International Human Rights in the 21st Century: Protecting the Rights of Groups

International HumanRights in the21stCentury

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International HumanRights in the21stCentury ProtectingtheRightsof Groups Editedby GeneM. Lyonsand

JamesMayall

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, I N C .

Lanham Boulder New York Oxford

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS,INC. Published in theUnitedStatesof America by Rowman& LittlefieldPublishers, Inc. Group A Memberof theRowman& LittlefieldPublishing 4720BostonWay, Lanham,Maryland20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com

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retrievalsystem,or transmitted in anyformor by anymeans,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, withoutthepriorpermission of the publisher. BritishLibraryCataloguing in Publication InformationAvailable Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data International humanrightsin the21stcentury:protecting therights of groups/ editedby GeneM. LyonsandJamesMayall. p. cm. Includesbibliographical references (p. ) andindex. ISBN 0-7425-2352-7(cloth)- ISBN 0-7425-2353-5(paper) 1. Humanrights. I. Lyons,GeneMartin, 1924- 11. Mayall,James. JC571.I5918 2003 323.14~21 2002011579 Printedin theUnitedStatesof America

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Contents

Preface

vii

List of Acronyms

ix

Part I. From Individualto GroupRights I. StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

GeneM. LyonsandJamesMayall

2. In Defenseof theUniversalDeclaration Model JackDonnelly

3 20

Part 11. The Casefor GroupRights 3. HumanRightsandCulturalPluralism

Jennifer Jackson-Preece

4. Indigenous Rights

49

72

Hurst Hannum

5. Protecting theHumanRightsof Women

Eva Brems

100

Part 111. The Roleof InternationalSociety 6. HumanRightsin Weak,Divided,andThreatened States Marc Weller

141

7. EnforcingHumanRights Nicholas J. Wheeler

169 V

vi

Contents

8. HumanRightsandInternational Politics

JamesMayall and GeneM. Lyons

200

Index

219

AbouttheContributors

225

Preface

This bookhadits originsin a meetingat DartmouthCollegein the fall of 1998to assess thefiftiethanniversary of theUniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.At thetime,we recognized thewidespread significance of thedeclarationandthe subsequent covenants that,together,makeup an international asan intebill of rightsand,mostimportant,havebecomewidelyaccepted gralpartof normativebehaviorin international relations. But we alsorecognizedthatthedeclaration andthe covenants largelyfocuson theprotection of individualrightsandgiveonlyindirectattentionto the rightsof groups, viotheir culture,language, and identity,whichhavebecomeincreasingly lated,especially sincetheendof the ColdWar. In the monthsthatfollowed,we becameconvinced thatthe problemsof grouprightsdeservespecialattention,particularly(but not exclusively) in casesof weakanddividedstateswherehumanrightshavebeenbrutallyviolatedbecause of ethnicor religiousdifferences andwherethepositionof womenhasbeenconsistently degraded. Thelastdecadeof thetwentiethcentury alsoprovideda seriesof casesof failedand dividedstateswherethe international communityhadintervened, in thefirstinstance,to provide humanitarian assistance, but in a numberof cases,to attendto thewider processes of nationbuilding,includingthe protectionof humanrightsfor is mixedbut neverindividuals andfor groups.The recordof intervention background toanticipate theproblems of interthelessservesasa significant nationalhumanrightsin the twenty-firstcentury,mostparticularlythe rightsof groups. We thereforetooktheinitiativeto assemble the scholars whohavecontributedto thisbookandto convene two workingsessions, thefirstat theCentre of International Studiesat the Universityof Cambridgeandthe second at theJohnSloanDickey Centerfor International Understanding at DartmouthCollege.We aregratefulto thetwo centersfor financialsupportthat vii

...

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Preface

enabledus to bringtheprojecttogether.We arealsogratefulto theparticifor pantsfor theirwillingness to join us.Eachof usis, of course,responsible hisor her own contribution, but we all profitedgreatlyfromthe sharpand challenginginteractions at the meetingsin Cambridgeand Hanover.In essence, ourpurposehasnot beento be definitivebut ratherto introduce perplexing issues thatshouldoccupytheattentionof scholars andstatesmen for muchof the centurythat hasnow started.We hopethat we havesucceeded.

List of Acronyms

ASEAN AU CEDAW CIM CIS CmEDAW COE

csw

DAW ECHR ECtHR ECOSOC ECOWAS EU FGM GATT HCNM ICC ICCPR ICESCR ICJ 1cm ILO IMF

Association of Southeast Asian Nations African Union Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Commission Interamericana de Mujeres (Inter- American Commission of Women) Commonwealth of Independent States Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Council of Europe Commission on the Status of Women Division for the Advancement of Women European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Economic and Social Council Economic Community of West African States European Union Female genital mutilation General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade High Commissioner for National Minorities International Criminal Court International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights International Court of Justice International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Labor Organization International Monetary Fund

X

INSTRAW

Listof Acronyms

International Research andTrainingInstitutefor the Advancement of Women International RefugeeOrganization IRO KosovoLiberationArmy KLA NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization NATO Nongovernmental organization NGO of AmericanStates Organization OAS Organization of AfricanUnity OAU UnitedNationsOperationin theCongo ONUC ONUMOZ UnitedNationsOperationin Mozambique Organization for SecurityandCooperation in Europe OSCE Presidential DecisionDirective PDD NationalResistance RENAMO Mozambiquan RPF Rwandese PatrioticFront SouthWestAfricaPeople’sOrganization SWAP0 UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights UDHR UnitedNationsAssistance Missionfor Rwanda UNAMIR UnitedNationsAouzouStripObserverGroup UNASOG UnitedNationsAngolaVerificationMission UNAVEM UnitedNationsCommission on HumanRights UNCHR UnitedNationsEducational, Scientific,andCultural UNESCO Organization andPakistan UNGOMAP UnitedNationsGoodOfficesin Afghanistan UN Officeof theHigh Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR UnitedNationsDevelopment Fundfor Women UNIFEM UNIIMOG UnitedNationsIran-Iraq Military ObserverGroup NationalUnionfor theFull Independence of Angola UNITA UnifiedTaskForce UNITAF UnitedNationsMissionin Ethiopia/Eritrea UNMEE in Prevlaka UnitedNationsMissionof Observers UNMOP UnitedNationsMissionof Observers in Tajikistan UNMOT UnitedNationsObserverMissionin Georgia UNOMIG UNOMUR UnitedNationsObserverMissionUganda-Rwanda UNOSOM UnitedNationsOperationin Somalia UnitedNationalSecurityForcein WesternNew Guinea UNSF UnitedNationsTransitional Authorityin Cambodia UNTAC WorldTradeOrganization WTO

FROM INDIVIDUAL TO GROUP RIGHTS

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1 StatingtheProblemof GroupRights GeneM. LyonsandJamesMayall

The UnitedNationsapproved the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights spawned two international covenants, oneon civil in 1948.The declaration andpoliticalrightsandthe otheron economic, social,and culturalrights. Together,the declaration andthe two covenants comprisean international bill of rights,a setof normsandprocedures, whichthe greatmajorityof stateshaveratified.More specifictreatieshavealsobeendeveloped-for example,to protectthe rightsof womenandchildrenandrid the worldof racialdiscrimination. Together,thesecommitments makehumanrightsa matterof international concernandgovernments liableto the international accomplishcommunity for theirimplementation. All of thisis a formidable mentoverthepastfifty-plusyears.What,then,is theproblem? Theproblemis twofold.First,governments continuetoviolatetheirtreaty obligations, theinternational communityis dividedonhowto compelstates to meettheir commitments, thereare tensionsbetweendifferentsetsof rights,andthe treatiesrun up againstthe claimof sovereignty by governmentsto dealwith domestic problems withoutoutsideinterference. Second, increasing controversies overtherightsof groupshavecomplicated theorigiandthe relationship betweenthestate nal focuson the rightsof individuals andtheindividual.Thisis especially truein thecaseof therightsof minorities,indigenous peoples, andwomenthatwereoriginallyneglected in creatinga baselinefor theinternational humanrightsregimewhentheUniversal Declarationwaswritten.The liberalapproachthat drovethe first seriesof humanrightsagreements hasbeenovertakenasindividualrightsbecome increasingly entangled in grouprightswheneverthe rights of individuals are violatedbecause they are membersof ethnicor religiousminoritiesor of indigenous peopleor because theyarewomen. 3

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This double-edged problemwasvividly exposedwith theendof theCold thatheightened theinternaWar, whichwasfollowedby twodevelopments tionalvisibilityand politicalsalienceof humanrights.First, the fall of the SovietUnionraisedthepoliticalstockof multipartydemocracy, leadingto thewidespread hopethatthemajorityof stateswouldnow optfor a democraticconstitutional orderwith full protectionof humanrights.The second was the resurgence of a seriesof fierceethnicand/orreligiousconflictsin whichtherewassystematic andwidespread abuseof fundamental rights.The scaleof thesehumanitarian catastrophes inevitablyfacedthe international community with the questionof how it shouldrespondand-since mostof theseconflictswerewithinthebordersof sovereign states-what basisthere wasfor interventioninto whatwere essentiallymattersof “domesticjurisdiction.’’ It was the desireto tracethe implicationsof thesedevelopments for the futureof the international humanrightsregimethatprovidedthe focusfor ourbook.Democracy and humanrightsarenotidenticalconcepts (asseveral of ourcontributors remindedus),buttheyoverlap.Mostimportant,if democraticpoliticsare to replaceauthoritarian systems, it is crucialthat fundamentalhumanrightsareentrenched in theworkingsof societyin realityand not merelyin theory.If they are not, therewill be no incentivefor those wholosean election,for example,to accepttheresults.It is possible,asJack Donnellyarguesin his chapterin thisbook,thatthe originalliberalregime can be adaptedto covernew concernsaboutthe rightsof groupswithout invokingnewsetsof obligations. But it is notobvious,particularlyin deeply dividedsocieties wheredemocratization, while oftenperceivedasa solution to civil conflict,canaseasilybecomea majorpartof theproblemif theinterestsof minoritiesare ignoredand they continueto fear beingtreatedlike second-class citizenswith theobliteration of theirculturalpracticesandlanguage. on therightsof groups This is the underlyingrationalefor concentrating in thechaptersthatfollow;theprotectionof grouprightsis a necessary part of any attemptto democratize troubledsocieties,especiallythosethat are deeplydivided.The reasonis that,in suchsocieties,constitutional guaranteesof individualcitizenrightsandthe rule of law may not be sufficientto overcomecommunaland/orsectarianidentitiesand rivalries.This is the essentialargumentin the chapteron minorityrightsby JenniferJacksonPreece,no lessthan in the chaptersthat follow on indigenouspeoplesby HurstHannumandthe rightsof womenby Eva Brems.If it canbe shown, for example,thattheexistingliberalframeworkcannotlenditselfto accommodatingissuesof greatimportanceto womenaswomen,thiswill provide powerfulsupportfor takinggrouprightsmoreseriouslythantheyhavebeen in the past.Also, as “native”to the countryin whichthey live, indigenous peoplesinsistthattheyarenotminorities,a distinctionthatmakesmorepsy-

StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

5

chological andhistoricalthanlogicalsense.Fromthepointof view of human rights,however,the campaignof indigenouspeoplesfor autonomyrather thansecession is nota directthreatto thesovereignty of statesand,paradoxically, may give themmoreroomfor maneuverin domesticpoliticsthan otherminoritiesenjoy. Ideally,theinternational communityshouldattemptto widenthebasisof humanrightsbothto serveasa prerequisite of credibledemocraticgovernment and to reassuremarginalizedgroupsof the legitimacyof democratic freedomsandpoliticsby guaranteeing therightsof theiridentity.Whathappens,however,whenall effortsto persuadegovernments to protecthuman rightsthroughdiplomaticchannels fail?O r whena government is tooweakenedor corrupted to fulfill itsobligations underinternational treaties? These arethequestions thatledusto considerthehumanrightsdimensionof internationalintervention, thesecondfocusof thebook.The strictproscriptions placedon theuseof forceundertheUnitedNationsCharterwouldseemto rule out interventionto respondto violationsof humanrights(asmuchas for any otherreason)exceptundervery limited circumstances: a threatto international peaceandsecurityasagreedto by theSecurityCouncil.Should thisproscriptionbe lifted, and if so,when?Underwhatconditionsshould the violationsof humanrightsbe interpretedas a threatto international peace?Havetheinterventions authorizedby theSecurityCouncil,especially after the Cold War, createda new setof commoninterestsin the internationalcommunity? Thesequestions are the centerof the chapterby NicholasJ. Wheeler. Whetherjustifiedor not, the international communityhasintervenedin a numberof conflictssincethe endof the ColdWar in whichtheviolationof humanrightshasnot beenthe only reasonbut hascertainlybeena major justification. Similarly,reconstruction effortsin countries wheretheSecurity Councilhas authorizedUN operations haveprovidedthat the civil and rightsand politicalorderberebuiltonthebasisof protectionof fundamental democratic institutions. How successful havetheseeffortsbeen,andto what extentdo they providesupportfor the view that international societyis evolvingtowardgreatersolidaritywith regardto the meaningand significanceof humanrights?Theevidencereviewedin thechapterby MarcWeller on thisissue. allowsus to reachtentativeconclusions Thecontributors in thisbookall agreedthattheworldhasmovedbeyond the narrowconfinesof the paradigmthat acceptsa naturallaw basisfor humanrightsand almostexclusivelyemphasizes the rightsof individuals, especiallyin relationto states.Thisis not to denytheimportance of liberalismasan argumentfor humanrights.AsJackDonnellyexplainsin hischapter, the originalliberalapproachhastakenus a longway, providingus with an ambitiousregimethatcontainsa far-reaching codeof humanrightsanda seriesof procedures, bothformalandinformal,to monitortheirimplemen-

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tation.The questionis whetherthe existingregimecanbe expandedto needbeadded.Libincludegrouprightsorwhethera newsetof obligations setof textsand eralismhasneverbeena staticphilosophy with a canonical prescribeddogmas,however.JustasJohnStuartMill waspersuaded by reflectionandexperience repeatedly to extendthe list of publicgoodsthat couldnot be providedby the unfettered market,’we areconvinced thatthe next fiftyyearsneedsan expanded frameworkof analysis, withinor beyond the presentregime,if the aim of extending humanrightsto thosewho are deniedthemis to succeed.

HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH HISTORY In manyrespects, humanrightshaveonlybeena majorissuein international politicssinceWorldWar 11. Fromthe emergence of modernstatesin the seventeenth century,humanrightshaveessentially beena matterbetween the stateandits people,with the behaviorof statesprotectedfrom outside interference by thedoctrineof sovereignty. Sovereignty, moreover,hasbeen a bedrockof theinternational system. Peaceandstabilityamongstateswere basedon thepremisethatstatesrecognized eachother’ssovereignty and intoeachother’sdomestic affairs.Nevertheless, sovagreednotto intervene ereignty,beyondits legaldimensions, hasneverbeenuniformor absolute. Somestates-to mimicGeorgeOrwell’sAnimalFarm-are moresovereign thanothers,and stateshavefrequentlybeencommittedby treatyto treat theirpeoplemorebenignlythantheymighthaveotherwise wished.2 From the beginning,for example,the internationalcommunityhas attempted throughtreatiesto protectminoritiesfrombeingrepressed by states. Thetreatiesthatmadeup thepeaceof Westphalia, comingastheydid at theendof thereligiouswars,prevailedon statesto ensuretherightof all groupsto followthereligionto whichtheybelong.Theimposition on state intothe nineteenth centurywhen policytoprotectminorityrightsextended themajorEuropean powersputpressure ontheOttomanEmpireto protect Duringthe Christianminorities(throughmilitarythreatsaswell astreaties). nineteenthcentury,the internationalcommunity-via the Concertof in abolishing the Europe-also madeinroadsontheprincipleof sovereignty of thewoundedandsickin war slavetradeandprovidingfor theprotection in thefirstGenevaconventions of 1864. Protectionof minoritieswas alsowrittendownin a seriesof treaties in theseveralcountries signedatthe endof WorldWar I to protectminorities beingformedout of the broken-upAustro-Hungarian Empire.Nevertheless,the ambitiousattemptby Japanto inserta provisionoutlawingracial wassummarilyrejectedby the other discrimination in the 1919 conference powersasa breachof theprinciples of sovereignty andnoninterference. All

StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

7

of theeffortsto protectminorities, moreover, weresubject to thewill of state authorities,and the widespread violationof minorityrightsin the years of thesysbetweenthetwoworldwarswasuglytestimonyto theweakness tem.Thishistoryprovidesmuchof thebackground to thechapterby Jennifer Jackson-Preece on the revivalof interestin, anddebateabout,minority rights. By 1945, thebehaviorof Nazi Germanysohorrifiedthe worldthatthere waslittleresistance to addinga provisionin theU N Charterthat,amongits majoraims,the UnitedNationswouldpromote“universalrespectfor, and observance of, humanrightsandfundamental freedoms for all withoutdistinctionasto race,sex,language, or religion.”CertainlytheHolocaust,the systematic attemptto eradicate theJewsof Europe,wasthe mostappalling of Nazi crimes.The Nazis’arrogantclaimof beinga superiorraceandthe throughout the countries thattheyoccupied deepfearsthattheyengendered createdwidespread supportfor raisinghumanrightsto a newlevelof internationalconcern. Theidealsof humanrightshadalreadybeengivenpositive directionby the “FourFreedoms” speechof FranklinDelanoRoosevelt in 1941, in whichthe Americanpresident calledfor a worldwith freedomof speech andworshipandequallyfreedomfromwantandfear. The humanrightsprovisions in the U N Charterare still limitedby the 2.7 recognitionof sovereignty and especially the admonitionin paragraph that “nothingcontainedin the presentChartershallauthorizethe United Nationsto intervenein matterswhichare essentially within the domestic to thislimijurisdiction of anystate.”Aswe notedearlier,theoneexception tationis whentheSecurityCouncilunderChapterVII authorizes enforcementmeasures. When,in effect,the SecurityCouncilfindsthat a threatto international peaceandsecurityexists,statesarenot protectedby the doctrine of sovereignty andcanbe held directlyaccountable for violationsof humanrights.In the yearssince1945, the expansion of the humanrights regimehasnot only threatened to erodethe conceptof sovereignty but, led the especiallysincethe end of the Cold War, has on severaloccasions SecurityCouncilto adopta widenedinterpretation of “international peace andsecurity”as the basisfor actionunderChapterVII of the Charter.In theprocess, thenarrowmeaningof securityas protectionof attackfrom anotherstateis slowlyshifting.Increasingly, threatsto worldpeaceemerge frominternalconflictsthatdirectlyaffectneighboring statesand,asthey becomemoreviolentand especiallyas they involvegrossviolationsof humanrights,alsodrawin theinterests andresources of majorstates, individuallyor in supportof internationally sanctioned coalitions.

THE EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Oneof thefirstactionstakenby theUnitedNationswhenit wasorganized a workingcommission to preparewhatcameto be in 1945 wasto establish

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the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights.From the time the Universal Declarationwasadoptedin 1948,it hasbeenwidely acceptedby statesand hasbecomepartof customary international law.3The declaration, by itself, is a statement of highlyendorsed intentionsbut is not operational in the senseof providingprocesses and institutionsfor the executionof its aims. The taskof writinga covenantto implementthe provisionsof the declaration becamemired in the conflictbetweencivil and politicalrights,on the onehand,andeconomic,social,and culturalrightson the other.TheWesternstatesstronglysupported civil andpoliticalrightsontwo grounds.First, on governments, whichare seen,in the tradithey emphasized constraints threatto personalliberty. tion of Westernpoliticalphilosophy, asa constant Second,becausegovernments weresoconstrained, politicaland civil rights couldbe expressed negativelyand in a form that, in principle,couldbe upheldin thecourts. TheWestwasmoredividedoneconomic, social,andculturalrights,which impliedan activerole for government. Suchrightswerestronglysupported by the WesternEuropeanstateswith importantsocialistconstituencies, as well asthe Sovietblocand,astheygainedindependence, by the developing countriesof AsiaandAfrica.TheUnitedStates,however,led theopposition to raisingtheserightsto a levelof obligationthatgovernments owedto their citizens.As a result,it wasagreedin the early 1950sto proceedby drafting two covenants, in effectseparating the two setsof rights.It was not until 1966thatthedocuments werereadyfor signature, andwhile theyhavebeen widelyratified,the UnitedStatesdid not ratify the civil andpoliticalrights covenantuntil 1992andhasneverratifiedthecovenanton economic,social, andculturalrights. Meanwhile,a seriesof anti-Semiticattacksin variouspartsof theworldin the early 1960sagainraisedthe spectrumof the Holocaustand renewed interestin writing,first,a declaration andthena “conventionontheelimination of all formsof racialdi~crimination.”~ Themomentum wasinitiallycarriedforwardby thecivilrightsmovementin theUnitedStatesandby newly independent African statesthat used the negotiations as a mechanism throughwhich to mobilizepoliticalsupportagainstthe apartheidgovernmentin SouthAfrica.Hereagain,Americanenthusiasm recededasconservative groupsin the United Statesfearedthat internationalhumanrights treaties,in general,would not only give the federalgovernmentincreased powerovertheindividualstatesbutwouldalsogivegovernment theauthority to limit the right of freedomof expression,guaranteedin the First Amendmentof theU.S. Constitution. DespiteAmericanreservations, the conventionon eliminatingracialdiscriminationwas alsoopenedfor signaturein 1966 andwaswidelyratified. Thecampaign againstapartheid, moreover,tookona life of itsownandcontinuedcondemnation was intensifiedin resolutions of the UN General

StatingtheProblemof GroupRights

9

Assembly,the Commonwealth, and,afterthe Sharpevillemassacre in 1960, periodicallyeventheSecurityCouncil.Cumulatively,thesepressures forced SouthAfrica into diplomaticisolation.The Westernpowers,however,continuedto vetoattemptsby the SecurityCouncilto imposeeconomicsanctionsunderChapterVII of the Charterin an attemptto disruptSouth Africantraderelationsanddeprivethe countryof essential imports. In 1977,afterthe murderof theblackconsciousness leaderSteveBiko by theSouthAfricanSecurityservice,Westernopposition faded,andtheCouncil imposeda mandatoryarmsembargo.From the mid-1980s,partly in response to pressurefrom the Commonwealth and the prosanctions lobby in theU.S. Congress, butprimarilyfromprivatefinancialinterestsactingfor prudentialreasons,thenet wastightened.To whatextentinternational condemnationand economicsanctions ultimatelycontributed to the fall of apartheidis very muchan openquestion.Nonetheless, the casewasonein whichthe shieldof sovereignty waspurposefully breachedby the internationalcommunityand servedas a precedentfor the moresubstantial challengeto theprincipleof sovereignty thathasresultedfromSecurityCouncil activitiesin the 1990s. The UnitedNationshasalsobecomean instrumentfor humanrightsinitiativesbeyondracialdiscrimination. A convention againstgenocide had alreadybeensignedin 1948andwasjoinedby “a convention againsttorture and othercruel,inhumanor degradingtreatmentor punishment” in 1984. Nevertheless, the difficultyof implementing theseeffortsto criminalize grossviolationsof rightsbecamemostevidentin the 1990s:For one,the international community failedto interveneto preventthe genocidalmassacreof Tutsiin Rwandain 1994;for another,theUN SecurityCouncilestablisheda weak“securityzone”thatprovedineffectivein deterringthekillings in Srebenica in 1995;and,yet again,it intervenedtoolatein Kosovoin 1998 to preventwhatamountedto a wide campaignof “ethniccleansing”of the KosovarAlbaniansby the Serbs(whichwas followedby the Serbsfleeing from theirhomeswhenthe Albaniansreturnedin the wakeof the NATOled intervention intotheKosovoconflict).At thesametime,therelevance of thetorturetreatywassharpened in 1998whenit becamethebasisfor a Spanish judgeexercisingthe right of universaljurisdictionto bringthe former Chileandictator,GeneralAugust0Pinochet,to trial for crimesagainst humanitywhile he washeadof state. Held in housearrestin Britain,the generalwas judgedto be medically unfit to standtrial and subsequently sentbackto Chile ratherthan extraditedto Spain.Nevertheless, buildingon the earlierNurembergtrials and the morerecentSecurityCouncildecisions to createad hoccriminalcourts for BosniaandRwanda,aswell asthe agreement in 1998to setup a permanentinternational criminalcourt,it will no doubtbe claimedin the future thatthePinochetcaseconfirmedthattheprincipleof “sovereign immunity”

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canno longerbe invokedto protectpoliticalleadersfrom takingpersonal responsibility for violatingthehumanrightsof theirpeople.Indeed,the apparentprecedentwas immediatelynoted:the Pinochetcasewas rapidly followedby thetrialof HisstneHabrCin Senegalese courts,forhumanrights violationscommitted while hewaspresident of Chad.Moreover,theindictof theYugoslavleader,Slobodan MiloSeviC, mentandultimatelythe transfer to theinternational tribunalin TheHaguein 2001, reinforced the concept of personal responsibility, notwithstanding questions raisedby theambiguities of “universal jurisdiction.” surrounding theapplication

EXTENDING HUMAN RIGHTS For all theexpansion, thereis stillconsiderable controversy overthe universalityof humanrights.At theU N humanrightsreviewconference in Vienna in 1993,representatives fromAsianstates,especially, insistedthattheinternationalbill of humanrightswas essentially a “Western”creation,andits provisionhadto be adaptedby othersin accordance with their own belief systems and culturalbackgrounds. Admittedly,manyAsianhumanrights groupslobbiedagainsttheirowngovernments atViennain favorof a universalstandard. Nonetheless, it is clearthatsomecultures holda narrowerrange of viewsontherelationsbetweentheindividualandthecommunitythanin the West andthat othersseedifferenttraditionalrolesfor womenin their society.The strongpressureto abandonthe idea of the universalityof humanrightsin favorof somekind of “culturalrelativism”mayhavebeen counlargelyopportunistic, butnotwhollyso.At thesametime,developing tries,led,in manyrespects, by China,insistthatmodernization anddemocthatmay requirecurtailment of political ratizationarelong-termprocesses rightsin ensuring thesocialstabilityessential for economic growth. Thetruthis thatthe “internationalization” of humanrightshasmorerapidly expanded in prosperous Europewherea EuropeanCourtof Human thatservesas an appealscourtwhenlitigants Rightshasbeenestablished haveexhausted nationalsystems of justice?Not onlyhasitsjurisdiction been dramatically broadened, butdecisions of the European Courtarebindingon participating memberstates.In Europe,the causeof humanrightswasalso advancedby the HelsinkiAccords,a seriesof agreements signedin 1975 betweenthe SovietUnionandits alliesandthe Westernmembersof the NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO) andthe European Union.The Helsinkidiscussions beganas an attemptby the SovietUnion to get some of its hegemony in EasternEurope.Duringthe course kind of recognition of longnegotiations, the Westinsistedon a setof humanrightsprovisions essentially involvingtheunitingof dividedfamilies,whichtheUSSRfinally accepted. The humanrights“basket,”asit cameto be called,wasexploited

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by privatehumanrightsgroupsin theWestto makecontactwith dissidents in the Easterncountries. The dissidents, in turn,mobilizedby leaderslike VaclavHave1in Czechoslovakia andAndreiSakharov in the SovietUnion, took the accordsas a basisfor pressingfor freedomof association and to expression and,with materialsupportfromwesterncontacts, contributed thefall of thecommunist regimes. Morebroadly,however,humanrightshavebeenfurtherextended in three of international activityin proways.First,therehasbeena vastexpansion tectingrefugeesandprovidinghumanitarian assistance in countriesdevastatedby civil conflict.6 Theseareareas,whiledistinctuntothemselves, that clearlyoverlapwith humanrights.EvenwhileWorldWar I1 continued, programshadbeendeveloped to dealwith the hundredsof thousands of refugees,largelyfrom EasternEurope,who hadbeendrivenfrom theirhomes and,in manycases, takenintoGermanyasforcedlaborers. In theyearsafter thewar,theInternational RefugeeOrganization (IRO) at firstbeganto repatriatethesedisplaced persons, butasthegovernments of EasternEuropefell intocommunist hands,the agencyadoptedprogramsof resettlement for thosewhowereopposed to returning to theirhomeland forpoliticalreasons. agencyto handleWorldWar I1 refugees, theIRO Intendedasa temporary increasein refugeepopulations, wasslowlydissolved. But thecontinuing initiallydrivenby thefirstArab-Israeliwar andby the Koreanconflict,led to the creationof the U N Officeof the High Commissioner for Refugees thatalsoestablished criteriafor deter(UNHCR) undera 1951convention miningrefugeestatus.Over the years,UNHCR hasdealtwith millionsof broughtonwith the refugees in Asia,especially asa resultof thedisruptions Vietnamstruggleand in Africa as countrieswereshakenby internalconflicts,largelyethnicin character. Indeed,by the 1990s,the problemwas expanded, principallyin Africa,by the addition of millionsof internallydisplacedpersons whowerenotqualifiedasrefugees sincetheywerenotforced out of theirhomestates,but whoserightshadbeenseriously violatedand wereno lessdestitute,havinglost all of theirpossessions in the horrorof civil war. Accordingto U N figures,by 1996,thereweremorethantwentyfive millioninternallydisplaced persons-up from aroundthreemillionin theearly198Os-in fifty-threecountries.’ Second,the problemsof refugeeprotectionandhumanitarian assistance havealso become entwinedwith theevolutionof U N peacekeeping. During the Cold War, the U N had developed peacekeeping procedures to deploy lightlyarmedtroopsbetweentheforcesof conflicting states,but onlywith theprioragreement of theantagonists andtheircommitment to seekapeaceful settlement of theirdispute. WhentheColdWar ended,consensus became morepossible in the Security Council,andin a seriesof casesinvolvingweak and dividedstates,the CouncilauthorizedU N intervention withoutprior A approvalof thewarringsides,to go far beyondtraditionalpeacekeeping.

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major objectivein the operations in a rupturedstatesuchas Bosnia,for example,was,first, to providehumanitarian assistance and,oncedrawnin, Peacekeepto go on to protectethnicminoritiesfromfurtherbrutalization. ing cameto includea rangeof functionsfrominterveningbetweenconflicting factionsto caringfor theweakandhomeless, protectingthedistribution of relief supplies, policingwar-strickencities,andsupervising electionsonce hostilitieshavebeenpacified.Marc Weller andNicholasWheelerdevelopa deeperanalysisof thesecasesin theirchapters. Third, the internationalhumanrightsregime-the treaties,international organizations, and networksof nongovernmental agencies-is an essential part of a normativeframeworkfor statebehaviorthat hasbeendeveloping sincethe UniversalDeclarationwaswrittenand expandingsincethe Soviet systemcollapsed.Statesthat havedefiedhumanrightsstandards, whether they signedthe humanrightstreatiesor not, areunderpressureto comply. Democraticpracticesandthestateof humanrights,for example,arecriteria for the admissionof former communiststatesof Easternand Central Europe,into the EuropeanUnion, as they were earlierfor the Councilof Europe.Democracies havealsoreplacedmilitaryregimesthroughout most of Latin Americaand are holdingtheirformerrulersto accountfor violationsof humanrights.O n his returnto Chile, for example,Pinochetwas strippedof his immunityandonly escaped judicialinquiryon violationsto humanrightsby reasonof medicalunfitness.In Africa,theendingof apartheidin SouthAfrica remainsa significanttriumphin thestrugglefor equality despitetheway humanrightsare trampledelsewherein the violenceof internalwars.In Asia,freedomof expression andassociation arespurredon by thespreadof freemarketsdespiteserioussetbacks, suchastheeconomic retrenchment andmilitaryresistance thatunsteadied thedemocratic election in Indonesiathat followedthe forcedresignationof the longtimedictator, Suharto. By the end of the twentiethcentury,humanrightshad becomea major issuein international politics.It hadalsobecomean extremelycomplicating issuesincehumanrightshasto be understood within a broadcontext;that is, they get linkedup with a full spectrumof othereconomicand social issues.For onething,theseveralsetsof humanrightshaveto be seenin relation to oneanother.This is mostobviousin the relationsbetweencivil and politicalrights,on the onehand,and economic,social,and culturalrights, on the other.Perhapsthe pointis oversimplified,but the right to express one’sviewsand the rightsof association may havelittle meaningto many peoplewho sufferseverepovertysuchasonefindsin manypartsof Africa andAsia.Thisneednot compromise theuniversality of humanrights.But it doesreinforcethe imperativeto provideeconomicrightsandensurethat thereis “freedomfromwant”aswell asfreedomof speechandassembly. Thereis more:Humanrightsare alsoinvolvedin the choicesthat states

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makein decidingoneconomicpolicies.Today,globalization is drivingstates to adoptopenmarketsandremoverestrictions onthefreemovementof capital. Suchderegulation increases the difficultiesin pursuingincomeredistributionpolicies.Therearepressures on developingcountriesto privatize theirindustries, reducegovernment expenditures, andconstructa society thatfacilitatessocialmobility.The UnitedStates,of course,is theprime exampleof a countryin whichsocialmobilityis a centralfeatureof economicdevelopment. Nonetheless, whatevertheothermeritsof freemarkets, the United Statescan only providea long-termmodelfor the rest of the world.Besidessufferingfromlargedisparities in incomein its ownpopulation,it is a continental statewith abundantnaturalresources that,overtime, providedunusualopportunities for a largeimmigrantand generallymobile in manypartsof theworld,thereis deep anddesperpopulation.In contrast, atepovertyandlayersof customandculturethatcannotbesoreadilyshedsnakelike-in theinterests of wealthcreation.Underwhatis effectivelya new internationaleconomicorthodoxythat eschewswelfareand prizes mobility,thosewhohavethemostdifficultyin climbingtheladderof social andeconomicsuccess withoutgovernment supportareveryoftenthosewho suffer the harshestdiscrimination: minorities,indigenouspeople, and women.Moreover,if they chooseto packup and migrate,they risk being classified aseconomicrefugees,not eligiblefor international protection,and turnedbackat thebordersof moreprosperous countries. H U M A N RIGHTS IN T H E NEXT FIFTY YEARS

A majorpurposein thisbookis thusto inquireintotwosetsof humanrights attentionduring problemsthatarecertainto beat thecenterof international the nextfifty years:the increasing evidenceof groupidentityas a principal sourceof humanrightsviolations,andthe intervention of theinternational community in emergency casesin whichtherearegrossviolationsof rights. JenniferJackson-Preece, HurstHannum,and Eva Bremsdevelopthe probThe chaptersby Marc Waller lem of grouprightsin depthin theirchapters. and NicholasWheelerexaminethe problemsthat internationalsociety encounters in responding to violationsof rightsin a worldthatis stillhighly “ pluralist”wherestatescontinueto pursuenarrowlyconceivedinterests. JackDonnellytreatsbothsetsof problemsin themoretheoreticalintroductory chapter. Donnelly,in the first place,identifiesthefocuson individualrightsin humanrights whathecallsthe“Universalmodel,”in effect,theinternational regimethat emergedwith the UniversalDeclarationandsubsequent Covenants.This is particularlyevidentin article27 of the covenanton civil and politicalrights,whichguarantees therightto pursueone’sownculture,reli-

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gion,andlanguage but onlyin termsof the rightsof individuals andnot of socialgroups.All of thisdespitetherealitythatpeopledo not live as“isolated,atomistic individuals” butassocialbeingswhocannoteffectively exerciserightsof culture,religion,or language alonebut only as members of a thecollective nature largergroup.ArguingthattheUniversalmodelassumes of individualrights,Donnellyinsiststhatthereis no need,as othersadvocate,for an additionalsystemof grouprights. Second,Donnellymaintainsthat,asa matterof practice,theUniversal modelleavesimplementation to the memberstates.In thissense,human eventhoughthey rightsareultimatelysubject to thepoliciesof governments, increasingly havecome“to express manyof thehighestpoliticalaspirations” in international society.Certainlyit is fair to saythat,in formulatingpolihumanrightsregime cies,mostgovernments haveto takethe international into accountsincetheiractionsareboundto be measured againstthe standardsof the regimeby othergovernments, by nongovernmental organizations(NGOs),andby the international media,aswell assectors of theirown public.Nonetheless, thisstill doesnot ensurethatconsiderations of human rightswill outweighotherfactorsandbe decisive in thepoliciesthatgovernstrongconsensus of what mentsadoptor that thereis as yet a sufficiently humanrightsmeanto makeinternational societyeffectivein influencing nationalpriorities.A majortaskfor the future,Donnellyconcludes, is to developmoreeffectivemethodsfor implementing theexistinghumanrights regimeratherthanaddingto it. In herchapter, Jackson-Preece alsoarguesthatthehumanrightsregimeis dominated by a concernfor individualrights.Thisemphasis hascomeabout notonlybecause of thestronginfluence of Westernpoliticalphilosophy but of theweightgivento the interestsof statesin international alsobecause is society.Attachmentto the state,particularlyin the form of citizenship, givenpreference overaffiliationwith othercommunities, whetherclansor ethnicgroups.For that matter,the onegrouprightthat is specifiedin the U N Charterandthehumanrightstreatiesis therightof self-determination. It is as if the choicefor any ethnicgroupis eitherto becomecompletely assimilated into the dominantcultureof the statein whichthey live or to achieveseparate statehood. CertainlytheU N Chartergavelessattentionto the right of self-determination than had the Covenantof the Leagueof Nations, but for understandable political reasons.In the caseof the covenant, a majorobjective wasto eliminatethepresence of minoritiesas a sourceof Europeanconflictby grantingthemstatehood, particularlywith the breakupof the Austro-Hungarian Empire.As for the Charter,selfdetermination wasby nowextended beyondEuropeto therestof theworld, whereit was deliberatelydownplayedsincethe major Europeanstates wishedto postpone thebreakupof theirempiresanddelaytherushtoward decolonization. However,decolonization did occur,morerapidlythanany-

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oneexpected, largelywithinboundaries thathadbeensetdownby the colonial powers. Self-determination was effectivelydefined as European a formulathatwas obviouslyin the interestof thosewho decolonization, hadwon controlof the stateandwho hadno interestin cedingterritoryto theiropponents. Mostof thenewstates createdin thiswayincludeddifferent ethnicgroupswho,aftertheunifyingexcitement of independence, beganto competefor poweranddomination. It is nonetheless importantto takenote,as Hurst Hannumdoesin his chapter,that unlikeotherminorities,therehasbeenlittle inclinationby a rightof secession. Livingon themarginsof indigenous peopleto exercise society,theyhaveusuallyaskedfor theprotectionof theirrightswithinthe stateandhaveespeciallybeenconcerned with their rightsto the land on whichthey live. Indigenous peoplecanbe clearlyidentifiedin North and SouthAmerica,in the Arcticregions,andin AustraliaandNew Zealand wherenativepeoplewereforcedoff theirlandandsegregated by invading Europeans whoproceeded to establish permanent settlements anddominate the politicallife of the developing state.The problemis morecomplexin Asia andAfricawherethereare nativepeopleforcedon to the marginsof society,but not so stronglydifferentiatedfrom the dominantgroups. of therightsof indigenous people Indeed,asHannumreports,a declaration is beingdraftedat theUnitedNationswithoutclearlydefiningto whomit applies. BothJackson-Preece and Hannumconcludethat a majorchallengeto humanrightsis to create“pluralist”societies thatenfolddifferentgroupsof people,livingtogetherwith tolerance-andevenrespect-for thevery differences thatsetthemapart.In thisregard,theirconclusions intersect with Donnelly’sdiscussion of the difficultiesof movingstatestowardpoliciesof tolerance and evenfurtherto nondiscrimination andeventuallyto multicultopluralistsocieties. Theproblemis noless turalismastheultimateresponse complicated whenwe addtheissueof gender.While therewereno distincwere tionsin theway thatthe UniversalDeclarationandthe two covenants written,it couldnot be takenfor grantedthatin implementing theirprovisions,stateswoulddealwith menandwomenon an equalbasis.For that onthepoliticalrightsof womenwasopenedfor ratifimatter,a convention cationas earlyas 1953and a separate convention on the eliminationof all formsof discrimination againstwomenin 1979.As Eva Bremsemphasizes in herchapter,the drivefor women’srightshasadvanced in twodirections: to ensurethatthetwo covenants applyto womenastheydo to menandto protectthespecialrightsof womenthatderivefromtheirownexperiencefor example,protectionfrom sexualharassment andspecialprovisions in casesof maternity. Morerecently,asBremsdiscusses, thequestfor women’srightsis leading of the humanrightsregimethat involvesan overall to a transformation

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rethinkingof the kind of societyin whichpeoplelive, a transformation, for example,from a largelymale-dominated, highlyassimilationist societyto a societyin which women-and minorities,whetherethnic,religious,or indigenous-playa fuller andmoreproductivepartin the normalpractices of daily life. This kind of transformation-spurredon by feministcritiques and movingin the directionof the kind of multiculturalism that Donnelly identifiesasa long-rangegoal-is onlybeginningbut,Bremscontends, will becomeincreasingly influentialin theyearsto come.More immediately,the storyof women’srightshasalreadydramaticallyillustratedhow the growing influenceof nonstateactorshasinfluenced ,theoveralldevelopment of humanrightsand,by practice,thecharacterof international society.Beyond theconventions thathavebeenpromulgated, improvement in women’sstatus hasbeenthefocusof a seriesof globalconferences, beginningin MexicoCity havebeenespeciallyusefulin creatinga vibrant in 1975.Theseconferences networkof women’sgroupsthroughout theworld,a primeexampleof how privateeconomicand socialmovements havecontributedto the expansion of humanrightsandbeena primemeansof encouraging, evengoading,governmentstowardcooperation. In herchapter,Brems’sdiscussion of therole of N G O s echoestheanalysisin the chaptersby Jackson-Preece andHannum.As all threechapters pointout,N G O sperforma seriesof functionsin international society:they serveas “lobbies”at the internationallevel and at the nationallevel,they conductindependent investigations of humanrightsviolations,theypublicizethehumanrightspoliciesandpracticesof governments, andtheymobilize publicopinionto supporthumanrightsactivitiesat homeand abroad. Transnational movements operatewheregovernments cannoteitherbecause of thefearof destabilizing politicalor economicrelationswith othergovernmentsor becausetheythemselves areviolatingthe rightsof theirown citizens. Governmentsare, more often than not, the targets of N G O investigations. At the sametime, it is justasimportantto rememberthat N G O s areprivateorganizations, and,asvaluableas they are, theremay be questions aboutwhomthey represent,how they are accountable for their activities,andhowtheyarefunded.8 society,they In the end, as muchas N G O s haveenrichedinternational havenot changedits fundamental structureor the centralrole within it playedby states.It is well to rememberthat,whatevertheincreasing roleof privatesocialandeconomicmovements in givingit centralpurpose,international societyis a societyof statesthat havedifferentand oftenopposing interests. Thereis thusreal questionwhether,asWheelerpointsout, the societyof statesis capableof developinga collectivecapacityfor human rightsenforcement. BothWheelerandMarc Wellergivespecialattentionto thecourseof international relationssincetheendof theColdWar, especially international operations to intervenein internalconflictsin dividedstatesin

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whichtherehavebeenwidespread violationsof humanrights.Theirverdict is mixed:ontheonehand,theseoperations provideconsiderable evidenceof the willingnessof international societyto overridethe limits of sovereignty and hold politicalleadersdirectlyresponsible when humanrightsare violated;on the otherhand,the decisionto intervenehasoftenbeenweakened (or abandoned, as in the caseof Rwanda)by an unwillingness to support operations with the humanand materialresources necessary to accomplish their objective^.^ Wheelertacklesthe problemin the broadersense,settingup his chapter asa dialogueamongthreeviewsof international society:realism,pluralism, andsolidarism.Realists,in thefirst instance,assumethat statespursuenarrowly conceivedinterestsin an otherwiseanarchicworld in whichpower, principallymeasured by materialresources, determines relationswith other states.Pluralistsseestatesno lessasseparateself-servingactors,but,in this case,theyareconstrained in theirrelationswith othersby commoninterests in maintainingstabilitylargelythroughdiplomaticexchangeand a willingnessto complywith international agreements. Finally,solidarists arguethat thebondsof international societyhavebeenstrengthened beyondtheclaims of pluralistsby thethreatthatweaponsof massdestruction posefor people everywhere,by the worldwideconnections createdby modernscienceand technology andtheexpanding globaleconomy,andby thecommoninterests that emergefrom the needto protectthe world environment from further degradation andfromthe commitmentto humanrightsin theinternational treatiesthathavebeenratifiedsincetheUniversalDeclaration.’O In manyrespects, Wheelerarguesthecasefor solidarism. Nevertheless, he is constrained in identifyingan evolutionfrom pluralismby the indecisive response of internationalsocietyto violationsof humanrightsin recent and herehe is internalconflicts.Therehasbeenas muchfailureas success, joinedby Marc Weller,wholooksat theseconflicts-in Africa,theBalkans, Asia, and CentralAmerica-from theperspective of the internalpoliticsof the countriesinvolvedas muchas the politicsamongthe statesin internationalsociety.Weller demonstrates in considerable detailhow traditional “ first-generation’’ peacekeeping hasdevelopedintomorecomplexoperationswith the end of the Cold War. He illustratesthe varietyof functions that so-calledinternational peacekeeping forceshavecometo perform.In EastTimorandKosovo,for example,theyhavebeenchargedwith thedirect administration of government affairs;in othercases,theyhavereconstituted publicagencies, providedpoliceprotectionfor localgovernment to operate, monitoredthe transitionfromviolenceto stability,encouraged reconciliation amongopposingfactions,and servedto preventfurtheroutbreaksof violence.Welleragreeswith Wheelerthat a majorweakness in international “ peacekeeping” comesfromtheunwillingness of themajorstatesin internaresources andto realizethatinternal tionalsocietyto providethenecessary

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conflictsin oftenpoorandunderdeveloped countriescanonly be resolved overa longperiodof time;majordonorswantcheapandquickresults.In Weller’scase,he alsocontends that it cantakeconsiderable time to bring strongconsensus amongthe conflicting partiesto reconabouta sufficiently stitutetheirsocietyalongmoredemocratic linesandto agreeontheconcrete shapeof a newpoliticalstructure.” All together,the chapters in thisbookdo whatmostscholarlycontributionsdo:theyraisemorequestions than answers. For thatmatter,theremay not be answersin the narrow,directsense.What the chaptersgive us is a senseof directionthat it wouldbe sensibleto takeif we areto extendthe effectiveness of the international humanrightsregimeoverthenextfifty years:for onething,to movetoward“pluralist”societies in whichdifferent ethnicor religiousgroupscanlivetogetherin peaceandtranquilitywith genuinerespectfor the differences amongthem;and,on the otherhand,to strengthen the movetoward“solidarism” in international societyby reinforcingincentives for statesto absorbtheinternational humanrightsregime In thisregard,the booktakesa posiinto theirinternalrulesandpractices. tion whetheror not all of us seeit in quitethe sameway. We think that humanrightsenhance thedignityof peopleandthatviolations reduceusto thecrudestandcruelest of humanrelations. We will wantto returnto these issuesin the concluding chapter,not to bringthemto a closebut ratherto on questions that areboundto providea basisfor a continuingdiscussion occupyscholars andstatesmen for sometimeto come.

NOTES 1. J. S. Mill, Principlesof PoliticalEconomy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1999),chap.13. 2. For a recentstudyof sovereignty, seeStephenD. Krasner,Sovereignty: OrganizedHypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1999).Krasner’sreview is valuable,howeverdoubtfulhis argumentthat,because the notionof sovereignty hasneverbeenabsolute,nothinghassubstantially changedsincethe settlement of Westphalia. 3. SeeJohannes Morsink,The UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights:Origins, Draftingand Intent(Philadelphia: Universityof Pennsylvania Press,1999).For a generalreviewof humanrightsin international relations,seeR. J. Vincent,Human Cambridge UniversityPress,1986); RightsandInternational Relations(Cambridge: JackDonnelly,International HumanRights(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1998);and David Forsythe,HumanRightsin International Relations(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,2000). 4. SeeGeneM. Lyons,“In Searchof RacialEquality:The Eliminationof Racial Discrimination,” in GlobalIssuesin theUnitedNationsFramework, ed.PaulTaylor andA. J. R. Groom(London:Macmillan,1989).

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5. For a reviewof theEuropeanexperience, seePhilipAlston,ed., TheEuropean Unionand HumanRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999). 6. The refugeequestionis coveredin Gil Loescher,BeyondCharity:Znternational Cooperationand the GlobalRefugeeProblem(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1993). 7. For ananalysis of theinternallydispossessed, seeFrancisM. Deng,Protecting theDispossessed (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1993). 8. For a broadreviewof the role of NGOs in severalissuesareas,seeMargaret E. KeckandKathrynSikkink,ActivistsbeyondBorders(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1998). 9. Severalearlycasesarediscussed in JamesMayall,ed., TheNew Znterventionism,1991-1994 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).The moregeneral relationship betweensovereignty andinternational intervention is analyzedin Gene StateSovereignty and M. LyonsandMichaelMastanduno, eds.,BeyondWestphalia? InternationalIntervention(Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1995). 11, 2001, whenterroristsdestroyedtheWorld 10. Sincethe eventsof September TradeCenterin New York andrammedan aircraftintothePentagon in Washington, D.C., thecampaign againstterrorismhasbeencalleda “commoncause”of theinternationalcommunity,at leastby the U.S. government. Thereis, nonetheless, some uncertainty whetherall states,eventhosecooperating with theUnitedStateswould agreeon a definitionof whoareterrorists. 11. Bothsetsof problemsmaybecriticallyaffectedby theexperience of theinternationalcommunity in rebuildingthestateof Afghanistan, butat thisstageof writing (late2OO2),it is stilltooearlyto cometo anyjudgment.

In Defenseof theUniversal Declaration Model JackDonnelly

The globalhumanrightsregimeis rootedin the 1948UniversalDeclaration of HumanRightsandits laterelaborations, especiallythe 1966International HumanRightsCovenants. Thesedocuments reflectwhat I will call “the UniversalDeclarationmodel”of international humanrights.In thischapter, thefirstfoursectionsoutlinethemodelandarguethattodayit standsonan on a politicalconception of justicebasedon the overlapping consensus notionof equalconcernand respect.The followingfive sectionsdevelopa liberal defenseof this vision,focusingon issuesof grouprights(which appearcentrallyin the chaptersby Eva Brems,HurstHannum,and especiallyJenniferJackson-Preece) andon the centralrole of the statein implementingtheserights(a shortcoming emphasized in the chaptersby Marc WellerandNicholasWheeler).

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION MODEL Four elementsof the UniversalDeclarationmodeldeserveemphasis: its focuson rights;therestrictionto individualrights;thebalancebetweencivil and politicalrightsand economic,social,and culturalrights;and national for implementing internationally recognizedhumanrights. responsibility

Human Rights Internationally recognized humanrightsare rights,a particularsortof socialpractice.’To havea rightto x is to be entitledto x and authorizedto 20

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makespecialclaimsto enjoyx shouldit be threatenedor denied.Although all rightshavecorrelative duties,theyarenotreducibleto thoseduties.Social andpoliticalduties,andthevaluestheyseekto realize,arevitally important. But they neednot be-and throughout mostof historyhavenot beenrootedin the entitlements of rightholders.Not all importantobjectives are bestrealizedthroughthepracticeof (human)rights. Humanrightsarethoserightsheld simplybecauseoneis a humanbeing, goods,services, andopportunities to whicheveryoneis entitled.Because one eitheris or is not a humanbeing,humanrightsare held equallyby all. Because onecannotstopbeinghuman,nomatterhowinhumanone’s behavior or the treatmentone is forcedto endure,they are inalienablerights. Humanrightsarealsocommonlyspokenof asuniversalrights.Thisuniversalityis moreprescriptive thandescriptive.2 The claimof ‘‘universal’’human rightsis that all humanbeingsoughtto be treatedin theseways,not that theyareor havebeen,or thatthesenormsare(let alonehavebeen)accepted everywhere.

IndividualRights All the rightsthat appearin the UniversalDeclarationandthe covenants are,with theexceptionof self-determination of peoples,rightsof individuals,notcorporateentities.Enumeration of rightsthustypicallybegin“Every humanbeing. . . ,”“Everyonehasthe right. . . ,”“No oneshallbe . . . ,” or “Everyoneis entitled.. . .” Evenwhereonemightexpectgroupsto appearas right holders,they do CovenantonCivil andPolitnot.For example,article27 of theInternational icalRights(ICCPR) reads,“In thoseStatesin whichethnic,religiousor linguisticminoritiesexist,personsbelongingto suchminoritiesshallnot be deniedthe right, in communitywith the othermembersof their group,to enjoytheirownculture,to professandpractisetheirownreligion,or to use theirownlanguage.”Individualsbelongingto minorities,not minorities (collectiveentities),havetheserights.The chapterby Jackson-Preece challengesthe adequacyof this approach,whichI defendlater. Individualrights,however,are a socialpractice.Individualand group rightsdifferin whoholdstheright-individuals or corporateactors-not in social.A’s right theirsociality.All (individualhuman)rightsareinescapably and operatesthroughsocialrelationships. to x with respectto B establishes Rights-bearing individualsalonecannoteffectivelyimplementtheir rights, a life worthyof humanbeings. let alonemakefor themselves The UniversalDeclarationmodelenvisionsindividualsdeeplyenmeshed in “natural”andvoluntarygroupsrangingfromfamiliesthroughthe state. on the state, Internationally recognized humanrightsimposeobligations regulaterelationsbetweencitizensandstates,andrequirethestateandsoci-

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etyfor theirrealization. Many (most?) humanrights,althoughheldby individuals,canonly be enjoyedcollectively.Consider,for example,workers’ rights,familyrights,andminorityrights,whicharedefinedby socialgroups freedomof assoor roles,aswell asrightsasdiverseaspoliticalparticipation, ciation,socialinsurance, andfreeandcompulsory primaryeducation. Civil and Politicaland Economic,Social,andCultural Rights

Anotherstrikingfeatureof theUniversalDeclaration modelis thebalance betweencivilandpoliticalandeconomic, social,andculturalrights.Nothing in eithercovenant suggests priorityfor onesetof rights.TheUniversalDeclarationdoesnot evenmakea categorical distinction. Althoughthe relationship betweencivilandpoliticalandeconomic, social, controversy duringthe andculturalrightswasa matterof intenseideological Cold War, todaythereis little disagreement that,as article5 of the 1993 ViennaDeclarationputsit, “All humanrightsareuniversal, indivisibleand interdependent andinterrelated.”For example,asof November16,2000 only8 stateswerepartyto justoneof thecovenants, while137wereparties to both.3Debatefocusesinsteadon short-andmedium-runprioritiesand themosteffectivemeansto realizeeconomic andsocial(andcivil andpolitical) rights.Suchdebates, however,arenot a centralconcernof thisvolume. theinterdependence andindivisibilityof all Therefore,I will simplyassume internationally recognized humanrights. NationalImplementationof InternationalHuman Rights

A furtherdistinctivefeatureof the UniversalDeclarationmodelis the nationalimplementation of internationallyrecognizedhuman rights. “Everyonehasa rightto x” in practicemeans“Eachstatehastheauthority andresponsibility to implementandprotectthe rightto x withinits territory.” The UniversalDeclarationwasformulatedas “a standardof achievement,”a setof aspirational normsthatleft stateswith full sovereign authority to implementhumanrightswithin their territory.The “enforcement” procedures of the covenants-periodic reportsto committees of experts+didnotsignificantly alterthisallocation of responsibility. Normcreationhas beeninternationalized, but implementation remainslargelywith sovereign territorialstates. The normativeadequacy of this statistapproachto implementation is a centralmatterof controversy within thisvolume,especially in the chapters by Marc Weller and NicholasWheeler.I returnto it myselflaterin this chapter.

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HEGEMONY AND SETTLED NORMS The nextseveralsections providea seriesof increasingly deepandsubstantive,andthusincreasingly controversial, justifications of theUniversalDeclarationmodel.I beginwith a descriptive, empiricalclaim:Humanrights politicaldiscourse, or whatMervynFrostcalls havebecomea hegemonic “settlednorms”of contemporary international society,5 principles thatare widelyaccepted asauthoritative withinthesocietyof states. Bothnationally and internationally,politicallegitimacyis increasinglyjudgedby and expressed in termsof internationally recognized humanrights. The six leadinginternational humanrightstreaties(on civil andpolitical rights;economic, social,andculturalrights;racialdiscrimination; discriminationagainstwomen;torture;andtherightsof thechild)hadanaverageof 154 partiesat the end of 2000.6 Evenmorenotableis the penetration of humanrightsintobilateral,multilateral, andtransnational diplomacy. In the 1970s, considerable controversy stillragedoverwhetherhumanrightswere evenanappropriate concern of foreignpolicy.As lateas1980, onlya handful of stateshadexplicitinternational humanrightspolicies,andmostof those usuallyweresupported onlywith verbalandsymbolicpolicyinstruments. Today,however,humanrightsarea standardsubjectof bilateralandmultilateraldiplomacy. Humanrightsnormsandvaluesare alsopenetrating moredeeplyinto a growingnumberof nationalsocieties. Bothgovernments andtheiropponentsappealto humanrightsnotonlymuchmorefrequentlybutmorecentrallythanjusta fewdecades ago.Compare,for example,the terms of debate andtherangeof politicaloptionsconsidered nationallyandregionally today in LatinAmerica,Africa,andAsiawith thosein the 1960s and1970s. Thisdoesnotmeanthathumanrightshavebeenenthusiastically embraced onlybecause everywhere. For many,theyarea “defaultoption,”’accepted theleadingcompetitors havebeendelegitimized. Evencynicalusespaytribto humanrights.And as the ute to the moralimperative of a commitment HelsinkiFinalAct illustrates, suchnormscantakeon anindependent life of theirown,with consequences verydifferentfromthoseintendedby cynical endorsers. Theprominence of humanrightsin contemporary international societyis notunrelated to theirendorsement by theworld’sleadingpower,theUnited States,and its principalallies.The UniversalDeclarationmodel,however, alsoresponds to someof themostimportantsocialandpoliticalaspirations of individuals, families,andgroupsin mostcountries of theworld.Human rightsdominatepolitical debate not onlybecause of thesupportof materially dominantpowersbut alsobecause a wide rangeof states,groups,and at leastquasi-voluntarily acceptsthem.They haveauthority,as individuals

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well asthebackingof force,andthushavebecomeinternationally hegemonic in a Gramscian senseof theterm. A N OVERLAPPING CONSENSUSON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JohnRawlsdistinguishes “comprehensive religious,philosophical, or moral doctrines”from “political conceptions of justice.”8Becausethe latter address onlythepoliticalstructure of society,defined(asfar aspossible) independent of anyparticularcomprehensive doctrine,adherents of different comprehensive doctrinesmayreachan “overlapping consensus” on a politicalconception of justice.9I will arguethat thereis an international overlapping consensus on theUniversalDeclarationmodel.’o Theideaof overlapping (ratherthancomplete)political(ratherthanmoral or religious)consensus offersa plausibleanswerto the question“How is it possiblethattherecanbe a stableandjustsocietywhosefreeandequalcitizensaredeeplydividedby conflictingandevenincommensurable religious, philosophical, and moraldoctrines?”ll This answerseemsespeciallyattracworld skepticalof foundations. It alsohas special tive in a “postmodern” attractions for a culturallyand politicallydiversepluralistinternational society. Moral theoriesand othercomprehensive doctrineshave rarely (until recently)beenfoundedonhumanrights.For example,humanrights,despite theirpoliticalprominence, haveplayeda tinypartin thehistoryof (Western) moraltheory.IZNonetheless, humanrightscan be relativelyeasilyderived frommanymoraltheories;for example,they canbe seenas encodedin or derivedfromthenaturallaw, aspoliticalmeansto furtherhumangood(utility), or as politicalinstitutionsdesignedto producevirtuouscitizens.The increasing politicalprominenceof humanrightsoverthe pastfew decades hasled moreandmoreadherents of a growingrangeof comprehensive doctrinesto endorsehumanrights-but (only) as a politicalconception of justice.For example,Muslimsof variouspoliticalpersuasions in manypartsof the Islamicworld havein recentdecadesdevelopedIslamicdoctrinesof humanrightsthatarestrikinglysimilarin substance to theUniversalDeclaration.” Althoughinternationally recognized humanrights“donotdependonany particularcomprehensive religiousdoctrineof humannature,”I4theyarenot compatiblewith all comprehensive doctrines.Claimssuchas thosein the covenantsthat “theserightsderivefrom the inherentdignityof the human person”or in theViennaDeclarationthat“all humanrightsderivefromthe dignityandworthinherentin the humanperson”setthe rangeof possible comprehensive doctrines withinan overlapping consensus. Thelink between

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humanrightsand comprehensive doctrines,althoughloose,is a matterof substance, not justproceduralagreement. Certaincomprehensive doctrines arein principleexcludedfromtheconsensus. Mostimportant,humanrights, because theyareheldequallyby all humanbeings,areincompatible with all fundamentally inegalitarian comprehensive doctrines.

EQUAL CONCERN A N D RESPECT Elsewhere,l5 drawingheavilyon RonaldDworkin,I6I haveshownthat the full list of rightsin the UniversalDeclarationand the covenants is easily derivedfrom the requirement that statestreat eachcitizenwith equalconcernandrespect.Here I will arguethatthepracticeof equalandinalienable rightsheld by all humanbeingscanbe seenasa politicalconception of justicebasedonequalconcernandrespectthathasbeenaccepted in significant measurefor intrinsicor moralreasons, notjustasa modusvivendi.” Humanrightsare bothconstitutive andregulativenorms.We are most immediately familiarwith theirregulativeaspects: “No oneshallbe subjectedto tortureo r t o cruel,inhumano r degrading treatmento r punishment”;“Everyonehasthe right to work, to free choiceof employment, to just andfavorableconditions of work andto protectionagainstunemployment.”Evenmoreimportant, though,humanrightsconstitute individuals as a particularkind of politicalsubject,ascitizensentitledto a government that will recognize,implement,andprotecttheir humanrights.By definingthe requirements and limits of legitimategovernment, they constitute statesfit to governrights-holding citizens. The equalityof all humanbeingsleads“naturally”to a politicalemphasis onautonomy. To justifydenyingor severelyrestricting individualautonomy almostnecessarily involvesan appealto inequality.Equaland autonomous rights-bearing individualsare entitledto makefundamentalchoicesabout what constitutes the goodlife (for them),with whomthey associate, and how.The statemusttreatsuchindividuals with equalconcernandrespect. A list of (humanandlegal)rightsreflectsa particularunderstanding of the meaningof equalconcernandrespect,basedon a substantive conception of humandignity,of the conditionsrequiredfor humanflourishing.Human rightspromiseto (re)shape politicaland socialrelationsso that this moral visionwill be realized.Equal,inalienablerightsheldby all againststateand societyprovidea mechanism to realizea world of equaland autonomous humanbeings.The effectiveimplementation of the specifiedrightswill producethe envisioned person/life(assuming a certaincoherence andpracticality in thatvision). Theunderlyingvisionof humanpossibilities in theUniversalDeclaration modelcannotbe separated from the politicalprinciplesand institutions by

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whichthosepossibilities areto berealized.Humanrightsthusaresimultaneouslya “utopian”visionanda setof institutions-equalandinalienable rights-for realizingatleastanapproximation of thatvision.Thesubstantive of this particular“realisticutopia’”*go a long way toward attractions explaining thehegemonic powerof theUniversalDeclaration model.

DEFINING LIBERALISM Equalconcernandrespect,understood as a politicalconception of justice, canbeendorsed by a varietyof comprehensive doctrines. I turnnowto one, to an increasliberalism.In so doing,the chaptermovesfrom description ingly prescriptiveargument.Startingfrom the commonassociation of humanrightswith “Westernliberalism,”bothin theirhistoricaldevelopmentandin contemporary politicalpractice,I arguethat(a particulartype of) liberalismprovidesa strongnormativefoundation for the substance of the Universal Declaration modelandfor itscontinuing refinement andelaborationin thecomingdecades. setof orientations and Although“liberalism”is a complexandcontested to saythatit is rootedin a commitment values,it is relativelyuncontroversial to liberty,freedom,or, in theformulation I prefer,autonomy. Moreparticularly,liberalsgivecentralpoliticalplaceto individualautonomy, ratherthan thelibertyof society,thestate,or othercorporateactors.Liberalsseeindifor vidualsasentitledto “govern”theirlives,to makeimportantlife choices themselves, within limitsconnected primarilywith the mutualrecognition of equalopportunities for others. Liberalismalsois speciallycommitted to equality-althoughmostliberal ultimately (andnonliberal)theoriesandall liberal(andnonliberal)societies permitsubstantial economic, social,or politicalinequality.Libertyis seen not asa special privilegeof anelitebutas(in principle)available to all. Equal libertyfor all is at theheartof anyliberalpoliticalvision.19 liberaltheoriesalongtwo dimensions: theextentto Figure2.1 categorizes whichtheyemphasize rightsor thegood(or virtueor someothervalue)and thesubstantive “thickness” of theirconceptions of thosecorevalues. JohnLockeis the seminalfigurein the strandof liberalismthat grounds the commitment to equallibertyon natural,or whatwe todaycallhuman, rights.Its rootsgobackat leastto LevelerandDiggerarguments duringthe EnglishCivil War. ImmanuelKant,ThomasPaine,andJean-Jacques Rousseauwereleadingeighteenth-century proponents. JohnRawlsandDworkin areprominentrecentAmericanrepresentatives. Liberalism, however,alsohasa stronghistoricalassociation with utilitarianism,a good-based theory.The rootsof thistraditionrun backat leastto

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Good Based

Thick

Figure 2.1

A Typologyof Liberal Theories

ThomasHobbes,buttheseminalfigureisJeremy Bentham. It wasthedominantvisionof liberalismin Britainin the nineteenthcentury.A microeconomic version underliescontemporary“neoliberal” market-oriented economicreforms. liberaldefenseof theUniverMy purpose hereis to advancea rights-based sal Declarationmodel.Good-basedconceptions, however,makehuman rightsat besta second-order or derivativepoliticalprinciple.Therefore, althoughmanygood-based liberalsparticipatein theoverlapping consensus on international humanrights,theirviewswill not be considered here. In fact, microeconomic, utilitarianneoliberalismis fundamentally opposedto the liberalhumanrightsperspectiveI defend.Its logic of efficiencyis aggregate,and thuscollectivist,in sharpcontrastto the logic of individualhumanrights20Neoliberalequalityinvolvespoliticalindifference to competingpreferences-unbiased treatmentin the marketplace-rather thanguaranteed access to essentialgoods,services, andopportunities. Neoliberal structuraladjustment is very differentfrom the welfarestatesof EuropeandNorthAmericawithwhichtheUniversalDeclarationmodelhas (rightly)beenspeciallyassociated. Turningto theseconddimension of ourtypology,therangeof recognized rights,threeimportantcontemporary variantsof rights-based liberalismcan be identified.At the end pointsof the continuumare what I label “European”(or socialdemocratic) or “minimalist”(or libertarian)liberalism,with the “American”variantlying somewhere in themiddle.

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A liberalismcompatible with theUniversalDeclarationmodelmustbe stronglyegalitarian,mustactivelyembracean extensive systemof economic andsocialrights,andmustreflecta robust(procedural andsubstantive) conceptionof democracy.21 The Europeanwelfarestateis the leadingpractical exemplarof sucha position,especiallyin itssocialdemocratic conception. It is distinguished by a dual emphasison the equalenjoymentof all human rightsby all membersof the politicalcommunityand an extensivelist of economicandsocialrights.All internationally recognizedhumanrightsare seenas entitlements of individuals-socialandpoliticalclaimsthat impose dutieson thestateandsociety-rather thanmereliberties.Evenwith recent welfarestateretrenchments, all the statesof WesternEuropelie towardthe topleft of figure2.1. At thebottomleft of thefigureliesa minimalistliberalism that emphasizes individualpersonallibertiesand includesonly a short list of economicand socialrights.Somecirclesrefer to this as “classical” liberalism.In the UnitedStates,it is perhapsmostneutrallydescribed as “libertarian.” Minimalistliberalism’struncatedlist of humanrightsis substantively incompatible with the UniversalDeclarationmodel.Whateverits historical or philosophical merits,it is bestseenas a critiqueof the substance of the UniversalDeclarationmodel,despitethe considerable overlapon civil and politicalrights.For the pasthalf century,no liberaldemocraticregimein WesternEuropeandNorthAmerica,noteventheUnitedStates,haspursued libertarianminimalistpolicies. An important“intermediate” rights-based perspective emphasizes personaland civil liberties,a modestlist of economicand socialrightsto be This providedby a welfare state,and primarilyproceduraldemocracy. “American”visionis muchmorewillingthanthelibertarianto restrictpersonallibertiesin orderto remedyinvidiousinequalities. It alsois somewhat more sympathetic to the idea of stateactionto assureminimumaccessto socialandeconomicgoods,services,andopportunities. The Americanwelfarestateis muchlessrobustthanthoseof Europe.In theUnitedStatesthis perspective is usuallyreferredto as“liberal,”pejorativelyby theright.I will treatit asthe thinnestplausibleliberalconception of theUniversalDeclarationmodel. “American”and“European”liberalismsarebothcommittedto a democracythatoperatesonlywithin thesubstantive requirements of equalhuman rightsfor all andto a welfarestatethatsupplements a marketsystemof productionwith substantial “welfarestate”redistribution, againin orderto assureequalhumanrightsfor all.22I will useliberalwithoutqualification to referto thissharedpoliticalidealof theliberaldemocratic welfarestateand theunderlyingvisionof equalconcernandrespect.

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LIBERAL APPROACHES TO GROUP DIFFERENCE A standard,and theoreticallyimportant,complaintagainstliberalismis its excessive individualism. Most liberals,andtheUniversalDeclarationmodel, will dogenerallydenyhumunrightsto groups.Theyassumethatindividuals exercisetheir rightscollectively,as membersof both“natural”andvoluntary groups,not asatomisticor deracinated individuals. All liberalregimesin practicerecognizelegal rightsof groupsranging from businesses and tradeunions,to churches and civic associations, to bowlingleaguesandhuntclubs.A greatrangeof internationally recognized humanrightsare of specialinterestand valueto marginalizedor despised groups.For example,freedomsof thought,conscience, religion,opinion, andexpression protectgroup,aswell asindividual,difference.Familyrights, includingtherightof parentsto choosethe kind of educationgivento their children,protectthetransmission of groupbeliefsandpractices. Nonetheless, issuesthat somesee as mattersof “group rights” are addressed by liberalsand by the UniversalDeclarationmodelprimarily I arguethat throughindividual rights. In thisandthefollowingtwo sections, a liberalindividualrightsstrategyto remedyingthe sufferingsof members of despised, oppressed, or disadvantaged groupsremainsviablein the contemporaryworld.

