Historical Constitution of Bonaventure's Philosophy (Studies and Texts)

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

STUDIES AND TEXTS 23

SAINT BONAVENTURE THE SERAPHIC DOCTOR Victor Crivelli: musee Jacquemart-Andre (Photo : Bulloz) Engraving supplied through the courtesy of R.P. Jacques Guy Bugerol, OFM, Collegio S. J3onaventura, Grottaferrata (Roma).

THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION OF ST. BONAVENTURE'S PHILOSOPHY BY

JOHN FRANCIS QUINN

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES TORONTO, CANADA 1973

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities Research Council of Canada, using funds provided by the Canada Council.

ISBN 0-88844 023-5 PRINTED BY UNIVERSA, WETTEREN (BELGIUM)

TO

The Franciscan Fathers 'Adam and Eve's' Dublin

Scientia et pittas pulcherrima societas

This page intentionally left blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD

11

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

13

INTRODUCTION HISTORICALVIEWS OF THIRTEENTHCENTURY PHILOSOPHY 17 First Series of Developments 17 Summary 41 Second Series of Developments 46 Summary 90 PLAN AND PURPOSE OF THIS WORK 99 PART ONE FOUNDATIONS

OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

101

CHAPTER ONE COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN Corporeal Matter and Substantial Form Formation of Corporeal Substances Union of Body and Soul in Man Conclusion

103 103 112 120 133

CHAPTER Two ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL Constitution of the Human Soul Personal Nature of Man Superior and Inferior Parts of Human Reason Conclusion

137 139 164 199 216

CHAPTER THREE PROBLEM OF PLURIAL FORMS Forms of All Bodily Substances Forms of Inanimate Bodies Forms of Animate Bodies Conclusion

219 224 235 278 316

PART TWO POWERS AND OPERATIONS

321

OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER FOUR POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE General Division of Potencies Particular Divisions of the Cognitive Potencies Conclusion

323 323 341 363

8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAFFER FIVE ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE Acts of the Sense Powers Acts of the Intellective Power Habitual Knowledge of Science and Wisdom Our Natural Knowledge of God Conclusion

367 370 376 396 428 436

PART THREE CERTITUDE AND ILLUMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE 443

443

CHAPTER Six CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE Degrees of Certitude Analogical Modes of Knowledge Analogy and Certitude Conclusion

447 448 468 492 518

CHAPTER SEVEN ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE Illumination of Human Science and Wisdom Intrinsic Effects of Illumination 560 Illumination of Philosophical Knowledge Conclusion

590 657

PART FOUR FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

665

CHAPTER EIGHT ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY Constitution of Theological Knowledge Union of Faith and Philosophy Conclusion

671 672 723 781

CHAPTER NINE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY Christian Evaluation of Natural Reason Christian Transformation of Natural Knowledge Conclusion

787 791 820 836

GENERAL CONCLUSION THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY 841phy Character of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy Question of Christian Philosophy Community of Philosophical Doctrines

841 841 860 878

523 526

560

TABLE OF CONTENTS

9

BIBLIOGRAPHY Preface Writings of St. Bonaventure Writings of St. Thomas Authors cited by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Writings of the Historians Bonaventurean Studies Bonaventurean Bibliographies

897 898 901 902 904 911 917

INDEX

919

ANALYTICAL Historical views Bonaventurean synthesis Thomist synthesis

919 922 960

AUTHORS: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL Named by the Historians Synthesis of St. Bonaventure Synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas HISTORIANS AND MEDIEVALISTS

974 977 979 980

This page intentionally left blank

FOREWORD

T

HE aim of this book is to establish the constitution of St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a whole, particularly with regard to its historical sources. Pursuing such an aim, the book presents an exposition rather than a critical study of the philosophical doctrines of St. Bonaventure. In exposing his doctrines, careful attention is given to the different historical sources, especially the writings of Aristotle and St. Augustine, used by St. Bonaventure in forming and developing his philosophical thought. The need for a book of this kind is shown in the introduction, which records the progressive and fruitful work of the historians who have stressed the important part played by St. Bonaventure in the development of thirteenthcentury thought. The recording of the work of the historians has a twofold purpose. It is intended, first, to acquaint the reader with their different and sometimes controversial views of St. Bonaventure's philosophy. It is intended, secondly, to draw attention to those views, so that, from them, there will emerge the many problems that must be examined in St. Bonaventure's philosophy in order to establish its historical constitution. Thus, relying on the solid achievements of the historians, the book approaches its subject on the basis of their accomplishments with the hope that, in exploring the various problems to be examined in St. Bonaventure's philosophy, a further contribution can be made to a better understanding and appreciation of his doctrine. Since his philosophy has been an object of controversy for very many years, the author finds it necessary to examine in detail numerous texts in the whole corpus of St. Bonaventure's writings. This is necessary not only to avoid insupportable conclusions in solving several problems in his philosophy, but also to obtain an adequate understanding of his philosophical doctrines in order to establish their historical constitution. As a consequence, asking the reader's indulgence, the author has chosen to extend rather than to contract the examination of certain texts that are of great importance for an appreciation of the content and the character of Bonaventurean philosophy. The texts of St. Bonaventure present his thought in the technical language and style of a thinker of the thirteenth century. Though it is not always feasible to get away from that condition of his thought, an effort is made to keep the use of technical language to a minimum while exposing his philosophical doctrines with as close a fidelity as possible to their original presentation in his writings, most of which are not available in English translation. There are numerous citations given in the notes, however, for the convenience of those who

12

FOREWORD

desire to see the original texts, especially in regard to points either of particular importance or summarized in the body of the book. The notes also contain information about the work of Bonaventurean scholars whose writings, which are listed in full in the bibliography, have given valuable help in finding solutions to problems posed by the texts of St. Bonaventure. The book closes with a general conclusion reviewing the work of the historians, whose positions are recorded in the introduction. The purpose of the review, which is intended to be constructive, is to show how their positions on St. Bonaventure's philosophy stand up under the evidence of his texts as they are examined in this book. Aware that the historians have not always concurred with one another, the author seeks their understanding and benevolence whenever he feels, regretfully, obliged to take a view that does not coincide with theirs. He wishes to state here that he owes an immense debt of gratitude to all his predecessors, without whose monumental work this book could never have been written. A personal debt of gratitude must be expressed toward Etienne Gilson, under whom the author was privileged to study the history of medieval philosophy and, more particularly, the philosophies of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. An expression of thanks is owed also to my colleagues, especially Anton C. Pegis, at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto for their amiable advice and assistance in composing the book. Other expressions of thanks are owed to the British Museum, to the University of Louvain, and to the Abbey of Mont-Cesar for providing from their libraries materials otherwise unobtainable. In this respect, a special word of thanks is paid to Stephen Brown, who was very kind in acquiring at Louvain for the author microfilm copies of much needed materials. A similar word of gratitude is paid to Harold B. Gardner, former librarian of the Pontifical Institute, who was very generous with his time and knowledge in coming to the aid of the author. J. F. Q. Toronto April 1971

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Common Contractions ad opp. arg. art. con. dub. eo. loc. eo. op.

ad oppositum argumentum articulus contra dubium-dubia eodem loco eodem opere

fa. fm. Prol. Resp. Sol. sc un.

fundamenta fundamentum Prologus Respondeo Solutio sed contra unicus

Writings of St. Bonauenture All references are given to the Opera omnia, edita studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 18821902), X volumina. Additional references, where applicable, are given to the Opera theologica selects, cura pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae edita, editio minor (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 1934-65), V volumina. To illustrate the use of the abbreviations listed below, here are three sample references: a) 2 Sent., 1.2.1.2, Resp. (2.42; ed. mm., 2.34). This stands for Commentarius in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber 2, distinctio 1, pars 2, articulus 1, quaestio 2, Respondeo (see: Opera omnia, v. 2, p. 42; Opera theologica selecta, v. 2, p. 34). b) Comm. in Luc,, 19.6 (7.311). This stands for Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae, caput 19, numericus 6 (see: Opera omnia, v. 7, p. 311). c) Coll. in Hexaem., 3.10-15 (5.345-46; Delorme, pp. 38-40). This stands for Collationes in Hexaemeron, collatio 3, numerici 10-15 (see: Opera omnia, v. 5, pp. 345-46; Delorme edition, pp. 38-40). For the Delorme edition consult: Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana quaedam selecta, Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevii, VII (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 1934). Brevil. Chris, units omn. magis. Co//, de donis Coll. de praec. Coll. in Hexaem. Coll. in loann. Comm. in Eccles Comm. in loann. Comm. in Luc. De reduc. artium

Breviloquium (5.199-291; ed. min., 5.1-175). Christus unus omnium magister (5.567-74; ed. nun., 5.295-307). Collationes dc septem donis Spiritus sancti (5.455-503). Collationes de decem praeceptis (5.505-32). Cotlationes in Hexaemeron (5.327-454). Collationes in Evangelium loannis (6.533-634). Commentarius in librum Ecclesiastes (6.1-103). Commentarius in Evangelium loannis (6.237-532). Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae (v. 7). De reductione artium ad theologiam (5.319-25; ed. min., 5.217-28).

14 Dec. ofiusc. DMT DPE DSC Itiner. Sent.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Decent opuscula ad theologiam mysticam spectantia (Florentine, ad Claras Aquas, Quarachi: 1949). Qiiaestio disputata de mysterio Trinitatis (5.45-115). Quaestio disputata de perfections evangelica (5.117-98). Quaestio disputata de scientia Christ! (5.3-43). Itinerarium mentis in Deum (5.293-316: cd. min.. 5 . 1 7 7 - 2 1 4 ) . Cmnmentarius in quatnor librns Sententiarum Petri I.omhnrrti (\rv. 1-4: ed. min.. w. 1-4).

Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas References are given to different editions of individual works. Two examples will suffice to show how the abbreviations, which follow, indicate the works most commonly used: a) DPD, 5.5, ad 1 (2.143). This refers to Quaestio disputata de potentia Dei, quaestio 5, articulus 5, ad argumenturn 1 (see: Quaestiones disputatae, editio nona revisa (Taurini, Marietti: 1953), v. 2, p. 143). b) ST, Ia2ae, 40.8, sc (2.932a). This refers to Summa theologiae, prima pars secundae partis, quaestio 40, articulus 8, sed contra (see: Summa theologiae (Ottawa, HarpelFs Press Co-Operative: 1953), v. 2, p. 932a). Compendium thealogiae nd Fraircm Reginald. Opusntlti tkeolgira .(Taurini, Marietti : 1954), v. 1. pp. 1-138). DA Quaestio disputata de nnirna. Quaestiones disputatnc. editio nona revisa (Taurini, M a r i e t t i : 1953). v. 2. pp. 281-362. De ente De enle et esscnta, M. D. Roland-Gosselin, 2c f'd. (Paris, J. V r i n : 1948) DPD Quaestio dispulatn de potentia Dei. Quaestiones disputatae. editio nona revisa (Taurini, Marietti : 1953), v. 2, pp. 7-276. DSpC Qu/iestio disputata de spintualibus crenturis. Quaestiones disputatae, editio nona revisa (Taurini, Marietti : 1953), v. 2, pp. 367-415. DV QufK'stw disputata de. i>eritntt'. (^uaestinncs disputfittie, editio nona revisa (Taurini, Marietti : 1953). v. 1. Expos, de Trin. Expositia super librum Bnethii de Trinitate, recensuit Bruno Decker (Leiden, E. J. Brill: 1955). Qdl. Quaestiones quodlwctales, -edition nona (Taurini, Marietti : 1956). SCG Suinnui contra Gentiles. Liber de neritate Cnthitliiae Fidei tnntra enures Inf'iileliuni (Taurini, Marietti: 1961), vv. 2-3. Sent. Scriptum super lihros Sententiarum rnagistri Petri Lombardi (Parisiis, P. Lethielleux: 1929-47), w. 1-4. ST Summa tkeologiae (Ottawa, Harpell's Press Co-Operative: 1953), vv. 1-5. CT

The titles of other works, less commonly used, are only partially abbreviated and, to facilitate their identification, they are noted with the names of their editors. The abbreviated titles of the works cited by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are sufficient to identify those sources without difficulty. Each reference to a work of Aristotle includes the appropriate number from the Bekker edition of his writings. With regard to the writings of St. Augustine and other Christian authors, the texts cited from them by St. Bonaventure

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

15

and St. Thomas are closer, for the most part, to the Migne collections, entered below; so, in referring to those authors, the notes direct the reader to the individual volume, and the proper section of the volume, in the particular Migne collection containing their writings. Complete information on these sources is provided in the bibliography, where the writings of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are also listed in full. Periodical and other Publications

Complete data is supplied with the first reference to each article and monograph; thereafter, an abbreviated title is used in referring to a work previously mentioned. For the sake of convenience, the following abbreviations are used constantly in noting items from publications cited quite frequently: APR AHDLM BTAM BT CF DHGE DS EF ENF ETL EX FF FKS FS LTP MS VSC ^"G PL RFNS RNS RNSP RPL RPFE RSPT RTAM SF SRHCl TP VV WW

Archivum franciscanum historicum (Florence, Italy). Archives d'histoire doctrinate et litUraire du moyen age. (Paris, France). Bulletin de thiologie ancienne et mediivale (Louvain, Belgium). Bulletin thomiste (Paris, France; Montreal, Canada). Collectanea franascana (Rome, Italy). Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographic ecclisiastiques (Paris, France: 1937). Dictionnaire de spirituality (Paris, France: 1937). Etudes franciscaines (Paris, France). Endclopedia filosojica (Rome, Italy: 1957). Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses (Louvain, Belgium). Ecclesiastica Xaveriana (Bogota, Colombia). La France franciscaine (Paris, France). Franziskanische Studien (Paderborn, Germany). Franciscan Studies (St. Bonaventure Institute, New York, U.S.A.). Laval thlologique et philosophique (Quebec, Canada). Mediaeval Studies (Toronto, Canada). The New Scholasticism (Washington, U.S.A.). Patrolngiae cursus completus series graeca. edidit J P. Migne (Paris, France). Patrologiae cursus completus series latina, edidit J. P. Migne (Paris, France). Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica (Milan, Italy). Revue nio-scolastique (Louvain, Belgium: 1894-1909). Revue nio-scalastique de philosophie (Louvain, Belgium: 1910-45). Revue philosophique de Louvain (Louvain, Belgium). Revue philosophique de France, et de t'etranger (Paris, France). Revue des sciences philosophiques et thiologiques (Le Saulchoir, France). Recherches de theologie ancienne et midievale (Louvain, Belgium). Studi francescana (Florence, Italy). Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda (Rome, Italy: 1951). Tijdschrift voor Philosophie (Louvain, Belgium). Verdad y vida (Madrid, Spain). Wissenschaft und Weisheit (Dusseldorf, Germany).

The sign ET is used to designate the English translation of particular writings; the symbol (NS) is found with a number of periodicals to indicate New Series, or nouvelle sene. Complete information on the various works mentioned in the notes is contained in the bibliography.

This page intentionally left blank

INTRODUCTION HISTORICAL VIEWS OF THIRTEENTH-CENTURY

PHILOSOPHY

T N the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Christian historians began to revive the thought of the Middle Ages. Spurred on by the Aeterni Patris of Leo XIII, these scholars prepared the ground and set the future directions for the developments in the history of medieval theology and philosophy. Thus, in the general area of medieval philosophy and in the particular field of thirteenth-century philosophy, the first fruits of the research done by those medievalists, especially M. De Wulf in Louvain, M. Grabmann in Munich and P. Mandonnet in Paris, were made known before the close of the nineteenth century. From the opening of the present century, the Christian historians continued to develop their views of thirteenth-century philosophy, which, they saw, was represented in an outstanding way by the doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. In a first series of developments, these two thirteenth-century thinkers evoked the interest of the historians, notably De Wulf and Mandonnet, who were joined later by E. Gilson in Paris. Their historical views of thirteenth-century philosophy, and particularly of St. Bonaventure's philosophy, gave rise to a second series of developments in the work of F. Van Steenberghen in Louvain. His views on these subjects have contributed much to the contemporary interest of medievalists in St. Bonaventure's philosophy. To introduce our study on the historical constitution of St. Bonaventure's philosophy, we shall record the positions given to his doctrine in the two series of developments, mentioned above, guiding our present understanding of thirteenth-century philosophy. First Series of Developments

The first historiographical account of medieval philosophy as a scholastic doctrine came from B. Haur6au in the year 1850; thereafter, from 1872 to 1880, he produced a history of scholastic philosophy.1 His description and definition of medieval scholasticism, however, were unacceptable to Maurice 1 De la philosophic scolastique (Paris, Pagnerre: 1850), 2 w. Histoire de la philosophic scotastique (Paris, Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, v. 1: 1872, w. 2 & 3: 1880).

18

INTRODUCTION

De Wulf. In his first historical work, issued in 1895, De Wulf systematized all the philosophies of the Middle Ages into a single doctrine, or a common synthesis. He described the scholastic philosophies of the thirteenth century, in particular, as a universally accepted system which was organized by the Aristotelean principles of act and potency, of form and matter. This unique system, though eclectic in its vision of reality, brought together many problems of common interest to the schools, especially on the nature of man, on his knowledge and, in the context of Christian revelation, on the moral aspects of human liberty. While giving widely different solutions to those problems, the thirteenth-century scholastics concurred in a common synthesis, their differences involving only particular points of detail. 2 But, in 1899, Pierre Mandonnet found no common synthesis of philosophy among the scholastics of the thirteenth century. He showed that, following the entry of Aristotelean and Arabian philosophies into Paris, several conflicting movements of doctrines arose there in the university. The Platonic-Augustinian theologians, represented chiefly by St. Bonaventure, opposed the new philosophies relentlessly. The Latin Averroists, led by Siger of Brabant, accepted those philosophies even when they contradicted Christian faith. Adopting the new philosophies only in part, Albert and Thomas Aquinas, who were Christian Aristoteleans, reinterpreted them either in a personal way or according to Platonic doctrines. Mandonnet also showed how the newly arrived doctrines of Aristotle and the Arabians were resisted in Paris by ecclesiastical authority. Proscribed in 1215 by Robert Courcon, they were submitted for correction to a committee in 1231 by Gregory IX; however, the committee did not produce a corrected version of Aristotle's philosophy. Hence, ignoring the prohibitions against that philosophy, the Faculty of Arts listed some of the proscribed works in its curriculum for the year 1255. Thus, in Mandonnet's view, ecclesiastical authority restricted the advance of Aristotelean philosophy in Paris during the first half of the thirteenth century. 3 Throughout that period, according to Mandonnet, the theologians in the Platonic-Augustinian tradition had no common bond of doctrine; nor did they form either a single school or a unified movement of thought. They had a loose unity consisting in a positive adherence to a collection of philosophical theses on the metaphysical, moral and psychological orders of human life. Certain negative factors were also predominant among the Augustinian theologians: they had no formal distinction of philosophy from 2 Histoire de la philosophic scolastique dans les Pays-Bas et la primipauU de Litge jusqu'a la Rivolution Franfaise (Louvain, 1895); see: Preface, pp. ix-xiii, c. I, pp. 1-4. Cf. "Le probleme des universaux dans son evolution historique de ix e au xille siecle", Archiujur Geschichte des Philosophic, IX, (1896), pp. 427-44. 3 Siger de Brabant et I'averrolsme latin au XIII* siicle. Collectanea Friburgensia, v. VIII (Suisse, Fribourg: 1899), pp. 19-40. The 2nd edition of this work, with an enlarged apparatus, had no radical changes in Mandonnet's views. This edition, with the same title as the 1st, appeared as w. VI & VII in the series: Les Philosophes Beiges (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic, v. 2, texts: 1908; v. 1, studies: 1911); cf v. 1, pp. 3-26.

INTRODUCTION

19

theology and, positing the necessity for a divine illumination of natural knowledge, they had a total wisdom which confused reason and revelation. In short, the Augustinians manifested a common tendency toward an affective rather than an intellective way of life. 4 Mandonnet found that, in the middle of the thirteenth century, this Augustinian movement was halted and eventually submerged by an Aristoteleanism begun by Albert, but developed and perfected by Thomas Aquinas. The rapid advance of Thomism, however, was opposed by the Augustinians in 1270 when John Peckham, supported by the majority of masters in theology, confronted Aquinas on the question of the unity of substantial form in man. Now, as an Augustinian, St. Bonaventure belonged to the group opposing Thomism even though, as Mandonnet observed, no personal animosity existed between him and St. Thomas. On the other hand, St. Bonaventure directed the Augustinian assault against the Latin Averroists who, by 1270, had become strong in the Faculty of Arts. Although St. Thomas was also opposed to the false Aristoteleanism of the Averroists, even so, escaping the condemnation of 1270, a number of his doctrines were included in the subsequent condemnation of 1277. Consequently, for Mandonnet, Thomism conflicted with Augustinianism while Latin Averroism conflicted with both of those movements.5 In 1900, De Wulf published a history of medieval philosophy, giving a prominent place to his common synthesis of scholasticism. He styled all the other systems of philosophy in the Middle Ages, including Latin Averroism, as anti-scholastic.6 Then, in 1901, he upheld his views on thirteenth-century philosophy against those put forward by Mandonnet. For De Wulf, the Augustinian movement ought to be called either old scholasticism or the pre-Thomist school. This trend of philosophical thought had four groups of doctrines which De Wulf isolated as typically Augustinian. The first group included theories, mainly in the psychological order, taken over directly from St. Augustine. The second group, dividing the Augustinians into different camps, contained doctrines formally opposed to St. Augustine's philosophy; those doctrines were supported by a divine illumination that, corrupting the metaphysical bases of human knowledge in St. Augustine, consisted in a special increase of intellectual light as a necessary condition for human certitude. The third group of doctrines was founded on Aristotle's principles of matter and form; however, these principles were attributed unconvincingly to St. Augustine and, following Aristotle's commentators, they were interpreted according to both the 4 Mandonnet referred to St. Bonaventure as the founder of a mystical school in theology, based on the principles of traditional Augustinianism. See: op. cit., I" ed, pp. 43, 62-69, 113; f ed., v. 1, pp. 22-29, 4957, 98. 5 Op. cit., lrced., pp. 43-45, 53-56, 61-63, 69-74, 103-25, 173-79; 2C ed., v. 1, pp. 28-42, 47-50, 89-103, 156-60. 6 Histoire de la philosophic midittiale (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1900).

20

INTRODUCTION

Augustinian indetermination of matter and the Arabian hylomorphism of spiritual beings. The fourth group had many theses either indifferent or alien to the philosophy of St. Augustine. Coming entirely from Arabian sources, they modified Aristotle's hylomorphism by positing a plurality of forms in compound substances as a prerequisite for knowing them. While the system of St. Bonaventure represented the best effort of old scholasticism, even so, he had an incoherent synthesis setting authentic doctrines of St. Augustine side by side with those of Arabian Aristoteleanism. Surpassing Bonaventure's effort, Thomas Aquinas brought the incoherent systems of old scholasticism into a rigorously unified synthesis of philosophy. Although Thomism had the same Aristotelean foundation as Augustinianism, nonetheless, the system of St. Thomas had a purer Aristoteleanism than the inconsistent assimilation of Aristotelean philosophy by the Augustinians. But Thomism also had doctrines borrowed from St. Augustine; so, not opposed to Augustinianism, the Thomist system was the perfect stage in the development of a common synthesis of scholastic philosophy. Thus, in De Wulf s judgment, Mandonnet's opposition between Thomism and Augustinianism depended on a material distribution of thirteenth-century philosophy which, to De Wulf, was fundamentally Aristotelean.7 Three years later, in 1904, De Wulf organized into a single treatise all his previous studies on the doctrinal nature of the common synthesis. The greater part of his treatise entailed a long and intricate search for a definition of medieval scholasticism which would lend itself to the contemporary movement of neo-scholastic philosophy.8 De Wulf next examined the historical aspects of this common synthesis. He saw "close family likenesses" among the scholastics in the thirteenth century, and he assigned to them a "family inheritance" forming an organic minimum which never suffered from their different interpretations of a "common intellectual 7 De Wulf granted some historical grounds for the term Augustinianism, particularly with reference to John Peckham, who opposed Aquinas in the name of Augustine; but he considered Mandonnet's absence of a formal distinction between philosophy and theology as uncharacteristic not only of Augustinianism but also of scholasticism: Le traiti "De Unitate Formae" de Cities de Lessines. Les Philosophies Beiges (Louvain, 1901), v. I, pp. 10-22. These pages were also published separately as: "Augustinisme et aristotelisme au XIIl" siecle", RNS, 8 (1901), pp. 151-66. Replying to De Wulf very briefly, Mandonnet noted that the lack of a formal distinction between philosophy and theology, among the Augustinians, was not a doctrine but the absence of a doctrine; on the divisions between the Augustinians and the Aristoteleans, Mandonnet suggested that he distinguished their differences and oppositions, whereas De Wulf stressed the likenesses among their diversities of doctrine: Siger de Brabant, 2 e ed., v. 1, notes to pp. 55 & 57. On the other hand, De Wulf concurred generally with Mandonnet's analysis of Latin Averroism; see: RNSP, 17 (1910), p. 408, and Bulletin de la Classe des lettres de I'Academie rcyale de Belgique, (1910), pp. 638-41. 8 Introduction a la philosophic neo-scolastique (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1904); English translation by P. Coffey, Scholasticism Old and New, an Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy Mediaeval and Modern (London, Longmans Green: 1910) — republished under the title: An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy [Scholasticism Old and New], (New York, Dover Publications: 1956).

INTRODUCTION

21

heritage". Hence, their common scholasticism was "the product of an abstraction", even though "the living reality was always this or that individual's system, worked out in all its details."9 By the year 1911, however, De Wulf felt the weight of many critics against his common synthesis of scholastic philosophy; so, adopting Baeumker's term Gemeingut, he referred then to that synthesis as a common intellectual patrimony present in the doctrine of every scholastic thinker. Constituting an impersonal treasure and transmitted through the Middle Ages from one generation to the next, this common collectivity had its particular systems in Anselm and Bonaventure, in Aquinas and Scotus. Accordingly, specified by several systems, each with its proper principles of individuation and irreducible to one another concretely, medieval scholasticism contained a variety of doctrines that, nevertheless, could be reduced abstractly to a common parentage of ideas. Thus, for De Wulf, the concrete system of Bonaventure ought to be understood abstractly as part of a common patrimony, of which Thomism was both the perfect exemplar and the indisputable norm. 10 During the next eleven years, when he situated thirteenth-century philosophy within the context of its concurrent civilization, De Wulf expresed similar views on the position of Thomism regarding the common patrimony, particularly as it was present in the synthesis of St. Bonaventure. De Wulf also stressed the autonomy of medieval philosophy with respect to scholastic theology.'' Designating St. Bonaventure as the best representative of pre-Thomism, De Wulf found in him a love for tradition and a natural inclination toward Augustinianism. But St. Bonaventure introduced Aristotelean factors to his philosophy, thereby producing a peripatetic system that, nevertheless, had all the traditional teachings of the Augustinian school. Thus, giving a proper efficiency to man's intellectual operations, his doctrine on human knowledge had the best explanation of St. Augustine's theory on the divine ideas. St. Bonaventure also understood the Augustinian illumination to be a created resemblance of God impressed on man's intelligence, and a general concurrence of the first cause with every act of human thought. "On this important point of Augustinian exegesis St. Bonaventure thinks with St. Thomas and Duns Scotus: only in his mode of expression does he appear to 9 The History of Mediaeval Philosophy, 3rd ed. (London, Longmans Green: 1909); see: pp. 104-09, 25069, 311-43. 10 "Notion de la scolastique medifivale", RNSP, 18 (1911), pp. 177-96. Cf. Clemens Baeumker, "Die Europaische Philosophic des Mittelalters", Die Kultur der Gegenwart, (Berlin, Paul Hinneberg), I, V, (1909), p. 316. 11 See the following: "Les courants philosophiques du moyen age occidental", Revue de philosophic, 20 (1912), pp. 225-42; also in RNSP, 19 (1912), pp. 157-76, 389-405, 592-603. Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (Princeton University Press, 1922), republished at New York, Dover Publications: 1953; see: pp. 62-81, 108-09. Mediaeval Phitosphy Illustrated from the System of Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge-Mass., Harvard University Press: 1922); cf. pp. 3-8, c. XIX. "The Autonomy of Mediaeval Philosophy", Hauard Theological Quarterly (1923), pp. 143-46.

22

INTRODUCTION

differ from them." 12 St. Bonaventure drew his doctrine on seminal reasons from the divine ideas, considered as the ontological foundation of contingent essences; St. Thomas developed his theory of efficient causality from the same divine ideas, considered as the causal principles of all creatures. Again, by consistently equating matter with potency and form with act, Bonaventure had matter in every creature and a plurality of forms in corporeal beings; but Aquinas had a better development of Aristotle's form and matter, act and potency, which permitted St. Thomas to insist on the immaterial nature of the human soul. Despite those different solutions to their scholastic problems, Bonaventure and Aquinas had in common, according to De Wulf, the Aristotelean principles grounding all the philosophical systems in the thirteenth-century.13 Etienne Gilson introduced a new approach to the history of medieval philosophy. His first treatise in that philosophy, a study of Thomism published in 1919, indicated that he viewed it as Christian in character.14 Commenting on Gilson's approach to Thomist philosophy, De Wulf granted that the philosophy of Thomas ought not to be separated from his theology, because they were neighbouring systems; nevertheless, by exposing his philosophy according to the method of his theology, Gilson was prevented from treating the metaphysical doctrines forming the core of the Thomist philosophical system.l5 Although Gilson's second study of Thomism contained many revisions and expansions, it retained a theological order of exposition for the philosophy of Aquinas 16 , Mandonnet now criticized this theological exposition of Thomist philosophy: he noted that Aquinas had distinguished philosophy from theology; so his philosophy should be expounded according to the proper order that he himself had set down for it. 17 In the year 1921, Gilson put out a volume of studies on medieval philosophy, giving particular attention to the original developments of philosophy by Bonaventure and Aquinas. Gilson described Bonaventure's philosophy as so dependent on his theology that, when separated from the 12 Hist Mediaev. Philos., 3rd ed., pp. 283-89, citation from p. 286; cf. Hist, philos. mfdiev., l^ed., pp. 290-94. 13 Histoire de la philosophic en Belgique (Bruxelles: 1910), pp. 12-13; cf. Introd. Scholas. Philos., pp. 98-111, and Hist. Mediaev. Philos., 3rd ed., pp. 284-87, 325-29, 332-37. 14 Le thomisme. Introduction an systems de saint Thomas d'Aquin {Strasbourg, Vix: 1919).

15 Cf. RNSP, 23 (1922), pp. 229-30. 16 Le thomisme. Introduction au systeme de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 2 e 6d. Etudes de philosophic medieVale, v. 1 (Paris, J. Vrin: 1922). De Wulf remarked, in his review of this edition, that Gilson still neglected the metaphysical doctrines of Aquinas and his philosophical approach to God RNSP, 24 (1923), p. 445. 17 Mandonnet also noted that Thomism was equally a philosophy and a theology, therefore, as a title, it ought not to be restricted to either discipline. The term systeme, moreover, designated the method rather than the doctrine of Aquinas; since Gilson was introducing the philosophy of Thomas, a better title would have been: Introduction a ta philosophic ..., or still better Initiation a la phitasophie ... But, Mandonnet added, Gilson has already foreseen this by entitling his English version: The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge, Heffer & Sons: 1924). See: BT, 1 (1924-26): 1924, pp. 132-36. Cf. G. Thery, RSPT, 12 (1923), pp. 549-50.

INTRODUCTION

23

illumination of faith and the single order of a Christian wisdom, this philosophy could no longer be true. Bonaventure left aside the new Aristoteleanism and, never keeping his philosophy apart from the Christian tradition, he drew up an Augustinian synthesis of Christian philosophy within a theological order of mystical contemplation. Thus, he developed an illuminative way to God. Although Aquinas had a formal distinction of philosophy from theology, nonetheless, under the influence of his theological speculations, he developed a Christian philosophy that, incorporating many Aristotelean doctrines, could be set apart from his theology. But his philosophy could not be separated from its own theological order of development.18 Gilson's next work, a history of medieval philosophy, issued in 1922, presented a different perspective of scholastic philosophy from the one advanced hereto by De Wulf. Coming close in many respects to Mandonnet's views of the thirteenth century, Gilson observed that the entry of Aristotle into Paris provoked a crisis of conscience for the theologians. The Augustinians saw in the new Aristoteleanism a threat to their traditional unity of Christian and pagan thought; so, following papal exhortations not to pose as philosophers, they kept the novel doctrines of Aristotle out of their theology. Represented chiefly by St. Bonaventure, the Franciscan theologians generally supported this Augustinian movement. But the Dominican theologians became true Aristoteleans. Their outstanding figure was St. Thomas, and he produced a system which, by a proper use of Aristotelean philosophy, overcame the false doctrines of the Averroists, who separated philosophy from their Christian faith. Hence, according to Gilson, the philosophy of Aristotle compelled the thirteenth-century theologians to reexamine the proper relation of natural reason to Christian revelation; as a consequence, the great scholastic systems were born. While Thomism was the best example of those systems, even so, the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas was not the only original product of that period. The synthesis of St. Bonaventure, which Gilson refused to see as a stage in the development of Thomism, both illustrated and perfected the traditional Augustinian ism transmitted to the thirteenth century through Alexander of Hales. Although Bonaventure used many Aristotelean expressions and made room in his synthesis for some Aristotelean doctrines, notably the theory of abstraction, nevertheless, he subordinated them to the spirit of his own Augustinianism. Consequently, while Aristotle was victorious in the

18 Etudes de pfiilosophif midifvale (Strasbourg, Vix: 1921); cf. pp. 76-124 —see also: Le thomisme, l re ed., pp. 7-26. De Wulf did not accept either Gilson's theological illumination for St. Bonaventure's philosophy or his description of that philosophy as an illuminative way to God; the latter expression was equivocal and distinguished insufficiently a theological mysticism from a special, though philosophical, illumination: KNSP, 23 (1922), pp. 230-39.

24

INTRODUCTION

philosophy of Aquinas, the synthesis of Bonaventure subordinated the Philosopher to a medieval Augustinianism.l9 Rejecting a prevalent conception of St. Bonaventure as an incipient Thomist, Gilson published in 1924 a major treatise on Bonaventurean philosophy. He wrote that Bonaventure's subordination of Aristotle to Augustine resulted from an antipathy toward Aristotelean philosophy. Though St. Bonaventure admired Aristotle as a man excelling in knowledge, nonetheless, from a Christian point of view, he thought that the purely natural philosophy of Aristotle was mere folly. Indeed, opting deliberately for the traditional metaphysics of Augustinianism, Bonaventure evaluated Aristotelean philosophy as "one who has understood it, seen through it, and passed beyond it." Thus, "for him Aristoteleanism is a doctrine condemned ... one has only to read what he writes to be convinced that, for him, Aristoteleanism was not a development of which he was unaware, but an error on which he had passed judgment." Wherefore, opposing the novel Aristoteleanism from the beginning, Bonaventure never allowed any separation of philosophy from theology. His tacit support of Peckham in 1270 against the Thomist unity of substantial form in man implied a rejection of even the Aristoteleanism in Aquinas. For his part, St. Thomas reproved the Augustinians for rejecting the position that the impossibility of an eternally created world could not be demonstrated. Now, for St. Bonaventure, the Aristoteleanism of Aquinas committed him to an autonomous philosophy, and one inevitably prone to error. This consequence came from the failure of Thomas to put Christ at the heart of his philosophy, when he had Christ at the centre of his theology. In his own synthesis, Bonaventure chose a Christian philosophy as a medium between faith and theology.20

19 La philosophic au moj/en age de Scot Engine a G. Occam. Collection Payot (Paris, 1922), 2 w., see: v. 1, pp. 88-95, 118-61; v. 2, pp. 146-51. Cf G. Thery, RSPT, 11 (1922), pp. 670-71; Revue de metaphysique et de morale (avril-juin 1922), suppl. pp. 4-5. Gilson had a different understanding than De Wulf of the term scholastic. The medieval thinkers, as Gilson knew them, used the term to designate anyone who taught, or was taught, in the schools. He thought that the modern application of scholastic to the philosophy of the schools was unsuccessful, because the term could not characterize medieval philosophy as a distinctive doctrine. Since scholasticism tended to confuse the whole thought of the Middle Ages, that word could not contain all the philosophies now signified by it. But when the term scholastic was used to mean school-effort, it could be extended legitimately to include the medieval philosophy coming from the schools, such as that in the syntheses of Bonaventure and Aquinas. Cf. op. cit., v. 1, pp. 7-8, 139-40. 20 La philosophic de saint Bonaventure (Paris, J. Vrin: 1924); see: pp. 9-17, 31-38. For a list of reviews of this work consult: BT, 1 (1924-26): 1926, p. 106. English translation by Illtyd Trethowan & F. J. Sheed, The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure (New York, Sheed & Ward: 1938); see: pp. 1-10, 24-34, our citations are taken from this translation. Gilson's description of St. Bonaventure's hostility toward Aristotelean and Averroist philosophies did not coincide entirely with the one given by Jules d'Albi in his Saint Bonauenture et les luttes doctnnales de 1267-1277 ('Famines, Duculot: 1922). On St. Bonaventure's part in the Averroist conflicts consult: C. Krzanic, "La scuola francescana e 1'averroismo", RNFS, 21 (1929), pp. 473-94; Hadrianus a Krizovljan. O.F.M., "Controversia doctrinalis inter magistros franciscanos et Sigerum de Brabant", CF, 27 (1957), pp. 127-42.

INTRODUCTION

25

The source of St. Bonaventure's philosophy, as described by Gilson, consisted in his initial experience that "the soul is originated for perceiving the infinite good, which is God; therefore, in Him alone ought it to rest and be fructified."21 By founding his doctrine on the self-consciousness of the soul, Bonaventure clung to the Augustinian tradition while grounding his Christian philosophy in the experience of his interior life. Faced with the historical fact of a natural philosophy in both Aristotle and Plato, however, Bonaventure could not deny the formal distinction between either faith and reason or theology and philosophy. Gilson had St. Bonaventure handle those distinctions in his own peculiar way. He reduced philosophy, which relied on human reason, to speculative cognition having only a natural certitude; but he saw Christian faith, which was rooted in an indefectible will, as affective cognition with a supernatural certitude, even though, from the innate principles of reason, philosophy had the greater cognitive certitude. Depending on human reason, philosophy went up to God from sense experience; theology set out from God as the first cause of creation and came down to His effects through the order of being. Because Christian faith could not justify the content of revelation in a rational way, it remained outside St. Bonaventure's theological system, which had its principle in the truth of Sacred Scripture. The roots of that system, nevertheless, inhered in the tendency of faith to understand what it believed; so, fortifying Christian faith with the authority of the Scriptures, theology added reason to the object of faith, thereby making it to be also an object of understanding.22 What then did St. Bonaventure think of the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato? In the first place, according to Gilson, he granted the ability of natural reason to construct an ideal philosophy having true and certain knowledge; however, without a higher illumination from a supernatural principle, this philosophy could not attain infallible certitude. Gilson understood that St. Bonaventure judged Aristotle's philosophy as one unable to acquire infallible certitude. Aristotle failed to put the world of ideas between God and the universe; seeking the sufficient reason of the universe in natural things alone, he had a philosophy with its back turned upon Christian faith. Plato had a world composed of images and symbols of ideas, which he set between God and the universe; taking him above that world, his philosophy was turned toward Christian faith. Although the Platonists went as far as natural reason could take them on the road to God, nevertheless, having no knowledge of Christ, they did not know the true end of man. As a result, the Platonists rested finally in natural reason, and so they erred, because they were not illumined by Christian faith. Hence, for Gilson, St. Bonaventure thought that Aristotelean philosophy was false in principle, because it was directed toward the earth, but Platonist philosophy was true in principle, because, though it could never reach God, 21 Cf. 1 Sent., 1.3.2, in Resp. (1.40; ed. min., 1.30). 22 Philos. s. Bonav., 1™ ed, pp. 88-94, ET pp. 87-92.

26

INTRODUCTION

it tended toward God as its proper object. Furthermore, Aristotelean philosophy contained the error of an eternal world, which was ruled by a necessary fate and controlled by separate intelligences. While the Platonists set up the divine ideas as exemplars of human virtues, even so, their philosophy could not avoid error, because its illumination did not extend to the true end of human life. Now Gilson found St. Bonaventure overcoming the errors of those philosophies by constituting a Christian philosophy with God for its true object. Depending on the illumination of Christian faith, which supplied the true object of cognition, St. Bonaventure's philosophy resulted from a coexistence of faith and philosophy. In fact, Gilson explained, there could be a true philosophy for St. Bonaventure only on this condition, that God was known simultaneously by faith and reason. Although, psychologically speaking, the same object could not be known integrally and yet be believed, nevertheless, an object not integrally known could also be believed, whereas one not integrally knowable could become known only if it were subject to belief. For instance: God could be known truly by natural reason with respect to His existence and according to some of His attributes; however, being a Trinity, God could be known fully only by faith. Thus, according to Gilson, St. Bonaventure taught that belief in the unity of the divine attributes must exist simultaneously with the knowledge of this unity acquired by philosophy: "when we are treating of an object transcending human thought, we both can and must know it and believe it at the same and in the same respect."23 Having stressed the originality of Bonaventurean philosophy, Gilson dismissed the notion that Thomism was the proper norm of interpretation for the development of philosophy in the thirteenth century. He insisted that St. Bonaventure, supplementing Augustinian doctrines with Aristotelean principles, formed part of a traditional movement of Christian thought, which influenced John Peckham and continued beyond 1270, particularly in Matthew of Aquasparta and William de la Mare. But Gilson thought that Bonaventurean philosophy belonged in the history of philosophy because it was an essentially mystical system with an original synthesis of being and knowledge. The triumph of Thomism over Averroism came when the philosophical form of Augustinian mysticism had already been perfected in the Bonaventurean synthesis: "the profound and characteristic tendency of medieval Augustinianism was to place the mystical element of the doctrine in the foreground, subordinating all the rest; and with St. Bonaventure this tendency for the first time achieved full expression."24 23 Op. at., pp. 98-111, ET pp. 96-110. 24 Op. cit., pp. 462-73, ET pp. 482-95. Referring to the differences between De Wulf and Mandonnet on Bonaventurean philosophy, Gilson said that, with De Wuif, he recognized its formal distinction from St. Bonaventure's theology and, with Mandonnet. he denied that St. Bonaventure's philosophy had an autonomy regarding his theology, however, Gilson did not accept Mandonnet's confusion of philosophy and theology as a characteristic mark of Augustinianism: cf. loc. cit., p. 463, n.l, which has been omitted from the English translation.

INTRODUCTION

27

Noting the originality of Gilson's Bonaventurean Augustinianism, Mandonnet questioned its reality as a unified and mystical system of philosophy requiring a concourse of faith for its validity. Gilson had confused the object of philosophy with the object of theology in his Bonaventurean synthesis; so, as a philosophical system, it was a material rather than a formal presentation of St. Bonaventure's doctrine. His philosophy, as seen by Mandonnet, was both conditioned by theological pursuits and blended with Christian faith. As a consequence, his doctrine could not be treated solely in a rational way; however, his philosophy could be presented intelligibly, provided its principles were separated from his theology, a possibility seen but not actualized by Gilson. What Mandonnet could not accept or understand was the position taken by Gilson on this problem: "If confusion reigns in the thought of St. Bonaventure, it is a confusion of a very particular kind that is in question. For in a certain sense, as we have shown, there is a reason to say that a formal distinction exists between philosophy and theology in this doctrine, but having posed it as real, St. Bonaventure denies it as illegitimate." 25 Then, adverting to the opposition of Bonaventure to the Aristoteleanism of Aquinas in Gilson's work, Mandonnet remarked that, though this opposition was real, there was much to be gained from drawing the doctrines of Bonaventure and Aquinas together without identifying them.26 In the fifth edition of his history of medieval philosophy, issued in 192425, De Wulf dismissed Gilson's attempts to define that philosophy as a religious doctrine. Although De Wulf viewed scholastic philosophy as a part of medieval culture and civilization, which he recognized as deeply Christian, nonetheless, he insisted on its intrinsic autonomy with respect to theology, both sciences having their own principles and objects. This was especially so in the thirteenth century, when the subordination of philosophy to theology did not suppress their proper distinctions. St. Bonaventure followed the common doctrine on those distinctions: though he completed his philosophy with Christian faith, thus developing the apologetic form of scholastic theology, Bonaventure did not have either a Christian or a mystical philosophy. Gilson found his Bonaventurean philosophy by emphasizing the apologetic form of St. Bonaventure's doctrine at the philosophical level. 27

25 Cf. Gilson, Philos. s. Bonav., l re ed., pp. 463-64, ET p. 483. 26 Mandonnet also found fault with the title of Gilson's treatise, suggesting instead: La doctrine thiologico-pkilosophique de saint Bonaventure. See: BT, 1 (1924-26): 1926, pp. 50.54. For some favourable reviews of Gilson's work consult: G. Thery, RSPT, 13 (1924), pp. 550-51; P. W. Lempden, AFH, 18 (1925), pp. 286-90; Etienne Bihel, FF, 8 (1925), pp. 165-69; P. Gratien, Revue d'hatoire framiscaine, 2 (1925), pp. 92-95; J. Bittremieux, ETL, 1 (1924), pp. 584-86; Paul Geny, S.I., Gregorianum, 6 (1925), pp. 118-21; Noel Franqueterre, Revue des sciences religieuses, 5 (1925), pp. 543-52; P. Monnot, Archives de philosophic, 3 (1925), pp. 555-63. 27 Hisloire de la philosophic midie'vale, 5C ed. (Louvain, Institut supSrieur de philosophic, V. 1:1924, v. 2: 1925); see: v. 1, pp. 22-25, 259-60, 304-05, 354-56 English translation by Ernest C. Messenger, The

28

INTRODUCTION

De Wulf recognized both the originality of St. Bonaventure's system and the Augustinian inclination of his philosophy. But this philosophy, nevertheless, was basically Aristotelean. Bonaventure's adaptation of Augustine's illumination to Aristotle's theory of abstraction illustrated that fact for De Wulf. Bonaventure accepted the Aristotelean way of knowing sense things by active and passive potencies of the intellect; thereafter, he turned to the Augustinian illumination for knowledge of God and purely intelligible things. Without depreciating the Augustinian illumination, which Bonaventure valued in common with Aquinas and Scotus, he followed Aristotle and abandoned the occasionalism of Augustine. Consequently, De Wulf observed, the term Augustinian should be applied to Bonaventure, and to the pre-Thomists, only in a restricted sense, namely, as a tendency to superimpose doctrines from Augustine on the principles of Aristotle. Now, prior to the events of 1270, little enmity was shown by the Augustinians toward Aristoteleanism or Thomism; therefore, since St. Augustine became a patron of the pre-Thomists at that time, the term Augustinian then "had mainly a polemical signification", and "only from about 1270". In short, disliking the term Augustinianism, De Wulf preferred "a more general term: 'the older scholasticism of the thirteenth-century', or 'pre-Thomist scholasticism'."28 Reviewing the first volume of De Wulfs work, Gilson could see no historical foundation for his common synthesis of scholastic philosphy. Its collection of conclusions could not belong to a single system, because their modes of demonstration were too diverse from one another. Gilson thought that the real concord among medieval thinkers depended on a number of conclusions without which no philosophy could be Christian. Furthermore, Gilson continued, the explanation of Augustinianism given by De Wulf entailed an anachronism. Having only a polemical significance, but not until History of Mediaeval Philosophy (London, Longmans Green: 1926), 2 w.; see: v. 1, pp. 16-21, 273-74, 31920, 371-73. De Wulf treated at some length, in his previous writings, the relations of philosophy to theology in scholasticism. Considering them doctrinally, he had philosophy coordinated with theology, to which it gave truths that, as motives of credibility, served an apologetic purpose; from this positive collaboration, theology acquired the dialectic method of philosophy. Taking them non-doctrinally, De Wulf had philosophy subordinated to theology, which controlled extrinsically the conclusions of rational speculation; from this negative collaboration, philosophy acquired some natural, truths contained in revelation, and from this point of view alone philosophy was the handmaid of theology. Thus, proceeding along parallel lines, philosophy and theology had a material community, but never a formal identity, of principles and objects; ultimately, however, philosophy was a step on the road to the perfection of theology in scholasticism. See the following: Hist Mediaev. Philos., 3rd ed., pp. 110-13, 310-13; Introd. Schot. Philos., pp. 7-12, 53-75; Hist, philos. Belgique, pp. 7-9; RNSP, 18 (1911), pp. 191-96; Revue dephilos., 20.1 (1912), pp. 225-42; The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, Robert Appleton: 1912), v. 13, pp. 549-50; Philos. & Civitiz., pp. 151-73; Harvard Theological Quarterly (1923), pp. 143-46. 28 De Wulf referred again to Bonaventurean philosophy as an imperfect stage of the common synthesis in relation to the more developed and organic system of Aquinas, but they had a basic concordance in the common patrimony: Hist, philos. medien., 5 e ed., v. 1, pp. 14-15, 318-23, 345-58; ET v. 1, pp. 11-12, 335-39, 362-75. For his account of medieval philosophy as a common synthesis see: v. 1, pp. 9-30, 89-93, 254306, (cf. pp. 318-76); ET v. 1, 5-26, 96-99, 269-321, (cf. pp. 335-93).

INTRODUCTION

29

1270, the term was used nonetheless to signify the evolution of scholasticism in St. Bonaventure and the pre-Thomists, particularly William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales. Thus, De Wulf had Augustinianism evolving before it even existed.29 A year later, in 1926, Gilson produced a lengthy historical analysis of the doctrinal division between Thomism and Augustinianism. He suggested that St. Augustine's doctrine on illumination was the critical point of separation between St. Thomas and the old scholastics. If this doctrine were taken as the proper mark of Augustinianism, all the philosophers who held it could be called Augustinian. Now, in the thirteenth century, there were Aristotelean and Avicennian forms of the Augustinian illumination. Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, among others, had the Aristotelean form, which attributed an agent intellect to each human soul. St. Bonaventure was influenced by William of Auvergne on this point. Although St. Bonaventure called the agent intellect God, as Mandonnet indicated, nevertheless, Gilson observed, he meant only that God was its cause. Roger Bacon and John Peckham were among those who had the Avicennian form of the Augustinian illumination. This form, making the agent intellect to be God, attributed only a possible intellect to each human soul. St. Thomas opposed both Aristotelean Augustinianism and Avicennian Augustinianism; but he was particularly opposed to the latter.30 In the year 1927, Gilson described St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a Franciscan doctrine. Portraying the Augustinian soul on its way to God, Bonaventure moved through Christ with Francis to the Creator from His shadows and images in the universe. This Christian journey, reaching its peak on Alvernia, ended in God as the being that is essentially immutable, purely spiritual, absolutely simple and self-subsistent. God was also attained as that which is essentially good in Himself, but with an inexhaustible fecundity giving rise to variable and contingent creatures, limited in time and space. This Bonaventurean synthesis, according to Gilson, gave both 29 "Histoire des philosophies medievales et des doctrines religieuses", RPFE, 100 (1925), pp. 289-90. G. Thery saw De Wulf confusing the nominal meaning of scholasticism with the historical reality of concrete syntheses developed by medieval thinkers: RSPT, 15 (1926), p. 549. M.D. Chenu rejected De Wulfs construction of the whole history of medieval philosophy on the basis of a common intellectual patrimony, from which he abstracted diverse philosophies to show how individual men interpreted a common synthesis: De Wulfs collectivity was a false and artificial principle suppressing the originality of different thinkers in the Middle Ages: BT, 1 (1924-26): 1926, pp. 84-86. R_ Dalbiez welcomed the common synthesis of De Wulf which, he remarked, was unjustly criticized by other historians: Revue de jihilos., 32 (1925), pp. 56163. 30 "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin", AHDLM, 1 (1926), pp. 1-127, see especially: pp. 5-8, 80-127. For the reference to Mandonnet see his: Siger de Brabant, 2" ed., v. I, pp. 243-44. Gilson asked whether the term Augustinian ought to be abandoned or replaced by the names suggested by De Wulf. Those names had very vague meanings for Gilson, who thought that all medieval philosophers were Augustinians, though with nuances and differences following their acceptance or rejection of Aristotle. But De Wulf supposed, apparently, that a philosopher accepted Augustinianism according as he adhered to Augustinian doctrines without opposing Thomism. Cf. AHDLM, 1 (1926), p. 102, n. 3.

30

INTRODUCTION

the definitive expression and the constituent theses to a Franciscan form of Augustianism. 31 The third edition of Gilson's study in Thomism also appeared in 1927. He prefaced it with an exposition of the problem of Christian philosophy down through the Middle Ages. Stressing the diverse solutions offered to the problem by Bonaventure and Aquinas, Gilson maintained that their philosophical syntheses, though they were different, had in common a Christian origin, content and design. Hence, he did not confuse their philosophies with their theologies by expounding the former according to the order of the latter. The proper method for analyzing Christian philosophies, to the historian, was their own theological order of development.32 In the same year, 1927, De Wulf responded to the criticism of Gilson, and others, of his stand on scholastic philosophy.33 Showing the reality of a doctrinal community, especially in the thirteenth century, De Wulf indicated that Gilson, in particular, neglected this aspect of medieval philosophy, because he concentrated on its diversity. Gilson preferred to unite medieval philosophies as Christian philosophies; but, De Wulf stated, by giving them such a common character, Gilson united them by an aphilosophical element extrinsic to philosophy and impoverishing its proper distinction from theology. At the same time, and somewhat inconsistently, Gilson spoke of the "constitution of scholasticism, of which Thomism is the most perfect type".34 Defending his position on the reality of a doctrinal community in the thirteenth century, De Wulf explained that a metaphysical pluralism was 31 Beside the notion of God as essentially being and good in Himself, the constituent theses enumerated by Gilson included: seminal reasons and plural forms, a human soul subsisting independently in relation to the body, and, stabilizing human knowledge, an illumination giving necessary and immutable truth to man, thus making God's existence very easy to know. See: "La philosophic franciscaine", Saint Francois t/'Assise (Paris, Droz: 1927), pp. 148-58; cf. Etudes philos. mediea., p. 81; Philos. s. Bonav., I"' cd., cc. 9-12. For some subsequent studies of Bonaventurean philosophy as a Franciscan doctrine see: Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., "Augustin et la pensee franciscaine", FF, 15 (1932), pp. 5-76; Philotheus Boehner. O.F.M., "The Spirit of Franciscan Philosophy", FS, 2 (1942), pp. 217-37; Anton C. Fegis, "St. Bonaventure. St. Francis and Philosophy", MS, 15 (1953), pp. 1-13; Ferruccio Ulivi, "II sentirnento francescano delie cose e S. Bonaventura", Letters italiane, 15 (1962), pp. 1-32. See also: Bernard Vogt, "The Franciscan School", Proceed. Americ. CnthoL Philos. Asso/:., 3 (1927), pp. 117-24. 32 Le thomisme. Introduction an sysiime de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 3" ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1927): see the Prfface and pp. 22-57. In reviewing this edition, Chenu remarked that the philosophies of Bonaventure and Aquinas could be called Christian when that name meant they were open to the supernatural; but a theological order of exposition did not transform a pure philosophy into a Christian doctrine, because philosophy remained autonomous at all times, even when obeying the demands of theology: BT, 2 (192729): 1928, pp. 242-45. 33 Beside Tilery and Chenu (see above: n. 29), the other historian, to whom De Wulf responded, was Fernand Sassen; cf. Stadia Catholica, 1 (1925), pp. 123-37. 34 "Y eut-il une philosophic scolastique au moyen age?", RNSP, 28 (1927), pp. 5-12. For the citation from Gilson see: Philos. moven age., l rc ed., v. 2, p. 147. De Wulf dismissed the comments of Chenu as, for the most part, merely a verbal repetition of Gilson's critique: cf. RNSP, 28 (1927). p. 5. For Chenu's replyto De Wulf consult: BT. 2 (1927-29): 1927. pp. 98-100.

INTRODUCTION

31

the scholastic solution for common problems. Based on the principles of act and potency, this pluralism contained different accounts of the limitations of contingent beings. Although the application of act and potency to matter and form produced a plurality of forms for some scholastics, even so, that development did not destroy their basic community with the others, since all the scholastics understood matter and form in an Aristotelean sense. Thus, giving different interpretations of the same patrimony, thirteenth-century scholastics had a pluralist solution for the same dynamism arid specification of contingent beings. Bonaventure and Aquinas were not mistaken about this solution, even though they were drawn apart by two worlds of irreconcilable ideas: they had the same interpretation of the theory of eternal reasons, which was one of St. Augustine's doctrines harmonizing well with the metaphysics common to the scholastics. Consequently, the doctrinal community in the thirteenth century was a foundation allowing diverse systems to make their individual contributions to a pluralism, which reflected the real diversity within the community of individual beings in the world. But, De Wulf continued, like natural things, philosophical systems had their principles of individuation and formed irreducible wholes; however, to say that they had nothing in common would be tantamount to denying the possibility of a scientific approach to history, which depends upon abstract views, on classifications and syntheses.35 Reconsidering his common synthesis of scholastic philosophy, De Wulf pointed out that a large group of thirteenth-century philosophers had common elements of doctrine, which no one could fail to see. Those elements formed a real foundation for the historian's abstract view of a common philosophy. Since the expression scholastic synthesis could call forth the notion of an organization already achieved, he set it aside and substituted the expression common patrimony, or "collective good of the scholastics" (Gemeingut, sententia communis). Obviously, he went on, all the scholastics did not use the same part of their common heritage. Each particular system presented an interpretation of the whole in a way that was more or less coherent, strong and personal; it was for this reason that the Bonaventurean, Thomist and Scotist systems were superior to the rest. Indeed, according as they were absorbed more or less with interpreting rational doctrines, the thirteenth-century theologians were more or less philosophers: Aquinas was more a philosopher than Bonaventure, who was preoccupied with religious themes. Although De Wulf did not reject Gilson's classification of medieval, or scholastic, philosophy as a religious doctrine, nevertheless, though it was real, De Wulf found this classification to be in-

35 RNSP, 28 (1927), pp. 12-19. Responding to Thery's remarks on the confusion of the name scholasticism with concrete philosophies, De Wulf intimated that Thery would make impossible a scientific approach to the history of particular events; see: eo. op., pp. 19-21.

32

INTRODUCTION

sufficient. To include all the aspects of medieval philosophies, their similarities and dissimilarities must be taken into account by the historian; so he could complete his monographs on those philosophies by fixing and appreciating their common patrimony.36 Gilson published a treatise on Avicennian Augustinianism in 1929. He traced the sources for Avicenna's doctrine of illumination, and showed how that doctrine influenced the interpretation of St. Augustine's teaching on illumination by some medieval theologians.37 When this fact has been accepted, Gilson concluded, the naming of it would be of little importance. Though names were arbitrary, they were also necessary in order to recognize what they signified; but their significations did not necessarily involve complete definitions. Thus, in a restricted sense, Augustinianism signified only the doctrine of St. Augustine; however, the name had a wider significance when it included either a doctrine or a school influenced directly by St. Augustine. 38 Now, in Gilson's view, St. Augustine influenced every form of medieval philosophy depending essentially for its object on Christian faith. Although faith presented this object, and illumined the road to it, philosophy alone demonstrated the rational truths of Augustinianism. Accordingly, no form of Augustinianism was a strictly rational philosophy: "there is no Augustinianism without this fundamental presupposition: true philosophy begins by an act of adhesion to the supernatural order, which frees the will from the flesh through grace and the mind from scepticism through revelation." The philosophies of St. Augustine and his medieval disciples, having a Christian inspiration, were never separated from their theologies. Every Augustinian philosopher purified Greek philosophy and then made it an essential part of a Christian wisdom. From this integral union of reason and revelation, 36 Op. (-it., pp. 21-24. De Wulf, refusing to debate the name scholastic, noted that it came from the Renaissance, when the name was understood pejoratively to stand for "the philosophers of the Middle Ages". But the name had now been purged of its derogatory significance, even though it still stood for the whole group of medieval philosophers. Gilson, however, took exception to his preference for old scholasticism rather than Augustinianism, which De Wulf used synonomously while reserving a polemical sense for Augustinian from 1270, when this name was first employed and in that sense by John Peckham. Gilson's use of Avicennian Augustinianism showed De Wulf the validity of his own reservations concerning the term Augustinianism, namely, that it included elements foreign to the philosophy of St. Augustine, whereas some of his authentic doctrines were found in the system of every thirteenth-century scholastic. Cf. eo. op., pp. 24-27, and note to pp. 26-27. 37 "Les sources greco-arabes de 1'augustinisme avicennisant", AHDLM, 4 (1929), pp 5-149. The formation of Avicennian Augustinianism was outlined by Gilson from these sources: Aphrodisias (pp. 7-15), pseudo-Alexander (pp. 15-22), Alkindi (pp. 22-27), Alfarabi (pp. 27-38), Avicenna (pp. 38-74): his influence on Algaxel (pp. 74-79], and on Gundissalinus (pp. 79-92), then on Christian Neoplatonism (pp. 92-102), to form Avicennian Augustinianism (pp. 102-07). 38 Gilson added that De Wulf had confused the two significations of Augustinianism, a name that he tinged with suspicion, because it connoted some non-Augustinian elements: moreover, the polemical significance given by De Wulf to Augustinianism introduced a third meaning for the name. Since the Augustinians had formulated their doctrines long before 1270. Gilson stated, it would be more accurate to say that they formed a party after the year 1270. Cf. up. cit., pp. 103-05.

INTRODUCTION

33

Gilson derived the Augustinian ideal of a Christian philosophy, which was true according as it was Christian: "while allowing each knowledge its proper order, the Christian philosopher considers revelation a source of light for his reason."39 Developing his own view of the thirteenth century, De Wulf described the period as "the age of metaphysics". He found that all the scholastic problems in this period were either basically metaphysical or connected with metaphysics. The doctors drew up syntheses explaining being, real or possible, and its attributes in a truly rational manner. Their syntheses, nonetheless, were not entirely diverse from one another; they blended in various ways as their different authors developed the doctrines forming the metaphysical framework of thirteenth-century philosophy. Illustrating this complexity, De Wulf outlined numerous problems handled by the scholastic, each in his own way, so that many syntheses were produced, but with a common ground in Aristotle's doctrine of act and potency. 40 From this perspective of a doctrinal community supporting different syntheses, De Wulf challenged Gilson's position on the divine illumination as the principal dividing line between Thomism and Augustinianism. The departure of Aquinas from the old scholasticism was marked, for De Wulf, fundamentally by "the interpretation of the contingency of being" in the synthesis of St. Thomas. Showing the consequences of the Thomist synthesis for several doctrines in the syntheses preceding Thomism, De Wulf traced the division between Aquinas and Augustinians to diverse applications of act and potency to the metaphysical structure of created beings. But Gilson did not take sufficient account of act and potency in St. Thomas, for whom those principles had, according to De Wulf, "the key role in sustaining the arch of his metaphysical structure of the contingent". The conflict between Thomism and Augustinianism, therefore, took place within their common and Aristotelean framework, and not within a frame of reference to the Augustinian illumination. 41

39 Introduction a I'etude de saint Augustm. Etudes de philosophic medievale, v. XI (Paris, J. Vrm: 1929), pp. 293-307. 40 "L'age de la metaphysique", RNSP, 32 (1930), pp. 389-95. 41 "L'augustinisme 'avicennisant'", RNSP, 33 (1931), pp. 11-21. The consequences of Thomism for the Augustinian syntheses involved the following: plural forms were eliminated from the corporeal substance, which was given a single substantial form; matter was removed from the angel, which was now unique in its species; seminal reasons made way fora passivity of prime matter, now no longer convertible with potency, which was one sort of potency confined to spatial beings; corporeal light was reduced from a substantial to an accidental form; the substantial independence of the body and of the soul in man was replaced by a soul and a body incomplete in themselves, but related as form and matter; the identity of the human soul and its faculties was displaced by distinguishing the faculties from the soul; creation was shown not to involve necessarily a temporal world, a beginning in time indicating the contingent but not the constitutive condition of the universe, so that an eternal creation was possible. Summing up: De Wulf noted that St. Thomas did not subscribe to the two metaphysical doctrines explaining the contingency of created beings for the Augustinians, as shown by the Summa philosophiae, namely, a hierarchy of forms and universal prime matter. Cf. op. cit., pp. 17-21.

34

INTRODUCTION

In fact, De Wulf continued, the philosophies said to be Augustinian arose from contaminations introduced to Aristotle's doctrine by his commentators. In the last analysis, however, the Augustinian philosophies were not directed away from the basic principles of Aristotelean doctrine, which were accepted by every scholastic. In like manner, the Aristoteleanism of Aquinas did not direct him away from the Augustinian illumination, whic was common to all the scholastics. But St. Thomas put the Augustinian illumination on a strong, metaphysical ground: holding the divine essence to be the foundation of finite essences, he posited the eternal rules of God as the rectitude of human knowledge, which had finite essences for its object. Furthermore, Thomas did not discriminate between an Aristotelean and an Avicennian form of the Augustinian illumination, as Gilson said; indeed, Gilson himself perceived that Thomas handled the Augustinian illumination only incidentally: "nowhere does St. Thomas undertake a systematic examination of the doctrine of St. Augustine; he seems to speak in an accidental manner, and still more as one preoccupied rather with reconciling than with judging it".*2 The chief weakness of Gilson's position, as seen by De Wulf, lay in his failure to demonstrate that St. Thomas separated himself from the Augustinians on grounds other than the divine illumination: basing his position on that theory alone, Gilson passed over the other doctrines of St. Augustine appearing in the Augustinianism of the thirteenth century. In short, it would seem that, by thirteenth-century Augustinianism, Gilson understood the theory of illumination, and "nothing but that theory".*3 The division of Aquinas from the Augustinians was reconsidered, also in 1931, by Gilson. He extended that division to a fundamental difference within a community of Christian philosophies. Originating with St. Augustine, the expression Christian philosophy went beyond him to signify every philosophical understanding of the created universe transformed by 42 Cf. Gilson, AHDLM, 1 (1926), p. 118. 43 RNSP, 33 (1931), pp. 22-25, 30-34. Replying directly to Gilson's criticism of both the polemical meaning of Augustinianism and its synonomous meaning with old scholasticism, though with certain reservations, De Wulf said that he accepted the meaning given the first term by Ehrle and Mandonnet, and one denoting what St. Thomas had repudiated: "a collection of doctrinal elements characteristic of the old scholastics". Maintaining his reservations for the term Augustinianism, which was an equivocal name no less than scholasticism, De Wulf insisted that the term included elements either alien or opposed to the doctrine of St. Augustine. For this reason, he still preferred "old scholasticism of the thirteenth century as a more suitable name for the schools flourishing between 1220 and the arrival of St Thomas". Cf. of), cit, pp. 35-39. Ghenu formed a contrary opinion to De Wulf on Gilson's position regarding the division between Aquinas and the Augustinians. According to Chenu, Gilson had demonstrated the reality of this division on metaphysical grounds; because St. Thomas had eliminated the doctrine of illumination at the heart of the Augustinian psychology, Gilson sought the sources of the doctrine and the reasons why Aquinas rejected it; so it was not simply a problem of knowledge that caused his division from the Augustinians, but the much more profound question of the efficacy of secondary causes. From the positions he analyzed, all of them basically metaphysical, Gilson showed that, for St Thomas, the theory of reality and the whole of metaphysics were involved Thus, for Chenu, the birth of Thomism itself was at stake in Gilson's quest. Cf. BT, 2 (1927-29): 1927, pp. 180-83; see also: M. M. Gorce, O.P., BT, 3 (1930-33): 1930, pp. 188-89.

INTRODUCTION

35

Christian faith: from this viewpoint, Augustinianism and Thomism had much in common. The thirteenth-century Augustinians, notwithstanding, accused Aquinas of going back to the pagan philosophy of Aristotle. Now, in their philosophies, the Augustinians expressed the concrete reality, but without analyzing it, and they did not distinguish reason formally from revelation; so, requiring the Christian to express his faith in order to have a true philosophy, the Augustinians held that he could not have a philosophy unless it were concretely, or integrally, Christian. Although Aquinas grounded his Christian philosophy in a concrete subject, nevertheless, he analyzed this subject within an integral unity of Christian thought, and he distinguished formally the concept of Christianity from the concept of philosophy. Realizing that Christians and philosophers existed, however, and not merely concepts of Christianity and philosophy, Aquinas expressed the concrete whole in a unique notion integrating the concepts of philosophy and Christianity. Consequently, for Aquinas, the philosophy of a Christian could be neither a purely rational doctrine nor one lacking in rationality. All the medieval philosophers, then, according to Gilson, exercised their reason under specifically Christian conditions. As a result, their philosophies existed because Christian revelation had an intrinsic role in constituting their rational understanding of the concrete reality. Hence, the credo ut intelligam of Augustine and the fides quaerens intellectum of Anselm were equally true definitions of Christian philosophy. Without Christianity, Gilson added, it would be difficult to explain what the philosophies of Augustine and Aquinas gave to those of Plato and Aristotle.44 In a course of lectures given at Aberdeen in 1931-32, Gilson returned again to the problem of the division between the Augustinians and Aquinas. He said that both Anselm and Bonaventure, accepting the conditions imposed on reason by revelation, would not philosophize apart from Christian faith. They knew it was possible to use reason alone; however, they also knew the mistakes made by Plato and Aristotle, so Anselm and Bonaventure put their philosophies under the control of Christian faith. The philosophy of Aquinas was also guided by Christian faith and, though he had many conclusions deduced from Aristotelean principles, this fidelity to the Christian tradition separated him from Averroist Aristoteleanism. While St. Thomas refused to divorce his reason from his faith, even so, he preferred to establish by philosophical arguments alone the truth of some questions, such as illumination and the eternity of the world, which invoked Christian faith for the thirteenth-century Augustinians. It was for this reason, Gilson said, that they rejected some philosophical conclusions of Thomism as a departure from the Christian tradition.45 44 "La notion de la philosophie chretienne", Bulletin de la SocHU franfaise de Philosophic, 31 (1931), pp. 37-93; see especially pp. 43-48. 45 L'esprit de la philosophie mediivate (Paris, J. Vrin: 1932), 2 w. Cf. v, 1, pp. 4-14. English translation by A.H.C. Downes, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (New York, Scribner's Sons; 1936); cf. pp. 4-12.

36

INTRODUCTION

Gilson left this problem and sought a definition of Christian philosophy. After an analysis of Christian doctrine from St. Paul to St. Anselm, he concluded: "this effort of truth believed to transform itself into truth known, is truly the life of Christian Wisdom, and the body of rational truths resulting from the effort is Christian philosophy itself. Thus the content of Christian philosophy is that body of rational truths discovered, explored or simply safeguarded, thanks to the help that reason receives from revelation."46 Hence the formula fides quaerens intellecturn signified an intrinsic relation between reason and revelation. This relation enabled Christian philosophy to establish certain truths known by revelation, yet open to investigation by reason. Although the truths of Christian philosophy depended on its rational doctrines, nevertheless, its constitution depended on the assistance of revelation, which gave that philosophy a positive content having a specifically Christian origin. Christian philosophy was historically real, and it was a species of philosophy with many systems owing their existence to the influence of the Christian religion: as concrete realities, those systems had their individual differences; but, as members of a single species, they presented common characteristics and could be grouped under the same name. Consequently, Gilson said: "I call Christian, every philosophy which, although keeping the two orders formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable auxiliary to reason."*'' In 1932, De Wulf delineated four movements of philosophy in the thirteenth century. The first movement was Augustinianism, which endured from 1220 until 1260, when Thomism came to the fore. Having a conservative spirit and a love of tradition, Augustinianism contained authentic doctrines of St. Augustine; however, it compromised them by blending them with the new Aristoteleanism. As a consequence, the doctrines of Aristotle were used to explain St. Augustine's teaching on such questions as the creation of the world, seminal reasons, the human soul and human knowledge. Moreover, explaining the structure of created beings, Augustinianism applied act and potency to them with the result that every corporeal being was constituted by prime matter and a plurality of substan46 Citation is taken from op. cit., ET pp. 34-35. 47 Op. cit., v.l, pp. 21-44, ET pp. 20-41: citation from ET, p. 37. Gilson confined the common characteristics of Christian philosophy chiefly to the order of revealed truths, particularly those dealing with man's relations to God within the domain of religion. But the most characteristic mark of this philosophy was said to be its theological development: "the spirit of Christianity penetrating the Greek tradition, working within it, drawing out of it a certain view of the world, a Weltanschauung specifically Christian"— Preface, citation from ET, p. viii; cf. v. 2, pp. 203-06, ET pp. 403-26. On the definitive condition of Gilson's views in this work see: Christianisme et philosophic (Paris, J. Vrin: 1936), Preface, English translation by Ralph McDonald, Christianity and Philosophy (New York, Sheed & Ward: 1939). For the reactions to Gilson's position on Christian philosophy consult the list of reviews in BT, 4 (1934-36): 1934, p. 298; note especially: M. D. Chenu, RSPT, 21 (1932), p. 231; M. J. Congar, eo. of/, pp. 596-98; O. Lottin, BTAM, 2 (1933-36), pp. 65-67. For the opinions of other historians at that time on Christian philosophy see: Gilson, L'esprit philos. mediis., \" ed., v. 2, pp. 279-90; cf. "Le probleme de la philosophic chrttienne", La eie spiritue/le, 38 (1931), pp. 214-32.

INTRODUCTION

37

tial forms. The Augustinians included St. Bonaventure, whom De Wulf described as "the last and the greatest representative of this first way of philosophizing" in the thirteenth century. The second movement was Thomism, which had a purified Aristoteleanism. St. Thomas employed act and potency in such a way that, following Aristotle more closely than the Augustinians, he developed a new metaphysics making it possible for him to give a more coherent explanation of contingent beings, the unity of corporeal substance, the nature of man and of human knowledge. Though the personal syntheses of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure differed from each other, even so, their two metaphysics had a common basis in Aristotle's act and potency.48 Paying tribute to De Wulf, in 1934, Gilson wrote a treatise on the metaphysical bases for the Augustinian illumination in the thirteenth century, stressing particularly the position of St. Bonaventure. Gilson understood this illumination to be a solution for a dilemma posed by the proper efficacies of both God and the human intellect as causes of natural knowledge. St. Augustine made sensation an act of the mind, which attained truth according to a divine illumination; but Aristotle had truth from human concepts formed by an abstraction, which he grounded in sensation. When these two doctrines met in the thirteenth century, Gilson maintained, alternate solutions to the resulting dilemma were possible. One solution was to take the Augustinian illumination as fundamental in attaining truth, thereby reducing the Aristotelean abstraction to a secondary, or consequent, factor in human knowledge. This alternative was chosen by St. Bonaventure. The other solution was to accept the Aristotelean abstraction as fundamental in acquiring truth, and then take the Augustinian illumination as the source of that abstraction. This alternative was chosen by St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. By choosing the first alternative, St. Bonaventure did not allow natural reason to construct, apart from the concurrence of a divine illumination, a true science having necessity and universality. Natural science was grounded in the sense world, which was unstable, and it was subject to the human intellect, which was both mutable and inclined toward non-being; therefore, for St. Bonaventure, the certitude of human knowledge originated from the immutable light of the eternal Word of God. Thus, as Gilson presented him, St. Bonaventure put natural science into the intellect by an Aristotelean abstraction, which depended on an unstable and Platonic world, and he guaranteed the certitude of science by an Augustinian illumination, which accounted for the efficacy of God and His conservation of the intellect. If this conservation were a part of 48 The third movement was Scotism, which also developed from an Aristotelean foundation; handling problems similar to those treated by Bonaventure and Aquinas. Scotus gave a unique explanation for the fmitude of contingent being. These three doctors were opposed to Latin Averroism, which DC Wulf saw as the fourth movement of philosophy in the thirteenth century. Cf. "Courants doctrinaux dans la philosophic europeenne du X1I1C siecle", RNSP, 34 (1932), pp. 5-20.

38

INTRODUCTION

God's general concourse with creation, the Augustinian illumination would be superfluous; if it were a part of His special concourse with grace, the human intellect would have no proper efficacy as a cause of knowledge: so St. Bonaventure offered a vague but prudent solution to the dilemma by uniting God's concurrence to the Augustinian illumination and without saying whether His general or His special concourse was involved in human knowledge. These peculiar difficulties of St. Bonaventure, Gilson went on, were avoided by St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. They gave the human intellect a true science having both necessity and universality. Maintaining the Augustinian illumination within an Aristotelean universe, however, they also looked to God as the ultimate source of natural truth for the intellect, which he conserved and assisted in its operations. God then was the first cause of human knowledge, and the intellect was its second cause; so, for Aquinas and Scotus, the divine cooperation with the intellect became the strength and not the weakness of natural science.49 In the same year of 1934, the first volume of De Wulfs final work on the history of medieval philosophy appeared. He combined the analytic and synthetic methods, or the monographic and comparative approaches, to the study of medieval philosophy; but he held back his synthetic and comparative accounts of it until he had examined its various systems. Hence, his presentation of the doctrinal community among medieval thinkers did not anticipate the analytic and monographic studies of their particular systems. Although he found an endless variety of philosophies in the Middle Ages, De Wulf remarked that, when all the writings of the period had become known, a common intellectual patrimony would emerge as the characteristic mark of scholastic philosophy. The thinkers in the Middle Ages had achieved an intellectual unity, a basic community of philosophical notions, which was never compromised by either the originality or the diversity of a particular system.50 49 "Sur quelques difficultes de I'lllumination augustinienne", RNSP, 36 (1934), pp. 320-31. Gilson had previously shown the metaphysical importance of illumination in the Bonaventurean synthesis: calling God Being, St. Bonaventure considered the essence and unity of God to be such that, as Being, He was selfevident absolutely, so the non-existence of God was inconceivable: "The whole Bonaventurean metaphysic of illumination lies behind this ... in readiness to explain our certitude of His existence by an irradiation of the divine being on our thought" Cf. L'esprit philos. mediiu., l re ed., v. 1, p. 64, ET p. 60: citation adapted from this edition. 50 Histoire de la philosophic mtditvale, 6C ed. (Louvain, Institut superieur de philoosphie: 1934), v. 1; cf. Prlface, pp. v-vii. English translation by Ernest C. Messenger, History of Mediaeval Philosophy (London, Longmans Green: 1935), v. 1; cf. Preface, pp. v-vii. Note his remarks on the term scholastic: "Conforming ourselves to the general usage, we now identify 'scholastic philosophy' and 'medieval philosophy'. The expression 'scholastic' thus has once more a chronological meaning, designating any philosophy of the Middle Ages... The modification is verbal rather than real, and this will not be surprising if we remember that most of the discussions concerning the expression "scholastic" can be reduced to quarrels concerning words. The equivalence between 'scholastic' and 'medieval' does not modify the bearing of certain fundamental facts which we shall establish, notably the formidable opposition between the communiter kquentes and certain other philosophers who attacked such or such a doctrine of the scholastic patrimony." See: ET, pp. vii-viii; cf. French edition, pp. vii-viii.

INTRODUCTION

39

De Wulf retained his position on scholastic philosophy as a purely rational doctrine influenced only in an extrinsic manner by the Christian religion. If scholastic philosophy were taken as an essentially religious doctrine, it would then be subordinated completely to scholastic theology. Since philosophy was formally distinct from theology, the expression Christian philosophy was a contradiction in terms. Consequently, De Wulf considered this expression an unsuitable name for scholastic philosophy.51 The second volume of De Wulfs work, made public in 1936, dealt with thirteenth-century philosophy. Speaking of the autonomy of Thomist philosophy with respect to theology, De Wulf said: "For a long time the scholastics had professed a distinction between philosophy and theology ... but the preponderating influence of the theologians tended to diminish the autonomy of philosophy and to assign to it only services of utility. The immediate predecessors and contemporaries of Thomas — those who are called the Augustinian theologians — stressed this ancillary function of philosophy ... With Thomas the situation changed: philosophy was autonomous."52 Now, among the characteristic doctrines of the preThomists, De Wulf listed the authentic teaching of St. Augustine on illumination. Some pre-Thomists, however, had a doctrine on a special illumination, which they attached to the active intellect in the doctrine of Aristotle as interpreted by Avicenna. In that way, De Wulf observed, they produced what Gilson has called Avicennian Augustinianism. Moreover, on the meaning of the name Augustinianism, De Wulf said that the term acquired "its fullest sense when applied to the period of controversies (1270-85)", because, after the success of St. Thomas, "the militant Augustinians ... put their doctrines under the patronage of St. Augustine, manifestly to put Thomism in an invidious position."53 In 1937, Gilson described St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a department of his theology. St. Bonaventure, according to Gilson, gave the theologian the task of reducing reason and philosophy to theology, or a Christian wisdom. Thus, not distinguishing philosophy concretely from his own theology, St. Bonaventure preferred always to be theologically correct, even at the expense of reason. As a result, to solve some problems in the natural order, his philosophy relied on a supernatural principle. For instance, finding all creatures to have a natural need of grace to stay in existence, St. Bonaventure withheld from every creature the efficacy to produce a new effect: if a creature were given this efficacy, it would have a power to create, 51 Op. at, pp. 17-21, 284-86: cf. 286-93; ET pp. 10-13, 279-80: if. 281-88. 52 Histoire de la philosophic meditvale, ff ed. (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1936), v. 2, p. 155. Citation is taken from the English translation by Ernest C. Messenger, History of Mediaeval Philosophy (London, Longmans Green: 1937), v. 2, p. 123. 53 Op. at., pp. 354-59: cf. pp. 114-23 (Bonaventure), 153-80 (Aquinas); ET pp. 320-25: cf. pp. 90-92 (Bonaventure), 120-47 (Aquinas) — citations are taken from this edition, p. 325. For De Wulfs account of the common patrimony in the thirteenth century consult: pp. 352-401, ET pp. 319-67. Chenu welcomed the organization of this new edition of De Wulfs work: BT, 4 (1934-36): 1936, pp. 779-81.

