Male Subjectivity and Poetic Form in “New American” Poetry
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Male Subjectivity and Poetic Form in “New American” Poetry
Modern and Contemporary Poetry and Poetics Modern and Contemporary Poetry and Poetics promotes and pursues topics in the burgeoning field of twentieth- and twenty-first-century poetics. Critical and scholarly work on poetry and poetics of interest to the series includes social location in its relationships to subjectivity, to the construction of authorship, to oeuvres, and to careers; poetic reception and dissemination (groups, movements, formations, institutions); the intersection of poetry and theory; questions about language, poetic authority, and the goals of writing; claims in poetics, impacts of social life, and the dynamics of the poetic career as these are staged and debated by poets and inside poems. Topics that are bibliographic, pedagogic, that concern the social field of poetry, and reflect on the history of poetry studies are valued as well. This series focuses both on individual poets and texts and on larger movements, poetic institutions, and questions about poetic authority, social identifications, and aesthetics. Language and the Renewal of Society in Walt Whitman, Laura (Riding) Jackson, and Charles Olson The American Cratylus Carla Billitteri Modernism and Poetic Inspiration The Shadow Mouth Jed Rasula The Social Life of Poetry Appalachia, Race, and Radical Modernism Chris Green Procedural Form in Postmodern American Poetry Berrigan, Antin, Silliman, and Hejinian David W. Huntsperger Modernist Writings and Religio-scientific Discourse HD, Loy, and Toomer Lara Vetter Male Subjectivity and Poetic Form in “New American” Poetry Andrew Mossin
Male Subjectivity and Poetic Form in “New American” Poetry Andrew Mossin
MALE SUBJECTIVITY AND POETIC FORM IN “NEW AMERICAN” POETRY
Copyright © Andrew Mossin, 2010. Cover image: Handwriting from one of Robert Duncan’s notebooks, used by permission of the Jess Collins Trust. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–61732–2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mossin, Andrew. Male subjectivity and poetic form in “new American” poetry / Andrew Mossin. p. cm.—(Modern and contemporary poetry and poetics) ISBN 978–0–230–61732–2 (hardback) 1. American poetry—Male authors—History and criticism. 2. American poetry—20th century—History and criticism. 3. Subjectivity in literature. 4. Self in literature. 5. Masculinity in literature. 6. Authorship—Collaboration. 7. Poetics. I. Title. PS310.S85M67 2010 8219.54093521—dc22
2009047063
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction “In Thicket”: Charles Olson, Poetic Career, and the Crisis of Cold War Masculinity Two “Homosexual Advertising”: Gay Subjectivity, Modernist Form, and Robert Duncan’s The Venice Poem Three In the Shadow of Nerval: Robert Duncan, Robin Blaser, and the Poetics of (Mis)Translation Four Recovering the Public World: Robin Blaser, Hannah Arendt, and the Discourses of Self and Other in Image-Nations 1–12 Five “Collapsed Aura”: Nathaniel Mackey, Robert Duncan, and the Poetics of Discrepant Subjectivity in “Song of the Andoumboulou” Afterword: Toward a Poetics of Mutual Understanding
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One
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159 191
Notes
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References
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Index
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Preface and Acknowledgments
T
his book, which had its beginnings more than fifteen years ago in conversations and discussions that took place in graduate seminars and creative writing workshops at Temple University, could not have been written, let alone completed, without the help, support, and generous input of many people along the way, more than I can thank or acknowledge here. I’m particularly grateful to my friends and colleagues in the graduate program at Temple, especially Kim Bernstein, Kevin Armitage, Seth Frechie, Jenny Gough, and Rachel Tzvia Back, with whom I spent many hours talking through issues related to our own early efforts in scholarship and poetry. For introducing me to the poets and poetics discussed here, I am deeply grateful to my teachers at Temple: Susan Stewart, Toby Olson, Lawrence Venuti, and Daniel T. O’Hara. I want to thank as well Charles Bernstein, who read an early version of this book in his role as outsider reader on my dissertation committee. His comments and suggestions, especially on Charles Olson and the complex set of issues related to formations of masculinity, were tremendously useful and have been integrated into my revisions. Robert Bertholf and Michael Basinski at The Poetry Collection and Literary Archives at SUNY/Buffalo were extremely generous with their time, providing me invaluable access to a range of Duncan materials housed there. I want to extend special thanks to James Maynard, assistant curator of The Poetry Collection at SUNY/Buffalo, for his patience and diligence in providing me with the scan of Duncan’s handwriting that appears on the cover. Paul Naylor, my editor and publisher at Singing Horse Press, also read and commented on an early draft of the manuscript and made invaluable suggestions for its improvement. Kevin Killian read and offered careful, generous commentary on a late draft of the chapter on Duncan’s The Venice Poem, and provided me with useful information and material on Duncan and Spicer’s relationship at the time of this poem’s writing; I’m especially grateful to
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him for providing me with a copy of Spicer and Duncan’s “A Canto for Ezra Pound.” Thanks to Lisa Jarnot for letting me read selections from a draft of her biography, The Ambassador from Venus: A Comprehensive Biography of Robert Duncan. For her long-standing friendship and willingness to listen and share ideas, as I recounted portions of this book to her, I want to thank Abigail Reikow. She has formed a vital part of that small community that has made this project possible. Many thanks to the editors and production staff at Palgrave, including Brigitte Shull, Lee Norton, and Heather Faulls, whose care and attention to the manuscript every step along the way made completion of this book a genuinely pleasurable experience. For her careful attention to the index, I am deeply grateful to Deborah Lopez, who helped make this document both clearer and more comprehensive. Special thanks to Rohini at Newgen for her careful copyediting of the manuscript. My deepest thanks go to Rachel Blau DuPlessis, who served as my MA advisor for creative writing and as my dissertation advisor at Temple. Her support over the years, unstinting and profoundly generous, has often made the difference between giving up and continuing on this path that began with the first workshop I took with Rachel in the spring of 1990. Both an assiduous reader of and advocate for the work this book represents, Rachel has been tutelary spirit, advisor, and collegial companion through the changes that life has brought, and brings. In a time that has tested the bonds of my family and challenged each of us in ways both regrettable and transformative, I thank my daughters, Mia and Isabel, for their patience and laughter and strength. What I have learned from my children as a father informs all of what follows. This book is dedicated, with love, to them. As this book neared production, I learned of the death of Robin Blaser from David Farwell, Blaser’s long-time companion. In a sad coincidence, my last letter to Blaser was written and sent to his home in Vancouver the day he died, May 7, 2009. The work that appears here has been inspired in every sense of the word by Blaser’s humane and intellectually far-ranging approach to contemporary poetry and poetics, a legacy in which we all share. With the exception of chapter two, the essays included here have been previously published; they have since been significantly revised for publication here. Many thanks to the editors of the following publications: “ ‘In thicket’: Charles Olson, Frances Boldereff, and the Construction of Masculinity at Mid-Century.” Charles Olson: A Poet’s Prose, ed. Gary GrieveCarlson. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishers, 2007. First published in Journal of Modern Literature 28, 4 (Summer 2005).
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“Recovering the Public World: Robin Blaser, Hannah Arendt, and the Discourses of Self and Other in Image-Nations 1–12.” Even on Sunday: Essays and Archival Materials on the Poetry and Poetics of Robin Blaser, ed. Miriam Nichols. Orono: National Poetry Foundation, 2002. “Unveiling Expectancy: Nathaniel Mackey, Robert Duncan and the Formation of Discrepant Subjectivity in Eroding Witness.” Baltimore: Callaloo (Fall 2000). “In the Shadow of Nerval: Robert Duncan, Robin Blaser and the Poetics of (Mis)Translation.” Contemporary Literature 38, 4 (Winter 1997).
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Introduction
I own publicly who you are, if nobody else owns . . . and see and hear you, and what you give and take; What is there you cannot give and take? —Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass And all I’ve been Is not myself? I think myself Is what I’ve seen and not myself —George Oppen, “Myself I Sing” Who cares for anything I do? And what do I care? To whom then am I addressed? To the imagination. —William Carlos Williams, Spring and All
I In 1991, while a graduate student in the MA program in creative writing at Temple University in Philadelphia, I started writing poems on eleven-byfourteen broad sheets of heavy manila paper. The poems, modeled somewhat loosely on the large format pages of Charles Olson’s Maximus Poems (1983) in the original edition published by the University of California Press, were typed onto the pages on my IBM Selectric (I had a MAC Classic, but still preferred the stiffness of the Selectric keyboard and the print balls that allowed one to change the font at will) and kept in a black artist’s portfolio case I picked up at Utretch’s Art Supply on Chestnut Street. I highlight these details because—apart from the content and language of the poems themselves, their aspirant form as initial efforts in open form poetics—it was the sheer materiality of making these poems, of having to insert the large sheets into the roller, adjusting and changing the font ball, taking care not to make mistakes as I typed, that suggested to me a kind of participation in a form of self-publication and generative making that I was discovering in the poetries and biographies of Robert Duncan, Robert Creeley, Olson, and others made
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available to me through my teachers, notably Susan Howe, Susan Stewart, and Rachel Blau DuPlessis. Reading Duncan’s prefatory remarks to Groundwork: Before the War (1984), “Some Notes on Notation,” I saw in his connection of typography, line placement, and visual awareness of the cadences of the poem a way to proceed that I could mimic, if not fully understand: The cadences of the verse, and, in turn, the interpenetration of cadences in sequence is, for me, related to the dance of my physical body. My hands keep time and know more than my brain does of measure. Stress patterns are dancing feet; my ear and voice follow a deeper rhythm, the coming and going of a life/death tide back of the beat of the heart and the breath. The literal time of the poem is experienced as given, even as the literal size of a painter’s canvas is given. (N.p.)
Enacting the “coming and going of a life/death tide,” Duncan’s work modeled for me a way of working that emphasized conscious awareness of silences, marked on the page by caesuras, gaps between words and lines, the white depth of the page surrounding words and lines—a field I was given permission (or so it seemed) to enter. Here is part of a poem from that period, aptly titled “For Duncan”: Scale it down to hear melody of the marksman wearing red cool motherboy Flesh has its secrecies approximate conditions the mtal offers no relief when I have stood w/out fair One
whitegummed
to a murdered dawn say Come forward awhile wastage complete the dry months I read You might have been Christ, some terrible force that would compel us to change, you you might have been an angel— & gave up the bastard case in high forgetfulness
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While the poem strikes me, years later, as both mawkish and derivative, a pastiche of Pound (from “Hugh Selwyn Mauberley”), early Eliot, and Duncan, it also represents an initial effort on my part to confront—poetically, formally, and in some liminal ways autobiographically—questions that are at the heart of this study. What are the relationships between poetic form and subjectivity? How does the “I,” the speaking subject of a poetic text, circumvent or rearticulate cultural forms of masculinity? What kinds of manhood do we find in the work of the poets under study here? What is the relation between the poet writing in isolation and perceptions of a public space outside the poem, of audience and readers who form perhaps the most visible community of reception for the poet’s work? How do poets who actively identify with practices and aesthetic criteria that place them at the margins of public recognition—margins that are by no means static or without porous layers—achieve a level of visibility that, if not entirely overcoming the limits of reception, moves the work more fully into public discourse? Finally, as this is a book very much about the connections between and among poets and the poetic careers that develop through the flux and unfixable forms of lived action in the public world—whether that world is the local bar, living room, or university classroom—what can we say about the relation between the forms of community that arise out of specific circumstances, propelled by the poets’ own need to be heard, and the work that results from this collaborative environment? The essays in this book were written partly in response to these questions. As such, they explore differing conditions of masculinity and the relationship among subjectivity, poetic form, and gender. My argument, in its barest form, is that masculinity and the variable subjectivities that developed its discourses are foundational aspects of male poetic practice, whether we are talking of the pitched tough-guy talk of Charles Olson and Robert Creeley in their correspondence with one another during the 1950s or, in a very different register, of the heated exchange between Robert Duncan and Robin Blaser regarding their translations of Gérard de Nerval’s Les Chimères (1973). Teasing out the relationship between masculinity and the broader framework of gender and the authorial subjectivity that develops in response to sociocultural pressures experienced by the male subject forms a critical part of my endeavor here. When I began writing this book I wanted to understand more clearly how poetry by men, my own included, understood or, alternatively, hid its means, methods, aims, and resistances as part of an ongoing discourse of male writing. Moreover, as my interest was drawn to the genitive stages of career, I sought to explore how certain male poets at early, transitional stages in their writing lives found ways of articulating their manhood in a body of work that represented the discordant and
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intractable lines of ambition, assertiveness, and authority. Thus, my chapter on Duncan’s The Venice Poem explores the tension between gay male subjectivity and the formal accomplishment this poem represents as a bridge work between two stages of Duncan’s career: a movement that can be loosely characterized as the shift from ephebe and novice to not so much mastery but adeptness. Tracing this seam between early career and the work that later signifies the poet’s authority and range informs my discussion of each of the writers here, to lesser or greater degrees. If delineating the connections between formations of manhood in the work forms one foundational part of this project, in other ways I was also drawn to pairings and other forms of literary partnering that each of these poets experienced in distinctive ways over the course of their early careers. In some ways artificial, as much separating as joining writers, literary partnering as I’ve outlined in the succeeding chapters suggests a way of discussing the tensions of affiliation while engaging in a more layered reading of the poems that result from necessarily social activities of collaboration, conversation, sharing of ideas, and so forth that are part and parcel of the poetic process. Early on in my research for this book, Wayne Kostenbaum’s Double Talk: The Erotics of Male Literary Collaboration (1989) suggested a particularly useful way of looking at the pairing and triadic formations that appear in the following chapters. As Kostenbaum says: When two men write together, they indulge in double talk; they rapidly patter to obscure their erotic burden, but the ambiguities of their discourse give the taboo subject liberty to roam. Men who collaborate engage in metaphorical sexual intercourse, and the text they balance between them is alternatively the child of their sexual union and a shared woman. (3)
While the poets discussed by Kostenbaum (Wordsworth and Coleridge, Eliot and Pound) can be said to have collaborated more directly on each other’s texts, the correspondence of Olson and Creeley and the nightly sessions of “dictational” writing conducted by Spicer, Blaser, and Duncan certainly represent other formations of double talk, writing that is two-voiced at least. Without being proscriptive about how and in what ways the collaboration represents either a child or a woman held in common between two men, it’s safe to say that the erotic impositions of collaboration permeate much of the writing discussed here. Insofar as literary collaboration and partnering suggests forms of the communal, my work here also addresses (most directly in the first two chapters) the viability of community as a social model through which poems get
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written and circulated. Indeed, this project originally developed out of my long-standing concern with issues of the social, as these became manifest in a number of contemporary poets’ responses to community and “public voice.” Drawn to the works of Robert Duncan, Robin Blaser, Jack Spicer, Helen Adam, and other San Francisco and Berkeley based figures, I became interested in how these writers had initiated poetic communities or, perhaps more appropriately, poetic coteries, and situated themselves in a collaborative set of personal and aesthetic relations that had a direct effect on the poetry they produced for and with each other. For “activist” poets such as Duncan and Allen Ginsberg the question of their affiliations as public and “oppositional” poets has particular relevance: both situated themselves firmly within a complex interrelation of Leftist and gay activist political-social ideas then beginning to achieve wider circulation. Moreover, both assumed roles early on that forced them to confront more directly the divide between public/ private stances in work that tended from the outset either to be shared among a select community of auditors (in the case of Duncan, Blaser, and Spicer) or (as would be the case with Ginsberg) to find widespread circulation in the beat communities of the North Shore, Haight Ashbury, and beyond. In other ways, my book seeks to investigate how friendships between poets, relationships that became central to the poetics and poetry of Olson, Duncan, and so on, figured into the mix of politics, aesthetic debate, and gender figuration that mark their poetries The exclusionary, homosocial, and misogynistic nature of these various partnerships and groupings has been noted by a number of critics [Davidson, Guys (2004); DuPlessis, “Manhood”], but my work here seeks to explore the enabling aspects of these communally developed poetries, especially in light of their avant-garde and innovative praxis. Without a doubt the communal exists in uneasy relation with the singular, a tension that my chapter on Duncan and Blaser’s translations of Nerval certainly highlights. At the same time, as Andrew Epstein points out, the literary friendships and partnerings that mark so much of the work that got done under the banners of experimentalism in the 1950s and 1960s allowed for an even greater level of creativity and social responsiveness: “These poets seem to value collaboration most because it can push an individual writer in new, unpredictable directions through a mixture of competition and mutual inspiration, and because it can create work which is polyvocal, unstable, and mobile” (35). While Epstein has in mind the collaborative work of New York School poets such as John Ashbery, Kenneth Koch, James Schuyler, and so on, his analysis applies as well to the poets I discuss here, poets whose linkages to one another extend far beyond the borders of any one poetic grouping and allow us to understand more fully how poetic practice and performances of the social interact and relate
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to one another, forming a palimpsest of relations that inform the production, reading, and reception of poems. In the spirit of Spicer’s oft-cited line from Admonitions, “There is really no single poem” (Collected Books 61), it could be said of the poetries and poets discussed here that there is really no single poet; rather, we encounter poets whose works continually negotiate and emanate from a co-joint space of authorship, one that is both communal and collaborative. This book is by no means an attempt to historicize in any systematic way the multifaceted sociocultural embeddedness of the poetries covered here, roughly starting in the late 1940s and extending through the 1980s. Rather, I’ve chosen poets whose careers and moment represent particularly revealing tendencies within the postwar avant-garde, specifically as these relate to questions of gender and the development of alternative poetic forms in response to larger cultural and historical pressures placed on the poets and their work. Targeting the group of poets that circulated in and around the 1950s San Francisco Renaissance initially suggested a way of grounding a larger study, one that goes beyond the scope of this project, of the development of alternative American poetries (including the works of minority and women poets) as these developed over the course of the next several decades. Part of this project, specifically my chapters on Olson’s early career and Duncan’s The Venice Poem, respond to what K.A. Cuordileone has identified as “an excessive preoccupation with-and anxiety about—masculinity in Cold War American politics” (516). While I don’t deal specifically with the circumstances of this preoccupation or seek to fashion a sociocultural rubric for investigating the connection between this cultural anxiety and the early careers of Olson, Creeley, Duncan, and Blaser, my work nonetheless relies on the scholarship of Cuordileone, Michael Davidson, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, and Eric Keenaghan to trace out certain connections between postwar and Cold War cultural formations and the innovative poetries that developed through those years. While attention to chronological continuity and broader historical frameworks has not dominated my structuring of this project and, with the inclusion of Olson and Creeley, I have clearly stepped away from an entirely West Coast orientation, I have strived toward an organizational principle that emphasizes a selection of players, if not the entire range, from which one can draw certain conclusions about how experimental and avant-garde poetry written by several male poets in the United States evolved at a critical period during the late 1940s and early 1950s; this was the time when, as Cuordileone observes, Americans were experiencing “an era of accelerated social change in which male writers were chafing against the prescribed male role and all that came with it—the constraints of breadwinning, family life, and the togetherness ethos, the conformity induced by
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the organization or overly demanding women” (531). The poetries engaged here, then, suggest different approaches and responses, aesthetic and political outcomes of work undertaken by writers who experienced those pressures. Still, as Cuordileone points out, historicizing sexual anxiety is risky business. Critics of the period have to be careful of connecting the dots too quickly and in ways that suggest one-to-one connections between evincible, lived experience and the art works produced in the wake of larger cultural forces. Grappling with the layers of meaning proposed by these poets’ individual and collective responses and seeking to illuminate wherever possible what the documents and life histories and poems reveal about gender and its relation to subjective and aesthetic experience form the key strands of this book’s interrogative stance. Following the lead of Libbie Rifkin, whose Career Moves (2003) establishes in a particularly cogent fashion the combined factors of geographical and institutional emplacement and the interpersonal exchanges of poets that occur off the radar, as well as in the more public venues of the lecture hall, classroom, local bar, or other communal meeting space, I use a variety of materials and approaches here to get to the interrelationship of masculinity and poetic practice. My questions developed out of close readings of the poems and consideration of extra-poetic materials that help situate and contextualize the poems themselves. What role did the coterie or surrounding community of poets play in the development and writing of the poems? To what degree did collaboration figure into the process, either the kind of round-table writing that gave rise to Duncan and Spicer’s work on “An Elegy for Ezra Pound” or the sort of co-creative effort represented by the Olson-Boldereff correspondence? What life circumstances helped generate the formal choices made in the work? In what ways does the personal, that is, subjectively based, inflect the public discourse of poetics? Using letters, diaries, biographical and autobiographical materials—along with the “finished,” published poems themselves—I tease out the complicated elements of friendly rivalry and discord, authorial agency and subjectivity, to assess the relationship between these factors and poems that are so often treated through close readings as singular objects of reading and writing. “The living poems,” John Emil Vincent argues, “are gone . . . I, for one, prefer the poems on the page to the biography, the tales of bar talk, and the histories of alliances and fallings out” (155). Yet, as this book suggests, the biography, tales of bar talk, and so on form another route of meaning-making: the composable aftermath and legacy of those living poems on the page. Knowing the particulars of the social conditions that gave rise to certain poems; the lines of circulation and reception established within a given cohorts’ culture; and the deeply subjective choices that are at stake both before and after the
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poet comes to her writing table help us discern more clearly the layered meanings any single poem proposes to us. Understanding the “larger social texture” (6), as Rifkin refers to it, we read poems in the context of career, career in the context of poems, and the lives of poets as inseparable and polyvalent signs of poems that reflect back, unevenly, uncertainly, but from within a space of writing that can be made legible in the thick description available to us as literary anthropologists. Doing such work means a turning away from the imprimatur of canonicity, still the singular mark of acceptance in both academic settings and the culture-at-large, and engaging texts whose importance to us needs to be revised, re-viewed, re-seen, not only in light of later scholarship on the poet’s work, but as part of an ongoing conversation about poetic materials whose stability can never be assumed. In this sense, reading a work such as Duncan’s Venice Poem for its refractive effects within multiple settings (literary, archival, interpersonal) builds an occasion not so much for a reconsideration of an undervalued work of genius (certainly one major approach that’s been applied to Spicer’s work in recent years), but for a recalibration of our understanding of the local events that anticipated, supplanted and have formed a set of shadow texts around the poetic text. As per one of this book’s focal points, masculinity and its shadowy histories, unwritten, revealed then lost again, establish a tension between the work and other layers of social meaning that, in sum, create the effect of meaning the poem delivers—or fails to. Of course, the moves here are complicated as one’s reading can quickly become subject to a form of “backshadowing,” to use Michael André Bernstein’s potent term, the reading of texts as evidence of what we already know happened. But poems do live, if they do, in the continuous present of reading acts that corroborate both the textual particularity on the page and what we can usefully consider of refractions cast through the uncertain prism of our shared social histories. II The poem if it reflects the sea reflects only its dance upon that profound depth where it seems to triumph. —Willliams, “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower”
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While the poets represented here all share a joint legacy in the modernist and postmodernist avant-garde, their work also has roots in the lyric tradition. Insofar as the work of Olson, Duncan, Creeley, and so on qualify lyric’s importance, it also attests to the ways in which lyric retains its aura, despite the universalisms and trans-historical positioning one often encounters in lyric. Theodor Adorno’s famous criticism of lyric in his essay “On Lyric Poetry and Society” lay the groundwork for a critique that has remained central to a consideration of the political limits of a form that, for contemporary poets, can just as often represent a cultural dead-end as an expression of a “uniquely human” and highly subjective experience. The universalism and solipsism of lyric remain among the chief concerns of Adorno’s essay. As he says: Immersion in what has taken individual form elevates the lyric poem to the status of something universal by making manifest something not distorted, not grasped, not yet subsumed. It thereby anticipates, spiritually, a situation in which no false universality, that is, nothing profoundly particular, continues to fetter what is other than itself, the human. The lyric work hopes to attain universality through unrestrained individuation. The danger peculiar to lyric, however, lies in the fact that its principle of individuation never guarantees that something binding and authentic will be produced. It has no say over whether the poem remains within the contingency of mere separate existence. (38)
Adorno goes on to suggest that the added danger of lyric is its separation from those very social forces that would make of poetic expression a vehicle for political and cultural change, rather than an object fetishized for its voicing of the ideological fiction of a self speaking in solitude. While Olson’s notable comment from “Projective Verse” that the contemporary poet must strive to move past the “lyrical interference of the individual as ego” (Human 59) has held sway for more than two generations, it’s important to assess the ways in which, for Duncan, Blaser, and Mackey, as for Olson himself, the problem remained discovering over and over again the methods and content adequate to a poetics of postmodern subjectivity.1 From Duncan’s late Romantic positing of a shifting and multiple “self” echoed back through time to Olson’s situating of an “objectivist,” postmodern subject to Mackey’s inscribing of cross-cultural, multi-textual voicings, at stake for each of these writers has been the contestable categories of “being” and “self” and discovery of a language adequate to their expression. In terms of contemporary American poetry, two predominant strains of poetics have emerged in response to the questions posed by lyric and the
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subjectivities inscribed therein. As Leonard Schwartz proposes in his essay “A Flicker at the Edge of Things: Some Thoughts on Lyric Poetry”: The dominant currents in American poetry today insist either on the exclusivity of the personal self, the empirical ego, on . . . the “immediacy of the self ” or simply “the immediate”; or else, and in direct opposition, the other dominant current, with another name and with other players insists on the exclusivity of the material, social and linguistic nexus from which the poem arises, a material and social nexus the poem sees itself as the subversion of, in a mode of composition [that can be termed] “the negation of the immediate.” (20)
As Language writing and other poetries of the contemporary avant-garde have shown us, notions of the dominant versus the marginal, immediate versus the mediated, are hardly uniform or homogenous. And while one might chafe at a representation of an arguably varied and discursive set of practices that can’t be boiled down to the identifiable categories of mainstream versus experimental, traditional versus innovative, Schwartz is right in suggesting the terms of a rift (or rifts) in American poetry that are situated not only in the politics of the poets working on this or that side of the experimental divide, but on the ethical, aesthetical, and formal decisions that mark their work and push it to one end of the poetry field or another. As Charles Bernstein argues in “State of the Art,” When poetry averts conformity it enters into the contemporary: speaking to the pressures and conflicts of the moment with the means just then at hand. By which I mean I care most about poetry that disrupts business as usual, including literary business: I care most for poetry as dissent, including formal dissent; poetry that makes sounds possible to be heard that are not otherwise articulated. (2)
The degree to which lyric poetry “averts conformity” while retaining the mark of the contemporary, possessed of the edge that Bernstein and others working in the idiom of avant-garde practices seek to maintain, remains one of the questions running throughout my discussion in this book. At stake, then, are a politics of lyric and the continuing viability of lyric writing as part of postmodern poetic discourse. For if works by each of the writers discussed in the chapters that follow suggest an unabashed attachment to aspects of lyric “voicing,” procedurally and contextually they also draw attention to the ways in which the lyric subject remains both a troubled and contested site for the contemporary poet. As Nathaniel Mackey suggests