Nondiscrimination Liberalapproaches to differencespana continuum lyingbetweentwovery differentkindsof communitarianism. At oneend are communitarians that allowor requirethe stateto imposecivil andlegaldisabilitiesagainstmembersof certaingroups.At theotherendarevisionsof a societyof “separate but equal”groups.Wherecommunitarians seeindividualsandthe social definedin significantmeasureby optionsavailableto them,asappropriately their groupmembership, liberalsarguethat groupaffiliationsoughtto be largelyirrelevantto the rightsand opportunities availableto individual^.^^ Eachindividual,irrespective of race,gender,religion,or anyothergroup affiliation,shouldbe treatedequally. Nondiscrimination is thusthe liberalstartingpointfor addressing issues of groupdifference.The UniversalDeclarationmodel’sgeneralprohibition of discrimination is powerfullysupplemented by a setof civil liberties(e.g., rightsto freedomof expression, belief,and assembly) that specifyparticularly importantactivitieswherethe statemustrespectindividualliberty, whetherthatlibertyis expressed in privateor in public,aloneor in association with others.

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We candistinguishthreeidealtypeinterpretations of the requirement of nondiscrimination, whichI will calltoleration,equalprotection,andmulticulturalism.Tolerationrequiresnot imposingdisabilitieson individuals basedon (voluntary,ascriptive,or imposed)groupmembershipor disapprovedbehaviorassociated with a group.24 It involvesa principledpolitical decisionnot to imposespecialburdenson (membersof) despisedgroups. But theymaystill be marginalized andsociallyexcluded. Equalprotectionrequiresactiveeffortsto ensurethat membersof disadvantagedor despised groupsenjoythe(equal)rightsthattheyformallyhold. At minimumit involvesan active effort to assurethat peopleare not excludedfrom goods,services,andopportunities thatwouldbe availableto themweretheynot membersof despisedor disadvantaged groups.In its strongerforms-affirmativeactionandevencertainkindsof reversediscrimination-equal protectionseeksto assurethat membersof targetedgroups achievefull legalandpoliticalincorporation intosociety. Equalprotection,however,allowsa neutral,evennegative,evaluationof diversity.Multiculturalism positivelyvaluesdiversity,implyingpoliciesthat recognize,celebrate,preserve,or fostergroupdifferences.Ratherthan attemptto abstractfrom groupdifferences, asin tolerationand equaltreatment,thosedifferencesarehighlightedandpositivelyvalued,within a generalcontextof equalconcernandrespect.

Liberal Neutrality and the Protectionof Difference Its respectfor andendeavors to assuretherealizationof thehumanrights of the of its citizensdefinethe legitimacyof the liberalstate.The purposes statethusordinarilyaresubordinated to therightsof itscitizens.Thissubordinationis oftenexpressed in theclaimthattheliberalstatemustbe neutral with respectto thevalues,purposes,andlife plansof its citizens,insofaras theyarerootedin protectedautonomous exercises of humanrights.This formulationof therequirement of nondiscrimination placestheemphasis on respectfor individualautonomy. Liberalneutrality,however,is not a signof indifferenceto the decisions of citizens.It reflectsan activecommitment,embeddedin the principleof equalconcernand respect,to fosteringcitizens’enjoymentof their rights. Neutralityoperates onlywithin the boundaries of humanrights. To requireidenticaltreatmentof all individualor groupdifferences would be morallyperverse.Consider,for example,the consequences of tolerating pedophiles, violentracists,thosewho derivepleasurefromkidnappingand torturingstrangers, andreligiousmissionaries committedto killing all those they cannotconvert.Suchdifferencesfall outsidethe rangeof the overlapping consensus and thusshouldnot be treatedneutrallyby a liberalstate.

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As CharlesTaylornotes,“liberalismcan’tandshouldn’tclaimcomplete. . .

neutral it^."^^

Politicalliberalism’soverlappingconsensus doesnot (and shouldnot) includeall possibleviews.“Liberalismis not a possiblemeetinggroundfor all cultures,butis thepoliticalexpression of onerangeof cultures,andquite incompatible with otherranges.”26 Neutrality,in otherwords,shouldbe seenasan expression of thecorevalueof equalconcernandrespect. Theliberalstateis requiredto beneutralwith respectto (i.e.,notdiscriminateagainst)exercises of humanrights.It neednotbe neutralto thoseactivitiesnot protectedby humanrights.It is requirednot to be neutraltowards activitiesthatinfringeor violatehumanrights. For example,a (liberal)statemustnot discriminateagainstany religion butneednotbeneutraltoward(showequalconcernandrespectfor) all conceptionsof thepurposeof sport(whicharenot ordinarilyunderstood to be protectedby internationally recognizedhumanrights).Equalconcernand respectfor all politicalbeliefsis required,but not for all beliefsaboutthe originof life. Creationism basedon a literalreadingof Genesis,for example, mustbe protectedinsofarasit reflectsan exerciseof humanrightsto freedomsof religionandspeech.It neednot-probably shouldnot-be treated equallyin scienceclasses or naturalhistorymuseums. Eachstate/society hasconsiderable latitudein how it treats,for example, particularminorityreligions.It wouldbe completelyconsistent with internationalhumanrightsstandards to (merely)tolerateminorityreligionu, while activelysupporting themajorityreligionandminorityreligionb. Such decisions fall withinthemarginof appreciation left to statesby thebroadly statednormsof theUniversalDeclaration.Statesmaychooseto treatall religionsidentically-for example,no statesupportfor any, as in the United States-but thatis requiredneitherby theUniversalDeclarationmodelnor by liberalism,asI am usingthattermhere. As MichaelWalzernicelyputsit, liberalismthusunderstood is “permisIt allowsfor a statecommittedto the survivaland sive,not determinative.” flourishingof a particularnation,culture,or religion,or of a (limited)setof nations,cultures,and religions-so long as the basicrightsof citizenswho havedifferentcommitments or no suchcommitments at all arep r o t e ~ t e d . ~ ~ withinliberalism.Theprotection Thereis notmerelya placefor difference of (manyformsof) differenceis one of its mostimportantpoliticalobjectives. Freedomof Association and GuaranteedParticipation

Nondiscrimination, however,is only onepart of the liberalapproachto difference.Remedyingsystematic discrimination usuallyrequirescollective action,whichin theUniversalDeclarationmodelis enabledby rightsto free-

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domof association and democratic politicalparticipation.Furthermore, activeparticipation in society-includinga right to work, understood as a right to economicparticipation-is an intrinsicallyimportantvalue,an essential aspectof (personal or group)autonomy. Nondiscrimination protectsa sphereof personal/group libertyandoffers protectionagainstsufferingimposedfor groupmembership. Freedomof association andrightsof participation makeindividualmembers of thepublic entitledto act individuallyand collectively,with othersof their own choosing, to realizetheirvisionsof thegoodlife. Takentogether,nondiscrimination andfreedomof association, broadly for understood, providea wide-rangingand coherentset of protections groupsandindividuals rootedin the core(liberalandhumanrights)values of equalityandautonomy. Thisliberalapproach is notwithoutdifficulties. modelsgroup Freedomof association, because it is a rightof individuals, membership as a “voluntary”exerciseof the protectedautonomyof its members. Descriptively, thisis obviously inaccurate for groupswhoseidentity is in significant measure externallyimposed. It mayalsobe problematic groupsmarkedby biologicalsignssuchas skincoloror sex-although,it mustbe emphasized, raceandgenderaresocialconstructs, not naturalcategories. Nonetheless, the liberalapproachhasconsiderable leverageevenin such cases.Whenindividualsaresubjected to sufferingwithoutanyvoluntary association with thegroupin question, nondiscrimination oftenwill provide the appropriate remedy.When,for example,womenor racialminorities to realizetheirinterests or protecttheirrights,freebeginto actcollectively domof association usuallymovesto theforefrontof thestruggle for equality andsocialjustice.

GROUP HUMAN RIGHTS: A SKEPTICAL VIEW Withoutdenyingthe achievements andattractions of thisliberalapproach, the chapters by Eva BremsandJenniferJackson-Preece arguefor supplementingit with grouphumanrights.In thissection,I posesevenquestions thatI thinkshouldleadusto be extremely waryof sucha move28 1. How dowe identifythegroupsthat(oughtto) holdhumanrights? Not all groupshavehumanrights.Consider,for example,states,multinational corporations, gangs,andbarbershop quartets. New substantive (individualor group)rightstypicallyemergeasresponses to the appearance or recognition of new “standardthreats”to humandig11ity.2~ Consider,for example, theriseof thepracticeof disappearances in the 1970sandthe ensuing international response. Thisstandard threatprovides a self-limiting character to suchexpansions of thelist of internationally rec-

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ognizedhumanrights.But grouphumanrightsare distinguished by right holder,not the substance of the threadright. Thereis thusa seriousdanger of excessive proliferationof humanrights. Suppose thatwe wereto agreethatgrouphumanrightsfor, say,minorities wouldbe desirable.By whatcriteriacanwe restrictgrouphumanrightsonly to minorities? This is not necessarily an intractable problem,but it is an importantone to which advocatesof grouprightsseemto havelargely ignored. The mostobviouscriterion-namely, a longhistoryof ongoing,systematic suffering-would yield grouphumanrightsfor women;racial,ethnic, religious,andlinguisticminorities;indigenous peoples;homosexuals; people with disabilities;the aged;children;and the poor,to mentionjust someof themoreprominentgroups.Prettymucheveryoneexceptprosperous white males-and manyof themaswell-would havegrouphumanrights.Sucha radicalexpansionof right holdersand associated claimsof rightsseemsto me extremelyproblematic. 2. Havingidentifiedgroupx as a potentialholderof humanrights,what x have?Certainlyit is not enough particularsubstantive rightsdoedshould thatx wantsr in orderto establisha (human)right of x to r.30 O n what groundcanwe saythatothersower to x as a matterof (human) rights? Themostlimitedmovewouldbeto recognizethoserightsneededto enjoy already-recognized humanrights.These,however,wouldbe onlytempoto rary, remedialmeasures andthusprobablybestseenaspracticalmeasures A moreinteresting(becausemoregenuine)class achievenondiscrimination. of grouprightswouldappealinsteadto theparticularcharacterof thegroup or to valuesor attributes notalreadyrecognized. Claimsof threatened values thatmeritgrouphumanrightsprotectionneedto be evaluatedon a case-bycasebasis.My pointfor now simplyis that in orderto avoiddebasingthe currencyof humanrightswith a flood of new, unregulatedcoinage,advocatesof suchrightsoughtto facea considerable burdenof proof. 3. Who exercises grouprights?Rightswork not simplyby beingvoluntarily respectedby duty bearersbut, mostimportant,by beingclaimedor otherwiseexercisedby rightholders.Governments exercisethe rightsof states;the rightsof businesscorporations, by shareholders, directors,and managers.Who ought-and is able-to exercise,for example,minority rights,understood asrightsof a group? The problemsof groupagencymay be modestfor small,concentrated, andhomogenous groupswith a strongtraditionof collectiveaction.(Indigenouspeoplescomereadilyto mind.) Whenthe groupis largelyvoluntary (e.g.,somereligiousminorities),theofficersof theassociation (e.g.,a clerical hierarchy)may be a plausibleagent.But wherethe groupis “natural,” ascribed,or coercivelydefinedandmaintained,agencyis likely to be highly problematic,especiallywhenthe groupis largeo r heterogene~us.~’ The

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“solution”of havinggrouprightsexercised by individuals or associations of groupmembers,beyondits irony,raisesseriousquestions ast o whether of individualrights. suchrightsreallyaregrouprights,ratherthanexercises 4. How dowe handleconflicts of rights? Althoughall rightsconflictwith at leastsomeotherrightsor importantsocialinterests, introducinggroup rightswill notonlyincrease thenumberof conflicts butwill createcompetitionbetweenqualitatively differentkindsof rightsthatis likelyto beunusually intense.How shouldwe respondto nativeNorthAmericantribesthat discriminate againstwomenwho claimequaltreatment? Relatedissuesmay beraisedby definingwhois (andis not)in the group. Especially problematic froma humanrightsperspective areeffortsto blockor punishexitfromthe group. 5. Are the purportedgrouprightsnecessary? Is the problema lackof grouprightsor ratherinadequate effortsto implementindividualhuman rights? Mostoftenit seemsto me thelatter.Oncemore,theburdenof proof oughtto lie with advocates of the rights. 6. Why shouldwe expectgrouprightsto succeed whereindividualrights havefailed?If a government refusesto respectthe individualrightsof a despised minority,often-althoughnot always(discussed later)-it will be hardto imagineit beingconvinced to treatthosepeoplebetteras members of a group.In fact,if grouprightsemphasize the differencebetween“us” and“them,”mightthisnotleadto worsetreatment? 7. Are grouprightsthebestwayto protector realizetheinterests, values, of collectiverights. . . oftenseemto or desiresof a group?“Proponents movein a rathercursoryway from the claimthat communities are good thingsto the claimthat communities haverights.”32 We mustdemandan argumentfor protectingthevaluein questionthroughthemechanism of rights.In particular,we mustaskwhetherthe globalrecognition of a new grouphumanrightis eithernecessary or desirable. At thispoint,we begin to circlebackto thequestions of whichgroupsoughtto beaddedto a list of internationally recognized holdersof whichhumanrights. Noneof theseproblemsis fatal.Many arelargelymattersof “negative externalities,” undesirable unintended consequences, wherethe required calculusof costsandbenefitsmayvarydramatically with circumstances. Some grouphumanrightsmay overcome all of theseproblems.(LaterI suggest that thisis truefor at leastsomeindigenous peoples.)Nonetheless, I think thatthepreceding discussion doescautionprimafacieskepticism toward all) group (althoughnot automaticrejectionof) most(but not necessarily humanrightsclaims.33At theveryleast,we shouldinsistonclarityin specifyingthe “gap”in the UniversalDeclarationmodelthatis beingaddressed andcarefulattentionto unintended consequences of the proposed remedy.

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WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES In thissectionI brieflyexaminehumanrightsclaimsfor threegroupsthat receiveextended discussion in laterchapters: women,minorities, andindigenouspeoples. Women systematic suffering Althoughwomenhavea sadhistoryof near-universal, in virtuallyeveryareaof the globe,the idea of grouphumanrightsfor womenis fatallyundermined by problemsof collective agencyfor a diverse It is alsounclearwhatrightswomen groupthatincludes half of humanity.34 asa groupmightbe heldto possess. Unlesswe acceptgenderrolesthatpostulatequalitative differences betweenmenandwomen,all the obvious candidatesfor specialwomen’srightsseembestformulatedin gender-neutral terms.35 For example,family rights,reproductive rights,or protectionagainst domestic violencearenot specialrightsof women.Althoughthe majority of adultvictimsof violencein thehomearewomen,thisnomoremakesprotection againstdomesticviolencea (group)right of womenthanthe factthat themajorityof thoseexercising (orsuffering violations of) tradeunionrights a (group)rightof men.The aremenmakestherightto bargaincollectively principlein eachcaseis independent of sexor gender:nooneshouldbesubpartner;everyoneis ject to violentassaultby anyone,includinga domestic entitledto bargaincollectively. In practice, womenin all countries continueto suffer(moreor lesssevere) us women.But thissimplydoesnot entailthe deprivations andindignities appropriateness, let alonethe necessity, of grouphumanrights.Compare workerswho sufferasworkersandpoliticaldissidents who sufferas dissidents.In eachcasethe sufferingarisesfrom coercively imposednormsthat statusgroup. createa subordinate Let us grantwomenspecialcollectivehumanrights.Why shouldwe expecttheserightsto bebetterimplemented thanalready-established rights? of collective agency,such Especially in lightof theinsurmountable problems rightswouldmostlikely turnoutto be, at best,irrelevantabstractionswhen they were not usedby patriarchalforcesto divert attentionand resources fromeffortsto establish truenondiscrimination andequalparticiof society. pationfor womenin all aspects Minorities

To evadecontroversy overthetermminorities:6I will followarticle27 of theICCPR andrestrictdiscussion to ethnic,religious,andlinguistic minori-

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ties.”Theestablished international approach to minorityprotectionrestson the dualpillarsof nondiscrimination and“measures to protectandpromote the separateidentityof the minoritygroups.”3*Protectingand promoting minorityidentity,and its politicalexpressions in the form of minority autonomy, is theprincipallocusof potentialgrouprightsclaims. Religiousminorities,however,presenta relativelyeasycasefor a liberal, individualrightsapproach. Freedomsof religion,expression, andassociation ordinarilywill providea contextfor perpetuating religiousidentity,particularly in conjunction with established international humanrightsnormsthat providefamilycontroloverthetypeof education childrenre~eive.~’ Furthermore,“church”structures, whicharereadilyconceptualized in termsof freedomof association, are an obviousmechanismfor collectiveaction, withouttheneedfor additionalgrouprights. Ethnicand linguisticminoritiesmay posemore seriousproblems.Languagerightsfor linguisticminoritiesmay be especiallyproblematicbecause almostall aspects of publiclife aretouchedby language.4o If serioussocialor with useof a minoritylanguage,mere economicdisabilitiesare associated tolerationis unlikelyto be enoughto preservegroupidentity. Even in thesecases,though,nondiscrimination, freedomof association, andfamilyeducation rightsprovideconsiderable leverage.For example,one couldreadilyarguethatit is discriminatory to provideaccess to publicservices-including schooling-only in a dominantlanguage.Single-language publicmediamightalsobe seenasinvolvinginvidiouslinguisticdiscrimination.Whethersuchmeasures are adequateis an empirical,not a theoretical, issue. of grouprightsfor minoritiesare My sense,however,is thatadvocates likelyto seeth.epreceding paragraphs as“missingthepoint.”Theyareinterestedin protections for groupidentitythat go well beyondthoseprovided by strongandeffectivemeasures of nondiscrimination andfreedomof association. Consider JacobLevy’stypologyof culturalrights:exemptions, assistance, self-government, externalrulesrestrictingnonmembers, internalrulescontrollingmembers,recognitionor enforcement of traditionalrules,minority representation in government bodies,and symbolicacknowledgment of worthor Nondiscrimination andfreedomof association principally encompass measures involvingexemptions, assistance, symbolicacknowledgment,and someformsof externalrules on outsiders.Grouprights claims,by contrast,aremostlikely to lie in theothercategories. Are all minorities,as a matterof humanrights,entitledto, for example, self-government or guaranteed grouprepresentation in governmental bodies?A just societycertainlymay legitimatelychooseto grantsomeform of self-government to particularminorities.But is it a humanrightsviolationif

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thesocietydoesnot?I canseenoreasonwhy minorities,or anyothergroup, shouldbe universallyentitledto self-government, or evenguaranteed group representation. And I amawareof nomorallyattractiveprinciplethatwould grantsuchrightsto minoritiesthatdoesnot alsograntthemto an impractical largenumberof othergroupsaswell. Shouldminoritycommunities haveguaranteed legalrightsto discipline members? Again,thepreciseformof thequestionis important.We areinterestedherein legalrights.(Membersof the communityare alreadyfree to shunthosewhoviolategroupnorms.)Because we aredealingwith a putative humanright,theissueis notwhetherit is permissible or desirable in particular casesto recognizesuchlegalrights,but whetherall minoritieseverywhereareentitledto suchpowersovertheirmembers. Givenspaceconstraints, let me simplysuggestthatsuchrightsarelikely to beleastproblematic whentheminoritycanbeunderstood asa freeassociationof individuals.The groupreadilyconceives voluntarymembership as implyingacceptance of discipline.By allowingeffectiveexit options,conflictsbetweenthehumanrightsof individualsandthegrouprightsof minoritiescanbe moderated to perhapsacceptable levels. Underany otherinterpretation, individualrightswouldbe subordinated to the grouprightsof the minority.I can seeno reasonwhy minorities shouldhavesuchsuperiorrights,whichare,I thinkrightly,deniedto other groups.In anycase,if thisis wherethe argumenttakesus,we areno longer talkingaboutmodestsupplements to the UniversalDeclarationmodel. Thesearemajorchanges thatrequirethesortof argumentthatfew advocates of grouphumanrightsfor minoritiesevenattemptto make. I am not, let me repeat,challenging theideaof minorityrightsas theyare alreadyestablished in themajorinternational humanrightsinstruments (i.e., asindividualrightsthatprovidespecialprotections to membersof minority groups).I am not evenchallenginggrouprightsof minorities.For example, the Singaporean practiceof reservinglegislativeseatsfor representatives of Hindu and Malay communities clearlyis (and oughtto remain)defensible onhumanrightsgrounds. Rather,I am questioning theideaof grouphumun rightsfor minorities. Singapore’ssystemof reservedlegislativeseats,or India’s muchmore extensivesystemof reservations for (membersof) scheduled castesand tribes,fallswithintherealmof discretionallowedstatesin discharging their humanrightsobligationsand coordinating themwith the pursuitof other importantsocialpurposes. Althoughsuchpracticeshavebeencontroversial, bothnationallyand internationally,they are not clearlyprohibitedby the UniversalDeclarationmodel.But neitheraretheyrequired.And it wouldbe a seriouserrorto view theabsence of suchreservations-oranyothergroup rightsof minorities-as a violationof humanrights.

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Protecting Group Identity Thisliberalapproach to differencemay,it mustbeacknowledged, leadto the weakening, or evendemise,of someminority(andothergroup)identities.Groupidentities, however,arenotnow,andI thinkoughtnot become, subjects of international humanrightsprotection. Only individualautonthatmustberespected by omygivesrise,andvalue,to thesortsof identities others.Any particularidentityis entitledto protection onlybecause it is an expression of therightsandvaluesof thosewhocarryit. Othersmay chooseto valuedifference for its own sakeor for the social benefitsthatdiversityprovides.They arerequired,asa matterof human rights,onlyto respectthe decisions thatpeoplechooseto acton for themselves,withinthelimitsof theirrights.Neitherindividuallynor collectively indido othershavea rightto imposeanyparticularidentityon a resistant vidualor groupbecause, for example,their ancestors borethat identityor because particularsocialrolesarewidelyendorsed. In almostall societies almostall adultshavemultipleidentities.It is for suchreal,andrealisticallycomplex,humanbeings42to balancethevaried rolesandhistoriesthat shapetheirlife. Suchchoicesare,of course,conditionedand thusin some(relativelyuninteresting) sensenot “free.” But if equaltreatmentandfreedomof association arefully realized,thosechoices canappropriately be seenasautonomous exercises of internationally recognizedhumanrights. In a socialandpoliticalenvironment markedby equaltreatmentandfreeto compete domof association, groupsof all sortshavea “fair” opportunity in shapingthe identitiesof “its” members.If a particularidentityis valued sufficiently, it will survive,perhapseventhrive.If not,thenit will not.That is the way it should The only alternative is to saythat identitiesare thingsthat canrightlybe imposedon thosewho reject,deny,or seekto modifythem.This is not an extension of the UniversalDeclarationmodel but a rejectionof its foundations. Peopleshouldbe-and throughtherightsof nondiscrimination, freedom recognizedhuman of association, and a varietyof otherinternationally rightsare-entitled to develop,express, andmodifytheir identities,acting bothindividuallyand~ollectively.4~ No particularidentityoughtto be entitled to specialprotectionas a matterof humanrightsbeyondthat which derivesfromthe(individualandcollective) choicesof its members. Nonetheless, whereequaltreatmentandeffectivefreedomof association are systematically violated,theremay be no viablealternative to minority self-government. Whereit canbe plausiblyarguedthat equaltreatmentis decidedlylesslikely withoutminorityself-government, then that may indeedbe the besthumanrightsstrategy.But thisdoesnot makeminority self-government a humanright.Rather,it is a localpolitical decision about

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meansof implementing internationally recognized humanrights,withinthe marginof discretionallowedby international humanrightsnorms.Such instances of minorityself-government arebestunderstood as extensions of the right to nondiscrimination, rathera new classof humanrights.When suchrightscometo be implementedterritorially,turningan oppressed minorityinto a potentiallyoppressing majority(e.g., Kosovo),vigilanceis requiredto minimizeunintended negativehumanrightsconsequences. IndigenousPeoples

Indigenous peoplesmaybeseenasposinganextremeexampleof justsuch a situationwhereeffectiveequaltreatment, perhapsevensurvival,requiresa grouprightto self-government. To simplifythediscussion, let usimaginean indigenous communitywith thefollowingcharacteristics.45 The community is smallif nota face-to-face society,at leastonein whichthelineageof most andculturmembersis knownto mostothermembers.It is geographically ally largelyseparate from the mainstream society.Mainstreaminstitutions thereare thusappearto mostmembersof thecommunityasalien.Because alsoregularcontactswith the “outside”world,we canthinkof thosewho residein the communityas havingchosento stay.Finally,the indigenous communityis fragile,in the sensethatwell-established mainstream institutions(e.g., privatepropertyin land) wouldas an unintendedconsequence radicallyalterthecommunity’s way of life in a fashionthatmostmembers wouldrejectif givena choice. In suchcircumstances, it seemsplausible to arguethattheindigenous communityhaschosena way of life. That choicedemands, on its face,a certain degreeof respectfrom mainstream societyandinstitutions, extendingin at leastsomecasesto accommodation andprotectionof thechosenway of life. In fact,in theconditions I haveoutlinedtherewouldappearto benoeffective alternativeto grouprightsinvolvingbothconsiderable self-governmentwhichwouldbefacilitatedby thegroup’ssmallsize,geographical concentration,andculturalhistory-and restrictions ontheactivities of nonmembers, in lightof thefragilityof theindigenous communityanditswayof life.Furthermore,thenegativeexternalities of theseparticulargrouprightsaremodest, imposingsevereburdenson relativelyfew outsidersin returnfor immensebenefitsto thegroupandits members. The broadersignificance of this “exception”bearsnoting.Evenif most claimsfor grouphumanrightsareprofoundlydefective,no particularclaim canberejectedwithoutexamining itsmeritsin detail.Evenwhereskepticism is theappropriate generalattitude,every claim for recognizing a newhuman rightdeserves carefulscrutiny. Systematic threatsto humandignitychangeovertime. In addition,our understandings of thenatureof thelife worthyof a humanbeing,andof the

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practicalmeaningof equalconcernandrespect,may change.AlthoughI am criticalof mostproposedadditionsto the list of internationally recognized humanrights,I am profoundlysympathetic to the collectiveprojectof this volumeof exploringgapsin andneededadditionsto theUniversalDeclaration model.The UniversalDeclarationand the covenants may be (for us, now) authoritative, evendefinitive.It wouldbe tragic,however,werewe to seethemasthelastwordoninternational humanrights.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE STATE Howeverskepticalof grouphumanrightsonemightbe,we cannotoverlook the deep,althoughusuallyobscured, communitarianism in the Universal Declaration model.As we sawearlier,statesarethenearexclusive instrument for implementing internationally recognized humanrights.The assumed politicalcommunityfor the practiceof humanrights,in the currenthegemonicunderstanding, is the sovereignterritorialstate.In effect,onegroup, thestate,is privilegedoverall others.And evenin thepost-ColdWar world, statesovereignty generallyinsulates governments thatfail to discharge their humanrightsobligations fromcoerciveinternational action. The UniversalDeclarationmodelin effecttransformshumanrightsinto rightsof citizens,a transformation that is explicitin classical contractarian theoristssuchasHobbesandLocke.Therightsthatoneenjoysthusdepend heavilyon accidentsof birth or residence,especiallyin a world with huge legalandpracticalbarriersto migration.Because life opportunities varyboth dramaticallyandsystematically fromcountryto country,the resultinginequalitiesarelargelyindefensible, on moralgrounds, from a humanrights perspe~tive.~~ The priority given t o statesin the UniversalDeclarationmodelthus shouldbe seenaspracticalratherthanmoralor theoretical, a concession to the international political reality of the primacyof sovereignterritorial states.Ratherthana politicalconception of justicein the strongsenseof a view endorsedfor largelyintrinsicreasons,it is insteada politicalmodus vivendiendorsed largelyfor instrumental reasons. If the UniversalDeclarationmodel’sessentialcharacteris cosmopolitan ratherthannationalist, thechallenge we faceis to pushthehegemonic understanding awayfromthisnearexclusive relianceonstatesfor implementation, to movebeyondthismorallydefectivemodusvivendi.The developing postColdWar practiceof humanitarian intervention, discussed in thechapterby Wheeler,represents onesmallbut significantstepin thatdirection. The limitationsof contemporary practiceshouldnot be underestimated. Eventoday,the bestwe cansayis thathumanitarian intervention in theface

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of genocideor extremehumanitarian emergency is legallypermissible (but not required).As Kosovoclearlyindicates,thepermissible modalitiesof suchintervention remaincontentious. Furthermore, thereseemsto be little evidencethatthisexceptionis spillingoverintoother,morecommonkinds of grossandsystematic humanrightsviolations. Nonetheless, the international immunityof the statehasbeenpunctured. And a strongargumentof an emerging(substantive, not merelyinstrumental) overlappingconsensus can be made.For thesekindsof violations,the relevantcommunityfor protectinghumanrightsseemsto be becomingthe societyof states,supplemented, perhaps,by regionalcommunities. We shouldremember,however,that not all formsof cosmopolitanism havethe same,or evennecessarily positive,humanrightsconsequences. For example,the cosmopolitan visionof certainevangelists of globalcapitalism isprofoundly problematic froma humanrightsperspective. Therefore,without minimizingthe threatsto humanrightsthat statespose,it is no less importantto rememberthatthe stateis ourprincipalcontemporary mechanismfor implementing and enforcinghumanrights.Most peoplestill enjoy mostof theirinternationally recognized humanrightsthroughtheagencyor mediationof the statesof whichtheyarea national.We thusshouldbe wary of antistatistarguments, suchas thoseby neoliberalinternational financial institutions, until we havebeenconvincedthat an alternativeto stateprovisionof humanrights-civil and politicalrightsno lessthan economicand socialrights-has beenidentifiedandhasplausibleprospects of beingputin place. In summary,I havetried to suggestthat theprincipalhumanrightstasks facingus todaylie not in developing new rightsbut ratherin betterimplementingthe rightsenumerated in the UniversalDeclarationand the covenants. Even in the area of implementation, without denigratingthe possibilities represented by new surpranational institutions, muchmoreis to be gainedby directingourlimitedresources to protectingandperfecting existingstate-based mechanisms. Ratherthansubstantially altertheUniversalDeclarationmodel,thekey to humanrightsprogress in thecomingdecadesliesin morecreative,andmoreeffectiveeffortsby states,citizens,and othernationalandinternational actorsto implementandenforceit.

NOTES 1. For furtherconceptual analysis,seeJackDonnelly,UniversalHumanRights in Theoryand Practice(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress,1989),chap.1, and JamesW. Nickel, MakingSenseof HumanRights:Philosophical Reflections on the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1987).

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2. Donnelly,UniversalHumanRights,1-2, 121-22. Althoughthe UnitedStatesis a party 3. Seewww.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. only to the civil andpoliticalcovenant, ideological attackson economicandsocial rightshavelargelydisappeared fromAmericandiplomacy.Furthermore, the recent Americanemphasis on marketsis regularlydefendedby their greatercapacityto delivereconomic welfareandby arguments of long-runinterdependence between economic andpoliticalfreedom.In practice,theUnitedStateshasan extensive welfarestatethatprotectsa wide (althoughby no meansadequate) rangeof economic andsocialrights.Foranargument thateconomic rightshavebeencentralto theWestern liberalapproach to humanrightssinceLocke,seeDonnelly,UniversalHuman Rights,chap.5. 4. For overviews of the international implementation machinery,seeJackDonnelly,International HumanRights,2d ed.(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1998),chap.4, andDavid?I Forsythe,HumanRightsin International Relations(Cambridge: Camexamination of internabridgeUniversityPress,2000), chap.3. For an authoritative tionalhumanrightsreporting,seePhilip AlstonandJamesCrawford,eds., The Futureof UN HumanRightsTreatyMonitoring(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2000). 5. Mervyn Frost,Ethicsin International Affairs:A Constitutive Theory(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1996), 104-1 1. 6. Seewww.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. 7. I takethistermfromClausOffe, whousedit at a conference on globalization andhumanrightsat Yale Universityin thespringof 1999. 8. JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1996),xliii-xlv, 11-15, 174-76; andTheLaw of Peoples(Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard UniversityPress,1999),31-32, 172-73. 133-72, 385-96. 9. Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism, 10. My arguments, however,shouldbe readas drawingon, ratherthansimply elaborating, Rawls;asRawlsian,butin somedetailsdifferentfromRawls. 11. Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism, 133. 12. No majormoralphilosopher priorto World War I1 tookhumanrightsas a moralprimitive.More recently,Alan Gewirthstandsas a moderatelyprominent exception thatprovestherule.SeeHumanRights:Essays on Justifcation andApplications(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1982). 13. See,for example,the Arab Charterof HumanRights,adoptedby the Arab and the Leaguein 1994 (wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/arabhrcharter.html) CairoDeclarationon HumanRightsin Islam(wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ cairodeclaration.htm1). For recentscholarlydiscussions, see,for example,Shaheen Law:Equalbefore SardarAli, GenderandHumanRightsin IslamandInternational Allah, UnequalbeforeMan?(Boston:KluwerLaw International, 2000); Mahmood Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism, andHumanRightsin theMiddle-East(Boulder, PluralColo.:Rienner,1998);AhmadMoussalli,TheIslamicQuestfor Democracy, ism,andHumanRights(Gainesville: UniversityPressof Florida,2001);andNorani Othman,“GroundingHumanRightsArgumentsin Non-WesternCulture:Shari’a andtheCitizenshipRightsof Womenin a ModernIslamicState,”in TheEastAsian Challengefor HumanRights,ed.JoanneR. BauerandDanielA. Bell (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1999).

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14. Rawls,Law of Peoples,68. AlthoughRawlsrefershereexplicitlyto a shortlist of rightscomposed principallyof life,liberty,property,andformalequality(65),the argumentholdsfor theUniversalDeclarationmodelmoregenerally. Seealso78-81. 15. Donnelly,UniversalHumanRights,71-73. Mass.:HarvardUni16. SeeRonaldDworkin,A Matterof Principle(Cambridge, versityPress,1985),chap.8. 17. For theimportance of thisdistinction, seeRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,145-50. 18. Rawls,Law of Peoples,11. 19. It is oftenarguedthatliberals(andnonliberalsaswell) facean inescapable trade-offbetweenlibertyandequality.Evenif true,thisunderscores thecommitment of liberalismto bothvalues.What distinguishes liberaltheoriesis theircommitment to equallibertyfor all, ratherthan,for example,equalityfor all or libertyfor some. Differentliberaltheorieshavevery differentaccounts of the meaningof “equalliberty for all.” Evenwhereliberalsacceptsubstantial inequality,it requiresspecial defense-Rawls’s “differenceprinciple”( A Theoryof Justice[Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1971],65-73)is a much-discussed example-and is subject to liberal(as well asnonliberal)critique.Dworkin,Matterof Principle,chap.9, offers an especially forcefulargumentfor thecentralityof equalityto liberalism. 20. SeeJackDonnelly,“HumanRights,Democracy, andDevelopment,” Human RightsQuarterly21 (August1999):608-32, at 626-30. 21. O n the complexrelationsbetweendemocracyand humanrights,with an emphasis on theirdifferinglogic,seeDonnelly,“HumanRights,”619-21. 22. For a furtherdevelopment of theseclaims,seeDonnelly,“HumanRights,” 619-21,627-31. 23. I certainlydo not want to denythat manypeopleapproachotherssignificantly,evenprimarily,in groupterms.But thissociological fact-to the extentthat it is indeeda fact-has little moralforce.In fact,I wouldsuggest that “othering” groupidentitiesis thehumanrightsproblem,not a potentialsolution. 24. I do not meanto suggest that thisthin conception is the only, let alonethe best,conception of toleration.It simplymarksan endpointon the continuum of approaches to nondiscrimination I consider here.For a characteristically subtlestudy of toleration,seeMichaelWalzer,On Toleration(New Haven,Conn.:YaleUniversity Press,1997). 25. CharlesTaylor,“ThePoliticsof Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining thePoliticsof Recognition, ed.Amy Gutmann(Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press,1994),62. 26. Taylor,“Politicsof Recognition,” 62. 27. MichaelWalzer,“Comment,”in Multiculturalism: Examiningthe Politicsof Recognition, ed.Amy Gutmann(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1994), 99-100. 28. To beasclearaspossible at theoutset,I wantto emphasize thatI donotargue thatwe shouldtreatany of the issuesraisedin thisor the followingsection“on a purelyindividualbasis”(KristinHenrard,Devisingan AdequateSystemof Minority

Protection:IndividualHumanRights,MinorityRightsand theRightto Self-Deterthe mination[The Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 20001,241). I havealreadyemphasized groupsasholdersof essentially socialcharacter of humanrights.I argueonlyagainst

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humanrights.I am not arguingcategorically againstrecognizinglegal(ratherthan human)rightsfor groups. In addition,I am concerned hereonly with grouprightsthat are not reducible to individualrights.(CompareMarliesGalenkamp, IndividualismversusCollective Filosopische StudRights:TheConceptof Collective Rightspotterdam:Rotterdams ies,19931.)Suchirreduciblygrouprightsposea realandsignificant challenge to the UniversalDeclaration modelthatoughtto betakenseriously howeverwe evaluateit. 29. Henry Shue,BasicRights:Subsistence, Affluence,and US. ForeignPolicy (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1980),29-34. 30. CompareMarlies Galenkamp,“The Rationaleof MinorityRights:Wishes RatherThanNeeds?”in Do WeNeedMinorityRights?Conceptual Issues,ed.Juha Raikka(The Hague:MartinusNijhoff, 1996). 31. For a thoughtfuland balancedphilosophical discussion of the problemof groupagencyin the contextof rights,seeJamesW. Nickel, “GroupAgencyand GroupRights,”in Ethnicityand GroupRights,ed. Ian ShapiroandWill Kymlicka (NewYork: New York UniversityPress,1997). 32. MichaelHartney,“SomeConfusions ConcerningCollectiveRights,”in The Rightsof MinorityCultures,ed. Will Kymlicka(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1995),203. 33. For a sympathetic approach to at leastsomegrouprightsissues, froma liberal perspective thatdrawsheavilyonWill Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship: A Liberal Theoryof MinorityRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),seeMaleiha Malik, “CommunalGoodsasHumanRights,”in Understanding HumanRights,ed. Conor Gearty and Adam Tomkins(London:Mansell, 1996). Malik also gives thoughtful consideration to thelimitations of individualrightsstrategies for realizing communalgoods. 34. Groupsof womenin particularlocalitiesor concerned with particularissues may havethe necessary collectivepersonality.Nondiscrimination andfreedomof association usuallywill allowsuchgroupsto acteffectively. 35. Theobviousexception is childbearing. Not all womenchoose to or arecapable of bearingchildren.Therelevantgroupthenwouldbe(potentially) pregnant women. Any group(or individual)rightsthat theymighthavewould involveonly minor additionsto theUniversalDeclaration. 36. Seechapter3 by Jackson-Preece in thisvolumeand,moreextensively, Henrard,MinorityProtection,16-55. 37. Racial minoritieshave been treatedin internationalhuman rights law separately(andwith a greatersenseof importance andurgency).Otherminority groupshave beenlargelyexcluded.O n homosexuals, seeJackDonnelly,“Nondiscrimination and SexualOrientation: Makinga Placefor SexualMinoritiesin the GlobalHumanRightsRegime,”in Innovationand Inspiration:F i f y Yearsof the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights,ed. PeterR. Baehr,CeesFlinterman,and MignonSenders (Amsterdam: RoyalAcademyof ArtsandSciences, 1999).In internationalhumanrightslaw, it is decidedlynot the casethat all “minorities,”in the broadsenseof thatterm,aretreatedequally. 38. Henrard,MinorityProtection, 8. 39. Thisrightis explicitlyrecognized in all threeof themajorinternational instruments:UniversalDeclaration, article26; ICESCR,article13.3;ICCPR,article18.4.

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40. For an overviewof linguistichumanrightsissues,seeToveSkutnabb-Kangas andRobertPhillipson,“LinguisticHumanRights,PastandPresent,”in Linguistic HumanRights:Overcoming LinguisticDiscrimination (Berlin:Moutonde Gruyter, 1995). 41. JacobT. Levy, “ClassifyingCulturalRights,”in Ethnicityand GroupRights, ed. Ian ShapiroandWill Kymlicka(New York New York UniversityPress,1997), 25. 42. As JeremyWaldronnotes,manyadvocates of grouprightsandminorityculturesinsteadassumethatindividualsare(if notexclusively, at leastprimarily)membersof a single,coherent,evenhomogenous “culture.”“MinorityCulturesandthe Cosmopolitan Alternative,”in TheRightsof MinorityCultures,ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),105-8. 43. Thisdoesnotprecludeactivestatesupportfor thegroupin question. But such supportshouldbe seenasan expression of thevaluesandchoicesof thesocietyasa whole,operating throughestablished politicalpractices, ratherthana matterof group humanrights. 44. I find particularlyattractiveWaldron’ssuggestion (“Minority Cultures,”112) thatwe thinkof personalidentity“notin termsof hierarchical management, but in termsof democratic self-government of a pluralisticpopulation.” 45. I claimonlythatsomeindigenous peoplesapproximate sucha model. 46. For a brief argumentto thisconclusion, focusingon the issueof openimmigration,seeJosephH. Carens,“AliensandCitizens:The Casefor OpenBorders,” in TheRightsof MinorityCultures,ed.Will Kymlicka(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1995).

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THE CASE FOR GROUP RIGHTS

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3 HumanRightsandCulturalPluralism The “Problem”of Minorities JenniferJackson-Preece

The generaltendencyof thepost-warmovements for thepromotionof humanrightshasbeento subsume theproblemof. . . minoritiesunder the broaderproblemof ensuringbasicindividualrightsto all human beings,withoutreferenceto membership in ethnicgroups.The leading assumption hasbeenthatmembersof. . . minoritiesd onotneed,arenot entitledto, o r cannotbe grantedrightsof a specialcharacter.The doctrineof humanrightshasbeenput forwardas a substitute for the concept of minorityrights,with the strongimplicationthat minorities whosemembersenjoyindividualequalityof treatmentcannotlegitimatelydemandfacilitiesfor the maintenance of their ethnicparticularism.

-Inis Claude’

HUMAN RIGHTS AND PLURAL SOCIETIES The ideaof humanrightsis predicatedon thenotionthat everyindividual humanbeing,by virtueof hisor her humanity,shouldhavethefreedomto of the goodlife. In other define,pursue,andrealizehis or her conception words,everymanandwoman,regardless of whichsovereign jurisdiction theyhappento inhabit,shouldenjoythecircumstances to be a fully autonomousindividual.Fromthisfundamental convictionarisesa wholeseriesof rightsdesignedto ensurethat suchbasicconditions of libertyexistfor all membersof humankind.That hasimportantimplications for international relations. 49

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Ethnocultural pluralismis a commonfeatureof manystates.(According

to oneestimate,the contemporary statessystemis composed of justunder

two hundredstatesthatcontainoverfivethousand ethnicgroups.2) Arguably becausehumanbeingshavea predisposition to creatediversecommunal attachments, to associate with their own peopleat their own time in their own place,they want to enjoyand exercisethis freedomto form andjoin theirowngroup.Moreover,thefactthatsuchdiverseidentitiesandassociationscontinueto existdespitepoliticaleffortsto alter or eradicatethem wouldseemto suggestthatvery manyindividualsconsidertheseethnoculturalexpressions to be an essentialcomponent of theirconception of the goodlife. Yet, despitethisevidence,bothliberalphilosophy andinternationalpracticedirectedat humanrightshavehistoricallybeenill disposed to the minorityproblemsthat very often arisein situationsof ethnocultural pluralism.Why? Becauseindividualrights-basedpolitical thoughtand actionwas a fundamental component of the politicaltransformation from the divineright of kingsto popularsovereignty andrepresentative government.Thisconnection betweenwhatwe nowreferto as“humanrights”and “democracy”led to a seriesof assumptions thatultimatelyrenderedtheidea of “minorityrights”highlyproblematic within the liberaltradition,aswill be discussed morefully in thenextsection.To putit simply,minorityrights as distinctfrom equalcitizenshipguarantees cameto be associated with politicalinstability,disorder,andconflict;fromthisperspective, recognizing minorityrightswouldputat riskthesocialconsensus onwhichpeace,order, and representative governmentwas built. As a result,problemsassociated with ethnocultural identities,associations, or expressions havetendedto be eitherignoredby liberalsor addressed only throughgeneralguarantees of freedomof expression, association, and equality.For this samereason,the international humanrightssystemcreatedafter1945has,untilveryrecently, largelyignoredthe dilemmasexperienced by membersof minoritygroups asdistinctfromthemajoritypopulationwithinstates. This chapterwill examineboththe initial failuresto addressminority rightsin thepost-1945humanrightsdiscourse andrecentinitiativesto rectify thisshortcoming. In sodoing,it will arguethat culturalpluralismis an essentialfeatureand importantvalueof the humancondition.For thisreason,pluralismoughtto be activelypromotedratherthanmerelytolerated within the liberalhumanrightsdiscourse sinceit is only in situations of socialpluralismthatfreedomcanbefully realized.Achievinggenuineautonomyfor all humankind will thereforerequirenotonlyrespectfor individual libertiesbut alsospecialguarantees for ethnocultural minoritiesin addition to thealready-recognized equalrightsprovisionscurrentlyincludedin multilateralhumanrightsagreements.

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THE “PROBLEM” OF PLURALISM Historically,theideaof rightsemergedin thecontextof Westernsocialand politicalthoughtof the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries. At thistime, theideathateverymanhadhisappointed statusandfunctionin a preestablishedorderwasbreakingdownin the faceof an advancing individualism expressing itselftheologically in Protestantism, economically in mercantile capitalism, andpoliticallyandphilosophically in thetheoryof naturalrights andthe socialcontract.The newtheorywasintendednot as a justification butasa criticismof theexistingorder;itstonewasradical,andin itsultimate employment, it wasrevolutionary.3 In otherwords,asnotedearlier,rights-based politicalthoughtandaction of the politicaltransformation from the were fundamental components divinerightof kingsto popularsovereignty andrepresentative government. of theliberaltradition For thisreason,thefundamental rightsandfreedoms beginning with the AmericanDeclarationof Independence andthe French to be a means Declarationof the Rightsof Man weregenerallyunderstood of protecting“thepeople’’fromtyrannyby thesovereign princeor government. It is at thispointin thehistoryof politicalideasthatethnocultural pluralismbecomes problematic. Who arethepeoplein whomsovereignty, and indeedliberty,ultimatelyresides? The peoplearethe nation,andthe state existsasan expression of thenationalwill. “The principleof all sovereignty restsessentiallyin the nation.No bodyand no individualmay exercise authoritywhichdoesnotemanate fromthenationexpressly” (article3,1789 Declarationof the Rightsof Man and of the Citizen).Moreover,“for a nationthusabusedto ariseunanimously andto resisttheirprince,evento the dethroning of him, is not criminalbut a reasonable way of vindicating theirlibertiesandjust right^."^Thisis thecriticalpointat whichtheideaof politicalcommunityasthe ultimate sourceof bothauthorityandindividual libertyentersthe liberaltradition,andnaturalrightsbecomeconfused with citizenship rightsanddemocracy. Rousseau’s conception of the socialcontractis predicated on the belief that in surrendering his or her will to the generalwill, the individualdoesnot losefreedombut insteadgainsit as a memberof an independent politicalcommunity.Popularsovereignty and representative government put thisconviction into practice;from thisperareperspective, specialminorityrightsbeyondthoseof equalcitizenship ceivedasthreatsto thesurvivalof theoverarching politicalcommunityand thefundamental freedomit givesriseto. We seethattodayin thedeepcontroversyin France,whichpenetrated to theheartof theFrenchgovernment, overthequestion of grantingsomemodestautonomy to Corsica. As the nineteenthcenturyprogressed, thisnewpoliticalthinkingspread

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to areasoutsideWesternEuropeandNorthAmerica.The ideaof thenation as a politicalor civic communityand its concomitant notionof national identitybecameincreasinglyinfusedwith ethnocultural characteristics, therebyrenderingthe positionof ethnocultural minoritiesevenmoredifficult.In Central,Southern,andEasternEurope,thenewrevolutionaries were confrontedby multilingualandmulticulturalempiresthatcontinued to base theirrule on ancientdynasticrightsarisingfrommarriage,succession, purchase,conquest,and so forth,with little regardfor eitherconstitutions or representative institutions. How, then,couldthe “will of the people”be expressed and developedin circumstances whereterritorieswere far flung and scattered,centraladministration was weak, and civic institutions were largelyabsent? The answerwas,of course,to developan alternativebasison whichto mobilizepopularsupportand action:languageand culturerather thanpoliticalor civiccommunity. This emphasis onlanguageandculturegavea newdynamismto theoriginal Anglo-Frenchideaof the nation-state groundedonpopularsovereignty: Whereaspreviouslystatesmadenations,henceforthnationswouldmakeand break-states. The amalgamation of smallerterritories(e.g., Venice, Florence,Milan, etc.)inhabitedby the samelinguisticandculturalgroup intoa singlesovereign, territorialunit(e.g.,Italy)-or, conversely, thepartition of largerterritoriesin whichdifferentlinguisticandculturalgroups intermingled underthe samesovereignauthority(e.g., the Hapsburgand OttomanEmpires)intosmallerpoliticalunitswith morehomogeneous ethnoculturalpopulations (asin thecaseof Greece,Serbia,Montenegro,Macedonia,Romania,andBulgaria)wouldpreoccupy international relationsfrom 1848to 1919.Thepoliticizationof ethnicityandcultureintroduceda whole new dynamicto relationswithin and betweenstates;it gaverise to a new principleof internationallegitimacy-national self-determination-that demandsthat the stateand the ethnonation shouldcoincide.This principle wasonlypreparedto recognizeonekind of state-the nation-state-whose boundaries wereno longerdeterminedby “the coursesof rivers,the direction of mountains,or the chancesof war, but accordingto racesor rather [ethno] nation^."^ Initially, this new ideawasunderstood to be a naturalcorollaryof both individualliberty and popularsovereignty-the fundamentalvaluesin defenseof whichtheAmericanandFrenchRevolutions ostensibly hadbeen fought.As JohnStuartMill wrotein his 1861 treatiseOn Representative Government: Wherethesentiment of nationalityexistsin anyforce,thereis a primafaciecase for unitingall the membersof the nationalityunderthe samegovernment, a government to themselves apart.Thisis merelysayingthatthequestionof governmentoughtto be decidedby the governed.One hardlyknowswhat any

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divisionof thehumanraceshouldbe freeto do,if notto determine withwhich of thevarious collectivebodiesof humanbeingstheychoose to associate themselves.

[However,Mill wenton to addthat] Whena peopleare ripefor freeinstitutions,thereis a stillmorevital consideration Freeinstitutions arenextto impossiblein a countrymadeup of differentnationalities.6 Liberalslike Mill considered ethnocultural pluralisma seriouspolitical problembecauseit appearedto underminethe socialconsensus and shared politicalvalueson whichrepresentative institutions werebased.The despotismcommonlyassociated with the multilingual,multicultural Hapsburg and OttomanEmpireswas construedas furtherevidence-shouldany be needed-that liberalismcouldnot easilybe achievedin ethnoculturally plural societies.Thus,it is only to be expectedthat Mill and Westernliberals like him, viewedliberty and nationalself-determination as naturalalliesin the fight againstdespotism and dynasticrule. The variousnationalmovementsdemandedtheunionof ethnonations dividedby dynasticempireand theindependence of otherethnonations suppressed within dynasticempire: Westernliberalsexpected,o r at leasthoped,that the new nation-states achieved in thiswaywouldpracticerepresentative government andguarantee the rightsof the individual. Unfortunately,historyhasdemonstrated timeandagainthat onceethnoculturalhomogeneity is accepted asthe idealbasisof politicalorganization, the individualliberty of membersof minoritygroupsbecomesprecarious. In suchcircumstances, the state“tendsto act as if it is a singleandunitary nation.”If, in fact,it is not this,it must“endeavour to makethefactscorrespondto theideal,”regardless of therightsandlibertiesof thoseamongits citizenswho do notbelongt o themajorityethnicgroup.’At the sametime, the reverseis alsotrue:Every ethnonation or fractionthereofthatis not an independent nation-statemuststriveto becomeone.In thisway, individual ethnic,cultural,andlinguisticidentitiesbecomeobjectsof politicalmanipulation.The individualno longerdetermines his or her nation;instead,the nation determinesthe individual.National self-determination quickly becomesnationaldeterminism. Justas the statedomesticallycameto view ethnocultural pluralismas potentiallydestructive of its territorialintegrityand politicalcohesion,so, too,did thesocietyof statesincreasingly associate suchdiversitywith internationalinstabilityand conflict.Historically,the problemof pluralismhas evokedtwo international responses designedto eliminateit: (I) themanipulationof eitherbordersto matchpeoplesor peoplesto matchborderswith a view to creatinguniformethnocultural populations within states,or ( 2 ) individualhumanrightsto equalityandnondiscrimination with the tacit acceptance of domesticassimilationist measures designedto createhomogeneityin culture,language,andvalueswithin existingjurisdictions.

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First,international effortsto createuniformitywithin stateshaveled to bothinternationally sanctioned populationtransfers andboundaryrevision a betterfit between juridicalterritoriesandethnonain thehopeof achieving tionalpopulations. Populationtransfers sanctioned by international agreement occurredon severaloccasions duringthe twentiethcentury.8For example,minorityexchanges betweenGreeceandTurkeyandto a lesser extentalsobetweenGreeceandBulgariafollowingWorld War I wereproSimividedfor in the 1919Treatyof Neuilly and1923Treatyof Lausanne. larly,thetransferof ethnicGermansbackto Germanyfromacross Central by the1945Potsdam andEasternEuropeafterWorldWar I1 wasauthorized Protoc01.~ Boundaryrevisionto createethnoculturally homogeneous states was attemptedby the victoriousgreatpowersof 1919. Both of these approaches assume thereis someoptimaldivisionof territorythatwill succeedin givingeveryethnonation its own homogeneous state.Experience, however,hasproventhat any solutionto the problemof pluralism,which groupsandboundattemptsto peacefullysecurea fit betweenethnocultural aries-populationtransfers andborderrevision-is in realityno solutionat all. Thisapproachultimatelyfailsbecause theidealof everyethnonation in its own homogeneous stateis in practiceunobtainable withoutthe useof considerable forceandresultanthumansuffering. Second,the problemof pluralismhasbeenaddressed by redefiningit in termsof individualdiscrimination andequality,therebyprovokinginternationalrequirements for existingstatesto removeanylegalor politicalbarriequalityof civil ersof individualmembership in a minorityby guaranteeing andpoliticalrightsto all itscitizensregardless of theirethnonational identity in accordance with prevailingliberalpractices. Suchinternational stipulations,thoughlaudablein andof themselves, arenevertheless well suitedto a politicalbeliefin thevalueof uniformitysincethey arefullycompatible with domestic programsaimedat assimilating individualmembersof minorities into the dominantlinguisticandculturalgroup.For example,if equalityis definedassameness, thenstipulating that all childrenmustbe taughtin the same(majority)language doesnot violateequalrightsprovisions. Equality coupledwith assimilation wassupported by the UnitedStatesandother majorWestern(liberal)powersafterWorldWar I1 because of boththefailure of the Leagueof Nationsminoritysystemlo to preventethnicconflictin of decolonization in AsiaandAfrica,whereethnoEuropeandthe prospect culturalpluralismwasevengreaterandthuspotentiallyevenmoredestabilizing. Consequently, the new international orderestablished after 1945 includeda systemof universal individualhumanrightsbutnotoneof special in thenextsection. minorityrights,aswill be discussed As a resultof thesevariousapproaches to the problemof pluralism,not all ethnocultural minoritiesarein thesamepositionrelativeto themajority." Someethnocultural minoritieswantto be incorporated withinthemajority

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but are separated from it againsttheirwill-minorities byforce. In these cases,the majoritydeliberatelydifferentiates betweenitselfandmembersof the minorityby, for example,callingattentionto ascriptivedifferencesin termsof race,ethnicity,language, religion,andsoforth,andusesthesecharacteristics as the basisfor oppression designedto perpetuate the separation This sortof oppressive treatmentwasthe experiof the two communities. enceof manyJewishcommunities in Centraland EasternEuropebetween the two world wars;of African Americansin the southernUnitedStates prior to the 1960s;andindeedof blackSouthAfricansduringthe era of apartheid,who were in a nondominant (thus“minority”)positionwith respectto thewhiterulingelite.In suchcircumstances, equalrightsandprotectionfromdiscrimination arenecessary to ensuretheindividualautonomy of minoritymembers.Liberalismin general,andtheinternational human rightsregimein particular,hasmadesubstantial achievements in this area overthepastfifty years. Otherethnocultural minoritieswantto preservetheirdistinctiveness as uniqueethnic,cultural,religious,or linguisticcommunities withinthe territory of the statebut are insteadsubjectto majoritycampaigns of assimilation, expulsion,or, at the mostextreme,genocide’z-minoritiesby will. Unwantedassimilation is a commonexperience of minoritiesduringnationbuildingcampaigns in the nameof the majoritynationalcommunity(e.g., CatalansandBasquesin Spain;Welsh,Irish, andScotsin the United Kingdom;Flemingsin Belgium;Moslemsin Bulgaria;HungariansandRomain RomaniaandSlovakia;Tibetansin China,etc.).Expulsion,too,hasbeen frequentlyusedby statesto overcomethe problemsassociated with troublesomeminority by will communities; post-1945examplesincludethe expulsionof ethnicGermansfrom Centraland EasternEuropebetween 1945and 1948,thepopulationmovementsaccompanying thepartitionof IndiaandPakistanin 1947,thePalestinian expulsions accompanying thecreationof thestateof Israelin 1948,the expulsionof AsiansfromUgandain the early 1970s,the exodusof MoslemsfromBulgariain the 1980s,andthe with the breakupof Yugoslavia variousactsof ethniccleansingassociated in the 1990s.In situations in whichthe minorityin questionis territorially concentrated, assimilationandexpulsionarevery oftenunderscored by a fear of secession or irredentismthat tendsbothto exacerbate minority/ majoritytensionsandto givean addedsenseof urgencyandsometimes also violenceto thesestatemeasures. The ultimateactof violenteliminationof a minorityis, of course,genocideas canbe evidencednot only in the Holocaustbut alsomorerecentlyin Cambodia,Rwanda,andBosnia.In suchcircumstances, equalrightsand protectionfrom discrimination are not by themselves sufficientto ensurethe individualautonomyof minoritymembers.In addition,specialguarantees designedto preserveand promote minorityidentitiesand communities arenecessary to ensureall individuals

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havethefreedomto maketheculturalexpressions andassociations theygenuinely value. Liberalismin general,and the internationalhumanrights regimein particular,hasmadeonlylimitedprogress in thisareaoverthepast fifty years.Consequently, this is one of the areasin whichrecentinterest andfutureactionmustbe concentrated to fulfill thegoalof humanrightsnamely,to ensurethat everyindividualhumanbeinghasthe freedomto define,pursue,andrealizehis or her conception of the goodlife.

HUMAN RIGHTS A N D PLURALISM AFTER 1945 The new internationalsystemcreatedafter 1945-and with it the various UnitedNationsandregionalhumanrightstexts-was formulatedlargely “withoutconsideration of the questions of principle”thatarisefromthe existenceof ethnocultural minoritiesin a “worlddominatedby the concept of thenationalstateasthe. . . unitof politicalorgani~ation.”~~ Thisis hardly surprisinggiventhat the internationalactorsthat createdthis systemwere noneotherthanstatesand thereforedeeplysuspicious of would-berival claimantsto their authority,territory,or population. The ideaof statehood, includingtherelatedconcepts of popularsovereignty andself-determination, is not easilyreconciledto that ethnocultural pluralismthat minorityrights would perpetuate. Accordingly,the onlyminoritygrievances considered legitimatewere thoseinvolvingdiscrimination by the majoritysuchthat individualequalrightsguarantees wereseenasthe appropriate response. Any minorityclaimsto specialtreatmentas a distinctivecommunitywere viewedas tantamount to secessionist demandsand thuscouldand, in the interestsof international peaceand stability,shouldbe ignored.Consequently,minorityclaimsfor specialrightsin cultural,educational, religious, andlinguisticmattersoverandabovethoseof equalcitizenshipwerenoticeably absentfrom thosetreatiesthat createdthe post-1945humanrights system. The UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights(1948)makesno mentionof specialminorityrightsbut insteadendorses the principlesof equalityand nondiscrimination. Amongitsvariousclauses, thosereferringto freedomof thoughtandreligion(articlelS), freedomof expression (article19),freedom of peacefulassembly andassociation (article2O), andtherightto freelyparto ticipatein the culturallife of thecommunity(article27) dohaverelevance the circumstances of minorities.However,theseclausesd o not grantthe rightsto culture,language,andeducation,which(some)minoritiesenjoyed (briefly)undertheearlierLeagueof Nationsminority~ y s t e mWhile . ’ ~ article 27 is directedat thepreservation of culturalcommunities, theclauseis vague asto whethercultural community in thiscontextincludesminoritycultures or simplythe dominantculture.This ambiguityhasenabledstatesto argue

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thatparticipation in thedominantcultureis all thisarticleguarantees; therefore, assimilationist policiesdirectedagainstminoritieshavenot beenpreventedby it. Interestingly,thetravauxprepamtoires indicatethattheinitialdraftof the UniversalDeclarationdid includea guarantee thatin all countriesinhabited numberof personsof a race,language, or religionotherthan by a substantial thoseof themajority,“minoritiesshallhavetherightto establishandmaincultural tain,outof anequitableproportionof publicfunds. . . theirschools, institutions, andto usetheirlanguagebeforecourts,organsof thestateand in thepressandpublicassembly.”’5 Yet, as the draftproposalwent from one committeeto the next, it was editedandfinallyremovedaltogether; onceagain,recognizing diversitywas as invitinginstability. construed Instead,on the samedaythatthe GeneralAssemblypassedtheUniversal Declarationof HumanRights,it alsopassedResolution217 C (111)entitled “The Fateof Minorities.”In thisresolution,theGeneralAssemblyacknowledgedthat it “couldnot remainindifferentto the fate of minorities”but, becauseit wasdifficultto adopta “uniformsolution”to this“complexand delicateissue”that has “specialaspects”in eachstatein whichit arises, decided“not to deal with the question”and insteadto refer it to the U N C H R andSub-commission for thePreventionof Discrimination and Protectionof Minoritiesfor furtherstudy.16Yet eventhis limitedmandate wasconsidered too controversial giventhe hostilityof manymemberstates towardminorityprovisions. As thesubcommission’s ownrapporteur admitted,fromthepassing of thisresolution until 1989,boththeU N C H R andthe subcommission failed to addressthe issueof specialminorityprotection.” Consequently, duringtheyearsfrom 1945to 1989,onlyoneUN convention incorporated a specificminorityrightsclause’?theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), whose article 27-originally proposedby the subcommission in 1950-stipulates that in thosestatesin whichethnic,religious,or linguisticminoritiesexist,persons belongingto suchminoritiesshallnot be deniedthe right, in community with othermembersof their group,to enjoytheir own culture,to profess andpracticetheirownreligion,or to usetheirown1ang~age.I~ This provisiongivesstatesignatories the freedomto determinewhether ethnicgroupsin theirjurisdictions constitute suchminoritiesby will. Needlessto say,very manystatesthatpossessed minoritieseffectivelyavoided their internationalobligations in this regardby redefiningthesegroups undera differentrubric,be it “immigrant,”“aboriginal,”or whatever. This generalantipathytowardthoseguarantees thatwouldhaverecogminoritieswithin existingstatesis also nized and in so doingperpetuated apparentin the activitiesof mostregionalorganizations between1945 and 1989.For example,colonialsuccessor statesin Latin America,Africa, and

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Asiagenerallyassumed thattheabsence of minorityrightswasmoreconducive to statesuccessdefinedin termsof territorialintegrityand internal politicalstabilitythanwouldbe thereverse.Thus,whiletheAmericanConventionon HumanRights(1969)reiteratesalmostall of the rightsincluded in the ICCPR, it doesnot includeany referencewhatsoeverto minority rightsalongthe linesof article27. This absenceof explicitminorityprovisionsis alsoapparentin the AdditionalProtocolto the AmericanConvention on HumanRightsin theArea of Economic,SocialandCulturalRights (“Protocolof SanSalvador”)(1988).Similarly,whiletheAfricanCharteron Humanand People’sRights(1981) incorporates a people’sright to selfdetermination, in practice“people”hasbeenidentifiedwith the alreadyexistingAfrican statesand not the varioustribal groupswithin them. Likewise,althoughthe Association of Commonwealth Statesrepeatedly emphasized its commitmentto individualhumanrightsandracialequality, it saidvirtuallynothingspecificto the circumstances of minoritiesby will and their desirefor protectionagainstunwantedpoliciesof assimilationor oppression. For example,the 1971(Singapore)Declarationof CommonwealthPrinciplesaffirms“equalrightsfor all citizensregardless of race,colour,creedorpoliticalbelief”andrecognizes “racialprejudiceasa dangerous sickness.”However,“self-determination” is mentionedonly in the context of “non-racialism”and oppositionto “all formsof colonialdomination.” Thereis no referenceat all to minorityrightsasdistinctfromequalcitizenon Racism ship.While the 1979LusakaDeclarationof the Commonwealth andRacialPrejudiceacknowledges that“everyoneis freeto retainpluralism in hisor hercultureandlifestyle,”thisstatement is madeonlyin thecontext of suchpluralismbeingnojustification for “theperpetuation of racialprejudiceor raciallydiscriminatory practices.”Again,thereis nomentionof what actions,if any, a stateoughtto taketo promotea pluralismof cultureand lifestyleswithin its jurisdictionor whetherthesemight includeprovisions thatwouldhelpperpetuate minoritiesby will. Evenwithin Europe,whereinternational minorityrightshadbeenrecognizedunderthe Leagueof Nationssystem,therewasno revivalof special minorityguarantees between1945and 1989dueto thewidespread fear that thismightrekindleold ethnicconflicts.For example,theCouncilof Europe (C0E)-which duringthistimecreatedwhatis arguablythemostsuccessful extremelyhesiregionalhumanrightssystemin theworld-was nonetheless tantto pursuea specificminorityrightsprotocolto the EuropeanConvention on HumanRights(ECHR) (1950).20Instead,it maintaineda publicly avowedpositionthatspecialminorityrightswereat best“notveryconvincing” andat worse“aggravated existingtensionsanddifficulties.”21 Moreover, minorityissueswere “not deemedto be of extremeurgency”becauseof a widespread belief thatprotectionagainstdiscrimination adequately protectedall legitimateminorityinterests.22

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Althoughthe HelsinkiFinal Act (whichestablished the Conferencefor SecurityandCooperation in Europe)specificallymentionsminoritiesin threedifferentpartsof thedocument-the DeclarationonPrinciples, Principle VII, and the sectionentitledCooperation in Humanitarianand Other Fields-the contentof theprovisionsis confinedto antidiscrimination measuresand allowedstatesa wide latitudein interpretingthe kindsof actions thatcouldandcouldnot be undertaken with regardto “minorities.”Moreover,thisinitial interestin minorityissueswasnot sustained in thevarious “CSCE Follow-upMeetings”that took place between1975 and 1989. Instead,thesemeetingswere dominatedby a concernfor the violationof individualhumanrights-particularlythosecivil andpoliticallibertiesassociatedwith themovementtowardhumanrightsanddemocracyin communist states.23So onceagain,“legitimate”minorityinterestsdid not include anyrightsin cultural,educational, religious,andlinguisticmattersoverand abovethoseof equalcitizenship. In sum,the circumstances of minoritiesby will weredeliberatelyignored by international actorsduringthe Cold War dueto thewidespread convictionthatthecontinuedexistence of suchgroupsposeda threatto theterritorial integrityandsocialcohesionof existingstatesandthusalsoto orderand stabilitywithin the statessystem.The only legitimateminoritygrievances human werethoseexperienced by minoritiesby force,and sointernational rightstextsfromthisperiodgiveconsiderable emphasisto equalrightsand antidiscrimination provisionsbut are virtually “silent”with regardto the specialrightsoverandaboveequalcitizenshipthatminoritiesby will believe are necessary to preserveandpromotetheirdistinctidentitiesand waysof life. Thisinternational attitudetowardminoritiesby will hada numberof consequences. It ledto theconclusion thatsuchminoritymatterswerenotproperly subjectsof internationalorganizations or multilateralagreements. Instead,and not surprisingly,theseissueswereunderstoodto be the preserveof the sovereignstatein whichthey occurred.Withoutinternational stipulations to the contrary,very many stateschoseto “resolve”their minorityproblemsnot throughminorityrightsconduciveto a climateof constructive pluralismbut insteadthroughpoliciesof assimilationor oppression. Unfortunately, aswe haverecentlydiscovered, thelong-term of suchpoliciesareveryoftenfundamentally destabilizing for consequences thestateaffected.Insteadof producinga sharedidentity,theunintended resultof assimilation is oftentimesa growingminority/majority distrustand antipathy.Similarly,insteadof perpetuating the currentregimeand its underlyingethnocultural powerrelations,oppression canprovokeviolent intercommunal conflictsof the sortrecentlywitnessed,for example,in RwandaandformerYugoslavia.Ironically,theColdWar stances withregard to minoritiesby will notonlyfailedto protecttheinterestsof theseminority

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communities but very oftenalsofailed to preservethe internalstabilityof thestatesin whichthey,howevertenuously, existed.