40

INTRODUCTION

and that was impossible; so, in solving this problem, St. Bonaventure went to St. Augustine, whose doctrine of seminal principles accounted adequately for the rdle of creatures in the production of effects. Since man also needed grace to stay in existence, St. Bonaventure withheld from the human intellect a power which would be sufficient for knowing truth with certitude. He went again to St. Augustine, whose doctrine on illumination provided a solution for the problem posed by the existence of immutable truth in a contingent intellect. But, Gilson commented, St. Bonaventure did not answer the philosophical question involved in that problem: he did not decide whether the divine illumination formed part of God's general concourse with creation or His special concourse with grace. Now this unsatisfactory solution showed Gilson how real was St. Bonaventure's reduction of philosophy to his theology, and how unreal it would be to separate the one from the other. Consequently, Bonaventurean philosophy would lose its distinctively Christian form, if it were separated from St. Bonaventure's theology, to which he himself has reduced it.54 The following year, 1938, Gilson examined the historical conflicts accompanying the movements of Christian philosophy from its beginning down to the Renaissance. He put the beginning of Christian philosophy in the doctrine of St. Augustine, who realized that his freedom from error and his certitude of understanding came solely from his belief in Christ. Because of this realization, St. Augustine used Christian faith as an infallible guide to the understanding of truth; and so he transformed the Greek ideal of philosophical wisdom, while forming the pattern of a Christian wisdom. All the thirteenth-century theologians, Gilson stated, adhered to this Augustinian way of philosophical understanding. They opposed the Averroists in their attempts to separate philosophy from revelation. The Averroists said that reason could reach necessary conclusions concerning certain truths, as though Christian faith did not reveal absolute truths. But Aquinas demonstrated that, because the conclusions of science had necessity, a true conclusion of philosophy was always necessary: if this were not so, no conclusion of philosophy could possibly be true.55 In Gilson's view, therefore, it was revelation and not reason that directed the search for truth in the Middle Ages. Although the medieval thinkers distinguished philosophy from theology, nonetheless, they used revelation to assess the work done by natural reason prior to Christian revelation. The medieval theologian was aware that faith necessarily imposed a Christian 54 The Unify of Philosophical Experience (New York, Scribner's Sons: 1937; London, Sheed & Ward: 1938), pp. 49-57. 55 Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York, Scribner's Sons: 1938), pp. 15-23, 50-60, 78-84. For a survey by Gilson of the contributions from the Greek philosophers on the understanding of God by the philosophers in the Middle Ages and by modern philosphers see: God and Philosophy (Yale University Press, 1941).

INTRODUCTION

41

outlook on his philosophy. For example, before he examined the truth of some questions about God and beatitude according to philosophy, the theologian had taken a position on them according to Christian faith. Since theology exercised such a real influence on the development of medieval philosophy, Gilson remarked, the historian could describe its theological development as a historical state of philosophy.56 Closing this group of studies, Gilson contrasted the views of Bonaventure and Aquinas on the experience of Christian life and its importance for theology. Though he saw Bonaventure using some doctrines from Aristotle, whose technique of investigation he also utilized, Gilson said that Bonaventure never ceased to repudiate the spirit of Aristoteleanism. He knew that Aristotle had rejected Plato's doctrine of ideas, and yet Bonaventure put those ideas at the centre of his theological wisdom. He did that to protect a Christian understanding of creation, divine providence, illumination and moral guidance. Aquinas was also Platonic in his doctrine on creation and the divine ideas; but, in his understanding of the sublunary world, he followed Aristotle. Moreover, Gilson continued, Aristotle gave Aquinas both the means and the way to organize Christian doctrine into a scientific theology. Thomist theology was rooted objectively in the common experience of the Christian life, which had for its end the contemplation of God, who was the compendium of wisdom. The theological vision of Aquinas, nonetheless, had God revealing to all men the means necessary for their salvation and beatitude. But Bonaventure, Gilson stated, did not formulate his theology according to the norms of Aristotelean science. Following rather the Augustinian tradition, he recorded his personal experience of the Christian life without expressing it in an objective, or scientific, manner. Consequently, Bonaventure modelled his theology after the ideal of Augustinian wisdom; so he developed a theological wisdom which was inseparable from his own experience of the Christian life. But the subjective view of Bonaventure, according to Gilson, was not opposed to the objective vision of Christian life presented by Aquinas. Their two theologies were simply diverse: Thomist theology expressed the common experience of Christian life, while Bonaventurean theology confessed a personal experience of Christian life.57 Summary

The particular views taken of thirteenth-century philosophy by our historians, as we have seen, depended largely on their perspectives of medieval philosophy as a whole. Taking medieval philosophy as a scholastic doctrine, De Wulf first presented it as a single system, or a com56 Christianisme ei philosopkie, pp. 114-41, ET pp. 82-102. 57 "Le christianisme et la tradition philosophique", RSPT, 30 (1941-42), pp. 249-66; see particularly: pp. 254-55, 261-63. Study was republished in Chercher Dieu, Rencontres 13 (Paris, 1943), pp. 61-81.

42

INTRODUCTION

man synthesis, which attained perfection in the thirteenth century. Mandonnet saw conflicting movements arising at that time from the entry of Aristoteleanism into the Parisian schools: some theologians, including St. Bonaventure, resisted the new Aristoteleanism and followed the Neoplatonic doctrines of St. Augustine; they opposed St. Thomas, because he accepted some of Aristotle's teachings, and they opposed the Latin Averroists, who accepted Aristotelean doctrines that contradicted Christian faith. After Mandonnet's work, De Wulf described the different developments of the common synthesis, which was basically Aristotelean, by Aquinas and by his predecessors. De Wulf showed that the Augustinians had incoherent systems combining doctrines of St. Augustine with others from Aristotle's commentators; St. Thomas had a coherent system and a sound interpretation of Aristoteleanism, but he also accepted some doctrines of St. Augustine. Then, preferring either pre-Thomist school or old scholasticism, De Wulf said that the name Augustinianism did not suit the predecessors of St. Thomas. Though De Wulf and Mandonnet diverged on this problem, they concurred in designating certain doctrines as characteristic of pre-Thomism, of which St. Bonaventure was said by both historians to be the best representative.58 In 1911, De Wulf used Baemker's term Gemeingut, signifying common intellectual patrimony, as a name for the scholastic synthesis of philosophy. Although the particular systems of the synthesis were irreducible to one another concretely, De Wulf said, they were best understood when reduced abstractly to the common patrimony. Thus, in the thirteenth century, Thomism became the norm of interpretation for the development of that patrimony, of which St. Bonaventure's system was an imperfect development. De Wulf maintained this modified view of the common synthesis up to 1924, when it was criticized again, notably by Gilson, who had exposed the diversity of scholastic philosophy, especially in the syntheses of Bonaventure and Aquinas. Consequently, in 1927, De Wulf abandoned both the expression scholastic synthesis and the notion of a single system common to most scholastics in the Middle Ages. He replaced that expression with common patrimony (Gemeingut, sententia communis), which signified the collective good of scholastic philosophy. This collectivity, or doctrinal community, supported different and even diverse syntheses, of58 Excepting the absence of a formal distinction of philosophy from theology, which De Wulf never accepted as a mark of Augustinianism, the characteristic doctrines in question included: universality of matter in creatures, seminal reasons and plural forms in corporeal beings, independence of the rational soul in relation to the human body, a lack of distinction (or an insufficient distinction) of the human sou! from its faculties, an illumination from God guaranteeing the truth of human knowledge (here, De Wulf found a special illumination in some scholastic systems, e.g. in the system of William of Auvergne). Excepting the contrast between the immutable being of God and the mutable being of creatures, the characteristic doctrines assigned by Gilson to the Bonaventurean synthesis included the doctrines marked by De Wulf and Mandonnet as Augustinian. Thus, the three historians concurred on this question; but Gilson described St Bonaventure's synthesis as a Franciscan form of Augustinianism, to which he gave the constituent theses.

INTRODUCTION

43

fering a pluralist solution to the common problems of the scholastics. Then, up to 1936, De Wulf described the departure of Aquinas from his predecessors on their application of act and potency to the metaphysical structure of contingent beings. Since every scholastic system was basically Aristotelean, though each had authentic doctrines of St. Augustine, particularly the divine illumination, the division of Aquinas from the Augustinians, who included Bonaventure, took place within an Aristotelean and not, as Gilson suggested, an Augustinian frame of reference. Retaining his position of 1924, De Wulf still preferred pre-Thomism or old scholasticism to Augustinianism. He said that the term Augustinian signified a doctrinal inclination of the old scholastics until 1270; then Augustinianism took on a polemical meaning, because the opponents of Aquinas put their doctrines under the patronage of St. Augustine. Gilson viewed the philosophies of medieval theologians as commonly Christian in character; so he presented them according to their theological modes of development. Gilson also stressed the diversity of the philosophical syntheses produced by the thirteenth-century theologians, who reacted differently to the new Aristoteleanism. The Christian philosophy of Aquinas included many Aristotelean doctrines; but the Christian philosophy of Bonaventure, who resisted the new Aristoteleanism, was formed under the influence of St. Augustine. While resisting the new Aristoteleanism, Bonaventure brought some Aristotelean doctrines into his philosophical synthesis and subordinated them to his own Augustinianism. This subordination, Gilson said in 1924, resulted from an antipathy toward Aristotelean philosophy, which Bonaventure judged as an erroneous doctrine and one to be condemned. Moreover, the Platonists were not illumined by Christian faith; so, ignorant of man's true end and unable to reach God, they erred by resting finally in natural reason. Seeing the errors of pagan philosophers, Bonaventure overcame them, Gilson said, by constituting a Christian philosophy with God for its true object and, depending a supernatural illumination, having a necessary coexistence with Christian faith. Bonaventure also saw that the Aristoteleanism of Aquinas opened the way to an autonomous philosophy, which could not avoid error, because it would not be centred on Christ. Hence, Bonaventure supported the attack in 1270 against Aquinas. Both Mandonnet and De Wulf questioned Gilson's presentation of Thomist philosophy in a theological way: Mandonnet, in particular, said that St. Thomas had distinguished philosophy from theology; so his philosophy ought to be presented according to its own intrinsic order. In 1924, De Wulf said that Gilson's description of medieval philosophes as commonly Christian blurred the formal distinction of philosophy from theology. De Wulf also thought that Gilson's definition of Bonaventurean philosophy came from an undue stress on the apologetic form of Bonaventure's doctrine at the philosophical level. Then Mandonnet noted that, by systematizing Bonaventurean philosophy through a necessary concourse of

44

INTRODUCTION

reason and faith, Gilson had confused the objects of theology and philosophy in Bonaventure's thought. In 1926, Gilson showed that Aquinas departed from all his contemporaries, chiefly because of their interpretations of the Augustinian illumination; they produced, Gilson said, both an Aristotelean and an Avicennian form of Augustinianism. Replying to his critics, Gilson stated, in 1927, that the philosophies of Bonaventure and Aquinas had in common with most medieval doctrines a Christian origin, content and design; however, their two syntheses offered diverse solutions to the problems of the thirteenth century. Then, from 1929 to 1932, Gilson developed both his view of the meaning of Augustinianism and his position on the division of Aquinas from the Augustinians. Gilson defined Augustinianism in the strict sense as the doctrine of St. Augustine, and in the broad sense as any doctrine or school falling directly under his influence. In both senses, Augustinian philosophy depended essentially on Christian faith for its object, but the rational truths of Augustinianism were demonstrated solely by philosophical reasoning. The thirteenth-century Augustinians, not analyzing the concrete difference between philosophy and the Christian religion, confessed their faith when philosophizing; Aquinas analyzed the concrete difference between philosophy and Christianity, so his philosophy was both distinct from and yet integrated with Christian faith. Because the Augustinians would not philosophize apart from their faith, they rejected some philosophical conclusions of Aquinas as a departure from the Christian tradition. But Gilson saw the Augustinians and Aquinas appealing commonly to Christian faith as an indispensable aid to reason. Hence, all the philosophies of medieval theologians were specifically Christian, their individual differences marking them as concrete systems. Gilson continued, up to 1942, to develop his outlook on both the Christian character and the diversity of medieval philosophies. He showed St. Augustine transforming the Greek ideal of wisdom by Christian faith, thereby setting a Christian standard of wisdom. This Augustinian pattern was followed by other medieval theologians, including St. Thomas; but he had a different vision of the Christian life from St. Bonaventure. Adhering very closely to the pattern of Augustinianism, Bonaventure had a theology recording his personal experience of the Christian life. Organizing his theology according to the principles of Aristotelean science, Aquinas formulated the common experience of Christian life. Gilson also examined the diversity of Bonaventure from Aquinas on the Augustinian illumination and the Aristotelean abstraction. Aquinas found abstraction to be sufficient for acquiring scientific knowledge; yet he retained an illumination as the divine source of abstraction, thus positing the cooperation of God as the first cause of natural knowledge, which had the human intellect for its second cause. Bonaventure grounded abstraction in an unstable and Platonic world; then, subordinating abstraction to illumination, he ascertained the truth of natural science by a divine concurrence with the in-

INTRODUCTION

45

tellect, which God conserved and assisted in a way requiring neither His general concourse with nature nor His special concourse with grace. In short, Bonaventure reduced his philosophy to theology; therefore, Gilson said, Bonaventure's philosophy would be no longer Christian, if it were separated from his theology. To sum up, Bonaventurean philosophy has been presented or described in various ways and under different titles by our historians. They concurred, for the most part, on a group of doctrines characterizing that philosophy as either pre-Thomist or Augustinian. This characterization reflected, in many respects, the constant interest of the historians in comparing or contrasting Bonaventurean philosophy with Thomist philosophy. Mandonnet saw Bonaventure's philosophy as a collection of NeoplatonicAugustinian doctrines, which were inseparable from his theology; so, unlike the philosophy of Aquinas, who had a Christian Aristoteleanism, the philosophical doctrines of Bonaventure did not constitute an organic or systematic whole. Although Mandonnet had Bonaventure opposing every form of Aristoteleanism, he preferred to minimize the differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas. De Wulf and Gilson uncovered both a community and a diversity of doctrines in the philosophies of Bonaventure and Aquinas; but the two historians did not concur on either the kind of community uniting those philosophies or the sort of diversity dividing them. To De Wulf, the philosophies of Bonaventure and Aquinas were united in a common intellectual patrimony grounded in the Aristotelean principles of act and potency; they were diversified by their different applications of act and potency to many metaphysical problems. To Gilson, the philosophies of Bonaventure and Aquinas were commonly Christian with a dependence on their theological orders of development; they were diverse in their solutions to the problems arising for the theologians from the crisis caused by the new Aristoteleanism. These were the views of Bonaventurean, and Thomist, philosophy in 1942, when Fernand Van Steenberghen entered the picture.59 59 Siger de Brabant d'aprts ses onwres intdites. Les Philosophes Beiges, w. XII & XIII (Louvain, Institut superieur de philophie: texts, 1931; studies, 1942), the two volumes have a continuous pagination. Chapter II (v. XIII, studies) appeared separately under the title Aristote en accident. Les origines de t'aristottltsme parisien, Essais philosophiques, no. 1 (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1946); this version which did not include the bulk of the annotations in the original publication, had some omissions from and a few additions to the text in the previous edition. It was translated by Leonard Johnston, A ristotle in the West The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1955). This edition included materials from other writings of Van Steenberghen: ch. 6, pp. 130-46, and ch. 9, pp. 230-38, were taken and adapted from Histoire de I'Eglise. Le mouvement doctrinal du IXC au xn'c siicle, ed. A. Fliche et E. Jarry (Paris, Blound & Gay: 1951), v. 13, cf. pp. 209-15, 287-92, 301-05; a section of ch. 8, pp. 209-29, was a modified version of "Siger of Brabant", The Modem Schoolman, 29 (1951), pp. 11-27. We shall give parallel references to the three editions, whenever this is possible. For Van Steenberghen's review of the positions taken by the historians, up to 1942, on the syntheses of philosophy in the thirteenth century, and for his view of Gilson's position on Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages see: Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 360-67; Arist. en occid., pp. 45-56, ET pp. 46-58.

46

INTRODUCTION Second Series of Developments

Van Steenberghen described the twelfth century as a period of assimilation rather than of synthesis. Philosophical productions, properly speaking, were meagre at the end of that period, when theology held the primacy in the Christian conception of knowledge. This latter fact involved the relations of reason and faith; so it influenced all previous attempts to interpret medieval thought. Since those attempts resulted in diverse judgments of the encounter between Christian doctrine and philosophy, Van Steenberghen, avoiding equivocations and disputes concerning words, immediately defined his position on that problem. Now, as a scientific discipline, philosophy began from evident principles and, assisted by critically defined methods, it drew up a systematic interpretation of the order of the universe. As a general conception of the world and human life, philosophy had a "synthetic vision of the universe", or a collection of ideas expressing the concrete attitude of man toward the mysteries of existence. Taken in this broad sense, philosophy was found in every society and under many forms of human culture, such as religion, art and literature. This cultural philosophy prepared the way for scientific philosophy and, as a psychological stimulant, supported the thought of the professional philosopher, such as Aristotle, while completing his scientific philosophy as both an integral wisdom and a practical outlook on human life. For the Christian, however, cultural philosophy was controlled by revelation. His universal vision, or Weltanschauung, was a Christian wisdom excluding every purely human wisdom that might be offered to him as the supreme rule of thought and action. Nonetheless, according to their own laws, all forms of human thought could be developed within a realized ideal of Christian humanism. Scientific philosophy had a place, therefore, with theology and the positive sciences, Van Steenberghen said, in a complete organization by the Christian of the intellectual life. While respecting the proper distinctions between the objects and methods of those disciplines, yet coordinating them, such an organization would unify all human knowledge in a supreme synthesis, or an integral wisdom, offering a specifically Christian vision of the universe.60 From this position on the meanings of philosophy and its r&le in a Christian view of knowledge and life, Van Steenberghen reviewed the first twelve centuries of Christian thought. He found that the theological synthesis of St. Augustine did not differentiate philosophy in a scientific way from Christian wisdom, even though Neoplatonism became the soul of Augustinian philosophy. Seeing the true philosophy as a love of wisdom coinciding with the love of God, Augustine considered true wisdom to be the one flowing from Christian faith. His formula, crede ut intelligas, had an 60 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 378-81; ArisL en occid., pp, 22-27, ET pp. 23-28.

INTRODUCTION

47

echo in St. Anselm's fides quaerens intellectual, which expressed the theological movement, and even synopsized the intellectual life, of the Christian era up to the end of the twelfth century. At that time, philosophy had only an auxiliary role in the development of an integral and Christian wisdom, which was called philosophy, with theology at its summit. Although some theologians in the twelfth century promoted the use of secular sciences within theology, while stressing its speculative character, nonetheless, when teaching philosophy, the twelfth-century theologians concentrated chiefly on dialectics. Beyond that, their philosophical teaching remained fragmentary and eclectic, never rising to the full perspective of a philosophical system. Van Steenberghen illustrated this fact by a brief examination of the schools in Paris immediately prior to the foundation of its university. The schools of liberal arts taught the quadrivium and the trivium, which were completed by logic, especially the Organon of Aristotle. Their philosophical formation exercised the mind rather than providing it with a philosophical view of the universe. The schools of theology expounded the texts of the Bible and the writings of the Fathers. Although those schools used dialectics as a methodological tool, their speculative theology did not produce either a real doctrinal synthesis or a philosophical system serving Christian doctrine. Eclectic in its inspiration, twelfth-century theology relied especially on St. Augustine, but it also used other sources, notably Aristotle and pseudo-Dionysius. Concluding his sketch of the twelfth century, Van Steenberghen said that, as a general vision of the universe, the philosophy of the period was essentially Christian and Augustinian; however, from the viewpoint of scientific philosophy, the twelfth century did not have a philosophical Augustinianism, for no Augustinian system of philosophy existed then. The formation of truly philosophical schools and of real doctrinal currents took place in the thirteenth century, when Aristotle made his way into Paris.61 The entry of Aristotle into the Latin world, Van Steenberghen observed, caused a crisis for the intellectual life of Christianity in the thirteenth century, especially at Paris. He reviewed Aristotle's reception in Paris under four headings: the translations of his writings, their juridical status, his doctrinal influence, and the existence of a Latin Aristoteleanism. Van Steenberghen examined the work done, notably by A. Pelzer and M. Grabrnann, on the translations of Aristotelean writings; he then concluded that those writings, with Greek, Latin and Arabic commentaries, were the most imposing sources in philosophy available at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Turning to the juridical status of Aristotle's works in Paris, Van Steenberghen, utilizing mainly the research of Grabmann and H. Denifle, examined the prohibitions of 1210 and 1215 against Aristotle's natural philosophy and its commentaries, probably those of Avicenna. In Van

61 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 381-89; ArisL en occid., pp. 27-41, ET pp. 28-42.

48

INTRODUCTION

Steenberghen's view, those prohibitions were doubtless inspired as a protection by the Faculty of Theology against the infiltrations of the new Aristotle into sacred science. As a consequence, a conflict arose between that Faculty and the Faculty of Arts, where the public reading of Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics was forbidden from 1215 to 1230. Since they could be read privately, the students going from Arts to the Faculty of Theology enabled the new Aristoteleanism to enter there. This infiltration provoked Gregory IX, in 1228, to warn the masters not to abuse theology by a misuse of philosophy. His repetition of the directive in Parens scientiarum of 1231, Van Steenberghen noted, following A. Masonovo and Grabmann, had in view a methodological purpose and not a doctrinal danger to be avoided. In the same document, the Pope promised to examine the banned books of Aristotle and to purge them from every suspicion of error that might be levied against them. Gregory set up a commission to carry out this task; however, as Mandonnet showed, no corrected versions of them were produced by the papal commission. 62 Van Steenberghen considered next the doctrinal influence of Aristotle, or the growth of Aristoteleanism, in Paris from 1230 to 1250.63 Adverting to Grabmann's discovery of a student's guide composed in the Faculty of Arts between 1230 and 1240, Van Steenberghen indicated the importance of the document (Barcelona ms., Ripoll 109) for the history of Aristoteleanism in Paris. The document showed that Aristotle's Metaphysics and Libri naturales were known, but not taught, in the Faculty of Arts at this time. The contemporary productions of Parisian philosophers reflected that fact: those productions consisted almost entirely of treatises on logic; however, there were also a number of treatises on grammar and, as O. Lottin showed, some commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics, The first apparent change in the situation came about 1245, when Roger Bacon taught the philosophy of Aristotle, particularly his Physics and Metaphysics, in the Faculty of Arts.64 Van Steenberghen then surveyed the productions of the theologians in Paris, from 1230 to 1250. He found two tendencies forming in the Faculty of Theology: the first tendency was to protest against the incursions of philosophy into theology; the second tendency, influenced by the new 62 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 389-408; Arist. en occid., pp. 57-86, ET pp. 59-88. 63 This consideration was supported by the work of many medievalists, particularly: M. Grabmann, O. Lottin, M. Stee'e. P. Delormc and P. Glorieux. Considering first the work of R. de Vaux on the Latin translations of Averroes, Van Steenberghen concluded that they were unknown in Paris until 1230; but, toward 1240, the penetration of Averroes into Paris was almost complete. Then, returning to Pelzer's studies, Van Steenberghen outlined the new translations about this time of Aristotle's writings, from both Arabic and Greek, along with those of other Greek, Arabian and Jewish authors. Cf. Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 409-14; Arist. en occid., pp. 87-92, ET pp. 89-94. 64 Van Steenberghen noted here that Theodore Crowley, in concluding a study of Bacon's psychology, found the term Augusttnianism not serving to characterize the philosophical teaching prior to St. Thomas: so, apart from Christian influences, Bacon's philosophy would be most adequately characterized as a Neoflatonizing Aristoteleanism; cf. RNSP. 42 (1939), pp. 647-50, see especially: p. 650.

INTRODUCTION

49

literature in philosophy, was to use philosophical speculation more and more in theology. The second trend prevailed after 1230, particularly with William of Auvergne, whose philosophical positions represented neither an Augustinianism nor an Aristoteleamsm. All the theologians at this time were influenced mainly by Aristotle; other influences came from Avicenna, Averroes and Maimonides. Thus, in the Faculty of Theology, forms of an eclectic Aristoteleanism, or a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, were evolving on the philosophical level; they had a theological framework, and so they were developed in an Augustinian spirit. Van Steenberghen found the same sort of philosophical speculation in the writings of the first Franciscan theologians in Paris: Alexander of Hales and John of la Rochelle. The first Dominican theologians showed no evidence that an Augustinian school of either theology or philosophy existed among them. Although a decisive change in their attitude toward philosophy, especially Aristoteleanism, took place with the arrival of Albert in Paris, even so, his work marked a quantitative rather than a qualitative advance over that of William of Auvergne and Alexander of Hales. Concluding this survey, Van Steenberghen said that the philosophy used by the theologians from 1230 to 1250 lacked coherence; it was an incompletely assimilated Aristoteleanism mixed with alien and disparate elements that could be grouped vaguely as Neoplatonist.6^ Introducing the next problem, the existence of a Latin Aristoteleanism, Van Steenberghen drew some consequences from his preceding analyses. He found that De Wulf was entirely justified in questioning the existence of an Augustinian school, or a Platonic-Augustinian school, in Paris before the Aristoteleanism of Albert and Aquinas, as Mandonnet maintained. Van Steenberghen found no philosophical Augustinianism there up to 1250, when the Faculties of Arts and Theology had similar trends in philosophy. Those trends were basically Aristotelean, with strong contaminations from Neoplatonist elements of diverse origins. The Augustinianism of the theologians existed uniquely on the theological level, where they concurred more or less on some Augustinian doctrines long since incorporated into Latin theology. The tendencies of the theologians to neglect the formal distinction of philosophy from theology, and to subordinate the one to the other, indicated that they saw philosophy as an instrument serving the speculative method of theology. The eclectic character of their philosophy and the nature of theological knowledge, which was united by principles very different from those systematizing philosophy, did not enable the theologians to form a truly philosophical system. The historians who opposed an Albertine-Thomist current to a traditionally Augustinian current, Van Steenbergen remarked, have not seen that "the philosophic-theological movement before 1250 is neither traditional nor essentially Augustinian ... what is commonly called pre-Thomist Augustinianism is the teaching of the Faculty 65 Sign de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 414-42; Anst. en acrid, pp. 92-126, ET pp. 94-126.

50

INTRODUCTION

of Theology, such as it was constituted in or about 1250 under the influence of philosophy"66 To Van Steenberghen, therefore, a Latin Aristoteleanism existed in Paris by 1250. This was an eclectic Aristoteleanism that, in the Faculty of Arts, mixed Aristotle's doctrines indiscriminately with Neoplatonist notions originating from Jewish or Arabian sources. The same features marked the writings of the theologians, according as they were influenced by the philosophical movement. Since Aristotle was the principal inspiration of the Parisian philosophers at this time, and since they filled out his system from the Neoplatonist tradition, their Latin Aristoteleanism was always to some degree a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism; but the elements of Neoplatonism were so predominant in some authors that it would be more apt to speak, in them, of a Latin Neoplatonism.61 This new view of thirteenth-century philosophy directed Van Steenberghen's consideration of the position regarding Aristoteleanism taken from 1250 to 1257 by St. Bonaventure. His Commentary on the Sentences came during the incomplete assimilation of Aristoteleanism, and before the beginning of the renewal of philosophical and theological studies by Albert and Aquinas. Bonaventure, moreover, was in the Faculty of Arts around 1240, when barely more of Aristotle was taught there than his Organon and Ethics (I-III). Although he may have read Aristotle's works privately, nevertheless, judging from Bonaventure's references to them, Van Steenberghen found his knowledge of Aristotelean metaphysics to be quite superficial. He illustrated this from selected texts of Bonaventure's Sentences, where Bonaventure would have encountered the chief errors of paganism and the characteristic opinions of the philosophers.68

66 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 442-44; Arist. en ocdd., pp. 128-30, ET pp. 128-30. 67 Van Steenberghen thought that Latin Avicennianism, of which R. de Vaux spoke, and Latin Averroism were exaggerated trends of doctrine; he also thought that Avicennian Augustinianism, of which Gilson spoke, was ^particular doctrine (on the Augustinian illumination) and a typical example of the synmticism characterizing the Latin thinkers, when the new philosophical sources were being assimilated: Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 444-46; Arist en ocdd., pp. 126-28, ET pp. 126-28. 68 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 446-49; Arist. en occid., pp. 131-34, ET pp. 147-50. From the texts that he surveyed, Van Steenberghen showed Bonaventure displaying either no or an inadequate knowledge of Aristotle's doctrine, though he did know some better (e.g. on the agent and possible intellects) than others (e.g. on the eternity of the world). Bonaventure was never hostile to Aristotle; on the contrary, he always esteemed Aristotle, sometimes joined his authority to that of St. Augustine or other Christian thinkers, and at times even excused his mistakes. For instance, on the spiritual substance as the mover of a body, he excused Aristotle, who did not know that the world would end nor that human bodies would rise again, truths known only by revelation: it was inevitable, Bonaventure remarked, that a philosopher fall into some error, unless he were enlightened by faith; since Aristotle was not so enlightened, Bonaventure excused his error on this question. (Cf. 2 Sent., 18.2.1, ad 6: op. omn., 2.447-48; ed. min., 2.460.) Van Steenberghen noted, nonetheless, that Gilson, swept away no doubt by his preconceived idea of Bonaventure as deliberately hostile to Aristotle, saw in this text Bonaventure's insistence on "the incapability of Aristotle, and of every pagan philosopher, to give the reason for even the most immediately evident physical phenomena, such as the movement of the heavenly spheres" (Philas. s. Bonav., lre ed., p. 16). Van Steen-

INTRODUCTION

51

From his inspection of Bonaventure's texts, Van Steenberghen concluded that he had a wide enough knowledge of Aristotle's works, and that he cited other philosophers, including Averroes. While Bonaventure undoubtedly got this philosophical initiation in the Faculty of Arts, he probably acquired a good number of his citations from his predecessors, and so his knowledge of pagan philosophy had no depth. Bonaventure himself was fully aware of this, because he declared himself incapable of settling controvered questions about Aristotelean doctrine, and he showed frequent reservations on opinions attributed to the philosophers. Hence, Van Steenberghen saw no textual evidence for Gilson's position that, from the beginning, Bonaventure understood Aristotle's thought, judged it and, leaving it behind, opted for tradition. On the contrary, choosing the most benevolent interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy, Bonaventure did his best to avoid opposing Aristoteleanism to either Christianity or the thought of St. Augustine. Consequently, Van Steenberghen found it altogether impossible to accept Gilson's judgment that St. Bonaventure saw Aristoteleanism as an erroneous doctrine, and one to be condemned. This judgment was not only very inexact, Van Steenberghen said, but also most inaccurate when Gilson used it to oppose Bonaventure and Aquinas. 69 Van Steenberghen then raised a question about Bonaventure's Sentences: "does this work comprise a philosophy and, if it does, what would its character be? 70 He set aside Bonaventure's later works, because they had a different background, though their doctrine was not very different. Turning to the Sentences, Van Steenberghen pointed out that this was a theological synthesis, which, like the Summae of Aquinas and Alexander of Hales, used philosophy as an instrument of theological speculation. None of these three theologians ever pretended to compose a Christian philosophy, nor did any of them oppose such a philosophy to the one in the Faculty of Arts. Since Bonaventure produced no philosophical works, the historian had to go to his theological writings to know his philosophical thought. Even if Bonaventure had condemned every distinction of philosophy from theology, the historian could distinguish in his writings the data of revelation from the truths he established by reason. Now the problem of the relation beberghen saw Bonaventure insisting only on his very valid excuses for Aristotle regarding problems with objects going beyond human experience. Cf. Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 449-56; for the above critique of Gilson's view see: pp. 454-55. 69 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 456-58; Arist. en occid., pp. 134-37, ET pp. 150-52. For Van Steenberghen's summary of Bonaventure's positions on the principal errors of pagan philosophy and his relation to Aquinas in this respect see: op. cit., pp. 458-59 (pp. 137-39, ET pp. 152-54). 70 Before replying to his question, Van Steenberghen set down the main points of the controversy on the subject between Gilson and Mandonnet: their debate was a prelude to the future controversies on Christian philosophy; however, the discord between them could have been easily removed, Van Steenberghen remarked; provided the necessary distinctions and precisions were made, thus eliminating from their respective positions what was onesided or exclusive: Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 459-61; Arist. en occid., pp. 139-42, ET pp. 154-57.

52

INTRODUCTION

tween reason and faith arose for the Christian philosopher when, accepting the control of revelation, his philosophy had to remain faithful to its own principles and method. Bonaventure was not over-anxious about this problem, Van Steenberghen remarked, for he neither guaranteed the autonomy of philosophical research nor worked out philosophical problems for themselves; so his thought had a theological and not a philosophical unity, as both Gilson and Mandonnet have seen. Since Bonaventure's heteronomous philosophy was really his theological speculation, or the philosophical themes he used when interpreting revelation, Van Steenberghen said, Gilson was wrong in presenting as Bonaventure's philosophy a mutilated exposition of his theology, while Mandonnet minimized its philosophical interest. Bonaventure's philosophy, according to Van Steenberghen, was a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism containing elements, not really blended, of diverse origins. He belonged to the Augustinian school solely as a theologian and, for his philosophical thought, Augustinianism was a secondary source with respect to Aristoteleanism. Van Steenberghen then concluded: "the philosophy of Saint Bonaventure is an eclectic and Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, put at the service of an Augustinian theology."71 The works produced by St. Thomas in Paris, from 1252 to 1259, marked a new stage, for Van Steenberghen, in the development of Latin Aristoteleanism. He saw Aquinas breaking away from the indecisive attitude of his contemporaries by adopting the basic intuitions of Aristoteleanism. It would be historically false, nonetheless, to say that the philosophy of Aquinas was either an integral and exclusive Aristoteleanism or the result of choosing Aristotle over Plato. The philosophical system of Aquinas was a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism; however, it had newness and merit in a perfect coherence of Platonist, Aristotelean, Neoplatonist and Christian elements, which Aquinas united on a solid foundation. Accordingly, his was "the first really original philosophy that the thirteenth century and, more generally, Christian civilization produced". Thomism was the only name aptly expressing the philosophy of St. Thomas, which was an original rejuvenation and deepening of Greek thought. It was also a Christian Aristoteleanism so widening and transfiguring peripateticism that, transcending its historical sources, Thomism became an original philosophy. Putting it into place within thirteenth-century thought, Van Steenberghen commented: Thomism appears as the culmination of the efforts realized, on the one hand, by the scholars in Arts and, on the other, by the speculative theologians to build, on Aristotelean foundations, a new 71 Siger fie Brabant, v. 2, pp. 461-64; Arist. en occid., pp. 142-47, ET pp. 157-62. For the official entry of the new Aristoteleanism into the Faculty of Arts, 1252 and 1255, see: op. at., pp. 465-67 (pp. 148-52, ET pp. 162-67). On the influence at this time in philosophical speculation of Albert, whom Van Steenberghen called "the true founder of Christian Aristoteleanism". consult pp. 468-79 (pp. 152-67, ET pp. 167-81).

INTRODUCTION

53

philosophy, which takes account of the soundest results of philosophical progress since Aristotle, and of the proper needs of Christian thought." 72 The philosophies of Aquinas and Bonaventure, in Van Steenberghen's view, could not be opposed to each other as irreducible syntheses. On the philosophical level, Thomism corrected Bonaventure's Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism by deepening the epistemological and metaphysical bases of Bonaventurean theology. On the theological level, they both followed the current of Augustinian doctrine, for they knew that philosophy was a step toward an integral synthesis, which was realized in theology. With respect to the history of philosophy and of theology, their two syntheses were successive phases and not parallel forms of Christian thought in the thirteenthcentury scientific movement. Any opposition that might have existed between them, Van Steenberghen noted, was in their views of the Christian life, or of spirituality. Personifying the Franciscan ideal, Bonaventure advocated a radical return to evangelical simplicity, an exclusive search for God and supernatural goods, while distrusting nature and showing contempt for human values. Bonaventure showed these trends in his judgments, toward the end of his life, of secular learning and philosophy. Adopting a more moderate Christian attitude, Aquinas found his ideal of the spiritual life in a harmony of nature and grace, of the human and the divine, of the pursuit of proximate ends and the search for the Supreme Good. Of the two, Aquinas had the greater desire for philosophical progress and for better critical requirements. Their divergent tendencies, Van Steenberghen suggested, were well expressed as Christian extremism and Christian humanism.73 Considering the origin of a heterodox Aristoteleanism, Van Steenberghen noted that there was no outstanding figure in Paris after the departure of St. Thomas in 1259. As a result, the climate there favoured the hatching of heterodox doctrines in the Faculty of Arts. In 1266, Siger of Brabant had been teaching in the Faculty for a little while and, in 1267, St. Bonaventure reacted against its subversive teaching. Thus, a doctrinal trend of heterodox Aristoteleanism first appeared there some time between 1260 72 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 479-84; Arist. en occid., pp. 168-75, ET pp. 181-88. 73 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 484-86; Arist. en occid., pp. 175-79, ET pp. 188-91. On Van Steenberghen's view of Bonaventure's Christian extremism see: Bede Lane, "The Extremism of St. Bonaventure", Catholic Survey fGalway), 1 (1951-52), pp. 3-18; Nicholas Egan, "Christian Extremism", op cit., pp. 17881. Van Steenberghen remarked that Gilson, and many Franciscan historians following him, were undoubtedly wrong in identifying the Franciscan spirituality, or Franciscan ideal, of Bonaventure with what they called Franciscan philosophy. They took the term philosophy too widely, namely, "as a synonym for vision of the world (Weltanschauung), or wisdom of life, which is the Augustinian sense" of the term; but this did not correspond to the sense of the term as Bonaventure himself used it, and as it has been commonly used today. Taking philosophy at the proper level, or as a scientific discipline, Van Steenberghen said that there were two opposing philosophies only after 1270, when the conservative theologians, including St. Bonaventure's disciples, sought to forge a philosophical system of Augustinian inspiration, and one intended to hold Thomism in check. Existing solely in germ in Bonaventure's work, this neo-Augustinianism would give birth later to Scotism.

54

INTRODUCTION

and 1265. Now Van Steenberghen asked: was Siger the promoter of a Latin Averroism? In answering the question, he traced the origin of this expression and its significance in the work of Renan, who influenced Mandonnet in accepting the fact of Latin Averroism in the thirteenth century. Mandonnet's work on the subject, Van Steenberghen showed, has since influenced other historians, notably Picavet, Grabmann, Gorce, Gilson and Glorieux. From the certain and reliable facts concerning the problem, however, Van Steenberghen concluded: "a heterodox philosophical current existed in Paris between 1260 and 1277; this current was fundamentally Aristotelean and it ought to be characterized as a heterodox or radical Aristoteleanism. Under the heading of the intellective soul, certain ... philosophers accepted the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle in teaching the monopsychism of Averroes."7* While reviewing the circumstances surrounding the condemnations of heteredox Aristoteleanism in 1270 and 1277, Van Steenberghen noted that, in 1267 and 1268, a preparatory role in the first condemnation was played by Bonaventure, who had declared open war on Aristotle, but not on Aquinas.75 Although Aquinas, in his early works, had declared implicity that many notions in Bonaventure's Sentences were obsolete, nevertheless, before 1270, the Franciscan and Dominican schools did not engage in any doctrinal disputes. But, starting around 1265, a reaction against the growing ascendancy of Aristoteleanism in Paris came from the conservative theologians, especially in the Franciscan school. This reaction initiated the conflict, about 1270, between Aquinas and that school, represented particularly by John Peckham. Despite the opposition, Aquinas maintained his philosophical progress on the question of the unity of substantial form in man. In the same year, 1270, Aquinas demonstrated that it was not a contradiction to say that the world was both created and without a beginning in time; so, hitting the weak point of Bonaventure's position, though not naming him, Aquinas tried to save what he could of Aristotle's doctrine on this problem. Now, staying within the total perspective of thirteenthcentury thought, Van Steenberghen rejected the notion that the conflict of 1270 took place between Augustinianism and Aristoteleanism. He saw it rather as a conflict on the twofold ground of university life, its general ground, and of philosophical controversy, its particular ground. On the general ground, the conflict was an episode in the struggle for influence between the Faculty of Theology and the Faculty of Arts: indeed, beyond Bonaventure and Aquinas, several theologians had opposed heterodox Aristoteleanism, even before 1270; on the particular ground, the conflict took place between two unequally evolved forms of Aristoteleanism.76 74 Siger de Brabant, v. 2. pp. 490-97; Arist. en accid., pp. 184-96. ET pp. 198-208. 75 Van Steenberghen deplored the grossly inaccurate accounts given by Jules d'Albi of Bonaventure's role in the events leading to the condemnadons of Latin Averroism, and of his attitude at this time toward Aquinas; see: Saint Bonaventure et Us luttes doctrinales de 1267-1277 (Tamines, Duculot 1922). 76 Siger de Brabant, v. 2, pp. 712-19.

INTRODUCTION

55

The condemnation of 1277, in Van Steenberghen's view, marked the official sanction of the action undertaken by Bonaventure in 1267. His action was exercised on the religious and theological level, where he defended Catholic doctrine and theology against the pretensions of a philosophy having a pagan inspiration and a heterodox nature; on the same ground, he stressed the danger for Christian faith and thought in following the leadership of Aristotle. On the ground of philosophical controversy, the Franciscan theologians, along with many secular masters, saw a need more and more for a united front against radical Aristoteleanism and Thomism. These theologians, after the condemnation of 1277, combatted the prestige of Aristotle, the influence of Albert and Aquinas, by rallying around St. Augustine and by appealing to his authority. In that way, a new philosophical school was constituted. Finding its definitive form in Scotism, this school was named, by Van Steenberghen, neo-Augustinianism. That name expressed its two essential characteristics: first, a direct appeal to St. Augustine's authority and to the Augustinian tradition found throughout Latin theology; second, an acceptance of many philosophical doctrines not authentically Augustinian, along with others of either Aristotelean or Jewish and Arabian origin. Summing up his views on the conflict surrounding the events of 1270 and 1277, Van Steenberghen said that it was not a struggle between Augustinianism and Thomism, understood as two philosophical systems. It was rather an opposition between a theological and a philosophical spirit, or a contest of Christianity with paganism, which was represented especially by the philosophy of Aristotle. 77 In a long review of Van Steenberghen's studies, Gilson insisted that he had been right in seeing a hostility toward Aristotle in Bonaventure's Commentary on the Sentences. Moreover, Gilson was unable to understand how he was "swept away by the preconceived idea of a S.B. deliberately hostile to Aristotle": his view was based on Bonaventure's text, which Gilson used as a general principle of interpretation for similar texts, thus showing that Bonaventure saw Aristotle as condemned to fall into some error : "Necesse est enim philosophantem in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adiuvetur per radium fidei." But Van Steenberghen has read in this text that Bonaventure desired "to excuse Aristotle by attributing his mistake to an (invincible) ignorance of certain truths known only by revelation." Granting their divergent interpretations of the text, Gilson said that his could be mistaken, but he could

77 Op. at., pp. 729-30. Van Steenberghen saw Bonaventure reacting strongly against Aristoteleanism in 1273, when he alluded to the anti-Christian attitude of the heterodox Aristoteleans, whom he reproached severely, while criticizing some Aristotelean theses that he judged to be contrary to sound theology; sometimes he blamed Aristotle, at other times he spared or excused him, but Bonaventure did not seem to have in view the Aristoteleanism of Aquinas, who had left Paris in 1272. Bonaventure offered no refutation of the philosophical errors taught by the masters, against whom he fought, because such refutation would have been out of place in his theological context, namely, sermons of a religious kind. Cf. op. cit., pp. 723-24.

56

INTRODUCTION

not see why it came from a preconceived idea. Then citing another text from Bonaventure's Sentences: "Profiler quod dicit Apostolus stultam fecisse Deum sapientiam huius mundi: quia omnis sapientia de Deo in via absque fide magis est stultitia quam vera scientia. " Gilson asked whether this view of Aristotle's natural theology also excused him. "Let each one judge for himself', Gilson replied, while saying that he had studied the facts from one point of view and his critic from another; if Van Steenberghen had tried to balance the two, he would have made real progress in finding some solution to the problem. 7 " The following year, 1943, Gilson accepted Van Steenberghen's reproach that he presented "as Saint Bonaventure's philosophy a mutilate exposition of his theology"; but Gilson maintained that this philosophy was real when it was seen within Bonaventure's theology. Gilson further pointed out that the problem should not be referred to either Bonaventure alone or his historian, who had posed it in connexion with all that the medieval theologians had said about philosophy. Thus, it was really the time-worn problem of Christian philosophy coming forward again, but under another form. Van Steenberghen has admitted, Gilson noted, "that the philosophy incorporated by St. Thomas in his Summa theologica is as truly heteronomous as that of St. Bonaventure"; so, Gilson went on, "it would he necessary to stop speaking even about a philosophy of St. Thomas, or at least of being inspired by his theological works in order to speak of his philosophy, and this would reduce it to being only a literal commentary on Aristotle." As a consequence, the Latin Averroists would be the only philosophers in the Middle Ages. In short, the intrinsic possibility of philosophies existing within medieval theologies was at stake here; therefore, no one might say, without first proposing a general solution to the problem, who was right or wrong in each particular case.79 Now, in 1942, Gilson had published the fourth edition of his study in Thomist philosophy. Referring then to the problem of naming this philosophy, Gilson said that St. Thomas did not name it, nor did he separate it from Christian wisdom. He probably did not foresee that future scholars would extract the elements of a philosophy from his theology. Being a theologian, Aquinas had no obligation to draw up a philosophical system; however, Gilson remarked, since others had done so, the expression Christian philosophy was a suitable name for his system, because that name expressed a theological view of a philosophical reality with a historical foundation. In this same edition, Gilson showed that St. Bonaventure's doc78 BT. (1940-42). pp. 5-22; see: p. 15. Gilson defended Mandnnnet's use of the expression Latin Arerroism. while questioning the nomenclature substituted for it by Van Steenberghen, whose descriptive terms of thirteenth-century' philosophy Gilson found to be devious: if. pp. 18-21. 79 La philosophie de saint Bonapentun, 2C ed. (Paris,.]. Vrin: 1943; 3 e ed., 1953); see: "Addenda et Corrigenda", pp. 409-10. Tracing the origin of these problems to Mandonnet, F. J. Thonnard outlined the issues at stake for Gilson and Van Steenberghen; but he offered no concrete solutions for their controverted questions: "Augustinisme et aristotelisme au xiir" siecle", Annie thlologique, 5 (1944), pp. 442-66.

INTRODUCTION

57

trine was grounded in the essentialist metaphysics of St. Augustine. Giison first examined Plato's idea of being, which was convertible with the stability of essence, but the contrary of becoming. He then indicated how St. Augustine derived, from Plato's doctrine, his teaching on variable and mutable being as measured ultimately by the supremely stable and immutable essence of God. Thus, as the principle of all being, God is in the highest degree, because He is supremely immutable; and since whatever is immutable also is in the highest degree, God is unchanging truth, which is necessary and eternal. Hence, Augustine saw in God simultaneously the supreme degree of both being and immutability: "God alone is the supreme being, because He was the stable totality of being; He could not change either by losing anything or by acquiring anything." In other words, Augustine saw God, who occupied the summit of being, as supreme in the order of entity, which Augustine understood as an order of essence. Giison next traced the influence of this Augustinian doctrine from St. Anselm to St. Bonaventure. He said that, with Bonaventure, the immutable essence of God dominated the entire problem of His existence and the whole question of its knowability. But Bonaventure was more interested in the knowability than in the inner reality of God's existence, and so he considered God to be "being by definition". 80 Reviewing, in 1943, the controversies about Christian philosophy, Giison said that, while Mandonnet saw the manual method as the proper procedure for studying Thomist philosophy, he preferred to take a theological approach as another and better procedure. This latter method had the advantage of presenting Thomist philosophy in its historical and real condition, namely, as a Christian synthesis. Giison then adverted to Mandonnet's view that St. Bonaventure was not a philosopher, but a theologian, and that he had denied, at least in practice, the formal distinction of philosophy from theology. In a brief comment on this view, Giison remarked that St. Thomas had also denied, in the practical order, that reason could be separated from faith. Since Aquinas could deny this without ceasing to be a philosopher, why could Bonaventure not do the same? But Bonaventure, like Augustine, accepted the title philosopher. Finding an irremediable difference between himself and Mandonnet on this point, Giison concluded: "I take Saint Augustine and Saint Bonaventure as Christian philosophers and Saint Thomas as a Christian philosopher." 81

80 Le thomisme. Introduction a la philosophic de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 4 e ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1942), |>p. 14, 70-78. There were no changes in these developments in any of the subsequent editions of this work. See: 5e ed. (Paris,J. Vrin: 1944), pp. 14, 73-81; 6e ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1965), pp. 14, 53-60. See also: English translation of 5' ed. (reprinted, 1948) by L. K. Shook, C.S.B, The Christian Philosophy of Si Thomas Aquinas, with A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works, by I.T. Eschmann, O. P. (New York, Random House: 1956; London, Victor Gollancz: 1957), pp. 7, 48-54. 81 L'esprit de la philosophic mtditvale, 'le ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1943; reprinted: 1944); see, in the reprinted ed., pp. 433-34. Giison also adverted to Chenu's view that a philosophy was not Christian through a

58

INTRODUCTION

In 1943 and 1944, Gilson developed his understanding of the r61e played by St. Augustine in the constitution of Christian philosophies in the Middle Ages. He saw St. Augustine producing the first, and the most original Christian philosophy from the union of Scriptural teaching and Plotinian philosophy. Employing the technique and using the materials of Plotinian philosophy. St. Augustine transformed that philosophy interiorly and in a Christian way by the fundamental notions of Sacred Scripture. As a result, he transformed the Plotinian doctrine of emanation into a Christian doctrine of creation, thereby inaugurating the era of Christian philosophies following one another down the Middle Ages. Accordingly, to Gilson, St. Augustine "did for Plotinus what Saint Thomas Aquinas was to do later for Aristotle: to subject a great philosophical interpretation of the universe to a rational revision, under the light of faith." 82 Although St. Augustine was influenced by Plato through Plotinus, nonetheless, Augustinian philosophy was neither Platonic nor Plotinian. The One was supreme in the doctrine of Plotinus; but the Christian God was supreme in the doctrine of Augustine, who saw God as Being, or Essence, which he set opposite the created universe as the Immutable to the mutable entity. Gilson called Augustine's view of God the heart of all Augustinianism: it was the most stable element of thirteenth-century thought, and this thought was authentically Augustinian whenever it revolved around the Nicean doctrine of the Trinity, which was also a divinity of Being or Essence. Thus, according to Gilson, the trinitarian God of Christian faith was the pivotal doctrine of medieval Augustinianism. There were various cosmogonies surrounding that doctrine, which supported different accounts of the human soul journeying to God; and He alone could free the soul, both morally and psychologically, from its travails in the present life. Now, in the thirteenth century, the best exponents of medieval Augustinianism were the Franciscens, especially St. Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta.83 theological order imposed extrinsically on its rational content, but through a conception of nature and of reason open to the supernatural. Gilson granted that a philosophy, to be Christian, need not be confined within a theological frame, because a theological order of exposition was not an intrinsic mark of Christian philosophy. Such an order, nevertheless, from a purely historical viewpoint, made it possible to observe the controlling influence of faith on reason, and this conferred on philosophy a Christian character. But a Christian philosophy could be exposed, Gilson said, and even one developed in a theological context, in a non-theological order; however, its Christian character would then be stressed less sharply than its philosophical character. For his own part, Gilson was not aware of -my philosopher who formed a philosophy "open to the supernatural". Cf. op. cit., pp. 435-36. 82 Introduction A I'ttude de saint Augustin, f ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1943; y ed., 1949), see, in either ed., pp. 306-10. English translation, of 2' ed., by L.E.M. Lynch, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York, Random House: 1960); see: pp. 232-35. 83 La philosophic au moyen Age, des origines patristiques a la Jin du XI\F slide Paris, Payot, 1944; reprinted: 1947); see: pp. 586-88. Although Gilson, in this revision, gave much attention to the influence of Greek and Arabic writings on thirteenth-century thought (pp. 377-91), and to the life of the universities (pp. 391 99), nevertheless, he made no substantial changes in his views of the reactions by the theologians to the Aristotelean crises (pp. 754-63); however, he incorporated many of his recent developments regarding

INTRODUCTION

59

Speaking, in 1950, about past research and the future prospects it entailed for scholasticism. Gilson first outlined some of the historical and critical problems that confronted previous historians of medieval philosophy. He then indicated that current research was tending, more and more, to reintegrate medieval philosophies within the theologies containing them. As a consequence, the doctrinal positions of medieval theologians were being differentiated, while their individual uses of Aristotle's technique were becoming better known and without denying what was common in their usage of that technique. Thus, it was becoming evident that the medieval theologians had as many philosophies as they had theologies, which employed a variety of philosophical instruments. When the historian has reintegrated those philosophies, within their theologies, then, Gilson said, he will realize that the separation of the one from the other tended "to reduce philosophy, deprived more and more of originality, to a common technique which, in the end, would be confused with the philosophy of Aristotle, as received through Avicenna or Averroes." Now the reintegration of medieval philosophies within their theological syntheses would also show the originalities of those philosophies and of their authors: it would be seen that philosophical thought became creative in its theological function, and that the more a master was a great theologian the more he was a great philosopher. If theology was an understanding of faith, Gilson commented, this understanding should not be separated from the faith to which it gave intelligence; nor should faith be isolated from the understanding that it sought: medieval philosophy owed its fecundity to its instrumental r&le in theology. A proper reading of history, moreover, showed that the thirteenthcentury theologians did not begin with the philosophical sciences in order to adapt theology to them. They began rather with faith; then, transforming those sciences in its light, they took them into theology. Consequently, they reinterpreted the philosophical sciences in such a manner that each theologian, in his own way, gave them an entirely new meaning, especially the science of metaphysics. To appreciate the importance of this historical truth, future research into scholasticism could not risk ignoring the integration of medieval philosophies within their own theologies.84

both Bonaventurean philosophy (pp. 436-51) and Thomist philosophy (pp. 525-42). Van Steenberghen reserved comment on Gilson's new developments of medieval Augustinianism, particularly in its Bonaventurean form; but he praised Gilson's revisions, while noting that he and Gilson had previously exchanged their opinions on the questions disputed between them: RPL, 46 (1948), pp. 111-13. Chenu noted the cultural value of Gilson's revision, its unique quality lying in the synthetic view that it presented of the Middle Ages: BT, 1 (1943-46), pp. 111-12. See also: M. Cappuyns, BTAM, 5 (1946-49), pp. 259-60. For a historical investigation by Gilson, around this time, of the metaphysical developments in the Middle Ages see: Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: 1949), revised and enlarged in 1952. 84 In the course of his talk, Gilson referred obliquely to Van Steenberghen's critique of his book on St Bonaventure's philosophy: "What you call philosophy, is only a mutilated theology"; his critic was right,

60

INTRODUCTION

The years 1950 and 1951 marked further developments in Bonaventurean scholarship. The first of these developments came from Patrice Robert, who analyzed the positions taken on Bonaventurean philosophy by Van Steenberghen and Gilson. Recording the importance of their personal contributions to Bonaventurean studies, Robert reviewed the reception by other medievalists of Gilson's and Van Steenberghen's work in Bonaventurean philosophy. Then, turning to Van Steenberghen's work, Robert observed that this historian, presenting a middle position between Gilson and Mandonnet, had reached his conclusions on the bases of St. Bonaventure's academic career (1248 to 1257) and a number of texts selected from his Sentences. Robert, however, thought that Van Steenberghen had suppressed, "with a stroke of his pen", an Augustinian philosophy, which would have had Bonaventure as its chief representative in the thirteenth century. Van Steenberghen's limited examination of Bonaventurean texts was insufficient to attain his own ends. He neglected, in the first place, many Bonaventurean works antedating 1257 and bearing on the object of his inquiries. In the second place, he did not examine deeply enough the rather precarious number of texts that he selected from Bonaventure's Sentences. Van Steenberghen ought to have considered other texts showing Bonaventure's own philosophical doctrines, and not simply those texts dealing with the errors of paganism and the characteristic opinions of the philosophers. It seemed, to Robert, that Van Steenberghen was preoccupied with indicating the extremely polite and respectful attitude of Bonaventure toward Aristotle. But the historian seeking to characterize Bonaventurean doctrine ought to take account of all the historical data, duly controlled, and so not lessen the value or impair the importance of Bonaventure's own conclusions. Van Steenberghen himself, Robert noted, emphasized the singular praise that St. Bonaventure gave St. Augustine as a philosopher, or as altisstmus metaphysicus. Considering this fact, Robert said that the doctrine of the text containing such a compliment could not be ignored. Moreover, the text immediately following it dealt with a question very foreign to Aristoteleanism, but most conformed to philosophical Augustinianism. This text, on the identity of matter in spiritual substances, handled "a problem strictly and exclusively philosophical". Having examined the texts, Robert concluded: Bonaventure treated his philosophical problems as they were treated in philosophy, namely, according to the principles and methods Gilson observed, but this criticism was equally true of every book on the philosophies of Aquinas. Scotus and Ockham. Referring also obliquely to De Wulf and others, Gilson remarked that the historians who extracted from medieval texts a philosophy freed entirely from theology were usually those who insisted on "the existence of a sort of common philosophy of the whole thirteenth century." See: "Les recherches historico-critiques et 1'avenir de la scolastique", SHRCI, pp. 131-42. An English equivalent, with some modifications, has been published in both The Modern Schoolman, 29 (1951-52), pp. 1-10, and A Gilson Reader. Selections from the Writings of Etienne Gilson. Edited, with an Introduction, by Anton G. Pegis, (New York, Garden City, Doubleday: 1957), Image Book D55, pp. 156-67.

INTRODUCTION

61

of rational science; in doing so, he designated Augustine as "the most profound metaphysician", whereas, shortly before, he had called Aristotle "the more excellent among the philosophers". Weighing all the evidence of the texts, Robert saw Bonaventure using philosopher to designate uniquely the pagan masters, and he used the nobler title theologian to designate the Christian thinkers, who, in his view, were the most competent philosophers. These titular precisions of Bonaventure showed his preference for Augustine as a guide, even in strictly philosophical problems. 85 Robert confirmed his conclusions with a text taken from Christus units omnium magister, a sermon of Bonaventure explaining the doctrine of his De scientia Christi. The text (nn. 18-19: op. omn., 5.572) gave Plato the word of wisdom and Aristotle the word of science; however, as the principal exponent of Sacred Scripture, Augustine had both the word of wisdom and the word of science. Considering this evaluation according to the distinction between philosophers and theologians, Robert understood the text to put Plato and Aristotle among the former, but Augustine among the latter, so that he was master both in theology and in philosophy. Robert then reaffirmed this view with a text taken from Epistola de tribus quaestionibus ... (op. omn., 8.331-36). Here, defending philosophical studies as a necessity for theological studies, Bonaventure said that none of the philosophers had given a better account than Augustine of the creation of the world, of the egression of forms and the propagation of things, of questions on the soul and on God. Robert saw this text as essential for an understanding of Bonaventure's entire doctrine, for an appreciation of his attitude toward philosophy in general and toward the philosophers in particular, notably Aristotle. Now Van Steenberghen was correct in saying that Bonaventure did not ponder philosophical problems sufficiently for themselves; but, Robert noted, that was normal enough for a theologian writing a theological work. This did not necessarily imply, nevertheless, as Van Steenberghen seemed to think, that Bonaventure had not pondered those problems sufficiently, or that he had not treated them philosophically. As a theologian, he gave his thought a theological unity and order; however, it did not follow necessarily, that the unity of his philosophical thought had to 85 "Le probleme de la philosophic bonaventurienne. 1. Aristotelisme platonisant ou augustinisme?", LTP, 6 (1950), pp. 148-56. Robert (p. 151) questioned Van Steenberghen's conclusion that the conflict of 1270 was not between Augustinianism and Thomism, understood as philosophical systems. In Robert's view, this conflict, on the level of university life, was between the Faculty of Theology and a heterodox faction in the Faculty of Arts. Aquinas played a primary r61e in that struggle for Christian orthodoxy and, as vigorously as Bonaventure, opposed the extreme positions of heterodox Aristoteleanism. Thus, Van Steenberghen's explanation of the conflict on the level of philosophical controversy, as a contest between two unequally evolved forms of Aristoteleanism, did not conform to the historical facts. While Aquinas struggled against the heterodox Aristoteleanism in the Faculty of Arts in order to restore an orthodox Aristoteleanism to Christian thought, he also fought against Augustinianism and the majority of the masters in the Faculty of Theology. See the study of Robert: "St. Bonaventure, Defender of Christian Wisdom", FS, 24 (NS) 3 (1943), pp. 159-79.

62

INTRODUCTION

have a theological order, nor that the elements of a really philosophical synthesis could not be found in his theological work. On the other hand, the text on philosophical studies confirmed Van Steenberghen's judgment that Bonaventure's knowledge of Aristotle was extensive, but not profound. Nonetheless, by neglecting this text, Van Steenberghen failed to see Bonaventure's own explanation for his incomplete knowledge of Aristotle: it came from Bonaventure's conviction of the inutility of research in Aristotle, from both the theological and the philosophical points of view. The Fathers and the theologians had taken over all the intellectual riches of paganism; so, putting Augustine ahead of the other Christian doctors, whose thought he had in a condensed form, Bonaventure was content to learn from them, even on philosophical questions, which Augustine handled incomparably. Robert, concluding his analysis, said that Bonaventure had an Augustinian philosophy, which inspired his doctrine and the elaboration of his synthesis. He also used, at least partially, Aristotelean realism to make good some deficiencies of Augustinian Neoplatonism: he realized the value for Augustinian intuitionism in the scientific precision of Aristoteleanism and its incomparable philosophical vocabulary. Bonaventure's profound and sincere respect for Aristotle and his authority moved him to utilize Aristotelean doctrines, whenever he could, to give firmer depth to Augustinian teachings. Bonaventure produced, for the first time in the history of Christian thought, a methodical ordering of philosophical thought, which, with a terminology and an arrangement borrowed largely from Aristotle, had an inspiration, a content and tendencies that were essentially Augustinian. History has justly designated this, Robert commented, by the name medieval Angusttmanism. 86 Presenting Gilson's position on Bonaventurean philosophy, Robert noticed that this position rested on two presuppositions. The first was that philosophy had as its proper object the human soul and its activities. The second was that, for St. Bonaventure, a purely rational science of God was impossible, because, concerning an object transcending human thought, it was necessary both to know and to believe at the same time and in the same respect. Robert saw the first presupposition as a principle directing Gilson's account of Bonaventure's critique of a natural, or an autonomous, 86 Though not concurring with Van Steenberghen on the historical constitution of Bonaventurean philosophy, Robert willingly endorsed his rejection of Giison's position on Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristoteleanism as "a condemned doctrine", or "an error that he judged". Van Steenberghen had shown that, for Bonaventure, Aristoteleanism was the highest expression of ancient thought and the most perfect explanation of the universe ever conceived by human reason, left to its own power. On the other hand, Robert could not see why Van Steenberghen, in ascribing a Christian extremism to Bonaventure, seemed to follow Gilson's view. Granting that Bonaventure's pursuit of evangelical simplicity harmonized with the truly Franciscan ideal, Robert did not accept this as a reaction against progress: he saw Bonaventure's attitude toward nature and human values as one seeking their exaltation and transformation by grace. Bonaventure denounced vigorously, at the end of his life, the errors of heterodox Aristoteleanism; but he never, at any time, condemned secular learning or philosophy. Cf. LTP, 6 (1950), pp, 156-63.

INTRODUCTION

63

philosophy in his Sentences. Gilson was right, Robert remarked, in placing the perception of God as the ultimate end of the soul's intellectual activities; however, he was mistaken in seeing the whole of Bonaventurean philosophy in that truth. Robert saw there only the potential infinity of human intelligence. Bonaventure realized that, as the Supreme Good, God alone could fully satisfy man's desires. But the Supreme Good was beyond his natural power, because the quasi-material condition of human intelligence made it necessary for man to know God through creatures by way of analogy and of causality. Knowing God in this way and not in Himself, natural reason could not satisfy man's desire for the Supreme Good; so, unable to take him to his destiny, philosophy was considered by Bonaventure as a point of departure for a more perfect science and wisdom having God for its proper object. Taking Gilson's second presupposition as his essential condition for interpreting Bonaventurean philosophy, Robert examined the questions in Bonaventure's Sentences dealing with the coexistence of faith and natural knowledge. In the first text, which Gilson overlooked, Bonaventure taught that faith and sense knowledge could deal with the same subject in a material way, but not under the same formal object: Christ was seen and believed by the Apostles; they saw a man, but believed that He was God. In the second text, Bonaventure handled the question of the coexistence of faith and science. Robert showed that Bonaventure, in answering the question, had belief and science standing together concerning the same thing, at the same time, but not, as Gilson mistakenly said, in the same respect: the unity of God was known with scientific certitude and, at the same time, it was believed to include a plurality of Persons. Thus, the same material object was known and believed, but under different formal aspects: the divine unity was known by a necessary reason, which did not exclude a simultaneous belief in its compatibility with a Trinity, a truth hidden from natural reason. Consequently, for Bonaventure, the mystery of God's nature in itself was beyond the capacity of philosophy, which attained divine things in an analogical way from creatures. Christian faith, however, did not suppress this philosophical knowledge; philosophy rather was completed by faith, and faith itself, contrary to Gilson's view, presupposed natural knowledge of God's existence.87 Robert examined next Gilson's interpretation of Bonaventure's Collationes de donis Spiritus sancti. This was a theological work, where Bonaventure did not handle formally the question of an autonomous philosophy. He treated the gifts of the Holy Spirit as dispositions of the soul, already rectified by supernatural virtues, seeking the joys of contemplation. Speaking about the gift of science, Bonaventure said that reason and faith were presupposed by it. But philosophy also had God for its author; so it was to be esteemed as a divine gift and, according to the threefold divisions of its sciences, as a 87 "Le probleme de la philosophic bonaventurienne. II. Discipline autonome ou hetdronome?" LTP, 7 (1951), pp. 9-25.

64

INTRODUCTION

vestige of the Trinity. Bonaventure defined philosophy as "certain knowledge of truth open to the scrutiny of reason". Philosophy had truth as its material object and rational truth as its formal object, which was known with certitude following reason's demonstration. Thus, distinguishing philosophy quite clearly from theology, from the gift of science and the vision of God, Bonaventure did not consider God to be the formal object of philosophical knowledge. Neither did he consider philosophy as a cause of error; seeing it only as an occasion for error, he criticized the philosopher who spurned the light of his Christian faith and, becoming foolish, took pride in his philosophical science, Robert noticed that Gilson did not refer to this important precision of Bonaventure regarding philosophy as an occasion of error; as a result, he misrepresented Bonaventure's text by saying: "the very essence of philosophy as such would be insufficient of itself and it would require the irradiation of a much higher light to conduct its proper operations successfully." In Robert's judgment, Bonaventure gave philosophy a proper sufficiency for knowing the formal objects of its individual sciences; in their entirety, they constituted the natural point of departure for contemplating God, who was the end and not the proper object of philosophical knowledge. Because natural reason could not know God as He can be known only by faith, the Christian philosopher, to avoid error, had to recognize the proper limitations governing the end of philosophical knowledge.88 Studying Bonaventure's Collationes in Hexaemeron, Robert rejected Gilson's view of the treatise as the resumption of a polemic against the autonomy of philosophy. Robert saw the treatise resuming the central and theological theme of the previous work. While Bonaventure maintained his esteem for philosophy, Gilson, abusing the expressions sapientia mundana and sapientia Christiana, found him condemning a natural (or separate] philosophy and preferring a Christian philosophy. But Robert found Bonaventure contrasting a mundane wisdom with a Christian wisdom, toward which he desired to draw his hearers. Although he exhorted them to put Christ, the treasure of all science and wisdom, at the centre of their knowledge, Bonaventure did not mean, as Gilson indicated, that Christ should be the object of philosophical knowledge. On the contrary, he meant only that natural knowledge took the philosopher implicitly to Christ, who was known explicitly by faith; but the theologian united reason and faith in a single wisdom centred on Christ. Consequently, Robert observed, Gilson did not speak for Bonaventure in saying that he opposed Aquinas, because Christ was not at the centre of Thomist philosophy.89 88 op. at., pp. 25-36. 89 Op. cit., pp. 39-43. Robert drew attention here to the unsatisfactory condition of the critical edition of the Collationes in Hexaemeron. The manuscripts supporting it were reportata, and they were so imperfect that any significant use of the established text ought to follow a severe and doctrinal critique, based on criteria internal to the other and authenticated works of Bonaventure. Another version of the Hexaemeron, from a refmrtatio set aside in the critical edition, was issued in 1934 by F. M. Delorme. Since the intrinsic value of this version came from its close relation to the true thought and spirit of Bonaventure, the critical

INTRODUCTION

65

Robert proceeded to rectify Gilson's interpretation of some Bonaventurean texts in the Hexaemeron, particularly those on the nature of human intelligence regarding both its proper object and the end of man. Confusing these two functions, Gilson made the end of man to be the proper object of human intelligence. In this way, he had Bonaventure say that the true philosophies were the ones worked out through reason strengthened by some sort of supernatural help. Robert, however, understood Bonaventure to reaffirm the existence of natural reason, of its essential aptitude to perceive truth, and of the conditions for its activities. Seeing no hint by Bonaventure of an incapacity of philosophy to be autononous, Robert saw him rather insisting on philosophy as a legacy of the philosophers, and as a triple ray of truth taking reason up to the first cause of creatures. Moreover, speaking within a context of man's moral perfection, Bonaventure, knowing that contemplative wisdom was not beyond natural intelligence, said that the ancient philosophers had promised to give this wisdom to their disciples. Gilson, however, showed Bonaventure choosing between two irreconcilable interpretations of the universe: one, which was false, came from Aristotle; another, which was true, came from Plato. What St. Bonaventure really found to be irreconcilable, Robert observed, was the Christian attitude that put the world under God and the naturalist attitude that separated the world from God; the second attitude was manifested by the heterodox Aristoteleans, from whom Bonaventure disassociated Aristotle himself. The irreconcilability of the two attitudes, furthermore, existed on the level of Christian wisdom, where natural reason as such, and not just Aristoteleanism, was insufficient to satisfy man regarding his final destiny. Since faith was needed to know this destiny and grace was necessary to attain it, Bonaventure taught that the Platonists could not obtain the contemplative wisdom which they thought was possible to acquire by their natural virtues. Summing up his examination, Robert concluded that Bonaventure did not condemn philosophy as an autonomous or selfsufficient knowledge; neither did he teach that, within its own domain, philosophy needed the illumination of faith to conduct its proper activities. He distinguished the principles, objects and methods of philosophy from those belonging to theology; but he also saw the two sciences as complementing each other within a Christian wisdom, and as relying on their proper contributions toward the possession by man of the Infinite Good.90 The second study by Van Steenberghen of the intellectual life of the thiredition could no longer be considered as the sole text of the Hexaemeron. Although Delorme's version of the work was available in 1943, when Gilson republished his book on Bonaventurean philosophy, nevertheless, in Robert's opinion. Gilson was at fault for failing then to take that version into account. See: eo. op., pp. 36-39. 90 Op. cit, pp. 47-57. In an additional note at the close of his article (p. 58), Robert said that Van Steenberghen's more recent study (which we are about to see) on Bonaventurean philosophy fully confirmed his own critique of Gilson's work concerning the point of departure, the object and method of this philosophy. For the rest, Robert did not believe that, between Van Steenberghen and himself, an irreductible discord existed on the other points of Van Steenberghen's interpretation of Bonaventurean philosophy.

66

INTRODUCTION

teenth century, while taking account of the recent progress in medieval scholarship, disclosed no basic changes in his views of the doctrinal movements in that period.91 Van Steenberghen's presentation, in this study, of St. Bonaventure's doctrinal synthesis had a different format from the one in his previous work. He first portrayed the vision of the world (Weltanschauung) and the vision of life (Lebensanschauung) that the theologians, following the lead of St. Augustine, had developed before the thirteenth century in an integral and Christian wisdom. Van Steenberghen then referred to the severe modifications of this Christian perspective resulting from the influence, in the thirteenth century, of the rationalist and naturalist outlooks in the new Aristoteleanism and the new Neoplatonism of Greek and Arabian origins. Now, situated against that background, St. Bonaventure's doctrinal synthesis appeared as an effort to give an organic unity to Christian wisom. Attending to this fundamental intuition, Bonaventure maintained the Christian ideal of a unique knowledge rooted in faith and relying on the science of God. Thus, taking account of the cultural progress since Augustine's time, Bonaventure realized that the Augustinian wisdom required both a structure and an organic unity. Consequently, he reformed the Augustinian wisdom, but under the influence of the Franciscan ideal of Christian life, which he applied to the intellectual life. Hence, reorganizing science interiorly and subordinating it through faith to the science of God, Bonaventure prolonged and developed the Augustinian wisdom while producing a really Franciscan wisdom, and one of the purest forms of Christian wisdom. He organized every phase of knowledge, from sense experience to mystical experience, in a synthesis subordinating the sciences within the dynamic order of a personal quest for the Supreme Truth and the Sovereign Good. As a result, the different forms of knowledge and the study of the sciences became steps of increasing perfection in the journey of man toward God. In short, the Franciscan wisdom of Bonaventure was a theology of the spiritual life in its widest and richest sense.92 91 "La XHl e siecle", Histoire de I'Egfce, ed. A. Fliche et E. Jarry (Paris, Blound & Gay: 1951), v. XIII, pp. 177-328. This study had a different organization from the previous work: describing the chief centres of intellectual life in the thirteenth century, the new literature and translations of the period, the role of the universities and of the mendicants in the development of its thought, Van Steenberghen showed the state of theological and philosophical studies up to 1200, closing with the ecclesiastical attitudes toward Aristotle (pp. 179-96); this was followed by a study of the philosophical and theological movements in both Paris and Oxford from 1200 to 1250 (pp. 196-215), then the great doctrinal syntheses from 1250 to 1277 (pp. 217-85) and the condemnation of 1277 (pp. 287-322), concluding with a synthetic view of the period (pp. 323-28). 92 Although Van Steenberghen endorsed here much of Gilson's views on the Augustinian and Franciscan wisdom of Bonaventure, he did not think that Gilson, and the historians supporting him, had stressed sufficiently the progress of Bonaventure, by comparison with Augustine, either in defining the complex internal structure of Christian wisdom or in offering the principles for solving the most delicate intellectual problem of the thirteenth century; the above historians, moreover, were inaccurate in attributing to Bonaventure a Christian philosophy, particularly since Bonaventure himself distinguished philosophy, as a work of reason, from its use by the theologian in his scientific elaboration of sacred doctrine, or by the Christian in his personal acquisition of a theological wisdom. Cf. op. at., pp. 219-22.

INTRODUCTION

67

Having described Bonaventure's organization of Christian wisdom, Van Steenberghen illustrated it from four of his works: De reduction artium ad theologiam (1257-59), Itinerarium mentis in Deum (1259), Collationes de donis Spiritus sancti (1268) and Collationes in Hexaemeron (1273). He noted Bonaventure's severe reactions in the last two works against the naturalist and rationalist tendencies then appearing in the Faculty of Arts at Paris; it was at this time that he defended, in a polemical way, the unity of Christian wisdom against the pagan ideal of a separate philosophy holding forth as a supreme and definitive wisdom. Viewing the Bonaventurean synthesis of Christian wisdom, Van Steenberghen indicated some important consequences for Bonaventure's stand on the sciences of philosophy and theology. Distinguishing the two sciences, he regarded philosophy as a rational discipline having its own principles, method and object. In its own domain, philosophy was capable of knowing truth with certitude, thus having a positive value for the theologian, who united its conclusions to the doctrines of faith. On the other hand, Bonaventure was vividly aware of the limitations of human reason. He realized that, unassisted by revelation, philosophy was exposed inevitably to error concerning knowledge of God and His action in the world. Van Steenberghen exemplified this from the two texts used by Gilson to show Bonaventure condemning every autonomous philosophy, because it could not attain truth apart from revelation.93 In the first text, Bonaventure excused Aristotle's errors: he could not have perceived the mysteries known only by divine revelation. Bonaventure was not referring here to a congenital weakness compromising the normal use of reason or impairing its proper functions; he was referring rather to the fatal aberration of human reason operating on a plane where it was not entirely at home. In the second text, Bonaventure simply expressed the common and classic affirmation of the Christian tradition on the superiority of divine revelation over human reason. He confirmed this judgment with the Pauline text explaining how God confounded human wisdom by the superior wisdom of the Cross, which was folly to natural reason. Bonaventure then concluded that human science, without the help of faith, strayed fatally into error when trying to get knowledge of divine things. In Van Steenberghen's view then, St. Bonaventure's ideal of Christian wisdom controlled his judgment of the Christian philosopher's attitude toward philosophical research, which was only a step on the road to that wisdom. On difficult questions concerning God and His providence, the Christian philosopher ought to be careful about his conclusions, while opening his mind voluntarily to the light of faith. Bonaventure's judgment on this problem was implicit in his Sentences, but most explicit in his later writings, especially in the Collationes, where he denounced strenuously the errors resulting from the separation of

93 See above: pp. 55-56.

68

INTRODUCTION

philosophy from Christian wisdom by Siger of Brabant and his followers. Bonaventure opposed the rationalism of those Christian philosophers, because, ignoring the authority of Christ, they tried to make philosophy a self-sufficient wisdom. But this did not imply that his own philosophy was Christocentric, or a Christian philosophy.94 In 1955, Gilson published his third history of medieval philosophy. He was convinced that the medieval theologians had produced diverse philosophies having both a truly Christian character and a properly rational content. Their integration of philosophy within theology had the special advantage of favouring in an eminent way the purification and progress of reason: "Whether the upshot was a truly favorable one or not is a point on which anybody is free to entertain his own opinion, provided he knows the history which he makes bold to judge; in any case, his conclusion can only be that of a philosopher, not a historian." 95 Speaking of the thirteenth-century Augustinians, Gilson said that they all subscribed to three doctrines. The first doctrine concerned the human soul, which they defined as a spiritual substance; but none of them upheld "the view that the very essence of this substance was to be the form of a body," Their position went back to St. Augustine, who, influenced by Plato through Plotinus, saw man as a soul using a body; in the thirteenth century, the Augustinian teaching harmonized well with the novel doctrine of plural forms, while producing different interpretations of the doctrines on sensation and the ability of the soul to know itself by an immediate experience. The second doctrine was a corollary of the first and had to do with the divine illumination. The Augustinians held that such an illumination was a 94 Op. tit., pp. 224-28. Van Steenberghen noted here (p. 230, n. 2) that the attitude of Aquinas toward the errors of pagan philosophy was not essentially different from Bonaventure's: Aquinas considered error to be almost always present in philosophy without the help of faith, but Bonaventure saw error there only sooner or later. There were no fundamental changes in Van Steenberghen's views of Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle, or of the character of Bonaventure's philosophy: subordinated to a theology that was chiefly Augustinian in its spirit, his philosophy was an eclectic and Neoplatonizing, especially Augustinizing, Aristoteleanism; cf. pp. 228-34. For his description of Bonaventure's theology see: pp. 23436; for his description of Thomist philosophy and theology see: pp. 246-65. For his accounts of the work of Siger of Brabant and of heterodox Aristoteleanism consult: pp. 265-85; cf. The Modern Schoolman, 29 (1951-52), pp. 11-27; Aristotle in the West, pp. 209-29. On the school of neo-Augustinianism, which was inspired by John Peckham and constituted as a barrier against the "new philosophy" of Aquinas, see: pp. 296-306; cf. Aristotle in the West, pp. 230-38. 95 History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, Random House & London, Sheed & Ward: 1955), citation from p. 368. For his accounts of the Greco-Arabian influence on thirteenth-century thought and the life of the universities see: pp. 235-50. (On his view of the significance of the term Scholasticism note: p. 249). Introducing the philosophy of St Bonaventure, Gilson remarked: "First and foremost a theologian, he was clearly conscious of the new type of learning represented by what we call today scholasticism and he has left us one of its most perfect descriptions." (cf. p. 331). Closing his presentation of Bonaventurean philosophy, which showed the progress of his recent research, Gilson said: "It appears from this summary that Saint Bonaventure's doctrine was not without reason designated by the name 'Augustinism'." (Cf. pp. 339-40). Making no response to Robert's critique, Gilson observed simply, regarding the two versions of St. Bonaventure's Hexaemeron: "the substance of the doctrine is the same but the division and wording of the text are different." (Cf. p. 726, n. 44; see also: p. 687, n. 24).

