Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period: (Praeger Studies of Foreign Policies of the Great Powers)

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

Praeger Studies of Foreign Policies of the Great Powers Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period: 1918-1940 H. James Burgwyn United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1941 Benjamin D. Rhodes

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

IAN NISH

Praeger Studies of Foreign Policies of the Great Powers B.J.C. McKercher and Keith Neilson, Series Editors

Praeger

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nish, Ian Hill Japanese foreign policy in the interwar period / Ian Nish. p. cm.—(Praeger studies of foreign policies of the great powers , ISSN 1090-8226) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-94791-2 (alk. paper) 1. Japan—Foreign relations—1912-1945. 2. World politics—1900-1945. I. Title. II. Series. DS885.48.N57 2002 327.52 , 009 , 042—dc21 2001058946 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2002 by Ian Nish All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001058946 ISBN: 0-275-94791-2 ISSN: 1090-8226 First published in 2002 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

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For decades the unhappy condition of China has been a dangerous influence, while the policies of Japan have been the stabilizing and protective influence in the Far East. (Speech of Matsuoka Yosuke at League of Nations meeting, Geneva, 21 November 1932, Nihon gaiko bunsho, Manshu jihen, iii, no. 54) The military is like a mad horse running wild. To stop it from the front means being mown down. But we cannot afford to let the horse just go cantering on. The only way to cope with it is by jumping on from the side and to some extent giving it its head. (Words of Hirota Koki as quoted in Shiroyama Saburo, Rakujitsu moyu) As we guessed then [in the 1930s] and know now, the [Japanese] army authorities kept the diplomatic representatives at more than one arm's length. (Sir Paul Gore-Booth, With Great Truth and Respect, p. 81)

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Contents Preface

ix

Abbreviations

xi

Introduction

1

1. The Paris Peace Conference

13

2. The Washington Conference of 1921-1922

33

3. Handling Nationalism in China, 1923-1929

49

4. World Depression and Military Expansion, 1929-1932

65

5. Departure from Internationalism, 1932-1936

85

6. Facing the Communist International, 1935-1937

103

7. The Sino-Japanese War: First Phase, 1937-1939

119

8. Japan, China, and the European War, 1939-1941

137

9. The Asia-Pacific War, 1941-1943

157

Conclusion

175

Notes

183

Bibliography

197

Index

209

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Preface Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume, labuntur anni nee pietas moram rugis et instanti senectae afferet indomitaeque morti. Alas, the fleeting years are slipping by, Postumus. Nor will prayers to the gods cause them to linger. (Adapted from Horace, Odes, 2.14) This volume is the product of over ten fleeting years. I hope that it reflects the conclusions, over the last decade, of researchers in the field to whom I am very grateful. In order to undertake this research, I received an emeritus travel grant from the Leverhulme Foundation, London, which enabled me to visit Japan. I have also benefitted from the facilities both of the Suntory Centre for Japanese Studies, LSE, and of the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1992 to the present. I wish to acknowledge the support and helpfulness of libraries and librarians, particularly the International House of Japan, Tokyo; the Law Faculty, University of Tokyo; but most especially the archives of the Diplomatic Record Office (Nihon Gaiko Bunshoshitsu), Azabudai, Tokyo. My research has been greatly assisted by the East Asian collections of the British Library of Political and Economic Science and by the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. May I also thank a generation of Japanese historians who have been so generous in supporting my research interests by giving me copies of their works over the years. I only hope that my efforts have matched the material they have presented to me. I am particularly grateful to the members of the Anglo-Japanese History Project with which I have been associated since its inception in 1995, especially Professors Hosoya Chihiro, Tanaka Takahiko, and Kibata Yoichi of the Japanese committee. I am similarly

X

Preface

indebted to coordinators on the British committee including Professor Ian Gow as well as Doctors Janet Hunter and Gordon Daniels. Writers working on the "interwar period" in the project have also been a constant source of ideas and help: Dr. Antony Best, Dr. Peter Lowe, Mr. David Steeds, and Mr. Tadashi Kuramatsu. I take full responsibility for the idiosyncratic way in which I have used their insights. In preparing this volume for the press, I am grateful to Dr. Heather Ruland Staines, Mr. Tod Myerscough, and the staff of Greenwood and Praeger for their tolerance and many courtesies. It goes without saying that I was honored to be invited to contribute to this series on Great Power diplomacy between the wars and owe much to the joint coordinators of the series, Professors Brian McKercher and Keith Neilson, especially the latter, who has been a patient, long-suffering, and uncomplaining editor. These adjectives apply equally to my wife to whom this book is dedicated with affection. JAPANESE NAMES In accordance with he established convention in academic works, Japanese names are ordinarily presented with the family name preceding the given name. Since this is a work based on prewar history, Chinese place names are generally spelled in their contemporary form.

Abbreviations ABCD CER FER HMG IHQ IJN IMTFE INA JFM KMT LC LSE MJRPW NEI NGB NGB WK NGB Showaki NGNB NGS PRO STICERD

America/Britain/China/Dutch Chinese Eastern Railway Far Eastern Republic His Majesty's Government Imperial Headquarters Imperial Japanese Navy International Military Tribunal for the Far East Indian National Army (Singapore) Japanese Foreign Ministry Kuomintang (Guomindang) Liaison Conference London School of Economics and Political Science J.W. Morley (ed.), Japan's Road to the Pacific War Netherlands East Indies Nihon gaiko bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents) Nihon gaiko bunsho, Washinton Kaigi (Japanese Diplomatic Documents, Washington Conference) Nihon gaiko bunsho, Showaki(Japanese Diplomatic Documents, Period of the Showa Emperor) Nihon gaiko nempyo narabi shuyo bunsho (Japanese diplomatic calendar and important documents) Naval General Staff Public Record Office, London Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines

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Introduction

To write of Japanese foreign policy in the interwar period is to judge it within a European, perhaps even global time-scale. Japan does not fit well into the mold of "interwar," if by that we mean the period from 1919 to 1939. The country was only marginally affected by the carnage of the First World War and the events in Europe between 1939 and 1941. Indeed, the history of Japan's foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s was not dominated by Europe, which actually was only one factor in its evolution. For the Japanese, "interwar" probably applies most appropriately to the period between the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, a battle of tremendous destruction, and the war with China which started in 1937 and became very cruel. But, in order to bring this study into line with other volumes in the series, starting as early as 1904 or omitting events before and after 1941 are undesirable. I have chosen, therefore, to examine Japanese policy from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to the Great East Asian Conference held in Tokyo in November 1943. 1 In this study, I am trying not to write about Japanese foreign policy as though the issues were all stepping-stones on the road to ultimate war. An account which portrays Japan as proceeding through the Manchurian crisis (1931-1933) and the China war after 1937 to a fascist alliance with Germany and Italy in 1940, the aerial attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the landward attack on Singapore in 1942, leads to a distortion as the historian probes the past in order to uncover clues to what he knows took place later. The time has now come, fifty years after the end of the Asia-Pacific war, to study Japan's growth as a mature society with increasing status as a great power; every event should not be interpreted as one leading to war. Instead, Japan will be viewed as a country, like any other, trying to find its own destiny within the parameters of its own time; the country has been working to secure (wherever possible) her national objectives by peaceful

2

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

means, which includes trying to maintain friendships and avoid catastrophic enmities. In this period of study, Japan was a country characterized by an internal political struggle for supremacy, the fickleness of which affected the course of her foreign relations. Over the interwar period, there was a gradual movement to the right, a reaction in part to the Bolshevik Revolution and the operations in Asia of the Communist International. This coincided with the desire of the military for a greater say in state affairs and their success in driving the political parties out of power. The Imperial army and navy together with their civilian collaborators stirred up an atmosphere of foreign crisis that resulted in a desire for self-sufficiency and general xenophobia.2 For the historian, "policy" is not a precise concept. In the realm of foreign policy, no country wears its heart on its sleeve. Policy is made by men who often apply to their decisions unspoken assumptions and linguistic vagueness. The Japanese are no different. Indeed, with their reluctance to make clear decisions and their endless desire to reach consensus, they do not readily reveal the motivations for their actions. Therefore, investigation of Japan's foreign policy is fraught with difficulty. The focus of Japan's policy in this period was predominantly continental, that is, securing her objectives in China and later in Southeast Asia. For that reason, my approach is less concerned with the Pacific Ocean area and trans-Pacific relations. There is no point in playing down the importance of the United States, whose involvement with Japan takes on a new level of intensity after 1919. The United States got dragged in (as did the colonial powers) because they supported China, both the nascent Nationalist government and the country at war. But if justice is to be done to the theme of the objectives which Japan professed in China, the story cannot be left high and dry with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. It has to be carried forward to Japan's New China policy and the Great East Asian concepts of 1943. However much we try to keep the focus of our story away from an approaching war, Pearl Harbor, of course, was important historically. The Pearl Harbor attack came like a devastating earthquake which concentrated global attention on the Pacific and the naval war. The Japanese of the time were not embarrassed to call the war which was declared in December 1941 "the Great East Asian War" (or sometimes "the Greater East Asian War"). On the other hand, Americans from the start of the war described it as "the Pacific War," a phrase the Japanese did not employ. By the end of the war, however, the victor's language prevailed, though not without some squirming. There is a minute in the Japanese files which records that the use in unofficial writings of the term "Great East Asian War" was banned with effect from December 1945 by the Education Ministry which proposed to describe it as the "Second World War." But the term "Pacific War" was not approved for use by the Monbusho. 3 In this study, we shall employ a

Introduction

3

neutral expression, the Asia-Pacific war, which was not in use at the time but seems to encapsulate more accurately the twin-centered nature of Japan's war effort. Nor should we neglect the countries of Europe in Japanese thinking and planning. It may be that Japan was remote from the First World War and the thinking which prevailed in the postwar conferences in Europe. Only a few of her statesmen and academics were conscious of the change which had come over European thinking in 1919 and the Wilsonian emphasis on self-determination. When the pattern of European affairs reached a dramatic turning point with the coming to power of Hitler in 1933, Japan was being internationally ostracized; so the country moved closer to Germany. The alliance among Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1940, or the four years of collusion which preceded it, were a source of increased confidence for Japan. Her actions in 1941 were played out against the background of European events though these did not determine her decisions, and her nexus with Germany and Italy was a complement to her Asian policy. Moreover, the change in political direction of Japan's old enemy, Russia, had its eastern dimension in the Maritime Provinces from which Japan expected the spread of communism. And the troop concentrations of Soviet Russia in the East were a greater source of anxiety for most Japanese in the 1930s. My approach is based on international history rather than diplomatic history. I am not primarily concerned with diplomatic documents exchanged among nations. To write of foreign policy purely in terms of what diplomats write to each other or report to their governments is unsatisfactory in any country. Foreign relations have to be seen against a broader background that takes into account factors at once economic, political, militarynaval, and cultural. In the case of Japan, one cannot ignore psychological factors: concepts such as tatemae and honne are deep-seated in Japanese behavior. Japanese resort to tatemae statements (the reason as stated) in order to promote harmony, reconciliation, and goodwill; sometimes an illusion is created, while the honne (real intent), which does not always come to the surface, is concealed. Since decision-making in Japan depends on consensus and anonymity, the search for motives is especially difficult. HISTORICAL MATERIALS It took time for historical materials on Japan in the interwar years to emerge after the end of the Asia-Pacific war. In the first place, large sections of the public archives were destroyed in the fire-bombing of Tokyo in 1945. It appears that much was also burnt in anticipation of the arrival of Allied forces. But soon vast source materials contained in the transcripts of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) became available even if flawed in some respects; some of the authoritative materials available

4

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Peri

to the Tribunal became accessible to researchers and the general public. Among these writings, the so-called Saionji Harada Memoirs, the testimony of Harada Kumao, who was private secretary to the last Genro, Saionji Kimmochi, was published as Saionji Ko to seikyoku; it was among the first of the primary source materials to be published in Japanese in the 1950s. Memoirs and autobiographies (some written in Sugamo prison, Tokyo, by prominent Japanese awaiting trial), apologetic and otherwise, gradually emerged.4 In addition, there were the reference publications of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The government archives themselves went to the Library of Congress and were microfilmed before being returned to Japan. But Japanese research into relationships with China and Southeast Asia was slow to resume after the war. This was due partly to disinclination or taboo and partly to the sheer difficulty of uncovering evidence from the archives, which were only slowly restored to good order. In any society "historical recovery" has to follow economic recovery. Public archives, like the documents in the Defense Research Library (Boei kenkyujo) and the Diplomatic Records Office (Gaiko shiryokan), have gradually opened up. In theory, Japanese authorities have granted researchers access to their archives in accordance with the 30-year rule, an accepted international yardstick. The archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in particular, are open for the 1920s and 1930s and are gradually being published in a comprehensive chronological series with additional specialist volumes. These volumes, Nihon gaiko bunsho, are now available for dates up to the mid 1930s, although they are too vast for this author to have used more than a fraction of them. Since the official record tends to be bland, the use of private and military archives are invaluable; they are especially relevant because there was a real dialogue going on in the 1920s over the course to be taken. On the other hand—and this is perhaps a peculiarity of Japan—there appear to have been only corner whisperings in the 1930s when the free expression of opinion was increasingly affected by state propaganda, fear of repressive police action, censorship, and possible dismissal from employment. Much speculation has surrounded the role of the emperor system in these years. As this study opens, it is the era of the Taisho Emperor (1912-1926) whose illness, perhaps exaggerated, was a matter of anxiety to Japan's oligarchic rulers. His successor, the Showa Emperor Hirohito, whose long reign (1926-1989) covered both war and peace-making, has become a figure of historical controversy. Around the time of his death in 1989, a number of new primary materials on the role of the imperial house in the 1920s and 1930s was published. In the following year, an account about the first twenty years of his reign titled Showa Tenno no dokuhaku 8-jikan and edited by H. and M. Terasaki was released to the public. This account, dictated by the Emperor in 1946, was released at the same time as were diaries of Kinoshita Michio, the vice grand-chamberlain responsible for the

Introduction

5

dictation sessions. Some of the imperial princes have also published their thoughts. In Chuo Koron, Agawa Hiroyuki gave some insights into the quite critical thoughts of Prince Takamatsu (1905-1987), a younger brother of the Showa Emperor, which he later edited and published as Takamatsu no Miya no nikki. Prince Mikasa gave some insights of a similar kind in 1994.5 Princess Chichibu also published an English version of her memoir of her husband (1902-1953) under the title The Silver Drum (1996), though it contains precious little of a political nature. They have given their views from behind the Imperial Screen, having kept a long silence. Full details of these works are found in the Bibliography. Whereas the reticence of former years has gradually dissolved, there is now improved access to historical materials and greater frankness in published work. Among the diaries that have appeared in print are those of significant performers on the political-diplomatic stage of the 1920s and 1930s: courtiers like Makino Nobuaki (Shinken), Kido Koichi, and Harada; diplomats like Shigemitsu Mamoru and Togo Shigenori; generals; and journalists. These are among the matters analyzed for foreign readers in the two excellent bibliographic guides on external relations literature: Japan and the World, 1853-1952 (1989) compiled by Asada Sadao and Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941 (1974) edited by J.W. Morley. Dr. Komatsu Keiichiro, in his study of the origins of the Pacific war, covers the same ground as this monograph and includes a detailed bibliography.6 Much scholarly research has been published by the Japanese. For diplomatic historians, a major breakthrough occurred with the publication of Taiheiyo senso e no michi: kaisen gaikoshi(edited by Doctors Kamikawa Hikomatsu and Tsunoda Jun) in 7 volumes in 1962-1963. This has greatly influenced a generation of Japanese readers. The series Nihon gaikoshi published by the Kajima Research Institute is of diplomatic interest. In the 34-volume series, the first thirteen volumes are contributed by Dr. Kajima Morinosuke while the production of the remaining volumes came under the supervision of diplomats involved in the events. For military historians, the output of the Tokyo publishing house, Misuzu Shobo, from the 1960s onward has been important; its publications have been invaluable for relevant older materials, such as the Gendai shiryo series (46 volumes including index) which throws much light on the role of the military. The Ministry of Defense has published its history of the Asia-Pacific war and its antecedents in Senshi sosho (102 volumes). A recent compilation in military history under the editorship of Okumura Fusao is Kindai Nihon sensoshi (4 volumes). Relevant to foreign relations are a number of economic series such as Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi (Iwanami Koza, 8 vols., 1992-1993), which concentrates on economic developments and disputes during Japan's colonial period. Large numbers of independent monographs by Japanese scholars have also been published. The literature in the Japanese language is vast, especially for periods of high controversy like 1937-1941, and a

6

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Peri

special interest in the coming of war still exists. We are remarkably wellsupplied with material despite how many archives for the period were lost. English readers are fortunate to have access to some of these writings in translation. Professor J. W. Morley has published selected essays in English translation from the Pacific War series (5 volumes, 1979-1999) under the title Road to the Pacific War. The Kajima Institute has also published Dr. Kajima's Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922 (1976-1980) in three volumes, of which Vol. Ill is relevant to this study. The study of interwar Japanese international relations has been greatly assisted by the publication of specialist journals. Among the many journals of interest, the two that have specialized on foreign affairs are Kokusai seiji, the publication of the Japan Association for International Affairs which has been issued since the 1960s, and the Gaiko Shiryokanho, the house magazine of the Japanese Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo. One cannot speak too highly of the contribution by the latter, which not only contains academic articles, but also introduces new volumes published in the Nihon gaiko bunsho series. It is, therefore, an essential reference work for those using these source materials. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS Before the Asia-Pacific war, the writing of history—especially diplomatic history—was an "unsafe" subject, open to government censorship and political intervention. Few scholars and journalists were able to ignore the pressures of nationalism. Only those like Takeuchi Tatsuji and Kiyozawa Kiyoshi were bold enough to adopt a liberal position. The official account of Japan's foreign relations was presented by the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry. One of the bureau's functions was to supply material for a so-called propaganda war with China and other countries; it invested considerably in such material and was (despite disclaimers) adept at disseminating negative information. So there is a formidable literature of accusation and counter accusation from the 1930s and early 1940s from which it is difficult to disentangle the truth. 7 After 1945, historical research was largely "liberated." This meant that history teachers at university level, and in schools, were freed from prewar constraints. Many of them chose to teach from a Marxist or left-wing standpoint. In the 1930s, such views had been suppressed. A body of historians with a broadly Marxist approach had formed the Rekishigaku Kenkyukai in 1932 and attracted support among anti-fascist scholars after the war. This was a natural reaction in a period when ultranationalist doctrines were excluded from the curricula of educational institutions. In 1957, some five years after Japanese sovereignty was restored, Ienaga Saburo prepared a history of Japan that was rejected by the Ministry of Education as a textbook for use in high schools because of its unacceptable interpretations.

Introduction

7

lenaga challenged the rulings in a series of important test-cases, some of which he won and some of which he lost in lengthy court proceedings. But it was a healthy development that the press and public opinion followed the debates with interest.8 As a counterpoise to Marxist predominance, those who were looking for liberal and anti-nationalist interpretations emerged. Partly an aspect of the professionalism of Japanese historians, this movement also resulted from Japanese scholars going abroad to immerse themselves in archives and take a less theoretical approach to their studies. Perhaps some of these, especially in the field of diplomatic history, were prompted to respond to the studies which were being published abroad, especially in the United States. Spurred on by foreign scholars who had read the Japanese archives and tried to convey the essence of the Japanese-language sources, Japanese scholars had published a full range of studies. In any case, a debate developed between Marxists and anti-Marxists which continued into the 1970s. Bitterly argued controversies abounded between the rival schools of interpretation over Japan's role in the twentieth century. It is advisable to look broadly at two of these in the simplest terms. The first school of interpretation was developed by the Marxists. Progressive intellectuals, they hoped to prevent the recurrence of war and condemned Japanese prewar aggression as well as expansion. They wanted to atone for the suffering caused by the Japanese by accepting the notion of collective guilt. The Marxists identified fundamental flaws in prewar Japanese society, especially the traces of feudal society from the nineteenth century which lingered on in the imperial system (kokutai). They attributed much to the evils of capitalism and its too ready adoption by Japan which led on inevitably to imperial expansion. They focused on the damage done to Japan by looking to Prussia as a model which gave an authoritarian structure to the twentieth century Japanese state, encouraging fascism. More specifically, they condemned militarist imperialism during what they call the fifteen years' war.9 Marxists claimed that fundamental issues relating to Japan's attitude towards China had been passed by in the Taiheiyo senso e no michi serie That had emphasized the Pacific element and hence rivalry with the United States, whereas the critical China dimension had been played down. They wanted the focus to be placed on Japan's approach to Chinese nationalism from 1895 onwards. A second critique came from studies relating to the Asia-Pacific war and its origins. These writers might be called the Nationalists. They are especially associated with the name of Hayashi Fusao, whose seminal book Dai to-A senso koteiron was published in 1963. Its first contention is that Japan was not exclusively to blame for the war; the responsibility was shared with the Allies. Thus the book claimed that Japan—lacking in raw materials, plagued by the problems of over-population, dependent

8

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Peri

on overseas markets, and suffering the after-effects of the Depression— was being economically "encircled" by America and her allies. Nationalist writers countered criticisms of Japan's conduct by dwelling on the guilt of the Anglo-Saxons. Official quasi-historical writing in Japan before the war, the publications of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry including those of Kawai Tatsuo together with authors like Tamura Kosaku and Akagi Hideichi commonly emphasized this guilt. It has to be remembered that apologetic writing of this kind in the 1930s was not so much addressed to a scholarly audience around the globe as addressed to an English-reading audience in Asia. In its Japanese versions, this writing appealed to veterans' organizations after the war and some members of the Liberal-Democratic party, the dominant political group in postwar Japan. 10 Hayashi returned to this tack, being positive in his defense of Japan's actions. He justified Japan's Pan-Asianism, the Coprosperity Sphere, and the notion of the holy war against colonies. He believed that Japan's southward expansion was justified so that the army could plug the gaps in supply routes to China or that the navy could seek oil stocks in Indonesia. Knowing in retrospect that the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia had led to the liberation of colonial territories there, he emphasized the benefits of Japan's colonization in the 1940s which had encouraged developments such as military-related industries: it may not have granted democracy but, from the standpoint of Asian nationalism, the Great East Asian war fought by the Japanese against the Allies paved the way to liberation and was not a mistake. Such writers emphasize economic benefits Japan gave to former colonial territories, even if they do not deny the harshness of the occupation regimes and the strong convictions of the resistance movements which they stimulated. We have tried to sketch some of the views which have surfaced and the controversies to which they have given rise. This is not the place to discuss the validity of the various arguments, and we can merely indicate the diversity and plausibility of the conflicting arguments advanced. In addition to these differences over historical interpretation of world events of the interwar period, there are basic divergences of view about the nature of the Japanese state and the domestic history of Japan. As in most other countries, many aspects of Japan's growth and territorial expansion are rooted deeply in her internal affairs. It is not possible to assess them adequately here because this would entail an examination of the role of the bureaucracy, both home and colonial; of bankers and businessmen; of newspapermen; and of the wire agencies such as Domei, all in a period when state propaganda was a vital factor. This raises inevitably the standing in Japanese society of civilians, whether politicians, bureaucrats or those outside government. Underlying the whole of this study is one basic question: why were the army, the navy and the right-wing able to dominate affairs

Introduction

9

in the 1930s and exercise so much influence over areas like foreign policy in which they did not have special expertise? Equally controversial and difficult to assess is the role in decision-making of the constitutional head of state, the Emperor. There are many critics of the imperial system (tennosei) and the kokutai. The view taken in this study is that, by the 1930s, the Emperor, following the conclusions of Professor Stephen Large, possessed supreme religious authority hut little political power as a reigning, but not a ruling, monarch.... Potentially he had considerable influence, due to the process of "working through the court" whereby competing elites jockeyed to obtain ritual sanction for a given policy in declaring it as the imperial will. This provided him with opportunities to influence decisions before a consensus was reached, which he would duly ratify as sacred legitimizer.11 The power of the military was linked to the power of the sovereign. By tradition, though not under the terms of the 1889 constitution, which still applied, the army and navy chiefs of staff had come to be permitted to report directly to the Emperor and to have equal access not only with the army and navy ministers, but also the prime minister himself. In effect, the military operated on a wavelength different from that of the civilian administration and increasingly grasped affairs during periods of national emergency in the 1930s. These historical controversies are only a pointer to the very active debate which goes on in historical associations and historical journals of Japan. To the outside observer, the tragedy is that it is largely an intraprofessional debate. The current generation of students who tend to steer clear of history—the so-called uncomfortable discipline—are probably unaware of such debates. The general public in Japan only becomes aware of these issues when they become the stuff of public controversy and media sensationalism. HISTORY POLITICIZED Politicians in all countries are tempted to use history to their own advantage from time to time. Japanese politicians are no exception. As Japan became more prosperous in the 1970s and, some would argue, more nationalistic, there was in some quarters a tendency to put a new gloss on the historical issues of the 1930s. This surfaced even more prominently from 1980 onwards and hit the headlines when some isolated parliamentarians, including a few ministers, in the Diet or in public speeches tried to defend Japan's decision to go to war and expand her territories. Their statements attempted to show inter alia that while Japan made mistakes on the road to the Asia-Pacific war, so also did the victors.

10

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Peri

In the light of such controversies, the preparation of school textbooks became a matter of political sensitivity. Did the authors present the truth to the next generation of Japanese? Did they give a fair account of the experiences of neighboring countries? And, in terms of censorship, was there too much government interference in textbook preparation? The publication of nationally-approved school textbooks became a delicate issue for authors, publishers, and the committees of the Ministry of Education. The government faced the complaint that Japan's version of her past presented to the younger generation in primary, junior high, and high school history textbooks had been sanitized by way of screening and ambiguous language used because of political and bureaucratic pressure. While the whole of Japanese history from the origins of the country was at issue, the complaints about the treatment of the interwar period are specially relevant to this study. Teachers found it hard to address the problems of the 1930s; more seriously, the young of Japan had a less clear picture of what had gone on than did their German contemporaries. The problem had specifically come into the limelight because of the criticisms of these textbooks by Koreans, Chinese, Southeast Asian, and European countries. Beijing, Taipei, Pyongyang, and Seoul in 1982 and 1986 alleged, from their different positions on the political spectrum, that the Japanese Ministry of Education had attempted to doctor the wording of authorized school textbooks relating to their countries. For example, Japan's "aggression" on the Asian continent was described by the word "advance." Public criticisms were made at the level both of professional disagreements among historians and of disputes among politicians. Japan was urged to reexamine her methods and modify her wording about the past. These international storms occurred at a time when Japan was claiming a role of leadership in Asia; it was incumbent on the country to address these uncomfortable topics. While Japan was anxious to keep this essentially educational issue out of politics and diplomacy, the conflict was deeply felt and has rumbled on in the world media.12 The textbook issue was only part of a broader one relating to responsibility for the war. The countries of Asia have made frequent complaints about Japan's aggression and colonial rule. Therefore, there has been a persistent call for an apology or, at least, some sign of remorse for Japan's wartime conduct. The debate rose to an unhappy crescendo in 1994, with the approach of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. The then prime minister of a coalition government, Murayama Tomiichi, took the view that "it is imperative for us Japanese to look squarely to our history with the peoples of neighbouring Asia and elsewhere" and announced a "Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative" to start in 1995. Part of this initiative was to consist of "support for historical research . . . to enable everyone to face squarely to the facts of history." 13

Introduction

11

While the government's attempt to push this political hot potato over to the professional historian or the following generation is understandable and legitimate, the issues remain political. The historian may be able to make technical clarifications of the events, which will be new and valuable; but the interpretations put on these historical findings by the general public in Japan are likely to be emotional as much as factual. It is vital for the historian to study these highly disputed decades and publish his findings; but it is important for him to remain detached, not fabricating political platforms. Since the history of the twentieth century has become a highly politicized issue in Japan, it has given birth to many lobbies. Bodies such as the Japan Forum on International Relations Inc. and the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform are united by concern about the current state of history education in Japan which, they allege, is "colored by a masochistic perception of history"; they are grappling with these problems of interpretation from a right wing standpoint. They are both bodies representing a wide diversity of interests and standpoints; and it cannot yet be said what their impact will be. These groups are linked by distrust for both the findings of the Tokyo Military Tribunal (IMTFE) and the judgments of the immediate postwar period. In a study claiming at the outset to try to avoid seeing Japanese foreign policy of the 1920s and 1930s as an accumulation of stepping stones on the road to war, the Introduction may seem strangely concerned with war. But historical materials that have become available, historical interpretations and political debates, tend to focus on the origins of the Asia-Pacific war. Despite this, it is important not to assume that a Great Power war in the area of Asia and the Pacific was inevitable. Indeed, the war parties did not secure a fevered public consensus in favor of war until late in the day. It is our task to chart the course of a foreign policy without prejudging the outcome.

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CHAPTER 1

The Paris Peace Conference

Japan emerged from the First World War as a country of 56 million, 14 million being engaged in agriculture and fishery and 8.5 million in manufacturing and commerce. In the agricultural sector, rice production was considerable and increasing; but Japan was still a net importer of rice, and this dependence grew as the number of farmers declined. The same dependence applied to the manufacturing sector. Japan was always seeking raw materials, needed for its burgeoning industry, from overseas. Unquestionably, the country had shown itself since the turn of the century to be capable of successful economic growth, even if that growth was in limited sectors of industry. But in the manufacturing sector (apart from silk production), the country was dependent on the importation of raw materials, whether raw cotton for mills, steel for shipyards, or coal. Japan's industrialists were always complaining of their uncertainty over sources of supply for their factories and markets for their finished products. They spoke increasingly of the need for autonomy over the supply of materials. Involved in a highly competitive world, Japan concluded that it was desirable to remain on good terms with its neighbors and trading countries around the world. But Japan had serious worries of a social kind. The vexing question was whether Japan with her slender resources would be able to provide for an already dense population that was estimated to grow at the rate of 10 million per decade. People were moving to the industrial towns, and the high birth-rate was alarming. The distribution of wealth was also uneven. The peasants and laborers sufferered most, even in times of prosperity. Many Japanese viewed their country as a "have-not" nation in competition with "have" nations like the United States and Britain. Despite Japan's pride in its new political standing in the world, there was a widespread feeling of

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Pe

insecurity. The emphasis of state propaganda was, therefore, on citizen belttightening and sacrifice for the state.1 The economic situation had been favorable for Japan during the war and had given her four years of relative prosperity. Governments had allocated funds to develop education, encourage industry, and improve communications. Japan's export trade expanded, especially with China. By the end of the war, she had the second largest gold deposit in the world and was cultivated by many international bankers. But wartime prosperity had led to runaway inflation in 1917-1918 which, in turn, led to the erosion of wage levels. So workers turned to violent confrontation with their companies. The steep inflation also increased the cost of rice, the staple diet of the Japanese people. Serious rice riots aimed at the government swept across Japan beginning in the spring of 1918 and affected most cities, especially Osaka and Kobe. Although the government mobilized troops, this failed to bring about a solution; the government fell in September.2 Despite the immediate poor outlook in the 1920s, some positive steps were taken later for Japan's industrial future. The combination of innovative technology and skillful commercial techniques enabled the country to compete effectively with more established industrial nations. Japan gradually advanced in the fields of shipbuilding, heavy chemicals, steel, and machinery. Although there were many pessimistic cries about possible economic stagnation, Japan was actually well placed to introduce some of the modern technologies which were in their infancy. Japan's industrial advance, promoted by a combination of government policy and aggressive entrepreneurship, was seen as critically intertwined with the role of empire. Thus in Taiwan and Manchuria, Japan established heavy industries that succeeded in complementing industrial development in her own nation. 3 POLITICAL BACKGROUND Hara Takashi (Kei, 1856-1921) came to power as head of a Seiyukai ministry in September 1918. His was arguably the first party government to exist in Japan. Hara had to operate within the apparatus of parliamentary government which was superficial in some respects. Since the new constitution introduced by the Emperor Meiji in 1889, a Diet, or a legislature of one elected house and another appointed (or hereditary) house, had existed. Elections were carried out on a limited franchise which had been extended in 1918. Although campaigns in favor of universal male suffrage were widespread, such a policy was not introduced until 1925. Elections under a multi-party system were to continue until 1940. There were active political parties, notably the two middle class parties, Seiyukai and Minseito; variations of title applied to both in the years ahead. A cabinet government presided over by a prime minister, a sort of democratic government with special Japanese features, existed. In practice, the system was

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criticized for its high level of corruption and for the degree of political confrontation to which it gave rise when the Diet was in session. There were, however, some factors that challenged the development of democratic procedures. First, distinct imperial prerogatives were built into the constitution of 1889, which had been handed down by the Emperor Meiji. These prerogatives were employed by governments to overcome the financial powers of the legislature. Part of the emperor's authority was exercised through the elder statesmen (or Genro); they, having no legal status, nevertheless enjoyed the country's confidence and advised him on each appointment of a new prime minister, a crucial task. The Genro were survivors of clan politics of the Meiji era which had been dominated by members of the Choshu and Satsuma clans. This helped the army leaders, still drawn largely from Choshu, to maintain an influence over affairs of state, which also were controlled by the navy. Although the Genro had been reduced in number because only one of them survived beyond 1924, they still held power. To support this leadership structure, there was a large bureaucracy which at once challenged the political parties and supplied a stability to the Japanese state which party politics seemed to threaten. In the meritocracy, the officials were trained at university and selected by examination. They had built for themselves a strong fortress in the government structure, one which politicians, holding office for short periods of time, could only challenge at their peril.4 Hara's power derived from the support of the Seiyukai, the political party of which he had been the effective leader for two decades. He was able, after some hard bargaining, to win the support of the senior elder statesman, Marshal Yamagata Aritomo. At the age of eighty, Yamagata held sway over the army, which still contained in its upper echelons a preponderance of representatives of the Choshu clan. Hara further consolidated this relationship by appointing General Tanaka Giichi as War Minister; he was a Choshu-born protege of Yamagata. He also obtained the crucial support of the other two elder statesmen, Matsukata Masayoshi and Saionji Kimmochi, the latter of whom was to survive into the 1930s. Hara had earlier established goodwill between the Seiyukai and the navy by supporting their claims for expansion. Through these alliances, he was able to cope with the intense enmity in the Diet from the Kenseikai party of Kato Takaaki. Despite these difficulties, Hara's appointment represented a landmark: it was the first truly party cabinet and the first governed by a commoner. His cabinet held out the promise of fresh beginnings for Japanese democracy.5 In spite of all Hara's efforts, his position was by no means secure. He inherited from his predecessors many unresolved issues including the rice riots, which had become nation-wide. By the spring of 1920, Japan lapsed into a postwar economic depression with a major strike at the vast steelworks at Yawata. Wartime industries had to be put on short time, and the financial situation became grave. Japan approached a period of economic

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

instability, facing restlessness and agitation at home as well as protectionism and economic blocs abroad. Yet, in spite of the national disarray, Hara called a general election for 10 May 1920 under the extended franchise. He overwhelmingly won, securing 280 seats for the Seiyukai compared to 110 for their rival, Kenseikai. While there were domestic problems galore, Hara was forced to devote much of his time to foreign affairs. Earlier in his career he had been a bureaucrat in the Foreign Ministry and had represented his country in Paris and Seoul (1896-1897). Therefore, Hara possessed both experience and a strong interest in international affairs. It was, perhaps, the first time in Japanese history that the prime minister was required to take a major personal role in this field. His foreign minister was an experienced career diplomat. Uchida Yasuya had most recently served as ambassador to Russia at the time of the revolution. But the major policy decisions belonged to Hara. His diaries suggest that foreign affairs occupied at least half of his time. The centerpiece of Hara's thinking continued to involve the maintenance of good relations with the United States, the major importer of Japanese goods. These relations held highest priority because the United States, which was highly suspicious of Japan's wartime activities, had suddenly risen to a position of economic and financial dominance in the world. But it was also necessary to retain the alliance with Britain, which had for two decades been the focus of Japan's policy, and to cooperate with those countries alongside whom Japan had just fought. Hara was also conscious of the need to cultivate more cordial relations with China, including the need for commercial cooperation. 6 In the implementation of its policies, the cabinet had to cope with the often hostile attitude of the Gaiko Chosakai, an advisory committee on foreign relations, which Hara had inherited from his predecessor. Consisting of cabinet members, privy councillors, and political party representatives, the Gaiko Chosakai to some extent reflected the views of those politically and personally suspicious of Hara. It, therefore, had to be handled with great care. Though an irritant and impediment to the expeditious conduct of foreign policy-making, this committee served some important purposes: it played its part not only in ensuring that long-term thinking on diplomatic issues was not confined to the bureaucrats, but also in securing a consensual approach towards national defense and China. Remaining in existence until September 1922, the committee then ended.7 The environment of World War I, of course, had demanded great expenditure on national defense. Traditionally, most war funds were pumped into the army. Now the navy tasted political power for the first time; with the setting up of the cabinet of Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyoe (Gombei) in February 1913, the navy hoped to obtain its fair share of funds. But the cabinet had not been in office for a year when a major international scandal over shipbuilding contracts, the Siemens affair, leaked out. A motion

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of no-confidence was passed in the Diet because of the alleged bribery of Japanese admirals, and the cabinet was forced to resign.8 But the navy, using the argument of its expanded role at sea during the war, persisted with its claim for increased naval funding. There was an ongoing rivalry between the navy with its costly program aimed at building an 8-8 fleet (eight battleships and eight cruisers), held to be necessary to keep up with American and British wartime building, and the army with its claims for fifty divisions, considered necessary to protect Japan's overseas empire in Taiwan and Korea. In presenting its case for expansion after the war, the navy used the argument that it had as one of the wartime allies extended its zone of operations to the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean and from 1917 onwards to the western Indian Ocean and Mediterranean where it had been engaged in joint operations (kyodo sakusen) with them. In the scramble for funds, both services became politicized; their senior officers were drawn into open intervention in civil affairs. But the postwar economic stagnation together with the escalating costs of all arms forced the war and navy ministers to reexamine their earlier ambitions and reduce their budget proposals.9 World leaders, in 1919, accepted that the old secrecy in the conduct of international relations had to go and that an attempt at greater openness would be necessary. In general, Japanese politicians were not skillful with or happy about dealing with the media, questioning in parliament or communicating with the people. Thus, they relied on the use of state communication; the interwar years saw a great expansion of propaganda, as in Europe. Counteracting the notion that their country lacked skills in public relations, Japanese government departments spent a great deal of money on publicity, directed both at foreign governments and their own people.10 ASIA-PACIFIC ISSUES AT PARIS At the 1919 conference held in Paris to bring the First World War to an end, Japan, though one of the victorious allies, was looked at in terms of its war record. The nation had declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914. Japan claimed to have entered the war in accordance with the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, though not its letter. A successful campaign in the Shantung province of China, which involved capturing Tsingtao on 7 November, and an equally successful campaign against stragglers from the German Pacific fleet, which included acting as an escort for allied convoys on the way to battle fronts in Europe, were both part of the country's military career. But the 21 Demands with which China was threatened in January 1915 strongly affected Japan's image abroad. Japan never really understood the extent of the resulting suspicion, probably because the true sentiments of the powers were muffled due to war conditions. When the United States joined the Allied side in 1917, the Chinese also declared war on Germany though they did not make a great contribution to victory, if

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

one excludes their labor battalions on the western front in France. The presence of two belligerents in the East complicated Japan's calculations about the peace settlement. Therefore, in the spring of 1917, Japan took pains to extract commitments from Britain, France and Russia that they would each support Japanese claims over Kiaochow and the Pacific islands north of the equator. Japan felt that cast-iron guarantees had been received from its wartime allies. But Britain, from her experience with previous settlements, knew that wartime commitments like these were often thrown into the melting pot at any peace conference which ultimately took place.11 Meanwhile the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo set up a committee under the chairmanship of Shidehara Kijuro, the Vice-Minister, which worked out Japan's desiderata for such a conference. It has to be said that as a result, Japan was in a remarkable state of readiness for the conference. Moreover, the country's expectations were not modest. On 27 November, the Japanese appointed Chinda Sutemi and Matsui Keishiro, ambassadors in London and Paris respectively, as plenipotentiaries and approached Makino Nobuaki (Shinken) and Saionji Kimmochi to follow up as political delegates from the Tokyo end. Sailing from Yokohama on 10 December, Makino travelled via the United States and reached Paris on 18 January, where he acted as interim head of delegation, rather outclassed by the big guns of the European delegations. But Saionji, who had been Hara's first choice as foreign minister, was suffering from ill health and initially refused to go. This gave the Japanese time to see at what level other countries were pitching their delegations. When it was announced that President Wilson would attend in person, Saionji, who had in 1918 refused the prime ministership because of ill health and was thought to be a person of the requisite seniority, was eventually persuaded to go. A political ally of Hara, Saionji was a person of influence and popularity with the general public. It was, however, mid January before he sailed and 2 March before he reached Paris. The delegation which represented Japan in France reflected the internationalist tendency in Japanese government thinking. 12 Tokyo's instructions to its delegates were comprehensive: they were most explicit on the aspects of peace in which Japan alone had an interest. These were to demand the cession to Japan of Germany's territorial rights to Kiaochow and to the Pacific Islands north of the equator. The cession of Germany's Shantung railway and associated mines, without compensation, was regarded as the more important of these; but Japan would offer Germany compensation for private property rights. These instructions preceded the proposal that a league of nations should be organized. So the initial orders included nothing about racial equality, except for the vague statement that the delegates should strive to devise some appropriate safeguards in order to prevent disadvantages which Japanese citizens might suffer from racism. These were spelled out in more detail by the Hara cabinet on 18 January 1919. But the delegates were warned not to rock the boat, to keep

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on good terms with the European leaders and, in case of doubt, be guided by Britain's reactions. 13 Preoccupied with the problems of Europe, the Allied leaders gave only secondary consideration to East Asian issues. Of these by far the most baffling was the problem of Kiaochow, part of Shantung province. Its port of Tsingtao had been captured by Japanese armies in November 1914 and the hinterland occupied for the remainder of the war. The status of the territory was defined by the Notes appended to the Sino-Japanese treaty of 25 May 1915: when Japan acquired free disposal of the territory at Kiaochow, it would restore sovereignty over the territory to China. This position was reiterated by Foreign Minister Uchida in his statement to the Diet on 21 January 1919, which gave the assurance that Japan harbored no territorial ambitions in China. These ideas were also contained in the instructions to delegates. The allied leaders were subjected to much lobbying by both the Chinese, who wanted Kiaochow to revert to them directly, and the Japanese, who wanted Kiaochow in the first place to be passed to them and mistakenly thought that their Shantung demands had been accepted by the Chinese leadership in advance. The European allies approached these questions at the Paris Conference from a comparatively neutral position, sympathetic to China but bound to Japan. They were awkwardly placed by the Fourteen Points published by President Woodrow Wilson which advocated self-determination and seemed to oppose further acquisitions of territory by the Allies.14 Over Kiaochow, the leaders discussed various options: the application of mandates or the exclusion of the issue from the current treaty. Japan's delegates refused flatly on both counts. Britain's delegate, AJ. Balfour, met the Japanese on 26 April to find some way to compromise. The Japanese took the firm line that both their 1915 and 1918 treaties with China, which others at Paris believed had been concluded under duress, were fully valid. They confirmed that they had no long term intentions to station troops in Shantung, telling the prime ministers gathered in Paris that Japanese garrisons would be withdrawn after the conclusion of the peace treaty and the reversion of the leased territory. On 30 April they asserted that their policy was to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao. The delegates announced this publicly on 4 May and, more significantly, Foreign Minister Uchida reiterated it in Tokyo on 17 May. On this basis, the treaty laid down that Kiaochow should be transferred from Germany to Japan. The Chinese, however, staged public demonstrations in their cities from 4 May onwards in protest against the Kiaochow clause. Under this public pressure, their plenipotentiaries did not attend the signing ceremony at Versailles and refused to sign the treaty. Although the Japanese had won their case under the treaty, there was no meeting of minds with the Chinese. This

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

meant, in effect, that the matter was reserved for later discussion as commonly takes place at international conferences with already overcrowded agendas. Whereas Britain had endeavored to play a disinterested mediatorial role in regards to Kiaochow, the nation was linked to Japan as a possible beneficiary over the fate of the German Pacific islands. Japan's case was that since the country had received 1917 promises of support from Britain, France and Russia at any future peace conference, it now wanted to receive outright cession of the German Pacific islands north of the equator, which had been under Japanese control since 1914. Her delegates argued that Japan wanted to continue to protect the local population. But, while this was being discussed, the League of Nations was taking shape. The leaders at Paris were inclined to nominate these territories as mandates of the League, the mandates being pitched at the appropriate level of civilization that had been attained in the various territories at issue. Japanese delegates very reluctantly decided not to push for the outright annexation of these territories, in the interest of solidarity between the powers. It was resolved that the German islands north of the equator in the Pacific would be placed under League trusteeship and would be awarded by the League to Japan as a C-class mandate. President Wilson had proposed the creation of a League of Nations as part of his Fourteen Points. While Japan supported the general objectives, it was none too keen on the league as planned. Japan knew, however, that being a new entrant to the group of great powers meant becoming a member. That being the case, the country proposed that racial equality should be recognized within the framework of the League of Nations. Makino, largely on his own initiative, pushed for a racial equality clause to be inserted in the preamble of the League covenant. This proved to be a divisive point among the leaders present. In the view of the latest specialist on the subject, it was basically a defensive initiative because the Japanese government being the only non-white great power, perceived the possibility of inequality in a predominantly European League of Nations. Quite clearly then "racial equality" was a misnomer because the Japanese sought to gain the status of honorary whites and nothing more. Possibly the delegates at Paris pushed this more than their superiors had intended. But, as the League took shape, demonstrations broke out in Tokyo and may have put some belated pressure on the government to act against discrimination, though there was little awareness of Japanese discrimination against China. Countries like Australia and the United States which feared Asian immigration felt that there were loopholes in the proposal and that it was simply a device to validate Japanese emigration. However, the issue to the Japanese did not involve immigration at all. Although the resolution gained much support, it was voted out eventually because

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of the lack of unanimity and the hostility of the American and British Empire delegations.15 The Versailles Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919. In retrospect, it is arguable that Japan made gains commensurate with its contribution to the allied war effort which was relatively limited in expenditure and relatively small in terms of casualties. But the nation, like others, felt that it did not obtain an adequate return for being on the winning side. While her delegates had been relatively successful during the negotiations over Kiaochow, they had lost their cases over the racial equality clauses and the Pacific islands. Although Britain did not support these last two issues, embittered relations did not seem to result. But, Japan had to make some sacrifices in order to maintain its strong position. Rather than make bold and provocative public statements, Makino and Chinda operated cautiously and privately. They recognized that Japan, as a country wishing to have a substantial share in the spoils of war, was not popular and that their approach needed to be gentle. Although this caution promoted a feeling in the Japanese press corps that their country had lost out in the propaganda battle with China, her delegates actually had played a positive role in secret diplomacy. Prince Saionji, who reached Paris late, played his part by contacts behind the scenes. With his senior colleagues, he saw much gain for Japan in the proceedings at Paris and in the creation of international organizations like the League of Nations. They all felt that Japan had established its standing with the world's statesmen in an intangible way. But other younger members attached to the Japanese delegation held diametrically opposed ideas. Such a one was Konoe Fumimaro, later to become prime minister in the 1930s, who sat in on sessions and kept a diary. Konoe condemned the League as a tool for shoring up Anglo-American power. Japanese writers place great emphasis on his view that the treaty would be an AngloAmerican imposed peace. But how far were his views representative of Japanese views of the day? All that can be said is that these attitudes were much reported in the Japanese press. From the British standpoint, there was not much evidence of Anglo-American cooperation or collusion before or at Paris. The notion that Britain and the United States cooperated at the conference is far-fetched.16 It was more in the aftermath of the treaty that Japan lost out because of factors not under her own control. One was the outburst of Chinese nationalism which greeted the Paris efforts to resolve the Kiaochow issue. In essence, the Versailles Treaty had laid down that Germany would pass over her Kiaochow lease to Japan though this was strictly on condition that Japan would, in turn, retrocede it to China. On 2 August, Japan made her public pronouncement to that effect, safeguarding only the economic privileges originally granted to Germany. But this policy statement contained no provision for a deadline by which the Japanese would withdraw their troops. This naturally offended the Chinese public, which had been engaged

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

in anti-Japanese riots since mid summer. China's leaders had been forced into a refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty or join the League, thus leaving unfinished business over the East Asian situation. It was also a disappointment for Japan that the United States was becoming drawn into what was a major regional dispute between itself and China. While Washington was increasingly distancing itself from the Wilsonian settlement at Paris, those Republicans in America who were suspicious of the settlement chose to latch onto the supposed injustice that had been done to the Chinese cause. Much attention, therefore, focused on Chinese issues such as the unresolved Kiaochow problem. For the next few years, these were kept by China on the front burner with the support of the United States, which was in the process of stalling over ratification of the Versailles treaty. This was bad news for Japan's "China Specialists" whose work over the previous decade was being challenged.17 ASIAN TENSIONS, 1920-1921 The international consortium of bankers making loans to China decided to revive its activities which had lapsed since 1914. In the spring of 1919, the United States proposed, with the support of Britain, that financial groups around the world should be able to participate equally in future loans to China for industrial and railway purposes. The intention of Thomas Lamont, the American banker who was the prime promoter of the move, and Sir Charles Addis of the Hongkong Shanghai Bank was to get agreement on an international Open Door settlement for China that would apply also to Manchuria. It was initially opposed by Japan, which wanted preferential treatment for, if not a monopoly over, South Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia and Shantung. The agreement for the new financial consortium for China was signed by Britain, Japan, the United States and France in London on 15 October 1920. It was hoped that Japan was going to cooperate in an international settlement of long duration. But China regarded the scheme as an insult and declined to make use of it, while Japan still continued to regard Manchuria as outside the purview of the consortium. The consequence was that railways were unlikely to be built in China with consortium funds.18 One of Japan's burdens was her participation in the Siberian intervention. Japan's decision to send a military expedition against the Bolsheviks in Siberia had been taken in June 1918. Tokyo did not want to be forestalled and preempted in Northeast Asia by the United States. Hara together with others like his foreign minister, Uchida, had bitterly opposed the idea when it was first raised before he took office; he only reversed his position after President Wilson gave the scheme his blessing. Wilson had been persuaded to change his mind because of the plight of the Czech brigade which was

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proceeding eastward from the Russian front and seemed to need outside support in central Siberia. European powers had not discouraged Japan from sending troops there from the start. The idea was strongly supported by the army general staff; General Tanaka Giichi was the author of an elaborate plan for the campaign. Thus, Japanese troops were sent to Vladivostok in August and in numbers much greater than Wilson had bargained for. Spreading westward, the troops occupied every major station along the Trans-Siberian railway as far as Chita. By the autumn, Japan was in a dominant strategic position in Siberia.19 In his new capacity as War Minister, Tanaka began to have second thoughts about the task and cut down on the troops in December. By the summer of 1920, the Japanese position had deteriorated: while the Europeans, Czechs, and Americans had pulled out of Vladivostok, the Japanese were left to face the successful operations of the Bolshevik partisans. Military opinion was divided, but Tanaka was now inclined to withdraw his total force. The actual decision was deferred when a local Bolshevik commander at Nikolaievsk on the Amur attacked Japanese civilians; Japan reacted by reinforcing its troops and sending an expedition to conquer the whole of Sakhalin island, which lies off the coast of Russia's Maritime Provinces. In spite of a rearguard action by the general staff, the decision to withdraw from Siberia because of costs and casualties was taken in the spring of 1921. Thus, Japan's intention to pull out was well-known long before it was announced by Shidehara at the Washington conference. The Siberian expedition, though it was one of Japan's few failures overseas, was an important episode that would leave a scar on Japanese thinking, especially the anti-Soviet obsession of the army manifested over the next two decades. It also revealed the splits between the War Ministry and general staff as well as between Japan and the international community.20 In his own country, Hara found that he had a major court and constitutional problem on his hands. The mental state of the Taisho emperor (r. 1912-26) had deteriorated markedly. Hara's vision was that the Emperor's son, the Crown Prince (b. 29 April 1901) later known as Hirohito, the Showa emperor, should be trained as an international monarch for the sake of the country. Since the prince might have to take over as regent (sessho) at any time, the sooner he undertook a journey abroad the better. The elder statesmen who had travelled abroad in their youth were generally supportive; they thought that the heir to the throne should see the changes that the war had brought about in Europe. The proposed journey was complicated by those who wanted to quickly marry the young prince off. Eventually, the Court announced his engagement to Princess Nagako of Kuni but stipulated no date for the marriage ceremony. Of course, further arguments emerged against the mission: the sea journey to Europe was a hazardous one; and the prince, adequately educated in Japan

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

by traditional methods, might be endangered by learning anything from abroad. Those from the right wing even formed an association to prevent the Crown Prince departing from Japan's sacred soil. Eventually, however, on 16 January 1921, the Taisho Emperor gave his sanction to his heir going overseas. After a leisurely ocean journey, the prince reached Britain in May and visited European countries during the following month. The journey was unquestionably beneficial for the Crown Prince and for Japan. The whole episode is valuable in illustrating the tensions which existed between the modernizing and traditionalist elites in their approaches to foreign countries, foreign influences, and the Imperial Japanese Court. 21 The hasty solution for the problem of China, contrived in Paris, had left many matters for later negotiation between Japan and China. It was a perfectly reasonable and understandable approach to leave complex regional issues to be settled between the two countries. But settling the issues on a bilateral basis required goodwill and a conciliatory approach on both sides, and this was lacking. On the central political issue, Japan's treaty rights in China, Peking declined all Japan's approaches. On the more specific issue of Kiaochow, China refused to enter into bilateral negotiations, instead placing its trust in Washington to act as its protector and friend in matters relating to Japan. This also hung fire because of the change of administration, so the period from the presidential election in November 1920 to the inauguration in March was an indecisive one. Japan had not secured all of its objectives at Paris and tended to misunderstand the causes of its failure. Both the young officials at Paris, like Shigemitsu Mamoru and Arita Hachiro, and the pack of accompanying journalists speculated at length about what had gone wrong: Japan's arguments had not made an impact in the propaganda battle that took place at Paris. There was a consensus that this could be attributed to the existence of partisan news agencies and the inadequacy of the international Japanese agency, Kokusai. After deliberations extending over two years, it was eventually decided to set up within the Foreign Ministry a public information bureau (johobu) as part of the Japanese postwar reforms. Formally created on 13 August 1921 under Ijuin Hikokichi, the former ambassador to Italy, the office had many purposes including publicity, domestic and foreign propaganda, and coordination among the ministries. This last coordination proved most difficult with respect to China where the army and navy had many long term China experts. The army China specialists and military attaches who constituted a sort of intelligence network within the general staff had extreme views of their own and did not want the Gaimusho as their spokesman. In spite of this, the Foreign Ministry information bureau increased its role and was to become an important vehicle for publicity in the 1930s. 22

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UNRAVELLING THE BRITISH ALLIANCE In spite of Hara's goal of improving relations with Washington, Japan remained closest to Britain through their alliance, renewed for ten years in 1911, that was the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. Some of the reservations which the Japanese government and its Advisory Council had about the League of Nations were connected with that group's likely hostility to this alliance. The covenant of the League of Nations was deemed to condemn alliances and (in the view of some international lawyers) thus to be inconsistent with the British alliance. In 1920, British and Japanese ministers were divided over what to do about it. On 8 July, they notified the League that "the alliance now existing between their two countries though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant is not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant." If the alliance were to be renewed, it would be made consistent with the covenant. A year later, in an even greater feat of verbal gymnastics, Japan and Britain reported that the alliance would be kept in force only in so far as it was not inconsistent with the covenant. Both parties were, after all, founding members of the League who were required to acknowledge the paramountcy of the covenant, but Britain was more strongly committed than Japan. In addition, how long the covenant would remain sacrosanct in the new League was unclear.23 The conflict over the alliance between Japan and Britain led to one of the rare overt crises during the long association between the two countries. Some British officials seem to have wanted the alliance to peter out in July 1921 while Japan in her note of 30 May wanted its existence to be extended to allow for negotiations to take place for adjustment and modification of the alliance. Britain's Crown Solicitor believed that notice of abrogation had already been given to the League in 1920, a view which was vigorously refuted by the Japanese legal advisers. To reduce legal squabbling, the politicians stepped in and elicited the views of the Lord Chancellor. As a result, Foreign Secretary Curzon on 2 July stated that members of the British government had fully considered Japan's view "in the opposite sense to that held by H.M.G. and are no longer prepared to insist upon their original interpretation." This meant that the Allies were able to announce that the existing agreement would remain in force until some new measure was taken. 24 Japan realized that more skepticism about the alliance existed in Britain than among her own people; while Lloyd George and Curzon were favorable to Japan's war effort and probably supported the continuation of the alliance, it was low in their priorities. Opponents within Britain and the Commonwealth pointed to various factors: China's known opposition, the disagreements among partners to the Siberian expedition, and the attitude of the League to the alliance. In Japan, the talk was rather of

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

American hostility to it. On 4 July the ambassador in Washington, Shidehara, issued a press statement: a campaign seems to be actively at work misrepresenting the possible effect of the Alliance upon the United States. By no stretch of the imagination can it be honestly stated that the Alliance was ever designed or remotely intended as an instrument of hostility or even defence against the United States.25 But Japan also showed flexibility and willingness to link up with the United States in some way which would temper Washington's suspicions and criticisms. The crunch came after the Imperial Conference of Dominion leaders meeting in London from 20 June when the Canadian prime minister opposed the renewal of the alliance even more strongly than had been expected, both for his own country and out of consideration for American sentiment. The outcome was that on 4 July, the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, reported to the Japanese ambassador in London and the Chinese minister that the Imperial Conference, which had just concluded, had resolved that a Pacific and Far Eastern conference should be convened in order to discuss the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Support for the renewal of the alliance was hoped for and the meeting was to be as small as possible but should include interested powers with Pacific interests. It was the British proposal to involve the United States, which might even convene the meeting. The Japanese ambassador in London, Hayashi Gonsuke, strongly recommended this course to his government that, however, saw snags not obvious to him and replied ambiguously. Hayashi, however, asked Tokyo to give its agreement in principle so that the proposal could be pursued. By contrast, Ambassador Ishii in Paris was more cautious and advised vigilance.The Japanese foreign minister hesitated, withholding his reply to Britain until he had seen how other powers would react. When Washington heard of this idea, it took over the initiative by proposing to hold a conference on the reduction of armaments. Issues like world disarmament, which had not arisen at Paris, had already come up at the 1920 sessions of the League of Nations. After America's defection, these matters could only be realistically pursued through bodies other than the League. Japan was by no means the only country affected. Japan opposed the limitations upon her army, as did France, and, along with other countries, was vigilant about the needs of the navy. On 11 July, Japan received a tentative sounding on this topic from President Harding. Shortly afterwards, the country was informed that, since the question of arms limitations was related to Pacific and Far Eastern questions, the proposed conference needed to cover that topic and include China. The Hara ministry was worried that the Washington invitation could potentially be adverse to Japan's interests on several counts. Genuinely keen on avoiding unnecessary friction with Washington, Hara wanted to prevent

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Japan from being pilloried for its opposition to all the liberal issues being ventilated in the postwar period. Japan had no hesitation over the disarmament issue and replied that she would wholeheartedly take part in such a conference. But on Pacific and Far Eastern issues, the cabinet decided to seek clarification. Japan returned a careful reply on 14 July stating that it needed to know the scope of the American proposal before it would commit itself.26 A week later, the Tokyo cabinet decided to proceed with negotiations preceding the conference on the agenda. It was not prepared to make "faits accomplis or issues between specific countries" the subject of discussion by other powers; special issues should be excluded from the agenda from the beginning. In response to enquiries by Ambassador Shidehara, the United States refused to prearrange the agenda but passed over assurances which appeared to be conciliatory. Japan replied on 27 July with the following proviso: "introduction [into the agenda] of problems which are of sole concern to certain particular Powers or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided." 27 The Americans asked Tokyo not to hold up the conference arrangements by insisting on prior agreement over the agenda and reaffirmed this on 9 August. Japan then accepted the invitation on 23 August, some six weeks after the initial overtures. The U.S. Secretary of State held out the hope that the Shantung problem could be sorted out before the conference opened on the basis of Japan's proposals for resolving it. On 8 September, the United States offered a set of headings to be covered by the agenda. For a month, this "unsatisfactory document" was chewed over by the various foreign policy committees, including the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs and the cabinet. Ambassador Shidehara, on 16 October, handed the State Department a note accepting its right to plan the agenda though once again stressing how Japan viewed the issue. These were difficult months full of American-Japanese suspicion.28 Internal minutes indicate that the "accomplished facts" about which Japan was doubtful included the British alliance, the Shantung lease, Siberia, and Pacific islands like Yap. Although Japan specifically insisted that the Shantung issue be excluded, the country was prepared to discuss the gradual ending of extraterritoriality and spheres of influence in China, the withdrawal of foreign troops from China, and the waiving of Boxer indemnity payments. In a concession, the Japanese agreed that faits accomplis might be discussed but in such a way as "not to give rise to a situation where Japan's past actions and policies alone are likely to be criticized."29 These instructions for internal use only show that Japan had doubts about her past actions and policies over Shantung and expected hostility toward them from the United States. Japan did not want interference from third parties about renewing the alliance with Britain. How much the United States was able to intercept these communications between Tokyo and its Washington embassy is not entirely clear.