MINORITY RIGHTS A N D PLURALISM AFTER 1989 Since1989,thepreviousinternational response to pluralismwithinstates (territorialinviolabilitycoupledwith individualequalityguarantees) has comeundergrowingcriticism,notleastowingto theincreasing incidenceof ethnicconflictaroundthe globe.Televisedimagesof the humansuffering causedby ethnicconflicthaveshockedtheconscience of international public opinion,at leastin the West,and precipitatedpublicdemandsfor internationalactiononminorityissues. Thispublicpressure hasresultedin a greater willingnessonthepartof Westernstatesto interferein thedomesticjurisdicfeatured tionsof nondemocracies, and so minorityrightshaveincreasingly in theirattemptsto fosterdemocratic development in nondemocratic states, particularly(thoughnot exclusively)in EasternEurope.Significantly, whereaspreviouslydemocratic assumptions tendedto discreditminority claimsfor specialrightsin additionto thoseof equalcitizenship, recentlythe ideaof democracy hasitselfbeenreevaluated, andindeedredefined,by liberthatis more alswho havecometo recognizetheneedfor a socialconsensus thanjust “majoritarian.”At the sametime, the demonstrated peaceand securityrisksassociated with ethnicconflicthavemadeit easierfor internationalsocietyto acknowledge minoritiessincethe old fear that suchaction mightprecipitateethnicviolencehasnow becomea mootpoint.As a result of thesenewperspectives, international actorsarenowbeginningto cometo the conclusionthat the only way to successfully resolvethe “problem”of pluralismis to createcircumstances in whichminoritiesand majoritiescan flourishsideby side.Suchconstructive pluralismwouldseemto requireat leastminimalminorityrightsin cultural,educational, religious,andlinguistic mattersoverandabovethoseof equalcitizenship. If international minorityrightsguarantees are intendedto ensurethat all individualhumanbeingshavethefreedomto define,pursue,andrealizetheir conceptionof the goodlife, then the contentof theseprovisionsoughtto reflectthecircumstances of bothminoritiesby forceandminoritiesby will. resultin the continuedoppression or disFailureto d o sowill unavoidably advantageof membersof particularminoritycommunities. For example,it as wouldbe inefficacious to grantminoritiesby forceautonomyguarantees suchprovisions wouldsimplyperpetuate theunwantedghettoization by the majority(hencethecreationof black“homelands”by the apartheidregime in SouthAfrica,whichwerenotoriously justifiedas“self-government” provisions).Similarly,it wouldbe inefficacious to grantminoritiesby will only

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equal rightsand antidiscrimination protection(i.e., withoutadditional autonomyprovisions)as thesecan be, and historicallyhavebeen,usedas instruments of unwantedassimilationby the majority.The new human rightsagendais thusseekingto augmenttheearlierprovisionsfor individual equalityand antidiscrimination measures with guarantees designedto preserveandpromoteminoritylanguages, cultures,identities,andwaysof life withinstates.In sodoing,it is onceagaindeveloping in conjunction with the liberaltraditionout of whichit emerged,whichhasin recentyearsalso begunto incorporatea greaterawareness of the socialcircumstances confrontedby membersof disadvantaged groups. A majordevelopment in globalstandards onminorityrightstookplacein 1992 when the UN Declarationon the Rightsof PersonsBelongingto Nationalor Ethnic,Religiousand LinguisticMinoritieswasofficiallyproclaimedby the GeneralAssembly.This declarationwasnoteworthyin the historyof international humanrightssinceit wasthe first suchinstrument devotedexclusivelyto minorityconcerns. Thepreambleandninearticlesin part reiteratedthoserightsalreadyrecognizedin article27 of the ICCPR. Personsbelongingto minoritieswererecognizedashavingrightsto existence,identity,and the enjoymentof culture,religion,language,social affairs,theeconomy,andpubliclife. Specialminorityrightsto participatein relevantnationaland regionaldecisions,to establishand maintainassociations,andto havecontactbothwithinandacrossinternational frontierssupplemented thesebasicprovisions. Moreover,the1992formulationreinforced a certaincollectiveelementby acknowledging that theserightscouldbe exercisedindividuallyas well as in communitywith othermembersof the group.It alsowentonto remedytheearlier1966failureto specifystatemeasuresaimedat thepromotionof minorityrights.Henceforth,stateswere requiredto adoptprovisionsfor minoritylanguageinstructionandthepromotionof knowledgeconcerning minorityculturesandlanguages among wereto be the majoritypopulation. At the sametime, minorityconcerns takenintoconsideration in bothdomesticprogramsandinternational cooperation. At the sametime, the 1992 declarationreiteratedthe traditionalinternationalstance,whichheldthat minorityrightswerenot intendedasvehicles to furtherminoritysecession or irredentism.Article 8 was thereforeconcernednot with the rightsof minoritiesbut with the sovereignrightsof statesincludingtheirsovereignequality,territorialintegrity,andpolitical independence. Indeed,thetext wasrepletewith vagueor equivocalwording suchas“encourage conditions,”“appropriate measures,”“whereappropriate,”“wherepossible,”“whererequired,”and“in a mannernot incompatiblewith nationallegislation.”Thesephrasescontinuedto give state signatories a degreeof maneuversufficientto avoidor at leastto limit those new minorityrightsobligationsthey considered mostdetrimentalto their

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sovereignpowersand prerogatives. In otherwords,sovereignty hasby no meansbeenabandoned; it remainsthe cornerstone of theinternational system,at leastfor theforeseeable future.Similarly,rewritingor redrawingsovereignjurisdictions, exceptby constitutional meansandwith theconsentof all concerned, will not be recognized or encouraged. Whathasbegunto change,and arguablywhatneedsto be furtherdeveloped,is the substantive sovereignty (or goodgovernance) practicedwithin frontiers.Despiteitsvariousshortcomings, theDeclarationon theRightsof Persons Belongingto National,or Ethnic,Religious,andLinguisticMinorities-with its global applicability-constitutesa basisfor international thinkingon minorityquestionsthat is developingin this direction.Other international organizations mightagreeon something betterthanthis basic codeof stateconducttowardminorities,but they cannotgo beneathit and expectto justifytheirpoliciesand actionson the issue.More thanthis,the UN declarationwas a major acknowledgment that minoritymattersincludingthoseof relevanceto minoritiesby will-were oncemorelegitimatesubjectsof international relationsand not solelythe concernof those statesin whichtheyoccurred. FollowingonfromthisUnitedNationsinitiative,Europeanregionalorganizationshavenowalsorecognized theneedfor multilateralminorityrights standard settingandenforcement. TheOrganizationfor SecurityandCooperationin Europe(OSCE) has beenconcernedwith formulatingcodesof stateconducttowardminoritiesbothasa way of minimizingethnicconflicts andasa way of preventingthe oppression of individualmembersof ethnoculturalminoritycommunities. The OSCE thereforeincorporated statementsof minorityrightsin all of thoseofficialdocuments, whichformedthe basisof the organization’s activitiessince1989.Theseincludedthe main OSCE humanrightsstandard-setting text of this period,the Copenhagen Document(1990),aswell asthe Charterof Parisfor a New Europe(1990), the GenevaReporton NationalMinorities(1991),the MoscowDocument (1991),the HelsinkiDocument(1992),andthe BudapestDocument(1994). Moreover,in December1992,theOSCEcreatedtheofficeof High Commissionerfor NationalMinorities(HCNM) to assistin memberstates’implementationof international minoritystandards andt o helpresolveethnic conflicts. At the sametime, the conditionof minoritieswasalsoexaminedby the C O E asa potentialobstacleto thedemocraticdevelopment of formercommuniststatesin the regionandas an economicandsocialproblemin those statesthatwereon the receivingend of minoritymigrations.VariousC O E bodiesincludingtheParliamentary Assembly,theEuropeanCommission of HumanRights,and for DemocracythroughLaw, theSteeringCommittee the Committeeof Ministersexaminedminorityrightsproposals between 1990and1995.Thememberstatesof theC O E decidedat theirViennaSum-

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mit Meetingon October9, 1993,to adoptbotha minoritiesprotocolto the ECHR thatwouldbe opento ECHR signatories anda separateconvention on minoritieswhichwouldbe opento bothmembersand nonmembers of the COE. The decisionto adopta Conventionon NationalMinoritieswas implemented in 1995,but little progresshasbeenmadethusfar with regard to the additionalprotocol.This failureresultsfrom bothideologicaldifferencesamongmemberstatesasregardsthe suitabilityof individualversus collectiveminorityrightsformulations and a widespread fear that transferring minorityresponsibility to the EuropeanCourtof HumanRightsin Strasbourg wouldjudicializean issueoverwhichmanyEuropeanstatesare determined to retaindomesticpoliticalcontrol. While mostOSCE andC O E provisionsfor minorityrightsaugmentthe post-1945 humanrightsregimeand the globalminimumstandardoutlined in the 1992 U N Declarationon Minorities,the 1990sEuropeanregional responseto this problemalsorevealsboth an importantreappraisalof Leagueof Nationslinguisticandculturalguarantees anda possibleextension of the right to self-determination of peoples.The COE’s Charterfor Regionalor Minority Languages (1992),for example,containedfar more extensive provisionsfor theuseof minoritylanguages thandid theUN Declarationon Minorities.Six generalcategories of activitywererecognizededucation,judicial, and administrativeauthorities;the media; cultural activitiesandfacilities;economicandsociallife; andtransfrontier exchanges. Its provisions werethereforean importantcontinuation of earlierLeague initiativesin this area-ideas, whichhad beenlargelyforgottenor ignored duringtheColdWar. Unfortunately,the charter’senforcement mechanisms allowedfor a certainnumberof opt-outsby states i g n a t o r i eAs ~ . ~a ~result, may be morelimitedthan the its actualimpacton minoritycircumstances contentof theprovisionsmightotherwiseindicate. Similarly,the right to freedomfrom assimilationand forcedpopulation transferwasalsoaninnovativeEuropeanresponse to ethnicconflict.Explicit prohibitionsagainstthesesortsof government practiceswerenot incorporatedinto the main bodyof any humanrightsagreementprior to 1990. Therewasa precedent in international agreements for sanctions againstseparationin its mostviolentor extremeform-namely, extermination or genocide.Genocidewasprohibitedin the Conventionon the Preventionand of theCrimeof Genocide(1948).Similarly,theUNESCODecPunishment larationon Raceand RacialPrejudice(1978)statedthat all individualshad the right to be different,to considerthemselvesas different,and to be regardedassuch.Importantly,this1978textaffordsevidenceof a movement towardthe prohibitionof forcedassimilationandpopulationtransferin international thinkingon minoritiesandrelatedmatters.Its preamblenotes that racismis manifestedthroughunjustpracticesamongwhichare the forcedassimilation of membersof disadvantaged groups.However,noprec-

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edentexistedfor the explicitprohibitionof formsof assimilation intended to alteran individual’slanguage,culture,andultimatelyhisor her ethnicor nationalidentityor to forciblytransferan individualfrom onelocaleto anotheron thebasisof ethnicor nationalidentity. The Copenhagen Documentwentbeyondthe international statusquoin this regardwhenit statedin SectionIV (32) that “personsbelongingto nationalminoritieshavethe rightfreelyto express,preserveanddevelop theirethniccultural,linguisticor religiousidentity. . . freeof anyattempts at assimilation againsttheirwill.” Similarly,the Conventionon the Protection of NationalMinoritiesspecifiedthat statesshallrefrainfrom both << practicesaimedat the assimilationof personsbelongingto minorities againsttheirwill” and“frommeasures whichmodifytheproportions of the population in areasinhabitedby personsbelongingto nationalminorities.” In suggesting variousformsof autonomyfor nationalminorities,the Europeanminorityrightstextsappearedto be refiningthe right to selfdetermination by advocating self-government within existingstateswherea nationalminority’soutrightindependence cannotberealized.In theCopenhagenDocument,reference wasmadein SectionIV (35) to “appropriate localor autonomous administrations corresponding to thespecifichistorical andterritorialcircumstances o f . . . nationalminorities.”The draftnational minoritiesprotocolput forwardby the Parliamentary Assemblyof the C O E in 1993wouldhavetakenthis development still further.Article 11 of thisproposalrecognized therightof personsbelongingto minoritiesto have at theirdisposalappropriate localor autonomous authoritiesor a special statusmatchingthespecifichistoricalandterritorialsituation.Weretheseor similarmeasures to be adopted,the relationshipbetweensovereignty, selfdetermination,and democracywould begin to changein certainkey respects. Suchchangeswouldmakethesecoreprinciplesfar moreamenable to the circumstances of thoseminoritiesby will thatpossess the normative characteristics (nationalidentityandhistoricterritory)currentlyrecognized asthebasisfor membership withinthe societyof statesandyet, for various In asmuchasthecollectiverightto selfreasons, donotpossess sovereignty. determination hashistoricallybeenunderstood withintheliberaltraditionas thefulfilmentof individualautonomy, theextensionof thisrightto national minoritiesand perhapsalso indigenouspeopleswould ensurethat all humans-including membersof thesegroups-have the equallibertyto refine,pursue,and realizetheir conceptionof the goodlife in association with othermembersof theirchosennationalcommunity. Unfortunately,suchsuggestions remainhighlycontroversial; manystates continueto equateempowering nationalminoritycommunities throughthe concession of self-government with undermining existinggovernmental institutions.As a result,all suggestions of autonomyfor suchminority groupsspecificallyacknowledge the state’srightto determinehow or even

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whetherautonomywill be implemented. So, for example,the Copenhagen Documentidentifiedautonomyasonlyoneof thepossiblemeansto achieve the promotionof nationalminorityidentitiesand acknowledged that all suchmeasuresmustbe in accordance with the policiesof the stateconcerned.Likewise,the Parliamentary Assembly’sproposeddraftnational minoritiesprotocolalsodeferredto the domesticlegislationin its characterizationof minorityautonomy.At leastthe inheritedpoliticalbeliefs(and prejudices) of thenineteenth centuryarenowbeingchallenged withinEuropeanorganizations; that,in itself,is a significantdevelopment. Certainly,there is evidenceof an emergingEuropeanconsensus on minorityrightsthat is far moreamenableto ethnocultural pluralism.The variousminorityrightsstandard-setting textsadoptedby the C O E and OSCE duringthe mid-1990~ havenow beenreaffirmedin theprovisionsof the North AtlanticTreatyOrganization’s(NATO’s) Partnership for Peace (1994)programwith formerstatesof theSovietBloc,theEuropeanUnion’s (EU’s) Pacton Stabilityin Europe(1995),andvariousE U provisionsstipulatingaccession criteria.Therehasthuscomeabouta thoroughinterweaving of COE, OSCE,NATO, andE U provisions regardingsecurityandminority rights.All of thesemajorEuropeanorganizations now appearto be operating in tandemusingcommonminorityrightscriteriabasedon thestandardsettingactivitiesof theOSCEandCOE. In thissense,then,onecanreasonablyspeakof an emergingpost-ColdWar Europeanminorityrightssystem thatreflectsa new foundrespectfor ethnocultural pluralism. However,regionalorganizations in otherpartsof the globehaveyet to address in anysignificantway theissuesraisedby minorityby will communitiesandwhat,if any,rightstheymightlegitimatelyclaimto maintaintheir distinctlanguage,culture,identity,and way of life. For example,boththe Commonwealth’s 1991HarareDeclarationand the 1995MillbrookAction Programmakespecialreferenceto “equalrightsfor all citizens,”“racial prejudiceand intolerance,”and “problemsof migrationand refugees”but saynothingwith respectto minoritiesby will and their desirefor, among others,minoritylanguagerightsandfreedomfromforcedassimilation. The ProposedAmericanDeclarationon theRightsof Indigenous Peoples(1997) extendsrecognitionto bothindigenous peoplesand“peopleswhosesocial, culturaland economicconditionsdistinguish themfrom the majority”but addsthe requirement that suchpeoplesmusthavea statusthat is regulated “wholly or in part by their own customs,or traditionsor by speciallaw and regulations.”In practice,thisprovisionwould givestatesthepowerto selectivelydeterminewhich nonindigenous groupsqualifyfor recognition andprotection. AfricanandAsianorganizations aresimilarlyreticentonthis pressingissue-and that ongoingsilenceis a fundamental andindeeddeliberateevasionof and equivocation on the seriousproblemscurrentlyconfrontingminoritygroupsin manystates.

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Why doesit persist? Becausestatesin theseregionscontinueto view ethplunoculturaldiversityas a problembestsolvednot throughconstructive ralismbut insteadthroughpoliciesof assimilationor oppression. These viewsnot onlyarewell established historicallybutwerealsoto a significant extentwrittenintotherulesof theexistinginternational system;asa result, modifyingthem is not an easytask. Similarly,majorities-where they exist-seem to haveaninherenttendencyto givetheirownbeliefsandopinionsinstitutional force;makingmajoritiesmoretolerantof differenceor dissentis somethingthat cannotbe achievedovernight-and certainlynot withoutgovernment support.Thesefundamental difficultiesare further compounded withinquasi-states, failedstates,collapsedstates,internally illegitimategovernments, and so forth.How can minorityor any other humanrightspoliciesbe implementedwhen thereare no legitimate,functioninggovernmentstructures? In other words,constructive pluralism a minimumdegreeof goodgovernance. requiresasa precondition C O N C L U S I O N H U M A N RIGHTS A N D CULTURAL PLURALISM The problemsposedby minoritieshavetakenon a renewedimportancein international anddomesticpolitics;accordingto onestudy,seventy-nine of the eighty-twoconflictsworldwidebetween1989 and 1992were linkedto ethnocultural minority/majority differences withinstates.25 Consequently, the relationshipbetweenminorityrightsandinternational stabilityis being reevaluated. In lightof recenteventsin formerYugoslavia,Rwanda,andthe formerSovietUnion,it is becomingincreasingly apparentthat a failureto addressthe specialrightsof minoritiesmay in the long term provokepreciselythatsortof instability(intercommunal conflict,demands for secession or irredentism,massrefugeeflows acrossfrontiers,etc.) that “silence”on thisissuehadsoughtto avoid.Sowhereasin thepastethnocultural pluralism withinstateswasrecognizedasan aberration to be ignored,suppressed, and wherenecessary eradicated,it is now slowlybeingacceptedas the norm. Along with this emergingshift in attitudehascomea dawningrealization thatconstructive pluralismis to bepreferredoverbothassimilation andconfrontation.As a result,minorityrightsprovisionsare prominentin recent Western-ledinitiativesto fosterdemocraticdevelopment in nondemocratic states. Constructive pluralism-which is broadlycomparable to themulticulturalismespoused by liberaltheoristssuchas IsaiahBerlin,Will Kymlicka, JosephRaz, andJudithShklar26-acknowledges thatpluralismwithin states is theconsequence of a politicaldesirefor territorialinviolabilityin thecontext of a normalhumanpropensityfor communalattachments that makes

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sociological pluralismin ethnocultural termsa usualandevendesirable state of affairs.It ispreciselythisaspectof humannaturethatgivesriseto families, tribes,ethnicities, andindeednation-states. In otherwords,we existassocial beingsand not isolatedindividuals.Moreover,our fundamentalhuman desirefor a language,culture,andvaluesystemthatis an expression of ourselvesmeansthatpoliticalattemptsto forciblysuppress or alterthesehallmarksof identityare unavoidablydestructive of bothhumanfreedomand creativity.The guidingprincipleof this way of thinkingaboutminority rights,to echoliberaltheoristJudithShklar,is that“socialdiversityis somethingthat anyliberalshouldrejoicein andseekto promote,becauseit is in diversityalonethatfreedomcanbe reali~ed.”~’ Accordingly,specialminority rightsguarantees overandabovethoseof equalcitizenship aresomething everyhumanrightsorganization oughtto recognize. Theconstructive pluralismethosdoesnotconsider pluralismto bea prima faciethreatto the integrityof the state.Insteadits centralpremiseis that minoritieswho arerecognizedandsupported by the statearefar lesslikely to challengeits authorityor threatenits territorialintegrity.International multilateralminorityrightsguarantees therebyaimto preventethnicconflict by encouraging domesticcircumstances in whichthe language,culture,relicommunities canbe preservedand gion,andway of life of all ethnocultural promotedwithinexistingbordersin theinterestof theindividualautonomy of theirmembers. Majoritiesarerequiredto respectminorities’desireto preservetheir way of life, while at the sametime the minorityis requiredto respectthe majority’sright to d o the same;and on this basis,unilateral minorityeffortsto secedefrom the existingstateare precluded.However, negotiated politicalsettlements betweengroupscompatiblewith democratic practices areencouraged-andwheretheseoptfor thecreationof new states (asin the so-calledvelvetdivorcewherebyCzechoslovakia wasreplacedby Slovakiaand the CzechRepublic),internationalsocietywould, of course, Suchminorityrightspractices respectthe wishesof the partiesconcerned. thusdisclosea prior consideration for bothdemocraticprinciplesand the territorialstatusquo:theprincipleof self-determination is setin thecontext of respectfor existingterritorialboundaries, andinternational actionis primarily directedat preventingviolencewithin existingstatesratherthan encouraging the recognitionof new statesexceptwherethisis an outcome of bonafide democratic negotiation. Consequently, theproponents of constructive pluralismseekto justifynot only government tolerationbut alsopositivegovernment actionto promote ethnocultural pluralismandto affirmthedignity,esteem,andmutualrespect of all citizenswhatevertheirethnocultural identities.For thisreason,special minorityrightsin additionto equalcitizenshipthat will help preserveand promoteminorityethnocultural identitieswithinexistingstatesarenow Suchrightsincludethefreedomto speaka minorstartingto be recognized.

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ity languagein certaincircumstances, the right to be educatedin this language,the right to useminoritylanguageplacenamesandsurnames, the rightto formminorityassociations andbuildminorityschoolsandcommuof thiskind areevidentin theUN Decnity centers,andsoforth.Provisions larationon the Rightsof PersonsBelongingto Minorities,in the COE’s Charterfor Regionalor MinorityLanguages and Conventionon National Minorities,andin variousOSCEdocuments suchastheCopenhagen DocumentandtheHelsinkiDocument. In thefuture,certainminoritygroupsmay themselves be deemedto possessrightsas communities. Minoritiesby will that possess that normative characteristic-namely,nationalidentitywithin a historicterritory-that is legitimacyandyet, for variousrearecognizedas thebasisfor international sons,donotpossess theirownsovereign state(e.g.,Hungariansin Romania, Basquesin Spain,Quebecois in Canada,etc.)arepotentialclaimantsfor collectiveautonomyguarantees. Suchgroupsareoftenlabeled“nationalminorities” to distinguishthem from other ethnoculturalminorities(e.g., immigrants,migrantworkers,or refugees)thatarenotin a positionto make suchnormativeclaims.Nationalminoritiesmayeventuallybe givenrightsto self-government in thoseregionswherethey predominate or to an appropriateshareof publicrevenuesin orderto build and maintainschools, churches,and othercommunityinstitutions.RecentC O E and OSCE recommendations in favorof minorityautonomydisclosesomemovementin thisdirection. Suchgroupguarantees for nationalminoritiesshouldproperlybe understoodas an extensionof the already-recognized collectiveright to selfdetermination of peoplesratherthanas a departurefrom the declarative modelof individualhumanrightsoutlinedby JackDonnellyin his chapter for sucharrangements-namely, in thisbook.Thereis a historicalprecedent the Leagueof NationsSystemof Minority Guarantees-thatwasunderstoodto originatefrom the normof self-determination andnot declarative humanrights,which,of course,it predated.Moreover,the fundamental valueat stakein theseendeavors remainsthatessential liberalconcernfor the autonomyof theindividualandhisor herabilityto define,pursue,andrealize his or her conceptionof the goodlife. Thus,groupsmustrespectthe libertyof theirmembersincludingthosewho freelychooseto dissentfrom majorityopinionsor waysof life. This line of reasoningcurrentlyapplies to thosetraditionalbearersof the collectiveright to self-determination of peoples-namely, states-and soonecan only assumethat it wouldalso applyto othergroups(i.e., nationalminoritiesor indigenous peoples)that mightacquirecollectiverightsunderthis principle.Thus,a collectiveright to internalself-determination for nationalminorities(andperhapsalso indigenous peoples)shouldbe compatible with the declarativemodelof individualhumanrightsascurrentlypracticedin international relations.

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In sum,the new humanrightsagendaoughtto includeinitiativesthat reflectthe growingrealizationthat culturalpluralismis an essentialfeature of humanityanda necessary precondition for individualliberty.Traditional civil andpoliticallibertiesshouldbe revisedto betteraccommodate cultural pluralism.Sincecultureis by definitionan aspectof “community,”individual rightsformulations should,whereappropriate, incorporate or at least acknowledge a collectivecomponent butwiththeprovisothattheindividual libertyof dissenters mustalwaysbe respected. Specialminorityguarantees havelong beenrecognizedwithin the domesticconstitutions and political traditionsof manystates(e.g.,Belgium,Canada,Fiji, Malaysia).Multilateral initiativesof this kind are now being implementedwithin the United Nationsand Europeanregionalorganizations. It is hopedtheseorganizations(with the supportof stateslike thosementionedearlier)will continue to developpluralistnormsandthatotherregionalhumanrightsbodieswill followtheirexample. It must,however,be recognizedthat pursuingconstructive pluralism within international organizations whosemembersare statesis likely to be that highlyproblematic.The historyof minorityrightssince1945 suggests manystatesthat possess minorities(particularlythoughnot exclusively thosein Africa,Asia,andLatinAmerica)arelikely to view anysuchinternationalrequirements asunacceptable incursions in their sovereignaffairs. More thanthis,until suchtime as localauthoritiessatisfyminimallevelsof goodgovernance, domesticcompliance with international minorityrights (andindeedhumanrightsmoregenerally)will be difficultto achieve.These issuesare very seriouspracticalproblemsand shouldnot be underestimated-but norshouldtheybeusedasan excusefor international organizationsto adopta “wait andsee”mentality.For change,howeverincremental, to occur,international actorsmustbeginto taketheinitiativein definingand implementing thenew humanrightsagenda.

NOTES 1. Inis Claude,NationalMinorities:An InternationalProblem(Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1955),211. 2. TedRobertGurr,Minoritiesat Risk:A GlobalViewof Ethnopolitical Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Instituteof PeacePress,1993),1. 3. S. I. BennandR. S. Peters,ThePrinciplesof PoliticalThought(NewYork:Collier, 1959),110. 4. BernardBailyn, The IdeologicalOriginsof the AmericanRevolution(Cambridge,Mass.:Belknap,1992),93. 5. Alfred Cobban,The Nation-Stateand National Self-Determination (New York:ThomasCrowall,1970),109.

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6. JohnStuartMill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty,Considerations onRepresentative Government (London:Everyman,1999),392-93. 7. Cobban,Nation-State, 109. 8. SeeJenniferJackson-Preece, “EthnicCleansing as an Instrumentof NationStateCreation:ChangingStatePractices andEvolvingLegalNorms,”HumanRights Quarterly20, no.4 (1998):817-43.

9. Thepost-WorldWar I1 movement of Germanminoritiesbeganasanattackof “ethniccleansing”andwasonly formalizedat Potsdam,whenthe Allied Powers tried (withoutmuch success)to humanizethe process.See M. Marrus, The Unwanted(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1985),andDer SpiegelSpecial:Die Deutschen nachderStundeNull (1995),no.4. 10. The Leagueof NationsMinority Systemboundthosenew or reconstituted CentralandEastEuropeanstatesof theinterwarperiod,1919-1939,to grantcertain rightsin additionto equalcitizenship to theminoritycommunities withintheirjurisdictionsas a meansof preserving the post-WorldWar I territorialsettlement. See Jennifer Jackson-Preece, NationalMinoritiesand theEuropeanNation-States System (Oxford:Clarendon,1998),chap.5. 11. It shouldbepointedoutthatthecharacterization of a givengroupasa minority by forceor minorityby will reflectsthe conditionsprevailingat a particular momentin historyandshouldnot thereforebe interpreted asapplyingfor all time. In otherwords,overtimeit is quiteconceivable for a grouppossessing thecharacteristicsof a minorityby forceto acquirethe attributes of a minorityby will andvice versa.JeanLaponcefirst employedthisdistinctionin TheProtectionof Minorities (LosAngeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1960). 12. Expulsionand genocideare not limitedto minorityby will circumstances, althoughI wouldarguethat suchactionsaremorefrequentlydirectedat minorities by will thanat minoritiesby forcepreciselybecause theformeraremorelikelyto be viewedaspotentialrivalsby the majorityin controlof the state(i.e., secession and irredentismare generallyassociated with minoritiesby will and not minoritiesby force). 13. Claude,NationalMinorities,113. 14. The Leagueof NationsMinoritySystemappliedonlyto thenewor reconstitutedstatesof CentralandEasternEurope,theAalandIslands,andIraq. Moreover, thehistorical evidence suggests thattheguarantees it recognized wereneverintended for universalapplicationbut only as a specificand possiblylimitedresponse to a seriesof problemsarisingin particularstates. 15. UnitedNations,E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.2,44. 16. UnitedNations,E/CN.4/Sub.2/41. 17. UnitedNations,E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/43,4. 18. Three otherU N conventions are in varyingdegreesrelevantto national minorities: the 1948Conventionon thePrevention andPunishment of theCrimeof Genocide, the1957ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous andTribalPopulations, andtheUNESCO Convention againstDiscrimination in Education. 19. UnitedNations,ICCPR,article27. 20. Nevertheless, outsidetheauspices of theCOE, certainof itsmemberstatesdid enterinto minorityagreements to resolveoutstanding minorityby will questions.

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For example,the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement of 1946betweenAustriaandItaly gavevariousrightsto the German-speaking minorityby BolzanoandTrento.The Italiangovernment undertook,amongotherthings,to provideprimaryandsecondaryeducation in Germanto members of thesenationalminoritycommunities andto ensureparityof GermanandItalianin the publicadministration. Similarly,a 1955 agreement betweenDenmarkandthe FederalRepublicof Germanyguaranteed the Germanminorityin DenmarkandtheDanishminorityin Germanyequalitybefore the law; the right to establish educational institutions; the right to maintaincrossborderreligious, cultural,andprofessional relations; therightto anappropriate share of publicbroadcasting facilities;andtheuseof Danishor Germanin the law courts andpublicofficesof eitherstate.In addition,theAustrianStateTreatyof 1955recognizedSloveneandCroatianasofficiallanguages alongside Germanin Carinthia,Burgenland,and Styria and gave minority languageeducationrights to these communities. Finally,the1954SpecialStatutefor theTerritoryof Triestegavea numberof special privileges to theSloveneandCroatianminorities in theItalianadministeredzone,mostespecially asregardsminoritylanguage education. 21. Councilof Europe,Document1002of 1959. 22. Councilof Europe,Document1299of 1961. 23. VojtechMastny,TheHelsinkiProcess andtheRe-integration of Europe19861991:Analysis andDocumentation (London:Pinter,1992),11-21. 24. Eachpartyundertakes to applya minimumof thirty-fiveparagraphs or subparagraphs fromthesectionof thecharterthatlistsvariousmeasures to promotethe useof regionalor minoritylanguage; of thesethirty-five,at leastthreeparagraphs mustreferto educational provisions, anotherthreeto culturalactivitiesandfacilities, and oneeachto judicialauthorities, administrative authorities, the media,andeconomicandsociallife. 25. “Towardsa Constructive Pluralism,”www.unesco.org/culture/culturalpluralism,1. 26. See,for example,IsaiahBerlin,TheCrookedTimberof Humanity(London: Murray,1990);W. Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1995);JosephRaz, The Morality of Freedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1986);JudithShklar,Legalism(Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, 1986). 27. Shklar,Legalism, 5.

4 Indigenous Rights HuntHannum

It is impossible to quantifythenumberof indigenous, native,or tribalpeoplesin theworld,buttheyarepresentin everyregion.Someestimates range but,whateverthenumashighas10 percentof theworld’stotalpopulation,’ ber, indigenous peoplesconstitute a significantculturalanddemographic factorin manystates.Theyareperhapsmostvisible-and havebecomemost politicallyactive-in theAmericas,wheretheynumberat leastthirtymillion people.2 The Europeansettlementof the WesternHemisphereand resultingdisplacementand marginalization of the peoplesliving on the continentat the peotime havebecomea classicexampleof the colonizationof indigenous ples,but comparable situationsexistin therestof theworld.The colonization of Australiaand New Zealandby Europeans fits the patternfoundin the WesternHemisphere,althoughit is more difficultto determinewhich groupsin Africa, Asia, andEuropeareindigenous (asopposedto ethnicor nationalminorities),sincethe linesbetweenwho is or is not “indigenous” areoftenblurred. Thesedefinitionalissuesare discussed furtherlater,but it may be sufficientasan introductory statement to suggestthatindigenous peoplesare as indigenous; (2) exhibithistoricalcontithosewho (I) identifythemselves nuitywith preinvasion or precolonialsocieties, particularlyin termsof cultureandgovernmental/social institutions; and(3) continueto live primarily in a traditionalmanner,distinctfrom the dominantsocietythat surrounds them,includingpracticessuchascommunalownershipanduseof land and resources anda spiritualattachment to theterritoryin whichtheylive. Indigenousness todaydoesnotnecessarily dependonwhichgroupwasin 72

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a givenlocationfirst,sinceall civilizationscamefromsomewhere elseif one goesbackfar enough.But wherea self-contained, nondominant group exhibitsthesocial,cultural,andsocietalcharacteristics described earlier,the will probablybe appropriate. termindigenous Withoutdescending hopelesslyinto terminologicalconfusion,it also shouldbe noted that many indigenouspeoplesrefer to themselvesas “nations,”in the sensethat that termwas developedin eighteenth-century Europe.Many suchindigenousnationsin North Americawereviewedas sovereign governments by earlycolonists, anda numberof NorthAmerican Indian nationsenteredinto treatieswith governments suchas Canada, France,GreatBritain,andtheUnited state^.^ However,thesetreatiesmadelittle practicaldifferencein mitigatingthe discrimination andlandseizuresto whichIndiansweresubjected, andthere is no identifiabledifferencein sufferingor survivalbetween“treaty”and “nontreaty”indigenousgroups.While the existenceof treatieshashad significantdomestic legalimpactin recentyearsin somecountries, theirbreach hasbeenof nomoreconcernto theinternational communitythanthebreach of countless treatiesamongEuropeanstates,manyof whichwerecreatedor destroyedby actsof so-calledGreat Powers,irrespectiveof treatyobligations. Most indigenous andtribalpeoplesnotonlyhavebeenattackedmilitarily by invadingsettlersbuthavesubsequently seentheircultureandway of life systematically assaulted.Colonialpowersand nineteenth-century statesin the Americasattemptedto conquerandexterminate hostiletribes,forcethe assimilationof moreacculturated indigenousgroups,erodetraditionalculture and landholdings, and expandprivatepropertyat the expenseof the collectiveor communalholdingsof indigenous peoples.’EarlyEuropean colonistsin Latin America,for example,usedindigenous laborfirstasslaves and subsequently as forcedwage laborers.Religiousmissionaries often playeda prominent role,frequentlyintervening to protectindigenous populationsfrom abuseand lobbyingfor moreeffectiveprotectivemeasures. At the sametime, however,missionaries sawtheir own role as one of “civilizing” and“converting”the “heathen”nativesandshowedrelativelylittle concernfor preservingindigenous ~ulture.~ Similarencounters occurredbetweenmoretechnologically or militarily advancedgroupsin AsiaandAfrica,whichoverranor surrounded nomadic, tribal, and othersmallergroupswho subsequently were encompassed in empiresor stateswithouttheirconsent. Today,populationpressures and moderncommunications andtechnology continueto closein on all but the mostisolatedindigenous communities. Indigenous rights,unliketherightsof religiousandotherminorities,were not recognizedas a separateissueof international concernuntil relatively recently.Even morestarklythanminorityrights,as notedin chapter2 by

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JackDonnelly,indigenous rightsposea dilemmafor statesin whichrights arebelievedto inherein individuals, ratherthangroups.Whileit is truethat nondiscrimination and equalityrights(in additionto manyotherhuman as such,thehistorical situarights)maybe appliedto indigenous individuals peoples,theirgeographic concentration, theirattachment tion of indigenous to particularterritories, andthefactthattheirinstitutions of self-government havelargelysurvivedmakerecognition of truegrouprightsnecessary, if the peoplesto preserve theirway of life. It is pregoalis to enableindigenous ciselythe exerciseof a meaningfuldegreeof self-government-inaddition to the protectionof religiousand culturalvalues-that indigenous groups seekto maintainand/orexpand.Suchself-government is anessential partof theirheritage,unlikethe primarilyculturalor linguisticconcerns of many minorities.6 Thus,fromtheearliesteffortsof indigenous nationsto gainadmission to of indigenous peoplesfor governmenttheLeagueof Nations,thedemands to-government recognitionhavebeenquitedifferentfromthe concernof minoritiesto preservetheir culture,language, andtraditions.It is a truism thatminorities donotenjoythe rightof self-determiwithinU N discussions nation,while (asdiscussed later)the relationship betweenindigenous peoplesandself-determination is stillbeingdefined. In additionto the discriminatory andpaternalistic wayin whichtheyhave beengenerallytreatedby states,bothindigenous groupsthemselves andthe domestic legalregimesunderwhichtheylive areextraordinarily diverse.In somestates,indigenous peoplesareaccorded a specialstatus that maygrant themcertainrightsnotavailable to othergroupsof citizensbutthatalsomay imposedisadvantages on theirfull participation in society.In otherstates, indigenous citizensaretreatedlikeall othercitizens, at leastin theory.Whateverthetheoretical rightsgrantedto indigenous individuals or communities, however,therealityhasconsistently beenoneof discrimination, poverty, andpowerlessness.

MAJOR ISSUES Priorto thegradualdevelopment of international humanrightsnormsin the half of thetwentiethcentury,thehumanrightsof indigenous peoples second wereaccorded no greaterattentionthanthehumanrightsof anyothersegmentof a state’spopulation. Murder,slavelike workingconditions, landseizures,interference with familylife, anddiscrimination becamecognizable as humanrightsviolationsin appropriate international forums,but it wasnot normsbeganto be developedto until the 1980sthat new international peoples.’ address thespecificsituationof indigenous Developmentof thesenormswas sporadic,uncoordinated, and often

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overlapping, anda quasi-chronological approachis the bestmeansof offerrightshave(or havenot) cometo be seenas ing a senseof how indigenous a uniquesubsetof humanrights.Beforesummarizing thosedevelopments, however,we will firstturnto threeof themostproblematic issuesassociated with indigenous rights,whichhaveat theirhearttheappropriateness of recognizingtherightsof groups,asopposedto therightsof individuals. These are the relatedquestions of definingindigenous peoples,determiningto whatextenttheyenjoytherightof self-determination, andidentifyingwhich aspectsof indigenous rightsarerightlyviewedashavinga collectivedimension.

Definition After yearsof occasionally heateddebate,theUN Sub-commission WorkPopulations decidednotto includea definitionof ing Groupon Indigenous It wasfelt thatanydefinition “indigenous peoples”in its draftdeclaration.8 wasboundto be controversial and wouldbe attackedby thosewho felt it includedtoomanygroups,aswell asby thosewhothoughtthatit wasoverly restrictive.The controversy wouldlikely detractfrom the moreimportant goalof drawingattentionto andarticulatingtherightsthatindigenous peoplesneededin orderto protectanddeveloptheircultures. Definitionsareimportantonlyif significant consequences areto bedrawn fromfallingwithin or outsidetheirparameters. However,giventhe expansivesetof rightsidentifiedin boththeUN andthe Organizationof AmericanStates(OAS) draftdeclarations discussed later(ascomparedto therights UN and Europeaninstruments), it of minoritiesrecognizedin comparable will probablybe in theinterestsof manygroupsthat wishto expandtheir politicalandeconomic powerto deemthemselves “indigenous.” At thesame problem” time, of course,manystateswouldpreferto see“the indigenous limitedto the WesternHemisphere,Australia,andNew Zealand,whereall wouldagreethatIndians,Maori, andAboriginalsconstitute classicexamples of indigenous peoplesandtheirsuffering. Fromtheperspective of theEuropeancolonialist, all of thenativepopulationsin the Americas,Africa, and Asia couldhavebeenconsidered indigenous,althoughthat designation obviouslycarriedwith it connotations of primitiveor uncivilizedor inferior.But wherethe Europeans did not settle and achievenumericalas well as politicaldominance(as they did, for the mostpart,in theAmericas),againstwhomshouldAfricansandAsiansassert their rightsas indigenouspeoples? Whateverhumanrightsproblemsmay it seemsdifficultto considergroupsnowin power existon thosecontinents, as any lessindigenousor nativeto the countrythan lesspowerfulgroups, whichalsofoundthemselves within new colonial-based states. Thisproblemwaspartiallyovercomeby theInternationalLaborOrgani-

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zation(ILO) whenit decidedto address the situationnot onlyof “indigenous”but alsoof “tribal” peoples-those,for instance,who would be as“scheduled tribes”orwhoaresometimes identifiedby IndiaandPakistan referredto as “hill tribes”elsewhere in Asia.9The focuswasplacedon the characteristics of thesegroupsandtheirrelationship to the dominant society, not on the questionof who displaced whomin the earlierdaysof empire. Thisapproach alsocorresponds to an informalunderstanding among many AfricansandAsiansthatit is appropriate to includewithinthe“indigenous” categorysmall,oftenisolated,ethnicgroupsor nomadiccommunities that haveremainedseparate fromthemainstream societyof thestate. No. 169,adoptedin 1989,indigenous Underarticle1 of ILO Convention on accountof their peoplesare “thosewho are regardedas indigenous descent fromthepopulationwhichinhabitedthecountry. . . at the timeof conquest or colonisation or the establishment of presentstateboundaries andwho, irrespective of their legal status,retainsomeor all of their own social,economic, culturalandpoliticalinstitutions.” Theconvention also condiappliesto “[tlribalpeoples. . . whosesocial,culturalandeconomic tionsdistinguish themfrom othersections of the nationalcommunity,and whosestatusis regulated whollyor partiallyby theirowncustoms or traditionsor by speciallawsor regulations.” As a matterof legalinterpretation, the latterdefinitionis difficultto disthatuseof the tinguishfrom that of any ethnicgroup,unlessoneassumes wordtribal itselfconnotes a certainkind of (undefined) society.How does onedistinguish betweenthose“whosesocial,culturalandeconomic conditionsdistinguish themfrom othersections of the nationalcommunity,and whosestatusis regulated whollyor partiallyby theirowncustoms or traditions”andgroupsthat,in othercontexts, mightbe termedethnic,religious, linguistic, or nationalminorities? The draftdeclaration on indigenous rightsadoptedby the OAS InterAmericanCommission on HumanRightslo nowfollowstheILO approach: It appliesto undefined“indigenous peoples,””as well as to “peoples” definedidenticallyto “tribalpeoples”in ILO Convention No. 169.** interpretation of theseprovisions maylie in the The key to a meaningful broaddifferences in “social,cultural,and economic conditions”that exist betweenindigenoushribal andotherpeoples. Thesedistinctions aredifferent of language, relifrom and,onemightargue,additionalto the differences gion,ethnicity,or nationalitythatcharacterize minorities. Germanspeakers in SouthTyrol,for example,areclearlya minoritygroup,basedonlanguage andnationality,but their social,cultural,andeconomic statusis not much differentfrom thatof Italians.The samecouldnot be saidabouttheTwa in Rwanda,theHmongin Vietnam,or theYanomamiin Brazil,whoselifestyles thatsurround them. areverydistinctfromthesocieties Geographic isolationor separateness alsoseemsto characterize indige-

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noudtribalpeoples,althoughnowhereis this criterionspecifiedin any of thetextsor proposed definitions. Landandterritoryareconsidered vital to the cultureof mostindigenous groups,andpossession or useof a defined minimumrequirement for indigenous peoplesto territoryis a necessary (Of course, exercise manyof therightssetforthin thevariousinstruments. manynational and otherminorities alsoinhabit reasonably well-definedterritories,althoughtheyareoftennotthesoleoccupiers.) Relatedto geographic separateness is thefactthatindigenous peopleshave a much better-developed setof traditional politicalinstitutions thandomost minorities.Indeed,thepowersidentifiedin the U N andOAS drafts,aswell as in ILO ConventionNo. 169, wouldbe difficultto exercise withoutthe existence of anindigenous government capableof takingdecisions onbehalf peopleshavebeenself-governing of the communityas a whole.Indigenous for centuries, in a waythatcannotbesaidto betruefor evennationalminorities. of minorityhave At theendof theday,however,justasformaldefinitions generallybeenavoidedin international texts,it seemsappropriate-andperhapsevennecessary-toleavethe conceptof “indigenousness” somewhat vague.So longas the conceptis basedon social,economic,cultural,and politicalcharacteristics ratherthanon historicalpatternsof migrationand a workabledefinitionshouldemergeovertime. settlement, Self-Determination

A greatnumberof recentarticlesandbooksaddress theissueof self-determination,includingitsapplicability to indigenous peoples, andit is impossible to do morethansketchtheoutlinesof thedebatehere.13 In brief,indigenous peoplesassertasa matterof logicthattheyare“peounderstood definitionof thattermandthat ples”withintheinternationally thereforetheybenefitfrom the international normstatingthat “all peoples havethe rightof self-determinati~n.”’~ Any otherinterpretation, theysubof “peomit, unfairlydiscriminates againstthemby creatingtwo categories ples,”thosewhohavetherightto self-determination andthosewhodo not. ThedraftUN declaration onindigenous rightsadoptsthisapproach, simply reiterating thelanguage of thehumanrightscovenants.15 Therearetwo problemswith this argument.The first problemis that, while theremay be agreement that the rightto self-determination exists, thereis no internationally accepted definitionof the“peoples”whopossess the right.The colonial‘‘peoples’’who had the rightto independence were not ethnicallydistinctgroupsbutratherincludedthe entirepopulationthat inhabiteda particularcolonialterritory.16 The secondproblemis that the as the right of self-determination should application of a right as essential not dependon definitionalconclusions thathasmoreto dowith semantics

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thanwith therealityof thosetheypurportto encompass. Thestatus,desires, needs,and rightsof indigenouscommunities do not changedependingon their designation as groups,communities, populations, peoples,or nations, and simplisticeffortsto pretendthat categorization as a “people”endsthe debatearedoomedto failure. On the otherside,many statesobjectto any referenceto an indigenous right to self-determination, becausethey, too, misinterpretthe right as an absoluteright that attachesunconditionally to any groupidentifiedas a “ people.”The misunderstanding is compounded by states’frequentequation of a right to self-determination with a right to secession or independence, a correlationthat may have been true during the processof decolonization butthathasnot beenacceptedeitherbeforeor since.A simple referenceto theformerYugoslaviashouldsuffice:Theworldcommunity recognized therightof all thoselivingwithinthe territoriesof thesixYugoslavrepublicsto becomeindependent uponthedissolution of thefederation, not the rightof anyethnicallydefined“people”to proclaimtheirindependence.This territorial,as opposedto ethnic,imperativewas reinforcedby the refusalto recognizesimilarrightsfor the largelyAlbanianprovinceof KOSOVO, because it wasa provinceratherthana republicunderYugoslavlaw. The concernsof statesare addressed in both ILO ConventionNo. 169 and the draft OAS declarationby inclusionof a caveatthat designation of indigenous groupsaspeoples“shallnot be construed ashavinganyimplication with respectto any otherrightsthat mightbe attachedto that termin international law,”” a positionopposedby mostindigenous organizations. Most indigenous groups(althoughthereareexceptions) havestatedclearly thatthey haveno desireto secedeformallyfrom thestateswithinwhose boundaries they are located.What they do desireis a largedegreeof selfgovernment, includingtherightto vetoor rejec: incompatible statelaws, while remainingwithinthe internationally recognized boundaries of the state. Therewill obviouslybe a greatdealof debateoverhowmuchself-governmentis appropriate for indigenous peoples,whovary widelyin population andculture,andhowto balancetheinterestsof indigenous peopleswith the legitimateinterestsof othercitizensof the state.However,that balance shouldnot turnon inclusionor exclusionof “self-determination” fromthe catalogueof indigenousrights.The more specificarticulationof what the rightto self-government or self-determination mightmean,asfoundin article 31 of the draft UN declarationand article15 of the draftOAS declaration,l8 is likely to be more helpful in guidingconsensual divisionsof authoritybetweenindigenousand stategovernments thanmereinvocation of the right to self-determination. At the sametime, statesshouldnot fear thatmentionof self-determination inevitablypresages thestate’sdisintegration.

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CollectiveRights The issueof collectiveversusindividualrightshasbedevilednearlyevery international discussion of therightsof minorities,indigenous peoples,and othergroups,asdiscussed in chapters 2 and3. TheUN covenants onhuman rights,the 1992UN Declarationon minorityrights,19andthevariousEuropeaninstruments on minorities20 carefullyrefer to the rights“of persons belongingto” minorities.In contrast,neitherILO ConventionNo. 169nor onindigenous rightshesitateto recognize thedraftUN or OAS declarations collectiverights. Severalarticlesin theU N draftspecificallyproclaim“collectiveandindividual”rightsfor indigenous peoplesandtheirmembers,andtheOAS draft recognizesthat “[i]ndigenouspeopleshavethe collectiverightsthat are indispensable to theenjoymentof theindividualhumanrightsof theirmembers.Accordinglythe statesrecognizeinteruliu the rightof the indigenous peoplesto collectiveaction,to their cultures,to professand practicetheir spiritualbeliefs,and to usetheir languages.’’21 The conceptof collective rightsalsois implicitin the OAS declaration’s recognitionof indigenous (article15), maintenance of cusrightsto autonomyandself-government tomarylaw (article16), ownership andcontroloverlandandintellectual property(articles18and2O), approvalof nationaldevelopment plans(article 21), andtheobservance of treaties(article22). The fear of somestates,notablythe UnitedStates,appearsto be thatrecognizingthe rightsof indigenous groupsqua groupswill grantto those groupspotentiallydangerous authorityover their members.While this potentialdoes,of course,exist,indigenous lobbyistsagreedduringthedrafting of theUN declarationthattheywouldabideby “internationallyrecognizedhumanrightsstandards” in thecourseof developingtheirinstitutional structures and“juridicalcustoms,traditions,procedures andpractices.”22 Moreimportant, asis thecasewithfederalor otherautonomous unitswithin a state,the stateitselfwill retainthe right andresponsibility to protectthe humanrightsof individualcitizens,be theyindigenous or not. Of course,recognizing grouprightsis notnew.Althoughcouchedin individualisticterms,freedomof religion,assembly, association, andotherrights are inherentlycommunalin their exercise.States(andinternational human rightsnorms)permitprivatereligiousorganizations to determinetheir own membership and to discriminate basedon genderand belief.Corporations andotherinstitutions haverightsandresponsibilities distinctfromthoseof theirindividualshareholders or members. Indigenouspeoplesseekthe right to determinetheir own political,economic,and socialpolicies,and, as evenDonnellyrecognizes,in orderfor themto do so,one mustrecognizemeaningfulcollectiverightsfor indigenousgovernments, not just individualrightsthatcanbe exercisedcollec-

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tively.It is alsoto be expectedthatindigenous interpretations of human rightsnormsmayvaryfromthosethatwouldbe followedby highlyurbanizedstates, justaswhatconstitutes a “fair trial”or an“adequate standard of living” dependson conditions in a particularsociety.To borrowa phrase fromEuropean humanrightsjurisprudence, bothstates andindigenous govthatallowsthemto adopt ernments shouldenjoya “marginof appreciation” their own policiesandbalanceindividualrightsagainstsocietalneeds,and peopleswill be lessconcerned thereis no reasonto expectthatindigenous aboutachieving theappropriate balance. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT rights We now turnto a brief summaryof the mannerin whichindigenous havebeenand are beingaddressed by variousinternational organizations, theplaceof indigenous issues within withoutwhichonecannotunderstand the moregeneralplan of humanrights.The first sectionsummarizes the waysin whichnon-indigenous-specific humanrightsbodieshaveaddressed humanrightsissues raisedby indigenous peoples. The secondsectionsummarizesthe majornormativeandinstitutional innovations of directinterest to indigenous peoplesthathavebeencreatedor arecurrentlyunderconsideration. International Actionon HumanRightsViolations againstIndigenous Peoples As is true for otherhumanrights,the corpusof the law of indigenous rightshasdeveloped ratherhaphazardly, depending on the political realities of variousforums.Althoughtheseforumssufferfromall of thewell-known deficiencies of international mechanisms to promoteandprotecthuman content rights,theydoofferprecedents for identifyingat leastthe minimum of someindigenous rights.They alsoprovideexamplesof why the further development andimplementation of indigenous rightsremainessential.

UnitedNations Thehumanrightsof indigenous peopleshavebeenaddressed in widevarietyof UN humanrightsforums,andthepresentchaptercannotsurveythem all. The followingsubsections thereforeaddress the mostdirectlyrelevant bodiesin whichindigenous rightspersehavebeenconsidered.

HumanRightsCommittee TheHumanRightsCommitteeis chargedwith supervision of the InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights,

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whichover140 stateshaveratified.Althoughthecovenantdoesnot include anyspecificreferenceto indigenous rights,the committeehasinterpreteda numberof communications broughtto its attentionby meansof individual petitionunderthe OptionalProtocolto the Covenantz3 as raisingissues withinthe scopeof article27, whichdealswith therightsof m i n o r i t i e ~ . ~ ~ the committeeupheldthe rightof In an earlycase,Lovelucev. Cunadu~5 an Indianwomanto live on her tribe’sreservation, despitea law thatwould havedeniedher this right becauseshehad marrieda non-Indianman.The committeefoundthat shewouldotherwisebe preventedfrom enjoyingher culture,in communitywith the othermembersof her tribe, as guaranteed underarticle27. The committeereacheda superficially oppositeresultin thecaseof Kitok v. Sweden,26 whereit upheldSweden’sdenialof Kitok‘s right to engagein reindeerherding,even thoughKitok was ethnicallya Saami,basedon Kitok‘s ancestral village’srefusalto granthim membership. UnderSwedish law, the villagehad the rightto restrictreindeerherdingin orderto ensure its economicviability,sincereindeerherdingis an essentialpart of Saami culture.Althoughit expressed “gravedoubts”aboutSwedishlegislationthat permittedanindividualmemberof an ethnicminorityto be deniedtheright to engagein an economicactivitythatis an essential elementof theminority’s culture,the committeein effectconcluded thattherightof theSaamito restrictreindeerherdingas a meansof preservingtheir cultureoutweighed Kitok’s individualright.27 In Orninayakv. Cunada?8the committeeconcludedin rathersweeping languagethat“historicalinequities”and“certainmorerecentdevelopments [i.e., grantingoil, gas,andtimberleases]threatentheway of life andculture of theLubiconLakeBand[anindigenous community]andconstitute a violationof article27 solongastheycontinue.”However,it thenimmediately expressed its approvalof a proposalby Canadato “rectifythe situation”by of otherland and compensation to membersof the offeringa combination LubiconLake Band,to compensate for damagecausedby the leases.Two yearslater,the committeerejecteda claimby anotherCanadiantribe that Canada’sfailureto allowthetribeto participatedirectlyin discussions over reformof Canada’sconstitution violatedthetribe’srightsto politicalparticipati~n.~~ Indigenous peopleshaveattemptedto raisetheissueof theirrightto selfdetermination, underarticle1 of the covenant,in a numberof cases.However,the committeehasconsistently heldthat article1 is beyondthe scope of its jurisdictionunderthe OptionalProtoc01,30althoughit hasdiscussed self-determination in the contextof its reviewof periodicstatereports. Sub-commission WorkingGroupon IndigenousPopulations Createdin 1982,theWorkingGroupon Indigenous Populations of the(then)UN Sub-

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commission on Prevention of Discrimination andProtectionof Minorities hasbeenthe singlemostsignificant forumin whichindigenous issuesare considered by theUnitedNations.Its oversightmandateextendsonly to “review[ing]developments pertainingto the promotionandprotection”of the humanrightsof indigenous peoples,andthe WorkingGrouphasno authorityto investigate or determineindividualcomplaints. Nonetheless, it hasbecome,in effect,a publicforumin whichbothspecificand general indigenous grievances canbe raised. Uniquelyat thetimeof itscreation,theWorkingGroupis opento participationnot onlyby states and nongovernmental organizations formallyrecpeoplesandtheir ognizedby the UnitedNations3’but alsoto indigenous As a result,theWorkingGroup’sannualtwo-weeksessions representatives. in Genevaareusuallyattendedby five hundredto onethousand indigenous people,whichin turnhavecreatedaneffectivelobbyingforcefor indigenous issues. A numberof statedelegations alsoparticipate in the sessions, anda fruitfuldialogue hasbeeninitiated,at leastoccasionally, betweenindigenous groupsandthecountries in whichtheylive. The WorkingGroup’sinitial mandatealsoextendedto monitoring“the evolutionof international standards” concerning indigenous rights.Thisled to draftingthe declaration onindigenous rightsdiscussed later.Proposals for a “permanent forum”for indigenous peoplesat theUnitedNationsalso werefirstmadeat theWorkingGroup.

PermanentForumon IndigenousIssues As noted,indigenous participation WorkingGrouphasbeen in the UnitedNationsvia the Sub-commission’s extensive sincetheearly1980s,andindigenous representatives greatlyinfluencedthetextof the draftdeclaration adoptedby theworkinggroupin 1993. For manyyears,however,indigenous peopleshavesoughtgreaterinstitutionalrecognition, moreappropriate to theirview thattheyshouldparticiBy the patein someaspects of the UN’s work on a parwith governments. mid-1990s,this desirehad coalesced aroundproposals for a “permanent indigenous forum”to be createdwithin the U N systemthat would be empowered to address theentirerangeof indigenous interests. While generalconsensus wassoonreachedon the needto createsome formof a newbody,seriousdisagreements persisted asto thatbody’smandate,membership, andpositionwithintheU N h i e r a r ~ hThe y . ~maximalist ~ andSocial indigenous positioncalledfor a bodyat thelevelof the Economic Council,withequalrepresentation for indigenous peoples andstates; indigenouspeopleswould choosethe formerthemselves. The mandateof the forumwouldbe as broadas possible, includingthe powerto adoptpolicy decisions andresolveconflictsbetweenindigenous peoplesandstates. Somestatessupported merelyextending the scope of theexistingsubcommissionworkinggroup,but mostaccepted thatan indigenous forumcould

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serveasanadvisorybody,perhaps subsidiary to theCommission onHuman Rights,whoseauthoritywouldnot extendto conflictresolutionbut would otherwise encompass fairlybroadpowersof givingadviceandrecommendations.Considerably differentopinionswereput forwardasto themembershipandthe meansof selecting membersof the forum;mostgovernments wereuncomfortable with theideaof indigenous representatives whowould be considered to be at thesamelevelasstaterepresentatives. TheCommission onHumanRightsformallyproposed creationof a “PermanentForumon Indigenous Issues”in April 2000.33 The forumwill be a subsidiary organof theEconomicandSocialCouncil(ECOSOC),reporting directlyto it, with a mandateto adviseECOSOC,includingprovidingrecommendations, onindigenous issues withinthemandateof ECOSOCitself thatrelateto “economic andsocialdevelopment, culture,the environment, pareducation, healthandhumanrights.”34Avoidingtheissueof indigenous ity with states,the forumis to be composed of sixteenindividualexperts, eightto be nominatedby governments andelectedby ECOSOCandeight to be appointed by the(governmental) president of ECOSOC“onthebasis of broadconsultations with indigenous organizations takingintoaccount the diversityandgeographical distribution of the indigenous peopleof the world,aswell astheprinciplesof transparency, representativity [sic] and equalopportunity.”35 Theindigenous forum,whosefirstsession washeldin May 2002,will thus existon a parwith otherfunctionalcommissions of ECOSOC,suchas the Commission on HumanRightsandCommission on the Statusof Women, althoughitsmembers will serveasindividualexpertsratherthangovernment (or indigenous) representatives. Its effectiveness will nodoubtdependonthe politicalskillsandreputationof itsmembers, aswell ason the contentof its proposals. In any event,creationof the Permanent Forumon Indigenous success for indigenous lobbyists, confirming thatindigIssuesis a significant enousissues in all theiraspects area legitimateconcernof the UN system. Organizationof AmericanStates

The OAS,withinthe jurisdiction of whosemembers manyof theworld’s indigenous peoplesarefound,tooklittleformalnoticeof the plightof Indianswithinthehemisphere until the 1990s.The oneexception to thislackof IndianInstitutein formalactionwasthe creationof the Inter-American 1940.Theinstituteis nowa specialized agencyof theOAS;it actsasa standing committeeto organizeperiodicInter-AmericanIndian Congresses (whichare considered organsof the OAS) andalsoprovidesadvisoryserHowever,it was not vicesand technicalservicesto OAS member until 1985thatindigenous peoplewereableto attendthe institute’s periodic congresses withoutinvitations fromtheirnationalgovernments.

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The mandateof the Inter-AmericanCommissionon Human Rights hashad no special extendsto all OAS memberstates,but the commission authorityor obligationto concernitselfwith the rightsof indigenous peoto the commission andits ples.It is only throughindividualcomplaints in particularcountries that occasional reportsonthehumanrightssituations a few specificindigenous situations havebeenexamined.” Facedwith a numberof individualpetitionsconcerning indigenous people in thelate1960sandearly1970s,thecommission in 1972did adopta resolution on “specialprotectionfor indigenous populations.” The resolution statesthattheprotectionof indigenous populations is a “sacredcommitment”of OAS memberstatesandcallson states,in particular,to train and monitorpublicofficialssothattheywill dealwith indigenous peopleapproandrecommendation ~ r i a t e l yUnfortunately, .~~ until 1995the resolution on indigeadoptedthe followingyear remainedthe only generalstatement nousrightsadoptedby the commission, and they appearto havehad little practicalimpact. Althoughthe commission hasdiscussed indigenous rightsin the context of severalreportson humanrightssituationsin particularcountries,until dealingspecificallywith the late 1990sit had reachedwrittenconclusions indigenous rightsin onlyfive cases.39 In thefirst threecases,concerning the Guahiboin Colombia,4o the Achein Paraguay,”andtheYanomamiin Brathe commission adoptedrathercursorystatements or resolutions, findingviolationsin the lasttwo cases.In theYanomamicase,the commissiondid implythatindigenous peoplesmightbeguaranteed additionalrights specificto their needs,when it notedthat “internationallaw in its present state,and as it is foundclearlyexpressed in Article 27 of the International Covenanton Civil andPoliticalRights,recognizes therightof ethnicgroups to specialprotectionon [sic] theiruseof theirownlanguage, for thepractice of their own religion,and,in general,for all thosecharacteristics necessary for thepreservation of theirculturalidentity.”43However,thecommission’s conclusions restedon the narrowerlanguageof the AmericanDeclaration on the Rightsand Dutiesof Man ratherthan creatingnew indigenousspecificrights. The fourthcase,concerning theMiskitoIndiansin Nicaragua,resultedin a major reportand deservesfuller discussion.44 Althoughthe proximate causeof thecomplaintwasviolencein Nicaraguathatled to theforcedrelocationof a largenumberof Miskito Indians,the casebecamemuchmore complexdueto divisionsamongtheoriginalcomplainants andexpansion of the complaintto includebroaderissuesof indigenousrightsto autonomy andself-determination. TheSandinista government of Nicaragua,whichwas engagedin a civil war with theU.S.-backedcontyusat thetime, participated activelyin thecommission’s proceedings andinvitedit to conductanon-site investigation intothe complaints.

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After numerousunsuccessful attemptsto negotiatea friendlysettlement, the commission concludedthat therehad beenviolationsof the Miskitos’ rightsto life andliberty,butit alsofoundthatsomeof theforcedrelocations werejustifiedaspermissible derogations fromnormalhumanrightsguarantees,in light of the military situationin Nicaraguaat the time. Of greater interestis the commission’s treatmentof Miskito claims(1) that they had inherentrightsto thelandstheyhadtraditionallyoccupiedand(2) thatthey enjoyedadditionalpoliticalrightsbecauseof theirstatusasindigenous peoples,in particulartherightto self-determination. With respectto land rights,the Nicaraguangovernment categorically rejectedthe argumentthat the Miskitoshad rightsanydifferentfrom those accordedto all othercitizensof Nicaraguaand observedthat “[tlerritorial unity standsaboveanyotherconsideration and is not subjectto discussion of anykind.”45Statingthat it was“not in a positionto decideon the strict legal validity of the claim of the Indian communities to their ancestral land~,”~6 the commission simplyconcludedwith a recommendation that a “justsolution”be foundthatwouldmeet“boththeaspirations of the Indiansandtherequisites of territorialunity”of Nicaragua.47 The commissionadopteda similarpositionof encouraging compromise with respectto the broaderpoliticalclaimsputforwardby theMiskitos, althoughits legalconclusions weresomewhatmoreprecise.After first noting that the AmericanConventionon HumanRightsprohibitsdiscrimination but containsno specificprovisionrelatedto “ethnicgroups”(the commission’s termfor the Miskitos),the commission proceededto analyze article27 of theCovenanton Civil andPoliticalRights,to whichNicaragua wasalsoa party.48 After findingthat the covenantguaranteed to minorities the rightsto usetheirownlanguage,practicetheir own religion,andenjoy theirownculture,thecommission wentonto consider“whetheror not ethnic groupsalsohaveadditionalrights[beyondthosesetforthin article271, particularlythe rightsto self-determination or politicala ~ t o n o m y . Its ”~’ conclusion remainsoneof the onlystatements to dateby a quasi-judicialor judicialinternational humanrightsbodyto addressdirectlythe questionof indigenous self-determination: The presentstatusof international law [in 19841 doesrecognizeobservance of theprincipleof self-determination of peoples,whichit considers to be theright of a peopleto independently choosetheirformof politicalorganization andto freely establishthe meansit deemsappropriate to bringabouttheir economic, socialand culturaldevelopment. This doesnot mean,however,that it recognizestherightto self-determination of anyethnicgroupassuch.50

Citing,inter alia, U N GeneralAssemblyresolutions1514 of December 1 , 1960,51 and2625 of October13, 1970,52 the commission concluded that

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the right to self-determination couldneverjustifydisruptingthe territorial integrityof a sovereignstate. Clearlyuncomfortable with the conservative readingof international law it hadjust given,however,thecommission wenton to notethattheabsence of anylegalrightto autonomy or self-determination didnotgrantto Nicaragua “an unrestrictedright to imposecompleteassimilationon those Indians.”53 Althoughthe currentstatusof international law doesnot allowthe view that the ethnicgroupsof theAtlanticzoneof Nicaraguahavea right to political autonomyandself-determination, speciallegalprotectionis recognized for the of theirreligion,andin general,all those useof theirlanguage, the observance aspects relatedto the preservation of their culturalidentity.To thisshouldbe whichincludes,among addedthe aspects linkedto productiveorganization, andcommunallands.. . . [I]t is fundaotherthings,the issueof the ancestral mentalto establish newconditions for coexistence betweenthe ethnicminoritiesandthe Government of Nicaragua,in orderto settlehistoricantagonisms andtheseriousdifficulties presenttoday.5’

Finally,a fifth case,theMayagan(Sumo)AwasTingniCommunityCase, challenged loggingoperations on indigenous territoryin Nicaraguaby a SouthKoreancontractor, whichhad beenagreedto by the government but withoutconsultation with the AwasTingnicommunity. The commission foradopteda reporton the casein 1998, and the casewas subsequently wardedto theInter-AmericanCourtof HumanRights. The court’sAugust2001 judgment55 upheldtherightsof theAwasTingni communityand hasbecomeoneof the mostinfluentialinternational decisionsconcerning indigenous peoples.It first foundthat Nicaraguahadviolatedtherightto judicialprotectioncontainedin article25 of theAmerican Conventionon HumanRightsby failing“to createan effectivemechanism for delimitationandtitlingof thepropertyof themembersof theAwasTingni MayagnaCommunity,in accordance with the customary law, values, customsandmoresof thatCommunity,”basedon the state’sownlawsand c ~ n s t i t u t i oThe n . ~court ~ wenton to find thatthe rightto privateproperty, protects“the rightsof membersof setforthin article21 of the convention, the indigenouscommunities within the frameworkof communalproperty, whichis alsorecognizedby the Constitution of Nicaragua.. . . Indigenous groups,by the fact of their very existence,havethe right to live freely in theirownterritory;theclosetiesof indigenous peoplewith thelandmustbe recognizedandunderstood asthe fundamental basisof theircultures,their spirituallife, theirintegrity, and theireconomicsurvival.”57 Thus,by failing to demarcate indigenous landandby grantingconcessions to thirdpartiesto onthatland,Nicaraguawasheldalsoto haveviolatedartiexploitresources cle21 of theconvention.

