LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Raj Aggarwal
Kent State University, USA
Uri Benzion
Technion, and Ben Gurion University, Israe...
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Raj Aggarwal
Kent State University, USA
Uri Benzion
Technion, and Ben Gurion University, Israel
Gurmeet S. Bhabra
University of Otago, New Zealand
Stephen P . Ferris
University of Missouri, USA
John F. Gaski
University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA
Vijay Gondhalekar
University of Michigan, Flint, USA
Pim Jansen
Rabobank International, London, UK
William W. Jennings
U .S . Air Force Academy, USA
Jinho Jeong
Hansei University, Korea
Hoje Jo
Santa Clara University, USA
Beni Lauterbach
Bar Ilan University, Israel
Kwangwoo Park
University of Illinois, Champaign, USA
Enrico Perotti
University of Amsterdam and CEPR, The Netherlands
John M. Pinkerton
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA
John G. Powell
University of Otago, New Zealand vii
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Viii
Haim Reisman
Technion, Israel
Atulya Sarin
Santa Clara University, USA
Karen Schnatterly
University of Minnesota, USA
Paul J. Seguin
University of Minnesota, USA
Joseph Yagil
Haifa University, and Columbia University, USA
Sijing Zong
Kent State University, USA
VALUATION OF INTERNET COMPANIES : A SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE
Pim Jansen and Enrico Perotti
ABSTRACT' In this article, we review the recent academic research on the valuation of Internet companies . In particular, we focus on the valuation method(s) which were said to be suitable for new economy start-ups in the boom years 1998-2000, and conclude that they were neither novel nor very accurate. Since the downturn in the sector, the valuation focus has returned to advanced fundamental valuation methods such as real options valuation .
INTRODUCTION The silliest claim was that in this New World of rapid technological change, old methods of share valuation had become irrelevant . Profits were for wimps, it claimed . Falls of 90-100% in the share prices of loss-making dot .com firms show that profits do matter after all. The Economist, May 12th, 2001
Innovations in Investments and Corporate Finance, Volume 7, pages 1-17 . Copyright © 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0897-4 I
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At the height of the Internet craze, flotations of Internet companies have created many millionaires . It was argued at that time that new rules of valuation had to be applied in the New Economy . Revenues and growth potential, rather than cash flows, were to be the new foundation of value . After the abrupt fall of NASDAQ index in the spring of 2000, reality set in . Many Internet companies continued to burn cash and to generate significant losses, and many have since gone bankrupt . Furthermore, in the financial press, among economists and among respected academics around the world, a broad discussion has finally developed on the value creation of Internet companies . In this article, we review the recent academic research on the valuation of Internet companies . In particular, we investigate the valuation method(s) which were said to be suitable for new economy start-ups .
SPECIFIC CHARACTERS OF INTERNET FIRMS Internet firms are often strikingly different from other firms . Consider the results from a study by Hand (2000a) on a sample of 274 Internet firms, 274 non-Internet firms and 213 IPO-matched non-Internet firms . An Internet firm has over half its revenues from Internet. The median Internet firm has ten times the market capitalisation yet employs only 40% of the number of people from a median firm. Relative to the median firm, the median Internet firm also has more than three times the beta risk (2 .55 versus 0 .78), one third of its stock held by institutions (8% versus 27%), half as much of its issued shares in public float (31% versus 62%), a public float turnover that is 6 .5 times faster (once every 19 versus 143 trading days) and five times as much of its public float sold short (5% versus 1%) . This pattern holds also when Internet firms are compared with IPO-matched firms . Another striking feature is the underpricing of the median Internet firm : the Internet firm is four times as underpriced at its IPO as the median IPO-matched non-Internet firm (37% versus 9%) with the mean underpricing for Internet firms reaches 69% to be compared with an average underpricing for all U .S . IPOs over the period 1960-1996 of 16% . These differences are unusual but not unique historically . A study by Amir and Lev [AL, 1996] for the ten years beginning 1984, reported that 69% of quarterly EPS of the 14 independent cellular telephone companies they examined were n egative . AL also report that the corresponding figure for 44 biotechnology companies over the same period was 72% . This compares to Hand's result of 77% of Internet firms reporting negative EPS over the period 1997 :Ql - 1999 :Q2, suggesting that Internet firms may be no more unprofitable than other groups of firms in earlier technology-based, high growth industries which went through an IPO cycle .
Valuation of Internet Companies
3
CLASSIFICATION OF INTERNET FIRMS We start by a general classification of the numerous types of Internet companies that have emerged in the last few years . The main distinction in use is between Business to Business (B2B) and Business to Consumer (B2C) Internet firms (e .g . Bowen, Davis & Rajgopal, 2000 ; Demers & Lev, Davis, 2001) . Across these categories, the most widely used in the USA (from w ww .intemet .com ) distinguishes : (1) e-tailers and e-commerce ; (2) Software ; (3) Enablers ; (4) Security ; (5) Content & portals ; (6) High speed and infrastructure ; and (7) ISP and access . Trueman Wong and Zhang (2000) especially focus on the difference between e-tailers (producing revenues by attracting visitors to their web sites and selling products) and the p/c firms (portal- and content community firms, who depend for their revenues largely on advertising) . Keating, Lys and Magee (2001) make a distinction between firms that market or sell primarily via the Internet ("direct" firms, or B2C firms) and firms that provide Internet infrastructure ("support" firms) . Perotti and Rossetto (2000) make a further distinction within the content and portal category, distinguishing between vertical portals, who specialise in the sales of one product (e .g . Amazon focusing originally on selling books via Internet) and horizontal portals, who sell all sorts of products or give access to multiple services .
FINANCIAL VALUE DRIVERS We now move to review common and less common financial measures used for valuing Internet firms and present some evidence on the value drivers of stock valuation . Is Accounting Information Useful for Internet Valuation? Hand (2000a) assesses the main accounting measures listed Internet firms operations and relates them to their stock market valuations . He finds evidence that basic accounting data is value relevant, albeit in a non-linear manner . Overall, he concludes that Internet firms' log-transformed market values are neatly linear in both log-transformed book-equity and log-transformed net income . This suggests a remarkable dispersion . Keating, Lys and Magee (2001) conclude that annual report information indeed explains a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in valuations at both March and May 2000 . They find that, for support firms, the annual report provides 20 .5 times the explanatory power on valuation relative
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to bits of information provided by analysts' forecast and earnings surprise information (the new information) combined . 2 Furthermore, the contribution of the annual report information to explaining valuations was significantly higher than new information . Perhaps the more succesfull Internet firms were expected to spend more on customer and product development than was generated in revenue during 2000, resulting in a lower forecasted earnings for the year . The earnings expectations appear to have changed by the end of May . The annual information provides relatively 21 .3 times the information provided by analysts forecasts and earnings surprises combined, significant at the 0 .01 level . Further, they observe that the coefficient on Gross Profit is significantly positive, while the coefficients on R&D and Other Expenses are significantly negative . They conclude that firms earning greater profits in 1999 experience a relatively smaller stock price decline in spring 2000, while firms that spend more on research and development in 1999 experience a relatively larger stock price decline . Adjusted Accounting Information Accounting measures often need to be adjusted for the purpose of valuation . A primary adjustment to earnings is to subtract the cost of committed capital . This requires a precise measure of capital . Economic Value Added (EVA 3 ) considers R&D, marketing and advertising expenses as investment rather than expenses . Using EVA, a greater percentage of the value appears in the earlier years, where forecasting is easier . When initial costs (R&D, marketing and advertising) are capitalised as investments, this creates higher earnings in the earlier years, where forecasting is more practical . When a considerable part of a company's value is in future growth opportunities, a better understanding of intrinsic value may be gained by applying real options' techniques . We will discuss this issue later in the article . Price-to-Sales Ratio Demers and Lev (2000) examine the value relevance of two categories of Internet companies' expenditures related to the acquisition of intangible assets : (i) marketing expenses ; and (ii) product development and R&D expenses . They hypothesise that the market will positively value both of these variables as long as it views them as positive NPV investments . DL also examine the value relevance of the income statement components cost of goods/services sold (COGS), R&D and marketing expenses . With the exception of COGS, the income statement components are significantly value relevant in 1999 . This is
Valuation of Internet Companies
5
consistent with studies on start-up industries (e .g . Amir & Lev, 1996) and R&D intensive firms (e .g . Lev & Sougiannis, 1996) . Their findings suggest that early in the Internet boom, the market viewed B2C Internet companies' material expenditures directed towards customer acquisitions and product development as investments rather than expenses . Following the major crash of NASDAQ in early 2000, the market appears to have shifted in valuation approach . In the year 2000, COGS is negatively and significantly associated with P/S-ratio but Marketing and Product Development expenses no longer explain Internet companies price-to-sales ratio . These findings suggest that in the year 2000, the market is no longer willing to implicitly capitalise expenditures on intangible assets in valuing Internet stocks . DL conclude that `the market continued to capitalise these expenditures during the first quarter of 2000 (i .e . until the bursting of the bubble), but then stopped capitalising them and/or began treating them as expenses in the second quarter of 2000 .' Using Aggressive Accounting Practices : Barter Trade & Grossed Up Revenues Stimulated by concern raised by the regulatory bodies Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) and the Federal Accounting Standard Board (FASB), Angela Davis [May 2000, AD] studies the value relevance of revenues for Internet firms . In particular, she studies whether reporting grossed-up or barter revenues has any impact on their valuation between January 1998 and November 2000 . Consistent with prior studies she finds a positive association between market value of equity and revenue announcements . This provides evidence for the notion that Internet managers had incentives to increase reported revenue, possibly through the use of grossed-up and/or barter revenue . Davis concludes that use of these aggressive accounting techniques appears to be concentrated in only a few Internet sectors, particularly e-tailers, content/community firms and portals . There is a positive and highly significant relation between quarterly value and revenue for these firms in both the pre- and post-crash periods . She finds that there is no statistically significant positive relation between market capitalisation and earnings in the pre-crash period but it becomes positive and statistically significant in the post-crash period . She further concludes that the market's valuation of revenue declines from the pre- to the post-crash period for firms reporting grossed-up revenue and/or barter revenue while this remains virtually unchanged for firms not reporting grossed-up or barter revenue . Additionally, she shows that the larger the number of individual investors following an Internet company, the less value is
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attributed to reporting grossed-up revenue and barter revenue. This suggests a changing investor behaviour in the post-crash period . In a more recent study, Bowen, Davis and Rajgopal (BDR, 2001) focus on economic motives underlying management's accounting choices of Internet companies . First, BDR document the extent to which Internet companies use allegedly aggressive revenue recognition policies and confirm the results of Davis (2001) . Second, they examine the economic incentives that potentially influence firms to choose aggressive revenue accounting practices . Where Davis (2001) and Bagnoli et al . (2001) find that the market responds to revenue surprises, BDR document that revenue levels are strongly associated with market values of Internet firms . This leads them to conclude that managers of Internet firms have economic incentives to report high levels of revenue . Since this strategy cannot be sustained for long, the question is why Internet managers seek to fool the markets . Specific incentives to influence stock prices according to BDR include : (1) stock option compensation ; and (2) access to (and cost of) equity capital . Furthermore, Internet managers also likely have incentives to influence third parties (e .g . capital providers other than stock market investors, suppliers and customers by reporting higher revenues) . Similarly, they find a positive association between the use of both barter and grossed-up revenue and the extent of cash burn, suggesting that pressure to seek external financing influences the aggressive revenue recognition choices of Internet firm managers . Cash-Burn Ratio Demers and Lev (DL, 2000) construct a proxy for B2C companies' ability to sustain their current rate of cash burn . Their proxy for cash burn is cash on hand divided by current period's cash flows from operations . They find that this proxy is a significant value-driver in both 1999 and 2000 . Their proxy is defined as [cash on hand]/[current period's cash flows from operations] . For both 1999 and 2000, this ratio is significantly associated with the price-to-sales ratio of Internet companies . For companies with negative cash flows form operations, the ratio is negative, and therefore the significantly positive coefficient results in a reduction to overall firm value . The intuition for this might be, that free cash flows (i .e . significant cash stores and limited cash burn) provide these Internet companies with greater option value for growth . Thus, cash provides these companies with the flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing market conditions and to react to emerging opportunities .
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Valuation of Internet Companies
"NON-FINANCIAL" VALUE DRIVERS In this paragraph we discuss studies analysing non-financial value drivers . Web metrics will be discussed extensively, together with managerial actions, strategic alliances and stock options . Web Site Usage : Indicator of Potential Future Demand Trueman, Wong and Zang (TWZ, 2000) consider the role of non-financial data in the valuation of Internet stocks . They provide insight into valuation of Internet stocks by examining the impact of both accounting information and measures of Internet usage . First they relate Internet stock prices with accounting information . To that extent they decompose the firm's earnings in three components : gross profits, operating expenses and non-operating expenses . They assume future gross profits to be positively and linearly related to a current period's gross profit, operating expenses and web site usage . This latter is based on the assumption that current period Web site usage reflects potential future demand for the companies products and affects the rates a firm can charge for advertising on the company's Web sites . Web usage is measured alternatively by the number of unique visitors to the firm's Web site and by the number of page views at its site . Consistent with those who claim that financial statement information is of very limited use in the valuation of Internet stocks (such as Stern, Stewart, Bagnoli et al .), TWZ are unable to detect a significant positive association between bottom-line net income and their sample of market prices . In fact, the association is actually negative . However, when decomposing the net income into its components, they find that book value and gross profits are significantly and positively related to stock price . Market Values of Web Businesses in Relation to Web
Traffic
Rajgopal, Kotha and Venkatachalan (RKV, 2000a) analyse the importance of web traffic as a non-financial indicator of the market values of B2C Internet firms . They examine a sample of 92 firms (compared to `only' 56 firms for TWZ) over the five quarters beginning with the first quarter of 1999 . They find that the number of unique monthly visitors to a site is positively associated with stock prices and adds significant incremental explanatory power to a valuation regression including just financial statement information. Internet companies use many strategies to generate
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traffic, such as an alliance with America Online (AOL), extensive marketing expenses and media visibility . Consistent with TWZ (2000b), RKV find that web traffic levels predict one- and two-quarter ahead sales . However, traffic has no incremental information about future revenues once the predictive information in past sales is controlled for. Hence, the market does not appear to value traffic merely because it predicts future sales. Finally, RKV find that the market values of web businesses are positively associated with the number of unique visitors to the firm's web site . While RKV offer important insights to the literature, the direct link with the valuation of Internet companies is weak . Log Linear Regression on Web 0
Traffic Data
Hand (2000b) claims to clarify the previous research (i .e . RKV, 2000a; TWZ, 2000a ; Hand, 2000a) by investigating the value-relevance of a more comprehensive set of web traffic measures . He assesses the value-relevance of unique visitors, household reach, page views, the number of hours spent on the page views and the gender, age and income levels of the visitors . This reveals the value relevance of supply and demand forces on Internet stocks . He regresses the log-transformed market value of equity on log transformations of three groups of factors : economic fundamentals, web traffic and supply and demand forces . Economic fundamentals are captured by current book equity, forecasted one-year earnings and forecasted long-run growth in earnings . Contrary to popular perception, he finds that the prices of Internet stocks are not driven by web traffic as much as by economic fundamentals . Current book equity, one-year-ahead forecasted earnings and long-run-forecasted earnings growth dominate in explaining cross-sectional variation in Net stock prices . Only marginally are Internet firms' market values related to only one of the three measures of web traffic : the number of unique visitors to the firm's web site . Supplementary tests also indicate that Internet firms' equity market values are unrelated to the average income, age or gender of Web site visitors . Third, after controlling for economic fundamentals and web traffic, Internet firms' equity market values are negatively correlated with their public float, indicating that Internet firms stock prices are higher the lower is the fraction of total shares available for trading . In contracts, Internet firms' equity values are positively correlated with their short interest and institutional ownership, suggesting that Internet firms benefit from the stability and/or reduced irrational trading risk provided by greater institutional ownership .
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In summary, Hand concludes that pricing of U .S . Internet stocks is dominated by expectations of near- and long-term profitability, although they are also uniquely impacted by some non-traditional value-drivers such as web metrics . Using Lagged Web-Traffic Metrics
Demers and Lev (DL, 2000) expand upon the prior web metric studies by examining the value-relevance of three web performance factors both before and after the Internet market correction in March-April of 2000 : (i) reach (attraction of new visitors to a Web site) ; (ii) stickiness (retention of visitors on the site) ; and (iii) customer loyalty (ability to generate repeat visits from surfers who have been attracted to the site in the past) . They find that both contemporaneous levels and changes in various web traffic metrics are significantly correlated with monthly stock return in each of 1999 and 2000, but the significance levels decrease in the later time period, suggesting at reduction in the implicit valuation of web traffic . More strikingly, the one-month lag in web traffic levels is significantly correlated with monthly stock returns in 1999, but the significance disappears in 2000 . Thus, while investors generally appear to react promptly to the release of traffic measures, the results suggest that there may have been some delayed reaction by the market in the earlier stages of the Internet economy . DL's findings of significance for the year 2000 on reach and stickiness confirm that web traffic measures remain important after the burst of the bubble in 2000 . Thus, even as the Internet sector begins to mature and B2C companies develop longer operating histories (so that a longer time series of financial valuation variables becoming available), web traffic metrics that were relevant during the bubble period of the market continue to be significant determinants of Internet companies' price-to-sales ratios after the Internet shakeout, at least throughout 2000 . The Impact of Financial Analysts
Lui and Song (LS, 2000) study the role of financial analysts in the Internet stock bubble in spring 2000 . They try to test if financial analysts as a whole overestimated the prospect of Internet companies . To this extent they examine the change of financial analysts' earnings forecasts around the crash in April 2000 . They conclude that :
• Financial analysts as a whole were too optimistic about the Internet stocks before the crash . The percentage of analysts who were optimistic declined
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significantly after the crash (from 41 .5% before the 33 .3% during the crash quarter and 35 .6% one quarter later) . Analysts revised down their forecasts significantly after the burst of the bubble ; • Although financial analysts seemed to change their forecasting significantly for the quarterly earnings, they remained quite upbeat on the long-term prospects of the Internet firms ; • Forecasts of analysts whose affiliated brokerage firm had done initial public offerings (IPO) for the Internet companies are more negative in their quarterly earnings forecasts relative to those of non-affiliated analysts . Especially on the quarter after the crash, the financial analysts had 19% of the optimistic forecasts, while non-affiliated analysts had 35% . This is important evidence that some investment banks oversold Internet IPO's . Bagnoli, Kallapur and Watts (BKW, 2001) perform a similar study . They examine the characteristics and relative information content of revenue and earnings news for Internet firms during and after the bubble . In line with TWZ (2000b) they find a tendency for analysts to underestimate revenues . Keating, Lys and Magee (KLM, 2001) examine the impact of analysts forecasts as well as new disclosures on Internet stock prices . Financial analysts' average buy/sell recommendation became less favourable for pure Internet firms and more favourable for support firms . While statistically significant, the changes were, however, small, and do not suggest a major systematic shift in analyst's attitudes towards Internet stocks . KLM conclude that analysts recommendations were mixed : less favourable recommendations for pure firms and more favourable recommendations for support firms . The only significant adverse changes were seen in fiscal year 2000 earnings forecasts which were lowered significantly . Managerial Actions : rose .co m Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (CDR, 2000) analyse the effect of a corporate name change (i .e . taking a name that ends o n .co m or .net) . In the popular press, CDR came across several articles that mention extremely large returns earned by these companies . These articles suggest the large returns being an effect of irrational day traders searching stock chat sites on the Internet . Companies that announce dot.co m name changes between June 1, 1998 and July 31, 1999 gave a mean return of 142% above that of similar companies during the period between 15 days before changing their name and 15 days after changing their name . The return is 122% for Internet companies and 203% for companies
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that have no relation with the Internet. The change in value does not appear to be temporary! CDR do not find evidence of a negative post-announcement drift even when removing the more extreme observations . CDR question whether it is a rational response for investors to apply a `premium' to a dot .com stock. They find that in the shorter horizons, market participants appear to apply a similar positive price premium across all companies changing their names to dot .co m names, regardless of a company's level of involvement with the Internet . In the longer horizon, and with the caveat that the sample size of the category not Internet related is very small, firms that have less involvement with the Internet have the greatest returns following a d ot .com . Overall a mere association with the Internet seems enough to provide a firm with a large and permanent value increase . CDR conclude that their results indicate irrational exhuberance by investors to be associated with the Internet at all costs . However, they acknowledge that only time will prove whether investors are rational in pricing large expectations of future earnings from the Internet into the stock price . The Value Relevance of Strategic Alliances Analysts' reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that strategic alliances are potentially important value drivers for Internet stocks . Demers and Lev (2000) find support for this argument after examining whether these are still positively valued by the market in 2000 . A strategic alliance with AOL has a positive relation to P/S ratio of B2C stocks in 1999, which complements the view of RKV (2000) who document a weak positive association between alliances with AOL and web traffic measure for reach during 1999 . In 2000, they find that AOL alliances are not adding value to B2C stocks . They also find that the cumulative sum of alliances entered into is significantly negatively associated with the P/S ratio in both 1999 and 2000 . Stock Option Plans Keating, Lys and Magee (2001) examine the valuation effect of Internet companies granting employee stock options . Stock grants are a form of employee compensation that many regard as an expense . Most companies grant options with strike price equal to the current market price which under current rules results in no expense recognition . In addition, changes in market conditions which make stock options less attractive for employees will force firms to offer more cash to attract and retain them, so in this case there is a
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risk that the company will not be able to fulfil investor's growth expectations . KLM argue that if these effects dominate investors' valuation of Internet firms, then the coefficient on stock option grants in the valuation regression should be negative . KLM construct as stock option variable the fair market value of options granted as disclosed during 1999 in the annual report footnotes . They expect this variable to change from March 2000 regression to the May 2000 regression in both a valuation model and a returns model . They conclude that investors positively view stock-option grants, most likely due to their effect on employee retention .
USING THE REAL OPTION APPROACH TO VALUE GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES The evidence on Internet firm valuation suggests a frequent use of nonfinancial information, which suggests that the market is attempting to use proxies for growth opportunities . We review the leading approach for their valuation : the real option approach . Using Real Options
Real options represent the most recent capital budgetting techniques to value growth opportunities . Schwartz and Moon (SM, 2000) and Perotti and Rossetto (2000) argue that Internet companies have call-option characteristics since they have large potential upside and limited downside potential (i .e . bankruptcy) . Furthermore, Internet companies have volatile revenues, rates of growth in revenues, costs, cash flows and stock prices . Since options are often claims on highly uncertain outcomes, these valuation techniques may be used to value Internet companies . Many strategic investments create opportunities that eventually will or will not be taken . In these cases, the investment opportunity can be viewed as a stream of cash flows plus a set of options . The real options approach involves options on real (non-financial, non-traded) assets . Uncertainty is defined as the unavoidable randomness of the external environment . Exposure to uncertainty is by consequence defined by a multiple of factors and can only be partially controlled by managerial actions . Risk is thus the potentially adverse consequence of a firm's exposure . The traditional valuation models are not appropriate to deal with these uncertainties since they normally use a single expected value of the future cash flows and it is difficult to find the appropriate discount rate for the options present (e .g . exit option) methods . SM (2000) argue, using a conventional DCF model with stochastic growth rates, that depending on the parameters chosen and given high enough
Valuation of Internet Companies
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growth rates of revenues, that the value of Internet stocks can be rationalised . Even when the chance that a company may go bankrupt is real, if the initial growth rates are sufficiently high and if there is enough volatility in this growth over time, valuations can be what would otherwise appear to be unbelievably high . In addition, they find the valuation has great sensitivity to initial conditions and exact specification of the parameters . This finding is consistent with observations that the returns of Internet stocks have been strikingly volatile . In 2001, SM apply the model to price the Internet company Ebay . Its market price at the time of measuring (11 April, 2000) was U .S .D 39 .17, 75% above the model price . The reasons could be that the market is implying higher margins, growth rate expectations and growth rate volatility and/or the model is missing some key aspects of value . Alternatively Ebay was overvalued at that date . The more recent stock price information suggests the latter . Even though real option valuation may not justify Internet valuation, it deals explicitly with option-like characteristics of Internet companies (i .e . asymmetric payoffs, large uncertainty in sales and sales growth and cost uncertainty) . Internet Portals as Portfolios of Entry Options Perotti and Rossetto (PR, 2001) investigate the valuation of platform investment, such as a software operating system or an Internet portal web page . They define a platform investment as a creation of an innovative distribution and production infrastructure which increases access to customers ; as a result it reduces entry costs in related products . A portal is a point of entry connected with relevant information or access to products . It lowers the cost of reaching customers and thus the cost to entry new market segments . PR make a distinction between horizontal and vertical internet portals . They relate the platform investment to the strategic real option literature . They build a model of the value of associated strategic advantages and compare the relative valuation of such `platform stocks' versus conventional producers (old economy) . In the comparative statistics they focus on the effects of uncertainty and show that it produces the greatest difference between option-based and NPV-based models of valuation . The effect of uncertainty on the strategic advantage and thus of the platform value is not obvious as there are two future countervailing effects : the higher the uncertainty the higher the value to wait, but at the same time the higher the expected profits in case of immediate cross entry . The important result is that in a context of increased uncertainty, the relative value of platform to traditional strategies increases ; the value of waiting
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to invest rises, but the value of platform increases even more . In some cases, platforms can reduce entry by making a parallel monopoly sustainable .
PR conclude that relative to conventional producers, portal-related firms enjoy
enhanced entry options in uncertain market segments, which may be valuable under some market conditions on Internet usage . Their advantage lies in the ability to exercise entry options at the optimal strategic timing .
CONCLUSIONS Based on the overview that has been given of recent academic research on the valuation of Internet firms, we draw the following conclusions :
I . Traditional accounting data remains important for valuing Internet companies yet the link between accounting numbers and Internet valuation is tenuous at best . • Large marketing expenses, R&D and selling expenses seem to be activated as intangible assets or valuable investments ;
• Internet firms which were profitable in 1999 are valued more realistically after the burst of the bubble (April, 2000), when bottom line profit does matter much more ;
• Aggressive accounting techniques (grossed-up revenue and/or barter
revenue) may have responded to exaggerate the focus on revenues . However, revenues are only seen as main value driver before the burst in 2000 . Thereafter the relationship seems to break down ;
• Managers have economic incentives (stock option compensation and access to/cost of equity capital) to report higher revenues .
II .
Web traffic is not a major value driver for Internet companies . • Web traffic is only value relevant for e-tailers ; more precisely it appears in fact to be used as a good predictor for future sales ;
• The significance of web traffic as a driver of monthly stock return •
disappears after the burst of the bubble ; If any, then only number of unique visitors is a useful web traffic variable in relation to valuation of Internet stocks .
III . Financial Analysts stimulated the overvaluation of Internet stocks : • Analysts were too optimistic in their forecast of quarterly earnings before the market crash, revenues were significantly downgraded after the burst of the bubble ;
• Long term prospects remained upbeat after the burst of the bubble ;
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• Focus during the boom shifted from profit to earnings ; • Support firms were revised upwards after the burst, B2C revised downwards, thus more value is attributed to infrastructure providers .
IV . New valuation factors deem unsustainable : Corporate name changes into dot .com, strategic alliances and stock option plans in the long term are not adding value to Internet stocks, only before the burst have they an impact on Internet stocks . V . New approaches to valuing Internet stocks are not new : a. Volatility of growth in revenues is a key value driver for Internet companies, this option variable rationalises the high valuation of Internet stocks ; b . Internet platform related firms enjoy enhanced entry options in uncertain market segments, to be exercised at the optimal strategic timing . The better the timing, the higher the value . All in all, we find no convincing evidence on new valuation techniques and/or value drivers for Internet stocks . Web traffic has important effects on predicting future sales and thus contributes to expectations on near- and long-term profitability but has no consistent direct impact on the valuation of Internet stock valuation . For strategic alliances, granting employee stock options and changing the company name into dot .com, only the latter impacted on the valuation of Internet stocks. This suggests that it is rather irrational exuberance before the crash than extreme optimism . Extreme optimism did play a role though . It is generally agreed upon that Internet stocks have many uncertainties - e .g . volatile (rates of growth) of revenues, cash flows and earnings - and it is a business that has little historical track record . However, after the burst of the bubble it has become obvious that the expectations (even those from financial analysts) were too optimistic and that this was the main reason for the overvaluation of Internet stocks . Traditional valuation techniques have not lost any of its relevance . It is just a matter of using the correct parameters and presenting them in a correct matter in the financial accounts to make the valuation of Internet stocks a `mission possible' !