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in his 1992 interview with Ed Foster, at least to a certain degree the suspicion with which many present-day poets regard lyric has to do with a questioning of the tenets of privative, subject-based loss and elegiac mystification that have been a central part of the lyric tradition: One of the reasons the lyric is in a troubled position is the elegiac tradition with regard to the lyric, the investment in loss that tradition brings with it, where you seem to be at odds with a political will to overcome loss. In saying that poetry, if not a loser’s art, is intimate with loss, I’m talking in part about the elegiac tradition, which does build on and lament loss in a way which becomes in some ways self-perpetuating, in some ways a consolation to losses that a more manifestly political will towards social change might tell you are unnecessary and not inevitable. The argument would be that there are losses that can be turned around and that one’s job is to be about the business of achieving that turn-around rather than lamenting loss . . . I think the lyric tradition is troubled by that problematic, but it’s also a problematic that the lyric tradition has acknowledged. (53)
Pushing past these consoling narratives and culturally conservative elements of lyric writing that circumscribe critical intervention and analysis has occupied a large portion of each of these poets’ projects. While Duncan’s position would seem on one level to be the most open to criticism for its unwavering attachment to the properties of lyric imagination, which is to say to that loss and elegiac impulse Mackey identities as fundamental to lyric practice, Duncan nonetheless complicates such a view by his simultaneous containment of nostalgia and univocal expressiveness in work whose intellectual range de-mystifies and enlarges upon its sources in the lyric tradition. In a somewhat different vein, Blaser’s response to the problem of lyric has been to integrate a more thoroughly post-structuralist approach to language and subjectivity (including the use of psychoanalytic, religious, and philosophical texts) as a way of grounding his analysis of poetic discourse and the expressivist assumptions that have been foundational to the lyric project. Olson’s work similarly participates in the exploration of a post-lyric discourse of expressivity and historical content while seeking to further the properties of lyric in his twentieth-century epic The Maximus Poems (1983). Finally, for Mackey, the project has been to reinscribe within his lyrical practice elements of a “discrepant engagement” in a mixture of Western and non-Western discourses of spirituality, mysticism, and ritual. As the writings of each of these writers to differing degrees and with different results suggest, we certainly can no longer assume the precedence of
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the Romantic-based short lyric as an exemplary model of poetic practice and consideration—even as its contemporary version seems to have become the most widely circulated and visible model for poetry in the culture-at-large.2 The monologic nature of lyric utterance, the presumptions of interiority and individual presence, the implicit separation between speaker and social reality—each of these points up the ideologically and politically troubling position lyric holds within contemporary avant-garde poetic discourse. Whether the neo-Romantic sublime of Stevens or the Keatsian inflected work of late Williams, both the autonomy of the lyric subject and the cultural position from which he/she speaks has increasingly come under attack. Returning to Adorno again, we find: “Poetic [i.e., lyric] subjectivity is itself indebted to privilege: the pressures of the struggle for survival allow only a few human beings to grasp the universal through immersion in the self or to develop as autonomous subject capable of freely expressing themselves” (45). Adorno’s critique of lyric has, in the contemporary period, been perhaps most forcefully extended in this country by the work of Language writers such as Ron Silliman, whose key early essay “Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World” set the tone for much of the critical writing that centered around the Language-based small magazines of the early 1970s: Quite clearly capitalism has its own mode of reality which is passed through the language and imposed on its speakers. The social function of the language arts, especially the poem, place them in an important position to carry the class struggle for consciousness to the level of consciousness. (131; Emphasis in the original)
The rhetoric is notable on a number of counts, not least of which is its positioning of poetry as a concertedly social and material practice, one that Silliman suggests has a major role to play in the ongoing class conflict of American consumer culture. Whether one accepts Silliman’s class analysis of poetry’s function or not, his identifying of the problem inherent in a poetry and poetic practice that would claim a space outside of and beyond the parameters of the social is key. It also usefully frames out a longer discussion of the ways in which Duncan, Blaser, Olson, Creeley, and Mackey position themselves vis-à-vis a poetic genealogy and tradition that are ostensibly Romantic and lyric in origin, even as their work proposes alternative, interrogative versions of poetic subjectivity. Theirs remains work that mediates between the word as a culturally determined sign and the word as a “presence.”3 Marjorie Perloff, in her essay “Postmodernism and the Impasse of Lyric,” has written that “minor poets continue to write neo-Romantic lyric, at the
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same time [that] a new poetry is emerging that wants to open the field so as to make contact with the world as well as the word” (181). In the twenty-five years since Perloff wrote those words, much has happened to suggest the parameters of what that new poetry might look like. Contemporary work by Jena Osman, Peter O’Leary, Phillip Foss, Harryette Mullen, Benjamin Hollander, Carla Harryman, Will Alexander, and others have all shown an abiding concern for the ways in which poetry of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries can “make contact with the world as well as the world.” At the very least, one needs to query Perloff’s use of “neo-Romantic lyric” as the whipping boy for all that’s wrong in contemporary poetry ca. 1985; rather, as I suggest, Perloff’s critique of lyric tends to simplify and overstate the case by reviewing all forms of lyric through the same lens. In this regard, Mark Jeffreys’ more recent re-historicizing of lyric (especially in its pre-Romantic variations) in “Ideologies of Lyric: A Problem of Genre in Contemporary Anglophone Poetics” provides a nuanced corrective to contemporary formulations of the genre (including Perloff’s) that tend to discuss all lyric writing through the paradigm of Romanticism: Even Perloff, the acutest critic of the evolution of nineteenth- and twentiethcentury lyric poetry, blurs the terms lyric and Romantic lyric so that it is unclear whether she contests the genre itself or only a particular historical variation. On the one hand, she has repeatedly characterized the specifically Romantic lyric—a category that she uses to encompass Romantic, Victorian, and symbolist lyrics, along with the “paradigmatic modernist lyric”—as reflecting a narrow, reactionary, and doomed view of poetry. On the other, she observes that “we take note of the ‘belatedness’ of this or that poetic text . . . without stopping to consider that it may be the genre itself that is ‘belated.’ ” If the entire genre of lyric is belated, then by implication a reactionary ideology inheres in the genre, and any text identifiable as an instance of that genre could be assumed to participate in its ideology. (197–98; Emphasis in the original)
Jeffreys would have us recognize here that as long as we remain tied to conceptions of lyric that derive from such relatively recent and historically lopsided views of the genre, the depiction of the form as a “nostalgic ideological marker” will inevitably persist (197). As Jeffreys points out, the label of lyric is often assigned inappropriately to poems that suggest other intentions, other kinds of work with different expectations than those generated by the term lyric: My question is whether any ideology, oppressive or subversive, radical or reactionary, can be confidently assigned to a text on the basis of its genre
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or of its proximate fit with a critical school’s generic standards. I contend that a given lyric text, although as inevitably marked by ideology as any other example of language art is, is not inevitably representative of a specific ideology simply because it has been identified as a lyric. Indeed, the very act of writing about lyric as a marginalized or marginalizing genre necessarily trades, implicitly if not explicitly, on an assumption of the transhistorical definability of lyric. The risk of that assumption is blindness to the political and historical dimensions of those texts that do not fulfill expectation. (196–97; Emphasis in the original)
Recasting Perloff’s critique of the form in terms of the genre typification at stake here, Jeffreys provides an important counterargument to the persuasive gloss of Perloff’s assertion that in becoming the dominant form of poetry available through anthologies and other teaching texts lyric has displaced other forms of innovative poetry from the modernist and postmodernist canon. Forward looking and important as Perloff’s readings of contemporary poetic practice have been, then, Perloff’s dissatisfaction with “neo-Romantic lyric” is based on a set of assumptions about lyric writing that needs to be tempered with more skeptical approaches, especially in terms of contemporary work that integrates analysis, critique, reflection with some of those elements familiar to us from lyric writing. The degree to which lyric represents a culturally reactionary genre, inevitably attached to “imperial assertions of self, the programmatic exclusion of otherness or difference, and the logocentric quest for presence” (Jeffreys 197) necessarily depends upon one’s view of the ideological content inherent in any literary form or practice—a discussion that tends to be glossed over in Perloff’s writing on the subject. To claim that lyric is by its very nature ideologically reactionary is to simplify dramatically the complex formations of lyric that together comprise the genre, including Sapphic, neo-Platonic, and metaphysical forms of the genre. Moreover, Perloff relies in her discussion here somewhat heavily on a binary that recalls Leonard Schwartz’s discussion, positioning the static, “I”-based neo-Romantic lyric at one end of the spectrum (represented by such poets as Robert Lowell, Theodore Roethke, Galway Kinnell, James Wright, and others) and the works of Pound, Zukofsky, Olson, and Language poets at the other. Privileging wordplay, parody, and indirection over lyric subjectivity and the self-absorption proposed by the traditional lyric as she sees it, Perloff’s analysis fails to include the ways in which the neo-Romantic “derivations” of Duncan’s “Passages,” for instance, or the cross-cultural mapping of Mackey’s “Song of the Andoumboulou” qualify in important ways how thorough the “impasse” of lyric has been for poets
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willing to pose alternatives to the impositions of a singularly post-structuralist view of language and poetic practice.4 Strategically investigating what it means to carry lyric forward, the poets represented here qualify in important ways the interiority and subjectivity of a tradition that remains as varied as the poets who work through it. Formally, work by Olson, Duncan, and so on has entailed a decided move away from the short, image-based lyrics of the early modernist period and a shift toward the writing of serial poems that intersect the lyrical, while attaining decidedly polysemous, hybrid structures in the process. The works of Duncan, Blaser, Olson, and Mackey in the long poem suggest a varied and porous reorientation to poems that echo each other in ongoing and multi-phasic formations. The ethics of this work rest in its appeal to public testimony and clarity. Insofar as narrative is maintained, it tends to be the narrative of intertextual relation and the discursive processes of language. The work proceeds along a number of different levels at once, stressing what Joseph Conte, in Unending Design (1991), has termed the “discontinuous and often aleatory manner in which one thing follows another” (3). Exploratory, rather than definitive, the serial works of these writers propose a poetics of indeterminacy and irresolution in place of completion or finality. Duncan’s “Passages,” Blaser’s “Image-Nations,” Olson’s Maximus, and Mackey’s “Song of the Andoumboulou” and ongoing prosework From a Broken Bottle Traces of Perfume Still Emanate all suggest closural principles reliant less on any preconception of the work’s ending as on an inchoate, procedurally based recognition of temporal repleteness, of the work’s contingency as part of a larger, co-extensive work-in-progress. In this way, as Conte observes, serial writing by these writers “not only disputes the necessity of telos, completion, but [they] also challenge the validity of direct consequence—any situation in which A must follow B” (Unending 54). As I argue here, lyric practice and the reinscriptions of lyric subjectivity such writing entails remain powerful, politically and socially reflexive discourses—even when resisted, refuted, revised—and can hardly be limited to the patterns of the short, “I”-based utterances that have tended to dominate critiques of the lyric as a genre. Indeed, it is axiomatic to my critical endeavor that lyric—as reenvisioned in the poetries of Duncan, Spicer, Blaser, Olson, Creeley, and Mackey—remains a sustaining and sustainable resource, providing both a useful vocabulary and literary context within which future generation of writers can work. In this sense, what we find are versions of postmodern lyric that do indeed “begin in the urge to return the material so rigidly excluded—political, ethical, historical, philosophical—to the domain of poetry” (180). That it does so in ways that are both interrogative of poetic form and exploratory of form’s content and
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constraints remains one of the achievements of much innovative writing in the lyric tradition. III One cannot say, Be as women, be peaceful, then. The hole from which we came isn’t metaphysical. The one to which we go is real. Surrounding a vast space seems boundless appetite in which a man still lives till he become a woman. —Creeley, “Conversion to Her”
These stunning lines form the close of a poem from Creeley’s 2003 collection If I Were Writing This. They underscore in particularly unguarded language one of this book’s key concerns: the relation between gender and its scripts and poetic form and production. Creeley’s attentiveness to these issues goes back a long way, a lifelong meditation on his own subjectivity and responses in poetry, work laden with masculine incentive, difficulty, dissembling, vulnerability, and strains of anger and violence. The “I” as Other, the Other as “I”: Creeley’s iconic geography of self and selves continually registers the cultural placement of masculine and feminine as polar and polarized categories of feeling and Being. As DuPlessis has observed in her acute and sympathetic discussion of this poem: In Creeley’s work, a continuous affirmation of strong polarized gender binarism (or sexual difference), with an extreme sense of largeness and hieratic sublimity and/or female figures, is sometimes coupled with striking images of wounding and loss. This wounding and loss are both exacerbated and cured by repeated addresses to the same sublimity. In this argument, males are “converted” to the female principle by recognizing, as converts or epigones, the Mana (and manna) of these goddesses, and they desire to “enter” them in some way, even together with other men, in order to be inside their powers and to be protected from those powers by the company of male partners. (“The Hole” 15)
DuPlessis’s discussion as well recalls the twenty-eight bathers section of Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” in which Whitman specularizes the male
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gaze through the perspective of the unseen woman who “hides handsome and richly drest aft the blinds of the window” (36). That movement, a conversion of a different kind, represents access to gender ideology as mutable and mutational, a discourse that both critiques and reifies gender constructs at the same time. In ways that DuPlessis makes clear, Creeley’s rescripting of this scene in his later work represents a profoundly humane effort to interrogate the binary of gender and provide alternatives in poetry to an otherwise fervent binarist thinking about Men and Women . . . Finally there is a possibility that the “common life,” the sheer human about which Creeley talked, offers a position beyond gender polarization. Thus among the thoughts Creeley entertained about gender materials, there are some that involve a few attempts to undo sexual difference, to critique gender binarism, to identify with a wounded woman. (“The Hole” 19)
Insofar as this book is an exploration of different forms of masculinity (the category is itself distressed, meaningful only insofar as one can link this term to conduct, behaviors, attitudes, beliefs, and so on that emerge through social interactions), it is also very much a discussion of the ways in which constructions (and re-constructions) of gender and sexuality inform poetic practice. My thinking through of these issues is indebted to Judith Butler’s enormously influential Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990). Nearly twenty years after its initial publication, this text remains central to our ongoing efforts to rethink what it means to be gendered, how and in what ways gender entraps and liberates any of us, providing a map for behaviors that is continually redrawn. Butler’s nuanced discussion of gender as a reflexive and resistant category of subjectivity alerts us again to the problematic aspect of binaries that, for most of us, remain accepted, given, “natural”: feminine/masculine, woman/man, gay/straight, and so on. Butler’s recognition, one to which I return again and again, implicitly if not overtly, is that gender is a complexity whose totality is never fully what it is at any given juncture in time. An open coalition, then, will affirm identities according to the purposes at hand; it will be an open assemblage that permits multiple convergences and divergences without obedience to a normative telos of definitional closure. (22)
Here and throughout her study, Butler draws attention to the entire range of socially formed attitudes and behaviors that “produce” what we have come to think of as permanent, fixed categories of “man” and “woman.” In so
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doing, she theorizes a space that is outside the bounds of conventional constructs and posits a less directive, far more unfixed construct of person and identity. As Butler suggests: Whereas the question of what constitutes “personal identity” within philosophical accounts almost always centers on the question of what internal feature of the person establishes the continuity or self-identity of the person through time, the question [in this discussion] will be: To what extent do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal coherence of the subject, indeed the self-identical status of the person? To what extent is “identity” a normative ideal rather than a descriptive feature of experience? And how do the regulatory practices that govern gender also govern culturally intelligible notion of identity? (16–17)
Each of these questions has profound implications for my own study, which engages a body of writing intimately involved in issues of identity, self, and the nature of subjective experience. In other respects, my thinking here is informed by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s probing analysis of cultural binaries that limit our ability to locate subjective experience across the plane of the human. It’s in her bracing Epistemology of the Closet (1990) that Sedgwick asks us to rethink the ideological and social conditions that give rise to these binaries and allow them to function as blinders to more discursive narratives of experience and expression: The master terms of a particular historical moment will be those that are so situated as to entangle most inextricably and at the same time most differentially the filaments of other important definitional nexuses. In arguing that homo/heterosexual definition has been a presiding master term of the past century, one that has the same, primary importance for all modern Western identity and social organization (and not merely for homosexual identity and culture) as do the more traditionally visible cruxes of gender, class and race, I’ll argue that the now chronic modern crisis of homo/heterosexual definition has affected our culture through its ineffaceable marking, particularly of the categories secrecy/disclosure, knowledge/ignorance, private/public, masculine/feminine, majority/minority, innocence/initiation, natural/artificial, new/old, discipline/terrorism, canonic/noncanonic, wholeness/decadence, urbane/provincial, domestic/foreign, health/illness, same/different, active/passive, in/out, cognition/paranoia, art/kitsch, utopia/apocalypse, sincerity/sentimentality, and voluntarity/addiction. (11)
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Calling for an “antihomophobic inquiry” that would “make certain specific kinds of readings and interrogations, perhaps new, available in a heuristically powerful, productive, and significant form for other readers to perform on literary and social texts with, ideally, other results” (14), Sedgwick ambitiously sets forth an agenda that we can usefully apply to the work of contemporary poetic discourses that, often as not, conceal the workings of gender through tropes and formal vocabularies that naturalize the kinds of binaries cited earlier. To be sure, configurations (not to say critiques) of gender and sexual difference/identity are more pronounced in the works of Duncan, Blaser, Creeley, and Olson; less visible in the work of Mackey, though still recognizable as topoi engaged as part of his poetry’s mythological and philosophical content, for example, the sequestered exilic male and female characters that wander without destination through his “Song of the Andoumboulou.” For Duncan and Blaser, such issues find especial resonance in their identities as gay male poets, working within and through the context of the then-developing postwar gay communities of the Bay area. As Maria Damon has argued in The Dark End of the Street (1993), for Duncan and Blaser the critical issue remained how to integrate gay social identity and male-male eros within a poetic context of holistic idealism. Seeking to bridge the rift created by Platonist separations of Self/ Other, Real/Imaginary would become, as Damon suggests, among the first orders of business: “Rather than the Platonic idea of two unbridgeable levels of being, the Ideal and the Immanent . . . Duncan’s poetry suggests that each person has all ranges of being in him . . . and that that range (‘its animal my angel’) is made immanent through erotic contact with a br/Other semblable” (183; emphasis in the original). Probing the ways in which gender functions for these poets, the understandings they developed of themselves as men and the ways in which the poetry reflects, conceals, complicates, and/or resists those understandings serves as one of this book’s central investigative beams. Chapter one begins with an investigation of these questions through the lenses of poetic career and masculine subjectivity in the work of Charles Olson, one of the central practitioners of mid-twentieth-century innovative poetics. In particular, I wanted to understand here how Olson invested enormous poetic capital in two key relationships at an early stage of his writing career, one with the book designer Frances Boldereff; the other with Creeley. Tracing out the formation of early key poems by Olson through his correspondence with both Boldereff and Creeley, I argue that he managed a highly charged struggle as he siphoned off emotional and sexual energies from his relationship with Boldereff to create the works that define his early
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career as a poet. In his turn toward Creeley, Olson engages the very different but related space of heightened (arguably hyper) and perplexed masculinity, where the propositions of a fierce form of masculine partnering supplant and eventually overtake the connection Olson formed with Boldereff. “Projective Verse,” the key document in postmodernist poetics to emerge from Olson’s partnering with Boldereff and Creeley, achieves its initial momentum in these exchanges between Olson, Boldereff, and Creeley; the frictive, incendiary quality of the essay’s prose comes to us, first, through correspondence with Boldereff, where Olson is notably more modulated in his tone, and then is refined and restaged in correspondence with Creeley, where the essay takes on the more assaultive cast we recognize as “Olsonian.” That transformation from epigone to generational spokesman, that use Olson made of Boldereff and, in a very different way, of Creeley, is the primary subject of my discussion here. Chapter two responds to the issue of poetic career and masculine subjectivity through the very different poetics and poetry of Duncan. Occurring at roughly the same time period as Olson’s pivotal correspondences with Boldereff and Creeley, the San Francisco Renaissance established a coterie of poets (Duncan, Blaser, Spicer), whose projects were in different ways and to different degrees informed by what Bruce Boone has described as the “gay subculture” of mid-century Berkeley and San Francisco. Discussing Duncan’s The Venice Poem as an influential and highly influenced work from Duncan’s early career, I draw special attention to the ways in which this poem served as a kind of filtration pool of gay identification, a way of forming initial contact points within Duncan himself and the gay realm that serves as the poem’s inscribed Other. While the literary ambitions of The Venice Poem are evident enough (at thirty-two pages it remains one of the longest of Duncan’s single poems), its attempt to forge in lyric language and serial form the content of a newly achieved gay subjectivity—working through a number of gender positions in the process (very much in the mode of Butler’s concept of gender asymmetry)—is perhaps its most spectacular achievement. As I suggest, this poem must be read in the context of Duncan’s groundbreaking essay “The Homosexual in Society,” published in Politics in 1944. It’s in this essay that Duncan argued openly and critically for a non-hegemonic approach to gay discourse and community, one that would no longer privilege the ghettoization of homosexuality or what Duncan terms the “cult” of gayness then evident in the bars and salons of New York, San Francisco, and other cities with nascent publicly gay communities. The Venice Poem, in its subtle working-through of the nature of poetic
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identity as it impacts upon and engages gender/sexual identity, offers a material example of the position Duncan took in this and later works: neither codifying gayness as a “unique” and privileged aspect of identity nor seeking to shun its aura of “camp” and masquerade. Rather, Duncan found a way in The Venice Poem to refract gender and sexual identity, allowing them play within a broader discourse of homosexualities. That he did so through the modernist discourses of collage and seriality suggests an appropriation of these formal strategies to a nascent queer poetics that Duncan articulates through his poem. Chapter three extends from this discussion to focus on the public debate in 1965 between Duncan and Blaser over their different translations of Gérard de Nerval’s Les Chiméres (1973). As a key poetic text of French Romanticism, Les Chiméres constituted for each poet both a marker of lyric tradition and a representative surface on which to inscribe their vastly different understandings of translation practice. As I outline in my discussion, the sources of Duncan and Blaser’s disagreement were interpersonal, having to do with a rivalry for the legacy of Spicer as much as their concern for the “right” way to translate Nerval; but what was most clearly at stake in this rift that never entirely healed was the very nature of poetic language. While Duncan views the poem and poetic language as operating in a realm of numinous eventfulness, one that “comes in a dancing organization between personal and cosmic identity” (Selected Prose 3), Blaser suggests a version of poetic agency and language as translational, a movement reliant on the dialectical operations of an “outside” that informs the poem’s formal development. Where Duncan is concerned with honoring the “original” in a translation that will keep central the particulars of Nerval’s language, Blaser is more assiduously concerned with the transformations of the poetic subject in language that never belongs to him, but is carried over in the course of translation. What we have before us, then, is the product of that transmission, that contact between poet and language, poem and world. It is a view of agency and authorship that finds its fullest expression in “The Practice of Outside,” Blaser’s essay on Spicer. Chapter four turns its attentions to Blaser’s developing notion of a public poetry and poetics through his reading of Hannah Arendt. Focusing on his ongoing serial project “Image-Nations,” I attend to the cosmological and political implications of Blaser’s effort to develop a poetry of public, as in commonly held, knowledge. As I argue, developing a stance of historical recognition in poems that register the disruptions of public life remains the key priority of “Image-Nations,” which would reimage and reimagine those
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realities that inform poetic discourse to the letter. As Blaser suggests in his essay “Particles,” Poetry has moved since early in the century to the inclusion of political content, not because the relevance of poetry can be defined by its political or ideological content, but because the public world is sick and has in many places disappeared for lack of particularity. Nothing is shared and no vision of a shared world is possible. (36)
Suggesting that “we return again and again to the importance of language in its activity of holding on to the world and life in that world” (40), Blaser casts a skeptical light on ideologies of self that would regard poetic practice as merely or insignificantly personal, bound to the signature of the first-person singular. In place of the fictions of an “I” that can somehow escape the forces of political and historical worldliness, Blaser posits a poetry of cosmological content that passes between poet and poem, reader and language, holding open the possibility of reform, renegotiation, and return to public forms of language, to its sacredness and human address, which have been all but obliterated in our discourses of postmodernity. Chapter five continues to explore the connections between subjectivity, language, and poetic form through discussion of “The Song of the Andoumboulou,” Nathaniel Mackey’s serial project in poetry. I begin by focusing attention on the relationship of Mackey’s work to Duncan’s, a connection that occurs most explicitly perhaps in Mackey’s extended essays on Duncan’s poetry in his two collections of criticism, Discrepant Engagement: Dissonance, Cross-Culturality, and Experimental Writing (1993) and Paracritical Hinge: Essays, Talks, Notes, Interviews (2005). Teasing out the connections between Mackey’s own developing poetry and poetics, I show how this key affiliation in Mackey’s career helped set the stage for the cross-culturally based “grand collage” of “Song of the Andoumboulou” from his first two collections, Eroding Witness (1984) and School of Udhra (1993). Building off associations with Duncan’s practices as a “derivative poet,” I show how Mackey incorporates multiple forms of language to assert a poetic subject both mutable and transformative; a movement between and among different states of public feeling and acknowledgment. Where Mackey appropriates the tenor of some of Duncan’s heightened, lyric-based language, he also modulates this register through formal investigation of the poetic line as discrepant mark of the poem’s meaning, its reticent and sonorous reserve. If the vatic and
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exhortative is the preferred mode for Duncan, for Mackey the pulsebeat is slower, more regulated, cadenced by a movement across lines that reach out for, but just as often deny, the release they would offer through the creases and folds of linguistic errancy. Rereading the difficulty we encounter in Mackey’s work, I follow his discussion of innovative African American writing to suggest that “difficulty” as a term applied to this work more often inhibits and prohibits our going further to investigate how such work resists, refutes, or otherwise rejects a model of black writing that places instrumental language and performative form first. As Mackey suggests, built into the charges of difficulty or obscurity are assumptions about what African American writing should look and sound like, the ideas of community and black experience such work should ratify and reidentify in the course of its public testimonial to the historical wrongs of slavery and its aftermath. While Mackey’s work is saturated in the historical particulars of the African diaspora, his writing resists easy commodification or consumption as a “report on the one thing African Americans are regarded as experts on—racial victimization” (Paracritical 240). Mackey’s multipronged response in poetry, poetic prose, and criticism continues to exert enormous influence on our ongoing deliberation of poetry’s sufficiency and preserve, its ethical proposition, even as the poet runs the twin risks of “the hubris of an easy gesture of commiseration, the assertion of solidarity through presumptions of suffering only vicariously suffered, [that] vies with the hubris of a callous transcendence of suffering, the narcotizing lure of holding life ‘in no higher esteem than it deserves” (178).