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It remainsto be seenwhetherthecourt’sbroadlanguagewill be extended to includesituations in whichthestatehasnot itselfrecognized indigenous landrights,as wasthe casein Nicaragua,but its pronouncements certainly recognizeindigenous rightsto a muchgreaterextentthanhadbeenheldpreviouslyby anyinternational tribunal. peoplesthat continueto occurin many Giventhe attackson indigenous Americancountries,it is surprising that the commission hasonly rarely addressed indigenous issuesin the contextof its generalreportson the humanrightssituationin various Of course,indigenous peoplesare oftenvictimsof humanrightsviolationsthataffectsocietyat large,particularly peasants, but the specificsituations of indigenous peopleshadbeen considered in onlya few reportsuntil recently.59 The commission did find thatthe Maya-Quichein Guatemalasuffered from “centuries-old prejudice”60 againstthemthatwasmanifestedin nearly everyfacetof Guatemalan political,economic,andculturallife. Despiterecognitionof indigenous culture,dress,andlanguagein the Guatemalanconstitution,thecommission foundinequalityanddefactodiscrimination to be widespread: Thereality-which theGovernment openlyacknowledges-shows thatGuatemala’sindigenous peoplecannotexercisethe samerightsanddo not havethe sameopportunities that the ladinopopulationor the peopleof European descent enjoy... . Thosewho retaincharacteristics that identifythem as Mayas-language, communitystructure,dress,religiouspractices-arenot only excludedfrom positions of powerandprestige in thenation,butin generalarescorned by politicians,conservatives, liberalsor Marxists. The overallpolicyof the Statehasbeenaimedat keepingthem[indigenous people]outof jobsandignoringtheir“backward”traditions,to allowsomeof the more“civilized”to becomeladinos,andto brutally“mowdownanywho posea directchallenge to Creoleor Ladinodominance.”6l

As notedearlier,theInter-American Courtof HumanRightsdeliveredits firstjudgmentin a caserelatingprimarilyto indigenous rightsin 2000, but it addressed indigenousissuesindirectlyin two earliercases.The ChunimP caseconcerned allegedmurdersof indigenous rightsactivistsin Guatemala, althoughit did notraiseissuesspecificto indigenous peoples.62 In theAloeboetoecase,the courtconsideredtraditionaltribal law in determiningthe amountof compensation to be paidby theSurinamegovernment to thevictims’families.63 Normative development^^^

InternationalLaborOrganization Followingconcernwith the plightof indigenous workersand a seriesof studiesthatbeganearlyasthe 1920s,in 1957the International LaborOrga-

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nization(ILO) adoptedConvention(No. 107) Concerningthe Protection andIntegrationof Indigenous andOtherTribalandSemi-tribalPopulations in Independent Countries.65 Althoughfromtoday’sperspective theconvention is paternalistic and clearlyenvisaged assimilation asits ultimategoal,it alsocontainedimportantprovisions on nondiscrimination, recognition of landownership, prohibition therightof collectiveandindividual indigenous of forcedintegration,respectfor indigenouscustomarylaws,and the right to be compensated for landtakenby the government. Thirtyyearslater,in partdueto pressures fromnongovernmental organizationsandindigenous groupsthemselves, the I L O replacedConvention No. 107with a nonassimilationist andnonintegrationist text, Convention (No. 169)ConcerningIndigenous andTribalPeoplesin Independent Countries.66Althoughmanyindigenous representatives at the time criticizedthe convention asnot recognizing sufficientlybroadindigenous politicalrights, theconvention doesrequireconsultation with indigenous peopleswhenever laws or administrative regulationsdirectlyaffectingthem are considered.6’ Governments areto adopt“specialmeasures” to safeguard indigenous interests,with theconsentof theaffectedpeople,andareto recognizeandprotect the “social,cultural,religiousandspiritualvaluesandpractices”of indigenouspeoples.68 Indigenous peoples“shallhavethe rightto decidetheirown prioritiesfor theprocessof development asit affectstheirlives,beliefs,institutionsandspiritualwell-beingandthelandstheyoccupyor otherwiseuse, andto exercisecontrol,to the extentpossible,overtheir own economic, socialandculturald e ~ e l o p m e n t . ” ~ ~ With respectto thecrucialissueof land,governments areto recognizethe “rightsof ownershipandpossession . . . overthelands,whichthey[indigenouspeoples]traditionallyoccupy. . . [and] to safeguardthe right of the peoplesconcerned to uselandsnot exclusivelyoccupiedby them,but to whichtheyhavetraditionallyhadaccess for theirsubsistence andtraditional activities.”70 While the rightsof indigenous peoplesto naturalresources are to be “speciallysafeguarded,” governments arepermittedto ownor exploit thoseresources, subjectonly to consultation with the peoplesconcerned.71 Finally,a numberof articlesdealwith, interalia, recruitment andconditions of employment, vocationaltraining,health,education,and cross-border contacts. AlthoughConventionNo. 169 had beenratifiedby only fourteenstates as of mid-2000, ten of thosestateswere in Latin America;the InterAmericanIndian Institutewas amongthe intergovernmental organizations that participated in the convention’s drafting.The conventionis subjectto theregularprocessof I L O supe~vision,~* andit remainsthemostimportant legallybindinginternational instrumenton indigenous rights.

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UnitedNations As discussed earlier,the WorkingGroupon IndigenousPopulations of the UN Sub-commission on the Promotionand Protectionof Human Rights(knownuntil 1998astheSub-commission onPrevention of Discriminationand Protectionof Minorities)hasbeenactivelyreviewingthe situation of indigenous peoplesaroundtheworldsince1982.After eightyearsof discussions, in whichhundreds of indigenous individuals andN G O sparticipatedregularly,the WorkingGroupadopteda draft Declarationon the Rightsof IndigenousPeoplesin 1993.73Due to the unprecedented level of influenceand participationby indigenouspeoplethemselves, the Working Group’stext largelyreflectspositionstakenby indigenous organizations (althoughone shouldnot alwaysassumeunanimityon the part of indigenousgroups). Sinceits approvalby the subcommission, the draft haslanguished in an open-ended workinggroupof the subcommission’s parentbody, the UN Commissionon HumanRights.Althougha few statesparticipatedin the earlydebatesof theWorkingGroup,it hasonlybeenat thelevelof thefull commission that moststaterepresentatives beganto expresstheirpositions on thedraftde~laration.~.‘ As onemightexpect,someof theirpositions vary considerably from thosesupported by indigenous representatives, although thereseemsto be generalagreementon the desirabilityof draftinga declarationthat eventuallywill be adoptedby the UN GeneralAssembly. Unfortunately,theattitudeof someindigenous representatives thatthesubcommission draftshouldbe adoptedon a “take-it-or-leave-it”basishasnot contributedco seriousdialogue,and somestatesare more than willing to delaytheprocessindefinitelyratherthancompromise. TheUN draftdiffersin severalimportantrespects fromthatadoptedlater by the OAS, discussed later, althoughthe thrustof both documents is to articulatea relativelybroadsetof indigenous rights.Generallyspeaking, the UN provisionsarecouchedin relativelyvague(or evenconfusing) language, but they seekto maximizeindigenouscontroloverland,the environment, development, and their own politicaland socialstructures. The U N draft alsodealswith severalissuesomittedfrom the OAS draft, suchas selfdetermination anddisputeresolutionbetweenindigenous communities and states. The provisionson landrightsarequitestrong,givingindigenous peoples the right “to own, develop,controlandusethe landsand territories. . . whichtheyhavetraditionallyownedor otherwiseoccupiedor Article 27 providesfor the restitutionof or compensation for indigenous lands takenwithout“full andinformed”consent,andarticle30 allowsindigenous peoplesto prohibitanydevelopment projectthatmightadversely affecttheir territories.

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Indigenous peoples havethe rightto determine theirowncitizen~hip~~ and maintain“theirinstitutional structures andtheirdistinctive juridicalcustoms . . .in accordance with internationally recognized humanrights~tandards.”~7 of indigenous Article20 furtherprovidesthatstatesmustobtaintheconsent peoplesbeforeadoptingandimplementing any“legislative or administrative measures thatmayaffectthem.” Finally,a numberof provisions callsonstatesto take“effectivemeasures” suchasthe rightof indigto guarantee the rights setforthin thedeclaration, effecenouspeoples underarticle22 to “specialmeasures for theimmediate, tive andcontinuingimprovement of their economicandsocialconditions, includingin the areasof employment, vocationaltrainingandretraining, housing,sanitation, healthandsocialsecurity.” of someof theprovisions, themost In additionto a morecarefulphrasing of this contentious issues in theU N draftarethoseoutlinedat the beginning a definitionof “indigenous,” andcollective chapter(i.e., self-determination, rights).The fate of the draftis likely to dependuponwhethera sufficient degreeof consensus, if notunanimity,canbe reachedon thesemajorissues.

Organization of AmericanStates The originalmandateof the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rightsgaveit noreasonto focusonindigenous issues in theAmericas. Howeffectivelobbying ever,the OAS hasnot beenimmuneto the increasingly carriedoutby indigenous organizations andhumanrightsNGOs, andthe norm-setting activitiesof the U N and ILO no doubtcontributed to the OAS’swillingness to address indigenous issues. The Inter-AmericanCommission first proposedthat it begindraftinga legalinstrument definingindigenous rightsin 1989,the yearin whichthe ILO adoptedConvention No. 169.A subsequent meetingof expertsheldat thata declaration the Inter-AmericanIndianInstitutein 1991concluded wouldbethemostappropriate formfor the instrument, andthe commission subsequently solicitedopinionsfrom OAS memberstateson the future in~trument.~~ After furtherinternaldiscussions, thecommission adoptedaninitialdraft in September 1995,whichwasagainsentto OASgovernments for theircomm e n t ~The . ~ most ~ recentdraft,basedon comments receivedfrom governments,indigenousgroups,and others,was adoptedin February1997.80 Timetables for finaladoptionhavebeencontinually pushedback,although it is nowhopedthata finaldeclaration mightbe adoptedby theOAS General Assembly in 2002or 2003. The commission’s draftdeclaration wasadoptedafterthe U N draftdisthedraftingprocess wasless cussedearlier,and,at leastin the earlyphases, influenced by indigenous organizations. This summaryfocuseson areasof

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difference betweenthe OAS andU N drafts,someof whichmaybe bridged asthedeliberative processes in bothforumsgoesforward. The mostimportantpoliticalandphilosophical statements in the OAS declaration areperhapsthosefoundin articles7 and8: Indigenous peopleshavetherightto theirculturalintegrity,andtheirhistorical andarcheological heritage,whichareimportantbothfor their survivalaswell asfor theidentityof theirmembers.81 Thestatesshallrecognize andrespectindigenous waysof life, customs, traditions,formsof social,economicandpoliticalorganization, institutions, practices,beliefsandvalues,useof dress,andlanguages.82 Indigenous peopleshavethe right to indigenous languages, philosophy and of nationalanduniversalculture,andassuch,[states] outlookasa component shallrespectthemandfacilitatetheirdissemination.83

The declaration goeson to address morespecifically issuesof language, education, religion,family,health,andtheenvironment. Like theU N draft, imposes numerous affirmativeobligations on statesto the OAS declaration peoples,as promoteor facilitatethe exerciseof the rightsby indigenous opposed to the moretypical“negative”formulationof otherhumanrights instruments. Article11,whichis concerned with familyrelations, addresses the sensitiveissueof theadoptionof indigenous children.UnliketheU N draftdeclaration,which prohibitsthe removalof indigenouschildrenfrom their familiesand communities“underany pretext,"‘^^the OAS draft only giveconsideration to theviewsof requiresthatcourtsandotherinstitutions theindigenous individuals, families,andcommunities concerned.85 SectionFour,on “organizational andpoliticalrights,”is perhapsmost notablefor what it omits:any specificreferenceto the right of selfdetermination. However,as discussed earlier,article15(1)doesfollow the language of commonarticle1 of the twoU N covenants onhumanrights,by peopleshavethe right “to freelydeterminetheir statingthat indigenous politicalstatusandfreelypursuetheireconomic, social,spiritualandcultural theprincipleof the territorial development.” Article25 implicitlyrecognizes integrityof states,statingthat “[nlothingin this instrumentshallbe conbetweenstates.” struedasgrantinganyrightsto ignoreboundaries Complementing therightto self-government is the rightof indigenous peoplesto participate“in all decision-making, at all levels,with regardto mattersthatmightaffecttheirrights,livesanddestiny.”86 Thisrightto participatedoesnot grantto indigenous peoplesa generalrightof vetoover nationalpolicies,butit doesensurethattheirvoiceswill be heard. Customaryindigenous law is to be deemed“partof the states’legalsystem”andshouldbe appliedin all mattersarisingwithinindigenous commu-

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nitie~.~’ Statecourtsalsoaredirectedto observe indigenous law andcustom in proceedings concerning indigenous peoplesor theirinterests.88 Article17 runscounterto the generaltrendof the declaration to empowerseparate indigenous institutions, in that it callson statesto facilitateinclusionof indigenous institutions andtraditionalpractices in states’“organizational “relevantto and serving structures” andprovidesthat stateinstitutions soas to promoteindigenous idenindigenous peoples”shouldbe designed tity andvalues. Seizures of land bysettlers or by the state areat the center of mostattacks on indigenous culturesandwaysof life. At thesametime,of course,developingcountries facedwithwidespread povertyandanexpanding population arelikely to covetlandthatmaybe onlysparsely populatedby indigenous peoples,as well as the potentialnaturalresources containedwithin such regions. SectionFive of the OAS declaration addresses theseissuesof landrights, aswell asintellectual property,development, andspecialmeasures to protect indigenous workers.Indigenous rightsto landandterritoriesinclude( I ) legalrecognition of the various formsof collective ownership anduseof ter(2) ownership of landsandterritories “historiritoryby indigenous peoples, cally occupied”by indigenouspeoples,(3) use of territoriesto which indigenous peoples“havehistorically hadaccessfor theirtraditionalactiviof theseindigenous ownership tiesandlivelihood,”and(4) the inalienability andusufructrights.89 Timber,oil, gold,andothermineralresources haveprovedto be almost irresistible attractions to indebtedgovernments, individualpeasants, wealthy landowners, andtransnational corporations, andthe exploitation of natural resources in areastraditionallyinhabitedor usedby indigenous peopleshas oftenled to explosive clashes betweenindigenous peoplesandeithersettlers or government forces.Althoughthe resources themselves maynothavebeen importantto traditionalindigenous cultures,theirexploitation inevitably resultsin substantial disruption of indigenous culturalandeconomic life. At the sametime,manyLatin Americanconstitutions or lawsreserveownerwithin the nationalterritoryto the state, shipoverall subsoilresources whetherthelanditselfis in publicor privatehands. The OAS draftattemptsa compromise betweenthelandrightsof indigenouspeoplesandthe exploitation of naturalresources by the state.It first declaresthe basicprinciplethat “[ilndigenous peopleshavethe rightto an effectivelegalframeworkfor the protectionof their rightswith respectto the naturalresources on theirlands.”90However,the succeeding paragraph appears to allowthe stateto exploittheseresources, solongas indigenous peoplesare consultedand solong as they participatein the benefitsof exploitation, includingreceivingcompensation for anydamagecaused.9* Theseprovisions shouldbe readin conjunction with thoseconcerning the

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environment, whichprovidethatindigenous peoples“havetherightto conserve,restoreandprotecttheirenvironment, andtheproductivecapacityof theirlands,territoriesandres0urces.”~2 Provisionson an indigenous rightto development seemto tilt thebalance backtowardindigenouspeoplesthemselves, whosedevelopment priorities are to prevail“evenwherethey are differentfrom thoseadoptedby the nationalgovernment or by othersegments of society.’’93Unless“exceptional circumstances” exist,no development planaffectingindigenous peoplesmay be adoptedwithouttheir“free andinformedconsent.”94 Thisbrief summaryis necessarily incomplete andsomewhat cursory.The languageof the OAS draftis moremoderateand its goalssomewhatmore modestthanthosefoundin theU N draftdeclaration. Althoughit mightbe rights,asa regionalinstruexpectedthatan OASdeclarationon indigenous ment,couldbe morespecificandmoreexpansive thana globalinstrument, thepresentdraftis, in fact,lessdetailedthantheUN draft.

CONCLUSION This chapterhasadopteda legalisticapproach to the issueof indigenous rights,because debatesoverwhetherindigenous peopleshouldenjoyspecial rightsandjustwhatthoserightsshouldbehavelargelyoccurredin thelegalpoliticalframeworkof theUnitedNationsandotherinternational organizations.In the shortspanof twentyyears,consensus seemsto havebeen reachedonan answerto at leastthefirstquestion, in thatthereis widespread supportfor includingindigenous peoplesamongthosevulnerablegroups whosehumanrightsdeservespecialattention.This hasbeendue,in large part, to the relativelysophisticated andpersistenteffortsof the indigenous peoplesthemselves, aidedby humanrightsN G O s and a few friendlygovernments. However,adoptionof a declarationor creationof a new UN organdoes notguarantee thatrightswill berespected. Therealtestfor indigenous rights will comewhentheinternational community attemptsto hold governments accountable for thepoliticalobligations theyassume undertheUN andOAS declarations.Indeed,implementation of existingnormsthat protectthe humanrightsof indigenous peoplesis sorelylackingin manystates,andthe first challengeof the twenty-firstcenturywill be simplyto enforce“ordinary” prohibitionsagainstthe murder,discrimination, and intimidationof whichindigenous peoplearesooftenvictims. Many of the indigenous-specific rightsarticulatedin the UN and OAS drafts,particularlythoseconcerned with politicalandeconomicautonomy, mustbe balancedagainstcompetinggovernment interestsand, in some instances, the competingrightsof others.At the sametime, however,few

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rightsareabsolute,andbalancingindividual(or group)rightsagainstthe human powerof government is a taskthatshouldbefamiliarto international rightsbodies. This chapterdoesnot attemptto resolvethe philosophical clashesover individualversuscollectiverightsor majorityversusminorityrights.However,thelegitimacythattheconceptof indigenous rightsis acquiring,aswell asthearticulationof thespecificcontentof thoserights,areimportantsteps towardguaranteeing that the relationshipbetweenindigenouspeoplesand thestatesthatsurround themis basedongreaterequalityandmutualrespect in this centurythanhasbeenthe casein the precedingfive centuries.Disagreementoverthe preciseextentof indigenousrightswill no doubtcontinue,but theirexistencecannolongerbe questioned.

NOTES 1. JasonClay, “LookingBackto Go Forward:Predicting andPreventing Human RightsViolations,”in Stateof thePeoples, ed.MarcS. Miller (Boston:Beacon,1993), 67. 2. AnnualReportof theInter-American Commission on HumanRights1988annualreportsare hereinaftercited as “IACHR 1989, 247. (The commission’s

AnnualReport”).

3. See generallyUN Sub-commission on the Promotionand Protectionof HumanRights,studyon treaties,agreements and otherconstructive agreements betweenstatesand indigenous populations (MiguelAlfonsoMartinez,specialrapporteur),U N Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20(1999).For an indigenous view of the earlyrelationshipbetweenNativeAmericansand the Europeansettlers,seeOren LyonsandJohnMohawk,eds.,Exiledin theLand of theFree: Democracy, Indian Nations,andtheUS.Constitution (SantaFe, N.M.: ClearLight, 1992). 4. It is, of course,impossibleto generalizeaboutan entirecategoryof people, but the attackson Indianandtribalpeoplesthroughout the world arewell known. Muchof theimpetusfor international actionon indigenous issues wasprovidedby a massiveUN studypreparedin the 1980s,Studyof theProblemof Discrimination againstIndigenous Populations (Jose R. MartinezCobo,specialrapporteur), UN Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7& Adds.1-4 (1986)(hereinafter citedasUN Indigenous Study).Amongmanyotherbroadsurveys,referencemightbe madeto Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues,Indigenous Peoples: A Global Questfor Justice(London:Zed, 1987),andthevariousreportspublished by nongovernmentalorganizations suchas SurvivalInternational(London),CulturalSurvival (Cambridge, Mass.),International Work Groupfor Indigenous Affairs(Copenhagen),IndianLaw Resource Center(Washington, D.C.), Centerfor WorldIndigenous Studies(Olympia,Wash.),andMinorityRightsGroup(London). 5. For a discussion of the philosophical justifications for the conquest of the Americas,see Robert A. WilliamsJr., The AmericanIndian in WesternLegal Thought: TheDiscourses of Conquest (NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress,1990).A

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discussion of thehistoricallegalcontextis foundin S. JamesAnaya,Indigenous Peoplesin InternationalLaw (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),9-38. 6. Of course,as discussed by Jackson-Preece, manyminoritieswould like to

exercisea greaterdegreeof self-government thanthey now enjoy.However,this desireis primarilyprospective, as opposedto reflectingpoliticaland/oreconomic powerthatminoritiesformerlyenjoyedbut subsequently lost. 7. In someways,thisattentionto indigenous issueswassimplypartof a growing internationalmovementto identifyvulnerablegroupswhosehumanrightsneeded specialprotection.For example,specialconventions o r declarationshave been adoptedsincethe 1970son refugees,women,children,minorities,migrantworkers, prisonersandotherdetainees, religiousintolerance, andracialdiscrimination. 8. The UN draftdeclaration is discussed morefully laterin thischapter. 9. Thisapproach is reflectedin thetitlesof I L O Convention(No. 107)Concerning the ProtectionandIntegrationof Indigenousand OtherTribal and Semi-tribal Populations in Independent Countries,signedJune26, 1957,enteredintoforceJune 2, 1959, 328 U.N.T.S. 247, and I L O Convention(No. 169) ConcerningIndigenous andTribal Peoplesin Independent Countries,adoptedJune27, 1989, enteredinto forceSeptember 5, 1991. 10. ProposedAmerican Declarationon the Rights of IndigenousPeoples, approvedby theIACHR onFebruary26,1997,OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.LN/II.95, Doc. 6 (1997) (hereinafter “OAS Draft Declaration”). 11. Article 1(2) providessimply, “Self-identification as indigenousshall be regardedas a fundamental criterionfor determining the peoplesto whichtheprovisionsof thisDeclarationapply.” 12. Thisreversedthe approachadoptedin thefirst(1995) draft,infra note,which wouldhavebeenlimitedto theparticularcircumstances of theAmericasanddefined indigenous peoplesas“thosewhoembodyhistoricalcontinuitywith societies, which existedpriorto the conquest andsettlement of theirterritoriesby Europeans.” 13. For contrasting views,compare,for example,Anaya,Indigenous Peoplesin InternationalLaw, 75-125; RusselL. Barsh,“The Challengeof IndigenousSelfDetermination,” Universityof MichiganJournalof LegalReferences 277 (1993):26; Lea Brilmayer,“Secessionand Self-Determination: A TerritorialInterpretation,” YdleJournalof InternationalLaw 177 (1991): 16;AntonioCassese, Self-DeterminaA LegalReappraisal(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1995); tionof Peoples: HurstHannum,“RethinkingSelf-Determination,”VirginiaJournalof International Law 1 (1993): 34; Maivin Clech Lim, “The Legal Value of Self-Determination: Vision o r Inconvenience?” in Peopleor Peoples:Equality,Autonomyand SelfDetermination(Montreal:InternationalCentrefor HumanRightsandDemocratic Development, 1996),79-142; DeanSuagee,“Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoplesat the Dawn of the SolarAge,” Universityof MichiganJournalof LegalReferfor Self-Determination of ence671 (1992):25; andDonnaLee Van Cott,“Prospects Indigenous Peoplesin LatinAmerica:Questions of Law andPractice,”GlobalGovernance43, no. 1 (1996):2. 14. The only formalinternational treatiesthatincludethisstatementare the two international covenants on humanrights,althoughtheprinciplehasbeenrepeatedin manyUN GeneralAssemblyresolutions andotherinternational instruments andis by nowuniversallyconsidered to be a normof customary international law.

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15. Seearticle3. Thetext of theUN draft,hereinaftercitedasUN DraftDeclaration,is foundin UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29,AnnexI (1993),andis reprinted in 34 InternationalLegalMaterials541 (1995). 16. SeeHannum,“RethinkingSelf-Determination,’’ 11-39. 17. Seearticle1 of I L O ConventionNo. 169,andarticle1 (3) of theOAS declaration. 18. Article31 setsout,“asa specificformof exercising theirrightto self-determination,”indigenous rightsto “autonomyor self-government in mattersrelatingto theirinternalandlocalaffairs,includingculture,religion,education, information, media,health,housing,employment, socialwelfare,economicactivities,land and resources management, environment andentryby non-members, aswell aswaysand meansfor financingtheseautonomous functions.”The OAS draft containssimilar language. 19. Declarationon the Rightsof PersonsBelongingto Nationalor Ethnic,Religiousor LinguisticMinorities,G.A. Res.47/135,December18, 1992. 20. See, for example,FrameworkConventionfor the Protectionof National Minorities,signedFebruary1, 1995,enteredinto forceFebruary1, 1998,Europe; T.S. No. 157. 21. OAS Draft Declaration, article2(2). 22. UN Draft Declaration, article33. 23. For a discussion of the petitionmechanism underthe Covenant,seeSidn Lewis-Anthony,“Treaty-Based Procedures for MakingHumanRightsComplaints withintheUN System,”in Guideto InternationalHumanRightsPractice,ed.Hurst 1999),41-50. Hannum(Ardsley,N.Y.: Transnational, 24. Article27 reads,in its entirety,“In thoseStatesin whichethnic,religiousor linguisticminoritiesexist,personsbelongingto suchminoritiesshallnot be denied theright,in community with the othermembersof theirgroup,to enjoytheirown culture,to professandpractisetheirownreligion,or to usetheirownlanguage.” 25. Communication R.6/24, Reportof the HumanRightsCommittee,UN Doc. A/36/40, Annex18 (1977),166. 26. Communication No. 197/1985,Reportof theHumanRightsCommittee,UN Doc. A/43/40, Annex7(G) (1988),207. 27. The committee’s decision wasno doubtinfluencedby thefactthatKitokwas, in practice,permittedby the villageto grazeand farm his reindeeron communal lands,eventhoughhe did nothavea legalrightto do so. 28. Communication No. 267/1984,Reportof theHumanRightsCommittee,UN Doc. A/45/40, vol. 2, Annex9(A) (1990),1. 29. Mikmaq Peoplev. Canada,Communication No. 205/1986,Reportof the HumanRightsCommittee,UN Doc. A/47/40, Annex9(A) (1992),213. 30. SeeHumanRightsCommittee,GeneralCommentNo. 23(50)(Art. 27), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5 (1994),para.3.1. 31. Consultative statushasbeengrantedto overonethousand nationalandinternationalorganizations, with a widevarietyof interests. Theirstatusandactivitiesare governedby ECOSOCRes.1996/31(1996),amending ECOSOCRes.1296(XLIV) (1968). 32. Seegenerallythe reportsof two open-ended workinggroupsestablished by

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theU N Commission onHumanRightsto consider thisissue,in UN Docs.E/CN.4/ 1999/83(1999)andE/CN.4/2000/86 (2000). 33. Res.2000/87of April 28,2000. 34. Res.2000/87of April 28, 2000,op.para.2. 35. Res.2000/87of April 28, 2000,op.para.1. 36. SeeUN IndigenousStudy,140-45; Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights,Inter-American Yearbookon HumanRights1969-1970(Washington, D.C.: OAS, 1976),73-83. 37. SeegenerallyDinahL. Shelton,“TheInter-American HumanRightsSystem,” in Guideto International HumanRightsPractice,ed.Hannum,121-34. 38. SeeZACHRAnnualReport1972,63-65. This andthe 1973recommendations regardingindigenous populationsare summarized in Inter-AmericanCommission onHumanRights,Ten Yearsof Activities 1971-1981(Washington, D.C.:OAS, 1982), 328-29. 39. For a surveyand analysisof theseearly cases,seeSheltonH. Davis,Land Rightsand Indigenous Peoples:The Role of the Inter-American Commission on HumanRights(Cambridge, Mass.:CulturalSurvival,1988);alsoseeHurstHannum, “TheProtection of Indigenous Rightsin theInter-American System,”in TheInterAmericanSystemof HumanRights,ed. David J. Harris and StephenLivingston (Oxford:Clarendon, 1998). 40. CaseNo. 1690(Colombia),IACHRAnnualReport1973,21-22. 41. Case1802(Paraguay), IACHRAnnualReport1977,36-37. 42. CaseNo. 7615(Brazil),IACHRAnnualReport1984-1985,24-34. 43. CaseNo. 7615(Brazil),ZACHRAnnualReport1984-198fi,31. Thisis a somewhat broaderarticulationof article27 thanis foundin the text itself,whichis set forthin note. 44. ReportontheSituation of HumanRightsof a Segment of theNicaraguanPopulationof MiskitoOrigin,OAS Docs.OEAISer.LNIII.62,doc.10 rev. 3 (1983)and OEAISer.LNIII.62,doc.26 (1984)(hereinafter“MiskitoReport”). 45. MiskitoReport,126. 46. MiskitoReport,127. 47. MiskitoReport. 48. The examinationof the covenantwasjustifiedby referringto article29(b) of theAmericanConvention, whichdirectsthecommission to interprettheconvention in a way thatdoesnotrestrictrightsrecognized by virtueof anyotherconvention to whicha statemaybe a party. 49. MiskitoReport,78. 50. MiskitoReport,78-79. 51. DeclarationontheGrantingof Independence to ColonialCountries andPeoples. 52. Declarationon Principlesof International Law concerning FriendlyRelations and Co-operationamongStatesin accordance with the Charterof the United Nations. 53. MiskitoReport,81. 54. MiskitoReport,81-82. 55. Mayagna(Sumo)AwasTingniCommunity v. Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001,Ser.C No. 79.

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56. Mayagna(Sumo)AwasTingniCommunity v. Nicaragua, para.138. 57. Mayagna(Sumo)AwasTingniCommunity v. Nicaragua, paras.148,149. 58. The commission’s increasing interestin indigenous issuesis illustratedby its recentpublication of a reporton TheHumanRightsSituation of theIndigenous People in theAmericas, OAS Doc. OEAISer.LNIII.108,doc.62 (2000),whichsummarizesboththe earliercasesdiscussed in this chapterand severalmore recentcases examinedby thecommission. 59. Amongthe reportsthat havediscussed indigenous issuesin somedetail,see the commission’s threereportson thesituationof humanrightsin Colombia,OAS Docs.OEAISer.LNIII.53,Doc.22 (1981),208-17; OEAISer.LNIII.84,Doc.39 rev. (1993),229-37; and 0EAISer.LNIII.xx(1999),Chap.X. Also seeThirdReporton theSituationof HumanRightsin Guatemala, OAS Doc. OEAISer.LNIII.66 (Oct. 1985);Reporton theSituationof HumanRightsin Mexico,OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/ VIII.100, Doc. 7 rev. 1 (1998), Chap.VII; andSecondReporton the Situationof HumanRightsin Peru,OAS Doc. OEAISer.LNIII.106,Doc. 59 rev. (2000),Chap. X. A recentpressreleaseindicatedthatthecommission is currentlyexaminingsome forty casespertainingto indigenous peoples;seeIACHR, PressReleaseNo. 23/01 (September 28,2001). 60. IACHR, FourthReportontheSituationof HumanRightsin Guatemala, OAS Doc. OEAISer.LI5III.83,Doc. 16 rev.(1993),36. 61. IACHR, FourthReporton the Situationof HumanRightsin Guatemala, 33-34 (citationomitted). 62. SeeChunimiCase(Emergency Provisional Measures), July15, 1991,Orderof the Presidentof the Inter-AmericanCourtof HumanRights,reprintedin 1991 Inter-American YearBook on HumanRights,1104.The casewassettledwithouta finaljudgmenthavingbeenadopted. 63. SeeAloeboetoeCase(Reparations), Inter-American Courtof HumanRights, Ser.C, No. 15 (1993).Thisaspectof thecaseis brieflysummarized in JoM. Pasqualucci,“TheInter-American HumanRightsSystem:Establishing Precedents andProcedurein HumanRightsLaw,” University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 297, nos.329-31 (1995):26. 64. Discussions of the development of indigenous rightsinternationally may be foundin, for example,Anaya,Indigenous Peoples in International Law,39-71; RusselL. Barsh,“Indigenous Peoplesin the 1990s:From Objectto Subjectof InternationalLaw?”7 Harvard HumanRightsJournal33 (1994); HowardR. Berman, “Perspectives onAmericanIndianSovereignty andInternational Law, 1600to 1776,” in Exiledin theLandof theFree:Democracy, IndianNations,andtheUS.Constitution,ed. OrenLyonsandJohnMohawk(SantaFe,N.M.: ClearLight, 1992),125-88; HurstHannum,Autonomy, Sovereignty, andSelf-Determination: TheAccommodationof ConjZicting Rights(Philadelphia: Universityof Pennsylvania Press,1996),74103, 501; SiegfriedWiessner,“Rightsand Statusof IndigenousPeoples:A Global Comparative andInternationalLegalAnalysis,”12 HarvardHumanRightsJournal 57 (1999);UN Indigenous Study,andthe annualreportsof theWorkingGroupon IndigenousPopulations of the UN Sub-commission on Promotionand Protection of HumanRights. 65. Supranote9.

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66. Supranote9. 67. ILO Convention No. 169,supranote9, article6(l)(a). 68. ILO Convention No. 169,article5(a). 69. ILO Convention No. 169,article7(1). 70. ILO Convention No. 169,article14(1). 71. ILO Convention No. 169,article15. 72. SeegenerallyLee Swepston, “HumanRightsComplaintProcedures of the InternationalLaborOrganization,”in Guideto International HumanRightsPractice,ed,Hannum,85-101. 73. ILO Convention No. 169,supranote9. 74. Both the subcommission and its workinggroupsare composedof experts electedby the commission, who servein theirindividualcapacities andnot asstate representatives. 75. UN Draft Declaration, article26. 76. UN Draft Declaration, article32. 77. UN Draft Declaration, article33. 78. A fairly extensivesummaryof the responses received(from elevengovernmentsandtwentyindigenous organizations) is includedin thecommission’s 1992-93 AnnualReport,0‘4s Doc. OEAISer.LNIII.83,Doc. 14,corr. 1 (1993),263-310. A usefulsummaryof subsequent proposals may be foundin a “workingdocument” preparedby the chairof the OAS workinggroupon the declaration,OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.K/XVI, GT/DADIN/doc.53/02(2002). 79. DraftInter-American DeclarationontheRightsof Indigenous Peoples, O.A.S. Doc. OEAISer.LNIII.90, doc.9 rev. 1, reprintedin IACHR AnnualReport1995, 207-18. 80. OAS Draft Declaration. 81. OAS Draft Declaration, article7(1). 82. OAS Draft Declaration, article7(3). 83. OAS Draft Declaration, article8(1). 84. UN Draft Declaration, article6. 85. OAS Draft Declaration, article1l(2). 86. OAS Draft Declaration, article15(2). 87. OAS Draft Declaration, article16(1)and(2). 88. OASDraft Declaration, article16(3). 89. OAS Draft Declaration, article18(1)-(3). 90. OAS Draft Declaration, article18(4). 91. OAS Draft Declaration, article18(5). 92. OAS Draft Declaration, article13(3). 93. OAS Draft Declaration, article21(1). 94. OAS Draft Declaration, article21(2).

Protecting theHumanRights of Women Eva Brems

A feministperspectiveon internationalhumanrightslaw and politics

emergedduringthelastdecadeof the*twentiethcentury.Feminismwasrelativelylatein confrontinginternational humanrightsbut, fromall evidence, is hereto stay.RadhikaCoomaraswamy, theU N specialrapporteur onviolenceagainstwomen,callsit a “revolution”:“[v(rlomen’srightshavebeen catapulted ontothehumanrightsagendawith a speedanddetermination that hasrarelybeenmatchedin international law.”’ The UnitedNations World Conferenceon HumanRights,held in Viennain 1993,wasa major turningpoint. Women’s groupsfrom aroundthe world with multiple agendas sharpened theirskillsof coalitionmakingandlobbyingandexperiencedthe strengthof theircombinedforces.2 Earlierefforts,particularlythe seriesof UN conferences on the advancement of womenthat had started in 1975,werepart of a periodof gestation; Viennamarkedthe birth of an international women’shumanrightsmovement.’ Feministcritiqueshavefor sometime beenappliedto crucialareasof domesticlaw. Many of theanalyticalandmethodological toolsdevelopedin the domesticcontextare now beingappliedto internationalhumanrights law. In thischapter,I examinehowfeministclaimsaretransforming internationalhumanrightsandsuggest wherethisgrowingimpactmaylead.Three differentapproaches to theprotectionof women’srightswill be addressed. The first is basedon what might be calledthe “sameness” of womenand men,whiletheothertwo takewomen’s“specificity”asa startingpoint,one leadingto a claim for specialhumanrightsfor womenand the otherto a claimfor thefeministtransformation of humanrightsfor all.

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Thereis a certainchronological orderin this presentation in that the “sameness” approach historicallycamefirst,andtheideaof a feministtransformationof humanrightsis relativelyrecent.Yet the threeapproaches are not intendedt o reflectthe viewpointsof specificpersonso r groupsbut rathershouldbe seenas theoreticalmodels,or analyticaltools,to facilitate discussion of differentways in which women’shumanrights can be approached. In therealworld,hardlyanyonepromotesa purely“sameness” approach. Whatis knownas“liberalfeminism”comesclosest, yetit includes someelementsof a “specificity”approach. Moreover,mostproponents of a specificitymodelsupportbothcertainproposals for specialwomen’srights, andcertain“feministtransformations” of humanrights.We arefacednot so muchwith a choiceamongthreemodelsaswith a choicebetweendifferent combinations of measures linkedto thethreeapproaches. All threeapproaches areasrelevanttodayastheyarefor thefuture.However, this chapterwill focusmoststronglyon feministtransformations of international humanrights.This is justifiedin the first placebecauseof the future-oriented perspective of thisbook:theimpactof feministtransformationsof humanrightsis only startingto be felt, and their potentialfor the futureis far-reaching. Moreover,within the specificityapproach,thischapter will promotethe transformative approach morethanspecialwomen’s rights,becauseit fits bestin a conceptionof universalitybasedon allinclusiveness. Finally,theclaimfor therecognition of women’sspecificityin international humanrightscannotbe considered in isolationsinceidentitybasedclaimsare beinglaunchedby others,notablyminorities,indigenous peoples,andrepresentatives of non-Western societies. Thoughsimilarto the feministdemandsin form and in their underlyingrationale,theseother claimsare oftenat oddswith feministviewswhenit comesto theirsubstance.Managingmultiplespecificities is anotherhugechallenge for internationalhumanrightsin thenextfifty years.

SAMENESS In thesimplestof terms,bothwomenandmenarehuman,whichmeansthat in manyrespectsthey arethe sameandtheywant to be treatedin the same way.The principleof theuniversality of humanrights4andtheensuingrule of nondiscrimination in the enjoymentof humanrightsare meantto assure suchequaltreatment.5 Whenhumanrightsfirst appeared on the international scene,with the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights(UDHR) in 1948,theyhada strongemphasis onnaturallaw.Theideaof universality was basedon that of an essential“human”nature.It was believedthat human rightscapturedthe commondenominator of all humanbeingsand that all the valuesand concernsthey embody,from politicalparticipationover

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propertyto laborstandards, weresomehowinherentin all humans,indepena commonhuman dentof socialclass,culture,or gender;thattheyexpressed dignity.An importantconsequence wastheassumption thattheformulation of theserights-as, for instance,in theUDHR-was neutralwith regardto suchfactorsas cultureor gender.Hencethe ambitionto applythe same rights,in the sameway, to everybodyregardless of their gender,class,and soforth.The idealof equalityof the sexeswasthatof formal,gender-blind equality. Formalequalityof thesexeswasa hugechallengein 1948,a timewhen,in manystates,womenhad only recentlyobtainedthe right to vote.6Formal equalityonly graduallybecamea reality,and it is still not realizedtoday. Discrimination againstwomenin all areasof life is widespread. Thenumber against of lawsstill on the booksthat formallyand explicitlydiscriminate womenis extensive.Accordingto the Sudanese PersonalLaw for Muslims Act, enactedin 1991,for example,a womanneedsa maleguardianto contracther own marriage.Duringmarriage,sheis requiredto obeyher husband,and while her husbandcan divorceher at will, shecan divorcehim only on certaingroundsand after a courtprocedure.'In SouthAfrica, womenmarriedundercustomarylaw are considered minorsand cannot enterintoanylegalcontractwithouttheconsentof theirhusbands or guardians.8And in SaudiArabia,womenarenot allowedto drivecars.9 exist,the Even wherethe lawsprotectingwomenagainstdiscrimination practiceis oftenonein whichthe rulesare flagrantlyviolatedon a daily basis.RecentlyHumanRightsWatchreportedhow abusesagainstwomen havebeencarriedoutfrequentlyandwith virtualimpunityin statessuchas Russia,SouthAfrica, Pakistan,andJordanthatlargelyfailedto fulfill their obligations to provideprotection.lOIn the United States,HumanRights Watchidentifiedviolenceby custodians againstwomenin prisons"and in Bosnia,discrimination againstwomenwith regardto loansandtrainingprogramsin reconstruction programs.** Theorganization alsoaccused theMexicangovernment of not protectingthe rightsof pregnantwomenthat are guaranteed underdomestic legislationbutviolatedby transnational corporationsin theexport-processing sector.13 As theseexamplesshow,the sameness approachtowardwomen'shuman rightsremainshighlyrelevant.Suchdiscriminatory practicesdenythesamenessof womenand men on the basisof patriarchalconstructions of difference,which d o not necessarilyview womenas inferiorbut are almost of the specificityof inevitablydistortionsbroughton by the interpretation womenby men (i.e., by outsidersin a dominantposition).Activistsfor women'srightsthusneedto continueto focuson eliminatingpatriarchal constructions of differenceandon achievingformalequalitybeforethe law throughtheabolitionof discriminatory lawsandtheenforcement of antidiscriminationlegislation.*4 This type of feministactivismrestswithin main-

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streamhuman rights rules and institutionsand has been called the “doctrinal”o r “institutional”approaehl5 or, in an analogywith feminist approaches to domesticlaw, “liberalfeminism.”16 It may seemtoo limited t o many living in Westerncountrieswhere its goalshave largely been reached,but it is a necessary step,whichcanmakean enormous difference in thelivesof women. Anotherconsequence of the sameness of womenandmenis thatwomen experience manyof the samehumanrightsviolationsas men.If a political partyor a religioussectis outlawed,femaleand malemembersare equally affected.If a villageis burneddownand the cropsare destroyed,all its inhabitants suffer.Thereis no needfor differentrulesfor menandwomen, nor is thereany needfor differentcontrolmechanisms. Yet in thosesituationsaswell, a women’sperspective onhumanrightsmaymakesensesimply because womenareoftennot awareof theirentitlement.Thereis a needto makewomenmoreawareof theirrightsin manysocieties andprovidethem with access to humanrightsdiscourse andremedies.”

SPECIFICITY Biologicaldifferences betweenmenandwomenleadt o differentpersonal experiences, as d o rolepatternsin the family andin the broadersociety. Beyondthesedifferences, somefeministsalsoclaimthat thereare inherent psychological differencesbetweenthe sexes.18At the sametime, men have dominatedthe historyof international humanrightssincethe Universal Declaration.Today,thenaturallaw approach to humanrightsnolongerprevails.Theconceptof “humannature”is underfire, andconsiderable dispute persists aboutwhethera neutralperspective is possibleat all. We realizenow that howeverwell intentionedthe draftersof the declaration, their attempt t o assumea commonhumannatureinevitablyresultedin a projectionof theirownexperiences, needs,andvaluesontotherestof humanity.Despite theparticipation of EleanorRoosevelt, thosewerepredominantly theexperiences,needs,andvaluesof well-off whiteWesternmen.The sameholdstrue for developments in humanrightstheoryandpracticesince1948. As socialgroupsemergefromdomination, theybecomeawareof thisdistortionwithin international humanrights,and they advanceclaimsto correctit. After theendof theColdWar, humanrightsjumpedto theforefront of international relations,and their powersubstantially increased. Emancipationmovements, suchasthewomen’smovement,becameawareof the increased potentialof international humanrightsto realizetheiragendas. As a result,the claimsto correctthe biasesof international humanrightshave becomelouder,in particularthosefrom thewomen’smovementand those from non-Westernsocieties. Thoseclaimsare basedon a differentconcep-

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tion of universality andequality.Theystartfroma realizationthatneutrality and objectivityare,practicallyspeaking,impossible and,as a consequence, formalequalityis not sufficientwhentherearerelevantdifferences, suchas therearebetweenmenandwomen. From that perspective, equalitycanno longerbe realizedby eliminating all context-related factorsbutratherby deliberately takingsomesuchfactors intoaccount.If humanrightsareto be universalin thesensethattheyapply in an equalmannerto all womenandall men,theymusttakesomegenderbaseddifferencesinto accountinsteadof stressing their irrelevance. This is not necessarily at oddswith the earlierview of universalityandequality, whichpurportsto eliminatedifferences. The differenceto be eliminatedin that first conception is differenceas constructed by dominantoutsiders,in casu by men.Thedifferenceto berecognized in thissecondview,however,is differenceasexperienced by theinsiders.In thiscase:by womenthemselves. Themainfocusof thischapteris ontheadaptation of international human rightslaw to the specificneedsandexperiences of women.Althoughthe specificityapproach mayobviouslybe linkedto a strandof feminismknown as “culturalfeminism,”19 it shouldnot be interpretedas takingsidesin the feministdebatebetween“sameness” and“difference.”Particularlywhen discussing the futureof international women’shumanrightsover the next severaldecades, the emphasison specificitysimplyoffersa morefruitful approach. The theoreticalframeworkwithin whichtheseissueswill be addressed is thatof “inclusiveuniversality.”-’OInclusiveuniversality is basedontheinclusionof all peoplein thehumanrightsframework.It acceptsthecritiquethat thepretended neutralityof humanrightsis inherentlybiasedand,asa result, insiststhatformalapplicabilityof standards is notenoughto guarantee general inclusionin humanrightsprotection.It recognizes thatpeoplewho do not correspond to the implicitreferencepointof humanrights(the human beingin its maleandWesternmanifestation) experience a form of exclusion becausetheir needs,concerns, andvaluesare not takeninto accountto the sameextentasthoseof Westernmen.Inclusiveuniversality proposes to correctthissituationby accommodating particularist claimsfromthosewhoare excluded. With regardto women,this meanslisteningto whatwomenhaveto say abouthow thepresentsystemof international humanrightsdoesnot sufficientlyprotectthem,doesnotcorrespond to theirneeds,anddoesnotreflect their priorities.Thereis now a strongand well-organizedwomen’smovementadvancingsucharguments and makingvery concreteproposals for changes t o standards, organizations, mechanisms, andpolicies.If human rightsare to be universal,they shouldrespondto theseclaims,for several reasons.In thefirstplace,from a democratic perspective, inclusionrequires participation. If humanrightsarethe rightsof all humans,all humansmust

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havea sayin definingwhattheyareandhowtheyareused.Thismeansthat womenshouldbe presentwhenhumanrightsstandards areformulatedand whenagendas areset.Theyshouldbe therein fact,andtheyshouldbe there in thesensethattheyarebeingfully takenintoaccount with all theirgenderspecificconcerns. Humanrightsshouldalsorespondto theclaimsof women(or otherswho havebeenexcluded)for pragmaticreasons. The connection betweenhuman rightsstandards and practice,on the one hand,and the life experiences of people,on the other,is crucial.Humanrightsmakeno senseunlesstheyare relevantto the experience of people.They only work if the peopleactivate them;they stronglyrely on an activecivil society.Womenmakeup at least half of the humanpopulation.If a significantgroupof womenfeel disconnectedfromhumanrights,thisundermines not onlytheirsignificance as “human”rightsbut alsotheireffectiveness. Thehistoryof humanrightscanbe readasa storyof increasing inclusion. Boththe form and substance of humanrightsevolvewith the inclusionof groupsthat havesuffereddiscrimination in thepast.Only after women accedeto the statusof full humanbeingsin the eyesof thecommunity21 do they havea voicein determining whathumanrightsshouldbe about.The emancipation of workingpeopleled to the expansion of humanrightsinto the field of socioeconomic claims,andthe emancipation of colonizedpeoplesled t o a widerrecognition of the right to self-determination andthe introduction of thenotionof a rightto development.22 Likewise,womenare determinedt o put their stampon international humanrights.H o w can women’sspecificitybe accommodated withininternational humanrights law?In general,two differentmethodsarepossible. The first methodinvolves“flexibility”or differentiation of humanrights standards, depending on the context(the relevantspecificities). Eithernew standards arecreatedspecifically for themembersof the excludedgroup,or a marginof variationis left within generalstandards sothat the needsand valuesof differentgroupscanbe takenintoaccount.With regardto women, the creationof special“women’shumanrights”is the main expression of “flexibility.” The secondinvolvesthe “transformation” of humanrighcs standards, with generalnormsor institutions beingchangedin response to the particularistclaimsof thosewho havebeenexcluded.In manyrespects, the transformation of generalhumanrightsstandards in response to the claimsof womenholdsthe mostpromisefor thefuture. Thus,withinthe“specificityapproach,”a distinctionis madebetweenan approachthatusesa “flexibility”technique,and onethat usesa “transformation”technique. The formeris focusedon creatingspecialrightsand mechanisms for women.The latterattemptsto changethe generalrights standards and mechanisms, so that the improvements that are inspiredby women’sspecialconcerns aremovedto thecenterandcanbe enjoyedby all.

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The threeapproaches to women’shumanrights-sameness,flexibility, andtransformation-reflect thethreetypesof claimsthatmaybe addressed to rightsdiscourse from theperspective of identitypolitics,asanalyzedby Higgins.The sameness approach reflectsthecomplaintof groups“thatthey areinappropriately definedasdifferent.”23The flexibilityapproachdeals with the complaintof groups“that their distinctiveness is inappropriately ignoredor disrespected by the majority.”24Finally, the transformation approachis the mostradical,expressing “an alternativeUniversalist vision that challenges the foundational commitments of themajority.”25 Yet howmay be, theyremain“internalto our everradicalsomeof thearguments humanrightsframeworkin that they acceptthe aspirations of the existing schemeat a generallevelbut arguethatthoseaspirations havebeenimproperly definedin somecasesandinadequately metin others.”26

FLEXIBILITY: HUMAN RIGHTS FOR WOMEN It is logicalthattheinitialresponse to feministdemands for theinclusionof women’sspecificityin international humanrightsshouldhavebeento add specifichumanrightsfor women.For onething,additionsto humanrights standards andinstitutions targetedat thoseexcludedaremorereadilyinterpretedasa response to thatgroupthanaremodifications of a generalnature. “When womencomplain,let’s do something for them”is the straightforwardreasoning of theflexibilityapproach. Thevisibilityof theadditionand its symbolicvalueare nearlyas importantas its impactin the real world. Second, thecreationof specific women’shumanrightsstandards andinstitutions leavesthe mainstreamsystemintact.When claimsfor important changes haveto be met,addingsomething new is a muchlessdrasticinterventionthanquestioning andreshaping whatalreadyexists.Hencetheflexibility approachis, at once, less drasticand more visible than the transformation approach. In manyways,theinternational movement for theadvancement of women datesbackto beforeWorld War I1 andwas initiatedquiteapartfrom the fromtheAmericas humanrightsmovement.In the 1920s,feministactivists pressured their governments into creatingthe Inter-American Commission of Women(Commission Interamericana de Mujeres[CIM]).27The CIM draftedtheInter-American Convention ontheNationalityof Women(1933) andpromotedan EqualRightsTreaty(1928).28 With the creationof the Organization of AmericanStates(OAS)in 1948,theCIM becamean autonomousspecialized commission of the OAS. It draftedtwo morewomen’s Convention on the Grantingof conventions in 1948: theInter-American PoliticalRightsto WomenandtheInter-American Convention on Granting Civil Rightsto W0men.2~ After shiftingits effortsto problemsof education

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anddevelopment, theCIM returnedto thequestion of women’srightsin the 1980s,with its work on theInter-American Conventionon thePrevention, Punishment, and Eradicationof ViolenceagainstWomen,adoptedby the GeneralAssemblyof theOAS onJune9, 1994.30 The CIM wasalsoinfluentialin thecreationof theUnitedNationsCommissionontheStatusof Women(CSW) in 1946.31 Until theearly1970s,the CSW was mainly orientedtoward the promotionof equal rights for women;z draftingtheConventionon thePoliticalRightsof Women(1952), the Conventionon theNationalityof MarriedWomen(1957),theConvention on Consentto Marriage,MinimumAge for Marriage,andRegistration of Marriages(1962),anda numberof declarations.33 The CSW alsodrafted the Conventionon theEliminationof All Formsof Discrimination against Women(CEDAW, 1979), the mostimportantexpression of the “human rightsfor women”approach. The CEDAW hasits own supervising body, the Committeefor the Eliminationof DiscriminationagainstWomen (CmEDAW). Withinthestructure of theUnitedNations,theDivisionfor theAdvancementof Women(DAW) is the secretariat for both CSW and CmEDAW.34 Other“bureaucratic spaces”35 for women’sissueswithintheU N include UNIFEM (UnitedNationsDevelopment Fundfor Women)andINSTRPLW (International Researchand TrainingInstitutefor the Advancementof Women).Thereare alsoa numberof International LaborOrganization (ILO) conventions-in particular,conventionno. 45 concerningthe employment of womenon underground work in minesof all kinds(1935), convention no.89 concerning nightworkof womenin industry(1948,revising a 1934convention), convention no. 100 concerning equalremuneration for menandwomenworkersfor work of equalvalue(1951),convention no. 103 concerning maternityprotection(1952,revisinga 1919convention), convention no. 111 concerning discrimination in respectof employment and occupation (1958),andconvention no. 156 concerning equalopportunities andequaltreatmentfor menandwomenworkerswith familyresponsibilities(1981). Whathasthusbeendeveloped withintheinternational systemarespecific instruments andinstitutions dealingwith women’srightsthatareexpressionsof a “flexibility”approach to theissueof humanrightsfor women.Yet withinthisapproach, differentattitudes canbe distinguished towardthe issueof gender.Severalof the older instruments, for example,reflecta “sameness” approach. TextssuchastheU N Convention on thePolitical Rightsof Women(1952) and the I L O EqualRemuneration Convention (1951)arebasedon a conceptof formalequalitythatelevates womento the samelevelof rightsas men.Because theyusea malereferencepoint,however,suchtextscannot(noraretheyintendedto) do justiceto the specific

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needsand experiences of women.Theyare gender-specific in form but not in substance. Othertextsarebasedonwomen’sspecificity,yet theyinterpretit in a way thatleadsto theexclusionof somewomen.In linewith traditionalrolepatterns,these“protective”instruments36 seewomenas especiallyvulnerable andin needof protection.For example,in theUN Declarationon the Protectionof Womenand Childrenin EmergencyandArmedConflict(1974), womenareput on thesamelevelaschildren.Theyare“the mostvulnerable membersof thepopulation”(articleI), “defenceless” (article2), andin general depictedas passivevictims.In the I L O conventions on nightwork (1948) and on work in mining(1935), the patriarchalprotectionof women evenleadsto their exclusionfrom certaintypesof activities.While many womenmayagreewith suchviewsof femininityandmanyalsomaybenefit from theseprovisions,othersfeel that this approachdoesnot do justiceto themaspersonscapableof makingtheirownchoices. In the morerecenttexts,the goalis to includean arrayof women’sperspectives thatis ascompleteaspossible. In thefirstplace,theytry to address the waysin whichthe experienceof humanrightsviolations,whethersufferedby menor women,is influencedby gender.For example,denialof the right to food or adequatehousingin a societywherewomenbearthe primary responsibility in thesefieldsaffectswomendifferentlythanmen.37 Anothertypicalsituationoccurswhenwomenaresubjected to arbitraryviolence-for example,in detention,wherethis frequentlytakesthe form of sexualassault.38 A fortiori,thesetextsalsoaddress violationsin whichgender is a determining factor,suchas relatingto the sexualityof womenor their reproductive capacity. Textsonwomen’srightsthat adoptthisapproach havebeenlabeled“corrective”i n s t r ~ m e n tand s 3 ~includeconventions thataddress traffickingin women,the UN Conventionon Consentto Marriage,Minimum Age for Marriage,andRegistration of Marriages(1962), theUN Declarationon the Eliminationof ViolenceagainstWomen(1993), and the Inter-American Conventionon the samesubject(1994). The lattertextsparticularlyreflect the perspectiveof womenby extendingprotectionagainstviolencethat is committedin the privatesphereandviolencethat resultsfromculturalfactors. As largelyanantiTheCEDAW containselementsof all threeapproaches. discrimination convention, it hasa strongsameness component asmanyprovisionsgive women“equalrightswith men.” Other provisionshave a protectivecharacter, in particularwithregardto women’sreproductive function(articlesIl[l][fl and[2][d]). And thereis a strongcorrectiveelementin theprovisionsthatdealwith issuesin whichwomenarenottreatedequally: politicalandpubliclife (articles7-8), nationality(article9), education(article lo), employment (articleII), healthcare(article12), economicandsocial

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life (article13), legal status(article15), and marriageand family relations (article16).Thedocument alsodevotesan articleto thespecificproblemsof ruralwomen(article14) and anotherto traffickingin womenandprostitution (article6). In theseareas,the CEDAW imposesspecificobligationson states,whichwouldnotnecessarily be readundergender-neutral provisions. For example,in thefield of education, statesarerequiredto eliminatestereotypedconcepts of therolesof menandwomen(article1O[c]) andto reduce femalestudentdropoutrates(articlelO[fl), andin thefield of employment, specificmeasures are requiredto preventdiscrimination againstwomenon thegroundsof marriageandmaternity(article11[2]).Moreover,theconcept of equalityin the CEDAW goesbeyondformal equality.It recognizes affirmativeactionmeasures (article4), extends protectionto all aspects of life (articleI), andstresses the needto modifydiscriminatory culturalpatterns (article5 ) . I n recentyears,especiallysincethe UN world conferences of Vienna (humanrights,1993) andBeijing(women,1995),the ideaof specialinstrumentshas,nevertheless, lostthesupportof manywomen.Specialization has cometo be seenasm a r g i n a l i ~ a t ior o nghett~ization~l ~~ with theexistence of specifictreatiesleadingto a neglectof womenunderthemainstream human rightsregime.42 At thesametime,mechanisms createdunderspecifictreaties areunderfunded andlack strongenf~rcement.~’ The concerns of women,it is argued,shouldbe at the centerof humanrights,not on their periphery, and gender-specific violationsshouldbe addressed throughthe mainstream instruments, usingthemainstream supervisory mechanisms. For thefuture,theremay be goodarguments to limit the creationof new specializedinstruments. Yet it would be foolishto totally rejectthosethat exist.The CEDAW, in particular,hasmuchpotentialthat hasnot yet been fully usedand shouldnot be abandoned, especiallythe OptionalProtocol, whichwas openedfor signatureon December10, 1999,44and enteredinto forceon December22,2000. Thisprotocolhasthepotentialto dramatically strengthen the role of the CmEDAW.It providesa complaintprocedure for individualsand groupsanda processof inquiryinto graveo r systematic abuses.The absence of an individualcomplaintprocedure wasa majordeficiencyin the originalCEDAW,45and with its inclusion,the convention deserves a new chancein thecomingdecades.46

TRANSFORMATION WOMEN’S RIGHTS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS The argumentfor “mainstreaming” callsfor the full integration of women’s rightsintotheinternational regimesothattheproblemsthatwomenfaceare takenintoaccountwheneverhumanrightsareon the agenda.For example,

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monitoringgender-specific issuesshouldnot be left to the CmEDAW but shouldbetakenup alsoby othersupervising committees suchasthoseestablishedunderthe InternationalCovenanton Civil and PoliticalRights (ICCPR), the International Covenanton Economic,Social,andCultural Rights(ICESCR),theTortureConvention, andtheCRC.47 Thusfar, thesituationhasvariedwith the Committeeon Economic,SocialandCultural RightsandtheCommittee ontheRightsof theChildbeingmostresponsive, and the Cammitteeon the Eliminationof RacialDiscrimination andthe CommitteeagainstTorturetheleast.48 “Mainstreaming” alsomeansthatthe perspectives of womencan bring abouta transformation of the systemof protecti~n:~ with “a reappraisal of and a qualitativechangein the relevant institutions, laws,andprocedures.”50 CharlotteBunchhasnotedthatthe transformative approachis increasingly the choiceof womenwho are now activelyworkingon humanrights.51 Boththeflexibilitymodelandthetransformation modelpropose changes in humanrightsnormsandinstitutions, or at leastin the way normsare interpretedandappliedin response to women’sspecificgenderexperiences. Bothassertthatthe humanrightsregimedevelopedin a male-dominated environment andthatinsufficient femaleinputexplainssomegapsin thesystem that needto be remedied.The differencebetweenthemis in the scope of theremedy.The flexibilitymodelproposes to completethehumanrights systemwith specific“women’s”normsor institutions. It restsonthesuppositionthatthe gapsdiscovered throughwomen’sgenderexperience arerelevant only for women, and it tailors the cure t o that diagnosis.The transformation model,on the otherhand,attributesa moreuniversalvalue t o women’sclaims,arguingthat they reflect generaldeficienciesin the humanrightsregime,applicable asmuchto menasto women.Theremaybe differentreasonswhy men havenot raisedsuchissues:becausethey suffer lessfromthosedeficiencies or in fewernumbersor because thosewho have sufferedhavenot beenin a positionto bringaboutchange.In the transformationmodel,changes in rightsbroughtonby womenapplyequallyto both menandwomen.A goodexampleis therightto parentalleavethatgenerally emergesfrom the hardshipthat womenhavein combininga careerwith a family. Womenusuallytake the initiativein ensuringthe right of parental leave,but men experience the problemof the doubleburdenaswell, and wheretherightto parentalleaveexists,manymenarehappyto makeuseof it, eventhoughmorewomendo so. Therearetwo strongarguments for preferringa transformation approach to a flexibilityapproach in advancing thehumanrightsof women.First,the transformation approachis moreinclusiveand showsmorerespectfor difference.How seriously will theclaimsof womenbe takenif theyareapplicable t o womenalone?Real participation impliesthe powert o changethe generalparameters, thepowerto contributeto thedefinitionof whathuman

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rightsareabout,not only for womenbut alsofor all. If it is true that,thus far,humanrightsreflecta malebias,52 thentheinclusionof womenmustlead to questioning someof the concretefeaturesof humanrightsthat manifest thisbias.Charlesworth rightlystatesthat“unlesstheexperiences of women contribute directlyto themainstream international legalorder. . . ,internationalhumanrightslaw losesits claimto universalapplicability: it shouldbe moreaccurately characterized asinternational men’srightslaw.”53 Humanrights“are not static,nor are they the propertyof any one group.”54 Justas otherexcludedgroups,womenare claiminghumanrights and, “in the process,expandingthe meaningof rightsto incorporatetheir own hopesand As notedearlier,the strugglefor inclusionof the workingclasses in humanrightsresultedin theadditionof a wholecategory of economicand socialrights.Similarly,the strugglefor inclusionof nonWesternpeople(s)reenforced the right to self-determination and led to the formulation of the right to development. In a similarvein,womenwantto achievefuller inclusionin international humanrightsthroughtransformation of the normsandinstitutions of the regime.The assertionthat “women’srightsare humanrights”expresses botha demandto be included“in the projectof humanrightsand a radicalredefinitionof what that project entails.”56 Second,the integrationof a women’sperspective in international human rightsshouldnotleadto new typesol exclusion.A flexibilityapproach runs theriskof excludingmenfromnewtypesof humanrightsprotection. Today muchof the criticalthinkingaboutlaw and politicscomesfrom one or anotherspecificperspective suchas raceor gender.However,innovative solutionsproposedon the basisof suchanalysismay oftenbe aspertinent outsideaswell aswithinthatspecificcontext.Theprincipleof universality of international humanrightsrequiresthatadditionalhumanrightsprotection, fromwhereverit emerges, applyto all humanbeings. In thecontextof genderspecificity,it mustin particularbebornein mind that genderitselfis a construction. Seenasa whole,the differences between men and womenare only one sideof the picture,and the natureand the importanceof thesedifferencesare relativein time and space.For example, the idea of breachingthe publidprivate dividecorrectlyassumes that, as a rule, theprivatesphereis moreimportantto womenthanthepublicsphere. Yet at the sametime this is not a situationmostfeministswant to preserve. For many,an equalpresence of menandwomenin bothspheres is thegoal. Somemen alreadylive morefully in the privatespherethansomewomen, and it is hardlyjustifiableto limit the protectionagainstviolationsin the privatesphereto women.Yet that is preciselywhat is happening,as such protectionis providedfor onlyin genderspecifictextssuchasCEDAW and theUN Declarationon theEliminationof ViolenceagainstWomen.57 Sometransformations alsohavea wider impactthanwhat mightbe pro-

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jectedby thosewhopromotethemfroma particularist perspective. Consider divide.In international thesameexampleof thebreachof thepublidprivate humanrightslaw,theaccountability of privateactorsfor humanrightsviolationsis centralto suchwidely divergentissuesas the applicationof human rightsstandards to the behaviorof companies and the prosecution of war criminals.Thereis a broadpotentialfor coalitionmakingandfor extending thebenefitsof a breakthrough on oneissueto others. EXAMPLES OF T H E TRANSFORMATION APPROACH BREACHING T H E PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE of transformation approaches the international humanrights The process regimefrom the perspective of women,but it providesthat men should equallybenefit.This is evidentin the effortto breachthe publidprivate divide,whichis alreadyanimportantthemein feministcritiquesof domestic law and a main demandof feministsthat couldtransforminternational humanrights.Eventhoughtherightsof bothmenandwomenareviolated within family life, theprivatecharacterof the homeenvironment is usedas anexcuseby publicauthorities to escapetheirresponsibilities to preventand remedythis harm.Feminists,nevertheless, claim that the harm doneto to womenat homeor at work is political,not personal,as it contributes maintaining relationsof “power,domination, andprivilegebetweenmenand womenin society.”58 In internationallaw, the “privatesphere”can be seenas an evenwider area,extendingto all relationsamongprivatepersons,in contrastto their relationswith publicauthorities.Traditionally,international law is binding only on states,so that only actscommittedby governmentofficialscould be labeledhumanrightsviolations.Wherejudicialor quasi-judicialcontrol mechanisms accompanyhumanrightstreaties,normallycomplaintsabout of violationscanonlybe addressed againststates,asthosearethesignatories the treaty.Yet contemporary doctrineand caselaw increasingly acceptthe responsibility of statesto preventandremedyhumanrightsviolationscommittedamongprivatepersons. In thecaselaw of theEuropeanCourtof HumanRights(ECtHR),thisis part of the “positiveobligations”of statesto protecthumanrights.59 For example,in a 1998judgment,thecourtheldtheUnitedKingdomresponsible for a violationof article3 of the EuropeanConvention(prohibitionof tortureandinhumanor degrading treatmentor punishment), because a British jury had founda manwho wassuedfor physicallyabusinghis stepson not guilty.The courtstatedthat article3 “requiresStatesto takemeasures designedto ensurethatindividuals withintheirjurisdictionarenotsubjected

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to tortureor inhumanor degrading treatmentor punishment, includingsuch ill-treatmentadministered by privateindividuals.”bo Thiswasconfirmedand extendeda 2001judgment,whichaddedthat“thesemeasures shouldprovide effectiveprotection,in particular,of childrenand othervulnerablepersons andincludereasonable stepsto preventill-treatmentof whichtheauthorities had or oughtto havehad knowledge.”61 In thiscase,the Britishauthorities wereheld responsible for a violationof article3 becausethey had failedto removechildrenfrom an abusivefamily environment and henceto protect themfrom seriouslong-termneglectand abuse.O n the basisof this case law, it is clearthat in Europe,statesareobligatedto providesufficientprotectionagainstdomestic violence. The Inter-AmericanCourtof HumanRightsalsorecognizes that states havea dutyto preventor punishhumanrightsviolationscommittedby private individuals.62 The deliberations in the UN HumanRightsCommittee seemto be goingin thesamedirection.63 Hence,froma legalpointof view, for violationsof womthereareno obstacles to holdingstatesaccountable en’s rightsin the privatesphere.Nor shouldtherebe any scruplesamong humanrightsactivistsaboutcampaigning againstissuessuchasdomestic violence.For that matter,someof the mostvigoroushumanrightscampaignshaveaddressed abusessuchas slaveryand racismthat alsooccurat thehandsof private The attentionof activistsis currentlyfocusedon violationswithinthe family andon culturalrulesor practicesthatareat oddswith humanrights. Most effortshavegoneinto the campaignaboutviolenceagainstwomen65 andin particularfor the recognitionof domesticviolenceasa humanrights issue.66 In 1992,the CmEDAW issuedGeneralRecommendation No. 19, underCEDAW andholding interpreting violenceasa formof discrimination states“responsible alsofor privateactsif theyfail to act with duediligence to preventviolationsof rightsor to investigateandpunishactsof violence andfor providingc~mpensation.”~’ Moreover,violenceagainstwomenin the privatesphereis includedbothin the1993 Declarationon Violence againstWomenandin the mandateof the specialrapporteuron violence againstwomen,appointedin 1994. Thus,importantprogresshasbeenmade,althoughactionis still fixed on holdingstatesaccountable underinternational law for violationscommitted by privateactors.Yet the possibilityof holdingprivateactorsdirectly accountable shouldnot be excluded.6* Direct accountability beforeinternationaltribunalsis presentlylimitedto international crimes.Yet domestic courtsregularlyholdindividualsaccountable for humanrightsviolationson the basisof constitutional provisions or directlyapplicablehumanrights treaties.Outsidethejudicialsphere,thereareevenmorepossibilities. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),for example,may campaignagainst privateperpetrators. In onecase,AmnestyInternationaldecidedin 1997to

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initiatepilot projectsto campaignagainstprivateviolators,severalof the projectsdealingwith women’sright~.6~

.UPGRADINGECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS Feministactivistsalsoarguethatmoreimportance be givento economicand socialrights,because theyconsiderthesocialandeconomicspheresasmore centralto women’sadvancement thanthepublic,politicalforumswherecivil andpoliticalrightsareexercised.70 In spiteof therhetoricalconsensus onthe indivisibilityandinterdependence of all humanrights,71 economicandsocial positionwithin the generalhumanrights rightsstill occupya second-rank picture.Theyaregenerallyconsidered to lackdirecteffectandjusticiability. Governments, international organizations, andevenN G O s systematically neglecteconomic andsocialrightsin theirhumanrightsagendas. In itsstatementto the 1993World Conferenceon HumanRights,the Committeeon Economic,SocialandCulturalRightsemphasized that [tlhe shockingreality . . . is that Statesand the international communityas a wholecontinueto tolerateall toooftenbreachesof economic,socialand culturalrightswhich,if theyoccurredin relationto civil andpoliticalrights,would provokeexpressions of horrorand outrageandwouldlead to concertedcalls for immediateremedialaction.In effect,despitethe rhetoric,violationsof civil andpoliticalrightscontinueto be treatedasthoughtheywerefar moreserious, and morepatentlyintolerable,thanmassiveand directdenialsof economic, socialandculturalrights.7Z

While thereis considerable merit to the argumentthat economicand socialrightsare morecriticalto the advancement of womenthancivil and politicalliberties,the relationbetweensetsof rightsis no lesscomplex. When basichumanrightsto food,housing,and goodhealthareconcerned, graveviolations,in particularin developingcountries,generallyaffect womenmoreharshlythanmen.Work-relatedhumanrightsarealsooriented towardpaidlabor,neglecting theworkthatwomenperformat homeandin the fields that familiesown and cultivate.73In this regard,upgradingecostepthat needsto be complenomicand socialrightsis but a necessary mentedby a r e ~ r i e n t a t i othat n ~ ~reflectsthe overallexperienceof women. Thereis an obviousrelevancehereto the discussion of bridgingthe public/ privatedividein that economicandsocialrightsareoverlyorientedtoward activitiesin the publicsphere,neglectingthe work that goeson insidethe home.Moreover,womenliving in povertypointout the needto recognize the interconnectedness of all categoriesof rightsin practice:for themit is impossible to seetheexerciseof civil andpoliticalfreedomsoutsidethecon-

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text of the structuralcauses75 of their poverty,whichdeniesthemhuman dignityandleavesthemvulnerable to violentabuse.76 EMERGING STANDARDS Integratingthe needsandexperiences of womencanaffectgeneralhuman rightsstandards eitherthroughnew formulations or throughinnovative interpretations of existingstandards. Together,accordingto Coomarasa “fourthgeneration” of humanrights77thatis emergwamy,theyconstitute ingin suchareasasreproductive rights,sexualviolence,therightof asylum, andrightsconnecting to slaveryandslavery-like practices. Theseareexamapproach rather thana flexibilityapproach, because plesof a transformative the situations theybringwithinthe focusof humanrightsattentiondo not thusinspiredconexclusively concernwomen,andthe normativechanges cerngeneralstandards, applicable to bothmenandwomen. Reproductive Rights78 whentheypursue Reproduction is an areain whichmanystatesintervene nationalist,economic,religious,or otherintereststo controlpopulation growththroughpronatalist or antinatalist policies.Theseinvariablyfocuson regulatingthe reproductive capacities of individuals.79 Thesepoliciesaffect bothwomenand men,yet womenare mostdirectlyconcerned. Over the years,women’smovements haveincreasingly focusedon reproduction as a humanright,anissuethatwasfirstbroughtto theinternational sceneat the on HumanRightsin Teheranin 1968.In its Final International Conference Act, the conference recognized that “parentshavea basichumanright to determinefreely and responsibly the numberand spacingof their children.”80 Thislanguage wassignificantly expanded in theWorldPopulation Planof havethe Actionadoptedin Bucharest in 1974:“All couplesandindividuals basicrightto decidefreelyandresponsibly thenumberandspacing of their childrenandto havethe information,educationandmeansto do so;the responsibility of couplesandindividuals in the exerciseof this righttakes intoaccount theneedsof theirlivingandfuturechildren,andtheirresponsibilitiestowardsthe community.’’s1 In 1979,underarticle16(l)(e), CEDAW recognized the sameright in a legallybindingfashion:“StatesParties. . . shallensure,on a basisof equalityof menandwomen.. . thesamerightsto decidefreelyandresponsibly on the numberandspacingof their children andto haveaccess to the information,education andmeansto enablethem to exercise theserights.”OtherCEDAW articlesarealsorelevantto reproductiverights.**

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A majorbreakthrough camewith the 1994CairoPopulation Conference, wherethe international women’shealthmovement,greatlyexpandedsince the 1970sand 1980s,becamea majorplayer.83 The Cairo Programmeof Action containsa chapteron reproductive rightsand reproductive health. Reproductive healthis a comprehensive concepts4 that includesthe “full spectrumof healthneedsassociated with women’sreproductive andsexual activities”85andthatembraces reproductive rights.On thatsubject,paragraph7.3 providesthat in reproductive rightsembracecertainhumanrightsthatarealreadyrecognized nationallaws,international humanrightsdocuments andotherconsensus documents.Theserightsrestontherecognition of thebasicrightof all couples and to decidefreelyandresponsibly thenumber,spacingandtimingof individuals theirchildrenandto havetheinformationandmeansto do so,andtherightto attainthe higheststandard of sexualandreproductive health.It alsoincludes theirrightto makedecisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion andviolence,asexpressed in humanrightsdocuments.

of Action, adoptedat the The 1995 BeijingDeclarationand Programme FourthUnitedNationsWorld Conference onWomen,reconfirms theCairo definitions of reproductive healthandreproductive rights,86addinga specific emphasis on the rightsof women:“The humanrightsof womeninclude theirrightto havecontroloveranddecidefreelyandresponsibly on matters relatedto their sexuality,includingsexualand reproductive health,free of coercion, discrimination andviolence”(para.96); also,“theneglectof women’sreproductive rightsseverelylimitstheiropportunities in publicandprivate life, includingopportunities for educationand economicand political empowerment. The abilityof womento controltheirownfertilityformsan importantbasisfor theenjoymentof otherrights”(para.97). The CEDAW provisions aside,reproductive humanrightshavenot yet beenincludedin otherlegallybindingdocuments. Nonetheless, the Cairo andBeijingDeclarations, bothbasedon a broadworldwideconsensus, provide strongauthorityto guidethe interpretation of existinghumanrights, includingthe right to healthand the right to privacy(whichencompasses sexualandreproductive freedom).g’Furtherdevelopments in thisareacould leadto therecognition of “sexualrights”thatarebroaderthanreproductive rightsbut failedto gaingeneralacceptance at the CairoandBeijingconferences.88 The enjoymentof reproductive rightsis, moreover,continuously influencedby medicaladvances,so muchso that radicalfeministsalready accuse reproductive technology of subjecting womento patriarchal contr01.8’ Strengthening reproductive rightsis a way of guaranteeing thatwhatever developments mayoccur,thedignity,equality,andfreedomof individualsbothmenandwomen-remain central.