NOTES 1 . This article is an abbreviated version of a paper, written as part of the Master in International Finance Program of the University of Amsterdam . 2 . Based on the relative information content provided by Theil (1987) .
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3 . EVA is calculated as [adjusted operating profit after tax-/-(cost of capital x adjusted capital employed)] .
REFERENCES Bagnoli, M ., Kallapur, S ., & Watts, S . (2001) . Top line and bottom line forecasts : a comparison of Internet firms during and after the bubble . Krannert Graduate Schoool of Management . Purdue University . Brealey, R. A., & Myers, S . C . (2000). Principles of Corporate Finance (6th ed.) . Irwin McGraw-Hill . Cooper, M . J., Dimitrov, 0 ., & Raghavendra, Rau, P . (2000). A rose .com by any other name (November) . Purdue University. Davis, A . K . (2001) . The value relevance of revenue for Internet firms : does reporting grossed-up or barter revenue make a difference? Journal of Accounting Research, conference version (May) . Washington University, St . Louis. Demers, E ., & Lev, B . (2000) . A Rude Awakening : Internet Shakeout in 2000 (September). William E . Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester . Financial Accounting Standard Board (2000) . EITF Abstracts 99-17, Accounting for Advertising barter transactions (January) . Financial Accounting Standard Board (2000) . EITF Abstracts 99-19, Reporting revenue gross as a principal versus net as an agent (May) . Greene, W. H . (1993) . Econometric Analysis (2nd ed .), 702. Prentice-Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey . Hand, J . R. M . (2000a) . Profit, Losses, and the Non-linear Pricing of Internet Stocks, draft (January) . Kenan-Flagler Business School, UNC Chapel Hill . Hand, J . R. M . (2000b) . The role of economic fundamentals, web traffic, and supply and demand in the pricing of U.S. Internet Stocks (April) . Kenan-Flagler Business School, UNC Chapel Hill . Ho, N ., Hui, N., & Li, L. (2000) . Does EVA © beat earnings? Round 2 : evidence from Internet companies . University of New South Wales . Keating, E ., Lys, T ., & Magee, R . (2001) . The Internet downturn : finding valuation factors in spring 2000 (January) . Kellog graduate School of Business, Northwestern University . Kozbeg, A . (2001). The value drivers of Internet stocks : A business models approach (April). Stem School of Business, New York University. Liu, Q., & Song, F . (2001) . The rise and fall of Internet stocks : should financial analysts be blamed? (March) . University of Hong Kong . Milano, G ., Stern, E ., Fencl, T ., & Piza, N . (2000) . Internet valuation, why are the values so high? (February) . Stem Stewart Europe Limited . Perotti, E ., & Rossetto, S . (2000). Internet portals as portfolios of entry options, Preliminary draft (November 8) . University of Amsterdam and CEPR . Rajgopal, S ., Kotha, S ., & Venkatachalam, M . (2000a) . The relevance of web traffic for Internet Stock Prices (October) . University of Washington/Stanford University . Rajgopal, S ., Kotha, S ., & Venkatachalam, M . (2000b) . Managerial actions, stock returns and earnings: the case of business to business Internet firms (October) . University of Washington/Stanford University . Roon, F . (2000) . Valuing Dot.com (September) . Erasmus University Rotterdam .
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Schwartz, E., & Moon, M . (2000) . Rational pricing of internet companies . In : Financial Analysts Journal (Vol. 56, No . 3, (May/June)) . Association for Investment Management and Research. Schwartz, E., & Moon, M. (2000). Rational pricing of Internet companies revisited (revised April 2001). Anderson School at University of California, Los Angelas . Schwartz, E. S ., & Moon, M . (forthcoming) . Rational pricing of Internet companies Financial Analysts Journal . Shapiro, C ., & Varian, H . (1999) . Information Rules. Boston, MA : Harvard Business School Press . The Industry Standard (2000) . Portals start to feel the heat (May 1), 63 . Trueman, B ., Franco Wong, M . H ., & Zhang, X-J . (2000a) . The eyeballs have it : searching for the value of Internet stocks (January) . Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley CA . Trueman, B ., Franco Wong, M . H ., & Zhang, X-J . (2000b) . Back to basics : forecasting the revenues of Internet firms (April) . Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley CA . Trueman, B ., Franco Wong, M . H ., & Zhang, X-J ., (2001) . Anomalous stock returns around Internet firms' earnings announcements (April) . Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley CA . UBS Warburg Global Equity Research (2000) . Navigating the I-valuation Jungle ( www. ubswarburg .com/researchweb) , May . Vuong, Q . (1989) . Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses, Econometrica, 57, 307-334 . Wingfield, N. (1999) . The tricky task of tracking web users, p . Cl, Wall Street Journal (November 22) .
DECISIONS IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS : AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF DISCOUNT RATES Uri Benzion and Joseph Yagil ABSTRACT Using three subsamples of subjects that differ in their level of formal education and knowledge in economics, this experimental study of intertemporal discount rates finds that subjective discount rates decrease with the time delay and monetary sum, and are higher for postpone-a-receipt than for a postpone-a-payment scenario . The findings indicate the existence of market segmentation, implicit risk and a weak added compensation . The findings also imply that subjective discount rates are lower and closer to real market rates of interest for subjects having higher levels of formal education and economics knowledge.
1 . INTRODUCTION The discount rate is one of the central concepts in financial economics . Its exact meaning in economics may vary across economic scenarios and can take such forms as borrowing rate, lending rate, and required return on financial assets such as bonds and stocks . While the discount-rate issue has been examined extensively in the financial economics literature, less attention has been devoted to the behavioral aspects of individuals' subjective (derived) discount rates . In Innovations in Investments and Corporate Finance, Volume 7, pages 1940 . Copyright © 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISBN : 0-7623-0897-4 19
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URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
recent years, however, behavioral studies inspired by the pioneering work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), focus on the psychological rather than the economic aspects of individuals' financial behavior . The objective of this study is to extend this line of research by focusing on subjective discount rates inferred from individuals' financial decisions . More specifically, the purpose of this study is twofold : (1) to re-examine the behavior of subjective discount rates across three dimensions : financial scenario (such as lending and borrowing), time delay and the monetary sum of the cash flow ; and (2) to investigate the extent to which the behavior of subjective discount rates is affected by the formal education level of the decision makers and their level of knowledge in financial economics . For three subsamples of a distinctive group of subjects, who vary with respect to the formal education level (undergraduates and graduates having bachelor's degree, master's degree or higher), and their knowledge level in financial economics, we find a very high similarity with respect to the behavior of their discount rates across the scenario, time and sum dimensions . However, the level of the subjective discount rates is lower for graduates than for undergraduates . The knowledge of financial economics also has a depressing effect on the level of the discount rates inferred from the subject's financial decisions . The plan of this study is as follows : Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature ; Section 3 presents the theory and hypotheses ; Section 4 discusses the experimental design ; Section 5 analyzes the findings ; and finally, Section 6 provides a brief summary .
2. LITERATURE REVIEW Experimental studies of subjective discount rates are reported by Thaler (1981), Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989), Benzion, Granot and Yagil (1992, 1994), as well as others . Generally, the results of these studies are found to be consistent with psychological models based on the notion of a reference point discussed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Loewenstein (1988), Loewenstein and Thaler (1989), and Thaler (1994) . One of the features of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979, 1986, 1992) prospect theory is the reluctance to realize losses . This reluctance is examined by Shefrin and Statman (1993, 1994) . The issue of subjective discount rates studied here is also related to the overconfidence issue examined recently in the literature . Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) summarize a large body of evidence from cognitive psychological experiments and surveys, which shows that individuals overestimate their own abilities in various contexts . Based on this premise of investor overconfidence, they develop a theory of security markets . Specifically,
Decisions in Financial Economics
21
they note two well-known psychological biases : investor overconfidence about the precision of information and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors' confidence . The overconfidence phenomenon has recently been investigated further by Barber and Odean (2000, 2001), and Gervais and Odean (2001) . It is argued there that overconfidence can explain high trading levels and the resulting poor performance of individual investors . Barber and Odean (2001) also find that men are more overconfident and trade more excessively than women . Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) also note the large body of evidence concerning underreaction and overreaction which indicates that in the short run, security prices underreact to news, while in the long run they overreact to consistent patterns of news pointing in the same direction . Their findings, they emphasize, challenge the efficient market theory . They propose a parsimonious model of investor sentiment (how investors form beliefs) that is consistent with available statistical evidence . In a recent study on mental accounting, Barberis and Huang (2001) argue that it is possible to improve our understanding of firm level stock returns by employing the experimental evidence related to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) "loss aversion", concept which asserts that people are more sensitive to losses than to gains . Another closely related concept is "myopic loss aversion" which, as defined by Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997), is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than gains, and the tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently . They, as well as Gneezy and Potters (1997), find that the more frequently returns are evaluated, the more at risk investors are . Another related concept is Thaler's (1987) "mental accounting" term, which refers to the process by which people think about and evaluate their financial transactions . Experimental studies suggest that, when doing their mental accounting, people engage in "narrow framing", or narrowly defined gains and losses . Loss aversion and narrow framing have already been applied to the aggregate stock market and retirement investment by Benartzi and Thaler (1995, 1999) . Motivated by their studies, Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) introduce loss aversion over financial wealth fluctuations into a dynamic equilibrium model, and find that it captures a number of aggregate market phenomena . Another two related studies are Ferris Haugen and Makhija (1988) on investors' reluctance to realize losses and De Bondt and Makhija (1988) on managers' reluctance to terminate economically unviable projects . In his attempt to reconcile market efficiency and behavioral finance, Fama (1998) contends that overreaction of stock prices to information is about as common as underreaction . In a recent survey of investor psychology and asset pricing, Hirshleifer (2001) sketches a framework for understanding decision biases, and discusses the importance of investor psychology for security prices .
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URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
This study attempts to extend prior studies of subjective discount rates, such as those by Thaler (1981) and Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989), by re-examining the discount rate behavior with respect to the three dimensions of scenario, time and sum, and investigating the effect of formal education and economics knowledge on both the level and variation of subjective discount rates .
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES The standard relationship underlying discounting and compounding of time-varying cash flows is given by : F=P (1 +R
)T
(1)
where F and P are respectively the future and present value of a certain cash flow, R is the discount or capitalization rate, and T is the time factor . Eq . (1) is used to infer the subjective discount rate inherent in intertemporal decisions involving monetary sums . The pure economic meaning of the discount rate is the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption . In that respect, the discount rate may depend on time preferences as well as other factors, affecting the utility function . However, given the availability of borrowing and lending in perfect capital markets, the marginal discount rate is equal to the interest rate in the market . This perception is the foundation for what may be called the "classical approach" asserting that in perfect and certain capital markets, the discount rate is identical for all individuals and for all (financial economic) situations or scenarios . Furthermore, it will also be invariable with respect to the monetary sum involved, and the time factor ; that is it is time symmetric . A different view regarding the scenario effect is implied by the "market segmentation" approach, which implies that, due to capital market imperfections and the lack of perfect arbitrage, the rate of borrowing will be higher than the rate of lending . Similar to the classical approach, this approach also advocates that in each market segment, the discount rate will be invariant with respect to both time delay and sum of cash flow . Behavioral studies by Kahneman and Tversky, Thaler, and Loewentstein establish that even when the intertemporal decision problem is formulated in terms of certainty conditions, as in our experiment, the subjects frame it as one involving some implicit degree of risk. The "implicit risk" approach assumes that, in making their intertemporal decisions, individuals believe that there is some probability that delayed receipts will not be paid and delayed payments will not be collected . Benzion and Yagil (1987) offer two hypotheses concerning
Decisions in Financial Economics
23
the effect of risk : the "one-period-realization" (OPR), and the "multi-periodrealization" (MPR) . By the first hypothesis, the risk associated with a project or an outcome can be incorporated in the first period only, so that subsequent time periods merely reflect the pure time value of money given by the risk-free rate of interest . Formally stated, it is : F=P(1+d) (1+i) T
(2)
where i is the risk-free rate of interest and d is the risk premium . According to the alternative MPR hypothesis, risk is incorporated in the discount rate applicable to each future time period. Formally, it becomes : F=P [(1+d) (l+i)]T=P(l+d)T(1+i)T
(3)
Equations (2) and (3) demonstrate the formal difference between the two competing hypotheses : the power of the gross risk premium (1 + d) is 1 and T by the OPR and MPR, respectively . To test these two alternative risk hypotheses empirically, the OPR Eq . (2) can equivalently be written as : Ln(F/P)=Ln(1+d)+Ln(l+i)T
(4)
and the MPR Eq . (3) as : Ln(F/P)=Ln[(l+d) (1+i)IT
(5)
The resulting estimated regression equation for both the OPR and MPR hypotheses will then be : Ln(F/P)=bo +b 1 T+e
(6)
where bo and b i are the ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients, and e is the error term . By the OPR : b o = Ln (1 + d), and b 1 = Ln (1 + i ), while by the MPR : bo = 0, and b I = Ln [(1 + d) (1 + i )] . It then follows that if b o is not statistically different than zero, and b i is statistically greater than the risk-free rate of interest, it would lend support to the MPR rather than the OPR risk hypothesis . The "added compensation" approach asserts that, in addition to other factors affecting a temporal monetary decision, there is an added compensation or premium associated with changing one's position or making readjustments . Furthermore, the premium will be positive for a negative position change and negative for a positive position change, where a negative change involves
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URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
receiving a cash flow in the future instead of in the present, while a positive position change involves paying a loan in the future instead of in the present . Stated differently, individuals will require a compensation for postponing a receipt, but on the other hand, will be willing to offer a premium for postponing a payment. The formal representation of the added compensation component (Q) can take various mathematical forms, one of which is the following : F = QP (1 + R ) T
(7)
For a negative position change such as a postponing-a-receipt scenario, Q should be greater than unity ; while for a positive position change such as a postponing-a-payment scenario, Q should be less than unity (and positive) . Eq. (7) can be rewritten as : Ln(F/P)=LnQ+Ln(1+R)T
(8)
and its regression form is Ln(F/P)=bo +b 1 T+e
(9)
where Q = e b0~, implying that b o should be positive (negative) for a negative (positive) position change . These four hypotheses, discussed in more detail by Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989), can be summarized as follows : the classical approach advocates that the discount rate is universally uniform across scenario, time, and sum, while the market segmentation approach asserts that it may differ across financial scenarios, but in each scenario it will be independent of time and sum . The implicit risk approach states that even certain (risk-free) intertemporal decision problems are framed by subjects as involving some degree of risk, causing the inferred discount rate to be higher than the risk-free rate of interest, where the implicit risk will be incorporated either by the OPR or MPR hypotheses . The added compensation approach further asserts that a position change will be associated with an additional compensation or premium . These four hypotheses are tested in the subsequent sections . In addition, we investigate whether the magnitude of the impact on the discount rate implied by each of these hypotheses is related to the levels of formal education and economics knowledge .
Decisions in Financial Economics
25
4. METHODOLOGY The questionnaire (fully presented in the appendix) consists of two parts corresponding to two scenarios : postponing-a-receipt and postponing-a-payment . As noted in the previous section, these two scenarios are examined in order to test whether the discount rates inferred from the subjects' responses are different, reflecting different levels of risk premium or compensation for a position change . In the first part of the questionnaire (postponing-a-receipt scenario), subjects are asked to state the amount of dollars required to leave them indifferent about receiving this amount in the present or receiving a higher amount in the future . Three time periods are offered 0 .5, 2, and 5 years, and three sums of $200, $600, and $5,000 . This trade-off between present and future is made with respect to a bank savings account in which the level of risk is practically negligible . The second part of the questionnaire involves a postponing-of-payment scenario. Subjects are asked to state the dollar amount they would be willing to pay in the future for a bank loan made to them in the present, which will make them indifferent about the difference between the dollar sum in the present, and the higher sum in the future . The same parameter values of time and sum are offered as in the first part of the questionnaire . Finally, the subjects are asked to state their highest academic degree (bachelor's degree, master's degree or higher), and specify the discipline or the field of study . The questionnaire was distributed to 117 subjects from the Technion (Israel Institute for Technology) and Haifa University . The sample was drawn from the following populations : undergraduate students in industrial engineering and economics ; graduate students from different disciplines, and those who had earned a master's degree or higher in an academic discipline . All questionnaires were filled out in the same week. Out of the 117 subjects who participated in the experiment, 105 completed all questions in the questionnaire, resulting in the following three subsamples : 45 undergraduates, 30 graduates, and 30 having a master's degree or higher . The disciplines of the last two subsamples are social, exact and natural sciences . The proportion of Economics majors was 59% in the bachelor's-degree subsample compared with only 30% in the mater's-degree subsample . Advantages and disadvantages of experimental studies noted in the literature apply to this study as well . Nonetheless, the questions were examined carefully, and the subjects were given sufficient response time, and were informed of the importance of the topic . Therefore, we believe that the subjects were positively motivated to complete the questionnaire with necessary care and diligence even without being offered monetary incentives,
26
URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
which, psychologists claim, do not necessarily improve performance . Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found in their experimental study that, in contrast to the economic convention, subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than those who were offered no compensation . The analysis of our experimental findings also implies that reliable responses appear to have been part of the subjects' utility functions .
5. RESULTS As noted in the previous section, two decision-making scenarios are tested : (1) postponing a payment ; and (2) postponing a receipt . These two scenarios are examined for varying times periods (0.5, 2, and 5 years), varying dollar sums ($200, $600, $5,000), and three subsamples (economics and industrial engineering undergraduates, and two groups of graduates : those who possess a bachelor's degree, and those who possess a master's degree or higher . The dollar responses of each subject were compiled, and implicit discount rates were derived from the dollar responses . The mean across subjects of the implicit discount rates are presented in Table 1 for the three subsamples by the three dimensions investigated : scenario, time, and sum . A detailed analysis of the pattern of the discount rates with respect to these three dimensions appears in Tables 2, 3 and 4 . Starting with the effect of time on derived discount rates, the major finding exhibited in Table 2 is that the inferred discount rates required decrease with time . The overall mean discount rate across subjects, scenario, and sum (indicated by the last line in Table 2) decreases from 14 .73% to 10 .90% and 8 .99% for 0 .5, 2, and 5 years, respectively . This time pattern of inferred discount rates is consistent with previous findings in the literature (e .g . Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil, 1989) and is different from the time pattern of market actual interest rates that generally increase with time . This difference is investigated later in this section . As demonstrated in Table 2, the decrease of discount rates with time holds across the two scenarios examined (postponing a receipt and postponing a payment), across sum and for all three subsamples . Also, the effect of time on discount rates is found to be decreasing at a diminishing rate . As indicated by the overall mean rate in the last line of Table 2, lengthening the time delay from 0 .5 to 2 years results in a reduction of about 4% in the discount rate, while the time change from 2 to 5 years only reduces the discount rate by about 2% . This "diminishing rate" property also holds across all scenarios, sums and subsamples tested (as seen in Table 2) .
Decisions in Financial Economics Table 1 .
27
Mean Discount Rates by Scenario, Time, and Sum (%) .* Scenario A - Time
Subsample
Sum 200
I
600 5000 200
2
600 5000 200
3
600 5000 200
Total
600 5000
0 .5
2
Scenario B - Time 5
0 .5
2
5
35 .64 (1 .33) 23 .72 (1 .13) 19 .22 (0 .68)
20 .88 (0 .91) 15 .55 (0 .83) 13 .78 (0 .68)
15 .54 (0 .64) 12 .86 (0 .70) 10 .67 (0 .55)
22.62 (1 .14) 17 .90 (1 .09) 19.06 (0 .93)
15 .23 (0.68) 12 .22 (0.56) 12 .97 (0.67)
11 .67 (0.60) 9 .78 (0.63) 10.15 (0.63)
10 .98 (0 .97) 13 .24 (0 .72) 10 .41 (0 .65)
12 .57 (0 .59) 9 .95 (0 .55) 9 .11 (0 .53)
10 .79 (0 .59) 6 .38 (0 .75) 8 .48 (0 .59)
11 .47 (0 .69) 9 .75 (0 .60) 8 .25 (0 .74)
12 .87 (0.50) 9 .50 (0.65) 7 .75 (0.78)
9 .00 (0 .58) 7 .68 (0 .64) 7 .02 (0 .79)
15 .03 (0 .99) 11 .13 (0 .75) 9 .04 (0 .57)
9 .58 (0 .73) 8 .17 (0 .69) 7 .50 (0 .70)
9 .01 (0 .63) 7 .60 (0 .64) 6 .94 (0 .60)
6 .94 (0 .73) 5 .93 (0 .75) 6 .65 (0 .90)
6.69 (0.55) 6.14 (0.59) 5 .66 (0.55)
6 .52 (0 .48) 6 .02 (0 .57) 5 .80 (0 .52)
23 .22 (1 .10) 16 .03 (0 .87) 12 .91 (0 .63)
14 .34 (0 .74) 11 .22 (0 .69) 10 .13 (0 .64)
11 .78 (0 .62) 8 .95 (0 .70) 8 .70 (0 .58)
13 .68 (0 .85) 11 .19 (0 .81) 11 .32 (0 .86)
11 .60 (0.58) 9.29 (0.60) 8 .79 (0.67)
9 .06 (0 .55) 7 .83 (0 .61) 7 .66 (0 .65)
* Number in parenthesis is the coefficient of variation (cov) defined as the standard deviation over the mean . Scenario A represents postponing a receipt, while Scenario B represents postponing a payment .
The effect of the dollar sum involved on the inferred discount rates is demonstrated in both Tables 2 and 3 . Focusing first on the overall mean discount rate across time, scenario and subsample, the last line in Table 3 indicates that the effect of sum on discount rates is negative . The discount rates found are 13 .95%, 10 .75% and 9 .92% for dollar sums of $200, $600 and $5,000, respectively . Similar to the effect of time on discount rates, the effect of sum too was found to decrease at a diminishing rate . As seen in
URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
28
Table 2.
Mean Discount Rates Across Scenario by Sum and Time (%) . Time
Subsample
Sum
0 .5
2
5
Mean
1
200 600 5000 Mean
29 .13 20 .81 19 .14 23 .03
18 .06 13 .86 13 .38 15 .11
13 .61 11 .32 10 .41 11 .78
20 .27 15 .33 14 .31 16 .64
2
200 600 5000 Mean
15 .22 11 .50 9 .33 12 .02
12.72 9.73 8 .43 10.29
9 .89 7 .03 7 .75 8 .22
12 .61 9 .42 8 .50 10 .18
3
200 600 5000 Mean
10.98 8 .53 7.87 9.13
8 .13 7 .16 6.58 7 .29
7 .76 6 .81 6 .37 6 .98
8 .96 7 .50 6 .94 7 .80
Total
200 600 5000 Mean
18.44 13 .61 12.11 14.73
12 .97 10.25 9 .46 10.90
10.42 8.39 8.18 8 .99
13 .95 10 .75 9 .92 11 .54
Table 3.
Mean Discount Rates Across Time by Sum and Scenario (%) .* Sum
Subsample
Scenario
200
600
5000
Mean
1
A B Mean
24.02 15 .61 20.27
17 .38 13 .30 15 .33
14.56 14.06 14.31
18 .65 14 .62 16 .64
2
A B Mean
14.10 11 .11 12.61
9 .86 8 .98 9 .42
9 .33 7 .67 8 .50
11 .10 9 .25 10 .18
3
A B Mean
11 .21 6.72 8 .96
8 .97 6 .03 7 .50
7 .84 6 .04 6 .94
9 .34 6 .26 7 .80
Total
A B Mean
16.44 11 .45 13 .05
12 .07 9 .44 10 .75
10.58 9 .26 9 .92
13 .03 10 .05 11 .54
* Scenario A represents postponing a receipt, while Scenario B represents postponing a payment.
29
Decisions in Financial Economics
the last line of Table 3, an increase in sum from $200 to $600 results in a reduction of about 3% in the discount rate, whereas an increase from $600 to $5,000 only results in a reduction of about 1% . Both the negative impact of sum on discount rate as well as its "diminishing-rate" property holds across all scenarios, time and subsamples tested (as seen in Tables 2 and 3) . Table 4 focuses on the scenario impact on discount rates . Scenario A represents postponing a receipt while scenario B represents postponing a payment . As indicated by the last column in Table 4, the overall mean discount rate is higher for Scenario A (13 .03%) than for Scenario B (10.05%) . As demonstrated by the other findings in Table 4, this scenario effect holds true across both time and sum, and for each of the three subsamples . As investigated shortly, risk factor and added compensation component may explain this scenario effect on discount rates . One of the more important issues examined in this study is whether formal education level and formal economics knowledge affect subjective discount rates derived from temporal decisions made by individuals . Accordingly, as discussed in the previous section, three subsamples were drawn : (1) undergraduates ; (2), graduates having a master's degree or higher mostly in Table 4.
Mean Discount Rates Across Sum by Time and Scenario (%).* Time
Subsample
Scenario
0 .5
2
5
Mean
1
A B Mean
26 .19 19 .86 23 .03
16 .74 13 .47 15 .11
13 .03 10 .54 11 .78
18.65 14 .62 16 .64
2
A B Mean
14 .21 9 .82 12 .02
10 .54 10 .04 10 .29
8 .85 7 .90 8 .22
11 .10 9 .25 10 .18
3
A B Mean
11 .75 6 .51 9 .13
8 .42 6 .16 7 .29
7 .85 6 .11 6 .98
9 .34 6 .26 7 .80
Total
A B Mean
17 .38 12 .06 14 .73
11 .90 9 .89 10 .90
9 .81 8 .18 8 .99
13 .03 10 .05 11 .54
* Scenario A represents postponing a receipt, while Scenario B represents postponing a payment .
30
URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
disciplines other than economics ; and (3) graduates having a bachelor's degree mostly in economics .
The derived discount rates for the three subsamples appear in Tables
1-4 . As noted earlier, there is no difference between the three subsamples in terms of the three dimensions investigated : scenario, time and sum ; that is, for all three subsamples, discount rates decrease with the time delay and the sum of the cash flow . Also, the discount rates are lower for lending (Scenario B)
than for borrowing (Scenario A) . Furthermore, for all three subsamples, the effects of time and sum decrease at a diminishing rate . However, the three subsamples do differ with respect to the
level of the discount rate . As
demonstrated by Tables 1-4, and especially Figs 1 and 2, the level of the discount rates were found to be higher for the undergraduate Subsample 1 than
for the graduate Subsamples 2 and 3 . The overall mean discount rates across
scenario, sum, and time (as indicated by the last column of Table 2) are 16 .64%,
10 .18%, and 7 .80% for Subsamples 1, 2 and 3, respectively . The graduates
discount rates, compared with the undergraduates' rates, appear closer to actual
interest rates which prevailed in the Israeli capital market at the time the experiment was conducted . This result implies that graduates are more familiar
with market rates due probably to higher age, rates of employment and marital status . As a result, they invest more time in acquiring market financial data . The fact that Subsample 3 had even lower discount rates than Subsample 2 appears to indicate that the higher economics knowledge of Subsample 3 more
than offset the higher formal education (mostly in other disciplines than
economics) of Subsample 2 . In other words, the Economics graduates of Subsample 3 are more familiar with market rates and, therefore, their discount
rates are closer to actual rates than Subsample 2 . Indeed, the actual market interest rates on dollar savings and loans were found to be similar to Subsample
3's discount rates, particularly for the larger sum of $5,000 and the longer delay
time of 5 years .
Another interesting result indicated by Table 1 is the variation in the
coefficient of variation (COV) defined as the ratio of the standard deviation over the mean of the subjective discount rate . The findings in Table I demonstrate that not only the level of the mean discount rate but also its
coefficient of variation both decrease with the dimensions of time and sum,
and are lower for Scenario B than for Scenario A . It is also found to be lower for graduates (Subsamples 2 and 3) than for undergraduates (Subsample
1) . These results imply that : (1) the variability across subjects with
respect to their required discount rate decreases with both time and sum ; and (2) the graduate sample is more homogenous than the undergraduate sample in terms of their intertemporal decisions .
Fig. 1 .
Subsample 1
Subsample 2
Years
2
- Subsample 3
5
Mean Discount Rates Across Scenario and Sum by Time for Three Subsamples .
0 .5
,I,
Fig . 2 .