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CHAPTER ONE
“In Thicket”: Charles Olson, Poetic Career, and the Crisis of Cold War Masculinity
you see, you sld know what you do, delivering to me up clean out of the delicate sure fingers of yr mind, such things, & Blake, &, for as much as I can take, crist —Olson to Boldereff, January 18, 1950 There is new work to be done, new work —Olson to Creeley, May 16, 1950
U
ntil fairly recently, literary scholarship has tended to view poetic career as developing largely through the strength, commitment, talents, and so on of the poet. It’s a narrative that’s been made familiar to most of us through biographies of poets, where the arc from visionary ephebe to master seems to occur in isolation from other cultural, institutional, publishing, and ideological frameworks. Lawrence Lipking, in his The Life of the Poet (1981), a study of how poets from Virgil and Dante to T.S. Eliot and Robert Lowell began and concluded their careers as poets, links the narrative of the isolated lyric poet to its attendant construct of
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greatness or genius, without which of course we wouldn’t care about the beginnings or endings of these careers. Lipking observes: Most of the poets discussed in this book share a common creed: a faith in greatness. Their ambition is less to write individual great verses than to become great poets by achieving great poetic careers. Such ambition may well induce a common uneasiness or even hostility. No poet likes to be accused of “careerism.” Indeed, for many poets the rejection of anything that resembles a career has always seemed the epitome of poetic virtue. (xi)
Later, in his discussion of Keats’s early career following his writing of “On First Looking Into Chapman’s Homer,” Lipking describes the quintessential scene of Romantic self-discovery: The true author of the poems is not the man himself but the Genius of Poetry within him and around him. Keats regards “Keats” as a presence radically indifferent to immediate personal concerns. A young poet must be ready to hazard everything, even his life. The future will forget all facts excepts those the poet has put to use. (6)
If this version of the origins of poetic career seems quaint and out-of-date from our cultural vantage point, one must remember how influential such models of reception still are, both in and outside the academy—and how resistant readers and critics alike have been to shifting discussion to the ways in which poetic career remains a deeply entangled process, one enmeshed in a network of social, institutional, and communal forms of cultural production. That Lipking draws on a cultural narrative whose forcefulness relies on its rendering of a coupling of poetic genius and canonicity isn’t surprising, when one takes into account the monumental ways poetic career has been narrativized as singular, iconic, unfolding in the ether of Romantic greatness. In recent years, critics such as Walter Kalaidjian and Libbie Rifkin have attended in particularly telling and resourceful ways to the development of poetic career as linked to social, political, and cultural pressures inseparable from the poetic texts that are produced in their wake. In his Languages of Liberation (1989), Kalaidjian provides a cogent counter to the de-socialized narratives of lyric production that have tended to absorb all discussion into a New Critical model of reading in which “poetry enjoys an aesthetic autonomy from its institutional infrastructures; the ‘ideal reader’ transcends heterogeneous interpretive communities; and
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the private lyric voice dwells apart from history’s social text” (13). Indeed, as Kalaidjian shows, the effective result of New Criticism’s dominant dispensing with any and all extra-textual discourses in considering a poetic text was to separate poems, their writing and circulation, and the careers of the writers as irrelevant concerns that bore no relation to “poems as autonomous and hermetically insulated verbal objects” (6). Stripped of their ideological, institutional, and political underpinnings, poetic practice and poems were separated as well from those critical discourses that established poetic careers through anthologies such as Cleanth Brooks’s Understanding Poetry (1938; revised editions 1950, 1960, 1976), and critical texts such as Ransom’s The World’s Body (1938), R.P. Blackmur’s The Expense of Greatness (1940), and Rene Wellek and Austin Warren’s Theory of Literature (1949) (Kalaidjian, Languages 5). While Donald Allen’s anthology The New American Poetry (1960) played a crucial role in providing a forum for writers in the contemporary idiom, such as Duncan, Olson, Creeley, Levertov, and others, and “legitimated a strong counterpoetics to the New Critical formalism then dominating the American literary scene,” the anthology relied for its critical force on a heavily antiacademic stance (thus valorizing the very foundation it sought to dismantle) and a surprising resistance to the “broader, ideological investments and effects of their own formal choices” (Kalaidjian, Languages 6–7). Defining the “new” field in the absence of a more concerted critique of the ideological and institutional forces at play limited, to some degree, the ways in which this initial grouping of avant-garde writers could effect a more fruitful response to the schism between poetic practice, theory, and poem set in motion by New Criticism decades earlier. In Career Moves (2000), an extremely useful examination of the poetic careers of Olson, Creeley, Louis Zukofsky, and Ted Berrigan, Libbie Rifkin suggests that only by examining more closely the interwoven strands of cultural, historical, and interpersonal relation can we begin to loosen canonicity’s grip on the analysis of reception by reconceiving the stakes of literary exchange in the narrower terms of the poetic career. A focus on career over canon enables an examination of institutions from the interested perspective of particular, historically situated individuals, and it allows for an understanding of the poet’s “duty” that includes Eliot’s bid to “extend and improve” the language, but is also responsive to local material, ideological and social demands. (6)
Aware of the silences, gaps, and fissures that punctuate histories of poetic career, wayward accounts that so often drift back to the model of poet
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outlined by Lipking, Rifkin’s analysis offers a new turn in the study of contemporary avant-garde poetry by providing a sobering account of “the interlocking set of textual and historical factors” that limn the writing of any single poem, the development and engagement of any single working poet. “Poetic careers,” Rifkin reminds us, “are both produced by and productive of this larger social texture” (ibid.). In this chapter, I focus on an early period in Olson’s career, one involving three central figures: the poets Robert Duncan and Robert Creeley, both of whom Olson came to know through correspondence in the late 1940s; and Frances Boldereff, who became Olson’s lover and initial recipient of and respondent to draft versions of many of Olson’s most important early poems, as well as his now-canonical essay on poetics, “Projective Verse.” Much of what follows in my discussion here is told through the letters and drafts that went back and forth with increasing urgency and frequency between Olson and Boldereff, and shortly thereafter between Olson and Creeley. Duncan is the less influential presence here, but here too Olson’s stance is indicative of the high octane mix of poetics, male bravado, gendered power relations, and career formation that mark this startling period in Olson’s life. Indeed, one might suggest that Duncan and Boldereff fall off as signally important figures of poetic address (one a gay man, the other a woman), as Olson found the perfect ear for his tutelary instructs and brash insistent “push” in his brother-in-arms, Creeley. In drawing these elements forward, I rely primarily on the two indispensable collections of letters that dominate the Olson archive: the first and most voluminous is that between Olson and Creeley, at ten volumes surely one of the preeminent and most intensively “personal” documents of postwar American poetry and poetics. These letters, written between 1950 and 1952 (where volume ten of the correspondence ends) trace Olson’s and Creeley’s early efforts in poetry and prose, as they sought to establish their footing as writers. The second collection, between Olson and Frances (Motz) Boldereff and dating from late 1947 through the summer of 1950, sharpens in pivotal ways our understanding of the period that Olson termed “a riot in my soul” and that saw a paradigmatic shift in his thinking about poetry, the practice of his craft, and the feminine principle as both ideal and fact of consciousness. While Olson’s letters to Creeley are important in their own right as documents of postwar American poetry and cultural thought, the letters to Boldereff suggest another, in certain ways more complicated (though no less culturally saturated), context: that of the lover and brother cum suitor, the poet as passionate admirer and mentor, working in collaboration with his muse under the sign of Eros. It is in this latter correspondence that
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we see Olson exploring his own newly discovered sense of poetic purpose and authority through an exchange with a woman who not only believed in the significance of his project and lost few opportunities to remind Olson of his potential to change the face of American poetry, but who remained in key ways a champion of Olson’s soul, a mate, muse, and nearmythically providential figure. Where the letters to Creeley suggest the combativeness and insistent self-positioning of two men struggling to place their mark on the cultural consciousness, those to Boldereff suggest another, interwoven aspect of this struggle. For in ways that the letters between Olson and Boldereff recapitulate in stunning detail, the lines between his aspirations in poetry and their relationship as romantic partners quickly became blurred. If Boldereff saw in Olson the potential for genuinely “new” American poetry and viewed it in some respects as her responsibility to supplant this project through direct contributions of her own (and the fusion of the intellectual and erotic projects is one key element in what happened here), Olson it would seem soon came to feel that he needed Boldereff as much for the intellectual instigation she provided as for her emotional courage and resiliency. What Boldereff provided in the way of both real intellectual work and psychological support can’t be underestimated. Hers and Olson’s relationship began, it must be remembered, during a period of great personal anxiety and doubt for Olson. With his Melville book, Call Me Ishmael, behind him and a chapbook of poems, Y & X, en route to being published, Olson was in the midst of a critical period of inner reformation and reorienting, a period that would in turn see the writing and publication of “Projective Verse,” and such early poems as “The Kingfishers,” “The She Bear,” and the first “Maximus Poems” (“I, Maximus of Gloucester, To You” appeared in the inaugural issue of Origin in 1950). Matching Olson’s intensity and intellectual prowess each step of the way, Boldereff would have an enormous impact on his thought and work at this early point and in the years to come, long after their relationship had cooled. It is, of course, accurate to say that here we have, as Marjorie Perloff notes in her book jacket comment for the paperback edition of the letters, “a window on Olson before he became Olson . . . an intimate, arresting portrait of the artist in the process of becoming.” But it’s also the case that this nascent Olson comes to us through pages of letters that are in themselves documents of the genius, not of a singular individual, but of a relation between two impressively gifted and decidedly interconnected personalities (the same, it should be added, holds true for the Olson-Creeley correspondence). Depicting not only a particular moment in Olson’s career, the
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letters between Olson and Boldereff and Olson and Creeley document in telling ways the formation of one key nexus of the American postwar avant-garde, and suggest the potent ways in which, played out in both sets of correspondences, pivotal “decisions—both individual and collective—[about how to] participate in the same set of struggles on the field of culture” (Rifkin 7). More to the point, by focusing on this limited period in Olson’s career, we have a window not only on Olson before he was Olson (and Creeley before he was Creeley), but on the ways in which Olson sought to gain the kind of cultural power that would “make those decisions matter—the accumulation of enough social capital not only to register one’s presence in a particular collective consciousness, but to define the rules and norms of the shared space” (ibid.). As Sharon Thesen clarifies in the introduction to the correspondence, the letters between Olson and Boldereff document in telling ways the range of contributions Boldereff made to Olson’s thinking at this early stage of his career—contributions, it might be added, that fomented in discernible ways the poet’s conception of himself as a player on the larger field of American poetry: It was Boldereff who introduced Olson to the work of Samuel Kramer on the Sumerian sources of the Gilgamesh myth; Boldereff whose letters often provided words and images for Olson’s poems; Boldereff who helped formulate the notion of what he came to call the postmodern, a way of reclaiming the vitality of “directness” (13 January 1950) of a worldview Boldereff called the “unHebraic” (14 March 1950) . . . Boldereff who encouraged Olson in the notion of a poem as a construct of energy and therefore Boldereff who stands behind the ideas in “Projective Verse.” (Olson and Boldereff xv)1
As the volume of correspondence collected and edited by Thesen and Ralph Maud suggests, our perceptions of Olson must be revised in light of the complex interchange that the Olson-Boldereff relationship represents. For beyond what Olson “took” from Boldereff—emotionally, intellectually (a debt that still goes unacknowledged in much of the scholarship on this poet)—it’s also clear that both were willing and intellectually matched partners in a romance that was, first, lived out primarily in the letters they wrote to one another; and that, second, their relationship exerted a considerable psychological toll on Boldereff, while providing a vital (erotically charged) space of writing for Olson—whose own poetry and career remained a consuming (in all senses of the word) topic of
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mutual concern. This is not to say that Boldereff saw herself as without choices in the face of the large claims Olson made on her attentions; far from it. But it’s clear from the letters that passed between them that the dynamics of their relation depended to a large degree on Boldereff ’s passionate enthusiasm for Olson as both poet and man. This is important to remember in light of the shift that occurs at the point where the published correspondence between Boldereff and Olson tapers off, and Olson begins corresponding with the other member of his “company of love,” the young Creeley. “I want some day to see you,” Boldereff writes Olson in October 1949 (a few weeks before they would actually meet at the Forty-Second Street entrance of the New York Public Library in Manhattan), “but I can not say how important it is that you go on being alive—that you do not stop writing—(I am trembling so terribly I just can’t hold the pen) I mean there is nothing if you can not write America can not be—” (Olson and Boldereff 50). For a relatively unknown and as yet untested talent, such language did more than provide encouragement. It gave formative weight to the push that “Charles the sohne” (53) needed to clarify his means, to set out. I In 1947, Olson, then thirty-nine years old, encountered two individuals who would quickly become central figures of his “defining company,” to use Creeley’s apt phrase. He met Duncan first, while on a trip to California to do research for a projected book on the American West. Duncan, who had recently completed writing a collection of poems titled Medieval Scenes with fellow San Francisco poet Jack Spicer, was then at the forefront of the Bay Area poetry scene and what has come to be known as the first Berkeley renaissance. Olson wouldn’t actually meet the second, Boldereff, in person until the fall of 1949. But in 1947, he and Boldereff, a book designer then living in Woodward, PA (Olson would consult Boldereff early in their relationship on the design for Y & X ), began an exchange of letters that would lead two years later to their becoming lovers. Olson, who at the time was living with his commonlaw wife, Connie Wilcock, courted Boldereff with an extraordinarily active and passionate correspondence (sometimes three letters a day) that would in time nearly rival that which Olson began the following year with Creeley. In April 1950, Olson started corresponding with the younger writer who had dropped out of Harvard in his final year to pursue a career as a novelist and short story writer. Creeley, then living on a
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farm in New Hampshire and earning a subsistence level income raising chickens, had been working hard to establish a mode for the early prose work that would go into his 1954 collection, The Gold Diggers. Creeley’s effect on Olson’s thinking and lifework was similarly decisive. Olson’s letters to Creeley demonstrate the range and impact of a relationship that, along with that shared with Boldereff, would absorb his emotional and intellectual energies and become vital aspects of his production as a poet and scholar. These letters, of which Olson had said, “Creeley and I have engaged in perhaps the most important correspondence of my life” (Olson and Creeley 1980, V.1 ix), in fact served as an extraordinary prelude to the face-to-face encounter between the two men that finally took place in 1954 at Black Mountain College in North Carolina—four years after Olson’s initial April 1950 letter. In what follows I want to investigate the interwoven elements of Olson’s relationships as pivotal occasions of intellectual, psychosexual, and poetic development at the starting point of his poetic career. In this sense, incipience, the threshold experience of authorship, is very much my subject here. Particularly important to chart are the ways in which Olson experienced his own push at a point still far from what could arguably be called “mastery.” In looking at “Projective Verse,” a career-making essay for Olson, and two early poems, “For Sappho, Back,” and “In Cold Hell, In Thicket,” I explore how his interpersonal relations with Boldereff, Creeley, and, to a lesser extent, Duncan helped underwrite many of the key moves Olson made in his writing at the time. Some questions related to this line of inquiry include: How did Olson, who at the time of his first meeting with Duncan had produced no signs of the poetic output, move from a place of tentativeness and uncertainty to the recognizable Olson of “For Sappho, Back,” “La Preface,” and “The K,”? In what ways did his intense “partnerships” with Creeley and Boldereff serve to forward his evolving projects in critical and poetic production? How does the overlap of these pivotal relations provide another context for our understanding Olson’s output during these critical, formative years of his poetic career? This last question in particular, loaded as it is with cross-references to the lives and written documents of those on the scene at the time, suggests the necessity of an approach that brings together a close critical reading of the poems with an attention to the details of Olson’s life circumstances at the time of their writing. What surfaces from a careful examination of the biography and its related materials are central connections between Olson’s work as a poet and his intimate (yet poetically backgrounded) relationship to Boldereff, a relationship that until recently has been considered relatively tangential to Olson’s procedures and development.