28

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

Of course, Tokyo understood that a new president and a new party now were in power in the United States; different initiatives had to be expected from the Republicans. But relations between Tokyo and Washington were so sensitive that any initiative was unlikely to be to Japan's advantage. There was a feeling in Tokyo, which was shared in London, that the United States had outflanked the two allies by proposing to host a conference on such sensitive issues. This was a time of brinkmanship. The Americans were firm while the Japanese were insistent. The Japanese described the American initiative as "a very disagreeable surprise, an event of such gravity as cannot be exaggerated"; Japan was being treated by the Americans as though it, and not Germany, had been the defeated party in the First World War. The Japanese might have welcomed a conference organized by the British in which that country might act as a friendly intermediary. But Britain's ready acceptance of the American initiative played, according to the Japanese, into the hands of President Harding. 30 On the other hand, Hara was not unaware that an international conference might serve his purpose of improving relations with both the United States and China and advance the cause of constitutional government in Japan. In the underlying battle between civilians and military in Japanese politics, he could use the conference to bring foreign pressure to bear on the more extreme positions taken up by the army and navy. Since he had already accepted the inevitability of evacuating Siberia and Kiaochow, it could be useful to make those opposed to his views aware of the strength of foreign feeling in this way. ALLIANCE IN THE WASHINGTON MELTING POT Since the Anglo-Japanese alliance was sorted out in the early stages of the Washington deliberations, we shall deal with it here rather than in the next chapter. The topic of this alliance had not been raised at the Paris Peace Conference and had, in effect, been on the negotiating table ever since. On the British side, the leadership, because of their preoccupation with other things, left great discretion to Arthur Balfour, who was chosen as plenipotentiary to Washington. Balfour was conscious of the weakness of Britain's bargaining position. During his stormy passage across the Atlantic, he drew up the draft of a triple entente between Britain, Japan, and the United States in order to present it on arrival in Washington. As a former foreign secretary, he had no animosity towards Japan; but he felt that Britain's top priority, after the dramatic collapse of Germany and tsarist Russia, was to cultivate the best possible relations with the United States. In fact Japan's ambassador in Washington, Shidehara Kijuro, was thinking along remarkably similar lines.31

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It had been the prior understanding between the parties that the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance would not be raised during the official conference proceedings. Indeed, this precondition for Japan's attendance had been observed for the most part. Japan's instructions to her plenipotentiaries stated that the old alliance in amended form could continue but that the country would favor a triple entente between Japan, Britain, and the United States "designed to bring about permanent peace in the Pacific and Far East." If the alliance and entente could exist alongside each other, Japan would be pleased. But if Britain favored replacing the alliance by the entente, Japan would agree. It was not until 23 November, when the conference was well under way, that the British draft for a new Anglo-Japanese-American agreement, previously discussed with Charles Evans Hughes, was presented to Baron Kato. For procedural reasons, this was resented by Japan. Japan suspected Anglo-American collusion, though this was probably unwarranted. When the draft reached Shidehara, by now confined to bed, he saw that its terms went far beyond anything to which Washington would agree. Therefore, he redrafted it along the lines that any Pacific dispute which arose would be referred to a conference of signatory powers. He sent the Counsellor at his embassy, Saburi Sadao, over to Balfour with a document modifying the British draft in a way more acceptable to the United States. Balfour asked for the Shidehara draft with minor amendments from himself to be handed to Hughes from the Japanese side. But the American delegates did not want to confine the entente to the three countries alone and, at that stage, may have hoped to include China. The document formed the basis for the draft which Hughes offered at his meeting with Balfour and Kato on 7 December. At American insistence, France was to be included. For her part, Japan wanted to avoid diluting the alliance by including additional countries. Eventually, however, it was agreed that France should be asked to participate in order to forestall any opposition on the part of American public opinion to a three-sided compact.32 On 13 December, the plenipotentiaries of the United States, Britain, and Japan signed the new Four-Power treaty; France was required to sign it, subsequently. At the same time, the three countries made a declaration on the application of the treaty to mandated territories and on its exclusion of domestic problems. The quadruple treaty laid down that if a controversy arose between the parties, it would be referred to "a joint conference" for consideration and adjustment and that, in the event of aggression taking place, they all would communicate with each other "fully and frankly."33 There arose some dissatisfaction in Tokyo with the formula which its delegates in Washington had accepted, namely that Japan Proper might be deemed to be included among the "insular possessions" specified in the treaty. On 6 February 1922 after much indecisiveness, the four signatories agreed to a supplementary treaty laying down that "the term

30

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

'insular possessions and insular dominions' shall include only Karafuto, Formosa and the Pescadores and the islands under the mandate of the League." 34 The quadruple treaty had been negotiated behind closed doors outside the apparatus of conference committees and plenaries. It was finally sprung on delegates as a fait accompli at a formal session on 13 December. Nonetheless it could be argued that its signing was the first "success" recorded at Washington. The ending of the alliance was central to the conference. Its transformation into the Four-Power treaty was essential in obtaining the cooperation of China and securing the formula adopted to resolve the China problem. Of course, the Four-Power treaty seems, in retrospect, to have been quite inadequate for strategic situations which later arose. This was because the 1921 signatories took such an optimistic view of the situation in the Pacific area and thought that a military alliance would be pointless. In particular, the new treaty was narrowly drawn with no reference to the crucial problem of Japan in China. Public opinion in Japan did not understand until much later that the FourPower treaty was not a failure of Japanese diplomacy but something which the diplomats had themselves drafted. In spite of the gloss put on it by the media in Japan after the conference, the ending of the alliance had been accepted by Japan long before the meeting itself. Since Japanese diplomats had long been aware that American opinion was determined to bring down the alliance, they naturally were prepared for just such a contingency. Realists like Prime Minister Hara, were ready to trade in Japan's British alliance in favor of a tripartite entente by October 1921. Indeed Japan's standpoint was not greatly different from that of Britain: both seeking some entente with the United States, they were prepared to preserve the alliance or yield it up, depending on Washington's reactions. Public opinion in Japan was generally in the dark over this change of tune. Because major leakages were avoided at the conference, the media and, consequently, the Japanese public were taken aback by the outcome. The change was a particular blow to the Japanese navy. The alliance had been a naval one, mainly involving the Pacific Ocean area. It was not just the loss of the alliance that alarmed the Japanese, but also the cutting of ties between the Imperial Navy and the Royal Navy; these ties stretched back for half a century and had been tested in time of war. But Britain was unsentimental and not slow to terminate cooperation over officer training and the exchange of technology, which had, of course, been one-sided in the past. The alliance negotiations left the Japanese with the unhappy feeling that they were now isolated after two decades of association with Britain. But the price was small if it was successful in achieving Hara's main objec-

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tive of avoiding confrontation with the United States and China. Nonetheless, the majority in Japan persisted in believing that Japan again was serving as the victim of "Anglo-Saxon domination." This was a view shared by the volatile Japanese press, which was inclined to claim that Japan was being held on a leash by London and Washington, who generally saw eye-to-eye.

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CHAPTER 2

The Washington Conference of 1921-1922 The eminent Japanese diplomat, Saburi Sadao, in an address to the Japan Society of London in 1929, drew a contrast between the Paris and Washington Conferences. According to him, the Japanese delegates who went to Paris felt that they had been asked to serve Japan's national aims while those who went to Washington were filled with a spirit of internationalism, concerned with global advantage rather than Japan's domestic advantage. It is interesting that a liberal-minded diplomat who had served in a vital secretarial capacity at both conferences should take this view. It suggests that Japan accepted the invitation to the conference at Washington in a spirit of willingness to sacrifice her national interest for the sake of the common good of the world. Although this awareness may have characterized some members of the Japanese delegation, it was far from widespread. And Japan earned the reputation of being hard-headed and tenacious in both sets of negotiations.1 In mid summer 1921, the Hara ministry, while accepting the need for a conference on naval limitation, did not wish to be bullied—and perhaps humiliated—by discussion of a host of sensitive East Asian issues on which there had been international discord over the previous few years. What also worried the ministry was the prospect of these matters being ventilated in public forum in the context of the new Open Diplomacy. That the situation in East Asia had not been harmonious since the powers at Paris had failed to solve the Kiaochow issue and had left it to be tackled through ordinary diplomatic channels was recognized by Hara. On 24 August, Prime Minister Hara asked his Navy Minister, Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, to become the senior Japanese plenipotentiary. The choice of a serving officer did not please the press. It was a disappointment in Japan and a matter of surprise in the United States, which would have preferred representation by civilians. But Hara, who was a skillful tactician,

34

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

must have reasoned that any solution emerging at Washington could only be sold to the Japanese navy if the most senior figure from the fleet were present at the deliberations. If Hara had chosen a right-wing delegate, the choice would have been criticized by the United States. If one of Japan's internationalists had been chosen, that man might have been too amenable to American pressure, generating opposition when the delegation returned home. Choosing Kato, who was becoming doubtful about the navy's 8-8 building plan, was, therefore, a judicious compromise. Kato, though a quiet introvert by temperament, was to take great pains over his assignment to Washington.2 The civilian delegates were to be Ambassador Shidehara, the ambassador in Washington, and Prince Tokugawa Iesato, the president of the House of Peers who was not a member of the Seiyukai but was fluent in English and exuberantly gregarious. Since Shidehara was to become seriously ill during the conference and Tokugawa was there on a largely honorific basis, Admiral Kato had to bear responsibility not just for the naval talks but also for the sessions on China and Far Eastern problems. Hanihara Masanao was later sent from the Gaimusho to replace Shidehara in dealing with Chinese issues, thereby ameliorating the Peking complaint that the Japanese delegation did not include a single China expert for most of the deliberations. It is alleged that Hara would have preferred Count Chinda Sutemi, the former ambassador to London, who had been a relatively successful plenipotentiary during the Paris conference. But the Count had just returned home from travelling in Europe as adviser to the Crown Prince and was unavailable.3 Meanwhile officials of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries were hard at work on position papers. Eventually on 14 October, the instructions were handed over to the delegates. The salient points follow: "Inasmuch as the maintenance of friendly and smooth relations with the United States is what Japan particularly wishes to stress, the plenipotentiaries shall endeavour to bring about closer relations with her at the conference."4 Retreating from earlier arguments, they agreed that faits accomplis might be discussed but in such a way as "not to give rise to a situation where Japan's past actions and policies alone are likely to be criticized." These instructions, for internal use only, implied that Japan saw itself as vulnerable due to its past actions and policies; the country assumed that the United States would be hostile. There was an assumption that Britain would be more amenable than Washington. How far the United States was aware of Japan's anxieties through the interception of her signals is not entirely clear.5 Shortly after the Japanese delegation reached Washington, Prime Minister Hara was assassinated at Tokyo station on 4 November. This was an act of mindless violence by a teenager and had nothing to do with the conference: the assassin was motivated by domestic economic concerns like the food shortage, the high cost of living, and the general corruption of poli-

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tics. Hara's death was a great loss. In his capacity as prime minister, he had accomplished much on the foreign front including improved relations with the United States and China and the setting up of the Dairen conference in August to establish relations with the Russian Far Eastern Republic and resolve the problems generated by the Siberian intervention. Following Hara's death, the experienced banker and finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo was chosen from among the cabinet members as the next prime minister. He made it clear that his policies would follow those laid down by Hara; but his party base was less secure, and the representatives at Washington were not likely to receive the same strong and vigorous support from him. Meanwhile, the announcement was made that the Crown Prince had become regent for his ailing father. NAVAL BARGAINING AT WASHINGTON After further skirmishing among the world's capitals, the conference was convened on 12 November. Large and distinguished delegations from the great powers of the post-Versailles era assembled, conscious of their dependence on Washington's goodwill. The conference had to cover a disparate group of international issues. Some were global and strategic, great power issues. These will be considered first. The others, an equally disparate group, were regional issues, mainly dealing with the future of China, the Open Door there and the future of Chinese nationalism. The last issue attracted special attention because of the youthful, vigorous members of the Chinese delegation in Washington and the strong, vocal pressure exercised by Chinese residents in the American capital. These issues will be considered later. The important strategic issue was to find some formula to reduce naval building and maintain the balance among naval forces around the world. Japan was aware that the Republican administration was anxious to see progress being made in cutting down the world's navies. Japan was conscious that its navy was third largest in the world and that it had become the major power in the western Pacific. The thought that its hard-won naval strength would be cut to size was not a pleasing one. Up until 1910, the navy had lost out to the army in the share obtained of the national budget; naval strength had been difficult to develop. This was only reversed when the navy was authorized to build an 8-4 fleet (8 battleships, 4 battle cruisers) and move towards an 8-8 fleet when the country's resources permitted it. In reiterating its case during World War I, the navy argued that the remit of the fleet as one of the wartime allies first extended to the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean; from 1917 onwards, the area extended to the western Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The navy presented a memorandum, on 10 October 1917, advancing the plans for an 8-6 fleet; these plans were approved by the Diet the following March. Moreover, it seemed likely that Japan would fall heir to at least some of Germany's

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

islands in the Pacific as a result of the peace settlement; the additional territory would place a burden on the existing fleet. Against this background the 8-8 program—the summit of the navy's aspirations—was approved by the Diet in July 1920 after a lengthy struggle to woo the political parties and gain compromises with the army. 6 But Japan's economy declined sharply after 1919, giving rise to worries in the navy. The steel on which her shipbuilding programs depended was not available in the needed quantities because of America's own domestic building program. Moreover, shipbuilding plans were seriously affected by strikes at the Yawata Steelworks and the Kawasaki dockyard in 1920. The fact that the world's navies were changing to oil as the source of energy also worried Japan because of its lack of oil resources. Some naval observers w h o were sent to Europe came back with doubts about the validity of big navy arguments. Parliamentarians like Ozaki Yukio, already aware of the heavy expenditure incurred in Siberia, proposed the limitation of naval arms and received full press backing. Taken together, these various factors planted doubts within the naval hierarchy. 7 Should the 8-8 program be followed or abandoned? In M a r c h 1 9 2 1 , Admiral Kato, the author of the program, told the Associated Press that "should the powers come to a reliable understanding, Japan would limit [her navy] to a suitable extent and not even insist on the completion of the whole of her program." This was some months before 11 July when Jap a n received President Harding's invitation to the naval discussions. Aware that the participants would be under pressure to limit the size of their fleets, Japan replied that it would be pleased to participate in a conference on naval limitation. Immediately naval committees were set up to consider Japan's national interest. Since basic disagreements were beginning to appear within the naval hierarchy, it was essential that there should be a radical review before the conference took place. This revised perspective was reflected in the instructions formulated by the Gaiko Chosakai as well as the cabinet and despatched to the delegates on 14 October. The portion on naval limitation read as follows: For the sake of Japan's security and world peace, Japan's naval strength must be kept in line with the strength which other powers can employ, at least in eastern seas (toyo). As for the naval strength that Japan will claim on the occasion of the present disarmament negotiations,... the 8-8 fleet will be the standard; but to the extent that the United States and Britain will accept a ratio which is in conformity with the above-mentioned idea and no great changes emerge in the future situation in the Pacific, it is not vital that we should persist in the programme which is being pursued at present and we are not averse to reducing it in accordance with circumstances. We should propose the abolition or limitation of fortification of islands in the Pacific . . . and at least strive for the setting up of a treaty preserving the status quo. 8

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In addition, Japan wanted the arms limitation (gumbi seigen) issue to be resolved first. Apart from that, her instructions were remarkably noncommittal and broad-minded, considering the long domestic campaign the navy had waged for the 8-8 program. Civilian politicians, who had to fund the naval building program, were taking a hostile line. Speaking for a wider group, one writer observed that "it was with a certain relief that Japan looked forward to a halt in the feverish preparations for war." Before the conference began in November, Kato assured the public that Japan had never entertained the idea of maintaining a navy equal to those of America or Britain.9 After their arrival in Washington, the Japanese delegates discovered, from the secretary of state's initial speech to the conference on 12 November, that limitation and decommissioning were to be the order of the day. They decided to approach the problem from a broad perspective, looking positively for a compromise. The delegation leader, Admiral Kato, responded three days later by accepting the American plan in principle and saying that Japan was "ready to proceed with determination to make a sweeping reduction in her naval armament." 10 This led to some dissension among his naval colleagues. At the Technical Committee, Admiral Kato Kanji proposed that the ratio between Japan and other navies should be 7 to 10; that the battleships, Mutsu and Aki, should be retained; and that aircraft carriers should be kept on an equal basis. But these proposals led to much intense technical debating among the naval staffs in Washington and did not find favor with other countries. On 23 November, Kato Tomosaburo, knowing that quick decisions might have to be taken, asked Tokyo which option it favored: 1. 2. 3. 4.

to to to to

stick to its original proposal fix the ratio at about 10 to around 6.5 and include Mutsu fix the ratio at 10 to 6 and include Mutsu agree to the United States proposal as it stands.

He added that "now that the opinions of Britain and the United States are already basically in accord, it is crystal clear that our country must bear the sole responsibility if we should clash with the United States on the question of naval armament limitation and lead to the conference's collapse." 11 After discussion with the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, Tokyo favored the second course but authorized Kato to accept the third plan with reluctance, on condition that the status quo for Pacific fortifications should be accepted. When the British delegate asked on 1 December if some formula could be found which would ease the acceptance of the inferior ratio, Kato proposed maintaining the status quo for fortifications in the Pacific islands.12 Two days later at a three-sided meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State

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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period

said that the United States would have no objection to guaranteeing the status quo in Pacific defenses provided that Japan accepted the ratio of 5:5:3 for battleships. Although Kato announced that he had no objection, he was further instructed to retain at all costs the new battleship Mutsu which, he was told, had been completed a month earlier; being fully equipped and manned, the ship was commissioned and had joined the fleet. Although the Americans proposed that the Mutsu should be scrapped, they finally relented and accepted her retention. Kato found general agreement for the proposition that powers with territories situated in the Pacific area should observe the status quo over fortifications and naval bases there. A draft treaty was, therefore, agreed upon. 1 3 Finding consensus over the area to be covered by this self-denying ordinance was not so easy. But Secretary Hughes promised that the matter would be considered over Christmas. Tokyo disagreed with the compact that Kato had reached with Hughes and Balfour, wanting to exclude the Bonin islands and Amami-Oshima from the nonfortification zone. This led to many points of contention and much irritation on Kato's part. Left in Washington over Christmas, he brooded on his exposed position. He suffered from a divided delegation, having differences with Admiral Kato Kanji in terms of personality and viewpoint about national defense. On at least three occasions, his negotiating position had been undermined by instructions from Tokyo. His interpreter records the situation: His own government's demands must have appeared to him wholly unreasonable, as it surely did to all impartial observers. . . . It would be very easy for him to resign. He knew who were behind the instructions but he must not make them enemies for that might make the work of the conference meaningless.14 Kato, therefore, sent a message from the Shoreham Hotel to the navy viceminister in Tokyo, Admiral Ide Kenji, on 2 7 December which revealed his thinking: since the recent world war, defense was regarded as a subject which could no longer be left to professional soldiers and sailors alone. For Japan, this was radical doctrine indeed. One has to rely, Kato continued, on the total mobilization of the state. Thus, while the military can arrange for munitions, it cannot put them to practical use unless it can rely on the industrial power of the people, encourage trade and maximize the nation's strength. Moreover, funds were very important: One has to admit frankly that, if one has no money, one cannot make war. . . . Even if we assume that our munitions are equal to those of America, we can no longer make war on the small amount of money that we could afford at the time of the war with Russia. If we consider where funds might be obtained, there is no other country apart from the U.S. which could supply a loan to Japan. If America is to be the enemy, the means of raising funds is restricted and Japan would have to find

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the military finance for herself. . . . We can only conclude that a war with America is impossible and must be avoided.15 But criticisms of Kato's thinking continued to be advanced on two levels. Those in his delegation in Washington who favored a large navy contained some of the most dissatisfied. There were also political enemies in Japan who were creating difficulties. So long as the original arrangement prevailed whereby Hara himself would act as navy minister in Tokyo, Kato had been relatively protected. But Prime Minister Takahashi, who took over after Hara's assassination, had neither the authority nor the inclination to arbitrate between the conflicting views. Although Kato was more discouraged than at any other time, he was able to win over both his opponents at home and his subordinates at the conference by tact and patience. In this way he was able to overcome Japan's main complaints against the naval treaty, which was finally agreed upon on 6 February 1922. According to its difficult Article XIX, the status quo was to be applied to the defenses of the Philippines, Guam, Hongkong, the Kurile islands, the Bonin islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo [Ryukyu] islands, Formosa, and the Pescadores. This was a compromise reached in response to Japan's demands. There were to be no increases in naval repair facilities, no extension of coastal defenses, and no new fortifications. Since there were to be no bases west of Pearl Harbor, Japan's anxieties about its vulnerability moved from the United States to Britain, whose colony of Singapore was excluded from the treaty.16 While large army and air force delegations also were in Washington, the issue of military disarmament was not really addressed. The Japanese army was as reluctant as the French one to address the issue. Of course, Shidehara announced that Japan would pull her armies out of Siberia before the end of 1922, as decided under Hara. But, in general, the army, though only marginally involved, was disgruntled. General Tanaka Kunishige, a former military attache in London and director of military intelligence, reported this wariness: One section of the American people has expressed the view that Japan's attitude has been unexpectedly conciliatory and that the conference's success has been due to this change on the part of Japan. While the black clouds which used to exist between the U.S. and Japan have certainly been dispelled,.. . America's satisfaction over the success of the conference is no more than a short-lived phenomenon. In the course of time she will return to her former posture and assume the mantle of the hegemonic power in the region.17 One of the practical military-naval problems between the United States and Japan was the future of Yap island in the central Pacific; the island had been occupied by the Japanese navy in 1914 and retained. The United States

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had wanted Yap excluded from Japan's mandated territories. This was one of the strategic points on which the naval positivists in Japan had set their sights. A conference in Washington in the autumn of 1920 had failed to reach agreement. Hughes tried to solve the disagreement before the major conference but failed. The outcome was that Japan entered into an agreement of convenience with the United States outside of the conference on 11 February 1922: American citizens on Yap secured certain rights and privileges. This enabled the United States to confirm Japan's mandates in the Pacific.18 CHINA ISSUES AT WASHINGTON

The original invitation of July had stressed the urgency of dealing with Pacific and Far Eastern issues alongside the naval issue. Though not specified, the most vital issues were assumed to be those relating to China. When the conference assembled, the Kiaochow issue was not explicitly stated as among the agenda issues in order not to offend the Japanese. Instead the more ideological issues connected with the Open Door were raised in profusion, with a finger pointed at all the imperialist powers in China but especially Japan. Since 1919, China had shown signs of a vibrant nationalism; and it was opportune that the international community should review matters such as the Chinese territorial and administrative integrity, railway issues, tariff autonomy, extraterritoriality, concessions, and preferences. Japan's position was that while the Shantung issue should be excluded from general discussion, Japan was prepared to discuss the gradual ending of extraterritoriality and spheres of influence, the withdrawal of foreign troops from China, and the waiving of Boxer indemnity payments. Clearly, there was scope here for radical differences of view. But, by persistence and persuasion, two treaties were signed and ten resolutions passed. Underlying all discussion was the question of the authority of the Chinese delegation. The sprightly Chinese delegates were Dr. Cheng-ting Wang; Dr. Wellington Ku; and Mr. Alfred Sao-ke Sze, the Chinese ambassador to Washington. Young, confident, and articulate, they presented their case ably, ignoring civil war and warlord rule at home. But one participant recorded the difficulties: The Chinese Delegation had a very difficult job, they had to act as though they represented some solid Government whereas everybody at the Conference knew full well that they represented nothing whatever and had no one behind them. If one bears this in mind, it is surprising really how seriously they were taken.19 For China, the key issue involved the return of Kiaochow, being more readily understood than the Open Door. The Japanese had occupied the German treaty port of Tsingtao since 1914 and developed a strong economic position in the province through their control of the Tsingtao-Tsinan rail-

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way. Since the Paris Peace Conference, the Japanese had been trying to regularize their position with China. When the Versailles treaty became effective in January 1920, Japan offered talks on the subject. After much delay, China replied on 22 May that she had not signed that treaty and could not negotiate directly with Japan. The Americans had also declined to sign the covenant of the League; this encouraged China to look to the United States for support. The result was that China would not open negotiations with Japan. Although the United States encouraged this refusal, in August 1921, Washington feared that a log jam of disagreements was likely to damage the forthcoming conference and suggested that the two parties might enter into talks with each other. On 7 September, Japan, through Minister Obata in Peking, stated the terms on which the Kiaochow issue could be settled, a foretaste of the solution that was finally adopted. But China replied that if these proposals were to be considered Japan's final concession, they fell short and proved the insincerity of Japan's desire to settle the question. The problem was not so much the territory as the railway which penetrated well into the heartland of China. Japan offered to manage the railway company jointly with China, while Germany had earlier treated it as a colonial monopoly operated by Germany. Some other interchanges took place before the conference, but there was little sign of a conciliatory spirit. The Chinese refused to enter into negotiations as such, dragging the matter out until the Washington deliberations began. On 30 November, it was announced that, through the kind offices of Hughes and Balfour, conversations would take place immediately. The Chinese wanted the issue to come before a plenary session; the Japanese were opposed. Instead thirty-six bilateral, private sessions were held in the presence of foreign observers in order to ensure that the proceedings were not too one-sided. J.V.A. MacMurray and E. Bell, the American observers, were present primarily to reassure China while Sir John Jordan, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, and Miles Lampson from Britain were there to console Japan. Agonizing discussions outside the conference resolved the disputed issues; the resolutions were announced in a treaty of 4 February 1922. Under the treaty, Japan was to restore to China, within six months, the former German-leased territory of Kiaochow in return for compensation. Japanese troops, police, and customs officers were to be withdrawn. The TsingtaoTsinan railway was to be bought out by China; some Japanese officials, a traffic manager and a chief accountant, were to remain until payment was complete. Most of the provisions were carried out within the year. It was, of course, something of a capitulation for the Chinese, who had hoped that the issue would go before the whole conference, which would be swayed by pro-Chinese sentiment from around the world. But they, nonetheless, secured much from the negotiations. These were difficult talks between unconciliatory delegations, and only the disinterested brokerage of foreigners prevented them from breaking down. 20

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The Nine-Power Treaty was of less tangible advantage to China. Many of the sessions of the Pacific and Far Eastern Committee of the conference were devoted to the Open Door in China with considerable input from the United States delegate, Elihu Root, and the Chinese delegates, Alfred Sze, Dr. Wellington Koo and CT. Wang. Sze in particular presented a ten-point program covering many areas of China's foreign relations. The Chinese had many complaints about leased territories and spheres of influence. Like Britain, Japan regarded itself as being on trial. Admiral Kato stated, at the initial meeting on 19 November, that Japan would avoid any action involving intervention in the internal affairs of China. After discussion of a vast agenda covering leased territories, spheres of influence, and the Open Door, many resolutions were passed. Eventually at the final session of the conference on 4 February 1922, Secretary Hughes read out the text of the NinePower Treaty. An American construct from the earlier resolutions, the treaty was amended and arranged as was required. It was appropriate that it should be proclaimed by the Americans, who were the begetters and upholders of the Open Door in China. Like the other powers, Japan had professed to observe the principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China. Japan accepted the Nine-Power Treaty although the country had reservations relating to Manchuria and Mongolia. It was Tokyo's understanding that this new reassertion of the Open Door principle would not directly affect Japan's existing interests and would not apply to some enterprises. Consequently the Nine-Power Treaty was undermined by, first, the inherent vagueness of the Open Door doctrine itself and, secondly, the glosses that individual states placed upon it. Unlike treaties that are fought over, clause by clause, this one consisted of a synthesis of various resolutions adopted independently.21 The Japanese had many conflicting interpretations of the agreements over China in the Washington treaties. Japan's position in Manchuria and Mongolia was in question. Further, the standing of the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915 and 1918, which China and the United States had condemned so wholeheartedly, was uncertain. For example, Ichihashi Yamato, who was secretary and interpreter to Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, asserts that Japan obtained recognition of the existing Sino-Japanese treaties at Washington. By contrast, the Japanese diplomatic historian Kajima Morinosuke argues that with the conclusion of the Nine-Power Treaty, a statutory basis was given to the conception that spheres of influence and special interests were incompatible with the Open Door Policy. However, judging from the actual situation in China, where the interested powers wielded influence in various areas of the country while the central government's policies remained ineffectual, to what extent such a provision could be applied was questionable. Now the Powers found themselves bound by an official document and the binding force was international law. This treaty aimed at the

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realization of equal opportunity in eastern commerce on the assumption that China would become an orderly and organized state. Since making such an assumption concrete in China was going to be hard to materialize, equal opportunity was also likely to be an unattainable target. This, writes Kajima, is "a striking example of a great mistake which the world committed in resolving questions in the Far East." His words reflect a very pessimistic assessment of Chinese affairs, which may be justified in retrospect. But, in the light of postwar idealism, the majority of conference members took a positive view of China's stability and future potential. 22 In their desire for stability in China, the Allied Powers had to grapple with the problem of providing income for the central government there. At the Paris Conference, China had asked to be granted the tariff autonomy that she had lost through the nineteenth century treaties. Instead, at Peking, the nations had put forward a provision for tariffs to be raised to 7.5 percent; but this had not found favor because of the disturbed mood in the country. The Chinese delegates, who held a stronger position in Washington than in Paris, again called for tariff autonomy. After protracted and heated discussions in the subcommittee, the Chinese Customs Treaty emerged, allowing for an immediate increase in tariff to an effective 5 percent. An important provision was that a Special Conference would be held in China to settle the Chinese Customs Tariff. This was done at Shanghai in March 1922. The Peking Tariff Conference was held in October 1925 so that the abolition of the likin levy and the raising of a surtax of 2.5 percent could be discussed; but, with civil war breaking out in China, a treaty was not concluded.23 The conference ended breathlessly with a plenary session on 6 February, which kept the main plenipotentiaries engaged until the last moment. Although there was give and take on all sides, Japan chose to believe that it had been subjected to a monopoly of giving. Japan again blamed her lack of success on Anglo-Saxon domination. This was a reaction similar to the one expressed over the Paris settlement three years earlier. For example, naval issues that were paramount to Japan had not been given adequate priority over the China issues. This was a view broadly shared by the volatile Japanese press which was in the throes of a circulation battle and happy to latch on to talk of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy. Balfour and Hughes, to be sure, often found themselves in agreement. But Admiral Kato was unhappy with the mindset formed by Tokyo that his delegation was negotiating against the combined opposition of the United States and Britain. In fact, Kato protested to Tokyo that the plenipotentiaries at Washington were not aware of coercion by the United States and Britain.24 But that did not convince Japan: an illusion that London and Washington always saw eye to eye and an inclination to ignore the extent to which the interests of the United States and Britain diverged over China continued.

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KATO'S LAST STAND AND LEGACY When Kato arrived back in Japan on 10 March, his reception was mixed. On the one hand, he had garnered golden opinions at home and abroad for the successful conduct of his mandate at Washington. His image had changed from that of the unrepentant naval expansionist to that of the sober, international statesman. Among foreigners, he had earned the reputation of being an advocate of disarmament. Among his countrymen, Kato was respected for his samurai demeanor and courtesy. Along with many cordial speeches of welcome, he received congratulations from the Emperor when he presented his report. Admiral Yamanashi was later to recall that Kato looked upon the invitation to Washington as a "gift from the gods" that would extricate him from the multiple difficulties surrounding the construction of the 8-8 fleet. Understandably, he was not universally popular in the navy; the disagreements that had surfaced during the conference worsened considerably afterwards. The actions of both the cabinet and advisory committee in Tokyo did not make things easy for him.25 The acting prime minister, Takahashi, had already set about implementing the Washington findings. The treaties were scrutinized as a package by the cabinet, Gaiko Chosakai, and privy council. But Takahashi's days as prime minister of a Seiyukai cabinet were numbered, and he resigned on 6 June. The elder statesmen, somewhat surprisingly, invited Admiral Kato to be his successor. Though not a party follower, Kato was able to extract promises of cooperation from the Seiyukai party; with that assurance, he accepted office six days later. Of course, the implementation of the Washington treaties was the vital issue which Japan had to face. So there were good grounds for leaving the course to be steered to one who had been involved in the negotiation. The intensive scrutiny being completed by 27 July, Japan announced herself ready to ratify the treaties. On 5 August, the Prince Regent, who had had to take over from the ailing Emperor in the previous November, gave his sanction to the Washington treaties after the proper ratification procedures. Like Britain, Japan had given priority to ratification of the Washington treaties. But, of course, not all powers were favorable to the treaties. The naval treaty, in particular, was greatly disliked by the French because of the humiliating ratio they had been allowed and their parity with Italy. During a cabinet crisis in Paris in January 1922, Aristide Briand, who had negotiated the Washington treaties, was forced to resign. His successor steered the treaties through the assembly but without great enthusiasm. Eventually, ratification, subject to the government adopting an extensive naval building program, took place in France. So the exchange of ratifications of the Washington treaties, which had been tightly negotiated over a three month period, did not take place until 17 August 1923, a delay of some eighteen months.

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Kato had to embark on a consequential program of reforms which were not universally popular. On 24 June, the new government had to withdraw its troops from Siberia, a withdrawal largely completed in October. Early in July, Kato who himself was acting as Navy Minister published a plan for naval retrenchment, involving the decommissioning of eleven warships and reducing the number of sailors by 12,000. A similar plan in the name of War Minister Yamanashi was designed to reduce the army by over 60,000 troops. In December, Japanese troops were evacuated from Tsingtao as a result of the agreement with China, though Japan refused to accede to China's request for the return of Dairen and Ryojun (or Port Arthur). A reexamination of the country's defense planning lay behind these decisions. As a result of this study, the national defense plan, teikoku kokubo hoshin^ was amended. It was resolved between the army and navy general staffs that existing plans would have to be amended "in accordance with changes in the situation at home and abroad" (naigai josei no henko ni yori). In-depth studies were carried out throughout 1922. While reviewing postwar relations, the planners decided that three countries fell into the category of hypothetical enemy: in order of perceived hostility, the countries were the United States, Soviet Russia and China. The United States was regarded as the country with which Japan was most likely to be involved in a collision (ware to shototsu no kanosei saidai ni shite). For the first time the United States ranked ahead of Russia according to this army-navy compromise. The conclusion came before Kato on 8 December; two weeks later, he again emphasized his view that service manpower and armament must depend on the state of Japan's finances and international relations.26 Japan's war history comments on a paradox: while Kato had tried to prevent trouble with Washington, the new defense plan, devised by the heads of the general staffs and adopted during his premiership, envisaged an American-Japanese war as a long-term contingency. But, of course, the Japanese fully recognized that accommodation with Washington was immediately necessary. And the army, in spite of the decision, was still inclined to focus its gaze on Soviet activities in Asia. Once again the clash of armynavy interests between Asia and the Pacific was coming to the fore.27 Kato died from stomach cancer on 24 August 1923; posthumously created a viscount, he was then promoted to being admiral of the fleet. His leadership of Japan in a critical period had been outstanding. That such a large slate of fundamental reforms could be introduced so quickly without tensions, disagreements, and unpopularity is unimaginable; but the reforms passed with remarkable smoothness. Under Kato's leadership, an extraordinary transition had taken place. It is important not to become so preoccupied with the government and so-called top brass that we ignore the politicians and tax-payers who were overjoyed with some aspects of the outcome in Washington. The fact that

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the military side of arms limitation had not been on the table at the conference had greatly annoyed Japan's political parties. The opposition Kokuminto and the pro-government Seiyukai presented a plan for reducing army funds for armaments. Accepting this proposal, the government reduced allocations for men and animals, the so-called Yamanashi reform. But, unlike the navy where Kato's vision and skill were praised, the army's scheme was ill-conceived. Both of the parties remained dissatisfied. It is hard to sum up Japan's achievement at Washington. In advance, the country knew that its wings might be clipped. Japan had been a relatively flexible negotiator over naval matters and the affairs of China. Prepared in the last resort to jettison her earlier beliefs in a big navy, it accepted the realities of the international situation after 1918. Japan's conversion was probably a gradual and reluctant one without a dramatic volte face. But the country was practical enough to face the fact that its weak economy could not yet afford to indulge in naval building that was competitive with the United States. Therefore, Japan made a strong attempt to seek good relations with the United States, which was likely to be dominant in the Pacific area for the foreseeable future. Japan accepted the various formulae because in the world of the 1920s, it had no alternative but to cultivate the American government. Its position fairly successfully safeguarded by the non-fortification agreement, Japan also made many concessions. The end result was that in a haphazard way many of the points of friction between the two countries were resolved in and around the conference. The outcome regarding China was a disappointment to most Japanese. Only those like Ambassador Hayashi Gonsuke in London thought that Japan should keep clear of China. The declaration that the Powers should give up their spheres of interest in China was anathema to the majority of Japanese. They were anxious to retain those spheres in northeast China that Japan had painfully accumulated and confirmed by her treaties of 1915 and 1918. Despite Ichihashi's statement that Japan received endorsement for these treaties at Washington, she could draw little satisfaction from the conference on that score.28 If serious American-Japanese tension relaxed, significant points of disagreement and bitterness still remained. Thus, the United States gave notice of termination of the Ishii-Lansing notes exchanged on 2 November 1917 as a way of maintaining a friendly relationship, especially vis-a-vis China. The notes had been dogged by misunderstanding on both sides from the start. They were formally terminated by the Republican administration in a further exchange of notes on 14 April 1 9 2 3 P Behind the high-flown rhetoric at the Washington conference, the shadow of policy about Japanese immigration to the United States still hung. Ambassador Shidehara had held unofficial talks with Morris, the former American ambassador in Tokyo, in order to resolve the problems connected with immigration into California. The intention of Californian legislators

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was to prevent the Japanese from owning—or even leasing—land. Talks took place in twenty-three sessions in Washington between September 1920 and January 1921, during the last days of the Democratic administration. But the negotiators failed to find an acceptable formula. Although Japan wanted to put negotiations on a formal basis with the new Republican administration, President Harding chose to delay the issue until after the Washington conference. Japan came away from the Washington conference weakened by the prospect of not having the British alliance but still being linked to the international body through her commitment to the League of Nations of which Japan was a founding member. Japan was vigilant about the effects of the Bolshevik Revolution: Japan believed that Chinese hostility could be attributed to Communist influence and that the Bolshevik Revolution influenced her own people. Many of the Japanese were ready to drink in the mood of postwar idealism, looking to the establishment of a representative system of government and the creation of a liberal society. That was part of the international mood which influenced its newspapers and periodicals. But each move in the direction of internationalism seemed to lead to a countervailing growth of nationalism. If the prevailing tendency since the RussoJapanese war of 1904-1905 had been one of militarism, that tendency had not been greatly changed following the expensive failure of the Siberian intervention and hesitation over pulling out of Shantung. The attempt of the Washington powers to restrict Japan's activities in China was seen as a particular attack on the army. The retrenchment of the 1920s angered the military establishment and set them against the civilians. While the navy's ambitions had been curbed by international action—and this was convenient for Admiral Kato—the navy was divided. Some were not prepared to accept international dictation over naval limitation. It took a decade for this naval radicalism to mature, but it owes its birth to the nationalist reaction to the Washington conference.