Subsample 1
Subsample 2
Sum($)
600
Subsample 3
5000
Mean Discount Rates Across Scenario and Time by Sum for Three Subsamples .
200
Decisions in Financial Economics
33
REGRESSION ANALYSIS The preceding analysis demonstrates the impact on derived discount rates of the three dimensions investigated : scenario, time and sum . Regression analysis reported below tests the hypotheses directly . The market segmentation approach goes beyond the classical approach by allowing the discount rate to vary across scenarios but implying no time or sum effects . In a regression form: R=bO C+b l T+b2 SA +b3 S B +e
(10)
where : R = discount rate ; C = cashflow sum ; T = time ; SA = Scenario A ; SB = Scenario B ; b's are the OLS coefficients, and e is the error term. By the segmentation hypothesis : b0 = b, = 0, and b2 > b3 > 0. The regression test results of Eq . (10) are presented in Table 5 . The findings re-establish the negative impact of both time and sum, and the positive impact of scenario . The level of relationship is relatively low, as indicated by R-squared, but statistically significant at 1% . Also, the impact of Scenario A (postponing-a-receipt) is higher than that of Scenario B (postponing-a-payment) . These findings confirm the existence of a scenario (segmentation) effect, but do not fully support the segmentation hypothesis, which asserts no further impact on discount rates such as that of time and sum . Table 5.
Regression Test Result of the Segmentation Hypothesis .* b0
Subsample 1 2 3 Total
(t) -0 .00001 (-2 .72) -0 .0006 (-3 .71) -0 .0003 (-2 .46) -0 .0006 (-4 .11)
bi
b,
b,
R2
F
(t)
(t)
(t)
(n)
(a)
-2.31 (-6.52) -0.726 (-3 .95) -0 .423 (-2 .98) -1 .302 (-7 .59)
26 .03 (18 .84) 14 .30 (19.59) 10 .98 (19 .31) 18 .26 (26.70)
21 .99 (15 .51) 11 .98 (16 .17) 7 .09 (13 .90) 15 .06 (21 .77)
0 .070 (810) 0 .075 (540) 0 .083 (540) 0 .053 (1890)
14 .2 (0.01) 10.2 (0.01) 12.1 (0.01) 25 .1 (0.01)
*The regression equation is given by Eq . (10) : R = b,C + b,T + b 2SA +b3 SB + e; where: R = discount rate ; C = cash flow sum ; T = time ; SA = Scenario A ; SB = Scenario B ; b's are the OLS coefficients; e is the error term ; R2 = R-squared; F = F statistic ; values in parentheses are t-statistic, number of observations (n), and the regression significance level ((x) . n is given by the product of the 2 scenarios, 3 time periods, 3 sums, and the subsample size, which is 45, 30 and 30 for Subsamples 1, 2, and 3, respectively .
34
URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
As stated in the previous section, although the experiment is formulated in terms of certainty conditions, the subjects apparently frame it as involving some degree of risk . This may explain the relatively high discount rates found particularly for small sums, short time periods and a postponing-a-receipt scenario . The question is whether the subjects in our experiment incorporate risk in line with the one-period-realization (OPR) risk hypothesis, or the multi-period-realization (MPR) risk hypothesis . The regression form of both Eq. (4) for the OPR hypothesis, and Eq . (5) for the MPR hypothesis is : In (F/P)=b0 +b 1 T+e
(11)
where, as stated earlier, H o by the OPR is : b o =1n (l+d) ;b i = 1n (1+i) while Ho by the MPR is : b=0, and bi=ln[(l+d)(l+i)] Equation (11) was estimated seven times for both Scenario A and Scenario B, and for each of the three subsamples as well as for the total sample . The statistical results are summarized in Table 6 and they indicate first that the intercept (b0) is not statistically different from zero in all seven regressions . Both its relatively low level and absence of significance level give support to the MPR than the OPR in which, as stated before, the risk premium (d) is incorporated in the first period only, while by the MPR, it is incorporated in every single time period . The slope (b 1 ) by the OPR represents the risk-free rate of interest (i) where i = e bI -1, while, by the MPR, the slope represents the discount rate (R) that consists of both the risk premium (d) and the risk-free rate (i ) ; i .e . R = e bi-1 . The findings in Table 6 indicate that b i is positive and highly statistically significant . The mean value of the discount rate implied by the OLS b i coefficient, which is the risk-free rate (i) by the OPR and the risky rate (R ) by the MPR, is 8 .43% across the six regressions in Table 6, ranging between 11 .6% to 6 .18% . This mean value is also close to the 8 .33% value implied by b i for the total sample regression (e 'I -I = e 0 .08 -1 = 8 .33%). This mean value is slightly higher than the interest rate on dollar denominated bank savings in Israel at the time of the experiment . This mean value of 8 .33%, however, is quite close to the mean discount rate implied by the subjects' responses, particularly for high values of time and sum . As indicated by the last column
Decisions in Financial Economics
35
of Table 1 for the total sample, the mean (across subjects) discount rate for Scenario B is 9 .06%, 7 .83% and 7 .66% for sums of $200, $600 and $5,000, respectively . For Scenario A (postponing-a-receipt), the corresponding discount rate values are 11 .78%, 8 .95% and 8 .70% . Recalling the null hypothesis concerning b, by the OPR and the MPR, these findings in conjunction with values of both bo and b, (see Table 6) appear to lend more support to the MPR rather than the OPR hypothesis . To test the added compensation hypothesis (ACH), let us rewrite the formal relationship representing this hypothesis : In (F/P)=lnQ+In (1+R)T=b o +b 1 T
(12)
where Ho by the ACH as discussed earlier, is : bo = In Q, and b, = In (1 +R) Equivalently, Q = e h o, and R = e h '-1 . The regression results of Eq . (12) appear in Table 6, and they demonstrate that the added compensation component (Q) is positive but not statistically significant . The mean value across the first six regressions in Table 6 of the added compensation component (Q) implied by the bo values is 2 .96% (where Q = e h0), ranging between 0 .16% and 6 .18% . The Q value for the total sample (Line 7 in Table 6) is 3 .34% . Both the level of Q and its low significance level imply a weak existence of an added compensation component. This result is also consistent with the reasonable level of Table 6.
Regression Test Result of the OPR vs . the MPR Hypotheses .*
Subsample Scenario I 2 3 Total
A B A B A B
b0
t (b(,)
bi
t (b i )
R2
n
F
0.06 0 .05 0 .03 0 .02 0 .02 0 .02
0 .26 0 .26 0 .16 0 .12 0 .11 0 .02
0 .11 0 .09 0 .08 0 .07 0 .07 0 .06
16.10 16.80 15 .60 13 .40 14.70 18 .70
0 .40 0 .43 0 .48 0 .43 0 .45 0 .56
405 405 270 270 270 270
127 142 121 90 108 168
0 .03
0 .17
0 .08
34.10
0 .39
1890
579
* The regression equation is given by : In (F / P) = b0 + b i T + e ; where : F = future value; P = present value ; T = time ; b 0, b I = OLS coefficients ; e = error term . By the OPR : bo =1n (1 + d) ; b, =1n (1 + i), while by the MPR ; b„ = 0 ; b, =1n [(1 + d) (1 + i)], where: d = risk premium ; and i = risk-free rate of interest . Also t(b) = t-statistic; RZ = R-squared ; F = F statistic; and n = number of observations given by the product of 3 time periods, 3 sums, and the subsample size ; Scenario A represents postponing-a-receipt, while Scenario B represents postponing-a-payment .
URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
36
derived discount rates found for our sample, particularly for high values of time and sum .
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION This paper re-examined the behavior of subjective discount rates across three dimensions : financial scenario, time delay and the monetary sum of the cash
flow, and investigated the extent to which the behavior of subjective discount
rates is affected by the formal education level of the decision makers and their knowledge of financial economics .
The behavior of the subjective discount rates is examined in the context of
four hypotheses : the classical approach advocating universal uniformity of the discount rate ; the market segmentation approach allowing for scenario effect, but no time or sum effects ; the implicit risk approach stating that, due to mental
framing, a risk premium is inherent in the subjective discount rate, and the added compensation approach asserting that position change will be associated with an additional compensation .
Three subsamples of 105 subjects were drawn from undergraduates,
graduates, and those having a higher academic degree - all affiliated with the Technion and Haifa University . The proportion of economics majors was 59% and 30% in the second and third subsamples, respectively .
The pattern of the inferred subjective discount rates found in this experiment
is similar to what has been established previously in the experimental litera-
ture ; that is, the discount rates are decreasing with the time delay and the sum of the cash flow, and are higher for a postpone-a-receipt scenario than for a
postpone-a-payment scenario . The depressing effect of time is probably due, as noted by Benzion, Granot and Yagil (1992), to the subjects' misevaluation of
the exponential function . The negative impact of sum appears related to both
Loewenstein and Prelec's (1992) psychological perception concept, which
asserts that individuals are sensitive not only to relative but also to absolute differences between monetary sums, and to Thaler's (1987) mental accounting
concept . The scenario effect can be due to Kahneman and Tversky's (1992)
"loss aversion" concept, which implies that investors attach higher weights to losses than to gains .
The subjective discount rates, particularly for low values of time and sum,
were found to be much higher than the risk-free rate of interest, implying the existence of an implicit risk premium, which is also consistent with the loss
aversion concept . Furthermore, regression results lend more support to the multiple-period-realization (MPR) than to the one-period-realization (OPR)
hypothesis, particularly for a postponing-a-payment scenario in conjunction with
Decisions in Financial Economics
37
relatively high values of time and sum . For very low values of time and sum, however, the findings concerning the MPR and OPR are mixed . The findings also lend weak support for the added compensation hypothesis . The comparison of the three subsamples demonstrates that formal education and economics knowledge do not appear to have an impact on the pattern of subjective discount rates with respect to scenario, time and sum . In contrast to this dimensional similarity, the level of the discount rates was found to be lower for graduates than for undergraduates, and this lower rate appears closer to actual capital market interest rates . This finding implies that graduates are more familiar with market rates probably due to their age, rates of employment and marital status . As a result, they tend to invest more time in acquiring market financial data . The experimental findings also indicate that higher formal economics knowledge is associated with lower discount rates that are closer to capital market interest rates . This finding may also be related to the "familiarity" factor examined recently by Huberman (2001) . The overall results concerning the impact of scenario, time and sum, which are not perfectly consistent with established economic theories, may indicate possible links between emotions and economics (Elster, 1998 ; Loewenstein, 2000), and psychology and economics (Rabin, 1998) .
REFERENCES Barber, B . M ., & Odean, T . (2000) . Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth : The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors. The Journal of Finance, 55(2), 773-806 . Barber, B . M ., & Odean, T. (2001) . Boys Will Be Boys : Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 156(1), 261-292 . Barberis, N ., Shleifer, A ., & Vishny, R . (1998) . A Model of Investor Sentiment . Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 307-343 . Barberis, N ., & Huang, M . (2001). Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion and Individual Stock Returns . NBER working paper No . W1890 . Barberis, N ., Huang, M ., & Santos, T . (2001). Prospect Theory and Asset Prices . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1-53 . Benartzi, S ., & Thaler, R . (1995) . Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 73-92 . Benartzi, S ., & Thaler, R . (1999). Risk Aversion or Myopia? Choices in Repeated Gambles and Retirement Investments . Management Science, 45, 364-381 . Benzion, U ., Rapoport, A ., & Yagil, J . (1989) . Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions : An experimental study . Management Science, 35, 270-284 . Benzion, U ., & Yagil, J . (1987) . On Discounting Formula for a stream of Independent Risky Cashflows . The Engineering Economist, 32, 337-345 . Benzion, U ., Granot, A ., & Yagil, J . (1992). The Valuation of the Exponential Function and Implications for Derived Interest Rates . Economics Letters, 38, 299-303 .
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URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL
Benzion, U ., Granot, A., & Yagil, J . (1994) . An Experimental Test of the IRP, PPP and Fisher Theorems . Journal of Economic Psychology, 15, 637-649 . Daniel, K ., Hirshleifer, D., & Subrahmanyam, A . (1998) . Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions . Journal of Finance, 53(6), 839-885 . De Bondt, W . F. M ., & Markhija, A . (1988) . Throwing Good Money After Bad? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 10, 173-199. Elster, J . (1998). Emotions and Economic Theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 86, 47-74 . Fama, E . F. (1998) . Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, and Behavioural Finance . Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 283-306. Ferris, S . P ., Haugen, R . A ., & Makhija, A . K. (1988) . Predicting Contemporary Volume with Historical Volume at Differential Price Levels : Evidence Supporting the Disposition Effects . The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 677-697 . Gervais, S., & Odean, T . (2001) . Learning to be Overconfident . Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 1-27 . Gneezy, U ., & Potters, J . (1997) . An Experiment On Risk Taking And Evaluation Periods . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 152(2), 631-645 . Gneezy, U ., & Rustichini, A . (2000) . Pay Enough or Don't Pay At All . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 155(3), 791-810. Hirshleifer, D . (2001) . Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing . Journal of Finance, 56(4), 1533-1597 . Huberman, G . (2001). Familiarity Breeds Investment. Review of Financial Studies, 14(3), 659-680 . Kahneman, D ., & Tversky, A . (1979) . Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision Under Risk . Econometrica, 47, 359-363 . Kahneman, D ., & Tversky, A. (1992) . Advances in Prospect Theory : Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty . Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323 . Loewenstein, G . (1988). Frames of mind in intertemporal choice . Management Science, 34, 200-214 . Loewenstein, G ., & Prelec, D. (1992). Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice : Evidence and Interpretation . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 57(2), 573-598 . Loewenstein, G., & Thaler, R . (1989) Intertemporal Choice . Journal of Economic Perspective, 3(4), 181-193 . Loewenstein, G . (2000). Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior. American Economic Review, 90(2), 420-432 . Rabin, M . (1998) . Psychology and Economics . Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 11-46 . Shefrin, H., & Statman, M . (1993) . Behavioral Aspects of the Design and Marketing of Financial Products . Financial Management, 22(2), 123-134 . Shefrin, H ., & Statman, M . (1994). Behavioural Capital Asset Pricing Theory . Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29(3), 323-349 . Thaler, R. H . (1981) . Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency . Economics Letter, 8, 201-207 . Thaler, R . H . (1987) . Anomalies : Saving, Fungibility and Mental Accounts . Journal of Economic Perspective, 1, 97-201 . Thaler, R. H . (1994) . Psychology and Saving Policies . American Economic Review, 84(2), 186-192 . Thaler, R. H ., Tversky, A ., Kahneman, D ., & Schwartz, A . (1997) . The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking : An Experimental Test . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 152(2), 647-661 . Tversky, A ., & Kahneman, D . (1986) . Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions . Journal of Business, 59(4), 251-278 .
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39
APPENDIX A Questionnaire on Problems in Financial Economics Decisions The purpose of the present experiment is to obtain some estimate of your preferences for paying or receiving an amount of money in the future instead of paying or receiving another amount in the present . The questions presented below have no unique answer . The answers may differ from one person to another according to his/her own investment preferences and his/her own financial position in the present and in the future . The questions you will be given are chosen from a wide spectrum of simple decision problems which can arise in different areas of one's economic behavior . This questionnaire is anonymous and for research purposes only . We ask you to use your best judgment, and to answer all questions sincerely and as best you can . (1)
Upon approaching the maturity date of your bank savings plan, the bank manger offers you the opportunity to reinvest the proceeds in a similar savings plan with a different maturity time . What is the amount of dollars the bank would have to offer you at the maturity date of the new savings plan, so that you will be completely indifferent about receiving the relevant sum today or receiving a larger sum in the future? Please state this future amount of dollars for each of the nine savings plans given in the table below (comprising of 3 different sums and 3 different times to maturity) . Dollar Amount You Require at the End of the Period Dollar Amount Today 0,5 a Year Hence $200 $600 $5,000
(2)
$ $ $
2 Years Hence $ $ $
5 Years Hence $ $ $
You need some amount of dollars today that your bank is willing to lend you . What is the amount of dollars you would be willing to pay back at the end of the period, so that you will be completely indifferent about receiving a certain amount today or paying back a larger amount in the future? Please state this future amount of dollars for each of the nine time and sum options given in the table below .
40
URI BENZION AND JOSEPH YAGIL Dollar Amount You Are Willing to Pay at the End of the Period Dollar Amount Today $200 $600 $5,000
(3)
0.5 a Year Hence $ $ $
2 Years Hence $ $ $
5 Years Hence $ $ $
Finally, please circle your highest academic degree earned : (a) Bachelor's degree (b) Master's degree or higher Discipline or field of study :
Thank you for your cooperation .
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, INFORMATION AND LIQUIDITY William W . Jennings, Karen Schnatterly and Paul J . Seguin
ABSTRACT We examine relations between institutional ownership and quoted bid-ask spreads in general, and the adverse-selection component of the spread in particular. For our sample of Nasdaq stocks, we find that high institutional ownership leads to narrower spreads and spreads with a smaller proportion attributable to asymmetric information . Our results are not attributable to institutions' preferences for liquid securities . The relation between spreads and institutional ownership varies significantly across institutional type and is related to the largest block size held by an institution. Our evidence suggests that increases in institutional ownership reduce the costs of liquidity services by ameliorating informational asymmetries .
1 . INTRODUCTION One of the most visible and controversial trends in equity market evolution is the growth of institutional ownership and participation . Institutional ownership of equity represented only 5% of total equity ownership in 1945, but increased
Innovations in Investments and Corporate Finance, Volume 7, pages 41-71 . 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd . ISBN : 0-7623-0897-4 41
42
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNA I I LRLY AND PAUL J. SEGUIN
to 24% by 1965, and to 38% by 1981 . By 1993, over 50% of all equity was held by institutions .
Although this growth has been well documented, little consensus has arisen
concerning its impact on the capital markets' ability to supply immediacy and
liquidity services . Divergences in opinion about the impact of institutional growth on market liquidity can be traced primarily to differences in opinion concerning the impact of the growth of institutional ownership on the
informational environment. For example, Kothare and Laux (1995) argue
that institutions are "informed" and that institutional trades convey superior
information . As a result, an increase in institutional trading raises the costs to
market makers of supplying liquidity . Therefore, the price of liquidity, notably
the bid-ask spread, must rise . Theoretic models of strategic trading (including Admati & Pfleiderer, 1988) predict that the impact of ownership on liquidity
depends crucially on the degree of informativeness of the share owners - an
increase in the presence of uninformed, or "noise" traders, can actually increase the liquidity of a market . Under this paradigm, an increase in participation by
institutions that are, on average, informed relative to market makers, can be viewed as an increase in the demand for liquidity . In contrast, an increase in
participation by institutions that are, on average, less or equally informed
relative to market makers, can be viewed as an increase in the supply of liquidity .
Although liquidity would be affected by the extent to which institutions
themselves were informed, it is possible that the mere presence of institutional ownership, regardless of their degree of informativeness could impact the
informational environment indirectly . For example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) argue that increases in institutional ownership induces subsequent
changes in analyst following, thus affecting the informational environment . As a result, increases in institutional ownership may have no direct effect
on liquidity, but such increases may lead to greater liquidity indirectly by ameliorating any informational asymmetries .
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of the growth in institutional ownership and trading on the liquidity and immediacy in security
markets . To do so, our empirical approach is to examine cross-sectional and inter-temporal relationships between institutional ownership and bid-ask spreads .
This objective and approach are not novel to this study - at least five other
studies motivate their investigations and model their empirical tests along similar
lines . Fabozzi (1979) represents one of the first attempts to determine empirically those factors that affect spreads . His list of candidates included
institutional ownership . However, for his sample of 239 OTC issues measured
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
43
over February 1977, he found no statistical relation between institutional ownership and spreads . Chiang and Venkatesh (1988) examined 56 NYSE stocks during 1973, and, like Fabozzi, found no evidence of a relation between institutional ownership and spread width . Kothare and Laux (1995) examined Nasdaq spreads measured over Octobers of 1984, 1988 and 1992 . Using a variety of metrics for the intensity of institutional trading, they find mixed support for a relation between spread width and institutional activity - one specification of institutional trading intensity yielded insignificant results, while their second specification yielded a positive relation between institutional activity and spreads . They conclude that institutional trading is, on average, informed, and that the secular widening in spreads for Nasdaq issues can be partially attributed to the secular growth in institutional participation . Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (1996) reach similar conclusions . Using a sample of 786 NYSE and Amex listed securities during 1985, they find that spreads are positively related to the degree of institutional holdings . In comparison, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) argue that the magnitude of the asymmetric information or adverse selection component of spreads is inversely related to the number of analysts following a stock . Further, they find that changes in institutional ownership of an issue during 1988 are positively related to subsequent changes in the number of analysts following that issue . They conclude that increases in institutional ownership have no direct effects on spreads, but that such increases narrow spreads indirectly by inducing increased analyst following, thus ameliorating the informational environment . In contrast to the relatively small data sets or narrow time frames examined in previous studies, our sample contains institutional holding and spread data over 35 quarters from the first quarter of 1983 through the third quarter of 1991 for Nasdaq-listed firms . Our final sample contains over fifty-thousand observations, so the statistical power of our tests greatly exceeds the power of previous tests . After controlling for numerous variables known to affect the width of the relative bid-ask spread, we find that the proportion of outstanding shares held by institutions is significantly related to relative spread . However, we find that the relation between institutional ownership and spread width is negative . Of course, this partial correlation is consistent with numerous, non-mutuallyexclusive, statistical interpretations . First, it is plausible that this correlation reflects the facts that institutions generally turn their portfolio over ("churn") at rates greater than do individuals and that investors with shorter investment horizons prefer more liquid securities . In other words, narrower spreads lead, or cause, increases in institutional ownership . Second, it is possible that changes in institutional ownership and spreads are jointly and
44
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNATTERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
simultaneously determined . For example, endogenous changes in the informa-
tional environment (e .g . news, regulatory changes, etc .) surrounding a firm may
simultaneously affect both institutional ownership and spreads . Finally, due to
the impact of institutional ownership on the informational environment, changes
in institutional investment could lead, or cause, changes in spreads . Such changes may be attributable to increased monitoring by the institution, its internal ("buy-side") analysts or external ("sell-side") analysts .
To disentangle these interpretations, we perform Granger-causation tests and
find causation in both directions . Finding that changes in spreads cause changes
in institutional ownership is neither surprising nor novel and simply reflects institutional preferences for more liquid securities . However, our finding that increases in institutional ownership "cause" or lead to subsequent decreases in
abnormal spreads is, to our knowledge, a new result, and indicates that our cross-sectional findings are not entirely attributable to institutional preferences
for more liquid securities . Instead, our evidence indicates that changes in the institutional ownership lead to changes in the informational environment surrounding the firm .
We next partition the quoted spread and find a relation between institutional
holdings and the adverse selection component of spreads . Specifically, the adverse selection proportion of the spread is lower for those issues with greater
institutional ownership . Thus, market makers price their services as if greater
institutional ownership mitigates informational asymmetries .
Additionally, we report two regularities concerning the relationship between
spreads and institutional ownership . First, when institutional holdings are
partitioned into the five institutional types, we find a heterogeneous relation
between institutional ownership and liquidity across the types . Specifically, we find that the negative relationship between institutional ownership and spreads
is strongest for commercial banks and insurance companies, while there is no discernible relationship between spreads and the holdings of pensions,
foundations, endowments and ESOPs . This heterogeneity is consistent with the notion that the impact on the informational environment of institutional ownership depends crucially on the nature of the institution. Second, when we separate institutional holdings into the largest block held by an institution and
the holdings of all other institutions, we find that the coefficient associated with
the largest block is positive and significant. This positive coefficient suggests that the presence of a large block exacerbates informational asymmetry .
The major implication of our results pertains to the secular growth in
institutional participation in the market . Specifically, since our evidence suggests
that cross-sectional and inter-temporal increases in institutional holdings are
associated with enhanced liquidity, we cannot support the claim that the secular
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
45
increase in institutional ownership represents a net drain on liquidity . Indeed, our results instead suggest that any attendant increases in the demand for liquidity or immediacy services are, on average, more than offset by some combination of an increase in the supply of liquidity services and an amelioration of informational asymmetries . As a result, we conclude that increases in institutional ownership should not be interpreted as threats to market cohesion . In the following section, we develop the major hypotheses of this paper and investigate links between institutional participation, informational asymmetries and the costs of providing liquidity services . Section 3 describes our sample . We present the results of our cross-sectional analysis in Section 4, and the results of our Granger-style tests in Section 5 . The relation between institutional ownership and the asymmetric information component of the spread is examined in Section 6 . The final section concludes and discusses some of the implications of our findings .
2. SPREADS, INFORMED TRADING AND INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP The microstructure literature in general, and the bid-ask spread literature in particular, are replete with theoretic models and empirical evidence linking informed trading to the width of the bid-ask spread .' Many of these models share a common intuitive underpinning - assuming that competition (real or potential) - imposes a zero-profit constraint on a market-maker, the marketmaker sets a bid-ask spread that balances the gains from trading against uninformed traders with losses from trading against informed traders . Typically, a trader is deemed to be informed or uninformed based on whether the trader has "superior" information about the intrinsic value of the asset compared to the market-maker. Algebraically, and holding trade size (or quoted depth) constant,' the market maker sets a quote such that : [ 1-Pr { next trader is informed}] [Profit I next trader is uninformed] +Pr(next trader is informed) [Profit I next trader is informed] = 0 One key variable in this trade-off is the probability of whether the "next" trader, that is, the trader who exercises the market maker's written option of trading at either of the market maker's posted quotes, is informed . Typically, it is assumed that the profit - conditional on the next trader being uninformed - is positive, while the profit - conditional on the next trader being informed - is negative. As a result, the bid-ask spread, which is usually the "choice variable" in the
46
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNATTERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
algorithm, is related to the probability that the next trader is informed . Simple calculus dictates that as this probability increases, the spread must widen .
Since informed traders engage in "stealth" trading, that is, they show
reluctance to announce their intentions to trade on superior information ex ante,
market makers cannot readily estimate the informed-trade probability directly . Instead, market makers must rely upon a set of observable variables from which they must estimate conditional probabilities . The primary objective of our study is to determine whether market makers include the proportion of shares held by institutional investors in their list of observable variables upon which they
condition their probabilities . To do so, we econometrically investigate whether there exists a discernible relation between quoted spreads, and hence the unobserved or implied probability that the next trader is informed, and the
ex ante proportion of shares held by institutions . In other words, we examine
whether the proportion of shares held by institutions is an informative proxy for the level of asymmetric information . Note that in most of our analyses, we include a number of proxies for the unobservable conditional probability previously identified in the finance literature, including firm size, share price,
number of market makers and past volume . As a result, our primary objective may be more precisely stated as determining whether the proportion of
shares held by institutions provides additional or marginal information after conditioning on an extensive list of alternative observable proxies .
There are numerous reasons why proportional institutional ownership could
proxy for the probability that the next trader is informed . For example, if institutional holdings as of the beginning of a period were correlated with the probability that a trade involved at least one institution during the period, then
the link between institutional ownership and quoted spreads might depend on
the market makers' perception of the information content of institutional trades .' If institutions are "informed" and institutional trades convey superior
information, then an increase in institutional trading raises the costs to market makers of supplying liquidity . Therefore, the price of liquidity, notably the
bid-ask spread, must rise . Alternatively, if institutions are "uninformed" and their trades convey little asymmetric information, then the growth of institutional ownership may be associated with a reduction in the average cost of supplying liquidity .
An additional alternative is one where institutions are only partially informed .