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A second, and intricately connected, aspect of my discussion here relates to Olson’s responses to Creeley and Boldereff as each of these figures influenced and helped transform Olson’s own developing articulation of masculinity. For this I will be relying on a number of sources, including Tom Clark’s comprehensive biography, Charles Olson: Allegory of a Poet’s Life (1991), as well as correspondence, interviews, and other extant archival material.2 Using the biographical context of these materials, I argue that the work that Olson produced during late 1940s and early 1950s and the different literary forms through which he sought to define what became “new” in American poetries ca. 1950 (manifestos and essay, poetry, correspondence) depended to a great degree on his complex negotiation of his own evolving perceptions of masculine subjectivity. Some of this work took place in private correspondence, later bleeding into the poetry and poetics in startling and chastening ways. Far from having little bearing on the work itself, Olson’s protracted assertions of masculinity were fundamental to his leap from epigone to Maximus. The letters to Creeley in particular evince approaches to masculinity that, from our vantage point of the early twenty-first century, may seem almost arcane in their continual swerving from tough-guy mannerism and patristic directive to considered intimacy and affection. Yet the emphasis on the “projective” male self that emerges from the letters to both Creeley and Boldereff—on the establishment of a center, a single (manly) position from which to speak—has much to do with Olson’s (and Creeley’s) need to find a context for their masculinity in a cultural setting that, if not hostile to their kind of man (anti-corporate, ambiguous in their claims to “real manhood”), could find little use for them (short of the universities that both men rejected; Olson too had left Harvard before completing his PhD in American Civilization). As Robert Corber has noted: Masculinity remained a contested terrain throughout the postwar period. Some middle-class men registered their opposition to the reorganization of masculinity by refusing to settle down in the suburbs and raise a family . . . Still other men fashioned an oppositional form of masculinity from different aspects of the beat movement, rock ‘n’ roll music, and African-American and working-class ethnic subcultures. (Homosexuality in Cold War 8)
In this sense, both Olson’s departure from the quasi-public life of government work and Creeley’s establishing of himself as a chicken farmer in Cornish, New Hampshire, constituted culturally oppositional options for two Harvard-educated, white males of the 1950s. That both Olson and
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Creeley were potently avuncular spokesmen for a straight male ethos didn’t lessen for a moment the pressures the culture exerted on them to conform and perform as part of an entire class of white, heterosexual men of the 1950s. If Creeley’s early fictions respond to this crisis by depicting men and women in various stages of relational discord, a staging of heterosexuality and marriage as domestic rancor (e.g., “The Unsuccessful Husband,” “Jardou”), Olson’s poetry registers a dis-ease with both femaleness and maleness as fixed positions of consciousness—while seeking solace in the reassurances of “my drum, whose lustiness / was not to be resisted” (Olson 1987, 83). The “genitalization of performance” cited by Michael Davidson serves to underscore the laboring after-effects of Olson’s initial forays into poetic production, particularly as reflected in his groundbreaking essay “Projective Verse” (Davidson, Guys 33). I want to suggest here the central role that Olson’s developing and conflicted understanding of his own masculinity plays in his development as a poet.3 It’s impossible to read “Projective Verse,” a central essay from this period, without becoming attentive to the enormous pressure exerted by tropes of manliness, of use and method as coded terms for appropriately performed masculine endeavor. Nor, in “For Sappho, Back,” “Hymn to the Word,” “A Lion upon the Floor,” and “In Cold Hell, In Thicket,” can one ignore the way that femininity is being fashioned—relentlessly so—made to function as a reflection of male ambition, prowess, assertiveness, and mastery. Clearly, as one of Olson’s poems from the early 1940s attests, the vocabulary and sensibility we associate with his later hyper-masculinist statements and poetry had already heavily inflected the poetry: Lock and bite suck and tongue fuck and bunt cock and cunt O
The language here is compelling in its associative imagery of male violence, sport jargon (“bunt”), and manly display (“cock and cunt”), all of which terminates in the open “O” that is a terminal signal of incipience and, fittingly, also the first initial of Olson’s last name (Collected Poems 8). From our retrospective vantage point, Olson’s push in writing seems from the beginning to have been that of a major force. One reading of this period in the poet’s career suggests that Olson became Olson because he had to become Olson. Yet it’s important to understand how his gestures of
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self-assertion and braggadocio are in themselves readable signs of cultural stress delivered back to us in the form of a lyric signature. It may be circular to state matters this way, but in part our successful engagement of this work depends upon both a critical participation in and appreciation of the gender-coded incentives of this poetry. As readers we are involved in what Rachel Blau DuPlessis has aptly described as a “hermeneutic circle” that is both dizzying and daunting (“Manhood”), as we try to unpack and respond to the gender-coded incentives of a poetry that suggests equal amounts of cultural transgression and gender performance. As with Whitman, whose emphasis on the male body as prima facie condition of writing Olson shared, one cannot easily stand outside (or inside) the masculinist context of Olson’s poetry: that is, a reader is either seduced by the language and enacted mythos of manhood or is likely to feel excluded by the exhortation of masculinity flowing out of the text (that certain women readers might be more likely to find Olson’s posturing harder to take than men doesn’t alter the way in which his writing inflicts its authority in such a way that its intended audience or “company” remains insistently male—and a particular kind of man at that). Another way of stating this would be to invoke the well-known (and equally well-worn) dictum from “Projective Verse”—“Form is never more than extension of content” (Human Universe 52)—by which one could also say: Olson’s form extends directly from the masculinist content that provides its center, its base. An appreciation of the former necessarily involves a complex apprehension, if not acceptance, of the latter. II Since its initial publication in Poetry New York in 1950, “Projective Verse” has achieved an arguably canonical status as perhaps the key statement of mid-twentieth century avant-garde poetics. Carving out a space of primogenitive ordering, Olson conceives himself here as the father of a new line in American poetry. At least part of the appeal or seduction of Olson’s rhetorical approach—for Creeley, Robert Duncan, Robin Blaser, and others who came under Olson’s spell at the time—lay in the muscular tone of Olson’s language; what Blaser has referred to as the “jectives” of Olson’s rhetorical style (“Minutes” #8 6). At the same time, Olson’s manifesto represented a distinctly instigatory call to arms in the face of the cultural complacencies and literary rigor mortis of the period. As one index of where things stood poetry-wise in 1950, one need only take a glance at some of the top prize winners in poetry for that year: John Berryman (American Academy of Arts and Letters),
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Theodore Roethke (John S. Guggenheim Foundation), Gwendolyn Brooks (Pulitzer), Richard Eberhart (Harriet Monroe Lyric Prize), John Berryman (Levinson Prize), Richard Wilbur (Oscar Blumenthal Prize), e.e. cummings (Harriet Monroe Poetry Award), and John Crowe Ransom (Bollingen Prize). With the exception of Brooks and cummings, two poets who challenged in different ways the reigning orthodoxies of postwar American poetry, the list represents the bulk of what was viewed by both the mainstream press and the academic critical establishment as important and vital. In this and other respects, Jed Rasula’s observation has particular relevance to the excitement (in certain circles, at any rate) that surrounded the initial publication in the fall of 1950 of Olson’s “Projective Verse”: “The poetry establishment that seemed so secure after World War II was a refined but precarious meritocracy, able to sustain the pretense, for a time, that the narrow circle of its initiates were producing the canon of ‘American poetry.’ ”4 As Duncan comments in a similar vein in his 1969 interview with Bowering and Hogg: “It’s hard to recapture, to tell you about what it was like in 1950 to have something actually happening in poetry, because nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing had been happening in America, nothing at all. It had been a period dominated by vast and inert mediocrities” (n.p.). In her 1973 essay “Charles Olson and the ‘Inferior Predecessors’: ‘Projective Verse’ Revisited,” Marjorie Perloff has provided a useful corrective to the impression—fostered, to a large extent, by Olson himself— that “Projective Verse” represented a wholly original step forward in American poetics.5 As she suggests, “Projective Verse” wasn’t so much a bold new departure as “essentially a scissors-and paste job, a clever but confused collage made up of bits and pieces of Pound, Fenollosa, Gaudier-Brzeska, Williams and Creeley” (295–6). While its centrality to the formation of Donald Allen’s 1960 anthology The New American Poetry remains indisputable, Perloff has a point that part of the genius of Olson’s essay was that it stirred up a pot of avant-garde poetries by providing a provocative instance of power-grabbing. If the document can now seem, as it did to Perloff in 1973, a mess of borrowed influences from modernism, there’s no question that Olson’s genius lay in his staging of what Alan Golding describes as “a (re)definition of poetic form as immanent and processual; a poetics of dailiness and of the personal (as distinct from the confessional); and a poetry of humor and play (as distinct from wit)” (180–1). In short, “Projective Verse,” like Pound’s “A Retrospect” before it, cleared a lot of ground, quickly. And for Duncan, Creeley, and others on the cusp of the alternative poetries of the 1950s and 1960s, this
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document was, to use Olson’s phrase, “sitting there, for use” and helped engender a movement (or movements—as various poetic camps took up Olson’s challenge), allowing a collective place to stand where none had seemed possible before. For poets of the next generation, the effects are still being felt, if tempered by a more critical recognition of the essay’s problematic cast—one that, nonetheless, allows for acknowledgment of the various breaks from business as usual Olson’s call represented. As DuPlessis has observed, Olson’s essay signaled “an epochal shift in poetic practice: the invention of a post-humanist practice of line break and the forwarding of a kinetic text (‘composition by field’) which represented gestural processes of thought” (“Manifests”, 13). In this regard, Olson’s activity and the momentum his essay provided to an entire range of avant-garde American poetry and poetics (including Beat, San Francisco Renaissance, and Black Mountain) need to be appreciated for the cultural work they accomplished. Both a manifesto with clear predecessors (Pound and Williams among the two most notable) and an attack on the hegemony of New Critical approaches to poetry and poetics (lavishly represented by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren’s anthology Understanding Poetry, “Projective Verse” was a call to the citizens of the Republic of Poetry (whoever might imagine themselves thus), with decided emphasis on Olson’s small coterie of fellow (male) poets.
III Men have their proper season, and that season its act and image, image more than act, a rhythm more than image or than act, proper to them. —“The Advantage” (Olson 1949)
An early draft of “Projective Verse” was enclosed in a letter to Boldereff in February 1950. In his letter to her, Olson indicates that “there are several changes, but they are mostly to take the bristles out, to formalize the treatment. So you must just regard the meat of it, and take it, as it is in the mss., much as a letter” (Olson and Boldereff 1999, 162). Indeed, Olson’s marking of this early version of his essay as itself a “letter” looks ahead to “Mayan Letters” and “The Gate and the Center,” portions of which were
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drawn almost verbatim from letters to Creeley. Moreover,” Projective Verse” is very much a collaborative work, created through correspondence, through a collaboration that relies as much on Boldereff ’s presence as an auditor to Olson’s formulations of a new prosody in American verse, as on Creeley’s contribution as fraternal recipient. It’s important to note that in “Projective Verse,” the male sources of Olson’s key precepts (for instance, Pound, Creeley, Dahlberg) are cited in the text. Boldereff is not. Again, it needs to be stressed that Olson’s motives for failing to mention Boldereff anywhere in the extant correspondence and published essays have a number of interwoven motivations. It would be unfair to suggest that Olson was operating out of a purely selfish and sexist mindset when he erased one of the main contributors to his thought from mention in the work itself. Yet, even allowing for the extreme difficulties of his personal circumstance (conducting an affair in private while maintaining public silence about a key participant in his growth as both a poet and a man), Boldereff remains a curious lacuna in Olson’s public writing from this period—a woman whose intellect, one could argue, had a similar impact on him as that of another female writer, Jane Harrison, whose writings on Greek mythology and early Greek culture were foundational to Olson’s work. Of course, the latter was an established historian of Greek culture and mythology, while Boldereff remained relatively unknown (and unpublished) until long after Olson had died. Nonetheless, Olson’s attributions to Harrison’s thought and writing are pervasive in the essays, with one of his key poems from the mid-1950s, “A Newly Discovered Homeric Hymn,” dedicated to her. Boldereff, on the other hand, is acknowledged only in the private and arguably less available (until now) realm of their correspondence.6 What is also clear now from the published correspondence is the way that Olson’s dramatic statement evolved during a period of increasing emotional crisis for Boldereff, whose own interests in the relationship with Olson (highly complicated, folded into an ardently protective vision of the poet as “God’s chosen”) were becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. As she writes in a letter that was never sent: I believe I know several things—one is that you are God’s chosen and it’s my business to go with you all the way—I wish I could see if this terrible struggle I make is of use—I mean of use as pattern—I, like you, am blind—I do not know whether I ask something which is wrong—that is, I am not sure a beautiful thing like ours should not be lived out in actual daily practice— but in the meantime dear I want this message to go to you—because I have been fighting over and over with myself to try to get clear of my own physical
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jealousy and to project forward to you the pure essence of my belief and faith. (Olson and Boldereff 1999, 169)
These are extraordinary admissions, acknowledgments of the ways in which Boldereff felt compelled, on the one hand, to “project forward” a caring (one could say caretaking) role as helpmeet; while, on the other, she couldn’t avoid the deeper emotional conflicts that such a role forced upon her. For his part, Olson wasn’t unaware of Boldereff ’s increasing frustration with a relationship that offered little in the way of the kind of “daily practice” that her letter so clearly demands. Yet Olson’s language in his letters to Boldereff remains suggestively oblique on what exactly he intends to do. baby, believe me, believe me, i am doing the very maximum in all directions the pitch is unbelievable, & inscrutable i never knew i could do so much (for what it may be worth, i should never have been so strong had i not, originally, moved to you, motz extraordinary). (Olson and Boldereff 170)
The insistence of Olson’s plea (“baby, believe me, believe me”) is characteristic of much of his writing to Boldereff, and evinces both an apologetic and overweening desire to assuage a situation he felt he was quickly losing control of. It is no coincidence that Olson should have been, in his more public statement on poetics, so concerned with a term that appears in Boldereff ’s unsent letter: namely, use. As Olson writes in the closing paragraph of his February 12, 1950, letter, a revision of a paragraph that he would later include in the final version of “Projective Verse,” “It comes to this: the use of a man, by himself and thus by others, lies in how he conceives his relation to nature, that force to which he owes his somewhat small existence” (Olson and Boldereff 167). In ways that Olson’s decidedly unsettled stance in relation to Boldereff suggest, he was being forced to work out his “relation to nature” on two fronts simultaneously: his personal involvement with his muse and sister, “Motz,” and his poetic manifesto of resurgent (manly) energies. At the top of the draft of “Projective Verse” sent to Boldereff are the bynow-familiar upper- and lower-case tags of the essay: an appeal to the visual and spatial economies that had already become such commanding forces for Olson. They also serve as introduction to the poetics-as-salvo approach that Olson had borrowed from Pound, and put to use in his own memorandum. It is an “us or them” strategy designed to co-opt the weak and overcome any
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opposition. Here is the opening section as it appears in the version sent to Boldereff: PROJECTIVE (projectile
(prospective
VERSE (percussive
vs. the NON-PROJECTIVE, what we have had, pretty much (outside Pound & Williams, what a French critic calls the “closed,” the visual verse, the lyric, if you like, the personal over against objectivism, the “private soul,” print.
Later in the draft, Olson follows this opening with a paragraph that would, in the version eventually published in Human Universe and Other Essays (1967), appear in somewhat less informal language as part of the essay’s overall argument: Verse now has become a matter of its instrument, the VOICE. And I am not necessarily referring to recitation, not at all to performance, though this is certainly going to be a matter of some importance. What I am deliberately talking about still is composition, composing verse by voice, by, if you like, musical phrase, but specifically by the rhythms as well as the images personal to the composer. Which sounds like what we have heard before. Only it ain’t. And for one straight reason: that it must be faced, that we have lost secrets of both the physiology of the human voice, and its usage. (Olson and Boldereff 164)
Notable here in this “unpublished” version of the essay are the ways in which Olson was still struggling to shake loose (rather openly) of the marked phrasing of Pound’s poetics (“to compose in the sequence of the musical phrase”). His argument here that “if this sounds like what we have heard before. Only it ain’t,” betrays both the level of confidence Olson had in his ability to convert any opposition by emphasis (“It ain’t”) and the way in which Olson understood his role as pedagogue, bringing up past lessons as new material for another generation of poets. Also embedded in Olson’s circulation of draft material for “Projective Verse” is an interesting issue of public versus private that needs glossing. In so far as Olson clearly intended this prose document to circulate, to be published and serve as a pedagogical tool (much as Pound’s “A Retrospect” had done and chapters from Robert Duncan’s H.D. Book
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sought to do), it is worth noting that by including an early draft of it in a letter to Boldereff he was also signaling (albeit not directly in the text itself ) her contribution and the act of collaboration that figuratively gave birth to the essay. The secret element of this transmission suggests a way in which, by holding the two realms separate (i.e., the private, draft form of the essay, included in a letter to his lover, and the more polished, ready-for-use version Creeley would see a short time later), Olson participated in a carefully managed production of his own literary career (and of the journey he repeatedly made between his worktable and his involvement with Boldereff ). This is to say, he took freely from Boldereff, a debt acknowledged only in private, while otherwise authorizing his literary endeavors at this crucial stage through the removal/excision of that female part that would not be seen by others, notably Creeley—who would soon be receiving draft versions of the essay as well. Olson’s “private soul” was indeed on display here, but so carefully partitioned and concealed within the combinate layers of his relation with Boldereff that even Olson’s effusive gratitude as articulated in his letters to her seems somehow incomplete disingenuous: “One of my secret delights is to find myself suddenly not just using Motz vocabulary, but the twisting of the mouth, the exact same heat and pressure of breath, the gestures, the works! and finding that it makes people jump . . . what a wonderful thing you are, what a power and beauty” (UCT/Storrs). Without belaboring this point further, I want to emphasize in Olson’s language the entangled discourses of thralldom, erotic impression, and fraternal address, as these helped generate the poetic discourses that retain the residue of the heady romantic encounter conducted off-stage. That materials are certainly gendered in familiar ways, debts are certainly being disacknowledged, as Motz/Muse for a time at any rate served as a primary goad and guide for Olson. It is revealing that in converting the at-times repetitive, occasionally tentative draft sent to Boldereff into the final form of “Projective Verse” Olson used his correspondence with Creeley as another testing ground for the essay’s ideas and language. For it’s in the letters to Creeley that the famous tag phrases—“Form is never more than an extension of content” (originally coined by Creeley and included in a letter from the younger poet to Olson) and “ONE PERCEPTION MUST IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY LEAD TO A FURTHER PERCEPTION” 7—enter into the essay as formative principles of Olson’s poetics. And, in ways that are significant to Olson’s presentational method, in the draft sent Creeley as a letter dated June 21, 1950, the more measured, tentative language of the
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Boldereff version has given way to what we recognize as Olson at his most avuncular and muscular: The big baby, LINE— it’s the whole damned problem, in COMPOSITION BY FIELD, this keeping of the line PURE: to undo free verse, its shittings, we must hammer each line out as purely as each SYLLABLE, or we’re dead ducks, like the Amygists, or even EZ, when, as so often, in the Cantos, he goes by his will, thinks that it will carry him, he’s so strong. It don’t, & IT WON’T. (Olson and Creeley Vol. l, 126)
In a little over four months, Olson managed to convert any hesitancy or modulation into the hammered-out text that lay the foundation for the version published in Human Universe and Other Essays. If Olson here proposes to “undo free verse, its shittings” (a scatological metaphor that links old-school “verse” with the bowel movement of weaker poets), Olson seems to suggest that making things right again will require physical force, as Olson and Creeley together “hammer each line,” syllable by syllable. It’s not incidental that the transformation in Olson’s prose occurred in a context of highly charged male relations, part of an exchange in which toughness and masculine bravado and assertiveness went hand-in-hand with the literary projects Olson and Creeley were engaging. Olson’s continual need to measure himself against Pound (to show the master up, so to speak) isn’t surprising, yet it suggests the ways in which Olsonian poetics develops as both a counter-punch to weak versifiers of the Amy Lowell variety and a subtle jab at the aging master, whose relevancy Olson doesn’t so much challenge as seek to re-possess. In the psychodynamic pairing of master-ephebe, Olson’s push clearly required not only the imprimatur of the father, but also some clear redrawing of boundaries between himself and such “lesser” forebears as Lowell, slammed not so subtly in the
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reference to the “Amygists”—itself a neat conflation of disdain for the genteel poetry of Amy Lowell and astringent reminder of Olson’s pairing of himself with Pound. If in “Projective Verse” Olson uses “the exact same heat and pressure of breath . . . the works” as his female collaborator, the curious fact remains that the essay stands as one of the more assertively male-oriented documents in poetics written in the last fifty years. Sharply masculine in orientation, the vocabulary jars with its repetition of “man” and the male pronouns “him,” “his,” and so on. As both Davidson and DuPlessis have observed, even when we take into account the sexual politics of the decade, Olson’s foregrounding of the male pronoun remains a startling aspect of this essay (Davidson, “Compulsory Homosociality” 201; DuPlessis, “Manifests” 6–17). Functioning as concentrates of highly gendered material, the phrasing and orientation of Olson’s language suggest a peculiarly emphatic homosociality. Indeed, as Olson formulates it here, the production, circulation, and audience of poetry become a closed circuit of masculine privilege (masking, again, the feminine presence of Boldereff, who vanishes in the mix); it remains a process by which a poet gets in, at all points energy at least the equivalent of the energy which propelled him in the first place, yet an energy which is so peculiar to verse alone and which will be, obviously, also different from the energy which reader because he is a third term, will take away. (Olson, Human Universe 52)
Like the breath that is always present but never seen, Olson’s rigorous imperatives are present to such a degree that one reads “man” in the statement given earlier—even when the reference is otherwise gender neutral. Describing the syllable as the “king and pin of versification” (53) Olson goes on in a characteristically erotically charged metaphor to posit that it is through the incestuous union of the male mind and female ear that the syllable is born: “the mind is brother to this sister and is, because it is so close, is the drying force, the incest, the sharpener . . . ” (54). Of note here: the mind in Olson’s description is that “force” that dries the presumably wet “female” ear. Beyond the pun on “wet behind the ears,” dryness can be associated with a sort of postcoital (or postpartum) swabbing, a necessary drying-out of the overwhelming (possibly suffocating, certainly compelling) dampness of the (female) body. The implications of Olson’s depiction of the ear as that organ that permits the male mind to get its work done are striking, as
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DuPlessis suggests: Ear is an open orifice which cannot close itself; Ear is obedient to the authority of sound. Ear is feminine and female. Two ways of seeing this: that the man has poised a necessary sister goddess in his space for his uses, or that the man has opened out a new organ on his (creative) body. Men are getting a lot of poetic advantage either way, or both. (“Manifests” 29)
Like the vagina, the feminine ear as well suggests mystery, secrecy, darkness, an unresisting openness. In this allegory of masculine artifice, the activities of the ear are made subservient to the “male” head—a dramatic conflation of physiology and poeisis based on the male model. IV Ezra/ out of Whitman by/ Homeros (Added in margin of letter to Creeley, June 22, 1950)
Creeley’s initial response to Olson’s budding friendship with Duncan— “Why do you bring this lavender into this group?” (qtd in Faas, interview 12)—is not surprising perhaps, the kind of remark that one straight guy makes to another as both reinforcement of heterosexist boundaries and masculine banter. In retrospect, Duncan seems to have understood full well the context of Creeley’s remark, coming as it did in the face of his work from the late 1940s, suffused with exactly the kind of symbolist, purple diction that Creeley and Olson were out to eliminate from contemporary poetry. What Olson actually made of Duncan, an openly gay poet, when the two poets first began corresponding in the 1940s is less clear. Tom Clark’s biography of Olson gives hints as to the kind of homosexual panic that seeps into the poet’s thinking when he was at Black Mountain College in the 1950s. And Libbie Rifkin, in her discussion of the Berkeley poetry conference of 1965, points to the moment when Duncan walked out at intermission and didn’t return to the hall, and suggests the layers of authorial and homosexual panic (blurring into each other) that made Duncan’s departure such an instigatory (and infamous, at least within the circle of Olson familiars) event: Here, as throughout the talk, a certain amount of insecurity underlies the banter between Olson and Duncan—and between Olson and a large portion
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of the Berkeley audience for that matter—sexuality is both a source and a symptom of this insecurity. By 1965, the scales have shifted to such an extent that the professedly straight poet is put on awkward defensive. At the intermission following Duncan’s request [to use the restroom], for instance, Lew Welch asked Olson if he’d like to go “pee” too. “Nah, shit, pee? I never pee,” Olson replied. “That’s one of the only—the reasons why I’m not a queen is I don’t have to pee to prove that I’m a man.” (26)
