 2000). Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece all became countries of immigration, using labour from Eastern Europe, North Africa, Latin America, and Asia for low-skilled jobs (King and Lazaridis 2000; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999; Anthias and Lazaridis 1999). Most of the immigrants came without documents. This immigration had already started slowly in the beginning of the 1970s (Nikolinakos 1975), but now reached large proportions. It might be thought that countries with traditions of emigration would be more capable of dealing with immigration. Unfortunately, southern Europe offers no evidence for this. The political response was long marked by benign neglect and laissez-faire, the bureaucratic response was discriminatory, and racism became a major problem. There is a specific southern European model of immigration, King (2000) argues, which differs from the earlier experience of Western Europe. It ‘ . . . is based on the demand for cheap and flexible workers in secondary and informal labour markets, where low wages are imposed on migrants through their often illegal or semi-legal status and the lack of opportunities in their home countries. The workers are highly concentrated in certain segments or niches of the labour market . . . ’ (King 2000: 18). Moreover, this new migration is shaped by the trends to globalization, flexibilization, feminization, and ‘illegalization’ typical of the late twentieth century. Thus, it lacks the elements of regulation and welfare-state integration typical of some (but not all) earlier movements. (We discuss these southern European patterns further in Chapter 4 and the Italian case, in detail, in Chapter 7.) At the same time, migration to Western Europe accelerated once more, particularly after the dramatic political changes of 1989–91. The largest new influxes were of undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, and ethnic minority ‘returnees’ from the former Soviet Union, while family reunion remained significant. Often these new currents were in fact the continuation of existing migratory chains: for instance, when Germany stopped Turkish labour recruitment in 1973, it was replaced by family reunion entries, as well as asylum seekers and undocumented migrant workers. This points to the durability of migratory processes once under way, and helps account for the failure of official migration control strategies. Undocumented migrants (also known as ‘illegal’, ‘clandestine’, or ‘irregular’ migrants) are job seekers from less-developed areas in eastern and southeastern Europe, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia, willing to take
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almost any job in the north. Many are young, and highly educated and skilled in their countries of origin, but likely to end up in unskilled, menial, and unregulated jobs in Europe (e.g. Reyneri and Baganha 1999). Their presence has given new impetus to the informal sector throughout Europe, and has been a major factor in the deregulation and social polarization of labour markets. This type of migration is stimulated by lack of opportunities in countries of origin, but responds foremost to demands for exploitable, ‘flexible’, and vulnerable workers in Europe’s economic growth zones. OECD countries have experienced a continuing rise in undocumented migration since the late 1990s. This followed a marked increase in undocumented movements around 1989. A further feature has been the ‘growth in trafficking of illegal migrants, which is now considered a form of organised crime similar to drug smuggling and prostitution’ (OECD 1999: 72). This criminalization of undocumented migration was one effect of growing political and media panics about population flows into Europe, which led to calls for tightly controlled borders. Similarly, influx of asylum seekers expanded in the early 1990s, not least in connection with the collapse of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Balkan wars. Indeed, it is hard to draw clear distinctions between the factors that drive refugees and undocumented workers to move. Both groups are motivated to migrate to Western Europe by the collapse of local economies, deteriorating institutional frameworks of government, growing legal insecurity, and the lack of human rights in the areas of origin (Schierup 1999a; Duffield 2001). As well, transnational networks facilitate their emigration and insertion into informal European labour markets, and income differentials as high as 20 to 1 between Western Europe and countries of the south and east exert a tremendous attraction, making the often high risks of migrating worth taking. The number of new asylum seekers in European OECD countries increased from 116,000 in 1981 to 695,000 in 1992. They came from Eastern Europe as well as from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Nearly two-thirds of them went to Germany, where annual entries increased from 49,000 in 1981 to 438,000 in 1992 (OECD 1995: 195). Between the early 1980s and 1995, some 5 million applications for refugee status were submitted in Western Europe (UNHCR 1995: 12). By the early 1990s this was being exploited by new populist movements, but also by traditional political parties, to create a panic about migration in Europe (Rydgren 2002; Hollifield 2004; Entzinger 2002). In fact, asylum-seeker entries fell sharply in 1993 and the following years. Nonetheless, the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo led to new movements throughout the 1990s, while asylum seekers from countries in Asia and Africa also remained numerous. Such movements became a routine part of Europe’s immigration scene, and began to increase again by the end of the decade. In 1999 some 363,000 asylum seekers entered fourteen countries of the EU (excluding Luxembourg). By 2003 entries were again declining sharply, to a figure of 288,000, due to
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3500 3000 Regular immigration of non-citizens 2500 Asylum seekers and refugees
2000
Ethnic Germans (Aussiedler, Germany only) Total
1500 1000 500 0 86 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19
FIG. 2.1. Annual migration into the EU (in ’000) Source: Based on Faist (2000a: 246).
tightening asylum regimes. The UK became the most popular destination country; it received a peak of 103,000 in 2002, which was followed by a sharp fall to 61,000 in 2003 (UNHCR 2004;). To these figures should be added numerous German Aussiedler (397,000 in 1990 alone) and other national minority groups from the former Soviet union, who moved to their ethnic ‘homelands’ in Western Europe. These new immigration movements in Europe are indicated in Fig. 2.1. They had significant effects on European politics. One result was an upsurge in racist violence and extreme-right and populist-nationalist mobilization in the early 1990s. Right-wing politicians fomented a panic over immigration and alleged ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. This came to be perceived as a votewinning issue, and populist and inflammatory speeches created a climate in which ‘foreigners’ could be blamed for a range of economic and social problems (Schierup 1993, 1994). Neo-Nazi groups seized the opportunity to portray themselves as the defenders of Europe from alien hordes, legitimizing violence against asylum seekers, Roma, and other minorities. The stresses of reunification made Germans particularly susceptible to nationalist and racist discourses. The number of officially recorded so-called xenophobic crimes rose from 2,426 in 1991 to a peak of 6,721 in 1993, and then declined to 2,644 by 1998. However, there were nine racist murders in 1998—the highest recorded number since 1945 (BBA 1999: 55). The number of crimes also soon rose again, showing that there are no grounds for complacency. In any case,
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the violence in Germany was no worse than that in the UK, France, Belgium, or Scandinavia. It simply attracted more attention, for historical reasons ¨ rgo and Witte 1993). The existence of openly racist political movements (Bjo became a constant feature of European societies (e.g. Baumgartl and Favell 1995). Another trend was the politicization of issues of asylum and border control. In Germany, after heated debates, Paragraph 16 of the Basic Law—a liberal post-war measure which had created a basic right to apply for refugee status in Germany—was amended in 1993 to restrict the right to asylum. By 1994 asylum-seeker entries had dropped to 127,000. Germany also introduced administrative measures designed to reduce the number of Aussiedler to 220,000 a year (Thra¨nhardt 1996: 237). Sweden tightened up entry rules: new asylum seekers dropped from 84,000 in 1992 to 19,000 in 1994, 13,000 in 1998 (OECD 1999: 263), and to 6,000 in 2003 (Migrationsverket 2004, and Chapter 10). Measures were taken to speed up processing of asylum claims, while intergovernmental agreements between EU countries sought to prevent applications to more than one country. The great majority of asylum applications were rejected. In 1993 the success rate was only about 4 per cent in Germany and around 10 per cent in Italy, Belgium, and Norway, but reached 28 per cent in France, yet dropped to 13 per cent in 2000 (Hollifield 2004: 195). However, many rejected applicants stayed on, with an uncertain legal status, since there were considerable legal and practical obstacles to deportation (OECD 1995: 121). The criminalization of undocumented migration noted above was reflected in an avalanche of new laws and police measures adopted by virtually all European countries to strengthen border control and to find and deport ‘illegals’ (see OECD 1999: 72–7). Most such measures were taken at the national level, but EU cooperation became increasingly significant. A succession of intergovernmental meetings was held to find ways of controlling migration. The most important measure was the Schengen Agreement, which was originally signed in 1985 but not implemented until 1995. The ‘Schengen states’—Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—began to dismantle border controls for people moving between these countries. At the same time, tougher control measures at the external borders of the ‘Schengen area’ were introduced. Effectively, the Agreement created a new class of ‘Schengen citizens’, to be added to the existing hierarchy of EU citizens, legal ‘third country’ residents, and undocumented immigrants. Schengen is emblematic of a general trend towards tighter control of entry to highly developed countries. In 1997 Italy, Austria, and Greece joined the Schengen Agreement—which was subsequently incorporated into the EU Treaty of Amsterdam (see Chapter 3)—and in 2001 the Nordic countries followed suit (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland). Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative effect of the migrations of the last half century on the populations of twenty OECD immigration countries. The
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25
Per cent
20 15 10 5
Foreign born
U ew Ca S Ze nad a a Au lan st d ra lia N
G It Sw erm aly iz an er y la nd
Fi
nl an Sp d Po a rtu in G gal re N ece o D rw en a m y Ire ark la nd Be UK lg N F ium et ra he nc rla e n Au ds sw stri ed a en
0
Foreign citizens
FIG. 2.2. Foreign-born and foreign citizens in per cent of population in 20 OECD countries, 2002. Note: For non-EU countries, data from 2000. For Italy, registered foreign citizens in 2003. Source: Integrationsverket (2003: 241, based on own estimates, OECD data, and EUROSTAT Labour Force Survey) and Cesareo (2004b, based on Istat).
data reveal the effect of diverging policies of incorporation, but also reflect national policies and prejudices. The great majority of foreign-born people in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy have remained foreign citizens due to these countries’ extremely restrictive naturalization policies. Because of this no separate data are available for the ‘foreign born’. The opposite is the case for the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which have inclusive policies that provide most (legal) immigrants with quick access to citizenship. But European countries that, like Sweden and the Netherlands, have led the way with inclusive ‘multicultural’, ‘minority’, or ‘diversity’ policies, also demonstrate a high rate of naturalization among the foreign-born. Portugal has a large number of naturalized persons due to its ‘post-colonial’ relationship to its former empire. However, figures on the foreign-born leave out the many second-generation migrants, who may still be seen as belonging to ethnic minorities according to criteria of social exclusion or cultural diversity. Ideally, national statistical authorities should provide data on foreign citizens, on the foreign-born and on children of foreign parents. This is the practice in Australia and Canada, but in Europe only Sweden and the Netherlands appear to do so. We return to this topic in the country case studies later in the book.
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Ambivalence and Disorientation in the Early Twenty-first Century Migration movements steadied for a while in the mid-1990s as a result of economic and political stabilization in Eastern Europe and a general tightening of rules on asylum and migration. But at the beginning of the new millennium, asylum and migration movements again increased. Moreover, they became much more prominent in the public consciousness. The politicization of migration, which had become prominent after the end of the cold war, took on new dimensions in the context of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’. At the same time, Western European elites became conscious of trends towards declining fertility and population ageing, combined with growing demand for both highly skilled personnel and low-skilled workers. Generous asylum rules and procedures in Western Europe in general, and in West Germany in particular, had originally been instituted in the aftermath of the Second World War, and later continued to function as a weapon in the ideological struggle with the Soviet bloc. Their tightening up after the termination of the cold war and the imposition of increasingly restrictive measures also towards other forms of entry were largely the result of a mainstream political accommodation to the claims and political advances of nationalistpopulist movements. But at the same time, notwithstanding a persistently high degree of unemployment among resident immigrants and ethnic minorities across most of Western Europe, a new debate about the future need for immigrants was triggered by powerful interest groups in the ‘old’ (pre-2004) member states of the EU. Low fertility was leading to demographic decline and ¨ nz 1996). By the 1990s, fertility in Italy was down an ageing population (Mu to just over one child per woman, or half the level needed to replace the population (Thra¨nhardt 1996: 232). Similar extreme trends prevailed in other southern European countries (Corkill 2001), but worries about demographic decline were general across the EU (Muus 2000). Germany began to recruit new types of guest workers from Eastern Europe, often under conditions even more onerous than the old guest worker system (Rudolph 1996), a practice that has been adopted even in other member states and discussed as a model for the EU as a whole. Yet Eastern Europe offers no long-term demographic reserves (Fassmann, ¨ nz, and Klekowski von Koppenfels 2002): fertility is low and life expectMu ancy is actually declining in some areas due to environmental factors. The high fertility and young underemployed populations of North Africa, Turkey, and the Middle East appear to many Europeans as both a threat and a potential benefit. Who else will provide labour for the factories and building sites, or carers for the aged, if present trends continue? But continued large-scale immigration from these areas will require a serious confrontation with the Islamophobia that has been the main tenet of populist anti-immigration agitation since the beginning of the 1980s and especially since 2001.
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Another important trend is the growing demand for highly skilled migrants in Europe. Highly skilled migration grew rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, and is a key element of globalization (e.g. Rhode 1993). Much of the movement is fairly short-term (from a few months to one or two years) and involves interchange of personnel between the economies of Japan, the USA, and Western Europe. However, most skilled migration does not lead to permanent settlement (Findlay 1995: 515–21). Highly skilled temporary migrants are much sought after, even in countries where there is growing hostility to immigration of less-skilled people (e.g. Findlay 1995: 515–21). They are perceived as bringing economic benefits for the receiving countries, without creating social obligations for the national welfare systems. Highly skilled migrants include managers and professionals of all kinds: executives, accountants, IT experts, medical practitioners, engineers, and research and development staff. The growing significance of computers and the Internet has put a premium on IT skills, and several countries have identified severe shortages in this area. Migrant entrepreneurs are also seen as important for international linkages and technology transfer, and the governments of immigration countries compete to attract their capital and abilities (Mitchell 1993). The international exchange of students is closely linked to the globalization of skilled labour; and cooperation agreements between universities, like the EU’s Socrates Scheme, are designed to encourage such trends. Indeed, the EU’s common labour market is designed to encourage interchange of qualified personnel; but mobility within the Community is quite low. All this increases pressures for opening up borders to experts from third countries; most member states have introduced special entry regulations to facilitate skilled migration. For example, in 2000, the German government decided to heed repeated demands from industry to open its borders to some 20,000 foreign computer experts (Erlanger 2002), and in 2002 the Bundestag adopted clauses in its Immigration Act allowing for import of more ‘immigrants with needed skills’. These moves, however, set off an inflamed political debate and contributed to populist agitation on the immigration issue by the CDU during the 2002 election campaigns (Erlanger 2002; see further Chapter 6). Similar dilemmas and conflicts are reported from most other EU member states. Today, Western European opinion is thus deeply ambivalent about immigration, and often contradictory policy trends express both real conflicts and deep bewilderment. Business leaders and economists emphasize the need for future labour, both skilled and unskilled, as a necessary precondition for a country’s remaining competitive in the global economy. Parts of the professional urban middle classes appreciate cheap personal services generated by immigration and often welcome the consequent apparent ‘cultural diversity’, while others line up with the populist parties. Humanitarians fight to defend the right of asylum. Large sections of the population feel threatened by the way immigration is used in neoliberal approaches to undercut the welfare
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state, stem the influence of trade unions, and undermine labour laws and collective bargaining. This is often linked to experiences of economic insecurity and social decline caused by globalization and industrial restructuring. Fears of immigration have become closely connected with political struggles surrounding change in national welfare states, their institutions, and their popular basis. By appealing to feelings of insecurity and using immigrants and asylum seekers as scapegoats, populist leaders have seized on immigration as an issue that can allow them to make inroads into the traditional constituencies of left or social-democratic parties (Schierup 1989, 1993; Bull and Gilbert 2001; Entzinger 2002). This politicization of immigration gives it a crucial significance in debates on the future of European societies.
The Dynamics of the Migratory Process The Globalization and Diversification of Migration The increasing politicization of migration is most conspicuously voiced in terms of the threat that immigration is alleged to represent to European societies through bringing in large numbers of people with a wide range of different ethnic, national, cultural, and religious backgrounds. In most Western European countries, foreign-born individuals now, as shown in Figure 2.2, make up 5–15 per cent of their total populations. These minorities are heavily concentrated in specific cities and neighbourhoods, where they influence social relations, welfare standards, lifestyles, and culture. Eastern European countries have smaller, but fast-growing, immigrant populations. In the early period of foreign-worker recruitment after 1945, most migrants came from neighbouring or fairly close countries: France, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland recruited from Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Sweden recruited from neighbouring Finland. The exceptions were the post-colonial immigration from Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia to the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Moreover, each immigration country tended to receive newcomers from a limited range of source countries: four or five countries generally accounted for the bulk. But from the late 1960s, as industrial countries competed for relatively scarce labour, recruitment spread to a larger number of countries and became truly globalized, affecting workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Oceania. The immigrant population of each immigration country of Europe came to include people with a much wider range of national, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds than ever before. After the turning point of 1973–4, it was the immigrant workers from southern European countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece) who tended to return to their countries of birth. This was connected with global and national economic restructuring and European integration processes, which
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brought about important changes in southern Europe’s subordinated position in the wider international division of labour (e.g. Nikolinakos 1977). This provided new opportunities for the reintegration of returnees. By contrast, other migrant groups, like those from Turkey, Yugoslavia, North Africa, and Asia, were more likely to stay in Western Europe, since their former homelands offered little in the way of improved economic opportunities. Economic incentives provided by the French and German governments to encourage Turks and North Africans to repatriate had little effect. German attempts to make workers pool their savings to bring about industrial investment in Turkey were largely unsuccessful due to lack of the infrastructure and the economic climate needed for development (Dietzel 1971). Those who stayed brought in spouses and children from their homelands or established new families in Western Europe. A further boost to diversity came with the new migrations of the 1980s and 1990s: asylum seekers and undocumented workers came from almost every area of the former Soviet bloc, as well as from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. By the end of the twentieth century, most European countries hosted immigrants from a large variety of backgrounds.