Under the assumption of partial information, theoretical work suggests that institutional activity can destabilize stock prices and create "excess" volatility,
either through herding, where institutions mimic each others' buying or selling decisions, or through positive feedback trading, where institutions buy winners and sell losers (see : Hirshleifer, 1995 ; Devenow & Welch, 1996) . However,
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
47
empirical evidence supporting these conjectures is sparse . Pound and Shiller (1987) find evidence of positive feedback trading among less risk averse institutional owners . Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) report only limited evidence for the presence of either herding or positive feedback trading . They argue that different pension funds pursue trading styles that are sufficiently different to offset each other . The proportion of shares held by institutions can affect the informational environment indirectly as well . For example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) argue that increases in institutional ownership lead to increases in analyst coverage. Further, since many institutions employ in-house ("buy side") analysts, increases in institutional ownership could lead to an increase in the competition for information production and evaluation . Regardless of the economic links underpinning the relation between institutional ownership and informational asymmetries, all that our interpretations require is that the proportion of shares held by institutions is positively correlated with the market maker's unobservable conditional probability that the next trader has superior information . If our proxy is poor, that is, the correlation is positive but "low," then the classic errors-in-variables problem is severe . Coefficients associated with this proxy will be biased towards zero, which reduces the power of our statistical tests . As a result, if we are unable to reject the null that our proxy has no explanatory power, we will be unable to determine whether the null is true or whether the proxy is uninformative . Though errors-in-variables adversely affects the power of tests, they do not impact test sizes . Thus, if we are able to reject the null, then we do so despite the errors-in-variables problem, not because of the problem . 4
3. DATA AND METHODS Our sample is comprised of quarterly firm observations for the thirty-five quarters from the first quarter of 1983 through the third quarter of 1991 . For a given quarter, our dataset contains the intersection of the set of firms listed on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Nasdaq dataset and the set of firms with at least one institutional ownership stake large enough to warrant coverage by the Spectrum database . We limit our study to Nasdaq-listed securities for three reasons . First, time-series of daily data on bids and asks are more readily available for Nasdaqlisted firms due to CRSP reporting conventions . Second, although the introduction of newer datasets (ISSM, TORQ and TAQ) allow us to capture spreads for NYSE/Amex listed securities, these data sets cover only a fraction of the 35 quarters for which we have institutional ownership data . Our longer
48 WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNAI IhRLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN sample horizon enables us to investigate the direction of causation between institutional ownership and bid-ask spreads, which previous studies have been unable to address . Finally, for Nasdaq listed firms, alternative trading venues and techniques are limited . For example, centralized limit-order trading, which could allow for institutional traders to trade within the quotes (Petersen & Fialkowski, 1994), is not currently feasible on the Nasdaq system . Further, the incidence of trading on regional exchanges or in an anonymous upstairs market like Instinet is virtually non-existent for the majority of firms in our sample . As a result, unlike NYSE or Amex listed securities, there is little or no distinction between the market environments in which individual versus institutional orders are filled, and posted quotes are more indicative of realized or effective spreads .' We use the CRSP daily master file and National Market System (NMS) supplemental file for return, volume, number of trades, price, shares outstanding and number of market makers data . End-of-quarter relative bid-ask spreads were computed as the ratio of spreads deflated by spread midpoints . We eliminated ten observations with negative spreads . (Later we use average spread over the quarter.) Our sample contains only Ordinary Common Shares (versus ADRs, LP units, etc .) of Nasdaq firms that have return data spanning the entire quarter including eight non-zero daily returns . Additionally, only firms that have end-of-quarter prices over $5 are included . We constructed variables measuring different dimensions of institutional ownership using data from the Spectrum files . These files, products of CDA Investment Technologies, contain quarterly information on institutional ownership of NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq listed stocks extracted from 13(f) filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission . These filings, mandated under the 1975 revision to the Securities Exchange Acts, collectively represent "a central depository of historical and current data about (institutional) investment activities," (Loss & Seligman, 1990, p . 2324) and "have become the single most important source of information available to the public about the holdings of major institutional investors" (Heard & Sherman, 1987, pp . 68-69) . Institutions with $100 million or more in accounts over which they exercise discretion are required to file quarterly reports with the SEC within forty-five days of the end of the calendar quarter . Institutions need not report a particular equity holding on the 13(f) if the holding is less than either 10,000 shares or $200,000 in principal and market value . As a result, such holdings may not be included in these data . For each firm and each quarter, Spectrum provides each institution's holdings . Note that observations with no Spectrum information are omitted at this point. If a firm is Nasdaq-listed for a particular quarter, but Spectrum contains no
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
49
synchronized record, then two possibilities exist . One alternative is that there are no non-exempt institutional holdings, so no 13(f) filings were recorded for that quarter . Under this alternative, institutional holdings should be coded as zero . The second alternative is that there are non-exempt holdings, but they are not recorded by Spectrum for inexplicable reasons .' Under this scenario, institutional holdings should be coded as a missing value . However, we know of no reliable algorithm for distinguishing between these scenarios . Therefore, we omit all such observations . The empirical conclusions we report below are unchanged, however, when we instead code all such observations as zero . Spectrum also records institutional type based on Standard and Poor's definition of the institution's primary line of business . Type 1 is made up of large bank holding companies such as the Bank of New York or Citibank . Type 2 is insurance companies . Type 3, investment companies and their advisors, is made up of mutual funds . Type 4, independent investment advisors, is made up of investment banks or other financial institutions whose primary area of business is not mutual fund management . Type 5, "other," consists of foundations, ESOPs, self-managed pensions and individuals who invest others' money who are not otherwise categorized . For each firm and each quarter we construct the proportion of a firm's outstanding shares held by all institutions, the proportion held by members of each of the five categories, and the proportions held by each of the five largest institutional investors . All proportions are expressed as a percent of shares outstanding . When we merge the Spectrum database with the CRSP database, 59,911 firm x quarter observations common to both remain . We then purge all observations with zero volume, fewer than two market makers, fewer than nine valid bid-to-bid returns, or where the shares outstanding reported in the two databases differed and could not be manually reconciled . This yielded a database with 50,533 observations . In Table 1, we report summary statistics for many of the key variables used in our analysis . For the observations in our sample, the mean and median proportion of shares outstanding held by institutions are 23% and 19%, respectively . Secular growth in institutional ownership appears in our sample of firms . As displayed in Fig . 1, cross-sectional average institutional holdings grew from a low of approximately 15% in the second quarter of 1983 to over 30% by the end of our sample period . Despite the selection bias inherent in using firms with non-zero institutional holdings only, our sample average lies below the cross-exchange average of about 45% . We attribute this discrepancy to the fact that we use only Nasdaq-listed securities . If, as is true within our sample, institutional
50
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNAI IERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
Table 1 . Variable Name
Mean
Market Equity Value 166 .19 (in $ millions) Relative spread (%) 3 .81 Lagged quarterly volume 2181 .88 (000's of shares) Number of market makers 10 .12 at beginning of quarter Return variance 5 .90 (bid-to-bid % z per day) Price per share 19 .37 Institutional holdings/ 23 .21 Shares outstanding (%) by type of institution commercial banks insurance companies investment companies indep . advisors others by institutional block size largest second largest third largest fourth largest fifth largest
Descriptive Statistics . Median
Standard Deviation
Minimum
65 .23
389 .52
1 .44
15,562 .01
2 .85 611 .29
3 .32 6567 .63
0 .11 0 .02
40 .00 192764 .88
8
6.76
2
Maximum
67
3 .35
12.50
0 .02
2027 .50
14 .75 19 .20
58 .67 18 .17
5 .03 < 0 .01
4850 .00 98 .74
6.39 1 .61 2.16 11 .76 1 .29
4 .08 0 .06 0 .47 8 .85 0.31
7 .25 3 .44 3 .76 11 .11 2 .81
0 0 0 0 0
85 .9 98 .63 81 .06 80 .58 94.05
6 .72 3 .33 2 .26 1 .68 1 .30
5 .43 2.96 1 .96 1 .45 1 .09
6 .31 2 .48 1 .79 1 .14 1 .19
< 0.01 0 0 0 0
98.63 41 .76 20.73 10.78 9.76
Note : Our sample is composed of 47,419 quarterly firm observations for the thirty-five quarters
from the first quarter of 1983 through the third quarter of 1991 based on the intersection of the set of firms listed on the CRSP-Nasdaq dataset, and the set of firms with at least one institutional ownership stake large enough to warrant coverage by the Spectrum database . End-of-quarter relative bid-ask spreads were computed as the ratio of spreads deflated by spread midpoints . Our sample contains only Ordinary Common Shares of Nasdaq firms that have return data spanning the entire quarter and prices over $5 . All proportions are expressed as a percent of shares outstanding .
ownership varies with firm size, then the institutional holdings for firms in our sample should be expected to be below aggregate averages . Consistent with this conjecture, the cross-sectional weighted-average proportion of shares held by institutions for our Nasdaq sample, with the market value of equity used as weights, exceeds 35% . Of the five institutional categories, independent investment advisors hold, on average, the greatest proportion of outstanding stock with 11 .8% . Bank holding
10%
15% -
30%
35% -
00
N 00
N 00
N 00
Date (YYQ)
N r 00
N 00 00
00
N
A
N O
Fig. 1 .
N
A A A
A % Institutional Ownership (left scale) - Relative Bid-Ask Spread (right scale)
N 00
A A A
A
•
-
2 .5%
3 .0%
- 3 .5%
- 4 .0%
- 4 .5%
- 5 .0%
- 5 .5%
- 6 .0%
m a
b ;
_a
`z
o'
o
.d •
O
A
O'
5
52
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNAI IhRLY AND PAUL J. SEGUIN
companies are second with 6 .4% . The "other" category has the lowest mean with 1 .3% .
The mean and median holdings of the single largest institutional owner
represents 6 .7% and 5 .4% respectively, of the firm . As mentioned above, our sample selection criteria ensure that the minimum holdings of the largest
institutional holder cannot be zero . However, entries of zero for the second largest holding are feasible for those cases where a stock has but one institutional holder. The top five institutional owners combined hold an average of 15 .3% of each firm, which represents roughly two-thirds of all institutional holdings .
Aside from institutional ownership variables, the other key variable in our
analysis is the quoted bid-ask spread, expressed as a percent of the closing price
or bid-ask midpoint . For our sample, the mean relative spread is 3 .8% with a median of 2 .9% . The large discrepancy between the mean and median reflects a skewed distribution, which should not be surprising for a variable that is
truncated at zero . In Fig. 1, we also plot the cross-sectional average spread for each of the quarters in our sample . As in Kothare and Laux (1995), we find that mean spreads increase throughout our sample period .
Despite the temptation to do so, it is difficult to infer that the secular growth
in the two variables plotted in Fig . 1 are in any way related . Since both variables exhibit significant time-series persistence, measures of correlation are
severely biased (see Plosser & Schwert, 1978) . To circumvent this issue, our
empirical methods will concentrate on either cross-sectional variations in spreads and institutional ownership, or first-differences in these variables .
4. CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS We begin by examining the marginal impact of ownership structure on relative spreads . The method we employ to calculate statistical significance is loosely
based on the methods pioneered by Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and
French (1992) . Specifically, for each of the 34 calendar quarters that our data
spans, we compute a separate cross-sectional regression, and then compute statistical significance using the time-series of the coefficient estimates . We use this method for two statistical reasons . First, standard errors from a pooled
time-series cross-sectional regression would be seriously understated due to the lack of independence between residuals for the same firm and adjoining
quarters . Second, as we demonstrated in Fig . 1, our two key variables, relative spread and institutional ownership are not mean-stationary . As a consequence, combining observations from the beginning and end of the sample period may result in parameter estimates that are biased .
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
53
Once a time-series of 34 parameter estimates is computed, we determine significance using a Fama-MacBeth-style test statistic which is computed as (µ,fri) / s where µ and s are the estimated weighted mean and weighted standard deviation of the series, n is the number of quarters used, and the weights are proportional to the number of observations available in a quarter . These tests statistics are reported in parentheses in Table 2 . Table 2 .
Institutional Ownership as a Determinants of Relative Spread . Model I
Intercept Shares Outstanding (x 10 t° ) Price Squared Price (x 106) Bid-to-Bid Return Variance Number of Market Makers at Beginning of Quarter Prior Quarter Volume (x 10 9) Percent held by Institutions Percent held by Banks Percent held by Insurance Co's . Percent held by Investment Co's . Percent held by Independent Advisors
8 .155 (25 .43) {13 .12) -2.237 (-9.74) {-5 .30) -0.106 (-9.89) {-4.98} 5 .637 (4.75) {2.44} 0.011 (3.12) {1 .76} -0.285 (-34.51) (-21 .26} 1 .292 (21 .04) 115.011
Model 2 8 .266 (26 .41) (13 .76) 2 .241 (-12 .00) (-7 .03) -0 .096 (-9 .51) (-4 .78} 5 .265 (4 .71) (2 .42) 0 .007 (2 .30) (1 .33) -0 .261 (-32 .54) (-19 .92} 1 .298 (19 .91) 114 .06) -2 .132 (-20 .84) (-11 .82}
Model 3
Model 4
8 .309 (26.29) {13 .70) -2.459 (-12.67) (-7 .47) -0.098 (-9.52) {-4.80} 5 .332 (4.72) 12.421 0.008 (2.56) (1 .45} -0.260 (-32.68) (-19.92) 1 .344 (20.21) (14.701
8 .065 (26 .08) (13 .52) -2 .190 (-13 .02) (-8 .12) -0 .093 (-9 .53) (-4 .80) 5 .081 (4 .71) 12 .42) 0.007 (2 .31) {1 .31) -0.249 (-32 .36) (-19 .73} 1 .310 (20.16) (14.59)
-1 .333 (-5.57) {-3.30) -1 .818 (-5.83) ( -3.95) -0.128 (-0.25) {-0.13) -3.130 (-27.59) 1-16.891
54
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNA I I hRLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN Table 2. Model I
Continued . Model 2
Percent held by Others
Model 3 -1 .410 (-2.78) 1-1 .66}
Percent held by Largest Institutional Owner Percent held by all other institutions Adjusted R2 from pooled regression
0.243
0.256
0.258
Model 4
1 .206 (5 .78) (3 .29) -3 .249 (-25 .48) 1-14 .11) 0 .261
In each specification, the dependent variable is end-of-quarter bid-ask spread deflated by the end-of-quarter bid-ask midpoint . Separate regressions are conducted each quarter . Parameter estimates represent the observation-weighted mean coefficient and are multiplied by 100, unless otherwise noted. Fama-MacBeth t-statistics for the weighted mean quarterly coefficient are reported in parentheses, and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics adjusted for second-order autocorrelation are reported in braces. Note :
Despite our use of Fama-MacBeth-style estimates, rudimentary time-series analysis suggests that estimates of the coefficients are autocorrelated out to lag two . As a result, we also report test-statistics that employ a standard error which accommodates first- and second-order autocorrelation in the estimates :
s
1
n+
2(n-1) 2(n-2) n2 P1 + n 2 P2
These test-statistics are reported in braces in Table 2 . The first specification we consider is our "baseline" model . The independent variables included in this specification are frequently employed in cross-sectional models of the bid-ask spread . Price per share and price-per-share squared are included to capture the often documented regularity that proportional spreads decrease with price, but at a decreasing rate . Coefficients associated with these two variables should, therefore, be negative and positive respectively . Previous literature suggests that spreads are composed of three components a pure transactions cost that covers the dealer's fixed and variable costs,
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
55
compensation for holding an inventory, and compensation for trading against traders with potentially superior information . Existing research also suggests that the variance of returns is positively related to the inventory risk borne by dealers . Since inventories are not well-diversified portfolios, increases in variances are associated with higher levels of risk borne by market makers . Assuming risk aversion, higher risk commands greater compensation in the form of wider bid-ask spreads . To accommodate this relation, we compute estimates of the variance of daily bid-to-bid returns . The use of bid-to-bid returns avoids overstating variance due to bid-ask bounce . We also include the number of market makers to proxy for the degree of competition in making a market for a particular stock . The relation between the width of the bid-ask spread and trading volume is complex . Recent theoretical and empirical studies of the volume-volatility relation demonstrate the importance of dichotomizing volume into an expected or anticipated component and an unexpected or "shock" component .' We argue that the relation between spread width and expected volume is likely negative ; if anticipated volume is larger, then the number of trades over which a market maker can expect to amortize the fixed cost component increases, reducing the per trade cost. In contrast, we, like numerous previous studies, argue that unexpected volume is associated with the amount of information arriving . Thus, higher unexpected volume indicates a greater amount of information which increases both the asymmetric information component and inventory risk component of the spread . We present estimates of our baseline model in the first column of Table 2 . All coefficient estimates are significant and have the expected sign - price, shares outstanding and the number of market makers are all negative, while the squared price and variance are positive . Consistent with the joint hypothesis that : (i) in our specification, the coefficient captures the covariance between spreads and only the unexpected component of volume ; and (ii) unexpected volume proxies for the flow of information, the estimated coefficient associated with volume is positive and significant .' Numerous studies find a negative association between volume and spreads, contrary to our findings . However, in these previous studies, measures of firm size are generally excluded from regression specifications . To determine whether our results are due to differences in the regression specification employed (or, in particular, due to the inclusion of alternative measures of firm size), or whether are results reflect a fundamental difference in the underlying market structure, we estimate specifications that include volume but exclude measures that are correlated with firm size . In each specification, which are not reported here, the coefficient associated with volume is, consistent with previous studies, negative .
56
WILLIAM W. JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNA I I hRLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN 4.1 . Effects of Aggregate Institutional Holdings
In the second specification, we add the percent of shares outstanding held by
institutions, or more precisely, the shares held by institutions as captured and
reported by Spectrum deflated by the end-of-quarter shares outstanding. For those firm-quarters where Spectrum reports no institutional holdings, the
observation is treated as missing . This coefficient is negative and significant, both econometrically and economically .
To measure the economic impact, consider that the estimated coefficient
associated with institutional ownership (-2 .132) is roughly 56% of the mean spread, and 75% of the median spread in our sample . Using this estimate and substituting the means of the remaining variables into this equation, we can
infer that a firm with no institutional ownership would be expected to have a
relative bid-ask spread that was 4.45%, while a firm that was entirely owned by institutions would have a relative spread of only 2 .32% . Further, a onestandard-deviation change in institutional ownership (18%) alters the spread by
about 0 .38%, which is 10% of the sample mean spread . Thus, we conclude that
the structure of institutional ownership has as important an impact on spreads
as many commonly employed determinants .
Our primary focus is not on institutional ownership, per se, but on using
institutional ownership as a proxy for market makers' conditional expectation
of the informativeness of trading . Our results are, in this context, consistent with the hypothesis that market makers believe that institutional ownership is
a useful proxy for the degree of asymmetric information in the marketplace . Further, this variable provides explanatory power, even when numerous
alternative proxies for the informational environment are included in the specification .
4.2 . Tests of Robustness Our empirical results are robust to numerous alternative specifications . We have estimated these relations using the natural log of relative spreads, spreads
averaged over the entire quarter, turnover, closing transaction price variance
and market capitalization . We have also replaced price and its square with their inverses (Harris, 1994), replaced volume with number of trades (Jones, Kaul & Lipson, 1993), included squared volume, estimated the specification using
only those observations associated with raw spreads in excess of one tick, and estimated the specification using only those observations where the market value
of outstanding equity exceeds one billion dollars . We have also accommodated potential cross-sectional heteroskedasticity, both by calculating t-statistics using
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
57
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, which provide consistent standard errors for coefficients that are consistent yet inefficient, and using an iterative weighted-least-squares procedure that provides coefficient and standard error estimates that are both consistent and efficient (see Davidian & Carroll, 1987) . In these tests of robustness, modified standard errors were calculated using a pooled time-series cross-sectional specification . In no case is economic or econometric significance affected . Finally, to test whether the relation between spread and institutional ownership is negative throughout the domain of institutional ownership, we replace the continuous institutional ownership variable with a set of ten limited independent variables : 10(i) _- max . {0, min. {% Instit . Ownership - 10 , . l} } for i = 0, . . ., 9 . For example, 10(3) equals zero for all observations where the percent held by institutions is less than or equal to 30%, equals one for all observations exceeding 40% and equals the difference between the proportion and 30% for all other observations . Employing this set of variables ensures a continuous, piece-wise linear specification . Surprisingly, the coefficient associated with 10(8) is significantly positive, suggesting that increases in institutional ownership from 80% through to 90% are associated with wider spreads . Care should be taken in interpreting these results as only 251 firm-quarter observations, or < 0 .5% of all observations, have in excess of 80% institutional ownership . 4.3. The Role of Institution Type Previous research on the impacts of institutional ownership treat institutions as homogenous investors with identical reporting and performance metrics, underlying investors, access to information and trading practices . 9 However, it is possible that the impact of institutional ownership on the information environment varies across the different types of institutions . To investigate this possibility, we partition the percent of outstanding shares held by all institutions into percents of outstanding shares held by each of the five institutional types . By construction, the sum of these five proportions equals the proportion held by institutions employed in the previous specification . Results from this estimation appear in the third column of Table 2 . Despite an only modest increase in the model fit, we still reject the hypothesis that the coefficients associated with each of the five institution types are equal
58
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNAI IERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
(F = 12 .807 > F4165,0 .01 = 3 .435) . Interpreting these coefficients as estimates of market-makers' perceptions of the relative impact of institutional ownership on the information environment, the estimates suggest increased ownership by
independent advisors has the largest effect on the informational environment .
In contrast, changes in ownership by investment companies appear to have little impact on the degree of informational asymmetry .
4.4 . The Role of Institution Blocks Aside from the nature of the institution, it is also plausible that informativeness would vary with the size of individual institutional blocks . For example, it is frequently argued that holders of large blocks have incentives to collect firm-specific information and monitor a firm since the benefits are linear in
the size of the stake, while the costs of monitoring contain a large fixed component . 10 To investigate this possibility, we partition the percent of outstanding shares held by all institutions into the percent of outstanding shares
held by the single largest institutional owner and the percent of outstanding
shares held by all other institutional owners . By construction, the sum of these
proportions equals the proportion held by institutions employed in the second specification .
The results from estimating the specification with the largest institutional
owner separated appear in the fourth column of Table 2 . The coefficient associated with the holdings of all but the largest holder is significantly
negative, and is more negative than any previous estimate . In contrast, the
coefficient associated with the largest block holder is positive and significant . We reject the hypothesis that the coefficients associated with the two measures
of institutional holdings are equal (F = 31 .392 > F166001 = 7 .035) . We again interpret these coefficients as estimates of market-makers' perceptions of the
relative impact of institutional ownership on the information environment . The
estimates suggest that market makers respond to increases in the size of the largest institutional block by widening spreads . This finding is at least
consistent with the joint hypothesis that the largest block holder has particular incentives to collect information and monitor, and that market makers believe that this information collection may give these largest block holders an
informational superiority . Although not reported, we estimated coefficients
associated with each of the five largest block holders . Results were unchanged
-
the coefficient associated with the largest block holder was positive
and significant, while coefficients for each of the other five block holders were negative and significant .
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
59
5. CAUSATION As we mention above, a finding of a significant relation between institutional ownership and bid-ask spreads in the cross-section can be subjected to numerous interpretations . For example, one such interpretation is that we are documenting institutional preferences for more liquid securities . Under this scenario, our regressions are detecting a correlation between institutional ownership and spreads but our model is misspecified and we are unwittingly running a reverse regression . We agree that institutions prefer more liquid assets, but also believe that this preference does not completely explain our results . In our specifications, we include numerous other determinants of the bid-ask spread along with institutional ownership . Thus, the correlation between spreads and institutional ownership is a partial one . Under the alternative interpretation of our results, this correlation cannot be interpreted as evidence that institutions hold only those securities with narrower spreads, but evidence that institutions hold only those issues with spreads that are abnormally low . Thus, institutions would have to be concerned with spreads that were unusually low after conditioning upon some common and important determinants of spreads, including price, market maker participation, volume and volatility . Although we feel that this behavior is unlikely, we nonetheless proceed by investigating the direction of causation using a modification of the techniques of Granger (1969) . Specifically, we want to determine whether institutional ownership Granger-causes bid-ask spreads . Affirmative results from our Granger-causation tests are consistent with, but, admittedly, do not represent definitive proof that changes in institutional investment cause, in some economic sense, changes in spread . Instead, we provide these tests as additional evidence that the two are linked and that changes in institutional ownership contain information (in a statistical sense) about subsequent changes in liquidity . It is important to first control for changes in those other factors known to affect bid-ask spreads . To purge the effects of these other factors, we employ the residuals from the first specification reported in Table 2 . Thus, we are testing whether changes in institutional ownership Granger-cause changes in abnormal spreads . The first issue in performing a Granger-causation test involves determining whether the test should be performed in levels or in differences, which depends crucially upon whether the variables of interest are integrated . To determine the order of these processes, we perform Dickey-Fuller and Augmented DickeyFuller tests for co-integration with one and three lags for both the institutional
WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNAI l1 RLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
60
Table 3.
Tests of Unit Roots and Granger-Causality . (Augmented) Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests Panel A : Abnormal Relative Spread
AY, =
W
Yr-,
AY, -,
0.056 (5 .66) 0.090 (8.71) 0.167
-31 .239 (-87 .99) -22 .332 (-52 .07) -15 .303
(12.04)
(-22 .94)
AY,
2
Obs .
AY,-3
47337 -25 .620 (-48.74) -38.040 (-42.14)
38323 -20 .024 (-21 .83)
-10.233 (-12.42)
19254
Panel B : Institutional Ownership xc 1 .072
(33 .43) 1 .010 (27 .38) 0 .964 (16 .53)
1
Ax, ~
Ax, 2
Obs .
-1 .885 (-17 .14) -1 .812 (-15 .04) -1 .878 (-11 .12)
47337 -0 .734 (-1 .38) -2 .130 (-2 .74)
38325 -0.118 (-0 .15)
0 .802 (1 .01)
19258
Granger-Causality Tests Panel C: Abnormal Relative Spread with Changes in Percentage Institutional Ownership Ay, =
W
Y,-,
0.066 (6.74) 0.098 (9.51)
0.172 (12.31)
AY,-,
-31 .349 (-88 .28) -22 .430 (-52.31) -15 .342
-25 .623 (-48 .78) -38 .076
(-23 .00)
(-42.19)
Ayt 2
-20 .053 (-21 .87)
Ay, a
Ax,
Obs .
-1 .740 (-7 .69) -1 .651 (-6 .94) -1 .102 (-3 .50)
47337
Ax,_
Obs .
-1 .163 (-4.59) -1 .123 (-4.57) -1 .248 (-3 .70)
38325
-10 .263 (-12 .46)
38325 19258
Panel D : Abnormal Relative Spread with Lagged Changes in Percentage Institutional Ownership Ayt=
W 0 .049 (4 .64) 0 .096 (9 .30) 0 .173 (12.39)
Y,-, -31 .426 (-78 .68) -22.430 (-52.25) -15 .378 (-23 .05)
AY,-,
-25.612 (-48 .74) -38 .066 (-42.18)
Ay,-2
-20 .068 (-21 .89)
AY,-3
-10 .261 (-12.46)
38325 19258
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity Table 3 .
61
Continued .
Note: y = Abnormal Relative Spread ; and x = Percentage Institutional Ownership . Abnormal Relative Spread is the residual from a regression of the end-of-quarter relative spread [(Ask-Bid) / Price] on shares outstanding, price, price squared, bid-to-bid return variance, volume and number of market makers . Price is defined as the average of bid and ask . Percentage Institutional Ownership is shares held by institutional owners divided by shares outstanding . For both the independent and dependent variables, the 0 operator indicates changes over the approximately 62 trading days of the indicated quarter . Parameter coefficients have been multiplied by 100 .
ownership and the abnormal spread variables . The results are presented in the top panels of Table 3 . Regardless of the form of the test, estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are significantly below one . Thus, the presence of a unit root is rejected for both series, suggesting that levels are appropriate. However, first order autocorrelations are close to one, so adjustments for autocorrelations are required . In subsequent panels of Table 3, we test for whether institutional ownership Granger-causes abnormal bid-ask spreads ; that is, we test whether, conditional on the past values of abnormal bid-ask spreads, past values of institutional ownership affect current values of abnormal spreads . To control for the past values of abnormal spreads, we start with the Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller specifications used to test for the presence of a unit root in the abnormal bid-ask spread process . We retain these specifications for two reasons . First, by retaining lagged levels and differences in the abnormal spreads, we accommodate its autocorrelation structure . Second, by including an intercept and lagged values, this specification explicitly accommodates secular trends in both institutional ownership and bid-ask spreads . Since we use abnormal spreads throughout, the mean of the spread variable and its differences equal zero by construction . Therefore, the intercept reflects the mean of the first difference in institutional ownership . As a result, our estimates capture the relations between changes in institutional ownership and bid-ask spreads which are deviations from each variable's long-run trend . We then augment this specification by adding past changes in institutional ownership . As a robustness check, we estimate and report specifications using two measures of changes in institutional ownership - the contemporaneous change in institutional ownership and the lagged change in institutional ownership ." The evidence reported in Panels C and D of Table 3 indicate that, regardless of the choice of the institutional ownership variable, changes in
62 WILLIAM W. JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNAI IERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN institutional ownership Granger-causes changes in spreads . Across the three Dickey-Fuller specifications and two choices of institutional ownership
variables, all six coefficients associated with changes in institutional ownership are significant at the 1 % level . These results suggest that market makers adjust spread widths in reaction or response to changes in the ownership structure of the stock . Although we have not reported the results, tests of whether changes in spreads Granger-cause changes in institutional ownership were also performed. Results were mixed and were highly specification specific . Nonetheless, the few specifications that were significant support the hypothesis that at least part of the contemporaneous correlation between spreads and institutional ownership is attributable to institutional preference for liquid securities . In other words, these tests offer support for the non-mutually-exclusive hypothesis that institutional ownership reacts to changes in liquidity . Such results provide support for Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) who conjecture that agents with shorter expected holding periods have a relative preference for more liquid securities . Given that institutions churn their portfolio at rates greater than do individuals, this finding is not surprising . We wish to emphasize that Granger-causality is a uni-directional test and Granger-causality does not require the absence of reverse Granger-causality . As
a result, even stronger results of bi-directional Granger-causation would not diminish the impact of our primary finding - that changes in institutional ownership are useful for forecasting both changes and levels of abnormal relative spread .