One would be hard-pressed to find instances of such outrageous behavior in contemporary academic setting (albeit one that quickly became a very unacademic poet’s gathering), though Olson’s jocularity is clearly meant to squelch the more troublesome distinction he’s making here: I’m a real man, you’re not, you’re queer. The gesture is salient and toxic at the same time, and makes one wonder what Olson did make of Duncan ca. 1947, when they began corresponding with one another. At least on the literary level, Olson seems to have been fairly receptive to early Duncan poems, such as The Venice Poem, “Song of the Borderguard,” and “An African Elegy.” In correspondence, Olson praises the poems’ formal accomplishment, Duncan’s management of seriality in The Venice Poem, the musicality of “Song of the Borderguard” as, perforce, instances of Duncan’s appreciable importance as a poet Olson was pleased to publish in the pages of Black Mountain Review. As Olson writes to Duncan from Black Mountain College in a letter dated November 25, 1951, he “waved [‘Song of the Borderguard’] & read it to all i cd lay my hands on the day it came, it is so clearly something fine, & a pleasure for us to publish.” Later, in the same letter, Olson writes, “It is yr perception that moves me. This is yr weight, the beauty, even behind the verse, what beauty it hath is clear, perhaps too clear, it is so unstopped, man of my other sense of reality might say” (UCT/Storrs). Parsing the meaning of “this is yr weight, the beauty, even behind the verse,” one might say that Olson returns here to the familiar script of masculine energy and bodily matter—its weight—as verification of a sublime and beautiful materialism that would seem to occur “behind the verse.” Both “unstopped” and product of a “man of my other sense,” a lot depends here on what you make of “man of my other sense.” Which sense exactly? The phenomenological? Philosophical? Psychosexual? It’s a blurry line, to be sure, but Olson would seem here to be gesturing toward a kind of queer agency at stake in a reading of the poems. In this respect, Olson’s later essay “Against Wisdom as Such,” a response to Duncan’s “Pages from a Notebook,” first published as The Artist’s View, no. 5 (July 1953) and later reprinted in Donald Allen’s The New American Poetry (1960), provides a cogent glimpse at the ways in which sexuality
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formed a coded, yet foundational element, of the conversation between these two poets. Duncan asserts in his “Notebook” that Here I am, at last, I said. Why who cares now, not I, that I imitate or pretend, or sit a great frog in the mighty puddle of my own front room. Here I need not be mature. I can be wet behind the ears, adolescent indeed. I shall live out my life in this small world, with my imaginary genius, doing as I please. (Selected Prose 20)
In response, Olson writes: I take it wisdom, like style, is the man—that it is not extricable in any sort of a statement of itself; even though—and here is the catch—there be “wisdom,” that it must be sought, and that “truths” can be come on (they are so overwhelming and so simple there does exist the temptation to see them as “universal). But they are, in no wise, or at the gravest loss, verbally separated. They stay the man. As his skin is. As his life. And to be parted only as that is. (Human Universe 68)
Further, Olson responds to Duncan’s statement that “wisdom itself, or at least the cultivation of energy states per se, thrives on secrecy, on sect, and finds its pleasures in conspiracy.” He writes in vehement response: “[The poet] is not free to be part of, or to be any, sect; that there are no symbols to him, there are only his own composed forms, and each one solely the issue of the time of the moment of its creation, not any ultimate except what is in his heat and that instant inn its solidity yield” (69). Michael Davidson, in his discussion of the connection between community and poetics in Duncan’s work, has described the differences between the two poet’s perspectives as follows: The argument between the two men is an argument over two notions of tradition: one as the archaeological (and archetypal) structure of certain dynamic ideas realize throughout history by a few capable imaginations, the other as the open-ended series of variations on a corrupt and corruptible text. Olson’s theory of tradition is recuperative; Duncan’s is interpretive.” (San Francisco Renaissance 129)
Situating the conflict here in historical and aesthetic terms, Davidson rightly suggests a generative fissure in these two poets’ responses to the formation of poetic lore. But I’m more interested here in the highly suggestive homo-texuality of Olson’s response to Duncan’s queer “poet, self-declared
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manqué” (Olson, Selected Prose 20). It’s another example of Olson laying down the law, yes, but his proscriptive reading of wisdom and truth as inseparable from the man—“They stay the man. As his skin is. As his life. And to be parted only as that is.”—raises the obvious question: What’s at stake in this claim? Why the insistence on such boundaries, the dismissal of Duncan’s “wet behind the ears” poetics of blurring, porousness, polysemousness? I would argue that Olson gains a good deal of poetic capital by strenuously injecting into a debate seemingly carried on purely aesthetic lines a mode of social critique that is masculinist at its base and, once again, positioned to ward off any possible threats to the kind of “containment” of self that Olson regards as central to poetic production. “The poet cannot afford to traffic in any other ‘sign’ than his one, his self, the man or woman he is” (69), Olson writes. It’s not hard to draw a line from this comment to Duncan’s insistence on signs as replaceable, interchangeable, playable, and pliable at the same time. Duncan’s mask, “manqué” and moldable to suit the occasion of the writing, certainly suggests a very different outlook to the more stringent instructs of Olson, who repeatedly advances a poetics of “one, his self, the man or woman he is” (an interesting deploying of the male pronoun to cover both genders). Certainly, as Davidson points out, another element of Olson’s response arose from his disparaging attitude toward the San Francisco scene in which Duncan was a major player. Describing the Bay area poetry world as an “école des Sages ou Mages as ominous as Ouija” (Human Universe 67), Olson repudiates Duncan’s “almost cultic sense of group identity” (San Francisco Renaissance 125) at the same time that he not so subtly conjoined Duncan’s poetics a scene whose orientation was decidedly homosexual. As Maria Damon has pointed out, the relationship between poetic community and eroticism was particularly strong among the poets who circulated in the Berkeley scene of the 1950s (142–201). Writers such as Duncan, Spicer, and Blaser lived out their relationships to one anther and to the work they produced in a consciously open, gay community that embraced the camp politics and ethos of the coterie. Duncan, along with other participants in this scene, was part of a literary culture in which “gayness, poetry and community [were] of a piece, coextensive” (Damon 160). This enfolding of homosexuality, poetic form, and communal values stands in stark contrast to those of Olson, Creeley, and others in the Black Mountain scene, a largely male, almost entirely heterosexual grouping of poets. Tracing the ways in which these very different worlds communicated with one another and found points of resistance and correspondence is beyond the scope of this chapter. But I want to suggest that Olson’s interactions with Duncan in this early period recast the omissions of their relation, and help us understand
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more fully some of the ways in which his lack of direct response to Duncan’s homosexual orientation seeps into our reading of these poets’ early careers. It’s surprising, to say the least, that Olson never seemed to have anything direct or specific to say about the homosexual content of Duncan’s work, particularly The Venice Poem, which throws open the door on gay themes, not least through its use of the word “cocksucker.” What, exactly, did Olson make of such overtly homoerotic material? While the answer to this question will have to remain largely conjectural, what does seem clear are the ways in which homosexuality, as both a context through which Olson examined his own sexuality and as a very real fact of life in the cultural mix he circulated through, formed a centrally informing—if not troubling—element of his experience in the early-to-late 1950s. Here, DuPlessis suggests a line of inquiry that allows for a consideration of the ways in which the openly gay poetics of Duncan, Spicer, Ginsberg, and others in the countercultural vanguard of the period may have affected Olson’s own heterosexist orientation: “There was a forceful pressure from homosexuality on male self-fashioning, on the male imaginary, on the splits and debates about what masculinity was in the 1950’s, given the sensual attention to male embodiment, sexuality, and physicality in overtly gay works” (“ ‘50’s Masculinity” 9). In ways that have direct relation to the formation of poetic career and a stance within an otherwise heterosexist literary culture, DuPlessis’s comments suggest how difficult it would have been for Olson, arguably enmeshed in some complicated inner debates about his own manhood, not to have experienced these forceful pressures as both threatening, on one hand, and intricately involved in his own self-fashioning as “Olson.” We certainly know from Clark’s biography that homophobia (as an internalized and/or outward directed fear of homosexuality) was not a foreign experience to Olson. In 1952, while teaching at Black Mountain College and suffering the strains of marital difficulty that would finally lead to his separation from his common-law wife, Connie, Olson seems to have found himself experiencing the obverse side of his continual courting of predominantly younger male poets, as issues of sexual identity came critically to the fore in his life and writing. Clark’s description of a dream Olson had during this period puts us squarely in the realm of Freudian scenarios of lost sons, frictive masculinity, and homosocial partnering: He dreamed of ambiguous sexual encounters involving male students like Nick Cernovich and a new favorite, Dan Rice, a handsome young apprentice whose “real Western Levis and tough way with a cigarette” made him the epitome of Black Mountain machismo. In Olson’s dreams, Rice turned from adoptive son into an enigmatic and menacing rival blocking the
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frantic patriarch’s access to his own wife’s bedroom. The “passion for men” Fielding Dawson [a student of Olson’s at Black Mountain College] made out in the Olson of these years was driven by a strong, highly sublimated “wish to engage,” to at once befriend and lock horns with other males. (224; Quotation marks in the original)
As Clark suggests, Olson’s perception of himself as possibly attracted to the young male ephebes gathered around him at Black Mountain provoked a high degree of anxiety and an accompanying refusal to confront aspects of his own masculinity implicated in this subtle dance of homo-eros. Certainly the pressures on Olson, as on straight men in general during the 1950s, were to repress (often violently) any open acknowledgment of homosexuality. To do otherwise was to risk being viewed as a failed man; in some senses, not a real man at all. As Michael Kimmel writes in his popular account Manhood in America: A Cultural History (1996): The trappings of gender failure were all around us in the 1950’s, and American men discovered what happened to men who failed, especially the sons of men who failed as breadwinners and fathers. They became homosexual, they became juvenile delinquents, they became communists—soft, spineless dupes of a foreign power, who were incapable of standing up for themselves. (237)
Moreover, as K.A. Cuordileone (2000) suggests in his account of Cold War politics and masculinity, the national discourse was dominated by an antiintellectualism that connected left-wing liberalism with male weakness, effeminacy, and, implied if not directly said, homosexuality: The attack on soft liberals who gave in to weakness was part of the oft-noted, heightened anti-intellectual temper of the time. In some quarters the liberal became virtually synonymous with the “egghead,” a carping intellectual weakling who was, according to the writer Louis Bromfield, “over-emotional and feminine in reactions to any problem . . . surfeited with conceit and contempt for the experience of more sound and able men . . . A self-conscious prig . . . An anemic bleeding heart.” (521)
Such discourses of anti-intellectual gender panic were part and parcel of a larger debate about the maintenance of sexual norms in the face of social and cultural changes that seemed unstoppable. By the late 1940’s, social, economic, and market forces were encouraging a new current of sexual modernism, often expressed in popular media, that
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bumped fitfully (as the first Kinsey report had in 1948) against an official ideology that insisted on allegiance to the nuclear family and sexual restraint. (531)
That such “allegiance” existed hand-in-hand with images of the homosexual as alluring threat to the status quo shouldn’t, then, be surprising: At once a figure of terrifying fear, buried envy and loathing, he appeared to have many male critics (not yet attuned to the cultural trends that would later sanction a male flight from commitment) seemed ultimately to desire: freedom form marital commitment, ease of sexual relations, and a kind of power over his life that conventional male roles precluded. (531–2)
It’s impossible to judge exactly the influence such cultural forces had on Olson, to know the degree to which he experienced conflicts about his own sexuality and manhood due to the evident strains on normative heterosexuality that Kimmel, Cuordileone, and others have documented. What is clear, though, based on what we know of Olson’s anti-academic (which is clearly not at all the same thing as anti-intellectual) stance, is that Olson could respond with venomous dismissal to male figures who didn’t measure up. In the example of Olson’s own linking of a certain brand of academic intellectualism with weakness and effeminacy, one can glean something of his reactions during the Black Mountain period by examining his encounter with Paul Goodman, a writer and visiting lecturer from New York University who two years previously had openly advocated homosexuality while teaching at the North Carolina college. Olson’s reaction to Goodman was, as both Clark and Michael Davidson have suggested, nothing short of vicious, a full-out attack meant to un-man the “sissy” poet. Following Goodman’s return to New York, Olson responded with this poem “Black Mt. College Has a Few Words for a Visitor”: dear you, dear true, dear clear, your poor dear doom, your going away not rightly used. He’d send you what I send you too, a little reedy Cross pulling feed out a bottle filled with what now rimes with sis (poor Sis who don’t get half a chance by contrast to boys because her tender ender’s such a portcullis it’s good for nothing more than making those fond ones you’d—what do you say? lay bare? o Paul (Collected Poems 268)
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While in part intended as a humorous send-up of Goodman, the poem is revealing in Olson’s direct suggestion that Goodman is a “sissy,” not a real man. With its language of sexual innuendo and gay-baiting, the poem suggests that a woman’s “tender ender” is no substitute for what the “boys” can offer. Olson’s use here of portcullis, a grating of iron or wooden bars or slats suspended in the gateway of a fortified place and lowered to block passage, draws a curious circle around anality and sexuality, aligning the female anus with a barred passageway, while proffering the image of presumably less resistant “fond ones” as pleasuring cohorts Goodman would “lay bare.” In a weird psychological play, Olson projects onto Goodman elements of his own fearful fantasy and dream life of the time—and vilifies him for activities that, to some degree at least, Olson had been processing internally and poetically: Look: us equals, that is, also sons of witches, are covered with cookies dipped in same from your fell poem. It fell, all right, four-footed with one foot short where five were called for—five, sd the Sphinx, confronted with senescence and with you, still running running running from her hot breath who bore you, Hansel Paul, to bore us—all. (169)
As Davidson notes, “These lines say a great deal about how Olson configures homophobia through misogyny, identifying with Goodman as ‘sons of witches’ and subject to Circe-like powers of transformation” (“Homosociality” 206–207). The defining image of “Hansel Paul” leaves no doubt as to where Olson positions himself in this allegory of emasculation and dis-empowerment. Clearly, his choice—as the stronger, virile poet on the scene—is to meet the challenges posed by the Sphinx, solve the riddle of his own perplexities via the masculinist assertions of poetry and poetics. If the poem is a not-so-subtle document of projection and homosexual panic, it’s also an instance of Olson’s attempt to manage the crisis poetically, instrumentally, sending Hansel Paul “running running running” from the “hot breath” of a figure who is at once male and female, masculine and feminine, a crossed-over site of blurred gender. Interestingly, it’s in a letter to Creeley in the year prior to Goodman’s visit that Olson suggests Duncan represents some other formation of sexuality, one that—like Olson’s carefully administered send-off of Goodman—entertains the possibility of androgyny: “The point, on Duncan, finals is that the Third Sex deal is just too goddamned EASY, WEH, for a diehard, axehead, Puritan as me—but where MY structures
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are (out of the sun) just now has me on the hook” (Olson and Creeley, Vol 8, 185). Whether meant as covert reference to Duncan’s androgynous appearance or as an acknowledgment of gay sexuality as another form of subjectivity altogether, Olson clearly feels uncomfortable with the attributes of this “third sex.” At the same time, Olson seems to concede here that his governing doubts have him “on the hook” in ways that remain disturbing and frightening to him. If Olson tended to steer clear of open discussion of Duncan’s homosexuality, we find in their relations as poets the experience of comradely respect and care that Duncan clearly saw as the basis for any connection in poetry. As he would write to Olson in December 1953: What more central love than the disturbance and trembling awakened by each new song; the calling up of one’s own spirit in answer, the still center in the excitement that comes as the poems are comprehended. A challenge. But to the intoxicated mind a more marvelous alcohol—a nourishment. Of my own otherness. My entirely differentness. It’s the coming back to the core of speech—that poetry might be a revelation of the language written by, created by Man—a closet speech wherein one speaks with the vastest spirit—a revelation of language not personality. What more central love than the comradeship in devotion to art? (UCT/Storrs)
Duncan’s language stands in stark contrast to the memorandum style of Olson’s correspondence with Creeley, and suggests as well a forging of public self of poetic language in the reciprocities of “comradeship in devotion to the art.” With its linkages to Whitman, “comradeship” is a shapely and suggestive term for the relationship that Duncan and Olson shared with one another during this period. As described by Robert Strikwerda and Larry May, comradeship among men involves an association and an attachment based not so much on the intimacies of a connection (as would more clearly be the case with Creeley) as on a sense of common pursuits, joint endeavor, and martial engagement: Comrades are not necessarily intimae friends, for they are often bound to one another as generalized others, not in terms of who each one is as a unique member of the human race. Somewhat paradoxically, comrades are loyal to each other not out of concern for the particularity of the individual other, but out of an almost impartial respect for people of a certain
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type or in a certain situation: fellow soldiers, compatriots, coworkers, etc. . . . Comradeship is a deontological regard for a generalized other and, in this sense, is quite different from intimate friendships, which are based on a regard for a particularized other and where consequences and contexts matter quite a bit. (83)
Without overstating the point, I would argue that part of the reason Olson and Duncan forged a long-lasting friendship had to do with exactly these patterns of homosocial bonding most closely resembling comradeship. Olson’s clear respect for Duncan’s accomplishments in poetry and his inclusion of him in the “company of love” suggest that whatever complicated reactions Olson in fact experienced in his connection to Duncan, the center of their friendship always rested on the bulwark of comradely devotion and care that provided a pertinent protection from forms of intimacy that would have unsettled Olson. Duncan’s assigning of “comrade” to his relation with Olson is telling on another level as well. The word in its late Latin etymological root bears within it the multiple puns on closet, since camera (from which comrade is derived) means room or chamber. If language is a closet “wherein one speaks,” then Olson and Duncan would seem to share the same closet: to be closeted together in their work as men of language. While the homosexual valence of closet can’t be overlooked, Duncan’s meaning here harks back to his notion of poetry as a private, sectarian act, a form of intimacy that relies on secrecy and trust between knowing participants. Framed this way, Olson’s masculinity exists in uneasy, but undoubtedly companionate, relation to Duncan’s vocabulary of comradely virtue. If Olson was partly frightened by the perplexing shadows cast by Duncan’s queer poetics, he learned, it would seem, to stand “out of the sun” and profit from the exchange with a poet who remained a central part of Olson’s thinking throughout his career. V judgment is a lie except as we use it only on ourselves. We may do that. This is, is it not, after all, why some of us commit errors, suicide, whatever: the privilege, of ourselves. And value? It better be, better stay, express itself only as, form.
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And those who do not know this, who think, by themselves, by their “sight,” by their—what? the excuse of, their energy?—to pin down another? O may they be damned, damned, damned —Olson to Creeley, July 4, 1950
When we turn to the poems from this period, what becomes immediately evident is the way in which a masculine model of poetic form remains for Olson (and to a certain degree for Creeley also) the implicit first fact of consciousness. By this I am referring particularly to the way poetic value for both these poets seems to emanate from a “stance” toward others that is at once judgmental and appraising and directed at an “outside” whose encroachments must be assiduously warded off by the containments of one’s probative manhood. It’s through the management and appreciation of form—the extension of content, in Creeley’s tag phrase—that the male poet understands how to act in the world, how to achieve autonomy, agency, and authority in the realm of public living. Content (as in the content of a man’s character) remains inseparable from the form or activity of the poet’s being. Olson’s directive here is toward a mode of inward judgment along the lines of Creeley’s earlier proposition—that each man judge his own actions by the singularity of his content. Thus, he becomes free from any judgment except self-judgment. In asserting the value of the individual act, Olson interestingly tethers his commentary to the recursive narrative of gender and, in particular, of Woman as a figure of sublimated desire. As he asks himself earlier in the same letter: Anyhow, value, as judger? ((I am reminded I had this, in a poem, the only thing worth saving, perhaps: behave, lest the outcry shall seize you, for what you have done for her who there lies naked whose body in that place is uncovered, whose breasts there, lie open before you and before the judges’ stare (Olson and Creeley, Vol. 2, 52–3)
This early version of “La Chute II,” written in July 1949 and enclosed in a letter to Boldereff as well is, like “In Cold Hell, In Thicket,” another poem composed around self-directives. The previous stanza, not cited in
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Olson’s letter, reads: Go barefoot. Make no sound. And when you meet the wife you loved do not kiss her nor strike the wife you hated. Likewise your sons. Give the beloved one no kiss, do not spit on his brother (Collected Poems 84)
As instruction of (male) selfhood, the language of “La Chute” suggests a mythologized scene of masculine territoriality and authority. That this poem should find its way into a letter to Creeley at the precise moment when Olson is ostensibly involved in a discussion on social and public value shows the degree to which the discourses of masculinity were implicated in Olson’s intellectual and poetic imagination. Moreover, the rhetoric of this poem points to the ways that the boundaries between idealizations of femininity and tropes of masculinity continually blur in the work. The sliding from one to the other—from presentations of gender to poetics and back again— suggests slippages between the incentives of poetic mastery and those of masculine accomplishment. In a highly complicated narrative that combines personal shame (over the pain he has inflicted on both Boldereff and Connie) and issues of poetic form and value, Olson aligns the act of discovering the woman “whose body in that place is uncovered” with the moment of “ACT and/or FORM.” Both a shield before “the judges’ stare” and the inciting figure of primal discovery, the “she” of the poem’s language is put in service of that act necessary to the poet’s—and poem’s— public acknowledgment, its usefulness as an occasion of artful praise and testimony. Olson ends this letter to Creeley—which becomes a sort of restraining order against judgment in generis—by connecting even more directly the discourses of use and value with the narrative of mythologized gender: note: it does seem of certain significance that this is written under the eye of (the photo of) a princess (Totonac?) which I rediscovered in my files today, and have now up on the wall again like a totem of, the sort of thing i am talking about above, the discrimination to believe that taste is given us neither for humility nor snobbery, neither for judges nor crawlers, but for the arrogance of,
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ACT and/or FORM only. She has, in the Mexican sun, a wonderful hole of an eye (it is a profile pix) which is cut precisely as is the Chinese character for a mouth And her mouth, of course, is shadowed so, it is, an eye . . . (Olson and Creeley, Vol. 2, 53–4)
Integrating allusions to Mexican folklore with a reference to Pound’s “Canto LXXVII”—“mouth, is the sun that is god’s mouth” (466)—Olson links the necessary “arrogance” of act and form with the talismanic presence of that goddess under whose watchful mouth/eye he proceeds. That Olson so quickly executes the shift from the female mouth to eye (i.e., the passage from sound and speech to the silence of the gaze) suggests the way in which he was imaginatively and perceptually committed to that “hidden constance of which all the rest / is awkward variation” (Olson, Collected Poems 162). Viewed from this perspective, Woman would seem to have constituted one of the ultimate use values in Olson’s work—as the fortifying presence that quite literally “bore the fruits.” “For Sappho, Back,” one of the key poems in Olson’s early oeuvre, serves as another useful model of the way in which tropes of masculinity and gender formation are consistently evoked in the poetry. Contemporaneous with the writing of “Projective Verse,” and the opening lines of which were drawn directly from Boldereff ’s letters to Olson, this poem can be seen as a sort of companion piece to “Projective Verse.” It offers a subtle enactment of that essay’s thematic of open field composition, a field, one might add, that is scored by gender narratives that are in themselves recits of the Western lyric tradition as emblematized in the allusion to the Greek poet Sappho: With a cold eye, with her eye she looked on, she looked out, she who was not so different as you might imagine from, who had, as nature hath, an eye to look upon her makings, to, in her womb, know how red, and because it is red, how handsome blood is, how, because it is unseen, how because it goes about its business as she does, as nature’s things have that way of doing, as
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in the delight of her eye she creates constants And, in the thickness of her blood, some variants (Collected Poems 161)
In its conflation of Sappho/Frances, the poem provides on one level a nonremarkable rendition of femininity as archetypal figure of Nature/Nurture. Like the ear that is both exposed to the world and conceals within its activity, the womb gives forth its “handsome blood.” Moving between the heightened discourse of the love lyric and a meditation on the feminine sublime, Olson’s text projects the existence of the feminine within the space of the masculine. It is the “intimate, the intricate, what shall perplex forever / . . . a matter . . . not of confusions to be studied and made literal, but of a dry dance” (162), which Olson’s poem and language are at such great pains to draw out. In lush imagery that enacts the gender narrative of woman as Muse, the female figure is described variously as “self-housed,” “limpid,” “forever new,” “tender-taken.” And, in a remarkable sequence that echoes key assertions of “Projective Verse”: look as she passes, on this moving thing, which moves as grass blade by grass blade moves, as syllable does throw light on fellow syllable, as in this rare creature, hidden, each moving thing is light to its known, unknown brother . . . (Collected Poems 161; emphasis added)
As Boldereff had written Olson, “That I am your actual flesh sister I now know . . . That our terrible oneness creates incest, I know . . . our paths so unlike and [yet] the blood-beat so precisely the same.” Olson’s perception, expressed to Boldereff in another letter, that “i am your male . . . yr brother-father, i am strangely the son of, F[rances] m[otz]” (qtd in Clark 171) amplifies the incestuous level of their relation in yet another direction: not only are they brother and sister, but Olson views himself in the serial roles of brother/father/lover to Boldereff. Olson’s figurative reenactment of cultural taboos surrounding incest serves as a potent psychosexual context for both the poetry and poetics (as Olson’s relations with Boldereff and Creeley share aspects of the fraternal), and provides a potent metaphor for the fraught gender relations this work intersects. As an astonishing example of the near-total blurring of the autobiographical, mythological, and poetic realms, the poem works as both a coded message to Boldereff