Settlement and Ethnic Community Formation This challenged a dominant short-term reductionist view among governments and employers, who had, in most cases, first seen entrants purely as labour migrants who would contribute to labour market needs without having any social, political, or cultural effects. Moreover, they would stay for only a few years and would not bring their dependants. Thus, migrant workers were, generally, not seen as future members of society. This view seemed plausible at first sight, at least in Germany and Switzerland of the 1960s, with their rigid ‘guest worker’ rule and special ‘foreigners police’, designed to restrict the rights of workers to a minimum and to ensure regular ‘rotation’ (Castles and Kosack 1973). In other countries, such a view was less plausible. Belgium, for example, had organized foreign labour recruitment after 1945, yet allowed spontaneous entry from the early 1960s, and did not generally prevent family reunion. Sweden recruited foreign workers, but claimed at an early date that they were never guest workers and therefore had full rights to family reunion and longterm residence. France established a labour recruitment system in 1945, but permitted it to fall into disuse, allowing spontaneous entry of undocumented workers from Spain and Portugal. By the late 1960s, 80 per cent of workers were coming this way, and were able to ‘regularize’ their position once they had jobs. This led to fairly chaotic situations, especially with regard to labour market rights and housing: foreign workers often endured sub-standard workplaces and lived in dreadful conditions in hoˆtels meuble´s (lodging houses) and bidonvilles (shanty towns). Family reunion also became uncontrollable. This laissez-faire approach seems to have been deliberate: undocumented workers matched employer demands for a low-skilled, exploitable workforce, while
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some measure of settlement was seen as beneficial in view of France’s low birth rate (e.g. Granotier 1970; Weil 1991). The countries which recruited workers from former colonies—France, the UK, Belgium, and Netherlands—must also have been aware that such workers were likely to settle but seemed to believe in the power of their assimilationist policies. Such colonial workers were citizens of the ‘mother country’ and had the right to family reunion and permanent stay. The Netherlands followed an apparently successful assimilation policy, devised originally to incorporate Indo-Europeans forced to leave Indonesia at the time of independence. However, this policy was to prove far less effective with subsequent post-colonial groups such as the Moluccans and Surinamese. France allowed in North Africans and migrants from former French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, but seems to have been deeply suspicious of them. Official statements indicated that they were to be short-term labour providers, while European immigrants were preferred for demographic growth (e.g. Castles and Kosack 1973). Yet the legal framework gave the colonial migrants a definite right to settle. In the UK, it soon became apparent that early post-war Caribbean and Asian immigrants would stay. This led to official discussions on possible consequences of settlement. Fears for public order (following the 1958 Notting Hill race riots) and for social cohesion seem to have precipitated the decision to severely restrict immigration of workers through the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. However, Britain’s economic stagnation also played a part in this decision. In 1973–4, when West European governments stopped labour recruitment and tried to expel migrants in order to ‘export unemployment’, they often achieved the opposite of what they wanted. Seeing the door to future mobility closed, migrants decided to stay on. This situation gave increasing importance to the informal networks developed by migrants as a way of coping with the difficulties of migration. Migrant networks are a way of accumulating and using cultural and social capital such as intimate knowledge of other countries, network-based capabilities for organizing travel, finding work, and adapting to a new situation (Faist 2000b: 195ff.). Informal networks are based on personal relationships, family and household linkages, friendship, community ties, and mutual help in economic and social matters. Such links provide vital resources for individuals and groups. Informal networks bind ‘migrants and non-migrants together in a complex web of social roles and interpersonal relationships’ (Boyd 1989: 639). These bonds are double-sided: they link migrants with non-migrants in their areas of origin, but also connect settlers with the majority populations of the immigration contexts in relationships of cooperation, competition, and conflict. Such networks are dynamic cultural responses which encourage ethnic community formation and are conducive to the maintenance of transnational family and group ties (Faist ¨ vell 2002). Closely related to such informal 2000b; Veiga 1999; Jordan and Du networks is the emergence of a ‘migration industry’ of labour recruiters, travel
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agents, advisers, informal credit providers, and fixers of various kinds. The key actors are informal pressure groups among employers, intimately connected with local administrations, who vie for cheap and flexible labour. On the basis of their historical experiences, European elites should have realized that immigration almost always leads to settlement of a substantial proportion of migrants and to processes of social, cultural, and political change. After all, immigration had played a key role in early processes of nation-building in nearly all Western countries. In North America and Oceania, myths of nation-building explicitly celebrate immigration and incorporation of settlers into the national community. In contrast, Western European countries have tended to write immigration out of their histories because it contradicted myths of national homogeneity (Noiriel 1988). In fact, internal and international migrations of workers, refugees, and settlers played an important part in industrialization and urban development everywhere (Moch 1992; Moch 1995). They have, historically, acted as powerful sources for political and cultural change. Once started, migratory movements often develop their own momentum and cannot easily be stopped or modified through government policies (Castles 1986, 2004). Hence, settlement and community formation followed inexorably from the dynamics of the migration process itself. Immigrants gradually turned into ethnic minorities. In the case of the post-1945 migrations, this took place in the context of structural factors which led to economic concentration at the lower levels of the labour market and spatial concentration in disadvantaged urban areas. Social divisions have been exacerbated by widespread practices of racism and discrimination and hostility to people of different ethnic backgrounds. These reactions gave impetus to the growth of informal community networks as well as political organization and interest representation among ethnic minorities at the local and the national levels (e.g. Miller 1978, 1981; Ireland 1994; Rex and Drury 1994; Pedersen 1999), and also, increasingly, at the supranational European level. The combination of changing economic and social conditions in both sending and receiving countries, powerful interests of employers (private as well as public), migrant networks, and the migration industry often appeared more powerful than the laws and institutions of national governments. This applied to the state apparatuses of northern Europe, but all the more so to the states of the new immigration countries of southern and central Europe. Here the influence of informal networks on local governments overrides formal democratic and institutional procedures to a greater extent than in the north. Powerful economic and political interest groups are able to manipulate local governments and the ways in which restrictive laws and regulations on migration and insertion into the labour market get interpreted and implemented or—more often—not implemented in daily practice (see also Chapter 7). Throughout Europe, long-term stay involved moving out of migrant hostels into affordable areas of cities and industrial towns. Immigrant neighbourhoods developed. These hardly ever had a majority population of a single
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immigrant group. Rather, they were areas of immigrant concentration, usually of a number of ethnic groups, where new cultural practices evolved, reshaping economic and social relations, and helping people to cope with changing social conditions. In such neighbourhoods, family reunion and family formation led inevitably to the birth of increasing numbers of children of immigrants—the ‘second generation’. Once these children began going to school in the receiving country and developed composite cultural identities ˚ lund 1997), return to the old country became less and less likely for the (A parents. A growing awareness of the long-term nature of their stay provided the motivation for building more acceptable ways of life in the country of settlement. This meant setting up places of worship, shops, professional services, clubs and associations, and increasingly influential political pressure groups. Informal networks and community formation were thus accompanied by, and merged with, more formal modes of organization. Migrants and new ethnic minorities began to act as interest groups towards administrations and political decision-makers.
Modes of Incorporation and Their Inefficacy The European immigrant countries adopted widely different approaches to managing the growing and long-term presence of immigrants and new ethnic minorities. Following national traditions, often developed through colonial practices, governments labelled their approaches ‘assimilation’, ‘integration’, or ‘insertion’. Here we use the term ‘modes of incorporation’ as a shorthand for the varying political-administrative frameworks or ‘policy regimes’. These encompass norms and processes whereby immigrants gain the rights, capabilities, and opportunities through which they participate in the various sub-systems of the societies in which they live (such as the labour market, the legal system, welfare, and political activity).13 Elsewhere (Castles 1995b, 1997; Castles and Miller 2003), we have discussed some of the huge literature on this subject, exposing diverging theoretical positions and controversies (e.g. Baubock 1994; Soysal 1994; Freeman 1995; Entzinger 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Mahnig and Wimmer 2000) and we have stressed the need to frame examinations of immigrant incorporation in a holistic analysis of the changing social, economic, and political relationships in European societies. We have distinguished between three very general ideal types of incorporation processes across Europe: 13 We use the term ‘incorporation’ as more general and neutral than terms like ‘integration’, ‘assimilation’, and ‘insertion’, which are often used to refer to specific political approaches or policy models, and which are loaded with variable (depending on countries and their policy orientation) and highly ideological meaning. It should also be noted that incorporation does not necessarily mean inclusion into society on an equal basis with nationals.
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differential exclusion, assimilation, and multiculturalism (Castles 1995b, 2000). Here we only briefly summarize a few points. Differential exclusion (in Europe generally referring to the guestworker approach) means accepting immigrants only within strict functional and temporal limits: they are welcome as workers, but not as settlers; as individuals, but not as families or communities; as temporary sojourners, but not as long-term residents. In this model, immigrants are (in principle) incorporated into certain societal sub-systems such as the labour market and some aspects of the welfare system, but excluded from others such as political participation. Differential exclusion implies legal and administrative arrangements that enforce strict distinctions between temporary residents and citizens, and which make it very hard to move from one status to the other. In post-war Western Europe, the German Federal Republic can be seen as having adopted the epitome of the differential exclusion model in Europe. However, it has certain similarities with exclusivist forms of migrant incorporation in many other parts of the world. The former apartheid system of South Africa, with its ruthless circular temporary migrant labour system (between the black ‘Homelands’ and urban-industrial and mining areas) (e.g. Wolpe 1972), could be seen as a particularly excessive form of differential exclusion, just like the highly exclusivist temporary workers regimes in oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. One could also consider systematic use of undocumented labour as an extreme form of differential exclusion. Where states tacitly accept or even create ‘back doors’ and ‘side doors’ for irregular migrants, they are covertly exploiting the lack of rights and the vulnerability of these migrants. Such practices have, for example, long been important with regard to Mexican labour in the USA and are currently used in Japan (Mori 1997; Komai 2000), Malaysia (Jones 2000), and other Asian countries. They have, of late, become important in the Eastern European member states, which joined the EU in 2004. Several of these, like Poland and the Baltic states, are themselves emigration countries with large groups of temporary migrant workers (often undocumented) in Germany and other Western European countries (most of which still oppose opening their borders to the new member states). Among the old migration countries of north-western Europe, France, the Netherlands, and Germany have long exploited substantial groups of clandestine and exceedingly insecure temporary migrants. But in the ‘new’ immigration countries in southern Europe, this has until recently been the overwhelmingly predominant practice (Fakiolas 2000; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999; Bagagna 1998; Corkill 2001). A growing southern European variety of nationalist-populist racism has become part of a cynical Catch-22 where immigrants are deemed unwanted because they are ‘illegal’, whereas their function as a low-wage heavily exploitable labour force for important sections of the economy is contingent on their being clandestine. As recounted by Theodoros Iosifides and Russell King (1999: 226–7), referring to the Greek case:
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Athens exemplifies the duplicitous view that Albanians and other immigrants can be exploited for their labour and paid the lowest wages possible, yet since they are illegal immigrants and ‘so should not be in Athens anyway’, their concentration in Spain in 2005 rejected spaces in sub-human living conditions is somehow justified. . . . Meanwhile, racism is becoming endemic and directed against virtually all non-Greeks.
Since the early 1980s, at the insistence of the northern European Schengen member states, consecutive so-called amnesties have been announced in southern European countries that have legalized the stay of hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants. These amnesties have seldom led to permanent resident permits or to substantial rights of citizenship, but often rather to a new precarious temporary status. As we discuss in detail in Chapter 7 on Italy, legalized migrants continue, after a short period, to relapse into a situation of non-legalized residence and irregular employment (Reyneri 1998b; Reyneri and Baganha 1999, 2001; Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas 1999; Calavita 2004; Sciortino 2004). Opaque and contingent legal and administrative practices have kept migrants in a state of long-term flux and insecurity between ‘illegality’ and temporary legalization. This has been instrumental in reproducing a highly flexible labour force, beyond state regulations and mainstream social welfare arrangements.14 For some firms and economic sectors, this provides an essential comparative advantage in global and inter-European competition (e.g. Mingione and Qassoli 2000). Yet, even in southern Europe, processes of family unification, settlement, and community formation are under way (e.g. Romaniszyn 1996; ISMU 2004: passim; Calavita 2004). They challenge the official common-sense philosophy concerning migration as well as prevalent administrative and management practices. Assimilation means accepting migrants as permanent settlers and inducing them to learn the national language and to take on the social and cultural practices of the receiving community. The basic underlying belief is that the descendants of the original immigrants will be indistinguishable from other members of the population, enjoying the same rights and obligations. Historically, French leaders consciously aimed to assimilate immigrants from Italy, Belgium, Poland, and other European countries, partly because France needed their labour, but also because it needed them as soldiers in the long struggle against Germany. Without immigration and assimilation, it was estimated that France’s population would have been only 35 million in the late 1980s instead of 50 million (Noiriel 1988: 308–18). When new migratory movements started after the Second World War, France and the UK urged assimilation on most groups up to the 1960s, as did several other European immigration
14 There is a growing literature on the southern European experience. See for example, King (2000), Baldwin-Edwards and Joaquin Arango (1999), and Anthias and Lazaridis (1999).
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countries. By the mid-1960s the assimilation model was being widely questioned. It became apparent that immigration countries were not living up to the liberal promise of equal opportunity. Immigrants experienced racism and discrimination, and found that mechanisms of labour market segmentation and residential segregation were leading to social isolation and exclusion. In response, migrants built communities in which ethnicity and cultural distinctiveness often formed the basis for solidarity. Organized immigrants pressed for change. In the UK, black and Asian immigrants from the New Commonwealth rejected assimilationist ideas that contrasted with their experience of dead-end jobs and racist harassment (Solomos 2003). In Sweden and the Netherlands, academics and policymakers began to recognize the importance of ethnic communities and cultural maintenance—issues pressed by migrant workers and their organizations. The response to the claims of immigrants was, in these three cases, to replace assimilation with ‘multiculturalism’ (under a variety of labels) in the 1970s and 1980s, even if more or less half-heartedly. The only old Western European immigration country to hold on persistently, at least officially, to hard-core ideas of assimilation is France, with its so-called Republican model of integration (e.g. Noiriel 1988; Brubaker 1990; Schnapper 1991; Favell 1998). Yet immigration to France—tacitly induced and exploited by employers in substantial parts of the labour market—has been marked by a strong measure of laissez-faire, with large contingents of undocumented migrant workers living clandestinely beyond citizenship and the reach of the French republican ‘pact of solidarity’ (Hargreaves 1995: passim). For those engaged in irregular sectors of the economy marked by dreadful working conditions and hyperexploitation, the French republican model of integration has little meaning. Yet, through repeated procedures of ‘regularization’, large numbers of undocumented workers in France have—unlike most regularized ‘illegals’ in southern Europe—acquired citizenship and become, at least formally, fully eligible for the associated civil, political, and social rights. But, as Hollifield (2004: passim) demonstrates, from the mid-1990s these fundamentals of the French republican model were progressively corrupted by attempts to roll back migrants’ civil and social rights. The right to family reunion was questioned, and a reform of the nationality code and erosion of birthright citizenship threatened fundamental political rights and the principle of naturalization basic to the republican model. This was the outcome of a long-term sequence of exclusivist measures, starting back in the mid 1970s and proceeding with the Schengen accord in the 1980s, where stringent external control measures went hand in hand with restrictions on migrants’ access to citizenship and an internal erosion of their civil rights and liberties. This process was, from the 1980s, influenced by the political sway of Le Pen’s Front National, and the movement’s voicing of arguments against immigration, family reunification, and the integration of Muslim and African immigrants in French society (Hollifield 2004: passim).