INTRODUCTION

69

prerequisite condition for necessary judgments by the human intellect regarding purely intelligible objects. The third doctrine dealt with the nature of matter. Most Augustinians gave a minimum of act and of being to matter as a creature of God; moreover, they identified matter with the pure possibility of change, because mutability was the distinctive mark of created being. Both of these positions originated in St. Augustine, who described matter as almost nothing, and as the mutability present in every creature, whether spiritual or corporeal. The thirteenth-century Augustinians, however, saw in matter an incipient seeking of form; so they found in prime matter a positive privation, but this was not the Aristotelean absence of form. Some Augustinians, those less influenced by Aristotle, blended the Stoic doctrine of seminal reasons, which they got from St. Augustine, with the positive passivity of matter. Although no one of them simply reproduced St. Augustine's doctrine, Gflson said, the fundamental doctrines of their theology were Augustinian and, functioning as a form, so to speak, they perfected, unified and ordered all their other doctrines. A real Augustinianism, in Gilson's view, this thirteenth-century development nevertheless owed its scientific organization to the dialectic of Aristotle. The perfection of that organization came with St. Thomas, who either reinterpreted some philosophical doctrines of St. Augustine or replaced them with others, which Aquinas accepted as more true. Consequently, by reforming theology itself, St. Thomas reformed philosophy: he substituted Aristotelean doctrines for Plotinian doctrines, transmitted through St. Augustine. But the Thomist transformation, Gilson maintained, was not a stage in a progressive discovery of Aristotle by Latin thinkers; it was theological before it was metaphysical and, on the philosophical level, it was a revolution but not an evolution of Aristoteleanism. Giving a new meaning to Aristotle's principles, St. Thomas produced a new metaphysics within his theology, which was always true to the Christian teachings of St. Augustine. 96 In his account of the philosophical controversies (1270-77), Gilson noted that the question of the unity of substantial form in man had been discussed peacefully from as early as 1230. Between that year and 1270, however, the question was complicated by biological data borrowed from Aristotle and by the theological belief in the direct creation of the rational soul by God Thus, in the debate between Thomas Aquinas and John Peckham on the question, there were at stake both a particular problem in philosophy and a 96 Op. cit., pp. 361-65. For Gilson's references to the positions of De Wulf and Mandonnet on Augustinianism see: p. 707, n. 86. For his description of the Christian philosophy of Aquinas and its relation to Augustine see: "What is Christian Philosophy?", A Gilson Reader, pp. 177.-91; cf. Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York, Doubleday: 1960) & The Spirit of Thomism (New York, P. J. Kenedy & Sons: 1964). Gilson has also published his personal reflections on the influence of theology on the Christian philosopher Le philosophe et la thlologie (Paris, Le Signe: 1960). English translation by Cecile Gilson, The Philosopher and Theology (New York, Random House: 1962).

70

INTRODUCTION

number of theological implications bound up with it, especially the status of Christ's body between His death and resurrexion. Gilson did not see St. Thomas abandoning his position on the question, which was debated for many years after 1270; so the disputation of 1270 caused only a doctrinal rupture.9'1 Now, in 1955, Van Steenberghen published some lectures that he had given, in 1953, on the thirteenth-century philosophical movement. He began with a review of the positions held, about 1940, by the historians on medieval philosophy; he gave particular attention to their perspectives of thirteenth-century thought and their different views on the problems of the unity of scholastic doctrine and the relation, within it, of Christian faith to human reason. Van Steenberghen then considered the historical antecedents of the doctrinal evolutions in the thirteenth century. Describing the heritage from pagan antiquity, he outlined the development of the liberal arts and their relation to philosophy (especially for Aristotle), which the ancients saw as "the complete synthesis of human learning"; thereafter, he spoke of the heritage from Christian antiquity in the De doctrina Christiana of St. Augustine, who took, for the Christian, the study of the Bible as the highest science, which he called elsewhere our philosophy, and this science used all the learning of pagan antiquity. The influence of St. Augustine on the organization of scholastic studies, Van Steenberghen showed, was evident up to the end of the twelfth century: throughout the period, "the fundamental idea was to replace pagan philosophy by a Christian synthesis." In developing this synthesis, the liberal arts were used as a necessary preparation for the study of the Bible; of the philosophical sciences, logic alone was taught systematically. With the new arrival, beginning in the middle of the twelfth century, of Aristotle along with his Greek and Arabian commentators, the liberal arts lost their position as the framework of the human sciences. Van Steenberghen illustrated this, first from the twelfth century, by a work of Gundissalinus (De divisione philosophiae) and, secondly from the thirteenth century, with the Barcelona manuscript (discovered by Grabmann) originating in the Faculty of Arts at Paris between 1230 and 1240. Van Steenberghen showed the significance of these documents for the change of attitude toward philosophy, particularly at Paris, where the Faculty of Arts became a Faculty of Philosophy in 1255, 97 History of Christian Philosophy, pp. 416-20. For Gilson's view on the other controversies of 1270 and 1277 consult: pp. 410-16, 420-27. Discussing the problems surrounding Latin Averroism. Gilson remarked: "even today, historians still hesitate on the authentic meaning of Aristoteleanism". He then showed that in the second half of the thirteenth century, there were three interpretations of Aristotle: Avicennian, Averroistic and Thomist, each presenting itself as the true Aristotle. On the conflict aroused by the Averroistic interpretation, he wrote: "Whether we call it, from its relation to theology, a 'heterodox Aristoteleanism', or, from its historic cause, an 'Averroism', the designation points out the attitude of the masters of arts, who, identifying Averroes with Aristotle, and Aristotle himself with philosophy, maintained that necessary philosophical conclusions could contradict the teaching of Christian revelation." (Cf. pp. 387-89. citation from p. 388).

INTRODUCTION

71

thus making the liberal arts auxiliary sciences to philosophy and not to theology.98 Toward the end of the twelfth century, there was in Paris, Van Steenberghen said: "an embryonic Aristotelianism, growing around the logic of Aristotle." In the Faculty of Theology, at this time, there were neither theological systems, strictly speaking, nor philosophical systems. A Latin Aristoteleanism, "eclectic and strongly influenced by Neoplatonism", first appeared early in the thirteenth century in the Faculty of Arts. Van Steenberghen distinguished three phases in the evolution of this movement. The first, "to some extent an Avicennian Aristoteleanism", lasted until the prohibitions of 1210 and 1215. The second phase, from those prohibitions until around 1240, realized progress in the logic and ethics of Aristotle, but not in hisLibrinaturales, which were mentioned from about 1230 and not yet studied in 1240. The beginning of studies in those works came during the third phase, from 1240 to 1255, when the prohibitions were ignored. Turning to the Faculty of Theology, Van Steenberghen found there a change, from about 1220, toward the use of philosophy in theology, which began to receive the new Aristotle through Arabian and Jewish intermediaries. When this Neoplatonic Aristoteleanism was received into theology, especially from around 1225 to 1250, it was influenced by many theological doctrines; but the chief influence came from St. Augustine, and so this Neoplatonic Aristoteleanism had a tendency to become Augustinian. Concluding his account of eclectic Aristoteleanism, Van Steenberghen said that the philosophical current in Paris from 1200 to 1250 was not Augustinian, but a new and Aristotelean current that, in both Arts and Theology, was at once eclectic and Neoplatonic; however, among the theologians, it was influenced by the theological tradition, particularly by the Augustinian tradition." Van Steenberghen spoke next of St. Bonaventure's philosophy. First recalling the views that he had expressed on the subject in 1942, he summarized the principal reactions to them. 10° In a general reply to his critics, he set down four points that, in his opinion, "were solidly established as a result of the controversy 1. In his Sentences, St. Bonaventure showed no hostility toward Aristotle, for whom he had esteem and sympathy; this point was fully confirmed by Robert. 2. St. Bonaventure never condemned philosophy, nor did he say that human reason, without faith, was bound to err; he accepted and stressed both the value and the utility of philosophy as a science seeking truth by rational methods, and this point was fully exemplified by Robert. 3. St. Bonaventure was a Christian thinker and theologian: wanting to unify Christian learning, he emphasized the superiority of theology over natural knowledge, but he also stressed the weakness of 98 The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, Nelson: 1955), pp. 3-37. 99 Op. cit., pp. 38-51, 54-55. 100 Op. cit., pp. 56-68. Beside Gilson and Robert, to whose additional note of 1951 Van Steenberghen referred as "very friendly towards me", the reactions came from: F. J. Thonnard, S. Brounts, Z. Alszeghy and L. Veuthey.

72

INTRODUCTION

human reason; he condemned only those Christian philosophers who made philosophy a self-sufficient science instead of a step toward Christian wisdom, and on this, Van Steenberghen remarked, there was no dispute. 4. The basis of St. Bonaventure's philosophy was Aristotelean, which was the common philosophy in Arts and Theology at Paris when he studied there; the philosophy found in his theological writings, moreover, showed that he adopted a whole range of Aristotelean doctrines: on this point, there were different opinions, even among Van Steenberghen's critics. He spoke next of three other points, which were open to various but legitimate judgments; he then gave his own judgments on them. On the first point, the complements and corrections added by St. Bonaventure to Aristoteleanism, he said that Bonaventurean philosophy was not a pure Aristoteleanism; rather, as a "Neoplatonic Aristotelianism, put at the disposition of an Augustinian theology", it was modified by many Neoplatonic influences and, from St. Bonaventure's theology, it was influenced by Augustinian elements: for this reason, Van Steenberghen did not reject the formula Augustinian Aristoteleanism. Concerning the second point, whether this philosophy formed a real synthesis or remained eclectic, he reaffirmed his view that it was not a fully unified system; St. Bonaventure's philosophical positions, often inspired by theological motives, did not always escape a juxtaposing of Aristotelean doctrines with Neoplatonic or Augustinian themes. Regarding the third point, which dealt with the spirit of St. Bonaventure's philosophy, Van Steenberghen remarked that what others called the Augustinian spirit of this philosophy was really the Christian spirit of St. Bonaventure's theology: this spirit, found also in St. Thomas's theology, was not specifically Augustinian; it belonged to the synthesis of all Christian learning and characterized Christian doctrine as a whole. Thus, integrated into St. Bonaventure's theology, his philosophy shared the Christian spirit; when his philosophy was isolated from his theology, then, Van Steenberghen said, it was only a rational system, of which it was difficult to say that it had any spirit at all, for it was rather a body without a soul. l01 In his account of the principal events leading to the condemnation of 1277, Van Steenberghen said that St. Thomas had understood better than any other theologian that philosophy necessarily formed the central

101 Op. cit., pp. 68-73. In 1964, Van Steenberghen wrote: "S'il fallait une etiquette simple pour designer la philosophic du saint Bonaventure, la meilleure formule serait: AristoUlisme angusimsanr. Pour etre plus complet et plus nuance, il faudrait dire: AristoUlisme nfoplatonisant et surtout angustinisant, mis au service d'une thiologie augustinienne et franciscaine. " See: Histoire de la philosophic. Periode chretienne (Louvain, Publications universitaires: 1964), p. 95. In his earlier work, handling the philosophy of Siger of Brabant and the problem of radical Aristoteleanism, Van Steenberghen restated his previous views on those subjects; then, having outlined his main positions on them, he summarized the reactions to his views and, replying to those who had criticized them, insisted on the historical accuracy of radical or heterodox Aristoteleanism as descriptive of Siger's philosophy: cf. Philos. Movem. Thin. Cent., pp. 75-93.

INTRODUCTION

73

framework of the sciences; he also understood that Christendom lacked a philosophy expressing its particular culture and peculiar needs. Hence, assuming a personal mission, he formed such a philosophy and, with its help, rethought all the theological problems of his age. Because his new system departed on many points from the traditional teaching of theology, the conservative theologians saw it as an ally, and then as an accomplice, of radical Aristoteleanism. Thus, in 1270, the innovations of St. Thomas provoked the attack on him by those theologians, particularly by John Peckham. Inspired by St. Bonaventure, who apparently encouraged Peckham's opposition to Thomism, he founded the philosophical school of neo-Augustinianism: this was new from an adoption of Aristotelean, Arabian and Jewish doctrines; it was an Augustinianism because of a deliberate attachment to Augustinian doctrines in the traditional theology.102 Returning to the problems of the unity of scholasticism and its relation to Christianity, Van Steenberghen gave his solutions to them. He said that De Wulf was right in explaining the unity of scholastic philosophy by the unified civilization of medieval Christendom. Although Aristoteleanism and Neoplatonism were the chief philosophical sources influencing Christendom's uniform cultural environment, nonetheless, Christianity also had a deep and universal influence on the unity of scholastic thought. Considering the nature of this unity, Van Steenberghen noted that De Wulf had abandoned the notion of a scholastic synthesis for Baeumker's scholastic heritage, which Van Steenberghen qualified as "chiefly a question of fundamental doctrines, a sort of common foundation" giving rise to different philosophical edifices. Now Gilson had united them in a common spmt, making them Christian philosophies. Reviewing Gilson's position of 1950, Van Steenberghen set his own position against it. He showed how philosophy was influenced by its cultural environment, particularly by Christianity, which had both a negative and a positive effect on medieval philosophy: negative, for instance, in impeding philosophical progress by untimely condemnations of error; positive, for example, in suggesting new themes for philosophical reflexion, as Gilson himself had seen. Showing next how philosophy had a reciprocal influence on its environment, Van Steenberghen indicated that, in the course of time, medieval philosophy became a separate and autonomous science with its own object and proper methods. But Gilson stated that medieval philosophies were specifically Christian and, in 1950, he attributed their value to the influence not only of revelation, but also of their theologies. Van Steenberghen was convinced that Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy was entirely foreign to medieval thinkers, who knew Christians that philosophized, and so they were Christian philosophers: for instance, Bonaventure and Aquinas, who constructed true, but not Christian, philosophies. Regarding the influence of medieval theology on philosophy, Van Steenberghen observed that, using 102 Op. cit., pp. 94-103.

74

INTRODUCTION

philosophy as an instrument, speculative theology studied the data of revelation common to every theologian; therefore, in the Middle Ages, theological systems differed essentially by the philosophies that they used as instruments. Consequently, the variety and originality of medieval theologies were mainly of the philosophical order; the value of medieval philosophies came from their authors, not as theologians, but as thinkers who had attained philosophical maturity, which was necessary to be a good theologian. 103 In a work published in 1959, Joseph Ratzinger studied the position of Aristoteleanism in St. Bonaventure's theological views of history. Ratzinger introduced his study with a review of the anti-Aristotelean attitude attributed by Gilson to an Augustinian Bonaventure, and the opposite stand on this question taken by Van Steenberghen, who saw Bonaventure only as inspiring a neo-Augustinianism by encouraging Peckham in his stand against Thomism. In the course of his review, Ratzinger noted the different reactions of other medievalists to the diverse views of Gilson and Van Steenberghen on Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristoteleanism: the reactions against Van Steenberghen's view, for instance, showed that the spirit permeating Bonaventure's Aristotelean doctrines, which were numerous, was indeed Augustinian. For his part, Ratzinger thought that Van Steenberghen's view of Bonaventure's Augustinianism was accurate, but his antiAristoteleanism had more depth than Van Steenberghen would admit.104 Presenting his own views on the problem, Ratzinger first examined the development of Bonaventure's anti-Aristoteleanism, which began in 1267 and, thereafter, became a constant theme in his sermons and discourses. Thus, in 1267, Bonaventure condemned both the doctrine of an eternal world and the doctrine of one intellect for all men. In 1268, drawing up a "canon of anti-Aristoteleanism", he also condemned the doctrine of the necessity of fate. Ratzinger saw Bonaventure condemning, up to 1273, these three doctrines as a threefold blindness leading to the triple error of denying the divine exemplarity, the providence of God and His disposition for men of future rewards and glory. Bonaventure's condemnations were directed primarily, not against Aristotle, but against those thirteenthcentury Aristoteleans who launched an eschatological attack on Christianity. He never condemned the Thomist form of Aristoteleanism, not even the stand on the eternity of the world taken by Aquinas, whose distinction between the philosophical and the theological approaches to the question Bonaventure explicitly approved. On the other hand, he saw that there was some danger for Aquinas in following Aristotle too readily.105 Having shown the development of Bonaventure's anti-Aristoteleanism, Ratzinger delineated its two principal forms. The first form was an attempt 103 Ofi. cit., pp. 106-14; cf. His/oire tie la philosophie, pp. 170-75. 104 Die Geschichtsthfologif dcs heihgen Bonaventura (Miinchen & Zurich, Snell & Steiner: 1959). pp. 1 '21-36. 105 Op. fil.. pp. 136-40.

INTRODUCTION

75

by Bonaventure to uphold a Christian concept of time. In his "antiAristotelean canon" of 1268, he saw Aristotle's denial of divine exemplarism as a fundamental error, because it gave rise to the doctrine of an eternal world, which introduced a host of other errors. Although Bonaventure had indicated those errors in his Sentences, nevertheless, at that time, he did not show any anti-Aristoteleanism, since he was not certain whether Aristotle had taught that the world was eternal. When Bonaventure was certain, in his later Collationes, that Aristotle had taught this doctrine, then, for the first time, he manifested an anti-Aristotelean attitude. While Aquinas held that an endless regress was possible in treating the question of an eternal world, Bonaventure denied such a possibility, because, in his judgment, the history of the world involved both an ordered emanation from God and an ordered return to God, with Christ at the centre. This view of history, Ratzinger observed, could not permit an eternal world: Bonaventure saw time as a period of salvation, but not as an accident of motion; so, influenced by Joachim of Flora, he understood time as history, particularly of salvation. Aquinas, however, rejected Joachim's theology of history and disproved it on the testimony, not only of Scripture, but-also of Augustine and Aristotle.106 The second form of Bonaventure's anti-Aristoteleanism, according to Ratzinger, was prophetic-eschatological. In his Sentences, Bonaventure had opposed the doctrine of an eternal world as a metaphysical contradiction. This line of his thought gave way to a second line in 1267, when he began to see heretical Aristoteleanism as an eschatological phenomenon. Thus, from 1267 to 1273, he spoke of heretical Aristoteleanism in apocalyptic terms, for instance, as the beast rising from the deep. At the same time, he applied to philosophy and to natural reason images that were tantamount to a condemnation of both. He spoke of philosophy as the magician of Pharaoh, as the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and as the beast from the deep; he referred to natural reason as a prostitute drawing men away from the wisdom of Christ, and he referred to those philosophers who, from pride, depended on reason alone as allies of Lucifer (luciferiani). Finally, prophesying the end of a theology relying on reason, Bonaventure, by 1273, became increasingly anti-intellectual and progressively anti-scholastic. This attitude had its roots in his original Franciscan ideal, which made room for some antiintellectual elements, such as those found in Joachim of Flora, while appealing to pseudo-Dionysius as the protector of the contemplative Church. 106 Op. cit., pp. 140-44. Considering Bonaventure's doctrine on time, Ratzinger digressed here (pp. 144-48) to illustrate it under three headings: 1) God as the intelligible sphere; 2) the circle of world-time i.e. from God, through Christ, to God); 3) the false doctrine of the philosophers on eternal circulation (namely, of motion and time, of the stars, and of human souls entering and leaving bodies). See also, by Ratzinger. "Der Mensch und die Zeit im Denken des heiligen Bonaventura", Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Problem des mittelalterslichen Augustinismus, L'homme et son destin d'apris les pemeurs du moyen age. Actes du Premier Congrts international de Philosophic Mddievale, Louvain-Bruxelles, 1958 (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1960), pp. 473-83.

76

INTRODUCTION

In short, never intending to be an Augustinian, Bonaventure sought only to give to Augustine and to Aristotle their rightful places in the history of thought. !07 On concluding his study, Ratzinger set down the three levels of antiAristoteleanism that he found in Bonaventure's writings. First, and from the beginning, Bonaventure had a concept of time causing him to reject Aristotle's doctrine of an eternal world Secondly, from 1267, he developed an anti-Aristoteleanism against, not Aristotle himself, but the thirteenthcentury Aristoteleans promoting a philosophy separated from Christian faith; this development resulted in an anti-philosophism on Bonaventure's part. Thirdly, he ended with a prophetic anti-scholasticism motivated by Franciscan, Joachimitic and pseudo-Dionysian elements; this attitude led Bonaventure to look upon a theology relying on reason as something transitory and to be replaced by a theology depending on authority, thus making all speculative thought superfluous and a thing of the past. Ratzinger, then, did not concur entirely with the position of either Gilson or Van Steenberghen, nor with that of Robert, on Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristoteleanism and philosophy. Ratzinger saw Bonaventure reasoning in much the same way at the end of his life as he did at the start of his scholastic career. In his later years, however, a new element appeared in his writings. This was an extra-philosophical and an extra-theological element, which provoked Bonaventure to appraise both scholastic and scientific thought in a different way from that in his early years. He did not belittle such thought, since he continued to cultivate it; but he took it as having no finality. Bonaventure, in his later years, foresaw that the way of life exemplified by St. Francis would eventually become the common way of life in the whole Church, when this simple and foolish man (simplex et idiota) would triumph over all the great scholars, and the latter-day Church would live in his spirit.108 The latest major work, issued in 1966, by Van Steenberghen showed no substantial change in his views on thirteenth-century philosophy. Following the general format of his first studies on the subject, this work incorporated much of the progress that he and other medievalists had made since then, 107 Die Geschichtstheologie ..., pp. 148-59. 108 Of>. cit., pp. 159-61. Two other studies, published at this time, sketched the controversies among the historians on Bonaventurean philosophy and noted the need for an acceptable solution to them: Christian VVenin, "La connaissance philosophique d'apres saint Bonaventure", L'hamme et son destin ..., pp. 485-94; R J. Roch, S. J., "The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure — A Controversy", FS, 19 (1959), pp. 20726. In a work entitled: "The quest for certainty in Bonaventure", B. A. Gendreau recorded, but did not take a stand on, the conflicting positions of the historians regarding Bonaventurean philosophy, however, he found that St. Bonaventure had a purely rational philosophy within the ambit of his theology, FS, 21 (1961), pp. 104-227. Two years later, Anton C. Pegis outlined the positions taken by De Wulf, Mandonnet and Gilson on medieval philosophy Pegis situated this philosophy within a theological order, which he saw as its proper and historical context; he then concluded that De WulFs "common synthesis" could no longer be sustained, whereas Gilson's position on the existence of several syntheses in the thirteenth century was now verified Cf. The Middle Ages and Philosophy (Chicago, Regnery 1963).

INTRODUCTION

77

both in understanding the doctrines of the thirteenth century and in a knowledge of its philosophical and theological literature. Adverting to the evidence contained in newly published editions of thirteenth-century writings, and using the many monographs and articles released by other historians, Van Steenberghen consolidated his position on the character of the philosophy developed, at Paris and Oxford, in the thirteenth century. For instance, regarding the literature of the first half of the period, he observed that, though it was either imperfectly known or insufficiently studied, what was now understood of the period and of its thought consolidated his conclusions on them. He was convinced that future research would indeed confirm those conclusions.109 On treating St. Bonaventure's philosophy, Van Steenberghen handled first the Bonaventurean problem as posed by Gilson. He recorded Gilson's position on the problem: Bonaventure, in transposing the ascetic ideal of Francis to the level of scholarly life, reorganized that life interiorly according to the Franciscan ideal, thus producing a Franciscan philosophy and a metaphysics of Christian mysticism. Van Steenberghen did not accept this interpretation of Bonaventure's primordial objective. Although Bonaventure, as Minister General of his Order, reorganized Franciscan studies and made them a way of sanctification, nevertheless, he accomplished his task without overthrowing the established state of things in both the schools of theology and the schools of liberal arts. He was formed in theology by Alexander of Hales and John of la Rochelle, whose doctrinal orientations he professedly followed; so, making no essential changes in the Franciscan programme of studies, Bonaventure allowed the young religious to study the secular sciences in the schools of liberal arts conducted by the Order. The Bonaventurean problem then, as defined by Gilson, did not exist. Bonaventure never transformed a natural, or pagan, philosophy into either a Franciscan philosophy or a metaphysics of Christian mysticism, both of which were altogether foreign to his thought. He sought rather to build a theological synthesis, and so he accentuated the spiritual orientation of theological studies, that they would be an apprenticeship for his religious in the contemplative life exemplified by St. Francis.110 109 La philosophic au xuf siede. Philosophes medievaux, t IX (Louvain, Publications universitaires & Paris, Beatrice Nauwelaerts: 1966), cf. p. 189. Beside the wealth of bibliographical materials contained in this part of the work, cc. 1-4, the following sections were noteworthy for their incorporation of recent progress on the subjects concerned: "Lacunes de notre connaissance du XIII* siecle", pp. 29-33; "Principaux centres d'fitudes superieures", pp. 73-81; "L'enseignement philosophique a Paris vers 1240", pp. 118-32, note particularly: pp. 121-24, 127-29: "La literature theologique a Paris", pp. 151-70, note especially: p. 156 on the Magisterium divinale of William of Auvergne, pp. 164-67 on the writings of Alexander of Hales, and pp. 169-70 on the penetration of Aristoteleanism into the Faculty of Theology. The final section: "L'aristotelisme latin vers 1250", pp. 181-89, had a defence of his expression aristottlisme niaplatonisant against a criticism of Ratzinger, following Gotlieb Sohngen (pp. 183-85), and an extended examination of the propriety of the expression avicennisme latin (pp. 185-87). 110 Op. ctt., pp. 193-96. Van Steenberghen thought thatj. G. Bougerol's interpretation of Bonaventure's scientific ideal marked a notable progress over Gilson's views. Bougerol described Bonaventure's

78

INTRODUCTION

Understanding Bonaventure's synthesis as constituting a theological wisdom, Van Steenberghen saw Gilson's use of 'Franciscan philosophy' and 'metaphysics of Christian mysticism' to signify the whole of Bonaventurean wisdom as corresponding neither to the thought of Bonaventure nor to historical reality. Gilson has tried to retain a distinction between philosophy and theology in the doctrine of the Augustinians by saying that the theologian argued and deduced conclusions from the articles of faith, whereas the philosopher meditated on the object of revelation. But Gilson, showing that Bonaventure has presented philosophy as an element of, or a step toward, an integral Christian wisdom, found in his writings only a condemnation of every philosophy separated from faith and independent of revelation. Considering this aspect of Gilson's position, Van Steenberghen suggested that many of Gilson's texts on Bonaventure's philosophy might be interpreted as relating to philosophy as a particular step toward, or a partial element of, the Bonaventurean synthesis. Could the philosophy so distinguished from theology, Van Steenberghen asked, be called a Franciscan philosophy or a metaphysics of Christian mysticism? The answer to this question required a proper understanding of Bonaventure's conception of philosophy in the hierarchy of the degrees of Christian knowledge. 1 " At this point, Van Steenberghen repeated his analysis, given in 1951, of Bonaventure's judgment concerning philosophy and its role in the organization of Christian wisdom. 112 He then drew, from his analysis, some consequences bearing on the Bonaventurean problem. As a step in the acquisition of Christian wisdom, philosophy was duly constituted as autonomous knowledge according to its proper and rational methods, and so it served as an instrument of theological science. Bonaventure, along with all the great theologians of his time, used philosophy in large measure to elaborate that science; but philosophy functioned then as a servant of theology and, in that subalternate position, it was no longer autonomous knowledge. Becoming a constitutive element of theological knowledge, philosophy was subordinated to the articles of faith, or the truths of revelation, which were the principal element, or the principles, of

Franciscan vocation as having for its objective the placing of intelligence at the service of devotion, so that he realized the unity of knowledge through theology; Christ was both the medium and the centre of this unity, which belonged properly to a theological wisdom: cf. Introduction 6 I'itude de saint Bonaventure, Bibiiotheque de theologie, serie 1, theologie dogmatique, v. 2 (Tournai & Paris, Descl6e: 1961), pp. 3547, 227-35. 111 Op. fit., pp. 203-05. Van Steenberghen reviewed here (pp. 205-10) the stand taken by Gilson on this problem and the objections raised, in 1926, against it by Mandonnet. Then, noting how Gilson had hardened his position since that time, Van Steenberghen drew attention to the work of Robert, who showed that Gilson's interpretation of Bonaventurean philosophy could no longer be sustained. Van Steenberghen also referred to an unpublished dissertation by C. Wenin (see above: n. 108), who concurred fully with Robert's conclusions in showing that Bonaventure's conception of philosophy was not different from that of Aquinas. 112 Op. cit., pp. 210-16; see above: pp. 67-68.

INTRODUCTION

79

theological science. Now, Van Steenberghen remarked, philosophy was always encountered in this ancillary condition in Bonaventure's writings; so, as Wenin suggested, it was not surprising that Bonaventure differed when he explained the nature and method of philosophy and, on the other hand, when he used it in his theology: the condition of philosophy was not the same in the two instances. Was it possible, Van Steenberghen asked, to withdraw Bonaventure's philosophy from its theological context and to reconstruct it apart from that context, which deprived philosophy of its autonomy? Gilson's answer to the question, he said, was well known: Bonaventure's philosophy, and the philosophies of Aquinas and Augustine, could not be reconstituted in this way, because those theologians chose to build Christian philosophies in the light of faith and having an order of exposition conformed to that of theology. But Gilson has never produced even one text showing that such was the intention of those theologians. In Van Steenberghen's view, Bonaventure and Aquinas manifested the contrary intention by distinguishing philosophy and theology according to their proper methods and orders of exposition. Although St. Augustine did not know that distinction, nevertheless, the Christian wisdom (which he called our Christian philosophy) that he opposed to pagan philosophy (philosophia gentium) was a theological wisdom still undifferentiated and containing virtually a philosophy and a theology. Because Gilson had not respected Bonaventure's own explanation of the nature and method of philosophy, Van Steenberghen was obliged to write: "Gilson was wrong in presenting as 'the philosophy of St. Bonaventure' a multilated exposition of his theology". This exposition reproduced his theological synthesis by eliminating doctrines exclusively theological and retaining themes common to philosophy and theology, while treating those themes in the light of revelation. But Van Steenberghen thought that it was possible to reconstruct Bonaventure's philosophy according to his own conception of that science, and with the help of the numerous philosophical materials embedded in his theological writings. 113 For his examination both of Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle and of his positions on the errors of pagan philosophy, Van Steenberghen restated what he had said before on those subjects.114 At the end of his examination, however, Van Steenberghen took notice of Ratzinger's views on the anti-Aristoteleanism of Bonaventure. Van Steenberghen noted that Ratzinger had situated Bonaventure's opposition to Aristotle on the level of the theology of history and not on the level of either epistemology or metaphysics; having a religious character, this opposition involved a contrasting by Bonaventure of a Christian vision of the world with the pagan

113 Op. cit, pp. 216-20. 114 Op. cit, pp. 220-38. Cf. Siger dt Brabant, v. 2. pp. 447-59; "Le xilf stecle", Histmre de t'Eglise ..., pp. 228-30.

80

INTRODUCTION

vision of it found in Aristotle. Van Steenberghen also outlined the three phases of the Bonaventurean anti-Aristoteleanism set forth by Ratzinger. Then, commenting on Ratzinger's views, Van Steenberghen said that he saw no difficulties in accepting them, for his own positions were closer to Ratzinger's than the latter had thought: Bonaventure, in his Collationes, attacked those Christian philosophers who separated philosophy from faith and theology, and he opposed them with a Christian vision of the universe, namely, the history of salvation through Christ. Thus, seeing in Ratzinger's exposition a certain complement of his own views, Van Steenberghen pointed out that, for Ratzinger, Bonaventure's change of attitude in his late years did not involve any change in the nature or content of his philosophy; so he did not abandon his Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism to adopt a specifically Augustinian philosophy. Consequently, his later developments took place outside philosophy, properly speaking; they took place in his theological perspective and in his attitude toward the philosophers. On the other hand, Van Steenberghen thought that the anti-Aristoteleanism and anti-philosophism of Bonaventure, as described by Ratzinger, could also be considered as the common attitude, for the most part, of all the orthodox thinkers of his time, including Aquinas. They all condemned as erroneous the Aristotelean conception of an eternal world and the pagan notion of a cyclical return of events; they also went back to the Biblical teachings on the fall and redemption of man, and they put Christ at the centre of history while making Him the keystone of the supernatural order. Moreover, condemning rationalism and naturalism, they all looked upon philosophy as an element of an integral Christian wisdom and as an instrument of theology. The sole originality of Bonaventure here lay in some of his eschatological and apocalyptical views, which he took, for the most part, from pseudoDionysius and Joachim of Flora. Stating that Aquinas, no less than Bonaventure, rejected Aristotle's theory of time according as it supported a necessary eternity of time and motion, Van Steenberghen noted that Aquinas, nonetheless, considered the idea of an eternal world not to be absurd, or at least that the impossibility of such a world could not be perceived, since revelation alone made it known that the world began to exist in time. In other respects, Aristotle's physical theory of time, which Aquinas accepted, was in no way incompatible with a theological conception of time as a limited duration of events constituting the history of salvation. Hence, Christian anti-Aristoteleanism, and not just Bonaventurean, bore uniquely on the thesis of the eternity of the world in the past: the eternity of time in the future was not excluded by the eschatological doctrines of Christianity, which implied that "a new heavens and a new earth" will replace the present cosmic order. In short, for Van Steenberghen, the antiAristoteleanism in St. Bonaventure's Collationes was less novel than Ratzinger thought. What was new about them, Van Steenbergen said, was the polemical tone and the literary form proper to those sermons; in addition, there was Bonaventure's eschatological and apocalyptical vision, but this

INTRODUCTION

81

contributed nothing essential to his constant view of the opposition between pagan and Christian thought." 5 While presenting Bonaventure's philosophy as such, Van Steenberghen asked how it ought to be characterized. Before answering the question, he described how he was led to depart from the views, commonly accepted prior to 1942, of Gilson and Mandonnet on Bonaventure as the best representative of thirteenth-century Augustinianism. Next, having given a panoramic view of Bonaventure's philosophical doctrines, Van Steenberghen explained the significance of his expression Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism as qualifying Bonaventure's philosophy. The substantive term Aristoteleanism indicated the fundamental constituent, or the basic element of that philosophy; the active participle Neoplatonizing marked the new orientation taken by this fundamentally Aristotelean philosophy, or the extensions and corrections of Aristoteleanism, thus giving to the final synthesis its proper colour, specific form and most characteristic traits. Since the Neoplatonic components of Bonaventure's philosophy were essential and specific, Van Steenberghen said, it would be inaccurate to say of Bonaventure that, in philosophy, he was Aristotelean and nothing more." 6 Adverting again to the critics opposing his stand on Bonaventure's philosophy, Van Steenberghen, on this occasion, replied to them individually."7 In his reply to Robert's criticism, Van Steenberghen observed that Robert found him in error because his examination of Bonaventure's writings was too narrow, and this prevented him from seeing where Bonaventure preferred St. Augustine to Aristotle, even in philosophy. Robert also showed that, in some important texts, Bonaventure displayed a great esteem for St. Augustine, even as a philosopher, and he declared that, in the writings of Augustine, a solution could be found for almost every philosophical problem. Robert conceded, nevertheless, that Bonaventure completed or corrected some gaps of Augustinian Neoplatonism with numerous borrowings from Aristoteleanism. Bonaventure's philosophy, therefore, deserved the name medieval Augustinianism, unless it could be shown from his texts that he was deluding himself in believing that he was following St. Augustine. Van Steenberghen then said that Robert's position was not as far apart from his own as Robert had thought, and as he himself remarked in 1951. To remove every possible misunderstanding between them, Van Steenberghen now added some brief observations on their differences. The profound admiration of Bonaventure for the genius of Augustine was as incontestable as the strong Augustinian stamp of Bonaventure's theological work; but that did not suffice to characterize his 115 La ptiilosophie au XIII' Slide, pp. 238-42. 116 Op. at., pp. 246-50. 117 In addition to those to whom he had given a general response in 1951 (see above: pp. 71-72), Van Steenberghen replied to a more recent critique by H. Krizovljan, and he analyzed the stand of G. H. Tavard on the status of philosophy in Bonaventure's theology: cf. op. cit., pp. 251-56, 260-61 & 264-67.

82

INTRODUCTION

philosophy, which ought to be detached carefully, piece by piece, and reconstructed apart from his theology. When completed, this operation would reveal a synthesis having basically Aristotelean components with sundry borrowings from Neoplatonism, notably Augustinianism, acting as complementary and specifying elements: in other words, a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism. Thus, Van Steenberghen saw Aristoteleanism constituting the point of departure and the foundation of Bonaventure's philosophy, or the stem on which he grafted Neoplatonic doctrines, particularly Augustinian doctrines; Robert, however, saw Bonaventure's philosophy as fundamentally Augustinian, but benefitting in very large measure from the growing influence of Aristoteleanism.118 Van Steenberghen adverted here to Ratzinger's concurrence, for the most part, with his views on the Augustinianism of Bonaventure. He also noted that Ratzinger showed how Bonaventure's theological completion of time followed the Aristotelean conception of cosmic time rather than the Augustinian notion of anthropological time. 119 But Ratzinger had seen a weakness in Van Steenberghen's position on the condition of Bonaventure's philosophy when it was withdrawn from his theology: that philosophy was a collection of purely rational doctrines and, as such, foreign to the Christian spirit; this was tantamount to conceding that the philosophy thus reconstituted was an artificial construction, and one forming a body without a soul. Ratzinger then concluded, Van Steenberghen said, that Bonaventure's philosophy, conforming to Augustinian conceptions, could not be isolated from his theology, to which it was vitally assimilated, whereas the philosophy of Aquinas could be taken apart from his theology, because this philosophy had a real autonomy in its own order. Van Steenberghen's position, therefore, entailed a certain inconsistency: against Gilson, he affirmed that Bonaventure's philosophy could be withdrawn from his theology, but this operation was artificial, and so Van Steenberghen came back implicitly to an Augustinian interpretation. Now Van Steenberghen, in reply, said that Ratzinger was mistaken in thinking that there was a difference between Bonaventure's philosophy and that of Aquinas, an error already exposed by Robert and Wenin. In principle, Bonaventure's philosophy was as separable from his theology as was the philosophy of Aquinas; however, in practice, the task was just as delicate and artificial in the one instance as in the other, so that it would be as senseless to speak of a spirit of the philosophy of Aquinas as it would be of Bonaventure's philosophy. Gilson's position on the question was entirely unacceptable, because, under the name philosophy, he has presented a mutilated exposition of the theology of both Bonaventure and Aquinas; so, neglecting 118 Op. tit., pp. 257-60. 119 Hence. Ratzinger's studies showed the defects in the views of some historians, e.g. Angelico da Vinca, on the status of Aristoteleanism in Bonaventure's philosophy: cf. op. cit., pp. 261-63; see above: n. 106, p. 75.

INTRODUCTION

83

their views on the nature of philosophy and on its relation to theology, he offered, not an artificial reconstructuon, but an inadmissable change of the nature of their thought.120 In the conclusion to his study of Bonaventure's philosophy, Van Steenberghen stressed once more that Bonaventure was a theologian and, as such, he produced a theological synthesis. For him, as for all the scholastics of his time, theology was the science of the credibile ut intelligibile and the fruit of fides quaerens intellectum. Using philosophy as a rational instrument, theology, in this condition, had a method involving a certain irreducible duality: it had to take account of the needs of reason while remaining subordinated to revealed doctrine, from which theology received its principles. This heteronomy of theological reasoning appeared frequently in Bonaventure's writings, where human opinions were evaluated in the light of Christian faith and accepted only to the degree in which they concorded with Catholic truth. On questions touching the faith, he rejected philosophical conceptions that he judged incompatible with either revelation or traditional theological teaching; but he also preferred philosophical opinions concurring better with the Scriptures or the Fathers and the Doctors of the Church. All this, in Van Stecnberghen's view, showed that the role of reason and of philosophy in the development of theology was still imperfectly understood by Bonaventure. Moreover, he never produced a sturdy philosophical synthesis, as did Aquinas. As a theologian, Bonaventure belonged to the Augustinian school through both the spirit and the principal doctrines of his theology; however, in philosophy, Augustinianism was but one of the sources of his thought, and it was secondary by comparison with Aristoteleanism. Gilson and Mandonnet concurred in seeing that the unity of Bonaventure's thought was not of the philosophical order: Gilson saw no rational synthesis there, so he proposed Christ as the centre of Bonaventure's philosophy; Mandonnet saw there a theological synthesis, so that Bonaventure's theological perspectives alone accounted for the nature of the philosophical elements incorporated 120 Op. cit., pp. 263-64. Van Steenberghen referred also to Ratzinger's difficulties in understanding how Bonaventure, an electic Aristotelean, could inspire an anti-Aristotelean neo-Augustinianism. Handling those difficulties, Van Steenberghen said that Bonaventure was not an eclectic Aristotelean, but a theologian using a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism still poorly consolidated, or eclectic. When he came face to face, a decade later, with new forms of Latin Aristoteleanism, especially heterodox Aristoteleanism, he approved and encouraged Peckham and the Franciscan school, who had gathered under the banner of St. Augustine to fight'against the radical Aristoteleanism of Siger and the disquieting Aristoleleanism of Aquinas. It was in this sense that Bonaventure inspired neo-Augustinianism; but his attitude at this time implied no change in the doctrinal content of his philosophy or of his theology, since neo-Augustinianism was not a new philosophical school. On the contrary, it was the philosophy adopted for forty years by the Parisian theologians; however, in 1270, an effort was made to give it strength and a principle of unity by putting it under the protection of St. Augustine. See: op. at., p. 471. For Van Steenberghen's account of neoAugustinianism see: pp. 475-500; cf. pp. 456-71, for neo-Augustinianism and Thomas Aquinas. For his account of heterodox Aristoteleanism see: pp. 356-412, particularly pp. 360-63; cf. pp. 430-56, on Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant.

84

INTRODUCTION

into his synthesis. Influenced by Gilson, most of the recent historians have presented Bonaventure's thought without weighing his own very lucid distinctions between philosophy and the use of it by the theologian in developing the science of theology, or by the Christian in his personal acquisition of a theological wisdom. The misunderstanding of these distinctions, Van Steenberghen remarked, has caused an extreme confusion of ideas, which, out of respect for Bonaventure himself, ought to be abandoned. His true greatness lay in his admirable Christian vision of the universe transfigured by the incarnate Word, and in the clear-sightedness with which he discerned and defined the steps of Christian knowledge from sense experience to the threshold of the beatific vision.121 In 1968, Hendrikus van der Laan published a work on the philosophical (wijsgerige) foundation of Bonaventure's theology. The last chapter of the work had to do with Bonaventure's synthesis, which van der Laan found to be determined by the theme of nature and grace, the relation of theology to philosophy, and the meaning of Sacred Scripture. Outlining the theme of nature and grace, he showed that man worked from nature by the light and the certitude of reason, but he worked from grace by the light of faith and the certitude of Scriptural authority. Thus, theology operated by a supernatural light, whereas the sciences operated by a natural light and, attaining truth, they culminated in philosophy, which was incomplete in its nature. Bonaventure, centering his thought on Christ, guaranteed the harmony of nature and grace, of philosophy and theology, by the fourfold meaning of the Scriptures, or their allegorical sense. The Aristoteleanism of Bonaventure was evident on many levels: in the structure of reality, the non-spiritual was set against the spiritual with man combining the two and, in the structure of things, there were matter and form, potentiality and actuality; in epistemology, Bonaventure adopted the agent and possible intellects, and he made sense knowledge the basis of intellectual knowledge; finally, he saw God, who was ens et bonum, as pure act and the ground of causality in creatures. But Bonaventure also manifested non-Aristotelean traits, both Platonic and non-Platonic. His Platonic traits were exemplarism, 121 Op. cit., pp. 267-71. For his views on Thomas Aquinas see: pp. 307-56. Van Steenberghen described the relations between Bonaventure and Aquinas from the viewpoint of their contributions to the cultural and doctrinal advances of their age on pp. 540-48. In particular, he returned to their differences on the level of spirituality. He said that his expressions Christian extremism and Christian humanism, used by him to delineate those differences, were not successful, because they were understood in a sense very remote from his thought on the subject Stating that the term extremism implied no pejorative meaning in his view of Bonaventure's doctrine, Van Steenberghen contrasted the reactions of Bonaventure with those of Aquinas to the threat against the wisdom of the Gospel posed by the deviations of heterodox Aristoteleanism. Bonaventure preferred to sacrifice a human value when it seemed to be an obstacle to the Gospel: hence, his extremism; Aquinas chose to defend by a serious and philosophical dialogue, the same human value without endangering the Gospel: hence his humanism. In short, they represented diverse attitudes, common enough in the Christian tradition, toward natural reason and human values considered in the light of faith. Ratzinger's study, Van Steenberghen noted, fully confirmed his own views on Bonaventure's Christian attitude, in his late years, toward the value of secular learning. Cf. loc. cit, pp. 543-46.

INTRODUCTION

85

illumination, and knowledge in the eternal reasons; his non-Platonic traits were the seminal reasons of St. Augustine and universal hylomorphism, which was derived from Avicebron and perhaps from St. Augustine, According to van der Laan, then, Bonaventure's thought constituted a Platinizing Aristoteleanism.12'1 In his description of Bonaventure's Platonic traits, van der Laan, utilizing the work of H. Th. Vollenhoven, presented a brief history of exemplarism. Centred upon the Platonic Ideas, this doctrine had different historical developments. Although the Old Academy followed Plato, his renowned pupil, Aristotle, later denied the existence of the Ideas; Aristotle then came to a semi-realism, which he eventually exchanged for an antirealist and purely cosmological dualism. The Middle Academy, ca. 275 B.C., asked whether the Ideas were knowable, but the New Academy, becoming skeptical, even questioned their existence while denying all criteria of truth. The Ideas were accepted, however, as criteria of the true, the good and the beautiful by early Mesoplatonism, ca. 100 B.C., which posited the existence of Ideas both in the divinity and in the human mind, thus holding a semi-realism with an apriority of ideas. Now, in Pythagoreanism, the Neopythagoreans taught the apriority, in the individual soul, of numbers and metrical limits, whereas the Mystics had an apriority of numbers only in the divine mind. Then, ca. 150 A.D., the New Academy examined more closely the apriority of numbers; but it arrived at an anti-realism with apriority of ideas, while late Mesoplatonism taught an apriority both of ideas and of numbers. Sometime after the year 200, Neoplatonism appeared; this was a mystical development accepting "apriori's" only in the divinity. Ammonius Saccas held that man contemplated the divine mind both horizontally and directly; Plotinus taught that the individual man advanced in the contemplation of ideas and numbers in the divine mind only as he ascended into the One, thus losing his individuality in ecstasy. Hence, with Plotinus, the positive theology of contemplation joined the negative theology of ecstacy. Finally, apriority was also examined in the Aristotelean school, where a Platonizing

122 De wijsgerige grondslag van Bonaventura's theologie (Amsterdam, Buijten & Schipperheijn: 1968), English Summary: pp. 209-10; cf. pp. 152-77. Van der Laan said that the character of Bonaventure's thought was determined by "time-stream and conception". The time-stream was the flowering of his second synthesis; conception had the following characteristics: nature and supernature, a structure of reality that was purely cosmological, dualistic and semi-mystical, having a plurality of forms and a doctrine of illumination. As a Platonizing Aristoteleanism, Bonaventure's dualism separated the spiritual from the non-spiritual; but the human body, which was lifeless in itself, received both being and life from the rational soul, and so man consisted of two substances. The human soul had God as its end and, contemplating God, it was united to him in rapture or ecstasy. In Bonaventure's doctrine on God, the conception of being played the central role: the divine essence was ens and esse; nonetheless, God was also being and good, though here Bonaventure made "a religious choice of position." God was the origin of all being, matter having the void, and not God, as its origin. Loc. cit., cf, pp. 167-77.

86

INTRODUCTION

Aristoteleanism developed by accepting "apriori's" in the mind of God and the minds of men. 1 2 3 It was this sort of Platonizing Aristoteleanism, or a semi-mystical intellectualism, that van der Laan found in Bonaventure, whose exemplarism was a development of the subject of apriority. He put the abode of the ideas in God and, following St. Augustine, he described idea as a "likeness of the thing known"; therefore, God was exemplar, because the ideas of exernplated things were in Him. Although Bonaventure understood idea as a norm of both ethics and knowledge (gnotische), he perceived ideas only in God, and in Him they were one exemplar form; so the Bonaventurean teaching on apriority did not extend to the human mind. Illustrating the Bonaventurean doctrine on the idea in God, van der Laan showed that, for Bonaventure, there were no separate ideas in God of form and matter, which did not appear independently in concrete actuality. This actuality consisted solely of things, and they were a combination of form and matter. Ideas then were related to the concrete actuality and not to its limitations. Hence, according to van der Laan, the doctrine of Bonaventure on exemplarism did not extend to the whole of reality: there was a gap between the divine idea and the reality, which did not have an ideal structure. As a consequence, the rule of ideal structure did not include form and matter, the hierarchical creation of reality and its causal structure, but all these formed a structure by themselves in the Aristotelean scheme of things. Considering the Platonic traits of Bonaventure's thought, van der Laan characterized his teaching on exemplarism as containing only a partial account of reality.124 Van der Laan then outlined the contemporary interpretations of Bonaventure's thought, particularly those of Gilson and Van Steenberghen.'" That done, van der Laan gave his own judgment of Gilson's and Van Steenberghen's positions. This judgment was based on a distinc123 Op. cit., pp. 164-65. In a note (n. 46) to p. 165, van der Laan adverted to these corrections by Vollenhoven: Neoplatonism was distinguished by the hen-tkema coming from Gnosticism and entering Platonism through the Pythagoreans; so, distinguishing Mesopythagoreanism from Neoplatonism, Vollenhoven now saw the former (which he previously called Neophythagoreanism) as characterized by the apriority of numbers, and Neopythagoreanism as a combination of the hen-therna with Mesopythagoreanism. 124 Van der Laan viewed Bonaventure's doctrine on illumination, which came from Neoplatonism, as another Platonic trait of his thought: in particular, the Neoplatonic influence was seen iti the idea of the contemplation of God and of the ascent to Him through rapture and ecstasy. A third Platonic trait consisted in the depe'ndence of human knowledge for certitude on both the ideas and the illumination of God. See: ofi. cit., pp. 165-77. For his views on the Aristoteleanism of Bonaventure consult: pp. 160-64. 125 Op. at., pp. 177-97; cf. p. 210. His summary of Gilson's interpretation was selected from L,'espritde la philosophic mldiivale, 1"' ed., (1932), which provided the perspective of Gilson's position on medieval philosophy as Christian, and La philosophic de saint Bonaventure, 3e ed. (1953): cf. van der Laan, op. cit., pp. 1 77-84; this was followed by brief accounts of the views of other historians accepting Gilson's interpretation, though with some modifications in each case, notably: B. Geyer, F. Copleston, A. D. Sertillanges. F. J Thonnard and L. Veuthey; cf. pp. 184-88. A Summary of Van Steenberghen's interpretation of Bonaventure's thought was given on pp. 186-96, followed by an outline of Van Steenberghen's response to the criticisms of Thonnard, Gilson, Alszeghy and Veuthey; cf. pp. 196-97.

INTRODUCTION

87

tion between the spirit and the conception of Bonaventure's thought. The spirit of Bonaventure's time was that of synthesis, or the union of concepts from pagan thinkers and themes from divine revelation. Van der Laan saw three ways of achieving such a union. The first way was by allegorical exegesis with the help of a method using demonstration and interpretation. The second way was by means of paradox, or of double truth, namely, a mutually exclusive philosophical and theological truth. The third way was that of distinguishing between nature and grace: philosophy and the sciences, which worked by the light of reason, belonged in the natural order; but theology worked by the light of revelation and of faith while using reason and its principles, and so theology belonged in the order of grace. Now the third way made it possible to stress the autonomy of either the natural or the supernatual order, thus introducing the idea of autonomy for nature and philosophy. This autonomy, however, did not imply a self-sufficiency of philosophy, because it was only within the framework of the relations between nature and grace, and with regard to grace, that philosophy was autonomous. When autonomy was taken in the sense of self-sufficiency, van der Laan remarked, there resulted a rationalism denying the supernatural order and the involvement in it of nature. Nevertheless, he went on, the supernatural elevation of nature should not be stressed in such a way that the difference between nature and grace disappeared altogether. This would eliminate the autonomy of philosophy, and even philosophy itself, thus ending directly in fideism and in the denial of the laws of nature; but the natural and supernatural orders worked with a mutual dependence, according to their own principles and methods, the supernatural order always having an ascendancy over the natural order. With all this in mind, van der Laan thought that a dialectic of nature and grace, of autonomous philosophy (with respect to theology) and non-autonomous philosophy, was characteristic of the third way of achieving the synthesis of pagan concepts and revealed themes. Indeed, seeing a dialectical argumentation as essential to this form of synthesis, van der Laan said that it had consequences for viewing the history of philosophy and for evaluating pagan and humanist authors (more precisely, Plato and Aristotle), whose thought was of small value within the framework of the twofold order of nature and grace. 126 From this perspective, van der Laan thought that Gilson was correct in saying that Bonaventure, neither distinguishing philosophy from theology nor recognizing the possibility of a separate philosophy, adopted a critical attitude toward Aristotle and considered Aristoteleanism to be erroneous. 126 Op. at., 197-98. Note his own English Summary: "In order to judge the two positions, we must distinguish in the thought result spirit and conception. The spirit is that of the synthesis of nature and grace, philosophy and theology, whereby the autonomy of nature and philosophy respectively are maintained. Autonomy may not be understood in the sense of self-suflicicncy. There is a dialectic of nature and grace dominated by grace and the directedness of philosophy to the supernatural. Philosophy has a developmental and 'stage' character." —- p. 210.

88

INTRODUCTION

Gilson, nevertheless, did not adequately characterize Bonaventure's modes of thought. Every Christian writer adapted pagan philosophy, or its conclusions, to his theology; or else he had a theology that employed pagan thought without either acknowledging it specifically or building a philosophical system upon it. Although the autonomy of philsophy was stressed, even so, philosophy was not divorced from theology or separated from man's supernatural destiny. Those Christians who accepted pagan thought were more or less critical of it; but they all acknowledged that pagan thinkers had attained truth by a right use of reason, even though, at times, they mixed truth with error. Gilson had said that Bonaventure did not recognize the autonomy of philosophy, and that his own philosophy was a metaphysics of Christian mysticism in which the light of faith coincided with the light of reason; Gilson also said that, for Bonaventure, there was no pure reason, so that philosophy must coexist with faith, and this put Bonaventure in the Augustinian tradition: in saying all that, van der Laan observed, Gilson was rejecting the sort of autonomy placing philosophy outside the framework of nature and grace. The true autonomy of reason, for van der Laan, allowed it to operate according to its own principles and methods within that framework. But this complicated the question concerning the philosophy of Bonaventure, because his writings were theological and it was from them that his philosophical thought must be abstracted. Furthermore, Bonaventure himself stressed both the progressive character of philosophical investigation and the supernatural direction that philosophical thought ought to take. He said that anyone not advancing beyond philosophy would not attain wisdom, and that anyone postulating a self-sufficiency of philosophy would miss the true goal of life, rapture and ecstasy being hidden from him. Bonaventure, then, with respect to a supernatural theology of mysticism, stressed the integration of philosophy into the twofold order of nature and grace. But it would be imprecise to say that, therefore, Bonaventure's thought was an Augustinianism. One could hold the opinion, van der Laan said, that the synthesis of faith and pagan concepts reached its peak in St. Augustine, and that St. Bonaventure followed him; nevertheless, this would not describe the conception of Bonaventure's thought. What has been called Augustinianism was basically nothing else than the idea of synthesis characterizing the patristic and medieval periods in the history of philosophy. Van der Laan added to this, with Van Steenberghen, that the "so-called Augustinian synthesis" was wholly theological, and that the supremacy of theology had impeded the progress of philosophy; however, in van der Laan's view, the latter trait was only a shift of emphasis. '- 7 127 Op. at., pp. 198-99. Van der Laan thought that Sertillanges was entirely mistaken in saying that Bonaventure knew nothing of a truly autonomous philosophy within the framework of nature and grace; Bonaventure, it would be more accurate to say, had no self-sufficient philosophy: "Dat hem mogelijkheid van een waarlijk autonome filosofie in deze zin ontging, zoals Sertillanges zegt, is beslist onjuist tenzij men onder 'waarlijk' 'zelfgenoegzaam' verstaat." — p. 199.

INTRODUCTION

89

Concurrring in many ways with Van Steenberghen's position, van der Laan stated that, before the thirteenth century, stress was laid on the unity of philosophy and theology, while the totality of the human sciences and theology was called philosophy. In the thirteenth century, and thereafter, the stress fell on the distinction between philosophy and theology, each science operating according to its own principles and methods. Although Bonaventure continued to stress the unity of philosophy and theology, nevertheless, it would not suffice to describe his conception by saying that this stress manifested an Augustinianism in conflict with a "so-called Aristoteleanism". Moreover, the accumulation of different themes presented by some authors gave no insight into Bonaventure's conception. It was by a study of his theological works, van der Laan said, that their philosophical grounds should be approached and then described, as far as possible, as a definite concept. In this respect, the investigations of Van Steenberghen had great importance, because he attained a definite concept of Bonaventure's thought as an eclectic and Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism serving an Augustinian theology. Van Steenberghen clearly distinguished nature from grace, while viewing Bonaventure's philosophy as Aristotelean; but Bonaventure did not accept the whole of Aristotelean teaching: his thought was an eclectic Aristoteleanism, which contained only what belonged to a philosophy established within the orders of nature and grace, while taking account of the data of revelation and of theology. Thus, Bonaventure's Aristoteleanism was Neoplatonizing in its doctrine of illumination. The spirit of Bonaventure's thought was the Augustinian spirit, namely, the superiority of revelation over reason; however, van der Laan noted, Van Steenberghen showed that this spirit was Christian and not especially Augustinian. The conflict between Van Steenberghen and Gilson on Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle had its place here: Gilson said that Bonaventure, at least in his later works, opposed Aristotle; but Van Steenberghen denied this, and he brought forth evidence for his views. Van der Laan, siding with Van Steenberghen on the question, examined some texts in the Collationes in Hexaemeron illustrating Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle and the philosophers. He found that Bonaventure judged Aristotle with tolerable approval: Aristotle reached the truth about God as the beginning and the end of things, but he erred by not recognizing Him as the medium. Other philosophers, who were illumined by God, recognized Him as the medium; but they remained in darkness nevertheless, because they did not have Christian faith. Hence, Bonaventure was neither hostile to Aristotle in particular nor to the philosophers in general. He saw that, through natural reason, they attained truth; however, they erred on some things beyond the capacity of reason to know, and so their errors were due to the absence of Christian faith. Although the philosophers went astray, Bonaventure esteemed them highly, especially Plato and Aristotle; but they were surpassed by St. Augustine, St. Paul, Moses and Christ, all of whom lived in the twofold order of natural and supernatural. Van Steen-

90

INTRODUCTION

berghen was right then in saying that Bonaventure never formally condemned all autonomy of philosophy. Though van der Laan thought that Van Steenberghen's characterization of Bonaventure's philosophy was not wholly satisfactory, he saw Van Steenberghen's great achievement to consist in establishing Bonaventure's Aristoteleanism with decisive arguments. Van der Laan's conclusion regarding the character of Bonaventure's thought was different from Van Steenberghen's, because their two starting points were not the same. 128 Summarv The views of medieval philosophy expressed byVan Steenberghen in 1942 were governed by his stand on the meaning of the term philosophy. Taken in a broad sense, the term signified a synthetic view of the universe, or a general conception of human life and the mystery of existence. Taken in the strict and proper sense, the term stood for a scientific discipline and a systematic interpretation of the order of the universe. For the Christian, philosophy in the broad sense was controlled by revelation and, as an integral wisdom, it included all the human sciences. St. Augustine had an integral wisdom flowing from faith, but not differentiating between philosophy and theology; so his Christian wisdom was a philosophy in the broad sense. He influenced the search, down to the twelfth century, for an integral and Christian wisdom, which was called philosophy. In the twelfth century, when the sciences were distinguised from one another, scientific philosophy had only an auxiliary function within theology. At the end of the twelfth century, which was a time of assimilation and not of synthesis, Christian thought presented a general vision of life and the universe. The formation of a scientific philosophy by Christian thinkers came in the thirteenth century, when they met the philosophical vision of Aristotle and the views of his Arabian and Jewish commentators. From a study of the entry of Aristotle into Paris, Van Steenberghen found that, from about 1230, an eclectic and Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism appeared there in the Faculty of 128 Op. cit., pp. 199-202. "In our characterization of the conception of Bonaventure we have come in the neighbourhood of Van Steenberghen. Our judgment, however, is different because our outlook on the history of philosophy, which is determined by a reformationai systernatics, is different." — English Summary, p. 210. In the final note to his work (n. 206. p. 202), van der Laan speaks of the possibility of St. Augustine being an Aristotelean rather than a Platonic thinker. He thought that it was not unacceptable to view Augustine as an Aristotelean, at least in a Platonizing spirit; Augustine recognized a dualism between spiritual (and invisible) actualities and material (and visible) actualities: on the one hand, there was God, the fulness of being, and, on the other, there was matter (materia signata), but God was naturally above all created things. Van der Laan said that a Platonizing adaptation of this perspective was to be found, inter alia, in Augustine's teaching on the reasons and causes of things, which were present as ideas or numbers in the divine mind. If this point of view were developed further, van der Laan remarked, Gilson and Van Steenberghen could be brought closer together; but the idea would have to be abandoned that St. Augustine, at least in his De cimiate Dei, was a Platonist: in this work, he was a Platonizing Aristotelean in semi-mystical sense.

INTRODUCTION

91

Theology. A similar Latin Aristoteleanism appeared, around 1245, in the Faculty of Arts. Thus, by 1250, both Faculties had a Latin Aristoteleanism with Neoplatonizing tendencies. There was neither an Augustinian movement nor an Augustinian school of philosophy then in Paris; Augustinianism was there only on the theological level of Christian thought. When St. Bonaventure was a student in Arts at Paris, only the logic of Aristotle and a small part of his ethics were taught there. When Bonaventure gave his Commentary on the Sentences, from 1250 to 1252, the asssimilation of the new Aristoteleanism was still incomplete. Consequently, his knowledge of Aristotelean metaphysics was superficial. Departing from Gilson on Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle and the pagan philosophers, Van Steenberghen showed that Bonaventure did not condemn them; excusing the inevitable mistakes of philosophers without Christian faith, he avoided opposing Aristotle to St. Augustine and Christianity. The Sentences of Bonaventure constituted a theological synthesis, but did not contain a Christian philosophy, as Gilson maintained; his presentation of Bonaventure's philosophy was a mutilated exposition of his theology. In Van Steenberghen's view, Bonaventure's philosophy was an eclectic and Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism serving an Augustinian theology. The philosophy of St. Thomas was also a Neoplatonizing Anstnteleanism. But Thomism advanced beyond the eclecticism of Bonaventure by achieving a perfect coherence of Christian elements and many different philosophical doctrines, all of which Thomas united in a real synthesis having a solid foundation. Thomism was the first original philosophy produced in the thirteenth century, and by Christian civilization. Van Steenberghen, diverging from Gilson, did not see the philosophies of Bonaventure and Aquinas as either irreducible syntheses or parallel forms of Christian thought. They were successive phases in the thirteenth-century scientific movement and, in each instance, they were steps toward an integral wisdom realized only in theology. Bonaventure and Aquinas were opposed solely on the level of spirituality, where the one manifested a Christian extremism and the other displayed a Christian humanism. Van Steenberghen saw a heterodox Aristoteleanism appearing at Paris, in the Faculty of Arts between 1260 and 1265. This was not a Latin Averroism, but a radical Aristoteleanism with the monopsychism of Averroes. The movement was opposed in 1267 and 1268 by St. Bonaventure, whose efforts influenced its condemnation in 1270. About this time, the Franciscan school opposed Aquinas for his stand on the unity of substantial form in man; but he opposed the Franciscans for their stand on the question of an eternal world. Those oppositions did not manifest a conflict between Augustinian and Aristotelean philosophies. They marked an episode in the conflict between the Faculties of Arts and Theology, and they indicated a struggle between two unequally developed forms of Aristoteleanism Bonaventure opposed heterodox Aristoteleanism again in 1273. He defen-

92

INTRODUCTION

ded Catholic and theological doctrine against Christians who made philosophy independent of faith. Though he saw the dangers in following Aristotle's lead, Bonaventure did not condemn Aristotle himself, nor did he oppose Aquinas. Nevertheless, Bonaventure's encouragement of Peekham's opposition to Aquinas in 1270 inspired the foundation of neo-Augustinianism. This was a new school, but not a new philosophy, appealing to the authority and protection of St. Augustine. Gilson, replying to Van Steenberghen, insisted on the validity of his view of Bonaventure as hostile to Aristotle, even in the Sentences. In the same year, 1942, Gilson showed that Bonaventure's philosophy was grounded in the essentialist metaphysics of St. Augustine, who derived his doctrine on the immutability of God and the mutability of creatures from Plato. Gilson also said that Christian philosophy was a suitable name for Thomist philosophy, because the name expressed a theological view of a philosophical reality with a historical foundation. In 1943, Gilson developed his position that Christian philosophy had its origin from St. Augustine. He transformed Plotinian philosophy interiorly and in a Christian way, thus transmuting the Plotinian doctrine of emanation into a Christian doctrine of creation. The innovation of Augustine influenced the subsequent Christian philosophies appearing in the Middle Ages. Gilson, in 1950, found that the current tendency was to reintegrate the philosophies of medieval theologians into their theologies. Since medieval philosophies were creative in their theological function, they ought not to be separated form their theologies. Becoming fecund in their roles as theological instruments, those philosophies had new developments of the sciences, particularly of metaphysics. Future historians would see that, by depriving medieval theologies of their philosophies, the latter would become a mere technique, lose their originality and, in the end, be confused with Aristotelean philosophy as interpreted by Averroes and Avicenna. In the same year, Robert questioned the historical grounds of Van Steenberghen's conclusions on Bonaventurean philosophy. Those conclusions, Robert noticed, were based on Bonaventure's academic career and drawn from a selection of texts in his Sentences. Bonaventure's philosophy, Robert said, ought to be evaluated on the basis of his positive affirmations, and not on his views of the errors of pagan philosophers or on his respectful attitude toward Aristotle. Bonaventure praised Augustine both as a philosopher and as a metaphysician: he also considered Christian theologians to be the most competent philosophers; so he preferred the guidance of Augustine, who gave a better account of many philosophical problems than the philosophers. Although Bonaventure had a deep respect for Aristotle and for his authority, as Van Steenberghen indicated, Robert nevertheless saw this attitude motivating Bonaventure both to fill out his Augustinian Platonism with Aristoteleanism and to complement Augustinian intuitionism with the scientific precision of Aristoteleanism.

INTRODUCTION

93

As a consequence, Bonaventure developed a medieval Augustinianism. In 1951, Robert analyzed Gilson's position on Bonaventurean philosophy. Gis position, according to Robert, was based on two presuppositions. The first was that, for Bonaventure, the proper object of philosophy was the human soul and its activities. In Robert's view, Bonaventure had the Supreme Good as the end of the soul's activities: since the Supreme Good was beyond the natural capacity of the soul, philosophy was unable to take man to his destiny; so Bonaventure saw philosophy as a point of departure for theology, which had God for its proper object. Gilson's second presupposition was that Bonaventure perceived a purely rational science of God to be impossible, because knowledge and belief had to stand together at the same time and in the same respect regarding objects transcending human thought. Robert showed that Bonaventure had faith and science coexisting with regard to the same material subject, but according to different formal objects and not in the same respect. Bonaventure put rational truth as the formal object of philosophy, which attained that truth with certitude. Although he considered philosophy as an occasion for error, Bonaventure neither condemned it nor judged it as a cause of error. He criticized the Christians who, spurning then faith and taking pride in their philosophy, separated the one from the other and ignored the proper limits of reason. But Gilson confused Bonaventure's mundane wisdom and Christian wisdom with autonomous philosophy and Christian philosophy, thus putting God as the object of philosophical knowledge. Robert saw Bonaventure contrasting mundane wisdom with Christian wisdom and, putting Christ at the centre of all knowledge, he had God as the object of theology, which united faith and philosophy in a single Christian wisdom. Because Gilson confused the end of man with the object of human intelligence, he understood Bonaventure to say that the true philosophy was developed under the supernatural light of faith. Robert understood Bonaventure to insist on the essential aptitude of reason to acquire truth and on the proper conditions for its natural operations. He never spoke of an incapacity of philosophy to be autonomous with respect to Christian faith, nor did he condemn the natural self-sufficiency of philosophical science. Bonaventure distinguished philosophy from theology according to their principles, objects and methods; but he united them in a Christian wisdom. He did not oppose Plato to Aristotle, nor did he see their views of the universe as irreconcilable. Finding a natural desire for wisdom in pagan thinkers, Bonaventure considered the philosophical positions of the heterodox Aristoteleans to be irreconcilable with those of orthodox Christians. He opposed the heterodox Aristoteleans on the level of Christian wisdom, where natural reason itself was insufficient to take man to his destiny. Thus, he realized that the pagans could not acquire contemplative wisdom by natural means alone. Van Steenberghen, in 1951, portrayed Bonaventure setting out to give

94

INTRODUCTION

Christian wisdom an organic unity, while taking account of the cultural progress made since St. Augustine's time. Influenced by the Franciscan ideal of asceticism, which Bonaventure applied to the intellectual life, he reorganized the human sciences and, subordinating them through faith to God's knowledge, he prolonged Augustinian wisdom and produced a Franciscan wisdom in which the different forms of knowledge functioned as steps in the Christian journey to God Bonaventure took philosophy as a rational discipline, and one capable of attaining truth with certitude according to its own principles and methods. He also recognized the limits of human reason and he realized that, unaided by faith, philosophy was exposed inevitably to error regarding God and His action in the universe. Opposing Gilson's view,Van Steenberghen saw Bonaventure stressing the Christian judgment of the superiority of revelation over reason, but he confined the inevitability of error in philosophy to a knowledge of divine things. Bonaventure's ideal of Christian wisdom directed his judgment that the Christian philosopher should keep his mind open to the truths of faith, while using philosophy as a step toward an integral wisdom. Because Siger of Brabant and his followers did not safeguard their philosophical research in that way, Bonaventure accused them of ignoring the authority of Christ and of making philosophy a self-sufficient wisdom. In Van Steenberghen's view, this did not imply that Bonaventure himself had either a Christocentic or a Christian philosophy. Gilson, replying neither to Robert nor to Van Steenberghen, was convinced that the medieval theologians had diverse philosophies with a Christian character and a rational content. In 1955, he set down the positions held in common by the Augustinians in the thirteenth century. No one of them simply reproduced the doctrines of St. Augustine. Their fundamental positions, nonetheless, were Augustinian and, both ordering and unifying their syntheses, they constituted a form of the whole; but the scientific organization of those syntheses was due to the dialectic of Aristotle. The perfect scientific organization of theology was reached by Aquinas, who reinterpreted some doctrines of Augustine and replaced others with truer ones from Aristotle. By reforming theology, Aquinas also reformed philosophy and, representing a revolution of Aristotle, this was neither an evolution nor a progressive stage in the discovery of his thought. Aquinas renewed the principles of Aristotle to develop a new metaphysics within a theology that remained truly Augustinian. Although Aquinas was opposed by Peckham in 1270, this opposition produced only a rupture between Augustinianism and Thomism. Advancing his views on medieval philosophy, Van Steenberghen traced, in 1955, the historical antecedents of the doctrinal evolutions in the thirteenth century to both pagan and Christian antiquity. In pagan antiquity, the liberal arts and philosophy were taken as the synthesis of all human learning. In Christian antiquity, the De doctrina Christiana of St. Augustine presented the study of the Bible as the highest science for the Christian, and

INTRODUCTION

95

this science was our philosophy. The influence of Augustine dominated the organization of scholastic studies down to the twelfth century. During that entire period, efforts were made to replace pagan philosophy with a Christian synthesis using the liberal arts as a preparation for a study of the Bible. From the middle of the twelfth century, when the new Aristoteleanism began to appear in the Latin West, the liberal arts gradually lost their primacy as the framework of the human sciences. Thus, by 1255, in the Faculty of Arts at Paris, the liberal arts became an auxiliary to philosophy and not to theology. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Faculty of Theology had an embryonic Aristoteleanism growing around the science of logic. The new Aristoteleanism with its Arabian and Jewish interpretations began, about 1220, to infiltrate the Faculty and, from 1225 to 1250, a Neoplatonic Aristotelianism with an inclination to Augustinianism in theology developed there. This Latin Aristoteleanism, with Neoplatonic tendencies, first appeared in the Faculty of Arts, where it was halted by the prohibitions of 1210 and 1215. Progress in Aristoteleanism was confined there, up to about 1240, to the study of logic; but, by 1255, Neoplatonic Aristoteleanism reigned in the Faculty of Arts. Van Steenberghen, at this time, consolidated his position on Bonaventure's philosophy as a Neoplatonic form of Aristoteleanism serving an Augustinian theology. But he did not disapprove Augustiman Aristoteleanism as a name for Bonaventure's eclectic philosophy. He said, nonetheless, that the Augustinian spirit of that philosophy was really the Christian spirit of Bonaventure's theology, and this spirit was common to every synthesis of Christian doctrine. Integrated into his theology, Bonaventure's philosophy shared its Christian spirit; isolated from his theology, Bonaventure's philosophy had no spirit, because it was a body without a soul. St. Thomas, Van Steenberghen said, understood better than his contemporaries that philosophy was a necessary framework of the sciences. Since Christendom had no philosophy expressing its culture and its needs, Thomas formed a philosophy fulfilling those requirements. Because his philosophy departed on many points from doctrines considered essential to the traditional theology, the conservative theologians opposed him as an ally and an accomplice of the radical Aristoteleans. This opposition, led by Peckham and encouraged by Bonaventure, produced neo-Augustinianism. Van Steenberghen, concurring with De Wulf, saw medieval philosophy united by Christian civilization. In Van Steenberghen's view, that unity consisted in some fundamental doctrines, or a common doctrinal foundation, giving rise to different philosophical edifices. Those edifices, contrary to Gilson's opinion, did not have a common spirit constituting them Christian philosophies. Van Steenberghen insisted on the autonomy of philosophy with respect to theology in the thirteenth century, when the two sciences were clearly distinguished according to their principles, objects and methods. Although revelation was a common factor in medieval theologies, their philosophical instruments were different. Thus, medieval

96

INTRODUCTION

theologies differed because of their philosophies, and they had their value from the maturity in philosophy of their authors. In Van Steenberghen's opinion, then, Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy was entirely foreign to medieval thinkers. They were Christian philosophers who produced true, but not Christian, philosophies. Ratzinger, in 1959, showed that Bonaventure had a Christian concept of time that, from his early years, could not permit him to accept the possibility of an eternal world His opposition in 1267 to the Aristotelean doctrine on this question was linked to Aristotle's denial of divine exemplarism, and so Bonaventure's earlier rejection of the doctrine as a metaphysical contradiction became an anti-Aristoteleanism. This was directed against, not Aristotle, but heretical Aristoteleanism, which Bonaventure, influenced by Joachim of Flora, saw as an eschatological phenomenon. He opposed this Aristoteleanism in such a way that, in the end, his opposition became an anti-philosophism and he himself became anti-intellectual and anti-scholastic. His attitude was nourished by the Franciscan ideal and the doctrine of pseudo-Dionysius. Although Bonaventure continued to cultivate scholastic thought in his later years, and he continued to reason then as he had before, his last writings showed that he viewed scientific thought as having no finality. He was convinced that the evangelical life exemplified by St. Francis would eventually triumph in the Church over the speculative learning of its great theologians. In Ratzinger's judgment, Bonaventure never intended to be an Augustinian. He intended only to acknowledge the historical positions of Augustine and Aristotle in the development of human thought. In his latest work, Van Steenberghen rejected Gilson's solution for the Bonaventurean problem, namely, an internal reform of the intellectual life according to the Franciscan ideal, resulting in a Franciscan philosophy and a metaphysics of Christian mysticism. Many of Gilson's texts on the problem, Van Steenberghen noticed, would apply to Bonaventure's description of philosophy as a step toward an integral wisdom. But this would give only a partial view of the whole of Bonaventure's synthesis. He saw philosophy in itself as autonomous knowledge and, as an instrument, he used it to serve theology, and thus his philosophy lacked autonomy. Gilson said that Bonaventure's philosophy was inseparable from his theology; but Van Steenberghen thought that Bonaventure's philosophy could be separated from his theology, provided his conception of philosophy controlled the reconstruction of the philosophical materials extracted from his theology. Though Robert concurred here with Van Steenberghen, the latter historian did not accept either Bonaventure's admiration of Augustine or the Augustinian character of Bonaventure's theology as sufficient reasons for qualifying his philosophy as Augustinian. A proper reconstruction of his philosophy would show that it was a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, and not an Augustinianism completed by Aristotelean elements. Aristoteleanism was the basic factor of Bonaventure's philosophy, and this factor was specified essentially by Neoplatonic elements, particularly from Augustine.