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and as a repository of key themes that Olson will work out in his future poetry and prose. “For Sappho, Back” suggests a fusion and diffusion, not only of poetic subjectivities (from “I” to “You”), but also of securely bounded gender categories of male and female. However, it is worth noting that in suggesting the possibility of a merge with “her tender-taken bones,” Olson’s poem finally vacates the scene altogether in the lyrically recursive, psychically irresolute image of “a dancer going off.” As poems of incipience go, Olson’s call here is finally indeterminate about what the next stage might be. Nonetheless, the terms as such have certainly been established; inevitably, they will circulate again and again around this figure of she whose “eyes are sign.” Throughout this process of autobiographical and mythic enfolding, the bits and pieces of emotionally charged material from the correspondence with Boldereff serve as serial units of composition within Olson’s poetic text. Transferred almost word for word in some instances from her letters to his poems, Boldereff’s language limns his texts as an unvoiced Other. Assimilated into the psychosexual economy of Olson’s impassioned cry to the Muse, this “rare creature” (Collected Poems 162) that is ostensibly the poem’s focus is not so much erased from view, as she is inscribed deeply into sign-making that draws a figure around gender. In so doing, Olson’s text consolidates culturally dominant and subjectively influential strains of gender formation to enlist the power of the feared daemon and rise to the Orphic heights the poem demands. In another poem from this period, “The Prayer” [later published in A Nation of Nothing but Poetry (1989) as “Lady Mimosa”], Olson inveighs the spirit guide, Lady Mimosa, to deliver us from all mud You who took on the job, keep us at it Lady, to whom it occurred: the very brilliance of my flesh, its form, is enough to lead them out; we follow you (Olson and Boldereff 283–4)
Olson’s beseeching of the Lady to “deliver” him “from all mud” suggests an oblique cry to Boldereff to help him clarify his means, to assist in his search for an “out” as both a poet and a man during this intense period of inner
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turmoil and real-life struggle. That Boldereff “took on the job” seems clear by her response to Olson’s lush introit, though in this exchange both tone and content differ markedly from her usual admiration of and receptiveness to his work. As she would write in a fierce response to this work in a letter postmarked April 3, 1950: I wait like a vigilant enemy—I want it all consumed. I want Olson to step forth without debt—to speak a new image as he did in the letter accompanying… The meaning of your poem is right—I want more violent language—I want more Olson. I want Lady Mimosa speaking aloud to herself— I want the pain I want the rejection I want the door But I do not want sex insulted—I want my Olson to say “how bright of nature to make us multiple”—it has to be hard language full of hard paradox— Oh! Christ what I ask of you— (Olson and Boldereff 294)
Boldereff ’s comments interestingly target those aspects of the poem that sound a false note, either because Olson renders Lady Mimosa speechless (a common enough trope of lyric writing by men) or, more importantly, because of the removal of violence from the poem’s language. In asserting “I want the pain / I want the rejection / I want the door,” Boldereff calls for Olson both to acknowledge his own acts in full—their punishing and violent effects on their relation—and a contrary claim for “more violent language” appropriate to the assertiveness of the poet who may “step forth without debt.” At the same time, Boldereff admonishes Olson for bad faith in a poem strenuously moving toward an image of Lady Mimosa as resource and enabler. To the lines from Olson’s poem “We thank you, / that you made us / as we are” (284), Boldereff ’s response comes back sharp and pointed: “I don’t thank. No female thanks. I hate its guts” (294). In saying “I do not want sex insulted,” Boldereff also seems to suggest that sex exists—female and male—as separate categories, and that Olson is, in this instance, doing a distinct disservice to his sex in a poem that beseeches, yearns, remains lyrically derivative (“I want Olson to step forth without debt “), while being untrue in its statement. The “hard language full of hard paradox” is exactly what’s missing, according to Boldereff, from Olson’s artful but finally disingenuous lyric call. If anything, her rebuke
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lays bare the overdetermined aspect of Olson’s relationship to Boldereff as both respondent figure and muse—guided by ear—and suggests that, while the figure of helpmeet certainly wasn’t problematic to Boldereff, what was simply unendurable to her—“I hate its guts”—was Olson’s position of gendered suasion that didn’t fully meet the terms of his own sexed existence. Those terms, it should be marked, necessarily include “violent language . . . pain . . . rejection.” Like “Help Me, Venus, You Who Led Me On,” and other works of this period, both “For Sappho, Back” and “Lady Venus” are very much poems of incipience, addressed as much to the attendant ear of his muse and helper as to authorizing figures of poetic authority and ambition. As Jed Rasula points out: the male voice of poetic authority is underwritten by a female voice-over: his poem is not so much “inspired” (in the convention to which we’re accustomed) as it is pre-articulated inside him, in a voice that is differently gendered. To experience voice as inner—that, as unvoiced—is to be initiated in the emergence of gender, particularly gender understood in affiliation with genius. (“Gendering” 161)
Read in the context of Rasula’s observation, Olson’s texts enact a complicated “dance” between “that which is the shoot, the thrust / of what you are” and “the hidden constance of which all the rest / is awkward variation” (Olson, Collected Poems 162). The poem, in marking off the female body as a site of intense regard, suggests the text’s status as a poem of beginnings, of incipience. Not admiration of female Beauty or desire for physical union with the Beloved, but this! this is what gives beauty to her eye, inhabitation to her tender-taken bones, is what illumines all her skin with satin glow when love blows over, turning as the leaf turns in the wind and, with that shock of recognition, shows its other side, the joy, the sort of terror of a dancer going off (Collected Poems 163)
Incorporating Boldereff as the silent figure behind the writing—“the part hidden . . . from everyone else”—Olson situates himself and his poem at
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a primal scene of writing, in which the incestuous figures of brother/sister, mother/son, father/daughter produce that “heave within” that is one of the signatures of masculine creativity. In face of the “terror” of losing contact with that portion of himself that holds the Muse within, literally containing that which makes the event of poetic production possible, Olson builds a delicate structure to house this incomplete version of empowering (female) Other, while seeking to replenish those energies that are irrevocably linked to her presence on the scene. “In the primal scenes of Western poetry,” Rasula writes, “the voice-over is female (Muses, Echo) or the voice of the poet is indebted to a vanished woman (Eurydice)” ( “Gendering” 162). What we find tucked within the “other side, the joy,” then, is Olson’s recurring terror that his Dancer/Muse may abandon him altogether, refusing the imprecations of the “accurate kiss” and vanishing beyond the reach of his suddenly diminished vocabulary. If “For Sappho, Back” articulates a simultaneous desire for and terror of the Muse figure, “In Cold Hell, In Thicket,” a poem that dates from the same period and was sent initially as part of a letter to Boldereff, revivifies the dilemma of the masculine subject struggling for affirmation. This too represents a poem of incipience, of surging male energy confronting and seeking to move past its limitations. The poem is riven by the anxiety of its male speaker—a “brother” who, like the speaker in “For Sappho, Back,” desires completion through linkage with the “necessary goddess.” Posed as a series of questions, the poem projects a terrain of “underbrush” and tangled wilderness (with allusion to Dante’s Inferno) from which the speaker must rise up to confront the central task of asserting himself. . . . (Who puts this on, this damning of his flesh?) he can, but how far, how sufficiently far can he raise the thickets of this wilderness? How can he change, his question is these black and silvered knivings, these awkwardnesses? How can he make these blood-points into panels, into sides for a king’s, for his own for a wagon, for a sleigh, for the beak of, the running sides of a vessel fit for moving? How can he make out, he asks, of this low-eye view, size? (Collected Poems 156)
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The problem for this speaker, as for Olson himself, is how to measure one’s progress and movement in the world, how to achieve “size.” Visibly dislocated in a nonlinear time in which the implements of preindustrial warfare combine with images of early American wagon trains moving across the West, the poem’s trajectory is “out”—into space—but how to get there, “how trace and arch again / the necessary goddess?” (ibid.). Oscillating between states of profound physical and emotional torment and the bewilderment of a man who needs to ask “Who / am I?” (157), “In Cold Hell” seeks to resolve its fundamental dilemma of masculine self-authorization in a triangulation of female figures: the all-encompassing maternal presence of the Egyptian goddess Nut; the Beatrice-like figure of the Beloved; and common, everyday woman, a “bitch” who remains at the center of daily action. The poem’s coercive discovery, that none of these female figures is sufficient to aid the speaker in the choices he must make, becomes both the grounding force behind poetic (and manly) enablement and doleful commentary on the predicament of the poet’s life circumstances: That it is simple, what the difference is— that a man, men, are now their own wood and thus their own hell and paradise that they are, in hell or in happiness, merely something to be wrought, to be shaped, to be carved, for use, for others does not in the least lessen his, this unhappy man’s obscurities, his confrontations (158–9)
As recounted here, Olson’s familiar themes of self-definition, personal difficulty, and the public usefulness of male endeavor are combined with an astringent sense of the ways in which the “obscurities” and “confrontations” that limn and limit his existence cannot easily—or perhaps ever—be resolved. If women and Woman remain central to this “hell” that the poet finds himself mired in (as they surely are), then Olson seems to suggest that while attaining strength as a man remains the only option, it doesn’t make any less painful the consequences of his ambivalence and torpor. The scripts of agency are curiously mired here in the understanding that no matter that “man, men, are now their own wood,” they are at the same time “something to be wrought, to be shaped, to be carved, for use, for others.” Will, the force of internal and public action, would seem then to face resistance
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and confrontation in a landscape of “obscurities” and unsettled debts. If the rhetoric is inflated in its response to the impress of lyric vocality (with its own troubled gender history), it’s also clear that Olson is here trying to come clean and face the “unhappy man” he’s become, one whose choices are no less fraught for their seeming to present different options, different occasions of use. Both self-instructive plan of inner growth and descriptive agenda for masculine endeavor, Olson’s poem charts a “heroic” path and concludes with an image of the poet and his Muse entering that metaphorical field of human endeavor and action—a space that is never far from Olson’s consciousness: He will cross And is bound to enter (as she is) a later wilderness. Yet what he does here, what he raises up (he must, the stakes are such this at least is a certainty, this is a law, is not one of the questions, this is what we talked of as —what was it called, demand?) (159)
Finally, the choice is that there is no choice; only the “law” remains, with its ceremony of “raising up” a self big enough, powerful enough, to continue. The poem’s concluding lines reveal a careful encoding (as the whole poem has been) of Olson’s personal inability and refusal to make a choice between his lover, Frances, and his wife, Connie. At the poetic level, Olson’s language reasserts his avowed intent to . . . forever waver precise as hell is, precise as any words, or wagon, can be made (160)
Which is to say: the private narrative may remain irresolvable or a situation left for others to resolve (in this case, Frances and Connie), while for Olson
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the inevitable task remains that of the man of language: to define a self and poetic method balanced carefully between wavering and non-wavering, between the forces of stasis and movement. Once this field has been defined (as all Olson’s work from this period is at such pains to do), it “is not a choice, is / as dangerous as a prayer, as a death, as any / misleading, lady” (159). Caught between gendered narratives of activity and passivity, agency and disempowerment, Olson’s poem suggests a complicated middle terrain. Scanning a landscape in which “men did die, where boys / and immigrants have fallen” (158), the poem’s speaker remains lodged deeply in the historical “abstract,” the “cold doing” that marks the road to accomplishment and mastery. In crucial ways, the female/feminine that is the poem’s subverted site of desire and transfiguring sexuality remains part of the underbrush, forever “isolated, observed, picked over, measured” (157). While this move is not extraordinary in itself as a self-legislating moment of masculinist apprehension, important to observe here are the ways in which Olson invests this maneuver in a poem of epic proportion with a forcefulness designed to signal his own incipient status as Poet and Maker. “So shall you blame those / who give it up, those who say / it isn’t worth the struggle?” Olson’s poem asks. As clearly as anything Olson ever wrote, “In Cold Hell” documents the means by which he understood his own struggle to become empowered as a poet, to achieve a force of act. If union with the representational “necessary goddess” finally remains impossible, the poet’s invocation of her must forge a place anew in a realm configured around the primacy of masculine speech and writing. In so far as culturally proscribed versions of masculinity remain at the root of Olson’s poetics, it’s also the case that Woman occurs as the proffered sign of incompleteness and silence. The important point would seem, then, that She remain “of use,” perpetually enfolded in the patterned projections of masculine ceremony and initialing.
CHAPTER TWO
“Homosexual Advertising”: Gay Subjectivity, Modernist Form, and Robert Duncan’s The Venice Poem
Social actions are themselves always embedded in systems of public signification, always grasped, even by their makers, in acts of interpretation, while the words that constitute works of literature are by their very nature the manifest assurance of a similar embeddedness. Language, like other sign systems, is a collective construction. —Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning Don’t say I can’t cast shame off, step out of my trousers an amazed man. Don’t say this isn’t a more lasting pleasure than the struggle for good government or an aesthetic standard. Don’t say the embrace of good bodies isn’t all that I mean when I praise the Sun or its princely powers. I mean the ebullient leaping of naked bodies when I speak of the spirit’s healing. —Robert Duncan, “A Fresh Start” (1947/48)
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I. The Poet as Homosexual Stories told after the fact are often apocryphal reminders of another kind of self-fashioning. When Greenblatt reminds us of the social nature of language as construction—and our identities within that framework as likewise constructs of “public signification”—he takes us to the heart of an inquiry into poetic making. Interpretation that follows the acts of the text predisposes us to a ceremonial affliction: we grasp at the contexts that no longer exist except as memorabilia of a text’s signification. The man or woman who was there is forever absent: a sign of someone we come back to, again. This chapter’s title is borrowed from an interview with Robert Duncan conducted by Ekbert Faas in 1980. In the course of the interview, Duncan mentions a letter Robert Creeley had written to Charles Olson at the beginning of their friendship with each other. Paraphrasing from this letter, Duncan refers to a question Creeley had posed to Olson: “Why do you bring this lavender into this group?” Duncan goes on to suggest, by way of explaining Creeley’s apparent derision, that “the letter was really responding to the kind of over-ripe writing I do. Because the kind of writing I was doing then and have been doing at all times had passages in it that could be called purple passages in the sense of what was used in the pre-Raphaelite period” (Faas, Interview 12). Duncan then relates this discussion to John Crowe Ransom’s outraged reaction to the publication of Duncan’s groundbreaking essay “The Homosexual in Society” in Politics in 1944. As Duncan halfhumorously put it, I have always done a grand job of advertising what my poetry is all the way along the line. And certainly some homosexual advertising is also going on. Homosexuality has always been built into the advertisement. I mean, I could have extricated it from the contents putting it in small letters like: smoke eight packs of this a day and it will make you want to travel. But if that was the message, then I put that in very large letters indeed to let them guess what it was that they were smoking. (Faas, Interview 13)
Duncan’s sense of homosexual content in his poetry as “advertisement” or promotion, a message directed at otherwise wary readers, is a useful way of beginning a discussion of The Venice Poem, the work that more than any other from Duncan’s early period incorporates openly homoerotic themes and imagery, and does so in a complex meditation on materials that range from the intimate and subjective to the literary, mythological, and sociohistorical. Along with Heavenly City, Earthly City (1947) and Medieval Scenes (1950) two other works from Duncan’s early period, The Venice Poem forms
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an important bridge between the earlier, less assured work of Duncan’s youth and the mature stance of Duncan’s later work in The Opening of the Field. Its central position in Duncan’s career stems at least in part from the exemplary manner in which he forged a version of poetic identity identifiable as that of Duncan, one that brought together a consideration of the mythic properties of language; a keen awareness of poetic subjectivity marked by the constructions of gender and sexual difference; and a distinctly exposed expression of life issues that constitute the poem’s figuring of what Michael Davidson has referred to as Duncan’s preoccupation with “embodied passional states and the extreme forms of jealousy and desire that they took” (“Marginality” 292). At the time of the poem’s writing, Duncan was living at 2208 McKinley with a group of predominantly gay writers that included Jack Spicer, Philip K. Dick, George Haimsohn, and Jerry Ackerman, who had became Duncan’s lover during this period. Having recently left the commune-like environment of 2029 Hearst Street—with Blaser, Spicer, Leonard Wolf, and other writers and artists as frequent guests—Duncan had by this time already completed two major works of his early period, Heavenly City, Earthly City (composed during 1946; published in 1947 by Bern Porter) and Medieval Scenes (written over a ten-day period in February 1947; published by Centaur Press in 1950). Work on The Venice Poem commenced in the early months of 1948, and relates to a very specific set of life circumstances within a gay community in which Duncan, at least for a time, circulated. To read Duncan’s work from the 1940s is to recognize the ways in which poetic career and a developing understanding of his own identity as a gay writer living and working in the developing gay communities of Berkeley and San Francisco form a critical part of Duncan’s milieu, his way of writing himself into a history then forming around him. As Bruce Boone has noted in his assessment of this early period in Duncan’s writing career, “The subject matter of these [early poems] is the gay subculture. It’s a writing that is full of conflicts, doubts, self-laceration” (74). It is also, as Boone goes on to point out, the poetry that precedes by only a couple of years Duncan’s meeting of Jess Collins, the painter with whom he would form a lifelong partnership. The self-directed rage and anguished tone of much of the language in The Venice Poem suggests that Duncan began here the passage from one state of feeling and self-recognition to another. The poem registers a separation, a growing awareness on Duncan’s part of the ways in which his own homosexuality and humanist idealism could find expression in a language of conscious, rapt, and rhapsodic awareness, without engaging in sentimental posturing or the camp affect of other markedly “queer” texts. The line
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between the “purple” writing that inflects many of Duncan’s poems from the 1940s and the formal and linguistic shifts evidenced in The Venice Poem is a fine one. Yet in telling ways, Duncan’s growing confidence in his art and vocation as a poet allowed him not only to develop multiple areas of intellectual and personal interest, but to do so through a figure of poetic identity (and intensity) whose roots in the lush language of the Romantics and pre-Raphaelites was joined to a considered rereading of Modernism’s linkages to romanticism. This dialogue between differing traditions—and competing versions of masculine subjectivity—is carried out, it must be remembered, in the social and political space of the 1940s postwar United States, a cultural climate hardly disposed to acceptance of homosexuality in whatever form it took. As Thom Gunn notes, “It is well to remind ourselves how little precedent there was for Duncan’s testimony at that time and in that society. Homosexuality was held in peculiar horror even by liberals who would not have dreamt of attacking other minorities” (143–4). There remained real danger in self-exposure, which makes Duncan’s statement in “The Homosexual in Society” all the more remarkable even at this late date.1 This essay is still startling to read on a number of counts, most especially for its rigorous honesty about the terms of the debate in which homosexuality functioned (as it still does) as a multi-valent sign, separating and bringing together various constructions of gay and straight identities. As Michael Davidson has pointed out, Duncan’s recognition of his own “culpability” in participating in what he terms a “cult of homosexual superiority” helped him gain “a good deal of polemical energy from establishing an apostate relation to what he perceived as orthodoxy” (San Francisco Renaissance 278). It is Duncan’s straightforward refusal to participate in a deft us/them binary that sets this essay apart from other statements addressing the role of gays as a minority community within the heteronormative culture-at-large. Fiercely arguing against the “ghettoization” of homosexual identity he saw as endemic to gay life, Duncan targets those members of the community whose rhetoric and manner further isolate the homosexual in a realm of perverse separateness: There are critics whose cynical, back-biting joke upon their audience is no other than this secret special superiority; there are poets whose nostalgic picture of special worth in suffering, sensitivity and magical quality is no other than this intermediate “sixth sense”; there are new cult leaders whose special divinity, whose supernatural and visionary claim is no other than
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this mystery of sex . . . Like early witches, the homosexual propagandists have rejected any struggle toward recognition in social equality and, far from seeking to undermine the popular superstition, have accepted the charge of Demonism. Sensing the fear in society that is generated in ignorance of their nature, they have sought not to bring about an understanding, to assert their equality and common aims with mankind, but they have sought to profit by that fear and ignorance, to become witchdoctors in the modern chaos. (Faas, Young Robert Duncan 320)
As Eric Keenaghan has suggested, in this essay “Duncan sought to link gender, sexuality, and nation so that they are no longer treated as discrete categories dividing the population and encouraging inter- and intra-group competition. Instead, his lyric images them as inter-related, similar entities” (90). Arguing fiercely against a “secret special superiority,” Duncan voices disgust with the “nostalgic picture of special worth” of “homosexual propagandists” he aligns with “witchdoctors of the modern chaos.” In so doing, he turns away from the coded stylization of behavior and speech that he witnessed in the literary salons and gay communities of New York and San Francisco. The power of Duncan’ position arises from both a rueful honesty about his own participation in the role-playing and masking of self with which he was deeply familiar and a prescient understanding of the ways in which, for there to be resistance of a homophobic culture-at-large, shifts would have to come from within various sectors of the gay community first. By refusing to engage in a “cult of the homosexual,” Duncan sought in this forward-looking essay to demystify and reinscribe gayness as an integral element of subjectivity; only this way, Duncan suggests, can one seriously assert the gay community’s “equality and common aims with mankind” (320). Moreover, in ways that The Venice Poem play out with remarkable attention to the political consequences of otherwise literary acts, Duncan’s stance in this essay requires a recalibration of our understanding of agency and the social. As Keenaghan describes this process, “Rather than beginning with the individual’s volition to express her difference, agency actually grows out of an eroticized openness to foreignness, an initial receptivity or vulnerability to differences embodied by others” (90). Duncan’s political argument for a re-recognition of the “battlefront toward human freedom” stems from his vaunted call for a more thoroughly “humane” approach to the understanding of the ways in which sexualities manifest themselves in the culture-at-large. Only by coming to terms with the ways in which the struggle for gay rights and gay identity exists as one part of a continuing and larger struggle toward fulfillment
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of our deeper humanity, Duncan suggests, can real equality and freedom be achieved. It must be always remembered that one’s own honesty, one’s battle against the inhumanity of his own group (be it against patriotism, against bigotry, against, in this specific case, the homosexual cult) is a battle that cannot be won in the immediate sense. The forces of inhumanity are overwhelming, but only one’s continued opposition can make any other order possible. (Faas, Young Robert Duncan 322)
The martial metaphor will certainly be familiar to readers of Duncan; what remains deeply compelling here as well is his almost Arendtian view of contemporary political and social life as continuously doing battle with the “forces of inhumanity,” forces that as Duncan suggests include any position that claims superiority for one group over another—even if that group exists as a minority within the culture-at-large. Duncan’s comments on the consequences of the publication of “The Homosexual in Society” from an interview published in 1980 are chastening. As Duncan remarked to Jack Cohn and Thomas O’Donnell, regarding what is still a remarkable turn of American literary history, The article on “The Homosexual in Society” came out and I got a letter from [John Crowe] Ransom, saying that he had not realized that this was a covert advertisement for homosexuality; Kenyon Review was not a journal accepting this sort of thing. [Ransom had accepted Duncan’s “An African Elegy” for publication in the Kenyon Review, then withdrawn acceptance of the poem upon reading Duncan’s essay.] And then I wrote back, “Would you prefer an overt one?” And then I got a letter, and he said he did not know what the law provided, but he believed that homosexuals should be castrated so that they wouldn’t breed more homosexuals . . . So scratch a Southern gentleman and you’ll find something awfully interesting. I was out, just read out, out, out, at a point when I would have been in at the wrong place. (524)
Certainly for the literary establishment, as represented then (and, to some degree, now as well) by the Kenyon Review, the Partisan Review, the Hudson Review, and a host of other like-minded magazines, Duncan’s public declaration represented a break with literary etiquette; more to the point, his position constituted a threat to the decorum of a New Critical mindset that was hostile to any expression of sexuality that deviated from the norms of
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a predominantly white, middle-class readership. Ransom’s attitude is best summed up in a letter to Duncan from December of 1944. According to Ransom, homosexual poets should “sublimate their problem, let the delicacy and subtlety of their sensibility come out in the innocent regions of life and literature” (Faas, Young Robert Duncan 153). As Duncan’s work in The Venice Poem suggests, there was little room for “delicacy and subtlety” when working against a history of cultural subjugation and ignorance veiled in aesthetic judgment. The poem, read out of its own history, descends to us as a disquieting reminder of what it meant to be out at a time when “innocent regions of life and literature” proscribed such subjectivities as a “problem” best left silent. II. “A Canto for Ezra Pound”: Jack Spicer, Robert Duncan, and Modernist Revision First published in 1949 in a collection titled Poems 1948–49, The Venice Poem remains an unsettling—and unsettled—text. Looking ahead to Judith Butler’s theorizing of gender binaries, Duncan’s poem emblematizes work of fetishized innocence, as well as complexly interwoven subjectivities. With its “imaginary instructions” that arise partly from life circumstance, partly from a rethinking of the properties of poetic language, Duncan’s poem radiates a “fierce antinomianism” (Keenaghan 88) that both inspects and carefully deconstructs the inventions of selfhood that The Venice Poem rigorously (one could say religiously) engages. As Ekbert Faas has suggested in his biography of the poet, the work charts a key moment in Duncan’s psychosexual and poetic development.2 It signals a deepening of the commitment to poetry as lifework manifest in Heavenly City, Earthly City, and looks ahead to the formal ambition and accomplishments of The Opening of the Field more than ten years later. If the text has become a curio in literary history, more important to the coterie of Duncan scholars than general readers of contemporary American poetry, its value for us still lies in its recalibration of sexuality and subjectivity, its re-inscription of Whitman’s homoerotic poetics in modernist form. More specific to my discussion here, The Venice Poem, scripted in the heyday of the 1940s Berkeley Renaissance, suggests a larger conversation with modernism, one that was revising on the move the way different branches of the modernist tree were to be understood and reevaluated. Significantly, Duncan began work on The Venice Poem immediately following his return to Berkeley after he’d visited Ezra Pound at St. Elizabeths in Washington, D.C. in the summer of 1947. Following in the footsteps of Charles Olson, who’d already made his pilgrimage to Pound at St. Elizabeths in 1946, Duncan wrote to Pound early that year.