6. THE ADVERSE SELECTION COMPONENT OF SPREADS To this stage, we have demonstrated that larger institutional ownership is associated with narrower bid-ask spreads and have inferred that this is due to a relation between institutional ownership and the informational environment . However, information content or adverse selection represents only one portion of the bid-ask spread . Therefore, to determine whether the negative relation between spreads and institutional ownership is attributable to adverse selection, we focus on the adverse selection component of the spread . Specifically, we adapt the methods introduced by George, Kaul and Nimalendran ("GKN," hereafter, 1991) to both estimate the adverse selection component and test whether this component varies systematically in the cross-section . In their study,
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
63
GKN estimated the overall level of adverse selection and examined whether adverse selection varies with size . In contrast, we examine whether that component varies with the percent of stock held by institutions . Following GKN, for each firm and each quarter, we calculate the raw bid-ask spread (measured either as the final spread or the average spread over the quarter), and a measure of the "true" spread :
2N, -Cov(Ret transe
t - Retbid . , Re ttrans-t
I
-Retbid. t- ) I
where : Rettrans and Retbid are returns constructed from last-transaction prices and closing bids respectively . Because the GKN method requires valid transactions prices as well as bid quotes, we restrict our sample to Nasdaq National Market System (NMS) firms when testing for the adverse selection component . CRSP's NMS Supplemental dataset provides data for our sample period with the exception of February 1986 . Accordingly, we eliminate the first quarter of 1986 when studying adverse selection . These two restrictions reduce our data to 19,568 firm-quarter observations . Next, a cross-sectional regression is estimated with the "true" spread as the dependent variable and the raw spread as the independent variable for each quarter . An estimate of the proportion of the spread that is attributable to adverse selection is computed by subtracting the slope coefficient from one . Finally, standard errors and significance levels are determined using the empirical distribution of the time series of cross-sectional estimates . For our sample period, we have a time-series of 33 quarterly estimates of the adverse selection component . To determine whether the adverse selection component varies with firm size, GKN partitioned each cross-sectional sample into size-based portfolios and estimated the coefficient separately for each portfolio . In contrast, we estimate a single cross-sectional regression for each quarter, but allow the estimated adverse selection component to vary across institutional ownership quintiles by including four indicator variables . Thus, we directly estimate the adverse selection component of the quintile with the smallest institutional ownership, and infer the adverse selection components of the other quintiles by adding the estimate of the associated indicator variable . One benefit of this approach is that it allows us to make statistical inferences . Specifically, we test whether the actual proportion of indicator variables exceeds the null of 0 .5 using a one-sided binomial test .
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WILLIAM W. JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNATTERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
Table 4.
Adverse Selection Component of Bid-Ask Spread and Institutional Ownership Levels . Panel A : Percent of Spread Attributable to Adverse Selection by Institutional Ownership Quintile
Institutional Ownership Quintile Smallest 1O-2 1O-3 1O-4 Largest
Percent of Spread Attributable to Adverse Selection ; Ir = (1-/3)
t-statistic for Hr : a = I
0.54 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.45
(3 .12) (3 .89) (3 .28) (3 .37) (3 .10)
Empirical distribution ; p
Binomial t-statistic for H0 : p = 0 .5
0 .76 0 .72 0 .74 0 .86
(2 .98) (2 .51) (2 .81) (4.15)
Panel B : Percent of Spread Attributable to Adverse Selection by Institutional Ownership Quintile & Calendar Year Quarter Institutional Ownership Quintile Smallest 1O-2 1O-3 1O-4 Largest
Quarter 1 (Jan.- March)
Quarter 2 (Apr.- June)
Quarter 3 (July - Sept.)
Quarter 4 (Oct.-Dec.)
0.54 0.44 0.49 0 .45 0 .42
0 .55 0 .50 0 .51 0.49 0 .49
0 .58 0 .51 0 .53 0 .50 0 .46
0 .48 0 .42 0 .46 0 .43 0 .41
Note: Following George, Kaul, & Nimalendran (1991), we estimate the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread as it = (1-/3) where /3 is taken from : 2,i-Cov (Ret«.,`, , -Reteid . " Ret( , -, t - i - Retn,, , , i ) = a + /3 Spread, + e, where: Ret„ e,,, and Retb ;d are returns constructed from last-transaction prices and closing bids respectively. Regressions were conducted quarterly within institutional ownership quintiles ; reported results are observation-weighted averages . The empirical distribution is the weighted fraction of periods when the estimated err for a quintile is less than -rr for the smallest quintile that quarter . Data for the table is an NMS-only subset of our general data .
6.1 . Adverse Selection Estimates Estimates of the adverse selection component and t-statistics for the quintiles appear in Table 4 . First, we note that our estimates of the adverse selection
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
65
component are roughly 50% which is consistent with estimates reported by Ho and Stoll (1989), but which are four times larger than those reported in GKN . 12 Of pertinence to this study, however, is the relation between the coefficient estimates . The results are at least consistent with the existence of a relation between the proportion of the spread attributable to adverse selection and the proportion of shares held by insiders . The four quintiles with larger institutional ownership all have lower estimates of the adverse selection proportion and every difference is significantly negative using the binomial t-statistic . The difference in the adverse selection component of the spread across the quintiles is accentuated when the adverse selection component is expressed as a fraction of the share price, rather than expressed as a proportion of the spread . The results in this section suggest that the proportion of the spread attributable to adverse selection is lowest for those firms with the highest levels of institutional ownership . However, as documented above, institutional ownership is negatively related to relative spread . Thus, those firms in the quintile containing the highest institutional ownership also have the narrowest relative spreads . Therefore, as institutional ownership increases in the cross-section, spreads narrow and the proportion of those spreads attributable to adverse selection also narrows . 6.2 . Seasonalities
Non-information based trading, including "window-dressing" or tax-related trading, may contribute to seasonalities in general, and to a reduction in the degree of adverse selection in the fourth quarter in particular . Because our adaptation of the GKN method relies on quarterly cross-sectional regressions, we can readily examine whether there are quarterly seasonalities in the adverse selection component of spreads . As above, we compute inter-temporal averages of estimates of the adverse selection component by institutional ownership quintile . However, in Panel B of Table 4, separate averages are calculated for each of the four calendar quarters . Consistent with an increase in noninformation-based trading around the calendar year end, the proportion of spreads associated with adverse selection are lowest in the fourth quarter and second lowest in the first quarter for each of the five institutional ownership quintiles . Despite these seasonal fluctuations, our conclusions concerning the relation between institutional ownership and adverse selection continue to hold . Across each of the four quarters, estimates of the proportion of the spread attributable to adverse selection are greatest for the quintile containing the lowest levels of institutional holdings, and smallest for the quintile containing the highest levels .
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WILLIAM W. JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNAI I'ERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
7. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION The recent growth of institutional share ownership has led many to question whether capital markets can support the attendant increased demand for liquidity . In this study, we empirically examine whether changes in institutional
ownership, both inter-temporally and cross-sectionally, adversely affect one measure of the cost of providing liquidity services - the quoted bid-ask spread . Our results indicate that spreads are, in fact, correlated with levels in institutional ownership, but the correlation is uniformly significantly negative . Further, we provide evidence that changes in institutional ownership Granger-cause changes in spreads, so our results are not simply reflecting an institutional preference for liquid securities . We also perform tests using the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread . We find evidence that the proportion of the spread attributable to adverse selection declines as institutional ownership increases . These findings have serious implications for the debate surrounding the desirability of institutional ownership . Specifically, in contrast to academic and popular perceptions, there is no evidence that the secular growth of institutional ownership is taxing the supply of liquidity in the equity markets . Indeed, our results suggest that an increase in institutional ownership, across time and/or across firms actually reduces the costs of liquidity services . Although our methods allow us to evaluate the relations between institutional holdings and liquidity, they are not designed to identify the economic link or links underpinning this relationship . Nonetheless, we would like to propose some candidates . First, our findings are consistent with the joint hypothesis that: (i) the beginning-of-quarter institutional ownership is related to the market maker's conditional probability that the next trader is an institution ; and (ii) that institutional trades convey less asymmetric information than non-institutional trades . One obvious possibility, consistent with semi-strong form market efficiency, is that the professional managers who instigate the trades are unsuccessful at collecting or using superior information . Under this scenario, it is these managers who provide liquidity to the markets . An alternative scenario is that the professional managers of these institutions do collect superior information and that a fraction of institutional trades are based on this superior information . However, on average, the proportion of trades based on information is overwhelmed by the proportion of trades that managers must make to meet the liquidity needs of their clients . For example, it is conceivable that for every discretionary trade made by a manager based on information, there are many trades that the
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
67
manager must execute solely to accommodate both discretionary and non-discretionary cash inflows to and outflows from the fund under management . The decisions that determine the direction and size of these cash flows are not made by the professional managers but are made by managers' clients . In many cases, these clients are individual traders . Under this scenario, it is the clients of these institutions who are the uninformed investors whose decisions convey little information about intrinsic value and merely provide liquidity . A second avenue through which institutional ownership can impact liquidity is through concomitant changes in information collection and processing . Following Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) it is plausible that increases in institutional ownership have no direct effects on spreads, but that such increases narrow spreads indirectly by inducing increased analyst following, thus ameliorating the informational environment. Under this scenario, increased institutional ownership actually creates a positive externality for small, uninformed investors . If increased institutional holdings lead to expanded information gathering, a reduction in informational asymmetries, and a reduction in the adverse selection cost of making a market, then the resulting declines in spreads benefit all potential traders . Regardless of the link underpinning this relationship, the results of the study
clearly indicate that increased institutional ownership does not represent a serious threat to the aggregate liquidity of the equity markets . Although increases in institutional ownership across firms or across time may have detrimental effects on demand for liquidity services, associated benefits are sufficient to more than offset them .
NOTES 1 . As a partial list, consider : Copeland and Galai (1983) ; Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ; Ho and Stoll (1983) ; and Stoll (1978, 1989). 2 . This assumption is convenient, but not necessary . If trade size varies between informed and uniformed investors, it could easily be accommodated in the two conditional per trade profitability measures . 3 . In previous drafts of this study, we provided empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that institutional ownership at the beginning of a period was highly positively correlated with subsequent institutional trading volume . However, in these earlier versions, we limited our subsequent interpretations of our findings to suggest that we detected only the information content of institutional trades per se, rather than the total effect of institutional ownership on the informational environment . 4 . See : Murphy and Topel (1985, especially p . 375) ; Pagan (1984) ; or Schwert and Seguin (1990, p . 1133) .
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WILLIAM W . JENNINGS, KAREN SCHNATTERLY AND PAUL J . SEGUIN
5 . Using the sample and techniques described in Bessembinder (1996), we estimated the correlations between effective and realized spreads for 1300 NYSE and 1300 Nasdaq firms from April through December 1994 using intra-day data . Although the correlations across firm-month observations between average quoted and effective spreads are high for both market structures, the correlation is greater for Nasdaq firms (0 .980) than the corresponding correlation for NYSE-listed firms (0 .974) . Also, see Demsetz (1995) . 6 . We have manually identified over 1,800 examples of no Spectrum data for a particular firm and quarter even though there are Spectrum-reported holdings for the previous and subsequent quarters . For example, Spectrum reported substantial institutional holdings, including one block of 67,400 shares held by the same institution in both the third quarter of 1985 and first quarter of 1986, for American Aggregates Corp . However, in the intervening quarter (the fourth quarter of 1985), Spectrum contains no record of any institutional holdings . 7 . See Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Clark (1973), Epps and Epps (1976), and Tauchen and Pitts (1983) for theoretic models, Karpoff (1987) for a review of empirical findings, and Bessembinder and Seguin (1992, 1993), and Bessembinder, Chan and Seguin (1996) for empirical evidence on the differential effects of the expected and unexpected components of volume. 8 . In a multiple regression framework, the coefficient associated with an independent variable estimates the relation between the dependent and that independent variable conditional on the inclusion of the other variables . In this case, we are picking up the relation between volume and spread, conditional on two important predictors of anticipated volume, the number of market makers and shares outstanding, being included in the specification. Thus, the coefficient we estimate must be (and, as we empirically verify, is) identical to the resulting coefficient from a two-step procedure where we first regress volume on number of market makers and shares outstanding. The second step then involves using residuals from the first step regression, which are estimates of unexpected volume, in our main specification . 9 . Exceptions include : Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny (1991) ; Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) who examine only pension fund managers ; and Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) who examine only mutual funds . 10 . See : Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ; Jensen and Warner (1988) ; Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) ; Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) ; or Black (1992) . 11 . It is important to point out that the choice of using the current level of abnormal spread or the change in abnormal spread as the regressand is irrelevant . Since we include the lagged level of abnormal bid-ask spread among the regressors, all estimated coefficients and their standard errors will be identical using either option, with one exception . The coefficient associated with lagged abnormal spread will be exactly one unit larger when the level of abnormal spread is used as a regressand than it would be if the change in abnormal spread was used as the regressand. However, the coefficients and standard errors on all remaining variables, including the institutional ownership variable, remain unchanged across the two specifications . 12 . To determine whether this difference is attributable to our error, we asked Professor Nimalendran to verify our code . He did so . He further reported to us that, using a Nasdaq-NMS subsample of his data, he generated estimates that are within one standard error of the estimates we report here
Institutional Ownership, Information and Liquidity
69
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Gautam Kaul and M . Nimalendran for their econometric help, and George Benston, Brian Bushee, Hendrik Bessembinder, Jay Coughenour, Diane Del Guercio, Mason Gerety, E . Philip Howrey, Michele LaPlante, Wayne Mikkelson, Harold Mulherin, G . William Schwert, Ralph Walkling, Marc Zender, and participants at seminars at Emory University, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, University of Missouri, Ohio State University, University of Oregon, the University of Texas-Dallas, Vanderbilt University, University of Western Ontario, University of Wisconsin, and the Financial Management Association meetings in Honolulu for their comments . The opinions included are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U .S . Air Force Academy, the U .S . Air Force or any other federal agency .
REFERENCES Admati, A . R ., & Pfleiderer, P . (1988). A theory of intraday patterns : Volume and price variability . Review of Financial Studies, 1, 1-40 . Agrawal, A ., & Mandelker, G. N . (1990) . Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers : The case of antitakeover charter amendments . Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 25, 143-161 . Amihud, Y ., & Mendelson, H. (1986) . Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread . Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 223-249. Bessembinder, H. (1996). The degree of price resolution and equity trading costs . Working paper . Tempe, AZ : Arizona State University . Bessembinder, H., & Seguin, P. J. (1992) . Futures-trading activity and stock price volatility . Journal of Finance, 47, 2015-2034 . Bessembinder, H., & Seguin, P. J. (1993) . Price volatility, trading volume, and market depth : Evidence from futures markets . Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 28, 21-39 . Bessembinder, H ., Chan, K ., & Seguin, P. J . (1996) . An empirical examination of information, differences of opinion, and trading activity . Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 105-134 . Black, B . S . (1992) . The value of institutional investor monitoring : The empirical evidence. UCLA Law Review, 39, 895-939 . Brennan, M., & Subrahmanyam, A . (1995) . Investment analysis and price formation in securities markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 361-381 . Brickley, J ., Lease, R ., & Smith, C . (1988). Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 267-291 . Chiang, R ., & Venkatesh, P. C . (1988) . Insider holdings and perceptions of information asymmetry : A note . Journal of Finance, 43, 1041-1048 . Clark, P . K . (1973) . A subordinated stochastic process model with finite variances for speculative prices . Econometrica, 41, 135-155 . Copeland, T ., & Galai, D . (1983). Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread. Journal of Finance, 38, 1457-1469 . Davidian, M ., & Carroll, R . J . (1987) . Variance function estimation . Journal of the American Statistical Association, 82, 1079-1091 .
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Demsetz, H . (1995) . A non-collusive explanation for the pattern of spreads on the Nasdaq . Working paper, L .A ., CA : University of California. Demsetz, H ., & Lehn, K . (1985) . The structure of corporate ownership : Causes and consequences . Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177 . Devenow, A ., & Welch, I . (1996). Rational herding in financial economics . European Economic Review, 40, 603-615 . Dickey, D . A., & Fuller, W . A . (1979) . Distribution of the estimates for autoregressive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 427-431 . Epps, T . W., & Epps, M . L. (1976) . The stochastic dependence of security price changes and transaction volumes : Implications for the mixture-of-distributions hypothesis . Econometrica, 44, 305-325 . Fabozzi, F . (1979). Bid-ask spreads for over-the-counter stocks . Journal of Economics and Business, 32, 56-65 . Fama, E. F ., & French, K . R . (1992). The cross-section of expected stock returns . Journal of Finance, 47, 427-465 .
Fama, E . F ., & Macbeth, J. D. (1973) . Risk, return and equilibrium : Empirical tests. Journal of Policitical Economy, 81, 607-636 . George, T ., Kaul, G ., & Nimalendran, M . (1991) . Estimation of the bid-ask spread and its components : A new approach. Review of Financial Studies, 4, 623-656 . Glosten, L . R., & Milgrom, P . R. (1985) . Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders . Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 71-100 . Granger, C . W . J . (1969) . Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods . Econometrica, 37, 424-438 . Harris, L. (1994) . Minimum price variations, discrete bid-ask spreads and quotation sizes . Review • Financial Studies, 7, 149-178 . Heard, J ., & Sherman, H . (1987) . Conflicts of interest in the proxy voting system . Working paper, Investor Responsibility Research Center . Hendricks, D., Patel, J., & Zeckhauser, R . (1993). Hot hands in mutual funds : Short-run persistence of relative performance, 1974-1988. Journal of Finance, 48, 93-129 . Hirshleifer, D . (1995) . The blind leading the blind : Social influence, fads and informational cascades . In : M . Tommasi & K. lerulli (Eds), The New Economics of Human Behaviour . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Ho, T. S . Y., & Stoll, H . R . (1983) . The dynamics of dealer markets under competition . Journal • Finance, 38, 1053-1074 . Jensen, M ., & Warner, J . (1988) . The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders and directors . Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 3-24. Jones, C . M ., Kaul, G ., & Lipson, M . L. (1993) . Information, trading, and volatility . Journal of Financial Economics, 36, 127-154 . Karpoff, J . M . (1987) . The relation between price changes and trading volume: A survey . Journal • Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 22, 109-126 . Kothare, M., & Laux, P. (1995) . Trading costs and the trading systems for Nasdaq stocks, Financial Analysts Journal, 42-53 . Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A ., Thaler, R., & Vishny, R . (1991) . Window dressing by pension fund managers, American Economics Association Papers and Proceedings, 81, 227-231 . Lakonishok, J ., Shleifer, A ., & Vishny, R . W . (1992) . The impact of institutional trading on stock prices . Journal of Financial Economics, 32, 23-43 . Loss, L., & Seligman, J . (1990) . Securities Regulation (3rd ed .), Boston, MA : Little, Brown and Co .
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Murphy, K . M ., & Topel, R . H . (1985) . Estimation and inference in two-step econometric models . Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 3, 370-379 . Pagan, A . (1984) . Econometric issues in the analysis of regressions with generated regressors . International Economic Review, 25, 221-247 . Petersen, M., & Fialkowski, D . (1994). Posted versus effective spreads : Good prices bad quotes . Journal of Financial Economics, 35, 269-292 . Plosser, C. I., & Schwert, G . W. (1978) . Money, income, and sunspots : Measuring economic relationships and the effects of differencing . Journal of Monetary Economics, 4, 637-660 . Pound, J., & Shiller, R . (1987) . Are institutional investors speculators? Journal of Portfolio Management (Spring), 46-52 . Sarin, A ., Shastri, K . A ., & Shastri, K. (1996) . Ownership Structure and Stock Market Liquidity . Working paper, Santa Clara, CA, Santa Clara University . Schwert, G . W ., & Seguin, P. J . (1990) . Heteroskedasticity in stock returns . Journal of Finance, 44, 1129-1155 . Stoll, H . R . (1978). The pricing of security dealer services : An empirical study of Nasdaq stocks . Journal of Finance, 33, 1153-1172. Stoll, H . R . (1989) . Inferring the components of the bid-ask spread : Theory and empirical tests . Journal of Finance, 44, 115-134 . Tauchen, G . E., & Pitts, M . (1983) . The price variability-volume relationship on speculative markets . Econometrica, 51, 485-505 . White, H . (1980) . A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity . Econometrica, 48, 485-505 .
INTERNAL CASH FLOWS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS Raj Aggarwal and Sijing Zong
ABSTRACT There continues to be much interest in the impact of internal funds on the level of corporate investment activity. While some studies provide evidence that investment decisions of firms that are financially constrained are more sensitive to the availability of internal funds than those of less constrained firms, other studies show the opposite, i .e. investment decisions of the most credit-worthy firms are most sensitive to internal funds availability. This paper tests these opposing propositions for U .S. firms using data for a longer and more recent period than in prior studies . The results support the latter view, i.e . investments at financially constrained firms are less sensitive to internal cash flows than in financially less constrained firms . Regardless, investments levels are found to be positively related to internal cash flows for all types of firms and for all periods examined indicating a pecking order in financing (firms prefer first using internal funds and only then go to external funds) .
Innovations in Investments and Corporate Finance, Volume 7, pages 73-92 . Copyright © 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN: 0-7623-0897-4 73
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1. INTRODUCTION As shown in Modigliani and Miller (1958) for a company operating in perfect
markets, it has been widely contended and generally assumed in the finance literature that a company's financing policies and capital structure decisions are
irrelevant in maximizing firm value and value maximizing real investment
decisions are independent of financing decisions . However, recent literature has started noting that most firms generally operate in incomplete or imperfect
markets and find that external funds are more expensive than internal funds . There seem to be a number of market imperfections that may lead to such a
situation . Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), Meyers and Majluf (1984) use
asymmetric information about a firm's investment opportunities (managers have
more information than do external providers of funds) as the reason for this
financing hierarchy . Bernanke and Gertler (1990) and Gertler (1992) show that agency costs can also lead to this differential in the costs of external versus
internal funds .
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir
(1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), and Lamont (1997), and others have
provided empirical evidence of the pecking order of financing costs and its
impact on firm investment levels . These studies note that investment levels
at the most financially constrained firms are most sensitive to the availability of internal funds . In contrast, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) find empirical evidence that investment levels at the least financially constrained firms are most influenced by availability of internal funds .' This paper attempts to address this controversy using improved methodology and more recent data .
Using data on U .S . firms for the thirteen-year period, 1988-2000, and two
sub-periods 1988-1994 and 1995-2000, this study documents that the least
constrained firms had a stronger cash flow-investment relationship than the most
constrained firms . For the overall period and for both sub-periods, the weakest cash flow-investment relationship was for the most financially constrained firms .
These results support the findings in Cleary (1999) and Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) - findings that are inconsistent with expectations and other prior research,
as classical arguments would expect us to find stronger cash flow-investment relationships for the most financially constrained firms .' Perhaps, more
importantly, investments levels are found to be positively related to internal
cash flows for all types of firms and for all periods examined indicating a pecking order in financing (firms tend to prefer first using internal funds and
only then go to external sources of funds) . These findings should be of interest not only to managers and investors but also to policy makers .
Internal Cash Flows and Corporate Investment Decisions
75
2. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE CASH FLOW-INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP As shown in the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958), for a company operating in perfect markets a company's investment levels should be unrelated to the availability of internal cash flows . Indeed, it has been widely contended and generally assumed in the finance literature that a company's financial condition is irrelevant for real investment decisions . However, recent finance literature has noted that most firms operate in incomplete or imperfect markets and that external funds are generally more expensive than internal funds . In such cases, corporate investment decisions are likely to depend on the availability of internal funds . For a number of years following the publication of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the finance literature generally assumed that corporate investment levels were independent of its financing decisions . However, this was not always so . Much literature before 1958 stressed the connection between investment decisions and financing constraints faced by a firm . An example of this early applied research on investment stressing the significance of financing constraints in business investment is Meyer and Kuh (1957) . While modern finance literature does not completely understand the nature of this relationship yet, it has again started to stress the relationship between corporate investment and financing decisions . In the Hubbard (1998) review paper, two main reasons that link internal funds and investment decisions are presented . The "macro" view is that the cyclical movements in investment appear too large to be explained by market indicators of expected future profitability or the user cost of capital . The "micro" view arises from the consequences of informational imperfections in insurance and credit markets where problems of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders lead to a gap between the cost of external financing and internal financing . This implies that the firms facing no information costs and firms with sufficient net worth to finance their desired capital stock will not be affected . In contrast, all else being equal, firms facing high information costs and low net worth are likely to have a positive relationship between availability of internal funds and investment levels . A modern empirical study that strongly supports this cash flow-investment relationship and financing hierarchy is Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (FHP, 1988) . FHP test whether determinants of investment differ between firms for which, a priori, the cost of internal financing and external financing are similar and firms for which the cost external financing exceeds the cost of internal financing . They use Value Line data for 422 U .S . firms over the 1970 to 1984
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RAJ AGGARWAL AND SIDING ZONG
time period to analyze differences in investment levels among firms classified
according to earnings retention . The FHP framework can be interpreted as using cash flow to measure the change in net worth . FHP control for the impact of differences in investment opportunity sets by including Tobin's q in their regression :
(I/K), r = f (X/K) 1r + g (CF/K) .r + u, 1 , where :
lit
represents investment in plant and equipment for firm i during period
t; K is the beginning-of-period book value for net property, plant, and equipment ; g (CF/K) is a function of current cash flow that measures the firm
liquidity, f (X/K) is a function of variables related to investment opportunities ; and u « is an error term. Here, f (X/K) is represented by a firm's Tobin's q value . It is argued that firms with higher retention ratios face higher informational
asymmetry problems and are more likely to be liquidity constrained . Indeed, it is documented that the investment levels of such firms are much more sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow than that of mature, high dividend firms .
Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) employ an Euler equation
approach to directly test the first-order condition of an inter-temporal
maximization problem to avoid the problems associated with the estimation and
use of Tobin's q . This model also has the advantage of controlling for the influence of expected future profitability in investment spending, while not
requiring an explicit measure of expected demand or expected costs . Both studies support the FHP results .
International evidence of this relationship has also been presented . Schaller
(1993) finds that for Canadian firms the cash flow effects are more pronounced
for young firms, firms with dispersed ownership, and non-group firms . Hayashi and Inoue (1991) use data for 687 quoted Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1977-1986 while Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992)
use data for 532 U .K. manufacturing firms over the period 1971-1986 . Both studies find that in addition to Tobin's Q, cash flows had a positive and highly significant effect on company investment .