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SexualViolence Oneof themostbasicprotections offeredby humanrightsis thatagainst state-inflictedviolence.Wheneverviolenceis inflictedon individuals-for example,by soldiersduringa war or by policeduringdetention-sexualviolenceis frequently included,in particular(butnot only)againstwomen.Yet international law hasbeenslowin recognizing theseriousness of thistypeof violence.Rapeby stateofficialshasonlyrecentlybeenrecognized astorture, amongothersby the Inter-AmericanCommission on HumanRights,9o the UnitedNationsspecialrapporteur on t ~ r t u r eand , ~ ’ the EuropeanCourton HumanRights.92 The generaloutragebroughton by the horrendous spreadof rapeduring thewar in theformerYugoslaviaservedasa catalystfor the development of international law in this area.The ViennaDeclarationhad condemned “the systematic rapeof womenin war situations” amongothermassive violations of humanrights(para.28) andnow the statuteof theInternational Tribunal for theformerYugoslavia93 includesrapeasa crimeagainsthumanity9’(article5[g]). A generalrequirement for crimesagainsthumanity,however,is that theymustbepartof a widespread or systematic attackagainsta civilianpopulation.A similarprovisionis includedin the statuteof the International Tribunalfor Rwanda95 (article3[g]). In theRomeStatuteof theInternational CriminalCourt,thisis expanded;96 not only is rapeindictableas a crime againsthumanity,but so are “sexualslavery,enforcedprostitution, forced pregnancy,enforcedsterilization,or any otherform of sexualviolenceof comparable gravity,”if it hasthe samesystematic or widespread character (article7[1][g]). At thesametime,suchactsarealsoindictableaswar crimes” whenevertheyconstitute a gravebreachof the GenevaConventions (article 8[2][b][xxii] and [e][vi]). The indictmentsandjudgmentsof the Yugoslavia andRwandaTribunalshavegivenparticularattentionto sexualviolence.’* Thesenewprovisions signala stepforwardfromtheGenevaConventions, whichhavebeencriticizedfor interpretingsexualviolenceas an attackon women’shonorand on the sanctityof motherhood, thussubordinating the violationof women’sbodiesto the humiliationof the group.In this, they had assumeda kind of “protective”attitudeand failed to treat womenas autonomous This is an areaof the law onwhichthereis continuingreflectionthatmayleadto otherinnovativestandards or interpretations, suchasestablishing massiveforcedimpregnation asgenocide.’oo In the broadareaof humanrights,outsideof violencein time of war, moreover,the mainquestionrevolvesaroundsexualviolencein privaterelations.The publidprivate divideremainsthe main obstacle in designating sexualviolenceas a violationof humanrights.If that can be surmounted, thereis no reasonwhy serious casesof domestic violenceshouldnotbe qualified as torture.It hasconvincinglybeendemonstrated thatin many cases,

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all the constitutive elementsof torturearefoundandthatfrom the victim’s perspective, the experience is horriblysimilar.1Ol

Right to Asylum Therightto asylumfrompersecution is a humanright(article14 UDHR). Theinternational law in thisregardis foundin the1951ConventionRelating to the Statusof Refugeesas modifiedby the 1967 ProtocolRelatingto the Statusof Refugees.The conventiondefinesa refugeeas a personwho, “owing to well-foundedfear of beingpersecuted for reasonsof race,religion,nationality,membership of a particularsocialgroupor politicalopinion, is outsidethecountryof hisnationalityandis unableor, owingto such fear,is unwillingto availhimselfof theprotectionof thatcountry.” Undertheseprovisions, persecution on thebasisof genderis notgrounds for asylum,anomissionthathaslongbeena seriousissuefor women’srights activists.102 Gender-based persecution, they insist,is systematicand widespreadandno lessseriousthanpersecution basedon raceor othercriteria. Again, the publidprivatedivideseemsto be the main obstacle,as genderbasedpersecution is sufferedmainlyat thehandsof privatepersons.Gradually it hasnonetheless cometo be recognized that gender-based persecution may be recognized by includinggroupsof womenunderthe categoryof “ membership of a particularsocialgroup,”’O3and severalcountrieshave takenimportantstepsin thisdirection.I0’Yet in thepresentstateof internationallaw, therightto asylumof womenfleeingfromsuchordealsasforced marriage,massiverape,and genitalmutilationdependson the goodwilland changingpoliciesof a smallnumberof states.Changesalongtheselinesare slowanduncertain.In thelongrun,theonlysolutionofferingadequate protectionto thesewomenis the inclusionof genderas a categoryof persecution in theinternational texts.

Slavery Evenbeforetheoriginof international humanrightslaw sensustricto,the international law againstslaveryincludedseparate rulesagainstthetrafficin womenfor p r o ~ t i t u t i o nHence, . ’ ~ ~ earlyon,thetermslaverywasinterpreted in sucha way asto encompass situationsin whichmainlywomenwereand are the victims.Moreover,as slaveryas an institutionwas increasingly reduced,international normsevolvedwith provisions againstslavery-like practices.In 1957, for example,the Economicand SocialCounciladopted theSupplementary ConventionontheAbolitionof Slavery,theSlaveTrade, andInstitutionsandPracticesSimilarto Slavery,whichincludedinstitutions andpracticesespeciallyaffectingwomen(e.g.,the saleof a womanin mar-

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riage, the transferof a wife by her husband,and the transferof a wife throughinheritance).l06 Sincethe 1970s, a WorkingGrouponContemporary Formsof Slaveryhas beenactivein the UnitedNations,andits mandatehasbeenexpandedinto manyareasthatconcernwomen;theseincludethesaleof children,thesexual mutilationof femalechildren,the exploitationof prostitution of others,sex trafficking,sextourism,the exploitationof migrantworkers,the sexual exploitationof womenduringwartime,violenceagainstwomen,and early marriages.107 The definitionof suchpracticesunderthe rubricof “slavery” hasan importantsymbolicandpoliticaleffectsince,togetherwith torture, slaveryis oneof thecentralviolationsof humanrights. I n theyearst o come,the questionremainswhetherinternational legal standards will be more deliberatelydevelopedin termsof theseexpansive gender-sensitive definitionsof slaveryandslavery-likepractices.Women’s rightsactivistscontinuet o lobbyfor suchdevelopments. For example,as currentinternational antitraffickinglaw108 is “premisedo n a definitionin whichtraffickingis linkedt o forcedp r o s t i t ~ t i o n ,it” is ’ ~ill ~ equippedt o addresssuchcurrentexamplesas the “coercedrecruitmentand transportation of women. . . for a varietyof otherforcedlabourandslavery-likepractices, suchas forceddomesticlabour,factorylabour,and commercial marriages.””O For thatmatter,thereis reasonto abandonthe strictconnection betweentraffickingandslavery-likepractices,asnot all womenwho undergotraffickingare subjectedto slavery-likepractices,nor have all womenwho are subjected to thesepracticesbeentrafficked.”’The Global AllianceagainstTraffickingin Women, a coalitionof N G O s , has made importantproposals for new standards in thisregard.”2

Proposalsfor Additional Standards Thereare otherfeministproposalsfor new humanrightsstandards, but thesearefartherfromgaininggeneralacceptance. Oneproposalis thatinternationalhumanitarian law no longerfocuson directviolencebutratheralso takeintoaccountthe long-termeffectsof armedconflicts,whichoftendisproportionately affectwomen.Il3Charlesworth, for example,arguesthat “conflictexacerbates the globallyunequalpositionof womenand men in manyways.We know,”shecontinues, that“distinctiveburdens[are]placed on womenthroughfood and medicalshortages causedby conflict.When food is scarce,more womenthan men sufferfrom malnutrition,often becauseof culturalnormsthat requiremen and boysto eat beforewomen andgirls.Humanitarian relief for thevictimsof conflictregularlyfails t o reachwomen,as men are typicallygivenresponsibility for its distribution. Economicsanctions imposedbefore,during,or afterarmedconflicthavehad particularimpacton womenandgirls,who aredisproportionately repre-

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sentedamongthe poor.Althoughthe effectof thesepracticesfalls heavily onwomen,theyarenotunderstood by international law to be humanrights abusesthatwouldengageeitherstateor individualresponsibility.”114 Still anotherproposition is to expandthedefinitionof genocide to inc!ude the generallyculturallydetermined practiceof femaleinfanticidewhether committedthroughdirectkillingsor throughneglectof femalechildren . ” com~ (with their consequent deathfrequentlydueto m a l n ~ t r i t i o n )A pletelydifferentproposalis that of restrictingthe scopeof the freedomof expression, so that it no longerprotectspornography.116 In this contextit shouldbe noted,however,thatpresentinternational standards alreadyallow for therestriction andevenprohibitionof pornography by national-or, for that matter,international-authorities.It seemsthat thosewho desire strictermeasuresin this area shouldaim their arrowsnot at international humanrightsstandards butratherat politicaldecisionmakers. O T H E R FEMINIST TRANSFORMATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS The women’shumanrightsmovementis extremelydiverse,encompassing groupsandindividualscampaigning for a wide rangeof differentissues.One suchissueis the languageof humanrights.Many womenhavetroublewith humanrights theconsistent useof malepronouns in almostall international texts.The Conventionon the Rightsof the Child is an exception; wherever possible,it usesthe gender-neutral “the child,” and wherethe useof the possessive pronounis necessary, it uses“hisor her.”Theimportance of languagein genderequalityhasbeenanalyzedin manydifferentcontexts,and the argumenthasbeenmadethat it operatesat botha directand a subtle levelto excludewomenby constructing andreinforcingtheirsubordination.Il7Thelanguagein theConventionontheRightsof theChildis a model for futureinternational texts. Evenmoreimportantis therepresentation of womenin international bodiesdealingwith humanrightsissues.Equalrepresentation is notonlya matter of democratic participation but alsoa necessary requirement if theneeds andexperiences of womenareto be incorporated intotheactivitiesof internationalorganizations. Despitestronginsistence fromactivists,*I8 therepresentationof womenin mainstream humanrightsbodiesis stillunacceptably low. Onebig stepfurtherin the representation ideais Knopp’sratherutopian proposalfor directrepresentation of womenas a groupon theinternational forums,womenaresupposed to be represented scene.In manyinternational by their state.Yet when the stateis seenas a patriarchalconstruction, it is desirableto circumventit. Knopp’sproposalbuildsontheexperience of the

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representation of unionsand employers in the ILO andthe increasing tendencyfor indigenous peoplesto represent theirinterestsdirectlyin internationalagencies. In the sameway, womenmightbe directlyrepresented and thusableto presenttheirclaimsfromtheirownex~erience.”~ Anothercrucialmatterinvolvesintegrating a woman’sperspective intothe methodologies usedfor investigating and enforcinghumanrightsnorms.12o Gallagherfindsthat “whenhumanrightsabusesagainstwomenareidentified, thewidercontextof theviolationis almostinvariablyignored.Thereis a subsequent failureto exploreand acknowledge the root causesof violationsagainstwomenandto developeffectiveresponses.”’21 Thisis an example, moreover,of how a remedyt o enhancethe rightsof womenmay improveprotectionmore generally.Methodologies developedwithin feminist studiesmay havebroaderapplicability.Feministanalysishas been describedas “contextual,experiential,and inductive.Whereasmuchsocial theoryis hierarchical,abstract,and deductive,the feministstartingpointis from actualhumanexperienceand the implicationsof that experience.”lZ2 More generally,takingthe experienceof victimsinto accountmay lead to moreeffectivemethodsfor responding to all humanrightsviolations. Somefeministsalsocriticizetheindividualistcharacterof international humanrights.They argue,on the one hand,that womenhavea relational world-view, which is not adequatelyexpressedin terms of individual rights123and,on the other,thatviolationsof a woman’shumanrightsare,in many cases,structuralproblemswhich are alsonot accountedfor.I2‘ This criticism,however,doesnot haveto lead to an advocacyfor grouprights, especially sincegrouprightsunderinternational law arelargelyconceived in termsof ethnicgroupsthat often subordinate women.Iz5The rights of womenas a grouphavereceivedsomeattentionin domesticlaw in connection with issueslike affirmativeaction,buttheyhaverarelybeenrecognized underinternational law. In the yearsto come,the collectivedimensionof women’srightsmay cometo theforefront,for example,asa frameworkfor addressing the root causesof genderdiscrimination. However,from an inclusiveperspective, thiswouldbe a stepin thewrongdirection,asthesame structural problems usuallyalsoaffectmen,andremediescreatedin response t o women’sgroupclaimsrisk excludingthem.126The final exampleis the claimfor the inclusionof women’shumanrights,or at leasttheprohibition of genderdiscrimination, in the categoryof jus c~gens.’~’ This fits perfectly in the mainstreaming concept:women’shumanrightsareto movefromthe peripheryto thecoreof international humanrights,andthe coreof thecore consists of thosehumanrightswithjus cogensvalue.In substance, thisclaim is not absurd,either,asthereis a clearparallelwith theprohibitionof racial discrimination, whichis a jus cogensrule.The symbolicvalueof this transformationcannotbe overestimated. Eliminatinggenderbiasfrom the inner coreof international humanrightswould be a majorvictoryfor women’s

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humanrights.However,asjus cogensper definitionchanges slowly,thisis notto be expected in theshortterm.

MULTIPLE SPECIFICITIES If humanrightsareto beall-inclusive, they should takeintoaccount therelevantdifferences betweenmenandwomen.Yet cautionis neededto avoid effortsdesigned to fully includewomenresultingin the exclusion of some of them. Whenthe “women’smovement” reactsagainstthe invisibilityof women in the conception of “humans”in dominanthumanrightsdiscourse, it puts of the forwardanimageof “woman”thatinevitablyreflectstheexperiences dominantgroupin that movement.Within the organizedwomen’smovementactingon the international scene,the mostpowerfullobbyingand agendasettingis generallydoneby whiteWesternwomen.Minoritywomen and non-Western womenhavestronglycriticizedtheirinvisibilityin the dominantfeministdiscourse.128 Mohantyhasshownhow Westernfeminist textsfail to captureaninsiderviewof non-Western women’slivesandcreate a “thirdworldwoman”asa singularmonolithicsubject.129 Evenin face-tofaceencounters, Westernfeminists oftenfail to listento theirsisters fromthe South.Azizahal-Hibri relatesthatduringtheUN worldconferences in the nineties,womenfrom developingcountrieswerefrustratedto find that womenfromtheWestattempted to speakfor all women: In Copenhagen, Third World womenweretold thattheirhighestpriorities relatedto theveil andclitoridectomy (femalegenitalmutilation).In Cairo,they weretold thattheirhighestprioritiesrelatedto contraception andabortion.In announced bothcases,Third Worldwomenbeggedto differ.They repeatedly thattheirhighestprioritieswerepeaceanddevelopment. They notedthatthey couldnotverywell worryaboutothermatterswhentheirchildrenweredying from thirst,hungeror war. . . . They will not seekto achievetheir liberation by denigrating theirreligionor cultureor by forcingupontheircommunity’s inappropriate prioritiesanddemands. Theywill do it theirownway.”O

For manynon-Western women,Westernfeminismfocusestoo narrowly on genderdiscrimination. As onewriteremphasized: Thepointis thatfactorsotherthangenderfigureintegrallyin theoppression of Third Worldwomenandthat,evenregardingpatriarchy,manyThird World womenlabourunderindigenous inequitablegenderrelationships exacerbated . . . Third Worldwomencan by Westernpatriarchy,racism,andexploitation. embrace theconceptof genderidentity,butmustrejectanideologybasedsolely against on gender.. . . We mustcreatea feministmovementwhichstruggles

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thosethingswhichcanclearlybe shownto oppress women,whetherbasedon race,sex,or classor resultingfromimperiali~m.~31

A certaindegreeof generalization is inherentin anygroup-based emancipationmovement,andall generalizations arein someway exclusionist. Yet if generalization becomesessentialism, if internaldiversitywithinthegroupis ignored,the exclusionbecomesparticularlyserious.In the women’smovement,thisrisk canbe avoidedif, in additionto the centralthemeof gender, otherfactorsaretakenintoaccount.The contextualization of humanrights in thepursuitof inclusiveuniversality should,in principle,extendto all specificitiesthathavebeenthebasisfor exclusion fromthedominantmodel.For example,the claim of non-Westernpeopleto seethe particularityof their economicsituationand of their cultureintegratedin humanrightsis as strongas women’sclaim with regardto their genderspecificity.NonWesternwomenfind themselves at the crossroads of bothsetsof claims. on international humanrightsrecognizes Contemporary feministdiscourse the diversityof womenaroundthe world and embracesin principlethe claimsof womenfrom the Southfor a strongerfocuson developmentrelatedrights.’)*Still,in the overallpictureof women’shumanrightsclaims, theseclaimsremainunderexposed. With regardto non-Western culturesand humanrights,globalfeminismcontinuesto fight traditionalpracticesand rulessubordinating women,yet animportantshiftis noticeable. Where“foreign”culturesandpractices usedto beregardedfromanoutsiderperspective andwereeasilybrandedaspatriarchal, todaytheinsidervoicesof thewomen concerned areincreasingly heeded.’3) In principle,theabove-discussed humanrightsclaimsof womenandnonWesternpeopleare claimsof groups,basedon the communalfeaturesof theirmembersthatdistinguish themfromthedominantgroup.Yet, sincethe specificities of differentgroupsarecombinedin individuals,theonlyway to avoidexclusionis to replacethe groupperspective with the perspectiveof theindividualsconcerned. Contraryto theabstractindividualsonwhichthe enlightenment conception of humanrightsrelies,theseshouldbe contextualizedindividuals,with their relevantspecificities. Hence,a consequence of inclusiveuniversalityin termsof methodis that the perspective shouldbe that of the (actualor potential)victimof humanrightsviolations.This does not u priori excludea conceptionof women’srights(or culturalrightsfor that matter)as grouprights,but they mustbe conceivedin functionof the individual.As a result,onconcreteissuesinvolvinga conflictbetweendifferent specificities, theperspective of the individual(s) concerned is crucial. Someof the mostproblematicof theseissuesinvolveconflictsbetweenthe rightsof women(asconstructed by thedominantdiscourse) andculturalor religiousrulesor practices. In the confrontation betweenhumanrightsand culture,humanrights

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activistseasilyassumethatculturehasto change.After all, humanrightshave a revolutionarynature:they are supposed to alterthe outlookof a society. Feminism,beingan assertive movement,rarelywantsto compromise in that respect.Yet, at thesametime,religionis protectedasa humanrightin itself, andcultureis increasingly comingto be seenin thesameway. For thatmatter, womenin traditionalsocietiesmay give highvalue to their culture, includingthe practicesthat violatetheir rights.In any suchcase,it is the decisionof the womanwho is directlyinvolved,the womanwho is the “insider,”thatcounts. It is importantto realizethatWesternfeministinterpretations of a cultural practicemaybe totallydisconnected fromtheexperience of womenwhoare “onthein~ide.”l3~ Moreover,evenif theyexperience a practiceasdiscriminatoryor repressive, adultwomenarecapableof balancinganypaintheymight sufferagainstthepositivebenefittheyderivefromparticipating in theirown culture.The rightto maketheirownchoicehasto be protectedby internationalhumanrights.135This meansthatthe humanrightsmovementhasto comeout stronglyin supportof women’sparticipation in the internalculturaldebateaboutsuchrulesandpractices.If suchdebateresultsin changes that eliminatethe oppressiveness of therule or practice,a perfectsolutionis 3 ~certain reached.136 It alsomeansthatindividualwomen’srightto opt0 ~ t * of practicesor cultureshas to be supported. The fact is that while forcing womento wearIslamicdressor to enduregenitalmutilationmaybe consideredhumanrightsviolations,theirrightto chooseto participatein such practices hasto be respected. Froman “insider”perspective, lawsoutlawing suchpracticescanno morebe supported thanlawsimposingthem. Goingfurther,thereis theissueof strategies andpriorities.Femalegenital mutilation(FGM) is an exampleof an issueon whichfeministshaveblunderedimmenselyin thepast.Withoutattempting to understand theperspective of the “insider,” they have calledit “torture”and “barbaric”and alienatedandangeredAfricanwomenwho may be opposedto the practice yet demandrespectfor their Africanwomenwho havejoinedthe fight againstpracticessuchasFGM shoulddecidehowto proceedandhow to setpriorities.For a Somaliwomanwhowouldlike FGM to disappear, for example,the more urgentissuesmay be food, housing,medicalcare,and education.It is alsoa matterof strategy.Respectfor otherculturesis not incompatible with campaigning againstcertainculturalpractices.Yet this campaigning hasto give cultureits dueand be directedfrom inside,at the grassroots level.Moreover,thereasonsfor opposing thepracticemustbe closeto the experiences of the womenwho are mostconcerned. In most casesit is advisableto leavefeministtheoriesof patriarchyat home.Sometimesit may evenbe advisableto leavehumanrightsdiscourse at home. Again,theimportance of the “insider”perspective is not onlya matterof democratic participation but alsoa matterof pragmatism. Feministanalysis

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haslongbeendeveloping methodologies to dealwith thediversityof voices in women’srightsdiscourse in both domesticand international andwith the complexityof real-lifesituations. In particular,feministscholarshaveaddressed not onlytheconflictingloyaltiesof womenin traditional societiesto genderequality,on the onehand,andculturalpractices,on the but alsothe multiplicityof oppressions sufferedby poorwomen, minoritywomen,and homosexual w0men.1~~ More than mostapproaches, feminismshouldbe ableto overcomethedilemmabetweenuniversalityand diversity.142Amongthe manybenefitsof feministanalysisto be integrated in mainstream humanrights,thiscapacityis crucial.

THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS Whatdevelopments canbe expectedoverthenextfifty years?Formalequality of womenandmenbeforethelaw (the“sameness” approach) is nolonger contested yet still hasto be realizedovermuchof theworld. It shouldbe a realisticgoalto eradicateall formalgenderdiscrimination overthe foreseeablefuture.At thesametime,education andincreasing activismshouldsubstantiallyenhancean awareness amongwomenabouttheirrightsand an understanding on thepart of menhow the conditionsunderwhichwomen live regularlysubjectthemto grossviolations. It is unlikelythatmanynew “women’shumanrights”instruments will be created.Yet thosealreadysetup havesomeunexplored potential.In particular, CEDAW shouldprovemoreeffectivewhentheOptionalProtocolenters intoforce.The individualcomplaintmechanism not onlywill benefitmany individualwomenbut will alsolead to the development of a caselaw that will elaborateandstrengthen international women’srightsnormsandthatis likely to inspiredomesticjudges. We canalsoanticipatethatwomenwill increasingly - _favor“transforming” humanrightsto respondto theirspecialexperience whileremaininguniversallyapplicable.This is to be preferredoverthe “specialrights”approach, because it showsmorerespectfor women’sdiversityandbecause it doesnot excludemenfrominnovations in thefield of humanrightsprotection. thathavebeentakingshapewill likelybe strengthRecenttransformations a legalobstaened.Thepublidprivate divideshouldnolongerbeconsidered cle, yet the extensionof humanrightsprotectionin the privatespherestill needsto gain generalrecognitionand acceptance. The standard-setting developments in theareaof domestic violencearepromising,yet it is unfortunatethattheyarerestrictedto women. Moreover,it is likely that privateperpetrators will increasingly be held responsible for humanrightsviolationsin international (criminal)tribunals, in domestic courtsandin extrajudicialhumanrightscampaigns. With regard

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to upgrading andreorienting economic andsocialrights,thewomen’smovementhasbeelllesssuccessful. In anyevent,thenextfewdecades will be decisivefor the questionwhethera humanrightsapproachcansolveeconomic and socialproblems.In the light of the expectedstrengthening of theposition of non-Westernactivistswithin the women’smovement,it is possible that feministswill build a coalitionwith others,includingthe third and fourthworld movements and organizedlabor,in supportof economicand socialrights. The new standards thathavebeendevelopingin the areasof reproductive rights,sexualviolence,asylum,andslavery-likepracticesarelikely to be moresolidlyestablished in thenearfuture.It is hopedthattheirbenefitswill be extendedto menaswell aswomen.Furthermore, improvements arealso likely in the useof gender-sensitive language,the representation of women in humanrightsbodies,andtheintegration of a genderperspective in human rightsmethodologies. Theseimprovements will in turnhaveanindirectpositive effecto n many otherissues.Non-Westernwomenfrom developing countries will certainlybe moreeffectivein internationalactivities,arguing that issuesof peaceandeconomicdevelopment arecriticalto advancements in humanrightsand that thosedirectlyaffected,the “insiders,”havet o resolveconflictsthat arisebetweenhumanrightsand culturalpractices,on theirowntermsratherthanon anyabstractnotionof rightandwrong.The future,asalways,is difficult,if notimpossible, to predict.Nonetheless, there is considerable hopethattheforcesof changealreadyunleashed will greatly improvethelivesof millionsof womenall overtheworld.

NOTES 1. RadhikaCoomaraswamy, Reinventing International Law:Women’s Rightsas HumanRightsin theInternational Community (Cambridge,Mass.:HumanRights

Program,HarvardLaw School,1997),9. 2. Coomaraswamy, Reinventing International Law, 14-16. 3 . ManishaDesai,“FromViennato Beijing:Women’sHumanRightsActivism andthe HumanRightsCommunity,”in DebatingHumanRights:CriticalEssays fromthe UnitedStatesandAsia,ed. PeterVan Ness(New York: Routledge,1999), 187. 4. For example,article2(1) UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights:“Everyone is entitledto all therightsandfreedomssetforthin thisdeclaration, withoutdiscriminationof any kind, suchas race,colour,sex,language,religion,politicalo r other opinion,nationalor socialorigin,property,birthor otherstatus.” 5. Equaltreatmentdoesnotalwaysmean“thesametreatment.”Therearemany differentconceptions of equalityandnondiscrimination, includingthosethatrecognizethatequaltreatmentrequiresdifferenttreatmentwhentherearerelevantdifferences.A formulationsuchas thatof article2(1) U D H R canbe readin that senseas

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well. In thecontextof thepresentanalysis, suchconceptions fall underthe“specificity” rubric.Under“sameness,” a conception of equalityis discussed whichfocuses on the commonhumanityof menandwomen,in the light of whichthe differences betweenthemareconsidered irrelevant. 6. In Belgium,womengot the right to votethat sameyear,in 1948.That was onlya fewyearslaterthanthewomenof France(1944)andItaly (1945).SeeKatarina TomaSevski, Women andHumanRights(London:Zed, 1993),9. 7. AsmaMohamedAbdel Halim, “Challengesto the Applicationof InternaNational tionalWomen’sHumanRightsin theSudan,”in HumanRightsof Women: ed. RebeccaJ. Cook (Philadelphia: Universityof and InternationalPerspectives, Pennsylvania Press,1994),401-3. 8. Human Rights Watch, World Report2000 (New York: Author, 2000); www.hrw.org/wr2k. 9. Thebanwasbasedontradition.In November1990,womendemonstrated for therightto drive,drivingin convoyin thecapitalRiyadh.As a result,theMinistryof the Interiorformallybannedfemaledrivers.AmnestyInternational, HumanRights Are Women’s Rights(London:Author,1994). 10. HumanRightsWatch,WorldReport2000. 11. HumanRightsWatch,WorldReport2000. 12. HumanRightsWatch,WorldReport2000. 13. HumanRightsWatch,WorldReport2000. 14. Feministactivismis frequentlyeffectivein thisfield.For examplein Uganda, women’srightsactivistspushedtheir governmentto accepta new law granting womenequalpropertyrights.HumanRightsWatch,WorldReport1999. 15. KarenEngle,“International HumanRightsandFeminism: WhenDiscourses Meet,”MichiganJournalof International Law 13 (Spring1992)531-64. 16. KathleenMahoney,“TheoreticalPerspectives on Women’sHumanRights andStrategies for TheirImplementation,” BrooklynJournalof International Law 21 (1996):802-8. 17. Theproblemof insufficient rightsawareness alsoexistsamongmen.Yet given women’ssubordinate positionin mostsocieties, raisingwomen’srightsawareness requiresspecialattention. 18. SeeCarolGilligan,In a DiffeeuentVoice:Psychological Theoryand Women’s Development (Cambridge, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1982). 19. Mahoney,“Theoretical Perspectives onWomen’sHumanRights,”808-14. 20. Theconceptof inclusive universality wasdeveloped to dealwithnon-Western particularist claimsabouthumanrights.SeeEvaBrems,“HumanRights:Universality andDiversity,”Ph.D. diss.,K.U. Leuven,1999,to be publishedby KluwerLaw International. 21. SeeCeciliaMedina,“Towarda More EffectiveGuaranteeof the Enjoyment of HumanRightsby Womenin the Inter-AmericanSystem,”in HumanRightsof Women.Nationaland International Perspectives, ed. Rebecca J. Cook(Philadelphia: Universityof Pennsylvania Press,1994),258. 22. SeeAndrewM. Deutz,“GenderandInternational HumanRights,”Fletcher Forumof WorldAffairs(1993):34. 23. TracyE. Higgins,“RegardingRights:An EssayHonoringtheFiftiethAnni-

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versaryof the UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights,”ColumbiaHumanRights LawReview30 (1999):239. 24. Higgins,“Regarding Rights,”239. 25. Higgins,“RegardingRights,”239. 26. Higgins,“RegardingRights,”241. 27. Mary K. Meyer, “NegotiatingInternational Norms:The Inter-American Commission of WomenandtheConventiononViolenceagainstWomen,”in Gender Politicsin GlobalGovernance, ed.Mary K. MeyerandElisabethPriigl(Lanham,Md.: Rowman& Littlefield,1999),62-65. 28. Thistreatyconsisted of just onearticle:“The contracting partiesagreethat withtheratificationof thisTreatymenandwomenhaveequalrightsin theterritories subjectto theirrespective jurisdictions.” 29. Meyer,“Negotiating,”64. 30. Meyer,“Negotiating,”65. 31. Meyer,“Negotiating,”64. Firstcreatedasa subcommission, it wasraisedto the statusof a commission of the EconomicandSocialCouncilin 1947. Elisabeth in GenderPoliPriiglandMary K. Meyer,“GenderPoliticsin GlobalGovernance,” ticsin GlobalGovernance, ed. Mary K. Meyer and ElisabethPriigl (Lanham,Md.: Rowman& Littlefield,1999),7. 32. In a secondphase,the CSW focusedon development. The CSW hasbeen confronted with seriousproblems,includingunderfunding andlackof institutional weight.Towardthe end of the 1980s,it convertedto the ideaof “mainstreaming” women’sissues. SeeLauraReanda,“The Commission on the Statusof Women,”in The UnitedNationsand HumanRights:A CriticalAppraisal,ed. Philip Alston (Oxford:Clarendon, 1992),265-303. 33. Declarationon the Eliminationof Discrimination againstWomen(1967), Declarationon the Protectionof Womenand Childrenin Emergencyand Armed of Womenin Promoting InterConflict(1974), andDeclarationontheParticipation (1982,draftedby theThirdCommittee of theGennationalPeaceandCo-operation eralAssembly,afteran initialproposalwasconsidered by theCSW). 34. Hillka PietilaandJeanneVickers,Making WomenMatter: TheRole of the UnitedNations(London:Zed, 1994), 101. 35. PruglandMeyer,“GenderPolitics,”8. 36. NathalieKaufmanHevener,InternationalLaw and the Statusof Women (Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1983),4. of Women’sHuman 37. AndrewByrnes,“TowardMore EffectiveEnforcement Rightsthroughthe Use of International HumanRightsLaw andProcedures,” in HumanRightsof Women, ed.Cook,194. 38. Byrnes,“TowardMore EffectiveEnforcement;CharlotteBunch,“TransformingHumanRightsfrom a FeministPerspective,” in Women’s Rights,Human Rights,International FeministPerspectives, ed.JuliePetersandAndreaWolper(New York:Routledge,1995), 12. I am by no meanstryingto denytheproblemof sexual assaulton men.Thefactthatmanyviolationsonthewomen’srightsagendaarealso undergone by menis preciselythereasonwhymy ownpreference is thatof a “transformation”approach; seeinfra. 39. Hevener,International Law andtheStatusof Women, 4.

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40. Anne Gallagher,“Endingthe Marginalization: Strategies for Incorporating WomenintotheUnitedNationsHumanRightsSystem,”HumanRightsQuarterly 19 (1997): 285. 41. UrsulaA. O’Hare,“RealizingHumanRightsfor Women,”HumanRights21 Quarterly(1999): 368. 42. Hilary Charlesworth,“Transformingthe United Men’s Club: Feminist Law & Contemporary Problems4 Futuresfor the UnitedNations,”Transnational (1994): 446. 43. SeeReanda,“TheCommission ontheStatusof Women,”270; AnneE Bayefsky, “GeneralApproaches to the DomesticApplicationof Women’sInternational ed.Cook,352-53. HumanRightsLaw,”in HumanRightsof Women, TheRightof Individual 44. SeeUrsulaA. O’Hare, “Endingthe‘Ghettoisation’: Petitionto the Women’sConvention,”WebJournalof CuwentLegalIssues(1997); webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/l997/issue5/o’hare5.html. 45. For example,JulieA. Minor, “An Analysisof StructuralWeaknesses in the Conventionon the Eliminationof All Formsof Discrimination againstWomen,” GeorgiaJournalof International and Comparative Law 24 (1994): 137-53. is broaderthanthe direct 46. The impactof an individualcomplaintmechanism resultsin the casesthat comebeforethe commission. In particular,it allowsthe development of a caselaw,whichcanbecomeanimportantguidance to theinterpretationof women’srightsin domestic law. 47. SeeBunch,“Transforming HumanRights,”17; AndrewByrnes,“Women, Feminismand InternationalHumanRightsLaw-Methodological Myopia,FundamentalFlawsor MeaningfulMarginalisation? SomeCurrentIssues,” AustralianYear Book of InternationalLaw (1988-1989): 205-25; Byrnes,“TowardMore Effective Enforcement.” 48. Hilary Charlesworth, “The Mid-Life Crisisof the UniversalDeclarationof andLeeLawReview55 (1998): 791-92; JaneConnors, HumanRights,”Washington “GeneralHumanRightsInstruments andTheirRelevance to Women,”in Advancing the HumanRightsof Women:UsingInternationalHumanRightsStandardsin DomesticLegislation,ed. AndrewByrnes,JaneConnors,and Bik (Hong Kong: 1997), 31-35; Gallagher,“EndingtheMarginalization,” Commonwealth Secretariat, 294-309. 49. For example,CharlotteBunch,“Organizingfor Women’sHumanRights Globally,”in Oursby Right:Women’s Rightsas HumanRights,ed.JoannaKerr (London:Zed, 1993), 145; Hilary Charlesworth, “HumanRightsasMen’sRights,” in Women’sRights,ed. Petersand Wolper, 1 1 1; ElisabethFriedman,“Women’s Rights,ed.Petersand HumanRights:The Emergence of a Movement,”in Women’s onWomenandInterWolper,19; JulieMertusandPamelaGoldberg,“A Perspective nationalHumanRightsafter the ViennaDeclaration:The Inside/Outside Construct,”NYU Journalof InternationalLaw and Politics26: (1994): 231; O’Hare, “RealizingHumanRights,”400-2; JuliePetersandAndreaWolper,“Introduction,” in Women’s Rights,ed.PetersandWolper,3; V. SpikePeterson andJacquiTrue,“New in International Relations, TimesandNew Conversations” in The “Man” Question ed.MarysiaZalewskiandJaneParpart(Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1998), 22. 288. 50. Gallagher,“EndingtheMarginalization,”

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51. CharlotteBunch,“FeministVisionsof HumanRightsin the Twenty-First Century,”in HumanRightsin the Twenty-first Century,ed. KathleenA. Mahoney andPaulMahoney(Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoff, 1993),976. 52. Bunch,“Transforming HumanRightsfroma FeministPerspective,” 13. 53. Charlesworth, “HumanRightsasMen’s Rights,”105. 54. Bunch,“Transforming HumanRightsfroma FeministPerspective,” 13. 55. Bunch,“Transforming HumanRightsfroma FeministPerspective,” 13. 56. ChristineBell, “Women’sRightsas HumanRights:Old Agendasin New Guises,”in HumanRights:AnAgenda for the21stCentury,ed.AngelaHegartyand SiobhanLeonard(London:Cavendish, 1999),139. 57. Many otherexamples couldbe cited.SeeCEDAW’sprovisions onthespecific problemsof ruralwomen(article14) andon traffickingin womenandprostitution (article6), referredto earlier.Ruralmenalsoexperience specificproblems,andmen arealsothevictimsof traffickingandprostitution. To theextentthatno generalprovisionsexistwith the samesubstance, thisapproach that formulates additionalprotectiverulesonlyto the benefitof womenis at oddswith the principleof inclusive universality. 58. CharlotteBunch,“Women’sRightsasHumanRights:Towarda Re-Visionof HumanRights,”HumanRightsQuarterly12 (1990):491. 59. The groundbreaking judgmentin thiscontextwasX and Y v. Netherlands, ECtHR, March26, 1985,Publications of the Court,SeriesA, No. 91. A mentally disabledgirl of sixteenhadbeensexuallyabusedwhile residingin a homefor mentally disabledchildren.Her fatherlodgeda complaint,yet no prosecution wasinitiated.Due to a gapin Dutchcriminallegislation, it wasnotpossiblefor thevictimin thiscaseto initiatethe criminalprocedure,as the girl lackedlegalcapacity,and no representation waspossible. The ECtHR considered theabuseasa violationof article 8 ECHR (privatelife, includingphysicalintegrity)andheldthestateresponsible for thisviolation,because it hadfailedto takeadequate protectivemeasures, in particularin its criminallegislation. This approach waslaterconfirmedin othercases, and extendedto otherrights.Underarticle11 ECHR (freedomof assembly),for example,stateshavea positiveobligationto takemeasures soasto enable manifestationsto takeplacewithoutbeinghinderedby physicalviolenceof countermanifestants(ECtHR,Arztefiir das Lebenv. Austria,June21, 1988,Publications of the Court,SeriesA, No. 139). 60. ECtHR,A v. UnitedKingdom, September 23,1998,Reports1998-VI, g 22. 61. ECtHR,Z andothersv. UnitedKingdom, May 10,2001,§ 73. 62. Inter-AmericanCourtof HumanRights,Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Ser.C, No. 4, Judgment of July29, 1988(1989),ILM 291. 63. O’Hare, “RealizingHuman Rights,” 396, citing the casesof Mojica v. DominicanRepublic,HumanRightsLaw Journal17 (1996): 18, and Bautistav. Colombia, HumanRightsLawJournal17 (1996):19. 64. Bunch,“Transforming HumanRightsfroma FeministPerspective,” 14. 65. See Mertus and Goldberg,“A Perspective on Womenand International HumanRights,”207-16; JuttaJoachim,“Shapingthe HumanRightsAgenda:The Caseof ViolenceagainstWomen,”in GenderPoliticsin GlobalGovernance, ed. MeyerandPrugl,142-60. Violenceagainstwomen,anditslink to powerrelations,is

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the centralpreoccupation of “radicalfeminism”(seeMahoney,“TheoreticalPerspectives,” 814-26). In thehumanrightssphere, thefocusonviolencehasbeentaken overby feministsof differentconvictions, for obviousreasons: thosehumanrights violations, whicharetakenmostseriously also,involveviolence. 66. SeeJoanFitzpatrick,“The Use of InternationalHumanRightsNormsto CombatViolenceagainstWomen,”in HumanRightsof Women, ed. Cook,534-40; KennethRoth,“DomesticViolenceas an InternationalHumanRightsIssue,”in HumanRightsof Women,ed. Cook,326-39; DorothyQ. ThomasandMicheleE. Beasly,“DomesticViolenceasa HumanRightsIssue,’’HumanRightsQuarterly15 (1993):36-62. 67. CmEDAW,GeneralRecommendation 19,A/47/38. 68. SeeGayleBinion,“HumanRights:A FeministPerspective,” HumanRights Quarterly17(1995):519. 69. In its firstreportonsucha pilotproject,Pakistan:Violence againstWomen in the Nameof Honour(September 1999),however,the organization still prefersthe indirectway of addressing demands to thegovernment. 70. SeeBell, “Women’sRightsas HumanRights,”146; Bunch,“Transforming HumanRightsfrom a FeministPerspective,” 14; Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin,andShelleyWright,“FeministApproaches to InternationalLaw,”AmeriLaw (1991):635;Friedman,“Women’sHumanRights,” canJournalof International 19-20; Gallagher,“Endingthe Marginalization,” 290-91; Franl?Hosken,“Toward a Definitionof Women’sHumanRights,”HumanRightsQuarterly3 (1981):2; JoannaKerr, “The ContextandtheGoal,”in Oursby Right,ed.Kerr,4-5; Barbara Stark,“NurturingRights:An Essayon Women,Peace,and InternationalHuman Rights,”MichiganJournalof International Law 13 (Fall 1991):144-60. 71. ViennaDeclaration, A/CONE157/24,June25, 1993,5 5. 72. U N Doc. E/1993/22,Annex111, § 5, quotedin HenryJ. SteinerandPhilip Alston,InternationalHumanRightsin Context:Law, Politics,Morals (Oxford: Clarendon,1996),266. 73. SeeCharlesworth, “HumanRightsas Men’s Rights,”108;Hilary Charlesworth, “What Are ‘Women’sInternationalHumanRights’?’’in HumanRightsof Women, ed.Cook,74; Mahoney,“Theoretical Perspectives,” 851-52. 74. ShelleyWright,“Womenandthe GlobalEconomicOrder:A FeministPerspective,”AmericanUniversity Journalof InternationalLaw and Policy10 (1995): 873-76, 885-86. Thisreorientation shouldnot be limitedto thework-related rights. O ntheneedforaninclusive approach to therightto health,seeAudreyR. Chapman, “MonitoringWomen’sRight to Healthunderthe InternationalCovenanton Economic,SocialandCulturalRights,’’AmericanUniversity Law Review44 (1994-95): 1157-74. 75. Structuraladjustment programsof the World Bank and the International MonetaryFund are frequentlyblamedfor negativelyaffectingwomen’seconomic andsocialrights.SeeRebecca J. Cook,“Women’sInternational HumanRightsLaw: The Way Forward,”HumanRightsQuarterly15 (1993) 242; RhondaCopelon, “BringingBeijingHome,” Brooklyn Journalof InternationalLaw 21 (1996):600; Adetoun0.Ilumoka,“AfricanWomen’sEconomic,Socialand CulturalRightsTowarda RelevantTheoryandPractice,”in HumanRightsof Women, ed.Cook,321.

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76. Bunch,“Organizingfor Women’sHumanRightsGlobally,”144. 77. Coomaraswamy, Reinventing International Law, 20. Sheis referringto the frequentlymadesubdivision of humanrightsin three“generations.” Thefirstgenerationarecivil andpoliticalrights;thesecondaresocial,economic, andculturalrights; andthethirdarethe so-calledsolidarityrights. 78. See Paula Abrams,“Reservations aboutWomen: PopulationPolicy and Reproductive Rights,” CornellInternationalLaw Journal29 (1996): 1-23; Reed Boland,“Population Policies,HumanRights,andLegalChange,”AmericanUniversity Law Review(1995): 1257-77; CarlotaBustelo,“ReproductiveHealth and CEDAW,” AmericanUniversityLaw Review(1995): 1145-55; RebeccaJ. Cook, “InternationalHuman Rightsand Women’sReproductive Health,” in Women’s Rights,ed. PetersandWolper,256-75; RebeccaJ. Cook andMahmoudE. Fathalla, “AdvancingReproductive RightsbeyondCairo andBeijing,” International Family PlanningPerspectives (September1996);SarahY. Lai andReganE. Ralph,“Female SexualAutonomyand HumanRights,”Harvard HumanRightsJournal(1995): 201-27. 79. Boland,“Population Policies,”1258-61. 80. UN Doc.A/CONE32/41, 16. 81. UN Doc. E/CONE60/19(1974),7. 82. ArticleIO(h) mentionstherightof access to information andadviceonfamily planning;articlell(l)(f) protects“[tlhe rightto protection of healthandto safetyin workingconditions,includingthe safeguarding of the functionof reproduction”; article11(2) requiresstatesto preventdiscrimination basedon pregnancyo r maternity leave,to introducematernityleavewithpay,to encourage theprovisionof social servicessuchaschildcareto assistworkingparents,andto providespecialprotection to womenfrom harmfulwork duringpregnancy; article12(1) dealswith “accessto healthcareservices, includingthoserelatedto familyplanning”;article12(2)requires statesto “ensureto womenappropriate servicesin connexionwith pregnancy, confinementandthepost-natalperiod,grantingfreeservices wherenecessary, aswell as adequate nutritionduringpregnancy andlactation”;article14(l)(b) guarantees access to familyplanningservices for ruralwomen. 83. Amy J. Higer,“InternationalWomen’sActivismandthe 1994CairoPopulation Conference,”in GenderPoliticsin GlobalGovernance, ed. Meyer and Priigl, 122-41. 84. Reproductive healthis a stateof completephysical,mentaland socialwellbeingandnotmerelytheabsenceof diseaseor infirmity,in all mattersrelatingto the reproductive systemand to its functionsandprocesses. Reproductive healththerefore impliesthat peopleare ableto havea satisfyingandsafesexlife andthat they andthe freedomto decideif, whenandhow often havethe capabilityto reproduce to d o so. Implicit in this last conditionare the right of men and women to be informedandto haveaccessto safe,effective,affordableandacceptable methodsof familyplanningof theirchoice,aswell asothermethodsof theirchoicefor regulation of fertility whichare not againstthe law, and the right of accessto appropriate health-careservicesthat will enablewomento go safelythroughpregnancyand childbirthand providecoupleswith the bestchanceof havinga healthyinfant. In line with the abovedefinitionof reproductive health,reproductive healthcareis

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definedas the constellation of methods,techniques and servicesthat contributeto reproductive healthandwell-beingby preventingandsolvingreproductive health problems.It alsoincludessexualhealth,thepurposeof whichis the enhancement of life andpersonalrelations,andnotmerelycounselling andcarerelatedto reproduction andsexuallytransmitted diseases. ( U N Doc. A/CONE171/13, § 7.2) 85. Abrams,“Reservations aboutWomen,”32. 86. U N DOC. A/CONE177/20,SS 94-95. 87. Otherrelevanthumanrightsincludethe right to life (e.g., deathcausedby unsafeabortion);theprohibitionof sexdiscrimination (e.g.,whenwomenareforced to undergoabortiono r familyplanning,or whenthey needthe approvalof a husbandor a male relativeto d o so),the right to family life, the prohibitionof torture andinhumano r degradingtreatment,the right to education, andthe right to enjoy thebenefitsof scientificprogress. SeeBoland,“Population Policies,”1262-63; Cook, “InternationalHumanRightsandWomen’sReproductive Health,”259-70; Cook andFathalla,“AdvancingReproductive RightsbeyondCairoandBeijing.” 88. Coomaraswamy, Reinventing InternationalLaw,26; Lai andRalph,“Female SexualAutonomyandHumanRights,”201. andGeneticEngi89. For example,RenateKlein, “The Impactof Reproductive neeringonWomen’sBodilyIntegrityandHumanDignity,”in HumanRightsin the Twenty-first Century,ed. KathleenE. MahoneyandPaulMahoney(Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoff, 1993),889-904. 90. ReportN o 5/96, FernandoandRaquelMejia v. Peru,March 1, 1996. 91. U N DOC.E/CN.4/1995/34, SS 15-19. 92. Caseof Aydinv. Turkey,September 25, 1997,Reports1997-VI. 93. In full: the International Tribunalfor theProsecution of PersonsResponsible for SeriousViolationsof InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committedin the Territory of theFormerYugoslaviasince1991,adoptedMay 25, 1993,amendedMay 13, 1998. 94. It shouldbe notedthatthisis notnew.ControlCouncilLaw No. 10,adopted by the Allied Powersin December1945, alreadyincludesrapeas a crimeagainst humanity.Nicole Eva Erb, “Gender-Based Crimesunderthe Draft Statutefor the Permanent International CriminalCourt,”ColumbiaHumanRightsLaw Review29 (1998):409. of PersonsResponsible 95. InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the Prosecution for Genocideand Other SeriousViolationsof InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committedin theTerritoryof RwandaandRwandancitizensresponsible for genocide and othersuchviolationscommittedin the territoryof neighboringstates, betweenJanuary1, 1994,andDecember31, 1994. 96. SeeBrookSariMoshan,“Women,War andWords:The GenderComponent in the PermanentInternationalCriminal Court’s Definition of Crimesagainst Humanity,”FordhamInternationalLawJournal22 (1998):154-84. 97. Again,it is notnewto considerrapeasa war crime,asit wasalreadytreated assuchby the International Military Tribunalfor the Far Eastestablished in 1946in Tokyo(Erb, “Gender-based CrimesundertheDraft Statute,”410). 98. Kelly D. Askin,“SexualViolencein Decisions andIndictmentsof theYugoslavand RwandanTribunals:CurrentStatus,”AmericanJournalof International

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Law 93 (1999):97-123. Seethe judgmentof the AppealsChamberof the InternationalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia,in the caseof TheProsecutor v. Anto Furunzija(‘July 21, 2000),the first recognition of rapeas a war crimeon the appeal level. 99. SeeHilary Charlesworth, “FeministMethodsin International Law,”AmericanJournalof InternationalLaw 93 (1999):386-94; JudithGardamand Hilary Charlesworth, “Protection of Womenin ArmedConflict,”HumanRightsQuarterly 22 (2000): 148-66. Seearticle27 of theFourthGenevaConvention(1949),requiring statesto protectwomenin international armedconflict“againstany attackon their honour,in particularagainstrape,enforcedprostitution,or any form of indecent assault.” 100. SeeSiobhinK. Fisher,“Occupation of the Womb:ForcedImpregnation as Genocide,”DukeLawJournal46 (1996):91-133. 101. RhondaCopelon,“IntimateTerror:Understanding DomesticViolenceas Torture,”in HumanRightsof Women, ed.Cook,116-52; RhondaCopelon,“Recognizingthe Egregiousin the Everyday:DomesticViolenceasTorture,”Columbia HumanRightsLawReview25 (1994):291-367; CatherineMacKinnon,“OnTorture: A FeministPerspective onHumanRights”in HumanRightsin theTwenty-first Century,ed.MahoneyandMahoney,21. 102. PamelaGoldberg,“Wherein theWorldIs ThereSafetyfor Me?WomenFleeing Gender-Based Persecution,” in PetersandWolper,345-55; Kerr, “The Context andtheGoal,”5; ErinK. Baines,“GenderConstruction andtheProtection Mandate of theU N H C R Responses fromGuatemalan Women,”in GenderPoliticsin Global Governance, ed.MeyerandPriigl,245-59. 103. Thiswasrecognizedby a recommendation of the EuropeanCommunityin 1984 and a recommendation of the ExecutiveCommitteeof the Office of the U N H C R in 1985,aswellasthe1991U N H C R Guidelines ontheProtection of RefugeeWomen(Goldberg,“Wherein theWorldIs ThereSafetyfor Me?”348-49). 104. Goldberg,“Wherein theWorldIs ThereSafetyfor Me?”349-51, mentions CanadaandGermany. 105. Seethe 1904 International Agreementfor the Suppression of White Slave Traffic,the1910International Conventionfor theSuppression of WhiteSlaveTraffic, the 1921Convention for theSuppression of theTrafficin WomenandChildren,and the 1933Conventionon theSuppression of theTrafficin Womenof Full Age. 106. Articlel(c), quotedin A. YasmineRassam, “Contemporary Formsof Slavery andtheEvolutionof theProhibition of SlaveryandtheSlaveTradeunderCustomary International Law,” VirginiaJournalof International Law 39 (1999):332. 107. Rassam,“Contemporary Formsof Slavery,”340-41. 108. In particular,the 1949ConventionFor theSuppression of theTrafficin Personsandof theExploitationof theProstitution of Others. 109. JanieChuang,“Redirectingthe DebateoverTraffickingin Women:Definitions,Paradigms, andContexts,”HarvardHumanRights Journal11(1998):73. 110. Chuang,“RedirectingtheDebateoverTraffickingin Women,”65. 111. Chuang,“Redirecting theDebateoverTraffickingin Women,”65-66. 112. Chuang,“Redirecting theDebateoverTraffickingin Women,”78-79; Elizabeth E Defeis, “Women’sHumanRights:The Twenty-firstCentury,”Fordham International LawJournal18 (1995):1753.

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113. Gardamand Charlesworth, “Protectionof Womenin Armed Conflict,” 161-62. 114. Charlesworth, “FeministMethods,”388. 115. Bunch,“Transforming HumanRightsfroma FeministPerspective,” 16. 116. KathleenE. Mahoney,“Destruction of Women’sRightsthroughMassMedia. Proliferation of Pornography,” in HumanRightsin the Twenty-first Century,ed. MahoneyandMahoney,757-75. 117. Charlesworth, “WhatAre ‘Women’sInternational HumanRights’?’’68. 118. For example,Byrnes,“TowardMore EffectiveEnforcement,” 200; Charlesworth,“Transforming theUnitedMen’sClub”;FrancineD’Amico,“WomenWorkers in the United Nations:From Margin to Mainstream?” in GenderPoliticsin GlobalGovernance, ed. Meyer and Priigl, 19-40; Karen Knop, “BeyondBorders: Women’sRightsandtheIssueof Sovereignty,” in OursbyRight,ed.Kerr,75;Cecilia Medina,“Do International HumanRightsLawsProtectWomen?”in OursbyRight, ed.Kerr, 79. 119. Knop,“BeyondBorders,”76-77; KarenKnopp,“Why RethinkingtheSovereignStateIs Importantfor Women’sInternational HumanRightsLaw,” in Human Rightsof Women, ed.Cook,159-60. In linewith my concernwithrespectfor diversityamongwomen,andmy ensuing preference for thecentralityof theindividualin humanrightsprotection,I havestrongdoubtsaboutthemeritsof thisproposal. 120. Bell, “Women’sRightsasHumanRights,”147. 121. Gallagher,“EndingtheMarginalization,” 292. 122. Binion, “Human Rights,” 512. See also Byrnes,“Women, Feminism,” 209-12; Charlesworth, “FeministMethods.” 123. V. SpikePeterson,“WhoseRights?A Critiqueof the ‘Givens’in Human RightsDiscourse,” Alternatives 15 (1990):328-32. 124. Charlesworth et al., “FeministApproaches to International Law,” 635. 125. Charlesworth et al., “FeministApproachesto InternationalLaw,” 637; Charlesworth, “HumanRightsasMen’sRights,”109-10; Charlesworth, “What Are ‘Women’sInternational HumanRights’?’’75-76; Mahoney,“Theoretical Perspectives,”852-53. 126. SeeRhodaE. Howard,“Women’sRights,GroupRightsandthe Erosionof Liberalism,”in MistakenIdentities:TheSecondWaveof Controversy over“Political Correctness,” ed.Cyril Levitt,ScottDavies,andNeil McLaughlin(NewYork:Lang, 1999),130-45. 127. LadanAskari,“Girls’ RightsunderInternational Law: An Argumentfor Establishing GenderEqualityasa JusCogens,”SouthernCaliforniaReviewof Law and Women’sStudies8 (1998):3-42; Hilary Charlesworth and ChristineChinkin, “The Genderof JusCogens,”HumanRightsQuarterly15 (1993):63-76; Christine M. Chinkin,“Remarks,”American Societyof International LawProceedings (1991): 349-52. 128. Desai,“FromViennato Beijing,”186;Priigl andMeyer,“GenderPolitics,” 6; L. AmedeObiora,“Feminism,Globalisation andCulture:AfterBeijing,”Indiana Journalof GlobalLegalStudies4 (1997):359-64. 129. ChandraTalpadeMohanty,“UnderWesternEyes:FeministScholarship and ColonialDiscourses,” in ThirdWorldWomen andthePoliticsof Feminism, ed.Chan-

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draTalpadeMohanty,Ann Russo,andLourdesTorres(Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress,1991),51-80. 130. Azizah al-Hibri, “Who DefinesWomen’sRights?A Third World Woman’s Response,” TheHumanRightsBrief (Washington,D.C.: Centerfor HumanRights andHumanitarian Law at Washington Collegeof Law, AmericanUniversity,1994). 131. CherylJohnson-Odim, “CommonThemes,DifferentContexts: ThirdWorld Womenand Feminism,”in Third WorldWomenand thePoliticsof Feminism, ed. Mohantyet al., 321; see also Obiora, “Feminism,Globalisationand Culture,” 372-73. 132. See Ilumoka, “African Women’sEconomic,Socialand CulturalRights”; The Need for Legal Nadia H. Youssef,“Women’sAccessto ProductiveResources: Instruments to ProtectWomen’sDevelopment Rights,”in Women’s Rights,ed.Peters andWolper,279-88. 133. Charlesworth et al., “FeministApproaches to InternationalLaw,” 618-21; JulieDimauro,“Towarda More EffectiveGuarantee of Women’sHumanRights:A MulticulturalDialoguein InternationalLaw,” Women’s RightsLaw Reporter(1996): 333-44. 134. Islamicdressis a clearexample.In Westerneyes,it is frequentlyseenas the paradigmatic expression of theculturalsubordination of women.Yet bothin Islamic countriesand amongimmigrantsin Europe,manywomenchooseto wear Islamic dressand attachpositivesignificanceto it as an expression of culturalidentity, nationalism, or evenasan emancipatory device.With regardto thehijab(theMuslim headscarf) amongimmigrants in France,seeFranqoiseGaspardandFarhadKhosrokhavar,Lefoulardet la Re‘publique(Paris:La Dicouverte,1995). 135. Coomaraswamy, Reinventing International Law,24-25. 136. Halim, “Challengesto the Applicationof InternationalWomen’sHuman Rightsin theSudan,”407-10; EleneG. Mountis,“CulturalRelativityandUniversalism:Re-evaluatingGenderRightsin a MulticulturalContext,”Dickinson Journalof International Law 15 (1996): 113-50. 137. RhodaE. Howard,HumanRightsin Commonwealth Africa(Totowa,N.J.: Rowman& Littlefield,1986),198-200. 138. Kay Boulware-Miller,“FemaleCircumcision: Challengesto the Practiceasa HumanRightsViolation,”HarzardWomen’s LawJournal8 (1985):171-73. 139. For example,AnnieBunting,“TheorizingWomen’sCulturalDiversityin FeministInternational HumanRightsStrategies,” Journalof LawandSociety(1993): 6-22; Nitya Duclos,“Lessonsof Difference:FeministTheoryon CulturalDiversity,”BuffaloLaw Review38 (1990):325-81; IsabelleR. Gunning,“ArrogantPerception,World-TravellingandMulticulturalFeminism:The Caseof FemaleGenital Surgeries,”ColumbiaHumanRightsLaw Review23 (1991-1992): 189-248; Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, “Women’sRightsasHumanRights-Rules, Realities andthe Roleof Culture:A Formulafor Reform,”Brooklyn Journalof International Law 21 (1996): 605-77; Tracy E. Higgins,“Anti-essentialism, Relativism,and HumanRights,”Harvard Women’sLaw Journal9 (1996): 89-126; Nancy Kim, “Towarda FeministTheoryof HumanRights:Straddling theFencebetweenWestern ImperialismandUncriticalAbsolutism,”ColumbiaHumanRightsLaw Review25 (1993):49-105; Mertusand Goldberg,“A Perspective on WomenandInternational

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HumanRights”;SusanMollerOkin,“GenderInequalityandCulturalDifferences,”

PoliticalTheory(February1994):5-24; JoshuaCohen,MatthewHoward,andMartha c.Nussbaum, eds.,Is Multiculturalism Badfor Women? SusanMollerOkinwith Respondents (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,1999);ElizabethV. SpelWoman:Problemsof Exclusion in FeministThought(Boston:Beaman,Inessential

con, 1988). Mahoneydescribesthis as the specialtyof postmodernfeminism: “Theoretical Perspectives,” 826-37. 140. RadhikaCoomaraswamy, “To BellowLike a Cow: Women,Ethnicity,and theDiscourse of Rights,”in HumanRightsof Women, ed.Cook,55. 141. Rebecca J. Cook,“Effectiveness of the BeijingConference AdvancingInternationalLaw RegardingWomen,”AmericanSocietyof International Law Proceedings(1997):313;SaraHossain,“Equalityin theHome:Women’sRightsandPersonal Lawsin SouthAsia,”in HumanRightsof Women, ed.Cook,482-83. 142. Bell, “Women’sRightsas HumanRights,”151; Desai,“From Viennato Beijing,”184-85; ShefaliDesai,“HearingAfghanWomen’sVoices:FeministTheory’s Re-conceptualization of Women’sHumanRights,”ArizonaJournalof Internationaland Compurative Law 16 (1999):806;J. Oloka-Onyango andSylviaTamale, “‘The Personal Is Political,’or Why Women’sRightsareIndeedHumanRights:An AfricanPerspective on International Feminism,”HumanRightsQuarterly17 (1995): 710.