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CHAPTER 3

Handling Nationalism in China, 1923-1929

The horrendous Great Kanto Earthquake (Kanto Daishinsai) took place on 1 September 1923; it destroyed much of the populous cities of Tokyo and Yokohama and caused heavy casualties. The catastrophe was huge for the military and civilians alike. Great damage was done to shipbuilding at Yokosuka, one of Japan's significant naval bases. The reconstruction of the ship Amagi, then being converted from a heavy cruiser to an aircraft carrier (junyo senkan), could not be carried out and the cruiser Kaga from Kobe was substituted. The naval academies at Tokyo and Yokosuka were substantially damaged.1 The tragedy led to the collapse of the government and to the creation of a short-lived "earthquake ministry" under the venerable Admiral Yamamoto Gombei. The United States volunteered generous help. From Manila and the United States supplies valued at 16 million dollars were rushed to Yokohama. Three field hospitals were erected by American troops and staffed by seventy American doctors and nurses on a temporary basis. This short-term aid was very welcome to the Japanese and contributed to a distinct improvement in the political relations between the two countries.2 But this has to be set against the immigration problem. By the end of 1923, Congress had under consideration immigration legislation directed especially against Japan. Japanese Ambassador Hanihara Masanao protested repeatedly and obtained some support from the administration. In May 1924, however, both houses of Congress passed a bill containing a clause aimed primarily at excluding Japanese immigrants; the bill would take effect on 1 July. Japan reacted with great disappointment. The Japanese government made a formal protest on grounds of racial discrimination; the House of Peers passed a resolution expressing extreme regret at this action; and the Japanese ambassador resigned in disappointment. It was, indeed,

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a great reversal after so many points of tension with Washington had been painstakingly removed.3 Another domestic crisis, which affected Japan's foreign attitudes, took place on 23 December 1923; an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of the Crown Prince, in his capacity as regent for his father, the Taisho Emperor. The prince was shot at close range on his way to open the Diet in what is known as "the Toranomon incident." The work of a Communist, the incident was treated as a danger signal pointing to the vulnerability of the Japanese state and society. In response, the government clamped down on protest movements and became extremely vigilant about communist activities among her neighbors. The cabinet resigned in the aftermath of the attempted assassination. The elder statesmen, called on to find a new prime minister, decided to steer clear of political parties with their destabilizing effects. They chose Count Kiyoura who set up a nonparty ministry, consisting (in Gilbertian fashion) solely of members of the House of Peers. This cabinet, too, was short-lived and was preoccupied by domestic problems. Japan, which had been represented in the media as a world leader at the time of the Paris and Washington conferences, had been sadly cut down. For the rest of the decade, the country was preoccupied with restoring her economy, industry, and foreign trade, in which she depended greatly on the China market. 4 In the general election of May 1924, the Kenseikai gained the most votes and formed a coalition party cabinet. The cabinet came to power in a mood of triumph at having broken the run of nonparty cabinets. Made up of the Kenseikai, Seiyukai, and the Kakushin Club, the coalition was led by the veteran leader and diplomat Kato Takaaki. But jealousies soon developed and exposed the fragility of the alliance. It broke up in August 1925 when Kato set up a one party ministry purely under the Kenseikai flag. He died five months later and was succeeded by Wakatsuki Reijiro. These Kenseikai cabinets inaugurated a period of political party rule which was to last until the Seiyukai ministry collapsed in May 1932. This period also ushered in greater continuity in foreign policy under Shidehara Kijuro (1871-1951) who, either as foreign minister or in opposition, influenced affairs down to December 1931. We have already discussed Shidehara as vice minister (1917-1919) and ambassador to Washington at the time of the Washington conference. In 1922, his embassy colleagues were worried about his health and urged that he be allowed to return home for rest so that his life would be in less danger. Shidehara left the American capital on 27 March and spent almost two years regaining his strength; he kept a loose attachment to the Foreign Ministry. When Prime Minister Kato was looking for a foreign minister, Shidehara was a natural candidate (he was in any case Kato's brother-in-law). During his convalescence, Shidehara had formulated the ideas which eventually became the basis of "Shidehara diplomacy" (Shidehara gaiko). His diplomacy dem-

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onstrated progressive views on internationalism and strong advocacy of good relations with the United States. He had the full support of Kato who as a former diplomat was to some extent his own foreign minister. Kato and Shidehara were both affected by the depressed conditions of the Japanese economy and anxious to rectify the growing encroachments of the army.5 THE ARMY AND RUSSIA Among the unresolved issues arising from the withdrawal of the Japanese army from Siberia was the question of Japan's policy towards the New Russia. It goes without saying that the thinking of the army leaders was critical for all aspects of Japan's continental policy, especially towards Russia. General Ugaki Kazushige (Issei), who had been serving as vice minister for war in 1923 under General Tanaka Giichi (1863-1929), was appointed war minister at the end of that year, after an unholy tussle between rival factions following the collapse of Yamamoto's cabinet. The fray resulted from the age-old clash within the army between the Choshu clique, headed by Tanaka, and the Satsuma clique, now headed by General Uehara Yusaku. It was for the army the end of clan influence, which had declined in the navy a little earlier. The younger, reform-minded officers redoubled their call for change under Ugaki's lead, while those wanting the status quo rallied around the conservative Uehara. Though Ugaki's tenure was interrupted by the change of government in 1927, he resumed office two years later. During his term, he reduced the army by four divisions, carried out overdue modernization plans, and ensured that promotion not be based on clan favoritism but on talent and professionalism.6 Modernization of the army was accompanied by its greater involvement in politics. For the upper echelons of the army, politics during the 1920s and 1930s meant increasing involvement with foreign affairs. The army was naturally much concerned with Bolshevism coming to power in Russia and the prospect of a new Communist regime stretching from Moscow to Vladivostok. It braced itself to confront the traditional enemy Russia in its new Soviet manifestation. During the First World War, the army had become concerned with the instability of China in the hands of the warlords. But the 1920s campaign for a united China waged by the Kuomintang army under Bolshevik influence was even more disturbing for the army leaders whose long-term strategies seemed to have failed in both respects concerning China. The army saw the key to Japan's continental policy as Manchuria which had been won by Japan's great efforts in two horrendous wars. It believed that this resource-rich country, whose population had little sense of belonging to China proper, possessed vast economic potential in addition to strategic importance at the frontier between Japanese, Russian, and Chinese interests. The responsibility for defending this vulnerable border

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rested with the Kuantung army, which had been established in Japan's leased territory of Kuantung and was the part of her military forces most difficult to discipline. That army had an impressive pool of China experts with linguistic skills which made them more effective on the ground than the Foreign Ministry, which tended to train people in western diplomatic skills. Though the Kuantung army was efficient and well-equipped, its force only amounted to 10,000 men, a small number by comparison with those which China could rally. In order to make up for its shortage of numbers, the Kuantung army relied on the cooperation, not to say subservience, of the local warlord Chang Tso-lin and emergency backup from the Japanese army in Korea. With Chang and the Japanese administration in Korea, this army shared an acute suspicion about Sino-Soviet intentions in Northeast Asia.7 When pulling her troops out of Siberia, Japan intended to negotiate the best possible terms for withdrawal. Therefore, negotiations were opened with the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia (FER), a purportedly noncommunist buffer state based in China. The talks took place at Dairen from August 1921. While the FER recognized all previous agreements between Japan and Siberia, the two sides were unable to clinch a deal because of Japan's unwillingness to withdraw her forces at this stage. In September of the following year, the FER delegates to Changchun had to be accompanied by ones from the Russian Republic for a second set of talks; this warned Tokyo that nothing could be settled in the East without Moscow's participation. 8 Finally, after the incorporation of the FER into the Soviet Union, it became necessary to devise unofficial channels for the Tokyo and Moscow governments, which did not recognize one another, to transact business. In Japan, many in the Diet and many in the army did not approve of making overtures to communists and denounced the failure of Japan's approach hitherto. The initiative was taken—and pushed through determinedly—by Baron Goto Shimpei, the mayor of Tokyo, who had formerly been foreign minister. Goto, a doctor by profession, met Adolf Joffe, the senior Russian representative in the East. In June 1923, he invited the ailing Joffe, as a private citizen and not public official, to Japan for treatment. Their secret talks were held up by Japan's demand for an apology for the atrocity perpetrated by Bolsheviks against Japanese civilians at Nikolaievsk in 1920 and by Russia's demand that Japan pull out of northern Sakhalin; the two were inter-related issues of particular sensitivity. Eventually, in November, Joffe departed, still without having clinched a deal.9 Meanwhile it became a matter of urgency for some sort of accommodation to be reached with the Soviet Union in the East, as in Europe. Moscow's anti-Japanese propaganda reached such a pitch that Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Japan's minister to China, was instructed to make a strong protest to the Soviet predsedatel (representative) in Peking, Lev Karakhan. At Vladivostok, the Soviet authorities made it hard for Japanese to obtain visas. Incidents became so serious there that the Japanese consul-general was arrested, al-

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legedly for espionage. The cards were stacked in favor of Russia. Finally, the Kato ministry overcame the opposition of disgruntled elements and resumed negotiations with Karakhan at Peking in August 1924. The minor pinpricks resolved, a treaty was signed on 20 January 1925. Japan recognized the Soviet Union and agreed to evacuate troops from northern Sakhalin in return for extensive commercial guarantees regarding oil and coal. The Soviet Union, in its turn, recognized all former treaties including the treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 and agreed, by a separate Annexed Note, to express sincere regrets for the actions of Bolshevik partisans at Nikolaievsk in March 1920. On this basis, an exchange of ambassadors took place; Japan ceased to recognize the provisional Russian government and its Tokyo representative, Dmitrii Abrikosov. Japanese troops were pulled out of northern Sakhalin by 15 May. There was optimistic speculation in the Russian and Japanese newspapers that the two countries would develop even closer relations. 10 SHIDEHARA AND CHINESE NATIONALISM Japan's problem over China was how to disentangle its interests in Manchuria from its interests in China proper. In the Manchurian case, Japan was all too aware of the Soviet anti-imperialist propaganda which was being spread; the railway offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway, running across the middle of Manchuria from Manchouli to Vladivostok, were poisoning the minds of the Chinese population. In the case of China proper, where Japanese exports made up about 25 percent of her total trade, Japan's worries were twofold: the inroads made by Bolshevism into Chinese policy; and the vehemence of the new Chinese nationalism with its strongly antiJapanese flavor. The two problems merged when Chang Tso-lin, the warlord of Manchuria, became engaged in a struggle for ascendancy in north China. The Japanese had a sort of love-hate relationship with him, sometimes encouraging him and sometimes restraining him. Unquestionably, both aspects of their strategy became more difficult when Chang took over at Peking in the autumn of 1924. On 1 July of that year, Foreign Minister Shidehara had made his first speech to the Diet on foreign policy, stressing that Japan should follow a policy of absolute non-interference in the internal affairs of China. But practical realities soon tested this principle when the second Fengtien-Chihli war broke out between the two warlords, Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria and Wu Pei-fu. Some voices within the cabinet called for increased support for Chang. Many Japanese politicians felt that there was a special relationship between Japan and China and that their country need not be governed by non-intervention which should apply only to other powers. But, on 22 September, Shidehara reaffirmed his intention not to intervene. A month later, the danger of Chang being defeated forced the cabinet to reexamine

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its policy from the fundamentals; Japan had to prevent fighting within China from spreading to Manchuria and had to uphold Japan's interests in the latter area. Outvoted by his colleagues, Shidehara offered his resignation; but Kato declined to accept it and pursued an ambiguous line. A recent writer points out that significant army intelligence intervention in the civil war undermined Wu's coalition "in violation of stated government policy with the apparent knowledge of Army Minister Ugaki." Wu's defeat resulted in Chang assuming control over the national capital at Peking almost immediately.11 The extent of Chinese nationalism, which had come to the fore in the 4 May Movement of 1919, was prominently revealed in 1925. Trouble arose in Shanghai, among other areas like Tsingtao, as a result of protests against terms of service in the Japanese cotton mills, which dominated these local economies. More broadly the protesters objected to the influence of foreign nationals in the treaty ports and especially in Shanghai's International Settlement. The most serious outbreak took place in Shanghai on 30 May. The police of the International Settlement, under their predominantly British officers, eventually fired, killing four and injuring nine Chinese demonstrators. This shooting, rather than the labor grievances which underlay it, ignited the anti-foreign movement that would spread to most of the treaty ports; demonstrations flared up under the slogan "the unequal treaties must go." Fortunately for the Japanese, much of the ill will which had originally been directed against Japan was now diverted to the boycott of British trade. 12 On 23 June there was a further serious clash between Chinese demonstrators and foreign warships at Canton. The Shamien incident, as the clash was called, resulted in a strike and boycott which lasted for fifteen months at Hongkong and Canton, effectively damaging British trade throughout south China. In the Yangtse ports a popular campaign against British goods and agencies also flourished. There was a tendency abroad to blame the campaign on communist agitators and, in the spirit of cooperation among the Washington signatories, look to Japan for help since it was better placed than any other world power to send a defensive force. But Shidehara, who wanted to avoid weakening Japan's main export market, had no wish to be drawn in and share the unpopularity of the British. Japanese trade naturally benefited from the losses which Britain incurred by the boycott. 13 Shidehara made common cause with others as Japan's interests dictated. At the International Opium Conference, which ran from November 1924 until February 1925, Japan sided with the Americans against the British in spite of the animosity which had been generated by the immigration legislation. The Tariff Conference, which had been promised at Washington, met eventually at Peking from October 1925 to July of the following year. General agreement was reached that tariff autonomy should be granted by

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1 January 1929, the sticking-point being China's ability to abolish the likin levy by the same date. But when the conference moved on to discuss surtaxes, Japan, as at the Washington conference, was anxious to recover her "Nishihara loans," that is, the unsecured loans concluded by Nishihara Kamezo on behalf of the Japanese government in 1918 which were never repaid. There was serious friction between the Japanese, British, and Americans on this account. Japan tended to collaborate with the United States over tariffs and the Nishihara loans for purely pragmatic reasons. While deliberations were still going on in April, the Peking government, then recognized by the powers in the civil war, collapsed; and the conference adjourned soon after without resolving the question of the surtax that would be levied to meet China's needs. In November 1925, a revolt took place against Chang Tso-lin which almost destroyed his power. Since the Kuantung army garrison had been weakened, Japanese soldiers, diplomats, and civilians in the area called out for reinforcements. Japan sent a military force of 2500 men to Mukden. General Shirakawa, the Kuantung army commander, ordered his troops to block the insurgents in spite of contrary instructions from Tokyo. The fortunes of Chang were restored by the end of the year; he entered Peking in April, appointing himself as marshal. The Japanese claimed to have acted in order to protect their own lives and property, and the foreign minister's speech to this effect was loudly applauded. So we must distinguish between the reality and the rhetoric of the "new China policy." In fact, Japan was not as opposed to intervention as Shidehara's rhetoric would suggest. On the ground, Japanese commanders did all they could to support Chang Tsolin against his adversaries, seemingly regardless of instructions from Tokyo.14 In reality, Shidehara was following a twofold policy: first, Japan cultivated the goodwill of China, or at least those elements in China prepared to work with Japan; and second, the country pursued markets regardless of cooperation with other trading countries. The policy can be described as part of a low-keyed economic diplomacy which was in marked contrast to that which Japan had been pursuing there in the 1910s. Clearly, it was an opportunist policy based on compromises within the cabinet as situations arose. The policy also could be adjusted in order to promote Japan's special interests in Manchuria where its formidable investment in the South Manchurian Railway did not allow for the area to be regarded as part of China. 15 The situation was transformed by the northern expedition of the Kuomintang (KMT) armies based on Canton, which succeeded in capturing Hankow, a major city on the Yangtse, in September 1926. It was hard for the KMT leadership to enforce discipline among the troops, and outrages against foreigners took place. This led to serious incidents when leftwing elements of the Kuomintang armies established themselves in Hankow,

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and 200 Japanese marines were landed as a protective force. It was estimated that the KMT armies might attack the Shanghai International Settlement by the end of January; Japan was asked to join the other powers in preventing this. By this time, Prime Minister Kato had died and been replaced by Wakatsuki; but Shidehara was invited to continue in office. In his speech of 21 January 1927, he reiterated the non-interventionist policy which he supported. The Japanese mill owners of Shanghai condemned the speech and advocated an international effort with the other powers; consular officers around China urged Tokyo to send reinforcements to their garrisons. 16 On 24 March, the Nationalist army entered Nanking. But discipline was slack, and mob rule prevailed for a time. Morioka, a Japanese consul, was dragged from his sick bed and only escaped with great difficulty. Japanese, both official and non-official, who took refuge in the consulate-general were attacked. In the general confusion, a few British and Americans were killed; but no Japanese died. That casualties were so few was due principally to the presence of British and American warships, which launched a barrage of shells between the foreigners and the attacking mob. During these dramatic happenings, naval Lieutenant Araki tried to commit hara-kiri on 30 March after he had been instructed not to intervene in the face of serious affrays against his nationals and then felt that he had failed to protect them. 17 The Chinese proceeded to attack foreigners, including nationals of Japan, in a second Hankow incident on 3 April. While Britain proposed a joint expedition, Japan sent in a force of 300 marines in order to restore her authority in the Japanese leased territory. The crisis moved from Nanking to Shanghai with those evacuated from upriver crowding into the International Settlement. Fortunately, the KMT troops involved were better disciplined and less indoctrinated. The naval commander of the Japanese landing party readily agreed to take part with others in defending the settlement provided that he was not under the orders of the British Expeditionary Force which had been sent for the protection of the city. A sector was, therefore, allotted to the Japanese force.18 While some of his consuls were calling for strong action, others supported Shidehara in his reluctance to collaborate with the other trading nations. In a telegram of 16 April, Yada, the Shanghai consul-general whom Shidehara specially trusted, stated from his long experience of China, The best guarantee for the effective protection of Japanese and other foreign lives and property in China lies in the removal of the fundamental causes of the present troubled relations between the Nationalist government and the powers who continue to sustain the regime of the unequal treaties. . . . This danger will exist as long as effective government is rendered difficult by foreign insistence on conditions which are at once a humiliation and a menace to a nation that has known greatness and is today conscious of renewed strength.19

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In agreement, Shidehara took the view that order could never be maintained in China if there were constant foreign interference by way of military-naval action and if foreigners, whether Japanese or not, working overseas had to face certain hazards. Opposed to settling complaints by force, he told his minister in Peking to rely on diplomatic methods in order to avoid Japan's China trade being jeopardized. All these incidents put the cabinet under at least some pressure to send force to China where the revolution seemed to be degenerating. The navy was certainly ready to send a fleet to the war zone. The army saw these KMT activities as being inspired and led by communists; and War Minister Ugaki was flabbergasted at Shidehara's weak stance. On 7 April, Ugaki appealed to Prime Minister Wakatsuki for a more positive China policy that would arrest the spread of communism there. His proposals were later recorded by his vice minister, General Hata: 1. to re-develop cooperation among the powers towards China more intimate than has recently existed; at the very least, to exchange views frankly about the powers' attitudes and plans towards China and to build up a complete structure of cooperation there, with Japan at its centre; 2. to adopt a policy of limiting the communists in China by cooperation among the powers a. through the media owned by the powers to employ propaganda directed against the Russian approach to China and attack the activities of the Chinese communists; b. by force to control strategic positions in Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien and Kuantung and by blockade to exclude the import especially of Russian arms and ammunition; and to employ these to work for the gradual restoration of trade and enterprise. 3. in order to eliminate the communists in the upper reaches of the Yangtse and the areas to the south of it, to provide war supplies and arms to malleable groups within the Northern and Southern cliques either with the understanding of the powers or with their collaboration; and to get them to enter the fray . . .20 Although Shidehara is not mentioned in this document, it was clearly an attack on his policies from within. His views were diametrically opposed to those of Ugaki and the army: Ugaki was urging collaboration with the Powers, while Shidehara wanted to independently pursue nationalistic policies. Even a general as opposed to Tanaka as Ugaki wanted firmer policies to restore Japan's honor. As the memorandum reveals, the army clearly had a deep detestation of Russian and Chinese communism and was ready to resort to extreme measures to prevent the expansion of either in collaboration with the other Powers. Clearly split, the Wakatsuki cabinet collapsed in disagreement on 17 April before a decision could be taken to address

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the crisis. Little wonder that Ugaki should welcome the fall of the government. Shidehara, in his first term, was not as opposed to intervention in the affairs of China as his public posture would suggest. He protected Japan's national interests as he saw fit in the full knowledge that others criticized his methods. His non-interventionism, in fact, was aloofness from other foreigners in order to very properly promote Japan's commercial interests. TANAKA AND ARMY ACTIVISM General Tanaka Giichi, who had as war minister been one of the main planners of the Siberian intervention, was scooped up when he retired from the army to head the leaderless Seiyukai party. In that capacity, he became prime minister on 20 April 1927 for a controversial two-year period. From the time that Tanaka assumed office, he became obsessed with finding a solution to the China problem which he felt Shidehara had mishandled. Tanaka became his own foreign minister; his style was not to operate exclusively through Kasumigaseki. Two months before becoming prime minister, he sent three political associates, Mori Kaku, Matsuoka Yosuke and Yamamoto Jotaro, on a fact-finding mission to China. While Mori later became his vice minister, Yamamoto was appointed general manager of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR), with Matsuoka as his deputy in July 1927. However, in the mission to China, Yamamoto's assignment was to settle outstanding disputes with Chang Tso-lin and obtain leases for the building of more railway lines in Manchuria. What emerged was a private undertaking between the two for the building of five of the requested lines. Although not consulted in advance, Minister Yoshizawa in Peking was ordered to sign the agreement with Chang. It was, as he wrote in his memoirs, a bitter moment in his diplomatic career. Evidently, Tanaka had no intention of acting exclusively through official channels. As Prime Minister Terauchi had used Nishihara Kamezo for his dealings with China ten years earlier, so Tanaka would use his own agents. This procedure sprang partly from a natural distrust of the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy on the part of the soldier. Tanaka also may have felt that he was better able to deal with China's warlords through his own military contacts. So he and the army kept a network of agents advising various figures in the Chinese power structure. 21 Tanaka found it difficult to handle the problem created by the renewed Northern Expedition of Chiang Kai-shek whose forces, now settled on the Yangtse river, were planning to move north. To safeguard her position, Britain had sent an expeditionary force to the Shanghai International Settlement. To defend the 17,000 Japanese nationals living in Shantung province, Tanaka now sent his first Shantung expedition on 27 May. This was a force

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of 2000 men drafted from Manchuria to join another 2200 men in Tsingtao, the port of Shantung, on 28 May. Because of internal rivalries, the KMT offensive collapsed, and the Japanese expedition could be withdrawn on 8 September. Though Japan's professed aim was to protect its own residents, the way in which the country dispatched troops to Shantung, as Britain had done at Shanghai, also suggested joint international action. There is no doubt that Tanaka took action, knowing full well that Britain supported him in doing what it had been urging for some time. Britain was anxious that Japan realize how China's offensive against foreigners combined nationalist elements with communist elements, the latter of which was dominant and difficult for China to cope with on her own. Therefore, Tanaka's action was the first example of international cooperation over China, one of the intended outcomes of the Washington conference. That the expedition was brief was also partially due to the financial crisis which suddenly engulfed Japan. 22 In order to hammer out a long-term China policy, Tanaka held the Eastern Conference (Toho kaigi) from 27 June to 7 July. He gathered politicians, diplomats, and businessmen as well as army and navy spokesmen who were involved in one or another aspect of Japan's interests in China and Manchuria. Some leaders, including Yoshida Shigeru, the consul-general at Tsingtao, opposed too great a reliance on the mercurial Chang Tso-lin and wanted Japan to be more single-minded in pursuing her interests. However, the consensus was that Manchuria and Mongolia (Mammo) should be regarded differently from China proper and that Japanese nationals overseas should be protected. The discussion may have served the purpose of clearing up Tanaka's own thinking, but it is not obvious that it laid down a clear line of approach to China. In the following months, the "Tanaka Memorial" (josobun), a document allegedly presented by Tanaka to the Emperor, emerged. It seems likely that it was the outcome of information collated by Chinese intelligence sources who were seeking data about Tanaka's more positive approach over Manchuria and, in particular, Mongolia. Since the document clouded the global image of Japan throughout the 1930s, ignoring it as being unhistorical is not sufficient. But studies of the language and content of the document cast doubt on its genuineness. Nor is there much sign of policies envisaged in the "Memorial" being implemented during Tanaka's term of office.23 On 23 October, Chiang Kai-shek, at this time out of office as the leader of the KMT, visited Japan on private business but with the intention of obtaining the goodwill of the new government for his military plans. Since he had purged the Communists from the KMT in April and the Soviet adviser Borodin had left in July, he may have thought he was persona grata in Tokyo. Certainly Tanaka appears to have welcomed him as an anticommunist figure. Chiang departed, feeling that he had received Tanaka's blessing, if not an official Japanese endorsement, for a renewed KMT

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offensive to the north. Under this impression, he, on his re-appointment as commander-in-chief, launched the second phase of the Northern Expedition to the north of the Yangtse river in the spring of 1928. Chiang may have been under a misapprehension about Japan's intentions. Tanaka's main aim was to keep the forces of Chiang and the protege Chang apart. His military advisers in China were pessimistic about the capacity of Japan's ally for resistance and took the view that the KMT armies must be prevented from reaching and entering Manchuria. Tanaka's position towards Chang, now a resident in Peking, was twofold: Japan would help him to govern Manchuria and would insulate him against an attack by the KMT beyond Shanhaikuan; but Tokyo would not assist him in holding onto Peking, if this involved fighting with the KMT forces.24 Challenged by a no-confidence motion, Tanaka decided to dissolve the Diet and appeal to the electorate. In a closely fought general election on 20 February, the Seiyukai secured 217 seats against the Minseito's 216. Returned to power, Tanaka authorized his second Shantung expedition of 5,000 men to Tsingtao on 18 April, as a mere show of force. But the general in charge, who received highly exaggerated reports on the situation, decided not to await instructions about how to deal with the Chinese advance and proceeded westward along the railway to Tsinan, the capital of Shantung province. A small encounter took place on 2 May which ended up in a major battle (8-11 May) in which Chiang's armies were driven from the city. The Japanese stayed and administered the area until the Tsinan affair was eventually settled some ten months later. Throughout this period, Tanaka was also engaged in a dialogue with the Chinese but, it has to be said, without success.25 In May, as the Nationalist forces were approaching Peking, Chang Tsolin was given an ultimatum by the Japanese to withdraw or face the consequences on his own. Wanting to resist the KMT army, he was reluctant to withdraw into Manchuria until his enemies were at the gates of the capital. Chang eventually decided to leave Peking for Manchuria on 3 June by rail. As his train reached the outskirts of Mukden, a bomb tore apart the coach in which he was travelling and he died some hours later. Chang had many enemies; it was not known who had caused this outrage, though many were suspected by contemporaries. It later transpired that the planner of the assassination was Colonel Komoto Daisaku, a staff officer of the Kuantung army and one of its China specialists.26 Komoto and his supporters thought that Chang was not only ungrateful to Japan, but also too independent so that his demise would be best. In the lawless atmosphere of Manchuria, it might have been quite plausible to stage his death as the work of his Chinese warlord rivals. Komoto had hoped that this staging would destabilize the situation in Manchuria, possibly boosting the power of the Kuantung army. The whole venture, therefore, was the result of a military stratagem. What is not clear is how many knew of the plot. But it would

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appear that while most of Kornoto's supporters appear to have been junior officers, some of his superiors were in the know. Tanaka was not. 27 Chang's death led to the succession of his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, who had no doubt that the Japanese were implicated in the assassination. He threw in his lot with the KMT by accepting the rank of commander-in-chief in the Northeast provinces, thus showing his willingness to take a different line from his father and cooperate against the Japanese. Japan's existing stake in Manchuria was put at risk by this army stratagem. Tanaka himself, suspicious about the as yet unproven Kuantung army's involvement, decided to get to the bottom of Chang's assassination. Met with stony silence by the army, he had to order the provost marshal to investigate the matter. Komoto was brought to Tokyo, but the army general staff tried to bury the matter in case the Emperor's army was exposed to public censure. Tanaka assured the court that if soldiers of the imperial army were involved, they would be tried rigorously. Emperor Hirohito evidently agreed in order to uphold military discipline. In the end Tanaka's position became impossible: he was trapped among the Emperor, Elder Statesman Saionji, and the civilians, on the one hand, and caught between the army and the Seiyukai leadership on the other hand. They were all at odds over China in spite of the Eastern Conference. In May, Tanaka told the Emperor that it was unclear who was responsible for Chang's death. The fudging of the issue evidently did not please the Emperor; according to his 1946 autobiographical confession, he then asked Tanaka to resign. This was a climactic act which some in court circles regarded as a doubtful use of the imperial prerogative and may have resulted in their reluctance to overrule ministers in the 1930s. 28 Tanaka's rhetoric was shown to be superficial. His call for "positive policy" (sekkyokuteki seisaku) had been latched onto by army activists. On two occasions, Tanaka had been victimized by this. His intentions over Tsinan had been subverted by his commander in the field; over the murder of Chang, it had been the case of middle-ranking officers taking the law into their own hands. Japan's actions on the ground in China were evidently beyond the control of Tokyo. Tanaka's positive policy had failed. Indeed, it had the reverse effect of stimulating Chinese nationalists to instigate a movement to boycott Japanese goods, both imported and manufactured in China. On the Japanese side, the army was resentful. RELATIONS WITH WESTERN POWERS Viewed from Tokyo, events of a global kind were minor compared to those in China at this time. But in an important symbolic event the U.S. State Department approached Japan and other powers in April 1928, inviting them to join in a treaty for the renunciation of war. It was an awkward request occurring just when Japan was sending a substantial

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force to Shantung. The Foreign Ministry presented a note setting out the pros and cons (tokushitsu) of ensuring Japan's freedom of action over China while responding to the United States. It was awkward, too, that the treaty had been worded by the American and French negotiators, Frank Kellogg and Aristide Briand respectively, as a declaration by the signatories "in the names of their respective peoples." The Japanese, jealous of the treaty-making prerogatives of their Emperor, took exception to this wording. But, when it was explained that the Emperor's prerogative was not being demeaned, the Privy Council was prepared to recommend its acceptance. Eventually, the concept of a no war treaty was wholeheartedly welcomed by Japan on 26 May; it safeguarded only the right to self-defense and the right to take "police action" against any nation that had taken warlike action against Japan. Uchida, whom we have examined earlier as foreign minister (1919-1923) was appointed to visit Paris on 27 August and sign the Renunciation of War treaty, sometimes known after its initiators as "the Kellogg-Briand pact." Thereafter, Tokyo made very heavy weather of the issue and it was not until June 1929 that it was ratified by the Privy Council. 29 After the signing, Uchida visited most European capitals for talks in order to fulfill the China dimension to his mission. He was instructed to explain Japan's policies about China to the French and British governments. In London, he not only left with the Foreign Office a memorandum defending his country's China policy after the second expedition, but also discussed how the two governments could work together. Tanaka needed reassurance from abroad and wanted to stress that his policy was one of cooperation with the international body. He secured only lukewarm assurances of collaboration. Uchida did the same in Washington, where he met President Coolidge and Secretary Kellogg.30 But while Uchida got a courteous hearing, he did not receive significant encouragement from any quarter. There were promises that foreign representatives in Peking would all work together when it suited them. But no country wanted to latch onto Japan, which had become the least popular foreign country in China. Rather, on 20 December 1928, Britain entered into a new treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government that conferred recognition on the new government in Nanking, where the capital was established in October, and acknowledged its right to full tariff autonomy. Other European countries followed suit. This was a blow to Tanaka. Underlying all his overtures to the Chinese had been the hope that general recognition of the new KMT government would wait until Japan had completed her own negotiations. In the new year, Tanaka revised his policies, coming closer to the standpoint of Shidehara. On the tariff problem, Japan had fallen behind the other powers. Tanaka authorized detailed discussions which resulted in a complex arrangement whereby Japan consented to China's new tariff schedule while the Chinese undertook to set up a debt consolidation fund and to

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abolish likin duties within two years. The revised tariffs came into force two days later on 1 February 1929. China and Japan, by both declaring their regret over the Tsinan incident, got over the delicate issue of who should apologize for the clash. A Sino-Japanese committee of investigation was constituted, and this face-saving device enabled the treaty to be signed on 28 March. Much delay was entailed in settling the Nanking, Hankow, and Tsinan incidents. It was 3 June, the anniversary of Chang Tso-lin's murder, before Japan eventually recognized Nanking. This recognition happened late in Tanaka's period of office, for his cabinet resigned on 2 July, after a rebuke by the Emperor. Tanaka had little to show for his positive policy except that he had alienated the Chinese and whetted the appetite of his middle-ranking officers in the Kuantung army. On 29 September, Tanaka died a disenchanted man. 31 In this chapter, which has concentrated on the thinking about China, we have questioned the conventional wisdom. Without a doubt, a contrast existed between the personalities of Shidehara and Tanaka as well as between their China policies. But the differences between the two foreign ministers have been exaggerated. Shidehara's policy was not as weak as his political opponents painted it. It was nationalistic, independent, and suspicious of the actions of others. He paid attention to commercial voices, though not invariably: while he rejected the advice of Japanese chambers of commerce in China, he tried to heed similar advice in Japan itself. On the other hand, Tanaka made great show of his positivism but was less positive when he came to high office. Constructive in seeking dialogue with others and in canvassing international cooperation, he was distinctly less positive than military officers on the spot. The officers, whether the goal was national expansion or combatting communism, felt they knew better than Tokyo. Moreover, they were experts in faits accomplis and knew how to avoid being restrained from home by exploiting the intense rivalry among the political parties and military factions at the time. Though the debate over the respective merits of Shidehara's and Tanaka's policies is controversial, the long-term results of all of these policies were small. Whether conciliatory as with Shidehara or firm as with Tanaka, Japan's policy was not sufficiently consistent or far reaching to attain any definite object. Over the conciliatory policy, there was a gap between the foreign minister's idealistic statements in the Diet and the thinking in the cabinet, where Shidehara's voice was not a commanding one. As we have seen, the views of General Ugaki were highly skeptical. Shidehara relied mainly on minimal activity, on the negative policy of refraining from asserting Japanese rights. This tended to encourage the Chinese leaders to take liberties that were humiliating to Japanese prestige. Because the policy was weak, it played into the hands of those in Japan who were nationalistic and xenophobic. This might seem to endorse the need for firmness. Indeed in Shantung and Manchuria, the Tanaka government showed firmness where

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the protection of Japanese life and property was concerned. But the extent to which it was prepared to push this positive policy was never tested because the assassination of Chang Tso-lin forced Tanaka to reverse it. In any case, there is no direct comparison between Shidehara and Tanaka. Shidehara was mainly addressing the problems of the Yangtse region with its new seats of power in Hankow and Shanghai. By Tanaka's time, the conflicts had become more serious for Japan: the second phase of China's Northern Expedition had moved on to the fringes of what the Japanese saw as their sphere of influence in Manchuria. While Tanaka's positivism secured Manchuria for Japan, it was at the cost of creating anti-Japanese sentiment both there and throughout China. 32

CHAPTER 4

World Depression and Military Expansion, 1929-1932

Japanese political parties found great difficulty in coping with the two great problems of the day: the economic depression which afflicted the whole world and the wave of expansion which was spearheaded by Japan's armed services. The Hamaguchi Yuko cabinet came into office on 2 July 1929. Hamaguchi, the president of the Minseito (formerly the Kenseikai party), had been the finance minister in Kato's ministry of 1924-1926. Strictly speaking, the post of prime minister should have gone to Wakatsuki Reijiro who had held that office in 1926-1927; but since Wakatsuki had not mastered the political skills needed to keep a cabinet together and had not performed well, Hamaguchi was now preferred. The party went to the country in elections for the lower house in February 1930 and emerged with a large majority of 273 seats (against 174), which kept it in power until December 1931. Shidehara returned as the foreign minister determined to solve the China problem.1 The twenties had been a decade of economic uncertainty. On the one hand, Japan's economic growth had been stimulated by domestic policies such as the expansion of public investment for recovery from the earthquake. Japan's manufacturing sector also showed steady progress throughout the 1920s, especially in the areas of iron, steel, electricals, and chemicals. But late in the decade, Japan's economic policy changed from expansion to retrenchment because of a series of financial crises, including the bank failures from March 1927 onwards in which twenty-four banks collapsed.2 The Minseito party was unfortunate in coming to power in the teeth of the world depression. Inexperienced, the party tried to tackle the problem with the old-fashioned remedies of retrenchment and disarmament. This had the effect of stunting domestic business activities. Even if the New York stock market had not collapsed, the Japanese economy would have been in serious trouble in 1930-1931. The party felt that it had to fulfill its

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manifesto promise to return to the gold standard at the old par exchange. With this in mind, Inoue Junnosuke, the finance minister, took strict measures to reduce public expenditure before returning to the gold standard in January 1930. But the measures hurt many sections of Japanese society. It proved impossible to check agricultural prices, which fell after the good rice harvest of the autumn 1930. The sharp drop in overseas demand for raw silk exports caused by the global recession also contributed to the impoverishment of the agricultural sector. This adversely affected farm households, the livelihood of which depended on the raising of silkworms for extra income. This rural depression was particularly felt by activist officers in the army who were concerned about agrarian poverty because many of them came from farming backgrounds. But falling industrial prices also led to urban unemployment, which rose by a half million between 1929 and 1932. There emerged a new urban generation that lost confidence in the industrial process and in political parties seeming to be in the pockets of manufacturers and traders. It was not long before Britain gave up the gold standard in September 1931; Japan was forced to do likewise three months later, after Inoue's resignation. Inoue's policies were unpopular and created social unrest; he was assassinated on 9 February 1932. 3 NAVAL LIMITATION—GENEVA AND LONDON CONFERENCES Following the Washington Conference, Japan was involved for fifteen years in a series of discussions on the restriction of navies, which had increased worldwide to meet national defense requirements. It was both an international and a domestic issue. Japan was under international pressure, mainly from the United States, throughout this period, to limit the size of her fleet at the same time as the naval hierarchy was becoming more and more assertive in Japanese politics. An emerging majority within the navy did not accept the restrictions that the major naval powers were trying to impose in order to curb naval building. Naval technology was developing all the time: distances were shrinking as the range of craft increased; naval aviation was advancing; and refuelling at sea had started. These technical changes were moving the goal posts, and there was genuine worry in the Naval General Staff about Japan's security in the new era. On the other hand, the politicians and bureaucrats were aware of budget constraints, bank failures, and the world depression; they wanted retrenchment and were more responsive to the pressure coming from overseas. The Washington naval treaty of 1922 had dealt primarily with battleships. In the years that followed, there was a natural tendency for the world's navies to concentrate on the building of auxiliaries that were unaffected by the treaty. In particular, Japan and Britain had led the way by constructing 10,000-ton 8-inch heavy cruisers, the so-called treaty cruisers. But in Feb-

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ruary 1927, President Coolidge of the United States issued invitations for the representatives of the five leading naval powers to meet in Geneva. France and Italy declined. But the Wakatsuki government wholeheartedly accepted; and after the financial crisis of March, the Tanaka ministry was also ready to cooperate. The United States wanted to extend the former 5:5:3 ratio to all auxiliary ships. When the conference met in June, it was expected that a major confrontation would take place on this point between Japan and the United States. Instead, a dispute developed between the United States and Britain over heavy cruisers. Despite at least two attempts by the Japanese at mediation, a compromise could not be produced, and the conference came to an ignominious end in August without agreement. Thus, the opposition of the Japanese to 5:5:3 was not fully revealed amidst the Anglo-American bickering.4 Behind the scenes in Japan, all manner of squalls took place in naval ranks. First, there was the opposition to the civilians who had appointed as chief delegate Admiral Saito, who was one of their admirals and enjoyed their confidence after his long service as governor-general of Korea (19191927). The naval leaders in Tokyo disliked the chosen delegates and, by bureaucratic engineering, tried to undermine their authority. There were many within the Navy Ministry, especially Vice-minister Osumi, and the Naval General Staff who were opposed to the terms offered and the compromises made by the moderate group in Geneva. But because of the deadlock which the conference reached, these differences did not become critical. However, historically the differences are important because they polarized naval opinion in Japan in the years that followed.5 Much more careful preparation was made for the next conference, the London Naval Conference of 1930. The initial approaches were made while the Tanaka cabinet was still in charge. Japan agreed to demand a ratio of 10:10:7 for auxiliary vessels, especially for 10,000-ton 8-inch cruisers; she also asked for 78,000 as submarine tonnage. On this occasion, the chief delegate was to be a civilian, Wakatsuki Reijiro, a former prime minister and also finance minister on two occasions. Reflecting his party's platform, he was naturally looking for budgetary retrenchment and cordial relations with other naval countries in order to ensure maritime peace. He shared the negotiations with the ambassador in London, Matsudaira Tsuneo. It is likely that their civilian agenda was markedly different from the naval one. The naval side of the delegation was led by the navy minister, Admiral Takarabe, the son-in-law of the naval veteran Admiral Yamamoto Gombei, and the chief naval adviser, Vice-admiral Sakonji, while the less moderate wing was represented by Admiral Abo and Rear-admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. The interim post of navy minister (kaigun daijin jimu kanri) in Tokyo was filled by Prime Minister Hamaguchi himself, assisted by the viceminister, Vice-admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin.6

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As soon as the conference opened in January 1930, Japan's delegates formally demanded a ratio more favorable than the 5:5:3 which had been accepted at Washington and was again proposed by the American delegates. The Japanese delegation was instructed to strive for a ratio of 10:10:7 in heavy cruisers; and hardliners wanted to block any concession to American pressure. American-Japanese differences which had been masked at Geneva now came to the foreground. Wakatsuki had to argue with his navy experts, with Admiral Takarabe standing awkwardly between. The delegates were meanwhile sending divergent opinions to Tokyo on what should be done. Eventually Senator David Reed, a member of the American delegation, and Matsudaira produced a compromise formula on 13 March which conferred on Japan an overall ratio equivalent to 69.75 percent in heavy cruisers and parity in submarine tonnage set at 52,700 tons. 7 This was the result of a series of discussions which were fully approved by Wakatsuki and H.L. Stimson for the United States and accepted by the British delegation. Wakatsuki recommended this course to Tokyo; and Takarabe, after considering whether to put on record a note of dissent, endorsed it reluctantly. Such a settlement was an anathema to the naval "kakushinha," the reformist group which was influential in both the London delegation and Tokyo. The group pulled all manner of strings to prevent the government from accepting the compromise. It mistakenly imagined that the compromise formula was not final and that counterproposals were still possible. But Hamaguchi in his capacity as interim navy minister, not wanting to take responsibility for the breakdown of the talks, showed a bold leadership which was rare in Japanese statecraft and accepted the formula as the basis for the treaty on 1 April. He duly received the backing of the Emperor. In London, Wakatsuki made a speech of conditional acceptance on 22 April: In view of the fact that the present agreement is binding upon the Powers concerned for a limited duration until 1936 and the naval strengths to be held by the Powers thereafter are to be considered at the next Conference, Japan . . . in the spirit of accommodation and harmony has gladly agreed to the present Treaty.8 The London Naval Treaty was signed on that day and was to remain in force until 31 December 1936. But provision was made for the signatories to meet in conference in 1935 to frame a new treaty, in which, as the Japanese saw it, the present ratio would not be perpetuated. The chief of the Naval General Staff (NGS), Admiral Kato Kanji, appealed to the Emperor and issued a public statement disapproving of the "American plan" as he called it. He deplored the government's disregard of the Naval General Staff in this instance and emphasized its right to decide on the scale of naval forces which Japan needed. Opponents of naval limitation accused the court ministers of preventing Kato Kanji from seeing the monarch and presenting him with their views. All manner of leakages took

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place in order to bring about the rejection of the treaty. Eventually, Kato presented his resignation direct to the Emperor on 10 June, claiming that his authority had been usurped by signing the London Naval Treaty. The unthinkable had taken place: the flag of mutiny had been raised at the top. 9 The government could rely on the general support of a number of senior officers in the navy. But Admiral Prince Fushimi and Admiral Togo expressed views critical of the government at a meeting of the Supreme War Council where Kato Kanji's views were not upheld. Most of the press (especially Asahi Shimbun) welcomed the treaty, though with minor misgivings. The court also supported the compromise; and Wakatsuki on his return in June received a message of congratulations from the Emperor by way of a rescript delivered at a court dinner.10 Those opposed to the treaty were still powerful enough to impede the ratification stage of the treaty. Their case was that the treaty "seriously jeopardized national defence" and had been forced on the delegates by AngloAmerican coercion; that naval authorities alone had the power to decide on the strength of the fleet; and that the civilian government had acted ultra vires. In the face of public approval, the navy whipped up opposition among the Seiyukai and found support for their cause in the Diet, the Supreme Council, and the Privy Council as the treaty made its slow passage through these bodies.11 But their sanction had to be obtained before the treaty could be ratified by the Emperor. When matters became serious, the government had to call on the older and less emotional heads in the navy as mediators. Thus, Admiral Okada, a former navy minister, assisted during the long discussions while the treaty was in committee. His message was similar to that of his mentor, Admiral Kato Tomosaburo: No matter how many arms are piled up, there never comes a moment for saying we are secure with that amount. . . . that sort of thing is impossible for a country like Japan whose national resources are inferior to those of the major powers. 12

The return of the delegates to Japan was cautiously handled. Hamaguchi argued his corner before the full Privy Council on 1 October and deplored its delay in giving advice to the throne. While the treaty secured unanimous support, it was only after a great deal of manipulation that it was accepted. It was eventually ratified by the Emperor, the ratification being deposited on 27 October. It was published on New Year's day, 1931. Shidehara was able to announce in the Diet on 3 February that the exchange of ratifications by the signatories was complete.13 Japan's experience over the London treaty was a painful one, both domestically and internationally. The constitutional position of the Emperor's armed services, connected as it was to the issue of the rights of supreme command (tosuiken), created much controversy and roused much emotion. The London treaty poisoned the delicate civil-military relationship that had

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existed in the past. One consequence was that the prime minister was shot at Tokyo station on his way to maneuvers at Okayama on 14 November. It would appear that the motive of the right-wing 23-year-old assailant who only fired once was a combination of opposition to the treaty and protest against the suffering caused by the depression. In the short term, Hamaguchi was incapacitated. Political upheaval was avoided by the speedy appointment of Shidehara as acting prime minister. In the longer term, Hamaguchi was able to return to office on 9 March 1931 but only for a month. He eventually died from his wounds in August. While naval limitation had been achieved, it had been at the price of political assassination. Although this was not the first such assassination, it was a significant event and the precursor of a series of similar atrocities later in the decade which made it "a testing-time for party politics." 14 The storm of controversy which was generated pushed naval opinion in more extreme directions. Many of those involved—the so-called kakushinha—wanted to see the collapse of naval limitation in general on the ground that Japan was being taken for a ride by its rivals; they took the view that the present "abhorrent treaty" must not be renewed when it lapsed in five years' time. They tended to believe that naval conferences were opportunities for professionals to secure compromises among naval powers, not for civilians to establish control over navies. Within the navy, power was passing away from the "treaty faction" to the "fleet faction" which, with its focus of power in the Naval General Staff, was highly politicized. These new forces showed the navy for the first time to be a formidable challenger of the civilian government.15 This episode was also painful for Japan internationally. Hamaguchi knew that if he refused to sign the treaty, Japan would be cast in the role of the spoiler of the London conference. That did not happen. But Tokyo's delay over ratification showed the outside world the intensity of opposition to naval limitation together with the growing mood of nationalism and xenophobia. SEEKING SETTLEMENT IN CHINA In 1929, Japan's relations with Nationalist China were damaged for personal reasons. The Japanese minister-elect to China, Saburi Sadao, took his own life at the Fujiya Hotel, Hakone, on 29 November, probably on account of the death of his wife. This was a tragedy for Japan's diplomacy because Saburi, who had been particularly close to Shidehara, had been present at the Paris and Washington conferences, the Peking Tariff Conference and the Geneva Naval Conference. He was, therefore, an expert in an area where Japanese talent was relatively thin; his expertise with conference negotiation was highly regarded outside Japan. With his appointment, there had been great expectations for a new period of Sino-Japanese

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detente.16 Shigemitsu Mamoru, the consul-general in Shanghai, had to take on the acting post. Japan nominated Obata Yukichi as Saburi's successor. But the new Chinese Nationalist government, exercising its new revolutionary diplomacy, withheld its agrement on 17 December because Obata's name was linked with the 21 Demands crisis of 1915; in spite of much lobbying, the Japanese could not secure his acceptance. In this strained atmosphere, Shigemitsu assumed the role of charge d'affaires and tried to make the best of improving Sino-Japanese relations which had been fundamentally damaged by the agrement dispute. Although China tried to persuade Japan to take part in talks over tariffs and extraterritoriality, the Japanese were the largest importers into China and slow to take on these issues. Shidehara continued his earlier policy based on economic considerations, but that did not make it any easier to make the concessions which China was seeking.17 The treaty revision negotiations with the Chinese led to the conclusion of a tariff agreement which was eventually agreed upon by the Tokyo government and signed on 6 May 1930. It recognized China's tariff autonomy. This was the outcome of many years of unsuccessful negotiations and did not completely overcome the bitterness between the two governments. The major area of disagreement was extraterritoriality on which new negotiations began in March 1931. Japan's intention was that her extraterritorial rights should only be retroceded in return for specific assurances; but the Chinese, having already received concessions from other governments, felt that the Japanese response was less satisfactory and insisted on immediate and unconditional abolition. When this was not accepted, a deadlock was reached in May; the Chinese issued a unilateral declaration abolishing all extraterritorial rights held by the powers in China to start as of 1 January 1932.18 Manchuria was, as always, the area of Japan's greatest vigilance. Underlying the political/military struggle in the territory, there was a commercial struggle. Manchuria was dominated by Chinese currencies. Chinese banks which were relatively prosperous in the 1920s were one of the adjuncts of Chang Hsueh-liang's power. With their aid, he was able to overcome the hyper-inflation caused by his father's expenditure on armaments, to stimulate the growth of the Manchu economy, and to embark on railway building. The Kuantung army was worried that if these trends were allowed to continue, they might have damaged Japan's two assets in the territory, the South Manchurian railway and the Kuantung leased territory.19 As soon as Shidehara returned to office in July 1929, he was faced with the so-called First Manchurian Crisis. The government of Chang Hsuehliang, in pursuit of the nationalistic policy being followed by the KMT government in Nanking, sought to encourage the movement of the Chinese to the Northeast. In particular, it attempted to gain total control of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). Hitherto, the line had been operated under

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the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 that provided for its joint control and management. In July, China replaced the Russian manager with a Chinese national and seized the funds of the railway. Later, under the pretext that the CER offices were being used for distributing Comintern propaganda and preaching subversion of Chang's regime, they were overrun in what was a clear violation of Russia's treaty rights. The Soviet consulate at Harbin was occupied, and Russian nationals were thrown into Chinese jails. Shidehara offered his good offices in Tokyo to the ambassadors concerned. On 25 July, the United States government appealed to Japan among other powers to join an international effort for peace, but Japan declined.20 Clashes continued for several months without any diplomatic solution offering itself. The Russians tolerated the inroads until they were fully prepared and then in November moved their troops across the border to Manchouli in the west of Manchuria. The Chinese, who had concluded that Russian troops were likely to be preoccupied in Europe, were taken by surprise and completely defeated. On 27 November, the United States tried to rally support for the issue of a joint note of warning to the Russians in the name of the recently concluded Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. But the Japanese, who had recognized the USSR, unlike the Americans, wanted to maintain a position of strict neutrality in the dispute and did not want to join in international representations. Their desire to avoid getting involved was shared by most of the world's powers (including Britain). Although a stout defender of Japan's rights in Manchuria, Shidehara believed in peaceful coexistence with Russia. There had recently been Soviet-Japanese friction over several matters: the renewal of Japan's fishery leases, the arbitrary closure of the Vladivostok branch of the Japanese-owned Chosen Bank and the attempted murder of a member of the Soviet embassy in Tokyo. Deep as Japan's suspicions about Russia's intentions were, her suspicions about the Chinese were deeper still. Japan realized that the Chinese, if successful, might be encouraged to take similar action against the South Manchurian Railway. For these reasons, Japan showed no enthusiasm for the international initiative being devised by the Americans and, in effect, supported the USSR. Shidehara's biographer claims that when the Russians withdrew it was a success for Shidehara's style of peaceful mediation behind the scenes and a great contribution to world peace.21 In defeat, the Chinese government had no choice but to accept in December the settlement terms for the railway as dictated by the Soviet Union at Khabarovsk. This did not resolve the tensions over the CER but strengthened the Russian position. This first Manchurian crisis of 1929 offered a taste of events that were to take place two years later, though with a different cast of actors. It had been a campaign of prolonged aggravation by one country, China, seeking to overturn the treaty rights of another, Russia; it had led to a short, sharp military intervention by Russia; the world

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powers had been reluctant to get involved in a legally difficult issue in a remote zone of the world. Of course, Japan was especially vigilant over the South Manchurian Railway (SMR). China knew full well that she could not make a direct military challenge to Japan's armies. Knowing that the provinces north of the Great Wall were sparsely populated and a great temptation, China had encouraged the migration of as many people as possible so as to reinforce the claim that Manchuria was indisputably Chinese territory. The nation took steps to build other railways in Manchuria which tended to divert traffic away from the Japanese SMR network. But Japan had an investment interest in 70 percent of the non-Russian railways in Manchuria. There were also frequent Manchurian land disputes, many of them involving Korean residents. The land cases were extremely vexatious because, not being settled between the Nanking and Mukden governments, they were shuttled back and forth. It led on 1 July 1931 to clashes at the village of Wanpaoshan to the north of Changchun city. No one was killed, but the clashes were followed by attacks on Chinese residents in Korea, which resulted in more than one hundred Chinese deaths. 22 Japan was also irritated by China's attacks on Japanese interests in China proper. In 1931, large numbers of outstanding claims by Japan against China because of the boycott of Japanese imports and threats to Japanese life remained unsettled. Shigemitsu's instructions were to solve the tension through negotiations. He managed to resist the direct pressure from members of the Japanese community resident in the Greater Shanghai area who were seriously disturbed by the anti-Japanese movement. In response to the incidents in Manchuria, Chinese business leaders in Shanghai called for a boycott throughout China on 13 July, though this was not supported by Nanking. At the request of the Japanese cotton merchants in Shanghai, the navy sent the First Expeditionary Fleet, under Admiral Shiozawa, to berth off the International Settlement. Shiozawa authorized several landing parties of marines to go to the aid of Japanese merchants whose goods had been confiscated, most notably on 11-12 August. This incendiary naval action was repeated several times over the following month. It was not fully known to diplomats or approved by them and led to discord between the navy and foreign minister, which was similar to that in Manchuria. It may have induced the Chinese to accelerate their boycott. In a sense, therefore, the Manchurian Incident was preceded by an escalating Shanghai Incident.23 In grappling with Sino-Japanese tensions, Shidehara tried various strategies to end the crisis. One hopeful sign was that the Chinese finally agreed to accept Shigemitsu as minister to China in August. His decision to make his base not in Peking but in Shanghai had the disadvantage that he was not much in contact with senior foreign representatives who still kept their legations in Peking, but the advantage was that he was relatively close to

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the Chinese capital. Shidehara authorized Shigemitsu to work with T. V. Soong (Sung Tzu-wen) who held the finance portfolio and was close to Chiang Kai-shek through his family connections. They wanted to improve relations especially over the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) and together drew up a comprehensive plan for coping with the problems of Manchuria. Kimura Eiichi of the South Manchurian railway had been engaged since January in productive talks there with local Chinese officials. Consul-general Hayashi in Mukden was cultivating good relations with officials in Manchuria. Eugene Chen, foreign minister of the Canton government, turned up in Tokyo at the end of July and offered his good offices.24 But even this network of contacts could not cope with the next explosive issue, the Nakamura case. Nakamura Shintaro was a captain in the Japanese army travelling incognito in the north of Manchuria on an intelligence mission. He was arrested by the Chinese gendarmerie and killed in suspicious circumstances. Because of the sensitivity of the circumstances, Japan did not initially want to reveal Nakamura's army connections; and the Chinese prevaricated. But on 17 August, Nakamura's identity was revealed. China was asked to conduct rigorous enquiries. The story was gradually pieced together and the culprits eventually punished on 17 September. But the Kuantung army, whose intelligence activities were at stake, made political capital among the troops out of these Manchurian incidents and the slowness of China's response. More broadly, it conducted a campaign at home, calling for a military expedition to Manchuria, including dropping leaflets over Japanese cities. Hopes of a peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes were dashed by the Kuantung army's coup at Mukden on 18 September that started the Manchurian Incident.25 THE MANCHURIAN DECEPTION, 1931 The next phase of the Manchurian crisis lasted for three months from 18 September. Working on the model of the rail "accident" which had led to the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, the Kuantung army in Manchuria staged a bomb blast on the track of the Japanese-owned SMR to the north of Mukden (Shenyang). Its intention was to present the incident as one which Chinese soldiers from the garrison to the north of the city adjoining the line were likely to have carried out and thereby to justify it in the eyes of its own people and countries around the world in occupying Chinese cities around the railway zone. Almost overnight, the Kuantung army took positive steps to attack the cities of south and central Manchuria. Knowing that its numbers were small compared to the nominal strength of the Chinese armies, the Kuantung army obtained the cooperation of General Hayashi Senjuro, commander of the Japanese forces in Korea, who moved his troops into Manchuria without Tokyo's consent. From this, we can see

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that it was an operation which had been carefully planned in advance. The Tokyo government, as in 1928, was taken by surprise despite its suspicions that something was in the offing. The consuls in Manchuria had warned that something was being cooked up by the Kuantung army and had alerted the Foreign Ministry.26 The government reacted by sending over to Mukden a special emissary, General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, to forbid the officers from undertaking any madcap scheme. But all sorts of leaks took place, and the venturesome younger officers planned to go ahead before the emissary could pass on his message to the commander-in-chief. Consul-general Hayashi in Mukden tried to persuade the ringleaders in the army to desist but was met with a violent response. Japanese consular representatives in Manchuria were generally opposed to the military approach. 27 The Chinese foreign minister made a strong protest to Shigemitsu. TV. Soong proposed to organize a committee representing both Chinese and Japanese for settlement of the incident. While Shigemitsu recommended this procedure to Tokyo, the Japanese army acted so swiftly that the proposal had to be given up. The Nanking government was preoccupied with the catastrophic flooding in the Yangtse valley and was not inclined to intervene militarily. On the ground, the armies of Chang Hsueh-liang offered only slight resistance and retreated southwest towards the Great Wall. None of the powers was ready to commit itself to practical intervention of any kind in the dispute. So Japanese units came into possession of most of the cities and major arteries in the south of Manchuria within a month. Japan, however, was taken aback when China referred the case to the League of Nations in Geneva, which had hardly been conspicuous in dealing with East Asian issues in the past. To Japan's surprise, the League took up the official Chinese complaint despite the confident prediction of the Kuantung army that Europe would be looking the other way during the depression and would not get involved.28 On 23 September Minister Shigemitsu in Shanghai attacked the actions of the army in Manchuria in a memorandum to Tokyo. In a further message on 9 October, he warned that the Manchurian incident was likely to be the cause of an anti-Japanese movement in China, which would last for many years and need to be kept under control. He predicted that the happenings in Manchuria would cast a shadow over Japanese interests elsewhere in China, where the boycott of Japanese goods and harassment of Japanese enterprises on his homeground of Shanghai were likely to be stepped up. Regardless of this, the army soon moved well beyond its role as protector of Japan's railway interests. General Honjo Shigeru, the new commanderin-chief since June, was inadequately informed of Tokyo's desire to restrain the Kuantung Army and allowed great discretion to officers ranking as colonel. Once fighting had started, he was ready to exercise his rights of

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independent command (dokudan senko) to authorize the extension of hostilities beyond Mukden despite the government's desire to limit the conflict. Such action was inconsistent with the official line which Japan initially took at meetings of the League Council, namely that its troops would be withdrawn. 29 It will become clear that addressing foreign policy in terms of the Tokyo government is not enough, for the army was in practice running an independent policy of its own. The degree of dialogue, consultation, and consensus between the government and army was limited: the Japanese army just went its own way. The pride and arrogance of the Kuantung Army made it indifferent to world opinion and confident that it could get away with its military advances. The weak Japanese cabinet defended the army's position in debates at Geneva through the autumn but increasingly found that the army was seriously out of control. Tokyo had a wider range of concerns than the generals. It had to take account of international complications like the possible intervention of the Soviet Union in the dispute. Prime Minister Wakatsuki told the war minister to halt the Kuantung army south of the Russianowned Chinese Eastern Railway lest the Soviets be tempted to become involved as they had been in 1929. If the army advanced to attack Tsitsihar, a town to the north of that railway, he threatened to resign. The troops did enter that town on 19 November, but the prime minister did not resign. The sheer frustration of civilian members of the cabinet is illustrated by one critic, Hayashi. As consul-general in Mukden, he visited Shidehara on 16 November and gave this account: I learned later that at a cabinet meeting the previous evening he had said that, if the Japanese army entered Tsitsihar, he would immediately resign as foreign minister. But even though our army did enter Tsitsihar there was nobody in the cabinet who took responsibility and resigned. They only told half truths to foreign countries. That being the case, there was no hope of our relations with foreign countries improving.30 Edgar Snow, then a correspondent in Japan, was told at a press conference that while Japan respected the League, her troops could not be withdrawn from their present positions and might have to go further inland. 31 The next problem was whether the Kuantung Army would violate Tokyo's assurances by pursuing the retreating troops of Chang Hsueh-liang towards the Great Wall, well beyond the zone of the Japanese railway. Its objective was Chinchou, a railway junction on the way to north China, which had already been attacked from the air. This was only stopped when the army command in Tokyo accepted that world opinion would be hostile and insisted on the pursuit being called off. But the Kuantung Army did not give up its plan to launch a land invasion of the city, despite the fact that Shidehara extracted an assurance from General Kanaya, the Chief

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of the General Staff, that the army would not attack it. The troops were given strict orders not to advance west of the Liao river. Despite this, the commanding general sent his troops off on trains for the attack on Chinchow. But the operation was firmly called off by Tokyo. Within a matter of days, General Kanaya, who was responsible for recalling the troops, mysteriously appeared on the retired list and was replaced by Prince Kanin, the Emperor's uncle, on 27 November.32 The Tokyo government was in a dilemma on several fronts. Its authority had clearly been flouted over Manchuria, though the actions of the army were popular. The Minseito cabinet was divided into competing factions over its relation with the army and the Manchurian incident. Home Minister Adachi Kenzo, in close touch with sections of the military, was advocating the need for a coalition government to deal with the emergency. It is doubtful whether Adachi and his associate, the businessman Kuhara Fusanosuke, would have opposed the emergence of the military in a more prominent fascistic role. When Prime Minister Wakatsuki came out against an all-party ministry, Adachi withdrew the support of his associates. This dissension has to be seen against the background of financial turmoil. As a result of a foreign exchange crisis, there had been a run on the yen, and the cabinet was divided on the urgency of leaving the gold standard. 33 After considering various options to deal with the crises on three fronts, the ministry decided that its top priority was to enforce discipline in the army. In a piece of neat footwork, it now sought to bring in the League of Nations by sponsoring a resolution on 10 December that Geneva should send a Commission of Enquiry, ultimately known as "the Lytton Commission," with the task of reporting on happenings in Manchuria. 34 This was a complete volte face for the cabinet, which had earlier kept its distance from the League. It was tantamount to bringing in an international doctor to cure some of the ills of the Japanese state. It was a high risk strategy over which Tokyo could only have limited control, but it did allow Japan time. Shidehara told Japan's representatives in Paris two days later of his general satisfaction with the outcome brought about by their efforts.35 On the following day, the Minseito cabinet resigned despite its majority in the Diet. A party cabinet of liberal persuasion had failed to cope with a serious crisis; it had tried to localize the incident which instead had expanded. The diplomat at the eye of the storm, Hayashi Kyujiro, was harsh in his assessment: "The present Manchurian incident was dealt with by the government with total inadequacy and lack of statesmanship. The prime minister and members of the Minseito cabinet have the ultimate responsibility for the incident and did the state much damage by their actions." 36 While Hayashi detested the army leaders, he was not uncritical of seniors in the Foreign Ministry for tolerating a structure of authority in Manchuria that was bound to favor the army.