A related study based on problems of asymmetric information in group firms,
Hoshi et al . (1991), found that investment decisions for 24 Japanese firms that
are not members of a keiretsu are much more sensitive to firm liquidity than that of 121 firms that are members of a keiretsu and are presumed to be less financially constrained . The idea is that keiretsu firms have access to external
financing from the group's "main bank", which monitors member firms closely and reduces information cost in external financing . Oliner and Rudebush (1992) examine 99 NYSE-listed firms and 21 OTC firms during the 1977 to 1983
Internal Cash Flows and Corporate Investment Decisions
77
period to show that investment is most closely related to cash flow for firms that are young, whose stocks are traded over-the-counter, and that exhibit insider trading behavior consistent with privately held information . However, not all studies support the basic FHP results . Indeed, there now seems to be significant evidence of an opposing view . Kaplan and Zingales (KZ, 1997) challenge the generality of the conclusions reached by FHP and related studies . They use a combination of qualitative and quantitative information extracted from the company annual reports to rank firms in terms of their apparent degree of financial c onstraint . KZ re-examine the sample of low-dividend-payout firms used in FHP . Based on statements contained in annual reports, they divide the firms into categories : "not financially constrained," "possibly financially constrained," and "financially constrained" . They find that the "financially constrained" group actually displays the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash flow of the three groups, a result that contradicts FHP. Based on this finding, they claim that investment-cash flow sensitivities provide no evidence of the presence of financing constraints . KZ are criticized mainly on the small sample size and their classification criteria. FHP (1996) and Schiantarelli (1995) argue the criteria rely on managerial statements about liquidity that may be self-serving and problematic and somewhat subjective operational definitions of what it means for a firm to be financially constrained . FHP (1997) also note that the FHP firm-years KZ classify as most financially constrained are actually observations from years when firms are financially distressed . FHP argue that the sample of KZ study was designed to exclude financially distressed firms, and so very few observations fall into the categories KZ label as "constrained ." As a result, the sample lacks sufficient heterogeneity to identify meaningful differences across their sample . Nevertheless, the KZ results are puzzling because they suggest that firms choose to rely primarily on internal cash flow for investment, despite the availability of additional external funds . Sean Cleary pursues this puzzle in his paper in 1999 . His study follows the approach of KZ by classifying firms according to financial variables that are related to financial constraints . Firm financial status is determined using multiple discriminant analysis, similar to Altman's Z factor for predicting bankruptcy . Unlike the previous studies, Cleary allows reclassification of firm financial status every period, and group composition is allowed to vary over time to reflect changing levels of financial constraints at the level of the firm . Cleary not only improved on KZ's methodology, but also tested a larger, more diversified sample of 1317 U .S . firms for the period 1987-1994 . His results show that while all firms are sensitive to firm liquidity, consistent with the KZ results, firms that are more
78
RAJ AGGARWAL AND SIDING ZONG
creditworthy exhibit greater investment-liquidity sensitivity than less creditworthy firms .
As this brief review indicates, there is clearly a controversy here . In theory
we should expect the most financially constrained firms to have the strongest
positive relationship between internal cash flow and investment levels . However, the empirical literature has supported opposing views of the impact of
financial constraints on the cash flow-investment relationship . One set of the literature supports a stronger relationship for the most financially constrained firms while the other set supports a stronger relationship for the least constrained firms . This paper uses improved research methodology and more recent data in an attempt to resolve this controversy and to explore if the recent
democratization of U .S . capital markets making external funds more readily available to firms (Duca, 2001) has changed this internal cash flow investment relationship .
3 . RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA This study follows Cleary's approach of utilizing a computed Z score (Altman, 1968 ; Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan, 1977) to define the financially
constrained (FC), partially financially constrained (PFC), and not financially
constrained (NFC) firms . However, we use a different and better set of variables in the discriminant function to calculate the Z scores of firms and
data for U .S . firms over a longer period, from 1988 to 2000 . The sample firms are first classified into groups according to their calculated Z scores as a proxy
of the company's financial status before examining the cash flow-investment
relationship with regressions for the total sample and for each group . Next we estimate if the regression coefficients across group are significantly different from each other and if there is any pattern of coefficients across groups .
A. Classification Methodology Cleary (1999) argues that the multivariate classification scheme in his paper
effectively captures desired cross-sectional properties of firms . This may not be true since he chooses the change of dividend payout as the classification/
grouping criteria in the discriminant analysis . According to his scheme, firms
are divided into three groups depending on whether the dividend payout is increasing, decreasing, or does not change from the last year .
Three problems arise from this grouping method . First, the no-change group actually contains two kinds of companies ; companies that pay the same
dividend in two consecutive years and companies that pay no dividend at all .
Internal Cash Flows and Corporate Investment Decisions
79
Obviously, these two kinds of companies could be quite different in terms of liquidity but Cleary's grouping scheme fails to distinguish between the two . Second, the change in dividend payout may not be a good proxy for a company's liquidity. Bhattacharya (1979) argues that dividends convey information about the value of the firm that cannot be fully communicated by other means of signaling . Companies, therefore, would choose a certain dividend payout and would be reluctant to change it especially when the liquidity problem is regarded as temporary . Third, the three groups are of vastly different size as very few companies change their dividends in any one year and the largest group consists of companies that did not change their dividend . In order to overcome the difficulties associated with the use of dividend payout for classifying firms, this study uses Fixed Charge Coverage (FCCOV) as the grouping criteria . 3 Fixed charge coverage ratio is defined as EBIT / (interest expenses + preferred dividend payment / (1-tax rate)) . FCCOV is a better and more direct signal of a company's liquidity . Employing multiple discriminant analysis, we classify companies into groups according to a beginning-of-period financial constraint index ZFC . Company classification is allowed to change every year to reflect the fact that financial status changes continuously . The index is similar to Altman's Z factor for predicting bankruptcy . The first step in discriminant analysis is to establish two or more mutually exclusive groups according to some explicit group classification . This study classifies companies as follows : Group 1 : Group 2 : Group 3 :
Companies with the highest FCCOV that are considered not financially constrained Companies with the lowest FCCOV that are likely financially constrained Companies with medium FCCOV (however, Group 3 companies are not utilized for purpose of the discriminant analysis but like other companies, they are assigned ZFC scores and are used in the subsequent regression analysis) .
Discriminant analysis uses a number of variables that are likely to influence the characterization of a firm in one of the two mutually exclusive groups of interest . The hypothesis is that these variables will enable us to assess the degree of financial constraint faced by each firm . As in Cleary (1999), coefficient values for each independent variable' are estimated that best distinguish firms between the two groups according to the following : Z FC = (3 1 CR +)3, SLACK/K + (33 NI% + 134 Sales Growth + 13 5 Debt Ratio
80
RAJ AGGARWAL AND SIDING ZONG
where CR is the current ratio ; SLACK/K is slack/net fixed assets ; NI% is the net income margin ; Debt Ratio is (Current portion of long-term debt + long-term debt) / total assets ; Net income margin is net income / net sales ; Net sales growth is (net sales at time t-net sales at time t -1) / net sales at time t-1 ; Slack is cash + short-term investments + 0 .5* inventory + 0 .7* accounts receivable - short-term loans (as in Cleary, 1999) . Companies are classified every year according to their Z FC value to reflect the fact that their financial constraint status is changing continually . The top one-third of the companies ranked by their Z scores each year are categorized as not financially constrained (NFC), the next one-third as partially financially constrained (PFC), and the bottom one-third as financially constrained (FC) . B. Regression Estimation We use a somewhat modified version of the FHP regression equation to estimate the impact of internal cash flow on investment levels controlling for variations in investment opportunity sets : I/Kit _ IM/B (M/B)it + 13cF/K (CF/K) ir + u ir , Where I/K it represents investment in plant and equipment divided by the beginning-of-period book value for net property, plant, and equipment for company i and time period t ; CF represents current period cash flow to the firm as measured by net income plus depreciation plus the change in deferred taxes ; and M/B represents the firms common equity market-to-book ratio based on the previous year's actual market value at year-end . We use market-to-book ratio to proxy the growth opportunities following KZ . Current period cash flow scaled by K is used to measure the liquidity variable . This regression equation follows the specification of most previous studies including FHP and KZ and should facilitate comparison of our results with previous evidence. In order to avoid the problem of time series cross-sectional cross correlations in error terms, consistent with Cleary (1999) this study also uses panel analysis procedures, i .e. the data are demeaned before regression . In this procedure, all variables are transformed by subtracting the industry, firm, and year means from the original observations . In addition, following prior studies (e .g . Cleary, 1999) and to avoid problems with outliers, selected observations are "winsorized" (assign the maximum or the minimum value if the value of a variable exceeds that cutoff maximum or minimum value) .'
Internal Cash Flows and Corporate Investment Decisions
81
C. Data Selection
The data set covers 648 U .S . companies for which complete data was available in the COMPUSTAT database for the thirteen-year time period, 1988 to 2000 . We also divide this period into two sub-periods to test the robustness of the results and to compare them with the results obtained by other studies such as Cleary (1999) . The first subset for 1988-1994 is the period used in Cleary's paper . The second subset covers the more recent period, 1995 to 2000 . This more recent data set will provide additional evidence regarding the robustness of the results and if the relationship has changed over time . Regulated firms such as banks, insurance companies, other financial companies, and utility companies are deleted from the sample . Included firms are required to have complete and positive values for sales, total assets, net fixed assets, and market-to-book ratio . Table 1 reports some summary statistics for each of the three data sets, 1988-2000, 1988-1994, and 1995-2000 .
4. RESULTS A . Differences Between Firms Grouped by Financial Constraints
Table 2 shows the correlations among the ten variables and the Z values . In contrast to Cleary's findings, we do not find strong evidence that net income margin has the highest correlation with Z values . Instead, among all variables, SLACK/K seems to correlate most significantly and consistently with Z values in each sub-period . In all three periods, the current ratio, debt ratio, investment scaled by K are the next most correlated with the Z scores . These relationships support the notion that the Z scores used in this study indicate availability of internal funds . We then sort the data sets by Z value of each firm in each year . The top one-third of the companies each year are categorized as not financially constrained (NFC), the next one-third as partially financially constrained (PFC), and the last one-third as financially constrained (FC) . We expect the number of firms in each group be different each year. Table 3 shows the mean of selected variables of different groups . It is interesting to note that the PFC (instead of NFC) firms have the lowest slack over K among the three . B. Regression Estimates of the Cash Flow-Investment Relationship
Regression results for the three data sets are reported in Table 4 . As expected, CF/K is positive and significant in each group in each time period . These results
0.02 0.00 -1 .00 -0 .95 -17 .56 0.04 0 .00 -5 .00 -95 .44 -48 .34
8424 8424 8424 8424 8424 8424 8424 8424 8424 8424
N
4536 4536 4536 4536 4536 4536 4536 4536 4536 4536
CR DEBTR FCCOV NIM SALEG SLACKK K 1/K CFL/K MKBKF
Variable*
CR DEBTR FCCOV NIM SALEG SLACKK K I/K CFL/K MKBKF
02 .00 -1 .00 - .91 -17 .56 .04 .00 -5 .00 -61 .60 -7 .23
Minimum
Minimum
N
Variable*
2 .2162 0 .2106 4 .005E-02 0 .1141 1 .7634 1138 .0172 0 .2213 0 .3962 2 .3395 0 .4245
1 .3640 0 .1610 0 .1150 0 .2159 7 .8171 4312 .8152 0 .1358 0 .6088 2 .7418 0 .7396
Std. Deviation
10.00 1 .68 1 .00 1 .09 73 .34 63864.00 2 .00 5 .00 10 .00 2 .14
Maximum 2 .2603 0 .2132 3 .061E-02 0 .1132 1 .5554 960 .8444 0 .2157 0 .3433 2 .1052 0 .1629
Mean 1 .3821 0 .1695 0 .1214 0 .2110 2 .9454 3840 .6251 0 .1324 0 .5990 2 .5494 0 .3795
Std . Deviation
Panel B: Data Set 1 (1988-1994)
10.00 1 .68 1 .00 1 .09 606 .54 94043 .00 2 .00 5 .00 10.00 3 .30
Mean
Panel A : Data Set 1 (1988-2000)
1 .910 2 .872E-02 1 .475E-02 4 .454E-02 8 .675 14750401 .392 1 .752E-02 0 .359 6 .499 0 .144
Variance
1 .861 2 .592E-02 1 .322E-02 4 .663E-02 61 .107 18600375 .246 1 .844E-02 0 .371 7 .518 0 .547
Variance
Descriptive Statistics for the Data Set .
Maximum
Table 1.
2 .136 1 .689 -3 .013 1 .315 11 .240 9 .596 2 .838 -1 .305 -8 .617 -3 .789
Skewness**
2 .190 1 .287 -2.802 1 .267 58 .247 9 .954 2 .844 0 .350 -9.690 -35 .755
Skewness**
6.880 7 .196 34.150 4.903 210.786 118.745 22.772 32 .480 191 .670 65 .485
Kurtosis**
7.265 4.827 35 .870 4.774 4309.799 136.858 23 .055 26.899 283 .781 2275 .79
Kurtosis**
G) N 0 z 0
C7
Z
M
N
N
0 .10 0 .00 -1 .00 -0.95 -1 .30 0 .07 0 .00 -5 .00 -95 .44 -111 .20
Minimum
Continued .
10 .00 0.80 1 .00 1 .08 606 .54 94043 .00 2.00 5 .00 10.00 2.34
Maximum
Std . Deviation
2 .1648 1 .3410 0.2075 0 .1505 5 .107E-02 0 .1060 0.1152 0 .2215 2.0061 11 .0538 1344.7188 4797 .6655 0.2277 0 .1394 0.4578 0 .6143 2 .6127 2 .9273 4.372E-03 2 .0353
Mean
Panel C : Data Set 3 (1995-2000)
Table 1 .
1 .798 2.265E-02 1 .123E-02 4.908E-02 122.186 23017593 .887 1 .944E-02 0.377 8 .569 4 .143
Variance
2 .261 0.585 -2 .375 1 .216 44.343 9 .883 2 .848 2 .136 -10 .686 -44 .217
Skewness**
7 .792 -0.059 38 .134 4 .619 2331 .291 135 .853 23 .313 20 .646 346.797 2322 .430
Kurtosis**
Note : Data Set 1 includes 8424 observations of 648 companies in the time period of 1988-2000 . Data Set 2 includes 4536 observations of 648 companies in the time period of 1988-1994 . Data Set 3 includes 3888 observations of 648 companies in the time period of 1995-2000 . Descriptive statistics are reported for the two data sets in A and B . * All variables are defined in the text . ** All skewness and Kurtosis are significant .
CR 3888 DEBTR 3888 FCCOV 3888 NIM 3888 SALEG 3888 SLACKK 3888 K 3888 I/K 3888 CFL/K 3888 MKBKF 3888
Variable*
c'
b ft
m
0
a o
A
0
Q y
A
CR
1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.000
Variable*
CR DEBTR NIM SALEG SLACKK K IK CFLK MKBKF Z
-0.202 1 .000 0 .000 0 .002 0 .000 0 .446 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
DEBTR
-0 .213 1 .000 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
DEBTR NIM SALEG SLACKK K IK CFLK MKBKF Z
CR
DEBTR
CR
Variable*
0.114 -0.171 1 .000 0 .000 0 .876 0 .031 0 .004 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
NIM
0 .112 -0 .172 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000
NIM
Table
0 .168 -0 .080 0 .077 -0 .028 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .501 0 .000
SLACKK
0 .058 -0 .047 0 .137 1 .000 0 .005 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
SALEG 0.276 -0.121 -0.002 0.042 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .771 0 .000
SLACKK
-0.178 -0.011 0.032 -0.058 -0.098 1 .000 0 .000 0 .001 0 .744 0 .005
K
-0 .183 -0 .013 0 .048 -0 .014 -0 .045 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0.000 0.000
Panel B : Data Set 2 (1988-1994)
0 .040 -0.010 0.139 1 .000 0.009 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SALEG K
Correlations among Variables .
Panel A : Data Set 1 (1988-2000)
2.
0 .088 -0 .168 0 .042 0 .195 0 .270 -0 .075 1 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000
IK
0 .090 -0 .191 0.020 0.161 0.172 -0.081 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
IK
0 .143 -0 .226 0 .468 0 .199 0.252 -0.051 0.132 1 .000 0.000 0.000
CFLK
0 .187 -0.242 0.434 0.165 0.277 -0.060 0.198 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000
CFLK
-0 .013 -0 .117 0 .080 0 .146 0 .004 0 .005 0 .129 0 .122 1 .000 0 .003
MKBKF
-0 .043 -0 .085 0 .115 0 .133 -0 .007 0 .057 0.132 0.142 1 .000 0.271
MKBKF
0 .569 -0 .380 0 .327 0 .092 -0 .545 -0.041 -0.082 0.069 0.044 1 .000
Z
0 .443 -0 .200 0 .095 0.131 -0.791 -0.057 -0.064 -0.069 0 .012 1 .000
Z
A
QC
1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .212 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .103
CR DEBTR NIM SALEG SLACKK K IK CFLK MKBKF Z
-0.231 1 .000 0.000 0 .024 0 .000 0 .427 0 .000 0 .000 0 .004 0 .694
DEBTR 0.117 -0.171 1 .000 0.000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .266 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
NIM 0 .020 0 .036 0 .143 1 .000 0 .001 0 .130 0 .000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SALEG
K -0.188 -0.013 0.059 0.024 -0.039 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .286
SLACKK 0.175 -0.087 0.124 -0.055 1 .000 0 .014 0 .000 0 .000 0 .334 0 .000
0 .097 -0 .220 -0 .018 0 .126 0 .175 -0 .092 1 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
IK 0 .248 -0 .263 0 .383 0 .130 0 .340 -0 .077 0 .263 1 .000 0 .000 0.000
CFLK
-0 .069 -0 .047 0 .143 0 .121 -0 .016 0 .092 0 .129 0 .148 1 .000 0 .304
MKBKF
-0 .026 0 .006 -0 .073 0 .099 -0 .987 0 .017 -0 .149 -0 .285 0 .017 1 .000
Z
expenditures during period t . Cash flow, investment, and slack are all scaled by net fixed assets at the beginning of fiscal year t . The discriminant score (Z) is calculated using discriminant analysis according to equation ZFC = 0 1 CR + /3, SLACK/K + /3~ NI% + 04 Sales Growth +,6, Debt Ratio . A full decription of the variables is included in the text . Panel A, B and C reports the correlations of the whole data set and two subsets separately . * Above the diagonal are the Pearson correlation coefficients, and below the diagonal are the significance probabilities .
Note : All financial variables are for the beginning of the fiscal year, except cash flow and investment, which represents firm cash flow and capital
CR
Variable*
Continued .
Panel C : Data Set 3 (1995-2000)
Table 2.
W
zz
z.
b
y
p p
0
A
RAJ AGGARWAL AND SIDING ZONG
86 Table 3 .
Selected Financial Ratios for Financial Constraint Groups . Panel A : Data Set 1 (1988-2000)
Variable Current Ratio Debt Ratio Net Income Margin Sales Growth Slack/Net Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets Investment/Net Fixed Assets Cash Flow/Net Fixed Assets Market-to-Book Z Score Valid N
Mean of Total
Mean of FC Group
Mean of PFC Group
Mean of NFC Group
2.2162 0.2106 4.005E-02 0.1141 1 .7634 1138 .0172 0.2213
1 .3264 0.2975 4.915E-03 6.254E-02 2 .3647 1834 .3583 0.2160
1 .8463 0 .1969 4 .531E-02 0 .1236 1 .1964 1315 .2496 0 .2155
3 .4761 0.1373 6.993E-02 0 .1564 1 .7290 264.4436 0.2323
0 .3962
0 .3177
0 .3820
0 .4887
2 .3395 0 .4245 8424
2 .3190 2.183E-02 2808
2 .3965 0 .3752 2808
2 .3029 0 .8764 2808
Panel B : Data Set 2 (1988-1994) Mean of Total
Mean of FC Group
Mean of PFC Group
Mean of NFC Group
Current Ratio Debt Ratio Net Income Margin Sales Growth Slack/Net Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets Investment/Net Fixed Assets Cash Flow/Net Fixed Assets Market-to-Book Z Score Valid N
2 .2603 0 .2132 3 .061E-02 0 .1132 1 .5554 960 .8444 0 .2157
1 .5400 0 .3221 -1 .5225E-02 8 .739E-02 2 .2135 1140 .9423 0 .2119
1 .8349 0.1985 3 .828E-02 0 .1153 1 .0198 1388 .0809 0.2100
3 .4059 0 .1192 6 .877E-02 0 .1370 1 .4328 353 .5099 0 .2252
0 .3433
0 .2654
0 .3293
0 .4353
2 .1052 0 .1629 4536
1 .9348 0 .07 1512
2.1408 0.1493 1512
2 .2401 0 .4822 1512
Variable
Mean of Total
Mean of FC Group
Mean of PFC Group
Mean of NFC Group
Current Ratio Debt Ratio Net Income Margin Sales Growth
2 .1648 0 .2075 5 .107E-02 0 .1152
1 .7953 0 .2665 1 .458E-02 5 .600E-02
1 .7334 0 .2128 5 .470E-02 0 .1072
2 .9658 0 .1431 8 .393E-02 0 .1824
Variable
Panel C : Data Set 3 (1995-2000)
87
Internal Cash Flows and Corporate Investment Decisions
Table 3 .
Continued .
Panel C : Data Set 3 (1995-2000), continued . Variable
Mean of Total
Mean of FC Group
Mean of PFC Group
Mean of NFC Group
Slack/Net Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets Investment/Net Fixed Assets Cash Flow/Net Fixed Assets Market-to-Book Z Score Valid N
2 .0061 1344 .7188 0.2277
4 .0216 909 .6240 0.2499
0 .9206 2022 .6465 0 .2105
1 .0760 1101 .8859 0 .2228
0 .4578
0 .5749
0 .3837
0 .4147
2.6127 4.372E-03 3888
2 .5877 0.02 1296
2 .6540 0 .1130 1296
2 .5964 0.4254 1296
Note : All financial variables are for the beginning of the fiscal yeat t, except cash flow and investment, which represent firm cash flow and capital expenditures during period t . K is the firm's beginning-of-period net fixed assets value . The discriminant score (Z) is calculated using discriminant analysis according to equation Z,,, = /3 i CR + /3, SLACK/K + /33 NI% + /3, Sales Growth +05 Debt Ratio . A full description of the variables is included in the text . The FC, PFC, NFC groups are formed by sorting all form according to their discriminant scores . Every year, the firms with the lowest discriminant score (the bottom one-third) are categorized as financially constrained (NFC) . Panel A, B and C report the selected financial ratio means for the two data sets .
Table 4.
Regression Results for Internal Cash Flow Impact on Investment Levels . Panel A : Data Set 1 (1988-2000)
CF/K Total Sample
2.011E-02 8 .394* FC 1 .430E-02 4 .081 PFC 1 .849E-02 3 .669* NFC 2.856E-02 5 .448** Dummy for CF/K between FC and PFC : -1 .139
MB
Adjusted R Square
3 .889E-03 0 .016 7 .684** 2 .080E-03 0 .009 3 .184** 9 .205E-03 0 .022 6 .635** 1 .355E-02 0 .046 8 .309** Dummy for CF/K between FC and NFC : -3 .782**
Durbin-Watson
Number of Observations
2 .020
8424
1 .973
2808
2 .030
2808
2 .065
2808
Dummy for CF/K between PFC and NFC : -1 .853
88
RAJ AGGARWAL AND SIDING ZONG
Table 4.
Regression Results for Internal Cash Flow Impact on Investment Levels . Panel B: Data Set 2 (1988-1994)
Total Sample FC PFC NFC
CF/K
M/B
Adjusted R Square
Durbin-Watson
Number of Observations
1 .247E-02 3 .842** 0 .3452E-02 0 .758 2.469E-02 2 .951** 2.644E-02 3 .447**
3 .858E-03 5 .555** 1 .828E-03 2 .036* 1 .189E-02 5 .835** 1 .833E-02 6 .990**
0.010
1 .948
4536
0.002
1 .849
1512
0 .032
1 .970
1512
0.052
2 .087
1512
Dummy for CF/K between FC and PFC : -2.596**
Dummy for CF/K between FC and NFC : -4 .017**
Dummy for CF/K between PFC and NFC : 0 .665
Panel C : Data Set 3 (1995-2000)
Total Sample FC PFC NFC
CF/K
M/B
Adjusted R Square
Durbin-Watson
Number of Observations
2.876E-02 8 .115** 2 .879E-02 5 .664** 2.905E-02 3 .366** 2 .138E-02 2 .256*
3 .833E-03 5 .190** 5 .244E-03 3 .494** 1 .267E-03 1 .522 9 .171E-03 5 .079**
0 .026
2 .001
3888
0 .036
1 .984
1296
0 .010
2 .070
1296
0 .025
1 .978
1296
Dummy for CF/K between FC and PFC : 0 .204
Dummy for CF/K between FC and NFC : 0 .361
Dummy for CF/K between PFC and NFC : -0 .064
Note: Reported coefficients are the within fixed firm and year estimates over the 1988-2000 sample period (t-statistics are below the regression coefficients) . Capital expenditure divided by net fixed assets 11K is the dependent variable . The firm's market-to-book ratio and cash flow/net fixed assets are the independent variables . The FC, PFC, and NFC groups are formed by sorting all firms according to their discriminant scores . Every year, the firms with the lowest discriminant scores (the bottom one-third) are categorized as financially constrained (FC) ; the next one-third are categorized as partially financially constrained (PFC) ; and the top one-third are categorized as not financially constrained (NFC) . Panel A, B, and C report the regression result for the whole period and the two subsets respectively . ** Correlation is significant at the 0 .01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0 .05 level .
Internal Cash Flows and Corporate Investment Decisions
89
show that investment levels and internal cash flows are positively related for all sub-groups of companies . This is clear evidence that company investment levels are higher (lower) when internal cash flows are higher (lower) indicating that most firms operate in imperfect or incomplete markets . The results presented here also allow for comparisons of the relative strength of this cash flow-investment relationship among firms with varying degrees of financial constraints . For the overall period (Panel A), this relationship gets stronger (higher coefficients for CF/K) with decreasing financial constraints, a result consistent with Cleary (1999) ; and Kaplan and Zingales (1999) but not consistent with other studies such as FHP (1988) . For the two sub-periods (Panels B and C) however, while this relationship is the same for data set 2 as for the overall period, data set 3 nominally shows that least financially constrained firms have the lowest coefficient for the cash flow term . However, these differences are not significant . C. Discussion
In summary, this study presents some significant and interesting results . There is clear and strong evidence that corporate investment levels are positively related to the availability of internal cash flows . While agency costs and asymmetric information have been given as some reasons for this finding, additional research would be very useful in resolving the exact reasons for this finding . In addition, for U .S . firms over a thirteen-year period, this study documents that the least constrained firms had the strongest cash flow-investment relationship . For the overall period and for both sub-periods, the weakest cash flow-investment relationship was for the most financially constrained firms . These results support the findings in Cleary (1999) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) - findings that are inconsistent with theoretical expectations as classical arguments would expect us to find a stronger cash flow-investment relationship for the most financially constrained firms . These findings seem consistent with an agency cost explanation - managers of the least constrained firms are most able to avoid the extra monitoring required in using external funds . There is also some evidence that differences in the strength of the investment-cash flow relationship among the three groups may depend on the time period being examined (indicating the possible presence of business cycle or other temporal influences) . As an example, the results of the second period especially may have been influenced by the sharp rise in stock prices and their effects on corporate investment levels . Clearly additional research would be useful to resolve the puzzle provided by these findings (and those in Cleary (1999) ; and Kaplan & Zingales (1997)) .
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RAJ AGGARWAL AND SUING ZONG
5. CONCLUSIONS For a company operating in perfect and efficient markets, it has been widely
contended and generally assumed in the finance literature that a company's
financing policies are irrelevant for its investment decisions . However, recent
literature has started noting that most firms operate in incomplete or imperfect markets and find that external funds are more expensive than internal funds .
There seem to be a number of market imperfections that may lead to such a
situation (e .g . asymmetric information and agency costs) . A number of studies
have provided empirical evidence of the pecking order of financing costs
(internal funds are cheaper and preferred over external funds) and its impact
on corporate investment levels . These studies note that investment levels at the most financially constrained firms are most sensitive to the availability of internal funds . In contrast some more recent empirical studies find that
investment levels at the least financially constrained firms are most influenced
by availability of internal funds . This paper presents new and additional evidence that addresses this controversy .
First, there is strong evidence that investment levels are positively associated
with the availability of internal funds for all sets of firms in all periods exam-
ined - a finding that is not consistent with classical assumptions in finance
theory . Indeed, the finding that investments levels are found to be positively related to internal cash flows for all types of firms and for all periods examined indicates a clear pecking order in financing (firms tend to prefer first using internal funds and only then go to external sources of funds) .