INTRODUCTION

97

Gilson's presentation of Bonaventure's philosophy, and of the philosophy of Aquinas, was really a mutilated exposition of their respective theologies. His presentation was not an artificial reconstruction of Bonaventurean or Thomist philosophy, but a change of nature resulting from Gilson's neglect of the distinctions made by Bonaventure and Aquinas between philosophy and theology. Considering Ratzinger's work, Van Steenberghen saw in it a complement of his own views on Bonaventure's attitude toward Aristotle. Nevertheless, Van Steenberghen observed nothing exclusive in the religious character of Bonaventure's anti-Aristoteleanism, which was common to all the thirteenth-century theologians. They manifested a Christian anti-Aristoteleanism directed uniquely against the doctrine of an eternal past. Bonaventure's peculiarity lay in the eschatological and apocalyptic terms that he used in attacking heterodox Aristoteleanism. Those terms added nothing essential to his constant judgment of the opposition between Christian and pagan thought. Writing in 1968, van der Laan described Bonaventure's synthesis as determined by the theme of nature and grace, the relation of philosophy to theology, and the meaning of the Bible. Philosophy belonged to the order of nature and, attaining certitude, worked through reason. Belonging to the order of grace, theology worked through faith and depended on the authority of the Bible. In achieving his synthesis, Bonaventure used a Platonizing Aristoteleanism, thus producing a semi-mystical intellectualism. Van der Laan distinguished between the spirit and the conception of Bonaventure's doctrine. The spirit consisted in his synthesis of pagan concepts and revealed themes. This synthesis entailed a distinction of nature and philosophy from grace and theology: the first order worked through reason, and the second worked through faith using reason and its principles. Within this twofold order, philosophy had an autonomy, but not a self-sufficiency, with respect to theology. Although nature and grace had a mutual dependence, the supernatural order had an ascendancy over the natural order. This necessitated a dialectic of nature and grace, of autonomous and non-autonomous philosophy, within Bonaventure's synthesis. Hence, van der Laan thought that Gilson was correct in speaking of Bonaventure both as not having an autonomous philosophy and as criticizing Aristotelean philosophy, which had a self-sufficiency. But these traits were common to all Christian thinkers using pagan philosophy in their syntheses; so, regarding Bonaventurean philosophy, Gilson's conception of it as Augustinian was not correct: Bonaventure's philosophy had a true autonomy within his theology, whereas his critique of autonomous philosophy dealt with a self-sufficiency outside his synthesis of pagan and Christian thought. Van der Laan found Van Steenberghen's conception of Bonaventure's philosophy to be more accurate than Gilson's. Van Steenberghen showed that the unity of Christian thought was theological up to the thirteenth century, when the sciences of philosophy and theology were distinguished from each other. By distinguishing the orders of nature and

98

INTRODUCTION

grace, Van Steenberghen attained a conception of Bonaventure's philosophy as a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism serving an Augustinian theology; he also found that St. Bonaventure did not condemn every autonomous philosophy. But van der Laan set out from a reformational conception of history; so, not concurring entirely with Van Steenberghen, he viewed the autonomous disposition of Bonaventure's philosophy within the twofold order of nature and grace. The historians contributing to this second series of developments, like those contributing to the first, have described Bonaventure's philosophy in different or diverse ways. Though they concurred in ascribing to him a doctrinal dependence on both Aristotle and Augustine, the historians held various and even contrary positions on his Aristotelean and Augustinian affiliations. To Van Steenberghen, whose views marked a progressive development over those held by De Wulf, Aristoteleanism was the basic factor of Bonaventurean philosophy, which depended secondarily on Augustinianism as on one, though an important, element of its Neoplatonic specification. Bonaventurean doctrine was Augustinian only on the level of theology, and particularly as an integral or Christian wisdom. Van Steenberghen was supported here by van der Laan and, to some extent, by Ratzinger. To Gilson, Bonaventurean philosophy was essentially Augustinian, and yet it had some Aristotelean elements, but they were subordinated to Bonaventure's Augustinianism. Robert concurred with Gilson on Bonaventure's medieval Augustinianism; for Robert, however, the Aristotelean elements of Bonaventure's philosophy filled in the gaps of his Augustinian Platonism. Robert supported Van Steenberghen in his rejection of Gilson's view of Bonaventure as both hostile to Aristotle and strongly critical of autonomous philosophies. Ratzinger described Bonaventure in his later years as strongly anti-Aristotelean, but, as Robert and Van Steenberghen held, with heterodox Aristoteleanism in view and not Aristotle himself. Gilson insisted on the Christian character of Bonaventurean philosophy, a feature that it shared with Thomist and all other medieval philosophies, which he said were inseparable from their theologies. Van Steenberghen and Robert upheld the instrumental role of Bonaventure's philosophy as an integral part of a Christian wisdom; but, with respect to his theology, Bonaventure's philosophy could be given autonomy as a rational science depending on its own principles, object and method. In this respect, Bonaventurean philosophy was not Christian; nor, in the same respect, was Thomist philosophy. Van Steenberghen, in particular, insisted on the autonomy of both Bonaventurean and Thomist philosophies, when reconstructed properly apart from their theologies. But van der Laan gave Bonaventurean philosophy a proper autonomy with respect to theology within a single synthesis uniting them in a twofold order of nature and grace. He understood Bonaventure to consider as self-sufficient and unacceptable pagan philosophies that could not be united to revealed truth within a synthesis of the natural and supernatural orders.

INTRODUCTION

99

These are the current views of the historians regarding St. Bonaventure's philosophy. Their views, as we are about to show, indicate the many different problems that must be studied to establish the historical constitution of his philosophy. 129

PLAN AND PURPOSE OF THIS

WORK

The plan of our work is determined by the objectives that we have in view, and they are three in number. The first objective is to establish the historical constitution of St. Bonaventure's philosophy. In pursuing this objective, the work will respect the theological context of his philosophical thought. The second objective is to compare that thought with the philosophical doctrine of St. Thomas. This comparison will be made at the end of the analysis of each particular problem studied in the writings of St. Bonaventure. The third objective is to contribute as much as possible to solving the problems dividing the historians on the historical constitution of his philosophy. The latter objective will be sought at the close of the work, where its conclusions will be used as a basis of comparison with the views expressed by the historians.

129 Many other historians and medievalists, in addition to those whose works we have recorded, have contributed to our present understanding of Bonaventurean philosophy. We draw attention to the following, which deal either with the historical aspects or the controverted features of that philosophy: Silvio Vismara, "La mistica di S. Bonaventura", RENS, 21 (1929), pp. 184-91; Ludger Meier, O.F.M., "Bonaventuras Selbstzeugnis iiber seinen Augustinismus", FKS, 17 (1930), pp. 342-55; F. Hohmann, Bonaventura und das existenzielle Sein des Menschen (Wurzburg, Becken 1935); Daniel A. Callus, O.P., "The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure and of St. Thomas", Blackfriars, 21 (1940), pp. 151-64, 249-67; Irenaeus Squadrani, O.F.M., "S. Bonaventura christianus philosophus", Antonianum, 16 (1941), pp. 103-30, 252304; Pelayo de Zamaydn, O.F.M., Cap., "L'aristotelismo di San Bonaventura ed altre caratteristische della filosofia francescana", Italia fransescana, 19 (1944), pp. 41-49; Angelico de Vinca, O.F.M. Cap., "L'aspetto nlosofica delPAristotelismo di S. Bonaventura", CF, 19 (1949), pp. 5-44; Louis de Mercin, O.F.M. Cap., "Essais sur saint Bonaventure", EF (NS), 4 (1953), pp. 89-97; Umberto Padovani, "Agostinisrno Bonaventuriano e agostinismo tomistico", Studio patavina, 1 (1954), pp. 85-98; G. H. Tavard, Transiency and Permanence. The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure, Franciscan Institute Publications, theological series, 4 (Franciscan Institute, St. BonavenLure, New York: 1954); Antonio Zigrossi, Saggio sti/ neo-platonismt> di San Bonaventura (Firenze, Studi francescani: 1954); Giuseppe Sperduti, "Gli elementi platonici nel metodo filosofico di S. Bonaventura", SF, 53 (1956), pp. 75-88; C.J. Majchrak, O.F.M., A Brief History of Bonaventunanism (Pulaski, Wise., Franciscan Publishers: 1957); N. Simonelli, O.F.M., Doctrina christocentrica seraphici Doctoris S. Bonaventurae, Collana S. Damiano, 2 (lesu, Scuola tipogr. francescana: 1958); Anthony Nemetz, "What St. Bonaventure has given to Philosophers today", FS, 19 (1959), pp. 1-12, Romano Guardini, Systembildende Elemente in der Theologie Bonaventuras, herausgegeben von Werner Dettloff (Leiden, E. J. Brill: 1964); Charles N. Foshee, "St. Bonaventure and the Augustinian Concept of mens", FS, 27 (1967), pp. 163-75; L. Veuthey, "Filosofia e Teologia nell'insegnamento di S. Bonaventura", Miscellanea francescana, 67 (1967), pp. 237-45; Camille Berube, O.F.M. Cap., "De la philosophic a la sagesse dans 1'itineraire bonaventurien", CF, 38 (1968), pp. 257307.

100

INTRODUCTION

Although our primary objective is to establish the historical constitution of St. Bonaventure's philosophy, and not to settle the conflicts of the historians concerning it, the recording of their views has both provided the central theme of this work and indicated the basic doctrines to be studied in order to attain its primary objective. The central theme has to do with St. Bonaventure's teaching on natural knowledge. The basic doctrines are the foundations of natural knowledge, its principles and modes, its certitude and illumination, and its role in the theological thought of St. Bonaventure. These four doctrines will form the principal parts of the work, each part having its particular problems. The first part, on the foundations of natural knowledge, will deal with St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the composition of body and soul in man, and the essence and nature of his spiritual soul. Those problems will include his doctrine on the following: act and potency in the metaphysical constitution of the creature and its natural composition of form and matter, the function of seminal reasons in the formation of the corporeal creature and the question of plural forms in all bodily things, and the fundamental relation of every creature to the Creator. The second part, on the principles and modes of natural knowledge, will be concerned with the distinctions made by St. Bonaventure between the potencies of cognition in man, and the operations of those potencies along with the sciential and sapiential modes of knowledge. The third part, on the certitude and illumination of natural knowledge, will include a study of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on analogy and his consideration of the science and wisdom of philosophy as a work of natural reason. This part will also assess his position, from the philosophical viewpoint, of the errors of nonChristian philosophers. The fourth part, on the formation and development of theological knowledge, will deal with St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the nature of theology and the way in which he transforms philosophy by faith in his theology. The problem of Christian philosophy in his writings and his theological evaluation of philosophical errors will be examined here. The work will close with a general conclusion comparing our views, as they are established from St. Bonaventure's texts, with those held by the historians whose work is recorded above. Our work will depend solely on the evidence offered by the texts of St. Bonaventure himself. Thus, guided by his texts alone, we shall follow their directions and, avoiding merely probable conclusions, the considerations of his philosophical sources will be confined to those authors cited explicitly in his writings. Nonetheless, regarding the doctrines that are important for establishing the primary objective, but not documented by St. Bonaventure, we shall try to determine their sources from the evidence available in each instance.130 130 The probable sources of many doctrines, whose authors St. Bonaventure does not identify, are documented in his Opera omnia; this documentation is lacking from the minor edition of his writings: Opera theologica selects.

PART ONE

FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

"pOLLOWING the teachings of Sacred Scripture: "God created man from the earth ... and made him according to His own image" (Eccles., 17.1-5), St. Bonaventure describes man as having a body from the earth and a soul like unto God. As an intelligent being, the soul has power to turn toward the human body, to turn upon itself and to turn to divine things. These three operations of the soul flow from it as the form and perfection of a body, as a self-subsisting substance (hoc ahquid), and as an image of God.' St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the foundations of natural knowledge is summed up in the above text. The composition of soul and body in man is the ground of sense knowledge. As a spiritual substance, the human soul is self-subsistent and supports rational knowledge. As an image of God, the soul is the basis of man's intelligence of divine things. The foundations of both sense and rational knowledge will be studied in this part of our work. The foundation of natural knowledge of divine things, namely, the image of God in the soul, has a theological character, for the most part, in the writings of St. Bonaventure. This foundation will be studied here to the extent that we find it necessary to complete our understanding of his doctrine on natural knowledge. 2

1 Coll. de donis, 8.13 (5.496). 2 On the theological character of the image of God in the human soul see: 1 Sent., 3.1.un.4 (1.75-77; ed. min., 1.54-55); 3.2.2.3 (1.92-93; ed. min., 1.69-70).

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER ONE COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN CT. Bonaventure teaches that the soul and body of man, though they are diverse from each other, are constituent parts of one essence and nature. According to Aristotle, "man is the end in some way of all those things which are"; adopting this point of view, Bonaventure sees the composite nature of man as the completion of corporeal creation. 1 In the temporal order of creation, the human body was produced most fittingly after all the other animals. St. Bonaventure gives three reasons for the fittingness of this order of production. First, every other body ought to precede and to contribute to the perfection of the human body, which is the most complete and the most composite of corporeal creatures. Secondly, the body of man is informed by a spiritual and incorruptible soul, whereas other bodies have corruptible and corporeal forms. Thirdly, man is the end of every corporeal creature, and this is due to his dignity as both the most perfect compound and the complement of earthly creation. In short, as supreme among the animals, man completes and terminates the corporeal universe. 2 St. Bonaventure holds that, through the order and mediation of other corporeal natures, the human body is disposed for the rational soul, which is the noblest of forms. He describes this soul as a being (ens), as a living, sentient and intelligent form. The soul is not a being from itself, but through creation from nothing by God; however, from itself and not from some extrinsic nature, it is a living form of perpetual life. The soul is an intelligent form as a producing essence (creatnx essentia) made in the image of God according to its memory, intelligence and will. 3 Thus, to St. Bonaventure, the whole world of corporeal creatures is predispositive for the formation of the human body. To determine the foundations of natural knowledge for St. Bonaventure, therefore, we must examine his doctrine on these three points: the relations between corporeal matter and substantial form, the formation of corporeal substances, and the union of body and soul in man. Corporeal Matter and Substantial Form

According to St. Bonaventure, God created matter from nothing and, through a successive production of forms, He brought it to perfection in the various distinctions of corporeal things. God created matter before the first 1 3 Sent., 21.1.3, ad 1 (3.441; ed. min., 3.433); 22.un.l, sc 2 (3.450; ed. min., sc b, 3.441). 2 Sent, 15.2.1, fm. 3 (2.382; ed. min., fm. c, 2.391); 2.2.1.2, fm. 2 (2.73; ed. mm., 2.65). See in Aristotle: Phj/sica, 2.2 (194a27-35). 2 2 Sent., 15.2.2, Resp. "Quamvis multiplex ..." (2,385; ed. min., 2.394-95). 3 Brevil., 2.9 "... et voluntatem." (5.226-27; ed. min., n. 1, 5.48-49).

104

CHAPTER ONE

day, when He produced corporeal light; so, for a short interval of time, matter existed prior to the production of corporeal light. 4 The matter created by God was a bodily substance having no distinct form; however, it had an imperfect form giving it both mass and extension, along with some distinction of parts. The diversity of parts in such imperfectly formed matter (matena informis') constituted its disposition for and its inclination toward distinct forms. Since the imperfect form of this matter did not give it complete being, its appetite for the distinct forms of corporeal things remained indeterminate until God brought them into existence. Hence, understanding imperfectly formed matter to have extension and corporeity, St. Bonaventure did not think that its corporeal form had the perfect actuality of form, as form. Nor did he think that imperfectly formed matter, as a bodily substance, had a perfect essence. In his judgment, this matter was incomplete in the genus of body.5 St. Augustine teaches that matter, according to its essence, is deprived of a distinct form. St. Bonaventure, interpreting St. Augustine, considers imperfectly formed matter to be essentially both the entire possibility of form and the capacity for all forms. St. Augustine has also taught that matter, which is not entirely nothing, had no form before God produced distinct forms; moreover, Augustine said that matter could receive forms even though, without them, it was almost nothing. Bonaventure has interpreted this teaching of Augustine according to a priority of nature and not of time. For Bonaventure, matter wholly in potency is first in the order of nature, but it must exist under some form. Although the matter of which Augustine speaks is imperfectly formed, or the possibility of form, according to its proper nature, nevertheless, it is never totally without form in the order of time, because its lack of form exists through some form, and its possibility of form exists through some act, in the order of time. Consequently, matter is prior to form in the order of nature and production, or the order of generation; but it is posterior to form in the order of time, because the completion and perfection of matter depends on a necessary ordination to form. 6 4 Consult 2 Sent, 12.1.2 (2.295-98; ed. min., 2.297-302); 12.2.2, Rcsp. (2.304-05; ed. min., 2.307); 12.dub.l, Resp. (2.307; ed. mm., 2.310). Matter came into existence before distinct beings were produced in time; matter, nevertheless, was not created before time began: time and matter were created together by God. Cf. 2 Sent, l.l.dub.2, Resp. (2.36-37; ed. mm., 2.28-29); Comm. in Eccles., 1.7, q. 1, Resp. (6.14). 5 "Dicendum quod cum materia ilia esset moles, habens extensionem, et caelum empyreum haberet ambiens, quod ipsa in loco erat, et cum esset substantial corpulenta, locum replebat Rursus, cum in partibus distinctionem quamdam haberet secundum subtilitatem et grossitiem, sed semiplenam, positiones secundum rursum et deorsum quodam mode sed imperfecte habebat" — 2 Sent., 12.2.3, Resp. (2.306; ed. mm., 2.309); cf. ad 2. "... materia ilia non sic erat corporea quod esset completa in genere corporum; sed sic habebat extensionem et corporeitatem quod non habebat perfectam formae actualitatem ..." — 2 Sent., 12.1.3, ad 5 (2.301; ed. min., 2.304); cf. Resp., ad 1 & 3. This is one of Bonaventure's rare uses of the term corpareitas, which designates the entity given to corporeal matter by its imperfect form; the term has a counterpart in sfiiritualitas, which is the entity given to a non-corporeal substance by a spiritual form: cf. 1 Sent., 10.2.3, Resp. (1.204; ed. mm., 1.164-65). 6 2 Sent., 12.1.1, arg. 2-3, ad 1-3 (2.293-94; ed. mm., 2.295-97); see in St. Augustine: Confess., 12.3.3 (PL 32.827). On the metaphysical and physical conditions of being that are proper to matter, as decribed

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

105

St. Bonaventure's interpretation of the Augustinian doctrine on matter and its relation to form shows certain Aristotelean influences, at least implicity. He associates the Augustinian possibility of matter for form with the (Aristotelean) potency of matter for form. He also associates the Augustinian distinction, or perfection, of matter through form with the (Aristotelean) act of matter through form. Thus, without citing Aristotle, Bonaventure draws together the Aristotelean conception of prime matter and the Augustinian notion of imperfectly formed matter.7 In that way, Bonaventure has developed his own understanding of matter. In his handling of the question whether there is matter in God, Bonaventure describes it as the most imperfect of beings, and so he follows Augustine in saying that matter is "next to nothing". At the same time, Bonaventure speaks of matter as the principle of privation and reception, or as a being (ens) in potency and, as such, different from form, which is a being (ens) in act. Because matter is a being in potency and lacks the perfect distinction of form, there can be no matter in God, who is most perfect and supremely different from matter. 8 Bonaventure's understanding of matter is also shown in his reply to a view upholding the position that there is matter in God. According to this view, matter, because of its incorruption, gives existence and permanence to creatures, and so it is the foundation of created existence; therefore, if God, or the divine being (esse), has existence or permanence through an incorruptible foundation, it would seem that matter belongs most of all in God. Replying to this argument, Bonaventure concentrates on matter as the foundation of existence. He says that the mode of this foundation does not belong in God, because matter is the foundation of being (esse), which it receives from another principle, namely, from form. But God does not receive being from any principle; so there is no matter in Him. 9 by Bonaventure, see: 2 Sent., 3.1.1.2-3 (2.94-101; ed. min., 2.83-92). For some considerations of this doctrine consult: Conrad O'Leary, The substantial composition of man according to St. Bonaventure (Washington, 1931), pp. 26-45; P. Robert, O.F.M., Hylemorphisme et devenir ckez saint Bonaventure (Montreal, Librairie saint Francois: 1936), pp. 15-49; Anton C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto, 1934), pp. 34-37; L. Veuthey, O.F.M. Conv., Si Bonaventurae philmophta Christiana (Romae, Officium Libri Catholici: 1943), pp. 154-56. 7 "Item, Augustinus, XII Confessionum (8.8; PL 32.829): 'Informem materiam fecisti ante omnem diem'." — 2 Sent., 12.2.2, fm. 2 (2.304; ed. min., fm. b, 2.307). "Item, ratione yidetur. Qualitas temporis debet respondere qualitati rei productae; sed materia prima nee est producta omnino sub privatione formae nee sub completa distinctione: ergo eius productio nee diei competebat nee nocti, ergo ante omnem diem."—Loc. cit, fm. 4 (ed. min., fm. d). 8 1 Sent., 19.2.un.3, con. 2-3 (1.360; ed. min., con. b-c, 1.288); see in St. Augustine: Confess., 12.7.7 (PL 32.828). Cf. lac. cit., arg. 5, ad 5-6 (1.360-61; ed min., 1.288-90). Note also: "... cuicumque inest mutatio, inest principium mutabilitatis; sed principium mutabilitatis est materia ... patet per Augustinum, XII Confessionum (19.28; PL 32.836): 'Omne mutabile insinuat quandam informitatem, qua forma capitur vel mutatur vel vertitur'." — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.1, fm. 1 (2.89; ed. min., fm. a, 2.79). The unity of time, for Bonaventure, is rooted in the unity of matter as mutable, or as a being (ens) in potency to form; time has being (esse) through the tendency of matter to form, which is the origin of movement and the entelechy of a being (ens) in potency: this being is the materia informis described by St. Augustine. See: 2 Sent., 2.1.1.2, Resp. (2.59-60; ed. min., 2.50-52). 9 "Item, videtur quod causa materialis magis competat Deo quam aliquod genus causarum, quia

106

CHAPTER ONE

For Bonaventure, then, matter is the principle of existence and the foundation of being in the creature. His understanding of matter represents a combination of Augustinian and Aristotelean elements. This can be further illustrated from his consideration of matter as an effect of God. Stating the opposite view, which is based on the principle that every effect is in some way assimilated to its cause, Bonaventure says that the first principle is pure act having nothing of the possible, but matter through its essence is the pure possible having nothing of act; therefore, since matter is in no way assimilated to God, it cannot be from God. Seeing this view to depend on matter as a being (ens) in potency, Bonaventure corrects it by teaching that matter is not made for its own sake, but to sustain form, which is its act. Although matter is not actually similar to God, nevertheless, it can be made similar to God through form. Hence, Augustine says that matter is the capacity for form and exists for the sake of form, even though of itself and in itself matter does not have the act of form. 10 Matter, according to Bonaventure, has an appetite ordered to form as to its substantial perfection; so, provided the form belongs to the same genus as the matter, they come together to constitute one thing. The appetite of matter, rendering it capable of form, inclines it toward conjunction with a form by mediating dispositions. Those dispositions remain in the conjunct, including the human body, because its form perfects rather than destroys them.'' In the doctrine of Bonaventure, substantial forms are educed from the appetite, or potency, of matter through seminal reasons, which are the mediating dispositions for those forms. Seminal reasons have a complex character in Bonaventure's doctrine. Properly considered, they are the media through which the complete being (esse) of an individual substance is educed from the potency of matter. In themselves, however, seminal reasons are acts and, as subjected to matter, they are in potency to complete actuality. For Bonaventure, therefore, seminal reasons are the active potencies of matter and, as such, they are at once in act and in potency. Seminal materia in his inferioribus dat existentiam et permanentiam propter sui incorruptionem, utide fundamentum est existentiae creatae: si ergo Deus sive divinum esse habet existentiam sive permanentiam per fundamentum incorruptibile, videtur quod Deo maxime competat ratio materialis principii, ergo etc." — 1 Sent., I9.2.un.3, arg. 3 (1.360; ed. min., 1.288). "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod materia est fundamentum existentiae, dicendum quod modus illius fundamenti Deo non competit, quia est fundamentum esse quod recipit aliunde, scilicet a forma; Deus autem a nullo recipit: ideo non cadit in eo materia"—Loc, cit., ad 3 (1.360; ed. min., 1.361). 10 2 Sent, 1.1.1.1, ad opp. 1, ad 1 (2.15, 17; ed. mm., 9-10, 11); for the reference to St. Augustine see in St. Bonaventure: op. omn., 2.17. n. 4. 11 "... dicendum quod appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam tamquam ad perfectionem substantialem, ex qua et materia fit unum; et ideo necesse est formam esse eiusdem generis cum materia, nee est omnino supra materiam" — 1 Sent., 1.3.2, ad 1 (1.41: ed. min., 3.30). "Observatio iustitiae disponit ad earn habendam, sicut appetitus materia inclinat ad formam et facit earn habilem, ut coniungatur formae mediantibus dispositionibus; non quod illae dispositiones perimentur, immo magis complentur sive in corpore humano, sive in aliis. Observatio igitur iustitiae introducit sapientiam." — Coll. in Hexatm., 2.2 (5.336; cf. Delorme, p. 20).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

107

reasons are the primal essences of substantial forms, and they are concreated in matter by God.' 2 St. Augustine is the historical source of the Bonaventurean doctrine on seminal reasons. But their complex character in the Bonaventurean doctrine manifests a combination of Augustinian and Aristotelean elements. Distinguishing causal reasons from seminal reasons, Bonaventure defines cause as a productive principle; this principle, applying to created and uncreated agents, is both intrinsic and extrinsic. Every cause is directed in its operation by a causal reason, which is the rule for that operation. The uncreated reason is the exemplar or ideal form in God, and the created causal reason is the natural form of the creature. The intrinsic cause, or productive principle, inserted naturally in the creature is its semen. A seminal reason, then, is the rule directing the creature in its natural operation, and this has the semen as its principle ex quo. Because the nature, or natural form, of the creature is the principle a quo of its operation, the seminal reason may also be called a natural reason and the directing rule ab aliquo of the thing coming into being. Seminal reason and natural reason, nonetheless, do not indicate any real difference of rule governing the intrinsic power of the semei. They are simply two ways of understanding the same active potency, which is the natural origin of the production of some effect. Immediate production of natural effects is ruled by causal reasons and without intervening dispositions. Such productions flow from the will of God and from His exemplar or ideal forms; in the creature, however, they come from an obediential potency, which is intrinsic to its natural form. When a production by a creature is mediated from a proximate and sufficient potency, then the rule is a seminal reason in the proper sense of the term, for instance, when a man begets another man. If the production is mediated from a remote and insufficient potency, a less proper rule or seminal reason is operating, for example, when bread becomes flesh through digestion. Now the seminal reason is not a universal form in active potency to many particular forms. Although Bonaventure accepts the validity of this view when applied to the seminal reason as conceived in abstraction, nevertheless, taking it concretely and considering it metaphysically, he sees the seminai reason as a particular form and, as the active potency of matter, one having incomplete being. In his own view, Bonaventure finds that his understanding of the seminal reason concurs with the teaching of Aristotle: "when I say heaven, I say form: when I say this heaven, I say matter." Thus, Bonaventure adds, the individual confers, not another form, but only matter on the universal form. 13 12 2 Sent., 18.1.3, ad 4 (2.443; ed. min., 2.456); 15.1.1, ad 1 (2.375; eci. min., 2.383); 7.2.dub.3-4 (2.20607; ed. min., 2.201-02). 13 2 Sent., 18.1.2, Resp. (2.436-37; ed. min., 2.448-50); 18.1.3, Resp. (2.440-42; td min., 2.453-56). For the citation of from Aristotle: "Dicit enim Philosophus, quod 'cum dico caelum, dico formam; cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam'", see: De coelo, 1.9 (278alO-l7).

108

CHAPTER ONE

The combination of Augustinian and Aristotelean elements is again evident in Bonaventure's account of the natural eduction into being of substantial forms from seminal reasons. He examines three different positions on the question. The first, which he attributes to Anaxagoras, holds that the eduction of forms involves a simple uncovering of forms actually existing in matter. According to Bonaventure, this position is impossible, because it entails the simultaneous presence in the same matter of principles that are actually contrary to one another. In his view, the position of Anaxagoras would be true if it were to hold that the essences of forms are in matter as beings in potency, just as the seminal reasons of forms are in matter since creation, pending their eduction into act by an agent. The second position, held by more modern philosophers, maintains that all forms are produced by the Creator. Some of those philosophers say, not without truth, Bonaventure remarks, that God is chiefly the agent and producer in the eduction of forms. Other modern philosophers take an impossible stand, because they say that God is the total efficient cause in the eduction of forms, the particular agent only adapting the matter to receive them. The third position, which Bonaventure attributes to Aristotle, holds that all corporeal forms are in the potency of matter and they are educed into act through the action of a particular agent. There are two interpretations of Aristotle's position. According to the first, corporeal forms are in matter as in a receptive potency, which is also active in some way, and so it cooperates with the agent in the production of those forms. Since matter can both receive them and cooperate with the agent and, on the other hand, since there is in the agent, as in an efficient and original principle, a form to be produced, therefore, because every form has a natural power to multiply itself, the induction of a form into matter results from the agent multiplying its own form there. Those who hold this interpretation illustrate it from the action of a single candle, which gives its flame to many other candles; they also illustrate it from the action of one object reflecting many images in several mirrors. Forms of this sort, they say, are not produced from a material principle, but from an original principle. Those forms, moreover, are not said to be created, nor are they said to be from nothing; they are produced in some way both by reason of the agent and by reason of the matter. According to the second interpretation, corporeal forms are in matter as the principle in which, by which and from which they are produced The essence of matter, however, is not the principle from which the thing is produced; rather, there is something concreated in matter from which the agent, acting in it, educes a form. This form, Bonaventure says, does not come from the agent, as though it were a part of the agent. On the contrary, it comes from some principle in matter which can be a form and which becomes a form, just as a rose comes to-be from a rose bud. This position holds that there are in matter the essences of all the forms to be produced naturally. When a form is produced, no new quiddity or essence is induced into matter. The production of a form in-

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

109

volves the giving of a new disposition, so that what was in potency is brought into act, for act and potency are different, not as diverse quiddities, but as substantial dispositions of the same thing. Bonaventure prefers this interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine not only because human reason supports it, but also because the authority of St. Augustine confirms it : "those things produced by nature are produced according to seminal reasons."14 Thus, in developing his understanding of corporeal matter and substantial form, Bonaventure utilizes the teaching of both Aristotle and Augustine. Combining their teachings, Bonaventure produces an original doctrine on the constitutive elements of bodily things. He sees corporeal matter, which was created by God, as the principle of existence in those things and the foundation of their being, which they have from substantial form. When God created matter, He inserted in it a productive principle, or semen, from which the natural operation of the creature flows. This operation is directed by a seminal reason, which is the principle or rule governing the creature's action. The seminal reason is an active potency of matter, or a particular form having incomplete being; the form receives complete being when, through the action of a natural agent, it is brought into perfect act as a substantial form.15

Thomas Aquinas, considering the priority of prime matter in the order of nature, understands matter to be both the subject of substantial form and the ultimate principle of natural resolution in bodily things. Prime matter cannot have being in time prior to the bodies of which, with substantial forms, it is a constitutive element. In the understanding of Aquinas, prime matter could not have had an imperfect form in the order of time that preceded the present dispositions of bodies in the universe. According to Avicebron, prime matter was first informed by a common form and, thereafter, became distinct through specific forms. Avicenna has refuted this opinion by showing that a substantial form gives complete being in the genus of substance, whereas every subsequent form is accidental to the thing thus constituted. Giving his own view, Aquinas says that prime matter 14 2 Sent., 7.2.2.1, Resp. (2.197-99; ed. min., 2.192-93). Note the conclusion: "Hanc positionem credo esse tenendam, non solum quia earn suadet ratio, sed etiam quia confirmat auctoritas Augustini, super Genesim ad litteram, quam Magister allcgat: quod 'quae producuntur a natura, secundum rationes seminales producuntur'." See in Augustine: op. cit., 9.17.31-32 (PL. 34.405-06). 15 On the Bonaventurean doctrine of seminal reasons consult C. O'Leary, The substant compos, of man, pp. 45-60; A. C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul, pp. 44-48; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 156-60; Efrem Bettoni. S. Bonaventura (Brescia, La Scuola: 1945), pp. 99-107: English translation by Angelus Gambatese. O.F.M., St. Bonaventure (University of Notre Dame Press: 1964), pp. 76-81. Brief expositions of the doctrine are given by G. R. Doran, De carports Adami origine ... (Mundelein III, 1936) pp. 38-39; H. Guthrie "St. Bonaventure", The Modern Schoolman, 15 (1938), p. 85.

1 10

CHAPTER ONE

has been created under several substantial forms, so that, from the beginning, all the substantial forms of the essential parts of the world were produced by God. The original matter of bodies, therefore, was concreated substantially with many and different forms. Those forms gave substantial being to elementary bodies, which, according to their accidental being, developed in time into more perfect substances. Their development resulted from the actions of the passive and active forces of the elementary bodies. ' 6 According to Aquinas, imperfectly formed matter (materia informis) has to do with matter considered in abstraction, and so entirely without form. Taken concretely, however, matter in any one thing is a potency for the substantial form of that thing alone. Consequently, the imperfectly formed matter described by St. Augustine should be understood as referring to matter in the order of nature and not in the order of time. If prime matter, as such, were to be in time, it would already be in act under a substantial form; but this would be a contradiction, because prime matter is only a potency for form." St. Thomas interprets the six days of Genesis as a temporal sequence marking the appearance of new substances, and they originated from the mutual action and passion of the elementary bodies concreated by God. The active and passive forces of those elementary bodies, which were the subsisting principles of subsequent substances, have been identified by St. Thomas with the seminal reasons in the doctrine of St. Augustine. 18 Some thinkers, St. Thomas notes, understand that seminal reasons are the active potencies of prime matter. Those thinkers interpret Aristotle's doctrine on the eduction of forms as a substantial perfecting of inromplete, or inchoate, forms pre-existing in the potency of matter: the production of such forms into perfect being requires the cooperation and excitation of some extrinsic agent. Aquinas rejects this interpretation of Aristotle, because, even though forms are educed from prime matter, the potency of matter always remains passive. On the other hand, since it is of the essence of matter to be the substantial foundation of forms, the purely passive nature of matter does not preclude its proper cooperation with the generating agent. But matter does not assist as an active principle in the generation of forms; rather, as the inchoation of forms, the appetite of mat16 2 Sent., 12.1.4, Sol., ad 3 (2.313-15); cf. 12.1.1 (2.301-04), ST, la, 66.2, Resp. (1.403b-04b). 17 S"/; la, 66.1. Resp. (1.401a-02a): cf. DPD, 4.1, Resp. (2.104-05). 18 "Respondeo dicendum, quod natura in operibus sex dierum talker instituta est ut naturae principia tune condita in se subsisterent, et quod ex eis alia propagari possent per mutuam actionem et passionem; et ideo oportet eis tune esse conferri, et virtutes activas et passivas, quas Augustinus, lib. V Super Gen. ad lift., cap. iv. col. 324, t. Ill, etc., vocat rationes seminales, quibus ex eis effectus consequentes producerentur Quantum ergo ad esse jpsorum principiotum, sumitur opus creationis, per quod substantia elementorum rnundi in esse producta est. Sed virtutum activarum et passivarutn quaedam sunt moventes ad determinatas species, ut virtus quae est in semine leonis et equi; quaedam vero sunt communes moventes ad omnem species, ut calidum, frigidum, et hujusmodi."— 2 Sent., 13.1.1, Sol. (2.327).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

1 11

ter is its ability to receive the generative action of the agent. The eduction of forms from the passivity of matter, by the activity of a generator, is made possible by the seminal reasons of elementary bodies. Those reasons are the active and passive forces of bodily substances: they are not called seminal reasons because they have imperfect being; they are given that name because from them, as from certain kinds of semen, natural things are produced and multiplied. 19 A comparison of Bonaventure's doctrine with the doctrine of Aquinas shows that they have similar and dissimilar views. For instance, regarding the Augustinian teaching on materia informis as having no form, they concur in saying that, since matter is never without form in the order of time, Augustine speaks of matter as formless only in the order of nature. For both Bonaventure and Aquinas, moreover, matter is the potency for the being of substantial forms, and they are the acts or perfections of matter. These similarities, no doubt, reflect an Aristotelean influence on the two theologians. Their dissimilar views, however, show that Bonaventure, in developing his doctrine, is more inclined than Aquinas to combine Augustinian with Aristotelean elements. Bonaventure and Aquinas do not concur on the nature of matter as the foundation of substantial forms; nor do they concur either on the nature of the original matter created by God or on the nature of seminal reasons and their role in the eduction of substantial forms. According to Bonaventure, matter is a being (ens) in potency to substantial forms which distinguish it through their acts. This position is based on his understanding of the nature of the original matter created by God. Existing with an imperfect form, the original matter of corporeal things was actually one and had incomplete being (esse) from its form. Thus, prior to the production of distinct substantial forms, corporeal matter had existence as a being (ens) in potency to many substantial forms. For Bonaventure, then, matter could never be purely passive: as the existing principle and foundation of the being (esse) of substantial forms, matter has always been both active and passive through its seminal reasons, which are its active potencies. They dispose matter to receive the being of substantial forms. But matter does not receive being immediately from substantial forms; rather, they perfect the imperfect being of its seminal reasons. Consequently, to Bonaventure, the production of substantial forms consists in the perfecting of seminal reasons, and not in the eduction of new forms from the potency of matter. Aquinas considers matter to be a pure potency for the being of a substantial form. This consideration follows his understanding of the nature of the original matter created by God. Matter was concreated originally with several substantial forms, so that, in the beginning, matter was already diversified substantially by the forms of elementary bodies. Every one of those bodies had its own substantial form, o 19 2 Sent., 18.1.2 Sol. "Ideo alii ..." (2.452-53); cf. ad 2 & 4. See also: ST. la, 105.1-2 (1.627a-28b

1 12

CHAPTER ONE

which matter was the essential foundation. The elementary bodies were also concreated with active and passive forces, or seminal reasons; they were intrinsic properties enabling the elementary bodies to undergo successive transformations in being. Such transformations, resulting in new and more perfect substances, came about through accidental changes introduced to the elementary bodies by the interactions of their active and passive forces. Thus, to Aquinas, matter has always been passive in the generation of substances. Since seminal reasons are accidental properties of bodily substances, their substantial forms cannot be produced from those properties. On the contrary, substantial forms are educed immediately from prime matter and as a consequence of the actions of seminal reasons; so, for Aquinas, the eduction of a substantial form from matter results in both a new form and a new substance, because the natural agent generates the whole composite.20 Formation of Corporeal Substances

St. Bonaventure speaks of a general and a special, or a generic and a specific, formation of bodies from the original matter created by God. The generic formation follows the production of light, which is a common form of a.!l corporeal things. The specific formation is a consequence of light and comes to-be through the production of forms in elementary and mixed bodies. 21 Matter, according to its essence, has a seminal principle of light, from which the first substantial form of all bodily natures is produced. This is corporeal light, the first active principle of both heavenly and earthly bodies. Taken concretely, light is a luminous substance; taken abstractly, light names the form of the luminous body to which it gives the power of lighting and acting (lucere et agere). All luminous bodies have the substantial form of light, and they have it in proportion to their participation in the truth and nobility of being (esse) in the genus of beings (entia). Although light is a common form preceding the other forms in corporeal substances, 20 "Tertia est Aristotelis, VII Metafih., text. 29, et XII, text 12, media inter has, scilicet quod omnes fonnae sunt in potentia, in materia prima, non autem actu sicut ponentes latitationes dixerunt: et agens naturale agit non formam, sed compositum, reducendo materiam de potentia in actum; et hoc agens naturale in sua actione est quasi instrumentum ipsius Dei agentis, qui etiam materiam condidit, et formae potentiam dedit Unde non oportet, hanc opinionem sustinendo, quod generans creet formam, vel quod facial aliquid ex nihilo: quia non facial formam, sed compositum." — 2 Sent., 1.1.4, ad 4 (2.26-27). Cf. DV, 11.1, Resp. "Et ideo..." (1.225-26); ST, la, 45.8 (1.291b-92b), 65.4. Resp. (1.399b-400a), 110.2, Resp. (1.659ab). For a more detailed comparison of the Bonaventurean with the Thomist doctrine on matter and form see: P. Robert, Hylemor. et devenir, pp. 24-37, 57-62. 21 2 Sent., I3.div.text. (2.310; ed. min., 2.312). Bonaventure, in his own doctrine, has a triple formation of bodies: common, generic and specific. The common formation follows the production of light, and this is followed by the generic formation, which has to do with the elements and simple bodies; the specific formation is next and this looks to both the mixed bodies, formed from the elements, and the complex bodies, constituted from mixed bodies.

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

1 13

it remains in them after the production of their posterior forms. Since corporeal light is their completive form, it perfects them according to their participations in its own perfection. Corporeal light is also the principle of colour in a determinate body: light gives being to a lighted body, thus making it to be actively luminous; brightness, which is an accidental complement of light, follows the existence of the substantial form of light in luminous matter. Consequently, as the substantial principles of brightness, corporeal light is the exterior foundation of visual cognition. 22 St. Bonaventure, in his account of the generic and the specific formation of bodies, presents a complicated picture of the generation of inanimate and animate substances. The inanimate substances are the simple bodies of the stars and the elements, mixed bodies formed from combinations of the elements, and complex bodies formed from a blending of mixed bodies. The animate substances include the bodies of the plants, the animals and men. 23 The elements are earth, water, air and fire. They have a double contrariety: heat and cold, which are active qualities; wet and dry, which are passive qualities. Because each element is both active and passive, it has an active and a passive quality; nevertheless, one of the two is the principal and proper quality of the element. For instance, wet is the principal and proper quality of water, but it is also either hot or cold. Bonaventure holds that the contrariety of the elements is necessary for the formation of mixed bodies. They are generated by the power of corporeal light, through whose

22 2 Sent., 13.2.1, ad opp. 2-3, Resp. (2.317-18; ed. min., ad opp. b-c, Resp. 2.320-21); 13.2.2, Resp. ad 6 (2.320-22; ed. min., 2.323-35); 14.2.2.1, ad 4 (2.359; ed. min., 2.364). Short accounts of light, as an essentially active principle in corporeal things, are given by: E. Bettoni, S. Bonaventura, pp. 96-99, ET pp. 7376; H. Guthrie, The Modern Schoolman, p. 85. According to Robert, Bonaventure has light as one throughout all bodies, to which it gives both extension and corporeity; Robert's view is based on this text: "Item, lux est natura comraunis, reperta in omnibus corporibus tarn caelestibus quam terrestribus" — See: Hylemar, et devenir, p. 71. Bui that text; which is taken from one of five opposing Bonaventure's position, goes on: "... sive sit substantia sive accidens: ergo si forma ista corporalis non est in materia nisi secundum aliquod esse, videtur idem quod prius." — 2 Sent., 12.2.1, arg. 4 (2.302; ed. min., 2.305). Bonaventure, giving only a general reply to all five of the opposing arguments, does not suggest that extension and corporeity are conferred on bodies by the common form of light: "Primae'enim rationes, quae ostendunt, quod caelestia corpora et elementaria communicant in materia secundum esse, loquuntur de materia quantum ad illud esse quod habuit ante productionem, et quantum ad proprieties, quae consequuntur illud esse, sicut extensio et perspicuitatis participatio." —Loc. at., ad 1-5 (2.303; ed. min., 2.306). Gilson cites the same proportion of the opposing argument used by Robert; however, Gilson supports his view from Grosseteste, whom Bonaventure does not cite here. Gilson thus holds that the indistinct matter of creation receives its extension and corporeity from the substantial form of light: Philos. s. Bonav., l rc ed., pp. 263 & 266, ET pp. 276 & 279; 2'' & 3'' ed., pp. 221 & 223. We have not seen Bonaventure positi light as the substantial principle of extension and corporeity in bodies; we have seen him, rather, positing matter as having extension and corporeity in its original condition, and so before the production of light, which gave distinct being to matter already existing as an extended and bodily substance. 23 Colt, in Hexaem., 1.18 (5.332; Delorme, pp. 7-8); 16.7 (5.404; Delorme, p. 131).

1 14

CHAPTER ONE

agency the contrary qualities of the elements are mingled in harmony. When this mingling reaches perfection in the mixed bodies, they unite to generate complex bodies, which complete the formation of inanimate substances in the mineral world. 24 Corporeal light, for Bonaventure, is the agent that produces the substances of mixed and complex bodies. This is why he says that the substantial form of light, by its active power, is the completive and perfective form of other corporeal forms. They are brought forth from matter after the production of light and, as substantial forms, they have completion according to their degrees of participation in the common form of corporeal light.25 The world of complex bodies constitutes the exterior foundation of sense cognition. Luminous and coloured bodies are the foundation of visual cognition; solid and terrestrial bodies are the foundation of tactile cognition. The senses of sight and touch, according to Bonaventure, have perfect acts of cognition, because they are grounded in the absolute properties of bodily things. The senses of taste, hearing and smell have imperfect acts of cognition, because they are grounded in the intermediate properties of bodily things. Taste is founded on watery things, hearing is founded on sounding things, operating through the medium of air, and smell is founded on odorous and vaporous things. Both the absolute and the intermediate properties constitute the foundation of the common sensible qualities in corporeal things, namely, number, magnitude, figure, motion and rest. Apprehension of those qualities requires a body that is suitably blended and organized to perceive their various species. This is a living body, which involves still another kind of formation and production of substantial form. 26 Life at its lowest level exists in the plants. The principal form of life in corporeal substances, however, is found in the animals, which were first 24 Brevil., 2.3 "Ratio autem ... uniformem quietem." (5.220-21; ed. min., nn. 2-4, 5.38-39); 2 Sent, 15.1.2, Resp. "Et propter ... " (2.378; ed. min., 2.386); cf. 14.2.dub. 1, Resp. (2.365-66; ed. min., 2.372-73), and Itiner., 2.2 (5.300; ed. min., 5.187-88). The qualities of the elements are sometimes called their properties, and they also designate the substances existing under such forms: "Et ideo atiter dicendum est quod sicut humor et calor dupliciter accipiuntur: atiquando enim dicunt proprietates sive qualitates corporeae substantiae, sicut dicuntur humor quae et calor ipsius ignis; aliquando nominant ipsam substantiam sub tali forma, sicut dicit Augustinus, quod humor et humus sunt elementa, et philosophi dicunt quod calor est substantia quaedam subtilis." — 2 Sent., 13.2.1, in Resp. (2.318; ed. min., 2.321). 25 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod forma ultima est completiva, dicendum quod hoc est verum formarum quae disponunt ad ipsam; lux autem potius est forma perficiens alias formas corporales quam ad eas disponens, cum secundum eius participationem maiorem et minorem formae corporales sint magis et minus completae. — Vel dicendum quod lux est nobilissima formarum corporalium, earum scilicet quae sunt ei extraneae; sed non est verum de formis luminariam caelestium, in quibus virtus eius et natura complete salvatur." — 2 Sent., 14.2.2.1, ad 4 (2.359; ed. min., 2.364). Consult: C. O'Leary, The substant. compos, of man, pp. 60-65. 26 Itiner., 2.3 (5.300; ed. mm., 5.188-89); 4 Sent., 49.2.1.3.1, Resp. (4.1018-19); 10.1.un.2, con. 2-3 (4.219; ed. min.. con. b-c, 4.205); 2 Sent.. 8.1.3.2, ad opp. 1-6 (2.221; ed. min., ad opp. a-f, 2.217).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

1 15

produced by God from seminal reasons in matter. Animals are now produced by seminal generation and from an active power of nature. God gave that power to the animals for their propagation and multiplication. This view, Bonaventure notes, concurs with the teachings of Augustine and Aristotle. Augustine teaches that, as the seed of a tree has the power to produce another tree, so the body of an animal has a seed-bed (seminarium) from which, under divine providence, other animals may emerge in the course of time. Aristotle shows that the vegetative and the sensitive souls are potentially in the seed before they are brought forth into being. He intimates, apparently, Bonaventure says, that the soul forms the members of the body, and he calls the soul the active potency, which is intrinsic to the seed. When the body is produced from the seed, and when the body is so organized that it can be perfected by the soul, the active potency then gives rise to the perfection of an organic body in act. Aristotle, in Bonaventure's judgment, uses several arguments and conjectures to prove what he says; nonetheless, his doctrine concurs in many respects with the teaching of Augustine, who writes: "The earth is pregnant with seeds, not only with respect to trees, but also with respect to animals." 27 The body of an animal has in itself the nature of the four elements. They are so harmoniously blended in the body that the animal can sense, move, and perform many other operations.28 With the nature of the animal, we have arrived at the first interior foundation of sense cognition, and the last predisposition for the formation of the human body. The interior foundation of sense cognition consists in the sensitive soul and the organs of the body. The development of those organs requires a mutual predominance of the active and passive elements. Now, in the body of an animal, the passive elements are predominant with respect to mass, so that the body is said to be made mostly from them. Since the soul rules the body by means of the active elements, they are predominant with respect to power. The reason for the twofold predominance, Bonaventure explains, is the end of the body's complexity. This end is the soul as the principle of life, sense and movement for the body. A complex body would not have life if the passive elements were 27 2 Sent., 15.1.1, Resp. "Aiiter tamen ..." (2.375-76; ed min., 2.382-83); cf. 15.dub.l, Resp. (2.389; ed. min., 2.399). See in Aristotle: De gener. animal, 2-3 (736a24-737bl4). For the references to Augustine consult: De gen. aii lit/., 3.14.22-23 (PL 34.288-89); De Trinitate, 3.18.13 (PL 42.875-76). See also: Dialog, tjuaest., q. 37 (PL 40.745); this work is not by Augustine, but by an unknown author — consult: P. Glorieux, Melanges de science religieuse, 9 (1952), Cahier supplemental: "Pour revaloriser Migne" (Lille: Facultes Catholiques), p. 27. 28 "Dicendum quod absque dubio corpora aniraalium habent in se naturam quatuor elementorum ... turn propter hoc ut sim idonea ad sensum; turn propter hoc ut sint idonea ad motum; turn propter hoc ut sint idonea ad multiplicitatem operationis; turn propter hoc ut in se habeant dignitatem completionis, quae omnia competunt illi corpori quod perficitur anima sensibili." — 2 Sent., 15.1.2, Resp. (2.378; ed. min., 2.386-87); cf. ad opp. 1-3 (2.377-78; ed. min., ad opp. a-c, 2.386). On the formation of the body of the anima! see: C. O'Leary, The mbstant. compos, of man, pp. 60-69; P. Robert, Hyllmar, et devenir, pp. 7072.

116

CHAPTER ONE

predominant, as they are in a mineral, with respect to quantity and power. Such a predominance would prevent life because of the coarseness and solidity of the passive elements. A complex body, moreover, would not have life if the active elements were predominant with respect to power and quantity. This predominance would prevent life, because the passive elements would be consumed immediately, and so the body could not be nourished by the soul. There must, therefore, be a mutual predominance giving rise to a concord and proportion of the elements in the body, so that it can receive life from the soul. A similar harmony among the elements is necessary to make the body fit for the senses. In the organization of touch, for instance, the nature of the passive element earth must predominate with regard to mass. Since touch is the first among the senses, the body would not have the organs of the other senses if earth were not predominant in it. There must also be, on the other hand, a predominance of fire with regard to power. This element predominates through heat, which, with the spirit of the body, is an instrument of the sense powers in the soul. Bonaventure, in both instances, follows Augustine: "Touch, which is fifth among the senses, accords more with the earthly element; hence, things that are touched are sensed through the whole body of a living thing, and this body is mostly from the earth ... The soul, to which the power of sensing belongs, since it is not corporeal, stirs up the force of sensing through a subtle body; for, through the subtlety of fire, the soul initiates movement in all the senses." Bonaventure also sees a necessity for a mutual predominance of the elements to make the living body suitable for movement. The motive power of the soul influences the members of the body by means of the active elements; so they must predominate according to power. The passive elements, however, must be predominant according to quantity, or mass, because, from them, the mobile members of the body are constituted. This is what Augustine says: "Fire penetrates all the senses, so that it brings about movement in them ... when the body, deprived of heat, freezes excessively, its sense is weakened, because movement, which is in the body from heat, slows down." Thus, for the members to be mobile, Bonaventure says, there must be in the body a mutual predominance of the active and passive elements. Consequently, the members of the body have strength from air, and agility from fire; but they have solidity from the predominance of earth and water according to quantity.29 Bonaventure's doctrine on the nature of the animals is influenced, for the most part, by the teaching of Augustine; however, Bonaventure also supports his views with the teaching of Aristotle. The Aristotelean influence on the Bonaventurean doctrine, as we have seen, touches the formation and organization of the body by the soul. But the influence of Aristotle does not stop there. It is also evident in Bonaventure's doctrine on the mutual 29 2 Sent., 15.1.3, Resp. "... secundum quantitatem." (2.380-81; ed. min., 2.388-89). See in St. Augustine: De Gen. ad litt., 3.4.6-7 (PL 34.281-82).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

1 17

predominance of the elements in the bodies of the animals. 30 Although the influence of Augustine in more pronounced than the influence of Aristotle, even so, Bonaventure does not hesitate to use Aristotle's teaching whenever it can be united to the teaching of Augustine. As a consequence, both Aristotle and Augustine share in the development of Bonaventure's doctrine on the formation of the animals and the organization of their bodies.31

According to Aquinas, the sun was produced by God on the first day, as related in Genesis. Perfected by a substantial form, the sun had light, which was an active quality. The nature of the sun determined the action of light; therefore, it was as an effect of the sun that, on the succeeding days, light was active in the production of heavenly and earthly bodies. Those bodies, as a consequence, were formed by the action of light. 32 Thus, for Aquinas, differing notably from Bonaventure, light is not a substantial form, even in the sun. Light is a visible, or sensible, quality of bodily things, and no such quality can be the substantial form of any thing, because the substance of a thing is known by the intellect and not by the senses. Hence, light is always an accidental form. If light is said to be the substantial form of the sun, then, as a stone is called light or darkness, light is said equivocally, for an accident and a substance cannot be said univocally of any thing. 33 St. Thomas also differs notably from St. Bonaventure on the nature of form as the principle of being in bodily substances. In the doctrine of Bonaventure, as we have seen, matter has imperfect being from its original 30 "Item, sicut vult Philosophus, 'ex eisdem constant animalia, ex quibus nutriuntur'; sed animalia maxime nutriuntur ex aqua et terra per cibum et potum: ergo etc." — 2 Sent., 15.1.3, fm. 2 (2.379; ed. min., fm. b, 2.387); cf. Aristotle, De gener. et corrupt., 2.8 (335alO-14). "Sicut vult Phiiosophus, vita maxime est per calidum et humidum: ergo si omnia animalia vivunt, in eis abundat et praedominatur calidum et humidum, ergo et illud elementum, cui haec principaliter insunt: hoc autem elementum est activum, scilicet aer: ergo, etc." — Lac. cit., ad opp. 1 (2.379; ed. min., 2.388); cf. Aristotle, De long, et brev. vitae., c.5 (466al6-25). "Ex praedictis igitur patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; patet etiam responsio ad obiecta, quia in corporibus animalium praedominantur elementa passiva quantum ad quantitatem molis, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem inductae; praedominantur nihilominus et activa quantum ad quantitatem virtutis, sicut ostendunt quatuor rationes in contrarium adductae." — Eo. loc., Resp. in fmem (2.381; ed. min., 2.390). 31 Note the following use of Aristotle by Bonaventure: "... quando fit commixtio elementorum, natura non facit ignem, qui sursum est, descendere vel aerem; sed eum ignem vel aerem, qui vel est in terra vel generatur per actionem alicuius agentis, facit venire ad constitutionem animalis. Et hoc quidem fit per naturam. non per violentiam. Quia enim natura, secundum quod dicit Philosophus, semper desiderat quod melius est, materia, quae est sub forma elementari, appetit esse sub forma mixti, et quae est sub forma mixtionis appetit esse sub forma complexionis; ideo cum ex diversis elementis fit mixtio in unum, appetitus naturae completur et violentia non infertur." — 2 Sent., 15.1.2, ad 6 (2.378; ed. min., 2.387); cf. Aristotle. De gener. et corrupt., 2.10 (336b27-28). 32 2 Sent., 13.1.4, Sol. (2.338; ST, la, 67.4, Resp. (1.410a-llb). Cf. 2 Sent., 13.1.1, Sol. "Per opus ..." & ad 1-2 (2.327-28). 33 2 Sent., 13.1.3, sc & Sol. "Alii autem ... non homo." (2.333-34); ST, la, 67.3, Resp. (1.409b-10a). Cf. In de anima, 2.1.14 (Marietti, nn. 420-21, pp. 144-45).

118

CHAPTER ONE

form and, through seminal reasons, matter is inclined toward many substantial forms, which give perfect being to distinct corporeal things. In the doctrine of Aquinas, as we have also seen, matter never has imperfect being. Matter, as a constituent element of a composite substance, always has perfect being from a substantial form. In the order of substantial being, therefore, matter cannot be inclined by seminal reasons to many substantial forms. Matter can have being only from a single substantial form; all the other forms, including seminal reasons, in a substance belong to the order of accidental being. Consequently, in the order of substance, each elementary nature has complete being from its substantial form. But the elementary natures are related materially, as it were, to the form of a mixed body. This body has its form is such a way that, when the elements are united in it, one of them is formal and predominant with respect to the rest. The formation of a mixed body, therefore, requires an alteration of the elementary bodies. This alteration gives rise to a mixed body when the power of the predominant element exceeds the power of every other element in the mixture.34 In the view of Aquinas, as in the view of Bonaventure, God produced the first animals; thereafter, animals have been produced by natural generation. Now, according to Aquinas, animals are generated either from putrefaction, which takes place by the power of the sun, or from an active principle, which is a formative power in the seed of an animal. In both instances, an elemental nature of some sort is the material principle for the generation of the animal. 35 Thus, to Aquinas, there is no need to posit a form of complexion as a substantial preparation of matter to receive a soul. The complexion of any body depends upon its predominant element, either according to the genus of the body or with respect to what is proper to the body in that genus. For instance, in the genus living body, the human body has a complexion which, by comparison with other bodies, is the best proportioned. There are degrees of proportion among human bodies, nevertheless, so that, for example, one is called melancholic and another choleric. The first is a consequence of the predominance of cold; the second is a consequence of the predominance of heat. Neither the cold of the melancholic body, however, nor the heat of the choleric body, goes beyond the proportion of the elements which is proper to the human body. The body of an animal has a comparable complexion. With respect to the genus living body, there is a predominance of the passive elements according to quantity; but the active elements are predominant according to power. Since the body of an animal is better proportioned than the body of a plant, then, with respect to the species, the animal's body has an equality of complexion superior to that found in the body of the plant. Although there is a predominance of quantity over power among the elements in the body 34 2 Sent., 19.1.4, ad 2 (2.492); cf. DV, 15.2, ad 11 (1.313). 35 ST, la, 71.1, ad 1 (1.428a).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

1 19

which is inferior to the animal, nonetheless, among the animals, there is a diversity of complexion according as one or other of the elements is predominant over the rest.36 Our brief exposition of the doctrine of Aquinas on the generation and formation of animals shows that his positions are similar in some respects to those of Bonaventure. Both theologians hold that animals are generated from an active power in their seed. They also hold that the formation of the body of an animal involves a complexion of the elements, so that, maintaining a proper balance or proportion, the passive elements are predominant with respect to quantity and the active elements are predominant with respect to power. But Bonaventure and Aquinas do not concur on the multiplication and formation of inanimate substances. Bonaventure speaks of the production from seminal reasons in matter, and in an ascending order, of substantial forms for light, elementary bodies, mixed bodies and complex bodies. He also says that the substantial form of light completes and perfects the being of the other inanimate bodies. Aquinas speaks of the production of the sun as perfected through a substantial form, and as having the active quality of light, which is an accidental form. The action of light effects the formation of elementary bodies, and they are produced with their own substantial forms. Having also active and passive qualities, the elementary bodies alter and unite with one another, so that mixed bodies are constituted through the formal predominance of one element over the rest. Complex bodies are formed through an equality of proportion among the elements. In this proportion, one element is predominant according to quantity and another according to quality, but the equality of the proportion is maintained in the body by its substantial form. Thus, for Aquinas, the mixture and complexity of bodies do not come directly from their substantial forms, as they do for Bonaventure. The difference between the two theologians here results from their separate views of matter as the foundation of the being of substantial form. To Bonaventure, matter is the foundation of the being of all substantial forms; they are produced from the seminal reasons, or active potencies, of matter. To Aquinas, matter is the foundation of the being of the substantial form actually composed with it; this form can give way to another substantial form drawn from the passive potency of matter by the work of seminal reasons. In short, the difference between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the production and multiplication of corporeal substances has its origin in their particular views of matter and form with respect to being.

36 2 Sent., 15.2.1, Sol. (2.378). St. Thomas does not discuss the r6le of the elements in the formation of the sense organs in the animal; his doctrine on the sense organs is given, for the most part, in connexion with the sense potencies of man. We shall compare his doctrine on the senses with that of St. Bonaventure when we have seen the Bonaventurean doctrine on the sense potencies in man.

120

CHAPTER ONE Union of Body and Soul in Man

The body of Adam, in the view of St. Bonaventure, was constituted from the four elements. They were so mixed and blended with one another that his body was proportioned from them not only in a manner due to an equality of justice, but also in a way befitting the requirement of its form. Owing to the nature of that form, both the proportion and the harmony of the elements in Adam's body were nobler than those in all other bodies. The body of Adam prior to original sin had such an equal proportion of the elements that there was neither opposition nor discord among them. As a consequence of original sin, however, a certain disharmony and inequality upset the proportion of the elements constituting the human body. This imperfection of the human body in the state of fallen nature will be removed when the body reaches the perfect state of beatitude.37 Because the soul of Adam was a spiritual substance, it was most distant from the opaque bodies of the earth, but less distant from the transparent and luminous bodies of the heavens. Thus, it would seem that, in addition to the four elements, the body of Adam was constituted from the nature of the heavenly bodies, so that the body and soul of Adam could not have been united unless the nature of light had intervened. St. Bonaventure, however, did not accept this view. He granted that the nature of the heavenly body was the more exalted in itself among the simple bodies; but he maintained that, with respect to a form subsequent to light, the heavenly body did not excel in dignity over any other body. The order of union between the body and soul of Adam, Bonaventure continues, required the elementary form to be united to his soul by the mediation of the form of a mixture (forma mixtionis), which combined the elements in preparation for the form of complexion (forma complexionis), or the form of a complex body. The latter form, harmonizing the elements of the mixture, blended and proportioned them to suit Adam's soul. Thus, the form of his complex body established an equality and harmony among its elements; so, conformed to the nature of the heavenly body, his human body was able to receive life from his soul.38 Has the soul of Adam been produced, Bonaventure asks, before or after the production of his body? Augustine has some doubts about the answer to this question, Bonaventure notes, because each side of the question seems probable. To Bonaventure, however, it must be held as true that God has 37 2 Sent., 17.2.3, Resp. (2.425-26; ed. nun., 2.437-39). 38 2 Sent., 1 7.2.2, arg. 6, ad 6 (2.421, 423; ed. min., 2.433, 436). Though the body of Adam was formed from the slime of the earth. Bonaventure said, it was beautifully organized, and it was proportioned in a multiform way, to suit the spiritual mode of the human soul. The human body was the noblest work of God in corporeal creation; God manifested His wisdom and power by consummating His work in man, the last of His earthly creatures and a conjunction of corporeal and incorporeal substances in one person and a single nature. Cf. Brevil., 2.10 "De corpore ... rectitudini attestaretur." (5.277-78; ed. min., nn. 1-4, 5.51-52). See also: 2 Sent., 1.2.1.2, sc 1 (2.41; ed. nun., sc a, 2.33); cf. ad 2-3. On the doctrine of Adam's body see: G. R. Doran, De carports Adami origine ..., pp. 30-38.

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

121

produced the soul of Adam in his body. One could say, Bonaventure remarks, that Adam's soul has been produced before his body, in order to show that the rational soul is able to subsist through itself, and so it does not depend on the body. But it is far more reasonable to say that God has produced Adam's soul immediately with his body. Bonaventure gives two reasons for his position. The first reason is based on his view of the rational soul as the natural form of the human body. This soul is united to the body as its natural perfection; moreover, the soul naturally desires to be united to the body: therefore, if the body were produced after the soul, it would have been a penalty for Adam's soul to be without a body. The second reason is based on the soul's freedom of choice. If the soul were produced before the body, then nothing would have impeded the soul in the use of its freedom of choice. As a consequence, before the union of body and soul, the soul would have either gained or lost its reward; so the body would not share the reward of the soul, nor would the soul deserve to be punished in the body. But the soul is united to the body as a mover to the movable, so that, without the body, the soul can neither gain nor lose its reward: therefore, Adam's soul ought not to be produced before his body, lest the soul be punished prior to any fault, and lest it gain or lose its reward without the body.39 Thus, in Bonavenure's view, the rational soul is both the natural form and the mover of the human body. But, with respect to being (esse), the soul does not depend on the body, as though the soul, for its own conservation, needed the body. On the other hand, the soul does depend on the body through the inclination of the appetite that the soul has for the body, as a form for a proper matter. Consequently, as a form is produced in matter, so ought the soul of Adam to be produced in a proper body.40 The body generated by Adam was produced through sexual union with the woman, the co-principle of human generation. This body had the nature of the four elements, and they were proportioned in an equality of complexion befitting a body possessing a natural appetite to be united to a rational soul. According to St. Bonaventure, it was just for God, as the Founder of nature, to satisfy that appetite which He inserted in the nature of the human body. Since God alone could fulfill the desire of this body for a rational soul, it belonged to His justice to create such a soul in the body generated by Adam. Thus, God perfected Adam's work of generation by giving the completive form to the body propagated through the woman. 41 In the view of Bonaventure, the human act of generation does not cause a sensitive soul. To support his view, he appeals to both Augustine and 39 2 Sent., 17.1.3, Resp. (2.417; ed. min., 2.428-29); lac. cit., con. 2 & 5 (b & e). For the reference to Augustine see: De Gen. ad litt., 7.24-28.35-43 (PL 34-368-72). 40 Lac. nt., arg. 4. ad 4 (2.416; 418; ed. min., 2.428-29). 41 BreviL, 2.10 "Postremo ..." (5.229-30; ed. min., nn. 5-6, 5.52-53); 2 Sent., 8.1.2.1, ad 2 (2.215; ed. min., 2.210); 32.3.2, sc 1-3 (2.796; ed. min., sc a-c, 2.797); cf. Resp.

122

CHAPTER ONE

Aristotle. According to Augustine, the human soul, when it leaves the body, retains the powers of sense, imagination, reason and understanding. This means, to Bonaventure, that the sensitive part of man does not originate through generation, because whatever is separated from the body cannot originate in that way. According to Aristotle, "the sensitive soul is in the intellective soul as a tetragon is in a pentagon, and the vegetative soul is in the sensitive soul as a trigon is in a tetragon"; so, Bonaventure reasons, if the same principle producing the pentagon also produces the tetragon, in like manner, the same principle producing the intellective soul will also produce the sensitive soul. But the intellective soul does not come from human generation; neither, therefore, does the sensitive soul. Both the sensitive and the intellective parts of man have one substantial principle, the human soul, which is created by God and, through its potencies, is the origin in man of life, sense and understanding.42 Explaining his view, Bonaventure examines three positions on the sensitive soul in man. The first position, held by the Manicheans, posits in man one soul from a good God and another from an evil God, thus accounting for the conflict between the spirit and the flesh. This position is shown by Augustine to be heretical. Bonaventure, for his own part, refutes it "according to the way of philosophy". He says that, of necessity, in one perfectible thing there is one perfection: since man is one thing through his essence, it is impossible that he be produced in being by principles entirely diverse from one another; therefore, if the rational soul is from a good God, the sensitive soul of man cannot be from an evil God. The second position, which was held apparently by some philosophers, has a rational substance and a sensitive substance in man. These are not two souls, because soul names a function. They are two substances ordered to the perfection of one body, the sensitive substance disposing it for the rational substance. Originating through generation, the sensitive substance depends on the body and is a perfection of some part of it. But the rational substance originates through creation and is not the act of any part of the body. Augustine has refuted this position by showing that one and the same soul disposes man for life, for sense knowledge and for rational knowledge. He also shows, Bonaventure repeats, that the human soul retains the sense powers when it departs from the body. The third position is taken by the theologians, particularly by Augustine. The theologians say that the sensitive part and the rational part of man belong to the same substance, and that they must be brought into being by the same principle, which is God, because they designate diverse potencies of the same substance. This position, Bonaventure remarks, is most reasonable, since it posits in man one perfecting substance that gives him life, sense and understanding. Now 42 2 Sent., 31.1.1, sc 1, 3 & 6 (2.741; ed. mm, sc a, c & f, 2.762-63). For the reference to Augustine see: De spirito et nnima, c. 15 (PL 40.791); we shall consider the authenticity of this work at a later time. For the citation from Aristotle see: De anima, 2.3 (414b20-415al2).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

123

the theologians do not oppose Aristotle, provided he is rightly understood Bonaventure demonstrates this by an account of sensuality. In one way, as Augustine shows, sensuality is a disposition of the flesh for the act of the sensitive power. In another way, it is a disposition of the flesh, not yet perfected by the soul, for sensing with the moving spiritual power. This mode of sensuality is in the embryo before its complete animation: the embryo cannot then have the perfecting substance of a soul, because the soul is "the perfection of a physical and organic body"; nor can the soul actually exist until the body exists with its proper complexion and organization. There can be in the embryo, nevertheless, a power from the soul of its generator. That power is in his semen, which communicates it to the embryo. The operation of the seminal power comes to an end, however, when the organized body receives the perfecting sensitive soul, whether this is drawn suddenly from the potency of matter or accompanies tlie rational soul infused extrinsically. The third mode of sensuality is both a disposition of the flesh with the moving power and the disposition that the flesh has from its perfecting soul, which is the rational soul. Now the first and second modes of sensuality are in man from the generator; but the third mode is in man from his perfecting soul, and this originates through creation, not through generation.43 Defending his point of view, Bonaventure shows that it is not contrary to Aristotle's doctrine. Aristotle says that the first change leading to the production of a sensitive soul is caused by the generator. Since that change is ordered to being, it would seem that the sensitive part of man is drawn into being by the generator. Bonaventure does not accept this interpretation of Aristotle. The first change, in Bonaventure's judgment, has to do with a soul which is sensitive according to its substance, and not with the sense potency of the intellective soul, which is an incorruptible substance. Putting it another way, Bonavanture says that Aristotle is referring to the second mode of sensuality, and this has being from the generator. In other words, the first change leading to a sensitive soul is caused by the seminal power transmitted to the embryo by the generator. But Aristotle also says that only the intellect enters the body extrinsically. Since the intellect alone enters the body through creation, therefore, the sensitive soul in man ought to be drawn from the principles of matter and through generation. Bonaventure does not concede that argument, because he understands Aristotle to speak of an intellective substance. To Bonaventure, moreover, the intellective and sensitive parts of man have the same substance. Consequently, in Bonaventure's understanding, Aristotle does not exclude an 43 Lac. fit., Resp. (2.741-42; erf. min., 2.763-65); cf. 30.3.2, Resp. "Aliquid autem ... aliquando restauratur." (2.735-36; «/. min., 2.758-60). See in Aristotle: De anima, 2.1 (412a20-412bl). For the sources in Augustine consult: De duab. animab., 1.12.16 (PL 42.105-06), 1.13.19 (PL 42.108); De spiritu et anima, c. 4 (PL 40.781-82); De cedes, dogm., c. 15 (PL 42.1216): the author of this work is Genade de Marseille and not St. Augustine — see: P. Glorieux, Melang. scten. relig., 9 (1952), p. 32.

1 24

CHAPTER ONE

extrinsic origin for what is sensitive in man; he excludes, rather, an extrinsic origin for the sensitive soul of the brute beast.44 Bonaventure's solution to the problem of a sensitive soul in man, as his teaching shows, depends on the doctrine of both Aristotle and Augustine. In arriving at his solution, Bonaventure maintains a balance between the Augustinian doctrine and the Aristotelean doctrine on the sensitive nature of man.45 But the solution reached by Bonaventure represents his own thought on the problem. Thus, in his understanding of the question, there is one substantial principle of life, sense and reason in man. This principle is the rational soul created by God. In the generation of man, a seminal power is transmitted to the embryo, which is organized and disposed by that power to receive the soul infused by God and possessing potencies for human life, sense and reason. In Bonaventure's view, therefore, the rational soul is the only form of the human body. He rejects the view of a sensitive soul preceding, either through generation or through creation, the infusion of the rational soul. The sensitive part of man has to do fundamentally with a potency of his rational soul, which is the one principle perfecting the human body.46 In the brute beast, however, there is a sensitive soul designating a form substantialized in matter. But this matter is subject entirely to change; and since the form of the animal depends for its being on such matter, the sensitive soul is corrupted when the body of the animal corrupts. When the human body corrupts, on the other hand, the rational soul is not corrupted because, unlike the sensitive soul of the beast, it originates through creation and not through generation.47 44 Lac. cit,, arg. 1-2, ad 1-2 (2.740, 742; ed. min., 2.762, 765). See in Aristotle: De anima, 2.5 (417bl718); De gener. animal., 2.3 (736B21-29). 45 Bonaventure also maintains a balance between Augustine and Aristotle on the question: "Utrum aliquid transeat in veritatem humanae naturae per actum generativae", 2 Sent, 30.3.1 (2.726-32; ed. min., 2.748-57). 46 "Item, quaecumque sunt idem in substantia ab eodem principio educuntur in esse; sed anima sensitiva et intellectiva in eodem homine sunt idem in substantia, quia unius perfectibilis una est perfectio: ergo, si rationalis non est per generationem, videtur quod nee est sensibilis." — 2 Sent., 31.1.1, sc 4 (2.740; ed. min., sc d, 2.762-63). "... Quodsi tu dicas quod una retrahit alteram propter ordinem et unionem in uno perfectibili, non in una substantia animae, obicitur contra hoc: quia anima rationalis aut potest sentire aut non. Si non potest, ergo videtur quod non possit corpus vivificare. Quodsi potest sentire, restat quod istae potentiae fundantur in eadem substantia. — Si tu dicas ad hoc quod duplex est in nobis sensitiva: una a generante, et haec corrumpitur; alia a creante, et haec cum anima separatur; obicitur contra hoc: quia natura non facit per plura quod potest facere per pauciora. Si ergo sensitiva ilia, quae est a generante, sufficit in brutis ad sentiendum, multo fortius ilia, quae est a creante, sufficit homini: ergo non est aliam ponere sensitivam, quae sit a generante. — Quodsi tu dicas quod est ibi non ad sentiendum, sed ad disponendum corpus ad susceptionem rationalis, hoc non videtur sufficere, quia, si talis anima est substantia aeque complete in homine sicut in brutis, et in brutis non caret operatione sensitiva, videtur ergo quod nee in homine. Aut igitur erit in nobis ponere duplicem actum sentiendi simul et semel, aut est ponere quod sensitiva sit in nobis a creatione. Sed primum manifeste est t'alsum: restat igitur quod ultimum sit verum." — Loc. cit., sc 6 (2.741; ed. min., sc f, 2.763). 47 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod anima sensibilis hominis est immortalis, dicendum quod non est

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

125

The union of soul and body in man, according to Bonaventure, is founded on a natural and inseparable property of unibility. This property of the rational soul is an "aptitude for uniting with the body". Unibility is essential and not accidental to the soul; so, apart from destroying the nature of the soul, unibility cannot be taken away from it.48 To understand unibility, we can compare it to the soul as to its subject and as to its cause. A property is said to be naturally in a subject when it is found in the thing both inseparably and from its origin. A property which is caused by the principles of its subject, and through which the subject itself causes a natural operation, is said to be naturally in the thing.49 Thus, in the first instance, unibility is in the rational soul inseparably and from its origin, which it has in the human body. In the second instance, unibility is caused by intrinsic principles of the soul, and through it the soul causes a natural operation. In other words, unibility is a natural and inseparable property of the rational soul through which the soul causes its formal union with the body in which it originates. Consequently, unibility is the essential aptitude of the rational soul to unite itself as a form to the human body wherein God creates it.50 The aptitude of the human soul to unite with the body, in Bonaventure's judgment, marks the distinctive and essential difference between the soul and the angel. With respect to genus, the human soul is as distinct from the angel, which does not have unibility, as the human body is distinct from the

simile. Sensibile enim in homine nominal potentiam, scilicet animae rationalis ... sensibile vero in brutis nominal formam substantificatur in materia transmutabili; el quia pendet ex ilia quanlum ad esse, comimpilur, ilia corrupla." — 2 Sent, 19.1.2, ad 3 (2.463; ed. min., 2.476-77). "Item, in libro De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus (c. 17; PL 42.1216): 'Animae animalium non sunt substantiae, sed cum carne ipsa carnis vivacitate nascuntur et cum morte finiuntur', anima vero humana non cum carne moritur, quia nee cum carne seminatur'." — 2 Sent., 31.1.1, sc 2 (2.740; ed. min., sc b, 2.762). "Item, quae simul corrumpuntur simul etiam producuntur: ergo pari ratione, quae simul separantur simul et infunduntur. Sed, recedente anima rational!, nullo modo remanet potentia sentiendi in corpore: ergo sicut amittitur potentia sentiendi in recessu animae, ita infunditur in adventu; non est igitur a generatione, sed a creatione." — Loc. cit., sc 5 (e). 48 "... unibilitas sive aptitudo uniendi cum corpore non est animae accidentalis, sed est ipsi animae essentialis, et ita non potest ab ea separari vel circumscribi, salva ipsius natura." — 3 Sent., 5.2.3, in Rcsp. (3.137; ed. min., 3.130). 49 "Nam proprietas naturalis comparatur ad aliquid sicut ad subiectum et sicut ad causam. Secundum comparationem, quam habet ad subiectum, naturaliter dicitur inesse quod inest a primordio ipsius rei et inseparabiliter et ab ea non recedit. Secundum comparationem, quam habet ad causam, dicitur naturaliter inesse proprietas, quae causatur a principiis subiecti et per quam ipsum subiectum efficit operationem naluralem." — 3 Sent., 4.2.3, Resp. (3.109; ed. min., 3.103); cf. 2 Sent., 16.1.2, fa. 1-2 (2.396-97; ed. min., fa. a-b, 2.407). 50 Ignatius Brady has shown that with respect to the body, the independence of the rational soul, as a form, is not its primary character, but a consequence of original sin. The rational soul, having come to be in the body as its natural and substantial form, was intended to remain permanently united to the human body, and to confer on man both subsistence and immortality. The primary condition of the subsisting soul, then, is to be the form and perfection of the human body. See: "In seipsa subsistere", Progress in Philosophy (Milwaukee, Bruce: 1955), pp. 141-52.

1 26

CHAPTER ONE

inanimate body, which cannot be united to a rational soul. With respect to species, the human soul is different from the angel, because, through the essential property of unibility, the soul of man forms one essence with the human body. Thus, as a part of man, the rational soul has complete being only in the whole man. Since the soul is a part of man according to its unibility, the complete being of the soul follows its union with the body; but unibility is essential to the rational soul, and so it is essentially different from the angel. Moreover, Bonaventure goes on, the soul has in the body the essential or substantial act of giving life to it. Now this act belongs to the soul from its unibility; therefore, as the formal and completive difference of the soul with respect to the angel, unibility marks the essential and specific difference between them. 51 Clarifying his point of view, Bonaventure says that the rational soul is not united to the human body, nor does it give life to the body, by either an accidental or an ignoble act. The soul, by its act, is both the substantial form of the body and the noblest of all forms, for the rational soul consummates the appetite of the whole of corporeal nature. Because the human body has the noblest complexion and organization in nature, it is completed only by the noblest form, or nature. Consequently, indicating the specific difference between the soul and the angel, unibility is an essential property regarding what is noblest in the rational soul. Now unibility is not a pure relation of the soul to the body; it is, rather, a natural aptitude found in the soul according to its intrinsic principles, and they are prior by nature to its union with the body, just as rational is prior with respect to man. Unibility, moreover, is not a property enabling the rational soul to unite with any body. On the contrary, designating something noble and essential, unibility orders the rational soul to union with a human body. The property of unibility, therefore, is the means by which the soul perfects a human body. Indeed, for Bonaventure, unibility is both that by which the soul is rational and the principle of all its noble operations. Though the soul perfects itself, it also perfects the human body, just as a form is united by itself to matter. In sum, as the perfection of the human body, the soul informs it with rational life. S2

51 2 Sent., 1.2.3.2. fa. 1-4 (2.49; ed. mm., fa. a-d, 2.41). 52 Loc. cit., Resp. "Et ideo ..." & ad 1-3 (2.50; ed. min., 2.43); cf. 2.2.2.3, ad 3 (2.82; ed. min., 2.73-74). See also: 3 Sent.. 5.2.3, Resp. (3.137; ed. min., 3.130). C. O'Leary, in Kis study on Bonaventure's doctrine, does not consider either the formal principle of unibility or the union of soul and body as a proper form in its proper matter: The auhsiant. compos, of man, pp. 83-104. E. Szdzuj pays special attention to unibility; coupling it with the notion of perfection, he suggests that the natural, or substantial, union with the body realizes the perfections of the soul by actualizing its potency of unibility: "Saint Bonaventure et le probieme du rapport entre 1'ame et le corps", FF, 15 (1932), pp. 285-93. For brief accounts of Bonaventure's doctrine on this question consult: L. Veuthey, "Bonaventura (S.)", ENF, v. 1, cc. 755-56; Alexander Schaefer. "The position of man in the created world according to St. Bonaventure", FS, 21 (1961), pp. 374-77.