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THE INUKAI CABINET AND SHANGHAI On 13 December, Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855-1932), the elderly president of the Seiyu party, agreed to form another party ministry. Why the elder statesman in whom the choice was vested should have recommended to the Emperor the opposition leader rather than arranged for the majority party to form a new ministry is not clear. Inukai may have been invited because of his China connections, especially his acquaintance with the late Sun Yatsen and his associates. Indeed, he lost no time in trying to mobilize these contacts. On 20 December, he sent Kayano Nagatomo to the Chinese capital to explore Sino-Japanese problems unofficially with his many influential friends. Inukai thought that by recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, the Chinese might be persuaded to accept Japanese de facto hegemony there. (Basically, this was the formula which the Lytton Commission was to propose and which was to be resoundingly rejected by Japan.) Mori Kaku, who as chief cabinet secretary expected to take some role in all aspects of foreign policy, immediately opposed the move. As a deputy foreign minister under Tanaka, he had been identified with the "positive approach" towards the anti-Japanese movement in China and may have favored severing diplomatic relations during the policy debate within the Inukai cabinet. At all events, Mori and the Foreign Ministry both disapproved of this exercise; Kayano was withdrawn on 5 January 1932. 37 It shows that Inukai's initiative for a viable agreement with China was not acceptable to his cabinet colleagues, far less to the army authorities. Inukai inherited an unstable political situation. On 8 January, Koreans opposed to Japan's annexation of their country made an abortive move to assassinate the Emperor on his way to open parliament in what is known as the Sakuradamon incident. Inoue Junnosuke, the former finance minister who had tried to cope with the depression by orthodox methods, was murdered by a secret society called the Ketsumeidan on 9 February. Baron Dan, the head of the Mitsui combine, was murdered by a similar group on 5 March. Inukai acted as his own foreign minister until Yoshizawa Kenkichi returned from Europe in order to take over at the ministry. He was wellqualified as a China expert, having been minister at Peking and having served in Paris and at meetings of the League Council over the previous six months. He decided to travel back to Japan by way of Moscow, the TransSiberian railway and Manchuria in order to see the situation at first hand. When he took over on 14 January 1932, he faced a difficult situation: throughout China, the anti-Japanese movement was peaking, and the Japanese residents in Shanghai wanted their government to take very strong action against those instigating the movement and the commercial boycott of Japanese goods. 38 However, Yoshizawa was soon preoccupied with the question of the army's plans in Manchuria and the planned administration proposed for

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its occupied territory. He recognized that there was a need to announce a just policy toward China as a whole and that it was necessary for Tokyo to take steps to deal comprehensively with the China question. But he was overwhelmed by problems on all sides. The prime diplomatic problem was how to deal with army schemes to find a new regime in Manchuria. On 16 February, a meeting of Japanese and Manchu officials was held to discuss the structure of a new state for the three provinces, hitherto regarded as part of China. One solution was for Pu Yi, the former boy emperor of China who had been forced to retire after the 1911 revolution, to head a new state. Having escaped from China with Japanese help, he then stayed in a South Manchurian Railway hotel at Port Arthur (Lushun). As a Manchu prince, he was a plausible choice. But his entourage wanted him to be recognized as monarch; the Japanese at this stage did not. It was agreed to make him regent or head of state, but not monarch. On 18 February, the parties were able to issue a declaration of the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia. Pu Yi was approached with the proposal that he should become regent; after the accustomed refusals, he eventually received a delegation at Port Arthur and accepted the position. After the districts and provinces had given their formal support for a new state, an All-Manchurian congress took place in Mukden on 29 February; there it was announced that Pu Yi would become regent of the new state of Manchukuo, initially for one year. Immediately, the Chinese minister in Tokyo protested Japan's role in pushing for the independence of what he called "China's Three Eastern provinces." On 9 March the new government was set up with its capital at Changchun, the railway junction which was given the new name of Hsinking (literally "new capital"); and on the following day an agreement was reached with Japan. 39 On 12 March, the new regime announced its existence to the powers and asked for formal recognition by them. The powers failed to respond. Japan, after a cabinet meeting, announced her decision to withhold recognition for the time being, presumably bearing in mind the opposition of the United States and European countries. Henry L. Stimson, the American secretary of state, in his so-called doctrine of 7 January, had strongly opposed recognition. In the circumstances, Yoshizawa evidently felt that it was desirable to avoid a confrontation with the powers. He and the majority of his colleagues felt that they had been pushed into a false position by the Kuantung army.40 During these momentous arrangements, the country went to the polls on 20 February. The Minsei party of the former cabinet found its seats reduced from 246 to 147, while Inukai's Seiyukai grew from 171 to 304. The Seiyu government secured an overwhelming majority after what has been described as a dirty general election. Yet the election did suggest that the public had endorsed Japan's actions in Manchuria and voted against the cautious China policy of the Minseito.

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While the Japanese army was expanding throughout Manchuria, the Chinese could not make a strong military response, retaliating instead by an unofficial boycott of Japanese goods. In the influential Japanese community in Shanghai, there was a great feeling of insecurity. This surfaced on 18 January when a religious procession of Buddhist believers moved through the narrow streets of Chapei to the north of the International Settlement only to be stoned by Chinese workers from a towelling factory. Two Japanese monks were killed. Dr. Goto presents the evidence that this may have been a deception inspired by the military. In retaliation for the killing, the Japanese community arranged for the towelling factory to be attacked. 41 The Japanese government not only demanded a formal apology and compensation for the monks, but also the immediate dissolution of anti-Japanese organizations. The mayor accepted the first demands but declined the second set, as perhaps being beyond his power. However, Admiral Shiozawa, the fiery naval commander at Shanghai, was not satisfied with partial acceptance and persisted in this line after Consul-general Murai declared himself satisfied with these assurances. At midnight on 28 January, a force of Japanese marines landed and occupied the defensive sector they had been allotted in order, it was said, to protect their nationals. Japanese planes bombed Shanghai on the following day. From that time a serious situation existed with clashes breaking out between Chinese and Japanese troops. The Japanese residents were making preparations for evacuation by ship. Minister Shigemitsu came to the conclusion that the Japanese population could not be protected by the naval units alone and asked the Tokyo government for the despatch of army units. The cabinet agreed, not without dissentients. 42 An expeditionary force, amounting to about three divisions, was sent under the command of General Shirakawa in various contingents spread over the month of February. From 14 February onwards, 12,000 Japanese reinforcements arrived, demanding the withdrawal of the Chinese troops of the 19th Route army to a perimeter of twenty kilometers from the settlement. When China refused the ultimatum, the Japanese attacked. The Chinese forces put up an unexpectedly stout resistance but were gradually surrounded though the Japanese left them a passage to withdraw from Chapei. The final part of the Japanese expeditionary force arrived at the end of February at Woosung, at the confluence of the Whangpoo and Yangtse rivers, with a view to continuing with the attack. Consonant with this, the government sent the navy's third squadron, under Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, to the scene at the beginning of February. It was a formidable armada of fifty vessels including cruisers and aircraft carriers. Ironically these combined forces had been sent at the request of Minister Shigemitsu. The Tokyo government let it be known, however, that it would welcome foreign mediation to resolve the issue. The Powers, not knowing whether

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the actions at Shanghai were the first move in a Japanese expedition for conquest up the Yangtse or merely a localized issue which had coincidentally gotten out of hand, were slow to react. But Sir Miles Lampson, the British minister to China, went to Shanghai on 12 February and took part in talks though he concluded that it was still too early for the Chinese and Japanese to discuss a ceasefire directly with one another.43 What had started as a Sino-Japanese dispute quickly became an international incident in which the Powers were keen to ensure the survival of the Chinese central government at Nanking as well as the defense of their own commercial and financial interests in the Shanghai area. But the Powers did not want to get involved in fighting. They wanted their local representatives to negotiate a settlement but, at the same time, sent formidable squadrons to Shanghai to safeguard their own interests. The same problem emerged as in Manchuria: the army would not negotiate until it scented total victory. Minister Shigemitsu found it hard to act on behalf of the generals involved on the ground. Tokyo, therefore, sent over as its special envoy the former diplomat Matsuoka Yosuke, by this time an influential Seiyukai politician. His exact role is not clear to this day, but his presence, like that of the army and navy commanders, did not make Shigemitsu's position any easier. The Japanese were in no mood for negotiation until they had won a military victory, however great the persuasiveness of the Powers. A real breakthrough did not come until the end of February. A plenary session of the League of Nations Assembly was due to be held in Geneva opening at 1100 hours (after midnight in Shanghai time) on 3 March. Treating this as a deadline, Shigemitsu desperately tried to arrange a ceasefire before the Assembly opened in order to restore Japan's international reputation. To that end he personally met Admiral Nomura early on the morning of 3 March. Nomura agreed but said that it might be a different matter for the army. On the previous day, he had been engaged in various critical discussions along with Matsuoka. It would appear that Matsuoka was supporting Shigemitsu behind the scenes but leaving the running publicly to him. Shigemitsu argued that the Japanese army, as a result of fighting in the Shanghai area, had completely secured the objectives of the expedition. Accordingly, he proposed that a ceasefire for the whole army should start without delay. At a critical meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, Shigemitsu had to use the argument that in the palace in Tokyo the Emperor himself was gravely worried about the outcome. On this basis, General Shirakawa was induced to stop the fighting and issue the order for a ceasefire. In Geneva the League Assembly was delighted to receive this report. 44 It was now up to Lampson, his League of Nations team in Shanghai, and the League authorities in Geneva to negotiate a lasting armistice. The talks, beginning in Shanghai on 19 March, were to precede a formal conference

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due to open at the end of March; these talks were held in accordance with a League of Nations resolution. The foreign powers were represented by the ministers and military attaches for the United States, Italy, France, and Britain. On the Japanese side, it was necessary to reconcile the views of the army with those of the navy as well as those of the diplomats. Since military operations were still in progress, the army claimed the right of dokudan senko, the prerogatives of independent action. This complicated the task of the civilian intermediaries shuttling between the foreign representatives and the army leaders who as victors were conscious of the strength of their own position. Late in the day, a further impediment to the peace process came from an unexpected quarter. On 29 April, the Japanese community in Shanghai assembled for a military parade in honor of the Emperor's birthday. After a parade of troops through the city—unquestionably a triumphalist act in an international city—dignitaries gave speeches in Hongkew Park. During these, a Korean threw a bomb which caused havoc to the platform party. General Shirakawa was killed; Minister Shigemitsu had to have his leg amputated; Admiral Nomura and Consul-general Murai were seriously injured. One can think of instances in which Japan might have used this event— which has to be described as a national humiliation—as a justification for calling off the talks with China. Instead, the talks were allowed to continue. Evidently, Tokyo was ready to see the Shanghai complication brought to an end as it was seen in Japan as secondary to developments in Manchuria, which were of a permanent nature. 45 The official Sino-Japanese truce agreement, which had been approved by the League in advance, was signed on 5 May. The Chinese troops accepted the restriction of remaining outside a perimeter of twenty kilometers from Shanghai. A joint commission of League countries was established to monitor the transfer of territory from the Japanese to the Chinese. Japan's troops were withdrawn from the territory apart from 2500 marines who continued as occupiers. The Japanese called for a Round Table Conference to discuss Shanghai's future, a conference that, it was hoped, would impose a long-term solution by way of a demilitarized zone around Shanghai. While local business opinion agreed with this proposal by the Japanese, the idea was allowed to die on the vine. The Powers, along with their representatives, were exhausted by the six months' conflict. The Shanghai side show had been closed, but it had led to a loss of face for Japan. On 15 May, a group consisting of several young naval officers and students from the military academy barged into Prime Minister Inukai's residence in Nagata-cho in Tokyo. Angered by the lack of resolution for Shanghai, the London naval treaty, and the plight of farm villages, they first argued their case and then fired at him. Inukai died shortly afterwards at the hospital. Simultaneous raids were made on liberal politicians and court officials who had been critical of recent events. The assassination of the

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prime minister was a deeply shaming incident for the Japanese state. The spontaneous work of younger members of the armed services and not representive of the army and navy as a whole, it still was a symptom of the disaffection between civilian and military leaders and the increasing independence of the latter from the authority of both the prime minister and cabinet.46 Inukai's death, of course, brought about the bitter end of the ministry and was to lead constitutionally to the end of party government in prewar Japan. It was a great misfortune for the ministry, which felt that it had falteringly solved its various crises. The ministry had coped with the world depression perhaps better than any other major power; it had ended the fighting in Manchuria and resolved the crisis by allowing the creation of Manchukuo. Most controversially of all, the ministry had settled the Shanghai issue by promising to pull out Japanese troops, thus enabling the country to concentate on Manchuria. But its well-meaning actions had generated a lot of resentment and resistance. The attempts to accommodate the domestic enthusiasm for expansion and the sensitivities toward other nations had failed, resulting in this humiliating personal tragedy for Inukai.

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CHAPTER 5

Departure from Internationalism, 1932-1936 On 15 May, the assassins of Prime Minister Inukai were making a protest against his attempt, and that of civilian politicians in general, to step up control of the armed forces, especially those operating overseas. These two issues, the role of party politics and the need for reining in the military, were to cast a shadow over Japan for the rest of the 1930s and were to be major issues in the country's foreign policy-making. Those entrusted with recommending a successor to Inukai decided to name Admiral Saito Makoto, who as a navy man was more acceptable than an army man. Saito was a moderate non-party man who had wide experience of international negotiation and of administration as governor-general of Korea for two spells (1919-1927; 1929-1931). He recruited members of both parties for his cabinet though the politicians debated over whether they would cooperate in an essentially non-party government. They did join; but it was clear to them that the days of purely party cabinets had passed.1 Saito appointed Count Uchida as Foreign Minister directly from his service as president of the South Manchurian Railway Company. A more controversial appointment was that of General Araki as War Minister. Under this mixed management, Japan took two significant steps towards isolation: her departure from the League and her departure from agreements on naval limitation. This isolation forms the subject matter of this chapter. THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS—THE INTERNATIONAL PHASE In May, the Manchurian crisis passed from being a regional crisis involving Japan and China to an international one largely because of the involvement of the League of Nations. The League had become involved as the result of an appeal by the Chinese government and its decision to send out a commission of enquiry to the area. The Lytton commission, so named

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because of the British chairman, Lord Lytton, had pursued a leisurely path through central and northern China, Manchuria, and Korea. In Japan, Lytton became aware of the unpopularity of what the League was doing. While the government was cordial enough, the commission was given protection against a hostile, patriotic public. It was a taste of the anti-foreign feeling which was to be roused in 1938-1939. In August, the commissioners were preparing their report, which was ultimately signed on 4 September, in Peking.2 Insider information told the Japanese of the Lytton Commission's likely recommendation that League members would be discouraged from recognizing the new state of Manchukuo. This put the Japanese government under some pressure to reach a firm decision over its own recognition of the new territory, which had hitherto been held in abeyance. It decided to grant recognition in advance of the report coming out. The cabinet had a consensus in favor of recognizing Manchukuo without delay since this would be less damaging internationally than recognition in defiance of the report. Uchida reported this to the Emperor on 14 July. In a speech to the Diet on 25 August, Foreign Minister Uchida argued the case for Japan robustly: Those who seek to place upon Japan the responsibility for the Manchurian revolution, by tracing the independence of Manchoukuo directly to our military operations, simply labour under an ignorance of the facts, and their opinions altogether miss the point. Manchoukuo has come into being as a result of separatist movements within China herself. Consequently the view expressed in certain quarters that recognition by Japan of the new state would constitute a violation of the stipulations of the Nine-Power Treaty, is an opinion incomprehensible. [Eng. original]3 Uchida went on to deny that Japan was seeking to annex Manchuria or had any territorial designs there. He concluded that "to extend to Manchoukuo formal recognition and assist its government to carry on their [sic] sound policy will be a notable step toward making Manchuria a happy and peaceful land for natives and foreigners." Despite the adverse global reaction expected, he added, the Japanese would not "yield an inch even if the country turned to scorched earth." Uchida's speech caught the patriotic mood. In fact, matters were held up by the reaction not from international quarters but from Manchukuo. First, the advent of General Araki at the War Ministry led to a tightening of discipline in the Kuantung army. General Honjo was to be replaced as commander-in-chief by General Muto while Colonels Itagaki and Ishiwara, the ring leaders behind the 1931 railway explosion, were marginalized. Second, the Chinese members of the Manchukuoan administration were suspicious about the offer of conditional recognition received from Tokyo. Japan's condition was that Manchukuo

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should sign a defense pact giving Japan the right to station troops on her territory in return for undertakings to defend her. Regent Pu Yi wanted an assurance that Japan would undertake to make him emperor, and the country undertook a secret endeavor which would come into effect on 1 March 1934. On this basis, the Japan-Manchukuo agreement (giteisho) was signed on 15 September, the same day on which Japan granted recognition to the new state. The effect of this was to disregard Chinese sovereignty over the territory and ignore a central finding of the Lytton report, which was published in Geneva on 1 October.4 The Lytton Commission was not intended to recommend courses of action to the parties. It had two functions: to analyze the facts of the case and to make suggestions to the League for improving the situation. Japan found fault with its report on two main counts. Over the regime in Manchuria, Japan objected to the statement that "the Independence Movement which had never been heard of in Manchuria before 1931, was only made possible by the presence of Japanese troops" and argued that it sprang from a genuine spirit of self-determination. Nor could Japan accept the League's conclusion that "the military operations of the Japanese troops during this night [of 18-19 September 1931] cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence."5 Military pride would not accept an implied criticism, however mild. Overall, the report was by no means anti-Japanese and contained many telling criticisms of China. But, in the climate of the times, Japan was not ready to receive advice from outside parties merely for the sake of upholding a reputation as a good internationalist. It was hard for the Foreign Ministry to be other than critical because public opinion had been so worked up. Publication of the Lytton report led on to its discussion by the League Council between 23 and 28 November. Japan appointed a special plenipotentiary to argue her case in the shape of Matsuoka Yosuke who, after a career in the Foreign Ministry, had resigned to join the South Manchurian Railway (1921-1929). Having great linguistic skills which, as we have seen, he had put to good use during the Shanghai negotiations earlier in the year, he was to prove an intrepid debater and eloquent (but lengthy) speechmaker in Geneva. The League report was passed to the Assembly for discussion between 6 and 9 December. This resulted in a plethora of antiJapanese speeches from the representatives of the smaller powers who had only a passing familiarity with the report itself. The matter got out of the control of the League leadership.6 To cool the temperature and allow for conciliation, the League referred the issue, over the New Year, to its Committee of Nineteen and its sub-committees; the real purpose was to prevent a direct confrontation between the League and the Japanese so that the latter would not leave the world body. Many in Japan advocated resignation from the League, which was seen as a negative force operating against the country's national interest. Nonetheless, Matsuoka and his colleagues

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tried hard to work out some form of words which would accommodate all parties. On 14 January 1933, the secretary-general of the League held a series of meetings with Sugimura Yotaro, the senior Japanese member on the League secretariat; they drew up a draft resolution of a kind assumed to be acceptable to the Japanese. But this exercise aborted since League members claimed it was incompatible with the objects of the League and an improper action for the memberships' bureaucrats. 7 In February, Tokyo made it clear that going back on its policy over Manchukuo or permitting China's sovereignty in that territory were not options. The League insisted on the withdrawal of Japanese troops into the railway zone and the recognition of Chinese sovereignty in the territory. With both parties sticking determinedly to such a rigid stand, it was apparent that conciliation by the world body was impossible. JAPAN LEAVES THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

One factor which swayed international opinion was that while these sensitive issues were being discussed, the Japanese armies were invading Jehol (Rehe), the area beyond the Great Wall claimed by Japan as closer to Manchukuo than to China. Since the state of Manchukuo had been set up, Japan had planned to incorporate "the provinces of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, the Tungsheng Special District and the Mongolian Leagues under several banners" [my italics]. The Japanese criticized, in particular, the misgovernment of the regime in Jehol, the bandits who operated there, and the traffic in opium. For a while, any plans for absorbing the mountainous and sparsely inhabited territory of Jehol into the independent government were kept obscure. From the Chinese side, Jehol was placed by the KMT government at Nanking under the control of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and the Chinese spiritedly opposed any suggestion about its incorporation into Manchukuo. After yet another "simulation" of a Chinese attack on a Japanese barracks similar to the incident of September 1931, Japanese troops seized the walled city of Shanhaikuan, a coastal town on the Great Wall vital for any Jehol campaign, on 3 January 1933. China appealed to the League, the attitude of which immediately hardened as members wondered whether the opening move in a campaign to take northern China had just occurred. There was scope for solving the dispute between Manchukuo and the governor; but the Chinese government was prepared to fight over it, and large forces were thrown into Jehol to prevent a takeover. The campaign, which started on 22 February, was brief; resistance collapsed, and Jehol city was occupied on 4 March. The military operations had been narrowly conceived to take effect before the thaw of early spring, apparently without considering their effect on the delicate state of Japan's negotiations at Geneva. A military success, the operations were a political blunder. Goals were pur-

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sued by the military and justified by the Foreign Ministry without international consequences being adequately assessed.8 Against this background, the League Assembly adopted the main thrust of the Lytton commission's report in a lengthy report of its own on 24 February. The vote was forty-two to one (Japan) with the notable abstention of Thailand. The League did not expel Japan from its membership and, indeed, rather tamely recommended that China and Japan should negotiate together to solve the problem. Instead, Matsuoka led his delegation out of the chamber, as he had been instructed to do. Did this imply that Japan would leave the League? This action led to an agonizing debate in Tokyo during March. Balanced against Japan's fear of isolation were its natural desire for autonomy and the pride of the military, which had been injured by the whole debate. On 27 March, the Japanese cabinet decided irretrievably on leaving the League. In giving the two years' notice of withdrawal, the Imperial Rescript said that she had come to recognize "an irreconcilable divergence of views, dividing Japan and the League . . . as regards the fundamental principles to be followed in the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East." In other words, the rhetoric of the day depicted Japan resigning because of grievances she had against an international body which had been unjust to the country.9 Whether or not Japan or the League handled this crisis well is debatable. Japan appears to have been stubborn and unyielding. Even Matsuoka and his entourage, many of whom were hard-liners, evidently thought that Japan had not shown enough flexibility. Whether world opinion would have allowed the League Assembly to appease Japan is unlikely. But as passionate an advocate of the League as Lord Lytton himself thought that the association of nations, too, had made tactical mistakes. He described the situation, in retrospect, in 1937: the most important thing was to get the Japanese to consent to discuss the basis of a settlement and to avoid an open breach between the League and Japan. .. . The Commission had deliberately avoided any comments on the facts and the Report contains no word of criticism of Japan. The future was of far greater importance than the past. A constructive peace rather than a legal judgment was their objective. . . . It is regrettable that their example was not followed by the League.10 In a further military action, the generals extended their operations south of the Great Wall on 1 April 1933. By fomenting unrest among the local warlords and pursuing the fleeing resisting armies, Japanese troops were advancing in the direction of Tientsin and Peking, though they stopped short of these cities. A ceasefire was negotiated between the Kuantung army and local Chinese commanders in the Japanese barracks at Tangku in May. Chinese armies were to withdraw from an area thirty to forty miles wide between the Great Wall and a line running across Hopei; Japan reserved

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the right to check on the buffer zone by the use of observers and reconnaissance aircraft. China had no such right. Once Japan was satisfied about China's withdrawal from the demilitarized zone, its forces would withdraw north to the Great Wall. A political truce along similar lines was signed with General Huang Fu, recently appointed as chairman of the Peking Political Affairs Council, on 31 May. Chiang Kai-shek, who had returned to power in January, would not convert the local arrangement into a formal national agreement or ratify what he described as "a painful document." Tokyo eventually gave assurances that Hopei, the province to the south of the Great Wall, would not be occupied and that it did not intend to provoke a war with China. 11 The Manchurian Incident closed with the Tangku truce after two long years of fighting. It left Japan seriously at odds with the international community and with China, where the boycott continued. By her actions, Japan had not only antagonized the League, but also the United States outside the League. Events in Manchuria had succeeded in bringing the State Department into the anti-Japanese camp: the United States had assisted the League powers in handling the Shanghai crisis, and the Lytton Commission had had an influential American member. But Japan was clearly determined to pursue its national goals regardless of the opposition and the isolation, which might be the consequence in her quest for autonomy. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRAINS Japan's economic position also affected her foreign policy. The nation had coped with the world depression remarkably well, probably because its economy was leaner due to the financial crisis of 1927. Still by 1933, suffering from the combined effects of the aftermath of the world depression together with the high costs of the military adventures in Manchuria and Shanghai had hurt Japan. Faring relatively well compared to other countries in terms of unemployment, Japan's main export, raw silk, was greatly reduced to the United States. In the years ahead after developing other parts of its industry, the country became an important buyer in world markets, especially of raw materials from colonial territories. So collisions occurred with colonial countries that were themselves trying to develop industrially. Her overseas trade faced restrictions, tariffs, and the growth of protectionism abroad. No longer a major market for imported manufactured goods, Japan became a formidable competitor of older industrial countries. 12 The domestic effect of the depression was to drive a wedge between city and country, between industry and the farming sector. Peasants and farmers, who made up half of the labor force, suffered from a fall in the price of agricultural products, feeling themselves to be doubly exploited by the bankers and the landlords. In their poverty, the peasants blamed the political parties who seemed to be the voice of industrial and trading inter-

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ests. They found warm supporters among junior ranks in the army who came mainly from farming backgrounds. 13 Just how this sympathy affected army thinking on overseas policy as a whole is not entirely clear. But, in respect to Manchuria, the leaders of the Kuantung army had a vision of developing the territory as a means of coping with Japan's great population explosion and assuring its independence from foreign suppliers of raw materials by tapping the rich resources of Manchuria. Beyond that, Japan embarked on ambitious schemes for the production of manufactured goods in Manchukuo, a rare phenomenon among imperialist powers. But there were doubts about whether Japan could shoulder the enormous burden imposed by the rehabilitation of that underdeveloped territory. Outside observers, like Lord Lytton, had grave doubts about Japan's ability either to bear the financial cost of fighting during the campaign or to assume the future cost of rebuilding the economy of Manchuria: Japan, Lytton thought, could hardly afford the greatly increased budgets needed for the development of Manchukuo. The left-wing in Japan was under no illusions about happenings there. It attributed them to "the ambition of the Japanese capitalist class and military to conquer Manchuria. Japan has its own Monroe doctrine. Japanese capitalism cannot develop, or even survive, without Manchuria." 14 But oppressive measures were gradually being applied in order to muzzle such left-wing voices. Speakers at public meetings were harassed by the police, and assassination was always a threat for those who stepped out of line. Central to this economic debate, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo gave his name to the Takahashi finance which characterized the period from 1931 until his assassination in 1936. On the one hand, he had opposed aspects of the military's actions in Manchuria and certainly objected to the escalation of operations at Shanghai. On the other hand, while the overall budget lessened during his tenure, the military/naval budget increased considerably, rising from 31 percent in 1931-1932 to 47 percent in 1936-1937. The paradox was that military expenditure was one way of achieving Takahashi's goal of restimulating the economy and spending Japan's way out of the world depression. Unintentionally, it played into the hands of the Japanese army rather than alleviating the lot of farmers. The successes which the military had achieved led the Diet never seriously to question the enlarged military budgets proposed, though Takahashi and Araki had frequent quarrels in cabinet.15 Seeing itself as a have-not nation, Japan was, therefore, an enthusiastic participant in the World Economic Conference held in London in June 1933. Her delegates, the diplomat Ishii Kikujiro and the banker Fukai Eigo, attended substantive discussions with the new Roosevelt administration in Washington en route to Britain. In general, Japan was in line with world opinion over gold, silver, and the exchanges; it advocated free trade and opposed import limitation. But Japan had felt the pinch of the boycott movement in China and tried to raise this as a

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matter of priority at the conference. Alas, the spirit of international cooperation had disappeared in these days of global stagnation, and the boycott issue was barely addressed. The failure of the Economic Conference was such that the Powers pursued increasingly nationalistic economic policies and tended even more to operate in blocs.16 Trade disputes became increasingly common. The most conspicuous example was that of British India, which became Japan's largest trading partner in 1933. In order to develop her cotton manufacturing, Japan had to purchase raw cotton from India with a view to exporting cotton goods back to India. On 1 April 1933, the government of India, under pressure from its own cotton mills, gave notice of termination of its trade treaty of 1904 with Japan. This was bad news for Tokyo. Negotiations began in September and, after protracted discussions centered on the Simla Conference, an agreement was reached whereby Japan would purchase Indian raw cotton and Japanese textiles would enter India on a 50 percent tariff basis.17 The weak Saito ministry survived despite frequent predictions of its early demise. On 8 July 1934, however, it was eventually succeeded by a cabinet headed by Admiral Okada, Saito's Navy Minister, who was again a figure with a reputation for moderation. General Araki, the War Minister, who had the reputation for being a firebrand, resigned around this time, thus confirming the impression that the new cabinet was a moderate one. Hirota Koki, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union and now Foreign Minister in September 1933, continued to serve. In contrast to Uchida, Hirota professed to look for better relations with all powers, though some historians consider him to have actually been a supporter of a tough policy towards China, in line with the army.18 The so-called Tangku truce of November 1932 was a one-sided arrangement that had not found favor with the Nanking authorities who had forthwith denounced it. The fact remains, however, that the truce was maintained right down to the outbreak of trouble in July 1937, while Japan took steps to develop the resources of Manchukuo. In these developments, the Japanese line, as Matsuoka had hinted at Geneva, was that "the door would be open for those [countries] who recognized Manchukuo." This view was confirmed by those from the Manchukuo administration. Tokyo, which claimed that the Open Door operated in Manchukuo, was displeased with this approach; but it is doubtful whether it greatly influenced the situation on the ground. The League, for its part, had warned its members not to recognize the "puppet state," while Americans saw its creation as a violation of the Washington Nine-Power Treaty. Nonetheless, Manchukuo presented a tempting market in the post-Depression period, and many international companies made approaches only to find that the Manchukuo government introduced protectionist measures. For example Manchukuo established an oil monopoly in 1934, thus especially injuring American and British companies. 19

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On the political front, Regent Pu Yi, on 1 March 1934, was created emperor of Manchukuo in a ceremony of great pomp at the new national capital of Hsinking (Changchun). To overcome any suggestion that Japan was proposing to annex Manchukuo, the Tokyo government found it expedient to withdraw its earlier objections to installing Pu Yi as emperor. In April 1935, Emperor Pu Yi visited Japan as the guest of the imperial household and received—admittedly reluctantly—a full ceremonial welcome. These occasions were used as further attempts at securing international recognition. But Japan hardly succeeded in beating the non-recognition policy of the League.20 Recognition came very slowly: first, from small states like El Salvador and the Vatican and, finally, from the more powerful countries. Germany, which was now under the rule of Hitler as Chancellor and had like Japan left the League of Nations, might have taken the lead. But when asked for recognition, the German Wilhelmstrasse doubtlessly remembered the close ties existing between Berlin and the Nationalist government of China and rebuffed the overtures for the time being. It was, however, ready to develop trade with the country under the German-Manchukuo pact of 30 April 1936. Recognition of Manchukuo by China was, of course, the greatest desideratum. While Japan raised the matter in the Tangku negotiations, only limited success followed. The Manchu authorities managed to forge a working relationship over transport and trade with the Political Affairs Council at Peking. This amounted to local recognition. Moreover, relations with the central Kuomintang government at Nanking reached a high level of superficial cordiality at the time when diplomatic representation was raised in May 1935 to ambassadorial level. But when recognition of Manchukuo was included in a slate of demands by the new ambassador to China, Ariyoshi Akira, the Nanking government was stubbornly negative.21 This would continue to be the response of the KMT leadership. In September 1933 Hirota Koki, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, joined the Saito cabinet as foreign minister. He arranged for a group of five responsible ministers to meet in a sort of inner cabinet to advise him on foreign policy and devised a formula which was approved by the cabinet on 21 October. In essence, the cabinet set as Japan's objective the creation of a concert among Japan, Manchukuo and China under Japanese leadership. Unfortunately for Japan, its perceptions were not shared by the Chinese. This mechanism of five-minister meetings, including army, navy, finance and foreign ministers with the prime minister, was to become an established practice for the rest of the 1930s and was in effect to give the service ministers a greater say in foreign affairs. One of Japan's problems in Manchukuo concerned Soviet Russia which was part owner of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), running east from Manchuli through Tsitsihar and Harbin to Pogranichny on the border of

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Russia's Maritime Provinces. Since 1931, the Kuantung army had operated around it and, in effect, held it hostage. On 31 December 1931, two months into the Manchurian Incident, the Russians shouldered the burden of the second five-year plan and offered Japan a non-aggression pact. Japan was dilatory in her response. Until a firm diplomatic response was received, the Russians could hardly have intervened in Manchuria during the international crisis. Only a year later, when Manchukuo was firmly in its grasp, did Japan reply, saying that the time was not ripe for a non-aggression pact. It was a time when world opinion was strongly anti-Japanese, and the publication of the exchange of correspondence in Moscow was damaging for Japan. Although both sides let the proposal lapse, the Soviet Union took an independent stance. Thus, the League recommended to Moscow in 1933 that Manchukuo should not be recognized by any world power; the Soviet Union, which was not a member, was not prepared to comply.22 Japan assumed the responsibility for the defense of Manchukuo by its alliance of September 1932 that had promised the stationing of Japanese troops on Manchu soil for maintaining internal order and external protection. Her armies had to guard a very long frontier estimated at 4300 kilometers, many parts of which were uncharted and disputed. This was the task of the Kuantung army which since the Siberian Intervention had had a long-standing ideological hostility towards Soviet Russia. These feelings had been increased by the interference of the Communist International in China in the 1920s and by the inroads of communist ideology into Japanese society itself. Russia had been the enemy contemplated in the defense plan for three decades. These facts were felt more by the Japanese army than by civilians; as the army's influence increased, the exploits of the Soviet Union called for more and more attention. But any government had to bear in mind that the expanding Japanese population needed a regular supply of fish from Russian territorial waters and had to balance its dietary needs against its political interests. At this time, the Japanese army was largely inspired by General Araki Sadao, the extremist war minister, and the members of his Kodoha (Imperial Way faction) which favored a policy of preventive war against the Soviet Union. The Kodoha felt that when the Soviet 5-year plan ended, Moscow would certainly plough more money into Siberia and build up its forces in East Asia. This was not a totally mistaken estimate: it appears that between 1932 and 1934 there was a considerable military build-up; the doubletracking of the trans-Siberian railway; and an atmosphere of greater selfconfidence. These measures all reflected the sense of threat that the Russians felt from Japan. Russia was aware of the vulnerability of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), which ran through territory not under Soviet control. Wanting to be relieved of defending it, Russia hoped that she could reduce the possibility of friction with Manchukuo/Japan if the railway was offered for sale.

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In addition, the Soviets needed the money. But there were two difficulties: first, the Soviet Union had applied for membership in the League of Nations, and that body had called on its members not to grant recognition to Manchukuo; secondly, the Russians were only partial owners, together with the Chinese, of the CER. So the process of negotiation was not likely to be a smooth one. From the Japanese standpoint, it made commercial sense for the CER to be integrated into the South Manchurian railway network now that Manchukuo and Jehol had been detached from China. Discussion over the sale first surfaced in the spring of 1933. On 2 May, Foreign Commissar Maksim Litvinov announced that Russia was prepared to sell the CER either to Japan or to Manchukuo, even if this amounted to Soviet recognition for the latter. The negotiation lasted for three months but eventually broke down over the fact that the Chinese, as joint owners, were opposed to the Soviet transaction. There were constant rumors that Japan would use force to acquire the railway, and this would not have been inconsistent with thinking in the Japanese army at the time. But nothing came of the scare, and the Soviets seem to have increased their armed strength in Siberia. The further progress of the talks was interrupted by frontier incidents, the occasional detention of Russian railway employees, and their alleged torture. Selling the Eastern Railway to Japan was not universally popular in Russia, but the economic advantages for the Soviet leadership were evident. The price that the Japanese were offering also was unattractive. Japan proposed the sum of 50 million yen, which was about one-tenth of what Russia was asking. The fact that each side was unyielding indicates that there were those on both sides who were opposed to the sale.23 When Hirota consulted his colleagues at the five-minister conferences, they consented to a general agreement to seek a framework for friendly approaches to Russia, in spite of the strength of anti-Soviet feeling on the part of Araki. The railway talks, which had been suspended for one year and a quarter, were reopened in September 1934 when Hirota had found his feet. Agreement was finally reached in January 1935; but last minute hitches prevented it receiving the immediate consent of the Privy Council, a consent essential to receiving the Emperor's approval. The final instrument of sale was signed on 23 March after a total of fifty-six meetings, conducted in Tokyo by Ambassador Yurenev. The Soviet Union sold its interests to the government of Manchukuo for Y 140 million plus Y 30 million as retirement allowances for Soviet employees (1/3 in cash; the rest in goods). The Japanese government was to guarantee payment. This was a hard bargain and the Japanese were to default on payment later in the 1930s and 1940s.24 One consequence of the sale was that Manchukuo had effectively secured recognition from a major world power. For the Soviets, that was a matter of limited significance. Desperate to cut their losses on a valuable asset

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which they could no longer protect, they were not interested in making recognition a matter of principle. They wanted to build on the sale of the CER by proceeding to a non-aggression pact, including demilitarization of the long frontier. On their part, the Japanese wanted the reduction of troop levels, economy in armaments, and guarantees about fisheries. While the Japanese lacked confidence in Soviet good faith, they managed to avoid a fish war in Soviet waters. 25 Meanwhile, the authorities of the South Manchurian railway proceeded with their long-standing ambition to convert the line from Russian broad guage to Japanese standard guage, hoping thereby to bring about the integration of the whole railway network in the country. It naturally also served the purpose of transporting troops to the borders in the event of an escalation of the incidents which occurred regularly. Though Hirota's intention had been to improve Soviet-Japanese relations, the tension persisted. The political interventions of the military continued as before. While an armed truce existed between the two countries on the Amur-Ussuri border, the Japanese had called for closer ties with Inner Mongolia for a long time and tried to gain control over the Mongolian People's Republic. When that government did not respond to diplomatic approaches, the Kuantung army made advances which were driven back by Mongolian troops in the autumn of 1935 and again early the following year. Eventually, the Soviet Union concluded a mutual assistance pact with the Republic of Outer Mongolia on 12 March 1936. THE PREPARATORY NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1934 Japan's restiveness in Northeast Asia had its counterpart in the Pacific area. The negotiation of the London Naval Treaty in 1930 had exposed the gulf between politicians and professionals in the Imperial Japanese Navy over building limitation. It was only the resolute leadership of Prime Minister Hamaguchi that had secured acceptance of the London treaty and enabled the cabinet to pull through a major crisis by the skin of its teeth. There was a desire on the part of civilians—and, indeed, a party platform— to curb spending on arms but, after the army's success in Manchuria, it was hard for politicians to challenge the armed forces and risk being called unpatriotic. While Japan left the League, it continued to attend the General Disarmament Conference which staggered on at Geneva throughout 1933; Japanese delegates, on the whole, were obstructive over the abolition of tanks and bombing aircraft.26 Naval opinion, too, was moving away from limitation: Admiral Osumi, the Navy Minister in 1933-1934, conducted a purge of senior officers unfavorable to his views, the "Osumi purge." As a result, power passed from the "treaty faction" to the "fleet faction," a broad grouping based on the Naval General Staff which covered a wide variety of views but wanted a Big Navy and opposed existing schemes of naval limitation. Moreover, the

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old domination of the navy by Satsuma officers was gradually disappearing. But there were officers from Choshu (Yamaguchi-ken) who were trying to gain prominence. The most successful were Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, the vice-chief of naval staff, and the group of officers around him who supported the expansionist aims of those in the army. It was, therefore, a reconstructed team that had to address the next stage of naval limitation. The Washington Naval Treaty was due to expire in 1936, subject to two years' advance notice being given of an intention to terminate it. The London Naval Treaty was valid only for five years. There was a provision that the signatories should meet one year before the expiry date to discuss the future of disarmament. The essential change which the Japanese navy sought was the abolition of the quantitative restriction imposed on the size of its fleet. If the treaties were to be denounced by Japan, it would have to give notice by the end of 1934. The navy under its new management was prepared to contemplate going it alone and cut adrift from the inconvenient entanglements imposed by international disarmament. 27 When Admiral Okada's cabinet came into office on 8 July 1934, plans were already afoot for preliminary naval discussions to be held in London. The critical issue involved the instructions to be given to Japan's delegates. From the early parleys in Tokyo, the navy took the line that, if Japan were forced to accept less than parity with United States and Britain, it would never again be able to hold its head up high. Therefore, the problems involved the size of each country's fleet and Japan's sense of relative inferiority. It was not necessarily that Japan proposed to build up to parity with the major naval powers, merely that it did not want to appear inferior. Having convinced the army and the court, the navy won over the cabinet at its meeting on 7 September upon agreeing to promote a treaty that could fairly ensure safety in national defense. The navy proposed a common upper limit on battleship tonnage: "we must depart from the unjust arrangement of the present limitation treaties and emphasize our need for equal rights of armament and our national right of survival (kokka seisonkon)." Japan could no longer accept quantitative restrictions over the size of her fleet. On 17 September, the country informed Washington and London of its intention to pull out of the Washington Naval Treaty before the end of the year.28 There was, however, some uncertainty as to whether it would go so far as to abrogate the treaties if the other naval powers met some of Japan's conditions. Scope for negotiation on this point was assumed. Britain, which had been charged with convening the preparatory conference, wanted desperately to keep the naval treaties in existence. But there were differences between Britain and the United States about the tactics to be employed towards Tokyo. Britain wondered whether Japan could be persuaded not to press its demand for equality in naval armaments if it was offered some assurances, such as a pact of mutual non-aggression, before

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the naval talks began. Although some Anglo-Japanese discussions took place, they hardly amounted to negotiations and were inconsequential. The old pro-British majority in the Imperial Japanese Navy was now outnumbered and could not be relied on to take a broader, international view as in the past. 29 At the London preparatory conference in the autumn, Japan was represented first by Ambassador Matsudaira and, from October onwards, by Rear-Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, who had travelled from Japan. Yamamoto was a strange choice because, as an air specialist, he was probably more interested in aircraft carriers than in the creation of a great battleship fleet. Since the kantaihawas in the ascendant in the navy, why Yamamoto was sent is puzzling though he had been associated with the tough-liners as a delegate to the London conference in 1930. His instructions, while couched in broad terms, were to oppose the renewal of the two existing treaties, which had acted against Japan's security, but not to rule out fresh negotiations. If this could be achieved, negotiations for a new treaty more favorable to Japan could begin on the basis of "a common limit kept as low as possible which naval powers must not exceed (kyotsu saidai gendoan)."30But Yamamoto apparently was critical of the instructions on a common upper limit. If unsuccessful in blocking the renewal of existing treaties, Japan would give notice of abrogation at the end of the year according to the cabinet; but having some other naval powers acting jointly with the country so that it was not the only party to end the treaties was desirable. While preparatory meetings in the form of trilateral and bilateral talks began on 23 October, no compromise could be reached. As the time to give notice of abrogation approached, there was great activity in Tokyo. On 27 November, the Japanese foreign minister, who wanted to avoid Japan being the only country to opt out, proposed to France and Italy that their two countries should join Japan in jointly withdrawing from the naval limitation structure. But both replied that it would be difficult to comply with the request. Evidently Japan did not want to be seen to be undermining international cooperation on its own and wanted to set up a sort of dissenting bloc. When this failed, the Tokyo cabinet decided to proceed unilaterally. Talks continued in London until 19 December without any side giving ground, and the American delegates returned home on the following day. The meetings were then informally adjourned, leaving open the possibility of further Anglo-Japanese parleys.31 Accordingly, the Tokyo cabinet decided to announce its unilateral withdrawal. The text passed the privy council unanimously on 19 December, receiving the Emperor's approval two days later. Japan gave formal notice of leaving the naval agreements on 30 December. In consequence, the sadly misnamed "preparatory naval talks" came to nought. Japan, as a deliberate act of policy, had pulled out of an important set of international agree-

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ments despite the blandishments of the powers. There was not much evidence of a spirit of compromise on any side. Tokyo did not have total confidence in Yamamoto, and he was warned not to be beguiled into unacceptable compromises, worked out by the persistent British who did not want to see the preliminary talks break down. Nonetheless, Yamamoto stayed on, expecting that the talks had only been postponed. But even the Anglo-Japanese parleys lapsed by 28 January 1935. There being little hope of a solution, Yamamoto set off for home, staying one night in Berlin at the invitation of the German government. His visit may have been encouraged by the growing pro-German faction in the navy.32 Arriving back at Tokyo station on 12 February, he had to report that it had not been possible to persuade Britain and America to accept the Japanese government's views but did not close the door on further efforts being made. He was looking to the British, who still showed great enthusiasm for bringing about some solution to the stalemate. Though Yamamoto was out of sympathy with his instructions, he appears to have fought doggedly for them. He was still too junior to have much personal say and did not become one of Japan's top admirals for another five years. THE SECOND LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935-1936 Once notice of termination had been given, there was much talk of a crisis of security for Japan during 1935. Conscious of its isolation, the nation felt hostility from abroad. As Japan's naval experts awaited the full conference, they professed to be willing to sign a new treaty, provided it was based on a new standpoint: they did not want to be bound by defense-thinking rooted in the 1920s, and wanted equality of strength in the Pacific. The preliminary soundings through Yamamoto and Matsudaira had not inspired confidence that these changes could be obtained; the major naval powers claimed that no geographical change had taken place since the Washington and London conferences to warrant amendments. But Japan was hopeful of again putting forward the argument that the maintenance of peace in East Asia could only be undertaken by Japan, which needed a strong army and navy for the purpose. Enemies in the region were jubilant, Japan argued, as long as the Japanese navy was inferior to those of United States and Britain. The nation claimed to be aiming not at preparing for war with other powers, but at having sufficient strength to safeguard its own land and "maintain the well-being of the far east." This implied that Japan was seeking a leadership role in East Asia.33 Japan wanted to proceed with the main conference without delay. In fact, the second London Naval Conference did not open until 9 December 1935. If the proceedings were to be more than a formality, there had to be some sign of compromise. The critical breakdown had already taken place in 1934; reversing the trend would not be easy, since virtually no new

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proposals were on the table. Admiral Nagano Osami and Ambassador Nagai Matsuzo, the former ambassador to Germany, were the Japanese representatives, and grave disagreements had surfaced between Nagano and the Foreign Ministry. Explicit instructions were worked out at a cabinet meeting on 4 November, and the delegates were kept on a tight rein. Japan was in favor of three-power parity among the leading naval powers and a low upper ceiling on warship construction. The question of parity was for her a matter of national prestige as well as national security for Japan. Delegates put forward Japan's case for an overall ceiling; but representatives from other countries opposed the proposal and hoped that the Japanese would compromise, specifically agreeing to formal exchanges among the naval powers about their building programs. When discussion of parity was sidelined, this was unacceptable to Tokyo; and Admiral Nagano told the first committee of the conference on 8 January 1936 that Japan only wanted the quantitative aspect to be resolved. Eventually, the Japanese delegates announced that, unless the others granted their navy equality, they would have to leave the conference and asked Tokyo for final instructions. This very serious step was decided at the highest level that involved first the military council (gunji sangikan kaigi), then the cabinet, and finally the Emperor. On 15 January, Nagano passed over a note stating that "the basic principles for comprehensive limitation and reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general support and Japan cannot agree to quantitative limitation." 34Before leaving for home, however, he gave the public assurance that Japan would not begin a naval race. But since Japan had entered a "no-treaty period," this assurance was suspect. The other powers continued their deliberations. Japan gave instructions that two observers should attend sessions, after the departure of her chief naval delegates, and report on developments. The second London Naval Treaty was signed on 25 March, whereby the signatory states were forbidden from building capital ships which exceeded 35,000 tons and carried guns of more than 16 inches. It was open to Japan to adhere to the treaty subsequently, but she had already made it clear that she would not accept any resulting treaties. From January 1937, Japan was entitled to go her own way without restriction. Although the country continued to be asked for details of her building programs, it declined to give the information. While maintaining the diplomatic courtesies, Japan took an independent line which can have come as no surprise to other countries because Japan had said in 1930 that "parity" must be granted when the earlier treaties expired.35 In this chapter we have seen Japan's departure away from internationalism during the early 1930s. Japan slid out of the League of Nations over China issues. Yet it was still willing to attend the League's Disarmament Conference, and it was invited to the International Economic Conference in London. Moreover, Japan paid its League dues until 1935. Having taken an ambivalent line on its mandated territories, Japan held on to them and

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reported annually to the League. The nation also left the naval limitation structure, a mostly American construct, though this mainly reflected the desires of naval authorities rather than the government as a whole. It was perhaps inevitable that Japan should strike out for autonomy in its area of the globe and try to throw off its international constraints. But the process was accelerated by the economic distress caused by the world depression and, at a domestic level, by the breakdown in relations between civilian government and the armed services, both army and navy.36