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Multiculturalism was first announced as a government policy for managing ethnic diversity in Canada in 1971, and introduced in Australia in 1973. At about this time, British race relations acts started to recognize that the UK had become a de facto multi-ethnic society and the notion of ‘multi-culturalism’ (initially hyphenated) began to be used in debates about education of black and Asian children in the UK (Joppke 1999: 233 ff.; Solomos 1988: 79 ff.). Sweden’s immigrant policy introduced in 1975 is often labelled as multiculturalism, and went far, in formal terms, in recognizing immigrants as ‘ethnic minorities’ with particular rights in Swedish society. The same applies to the Dutch ‘minorities policy’ established in 1983 (Rath et al. 1999; Entzinger 2002). Multicultural policies have also been introduced in specific sectors, such as education or social work, even in countries, like France and Germany, which have rejected multiculturalism as a general model. Multiculturalism can be characterized as a political ideology and a model for public policy designed to ensure the full socio-economic and political participation of all members of an increasingly diverse population (Rex 1985; Castles 1999). As such, multiculturalism has generally meant the public acceptance of immigrant and minority groups as representing distinct communities, which are distinguishable from the majority population with regard to language, culture, and social behaviour, and which have their own associations and social infrastructure. Multiculturalism implies, in this sense, that members of such groups should be granted equal rights in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their diversity (Taylor 1992; Parekh 2000b), although usually with an expectation of conformity to certain key values (Kymlicka 1995), which are seen to guarantee equity and commitment to social equality. It is this combination of recognition of cultural difference and measures to ensure social equality that is habitually taken to represent the essential feature of multiculturalism (Rex 1985; Castles 1994a, 1997; Castles 1995a). But there is, generally, a marked discrepancy between the theory and ideology of multiculturalism and actual political practice. Thus, critics of an actually existing multiculturalism in Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK, have pointed to the cooption or blocking of migrants’ civil agency through state-sponsored multiculturalism from above (Schierup 1991b; Rath 1993), or the danger that an excessive ‘cultural essentialism’ or focus on ‘corporate identity’ (Young 1989, 1997) will come to jeopardize the welfare institutional (social class) objective of equality (Frazer 1997; Barry 2001) and unwittingly promote a new racism focused on cultural difference (Barker 1981; ˚ lund and Schierup 1991). Critics on the right Duffield 1984; Gilroy 1987; A have argued that multicultural policies exacerbate the ‘clientilism’ connected ¨r with extensive unemployment among immigrants and ethnic minorities (Gu 1996). It is important to note, however, that the concept of multiculturalism is not always used in the way outlined above, that is, as a political ideology and a
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certain orientation in public policy. For instance, the term ‘multicultural society’ is frequently used as a synonym for a ‘multi-ethnic society’—that is, one in which groups with differing languages and cultures live side by side—or a ‘plural society’ (critical discussion in Rex 1985). In these terms, the great majority of the world’s societies today would be multicultural (though some more so than others). But this says nothing about the relationship between majorities and minorities, or about public policy towards minorities. A multicultural society in this sense may have highly conflictual intergroup relations, like South Africa under apartheid. In other cases, multiculturalism is often used primarily as a statement about historical and cultural identity. This is its main reference in the USA, where managing intergroup relations is not generally seen as a task of the state. US supporters of multiculturalism argue for the distinctive inclusion of the role played by Native Americans, AfricanAmericans, other racial and ethnic minorities, and women in national history, education, and culture. This understanding of multiculturalism has been criticized for its lack of a wider understanding of the intersection of race, ethnicity, and social class (Escoffier 1991; Marable 1993; Giroux 1993, 1999). Conservative opponents of multiculturalism in the USA, Europe, and elsewhere argue, on their part, that it legitimizes separatism, cultural relativism, and even fundamentalism, leading to a segmented society fraught with conflicts and therefore a threat to citizenship, modernity, secularism, and gender equality (e.g. Schlesinger 1992a; Schnapper 1991, 1994).
Between Liberal Ideals and a Convoluted Realpolitik: International Migration and the Future of European Societies The 2004 enlargement of the EU with new member states in Central and Eastern Europe may bring some satisfaction to employers’ demand for both low- and high-skilled immigrant labour. But these countries all experience high rates of economic growth, have very low natural demographic growth rates, and are themselves becoming labour-importing countries. This means that the import of labour from Asia, Africa, and parts of Latin America will probably continue for any foreseeable future. But at the same time European racism is particularly focused on these ‘visible minorities’ and the heated rejection of further settlement. Grappling with this dilemma, governments across the Union appear indeed to be staging a sort of ‘return to the future’ in terms of the post–Second World War experience of migration and settlement. Governments, local administrations, and public service institutions strive to meet employers’ demands for cheap and ‘flexible’ labour but, at the same time, they attempt not to provoke anti-immigrant populism. New short-sighted
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policies are emerging, opening the doors to new discriminatory employment practices which are supposed to steer clear of those ‘imperfections’ of earlier policies that allowed immigrants’ settlement and their gradual incorporation into a status of denizenship or citizenship.15 This is effected through short-term contract worker systems, elaborate international sub-contracting relationships, and the increased importance of non-documented or so-called illegal, or clandestine, labour migration. The latter is welcomed by certain employers and tacitly tolerated by local authorities (Martin 1997; Hunger 2000; Slavnic 2000; Calavita 2004; Sciortino 2004). Given Europe’s projected large demographic deficit and present trends in labour market needs, immigration and settlement are most likely to continue and, conceivably, to take on hitherto unprecedented dimensions. In the process, European societies across the EU, including the new member states, will most likely continue to become increasingly ‘plural’ in terms of actually existing ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. However, it is not clear how this increasing plurality will be managed. Given the likely reality of further permanent settlement, a number of liberal scholars envisage a long-term convergence on inclusive citizenship rights for immigrants, based on fundamental principles of liberal democracy, including ¨ ck, Heller, and Zolberg recognition of a measure of cultural difference (Baubo ¨ ck and Rundell 1998; Joppke 1999): a moderate liberal civic multi1996; Baubo culturalism supplanting debased models of incorporation. Both policies of differential exclusion and a compromised assimilationism have, indeed, proved their inefficacy in dealing with the dynamics of processes of international migration, and have become trapped in the contradiction between nationality and citizenship. The stigmatization of those who are seen as culturally or racially ‘alien’ to an imagined homogeneous national community exacerbates exclusion from social rights and civil agency. This tends, on the one hand, to further alienate growing categories of immigrants in terms of culture and identity, and on the other, to play into the hands of populist movements. But the trend towards policies of recognition (Taylor 1992) in terms of ethnic plurality in some European countries in the 1970s did not necessarily, in itself, indicate greater flexibility or far-sightedness on the part of policymakers. It was sometimes adopted because an actually existing ‘multiculturalism’ was quite compatible with specific traditional models of colonial administration for dealing with ethnic plurality (Solomos 1988: 30 ff.), or conveniently extrapolated from institutional practices habitually employed ˚ lund for dealing with religious cleavages (Entzinger 2002) or class conflicts (A and Schierup 1991; Soininen 1999). Moreover, the move towards a liberal civic multiculturalism was not a one-way street. An optimistic view of the chances of multiculturalism in the 1980s and early 1990s, whatever its specific 15 The term of denizen was introduced in the habitual social science vocabulary by Hammar (1990) for covering the status of individuals (migrants and often also subsequent generations) who are not formally citizens, yet have a substantial array of rights and obligations in a state.
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(national) label, was challenged by more dissociated neoconservative views on migrant incorporation from the mid-1990s. In Sweden this had already emerged by the mid 1980s, but was not to the same degree as in Holland, one decade later, followed by a neo-assimilationist backlash: a ‘strong move away from liberal tolerance and cultural relativism and toward neoconservatism with certain nationalist traits’, as worded by Han Entzinger (2004: 291). In 2002, the Dutch government declared that it had plans ‘to force immigrants to swear allegiance to the Dutch flag and to learn the national anthem by heart’ (Dagens Nyheter 2002), and in 2003, an act for the ‘Integration of Newcomers’ was passed by parliament putting an emphasis on compulsory and disciplinary civic and language instruction to promote assimilation and loyalty to the nation. A somewhat similar trend can be discerned in the UK, notwithstanding the advocacy of a liberal ‘multicultural future’ by a distinguished government counsellor (Parekh 2000b). The Conservatives decided to ‘play the race card’ in the 2005 General Election by putting forward policy proposals designed to make immigration and asylum major campaign issues. Conservative leader Michael Howard proposed a British withdrawal from the Geneva Refugee Convention and parts of the European Convention on Human Rights (Tempest 2005). There appears currently to be a convergence on such neoconservative or neo-assimilationist political models in major parts of the EU, including, among other countries, Denmark, France, and Germany. The issue of multiculturalism recurred as the subject of heated discussion during the German election of 2002. Responding to a statement by a representative for the Green Party, who aspired to remake Germany in the image of ‘a modern, multicul¨ nther Beckstein, the Christian Democrat tural land of immigration’, Gu spokesman on ‘police and immigration matters’, responded: ‘That is exactly what we don’t want’ (cited in Erlanger 2002). Current supranational ‘postAmsterdam’ EU policy orientations concerning racism and discrimination, targeted at social inclusion through enlightened ‘diversity management’, are certainly an encouraging trend. Yet, it is doubtful whether such policies will survive or achieve their intended effects in the context of the general onslaught on equality and the welfare state. This is exacerbated by the hitherto dominant realpolitik concerning ‘the social dimension’ at the EU level, together with the increasing criminalization of immigration and debasement of formerly liberal and humane refugee and asylum regimes, and are issues that we examine in the following.
THREE
Migration, Citizenship, and the European Social Model
B
Y the end of the 1990s, the issues of immigration, asylum, and migrant and ethnic minority ‘integration’ rose to the top of the EU agenda. Boosted by a process of supranationalization of important areas of migration policy inaugurated by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and the Tampere European Council in 1999, the EU has emerged as a powerful force and influential actor within the field of migration policy. Before we turn our attention to the most recent developments, it is important to clarify at the outset that European integration has always had, since its beginning in the 1950s, a bearing on questions related to international migration (see Hansen 2005b). Apart from being organized around the issue of colonial relations and the cold war logic inherent in West German rehabilitation, the coordination of coal and steel production, as well as numerous other issues tied up with security concerns, European integration also started out as a response to ‘the powerful logic of capital accumulation’ (Williams 1994: 3–4) that was to advance significantly in Western Europe during the post-war economic restoration and ensuing boom. In this scheme of things, labour migration was allocated a crucial function. Migration was seen as intrinsic to the founding logic of the EEC whereby a competitive economy of scale would be created in the Community in which the free movement not only of goods, capital, and services, but also of labour, was seen as one of the ultimate goals of integration. With each national labour market unable to meet the great postwar demand for labour on its own, intra-Community labour migration was viewed as instrumental in compensating for the general shortage of labour as well as in assisting in phasing out regional bottlenecks and other types of labour-market imbalance. However, since workers in the member states were slow to practise ‘free movement’ to meet the demand for labour, it was, instead, labour migrants from outside the Community who underwrote the continued economic expansion in the EEC and in post-war Western Europe at large. Major changes in the Community during the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, brought about by the Single Market Programme (1985), the Single European Act (SEA, 1987), and the Maastricht Treaty (1993),
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entailed an increasingly prominent role for the project and process of European integration. This culminated in Maastricht’s endorsement of European Monetary Union (EMU) and its institution of a ‘Citizenship of the Union’—or ‘European citizenship’—for member state nationals, the latter constituting an integral part of the EU’s ever more prioritized project of promoting a collective sense of ‘European identity’ in the Union (Hansen 2000a). This development, whereby more and more policy areas and future challenges to the member states took on a ‘European dimension’, would by no means sidestep the question of migration. In our discussion in Chapter 2 of the ‘turning point of 1989’, we noted that around this time, increasingly harmonized perceptions of and policies on migration were taking shape among member state governments. This signalled the true emergence of migration as a common ‘European’ ‘problem’ and ‘crisis’, calling for common action and solutions. Market-making measures introduced under the banner of the Single Market, particularly those pertaining to the free movement of persons and the associated goal of abolishing internal border controls, thus instigated a logic whereby immigration and asylum would be progressively framed as Community matters. The future dismantling of border checks between member states was generally perceived as intimately related to the compensatory development of coordinated control measures at the Community’s external frontier. Indeed, the very notion of such an external and hence, communal, border was directly related to the EC’s growing interest in questions of immigration and asylum. But, since the free movement provisions came to apply only to member states citizens, the implementation of the Single Market would also come to hinge on the development of new measures for the internal control of asylum seekers and third country nationals. From the outset, then, the endeavour to coordinate and harmonize immigration and asylum policy in the EC was to have both external and internal repercussions on the ‘frontierfree Europe’. But Community activity in the area of migration also began to address a range of other pressing problems concerning the situation of ethnic minorities of migrant background. After wide-ranging deliberations on the long-term effects of immigration in the EU, the European Commission embarked, after Maastricht, on a series of policy proposals attending to the changing conditions brought about by an increasingly multi-ethnic society. These addressed, inter alia, growing problems of ethnic exclusion and segregation, the spread of racism and xenophobia, and how to better ‘integrate’ ‘legal immigrants’ and ethnic minorities into Community societies. Indeed, the Commission believed that any failure to respond appropriately to these urgent problems would carry considerable risk, since it might well exacerbate the animosities and conflicts between majority and minority populations throughout the Union (see Hansen 1997). The present chapter likewise proceeds by way of a double movement, examining efforts in the realm of ‘immigrant integration’ together with the EU’s
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assumptions and interventions in the area of immigration and asylum. In Chapter 2 we discussed issues connected with the incorporation of immigrants as citizens or denizens in different European nation states. Our focus here is on how the development of EU social policy and policies concerned with migrant integration during the 1990s started to expose the incorporation of immigrants to a new contradictory set of conditions. This gradually puts into question established policies and terms of incorporation in individual nation states, and thus also influences the actual configurations of citizenship. On the one hand, a new manifest anti-racist orientation had, by the turn of the millennium, been turned into mandatory directives and EU-sponsored transnational development programmes requiring member states to combat discrimination and social exclusion. This reorientation towards ‘diversity’, ‘social inclusion’, and equal opportunity is, however, part of a new European Social Model (ESM), which is conditioned by an overall neoliberal consensus and policy dynamic. The contours of an emergent ‘embedded neoliberalism’ (van Apeldoorn 2003) are those of a post-national workfare regime, with critical implications for the transformation of the frameworks of citizenship marking the post-war European welfare states in general, and the incorporation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in European societies in particular. In the first part of the chapter, we discuss the changing conditionality posed by the neoliberal turn and changing frameworks of citizenship with regard to the inclusion of resident denizens and citizens with migrant background. That is (see further Castles and Davidson 2000), we focus on the actual condition of being a citizen (with immigrant background outside the OECD area). In the second half of the chapter, we shift our focus to a discussion of changing conditions for becoming (or not becoming) a citizen framed by a new supranational political economy of border control, migration management, and asylum.