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I11 THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

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6 HumanRightsin Weak,Divided, andThreatened States Marc Weller

Humanrightsguarantee peaceand stabilitywithinand amongsocieties. Essentialfor thisfunctionarehumanrightsconnected with personaland througha democratic syspoliticalfreedomsandtheruleof law, guaranteed tem.Theneedfor theintroductionor reintroduction of a humanrightsculturebecomesparticularlypronounced wherestateshavecollapsedor are in dangerof collapse.To stabilizeor restorethese“failed” states,liberalinteractionmay be necessary to rebuild nationaltheoryholdsthatinternational a democraticsystembasedon the rule of law and humanrights.Over the pastdecade,numerousand sustainedattemptshavebeenundertakento “restoredemocracy”or theveryintegrityof a threatenedstateaccordingto a setof Western-liberal valuesandrights.As a result,we nowhavea laboratory of casesto usein testingthistheoryagainstthe experienceof internationalintervention. This is thepurposeof thischapter. Therehavealsobeena numberof instances of softerstatetransformation. Theseincludethe transitions to democracyin Centraland EasternEurope, in SouthAmericaand, morehesitantly,in somepartsof Africa and Asia. SouthAfrica’scampaignto overcomethe apartheidlegacyis alsoa particularly impressive exampleof a significanttransition.Of course,therecordin theseinstances is somewhat mixed.Somesocieties havenotprogressed asfar as others.Nevertheless, thesetransformations are rightlyseenas a vindication of the aim, andthe possibility,of reconstructing societies-at times quitefundamentally-accordingt o the democratic modelof governance. The introduction of a humanrightscultureandtheruleof law hasplayeda 141

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crucialrolein theseprocesses. Theseeffortswereoftensupported by a wide rangeof international agencies, from the UnitedNations,the Organization of AmericanStates(OAS) andtheassociated juridicalandhumanrightssystem,theCommonwealth Secretariat, theCouncilof EuropeandtheOrganizationfor Securityand Cooperation in Europe(OSCE),to a largenumber of specialized nongovernmental organizations. Nonetheless, and crucially, thesesocietiesthemselves had the driveand capacityto launchand sustain theprocessof transformation. The liberalprojectof reformwaslegitimized fromthe beginningby the factthatit wascarriedby an indigenous political movement;the elementof internationalinvolvementwas ancillaryto, and not constitutive of, thetransformation process. Statetransformation is a far morecontroversial subjectwherethe society in questionlacksthe capacityto undertakethisprocesson its own. This is invariablythe casewhereweak,failed, or threatenedstatesare concerned. The situationof actualor imminentcollapseis manifestlythe resultof the inabilityof thesocietyin question to reformitself.Softassistance of thetype mentioned earlierwouldnotbe sufficientto supporta transformation at that late stage.The questionthereforeariseswhetherit is possibleto effector evenenforcesucha transitionthroughexternalintervention. Shouldit turn outthattheseattemptsareforeverdoomed,thisfindingwouldhaveconsiderableimportance for the debateaboutinternational actionto transformor stabilizeweak,failing,or threatened statesandits legitimacy. Beforeturningto a reviewof experience gainedfromrecentcasesof externally driveneffortsat statetransformation, it may be helpfulto distinguish thesefromhumanitarian interventions addressed by NicholasWheelerin the followingchapter.Humanitarianinterventions are forcibleactionsby foreignmilitaryforceson behalfof thepopulationof a statewithoutthe government’sconsent.The operationmustbe aimedat avertingor terminating an actualor imminenthumanitarian disasterthatthreatens thevery survival of all or a substantial portionof the population.It is axiomaticthat such interventions areshort-term, palliativemeasures. Indeed,in international legal terms,it is a requirement that the interventionis limited to action designedto avertthehumanitarian emergency. Intervention, notmerelyto address theimmediatecatastrophe butto reestablishthe conditionsnecessary for sustaining a democratic systemthat guarantees humanrights,is a differentmatter.A rushedmilitaryengagement thatis strictlylimitedto rescuinga populationfromdisasteris notlikely to providetheconditions necessary for whathasbecomeknownasstatebuilding. However,a staterequiringhumanitarianinterventiontendsto be preciselythe kind of statethat is in needof statebuilding.The humanitarian emergency and the ensuingintervention will, afterall, invariablyhavebeen triggeredby deficiencies in the governance or in the fundamentalstructure of thestateconcerned. Unlessthatunderlyingissueis addressed, thehuman-

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itarianintervention will leavethe societyin questionpersistently vulnerable to a relapseintocircumstances of humanitarian or politicaldisaster. Humanitarianintervention andpostconflictreconstruction arethusat timeslinked together,eventhoughtheyareconceptually distinct. Over thepastdecade,abouttwenty-fiveinternational state-building or stabilizationactionshavebeenundertaken, in contrastto just threeduring the Cold War period.The first of theseearlieroperations was the ONUC (United NationsOperationin the Congo)missionfromJuly 1960 to June 1964.That missionwaswidely perceivedto be a greatdisaster,leavingthe territoryin thehandsof SCsC SekoMobutowho,becomingincreasingly dictatorial,ultimatelyled the stateinto disintegration and chaossomethirty yearslater.The secondattempt-the UNSF (UnitedNationsSecurityForce in WesternNew Guinea)operation-involvedU N administration of theterritoryfromOctober1962to April 1963.Althoughit helpedsmooththeway to integration with Indonesia,thisoutcomenotonlywasanunusualmethod of transferring powerbutalsoremainscontroversial. Indeed,it hastriggered a certainlevelof armedresistance overthe pastdecade.Finally,therewasa brief and lessdirectinvolvementof the U N in the internalconflictin the DominicanRepublicin the mid-1960s.That mission,however,wasovershadowedby the actionsof the United Statesand the OAS and cannotbe considered a genuineexampleof international statebuildingand stabilization. OtherUN operations in theColdWar yearsweretraditionalpeacekeeping missions, mainlydedicated to theseparation of armedforcesin state-to-state conflictsor in mixedinternal/international conflicts,andthereforefall outsidethescopeof thischapter.Sufficeit to saythattheseactionsaregenerally creditedwith havingcontributedto military stabilizationin their areasof deploymentand in a few cases(e.g.,Cyprus)alsomadea limitedcontribution to humanitarian objectives. While few of theseoperations led to a resolutionof the underlyingsourceof militarytension,therecordof traditional peacekeeping hasgenerallybeenseenaspositive. Sincetheendof theColdWar, theUnitedNationshascontinuedto manageseveraltraditionalpeacekeeping missions.'However,theseoperations havebeenovershadowed by the acceleration of U N mandatedstate-building o r stabilization attempts,oftenfollowingon from initially morelimited humanitarian interventionoperations. This acceleration is all the moresurprisinggiven the apparentfailure of the operations in Somalia,Angola, Rwanda,Croatia,*and,initially,BosniaandHerzegovina. Thesefailureshaveexposed liberalinterventionism to criticismfromthree directions.In the remainderof this chapter,I shalldeal first with eachof thesecriticisms-and the liberalresponse t o them-and secondwith the recordof international statebuilding,its successes andfailures.In bothparts I shalldistinguishbetweenweak,divided,and threatenedstates,the three

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kindsof statethathavebeenthe targetof international interventions. Weak statesare thosewheregovernmenthaseffectivelybeendestroyedby prolongedconflict;dividedstatesare fracturedusuallyalongethniclinesand characterized by the determination of the dominantgroupto controlthe threatenedstatesfacethechallenge of stateanddisenfranchise its opponents; secession and/ordissolution. CRITICISMS OF LIBERAL STATE SUPPORTOPERATIONS The threearguments advancedagainstthe liberalagendaof assisting in state reconstruction or stabilizationare that interventionfor this purposeis an illegitimateinterference in the domesticaffairsof a sovereigncountry,that it ignoresthe realitiesof powerpolitics,andthat the international community lackstheresources andcapacityto achieveits objectives. Action Sovereignty andLegitimacyof International

It assumes that all statesoughtto be The liberalagendais cosmopolitan. constructed accordingto a basicmodelthat mustfeature,at a minimum,a democratic culture,theruleof law andhumanrightsguarantees. Democracy The ensures thattheauthorityto governis basedonthewill of thegoverned. relationsare conrule of law ensures thatpublicactsandintersubjective ductedwithintheframeworkof the constitutional andlegalenvironment createdon the basisof the exerciseof this will. Humanrightsensurethat individualsandgroupscanunderall circumstances rely on basicguarantees that cannotbe overturned,eventhroughthe exerciseof democraticmajoritarianismandthe systemof law thatsupports it. Somemightalsoaddeconomicconsiderations (i.e., theneedto establish a freemarketeconomy). Any statethat failsto exhibittheserequirements is a failureandin needof international action. Thisvisionhasbeencriticizedasbeingculturallyimperialiston philosophical/ideological and structuralgrounds,althoughbothare intertwined. The philosophicalhdeological objectionassertsthat everysocietymustbe enabledto organizeitselfautonomously, onthebasisof thewill of thegoverned,withoutreferenceto anyimperatives thatlie outsideit. Theseexternal imperatives, it is argued,areinvariablyestablished by powerfulstatesor multinationaleconomicinterests.The structuralcriticismrefersto the internationalpoliticalor legalprinciples,whichsupportthe autonomyof societies organizedas states.The self-determination of peoples,the sovereignty and equalityof states,andtheattendantprohibitionof intervention in theinternal affairsof states,all of whicharelaid downeitherin theUN Charteritself

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or in countless GeneralAssemblyresolutions, areinvokedin supportof this view. How maysuchcriticismsbeanswered? Thosewhoobjectto internationalized statebuildingoverlookthe fact that not everysystemof governance, andnoteverygovernment, is necessarily anexpression of thefreedetermination of the statepopulation.In weak, divided,or threatened states,it is, almostby definition,a construct of powerthatis basedon anythingbut the will of thegoverned.In statesweakenedby prolonged internalconflict,there Instead,thereare factionsexercising is no longera systemof government. effectivecontrolover segmentsof the population.In ethnicallydivided states, dominant a groupfrequentlydisenfranchises otherpartsof thepopulation.In othercases,thevery legitimacyof the stateitselfis threatenedby the demandfor self-determination andsecession of a significantproportion of its population.In all thesecircumstances, statebuildingor stabilization effortswill seekto restoregovernmental legitimacy,oftenon the basisof a constitutional consensus andthroughdemocratic elections.Far fromundermininginternational legal principle,it is the aim of theseoperationsto restorea situationwherethe peoplecan exercisetheir sovereignrights througha machineryof governance basedon theirexpressed will. It is alsoarguedthatsuchstate-building activitiesviolatetherightsto selfof populations becausea Westernliberalstatesystemis arbidetermination trarilyimposed.However,with the exceptionof KOSOVO, virtuallyall statebuildingventuresthat haveeveroccurredarebasedon an agreedsettlement of the partiesto the conflict.Therewill oftenbe a new constitution establishedby thelocalparties,albeitwith international assistance, whichwill be subsequently validatedand filled with life througha roundof elections. Essentially,therefore,thisis oneof themostdirectmethodsof givinga state populationtheopportunity to establish thestatestructureit wishesfor itself andto legitimizethisstructure throughanactof will. It ispossiblethatinternationalattemptsto supportsuchventuresmay haveat timessoughtto encourage thepartiesto createa systemof government unsuitedto the culture and traditionof the populationin question.Arguably,this was so in Somalia,buttherearenot manyotherobviousexamples. Anothersovereignty-based argumentis that internationalstatebuilding providesa meansfor powerfulstatesto interferein the affairsof the less powerful.Sucha riskdoesexist.However,virtuallyall post-ColdWar statebuildingattemptshavebeenconducted undertheaegisof a UnitedNations mandate.This hasnot alwayspreventedsomestatesfrom takinga lead in operations affectingstatesor regionsof concernto them,astheUnitedStates did in Haiti; Russia,actingunderthe auspicesof the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) did in Georgia;andNigeriathroughits leadership of the EconomicCommunityof West African States(ECOWAS) did in LiberiaandSierraLeone.In all threecases,however,theUN insistedon the

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deploymentof its ownmissionsto monitorandhelpshapetheseoperations. In Haiti, theU.S.-ledoperationdid notseekto bringto poweritsowncandidatefor government but insteadsoughtto restorethe incumbentpresident, who had beenoustedby a military coup.A subsequent UN operationfollowed,to helpstabilizedemocracy in Haiti in a moregeneralway.In Liberia, theUN joinedthe initial ECOWAS operation.After somestopsand starts, the end resultwasthat CharlesTaylor,the rebelleaderwhomNigeriahad initiallysoughtto keepfrompower,waselectedpresident.In SierraLeone, theUN intervenedin anotherstate-building operationinitiallycommenced by ECOWAS,perhapswith Nigerianinterestsat heart.Eventually,the U N wasagainableto ensure participation at a levelthatwouldensurea genuine restoration of legitimatestateauthority.Georgia,is the onepossibleexception, sinceon thisoccasion,theU N wasonly ableto dispatcha monitoring mission,and Russia,ostensiblyactingon behalfof the CIS, intervenedto with stabilizethe situationon the groundperhapsvery muchin accordance its ownnationalinterests. Overall,therefore,onemay concludethat statebuildingandstabilization arepreciselyaimedat revindicating thewill of thegovernedin circumstances to them.Thisprocess will generwheregovernance is nolongeraccountable ally be conductedon the basisof a popularmandate.Thesemissionswill typicallybe conductedby the U N itself or by agenciesactingwithin the by theUN. Hence,therisk of undueinterferremitof a mandateestablished enceis reduced. The RealistCriticism

The realistcriticismappreciates the realitiesandalsothe limitationsof international politics.Realistsarguethatcertainstateseitherareillogical constructions that cannoteversucceedor are subjectedto internalconflicts socomplexthat they cannoteverbe resolvedthroughinternational action. Ultimately,it is for the societyin questionto reorganizeitself,be it through a dissolution of statestructures or throughprolongedstrugglefor power withinthe state.Hence,thepositionof theinternational communitycan only be to isolateitself from statesthat are in the processof collapseand possibledissolution andperhapsto organizea minimumof palliativeaction. The liberalresponseto this argumentwill differ dependingon whether interventionis intendedto overcomethe problemsof seriouslyweakened, divided,or threatenedstates.As we haveseen,weakstatesare thosewhere prolongedinternalstrifehasbeenthe resultof a strugglefor politicalpower of the amongcompeting armedelites.This strugglehasled to a degradation stateinstitutions. Authorityis only basedon effectivecontrolexercisedby warringfactionsoverpopulations andterritoryandespeciallyoverwhatever economicresources can be rapidlyconvertedinto cash(diamonds,metals,

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timber,oil andgas,etc.).While theseelitesmay,on occasion, haveanethnic of state basis,ethnicityis not the key issuethat hasled to a deterioration authority.Examplesfor thesetypesof conflictsarethe struggles for power in Liberia,SierraLeone,the Congo,and,in its laterphases, Angola. in a conflict Manyrealistswouldarguethatthereis nopointin intervening of thiskind. A vastinternational intervention forcewouldbe necessary to reestablishcentralauthorityin a territorylike the Congo.Sucha force wouldfindit difficult,if notimpossible, to disenfranchise theopposing factions.Evenif thatwerepossible, therewouldbe no realpoliticalalternative in place.Thestatewouldsoonsinkagainintoa factionalstruggle for power. Moreimportant,sinceno vitalnationalinterests areat stake,fromtherealist and dangerous view, therecanbe no justificationfor launchingexpensive missions of thiskind. The argumentrelatingto feasibilityis admittedlypowerful,andit gains supportfromthe listof UN failuresduringthe1990s.Theoutcomeof some of themorerecentlylaunched missions also stillhangsin thebalance. However,aswe shallsee,thebalancesheetis by no meansasnegativeasis often presumed. The argumentfrom interestis moreeasilycountered. It is now of clearthatinternalconflictsof thiskindwill oftenleadto a destabilization entireregions;witnessthe spreadof the Liberianconflictto SierraLeone andthe dangerous effectof thestruggle withintheCongoon its neighbors. The internalconflictsof CentralAmericaof the 1980sprovidedan earlier lessonof thiskind.Individualstatesmaylackanoverriding nationalinterest butcansometimes be persuaded to intervene in theinterests of regionalstability. In additionto strictlynationalandregionalinterests, thereexistinternathatmayneedto be maintained. Theprevention tionalcommunityinterests of massivestarvationof populations sufferingfrom civil strife,oftencombinedwith actsof violenceagainstlargenumbersof civilians,is nowrecognized as an importantaim of international policy, at leastin casesso egregious that theycannotbe easilyignored.This is evidenced by the fact thatevenaftertheunsatisfactory firstroundof complexpeacekeeping operationsin weakstates(Somalia,Angola,Liberia,Rwanda),whichsignificantly dampened the appetitefor suchmissions of the UnitedNationsSecretariat statesalike,a second roundwaslaunched (Sierra andUN force-contributing Leone,CentralAfricanRepublic,Congo).Thisdevelopment doesnotreflect a rebornliberalidealismbuttheacceptance by themajorpowersof theneed to act in termsof realpolitik.In otherwords,statepracticehoistsrealists with theirownpetard. of predominantly ethnicviolenceexemplifythe politicsof Campaigns dividedstates. Sometimes, suchcampaigns amountto attempts by onegroup to exterminate or permanently displaceanother.Thispractice,illustratedin its mostdrasticform by theRwandangenocide, is manifestlyincompatible

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with the fundamentalinternational interestto maintaincommunityvalues, includingthe legalprohibitionof genocide,the survivalof principlesof humanitarian law applicableto internalconflicts,and the prohibitionof forceddisplacement of entirepopulations. Regionalintereststend to be affectedby the significantrefugeestreamsthat are alwaysconnected with campaigns of ethnicdominationandthatcanleadto regionaldestabilization. Whethermotivatedby the needto maintaincoreinternationalcommunity valuesor by the needt o preventthreatsto regionalstability,stateshave thereforefoundit verymuchin theirinterestto act. Onceagain,the argumentmay be more difficultto win in termsof the feasibilityof effectiveinternational interventionthan in termsof its legitimacy.Ethnicconflictsarenotoriouslydifficultto terminate,andevenwhere this hasbeenpossible,postconflictpeacebuildingappearsto be a particularly dauntingtask.The reviewof practicein the next sectionwill address thispoint. In thecaseof threatened states,in dangerof breakingup throughsecession or dissolution, theinternational andnationalinterestcanbe established most clearly.All governments sharein theurgentdesireto avoidanysortof precedentthat mightencourage secession. Their passionate attachment t o the principleof territorialintegrityhasbeenrepeatedly demonstrated, fromBiafra to Katangaand from Chechnyato Kosovo.When it provedimpossible to stabilizeYugoslaviaas a whole, the international communityinvested massively to preventfurtherdisintegration, underwriting thecontinued existenceof BosniaandHerzegovinaandsubjecting unrulyKosovoto internationaladministration. Whetherit caneverbe feasibleto address conflictsof thiskind,evenif nationalinterestdemands suchaction,will againbe consideredlater,in thelight of recentpractice.

The ManagerialCriticism A final strandof criticismfacinginternationalized state-building or stabilizationeffortsconcernsthe ability of the organizedinternational community to manageactionsof thiskind. Thereis doubtaboutthe willingnessto makeavailablethe resources necessary for theseoperations and aboutthe long-termcommitment thatis requiredto sustainthem.In addition,detailed studiesof individualcaseshavebroughtout somemorespecificmanagerial lessons. Many of thesewereconsidered in a consolidated way in the United NationsBrahimireport.It maybe convenient to bearin mindthefollowing factorsin this context:

Authority.Fromthelegalpointof view,onemaydistinguish operations accordingto the sourceof authorityfor internationalized attemptsof stateconstruction or stabilization.In a numberof cases,the originof

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authorityrestsin a peaceagreement achievedby thepartiesthemselves whothenrequestinternational supportby way of a peacekeeping mandateunderChapterVI of theUN Charter,the chapterconcerned with thepeacefulsettlement of disputes. Hence,theauthorityof theinternationalelementin the ventureis consentbasedand doesnot exceedthe consentgiven.This authoritycan nevertheless be extensive,as, for example,in the internationaladministration of Cambodia(United NationsTransitional Authorityin Cambodia[UNTAC]). A secondtype of mandateis partiallybasedin ChapterVI of theCharter,butChapter VII enforcement elementsare added-for example,in relationto force protection, to sanctions enforcement or evento theprotectionof endangeredpopulations. Finally,thereareoutrightChapterVII mandates, whichinvolveenforcement throughdiplomatic,economic,or military meansand locatesupremeauthorityfor the implementation of the entiremandate. Actors.Thereareat leastfourdifferentmodalitiesof international action coveredby U N mandates. Theseare operations directlycontrolledby the UN Secretariat(e.g., United NationsOperationin SomaliaI1 PNOSOMII]), jointUN andregionaloperations (e.g.,Liberia),operationsmanagedby regionalorganizations o r defensivealliances(e.g., SierraLeonein the first caseand Kosovoin the second),and,finally, actionsundertaken by coalitions of states(e.g.,Albania).Thesedifferent typesof actorsat timesperformtheir rolesin parallelor handon from one to the otheras the missionevolves.Thereis a similardivisionof laboramongUN agenciesand regionalagencieslike the Councilof Europeandthe OSCE. Mandates.The attemptsto stabilizeexistingstatestructures havebeen coveredby a variety of mandates,rangingfrom the initially modest mandates to protectpopulations or createconditions for the safedelivery of humanitarian assistance, to supportfor individualaspectsof the statestructure (e.g.,policingin Albania)or to very ambitiousattempts to reconstruct a polity from scratch(e.g. UNISOM 11). Most missions evolved,endingup with far moreambitiousdesignsfor societalreconstructionthanwereinitiallyintended. Tools.The natureof the mandatedeterminesthe tools that can be broughtto bearonthetaskat hand.Thetoolsappliedby thesedifferent typesof missions includethefollowing: Military separation of forces,the disarmingof competingarmedformationsandthe establishment of a new militaryandsecuritystructure Reconstruction of constitutional structures, theestablishment of newelectoralsystems, andthe administration or monitoringof elections The reestablishment of administrative structures, the judiciaryand other

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aspects of civilandsocialservices, andtheintroduction of humanrights monitoringandimplementation measures International supportfor economicreconstruction, includingmeasures to openup economicopportunities for all segments of thepopulationand for formercombatants Accountabilitymechanisms, rangingfrom truthcommissions to the local or eveninternational administration of justice Thereare threetypesof international operations. The mostcomprehensive approach,at timesinvolvingall of the preceding factors,is international interimgovernance. International agenciestakeoverthe functionsof the statewhile assistingin the processof constructing an indigenous political systemandsupporting thedevelopment of a newadministration. Thesecond andlessintrusivetypeis a complexpeacekeeping mission.Thepartiesthemselvescontinueto exercisegovernmental authority,oftenunderan interim powersharingagreement; the UN stabilizesthe situationwhile assisting in constitutionbuildingand oftenholdsthe first roundof elections.Finally, therearepeacekeeping operations, wherean international agencywill supporto r takeoversecurityfunctionsbutis lessinvolvedin civil reform.

THE RECORD OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS Havingdisposed of someof thecriticismsof state-building andstabilization efforts,it is now necessaryto addressthe two principalobjectionsthat remain.Theseareeitherthatit is neverpossibleto address internalconflicts throughexternalactiono r that,if thisis possiblein principle,theorganized internationalcommunitylacksthe resources and managerialskillsto perform this function.Thesecriticismscanonly be assessed by reviewingthe actualcasesin whichtheinternational communityhasbeenengaged, in relation t o weak, divided,and threatened states.The appropriateness of the international response in eachcasewill be investigated in relationt o the authorityunderwhichtheactionis taken,the actorsinvolved,themandates thatspecifywhattheyareto do, andthetoolstheyuse. It is, of course,noteasyt o determinewhetherinternational statebuilding andstabilization hassucceeded or failed.Obviously,thesearerelativeterms, rangingfromarresting furtherdisintegration of a societyto thedurablereestablishment of civilsocietyin theliberalmold,basedona democratic human rightsculture.For thepurposes of thischapter,success is definedasreestablishinggovernanceon the basisof the will of the governed.Manifestly unrepresentative exerciseof publicauthorityis replacedby constitutional governance thatcanbe tracedbackin someform to an exerciseof popular will, evenif it doesnotfully conformto Westernliberalstandards of “good

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governance.”I n addition,a basichumanrightscultureis established asa resultof the international operation.Success may be presentwhensuchan arrangement is stabilizedoverat leastoneelectoralcycle. WeakStates In statesthat havesufferedfrom a violentandprolongedcontestfor central state power,international actionwill mostlyseekto reestablish a constitutional consensus.O n this basis, governmentalauthority is then constructed on the basisof an exerciseof thewill of thepopulationthrough elections.Therewill alsobe a needto reestablish administrative structures andthejudiciaryandto introducea humanrightsculture. Therearetwo typesof weakstates:thosesufferingfromconflictdrivenby ideologicalconfrontation and thosewhereinternalfactionsare fighting aboutnakedpoweroverthestatestructure. Eight missionshaveaddressed ideologicallydrivenconflict,varyingconsiderablyin termsof authority,actors,mandate, and tools.The formsof missionsvariedfrominternational interimgovernance t o complexpeacekeepingandlimitedpeacekeeping. Cambodiawas the siteof the first, and one of the mostcomprehensive post-Cold War state-building missions.This operationinvolvedsome twenty-twothousandmilitaryand civilianpersonnel,lastedfrom October 1991to September1993,andincludeda smallerad-qance stabilization operation. The authorityof the operationwasbasedon the ParisAgreements on the Comprehensive PoliticalSettlement of the CambodiaConflictof October 23, 1991.The Him Senregime,thenin powerovermostof theterritory, the formergovernment of the KhmerRouge:hat hadbeendisplacedby the Vietnamese invasionof 1978,the oppositionled by PrinceSihanouk,anda furtherpartyagreedto a settlementprovidingfor military disengagement, decommissioning of irregularunits,a new constitutional structure,and internationally managedelections. The agreement established a Supreme NationalCouncilfor Cambodia,“theuniquelegitimatebodyandsourceof authorityin which,duringthetransitional period,thesovereignty, independenceandunity of Cambodiaare enshrined,”composed of representatives of theprincipalfactions.Thisauthoritywas,in turn,delegated to theUnited Nations.Giventhisgrantof authority,a ChapterVI mandatewassufficient. The substance of the mandatewaswide-ranging,providingfor the full reestablishment of a functioning stateon thebasisof a new,agreedconstitution. The missionconducted an electionto a constitutiveassembly,which draftedtheconstitution andthentransformed itselfintoa parliament.In parallel,theUN missiontookoversupervision of publicadministration in most sectors,exercised administrative authorityin others,andestablished a trainingprogramfor publicofficials.Thearmedforcesof theformerwarringfac-

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tionswere cantonedand integratedand policingwas addressed. A human rightscomponent wasincludedin the mission,in thehopeof improvingthe performance of officials.With respectto severeviolations,the missioneven attemptedt o establisha systemof enforcement, includingthe powersof detentionand trial. An economicreconstruction component was alsoprovided.Hence,nearlythe entiretool kit of state-building instruments was applied. The missionwas challengedby the refusalof the formerKhmer Rouge factiont o grantaccesst o the territoryunderits control.Throughout the mission,patientattemptswere undertaken t o negotiatewith this group. However,the UN never madeany headway,even after sanctions were adoptedt o preventthe KhmerRougefromprofitingfrom illegallogging operations. In the end, this part of the territory,approximately5 percent of Cambodia,did not participate in the elections.Nevertheless, a powersharinggovernmentinvolvingthe two main partiesresulted,and boththe missionandtheelections werejudgeda success. Theconstitutional assembly adopteda new structure of the state,providingfor a constitutional monarchy.After thewithdrawalof themission,thepoliticalpartyheadedby Hun Sen soughtto oustits coalitionpartnerfrom government.However,the politicalsystemby and largesurvivedthis challenge.With U N mediation, agreement wasreachedin April 2000 to establishan accountability mechanismrelatingto theKhmerRougeperiod,addingthefinal elementof possible international involvement in statebuilding. The U N involvementin the transferof powerin Namibiaalsoinvolved substantial international governance duringthetransition.The territoryhad beenundernominalU N authority,buteffectiveSouthAfricancontrol.The terminationof theColdWar madeit possiblefinallyto implementproposals for a transitionto indigenousand independent government that had been draftedtowardsthe end of the 1970s.SouthAfrica consented to a transitionalarrangement andinterimadministration with a strongU N role.As in Cambodia,a ChapterVI mandate,whichaimedto establishan environment for freeandfair electionsandtheexerciseof therightof self-determination, wasdeemedto be sufficient.A largeUN missioncomposed of some5,000 military,2,000 civilian,and 1,500policestaffwasdispatched. The latterelementwasparticularlyimportantto ensureconfidence of all segments of the populationin the politicalprocessand the eiections.The continueduseof SouthAfrican administrators and of the policeforceestablished underits authorityis noteworthy in thisinstance.An additionalonethousandinternationalmonitorsweredraftedin to supportthefirstroundof elections. To achievethe aimsof themission,it wasfirstnecessary to demobilizeor integratethe oppositionforcesthathad beenbasedin neighboring territories,in parallelwith thewithdrawalof SouthAfricanforces.Thiswasparticularly difficult,giventhe distrustamongthe partiesandviolationsof the

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cease-firearrangements. The availabilityof powerfuland interestedstates, includingAngola,Cuba,and SouthAfrica, and the USSR and the United Statesas“observers” wasimportantin stabilizingthisprocess. Electionswereheldto a constituent assembly. In parallel,theUN mission repealeddiscriminatory legislation,althoughmainlyonly thoseelements thatwererelevantto theholdingof elections,andengaged in thesupervision of administrative activitiesandof policing.After this hadbeenachieved,an indigenousgovernment wasestablished, underthe leadership of the former nationalliberationmovement,SouthWest Africa People’sOrganization (SWAPO),whichhad won the majorityof seats.Its authorityhasnot been challenged. In additionto the administration of changethroughinternational governance,a secondapproachthathasbeenattemptedreliedon complexpeacekeeping.Thefirstseriesof complexpeacekeeping operations werein Central America.With thewithdrawalof Cold War supportfor the Sandinista governmentin Nicaragua,on theonehand,andfor theright-winggovernments in El Salvadorand Guatemala,on the other,it becamepossibleto negotiate peaceagreementin all threestates.The mandatescovereda rangeof peace supportactivities,inc1:idingdemilitarization, theintegrationof formerly opposing forces,therestoration of a constitutional consensus, andtheholding of a first roundof elections.Significantattentionwaspaid to institution buildingandtheintroduction of a humanrightsculture.In fact,theEl Salvadoroperationwasfromthebeginningspecifically dedicated to humanrights monitoringand legal reform.An importantelementalsorelatedto the reconstruction of thepoliceservices, whichhadplayeda particularroleduring the conflicts.The societiesin questionalsosoughtto coveraccountability, althoughmainly throughsoft mechanisms suchas truth commissions with the involvementof international personalities. All operations culminatedin theholdingof electionsthatwereeitherorganizedor monitoredby international agents.Sincethe authorityto act wasbasedin peaceagreements,ChapterVI mandates weresufficient.While the threemissionswere UN operations, theywereconducted in closecooperation with the OAS. The two post-Cold War African cases-Angola and Mozambiqueprovedto be evenmore difficult than the examplesfrom CentralAmerica and Asia.The prospectfor a settlementin Angolaopenedup when Cuba and SouthAfrica agreedto withdrawtheir interventionforces.The initial mission,United NationsAngolaVerificationMission I (UNAVEM I), was mainlydedicatedto verifyingthis process,while a secondmission, UNAVEM 11,concerned itselfwith the agreement betweentheinternalparties:the government of Angolaand the oppositiongroup,NationalUnion for theFull Independence of Angola(UNITA). A thirdmission,UNAVEM 111,followedwith a similarmandate,to assistimplementation of the peace accordsof 1991 and later the 1994 LusakaProtocol.The mandateof this

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traditionalChapterVI operation conducted by forcesunderU N controlwas mainlyfocused onmilitaryseparation, cantonment andintegration of forces. to ensurethe neutrality of the AngoHowever,therewasalsoa requirement lan policeforcecontrolledby the government andto helpestablish conditions for the holding of free and fair elections.Throughout,the implementation of thismandatewasthreatened by deepdistrustamongthe partiesand the inabilityto extendU N activitiesfully to areasheld by relatingto demilitarization UNITA. Hence,thefirststepof implementation was neverfully achieved.The withdrawalof SouthAfrican and Cuban forces,ontheotherhand,wasfully successful. The failureof implementation led the U N SecurityCouncilto threaten thetermination of themission. However,a furthereffortwasundertaken in 1997,with thetransformation of UNAVEM I11 intoa broadermissionwith a morepoliticalmandate,includingthe normalizationof administration all throughout the countryanda confidence buildingpresence to reassure segments of the population. Evengreaterattentionwaspaidto policemonitoringandto attemptsto integrateUNITA personnel intothepoliceforces. A humanrightscomponent was added,dedicatedto the suppression of abusesandcapacitybuilding.In the end,it wasalsopossibleto organize elections, although, whenit lost,UNITA failedto recognize the result. Civil war resumed. The U N SecurityCouncilresponded by imposingeconomic sanctions againstUNITA, seekingto reduceits controloverthe economic resources thathadenabledit to sustainitself. A numberof reasons for thefailureof themissioncanbe advanced. First, the U N missionwas from the beginninglimited. The mandateonly of expanded asthedifficultiesmountedandthemeansplacedat thedisposal the headsof the successive missions wereinadequate. Nor wasthe mission invasive.Its mandateremainedon a ChapterVI peacekeeping footingfrom the beginning. Therewasno attemptto imposecompliance with the terms of thepeaceagreement uponthe recalcitrant party,particularly importantin relationto the first stepof demilitarization. Instead,agreements wereconstantlyrenegotiated. Electionswerefinallyconducted, but in an environmentthat wasanythingbut politicallyneutralandwhenUNITA retained themilitarypotentialto resistimplementation of theresult.International effortsto cut UNITA off from its sources of fundingwerealsoinadequate andbelated. An effortwasmadeto avoidsomeof thesepitfallsin theUnitedNations Operationin Mozambique(ONUMOZ), whichwas basedon the 1992 peaceagreement concluded betweenthegovernment andtheMozambiquan NationalResistance (RENAMO). The operationwasconducted by theU N demobilization, Secretariat undera ChapterVI mandate.It encompassed withdrawalof foreignforces,civilfunctions, andthemonitoringof theelectoralprocess. Thesefunctionswerefrom the beginning seenas interrelated

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anddeservingof equalattention.As in Angola,difficultiespersisted in relationto demilitarization. However,thistime,it waspossibleto achieveagreean mentson the integrationof RENAMO-controlledareasandto establish international policesupportmission.To ensureimplementation, theUN secretary-general himselfengagedin directcontactwith theparties.The governments of France,Portugal,andtheUnitedKingdomalsodirectlysupportedthe crucialissueof the establishment of an integrateddefenseforce. Whenprogressstalled,the U N SecurityCouncilsenta high-levelmission, includingRussia,China,andtheUnitedStates,whichresultedin anacceleration of implementation in advanceof the electionsof October1994.The electionsresultedin victoryfor thepartyof theincumbent president.A secondelectionheldin 1999yieldeda similarresult. The distinctionbetweenideologicalandpurepowerstruggles is not absolute. In Angola,whatstartedasonedegenerated intothe other.Theremay alsobe an ethnicdimensionto them,sincemoreoftenthannotthecompeting leadersor war lordsrely on clanor triballoyalties.Essentially,though, suchcivil conflictsareabouttheestablishment of governance throughforce. In thisrespect,theyrepresenta particularlystrongchallengeto liberalviews aboutthenatureof governance andthelegitimacyof publicauthority.Operationsin countriesweakenedby suchinternecine feudinghavegenerally beenconducted underChapterVI, althoughin SierraLeone,enforcement elementswere added,and the Somaliaoperationwas conducted entirely underChapterVII. Internationalactionto addresstheseconflictshasat timesbeendecisive andat timeshesitant.WhenU.S. interestswereengagedin Haiti, the threat of a militaryinvasionresultedin a retreatof the militaryjuntathat had deposedthe electedpresident.Thoseelectionsin turn were the resultof a prolongedpeaceeffort by the UnitedNationsand regionalorganizations. Despitethe apparenteffectiveness of threatenedforcein this instance,the operationdid not endwith the returnof PresidentAristide.Haiti demonstratedthe needfor long-term,sustained involvement.The gradualrebuilding of an administrative infrastructure and of a policeand judicialsystem wereparticularlyimportant. An initiallylimitedU.S.-ledcoalitionwastherefore transformed into a full-fledged,complexU N peacekeeping operation. The missionnot only assistedin the difficulttask of maintaininglaw and orderbutalsoguidedthestate’sreturnto constitutional rule.A prioritywas the formationof a new nationalpoliceforceandthe holdingof the next roundof elections.When the missionterminated,a more limited support missionwas establishedto sustainthe progressthat had been made. Throughout, thisprocesswassupported by a groupof “friendsof the UN Secretary-General for Haiti” (Argentina,Canada,Chile,France,the United States,andVenezuela),andtherewasfull cooperation with regionalagencies

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in seekingt o introducea humanrightsculture.Disappointments subsequentlyraisedquestions still difficultto answerin thecaseof Haiti. The needfor stayingpowerand,whennecessary, decisiveness wasmore effectivelydemonstrated in the1997Italian-ledcoalitionto Albania.Initially launchedwith a humanitarian mandate,it wastransformed intoan electoral missiondesignedto leadAlbaniabackto constitutional rule, followingthe chaoticbreakdownof governmental authority.As in Haiti, the mission launcheda programof policetrainingandcivil affairsmanagement. The renewed-albeit brief-breakdown of authoritya year laterwas addressed throughinternational involvement.By that time, Albaniahad assumeda strategic significance for someWesterngovernments, whichundoubtedly madeit easierto mobilizethenecessary additionalresources. Attemptsto reconstitute civil societyafteraninternalconflicthaveproved to be muchmoredifficultin Africa, whereno suchstrategicinterestexists. ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, has launchedthree operations-in Liberia, GuineaBissau,andSierraLeone-at timesjointlyor in cooperation with the UnitedNations.Eachcasecalledfor ambitiousplansfor thereestablishment of a constitutional consensus, theholdingof elections,integrationof armed forces,and the establishment of a humanrights-basedcivil societyculture. The resultsweremixed. In Liberia,a peaceagreement was implementedafter manyfalsedawns, but only after electionshad broughtto powerthe brutalwarlordCharles Taylor,whohadlaunchedthe insurgency in thefirstplace.In SierraLeone, instabilityand civil war wereinitiallybroughtaboutby a very smallinsurrection.A peaceagreementfollowedby electionswas upsetby a military coup.A power-sharing arrangement, againincludingtheleadersof themost violentopposition movement, wasreached.However,whenthepartyled by theformerrebelleader,nowVice President Sankoh,resumedviolencein 2000, uniquely,his treacherytriggereda reasonablydecisivemilitary response by theUnitedNations,supported by theUnitedKingdom.A more aggressive ChapterVII mandatepermittedactiont o securefreedomof movementof UN personnelandprotectionfor civiliansunderthreatof violence.While it is too earlyto tell whetherthe governments involvedandthe UN will havethe determination to maintainthis commitmentto the peace accords,their actionmarksan interestingrecoveryfrom the Somaliexperience,whichfrozeanddoomedto failureseveralotherpeace-making operations. Somaliaitselfis oftenquotedasthetypicalexampleof misguidedWestern liberalinterventionism. While the initial U.S.-led humanitarian rescuemission(UnifiedTaskForce[UNITAF]) succeeded in meetingits objective,the UN SecurityCouncilthen authorizedthe deploymentof a large UN enforcement operationchargedwith reestablishing civil societyin Somalia, includingtheintroduction of a humanrightsculture.Thewithdrawalof the

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missionin disgraceunderminedthe attemptsthat had beenunderway to build alternativestructures of legitimacyon the basisof local tradition.It may be reasonablyarguedthat Somalisocietyis peculiarlyunsuitableas a testinggroundfor international interventionaimedat the local empowerment of disenfranchised populations.But the operationwas the sourceof severallessons concerning themanagement of UN operations-for example, the needfor decisiveness andsteadiness in response to challenges to UN mandatesand for long-termstayingpowerand commitmentto operations oncetheyhavebeenestablished. It remainsto be seenwhethertheselessonshavebeenlearned.Sincethe Somaliepisode,therehasbeen asecondwaveof Africanpeacekeeping operationsin Congo/ZaireandCentralAfricanRepublic.The factthatthesemissionsare beingconductedon the basisof a very limitedagreementby the partiesto a civil conflict,haverestrictedmandates, and are severelylimited at their disposalmustleadto someskepticism in in the toolsandresources thisrespect.

DividedStates In someconflicts,one ethnicgroupstrugglesagainstanotherto ensure exclusivecontroloverthestare.Theseconflictsarenotsecessionist. Thereis no plan for ethnicterritoriesor groupsto leavethe state;instead,an ethnic groupseeksto dominatetheentirestateunderits control. Rwandahadbeenunderthedominationof itsHutu majoritywhena force of the Tutsi-ledRwandesePatrioticFront(RPF) infiltratedthe territory fromUgandawith the aim of overthrowing the government. After Uganda gaveassurances againstintervention stemmingfromitsterritory,a smallUN monitoringmission,UnitedNationsObserverMissionUganda-Rwanda and (UNOMUR), wasdispatched in 1993.In themeantime,thegovernment the RPF had managedto concludethe Arushapeaceagreement, providing for a cessation of hostility,integrationof armedforces,theestablishment of a power-sharing interimgovernment, followedby the holdingof internationallymonitoredelections.Therewasalsoprovisionfor a civilpolicecontingentto help and to ensurea secureenvironment for all segments of the population.However,from the beginning,the securitysituationremained fraught.The interimgovernment was alsonot installed,mainly due to obstructionfrom the incumbentHutu headof state.His deathon April 6, 1994, alongwith the deathof the presidentof Burundiin an aircraftcrash, wasfollowedby anorchestrated campaign by thestillHutu-dominated governmentand local militiasto exterminatethe Tutsipopulation.In all, it is estimatedthat someeighthundredthousandTutsicivilianswerevictimsof thisgenocide. TheBelgiancontingent of UnitedNationsAssistance Mission for Rwanda(UNAMIR) waswithdrawnat that moment,reducingthe UN

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presenceto approximately1,500 personnel.The UN SecurityCouncil decidedto withdraweventhat presence, with the exceptionof a smallcore missionof 270 to continuemonitoringdevelopments andseekto establish a cease-fire. Duringtheensuingchaos,nosuchcease-fire waspossible.Efforts to intervenewith an expanded U N forcewere frustratedin the Security Council.Only whenthe Hutu government appearedto fall to the advance of the RPF rebelswas a French-ledcoalitionoperationlaunchedunder ChapterVII authority. Operation Turquoise did notpreventtheestablishment of effectivecontrol by the RPF throughout the territory.UNAMIR wasthenexpandedagain, to assistin stabilizingthe situation,supportthe new Tutsi-ledbut broadbasedgovernment in its effortsto achievereconciliation, providehuman rightssupport, andhelpestablish accountability for thegenocide.In thevast majorityof cases,justicewas pursuedthroughlocal courtsand in a small numberof instances throughaninternational tribunalcreatedunderChapter VII authority.Despitethereopening of theNationalAssembly,thesituation remainedtense,mainlydueto the presence of 1.5 million Hutu refugeesin neighboring Zaire,purportedly underthecontrolof membersof theformer Rwandanregimewho were reportedt o be rearming.A U N ChapterVII missionto take controloverthesecampswaslong delayed.Canadaagreed to leada coalition-type operationbut in the endwasnot deployed. In Rwandaitself,a HumanRightsField Operationof someonehundred personnelwas dispatched to assistin reconstructing the judiciaryand implanta humanrightsculturein the new administration. The Rwandan government soughtto limit progressively theroleof theU N in theterritory, leadingto a drawingdownof the militarycomponent, andlaterevenof the civil policeelement,and to an emphasison reconstruction, reconciliation, anddevelopment. Throughout, thesafereturnof refugeesremaineda priority. The missionendedin March 1996. The initial failureof the Arushapeaceprocesscanbe partiallyattributed to theunwillingness of thepartiesto settle.But theinternational community alsofailedto establish a complexpeacekeeping missionthatcouldhavesupportedthepeaceprocessmorevigorously.It wastoo small,its mandatetoo weak,andits leadership wasneitherwillingnorableto pressthepartiesinto compliance with theirownundertakings at criticaljunctures. Therewasalso no significantinvolvementby the greatpowersthat mighthaveassisted in maintaining security.Instead,therewasrivalry amongcertainstateswith interestsin the area. The failure of the missiont o preventthe Rwandangenocidestemmed fromthefailureof theSecurityCouncilto changethemandateof UNAMIR froma ChapterVI to a ChapterVII operationandto boostitscapacity.Senior membersof the missioninsistthat they couldhavemanagedto prevent someof the outragesuntil a largermissioncouldhavebeenestablished.

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However,the reluctanceof forcecontributing states,and evenof states unwillingto contribute forces(e.g.,theUnitedStates)to permittheenlargementof the UN mandateand missionin the wake of the Somaliadisaster, wascrucial.In any event,theinternational effortt o reintegrate Rwandan societyfailed. A moresuccessful effortwasmadein easternSlavonia,whichwasplaced undera mixtureof international administration and complexpeacekeeping after Croatiaobtainedthe meansto forciblyreincorporate it. Croatiahad alreadyincorporated Krajinain 1995 by displacingthe occupyingSerbs. Towardthe end of the year, Croatiaconcludedan agreement providingfor the internationalized reintroduction of Croatianauthorityinto easternSlavonia.Thiswasto be donein a way thatwouldfacilitatethe returnof ethnic Croatianswithoutat thesametimepressuring theethnicSerbpopulationto flee. The UN established a competent international mission,whichtook controloversomeaspectsof civil administration andinstituteda reformof the policesystem,t o ensurean ethnicbalanceand to introducea human rightsculture.It alsofacilitatedthe gradualintroductionof Croatianlaw in the territoryandfacilitatedthe eventualhandoverto full Croatadministrativeauthority. Assurances wereobtainedfromtheCroatiangovernment that humanand minorityrightswould be appliedto the territory,as elsewhere in Croatia,includinga limitedmeasureof culturalautonomy. On the admittedlycontestable assumption that the Daytonaccordsand SecurityCouncilResolution1244havesettledthe self-determination crises of Bosniaand Herzegovinaand KOSOVO, respectively, at leastfor the time being,onemightalsoconsiderthemasexamples of international attemptsto imposehumanrightsstandards and democraticgovernance on divided states.In BosniaandHerzegovina, ethnicdivisionandpoliticsareessentially written into the internationally draftedconstitution. While a ChapterVII mandateexists,the stateis not formallyunderinternational administration. A NATO-led force maintainssecurity.Under the authorityof a Peace Implementation Councilof powerfulandinterested states,a highrepresentativesupports governance in theterritory,althoughit wasneverintendedthat he shouldtake over the functionsof governance. A wholehostof other implementation agencies,includinga UN mission,are contributingt o reconstruction andreintegration of society.Thereis an internationalized humanrightsmonitoringsystem,includingan international ombudsman anda HumanRightsChamber(Court). Theverywide-ranginginternational humanrightsguarantees in the Dayton accordsmirrorWesternEuropeanstandards and in somerespectseven exceedthem.Particularattentionis paid to the rightsof ethnicgroupsand therightof returnof thedisplaced. Themissionchargedwiththeimplementationof the Daytonaccordshasmanagedto establish manyof the institutionsstipulatedin the accords,includinghumanrightsmonitoringand

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implementation. However,giventhe realityof “ethnicdemocracy”on the ground,thevalueof theseprovisions hasbeensignificantly undermined, and it hasnot alwaysbeenpossibleto fill theseprovisionswith life. While there is someevidenceof progress in humanrights-relevant areas,thestructureof theDaytonaccordsandtheapproachto theirimplementation havecontributedto a situationwhereethnicdivisionis becomingpoliticallyentrenched. The reasonis that the accordsonly paperoverthe fact that the underlying tensionthat createdthe crisisand confrontation in the first placehad not beenaddressed. This case,therefore,is one of a politicalsolutionimposed on the partiesratherthan supported by them.For the moment,it remains viableonlyfor aslongasit is internationally enforced. Unhappily,thehopethatthemodelof humanrightsandinterethnicgovernancewill graduallytakeholdandthattheconcerns of “real”life will gento a multiethnicdemocracy appearsoptimistic.The eratea commitment effortsto maketheDaytonpoliticalstructure workby givingtheethnicpartiesincentivesto cooperate in interest-led politicshavethusfar notfallenon fertileground.Instead,the international highrepresentative hasbeenforced to exercisehis supremepowerswith considerable vigor,almostturningthis administration. For example,on occasions he has intoa caseof international removedfrompublicofficeanyonewhoengages in unhelpfulethnicpolitics, thusin a way disenfranchising thepopulationtheUN missionis intendedto unfortunately serve.Theproblemis, of course,thatmanyof thesepoliticians developments in BosniaandHerzeenjoya popularmandate.Nevertheless, govinahavebeenlessdiscouraging thanmighthavebeenexpected. Military confrontation has ended,the securitysituationfor the populationhas improvedvastlyand thereis a senseof normalcyandreconciliation that is emergingin severalareas. By contrast,KosovowasplacedunderdirectUN administration with a ChapterVII mandate.TheUN is chargedwith developing a systemof widerangingself-governance. The OSCEis activein relationto democratization andtheEuropeanUnion(EU) exercises authorityin relationto reconstruction and development. Significanteffortshavebeenmadeto introducea humanrightscultureintothenewinstitutions, includingtheKosovopolice, the newly established judicialsystemthat functionsunderinternational that are now being supervision, and the institutionsof administration increasingly takenoverby localpoliticians.Electionslatein 2001 resultedin a power-sharing government involvingall of the majorethnicAlbanianpartiesandalsothoseelementsof theethnicSerbcommunity willingto cooperate.While greatcarewastakento ensurefull andadequate representation of minoritycommunities at all levelsof governance, no firm blockingpowers for ethniccommunities havebeenintroducedintothe constitutional frameearlyin 2001. work thatwaspromulgated by theUN administration Thislessonwasalsoappliedin Macedoniaby boththeUnitedStatesand

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the EuropeanUnion. Duringthe 1990s,a smallUN preventativemission hadbeendeployedto deterethnicconflictbetweenthemajoritySlavpopulation, the sizeablecommunity of ethnicAlbanians,andseveralsmallminorities.Therehad alwaysbeenconcernthat Albaniansin Macedoniamight attemptto secedein orderto createa greaterAlbania.Fortunately,thelocal ethnicAlbanianleadershiphad consistently limiteditself to claimingfull equalityfor itspopulationwithinMacedonia.Evenduringthedramaticrefugeecrisisof the 1999Kosovoconflict,leadingto a vastandsuddeninfluxof ethnicAlbanians,the situationhad maintainedreasonably stable.However, wasmountedfrom areascloseto at the startof 2001, an ethnicinsurgency society. theKosovoborder.Thisrapidlyled to a polarizationof Macedonian The Macedoniangovernment wasveryreluctantto admitto international intervention,evenwhenethnicAlbanianarmedformationsgainedground. It arguedthat it was in the processof makingsufficientprovisionfor the protectionof Albanianrightsin its own legislation.The Albanians,on the otherhand,objectedto the fact that the Macedonianconstitution defined the stateas an ethnicstateof Slav0Macedonians, thattherewasinsufficient provisionfor Albanianlanguageandeducation,andthattherewasa lackof equaleconomicopportunity. O n August13,2001a frameworkagreement wasconcluded, addressing all of thesepoints.It was achievedthroughmediationby the EU, althougha breakthrough onlybecamepossiblewhentheUnitedStatesbecamedirectly of the agreement in its militaryprovisions engaged.The implementation providedfor a withdrawalof ethnicAlbanianinsurgents, theirdisarming withina shortperiodof time,andthegradualreintroduction of Macedonian government policeinto areasof conflict.It was supportedby a limited NATO-led forceactingundera UN mandate.Provisionwasalsomadefor an amnestyfor Albanianfighters.Modestpowersharingwasintroducedin the political institutionsof the state,and provisionmadefor equitable minorityrepresentation in the civil service,thejudiciary,andthepolice. Limitedpowersof localself-government (territorialautonomyin disguise) wereprovidedfor. In addition,minorityrightsaddressing languageuseand educationareto be enshrinedin legislation. Theagreement isunique,inasmuch astheethnicAlbaniancommunity was represented in thecentralgovernment throughout.It wassignedby theparties in this governmentof nationalunity, createdunderinternational pressurewhentheconflictbrokeout,ratherthanby a government andanarmed opposition.The agreementsucceeded in its initial phases.The insurgency wasterminated,at leastfor themoment.A senseof normalityreturned.The constitutional changes requiredby theframeworkagreement weremadeand otherimplementing legislationdrafted.Because of thesensitivityof therepresentatives of the majoritycommunity,no significantinternational civil implementation was attached.Nevertheless, the E U and the OSCE have

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graduallyandinformallyincreasedtheir supportfor reintegration in the country,althoughthisfactmay itselfcreateproblemsfor thefuture. In Macedonia,greatpowerintervention did succeed in arresting ethnic conflictbeforeit tooka firm grip on the country.The settlement is modest andcleverlyconstructed. If implemented, it may satisfythe concerns of the ethnicAlbaniancommunity,withoutturningMacedoniaintoa constitutionally dividedethnicstate,alongthe linesof the unhappyBosnianexperiment-unhappy, thatis, froma liberalpointof view. ThreatenedStates

The international communityhasattemptedto redresssecessionist conflictson severaloccasions. In the earlycasein the Congo,for instance,the UnitedNationsactuallymilitarilydefeatedthe Katangasece~sion.~ The U N peacekeeping missionthen supported attemptsof restoringa Congo-wide administration basedon thepreexistingconstitutional structure.In relation to Biafra,the UN did not take actionuntil the Nigerianarmedforceshad defeatedthe secessionist forces.A UnitedNationspresence wasintroduced to providehumanitarian assistance in the wake of the reintroduction of Nigerianforcesintothe territory. In the caseof the formerYugoslavia-the first post-ColdWar challenge of thekind-initial attemptsat international crisismanagement alsofocused on the retentionof the territorialintegrityof theSocialistFederalRepublic. Whenthisappeared fruitless,it washopedthattheterritorialintegrityof the constituent republicscouldbe maintainedthroughinternational action.The intentionwasto achievethe orderlydissolution of theformerYugoslavia throughtheconsentof theparties.4 Accordingto thisstrategy,ethnopolitical conflictresultingfrom the establishment of new boundaries and the consequentcreationof new minoritieswas to be managedthrougha detailed humanrightsregime.Thiswascoupledwith lesspreciseproposals for territorial autonomy,principallyintendedfor areasmainly inhabitedby Serbs thatwouldin thefuturelie outsidetherumpYugoslavia. Beforethe strategycouldtake hold, Yugoslavarmedforcesoccupied approximately a third of Croatianterritory,includingareasmainlybut not solelyinhabitedby ethnicSerbs.TheUnitedNationsestab1ished.a regimeof so-calledU N protectedareas.While the UN waspresentundera Chapter VI peacekeeping mandatein theseareas,it failed to preventthe continued ethniccleansing committedby YugoslavandSerbforces.Thus,anethnically pureSerbentitywas established, whichclaimedindependence and agitated for incorporation with Serbiaproper.ThefactthattheUN presence hadleft thelocalnon-Serbpopulationwithoutanyprotection, in spiteof thehuman rightsprovisionscontainedin the conceptof operations for their deployment,considerably lessened international opposition whenCroatiaforcibly

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reincorporated theseterritoriessomethreeyearslater.The credibilityof the UN as an agency,which canintroducehumanrightsinto at timesviolent discourse aboutsecession, wasinevitablyseverelydented. After Croatiahad recapturedthe territory,it provedresistantto internationalattemptsto protectthehumanrightsof itsremainingSerbpopulation. with thefailureto insistontheappliOnceagain,theUN becameassociated cationof humanrightsprinciples,thistimein relationto theexodusof most Serbswho had traditionallyinhabitedthat area.Again,UN credibilitywas underminedto an extentthat a far morepositiveexamplealsoconcerning Croatiathatwasnotedearlier(easternSlavonia)is oftenoverlooked. BosniaandHerzegovinawasalsothesiteof a sustained secessionist camof an ethnicallypureSerbentity,which paignaimedat the establishment claimedindependence and ultimateintegrationwith Serbia.The Republica Srpska,wasat onetimeestablished in overhalf of Bosnianterritorythrough armedactionby YugoslavandlocalSerbmilitaryandparamilitaryforces.A campaignof terror,arbitraryarrest,killing, and deportation was mounted over somethreeyearsagainstthe mainlyMuslim population.Otherareas of civilianpopulations, notyet capturedandcontaining largeconcentrations includingthe displaced,weresubjected to humanitarian blockades and sustainedmilitaryattack.In all, abouttwo hundredthousandcivilians,mainly non-Serbs,aresaidto haveperished,andsometwo millionweredisplaced. the UnitedNationsmaintainedan international peacekeepThroughout, ing forcewith someenforcement powersin the territory.Its ineffectiveness in preventinga probablegenocidewhile pretending to protectfundamental humanvalues-symbolizedby thefall of theso-calledU N safeareaof Sreslaughter-onceagainseverelyunderminedthe brenicaandthe consequent ethnopolitical violenceandsecessioncredibilityof UN attemptsto address ist conflicts. Towardthe end of 1995,NATO armedactionand joint BosniagovernmentandCroatmilitaryoperations broughtthe carnageto a provisional end,culminatingin theDaytonpeaceagreements. A NATO-led implementationandstabilization forcewasestablished undera verywideChapterVII UN mandate.As wasnotedearlier,the missionhasbeeneffectivein imposing a cease-fireandthe cantonment of armaments on theparties.However, the resultof havingcreateda very weakcentralstate,whichis ethnically divided,is provingvery difficultto overcome.Hence,it is not entirelycertainthatthesecessionist impetushasbeencurbed.In fact,in 2001, theCroat Bosnianentitywithin the BosnianFederationsoughtto withdrawfromthe state. Severalattemptswere madeto containthe momentumtowardKosovo independence. Theseincludedthe deploymentof a brief OSCE long-term monitoringmissionin theterritory,thenegotiation underthethreatof force of an OSCE verificationmissionof severalthousandunarmedobservers to

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be deployedin the territory,and the attemptto obtainan autonomyor interimagreementbetweenthe partiesthroughshuttlediplomacyand, finally, the proximitytalksat Rambouilletin February1999.The proposals thatemergedfromRambouilletprovidedfor a multilayered systemof power sharingthatwouldhavebeenverydifficultto implement.Theyalsoincluded substantive humanrightsguarantees, plusvery wide functionalautonomy for minoritypopulations. Had theagreements beenimplemented, muchreliancewouldhavehad to be placedon enforcement that wasto be provided througha substantial UN-mandated, NATO-ledforcebecause of theircomplexity and the reluctanceof bothpartiesreadilyto embracethem.Once again,thiswouldhavebeenan international attemptto imposea solution,to which neithersidewould havebeen actuallycommitted.In the end, an interimsolutionwasimposedon thepartiesby force,providingfor internationalizedself-governance of the territoryuntil suchtime as its final status canbe settled.Hence,theunderlyingself-determination disputehasnot yet beenaddressed. The situationwasdifferentin relationto EastTimor. Indonesiaconsented to the holdingof a referendumon independence in that territory,being awarethat the majorityof the indigenous populationwouldoptfor separation. Oncethat outcomehad beenachievedin August1999,governmental forcesandaffiliatedmilitiasin theterritoryengaged in a campaignof terrorizationof the population.This triggeredthe establishment of a U N interim administration, chargedwithprovidingsecurityandestablishing anadministrationand the development of civil andsocialservices.It wasalsocharged with theadministration of justiceandwith assisting in developing a sustainablecapacityfor self-government. Thisprocess,while fraughtwith difficulties and alsohamperedby manageriallimitationson the part of the UN mission,wasconcluded with the holdingof freeandfair elections,allowing it to assume its independence aftera periodof interimUN administration. An attemptwas alsomadeto addressone of the few remainingcasesof colonialself-determination throughinternational actionin WesternSahara. In 1988,it was finally agreedto settlethe statusof the territorythrougha referendum. A U N ChapterVI missionwasestablished in 1991to monitor a cease-fire, verifythereductionof Moroccantroopsin theterritoryandthe cantonment of otherforces,andregistervotersfor a referendumto be conductedby the UN. However,the work of the missionhasbeenobstructed overthe issueof registrationof thoseentitledto participatein the referendum.Hence,it may be saidthatMorocco,thestateexercising effectivecontrol overthe territory,may haveconsented to a settlementassuming that it wouldbe ableto controlthe outcomethrougha manipulationof the registrationprocess. Oncethatoutcomewasthreatened, attemptshavebeenmade to inhibittheprocess until controloverit canbe removedfromtheU N mis-

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sion.A genuineagreement on a trulyinternational administration of the act of self-determination may thereforenot haveexistedfromthe outset. Othersecessionist conflictshavebeenaddressed with hesitantattemptsto achievestabilizationthroughlimitedpeacekeeping. For example,the situation in the secessionist Georgianentityof Abkhaziahasbeensubjected to a UN monitoringmission,followingagreements on a cease-fire of 1993-1994. In fact,themaintenance of thecessation of hostilities andalsoof thepolitical statusquoof de factoself-administration hasbeenmainlyassuredby a CIS peacekeeping forcewith a largeRussiancontingent. TheUN missionis principallydevotedto observingtheperformance of thatmission,giventherisk of partialityin this matteron the part of the CIS forces.In additionto its militaryobservation task,thereis a U N humanrightsofficeaffiliatedwith themission.The 1994agreement envisaged thenegotiationof a politicalsettlementonthebasisof autonomy andpowersharingfor Abkhasia.However, little progress hasbeenmadein thisrespect,andtheU N missionhasthereforenotbeenableto expandits mandateintociviliansupportfor thereconstructionof civil authoritywithin an agreedframework. Theinternational sensitivityof casesof secession is alsoexhibitedin relation to the Somaliacrisis.AlthoughSomalilandhasadministered itselflike an independent stateover muchof the pastdecade,the variousUnited Nationsmissionshavehad difficultiesin engagingits authorities. Carewas takento conductsuchcontactsthroughthe U N structurefor Somaliaas a whole,andsuchcontacts, andU N assistance, havebeenquitelimited.Nevertheless,Somalilandhasmanagedto provideone of the few raysof hopein Somalia,managingto providesecurityfor its populationanda modicumof economicstability.

CONCLUSION This chapterhas demonstrated that the pictureregardinginternational attemptsto reconstruct civil societyin statesin crisisis far lessbleakthan mighthavebeenexpected. The largemajorityof missions weresuccessful in termsof the criterionestablished earlier-that is, the restorationof governanceonthebasisof thewill of thegoverned. It is notevenpossibleto argue thatcertaintypesof conflictscanbe addressed throughinternationalized statebuildingwhile otherscannot. In relationto weak states,it was possiblein mostinstances to restorea constitutional consensus. In particular,goodresultswereobtainedin cases of weakstatesthat haveemergedfrom a periodof civil unrestand that are “ripe” for a transition.This appliedespeciallyto conflictsthathad been fueledby Cold War competition.In mostof thesecases,the protagonists were tired of strife,their constituents were attractedby the benefitsof life

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in an ordinarycivil society,and, mostimportant,their resourcebasewas threatened. Under thesecircumstances, international actorsdevelopeda complexand sophisticated systemof stabilizingthe situation.It generally followedan attemptto reestablish civil societythroughan act of popular will, mainlyin generatingand approvinga new constitution, accompanied by internationally managedor monitoredelections.Transitionalauthority wasexercised with international supportandat timesinternational involvement.O n thisbasis,theevidencesuggests thatit is possibleto evolvea new, humanrights-basedsocietalconsensus. A processof nationalreconciliation throughtruthcommissions or the administration of justicewith internationalinvolvementcanplaya key rolein consolidating themovefromtransition to stablesystem. The recordis marredin relationto casesin whichoneor moreof thefactionspreviouslyinvolvedin the conflictarein dangerof losingpoweraltogetheras a resultof an exerciseof popularwill, and/orwhereoneor more factionsretainindependent accessto resources thatpermitthemto sustain themselvesoutsidethe re-createdstatestructure(Angola,SierraLeone). Similarly,andunsurprisingly, the recordof UN actionis bleakwhereit intervenesin the absenceof a consensus amongthe partieson the needto renewa particularsocietyand the concreteshapeof a new constitutional humanitarstructure.It hasrarelybeenpossibleto transforman emergency ianoperationintoanoperationthatsupports a long-termpoliticaltransition underthosecircumstances. The recordin relationto dividedstatesis alsofar lessnegativethanmight be expected. Wheretheethnicpowerstrugglehasin somesensebeendecided and a dominantgrouphasemerged(Rwandaafter the victoryof the RPF, CroatiaafterOperationStorm),international involvementcanassistin protectingat leastthehumanrightsof thenondominant groups.However,from a numberof othermorerecentinstances, it appearsthatevenongoingethnic conflictcanbe arrested.In this context,it is particularlyinterestingto see of ethnic howlessonshavebeenlearnedin theinternational management division,from the initial disastersof Rwandaand Bosniaand Herzegovina to thefar moreadvanced Macedonian settlement. Theexampleof Macedonia alsogivesriseto thehopethatit ispossible,throughinternational actionand onthebasisof anestablished theencouragement of interethnic collaboration humanrightsculture,to preventtheneedto arisefor a violenttestof whois thedominantgroupin a particularstate. effectively.This is, of course, Threatenedstatesalsohavebeenaddressed mosteasilypossiblewheretheunderlyingself-determination disputehas beenaddressed (EastTimor). O n the otherhand,wheresuchan agreement mayhavebeenreachednominallybutnotin fact,noprogress hasbeenpossible (WesternSahara).The attemptsto imposea definite(Dayton)or an interimsettlement (Kosovo)beganamidwidespreadpessimism. However,

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somerecentdevelopments give causeto cautiousoptimismthat the settlementscanbe sustained oversometime.Whethertheywill persistwhenthe considerable investment in international implementation wanes,or whenthe underlyingself-determination conflictis beingrekindled,is a more.difficult matter. Wheredifficultieshaveoccurred,especiallyin relationto internalpower struggles,the occasional lack of success is not due to the inabilityeverto addresssuchsituations. Instead,thereexistmanagerialfailingsanda lack of decisiveness andinvestment in thenecessary resources andin a lackof stayingpowerof theinternational agencies involved.Giventhatsuccess in these caseswill tendto be obstructed by quitesmallelitesthatdominatesegments of societythroughintimidationandviolence,onemightalsoarguethatoperationsof thiskind havenotreallybeenattempted yet.Thatis,if suchprojects are to be undertaken in the future,they will requirea long-termcommitmentof resources and skillsto the taskof seekingto empowerpopulations at presentdenieda participation in governance. In termsof managerial issues,someof theapparently obviousconclusions one might reachare in fact not borneout by the analysis.A ChapterVII mandate,for instance,is not alwaysnecessary for success. In fact,it remains the rareexception,mostlyassociated with imposedsettlements. Generally, the qualityof the initial agreementof the protagonists to settleis a crucial ingredientof success. However,evendefectsin the commitmentof the one or the otherpartycan be overcome.To this end,it is necessary to fully engageall partiesthroughout the implementation process,ratherthanrelying juston some.Stepsmustbe takento isolaterecalcitrant groupsfrom sourcesof fundingandinternational support,andit is oftenvery helpfulto UN mediationwith theinvolvementof a contactgroupof states accompany thatmayfind it easierto bringpressure or incentives to bearon theparty in question. Oneof themoreobviousfindingsof thisreviewis thatthequalityof missionsandoutcomes depends very muchon the qualityof the resources and operations. Limitedpeacekeeping missionsfocusingmainlyon securitythat haveonlyaddressed theunderlyingsocialtensionsin an incidentalway will alsogenerallyhaveonlyyieldedlimitedeffect.However,wherethefull toolbox of measures-fromthe restoration of a constitutional consensus, to the rebuildingof civil administrative structures, the establishment of a reliable policeforce,supportfor an independent judiciary,to the introductionof stronghumanrights-buildingelementandaccountability mechanisms-has beenapplied,resultstendto be impressive. This is oftendoneto besteffect with the involvementof a significantrangeof specialistagenciesgoing beyondthe immediateUN family. Finally, the issueof economicreconstructionis to be considered. Thiselementis altogether toooftenoverlooked but crucialfor thelonger-termsustainability of a settlement.

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Overall,therefore,we havesomecausefor optimismin relationto internationaloperations aimingto stabilizeweak,divided,andthreatened states. However,if therecordof thenextfifty yearsof practicein thisrespectis to be evenmorepositive,it will be necessary to recallthat success is a matter of long-termcommitmentand the considerable investmentof resources in stabilization measures. Thequestion is whethertheinternational community is willingto makesuchan investment.

NOTES 1. UnitedNationsAouzouStripObserverGroup(UNASOG) in ChadILibya, United Nations Good Offices in Afghanistanand Pakistan(UNGOMAP) in Afghanistan, UnitedNationsMissionof Observers in Tajikistan(UNMOT) in Tajikistan,UnitedNationsIran-Iraq Military ObserverGroup(UNIIMOG) in Iraq/ Kuwait,UnitedNationsMissionin Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE) in Ethiopia/Eritrea, UNOMUR concerning UgandaandRwanda,UnitedNationsMissionof Observers in Prevlaka(UNMOP) in Croatia,and the UnitedNationsObserverMissionin Georgia(UNOMIG) monitoringmissionin Georgia,although,aswe shallsee,this operation alsohasa stabilization element. 2. One may perhapsalsoconsiderthe UN-mandatedoperationin Bosniaand Herzegovina underthisheading,asit is guidednot by the UnitedNationsbut by a PeaceImplementation Council.But the authorityof this councilwas established throughthe Daytonagreements by thepartiesandhasbeenconfirmedby the U N SecurityCouncil. 3. Thiswaspresented as an accident at the time,dueto a lossof communications betweentheU N forcesin thefieldandU N headquarters. 4. This took the shapeof the Carringtonpeaceconference, whichattemptedto of independence persuade thepartiesto agreeto a treatyprovidingfor thepossibility for thosefederalrepublics wishingit andregulating itsmodalities.

7 EnforcingHumanRights Nicholas J. Wheeler

Securingcompliance with globalhumanitarian normsis oneof thekey challengesfacingthesocietyof statesin thenextfifty years.Thelitanyof atrocitiesperpetuated by gangsterstatesin the 1990sandtheviolenceinflictedon civiliansasa consequence of the collapseof orderin Africa’s“failedstates” bearspowerfultestimonyto the continuingfailureof international society to live up to its humanitarian standards. This gapbetweennormativestandardsandmoralpracticesis not new sinceit wasa persistentfeatureof the international responseto genocideand massmurderduringthe Cold War. But whatmakesthe failureto defendhumanrightsin the 1990ssodepressing is thattheendof theColdWar seemedto holdoutthepromiseof a new eraof humanrightsenforcement. Consequently, the questionthat hasto be askedis whetherthe storyof recurrence andrepetitionthatcharacterizes theinternational response to the “loud emergencies” of genocide,massmurder,and ethniccleansingin the 1990ssupports the claimsof thosewho arguethat the societyof statesis incapableof developinga collectivecapacityfor humanrightsenforcement. Two voicescanbe heardarguingthis case.First is realism,which is suspithat claimthe humanitarian mantleand believesthat ciousof governments geopoliticalinterestswill alwaystrumpconsiderations of commonhumanity. Realismbelievesthatstateleadershavea primaryethicof responsibility to protectthe nationalcommunityand thatwhile this doesnot rule out moralactionin foreignpolicy,thesearealwayssubjectto this overriding ethicof responsibility. Second,pluralistinternational societytheory(hereafterreferredto asplurulism)believesthatwhilestatescanagreeontheneedfor orderdespitetheir 169

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conflictingconceptions of justice,anyattemptto promotehumanrightswill be subversive of that order.Althoughindividualthinkerswill straddleboth of thought,pluralismshouldbe differentiated fromrealismonthe categories followinggrounds.Pluralismis committedto the ideathatstatesrecognize the existenceof bindinglegalobligationsand that theseauthoritativerules functionto mitigatethe exerciseof brutepowerin the societyof states.By contrast,realismseesrulesas instrumental maximsthat are only followed outof calculations of self-interest. Statesmightadoptmoreenlightened conceptionsof theirinterestsasin regimetheory,buttheiridentitiesasrational egoistsconstitutethelimitsof interaction.Setagainstthis,pluralismargues of interthatstateidentitiesandinterestsareboundup in theirmembership nationalsociety.Theethicof responsibility thatguidespluralismis the constructionof a setof commonrulesthat establisha legitimateinternational orderbuilt on themoralprincipleof coexistence. The pluralistcommitmentto an ethicof tolerationbetweenstatesreflects skepticism thatstateswill provecapableof reachinga consensus onuniversal values.It followsfromthisthatpluralismis deeplysuspicious of statesthat setthemselves up asguardians of theworldcommongood.Theworryis that Westernstateswill employtherhetoricof universalhumanrightsto trespass overtheprincipleof nonintervention in theinternalaffairsof statesandthat this will lead to a collapseof the pillarsof interstateorder.Suchconcerns wouldbe amelioratedif thereweregreatpowerconsensus on humanitarian pluralists intervention,but as I showlater in the chapter,contemporary opposea doctrineof humanrightsintervention becausethisundermines orderamongthe greatpowers.The moral consequences of standingaside whenanothergovernment massacres its citizenshasto be setagainstthe greatpowerstabilmoralconsequences of unilateralactionthatjeopardizes ity andtheUN Charter’sfragilerestraintsagainsttheuseof force:the cure mightbe worsethanthedisease. The failureof governments to act as humanitarian law enforcersis purportedto demonstrate thepowerof realistandpluralistvaluesin constitutingtheboundaries of legitimatestateaction.However,thereis anothervoice in theconversation thatlooksto thepossibilities of placingtheenforcement of humanrightsat the centerof foreignpolicy decisionmakingand challengesboth realismand pluralism.This is the solidaristconceptionof the societyof states,whichis predicated in HedleyBull’swordsonthe“solidarity, or potentialsolidarityof thestatescomprising international societywith respectto theenforcement of thelaw.’” Bull’straditionalformulationof solidarismembraced bothcollectivesecurityandhumanitarian intervention, butthischapterwill restrictitselfto thelatter.It seeksto advancethesolidarist projectby highlightingthe normativelimitationsof realismandpluralism andby exploringhow far a foreignpolicycommittedto the defenseof humanrightscanreconciletherequirements of bothorderandjustice.