Second, using data on U .S . firms for a recent thirteen-year period and for
two sub-periods, this study documents that the least constrained firms had the
strongest cash flow-investment relationship . For the overall period and for both sub-periods, the weakest cash flow-investment relationship was for the most
financially constrained firms . These findings seem consistent with the fact that managers of the least constrained firms are best able to avoid the additional
external monitoring required when using external funds . These results support the findings in Cleary (1999) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) - findings that are inconsistent with theoretical expectations as classical arguments would expect us to find a stronger cash flow-investment relationship for the most
financially constrained firms . These findings seem consistent with an agency
cost explanation - managers of the least constrained firms are most able to avoid the extra monitoring required in using external funds .
These results should be of interest not only to managers, investors, and
bankers, but also to economists and policy-makers . The determinants of corporate investment levels are an important policy input in the management
Internal Cash Flows and Corporate Investment Decisions
91
and growth of an economy . Investors and other providers of external funds to a company need to understand this ability of managers of the best firms to avoid what they might consider excessive external monitoring (leading to adverse selection among their customers) . These findings also have some implications for corporate dividend policies and capital structure decisions as policies that require high cash payouts are likely to be better for owners .
NOTES 1 . See Hubbard (1998) for a recent survey of this burgeoning literature . 2 . There is some evidence that at least for some sub-periods, the strongest cash flow-investment relationship is for partially financially-constrained firms (may be due to the smaller sample sizes) . Clearly additional research is needed to resolve the puzzle posed by the empirical findings presented in Cleary (1999) ; Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and in this paper. 3 . Investment is scaled by the total asset of the company to avoid the bias toward large companies . 4. The use of dummy variables for different industries in the Z value function does not result in coefficients that are significantly different . 5 . The following rules used : (1) . Assign a value of 100% (-100%) if growth in sales is greater (less) than 100% (-100%) ; (2) . Assign a value of 2 (-2) if investment/net fixed assets is greater (less) than 2 (-2) ; (3) . Assign a value of 5 (-5) if cash flow/net fixed assets is greater (less) than 5 (-5) ; (4) . Assign a value of 10 if market-to-book is greater than 10 ; (5) . Assign a value of 10 if current ratio is greater than 10; (6) . Assign a value of 100% (-100%) if net income margin is greater (less) that 100% (-100%) ; (7) . Assign a value of 100 if fixed charge coverage is greater than 100 and a value of -0 .1 if it is less than 0 .
REFERENCES Altman, E . I. (1968) . Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy . Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609 . Altman, E. I., Haldeman, R . G ., & Narayanan, P . (1977) . Zeta Analysis : A New Model to Identify Bankruptcy Risk of Corporations . Journal of Banking and Finance, 1(1), 29-54 . Bernanke, B ., & Gertler, M . (1989) . Agency costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations . American Economic Review, 79(1), 14-31 . Bhattacharya, S . (1979) . Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and `The Bird in the Hand' Fallacy . Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 259-270 . Blundell, R . W ., Bond, S ., Devereux, M ., & Schiantarelli, F . (1992) . Investment and Tobin's Q: Evidence from Company Panel Data. Journal of Econometrics, 51(1-2), 233-257 . Bond, S ., & Meghir, C . (1994) . Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm's Financial Policy. Review of Economic Studies, 61(2), 197-222 . Cleary, S . (1999) . The Relationship between Firm Investment and Financial Status. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 673-692 .
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Duca, J . W . (2001) . The Democratization of America's Capital Markets . FRB Dallas Economic and Financial Review (Quarter 2), 10-19 . Fazzari, S ., Hubbard, R . G ., & Petersen, B . C . (1988) . Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment . Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 141-195 . Fazzari, S ., Hubbard, R . G ., & Petersen, B . C . (1996) . Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment : Response to Kaplan and Zingales . NBER WP, No . 5462 Gertler, M . (1992) . Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuation in an Economy with Multi-Period Financial Relationship . Review of Economic Studies, 59(3), 455-472 . Gilchrist, S ., & Himmelberg, C . (1995) . Evidence for the Role of Cash Flow in Investment . Journal of Monetary Economics, 36(3), 541-572 . Greenwald, B ., Stiglitz, J . E ., & Weiss, A . (1984) . Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations . American Economic Review, 74(2), 194-199. Hayashi, F . (1982) . Tobin's Marginal Q and Average Q : A Neoclassical Interpretation . Econometrica, 50(1), 213-224 . Hayashi, F ., & Inoue, T . (1991) . The Relation F growth and Q with Multiple Capital Goods: Theory and Evidence from Panel Data on Japanese Firms . Econometrica, 59(3), 731-753 . Hoshi, T ., Kashyap, A ., & Scharfstein, D . (1991) . Corporate Structure, Liquidity and Investment : Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 10(1), 33-60 . Hubbard, R . G . (1998) . Capital Market Imperfections and Investment . Journal of Economics Literature, 36(1), 193-225. Kaplan, S . N ., & Zingales, L . (1997) . Do Financing Constraints Explain Why Investment Is Correlated with Cash Flow? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), 169-215 . Lamont, O . (1997) . Cash Flow and Investment : Evidence from Internal Capital Markets . Journal of Finance, 52(1), 83-109 . Mayer, C . P . (1988) . New Issues in Corporate Finance. European Economic Review, 32(5), 1167-1189 . Meyer, J . R., & Kuh, E . (1957). The Investment Decision, Cambridge : Harvard University Press . Myers, S ., & Majluf, N . (1984) . Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have . Journal of Financial Economics, 13(2), 187-221 . Modigliani, E., & Miller, M . H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297 . Oliner, S . D ., & Rudebusch, G . D . (1992) . Sources of the Financing Hierarchy for Business Investment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(4), 643-654 . Schaller, H . (1993). Asymmetric Information, Liquidity Constraints, and Canadian Investment . Canadian Journal of Economics, 26(3), 552-574 . Schiantarelli, F . (1995) . Financial Constraints and Investment : A Critical Review of Methodological Issues and International Evidence . Working paper, Boston College . Whited, T . (1992). Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Investment : Evidence from Panel Data. Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1425-1460 .
PREFERENCES ON RELATIVE RETURN : A POTENTIAL EXPLANATION FOR SOME PRICING ANOMALIES Beni Lauterbach and Haim Reisman
ABSTRACT We derive a version of the CAPM in which investor preferences depend only on the mean and variance of the ratio between the portfolio return and a reference return. The reference return is specific to each investor, and can also be interpreted as a proxy of the consumption of his neighbors . That is, investors in our economy care about how much they consume relative to their neighbors . The model provides a rational potential explanation for the home bias enigma and for other pricing anomalies .
1 . INTRODUCTION The standard approach in asset pricing models assumes that the preferences of economic agents are defined over the distribution of random consumption streams . This paper derives an asset pricing model, assuming that the preferences of each economic agent are defined on the distribution of the agent's consumption relative to a reference consumption, for example, relative to the Innovations in Investments and Corporate Finance, Volume 7, pages 93-103 . Copyright © 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd . All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN: 0-7623-0897-4 93
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BENI LAUTERBACH AND HAIM REISMAN
consumption bundle of a group of other agents . In our setting, agents care about how much they consume relative to their neighbors . Preferences in our style of "catching up with the Jones' " (see Abel, 1990) were first introduced by Deusenberry (1949) . Recently, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) used such preferences to explain the equity risk premium puzzle . In our model, an agent views unfavorably a deviation of her portfolio return from that of her neighbor's . That is, an agent considers part of the risk of her neighbor's portfolio as desirable, and will hold a portfolio partially resembling that of her neighbor . This generates reference portfolios that investors wish to hold mainly because they do not want to be too different from their neighbors . The reference portfolios are hedging portfolios, assuring the correlation between individual j and her group's returns . We show that under preferences on relative return the classic CAPM must be modified . Our corrected CAPM formula deducts from the classic CAPM a term that is proportional to the covariance between the asset return and the return on the portfolio of reference portfolios . Preferences on relative return generate a demand for reference portfolios . Thus, in equilibrium, stocks included in (or correlated with) the aggregate (sum of all investors') reference portfolio offer lower expected returns than the classic CAPM predicts . Our model offers interesting insights into several pricing phenomena, described in the literature as "anomalous". Consider, for example, the home bias puzzle, presented in Kang and Stultz (1997) . They observe that although barriers to international investment have fallen dramatically in recent years, investors hold more securities from their home country than implied by portfolio optimization . Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Huberman (2001) report the existence of a domestic home bias as well . Investors tend to hold in their portfolios stocks of companies from their geographic region, for example, their local baby-Bell companies . Assuming the future performance of a baby-Bell is correlated with that of the region it serves, this investor behavior is inconsistent with principles of diversification implied by portfolio theory . Another, and perhaps most puzzling, example of a home bias is the evidence in Benartzi (2001) that workers hold non-trivial amounts of their company's stock in their retirement accounts, increasing the correlation of their future wealth with the future value of their company . In our setup, the home bias phenomenon, described above, is natural and not a puzzle at all . Because of the relative preferences, an investor wants to be (to some extent) like his neighbors in terms of consumption and wealth . Consequently, country, geographical location, and even occupational home biases emerge in individual investor portfolios, as everybody tries to link his future economic welfare to that of his neighbors, peers and reference group .
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Other pricing anomalies can also be examined in light of relative preferences . The main insight is that whenever some group of stocks becomes a reference portfolio, it would offer a lower expected return than other "small", "neglected", or "illiquid" stocks . The paper is organized as follows . Section 2 introduces the economic setting . Section 3 derives our version of the CAPM, and Section 4 discusses how the model might help explain several asset pricing "anomalies" .
2. THE ECONOMIC SETTING Assume there are N assets in the economy with random returns R i (i = 1, . . ., N), and a risk free asset (asset N + 1) that returns R f . These assets are traded at time zero and pay off at time one . Investors can choose portfolio returns of the form : N
N
R P =~c _ i ~.R.+(1-~c ~ _ r ~.) Rr.
(1)
where ci is the weight of asset i in the portfolio, and there are no restrictions on portfolio weights . Note that we define returns as payoffs, i .e . as 1 + the rate of return . We assume that investor's wealth at time one equals the portfolio return, i .e . there is no private income or endowment at time 1 . The standard assumption, made in the CAPM literature, is that preferences are defined on the mean and variance of portfolio returns . We assume, instead, that each investor considers the mean and variance of: WA (1 + Rp)/(1 + X A)
(2)
where W A is the initial wealth of investor A ; and XA is the return of a reference portfolio that investor A cares about . The reference portfolio may represent the portfolio of investor A's friends, neighbors, peers or socioeconomic layer . This is the group investor A belongs to and whose standards of living she would like to follow . Equation (2) focuses on relative future consumption . The idea of modeling preferences using relative consumption was first introduced by Deusenberry (1949) . More recently, it has been studied by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), who assume that preferences are defined on the ratio between the consumption and a weighted-average of aggregate past and future consumption of all investors (representing a consumption habit) . Whereas in their models the "Jones' " are all investors, in our setting the reference
BENI LAUTERBACH AND HAIM REISMAN
96
consumption may also be that of a subset representing the "neighbors" of our investor. Now, define : EA = E[(1 + RP )/(1 + XA )]
(3)
QA
(4)
=
Q[(1
+ RP )/(1 + XA )]
and assume (for simplicity, without affecting the basic results) that the investor's utility function, UA , is linear in QA and E A . That is : U A(fA, EA ) _
- QA
+2kA EA
(5)
where 1/kA , is the risk aversion of investor A . Note that because WA is known, defining preferences on (1 + RP)/(1 + X A), as we do in Eq . (5), yields equivalent results to defining preferences on W A (1 + RP)/(1 + X A) . The only difference is a re-scale of the utility function . We assume that other investors have utility functions similar to that of investor A (possibly with different risk aversions) . In addition, each investor optimizes her future wealth relative to a reference return specific to her . The reference return of each investor is correlated with but not necessarily identical to that of his neighbor. 3. THE PRICING MODEL Assume that X A and RP are close to 1 . Then, for each portfolio-return R P , we can use the approximation : (1 + R P )/(1 + XA ) = 1 + RP -X A
(6)
Given the investor's mean variance utility function, Eq . (6) suggests that the investor wishes to maximize the expected value and minimize the variance of RP -XA . On reflection, the investor problem in a world with relative preferences is to determine the optimal deviation from X A , the reference portfolio . Obviously, if the investor chooses a portfolio R P = XA , i .e . to invest all wealth in the reference portfolio, she minimizes the risk of her objective (specified in Eq . (6)) . However, the investor may choose a different portfolio than the
Preferences on Relative Return
97
reference portfolio, because the expected value of her objective, and not only its risk, enter her utility function . A simple solution to the investor's concerns about XA is to borrow and invest the proceeds in X A (i .e . hedge against XA ) . The chosen portfolio return is thus : RP = XA -Rf +
R
(7)
NH
where RNH is the return on the non-hedging component of the investor's portfolio . Substituting Eq . (7) into (6) changes the investor's objective to : I +R NH -R _
(8)
The investor's problem has transformed into choosing a portfolio NH that maximizes the expected excess return while minimizing the excess return variance . This is the familiar and standard problem in mean variance analysis . The investor chooses a mean variance efficient portfolio of risky assets and combines it with the risk-free asset . Denote the portfolio on the efficient frontier of risky assets with the highest Sharpe measure (the tangency portfolio) as MV . Then, investor A would choose a non-hedging portfolio NH with a return of: RNH
=
(1
a
A )R
f+
a AR
(9)
MV
where R MV is the return on portfolio MV ; and a A is the proportion of portfolio MV in investor's A optimal portfolio . Substituting Eq . (9) into (7), we obtain that the return of the optimal overall portfolio of investor A is given by : RP = X A -R f + (I-
a
A ) Rf + a AR
MV =
a A( R
MV -Rf) +
XA
( 10)
For utility functions with the special form assumed in Eq . (5), the optimal aA can be computed explicitly - see the Appendix, and it is given by : aA =k A G
(11)
G = (E[RMV]-Rf)/ Var[R MV]
(12)
where
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Formulae similar to Eq . (10) hold for all other investors in the economy . Other investors may differ from investor A only in a and X . Differences in a, the proportion invested in the mean variance efficient portfolio MV, emanate from differences in risk aversion . The differences in X evolve because of differences in the reference portfolio. Note however, that we assume that all investors have homogeneous expectation . They agree and invest the non-hedging component of their portfolios in a combination of the risk free asset and portfolio MV the tangency mean variance efficient portfolio . Given that MV is a mean variance efficient portfolio, individual asset returns are on a security market line, and can be written as : E[R .)-Rf = X Cov(RMV , R)
(13)
X = (E[RMVI-Rf)/ Var(R MV)
(14)
where
Equation (13) is similar to the classic CAPM except that here, the mean variance efficient portfolio of risky assets, MV, replaces the market portfolio of risky assets . Now, let's consider the equilibrium in the economy . If each investor k demands a portfolio return R of the form of Eq . (10), then the aggregate demand P portfolio return is : k
= (Wk / W) (ak(RMV-R) + X k )
( 1 5)
where Wk is the wealth of investor k in the economy ; and W is the aggregate wealth of investors in the economy . On the other hand, the aggregate supply portfolio return is RM , the value weighted return on the market portfolio of all assets (including the risk-free asset), i .e . : N+I
RM = Ei=1w- R
I
(16)
where w1 is the proportion of the value of security i in the market . In equilibrium, the aggregate demand and aggregate supply portfolios are identical . Thus : RM = a(RMV - Rf) + Rx
( 17 )
Preferences on Relative Return
99
where a = 1: (Wk/W)a k k
reflects the aggregate risk aversion, and R x = 1 (Wk/W)Xk k
is the aggregate reference portfolio in the economy . Rearranging Eq. (17) yields the following expression for RMV : RMV = Rf + (R M -R x)/a
(18)
Substituting RMV (Eq . (18)) into the covariance term of Eq . (13) renders the following pricing formula : E[R .]-Rf = ( X/a) Cov(RM , R .)-(X/a) Cov(Rx , R)
(19)
It is noteworthy that : X/a = E(RM -R x)/ Var(R M -R x )
(20)
To derive Eq . (20), consider an asset whose return R 1 = R M -Rx + R V and plug R, into Eq . (19) . Equation (19) is the main pricing result of our study . It is essentially a modified CAPM model, taking into account preferences on relative consumption and the existence of reference portfolios . The insight provided by Eq. (19) is that the expected return on an asset is determined not only by its covariance with the market portfolio, but also by the covariance of its return with Rx , the aggregate reference portfolio . The aggregate reference portfolio represents the aggregate investors' demand generated by their desire to resemble their neighbors . According to our model, an asset that is broadly and relatively heavily used for "catching up with the Jones"' (has a large positive weight in the aggregate reference portfolio, or is strongly positively correlated with it), would have a markedly lower expected return (all other things equal) . This is because if asset j serves frequently in the investors' reference portfolios, its demand and price would increase, and its expected return would decrease . Essentially, we have a kind of hedging demand for asset j, which justifies its lower expected return .
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4. CAN OUR MODEL EXPLAIN ASSET-PRICING ANOMALIES? 4 .1 The Home Bias Enigma The home bias enigma is the most puzzling investor behavior anomaly uncovered lately . It appears that investors under-diversify . Despite the clear theoretical and empirical demonstrations that diversification can improve the risk-return tradeoffs of their portfolios, investors impose restrictions on diversification, that is do not diversify enough . Individual and professional investors prefer to hold, and tilt their portfolio weights towards, stocks of companies that are familiar and (geographically) close to them . The home bias was first detected in international finance, where it is referred to as the home country bias . French and Poterba (1991) demonstrate the strong tendency of investors in the U .S ., U .K., and Japan to hold domestic securities . Although many explanations have been offered - see Lewis (1999) for a review, few have undergone empirical testing and none has provided a complete account for the insufficient international diversification phenomenon . For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) note that although the barriers to international investment have fallen dramatically, foreign ownership of shares remains extremely limited . Thus, barriers on international investments and transaction costs offer, at best, only a partial explanation for the home country bias . A home bias is present in the portfolio of domestic securities as well . Coval and Moskowitz (1999) report that U .S . money managers prefer to hold in their managed portfolios stocks of firms whose headquarters are geographically close to the money manager's office . Huberman (2001) finds that in almost every state of the U .S . shareholders prefer (overweight in their portfolios) stocks of the local regional Bell company . The within-country regional home bias evolves, in the opinion of Huberman (2001), because of the cognitive preference for the familiar, discussed in Heath and Tversky (1991) . Coval and Moskowitz (2001) offer an alternative explanation . They show that money managers earn excess returns on local holdings, and argue that informational advantages motivate investors to favor nearby investments . Interestingly, it could be argued that familiarity and information advantages play a role in generating the home country bias as well . The most perplexing home bias anomaly is the within-firm home bias . Benartzi (2001) documents that employees invest about a third of their retirement funds in their own company stocks . Some of these investments can be attributed to discounts that employees receive from the company when investing in company stocks . However, Benartzi (2001) finds that about a quarter
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of the employees' discretionary funds are also invested in the company stocks . Benartzi (2001) claims that this home bias is due to excessive extrapolation, as evidenced by his finding that employees of companies that experienced the worst (best) stock performance over the preceding 10 years allocate about 10% (40%, respectively) of their discretionary contributions to the company stock. The superior information explanation is not successful in explaining the within-firm home bias . Benartzi (2001) finds that allocations to company stock do not predict future stock performance . In the present paper, we offer a possible rational explanation for the home bias phenomena . The basic idea is that if investors care about their consumption relative to that of their neighbors, they would bias their portfolios in the direction of securities held by their neighbors, thus increasing the correlation between their own and their neighbors' wealth . We formalize this idea by assuming that economic agents have mean-variance preferences on the ratio of their return to a reference portfolio return . Under such conditions we show that investors would hedge by investing in the reference portfolio a portfolio that resembles that of their neighbors . A question arises about why investors cannot agree on the market portfolio as the reference portfolio, in which case the home bias would vanish . There are at least two answers to this question . First, if we begin with geographically segregated or segmented investment patterns, the equilibrium appears stable, and there are no major forces that can convince individual investors to change their reference portfolio to the market portfolio . Second, given non-tradable assets such as restricted stocks and options that employees receive in their workplace, investors would have to bias their reference portfolios towards local stocks . Moreover, given that local employment, wealth, and consumption is better reflected by the prices of local company shares, tilting the portfolio towards local stocks affords higher correlation with your neighbors consumption and wealth . In sum, if you want to be correlated with your neighbors, buy the stocks of the companies they work for along with other local company stocks that best track the local economic conditions . A home-biased portfolio follows . 4 .2. Other Anomalies Reference portfolios exist in practice not only because of preferences in the style of "catching up with the Jones"', but also because of money management norms and quality-control designs . Money managers are typically evaluated on the basis of their performance relative to a benchmark index . Thus, the benchmark index is the reference portfolio of money managers . Our model
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predicts that money managers would be reluctant to deviate from their benchmark portfolio, and would hedge by investing in it . This prediction is borne out by empirical evidence . Lakonishok et al . (1997) show that money managers do not take positions that deviate considerably from the benchmark they are expected to beat . Now, suppose that many money managers use the S&P 500 as the benchmark (or reference portfolio in our paper's terms) . Then, in equilibrium, because of the preference (hedging demand) of money managers for S&P 500 stocks, S&P 500 and perhaps other large stocks (that are strongly correlated with the S&P 500 index) would have a lower expected return than small-cap stocks (all other things being equal) . This could contribute to the small firm high return anomaly, found by Banz (1981) . Further, in general, stocks that are relatively heavily represented in (or strongly correlated with) the aggregate reference portfolio, should have higher trading activity, hence, superior liquidity . This is because the routine daily rebalancing of portfolios due to changes in wealth necessitates larger transactions in these stocks . The resulting pricing effect is that relatively liquid stocks would have lower expected returns, as found by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) . In sum, our model of reference portfolios suggests that small, illiquid, or neglected stocks, which are infrequently used in reference portfolios, would have abnormally high expected returns, relative to the predictions of the standard CAPM model . Future research should examine in more detail the empirical implications and relevance of our modified CAPM model .
ACKNOWLEDGMENT We are grateful to Yakov Amihud for his many helpful comments .
REFERENCES Abel, A . (1990). Asset Prices Under Habit Formation and Catching Up With the Jones' . American Economic Review, 80(2), 38-42 . Amihud, Y ., & Mendelson, H. (1986) . Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread . Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 223-249 . Banz, R . (1981) . The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Stocks . Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 3-18 . Benartzi, S . (2001) . Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Company Stock . Journal of Finance, 56, 1747-1764. Campbell, J., & Cochrane, J . (1999) . By Force of Habit : A Consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Behavior . Journal of Political Economy, 107, 205-251 .
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Coval, J ., & Moskowitz, T . (1999) . Home Bias at Home : Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios . Journal of Finance, 54, 1-39 . Coval, J ., & Moskowitz, T . (2001). The Geography of Investment : Informed Trading and Asset Pricing . Journal of Political Economy, (forthcoming). Duesenberry, J. (1949) . Income Saving, and Theory of Consumer Behavior . Harvard University Press . French, K., & Poterba, J . (1991) . Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets . American Economic Review, 81(2), 222-226. Heath, C ., & Tversky, A . (1991) . Preferences and Beliefs : Ambiguity and Competence in Choice
Under Uncertainty . Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4, 5-28 . Huberman, G. (2001) . Familiarity Breeds Investment . Review of Financial Studies, 14, 659-680 . Kang, J ., & Stultz, R . (1997) . Why is There a Home Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio Equity Ownership in Japan . Journal of Financial Economics, 46, 3-28 . Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A ., & Vishny, R . (1997) . What do Money Managers Do? Working Paper, Harvard Business School . Lewis, K. (1999) . Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption . Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 571-608 .
APPENDIX Given the agent's utility function, specified in Eq . (5), we need to solve Max{U A = - Var(l + R P -X A) + 2kA E[l + R P -XA] }
(Al)
Substituting Eq . (10), Rp a A (RMV -Rf) + XA , into Eq . (Al), transforms the problem into : Max{U A =
-CL
Var(RMV -Rf) + 2cXA kA E(R MV -Re), a A is real)
(A2)
The only investor choice variable in the maximization problem Eq. (A2) is aA, the proportion invested in the mean variance efficient portfolio whose return is RMV . All other variables in Eq . (A2) are pre-determined . Solving the maximization problem, we obtain (from the first order conditions) that : cc A = kA G, where G = (E[RMv]-Rf)/ Var[RMV] These are Eqs (11) and (12) in the text, respectively .
CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INVESTOR : A CASE OF A SUPERIOR PRODUCT MISMARKETED John F. Gaski
ABSTRACT The subject of this manuscript is marketing of a financial concept, or principle. Despite copious empirical support and scientific acceptance, the concept of capital market efficiency has not gained widespread appreciation among the general investing public . Reasons for this apparent communication failure are examined, and an integrated remedial program is outlined. If the financial academic community wants the market efficiency idea to be noticed, let alone accepted, by investors, then better marketing, primarily promotion, will be needed.
INTRODUCTION In 1970 Eugene F . Fama published the landmark article, "Efficient Capital Markets : A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," which formally described the concept (then hypothesis) of financial market efficiency . As understood and Innovations in Investments and Corporate Finance, Volume 7, pages 105-125 . Copyright © 2002 by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved . ISBN : 0-7623-0897-4 105
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widely accepted in the allied fields of financial economics and investment science, an "efficient" market is one that fully reflects all available information in the sense that prices of assets, such as securities, incorporate that information and thus may be considered "fair" (Fama, 1970, pp . 384-385) . As prices adjust rapidly to available information, it is not possible for investors to earn above-market returns by purchasing assets they feel are undervalued or selling those considered overvalued . The market will have already bid down the latter prices and bid up prices of the former category to an equilibrium level, because of its "efficient" information processing capability, so that such investor trading opportunities are not generally present . As a result of this market efficiency, with respect to an individual security (e .g. a stock) or a portfolio of all such securities (the "market," proxied by a diversified mutual fund), an investment strategy of buy-and-hold produces the highest expected return . The apparent existence of this condition, or something very close to it, also explains why the overwhelming majority of actively managed mutual funds fail to equal the market performance level . (The acknowledged exception to this rule of so-called "semi-strong form" efficiency (Fama, 1970, 1991, pp . 1599-1602) is the possession of genuine insider information, rarely held by investors) . The modestly-named "efficient market hypothesis" - perhaps it is overdue to confer the label "principle" in view of the abundant empirical support (Fama, 1991) - contains practical implications for the investor that are noteworthy . If no trading strategy can be found to outperform the most naive possible approach of buying and holding a diversified "market" portfolio, then is not any alternative trading strategy, such as trying to "time" the market, suboptimal or even irrational? If individual stock market investors, for instance, were to learn that a strategy of random portfolio selection, i .e . throwing darts blindfolded at the stock listings (or hiring chimpanzees to do the same) and then holding indefinitely, delivers returns greater than those achieved by 75%-80% of professional money managers and stock mutual funds (Jensen, 1968 ; Malkiel, 1995), would that not be of great strategic interest to them? What are the pragmatic benefits of adhering to the investment strategy indicated by the efficient market phenomenon, i .e . buy-and-hold a market index? Because of several decades of empirical research on the subject, investors have been presented with no less than the means of maximizing expected investment returns, or at least an approach that provides the greatest risk-adjusted expected return . In other words, research on market efficiency would seem to have discovered the "holy grail" for investors . Investors wish to earn the highest possible returns, given a risk tolerance or asset class, and the method by which that can be done is now known (as well as anything in human behavioral science
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can be "known") . Investors have had the optimal trading strategy revealed to them, and it turns out to be the easiest, most straightforward strategy imaginable - a real "no-brainer ." One would think investors would appreciate what might be considered the ultimate in financial guidance . The question becomes, therefore, why has information of such obvious benefit not been more widely accepted in practice? Based upon evidence of the number of investors, institutional as well as individual, who continue to pursue an active trading approach in contravention of efficient market principles (proxied by the proportion of actively-managed mutual fund assets to those in index funds), apparently the market efficiency-related discoveries and corollary implications have remained either uncomprehended or rejected by the investing public, by and large .' If the optimal investment strategy (of all those known) is at hand, but grossly underutilized, why are investors so determined, or at least predisposed, to throw their money away on alternative, losing strategies? When an inherently beneficial product is not accepted by intended customers, suspicion naturally turns to problems of marketing .