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CHAPTER 6

Facing the Communist International, 1935-1937 The traumatic years of the Manchurian Incident had been followed by a quieter period of taking stock of issues. Japan had left the League of Nations as a result of the Manchurian fracas and had uncoupled herself from international naval entanglements, which had been a restraint on her activities. Japan's diplomats overseas worried about the isolated position that their country was left in and suggested a way of improving relations by increasing the range of its commercial treaties.1 But due to the duality of her foreign relations—a military foreign policy being pursued alongside her main foreign policy—quite separate developments were taking place. These policies came into public view in 1935. This chapter shows first how Japan, and especially the military, was worried over communist encroachments in China and the East in general. Then it shows how the relatively isolated Japan eventually teamed up with Germany and the axis powers to counter what she saw as the global expansion of the Communist International. Gradually, the political aspect of the country's foreign relations was making way for a more security-minded approach. AMBIGUITY OVER CHINA In view of the deteriorating relations between Tokyo and Nanking after 1933, Japan looked suspiciously at Chinese attempts to enlist support from her international allies. In particular, the Kuomintang (KMT) finance minister, Dr TV. Soong, made a world tour in the spring of 1933, canvassing the money markets in New York and London for financial aid. China also appealed to the League of Nations for technical assistance; the League responded generously, offering the services of technical experts in many fields. The coordinator of these services was to be Dr. Louis Rajchmann, a Polish member of the League staff who had visited China many times. He now

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held the post of director of the Health Section. However, such approaches seemed objectionable to Japan, which believed that it had a right to be invited to assist in China's economic development before countries outside the area; Delegate Ishii gave a warning to the League at the London Economic Conference. Japan increasingly saw the KMT's current diplomacy as creating part of a global anti-Japanese movement.2 The Japanese received many reports from their friends in China that the Chinese genuinely did not want interference from outside Asia in the process of their economic development. Japanese documents suggest that some leaders in China told Tokyo that they wanted aid from Japan rather than the imperialist powers. But Chinese histories cast serious doubt on this interpretation, which was very hard for outsiders, including the Japanese, to assess. For their part, Britain and the United States did not accept Japan's preemptive rights and were not inclined to change their policy of assisting China, while clinging to their existing stakes in investment and trading in its commercial centers. These disagreements came to the foreground in the controversy over the so-called Amau Declaration. Amau [Amo] Eiji, the diplomat who was serving as the head of the press information bureau in the Foreign Ministry, made an unofficial policy pronouncement on 17 April 1934 on the question of China seeking loans overseas. He told journalists that Japan had the sole responsibility for the preservation of peace in the East and that "in matters relating to east Asia Japan's circumstances and mission (shimei) may not be reconciled with those of other countries." In practice, Japan opposed any efforts which China was making to seek technical, financial or military assistance from a third party or parties in order to resist Japan. Amau reiterated Japan's known position, namely that China should not try to raise military funds or other aid from sources other than Japan. This was not a private aberration of Amau: he may be criticized for his bluntness, but he was merely disclosing what Foreign Minister Hirota was writing to his ambassador in China. It was in the nature of a bold warning not only to China, but also to the powers. It led to protests by Washington and London since it contradicted the Open Door policy in China. Hirota made attempts to explain away the menacing tone of the statement and, indeed, disowned it. But the confrontation between the respective positions was clear. The whole incident was inevitably damaging for the attempts Hirota had been making since he took office in March to win the goodwill of the powers. 3 Japan resented the response which Britain, in effect, made to this warning from Tokyo. She sent Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, who was well-known to Japanese in the business world because of his role at the London Economic Summit, on a mission to China in 1935. Britain's fundamental purpose was to assist China in its plans for monetary reform. Her hope was that this could be done with the cooperation of the Japanese. But, when Leith-Ross visited Tokyo on his way to China, the Japanese conveyed the

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chilliest attitude towards his mission and, in particular, his tentative proposals on Manchukuo. The civilians cold-shouldered Leith-Ross and left him to the army, which appeared to have the major input into decisions over China. Since the army attitude was one of total distrust, no substantial advance was made during the visit by Leith-Ross; and he was left to travel to China in September under the impression that the Japanese would be totally uncooperative. This contrasted oddly with Hirota's earlier conciliatory talk.4 There was a fresh outburst of Kuantung Army political activity in northern China in June 1935. Chiang Kai-shek had long been vulnerable in the North because he was preoccupied with the extermination campaigns he was waging against the communists' southern bases. He had concluded that he was on firmer ground to attack the communists than the Japanese, whom he could not defeat. These campaigns ended with qualified success by forcing the communists to leave their base in Kiangsi province in 1934 and undertake their Long March to Yenan, in which so many soldiers perished.5 In that context, Japanese army strategists apparently intended to encourage separatist movements in north China on the lines followed in the creation of Manchukuo and to detach them from Nanking's influence. Major General Umezu, the commander-in-chief of Japanese forces in China, conducted a campaign in Hopei to the north of Peking in the first half of 1935 that led the local commander, General Ho Ying-chin, to agree to withdraw KMT forces and influence from the Tientsin-Peking area. The Ho-Umezu agreement created the equivalent of a buffer zone in northern China. Not long afterwards, Major General Doihara received assurances that KMT influence would be removed from Chahar, the area north of the Yellow River. By the end of the year, a Hopei-Chahar political council had been set up, strongly under Japanese influence. Though these arrangements were described as local, there can be no doubt that they were a humiliation for Nanking. It was the Japanese army's object to encourage the suspicions of the northerners against the KMT regime and abet their separatist tendencies. But how far this was Tokyo policy and how far the initiative of local commanders is hard to say. After 1931, it was becoming increasingly difficult for Tokyo to exercise control over the army in China.6 TALKS WITH GERMANY AND ARMY MUTINY Among various options being considered to relieve Japan from the consequences of her international isolation, a rapprochement with Germany was put forward by an influential but unofficial group. Following the First World War, Japan's relations with Germany had been retrieved by the cordiality generated by the successful embassy of Dr. Wilhelm Solf from 1920 to 1928. There was much in the Weimar Republic which the liberal Japanese cabinets of the 1920s admired. When the Manchurian crisis developed,

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Germany agreed to appoint Dr. Heinrich Schnee as its representative on the League of Nations commission to investigate the Chinese complaint. After the League published its recommendation that the state of Manchukuo should not be recognized, Germany joined the others in endorsing the Lytton Report. 7 But by the time Japan gave notice of leaving the League in March 1933, the National Socialists and Hitler had come to power in Germany. This gave Germany and Japan an obvious sense of affinity, which they had already sensed as revisionist powers. From 1919 onwards, some Japanese had seen themselves as being hemmed in by the Anglo-Saxon powers. This feeling was increased after the various Washington treaties came into force. When Hitler issued an appeal for German-Japanese friendship in one of his speeches reproduced in the February issue of Gendai, it struck a chord in Tokyo. There were also strong initiatives in the cultural field. In 1934 the Deutsch Japanische Gesellschaft and Japanische Verein were established in Germany, while the Japan-Deutsch Kultur Institut (Nichi-Doku Bunka Kyokai) was set up later in the year in Japan. 8 Of course, Japan was sensitive about Germany's involvement in China. The Japanese were fully aware how many German specialists were assisting the Kuomintang in the reform of its armed forces but saw that as partly anti-communist in purpose. Indeed, they seemed content that Germany should take a view of their activities in China that was relatively relaxed compared with the view taken by the Anglo-Saxon powers. The two nations were naturally drawn together out of security considerations, not least because of their common distrust and fear of the Soviet Union. The antiSoviet sentiments of the Japanese press and public opinion produced a fertile soil for increased cooperation with the Third Reich.9 It was the Japanese army that led the way to improving relations with Germany. Colonel Oshima Hiroshi, the Japanese military attache in Berlin (1934-1938), had always been a Germanophile, having been assistant military attache in Berlin in 1921 and then attached to Austria-Hungary in 1923. He was also married to a German and claimed to have known Hitler from his Munich days. Oshima was appointed military attache in Berlin in March 1934 while Araki was still war minister.10 He seems to have spoken occasionally of the need for discussions to cover the eventuality of war with Soviet Russia which was at that time being much spoken of. Although there were probably intimate talks between army enthusiasts on both sides, the dialogue took on greater political significance when he met Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893-1946) of the Buero Ribbentrop, a man who already seemed to have won the confidence of Hitler. Through intermediaries they exchanged ideas unofficially from July 1935 onwards. Most Japanese army men were strongly anti-communist, while Ribbentrop found the idea of a German-Japanese understanding attractive. On the other hand, the German Foreign Ministry officials in the Wilhelmstrasse, deeply distrustful of the new offshoots of the Nazi party interfering in foreign affairs, would not

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countenance these talks being pursued on an official basis, while there were similar feelings in Japan. The themes were a closely guarded secret.11 It is conventional to say that Oshima did not consult his diplomatic colleagues in Berlin. The position at the Berlin embassy did not make consultation easy. Mushakoji Kintomo was ambassador from 28 December 1934 to 3 July of the following year when he went on home leave, entrusting the embassy to his deputy. The senior staff discussed relations with Germany before he left. But Mushakoji was absent during the months of the critical approaches when Oshima's discussions took on more concrete form. On the whole, however, Oshima does not appear to have been unduly reckless. The General Staff and the War Ministry, to which he reported, were also cautious and sent Lieutenant Colonel Wakamatsu Tadaichi, head of the German desk in the intelligence division, to assess the state of the talks in June 1935. It seems probable that on both the German and Japanese sides, the foreign ministries were not totally uninformed.12 These secret proceedings were interrupted by the Incident of 26 February 1936 (ni-ni-roku jiken) as the army mutiny is euphemistically called. Following the general election on 20 February, a small group of junior military officers belonging to the Imperial Way faction (Kodoha) took control of the Diet and the administrative district of central Tokyo, Kasumigaseki, by way of a military putsch. These officers, with the rank of captain and below, mobilized their soldiers who were under the impression that they were going for a night exercise. There were probably as many as 1400 men from the crack Guards unit who took part. The officers' objective was to kill off what they called the "effete leadership" of the country which was characterized by party bickerings illustrated as recently as the general election of 20 February. Having the advantage of surprise and unpropitious snowy weather, these officers succeeded in taking control of the area for three days. This military insubordination by younger officers in the Imperial Way faction could not be controlled by their seniors.13 The plan also included attacks on Prince Saionji, the only remaining elder statesman, and Count Makino Nobuaki (Shinken), formerly the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Both were top advisers to the Showa Emperor. Insofar as the army officers involved believed that the Emperor was being misled by his civilian advisers, they were gunning especially for Makino. Fortunately, he escaped by the rear entrance of the inn where he was staying in Yugawara, with the help of his grand-daughter. This left the attackers so furious that they set the building on fire. Saionji also escaped. The other targets of the plotters were prominent ministers: Admiral Saito, former prime minister (1932-1934); Admiral Okada, prime minister since 1934; and Takahashi Korekiyo. Perhaps the most significant was Takahashi, the elderly Finance Minister in the Saito cabinet. He had joined the Okada cabinet in November 1934 by which time the economic depression in Japan had eased. Feeling the need to return to normal financing as soon as

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possible, he had urged military leaders to curb their budgets and opposed increases in army-navy spending. He was targeted by the mutineers because of his disagreements with the military leadership and was killed—as was Saito. Okada managed to escape, but his brother-in-law was mistakenly killed instead.14 Martial law was declared, and leaflets were distributed to the soldiers to persuade them to return to duty. The mutiny was crushed following an outright rejection of its cause by the Emperor, who called on loyal troops to suppress it. The rebels surrendered on the afternoon of the 29th. The whole incident caused shock, chaos and, in spite of Admiral Okada's survival, the collapse of his cabinet. Tokyo continued under martial law until July. This might be treated as an event of purely domestic political significance that would not justify a mention in a history of foreign relations. But, in fact, it inflicted a major wound on the free conduct of Japan's foreign policy and may, indeed, be described as a major turning point in it. It represented an attack on the internationalists, that is, those in the court, the ministry, and the bureaucracy who were not concerned purely with Japan's narrow interests but were ready to take into consideration global concerns. These events also called into question Japan's claim to be a haven of political stability and damaged her claims for leadership in East Asia. The mandate to form the next cabinet passed first to Prince Konoe Fumimaro, president of the House of Peers; when he declined on grounds of ill-health, it was accepted by Hirota Koki, a former diplomat and foreign minister. Hirota, who was to serve as a civilian prime minister for a year (March 1936 to January 1937), may have been favored by the Genro because he had been ambassador to the Soviet Union (1930-1932). It appears that Hirota prematurely leaked a list containing the members of the new ministry including Yoshida Shigeru, an experienced and senior diplomat, as a probable foreign minister. For the first time, the Supreme War Council was consulted about the cabinet and black-balled Yoshida in a clear and unequivocal piece of military interference. General Count Terauchi Hisaichi, who had been nominated by the army for the post of War Minister, refused to serve in a cabinet which seemed to be too liberal. The Prime Minister, therefore, decided to send Yoshida as ambassador to London and to appoint Arita Hachiro, who had been a minister in Belgium until November 1935 and had just presented his credentials to the Chinese president, as the new Foreign Minister. Clearly, an emergency in the Foreign Ministry postings had been caused by external military interference.15 For the military to dictate ministerial appointments in this way was an attempt to influence foreign policy-making itself. The historian wonders why the army, which might have expected to be in national disgrace after the mutiny, was still strong enough to call the tune. The whole episode was a gesture on the part of the army against the civilian government. Not united in its views, the army was still the repository of intense national-

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ism, a desire to go it alone. The army felt that too many international restraints had hampered Japan's growth since 1930 and that these should be ignored. The so-called army reformers blamed the court, the spineless ministers, and even the weak leadership within the army itself. While the army mutiny of 1936 failed in its purpose, it succeeded in scaring the senior civilian ministers.16 THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT WITH GERMANY, 1936 The new Hirota cabinet decided to carry on the talks with Germany, which had been delayed because of the domestic political crisis, even if the majority of the Foreign Ministry officials had considerable reservations about them. The new Foreign Minister, Arita Hachiro, had visited Berlin during his term in Brussels, and talked to Oshima. He had sounded out opinions in the European capitals about Japan's possible collaboration with Germany against the Soviet Union; he was now ready to favor relevant negotiations continuing on an official basis. As a person who had made a special study of the question, he closely supervised the drafting of the agreement. Ambassador Mushakoji, who was still staying on in Tokyo, had consultations with War Ministry officials at the end of March. He came to favor the approach to Germany provided that the negotiations were taken out of the hands of the army and presented on a new official basis. Returning to Berlin on 30 April, Mushakoji received the government's instructions on 8 May to sound the German intentions, whether of the Nazi party or the Wilhelmstrasse. But he was to make no specific proposals of his own. Berlin, however, was preoccupied with the Rhineland question and was content to let things take their time. 17 The Japanese, too, were cautious. While the Foreign Ministry approved of negotiations being pursued in Berlin, it insisted in July that the new pact should not antagonize either Soviet Russia or Britain; on this basis, a consensus of sorts was worked out with the Army Ministry. Hirota and Arita steered the consensus through the five-minister conferences on "imperial foreign policy" (teikoku gaiko hoshin) on 7 August. Some said that the Japan-German relationship which Arita imagined was so nebulous that it appeared to have been written with thin ink. It certainly reflected cautious Foreign Ministry viewpoints as much as army opinions. After detailed scrutiny by the Privy Council, the agreement was signed in Berlin on 25 November, though it was not published until the end of the month. The pact itself was anodyne and stated that the signatories would be on guard against the Communist International (Comintern). It was communicated to the Russians two days before publication, with assurances of its being against the Comintern but not anti-Soviet. But Litvinov, the foreign commissar, was not taken in and expressed his displeasure on 29 November.18

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There were a number of instruments exchanged apart from the main pact. The secret supplementary protocol, whose existence was stoutly denied by both signatories, was more forthright than the pact. It stated that the Soviet Union was working towards the accomplishment of the Comintern aims and intended to use its army to that end: "should one of the parties be unprovokedly attacked or threatened by the Soviet Union, the other party agrees not to carry out any measures which would relieve the position of the Soviet Union but will immediately consult on measures to preserve their common interests." This was an unusually explicit statement about the Soviet Union. It also contained the guarantee which was later to become a point of controversy: neither side could make any political treaties with the Soviet Union that were contrary to the spirit of the pact without mutual consent between them. Japan also safeguarded her position over the existing political treaties which were excluded from the pact. 19 The Japanese wanted to avoid publication of the pact altogether because it would give rise to "extremely bad results in the case of Soviet relations." But their hand was forced because the Germans wanted early publication, and the Japanese press had leakages which made it desirable to publish the main treaty. As always in Russo-Japanese relations, the underlying consideration was that Japan needed to have access to fish stocks in Russia's territorial waters off its Maritime Provinces. Japan was in the process of negotiating with Russia a fisheries convention which, it was hoped, would be more durable than the one-year treaties signed hitherto. Talks were due to be completed on 20 November. But when the terms of the AntiComintern Pact became known, the Soviets immediately branded them as anti-Russian and reacted by reverting from the fisheries treaty concluded on 28 December to year-by-year fishing quotas. They also detained Japanese fishing vessels and placed obstacles in the way of Japanese oil concessions in northern Sakhalin.20 As soon as the pact was announced, Italy asked to join it. This was fully supported by the Japanese army, which felt that the pact was not inclusive enough. Galeazzo Ciano, the son-in-law of Mussolini, who had become Foreign Minister in 1936, wanted improved relations with Japan. Originally favorable to China by reason of his long diplomatic service in that country, he objected to China's anti-Italian stance at the time of the Abyssinian war. But there was opposition on the Japanese side: many diplomats, including Ambassador Sugimura in Rome, and the court in Tokyo believed that Italy's recent conduct had made her unacceptable as an associate. Japan might have been willing to compromise by concluding some bilateral arrangement with Italy, but the proposal lapsed. Germany did want Italy to become the third member of the existing pact. But it was not until 6 November 1937 that Ambassador Hotta eventually signed the expanded treaty, including Italy, in Rome. 21

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Those in Japan who opposed the Anti-Comintern Pact were inclined to cultivate the United States and Britain rather than alienating them. Some who favored the pact felt that it would be more effective if extended to take in Britain and the Netherlands as countries suspicious of the Soviet Union. By chance, Hitler had appointed Ribbentrop as ambassador to London in July 1936 though he did not take up the post till October. Whether his appointment was part of the strategy of extension or not, various approaches were made to test the ground in London and the Hague. A memorandum of the Europe-Asia Bureau stated that efforts had been made "to obtain Britain's understanding regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact so that friendly relations would not be impaired." 22 Ambassador Yoshida was aware of these considerations in the rambling talks that he conducted with Britain early in 1937, but his heart was not in the idea of extending the Anti-Comintern Pact. And it is not clear that Tokyo seriously thought of widening the pact's scope in the early stages. In any event, Britain had no interest in taking part in it or in endorsing its contents. In assessing the practical value of the Anti-Comintern Pact for Japan, we have to recognize that Japan's image with the Western world was damaged by association with the fascist bloc in Europe. On the other hand, it did achieve one of the important goals of successive Tokyo governments: the recognition of Manchukuo by larger nations like Germany. After its initial rebuff, Germany was ready to develop trade under the German-Manchukuo pact of 30 April 1936. Italy granted formal recognition in November 1937, as did Germany in the following year. Moreover, there were advantages in having friends in the world and knowing that some of the major powers would no longer avoid Japan and its adventure in Manchukuo. Bernd Martin has described the pact as "little more than a gigantic propaganda bluff." The Japanese provisos, he argues, had drained it of most of its substance. The majority of Japanese did not at this stage want the pact to have too much substance; that is, they did not want it to become an alliance. Japan was drawn to the pact more because of feeling threatened by the Soviet Union than because of being an admirer of Hitlerite Germany; this explains the reference to Arita's "thin ink diplomacy." At the same time, it is probably true that the pact took on greater significance after 1938 when Ribbentrop returned to Berlin as the Foreign Minister.23 To the outside world it appeared that the pact was more than a gigantic bluff and that Japan had symbolically joined the axis bloc. This impression perhaps matters most. There had been copious leakages which had suggested to skeptics around the world that there was more to the new relationship than the inconsequential fragment that was published. Japan and Germany were perhaps unwise to allow an exaggerated impression of the pact to be spread abroad. But, in the era of Goebbels' propaganda, it was hard to prevent it. In fact, the practical benefits conferred by the pact were few.

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IMPERIAL DEFENSE PLAN, 1936 After Japan's exit from the arms limitation treaties, it was natural that there should be a review of the Imperial Defense Plan (teikokukokubo hoshin). Detailed study and consultation by both the army and the navy had been taking place since the summer of 1935. From the army's standpoint, the prime problem was associated with Manchukuo and Soviet Russia. Japanese intelligence had accurate evidence that the Soviets were building up their forces with tanks and planes. The army general staff in preparing its defense policy wanted to adopt a "non-aggressive stance" towards the Soviet Union and sought a budget merely to reinforce its position in Manchukuo and North China. But, realistically, this could only be obtained with the cooperation of the navy. However, the navy was changing its policy by giving priority to a southern advance (nanshinron) and was suspicious of the Kuantung army for harboring dangerous ambitions in the north. 24 The naval side in calling for a positive southern advance may have been influenced by the findings of Captain Ishikawa Shingo, a naval hard-liner, on his world tour. In the Philippines and Southeast Asian countries, he saw the abundance of raw materials lacking in Japan, particularly the availability of oil, which was so valuable a source for the navy and naval airforce. Ishikawa clearly resented the fact that these resources were in the hands of colonial powers. During a tour of Europe, he was most cordially received in Germany. In his report, he drew attention to the encirclement of Japan since the Manchurian Incident and saw Germany as an ally who was trying to upset the established order in Europe and would assist Japan to break out of her encirclement. Although Ishikawa's report did not appeal to the navy top leadership who demoted him on his return, Admiral Nagano Osami returned from the London Naval Conference to become the Navy Minister and may have sympathized with the captain. In any case, Ishikawa's ideas were gaining support. 25 Though different shades of viewpoint existed, both military services were expansionist and seeking corresponding funding. The practical political problem behind the third revision of the National Defense Policy was how to balance the budget in the face of demands from the army for more divisions and from the navy for more warships. In 1922, the earlier plan had named the United States and Russia as the budgetary enemies, the standard against which budgetary targets would be set. By the mid-1930s there was the serious possibility of a clash between the army and navy due to incompatible expansionist ideas. Now that they both appeared to have scored popular successes, the army in Manchuria and the navy in London, they were not in a mood for compromise. Naval contingency plans were now for the first time aimed at the United States. The new Imperial Defense Plan, formulated in June, incorporated both the navy's ambition of advancing to the south (nanshinron) and the army's

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plans in the north (hokushinron).It seemed to keep a balance between pursuing security on the East Asian continent for the army and guaranteeing security in the west Pacific for the navy. But, to the previous budgetary targets, the plan added the need for preparations against China and Britain. The inclusion of Britain in the plan for the first time gave rise to momentary opposition, but the formulation was finally accepted on 29 May when it received the Emperor's assent. The plan was, of course, a compromise document and did not ease Hirota's headache over budgeting for the needs of two demanding services. Accompanying it was a civilian message to the services that they must take a peaceful and unprovocative approach to their "enemies." However benign this wording, the Defense Plan implied a need for rearmament. In effect, the Hirota cabinet did not make an irrevocable choice between a southern strategy and a northern continental one; it put them both on a par. Insofar as this was known to the rest of the world, the Russians felt less reassured in the north while the United States, Britain, France and Holland feared for their colonial territories to the south. 26 The rethinking of the Defense Plan required an appropriate adjustment of political objectives. At the critical five-ministers conference which took place on 7 August, there emerged two policy documents entitled "Fundamentals of National Policy" (kokusaku no kijun) and "Imperial Diplomatic Policy" (teikoku gaiko hoshin). These were compromise documents which tried to fit the consensus reached between the services within the broader concepts of diplomatic policy. Both documents had a strong emphasis on policy towards China. Along with the Second North China Plan (dai 2-ji Hokushin shori yobo) adopted four days later, the documents put forward a cluster of policies: Japan and Nationalist China should cooperate in eradicating communism as well as consult on a wide range of political and economic problems, including the tension over the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; and China should be encouraged to throw off its dependence on Europe and the United States. To implement this, the Japanese ambassador in China, Kawagoe, held many high-level consultations with Chinese ministers. 27 Thus in December 1936, Japan proposed four demands to China: the opening of air services, particularly from Shanghai to Fukuoka; the reduction of tariffs; the employment of Japanese advisers by the Chinese government; and the improved control of anti-Japanese Koreans in China. Such harsh demands seemed to treat the new China as an underdeveloped country, and there was much talk of the 21 Demands of 1915 being repeated. When the Nationalist government refused to countenance them, negotiations irretrievably collapsed. CHINAS HARDENING ATTITUDES Japan's policy toward China reflected her antipathy toward communism. This was not seen solely in relation to Soviet Russia, Korea and

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Manchukuo. There is a strong thread running through Japanese documents of a mission to save China from communism. This was to lead to paternalist policies which were out of keeping with the nationalist spirit growing in China. Japan's special concerns in China were twofold: that there would be a rapprochement between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party, and that the Soviet Union might be drawn into a united front with them against Japan. This nightmare came within the bounds of possibility at the end of 1936. Until then, Chiang Kai-shek had taken the easier option of attacking the Chinese communists while parrying the Japanese demands with small concessions. But he was always aware that the people of China wanted united action against the Japanese and hoped that if he assumed the leadership of such a movement, he could gain popularity for himself and his party. Japan's relations with China took on a new dimension after the Sian incident of December 1936. Generalissimo Chiang, finding the communists ensconced in Yenan after the Long March, was worried about the loyalty of his commanders and troops in that neighborhood. In October, he had flown to the provincial city of Sian to interview Chang Hsueh-liang who was commanding the Northwest Army withdrawn from north China under the Ho-Umezu agreement. When he returned there on 12 December, Chang's troops mutinied and forced Chiang to flee. But he was soon taken into custody by disaffected leaders of various persuasions, some communist and some nationalist. The kidnapping was fundamentally the result of a domestic confrontation between those who wanted to see greater resistance to Japan's intrusions into China and the Kuomintang (KMT) government which felt that China's military strength was inadequate to challenge the Japanese. The backers of this mutiny wanted an end to the KMT campaigns against the communists and warlords along with the formation of an anti-Japanese united front. But the mutiny had, of course, wider ramifications. It attracted the attention of the Soviet Union which, taking a greater interest in East Asian affairs, wanted the two parties in China to sink their differences and create a united front.28 In the murky negotiations which took place, it is assumed that the plotters were only prepared to release Chiang Kai-shek on condition that he would guarantee to launch an anti-Japanese campaign. It still cannot be said what Chiang did agree to under duress. At all events, he flew back to the capital on 25 December without any communique being issued that clarified the terms of his release. Chang accompanied him and after sentencing by a military tribunal for disloyalty, went into a long period of exile. The disputed arrangement could be interpreted in different ways. Some commentators believed that the leadership of the CCP had played a part in finding a formula under instructions from Stalin. Certainly these groups may have calculated that if Generalissimo Chiang had been assas-

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sinated, there would have been an international outcry and power might have passed to a group more favorable to Japan. At all events, the end result was that the KMT Executive in a statement of February 1937 attacked the Red menace but came out in favor of a united front provided the communists would place their armies under Chiang's supreme command. In this potential KMT-CCP reconciliation, the intention may only have been "not to increase the intensity of resistance to Japan but rather to freeze the status quo." 29 What mattered was the impression that this and subsequent events made on the Japanese. As with the secret aspects of the Anti-Comintern Pact itself, the outcome was unclear and left scope for massive speculation. Japanese residents throughout China were apprehensive about China's unification movement (Shina toitsu undo). Diplomats and consuls reported increased anti-Japanese activity, and newspapers in Japan reported frequent skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese troops. Strong nationalist feeling had been stoked up in China. Japan urgently needed to find ways of improving her relations there. Unfortunately, there were competing views within the Gaimusho between reform bureaucrats and their seniors.30 The deteriorating situation in China had to be handled by a new cabinet. The Hirota cabinet had collapsed on 25 January 1937 after a year in office following a financial crisis and attacks on the army in the Diet. The elder statesman chose as the next leader General Ugaki, who was, however, unable to form a cabinet because the faction-ridden army refused to nominate an army minister, thus preventing the formation of a cabinet. Thus, the succession passed to General Hayashi Senjuro who, as War Minister during the 26 February incident, had not shown conspicuous qualities of leadership. Hayashi became acting foreign minister while Sato Naotake, one of Japan's most able and liberal diplomats, was recalled from the Paris embassy to take over. Sato had had long experience at the League of Nations and more recently as ambassador to France in 1933-1937. He tried to revise Japan's thinking over international and East Asia. In China, Japan had been following a policy which amounted to creating a movement for autonomy in the provinces of Hopei and Chahar around Peking; the tactic had been employed with some success in Manchukuo in 1931-1932. The Kuantung army had invaded Suiyang, the next province to Shensi, where Chiang decided to avoid confrontation. Soon after Sato took office, he made a policy statement to the lower house of the Diet on 12 March: the "crises were of Japan's own making; and she could herself take corrective action." The lower house applauded this dose of realism. His remarks have been regarded ever since as the credo of the Anglo-American party (Ei-Beiha) in Japan, as "the voice of reason" which somehow went unheeded for the rest of the 1930s. 31

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Like all foreign ministers of the time, Sato gave first priority to finding a solution for the China problem. Despite the weak political standing of the Hayashi cabinet and his own weaker position as a relative outsider on the Tokyo scene, he tried to reach a practical accommodation with the military, an accommodation recorded in his autobiography: "in discussions with the military, I made a plea for settling the China question peacefully and avoiding war with the Soviet Union and re-establishing amicable relations." Eventually on 16 April he did work out a consensus; a conference among ministers for the army, navy, finance ministry, and himself adopted two policy documents, one on China (Tai-Shi jikkosaku)and one on Nort h China (Hoku-Shi shido hosaku).Sato was moving towards a more accommodating attitude over North China whereby the Hopei-Chahar Political Council might be wound up. Sato's policy was fairminded and moderate. In many ways, his approach resembled that of Shidehara, whose views had now gone generally out of favor. But, even as Sato tried to relieve tensions with Nanking, the Kuantung army was getting involved in new adventures in Chahar; and there were signs of further disputes in the offing.32 In the political realm, the non-party Hayashi cabinet faced fierce opposition. On 31 March, this cabinet dissolved the Diet. When the twentieth general election was held on 30 April, the vote went against the reformist politicians, promoted by Hayashi, and gave the two main parties strong representation. The Minseito won 179 seats and the Seiyukai 175. On 28 May, these two parties, showing their muscle, called for the immediate resignation of the Hayashi cabinet, which was not in a position to resist. Sato during his three months at the Foreign Ministry had made a favorable impression internationally but had achieved little. He had tried to introduce a fresh approach. But, as a highly placed observer writes, this led to great ambiguities over China policy "even when it is professed that Japan has no territorial ambitions in China, in reality no one can say this with enough confidence."33 The summer of 1937 was not reassuring for Japan. Her reporters from China noted signs of a confident United Front against Japan following the Sian incident. There was evidence, too, that Russia had played a part behind the scenes in Chiang's release and was planning to give the newly unified country every support. To most observers, this amounted to some sort of triangular arrangement between the KMT, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese communists. On 21 August, Nanking entered into a pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union. Japanese intelligence claimed to have proof that members of the Communist International had penetrated all classes in China, destroying the social fabric of the country and region. While the Japanese ambassador in China still tried to find common ground with the anti-communist factions of the KMT, the tide seemed to be flowing in the other direction.

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Japan found itself to be self-confident but also conscious of its own weaknesses. In China, Japan had consolidated her position both in the North and in Manchukuo. But this consolidation had a downside insofar as the Soviet Union as well as both the right wing and the left wing in China had been antagonized. While severing ties with the League, Japan had strengthened its position by allying with Germany and entering into a global crusade against communism. In Pacific naval matters, the country had escaped from the fetters of the naval unequal treaties, as Japan saw them; but naval experts greatly feared a battle with the United States. Internally, government was suffering from the increased role played by the army and navy in domestic politics with their competing budgetary demands. The political parties could not resist their growing strength, and demands were emerging for a one-party state.

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CHAPTER 7

The Sino-Japanese War: First Phase, 1937-1939 Throughout the 1930s, tensions within the army and navy as well as between the military and civilians made it hard to establish a system of longlasting, stable government. Like its predecessors, the ministry of General Hayashi had been short-lived. It made way for that of Prince Konoe Fumimaro in June 1937; he had been president of the House of Peers and a compromise candidate with a reputation for being trusted both by the military and the court. Hirota Koki, the former diplomat, foreign minister, and prime minister, agreed to take on the Foreign Ministry and made up for the lack of governmental experience on Konoe's part. Konoe's cabinet, which is the focus of this chapter, lasted until January 1939 and became embroiled first with the "North China Incident" and then the "China Incident," both of which were part of a multifaceted war with China. We cannot hope to cover the complexities of Japan's campaigns in the mighty land mass of China; it will be enough to discuss the impact of the China war on her foreign relations.1 As the new Konoe government took over, relations between Japan and China were in a state of high tension and irritation. At the root of it, competing nationalisms clashed. China's militant nationalism had been boosted by the heavily publicized United Front which transcended regional differences in that vast country. The promise of Soviet support, thought likely to emerge from the Sino-Soviet non-aggression agreement of 21 August, reinforced the United Front. In the face of this, Japan's militant nationalism was subdued but vigilant. Based on an awareness of Japan's industrial and military superiority, her nationalism contained a strong ideological hatred of communism, which gave the Kuantung army a sense of mission in its dealings with China. In political circles at home, there was a feeling that the military was in command whenever decisions on China came to the foreground. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to learn that the Emperor

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in meeting with the Chief of the General Staff, Prince Kanin, and the War Minister, General Sugiyama, urged on them moderation over China.2 Konoe and Hirota were not well-equipped to deal with a military crisis within barely a month of taking office. Konoe with his reformist background was thought to share many of the objects of the military. Hirota, who was condemned by his juniors for failing to take a strong stand in cabinet committees in the interest of peace, is still a mystery. Was he basically sympathetic with the actions of the military? Or was he just a meek diplomat offering to perform a technical diplomatic service? His biographer, making the case for him, tells a story in which Hirota was asked how best to handle wild horses. Hirota replied that it was wise not to stop them from the front but to jump on from the side. In the emerging crisis, however, he was not very skillful at broadside approaches. The standing of the Foreign Ministry declined, if one excepts a short period, during the years of the China war.3 UNDECLARED WAR IN CHINA Japan's war with China owes its origin to an obscure incident at the Marco Polo bridge (Lukouchiaoto the Chinese;Rokokyoto the Japanese) to the southwest of Peking. It had, in fact, many different causes. The Japanese armies around Peking wanted to build a barracks and airfield in the area, but the local Chinese landowners would not sell or lease the land and were allegedly encouraged in this by Chinese officials. The desire to hold a strategic railway bridge added to the existing atmosphere of suspicion between the two countries. On 7 July, a Japanese soldier went missing after night operations. His commanding officer claimed the right to enter Wangping in order to search the area. But shots were fired, and the Japanese unit had to retire. Tokyo ordered the local commander to demand that China apologize, while advising him against making any attack; the local mayor agreed to offer apologies on 11 July. This outcome pleased the Tokyo government, which was anxious for a local solution of the problem. It knew that the North China army could only muster 10,000 against 100,000 on the Chinese side; many of them, in any case, were out on maneuvers near the Great Wall. Intelligence was received about considerable Chinese reinforcements. So General Sugiyama, the War Minister, insisted in cabinet that Japanese civilians in the area were so vulnerable that three more divisions should be sent and secured its agreement. On 26 July after the arrival of some of the new troops, the Japanese commander demanded that Chinese troops should withdraw from Marco Polo bridge. If not, he proposed to attack. It would appear that the Nanking government wanted a national settlement for its various disputes with Japan rather than the regional one which the Japanese tended to want, while local commanders seem to have wanted a showdown. Large-scale fighting

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erupted in what the Japanese call the North China Incident, and the Chinese were decisively defeated. Within a week after severe fighting at Tientsin and the massacre of about 180 Japanese civilians working in Tungchow, the Japanese armies made themselves supreme over the whole region; they captured Peking on 31 July and declared an autonomous region. On 8 August Ambassador Kawagoe Shigeru made proposals to China for a comprehensive settlement of outstanding problems, calling for China's recognition of Manchukuo, an anti-Comintern pact between China and Japan, and the suppression of anti-Japanese agitation in Chinese cities.4 But almost immediately Chinese aircraft, in reprisal for Japan's activities in the North, openly attacked Japanese naval forces at Shanghai. On 9 August, a naval lieutenant was murdered by Chinese troops and four days later, fighting began with an air attack on the Japanese cruiser Izumo. The response of the Japanese cabinet, on 13 August, was to authorize the sending of an expeditionary force to central China. Three mobilized divisions from Japan occupied Shanghai, but not the International Settlement, and in due course began advancing towards Nanking, claiming that the Chinese commanders were not observing the provisions of the 1932 agreement for a demilitarized zone. Then Japan declared a "war of chastisement." Up to this point, the hostility had not been a preconceived conspiracy as in the case of the Manchurian Incident but rather the same kind of uncontrolled escalation which had taken place in earlier adventures in China. Tokyo proclaimed its opposition to any extension of hostilities. The General Staff felt that if a strong line were not taken, the Chinese armies might take advantage of the situation by creating other incidents; but Tokyo was not unanimously in favor of undue extension of hostilities. General Ishiwara Kanji, the leader of one group in the army General Staff, was opposed to operations in the Yangtse area, arguing that it would weaken Japan's strength further north vis-a-vis the Russians who were the prime enemy. But just how much his voice counted for is doubtful since he was relieved from his post on 27 September.5 Following the fiercely fought battle of Shanghai, the campaign moved up the Yangtse. In spite of their superior numbers, the crack Chinese units were defeated by the much smaller Japanese force which had been reinforced and had the benefit of air superiority. The offensive was to culminate in an assault on Nanking, the Kuomintang (KMT) capital. On 13 December, the invading troops captured Nanking and went out of control, killing Chinese brutally and indulging in rape and plunder. Various arguments have been put forward to explain this lapse of discipline: the fighting between Shanghai and Nanking had been exhausting and violent on both sides; the Chinese soldiers had behaved brutally to the Japanese in the earlier fighting; the looting was not exclusively done by the Japanese, and the Chinese had plundered ruthlessly as they withdrew from the city; and Japanese soldiers,

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having captured the Chinese capital, were exultant because they felt the war had ended in victory. Discipline was only very slowly restored after the new year due to the late involvement of Japanese diplomats and the more farsighted members of the Japanese military. General Matsui Iwane was relieved as commander-in-chief, and General Homma appeared in Nanking in February 1938 to try to explain that this behavior was unrepresentative of the Japanese army and to apologize. Clearly, it was vital for Japan to restore discipline; otherwise, she would have difficulty in occupying an area where the local population had been terrorized and alienated.6 The so-called Rape of Nanking (Nankin daigyakusatsu) cannot be described as a deliberate part of Japan's foreign policy, but discussion of it cannot be omitted here because it embarrassed Japan and tarnished her image in China and abroad. Foreign Ministry officials had tried in vain to avoid escalation of the conflict; they now had the responsibility to step in to address the diplomatic problems caused by the atrocity. There was a feeling that Hirota was slow to embark on a program of damage limitation but, within the range of his authority, he did try to take corrective action, because of the large number of casualties and the violence involved.7 The Nanking Incident also created diplomatic ripples internationally because of the presence of foreign observers and foreign property in Shanghai and Nanking. This was one of the early wars in which the craft of the press photographer beamed the evidence of violence around the world and created a diplomatic stir. The New York Times of 18 December carried the stark headline "Butchery marked capture of Nanking." There were widespread complaints which came most tellingly from the side of Germany, Japan's recently acquired partner. The diaries of John Rabe, a German resident of Nanking, are testimony to the activities and observations of the International Safety Zone Committee. There were also strong protests by Washington and London to which the Tokyo government was most precise in apologizing. But when the Nanking embassies were reopened in January after the month of chaos, the U.S. envoy, John Allison, was slapped by a Japanese soldier in what became a major diplomatic incident.8 Events at Nanking were a subject of great anguish for Japanese embassies abroad, which were confronted by detailed news coverage. Thus on 29 January 1938, Ambassador Yoshida in London, faced by complaints from government, journalistic quarters, and public demonstrations, "deeply deplored" reports accusing Japanese soldiers of "unspeakable atrocities" and added that such conduct was foreign to "our noble traditions." 9 Within days of the attack on Shanghai, China had appealed to the League of Nations. The matter was placed before its Far East Advisory Committee purely on the evidence of the Chinese; their report was adopted by the full Assembly on 6 October. But the League was not a good forum for mediation since Japan was no longer a member. For that reason, an invitation was issued on 20 October to national powers which were signatories

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of the Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922 to meet at Brussels at the end of the month. Japan's response on 27 October was that her action, being one of self-defense, lay outside the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty: "what is needed is a realization by China of the common responsibility of Japan and China regarding the stability of East Asia." Japan thought that her problems with China were best solved between themselves, rather than in conferences or treaties suited only for dealing with European or global situations. 10 Representatives met at Brussels on 3 November and issued a second appeal to Japan four days later. Since Japan declined to attend the main conference, it was asked to depute a representative for an exchange of views with a small number of Powers. But this was also refused. On 15 November, certain countries at Brussels called for a cessation of hostilities, but to no avail. On 24 November, the conference presented its final report which was, of course, one of failure. The debates had given little evidence of a widespread willingness on the part of the Powers to embark on a united policy of economic sanctions against Japan. 11 AXIS RELATIONS Alongside the bloody campaigns on the ground, Japan tried a twopronged approach to test whether negotiations with the Chinese leadership would be possible. One approach was to China, the other to Germany. The army indirectly approached Wang Ching-wei, who was one of the Chinese leaders most favorable to Japan. While the Chinese had many different approaches to the problem, much prospect of a solution was doubtful unless Japan took up issues with the internationally recognized KMT government which, as a result of the hostilities, had reached the peak of its popularity and managed to retreat upriver. Opposed to an internationally brokered solution through the League, the government tried to enlist the good offices of Germany. This first involved the German military attache in Tokyo, Eugen Ott, and then both ambassadors, von Dirksen in Tokyo and Dr. von Trautman in Nanking. Germany was ready to offer her good offices. On 2 November, Foreign Minister Hirota gave Dirksen a statement reiterating the three earlier Kawagoe proposals. The Chinese responded that they had no alternative to throwing in their lot with the Soviet Union—a clear threat to Japan. But with the military front becoming so precarious, the Chinese also indicated their willingness to accept proposals for a ceasefire on 3 December. Hirota now told Dirksen that it would not be possible to negotiate on the old basis. After the fall of Nanking to Japan in mid December, the Japanese seemed to raise the stakes of their peace terms; Germany complained that the current version greatly exceeded what had been presented in November. Hirota justified this on the ground that the military situation had changed in Japan's

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favor. The German diplomats were doubtful whether the new demands would prove acceptable but did pass them on. On 13 January 1938, the Chinese foreign minister parried the communication without refusing it.12 But Japan would brook no further delay; three days later the cabinet broke off attempts at mediation by issuing the announcement uaite ni sezu" (have no truck with an opponent). While ambiguous, the language implied that Japan would no longer pursue negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek but would persevere with her initiatives with other Chinese. It came at the end of a long period of friction between those who favored dealing with the main KMT leadership and those who preferred the more pro-Japanese Wang Ching-wei party. These brief attempts at mediation took place despite the ambiguity of Germany's attitudes towards East Asia. On the one hand, a state visit was paid to Germany by Prince Chichibu in September 1937, and the cruise of HIMS Ashigara included a call at Kiel. On the other hand, Germany was supplying the Chinese armies with advisers and supplies. The pace of rearmament and technological developments in Germany meant that this could prove to be not just a nominal, but a substantial, form of cooperation. It was not until May 1938 that Hitler made the crucial and final decision to pull out his military mission and cut off arms supplies to the KMT. But, despite protests about broken contracts and opposition from military advisers to this recall, Germany cut its ties with China. 13 Italy's position was simpler. The nation had little trade with China and less influence. The Italian government had been represented at the Brussels Conference and supported the Japanese whole-heartedly. It was not unexpected, therefore, that unofficial talks should begin between Japan and Italy during the autumn of 1937. Foreign Minister Ciano and Ambassador Sugimura did not like the private channels of approach which the Germans were using to make the Anti-Comintern Pact a tripartite one. Eventually, Ribbentrop went from London, where he had become ambassador, to Rome and proposed to make Italy an equal member of the year-old GermanJapanese Pact. Although Japan was willing to improve bilateral relations with Italy, it did not intend to put Italy on a par with Germany. Italy became a member of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern agreement on 6 November 1937. This formed the basis for a possible Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. But there were discordances among the trio. Italy was more forthright than Germany in recognizing Manchukuo almost as soon as it had been admitted to the Pact, thus gaining Japan's gratitude and acting much earlier than Hitler and the Nazi hierarchy.14 One factor which has to be taken into account is the appointment of Togo Shigenori as ambassador to Germany in October 1937. Togo in his capacity as director of the Foreign Ministry's Europe-American bureau (19331937), had been one of the main drafters of the Anti-Comintern Pact; but he had been responsible for keeping it within limits and not alienating other

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powers. Togo was in an uncomfortable position when he reached Berlin. His instructions were to get Germany to recognize Manchukuo, withdraw its thirty military advisers from China, and stop the export of arms to China. He was faced with two formal demands from the German side: one for an economic agreement, and the other for the conversion of the more anodyne Anti-Comintern Pact to a tripartite alliance. In both cases, Togo acted as a brake on the initiative, despite the strong advocacy of the military attache General Oshima Hiroshi, who was especially well-connected in Berlin. In a telegram to Tokyo of 5 May 1938, Togo reported on the relationship as a battle (tatakai): it is natural for me to become tense over the conduct of the military attache. When Oshima came to my house yesterday, I told him that, while there was no objection, generally speaking, to his having dealings with German authorities over military matters, it was proper to leave diplomatic matters apart from these to the diplomatic authorities. Not only do the interventions of third parties lead to uninteresting consequences, but I have to say that as ambassador I cannot recognize them. Oshima replied that this was proper but there were occasions when he received instructions from GHQ on matters apart from military ones (e.g. about the successor to the German ambassador to Japan or enquiries about German views on colonial questions). In these cases he was embarrassed.15 Despite the discreet language, we can discern the major disagreements between Togo and Oshima. In using the word "uninteresting," Togo probably meant "disastrous." Togo's disputes with Oshima, who had a long-standing rapport with the Nazi leadership, became widely known in Berlin. As a result, Togo came to be cold-shouldered by the German authorities. PACIFIC IMPLICATIONS

If the China war brought Japan closer to axis countries in Europe, it also alienated her from the Anglo-Saxon world, which tended to sympathize with China. International interest in the China war became intense as soon as hostilities moved to Shanghai, even if the International Settlement remained immune. The new British ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugesson, was strafed from the air on his way by car from Nanking to Shanghai. President Roosevelt, in his quarantine speech of 5 October, had stated that "an epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading" and that "when an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community... joins in a quarantine of the patients," he added, however, that America was only engaging in the search for peace and had no thought of military or naval action. The United States naval gunboat Panay was attacked from the air and sunk upriver at Nanking in December; the British gunboat Ladybird was shelled and suffered the loss of a sailor. Reacting to an enraged public, Roosevelt went much further than his quarantine

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speech and discussed matters with his chief of naval operations. He took the exceptional step of complaining directly to the Japanese Emperor over the heads of his ministers. Faced with this upsurge of international hostility, Hirota had no alternative but to apologize, on behalf of the Tokyo government, and offer compensation to the bereaved and the injured. Public opinion in Tokyo feared some naval retaliation in the Pacific. It was aware of international worries that Japan had embarked on a naval building program that was to include two mammoth battleships of the Yamato class. The major naval powers continued to ask Japan formally to disclose her building intentions. On 5 February 1938, the American, British, and French governments sent a note of complaint to Japan: unless Japan gave explicit assurances within fifteen days that it was not exceeding the internationally accepted limits, these countries all reserved their rights to build beyond the limits prescribed in the treaty. This was a serious though inevitable step. It was the first ultimatum presented by one set of Powers to another since the First World War. In a very long reply on 12 February, Japan refused to disclose its naval building programs, far less the specifications of its new battleships and cruisers. Instead, the nation reiterated its grievances mainly in the economic field, asking Britain and America to withdraw their spheres of influence in China, "which is the only chance left for Japan's survival." Japan elaborated on its intentions: The British possess a great self-sufficient empire, the Americans have an equally self-sufficient position in the two American continents. They ought to be generous enough to concede to Japan a place in the Orient that will meet her dire needs. . . . Japan does not intend to monopolize China, abolishing completely the policies of the "open door" and "equal opportunity." Japan asked the two powers to abate "their rigid policies" and modify them "to suit actual conditions." Thus, the reply on a technical naval issue was couched in economic and social terms. Japan was portraying herself as a "have-not power." 16 Of course, Japan's attitudes towards all governments except the axis had hardened by 1938. It may have realized that the main rivals were either, as in the case of Britain, too preoccupied with the desperate situation in Europe, or, as in the case of the United States, disinclined to get involved in large-scale shipbuilding in competition with Japan. Even so, Japan launched its naval replenishment plan, which was expensive and comprehensive. When the Americans saw its implications, a race in naval building and naval armament gradually took shape. 17 It was against this background of crisis that Konoe reconstructed his cabinet after one year in office. General Itagaki was made War Minister in June 1938 while General Tojo Hideki became his vice-minister. General Ugaki Kazushige was appointed to take the place of Hirota as the Foreign

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Minister. While Itagaki spent much of his time dealing with Germany, Ugaki gave more attention to the Pacific implications of the deteriorating China campaign. He only agreed to take office on condition that he should have supreme control over foreign policy decision-making. He also secured an assurance that, in renewing negotiations with China, he could waive the aite ni sezu declaration which had proved to be a disaster for Japan and open negotiations with the Kuomintang. It was recognized that it was going to be a long war, indeed a war of attrition (zemmenteki senso); alternative remedies had to be explored. In these circumstances, Ugaki appears to have hoped to use the influence of America and Britain to solve the China riddle. At all events, he used intermediaries to open negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's government.18 Ugaki also initiated a general post of diplomats. Yoshida Shigeru was recalled from London, and Shigemitsu was switched there from Moscow. There was an important move within the ministry to make Shiratori Toshio foreign vice-minister; for a long time, he had been the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry Press Bureau who was opposed to foreigners and the leader of the "Renovationist" group among bureaucrats. This did not succeed, but he was appointed ambassador to Rome. Togo, though he was anxious to stay on in Berlin, was appointed ambassador in Moscow from October 1938-1940. General Oshima Hiroshi, the architect of the AntiComintern Pact, had long been the favored candidate of the General Staff (Sambo Hombu) for the post of ambassador in Berlin and now achieved his ambition. If some of the changes brought about by Ugaki were wellintentioned, some of the postings seemed to play into the hands of the axis faction which had been nurtured by Shiratori.19 In any event Ugaki resigned on 30 September on the ground that he had been outmaneuvered by his colleagues and that Konoe had broken the conditions of his appointment. The army successfully insisted on creating the Ko-Ain, a department in which all parts of government concerned with Chinese affairs could have an equal say. This was a means of depriving the Foreign Ministry of such influence as it had hitherto enjoyed in handling relations with China. Ugaki, responding to the overwhelming support of his officials against the introduction of the Ko-Ain, resigned in protest. But he also acknowledged that his approaches to China had made no progress and that China's resistance was likely to increase.20 The incoming Foreign Minister, Arita, did not try to follow up Ugaki's line of approaching Chiang through the good offices of the major powers. This policy had met with strident opposition from the army and from the Renovationist group of juniors in the Foreign Ministry. Hankou and Canton fell in October; but the KMT, instead of pleading for a ceasefire, successfully evacuated its administration further into the hinterland. In these circumstances, Arita reverted to the army line of making an approach to Wang Ching-wei. An agreement was reached on 20 November between

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Tokyo and Wang laying down preconditions for a ceasefire, the so-called Nik-Ka kyogiroku. Chiang naturally did not recognize the agreement and continued to resist from his new capital, Chungking. So the situation reached a stalemate. Despite the new willingness of Japan to negotiate, the KMT leadership was stubborn and resourceful, recognizing that the Japanese were experiencing grave logistical difficulties with their troops being drawn more and more into central China and were lacking the manpower to cope with their extended lines of communication. It became essential for Japan to institute a blockade to prevent war supplies reaching Chiang and to stir up anti-Chiang feeling in the areas under Japanese occupation. Because of his defeat in the power struggle with Chiang, Wang Chingwei was persuaded to leave China for Hanoi. But he had miscalculated the extent of the popular support he would receive for a deal with Japan; and only his immediate entourage followed him. The members of Ume Kikan, one of the intelligence groupings operating within the Japanese forces, assisted Wang in planning a new Chinese government; and after some months of reflection, Wang agreed to identify himself with a government which had been set up in occupied Nanking in April 1939 with Japanese backing.21 HESITATION OVER AN AXIS ALLIANCE, 1938-1939 Before Ugaki's resignation as foreign minister the cabinet had taken steps towards the axis. In February 1938, Ribbentrop, who had become foreign minister in Germany, proposed a series of pro-Japanese maneuvers. He argued in favor of Germany granting recognition to Manchukuo and the withdrawal of the country's military mission from China. Hitler announced these measures in the Reichstag on 20 February. The thirty advisers to China were removed in May. When the China campaign failed to induce the KMT leadership to offer a ceasefire in the summer of 1938, there was talk of Japan strengthening her pact with the axis powers. There appeared to be a mutual desire and interest on the part of all three members to breathe fresh life into the Anti-Comintern Pact. A German draft by Ribbentrop was conveyed to Japan by Major-general Kasahara Yukio on 5 August. The battle-lines were drawn over the German demands, with the Foreign Ministry and the navy leadership on the one side, and the army and parts of the navy (kaigun jimukyoku) on the other. War Minister Itagaki announced that the army favored this draft in a memorandum entitled "the army's hopes regarding present foreign policy." This began the lengthy process of reaching consensus on the discordant views within the Japanese leadership. The army and navy ultimately reached consensus on the Kasahara draft with qualifications over Japan's commitment. Behind this, some junior officers from both services favored the German proposals, arguing that any military action which was proposed against Russia also should be applied to Britain and France.22