Migrant Integration and Anti-Discrimination Policy on the EU Agenda Third country nationals (TCNs) were long to remain severely disadvantaged compared with member state citizens of the European Community, both in terms of freedom of movement within the Community and, in most cases, in terms of actual entitlements to civic, political, and social rights in the member states where they lived. This remained a prevalent condition, although the 1970s and 1980s saw some Community initiatives to promote the integration and mobility rights of TCNs (CEC 1985). However, this dualization between citizens of the member states and TCNs in terms of freedom of mobility and rights of citizenship should not make us forget the convoluted relation between formal and substantial rights of
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citizenship for naturalized ethnic minorities of migrant background, especially those coming from non-OECD countries. The basic assumption of the concept of universal citizenship shared by most liberal political philosophers and political ideologies is that people are equal and homogeneous in their role as citizens, and should therefore be treated equally by the state. But formal equality as citizens does not in itself overcome economic disadvantage or social marginalization, nor does it impart a share of power in major economic and political institutions. Hence, even when immigrants or their offspring have become legally entitled to a range of civil, social, and political rights in their capacity as naturalized citizens or legally resident denizens in a nation state, they may be prevented from actually enjoying their rights by discrimination, racism, or poverty (see further, Castles and Davidson 2000). The experience of migrants and ethnic minorities is that established institutions are unable to tackle a range of practices that block their full membership and actual participation in society. They may even be instrumental in upholding such practices because of their discriminatory rules, stigmatizing institutional ideologies (Grillo 1985), or habitual administrative routines that are unintentionally discriminatory in their effect (see e.g. Feuchtwang 1982). This raises the issue of pervasive and complex institutional change aimed at bridging the gap between a universalist discourse of rights and the actual reality of a ‘truncated citizenship’ (Cross 1998a). A series of Community resolutions on racism and xenophobia from the 1980s and 1990s are important in this context. Several policy documents discussed adequate responses to the perceived fact that the European Community had become increasingly ‘multicultural’ through immigration (for a detailed discussion, see Hansen 2005b, 2005c). However, without formal powers vested at the supranational level, and with matters of migration and migrant incorporation continuing to be covered almost entirely by national legislation and intergovernmental cooperation, reiterated declarations from Community institutions attracted justified criticism for being little more than ‘symbolic responses to racism’ (Silverman 1992:68, see also Geddes 2000a; Ireland 1995: 252). Although the Maastricht Treaty underlined the growing salience of migration as a Community issue and formalized intergovernmental cooperation, this hardly offered any improvement. On the contrary, the Treaty’s institution of EU citizenship further reinforced the exclusion of TCNs by reserving citizenship of the Union exclusively for individuals who were already citizens of one of the member states (see further Hansen 2005b). Only with the Amsterdam Treaty was the Commission provided with some genuine leeway for developing binding policies on diversity and integration and for combating racism and discrimination. According to the Commission (CEC 2001c), the incorporation of a new anti-discrimination article (Article 13) in the treaty gave ‘the Community for the first time the power to take legislative action to combat discrimination’. Article 13 was prefaced by an
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intensified supranational engagement with the problem of racism and xenophobia from the mid-1990s onwards. The European Year against Racism in 1997 and the decision to establish a European Monitoring Centre against Racism and Xenophobia in Vienna were just two of several developments that prepared the ground for the treaty amendment (see CEC 1995; Council of the EU 1997; CEC 2001c: 4). That there existed an actual willingness to follow up central provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty was confirmed at the Tampere European Council in 1999, which declared that ‘a more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting’ TCNs ‘rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens’. Moreover, the Council undertook to ‘enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia’ (CEC 2001a: 2). After the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999 the momentum continued, and it would not take long for this explicit anti-discrimination orientation to begin to take the form of mandatory directives and development programmes requiring member states to combat racism and discrimination. In November 2000, the emerging policy agenda was laid out in an ambitious sixyear (2001–6) ‘Community Action Programme to combat discrimination’ (Council of the EU 2000a). Before that, Article 13 facilitated the adoption of a landmark Racial Equality Directive (Council of the EU 2000b), which was to put into practice Article 13 and thus to give effect to ‘the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin’. Integral to this was the objective of creating ‘a socially inclusive labour market’ and ‘a high level of employment and of social protection’. The Directive also focused on discrimination in the areas of education, housing, social welfare, and health. This was soon complemented by the Employment Framework Directive (Council of the EU 2000c), which added discrimination in the labour market on grounds of religion to the general framework for combating racism and discrimination. Largely confined to symbolic gesturing in the mid-1990s, EU antidiscrimination policy today musters an impressive array of measures and instruments. This includes binding directives as well as a plethora of ‘soft law’ schemes corresponding to the policymaking style of the Open Method Coordination (OMC), a cornerstone of the ‘Lisbon process’ (Hansen 2005a). As Soininen (2003: 45) states, it is largely the Commission’s astute utilization of soft law policymaking, starting in the mid-1990s, that paved the way for the Council directives, and thus for the introduction of binding EU legislation on anti-discrimination. Particularly instrumental in this development has been the Commission’s effort ‘to pursue a coherent strategy of integrating antiracism into EU policies, known as mainstreaming’ (CEC 2003c: 5). The strategy of mainstreaming facilitated the incorporation of anti-discrimination measures into a variety of EU programmes and policies, most prominently in employment and social policy (Soininen 2003). This is forcing member states to adjust and upgrade their anti-discrimination policies and legislation.
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For those member states with underdeveloped policy regimes in the area, this proffers real vistas for positive change and also for systemic change whereby EU policy may alter the distribution of influence between various actors over national policymaking in the field (Soininen 2003: 46). As Soininen (2003: 44) notes, however, when anti-discrimination policy enters the areas of the EU’s Employment Strategy and social inclusion policy, ‘the rights perspective shifts over to perspectives such as the employability of the individual’. It therefore needs to be asked to what extent EU anti-discrimination policy constitutes merely yet another market-expedient employability instrument substituting for, rather than forming part of, an EU commitment to the establishment of a structurally embedded social dimension.
Changing Configurations of ‘Exclusion–inclusion’ The ambiguities of EU approaches can be seen clearly in discourses on social exclusion and inclusion. ‘Social exclusion is a slippery and contested concept’, maintains Geddes (2000c: 783), ‘capable of a wide range of analytical and political perspectives’. But social exclusion is also a very powerful notion, argues Ruth Levitas (1998: 178), though not ‘because of its analytical clarity which is conspicuously lacking, but because of its flexibility’. This was already obvious when the notion of ‘social exclusion’ was incorporated into the French political vocabulary in the mid-1970s (Silver 1994). Ever since, it has been a contested concept, exposed to competing Catholic and socialist or social democratic understandings. A similar situation arose when, in the 1980s, discourses on social exclusion began to penetrate the wider EU political scene, and the notion eventually became elevated to a hegemonic status, guiding political strategy as well as scientific enquiry across Europe (Chamberlayne 1997). Its original strategic advantage can be seen to emerge from its inclusiveness as a concept that provided a common language of ‘solidarity’ merging the concerns of two main European political traditions, even though they would attach substantially variable meanings to the concept. One was the Christian democratic, stressing moral integration and social order; the other was the social democratic, concerned with poverty and broad issues of social justice and democratic participation. The potentially hegemonic promise and general European currency of the concept of social exclusion, and thereby also of its antonym, ‘social inclusion’, were articulated by Ralf Dahrendorf (1985) in terms of the moral and political premises of citizenship on which the twentieth century welfare states were constituted. He presented a range of new forms of marginalization and poverty that had emerged in the economically advanced welfare states from the mid1970s as an ongoing process expressed in exclusion from established rights encoded in national charters on social citizenship (Dahrendorf 1985, 1988; Schmitter-Heisler 1992). The new odd miscellany of socially marginalized and
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poor categories of the population—among them a high proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities—made up a deviant, restless, but disorganized new ‘underclass’ excluded from the social compact of the welfare state. Thus, Dahrendorf analysed the problem of social exclusion in terms of a major contraction of the welfare state which had created a ‘crucial boundary . . . between the majority class and those who are being defined out of the edifice of citizenship’ (Dahrendorf 1985: 98): a social cleavage threatening to undermine the legitimacy of the liberal–democratic state. Consequently, the precondition for combating social exclusion and social unrest would be to uphold an ideal of citizenship as a universal entitlement. This would, inter alia, entail a distinctly redistributive welfare policy. In accordance with the ‘Social Europe’ ambitions of then European Commission President Jacques Delors, this was also a dominant connotation of social exclusion when, from the end of the 1980s, the concept became of key importance in EU political parlance. For example, the Background Report to the European Poverty Programme focused on tackling a broad range of social disadvantages (CEC 1991). The analytical and normative–political framework for reform and renewal was informed by the British sociologist T. H. Marshall’s theory of citizenship (1950): an integrated analytical and moral–political framework for the understanding of the relationship between market, welfare, and democratic polities. In the Poverty Programme of the Delors Commission, the poor were defined as ‘persons whose resources (material, cultural, and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live’ (CEC 1991: 1). This echoed T. H. Marshall’s conception of social inclusiveness in Citizenship and Social Class, where he defined social citizenship as that ‘whole range [of rights of citizenship] from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall 1992: 8). Marshall’s concept of social citizenship was explicitly adopted as the basis for the work of the Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion, which was founded by the EC in 1990 (Room et al. 1992). The Observatory defined social exclusion ‘first and foremost in relation to the social rights of citizens’, to be analysed ‘in terms of the denial—or non-realisation—of social rights’ (Room et al. 1992: 13–15). The Observatory included other types of rights of citizenship—that is, Marshall’s civil and political dimensions—in its analyses in so far as they were considered important for exclusion from or realization of social rights (Room et al. 1992: 16ff.). However, with the marked redirection of Union policy after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a new situation emerged. If, prior to Maastricht, the Delors Commission had conceived of social exclusion as exclusion from citizenship in the broad sense of the blocking of opportunities for individuals to exercise substantial social, political, or civil rights in a
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democratic welfare society, post-Maastricht this focus was soon superseded by an alternative notion of social exclusion which stressed labour market integration as a precondition for ‘social cohesion’. The wider implications of poverty and inequality were thereby moved into the background (see Levitas 1998). The core concern now became to reconcile ‘social cohesion’ with ‘economic efficiency’. Moreover, the discussion was phrased in terms of deregulation and the demand for economic growth, while a parallel social concern counterpoised ‘solidarity, integration and cohesion’ to ‘unemployment, poverty and social exclusion’. But, in spite of the many references to solidarity, the emphasis was here one-sidedly on exclusion from paid work or on the issue of ‘unemployment’. Already in the European Commission’s Green Paper on social policy from 1993, this change of tone was made apparent: There is a consensus in Europe that all citizens should have a guarantee of resources but social policies now have to take on the more ambitious objective of helping people to find a place in society. The main route, but not the only one, is paid work—and that is why employment policies and social policies should be more closely linked. (CEC 1993a: 21)
What is at play is not any unequivocal enthusiasm for the market, which is seen to need ‘management’ through collective solidarity mechanisms. But it is, Levitas (1998: 23ff.) argues, crucial to note that the type of ‘solidarity’ in question is far from being synonymous with that of a redistributive welfare state. Since welfare state expenditures are deemed too costly to sustain, solidarity is instead invoked as a form of restraint in order to reduce the costs of social provision. At stake, therefore, is no longer the duty of the whole community to face up to the universal rights of citizenship, but rather a moral commitment by individual citizens, corporations, and social groups to safeguard ‘social cohesion’. The Commission’s influential White Paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness, Employment’ illustrates this. While the White Paper was not wanting in statements supportive of ‘[a]n economy characterized by solidarity’, ‘the fight against social exclusion’, unemployment, and poverty (CEC 1993b: 15–16), it also firmly established that these aims in no way contradicted the White Paper’s overarching neoliberal stance. Prepared in close collaboration with the European Roundtable of Industrialists (Hines 1997), the White Paper comprised calls for a flexible labour market, a set of ‘more enterprisefriendly’ regulations, reduced labour costs and unemployment benefits, lower taxes, cutbacks in welfare systems and overall public expenditures, and increased privatization (CEC 1993b; see also Levitas 1998; Leibfried and Pierson 1995: 49–50). This outlook would also find expression in the Commission’s subsequent White Paper on social policy (CEC 1994a). Moreover, the post-Maastricht turn away from redistribution became ingrained in the practices of the whole range of projects initiated by the EU’s structural funds
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designed to integrate marginal groups into the labour market or to promote equal opportunities. These were now exclusively set to finance projects targeted directly on the labour market, and their rules were designed so as to ‘reinforce the understanding of social participation as labour market activity’ (Levitas 1998: 25). Arguably, this represented a nascent hegemonic shift at the EU level, a movement from one type of European political discourse and coalition to another: that is, from a traditional redistributive discourse (Levitas 1998) and a conservative-social democratic coalition attempting to merge differential political concerns with ‘social order’ and ‘equality’, towards a social integrationist discourse (Levitas 1998) of a neoliberal-conservative consensus concerned with reconciling the need for ‘market expediency’ with the exigency of ‘social cohesion’. This corresponds well with van Apeldoorn’s (2003) contention that it was a type of ‘embedded’ neoliberalism that emerged as the dominant ideological force in the shaping of the EU’s trajectory from Maastricht onwards. This was contingent on the collapse of Jacques Delors’ Social Europe Plan and the failure of ‘transnational social–democratic forces’ to set in motion a supranational harmonization of a strong welfare policy in the EU, and so put welfare objectives on a par with the Single Market and EMU (van Apeldoorn 2003). Instead of taking up the gauntlet thrown down by the various structural imbalances between ‘Market Europe’ and ‘Social Europe’, the social–democratic governments that came to power in most member states in the late 1990s increasingly came to embrace an embedded form of neoliberalism. Owing to this shift, ‘modernized’ social democracy discerns less and less of a contradiction in the enterprise of pledging to uphold the ‘European Social Model’ while simultaneously undermining the welfare state piecemeal through a steadfast neoliberal realpolitik. Unlike previous social–democratic leaderships and the Delors Commission, for which the contradiction was still real and therefore framed as a problem in need of resolution, the new social democracy, including successive European Commissions, has in many respects ridded itself of such quandaries. This is not to imply that it evinces any less concern with social welfare, cohesion, and exclusion. But since these matters are now said to hinge less on structural means geared towards universal social entitlements, redistribution, and decommodification, and more on supply-side measures of flexible labour markets, employability in paid work, and budgetary discipline, as well as on individual and corporate social responsibility, the advocacy of neoliberal policies on the part of social democracy and the steady extension of market relations into previously protected areas are no longer construed as contradictory measures (e.g. Moschonas 2002). The transition from a redistributionist to an integrationist discourse in the EU was stimulated by the British Labour Party’s so-called Third Way in the 1990s, and its subsequent adoption by other member states and the European Commission (see further, Hansen 2005a). Anthony Giddens (1998), who served as a counsellor to Tony Blair, endeavoured to mark out a new Third
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Way for British Labour that would meet the challenges of globalization through transcending both ‘old style social democracy and neoliberalism’ (Giddens 1998: 26) with an extension of direct participatory democracy as a central means for enhancing efficiency and competitiveness, and for strengthening social integration. Yet there is an unmistakably moral-political dimension to this project. Thus, argues Giddens (1998: 27), [H]aving abandoned collectivism, third way politics looks for a new relationship between the individual and the community, a redefiniton of rights and obligations . . . Unemployment benefits . . . should carry the obligation to look actively for work, and it is up to governments to ensure that welfare systems do not discourage active search. As an ethical principle ‘no rights without responsibilities’ must apply not only to welfare recipients, but to everyone.
‘Empowerment from Below’: Ethnic Minorities and the EU’s ‘Third Way’ A general reorientation towards a moral integrationism and social participation as labour market activity is clearly mirrored in the EU’s post-Amsterdam policy on the integration of immigrants. While still not altogether reducible to economic objectives, the policy discourse on ethnic minority integration nevertheless finds less and less application outside of the realm of market expediency and, in particular, of labour market policy. Thus, in the current policy discourse, the more elaborate discussion most often equates the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities with ‘their integration into the labour market’ (CEC 2000b: 19; see also CEC 2003b: 1). This is, in turn, closely linked with an increasingly evident resort to a moralizing, Third Way-type policy discourse, full of allusions to obligations, responsibilities, duties, and sanctions. While the host society is said to be obliged to provide opportunities and hold out inducements, the ultimate success or failure of the integration policy that comes into view here still seems to hinge upon the moral stature of the migrants themselves, on their ‘willingness to integrate’, as well as on their ability to adapt to certain prescribed ‘European’ cultural and civic values. This echoes the strong ‘neo-assimilationist’ trend of the (national) member states (see Chapter 2). The EU’s new outlook on integration conforms to Third Way ideology in its heavy emphasis on the prominent part to be played by ‘civil society’ and also in its holding up integration as a potentially ‘profitable strategy’ for corporations, ‘helping them to achieve their business goals through its focus on the commercial possibilities arising from increased diversity’ (CEC 2003d: 20). This is, for example, clearly reflected in the much propagated Equal programme (2000–6) on combating discrimination and social exclusion—only one of many policy schemes that operate in accordance with this strategy (see
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e.g. CEC 2001d: 9). Managed by the European Social Fund, the Equal programme conspicuously ties together the new anti-discrimination and migrant integration agenda and the current employment agenda within the overall framework of an integrated transnational development strategy. The programme aims to try out new ways of dealing with problems of discrimination targeted on a range of disadvantaged groups (CEC 2000c: 13; 2001d: 9; see also Blaschke and Vollmer 2004). In the neo-communitarian spirit of the Third Way, the Equal programme appeals for the bottom-up mobilization of networks in ‘civil society’ into composite ‘development partnerships’ of ‘stakeholders’. These include local and regional government, small and corporate business, labour market organizations and institutions, educational bodies, and a proliferation of NGOs and networks of citizens, including immigrant associations. Such approaches convey a new hegemonic conception of governance, an instrument for forging ‘social cohesion’, and a distinct ideological and political alternative to the corporatist compacts between the ‘social partners’ (unions and employers) which were still dominant in Western European countries in the 1980s. Among the favourite targets are segregated city districts with a large proportion of socially marginalized inhabitants of recent migrant background. In general, this new networked governance has developed in parallel with the transnational convergence on an ‘embedded neoliberalism’ and its search for new sustainable policies for social inclusion to repair the proliferation of socially exposed spaces left behind by increasingly deregulated national welfare regimes. Viewed from this perspective, Equal, as well as a multitude of other EU-sponsored partnership programmes, may, in a positive light, be viewed ‘as experimental projects which in due course will need to be ‘‘mainstreamed’’ . . . [a] laudable recognition of ‘‘grass roots capacity and competence’’ ’, or more critically, ‘as a fragmentation or localisation of policy against social exclusion . . . [a] ‘‘local dumping’’ of issues that the nation state cannot resolve’ (Geddes 2001b: 24). Experience varies, not only from locality to locality, but also systematically between member states, according to their path-dependent economic policies, welfare and labour market regimes, and configurations of civil society (Geddes 2000c; Geddes and Benington 2001). The range of different ‘path-dependent’ practices suggests ‘that it might be necessary to think in terms of various ‘‘partnership regimes’’ rather than a single model’ (Geddes 2000c: 789). However, the work of a number of scholars (e.g. Jessop 2002a; Geddes 2000c; Geddes and Benington 2001; Levitas 1998) suggests—from the perspective of today’s erosion of citizenship—a need for a critical scrutiny of the EU agenda on social exclusion and inclusion, the propagation of transnational policies for ‘diversity’ and anti-discrimination from the perspective of the overall direction taken concerning the institution of a ‘neoliberal European policy consensus’ (McNamara 1998).