EFFICIENT MARKET MARKETING OVERVIEW The development and publication of the concept of capital market efficiency as has originated in the finance literature over the past quarter century can be interpreted as a classic manifestation of social marketing, i .e . dissemination of an idea (Kotler & Zaltman, 1971) . Such "idea marketing" differs from conventional marketing of goods and services in some important respects . First, the product - an idea - is completely intangible . Even so-called services include a tangible aspect in most cases, e .g . air travel may include a meal, medical services relate to the explicitly tangible among the five senses, leasing or rental involves taking temporary possession of a physical product . Moreover, while marketing customarily is a matter of exchange of one thing for another (such as money), with social marketing there is virtual identity across the two sides of the transaction . The idea is the product being offered, and all the idea marketer seeks in return is acceptance of the idea . Alternatively, the marketer has the idea, and wants the customer to have the same idea . It is special circumstances such as these that pose some unique problems for the social marketer, in this instance those who would endeavor to foster understanding of capital market efficiency . (This material may resonate with readers who are also teachers, as they reflect upon difficulties encountered in getting students to "buy" what they are selling .) Perhaps capital markets scholars have never thought of themselves as marketers, and would consider such a role inappropriate or even repugnant . After all, is not the function of science and
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scholarship the creation of knowledge, with acceptance at the discretion of the audience (in some cases including certain segments of the general public)? Actually, and to the contrary, most scholars approve the dissemination of knowledge as part of their job description,' so marketing - literally social marketing - is a suitable functional paradigm for one aspect of the scholar's professional mission . The proposition that "science is marketing" (at least in part) is not new, and has received credible endorsement (Peter & Olson, 1983) . Could the problem of public non-acceptance of the objectively profound market efficiency idea be attributable to lack of effort on the part of scholars in the area? Is it that finance scholars simply have not tried to influence the general investing public, concentrating exclusively on a different target market, the academic audience? There is some evidence contesting this explanation (e .g . Malkiel, 1981 ; Mann, 1991), but even if it were largely true that technical scholarship in the field of investment science has been guilty of excessively narrow audience targeting, with insufficient concern for ameliorating the real world of investors (short of becoming registered financial planners, of course), there appear to be other marketing problems, beyond producer (of ideas) default, impeding any prospective or extant effort to market market efficiency . 3 The following sections attempt to diagnose this curious social marketing conundrum, and also describe a corrective marketing plan . The Competitive Environment
One potential difficulty afflicting almost any marketing program is the presence of competition . What kind of competition could there be opposing the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in the marketplace for ideas? Who has a vested interest in suppressing EMH information, one should ask . What would be the consequences for the investment industry if their customers were to learn about, and accept, the EMH and its practical implications? Were investors to realize that no trading strategy betters one of "buy and hold the market portfolio," would not discretionary trading volume, and brokerage commissions, plummet? Demand for actively managed mutual funds, and for the services of money managers, likewise would be expected to evaporate . (As Samuelson put it, "[M]ost portfolio decision makers should go out of business - take up plumbing, teach Greek . . . . drop dead," 1974, p . 18 .) Clearly, money managers, mutual funds, stockbrokers, and investment advisers have a financial stake in defeating the EMH and would be motivated to do everything in their power to resist its propagation and adoption. In fact, many functionaries in the investment industry are acquainted with EMH, having been familiarized through training, and are armed to argue against it . The author has
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noted a few occasions over the years in the general financial media - a rare handful to be sure, but a few - in which investment industry representatives were confronted with EMH-related information or questions, typically just the skeleton of the concept, and were well-prepared to pounce on it in reply with disingenuous or sophistic rebuttal . Apparently, industry counter-propaganda has been winning the battle for hearts and minds (such as they are) so far, but then the other side, the investment science community, may not have truly mobilized for a war effort yet . For that, a marketing strategy may be needed . Strategic Fundamentals
The first step in the development of a marketing strategy, and the first phase of performing a marketing audit to diagnose an apparent marketing failure, rightfully should be examination of the nexus between product offering and need . In other words, what is the need that the product attempts to satisfy, and does the product genuinely provide the benefits to fulfill need satisfaction? In the case of the capital market efficiency knowledge-product, this relation may be straightforward . Normally, marketers conduct extensive research to excavate customer needs, wants, or preferences . If the purveyors of EMH-related knowledge have not presumed to venture beyond their primary realm of finance expertise and become practicing market researchers, are they to be condemned for dereliction? No ; primary research is not necessary in every marketing setting . The guiding principle is whether the research contributes information of enough value to justify its cost .' Some marketing answers are already known a priori with high enough confidence as to render research superfluous . Sometimes mere inspection of available secondary data is sufficient to answer a given research question . The focal question concerning the market for investment information appears to be an issue of that kind . Because of voluminous research done over many years, including proprietary work, along with common sense understanding of human nature, little mystery attaches to the basic motivation of investors . Varied underlying purposes are possible such as accumulating funds for retirement or for a major purchase such as higher education, or any intended future consumption, but a fair representation of the primary benefit sought from capital investment is return (Hirshleifer, 1965) - operationally expressible as maximizing return or optimizing risk-adjusted return (i .e . maximizing return subject to a risk-class constraint) . Therefore, discrepancy between customer need and central product characteristics does not appear to be a plausible candidate for the source of
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market non-acceptance in the case of this particular idea-product . EMH is a good product by any standard . It delivers the primary benefit customers are seeking by revealing the optimal trading (actually non-trading) strategy, according to a preponderance of evidence . We must look elsewhere for the cause(s) of the observed symptom . Market Segmentation and Targeting Given a market definition of general investing public, and the nature of the product as information, two distinct market segments can be identified based upon cognitive status of potential customers : those who understand market efficiency and those who do not . Investors who understand efficient market principles and yet reject the derivative strategic implications probably should not be targeted as a market . Anyone who volitionally chooses a 75%-80% probability of earning below-market returns as the price of a 20%-25% chance of above-market returns exhibits such a pronounced risk-preference that s/he may not be persuasible . Marketing science and practice have long recognized that it tends to be more efficient to offer a product that conforms to existing attitudes than to attempt the difficult task of changing attitudes in the direction of a marketed product . Targeting the informed-yet-resisting investor segment would require such inefficient effort . Therefore, the appropriate target market would be those who do not have an understanding of capital market efficiency . (The ones who do understand and accept it are already converted and need not be targeted .) That segment includes investors who would benefit from such EMH information and its implied strategic guidance, but may not have a firm attitudinal predisposition against the EMH product . Selection of that segment as a target comes with a built-in advantage for the information marketer . When the communication objective is one of creating awareness or mere cognition, rather than overcoming established attitudes, the promotional task is simplified . One is allowed to write on a blank slate, as it were .
MARKETING THE IDEA OF MARKET EFFICIENCY :
STRATEGIC SPECIFICS The Product
A product is fundamentally a bundle of benefits, a need satisfier, a problem solver . From the earlier discussion of product-need correspondence, the core benefit offering associated with EMH information seems to be well in
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order, matching the customer need precisely enough objectively to merit consideration for a product quality award - if award-conferring bodies were ever to recognize that EMH is a product . Given our intention to understand the anomalous popular resistance to an ostensibly superior product, the full range of product features also needs to be scrutinized. A now-classic exposition of the factors influencing the rate of a product's adoption was formulated by Rogers (1962) . Product characteristics affecting adoption by a market include
• relative advantage, the degree of superiority over other available products [some of the entries are analytically obvious] ;
• divisibility or trialability, the extent to which a product can be sampled on a limited basis ;
• communicability, or the ease and convenience of transmitting information about the product ;
• compatibility, how well a product fits in with the full spectrum of a customer's life ;
• complexity, or inherent difficulty of comprehending the product . The first four in the series enhance the rate of adoption, the last retards it . How does the EMH product measure up in terms of possessing the adoption facilitators? As has been established, an abundance of scientific evidence supports the "relative advantage" of EMH-enlightened capital investment . That is, the buy-and-hold-the-market approach delivers results demonstrably superior to any known rival strategy (subject to occasional and usually ephemeral anomalies of questionable practical import ; Fama, 1991, pp . 1588-1602 ; most recently Gruber, 1996 ; Haugen, 1996 ; cf. Shanken & Smith, 1996) . Likewise, the efficient market idea certainly could be tried on a limited basis (divisibility) in an investment portfolio . A small proportion of assets could be allocated to a single index fund, with its performance used as a yardstick against which other investments would be measured (if an investor chose not to believe the overwhelming volume of historical evidence available whose magnitude would dwarf the kind of trial or quasi-test described) . It is also difficult to imagine that the lower returns produced by alternative trading strategies could be more compatible with most investors' overall frames of reference than the higher returns yielded by EMH guidance . At first sight, communicability and complexity might not seem to be problematic either . As one professor of finance known to the author (and to the field through his distinguished scientific record) has expressed it, "Everything you need to know about how to optimize investment strategy can be learned
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in five seconds : buy and hold a market portfolio ." His variation of the punch line is, "Buy a Vanguard index fund." However, when investors have their own real money on the line, they may need more than a naked directive . It would be understandable for an investor to demand support, or underlying basis for the normative rule. Therein may lie some complexity . Elaboration of the EMH and its analytical and empirical underpinnings has involved a number of articles in technical scholarly journals (as cited earlier, among others such as Samuelson, 1989) . Full comprehension of that material may lie beyond the ken of the average layman investor, and possibly a fair proportion of money managers . Yet the relevant essentials of EMH are reduceable to : most professional fund managers fail to equal the success of a strategy of chimpanzees throwing darts blindfolded (cf. Fama, 1970, p . 413) and no trading strategy outperforms buy-and-hold . So perhaps complexity is not the most plausible suspected culprit in the strange case of general non-acceptance of the EMH . Moreover, given the dramatic and graphic language into which EMH can be distilled, as above, the idea-product actually lends itself to communicability contrary to a common difficulty associated with the marketing of ideas (see Rothschild, 1979, p . 12) . (The advertising creative department would have a field day!) So maybe the problem is not communicability, but the enactment of communication . Though limited efforts have been made by the creators of EMH to reach out and bring the product to the attention of the general public (e .g . Mann, 1991), their voices surely have been drowned out by the noise or propaganda of industry-vested interests, as alluded to in the section on competition . Better, or more aggressive, promotion may indeed be a major part of the answer for any who might wish to achieve popular acceptance for EMH and its practical investment significance, and that issue will be addressed in due course . Other Product Dimensions As the intrinsic EMH product seems conducive to market adoption in at least most respects, secondary product aspects such as branding and packaging should be reviewed as well . What could branding (i .e . identifying by name or symbol) possibly have to do with the EMH? Though science in the branding area may be underdeveloped, certain rules have gained consensus status regarding desirable qualities of a brand name, qualities which actually may aid a product in gaining acceptance (Kotler, 1984, p . 487) . Efficient market hypothesis and capital market efficiency may be perfectly acceptable "brand names" for the academic audience, but if one desires to impact the behavior of the general investing public, something "sexier" may have to be considered .
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If that proposition has not irretrievably alienated financial-oriented readers, a laundry list of attributes of an effective brand name includes the following . It should be short, simple, distinctive, memorable, easy to pronounce and recognize, compatible with the product, and should express something about the product's features or benefits . Action-oriented words can be helpful in some cases and the name must not impart any negative connotations . The names that have been in use for the EMH product when targeting the academic market may be adequate for the general investor segment on most counts, but some problems loom . Though the traditional brand-naming criteria surely were not among the leading concerns of the inventors of the terms "efficient market" and "market efficiency" and the associated construct, those terms may not be the most evocative with the more general audience . The deficiency clearly seems to be in not transmitting the practical features or benefits integral to the product . "Efficiency" does not quite "say it" to the investor, one can reasonably hypothesize . The scientific approach to addressing the possibility of a weak brand name would involve : (1) generating a large number of alternative names ; (2) screening out the poorer alternatives via presentation of the entire set to multiple focus groups ; and (3) testing the remainder through experimental research to identify which brand names produce the most desirable attitudinal and behavioral effects . This may not be the best forum for a detailed exposition of that process, but the beginnings of the first stage can be proposed and illustrated . Prospective audience-grabbing terms suggesting the pragmatic benefits of adopting the EMH perspective might be "optimal performance," "rational investment," "return maximizing," "beat the pros," "buy and hold your way to wealth," or "leave the ignorant losers in your dust" strategy . Perhaps, after adequate testing, applying one of those tentative brand names (or something else entirely) to the EMH idea - for the general audience only - would succeed in provoking more public attention and reaction to the product which, of course, would accrue to the investing public's own benefit .' Because of the intangibility of the EMH product, packaging will be interpreted liberally as the auxiliary and even subjective accoutrement of a product . As used here it means the constellation of perceived product attributes, as intended by the marketer, beyond the objective features (short of the ultimate benefits) - closely akin to what is known in marketing as positioning . Some creative packaging of EMH might also be helpful in gaining acceptance for it in the real-world market, as suggested in the following . A basic human need is that of self-esteem . Countless products are positioned to create the appearance of fulfilling that motive for the customer, from durable goods like automobiles to financial services such as home mortgages and other intangibles like self-improvement courses . Again, a comprehensive approach to
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"packaging" or positioning would be based upon extensive research to discern the complete range of buying motives, in addition to objective return on investment, among potential EMH customers, but a good starting point for investigation would be focus on self-esteem as a relatively safe bet to be almost ubiquitously present as a buyer motivation . Therefore, some kind of self-esteem enhancement could appropriately be made part of the total EMH package . One can speculatively foresee selling points that capitalize on that theme . Future purveyors of EMH could invoke the connection between : (a) adherence to the practical strategic implications of EMH ; and, (b) superior achievement or even personal superiority . Adopters of EMH might derive satisfaction (the purpose of any product consumption) from knowing that a result of that "purchase" is to put themselves ahead of the game, and ahead of other people, in terms of likely financial gain . To embellish for dramatic emphasis : `Be the first one on your block to understand market efficiency, or the `return-maximizing' strategy" ; "Apply the EMH investment approach and you will not only keep up with the Joneses, you will outperform at least 75-80% of the Joneses who use any other trading strategy" ; or even "Nine out of ten doctors (of finance) recommend EMH ." This intersection of Wall Street and Madison Avenue could be dangerous . Even the traditional definition of packaging may be relevant to the EMH situation . The primary functions of packaging are protection (of the product), economy, and convenience . Though physical protection of an intangible product would not be an issue per se, the EMH product is a way to preserve and protect financial assets . The EMH product is literally descriptive information and derived prescriptive strategy, but investment return would be a fair proxy for it from the customer's perspective . Adoption of the EMH (the purchase decision sought by the marketer), according to most available evidence, is the best known way of protecting investment returns . The virtual no-decision, no effort, "no-brainer," simplified approach to investing offered by EMH certainly is compatible with the economy and convenience packaging functions. In other words, the highest-return-likelihood core product comes wrapped in an economical, low transaction cost, low turnover, minimal trading tactical execution (as testified to by the comparatively low operating costs of index mutual funds) along with the ultimate convenience of a policy that eliminates any need for frequent decision making and discretionary trading . Such attributes should be made known to potential customers . The Price
Initially, it may appear as though acceptance of EMH comes at no price to the investor-customer . If anything, the price would seem to be negative as
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adoption of EMH-derived strategy produces financial gain . Yet customer acquisition of this product does come at a cost, if not a strictly financial one or monetary price . First, some effort and time may be involved in comprehending EMH sufficiently - even developing rudimentary understanding of the simplified expressions of it seen herein - so that the investor will be confident and comfortable with the naturally derived strategy . The most significant cost to individual investors, however, is the opportunity cost of forgoing alternative strategies or alternative views of financial markets . What opportunity cost accompanies abandonment of a losing strategy? For the extreme riskpreference segment, there is the loss of that 20%-25% chance of exceeding the market return . At the hedonic or emotional level, acceptance of EMH represents a form of "spoiling the fun ." Laymen become disappointed or even angry upon learning of EMH and its strategic implications . As Malkiel describes the reaction, "Telling an investor there is no hope of beating the averages is like telling a six-year-old there is no Santa Claus" (1981, p . 339) . No longer can those people feel like they are really "with it," sophisticated, and accomplishing something through their fatuous active trading . Even for the institutional investor, acceptance of "you cannot beat buying and holding a randomly selected portfolio" may take an emotional toll . After all, what career function or purpose in professional life can they have post-EMH adoption? Recall again Samuelson's advice to take up plumbing or drop dead . What can EMH marketers do to reduce the price and lessen the severity of "sticker shock" or buyer's remorse - a common customer malady when financial stakes are high? Applying their teaching talents in some way to the problem of educating the public about EMH and its significance would be a good place to start . Anything that can be done to streamline the investor learning process to mitigate the time and effort requirement may be particularly helpful . In addition, arguing the triviality of the kind of subjective emotional concerns suggested above would be a similar contribution - literally reducing the denominator's weight in the critical value/price ratio that determines a product's utility . (The risk-preferring segment is probably a lost cause, an unattractive market target as hypothesized earlier) . Issues of communication (i .e . education) and persuasion, however, are primarily the domain of promotion, addressed in a section to follow . Distribution
The distribution function, likewise, may not at first seem germane in the social marketing setting . Typically, the marketing of ideas proceeds through a direct
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channel from producer to recipient end-user . Yet distributors may indeed be utilized in EMH marketing, in a fashion, by converting opinion leaders first, in the hope that they in turn will market the idea to others . Opinion leaders in the retail investment world would include the likes of financial planners, investment advisers, book authors (other than textbooks/university professors, as the general investing public seems to pay little heed to them), financial media personae such as columnists and television commentators (e .g . Louis Rukeyser), and stockbrokers. The last may be a challenging but rewarding target market . Stockbrokers, and possibly money managers, might ordinarily be the least inviting EMH market to target, because normal self-interest would dictate rejection of the product for reasons reviewed earlier . Who would want to put themselves out of business? It may prove viable nevertheless to demonstrate a self-interest justification for accepting EMH strategy and perspective to a leading-edge cadre of financial products dealers . A variation of the "be the first on your block" theme is proposed, involving the premises : (1) Retail customers might appreciate and favor dealers who have the integrity to proffer profitable information, though it is ostensibly contrary to their own interests (i .e . no one can better the blindfolded dart-throwing approach, so skip brokers and money managers and dump everything into index funds) . (2) If the EMH idea ever catches on with the masses, the brokerage, money management, and mutual fund industries will be more than decimated anyway . (3) To inoculate or insure against that prospect, and enhance the likelihood of being among the survivors, it would be prudent for a dealer to be out in front of the curve on the EMH issue by pioneering advocacy of EMH-derived investment strategy . (Some stockbrokers and money managers will have a legitimate role in an EMH world after all, without having to "drop dead" .) Such targeting of a hostile segment may appear to be a matter of quixotic attempted attitude modification . However, the strategy fundamentally relies upon an existing attitude, self-preservation, perhaps the strongest motivator of all . Once again, after verging on promotional issues, explicit attention to that subject is due . Promotion
Aspects of a nascent strategy for promoting the idea of capital market efficiency (and especially its practical significance) have been previewed in the sections on the inherent communicability of the product, packaging/positioning, pricing qua lowering the perceived cost through persuasion, and even distribution, i .e . reaching opinion-leading intermediaries as conduit to a larger audience . (All of this is accurately suggestive of the integrated nature of good
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marketing strategy .) Much of the message content part of promotion strategy has already received elaboration, therefore . One related method for the EMH marketer to seriously consider is intensification of the message . If the personal importance of an issue can be raised for the audience (increasing the involvement level, in the lexicon of marketing), it can be more motivating of attitude and behavior . The investment implications of EMH naturally lend themselves to dramatic portrayal in a way that should evoke personal connections with investors, and maybe even higher blood pressure . Consider the following sample argument from a prospective promotional message designed for the general audience . We bring startling news to the investor about a scandal brewing in the securities industry - a scandal that may have important implications for one's own investment performance and success . The information concerns a revelation about investment strategy that could, and should, revolutionize the investment world and discredit the securities industry . Curiously, the information is well-known among those who study investment scientifically, but appears almost universally unknown within the general investing public . The news is simply this : In the stock market, it is not possible to outperform a strategy of buy-and-hold (actually buy-and-hold a market portfolio) . The most common initial reaction to this assertion is to cite the many mutual funds and money managers who report performance superior to "buy-and-hold" or the unmanaged market portfolio. The answer to that objection is succinct : The number of funds and managers who outperform the market index is far less than would occur by random chance . In other words, if all these investment managers used a strategy of throwing darts blindfolded to select stocks, they would do much better, on average, and there would be many more who earned returns in excess of the market average (the ultimate randomly selected portfolio) by chance, of course . The underlying reason for this surprising reality is what is known as the "efficient market" principle . Essentially, this means the market instantly absorbs all available information and reflects it in stock prices . Favorable information causes price to rise, unfavorable news causes price to fall - before an investor can do anything about it . Therefore, it is not possible to gain by selling one stock (already bid down) to buy another (already bid up) over the long run, except by chance . Over the long term, of course, chance gains and losses cancel out, leaving the investor in the initial buy-and-hold position except for transaction costs such as commissions and taxes . Transaction costs are the main reason active traders such as fund managers, in the aggregate, fail to match the market/buy-andhold (or dart-throwing) performance level . This efficient market idea is well-established and is supported by a mountain of evidence . The strategic implication is clear : It is irrational, in the sense of sub-optimizing, to sell a stock (from an adequately diversified portfolio) - unless one has genuine insider information that the market does not possess . Of course, there can be constraints such as a cash need that force one to sell . Discretionary trades, nevertheless, are losing events (absent chance exceptions) relative to the simple buy-and-hold alternative! The upshot of all this for the investing public, and you, is that it has the elements of a major scandal . Naturally, the brokerage industry would be motivated to withhold such information from the public because of the severely depressing impact there would be on
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trading volume, and commissions, if investors were to understand that nothing can beat buy-and-hold. One can anticipate that many securities dealers would go out of business if this information became known . Either the brokerage firms and investment companies of the world are aware of the efficient market principle, or they are not . If they are not, they are guilty of gross misfeasance. If they are, they are guilty of malfeasance tantamount to fraud - i .e. to the extent that they represent themselves as offering something better than throwing darts blindfolded .
Visualize something like the preceding copy delivered in the format of an op-ed column, a public service announcement, or a television talking head . Suggestion of scandalous or lurid dimensions of industry practice may qualify as an expose, or at least create that atmosphere - appropriately, based on the evidence - from which the public may be expected to take notice, for once . Empirically-based marketing theory also furnishes some guidance for message structure, as well as content . The circumstances defining the EMH marketing setting favor a conclusion-drawing approach, meaning a conclusion is expressly stated in the message as opposed to being left implicit (e .g . "Use Brand X laundry detergent; it gets your clothes whiter and brighter, therefore your family will appreciate you") . Expressing a conclusion if and when promoting the benefits of EMH-driven investment would be reasonable because the message involves some complexity and the audience is relatively unsophisticated with respect to the subject matter (Hovland & Mandell, 1952) . Examples in context might be "Use buy-and-hold rather than active trading to maximize expected return and therefore not undermine your own investment efforts," and "Buy an index fund, not an actively managed fund, to enhance your performance and therefore not appear a fool to those who understand capital markets ." It also appears that a two-sided message may be appropriate in this case . A two-sided message is one in which the marketer/promoter says something negative about the product offering, as well as something positive, e .g . "Sure our brand costs more, but it is worth it ." A crude contextual illustration would be "Abide by buy-and-hold or indexing because of the profit potential, even though you will no longer enjoy the thrill of being a `wheeler-dealer' who makes a lot of transactions ." Conditions dictating this type of technique include : (1) an audience that is already opposed to the communicator's position ; (2) an environment that involves competitor counter-propaganda (to be inoculated against) ; and (3) an audience sophisticated enough to think of the negative side on their own (Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield, 1948) . The first two points clearly are present in the EMH market setting to some extent . Most investors do not believe the EMH-implied "buy and hold the market" philosophy, if they are aware of it, and most adhere to a completely contrary orientation in practice . The prevailing information environment is dominated by the
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promotion of actively managed funds and their stockbroker and money manager fellow travelers . Though the investing public may not be sophisticated financially, by the standards of EMH scholars, the limited down-side of strategic EMH adoption (as above) is probably not beyond their cognitive capabilities . Media Now that some ideas for creating a promotional message have been "run up the flagpole" (in caricature language any finance-oriented readers might stereotypically expect in a marketing discussion), modes of message delivery next need to be decided . The standard promotional tools to choose from are advertising, sales promotion, personal selling, and public relations . Advertising (which is paid and definitively sponsored), whether electronic or print, is probably not a viable option in general for use in getting the EMH message out . One can imagine an FMA- or AFA-sponsored full-page ad in The Wall Street Journal explaining the content and implications of Fama (1970, 1991), Samuelson (1974, 1989), and Malkiel (1981) - at a cost that may be exhorbitant even for an organization with "Finance" in its name . More realistically, the world's newest medium could be utilized : a World Wide Web site could be created to transmit the same information . What are known as "advertising specialties" would not be amenable to the task at hand either . Information adequate to explain EMH would be difficult to fit on a matchbook cover, a ball-point pen, or the back of a bowling shirt . Likewise with billboards, and the limited attention audiences are able to give them. Similarly, it would be a challenge to find a place for sales promotion, a miscellaneous category of short-term incentive-oriented tactics such as coupons, premiums (e .g . the prize inside a box of cereal), sweepstakes, and trading stamps . Rather, public relations, especially the generation of publicity, would play a leading role in effective promotion of the EMH idea . Specific tactics could include the following .
• The contribution of op-ed pieces and letters to major market and national
newspapers, as well as feature articles for business magazines, which would clarify EMH implications in a way that is comprehensible to the layman . • Issuance of press releases announcing market efficiency-related empirical studies and, especially, their practical investment indications . (Closer cooperation between university faculty and university publicity offices might be advisable in general, not only for EMH promotion purposes . Greater public dissemination of newsworthy findings could produce selling points for fundraising .)
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• Leading EMH scholars could make themselves available for media interviews, especially if the two preceding suggestions achieve some success . The author found it somewhat surprising when this very thing was done in the Mann (1991) piece . Essentially, the Fidelity Investments magazine ran an article revealing that it is virtually pointless to deal with Fidelity Investments . Apparently the firm correctly foresaw that the published revelation would not register with readers and would have no impact . Perhaps an integrated communication campaign, rather than isolated contacts, would be the remedy . The moderate amount of publicity surrounding Fama's 1970 article appears to have had insufficient long-term effect, as predicted by Samuelson (1974) . If a Nobel prize is in Professor Fama's future, that event could serve as fulcrum for a comprehensive promotional campaign . • Legal action, such as a class action suit alleging massive fraud by the securities brokerage industry, might be an attention-getter . Publicity as a marketing tool comes equipped with some distinct advantages . First, it is potentially more effectual because it is perceived as unbiased (i .e. originating with a third party) and therefore more credible . Also, note that most of the above listed tactics impose no out-of-pocket costs, requiring only minimal time and effort to execute . Personal selling (i .e . in-person contact), on the surface, would also seem to have limited applicability to EMH marketing . If every finance professor in the world devoted all discretionary time to the mission of explaining market efficiency to every friend, acquaintance, and button-holed passer-by, would the activity have more than minor impact compared to more efficient mass media publicity? However, once again, if opinion leaders were targeted, personal selling may not have to be ruled out . To illustrate, an anecdote from the author's own observation may be meaningful . The occasion was a country club encounter between a finance Ph .D . and an ophthalmologist on the subject of investment strategy . After receiving explanation of the efficient market implications as detailed here, the latter completely revised his portfolio the next day reallocating most financial assets into a handful of index funds . Not to generalize from a single case, the episode is sufficient to hypothesize a lesson : some laymen are coachable, especially if highly sophisticated . And who better than a physician to lead opinion subsequently on the topic of investment? Such high-end converts can be invaluable in social marketing . Are we not overlooking the obvious? What about the most fundamental kind of "personal selling" university professors do? Students in business schools have been exposed to information on market efficiency, along with the finest instruction, for decades now . Is this not precisely the kind of personal contact
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with potential opinion leaders that is sought? Yes, but apparently it has been inadequate - possibly because of prevalent student disbelief that information from academia, textbooks, and professors could have anything to do with the
real world . The ratio of assets in index funds to those in managed funds (about
6%, though growing ; The Wall Street Journal, 2000) may be a fair indicant of the poor success rate of the existing state of EMH "marketing ."
CONCLUSION Tentative explanation for the limited public acceptance of market efficiency
and its investment implications has been put forth heretofore, including :
(1) insufficient effort by those knowledgeable of EMH ; (2) counter-efforts by industry special interests ; (3) communication barriers ; (4) inherent investor incapacity ; and (5) poor marketing strategy (vs . effort) by promoters of EMH knowledge . Cons