COMPOSITION OK BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

127

In Bonaventure's doctrine, therefore, the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. They share in one rational life. Thus, the union of soul and body constitutes the man, and it constitutes him a living thing. This is required by nature, which demands that man be composed at once from a body and a soul, as from matter and form, having a mutual appetite and inclination. Now, by nature, a proper form comes to-be only in a proper matter: since the rational soul is the proper form of a human body, that soul has a nature to be united only with a human body.53 The rational soul and the human body are proportioned to each other, in their union, as a principle of perfection to the subject of perfection. The rational soul, therefore, cannot be the perfection of any other body, because it is the perfection of the human body. As the form of the human body, furthermore, the rational soul gives being to the whole body and to all its parts. Explaining the fact, Bonaventure says that, to give being to a whole and to all its parts, the form must be united essentially to the whole, because it is through its essence that a form gives being. Consequently, as a form, the rational soul is united essentially to the human body.54 Since the rational soul is united according to its essence to the human body, the whole soul is in each part of the body. Bonaventure, in this instance, follows Augustine, who says: "We see that, in one perfectly healthy animal, there is one health in the several parts, and not a greater health in a greater part nor a lesser health in a lesser part". If such is the condition of a corporeal form, Bonaventure reasons, all the more is it the condition of a spiritual form. The rational soul is a simple form and a sufficient mover of the body. Because the soul is a simple form, it is not in the body according to this or that part; rather, as the form of the whole body, the soul is in the 53 "... unio animae cum corpore facit hominem et facit vivum." — Brevil., 4.9 (5.250; ed. rain., n. 8, 5.95) "... completio vero naturae requirit, ut homo constat simul ex corpore et anima tanquam ex materia et forma, quae mutuum habent appetitum et inclinationem mutuam." — Op. cit, 7.5 (5.286; ed. min., n. 2, 5.165). "Item, propria forma non est nata fieri nisi in propria materia. Ergo, cum anima sit propria forma corporis quod perfecit, non est nata uniri nisi illi." — 4 Sent, 43.1.4, fm. 4 (4.888; ed. min., fm. d, 4.877). On the mutual appetite and inclination of the soul and body note the following: "Ex hoc etiam habetur et colligitur ratio ex parte materia. O_uia enim ipsum quo anima sive forma tantae dignitatis est ut ipsam animam reddat Dei imagine insignitam, quae est conditio nobiiissima, materia, quae huic formae unitur, tanto appetitu ei coniungitur et ita eius appetitus in ipsa lerminatur quod nullatenus queat aliam formam appetere, cum optima colligantia iungantur ad invicem." — 2 Sent., 19.1.1, in Resp. (2.460; ed. min., 2.472). "Anima enim rationalis, quia est anima, differt ab angelo et convenit cum aliis animabus, et per hoc habet inclinationem ad corpus; quia rationalis, ad corpus humanum; quia nobilis, ad nobilius organizatum; sed ad hoc magis quam ad aliud, propter coniunctionem quam habuit ad illud." — 4 Sent., 43.1.5, in ad 6 (4.894; ed. min., 4.884). 54 "Item, perfectionem et perfectibile necesse est ad invicem esse proportionabilia: ergo nee perfectibile excedit perfectionem nee perfectio ipsum perfectibile. Si ergo anima rationalis est perfectio corporis humani, ilia anima rationalis, quae est perfectio istius corporis, non est perfectio alterius corporis; et ita impossible est quod perfieiat aliuri corpus." — 2 Sent., 18.2.1, con. 2 (2,445; ed. min., con, b. 2.457). "Item, quod dat esse toti et partibus unitur toti et partibus secundum essentiam, quia forma pei sui essentiam dat esse, et hoc non nisi ei cui essentiaiiter unitur; sed anima dat esse toti corpori et omnibus partibus: ergo etc." — 1 Sent., 8.2.un.3, fm. 2 (1.170; ed. min., fm. b, 1.135).

128

CHAPTER ONE

whole body. Likewise, as the sufficient mover of the body, the soul cannot have a site there, and so it is neither in a particular point of the body nor in a determinate part of it. Since this explanation is founded on reason, and since Augustine has given it, Bonaventure says that he approves it. But he is confronted with a different point of view based on Aristotle. An organic body has diverse perfections in its parts with reference to the whole. Now the soul perfects the whole body with respect to essence, and it perfects the parts with respect to potency; so the rational soul is in the parts of the body only with respect to the potencies. This is why Aristotle says: "as the soul is to the body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body". Bonaventure, however, has no difficulty in showing that his position on the question concurs with the teaching of Aristotle. The parts of the body are to be referred to its organization and complexion: by their complexion, the parts are uniform in the whole body and, disposed for the same kind of life, they are perfected by one principle; by their organization, the parts are diverse, and so they are perfected by the potencies. Thus, in Bonaventure's view, there is no conflict between Aristotle and Augustine on this question. On the contrary, though Bonaventure develops his position under the influence of Augustinian doctrine, he sees the Aristotelean doctrine on the question to be in conformity with his own teaching. 55 The union of body and soul in man is not immediate, because, as we have seen, the soul is united to the body by the mediation of unibility. This is reflected in the mode of union between the soul and the body in the order of operation. In that order, the soul is united to the body by means of the sense potency, and this is united to the body by means of the vegetative potency, which transmits life to the body.56 Now, according to Bonaventure, the rational soul vivifies the human body as its form and perfection. In vivifying the body, the soul looks to its complexion, which is one in the whole body. But the soul is also the mover 55 1 Sent., 8.2.un.3, Resp., sc 4 & ad 4 (1.170-71; ed. min., 1.235-36). C. M. O'Donnell, in his account of the union of soul and body in man according to St. Bonaventure, sees the Aristotelean elements to be superior to the Augustinian elements: The Psychology of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, 1937). pp. 19-20. E. Bettoni sees the Augustinian character of Bonaventure's thought modifying the AristoteSean elements: Bonaventure reconciles, through Augustine, the Platonic doctrine and the Aristotelean doctrine on the soul and body in man; his reconciliation preserves both the metaphysical independence of the rational soul and its natural union with the body. Though the Bonaventurean formulas are Aristotelean. Bettoni says, "as usual under an identity of formulas there lies hidden a profound difference of conceptions." See: S. Bonaventura, pp. 19-27, 110; ET pp. 13-20, 83-84. 56 "Anima enim, cum sit spiritualis, non potuit in se significari, sed in annexo, ut puta in sanguine, in quo est sedes animae, non quia in solo sanguine, sed quia anima rationalis unitur mediante potentia sentiendi, et ilia mediante potentia vegetandi, et ilia, cum habeat tres virtutes, prirna, fundamentum omnium, est nutritiva, et nutrimentum sanguinis vel aliquid loco eius." — 4 Sent, 11.2.1.2, ad 3 (4.257; ed. rntn, 2.241). "Item, vegetabilis et sensibilis disponunt ad rationalem et magis ad ipsam appropinquant quam natura alicuius corporis, nee alicui corpori unitur rationalis potentia absque vegetabili et sensibili; nullum ergo corpus est habile ad actum vitae rationaiis nisi prius fuerit habile ad actum vitae vegetabilis ..." — 2 Sent., 17.2.1, sc 3 (2.419; ed. mm., sc c, 2.431).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

1 29

of the body. In this respect, the soul looks to the organs of the body, and it is united to them by means of its potencies. As the source of life for the body, then, the soul is united to it with respect to substance. The union of soul and body as mover and movable, however, constitutes the intrinsic foundation of sense knowledge in man." The soul alone, on the other hand, is the foundation of man's intellectual knowledge. Although the whole soul according to its essence is in every part of the body, nevertheless, the soul, according to its intellective potency, is not limited to any determinate part of the body. The soul is limited in its operations, however, according to the sensitive potencies and their appetites. Because man has sense knowledge, as well as intellectual knowledge, he has to have a multiform body, so that his diverse organs will serve the needs of his senses with respect to their objects. All the corporeal natures inferior to man, moreover, have been created to serve him. They have been created, furthermore, in order that, through man's mediation, they will be taken to their end. For those reasons, Bonaventure says, the rational creature has to be composed in such a way that the service of inferior creatures will be useful to him, and that by his mediation they will somehow be taken to beatitude.58 Bonaventure develops some of his doctrine on the union of body and soul in man, as we have shown, with the support of both Aristotle and Augustine. On those occasions where we have seen him appealing to the authority of Augustine, but not of Aristotle, he is able nonetheless either to draw Aristotlean doctrines to the support of his own positions or to demonstrate that Aristotelean teachings can be understood to concur with his own. On the essential principle of union between the soul and the body, however, Bonaventure does not cite Aristotle or Augustine. Thus, concerning the property of unibility and its function in the composition of man, Bonaventure goes his own way as he presents his view of the rational soul in its condition as the substantial form of the human body. From his point of view, the rational soul communicates rational life to the human body, which participates in the being and perfections of the soul as its proper substantial form.

57 "Et exemplum naturale est in anima humana perficiente corpus, quae in quantum vivificans respicit complexionem, quae est una in toto corpore; in quantum motor respicit organa diversa." — 4 Sent., 49.1.un.4, in Resp. (4.1006; ed. min., 4,991-92). "... dicendum quod anima est perfectio quantum ad substantiam et motor quantum ad potentias; etsi anima non sit composita, immo simplex quantum ad substantiam, habet tamen multitudinem potentiarum, ratione quarum ad diversa organa comparatur." — 4 Sent., 44.1.2.2., ad 3 (4.914; ed. min., 4.903). Cf. Brevil., 2.9 "Quoniam autem ..." (5.227; ed. min., n. 5, 5.50); DSC, q. 5, ad 11 (5.31); Comm. in Ecdes., 3.22, q. 2, ad 2-3 (6.37); Coll. in loam., 5.2 (6.542). 58 4 Sent., 23.2.3, ad fa. 1-3 (4.599-600; ed. min.. ad fa. a-c, 4.590); 2 Sent., 17.2.1, Resp. "Ordo ipsius ... elementorum constitui." (2.419-20; ed. min., 2.431).

1 30

CHAPTER ONE

The first man, according to Aquinas, was composed in some way from all things. In the genus of spiritual substances, Adam had a rational soul. In the world of bodies, Adam had a body removed from contraries through a maximum equality of complexion, thus approaching the nature of the heavenly bodies. His body also had the four elements: fire and air, which were necessary for life, were predominant according to power; water and earth were predominant according to quantity, and so they were inferior to fire and air with respect to power. The elements were combined, however, in an equality of complexion suitable for a body having a rational soul and requiring sense organs. Hence, the body of Adam had a due proportion to his soul and its operations, for the rational soul acquires knowledge by way of the senses.59 Thus, concurring with Bonaventure on the dispositions of Adam's body, Aquinas also harmonizes with him on the inclination of the rational soul toward the human body. In the view of Aquinas, the rational soul has a natural aptitude for the most complex and the best organized body in the universe. He also sees in the human body a complex organization corresponding to the multiple functions of a spiritual soul, which is simple in essence. The rational soul is the noblest of all substantial forms in matter, and it is created both directly and immediately by God.60 But St. Thomas takes a different position from St. Bonaventure on the natural generation of man. The Thomist doctrine on this question is influenced to a large extent by Aristotelean principles. Thomas, denying that any soul has being before animating a body, shows that, according to Aristotle and Averroes, both the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul originate through generation, because they have being as part of the composite and not absolutely as natural forms. It is not the form that is generated, therefore, but the composite substance, and this requires the generator itself to be composed of matter and form. Accordingly, in the generation of man, the human body has a vegetative soul, then a sensitive soul, from the generator before the arrival of a rational soul. The vegetative soul is corrupted when the sensitive soul appears, and the latter corrupts on the arrival of the rational soul. Since the rational soul is created, and since it has both vegetative and sensitive potencies, the whole man is said to be created by God.61 59 ST, la, 91.1, Resp. ad 1 & 3 (1.563); 91.3, Resp, (l.565b-66a). Aquinas, like Bonaventure. rejects the view that light is a mediating principle in the union of body and soul in man: "Nee est verum quod quidam dicunt aliquid de quinta essentia materialiter ad compositionem humani cor]x>ris advenirc. ponentes animam uniri corpori mediante quadani luce ... impossible est aliquid de quinta essentia vel a corpore caelesti dividi, vel elementis permisceri, propter raelesti corporis impassibilitatern. Uncle non venit in compositionem mixtorum corporum nisi secundum suae virtutis effecturn." — See, in the first reference, ad 2. 60 2 Sent., 1.2.5 (2.54-56); 18.2.1, sc 1-3, Sol. & ad 5-7 (2.459-62). ST, la, 76.5 (1.457a-58b); DA, a. 8 (2.308-12); DPD. 3.9, Rtsp. (2.65-66); SCG, 2.87-88 (2.249-53). 61 2 Sent., 18.2.3, Sol., arg. 4 & ad 4 (2.466-72). Cf. SCG. 2.86 (2.248-49); DPD. 3.11. Resp., ad 2-3 (2.274-75); ST, la, 118.1, Resp. (1.700); Qdl., 9.5.1 or 9,11 (pp. 189-91).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

131

In Bonaventure's solution to this problem, the rational soul is created in the human body without a succession of preceding forms. A seminal force prepares the embryo to receive the rational soul; having vegetative and sensitive potencies, the rational soul completes the formation of the human body, Bonaventure's doctrine is influenced here, as we have observed, by his desire to demonstrate that the teaching of Augustine is not opposed to a proper understanding of the teaching of Aristotle. The doctrine of Aquinas, however, is influenced directly by Aristotle's thought. Although Aquinas insists, as does Bonaventure, on the creation of the rational soul, which has vegetative and sensitive potencies, nonetheless, departing from Bonaventure, he upholds Aristotle's teaching on the successive formations of the human body by a vegetative soul and a sensitive soul originating from the semen of the generator. For Aquinas, therefore, it is not sufficient to say that the rational soul is preceded only by a seminal force, or formative power in the semen. On the contrary, it must be said that the rational soul is preceded by a sensitive soul, which is preceded by a vegetative soul. When the rational soul arrives, it carries out the vegetative and sensitive operations required to complete the formation of the human body.w The description given by Aquinas of the union of body and sou! in man is similar in some respects to the description given by Bonaventure. Both theologians say that the rational sou! communicates being to all the parts of the human body, because, as its proper substantial form, the soul is wholly in each and every part of the body. They also concur in saying that, as the mover of the body, the soul is referred diversely through its potencies to the several parts of the body. 63 The position of Aquinas on the essential union of soul and body, as the proper form and the proper matter of man, is unmistakably different from that of Bonaventure. According to Aristotle, whom Aquinas follows on the problem, a union of form and matter through some sort of medium would be accidental and not essential. Now the soul is the form of the body;

62 ST, la, 118.2, ad 2 (1.702a-03b); DA, a. 11,ad 1 & Resp. (2.322-24); DSf,C, a. 3, Resp. "Sic ergo ..." (2.381-82). We have noticed St. Bonaventure handling the question of multiple souls in man by combining Aristotelean doctrine with Augustinian doctrine. St. Thomas approaches the question as a Platonic problem; he treats the problem in a noticeably Aristotelean way, and without reference to St. Augustine. Cf. SCG, 2.58 (2.184-86); ST, la, 76.3, Resp. (1.448a-50a). On the question: "Utrum aliraentum in veritatem humanae naturae convertatur". Aquinas, in common with Bonaventure, uses the doctrine both of Aristotle and Augustine; but an Aristotelean influence on Aquinas is quite pronounced: 2 Sent., 30.2.1 (2.776-87): cf. a. 2 (2.787-96); ST, la, 119.1 (1.704b-08a): cf. a. 2 (1.708a-09b). 63 On these point in Aquinas see: 1 Sent., 8.5.3 (1.232-34); SCG, 2.72 (2,206-07); DA, a. 10, sc 1-3, Resp., ad 13 & 17 (2.318-21); DSpC, a. 4, Resp., ad 8 & 21 (2.385-87); ST, la, 76.8, Resp. (1.461b-62a). Bonaventure and Aquinas differ, nevertheless, in their understanding of the twofold nature of the rational form as a self-subsisting substance and as the mover of the human body. We shall meet this difference in the next chapter.

132

CHAPTER ONE

hence, Aquinas maintains, the soul through its essence must be united immediately to the body, so that one thing is caused by their union. 64 Expressing his thought very concisely, Aquinas says that "the essence of the rational soul is united immediately to the body, as a form is united to matter". He clarifies his statement with a consideration of the capacity of the soul and the body to come together. According to their natural properties, the soul and the body are very far apart; however, according to their proportion as act and potency, the soul and the body are so very close that their capacity to come together requires the soul to be united immediately as a form to the body.65 For Aquinas, the rational soul is a substantial form because it establishes man in a determinate species of substance. There is, then, no other substantial form acting as a medium between matter and the rational soul. Man has diverse perfections from his soul, so that, from it, he is a body, a living body and a rational animal. As the recipient of those perfections, matter must be understood, together with its appropriate dispositions, as the matter which is proper for the rational soul according as it gives to man his ultimate perfection. The rational soul, therefore, as a form that gives being, has no medium of any sort between itself and prime matter.66 The difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure on this particular question, no doubt, stems from their individual interpretations of act and potency as applied to form and matter. In the consideration of Aquinas, form is act and matter is potency. Because form and matter are proportioned to each other as act to potency, a form cannot be united to matter through a medium. Any medium coming between form and matter would itself have to be a form, and so it would give an act to matter, thus con64 "Philosophus, in VIII Metapk., text 15, ostendit quod unio formae et materiae non est per aliquod vinculum medium; immo per se unum alteri unitun alias non esset unio essentialis, sed accidentalis. Anima autem forma corporis est; unde oportet ut ipsa anima uniatur per essentiam suam immediate corpori, ut ex ea et corpore efficiatur unum, sicut etiam cera et sigillo, ut in II De anima, text 7, dicitur." — 2 Sent., 31.2.1, Sol. (2.812). 65 "Et ideo dicimus quod essentia animae rationalis immediate unitur corpori sicut forma materiae, et figura cerae, ut in II De anima, text. 7, dicitur. Sciendum ergo quod convenientia potest attend! dupliciten aut secundum proprietates naturae, et sic anima et corpus multum distant, aut secundum proportionem potentiae ad actum, et sic anima et corpus maxime conveniunt. Et ista convenientia exigitur ad hoc ut aliquid uniatur alteri ut forma; alias nee accidens subjecto nee aliqua forma materiae uniretur, cum accidens et subjectum etiam sint in diversis generibus, et materia sit potentia, et forma sit actus." — 2 Sent., 1.2.4, ad 3 (2.53-54). 66 "Sic igitur cum anima sit forma substantialis, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos gradus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal rationale. Sed oportet quod materia secundum quod inelligitur ut recipiens ab ipsa anima rationali perfectiones inferioris gradus, puta quod sit corpus et animatum corpus et animal, intelligatur, simul cum dispositionibus convenientibus, quod sit materia propria ad animam rationalem, secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem. Sic igitur anima, secundum quod est forma dans esse, non habet aliquid aliud medium inter se et materiam primam." — D A , a. 9, Resp. (2.31). Cf. SCG, 2.71 (2.206); DSpC, a. 3 (2.378-84).

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

133

stituting a substance. As a pure potency for the act of form, prime matter is always united to a substantial form without the mediation of any dispositions. Consequently, for Aquinas, a substantial form is united immediately to prime matter, so that the form gives being to the matter. The soul and body of man are united in that way. The soul, as a substantial form, gives being to matter immediately and, forming one thing with it, the soul perfects the body, thus constituting the man immediately as a living thing and a rational animal. In Bonaventure's consideration, matter is a being in potency and form is a being in act. For the one to be united to the other, matter must predisposed by a mediating principle, because matter, even in its original or primary condition, is never a pure potency. As a consequence, matter cannot be united immediately to a form. Matter is inclined toward a form through a seminal reason, from which the substantial form is produced. Although the rational soul is not produced from a seminal reason, nonetheless, as a substantial form, the soul is inclined toward a human body. Since the soul is a rational form, it must have an aptitude to unite with matter; and since the matter constituting the human body is not in potency to receive a rational form immediately, the body must be properly disposed to receive the soul. Consequently, for Bonaventure, the soul and body of man are not united immediately to each other. They are united through mediating principles: unibility on the part of the soul, and complexion on the part of the body. Thus, the body is not an immediate potency for the soul; nor is the soul an immediate act of the body. The soul must give being and rational life to the body through mediating principles.67 CONCLUSION St. Bonaventure sees two extremes in the order of corporeal creatures. Those extremes are prime matter and the ultimate form, which is the rational soul. Both extremes share in the fulfilment of the universe.68 The two extremes depend directly and immediately on God, who has created them. Prime matter is the foundation of the existence of corporeal things, and the rational soul is the fulfilment of their nobility of being. In the order of corporeal things, there are non-living and living substances. Non-living 67 For a short contrast of the Bonaventurean doctrine with the Thomist doctrine on the union of soul and body in man see: H. Guthrie, The Modern Schoolman, 15 (1938), pp. 85-86. The substantial union of form and matter, especially of soul and body in man, as described by St. Bonaventure, raises the particular question of his position on the unity of substantial form. The question, however, involves the general problem of plural forms in a corporeal substance. That problem, in our view, cannot be considered sufficiently until the doctrine of St. Bonaventure is known on the individuation of corporeal substances and on the personal individuation of man. We are going to examine his doctrine on those subjects in the following chapter. We shall then consider, in a separate chapter, the whole problem of plural forms. 68 "In ordine creaturarum universi, reperimus primam materiam et ultimam formam, et aeque vel magis est de complemento universi ultima forma sicut et prima materia." — 2 Sent., 19.1.1, ad opp. 1 (2.458; ed. min., ad opp. a, 2.470).

] 34

CHAPTER ONE

substances consist in elementary bodies, mixed bodies and complex bodies. Elementary bodies share in the formation of mixed bodies, and mixed bodies share in the formation of complex bodies. All non-living bodies participate in corporeal light, from which they derive their nobility of being. Complex bodies are ordered to the formation of living substances. These substances consist in plants, animals and men. Plants have the simplest form of life, which is vegetative life. Animals have sensitive life and, participating in vegetative life, they have a nobler form than the plants. The sensitive form of an animal enables it to move from place to place and, by its sense powers, to know other things. Those activities require the body of an animal to be organized in an equality of complexion. The body of a man requires the best equality of complexion, for man has rational life, and this is the noblest life in the corporeal world. The principle of that life is the rational soul, which is the noblest of all corporeal forms. The composition of soul and body in man, then, completes the formation of corporeal things, thus consummating the perfection of the corporeal world. By his body, man participates in and completes the nature of other bodily things; by potencies of his soul, man also perfects and participates in both vegetative and sensitive life. By his rational soul, however, man stands alone, because no other corporeal creature has the capacity to know the world in an intellectual manner. Thus, the whole of the corporeal world is ordered to the perfection of man, who is all things in a participational way. As the peak of perfection in the corporeal universe, man is the medium through which all other corporeal things are taken back to God, who is the principle and the end of creation. In short, the notion of participation governs St. Bonaventure's understanding of the constitution of the corporeal universe. In developing his understanding of the corporeal universe, St. Bonaventure draws upon the teachings of Aristotle and St. Augustine. Those historical sources have contributed in a variety of ways to the Bonaventurean doctrine on the origin, formation and nature of corporeal substances. In some ways, an Aristotelean influence stands out, for instance, on man as the completion of the corporeal world. In other ways, an Augustinian influence is pronounced, for example, on the organization of the senses in the animals. For the most part, Bonaventurean doctrine, seen according to its historical sources, manifests a combination of Augustinian and Aristotelean elements. These elements are carefully balanced by St. Bonaventure, so that the resulting synthesis is neither Augustinian nor Aristotelean, but noticeably Bonaventurean. When Aristotle seems to teach the contrary to Augustine, or when Augustine's authority is invoked but not Aristotle's, then, keeping his own synthesis in view, Bonaventure is able to demonstrate either that Aristotle and Augustine are not in conflict or that Aristotelean thought conforms to his own interpretation of Augustinian thought. Thus, both Augustinian thought and Aristotelean thought participate in the Bonaventurean understanding of the constitution of the corporeal world.

COMPOSITION OF BODY AND SOUL IN MAN

135

An Aristotelean influence is more pronounced on the doctrine of St. Thomas than on the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. From what we have seen of their philosophical thought, thus far, we are not inclined to say that their syntheses are diverse. If they were diverse, the two theologians would rarely concur in their thought. St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas do concur on many points of doctrine. They also differ in their positions on some rather important doctrines, notably on the nature of form and matter as constituent principles of being, and on the union of soul and body in man. Taken together with their similar points of view, however, the differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas mark their syntheses as separate, but not as diverse, developments of doctrine on the origin and the constitution of corporeal substances.

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER TWO ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

T HE

whole corporeal world, St. Bonaventure tells us, has been created for man's sake. Man, however, is not the principal or ultimate end of other corporeal creatures. That end is God, who created all things, both rational and irrational, for His own sake. Man is the proximate end of irrational creatures. Aristotle suggests this when he says: "We are the end in some way of all the things that are" (Phys., 2.2; 194a35). Sacred Scripture also suggests it and, Bonaventure remarks, in a much more excellent manner: "Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him preside over the fishes of the sea ..." (Gen., 1.26). As an image of God, man is capable of reason and he has liberty of choice; so, by his nature, man dominates the other animals. As a likeness of God, man tends towards Him immediately; therefore, all irrational creatures are ordered to man, so that, by his mediation, they will be taken to the ultimate end.' The natural dignity of man, then, is grounded in the nobility of his rational soul. While no other creature has dominion over the soul of man, he has been given power with respect to other corporeal things. They have been created to serve man, Bonaventure says, "so that, from them, man would be inflamed to love and to praise the Creator of the universe". Thus, in His providence, God has given the corporeal world, as a home made by Himself, to man until he shall arrive at his heavenly home. Then his soul and body will find rest in beatitude.2 In Bonaventure's judgment, therefore, the Aristotelean doctrine on man as the "end of all things" is in harmony with the Scriptural doctrine on man as an "image and likeness" of God. Conjoining the two doctrines, Bonaventure attains his view of man, in his soul and body, as the proximate end of the rest of corporeal creatures.3 1 Before Adam sinned, Bonaventure notes, the animals obeyed him and, adorning his home, they stirred him up to see the multiform wisdom of God in their diverse natures; from his natural affection for the animals, Adam was elevated to a love for God. After Adam sinned, he lost his dominion over the animals, and so we have been restricted to using them to fulfil our needs, such as food and clothing. See: 2 Sent., 15.2.1, Resp. (2.382-83; ed. min., 2.391-92). 2 Brevil., 2.4 "El quoniam ..." (5.221-22; ed. mm., nn. 4-5, 5.40-41). 3 "Anima et corpus sunt partes constitutivae, propter quern factae sunt ceterae creaturae, secundum illud Genesis primo (26): 'Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit volatilibus coeli' etc." — Comm. in Luc., 12.34 (7.319). First and foremost an image of God, man rules the rest of the corporeal world because he is a rational creature having freedom of choice. As a corporeal creature, man also consummates and perfects the sensible universe by his most complex and organic body, which befits his intellective soul. Accordingly, in his composition of soul and body, man unites the sensible and intellectual worlds. Consult: A. Schaefer, FS, 20 (1960), pp. 261-63; 21 (1961), pp. 233-82.

138

CHAPTER TWO

The exalted position allotted by St. Bonaventure to man in the universe has the support of St. Augustine. He teaches that the human soul is in the minor world of the body in a way similar to the presence of God in the major world of bodily things. Hence, according to St. Bonaventure, man is called a minor world because, more than any other creature, he represents the Creator in the corporeal world. The rational soul represents God not only in itself, but also as united to the human body. The soul rules and dwells in the whole of the body, just as God rules and dwells in the major world.4 Thus, the source of man's exalted condition in the universe lies in the nobility of his rational soul. Now St. Bonaventure distinguishes two portions in the rational soul: a superior portion, or spirit, which has the greater closeness to God and gives the body perpetuity and incorruption; an inferior portion, or soul, and this gives life to the human body.5 The rational soul, nevertheless, as we have seen, is the substantial form of the human body. As such, the soul is the completive form of human nature. Every substantial form completing a nature, according to St. Bonaventure, is called essence, nature, and species. It is called essence when considered in itself, and it is called nature when considered with reference to its proper operation; the name species is given to a substantial form when it is considered in relation to our knowledge of it.6 Considered in itself, then, the rational soul is called essence. As an essence, the soul is constituted through its own intrinsic principles, and so it is a self-subsisting substance. Thus, our first problem has to do with the constitution of the human soul. Considered with reference to its proper operation, the soul is called nature. As a nature, the soul is the foundation of 4 1 Sent, 8.2.un.3, Cm. 1 (1.170; ed. min., fm. a, 1.135); 3 Sent., 2.1.2. Resp. "Secunda ratio ..." (3.40; ed. mm., 3.35). 5 "Et accipitur spiritus pro superior! portione animae, sicut dicitur Magister, quae maiorem converiientiam habet cum Deo; anima vero pro inferior! parte animae, secundum quam vivificat corpus. Et per iiaec duo nihil aliud datur intetiigi quam iilud corpus ... habet per anirnam vivificari et per spiritum ad perpetuitatem et incorruptionem ordinari." — 3 Sent., 2.3.1 in Resp. (3.50; ed. mm.. 3.46). The distinction of spirit from soul in the rational form is taken by St. Bonaventure from the text of Peter Lombard: k 'Spintus enim, scilicet pars animae superior, maiori similitudine Deo propinquat quam anima, scilicet ipsa eadem secundum mferiorem partem, et anima magis quam corpus ..." — dist. II, c. II: St. Bonav., op. omn., (3.35). The editors suggest the work De spiritu et anima, cc. 14 & 18 (PL 40.789, 793, 806), as the probable source for both the doctrine of Lombard and the references to St. Augustine in the previous number (n. 4, above). The true author of this work is Alcher of Clairvaux; consult: P. Glorieux, Melang. scien. relig., 9 (1952), p. 27. Although St. Bonaventure was aware of its doubtful authenticity as a work of St. Augustine, nonetheless, he accepted its doctrine as truly Augustinian and never ceased to employ it as such. In any event, he had no doubt about the true Augustinian source of the superior and inferior parts of the rational soul. Cf. 2 Sent., 24.1.2.1, Resp. ad 1 (2.559, 561; ed. min., 2.576-78); 24.1.2.2. (2.563-64; ed, min., 2.581-83). 6 "Dicendum quod uniuscuiusque forma substantialis et completiva dicitur species, natura et essentia, et hoc secundum triplicem considerationem. Potest enim considerari in se, et sic dicitur essentia; potest considerari in comparatione ad operationem propriam, et sic dicitur natura, potest iterum considerari in cornparatione ad nostram cognitionem, et sic dicitur species." — 1 Sent., 31.2.dub.5, in Resp. (1.551; ed. min., 1.439).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

139

intellectual knowledge; however, as a substantial form, the soul is also the foundation of rational knowledge and of human action. Since all these operations are proper to the human person, who is the individual performing them, our second problem concerns the personal nature of man. On the other hand, the human soul is called spirit from its superior part, and it is called soul from its inferior part. Those distinctions are based on its functions according as it is referred either to God or to bodily things. Hence, our third problem bears upon the r91e of the superior and inferior parts of the soul in human knowledge. 7 Constitution of the Human Soul The human soul, St. Bonaventure holds, is created by God and not generated by man. Now Aristotle teaches that the human intellect enters the body extrinsically. To Bonaventure, this implies that the soul of man is not generated. He supports his view from reason: everything that can be propagated by nature is corruptible; but the rational soul is incorruptible and, therefore, is not propagated by nature. If the soul were generated, it would be from either the flesh or the soul of the generator. The soul cannot come from his flesh, because it is impossible for a body to become what is not a body, and the soul is not a body, as both Aristotle and Augustine have shown. Consequently, if the rational soul were generated, it would be from either the whole soul of the generator or a part of it. Since his soul is simple, it cannot generate a part of itself; if it were to give the whole of itself, the generator would die, but this obviously does not happen when one man begets another. The rational soul, moreover, is a substance existing through itself, and so it has matter and a form. When the soul is produced, therefore, it is produced either from preceding matter or together with its matter. If the soul were produced from preceding matter, this matter would have to be spiritual, because the rational soul cannot be produced from corporeal matter. But spiritual matter cannot be without a form, since all being is from form. Having a form, therefore, such matter cannot remain numerically the same under another form. As a consequence, the rational soul cannot come into being from spiritual matter. The soul originates together with its matter and, for this reason, Bonaventure says, it is necessary that the soul be produced from nothing, and by God alone. 8 The rational soul, then, according to Bonaventure, is produced by God alone. He creates the soul and, by creating it, infuses it into the body; thus, by this infusion, God produces the rational soul. Bonaventure gives two 7 The human soul, as a species, refers to the order of cognition; so, as such, it is outside our present consideration. 8 2 Sent., 18.2.3, con. 2-5 (2.452; ed. min., con. b-e, 2.465). For the references to Aristotle see: Degener. animal., 2.3 (763a24-737bl4); De anima, 1.4-5 (407b28-41 Ib30). See in St. Augustine: De immort. ammae, 10.17 (PL 32.1029).

140

CHAPTER TWO

reasons why God alone can create the rational soul. The first reason is the dignity of the soul: as an image of God, the rational soul by nature is drawn immediately to God and, by loving Him, it is beatified in God; therefore, the rational soul ought to have its whole being immediately from God. The second reason is the immortality of the soul: since God alone has life, and unfailing life, in Himself, only He can produce a perpetual principle of life; an incorruptible thing, furthermore, cannot be substantialized in matter that is entirely mutable: now the operation of a creature concerns this sort of matter; no creature, therefore, can possibly produce a rational soul. Hence, only God produces the rational soul. The brute soul, on the other hand, is a corruptible form, and such a form can be drawn from preceding matter. But the rational soul is an incorruptible and singular thing (hoc aliquid) which cannot be drawn from preceding matter. This is what St. Augustine teaches, for he has shown in many ways that the rational soul cannot come from pre-existing matter, whether corporeal or spiritual.9 We have learned thus far that, for Bonaventure, the human soul is a substance existing through itself and, having its own matter and form, is a singular and incorruptible thing. The matter in the human soul is a spiritual matter created together with a form; so, because the form is also spiritual, the soul is self-subsistent as a spiritual creature. But the soul is not a pure spirit. God alone is a pure spirit, since only He is entirely free from matter, from every sort of composition, and from dependence on any creature. Hence, God is a spirit through His essence. l ° As a being (ens) through Himself, God has no need of another in which to subsist. Although a creature is not a being (ens) through itself because it is in another as in a subject, even so, a creature needs another for its own conservation. Consequently, God alone subsists perfectly in being (esse).'' Tlie rational soul, then, is a spiritual being (ens) subsisting in itself and through its matter and form. As a creature, however, the soul depends on God for the conservation of its being (esse). As a created spirit, moreover, the rational soul is not free entirely from matter. It is free only from corporeal matter. Thus, the rational soul is spiritual because it has no corporeity.12 9 Lac. cit., Resp. "Et ideo ...", ad 5 (2.453-54; ed. min., 2.466-67); cf. ad 3. Consult in St Augustine: De Gen ad litt., 7.5-9 (PL 34.358-60). See also in St Bonaventure: 1 Sent., 37.1.2.1, fm 3 (1.642; ed. min., fm. c, 1.509); 2 Seat., 15.1.1, fm. 5 (2.373; ed. min., fm. e, 2.380); 18.1.3, con. 4 (2.440; ed. min., con. d, 2.45253). 10 "Deus est spiritus purus, omnino impermixtus et independens a creaturis omnibus ..." — 2 Sent., 16.2.1, in Resp. (2.402; ed. min., 2.413). "Deus autem non potest esse ex disparibus et dissimilibus, quia spiritus per essentiam." — 1 Sent., 8.2.dub.6, in Resp. (1.176; ed. min., 1.141). 11 See: 1 Sent., 8.2.un.4, ad 2 (1.173-74; ed. min., 1.139); 8.2.dub.5 (1.175; ed. min., 1.140). 12 1 Sent., 10.2.3, Resp. (1.204; ed. min., 1.164-65). Note the following passages: "In substantia autem corporali spiritus dicitur dupliciter: aut a spiritualitate contra corpulentiam; et sic dicitur absolute, et vocatur spiritus corpus subtile ... aut a spiratione; et sic dicitur spiritus flatus ... Secundum hunc duplicem modum accipitur in substantia spiritual!, sive rational!, aut a spiritualitate contra corporeitatem; et sic substantia rationalis vel eius potentia interior dicitur spiritus ... aut a spiratione; et sic affectus vel amor dicitur spiritus." — Ibid.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

141

In demonstrating a necessity to posit matter and form in the human soul, Bonaventure seeks much support from Aristotle. Now, according to Aristotle, there is matter and an efficient principle in every nature; so, in the soul, there is an intellect by which all things become known, and an intellect which makes them known. Since passive potency is on the side of matter, Bonaventure concludes, there is matter in the rational soul, because it has a passive potency. Aristotle also teaches that, as matter is the subject of substantial forms, the composite is, in like manner, the subject of accidents; but the rational soul is subject to the sciences and to the virtues, and so the soul is a composite of matter and form. Aristotle, furthermore, says that an operator and a generator cause something only because of matter. Since God causes the rational soul, Bonaventure argues, and the soul is other than God, it is necessary that there be matter either in God or in the soul. But there is no matter in God. There is matter, therefore, in the rational soul.l3 Bonaventure goes on to demonstrate this from reason; however, his demonstrations reflect an Aristotelean influence. In one demonstration, Bonaventure reasons that the rational soul, because it has a proper operation, cannot be only a form, since every creature has both an active principle and a passive principle of its proper operation. If the soul were purely form, it would act only from itself; but the soul acts according to its principles of operation, so the soul has some material principle. In another demonstration, Bonaventure shows that the rational soul must be composed of matter and form, because it can be joyous or sad according to an intrinsic mutation. He bases his demonstration on the principle that everything susceptible to contraries according to an intrinsic mutation is both a singular thing (hoc alquid) and a substance existing through itself in a genus. The soul is a thing of this sort, and since this sort of thing is composed of matter and form, therefore, the soul is composed in that way. l4 Bonaventure, seeking the support of Boethius and Augustine, presents a final argument founded on the life of the rational soul. The soul not only gives life to the human body, Bonaventure says, but also lives by itself. The soul, then, is either its own life or it is not: if the soul were its own life, the living thing would not be different from that by which it lives; thus, the soul would be living through its essence and not through participation, but this is contrary to the teaching of Boethius and of Augustine. It is necessary, therefore, to posit in the human soul something giving it life and something receiving that life. Consequently, the soul must be composed of form and matter.15 13 2 Sent., 17.1.2, sc. 1-3 (2.413-14; ed. min., sc a-c, 2.425). See in Aristotle, De anima, 3.5 (430alO-19); Metaph., 7.6-7 (1031a29-1032bl4). 14 Loc. cit, sc 4-5 (2.414; ed. min., sc d-e, 2.414). The doctrine of substance as something singular (hoc atiquid) is derived from Aristotle; consult: Metaph., 4.8 (1017blO-25), 9.7 (1049a25-35). 15 Loc. cit., sc 6-e. See in Boethius: De Trimt, c. 2 (PL 64.1250-51); and in St. Augustine: De monb. Manich., 2.4.6 (PL 32.1347).

142

CHAPTER TWO

Although Aristotle does not teach that the human soul is composed of form and matter, nevertheless, we find St. Bonaventure drawing heavily on Aristotelean principles to demonstrate a necessity for form and matter in the human soul. The Bonaventurean position on the question, therefore, involves an application of Aristotelean principles to the problem rather than a strict interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine on the nature of the human soul. To Bonaventure, the soul has a form, which is its active principle and source of life. The soul also has matter, this is its passive principle, and that by which it has life. Hence, the constituent elements of the soul are not strictly Aristotelean. They manifest Bonaventure's understanding of the necessary constitution of the soul as a spiritual creature. The functions which he assigns to form and matter in constituting the human soul clearly demonstrate this. The soul is a singular thing having through itself a natural capacity to subsist, to act and to receive action, to move and to be moved; therefore, the soul has within itself a twofold foundation of its own existence: a material principle of existing (existere), and a formal principle of being (esse). In other words, the soul has being from its form, and it has existing from its matter. Since it is the material principle that determines the existence (existentia) of a creature in itself, the human soul must have matter. The matter in the soul, however, is raised above the being (esse) of extension, of privation and of corruption; it is, therefore, a spiritual matter.16 But Aristotle teaches that the intellect is not mixed with matter, and that it has no passivity. Since everything which has matter also has a passive potency, the intellective substance of man cannot have matter. Bonaventure handles this difficulty in his own way. He holds that Aristotle removes matter from the intellect according as matter is subject to privation and to a potency for transmutation with respect to being; so, not removing matter universally from the intellect, Aristotle in fact puts matter there when he says that, in the intellect, there is a nature making things known and a nature by which they become known. 1 7 Thus, Bonaventure interprets Aristotle's principles in such a way that the human soul, as a spiritual creature, is necessarily constituted by a spiritual matter and form. A similar constitution is posited by Bonaventure in the

16 "Et ideo csl tertius modus dicendi ... quod anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, inovere et moveri. quod habet intra se fundamentum suae existenliae et principium materiale a quo habet existere. ct formale a quo habet esse ... Cum igitur principium, a quo est tixa existentia creaturae in se. sit principium materiale. concedendum est animam humanam materiam haherc. Ilia auteni materia sublevata est supra esse extension!* et supra esse privatiunis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur spiritualis." — Loi. cit, Resp. (2414-15; ed. min., 2.426); cf. ad 5. (Since we shall be concerned with cxistfrf. we shall translate it by the English term: existing.) For a study of spiritual matter in the human soul and in the personal nature of man, according to St. Bonaventure and to other medieval thinkers, see: P. Bissels, "Die sachliche Begriindung im philosophiegeschichtliche Stellung der Lehre von der materia spirilualis in der Scholastik", FKS, 38 (1956), pp. 241-95. 17 Lac. at., arg. 2, ad 2 (2.413, 415; ed. min., 2.424, 426). See in Aristotle: De anima, 3.5 (430alO-19).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

143

substance of an angel, and he himself directs us to his doctrine on the nature of the angel, in order to complete his doctrine on the constitution of the human soul.18 The first reason given by Bonaventure for putting form and matter in the angel has to do with its mutable nature. Wherever there is mutation, he reasons, there also is matter, which is the principle of mutability. This is clear from Boethius, who shows that what is merely form cannot be subjected to accidents, because, to receive an accident, a form must be subject to matter. It is also clear, Bonaventure says, from Augustine: "every mutable thing suggests a sort of formlessness by which a form is received, or changed or replaced". Although mutability is found in creatures because they are from nothing, as Augustine has shown on many occasions, nonetheless, it is not a pure privation, but something positive and having a positive cause. On the other hand, this cause is not entirely positive, since it includes privation; therefore, Bonaventure concludes: "it is something which is not entirely something, and not entirely nothing, but a medium between something and nothing". Now this what Augustine calls matter; so there is matter in the angel.19 In Bonaventure's judgment, then, the essence of the angel is not simple absolutely. There are in fact many kinds of composition in the angel. When this creature is compared to its principle, which is God, then, because the angel depends on God, it has the composition found in every creature, namely, of mutability and stability in being. When the angel is considered with respect to its own effects, it is seen to be composed of a substance and potencies. Taken as a being (ens) in a genus, the angel is then understood by the metaphysician to be composed of act and potency, while the logician understands it to be composed of genus and difference. Considered as a being (ens) in itself, moreover, the angel has three sorts of composition regarding being (esse):20 with respect to actual being, it is composed as a being with being and, with respect to essential being, it is composed from what it is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est); regarding individual or personal being, the angel is a composite of what it is (quod) and who it is (quis). Undoubtedly, therefore, Bonaventure says, the angel has a composition of matter and form, or of a material principle and a formal 18 "Et ad hoc possit adduci rationes, quae adductae sunt supra ad ostendendum angelum esse compositura ex materia et forma" — Loc. cit., sc 6-f; cf. Resp. in fmem. 19 2 Sen!., 3.1.1.1, fm. 1 (2,89; at mm., fm. a, 2.79); cf. 1 Sent., 19.2.un.3, con. 1-2 (1.360; ed. mm., con. a-b, 1.288). See in Boethius: Dp Trinit.. c. 2 (PL 64.1250-51); and in Augustine: Confess., 12.19.28 (PL 32.836), 12.3.3 (PL 32.827). Of the other foundation arguments offered here, no. 2-b is a variation of those noted above in n. 14, and no. 4-e is similar to no. 2-b in n. 13 above; however, no. 3-c of our present text is founded on the individuation of the angel, so we are setting it aside for the moment, noting only that Bonaventure, in this instance, draws support from Aristotle: De caelo, 1.9 (278alO-17). 20 To simplify the difference between the terms ens and esse, we shall render ens as a being, or the being, and esse as being; we shall also use the latter form whenever we couple or contrast esse with existere (existing).

144

CHAPTER TWO

principle. Since there is in the angel a principle of mutability, both toward non-being and according to its diverse properties, its essence, like that of every creature which is a being through itself, is composed of diverse natures related to each other as possible and actual principles, and so it is composed of matter and form. 21 How are we to understand the numerous compositions and the different limitations that, in Bonaventure's view, require the angel's essence to be composed of matter and form? Among the four kinds of composition necessitating the angel's essential composition of matter and form, the first kind is the ground of the rest. This is the composition resulting from the dependence of the angel on God, who causes and conserves its being. Because the angel is a creature, it has mutability toward non-being, and so it has matter, which is the universal principle of mutability in creatures. On this point, St. Bonaventure is influenced particularly by St. Augustine. The influence of Aristotle, however, is evident with regard to the second and third kinds of composition, namely, the composition of substance and accidents, the metaphysical composition of act and potency, and the logical composition of genus and difference. The fourth kind of composition indicates the influence of Boethius. This composition does not involve three different sorts of being; it involves, rather, three modes of composition in being. The first mode, regarding actual being, concerns the substantial composition of the angel in being. The second mode concerns the composition of actual and possible principles (quod and quo) essential to the angel in being. Those principles are the form and the matter composing the angel as a being with being; so the second mode of composition is really another way of looking at the first. The third mode has to do with the composition of formal and material principles (quis and quod) constituting the angel individually or personally in being. This mode looks to the perfection of the angel as a being subsisting through itself in essential being. Now, since being is from form and, as we have seen, matter is the created foundation of being, the angel's compositions in being are possible, to Bonaventure, only if it has a form grounded in matter, which is the origin of mutability in every creature. Although Bonaventure is influenced here by Boethius, nevertheless, the Bonaventurean reasons for putting matter in the angel seem to be contrary to the doctrine of Boethius. The latter has shown that only a 21 'J Sent.. 3.1.1.1, Resp. (2.90-91; «/. min., 2.81-82). Note particularly the following parts of the text: "Item, habet considerari n( ens in se; et sic quantum ad esse actuale est in ipso compositio entis et esse, quantum ad esse essentiale ex 'quo est' et 'quod est', quantum ad esse individuate sive personate sic 'quod est' et 'quis est'. Cum ergo angelica essentia dicitur simplex, hoc non est per privationem harum compositionum ... Sed ... cum in angelo sit ratio mutabilitatis non tantum ad non-esse, sed secundum diversas proprietates, sit iterum ratio passibilitatis, sit iterum individuationis et limitationis, postremo ratio essentialis compositionis secundum propriam naturam: non video causam nee rationem, quomodo defend! potest, quin substantia angeli sit composita ex diversis naturis. et essentia omnis creaturae per se entis; et si composita ex diversis naturis, illae duae naturae se habent per modum actualis et possibilis, et ita materiae et formae."

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

145

corporeal substance needs a material foundation: since a corporeal substance cannot be changed in any way into an incorporeal species, there cannot be a material foundation in the angel, because it is an incorporeal creature. This can also be demonstrated from Aristotle, who teaches that the human soul, which is intellective, is neither a body nor a form mixed entirely with matter; but the angel is an intellective substance: therefore, it cannot have matter. Treating both objections at once, Bonaventure replies that Boethius speaks of matter as the ground of passive potency, "which is the principle of reception from another and of being changed by another". This is evidently what Boethius has in mind, because he wants to show that corporeal things are not turned into spiritual things, nor the latter into corporeal things. If this is not what Boethius intends to say, he is contradicting himself when he says that God alone is immaterial, and that a form has accidents only through matter. Aristotle likewise wants to affirm that the human soul ought to be stripped of matter according as it causes mixture and corruption. Neither Aristotle nor Boethius, therefore, Bonaventure insists, speak of matter in a general way, but only as appropriate to their particular points of view.22 Excepting the composition in personal being, all the compositions ascribed by Bonaventure to the angel can also be ascribed to the rational soul as a spiritual creature.23 These compositions are grounded essentially in matter and form, which constitute the spiritual being in actual, or substantial, being. But that being depends on the mutability of matter and, as we have learned, the rational soul as a spiritual being has existing from its matter. Thus, to comprehend St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the constitution of the human soul, we must grasp his understanding of matter, both in itself and in relation to the being of form. To do that, we must examine two problems: the identity of matter in spiritual and corporeal substances, and the meaning of creation with respect to being. Introducing the first problem, St. Bonaventure points out that, in speaking of a spiritual substance, he is using the term matter in a wide sense, that is, for any potential principle entering with another principle into the constitution, the foundation, so to speak, of the thing. Hence, he is considering whether that matter is the same as the matter of a corporeal thing. Bonaventure is not concerned here with an identity of matter according to number in spiritual and corporeal things. He is dealing with their matter according to an identity of a common nature. 24 22 Lac. at., sc 1-2, ad 1-2 (2.90-91; ed. min., 2.80-82). See in Boethius: De una persona, c. 6 (PL 64.1350); De Trinit., c. 2 (PL 64.1250); and in Aristotle: De amma, 3.4 (429alO-28). 23 See: loc. cit., ad 3. In the next section of this chapter, we shall show that, for St. Bonaventure, personal being belongs to the individual man and not to the rational soul. 24 "Secundo, dato quod habeant compositionem ex materia et forma, large sumto nomine materiae ad omne potentiale, quod cum alio venit ad constitutionem tamquam fundamentum rei; quaeritur de ilia materia utrum si eadem cum materia corporalium. Non loquor de identitate secundum essentiam numeralem ... sed loquor secundum identitatem naturae communis ..." — Sent., 3.1.1.2. initio (2.94; ed. min., 2.82). Bonaventure handles the problem of numerical identity in the next question.

146

CHAPTER TWO

On presenting his solution to the problem, Bonaventure says that it has caused wise men to controvert one another, and it has diversified great and profound men both in theology and in philosophy. Some have thought that matter in spiritual and corporeal substances has a community only of analogy; others have thought that it is essentially one in both substances. In Bonaventure's estimation, the two points of view are true, but in diverse ways. He explains this by distinguishing knowledge of matter through privation from knowledge of matter through analogy. Matter is known through privation by first removing form, then disposing it for form, and thus considering the bare essence of matter in itself as some sort of intelligible darkness. Those who say that matter is the same essentially in spiritual and corporeal substances consider it in that way, for, deprived of all substantial and accidental forms, matter will seem to have no diversity of any kind. Matter is known through analogy when it is considered with respect to a similar potency, and so, through the mediation of potency, by comparison with form. This comparison can be made according as the potency of matter supports form either as a being or as subject to motion. Those comparing matter with form as a being see matter sustaining the forms of corporeal substances and giving to such forms both existing and subsisting (subsistere). Matter in spiritual substances is seen to have a similar function; but there is a difference of participation in matter by the form of a spiritual substance with respect to the form of a corporeal substance. The matter in a spiritual substance supports only a substantial form. In a corporeal substance, however, the matter both stands under a substantial form and, in a heavenly body, is subject to quantity to which, in an earthly body, contrariety is added. Since the spiritual substance is farthest removed from accidents, then, having the firmest ground of substantial independence, it ranks first among the substances. Next in order is the heavenly body, and this is followed by the earthly body. Hence, those considering matter in this way do not say that it is properly the same in corporeal and spiritual substances, because the matter of corporeal substances cannot sustain spiritual forms, nor can the matter of spiritual substances sustain corporeal forms. Those comparing matter with form as subject to motion speak of something sustaining the variations of properties in corporeal substances. They find a similar principle in spiritual substances; but there is a difference of priority and posteriority between a spiritual substance and a corporeal substance regarding their participation in that principle, which is matter. In a corruptible body, matter can support variation according to both position and form; in an incorruptible body, matter supports variation only according to position. Matter in a spiritual substance, on the other hand, supports variation leading to either the reception or the loss of a habitus or an influence of some sort. In this comparison, matter is seen to be properly in corruptible substances, then less properly in incorruptible substances, and least properly in spiritual substances, and so the latter are said to be immaterial, since they have the least possibility of mat-

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

147

ter. Those considering matter from this point of view do not say that it is one, because the matter in a spiritual substance has no possibility either for a transmutation of substantial forms or for receiving corporeal forms. Thus, considering the potency of matter in relation to form as subject to motion, Aristotle says that matter is not one for spiritual and corporeal substances.25 Preparing his own stand on the problem, Bonaventure speaks of the unity of matter as the terminus of analysis of the principles of substances. He sees three ways of analyzing those principles into matter. The first way is taken by the philosopher who studies earthly bodies. Because they can be changed by transmutations with respect to forms, he considers matter to be the principle of their generation and corruption. The second way is taken by the philosopher who studies the motion of earthly and heavenly bodies: earthly bodies move with regard to position and form; heavenly bodies move only with regard to position. The philosopher sees matter as the principle of all those changes, and so he considers matter as changeable to be the same in all bodily substances. The third way is taken by the metaphysician, who studies the nature of every creature, and especially of the substance which is a being through itself. He considers in that substance an act of being, which is given by the form, and a stability of existing, which is given by the matter, and this is the support of the form. Now, in spiritual and corporeal substances, to be self-subsistent designates a real community as well as a community of analogy: therefore, having recourse to the principle of unity, the metaphysician posits a unity of matter in every being which exists through itself. In Bonaventure's judgment, each of these ways reaches the truth of the unity of matter, though from different points of view. The first and second ways, stopping short at bodily substances, arrive at the unity of matter according to being, but not according to essence. Those ways, nevertheless, do not reach the whole truth of matter according to being, because matter has, in spiritual substances, some being not found in corporeal substances. Since the third way attains spiritual substances, it arrives at the unity of matter according to both being and essence, thus reaching the truth that matter is one through its essence. When the theologian handles the problem, Bonaventure goes on, he may take any one of the three ways, because he can follow the ways of all the sciences, since every science serves theology. If he takes the first or the second way, the theologian sees that matter is not the same according to being in corporeal and spiritual substances. If he takes the third way, the theologian sees that matter is the same in them through its essence, but different according to being. Now the third way results in a nobler view than the other two: therefore, those who take the third way judge the truth better than those who take the other ways. Bonaventure, then, accepts the view that matter is 25 Loc. cit., Resp. "... ut mobiiem." (2.96-97; ed. min., 2.84-86). Aristotle, Metaph., 8.4 (1044b3-20). Aristotle actually says, regarding natural though eternal substances: "perhaps some have no matter, or not matter of this sort [i.e. corruptible], but only such as can be moved with respect to place."

148

CHAPTER TWO

essentially the same in spiritual and corporeal substances, as suggested by Augustine, "who was a most profound metaphysician".26 Having accepted the position that matter is one through its essence, Bonaventure is led to the conclusion that matter is also one in number regarding all substances. The reason for his conclusion is that matter, considered in itself, is a being entirely in potency. Bonaventure demonstrates the validity of this conclusion in a variety of ways. He shows, for instance, that the unity of matter cannot be a unity of either continuity, as a mountain is one, or of actual simplicity, as an angel is one. The unity of matter, as a being in potency, is a unity of homogeneity. This unity remains undisturbed in diverse things, for example, the gold in many vases remains the same through homogeneity; but the gold in one vase differs from the gold in another, so that it is not one in both through continuity. The homogeneous unity of matter, moreover, is not taken away on the arrival of forms. Matter is one under all forms, just as it is one when considered apart from them, and then there is no distinction in matter; it is understood, rather, to be simply one as a being in potency. In other words, for Bonaventure, the unity of matter is a unity of possibility, or of a capacity, for receiving and sustaining a multitude of diverse forms. Because of its supreme possibility, matter is so homogeneously one that it can contain a greater addition of forms than the unity of a universal form, even of the most general genus. In short, matter is one in number, because it is one without number, and so it has a unified capacity for innumerable forms. Since matter is incomplete of itself, furthermore, the unity of matter is likewise incomplete. With respect to being, nonetheless, matter is completed through form, which constitutes an individual as one in number by an actual and complete unity. Thus, the distinction and the multitude of numbered things result from their forms. 27 How does St. Bonaventure's understanding of the unity of matter contribute to our comprehension of his doctrine on the essential constitution of the human soul? In the first place, as the potential constituent of all created substances, matter is one both in essence and in number. Thus, in itself, matter is the unique foundation and the sustaining principle of all substantial forms. As a consequence, the matter in the human soul is its potential constituent; this matter, therefore, is the foundation and the sustaining principle of the form in the human soul. In the second place, matter is one through its essence in all created substances, according as they are beings

26 Loc. at., Resp. "Vel aliter ..." (2.97-98; ed. min., 2.86-87); cf. fa. 1, 4-6 (2.94-95; ed min., fa. a, d-f, 2.82-83). For the direction to St. Augustine see: De mirabilibus sacrae Scriptume, \.\(PL 35.2151-52). This is the work of a 7th century author and not of Augustine; consult. P. Glorieux, Melang. men. relig., 9 (1952), p. 23. Bonaventure's esteem for Augustine, no doubt, does not rest solely on this work. Besides, Bonaventure is able to show that his position on the essential unity of matter conforms to the teaching of Augustine in his Confessiones; cf. eo. Inc., con. 2 & ad 2. 27 2 Sent., 3.1.1.3, Resp., ad 1-2 (2.100-01; ed. min., 2.89-90).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

149

existing through themselves. From that point of view, matter is the unique principle of existing in created substances, and they have stability of existing from matter as the foundation of their substantial forms. Hence, the matter in the human soul is the principle of its exisiting, and the soul has stability of existing from matter as the foundation of its substantial form. In the third place, matter is not one according to being in all created substances. Matter is numerically different in those substances, so that the matter in a spiritual substance is not the same in being as the matter in a corporeal substance. The matter in a corporeal substance has being from a form which, if it is in a heavenly body, can be changed with respect to motion, and which, if it is in an earthly body, can also be changed for another form. The matter in a spiritual substance has being from a form that cannot be changed for another form, nor can it be subjected to change with respect to motion. The form in a substance existing through itself, moreover, gives an act of being to that substance. Since the spiritual substance exists without the possibility of a transmutation of its form, the act of being given by this form constitutes the substance as a being according to the determinate existing of its matter. Consequently, the spiritual matter in the human soul has being from an unchangeable form, which gives an act of being to the soul, thus constituting it as a being according to the determinate existing of its matter. To sum up: the form of the soul is the actual principle of its being, and the matter of the soul is the potential, or possible, principle of its existing; the soul is constituted as a singular thing by the act of being of its form, which is determined by the existing of a spiritual matter, and so the soul is a being having a fixed existence in its own form and matter.28 This view of the human soul will help us now to see how the manifold compositions found in the angel, as a being, are also found in the rational soul.29 As a being in the genus of substance, the soul is composed metaphysically of act and potency, or of form and matter, which are its substantial principles of being and existing; the soul also has the logical composition of genus and difference, or the specific nature of a spiritual substance as differentiated from the specific nature of a corporeal substance.30 As a being in itself, the soul has actual being; so it is composed as a being with being, that is, the soul is composed as a substance with an act of being communicated by its form and determined in existence by its matter. The soul, as a being in itself, also has essential being, and thus it is composed 28 See above: pp. 141-42. 29 See above: pp. 143-45. 30 P. Robert sees St. Bonaventure identifying form with act, and matter with potency: "Tout acte est forme, toute puissance, matiere"; hence, act and potency are essentially univocal terms, though matter is analogical in its concrete applications: Hyltmor. et devenir, pp. 28-45, 143-48. In our view, form and matter are the fundamental, but not the only, principles of act and potency for St. Bonaventure. He has other principles of potency and act, for example, those explaining the differences between specific natures in a genus, those explaining the differences between substances and their accidents, and those accounting for the distinctions between the operations and the powers of the human soul.

150

CHAPTER TWO

from what it is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est). The soul is seen here to be composed of form and matter as the actual and possible principles that are essential to it in being; they are essential because, to subsist through itself in being, the soul needs an existing foundation for the act of its form, and this is provided by the possibility of its matter. We can see, furthermore, what St. Bonaventure means when he says that matter is something positive, and that it has a positive cause, even though it is not without privation.3' The positive principle found in matter is existing, and it is because of this principle that matter is posited, by Bonaventure, as a medium between something and nothing, or between a form and non-being. But matter also has privation, for matter is the principle of mutation in all created substances. The mutability of matter inclines them, as created substances, toward non-being. Every created substance, therefore, including the human soul, has an intrinsic inclination toward non-being. Consequently, to complete our comprehension of St. Bonaventure's understanding of the constitution of the human soul, we must consider his doctrine on creation with respect to being: it is through creation that the soul has being; and it is through creation that the soul has existing from the matter which stands as a medium between its form and non-being. In his doctrine on creation, St. Bonaventure follows both St. Augustine and St. John Damascene; however, St. Bonaventure also describes creation in his own way as a mutation resulting in the production of a being from nothing. 3 ^ St. Bonaventure distinguishes creation from generation. The product of generation originates from a material principle, and the product is otherwise after production than it was before. Thus, existing initially in the potency of matter, the product was first under one disposition, and then it is under another disposition. The action of generation, therefore, involves motion, mutation and a production. Motion is required to prepare the matter, and the matter is prepared through accidental dispositions, which need both succession and time. Mutation is required because of the coming forth into being of the product, or because of the reception by the matter of a substantial form, and this comes about in an instant. Finally, a production is 31 See above: p. 143. 32 "Primo per auctoritatem Augustini, XII De civitate Dei 1.3; (PL 41.349): 'Omnia quae create sunt, mutabilia sunt, quia de nihilo facta sunt'; si ergo creabile est mutabile, ergo creatum est mutatum, et creatio est mutatio. Si tu dicas, quod est mutabile, quia potest in nihil cedere, et non quia productum est; contra: sicut destrui dicit viam devcniendi in non-est.e, ita creari in esse: si ergo destructio ponit mutationern, ergo pari rationc et produotio." — 2 Sent., 1.1.3.1, fm. 1 (2.30-31; ed. mm., fm. a, 2.23). "Item, per Damascenum, qui philosophus et theologus est: 'Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit' — loquitur de creatione — ergo, secundum ipsum, creatio est versio; sed omnis versio est mutatio, sicut ipse idem dicit. quod creata sunt mutabilia, quia vertibiha: ergo creatio est mutatio." — Loc. cit., fm. 3-c; cf. De fide ort/iodoxa, 1.3, 2.27 (PG 94.795. 959). "Item, quanto aliqua sunt magis distantia, tanto in perveniendo ab uno ad alterum rnaior est mutatio et variatio: sed ens et non-ens summe distant: ergo cum creatione de non-ente fiat ens, creatio verissime est mutatio." — Eo. loc., fm. 4-d.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUI.

151

required because the matter has that form from an effective principle, which is other than the matter itself. The product of creation comes into being from nothing, and so it is in every way after production, but was in no way before its production. The action of creation, accordingly, does not entail motion, since, having no material principle, creation cannot have any disposition going before it. There is a need, however, for mutation and production. Mutation is required for the sudden and new induction of form into being. A production is required because that induction is the work of an effective principle other than the thing produced. Consequently, creation is a production resulting from a mutation having no material principle. 33 When creation is taken as an action, Bonaventure maintains, the term does not designate a real medium between the Creator and the creature. Since God is supremely simple, He is His own action; so creation designates a medium between the Creator and the creature only according to our understanding. When creation is taken as a reception of God's action, then, following a twofold signification of the term creature, it does designate a medium between the Creator and the creature. The term creature signifies first: "everything that is from another, so that is has being after not being (non-esse) in any way whatsoever". In this signification, creature is included in creation, because creature names not only a created thing, but also a concreated thing; so, in that signification, creation is not a medium, either really or according to our understanding, between the Creator and the creature. The term creature also signifies: "the very substance of the thing produced from nothing by another"; according to this signification, creation, as a reception of God's action, is a medium of reason and of relation, but not a real or a natural medium, between the Creator and the creature.34 The medium designated by creation, Bonaventure says, is a medium of reason because it is not something diverse through its essence from the creature itself. Although creation designates ''being, from nothing", nonetheless, it also desinates "being, caused by God". As a reception of God's action, therefore, creation establishes a relation in the creature both to preceding non-being and to its producing being. Consequently, the principal signification of to-be-created is not being, but "to go out from non-being into being", and this is caused by God. There is, then, a twofold relation designated by creation: the relation to preceding non-being, which is the principal one, and the relation to the Creator, who is the cause of being. Explaining the second relation, Bonaventure speaks about three sorts of 33 2 Sent., 1.1.3.1, Resp. (2.32; ed. mm., 2.24); cf. ad opp. 4-6, ad 4-6, where Bonaventure's explanation of creation as a mutation is opposed on both Aristotelean and Augustinian grounds, then defended by Bonaventure according to the principles employed in his Resp. 34 2 Sent., 1.1.3.2, Resp. "... et habitudinem." 12.34; ed. mm., 2.26). The original matter created by God is an example of a created thing signified by creature, and the seminal reason for a substantial form is an example of a concreatecl thing signified by the same term: cf. 1.1.1.1, I'm. 6 (2.15; ed. mm., fm. f, 2.9).

152

CHAPTER TWO

relation. The first sort is founded upon an accidental property by which some things are said to be similar: white things are similar through whiteness. The second sort of relation is founded upon an essential dependence, such as the dependence of matter upon form. The third kind of relation is founded on natural origin, and such are the personal relations in the Trinity. The first relation, Bonaventure goes on, adds to things something essentially other, whereas the third relation adds only "purely to-be"; falling between these relations, the second adds something which is the same in one respect and which is different in another respect. Such is the relation that creation signifies between the Creator and the creature, for the creature depends totally and essentially upon the Creator. In other words, because the creature has being, it is similar to God, who causes its being; however, because the creature "goes out from non-being into being", it is dissimilar to God, who does not originate from non-being, but is His being. Thus, explaining the essential relation of the creature to preceding nonbeing, Bonaventure holds that it is a mutation. Clarifying this, he distinguishes three kinds of mutation: toward being (ad esse), from being (ab esse). and in being (in esse). Mutation toward being posits something only on the part of the terminus of the relation: ''to-be, now, in the first moment"; so this mutation looks to the first moment of being for the creature on going out from nan-being. Mutation from being posits something only on the part of the principle: "to-be, now, in the last moment"; therefore, this mutation looks to the last moment of being for the creature with respect to going back into non-being. That mutation, nevertheless, does not posit anything real in the creature, other than the thing itself; it posits something there only according to our understanding of the creature with regard to non-being. Mutation in being posits something with respect to both the principle and the terminus of the relation: containing both extremes, this mutation has a subject which is prior by nature to the terminus, or to the first moment of being for a creature on going out from non-being. Hence, mutation in being can be something that, by nature, precedes the terminus of the relation and is diverse from it, even though that something is not an actually complete being. Concluding his explanation, Bonaventure affirms that to-be-created is prior by nature and not by duration to being: the creature must have being, in time, in order to be a creature; but, according to nature, the creature must be created to have being. The creating action of God, nevertheless, is more one with Him than the reception of His action is one with the created thing. There is a difference between God and His action only according to our understanding of creation, whereas the difference between the creature and its reception of that action is a difference both of reason and of relation, but this relation is essential to the creature. In short, for Bonaventure, the medium in creation between God and the creature is really the creature itself: the medium is distinguished from it according to reason, and

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

1 53

thus the medium is seen to be the foundation of a relation to non-heing. but a relation which is essential to the creature in being.3S To understand the importance, for our present purpose, of Bonaventure's doctrine on creation with respect to being, we must see the above explanations in their proper context; so we must consider them in conjunction with his previous comparison of creation to generation.36 In that comparison, Bonaventure spoke of generation as resulting in a product which, originating from a material principle, comes into being according to successive changes in time, so that the product is now this and then that and, finally, a being other than its generator. Creation results in a product having no material principle: originating from nothing and coming into being by way of mutation, but not in time, the product has being in no way before production and in every way after it, because the mutation, which is creation, involves the sudden and new induction of a substantial form into being by God. Thus, generation does not produce the whole product; its original element has being in the generator prior to the act of generation. But creation does produce the whole substance of the product, which God creates "by willing it to-be, in the First moment, since it is not."37 By describing creation as a mutation, nevertheless, Bonaventure does not imply a change of nothing into something. He means, rather, that after not-being something now is, and it has being from a principle which is essentially different from the being that it effects. Although nothing is not subject of itself to mutation, nonetheless, an eduction by which something, not previously a being, is effected a being necessitates a beginning and a mutation. 38 As a mutation, then, creation terminates at the whole substance of a being that previously was-not in any way. Hence, for Bonaventure, a being is said to-be-created because it has been brought totally by God into being from preceding non-being. In other words, after not being in any way, a being now is, and it has a substantial form which is induced instantaneously into matter, so that a whole substance comes into being all at once. As a mutation toward being, therefore, creation terminates properly at the form, which gives being to the substance, but according to the limitations of its matter. Considering the first moment of receiving that being, Bonaventure 35 Lac. cit., Resp. "Ilia tamen ..." (2.34-35; ed. mm., 2.26-27). 36 "Et ideo non sic creatio est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, sicut generatio inter generantem et generatum. Dicendo igitur comparationem ad non-esse, dicit medium non diversum per essentiam, sed secundum rationem." — Ibid. 37 Loc. cit, arg. 1, ad i (2.33, 35; id. min., 2.25, 27). 38 "Item, plus recedit a ratione mutabilitatis nihil quam aliquid, ergo et productio rei de nihilo quam productio de aliquo; nihil enim nullo modo mutabile est; sed impossible est, aliquid produci de nihilo sine eius mutabilitate: ergo similiter de aliquo." — D M T , 6.2, arg. 10 (5.103). "... dicendum quod illud non est simile: quia non potest aliquid produci de nihilo, quin habeat esse post non-esse, quin etiam habeat esse a principio essentialiter differente. Unde quamvis nihil non sit mutabile de se, tamen eductio, qua aliquid, quod prius non erat ens, efficitur ens, de necessitate ponit inceptionem et mutationem ..." — Loc. cit., ad 10 (5.106).

154

CHAPTER TWO

posits it as the terminus of a relation to the preceding non-being of the creature. This relation is really the creature itself as referred to the non-being of its form prior to the being that the form gives, in the first moment, to the substance within the limitations of its matter. The mutation from being, on the other hand, has to do with the loss of being by the creature, or its reversion into non-being. Considering the last moment of having being, Bonaventure posits it as the principle of a relation to the possible non-being of the creature. That relation is also the creature itself as referred to the non-being of its form; however, in this instance, the non-being of the form is considered as possible with reference to the final moment in which the form gives being to the substance within the limitations of its matter. Thus, the principle of reversion into non-being and the terminus of emergence into being are really one and the same, namely, the form of the substance; so, with reference to the mutation of the being of that form, they are simply different ways of understanding the relation to non-being which is essential to every creature. Now the mutation in being holds a middle position between the other two: it draws them together by sustaining the form, with respect to non-being, both in its first moment of being and in its last moment of being. The mutation in being, therefore, relies upon a subject, or a principle of continuity, which provides a foundation for the being of form, and so for the conservation of form with regard to non-being. This subject, then, is prior by nature, though not in time, to the first moment of the reception of being by the substance from its form. Consequently, the mutation in being is also prior by nature, but again not in time, to that initial moment of being from which, therefore, it is really diverse, even though the subject of mutation is not actually a complete being. While this subject is essential to the substance in being, nonetheless, because it provides the foundation of the relation to non-being, the subject is considered, according to our understanding of creation, as a medium between the action of the Creator and the reception of being by the creature. Mutation in being is distinguished in that way from the other two, neither of which can be a medium between the Creator and the creature.39 Our immediate interest is directed to the subject of mutation in being. The subject, grounding the being of substantial form with regard to nonbeing, has been described by Bonaventure both as an actually incomplete being and as the medium between the Creator and the creature. We have seen something else described in similar terms by Bonaventure, and that something is matter, which is the foundation of substantial forms. He considers matter in itself as a being in potency, but also as making a positive contribution to the constitution of substances, whether corporeal or spiritual. In the order of corporeal substances, matter, in its original condition, is an incomplete being and, as such, is without form according to a priority of nature, but not of time, since matter is never without form in time. As a being in potency, moreover, matter is the principle of existence 39 2 Sent., 1.1.3.2, arg. 4, ad 4 (2.33. 35; ed. min., 2.26-28).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

1 35

for substantial forms, and it exists for their sake, because it is the capacity or the possibility for substantial forms. 40 In the order of spiritual substances, matter is also the potential constituent of the essence of the creature, and it exists for the sake of the creature's substantial form. Hence, matter is the unique foundation and the one sustaining principle of substantial form in every creature. From this point of view, Bonaventure describes matter as the essential principle of existing in a created substance, to which it gives a stability of existence. In a spiritual substance, furthermore, the act of being given by the form is stabilized in an unchangeable existence, because the matter is not subject to transformation in being. As the principle of existing in a spiritual substance, then, matter stands continually between an unchangeable form and non-being.^ We have now reached, with respect to the human soul, the full significance of St. Bonaventure's description of matter as: "something which is not entirely something, and not entirely nothing, but the medium between something and nothing". 42 As "something which is not entirely something", matter is not actually a complete being, but a being in potency, and so it is the possibility or the capacity for the substantial form of the human soul. As "not entirely nothing", matter is the foundation for the being of that substantial form, which it sustains in being. As "the medium between something and nothing", matter is the subject of continuity, or the principle of existing, for the being of the soul's substantial form with regard to non-being, and thus matter gives stability to the form for whose sake it exists. Under all three headings, matter is prior by nature, but not in time, to the substantial form: matter is not prior in time to the form, because, as we have seen, the form and the matter of the human soul are created together and at the same time; however, the matter is prior by nature to the form as a potency is prior to its act, and as the foundation of a substance is prior to its completion. Consequently, the existing of the matter is prior by nature to the being of the form. As the terminus of the mutation toward being, the soul has being, because the existing of the matter stands between the form and non-being. Since the form is not subject to mutation in being, the existing of the matter, presupposing its conservation by God, continues to stand between the form and non-being, thus giving stability of existence to the substance and preventing its mutation from being. Within the substantial composition of the soul, therefore, the form has an essential dependence on the matter to-exist, and 40 See above: pp. 104-06. 41 See above: pp. 148-50. 42 "Si tu dicas mihi, quod mutabilitas venit rebus, quia sunt ex nihilo, sicut in pluribus locis vult Augustinus; sed constat, quod mutabilitas non est pura privatio, immo dicit aliquam positionem: ergo non habet causam ipsam puram privationem. Necesse est ergo quod habet causam dicentem positionem; sed non positionem omnimodam, cum etiam dicat privationem: ergo aliquid, quod non est omnino aliquid, nee omnino nihil, sed quo est medium inter aliquid et nihil: hoc autem dicit Augustinus materiam: ergo etc." — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.1, fm. 1 (1.89; td. min., fm. a. 2.79); see above: n. 19, p. 143.

156

CHAPTER TWO

the matter has an essential dependence on the form to-be. The matter participates in the being of the form, and the form participates in the existing of the matter. In short, for Bonaventure, the existing (ex-sistere) of matter signifies to-stand-outside non-being, and that is the positive contribution made by matter to the constitution of the human soul: standing continually between being and non-being, the matter gives existing to the form, so that the form, standing-outside non-being, can give an act of being to the whole substance, which has, as a consequence, a fixed existence as a singular thing subsisting through itself.43 What can we say about the historical aspects of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the constitution of the human soul? Now, by historical aspects, we mean those features of Bonaventure's doctrine influenced by, or depending on, the sources that he uses in developing it. He goes to both Aristotle and Augustine to show that the human soul is not produced by generation, adding his own reasons to their combined authority. Bonaventure demonstrates that the soul is produced by creation. On showing the necessity to posit the soul as composed of form and matter, Bonaventure relies heavily on Aristotle's principles, even though Aristotle himself does not teach that the human soul is composed of form and matter. We have indicated that Bonaventure, in this instance, is applying Aristotelean principles to a problem which he solves without adhering strictly to Aristotle's doctrine on the human soul. Bonaventure's solution to the problem is influenced by the doctrines of Augustine and Boethius, who teach that the soul has life through participation and not through its essence. As a result, Bonaventure's personal position on the composition of form and matter in the human soul presents a remarkable synthesis of the sources that he employs in developing it: the soul has a form, which is its actual principle of being and life: it also has matter, which is both its potential principle of life and its constitutive principle of existing. Having arrived at this solution to the problem, Bonaventure is able to show that, in his view, it does not contradict what Aristotle or Boethius say about matter and the nature of incorporeal substance. Bonaventure, understanding matter to signify the poteniial constituent of any created substance, interprets both Boethius and Aristotle as eliminating from a spiritual substance only that matter which is subject to either corruption or transmutation in being. Hence, Bonaventure's understanding of form and matter as essential components of the human soul represents his own interpretation of historical sources, and in a synthetic way, rather than a strict adherence to their individual or common doctrines. 43 Consult above: pp. 143-45. We should add here that, because the soul has a substantial composition of potential and actual principles, the intellective power, following the nature of the soul, must also be composed of potential and actual principles, or elements. The actual element, which makes things known, gives being to the intellect, and the potential element, by which things become known, gives existing to the intellect. Thus, in the order of accidental existence, the soul stands-outside the non-being of truth through the potential element of the intellect and, through its actual element, the soul has the being of truth, which is determined according to the intrinsic capacities of a created intelligence.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

157

The same three sources are employed by Bonaventure in demonstrating the necessity for a composition of form and matter in the angel. In this particular instance, however, his notion of matter as the principle of mutation with respect to non-being is clearly influenced by the doctrine of Augustine; at the same time, Bonaventure takes from Boethius the notion of form as subjected to accidents because of matter. 44 The various compositions necessitating matter and form in the angel, on the other hand, contain another remarkable blending of doctrines from Augustine, Aristotle and Boethius; on this occasion also, Bonaventure develops his own understanding of matter to show that neither Boethius nor Aristotle, as he interprets them, eliminates every potential principle from an incorporeal substance.45 Bonaventure's analysis of the essential unity of matter is based on a consideration of matter as the potential constituent of all created substances. Although he approaches the problem in a historical way, Bonaventure, in his approach, names only Aristotle, whom he cites as saying that matter is not one for spiritual and corporeal substances. Bonaventure attributes this to Aristotle as considering the potency of matter in relation to a form which is subject to motion. Following his historical approach to the question, Bonaventure reframes it by speaking of the unity of matter as the terminus of analysis of the principles of substances. He indicates that the natural philosophers unify matter according to being, but the metaphysician unifies it according to essence; however, the theologian who takes the metaphysical view of the question unifies matter according to essence, while differentiating it according to being. Thus, the theologian has a more universal judgment of the question than either the natural philosopher or the metaphysician. It is in this context that Bonaventure refers to Augustine as "a most profound metaphysican". Since Bonaventure does not refer to Aristotle in that particular portion of the text, his appraisal of Augustine does not necessarily involve a contrast with Aristotle. Indeed, it seems to suggest simply that the theologian can be a metaphysician, as Augustine was in a very profound way. In any event, Bonaventure's account of the 44 Note the following use of Boethius to explain an Augustinian doctrine: "Item quaeritur de ista ratione Augustini: 'Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem' etc. Probat enim. animam esse compositam propter multitudinem proprietatum. Sed contra: nulla substantia componitur ex proprietatibus neque per se neque cum alio: ergo ex hoc non probatur quod anima sit composita. — Dicendum quod Augustinus hoc non probat nisi a posteriori. Compositio enim accidentis ad subiectum et diversitas necessario praesupponit aliam compositionem, quia, ut dicit Boethius: 'quod est pure forma subiectum esse non potest': ergo ad hoc quod aliquid sit subiectum accidentium plurium, oportet in illo praeexistere compositionem intrinsecam; sed anima capit in se multitudinem accidentium: et ideo necessario infertur a posteriori quod ipsa sit composita, licet non ex accidentibus." — 1 Sent., 8.2.dub.3 (1.175; ed. mm., 1.139-40). Cf. Boethius, De Trinit, c. 2 {PL 64.1250). 45 Bonaventure knows that, according to Aristotle, matter as the potential constituent of a substance does not come to-be and, therefore, is ingenerate: Physica, 1.9 (192a25-33). This view of matter is set aside by Bonaventure, who argues that God, because of His infinite power, does not need the support of matter in order to produce anything; He can produce something from nothing, and so without the necessity for a material foundation: 2 Sent., 1.1.1.1, ad opp. 6, ad 6 (2.16, 18; ed. min, 2.10, 12).