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From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Workfare’: Negative Integration and the European Social Model The overall logic conditioning the processes of European integration since the founding Treaty of Rome in 1957 until today has been dubbed ‘negative integration’ (Scharpf 1998; see further discussion in Hansen 2005a). This refers to ‘measures increasing market integration (by eliminating restraints on trade and distortions on competition)’, whereas ‘positive integration’ implies the establishment of ‘common European policies to shape the conditions under which markets operate’ (Scharpf 1998: 157). Negative integration has, in spite of attempts to construct a European Social Dimension over and above the national welfare states, continuously had the upper hand. Historically speaking, but particularly since the Single Market conversion in the mid-1980s, negative integration has thus stood to gain from the legal and institutional arrangements of European integration (Scharpf 1998: 157). Under the auspices of Treaty and European law, and with the Commission and the European Court of Justice as effective overseers, liberalization has thus been able to proceed and advance without much inhibition, implying, as it does, a ‘ ‘‘constitutionalization’’ of competition law’ along neoliberal lines (Scharpf 1999: 54; see also Jessop 2002a: 209–10). As for positive integration, or policies which would reinstall at the EU level what deregulation detracts from democratic political bodies at the national level, practically none of these institutional and legal structures apply. Instead, positive integration has remained in the hands of national governments in the Council of Ministers, where it readily falls prey to national assertiveness, unanimity, and the vagaries of consensual decisionmaking (Scharpf 1999: 50–1, 72; see also Streeck 1995: 395). Colin Crouch (1998: 241) describes the EU in a nutshell as ‘experiencing simultaneously a globalization of economic processes but a reassertion of the nation state (against supranational political entities) at the political level’. This line of reasoning corresponds with Streeck’s argument (1995) that neoliberalism and nationalism in fact made up two mutually reinforcing developments, both being augmented by the transformations set in motion in the Community during the 1980s. This overall development can also be seen as the result of a compromise in the 1980s between corporate capital and national political elites, whereby corporate capital was willing to concede national industrial protection schemes in exchange for nation-state elites’ commitment to phasing out market regulations imposed by political bodies in the member states, as well as ensuring that these were not to be restored at the EU level in the future (Streeck and Schmitter 1996: 184–5; see also Ross 1992). On this account, the Single Market project was predicated on an ability to deliver watertight guarantees to capital that the new supranational powers would be used solely for ‘the external reassertion of, as
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opposed to internal intervention in, the European economy’ (Streeck and Schmitter 1996: 185, italics in original). The reassertion of the nation state against supranational political entities at the political level has, argues Crouch (1998: 241), resulted in ‘a growing divorce between the level at which political action needs to be taken and that at which it can be taken’, with one crucial exception, namely, ‘policy to deregulate markets’. An ill-fated strategy of the Delors Commission from the late 1980s (which we have referred to above) of taking advantage of marketdriven integration as a motor for transposing essential features of the national welfare state to the supranational level, and thus firmly linking a ‘social dimension’ to the accomplishment of the European Single Market, is the most pungent illustration of Crouch’s succinct point on the ‘immobilizing’ dynamics of deregulation (see further, Hansen 2005a). Thus, once the Single Market and the Single European Act set out to restrain regulatory powers at national levels, the prospects, scope, and relative strength of policies tied to the welfare state would, from the mid-1980s, increasingly come to hinge on the compensatory capacities and regulatory competencies at the supranational level. Mainly because of the prevalent political disinclination at the time— that is, ‘the neoliberal European policy consensus’ (McNamara 1998)—the supranational level was never invested with such compensatory authorities. To the detriment of the EU’s welfare states, it was, rather, negative integration that prevailed, hence endowing the EU with an institutional, decision-making, and legal framework and dynamic that would come to promote a deregulating market integration, but at the expense of a protecting and positive welfare integration. This provided, the political and social consequences of the Single Market transformations were to become both extensive and lasting. These conversions continue to cast their shadow on today’s developments and, as such, they remain essential when we seek to comprehend the current situation. This certainly does not mean that, after Maastricht, the Commission and other actors gave up for good the ambition to equip the EU with a ‘social dimension’. On the contrary, prompted by anxiety about the popular legitimacy of further processes of European integration and perceived needs to combat exacerbated processes of social exclusion, new attempts at a social dimension were sailing up into the late 1990s. Finally, at the Nice Council in 2000, a new European Social Policy Agenda (SPA) was adopted as the basis for constructing a revived European Social Model (ESM), and instituted as a component of the much-propagated Lisbon Strategy and reform agenda (see further Hansen 2005a). As already noted, however, by then neoliberal recipes for reconstruction had become emblematic among reformed European social democratic parties. Thus, the basic principles of the SPA reflected neoliberal concerns about ‘employability’, ‘flexibility’, ‘social cohesion’, and ‘moral obligation’, while worries about ‘social inequality’, ‘social rights’, and redistribution had been pushed thoroughly backstage. Efforts at constructing an
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ESM had thus come to be one-sidedly connected with an agenda for economic growth and human capital development, and estranged from the premise of social rights of citizenship. Phrased in more general theoretical terms, the present state of the EU’s SPA affirms indeed the thesis of Bob Jessop (2002a; 2002b) concerning the transition in advanced capitalism from a ‘Keynesian welfare national state’ (KWNS) model into that of a ‘Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime’ (SWPR). The configuration of and transition to SWPR is formulated by Jessop (2002b: 112–13) in the following terms: . An economic policy emphasizing sociotechnical innovation and international competitiveness through supply-side policies rather than full employment and planning. Social policy is subordinated to economic policy with the aim of making labour markets more flexible. . Downward pressure is put on the social wage, which is now considered a cost of production rather than a means of redistribution. The general idea is to ‘get people from welfare into work’, to ‘create enterprising subjects’, and to break a ‘culture of dependency’ rather than ‘resort to allegedly unsustainable welfare expenditures’. . The ‘national scale of policy is being . . . challenged, as local, regional and supranational levels of government and social partnership gain new powers’. . There is a ‘growing reliance on partnership, networks . . . and other forms of reflexive self-organization, rather than on the combination of anarchic market forces and top-down planning associated with the postwar ‘‘mixed economy’’ or the old tripartite corporatist arrangements based on a producers’ alliance between big business, big labor, and the national state’. Although these features of SWPR are all, to a greater or lesser extent, present in the transformation of the advanced welfare states of Western Europe, there is, Jessop argues, no single model of change. There is, rather, a variety of different approaches that lead from different, actually existing, forms of the KWNS to particular forms of a SWPR, where neoliberal modes of governance are more or less dominant. As indicated above, the character of the ‘embedded neoliberalism’ propagated by the EU’s turn-of-the-millennium SPA pays particular attention to moral cohesion, civic agency, and a ‘stakeholders society’ based on ‘local partnerships’ and networked forms of governance. It thus embraces a conspicuous ‘neocommunitarian’ (Jessop 2002b: 116; 2002a: 263ff.) perspective on governance. However, given its close reliance on performance and flexibility, which thereby subjects a number of qualitatively different models of KWNS in Europe to an ongoing process of modification, the modernized ESM now propagated by the EU within the wider framework of the Lisbon process is not easily identified. But even if it proves difficult to present a lucid picture of what the ESM amounts to, we can still provide an assessment based on what it
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does not, indeed cannot, amount to under present circumstances. While EU policy documents abound with general statements embracing a modernized ESM that is conducive to ‘a high level of social protection’ and ‘an appropriate balance between flexibility and security’, this does not gainsay de la Porte and Pochet’s contention (2002: 292) that the EU’s social model is taking shape in the shadow of an all-pervasive neoliberal ‘economic and monetary model that continues to constitute the ide´e-force of European integration’. Due to these obvious limitations, ‘[c]ertain options in welfare politics are simply not open’ (Chalmers and Lodge 2003: 10; see further the detailed discussion of ESM and the Lisbon process in Hansen 2005a): rather, a looking glass through which we must discuss also the EU’s policies on migrant ‘integration’, ‘diversity’, and anti-racism. The changing discourse and ideology of ‘social exclusion/inclusion’ on which these policies hinge conform well to the general mode of transformation from KWNS to SWPR theorized by Jessop. The social consequences of this ongoing transformation of EU policies on social exclusion were, as mentioned above, discussed by Ruth Levitas (1998) in terms of the post-Maastricht shift from a redistributive discourse to a neocommunitarian social integrationist discourse. This change in discourse and policy, she argues, obscures and legitimizes inequalities in the labour market. It carries with it a general dissociation from social citizenship. This not only represents a neglect of class inequalities and actual poverty, but also has important gender aspects, as women are far more likely than men to hold low-status jobs in the labour market (Levitas 1998: 26ff.). Arguably, it may also exacerbate rather than mitigate racialized exclusion in European labour markets with negative implications for ethnic minorities (citizens as well as denizens). In a similar critical discussion, Ruth Lister (1990, 2001) expresses her concerns about a situation where ‘poverty’ becomes ‘social exclusion’ and where, as the reference of ‘social exclusion’ becomes in the next moment limited to ‘exclusion from paid work’, the result may be the stigmatization of one particular subgroup among the poor, namely, ‘welfare clients’. A most adverse but quite typical result is that the issue of poverty and social exclusion becomes subsumed within an understanding that locates the cause of misery in a moral deficiency among the excluded themselves, (see also Katz 1989) and with a clear racial tinge. It is in the USA and (to some extent) the UK that this kind of moral underclass discourse (Levitas 1998) has been most forcefully adopted as a recipe for ‘social integration through work, or ‘workfare’, directed, to a particularly high extent, at African Americans and poor ethnic minorities. But similar practices have become commonplace across Europe since the beginning of the 1990s. Processed through ‘tough love’ disciplinary strategies of work enforcement, they have often proved to lead to the transformation of poor ‘welfare clients’ into a populous category among the ‘working poor’, permanently trapped in enforced low-status work. Morally induced work enforcement of a disciplinary character may thus deprive the poor of their power and civil and social right to defend their entitlement to an acceptable level of
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welfare by withholding their labour from the market’s sub-standard jobs (King 1999; Fox Piven and Cloward 1993).
Citizenship of the Union and the Political Economy of Free Movement While we attend more closely to the consequences of welfare state transformation for citizens and denizens of migrant background in Chapters 4–9, in the remainder of this chapter we discuss the potential implications for frameworks of citizenship of an emerging EU post-national workfare state connected with the management of migration, border control, and asylum. A critical note to the work of Virginie Guiraudon (2000) on the incorporation of migrants into Western European welfare states appears seminal as a point of departure. Based on a comparative study of France, Germany, and the Netherlands following the end of post-war foreign labour recruitment in 1973, Guiraudon (2000: 87) argues that the evolution of the rights of the foreign-born represents the ‘Marshallian triptych reordered’. Everywhere, she argues—even in Germany, with its official guest-worker policy—‘the inclusion of legally residing foreigners in the welfare state has been quite extensive . . . in spite of that fact that it ran against some of the policy goals of migration control policy and against the closed logic of the welfare state’. This is, she contends, connected with standardized practices of social bureaucracies and courts, which ‘have been positively biased in favour of equal treatment’, in terms of social rights, ‘for reasons that originate in their own functioning’. Other rights, such as voting rights, are more ‘visible’ in the reform process and thus more difficult to legitimize. Thus, in contrast to the Marshallian evolutionary scheme, where the civil and political rights were granted before social rights,16 the reverse order marks the post-war integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Western Europe. However, gainsaying the dominant post-war trajectory and qualifying Guiraudon’s general argument, the EU’s general approach to the issue of an emergent transnational citizenship for TCNs puts the topsy-turvy Marshallian model back on its feet. Expressed in another way, we experience a ‘return of history’ at the supranational level, starting all over, as we discuss further below, with a marketbound civic citizenship, but with no guarantees of an evolutionary follow-up in the future in terms of a social citizenship of the Union. Although hardly traceable to the founding Treaty of Rome as such, a dualized approach to migration was installed early on in the EC, under which the treaty’s provisions relating to freedom of movement for workers within the Community came to apply solely to nationals of member states, thereby effectively excluding resident TCNs. Kostakopoulou (2001: 183) argues that 16 Notwithstanding important national differences. See, for example, Michael Mann’s (1987) critical comparative reappraisal of Marshall’s theory.
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this needs to be seen in light of the negative attitude towards immigration that, towards the end of the 1960s, had begun ‘to replace earlier discourses extolling the economic benefits of immigration’. Immigration from outside the Community, including the handling of the situation of TCNs within the wider borders of the EC, long remained within national jurisdictions, and in ‘grafting their notions about ‘‘who the Europeans are’’ onto the emerging institutions’ of the Community, the member states ‘managed to institutionalize exclusion at the heart of the European project’. In this sense, the exclusion of TCNs from freedom of movement was, in effect, also ‘filtering out alternative postnational criteria of membership in the emerging Europolity’ (Kostakopoulou 2001: 184–5; see also Hansen 2005b; 2005c). In conjunction with the launching of the Single Market Programme and the negotiation of the SEA in the mid-1980s, the Commission made plain its aspirations to supranationalize the policy domain of immigration and asylum, seeing it as a necessary and logical part of the Single Market’s larger framework. But, in spite of recurrent efforts at reform from the European Commission and the European Parliament, member state governments were not swayed. Similarly, the Commission’s insistence that the freedom of movement entitlements should embrace all Community residents, irrespective of whether they were member state nationals or TCNs, was also in clear discord with the dominant political agendas of the old immigration countries in central and north-western Europe. Only after the Amsterdam Treaty were serious steps taken to even out some of the imbalances between the rights of member state nationals and TCNs (Kostakopoulou 2002). As part of this, the Commission introduced the concept of ‘civic citizenship’, which is deemed a long-term goal emerging out of the progressive ‘granting of civic and political rights to longer-term migrant residents’ (TCNs), and comprises ‘a set of rights and duties offered to third country nationals’ (CEC 2000b: 22). Civic citizenship is said to epitomize the principles and values laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European Union 2000) adopted at the Nice summit in December 2000 (CEC 2001a: 3), and subsequently incorporated into the as yet (as of spring 2005) unratified Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 2004: Part II, Titles I-VII ). However, this in no way implies that permanently settled TCNs are about to become naturalized EU citizens any time soon, or, for that matter, that long-term residence is about to replace nationality as the determining qualification for EU citizenship. Evidently, ‘free movement’ constitutes one of the core issues around which the Commission organizes and articulates its civic citizenship endeavour to expand the rights of ‘legally’ resident TCNs.17 ‘A genuine area of freedom, security and justice’, the Commission (CEC 2001a: 8) asserts, ‘is unthinkable 17
With the adoption of a Council Directive in 2003, certain limited rights of intra-EU mobility and residence have now been granted to third-country nationals ‘who are longterm residents’ (Council of the EU 2004c).