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It is necessaryat this point to clarify how I am usingthe conceptof enforcement. Internationallawyerswho employthis terminologythink in termsof internationallegal instruments that setstandards and establish mechanisms for monitoringstatecompliancewith the 1966International CoveCovenantonCivil andPoliticalRights(ICCPR)andtheInternational nanton Economic,Social,and CulturalRights(ICESCR).The key bodies hereat the globallevel are the UN’s HumanRightsCommitteeand the onHumanRights.At theregionallevel,therearehuman UN’s Commission rightsinstruments setup by theOrganizationof AmericanStates(OAS) and the Organization of AfricanUnity (OAU, now the AfricanUnion),but the mosteffectiveandlegitimateregionalarrangement is theEuropeanCourtof HumanRights.A crucialcomponent in thisprocessof holdinggovernments accountable is theroleplayedby theplethoraof nongovernmental organizations(NGOs)like AmnestyInternationalandHumanRightsWatch.Based on their extensivenetworksin targetstates,theseorganizations are ableto providevaluableinformationto the UN monitoringsystemaboutcasesof humanrightsviolations,and throughpersistentlobbyingandthe powerof “namingand shaming,”they are ofteneffectivein persuading governments to honortheir commitments. However,when I talk aboutenforcementin thischapter,the referenceis not to the modalitiesof globalstandardsetting and compliance; rather,the focusis on the capacityof statesand internaagainstgoverntionalorganizations to employa rangeof punitivesanctions mentsthatgrosslyviolatehumanrights. The secondqualificationconcernsthe type of humanrightsabusesthat are beingdiscussed here.The failureof governments andtransnational corporationsto live up to thesocialandeconomicprovisionsof the 1966covenantsandthe 1948UniversalDeclarationof HumanRightsposesprofound challenges to the globalhumanrightsregime.But theserightscannotbe defendedthroughthe useof coercivesanctions. Rather,endingtheseviolationsraisesuncomfortable questions aboutthecharacter of globalcapitalism and the growinginequalitiesbetweenthe globalrich and poor that go beyondthe scopeof this chapter.The focusof this chapteris on the prospectsfor creatinganeffectivecapacityfor humanrightsenforcement in cases in whichgovernments, or otherpoliticalentities,useforceto repressthe humanrightsof ethnicor politicalgroupswithinthe state. The argumentproceeds in fourstages.First,I setup a solidaristtheoryof humanrightsenforcement thatchallenges realistandpluralistvalues.Having established thetheoreticalframeworkthatwill guidethesubsequent investigation,the chapterexploreshow far solidaristvaluescanbe translatedinto effectiveforeignpolicyaction.Here, I examinethe followingquestions: the significance of the end of the Cold War in changingthe possibilitiesfor humanrightsenforcement; theproblemof theselective character of humanitarianintervention; the role of economicsanctions in protectinghuman

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rights;and,finally,the questionof whetherforcecaneverbe a servantof humanitarian ends.With regardto thelatter,thechaptersetsupsomeprinciintervention, and plesor guidelines for judginga legitimatehumanitarian thesearethenusedto assess thehumanitarian credentials of NATO’s interventionin Kosovo.

A SOLIDARIST THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT Realismis predicated on a particularconception of the relationship between callsan ethic citizensandstrangers thatprivilegeswhatRobertH. Jackson of “nationalresponsibility.”* Statesarepermittedto promotemoralvalues in foreignpolicy,but thispermission is heavilycircumscribed. Evenif an actioncanbejustifiedonthegrounds thatit savesfellowhumans, it mustbe ruledoutif it threatens vital securityinterests. Thisbegsthe questionasto whatis to countasa vitalinterest.Avoidingwar clearlymeetsthiscategory, butwhatabouttheeconomic costsincurredasa resultof notsellingarmsto a government engaging in grosshumanrightsabuses? Is a stateleaderfailing if whatever in moraldutyto protectthesecurityof thenationalcommunity actionsaretakenleadto somefellownationalsbeingmadeunemployed? The hardercaseconcerns whetherstatesshouldrisk their soldiers’livesto saveotherhumans in danger.Manyrealistswouldagreewith SamuelP. Hunin Somaliawhenhewrites,“[I]t is tington’scriticismof theU.S. intervention morallyunjustifiable andpoliticallyindefensible thatmembers of thearmed forcesshouldbe killed to preventSomalisfrom killing one another.”3 Pushedto its logicalextreme,thispositionrulesoutriskingoneAmerican life evenif thiscouldsavemillionsof nonnationals. Whilefew realistswould endorsesucha strongclaim,the problemis how manyof our “boysand girls”arewe preparedto riskto stopcrueltyandsuffering? Solidarismchallengesthis realistconceptionof ethicalstatecraftby intervention is a moralduty.Solidarism agrees arguingthathumanitarian to protectthe with realismthat stateleadershavea primaryresponsibility securityandwell-beingof theircitizens,butit partscompanywith it on the question of whetherthisobligationexhausts obligations to noncitizens. The debatewithin solidarism is over the natureand character of theseobligato humanrightsprinciples-“goodinternational cittions.Statescommitted i~ens”~-are not requiredto sacrificevital interestsin defenseof human rights,but they arerequiredto forsakenarrowcommercialandpolitical advantage whentheseconflictwith theprotection of human rights. A solidarist ethicrequiresgovernments to refrainfrom sellingarmsto repressive at home,and to rigorously regimes,evenif this createsunemployment enforcesanctions againstgrossviolators,evenif thisleadsto the lossof

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lucrativecontracts. Giventhesecriteria,the Blair government clearlyfailed this testin sellingHawk aircraftto the Indonesian regimein 1997-1999 whileit wasbrutallyrepressing the human rightsof theEastTimoreseresistancem ~ v e m e n t . ~ The hardquestionis whethersolidarism permitsstateleadersto riskand losesoldiers’ lives.The solidarist battlecry thatstateleaders“areburdened asto with theguardianship of humanrightseverywhere”6 begsthequestion how thisdutyshouldbe balanced againsttheirresponsibility to protectthe livesof citizens, includingthosewhoservein thearmedforce.Theargument defended hereis thatsoldiers’livesshouldbe riskedin casesof whatI call rr supreme humanitarian emergency.” Thisargument borrowsfromMichael Walzer’snotionof “supremeemergency”in Justand UnjustWarsand appliesit to the moralchoices facingstateleadersin decisions onhumanitarianintervention. Walzer’sbookis a powerfuldefense of theprincipleof noncombatantimmunityin the just war tradition.But havingbuilt up the argument asto whywarcannotescape moraldiscourse, he arguesin chapter 16thatsituations arisewherethesurvivalof thestaterequires leadersto violate the prohibitionagainstthe deliberatekilling of civilians.A supreme emergency existswhenthedangeris soimminent,the character of the threat sohorrifying,andwhenthereis no otheroptionavailableto assure thesurvival of a particularmoralcommunitythanviolatingtheruleagainsttargeting civilians.He givesthe exampleof Britishpoliticalandmilitaryleaders employing strategic bombingagainstGermancitiesin 1940-1941astheonly defenseagainsttheevil of Nazism.’ theoryof humanitarian intervenApplyingthisframeworkto a solidarist tion,thesurvivalof ourstateis not on theline (andin thatsenseit is not a supreme emergency in thewayit wasfor Britainin 1940),butit is a supreme emergency for thosehumanbeingsfacinggenocide, massmurder,andethnic cleansing.A supremehumanitarianemergencyexistswhen civiliansin anotherstatearein imminentdangerof losingtheirlife or facingappalling hardship, andwheretheonlyhopeof rescueis outsidemilitaryintervention. It is importantto distinguish betweencaseslike SierraLeonewheresubstate actorsperpetrate abuses andthe government wouldlike to actbut is unable to doso,andcases like Kosovowherethe source of theviolations is thegovernmentitself.8What countsas a supremeemergency is opento interpretation,andnaminga situationasanemergency will alwaysbeopento political will be more manipulation, but it is alsoevidentthat someinterpretations persuasive thanothers.Justifying theuseof forceon humanitarian grounds requirespersuading othergovernments, domesticpublics,andthe wider transnational citizenrycommittedto humanrightsthat the scaleof the humanrightsviolations warrantsmilitaryintervention.9 Westernstateleadersincreasinglyfoundthemselves confrontedwith supremeemergencies in the 1990s,andwhentheydid, theyfacedthe ulti-

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matechoicebetweenrealistandsolidaristconceptions of moralresponsibility in statecraft. The latterdemandsthat stateleadersoverridetheirprimary responsibility not to placecitizensin dangerandmakethe agonizingdecisionthat savingthe livesof civiliansbeyondtheir bordersrequiresrisking thelivesof thosewhoservein thearmedforces.Thisstillleavesunanswered theappallingmoraldilemmaof whatcountsasunacceptable losses. As Hugh Beachputsit, “How manyDutchliveswasit worthto protectSrebrinica?”Io The bar is considerably higherfor solidarismthan realism,but how much higher?How manycasualties arewe preparedto acceptto savex numberof civiliansbeingslaughtered by eithertheirgovernment or otherarmedgroups within thestate? Evenif it is agreedthatthereis a moraldutyof humanitarian intervention in conditionsof supremehumanitarian emergency,thereis the pluralist objectionthatthiswill issuea licensefor unilateralintervention thatwill placein jeopardythefoundations of international order.Thepluralistargumentis predicatedon the assumption that the societyof stateslacksa substantivevalue consensus on what level or type of humanrightsviolations shouldtriggerintervention andthatin theabsence of this,it is thepowerful who will decidewhetherintervention is justified.Reflectingon the lack of supportin statepracticefor a doctrineof humanitarian intervention during the ColdWar, Bull encapsulates thispluralistargument: Thereluctance evidentin theinternationalcommunity evento experiment with the conception of a right of humanitarian intervention reflectsnot only an unwillingness to jeopardize the rulesof sovereignty and non-intervention by conceding sucha rightto individualstates, butalsothelackof anyagreeddoctrineas to whathumanrightsare.” Onestandardobjectionto creatinga legalrightof humanitarian intervention is that stateswill abusesucha right by cloakingstateinterestsin the garbof humanitarian rhetoric.However,Bull’spluralistobjectionis a different one:the argumentis that sincethereis no consensus on the substantive valuesthat would governthe exerciseof sucha right, this practiceshould remainoutlawedby the societyof states.Moreover,it is not the casethat pluralismthinksthat sucha consensus shouldbe soughtsinceit is claimed that any attemptto createonewill run into the fundamental difficultythat stateshold very differentunderstandings of the meaningand contentof humanrights. It canbe agreedwith pluralismthat enforcement actionon humanitarian groundswill remainin thehandsof thepowerfulwithoutsuccumbing to the view thatsuchactionsmustleadto an erosionof order.Enforcement action by individualstatesis unlikelyto bedisruptiveof orderif it hastheauthority of the UN SecurityCouncilbehindit. A threatto orderonly ariseswhen

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interventionis undertakenwherethe permanentmembersdisagreeon the meritsof theactionandwhereit threatensthevital securityinterestsof one or moreof thesestates. Article2(7) of the CharterbanstheUN SecurityCouncilfromintervening in mattersthat are “essentiallywithin the domesticjurisdictionof any state,”but this prohibitiondoesnot applyto mattersthat the Security CouncildeterminesunderArticle 39 of ChapterVII as posinga threatto ‘‘.international peaceand security.”Duringthe Cold War, the Councilhad refusedto definehumanrightsemergencies insidestatebordersasconstitutsecurity,restricting this to casesof interstate ing a threatto international aggression. This conception of the Council’spolicingrole belongsto a pluralistethicof coexistence. A solidaristethicof humanitarianresponsibility wouldinterpretarticle39 aspermittingUN-authorizedhumanitarian intervention.As I showlater, thissolidaristethicdid notshapeSecurityCouncil practicein the Cold War, but it hasbeenincreasingly evidentsincethe end of the Cold War. Growinginternational pressurefor effectiveUN actionto stopgrossand systematic humanrightsabusesled the SecurityCouncilto stretchthetraditionalmeaningof a threatto “international peaceandsecurity” to legitimateinternational intervention in theinternalconflictsin northern Iraq, Somalia,Bosnia,and Haiti. In the casesof Somalia,Bosnia,and Haiti, theCouncildelegatedto U N memberstatesits ChapterVII authority to useforceto protecthumanrights. Bull hasdefinedsolidarismin termsof the enforcementof the law, but thisis toonarrowa definitionsincethepriordiscussion illustrates thatpluralismis compatiblewith SecurityCouncilenforcement action.Whatdistinguishespluralismfromsolidarism is notthecapacityfor enforcement action intervention. In thecaseof pluper sebut theethicalpositionunderpinning ralism,enforcement actionis onlyjustifiedif it upholdsinternational order andis sanctioned by theSecurityCouncil.By contrast,solidarism maintains thathumanitarian intervention is valuedasanendin itself,andtheremaybe of U N authoricasesin whichintervention is permissible evenin theabsence zation. The problemwith the UN Charter’sban on the useof force(exceptfor purposes of self-defense andcollectiveenforcement actionunderChapter VII) is that it makesan interventionto end genocidedependenton prior SecurityCouncilapproval.This issuewas posedstarklyover Kosovo because RussiaandChinamadeit clearthattheywouldvetoanydraftresolutionthat soughtauthorityfor NATO to useforceagainstthe Federal Republicof Yugoslavia(hereafterYugoslavia).NATO’s decisionto bypass the Councilandjustifyits useof forceon humanrightsgroundschallenged the authorityof coreCharterprinciples.This promptedUN secretarygeneralKofi Annanto invitethe GeneralAssemblyto debatethe legitimacy of humanitarian interventionin casesin whichthe SecurityCouncilwas

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unwillingor unableto act(hereafter alsoreferredto asunilateralhumanitarian intervention).I2 In openingthe debate,Kofi Annanposedthe following hypothetical question to the GeneralAssembly: If, in thosedarkdaysandhoursleadingupto thegenocide [in Rwanda],a coalition of Stateshadbeenpreparedto actin defenceof theTutsipopulation,but did not receivepromptCouncilauthorisation, shouldsucha coalitionhave stoodasideandallowedthehorrorto unfold?”

Annandidnot answerthisquestion, buta solidarist replywouldbe thata decision whetherto intervenein casesof supreme humanitarian emergency cannotbe hostageto the exerciseof vetopowerin the SecurityCouncil. Consequently, thechallengeis to deviserulesor guidelinesto copewith of humanitycriesout for thoseexceptional casesin whichthe conscience intervention buttheCouncilis blockedby thevetofromacting.I will return to this questionof how to legitimateunilateralhumanitarian intervention whenI discuss thecaseof Kosovolaterin thechapter.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE END OF THE COLD WAR FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS Has the end of the Cold War transformed the possibilities for enforcing humanrightsin international society? To explorethisquestion,I consider how fartheinternational response to genocide andstatesponsored slaughter onthecases of the “killingfields”in Cambochanged in the 1990s, focusing in the 1990s. diain the 1970s andtheRwandangenocide The adversarial relationshipbetweenthe United Statesand the Soviet Unionensuredthatwhenthe stakeswerehighenough,localconflictswere alwaysinterpreted andplayedoutin termsof their impacton the superpowercompetition. Thepeopleof Cambodiawereoneof themanypeoples to sufferas a consequence of thisgeopolitical dynamic.Their fatedemonhumanitarian intervention. strateshow the Cold War dynamicconstrained The storyof the terriblebrutalitiesinflictedon the Cambodianpeopleby between theKhmerRouge,with up to twoto threemillionpeopleperishing 1975 and1979, hasbeentoldmanytimes,andourinterestliesin why it was thathumanityabandoned theCambodians to theirfate.Realismtellsusthat Cambodia’s misfortune wasto finditselfa pawnin thegameof superpower politics.The Carteradministration wantedto balanceSovietpowerin the region,fearfulthatVietnamwasactingasa Sovietproxy.ThisledtheUnited Statesto alignwith China,whichin turnwasalliedwith thePol Potregime in Cambodia.The Carteradministration wasvery uncomfortable with the

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grosshumanrightsviolations takingplaceinsideCambodiaasnewsof these beganto leakoutof Cambodiain late1977andearly1978,buttherewasno questionof the United Statestakingmilitaryor any otherkind of action againstPolPot. Moreover,whentheVietnamese decidedfor theirownsecurityreasons to endthe Pol Pot regime-saving the Cambodianpeoplefrom the appalling excesses of the KhmerRouge-theU.S. response wasto condemn Vietnam’s action.ThefactthatCambodians hadwelcomedthe intervention asa liberation was ignoredby Americanpolicymakers who focusedsolelyon what they perceivedas growingVietnameseand Sovietexpansionism in the region.The U.S. positionwassupported by its Europeanallies,China,and theregionalstatesof theAssociation of Southeast AsianNations(ASEAN), who wereespecially fearfulof Vietnam’sexpansionist ambitions. Vietnam shouldnothavebeenpraisedfor itsintervention sincethehumanitarian benefitswereaninadvertent outcomeof actionstakenfor nonhumanitarian reasons. But becauseits motives and the means employedwere not outcome, it shouldnothavebeen incompatible with a positivehumanitarian condemned by widerinternational ~0ciety.l~ Realismwill replythattheUnitedStatesandChinahadno choicebut to emphasize geopolitical imperatives because theirsecuritydependtdon containingSovietpowerin Southeast Asia. Similarly,for stateslike Malaysia, Singapore, andespecially Thailand,it wasthe fearof Vietnamese expansionismthatdictatedthe response to the overthrowof the Pol Pot regime.The problemwiththisargument is thatby treatingVietnamasa pariah,theWesternbloc,China,andASEAN only succeeded in pushingHanoievenmore intothe arms of theSovietUnion.Whatis more,by continuing to economicallyandmilitarilysupporttheKhmerRouge’songoing war againstthenew government in PhnomPenh,a chancewaslostto pursuethealternative path of tryingto persuade Vietnamthatitslong-termsecurity wouldbeenhanced if it accepted a neutralization of Cambodia.In short,thegeopolitical justifications for opposing Vietnamareopento thechargethatthesewerenotonly morallybankruptbut alsomyopicandself-defeating in termsof promoting regionalsecurity. In arguingthat Vietnam’sactionshouldhavebeenexcusedbecauseit endedthe killingfields,thereis thepluralistobjectionof orderto consider. Had Vietnam’sactionbeenapprovedon the groundsthatit rescuedthe Khmerpeoplefromthe murderous clutches of Pol Pot,wouldthishaveset a precedent thatcouldbeusedby thepowerfulto enforcetheirculturaland ideological valueson weakerstates? Thisbringsus backto the questionof whetherhumanitarian interventioncanbe legitimateif it lacksSecurity Councilauthorization. In the caseof Vietnam’sintervention in Cambodia, it is clearthathadthe government in Hanoitriedto securea mandatefrom

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theCouncil,eitherthismovewouldhavefailedto securethenecessary votes, or it wouldhavebeenvetoedby theWestandChina. If governments canpleadthattheywereconstrained by ColdWar imperativesfrom interveningin Cambodia,thenthey haveno suchjustificationto Theendof theCold explaintheirnonintervention in theRwandangenocide. War changedthe contextfor humanitarian interventionin threekey ways: first,thenewfoundcooperation betweenEastandWesttransformed thepossibilitiesfor the SecurityCouncilto live up to its Charterresponsibility of maintaining“international peaceandsecurity”;second,it appearedto eliminate the worry that interventionmightlead to a superpower crisisrisking nuclearwar; and, finally, it left the UnitedStatesas the globalhegemonic powerthat, underthe Clintonadministration, professeda commitmentto defendhumanrightsaroundtheworld.Yet thenotionthathumanitarian valuesbecameelevatedin thehierarchyof U.S. foreignpolicyprinciplesin the 1990srunsimmediatelyintothegrimrealitythatit wastheClintonadministrationthatdecidedto donothingwhileovera millionRwandans werekilled in thegenocidethatbeganin April 1994. It can only be speculated how the Clintonadministration wouldhave reactedto eventsin Rwandahad this beenthe president’sfirst African humanitarian crisis.As it was,the ghostof the eighteenRangerslost in a with the Somalifirefightin October1993 hauntedthe U.S. government, presidentrulingout anyoptionsthatplacedAmericanpersonnelin harm’s way. In response to the Somalidebacleandcongressional concerns that the UnitedStateswas actingas the world’spoliceofficer,the presidentsigned Presidential DecisionDirective(PDD) 25 thatwasmadepublicat thebeginningof May. Thisattemptedto establish strictlimitsto Americanparticipationin futureU N peacekeeping operations by statingthattheUnitedStates would only contributeto operationswhere its nationalinterestswere engagedandthatits soldierswouldalwaysremainundernationalcommand and control.Althoughseveralcommentators havesuggested that the Tutsis werethe first to sufferthe consequences of Clinton’sPDD 25,15the documentis sufficientlyindeterminate to havebeeninvokedby the administration to justifysendingU.S. soldiersto Rwanda.As OliverRamsbotham and Tom Woodhouse pointout,the directivestatesthatit is in theU.S. national interestto supportpeaceenforcement operations where“thereis a threatto or breachof international peaceandsecurity. . . definedasoneor a combinationof the following:international aggression; or urgenthumanitarian disastercoupledwithviolence. . . or grossviolationof humanrightscoupled with violence;or threatof violence.”16 Consequently, the Clintonadministration couldhavedefendedmilitary interventionin Rwandain the first two weeksof April on the groundsthat haltinggenocidewasa moralduty andin the nationalinterest.Unfortunately,thepresident-who onhistripto Rwandafouryearslaterapologized

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for theinternational community’s failureto saveRwanda-lacked themoral should courage to taketheleadin arguingthecaseat homethatU.S. soldiers be put at riskin defenseof commonhumanity. Despitethe changedgeopoliticalcontext,realismhasno difficultyin explaining why Rwandawasabandoned. The plaintruthis thatno Western statethat had the military capabilityto makea differencecaredenough lives aboutthefateof Africansin a farawaycontinentto risktheirsoldiers’ in the early to end the genocide. What is apparentis that the deployment forceof five to ten thousandwellweeksof April 1994 of a multinational armedsoldierscouldhavesignificantlyhaltedthe killings.However,no Westernstatecameforwardwith the offerof troops,andwhenAfricanstates volunteered to sendforcesto Rwandain the period May toJune,theUnited logistics to fly theseforcesintoKigali. Statesfailedto providethenecessary The Clintonadministration wouldnot landheavytransports into Kigali withouta priorcease-fire because it fearedfor the safety of U.S. air crewand groundcontrollers. Thebarrierto intervention in Rwandawasnotanydoctrinaldisagreement amongmembersof the SecurityCouncilas to the priorityto be accorded humanrightsoversovereign rightsin the post-ColdWar order.Instead,as U N secretary-general Kofi Annanacknowledged in his 1999annualreport, of Member ‘‘[TIhe failureto intervenewas drivenmoreby the reluctance Statesto paythehumanandothercostsof intervention, andby doubtsthat theuseof forcewouldbe successful, thanby concerns about~overeignty.’”~ Theappallingfailureof Westerngovernments to endthekillingsin Rwanda demonstrates thatevenin a casein whichthereis goodreasonto thinkthat theuseof forcewouldhavebeensuccessful, with only limitedcasualties, Westernleadersdecidedto privilegetheirresponsibilities to protectcitizens overthemoralclaimsof otherhumansin danger.18 in April 1994to endthe Had anystatesoughta SecurityCouncilmandate genocidein Rwanda,thereis little questionthat this mandatewouldhave beenforthcoming. Theendof theColdWar createda contextin whichthere international norm”in supportof U N authorizedforcible is a “developing humanitarian intervention. However,thisemergentnormdoesnot make humanitarian intervention a dutyof individualstates or the society of states. that The development of a newnormenablesnewpracticesof intervention werepreviouslyunthinkable, but thisdoesnot determinethat intervention will takeplacewhenit is desperately neededasin Rwanda. How to persuade stateleadersthattheyhavea moralresponsibility to for a solidarist theory “paythehuman”costsof intervention is thechallenge of international society.The factis that no Westerngovernment hasintervenedto defendhumanrightsin the 1990sunlessit hasbeenconfidentthat The implicationof thisis thatstateleaders therewaslittle riskof casualties. will acceptanythingotherthanminimalcasualties onlyif theybelievevital

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nationalinterestsareat stake,andthismeansthatpracticesof humanitarian intervention will alwaysbe subjectto thevagariesof geopolitics. T H E POLITICS OF SELECTIVITY The selectivityargumentis the most popularreasonadvancedagainst humanitarian intervention. Butwhileit unitesrealistandradicalcritics,these groupshavevery differentperspectives on this question.For sophisticated realistslike David Hendrickson,a selectiveapproachto the applicationof humanrightsreflectsthevoiceof prudencein foreignpolicydecisionmaking. Reflectingon why morewas not doneto end the Turkishgenocide of againstthe Armeniansin 1914, he considersthat in the circumstances World War I, “it is difficult to seewhatoutsidepowersmighthavedone.” William Rubenstein echoesthis conclusion in his persuasive studyof how the Allied powerscouldnothavedonemoreto saveJewsduringWorldWar II.19Realismremindsstateleadersthatactingasa forcefor goodin theworld mustalwaysbe balancedby a recognitionof themoralconsequences of such actions. At the otherend of the spectrumis the claimof publicintellectualslike Noam Chomskythat Westernstatesare guilty of moralhypocrisyin their protestations of whathe callsthe“newmilitaryhumanism.”20 Thechargeof doublestandards is a powerfulone:Chomskypointsto the blatantselectivity of U.S. militaryactionto defendthe humanrightsof the Kosovarswith its deafeningsilenceoverColombiaandTurkey’sgrossviolationsof human rights.The explanation for theseradicallydivergingresponses to human interestsdictateactionin rightsabusesis thatU.S. securityand commercial onecaseand inactionin the others.The belief thathumanitarian claimson thepart of theWestare alwaysa coverfor the pursuitof selfishinterestsis oneof theprincipalarguments advancedby Russia,China,andIndiaagainst intervention in Westernattemptsto legitimatea doctrineof humanitarian onthe international society.Therefore,anyprogress in reachinga consensus enforcement of humanrightsprinciplesdependson addressing theproblem of selectivity. In thinkingabouttheproblemof selectivity,solidarism arguesthat a distinctionshouldbe madebetweenactionsthat are selectivebecausestates privilegeselfishinterestsand thosethat are selectivebecauseof prudential concerns.This doesnot resolvethe problembecausetherewill alwaysbe scopefor debateoverwhethergovernments areactingprudentlyor selfishly in particularcases,but what mattersis that this debateis a publicone in whichcitizenscanarticulatetheirviewsandhold governments accountable for the decisions takenin theirname.I arguedearlierthat the Westshould nothaveput ColdWar imperatives priorto thehumanrightsof theCambo-

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dian people,but otherswould arguethat prudencerequiredU.S. decision makersto actin thisway giventhethreatposedby theSovietUnionto U.S. securityinterestsat theendof the 1970s. A hardercasethantheCambodianoneis thequestionof howto dealwith Turkey’suseof forceagainstKurdishcivilianslivingwithin its easternbordersandinsidenorthernIraq. Goingwell beyondMiloSeviE’sethniccleansing of the Kosovarsin 1998-1999, it is reportedby humanrightsgroups insideandoutsidethecountrythattheTurkishgovernment haskilledseveral thousandKurdishciviliansin its questto wipe out the PKK, the guerrilla movementcommittedto Kurdishindependence. Turkeydeniesdeliberately killing civiliansandinvokesthejustificationof maintainingtheterritorial integrityof thestateto legitimateitsuseof forceagainstrebelforces.Thisis thesamerationaleasthatemployedby theMiloSeviCregimeandtheRussian government to justifytheirrespective attacksagainstthe KosovoLiberation Army (KLA) andseparatist forcesin Chechnya. If solidarism requiresthatgovernments alwayspaya heavypricein diplomatic,political,andespeciallyeconomictermsfor grossviolationsof human rights,thenTurkey’salliesin NATO havefailedthistestby turninga blind eye to its humanrightsviolations.Turkeycontinuesto buy armsfrom its NATO partners,includingthe U.K. government, whichconveniently overlooksthe fact thatTurkeybreachesthe guidelinesfor armssaleslaid down by ForeignSecretaryRobinCookin July1997.Thecaseof Turkeyillustrates thecomplextrade-offinvolvedin tryingto promotehumanrightsin foreign policy.The paradoxis thatwhile Turkeyis guilty of indiscriminately using forceagainstKurdishcivilians,it is fromTurkishbasesthatU.S. andBritish jetspolicethe “no-fly’’ zoneimposedby the latter over northernIraq in the immediateaftermathof the 1991Gulf War. This providesan important measureof protectionfor theKurdsagainstanyattemptby SaddamHussein to removethe limitedde factoautonomythey gainedas a consequence of the creationof the “safehavens”in April 1991.Puttingpressureon Turkey to stopits campaignof violencemightjeopardizethese“basing”rights,and NATO strategists arewell awarethatTurkeywouldbevital asa logisticstaging basein anyfutureconflictwith Iraq. Turkey’spivotalgeopolitical positionin the Middle Eastandthelucrative marketit offersfor WesternarmssalesprotecttheTurkishgovernment from seriousinternational pressure.Trying to persuadethe Turkishgovernment to adopta morerestrainedpolicyhasclearlyfailedand it is arguablytime for toughermeasures. Onestepthatshouldbe takenis thatNATO members shouldceasesupplyingthe Turkswith any military equipmentthat is tailored specificallyfor internalrepression. This would be little more than a symbolicstepsinceit wouldnotstopKurdishciviliansbeingkilledby indiscriminateTurkishair attacksagainstrebelbases.Turkeyjustifiesits acquisition of strikeaircrafton the groundsthat this is a legitimaterequirement

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of self-defense, but statescommittedto theprinciplesof goodinternational citizenshipshouldnotsellweaponsto anygovernment, whichis committing grosshumanrightsviolations.Threateningto applythis principleto Turkey-or evenapplyingit-would clearlycreatea majorcrisisin the alliance. Withoutthepressure of thissanction,it is hardto seewhatincentiveTurkey hasto moderateitsuseof forceagainsttheKurdishguerillas.Employingthe sanctionof restrictingarmssalesto Turkeywouldnotguarantee animprovementin thehumanrightssituation,butit wouldaddress thechargeof selectivity. What is requiredis that like casesbe treatedalike. This doesnot mean prudencedemands different takingthesameactionin everylike casebecause responses in differentsituations. Westernmilitaryintervention to endgross abusesof humanrightsis unthinkable in placeslike ChechnyaandTibet becauseit wouldrisk war-including nuclearwar-with Russiaand China. Theproblemis thatif thesestatesareseento be ableto abusehumanrights with impunity,then the dangerous signalis sentthat the way to avoid becominga targetfor humanitarian interventionis to developweaponsof massdestruction that will makethe costsof military intervention prohibitive. Solidarismrequiresthat Russia’sindiscriminatekilling of civiliansin norms.However, Chechnya be treatedasa violationof globalhumanitarian whatwasstrikingabouttheWesternresponse to Russia’sactionin 2000 was howmutedit wascomparedto thepositiontakena yearearlieroverhuman rightsabusesin Kosovo.With military interventionclearlyruled out, the world wasleft with only two sticksby whichto alter the Russiangovernment’sbehavior:diplomaticcensureand economicsanctions. The decision by the Parliamentary Assemblyof the Councilof Europein April 2000 to suspend Russia’smembership wasanattemptto signalto theRussianleaderof shipthat its useof forceagainstciviliansplacedit outsidethe standards Europeancivility.Thislimitedsanction failedto persuade theRussianpolitical and military leadershipto stopbombingthe capitalof Grozny,which wascausingthe exodusof hundredsof thousands of civilians.The fact that the Russianleadership wasnot inhibitedby concernsaboutRussia’smoral standingis furthergristto the realistmill that statesonly respectinternationallegalstandards whenit is convenient to do so. ShouldWesterngovernments havedonemoreto enforceglobalhumanitariannormsagainstRussiafor its actionsin Chechnya? The UnitedStates, andespeciallytheU.K. government, decidedthatthebesthopeof protecting theChechens lay in initiatinga dialoguewith thenewRussianpresident Vladimir Putin.The lattervisitedtheUnitedKingdomin April 2000 and after thesharpdownturnin relationsoverKOSOVO, theprimeministerandforeign secretarywere keen to improverelations.Tony Blair raisedthe subjectof Chechnyawith Putinat theirmeetingonApril 17,andhe defendedthedeci-

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sionto invitethe Russianleaderto Londonin the followingterms:“Some saythatbecauseof ourconcerns aboutChechnyawe shouldkeepsomedistancefrom Moscow.I haveto tell you that while I sharethoseconcernsI believethat the bestway to registerthoseconcerns and get resultsis by engagingwith Russiaandnotisolating Setagainstthis,thereis no evidencethat this attemptat dialoguehad any significantimpacton the groundin Chechnya.The Russianpresidentrightly calculatedthat the UnitedKingdomandUnitedStatesplaceda goodrelationship with Russia aheadof concernsfor the plight of the Chechens.AlthoughWesternstates had little roomfor maneuveroverChechnya,did Blair’sdecisionto invite Putinto Londonsendthewrongsignalto theRussianleadership? The decisioncertainlyleft the U.K. governmentopento the accusation that it was applyingdoublestandards in its treatmentof governments that violate humanrights.PeterBouckaertof HumanRightsWatchleveledthischarge. He stated,“DuringKOSOVO, Mr CooksaidEuropecouldnot standby and watchatrocitiesbeingcommittedor it wouldbecomplicit.Butthatis exactly what he is doingwith Chechnya.”22 Westerngovernments nevertried to makethe casefor imposinga toughsanctionagainstthe Putingovernment, andthisperhapsreflectedthefactthattheonlystickavailablewaseconomic sanctions. As I discusslater,theseachievedlittle in the 1990sin protecting humanrights,and it is not surprising that the United StatesandUnited Kingdomwerereluctantto selectthisinstrumentof coercionwhenit came to Chechnya. ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS T H R O U G H SANCTIONS Utilizing economicsanctions as a meansof defendinginternational human rightsstandards posestwo key problems.First,thereis the questionof whetherit caneverbe effectivein changingthe cost-gaincalculations of the targetgovernment. Second,thereare the ethicalconsequences of a strategy thatis justifiedon humanitarian groundsbutwhichmightbe likenedto the contemporary equivalentof siegewarfare.23 For sanctions to work thefollowingconditions mustbe satisfied.First,a government mustbe heavilydependent on oneor a numberof commodities that canbe cut off withoutalternativesourcesbeingfoundby the regime. Second,the sanctionsmustunderminethe domesticlegitimacyof the regime.Third,thecostsimposedby sanctions mustbe sufficientlyhighthat they outweighthe benefitsthat the regimegainsfrom its repressive policy. Satisfyingtheseconditions in practicehasprovedverydifficultasthecaseof sanctions againsttheMiloSeviEregimeshows. The UN SecurityCouncil imposedmandatoryeconomicsanctions

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againstYugoslaviain the early1990s.However,thereis no evidencethatthis moderatedMiloSeviC‘spolicyof ethniccleansingin the Balkans.The coercivepressure represented by sanctions wasinsufficientto compelthe MiloSeviCregimeto changepolicy in Bosniaor Kosovo.The regime’spolitical survivalwas too boundup with its policy of ethniccleansingto be influencedby the useof this weapon.The sameproblemexistedin the caseof Chechnya.Russiawouldhavebeenaffectedby Westerngovernments cutting off financialaid in responseto its conductin Chechnya.But the Russian government’s overridingsecurityinterestin preventingChechnyaseceding fromtheunionfar outweighed anycoststhattheWestcouldinflict through a policyof economiccoercion.Many Russiansareresentfulat theWestfor not doingmoreto helpRussiaeconomically throughthe 1990s,andthefact theleverage thatWesterneconomicsupporthasbeensolimitedundermines thatcanbe extractedfromthiskind of action. The onecasein whichit is arguedsanctions workedto bringabouta fundamentalchangeof domesticpolicy is SouthAfrica. Sanctionswere an importantfactorherebecausetherewasa strongbodyof opinionin the business communityandamongvoterswhowerehurtby the sanctions and who soughtradicalpoliticalchange.24 Growingpublicoppositionto apartheid by whiteswithin SouthAfrica coupledwith sustained pressurefrom outsidecreatedthecontextthatmadepossiblethetransitionto blackmajority rule.Thisprocess did nothappenin thecaseof sanctions againstYugoslavia in the 1990s,nor is thereany evidenceof it in relationto the sanctions imposedagainstIraq. Rather,in boththeseexamples,sanctions createdan impoverished peoplewho lined up behindregimesthat werevery effective in representing the adversehumanitarian consequences of the sanctionsas the fault of theWest. The fact that economicsanctions provedineffectivein the 1990sas an instrument for enforcinghumanrightsis evenmoreworryinggiventhat sanctions raiseprofoundethicaldilemmas.It is thecaseof sanctions against Iraq thatillustratesthismostgraphically.The strongest supporters of sanctions,Britain and the UnitedStates,justifythe sanctions, imposedagainst the Iraqi government afterits invasionof Kuwait in August1990, on the groundsthat Iraq hasnot compliedwith U N SecurityCouncilresolutions thatrequireIraq to disarmits chemical,biological,andnuclearcapabilities. Criticsof the sanctions point to the UN estimatethat sincethey were imposedtherehavebeen720,000deathsin Iraq beyondthenormalrate.The worsthit are children,who are lessableto copewith malnutritionand the lackof medicines.25 AlthoughtheUN established an “oil for food”program thatallowstheIraqi government to selloil andspendsomeof themoneyon foodandvital medicines,diphtheriavaccinesandchemotherapy medication remainonthebannedlist.Theyareprohibitedbecause theUnitedKingdom

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andtheUnitedStatesarguethattheycouldbeusedin Iraq’schemicalweaponsprogram.26 The U.K. positionis that SaddamHusseinis deliberately allowingthe Iraqi peopleto sufferin orderto get the sanctions lifted withouthavingto acceptanyweaponsinspections regime,a claimthatis not withoutsome f0undation.2~ But whateverthe Iraqi government’s complicityin aggravating on Iraqi civilians,theUnitedKingdomandthe the impactof thesanctions UnitedStateshavesupported a policythathashadtheeffectof killing hundredsof thousands of Iraqi civiliansoverthelasttenyears.It is littlewonder that this policyhaslostall legitimacyin the eyesof the widersocietyof statesandworldpublicopinion.The alternativestrategywouldbe to lift sanctions andallow the returnof foreigninvestment to Iraq in returnfor a limiteddegreeof UN monitoringof Iraqi disarmament. Thereis alsoplentyof evidencethatneighboring governments arebreaching the sanctions. This confirmsfor realismhow sanctions will neverwork becausesomegovernments arealwaystemptedto placeselfishadvantage priorto the effectiveimplementation of sanctions. Thereis somevalidityto this claim,but whatis overlookedis how breachesof the sanctions regime againstIraq haveincreasedasthepolicyhaslostwhatlittle international legitimacyit possessed. Theworryingconclusion to bedrawnfromthisview is thatIraq mightwell be ableto obtainoverthelongertermthe materialsit needsto furtherits ambitionsof acquiringchemical,biological,andeven nuclearweapons.EwenMacAskill,citingWesternsourcesin Baghdad,considersthat “at theJordanianborderonly onein 20 trucksis beingchecked on theTurkishborder,aboutonein 200; andthe Iranian by UN inspectors: borderis themostporousof Lifting thesanctions wouldincreasethe opportunities for Iraq to acquireweaponsof massdestruction, butonepossibilitysuggested by MacAskillis to restrictthe embargoto arms.29 However, this recommendation overlooksthe problemthat much of the controversy aboutwhatto allow into Iraq revolvesaroundthe questionof whethersuchmaterialscouldbe usedfor military applications. It will be manymoreyearsbeforeIraq is in a positionto challengeits neighbors,and whilea nuclear-armed Iraqwouldchangetherisksfor Westernpolicymakers in any renewedconflictwith Iraq, it is not morallyacceptable for governmentscommittedto humanrightsto useIraqi civiliansasa meansto theend of containingIraq. of sanctions is that The key conclusion thatemergesfromthisdiscussion in thecasesof IraqandYugoslavia,sanctions failedto hurtthosewhomthey weretargetedat. SaddamHusseinhasbeenableto continueto live a life of luxury,divertingmoneyintopalacebuildingprogramsandprotectingthose in the armyon whoseloyaltyhe reliesto stayin power.Sanctions alsohad becausethey did not little or no impacton MiloSeviCandhis supporters damagethefinancialandbusiness interestsof theregime.As a resultof the

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ethicalandpracticalfailureof comprehensive sanctions in boththesecases,

theClintonadministration movedtowardtheideaof “smartsanctions” that

aredesigned to hurtthoseindividuals whoaredirectlyresponsible for gross humanrightsabuses. Threepossiblestrategies suggest themselves here.First,travelrestrictions couldbe imposedon namedmembersof theregime.Thiswouldturnindividualsintointernational pariahs.Second,strenuous effortscouldbe made to freezetheassets heldoutsidethecountryby membersof theleadership. Theseareimportantmeasures, but oncea regimeis committedto a policy thatinvolvesgrossandsystematic humanrightsabuses, theyareunlikelyto be sufficientto compelit to changecourse.The third andmostpromising sanctionis the creationof a regimeof universaljurisdictionfor crimes againsthumanity.The knowledgethatindividualscannotleavetheircountriesbecause of fearof prosecution, or theworrythata changeof powerat homecouldleadto thembeingtried for crimesagainsthumanity,might deterfutureleadersfromcommittingsuchcriminalacts. CriminalTribunalfor theFormerYugoslaIn May 2000, theInternational via (ICTY) issueda war crimesindictmentagainstMiloSeviCfor his commandresponsibility for OperationHorseshoe (theallegedplanpreparedby Serbgeneralsfor ethnicallycleansing Kosovoof its Albanianpopulation). After beingsweptfrompowerby VojislavKostunica in theelections in Sephandedoverto theICTY. Thevictember2000, MiloSeviCwassubsequently tory of Kostunicamight be cited as evidenceof the long-termeffectof economic sanctions andinternational isolationin erodingthedomestic legitimacyof authoritarian leaders.The destruction inflictedby NATO planes againstthecivilianinfrastructure of theYugoslavstateprobablyalsoplayed a significant rolein leadingtheSerbpeopleto rejectMiloSeviCastheirleader. His trial beganonFebruary12,2002,in TheHague,thefirstprosecution for warcrimesof anex-headof state.Therecanbenoguarantee thatthecriminal casewill succeed againstMiloSeviC.At the time of writing,he hasrefused anyformallegaldefense, relyingontheclaimthatthecourtis illegalandhas no authorityto try him.’O If he doessubsequently providea detailedlegal defense, it islikelyto restontheclaimthatNATO andnottheSerbianarmy andsecurityforcesareresponsible for themassexpulsionof Kosovars during OperationAllied Force.In his openingstatements to the court,he allegedthatNATO politicalandmilitaryleadersareguiltyof war crimesfor launchinga bombingcampaignagainstYugoslaviathat killed hundredsof Serbcivilians.31 It is highlyunlikelythatsucha pleaby MiloSeviCwill be accepted by the ICTY. Nevertheless, theuncertainties of relyingon legalprocesses in determiningviolationsof humanrightsand international humanitarian law led sevengovernments (includingtheUnitedStates)to opposethesigningin July1998of theRomestatutethatfoundedtheInternational Criminal Court

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(ICC). Another21 statesabstained, but 122statessupported theprincipleof universaljurisdictionfor war crimes.However,thelimitsof theadvancethat humanrightshavemadeoverstatesovereignty sincetheNurembergand Tokyotribunalsis illustratedby the limitationsimposedon the ICC. First, casescanonly be referredto the prosecutor if thereis consentby the state wherethecrimeis committedor theaccused is handedoverby its owngovernmentto the court.The SecurityCouncilcanalsorefer cases,but this opensthe doort o the possibilityof permanentmembersvetoingresolution~.~~ The Clintonadministration initially refusedto signthe Romestatute like JesseHelms,thenchairof because powerfulcriticsin theU.S. Congress theSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,indicatedthatit wouldbe deadon arrival if placedbeforethe Senatefor ratification.For Republicanslike Helms,it is unacceptable thataninternational courtshouldhavejurisdiction overU.S. soldiersservingwith theUN. In thelastweeksof hispresidency, Clintonsignedthe treaty,perhapsin the hopeof lockingin president-elect GeorgeW. Bush,who is stronglyopposedto the ICC.33The treatyis unlikelyto be placedbeforetheSenatefor ratificationonBush‘swatch,and this doesnot augurwell for the long-termviabilityof the ICC. The ICC doestake us furtheralongthe roadto universaljurisdictionbegunin 1946 andcarriedforwardwith thecreationof the tribunalsfor theformerYugoslaviaandRwanda.But it doessoagainsta backdropof powerconsiderations that continueto setlimits to the solidaristvisionof a universalsystemof criminallaw enforcement.34 For all theirproblemsandlimitations,sanctions aregenerallyviewedasa moreacceptablealternativeto the useof force.As Larry Minearpoints out, it mightbe erroneous to thinkthat “militaryactionis necessarily less civilian-friendlyor morallyjustifiablethaneconomiccoercion.”35 The civiliansufferinginflictedby economicsanctions shouldalwaysbeproportionate to the humanitarian endsof thepolicy,a testthatwasclearlyfailedin Iraq. A decadeof sanctions hasfurtherdestroyedthe infrastructure that was alreadybadlydamagedaftertheair strikesagainstIraq in the1991Gulf War. In casesin whichit is believedthat sanctions will, or are, contradicting humanitarian ends,it is necessary for policymakers to considerwhether forcemightbe a moreethicalinstrumentin defendinghumanrightsvalues.

ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS BY FORCE36 Can it everbe ethicalto kill in the nameof defendingthe humanrightsof ethicof civiliansin anotherstate?Forpacifistscommittedto a deontological in whichit is justifiedto kill to stop nonviolence, thereareno circumstances crimesagainsthumanity.This absoluteprohibitionon killing is a morally

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respectable position,butit deprives governments of thethreatoruseof force to endgrossviolations. If theprincipleis recognized thatit is ethicalto kill to saveotherhumansin danger,thenthelogicalcorollaryof thisis thatthe Since intervening statemustbepreparedto placeat riskitsservicepersonnel. policymakers canneverknowin advance whetherforcewill producea surplusof goodoverharm,andthereis alwaysthe risk that intervention will of the killing,it is vital that criteriabe arrivedat for lead to an escalation judginga legitimatehumanitarianintervention.A solidaristtheoryof humanitarian intervention establishes fourkey criteria,derivedin partfrom interventhe justwar traditionthat shouldgoverna dutyof humanitarian tion. LaterI explorehow far NATO’s intervention in Kosovomet these requirements. First, theremustbe a just cause,or what I calledearliera “supreme humanitarian emergency.” Genocideandstate-sponsored massmurderare the mostobviouscases, butI alsowantto includeethniccleansing. Thelatter canbedefinedasthemassexpulsion of individuals belonging to a particular racialor ethnicgroup,wheremenof fightingageareeitherimprisoned or killed. Humanitarianinterventionis justifiedin thesecases,but if we wait until thousands havebeenkilled or hundredsof thousands expelled,rescue will cometoolatefor thosewhomwe wantto save.Thisraisestheproblem of howearlyintervention shouldbe.Eventhoughit is easiertojustifya military interventionafterbloodhasbeenspilton a significantscale,governmentsshouldnot wait for thousands to die beforethey act. Here, I agree with MichaelBazylerthatthe “intervening nationor nationsneednot wait for thekillingsto startif thereis clearevidence of animpending mas~acre.”3~ Thisdoesnotresolvetheproblemof deciding in particularcases whatcounts as“clearevidence,” andtheseassessments will alwaysbe opento dispute. Criticsof NATO’s intervention in Kosovochargethat the situationhad not reachedthepointwheretheuseof forcewasjustified.They arguethat Serbiansecurityforceswerenot the onlypartyto the conflictandthatthe KosovarLiberationArmy (KLA) wasalsoguiltyof committingatrocities. They buttresstheir argumentwith the propositionthatNATO failedto exhaustall peacefulmeans.Indeed,it is arguedby somethat the United StatesandUnitedKingdomdeliberately settermsat thetalksin Rambouillet thattheyknewMiloSeviCwouldnotaccept,therebylegitimating thedecision Theproblemwith thiscriticismis twofold.First,it restson to go to war.38 theproposition thatno sovereign statewouldhaveconsented to thetypeof restrictions thatthe “InterimAgreement”imposedonYugoslavia’s control overKosovo.But thisoverlooks thecrucialpointthattheonlyway to safeguardthe humanrightsof the Kosovars wasto limit the sovereignty of the Yugoslavstatein thisway. Second,it ignoresthe evidencethatSerbethnic cleansing wastakingplaceunderthecoverof thenegotiations. NATO’s justificationfor intervention wasto preventan impending humanitarian catas-

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trophe,andit wasarguedby the leadingalliancegovernments prosecuting the war thatintelligence intercepts indicatedthatthe MiloSeviCregimewas preparing to embarkonanoperationto expelAlbanians fromKosovo.In the absence of the intelligence intercepts thatNATO wasworkingwith (someof whichwerehandedoverto the HagueTribunal’schief prosecutor prior to herdecision to indictMiloSeviCasa warcriminal),it is hardto reacha definitivejudgmentasto whethertheuseof forcewastheonlymeansof preventinga humanitarian catastrophe. It is too demanding to requirestateleadersto exhaustall peacefulremediessinceeveryday’sdelayrisksan ever-increasing deathtoll. However, whatis requiredto meetthesecond criterionof lastresortis thatpolicymakthattheyhaveconsidered all avenues thatarelikelytoprove ersareconfident successful in stopping the cruelty.If thereis doubton thisscore,thenstate leadersaremorallyrequiredto continueto pursuetheirhumanitarian ends throughnonviolentmeans.The use of forcecanpromotegoodconsequences, but it shouldneverbe forgottenthat it alwaysproducesharmful onesaswell. If thefatefuldecision is takento useforce,thenstateleadersmustadhere to the absolutist principlein the justwar traditionthat civilianscannotbe deliberately targetedno matterwhattheproclaimed beneficialconsequences of suchattacks.Nevertheless,it is acceptedwithin the traditionand enshrined in the 1977AdditionalProtocol1 to the 1949GenevaConvenconsequence of tionsthat civilianscanbe harmedif this is an inadvertent attacksagainstlegitimatemilitaryobjectsandwherethe civiliandeathsare not excessive in relationto theanticipated militaryadvantage. In thecaseof NATO’s bombingof Yugoslavia, wereNATO’s attacksagainstbridges,the TV station,andtheelectricitygridin conformitywith thelawsof war?The eachtargetanddefended its taralliancehada teamof lawyersscrutinizing getingpolicyonthe groundsthatits targetsall hadmilitaryrelatedapplications.However,thechargeraisedduringthewar by critics,includingMary andafterwardby Human Robinson,theUN’s humanrightscommissioner, RightsWatchandAmnestyInternational is thattheciviliandeathswereout of all proportionto the militaryadvantage gained.No oneis claimingthat NATO deliberately targetedcivilians.But the legalstipulation thattheybe protectedasfar aspossible from the exigencies of war begsthe questionas to whetherNATO’s determination to win theconflictled the allianceto attacktargetsthatstretched theruleof noncombatant immunityto a breakingpoint. Thecontroversial decision to attacktheheadquarters of theradioandtelevisionstationon April 23, whichkilledsixteentechnicians, wasjustifiedby NATO on the groundsthat it wassupporting the Serbianwar effort,and hencea legitimatemilitarytarget.Equallycontroversial wasthe strikethat tookoutthepowergridon May 24, puttingthelightsout all overBelgrade

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and demonstrating that NATO couldhit at the heartof the regime.As MichaelIgnatieffpointsout,it wasthepowergridthatalsosuppliedthehospitals,andhe citesoneNATO lawyerassaying,“We’d havepreferrednotto haveto take on thesetargets.But thiswasthe Commander’s ~a11.”3~ There canbe no final objectivejudgmentas to whetherNATO breachedthe laws of war over Kosovo;international humanitarian law establishes the legal normsfor decidingthis issue,but it doesnot resolvethe issuein specific cases. What is apparentafterKosovois that governments, whichseekto justify theiruseof forceashumanitarian, mustmakeeveryeffortto upholdthelaws of war. And wheretheir targetingdecisionsare stronglycontested, they shouldbe preparedto publiclydefendthesechoices,perhapsevensubmittingthemto a process of judicialreviewby theInternational Courtof Justice (ICJ) or the International CriminalCourt(ICC). It is only throughthis processthat a bodyof caselaw will be built up establishing thelegalnorms thatshouldgoverntheconductof humanitarian wars. The fourthcriterionin decidingwhetherto interveneis whetherthereis a reasonable prospectof a successful outcome.This is the proportionality requirement andit is satisfiedonlyif thedestruction producedby theuseof forceis outweighed by the goodthatis achieved.Intervention mustsave more livesthan would havebeenlost by a policy of nonintervention, and politiciansand militaryleadersconfrontagonizingmoraldilemmasin formulatingtheseethicaljudgments withoutthebenefitof hindsight.In judging the success of a humanitarian intervention, the Argentinean international lawyerFernandoTesondefinesa successful humanitarian intervention asone thatrescues“thevictimsof oppression, and[where]humanrightshavesubsequentlybeenrestored.”40 How far, then,doesNATO’s intervention in KosovomeetTeson’scriterion?Within weeksof thestartof thebombing,it is estimatedthatapproximatelythreethousandKosovarAlbanianswerekilled by Serbforces(thisis basedon thediscoveryof bodiesafterthe conflict,but therecouldbe many morewhowill neverbe found);half a millionweredrivenfromtheirhomes to becomerefugeesin neighboring countries, andhundreds of thousands foundthemselves internallydisplaced withinKosovoitself.U.S.DeputySecretaryof StateStrobeTalbottconcededin October1999that the bombing campaign “accelerated” theethnic~leansing.~’ NATO leadersstandaccused, then,of exacerbating the humanitarian disasterthat their interventionwas justifiedasaverting. Havingfailedto preventa humanitarian catastrophe, bombingdid play a significant, thoughnotdecisive,rolein producinga politicalsettlement. Russia’srefusalto cometo the aid of MiloSeviCand NATO’s developingplans for a landinvasionof Kosovowereequallysignificantfactorsin compelling MiloSeviCto agreeto theNATO-led international forcefor Kosovoentering

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the province.This enabledthe refugeesto returnhomeandprovidedthem measureof politicalautonomythattheywouldhavebeen with a substantial deniedin the absence of NATO intervention. JonathanSteele,writingfrom Pristinain July 1999,declared,“ThoseWesterncriticswho condemnthe bombingfor turninga humanitarian crisisintoa catastrophe getshortshrift in Kosovo.Albanianswerethe primaryvictimsand thereis an almostuniversalfeelingthat althoughthe pricewasfar bloodierthanexpected,it was worthpayingfor thesakeof liberationfromSerbrule.”‘* On the otherhand,NATO’s interventionis problematicas a modelfor futurehumanitarian interventions becauseit hasnot succeeded in restoring humanrightsto the peopleof Kosovo.It might be arguedthat this is too demandinga testof humanitarian interventionand that what mattersis to endthe atrocities.Interventionthatpreventsor endssupremehumanitarian emergencies is clearlypreferableto inaction,but if thewithdrawalof the of theviolencewithina shortspace interveningforcesleadsto a resumption of time,thisdiminishes thehumanitarian credentials of an intervention. The international communityhastakenon, throughits peacekeeping forceand the UN’s transitionalcivil administration, the challengeof addressing the politicalcausesthatproducedviolencebetweenthe SerbandAlbaniancomTheinternamunities.Unfortunately,theresultshavenotbeenencouraging: tionalforcefailedto stopa new roundof ethniccleansingas thousands of Serbsfled in fear of Albaniansseekingrevenge.Thosewho remainlive in ghettos,fearfulof travelingto work or schoolwithoutprotection.This raggedendto OperationAllied Forceis reflectedin thelimitedmoralcommitmentto postwarreconstruction. Westerngovernments, whichspentmillions resources for the prosecuting the war, havefailedto providethe necessary rebuildingof Kosovo.This demonstrates the gap betweenthe rhetorical commitmentof NATO governments to humanrightsand theirwillingness to acceptthecostsof protectingtheserightsin thepostconflict environment. Evenif potentialintervenors aresatisfiedthattheirproposedactionmeets the requirements of justcause,lastresort,noncombatant immunityandhas reasonable prospectof success, thereis the questionas to whethersuch actionshouldtakeplacein theabsence of a supporting SecurityCouncilresolution.This questionwascruciallyraisedoverNATO’s bombingof Yugoof NATO’s use of force is that it violated slavia. O n e interpretation international law becauseonlytheSecurityCouncilcanauthorizetheuseof forcefor purposes of collectiveenforcement action.Thiswastheview taken by Russia,China, and India in the SecurityCouncildebateson March 24 and26, 1999.Theyarguedthattheactionrepresented a directassaultonthe principlesof international ~ r d e r .NATO ~’ governments repliedthat it is legitimatefor statesto use forcein thoseexceptionalcasesof extreme humanitarian necessity withoutexplicitSecurityCouncila u t h o r i ~ a t i o n . This argumentchallenges thepowerof thevetoin theSecurityCouncil.The

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pluralistjustification for the insertionof the vetointo the Charterwasto preventtheU N fromtakingactionin situations wherethe great powerswere divided.As RobertJacksonwrites,“The vetois a legalrecognitionthat armedintervention by international societymustreston a greatpowerconensu us."^^ O n thisview,NATO wasbehaving recklessly in splittingthefive permanent members of theCouncilintoopposing campsin orderto savethe KosovarAlbanians. It is obviouslydesirableto havethe authorityof the SecurityCouncil behindhumanitarian intervention, andthechallenge is to maketheCouncil work moreeffectivelyto defendhumanrightsin thefuture.However,solidarismcannotacceptthat a strictlegalismshouldtrumpthe defenseof human rights in cases of humanrightsemergency. Instead,it wantsto distinguishbetweenresponsible andirresponsible usesof theveto.The solidarist claimthat the right to the vetocarrieswith it concomitant responsibilities wasraisedby theSlovenian permanent representative duringtheSecurity CouncildebateoverNATO’s actionon March24, 1999.He impliedthat RussiaandChinawereabusingtheirpowerof vetoby refusingto support militaryactionto protectthe KosovarAlbaniansandpreventthe conflict thatNATO’s actionwasjustified in Kosovofromescalating. He contended because “notall permanent members werewillingto actin accordance with their specialresponsibility for the maintenance of international peaceand se~urity.’’~6 Thetaskfor thefutureis to persuade thepermanent members of theCouncil,andthewiderU N membership, thatit is illegitimate to exercise thepowerof the vetoin casesof supreme humanitarian emergency.

CONCLUSION A NEW AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT? Thischapterhasmappedthechallenges facingtheglobalhumanrightscommunitywhenit comesto enforcing minimumstandards of commonhumanity. Crucially,it hasaskedwhethergovernments arecapableof actingas humanitarian lawenforcers orwhetherthe constraints setoutby realismand pluralismcontinueto limit the possibilities for the solidaristprojectof enforcinghumanrights.O n theonehand,theendof the ColdWar opened up newpossibilities for givinghumanrightslaw theenforcement armit has lacked:theSecurityCouncilwasfreedfromits ColdWar paralysis, andthe creationof the tribunalsfor the formerYugoslaviaandRwandabrought nearerthe daywhentherewill be a regimeof universaljurisdiction for all war crimes.On theotherhand,progress is blockedby a realistandpluralist to refuseto acceptthe principle mind-setthatleadspowerfulgovernments of universaljurisdiction for war criminals,remainsstubbornly defensive of

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the prerogatives of statesovereignty, andis selectivein its protectionof humanrights. Someliberal-democratic governments suchas Canadaand the United Kingdomhavebeenprominent in tryingto givetheirforeignpoliciesanethicaldimension. ButwhiletheBlairgovernment cantakecreditfor joiningthe majorityof statesin supporting the ICC againstthe oppositionof the UnitedStates,its otherforaysintothisterritoryhavebeenlesssuccessful. It hasfounditselfincreasingly isolatedoveritsstrongsupport for the sanctions policyagainstIraq, andits decisionto sellthe Hawksto Indonesiacontragovernments. The dicteditspositionthatit wouldnotsellarmsto repressive UnitedKingdomfailedthe testof goodinternational citizenship because it privilegedcontracts in theaerospace industryoverhumanrights.In making this decision,thereis every reasonto think that the Blair government if governbelievedthatit wouldnotfacea publicoutcry.Consequently, mentsareto be persuaded and cajoledintoplacinga greaterpriorityon humanrights,it will be necessary for domesticandinternational public opinionto makeitself heardon this issue.The progress madein banning landminesandin creatingthe ICC owedmuchto the activismof human rightsgroupsin mobilizingpublicpressure. Yet it is alsoclearthatthispressureis mosteffectivein changing globalnormswhengovernments committed to the principlesof good internationalcitizenshipsupportit. For example,the ex-CanadianforeignministerLloyd Axeworthyplayedan importantcatalyzing rolein translating the pressure fromtransnational civil societyintoaninternational agreement to banlandmines. a commitment to defend Realismarguesthat stateleadersonly espouse human rights whenthisdoesnotconflictwithimportant political,economic, or securityinterests. Thus,it is easyfor Canadato take a leadingrole in banninglandminesbecause thisapproach doesnotaffectitsinterests. However,thisunderestimates howfar statescommitted to internationalist values canraisehumanitarian claimsthatleadto normative changein thesocietyof TheICC is a verygoodexample.Afterweeksof negotiating, the draft states. treatyadvanced by humanrightsgroupsand a broadcoalitionof western againstthewishesof andsouthern stateswaseventually putto the vote and, theUnitedStates,a majorityof statesvotedtheirapproval. Therealistargument thatstatesareonlyinterested in pursuing theirsecurity interestsoverlooksthe solidaristclaimthat humanrightsand security neednot be opposed values.The thesisof goodinternational citizenship is predicated on theproposition thatstateshavea long-termnationalsecurity interestin protectinghumanrightseverywhere. The reasonthat NATO founditselfusingforcein Kosovowasbecause international societyfailedto actto endthe human rightsviolations againsttheKosovars in the late1980s. As Marc Wellershowsin his chapterin thisvolume,preventivemilitary deployment on thepartof theUN canbe effective,asit wasin Macedonia,

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in defusing ethnicconflictthatthreatens t o explodeintoviolentconflict. However,it is hardto generalizefromthiscasesincethedeployment of U N peacekeepers to Macedoniahasto be locatedin thecontextof worriesabout thewar in Bosniaspreading to engulfMacedonia. Moreover,theMacedonian governmentconsented to the operation.However,preventiveactionis frequentlyrequiredin casesin whicha staterefusesto acceptintervention or thestatehascollapsed, asin SomaliaandLiberia.Theproblemis thatjustifying preventivemilitary actionto domesticandinternational publicsis very difficultin a contextin whichthereis nocompellingevidencethatthe situationconstitutes a supreme humanitarian emergency. But if intervening states wait for suchevidencebeforetheyact,manyliveswill alreadyhavebeenlost, andtherisksandcostsof endingthe emergency arelikely to be greaterthan if actionhad beentakenearlier. In arguingthatthe concerns of nationalsecurity,international order,and humanrightscan oftenbe reconciled,it is necessary to acknowledge that therewill be situations in whichorderhasto be privilegedoverjustice.But evenin casessuchasChechnya wheremilitaryintervention wasrightlyruled out as unthinkable,responsible statecraftrequiresgovernments to express theirstrongest regretat humanrightsviolations.And if stateleadersbelieve therearegoodreasons for notpubliclycensuring and/orsanctioning governmentsthatviolatehumanrights,theyshouldbe preparedto explainandjustify thesechoicesin thewiderpublicsphere. Theproblemwithpluralismis thatit all toooftenexaggerates thedangers to international orderposedby thepracticeof unilateralhumanitarian intervention.This is reflectedin RobertJackson’s contentionthat “the stability of international society,especiallythe unityof the greatpowers,is more important,indeedfar moreimportant,thanminorityrightsandhumanitarian protections in Yugoslaviaor anotherc o ~ n t r y . ”This ~ ’ pluralistargument is opento two rejoinders.First, NATO’s actionwas recognizedby many statesasan exceptional onethatcouldonlybe invokedasa precedent where it couldbe plausiblyarguedthata similarsetof circumstances pertained.A key aspectof NATO’s justification wasthepriorexistence of threeSecurity CouncilresolutionsadoptedunderChapterVII that definedthe MiloSeviC regime’sviolationof international humanitarian standards asa threatto the peace.In theabsence of similarCouncildeterminations in futurecases,states wouldnotbe ableto claim,asNATO did,thatenforcement actionto protect humanrightswas takenon behalf of the purposesset out in successive Councilresolutions. ThesecondreplytoJackson is thatNATO’s actiondid notthreatengreat powerstabilityin theway he suggests. The alliancewasableto trampleover RussianandChinesesensitivities for two reasons: first,Westernpoweris dominantin theglobalarena;second,neitherRussianor Chinawouldhave riskedwar with NATO overKosovosincethisareawasnot a coresecurity

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interestfor eitherof them.Themorepertinentquestionto askovertheruptureof relationsamongthe permanentmembersof the SecurityCouncilat the end of the last decadeis whetherthis actioncouldhavebeenavoided. The deterioration in relationswith Russiacanbe tracedto thefailureof the Westto drawRussiaintoa genuinesecuritypartnership. The decisionof the allianceto admitPoland,Hungary,andthe CzechRepublicasfull members wasa key turningpointin thisprocess. It hasto be askedwhethera different approach to Russiain theyearsbeforeKosovomighthaveledRussiato bring moreconcertedpressureto bearon the MiloSeviCregimein the run-upto hostilities. Indeed,it is notentirelyfar-fetchedto think thatNATO andRussiacouldhaveimposeda jointmilitaryprotectorqte overKosovoin late1998 asan alternativeto war. The argumentthatNATO wasableto act in the caseof Kosovobecause of its preponderant powerraisesa troublingissuefor solidarism. Theworry is that OperationAllied Forcemighthavesentthe dangerous signalthat stateswishingto resistWesternpowershoulddevelopweaponsof mass destruction. To preventNATO’s firsthumanitarian war beinginterpreted as a newformof Westernimperialism, it is importantthatthesocietyof states forgea new consensus at theUN on the substantive andproceduralcriteria that shouldgovernSecurityCouncilauthorizedhumanitarian intervention. Thiswill notresolvetheproblemof decidingin specificcaseswhetherthese a commonlanguagewithin principleshavebeenmet, but it will establish which the argumentcan take place.This debatewill haveto addresswhat shouldhappenif the SecurityCouncilcannotactbecauseof the exerciseof thevetoby oneor moreof thepermanentmembers.Thisis a very sensitive issueat theUN, butit is hardto seehowthisquestioncanbe avoidedin any futuredialogueon thisissue.48 The UN Chartercommitsstatesto solvingtheir conflictsby peaceful beginsmassivelyviolating means.But, asI haveargued,oncea government the humanrightsof its citizens,little leverageis providedby nonviolent actions,includingeconomicsanctions. Evenon themostoptimisticassumptions,by the time sanctions work, thosewhomwe are tryingto savewill be dead.The bestrecentexampleof the limitsof nonviolenthumanitarian intervention is theRwandangenocide: theonlyrealisticmeansof haltingthe frenziedkilling afterApril 6 wasarmedintervention. The reasonthatWestern governments failedto actwasbecausetheydid not believethat there were any interestsat stakethat justifiedriskingwesternsoldiersto save Rwandanstrangers. The Kosovointerventiondoesnot alterthis conclusion. NATO believed thatit couldcompeltheMiloSeviCregimeto acceptitstermsthroughtheuse of air powerandthatthisstrategyriskedfew alliancecasualties. Criticsargue that NATO couldhavesavedthe lives of more KosovarAlbaniansand avoidedkillingsomanySerbcivilianshadit reliedon a landinvasion.How-

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ever,thispositionis rejectedby manymilitarystrategists who arguenot onlythata landinvasionwouldhaveproducedmuchgreatermilitarylosses on bothsidesbut alsothatmanymoreKosovarAlbanianswouldhavebeen killed. This is a counterfactual questionthat is opento debate,and other militaryexpertshaveadvanceddifferentviews.Whatcanbesaidwith greater certaintyis that therewasno supportamongNATO politicalleadersfor a groundoperationthatriskedsignificantcasualties. Had the onlymilitary optionbeena landinvasion,it seemsthatNATO wouldnothaveactedover humanrightsabusesin Kosovo.MichaelWalzer fundamentally challenges thisconception of risk in Westernmilitaryoperations: Youcannotkill unlessyouarepreparedto die. . . .Politicalleaderscannotlaunch a campaignto kill Serbiansoldiers,andsureto kill otherstoo,unlessthey are preparedto riskthelivesof theirownsoldiers.Theycantry;theyoughtto try to reducethoserisksasmuchastheycan.But theycannotclaim,andwe cannot accept,thatthoselivesareexpendable, andthesearen0t.49

RobertJacksonarguesthatthepromotionof humanrightsin international societyis limitedby pluralistethi~s.5~ However,it wasnot pluralistethics thatled Rwandato be abandoned or NATO to employbombingwith all its attendantmoralambiguities in Kosovo.Thesechoicesowenothingtopluralist concernsaboutthe dangersof privileginghumanrightsoverconsiderationsof internationalorder.Instead,it represents the triumphof realist ethicsoversolidaristones.The futureof humanrightsdependsonpersuading stateleadersto changethis mind-setand embracea solidaristethicof humanitarian responsibility.