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As he recalled the gist of this letter to Faas, Here you are a totalitarian, and I’m an anarchist; and here you are with my parents’ anti-Semitism which I threw out the window with miles of other junk; and still you happen to be an absolute master for me in poetry, so poetry must be something completely different from something we assume it actually is. (Faas, Young Robert Duncan 237)
Duncan’s querying of poetic value and its relationship to personal and cultural ethics bear noting, as does the stance of ephebe-to-master the letter assumes. When the visit to Pound finally materialized in the summer, Duncan met a man deeply absorbed in contemporary poetry and poetics, still garrulous and open to meeting younger poets. As Faas has described those visits: Ezra seemed wildly enthusiastic, and on each of their three afternoons together they talked long beyond the official visiting hours. A person who under normal circumstances tends to dominate every conversation, Duncan in this case was glad to listen. There was practically no aspect of Pound he wasn’t familiar with, and hearing Pound talk was like rereading Kulchur for the third or fourth time. Once in awhile Duncan would venture a question or touch upon an issue previously discussed in correspondence. Had Pound read his book Heavenly City, Earthly City and the manuscript of Medieval Scenes he had sent him? Pound had and wondered why a younger poet would get into that, since he had already cleared the ground in earlier years. On the whole, Pound seemed to be far more interested in Duncan’s prose and ideas than his poetry. (240)
The meeting’s value for Duncan, as Faas suggests here, lay in its purchase of poetic capital that would serve as instruct and goad to the writing of The Venice Poem a few months later. The linkages between the gay-identifying The Venice Poem and the modernism of Pound, Eliot, Williams, and so on are worth teasing out here. Interestingly, in the fall of 1946, Spicer and Duncan collaborated on “A Canto for Ezra Pound” while they were living together at 2029 Hearst Street (also collaborating, round-robin-style on this poem were mutual friends Jo and Fred Fredman and Hugh O’Neil). The canto was sent to Pound in December 1946, though it’s not known whether he ever responded. Referencing Leonard Woolf, Al Capone, Sophie Tucker, Cocteau, Gerard Manley Hopkins, to name just a few of the pop cult and literary names that appear, “A Canto” is both a send-up of Pound, Eliot, and Williams and others included in
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the modernist cohort, and a coterie-driven rejection of the verities of mainstream culture. The poem opens with a quote attributed to Leonard Wolf, a poet whose work both Duncan and Spicer knew and regarded highly (Killian, Ellingham 14), “Not everybody is the wife of Horace Gregory” (a well-published poet of the 1930s), and continues: “Wonders and wonders and Doubleday Doran. A book of the month club for horses.” “The handsprung apes in the deserted zoo talk of Capone, talk of Capone. A final bestiary.” Thus Spicer, including “all his grapes within the houses.” Every new generation has its new Gods. Why, if New Directions has become a Financial SUCCESS, does it print less POETRY? And Pound printed in all the little mags. piously. With apologies. Every new generation has its new Academies. Every generation faces new Dolts in the EDitorial CHAIRS.
With its satiric reference to Eliot’s “Prufrock” (“The handsprung / apes . . . talk of Capone, talk of Capone”) and skewing of New Directions for printing less poetry than before, the poem lays bare its contempt for a contemporary scene dominated by “new Dolts” who, as the poem’s next line has it, represent “Old bottles and no wine.” The attack on business-as-usual verse-making continues in the following stanza: Reading Poetry Magazine’s piss all over our old Poet TO END ALL POETS. “Why doesn’t someone take Peter Disease for a ride? “Chicago’s cemetery for all verse. TRAITORS TO POETRY! WORSE THAN THE BOOK FOR THE MOUTH DISEASE!
1946. “Looks as bad as any other year.” Even an Atom bomb can’t cheer it up.
“Chicago’s cemetery” is linked to a Book-of-the-Month-Club (“BOOK FOR THE MOUTH DISEASE”) preservation of literary “taste,” one that Spicer, Duncan, and so on ride hard on throughout the piece. If the poem is ribald, it’s also deadly serious about a political and cultural milieu, “bad as any other year,” following the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima
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and Nagasaki, which endorses the efforts of “handsprung apes” over the kind of new poetry, we can assume, the authors of “A Canto” have in mind. Mixing doggerel and racialist discourses, the poem is like an amusement park mirror reflecting back bits and pieces of cultural matter: ES GUD ES ENY UDDER sez Jack Spicer spittin’ ez usual in our old china sugar bowl. A REGLAR MENSTRAL SHEW Or as Sophie Tucker, the Yiddish mama, makin’ ‘em all weep wit’ laughin’ “And it takes a lot of the TAT for the TIT I got.”
The poem’s a critique, all right, crazy quilt of late night bar talk, inside jokes, and loose literary motifs that it is. In perhaps the most striking part of the poem, written in the form of a letter to Pound, Duncan lays out the particulars of an argument that both corroborates Pound’s achievement, while poking some big holes in the monument that sits before “a third generation of poets,” trying to find new ways of writing poems: Dear Pound: As to Usura and the old problem, the sacrifice of all that good poetry to no end, poets gone dead in battling the banks. poets gone dead in battling the enemy, what other enemy than the public demand? It isn’t the principle of the thing It’s the MONEY. With Economics built no man of good stone. 70 odd Cantos shot thru with Econ. 1A And say the answers were all right. All them years fighting clay pigeons, refining a language to shoot at the decoys. Put them in Hell, that’s eloquent enuf. What counts is the eye for a Beautiful thing. Even the shadow is In admiration of the Beautiful thing. A generation out of one man’s sense. 70 odd Cantos fighting clay pigeons, incident with Beauty.
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And when the uproar is done, The young will affirm his intention. A generation tired of the whole works, intent upon beauty in a mean state. “Private names in public places” scrawled on the cans of half a continent. And Pound, avid for public virtue, twenty years of poetry shot thru with Econ. 1A, twenty years in advance of the academies, Thank God, it didn’t work. With public virtue builded no man a house of good stone, nor was poem written to correct polity poem of good stone. Still, beauty shows thru. Food for a third generation of poets. 1946. Ten years after Auden’s invasion. 70 odd Cantos remain curiously right, curiously wrong. The cost of too much concern for the Public Good. R.D.
“The sacrifice of all that good poetry to no end.” The poem asserts a stirring form of public debt, one that Duncan suggests is still being paid, albeit unwittingly. If Williams’s “Beautiful Thing” is, at base, as marred by its own resident complicity in a poetics of shadowy forms, “clay pigeons” that skirt the real, it’s Pound’s project, flawed, incomplete, yet somehow necessary, that Duncan is at pains here to delineate in the crackling lines of this collaborative canto. “Ten years after Auden’s invasion,” Duncan suggests, what’s left, what’s ahead are “70 odd Cantos” that “remain curiously right, curiously wrong.” The asperity of Duncan’s commentary suggests both generational debt being paid and recognition of the “cost of too much concern / for the Public Good.” It’s a rebuke, if you will, of the modus operandi of The Cantos (1983), which are, if nothing else, all about reclaiming a space of public acknowledgment through its economy of collagist methodology and tutelary forms. Highly revealing in terms of its discussion of the Berkeley scene is a letter Spicer wrote to Pound in 1946. It’s not clear if the letter was ever sent, but it has a great deal to say about the coterie of poets working around Duncan and Spicer and their wayward affiliations with modernism. Here’s Spicer,
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mapping out Berkeley for Pound: Poets are conscious here that they are writing the poetry of the forties (whatever that is!), reject Auden with a deadly horror, have a sullen contempt for Eliot which is sometimes tinged with reason, agree with Johnson about “metaphysical poetry,” find the dramatic structure of the Cantos, the elegance of Cocteau, and the “je ne sais quoi” of Williams’ “Patterson” [sic] (which is certainly derivative dramatically from the Cantos) their goals. “Finnegans Wake” stands a little above these as a combination Bible and Mother Bunch. Everyone will call this summary of creed malicious and unfair, but if one were to lay “Patience” in Berkeley, Bunthorne would believe these things. The greatest tragedy is that Yeats is almost completely ignored here. People say they kno [sic] him great and intend to read him someday. There are exceptions to this too, but generally the poetry written around here is too bloody and needs a hardening of poetic arteries. Yeats could have given them that.
The reference to Yeats is intriguing, and certainly makes sense in terms of Spicer’s poetics of dictation. But as a “summary of creed,” what’s telling here is the finessing of modernism almost as a kind of reactionary, old order, with works such as Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake standing still and silent on the terrain, “a combination of Bible and Mother Bunch.” Malicious and unfair Spicer’s judgments may be, but they say a lot about a kind of working out of the problems posed by the orthodoxies of the “new” in American poetry. In ways that are familiar to us now, Spicer’s comments seem to skip generations and could apply as well to sectors of the current American poetry establishment, however one might conceive of such. Later in his letter, Spicer suggests that, politically speaking, Berkeley poets walk a fine line between Stalinist rapprochement and suspect forms of anti-Bolshevism, couched in the rhetoric of the politically vacuous figure of Archibald Macleish: Politically, Berkeley is the avante-garde [sic] of a horse walking backwards. Fortunately, there are no Stalinists or Partisan Reviewers walking around, but the general mass of poets (almost all of whom were violently against Mr. Roosevelt’s War) are beginning to wonder if it wouldn’t be better to become Archibald MacLeishs in the Missouri tie salesman’s coming Crusade Against Bolshevism. By the way, has Wyndy Lewis really become a Stalinist?
The “horse walking backwards” reveals a good deal of Spicer’s contempt for the culture of revisionist political history already coming to life in the years
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immediately following the war. And it pokes a fierce finger in the face of those who would opt for the solution posed by the Archibald MacLeishs of the world. Some years later, Spicer would recall the evenings spent writing “A Canto” in a poem from his book Language. It’s part of a section titled “Love Poems”: 3. “ ‘Arf,’ says Sandy” “To come to the moment of never come back to the moment of hope. Too many buses that are late” Hugh o’Neill in our Canto for Ezra Pound. The ground still squirming. The ground still not fixed as I thought it would be in an adult world. Sandy growls like a wolf. The space between him and his image is greater than the space between me and my image. Throw him a honey-cake. Hell has been proved to be a series of images. Death is a dog and Little Orphan Annie My own Eurydice. Going into hell so many times tears it Which explains poetry. (Collected Poetry 383)
“Private names in public places” would seem to be the operative aesthetic here. A working through that allowed both Spicer and Duncan some space for the necessities of their own work in the 1940s, work both at odds with aspects of Pound’s project and indebted to the monument erected in place of public culture. The debt was, of course, enormous and “A Canto for Ezra Pound” is, in its way, ample and rueful documentation of that debt. Principally speaking, Duncan’s subtle working through of melopoeia, phanopoeia, and logopoeia as first stated by Pound in his ABC of Reading (1960) exerts an important pressure on Duncan’s early poetic career overall and on the writing of The Venice Poem in particular. There’s no doubt that what Pound gave Duncan, Spicer, Blaser, and others on the scene in this postwar period was a way of recalibrating the broken engine of American poetry, or at least attempting to do so. In accordance with Duncan’s own developing sense of his poetics as bound to the modernist legacies of Pound, Stein, H.D., and Eliot (different parts of each find their way through and into the work of Duncan), the uncompromising (and autocratic) dicta of Pound’s poetics serve as pivot points for Duncan’s discursive practice. In a collagist mode
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adopted to a large degree from The Cantos and The Waste Land (which in the present critical context seems more like a symptom of Pound’s enormously absorptive authority as poet/critic than the integral signature of Eliot’s poetic genius), these rules of conduct form key aspects of the imaginary instructions Duncan enlists as support for his procedures in The Venice Poem. At the same time, the citations from Pound (“the melodic coherence, the tone leading of vowels”) exist in a poetic text whose adherence to such principles is always measured against Duncan’s decided discrepant sense of the discursive formation of literary tradition. Duncan suggests “a realistic image” as a third proposition or “instruction,” but the “real” in his sense of it is far less bound by the historical interrelation of diverse materials (as in Pound), than as to the envisioning of each “image” as it becomes manifest in writing that partakes of precepts of both Pound’s imagism and Eliot’s symbolism. In so far as Duncan positions himself in a line of “great moderns” extending from Pound and H.D. through Zukofsky, Williams, and Olson, he simultaneously risks the “mushy technique” of the Romantics (notably Shelley and Keats) and French Symbolist poets with whom he also shares a deep affinity. Borrowing from the proscriptive agendas of Pound, Duncan nonetheless positions himself in a decidedly dialectical space, wherein he roams freely among a number of competing idioms and authorial figures. As Michael André Bernstein suggests, Duncan is determined to retain the technical repertoire of both Romantic and Symbolist verse forms, and unlike Pound or Olson, it is hard to envisage Duncan issuing lists of works to be avoided for their pernicious influence on young poets. What is so curious about Duncan’s position, then, is that he continues to produce the one indispensable body of work to validate the generative force of a certain tradition while consistently challenging its fundamental axioms. (178)
Indeed, it is this catholicity and openness that mark both the writing of The Venice Poem and later work that would, likewise, celebrate a range of influences and predecessors, with little adherence to the strictures of this or that school or camp or stance. The Venice Poem, like the work that succeeds it in The Opening of the Field (1960), Roots and Branches (1964), and Bending the Bow (1968), creates a boundary line, continually crossed over, between the obdurate modernist surfaces of textual and historical allusion and the Symbolist motif of recurring interior meanings: a mode of writing that establishes a means for Duncan to appropriate both the fragmentation and polyphony of The Cantos,
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managing several sites simultaneously: mythic, narrative, allusive, autobiographical, erotic. Interestingly, Pound’s initial response to The Venice Poem was less than positive. “You should have had a plan,” he wrote Duncan at the time, suggesting the limits of Pound’s own appreciation for a kind of poetry that blurred particular historic and literary meanings to achieve a movement and momentum beyond that of an epic structure. Duncan’s desire for Pound’s approbation is genuine and moving, but it is far from total. Even as Duncan himself insists upon a relation between The Venice Poem and The Cantos that privileges Pound’s ideogrammatic and collagist orientation, what seems most apparent now is how far removed from Pound’s project Duncan’s poem actually was. What Duncan’s experience in writing The Venice Poem usefully highlights instead is a fundamental shift in his approach to strategies of modernist collage and a movement toward seriality (or, as Duncan would later term it, the poem-as-grand-collage) as the predominant controlling procedure. If we compare, for instance, a statement by Williams on the collagist orientation of Marianne Moore’s work with almost any section from The Venice Poem, what becomes apparent is the discrepancy between Duncan’s ascription of collage-based procedures to his work and the actual effect produced by the language of his text. Here is Williams: There is almost no overlaying at all. The effect is of every object sufficiently uncovered as to be easily recognizable. This simplicity, with the light coming through from between the perfectly plain masses, is however extremely bewildering to one who has been accustomed to look upon the usual “poem,” the commonplace opaque board covered with vain curlicues. (Selected Essays 129)
Now here are the opening lines of the “Recorso” section of Duncan’s poem: into the long, slow cadence, the anticipating, rapt, attentive, climbing neither upward nor downward, but hovering : dream of sea-surge the tide, the tide of event, And the old gods rising, falling. —Those were only waves roaring— —That dark form, a sea-lion, floating— neither upward nor downward, but sleeping : washd by the tides… (The Venice Poem 94)
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Instead of the discrete objects of Williams’ depiction or the ideogrammatic particulars one might find in The Cantos—“Cut trees at solstice, and arrow shafts of bamboo. / Third month, wild geese go north, / magpie starts building” (Canto LIII)—Duncan’s language is markedly descriptive, working the images into a narrative of symbolic and mythic content. Tone and rhythm (“long, slow cadence,” “hovering : dream of sea-surge”) become the controlling aspects of the poem, as the cadences of the lines establish an emotional context for the rising and falling images. Sometimes, in the mind’s closed eye, everything springs into flame, hot as radium, unstable, death to the touch, the whole sea raging, rising . . . (The Cantos 94)
Duncan’s poem establishes links not so much through the abrupt shifting of image and scene that one encounters in Moore’s “A Grave,” for instance, with its radically disrupted imagery and narrative, but through the careful attention to repeated melodic sequences (as in the musical phrase “recorso”). The poem is accumulative, rather than discretionary; the series rather than the fragment becomes the controlling metaphor for the poem’s procedures. Marking off subtle yet important distinctions between Pound’s methodology and his own, Duncan begins in The Venice Poem to establish the terms by which his “grand collage” would proceed. As Micheal André Bernstein has pointed out, the force of these distinctions lies in those differences in attitude and choice about what goes in to the poem: The very decisions about what emotions or themes are primary, and which secondary, so crucial to the authority of the ideogram, cannot be determined in a grand collage until the process as whole is completed, and even then the equal participation of all the constituent elements may well make any such differentiation irrelevant. (“Talent” 188)
What remains perhaps most striking about both Duncan’s language in The Venice Poem and the formal means used to yoke together the separate sections is the strong affinity for Eliot this poem evinces. While Duncan has openly acknowledged his debt to Eliot, the degree to which Duncan did embrace Eliot’s poetics of the symbolic sublime bears reemphasizing (if nothing else as another way that Duncan subverts expectations regarding influence and remaps his predecessors through the formation of an alternative and openly gay poetic subjectivity). In The Venice Poem Duncan was establishing
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a means of working toward the objectivist romanticism of his later work; in so doing, he remained only partly attentive to Pound’s instructions, while enacting key aspects of Eliot’s poetics of “impersonality” as well. Indeed, it is the presentation of physical, observed realities as a means of establishing a setting for the discourses of subjectivity that remains Eliot’s chief achievement in the poems from his early period—and finds a potent analog in Duncan’s The Venice Poem. Eliot’s “Rhapsody on a Windy Night,” included in his Collected Poems 1909–1935, suggests one example of the tonal quality and revelation of identity Duncan seems to have been aiming for in his own work: Twelve o’clock. Along the reaches of the street Held in a lunar synthesis, Whispering lunar incantations Dissolve the floors of memory And all its clear relations Its divisions and precisions, Every street lamp that I pass Beats like a fatalistic drum, And through the spaces of the dark Midnight shakes the memory As a madman shakes a dead geranium. (Eliot, Collected 14)
In its symbolic language with echoes of Jules Laforgue and Baudelaire, and its elegiac tonal rhythms, the poem is familiar to us as early Eliot. More importantly, its mannered, highly metaphoric idiom finds echoes in The Venice Poem: We held our humming heads with both hands, swinging, swinging, to and fro, the light falling away across the water, lavender, rose, ultramarine, rising, falling— the woman climbing up the stairs, the woman climbing up the stairs, the woman climbing up the stairs, up and up, to and fro— open and closed, open and closed— lips parted, teeth half opend, tongue held between, the lips parted, swinging, spinning like a top— Do you remember, remember? (The Venice Poem 95)
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As in Eliot’s “Rhapsody,” Duncan’s poem registers its emotional effect through the use of repetition (“the light falling . . . rising, falling,” “open and closed, open and closed”) and the elegiac cadences of such phrases as “Do you remember, remember?” Indeed, Duncan’s work here succeeds almost entirely through its adroit management of tone and setting, both of which establish primary contexts for our reception of the poem’s symbolic site of loss. Later, in what might seem now as almost a parody of both the high diction of Eliot’s Four Quartets (1971) and the colloquial wordplay of The Waste Land, Duncan fuses his own experience of betrayal and loss with a rhetoric of moralism and private instruction: When you come to this moment the water in the tap drops as if counting the eternity of time. Stop! Look and Listen. Summon up your wisdom. Nothing will answer and the long dark room will not be light when you turn on the light. Your four hundred volumes by the very best authors will go blank as the paper at which you are staring. When you come to this moment the mind goes dead. It will never restore when you cry out in need the faith in which there was no need. When you come to this moment and you are left over, you rise to the occasion and death won’t come. When the love-light perishes and lusting has gone and you try to make up love in the marriage bed, you will long for the violence of the approaching wars. BANG. You will lust for cut of the stone. BANG. (101)
The dactylic meter suggests the dullness of emotional fatigue, even as the language lapses into a prose-like rhythm toward the section’s end, recalling portions of Duncan’s notebook entries from this time. From a contemporary standpoint, one might now wince at the almost prosaic quality of statement, the vacuity of such phrases as “eternity of time,” “the love-light perishes,” and so on. Yet, Duncan wants to risk the “emptiness” and preciousness of such language, both as a way of permitting diverse materials into the poem and of further acknowledging (even in a somewhat hackneyed fashion) his debt to Eliot. More importantly for my discussion here, Duncan’s decision to preserve the Eliot-like register of his poem, in all its awkward and mawkish
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aspects, signals a willingness to allow Eliot into the poem as a formative influence—along with Pound. While this linkage may seem less risky now, it represented a bold move at the time, as Olson in particular forged ahead with a polemically based poetics situated squarely at the doorstep of Pound’s brand of modernism. Eliot, a darling of the New Critics, along with Auden and Stevens, remained something of an anomaly, classical and elitist, where poets like Olson and Creeley were far more interested in ways to move through and beyond Pound. It’s this rift, charted in the developing poetics of Duncan’s work from this period, that gets so much play, and continued to exert an influence on the heterogeneity of Duncan’s later work. If The Venice Poem never quite comes together as a coherent work, the reasons for this would seem to stem in part from the still unresolvable dilemma confronting Duncan as he sought to yoke together two competing notions of the modernist project. While Duncan’s writing from the late 1950s forward suggests that, in the final analysis, his work rests more securely in the Poundian terrain of “direct treatment of the thing” (Essays 3), later supplanted by Olson’s dictum to “USE USE USE the process at all points” (Olson, Human Universe 53), as The Venice Poem demonstrates, this book of “first things” was driven by a number of compelling and competing forces—no one of which can be viewed as decisive. Unlike Pound, whose perceived failure to “make it cohere” was squarely at odds with the totalizing ambitions of the Cantos, for Duncan the point was never coherence so much as a participatory regulation of form in which all the parts become manifest in a design of unbounded potential. Discovering the form in which to say what he had to say meant, as well, finding a form for the subjectivity that was yet en-route in this generative work. Describing his debt to collagist procedure, Duncan would note in his 1985 interview with Burton Hatlen and Michael André Bernstein: The collage world keeps all its references and doesn’t improve anywhere but it knows that if you a get a finer construction, more details—then you’ve got something. Because the imagination is leaping to find something that holds all that together. Correcting is to surrender to an earlier picture in which things hold together, by eliminating new things that were impossible. (88–9)
This is, in its way, a cogent statement on the workings of subjective presence in the poetry. Not correcting, not revising, amplifies the ethics of a poetry devoted to an elegant, but manifestly real, depiction of the self’s engagement in a world that is presented, without correction or revision. In the context of a queer poetics of subjectivity, one could say that Duncan adjoins the
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aesthetic project of modernism with a layered understanding of collage as a beneficent procedure of identity formation. If Duncan learned through the writing of The Venice Poem how to synthesize a wealth of psychosexual and literary materials in a work that fittingly pays tribute to Pound’s collagist methodology (one that is itself indebted to turn-of-the century experiments in the visual arts), he also pays homage here to his other master, Eliot. Using a symbolist framework for his own meditations on the split screen of form and content, world and self, Duncan participates in an exchange of poetic influences that goes in a number of directions at once. Reading Shakespeare, Eliot, and Pound back into his own poem, Duncan elides the question of his own authorial position, suggesting instead that the poem moves through the discretionary particularities of the writer’s (un)conscious affiliations and attachments. In so doing, writer and text are perceptibly transformed by what Duncan describes elsewhere as “a romance of the actual” (Selected Prose 136). III. Venetian and Shakespearian Motifs in The Venice Poem In a letter addressed to his friends at the time, Duncan would describe the process of writing The Venice Poem as one that remained arduous always as there seems to be in each passage now to me shadows of the unrealized, intimations of the unknown. I mean here just all that remains to be comprehended in this poetic universe. For the joy of each discovery or consummation—the apprehension just here of what has not been discovered nor consumed. (Duncan Papers/U Cal).