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On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry thought that one way of reconciling differences would be to have separate agreements with Germany and Italy, the German one being of "mutual assistance" while the Italian one would focus on "neutrality and consultation." But the decision eventually taken at the five-ministers' conference on 26 August was merely to initiate negotiations with Germany for extension of the pact. Stoutly advocating the idea of an unrestricted alliance with Germany and Italy, General Itagaki was ready to use force against the Soviet Union. He pointed out the logic of strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact: it would save continental China for Japan, elevate China's international standing, and cause the Chinese government to give up its policy of both tolerance to communism and resistance to Japan. But colleagues hesitated. Berlin, which was feeling more confident in Europe after the Munich agreement in September, was less inclined to tolerate delay because of caution and ambiguity on the Japanese side. Unable to find a satisfactory consensus in Tokyo, Prince Konoe resigned on 3 January 1939. The prime ministership passed to Baron Hiranuma who, sympathetic to the army, still insisted on a full examination of the axis problem. Arita continued to serve as foreign minister. As the exponent of army views, Itagaki continued to use threats of resignation to persuade the new cabinet of his cause. He reiterated his argument that, because of the communist threat, Japan should expand its armaments and links with Germany while Italy should be strengthened.23 On 19 January the new cabinet, attempting to meet the European partners half-way, drew up compromise instructions whereby countries other than the Soviet Union might become targets whenever the common interests of the allies demanded. The cabinet sent Ito Nobufumi, former ambassador to Poland, to Europe in the hope of talking ambassadors Shiratori and Oshima around to the government line that Japan did not want a universal military alliance. But the two impulsive ambassadors were not willing to pass over to their respective governments terms of which they personally disapproved. So on 2 March, Oshima and Shiratori again withheld Japan's opposition, thereby conveying a false impression of Tokyo's intentions. Itagaki supported their actions at the Tokyo end. When Hiranuma convened a five-minister conference on 22 March, there was anxiety that the Anglo-French approaches to Moscow might lead to cooperation against Japan. The Prime Minister was inclined to waver. But the navy, the court, and the Foreign Ministry would not countenance any pact which might involve Japan in war against Britain, France and, by extension, the United States. When Itagaki again offered his resignation, Hiranuma drew up a placatory compromise on 4 May whereby Japan would conclude an alliance with Germany against all other powers, with the proviso that her military contribution would only be made when circumstances suited Japan. 24

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After further pressure from Germany on 15 May, the ministers accepted that country's demands, except for the reiterated point that Japan must decide for itself the timing of any entry into a war against France and Britain. Japan could not make a clear decision, and the Europeans could not wait. Ribbentrop, who was only prepared to accept an unconditional commitment, rejected Japan's offer, which he took to be insulting. Instead, Germany and Italy made an alliance on 22 May, the "pact of steel." Itagaki declared publicly that the alliance between Germany and Italy was a welcome contribution to the new rising world order and hinted that Japan might join later. He was willing to take the supreme risk of Japan joining an axis alliance directed against the Western powers as well as the Soviet Union, but Arita and Admiral Yonai consistently opposed it. On 22 June, Japan went so far as to declare that it would automatically enter a war against the Soviet Union. But its declaration was too late for Germany. While demands continued for the talks to be reopened, little headway was made in June and July.25 This left Japan clinging rather precariously to the original AntiComintern Pact, though its scope was extended at this time. In February 1939, Manchukuo and Hungary subscribed to the Pact. Franco Spain, which had been recognized by Japan in December 1937, entered into a treaty of friendship with Germany in March 1939 and joined the Pact one month later. In addition, there was a cluster of cultural and trade agreements among these political partners. A new world order had been created with the tripartite powers as its nucleus and with Manchukuo, Hungary, and Spain on the periphery. But the 1936 Berlin-Tokyo axis was certainly its central constituent. SOVIET-JAPANESE TENSIONS The argument in favor of Japan moving closer to Germany was the threat she felt from the Soviet Union to her continental territories. Japan was conscious of a formidable Soviet military buildup in the East. The Russians were proud of the steps that had been taken there under the second fiveyear plan. Both in terms of airpower and in tank armament the Soviets were a considerable threat to the Kuantung army, which was not noted for its advanced technology. Intelligence reports were giving a mixed picture. On the one hand, they said that Russia, within a month of operations starting, could have available in the East 1500 planes and countless divisions from the European sector. On the other hand, the morale of the Soviet military was affected by the purges. This had been seen clearly in the defection of General G.S. Lyushkov, the Siberian NKVD commissar, to the Kuantung army in 1938. A war of nerves was developing on the SovietManchukuoan frontier. In response, the Japanese had been reinforcing their frontier forces, and the border clashes were multiplying year by year with

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increasing more violence. The Kuantung army wanted to make a strategic probe of the borderland while opinion in the Foreign and Navy Ministries opposed such a dangerous plan. 26 An incident relating to islands in the Amur river took place in the summer of 1937. The Japanese claimed that the islands belonged to Manchukuo and had been wrongly occupied by the Soviets. It appears that, without the authority of the high command, local army commanders had become involved in clashes with Russian gunboats on the Amur. Perpetrated in the name of the Kuantung army, the fights were countermanded from Tokyo. Still, the Japanese army as a whole felt humiliated. To Tokyo's surprise, Moscow agreed to restore the status quo. The Japanese deduced that the Stalin purges, then at their peak, had destroyed the confidence of the officer corps. Heartened by the Soviet concession, Tokyo sought negotiations and proposed the creation of two commissions consisting of Japanese, Manchukuoan, and Soviet representatives to dispose of practical issues like fisheries, oil, and coal. But, in the climate of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviets were not in a mood for compromise.27 The following summer an incident took place at Changkufeng, a hill of 480 feet in eastern Manchukuo, which with a number of other peaks ran parallel to the western shore of Lake Khasan, but to the east of the Tumen river. The unpopulated frontier was disputed, each side having a claim of sorts to hold the hilltop. The Russian commanders who seem to have originated the action may have wanted to probe the Japanese defenses or make a gesture in favor of their Chinese partners. The high command in Tokyo and the Korean army did not want to get involved with the Russians. But the Kuantung army was not so cautious. Tokyo discussed whether to counter the Russian advance by a limited offensive. Itagaki asked for permission to use force; but the foreign minister only agreed to make preparations, and the Emperor would not allow the War Minister to get his way. Nonetheless, the Korean army, under some degree of provocation, launched an offensive on 29 July to drive the Russians back to their territory; it lasted until they eventually withdrew on 2 August. The five-minister conference decided that Japan should not risk an escalation while the situation in China was causing anxiety. The incident was resolved by a ceasefire negotiated between Ambassador Shigemitsu in Moscow and Maksim Litvinov on the night of 10 August. There would be a mutual cessation of hostilities, Soviet and Japanese forces maintaining their respective lines. It is hard to say whether either side could rightfully claim a victory. But Japan did keep her end up without lavish use of extra troops and arms. 28 Earlier border clashes do not bear comparison with the crisis of 1939 which Professor Alvin Coox calls "the Nomonhan war." Nomonhan was a town on the Khalka river, the frontier between western Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia. It was a natural point of tension between the Mongolian

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authorities, who relied on the protection of the Soviet Union under their Mutual Defense Pact, and the Manchukuo authorities, who were protected by the Kuantung army. Following thirty violations of the frontier, the latter prepared a paper on 25 April that dealt with the principles for settling border disputes and was critical of the cautious line of the high command. Its commanders were feeling their way towards taking strong unilateral action to redefine a frontier in their favor. The Japanese military plunged into a large-scale conflict with the Soviet Union at Khalka river (Khalkin got). On 11 May, several hundred Japanese soldiers advanced in the Lake Buir Nor district of Outer Mongolia and pushed through to the river. After the replacement of Litvinov by his deputy, Molotov, and General Blyucher by General Zhukov, the Soviets seem to have taken a more positive stance and issued warnings to the Japanese against their action. At the end of the month, a combined force of Mongols and their Soviet allies undertook an armored offensive but was driven back. Japan lost a cavalry regiment in the gory conflict. The Soviet-Mongolian forces were substantially reinforced, in particular with tanks and planes. When War Minister Itagaki urged his colleagues that hostilities should be allowed to continue, Prime Minister Hiranuma disagreed and obtained the backing of the cabinet. In spite of orders from Tokyo to the contrary, the Kuantung army, allegedly under the influence of Colonel Tsuji Masanobu of later notoriety in the Malayan campaigns, decided to punish its opponents. So the army launched air attacks against bases in Outer Mongolia, followed by a ground offensive on 2 July. Though the five-ministers conference in Tokyo had called for "non-enlargement," it seems to have been a case of "escalation by mutual consent" of the forces on the ground. 29 Though the Kuantung army was considerably reinforced with men, tanks, and aircraft, it found itself confronted by overwhelming Russian strength in artillery and airpower, both of which were being operated with much more efficient drive than had been experienced in the previous year. Under the new leadership of General Zhukov, who had managed to obtain an eastern posting and thus escape the purge, the Soviets launched a major counterattack on 20 August, trouncing the Japanese with air as well as tank superiority. By the end of the month, the Japanese had been routed, suffering some 17,500 casualties; about one-third of the troops committed had been killed or wounded. The local Japanese commanders made a ceasefire agreement at the frontier on 15 September.30 The Nomonhan incident was not a deliberate part of foreign policy. On the Japanese side, it appears to have been an example of remarkable irresponsibility on the part of local commanders acting without, or in defiance of, the authority of the high command. It was the outcome of a sort of military foreign policy conceived by the Kuantung army. When it failed, the diplomats had to conclude a ceasefire on 9 September. The resulting bitter talks on border demarcation were handled skillfully in Moscow by Ambas-

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sador Togo and Foreign Commissar Molotov, leading eventually to an agreement concluded on 9 June 1940. It enabled the Soviet-Mongolian side to secure their frontier against Manchukuo. The concessions made by Japan were not to the liking of the army, whose pride would not allow it to publicly admit the severity of its defeat.31 The psychological impact of this catastrophe on the once triumphant Kuantung army was colossal. It was humiliating for the army to send home by rail the ashes of comrades who had been lost by poor generalship. Having grown overly confident and disobedient, it had underestimated the capacity, but not the numbers, of the Soviet army in the East through faulty intelligence. Its defeat led to a shake-up in the Kuantung army. The news of this major loss, the first by Japan since the Siberian intervention, was concealed: the Japanese public was kept in the dark for some weeks, though the extent of Japanese casualties was known to inner circles. The absence of information was passed onto the Russians by their spy in Japan, Richard Sorge, while the British also had an accurate indication from their Consulate General in Mukden. Only the army in China, demoralized by the failure of its campaigns, could take heart: the preoccupation of Soviet forces around Nomonhan probably prevented their intervening in the China war.32 REACTING TO THE NAZI-SOVIET NON-AGGRESSION PACT On 23 August, the announcement was made of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. It and its secret protocol were drawn up largely for European reasons and were, in any case, rushed through. Japan only heard of them when Ribbentrop telephoned Ambassador Oshima from Berghof late on 21 August. Astonished, the Ambassador called on the Foreign Ministry at midnight to demand further explanations. Oshima insisted on seeing Ribbentrop at Tempelhof airport as he passed through Berlin on the way to Moscow. Oshima was personally affronted by the secrecy surrounding the Non-aggression Pact. Along with others in Berlin, he had heard rumors of it in June, but understandably believed them to constitute a bluff, a mere ploy to induce Japan to come to an early decision over an expanded alliance with Germany. The news also had a devastating effect on Japan. It did not come as a total surprise because there had been many rumors that Germany and the Soviet Union would reach an accommodation in order to safeguard their interests in eastern Europe. What alarmed Japan were the implications for Northeast Asia, the possibility that large Soviet forces could be drafted to the East.33 Already demoralized by the defeat at Nomonhan and the war of endurance in China, Japan took this new development as a cruel blow. The cabinet, on 25 August, interpreted the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact as a violation and decided to make a strong official protest, which was tardily delivered by Ambassador Oshima on 18 September. The Hiranuma

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cabinet further decided to suspend all discussion of a triple alliance and issued a significant public announcement that Germany's act was a great betrayal. While the pact was not an infringement of the terms of the public Anti-Comintern Pact, it could be said to violate its spirit. Further, the pact violated one of the accompanying secret articles which laid down that no separate treaties should be concluded with the Soviets. The original pact of 1936 contained exclusions providing for commercial or fishery agreements, but it was impossible to pretend that an agreement with the Soviet Union was consistent with its undertakings. Germany could try to defend its action on the basis that Japan had shown its own lack of solidarity with European partners by the Japanese dilatory reactions earlier in the year. But in a country like Japan where decisions are by consensus and painfully slow, such delays were not unusual. If Tokyo felt double-crossed, Oshima felt humiliated. He, therefore, offered his resignation instantly and returned to Japan via the United States in November. The irony of the situation was that the Foreign Ministry had been trying to discipline him for some years without success. He had had his own agenda and, secure in the knowledge that he had supporters in high places, had not in the past feared recall. When asked by Germany for an interpretation of Tokyo's ambiguous messages of 1939, Oshima had followed his own preferences. But now, ironically, the actions of Berlin, not Tokyo, brought about his departure from Germany.34 Nevertheless, Oshima stuck to his conviction that alignment with Germany was good for Japan. He spent the year after his return home addressing meetings in favor of closer relations with Germany. In the end, his absence from Berlin was only temporary, as he was to return as ambassador early in 1941 and stay there until 1945. Shiratori, Oshima's counterpart in Rome, whose position was less secure, was not so much affected because Italy had not known of the secret Pact and thus had not joined it. He, like other members of the Renovationist group (Kakushinha) in the Foreign Ministry, had radical ideas about the problems created by the turmoil in Europe and continued to favor an axis connection for Japan. Nonetheless, Shiratori left Italy in January 1940 to become a consultant (ichiji komon) to the Gaimusho and, two years later, a member of the Diet. As a direct result of the Pact, the Hiranuma government resigned after one of the most disastrous months in Japan's modern history. The incoming government under General Abe Nobuyuki had to face the crisis created by the start of the war in Europe. It published a statement saying that Japan would not intervene in the European conflict but would concentrate on settling Chinese affairs.35 The start of the European war should have helped her commerce and strengthened Japan's position in so far as the colonial powers like Britain, France, Holland, and even the United States had to give Europe a priority higher than East Asia. Instead, Japan felt demor-

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alized over her failure to resolve her problems in central China. Despite this demoralization, Japan did not try to leave the Anti-Comintern Pact. The enthusiasts who wanted to convert the Pact into an alliance were silenced, but only temporarily. Before long, other groups, feeling that Japan's position in Northeast Asia was exposed, were advocating some agreement with the Soviet Union. In that quest, Germany's role as Moscow's new friend could potentially be helpful. This was a strange reversal because Japan had played with the notion of waging a holy war against the Soviet Union for much of the 1930s. But that part of her rhetoric had been discredited by the cavalier actions of the Nazi leadership. In the summer of 1939, Japan scored a partial success when Britain came under sustained pressure at Tientsin. There was a natural temptation, as the war clouds darkened in Europe, for Japan to settle scores with countries like Britain, France, and Holland. In Britain's case it surfaced in April over the British concession in Tientsin where the alleged nationalist killers of a Chinese collaborator of the Japanese were hiding. After Britain refused to hand over the suspects, Japan's troops blockaded the concession and cut off its trade. Eventually, it was agreed to hold a series of talks in Tokyo between Ambassador Craigie and Foreign Minister Arita. Britain eventually agreed to an accord of 22 July whereby the country confirmed "[having] no intention of countenancing any act or measures prejudicial to the attainment o f . . . the objects of the Japanese forces in China." 36 This was a considerable compromise with the occupying power in northern China, but many Japanese regretted that this principle had been conceded because they were anxious to pick a fight. Foreign Minister Arita wanted to go further and raise the whole question of Britain's position in North China and reach some accord limiting her activities in the field of commerce, currency, and banking. But London rejected the notion of an overall pact to cover all disagreements in China; Britain was fortunate to avoid recognizing Japan's New Order, withdrawing the fapi currency from circulation, and collaborating in Japan's security arrangements. Inevitably, tension continued, and the blockade remained in force until June 1940. While the accord was an act of appeasement by Britain, it was made in the context of the war developing in Europe. 37 Like many countries in a similar position, Japan was less inclined to blame the stalemate in its China campaign on failures of its own war leadership than on the hostility of other powers, especially the Anglo-Saxon countries. Japan was convinced that arms were passing to the KMT in their upcountry bases through colonial ports like Hongkong, Hanoi, and Rangoon. There was an increasing inclination, therefore, on the part of Japan to try to solve the China problem by moving further south against the European colonial empires. Meanwhile, the United States, though no defender of European colonialism, was clearly disapproving of Japan's activities; on 26 July, the United States gave notice that it intended to cancel

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its trade agreement of 1911 with Japan. This would give the administration the power to prohibit the export to the Japanese of war materials like oil, copper, and iron. It was a chilling reminder to the Japanese that, though they had been shy of total entanglement with Germany, they were still regarded abroad as her partner. Japan was enmeshed in three wars. The war in China was serious: over two years, Japan had failed to bring the Kuomintang to the negotiating table. The Nomonhan war, while it had reached a ceasefire in September, also was still under negotiation, as late as June 1940. It had been a salutary reminder of the dangers of military lack of discipline and the weakness of Japan at war. Moreover, there was the European war. None of Japan's business, in a sense, this war did mean, however, that Japan had to exist in a global wartime environment. Japan reacted by declaring strict neutrality in the European war; it was, in most respects, cut off from its allies, Germany and Italy. But now that the Americans had shown increased interest in East Asian affairs, the United States had given Japan notice that it could be subject to trade sanctions unless its conduct improved in terms of Germany and Italy. Given this situation, Japan obviously had to do her utmost to cultivate the goodwill of strong and uncommitted powers like the United States and Russia.

CHAPTER 8

Japan, China, and the European War, 1939-1941 In the momentous years from 1939 to 1941 there was a war in Europe and a quite separate war in East Asia with interesting points of convergence between the two. Japan was herself engaged in war with China but, by reason of its connections with Germany and fear of the Soviet Union, the country could not afford to ignore the European war. At the start of the European war in September 1939, Japan was reeling from a series of blows from Germany, Russia, and the United States; it promptly announced neutrality. But the next two years were to be a period of diminishing neutrality toward European countries. Japan's position in the East became stronger because of the preoccupation of other powers either as antagonizers or as observers in the European conflict. When the phony war led to the fall of Holland and France in April 1940, the inclination to make common cause with Germany was particularly strong. Japan was ready to reconstruct its relationship with Germany, over which she had vacillated for three years, and to forge the Tripartite Pact. But it was not only the Grosse Politik with which Japan was concerned, but also its economic position and war with China. How could Japan use her diplomacy to extract herself from these major troubles? The Japanese leaders were faced with various options including resolving the dispute with Nationalist China, possibly with the help of the United States, or taking Germany's advice in striking at Southeast Asia, which might confer economic benefits. For the outcome, the factionridden leadership appears to have employed contradictory strategies, one wing developing relations with the axis and Soviet Russia while the other complementarily cultivated Washington. In coping with these divided views, foreign policy-making and its coordination had a large and difficult role.1 Decisions were made in the war period by joint military-civil committees. It is already be clear that there were many factions in civil government, the army, and the navy that were divided and in dispute. How then

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were policies reached? Foreign policy tended to be ironed out, as we have seen, by four- or five-minister committees, in other words by a sort of inner cabinet. To cope with the exigencies of war, however, matters of high policy were dealt with at the Imperial Headquarters Government Conferences (Daihonei-seifu kaigi), more generally known as "Liaison Conferences." Thus, representatives of the cabinet met with the chiefs of the army and navy general staffs. These conferences were revived in 1940 after they had fallen into disuse over the mediation moves by Trautmann in 1938. For them to be a regular mechanism for decision-making, there had to be a degree of mutual understanding among the members. Decisions on national policy were then referred to more formal bodies like the Privy Council or the Imperial Conference in the presence of the Emperor. But, as the earlier chapters have suggested, groups existed within the navy that shared the aims of the army, and vice versa. Even the Foreign Ministry had at a junior level the Renovationist group (Kakushinha) that shared some of the goals of the services and was hostile to the Anglo-American clique (EiBeiha) which they felt had had too much influence in the Ministry.2 Policy-making was in the hands of, first, the Abe cabinet with Admiral Nomura as foreign minister, and then, from January 1940, the cabinet of Admiral Yonai with the experienced Arita at the Gaimusho. Power passed, on 22 July, to Prince Konoe for his fourth cabinet, which appointed as Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke, a fluent and confident speaker of English but not so strong a writer. It would appear that those entrusted with the task of appointing prime ministers in the early part of the 1930s favored senior navy leaders who represented the more cautious and judicious voice within Japan's armed services. The years 1939-1941 were years of changing attitudes within the navy as the younger officers began to exert more influence over policy-making. While many navy men favored a southern strategy provided it did not require them to take up arms against the United States, they came increasingly to accept the military risk as unavoidable and made common cause with the army. Japan was still concerned with both the Pacific Ocean area and the Asian continent. Regarding Pacific matters, Britain and its dominions were no longer players of first importance. Japan's greater concern was the changing attitude of the United States. Washington was beginning to take an increasing interest in China and assume a protective role towards the Kuomintang (KMT). By extension, it was taking a serious view of Japan's expansion into Southeast Asia. Moreover, the United States navy was at last beginning to proceed with its building program. In terms of Asian continental matters, Japan still had major headaches. Militarily, there was still a serious problem in China, though the situation had stabilized. In order to improve its position there, Japan had to plug the supply routes that were feeding the Chinese war effort. This had drawn Japan, in February 1939, into occupying Hainan island and would later involve her in Hanoi and

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Saigon. But a point was reached at which expansion into Southeast Asia ceased to be part of Japanese military strategy in the China war, becoming part of straightforward national expansion. CONSENSUS FOR A TRIPARTITE PACT The navy had hitherto been the main opponent of increased collaboration with Germany. The problem for the admirals was that, following the second London naval conference, Japan had embarked on the third replenishment plan for the navy which still felt itself to be vulnerable by comparison with the United States. What emerged were plans for four 64,000-ton vessels which were to be heavily armored and equipped with nine 18.1 guns. Of these, the Yamato was to be completed in December 1941 and the Musashi in the following year. The others were later converted into aircraft carriers. The building of these outsize craft was the subject of intense debate. The cause of the super-battleships was espoused especially by members of the old Fleet faction, notably Admirals Suetsugu Nobumasa and Nakamura Ryozo, while opposition came from the advocates of naval aviation, notably Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. But the case for airpower was not yet fully convincing, and the battleship building plan went ahead with high expenditure out of the military-naval budget. While Japan doubled her carrier strength, it could not compete with the American navy in this category. In the field of fighter aircraft (notably the Zero fighter) and the submarine, however, Japan had some superiority.3 The Yonai-Yamamoto faction in the navy exercised a degree of control until the summer of 1940. Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, who was the Prime Minister during the critical period from January to July, feared AngloAmerican collaboration and followed a cautious policy. But the radical younger officers in the navy, who were impressed by the successes of German blitzkrieg and the British withdrawal from Dunkirk, were dissatisfied with their superiors; these younger officers thought that collaboration with Germany, which had denied having any ambitions in the area, would fit in with Japan's pursuit of a southern strategy (nanshin). Therefore, these naval officers came closer to their army counterparts in calling for some arrangement with Germany. They joined the army in securing Yonai's overthrow in July. His naval successors, Admirals Yoshida Zengo and Oikawa, were also cautious; but Oikawa gradually aligned himself with the majority view. At an army-navy-foreign ministry conference on 16 July, they adopted a plan for strengthening relations among Japan, German, and Italy.4 Prince Konoe formed a new cabinet on 22 July. Even before he came to power, Konoe held talks about policies to meet the national emergency. The "Outline of a Basic National Policy" (kihon kokusaku yobo) was drawn up and accepted by the cabinet. It dwelt on the need to escape from dependence on foreign countries; it highlighted the southern problem. The

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concept of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which had been spoken of in the past, was now formulated more clearly and defined as including French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies. This, too, tilted the balance in favor of intensifying the understanding with Germany. The Japanese would always be suspicious that Germany might be carried away by its European successes and reveal ambitions in the colonial territories of the European countries it had overrun. But Germany had just given assurances, in her statement of 20 May, that she had no ambitions to acquire these colonies. The new Konoe administration undertook a realignment of policies. On 26 July, it defined its views on Japan's position on the international scene (kokusai josei to teikoku no tachiba). Since the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939, Tokyo had been highly suspicious of Germany and the lobby which advocated a military alliance with her. General Oshima had been withdrawn as ambassador in Berlin. The negotiations for a German-Japanese commercial treaty, which had been proceeding since early in 1939, were suspended by Japan. When, however, Germany overwhelmed Holland and then France, it was opportune to review the relationship. 5 When Matsuoka Yosuke became Foreign Minister with Ohashi Chuichi as Vice-Minister, he brought a Manchurian tinge to the drab colors of Kasumigaseki. Matsuoka opened discussions in Tokyo with Ambassador Ott, whom Berlin did not completely trust, and found that Germany, which had been so enthusiastic for an expanded relationship in 1938-1939, was now less responsive. But Germany, on 23 August, sent Dr. Heinrich Stahmer, an Auswaertiges Amt official who was the confidant of Ribbentrop, on a return mission to Tokyo in order to investigate Japan's true intentions and negotiate a new treaty. A four-minister meeting on 6 September agreed that Japan would embark on talks with him. Formal negotiations, therefore, began three days later. Admiral Oikawa, the new Navy Minister, stated at the liaison conference on 14 September that his service, which had for so long been the main impediment to closer ties with Germany, would withdraw its objections to an axis alliance provided that Japan retain the right to determine the circumstances in which it would have to offer military assistance to its allies. Japan received assurances that the treaty would come into force only in the event of an attack on the signatories; on 27 September, the treaty was signed in Berlin by Ribbentrop for Germany, Ciano for Italy, and Ambassador Kurusu for Japan. The official text was in English. There was in addition a secret exchange of letters in Tokyo which are essential to an understanding of the pact. The joint targets of the pact were the Soviet Union and the United States if the latter were to become involved in war with Germany.6 Technically not a full military alliance, the pact did pledge that the parties cooperate to "assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power

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at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict." This would take effect only in the eventuality of an attack on any of the three by the United States or the Soviet Union. So far as Russia was concerned, it showed Germany's lack of confidence in the effectiveness of her nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union and caused Russia to protest to Germany. Much more important were its implications for the United States with which Germany and Japan were united in wanting to avoid war. Professor Hosoya sees the treaty as an example of deterrent diplomacy aimed at persuading the Americans that it was not in their interest to go to war with the signatories. In fact, it probably increased Washington's suspicions and accelerated the drift towards global war.7 In the accompanying letters exchanged between Ambassador Ott and Matsuoka, Japan secured a "let-out" clause. It was stated that "whether an attack has taken place must be determined through joint consultation." In other words, Japan would retain discretion to interpret whether any attack on Germany merited its intervention. If Germany were attacked by a power so far not engaged, as the United States, the Germans should not expect Japan's cooperation in the conduct of war. But Japan called Germany's attention to the possibility of armed conflict between Japan and Britain, asking for its help. Finally, it was agreed that German colonies in the Pacific under Japanese mandate should remain in Japan's possession, subject to compensation. However, those under British mandate should be "restored automatically to Germany upon conclusion of the peace," subject to discussion with Japan about their disposal.8 The signatories mutually recognized each other's prospective spheres of power. Each partner reserved its rights to undertake single-handed operations. It is unlikely that Japan was taken into the confidence of the Nazi leaders about their long-term strategic thinking. While the Japanese and German foreign ministers tried to associate the Soviets with the pact in some way, this failed because of exaggerated Soviet demands. The situation stood in marked contrast to the German-Japanese negotiations of 1938-1939 which had been targeted at Soviet Russia. After the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the atmosphere in Japan changed. This pact had been conceived in a period of German successes and before the outcome of the Battle of Britain was clear. Perhaps naturally, senior officers of the army became more inclined towards the German cause. As if to reflect this new confidence on the army side, General Oshima was reappointed ambassador to Berlin in December, returning in February 1941. In the navy, too, the expansionst element took the upper hand, both at the Navy Ministry and at the General Staff. Captain Ishikawa, a senior figure among the junior officers, came to wield much influence in guiding naval, diplomatic, and political policy; he was regarded as the leader of the group. The First Committee, established in December 1940, became the crucial institution for formulating changes in naval policy.9

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CHINA: A TWIN-TRACK APPROACH Alongside these global complications, Japan found herself in "a China quagmire" by the autumn of 1939. In spite of defeats in Hunan, Japan had managed to occupy Hankow and Canton in October 1938; but it had encountered tough resistance in Kuangsi. The country had failed to achieve the expected surrender of the Kuomintang government, which moved west and set up its new capital in the mountain resort of Chungking. With problems over lines of communication in China and the guerrilla activity which was growing in occupied areas, a strategic dilemma clearly existed. Many Japanese, including some in the army, thought that an extension of the China campaign into the western hinterland would be disastrous and favored a negotiated settlement. The unexpected prolongation of the campaigns had gravely affected and distorted the Japanese economy, so big business also favored an early settlement. But how? All the unofficial approaches to Chungking drew forth negative responses and massive volumes of anti-Japanese propaganda. Meanwhile, equally secret approaches were being made to Wang Chingwei, a long-time rival of Chiang Kai-shek. Wang's thinking was expressed in the Chinese press in Shanghai, which became his base during 1939. Basically, he felt that it was futile for China to continue fighting Japan, equivalent to "throwing eggs against a rock." He favoured a policy of "resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other." He appealed to the commercial community of the Chinese ports, a community that wanted a return to normal business conditions by economic cooperation with Japan; he also appealed to the "orthodox Kuomintang" by proposing a policy of good neighborly relations with Japan and a common front against the Comintern. Wang had latched on to themes which had appeared in speeches by Prime Minister Konoe. In his keynote speech of November 1938, Konoe had invited China to share Japan's mission of establishing a New Order in East Asia on the basis of opposition to communism and promised that Japan would recognize China's full independence and end the extraterritorial rights which were still being exercised by foreign powers. He further pledged that Japan would not conquer China but lead it to prosperity and only wanted its cooperation. On these points, there was some measure of agreement between the Japanese and Wang's supporters. Wang was looking to Japan for aid on a large scale and seeking collaboration without political interference. He took the gamble of leaving Chungking for Hanoi on 18 December without receiving guarantees, not knowing whether he would be regarded as patriot or puppet. 10 Eventually Wang issued a manifesto formulating his government's policy in Shanghai on 12 March 1940. He was installed as the head of the Reformed Government of the Republic of China which was set up in the old

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Nationalist capital of Nanking on 30 March in the presence of large numbers of Japanese troops. General Abe Nobuyuki, the former Prime Minister, was posted as the first ambassador to Nanking. While Wang did receive some support from influential Chinese in occupied China, the weakness of his support base became obvious. Japan did not immediately recognize the new regime in order to maintain the illusion of Wang's independence. It also left the way open for Japan to negotiate with Chiang, who was now vulnerable because the army capture of Ichang made bombing raids on his new capital of Chungking a possibility. The Japanese signed the basic treaty with Wang on 30 April and, later in the year on 8 November, the Joint Declaration by the three countries associated with the ten-year JapanManchukuo-China contruction plan. All the policies of Japan, Manchukuo, and China were to be coordinated with the idea of achieving a speedier realization of a mutual prosperity sphere in East Asia on the basis of a contrived development of the three countries' economies: "the world economic order based on free trade principles has been crumbling away with age and belongs to the past. The reorganization of our Empire must part company with it." The imperial conference, on 13 November, adopted an outline plan for managing the China Incident (Shina jihen shori yoko). In organizing this Great East Asia Solidarity Bloc, Tokyo stated that the mainstay of the bloc was China where there were plenty of raw materials. Japan was already monopolizing foreign trade in central China and the Open Door there had already been sealed. Organized riots against foreign business activities were commonplace.11 But this all took place against the background of negotiations with Chungking through various agencies. Japan had to face the reality of guerilla warfare in the countryside of China; because of shortage of manpower, it could only hold the major cities together with railway and river lines. Apart from Wang's party, Japan could not rely on prominent collaborators. Its financial measures to replace the "fapi"9 the depreciated Nationalist currency, with one of her own were a failure. In the circumstances Japan made repeated attempts at a negotiated settlement with those close to Chiang. In the first half of 1940, negotiations with Chungking known as "the Kiri project" were pursued by Tokyo, but they did not achieve a ceasefire. After the Tripartite Pact, Chiang tended to align with the Americans, but Japan persisted with its overtures toward peace, utilizing the high-level intelligence networks in which it had special skills and experience.12 Before granting recognition to Wang at the end of November, the Japanese had procrastinated and been indecisive. The attitudes of the occupying army made it difficult to allow the Wang regime any real degree of independence or self-government. The army was reluctant to give the meaningful concessions which might have strengthened Wang's position. So Wang, who had taken a colossal political risk, became deeply disheartened

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with the lack of consultation from Tokyo. He was sadly reduced from being a prominent political leader to being the accessory of a Japanese regime. Thus, one year later when the Japanese declared war on the United States, they would not give Wang advance warning. Feeling that his hand had been forced, he still decided to declare war alongside Japan. Indirectly he benefited because Japan immediately moved into the International Settlement in Shanghai which forthwith ceased to exist. Japan abolished its extraterritorial rights on Chinese territory and undertook to restore the concessions to Nanking's jurisdiction, shortly after the Western Allies gave China similar undertakings in 1943. It was, of course, easier for powers dispossessed of their interests to give China this concession than for Japan whose armies occupied much of the country. Thus, the New Order in East Asia and the associated doctrine of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere conferred some unforeseen benefits on the people of China. 13 KONOE-MATSUOKA TENSIONS It was natural for Japan to lay some of the blame on others for its failures in China. The Yonai cabinet, through its Foreign Vice-minister Tani Masayuki, had presented Arsene-Henry, the French ambassador, with an ultimatum on 19 June 1940 soon after the fall of France to Germany, calling for the transit of arms and petrol to China through Indochina to cease. The French colonial authorities had no realistic alternative to complying with the Japanese terms. On the ground, Japan's demands continued to escalate. Tani had also demanded from Britain the stopping of supplies to Chiang Kai-shek via Hongkong and the Burma Road on 24 June. From the Japanese point of view, Hongkong was probably the more important of the two because of Chinese ingenuity in beating the blockade around Canton. For Britain, the Burma Road was politically more sensitive since it was an access route to the capital of Free China. But, finally, Japan managed to induce Britain to close the road on 12 July. The United States announced its opposition to this move. But even these political victories did not save the Yonai ministry, and its failure to turn the dramatic events in Europe more to Japan's advantage led the army to withdraw the War Minister from the cabinet, thus forcing the latter from office.14 On 16 July the new Konoe ministry stepped up the pace of intrusion into French Indochina. On 1 August Foreign Minister Matsuoka passed over to Arsene-Henry a further ultimatum of demands regarding the use of airfields for strikes against China. Vichy France did not give in immediately and offered negotiations for a far-reaching agreement. Henry, on 30 August, asked Japan to respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East and stated that, on economic matters, France was ready to negotiate the means of developing exchanges between Indochina and Japan. 15 Faced by the stern hostility of the United States and Britain, Japan decided to give Vichy some

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of the political guarantees for which it had been asked. On 30 August, Matsuoka and Henry signed a preliminary agreement, recognizing permanent French interests in Indochina. In return, France recognized Japan's predominance (situation preponderate) in the East. The Japanese gave assurances that the military privileges they sought would be limited and temporary. But Admiral Jean Decoux, the French governor-general, who was troubled by repeated Chinese threats to move into Indochina to prevent a Japanese occupation, was left to negotiate a military settlement with the Japanese commander in Hanoi. On 17 September, General Nishihara demanded the use of six airfields and the admission of 25,000 Japanese troops into Tonkin. Decoux signed a military accord (Nichi-Futsuin gunji joyaku) just a few hours before the Japanese deadline expired on 22 September, covering three airfields and 6000 troops. After the battle of Langson, which resulted in a resounding French defeat, Japan infiltrated resolutely and effectively. Japan was well placed to take advantage of the situation when, on 28 November, a local war began between the Thais and the French. In view of France's various preoccupations, Thailand chose this moment to claim the return of territory that it had been forced to give up during the previous half century. When the Thais suffered a major military reversal at the battle of Koh Chang in January 1941, Japan stepped in to offer mediation of the boundary dispute. A Japan-Thai-Indochina declaration of cooperation was agreed on 11 March. The settlement was not finally signed in Tokyo until 9 May. It was not regarded favorably by the parties, who felt that they had been cheated by the honest broker. Japan had been engaged in economic negotiations since November, and large concessions to Japan were made in a trade agreement reached some three days before the final signing of the Thai-Indochina agreement. Matsuoka's particular formulation that, which French Indochina, Netherlands East Indies, and Thailand (but not Malaya) as part of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity sphere, had been contained in a speech of 21 January. It was a symbol of the new relationship that Japan's legation in Bangkok was raised to an embassy on 18 August.16 The Germans looked to Japan for cooperation in their war effort by making a naval attack on Singapore which, it was thought, would bring Britain to its knees. But the Tripartite Pact was interpreted much more cautiously by Japan than by Germany. The Germans had greater confidence than the Japanese in the capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy at this stage. The documents German ships had captured from the intercepted British merchant-vessel Automedon suggested that Britain recognized the weakness of its position at Singapore and would not defend the base. The Germans passed over these documents to Japan on 11 December 1940. But the army General Staff, knowing the German enthusiasm for Japan to attack Singapore, was not totally convinced and sent intelligence officers to

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Southeast Asia to test the document. 17 On 23 February 1941, Ribbentrop told Oshima, who had just returned to Berlin, that an attack on Singapore would destroy Britain's base in the East and keep the Americans out of the conflict; Japan should grasp the favorable opportunity which would never recur. In Tokyo, Admiral Wenneker and Ambassador Ott continued the pressure on Admiral Kondo Nobutake, chief of the Naval General Staff. The Japanese were fully aware of the opportunity but, fearing American complicity with Britain, did not respond. 18 Because of Japan's reluctance, diplomatic fences had to be repaired with Germany. At a critical meeting of the liaison conference on 3 February, Matsuoka set out his plans for building on Japan's relationship with Germany and Italy and undertaking negotiations with the Soviet Union. The meeting fully approved the commencement of talks to adjust Japan-Soviet relations in which the Germans hopefully would assist. It authorized Matsuoka to go to Europe to demonstrate tripartite solidarity. This was a significant step. It was remarkable to mandate a government minister to visit the European war zone. Though most of Japan's prewar foreign ministers had held diplomatic posts overseas, this was the first time that a serving foreign minister had undertaken such an official visit overseas—now an everyday occurrence. It, of course, may have been viewed by his colleagues as a way of getting rid of a garrulous minister at an inconvenient moment. Setting out on 12 March, Matsuoka reached Moscow on the 23rd when he had discussions about improving relations with Foreign Commissar Molotov and Secretary General Stalin. After a brief sojourn in Berlin, he held further talks in Rome on 1 April. On his return to the German capital, Matsuoka had sessions with Ribbentrop and Hitler, both of whom urged Japan to attack Singapore in order to embarrass their prime enemy, Britain. No decisions of substance were made. There seems little doubt that Ribbentrop mentioned the deterioration of relations with Russia and the massing of German troops on the east Prussian border. But Matsuoka was blind to the implications of this, perhaps because he was puffed up by his ecstatic reception in war-torn Europe and misled by the German emphasis on Singapore. He was later to admit that he had not properly judged the hints that were being dropped. 19 Back in Moscow on 7 April, Matsuoka saw Molotov several times and then Stalin, who sympathetically discussed a neutrality pact. Not a new proposal, this had been studied for some time in the Foreign Ministry where kakushinha members favored a deal with her. The foreign minister now obtained the agreement of his home government in principle and clinched the deal with Stalin and Molotov. The Treaty of Neutrality was signed on 13 April by Ambassador General Tatekawa and Molotov. The pact, which was to run for five years, laid down that if one of the parties were to be attacked by one or more Powers, the other would observe neutrality. There were no secret clauses; but in a private letter to Molotov, Matsuoka prom-

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ised to resolve within months the question of rights in northern Sakhalin. He naturally expected that a deal with Russia would tie the hands of China's main ally. Certainly, the Chinese leaders were greatly worried by the news. It was not long before the pact was put to the test. On 5 June, Ambassador Oshima sent a telegram from Berlin reporting the inevitability of a German attack on Soviet Russia. Matsuoka's first reaction on hearing the news was to offer to mediate to prevent the Soviet-German war developing. But when the German offensive began on 22 June, many questioned whether the neutrality pact had been a wise move. It naturally revived the Kuantung army's thinking on a northward thrust from Manchukuo and Korea—an initiative without Tokyo's sanction would not have been unknown—but Japan's hands were now legally tied by the pact with Russia.20 THE NAVY, OIL, AND THE AMERICANS The United States and Britain had been greatly annoyed by the Tripartite Pact and the tougher stance adopted by Japan in its aftermath. Washington, in presidential election mode, made its views clear by its decision on 27 September 1940 to ban the export of scrap and aviation fuel with the possibility that these measures would be extended. The Japanese army and navy were both affected. It was clear that the United States was no longer content to be a back number in East Asian affairs. Britain had no hesitation in following this lead by re-opening the Burma Road on 18 October after the end of the monsoon period, during which the route had been unusable in any case. The big debate was whether Japan could gain her objectives without antagonizing the United States. In the course of the crisis of February 1941, this was discussed in the Diet. On 25 February the veteran politician Ozaki Yukio affirmed Japan's policy: If it be [Japan's] policy to reject the special privileges of the countries of Europe and America in Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies and to make the resources of those territories available on a fair basis, neither France nor even the Netherlands would oppose this. Still less Britain and the United States. It is because we do not state our objectives clearly and in concrete terms that we invite the misgivings and opposition of the Powers concerned.21

Prime Minister Konoe replied that he was not pessimistic over future relations with the United States. It was not long before he permitted overtures to be made in Washington which were to dominate the rest of the year. His ambassador was Admiral Nomura, a reserve admiral who had served as foreign minister at the end of 1939. He had been attached to the Washington embassy earlier in his career and was appointed by Matsuoka to return there early in 1941. He had relevant experience as a political admiral, not as a professional diplomat. But American-Japanese relations were

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largely naval relations, and it was hoped that the appointment of someone with naval credentials would be helpful. Nomura associated himself with certain unofficial overtures being made in Washington by individual Japanese and Americans who wanted to keep the peace between the two countries; on 16 April, Nomura discussed with Cordell Hull, the secretary of state, a draft understanding, which was adopted two days later as "a basis for discussion." In Tokyo, the liaison conference then discussed what Nomura described as an American proposal and agreed to accept it in substance.22 At the time when Konoe as acting foreign minister was making these overtures to Washington, Matsuoka was making his own approaches through Steinberg, the United States ambassador in Moscow. On 22 April, when Matsuoka returned from Europe, a further liaison conference met to consider Japan's response to Washington. In a pique at maneuvers taking place behind his back, Matsuoka failed to attend, instead presenting more robust proposals at the resumed meeting on 3 May. He carried the day and Nomura was instructed to pass over the new and tougher terms covering an oral statement and a proposal for a neutrality treaty. The ambassador, who found the terms uncongenial, presented them with much prevarication. When the unfavorable American reply came on 31 May, it was a considerable disappointment to the Tokyo leadership, who had been overly optimistic. Japan's European allies were duly informed of this overture and expressed their dissatisfaction that they had not been consulted. By this time, disagreements between Nomura, supported by Konoe, and Matsuoka had become serious. Nomura favored a degree of concession that he thought would have a good psychological effect in Washington. To that end, he indulged in a good deal of misinformation and concealment with both the American and Japanese governments, though with the best of intentions. He failed in his role as a communicator. His approach was in marked contrast to the increasingly tough negotiating stance taken by Matsuoka. 23 On the Japanese side one of the factors which affected the American approaches was the navy's worries about access to oil. Sources of fuel were becoming fewer: the United States could no longer be relied on; Germany, which claimed to have abundant oil, was geographically remote; and quantities available from Soviet fields near Sakhalin were small. Japan would have to look to Asian sources, notably the Netherlands East Indies (NEI). There had been various attempts at cultivating the Dutch, most notably the 1934 Trade Mission to NEI led by Nagaoka Shunichi, whose proposals the Dutch had found unacceptable. Japan now hoped to capitalize on the German conquest of Holland in May. The Dutch, naturally expecting an invasion of their islands, were ready to consider acting with the United States and Britain by imposing an embargo on oil supplies to Japan. On 28 August 1940, the minister for industry and trade, Kobayashi Ichizo (18731957), had been appointed as special ambassador to the Dutch East Indies

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with a specific mandate from the cabinet. The two sides entered into negotiations which led finally to the joint Japan-NEI declaration on 16 October as well as to some arrangements between Mitsui Bussan and Shell Oil and Standard Oil. He had not raised political issues of independence as more extreme opinion wanted. But Japan did not express open dissatisfaction with the compact in case it showed the country's motives too clearly. Kobayashi was recalled and returned to his post in Japan, but he was to resign from the cabinet in April 1941 because his ideas did not match those of the military and the new bureaucrats. Japan appointed, as Kobayashi's successor, the veteran diplomat Yoshizawa Kenkichi on 30 November 1940. The cabinet had meanwhile passed a resolution dealing with measures for the development of the NEI economy. Yoshizawa reached Batavia towards the end of December with this mandate and embarked on negotiations. On 16 January, he refused to enter into indeterminate (hiteiteki) commercial talks. Though normally a dove, Yoshizawa reported the following month that he saw no prospect of success for Japan's desire for an increased quota of Indonesian oil apart from force. Withdrawn after six months, he had only succeeded in convincing the NEI to continue with the existing quota. While this was an adequate response from the Dutch point of view, it was quite inadequate for the Japanese who regarded themselves as neutrals willing to pay for oil on the open market. Indeed, Matsuoka said in the Diet on 29 January that Japan relied primarily on NEI oil. But the Dutch were able to show convincingly in the negotiations that Japan was reexporting to Germany rubber and tin acquired from Southeast Asian sources. Japan continued to present demands for increased quotas through her representatives (daihyobu) in NEI but failed to gain concessions. Despite this, Captain Nakahara, who was one of the two naval attaches on the Kobayashi and Yoshizawa missions, stayed on in the Indies; he stayed for about ten months, until June 1941 when the talks broke down. According to his diaries, his aim was to make preparations for the day when war started. 24 By the summer the navy, whose dependence on oil was greater than the army, became more hawkish and inclined to accept the inevitability of war. The First Committee, which is credited with being the most significant decision-making body within the navy, passed an extreme resolution on 5 June that the navy "in the present critical situation has to decide quickly and clearly on its will for war (including engagement with the U.S.) and to conduct every policy with an aggressive attitude." The failure of the Batavia talks played into the hands of the naval expansionists and seemed to justify an advance to the south. The navy, whose main worry over the southward strategy was that an attack on Britain in Singapore would inevitably draw in the American fleet, had completed new battle-formations which gave it greater confidence in dealing with the naval strength of the American fleet.25 Of course, oil was an international issue, and the Dutch were under great pressure from abroad to make concessions slowly. The Anglo-Dutch

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agreement on commercial and economic affairs of 14 January was designed to give the Netherlands confidence in their colonial policies. Oil was one of the elements in a policy of sanctions which Washington contemplated as a means of restraining Japan but was as yet reluctant to impose. From mid July 1940, a complete embargo was imposed when the United States froze Japanese assets and enforced a strict licensing regime for commodities. Britain, India, Burma, Canada, and Holland acted in parallel fashion, following the American lead.26 REACTING TO BARBAROSSA Japanese thinking was greatly affected by Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, which began on 22 June. This was the second example of Germany acting on its own without consultation. The Soviets naturally assumed that Matsuoka had known all along and was merely waiting for the day. This naturally detracted from the value of the Soviet Neutrality Pact as far as Japan was concerned. It also destroyed the possibility of a quadruple alliance by joining the Soviet Union to the axis, which Japanese policymakers had been studying. Fanciful, the proposal still had been seriously considered. Some Japanese reacted so strongly against Germany's move that they argued the Tripartite Pact should be abrogated. It is alleged that Konoe was so shocked that he thought of resigning in disappointment. Matsuoka had been an advocate of Germany's recommendation that Japan should attack Singapore. Now, however, he hinted to the Germans, naturally anxious to know Japan's intentions, that his country would take the opportunity to attack the Soviet Union in the rear. Japan's German-Italian alliance seemed older and more significant to him than its Soviet Neutrality Pact; if the latter was in conflict with the alliance, the alliance would prevail. Whatever the logic of his position, the insinuation that Japan might enter the war against Soviet Russia was purely personal. Matsuoka's first assumption was that war against the Soviet Union was less likely to attract the opposition of the United States than a southern thrust and thus was a safer option. His second assumption was that the German armies would crush the Soviet ones and that the Japanese people would willingly throw their weight on the winning side. While these views were music to the ears of the Germans, they were out of line with majority thinking in the Konoe cabinet; more significantly, any northern campaign in Siberia which had to be undertaken before winter arrived did not command the support of the military in view of their heavy commitments in China and their calculations about Soviet military strength in the area. Matsuoka's reversal of opinion was not widely supported, but there still existed some ambiguity. The Soviet military presence in the East had been one of the mainsprings of Japanese policy-making throughout the 1930s. Japan wondered whether the Soviet troops would

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withdraw to the European front or stay, and her intelligence sources deduced that they would stay. Future policy had been discussed at a liaison conference between government and high command on 19 June but was modified four days after the "Barbarossa" attack when senior army and navy strategists met. The strategists wanted to have it both ways: to strike South and, at the same time, reinforce army positions in the North, especially in Manchukuo. This entailed a major mobilization of reservists not yet forty years old. The strength of the Kuantung army grew from 400,000 to 700,000 during the summer. Some of these troops were posted at the northern border between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union to be available for opening a new front if things seemed to be going well in the German campaigns. But there was reluctance to get involved for the present. Trained observers, like the informants of the Soviet spy Richard Sorge, found the evidence about troop movements in Manchuria to be confusing and contradictory; but Sorge reported to Moscow that, on balance, Japan would join in the struggle when she was ready.27 For a while, a confusing indecisiveness characterized Japan. It had long been her ambition to move north. Now that the opportunity presented itself, Japan failed to take the initiative, being deterred by memories of Nomonhan, intelligence estimates of the number of Soviet troops across the border, and the danger of overextending her forces. At several liaison conferences, anti-Soviet operations were still discussed. The Japanese had not been invited by Germany to join in, presumably because Germany wanted to claim the glory of the victories for itself. It was the end of the month before Ribbentrop made such a request, arguing that Japan should strike north before striking south to Singapore, as Germany had earlier urged. Japan approached the proposition cautiously, especially when the German offensive was seen to be held up. A new national policy was adopted at the Imperial Conference on 2 July when the Konoe government decided not to open a second front in Siberia unless there was a collapse or withdrawal on the part of the Red Army. Neither took place. But the troops needed for intervention were still retained. Having resolved to watch and wait in the North, Japan also fatefully decided in favor of an advance into southern Indochina even if this entailed war with the United States and Britain; the nation made a policy statement to this effect. Characteristically, the resolution appeased both sides. A few units in Manchuria slipped south to Taiwan and Hainan during August for jungle training, but the numbers transferred were still remarkably small. An order sent to units stationed in Manchukuo on 6 August told them to avoid border confrontation with the Soviets such as had taken place in 1938 and 1939. Clearly, the army wanted to avoid any possibility of fighting simultaneously with Russia and the Anglo-Saxon powers. 28

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THE KONOE GOVERNMENT RECONSTITUTED Konoe held discussions with the army, navy, and home ministers; they all supported the need for continued negotiations with Washington. Still hoping to avoid war with the United States, Japan nevertheless was ready to attack British colonies. Japan failed to understand that, in the American view, it had already crossed the Rubicon by penetrating into Indochina. This had been one of the points of fundamental dispute between Konoe and his foreign minister, who was now isolated in the cabinet. Moreover, Ambassador Nomura had gone to Washington in February and found dealing with Secretary of State Cordell Hull very demanding after Japan's intrusion into Indochina. He was dissatisfied with Matsuoka's intention to delay negotiations. Nomura also found the Gaimusho's instructions to deliver several undiplomatic, tough messages to Hull objectionable. He was depressed at the sanctions imposed and the fact that others had followed the American lead. Nomura, therefore, offered his own resignation and, when this was refused, asked Matsuoka for the help of a senior diplomat (gaimu no sempai) and may have mentioned his preference for Ambassador Kurusu by name. In this turmoil Konoe offered his resignation on 17 July; his colleagues followed suit, apart from Matsuoka, who refused to resign. Konoe was invited to form a new cabinet and did so without including Matsuoka. In effect, the latter had been jettisoned in the middle of the North-South debate. Konoe, continuing as Prime Minister of the reconstituted cabinet, now had to play a major role in foreign policy. But he was becoming weary with the office and his lack of success in resolving the key issue, the declining relations with the United States. The new Foreign Minister was Admiral Toyoda Teijiro, the Navy Vice-minister since July 1940. It is not possible to detect a vast difference between the policies of Toyoda and Matsuoka over Indochina. In Toyoda's name, the southern Indochina settlement was concluded; his was the resulting popularity, though the settlement had been initiated by the previous government. Japan had chosen to ignore the cautious advice of the diplomatic professionals and proceed opportunistically to resume the southern offensive. On 14 July, Japan had presented the Vichy government of France with an ultimatum that would allow her to establish bases in southern Indochina. Vichy France agreed with amendments to Tokyo's demands in an exchange of documents a week later. The issue was examined on 25 July by the Privy Council, which received explanations from Admiral Toyoda. The questions asked show that members had become aware that their actions would seriously damage Japan's relations with the United States. While their approval was guarded, they eventually went along with the government's recommendations. On 29 July, "the Protocol concerning the Defence in Common of French Indochina" was published, though the documents about

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military cooperation were withheld. This was followed by the Japanese army moving into Saigon, occupying the southern half of French Indochina, even going so far as to take bases along the Thai-Cambodian frontier.29 Toyoda urged his officials to "begin propaganda (senden) actively about the present inroads (shinchu) into Indochina." They were to collaborate particularly with the French military (gumbu) in their area. The next stage was the sending of a special ambassador in order to improve the diplomatic machinery for communication with Indochina. His instructions were to get the French authorities to bring their economic, financial, and trade relations into line with Japan's plans for "combined defense" (kyodo boei). The Japanese had taken a calculated gamble over the likelihood that Washington's response would be dilatory, and Foreign Minister Toyoda did not foresee any further sanctions being applied.30 Unexpectedly, the United States reacted swiftly to the new Japanese offensive in the South by asking Japan, on 24 July, to stop her advance, withdraw her troops, or declare Indochina a neutral zone. Two days later, the United States introduced a total trade embargo and froze Japanese assets; on 1 August, it further announced a ban on oil shipments, jointly with Britain and the Netherlands, taking the Japanese by surprise. This was followed by a complete embargo in September 1940. Toyoda's miscalculation led to bitter Japanese complaints about what it called ABCD encirclement. Her unilateral action in the face of almost unanimous international condemnation had been met by severe American countermeasures. Because of the interdependence between the Japanese economy and the other world economies, Japan was very vulnerable. Especially with energy supplies, Japan depended on imports from American and British spheres of influence. However, the embargo did bring the Japanese navy into line with army thinking. The Tokyo-Washington parleys of the early summer were still dragging on. During these months, the United States and Japan set out their positions, which diverged greatly after July. While the Japanese forlornly hoped that they were close to agreement, the Americans had little doubt that they were far apart. Japan would not admit this because the language on both sides was restrained and evasive.31 Contacts had deteriorated so far that Konoe concluded that they could only be reestablished by a summit meeting between himself and President Roosevelt. It was a proposition unparallelled at the time. Worried that war with America was just around the corner, Konoe still argued that reasonable compromises could be reached during a face-to-face meeting with Roosevelt. The army leaders were concerned that Konoe would agree too readily to American suggestions, fearing that this was the old civilian device of enlisting foreign pressure in order to gain leverage over themselves. They tried to place restrictions on Konoe's bargaining position: any settlement

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must last at least ten years; the United States must use its influence to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to sue for peace; and normal economic relations must be restored. Until these terms were met, Japanese troops would remain in Indochina and China. In response, Konoe sought to persuade the Emperor to ensure the army's acceptance of any terms he might negotiate at the summit. He made the request for a summit conference through Ambassador Nomura on 7 August.32 Konoe's proposal was received coldly, but courteously, by President Roosevelt on 2 September. Konoe, the eternal optimist, was determined to keep talking and telegraphed the president that since their two countries alone had the "key to international peace," they should meet to discuss "all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area" [my italics]. In spite of this plaintive appeal which noticeably omitted mention of China, the Imperial Conference met in the presence of the Emperor on 6 September and took a very positive stance. It authorized war on the United States and Britain "in the event that there is no likelihood that our demands will be fulfilled by early October through diplomatic negotiations." 33 No specific date was fixed, but action could be taken if talks produced no prospect of an amicable settlement by the beginning of October. For all practical purposes, war was decided upon; but talks would continue. From his vantage point in Washington, Ambassador Nomura called for a radical change of thinking in Tokyo; but this proved impossible to achieve in view of this decision of 6 September, which was interpreted in a fundamentalist way. Although the Japanese made fresh proposals on 23 and 27 September, the American leaders found them even less acceptable than those put forward earlier. Looking at the history of these two years, one has the feeling that Japan could claim to be at the height of her international prestige. The Tripartite Pact identified Japan with the axis powers in Europe. Bearing in mind the China quagmire in which its armies were bogged down, Japan gained a sense of strength through alliance with Germany and Italy. The celebrations of that pact both in Berlin and Tokyo were greater than for the earlier Anglo-Japanese alliance, though techniques of stage management had improved over four decades. Matsuoka had followed the pact up by going abroad; he was the first foreign minister in office to do so. His reception in the three capitals of Rome, Berlin, and Moscow had been astonishing for war-scarred Europe. But as the months passed, Japan discovered that it had antagonized two potential enemies: the Soviet Union harbored hostility because of the German attack, and the United States because of the situation in Indochina. Handling both these countries with velvet gloves, Japan nevertheless did not offer concessions. On the contrary, Japan was inclined to exaggerate her strength and throw her weight about elsewhere.