158

CHAPTER TWO

unity of matter according to being manifests an Aristotelean influence, whereas his account of the unity of matter according to essence does not show any special Augustinian influence. Rather, it is here that he introduces his own understanding of the self-subsisting substance as stabilized in existing through an act of being given by the form. 46 In his consideration of creation, Bonaventure describes it, by contrast with generation, as a mutation resulting in the production of a being from nothing. He is influenced here not only by Augustine, but also by John Damascene, whom he cites as both a philosopher and a theologian. But, once again, Bonaventure develops his position on the question in such a way that he can defend it as not contrary to the principles of Aristotle, and on this occasion also of Augustine, who is coupled with Aristotle in opposition to Bonaventure's consideration of the problem. 47 Finally, in treating creation as a medium and a relation between God and the creature, Bonaventure makes known his quite complicated solution to this question without reference to any historical source. Although the solution presents his own thought on that problem, nonetheless, beneath his thought, lies the doctrine of Augustine on matter as something which is close to nothing; however, for Bonaventure, matter in that sense is the principle of existing standing between the being and the non-being of form. Bonaventure supports his position here on created being with the authority of Aristotle, whom he cites as the author of the Liber de causis.*6 When Bonaventure speaks of being with respect to form, he usually relies on the 46 "Metaphysicus considerat naturam omnis creaturae, et maxime substantiae per se entis, in qua est considerare et actum essendi, et hunc dat forma; et stabilitatem per se existendi, et hanc dat et praestat cui ininititur forma, hoc est materia." — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.2, in Resp. (2.97; ed. min., 2.86). The Augustinian support for Bonaventure's consideration of substantia per se ens is probably^™. 1-a, which is taken from De mirabil. sacrae Script., 1.2 (PL 35.2152), and not from Augustine who, nonetheless, does speak of selfsubsisting with regard to substance: De Trinit., 7.4-5.9-10 {PL 42.942); but Bonaventure does not refer here to the fact. Boethius speaks in similar terms: Liber de persona, c. 3 (PL 64.1343-45); and yet Bonaventure is obliged to answer a contrary argument taken from that work: Lac. cit., con. 2, ad 2 (2.95, 98; ed. min., 2.84, 87). The doctrine of substantia as per se ens, of course, is formulated by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, bks. 7-8 (see: 6.1; 1026a7-33), and Bonaventure cites him explicitly as a metaphysician in this question: Eo. loc., fm. 2 (2.94; ed min., fm. b, 2.83). Consequently, Bonaventure's personal esteem for Augustine is not based on any notable contribution of the latter to the solution of the problem under discussion; his esteem is founded on a general appraisal of Augustine as a theologian, who was also "a most profound metaphysician". 47 See: 2 Sent.. 1.1.3.1, ad opp. 4 & 6 (2.31-32, 32-33; ed. min., 2.24-25). 48 "Philosophus, De causis: 'Prima rerum creatarum est esse'; sed nihil ex parte creaturae est ante creari: ergo creari non esl aliud quam esse, ergo nee creatio quam essentia: ergo nulla est differentia creationis ad creaturam." — 2 Sent., 1.1.3.2, con. 1 (2.33-34; ed. min., con. a, 2.26). The Liber de causis is a Latin version, made by Gerard of Cremona in the 12th century, of an Arabic work for which the sources are not yet adequately known. When Thomas Aquinas received, in 1268, William of Moerbeke's translation from the Greek original of the Etementatio theotogica by Proclus, he then discovered an intrinsic relation between that work and the Liber de causis. Thus, in 1273, Bonaventure did not attribute it to Aristotle: Co//, in Hexaem., 10.18 (5.378; Delorme, p. 132). For a detailed study of the problem and the influence connected with the Liber de causis see: H. D. Saffrey, O.P., Sancti Thomae de Aquino super iibrum de causis expositio (Louvain, E. Nauwelaerts & Fribourg, Societe Philosophique: 1954), pp. xv-xxxii.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

159

doctrine of Boethius, and yet he can interpret Boethius in a recognizably Aristotelean way. Notwithstanding that, Bonaventure has his own understanding of being as received extrinsically by the creature.49 Considered historically, then, the doctrine of Bonaventure on the essential constitution of the human soul contains an original synthesis of elements drawn from many sources. Each of these sources contributes in a proportionate way to Bonaventure's thought on the problem. As a result, all of them participate in his synthesis on the human soul as a singular being subsisting through itself and in its own matter and form. Bonaventure's synthesis is so organized that it is not constituted in a distinctive way by any one of its historical elements, or by any particular combination of some of them, e.g., of Aristotelean and Augustinian elements. His careful blending of different elements presents a notably Bonaventurean unity of thought, which is expressed by the fundamental features of the soul in its condition as a created being. Those features consist in an essential composition of being and existing founded on a substantial composition of form and matter, but with a total dependence on God with respect to both emerging from and remaining outside non-being: thus, having a fixed existence outside nonbeing, the human soul is constituted in itself as a singular being, because its matter participates in the being of an unchangeable form, while the form shares in the existing of a determinate matter.50

In the doctrine of Aquinas, as we have seen, the rational soul is created directly and immediately by God On this point, Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure; however, they are very far apart on the composition of the human soul. St. Thomas does not see any necessity to posit form and matter in the soul, even though what the soul is (quod est) and that by which it is 49 "Item, Boethius: 'Omnis esse est a forma'; sed omne quod creatur, statim post crcationem est: ergo vel est forma vel habet formam. Si igitur materia prima creata fuit, vel fuit forma vel habuit furmam in suae eductionis principio; sed non fuit forma: ergo etc." — 2 Sent., 12.1.2, fm. 2 (2.293; ed. mm., fm. b, 2.296); cf. Boethius, De unitate et uno (PL 63.1075A). "Nulla creatura est actus purus, quia in omni creatura, ut dicit Boethius, differt, 'quo est' et 'quod est'; ergo in omni creatura est actus cum possibili; sed omnis talis habet in se multiformitatem et caret simplicitate." — 1 Sent., 8.2. un. 2, fm. 1 (1.167; ed. mm., fm. a. 1.132-33); cf. Boethius, De Trinit., c. 2 (PL 64.1250); De hebdomad., (PL 64.1311A-12B). "Item, omnis creatura habet esse finitum et limitatum: ergo habet esse arctatum; sed unicumque est esse limitatum, est ibi aliquid quod contrahit, et aliquid quod contrahitur, et in omni tali est compositio et differentia: ergo omnis creatura est cornposita: ergo nulla simplex." — Lac. at., fm. 2-b. "hem, omnis creatura habet esse datum aliunde, ergo habet esse aliunde acceptum, ergo nulla creatura est suum esse, ergo in omni creatura est dependentia sive differentia; sed nullum tale simpliciter simplex: ergo etc." — Eo. loc., fm. 3-c. 50 Bonaventure does not refer to the Fans vitae of Avicebron, whose name, to our knowledge, never occurs in his writings. For the immediate sources of Bonaventure's doctrine on the hylomorphic constitution of created spirits see: O. Lottin, "La composition hylemorphique des substances spirituelles. Les debuts de la controverse", RNSP, 34 (1932), pp. 21-41.

160

CHAPTER TWO

(quo est) are distinct from each other. Let us suppose, Aquinas says, that there is an essence which is not composed of form and matter. This essence either is its own being or it is not. If the essence is its own being, it will be the essence of God, for His essence is His being. If the essence is not its own being, it must have being which is acquired from elsewhere: since, by supposition, this essence does not subsist in matter, the being of the essence is not acquired in matter, but in the essence itself; therefore, the essence will be the quod est, and its being will be the quo est. Because such an essence is not its own being, it will be possible with respect to both being and its principle; so, in that essence, there will be potency and act according as essence is what is possible and being is its act. It is in this way, Aquinas maintains, that composition of potency and act is found in both an angel and the human soul: the essence is a potency with respect to its being, which is an act. Hence, the composition of quod est and quo est in the soul refers to a composition of an essence, which is a simple form or nature, with its act of being.51 The position of Aquinas on this question seems to contradict the doctrine of Boethius, who teaches that no simple form can be subjected to accidents. Now the human soul has accidents: how then can it be simple? If Boethius is speaking about a subject regarding any accidents whatever, Aquinas responds, what he says is true with respect to God, who is so simple that His form is His being. Moreover, if Boethius speaks of a subject regarding accidents with a firm being in nature, and which belong to an individual, what he says is then true of a simple form which is not composed of parts. There are two sorts of accidents with a being in nature. The first belongs to an individual, such as white in this man, and cannot be subjected to the soul, because, depending on matter through which the nature is individuated, it does not follow the whole human species. The second sort, which is called a property, follows the principles of the species; so the soul can be subjected to this sort of accident, such as the intellect, which is a potency of the rational soul.52 According to Aristotle, nonetheless, the human soul is entirely simple. He shows that the soul, because it is the form of a body, is neither matter nor a composite. Everything which is a composite, furthermore, has being from its component parts: if the soul were a composite, there would then be in man one being of his soul and another being of the compound of body and soul; but this is not possible, for there is one only being in any one thing. Handling those difficulties, Aquinas points out that the essence of the human soul is not composed of parts any more than the essence of any other form. The human soul is an absolute form and does 51 1 Sent., 8.5.2, Resp. "Alii dicunt..." (1.229-30). Opposing Avicebron's doctrine, Aquinas says that matter in the human soul would prevent it from uniting with a body to form the species man, and so the whole soul could not be the formal principle of being for the human body: DA, a. 6, Resp. "Quod etiam... forma ems." (2.301-02). 52 1 Sent., 8.5.2, arg. 4, ad 4 (1.228, 230-31); cf. Boethius, De Trinit., c. 2 (PL 64.1250).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

161

not depend on matter, so that, unlike all other corporeal forms, it has being through itself. Thus, a composition of being and essence is found in the human soul, but not in other corporeal forms, since they have being in matter and never apart from it. The human soul, then, has in itself a perfect being. This being does not come from component parts of the soul's essence, nor is there some other being in man from the composition of his body and soul. The being of the human soul itself becomes the being of man: the being of the human compound is the being of its form. Other corporeal compounds do not subsist in the being of their forms, but in matter and form, which are their principles of being.53 In the judgment of Aquinas, differing obviously from Bonaventure, matter does not enter into the constitution of the human soul. Everything having matter, according to Aquinas, also has a substantial form giving being to matter. Since the soul is a substantial form giving being to a human body, the soul itself cannot have matter: if the soul had matter, then, in man, there would be a substantial form of a substantial form, which is not possible. Moreover, St. Augustine shows that the soul cannot come from matter, whether spiritual or corporeal. To St. Thomas, this implies that the soul cannot have matter. The soul is a simple form and nature; therefore, the soul, according to its whole essence, is the form of a body, and so it is impossible for part of its essence to be matter. Besides, Aristotle shows that matter, which is pure potency, is the immediate subject of substantial form and of generation; for this reason, Aquinas says, matter cannot be the form or the act of anything. If the soul were constituted with matter, the soul would then be the form of a body through that part of itself which is in act, but not according to its matter, which is a potency. As a consequence, one form would be the act of both spiritual matter and corporeal matter; since they are diverse according to genus, the form of the soul would be one act perfecting diverse potencies in the genus of substance, which is really impossible. The only composition in the human soul, therefore, as in an angel, is the composition of being and essence.54 53 Loc. cit., arg. 1-2, ad 1-2 (1.227, 230); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 2.2 (412al2-413alO). St. Thomas explains this more fully in a later text, where he appeals to the authority of Boethius: DA, a. 6, Resp. "Quomodo autem ..." (2.302). 54 2 Sent., 17.1.2, sc 2-3, Resp. (2.417-18); cf. ST, la, 75.5 (1.443a-44b). Consult: St. Augustine, De gen. ad lilt, 7.6-15 (PL 34.359-63); Aristotle, De gener. et corrupt., 1.3 (316b33-319b4). The reasoning of Aquinas for the absence of matter from the nature of an angel is similar to his reasoning with regard to the human soul, excepting that an angel is not the natural form of a body: 2 Sent., 3.1.1 (2.85-89); SCG, 2.50-54 (2.171-75); ST, la, 50.2 (1.315b-17b); DSpC, a. 1 (2.367-73). Differing again from Bonaventure, to whose doctrine he refers, Aquinas distinguishes the human soul from an angel according to species, but not according to genus, since they are both immaterial substances; however, the soul, as the natural form of a body, is specifically different from an angel: 2 Sent., 3.1.6 (2.101-06); ST, la, 75.7 (1.446a-47a); DA, a. 7 (2.303-08). In the first of these places, Aquinas refers to (Bonaventure's) doctrine on the specific difference of the angel from the soul through the unibility of the latter regarding a human body: Aquinas considers that doctrine to be based only on the difference of intelligence between the soul and the angel; he prefers to differentiate them according to being, and so with respect to the essence of the soul as the natural form of a human body.

162

CHAPTER TWO

There are certain similarities between the positions of Aquinas and Bonaventure on the composition of the soul. They both have being as the proper act of form, and they have a composition in the soul of quod est and quo est. Beyond those similarities, their two positions are far apart. To Aquinas, there simply cannot be matter in the human soul, and for two reasons: in the order of nature, the soul is the substantial form of a body and, therefore, cannot itself be composed of form and matter; in the order of being, the essence of the soul is a potency for a proper act of being, and so, as a potency, the soul cannot be composed of form and matter, because they are act and potency in the genus of substance. Thus, for Aquinas, composition of form and matter is confined entirely to the order of nature; in the order of being, the composite substance of man subsists in the being of his soul, which communicates it to his body. To Bonaventure, there must be matter in the human soul, and for these reasons: in the order of accidental being, the soul is subjected to actual and possible principles, which necessitate similar principles in the soul itself as a substantial being; in the order of essential being, the soul has an intrinsic relation to non-being, so that, to have being, the soul must have a principle standing between being and non-being: that principle is matter, which gives existing to the being of a form. Hence, for Bonaventure, composition of form and matter is necessary both in the order of nature and in the order of being. It is not enough, in his judgment, to say that the human soul, or the angel, is a simple substance having only a composition of quod est and quo est. A created spirit must also have a composition of form and matter.55 The difference between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the essence of a spiritual creature is grounded in their separate views of matter. Those views involve distinctive interpretations of the significance of quod est and quo est with regard to the creature. The two theologians concur on the quod est, which is the form of the creature; but they depart from each other on the quo est. For Bonaventure, this is matter as the potential constituent of a created essence, which has being from form. For Aquinas, the quo est is being, which is the act of a created essence, whether composed of matter and form 55 "Quidam enim dixerunt nullam animam, nee rationalem nee brutalem, habere materiam, quia spiritus sunt sitnplices; animam tamen rationalem dixerunt habere compositionem ex quo est et quod est, quia ipsa est hoc aliquid et nata est per se et in se subsistere. — Sed cum planum sit animam rationalem posse pati et agere et mutari ab una proprietate in aliam et in se ipsa subsistere, non videtur quod illud sufficial clicere quod in ea sit tantum compositio ex quo est et quod est nisi addatur esse in ea compositio materiae et form." — 2 Sent., 17.1.2, in Resp. (2.414; ed. min., 2.426). Note how Aquinas, probably with Bonaventure in view, deals with this: "... in quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae oportet materiam inveniri, cum proprietates rei a re non separentur. Sed in anima inveniuntur quaedam proprietates materiae, ut subjici, recipere, pati, et hujusmodi. Ergo videtur quod sit ex materia composita." — 2 Sent., 17.1.2, arg. 2 (2.416). "... dicendum, quod pati et recipere, et omnia hujusmodi, dicuntur de anima et de rebus materialibus aequivoce, ut patet ex Philosophic, in III De anima, text. 6, et ex Commentatore ibidem: unde non oportet quod materia in anima inveniatur; sed sufficit quod sit ibi aliqua potentialitas ..." — Loc. fit., ad 2 (2.418). For similar arguments concerning the life of the soul and its operations see: arg. 5-6, ad 5-6.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

163

or consisting of form alone. The fundamental point of difference between Bonaventure and Aquinas, then, has to do with the essential dependence of the creature on being, or with its quo est. There is no variance between them on the fact of a creature receiving being from God through creation. Their different views concern the condition of being which is proper to the essence of a creature, or, more precisely, its essential possibility of mutation to nonbeing. In the consideration of Aquinas, being follows the form of a creature, presupposing the conserving influence of God. Although God can withdraw His influence, thus reducing the creature to nothing, nevertheless, the potency to non-being resides rather in the power of God than in either the form of a spiritual creature or in the matter of a corporeal creature. Consequently, considering the nature of all creatures, Aquinas holds that none of them has an intrinsic tendency to non-being. Lacking contrariety, spiritual creatures have permanent being through the immaterial nature of their simple forms. Corporeal creatures have permanent being at least according to matter, which is incorruptible as the existing subject of generation and corruption.56 According to Aquinas, therefore, there is no essential tendency to nonbeing in any creature. The essence of a spiritual creature is an immaterial form and, as such, it is by nature a simple potency for a proper act of being. While the act of being is other than the essence of the creature, even so, because its essence is an immediate potency with respect to its being, the spiritual creature has permanence in being both in time and according to nature. Although the composite essence of a corporeal creature can lose its being through corruption, nevertheless, as the existing foundation of substantial form, matter is incorruptible both according to its nature as the potency for form and in time, since matter always has being under some substantial forms. Hence, for Aquinas, matter is the principle of stability for corporeal natures; to this extent he concurs with Bonaventure. On the other hand, Aquinas does not consider matter to be a principle of mutation regarding non-being in any nature: matter is simply the subject of mutation for substantial forms in the order of corporeal nature; to that extent he departs from Bonaventure, who posits matter as the principle of mutability in every nature. For Bonaventure, then, there is an essential relation to nonbeing in corporeal and spiritual creatures. This relation is grounded in matter, which gives existing to the form, so that, standing-out with respect to non-being, it can give being to the substance. Since matter is prior by nature to form, the substance is mutable according to nature. Because the form is prior in time to matter, however, the substance is stable according to time. Consequently, the substance has mutability of being in nature, but stability of existence in time. Here, Bonaventure is a long way from Aquinas, who 56 ST, la, 104.1, ad 1 (1.623b); 104.4, Resp. (1.626a). Although no creature has an Intrinsic potency to non-being, nonetheless, depending on God for its being, every creature remains in being because God wills it to-be; but He wills it to-be according to the nature that he has created: DPD, 5.4 (2.137-40).

164

CHAPTER TWO

posits a stability of being in both time and nature because of matter, which is the existing foundation of corporeal forms.57 While concurring on some points, Bonaventure and Aquinas differ in their views on matter, and those views entail distinctive positions on the essence of the human soul. In Bonaventure's view, matter is the universal principle of existing in created substances, thus necessitating a composition of matter and form, or of existing and being, in the essence of the human soul. In the view of Aquinas, matter is the potential principle only of corporeal substances, so that, having no matter, the essence of the human soul is a simple form composed only with being. Although both theologians use the same historical sources either to support or to develop their particular points of view, nevertheless, their interpretations of those sources are not the same. That fact indicates a different doctrinal approach to common historical sources. Aquinas approaches them from his understanding of man as composed of a body and a soul united immediately in an act of being. Bonaventure approaches them from his understanding of man as composed of a body and a soul united through the mediation of a rational property. Thus, for Bonaventure, the soul is something substantial in itself and, therefore, it has existence according to its own form and matter.58 Personal Nature of Man St. Bonaventure sees three kinds of difference in creatures. The first kind, found in created agents, is a difference of substance and accident, or of a substance from its powers and their operations. This difference is proper to a created subject of action because, having being mixed with potency, it does not act from its whole self; in such a subject, that which acts and that by which it acts are not the same. The second kind of difference, which is between supposit and essence, is found in the creature as a being in a genus. That difference is proper to every individual thing: having being within limits, one individual thing with respect to another is 57 The problem of a temporal or eternal origin of the created universe is beyond our immediate objective; however, we believe that a thorough study of the differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the mutability and the stability of the creature, according to both nature and time, would set in relief their different philosophical solutions to the problem. 58 St. Thomas does speak of existing (existent), and we shall see what he means by it when we consider his doctrine on the personal individuation of man. Since being and existing are intrinsic to essence for Bonaventure. there is no problem for him concerning a composition of essence and existence, or a distinction between them. For some discussions on this question with reference to Bonaventure consult: P. Robert, Hj/limor. et devenir, pp. 75-99; J. Bittremieux, "Distinctio inter essentiam et esse apud S. Bonaventuram", ETL, 14 (1937), pp. 302-07; L. A. Cruz, "La patticipacion en la filosofta de san Buenventura", EX, 1 (1950), pp. 202-13. For a comparison of Bonaventure with Aquinas on the question see: L. de Mercin, "Notes sur le probleme de I'etre selon saint Bonaventure", EF (NS), 11 (1961), pp. 2-16. The composition of form and matter in the human soul contains a special problem for St. Bonaventure on the union of such a soul with a body in man: we shall treat this problem in the following section of the present chapter.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

165

both the same and different; it is the same in essence, but different in supposit, for essence is multiplied in supposits. The third kind of difference is found in every created and concreated thing. Since all things, other than God, receive being from an extrinsic principle, they are not their own being, and so there is a difference in them of the being and its being. All three differences are grounded in the essential composition of creatures, either through matter and form or through body and soul.59 These differences apply to man, who is a composite of body and soul. The first difference, of substance and accident, applies to him in a twofold way, since the human soul is also composed of matter and form. The difference of substance and powers is found in the soul, which is the subject of man's intellective potencies; the difference is also found in his composite nature, which is the subject of man's sense powers. The second difference, of supposit and essence, applies to man as an individual thing: every man is the same in species, but each man is different as a supposit of the species. The third difference, of the being and its being, applies to man, like the first, in a twofold way. The difference is found in his soul, which is a created being with being that is not the same as the soul itself; the difference is found again in his composite nature, because this is a concreated being that has being which is other than the whole composite thing. Thus, we are faced with the problem of the unity of the whole man in Bonaventurean doctrine, a problem bearing directly on the foundations of natural knowledge, for it is the individual man who knows, and he knows both by his senses and by his intellect. Our proper approach to the problem, then, is to consider man in his individual nature, rather than to consider him according to his composite parts and try to see how they can come together. The soul of man is created in a human body, so that, from its first moment in being, the human soul exists together with a body. The problem is, therefore, to see how the individual man, or the human person, is one in both essence and nature, even though his soul is a composite of matter and form. In short, we are dealing with the personal nature of the individual man.60 St. Bonaventure teaches that the name person is said in the Trinity according to relation rather than according to substance. His teaching relies on the combined support of Boethius and Richard of St. Victor. Bonaventure relies on Boethius for these three points: whatever in God belongs to the persons is not said of the divine substance, but of the divine relations; 59 1 Sent., 8.2.un.2, Resp. "Similiter est ... in compositionem." (1.168; ed. min., 1.133-34). 60 St. Bonaventure treats the human person, as such, only in so tar as he is an image of God; even then he considers the human person in comparison with the person of an angel: 2 Sent., 16.1-2 (2.393-406; ed. min., 2.404-18). Bonaventure considers the notion of person and the personal individuation of man in the course of his doctrine on the Trinity, the angels, and the human nature of Christ. Accordingly, relying on texts within those contexts and respecting their theological content, we ourselves shall have to draw together his philosophical thought on both the constitution of the human person and the personal nature of man.

166

CHAPTER TWO

secondly, the substance of God contains the divine unity while relation multiplies the Trinity, so person is said according to a divine relation; thirdly, person is a hypostasis which is distinguished by the property of individuation, and thus person, involving a distinction, is said according to relation and not according to substance. Bonaventure depends on Richard for this definition: "person is the same as that which is an existing thing through itself, according to a certain mode of singular existence of a rational nature"; since, for Bonaventure, a singular mode of existence is a relation in God, the name person is said in God according to relation.61 Explaining the doctrine, Bonaventure holds that person signifies "a supposit of a rational nature", and "a supposit distinct by a property". As "a supposit of a rational nature", person indicates a substance; this follows the general and primary understanding of person, which signifies "a certain supposit of a substance" both in God and in creatures. As "a supposit distinct by a property", however, person indicates a relation, and that follows its special and final understanding, since, with this significance, person is said only in God. Thus far, Bonaventure is influenced by Boethius; but the influence of Richard of St. Victor follows immediately in a solution to a difficulty raised by Bonaventure himself. Since the names said of God according to substance are the opposite of those said according to relation, it would seem that substantive and relative names cannot both be said of a person, or else person implies in itself opposite things. Now, for Richard of St. Victor, a name is said according to substance in two ways: either by indicating a substance as a common nature, such as man, or by indicating a substance as a certain supposit, such as a certain man; in the first way, the name indicates an essence and, in the second way, it indicates a someone. Bonaventure, accepting this precision, says that essence, or substance, indicates a common nature, but person, when said according to substance, indicates a certain and distinct supposit. Because the common nature in God is neither multiplied nor related, it is said in such a way that, referred to itself, it cannot be said in any way according to relation, and in that way it is the opposite of relation. A supposit or hypostasis, however, can be pluralized, and it can be compared to another, and so it can be related to another in a common nature. When a supposit is said according to substance in that manner, there is nothing to prevent saying it also according to relation.62 From the above explanation, we can learn much about Bonaventure's thought on the human person. He says, under the influence of Boethius,

61 I Sent., 25.1.1, con. 1-4 (1.436; ed. min., con. a-c, 1.345); cf. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinit., 4.24 (PL 196.946-47). For the references to Boethius see: Utmm Pater et Fitius ..., (PL 64.1302B); De Trinit., c. 6 (PL 64.1255); De una persona, c. 3 (PL 64.1343). 62 Loc. oil., Resp. "Et propterea ..." (1.436; ed. min.. 1.346); Richard of St Victor, op. cit., 4.19 (PL 196.942-43).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

167

that the general and primary significance of person, both in God and in creatures, is "a certain supposit of a substance", or "a supposit of a rational nature". The special significance of person, as "a supposit distinct by a property of relation", applies only in God. Bonaventure says, moreover, influenced by Richard of St. Victor, that man indicates an essence or substance, which is a common nature, whereas person indicates a supposit or a certain someone of that nature. Thus, said of man, person signifies a supposit or hypostasis of the rational nature, or essence, which is common to all men, and so person indicates a substantial mode of distinction in human nature. Considering the definition of person by Boethius: "an undivided substance of a rational nature", Bonaventure says that it is apt for a divine person.63 There are some difficulties, nevertheless, in applying the definition to a person in God. Of those difficulties, one in particular concerns us, because it involves the notion of person and the human soul. The particular difficulty is the non-convertibility of the definition: the soul of a man is "an undivided substance of a rational nature", but it is not a person; so the definition of person by Boethius seems to be unsatisfactory. On treating the difficulty, Bonaventure compares the definition of Boethius both with one given by the masters and with two taken from Richard of St. Victor. For the masters: "person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to nobility"; so, to Bonaventure, the masters and Boethius define person as it is said commonly in God and in creatures. But Boethius considers the ground of person, whereas the masters go on to the reason for transferring the name from creatures to God. Richard of St. Victor defines person as "an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature", and as an "existing thing through itself, according to a singular mode of existence of a rational nature". These definitions, Bonaventure says, apply chiefly to the divine persons: the first definition assigns the proper reason for person; the second is an explanation, or correction, of the definition given by Boethius. 64 For Bonaventure, then, the proper signification of person is "an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature", and this excludes the soul of a man, since his existence includes a human body. Although that signification refers chiefly to a divine person, nevertheless, as the proper signification of the term, it refers also to a created person, so that, 63 Cf. 1 Sent., 25.1.2, fa. & Resp. (1.436-37; fd. min., 1.347-48). See in Boethius: Df Una persona, c. 3 (PL 64.1343). 64 Loc. cit., con. 4, ad 4 (1.439, 441; ed. min,, 1.348, 350); cf. Richard of SL Victor, op. at., 4.22 (PL 196-946). In ad. 3, Bonaventure explains the expression "undivided substance" according to first and second substances: "Et propter hoc dicitur tertio, quod nomen 'substantia' stat ibi, secundum quod substantia dividitur in substantiam primam et secundam. et ita in quadam communitate ad substantial!! universalem et particularem; et illud colligunt ex verbis Boethii, quando venatur definitionem personae per praedictam divisionem substantiae, ut ibi patet. Unde hoc nomen 'individua' coarctat illam differentiam illius nominis, ut stet pro substantia prima; et sic non est ibi nugatio nee substantiae communis individuatio." — (1.441; ed. min., 1.350); cf. Boethius. Df una persona, c. 2, (PL 64.1342-43).

168

CHAPTER TWO

designating "an incommunicable existence", the name is said relatively in God, but substantively of the creature having "an intellectual nature". The proper meaning of person, furthermore, clarifies the other definition of Richard, a definition said by Bonaventure to explain and to correct the one by Boethius. As "an existing thing through itself, a person is an "undivided substance", or a hypostasis and supposit; as having "a certain mode of singular existence of a rational nature", a person has "an incommunicable existence" in a common nature either relatively, as in God, or substantively, as in a creature: the common nature in God is properly intellectual; it is either intellectual or rational in a creature. Consequently, to stand-out as a person, a creature must exist not only in itself as an undivided substance of an intellectual or a rational nature, but also incommunicably with regard to all other individuals of the same nature. In God, however, a person standsout through His proper relation in the divine essence, or common nature; this relation gives existing to the person, so that, with respect to the other persons, He is relatively incommunicable within the one divine being.65 There are, then, two fundamental features of a created person: he exists in himself as an undivided substance, and he is distinct from other individuals existing in the same nature, whether intellectual or rational. St. Bonaventure explains these two features in his texts on the personality of an angel, who has an intellectual nature by comparison with a man, who is properly rational. To understand St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the constitution of a created person, we must consider his texts on the personal nature of an angel.66 The personal difference of one angel from another, Bonaventure teaches, is founded on a substantial property and not on an accidental property. A person is an undivided substance of a rational nature; so personality must belong in the genus of substance. Now an accident is in an individual substance, for every accident follows upon the individuation of an essence, whether rational or irrational; therefore, an individual thing of a rational nature is prior by nature to its accidents, and thus neither the person nor his difference in personality is constituted by his accidents. Diverse accidents, furthermore, can be in one supposit, so that those accidents are one in number: one man can be both a grammarian and a musician; however, this would be impossible if numerical diversity or personal difference

65 "Secus est in relationibus creaturae et Dei: quoniam relationes in creaturis non dant relativis existere; unde sine illis potest res esse et cum iilis; in divinis autem dant personis existere; et ideo si in personis intelligatur. quod proprietas insit hypostasi, intelltgitur esse hypostasis, et similiter, si intelligitur non inesse, intelligitur hypostasis non esse." — 1 Sent., 7.dub.4, in Resp. (1.145; ed. min., 1.113). 66 "... dicendum quod rationale, secundum quod est differentia animae et angeli, differt. Nam rationale angeli est intellectuale: sed rationale animae proprie est rationale. Nam angelus natus est intelligere secundum intellectum simplicem et deiformem, anima secundum intellectum inquisitivum et possibilem." — 2 Sent.. 1.2.3.1, ad 2-3 (2.48; ed. min., 2.41).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

169

resulted from accidents. Differences in personality, then, arise from differences in substantial principles: Peter and Paul are different in personality because they have different substantial principles. 67 Personal difference, among creatures, adds something over and above individual difference, which designates both individuation and, consequently, a distinction. Individuation comes from the individualization and appropriation of the principles in a thing: on conjoining, the principles undergo a mutual appropriation in the substance and, in that way, they constitute an individual thing. This thing, as a consequence, is different or distinct from every other thing, thus giving rise to number, which is an accidental property following upon a substance. Individual difference, therefore, has a substantial foundation and an accidental consequence. Personal difference adds the dignity of personality to individual difference. That dignity consists in rational nature and substantial completion. The nobility of rational nature is such that it holds first place among created natures; the dignity of substantial completion perfects the individual nature, so that it cannot be ordered to a more perfect form. Although the property of personality has to be understood through the mode of a quality, nevertheless, Bonaventure insists, it is essential to a rational nature. Personality is an actual eminence of such a kind that no other nature individualized in a supposit can surpass it. Summing up his views on the question, Bonaventure says: "as an individual difference comes from the existence of a natural form in matter, so a personal difference comes from the existence of a noble and supereminent nature in a supposit."68 In Bonaventure's judgment, therefore, the substantial individuation of a form in matter results in an existing supposit, which is distinct from all other individual things. That distinction entails an accidental and numerical diversity of supposits; but their individual differences are grounded in their substantial individuation, and not in their accidental property of number. When a rational nature exists in a supposit, however, there is added to the individual substance the essential dignity of personality. This dignity is a substantial perfection founded on the constituent and particularizing principles of the substance; but the dignity of personality is known accidentally from the qualities following upon the personal difference, or the personal distinction, of one creature from another: i.e. of one man from another man, or of one angel from another angel. 0 '* In answering the question: "whether personal difference is on the side of the formal principle, or of the material principle", Bonaventure remarks 67 2 Sent, 3.1.2.2, fa. 1-6 (2.105-06; «/. HIM., fa. a-f, 2.95-96). 68 Lac. tit., Resp. "Et ideo ... in supposito." (2.106; ed. min., 2.96-97). 69 "Sed ratio distinctions personalia, quantum ad veritatem, venit ex phncipiis constituentibus et particulantibus, quantum ad notitiam, venit ex qualitatibus; quorum utrumque est in angelis reperire secundum diversitatem; diversa enim habent principia indivlduantia et diversas proprietates innatas. Sicut enim homines diversas habent facies, sic diversas habent mentes et proprietates mentales; ita intelligendum est in angelis suo modo." — 2 Sent., 3.1.2.1, ad 4 (2.104; ed. min., 2.94).

170

CHAPTER TWO

that it has to do with individuation with respect to personal difference, and that the question has caused contention among men of philosophy. Some of them, seeking support from Aristotle, say that individuation comes from matter, because the individual adds only matter to the specific form. To other men of philosophy, individuation comes from form: they say this because they understand the order of forms in nature to be the same as their order in a genus. Thus, the most general form comes first to matter, then other forms up to the specific form, which does not constitute the individual, and so a form of the individual is required, since that form alone is entirely in act, just as matter is entirely in potency. Bonaventure finds both of these positions unsatisfactory. Because matter is common to all things, he cannot see how it could be the chief principle and cause of their individual distinctions. Nor can he see how form could be the whole and principal cause of numerical distinction between things, particularly because each created form, as Aristotle suggests, is like some other form. How could two fires differ formally, Bonaventure asks, when they are multiplied and distinguished numerically only by dividing the same fire, since there is no induction of a new form to separate them?70 Setting aside those two positions, Bonaventure goes on to answer the question in his own way. He says that individuation originates from the actual conjoining of matter with form, a conjoining in which the one appropriates the other to itself. Now the individual thing is a hoc aliquid; it is hoc (this) chiefly because of matter, which gives existing to the form, thus positing it in place and in time; it is illiquid (something) because of form, which gives an act of being to the matter. Individuation in creatures, therefore, has its origin from the conjunction in them of form and matter, or of the principles of being and existing. Personal difference, however, looks to singularity and dignity. Regarding singularity, personal difference refers to the conjunction of substantial principles, and this results in the essence of the thing (quod est); but, regarding dignity, personal difference refers chiefly to the form, and thus personal difference originates in creatures, Bonaventure concludes, whether in men or in the angels." This is is the third time that we have seen St. Bonaventure speaking of form and matter as the essential principles of being and existing in created 70 2 Sent., 3,1.2.3, Resp. "... formae inductio." (2.109; ed. min., 2.99); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 7.15 (1040a28-40b4). 71 "Ideo est teitia pusitio ... quod individuatio consurgit ex actual! coniunctione maleriae cum forma, ex qua coniunctione unum sibi appropriat alterum ... Si tamen quaeras, a quo venial principaliter; dicendum quod individum est 'hoc aliquid'. Quod sit 'hoc', principaiius habet a materia, ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore. Quod sit 'aliquid', habet a forma. Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere. Existere dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae. — Individuatio igitur in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio. Personalis autetn discretio dicit singularitatem et dignitatem. In quantum dicit singularitatem, hoc dicit ex ipsa coniunctione principiorum, ex quibus resultat ipsum 'quod est'. Sed dignitatem dicit principaliter ratione formae; et sic patet, unde sit personalis discretio originaliter, in creaturis loquendo, sive in hominibus sive in angelis." —Loc. cit. (2.109-10; ed. min., 2.100).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

171

substances. He speaks of form giving an act of being to a created substance, whether spiritual or corporeal, and of matter giving to such a substance stability of existing, which it has through itself. He speaks also of form and matter as the principles of being and existing in the human soul, which has a fixed or determined existence because of its matter. He speaks now in a way that applies these notions to the constitution of created substances, either as individual things or as personal supposits. A created substance is constituted an individual thing by the actual conjoining of its form and matter: in that conjoining, they undergo a mutual appropriation to constitute the substance as this chiefly by the existing of its matter, and as something by an act of being given to the matter by its form; since the matter posits the form in place and in time, the individual substance has stability of existing, or a fixed existence, in being, and that results from the particularization of its matter by the form. A created substance is constituted a personal supposit when the essential conjunction of its form and matter in being and existing results not only in the singularity of a fixed existence, but also in the dignity of a rational nature having an incommunicable existence. Within the incommunicability of a personal existence, then, the singular substance is this chiefly because of its matter, which gives stability to the form, and it is something rational, or someone, chiefly because of its form, which prevents any further perfection from a nobler form. Hence, the incommunicability of a personal existence involves a substantial mode of distinction between individuals of the same nature, or species. Thus, we are confronted with the problem of the personal existence of man: the human soul is a singular substance with its own form and matter; nevertheless, properly speaking, it is the form of the human species, or its formal part, rather than the species itself. 72 A definition encloses the whole essence, according to Aristotle; so, for Bonaventure, the definition of man encloses the composite of matter and form. If both man-in-common and rational nature include matter, Bonaventure says, and if person adds something above nature, therefore, since it cannot add matter, person must add something formal to the common nature. 73 Bonaventure's doctrine on the personal individuation of man is contained in his texts on the human nature of Christ. Consequently, we must 72 "Tertia positio est, quod angelus et anitna specie diffcrunt; quae sit autein ilia differentia, quaeretur iam. Nunc autem iuxta communem positionem tenendum est quod essentialiter dtfferant et in genere substantiae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes probantes angelum et animam esse specie differentes, eo modo quo licet dicere animam rationalem esse species. Nam, proprie loquendo. potius est forma speciei sive pars formalis, quam species; extenso tamen nomine potest species appelari." — 2 Sent, 1.2.3.1. Resp. (2.48; ed. min., 2.40). 73 "Item, 'definitio, ut vuit Philosophus, est aggregati'; ergo cum definitur homo, non forma tantum sed compositum ex materia et forma definitur; ergo si homo in communi claudit in se materiam, et natura rationalis similiter; si persona addit aliquid super naturam, cum non possit addere materiam, oportet quod addat aliquid formale.'' — 2 Sent., 3.1.2.3, fm. 6 (2.108; ed. mm., fm. f, 2.98); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 8.3 (1043a29-1043b33).

172

CHAPTER TWO

look at those texts to grasp his thought on the personal nature of the individual man. To be a man, Bonaventure teaches, Christ must correspond with other men in the specific form humanity. Now the union of rational soul and human flesh constitutes man, which is a common species in all men; but, in Christ, there is a rational soul united to human flesh, and so He has the common species with other men. 74 A species consists in the form of a whole thing. This is the form enfolding a whole being, as Boethius says: "a species is the whole being of individual things"; other philosophers, Bonaventure notes, including Avicenna, concur with Boethius on that point. A specific form can be understood to be common, however, either as predicated of individual things or as entering into their constitution. For instance, according to predication, man is a common form in Peter and Paul; however, as entering into the constitution of Peter or of Paul, man is a form consisting at once in soul and body, and this form results from the conjunction of a soul with a body, for the soul and the body of a man come together to constitute one essence. Hence, a thing constituted from a soul and a body has one specific form, which is common through predication both to the thing and to all other things constituted in the same nature; nonetheless, through a certain information and completion, Bonaventure adds, the specific form is common to their constituent parts. Thus, the human nature of Christ has the common species man, because, as in other men, there is in Him the form humanity, which, informing and perfecting Him, results from the conjunction of His soul with His body. Christ, therefore, has the species common to all men both through predication and through their constitution. On the other hand, there is not in Christ a common species of His divine and human natures, because they do not unite to constitute one essence, and so the divinity and the humanity of Christ do not conjoin in a common or universal form. Although there is in Christ a threefold substance, nevertheless, He has a common species only from a conjunction of two, namely, of His soul with His body; from their conjunction, one specific form results, and Christ has it in common with all other men." Keeping in view that person adds something formal to man, let us see what the above texts, together with we already know, tell us about the individual man. Bonaventure, following Aristotle, considers man-in-common to enclose both form and matter. In his own words, man is the common species, or the specific form, of every individual man. As a common nature, man is the form of the whole individual and, in the words of Boethius, the species which is the whole being of individual men. Thus, the individual man is

74 3 Sent., 2.2.3, fa. 1-3 (3.48; ed. min., fa. a-c, 3.43). 75 Loc. at., Resp. (3.48; ed. min., 3.43-44). Cf. Boethius, In Porphyr. comment, lib. 3 (PL 64.115-16); Avicenna. Logics, c. De specie, fol. 7r-8r (Venetiis, 1508) — see also: Metaph., 5.3-4, fol. 98v-99v (Venetiis, 1508).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

1 73

human because he is particularized as a supposit, or a first substance, of the common nature and species man, and this is a second substance, or the form of the whole giving being to an individual man. 76 In the order of predication, man is a common or universal form, which can be said of every individual man. From that point of view, the species is taken abstractly as humanity, or the human nature by which all men are known to be human. From the same point of view, the specific form is called essence, whereas nature designates it concretely, and particularly as the principle of human operations.77 In the order of nature, then, man is a concrete form resulting from the conjoining of a rational soul and a human body. Their conjoining constitutes man as one specific form, which is both the form of the whole individual, as an individual, and a form that he has, as a man, in common with all other men. But this is not one only form in which every man exists; it is, rather, one specific form in each individual man by which he is concretely rational and human. Hence, all men are commonly rational and human because they have similar forms establishing them in a specific nature. The concrete form man is constituted, nevertheless, from the conjoining in each man of his rational soul and his human body. Since they come together to constitute one specific form of the whole individual man, or a second substance giving being to a first substance and supposit, therefore, in calling the soul and the body two substances, St. Bonaventure is not naming them either as complete natures or as supposits. He is referring to them as constituent parts in the order of substance: they constitute the individual man as a first substance, or supposit; as a consequence, they also constitute his specific form, which is a second substance. Accordingly, considered concretely, the soul and the body of a man come together substantially to constitute one supposit of a specific nature; considered abstractly, a rational soul and a human body unite to constitute one essence, or human nature, that can be predicated of every individual man. This is the proper way to understand St. Bonaventure in saying that a spiritual substance and a corporeal substance are conjoined in one person and nature, or that a rational soul and corporeal matter unite at once in one man, in a unity of nature and of person.78 76 On the distiction between a first and a second substance see above: n. 64, p. 167. 77 "... unde de nulla hypostasi, cuius sit natura creata, conceditur quod sit sua essentia vel natura in abstractione, sed solum per modum concretionis; unde non dicitur quod Petrus sit humanitas, sed quod Petrus sit homo." — 3 Sent., 5.2.1. ad 2 (3.131; ed. min.. 3.125). "In hoc enim differt essentia a natura. quia essentia nominal rei formam in quadarn abstractione, natura earn nominal entem in motu et materia ut naturatium operationum priricipium." — Loc. cit., ad 4 (3.131; ed. mm., 3.126). Cf. 3 Sent., 5.2.4-5 (3.138-41; ed. min., 3.131-36). 78 For instance: "Ut igitur in homine manifestaretur Dei potentia. ideo fecit eum ex naturis inaximc distantibus, coniunctis in unam personam et naturam, cuiusrnodi sunt corpus et anima, quorum unum cst substantia corporea, alterum vero, scilicet anima, est substantia spiritualis et incorpurea, quae in grnere substantiae maxime distant." — Brevii, 2.10 (5.228; ad. min., n. 3. 5.52). "Ut ergo manifestaretur potentia, ad sui ipsius laudem, gloriam et honorem omnia pmduxit de nihilo. faciens aliquid prope nihil, scilicet materiam corporalem, et aliquid prope se. scilicet substantiam spiritualem. ct simul haec iungcns in unu

174

CHAPTER TWO

The problem of the personal individuation of man remains unresolved, nonetheless, for the rational soul is the form of the species, or the formal part of man. The being of the species particularized in an individual man, therefore, comes from his rational soul. Since the form of his soul is the principle of its being, the man has rational being from the form of his soul. But the soul also has matter, which is the principle of its existing, and so the formal part of man exists according to its own material principle. Thus, in a man, it is the species that is individuated, and not the rational soul, which has an individuation from its own form and matter. How, then, does an individual man, or a human person, exist as one supposit with such a soul? To answer this question, we must first see why the rational soul cannot be a person and, thereafter, see how the soul and the body of an individual man actually constitute a human person.79 In his doctrine on the human nature of Christ, Bonaventure teaches that a person is complete in being, for person signifies perfect completion of a rational nature. In other words, person names a complete individual, and one distinct from others by an ultimate completion. 80 As we have seen, Boethius defines person as "an undivided substance of a rational nature"; since Christ has assumed a nature conforming to that definition, as John Damascene notes, it would seem that He has assumed a human person.81 When attending to this question, Bonaventure explains how he understands the expression "undivided substance" as contained in the above definition of person. His explanation is based on a consideration of an individual thing as "undivided in itself and distinct from other things". An individual thing has the distinction of singularity, because it is one thing alone and not something common to several things: Socrates is an individual, but man is not. An individual thing also has the distinction of incommunicability, because it is neither a part of another thing nor a constituent of a third thing in composition with something else: a hand is a part of a man, so it is not properly said to be an individual thing. Finally, an individual thing has the distinction of supereminent dignity, which is received from the noble property designated by the name person, and so that property is found only in an individual of a rational nature, because this is the noblest creature.

hornine in unitate naturae et personae, scilicet rationalem animam et materiarn corporalem." — Op. cit., 7.7 (5.289; ed. mm., n. 2, 5.170-71). Cf. 2 Sent., 1.2.1.2. sc I (2.41; ed. min., sc a, 2.33). 79 On the individuation of the soul note: "Ad illud autern quod ... obicitur ... quod inteliectus non dependct a corpore, ergo ab eo non potest individuari, dicendum quod inteliectus individuatur secundum corporis indigentiam; non tamen eius individuatio est a corpore, sed a propriis principiis, materia scilicet et forma sua, quas de se habet, sicut in se subsistit." — 2 Sent., 18.2.1, in ad 1 (2.447; ed mm., 2.459-60). This implies, of course, tliat the species man has a twofold material principle: one on the part of the soul, another on the part of the body; so it invokes the problem of plural forms. For the present, however, we are not dealing with that problem, but with the personal individuation of man, 80 Cf. 3 Sent, 5.1.4, sc 4 (3.127; ed. mm., sc d, 3.121); 5.2.2, sc 3 (3.132; ed. min., sc c, 3.127). 81 3 Sent, 5.2.2, arg. 1 (3.132; ed. min., 3.126); cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orthod., 3.2 (PG 94.1023).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

1 75

Since the human nature assumed by Christ is ordered to the nobler property of a person of the divine nature, His human nature does not have the property of a created personality. Consequently, Christ's human nature lacks a supereminent dignity, so that, speaking correctly, His human nature is not said to fall under the definition of person, for the personality of that nature is the personality of the divine Word.82 We know now what person adds formally to man: the property of personality, which consists in both the individual dignity of a rational nature and the nobility of an ultimate completion. This is how St. Bonaventure, as we recall, describes the property of personality in an angel. But the personal completion of man, unlike that of the angelic species, is founded on the conjoining of a rational soul with a human body. Their conjoining, in every instance, results in a substance undivided in itself and distinct from other human substances by the distinctions of singularity and incommunicability. Excepting the human nature of Christ, which is constituted in a divine person, the union of a rational soul and a human body always constitutes a hypostasis and a person of human nature, which is completed in rational being by the personality cf that hypostasis. Hence, personality is the ultimate completion distinguishing the individual man as a human person.83 St. Bonaventure applies his interpretation of person, as defined by Boethius, to the question of personality regarding the rational soul, considered in itself and apart from any union with a human body. Since the rational soul by its nature has to be united with a body to constitute a third thing, the soul is not a person, which is one thing through itself and distinct from other things. A person, moreover, is the most complete individual in the genus of substance and cannot be ordered to a higher perfection in that genus; but the rational soul is ordered to the constitution of a man, Bonaventure says, so it cannot be a person. When the soul is united to a body, Bonaventure continues, the soul itself is not then a person. If it were a person on separating from the body, the soul would have a nobler mode of existing outside the body: but "nature always desires what is better", so that the soul would never desire to be united with a body; therefore, it would be prejudicial to the soul to be united to a body, and it would be a reward, not a penalty, for the soul to be separated from the body. Since this is not the natural condition of the soul, Bonaventure insists that, when separated from the human body, the soul cannot be a person. Indeed, if it were a person, then, like an angel, the soul would assume a body without constituting with it a human person.84

82 Loc. at., ad 1 (3.133; ed. mm., 3.127-28). 83 See: loc. at., ad 3 (3.133-34; erf. mm., 3.128); 6,2.3, ad 3 (3.163; ed. mw.,3.155); 10.1.2, sc 4-5 (3.223; ed. min., sc d-e, 3.219). 84 3 Sent., 5.2.3, sc 1-4 (3.136; ed. min., sc a-d, 3.129-30).

176

CHAPTER TWO

For Bonaventure, therefore, the rational soul, even when separated from the body through death, cannot be a person. Although Peter Lombard and Hugh of St. Victor teach that a separated soul is a person, Bonaventure cannot follow their teaching, because, in his view, a separated soul lacks the distinction of incommunicability.85 A separated soul has singularity and rational dignity, which mark it as an individual; but it also has an appetite and an aptitude for union with a body to constitute a third thing, and so it necessarily lacks the distinction of personality. Now, according to Augustine, a soul is more complete while its appetite is fulfilled with respect to a body, and this appetite will be fulfilled again in a separated soul when it resumes the body; therefore, when it is separated from the body, a rational soul cannot have personality. Bonaventure's position on the question, then, is based on the natural unibility of a rational soul with respect to a human body. This unibility, as we have seen, is an essential aptitude, or an inseparable capacity, of a soul for uniting with a body. Unibility is a property that a rational soul has from its origin in a human body; hence, by its rational nature and from its origin, a human soul necessarily communicates with a body in being, so that, in itself, the soul can never have the distinction of incommunicability in existing. Since human personality is founded on natural origin, a human person consists in a whole conjunct of a soul and a body; so, apart from such a personal nature, a rational soul cannot be complete in being, for it has fulness in being only when conjoined to a human body.86 It is clear, thus far, that Bonaventure considers personality to be something over and above individuality. The distinctions of singularity and incommunicability are sufficient for individuality; personality is an additional distinction found only in a complete substance of a rational nature. Since the rational soul lacks incommunicability, it does not have a proper individuality, and so, in itself, it is not a complete substance, even though it has both singularity and the dignity of rationality. Personality, furthermore, follows the individualization of man in a supposit; but the rational soul is both the formal principle of the individual man and, as a consequence, the formal part of man: therefore, personality completes the individualization of man, and thus personality is not a property of the rational soul, but of the individual man, who is the person. This brings us to our second question: how do the rational soul and the human body actually 85 Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis, 2 . 1 . 1 1 (PL 176.401-12). Peter Lombard said: "Persona enim est substantial rationalis individuae naturae, hoc autern est anima. Ergo si animam assumpsit, et personam; quod ideo non sequitur quia anima 11011 est persona quando alii rei unita est personaliter, sed quando per se est absoluta enim a corporc persona est. sicuti angelus." — Liber sentenliarum, 3.5.5 (PL 192.767). The masters of theology in Paris, by a decree issued in 1250, were not permitted to follow the above opinion of Lombard: Henricus Denifle, Charlularium Universitatis Parisiensis, (Parisiis, Fratres Delalain: 1889), v. 1, n. 194. pp. 220-21. 86 Loc. at., Resp., ad 3-4, 6 (3.136-37; ed. min., 3.130-31); see in St. Augustine: De Gen. ad lift, 12.35.68 (PL 34.483-84). Consult above: pp. 125-26.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

177

constitute a human person? St. Bonaventure handles the question when considering both the problem of two supposits in Christ and the problem of His individuality as a man. On treating the first problem, Bonaventure notes that it can be considered in three ways. First, that Christ is two natures, the one divine and the other human; but He is neither taken nor understood in this way. Secondly, that Christ is two persons, a position which is contrary to Catholic faith. The third way falls between the other two: Christ is neither two natures nor two persons, but two things of nature (res naturae) or two supposits. The two things of nature look to diverse natures, and the two supposits look to diverse substances: Christ is God because of the divine nature, and He is man because of a human nature; so He is two things of nature, and the one is predicated of the other because of the unity of His person. Although this view seems probable, St. Bonaventure considers it to be deceptive. It is clear, he says, that things predicated of each other are really one in number, even though they are formally distinguished. For example, "Peter is a musician": Peter and musician are not two in number, even though they are formally distinct from each other. If the third view of Christ sees that "God is man", and that "man is God", it cannot be upheld, because, regarding supposit, there would be two concrete things in Christ. In Bonaventure's judgment, this way of seeing Christ fails to distinguish between a supposit as subjected to a genus, and a supposit in which the whole being of a thing is made a substance. Thus, in the first instance, body and colour have diverse supposits, because they have diverse differences. In the second instance, however, body and colour can have only one supposit, because there is but one substance and one individual thing in which both the nature of body and the nature of colour are preserved. In other words, considered abstractly, body and colour are different with respect to their supposits: body has a supposit in the genus of body, but colour has a supposit in a specific body, of which it is predicated. Considered concretely, however, body and colour have one only supposit, and this is an individual thing in which the whole being, or the specific form, is realized substantially. Now things are not numbered according to an abstract consideration of supposits; on the contrary, they are numbered according to their concrete consideration, and so a supposit is one according as the whole being of a specific form is realized in it substantially. But, in Christ, human nature is realized substantially in a divine person; therefore, Christ is but one supposit, since, regarding being which is in act, He is one in number. 87 87 3 Sent., 6.1.1, Resp. (3.148-49; ed. min., 3.140-41). Note the following portion of the text: "Ratio autem huius deceptionis venit ex hoc quod non distinxerunt inter suppositum, secundum quod suppositum dicitur quod subicitur generi, et suppositura, quod dicitur illud in quo substantificatur totum esse rei, cum tamen magna sit differentia Si enim dicatur suppositum quod subicitur generi, corpus et color diversa habent supposita, quia diversas habent differentias. Si autem dicatur suppositum secundum quod in eo substantificatur totum esse rei, sic corpus et color unum possunt habere suppositum, quia una est substantia et unum individuum in quo salvatur natura corporealitas et natura coloris. Res autem non

178

CHAPTER TWO

Considering a thing concretely, then, Bonaventure understands it to be one in number because it exists as a supposit in which a specific form is realized substantially. Thus, an individual man is one thing because he exists as a supposit in which man is realized substantially. Since man is thus realized in the divine supposit of Christ, human nature in Him is said concretely to be individualized in a divine hypostasis. Consequently, the whole being of Christ is realized substantially in that divine hypostasis and not in a human hypostasis.88 What is the difference between hypostasis and supposit, particularly regarding the personal individuation of man? St. Bonaventure answers the question for us in his, rather long and comprehensive, text on the individuation of Christ's human nature. He maintains that it is both false and improper to say either: "Christ, according as He is man, is a person", or: "Christ, according as He is man, is a hypostasis". The first statement cannot stand, because person involves both a property of nobility and the foundation of the whole of natural existence. The second statement cannot stand, because hypostasis, though it does not refer to personality, has to do with the foundation of existence. Now the foundation of existence in Christ is the uncreated Word, and not Christ's soul, nor His body, nor the composite of His body and soul. Can it be said that "Christ is an individual, according as He is man", and that "Christ is a supposit, according as He is man"? From Bonaventure's position, both statements are at once proper and improper. It is proper to say: "Christ is an individual, according as He is man", provided individual signifies "something undivided in itself; however, the statement is improper, if individual signifies "something divided from other things and subsisting both in itself and through itself, for the human nature in Christ is united to the uncreated Word as to the supposit in which and through which it subsists. Hence, the second signification of individual is the equivalent of hypostasis, and so, with that signification, the statement implies two hypostases in Christ, because it indicates a division between His divine and human natures. It is proper, moreover, to say: "Christ is a supposit, according as He is man", provided supposit designates that of which man is predicated, and which is subjected to the person of the uncreated Word. But the statement is improper, if supposit designates that in which the whole being of the thing is realized substantially, since Christ, as a man, is not a supposit in that way, except in so far as He supports the accidents of His human nature. This improper mode

numeratur secundum supposita in subiciendo et praedicando, sed secundum numerum suppositorum in essendo et substantificando." The use of body and colour in this text is probably suggested by Aristotle: Categorise, c. 5 (2a33-2bl4). 88 "Persona quidem duo dicit, scilicet hypostasitn, in qua est substantia totius esse rei, et proprietatem supereminentis dignitatis ... Nam hypostasis divina est ilia in qua substantificatur totum esse Christi, non humana; proprietas etiam dignitatis inest illi secundum illam naturam quae non potest uniri digniori." — 3 Sent, 10.1.2, in ad 4 (3.229; ed. min., 3.220-21); cf. 2.2.3, sc 3, ad 3 (3.48-49; ed. min., 3.43-44).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

1 79

of the statement makes supposit the equivalent of hypostasis, so that, implying two substantial realizations of being in Christ, it posits in Him two supposits. Summing up his position, Bonaventure says that the human nature of Christ is united in the person of the Word not only with respect to His personality, but also with respect to an incommunicable supposit, namely, His hypostasis. In this way, therefore, the person of the Word makes Himself a supposit of human nature, so that the mode of existing attributed to other men according to human nature is attributed to Christ only according to His divine nature. Consequently, according to His divine nature alone, Christ is a person and a hypostasis, and He is an individual and a supposit in so far as those terms are equivalent to a hypostasis. According to His human nature, then, Christ is an individual because that nature is undivided in itself, and He is a supposit because this designates His individual human nature of which man is predicated, and which is subjected to His person.89 Before continuing with St. Bonaventure's text, we shall pause to see how the above precisions apply to the personal nature of a man other than Christ. As we have seen, a man is one thing because he exists as a supposit in which human nature is realized substantially. Hence, his human nature designates a specific mode of existing: he exists as an individual man, because his nature is undivided in itself, and he exists as a supposit, because man is predicated of his individual nature, which is subjected to his person. Since a man is an individual of human nature, he also exists as divided from other men, and so he subsists both in himself and through himself: therefore, he has the distinction of singularity in the being of human nature. Since a man is a supposit of human nature, moreover, he exists as an individual in which the whole being of human nature, or the specific form man, is realized substantially: therefore, he has the distinction of incommunicability in the being of human nature. When the distinctions of singularity and incommunicability are taken together, a man is seen to be a hypostasis, for he is then seen to be composed of a soul and a body. Their composition constitutes the foundation of the whole of his natural existence, which includes the following: his singularity as an individual man, his incommunicability as a supposit of human nature, and the accidents that are proper to his human nature. Finally, as a person, a man has a unique property of personality, which completes the being of his singular and incommunicable nature. Consequently, preventing any further perfection of that nature in a substantial way, personality establishes the man in existence both as a singular thing and as an incommunicable supposit of human nature, which is thus constituted in a really personal manner.

89 3 Sent., 10.1.3, Resp. "... praetactum est." (3.230-31; ed. min., 3.222-23).

180

CHAPTER TWO

In the remaining portion of his text, Bonaventure, reviewing his own position, poses a rather grave question: "How can Christ, according as He is man, be truly and properly individual"? Bonaventure responds to the question by a direct reference back to his previous consideration of individuation concerning an angel, a consideration which, on that occasion, he said also concerned a man. Individuation, Bonaventure reminds us, comes from the intercommunication of a form and a matter, even though it is known only from the collection of accidents resulting therefrom. Thus, as a man, Christ is composed of a soul and a body, just as any other man; so He has a true and proper individuation, according as He is man. But Bonaventure has restricted the meaning of both individual and supposit to Christ's human nature in such a way that, apart from supporting accidents and properties, this nature does not seem to have a true and proper individuation as a human nature. As a result, Bonaventure is obliged to show how human nature is individuated in any man. He maintains that individuation does not come from either the accidents or the properties of a thing. Individuation comes, rather, from its intrinsic principles, for it is according to them that the thing is constituted one supposit in which the whole being of the thing is stabilized. Because the individual thing is constituted from the coming together of those principles, and because there results in it a form of the whole, or a specific form, therefore, Bonaventure insists, Boethius says: "a species is the whole being of an individual thing". Since the soul and the body of Christ, or the form and the matter of His human nature, are united not only in the individual thing that they constitute, but also in the hypostasis of the eternal Word, then, according as He is man, Christ is not entirely complete as an individual thing. He stands midway between a thing that is properly individual and a thing that is said to be individual, but which is not properly undivided. In a thing that is properly individual, there is both a union of substantial principles and a constitution of a first supposit in itself alone and not in another supposit. Each of these is absent from a thing that is not properly undivided, for instance, from an accident, which does not subsist either in itself or through itself, but by some properly individual thing. Now, in Christ, there is a union of substantial principles, or the form and the matter of His human nature, but they do not constitute a first supposit, because they subsist in and through a supposit of the divine nature. To understand all this, Bonaventure concludes, it must be kept in mind what he has already said concerning the individuation of an angel, or of any created person.90 We have now the last elements in St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the individuation, and therefore the constitution, of a human person. The elements consist in this, that a substantial union of form and matter con-

90 Loc. cit., Resp. "Sed contra ..." (3.231-32; ed. min., 3.223-24). Note the concluding statement: "Ad haec autem valent praedeterminata libro secundo, distinctione tertia." — See above: pp. 168-71.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

181

stitutes a thing as a single supposit in which the whole being of an individual thing is stabilized: from that substantial union, there results in the thing a specific form, which is the whole being of the individual thing itself. Applying those elements to a human person, we can say that the substantial union of a rational soul and a human body constitutes a man as a single supposit in which his whole being is stabilized: from that substantial union, there results in the man the specific form man, which, as a concrete form, is his whole being; therefore, his individuated nature, because it is both rational and human, is a personal one that cannot be the individual nature of any other man, and so, as "an undivided substance of a rational nature", he has the incommunicability of existence which is proper to a human person. With all this in mind, we shall proceed to draw together St. Bonaventure's philosophical thought on both the individuation of man and the constitution of a human person. The individuation of man originates from the substantial union of constituent and particularizing principles, namely, a rational soul and a human body, for they are the proper form and proper matter of a human nature. In their actual conjoining, the soul appropriates to itself the body, which appropriates to itself the soul. By their mutual appropriation, the soul and the body communicate in being and existing: the soul gives an act of being to the body, while the body gives existing to the soul, thus positing it in place and in time. As a consequence, this man is constituted as an individual thing: he is this man chiefly through his human body, but he is this man principally through his rational soul, which is the formal part of his human nature. Since the soul and the body of the individual man are really conjoined in one act of being, and since their conjunction establishes in him the specific form man, which is the whole being of an undivided nature, therefore, the soul and the body constitute the whole being of the individual man. As an individual of human nature, then, the man has being which is stabilized in the existing of a single substance, so that, divided from other men, he subsists both in and through himself. Consequently, this man signifies a single supposit in which the whole being of an individual nature is realized substantially, because the being of that nature is stabilized in the particular existing of a body. Hence, having a fixed or determined existence as an individual thing, the man has the incommunicability of a supposit of a rational nature. As a hypostasis, therefore, each man is different from other men, because, with respect to other men, the rational form of this man has a unique existence in and with his own human body.91

91 In an article entitled: "Esse and Existtre in St. Bonaventure", MS, 8 (1946), pp. 169-88, G. P. KJubertanz, though he admits a real distinction between form and matter, minimizes the consequent difference between esse and exisiere: "The distinction between matter and form is only indirectly pertinent; hence it is sufficient to say that everyone admits it to be real. The distinction between esse and existere is a logical distinction: because existere is esse hoc. The distiction between quod est and quo est is of itself a distinction of signification and therefore a logical one." — p. 18. KJubertanz identifies esse with both

182

CHAPTER TWO

The personal difference of one man from another, however, comes from their respective properties of personality. Completing the being of the individual man, the property of personality is grounded in his unique existence as a hypostasis, or in the substantial conjunct of this soul and this body. As a human person, therefore, the man is not only one, and chiefly because of his human body, but also someone who is a rational being principally because of his soul. Accordingly, personal difference among men results from the singular and incommunicable existence of a rational nature in this or in that supposit, or hypostasis, which cannot be perfected substantially by a nobler or more eminent form. Every form following the personal perfection of a rational substance is an accident, or a property, of that substance, and so, existing in the personal nature of a man, such a form does not enter into the constitution of his person. In short, a human person is one thing substantially: he is one chiefly because of his human body, which appropriates to itself the being and life of his soul, he is someone principally because of his rational soul, which appropriates to itself the existing of his body. Thus, the formal principle of human personality is found in the rational soul, and in the form of the rational soul, for this is both the intrinsic origin of his substantial being and the formal part of his human nature, which is the intrinsic principle of his personal operations. 92 The natural union of soul and body in a human person constitutes the substantial foundation of his rational knowledge. This knowledge is at once both sensitive and intellective: as sensitive, it is subjected to the conjunct of soul and body; as intellective, it is subject to the soul alone.93 Bonaventure indicates the foundation of that distinction in his doctrine on the inability of a rational soul, when separated from the body through death, to use its sense potencies. Citing Aristotle's principle: "sensing is an operation of the conjunct", Bonaventure holds that a separated soul, because it is not an animal, cannot acquire sense knowledge.94 Such knowledge, whether inessence and specific form; as a result, he fails to see, in the texts which he cites from Bonaventure, that the term form signifies the substantial principle of act in a composite thing (pp. 178-82). Now an identification of esse with essence and specific form is an oversimplification of Bonaventure's doctrine. Although, in a composite substance, essence is the same as specific form, of which it is an abstract consideration, nevertheless, they are not altogether the same as esse, because existere also belongs to the common form (or essence) of a composite thing. The thing is individuated according to both esse and existere, so that essence connotes its substance according to an actus essendi, whereas existence connotes the same substance according to the limitations of its existere, and so essence and existence are reciprocal but not interchangeable terms. KJubertanz. unfortunately, has not considered matter as the existing principle of mutation toward non-being, nor has he considered the existential constitution of the human person (pp. 182-87). 92 Consult: C. O'Leary, The substant. compos, of man, pp. 87-95; A.C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul, pp. 26-32, 50-52. On the historical sources of the terms: subsistentia, essentia, hypostasis and persona, as used by St. Bonaventure, see: V.Ch. Bigi, "Concezione bonaventuriana della sostanza e concezione aristotelica", SF, 55 (1958), pp. 198-209; "II termine e il concetto di sostanza in S. Bonaventura, come risulto della discussione dei termini e concetti sinonimi e apparentati". SF, 56 (1959), pp. 16-36. 93 4 Sent., 23.2.2, ad fa. 1-3 (4.599-600; ed. min., ad fa. a-c, 4.590). 94 4 Sent., 50.2.1.1, con. 1 (4.1045; ed. min., con. a, 4.1028); cf. Aristotle: De somno et vigitia (454a7-ll).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

183

terior or exterior, depends on potencies bound by the organs of a body; when those organs are dissolved, the sense potencies can no longer operate. In fact, the absence of an organ in a living body prevents a sense potency from operating: a blind man cannot see, even though he has the potency of sight in his soul, because he lacks the organ of sight in his body. For Bonaventure, then, a sense power has an active potency in the soul and a passive potency in an organ of the body. This organ is so necessary for a man to acquire sense knowledge that, after his death, the active potency in the soul cannot operate, since it is deprived of its organ.95 The intellective power, according to Bonaventure, is also differentiated into active and passive potencies. In this instance, however, because the intellect is more spiritual and simple than a sense power, the difference looks to the spiritual substance of the rational soul. Since the soul is itself active and passive because of its form and matter, therefore, following the nature of the soul, the intellect has a difference of active and passive potencies. Consequently, the difference of act and potency in the human intellect originates from the form and matter of a spiritual soul, whereas the similar difference in a sense power originates from the conjunction of the soul and the body.96 Bonaventure's reason for putting active and passive potencies in the intellect, namely, that the composition of form and matter makes the soul a spiritual substance, would seem to imply some substantial independence for the soul with respect to the human body. When that reason is seen along with, and not in isolation from, his understanding of the individual man as one in nature and in person, Bonaventure cannot be said to posit any substantial independence of the soul from the body. Now, as we have shown, he teaches that a rational soul, as a spiritual substance, begins to be and to exist, according to nature and time, in and with a given human body; he also teaches that a rational soul, according to its essence, is united to and is in each part of the human body, both as its form and as its mover.'" Hence, in its natural and temporal condition, a rational soul is one substantially with a particular human body, which confines it to a here 95 Lac. cit., con. 2-4 (4.1045; ed. min., con. b-d, 4.1029). 96 "Ad maiorem autem intelligentiam est notandum quod sicut in omni natura est aliquid quo est fieri et aliquid quo est facere, sic et in omni cognitione; et cum haec sit prima divisio potentiae per activum et passivum, necesse est ista differe. Verumtamen, secundum gradus maioris et minoris simplicitatis et spiritualitatis, habent maiorem et minorem differentiam. Intellectiva namque, pro eo quod est spiritualior et abstractior, habet utramque potentiam quae respicit sufastantiam spiritualem, ita quod activa est ratione ipsius quo est et passiva ratione ipsius quod est, scilicet materiae et formae. — In potentia autem sensitiva, quae est minus spiritualis, activa potentia est ex parte anima et passiva ex organo; et ideo, quia sensus non est sine actione et passione, ideo sentire dicitur esse operatic coniuncti. Et iterum, cum activa nihi! agat sine passiva, et quando anima amittit corpus, amittit passivam respectu actus sentiendi: ideo impossibile est quod aliquo sensu utatur, sive interiori sive exterior!, quamdiu est separata" — Loc. cit., Resp. (4.1046; ed. min., 4.1030). 97 See above: pp. 120-21, 127-28.

184

CHAPTER TWO

and now in a fixed or determined existence; so a rational soul cannot have any substantial independence from such a body, with which it constitutes an individual man as one in nature and in person. Consequently, the intrinsic composition of the soul as a spiritual substance has to do with the substantial foundation of the human intellect as a power that does not depend on any part of the body in order to operate: Bonaventure refers only to the operative independence of the human intellect with respect to the bodily organs of a man's nature; but this is an independence in the order of accidental perfection, which does not imply an independence of the soul from the body in the order of substantial perfection. Indeed, if the soul had a substantial independence from the body, the soul would not then perfect the body in an organic way for the senses. But Bonaventure maintains that, as an instrument of a sense potency, a bodily organ is united to the soul not only for performing an operation, but also for constituting one (accidental) form; the organ is perfected by the soul and comes together with it as a mover in the unity of the form of the whole man, or his concrete form, and so the organ is one with the soul in the operation of his sense power.98 In Bonaventure's doctrine, therefore, the substantial union of a rational soul and a human body constitutes a man, who is one thing both in his nature and in his person. His nature is the singular principle of his personal operations, and the person himself is the one agent performing them. All the operations of a man, then, have a really natural and personal unity. Because the rational soul is both the formal part of human nature and the formal source of its personal perfection, the soul of a human person is the formal principle of his every operation. The soul functions in that way as a consequence of its union with a body. This union has to do with the perfecting and the perfectible components of a human nature. Following their substantial composition, the soul and the body work together as the moving and the movable parts of one human nature. But the soul and the body of such a nature constitute one person: depending on their unity in a personal nature, the soul and the body of a man really constitute one principle of his personal operations. When St. Bonaventure refers to the rational soul as the mover of the human body because the soul is a spiritual substance in itself, he is not alluding to a substantial action on the part of the soul with respect to a substantial reception on the part of the body. On the contrary, he is referring only to the substantial foundations of a human person's operations, which perfect him in an accidental way. Although his sensitive operations are subject to his composite nature and his intellective operations are subject only to his spiritual soul, nevertheless, whether he 98 "... dicendum quod est instrumentum quod est separatum et instrumentum sive organum unitum, non tantum ad aliquam operationem faciendam, sed ad unam formam constituendam; et hoc perficitur et convenit cum motore in unitate formae totius et operationis per consequens; et sine tali nunquam habet motor perfecte compleri propter colligantiam ad illud." — 4 Sent., 43.1.1, ad 3 (4.884; ed. min., 4.873); cf. con. 3.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

185

acts by his soul alone or by his composite nature, a human person always acts according to his proper nature, which is indivisibly personal. The different foundations of the sensitive and the intellective modes of his rational knowledge, as we shall see shortly, have to do really with the functional distinction between his spirit and his soul, or the superior and inferior portions of his substantial form." The main historical sources used by Bonaventure in his doctrine on the personal individuation of substances are those of Boethius and Richard of St. Victor. Bonaventure uses their doctrines to show that, in God, person must be said relatively and not substantively. In particular, he follows Boethius in saying that person is a hypostasis which is distinguished by the property of individuation; he follows Richard, who says that person is a thing existing through itself according to a certain mode of singular existence. But Bonaventure interprets their doctrines in his own distinctive manner. He understands Boethius to say that "person is a supposit of a rational nature"; to Bonaventure, this is the primary significance of person for Boethius because it designates a person who is created or uncreated "as a certain supposit of a substance". He understands Richard, on the other hand, to speak of person "as a certain supposit of a common nature"; from that point of view, a created or uncreated person is "a hypostasis existing through itself with a singular mode of existence in a common nature". Thus, comparing the classical definition of person by Boethius with the one given by Richard, Bonaventure finds the first definition inadequate, since it remains on the ground of person as common to a creature and to God. Consequently, that definition does not necessarily exclude the rational soul, which is "an undivided substance of a rational nature", but is not incommunicable in its "singular mode of existence", and so Bonaventure accepts the definition of person by Richard as a necessary modification of the one given by Boethius. Following this line of thought, Bonaventure understands another definition of person by Richard to be the proper one: "an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature". Though it applies primarily to God, nonetheless, Bonaventure applies the definition in a secondary, yet proper, way to a creature, thus designating a created person as "an incommunicable existence" of either an intellectual or a rational nature. With all this in mind, Bonaventure shows why, in his judgment, neither a rational soul nor the human nature of Christ can fall within the definition of person as formulated by Boethius. To be a person, a thing must not only be undivided in itself and have a rational nature, but also exist as distinct from all other things, so that it has both singularity and incommunicability in its 99 L. Veuthey finds Bonaventure positing a separate and substantial entity in the soul and in the body of man not only in regard to their essential union, but also in regard to their unity as a natural principle of operation: Si. Bonau. fikilos. chris., pp. 166-70. E. Szdzuj reverses Bonaventure's distinction between the soul as the form and the mover of the body, thus considering the soul to move the body as its form, and to perfect it because the soul is something substantial in itself: FF, 15 (1932), pp. 293-308.

186

CHAFFER TWO

existence as an entirely, or formally, complete substance. Regarding the rational soul, Bonaventure thinks that it cannot be a person, because, from its original existence in and with a human body, a rational soul has an essential and inseparable appetite to communicate in being with that body, even after death, when it is separated from the body. Bonaventure supports his stand here with the doctrine of Augustine on the more perfect condition of a soul in fulfilling, rather than in not fulfilling, its appetite for a body. This is the sole reference to Augustine in the texts of Bonaventure that we have seen on the personal individuation of substances. But that is not remarkable, since, by now, we are aware that Bonaventure is really forming a synthesis of his own and, in view of it, he selects the sources best suited to his personal thought on a given problem or question. 10° On the particular problems and questions concerning individuation and personality, Bonaventure draws up a clearly unified synthesis, which is grounded in his understanding of being and existing. These two metaphysical notions are fundamental to his thought, and they support his views on individuation and personality with respect both to God and to the creature, particularly with regard to the hypostatic union of the two in Christ. It is not suprising, then, that Bonaventure prefers the view of person offered by Richard of St. Victor. Nor is it surprising that he harmonizes, with the doctrine of Richard, both the doctrine of Boethius on personal individuation and the doctrine of Aristotle on the common nature of men. From his own viewpoint, Bonaventure can say, with Richard, that a person exists singularly and incommunicably as a supposit of the common nature man; from the same viewpoint, he can say, with Boethius, that man is a species and the whole being of the individual thing, and so a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. At the same time, Bonaventure is able to say, with Aristotle, that man is a common nature enclosing both form and matter; from his own point of view, the form and matter of man are really the consequence of the conjoining of this form and this matter as the principles of being and existing in the constitution of a man, who is one in both nature and person. Finally, following Aristotle's definition of man, Bonaventure has no difficulty in subscribing to the Aristotelean distinction of first substance from second substance; however, when applied to Christ, the significance of first substance must be restricted.101

100 There are many references to Augustine in Bonaventure's theological doctrine on the persons in the Trinity; but there are also numerous references to other historical sources, as any particular group of texts can show, e.g., 1 Sent., dd. 26-29 (1.450-519; ed. min., 1.356-414). The really significant fact shown by Bonaventure's texts here, as elsewhere, is that his own reasons for the positions he holds are far more numerous and, in many instances, evidently more important than the reasons he finds in the historical sources that he selects to support his own points of view. 101 "Item, haec est vera: Christus, secundum quod homo, est substantia; sed substantia dividitur sufficienti divisione a Philosophic per primam et secundam: aut igitur Christus est substantia prima aut secunda. Non secunda, cum non sit genus vel species: ergo prima; sed prima substantia idem est quod in-

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

187

Since person signifies a complete individual existing in an intellectual nature, St. Thomas says that the name can be applied to God and in a more excellent way than to a creature. Said of a man, for instance, person designates a complete individual of a composite nature; but, said of God, person designates a complete individual of a nature which is simple absolutely. Thus, subsisting through himself in the most simple being, a person in God subsists in the most perfect manner, for the divine simplicity does not exclude personality. A divine person is said to subsist in being, however, only according as God is understood to be under some property. For this reason, Aquinas notes, Richard of St. Victor, wanting to speak properly, says that the divine persons do not subsist, but exist: they exist as distinguished by those properties according to which one person originates from another, and under which they are not placed as subjects; so, for Richard, a divine person is an existence, but not a subsistence. Because the term individual signifies only incommunicability in God, and because substance signifies in God "to exist through itself, therefore, Aquinas maintains, Richard corrected the definition of person by Boethius, so that, applied to God, the term signifies "an incommunicable existence of the divine nature".102 Aquinas, nonetheless, sees the definition of person by Boethius to be quite proper. Although every genus contains something universal and something particular, Aquinas says, an undivided thing belongs in a special way to the genus of substance. Unlike an accident, which is individuated through its subject, a substance is individuated through itself, and so an individual or undivided substance has the special name hypostasis, or first substance. A particular and undivided thing belongs in a more perfect way to rational substances than to other substances, because an individual of a rational nature not only acts through itself, as all singular things do, but also has dominion

dividuum: ergo etc." — 3 Sent., 10.1.3, 5 (3.230; ed. mm., 3.221); cf. Aristotle, Categonae, c. 5 (2al 1-33). The argument falls among those, of which Bonaventure says: "... procedunt de individuo secundum quod individuum dicitur quod de uno solo dicitur ... et hoc modo individuum dicitur quod est indivisum in se. Et sic absque dubio Christus, secundum quod est homo, est individuum." Thus, applied to Christ, first substance does not signify: "... individuum quod est ab aliis divisum et subsistit in se et per se"; because: "hoc modo accipiendo individuum, humana natura in Christo non est individuum. Est enim unita Verbo increato sicut suo supposito." — Loc. cit., in Resp. (3.231; ed. min., 3.222-23). 102 1 Sent., 23.1.2 (1.558-60); ST, la, 29.3, Resp., ad 4 (1.194b-95b): cf. 1 Sent., 34.1.1, ad 3 (1.790); ST, la, 29.4, ad 3 (1.197b); DPD, 9.2, ad 11 (2.229), 9.3, Resp., ad 4 & 6 (2.230). Aquinas, like Bonaventure, thinks that the definition of person given by the masters is not really different from that of Boethius: "Sciendum tamen est, quod de persona dantur aliae definitiones. Una est Richardi, IV De Trinit., cap. xviii, col. 941, qui corrigens definitionem Boetii secundum ilium modum quo persona dicitur in Deo, sic definit personam: 'Persona est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia', quia rationale et individuum et substantia non proprie competunt in divinis quantum ad communem usum nominum. Alia datur a Magistris sic: 'Persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente': et quasi in idem redit: nisi quod haec sumitur per comparationem ad proprietatem distinguentem et cui substat persona, el ilia Boetii per comparationem ad naturam, ad quorum utrumque persona comparationem habet." — 1 Sent., 23.1.1, ad 8 (1.606).