NOTES I am gratefulto Tim Dunnefor hiscomments on an earlierdraftof thischapter. 1. HedleyBull, “The GrotianConception of International Society”in DiplomaticInvestigations: Essaysin the Theoryand Practiceof InternationalPolitics,ed. HerbertButterfieldandMartinWight(London:Allen & Unwin, 1966),52. 2. RobertH. Jackson,“PoliticalTheoryof InternationalSociety,”in InternationalRelationsTheoryToday,ed. SteveSmithand Ken Booth(Cambridge: Polity, 1995),123. 3. Quotedin MichaelJ.Smith,“Humanitarian Intervention: An Overviewof the EthicalIssues,”Ethicsand InternationalA f f i r s2 (1989):74. 4. The ideaof statesas “goodinternational citizens”wasfirst employedby the formerAustralianministerfor foreignaffairsandtrade,GarethEvans,to describe his pursuitof a foreignpolicythatreconciled“enlightened self-interest” and“idealistic pragmatism.” The conceptwasfirst developedby AndrewLinklaterin “What Is a GoodInternationalCitizen?”in EthicsandForeign Policy, ed.PaulKeal(Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1992).Tim DunneandI arguethatthetestof “goodinternational

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citizenship” is howwell stateslive up to thesolidaristethicof actingasguardians of humanrightseverywhere. SeeNicholasJ. WheelerandTim Dunne,“GoodInternationalCitizenship:A Third Way for BritishForeignPolicy,”InternationalAffairs 74, no. 4 (October1988):853-56. 5. WheelerandDunne,“GoodInternational Citizenship,”862-65. 6. Bull, “TheGrotianConception,” 63. 7. MichaelWalzer,Justand UnjustWars(London:Allen Lane,1977),251-68. 8. Britishforeignsecretary RobinCookmadethisdistinctiononJuly 19, 2000, in hisspeechto theAmericanBar Association, London.Seewww.fco.gov.uk/news/ speechtext.asp?3989. 9. For a fullerdiscussion, seeNicholasJ.Wheeler,SavingStrangers: Humanitarian Interventionin InternationalSociety(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000). 10. Hugh Beach,“Secessions, InterventionandJustWar Theory:The Caseof KOSOVO,” PugwashOccasionalPapers1, no. 1 (February 2000):29. 11. HedleyBull, “Conclusion,” in Intervention in WorldPolitics,ed.HedleyBull (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1984),193. 12. I follow W. MichaelReismanin defining“A ‘unilateralaction’is an actby a formallyunauthorized participant, whicheffectively preempts theofficial,decisiona legallydesignated officialor agencywassupposed to take.Yet theunilateralactionis accompanied by a claimthatit is,nonetheless, lawful.”Thedefiningcharacteristic of a unilateralact is that the legalprocedure by whichit shouldhavebeentakenhas beendisregarded, but the actorclaimsthat the act is a lawful oneon substantive grounds.SeeW. MichaelReisman,“UnilateralActionandtheTransformations of the World Constitutive Process: The SpecialProblemof Humanitarian Intervention,” EuropeanJournalof InternationalLaw 11,no. 1 (March2000):7. Consequently, it is clearthatwhenwe are talkingaboutunilateralactsin international law, we arenot referringto a singularstateor entity.Multilateralgroupings of statescanactunilaterally on thisunderstanding of theterm. 13. Secretary’s GeneralAnnualReportto the GeneralAssembly,PressRelease SG/SM7136GA/9596, srchl.un.org:80/plweb-cgi/fastweb, September 20, 1999. 14. This argumentand the background to the Vietnameseactionare developed morefully in Wheeler,SavingStrangers. 15. For example,Alain Destexhe,“The ‘New’ Humanitarianism,” in Between

Sovereignty and GlobalGovernance: TheUnitedNations,theStateand Civil Society, ed. AlbertJ. Paolini,AnthonyP. Jarvis,andChristianReus-Smit(London:Macmil-

lan, 1998),97. 16. PDD 25 ExecutiveSummary,4. Quotedin Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, HumanitarianIntervention in Contemporary Conflict(Cambridge: Polity, 1996),141. 17. Kofi A. Annan,PreventingWar and Disaster:A GrowingGlobal Challenge (1999annualreporton the work of the organization) (New York UnitedNations, 1999),21. 18. For a powerfulandcompellingaccountof theWest’sfailureoverRwanda,see LindaMelvern,A PeopleBetrayed:TheRoleof theWestin Rwanda’sGenocide (London:Zed,2000). 19. David C. Hendrickson, “In Defenseof Realism:A Commentary onJustand

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UnjustWars,”Ethicsand International Affairs11 (1997):43, andWilliam Rubenstein,TheMythof Rescue:WhytheDemocracies CouldNot HaveSavedMoreJews fromtheNazis(London:Routledge,1997). 20. Noam Chomsky,TheNewMilitaryHumanism: Lessons fromKosovo(Monroe,Me.: CommonCourage,1999). 21. Quotedin EwenMacAskilland GrahamDiggines,“RussiaEvadesHuman RightsIssues,”TheGuardian, April 18,2000. 22. Julia. Borger,“GeneralsAccusedof War Crimes,”The Guardian,February 26,2000. 23. I owethispointtoJamesMayall. 24. This argumentis advancedby JonathanFreedland,“Compromised,” The Guardian,March8,2000. 25. Foranauthoritative examination of thisissue,seeEricHerring,“BetweenIraq anda Hard Place:A Critiqueof the BritishGovernment’s Casefor UN Economic Sanctions,” Reviewof International Studies28, no.1(January2002):39-57. 26. Freedland,“Compromised.” 27. PeterHain, “I FoughtApartheid.I’ll FightSaddam,”TheGuardian, January 6,2001. 28. EwenMacAskill,“SoDropYourVendettaandGiveIraqiKidsa Break,Peter,” TheGuardian,April 3,2000. 29. MacAskill,“SoDropYourVendetta.” 30. Ian Black,“MiloSeviC:A Lustfor PowerDrivenby MedievalSavagery,”The Guardian,February13,2002. 31. Ian Black,“I’m BeingCrucified,SaysMiloSeviCin Four-HourDiatribeto Court,”TheGuardian, February15,2002.HumanRightsWatch‘sdetailedinvestigation on the groundputsthe figureof Serbcivilianskilled at between489 and528. See Civilian Deathsin the NATO Air Campaign,hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/ Natbm200-01.htm. 32. For an excellentdiscussion of theICC, seeDavidWippman,“Canan InternationalCriminalCourtPreventandPunishGenocide”in Protection againstGenocide: MissionImpossible? ed.Neal Rimer(London:Praeger,ZOOO),85-105. 33. JulianBorger,“US Will JoinWorldCourt,”TheGuardian, January1,2001. 34. GeoffreyRobertson,CrimesagainstHumanity:TheStruggle for GlobalJustice (London:Penguin,1999),324-67. 35. LarryMinear,“TheMoralityof Sanctions,” in Hard Choices: MoralDilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, ed.Jonathan Moore(Oxford:Rowman& Littlefield, 1998),238. 36. The arguments in this sectiondraw heavilyon my otherpublishedworksin thisarea.SeeWheeler,SavingStrangers, 275-81, andNicholasJ.Wheeler,“HumanitarianInterventionafterKosovo:Emergent Norm,MoralDutyor theComingAnarchy,”International Atairs77, no. 1 (January2001):113-29. 37. M. Bazyler,“Reexamining theDoctrineof HumanitarianInterventionin the Light of the Atrocitiesin Kampucheaand Ethiopia,”StanfordJournalof InternationalLaw 23 (1987):600. 38. SeeChomsky,TheNewMilitaryHumanism. 39. Quotedin Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovoand Beyond(London: Chatto& Windus,ZOOO), 108.

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40. Fernando Teson,Humanitarian Intervention: AnInquiryintoLawandMorality (DobbsFerry,N.Y.: Transnational, 1988),106.

41. StrobeTalbottwasspeaking at a conference organizedby theRoyalInstitute of International AffairsandtheInstituteof WorldEconomyandInternational RelationsRussianFederation on “NATO Development in Partnership: Engagement and Advancement after2000’’ heldat ChathamHouse,London,October7-8, 1999. 42. Jonathan Steele,“Confusedand Still in Denial, SerbsHave a LongWay to Go,” TheGuardian, July9, 1999. 43. S/PV.3989,March26, 1999,6. 44. S/PV.3989,March26, 1999,5; S/PV.3989,March26, 1999,3. For a fullerdiscussion of thesearguments, seeNicholasJ.Wheeler,“Reflections ontheLegalityand Legitimacyof NATO’s Interventionin KOSOVO,” in The Kosowo Tragedy:The HumanRightsDimensions, specialissueof International Journalof HumanRights 4, nos.3/4 (AutumdWinter 2000):145-64. 45. RobertH. Jackson,TheGlobalCovenant (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2000),284. 46. SeeSIPV.3988,March24, 1999,6-7. 47. Jackson, TheGlobalCovenant, 291. 48. For a discussion of theseissues,see NicholasJ. Wheeler,“Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: PrinciplesandProcedures,” Melbourne Journalof InternationalLaw 2, no. 2 (2001):550-67. 49. Quotedin MikulasFabry,“TheDefeatedFeat:The Legality,JusticeandEthicsof theNATO InterventionoverKOSOVO,” paperpresented at theBritishInternational StudiesAssociationannualconference held at the Universityof Bradford, December16-18,2000, 18-19. 50. Jackson,TheGlobalCovenant, 289.

HumanRightsandInternational Politics JamesMayall and GeneM. Lyons

In ourintroductory chapter,we discussed thecentralproblemthatwe confrontin thisbook:The international humanrightsregimethathasemerged sinceapprovalof theUniversalDeclarationon HumanRightshasgenerally focusedonindividualrightsandyet recentviolationsof rightshave,in large measure,resultedfromtheindividual’sidentitywith a group,be it ethnicor religious,an indigenouspeopleor as women.This leadsto two questions thatwe addressin thisconcludingchapter:first,whetherwe needto extend thehumanrightsregimeto includespecificprotections for grouprights;seccommunity caneffectivelyrespondto violations ond,howtheinternational of grouprights,especiallyin casesof dividedsocietieswheregovernments havefailedandpoliticalleadershaveactuallyauthorizedviolationsasa matter of officialpolicy. In hischapter,JackDonnellyagreesthattheregimeis centeredonindividual rights,buthe goesonto arguethatno furtherelaboration of grouprights solongasthe collectivenatureof rightsis recognized-thatis, is necessary thatfreedomof association or of religion,for example,cannotbe exercised are alsoprotected. unlessthe rightsof groupswith whichoneassociates, Othercontributors-JenniferJackson-Preece on minorities,HurstHannum on indigenous people,and Eva Bremson the humanrightsof womennonetheless advocatethepromulgation of grouprightsthatobligategovernmentsto complywith specificobligations.Whereverthey standon this issue,all of our contributorsagreethat a majorissuefor the futureis the enforcement of humanrights:to developstrongincentivesfor governments 200

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to complywith treatyobligations and to bringpressure, includingwhere necessary, militarypressure, to bearwhenthereis evidence of grossviolaviolationsthatconstitute crimesagainst tionsof humanrights,especially humanityor genocide.In this regard,the yearssincethe endof the Cold in War haveprovidedwhatMarc Weller callsa “laboratory”of experience which the internationalcommunity,usually(but not always)working throughtheU N SecurityCouncil,intervened in theaffairsof states in which governments werefailingandin deeplydivided societies oftenmiredin cruel ethnicconflict. In theirchapters, bothWellerandNicholasWheelerpointto theuneven intervention, eitherin termsof bringingstabilityto resultsof international troubledstatesor creatingtheinfrastructure for theprotectionof human rights.Therehasbeen,asWeller testifies,limitedsuccess but alsoabysmal failure,principallybecause of the reluctance of majorstatesin the internationalsystemto acceptthelong-termcommitments thatsuchenterprises requireandthe equallylongtimethatit takesfor internalgroupsthathave theirdifferences anddevelopa dembeenat warwith eachotherto reconcile that a workinggovernment requires.It is this realistic ocraticconsensus thatleadsWheelerto askwhethertheinternational community, assessment aspresentlyconstituted andmotivated, is capableof enforcingthe internationalhumanrightsregime,orwhetherit hasto movecloserto a more“solidarist”consensus oncommonprinciples. In thisconclusion, we wantto elaborate furtheronthe positions takenby ourcolleagues on the questions of grouprightsandinternational intervention.We believethattheseissues cannotbe treatedaspurelytechnical, legal, that arelikely to emerge or evendiscreteissues. In bothcases,the answers in practicewill be deeplyinfluenced by the moregeneralclimateof ideas. We start,therefore,with the evolutionof ideasaboutinternational society. Ourpurpose is to identifytheideasconnecting international society,democraticgovernment, andhumanrights.Theselinks,we believe,mustbeunderstoodbeforewe caneffectivelyconfrontviolations of therightsof groups.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY Theideathatall humanbeingsareendowed with rightsessentially by virtue of their humanityis deeplyattractive, but it is not self-evident. It restson arguphilosophical foundations thatarecontested. Nor is thephilosophical ment-in particularbetweenthosewho resttheircaseon u priori assumpunderstanding tionsandthosewho locatehumanrightswithina historicist of humandevelopment-susceptible to final resolution. It is for thisreason socruciallyon thelaw. Oncea set thatprotection of humanrightsdepends

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of principles hasbeenlegallycodified,it is placed,for all practical purposes, beyondthereachof normative andphilosophical dispute.The law is not,of in stone.Nor course,static,inscribed for all time,like the commandments, canit be expected to command respect if it attempts to rideroughshod over customandsocialconsensus. Ultimately,it canbechallenged, ignored,overthrown,or rewritten.Nonetheless, in themeantime, it providessocietywith a frameworkof stability,predictability, andorderandat leasta partialguaranteethat powerwill not be exercised arbitrarilyoverthosewho haveno redress. Justas law in generalis indispensable to any societybut is not synonylaw is a centralinstitution of international mouswith it, sointernational societyfromwhichit drawsits authoritybut shouldnot be confused with it. With respectto humanrights,thisis an importantdistinction, because it showsthatit will not be possible to establish an international orderon the basisof humanrightsby legalmeansalone.Respectfor the law, whichis deeplyengrained in mostsocieties, may well act as a powerfulincentiveto harmonizeinternational standards andpractices, but if it getstoo far ahead of the politicalconsensus on whichit rests,it will fail. If this holdsfor domesticlegislation,wheregovernments canusethe law to buttresstheir levelwherethelaw authority,it is evenmoreimportantat theinternational depends on interstateagreement andself-policing. The evolutionary potential of international society-and its direction-are, therefore,crucialpreconditions for thedevelopment of a globalhumanrightsculture. Traditionalinternational societyfrom the seventeenth centuryon was a minimalistassociation. It wasconcerned with the mutualrecognitionof Europeansovereigns, but with little else.Beforethe nineteenthcentury, therewasno conception of international progress or of sovereigns engaging in cooperative projectsto advance thewelfareof theirsubjects. HedleyBull hasdescribed changes thatthenoccurred: The centuryfollowingtheCongress of Viennawitnessedtheexperimentin of theinternational systemby a concertof greatpowers,theregumanagement lationof diplomaticprecedentandprotocol,the steadyprofessionalization of internationallaw, dramaticsuccesses in communications and transport,the deeperinvolvement of manysocieties in an expanding international economy, theriseof technical organizations, thefirststirringsof internationally organized actionabouthumanrightsin relationto the slavetrade,andnew ideasabout disarmament andthepeacefulsettlement of international disputes.'

In the twentiethcentury,international societyfurtherexpandedin two in science andtechnology that majorways:first,by the impactof advances dramatically increased theinteractions of statesandsocieties; second, by the participation of an increasing numberof statesfrom Asia,Africa,and the

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Americasthat beganto influencethe internationalsocietythat Europeans had initiated.As Bull andAdam Watsonhaveindicated,thesenew participants“accelerated the paceof decolonization or national liberation, and broughtabouta new legalandmoralclimatein worldaffairsin whichcolonial rule and by extensionrule by settlerminorities,cameto be regarded asillegitimate.”*Thesedevelopments expanded international societybutnot necessarily a new spiritof international cooperation. The enthusiasm with which non-Europeangovernmentsembracedinternationalsocietyand soughtentryto it as a mark of their freedomfrom colonialrule largely stemmedfromits groundingin thelegalprincipleof sovereignty ratherthan commoninterestswith themajorpowersin thenorth. Sovereignty hasalwaysbeenmorehighlyregardedby theweakandvulnerablethanby thestrong.It is notsurprising, therefore,thatin thecontemporaryworld thosewho believemoststronglyin the minimalist,static conception of international societyareto be foundin Africa andAsia.Like new entrantsbeforethem,they fear that they may losetheir independence ongrounds of international astheresultof intervention, allegedlysanctioned solidaritybutin factmaskingtheeconomicandpoliticalinterests of stronger states.Thisretreatto a strictreadingof sovereignty may alsohavebeenhastenedby the failureof newlyindependent developing countries in the 1970s to influencechangesin international societyto emphasize theredistribution of resources andredresswhattheysawastheinequalities of theworldeconomy.Theireffortsto translateUnitedNationsresolutions callingfor “a new international economicorder”intopoliticalrealityfailedandthe gapin living standards and life chancesenjoyedby the populationof rich and poor countrieshascontinuedto widen.It is not surprising,therefore,that argumentsaboutthe needto makeinternational societymoreresponsive to the peopleand their rightscontinueto be regardedat bestwith ironicskepticism,andoftenwith deepsuspicion in thenon-Western world. Nevertheless, the evidencethat international societyhasevolvedis compelling.Modificationsin theoriginalconception followedtheeconomicand strategicintegrationof the world as the resultof the industrialrevolution and Westernimperialism.In reactionto the relentlessglobalizationof the world economy,therehasbeena tendency,throughout the twentiethcentury, to transformthe quasi-constitutional orderof international society association-thatis, onethat existsto pursuesubstantive into an enterprise goalsof its ownsuchaseconomicdevelopment or the protectionof human rights.Thecommitment of statesto a pluralistframework-and thecontinuing importanceof sovereignty as the foundationof international lawsocietyof this continuesto block the way to a fully fledgedtransnational kind.As we arguedin theintroduction, however,thefactthat mostgovernmentsacceptthat peoplehavepositiveas well as negativerights-and have been preparedto sign and ratify treatiesbindingthemselvesto uphold

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them-illustratesthe extentto whichinternational politicalthoughtand practicehavebeenpenetrated by solidarist assumptions. betweentheprinciples of pluralismandsolidaThecasefor a compromise rismemerges assoonaswe consider theoriginsof solidarist claimsandthe problemsof implementation. Theideaof international solidarity,like the thatgaveriseto it, tookshapein thewake politicaldoctrineof nationalism of the Americanand FrenchRevolutions. The nationalization of the state wasaccompanied, almosteverywhere, by the socialization of thenation.The partialandawkwardexception is the UnitedStates.It is partialbecause for thatrelateto theperiodwhenthe Americannationtookshapeand reasons to the fact that atypicallyit wasa nationof immigrants, it largelyavoided of popularsovereignty the collectivism that was a featureof the assertion elsewhere. It is awkwardin that Americanexceptionalism, combinedwith a virtualveto Americanpower,has,in recentyears,givenU.S.governments overformsof international cooperation (and/orstandard setting)of which it disapproves. In themajorityof otherstates,the claimthatsovereignty wasbeingexercisedby the nation andonitsownbehalfledineluctably to theviewthatthe nationaleconomyhadto be broughtundernationalcontrolandfreedfrom foreigninterference andexploitation. Theunderlying idea-and onthisissue theUnitedStatesconcurs-was therightof all peopleto managetheirown affairs.Butif thiswasa right,it necessarily impliedtheexistence of anexclusivedomainfromwhichoutsiders couldbe legitimately excluded. on the evolutionof international societywas The impactof nationalism theprogressive ideaof popthusparadoxical. O nthe onehand,it introduced ularrepresentation-ifthe stateexistedto servethe interests of thepeople, international societyhadto be a societyin whichtherightsof all peoplesto self-determination wererecognized. O n theotherhand,popularsovereignty reinforced thetraditionalconceptof exclusive jurisdiction. It is truethatthe exclusive domainhasshrunkunderpressures frommany directions, includingdemands for theinternational protectionof humanrights.But aslongas the stateremainsthe dominantpoliticalform-and thereis no seriousevidencethatit is witheringaway-it cannotbe ignoredaltogether. Indeed, at all, depends on its recognition. international progress, if possible The implications of this observation for the futureof the humanrights of the GreatDepresregimecanbestbe illustratedby analogy.Experience sionandworldwar led themajorpowersto conclude at theBrettonWoods welfarerequiredthe creationof instituconference in 1944 that economic tionsto lubricatetheworldeconomywith capitalandcredit,andpolicethe liberalization of worldtrade.Theaimof the Bretton Woodsinstitutions (and theGeneralAgreement onTariffsandTrade[GAl'TJ wasto developa rulebaseddiplomacy-andhencein a sense to depoliticize economic affairs-but notat theexpense of nationalwell-being.It wasconceded, for example,that

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in a crisisthe government’s dutyto maintainfull employment wouldtake priorityoverinternational obligations. A concernfor popularrightsandwelfare,in otherwords,setspractical limitsto the evolution of international societyin thedirectionof cosmopolisourceof authority tansolidarity.In 1944,notonlywasthereno alternative to thestate,but therewasnointerestin seekingone.If economic orderwas of mostfavorednationrights, to be maintainedby a reciprocalexchange therehadto be nationalgovernments to maketheexchange. The difficulties (WTO)todayarisenotfroma rejecfacedby theWorldTradeOrganization tionof thisprinciplebutfromdoubtsaboutwhetherit canprovidesufficient protectionto thosevulnerablestatesandcommunities-orindeedto the environment-thatareon thelosingendof globaleconomic integration. In parentheses, onemightnotethat if it cannot,the problemof expanding respectfor humanrightsbeyondthe minorityof affluentstateswill be greatlycomplicated if notrenderedinsoluble. The samelogiccoversotheraspects of contemporary worldpolitics.For of regionaland example,undertheUN Charter,it coverstheestablishment standingalliances in the absence of a crediblesystemof collectivesecurity. haveto refrainfrom O n groundsof humansolidarity,all governments notonlyto dotherefrainaggressive war,buttherehaveto be governments againstpotentialaggressors. It appliesalsoto ingbutto maintaina deterrent humanrights.It didnotneedthechapters in thisbookto establish thatmany governments regularlyabusethehumanrightsof theircitizens,butit is also thatupholdthem.Indeed,notwithstanding theimportance of governments publicopinionandthe NGOsthatseekto mobilizeit asan instrumentof pressure on government, it is ultimatelyonlythroughgovernments thatthe international humanrightsregimecanbe deepened andextended.

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY Theproposition thatinternational societywouldbe more“solidarist”if madeup of democratic states is notnew.It hasbeenaroundat leastsincethe establishment of the Leagueof Nations.Whatis newis the defeat,with the of communism, of theonlylarge-scale endof theColdWar andthecollapse ideologicalrival to liberaldemocracy. This hasled someto arguethat the majorremaining obstacle to globaldemocracy hasbeenremovedandothers of democracy astheprincipalsourceof violentconflictin to seetheabsence thecontemporary system.Sincetheseconflictsaregenerallyassociated with massivehumanrightsviolations, it follows,in thisframeof thought,thatthe protection of humanrightswill be madeeasierwithina democratic environment.

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Whateverthe evidencein supportof the claimthat international society is evolvingin this direction,manyinternational lawyersand humanrights advocates-includingsomeof the authorsof this volume-are reluctantto concedethat thereis a necessary relationship betweenhumanrightsand democracy.One can seewhy. If humanrightsexist, they belongto all humanbeings,regardless of thenatureof theregimeunderwhichtheylive. To tie themtoo closelyto democracy, it may be argued,is to let tyrantsoff the hook;theywill be ableto arguethatrightsare ideological,conditional on a particularpoliticalphilosophyandculture,ratherthanbeingtrulyuniversal,andthusin a senseaboveandbeyondpolitics. Thereis a furtherproblemthat comeswith treatinghumanrightsas an The attemptto pursuean ethiinstrumentof foreignpolicyin a democracy. cal foreignpolicywith humanrightsobjectivesalmostinevitablyleadsto accusations of doublestandards, asPresident JimmyCarterdiscovered in the UnitedStatesin the 1970sandtheBlair government discovered in Britainin of the the 1990s.A higherstandardof publicbehaviorwill be demanded weak andvulnerablethanof the strongand economicallypowerful.The standardriposteto thiscriticismis that the bestshouldnot be madethe enemyof the good,that just becausehumanrightscannotbe protected everywhereshouldnot stopactionagainsttheir abusewhereit is possible. Perhaps,but somehowthis soundsa moreconvincingdefensewith respect to, say,faminerelief,thanwith humanrights.In theformercase,thefamine may or may not be accompanied by humanrightsviolations,and the decisionto sendor withholdassistance mayquitereasonably be conditioned by practicalconsiderations, suchas access,distance,intelligence,and capacity. In the lattercase,someof the greatestoffendershavebeenable to claim immunitymerelyby referenceto theirpower. Moreover,theverypowerful-China, for example(potentiallyif notactually)-are oftenprotectedby an ancientcivilizationthatis groundedon differentstandards of publicandprivatebehaviorthanthosethatunderpinthe will be UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights.Of course,thisproposition contested,not leastby many bravepeoplein the countrieswhoseleaders claimtheprotectionof alternativevaluesystems. But thereis littledoubtthat Westerngovernments feel moreconstrained in dealingwith representatives of so-calledworldcivilizationsthanwith smallerstates,manyof whichwere shapedby Westernimperialismandonlyrecentlyreleasedfromits clutches. It is for reasonsof this kind that scholarssuchasDonnellyseethat it is statesthat must,finally, implementhumanrightsandthatthe essentialrole of the international communityinvolvesstandardsetting,thepromotionof debate,and patientadvocacy.On this view, the protectionof human rights-and whereappropriate, their extension-requiresvigilancein stable liberal democracies and not merelyin collapsedstatesand thoseruled by tyrannicalautocrats. It is possible,he believes,to accommodate mostclaims

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for grouprightsthat havebeenpressedsincethe end of the Cold War by ensuring thatexistingindividual rights areproperlyinterpreted and,if necessary,by extendingtheirrange. However,otherauthorsin thisvolumehavevariouslychallenged hisposition;they areat onewith Donnellyin believingthattheultimateaim is the creationof a humanrightsculturethat,whateverits basis,will removethe protectionof people’sfundamental freedomsfromthearenaof politicalcontestation.We sharethishope.Nonetheless, in the meantimethereis a more immediatepoliticalreasonfor takingseriouslythe pressuresfor group for democratization in rights.It is intimatelylinkedto thepreconditions deeplydividedsocieties. Whetheror not a rightof freeassociation necessarily impliesdemocratic government, it clearlycreatesthepossibility,particularly whencombinedwith the onecollectiverightrecognized withinthe currentregime-namely, the right of all peoplesto self-determination. The problemarisesespeciallyin deeplydividedsocieties, where,howeverregrettably,peoplerefuseto subordinate theirethnic,national,or religiousidentity to theiridentityascitizens. Two nineteenth-century authors-Lord ActonandJohnStuartMillthesocialpreconditions thathadto be metif a democracy wasto considered functionproperlybut drewradicallyoppositeconclusions. For Acton,the idealwasa societyconsisting of asmanyseparate socialgroupsaspossible. If the socialmix wassufficientlyheterodox,he believed,peoplewouldsee no advantagein mobilizingalongethnicor communallines.O n the conas citizens. trary, they would haveevery advantageto identifythemselves The Actonianmodelprojectedontothe contemporary politicallandscape to theUnitedStates.3 bearsa strikingfamily resemblance Mill’s commitmentto democraticfreedomswasno lessthanActon’s,but he drew an oppositeconclusion, or, moreaccurately,he basedhis analysis on a differentbut arguablymore widespreadsocialconfiguration. He believedthatif a dividedsociety-presumablyhewasthinkingof theUnited Kingdom-had developeda politicalcultureovera longperiodof timeduringwhichno oneenjoyedcivil andpoliticalrights,thenwheneventuallythe demandfor democratic representation prevailed,the issueof social,religious,or ethnicorigins,in a wordof bloodline andancestry, wouldbe irrelevant.’ It wasnotthatpeoplewouldnecessarily forgetwhethertheywereEnglish, Scots,or Welshor considerthis aspectof their identityunimportantbut ratherthatit wouldnotdefinetheirpoliticalloyalties.On theotherhand,if thedemandfor nationalanddemocratic freedomsarosesimultaneously in a societythatwasdividedbetweentwo ethnonational communities of approximatelyequalsize,then,he believed,a democratic constitution wouldinevitablyresultin bothcommunities mobilizingto capturethestatethroughthe ballotbox. In a winner-take-allsituation,thewinnerwoulduseall available

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meansto eliminate theloser.Projected ontothecontemporary politicallandscape,Mill’s visionbearsanuncomfortably closeresemblance to theformer Yugoslavia andto manyothertroubledsocieties aroundthe world. The implications of the Mill/Acton contrastfor a would-bedemocratic worldorderareclear.If democracy is not onlyto be regardedas a goodin of conflictresolution andanenabling mechanism itself,butasaninstrument for a humanrightsculture,therearetwoplausiblelinesof development. The firstis to accept-as Mill did,althoughonlyup to a point-that thepromotion of democracy mayrequirepartition.The secondis to accepttheposition (largelyprevalent in today’sworld)thatthereis no rightof secessionist self-determination andthatunlesspartitionis agreedbetweentheparties,it is illegal.If thispathis followed,theonlyway to reconcileterritorialintegrity with democratic freedoms is to acceptthe rightof communities to democraticrepresentation on their own behalf andto engineerthe democratic constitution accordingly. Thereareadmittedlyformidableproblemsthatneedto be addressed if democratization is to bepursuedby wayof thissecondalternative. Mill was not preparedto acceptthe right of secessionist self-determination for any but thelargestandthereforemostindigestible of stateless nationalcommunities.Yet if minorityrightsreallyarehumanrights,how logicallycanthis be denied? It is presumably because thisis indeedrecognized to be thecase that,evenin Europe,governments stillrefuseto translate theirpoliticalcommitmentto minorityprotectioninto a legalright that couldin theorybe usedto challenge theirauthority.If, as HurstHannumsuggests, indigenous peoples havemademoresubstantial progress in puttingtheirrightsona legal basisthanminorities,thisis partlybecause theyhavedealtwith practical problemsof discrimination andeschewed theproblemof definition,butit is mainlybecause they mostlycannotentertainseriousambitionsof separate statehood. Extendingthe humanrightsregimeto meetthe specialneedsof women cansimilarlybe bestapproached by addressing problemsof discrimination astheyarisewithinthestate,alongthelinesoutlinedby Brems,ratherthan by engagingin philosophical confrontation. The politicalproblemthat underlies Jackson-Preece’s chapteron minorities,on the otherhand,is that it is muchmoredifficultto avoidsuchconfrontation; in otherwords,it is difficultto avoidthe problem of definitionand,in the present stateof internationalsociety,difficultto address minorityfearsin a waythatwill notbe perceived by stateauthorities asa threatto theirsovereignty. If a way could be foundto headcommunalconflictoff at the pass,prior to democratization, thenwe couldjustly claimthat international societyhad evolveda workablecompromise betweenthe principles of solidaritythatunderpinthe humanrightsregimeand of pluralismthat is impliedby the conceptof a

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societyof sovereign states.If prevention of thiskindis not available, thenit minorityrightswill be sufficientto resolvetheissue. is unclearthatsecuring

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS Againstthisbackground, let us turnto thetwoproblems thatwe suggested in theintroduction hadposedthemostserious challenge to thehumanrights regimein theyearsfollowingtheColdWar:theincreasing evidence of group vioidentityasa principalsourceof civil conflictandhenceof human rights lations,andtherole of theinternational communityin confronting gross violationsof rightsin situations of extremeemergency. We alreadyargued efforts thattheproblemof grouprightscouldnotbeavoidedif international at democratization wereto haveanyrealisticchanceof bearingfruit. Here, by contrast, ourconcern iswith therecordsincetheendof theColdWar and thusnotwith thetheoretical problembutwith whathasactuallyhappened. Both of theseproblemsare in manywaysrelatedto the resultsof the Minoritiesat RiskProject,whichTed RobertGurrhasnow reportedin his book,PeoplesversusStates.His analysisis basedon trackinga worldwide thatby seriesof ethnicconflictsfrom themid-1980sto 1999.He concludes the endof the 1990s,“armedconflictwithinstateshadabated,”and“there declinein the onset of newethnicwarsanda shiftin many wasa pronounced ongoingwarsfrom fightingto negotiation.”5 Leavingasidethe hostages to aremoreoptimisticthanonemight fortunethathe takes,theseconclusions deducefromthenumberandintensityof civil conflictsthathavecontinued intothetwenty-firstcentury. To be fair, Gurrhimselfdoesnot denythatinternalconflictscontinueto peaceandsecurity.Nonetheless whatis of be a majorthreatto international specialinterestin relationto theproblems discussed in thisbookarethereathattherehasbeena “generaldecline sonsthat Gurroffersfor concluding in ethnicwars.”First,he argues,we havenow passedthroughthe initial “shocks”caused by thefall of theSovietUnionandthe disintegration of the Sovietsphereof influence.The breakdown of Sovietcontrol,togetherwith of communist authorityin the formerYugoslavia, opened the fragmenting up new-and revivedold-ethnic rivalriesin EasternandCentralEurope. If we comparethe transitionin EasternEuropeand the formerSoviet Union with the previousmajor internationalupheaval-the transferof powerfrom the Europeanimperialpowersto successor statesin Asia and Africa-his analysis seemsconvincing, at leastup to a point.Then,too,there werea seriesof postcolonial crisesandconflicts afterwhichthe situation stabilized,althoughveryoftenastheresultof theconsolidation of authoritarian governments. In thepresentcase,however,it is claimedthatdemocracy

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hasitselfhelpedto stabilizethe emergingorder.Evenif we concludethat,in somecases,ethnicrivalrieshavebeen restrained by theemergence of embryonic democraticregimes,it is difficultto ignorethe continuedtensionsin BosniaandKosovo(wheresuchstabilityashasbeenachievedis theresultof de facto international trusteeships ratherthanlocaldemocracy), let alonein Chechnya,Georgia,anda numberof otherformerSovietRepublics. Gurr alsoprovidestwo more generalreasonsfor the decreaseof ethnic conflictsthat extendthe analysisto the restof the world:oneis the spread of assimilaof democraticsocietiesthat “are lesslikely to rely on strategies tion andrepression” and“morelikely to followpoliciesof recognition, pluralismand groupautonomy”;the secondis that “statesand international organisations, promptedby intensemediaattentionandtheactivismof nongovernmental organisations, havebeenmorewilling to initiatepreventive and remedialaction.”6Theseare large claims.A more skepticalset of assumptions aboutthecapacityof politicalandsocialstructures to transform themselves overnight,in the first case,andattentionto howpost-ColdWar enthusiasm for humanitarian interventionhas becomemore ambiguous mighthaveled to ratherdifferentconclusions. Gurr himselfseemsfully awareof the thinnessof the ice on whichhe skates.He sensiblywarnsus that ethnictensionswill certainlycontinueto eruptintoviolentconflict,that democraticregimesare oftenweakandvulnerable,andthatinternational organizations (andthe statesthatsupport them)often“walk away” after preliminaryinterventionand leaveunattendedthelong-termobjectives of politicalandeconomicstability.His conclusionsat bestareonlyconditionally positive.We arestill confronted with theformidableobstacles facing“pluralist”societies (in thedemocratic rather thaninternational senseof thatterm)thatbothJackson-Preece andHannum discuss,as well as the obstacles that arisein connection with a moreactive andpersistent international role thatWellerandWheeleranalyze. Thefactis thatthetwoproblemsat thecenterof ourstudystronglyreflect the interactionbetweendomesticand international politics.The searchfor “pluralist”societyin whichdiversecollectiverightsare,at a minimum,protectedand,beyondthat,promotedis essentially a matterfor domesticsociety.Theprotectionof thelanguageandcultureof minoritiesandindigenous peoplesand the exerciseof affirmativeactionto grantthema leg up in the ranksof society(theAmericanandin theendstill assimilationist option)or a separatespacein whichtheyarepoliticallyautonomous yet remainwithin thestate(theEuropeanand/ormulticulturaloption),all dependon governmentpoliciesandpublicprograms. At thislevel,aswe notedearlier,therole of international society(in whichgovernments andNGOsbothparticipate) rangesfrom standardsettingto generalexhortationand“shaming.”Insofar asinformeddebatemayinfluencedomestichumanrightspolicies,theeffect of “internationalpublicopinion”cannotbe discounted, but it remains

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impossible to measure. At the sametime,international enforcement is only accepted underextremeconditions and,eventhen,difficultto carryout. Nevertheless, it is whengovernments fail to promotepluralismandleave minoritiesandindigenous peoplesin deprivation withouthopeor expectations,that the seedsof conflictarenourished. The failureto meetpluralist thestabilityof domestic societybutcallsinto aspirations notonlythreatens society,first throughits impacton questionthe solidarityof international theimmediate regionandthenmorebroadlythroughtheprocesses of contemporaryglobalization. The “internationalization” of domesticconflictshasbeenwidenedand of intensified by the growthof the globaleconomybeyondtheuniversality the international humanrightsregime.What doesthis statementmean? First,the globaleconomy,characterized by theinterpenetration of national economies, has,in severalways,a directimpacton humanrights.The great disparitybetweenrichandpooracrosstheworldencourages the migration of tensof thousands from the lessdevelopedto the moreindustrialized countries. Theretheyoftenconstitute substantial minorities, theirnumbers swollenby thedemand-in defianceof nationalimmigration laws-for lowpaidworkers. The problemis that moreoftenthannot the rationalneedof the labor marketis at oddswiththeinterests of thegeneral population, manyof whom arelikely to perceivethe newcomers as a threatto theirown jobsandway of life andto resentthemfor all their“differences.” Suchhascertainlybeen thecasewith the influxof workersfromCentralandSouthAmericaintothe United States;from Turkey,EasternEurope,andthe formerSovietUnion intoGermany;fromnorthAfricaintoFrance;andfromthe IndiansubcontinentandtheCaribbeanintoGreatBritain. Globalization hasalsoencouraged theflow of investment intoless-developedcountriesasmultinational corporations seekcheaplaborandproduction facilities.They arealsoattractedto countries whereworkersrightsare lessrigorously enforced thanin the industrialized worldandwherethe standardsof environmental protection arelower.Thisprocess hashadbothposiOn the one hand,foreign tive and negativeresultsfor the hostcountries. privateinvestment hasfueleddevelopment andlockeddeveloping countries into the internationaldivisionof labor on which the globaleconomy depends.O n the other,it hasincreased corruptionamonglocalentrepreneursandpoliticalleadersand abusedworkers’rightsthroughlowerstandardsof compensation and,in somecases,the exploitation of childlabor. The mostflagrantcaseshavebecomethefocusof theworldmediaandvoluntaryhumanrightsadvocates. Theirpressure hasin turnled majorcorporationsto adopt“goodconduct”agreements to protectworkersrightsand secureequivalent standards andbenefitsin developing countries asin their “home”plantsandfactories.

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Thereis an inevitabletensionbetweenthe development needsof poor a universal standard of positiveaswell countries andtheattemptto establish as negativerights.It is preciselybecause countriesarepoorthat laboris cheapandthereforeattractiveto foreigninvestors. Consequently, workers in industrialized countriesarelikely to claimthattheyare beingsubjected to unfair competition andto join forceswith humanrightsadvocates in amountto a nontariffbarrier-in claimingthatdifferentiallaborstandards otherwords,a hiddenform of protection.Eventhe attemptto banchild labormayseemdiscriminatory in cultures wherethe familyhasalwaysbeen regarded asan economic aswell asa socialunit andwheretrainingfor craft manufacture-forexample,in thehand-woven carpettrade-was traditionally done“on thejob” andbeganat a veryearlyage. thatchilThisis notto condone exploitative practices, let aloneto suggest but ratherto drenin developing countries do not havea rightto education, pointoutthe practical difficultiesthatmayariseandthe scope for crosscultural misunderstanding in the attemptto harmonizestandards worldwide. Despitesuchdifficulties, suchcompanies asWalt Disney,Gap,Levi,Reebok, Nike, aswell asShell,BritishPetroleum, Texaco,andWal-Marthavesigned “goodconduct”agreements. In the end,however,the enforcement of standards-and the workingout of sensiblecompromises betweendifferent nationalpractices-depends on the construction of stable,responsible governments.

BY WAY OF CONCLUDING Theworld,in effect,hasbecomeincreasingly interconnected. The recent intensification in the process of globalization hasreinforcedthe tendency, to whichwe referredearlier,to regardinternational societyas an enterprise the incentiveof statesto find association. In otherwords,it has increased commoninterestsand to cooperateto meetsharedobjectives. Common interests havetwomajorsources: the onepragmatic, emerging fromcommon concerns aboutmaterialresources andrelationsof militarypower,the secof conduct, whichare ondmoredoctrinalin thesenseof creatingstandards recognized by moststatesasthetestof a government’s legitimacy. a deepstructural problemin movingin any Thereis,aswe also suggested, communityof peofinalwayfroma pluralist society of statesto a solidarist ples.The realquestion, at leastfor theforeseeable future,will be whatkind will bestruck.Forthetimebeing, of compromise betweenthetwoprinciples Donnellywas surelyright to arguethat “politicallegitimacyin the postColdWar worldis increasingly judgedby andexpressed in termsof internationallyrecognised humanrights.”It maynot be an exaggeration to add << democratic processes” to thisformulation. Certainlythisviewis supported

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by the teststhathavebeenestablished for entryinto the EuropeanUnion, the Commonwealth, andeven,in theory,the (newlyconstituted) African Union,aswell asthenewversionof politicalconditionality increasingly MonetaryFund(IMF). exercised by the World Bankandthe International It is alsosupported by the statedobjectiveof fair and equitableelections repeatedly stipulated by theU N SecurityCouncilin establishing peacekeepingforcesto intervene in civil conflicts. Sincetheendof the ColdWar, theprotectionof grouprights,whichhad asa centralissuein the debate beenvirtuallyignoredafter1945,reemerged aboutthe futureof the humanrightsregime.Arguably,it has already becomepartof the growingdoctrineagainstwhichtheactivitiesof governmentsare evaluated.Donnellymaintainsthat the existinginternational humanrightsregimecanbe easilyextendedto encompass the legitimate interests of groupswithinanexpanded versionof liberalism. Thiswill maintaintheexistingprioritygivento individuals butinteralia integrate political andcivil rights,on the onehand,with economic, social,andculturalrights, ontheother.We havealreadyarguedthattheremaybe instrumental reasons why it maybenecessary to recognize groupsasa distinctcategoryof rights holders-for example,by expanding thescopeof democratic government in deeplydividedsocieties where,in the absence of suchrecognition, democracymaycontribute to socialconflictratherthanresolveit. the promoIn her chapter,Jackson-Preece goesevenfurther,advocating tionof grouprightsasdesirable endsin themselves, asmuchastheirprotection.Moreover,despitethe qualifications thatsheprudentlyenters,shesees considerable progressin the 1992 passage of the U N Declarationof the Rightsof Persons Belonging to Nationalor Ethnic,ReligiousandLinguistic Minorities,the action in Europeona Charterfor Regionalor MinorityLanfor SecurityandCooperation in guages, andthepoliciesof theOrganization Europe(OSCE)in focusingon the collectiverightsof minorities. Hannum demonstrates, equallyeffectively,how indigenous peopleshavebeensuccessful in promulgating international agreements to putpressure onnational governments to adoptpoliciesthatwill sustain theirautonomy. Their argumentslendweightto the view that the international humanrightsregime, likeinternational societyitself,is notstatic.On thecontrary,it is continually evolving,a process thatis furtherdrivenby thekindsof transformation that Bremsindicates arebeingpressed on behalfof women,especially theextensionof rightsintoprivaterelations. Thesearethe positive signsof progress. Theyareworthyof attentionbut shouldnot temptusintounrealeuphoria. Theprotection,let alonethepromotion,of grouprightsis alsomeetingresistance at variouslevelsof domessociety.Despitetheadvances thatJackson-Preece tic aswell asinternational reportsin Europe,for example,thereis strongopposition to immigration in the industriallyadvanced countries with outbreaks of xenophobia that fre-

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quentlyleadto violentattacksagainstnewimmigrants. In theUnitedStates, a countrybuilt up throughperiodicwavesof immigration,the mythof the “meltingpot” has beenreplacedby the more inclusiveif vaguerimageof multiculturalism. Yet, simultaneously, thereis continuing resistance to bilingualeducation, proposals to establishEnglishasthe officialnationallanguage,andoppositionto affirmativeaction. The problemis complicated by thefactthat,while conservative andeven reactionaryforcesmay drivesuchcampaigns, it is not self-evidentthat the endsthattheyseekarenecessarily reactionary.If theresultof multicultural education is to makeit easierfor themajorityto marginalizeminoritycommunitiesin linguisticallysealedghettos,the causeof humanrightswill not havebeenwell served.Theproblemis evenmoreacutein manypartsof the developingworld. In muchof Africa, for example,assimilationist policies, adoptedin the nameof nationbuilding,haveled to the rightsof minorities being systematicallyabused,a situationthat has not been noticeably improvedby the reintroduction of democratic elections. peoThroughout CentralandSouthAmerica,theconditionof indigenous plesremainsdismalandunresolved, whilepoliciesto redressthemiseriesof the indigenous peopleof Australiaand the Maori in New Zealandhave polarizedthe Europeanpopulations in both countries.The historyof nationalpolicieswith regardto AmericanIndiansin theUnitedStatesis no lessdiscouraging, and only marginallybetterin Canada.It is difficultto be overlyoptimistic,therefore,aboutthe futureof grouprights,particularly againstthebackground of continuingethnicrivalriesin theBalkansandthe statesof the formerSovietUnion; the revivalof intolerantfundamentalism in Christianity, Judaism,andIslam;andthefrighteningpovertyin largeparts of Asia and Africa that pits groupagainstgroupin the strugglefor scarce resources. The protectionof grouprights,in this regard,is far from beingfully accepted aspartof thenormativeframeworkof international society.We can onlyreiteratethatunlessprogresscanbe madein buildingminorityprotection into effectivepreventivediplomacy,prior to the outbreakof violent conflict,it mightproveto be too late afterward.Nonetheless, theviolation of the rightsof minorities-and in somecasesof majoritiesthat havebeen excludedfrom powerby the minority-remains a triggerfor international actionby organizedhumanrightsmovements,by the massmedia,and, it mustbe admittedoftenreluctantly,by governments. Nevertheless, all of the abovenot withstanding, the factis thatthe permanentmembersof the U N SecurityCouncilhavebeenin retreatfrom the readinesswith whichthey acceptedthe idea of humanitarian interventionin the immediateaftermath of the ColdWar. a questionwhethera changein directionmightbe Thereis, nevertheless, markedby NATO’s intervention in Kosovo;by theestablishment of, first,a

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peacekeeping operationandthena de fact0 trusteeship in EastTimor, both in 1999;and,morerecently,by thecommitment of theinternational community to thelong-termrebuildingof Afghanistan oncetherulingTalibanwere overturnedand the a1 Qaedacampsfor trainingterroristsdestroyed. With regardto thewillingnessof theinternational communityto address mass violationsof humanrights,thesecaseshaveadmittedlyambiguous implications.It is truethat,in KOSOVO, NATO-whose bombingcampaigndramatically increasedthe flow of refugees-insistedthat it was motivatedby humanitarian considerations. N o doubtit was,but it wasalsoconcernedto carveout a role for itself after the Cold War that wouldjustify its recent enlargement andto preventanyfurtherencroachment by theUN-a body that many,in the UnitedStatesin particular,regardedas unreliable-into thesecurityfield. The EastTimor operationwas not initially triggeredby violenthuman rightsabusebutby a decisionof theUN SecurityCouncilto allowtheterritory, a formerPortuguese colony,the rightof self-determination that other colonieshadenjoyedbutthatin thiscasehadbeenpreventedby theIndonesianannexationof 1974.Self-determination asdecolonization wasthe conventionalinterpretation of theconceptthatemergedafter1945.However,in the contextof the Americanwithdrawalfrom Vietnamin the 1970s,the Westernpowershad turneda blind eyeon Indonesia’saggression, although onlyAustralia-ironicallythecountrythatledthe1999peacekeeping operation-had everrecognizedIndonesia’sincorporation of theterritory. Therehad undoubtedly beenseriousviolationsof humanrightsin East Timorduringthe occupation, asindeedtherehadbeenin otherpartsof the Indonesian archipelago whereverethnicminoritiesopposedthe domination of theJavanese. But onlyin EastTimor,whereit waspossibleto claimthat a rightfultransferof powerhad beendenied,wasthe UN preparedto act. Arguably,moreover,theUN’s actioninitiallymadethehumanrightssituation worse.By organizinga referendumon independence in circumstances that left the Indonesianmilitary,the one organization in the countrythat remainedimplacablyopposedto independence, in chargeof security,it effectivelyguaranteed that therewouldbe attemptsto terrorizethepopulation intoopposingsecession. The majorpowerswere alsodrawninto Afghanistan,whichthey had abandoned after the retreatof Sovietforcesmorethan a decadeearlier,in response to theterroristattacksagainsttheUnitedStatesin September 2001. The problemsthat they facedwereformidable,not leastthe difficultiesin creatingand supporting a unifiedgovernmentin a countrythat is severely dividedintoa numberof historicallyantagonistic groups,separated by forbiddinggeographic formationsand the absenceof any kind of connecting transportation system.Developinga democraticregimewill requirestrong

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JamesMayall andGeneM. Lyons

protection for theinterests of theseveralgroupsthatmakeupthepopulation of thecountryandwill nototherwisegiveup theirautonomy. that The evidencesincethe end of the Cold War thusstronglysuggests whileviolationof grouprightsmaytriggerinternational action,it is notsufficientto ensuretimelyandeffectiveenforcement. The reallessonof recent casesmaybe different.KOSOVO, EastTimor,andAfghanistan all indicate how, despitetheir reluctance, the majorpowers,actingeitherthroughthe U N or outsideit, arestilllikelyto find themselves drawnintointernational whethertheywantto intervene crisesthatinvolvehumanitarian catastrophe, or not. Thequestion posedby thispossibility is this:If humanitarian intervention is unavoidable, doesthismean,asWheelerurges,thatinternational society shoulddevelopalongsolidarist lines?Indeed,doesit implythatit will necesto give an unambiguously positive sarilyhaveto do so?It is impossible answerto thesequestions. Wheelerargues,persuasively, in our view, that thereasonNATO felt compelled to actin KosovooutsidetheU N Security of the alliance,theUnited Council,wasthat,in seekingthe enlargement Statesandits allieshadfailed“to drawRussiaintoa genuinesecuritypartnership.”The implicationis thathadthisbeendone,possiblyby admitting Russiaor by eschewing theideaof enlargement altogether, it mighthave beenpossible “to forgea newconsensus at theU N onthesubstantive criteria thatshouldgovernSecurityCouncilauthorizedhumanitarian intervention.” But, evenif we concede the counterfactual hypothesis-namely, that “a solidaristethicof hadtherebeena differentdecisionon enlargement, responsibility” mighthavetakenhold-it wouldstillhavebeentakenon a view of stateinterests. Sucha decision wouldhavereflecteda moreenlightenedpluralistconception of international relationsthanthe onethatwasin factadopted,but it wouldstillnot havebeenbasedon solidarist principles: whateverelseit is,NATO remainsa nonuniversal defensive alliance. Thereis nothingreprehensible in suggesting thatthemoralimprovement of international societyshouldbe pursuedcrabwiseratherthanvia a direct confrontation betweenprincipleandinterest.The mostcelebrated advance in appliedinternational ethics-the abolitionof theslavetrade-was brought aboutin preciselythismanner.Unfortunately, in thepresentcase,the analogyis imperfect. Thecomparison withhumanitarian intervention worksbetter if oneconsiders international actionagainstslaveryitself.This wasa muchhardernut to crack.In the end,givenpowerand the will to useit, theslavetradecouldbe stoppedonthehighseas.Slavery,whichwasdeeply embedded in the politicalcultureof slave-owning societies, wasmuchless susceptible to externalpressure. By analogy,the reasonwhy Westerngovernments failedto actin Rwandawasnot merely,asWheelerargues,“that they did not believethat it was worth sacrificing Westernsoldiersto save Rwandanstrangers,” althoughthat wasno doubtpart of the story;it was

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alsobecause theydid not know whatto do. What is thereto suggest that theywouldbe betterplacedto actif a similaremergency wereto arisein the future? Westernleadersdo not knowwhatto do because, for understandable reasons,theyareunwillingto acceptthatthelogicof humanitarian intervention andadministration to is imperial:it involvesthe settingup of a government replacediscredited institutions associated with the catastrophe, anda willingness to stayaslongas it takesto buildlocalsupportfor institutions that are bothmorestableand morerepresentative thanthosethey replace.As Wellerdemonstrates, in many humanitarian crises,it is nottruethatnothing canbe done,although,as he alsoconcludes, “the recordof U N actionis of a consensus on the needto rebleakwhereit intervenes in the absence founda particularsocietyandon theconcrete shapeof a newconstitutional structure.” Thelogicof humanitarian intervention is notonethatthegovernments of the majorpowersfind attractivebecause it is expensive, open-ended, and likely to proveunpopular.If governments, nevertheless, continueto be drawnintosuchcrises-and we believetheywill-it behooves themto think longandhardaboutwhattheyaregettinginto.Collateraldamage is aninevitableconsequence of any military action,whichmakesit all the more importantthat enforcement actionbe sanctioned onlywhenthereis a reasonable prospect of relievinghumansuffering, evenif it is notalwayspossiof the underlying conflict.Defyingthedangers of bleto achievea resolution predictions, ourownconclusion is that,intothetwenty-firstcentury,internationalsocietywill movepainfullyin the directionof solidarist principle. of Nevertheless, anyadvance will proceedwithoutrelinquishing theessence pluralism:the continuedexistence of separately organizedsovereign states that pursuetheir interestsin a world dividedby the strugglefor material resources andideasaboutwhatthe goodlife is all about.

NOTES 1. HedleyBull, “The Emergence of a UniversalInternational Society,”in The Expansionof InternationalSociety,ed. HedleyBull and Adam Watson(Oxford:

Clarendon,1984),125. 2. HedleyBull and AdamWatson,“Conclusion,”in The Expansionof InternationalSociety,ed.Bull andWatson,428. 3. Lord Acton, “Nationality,”in Essayson Freedomand Power (Gloucester, Mass.:Smith,1972),141-70. 4. J. S. Mill, “Of NationalityasConnected with Representative Government,” in Utilitarianism,Libertyand Considerationon Representative Government(New York:Everyman’s Library,1972),359-68. 5. Ted RobertGurr,PeopleversusStates:Minoritiesat Risk in theNew Century (Washington, D.C.: UnitedStatesInstituteof PeacePress,2OOO),viii. 6. Gurr,PeopleversusStates,xiv.

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Index

Abkhazia,165 aboriginals,75 Ache,84 Acton,Lord,207-208 affirmativeaction,30, 109, 121,214 AfricanAmericans, 55 AfricanCharteron HumanandPeople’s Rights,58 AfricanUnion,171 Albania,156, 161 AmericanConventionon Human Rights,58, 85, 86 AmericanDeclarationon theRightsand Dutiesof Man, 84 AmnestyInternational,113, 171, 189 Angola,143, 147,153-54 Annan,Kofi, 176,179 anti-Semitism, 8 apartheid,8, 12, 55, 60, 141, 184 Arusha,158 assimilation, 55, 59, 63-64, 88 Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN), 177 Australia,72, 75 Austro-Hungarian Empire,6, 14. See alsoHapsburgEmpire AwasTingnicommunity,86 Axeworthy,Lloyd, 193 Aziza al-Hibri, 122 Bazyler,Michael,188 Beach,Hugh, 174

of BeijingDeclarationandProgramme Action(1995), 116 Bentham,Jeremy,27 Biko,Steve,9 Blair,Tony, 182-83 Bosnia,12, 55, 102, 143, 148, 159, 163, 175,210 BrahimiReport,148 BrettonWoods,204 Bulgaria,52 Bull, Hedley,170, 174,202,203 Bunch,Charlotte,110 Bush,GeorgeW., 187 CairoPopulationConference (1994), 116 Cambodia,55,149,151-52,176 Canada,73,81, 158,193 Carteradministration, 176 CEDAW. SeeConventionontheEliminationof All Formsof Discrimination againstWomen Charlesworth, Hilary, 111, 119 Chechnya,182-83 Chile, 12 China,10, 175, 176,206 Chomsky,Noam, 180 Claude,Inis, 49 Clintonadministration, 178-79, 186, 187 ColdWar, 4, 5, 59, 143, 152, 153, 165, 169,175,178,192

219

220

Index

Commonwealth, 9; 1991HarareDeclaration,65; Declarationof Principles, 58; DeclarationonRacismandRacial Prejudice, 58 communitarianism, 29, 40 Concertof Europe,6 Convention on the Eliminationof All Formsof Discrimination against Women(CEDAW), 107,108-109, 111,113,115,125 Conventionon theRightsof theChild, 120 Cook,Robin,181 Coomaraswamy, Radhika,100,115 Corsica,51 Councilof Europe,58,62-63,182; Charterfor Regionalor MinorityLanguages, 63 Creationism, 31 Croatia,143,159, 162-63, 166 culturalpluralism,49, 50, 53. Seealso pluralism culturalrelativism,10 Cyprus,143 Czechoslovakia, separation of, 67

ECOWAS.SeeEconomicCommunity of WestAfricanStates El Salvador,153 ethniccleansing, 55, 162, 169, 173, 184, 188 EU. SeeEuropeanUnion EuropeanConventionon Human Rights,58 EuropeanCourtof HumanRights (ECHR), 10,63,112,117,171 EuropeanUnion(EU), 10,65,160,161 femalegenitalmutilation,124 feminism,asa perspective on human rights,100, 102-103, 121 France,51, 73, 155 FrenchDeclaration of theRightsof Man, 51

Gallagher, Anne,121 SeeUnitedNations GeneralAssembly. Genevaconventions, 117,189 genocide, 41, 55, 63, 120, 157, 169, 173, 175,188,201 Germany,7, 54 GlobalAllianceagainst Traffickingin Women,119 Daytonaccords, 159-60 globalization, 13,203;effecton human Declarationon theRightsof Indigenous rights,211-12 Peoples: OAS draft,90-93; UN draft, GreatBritain,73, 173.SeealsoUnited 89-93 Kingdom de-colonization, 14-15, 54 Greece,52,54 democracy, 4-5, 60, 64, 141, 144,205Guahibo,84 206,208;ascriterionforEU memberGuatemala, 87, 153 ship,12;aspartof humanrights Gurr,Ted Robert,209-210 perspective, 28 DominicanRepublic,143 Habri,Hisshe,10 Dworkin,Ronald,25, 26 Haiti, 145, 146,155,156,175 EastTimor, 17, 164 ECHR. SeeEuropeanCourtof Human Rights EconomicCommunity of WestAfrican States(ECOWAS),145, 146, 156 economic sanctions, 183-87 EconomicandSocialCouncil.See UnitedNations

HapsburgEmpire,52,53.SeealsoAustro-Hungarian Empire Havel,Vaclav,11 Helms,Jesse,187 HelsinkiAccords,10, 23, 59 Hendrickson, David,180 Hobbes,Thomas,27,40 Holocaust, 7, 8,55 humanrights,20-21,23,41, 144, 169,

Index 206; balancebetweensetsof rights, 22-28; dependence on thelaw, 201202; differentinterpretations, 174; enforcement of, 171,176-80; evolution of, 3-13; of indigenous peoples, 73-75, 79-80; universality of, 101-111 HumanRightsWatch,102,171,183,189 Hun Sen,151-52 Huntington,SamuelH., 172 Hussein,Saddam,181, 185 Hutu, 157-59 ICCPR.SeeInternational Covenanton Civil andPoliticalRights ICESCR.SeeInternational Covenanton Economic,SocialandCivil Rights Ignatieff,Michael,190 ILO. SeeInternational LaborOrganization India,37, 76 Indians,73,75 indigenous peoples,15,33,34,35-40, 72-99,208;problemsof definition, 75-77 Indonesia, 164 Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights,1 1 8andrightsof indigenous peoples, 90 Inter-American Commission on Women,106 Inter-American Convention onthe Grantingof Civil Rightsto Women, 106 Inter-American Convention on the Grantingof PoliticalRightsto Women,106 Inter-American Convention onthePrevention,Punishment andEradication of Violenceagainst Women,107 Inter-American Courtof Human Rights,86, 87, 113 Inter-American IndianInstitute,88,90 International Courtof Justice (IJC), 190 International Covenanton Civil and PoliticalRights(ICCPR), 3, 8, 13-14, 21, 57, 58, 80-81, 84, 85, 110,171

22 1

International Covenanton Economic, SocialandCulturalRights,3, 8, 110, 171 International CriminalCourt,117, 18687,195 International LaborOrganization (ILO), 75-76,77,78,121;conventionsonwomen,107;andindigenous peoples,87-88 International RefugeeOrganization (IRO), 11 International Tribunalfor Rwanda,117 International CriminalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia,117, 186 Iraq, 175,184 RefugeeOrganiIRO. SeeInternational zation Jackson, RobertH., 172,192,194, 196 Japan,6 Jordan,102 juscogens,121-22 just war,173,189 Kant,Immanuel,26 KhmerRouge,151,152,176 Knopp,Karen,121 KOSOVO, 9, 17,39,41, 145,148,159,172, 173,175,182,188,191,210 Kurds,181 Kuwait,184 Leagueof Nations,14, 54, 56, 63, 68, 74 Levy,Jacob,36 liberalism, 5-6,26,29; “American”and “European” versions, 28; compatibility with humanrights,28 Liberia,145, 146, 147 Locke,John,26,40 LubiconLakeBand,81 MacAskill,Ewan,185 Macedonia, 52, 160-62, 194 Malaysia,177 Maya-Quiche,87 Maori,75 Mill, JohnStuart,6,52-53,207-208 Milosevic,Slobodan, 10, 181,183,184, 185,186,188,189,190,194,195

222

Index

minorities,21, 32-33, 35-37, 56-57, 4969, 208; by force,55, 59, 60; in HelsinkiAccords,59; by will, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 68 MiskitoIndians,84-86 Mobuto,S6s6 Seko,143 Montenegro,52 Morocco,164-65 Mozambique,153-55 multiculturalism, 30, 52, 66 Muslims,24, 163 Namibia,152-53 NATO. SeeNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization New Zealand,72, 75 N G O . Seenongovernmental organizations Nicaragua,84-86, 153 Nigeria,156, 162 nongovernmental organizations, 14, 16, 93,113, 114,119,205 NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization (NATO), 10,65, 159, 163,172,175, 181, 188,195 Nuremburgtrials,9 OAS. SeeOrganization of American States of AfricanUnity, 171 Organization Organization of AmericanStates(OAS), 75, 83-87, 106, 153, 171;InterAmericanCommission on Human Rights,75, 84-87; Inter-American IndianCongresses, 83; InterAmericanIndianInstitute,83 Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe(OSCE),62,63, 142, 149,160,163-64 Orwell,George,6 OSCE.SeeOrganization for Security andCooperation in Europe OttomanEmpire,6, 52, 53 Paine,Thomas,26 Pakistan,76, 102 peacekeeping, 11, 12, 17-18, 143, 150, 151,153,162

Pinochet,GeneralAugusto,8-9, 12 pluralism:asa characteristic of internationalsociety,17, 169-70, 174, 192, of 193, 194,204;asa characteristic nationalsociety,15,54,59,60,66-69, 211; in Commonwealth Declarations, 58. Seealsoculturalpluralism populationtransfers,55, 63 Portugal,155 Presidential DecisionDirective25, 178 Putin,Vladimir, 182 Rambouillet,164 Rawls,John,24, 26 realism,17, 169, 172,179-80, 185, 194; critiqueof international relations, 146-47 refugees,1I, 118 reproductive rights,115-16 Robinson,Mary, 189 Romania,52 Roosevelt,Eleanor,103 Roosevelt,FranklinDelano,7 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 26, 51 Rubenstein, William, 180 Russia,102, 145, 146, 155, 165, 175, 182, 194-95 Rwanda,9,55,59,66,76,143,147,15759, 166, 176,178-79 Saami,81 Sakharov,11 SaudiArabia,102 SecurityCouncil.SeeUnitedNations self-determination, 52, 53, 58, 64, 74, 105, 111, 145, 164, 208;in caseof indigenous peoples,77-78, 85-86; asa humanright,14 Serbia,52 sexualviolation,117-18 SierraLeone,147, 155, 156,173 Singapore,37, 177 slavery,118-19 Slavonia,159 solidarism,17, 170-71, 172-73, 175,179, 180,182,187,192-93,201,204

Index

223

Guinea(UNSF), 143;U N Operation Somalia,143, 145, 147, 155,156-57, 165, in theCongo(ONUC), 143;UN 172, 175, 178 Operationin SomaliaI1 (UNOSouthAfrica,8,9,102,141,152,153,184 SOMII), 149;U N Transitional SouthTyrol, 76 SouthWestAfricaPeople’sOrganization Authorityin Cambodia(UNTAC), 149;UN, in caseof Namibia,152-53; (SWAPO),153 UN operations in CentralAmerica, sovereignty, 6, 7, 9, 40, 62, 64, 144, 174, 153; 179,203,204 U N AngolaVerificationMission, SovietUnion,4, 10, 176,209 153-55; Srebenica, 9, 174 SWAPO.SeeSouthWestAfricaPeople’s U N Operationin Mozambique,154; U N Operations in SierraLeone,156; Organization U N Operations in Slavonia,159; Sweden.81 WorkingGroupon Contemporary Formsof Slavery,119;WorldConferTalbott,Strobe,190 enceon HumanRights,100, 114 Teheran,115 UnitedStates,8, 13, 28, 54, 73, 79, 102, Teson,Fernando,190 143, 145, 155, 159, 176, 193,204 Thailand,177 Treatyof Lausanne, 54 UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights, Treatyof Neuilly,54 3, 8, 20-21, 56, 101, 171,200, 206 tribalpeoples,76 Turkey,54, 181 Vienna,100;Congress of, 202;human rightsreviewconference, Tutsi,9, 157-59, 176 10,22 Vietnam,76, 177 Uganda,157 UnitedKingdom,112-13, 155, 193.See Walzer,Michael,31, 173, 196 Watson,Adam,203 alsoGreatBritain UnitedNations,9, 80-83, 142, 151, 155, Westphalia, Peaceof, 6 Women,humanrightsof, 15-16,32-33, 156, 158;Charter,5, 7, 14, 144, 149; 35, 100-137,208;addingnewsetsof Commission on HumanRights,57, rights,112-20; breaching on theStatusof thepublic/ 89, 113;Commission privatedivide,112-14; diversityof Women,107;credibilityof, 162-63; priorities,123;feministtransformaDeclarationon theRightsof Persons tionof, 109-112;“sameness” Belongingto NationalEthnic,Reliapproach, 100-103; specificity of giousandLinguisticMinorities,61, rights,100, 108-106 62; EconomicandSocialCouncil (ECOSOC),82, 83,89, 118;General WorldPopulationPlanof Action(1974), 115 Assembly,8-9, 57, 61; High Commissioner for Refugees, 11; PermaWorldTradeOrganization (WTO), 205 WorldWar I, 6 nentForumon Indigenous Issues, WorldWar 11,6, 11, 54 82-83; SecurityCouncil,5, 174-75, WTO. SeeWorldTradeOrganization 178, 191,195,201;SpecialRapporteuronTorture,117;Sub-commissionWorkingGroupon Indigenous Yanomami,76, 84 Yugoslavia, 59, 66,78, 117, 148, 162,175, Populations, 75, 81-82, 89; U N 184 SeiurityForcein WesternNew

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AbouttheContributors

Eva Bremsis a professor of humanrightslaw at the University of Ghentin Belgium.Her research interests includemostareasof humanrightslaw, in law. Europeanandinternational law, as well as in Belgianandcomparative Mostrecently,sheis theauthorof HumanRights:Universality andDiversity (MartinusNijhoff, 2001). Jack Donnellyis the Mellonprofessor in the GraduateSchoolof InternationalStudiesat the Universityof Denver.He haspublished widelyin the fieldof humanrights.His worksincludeTheConcept of HumanRights(St. Martin’s,1985); UniversalHumanRightsin Theoryand Practice(Cornell, 1989);International HumanRights(Westview,1998, 2d ed.); Realismand (Cambridge, 2000). International Relations Hurst Hannum is a professorof international law andcodirectorof the at theFletcherSchoolof Centerfor HumanRightsandConflictResolution Law andDiplomacyat TuftsUniversity.He hasservedas counselin cases beforethe Europeanand Inter-AmericanCommissions on HumanRights andis the authorof Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Universityof Pennsylvania Press,rev.ed., 1996)andeditorof Guideto InternationalHumanRightsPractice(Transnational, 3d ed.,1999). JenniferJackson-Preece is currentlya lectureron nationalism in Europeat the LondonSchoolof Economics andPoliticalScience. Recentpublications Nation-States System (Oxford includeNationalMinoritiesandtheEuropean asan Instrument of NationUniversityPress,1998) and“EthnicCleansing StateCreation”(HumanRightsQuarterly,1997).

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Aboutthe Contributors

GeneM. Lyonsis a seniorfellowof theJohnSloanDickeyCenterfor InternationalUnderstanding at DartmouthCollege.He has servedwith the NationalResearchCounciland UNESCO and beena visitingprofessorat the Universityof Paris(Sorbonne).He hasrecentlybeencoeditorandcontributorto BeyondWestphalia: StateSovereignty and InternationalInterventionUohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1995)andto The UnitedNations System:the Policiesof MemberStates(UnitedNationsUniversityPress, 1995). JamesMayall is a professorof international relationsanddirectorof the Centerof InternationalStudiesat theUniversityof Cambridge.He wasfor manyyearsa memberof thefacultyof theinternational relationsdepartment at the LondonSchoolof Economicsand PoliticalScience.His publications includeNationalismand IntevnationalSociety(CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990), The N e w Interventionism 1991-1994 (CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996),and WorldPolitics(Polity,2000). Marc Welleris an assistant directorof studiesin theCentreof International Studiesof the Universityof Cambridge,a fellow of the Lauterpacht ResearchCentreof International Law andof HughesHall, anda directorof the EuropeanCentrefor Minority Issues.His researchinterestslie in the areasof international law andthemanagement of conflictandof thedeveloping international constitutional order. NicholasJ. Wheeleris a seniorlecturerin theDepartment of International Politicsat the Universityof Wales in Aberystwyth.He has servedas a researchassociate at the InternationalInstitutefor StrategicStudiesand is coeditorof HumanRightsin GlobalPolitics(CambridgeUniversityPress, 1999).He hasrecentlypublishedSavingStrangers:HumanitarianIntervention in InternationalSociety(OxfordUniversityPress,2000).