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without a degree of mobility for third-country nationals residing there legally.’ Granted that any upgrading of mobility rights for TCNs must be welcomed as such, the issue cannot rest simply as a structurally detached expression of the Commission’s benevolent intention to make ‘legal’ TCNs more visible through their gradual ‘integration’ as ‘civic citizens’. Rather, it needs to be linked to the larger question of the political economy of free movement and the Commission’s explicit mission to stimulate the economically vital, yet so far dormant, labour mobility within the EU area. Hence, it contends that to continue barring ‘legally’ resident TCNs from the free movement provisions runs counter to ‘the demands of an employment market that is in a process of far-reaching change, where greater flexibility is needed’ (CEC 2001a: 8; see further Hansen 2005c). Permanently settled TCNs constitute an untapped labour reserve that, once unhampered by the EU’s internal borders, could help remedy recurrent labour shortages in growth industries and other labour market distortions across the Union (CEC 2004c: 18; 2003a: 1). In this equation, unemployment appears to be a key variable. Since TCNs suffer disproportionately from unemployment, the Commission presumes they should be more open to intra-EU labour mobility than are member state nationals: hence the promotion of extended free movement rights as a means by which TCNs could ‘escape unemployment in the Member State where they reside’ (CEC 2001a: 8). Arguably, the articulation of civic citizenship is also contingent upon the Commission’s more general approach towards ‘social exclusion’ as manifested in the ‘embedded neoliberalism’ of the Lisbon reforms. The institution of civic citizenship thus rests on the basic premise that accelerated labour market deregulation and a more flexible and adaptable labour force hold the key to the EU’s allegedly analogous problems of unemployment and social exclusion. Promoted as a possible ticket out of unemployment for TCNs in particular, and as a means to attain more flexibility within the EU’s labour market as a whole, civic citizenship could then be seen as yet another attempt at reconciling social cohesion with market expediency.
A Contradictory Policy on Migration and Asylum Seen from a wider perspective, the discord in the 1980s and 1990s between the Commission and member states concerning the extension of the rights of free movement to TCNs had implications not only for the status of permanently resident TCNs, but also for the framing of a contradictory supranational migration and asylum regime in general. This problematic character of emergent ‘post-national’ migration policies was initiated by Schengen and other intergovernmental accords precipitating the Maastricht Treaty. The reasoning of the Commission suggested that without a universal arrangement on freedom of movement, an envisaged abolition of internal
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border checks would be unfeasible (Geddes 2000a: 70). But such a transfer of competencies to the Community level was not attainable, since member states proved far from ready to surrender their sovereignty in this policy area (Geddes 2000a: 70–1; Hoskyns 1996: 172–3). As it turned out, the Commission’s unsuccessful bid to supranationalize immigration and asylum, and resistance from the member states concerning the expansion of the scope of freedom of movement, would not prove to be a stumbling block to the subsequent rapid development in the area. Anticipating what was in the offing, given the overall agenda of the Single Market, member states had already embarked on setting up cooperative frameworks in order to coordinate and harmonize what they took to be vital precautionary measures related to migratory movements, both into and within the Community. In this sense, a consensus emerged among governments acknowledging that the Single Market required a stepping up of joint efforts and the working out of harmonized policies. Instead of a supranational solution, what resulted was an intensification of secret and democratically unaccountable cooperation along intergovernmental lines (den Boer 1995; Hentges 2002). In 1985, the first Schengen Agreement was signed by five of the member states, followed by the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration in 1986 and the Co-ordinators’ Group on Free Movement of Persons two years later. Furthermore, in June of 1990 both the Schengen Implementation Agreement, or Schengen II (effective from 1995), and the Dublin Convention (ratified in 1997) were signed. Designed in large part to develop a common framework and course of action for combating illegal immigration and the management of asylum matters in the Community, these intergovernmental schemes would serve to gradually weaken the right of asylum and the Geneva Refugee Convention during the 1990s (Guild 1999; Hentges 2002; Joly 1999; Lavenex 2001a; Overbeek 1995). Besides the plethora of restrictive measures that flowed from these and other intergovernmental arrangements—not to mention Schengen’s amalgamation of asylum policy and international crime prevention—the building up of a new intergovernmental asylum regime would also engender a logic whereby countries with less restrictive asylum policies came to fear that they would have to carry the brunt of the EU’s future ‘refugee burden’. As a consequence, ‘[w]ith Schengen II and Dublin an ECwide contest for the most restrictive granting of residence permits, visas and transit visas was set in motion’ (Hentges 2002: 110). Other key constitutive measures of the EU’s emergent asylum and immigration policy regime that would work to the detriment of refugee protection in general and of the principle of non-refoulement in particular included the introduction of the ‘safe third country’ rule, the Resolution on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, and the establishment of various readmission agreements with East European countries (see Lavenex 1999, 2001b). Although this intergovernmental manner of proceeding in the post-Single Market period clearly ran counter to the Commission’s supranational scheme,
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the Commission’s response never came close to all-out rejection or confrontation. Instead it opted for a ‘pragmatic stance’, deciding that it could have more say in the matter, however hamstrung it was, by accepting a subordinate role inside the intergovernmental arrangements than by maintaining a principled opposition from the sidelines (Geddes 2000a: 72). The growing salience of migration as a Community issue was further underscored by the Maastricht Treaty, which formalized intergovernmental cooperation and incorporated it into the Treaty’s so-called third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs). As far as transparency and democratic accountability were concerned, however, this formalization offered few, if any, improvements. As O’Keeffe (1999: 273) maintains, ‘the culture of secrecy endemic to the Schengen structure was continued in the framework of the Third Pillar’. Besides immigration and asylum, the third pillar also contained cooperation on police and judicial matters, including the fight against international crime, terrorism, and the traffic in narcotics (d’Oliveira 1994: 261–2). Hence, if the framing of certain forms of immigration as threats against social stability—as naturally related to serious international crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism—had been prevalent at the national level for many years, Maastricht formalized the duplication of this securitized approach at the EU level (Anderson et al. 1995; den Boer 1995; Huysmans 1995; Martiniello and Rea 1999). Even if the Maastricht Treaty formalized cooperation on immigration and asylum, the Commission’s influence remained weak vis-a`-vis the Council and the member states. That the Commission was at odds with the intergovernmental form should not, however, be taken to imply that it was opposed also to the actual content of intergovernmental cooperation on immigration and asylum. Although the Commission could be sceptical towards some of the policy objectives agreed upon by member states, Brussels and national governments were in agreement on most points, and that fact would set the tone for developments in the area during the remainder of the 1990s. Most importantly, the European Commission came to share many of the elements which structured the hegemonic discourse on immigration and asylum and which treated immigration as a ‘problem’, a malignancy, and as a potential flood about to destabilize the Union unless checked through vigorous security measures at the external borders as well as within the EU (see Hathaway 1993; Maier 2002: 94). Herein, moreover, the distinction between immigrants and illegal immigrants, and between asylum seekers and bogus asylum seekers, was gradually blurred, thereby evincing the self-perpetuating logic behind the policing and security approach. Portrayed as both enemies at the gates and enemies within, ‘illegal immigrants/illegal immigration’ would become a catch-all term in the 1990s which in many contexts almost completely eclipsed previous meanings assigned to (non-Western) immigration and asylum seeking. After Maastricht, the Commission’s message became even more pronounced (CEC 1994b: 28). A ‘comprehensive approach’ to immigration was elaborated, consisting of a three-pronged strategy. It called for: (a) ‘Taking action on
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migration pressure’; (b) ‘Controlling migration flows’; and (c) ‘Strengthening integration policies for the benefit of legal immigrants’ (CEC 1994b: 11). Unmistakably, one of the key assumptions in this strategy rested on the postulate that ‘without limitation, integration is impossible’ (Gilroy and Lawrence 1988: 133; see also Skellington and Morris 1992: 50–2). To use the Commission’s own formulation (1994b: 11): ‘It has, for example, become clear that an indispensable condition for successful integration policies with respect to third country nationals resident in the Union is control of migration flows.’ And further: ‘Society’s readiness to accept the inflow of new migrant groups depends on how it perceives government to be in control of the phenomenon’ (CEC 1994b: 32). Indeed, in the 1990s this emphasis on an assumed society that was said to demand that governments curb immigration became one of the most commonplace ways for EU governments, including the Commission, to disguise their own (tactical) readiness to impose restrictive immigration and asylum policies as simply reflecting the mood of the electorate (see Miles 1993: 201, 206). However, what national governments and the Commission failed to recognize was that, once immigration had been identified as a ‘problem’, and immigrants and refugees staged as ‘floods’ who, upon entry, could cause serious difficulties, this would scarcely promote a desired ‘integration’ of migrants or decrease the difficulties for those ethnic minorities residing in the EU who already suffered from various forms of stigmatization and racialization.
The Post-Amsterdam Volte-Face The political climate in which the Amsterdam Treaty took shape was characterized by a growing dissatisfaction with Maastricht’s intergovernmental management of matters pertaining to immigration and asylum (Lavenex 2001a: 864; Hix 1999: 328). In order to come to terms with these problems, the Parliament and the Commission called for a thorough supranationalization of immigration and asylum policy. Another novel feature of Amsterdam’s preparatory stages was the attendance of numerous NGOs, all advocating the cause of expanded protection and rights for refugees and immigrants. Forming part of the larger attempt to enhance the EU’s threadbare democratic credentials and popular legitimacy, these NGOs were invited to present their cases regarding the shaping of the Union’s future immigration and asylum policies (Geddes 2000a: 113–14). Being favourably disposed to transferring immigration and asylum policy to the Community level (Hix 1999: 329), their involvement provided an additional impetus to the supranational cause. By the mid-1990s, the case for some form of supranationalization had also, eventually, gained conditional support in all but a few of the national cabinets (Geddes 2000a: 115–18; Melis 2001: 14). But, backers of a more radical, ‘post-national’ model
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were to be yet again frustrated (Geddes 2000a: 117). While important (but far from all) elements of migration policy were relocated from the EU’s third intergovernmental pillar to the first, supranational pillar, for at least five years (1999–2004), decision-making in the area still had to abide by the unanimity principle. Although assuming recognition as a ‘communitarized’ area, the traditional Community method of, inter alia, qualified majority voting (QMV) was not to be set to apply to immigration and asylum policy until the transitional period had run its course. However, a Council Decision (Council of the EU 2004e) in December 2004 finally settled the matter, thus making QMV applicable to the Amsterdam Treaty’s new articles on immigration and asylum. Despite a rather awkward ‘supragovernmental’ set-up at the time, which drew criticism from many quarters (see Melis 2001: 51), the Amsterdam Treaty marked a historic shift which laid down the broad outlines for a future EU policy on immigration and asylum. Among other things, it was specified (Article 62) that measures should be adopted granting certain limited intraEU mobility rights to TCNs. A series of measures on asylum and immigration stressing the creation of a set of ‘minimum standards’ in the area of asylum (Article 63) were outlined, and the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the Treaty framework. Due to British, Irish, and Danish opposition, however, and in order not to derail the negotiations, it became necessary to allow these countries to opt out of these new provisions. As it turned out, such differentiation did not stem the flurry of activity and policy transformations that followed in the wake of the Amsterdam, and the subsequent, Tampere agreements. To start with, it did not take long for the Commission to decide to reverse its official stance on the issue of extra-Community labour immigration. Departing from ‘an analysis of the economic and demographic context of the Union and of the countries of origin’, the Commission takes the view ‘that channels for legal immigration to the Union should now be made available for labour migrants’ (CEC 2000b: 3). The ‘zero immigration’ of the previous thirty years is repudiated as ‘quite simply, unrealistic’ (CEC 2000d: 4). ‘The main challenge’, argues the Commission, ‘will be to attract and recruit migrants suitable for the EU labour force to sustain productivity and economic growth’ (CEC 2003d: 10). The Commission’s call for an ‘efficient management of migration flows’ (CEC 2000a: 9) is, above all, construed as a response to a set of acute predicaments facing the Union’s labour market. Prefaced with references to already established and developing recruitment schemes at the member state level (CEC 2003g: ch. 6; see also CEC 2004c), the Commission insists on a coordination of national responses within ‘an overall framework at EU level’ (CEC 2000b: 14). Hence, and since the admission of third country labour migrants will remain a national sphere of authority, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is set to complement and support the EU’s so far limited legislative instruments (see Caviedes 2004). This is done so as to bring forth common
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objectives and guidelines as well as best practices and targets that are sensitive to different national needs (CEC 2001b). In due course, the Commission envisages, such an OMC-driven process will help establish a common framework for third country labour migration in the EU. As part of the OMC in this particular area, all measures are to be aligned with the objectives laid down in the European Employment Strategy and developed in close collaboration with the social partners, actors at regional and local levels, various NGOs, ‘associations of migrants as stakeholders’ and other representatives of ‘civil society’ (CEC 2001b: 14). Such coordination of recruitment policies for ‘economic migrants’ should ‘enable the EU to respond quickly and efficiently to labour market requirements at national, regional and local level, recognising the complex and rapidly changing nature of these requirements’ (CEC 2000b: 15). In this context, the Commission recommends the bilateral agreements on seasonal and temporary work that southern European members have signed with various third countries, not only for helping to alleviate labour shortages but also even more, for strengthening cooperation with third countries in the fight against illegal immigration. It is also important to note that the Commission does not take issue with the fact that some of these bilateral agreements do not award seasonal third country labourers the same working conditions and salary levels as nationals (CEC 2004c: 7).
Imposing Sender-Receiver ‘Partnerships’ On the whole, the Commission advocates a policy on new third-country labour migrants that is guided by a ‘flexible approach’. ‘[W]orkers who intend to return to their countries of origin’ are said to be best admitted on the basis of ‘temporary’ work permits. Within this category, moreover, ‘special arrangements’ could be worked out for ‘certain types of workers; e.g. seasonal workers, transfrontier workers, and intra-corporate transferees’. Subsequently, temporary permits might be extended and, ‘after a number of years’, workers who ‘meet certain criteria’ may be awarded permanent work permits (CEC 2000b: 17–18). Moreover, ‘the idea of recruiting workers and developing training programmes in countries of origin in skills which are needed by the EU could be explored’ (CEC 2004c: 19). In line with this, and in order to better ‘manage’, ‘regulate’, and ‘control’ the ‘increasingly mixed flows of migrants’, a development of a ‘partnership approach’ with third countries is advocated (CEC 2000b: 8). This is set to ‘provide a framework for dealing flexibly with new trends in migration’ whereby migration, rather than being perceived as ‘simply a oneway flow’, now must be construed as a ‘pattern of mobility’ (CEC 2000b: 8, 13). A related course of action concerns the connection between labour migration and international protection. Set to be coordinated ‘in partnership with third countries’, it is recommended that ‘[b]etter access to protection in Europe must go hand in hand with a regulated and more transparent frame-
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work for a policy on admissions, including for employment purposes’ (CEC 2003e: 7), and ‘the discussion on the number of economic migrants needed in different sectors should take into account the number of persons under international protection’ (CEC 2000b: 15). The issue of immigration and asylum has thus been constituted as a centrepiece in all of the EU’s development programmes, also expressed as ‘the migration-development nexus’ (CEC 2002a: 23). Development assistance to poorer countries is to target more forcefully ‘the root causes of migration flows’—the so-called push factors—so as to better ‘manage’, ‘control’, and ‘reduce’ global migration flows (CEC 2002a). That is to say, helping developing countries come to terms with what the Commission describes as the mostly self-inflicted problems of ‘negative growth’, ‘overpopulation’, ‘unemployment’, ‘[a]rmed conflict’, ‘ethnic cleansing’, ‘[h]uman rights abuses’, and ‘[p]oor governance’ will, in the long term, also help ‘to reduce the migratory pressure’, hence facilitating a future development where migration ‘can be a positive factor for growth and success of both the Union and the countries concerned’ (CEC 2002a: 10, 7, 4). To enable third and neighbouring countries to improve their management of migration flows in general, and to reinforce their fight against illegal migration in particular, the Commission is calling for an increase in the EU’s technical and financial support within the framework of its various external policies and cooperation programmes (CEC 2004d). The ‘New Neighbourhood Policy’, designed to enhance cooperation with countries along the EU’s eastern borders and in the Mediterranean basin, harbours the twin purposes of managing the new labour migration to the EU more efficiently on the one hand and, on the other hand, of combating what the Commission enumerates as the ‘serious threats’ of ‘illegal immigration, organised crime, trafficking of various kinds, terrorism and communicable diseases’ (CEC 2004b: 23).