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Thus, in dealing with countries weaker than itself, Japan was intransigent in negotiation: in China, with both the Wang and Chiang administrations; with Britain, over the Burma Road; with French colonial administrators in Indochina; and with the Netherlands East Indies government over oil. Japan was trying to avoid all-out war but was not ready to pay the price for peace.

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CHAPTER 9

The Asia-Pacific War, 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 3 Japan's policy had conflicting objectives in the two years from the Imperial Conference's decision for war on 6 September 1941 to the meeting of the Great East Asian Conference in November 1943. On the one hand, there was a determination not to be browbeaten into abandoning her military objectives; on the other, there were new initiatives to lay claim to the leadership of Asia by persuasion. In 1941, Japan moved from a relatively cautious stance, trying to prevent the outbreak of a war which seemed to be very close to one that was bold, decisive and, it has to be said, reckless. If the war in China and the domestic economy had been going well in 1941, it would have been understandable to expand the conflict. But the war in China was going badly, and almost one million troops were tied down on the Asian mainland in a number of unrewarding campaigns. As an extension of hostilities came ever closer, the Foreign Ministry had only secondary, though important, input into decision-making. Campaigns of expansion involved ministries like those of labor, transport, and supply. Measures were in train for a further national mobilization and redeployment of the population. But could a country with a population of 73 million continue to supply the manpower needed? Could a country with limited access to steel, iron, and oil sustain a campaign against a country like the United States? The priority issues were essentially military/naval ones. Though the country had been on a war footing for almost a decade, emergency steps were now needed to provide warships, merchant marine ships, aircraft, arms, and essential materials for a campaign in the South. The commanders in the field were already complaining about extended lines of communication and supplies in China. It was all the more strange, therefore, that Japan should be contemplating a further extension into the nanyo. Obviously the views of military leaders were critical in this situation; many warned that Japan's manpower and resources were inadequate for fighting

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a long war and that war should either be prevented or shortened by making an initial surprise attack. 1 At a time of expanding frontiers for Japan, the making of foreign policy had to be a shared responsibility. The historian of modern Japan must keep an interpretative balance among the actions of diplomats, the channel of communication with the outside world, and the military, which was developing into the most potent force in Japan's policy-making. It is not enough merely to consider telegrams being exchanged between capitals and ignore the preparations taking place on the ground, in this case also on the sea. In the months before Pearl Harbor, Japan did offer diplomatic concessions to Washington. But could these be trusted since they seemed to be out of line with her actions on the ground? Gaimusho officials were able, professional, and skilled in advocacy. The problem with their paper offerings was not one of content so much as one of credibility. The Americans could not ignore the possibility that the Japanese army which had gone its own way in Manchuria and China in spite of public assurances to the contrary might well do likewise in future operations in other spheres. AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TOJO GOVERNMENT Ultimately the question of war and peace rested between Tokyo and Washington. Rightly or wrongly, the American reply to Ambassador Nomura on 2 October seemed to ignore the Japanese proposals and came close to breaking off negotiations for a Konoe-Roosevelt summit after fifty days of exchanges on the subject. The prospect of an open-ended summit conference did not appeal to the secretary of state, Cordell Hull, who insisted on reaching agreement on basic principles in advance of any meeting. He was sensitive to any charge of appeasing Japan, and Roosevelt's negative reply did not even give the Japanese some hope of a face-saving formula. It was disappointing for those optimists in Tokyo who felt that some form of words could be found to resolve the issue; they mistakenly assumed that semantics could overcome a basic divergence of objectives. The parties were drifting farther apart, rather than coming closer.2 The failure of the summit proposal naturally increased army pressure to end the diplomatic approaches. By the end of September, the army and navy chiefs, who had virtually completed their war plans, were increasingly working together and jointly pressed the government to decide on war or peace by 15 October. Their ally's campaign in Russia was not going well; the outcome of its assault on Moscow, which had started on 2 October, could not be predicted. Under the circumstances, Japan told Germany that there was no question of Japan setting up an eastern front though it would be prepared to assist in obtaining a mediated settlement with Russia in order to keep the Red Army units in Siberia.

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The navy's leaders were concerned over its inferiority to the United States Pacific fleet in the event of conflict and were inclined to avoid breaking off talks with Washington. Konoe, Toyoda, and Nomura supported the navy's flexible approach. On the other hand at an emergency cabinet on 14 October, Tojo complained that this leniency was a violation of state policy which had been agreed upon in the presence of the Emperor on 6 September and claimed that the only honorable course was for the cabinet to resign. He argued that the urgency of military preparations forced him to insist on an immediate decision for or against war: the choice was between war or surrender. Surrender was intolerable to him since it implied the evacuation of Japanese armies from a permanently hostile China and Indochina as well as the loss of Manchukuo and possibly Korea. Demanding that the government abandon negotiations with Washington when there was no prospect of obtaining Japan's demands, Tojo was unwilling to talk further to Konoe. 3 Konoe resigned on 16 October, and Tojo was unexpectedly called upon by the conference of senior statesmen (jushin kaigi) to form the new government. The mandate that he was informally given from the Emperor was to rethink policy from scratch (hakushi kangen, literally "going back to blank paper"). This implied that Tojo should not be obsessed with the Imperial Conference decision of 6 September. He accepted this mandate even though it was inconsistent with the position he had adopted in bringing down Konoe. The Tojo cabinet was the third occasion on which the army had been permitted to take control of policy. Following in the footsteps of the short-lived prime ministers Generals Hayashi and Abe, it proved to be the most durable of these military cabinets. Tojo, a serving officer, acquired exceptional personal power, combining the premiership with the oversight of the army and home ministries as well as, of course, intervening frequently over foreign affairs. The world did not consider that this was a healthy move. Thus, the London Times surveyed the situation with pessimism: For ten years, Japan . . . has sought to achieve her ends sometimes by direct attack, sometimes by economic pressure, sometimes by menace and blackmail. Confronted by a solid obstacle, she has halted or recoiled, raising loud cries of "encirclement" at every point where her advance has been checked. The so-called ABCD powers with whom Russia is now associated have been compelled to ask themselves where the process of Japanese penetration will end.4 Togo Shigenori's appointment as Foreign Minister was surprising, given the fact that as ambassador to Germany, he had fallen out with the Nazi party and with General Oshima, who was close to the army and had just returned to Berlin again as ambassador. General Togo, who had to define his foreign policy in an inaugural statement, set out his objectives as being to bring the

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China Incident to a successful conclusion, establish the Great East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, and contribute to world peace. These views and Togo's earlier attitudes might have suggested that the talks with Washington would be wound up. But Togo's more detailed statements suggested that his top priority was to avoid war with the United States, if at all possible. To this end, he drew up Plan A and sponsored Plan B which had been drawn up by Shidehara and Yoshida in consultation with Ambassadors Grew and Craigie. During the last week of October, liaison conferences were held daily. Army representatives were opposed to reexamination of Japan's terms. An acrimonious cabinet crisis took place on 1 November from which a resolution for war emerged. But it was understood informally that if Washington showed any interest in Plans A or B, "Japan's negotiators would be authorized to make limited concessions (say) over stationing of troops." 5 While the navy was still anxious to secure American neutrality, its views were coming more into line with the army's. The army insisted on critical amendments to Plan B, the formula for a last ditch offer to Washington. It is doubtful how serious the army was in agreeing to any proposal whereby Japan's troops in Indochina would be withdrawn to the position before the invasion. Tojo, who wanted victory in China above all, proclaimed in his opening speech to the Diet that the China Incident had cost Japan 150,000 lives and "more than 15 billion yen." Due to its past sacrifices, an armybased cabinet probably would not agree unilaterally to any substantial withdrawal of troops, not that Japan was unready for workmanlike concessions. But offers of withdrawal were qualified by the phrase "in due course" which might have meant twenty-five years, as Nomura was told. The offers also specified that a limited area of North China should be earmarked for their retention. On 5 November, an Imperial Conference adopted resolutions stating that if negotiations with the United States were successful by 1 December, military preparations would be suspended; otherwise, the plans for joint military-naval action would be approved. Since a lengthy war was beyond Japan's capacity, some strategy to shorten war became a necessity. The navy's internal understanding was that "we shall start the war with surprise attacks destroying all bases promptly." 6 On 7 November Nomura presented Japan's final compromise Plan A, but it was rejected. It included unilateral concessions on the Chinese problem over the status of Wang's government and the partial selective withdrawal of troops over two years. Secretary of State Hull immediately gave a cabinet meeting a "solemn warning of dangers ahead" based on the tone of intercepted messages passing back and forth between Tokyo and Washington, the inflamed statements being made in Tokyo, and the unyielding nature of the demands he had received. From this, we can see that Hull was influenced by a wide range of sources. Dr. Komatsu has plausibly argued that intercepts from MAGIC were an important source of misunderstanding, that some intercepts were mistranslated or misinterpreted in Washington,

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and that "the effect of poor translation from Japanese secret codes into English has been underestimated." But coded intercepts were by no means the only source on which Washington based its intelligence assessments.7 For the final lap of negotiations, Ambassador Nomura was assisted by the special emissary he had requested. The choice fell on Kurusu Saburo, an experienced diplomat with a British wife who had served as ambassador to Berlin and signed the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. Then he had been unceremoniously discarded by Matsuoka when General Oshima was reappointed to the German capital that December. Kurusu was asked by Togo to make an emergency visit to Washington in order to break the diplomatic deadlock. Given the title of Special Ambassador, he arrived by clipper to join Nomura on 15 November. Though the arrangement was exceptional, the two ambassadors seem to have worked well in tandem; but it was too late for Kurusu to rein in the unauthorized initiatives of Nomura. 8 On 18 November, Kurusu and Nomura made an offer to Hull that Japan would withdraw from southern French Indochina in return for a slight relaxation of the American embargo. Though presented as a personal initiative and a selective interpretation of their instructions, the ambassadors were ordered by Foreign Minister Togo to withdraw the offer. They, therefore, presented Plan B in full at the State Department on 20 November: if Washington did not accept, negotiations would inevitably lapse. The United States inferred that it would be difficult to extract major concessions from the Japanese in their current mood. The United States, Britain, the Dutch government-in-exile, Australia, and China reacted strongly in unison, thereby reinforcing the anxiety that the moderate group in the navy had all along felt. Japanese forces were totally dependent on imported oil. Although the oil reserves were likely to be adequate for about eleven months, Japan had to secure not just immediate oil deliveries but also long-term guarantees of supply. On the assumption that the Americans would not lift their embargo, the Japanese would have to push ahead with their southern advance in order to acquire the oil wealth of the Dutch and other resources from the area. The problem underlying the talks was the far-reaching nature of the concessions required. Over the period of the talks, the Japanese had asked for the partial removal of sanctions and for help in persuading China to make peace. In return, the United States had asked for a phased withdrawal of Japanese armies from China and Indochina. Japan, as a proud country, was divided on such an issue. While army specialists were ready to countenance limited withdrawals in Indochina and China, for them to say this publicly was difficult. Moreover, it was one thing for Japanese to admit among themselves that they had been overstretched in China and another to stage a withdrawal at the behest of a foreign power. The majority of Japan's leaders were opposed to any proposal that they withdraw from China and wanted the Americans to recognize "our superior position in the west

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Pacific": if Japan were to achieve self-preservation and self-defense, the Anglo-Saxon powers should not be allowed to either obstruct the country's settlement of the China Incident or engage in actions that threatened its national defense. While the various formulae were being examined, forward policies were being pursued. In mid November, Japan asked France for the revision of the Franco-Japanese (Nishihara-Martin) agreement of September 1940. The purpose was to secure a defense agreement for Japanese troops to operate to the south of the Red River. This implied that Japan was planning to make a third-phase expansion in the area and establish a new administration there through her new envoy Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who reached Haiphong on 8 November.9 While the exchange of messages proceeded between Tokyo and Washington, the services reached consensus on the administration of occupied territories in the south and over the handling of resources there. In November, the army and navy, in spite of their diverse strategies, reached agreement to seize the initiative with a sudden attack on the Philippines and Malaya, involving an assault and landing by the Malay Advance Force (Senken Heidan) while opening operations at the same time elsewhere. The Japanese would be ready for any British offensive that took place before Japan's attack. There would also be supplementary operations in strategic areas in Guam, Hong Kong, and British North Borneo and for the stabilization of Thailand. These objectives were confirmed by the Liaison Conference.10 On 26 November, Hull rejected Plan B and presented the Japanese with the so-called Hull note, variously referred to as "the Oral Statement" or "the Ultimatum," accepting that they were now in the final round and few concessions were possible. Hull's proposals were the most extreme statement of the American position in respect to Indochina, China, Manchukuo, and the Tripartite Pact since the United States had called on the Japanese government to "withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China." Declining to accept special pleas from the ambassadors, Hull, however, did arrange for these men to meet with the president.11 Tokyo and Washington were leaving no stone unturned to secure a peacekeeping formula. But the Hull Note was so insistent on troop withdrawal that it played into the hands of the war party in the Liaison Conference. On 1 December, an Imperial Conference reiterated its earlier decision to declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands (stated in that order). The Emperor sanctioned 8 December as the date for operations to commence. Nonetheless, the long-lasting exchanges were allowed to drag on. The Gaimusho had prepared a draft which stated Japan's intention to commence the war. Evidently the phraseology of this ultimatum was not approved at a Liaison Conference with the army and navy representatives.

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Instead, the explicit threat of military action was omitted from the elaborate message which was sent off in thirteen parts on 6 December, according to the Japanese calendar. It was a sort of lugubrious coda which recapitulated the old material and aimed to place the blame on Washington for any war which broke out. But Tokyo held up the last part that contained in its original draft the phraseology of a final ultimatum in spite of a rearguard action by Foreign Minister Togo. The final section left Tokyo late. Nomura's subordinates in the understaffed Washington embassy, whose numbers had been deliberately reduced during the previous month, were probably unaware of the urgency of decoding and transmitting it. In any case, the whole could not be delivered to the State Department before the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor. A more efficient and timely method would have presented the note through the American embassy in Tokyo, but that was not the channel favored. The Japanese cable was drafted artfully as a severing of diplomatic relations and not a declaration of war. These twilight negotiations were intended to keep the Americans off the scent. The routing of the message and the delay in its handling reinforced the notion in American minds of Japanese double-dealing. The Americans with the benefit of intercepts were well able to form their own judgments. The embassy staff sometimes have been accused of delaying the presentation of the message to the State Department and bringing Japan into disrepute. But the operation was a crafty one and, while the Washington embassy was guilty of taking its time, the blame was greater for those in Tokyo.12 Were the Japanese negotiations over the previous two months genuine or part of a strategy of delay? This is a difficult question. On the one hand, the army and navy had not been pleased with the government's failure to come to a clear decision because of "diplomatic alternatives" and had opposed delays since plans for the landing on the Malay peninsula and the war-shortening attack on Pearl Harbor had long since been finalized. Delay for them only created ambiguity and uncertainty. On the other hand, some in the Japanese establishment felt that the negotiations were quite genuine and showed their willingness for peace, if only a formula could be found. At 1:15 A.M. on 8 December (Tokyo time), the Japanese armies landed at Kota Bharu in Malaya; at 3:20 A.M., the attack on Pearl Harbor followed; shortly after 4 A.M. (2:20 P.M. Washington time), Nomura and Kurusu handed over their final message. The Asahi Shimbun in its front page coverage on 9 December recorded how the imperial armies and navies fanned out southward throughout the Asia-Pacific area. The long expected attacks on various strategic points in Southeast Asia, Hongkong, Malaya, and the Philippines, together with the unforeseen operations against Guam, Honolulu, and Hawaii were devastatingly successful. The Asahi wrote justly of "the great victory of our initial operations." But the paper's Bangkok correspondent reported that because of Britain's despatch of forces into

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lower Thailand, the Imperial armies were forced to make landings at Kota Bharu (Malaya) and Singora and Patani (southern Thailand) in order to defend the independence of Thailand. While Japan may have feared a preemptive strike by Britain, the evidence shows these allegations to be unfounded since British officials on the spot thought that any such provocative attack on a neutral Thailand would be counterproductive. But such were the rumors and misrepresentations brought to the service of the Japanese forward move. 13 There was also some jockeying for position on the American side: President Roosevelt sent the Japanese Emperor a last minute appeal for peace at 9 P.M. on 6 December, calling on him to eliminate any form of military threat. War was declared on 8 December shortly after delivery of this message. It was, to be sure, the most extraordinary day of Japan's long history, the culmination of many months of careful policy planning. The beleaguered members of Japan's Washington embassy were interned until arrangements could be made for their repatriation. The base for the repatriation exchange was Lorenzo Marques in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. Fujiyama Naraichi, a young trainee who had come through the traumatic last months in the Washington embassy, records in his memoir that after spending three weeks there, he sailed by Portuguese ship to Lisbon with twenty colleagues. He was provisionally posted to Spain, as he had hoped. But his real destination was Germany. Passing through Madrid, his party travelled through German-occupied France to Paris. On his arrival in Berlin, he was told by Ambassador Oshima that he must now dedicate himself to German-Japanese relations and must have a change of heart from his Washington days. 14 EUROPEAN ALLIES OF A KIND The decisiveness with which Japan carried out this many-sided operation belied the doubts and delays of the previous three months. Despite a resolute exterior, the underlying attitude of the leadership was a combination of determination and anxiety. Aware of its own slender resources, Japan had to look for undertakings wherever they could be obtained. In the short run, Japan's allies in Berlin and Rome had to be consulted to see what role, if any, they would agree to play alongside Japan in any war against the United States. In the long run, once war started, Japan had to seek the support and partnership of those whose lands were to be occupied by her armies. When Japan opted for a southern campaign, this was the fulfillment of one of Germany's objectives. Germany had been trying for almost two years to persuade Japan to attack Singapore through Ambassadors Ott and Oshima as well as Foreign Minister Matsuoka when he had visited Europe. Germany had also urged this course on Lieutenant General Yamashita, resi-

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dent in Germany on the military attache's staff and later to become commander in Malaya when the war started. After Pearl Harbor, the allies of the Tripartite Pact could not be of much use to each other militarily. As it contemplated its offensive, the Japanese army command did not expect practical assistance from Germany in the conduct of its campaigns or advice on wider aspects of strategy. Likewise, the navy had little desire for operating jointly with, or alongside, the Germans and sought merely a separation of operational zones along a north-south line through the Indian Ocean. But Japanese army leaders, confident that their country remained on good terms with Moscow, felt that they could help Germany diplomatically; they wanted to extract Germany from its war in Russia, a war which had been going badly since the German assault on Moscow. Hitler did not see any value in such Japanese mediation. 15 But the Japanese side wanted positive guarantees that the three allies would not enter into a separate peace with their enemies. The Japanese had asked Germany on 18 November whether in event of a decision for war being taken at the Liaison Conference, Germany would become involved if a Japanese-American war began. Ambassador Ott felt that the request did not fall within the terms of the Tripartite Alliance and asked Berlin for instructions. Perhaps somewhat to Tokyo's surprise, Ribbentrop replied straightaway that Germany was ready to sign an agreement that it would make no separate peace settlement "if Japan or Germany, regardless of grounds, becomes involved in a war with the United States." This undertaking was given with the approval of Hitler, presumably on 21 November. Four days later, Japan joined Germany and Italy in Berlin to sign a memorandum extending the Anti-Comintern Pact for another five years: there was "absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under any circumstances." This was extremely positive and may be explained by the fact that Hitler was on the eastern front supervising operations and may have feared that the deterioration there would induce the Americans to enter the global war in any case.16 When Japan's leaders at the Imperial Conference on 1 December learned of Washington's rejection of their compromise Plan B and took the final decision for war, they had the assurance of German support. But they could not rely on the support without having in writing a guarantee that peace would not be made separately. Ideally, the countries would have liked to arrange simultaneous entry into the war against the United States. While Germany hesitated, Mussolini agreed. Ribbentrop eventually followed suit on 5 December at 4 A.M. Ambassador Oshima received a form of words amounting to a Japanese-German-Italian undertaking not to make a separate peace. Some sixty hours before hostilities started, Germany and Italy had in effect given a written promise that they would join in Japan's war. Ironically, the Germans first heard about Japan's actions in Malaya and at Pearl Harbor from a BBC broadcast. Taken aback by the unexpected news

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about Pearl Harbor, the German leaders delayed their declaration of war on the United States until 11 December; on that day in Berlin, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed an agreement that they would wage the war in common, would not make a separate peace, and would together build a new world order.17 It is clearly an exaggeration to say that Germany encouraged Japan to take up arms against the United States. But certainly Japan's European allies, for a complex set of reasons, did not discourage Japan from declaring war and, indeed, seem to have welcomed a globalization of the conflict. It would appear that Hitler, disturbed that his divisions had been forced into retreat from Moscow, concluded that Washington would eventually declare war on Germany and wanted to turn the tables by declaring war first. But it cannot be said that Germany's action was totally logical. Perhaps one explanation is that the Germans were anxious to exude self-confidence after the catastrophic losses suffered on the Russian front. Yet Germany did what Japan wanted not out of comradeship but out of self-interest.18 Japan, being well aware of the extreme pressure which would be imposed on its economy by the pursuit of these immense objectives, also wanted an expanded military agreement under the Tripartite Pact. Military negotiations began in Berlin almost immediately. Oshima presented the draft of an agreement on military cooperation in which the allies would define their spheres of interest. Eventually on 18 January 1942, the representatives on the tripartite military commission signed in Berlin a new agreement setting out the Japanese sphere of operation as the waters eastward of 70 degrees east longitude to the western seaboard of the United States. But it was further laid down that if the American and British fleets were to concentrate on the Atlantic ocean, Japan would send its navy there while Germany and Italy would send equivalent assistance if enemy naval concentrations were primarily in the Pacific. It is noteworthy that the Indus river was the boundary between the two notional "spheres" and that the Indian subcontinent was deemed to fall within the Japanese sphere of operation in spite of Germany's historic claims in that area. The split into spheres was a symbol of separation rather than warmhearted cooperation. Certainly, Hitler was not a believer in joint armed cooperation with the Japanese. On the positive side, Japan signed a "Mutual Economic Aid Pact for Winning the War" with Germany and Italy separately on 20 January 1943; but these relationships offered only limited scope for economic assistance. There were probably mutual gains in the fields of intelligence and technology. The fact that Japan did not stand alone gave her a strong morale boost at home. On the strategic side, the Tripartite Pact was strengthened by the inclusion of Thailand, Manchukuo, and the Nanking government of China. Much was said of solidarity. But Germany and Japan fought separate wars which had no real point of contact. Any hope that Germany had of a Japanese attack on the Soviets in the rear were soon dashed. As the war developed,

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little was heard of interallied cooperation, either commercial or strategic. The practical operation of the Tripartite Pact in wartime showed that the signatories were only "allies of a kind." 1 9 THE GREAT EAST ASIAN WAR DECLARED There is an old adage that when wars begin, diplomacy ceases. That is, of course, broadly true between belligerents. It is, moreover, true that the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which had been cut down to size over the years, was further limited by Prime Minister Tojo because of his personal prejudice against it. But it was not true between Japan and her allies or between Japan and neutral countries where active diplomacy was carried on. Japan's frenzied diplomacy of the last months of 1941 changed direction after war had been declared. Now, in addition to holding together a viable wartime coalition with Germany and Italy, the nation had to make the best of such help as it could muster from Asian quarters. This was the overwhelming difficulty created by Japan's early military-naval successes. All too soon, Japan's problem was not h o w to expand militarily into new lands but how to administer the territories already occupied on a basis that was cheap, manageable with the manpower available, and attractive to the Asian peoples concerned. The wording of the declaration of war by the Emperor put Japan's case as persuasively as possible to the Japanese and Asians. The Imperial rescript of 8 December explained the declaration as follows: We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. . . . It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected neighbourly intercourse and cooperation, the regime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition. . . . Moreover [the United States and British Empire], inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. . . . Patiently have We waited and long have We endured in the hope that Our Governments might retrieve the situation in peace, but Our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. . . .20 Underlying the general tone of victimization, there was a note of regret and the suggestion that Japan was desperate rather than coolly calculating. The failures of the China campaigns, sometimes referred to as "Japan's Spanish Ulcer," were skillfully underplayed in the rescript.

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While the China incident went on relentlessly, Japan became embroiled in an extended Asian war by striking south. For various reasons, Japan accepted the risks involved. There were global political factors. Germany, as part of the Triple Alliance, had consistently urged Japan to extend its sphere of influence towards Singapore, in order to weaken Britain's capacity for resistance in Europe. The fall of France had made the independent existence of its colony in Indochina more vulnerable. In addition, the fall of the Dutch government on the European mainland had cut the umbilical chord with the NEI and left the administration in Batavia to its own devices without much prospect of British support. To a strategist, each situation was a sitting target unless there was outside intervention. Then there were the economic factors. As expressed in the rescript, the Japanese believed that the ABCD powers, America, Britain, China and the Dutch, had been cutting off their access to raw materials and markets for more than a decade. More recently, the Americans had enforced the abrogation of their commercial treaty, thereby introducing a policy of selective sanctions. They had frozen Japan's assets overseas. The British, who were in a much weaker position, had limited the export of rubber and manganese from Malaya. The Netherlands East Indies, which was an important source for Japan's oil supplies, had been twice approached by high level Japanese missions. But in both cases, the NEI Governor General had been insincere according to Japan; that is, he had not made crude oil available in the quantities that Japan required for her stockpiles. The extent of Japan's resentment at this "economic encirclement" by the ABCD powers was bitterly expressed in the rescript: They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of Our Empire. . . . When a nation is obstructed in the case of its natural and peaceful development or when the means of its existence is threatened, not only is it imperative that it should take defensive measures, but it is also required to do so for the maintenance of a just peace. Lastly, there were the ideological factors. From the 1930s, it becomes difficult to distinguish between policy and propaganda. The world was living in the Goebbels age, and Japan was skillful and painstaking in presenting its nationalist aspirations favorably. Japan had taken over the ideologies of Europe when proclaiming its New Order in East Asia. On 29 June 1940, Foreign Minister Arita had announced in a radio broadcast that the bounds of the New Order were being extended. While the original bounds had included China, Korea, and the China Seas, they were being extended to take in the countries of nanyo (literally the "southern seas," "Southeast Asia" not being a term in Japanese usage at the time). When Prime Minister Konoe returned to office in July, he reiterated his views on the New Order, and Arita promised "increasingly to bind ourselves economically to Manchukuo and China and to proceed to nanyo."11

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When the Asia-Pacific war was declared, it was laid down that Japan would henceforth be known as "Nippon" and that the war, including the China Incident, would be called "the Great(er) East Asian War," thus indicating a new emphasis on nationalist and pan-Asian thinking. The idea of a Great East Asia War appeared as a fresh initiative. While the China Incidents actually described war, it would have been inappropriate to use that term at the time. The thrust of publicity henceforth would be on Japan's ideological war for the liberation of Asian peoples from colonialism. The right-wing literary critic Eto Jun, echoing President Laurel in 1943, observed that when Japan declared war, its motives were still self-preservation and self-defense (jison jiei); but, as the war developed, it claimed to be fighting not for its own people (kokumin), but for the races (minzoku) of Great East Asia.22 It was the hope that these pan-Asian ideas would appeal to the peoples of the occupied territories and encourage them to cooperate in the New Order, or at least to embrace the notion of cooperation in its economic/ commercial dimension, the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. These ideas came close to being "cultural imperialism"; and the most recent study in the field concludes that they found little resonance in China: The policy of promoting Japan's experience of cultural development in the 1920s degenerated, especially after 1937, into one of crude pan-Asianism, whose goal of purging every bit of Western influence was closely tied to the Japanese ambition of dominating Asia.23 LEADING GREATER EAST ASIA Japan's forces scored remarkable successes on all fronts in the early months of the war. The Imperial Japanese Navy had long planned for such a war and approached it with caution and considerable pessimism. The army, whose strategic thinking had largely been directed against Russia, was less sanguine towards campaigning in the south. But the troops intended for Malaya had been trained and acclimatized on Hainan island, which was comparable in size to Malaya. Military and intelligence planning was developed in Taiwan. Soon the Philippines were overrun; Singapore fell; the Indonesian archipelago was conquered; and Burma was attacked. This led, of course, to comprehensive problems of occupation which only magnified the problems already faced in China, including the limited number of Japanese forces and the overly burdened Japanese supply-lines. After its remarkable performance in the field during 1942, the army was left with the task of completing the conquest of Burma. If Japan was to maintain law and order over its expanding territories with slender resources, how could the nation win the hearts of the Asian peoples?

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How did the states of Southeast Asia, which now became the targets of Japan's propaganda, react to this? In Thailand, the only non-colonial territory in the area, Marshall Phibun Songkhram, the prime minister since 1938, mysteriously left the Thai capital just as the Japanese troops came over the border on 8 December. This can only be interpreted as a vote of no-confidence in Japan. On his return to the capital, he called off the initial resistance and authorized the "peaceful transit" of Japan's forces through his territory. On the 21st, Marshall Phibun put his signature to an alliance with Japan and four days later, declared war on the Western allies. He gave the Japanese the impression that it had always been his intention to align his country with Japan. The rest of Southeast Asia looked on with vigilance.24 It was necessary first to define Japan's war aims towards its enemy of five years, China. Since the Wang Ching-wei government had been set up at Nanking in March 1940 with an immediate offer of Japanese support, the relationship had been a strange one. Wang's administration, though deeply divided, had managed to cling to a measure of independence from Tokyo. The two signed the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty in November; a Declaration of Cooperation accompanied the treaty. On 16 June 1941, Wang was cordially welcomed on a visit to Tokyo and issued a joint statement with Prime Minister Konoe. He later obtained assurances about the intention of the Japanese to give up their concessions in China and to renegotiate the Basic Treaty of 1940. A pact, said to be one of alliance, was concluded. Shigemitsu Mamoru, who previously had been posted in London, went as ambassador to Nanking in January 1942. His recommendations for a new policy towards China won the backing of Prime Minister Tojo. The guidelines for dealing with China were fundamentally changed after some obstruction by the army at an imperial conference on 21 December: Nanking was now permitted to declare war; the regime was strengthened; and Japan's various extraterritorial concessions were gradually withdrawn, as the United States and Britain already had done. Nanking, in turn, recognized Manchukuo. While the Japanese regarded their program as generous, it was, in fact, still hopelessly one-sided. Despite its ties with Nanking, Japan still hankered after a settlement with the Generalissimo at Chungking and hoped that Wang could serve as one channel of approach. But it was scarcely credible that Wang, who had in the past been pursued by KMT assassins, would be willing to intercede with Chiang on Japan's behalf.25 The ease with which these conquests of colonial territories had been made caused Japan to rethink its war aims which were now increasingly focused on Co-prosperity. But Co-prosperity itself was largely a concept of colonialism. In the new situation created by the surprising scale of its victories, something more than economic cooperation was needed. Japan tended to emphasize the role which it was increasingly assuming: liberating down-

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trodden peoples from colonialism. This was not a new idea, but it was new that it should be adopted as government policy. With the downturn in Japan's military-naval fortunes, an increase in tempo became necessary. By the time of the renewed battle of Changsha from December 1941 through January 1942, the Japanese had to be vigilant. Defeated, they had suffered numerous casualties in the major southern city between Hankow and Canton. It showed the capacity of the large Chinese armies for resistance. From the summer of 1942 on, the sea battles of the Coral Sea in May and of Midway in June resulted in major losses, even if these were concealed from the cabinet.26 The allied retaliation in the Solomons had begun. Japan's shipping routes to her occupied territories were in tatters, causing heavy losses in its mercantile marine. Japan's cities came within the range of American air attack as of August. Italy's unconditional surrender took place in September 1943. The euphoria of 1942 was passing. Japan might have experienced these setbacks earlier in the war if the Americans had not chosen to give priority to the Atlantic sector of the global war. In September, Foreign Minister Togo, who seems to have played a not inglorious role in putting a brake on Japan's career towards total war, clashed with the Prime Minister over the establishment of the Great East Asia Ministry. This was intended to be a ministry which would handle the affairs of the various Asian territories occupied by Japanese troops. The Foreign Ministry opposed the plan which undercut its role in favor of the service ministries. Togo was supported by his officials but was forced to resign under pressure from his cabinet colleagues. The experienced Shigemitsu was recalled from the Nanking embassy to become foreign minister in April 1943. He hoped to extend the application of his New China Policy to the whole of Asia. He also thought that Japan needed to end the war by emphasizing its goal of Asian liberation, which had hitherto been a matter of secondary consideration. The first priority to Shigemitsu was to make peace with China, initially with Nanking and, through Nanking, with Chungking. Shigemitsu explains the motives for his foreign policy as proclaiming "war aims" that had never been very clearly explained to the people— the liberation and rebirth of East Asia, the emergence of its nations from "colonialism," all countries to be on an equal footing as a bulwark of world peace.27 Having explained this philosophy to the Japanese people, he sought to formulate a New Asian Policy that would emphasize not Japan's expansion but the ideology underlying it. The New Policy was extended to the rest of occupied Asia in the hope of winning the goodwill of its peoples. On 14 January 1943, the Liaison Conference had already placed the occupied areas in two categories: those to be incorporated into the Japanese Empire

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and those, Burma and the Philippines only, to be given independence. On 18 March, Dr. Ba Maw (Bhamo), who had been appointed as prime minister under British rule in 1937, visited Tokyo and discussed a form of words by which independence for Burma could be announced. Conscious of the overextension of Japanese forces over Southeast Asia, Japan wanted to offer Burma a limited form of independence under Ba Maw; the independence would include an army under the young student revolutionary Aung San, who was given the rank of Major General. On 1 August, Burma issued a declaration of "independence in cooperation with Japan." Japan, whose armies were in occupation of the country, concluded a treaty of alliance with Burma.28 The Tojo cabinet decided that Japan should move further and try to rally her Asian partners in resistance. Showing tremendous energy, Tojo broke with precedent and himself toured various occupied territories, trying to persuade the leaders to visit Tokyo. During his stay in Manila in May, he made appropriate arrangements for independence; Jose Laurel, who was elected president, negotiated an alliance with Tokyo on 14 October. During a further trip in July, Tojo went on to Singapore, Malaya, and Thailand. In Singapore he shared the platform at the City Hall with Subhas Chandra Bose of the Indian National Army; Bose had escaped from Germany by submarine and, despite Tojo's initial reluctance, been allowed to land in Japan in May. On 21 October, Bose, who had obtained the full support of General Terauchi, the commander-in-chief of the Southern Army, declared an independent government for India in Singapore and became its provisional president. Both changes were immediately recognized by Japan, but they might have been more effective if Bose had reached the area sooner.29 Whether Indonesia should be granted independence under Soekarno also was discussed. But this was not implemented because of lack of consensus between the two authorities administering the islands; the army favored independence, and the navy opposed it. Nonetheless, a measure of practical autonomy was given to Indonesia and Malaya, even if they were not regarded as being ready yet for independence. Shigemitsu, at a conference on 30 September in the presence of the Emperor, secured acceptance for a statement of "guidelines for the war" which set out Japan's aims for its occupied territories in a spirit of greater liberality. Shigemitsu, in his memoirs, states with some satisfaction that he had believed that Japan had a mission for Asian liberation during the 1930s; but the evidence suggests that most people thought the idea a much later wartime development.30 The Great East Asian Conference held in Tokyo on 5-6 November was the zenith of this concept and has been called by one author "the first Asian Summit." 31 It was the culmination of Japan's diplomacy during 1943 and much personal exertion by Prime Minister Tojo. The purpose of the "Assembly of Greater East Asian Nations" as the Japanese liked to describe

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it in English, was to proclaim to the world the existence of the Co-prosperity Sphere. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Nanking government, Thailand, Manchukuo, the Philippines, and Burma, the last two having just been granted independence. On the final day the delegates signed a joint declaration "undertaking to cooperate toward prosecuting the Greater East Asian war to a successful conclusion and liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination." It also mentioned a number of other strands: the establishment of co-prosperity, mutual recognition of each other's independence, abolition of racial discrimination, and the need for developing the resources of the region. The declaration in which the Foreign Ministry had a major say is thought to have been influenced by the Atlantic Charter. It professed to show the unity of Asia in sharing these war aims and, at another level, to offer a blueprint for postwar Asia by laying down principles for independence.32 The doctrines contained in this declaration were the product of changing wartime thinking. They were important for Japanese school children. During the conference itself, elementary school pupils waving Hinomaru flags lined the route to the Diet building, giving a splash of color to the khaki drabness of wartime Tokyo. Tojo, who was generally averse to great public display, went round giving the hand of friendship to the visiting delegates. As presented in the press, these ideas may have "captured the imagination of many liberals in the Japanese establishment," but whether they got through to a deprived population is hard to estimate.33 The declaration was significant for the Asian leaders who attended because it gave them the accolade of approval from their mighty ally. But it was at best a statement of ideals. For most Asians, the declaration had a hollow ring as a piece of unrealistic propaganda; to believe that Japan would act as their equal partner was impossible.34 The Asian guests in Tokyo were well aware that the Pacific naval war had already been lost and that the occupied territories presented Japan with logistic problems which were insuperable by Japan now that it had lost command of the seas. Subhas Chandra Bose, the leader of Free India who attended purely as an observer, insisted on arguing that India did not belong to Greater East Asia and that the Joint Declaration was not relevant to his country. In this view Tojo concurred. The transition from the agonizing decisions of autumn 1941 through the spectacular early months of the Asia-Pacific war to the East Asian Conference is among the most meaningful in modern Japanese history. The fighting in China reached stalemate as the main armies moved to Southeast Asia. There, the direction of the war was determined by the successes of the campaigns. The declarations of intent focused on the New Order, which reflected Japan's alignment with her anti-communist allies in Europe. Vague and imprecise, this focus concerned the boosting of morale and image creation more than clear statement about the nation's objectives in making war.

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The doctrine of Asian liberation that led up to the Great East Asia Conference of 1943 was the closest that Japan came to a statement of national policy and it created a sense of moral purpose. Does the East Asia Conference make a fitting culmination to this volume? It makes a symbolic climax in the sense that it represented a wartime redefinition of Japan's self-image, stressing leadership in Asia and cooperation among independent states. The conference was an attempt to demonstrate to the Japanese people and anyone else who would listen that Japan's war was not purely one of expansion but also one of securing the liberation of oppressed colonial peoples. It also was held at the end of some successful campaigns when the perimeter of territories held by the Japanese armies had reached its maximum. In the context of Japan's relations with her neighbors, the conference indicated that Japan had not become such a modernized and Europeanized country that it ignored Asia. Japan was trying to present itself as having a mission and a vision of Asia. But the conference was also an anticlimax. The purpose of the Great East Asian Conference was partly to romanticize the remarkable successes so far achieved and partly to prepare the way for possible failures. There had been naval reverses in the Pacific zone, but in Asia no new territories were being occupied in spite of the hard fighting continuing. The fact that Japan was now on the defensive, so clear to a later generation, was only slowly becoming clear to people at the time because of censorship. Since these panAsian doctrines were formulated against a background of Japan's declining fortunes in the war, they left the impression that they might in large measure have been contrived for reasons of political expediency. So the Great East Asian Conference was a place where realism and wishful thinking were hopelessly confused.

Conclusion

The stretch of time covering the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles in 1919 through the chambers of the Japanese Diet in 1943 was the comparatively short period of a quarter of a century. But the period was a very eventful one for Japan by any standards. During this period, Japan made unprecedented strides as a successful nation state: by 1919, the country had already risen to the unquestionable status of a world power and had made considerable economic as well as financial achievements. Over the following twenty-five years, Japan continued its growth. A successful quasi-colony in Manchukuo was created as a valuable adjunct to the Japanese economy. The country's prosperity depended on the volume of foreign exports, a volume sustained so long as peace lasted because prices stayed low. The Japanese leaders of industry maintained a high level of productivity on the basis of low wages and relatively low raw material costs. Japan was living through an era of increasing warfare, not a new situation for the Japanese. Since 1894, the Japanese had never been clear of war, or the consequences of war. Our study opened with the Siberian Intervention, an international enterprise in which Japan operated by invitation. In taking up the international invitation, the country showed hesitation mixed with ambition. Thereafter, its moves were self-initiated and dictated by its own needs. The economic turmoil of the 1920s and the steep growth of population led to calls for lebensraum. In 1931, Japanese governments allowed themselves to be stampeded into condoning military measures in Manchuria in order to solve political problems, but the government gained only minimal control. The successes of the Manchurian intervention only gave expansionist groups greater confidence in 1937. Military conquest enabled Japan to create a successful Empire which had by 1943, the terminal point of this study, reached frontiers beyond its

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wildest dreams. In spite of the spectacular rise, there was to be a short and plummeting fall for Japan which we do not chronicle here. As crises were never absent for long, defense and security considerations were important ingredients in the formulation of Japan's foreign policy. There was in the 1930s a great deal of General Staff planning which came close to being an independent "military foreign policy." This study is not primarily about military policy but cannot neglect military thinking. In her foreign relations, Japan was confronted by a strategic dilemma imposed by its geography: facing the Pacific Ocean and the Asian continent at the same time. These two directions offered opposing objectives and temptations. The army looked for expansion into Greater China while the navy ultimately called for expansion to the south and west Pacific. It was increasingly hard for statesmen to control or restrain these military aspirations. Expansionist policies were unquestionably popular and, until the outbreak of war in 1937, possible without undue sacrifices. But they placed a double burden on Japan's limited natural resources. These were decades when the economy was in turmoil because of the 1923 earthquake and the world depression. Moreover, the armed forces were flexing their muscles in political affairs. They did not trust civilian politicians, political parties, or party cabinets. In fact, both services felt resentment at the political process. The navy in the 1920s had reluctantly accepted a measure of limitation on its shipbuilding as a result of international pressure; the army suffered retrenchment for domestic financial reasons. From 1930 onwards, the army and navy each pushed for a greater share of the nation's wealth and a greater say in affairs so that they could achieve their own overseas objectives. Since these objectives diverged widely, political confrontation between the two military forces was inevitable. The Japanese government liked to portray itself in the 1930s as stable, monolithic, and united. In fact, the government was unstable, complex, and faction-ridden. There were grave weaknesses in Japanese decision-making. The deeper one looks, the more one finds evasions and compromises on the part of civilian politicians. It took strong civilians to stand up for their principles and for non-military considerations. The names of Hara, Hamaguchi, and Takahashi stand out. The majority were weak, malleable, and afraid for their lives. Consequently, as the thirties progressed, the armed forces had little civilian control, though civilians continued to serve in Japan's so-called military cabinets. In the field of international affairs, Shidehara was the only foreign minister in this class, and he was out of office throughout the 1930s. Japanese expansion was opposed not only by countries of Asia, but also by global powers: the United States was deeply concerned by Japan's Pacific ambitions throughout our period and by its role in the dismemberment of China; European countries were equally vigilant over Japan's intentions in continental and island Southeast Asia. Japan had to exercise restraint

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because the United States was its major market, and the colonies of Southeast Asia were important sources of materials for industrial and military needs. After the European war broke out in 1939, Japan's caution was reserved for the United States, whom it hoped to persuade to keep clear of any Asian war that arose. This study falls into three well-defined sections, each of which possesses its own distinct characteristics. As we began our story at the end of the 1910s, Japan had already attained a position of high international standing. It had reached this preeminence at a time when imperialist values prevailed. Naturally, Japan was drawn into the expansion, first by the 21 Demands made on China in 1915 and later in the escalation by the Siberian intervention in 1918. The latter campaign was wound up voluntarily and involuntarily. A debate within Japan about the Tightness of its actions fueled the case for voluntary withdrawal. Involuntarily in the sense that the other nations which sent expeditionary forces pulled out and left Japan very exposed. For these reasons, the nations at both the Paris and Washington conferences expressed their suspicions of Japan and gave the impression of wanting to clip her wings. In the 1920s, most Japanese were in favor of keeping a low profile. As one of the Great Powers, Japan legislated for a new world order and took its share of global affairs through the League of Nations. This cautious internationalist response made good sense: Japan was recovering from war, was suffering from the aftermath of the earthquake, and later experiencing the world economic depression. Japan did many positive things which appealed to international opinion. From the Washington treaties through the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) to the London Naval Treaty (1930), the country worked within the world community. Japan bargained hard and strongly defended its own position but also made some sacrifices. The Moderates and Internationalists had a voice that continued to be heard in Japan throughout the 1920s as part of the ongoing political debate; but they were accused of weakness, especially in China, in the growing climate of nationalism. The next phase begins with the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933, which was an important turning point in Japan's fortunes, both domestically and internationally. The Manchurian problem was not a new one: Japan had been trying to come to terms with it since 1894. In the background, there were problems associated with economic and population pressures; the gulf opening up between civilian party politicians and the disaffected army and navy; and the difficulty which Japan experienced in coping with the new statehood of China in its political, commercial, and financial dimensions. The Japanese army in Manchuria precipitated the issue, supporting the creation of the new state of Manchukuo, and weak civilian ministries failed to control the provocative acts. Confronted by widespread criticism abroad,

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the government could not afford to admit the failure of the army establishment and ministers in order to curb the actions of the Kuantung army which were overwhelmingly popular. The Foreign Ministry, while it served as a voice of moderation domestically, seemed to defend the army publicly and justify its actions in the councils of the League of Nations and elsewhere. So Japan's image became tarnished in the eyes of the United States and other members of the League from which Japan now resigned. Of course, there were still influential internationalist voices in Japan. But the leaders in power, not prepared to be lectured at by the world community for a second time, preferred to accept isolation and criticize many aspects of the Washington Conference of 1921. Manchukuo was not a failure. Despite many informed predictions to the contrary, the new government survived and made progress. It built up a highly planned economy and a state enterprise under military supervision, a partnership between soldiers and capitalists with some independence from Tokyo. Manchukuo was an important off-shore base which helped to drag the Japanese economy out of its depression. But there was a down-side: the more they developed this industrial base, the greater the losses for Japanese exporters to the vital China market. Manchukuo also presented security problems; it was a dangerous place with much guerilla activity. Defending the area was costly. A bastion of anti-communism, Manchukuo was sustained by ideologically committed officers of the Kuantung army. Because the Soviets would not withdraw their troops from the border, Japan found herself committed to keeping overly large forces in the area. The early 1930s were still a period of economic and political readjustment in Japan. The country appealed for sympathy because of its high birth rate and status as a "have-not power." Japan continued to boast about being the most stable part of East Asia, in contrast with the unstable China and the dangerous Soviet Russia. But recurring political assassinations and the consequent threats to political order actually undermined its stability. It was one thing for Japan to claim that journalists exaggerated the instability while the fundamentals of the kokutai, the essence of the emperor system, were stable. But the truth was that right-wing forces destabilized the country. After the 26 February Incident of 1936, these influences spread to foreign policy. Japan, which claimed to be an anti-communist country, was rescued from its brief isolation by the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany (1936), another of the interwar revisionist powers. Japan's partnership with Germany, and later Italy, should have defined its position as within the fascist and anti-Soviet camp. But Tokyo remained not wholly sure of where it stood and, to the despair of Germans and Italians, remained on the fringes of that camp. In the third phase of our study, the war with China began in earnest in 1937, even if Japan continued to pretend that it was no more than an incident. Mobilized for a war emergency, Japan could not be described as a

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country at peace. In spite of the heavy casualties sustained in China, the war spread to Southeast Asia after the fall of France in 1940. Japanese diplomatic efforts seemed to conscientiously try to keep the peace but suggested that Japan's objectives were incompatible with those of the rest of the world. The escalation of the nation's actions in Indochina spilled over into later attacks on the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, and Burma; the attacks achieved spectacular military successes. There were several different strands in the rope which pulled Japan towards total war in 1941: the Asian strand was directed at Southeast Asia; the Pacific strand started with the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. A distinction has to be drawn between these two. The first came in the wake of the China war which had, by 1941, been in existence for four years (some would argue ten). The ideology of the Co-prosperity Sphere clearly focused on the East Asian war zone at first. Finally, however, the naval leaders insisted that Japan could only be successful in war if surprise attacks were made on American bases and Pearl Harbor was disabled. The surprise air attack on Hawaii was the strategic fusion between what were separate strands in the rope, but its explosive effect around the world tended to give greater prominence to the Pacific side of the operation. Within the emerging war, the European area was less important. This was a sign that a Europe-based world order had come to an end. To be sure, Japan's action in signing the Tripartite Pact had lit the slowly smoldering fuse of suspicion under both Japan and the United States. According to Washington, Japan had moved into the wrong camp; diplomats had a more difficult time keeping the peace. Much of 1941 was taken up with the delicate American-Japanese negotiations—and we perhaps devoted too little space to this complex diplomatic interplay. The negotiations started from the assumption that the two powers, though not friendly, were not so hostile as to justify an American-Japanese war. While war was probably not inevitable, it is very hard to see on what basis, after September 1941, any concessions or compromises could have been worked out which would have resolved the crisis. Washington largely distrusted Japan, its suspicion deepening with the ability of the Americans to intercept and decipher Japanese diplomatic messages. It is hard not to conclude that Japan's leaders, under the strong influence of the military, made a number of unwise decisions. Considering what they knew about their inadequate sources for raw materials and the vulnerability of their supply lines, for them to take up arms against the might of America was unwise. But the majority thought that a short war might be possible. The Japanese relied on the fighting spirit of their soldiers and dedication to the Emperor, both of which counted for more than the machines and technology possessed by the enemy. The attacks on European colonies were not so illogical in military terms, though there could be no certainty about the outcome until battle was

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joined. Japan first relied on pan-Asian doctrines developed early in the war in order to win popular support. Its wartime propaganda centered on the ideology of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and largely addressed occupied peoples of Asia in the English language. It was, therefore, the Japanese statement of mission, a matter of pride and a challenge to the West. But, to the people of Southeast Asia as of China, the idea of Japan's hegemony was not attractive. In this concluding section, we discuss the role of the Foreign Ministry, the army/navy in influencing foreign affairs and the Emperor. The Foreign Ministry was never a strong ministry in Japan. Its ministers were generally junior in cabinet ranking. In decision-making at the end of the Meiji period (1868-1911), the Genro called the shots, but the ministry more often than not shared their views. During the second half of the 1920s, security and economic considerations became increasingly important, and the Foreign Minister declined in fortune and status. The Foreign Ministry was rarely an initiating ministry; supported by diplomacy and publicity, others initiated the national objectives. This decline became even stronger in the 1930s. Diplomats from overseas, observing the Japanese scene, recognized that the Foreign Ministry had to share with others its role in determining the lines of foreign policy. In respect to China especially, this ministry lost some of its functions and was cut to size, as in 1938 during Ugaki's term of office and in 1942 during Togo's. But it survived by adaptation and was still operating in 1945. It would be wrong to suggest that there were not occasional foreign ministers who were individualistic, and had visionary and leadership qualities. Shidehara was an important and respected figure, though his absence from the stage from 1931 to 1945 was a loss for Japan. As the negotiations with Washington in 1941 show, Matsuoka and Togo had an important voice in the liaison committees of the army, navy, and foreign affairs. While Japan's actions increasingly emanated from army/navy thinking, Foreign Ministry also usually had input. In 1943—the final throw of the dice—the role of Shigemitsu was considerable. Foreign Ministry was not a monolith: there were divisions and cliques within it. There were policy disputes and rivalries among sections. In an unenviable position the Foreign Ministry had to be sensitive to public opinion, unlike the Army and Navy Ministries, and had to represent faithfully the thinking of foreign governments. It also had to straddle the gap between nationalism and internationalism. Thus within this ministry, groups developed like the Anglo-American faction (Ei-Beiha), whose influence declined like the power of the Ministry itself, and the Axis faction (Sujikuha), which exerted some influence in the 1930s under the leadership of ambassadors like Shiratori and Oshima. There were also personality clashes. Matsuoka's purge of the more international diplomats in 1940 was only the most

Conclusion

181

extreme example. Disagreements between the upper and lower echelons of the bureaucrats also erupted, most notably attempts of the junior Renovationist faction to influence policies from below, as was happening in the army. The influence of the army and navy on foreign affairs was affected by the strength of the army. Loopholes in the Meiji constitution allowed the army to gain too much control. The result was that Japan appeared to operate a Dual Diplomacy, a phrase coined by Professor Trotter: two policies were being pursued at the same time, one by the army/navy in the field and one by the cabinet. The Imperial Headquarters (Daihonei) came into being in 1937 for the war emergency in order to give the army and navy the opportunity to coordinate their policies. It was soon necessary to set up civilian-military structures which constituted a forum for adjusting military with political strategies, particularly the Liaison Conference (Renraku Kaigi). By 1940, the services had gotten the upper hand in this body. The army's move into Indochina was a move too much for the diplomats and left them with greatly reduced scope for conventional diplomatic activity. Decisions taken were conveyed to the Emperor by the Prime Minister and the army and navy Chiefs of Staff acting independently. Foreign relations were not invariably initiated by the Foreign Ministry. The army and navy, in effect, leapfrogged over the Foreign Ministry, which had a voice in the debates down to the end of the war and continued to play a part in forming the policy consensus, while being reduced in influence, certainly as long as General Tojo ruled supreme. A general study cannot deal adequately with the role of the Showa Emperor in the key issues of foreign policy-making. By the Meiji constitution, the Foreign Ministry was the servant of the Emperor. Unlike the army and navy officers, the minister did not ordinarily have access to the Emperor. However, the attitudes and thinking of the Foreign Ministry were made known to him through court personnel, many of whom came from diplomatic backgrounds. For most of our period, the role of imperial diplomatic adviser was undertaken by Makino Nobuaki (Shinken) who dominated the imperial household from 1921 to 1935. The Emperor's thinking depended on the courtiers and advisers with whom he discussed matters and to whom he let his views be known privately. Hirohito, both as Crown Prince and Regent from 1921-1926 and as Showa Emperor from 1926 on, followed developments closely. He was assiduous in his attention to papers presented to him; he had private interviews with key ministers and chiefs of staff in his capacity as commanderin-chief; and he was present at Imperial Conferences. He was, in short, not ignorant of, or insulated from, events like emperors of previous centuries. Hirohito was kept abreast of developments even though he did not originate them, and from time to time, offered pointed criticisms of them. Hirohito was probably well acquainted with the war planning which led

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up to the decisions of December 1941 but it is probably true that there was no question of his carrying enough weight to arrest the war in China or veto the outbreak of war with the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. It was established procedure for the authorities to take crucial decisions in his name and thereby ease their acceptance or secure their passage through the Diet. The authorization of the throne was a convenient political device. But, in general, it was considered unwise for the Emperor, as constitutional monarch, to interfere with a decision taken by a consensus of his officials even if he disapproved of it. With very few exceptions, the Showa Emperor observed this convention. How does one assess Japan's foreign policy overall during these two decades? By Japanese criteria, it was not unsuccessful. Over a quartercentury, the country had, in spite of occasional setbacks, achieved great advances in production and trade, extending influence and territory. Japan had achieved its "quest for autonomy," to use Professor Crowley's phrase: it had thrown over the Washington treaty settlement, had not given in to Germany's blandishments in 1938-1939, and had challenged the Soviet Union on the Mongolian border, unwisely as it proved. Strong enough to act on its own, Japan was without doubt one of the great powers in the interwar period. This power resulted from military strength in its own region, not from popularity. Old-time diplomats like Shidehara described the trend of 1930s diplomacy by the phrase "Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka," thereby implying that civilian government had sold out to the military. Admittedly there had been mishaps on the way, notably the Siberian and China campaigns. But the general populace followed the extension of Japan's frontiers with approval and regarded progress in the foreign field with some degree of pride. Like their contemporaries in Germany, they were happy to be xenophobic and nationalistic.