Duncan’s sense of the work at hand as that of pursuing the “unknown” and shadowy terms of his poem’s multiple meanings forms a central aspect of his developing awareness of his own vocational engagement and ambition. As Duncan would describe the matter years later, it was the first time he recognized “the full structural imperative of a form seeking to come into existence in the process of the poem that, at the same time, I was in my own work working in cooperation with, coming to acknowledge in the works of the poem” (Caesar’s Gate xii). The chapbook length poem (thirty-five pages in the City Lights edition) follows the form of a sequence and is broken into six sections, each of which carries a title suggestive of a thematic or metaphoric topos: “A Description of Venice,” “Testimony,” “Imaginary Instructions,” “Recorso,” “The Venus of Lespuges,” and “Coda.”3 Without a strict narrative structure per se, the poem proceeds thematically and associatively as it explores the dramatic consequences—psychological, sexual, aesthetic—of a
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lover’s betrayal. Using Shakespeare’s Othello and its plot of marital infidelity as an initial organizing rubric, Duncan works with each of the sections as “movements” in a symphony—loosely following the form of Stravinsky’s Symphony in Three Movements. In so doing, he musters together a good deal of autobiographical, literary, artistic, and cultural information to form an elaborate collage of highly charged material. While no one individualized presence dominates the poem (it is a notable feature of the work that it shifts registers and “voices” throughout), the “I” who emerges as The Venice Poem’s primary speaker functions as a kind of fictive guide through whom we view the imaginary city of Venice that is the poem’s topographical focal point. “The poet’s cry of loss,” Michael Davidson writes, is set against the backdrop of two cities, one ancient, the other contemporary. Renaissance Venice, which Duncan knew only through art history slides, represents an unearthly city of gilded domes and ageless monuments. Contemporary Berkeley represents the other side of Venice, the historical city whose campanile bells mock the poet’s desire for transcendence. (Renaissance 55)
While primary information about Venetian architecture and artwork came to Duncan via the art courses he attended at UCLA Berkeley in 1948, other pertinent aspects of the city’s history—for instance, its reputation in the seventeenth century for open sexuality and promiscuity—would no doubt have been available to him through his readings of Shakespeare, Jonson and other playwrights of the period.4 Though the poem’s imaginative impact is undeniable, it remains a startling fact that Duncan had never in fact visited Venice. This accounts, at least in part, for some of the more “literary” language of its opening description of the city in which the poem traverses a realm both culturally recognizable and ineffable in the poet’s consciousness: The lions of Venice crouch suppliant to the ringing in the air. The bell tower of San Marco shakes the gold of sound upon the slumbering city. Gathering, the bronze boy burns the blue of sky with jewel blue eyes. The lions crouch suppliant to the ringing, burning blue. (The Venice Poem 81)
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With its echoes of Hart Crane and Eliot (especially “The Love Song of Alfred J. Prufrock” and The Waste Land), the language conveys a scene of eroticized—and decidedly elegiac—tranquility. The poem’s locale creates a dreamy backdrop for the actions of a work in which the primary thematic reference points will be betrayal and loss. The talismanic presence of the bronze boy, captured in the back-looking gaze of the poem’s speaker, suggests a parallel in Duncan’s excursion into the realm of homoerotic persuasiveness, as he relocates himself in a scene caught in the reflected radiance of the boy’s eye, “as if he saw all love was frozen there in knowing, / forming a central sapphire, / cruel and absolute” (ibid.). The scene as well accords with Duncan’s sense of the poem as a progression from “signs,” moments of apprehension read in the events of persons—the apprehension of something cruel and unmasking in the lustful and shrewd fixd glance of a young boy in whose blue eyes seemed a written story of calculating but meaningless accident, and in whose lithe autoerotic body seemd the universe of rich sensuality. (Duncan Papers/SUNY )
Duncan’s remark suggests both a prescient commentary on the homoerotics of the gaze and a critically acute assertion of his role as reader of his own poem. Moreover, Duncan’s “apprehension of something cruel and unmasking” registers the poem’s tension between homoerotic desire and self-abnegating pathos. As a site of impinged homoerotic longing, Duncan’s Venice provides both a literary fiction of a “Carnal City” (ibid.), an artifact of Duncan’s ritualizing imagination, and a foundational scene of the poem’s writing. Duncan’s work here becomes one of forging out of the details of personal crisis a poem resonant with the carefully formed particulars of a universalist awareness. As he writes in his 1964 essay “Towards an Open Universe,” “Our consciousness, and the poem as a supreme effort of consciousness, comes in a dancing organization between personal and cosmic identity” (Selected Prose 3). Or, as Duncan phrased it in another context, “I work with what is the matter with this life in an alchemical operation seeking not the overthrow of the matter—though increasingly the theme of letting it all go comes into the works—but the transvaluation of that matter” (Fictive 137). Duncan’s notion of his materials—autobiographical, literary, mythic, cross-cultural—as being worked in an “alchemical” process in which the poem emerges suggests an alternative reading of Eliot’s sense of the poem as a distinctly “impersonal” act. As he begins to organize these materials in The Venice Poem, Duncan’s “interweaving” of the expressively individualistic and the multitextual suggests an active mediation, in which the poem
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functions as a vector of several narratives at once. Following the model of Pound’s Cantos, no one account or “fragment” is given supremacy over any other; rather, the poem provides us with brief portions of emotional and cultural material—whose full impact can only be assessed from the composite meaning of the poem’s elements. Inasmuch as The Venice Poem functions as the preliminary staging ground on which Duncan’s newly achieved apprehension of his own ambitions are played out, Shakespeare’s Othello serves as a drama well suited to the poet’s methodical apprenticeship. Duncan’s use of Othello in The Venice Poem is concertedly an act of literary derivation overdetermined from the outset by the range of references Shakespeare’s play necessarily invokes. As is popularly known, Othello is most clearly a play about betrayal, jealousy, and revenge, and, as Duncan’s poem asserts, the psychosexual struggle at the play’s center arises from a conceptual investigation of the ways in which power is deployed, made manifest, and engaged culturally and intersubjectively. Insofar as much of the play is devoted to a dilation of Othello’s suspicions and jealousies as he comes to doubt the fidelity of his wife, Desdemona, the real drama occurs around the figure of Iago as he seeks to advance his rank, while bringing to an end Othello’s own position as a much-decorated general in service to the Venetian state. Iago’s single-mindedness in his quest to destroy Othello has been the subject of Shakespeare scholarship for decades, but what is interesting from the point of view of Duncan’s poem is the way in which Iago exists as a paradigm of the masked figure who never reveals his “true” identity. As Iago confesses to Roderigo early on in the play: For when my outward action does demonstrate The native act, and figure of my heart, In complement extern, ‘tis not long after, But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve, For doves to peck at: I am not what I am. (I.i.61–65)
For Duncan, absorbed in the fashioning of a masked persona, Iago provides an ample site for his own explorations of masculine subjectivity and the poet’s role in constructing a self both more and less real than that of his own person. “There is no mask I wear / that is not emotion, / that is not deeply rooted,” Duncan writes (106). Playing on the terminology of mask as a covering, frontis, disguise, and protective shield, Duncan suggests the complex relation between the artificed subjectivity of the male poet and the lived experiences that underwrite that subject. More to the point, the play’s heterosexual surface allows Duncan to explore gay sexuality under cover,
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so to speak. As Gunn remarks on the strategy of “translation” employed by many gay writers of the time to make their “irregularity” less visible, Duncan reverses the gender of the drama, both to explore a non-heteronormative space of erotic longing and to put into question his own decidedly gay orientation as part of an unfolding drama within the larger drama of Shakespeare’s play (Gunn 144). If the feelings are disguised, they are hidden just barely out of view. In this sense, Iago, in Shakespeare’s rendering of him, may indeed exist as a figure of ultimate cunning and duplicity; but it is these very qualities that serves as instigatory marks for Duncan’s investigation of his own highly “worked” manipulation of events and character within The Venice Poem.5 Describing the play of words in the poem like “the play of actors on a stage” (Selected Prose 7), Duncan provides an apt metaphor for his own procedures in the poem’s opening sections, in which Shakespeare (renamed “Saint William Shakespeare,” in keeping with the work’s predominant high rhetorical mode) appears alongside Othello and Iago as a figure on the stage of the poem. And when Saint William Shakespeare plagued by the flies of jealousy and rage entered the Carnal City and stood defiant with love in full sight of the Doge, he lit the holy tapers and worshipd under the five adulterous false domes of burnishd copper. (The Venice Poem 81)
In the stylized language of its address, the text both celebrates the “tutelary” figure of Shakespeare, who remained for Duncan an authorial presence matched only by that of Dante, and foregrounds the “artificial” nature of the poem’s literary production. Indeed, it is at the level of “puppetry” that The Venice Poem becomes most revealing, as Duncan claims a space in the work for both his own role as author and the “fictions” of his imagination. Blurring the line between each, as he blurs distinctions between his writing of the poem and the experiential realities to which it alludes, Duncan’s poem suggests a narrative in which Shakespeare is himself “betrayed” by his own fictive creation: The Doge, Iago, knowing more than Shakespeare,
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saw with cynic wonder at such poetic consternation the lewd shadows haunting the holy candles; saw with satisfaction the simple-minded Shakespeare light with love the beautiful fat candles. (The Venice Poem 81–2)
Aligning Shakespeare with the tragic figure of Othello, Duncan suggests a meeting of textual realities in which the playwright and his fictions are distributed in a space both wholly actual and wholly made-up. In this way, the force of Iago as a character drawn from Shakespeare’s play extends far beyond the limits of his creator’s mind. The reference to Shakespeare’s “simpleminded” devotion as compared to the “cynic wonder” of Iago suggests a curious separation between author and text and author and character, one that mirrors Duncan’s own procedural marking out of personae through whom his poem’s voicing occurs. It as well provides another context in which to read the poem: as a recasting of the plot of adultery, as it appears in Shakespeare’s text, into a dynamic in which Iago betrays not only Othello, but his creator as well—a situation that, Duncan seems to suggest, is beyond Shakespeare’s ability to control. While this shifting of “real” and “fictive” may strike one as fanciful, it is important to stress the way in which, for Duncan, Shakespeare’s text resonates as a book of continuous making. Recast on the stage of The Venice Poem, the characters from Othello form a trans-historical space in which psychologically charged language and imagination merge to forge the new work, thereby exceeding the boundaries of either text. Duncan discusses the complicated scenario of self-generating, authorial power, and productivity in a revealing passage from Caesar’s Gate (1972): I had wanted, I think, a fatefulness in my poetry, an inevitability to its course, an autocracy, as if, indeed, in the person of the poet in writing, I were in the person of “I” who created my life and world, in the enormity of a governing intent, as content of a poetry or creation. God, then, appears in the poem, as the Gnostic heresies portray him, as the creator or poet who is guilty of his creation, behind whose reality there is an other reality. This God is a Creator in search of an Identity that is in the process of Its creation; He projects the theater of Time and Space in which to become manifest. He is betrayed by his poetry. (xvii)
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What remains most astonishing is the link Duncan makes here between the “I” who informs the work of the poem and the greater I of God the Creator. Does Duncan really mean to suggest that he occupies a god-like position in the artistic process? A qualified response would have to be: yes and no. At one level he seems to be arguing for a vision of the creative process as entirely self-sufficient. The poet begins in the arena of his devotions and inner life and proceeds outward from that toward a position in which the I can be claimed as a force behind the work. At another level, Duncan’s language suggests the difficulty involved in translating this process into real terms; in a terminology that borrows from the Romantic sense of originary self, he argues for a view of poeisis as one in which God, poet, and subjectivity exist on a continuum of procedural form—form, one might add, that requires the revelatory procedures of the God/maker to achieve meaning. Duncan’s peculiar notion of God’s being “betrayed by his poetry” places the writing of The Venice Poem in the context of an evolving “mystery play,” in which God must perpetually search for the identity of his creation. For the poet seeking spiritual affirmation in the Word, the claims are stark and all-encompassing. Folding himself into the work in which he is both active participant and originating force, Duncan musters enormous psychic and poetic energies on behalf of a project that, by his own reckoning, is doomed to failure. As God is betrayed by the poetry of his Creation, so the poet is likewise betrayed by those forces and identities that exceed the bounds of his own making. “Since God is not a Logos defining all the essential properties of being, but a force seeking to realize himself in evolution,” Charles Altieri pointedly suggests, “Duncan’s allegory keeps returning to its own failures, to the lacunae in the text, for it is only by encountering what is lost or not present that one can help gather together that divine Being which escapes man” (Temple 152). In this twofold process, Duncan suggests that the poet is implicated in the inevitability of guilt, as he recognizes his failure to apprehend that version of creative form “behind whose reality there is another reality.” Inasmuch as the themes of betrayal and guilt are intimately interwoven throughout Duncan’s (and Shakespeare’s) text, it is important to see how Duncan viewed these as paradigmatic forces of creativity and poetic validation. Hearing in the work a song that Othello does not sing in Shakespeare’s text, Duncan enlists the powerful thematic narratives of adultery and betrayal (it is important to point out that in the play, as in the poem, overwhelming jealousy is the response to an adultery that is in fact never witnessed). In so doing, he reworks these themes in a dramatic setting that underscores the poem’s status as a derivative text. The plaintiveness of
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the I-based lyric is undercut by its position in Duncan’s poem as that of a “voiced” Other: Why is the house so still? Where have you gone? My knowing now will never be still. My loving now will never be still. I am like an empty shell tortured by voices. Alone I know not where I am. I cry out. My voices answer. O my soul’s joy! Love burns in changes of the Moon. She comes so near to earth and makes men mad. Alone I know not where I am. The world is false as water. It echoes back the heart’s desire. Love burns in changes of the Moon. (The Venice Poem 83–4)
Duncan ventriloquizes the voice of Othello to enlist the powerful narrative of Shakespeare’s drama in a tripartite movement among the figures of the Moor; the I that appears in the language of the lyric; and Duncan as invested author, whose personal narrative of loss and betrayal is implicated in the emotional content of Othello’s speech. It is a principal maneuver in The Venice Poem, one in which Duncan effectively creates a palimpsest of materials (psychosexual, cultural-historical, and interpersonal), whose convergence mimics the collaged fragmentation of Pound and Eliot. Rather than offering a singular, linear, and temporally segmented account, Duncan’s text traverses a layered, imaginal environment in which the individual voices in the poem are situated between each other and the mythical, polyphonous realm in which they appear. Interestingly, Othello’s voice responds to a figure who never speaks in the poem: that of Desdemona. The subject of Othello’s (and Duncan’s) discourse, she remains the “true witness” and “advocate” of Othello’s suffering, “confident of merit, and conscious of innocence.”6 A symbol of “feminine” purity and ultimately the more injured party in this drama (her death through suffocation at the play’s end suggests the horrifying antithesis of “song” performed
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by Othello in Duncan’s text), Desdemona exists as that unexpressed site of incontrovertible (and feminine) honesty. While Duncan never gives her voice in the poem, Desdemona provides a powerful counterpoint to the thoroughly homosocial matrix that remains The Venice Poem’s primary focus—an alternative version, if you will, of “Our Lady of Love,” in whose service Duncan suggests, “There is no pain / that I would not bear for her sake” (105). More importantly, even though Duncan never fully elaborates on Desdemona as a tragic figure, her position in the poem suggests Duncan’s profound sympathy for a character whose fidelity and honesty are no match for Othello’s enlarged rage and jealousy or Iago’s cunning manipulations. And in this sense too, Duncan inhabits the “feminine” space of Shakespeare’s tragic character, blurring the boundaries of gender and language that, as Duncan’s poem suggests, become alternative fictions of mind. In a certain sense, then, Duncan plays all the roles of his poem simultaneously; his casting of Desdemona as the silent, feminine portion of his own identity seems fitting in a text that subverts traditional markers of sexuality to reinscribe a queer poetics. The poem’s attractiveness, its sublime authority, may be said to rest on this eliding of structural gender in favor of a more diffuse and porous conception of the self as traveling along a stream of gender identifications—marked in language at once mythological, erudite, and poly-vocal. IV. Blood Rites and the Trauma of Sexuality As I’ve already suggested, the signal achievement of The Venice Poem rests in its simultaneous management of diverse cultural, mythic, anthropological, and psychosexual issues. In any one of these areas, Duncan would have drawn justifiable distinction for a work of singular ambition and vision. It is in fact the vulnerability of the poem’s language that remains most striking today, the way Duncan refuses to valorize the speech of masculinist address, appropriating instead a discourse of vulnerable and wounded (masculine) shamefulness, explicating a position of discursive sexuality not easily ascribed to any one subjectivity. If the poem can be said to have any canonicity, it may be for its specular repositioning of eros as a site of “imaginary instructions,” mutable, not singular or binaried. Viewed through the lens of “liberation and contestation” (Keenaghan 89), The Venice Poem celebrates discordancy, as it passes before us “lantern-slide visions” of a Venice constructed out of whole cloth, invented and beyond repair in the poet’s translation of this “unreal city.” It is in The Venice Poem that Duncan confronts for the first time in poetic language the terms of a struggle outlined in his essay “The Homosexual in Society.” While this essay represents Duncan’s vocal coming out in a prose
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format, in The Venice Poem he articulates as he had never before in his poetry the actual physical language of his own sexual identification. “A blood initiation” is how Duncan later described the events surrounding the writing of the poem (Gay Sunshine 84). The comment is notable, in that it refers to another statement Duncan makes, in which he links his crosscountry journey to Pound and the pain suffered en-route from an infected wisdom tooth to the sexual energies and torment that heavily mark this time in his life: “The blood that comes into the rites of the poems of The Venice Poem period is the blood that could gush up from a torn vein left after the operation on those sunken teeth and did when in sexual excitement my blood pressure increased, filling my mouth and throat” (Caesar’s Gate xiii). The sense of blood loss as it is connected with the loss of teeth suggests a rite of passage, a fundamental transition in his psychic person. Interestingly, as Abraham and Torok suggest in their essay “The Illness of Mourning”: “Teething marks the first great transition, hence its symbolic value in the evocation of transitions in general. Whether it is the oedipal passage, adolescent growth, the attainment of adulthood or progress toward menopause, ‘teeth’ always lend themselves to symbolizing the vicissitudes of libidinal reorganization” (123). Significantly, Duncan’s passage toward Pound (who exists here as a kind of pre-oedipal father) and the processes leading up to the writing of The Venice Poem coincide as parallel events of psychosexual/poetic transformation. Certainly, at one key level, it is the “trauma of sexuality” (Boone 76) that gives rise to the poem, a trauma that in part grew out of the circumstances surrounding Duncan’s break-up with his partner of the time, Jerry Ackerman. As Faas recounts it, as the couple drifted apart, Duncan “would insist on a basic freedom in their relationship allowing for sexual contacts other than those between himself and Jerry. When confronted with the actual facts, however, such generosity at least concerning his lover’s sexual freedom quickly gave way to raging jealousy” (Young Robert Duncan 255). Duncan’s outrage and hurt are evident in his journal entry from March 13, 1948, as he describes his jealousy and anguish over Jerry’s unfaithfulness: Now I must sit in these hours, listening to the clock tick. Jerry’s being away with someone else fucking or wanting to fuck cast panic upon me. There is no agony like these moments or hours, these unbearable stretches of time. O God how can I bear it? If only Robin [Blaser] had come up with me to sit and talk, to divert my mind. If he does not return I will walk alone in the hills for awhile—to be alone here is to be deserted—every living object of the room causing pain, mocking me. (Ibid.)
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“Fucking or wanting to fuck”—these are propositional statements that both entice and repel, as the figure of the poet manqué gets situated here in the discourse of intimate loss. If the injury apparent in this language is notable for what it suggests about Duncan’s state of mind at the time, it’s also the case that this notebook entry served a kind of prewriting that brought Duncan into the central arena of his poem’s more elaborate (and poeticized) configuration: My jealousy is like a jewel, a sapphire or sapphire needle “good for 1000 performances,” cruel and absolute, from which comes my music, at once apparent and mysterious this beauty, as the apparent, yet explainable phonograph and recording disc renders the impressed concerto of voices for the listening ear. For the hearer, there is no apparatus, no ingenuity, but the ingenuous melody distracts, not happy, but splendid. (87)
The poem here delivers an image of startling metaphoric power, a kind of enlisting of jealousy itself as the driving force behind the “melody” that emanates from the poem’s epicenter. With its combined image of the sapphire drawn from childhood memory and the ad copy for the phonograph stylus (with its double meaning of writing instrument and phonograph needle), the passage puns on its own sources in the poet’s biography. While Duncan’s journal entry preserves elements of the traditional high school or college diary, with the notable exception of the homosexual cast of the romance, his language at this point in the poem is notable for its dispersion of those same materials into lyric correspondences that maintain both the “apparent” and the “mysterious” as poles of poetic meaning. And as the next stanza suggests, “Great Jealousy is no mere needle. / Terrible and lovely the Greeks addressed her” (87). In ways that this passage makes manifest, the psychosexual content of the poem tends almost immediately to be transformed into the mythic, as the diurnal gives way to the symbolic and imagined. As The Venice Poem tellingly illustrates, Duncan’s text simultaneously occupies a space of religious and mythic instruction, even as it enlists a language of direct and frank sexuality that is at variance with its otherwise “unreal,” denaturalized vocabulary.
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Recalling a bust of Bernini that he had seen at the Andrew Mellon Museum, the poem’s speaker asks: Why am I toucht so deeply? There is a root, faithless and painful, from which we spring. Why does the rose never cease unfolding but grows and unfurls the swirl, the twist, the savage despair of draperies so that its beauty surpasses knowing. (89)
The sense of “rootedness” (a play on the exposed “root” cited in the earlier Caesar’s Gate passage) exposes the self to its own faithlessness and to a painful acceptance of the role one plays in the unfolding drama of the poem. It is a sense that quickly gives way to a shocking and highly exposed language of self-laceration and shame: Accident will finally strip the king and show him naked in a moment’s mirror. —This is not the exalted face Bernini saw— the forlorn cocksucker is not wonderful. (89)
Providing the psychosexual and critical center of the poem, this passage foregrounds with dramatic force the sense of a “despised” self that stands at the other extreme of “the cross-eyed king of one thousand lines” (88). The language suggests the degree to which claiming a space of recognition and acceptance remains for the speaker of this poem a difficulty situated in cultural, personal, and homoerotic materials that defy separation: Buggery stirs enmity, unguarded hatred. Cocksucking breeds self-humiliation, pride, helplessness; begets Lotophagoi, dreamers. Yet here seeks the heart solace. Nature barely provides for it.
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Male Subjectivity and Poetic Form
Men fuck men by audacity. Yet here the heart bounds as if only here, here it might rest. (90)
Punning on lotophagi, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “lotuseaters; a people in Greek legend who lived on the fruit of the lotus, which was said to cause a dreamy forgetfulness in those who ate it,” Duncan links “faggotry” with forgetfulness and erotic indolence. Claiming that “men fuck men by audacity,” Duncan defines a queer space of radicalized marginality, one that is in this sequence of lines made to occupy a central stance of ideological refusal and vulnerability. The diction of this passage is a radical departure from what has preceded it and, in effect, provides the poem its crucial midpoint. The unguardedness of Duncan’s language, its resolute defiance of social and legal barriers to such openness (at the time Duncan was writing, homosexual activity was still a crime punishable in parts of the United States by lifetime imprisonment and anti-sodomy laws were still on the books in most states), effectively marks The Venice Poem as a decidedly political and publicly queer document. Interestingly and important to note here, two versions of this poem were originally published, one with the references to “cocksucker,” the other with the lines containing this word struck through by solid lines. As Duncan wrote to Henry Wenning in a letter dated November 7, 1972, “I had wanted 100 of the 500 copies censored (for sale to sensitive old ladies at poetry readings), and the printers (who were sensitive old lady anarchists) reversed the proportions so that 100 uncensored copies and 400 censored copies were printed” (Bertholf 25). Duncan’s partial acceding to cultural norms bears noting, as does his simultaneous emphasis on preserving the openly gay references that anchor the work in a discourse he had entered into with the publication of “The Homosexual in Society.” In ways that still startle more than sixty years later, the passage given earlier connects “cocksucking” with a range of emotional states from selfhumiliation to dreamy. The “audacity” of the act is matched by a corollary awareness of the ways in which the speaker would locate for himself, beyond the purely sexual moment, respite and recognition in the arms of another. “Yet here seeks the heart solace,” Duncan writes. Where we are— where here is—remains an ambiguity, as the poem’s language engages sexuality in images of both profane and sacrosanct self-actualization. Here is the poem as “testimony,” as (p)act in which the lovers’ embrace forms both a despised and pure symbol of original feeling. As in Duncan’s later “This Place Rumord To Have Been Sodom” (1960), the poem moves paratactically
Duncan’s The Venice Poem
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toward a position of cultural and personal acceptance and forgiveness (in both the Christian and secular senses). Profoundly an act of envisioning, reception, attentiveness, the poem charts a course of negotiable realities in which the conception of form and content are grounded in the poet’s recognition of his role in a sensuous realm of reciprocal feeling: One of the most important things for me in poems is realizing. If this poem will not be a root back to the place where the hand knows the cock, the mouth knows the cock. No matter what is in it (the poem), that it go there and find what it is. (Gay Sunshine 87)
Allowing no barrier between what he sees and what he says in the poem forms a crucial element in Duncan’s aesthetic orientation, and provides as well the queer ethics of a poem that refuses to shy away from the centrality of its most representative sexual act. As with the figures of Greek and early Roman mythology that appear, the naming of “cocksucking” is not meant to be decorative or figuratively descriptive, but to form a picture in the mind wherein thought and sensation are given language. In this way, as with Jack Spicer’s “real lemon like a newspaper in a collage is a real newspaper