‘Flexible Integration’: Migrant Incorporation and Public Relations Post-‘Zero Immigration’ But the management of new labour migration is not only promoted under the banner of ‘flexibility’ and mutually beneficial ‘partnerships’ between senders and receivers. It also intimates that newcomers should be greeted with measures of ‘integration’ and with the associated boons of civic citizenship, antidiscrimination policies, and social inclusion. Integration is also construed as a competitive device, as when the Commission urges the member states to ‘greatly contribute to the integration process’, since this ‘will be particularly important in attracting migrants to highly skilled jobs for which there is world-wide competition’ (CEC 2000b: 19). But if integration can be held up as enhancing the Union’s competitive edge, its perceptibly discordant relationship with many of the objectives inherent in
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the ‘flexible management’ of new labour migration also elicits some hesitation on the part of the Commission as to how extensive integration measures really ought to be. Put differently, if the new labour migrants derive their utility precisely from their flexible status—always open to return and to continual mobility—this is clearly at variance with the Commission’s (CEC 2000b: 20) conception of integration as inevitably amounting to ‘a long-term process’ comprising a series of measures that, apart from focusing on the needs of new arrivals, are to pay ‘special attention’ to ‘second generation migrants’. Given this policy conflict, it is little wonder that the Commission, on other occasions, proves equally eager to temper, even retract, its affirmative stance on the integration of new labour migrants. As part of a wavering attempt to paper over the contradiction between integration and flexibility, the Commission thus suggests that it might be advisable to adopt an ‘incremental’ approach to integration—an approach ‘[d]ifferentiating rights according to length of stay’ (CEC 2000b: 15, 17). However, since the Commission has already established that ‘length of stay’ is to be managed through the issuing of various temporary and renewable work permits and determined by the rapidly changing and hence indeterminable market needs, this proposal cannot but amount to little more than a tautology. Arguably, it essentially seeks to square the integrationflexibility circle by subordinating the issue of integration to the requirements of flexibility. This contradictory endeavour is reflected too in the Commission’s subsequent recasting of integration as ‘reintegration’ in the EU’s proposal to design a ‘reintegration framework’ ‘to assist returning migrants to re-settle in their countries of origin’ (CEC 2000b: 8; 2001b: 10). Another predicament facing the Commission revolves around its undertaking to secure widespread public acceptance of the (official) revocation of the EU’s long-established tradition of ‘ ‘‘zero’’ immigration policies’ (CEC 2000b: 3). To be sure, ‘zero immigration’ never constituted an actual line of policy in the literal sense of the term; today it is rather used as a generic term, denoting thirty years of restrictive immigration policies aimed at limiting the (legal) entry of labour migrants, or ‘economic migrants’, from poorer parts of the world. But if the Commission’s call to end zero immigration must not be allowed to conjure up a picture of the past thirty years as characterized by a true intention to hermetically seal off the borders for all third country labour migrants (as we demonstrate elsewhere in this book, the passivity, even tacit consent, of many governments towards industry’s exploitation of undocumented labour amounts to just one refutation of such an intention), neither should it be taken to signify the first step towards a future policy of ‘open door’ labour immigration. Listening to the Commission, however, one gains the impression that it is, nonetheless, a public reaction partly built on just such an interpretation which it has now set out to forestall. The Commission appears to be apprehensive that the ‘host populations’ will respond negatively to the abrogation of ‘zero immigration’, possibly interpreting it as portending less restriction and an uncontrolled inflow of immigrants. In its detailed Opinion
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on the Commission’s new approach to immigration, the Economic and Social Committee (2001: 111) voices similar concerns: ‘It will not be easy to persuade public opinion to take a favourable view of the more open immigration policy now being proposed, but far-reaching work to this end is now urgently required.’ In light of the Commission’s exceedingly restrictive stance on immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, however, such uneasiness is far from surprising. Indeed, for more than two decades the Commission rarely missed an opportunity to emphasize that a restrictive immigration policy, or ‘zero immigration’, was the only ‘realistic’ way forward. The restrictive approach to immigration also functioned as a crucial public relations tool, often put to use when the Commission sought to assure the EU citizenry that further European integration by no means implied an increase in extra-European immigration. As such, the pledge to uphold (the illusion of) ‘zero immigration’ also served as one of the core ingredients in the Commission’s articulation and promotion of a ‘European citizenship’ during the 1990s. Here, the underlying assumption was that the EU citizenry, in order to consolidate, needed to be assured that immigration and asylum were being effectively checked at the external borders (see Hansen 2000b). In order to obviate possible public disapproval of the EU’s rather abrupt shift from its promise to perpetuate the policy of ‘zero immigration’ to its current call for an increase of third country labour immigration, the Commission has come up with a series of public relations measures to be adopted by a range of elite actors. ‘A shift to a proactive immigration policy’, the Commission (2000b: 22, 15) asserts, will ‘require strong political leadership to help shape public opinion’, as well as ‘a clear commitment to the promotion of pluralistic societies and a condemnation of racism and xenophobia’. More specifically, politicians are being urged to highlight the positive effects of immigration and to ‘avoid language which could incite racism or aggravate tensions between communities’. In addition, the media is held up by the Commission as having ‘considerable responsibility in this respect’, that is, ‘in its role as an educator of public opinion’ (CEC 2000b: 22). While the public is to be on the one hand reassured about the EU’s commitment to an ever more intense fight against illegal immigration, and on the other hand educated about the benefits of immigration and diversity, the Commission also puts forward a third set of conditions to be considered. Here, and in contrast with the critical importance attributed to the task of teaching the public to be appreciative of immigration and diversity, the Commission (2000b: 16) sees it necessary also to pay heed to such ‘factors’ as ‘public acceptance of additional migrant workers in the country concerned, resources available for reception and integration’, as well as ‘the possibilities for social and cultural adaptation etc’. Although the Commission refrains from any further elaboration of these ‘factors’, their very incorporation into the Union’s overall immigration scheme is nonetheless quite indicative of the
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contradictions that pervade immigration policy at the EU level. As such, it tallies with the situation at national levels, and could arguably be interpreted as a tactical move on the part of the Commission to appease the discrepant positions on immigration between, as well as within, the member states. True, most governments share the Commission’s view that an increase in extra-EU labour migrants is necessary, but to assume that they are able, let alone prepared, to shoulder the responsibility to ‘shape public opinion’ in an anti-racist and pro-immigration direction is a completely different matter. As has been made painfully clear in recent years, the relationship between the traditional parties of government and the anti-immigrant right is no longer limited to one where the former assimilates many of the proposals and sentiments of the latter; rather, in many member states, it has entered a phase of open cooperation and coalition-building.
Externalizing the Asylum Crisis In the post-Amsterdam period, asylum policy has been subjected to even more intensive supranational activity than the issues of migrant and/or minority integration and extra-EU labour migration.18 So-called ‘minimum standards’ have been established in a number of areas; for example, minimum standards on ‘temporary protection’ (Council of the EU 2001a),19 ‘reception of asylum seekers’ (Council of the EU 2003a),20 ‘the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees’ (Council of the EU 2004a), and ‘minimum standards on procedures for granting or withdrawing refugee status’ (Council of the EU 2004b).21 On account of Amsterdam’s new provisions, moreover, all facets of visa policy have been incorporated into the EU’s legal framework (Council of the EU 2001c).22 As for the Commission’s rationale, it is ‘illegal immigration’ that ‘represents one of the basic criteria for the determination of those third countries whose nationals are subject to the visa requirement’ (CEC 2003h: 4). Since prospective asylum seekers, as a rule, are denied visas to EU countries, this conversion implies a key legal retrenchment on the right of asylum. Indeed, the number of countries whose citizens are required to have a visa in order to enter the Union includes practically all those countries that the EU recurrently reprimands for human rights abuses. In line with the EU’s visa policy, an EU Directive on Carrier Sanctions was adopted in 2001 (Council of the EU 2001b). It imposes financial penalties on 18
For a more detailed analysis and further sources, see P. Hansen (2005c). While the UK decided to opt in to this Directive, it does not apply to Ireland and Denmark (Council of the EU 2001a: 13). 20 The UK has opted in to this Directive; Ireland and Denmark do not participate (Council of the EU 2003a: 19). 21 At the time of writing (2005), the adoption of this Directive is still pending. 22 The UK and Ireland retain their own visa policies. 19
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carriers that transport TCNs who are refused entry into the Union, and obliges carriers to send back such TCNs. The Eurodac information system, which became fully operational across the EU in 2003, makes up another component of the building of a ‘Common European Asylum System’ (see Council of the EU 2002a).23 It was established in order to ensure the effective implementation of the Dublin Convention (see Council of the EU 2003b), which stipulates that asylum seekers are allowed to file for asylum in only one member state. Its decision, then, has legal force in the Union as whole, thus preventing a rejected applicant from taking her case to another member state. Eurodac’s main official function is to collect and store fingerprints of all people over the age of 14 who have applied for asylum or been detained while ‘illegally’ entering or residing in a member state. Despite the growing number of new supranational provisions and measures, Brussels maintains that the process embarked upon since Amsterdam and Tampere has done little to overcome the crisis that has plagued asylum policy in the EU since the early 1990s. On the contrary, the Commission maintains, the new millennium has just seen a worsening of this crisis. There is thus a ‘growing malaise in public opinion’ and ‘[a]buse of the asylum procedures is on the rise’ (CEC 2003e: 3). Brussels views the asylum crisis as ‘a real threat to the institution of asylum and more generally for Europe’s humanitarian tradition’. As such, it ‘demands a structural response’ that does not stop short of measures targeted at the internal operation of the EU’s developing asylum system (CEC 2003e: 3). Rather, and in line with the measures embarked upon in the EU’s new labour migration policy, the core of this structural response needs to be transposed to the external dimension of the EU’s asylum and immigration policy. As was declared at the Seville European Council in 2002, the issue of migration should make up an obligatory and salient feature in all of the EU’s external relations (CEC 2002a: 4). Thus, a growing emphasis has been placed on the establishment of ‘asylum and immigration projects in third countries’ (CEC 2002a: 4), including cooperation in reinforcing border controls and in rendering more effective the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers (CEC 2002a). The Commission seems unable to emphasize enough that ‘[a] policy on returns or effective removal from the territory is an absolute necessity for the credibility of the common asylum system and the common procedure’ (CEC 2000c: 10; 2003h: 8), and is thus keen to use readmission as a public relations tool to increase ‘public faith in the need to uphold the EU humanitarian tradition of offering asylum to those in need of international protection’ (CEC 2003f: 20); that is, as a promise to an imagined populace hankering for reassurance about the authorities’ resolve and relentless crackdown on bogus asylum seekers. The Commission also points to the merits of ‘the forced return of illegal residents’, arguing that this can ‘help to ensure public acceptance for more openness towards new 23
The Eurodac Regulation does not apply to Denmark (Council of the EU 2002b: 2).
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legal immigrants against the background of more open admission policies particularly for labour migrants’ (CEC 2002b: 8). As part of the external dimension and the EU’s ‘global policy’ (CEC 2002a: 26) on asylum and immigration, the Commission has been seeking to establish a firm link between development assistance policy and the striking of readmission agreements with third countries. The Cotonou Agreement (replacing the Lome´ conventions), or the EU’s ‘Partnership Agreement’ with seventy-seven African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries already contains a readmission clause (CEC 2002a: 24; see Lavenex 2002), just like the EU’s agreements with countries such as Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. Moreover, the Commission has been authorized to negotiate ‘readmission agreements’ and other migration- and asylum-related cooperation agreements with a growing number of countries, the great majority of them (like those already enumerated) with deplorable human rights records (see CEC 2002a: 25; 2003h: 12–14). Furthermore, the AENEAS Programme has been established to facilitate the development of the readmission instrument and also aims to address the root causes of migration, promote legal labour migration channels, improve third countries’ asylum systems, and combat illegal immigration and organized crime (European Parliament, Council of the EU 2004). Closely related to this is an endeavour to render more effective the utilization of refugee-absorbing ‘safe third countries’ and, most importantly perhaps, to develop the instrument of ‘refugee protection in the region of origin’, or ‘regional protection’. As Boswell (2003) argues, regional protection may be developed into a tool of mere refugee containment, thus perpetuating the ongoing transfer of the refugee burden from richer to poorer countries; or it could be based on a commitment to real protection and human rights, and vested with adequate resources. But the current reality of protection in the region of origin is a distressing one indeed, and there is little prospect of improvement in the near future, the actual trend being towards a worsening of conditions in the regions of refugee origin (Loescher and Milner 2003; ECRE and US Committee for Refugees 2003). However, despite being fraught with obvious drawbacks, the notion of regional protection is still confidently espoused. One conspicuous initiative was taken with the British government’s Vision paper in 2003 (UK Government 2003: 2), calling for sweeping reform of a ‘failing’ asylum system, deemed to undermine ‘public confidence’, because it is held to be tremendously demanding to expel rejected asylum seekers, something which, in turn, is claimed to be gratifying for illegal immigrants and terrorists (UK Government 2003: 1–2). A package of far-reaching measures is here put forth, promoting refugee protection in regions of origin through the establishment of Regional Protection Areas (RPAs) outside the EU. Once the RPAs have been set up, the paper goes on, all asylum seekers (with a few exceptions) arriving into the UK and, preferably, the whole of the EU and possibly ‘other Western States’ should be deported to them (UK Government 2003: 2). The RPAs should provide for basic needs so that refugees do not
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decide to abscond (and turn ‘illegal’) in search of better living conditions, but should also guard against offering too generous provisions since this ‘will act as a magnet to those in need in the surrounding area and cause resentment’, ‘envy or mistrust’ (2003: 13, 2). As for the processing of asylum claims, the paper approaches this as something that ‘[i]deally. . . would not be necessary because the asylum seekers will be able to go home quickly and it is more efficient to provide for all rather than determine claims’ (2003: 13). Among the many proposals—of which just a selection can be accounted for here—the British government also affirms an ‘international recognition of the need to intervene to reduce flows of genuine refugees and enable refugees to return home’. Measures here would range from ‘non-coercive’ to ‘coercive’ action, including military intervention in sovereign states (2003: 3, 11). As Noll (2003: 309) argues, these and other far-reaching changes proposed in the British Vision paper ‘signal the most radical break with the international refugee regime as we know it’. They reflect ‘an ongoing paradigm shift’ in asylum policy, one that purports to ameliorate the refugee crisis ‘by locating the refugee beyond the domain of justice’ (Noll 2003: 338; see also Loescher and Milner 2003). In a recent Communication (CEC 2004c: 16), the Commission concludes that there is indeed ‘a long way to go before most of the current refugee hosting countries in the regions of origin could be considered to meet such a standard where they are able and willing to offer effective protection’. Nevertheless, the Commission has decided to promote what it has termed ‘EU Regional Protection Programmes’ before the decidedly distant and difficult goal of meeting protection and human rights standards has been fully realized. Less than two years after the original UK proposal, then, external EU or EU-sponsored camps for refugees have emerged as a highly viable option. The EU’s new multi-annual Hague Programme (2005–10), which succeeds the Tampere Programme, has confirmed that EU Regional Protection Programmes are to be vigorously pursued in the future. The Hague Programme envisages pilot projects to help establish asylum centres in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, where refugees en route to Europe, and those apprehended in the international waters of the Mediterranean, would be deported and housed (Council of the EU 2004d: 21).