Notes

Full details of the authors' work to which reference is made here will be found in the Bibliography. INTRODUCTION 1. I chose 1943 as the natural terminal date for this study before I realized that this had also been adopted by G.R. Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943. 2. Gordon Berger, Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931-41, chs. 2 and 3. 3. Archives of Japanese Foreign Ministry, Gaimusho A7/0/0/9, note of 15 Dec. 1945. 4. R.H. Minear, Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trials. 5. Prince Mikasa in Yomiuri Shimbun, quoted in London Times, 7 July 1994. 6. Komatsu Keiichiro, The Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of Magic, 385-403. 7. G.R. Storry, "The English-language presentation of Japan's case during the China Emergency of the late 1930s," in European Studies on Japan, ed. Nish and Dunn, 140-48. 8. Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations, 126-27; lenaga Saburo, The Pacific War, 1931-45. 9. Germaine A. Horton, Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan. 10. These works are discussed in Maruyama Masao, Senchu to sengo no aida and Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics; Ivan Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Postwar Trends. 11. Stephen Large, Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan, 8-9. 12. Rose, ocit., 115-29. 13. Statement by Murayama Tomiichi, Prime Minister's Office, 31 Aug. 1994.

184

Notes

CHAPTER 1—THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1. Usui Katsumi in Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-52, 95, quoting Amo Eiji. 2. John Crump, Hatta Shuzo and Pure Anarchism in Interwar Japan, 35-36. 3. Nakamura Takafusa in P. Duus (ed.), Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 6, 451-56. 4. Mitani Taichiro in Duus, o cit., 59-76. 5. Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change, ch. 6; Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline, 280-91. 6. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 280-81; Uchida Yasuya, 238ff. 7. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 200. 8. Nish in Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, ed. N.A.M. Rodger, 77-81. 9. cf. Okumura Fusao, Kindai Nihon sensoshi, vol. 2, ch. 5. 10. Richard Storry in European Studies on Japan, ed. Nish and Dunn, 140-48. 11. Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 697-707; Uchida Yasuya, 231-32. 12. Lesley Connors, The Emperor's Adviser, 60-75; Shimazu Naoko, Japan, Race and Equality, 15-16; Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 707-8. 13. NGB Taisho, 8, Bk 3, no. 538. 14. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: British Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series 2, Paris Peace Conference of 1919, vol. 12, "The Far East", edited by M. Dockrill, Maryland, 1991, docs 1-4; Nish, Alliance in Decline, 274-76. 15. Shimazu Naoko, "The Japanese attempt to secure racial equality in 1919," Japan Forum, 1/1, 93-100; and Japan, Race and Equality, 83-87. 16. Hosoya Chihiro in Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 6-7; Barbara J. Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy, 32-36. 17. Brooks, ocit., 79-80. 18. Nish, Alliance in Decline, 287. 19. J.W. Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 239-47; and Chihiro Hosoya, Shiberiya shuppei no shiteki kenkyu, ch. 3 passim. 20. Tobe Ryoichi, Nihon rikugun to Chugoku: Shina-tsu ni miru yume to satetsu; L.A. Humphreys, The Way of the Heavenly Sword, 44-45; Uchida Yasuya, 225ff; A. M. Young, Japan under Taisho Tenno, 135. 21. Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 150; S.S. Large, Emperors of the Rising Sun. 22. Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 1028-35; Hara nikki, vol. 8, 194. 23. Nish, Alliance in Decline, ch. 17. 24. NGB, Taisho 10, vol. 3-2, no. 908. 25. Kajima Morinosuke, Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, 560. 26. NGB, Washinton Kaigi, vol. 1, no. 7. (Hereafter NGB WK) 27. NGB, WK, vol. 1, no. 52. 28. NGB, WK, vol. 1, nos. 163-64. 29. Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, 460. 30. Stuart Kirby, Japan and East Asia, 12. 31. Shidehara Kijuro, 227-31; Daihonei: Rengo kantai, vol. 1, "kaisen made", 190ff. 32. NGB, WK, vol. 1, 553-54.

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33. NGB, WK, vol. 1, 547ff. 34. NGB, WK, vol. 1, 672-76. CHAPTER 2—THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1 9 2 1 - 1 9 2 2 1. Saburi Sadao, "Japan's position in the Far East," Proceedings of the Japan Society of London, 26(1929), 109. 2. Ian Nish in Ian Neary (eds.), Leaders and Leadership in Japan, 147-49. 3. Kirby, Japan and East Asia, 22. 4. Uchida to Kato, 14 Oct. 1921 in Kajima, Nichi-Bei gaikoshi, 158-61; Nish, Alliance in Decline, 360. 5. Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific, 1914-1922, 193-95; Nihon gaiko nempyo narabi no shuyo bunsho, i. [hereafter cited as "NGNSB."] 6. Daihonei: Kaigunbu—Rengo kantai, vol. I, ch.2, part 6, in Senshi Sosho series, 156-70. [hereafter cited as "Rengo kantai."] 7. Asahi shimbunshi, 179-84. The naval issue is well-treated in Asada Sadao, "From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921-30;" Malcolm Murfitt, Look Back in Anger: Western Powers and the Washington Conference of1921-2; Ian Gow, "The Politicization of the Prewar Japanese Naval General Staff" in EARC Research Papers (Sheffield), 13(1996); Kobayashi Tatsuo in Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol. 1, 1-38. 8. NGB WK, vol. 1, 181. 9. Asahi shimbunshi, 184. 10. NGB WK, vol. 1, 261. 11. NGB WK, vol. 1, 280-82. Ikeda Kiyoshi in Nihon no kaigun, 2 vols., vol. 2, 81-89, points out the difference in personality and policies of the "Two Katos." 12. NGB WK, vol. 1, 291-93. 13. NGB WK, vol. 1, 314-16. 14. Ichihashi Yamato, The Washington Conference and After, 85-86, 90. 15. Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol. 7, 3-7. 16. cf. Uchida to Kato, 28 Jan. 1922 in Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, 495. Also Ichihashi, o cit., 85-86: "Baron Kato was made a victim of domestic politics." 17. Tanaka to Yamanashi, 8 Feb. 1922 in NGB WK, vol. 2, 637-39. 18. Gaimusho no 100-nen, vol. 1, 844-45. On the Yap settlement, Shidehara Kijuro, 179-93. 19. Diary of [Sir] Miles Lampson, 10 Feb. 1922. [in private hands] 20. NGB WK, vol. 2, 546ff; Maurice Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain, 2 8 29. 21. Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, 554-55. 22. Ichihashi, o cit., 343-44; Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 3, 556. 23. NGB WK, vol. 2, 284ff. 24. On the lack of Anglo-American cooperation, see Goldstein in T.G. Otte and C.A. Pagedas (eds.), Personalities, War and Diplomacy, 72: "All attempts to coordinate policy with the Americans prior to the Conference were spurned, and only the barest indications of American thinking were given to London." 25. Ichihashi, o cit., 85-86; NGB WK, vol. 2, 654-56.

186 26. 27. 28. 29.

Notes Rengo kantai, vol. i, 187ff. Humphreys, Way of the Heavenly Sword, ch. 3. Ichihashi, o cit., on 1915 and 1918 undertakings. M. Kajima, Nihon gaiko seisaku no shiteki kosatsu, 344-77.

CHAPTER 3—HANDLING NATIONALISM IN CHINA, 1923-1929 1. Rengo kantai, vol. 1, 206. 2. A.J. Bacevich, Diplomat in Khaki: Major-general Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949, 107-8. 3. NGNSB, ii, 58-61; Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 873-77. 4. Peter Duus, Party Rivalry and Political Change in Japan, 216-17. 5. Shidehara Kijuro, 250-58; Bamba Nobuya, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma, 158-61. 6. Humphreys, Way of the Heavenly Sword, 72-78. 7. Humphreys, 134-37. 8. Kajima, Nihon gaiko seisaku no shiteki kosatsu, 404-7. 9. Kajima, pp. 401-21; G.A. Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the USSR, ch. 3. 10. Lensen, ch. 6; Rengo kantai, vol. 1, 213. 11. Shidehara, Gaiko 50 nen, 31 Off; Humphreys, 130; Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928, 145ff. 12. A. Morgan Young, Imperial Japan, 1926-38, 333-34; Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31, ch. 2. [hereafter cited as Goto] 13. Chan Lau Kitching, China, Britain and Hong Kong, 170-84; Goto, 16-17. 14. Tobe Ryoichi, Nihon rikugun to Chugoku, 79-80. 15. Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 157. 16. Goto, 42-51. 17. Young, 15; Bamba, 280-81; Goto, 49. 18. On p. 51 in Goto, Professor Hosoya takes a view favorable to Shidehara's conduct. 19. Yada (Shanghai) to Shidehara, 16 April 1927 in Japanese Foreign Ministry microfilm, PVM 87. On Yada as a long-term China Service officer, see Brooks, 66 67. 20. Note by Hata, "Shina ni okeru teikoku chiho no yogo ni kansuru kenkyu," 12 April 1928 in NGNSB, ii, 92-94. Ugaki spoke to Ambassador Tilley on similar lines on 22 March (Goto, 49). On Ugaki, see Ikei Masaru, "Ugaki's view of China and his China Policy, 1915-30" in Akira Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and Japanese, 21617. 21. Tobe, Nihon rikugun to Chugoku; Bamba, 283-85. 22. Motoei Sato, Showa shoki tai-Chugoku seisaku no kenkyu, 60. 23. The most authoritative study is still Ino Tentaro, "Tanaka josobun wo meguru 2/3 no mondai," Kokusai seiji 26(1963), 72-87. 24. Bamba, 287-89. 25. Tobe, 142-52; Humphreys, 148-52. 26. McCormack, 247; Bamba, 339-41.

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27. Humphreys, 161; Hayashi Kyujiro, Hoten soryoji, 18-22. 28. M. Terasaki-Miller, Showa tenno no dokuhakuroku: Terasaki Hidenari goyogakari nikki. 29. Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 877-94. 30. Uchida Yasuya, 275-304. Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the US in Japan's view," in Anglo-Japanese Alienation, ed. Nish 14. 31. Humphreys, 169-70; Bamba,355-56. 32. Ikei Masaru, "Ugaki Kazushige's view of China," in The Chinese and Japanese, ed. Iriye, 217-19; McCormack, 255-56. CHAPTER 4—WORLD DEPRESSION AND MILITARY EXPANSION, 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 2 1. Shidehara Kijuro, 437-39. 2. Tamaki Norio, Japanese Banking 1859-1959, ch. 22. 3. Nakamura Takafusa, A History of Showa Japan, 1926-89, ch. 1. 4. Asada Sadao, Ryotaisenkan no Nichi-Bei kankei, 168-76 and "From Washington to London, 1921-30" in E. Goldstein and J. Maurer (eds), Washington Conference, 1921-2, 157-63. Also Kuramatsu Tadashi, "Cecil, Churchill and Geneva Naval Conference", Personalities, War and Diplomacy, ed. T.G. Otte and C.A. Pagedas, 105-26. 5. Kuramatsu Tadashi, "A Great Ordinary Man: Admiral Saito", in Biographical Portraits, ed. Hoare, vol. 3, 191-93. 6. The best authorities on the 1930 conference are Asada, Ryo taisenkan no Nichi-Bei Kankei, 179-90 and Kobayashi Tatsuo in Taiheiyo senso e no michi, vol.1, 47-149. NGB has one volume devoted to proceedings leading up to the ratification of the London Naval Treaty. Also see Haruko Fukuda, "Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin" in Britain and Japan, ed. Cortazzi and Daniels, 208-10. 7. Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 924-26; Rengo kantai, vol. 1, 208-10. 8. Speech of Wakatsuki, 22 April 1930, in NGB, Rondon kaigun kaigi hokokusho; Fukuda, 210. 9. T.F. Mayer-Oakes, Fragile Victory, Saionji-Harada Memoirs; Young, Imperial Japan, 53-55. 10. Admirals Yamanashi, Nomura, Kobayashi, Okada, and Saito as well as Count Yamamoto Gombei and his Satsuma clique supported the government line. 11. Young, Imperial Japan, 55-58. 12. Okada as quoted by Kobayashi in J.W. Morley (ed.), "Japan's Road to the Pacific War," Japan Erupts [hereafter cited as 'MJRPW'], 36. 13. NGB devotes one volume on the London Conference to "Sumitsuin shinsa kiroku, 1930"; Hatano Masaru, Hamaguchi Osachi: Seito seiji no shiken jidai. 14. Ikeda Kiyoshi, in Kaigun to Nihon, and J.B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonumy, 1930-08, are among many authors who have discussed the tosuiken issue. 15. Rengo kantai, vol. 1, 233-35. 16. Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 894-901. 17. Ian Nish, "Shigemitsu and the Shanghai Crisis of 1932," International Studies (STICERD LSE), 1990/IV, 83-96; Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 901-6.

188

Notes

18. Iriye Akira, After Imperialism, 271-73 and 285-88. 19. Yasutomi Ayumu, "An Overview of Currency Struggles in Manchuria, 18951931," International Studies (STICERD LSE), 1997/330, 32-44. 20. G.A. Lensen, Damned Inheritance, 105-6. 21. Shidehara Kijuro, 384-86, quoting Gaiko 50-nen: "Heiwateki chotei ni seiko su." 22. Lytton Report, 35-36; Nihon gaiko bunsho: Manshu jihen vol 1/1, ch.l. [hereafter cited as 'NGB M/'] 23. Goto, 127-8; NGB MJ, vol. 1/2, nos. 974-87. 24. NGB MJ, vol. 1/2, ch. 6, no. 9. 25. Lytton Report, 63-66, has a special section on the Nakamura case; Brooks 91-93; Hayashi Kyujiro, Hoten soryoji, 107-15. 26. On the Manchurian Crisis, the main books in English are Ogata Sadako, Defiance in Manchuria, 1931-1932; C.G. Thorne, The Limits of Foreign Policy, 1931-1933; Yoshihashi Takehiko, Conspiracy at Mukden; and I.H. Nish, Japan's Struggle with Internationalism, 1931-1933. [The last, hereafter cited as Internationalism, is especially strong on the last half of the crisis.] 27. Hayashi, Hoten Soryoji, 119; Ogata, 58-59. 28. Nish, Internationalism, 25, quoting Ishiwara; NGB MJ, vol. 1/3, nos. 150-56. 29. NGB MJ, vol 1/3, no. 79; Brooks, 147-48. 30. Hayashi, Hoten Soryoji, 136-37. 31. Edgar Snow reports on a press conference in November in which he was told that Japan was sorry about the League of Nations, but her troops could not be withdrawn from positions presently held and might have to go further inland. Edgar Snow, Far Eastern Front, 82-85. 32. NGB MJ, vol 1/3, nos. 688-92; Nish, Internationalism, 54-55. 33. Nish, Internationalism, 63. The Wakatsuki ministry, in addition, had faced a possible coup d'etat in October. The plot was aborted; and information leaked out that ten officers belonging to the Sakurakai had been arrested in connection with a plot to assassinate Wakatsuki, Shidehara and Makino, who were national leaders understood to be opposed to the actions of the army. 34. NGB MJ, vol. 1/3, nos. 786, 816. 35. NGB MJ, vol. 1/3, no. 819. 36. Hayashi, Hoten Soryoji, 137. 37. Mayer-Oakes, Harada, 136; NGB MJ, II/2, 657-64. 38. Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Gaiko 60-nen, 79-80. 39. Aisin-gioro Pu Yi, From Emperor to Citizen, 2 vols, vol. II, 253-57; R.F. Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, 448ff. 40. Stimson to Forbes, 7 Jan. 1932 in NGB MJ, 1/3, nos. 134-35, 139-40; Goto, 137-38. 41. Goto, 139-42; Nish, Internationalism, 95. 42. Nish, Internationalism,97-98. 43. NGB MJ, II/l, 202-5. 44. Nish, Internationalism, 104-6. 45. Nish, Internationalism, 116-20. 46. Ozaki Yukio, "Constitutional Government in Japan," Proceedings of Japan Society of London, 28(1931), 28-39.

Notes

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CHAPTER 5—DEPARTURE FROM INTERNATIONALISM, 1932-1936 1. Kuramatsu Tadashi, "Saito Makoto" in Biographical Portraits, J.E. Hoare (ed.), iii, 193-94; Young, Imperial Japan, 172-4. 2. Works covering the second international phase of the Manchurian crisis include Stefan Hell, Der Mandschurei Konflikt: Japan, China und der Volkerbund, 1931-1933; Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperi alism, 1931-1937; Nish, Internationalism. 3. NGB MJ, H/2, 382-87, "Kokusai kankei yori mitaru jikyoku shod hoshin." 4. NGB MJ, II/l, 621-41. 5. Lytton report, 71 and 97; NGB MJ, II/2, 377-79. 6. Matsuoka's speeches in NGB, III, 83-86, 130-45. 7. NGB MJ, III, 235ff. 8. NGB MJ, III, 648-50 (Shanhaikuan); 688-91 (Jehol); Uchida speech of 21 Jan. 1933 in NGB Showaki, II/2/2, no. 1. 9. Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 988-91; NGB MJ, III, 528-44, 549ff, 614ff. 10. Lytton, "The fate of the League of Nations," Headway, 18(1936), 125. 11. NGB MJ, III, 867-72, 884-85; Coble, 102-12; Shimada Toshihiko in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 55-61. 12. R.J. Smethurst, "Japan's first experiment with democracy, 1868-1940," in Social Construction of Democracy, 1870-1990, ed. Andrews and Chapman. 13. John Crump, Hatta Shuzo, 118. 14. Crump, 95. 15. David Titus in MJRPW, The Final Confrontation, xxiii. On Takahashi, R.J. Smethurst, "Takahashi Korekiyo and Economic Policy during the Great Depression," in Learning in Likely Places: Varieties of Apprenticeship in Japan, ed. Singleton; and I.H. Nish, "Finance Minister Takahashi and the Manchurian Crisis" in What Is Behind the Japanese Miracle?, ed. Sungo Park and Mica Jovanovic, 34-38. 16. NGB Showaki, 11/2/2, 282-98; Fukai Eigo, Kaiko 70-nen, ch. 3. 17. NGB Showaki, II/2/2, ch. 9; Ishii Osamu and John Sharkey in Kibata and Nish (eds.), History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, vol. 2, chs. 3 and 4. 18. Shimada in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 76-9. But see Young, Imperial Japan, 209. 19. On the Petroleum Industry Law of 27 March 1934 and the Manchurian Oil Monopoly, Sharkey in Kibata and Nish (eds), o cit., vol. 2, 91-97; and Joseph Grew (ed.), Turbulent Era, II, 979-80. 20. Pu Yi, Emperor to Citizen, ii, 273-83. 21. Shimada in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 74. 22. Ian Nish, "Conflicting Japanese Loyalties in Manchuria" Japan Forum 6(1994), 216. 23. G.A. Lensen, Damned Inheritance, chs. 8-10. 24. NGB Showaki, II/2/2, 501-63; Jonathan Haslam, Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-1941, 43. 25. NGB Showaki, II/2/2, 564-67. 26. NGB Showaki, II/2/2, 47-149; Dick Richardson, "Geneva Disarmament Conference," in Decisions and Diplomacy, ed. Richardson and Stone, 73-79.

190

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27. The main sources on naval matters are Daihonei kaigunbu: Rengo kantai, vol. i, 278-83; Gendaishi shiryo, vol. 12, "Nitchu senso", ch. 1, 3-105; NGB vol umes on "Rondon gunshuku kaigi". The most detailed academic treatments are in Stephen Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, 125-36; Asada Sadao, Ryotaisenkan, 222-28. 28. NGJB 1934, no. 88; NGB 1934, no. 100. 29. Gaimusho no 100-nen, ii, 515-20. 30. Instructions are contained in Yamamoto's report of 19 Feb. 1935 in Gendaishi shiryo, 12, 83. 31. Ibid., 12, 83-85; Gaimusho no 100-nen, ii, 520-22. 32. The pro-German faction in the navy tended to be led by Captain Ishikawa Shingo. He was one of those who, in July 1935, was instrumental in setting up the Research Committee for South Seas policy in the General Staff and was then sent on a round-the-world cruise. 33. Rengo kantai, i, 282-83. 34. Nagano's note of 15 Jan. 1936 in NGNSB, ii, 323-24; Rengo kantai, i, 283 85. 35. Rengo kantai, i, 285-87. 36. Gaimusho no 100-nen, i, 991-96. CHAPTER 6—FACING THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, 1935-1937 1. NGB Showaki, II/2/2, chs. 8-9. 2. "Kokusai Remmei ni yoru tai-Chukoku enjo mondai" in NGB Showaki, 11/ 2/2, 299-340. 3. Coble, 153-56; Young, Imperial Japan, 203-4; NGNSB, ii, 284-87. 4. Kibata "Anglo-Japanese Relations: Missed Opportunities?" in Kibata and Nish (eds), ii, 9-11; Hosoya "Britain and the US in Japan's View" in Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 20-22; Matsuura Masatake, NitChu senso ki ni okeru keizai to seiji. 5. E.L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, 194-200; Dick Wilson, Long March, 1935. 6. Shimada in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 102-14, 114-22; Coble, 202-9. 7. Ian Nish, "Germany, Japan and the Manchurian Crisis," in Deutschland und Japan in der Zwischenkriegzeit, ed. Kreiner and Mathias, 91-104. 8. Frank Ikle, "Germany," in Japan's Foreign Policy, ed. Morley, 306ff; Miyake Masaki, Nichi-Doku-I sankoku domei no kenkyu, Tokyo, 1975. 9. Gerhard Krebs and Bernd Martin (eds.), Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin-Tokyo, Munich: iudicium, 1994, 14-15. 10. Tajima Nobuo, "Die japanische Botschaft in Berlin" in Krebs and Martin, op. cit., 64-65; Ohata Tokushiro, "Anti-Comintern Pact" in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 23-24. 11. Krebs and Martin, op. cit., 15-16. 12. Carl Boyd, Extraordinary Envoy: General Hiroshi Oshima. 13. Ben-ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan. 14. Yoshida Yuki, Whispering Leaves, 35-36. 15. London Times, 2 March 1936. Ian Nish, "Ambassador at Large: Yoshida

Notes

191

Shigeru" in Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History, Henny and Lehmann, 208-9. 16. A good account is given in Emperor Hirohito and His Chief Aide-de-Camp: The Honjo Diary, 1933-1936, translated by Mikiso Hane. 17. Ohata in MJPRW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 29-32. 18. Gaimusho no 100-nen, ii, 392ff. 19. Robert Whymant, Stalin's Spy, 88-9. Pact terms are given in MJPRW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 265ff, Appendices 1, 2. 20. Leonid Kutakov, Japanese Foreign Policy, 12. 21. Valdo Ferretti, II Giappone e la Politica Estera Italiana, 1935-1941, 166ff. 22. Ohata in MJPRW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 41. 23. Gaylord Kubota, "Nichi-Doku bokyo kyotei ni okeru usuzumiiro gaiko no tenkai" [Arita's Thin Ink diplomacy in the Anti-Comintern Pact], Kokusai seiji 56(1976), 46-64. 24. Aizawa Kiyoshi, "The Tripartite Pact and the Japanese Navy's Strategy" and "The Navy in Interwar Japan", International Affairs (STICERD, LSE) 311(1996), 1-11. 25. Ikeda Kiyoshi, Nihon no kaigun, ii, 135-36. 26. Rengo kantai, i, 305-19. 27. NGNSB, ii, 360-62. 28. On the Sian Incident, Coble, 341-4; Shimada in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 224-25; Gendaishi shiryo, vol. 12, "NitChu senso", 239-33 29. Coble, 345-51; Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek: His Life and Times, 51622. 30. Brooks, Imperial Diplomacy, 173-5; Shimada in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 225-27. 31. Sato Naotake, Kaiko 80-nen, 375. 32. NGNSB, ii, 360-62. 33. Prince Takamatsu's diary entry for 19 June 1937, quoted by Kibata in Kibata and Nish (eds), ii, 14, from Agawa Hiroyuki (ed.), Takamatsu no miya nikki, 456. CHAPTER 7—THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR: FIRST PHASE, 1937-1939 1. Oka Yoshitake, Konoe Fumimaro, ch. 3; Yabe Teiji, Konoe, 267ii. "Shina jihen" (China incident) is the euphemism applied by the Japanese to the war of 1937-45. It has to be said that "jihen" has a stronger meaning than the English "incident"; but they both fall far short of the word "war". 2. Hata in MJPRW, China Quagmire, 256. 3. Shiroyama Saburo, War Criminal; Brooks, 181-84. 4. Hata in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 248-62; Coble, Facing Japan, 370-74. 5. Lu in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 237-38; Hsu Long-hsuen, History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45. 6. The immense literature on this subject has been greatly expanded since the publication of Iris Chang's The Rape of Nanking in 1997. This has since been complemented by the new evidence from the diaries of John Rabe, edited as The Good German of Nanking (1998) by Erwin Wickert. The Japanese position has

192

Notes

been discussed over the years by Professor Hora Tomio and more recently in Hata Ikuhiko, Nankin jiken (1986) and "The Nanking Atrocities: Fact and Fable" in Japan Echo (1998), 47-57. Recent reassessments include Joshua Fogel (ed.), The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (2000); Timothy Brook (ed.), Documents on the Rape of Nanking (1999); Dick Wilson, When Tigers Fight (1970). But older studies are still useful, notably Lewis Smythe, War Damage in the Nanking Area (1938). 7. Brooks, 181-84. 8. John Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 40; Tobe Ryoichi, Nihon rikugun to Chugoku, 215-16. 9. North China Daily News, 30 Jan. 1938, quoted in Rabe, 194; Yoshida Yuki, Whispering Leaves, 43. 10. NGNSB, ii, 372-75. 11. Hata in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 280ff. 12. For German mediation, see Rabe, 259-64. 13. WC. Kirby, Germany and Republican China, 234-39; Brooks, 187-88; Tobe, 201-2. 14. Valdo Ferretti, II Giappone e la Politica Estera Italiana, 175-80, 205ff; Carl Boyd, Extraordinary Envoy, 56. 15. Togo to Hirota, 5 May 1938, quoted in Hagihara Nobutoshi, Togo Shigenori—Denki to kaisetsu, 226. 16. Nihon gaiko bunsho: 1935-nen Rondon kaigun kaigi; Allison, Ambassador, 33-35; Usui, "Japanese views of Britain," in Alienation, ed. Ian Nish, 33-35. 17. Pelz, ch. 12. 18. Usui in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 52-53; Brooks, 193-94. 19. Ohata in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 52-53, 70. 20. Usui in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 336-37. 21. Tobe, 209-12; J. Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War; Gerald Bunker, Peace Conspiracy, 82-84. 22. Gendaishi shiryo, vol. 12, "NitChu senso", 395ff. 23. Ohata in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 71-77. 24. Ohata in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 77-88. 25. Boyd, Extraordinary Envoy, appendix; Ohata in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 105-6 and Appendix 4. 26. Boyd, Extraordinary Envoy, 121. 27. Robert Whymant, Stalin's Spy, 104-5; Coox in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 120. 28. Coox in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 119. 29. Hata in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 153-57; Shigemitsu Mamoru,/tfpdw and Her Destiny, ch. 8. 30. Coox, Nomonhan, ii, 886, figures from Appendix J. 31. Coox, Nomonhan, ii, ch. 41; Hata in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 171. 32. Interview with Dudley Cheke, British consular officer, Mukden, 1939; Sorge to Moscow, 24 Jan. 1940 quoted in Whymant, Stalin's Spy, 109. 33. Hosoya in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 190-92; Whymant, Stalin's Spy, 109-11. 34. Hosoya in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 199. 35. Japan's statement of neutrality, 4 Sept. 1939, in NGNSB, ii.

Notes

193

36. Inouye Yuichi, "Arita no hiroba keizaiken koso to tai-Ei kosho," Kokusai Seiji 56(1976), 65-84; NGNSB, ii. 37. Essays by Kibata and Best in Kibata and Nish (eds.), Political-Diplomatic Dimension, ii, 17-18, 40^1. CHAPTER 8—JAPAN, CHINA, AND THE EUROPEAN WAR, 1939-1941 1. Good general accounts are to be found in essays by Iriye and Hosoya in Borg and Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History; John Pritchard with Calvocoressi and G. Wint, Total War, vol ii; Peter Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War; Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor, 1936-41. 2. Ikeda Kiyoshi, "Anglo-Japanese relations, 1941-1945" in Kibata and Nish (eds.), Political-Diplomatic Dimension, ii, 112-13; Ian Nish, "The Renovationist Faction in the Japanese Foreign Ministry," Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies 1(1976), 95-109; Tobe Ryoichi, "Gaimusho Kakushinha to gumbu" in Miyake Masaki et al., Showashi no gumbu to seiji, Tokyo: Daiichi Hoki, 1983. 3. Stephen Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, ch. 14; Ikeda, Nihon no kaigun, ii, 143203; Rengo kantai, i, 369-71. 4. Hosoya, "Britain and the US in Japan's View" in Alienation, ed. Nish, 6566; Hosoya in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 213-14. 5. NGNSB, ii, 436-7; Hosoya in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 220-1. 6. On Matsuoka, Miwa Kimitada, Matsuoka: sono ningen to gaiko; Hosoya in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 232-55. 7. Hosoya in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 255-57 and Appendices. 8. Hosoya in MJRPW, Deterrent Diplomacy, 256. 9. Ikeda, Nihon no kaigun, ii, 135. 10. Usui in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 379-84. 11. Japanese Foreign Ministry archives, A6/6/01 v. 3 [hereafter cited as JFM]; Usui in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 421-24. 12. Usui in MJRPW, China Quagmire, 409-22; Tobe, Nihon rikugun, 214. 13. Wen-hsin Yeh (ed.), Wartime Shanghai, 1-5; Chan Lau Kitching, China, Britain and Hong Kong, 1895-1945, 305-8. Sino-Japanese Treaty of 9 Jan. 1943 in NGNSB, ii, 581-2. 14. Best, Britain, Japan, 117-19; John Dreifort, Myopic Grandeur, 1919-1945, ch. 8; Richard Aldrich, Key to the South, 1939-1942, chs. 5-6. "Japan's Policy to wards the South" (17 April 1941) in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, Appendix 3 and NGNSB, ii, 495-96. 15. JFM archives, A7/0/0/9-2 vol. 3. 16. Hata in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, ch. 3. 17. I differ from many authors over the importance of the Automedon evidence. See my debate with Professor Ikeda Kiyoshi in "Germany and the Capture of the Automedon Documents" International Studies (STICERD, LSE), 3(1986), 38-49. 18. Nagaoka in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, 232-33. 19. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 137-41. 20. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 137-41; Hosoya in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, ch. 1 with Appendix, Matsuoka to Molotov, 13 April 1941.

194

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21. Osaki Yukio in JFM archives, A6/6/0/1 vol. 3. 22. For Nomura, Hilary Conroy, "Nomura Kichisaburo," in Diplomats in Crisis, ed. Burns and Bennett, 297-313; Hosoya in Pearl Harbor as History, 150-51; Komatsu Keiichiro, Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of "Magic," 189-90. 23. Hosoya in Pearl Harbor as History, 151-53. 24. NGB Showaki, II/2/2, "Ran-in ni okeru yunyu seigen mondai," 686-723; Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Gaiko 60-nen, chs 8-9; Nagaoka in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, 125-55. The most detailed treatment is in Goto Kenichi, Returning to Asia, 54-9, 95-100. 25. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, 287-95; Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 199 201. 26. John Sharkey in Kibata and Nish, Political-Diplomatic Dimension, ii, 99 101; Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 157H. 27. Whymant, Stalin's Spy, 211-17 passim; Coox, Nomonhan, ii, 1034-52; Komatsu, Origins, 105-10. 28. NGNSB, ii, 531-2; Whymant, Stalin's Spy, 220-21. 29. Nagaoka in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, 236-40. 30. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 150-57; Nagaoka in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, 238-40. 31. Nagaoka in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, 239-40; Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 180-81. 32. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 181-85; 194-97. 33. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 199. CHAPTER 9—THE ASIA-PACIFIC WAR, 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 4 3 1. "Senso shumatsu sokushin ni kansuru fukuan", agreed at the Liaison Conference of 13-15 Nov. 1941 in NGNSB, ii, 560-61. 2. Toyoda to Nomura, 26 Aug. 1941 in NGNSB, ii, 542-4. 3. On Tojo, R.J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War; Alvin Coox, Tojo. A more sympathetic account is given in the revisionist movie about Tojo, "Puraido: ummei no toki." 4. London Times, 18 Oct. 1941. 5. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 264. On Togo, Hagihara Nobutoshi, "Togo as Ambassador to Berlin," International Studies (STICERD, LSE), 3(1986), 1-9. 6. "Tai Bei-Ei-Ran-Chiang senso shumatsu sokushin" in NGNSB, ii, 560-61. Komatsu Keiichiro, Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of "Magic", 295 and 300-304. 7. Komatsu, 247. 8. Hilary Conroy, "Nomura," in Diplomats in Crisis, ed. Burns and Bennett, 297-313. 9. Yoshizawa, Gaiko 60-nen, 241-6. Hata in MJRPW, Fateful Choice, 191-92. 10. Tsunoda in MJRPW, Confrontation, 315-17. But, for a critique of Tsunoda's views, see David Titus, "Introduction," xxxiii. 11. Komatsu, 438-46.

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12. Iguchi Takeo, "Surprise attack on Pearl Harbor," Asahi Evening News, 4 June 2000. Dick Wilson, "Did Japan Declare War?" Asian Affairs, 31(2000), 3 7 40. 13. Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, 9 Dec. 1941; Ong Chitchung, Operation Matador, 1918-41, 230-33; Aldrich, Key to the South, 360-61. 14. Fujiyama Naraichi in Gaiko shiryo kampo 4(1991), 27-40. 15. Good accounts are given in the essays of Krebs and Martin in Krebs and Martin (eds.), Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin-Tokyo, 11-51 passim; Miyake Masaki, Nichi-Doku-I sangoku domei no kenkyu; Yoshii Hiroshi, Nichi-Doku-I sangoku domei to Nichi-Bei kankei; Bernd Martin, Deutschland und Japan in Zweiten Weltkrieg. 16. Carl Boyd, Hitler's Japanese Confidant, 31-35; EC. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia, 324-29; NGNSB, ii. 17. NGNSB, ii, 574; Boyd, 35-37. 18. Nicholas Henderson, "Hitler's Biggest Blunder," History Today 43(1993), 35-43. 19. Boyd, 44-6; Jones, 401; NGNSB, ii, 582-83. 20. Official translation of the Imperial Rescript on the declaration of war, Japanese Government Publicity Department, 8 Dec. 1941. 21. "Kokusai josei to teikoku no tachiba", 29 June 1940 in NGNSB, ii, 4 3 3 34. 22. Eto Jun in Fukuda Yusuke, Reimei no seiki [The century of daybreak]: Daitoa kaigi to sono shuyakutachi, 262-3. 23. See Heng Teow, Japan's Cultural Policy toward China, 1918-1931, 213. 24. Aldrich, Key to the South, 350. 25. Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny, 281-85. Chan Lau Kitching, China, Britain and Hong Kong, 305ff. 26. Ikeda in Kibata and Nish (eds.), Political-Diplomatic Dimension, ii, 112, 117-18. 27. Shigemitsu, Destiny, 288-90. On Togo's resignation, Nishi Haruhiko, Kaiso no Nihon gaiko, 114-15, 126-28. 28. Ikeda in Kibata and Nish (eds.), ii, 119-20; Iriye, Power and Culture, 11314. 29. Jones, Japan's New Order, 369, 388; John Figgess in Japan Experiences, ed. H. Cortazzi, 9-10. 30. Shigemitsu, Destiny, 291-94; Ikeda in Kibata and Nish (eds), ii, 123-24; NGNSB, ii, 588-89. Iriye, 110-11: "The decisions of September 1943 prepared the Japanese psychologically and intellectually for accepting defeat in the war by stating that the objectives they had fought for had been achieved." 31. Fukuda, Reimei no seiki. 32. Furuya Tetsuo, NitChu senso; Fukuda, o cit. 113-19; Iriye, 118-21. 33. Fukuda, 241; Iriye, 120-21. 34. Iriye, 154. Cf. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Bombay: Asia Publishing, 1961, 498ff.

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Index

Abe Nobuyuki, General, 134, 138, 143 Abrikosov, Dmitrii, 53 Adachi Kenzo, 77 Allison, John, 122 Amau [Amo] Eiji, 104 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 25, 28 Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), 109-11, 124, 130-31, 135, 178 Araki Sadao, General, 85-86, 91-92, 94 Arita Hachiro, 108-9, 127, 129-30; as foreign minister, 135, 138, 158 Ariyoshi Akira, 93 Arsene-Henry, Charles, 144-45 Asahi newspaper, 163-64 Aung San, 172 Automedon incident (1940), 145-46 Ba Maw, 172, 173 Balfour, Arthur J., 28-29, 40-43 Blyucher, V. K., General, 132 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 172, 173 Brussels Conference (1937), 123, 124 Burma Road, 144 Burma-Japan Alliance (1943), 172 Chang Hsueh-liang, 61, 71, 75-76, 88, 114-15 Chang Tso-lin, 52-53, 55, 59-60, 64 Changkufeng, battle, 131 Chiang Kai-shek, 58-61, 90, 105, 11415, 124-28, 142, 154, 170

China: financial consortium, 22; Opium Conference (1924), 54; Tariff Conference (1925), 43, 5 4 55; trade boycott, 73 Chinese Eastern Railway, 94 Ciano, Galeazzo, 110, 124, 140 Coox, Alvin, 131 Craigie, (Sir) Robert, 135, 160 Crowley, James, 182 Curzon, (Lord) George, 25, 26 Dan Takuma, Baron, 78 Elder Statesmen (Genro), 15 Etojun, 169 First Manchurian Incident (1929), 7 1 73 Fujiyama Naraichi, 164 Geneva Naval Conference (1927), 67 German-Italian-Japanese Agreements (1941-43), 166-67 German-Manchukuo Pact (1936), 111 Goto Harumi, 80 Goto Shimpei, Baron, 52 Great East Asia: Conference (1943), 172-74; Co-prosperity Sphere, 14445, 170-71, 180; Solidarity Bloc (1940), 143 Great East Asian War, 2-3, 169

210 Grew, Joseph, 160 Hamaguchi Osachi (Yuko), 65, 68-70, 176 Hanihara Masanao, 34 Hara Takashi (Kei), 14-18, 22-28, 3 3 34, 176 Harding, Warren G., 36 Hata Shunroku, General, 57 Hayashi Gonsuke, 46 Hayashi Kyujiro, 74-75 Hayashi Senjuro, General, 74, 115-16, 119 Hiranuma Kiichiro, 129, 132-34 Hirota Koki, 92-93, 96, 104, 108-9; as foreign minister, 122-23; as prime minister, 113, 115, 119 Hitler, Adolf, 128 Homma Masaharu, General, 122 Honjo Shigeru, General, 75-76, 86 Hosoya Chihiro, 141 Hughes, Charles Evans, 27, 29, 37-38, 41-43 Hull, Cordell, 148, 152, 158-62 Ichihashi Yamato, 42 Indochina, 144-45 Inoue Junnosuke, 66, 78 International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), 3, 11 Inukai Tsuyoshi, 78, 82-84, 85 Ishii-Lansing notes, 46 Ishikawa Shingo, Captain, 112, 141 Ishiwara Kanji, General, 86-87, 121 Itagaki Seishiro, General, 86-87, 12630, 131-32 Italy, 123-24 Ito Nobufumi, 129 Japan: Foreign Ministry Information Bureau, 6, 8, 24; history textbooks, 10; Imperial Defense Plans (1922), 45, (1936), 112-13; Navy, 35-36 Joffe, Adolf, 52 Kajima Morinosuke, 5-6, 42 Kanaya Hanzo, General, 76-77 Kanin, Prince, 77, 120

Index Kanto Earthquake (Kanto Daishinsai), 49 Kasahara Yukio, 128 Kato Kanji, Admiral, 37-38, 68-69 Kato Takaaki, 50, 54, 56 Kato Tomosaburo, Admiral, 29, 33-49 Kawagoe Shigeru, 113, 121, 123 Kayano Nagatomo, 78 Kimura Eiichi, 74 Kiyoura Keigo, Count, 50 Kobayashi Ichizo, 148-49 Komatsu Keiichiro, 160 Komoto Daisaku, 60-61 Konoe Fumimaro, Prince, 108, 119, 127, 129, 139-41; as prime minister, 142, 144, 147-48, 150, 152, 15859, 168 Kuantung army, 51-55, 74-76, 86, 89, 91-96, 105, 116, 131-33, 146, 151, 178 Kuhara Fusanosuke, 77 Kurusu Saburo, 140, 152, 161-63 Lampson, (Sir) Miles, 81 Large, Stephen, 9 Laurel, Jose, 169, 172, 173 League of Nations, 41, 103-4, 17778; Japan resigns, 88-90; Manchurian crisis, 75-77, 81, 92, 94, 100-101, 102; racial equality, 20-21 Leith-Ross, (Sir) Frederick, 104-5 Liaison Conference (renraku kaigi), 138 Litvinov, Maksim, 95, 110, 131 London Economic Conference (1933), 91, 104 London Naval Conferences (1930), 66-69; (1934), 96-99; (1935), 9 9 100 Lytton Commission, 77, 85-87, 89, 91 Lyushkov, (General) G.S., 130 Makino Nobuaki (Shinken), 18-19, 107, 181 Manchukuo, 175, 177-78 Matsudaira Tsuneo, 67, 99 Matsui Iwane, General, 122

Index Matsuoka Yosuke, 58, 81, 87-89, 92, 138, 140; in Europe, 146-48; as foreign minister, 141, 144-45, 14950, 152, 180 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 133, 146 Mori Kaku, 58, 78 Morley, James W , 5-6 Murayama Tomiichi, 10-11 Mushakoji Kintomo, 107, 109 Mussolini, Benito, 165 Nagai Matsuzo, 100 Nagano Osami, Admiral, 100, 112 Nagaoka Shinichi, 148 Nakamura Shintaro, 74 Nanking, 'Rape' of, 121-22 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact (1939), 133-34, 140 Netherlands East Indies, 148-49, 168 New Order in East Asia, 168 Nikolaievsk incident (1920), 52-53 Nomonhan incident (1939), 132-33 Nomura Kichisaburo, Admiral, 80-81, 138; ambassador in U.S., 147-48, 152, 154, 158-63 Obata Yukichi, 41, 71 Ohashi Chuichi, 140 Oikawa Koshiro, Admiral, 140 Okada Keisuke, Admiral, 69, 92, 97, 107, 108 Oshima Hiroshi, General, 106-7, 12529, 133-34, 140, 141, 146-47, 159, 161-66 Ott, Eugen, General, 140-41, 165 Ozaki Yukio, 36, 147 Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand) (1928), 62,72 Pan-Asianism, 169, 171, 174 Pearl Harbor attack, 1-2, 39, 163, 166, 179 Peking Tariff Conference (1925), 43, 54-55 Phibun Songkhram, 170 Pu Yi, Emperor, 79, 87, 93 Rabe, John, 122

211 Rajchmann, Louis, 103 Renovationist group (Kakushinha), 18, 134, 138 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 106-7, 111, 124, 128, 130, 140, 146, 165 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 125-26, 15354, 158, 164 Saburi Sadao, 70-71 Saionji Kimmochi, Prince, 18-19, 107 Saito Makoto, Admiral, 67, 85, 92, 107 Sakuradamon incident (1932), 78 Sato Naotake, 115-16 Schnee, Heinrich, 106 Shantung expeditions: (1927), 58-59; (1928), 60-63 Shidehara Kijuro, 50-57, 62-65, 6585, 176, 180, 182 Shigemitsu Mamoru, 71, 73-75, 8081, 127, 131; as foreign minister, 170-72, 180 Shiozawa Koichi, Admiral, 73, 80 Shirakawa Yoshinori, 80-81 Shiratori Toshio, 127, 129, 134 Showa Emperor, 4-5, 9, 126; as Crown Prince, 23-24, 35, 44, 50; as Emperor, 61, 78, 164, 167-68, 18182 Sian incident (1936), 114 Siberian Intervention (1918), 22-23, 39, 45, 51-52, 175, 177 Simla Conference (1933), 92 Singapore, 1-2, 39, 164-65, 168-69 Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact (1937), 116, 119 Snow, Edgar, 76 Soekarno, 172 Solf, Wilhelm, 105 Soong, TV. (Tzu-wen), 74, 103 Sorge, Richard, 133 South Manchurian Railway, 68-85 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (1941), 146-47 Soviet-Mongol Alliance (1936), 96, 131-32 Stahmer, Heinrich, 140 Stimson, Henry L., 79

212 Sugimura Yotaro, 88, 110, 124 Sugiyama Hajime, General, 120 Taisho Emperor, 4, 23-24 Takahashi Korekiyo, 35, 39, 44; as finance minister, 91, 107, 176 Tanaka Giichi, 23, 57; as prime minister, 58-59, 60-64, 67 Tanaka Kunishige, General, 39 Tani Masayuki, 144 Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, General, 75, 146-47 Terauchi Hisaichi, General, 172 Tientsin incident (1939), 135 Togo Shigenori, 124-25, 127, 133; as foreign minister, 159-63, 167, 171, 180 Tojo Hideki, General, 126, 159-61, 171-73 Tokugawa Iesato, Prince, 34 Toyoda Teijiro, Admiral, 152-53, 159 Tripartite Pact (1941), 3, 139-41, 166 Trotter, Ann, 181 Tsuji Masanobu, Colonel, 132 Twenty-one Demands (1915), 177 Twenty-sixth February incident (1936), 107 Uchida Yasuya, 19-20, 62, 85-86

Index Ugaki Kazushige, 51, 57-58, 63, 12627 Ume Kikan, 128 United States, 2; Japanese immigration, 46-47, 49-50; Japanese Trade Agreement (1911), 135-36, 137, 147 Wakatsuki Reijiro, 50, 56-58, 65, 6769,76 Wang Ching-wei, 123, 124, 128, 14244, 170 Washington Conference (1921), 2 8 30, 33-48 Wilson, Woodrow, 18-19, 20, 22-23 Yada Shichitaro, 56 Yamagata Aritomo, General, 15 Yamamoto Gonnohyoei, Admiral, 49 Yamamoto Isoroku, Admiral, 98-99, 139 Yamanashi Hanzo, General, 45-46 Yamanashi Katsunoshin, Admiral, 44, 67 Yamashita Tomoyuki, General, 164-65 Yap island, 39-40 Yonai Mitsumasa, Admiral, 130, 139 Yoshida Shigeru, 59,108, 111, 122,127 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 78-79, 149, 162

About the Author IAN NISH is Professor Emeritus of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His most recent publications are Japan's Struggle with Internationalism, 1931-33 (1993) and The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe (1998).