Migration and the Conditionality of an Emerging Post-National Regime The task of analysing the EU’s post-Amsterdam policies on migrant and ethnic minority integration together with policies on immigration and asylum is largely a matter of grappling with an awesome accumulation of contradictions. We began by examining pronounced commitments in the EU’s integration policies
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to equality of migrant ethnic minorities and extended free movement rights for TCNs on the one hand, and their marked adjustment to the needs of the EU’s flexible labour market on the other. As also elucidated, a similar approach permeates the Commission’s policy line on labour immigration from third countries. Here, however, the heavy emphasis on flexible and temporary work permits for new labour migrants contradicts the premise of integration policy that migrants’ integration is always a long-term process. On the whole, the primacy of market requirements that permeates EU policy discussion on new labour immigration leaves very little room for the type of ‘civic citizenship’ and rights dimension that, despite its flaws, is still endorsed in policies addressing the situation of the EU’s ‘legally’ and permanently settled TCNs. But we also saw that EU integration policy is not only adapted to market requirements and labour market flexibility. The aspiration that migrants and minorities should embrace ‘European values’ is also accentuated, as are these groups’ responsibilities and obligations in the integration process. The conceptions that underpin this approach to the integration of resident migrants and minorities are also manifest in the Commission’s contradictory endeavour to prepare host populations for the rescission of the ‘zero’ labour immigration policy. Calls for increased tolerance and a greater understanding of the benefits of additional labour migrants are made to coexist with the Commission’s respect for popular scepticism about the prospects for migrants’ ‘social and cultural adaptation’, as well as for host populations’ possible rejection of new labour migration from third countries. Arguably, such contradictory approaches largely draw upon the political currents in vogue in most member states. It partly represents the Commission’s adaptation to governments which are intent on inviting in more migrant labour in order to sustain competitive economies, but which have simultaneously fomented anti-immigrant sentiment and played on ethno-cultural identity politics in order to stay competitive with the extreme right at the polls. Adding to the contradictory picture, we also pointed to EU policy initiatives which appear at odds with such sentiments, above all, anti-discrimination and anti-racism policies. Arguably, we may conceive of these as signifying budding elements of a more inclusive ‘European creed’ that addresses the ‘social exclusion’ of disadvantaged groups in their institutional and structural embeddedness. However, from a wider perspective, we also need to enquire where anti-discrimination policy will end up when, as now, it lacks a foundation in a firm commitment to social citizenship rights. Without such a foundation, the more far-reaching aspects of EU anti-discrimination policy might run the risk of becoming bogged down in fragmented, localized, and parochial projects and partnerships for social inclusion, however supportive of ‘diversity’ or ‘empowering from below’ they may appear to be. However, the EU’s increasingly externalized policies on asylum, illegal immigration, expulsion, and border control raise another and perhaps even more pressing question. We have to wonder what the real prospects for anti-
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discrimination are in a Europe that (once again) is haunted by the ‘spectre of the camp’ (Noll 2003: 339). It is here, then, at the intersection of benign antidiscrimination objectives and the deplorable treatment of asylum seekers and ‘illegals’ that we are brought face to face with some of the most painful contradictions inherent in today’s European integration. We have seen how the already diluted right of asylum in the EU appears to be on the verge of being debased to the level of a merely formal commitment, set to be outsourced through the politics of stick and carrot to poorly resourced countries in the regions of refugee origin. This development forms an integral part of the gradual downgrading of the EU’s commitment to resolving the global refugee crisis to the mere globalization of its border controls, or to its ‘fight’ against illegal immigration, international crime, and terrorism. The fabrication of a menacing ‘problem’ of illegal immigration and the actions that supposedly have to be taken to address it thus constitute key enabling factors in the gradual undermining of the right of asylum. In this way, moreover, the EU is exploiting, as a pariah and scapegoat, the very same group—the ‘illegals’—that simultaneously serve as indispensable cogs in the Union’s much desired flexible economy and labour market. Having arrived here, and seeing that all roads—beyond or maybe indeed as a consequence of all contradictions—lead to the flexible labour market, we can now appreciate more fully the intimate and complementary relationship between policies on extra-EU immigration and policies on intra-EU integration. If the intra-EU labour reserve of long-term resident TCNs needs to be induced to relocate in step with the labour market’s ‘flexibility’ requirements, the same can be said to apply to select groups from within the extra-EU labour reserve. The fact that the Commission (2000b: 15, emphasis added) requests that recruitment schemes for extra-EU labour migrants address ‘the need for greater mobility between Member States for incoming migrants’ is just another case in point underscoring the complementary character of the two policy schemes in question. If the policy development in the wake of Amsterdam and Tampere has been deeply disquieting, it must also be kept in mind that it has occurred in conjunction with an increasing supranationalization of the policy areas in question. Contrary to what many analysts and NGOs had predicted or hoped, then, supranationalization has, so far, not proven to be conducive to a reversal of the pattern of a ‘race to the bottom’ harmonization that was set in train through intergovernmental cooperation in the 1980s. True, as indicated above, in some areas of anti-discrimination policy, supranationalization has effected an upgrading of many of the national anti-discrimination regimes. But as demonstrated in this chapter, this seems to be the exception that proves the rule. This problem strikes at the heart of the current European dilemma. It also raises a number of central questions about the future development of European integration. We have emphasized the necessity of discussing the EU’s development of supranational or ‘post-national’ policies on migration and the societal
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incorporation of migrants and ethnic minorities within a wider framework that focuses on the particular conditionality posed by the EU’s emergent social model. In all, the EU’s Lisbon reform agenda represents a modification of European approaches to the welfare state, one that is almost exclusively preoccupied with growth and competitiveness, while effectively steering clear of any serious attention to social citizenship. Here, economic policy encroaches upon social policy by way of seeking to extricate, or immunize, itself from those aspects of welfare policy that are deemed to impinge on growth, competitiveness, employability, and so on. To borrow from Chalmers and Lodge (2003: 10), this encroachment-extrication nexus now operating in the EU could also be likened to ‘a colonisation of the Welfare State by the economic policy-making process’. We have, in the context, referred to Jessop’s (2002a) general theory on the transformation of a ‘Keynesian national welfare state’ into a ‘Schumpeterian postnational workfare state’. We have argued further that the emergent European Social Model carried along through the EU’s Lisbon process and its so-called open method of coordination represents a markedly neocommunitarian approach to this more general transformation, contingent on European social democracy’s change of course. Despite the patently neoliberal nucleus of the Lisbon process and the deepseated structural–institutional transformation of European welfare state traditions it carries along, a number of crucial qualifications remain to be spelled out. For one, we should like to note that our account is not to be read as implying that the road now lies open for the smooth liquidation of the welfare states in the EU, or, for that matter, that the wholesale importation of the American model is just around the corner. Certainly an emergent EU regime, which is in many aspects modelled on American policies, represents a common conditionality to which the member states are bound to adapt. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Europe’s historical plurality of policies and regimes of citizenship has come to an end, or that the actually existing EU-Europe has come to ‘speak with one voice’ on today’s increasingly complex and controversial issues of social welfare and migration. This is the subject to which we are now directing the inquiry.
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HE observation that immigrants and ethnic minorities in Europe suffer from racial discrimination and unequal access to citizenship, welfare, and socio-professional advancement is hardly new. As discussed in Chapter 2, the immigrant workers or Gastarbeiter of post-war Western Europe often lacked fundamental rights of citizenship in the countries where they worked. But their typical mode of employment and social trajectory (as documented by Rex and Moore 1967; Rex and Tomlinson 1979; Castles and Kosack 1973) differed from those of substantial sections of the multifarious new immigration of the 1980s and 1990s. What emerged in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, giving the European issue of race, class, and migration its particular tinge at the turn of the third millennium, are new forms of exclusion that are seemingly permanent: disadvantaged enclaves in a fragmented ethnic division of labour tend to become or remain isolated from mainstream inclusive institutions that regulate access to citizenship in the member states of the EU. As a result, in a multi-ethnic and still multinational Europe an incipient ethno-racial stratification confronts us with a whole range of differentially excluded population groups, variously stigmatized as ‘immigrants’, ‘foreigners’, an ‘underclass’, or ethnic or racial minorities. Most migrants coming from outside the so-called Western geopolitical space, including the growing number of migrants and children of migrants who have indeed managed to make ‘elite’ careers in cultural and political spheres, continue to suffer from racial stigma and practices of exclusion. In this and the four following chapters, however, we concentrate on the conditions of some of those groups that are most marginal in relation to the frameworks of citizenship in European soci¨ ic Wacquant eties. These are groups that share what the French sociologist, Lo (1996a), has called ‘advanced marginality’ and others ‘the new poverty’ (e.g. Room, Lawson, and Laczko 1989). Their advanced marginality signifies that their exclusion and their lives are formed by conditions that belong to the novel and most advanced political and economic configurations rather than
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representing the imperfections of a passing order. The new racialized poor are socially marginal but essential cog-wheels serving the much-hailed flexibility of labour-market regimes and of the new service economies characteristic of current processes of restructuring (e.g. Sassen 1991, 1998; Castells 1996; Spoonley 1992; Lash 1994). These economies and societies are qualitatively unlike the ‘Fordist’ industrial mass-production and welfare states characteristic of the post-war employment of immigrant workers in Western Europe. As broad class-based organizations, previously so influential in the established European welfare states, lose their integrative power for economy and society, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘diversity’—major idioms of the self-understanding of contemporary Western societies—have emerged as coded references to new fragmented divisions of labour and multiple forms of racialized exclusion (Balibar 1991; Wallerstein 1999; Grillo 2000). These processes of restructuring and new forms of ethnic segmentation within contemporary advanced capitalist economies and labour markets are still most typical for the USA, but they are present in Europe as well, both in the ‘old’ immigration countries in central and north-western Europe and in the newer immigration countries of southern Europe. In shrinking welfare states under global pressure, migration has become a source of conflict, embedded in struggles over the current restructuring of the national welfare state. One general scenario includes the impact of migration on what has been described as the wholesale ‘Americanization’ of European social policies (Freeman 1986; cf. Leibfried 1992). Migration and the ‘politics of belonging’ (Crowley 1999) as it relates to immigrants, asylum applicants, and new ethnic minorities become main issues of contention in the broad consensus on which national systems of social redistribution and citizenship have rested (e.g. Freeman 1986). This carries the potential for political and social fragmentation along lines of ethnicity and ‘race’. Deepening social divisions, expressed in terms of ethnic divisions of labour, serve to rationalize new discourses of social exclusion. These tensions, it is argued (e.g. Favell 1998), become difficult or impossible to solve within the closed ‘clubs’ of national welfare states and their crisis-ridden institutions. We may add—along the lines of the argument in Chapter 3—that the prevalent dynamics of ‘negative integration’, embedded in the policies and institutions of the EU, tends to exacerbate such so-called neo-American (Kloosterman and Rath 2001) trends of the deregulation of national labour markets and the dismantling of the decommodifying institutional frameworks of the welfare state. Yet, although present everywhere, such processes are articulated in importantly different path-dependent ways in the various member states. We cannot translate American policy experience, the institutional-structural transformation in the economy and the labour market of the USA, or the effects of this on the social fabric, to Europe in any straightforward way. Nor, in spite of all efforts at and indeed, pervasive effects of supranational
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integration, is the EU a single cultural, social, or economic space. Hence, the impact of economic globalization should be understood in terms of its concrete articulation within a range of unique national and local institutional settings, political traditions, and systems of governance, which still lend the EU the character of a patchwork of national states rather than a uniform social and cultural space. Current changes demand a theoretical and conceptual framework that is capable of mapping the articulation of the general and the specific, the global and the national, the supranational and the national. Mainstream sociological studies of welfare states and labour markets provide clues to a theoretical and analytical understanding of the still differentiated impact of current global change on particular nation states, but they lack frames of reference for understanding issues of exclusion/inclusion, labourmarket segmentation, and access to citizenship and social welfare as these relate to processes of ethnization or racialization. Most of them still ignore the fact that European societies have become multi-ethnic. This blunts their analytical power and credibility at a historical juncture when ethnically segmented labour markets and the racialization of access to social citizenship have increasingly come to shape the institutions and practices of the changing welfare state per se. In the attempt to overcome these inadequacies of mainstream sociology of the welfare state, some innovative European studies have had recourse to rich US academic research and debate on racial or ethnic disadvantage. Along similar lines, in this chapter we discuss two prevalent US academic perspectives on current post-Fordist macro-structural political and economic change. We address the issue of a possible transatlantic convergence between the US and current EU experience. Finally, we discuss seemingly contrasting discourses and research perspectives on racialized exclusion in the EU, which bring out the complexity of the issue. One major approach to the study of racialized social exclusion focuses on the disadvantaged urban welfare-dependent poor. In a series of studies, ‘leftliberal’ (or ‘social-democratic’ in continental European discourse, but simply ‘liberal’ in US political discourse) scholars of US race relations demonstrate how the spatial and socio-demographic mismatch between de-industrialization and the relocation of services and production within cities has impoverished racially stigmatized African-American residential areas and generated a new disadvantaged urban underclass. This spatial mismatch is exacerbated by another mismatch between the increasing demand for and actual deficiency of qualified labour, with African-Americans in the urban ghettos again remaining at the bottom. But others have focused rather on the development of a new urban job hierarchy resulting, as they see it, from a fundamental structural transformation of the global economy. The concentration of finance and advanced producer services in large cities in the economically leading regions of the world is thought to lead to a new division of labour. It is
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marked by the polarization between new high-status, high-tech professional jobs and low-status, low-paid casual jobs in a new booming service sector, with the disadvantaged pole largely staffed by new immigrant labour. One result is the emergence of a multitude of new categories of racialized ‘working poor’. These two major and complementary (albeit not entirely satisfactory) frameworks for analysing the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities in the advanced economies and in the societies of the North Atlantic sphere originally took US cities as their chief point of reference. They have also had a major impact on European research. As we shall argue, however, a convergence between the extent and the qualities of racialized exclusion in Europe and the USA is not evident. We may even question the extent to which these perspectives from US urban sociology on race, class, and postFordist restructuring, which have attracted particular attention in Europe, capture the contemporary complexities of the intersection of race and class in the USA itself. However, a critical discussion of them may induce us to go further into the rich US academic debate on migration, race, ethnicity, and class, which, we argue, may in turn promote an informed discussion of the demands that could be placed on a complex comparative theoretical and analytical framework for understanding current trajectories of migration and racialized exclusion in Europe. Hence, although generalizations from the US experience cannot be brought to bear on European societies in any simple way, American theory and research may certainly provide clues for interpreting the multifarious contemporary European scene. It is thus important to develop the perspectives of European scholars (e.g. Cross 1998a; Kloosterman 1994) who have tried to integrate American ethnic and urban studies with comparative insights from European sociological studies of changing welfare states. Although others have tried to refine the typology with additional distinctions and categories, Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1996: 194) broad tripartite division of ‘welfare regimes’ in the Euro-Atlantic sphere still stands out as the most well- argued and authoritative analytical framework and proficient theoretical edifice in current social policy and welfare state studies. His three ideal types of modern ‘welfare state regimes’, or ‘worlds of welfare’, in the ‘western’ Euro-Atlantic sphere are: 1. The Anglo-American liberal regime focusing strongly on the market, a liberal work ethnic which favours private welfare solutions combined with a system of means tested public welfare transfers targeted at low income groups and based on a universalism of minimal needs. 2. The conservative central and southern European corporate regime highly influenced by Christian values, which focuses on the conservation of the traditional family, a morally sanctioned social order, and which reproduces a particularistic and hierarchic edifice of citizenship.
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3. The social democratic regime, most typical for Scandinavia, focusing on values of equality and individuality, and which is occupied with safeguarding a high degree of universalism in an extensive and ramified public welfare system, catering even for differentiated needs of the middle classes. ‘Welfare regimes’ is here understood as qualitatively different arrangements between state, market, and the family or household that different historically established modes of governance and class relationships have given birth to. The three welfare state regimes differ in terms of historical formation, political foundation, institutional set-up and functional logic. Each of them elaborates the dimension of social citizenship on the basis of its own distinct political rationale, embedded in specific institutional frameworks, and carried up by different forms of class alliances and modes of consensus making. The simpler and more common notion of the ‘welfare state’ is often ‘too narrowly associated with the conventional social amelioration policies’, argues EspingAndersen (1990: 78), and denotes linear and quantitative classification rather than the qualitatively different dynamics of welfare state institutional frameworks. However, what is important is not only how the traditional social welfare policies of different countries are constructed, but how they influence and shape society, economy and the labour market, and social stratification and segmentation. A ‘regime’ in this sense thus denotes welfare as a ramifying complex of legal and organizational features systematically interwoven between state and economy (Esping-Andersen 1990: 78). It also takes into account a range of non-state forms of welfare (Bagguley 1994: 78) and their complex interrelation with state, civil society, and the market. Esping-Andersen’s tripartite typology has been criticized for being obsessed with the ‘desire to emphasise the role of institutional and political traditions in shaping contemporary welfare regimes’ (Bagguley 1994:78–9) and neglecting the possibilities of piecemeal change brought about by local social actors. It has also been criticized for not providing any analytical space for transition between qualitatively different regimes. Its emphasis on the traditional Fordist industrial working class (and its role in political coalitions) is claimed to have inhibited any discriminating understanding of deepening and differentiated class, gender, and ethnically based divisions of welfare and labour (Bagguley 1994: 82, referring to Esping-Andersen 1990). Although these criticisms appear at least partly justified, and although issues of immigration and ethnic minorities are indeed peripheral to Esping-Andersen’s work, several of the existing (and so far few) empirically based discussions of European welfare states and their current transformation from the perspective of immigration and ethnic relations (e.g. Lash 1994; Soysal 1994; Faist 1995b) suggest that the ‘welfare regime’ approach remains fruitful. However, these studies, inspired by mainstream welfare and social policy research, tend to eschew the central and most dynamic aspect of EspingAndersen’s work, which is his endeavour to reintegrate the welfare-state
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debate into the intellectual tradition of political economy. Most important in Esping-Andersen’s analytical perspective is not the typology itself, or whether it should be supplemented with further European ‘regimes’ or ‘worlds of welfare’, but its theoretical meaning. This is his vantage point for analysing the central role of the welfare state and particular welfare regimes as a midwife of different post-industrial trajectories as they influence the distribution of jobs by gender and race or ethnicity (Esping-Andersen 1990: 192; elaborated further in Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999). The present study shares this ambition to reintroduce a political economy perspective, though integrated within a comparative analysis of post-Fordist ethnic divisions of labour and racialized exclusion.
‘Underclass’, ‘Ghetto Poor’, ‘Working Poor’, and ‘Workfare’ in US Research The ‘Mismatch’ Perspective Myrdal’s introduction (1964) of the old-fashioned Swedish term ‘underclass’ into the American debate on poverty and, mainly black, urban disadvantage received considerable attention among liberal (that is, ‘social liberal’ or ‘social democratic’) US scholars during the 1960s. African-Americans