188

CHAPTER TWO

over its own actions. Such an individual substance, therefore, is given the special name person, which signifies "an undivided substance of a rational nature." As "an undivided substance", person signifies an individual thing, or something singular, in the genus of substance; this excludes from person both accidents and second substances. As an individual of "a rational nature", person signifies the specific difference with respect to other particular things, thus excluding riot only inanimate natures, but also plants and animals. l03 The definition of person by Boethius, as accepted by Aquinas, looks to the common ground of singularity in persons rather than to this or to that person. The definition, therefore, follows Aristotle's mode of defining first substance. 104 Explaining the definition in his own way, though influenced by Richard of St. Victor, Aquinas points out that three things are to be considered in a particular substance. The first is the nature of the genus and the species existing in a singular thing. The second is the mode of existing of such a nature, for the nature of a genus and a species exists in a singular substance as proper to this individual thing, and not as common to many things. The third thing to be considered is the principle causing such a mode of existing. Looking at all three, Aquinas says that, just as a nature taken in itself is common, so also is a mode of existing: the nature of man exists only in things that are individuated by something singular, for there is no man which is not some man. The principle of such a mode of existing is the principle of individuation, which is not common; rather, it is different in this man and in that man, since one singular man is individuated by this matter and another by that matter. Now, just as man or animal is common and definable as signifying a nature, so is hypostasis or person common and definable as signifying a nature with a determinate mode of existing. But a name that includes in its significance the determinate principle of individuation is neither common nor definable, such as Plato and Socrates. Hence, for Aquinas, both singularity and a nature with a determinate mode of existing are common to all individual substances. From this point of view, he says that hypostasis signifies a nature as individuated in the genus of substance, whereas person signifies a rational nature under such a determinate mode of existing; nevertheless, neither hypostasis nor person signifies the singularity or the individuation of the thing, but the concrete thing itself.105 In the judgment of Aquinas, then, hypostasis designates a substance with a determinate mode of existing, and person designates a rational substance which is a hypostasis. The term hypostasis, as explained by Boethius, means chiefly an individual thing of a substance, or simply a first substance. According to Aquinas, this is something which is complete, distinct and in103 ST, la, 29.1, Resp. (1.192a); DPD, 9.2, Resp. (2.228); cf. 1 Sent., 25.1.1, Sol. & ad 4 (1.601, 60405). 104 57", la, 29.1, ad 1 (1.192a); cf. Aristotle, Categoriae, c. 5 (2all-18). 105 DPD, 9.2, ad 1-2 (2.228); cf. ad 6.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

189

communicable in the nature of substance. Consequently, a divine hypostasis is something that, subsisting through itself, is both distinct and incommunicable. Since only that which is relative is distinct among the divine persons, and since the divine essence is really what God is, therefore, a distinguishing relation is really what is distinct in God. Because such a relation is the same as the divine essence, moreover, what is distinct by thac relation is the same as what is subsistent in the divine essence, and this, Aquinas says, is the signification of hypostasis in the doctrine of Boethius. Giving his own meaning of the term, however, St. Thomas holds that, in God, hypostasis signifies a relation as distinct through the mode of a subsistent thing in the divine nature. Accordingly, not including the determinate ground of the distinction, the term is somewhat different from person, which looks to dignity; therefore, person signifies the relation as a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature. 106 How does St. Thomas handle the question, concerning God: "Whether 'person' signifies substance?" 107 There are some things, Aquinas says, that fall within a less common signification of a term, but not within its more common signification. For example: rational is included within the signification of man, but not of animal, so that, seeking the signification of animal, we do not seek the signification of the animal which is man. Likewise, seeking the signification of person as a common name, we do not seek the signification of a divine person. As a common name, person signifies "an undivided substance of a rational nature"; however, what is undivided is indistinct in itself, but distinct from other things. In any nature, therefore, person signifies what is distinct in it. Thus, in human nature, person signifies these bones, this flesh and this soul, for they are the principles individuating man. Although those principles do not belong to the signification of person, they do belong to the signification of a human person. Now, among the divine persons, distinction designates relations of origin; however, such relations are the divine essence itself, and so a relation in God is a subsistent relation. Consequently, in God person designates a relation as subsisting, or a relation by way of the substance, which is the hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature. In that way, person designates a relation directly and the divine essence indirectly; nevertheless, it does not designate the relation, as a relation, but as it is signified by way of a hypostasis. In a similar manner, and because the essence of God is the same as the hypostasis, person signifies the divine essence directly and a relation indirectly. In short, hypostasis is signified as a distinct relation in God, and that relation, as a relation, falls within the meaning of person indirectly. 108 106 I Sent., 26.1.1, Sol. (1.622-23); of. DPD, 9.3, ad 1 (2.230). 107 He treats the question, each time that he handles it, at considerable length and, though he prefers the support of Boethius, he outlines, on each occasion, many different positions on the question. It will be sufficient, for our purposes, to show his own position on the question. 108 ST, la, 29.4, sc & Resp. "Ad evidentiam ... in oblique." (1.196a-97a); cf. Boethius, De Trinit., c. 6

190

CHAPTER TWO

Aquinas clarifies his doctrine by differentiating between the formal and the material signification of a name. Taken formally, a name has a principal meaning: man means principally a composite of body and rational soul. Taken materially, a name signifies something in which the formal ground of the term is preserved: man signifies something having parts (e.g., heart and brain) without which there cannot be a body animated by a rational soul. Thus, signifying "an undivided substance of a rational nature", person means formally a distinct subsistent in human nature, or in the divine nature. Taken in that way, the name refers to a substance which is incommunicable and distinct from other individual substances, whether person is said of God or of a man, or even of an angel. A distinct subsistent in human nature refers to something individuated by an individual matter and diverse from other such things; so this has to be signified materially whenever person is said of a man. But, in the divine nature, a distinct and incommunicable subsistent can refer only to a relation, because everything else in God is common and indistinct. Since a divine relation is really the same as God's essence, therefore, as Godhead and God are the same, a relation and the property through which it is referred are the same, and so a relation is identical with a distinct subsistent in the divine nature. Consequently, taken formally, person signifies a distinct subsistent; however, taken materially, the name signifies a relation, or what is relative in God. This is why Aquinas says that person signifies a relation by way of the substance, and that the signified relation is included indirectly in person. According to its formal significance, the name refers to the divine substance as a hypostasis and not as an essence. By its material significance, the name refers to what is relative, such as Father, and not to the relation, as a relation, namely, Fatherhood.109 The above texts of Aquinas contain nearly all the essential elements of his philosophical thought on the meaning of person. That thought manifests a combination of the doctrines of Boethius and Richard of St. Victor, but Aquinas develops their doctrines in a distinctive manner. To show this, we shall summarize his philosophical thinking on the significance of person. Taking the term as a common name signifying a nature with a determinate mode of existing. Aquinas applies it in different, yet proper, ways to a divine person and to a human person. In both instances, he distinguishes (PL 64.1254). Note arg. 1 & ad 1, where Aquinas interprets, according to his own thought, the doctrine of Augustine on person in God. See also: 1 Sent., 23.1.3, Sol. "Et ideo ...", arg. 1 & ad 1 (1.560-65). On the significance of a relation by way of the divine substance, note: "... dicendum, quod hypostasis, ut dictum est, significat in divinis relationem per modum substantiae: quia sicut propter simplii itatem, idem est in Deo essentia et ens: ita etiam idem est in eo relatio distinguens et distinctum relatione; sed differunt secundum modum significandi, qui fundatur in re, quia utrumque nomen habet veram significationem suam in Deo; et ideo differunt etiam quantum ad modum supponendi, quia supposito uno non supponitur aliud. Sicut enirn dicimus quod Deus generat et deltas non general: ita dicimus quod hypostasis distinguitur et relatio distinguit." — 1 Sent, 26.1.1, ad 5 (1.624-25). 109 DPD, 9.4. Resp. "Sed sciendum ..." (2.232-33); cf. ad 16-18. See also: 1 Sent, 34.1.1, Sol. (1.78889).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

191

person from hypostasis. The term hypostasis, as understood by Boethius, signifies an individual substance, or a first substance. Aquinas, interpreting Boethius, takes hypostasis to mean a nature which is individuated through itself, thus excluding accidents, which are individuated through their subjects. A hypostasis is something complete, distinct and incommunicable in the nature of substance; so, subsisting through itself, it is an individual substance in which a common nature has an individuated, or a singular, mode of existing. Such a mode of existing, which is caused by a principle of individuation, distinguishes one hypostasis from another. But a hypostasis does not signify the ground of distinction in rational substances; so the name person is used to signify an individual substance in which a common and rational nature has an individuated, or a singular, mode of existing. Applying person in that way to God, Aquinas takes the divine essence as a common intellectual nature with distinct and incommunicable modes of existing in the divine relations. Thus, identical in the divine nature, those relations are understood to subsist through themselves, and they are distinct from one another through their origins; therefore, as properly incommunicable, a subsisting relation in God is a complete individual existing in the divine nature. Consequently, taken formally, person signifies a distinct and incommunicable subsistent in the divine nature; taken materially, the name signifies a divine relation as something relative. With Boethius, then, Aquinas can say that "person is an undivided substance of a rational nature"; and, with Richard of St. Victor, he can say that "person is an incommunicable existence of the divine nature". Although Aquinas approaches the questions on the divine persons in a manner evidently different from the one chosen by Bonaventure, nonetheless, they do not differ in any notable way in their particular views on those questions. Their understanding of person as applied to God is quite similar, even though it is expressed in different ways. Bonaventure speaks of person as signifying something relative according to the divine substance. Aquinas speaks of person as something relative by way of the divine substance. The two theologians differ, nevertheless, in their applications of person to creatures. They differ here according to their interpretations of person as signifying a mode of existing. To show that, we must first see how Aquinas accounts for the personal individuation of man. We have seen, thus far, that a human person, for Aquinas, exists through himself as a complete individual of the composite nature man. Consisting in human body and rational soul, man is a common nature existing in a singular way in a human person; he is individuated in that nature by this matter, which is an individual matter. A human person, then, is a complete thing through himself as a hypostasis of human nature. In other words, he is a distinct and incommunicable individual subsisting in human nature, and so he exists with this rational soul, this flesh and these bones. Since they do not fall within the common species, and since an individual matter along with its individuating accidents are also outside the species, therefore,

192

CHAPTER TWO

in every individual man, the supposit is other than the nature. The supposit is the whole thing, of which the nature, or species, is the formal part and the individual matter is the material part. In things not composed of form and matter, however, there is no difference between the nature and the supposit, because such things are simple forms individuated through themselves, and so they are subsisting supposits.no Those subsisting supposits, apart from God, are intelligent forms or created spirits. Though they are simple in their natures, they are nonetheless composite beings. The substance of a created spirit is composed with being, as a potency with its proper act; the nature of such a creature is that which it is, and its being is that by which it subsists. In this respect, even,' created spirit differs from God, because, in God, being and substance are the same: God is subsistent being. Although creatures differ according to genus and species, nevertheless, Aquinas says, their differences are due fundamentally to being, which is diverse in diverse things. Thus, the fundamental difference between created spirits looks to their diverse acts of being, and those acts are limited according to the diverse capacities of the forms that, as potencies, receive them. Since there are no material principles individuating spiritual forms, they are individuated through themselves and, as a consequence, each form is a single species subsisting through itself. The distinction of one such form from another follows the limitation of being by this or that form. The greatest limitation of being is found in the human soul, which is quite distinct from every other created spirit, because the soul is individuated by matter and does not constitute a whole species in itself. As an intelligent substance, the soul has a possible intellect which is related to intelligible forms as prime matter is related to sensible forms. Hence, the human soul is made so close to material things that a material thing is drawn to share in the being of the soul itself. As a consequence, from the union of the soul and body, one being results in one composite thing, even though that being belongs properly to the soul. The individuation of the soul begins on the occasion of its union with the body: a human soul acquires an individuated being only in that body of which it is the act. But a soul does not lose its being on the death of the body; the soul has being absolutely, since it acquires an individuated being as the form of this body, and that being remains always individuated. As the act of a composite substance, however, the being of the 110 ST, la, 3.3, Resp. (I.17b-18a). Cf. 1 Sent., 25.1.1, ad 3 (1.603-04); SCG, 1.21 (2.31). Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in saying both that the human species is the form of the whole individual man and that it results in him from the conjunction of his soul and body: St. Thomas, 3 Sent., 2,1.3, qa. 3 (3.65-66); ST, 3a, 2.5, Resp. (4.2429b). They also concur in teaching that the composite nature of soul and body is the proper principle of a man's sense operations, whereas his soul alone is the proper principle of his intellectual operations: St. Thomas, SCG, 2.57 (2.182-84). For Aquinas, however, this also means that no rational soul alone can be man, because that would eliminate matter from the human species, thus reducing it to form only; since an individual man is composed of this soul, this flesh and these bones, man must be a composite of soul, flesh and bones: ST, la, 75.4, Resp. (1.442b).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

193

human soul is limited by a nature which is individuated by an individual matter, and this introduces a multiplicity into the one species."1 For Aquinas, therefore, individuation has a twofold principle. In the order of nature, an angel is individuated by an immaterial form, which is a subsisting species; but a human soul is individuated by a proper body, so that, subsisting in them, a man is one individual subsisting in the nature of the human species. In the order of being, an angel subsists by an act of being, which is individuated by the potency of an immaterial nature; but the being of a human soul is individuated by the body in which it originates, and so an individual man subsists in a composite nature by the being of his soul. When the act of subsisting and the individuated being are both taken together with a rational nature, then, according to Aquinas, the three constituents of personality are present in either an angel or a man, though more nobly in an angel than in a man. An angel subsists in a simple nature having neither matter nor parts; so, with a simple intellect, an angel understands without discursive reasoning. The nature of an angel, moreover, is determined in itself and cannot be determined as a form in something else; therefore, not determined by any other principle, an angel is incommunicable in its being. A man subsists in the parts of his composite nature; so, acquiring knowledge by way of his senses, a man understands by discursive reasoning. Since his rational soul has a foundation in matter, a man has incommunicability in being because his nature is determined, or individuated, by matter, and thus he has a determinate being. In short, as a person, a man is a hypostasis, or a subsistent individual, which is both distinct by its rational nature and incommunicable by its individuated being.l!2 There is an obvious difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure in their accounts of the constitution of a created person. The difference has to do fundamentally with their separate views of the creature, as a creature. To Bonaventure, every creature has existing from matter and being from form: matter and form are so united in an act of being that a singular, or individuated, substance results; the substance is this chiefly through the 111 De ente, cc. 4-5 (R-G. pp. 34.4.-42); Marietti, cc. 5-6. Cf. 2 Seat, 3.1.3, Sol. "Unde dico ..." (2.9394); DPD, 9.3, ad 5 (2.230). 112 2 Sent, 3.1.2, sc & Sol., ad 1 (2.90-91). Cf. 1 Sent., 25.1.1, ad 4 (1.604); DPD. 9.2, ad 10 (2.229). One of the consequences of the position of Aquinas on the constitution of a person is that no rational soul, either in itself or as separated from the body, can be a person. Aquinas concurs here with Bonaventure and partly for the same reasons: a person is a whole and complete thing, but a human soul is a part of a whole and, therefore, incomplete of itself; by its nature, the soul is the form of a body, and so, retaining its nature as such a form, a separated soul cannot be a person. Aquinas, however, has another reason: if the soul were a complete being in itself, as Plato says, the body would be united to it accidentally, so that, even in this life, the total personality of a man would be in his soul: but the soul and the body, as Aristotle shows, constitute one thing through itself, thus the soul is not a complete nature in itself. While a separated soul is called hoc illiquid, because it subsists through itself, it is not properly called a substance, since it remains a part of human nature. — 3 Sent., 5.3.2 (3.206-07); ST, la, 29,1, ad 5 (1.193a), 75.4, arg. 2 & ad 2 (1.442b-43a); DPD, 9.2, ad 14 (2.229).

194

CHAPTER TWO

existing of the matter, and it is something chiefly through the being of the form. A human person, for example, is this man mainly through the existing of his body, and he is someone mainly through the being of his soul. To Aquinas, a spiritual creature has an immaterial form individuated through itself and subsisting by a proper act of being. There is matter in human nature, though not in the rational soul; however, matter is not a principle of existing, but a potency for form in the order of nature. The being of human nature belongs properly to the soul, which has its being in an individuated way because of the individual matter of a human body. Hence, a human person is this man through his individual body, and he is this person because he subsists in human nature by the individuated being of his rational soul. There are, of course, some points of similarity between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the constitution of a human person. For both theologians, a human person is a singular thing of a rational nature, and he is distinct by his proper personality from other individuals of the same nature; in the metaphysical order, a human person is incommunicable in the being of his own nature, because he is a hypostasis subsisting through himself, or in a properly individual manner. 113 The term hypostasis, for Bonaventure, signifies the foundation of the whole natural existence of a human person. Taken in abstraction from his existence, the person is said to be an individual because he is undivided in himself, and he is said to be a supposit because of the nature which is subject to him. Considered concretely, or according to his existence, the person is a hypostasis and, as such, he is also said to be an individual and a supposit: as an individual, he is divided from other things, and he subsists both in himself and through himself; as a supposit, he is that in which the whole being of a nature is realized substantially. For Bonaventure, then, a human person is a hypostasis of a rational nature with incommunicability in being and distinct modes of existing. For Aquinas, the term hypostasis signifies a singular substance individuated through itself; a human persons adds to that an individual of a rational nature. As a hypostasis, the person is an individual substance in which human nature has a singular mode of existing, and this is caused by his principles of individuation: his proper body and his proper being. As such an individual, the person is a supposit subsisting through himself and by his being, but in a composite and existing nature. Thus, a human person is a distinct subsistent in a common nature, and he is incommunicable in the being of his own soul, so that, as a hypostasis, he exists through himself because of the existing of his rational nature. Two questions arise from these apparently similar and dissimilar views regarding the human person: What precisely does Aquinas mean by existing? How does his understanding of the term compare with that of Bonaventure? To answer those questions, we must consider some texts of Aquinas on the 113 There is another point of similarity to Bonaventure in the doctrine of Aquinas, who holds that, in any man, the union of a soul and a body constitutes a unity of both nature and person; but, in Christ, a divine person subsists at once in both the divine nature and a human nature: ST, 3a, 2.1, ad 2 (4.2425a).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

195

human nature of Christ, for it is in regard to Christ that he speaks of a human person as existing through himself. 114 Speaking of the hypostatic union, Aquinas denies that Christ, though He is only one person, can be called two things of nature, or two hypostases, or two supposits. A thing of nature (res naturae) is a complete and subsistent thing; so, imposed on a particular thing, the name signifies the thing through a relation to a common nature (Peter through an individuation of man). Based on that imposition, the name supposit is imposed on the particular thing to signify both the thing itself and its relation to the common nature: the name signifies the thing as exceeded by the common nature (Peter as having human nature); it signifies the relation inasmuch as the thing subsists in the common nature (the individuation of Peter as subsisting in human nature). In other words, thing of nature is a name of first imposition, and it is said of the whole thing; supposit is a name of second imposition, and it is said of the thing according to its individuality. Since accidents follow a nature, every name designating a particular thing according to a relation to properties also designates the thing through a relation to a common nature. Now this designation can come about either by a name of first imposition or a name of second imposition. Thus, of first imposition, hypostasis commonly designates a particular thing in all substances, but person in rational substances; of second imposition, individual designates the thing as undivided in itself, but singular as divided from other particular things. Some names of second imposition can signify particular things in any genus, and so they can be said of accidents, which are not complete things, nor do they subsist through themselves. Such names, Aquinas says, can be applied to Christ, so that He can be said to be either an individual man or a singular man according to His human nature. The name supposit, however, and names of first imposition, can signify particular things only in the genus of substance. Since it is proper to a substance that it subsist through itself, all those names are said only of complete things subsisting through themselves. But it is not possible for one complete thing to be another complete thing, because each of them subsists through itself. Now Christ subsists through Himself as a divine person: therefore, it is not possible for His human nature also to subsist through itself. Consequently, the composition of soul and body in Christ does not constitute a complete, or subsistent, thing that, as a man, can be designated a thing of nature, or a supposit, or a hypostasis. The human nature of Christ is that in which a divine person subsists. Although it is the human 114 For example: "Dicendum quod ex hac ratione moti videntur illi qui negaverunt unionem animae et corporis in Christo; ne per hoc scilicet cogerentur personam novam aut hypostasim in Christo inducere, quia videbant quod in puris hominibus ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur persona. Sed hoc- ideo in puris hominibus accidit quia anima et corpus sic in eis coniunguntur ut per se existant. Sed in Christo uniuntur ad invicem ut adiuncta atteri principaliori quod subsistit in natura ex eis composita. Et propter hoc ex unione animae et corporis in Christo non constituitur nova hypostasis seu persona, sed advenit ipsum coniunctum personae seu hypostasi praeexistenti." — ST, 3a, 2.5, ad 1 (4.2429).

196

CHAPTER TWO

nature of that person, nevertheless, He is not a person because of His human nature; rather, it is united to Him in His divine person."5 In view of these precisions, we can say that, for Aquinas, the terms hypostasis, supposit and thing of nature designate a particular thing which is a whole and complete subsistent in a common nature: as a whole and complete thing, it is something individual and singular; as a subsistent thing, it is a substance subsisting through itself. When the common nature in which such a thing subsists is a rational nature, the whole and complete thing is then designated by the term person. Thus, a human person is a whole and complete thing of the rational nature man. As a hypostasis, or supposit, a human person is an individual and a singular man. The person is this man and, as such, he is a whole and complete thing. He is all that because, as a distinct subsistent, he has all at once both the essential principles of the whole nature man and the individuating properties of a complete human nature. In the order of nature, then, a human person consists not only of this soul, this flesh and these bones, but also of his proper accidents. As a name of second imposition, supposit designates the person who is an individual and singular thing to which the common nature man is subject; as a name of first imposition, hypostasis designates the person who is the thing to which all the natural properties and operations are subject, and thus person signifies a particular hypostasis which acts through itself, or a whole and complete thing of a rational nature. The human nature of Christ, however, does not fall within the designation of those terms. The properties and actions of His human nature, along with the common nature man, are subject in Him to a divine person, who is the sole hypostasis and supposit there."6 In the metaphysical order, furthermore, a particular man is a subsistent thing having complete being. Although the divine Word, on assuming a human nature, has two different reasons for subsisting, nevertheless, because He subsists in the complete being of the divine nature, the person of Christ is one subsistent in two natures. 117 As a consequence, the human nature of Christ is not a whole composite being. To be a whole, a composite being must have being from its parts, and that being must belong to all of those parts, since they have being only in the whole composite. Now, according to Aquinas, the parts of Christ's human nature do not have being because of that nature: on the contrary, the being of the divine person is the one being of Christ; therefore, having no being from the union of His soul and body, the human nature of Christ is not complete through itself, and so, unlike the human nature of any other man, it is not com115 3 Sent., 6.1.1, sc & Sol. 1 (3.224-26); cf. De unime Verbi incarnati, a. 2, Resp. "... vel persona" (2.426-27); 1 Sent., 26.1.1, ad 3 (1.623-24). 116 3 Sent, 5.1.3, Resp. ad 3 (3.196-97); De unione Verbi incarnati, a. 1, Resp. "... individua substantial' (2.422); 57", 3a, 2.2, Resp. (4.2425b-26a), 2.3, Resp. ad 2-3 (4.2427a-28b). See also: 3 Sent., 10.1.2 (3.33640). 117 3 Sent., 6.1.2 (3.229-31); .ST. 3a. 2.4 (4.2429a-30b): cf. 3.4 (4.2450b-51b).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

197

posed as a person. Since a person has being according to his nature, being belongs at once to both the subsisting person and the nature in which he subsists. But the being of Christ is the one being of the subsisting person; so, not resulting from the union of His human nature with the divine nature, His being remains one, even though Christ is two according to nature." 8 In showing why Christ's human nature is neither whole nor complete, Aquinas also indicates that a human person must be a whole and complete thing both of nature and in being. It is precisely the combination of wholeness and completion, both of nature and in being, that Aquinas signifies by the term existing. In his judgment, a nature has being only in its supposit: human nature can have being only in a man; therefore, anything existing through itself in the genus of substance is a supposit or hypostasis. "9 A particular thing in the in the genus of substance, then, is not enough to be a supposit or hypostasis. The thing must also be perfect and subsistent in itself. 120 The human nature of Christ is neither perfect nor subsistent in itself, since it has being only in the person of the incarnate Word. While united to the Word, the human nature of Christ, because it does not exist according to itself, does not have a proper hypostasis or supposit beyond the person of the Word. If that nature were separated from the Word, Aquinas says, it would have not only a proper hypostasis or supposit, but also a proper person, for it would then exist through itself. 121 Although the assemblage of accidents proves sufficiently that Christ's human nature is individuated, nonetheless, because it does not exist through itself, it is not a hypostasis or a supposit. If Christ were to exist through Himself because He is composed from His soul and body, the human nature united to the divine Word, would constitute a supposit and hypostasis; but, Aquinas insists, that is not so in Christ. 122 Because His human nature does not subsist

1 1 8 3 Sent., 6.2:3, Resp. (3.241-42); De unions Verbi incarnati, a. 1, ad 10-11 (2.425). For a more detailed exposition of the one only esse in Christ see: 3 Sent., 6.2.2 (3.237-40); ST, 3a, 17.2 (4.2541b-42b); De urn/me Verbi incarnati, a. 4 (2.432). 119 "Dicendum quod nulla natura habet esse nisi in supposito suo. Non enim humanitas esse potest nisi in homine. Unde quicquid est in genere substantiae per se existens, rationem hypostasis vel suppositi habet."—Sent.. 2.2.3, qa. 3, Resp. (3.85). 120 "... dicendum quod ad rationem hypostasis vel suppositi non sufficit quod aliquid sit particulare in genere substantiae; sed ulterius requiritur quod sit perfectum et in se subsistens ..." — De unione Verhi incarnati, a. 2, ad 3 (2.428). 121 "... dicendum quod humana natura quamdiu est Verbo unita, quia non secundum se existit, non habet proprium suppositu.-n vel hypostasim praeter personam Verbi. Sed si separatur a Verbo, haberet non solum propriam hypostasim aut suppositum, sed etiam propriam personam; quia iam per se existeret. — Lac. at., ad 10. 122 "... dicendum quod propriorum accidentium aggregatio sufficenter probat individuationem humanae naturae in Christo; non autem quod habeat rationem suppositi vel hypostasis, quia non per se existit." — Lot. cit., ad 14: "... dicendum quod anima et corpus unita constituunt suppositum et hypostasim, si per se existat quod ex utroque componitur; quod in proposito non contingit." — Ei>. lot., ad 17 (2.428-29); cf. arg. 17 (2.426).

198

CHAPTER TWO

separately through itself, but exists in the hypostasis of the divine Word, that nature can be called an individual, or a particular, or a singular thing; nevertheless, it cannot be called either a hypostasis or a supposit, just as it cannot be called a person. I23 In short, the perfection of personality, as understood by Aquinas, involves such a fulness of nature and being that the name person signifies "that which exists through itself, and so it excludes whatever exists in another, for "existing though itself is opposed to notexisting through itself." 124 The term existing, therefore, has both similar and dissimilar meanings in the doctrines of Aquinas and Bonaventure. The term is used by both theologians to signify a condition in being. Said of God, for instance, existing designates a person as standing-out, with respect to the other persons, in the one divine being. From that point of view, the significance of the term for the two theologians is quite similar. Said of creatures, however, and particularly of a created person, existing has different significations for Aquinas and Bonaventure. To Aquinas, the term designates the ultimate perfection of a creature both according to nature and in being. As a whole and complete thing of nature and in being, a first substance stands-out as subsisting through itself in a common nature and by a proper act of being. That sort of thing, especially a human person, is said to-exist through itself. A second substance stands-out as having a singular existing in a first substance: the species man exists in a singular way in a particular man, so that, in him, it stands-out incommunicably with respect to other men and, with them, it stands-out with respect to other things that are not men. An accident is also said to-exist, though not through itself; rather, existing through the individual substance in which it has being, an accident stands-out as a perfection of that substance as a self-subsistent thing. Thus, for Aquinas, existing is the mark of subsistent perfection of an individual thing, which is both whole and complete in its nature and in its being. To Bonaventure, the term existing signifies the material condition of a creature in being. His signification, therefore, looks to the initial or fundamental coming into 123 "Sic igitur, quia huniana natura in Christo non per se separatim subsistit, sed existit in alio, id est in hypostasi Verbi Dei ... ideo hurnana natura in Christo potest quidem dici individuum aliquod vel particulare vel singulare. non tamen potest dici vel hypostasis vel suppositum sicut nee persona.'1 —Loc. cit., Resp. in finem (2.427). 124 "Dicendum quod personalitas intantum pertinet ad dignitatem alicuius rei perfecionem, inquantum ad dignitatem alicuius rei et perfectionem cius pertinet quod per se existat quod in nomine personae intelligitur. Dignius autem est alicui quod existat in aliquo se digniori, quam quod existat per se. Et ideo ex hoc ipso humana natura dignior est in Christo quam in nobis, quia in nobis quasi per se existens propriam personalitatem habet, in Christo autem existit in persona Verbi." — ST, 3a, 2.2, ad 2 (4.2426ab). "Sciendum est tamen quod non quodhbet individuum in genere substantiae etiam in rational! natura habet rationem personae, sed solum illud quod per se existit, non autem quod existit in alio perfectioni ..." — Loc. fit., ad 3. "... opposita non possunt venficari de eodem. Sed esse per se et esse ad aliud sunt opposita. Si ergo quod significatur nomine personae est substantia, quae est ens per se, impossible est quod sit ad aliquid." — DPD, 9.4, arg. 12 (2.231). "... dicendum, quod per se existens opponitur ad non per se existens, non autem ei quod est ad aliud." — l.oc. cit, ad 12 (2.233).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

199

being of a created substance, whether spiritual or corporeal. Every created substance stands-out originally in being through a material principle. Since this is the substantial condition of a created person, the terminal perfection of a personal substance cannot be designated simply by existing. Rather, completed as a whole thing in the being of one nature, a personal substance has perfection of existence (existentia), and that expresses both an indivisible and an incommunicable union of being and existing. Thus, as a perfect man, a human person has a singular mode of existence through himself, because he is a whole and complete thing in the being and existing of his rational nature. Superior and Inferior Parts of Human Reason St. Bonaventure, as we have seen, considers the rational soul to be a spiritual creature. The soul has a spiritual nature because it is free from corporeal matter; therefore, having a simple essence, it has no quantitative parts. As the form of a human body, however, the spiritual soul has a superior part, or spirit, and an inferior part, or soul. The spirit is closer to God than the soul, which is the source of life for the body. Bonaventure's distinction between spirit and soul has to do also with his distinction between the superior and the inferior parts of human reason. Our present task is to show that, for Bonaventure, the spirit and the soul of a man are really two different ways of regarding one and the same substantial source of his rational knowledge. 125 Speaking of the human soul as the principle of reason, Bonaventure differentiates between reason as reason and reason as nature. In the first instance, reason refers to the power of deliberation in the soul. From that point of view, reason does not always act in conjunction with the body: a man may deliberately rejoice by his reason while suffering in his body; this is possible because the deliberation of reason does not depend on a bodily organ. In the second instance, or reason as nature, reason refers to the human soul itself. As the natural perfection of the body, the soul has a natural appetite and inclination for conjunction with it. Since the rational soul is the natural perfection of the human body, it is perfected by the soul not only according to sense potencies, but also according to both the whole essence of the soul and the whole of its potencies.126 Within this context, Bonaventure denies that the superior part of reason is given that name only

125 The superior and inferior parts of the spiritual soul are also called its two faces: the one turns toward the soul itself, and beyond it to God; the other turns toward the body, and beyond it to bodily things: BreviL, 5.4 "Rursus, quoniam ... et obedientia." (5.256; ed, min., nn. 4-5, 5.107-08). Consult: J. Rohmer, "Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de Tame", AHDLM, 2 (1927), pp. 73-77, For a historical survey of the doctrine in the Middle Ages see: R W. Mulligan, "Ratio Superior and Ratio Inferior. The Historical Background", NSC, 29 (1955), pp. 1-32. 126 3 Sent, 16.2.1, Resp. ad 1 (3.354; ed. nun., 3.347-48).

200

CHAPTER TWO

because it looks to things superior to the human body. The superior part of reason, he says, rules the inferior part. Listening to reason in some way, all the potencies of the soul are ruled and commanded by the superior part of reason; so, by way of nature, it is connected to all the other potencies and, as a principle of perfection, is bound to the human body. This portion of reason is called superior from its regard for superior things; but that has to do with its principal act, which does not exclude its turning upon inferior things or its connexion with them. The superior portion of reason deliberates and decides about those things that belong to the domain of the soul, and so the superior reason controls the inferior powers of the human soul. 137 The superior portion of reason, then, is not separated from its inferior portion. Their distinction involves only a difference of act originating from the same spiritual soul. The superior and inferior portions of human reason, therefore, are not diverse potencies of the soul. Bonaventure holds this position with the combined support of Augustine and Aristotle. According to Augustine, the superior and inferior parts of reason are two functions of the one human mind; he also says that the uncreated light is referred to creatures as the light of the sun is referred to colours. Now, Bonaventure argues, since we see both light and colours by the same sensitive potency, and since the intellect, which is not held down by the body, has a much wider range than sight, therefore, by one and the same potency, the human soul can turn toward the eternal light and toward temporal things. Aristotle shows, moreover, that the human soul is all things in some way according to its intellect. To Bonaventure, this implies that the soul naturally knows all things by its intellective potency, which is one; when it is called a superior reason and an inferior reason, the intellect is not said to be diverse potencies. 128 Thus, for Bonaventure, the division of human reason into a superior part and an inferior part does not imply that the intellect has two diverse members, or two diverse potencies. The difference between the two parts of reason concerns dispositions and functions of the same power, which is 127 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod ratio superior non dicitur, nisi in quantum convertitur ad superiora, dicenduin quod hoc non est verum, pro eo quod ad superiorem portionem rationis special regere inferiorem el penes ipsam residet regimen et imperium respectu omnium potentiarum animae, quae sunt aliquo modo rationi obaudibiles; et ita per modum naturae colligatur potentiis aliis et ipsi corpori humano tamquam perfectibili; et ideo pati habet, corpore palienle. Quod aulem dicilur ratio superior altenditur secundum aspectum ad superiora, hoc dicitur quantum ad eius principalem actum, non quod excluditur conversio et colligantia ipsius ad inferiora." — 3 Sent., 16.2.2, ad 6 (3.357; ed. min., 3.351); cf. 2 Sent, 24.1.1, ad 3. (2.575; ed. mm, 2.595), "... quod superior portio rationis habet converti ad superiora, dicendum quod non solum actus eius est ad superna, sed etiam aclus eius discernere et sententiare de his quae fiunt in regno animae el compescere vires inleriores; el ideo, cum non compescil, imputatur sibi." — 2 Sent., 24.2.2.2, ad 3 (2.582; ed. min., 2.603); cf. 24.2.1.1, sc 4-5 (2.574; ed. min., sc d-e, 2.594). 128 2 Sent., 24.1.2.2, sc 1-4 (2.563-64; ed. mm., sc a-d, 2.581-82). St. Augustine, De Trinit., 12.4.4 (PL 42.1000), Soli/tx/., 1.8.15 (PL 32.877); Arislolle, De anima, 3.8 (431b20-23).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

201

essentially one. According to its dispositions, reason is both strong and weak: because of its strength, reason is likened to a man and, because of its weakness, it is likened to a woman. Such a diversity, Bonaventure says, does not originate from a diversity of nature in human reason, but from a diverse comparison of it to different objects. While turned toward superior things, reason is cleansed, illumined and perfected; it is fortified and invigorated in good, because it looks upon the eternal laws of God and the immutability of His power and equity. While turned toward bodily things, which are inferior to the soul, reason is withdrawn in some way from higher things, and so it is said to be effeminate. But the two dispositions do not diversify the nature of human reason; they are, rather, the source of its superior and inferior functions. Because the inferior disposition originates from the superior disposition, however, and because they are conjoined, therefore, Bonaventure observes, they are rightly likened to a man and a woman, so that they are said to be wedded to each other. According to its functions, on the other hand, human reason has a part which rules and a part which is ruled. From this point of view, they are differentiated into superior and inferior parts. The superior part, since it is strong and intelligent, consults the divine will. The inferior part, since it is weak, follows and carries out the work of the superior part. 129 Taking human reason either as nature or as reason, Bonaventure insists, in each instance, on its essential unity. When he takes human reason as nature, Bonaventure refers to the human soul as an essentially rational form and, as such, he considers it to be the natural perfection of the human body. The rational soul is conjoined to the human body by a natural appetite and inclination, so that the body is perfected according to both the whole essence of the soul and the whole of its potencies. When Bonaventure takes human reason as reason, he refers to the intellect as the principle of rational knowledge. The intellect is naturally one, but it has a twofold disposition giving rise to a dual function. By its superior disposition, the intellect functions as a deliberative and judicative reason in accordance with the eternal laws of God. The turning of the intellect toward God is the principal act of its superior reason; but this part is called superior because it rules the inferior part and, through it, all the other potencies of human nature. Thus, controlling the domain of the soul, the superior reason, by its nature, is conjoined to all the potencies of human nature. By its inferior disposition, the intellect functions according to the deliberations and decisions of the superior reason; so, following directions with regard to the body and to other temporal things, this part of the intellect is called the inferior reason because it is ruled by the superior part. Hence, by the superior reason, which is conjoined naturally to the inferior reason, the

129 Loc. cit., Resp. (2.564; ed. min., 2.582). Cf. Comm. in loann., 4.33 (6.294), 4.82 (6.301); Coll. in loann., 6.18 (6.557-58).

202

CHAPTER TWO

human intellect exercises control over the other potencies and, through them, over the human body. In other words, according to nature, the superior reason is conjoined not only to the inferior reason, which is ruled by it, but also to the other potencies, which are subject to it, and to the human body, which is perfected by it. Though they have diverse acts and objects, the superior and inferior reasons have the same essential foundation. Bonaventure describes that foundation, in Aristotelean terms, as distinct dispositions of one intellective potency and, in Augustinian terms, as different functions of one human mind. In his own accounts of them, Bonaventure considers the two portions of reason to be really one, because they are grounded essentially in the rational soul as the natural form and perfection of the human body.130 There is an obvious similarity between Bonaventure's distinction of the superior reason from the inferior reason and his distinction of the spirit from the soul. The superior reason looks principally to the eternal laws of God, and the spirit is closer to God than the soul. The inferior reason looks to temporal things, especially the human body, which is vivified by the soul. Evidently, then, spirit designates the seat, or the foundation, of the superior part of human reason, and soul designates the seat, or foundation, of its inferior part. Since the superior and inferior reasons are one in both essence and nature, therefore, as their substantial source, the spirit and the soul are also one in both essence and nature. Hence, spirit designates the whole of the rational soul as the substantial foundation of superior reason; likewise, soul designates the whole of the rational soul as the substantial foundation of inferior reason. Taken in itself, however, the rational soul, or its intellective potency, is called a spirit because it is a rational or spiritual substance. 131 Strictly speaking, therefore, spirit designates the whole substance of the soul. As such, it is the principle of the human intellect, and so this is a spiritual potency. But the spiritual soul and its intellect exist in the human person, who is a properly rational creature. From that point of view, his intellect is a rational potency, or the power of human reason. Consequently, for Bonaventure, the human person can exercise his reason either independently of his body or in conjunction with it. The person exercises his reason in the first way by using it in a superior manner, which is a spiritual use of reason. Functioning in a spiritual manner, then, the superior portion of his reason is grounded in his spirit, or in his rational soul as a spiritual substance. When the person exercises his reason in conjunction with his body, though not apart from his spirit, he is then using his reason in an in-

130 R.W. Mulligan sees a prodominant influence of Augustine on Bonaventure's doctrine concerning the superior and inferior portions of human reason: "Portia Superior and Portia Inferior in the Writings of St. Bonaventure", FS, 15 (1955). pp. 332-49. 13! See above: n. 12, p. 140. see also: n. 5, p. 138.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

203

ferior way, which is not entirely spiritual. Functioning in that way, the inferior portion of his reason is grounded in his soul, or in his rational soul as the form and perfection of his body. Now, as the ground of inferior reason, the soul is the formal part of human nature, to which, as to a composite principle, the sense potencies of the human person are subject. Thus, his inferior reason looks to those potencies and works together with them under the direction of his superior reason, which controls the domain of the soul. All this conforms to what we have seen previously in St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the principles and foundations of rational knowledge.132 Belonging properly to the human person, rational knowledge consists at once in sense cognition and intellectual cognition. The composite nature of his soul and body constitutes the foundation of his sense potencies, and they are the principles of his sense cognition. The soul of the person constitutes the single foundation of his intellect, which is the principle of his intellectual cognition. But the two kinds of principles and their foundations are really one in the human person, who has an indivisible and rational nature. His rational soul, by its whole essence, is united to his body and to all its parts, so that, forming and perfecting his nature, the rational soul of the person is present as a whole in every part of his body. As a consequence, the rational soul, by its potencies, moves the body into operation through the multiplicity of its organs. It is in the order of operation, therefore, that the human person has diversity. He is one thing in the order of nature, and this unity is founded on the nature of his rational soul, which is a simple substance. Because it is a simple substance, Bonaventure teaches, the rational soul is united to the human body.133 But the rational soul, as we have seen, is a simple substance because of its intrinsic freedom from corporeal matter, and so it is called a spirit. Since the whole soul is a spiritual substance, therefore, it is a spiritual soul which is united to the body of a human person. Accordingly, the distinction of spirit from soul has to do with the substantial foundation of his rational knowledge rather than with the principles of his rational nature. Indeed, it is precisely as a rational form that the spiritual soul moves the human body into operation. Since the human person is the single agent of rational knowledge, it is he who has that knowledge and not his soul or his spirit. He is the one who reasons in a superior way by his spirit, and in an inferior way by his soul. Consequently, the unity of rational knowledge is grounded in the substantial unity of nature in the human person: just as the superior and inferior parts of his reason are one in both essence and nature, so are his spirit and his soul.134 132 See above: pp. 182-85. 133 "Item, anima est in toto corpore; sed hoc non facit unio, quia ex hoc ipso habet dependentiarn, et ita arctationem: ergo hoc est ratione simplicitatis ..." — 2 Sent., 2.2.2.3, fm 4 (2.81; ed. min.. fm. d, 2.72); cf. ad 3. Consult also: 1 Sent., 8.2.un.3, fm. 5 (1.170; ed. min., fm. e, 1.135). 134 St. Bonaventure's distinction between the superior and the inferior parts of reason has a chiefly theological purpose, particularly with regard to his doctrine on sin: 2 Sent., 24.2.1-3 (2.573-88; ed. min., 2.592-609), and with regard to the sufferings of Christ: 3 Sent., 16.2.1-3 (3.352-59; ed. mm., 3.346-54). In

204

CHAPTER TWO

Maintaining the unity of reason and nature in the human person, Bonaventure attributes to the superior part of reason a distinctive operation and a marked source of perfection. Speaking about Christ's human knowledge, Bonaventure says that the perfection of the superior reason consists in knowing things in the eternal Word, whereas the inferior reason attains its perfection by considering things in their proper natures. 135 Although the superior reason exercises its noblest act by turning toward eternal things, nevertheless, this part of reason is not always exercising that act. The superior reason is often intent upon itself, so that, turned in upon itself, it can be turned away from God and from His eternal laws. When the superior reason directs itself toward God, however, it is illumined and perfected by Him, provided it turns to God in an ordinate manner.136 Thus, the superior reason has the distinctive operation of self-reflexion. This is the part of reason by which a human person reflects within himself. Such an operation is possible because his intellective potency, grounded in a simple substance, is not restricted by a bodily organ, as his sensitive potencies are. Through the science that he has in his intellect, therefore, a human person knows both himself and his science.137 Granting the power of the intellect to reflect upon itself, Bonaventure still does not grant complete independence from the body to the intellect, even though it is subject only to the rational soul. In his view, the form of the whole man is more perfect than any part of his nature. All the parts of human nature are ordered to the whole of the specific form; but the rational soul is a part of the specific form, and so this form is more complete and more perfect than the rational soul.138 The operation of the intellect, then, can be impeded by the body. The soul operates in the body to which it is conjoined, and with which the intellect shares its operations. The sense his theological considerations of those questions, Bonaventure relies on a view of human nature and of human reason that contains the three following points: a) human nature and human reason are grounded in the substantial unity of a body and a soul in man; b) human nature is essentially one, even though the superior and inferior parts of reason are more united than the inferior reason and the sensitive part of man; c) human reason is one potency in essence and nature, but personal responsibility is rooted in its superior part. 135 3 Sent., 14.3.1, si- 4 (3.319; ed. min., sc d, 3.313). 136 2 Sent., 24.2.1.1, ad 4 & 6 (2.575; ed min., 2.595). 137 "Et quod obicitur, quod specialia non reflectuntur, dicendum quod reflexio in forma aliquando venit ex natura, et sic est in generalibus; aliquando venit ratione eius in quo est, et sic est in formis, quae sunt in potentiis natis supra se convert!, et in quantum supra se convertuntur. Et quoniam potentia cognitiva se ipsam cognoscit, et voluntas est instrumentum se ipsum movens, ideo per scientiam aliquis se et scientiam novit, et per caritatem se et ipsam diligit. Et si quaeratur ratio, quare potentia intellectiva nata est supra se redire et voluntas, alibi dicitur, sed modo tanto sufficiat, quia sunt simplices potentiae et in substantia sirnplici fundatae et organo non alligatae; et ideo patet, quod non est simile illud quod obici consuevit: in sensibus alia est potentia, quae videt, et alia quae videt se videre, quod similiter debeat esse in intellectu." — 1 Sent., 17. l.un.2, ad 4 (1.297; ed. mm., 1.241-42). 138 "Item, perfectior est forma compositi quam aliqua pars, quia paries ordinantur ad formam compositi; ergo completior et perfectior est forma humanitatis quam ipsa forma quae est anima ..." — 4 Sent., 43.1.1.1, fm. 5 (4.883; ed. min., fm. e, 4.872).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

205

powers, for their part, serve the intellect immediately. If the sense organs are injured, the operations of the sense powers will be impeded. As a consequence, and because the senses and the intellect strengthen one another, the operation of the intellect must be impeded, even though the intellect itself is not impaired in any way. Unimpeded operation of the intellect is possible only when the soul is separated from the body, for the intellect will not then depend on the service of the senses.139 The marked source of perfection attributed by Bonaventure to the superior reason is closely associated with its operation of self-reflexion. He sees the power of judgment residing in the superior reason, which moves all the other powers, and they obey its commands. Knowledge of supreme justice, which is the measure of every right, is required to distinguish between what is just and unjust, and to discern what is one's own from what is another's. Knowledge of this sort, according to Bonaventure, is found only in a rational substance, because it alone, having a capacity for selfreflexion, has the power to know itself and its own act. That perfection belongs to a rational substance as a creature participating in reason, thus distinguishing it as an image of God. 14° The rational soul is an image of God according to its supreme part, or spirit, which is formed and perfected immediately by God. Considering the human soul in that way, Bonaventure describes it as a rational spirit vivifying and moving a body. From the viewpoint of its potencies, however, Bonaventure, following Augustine, considers the supreme part of the soul to be its mind. Now the mind is not the soul's substance, but its supreme potency. Hence, the apex of the mind is the superior part of human reason.141 Bonaventure, again following Augustine, teaches that the human mind is formed in truth immediately by the first truth, which is God. This formation consists in an illumination received by the intelligence. Since the power of intelligence belongs to the supreme part of the soul, God alone can illumine the human mind. 142 Though the mind is not the substance of the soul, nevertheless, just as spirit can be said of the intellective potency, 139 2 Sent., 19.1.1, ad 6 (2.461; ed. mm., 2.473). 140 2 Sent, 25.1.un. 1, Resp. "Sumiter etiam ..." (2.593; ed min., 2.612). 141 "Spiritus vero rationales, qui sunt vivificatores et motores corporum, sic habent gradum et ordinem, ut tamen secundum suum supremum a Deo immediate perficiantur et formentur; et hoc est propter rationem imaginis, per quam immediate sunt ipsius Dei capaces." — 2 Sent., 14.1.3.1, ad 4 (2.346; ed. min, 2.350). '"Eo est anima imago, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest', ut dicit Augustinus, XIV De Trinitate (8.11; PL 42.1044); sed est capax quantum ad partem superioremi ergo etc." — 1 Sent., 3.2.1.2, fm. 1 (1.82; ed. min., fin. a, 1.60). "... sed supremum animae, sicut vult Augustinus, est ipsa mens; mens autem non est ipsa substantia animae, sed potius potentia suprema ..." — 2 Sent., 26.un.5, sc 5 (2.642; ed. mm., sc e, 2.664); cf. St. Augustine, op. cit., 6.9.10 (PL 42.930-31). "leremi" 2; 16: "Filii Mempheos et Taphnes constupraverunt te usque ad verticem." Si ergo vertex, secundum quod Sancti exdicitur ibi apex mentis sive superior portio rationis, videtur quod et ilia habeat per peccatum constuprari et foedari." — 2 Sent., 24.2.1.1, sc 1 (2.574; ed. min., sc a, 2.593). 142 Cf. 2 Sent., 10.2.2 (2.264-67; ed. mm., 2.265-68): see in particular, ad opp. 1, 4-6 (a, d-f); 1.2.2.2, con. 1 & ad 1 (2.45-46; ed. min., 2.38-39).

206

CHAPTER TWO

the term mind can be said of the soul. Naming mind from its essential act, Bonaventure applies three sorts of act to the soul. The first is that by which the soul has being in a most general way, and so the soul is called essence. The second sort gives the soul being in a general way, or living being, and thus the soul is called life. The third sort of act gives the soul spiritual being; according to this act, the soul is called mind, which signifies that the soul lives by an intellectual life. In short, the soul in itself is called essence and, as the act of a body, it is called life, but it is called mind as perfectible by God.'« From whatever viewpoint Bonaventure considers either the superior and inferior reasons or the spirit and the soul, he insists always on their essential and natural unity. This unity, found really in the human person, is grounded in the composition of a rational soul and a human body. As an essential act, the rational soul is the form of the body and the source of its being. As a vivifying form, the rational soul is the body's source of living being and the principle of its organization. Constituting one perfection, however, those acts are attributed to the rational form both as the formal part of a human nature and as the soul of a human body, which it informs with rational being and rational life. In that respect, the soul is taken as the formal principle of the sense potencies and the foundation of the inferior functions of human reason. As the foundation of the intellective potency, the rational soul is seen to be a spirit living an intellectual life and having spiritual being. In this respect, the spirit is taken as a mind and, as such, the ground of the superior functions of human reason and the principle of God's image in the rational soul. Now the human mind is really one potency with superior and inferior functions, and the rational soul is really one source of being, life and operation. Bonaventure expresses this fundamental unity when he refers to the soul as a rational spirit giving life to a body and moving it into operation. But he expresses it more firmly with regard to the image of God: this perfection is found in the human mind, and chiefly in its intelligence; however, it is truly the individual man, or the human person, who is God's image.144 There is no doubt about the Augustinian influence on the Bonaventurean doctrines concerning the superior and inferior reasons, the human mind, and its perfection as an image of God. But there is an evident influence of Aristotle on Bonaventure's understanding of the functions of the superior and inferior reasons. He grounds those functions in the natural

143 "Ad illud quod quaeritur de mente, dicendum quod mens dicitur ab actu essential!. Propterea est intelligendum, quod 'quo est' dat anima esse generalissimum, et sic dicitur essentia; vel inquantum dat esse generale, et sic dicitur vita, quia anima est in genere viventium, aut inquantum dat esse spirituale, et sic mens. Mens enim non dicitur nisi quod vivit intellective. — Vel anima in se dicitur essentia, ut actus corporis vita, ut perfectibilis a Deo mens." — 1 Sent., 3.2.dub.2, Resp. (1.94; ed. min., 1.71). Cf. St. Augustine, De Trmit., 10.11.18 (PL 42.983). 144 See: 2 Sent., 16.1.1-2 (2.393-98; ed. min., 2.404-09); 16.2.2-3 (2.403-06; ed. min., 2.414-18).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

207

dispositions of an intellect which is a potency of the human soul. Although the intellect functions in an unmistakeably Augustinian fashion, i.e. in both superior and inferior ways, nevertheless, as the potency of a soul informing a human body, the intellect, as a power of reason, works together with the sense potencies, and yet its proper act does not depend on any bodily organ. Consequently, taking a position that is neither Aristotelean nor Augustinian, Bonaventure, interpreting Aristotle and Augustine in his own manner, presents a new position on the activities of human reason arid its intrinsic foundations. Rooting every activity of reason in the spiritual soul, or the rational spirit, Bonaventure attributes three sorts of cognitive activity to the human person. The first activity is a rational consideration by the person of corporeal things in themselves. This activity, which is rooted in his soul, involves a cooperation of his reason and his-senses. The second activity, rooted in his spirit, is an intellectual reflexion by the person within himself, a reflexion having to do with either his own acts or his scientific cognition of corporeal things. The third activity is rooted in the mind of the person, and it is found there because he is an image of God. Directing the person to God, this activity is an intelligent awareness of the eternal reasons of created things in God. All three activities depend on God's formation of the mind in truth by an illumination, so that, participating in this illumination, the human person's rational knowledge of created and corporeal things is both perfected and unified. Drawing the person to God by a participation in divine truth, his mind contains the fundamental principles of unity in being and in life.

The doctrine of St. Thomas on the superior and inferior reasons corresponds in many respects to the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. Both theologians maintain that the two parts of reason, which St. Augustine distinguishes as two functions of one human mind, are not diverse potencies in the human soul.145 Aquinas, however, does not account for the Augustinian functions of reason in exactly the same way as Bonaventure. Relating reason to the will, Aquinas points out that the will is moved toward its object only after the object is apprehended as good or evil. To perceive those aspects of an object, a man must consider and investigate the reasons why it is agreeable or harmful. As a consequence, the human power through which such reasons are known is itself called reason. Now, among the things considered by reason, there is an order distinguishing them as eternal and temporal. In the order of nature, inferior things are caused and directed by superior things, and so reason is directed toward temporal things through eternal things. But reason acts with respect to eter145 See: St Thomas, DV, 15.2, sc 1-2 (1.311); ST, la, 79.9, sc (1.490a).

208

CHAPTER TWO

nal things in two distinct ways. In the first way, it considers eternal things in themselves without going beyond the limits of speculation. In the second way, reason considers eternal things as rules of those temporal things at a man's disposal, thus moving into the practical realm. Because the superior reason is partly speculative and partly practical, it is not distinguished from the inferior reason by a consideration of an entirely speculative object. The superior and inferior reasons have the same formal object, which differentiates their considerations only in a material manner. The distinction between the two parts of reason is based on the media of its considerations. Tending toward temporal things, the inferior part consults the superior part on the proper choice of such things, while the superior reason consults their eternal and divine rules. Although the superior and inferior reasons have diverse media, nonetheless, proceeding toward the same kind of conclusion, the two considerations of reason do not require diverse potencies, but a diversity of habitual dispositions. The superior part of reason is perfected by wisdom, and the inferior part by science. Every habitus of science is ruled and directed by the habitus of wisdom; so, relying on superior principles, the inferior reason is said to be deduced from the superior reason. 146 Drawing close to Bonaventure in evident ways, Aquinas explains the superior and inferior functions of human reason according to a distinction of objects in eternal and temporal things. Though they take a similar approach to the question, Bonaventure and Aquinas differ to some degree in their solutions to it. Bonaventure distinguishes the superior reason from the inferior reason because the one has a strong disposition and the other a weak disposition; so, grounding their functions in their dispositions, he stresses their acts as ruler and ruled, thus naming the one as superior and the other as inferior. Aquinas distinguishes them through habitual dispositions of wisdom and science; therefore, grounding their functions in those dispositions, he stresses the act of the one as contemplating superior things, and the act of the other as considering inferior things. Consequently, from these acts, he names the one as superior and the other as inferior. 147 There is also a correspondence and difference in the doctrines of Bonaventure and Aquinas on the Augustinian spirit and mind. For both men, those terms are associated with the intellective nature, or superior part, of the human soul, and with its perfection as an image of God. But, within their correspondence, Bonaventure and Aquinas have noticeable dif-

146 2 Sent., 24.2.2, Sol., ad 4 (2.605-08); DV, 15.2, ad 5, 8, 13-14 (1.313-14), Cf. ST, la. 79.9, Resp. ad 1-2 (1.490ab). The inferior reason is also partly speculative and partly practical, but it is not concerned solely with contingent things, since it contains the necessary conclusions of the sciences. Neither is the superior reason concerned exclusively with necessary things; it has to do also with contingent things, such as human actions, which flow from decisions depending on the guidance of eternal principles. Consult: 2 Sent, 24.2.2, ad 2 (2.606-07); DV, 15.2, ad 3-4 (1.312); 15.3, ad 5 (1.315); ST, la, 79.9, ad 3 (1.490b-91a). 147 DV 15.2, Resp. (1.311-12); cf. arg. 9, ad 9.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

209

ferences. Regarding the term spirit, Aquinas notes that Augustine uses it rather loosely, and in six different ways. He uses it to signify: any subtle body (e.g., air), the resurrected body of a man, the brute soul, the power of imagination, the mind of a man or of an angel, and the substance of God. Thus, mind is only one meaning given by Augustine to spirit and, according to Aquinas, the human mind is called a spirit because it is the subject of God's image in the soul. When the mind is taken as a spirit, then, in the judgment of Aquinas, the human mind does not differ essentially from the human soul. On the other hand, mind designates a potency, or a property of the soul; in this respect, the human mind is essentially different from the human soul, to which it is subject. Hence, for Aquinas, the term spirit can signify either the human mind, which is the principle of God's image in the soul, or the intellective potency, which is the superior part of the soul. When the intellect is taken as a spirit by comparison with the inferior potencies, the term soul stands for the whole of those potencies, because they are common to all the soul. Strictly speaking, however, soul signifies the essence of the rational soul.148 The term spirit, for Bonaventure, signifies the whole substance of the rational soul, and the term soul designates the spirit as the form of a human body. Differing from Bonaventure, then, Aquinas restricts the significance of spirit to the mind and the intellect, while reserving the proper meaning of soul for the essence of the rational soul. But Aquinas does not seem to follow the significance of spirit as it is found in Augustine, who says that mind and spirit designate the essence of the soul. Consequently, if Aquinas takes mind as designating a potency, the intellect, which is also a potency, would be the essence of the soul.149 Defending his point of view, Aquinas draws attention to a twofold use of names. The name sense, for instance, is used sometimes for a potency and othertimes for the sensitive soul: the term designates the soul according to its principal potency, which is the sensitive potency. The intellective soul, likewise, is sometimes called the intellect from its principal power: Aristotle, for example, says that "the intellect is a kind of substance". It is in this manner that Aquinas understands Augustine's reference to the mind as a spirit, or an essence. The mind is, so to speak, the superior part of the soul; so, the term mind, referring to a potency, is used to signify the essence of the soul, thus designating it as a spirit.150 148 3 Sent., 2.2.1, qa 2, Sol., ad 2 (3.75-76); ST, 3a, 6.2, Resp. ad 1 & 3 (4.2460a). Cf. 1 Sent., 3.3.1 (1.109-11). 149 "Intellectus enim idem videtur esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animae, sed essential dicit enim Augustinus, IX De Trin. (2.2; PL 42.962): 'Mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant'. Ergo intellectus est ipsa essentia animae." — ST, la, 79.1, arg. 1 (1.479b); cf. DV, 10.1, arg. 1 (1.190). 150 Dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando pro ipsa anima sensitiva: denominatur enim anima sensitiva nomine principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur intellectus, quasi a principaliori sua virtute; sicut dicitur in I De

210

CHAPTER TWO

Considering the human mind as a potency, Aquinas maintains that it cannot be the essence of the soul. All the potencies of the soul are rooted in its essence, but the mind contains only those potencies that are distinguished from the inferior potencies. The essence of the soul, properly speaking, does not have a superior part and an inferior part, whereas the mind has a superior and an inferior reason. The mind, furthermore, is a principle of intellection and not of life; but the essence of the soul is a principle of life, and so it cannot be the same as the mind. Indeed, according to Augustine, the soul is an image of God only with respect to its mind, and not with respect to its whole essence.151 Accordingly, treating the human mind as the subject of God's image in the soul, Aquinas holds that the mind is what is highest in the soul's power. Since God's image is found in the mind, His image does not belong to the essence of the soul, unless mind, signifying its highest potency, be taken to designate the soul's essence as the source of that potency.152 In the doctrine of Aquinas, then, mind signifies properly a potency of the rational soul, of which it is a part only as a property. The human mind, however, is not a single potency of the soul. Aquinas describes it as some sort of potential whole enfolding all the superior potencies as parts, so to speak: just as the sensitive soul is understood to be a sort of potency enclosing all the senses, in a similar way the mind is understood to enclose the potencies of memory, intelligence and will. 153 Aquinas is confronted once more with the teaching of Augustine: "memory, intelligence and will are one mind, one essence and one life". an. (4.13; 408bI8), quod 'intellectus est substantia quaedam'. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus dicit quod mens est spiritus, vel essentia." — ST, la, 79.1, ad 1 (1.480a; cf. ed Leon., 5.258); see in Augustine: De 1'nnit., 14.16.22 (PL 42.1053). "Aniina non habet alias partes nisi suas potentias. Sed inens est quaedam pars animae superior, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De Trin. (XII. cap. II, III, IV et XII). Ergo mens est potentia animae." — DV, 10.1, sc 1 (1.191); cf. ad 1. For some examples of the use of mind in that sense by St. Thomas see: Expos, de Trin., 1.1-4 (Decker, pp. 56-79). 151 DV, 10.1, sc 2-6 (1.191); cf. St. Augustine, op. at., 12.3-4 (PL 42.999-1000); 12.7.10 (PL 42.1003). 152 "Patet ergo, quod mens in anima nostra dicit illud quod est altissimum in virtutc ipsius. Unde, cum secundum id quod est altissimum in nobis divina imago inveniatur in nobis, imago non pertinebit ad essentiam animae nisi secundum mentem prout nominal altissimam potentiam eius. Et sic mens, prout in ea est imago, nominal potentiam animae, et non essentiam; vel si nominal essentiam, hoc non est nisi inquantum ab ea fluit talis potentia." —Op. cit., Resp. in fmem (1.191-92); cf. ST, la, 93.6-7 (1.577a80b). Aquinas concurs here in a certain way with Bonaventure, who subjects the image of God to the mind and not to the essence of the soul: 1 Sent., 3.2.1.2, Resp. (1.83-84; ed. mm., 1.61-62); 3.2.2.2 (1.9192; ed. mm., 1.68-69). 153 "Dicendum, quod sicut pars animae sensitiva non intelligitur esse una quaedam potentia praeter omnes particulares potentias quae sub ipsa comprehenduntur, sed est quasi quoddam totum potentiale comprehendens omnes illas potentias quasi partes; ita etiam mens non est una quaedam potentia praeter memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; sed est quoddam totum potentiale comprehendens haec tria; sicut etiam videmus quod sub potentia faciendi domum comprehenditur potentia dolandi lapides et erigendi parietes; et sic de aliis." — DV, 10.1. ad 7 (1.193); cf. arg. 7. For some examples of this interpretation of mind by St. Thomas see: DPD, 9.9. Resp. "Relinquitur ergo ..." (2.249); SCG, 4.26 "Huius autem ... scilicet homines." (3.299, n. 3631).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF 1 HE HUMAN SOUL

21 1

If life belongs to the soul's essence, then, according to the teaching of Augustine, the mind also belongs to the soul's essence.154 Presenting his own interpretation of Augustine's text, Aquinas says that a creature must be, it must live, and it must understand in order to have the perfect ground of God's image, since this requires perfect conformity to God's essential attributes. When the image of God is assigned to the human soul, the mind takes the place of God's essence, while the memory, intelligence and will take the place of the three persons. According to Aquinas, therefore, Augustine does not intend to say that the mind and life of the soul are its essence. Although to-be, to-live, and to-understand are the same in God, they are not the same in us. Proceeding from one essence of the mind, those three acts are called one essence. Belonging to one kind of life, they are called one life. Finally, just as the senses are enclosed within the sensitive part of the soul, so are being, life and understanding enclosed within the mind as parts within a whole, and so they are called one mind.'55 Interpreting the doctrine of Augustine in one way, Bonaventure understands mind to signify that the rational soul is a spirit, because it has spiritual being and lives an intellectual life. Interpreting Augustine's doctrine in another way, Aquinas understands mind to connote the essence of the rational soul, which is then called a spirit from its intellective power. Neither Bonaventure nor Aquinas, however, use the term mind to signify directly the substance of the rational soul. As a consequence, they are not very far apart in their interpretations of Augustine's doctrine on the human mind as the principle of God's image in the soul. In addition, both Bonaventure and Aquinas, each in his own way, explain the superior and inferior functions of the human mind, or human reason, in a manner reflecting the influence of Aristotle. Although Aquinas uses spirit most often to designate the human mind, or the human intellect, he uses the term occasionally to designate the 154 "Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in X De Trinitate (11.18; PL 42.983), quod 'memoria et intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una essentia, una vita'. Ergo sicut vita ad essentiam pertinet, ita et mens." — DV, 10.1, arg. 5 (1.191). 155 "... dicendum, quod vivere addit supra esse, et intelhgere supra vivere. Ad hoc autem quod imago Dei in aliquo inveniatur, oportet quod ad ultimum genus perfectionis perveniat quo creatura tendere potest; unde si habeat esse tanturn, sicut lapides. vel esse et vivere, sicut plantes et bruta, non salvatur in hoc ratio imaginis; sed oportet ad perfectam imaginis rationem, ut creatura sit, vivat et intelligat. In hoc enim perfectissime secundum genus conformatur essentialibus attributis. Et ideo, quia in assignatione imaginis mens locum divinae essentiae tenet, haec vero tria, quae sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, tenent locum trium personarum; ideo Augustinus menti adscribit ilia quae requiruntur ad imaginem in creatura, cum dicit, quod 'memoria et intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una essentia'. Nee tamen oportet quod ex hoc dicatur etiam mens et vita quo et essentia; quia non est idem in nobis esse et vivere et intelligere, sicut in Deo; dicuntur tamen haec tria 'una essentia', inquantum ab una essentia mentis procedunt: 'una vita', inquantum ad unum genus vitae pertinent; 'una mens', inquantum sub una mente comprehenduntur ut partes sub toto, sicut visus et auditus comprehenduntur sub pane animae sensitiva." — Loc. at., ad 5 (1.192-93).

212

CHAPTER TWO

human soul, thus referring to it as a spiritual substance. 156 In calling the human soul a spirit, even according to its substance, Aquinas has in view the immaterial nature of the soul and its consequent capacity to subsist through itself. Those two features of the soul, nonetheless, are known from its mind, or intellect, which operates through itself arid not, like a sense potency, through a bodily organ. Hence, having an intellectual operation, as Aristotle shows, the rational soul is a singular substance (hoc aliquid) subsisting through itself, and it is the form of a human body.157 To be a singular substance, a thing must be a complete individual subsisting through itself. Since the rational soul has the proper operation of understanding, an operation not shared with the body, therefore, because a thing operates according as it has being, the soul must have being through itself and not through a dependence on the body. Giving movement a wide meaning, Aquinas says that the human intellect moves itself into operation. But the soul is also the body's principle of life: since to-live is to-be for a living thing, the soul is the body's principle of being; therefore, the human soul is also the form of the body, because it is from a form that a body has being. Consequently, the soul does not subsist through itself as though it were a complete species in itself; rather, it subsists as perfecting the human species, and so as the form of a body. The being of the species, nevertheless, belongs to the soul, but it has that being with the body in order to complete the species. Though the rational soul can operate without communicating with the body, even so, only that which is complete in its species can have whatever is necessary for the proper operation of the species. As a consequence, the human intellect must acquire cognition of truth by way of the senses. In short, as subsistent, the soul is composed with its being, as a potency with its proper act; as the form of a species, the soul is an act composed with a human body, which is its proper potency.158 Speaking concretely, St. Thomas maintains that the operation of understanding belongs to this singular man, i.e. the human person. The principle of understanding, therefore, must be in him. As an operation not depending intrinsically on matter, however, understanding is proper to a spiritual substance. Hence the form of the human body is a spiritual substance.1S9 When referring to the human soul as a spiritual substance, 156 "... dicendum quod anima secundum suam essentiam est forma corporis, et non secundum aliquid additum. Tamen in quantum attingitur a corpore, est forma, in quantum vero superexcedit corporis proportionem, dicitur spiritus, vel spiritualis substantial' — DSpC, a. 2, ad 4 (2.377); cf. ad 14. 157 DA, a. 1, sc 1 (2.283); see in Aristotle: De anima, 3-4 (429alO-430a9). Treating the soul as subsistent, because it is an incorporeal substance, Aquinas speaks of the "intellectual principle, which is called mind", and again of the "human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind." — ST, la, 76.2, Resp. (1.440b-41a). 158 DA, a. 1, sc 2, Resp. ad 6 (2.283-85); cf. DSpC, a. 2, ad 19 (2.378). 159 "Manisfestum est enirn quod huic homini singular! ... convenit intelligere. Nulla autem operatic convenit alicui nisi per aliquam formam in ipso existentem, vel substantialenl vel accidentalem; quia nihil

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

213

Aquinas, considering the immaterial nature of its intellectual operation, adverts to its capacity to subsist through itself. When Aquinas refers to the soul as the form of a body, he is then adverting to the soul as united to matter and as communicating its own being to bodily matter. If the spiritual substance, or the soul, were already composed of matter and form, Aquinas affirms, it would be impossible for it to be a corporeal form. 16° In the judgment of Aquinas, therefore, Bonaventurc's understanding of the rational soul as a composite of matter and form makes it impossible for that soul, as a spiritual and subsistent substance, to be the form of a human body. Thus, their two views are far apart on the spiritual and subsistent nature of the rational soul. In Bonaventure's view, the soul is a spiritual substance because it has no corporeal matter. As a created spirit, however, the soul cannot be its own being; so it must have a matter which is proportionate to its being, and this is a spiritual matter. The presence of spiritual matter in the rational soul is manifested to Bonaventure from the passive principle of its intellect. Finding active and passive principles of both nature and understanding in the rational soul, Bonaventure concludes that it subsists through itself, and that the intellect operates by the soul alone. From this point of view, Bonaventure refers to the soul as a spirit and, as such, it is the substantial principle of intellectual operations in the human person. On the other hand, his soul is also the form of his body, with which it constitutes one human nature. Since the soul is the formal part of human nature, then, as a form, the rational soul is the substantial principle of the person's sensitive operations. Those operations depend on active potencies in the soul, and on passive potencies formed, or organized, by the soul in the body. Viewing the rational soul in that way, Bonaventure refers to it as a soul. In his judgment, the soul and the spirit are really one and the same form, which is a rational spirit vivifying and moving a human body. As a soul, it forms and vivifies the body; as a spirit, it moves the body into operation through the mediation of active and passive potencies. When Bonaventure refers to the movement of the body originating from the soul as self-subsistent, he is not adverting to a substantial independence of the spirit, or of the soul, from the human body. He is ad-

agit aut operatur nisi secundum quod est actu ... Oportet igitur principiurn huius operationis quod est intelligere, formaliter inesse huic homini. Principium autem huius operationis non est forma aliqua cuius esse sit dependens a corpore, et materiae obligatum sive immersum; quia haec operatic non fit per corpus ... unde principiurn huius operationis habet operationem sine communicatione materiae corporalis. Sic autem unumquodque operatur secundum quod est; unde oportet quod esse ilhus principn sit esse elevatum supra materiam corporalem, et non dependens ab ipsa. Hoc autem proprium est spiritualis substantiae. Oportet ergo dicere, si praedicta coniungantur, quod quaedam spiritualis substantia sit forma humani corporis." — DSpC, a 2. Resp. (2.375); cf. ad 2. See also: ST, la 75.2, ad 2 (1.441a). 160 Loc. at., Rcsp. "Perfectissima autem ... primum subiectum." (2.376). Note the conclusion: "Si vero substantia spiritualis esset composita ex materia et forma, impossibile esset quod esset forma corporalis: quia de ratione materiae est quod non sit in alio, sed quod ipsa sit primurn subiectum."

214

CHAPTER TWO

verting to the one principle of subsistence by which the human person moves his body into operation, and this is the same principle by which he moves his intellect into operation without communicating with his body. Taking a very different view, Aquinas posits matter only in corporeal substances, Having an immaterial nature, the rational soul is a spiritual substance composed with being, as a potency is composed with act. The immaterial nature of the soul is evident to Aquinas from the immaterial nature of its intellect. Since the intellect operates through itself, the principle of the intellect must subsist through itself, and so Aquinas concludes that the rational soul is self-subsistent. Looking at the soul as an intellective principle, Aquinas holds that it is both the form of a man's body and the first principle of his operations. As the form of his body, the soul is that by which he has being and life. His life is manifested by the diversity of his operations, so that his soul is the first principle of his vegetative, sensitive and intellective operations. When his soul is named from his intellective operations, it is then called either the intellect or the intellective soul; nevertheless, as Aristotle demonstrates, it is the form of a body, since otherwise the act of intellection could not be attributed to the man, who is the one agent exercising that act. Hence, for Aquinas, as for Bonaventure, it is not the soul which understands, but the man, who understands by his soul, just as he senses by the composite of his body and soul. It is the man, Aquinas notes, who perceives that he senses and that he understands. l61 Although both Bonaventure and Aquinas attribute the operations of the senses and the intellect to the individual man, the reasons supporting the position of Aquinas indicate that, from his viewpoint, Bonaventure's position on the soul, as a composite of matter and form, prevents it from being a form of the body. Such a soul, according to Aquinas, could not move the body of the individual man, so that the action of the intellect would be attributed to him. Aquinas offers several reasons for this. The intellect would be outside the composite of body and soul, which form the essence of the individual man; so he could not understand in an immanent manner by his intellect. As a consequence, the act of understanding would be attributed to the man only as an instrument of his mover; but this is contrary to fact, since the intellect, as Aristotle has shown, does not act through a bodily instrument. Furthermore, the action of one part is never attributed to another part, but to the whole composite; therefore, if the intellect moves the man's body, yet does not inform it, the intellect alone would understand, because it does not form one thing with the man, who cannot then be a single being. Now Aristotle has demonstrated that it is this man who understands, and he understands because his intellective principle is his form. Following this line of thought, Aquinas teaches that

161 57", la, 76.1, Resp. "... Socrates uniatur." (1.448ab); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 2.1 (412b25-4l3alO).

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

215

understanding is the proper operation of a man, as a man. According to his specific nature, therefore, a man has an intellective principle as his proper form. This form has a power and an operation exceeding corporeal matter, but they belong to the individual man. Consequently, if his soul were composed in itself of matter and form, it could not according to its whole self be the form of his body. 162 Bonaventure never says that the intellective soul is united only as a mover to the human body; he affirms constantly that the rational soul is the form of the body. At the same time, he regards the soul as the mover of the body, because the soul subsists as a composite of matter and form. It is precisely the latter point of view that, in the judgment of Aquinas, makes the intellective soul only the mover of a human body, thus preventing the individual man from really understanding. Though Bonaventure and Aquinas see the soul subsisting as the form of a body, Aquinas does not see the soul moving the body because the soul is subsistent, but because it is the form of the body. It is not as a form, however, that Aquinas sees the soul moving the body. The soul, as a form, gives being immediately to the body. Presupposing the body as already in act, the soul moves it through a potency, so that, according to its motive power, the soul is the moving part, while the moved part is the animated body. But the soul is the form of the body, both as its act and as its mover; the difference between these two effects of the soul in the body is only a difference of reason.163 We cannot minimize the difference between the two theologians on the nature of the rational soul as a spiritual and subsistent substance. The consequence of their difference on this question is such that, to Aquinas, the position of Bonaventure prevents the substantial union of the soul with a human body. Bonaventure, as we have seen, posits that union through the mediation of unibility, which is a property of the rational soul. But Aquinas constantly rejects the possibility of any substantial union of the soul and the body through a medium. 164 He does allow a medium between the soul and the body in a man's operations, provided the immediate union 162 Loc. at, Resp. "Quidam autem ..." (1.449a-50a). Again, note the conclusion: "Est autem attendendum quod si poneret animam componi ex materia et forma, nullo modo posset dicere animam esse formam corporis. Cum enim forma sit actus, materia vero sit ens in potentia tantum; nullo modo id quod est materia et forma compositum, potest esse alterius forma secundum se totum. Si autem secundum aliquid sui sit forma, id quod est forma dicimus animam, et id cuius est forma dicimus primum animatum." 163 "Dicendum quod anima non movet corpus per esse suum, secundum quod utiitur corpori ut forma; sed per potentiam motivam, cuius actus praesupponit iam corpus effectum in actu per animam; ut sic anima secundum vim motivam sit part niovens, et corpus animatum sit pars mota" — ST, la, 76.4, ad 2 (1.456b). "... dicendum quod, licet anima sit forma in quantum est actus, et similiter in quantum est motor, et ita secundum idem est forma et motor, tamen a'ius est effectus eius secundum quod est forma, et alius secundum quod est motor, et propter hoc locum habet distinctio." — DA, a 9, ad 2 (2.315); cf. arg. 2. "Sicut enim eadem est, secundum substantiam, anima quae est motor et forma, sed differ! ratione, ita et eadem sunt quae sunt necessaria ad uriionem formalem et ad administrationem, licet non secundum eamdem rationem." — DSpC, a. 3, ad 7 (2.382). 154 2 Sent., 1.2.4, ad 3-4 (2.53-54); SCG, 2.71 (2.206); ST, la, 76.6 (1.458b-59); DSpC, a. 3 (2.378-84).

216

CHAPTER TWO

of his soul and body is maintained as the foundation of his operations, whether they be sensitive or intellective. 165 Is it possible, in any way, to draw Bonaventure and Aquinas together in their views on the nature and essence of the rational soul? Granting their wide difference on the question, we find them saying the same things about the unity of nature and of operations in the human person. 166 St. Thomas himself suggests a possible way of drawing St. Bonaventure's position close to his own: if all potency is named matter and all act is named form, a spiritual substance may be said to have a composition of matter and form. But, Aquinas adds, that is neither the proper meaning nor the common use of those names. 167 CONCLUSION St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the essence and nature of the human soul has its completion within a synthesis on the unity of essence and nature in the human person. That synthesis encloses the two extremes of the personal nature of an individual man. Those extremes are his rational spirit and his human body. Both extremes are united in the singular and incommunicable existence of a personal nature, which is a rational nature constituted in the whole being of the individual man. Thus, existing uniquely within a single nature, the soul and the body of the human person participate in his one rational being and life. The personal union of body and soul in the individual man draws together the two extremes of created substances: corporeal substance and spiritual substance. These extremes come together in the personal nature of the individual man, who is constituted by the union of his body and soul. The indivisible nature of the 165 DSpC, a. 3, ad 4 (2.382); DA, a. 9, Resp. ad 1, 6.11.15, (2.314-17). Note the conclusion to the Rap. here: "Sic ergo inter animam secundum quod est motor et principium operationum et totum corpus, cadit aliquid medium; quia mediame aliqua prinia parte prime mota movet alias partes ad suas operationes, sicut mediame corde movet alia membra ad vitales operaliones; sed secundum quod dat esse corpori, immediate dat esse substantiale et specificum omnibus partibus corporis. Et hoc est quod multis dicitur quod anima unitur corpori ut forma sine medio, ut motor autem per medium. Et haec opinio procedit secundum sententiarn Aristotelis qui ponit animam esse formam substantialem corporis." 166 They both say, for instance, that the soul, as a spiritual substance, is the form of a human body, to which it communicates being, and in every part of which the soul is present as a simple substance; see above: p. 131 (n. 63). They also say that the human soul, though simple in its essence, is multiple according to its potencies, and that the soul, through its potencies, moves the body into operation. On these points in St. Bonaventure, see above: n. 57, p. 129. In St. Thomas, see the following: ST, la, 76.6, ad 3 (1.460ab); DA, a. 8 ad 14 (2.312), a. 9, ad 14 (2.317), a. 10, ad 1-2, 13 & 17 (2.319-21). 167 "Et hoc modo natura spiritualis substantiae quae non est composita ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu sui esse-, et sic in substantia spiritual] est compositio potentiae et actus, et per consequens formae et materiae; si tamen omnis potentia nominetur materia et omnis actus nominetur forma. Sed tamen hoc non est proprie dictum secundum communem usum nommum." — DSpC, a. 1, Resp. in fmem (2.371). On this view of matter and form in St. Bonaventure, see above: n. 24, p. 145. We shall return to this question in the next chapter.

ESSENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL

2 17

human person shows that he is the participational perfection of corporeal and spiritual substances. His natural perfection as a spiritual and corporeal creature is completed by his operational perfection as a sensitive and intellective creature. In the cognitive order, the human person has rational knowledge as his proper mode of cognition. Grounded in the unity of his nature, rational knowledge manifests a participation in sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. This participation depends on the soul and the spirit, which form one substantial foundation of the person's rational operations. Functioning according to his soul, the person turns toward temporal things and reasons in an inferior way; functioning according to his spirit, he turns toward eternal things and reasons in a superior way. Both ways of reasoning have one foundation in the person's mind, which participates in divine truth by an illumination from God. That participation is proper to the human person as a rational creature made in the image of God. The principle of participation, therefore, unifies the Bonaventurean synthesis on the nature and operations of the human person. Having being and existing from the formal and material components of his human nature, the person shares in the perfections of both the corporeal and the spiritual worlds. In composing his synthesis, St. Bonaventure uses many doctrines from different historical sources. His dependence on those sources varies according to the particular problems confronting him. In some instances, he relies only on one source: on the origin of the human soul and the perfection of its mind, he relies on St. Augustine; for the definition of person in existential terms, he relies on Richard of St. Victor. In other instances, St. Bonaventure relies on two or even more sources. Concerning the notion of creation as a mutation, he seeks the combined support of St. Augustine and St. John Damascene. On the composite essence of the angel and the human soul, St. Bonaventure combines the doctrines either of Aristotle and St. Augustine or of Boethius and St. Augustine; he also blends their three doctrines while forming his own distinctive position on the hylomorphic constitution of spiritual substances. In his explanation of the term person, St. Bonaventure interprets the doctrine of Boethius according to the doctrine of Richard of St. Victor. Extending this interpretation to the constitution of a created person, St. Bonaventure calls upon Aristotle for a definition of man; he also seeks the support of St. Augustine to show that the human soul alone cannot be a person. Though he cites Boethius constantly in showing that the human species is the whole being of an individual thing, St. Bonaventure invokes Avicenna on that point. Finally, he depends on Aristotle regarding the composition of soul and body as the proper subject of man's sense operations, and yet he unites Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines in his explanation of the superior and inferior parts of human reason. Each of the sources used by St. Bonaventure contributes to the development of his synthesis; but no single source, nor any particular combination of sources, constitutes that synthesis. St. Bonaven-

218

CHAPTER TWO

ture organizes his synthesis in such a distinctive manner that, interpreting historical doctrines in his individual way, he produces a truly participational composition of philosophical doctrines. Thus, all the sources used by St. Bonaventure participate in his synthesis, which is an original, or Bonaventurean, composition of philosophical thought. From the comparisons that have been made between the doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, it is evident that their philosophical thought is both similar and dissimilar with respect to the rational soul, the personal nature of man, and his cognitive operations. The two theologians concur in so many ways on those subjects that their differences, while separating their two syntheses, do not really diversify them. Their fundamental source of difference lies in alternate interpretations of the principles entering into the constitution of created substances. Those interpretations give rise to very dissimilar positions on the nature of spiritual substances and, as a result, on the natural and operational unity of the human person. But the dissimilar positions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas on these questions do not prevent the two theologians from holding quite similar views on several aspects of them. For that reason, the syntheses of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, maintaining a manifest difference in their interpretations of metaphysical principles, are separate but not diverse developments of philosophical doctrine. Though the two theologians use the same historical sources in some instances, St. Thomas is influenced more directly than St. Bonaventure by Aristotle and Boethius. Along with the doctrines of St. Augustine and Richard of St. Victor, however, St. Thomas also uses the doctrines of Averroes and Avicenna. The Thorn ist interpretation of historical sources reflects both the similarity and the dissimilarity of doctrine between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. The historical doctrines used by them do not characterize specifically their developments of philosophical thought. Rather, constituting two original syntheses, the philosophical developments of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are characterized by their personal organizations of doctrine. The historical sources contributing to the formation of the syntheses of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, then, are developed in a Thomist and in a Bonaventurean manner.

CHAPTER THREE PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

of plural forms in bodily substances has been assigned to St. A doctrine Bonaventure by almost all the historians of medieval philosophy. He is

said to depend chiefly on Avicebron for that doctrine.' Many Bonaventurean scholars, following the lead of the historians, have ascribed a doctrine of plural forms to St. Bonaventure. But their accounts of this doctrine in St. Bonaventure vary considerably. Some scholars ascribe to him a limited plurality of forms in corporeal things. 2 Other scholars find light as a substantial form in all bodies; however, those scholars do not concur on the formal nature of corporeal light.3 Still other scholars see, in Bonaventure's doctrine, a whole structure of plural forms, including the common form of light, in bodily substances.4 Clearly, therefore, there is a problem con-

1 We have recorded these facts throughout our Introduction. We noted before that Avicebron's name does not occur anywhere in Bonaventure's writings. In an addition, of uncertain authenticity, to a text in the Sentences, however, there is the following passage: "Hoc ipsum dicit auctor Fontis vitae, in prima parte sui libri, et expresse probat ... quod corporalium et spiritualium est materia per essentiam una. Et hoc probat per hoc quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et per hoc, quod, si spiritualia et corporalia non haberent materiam per essentiam unam, impossibile esset quod aliquid esset eis univocum, quia diversitas radicutn prohibet convenientiam in ramis. Aliorum autem auctoritates causa brevitatis omitto." — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.3, in finem (2.102; ed. min., 2.91-92). This is the sole reference that we have found in St. Bonaventure's writings to the Fons vitae, and to its doctrine. 2 C.M. O'Donnell refers only to a "form of organization", which mediates life to the body from the soul in man; but he also sees that "body and soul form a substantial union in the human composite without the aid of another form" — surely there is confusion here? See: The Psychoi (if St. Bonaventure ..., pp. 23-27. G. Thery, following M. De Wulf, speaks of a "form of corporeity"; other forms, in ThCry's view, are present in bodies only implicitly: Ada Hebdomadae Augustmianae-Tkomisticae (Taurini & Romae, Marietti: 1950), pp. 158-60. 3 H. Guthrie finds light and a specific form in every inanimate body; however, for him, "light is ... a form which is reductive corporeal without being itself a body": The Modern Schoolman, 15 (1938), p. 85. J. A. Mazzeo says that light, for Bonaventure, is the form of corporeity: "the substantial form of body as such"; following Gilson's view, he takes light as the medium of the human soul's union with the body: "Light Metaphysics ...", Traditio, 14 (1958), pp. 204-05. V.Ch. Bigi rejects the notion of light as a mediating form between the soul and body in man: the true medium, he says, is heat and an animal spirit. But Bigi has a substantial form of corporeity in all bodily substances, along with an accidental form of extension; light is a common substantial form only in celestial bodies: it exercises an extrinsic influence on earthly bodies, thus producing in them a substantial force, or power, of light See: "La dottrina della luce in S. Bonaventura", Divus Thomas, 64 (1961), pp. 395-422. 4 Such is the view of P. Robert. Hyltmor. et devenir, pp. 69-70; and of E. Bettoni, S. Bonaventura, pp. 91108, ET pp. 69-82. Depending much on secondary sources, C. O'Leary holds that no substantial form is completely displaced by a succeeding form: in man, for instance, there are forms of the elements, of the complexion, and the ration.il soul; each lower form is contained in a subordinate way by the form im-

220

CHAPTER THREE

cerning the question of plural forms in Bonaventurean doctrine. The problem, moreover, touches not only the fact of plural forms in a bodily substance, but also, even granting the fact, how far St. Bonaventure has gone in positing a plurality of forms in corporeal things.5 The texts of Bonaventure that we have examined thus far do not offer any immediate solution to the problem. Indeed, falling into three groups, those texts confirm the reality of the problem itself. The first group of texts, which are the smallest in number, seems to suggest a doctrine of plural forms in bodily things. That group includes the texts on corporeal light as a common form of all corporeal things, remaining in them after the arrival of posterior forms.6 It also includes the texts on the composition of matter and form in the human soul, for this would indicate a proper composition of form and matter in the human body. 7 The second group, containing the largest number of texts, suggests that there is one only substantial form in a bodily thing. This group includes most of Bonaventure's texts on the individual formation of corporeal substances, on human nature and the constitution of the human person. Thus, speaking of the unity of matter, Bonaventure says that, in spiritual substances, matter supports only a substantial form, whereas, in corporeal substances, it supports, in addition to a substantial form, the accidental forms of quantity and of contrariety; he also speaks of matter being prepared, in the generation of a new substantial form, through accidental dispositions requiring time and motion.8 mediately succeeding it, thus the form of complexion, which is also the form of organization and of corporeity, contains the inferior bodily forms, while the complex, or organic, form itself, disposing the body for life, is subordinated to the human soul: The substant. compos, of man, pp. 65-81. 5 D.A. Callus, reviewing the doctrine of piural forms, does not even mention the name of St. Bonaventure: "Origins of the Problem of Unit)- of Form", The Dignity of Science (Washington, The Thomist Press: 1961), pp. 123-49; and Thomist, 24 (1961), pp. 257-85. A.C. Pegis sees in Bonaventure's doctrine mediating dispositions, or formal perfections, which are necessarily and continually present in a bodily substance to ensure the unicity of its substantial form, particularly in the union of soul and body in man: St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul, pp. 42-50. 6 See above: pp. 112-14 (nn. 22-25). 7 See above: pp. 139-42 (nn. 8-17). There are other texts suggesting plural foims in man. For instance: "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod compositum ex materia et forma est ens completum, et ita non venit ad constitutionem tertii, dicendum quod hoc non est verum generaliter, sed tune quando materia terminal omnem appetitum formae et forma omnem appetitum materiae; tune non est appetitus ad aliquid extra et ita nee possibilitas ad compositionem, quae praeexigit in componentibus appetitum et inclinationem. Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; sicut corpus organicurn ex materia et forma compositum est et tamen habet appetitum ad suscipiendam animam." — 2 Sent., 17.1.2, ad 6 (2.415-16; ed. min., 2.427). Again: "Sic anima tanto affectu unitur substantiae carnis quam prius vivificavit, quod non complete ei satisfit nisi ilia eadem, ubicumque lateat, reparetur." — 4 Sent., 43.1.5, in ad 6 (4,894; ed. min., 4.884). 8 See above: pp. 146-51 (nn. 25-33); and n. 46 on p. 158. Note the support for unity of form in this text: "Item, ratione videtur: 'In quolibet genere est reperire unum primum, quo mensurantur omnia quae sunt in illo genere', ut vult Philosophus in X primae Philosophiae; sed substantia est unum genus, non tantum secundum logicum qui considerat rerum intentiones, sed secundum metaphysicum qui considerat essentias rerum: ergo in genere substantiae est unum aliquid, quo mensurantur omnia in illo

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

221

Accounting for the individuation of a substance, Bonaventure holds that individuation results from the mutual appropriation of a form and a matter: the form gives an act of being to the matter, which communicates existing to the form. In this context, he rejects the view that individuation comes either from matter alone or from an addition of forms leading ultimately to a form of the individual; considered concretely, then, an individual thing is one substance, or a supposit, in which diverse natures are really one, such as body and colour in a white thing.9 Though Bonaventure considers the body and soul of man to be diverse from one another, nonetheless, he maintains that they are the constituent parts of one essence and of one human nature.10 The human soul is the natural form and perfection of the human body in which it is created, for which it has a natural desire and inclination, and with which it is united as a proper form with its proper matter. Thus, to Bonaventure, a man is one thing through his essence, having one only soul disposing him through its potencies for the operations of life, sense and reason, or understanding. The rational soul unites itself as a substantial form to the human body, and so the soul, completing its being in the body, has an essential and substantial act of vivifying that body. Consequently, forming one living thing, the human body and the rational soul are united to each other as the perfecting and perfectible principles of one human nature. The rational soul, through its essence, gives being to the whole body and to all its parts; the soul is united essentially in being to the body, as a substantial form is united to matter, so that the soul is present in the whole body and in its every part. Finally, the complexion of the human body looks to its uniformity, and to its one kind of life, which come from the rational soul, whereas the organization of the body looks to its multiformity, or to its diverse organs, and they are constituted in being by the soul." As the perfecting principle of a human nature, which is both essentially and substantially one, the rational soul is the formal part of the species man, and that species is individuated in this man. The union of his soul with his body constitutes the species, or the form of the whole individual man; this form, enfolding the whole being of a body and a soul, is really one in each man, but it is taken abstractly as a form common to every man: man-incommon, and so it is said to consist in matter and rational nature. 12 Excepting the hypostatic union of soul and body in Christ, St. Bonavengenere. Sed illud non potest esse principium extrinsecum, cum secundum huius maiorem et tninorem participationem intrinsecam res illius generis magis et minus sint: ergo cum principium intrinsecum non sit nisi forma vel materia, erit ve! materia vel forma. Si materia, habeo propositum: si forma, sed unitas formae necessario praesupponit unitatern materiae: ergo etc." — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.2, fm. 2 (2.94; ed. min., fm. b, 2.83); cf. con. 6 & ad 6. 9 See above: pp. 168-70 (nn. 68-71); pp. 177-78 (nn. 87-88). 10 See above: p. 103 (n. 1); and n. 3 on p. 137. 11 See above: pp. 120-29 (nn. 39-58). 12 See above: pp. 171-74 (nn. 73-79).

222

CHAPTER THREE

ture teaches that the union of a rational soul and a human body constitutes a person, who is an undivided substance, or an individual thing, of a rational nature. A human person is constituted as an individual substance which is complete in being, and this being is proper to that one substance alone.13 The person is a hypostasis of a rational nature: as such, he has the foundation of the whole of his natural existence from the union of his soul with his body; he is also a supposit of a rational nature: in this respect, he is undivided in his nature, through which and in which he subsists, so that his specific nature, or his whole being, is realized substantially by the union of his soul with his body. Having an incommunicable and a self-subsistent mode of existing, then, *he human person is an individuated substance of a rational nature because of the intercommunication of a rational form and a corporeal matter, or the soul and the body of his human nature.14 The unity of human knowledge, which is a rational knowledge, depends on the substantial unity of human nature in the individual man. His substantial unity is founded upon the composition of a soul and a body. Following that composition, the soul, by its sense potencies, perfects the body organically, and so the soul, as a mover, is one with the body's organs in the unity of the form of the whole individual man. Although his intellective potencies are subject only to his soul, which alone individuates them, nevertheless, because of the natural union between his soul and body, they can be impeded in their operations whenever the bodily organs are seriously injured. Even though the human intellect is not determined by any bodily organ, nonetheless, such impediments arise from the nature of the soul as the formal part of man, which is more perfect in being than the soul itself. Thus, the intellect's self-reflection is really an act of the person reflecting within himself, for the intellect cannot have a truly independent operation as long as the soul is united to the body.15 In short, grounding every human operation in the rational soul as the natural perfection of the human body, St. Bonaventure considers that soul to be the act of its human body, to which it gives both being and life. 16 The third group contains texts that are ambivalent with regard to the problem of plural forms. We find them ambivalent because they do not indicate sufficiently whether or not St. Bonaventure can be said to have a doctrine of plural forms. He says, for instance, that the appetite of matter orders it to form as to its substantial perfection, so that the form and the matter become one thing, provided the matter is of the same genus as the form. They are united, however, through mediating dispositions, which an ultimate form perfects without destroying them, and so such dispositions remain in the conjunct, not excluding the conjunct of soul and body in 13 14 15 16

See above: pp. See above: pp. See above: pp. Consult above:

174-75 (nn. 178-80 (nn. 182-84 (nn. pp. 199-200

80-83). 89-90). 93-98); pp. 204-05 (nn. 135-39). (nn. 126-27); pp. 205-06 (nn. 142-43).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

223

man. Now those dispositions are the seminal reasons through which the complete being of an individual substance is drawn forth from prime matter; but the production of a new form involves the giving to matter of a new disposition, or the actualization of a potency, since act and potency are substantial dispositions of the same thing. 17 Speaking again about the appetite of matter, Bonaventure says that the matter under an elementary form desires to be under the form of a mixed body, and its matter desires to be under the form of a complex body; since a mixture comes to-be in one body from diverse elements, the appetite of nature is fulfilled. 13 Although Bonaventure teaches that corporeal light has not entered into the formation of Adam's body, nevertheless, he maintains that Adam's soul was united to his body through the mediation of the elementary forms, the form of a mixture, and the form of a complexion.19 Bonaventure speaks, moreover, of every creature as having a composition of actual and possible principles, and so it has a multiformity. Describing the composition of form and matter, he says that they are composed as diverse natures related to each other as actual and possible principles constituting the essence of every creature which is a being through itself.20 From this point of view, his texts on the union of soul and body in man, as two natures or substances uniting to constitute a third, retain a certain ambivalence, even though he insists so often on the rational soul as the form 17 See above: pp. 106-09 (nn. 11-14). 18 Text cited above: n. 31, p. 117. Note the following text: "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod formae elementares sunt primae in materia corporali, dicendum quod verum est de formis quae dant materiae esse completum; forma vero ilia quam habebat informis materia, non dabat sibi esse completum, et ideo tarn formas simplices quam compositas, quae esse completum tribuunt, praecedebat vel praecedere poterat" — 2 Sent., 12.1.3, ad 3 (2.300; ed. min., 2.304). 19 See above: p. 120 (n. 38). The body generated by Adam also had the nature of the four elements, proportioned in an equality of complexion; however, thus far, we have not found St. Bonaventure speaking of this body as united to its soul through the mediation of other forms — see above: p. 121 (n. 41). 20 Texts cited above: n. 49, p. 159, and n. 21, p. 144. On the multiformity of the creature note the following passages. "Dicendum quod ... simplex, secundum quod est Dei proprium ... opponitur composition! et multipiicitati. Quantum ergo ad privationem compositionis, dicit quod non habet multitudinem partium; quantum vero ad privationem multiplicitatis extraneae, dicit quod non habet varietatem accidentium; quantum vero ad privationem multiplicitatis intrinsecae, dicit quod non habet varietatem formarum, ut generis, speciei et differentiae ..." — 1 Sent., 8.2.dub.2, Resp. (1.174-75; eii. min., 1.139); cf. dub. 6, Resp. (1.1 75-76; ed. min., 1.140-41). "Ad illud quod ... obiicitur, quod nihil omnio simplex est multiforme in specie vel in assimilatione; dicendum, quod est multiformitas secundum rationem informandi et secundum rationem exprimendi. Primo modo competit multiformitas ei quod habet intra se diversarum formarum naturas; et sic non potest stare cum summa simplicitate. Secundo modo competit multiformitas ei quod habet in se multarum formarum ideas, et hoc modo stat cum summa simplicitate." — DMT, 3.1, ad 14 (5.73). Nevertheless: "Item, forma generis est abstrahibilis a formis specierum sive a differentiis; sed substantia dicit formarum generis, corporeum et incorporeum sunt differentiae; ergo ab his potest abstrahi. Sed forma generis naturaliter est prior quam forma differentarium, sicut dicit Philosophus, quod prius est animal quam homo. Consideretur igitur materia spiritualium el corporalium sub forma generis; nee differunt quantum ad formam, quae consequitur ipsam essentiam materiae: ergo multo fortius non differunt quoad ipsam materiam." — Sent., 3.1.1.2, fm. 5 (2.95; ed min., fm. e, 2.83).

224

CHAPTER THREE

and perfection of the human body.21 From the same point of view, his use of the term conjunction, particularly of the soul and body in man, is also ambivalent, as is his use of the expression completive form, especially of the rational soul. In Bonaventure's doctrine, conjunction can be the equivalent of either union or composition, and a completive form can be said to perfect either another form or a substance.22 There is unquestionably, then, a very real problem concerning Bonaventure's position with respect to plural forms in corporeal substances. A solution to the problem, if such can be attained, would seem to rely largely on a proper understanding of what we have called his ambivalent texts, and on a proper interpretation, according to that understanding, of the other groups of texts. We do not propose, however, to re-examine all those texts. Rather, bringing forward additional texts, we shall endeavour to solve the problem by a consideration of Bonaventure's doctrine on: first, the forms of all bodily substances; secondly, the forms of inanimate substances and, thirdly, the forms of animate substances. As we proceed, we shall try to clarify, if we can, the meaning of the ambivalent texts relating to our problem. Forms of All Bodily Substances

The first corporeal form produced by God, in Bonaventure's view, is the form that He created with prime matter, which God has brought into being from nothing. Taken according to its essence, or in an abstract way, corporeal matter is understood to be without all form (informis), as Augustine teaches, for it is the possibility and the capacity of all corporeal forms. Taken according to its being in nature, however, corporeal matter is never without place and time, nor without motion and rest; so, considered concretely, corporeal matter cannot exist without a form. 23 Now, as we have seen, the form of prime matter was an incomplete form and, as such, gave an incomplete being to that matter. Since prime matter was formed imperfectly, its appetite for form was not completely fulfilled, 21 See above: pp. 175-76 (nn. 84-86); n. 78, pp. 173-74. The ambivalence of these texts can be extended to the passages, to which we have referred, on the specific nature of an individual thing as enfolding its whole being, particularly regarding human nature; such being could be understood as a coming together of the being of the rational soul and the being of the human body. 22 See above: pp. 112-13 (n. 6); p. 121 (n. 41), and p. 138 (n. 6). Neither the expression completive form nor the term conjunction (or conjunct, conjoined etc.) necessarily indicate a doctrine of plural forms. Aquinas, even in his latest writings, regularly uses completive form and conjunction (also conjunct, conjoined etc.), and he is opposed explicitly to a plurality of forms. Note, for example: "Sicut etiam esse completivum speciei pertinet ad dignitatem formae; tamen sensitivum nobilius est in homine propter coniunctionem ad nobiliorem formam completivam, quam sit in bruto animali, in quo est forma cornpletiva." — ST, 3a, 2.2, in ad 2 (4.2426b). For Aquinas, coniunctio is equivalent to compositio. and the forma cornpletiva is the final form of a substance, and its only substantial form; the form immediately preceding it is corrupted on the arrival of the ultimate form. For Bonaventure, however, the exact significance of forma cornpletiva is not readily apparent. 23 2 Sent., 12.1.1, Resp. (2.294; ed. min., 2.296-97); cf. St. Augustine, Confess., 12.3.3 (PL 32.827).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

225

and so it had a disposition and an inclination for other forms. But the form of prime matter did not have in itself diverse natures; rather, Bonaventure says, the matter had a sort of imperfect diversity in its parts. This diversity, however, did not come from diverse and complete acts, but from the appetite of matter for diverse acts, or forms, and thus prime matter was thoroughly mixed up and confused. Bonaventure has illustrated his point of view with a very interesting example. There is in an embryo, which actually has one form, an indistinct shape of massed flesh, and that figure is a disposition for diverse shapes and limbs. This example is not entirely similar to prime matter, Bonaventure remarks, because the form of prime matter has not had as much actuality as the form of an embryo, nor has the form of prime matter been as close to the eduction of subsequent forms as the form of an embryo is to the eduction of the limbs. An embryo has a visible form that, by a force of nature, can be produced to complete perfection. But prime matter, under its form, has not been a composite, and it has been invisible; therefore, it could have been given subsequent forms solely by a divine power and operaton.24 In Bonaventure's view, then, prime matter has never existed under a diversity of forms. In its original condition, corporeal matter had one only form, from which it received incomplete being. Having neither perfect opaqueness nor perfect transparency, prime matter had in its diverse parts a disposition, inserted by God, for the production of diverse forms, but it did not have a diversity of forms. Illustrating his point again, Bonaventure says that, as a body might be more refined in one part and, saving the unity of its form, more compact in another part, so prime matter ought to be understood as having had a form which was capable of receiving many perfections.25 Thus, not a complete being, prime matter was neither a specific body nor a complete thing in the genus of bodies. Although it had extension and corporeity, prime matter did not have the perfect actuality of form. Such actuality came from the elementary forms, which were the first forms giving complete being to corporeal matter. Since prime matter had incomplete being from its form, therefore, Bonaventure maintains, this form could and did precede both simple and composite forms. 26 In these texts, Bonaventure stresses the unity of form not only in prime 24 2 Sent, 12.1.3, Resp. "Et ideo ..." (2.300; ed. min., 2.303-04). Note the illustration: "Sicut exemplum ponitur in embryone, quod actu habet unam formam et figuram quadam massae carnis, ilia tamen est dispositio ad diversas membrorum figurationes. Istud tamen non est omnino simile, quia forma ilia non erat tantae actualitatis, sicut est forma embryonis, nee in tanta propinquitate ad eductionem formarum sequentium, sicut forma embryonis ad eductionem membrorum. Forma enim embryonis est visibilis et per vim naturae ad perfectam completionem est producibilis; ilia vero materia sub tali forma incomposita erat et invisibilis, et ad formas subsequentes sola divina virtute et operatione poterat perduci." 25 Loc. cit, ad 4 (2.300-01; ed. min., 2.304). Again, note the illustration: "Sicut si intelligitur quod aliquod corpus in una parte sit rarius et in alia magis compactum salva formae unitate, sic intelligi debet in ilia materia quae formam habebat maxime ad multa possibilem." 26 Loc. at, ad 5 (2.301; ed. min., 2.304); ad 3 (2.300; ibid): text cited above in n. 18, p. 223.

226

CHAPTER THREE

matter, but also, as his illustrations show, in an inanimate body and in the formation, or organization, of a living body. Moreover, the context of the expressions simple forms and composite forms, namely, the doctrine that prime matter is neither a simple body nor a composite body, indicates that they refer respectively to the forms of simple bodies, and the forms of composite bodies. It remains to be seen, nonetheless, whether or not Bonaventure's view of the production of subsequent forms from prime matter will present a similar perspective. Describing the production of bodily natures, Bonaventure holds that God, forming light on the first day, distinguished a luminous nature from a transparent and opaque nature, thus dividing light from darkness. On the second day, forming the firmament between the waters, God distinguished one transparent nature from another, and so He divided the waters on the earth from the waters in the heavens. Then, on the third day, God completed His work of distinction by separating the transparent nature of the earth from its opaque nature; so, dividing the seas from the lands, He also distinguished the nature of the heavenly bodies from the nature of the elementary bodies. Commencing His work of ornamentation on the fourth day, God formed the sun, the moon and the stars. On the fifth day, producing the birds and the fishes, He ornamented the transparent nature of the heavens (air) and the transparent nature of the earth (seas). Completing His work of ornamentation on the sixth day, God adorned the opaque nature of the earth (lands) by forming the animals, and He consummated His work with the formation of human nature. God rested on the seventh day, not because He no longer works, Bonaventure observed, but because He now produces no more new species. In producing the first bodily natures on the earth, God established in them seed-beds from which, through seminal reasons or through natural generation, other bodily things would come into being.*1 The first distinct form drawn from prime matter, according to Bonaventure, was co.'poreal light. Forming the fiery heaven (caelum empyreum), corporeal light set it apart from the transparent and opaque parts of matter. The fiery heaven, consisting in pure light, was wholly luminous; it was also uniform and immobile. The next forms drawn from matter distinguished its transparent parts. This distinction looked to the formation of the crystalline heaven (caelum crystallinum) and to the firmament. The crystalline heaven, having a watery nature, was totally transparent; it was also uniform but mobile. The firmament, which was mobile and multiform, had both a watery and a fiery nature, so it was partly transparent 27 Brevii, 2.2 (5.219-20; ed min, 5.36-38). Explaining the appearance of new animals after the sixth day, Bonaventure says that those animals were produced on that day in their principles and seminal reasons, so that the commingling of species has not entailed any new creations by God. The one exception is the rational soul, which has not been produced, nor is it now produced, according to a seminal reason; God still creates rational souls, but their creation involves only new individuals in the human species, which has been produced in Adam. Cf. 2 Sent. 15.2.3, ad 5-6 (2.387-88; ed. min., 2.398-99).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

227

and partly luminous. The last forms distinguishing corporeal matter had to do with the formation of its opaque parts. This formation produced the elementary nature on the earth, thus setting apart the four elements from the fifth nature, or essence, of the heavens. Although the three heavens were distinct according to form, their nature was of one kind, because they were incorruptible. Each of the four elements also had its own form, but their nature was of one kind, because they were variable, though incorruptible. The first ornamentation took place within the firmament, which is the starry heaven (caelum stellatum), where God produced the sun and the moon, the stars and the planets. Hence, the multiformity of the firmament looked to the difference of form among those heavenly bodies, and they were far removed from the contrariety of the four elements. The second and third ornamentations took place on the earth, where God produced, Bonaventure says, a multiformity of forms as an expression of His multiform wisdom. This multiformity of forms, however, had to do with the distinct forms of mineral bodies, of plants and of animals. Their bodily natures were formed from the multiformity, or the different natures, of the simple bodies, which were the four elements. The formation of those bodily natures came about through mixings of the elements, whose contrary qualities were reconciled by the instrumental power of the heavenly light. 28 Now, according to Bonaventure, the highest heaven is the fiery heaven, which is entirel/ uniform and, because it is pure light, wholly luminous. The crystlline heaven, having a totally transparent and uniform nature, is the middle heaven through which corporeal light is communicated to the firmament.29 Since the firmament is both transparent and luminous, and since it is the lowest heaven, or the one nearest the opaque nature of earthly bodies, it is the heaven that communicates light to the earth. Although the firmament contains a multiformity, nevertheless, this does not imply that it is one celestial body with a multiplicity of forms. On the contrary, containing many luminous bodies of an incorruptible nature, and so of one kind, the firmament has a multitude of luminaries, each of which is perfected and differentiated from all the others by a proper and specific form, as the sun, for instance, is distinguished from the moon.30 It is by the influence of the luminaries in the firmament that, according to Bonaventure, those terrestrial natures subject to generation and corruption are produced, namely, minerals, plants, animals and human bodies. All the composite bodies on the earth, therefore, are generated from the elements by the power of light in the heavenly bodies; however, the heavenly bodies do not exercise any influence on the souls of men, nor on their spiritual opera28 BreviL, 2.3 (5.220-21; ed. min., 5.38-39). 29 Cf. 2 Sent, 13.1.1-2 (2.311-16; ed. min., 2.313-20); 14.1.1.1 (2.335-38; ed. min., 2.337-40). 30 Cf. 2 Sent., 14.2.2.1, fa. 1-4 (2.357; ed. min., fa. a-d, 2.362-63). Note the comparison with the earth infm. 4-d: "Item, terra ornata est diversis lapidibus et plantis et animalibus secundum speciem: ergo par! ratione videtur quod caelum sit ornatum diversis luminaribus secundum speciem differentibus."

228

CHAPTER THREE

tions.31 Each luminary in the firmament has light from its form and species, and it has movement through the influence of the crystalline heaven. By their illuminations and movements, then, the luminaries measure the times and the seasons on the earth. The luminaries also have heat and power by which they influence the four elements to come together for the production of the minerals, the plants, the animals and human bodies. Since the human body is the most perfect body, it is disposed by the elements for the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Thus, the appetite of the whole of corporeal nature is both ordered to and terminated in the rational soul, which is a form and a being, a living, sentient and intelligent thing. 32 Two observations are in order at this point. First, Bonaventure posits a unity of form, or a uniformity, in both the fiery and the crystalline heaven. On the other hand, he posits a multiformity in the firmament and on the earth. But the multiformity of the firmament looks to the multiple difference of form in many species of luminaries. Likewise, the multiformity of forms on the earth looks to the multiplicity of forms distinguishing different sorts of bodies, i.e. minerals, plants and animals. Hence, for Bonaventure, the term multiformity does not necessarily signify a plurality of forms in one bodily substance. Secondly, he separates the nature of corporeal matter in the heavens from the nature of corporeal matter on the earth. Celestial matter is entirely incorruptible and free from contrariety. Terrestrial matter is incorruptible only in elementary natures, and they are subject to contrariety through the variations of their qualities. Consequently, prime matter has complete being in the genus of bodies according to either the incorruptible form of a celestial body or the corruptible form of a terrestrial body.33 Now, insisting on the unity of form in prime matter, Bonaventure maintains that corporeal matter in celestial bodies is different according to being from the corporeal matter in terrestrial bodies. The matter of a celestial body has being from an incorruptible form, and so there is no potency in such matter for any other form. Each terrestrial element also has being from an incorruptible form, thus preventing its matter from having a potency with respect to the forms of the other elements. The matter of a terrestrial body, which is formed from the elements, has being from a corruptible form. This matter has a potency for another form, because it can undergo a change of form and a transmutation in being.3* It follows, therefore, that a celestial body, which is a simple body, cannot exchange its form for

31 BreviL, 2.4 "... esse fatum." (5.221; ed. min., n. 1, 5.39-40). Cf. Itiner., 2.2 "Generantia sunt ... corpora humana." (5,300; ed min., 5.188); 2 Sent., 14.1.1.2, ad 6 (2.340-41; ed. min, 2.343), and 14.2.2.3 (2.361-65; ed. min., 2.367-72). 32 Breuil., 2.4 "Ratio autem ... et beatificatur." (5.221; ed min., an. 2-3, 5.40); cf. 2.5 (5.222-24; ed. min., 5.41-44). See also: 2 Sent., 14.2.2.2 (2.359-61; ed. min., 2.365-67). 33 Cf. 2 Sent., 12.2.1, con. 1-4 (2.302-03; ed. min., con. a-d, 2.305-06). 34 Loc. cit., Resp. (2.303; ed. min., 2.306).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

229

another, nor can it suffer a transmutation in being. This is also true of an elementary body, as such; however, because of their contrariety, the elements mix with one another to generate the terrestrial bodies, which can undergo an exchange of forms. St. Bonaventure adverts to those differences in a very condensed description of the unity of matter and its relation to being. With respect to its essence, matter is subject to substantial form alone, and so matter is one for all spiritual and corporeal substances. With regard to being, however, matter is found in bodily things according to a threefold difference. Regarding being which is incomplete and remote from completion, matter is subject to substantial form and extension, or to quantity. In this respect, the matter of celestial and terrestrial bodies, or of incorruptible and corruptible substances, is the same. Regarding being which is incomplete but close to completion, matter is subject to substantial form, to quantity and to contrariety. In that respect, the matter of celestial and terrestrial bodies is different; but the matter of the elementary bodies is the same, and so is the matter of corruptible bodies. Regarding being which is simply complete, matter is subject to substantial form, to quantity and to uniformity in all its parts, but is not subject to contrariety. Under this condition, the matter of celestial and terrestrial bodies is not the same; however, it is the same for bodies similar to one another in species and in nature. 35 The first condition, described above, of corporeal matter regarding being is founded on substantial form and extension, or quantity. Matter in that condition, which is remote from completion in being, is one for celestial and terrestrial bodies. Such a description points to prime matter, which is the remote and common subject of all corporeal forms. On receiving being from the substantial form of a celestial body, corporeal matter is then subjected to a determined quantity, but not to contrariety. The second condition of matter with regard to being is founded on substantial form, on quantity and on contrariety. This condition of matter, as close to completion in being, excludes the celestial bodies, and so it points to corporeal matter as the proximate subject of terrestrial forms. On receiving being from a terrestrial form, corporeal matter is then subjected to both quantity and contrariety, but in two distinct ways. The substantial form of an elementary 35 "Aliter posset dici ... quoniam quadrupliciter potest intelligi et esse unitas in material aut quantum ad essentiam aut quantum ad esse incompletum et a completicne remotum aut secundum esse incompletum, completioni proximum, aut secundum esse simpliciter completum. Et secundum hoc distinguitur materia, quod quaedam est subiecta formae substantial! tantum, quaedam formae substantial! et extension! sive quantitati, quaedam formae substantial! et quantitati et contrarietati, quaedam formae substantial! et quantitati non contrarietati et in omnibus suis partibus uniformitati. Primo modo dicitur esse eadem materia spiritualium et corporalium ... secundo modo, caelestium et terrestrium sive corruptibilium corporum et incorruptibilium; tertio modo, corporum elementarium et ad invicem transmutabiiium: quarto modo, corporum specie et natura similium. Primo igitur et secundo modo eadem est materia caelestium et terrestrium ... tertio et quarto modo non ..." — Lot. cit., ad con. 1-4 (2.303; ed. min., ad con. a-d, 2.306-07).

230

CHAPTER THREE

body makes its matter to be incorruptible, whereas the substantial form of a body generated from the elements does not. The matter of a generated body, nevertheless, acquires completion in being when the next, and third, condition is realized. The third condition is founded on substantial form, on quantity and on a uniformity of parts. Requiring completion in being, but without contrariety, that condition of matter is proper to all bodily substances similar in species and in nature. Since the nature of the heavenly bodies is incorruptible and the nature of the earthly bodies is corruptible, therefore, the condition is not the same in the heavens and on the earth. The matter of a heavenly body, receiving complete being both simply and incorruptibly from its substantial form, cannot sustain contrariety in any way; so, having quantity and a uniformity in all its parts, the matter of this or that heavenly body in a species is the same with respect to the species. The matter of an earthly body, however, has complete being in a simple but corruptible way from its substantial form. Since this matter receives complete being in a simple way, it does not sustain an actual contrariety; nevertheless, receiving that being also in a corruptible way, the matter is subject to the possibility of contrariety. Consequently, having quantity and a uniformity in all its parts, but with a possibility regarding contrariety, the matter of an earthly body is one in species with the matter of other earthly bodies in the same species; for example, the matter of Peter's body is the same in species as that of Paul's body, for they both have human matter. It is to be noted that, in describing the unities of matter in being, Bonaventure speaks of matter in its eveiy condition as subject to substantial form. Thereafter, maintaining the incorruptibility of the heavenly bodies and of the elementary bodies, he distinguishes the different conditions of matter in being, not according to a plurality of substantial forms, but according to the presence or absence of contrariety, which is an accidental quality of bodies. Moreover, maintaining a quantified matter in every body, including the elementary bodies, Bonaventure posits a uniformity in all the parts of a body, or a unity of form in the whole body, which has complete being in its proper species, such as a heavenly body or a human body. Although the matter of an elementary body has incomplete being, nevertheless, as we have seen, this is a simple body existing under one substantial form. The matter of a body undergoing generation from the elements also has incomplete being until it acquires the substantial form of a species. This is the sort of matter in a body suffering either a transmutation in being or an exchange of forms. Granting that Bonaventure does not speak of a uniformity, or a unity of form, in this kind of body, which is partly in act and partly in potency, nonetheless, we do not find him speaking of a plurality of substantial forms in that body.36 36 We would like to note here that, in Bonaventure's view, a body having incomplete being is not an individual substance, or a supposit; so its being is not yet stabilized in a truly substantial way, as it would be in a supposit ur a hypostasis.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

231

There is no doubt, thus far, about the uniformity, or unity of form, in a terrestrial substance having complete being from .a specific form, as a man has complete being from his human form. St. Bonaventure speaks quite clearly on that question when handling two arguments contrary to his position, that the rational soul is in the whole human body and in each of its parts. Those arguments run as follows: a form which is one in the whole body and in its parts names the parts and the whole, because they are wholly similar, and so each part of the fire is a fire; therefore, if a soul is in each part of the body, each part of the animal is an animal, just as the whole is an animal, since each part would be an animated and sensitive substance: moreover, the existence of the rational soul does not depend on any part of the human body, because that existence is fixed in the soul itself; therefore, the rational soul is not in each part of the human body.37 Replying at once to both arguments, Bonaventure sets down a threefold kind of form. The first kind is the form of an inanimate body. This sort of form is in the whole body, because it perfects the whole body; since it is extended in the body, the form communicates the perfection of the whole to the parts, thus each part of a fire is fire. Because the form also depends on the body and does not act through itself, it communicates the operation of the whole to the parts; so each part of the fire heats.38 The fire about which Bonaventure speaks here is a body of fire having complete being in the species of fire. In other words, he is referring to an individuated body of fire, which is numerically different through its own matter and form from similar bodies. We have observed him speaking of fire in this way when rejecting the view that the individuation of any thing comes from a gradual addition of forms, terminating in a form of the individual.39 Besides, no action is attributed to a thing unless it is an actual being, and no thing is such except as in a supposit. Hence, an action is attributed to a form only in a supposit, and so a fire that heats must be an actual being, or a complete 37 1 Sent., 8.2.un.3, sc 1-2 (1.170- ed. min., 1.135). 38 "... dicendum quod triplex est genus formae. Est enim quaedam, quae perficit et extenditur et dependet. Et haec, quia totum perficit. est in toto; quia vero extenditur. perfectionem totius communicat partibus; quia vero dependet nee agit per se, operationem totius communicat partibus, ut patet in forma ignis, quia quaelibet pars ignis est ignis et quaeiibet calefacit." —Loc. cit., ad 1-2 (1.171; ed. min., 1.13637). 39 "Aliis vero aliter visum est, scilicet quod individuatio esset a forma, et dixerunt quod ultra formam speciei specialissimae est forma individualis. Et quod movet hos ponere illud fuit, quod intellexerunt ordinem in formis secundum generationem et naturam esse per eumdem modum, per quern ordinantur in genere, ita quod forma generis generalissirni primo advenit materiae; et sic descendendo usque ad speciem. Et adhuc forma ilia non constituit individuum, quia non est nmnino in actu, sed ultra hanc formam individualis subsequitur, quae est omnino in actu, sicut materia fuit omnino in potentia ... quomodo forma sit tota et praecipua causa numeralis distinction is, valde difficile est capere, cum omnis forma creata, quantum est de sui natura, nata sit habere aliam similem, sicut et ipse Philosophus dicit etiam in sole et luna esse. Vei quomodo dicemus duos ignes differre formaliter, vel etiam alia, quae plurificantur et numero distinguuntur ex sola divisione continui, ubi nullius est novae formae inductio?" — 2 Sent., 3.1.2.3, in Resp. (2.109; ed. mm., 2.99). See above: pp. 169-70 (nn. 70-71); n. 34, p. 228.

232

CHAPTER THREE

substance, having a substantial form in a supposit, which is always concretely and actually one thing. 40 The second kind of form is found in a plant or an animal. This kind, because it perfects the whole body, is in the whole body and in each part, so that no part of an animal is animal. Since that sort of form is not extended in the body, the act of the whole is not attributed to the parts; for instance, the life of the animal is not attributed to its parts, but to the whole, which lives by its soul. Depending on the body, however, the form communicates the operation of the whole to the parts, and yet each part of the animal lives and senses.41 The third kind of form is the rational soul. Because it perfects the whole body, this form is in the whole body and in its parts. But the rational soul is not extended in the body; therefore, it does not communicate the perfection of the whole to the parts, and so no part of a man is man. Since the rational soul does not depend on the body with respect to operation, the soul does not communicate its operation to the body, and thus no part of the man understands, for it is the whole man who understands. Now the rational soul communicates the act of the whole to the man, as to his parts: for example, it communicates the act of sensing to the man, as an act of his sense powers; therefore, the perfection of the man, or his rational soul, is in each part of his body, since each part is a part of the man, and it is vivified by his soul, or perfection. 42 The one feature common to all three forms is that each of them is in a whole body, because it perfects the whole body and, note, not another form. But the form of an inanimate body perfects the whole in a different way than the form of an animate body. The reason for this, according to Bonaventure, is that the form of an inanimate body is an extended form, 40 "... nulla actio esse intelligitur alicuius nisi ut entis in actu; nihii enim est in actu ens nisi prout est in supposito." — 3 Sent., 5.1.4, in sc 2 (3.127; ed. min., sc b, 3.121). Again: "... actio non attribuitur formae nisi in supposito ... quia actio est formae in supposito." — Loc. cit., in Resp. (ibid.} "Item, unum et multum sunt differentiae entis, et entis in actu; sed materia est omnino ens in potentia: ergo si dividentia non conveniunt nisi eis, quibus convenit divisum: ergo nullo modo potest dici materia per essentiam una numero." — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.3, con. 2 (2.99; ed. min., 2.88-89). "... dicendum quod verum est de uno quod dicit unitatem completam. Unitas enim et veritas et bonitas proprie et complete sunt in creatura completa; nihilominus tamen, sicut dicit Augustinus, De vera religione (32.60; PL 34.149), incomplete reperiuntur in materia. Sicut ergo materia incompleta est de se, ita unitatem secundum se habet incompletam, possibilem tamen, quantum ad esse, compleri per formam, cuius adventu constituitur individuum numero unum unitate actuali et completa, ex cuius etiam adventu fit distinctio, et surgit in rebus multitudo." — Loc. at., ad 2 (2.101; ed. mm., 2.90). 41 "Est alia forma, quae perficit et dependet, sed non extenditur; et talis forma, quia totum perficit, est in toto et qualibet parte; quia vero dependet, operationem totius communicat partibus; et talis est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis, quia nulla pars animalis est animal, tamen quaelibet pars animalis vivit et sentit." — 1 Sent., 8.2.un.3, ad 1-2 (1.171-72; ed. min., 1.137). 42 "Est iterum forma, quae totum perficit, tamen nee extenditur nee dependet quantum ad operationem; et talis, quia perfectio est, est in toto et partibus; quia vero non extenditur, perfectionem totius non communicat partibus; quia non dependet, ideo nee operationem communicat; et talis est anima rationalis, quia nulla pars hominis est homo, et nulla pars hominis inteiligit. Tamen etsi non communicet actum totius ut toti, communicat ut partibus; quia quaelibet pars est pars hominis et vivificatur a perfectione hominis; et ideo perfectio hominis est in qualibet parte." — Loc. at., (1.172; ed. min., 1.137).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

233

whereas the form of an animate body is not extended. An extended form perfects the parts by communicating to them the perfection of the whole, thus the parts have a uniformity. Although an inanimate body, which is an inorganic body, has a uniformity in its parts, nevertheless, because it is a mixture, all the parts of the body are not necessarily perfected to the same degree. For instance, one part of a fire can be more intense than another part; or again, as we have already noted, a body can be more refined in one part and more compact in another. 43 A form that is not extended perfects the parts in perfecting the whole. This sort of form requires a complex body, which is organized for operation. Because of the complexion, the parts are uniform with respect to the whole and, disposed for the same kind of life, they are perfected by one principle. Because of their organization, however, the parts are both diverse and perfected by potencies. 44 The form of an inanimate body and the form of an animal, or of a plant, depend for their being on the body. Since the one form is extended and the other is not, Bonaventure attributes to them a difference of operation. To an extended form, which cannot act through itself, he attributes an act only through the body. In his view, no extended form is distant from matter; therefore, an extended form cannot be the sufficient mover of its body.45 To a form that is not extended, Bonaventure attributes an act which, belonging to the whole, is communicated to the parts: the whole animal, and each of its parts, lives and senses by its form, or soul. Communicating the act of the whole to its parts, the form of animal is the sufficient mover of its body. Unlike the rational soul, which does not depend for its being on the body, the form of an animal is not a sufficient mover because the animal is a singular thing in itself having a matter and form. Nor is it a sufficient mover because it may first move the body that it perfects; rather, Bonaventure says, the form of an animal is a sufficient mover because it has a whole and singular body, so that, in moving a part of the body, the form moves the whole of it. The parts of a stone, on the other hand, are moved only by a movement of the whole stone.46 To be a sufficient mover, Bonaventure continues, it is not necessary for a form to be so distant from its body that 43 See the text cited above in n. 25, p. 225. 44 "... dicendum quod in partibus est considerate organizationem et complexionem. Ratione complexionis sunt uniformes toti et sunt dispositae ad idem genus vitae et perficiuntur ab uno; ratione organizations sunt diversae et perficiuntur a potentiis." — 1 Senl., 8.2.un.3, ad 4 (1.172; ed. mm., 1.137). 45 "Item, omnis motor sufficiens distal a mobili: cum ergo nulla forma extensa distet a materia, nulla forma extensa potest esse motor sufficiens ..." — 2 Sent., 14.1.3.2, con. 3 (2.347-48; ed. min., con. c, 2.351). 46 "Et si tu obicias, quod anima sensibilis est motor sufficiens, et ita est hoc aliquid et habet materiam et formam. dicendum quod anima sensibilis non dicitur esse motor sufficiens, quia ipsa primo inoveat corpus quod perficit; sed quia corpus totum quod habet, est hoc aliquid, et virtute animae, quae est forma eius, movet pattern, et movendo partem suam movet totum ... Et quod illud verum sit, apparet, quia si anima sensibilis poneretur in corpore, quod non haberet partem mobilem nisi motu totius, sicut in lapide, nunquam illud moveret." — 2 Sent., 15.1.1, ad 2 (2.375; ed. min., 2.383-84).

234

CHAPTER THREE

the form itself is another substance differing from the body through a matter and form. It suffices for the form to be in the genus of substance, or to be a substantial form lacking extension both essentially and accidentally. A form of this sort is so whole in one part of the body that it is also whole in another part; such a form is united to the part which it moves, and still the form is distant from that part of the body. The distance between the sensitive soul and the body is sufficient to enable the one to move the other: an animal has organs suited to the operations of a sensitive soul. 47 It is clear, then, that the distance between a soul and its body, which establishes the soul as the mover of the body, has to do with distinct considerations of a soul as the perfection of its body and as the principle of its organization. In the first consideration, a soul is seen to be whole in each and every part of the body; as a consequence, the whole body is seen to be substantially uniform in its parts. Grounded in that uniformity, the second consideration regards the soul as acting through its potencies in the organs of the body; as a result, the parts of the body are seen to be accidentally diverse. Thus, positing a substantial uniformity as the foundation for the operations of an animal, Bonaventure puts an accidental diversity, or multiformity, in its potencies and organs. Now this is a condition of nature that Bonaventure also finds in man, as we have seen, even though his act of understanding is not communicated to the body by his rational soul.48 Excepting perhaps a body being generated or corrupted, we find St. Bonaventure maintaining, in the texts examined up to this point, a unity of form, or a uniformity, in all bodily things. Though he speaks of a multiformity in the firmament, or the starry heaven, and of a multiformity of forms on the earth, he does not refer in either instance to a complete and individuated body as having a plurality of substantial forms. Regarding the firmament, Bonaventure speaks of a multitude of luminaries, each one having a specific form. Regarding the earth, he speaks of a multiplicity of bodies, each with its own substantial form, from which it receives either incomplete being, as an elementary body, or complete being, as the body of a mineral, a plant, an animal and a man. Bonaventure also maintains a substantial uniformity as the foundation of operation, which he attributes to a form only in a supposit, or a complete and individuated substance. In this regard, he posits a substantial uniformity of complexion and of life in a living body, while diversifying its parts accidentally by way of organization. Consequently, the multiformity of a living body refers to the multiplicity of 47 "Vel aliter dici potest quod ad hoc quod aliquod sit motor sufficiens, non oportet quod distet a mobili, ita quod sit substantia altera differens per materiam et fortnam; sed sufficit quod ilia sit forma in gencre substantia, carens extensione per se et per aecidens. Et haec forma sic est in una parte tola, quod tota est in alia; et ideo sic unitur isti parti quam movct, quod etiam ab ea distat. Et haec distantia sufficit ad hoc quod possit movere earn, nee requiritur quod habeat aliam materiam. Et sic est in anima sensitiva in his animalibus, quae huic operation! habent organa apta." —Loc. at. 48 This touches the delicate problem of the substantial uniformity of human nature, which has a soul composed intrinsically of a form and a matter; but we shall consider that problem in due course.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

235

its organs and not to a plurality of substantial forms. But there are many questions still left unanswered, both with respect to inanimate things and with respect to living things. We shall now consider those questions, taking first the problems relating to the forms of inanimate bodies. Forms of Inanimate Bodies

There are two problems facing us here. The first and main problem has to do with the nature of corporeal light. This problem involves the various forms of luminous substances, both in the heavens and on the earth. The second problem concerns the nature of mixed bodies, which are generated from the terrestrial elements. That problem, then, touches the many forms of inanimate substances produced on the earth. Now, as we have shown, St. Bonaventure teaches that corporeal light is the first distinct form produced by God from prime matter. By producing this form, God has established the fiery heaven, which is pure light, and so it has a wholly luminous nature. Then, forming the crystalline heaven and the firmament, God has given the one a wholly transparent nature, and he has given the other a nature that is partly transparent and partly luminous. Thus, both luminous and transparent, the firmament has become the place of the different species of luminaries. They illumine the opaque nature of the earth and, influencing the simple bodies of the elements, are instrumental in the production of composite bodies. But the elements are not entirely opaque: fire is luminous, water is transparent, and air has a transparent nature that can also be luminous. Consequently, the celestial bodies and the terrestrial elements have in common a luminous and transparent nature. 49 It would seem, therefore, that the form of luminous nature is a common form among the heavenly bodies. It would also seem that this form, which is corporeal light, is found in some way in the matter of the elementary bodies, at least of elementary fire, which is a luminous body. Now, in his first consideration of the distinction of corporeal matter, Bonaventure refers to a twofold information: a general information by the form of light, which is a form common to all corporeal natures, and a special information by other forms, which are the elementary forms or the forms of mixed bodies.50

49 The transparent nature in the heavens has an altogether different form from the transparent nature on the earth; for that reason, Bonaventure does not speak either of water or of air as a common form in all bodily things: Brevil., 2.5 "Et quoniam ... scientia sublimis." (5.222-23; erf. min., nn. 4-7, 5.41-43); 2 Sent., 14.1.1 (2.335-38; ed. min., 2.337-40). 50 "Supra egit Magister de productione naturae quantum ad principium materiale; in hac vero pane intendit agere de eius completione sive formatione quantum ad principium formale. Et quoniam duplex est informatio materiae corporalis, quaedam generalis quaedam specialis — generalis per forrnam communem omnibus corporalibus, et haec est forma lucis; specialis vero per alias formas sive elementares sive mixtionis — ideo Magister primo agit de formatione sive productione lucis, in hac scilicet distinctione." — 2 Sent., 13.div.text, (2.310; ed. min., 2.312).

236

CHAPTER THREE

From this delineation, it seems that both the forms of the elements and the forms of mixed bodies inform matter already informed by corporeal light. On the other hand, having completed his account of the formation of matter by light, Bonaventure, turning to the special forms, refers to light, not as a common form, but "as it were, a general principle of distinguishing the rest of the corporeal forms." Those forms are the special forms of every sort of body (excluding the human body) in the heavens and on the earth.51 From that delineation, it is apparent that light is some sort of general principle of distinction for every other corporeal form, both celestial and terrestrial. There is a very real problem, then, regarding Bonaventure's exact position on the formal nature of corporeal light, and on its relation to the forms of other bodily things. Let us see whether or not the problem can be resolved from Bonaventure's texts on light. In his initial question on the subject, Bonaventure establishes that the light produced by God on the first day was corporeal light, and not spiritual light.52 Corporeal light, however, did not then exist as it would on the fourth day, when God distinguished it completely according to the number and the property of the heavenly bodies, such as the stars and the planets. After the fourth day, nonetheless, corporeal light remained according to the form and nature, but not according to the state, of its primary constitution; for instance, it has continued in the sun, which was formed from it on the fourth day.53 Thus, after the first day, God did not produce a new light; rather, from the first light, He distinguished the luminaries in the heavens and. among those luminous bodies, the sun is now preeminent. Adverting to the view of Damascene, who says that the original formation of light was most perfect, Bonaventure remarks that Damascene is comparing this formation to other bodies, which have to receive an influence from light, and not to the production of the luminaries, which are formed from light itself. 54 It its original state, therefore, corporeal light has not had the complete distinction that it now has in the sun and in the other heavenly bodies. Moreover, earthly bodies are influenced by light, whereas the heavenly bodies are formed from light, and so they are properly luminous bodies. Ap51 "Supra cgit Magister de productione illius formae, quae est quasi generale principium distinguendi ceteras corporales formas. In hac parte agit de productione rerum quantum ad formas speciales. Et quoniam quaedam res sunt simplices, quaedam mixtae, sive quaedam sunt insensibiles, quaedam sensibiles, ideo pars ista habet duas. In prima agit Magister de productione simplicium et insensibilium. In secunda vero de productione mixtorum et sensibilium, infra distinctione decima quinta. 'Dixit quoque Deus: Producant aquae reptile' etc." — 2 Sent., 14.div.text, (2.335; ed. min., 2.336). 52 2 Sent., 13.1.1 (2.311-13; ed. min., 2.313-16). 53 Loc. at., ad 4 & 6 (2.313; ed. mm., 2.315-16). 54 "Sed quoniam non videtur Scriptura (Gen., 1.14-19) exprimere quod Deus post primum diem produxerit novam lucem, sed solummodo luminaria distinxit, ideo est quarta opinio, quod ex ilia luce facta sunt corpora iuminosa, inter quae principatum tenet sol ... Quod autem dicit Damascenus, opus primae diei fuisse perfectissimum, hoc dicit per comparationem ad alia corpora quae a luce habent recipere influentiam, non per comparationem ad luminaria quae ex ipsa luce sunt formata." — 2 Sent., 13.dub.2, in Resp. (2.331; ed. mm., 2.333); cf. St. .John Damascene, De fide ortkod., 2.7 (PG 94.887).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

237

parently, then, the production of light on the first day has not involved the formation of every part of corporeal matter. Bonaventure indicates as much in his next question, where he shows how corporeal light, before the luminaries were produced, measured day arid night by its revolution. ss In showing this, Bonaventure teaches that corporeal light illumined the two hemispheres. With respect to one and the same hemisphere, light made day and night successively; but, with respect to both hemispheres, it made day on the one side and, at the same time, night on the other because of the opposition of the dense nature in the middle of the matter. Although that matter was not yet under a complete form, nevertheless, it was so dense in its middle part that it could project a shadow, just as the superior part of matter, because of its rarity and subtlety, could receive the influence of light. 56 Recalling Bonaventure's description of the production of light, we can readily understand his teaching on the illumination of the hemispheres. On producing light, God set it apart from the transparent and opaque parts of matter; so, by its illumination, the light penetrated the transparent part, which was subtle and rarefied, but not the opaque part, because it was dense and compact, thus opposing, or casting back, the illumination of the light. In that way, then, one hemisphere was in the light and the other was in the dark, and so light was divided from darkness, or day from night. The darkness of matter on the first day, therefore, consisted in a privation of lumen, or in night as opposed to day.S7 Explaining this fact, Bonaventure points out that darkness implies two sorts of privation. The first sort is simply the absence of light; so, formally speaking, such privation is really nothing. The second sort involves an absence of light in one part and the presence of its illumination in another part. In that way, darkness is called shadow, which results from the opposition of an opaque body. It is in this manner, Bonaventure says, that light was divided originally from darkness, or day from night.58 Bonaventure's texts, so far, suggest that he does not consider the form of light to be an intrinsic perfection of every part of corporeal matter. The transparent part of matter is illumined, but not formed, by light; the opaque part of matter reflects, or casts back, the illumination coming from light. In his third question on light, Bonaventure demonstrates that it is not a body, but the form of a body. He upholds his position with the combined support of Aristotle, Augustine and Damascene.59 In this question, as we have seen before, Bonaventure notes that heat sometimes names the property or quality of a bodily substance, such as a fire; at other times, it 55 2 Sent., 13.1.2 (2.314-16; ed. mm., 2.316-20). 56 Loc. at, Resp. ''Alms modus ..." (2. 315; ed. min., 2.318). 57 Cf. 2 Sent., 13.3.1, ad opp. 2 (2.324; ed. min., ad opp. b, 2.326). Since the term lumen has a different significance for Bonaventure than the term lux, and because the term light cannot express the difference between them, we shall use tight for lux and retain the Latin term lumen. 58 2 Sent., 12.dub.2. Resp., "Sed adhuc ..." (2.308; ed. min., 2.311). 59 2 Sent., 13.2.1, ad opp. 1-3 (2.317; ed. min., ad. opp., a-c, 2.320-21).

238

CHAPTER THREE

names the substance itself under such a form, just as the philosophers say that heat is a sort of subtle substance. Likewise, said in abstraction, light names the form of a luminous body, which has the power of lighting and acting (lucere et agere} from that form, and so Damascene says that light is a quality of fire. Said concretely, light names the luminous substance itself; so, with glow and flame, light is one of the three species of fire. Thus, Augustine says that light holds the first place among bodies, that air and light are the more subtle bodies; but he calls light, Bonaventure remarks, what we call fire. In short, for Bonaventure, speaking properly and abstractly, light is not a body, but the form of a body.60 Seen in abstraction, therefore, or in itself, light is properly understood to be the form of a luminous body. Since a celestial body is formed by light, then, taken abstractly, light designates the luminary from its action of illumination. The term also designates a fire, as a luminous body, from its active quality of lumen.1'1 Seen concretely, light is not understood in itself as a form, but as a luminous substance having the form of light. In this way, the sun can be called light, since it has the form of light. Similarly, though in its own way as a subtle substance, a fire can be called light, for we speak about the light of a fire, just as we speak about the glow, or about the flame, of a fire. In each instance, a quality specifies the fire, or names it specifically, according to the subtlety of its substance. Bonaventure's next question on light has to do with its nature as a form, arid he takes the position that it is a substantial form. Preparing his position, Bonaventure affirms, first of all, that light has been created before every other corporeal form; so, since generation of a substance is prior to generation of an accident, and since a substantial form is nobler than an accidental form, light is a substantial form and the noblest of corporeal forms. Furthermore, an accident, not existing through itself, cannot act through itself; but a luminous body, to the extent that it is luminous, does act through itself, and so light is not an accident, but a substantial form, of that body. Now a greater and lesser participation of things in an accident does not confer a degree of nobility on them according to specific differences: but the bodies in the world are more and less noble with respect to substantial being, and to specific difference, according as they participate more and less in light; therefore, Bonaventure says, it is impossible for light to be an accident of a luminous body.62 It is quite clear that Bonaventure is talking of light as the substantial form of a luminous body, such as a celestial body; but he also refers here to all bodies as participating in light. This question of the nature of light as a 60 Loc. ri!~, Resp. "Et ideo ..." (2.318; ed. min., 2.321). Note the passage closing the question: "Sic igitur ex praedictis patet, quod lux, proprie et abstracte loquendo, non est corpus, sed forma corporis." — ad 6 (2.318; ed. min., 2.322). 61 "Damascenus: 'Lumen est qualitas naturalis ipsius ignis'; sed nulla qualitas est corpus: ergo lux non est corpus, sed qualitas corporis." — Loc. cit., ad. opp. I (2.317; ed. min., ad opp. a, 2.320); cf. De fide orthod., 1.8 (PC 94.815), 62 2 Sent, 13.2.2, fa. 1-2, 5-6 (2.319; ed. mm., fa, a-b, e-f, 2.322).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

239

form, bringing us to the heart of our problem, requires our special attention: Bonaventure himself handles it very carefully. Finding contrary opinions among wise men, he sets down their views on the subject. Some say that light is an accident of a luminous body, as colour is an accident of a demarcated body, and heat of a heated body. Hence, light is a noble form with respect to second being, just as science, which is a spiritual light, is the noblest form in the human soul. Others say that light is a substantial form of bodies, which have truer and nobler being in the genus of beings according as they participate more and less in light. Wherefore, the noblest body is the fiery heaven, which is chiefly luminous, the least noble body is the earth, which is mostly opaque, and the bodies in between are more and less noble according to their greater and lesser participation in light. Those of this opinion say that all bodies share in the nature of light, for there is scarcely no opaque body that cannot be made luminous after much cleaning and polishing, as glass is made from cinder and a jewel from the earth. Weighing the merits of both opinions, Bonaventure finds truth in each of them. Light is a substantial form, he says, since it is the noblest of corporeal forms, and bodies are more and less beings according to their greater and lesser participation in light. But light also has the nature of an accidental form, because it is essentially sensible, an instrument of operation and, preserving the substantial form, can be augmented or diminished. Resolving the question in his own way, Bonaventure draws up the following comparison: embodied light is the principle of colour in the demarcated body itself, and colour is an accident and a passible quality perceived by sight; in a similar way, light is the principle of a certain brilliance in a luminous body, and brilliance is an accident after the manner of colour, for a luminous body is seen by the mediation of its brightness. Consequently, there are two ways of taking light. In the first way, it is taken as the form itself, which gives being to a lighted body and by which, as by a first mover and regulator, a luminous body is principally active. In the second way, light is taken as the brilliance, or brightness, surrounding a luminous body, and so, following the existence of light in such matter, this is an accident, an object of sight and an instrument of operation.63 Let us consider first St. Bonaventure's position on light as a substantial form. It is a substantial form, in the first place, because it is the noblest of corporeal forms. The nobility of light comes from its priority in being and in time over other corporeal forms. As a consequence, the bodies formed after the production of light have a greater and lesser dignity in substantial being, and of specific difference, according as they participate in light. Thus, in the second place, light is a substantial form because it measures the nobility of both the substantial being and the specific differences of bodies in the world. As their measure, however, light distinguishes them in the genus of beings, and not in the genus of bodies. They are distinguished 63 Lac. at., Resp. (2.320-21; ed. mm., 2.323-24).

240

CHAPTER THREE

in the genus of bodies by their own specific forms, from which they receive substantial being. Maintaining this distinction, the different bodies in the world are then distinguished as beings that, with respect to their being and specific differences, are more and less noble through their participation in light. Hence, it is a nobility of specific difference and of being, rather than the being or a specific difference, that a body has through its participation in light. In the third place, on the other hand, light is a substantial form because it is a principle of being, and a principle of action or of illumination. As a principle of being, light is the substantial form of a lighted body (corpus lucidum); as a principle of action, it is the substantial source of illumination in a luminous body (corpus luminosum). Now, taken abstractly, a lighted body is a body with a substantial form of light, and a luminous body is one operating from a substantial principle of light. Taken concretely, however, a lighted body is a luminous body: the sun, for instance, as a lighted body, has substantial being from light, which distinguishes it specifically in the genus of bodies from those bodies which have an embodied light; as a luminous body, the sun is a luminary operating by its substantial form, and so, with a greater nobility in the genus of beings than a body not formed by light, the sun has more actuality than a body having only an embodied light.64 There is evidently at least a specific difference between a luminary, which is formed by light, and a body having only an embodied light. The difference underlies Bonaventure's description of the accidental forms of light and colour. He describes the accidental nature of light as the brilliance of a luminous body, and he describes colour as an accident of a demarcated body (corpus terminatum}. The accidental form of light, completing a lighted body, is found in a luminous body having a substantial form of light, whereas the accident of colour is found in a demarcated body having an embodied light. Both brilliance and colour are perceptible qualities and instruments of operation; nonetheless, as Bonaventure indicates, they have different substantial foundations. The foundation of brilliance is a body which is formally and actively luminous: it is formally luminous because it has being substantially from light; it is actively luminous because light is the intrinsic source of its illumination. The foundation of colour is a body that, by contrast with a luminous body, is not formally and actively luminous. Having only an embodied light, this body is materially luminous, thus needing an extrinsic influence of light to become actively luminous. In short, light is an extrinsic principle of colour in a body having an embodied light; but a substantial form of light is the in64 On this point note: "Ad illud obicitur, quod si lux solis esset permixta materiae, non posset se multiplicare perfectae, dicendum quod praesentia materiae non tollit actualitatem formae, maxime quando corpus multum habet de specie et parum de materia; et quia in sole est abundantia lucis, quamvis sit ibi materia, non impeditur ab actione sua. Ea autem quae dicuntur habere lucem incorporatam, non habent perfectam potestatem multiplicand! se, non quia lux sit solum ibi in materia, sed quia corpora ilia multum habent de materia et parum de specie." — 2 Sent., 13.2.1, ad 5 (2.318; ed. mm., 2.322); cf. BreviL, 2.5 "Ad insinuandum ... nobilitatis formae." (2.223; ed. min., n. 6, 5.42-43).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

241

trinsic principle of brilliance surrounding a luminous body.65 It is to the latter sort of body, therefore, that Bonaventure refers when he speaks of light as a substantial form perfecting the body interiorly.66 He speaks of the same sort of body, moreover, when he says that the light of a luminous body is augmented because of its accidental form, and not because of its sub stantial form. According to its nature, a substantial form does not become more and less; nevertheless, according to its being in matter, a substantial form is subject to higher and lower degrees of modification. This is mostly true of general forms, Bonaventure remarks, among which there is a community of analogy according to the more and the less, the prior and the posterior, rather than a community of univocation. 67 The general forms, of course, are light and the elementary forms. As St. Bonaventure maintains, they are common forms by way of analogy and not of univocation. For instance, bodies participating in fire do not share in one and the same form of fire; rather, with reference to the first fire, those bodies, when compared with one another, are said to share more and less in the form of fire, and so one body of fire is more or less perfect than another. In a similar way, light is common analogically to luminous bodies. Existing preeminently and with a priority of being in the sun, light exists thereafter, or posteriorly, in varying degrees according to its being in other luminous bodies. Thus, with reference to the sun and from a mutual comparison, those bodies are known to participate more and less in the form of light. 68 Since every body, as a being, has a nobility of being and of specific difference through a participation in light, it follows, therefore, that the different degrees of nobility among bodies are also analogical. It follows from 65 "Nihil est de constitutione accidentis nisi accidens; sed lux est de compositione coloris, cum color non sit aliud quam lux incorporate ergo cum color sit accidens, lux est forma accidentalis." — 2 Sent, 13.2.2, con. 1 (2.319; ed. mm., 2.322-23). "Ad illud ... quod lux est de compositione coloris did potest, quod lux non dicitur esse de compositione coloris tamquam principium intrinsecum, sed tamquam principium effectivum, cum accidentia simplicia sint; forma autem substantialis bene potest esse principium effectivum accidentis." — Lac. cit., ad 1 (2.321; ed. min., 2.324). 66 "Item, in creaturis qualitas est immediatum principium actionis; unde forma substantial^ agit mediantibus proprietatibus accidentalibus tamquam instruments; sed lux est immediatum principium actionis: ergo videtur quod lux sit accidens." —Loc. cit., con. 6 (2.320; ed. min., 2.323). "Ad illud ... dicendum quod illud non cogit necessario, ut videtur; forma enim substantialis per se posse agere videtur. Sed quia exemplum huius non de facili invenitur aliis, quamvis non irrationabiliter credatur in forma lucis esse possibile, cum sit maxime activa, concedi potest quod, quamvis lux interius perficiens sit substantialis forma, tamen fulgor ille, quo corpus illud instrumentaliter operatur, sentitur et decoratur, ad naturam accidentis, sicut praedictum est, pertinere non indocte credi potest" —Eo. Inc., ad 6 (2.323; ed. min., 2.325). 67 "Item, quod augetur in aliquo, salva eius substantia et natura, ipsum est sibi accidens; sed lux augetur in corporibus praecipue luminosis ... ergo lux non est substantia sed accidens, cum substantia non recipiat magis et minus." — Loc. cit., con. 3 (2.320; ed. min., 2.323). "Ad illud ... dicendum est quod augmentum illud attenditur ratione fulgoris, non ratione lucis, quae est forma substantialis; et si ratione illius attenderetur, ad hue ratio non valeret, quia, quamvis forma substantialis secundum se non recipiat magis et minus, habet tamen intendi et remitti secundum esse ipsius in materia. Et hoc maxime verum est de formis generalibus, in quibus magis consistit commumtas analogiae secundum magis et minus, et prius et posterius, quam univocationis." —Eo. loc., ad 3 (2.323; ed. min., 2.324). 68 The moon, for example, has only a modicum of light: 2 Sent., 14.2.dub.3, Resp. "Et ratio ... est nocti." (2.368; ed. mm., 2.376).

242

CHAPTER THREE

this, that the substantial form of light in a lighted body has a community of analogy, and not of univocation, with respect to the light embodied in a thing not formally luminous. It would seem, then, that there is a wide difference, but also a true similarity, between those two conditions of light. Let us see whether our subsequent texts from St. Bonaventure can explain the significance of that difference and similarity. 69 We shall start with a text presenting a contrary position to the one chosen by Bonaventure on light as a substantial form. The text presupposes that there is some form of light in a fire, which is a terrestrial body. Now, if the light in a fire is a substantial form, it is either the completive form or next to the ultimate form of the fire. But light cannot be the ultimately completive form of a fire, because, if it were, the nature of fire would be the same as the nature of a celestial body, so that no luminous bodies would be specifically different from one another. On the other hand, if light is a form next to the ultimate or specific form, light is then the less perfect form, and thus it is not the noblest form in the fire, since the fire would be perfected and completed by its specific form. If light is the ultimate form in a celestial body, therefore, the elementary bodies would be nobler than the celestial bodies. If this is false, it follows that the light in a fire is not a substantial form. 70 In his reply to this demonstration, Bonaventure says that, if light is posited as a substantial form of bodies diverse in species, such as a celestial body and a body of fire, it is not the ultimately completive form of either body. From this, therefore, it is not to be concluded that an elementary nature is nobler than the celestial nature; nor can it be concluded that another form, even though it is a subsequent form, is nobler than the form of light. When the form of light is posited in the same body with another form, it is not posited as an imperfect disposition which, by its nature, is to be perfected through the ultimate form. Light is posited there as a form and nature conserving every other corporeal form and, giving efficacy of action to the form, as the measure of the dignity and excellence of any corporeal form whatsoever. Regarding the view that the ultimately completive form is the nobler form, Bonaventure says that this is true where a common form has to be completed and perfected by the ultimate and specific form. In other words, it is true where each form, i.e. the common form and the ultimate form, exists in the fullest power of its being; however, light is in that condition only in a celestial body. 71

69 The following texts indicate the problem: "Item, triplex est species ignis, scilicet ignis carbo, ignis lux et ignis flamma; sed natura firmament! est ut natura lucis: ergo videtur contineri sub tertia specie ignis." — 2 Sent., 14.1.1.2, arg. 5 (2.339; ed. min., 2.341). "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod lux est species ignis, dicendum quod non quaecumque lux est species ignis, sed ilia quae est in materia transimitabili; et haec est quae habet caliditatem annexam, informantem eandem materiam; huiusmodi autem non est lux corporis quinti, quamvis aliquo modo sit isti conformis." — Lac. cit, ad 5 (2.340; ed. min., 2.343). The heat accompanying fire is an accidental, and not a substantial, form: 2 Sent., 13.2.2, ad 4 (2.320; ed. min., 2.324-25). 70 2 Sent., 13.2.2, con. 5 (2.320; ed. min., 2.323). 71 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod non est forma ultima in igne, dicendum quod si lux ponitur esse

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

243

Bonaventure's response in this text must be understood within its proper context, namely, his entire question on light as a form, whether substantial or accidental. In the first part of the text, without committing himself to the position that light is a substantial form in a fire, he says that, if it is a substantial form of a fire and of a celestial body, light is not the form that ultimately completes either body. He is saying, then, that the form of light cannot be the final form both of a celestial body and of a terrestrial body, but either only of a celestial body or only of a terrestrial body. Again, if light is not the ultimately completive form of either body, it does not follow that fire has a nobler nature than a luminary, nor must it follow that a subsequent form is nobler than the form of light. By these statements, Bonaventure means that, although a fire would be completed ultimately by the specific form of fire, nevertheless, it does not follow that the nature and form of fire are nobler than the nature and form of a luminary. This conclusion is ruled out because the nobility of a thing is not measured according to its specific form, but according to its participation in light, and that participation, which is really analogical, confers a higher degree of nobility on a celestial body than on a terrestrial body. Hence, speaking on the above suppositions, Bonaventure does not say explicitly that a body of fire with the ultimate form of fire also has a substantial form of light; rather, saying that the form of light cannot be the ultimately completive form of bodies diverse in species, he speaks only about the form of light as a principle of substantial being. In this respect, as we have seen, light is the substantial form of a luminary, or a lighted body, whereas terrestrial bodies, having being from their own specific forms, contain an embodied light. There is no explicit commitment here by Bonaventure to the view that light is a substantial form of a fire. In the second part of the text, however, he speaks of light when it is posited with another form in the same body. In that regard, he says something negative and something positive. From the negative viewpoint, he says that light is not an imperfect disposition requiring a natural perfection from an ultimate form. Bonaventure is saying here that light, when it is posited with an ultimate form in the same body, is not perfected by the ultimate form, because the nature of light is such that it is not an imperfect disposition with respect to an ultimate form. Light, of its own nature, is a principle of perfection and, as the noblest corporeal form, cannot be perfected or completed by any other corporeal form. forma substantialis corporum specie diversorum, utpote caeli et ignis, neutrius est forma ultimo completiva. Icleo ex hoc non concluditur, quod natura elementaris sit nobilior caelesti; nee ex hoc etiam potest concludi, quod alia forma sit nobilior forma lucis, quamx'is sii ulterior. Forma enim lucis cum ponitur in eodem corpore cum alia forma, non ponitur sicut dispositio imperfecta, quae nata sit perfici per ultimam formam, sed ponitur tamquam forma et natura omnis alterius corporalis formae conservativa et dans ei agendi efficaciam, et secundurn quam attenditur cuiuslibet formae corporafis mensura in dignitate et excellentia. — Et quod obicitur, quod forma ultimo completiva nobilior est; ubi forma ilia habet compleri et perfici per ultimam, scilicet ubi forma communis habet perfici pel ultimam et specialem. Vel dicendum, quod veritatem habet, ubi utraque forma, scilicet communis et ultima, est in suo potissimo esse; sic autem lux non est nisi in caelesti corpore." Loc. cit., ad 5 (2.321-22; ed. rain., 2.325).

244

CHAPTER THREE

From the positive viewpoint, then, light is a form and nature conserving every other corporeal form, to which it gives efficacy of acting, and of which it is the measure of nobility. In this statement, describing the functions of light in a body with another form, Bonaventure tells us what light does as a form and a nature. Thus, he is speaking now of light as a principle of action, at least with respect to its functions of conserving the being of other forms and of communicating to them their efficacy of operation. In that respect, as we have also seen, it is a lighted body, or a luminary, which has a substantial form of light, so that this sort of body, which is accidentally brilliant, is luminous by an intrinsic principle of light. The other sort of body, which is accidentally coloured, has only an embodied light, and so a body of that kind, which is a terrestrial body, is made luminous by an extrinsic influence or illumination of light. Since terrestrial bodies are illuminated by the celestial bodies, and since the proper action of light is illumination, therefore, as a substantial form, light gives an intrinsic efficacy of acting to a celestial body, or a luminary, and this body, by its proper act, transmits light to a terrestrial body, which has a proper act from its own specific form and nature. Hence, it is not necessary to conclude from this part of Bonaventure's text that, in saying when light is posited with another form in the same body, he posits a substantial form of light in every inanimate body. It is not certain, on the one hand, that he posits such a form in terrestrial bodies, since they are not formed by light, because they are not lighted bodies. They are bodies undergoing an extrinsic illumination, for they receive the transmission of light from celestial bodies; therefore, terrestrial bodies are conserved in being and are effective in act by the influence of celestial light, while the nobility of their completive forms is measured by their capacity to share in that influence. It is certain, on the other hand, that Bonaventure posits light as a substantial form in the celestial bodies, since they are formed by light; so, as a substantial form, light conserves the being and measures the nobility of the completive forms of the celestial bodies. In the third and last part of his text, Bonaventure says explicitly that light exists in the fullest power of its being only in a celestial body. Taking light here as a common form among the celestial bodies, he speaks of their ultimately completive forms as nobler than their common form, because the final forms exist also in the fullest power of their being. Since the final form of a celestial body is in fact a particular form of light itself, this position does not necessarily hold that there are two or more substantial forms in such a body. Bonaventure's position can be seen equally as positing a specification of the common form of light in this or in that particular luminary, where the power of its being is most full both as a common form and as specified in the particular luminary. A similar position can be taken with respect to the common terrestrial forms: fire, for instance, which properly burns and heats, is found in every fiery body, and it is there in its most powerful being, both commonly and specifically; but its being is less powerful in other bodies, where fire burns and heats in varying degrees. In short, the form of fire or of light is common by way of analogy and not of

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

245

univocation: a particular body of fire or of light has being from its special form, which is really a particularization of a general form, or a specification of a generic form. There are, nonetheless, two problems left unsolved by this part, and by the other two parts, of Bonaventure's text. The first problem has to do with the nature of the celestial bodies, particularly their completive forms, and with the nature of their influence on terrestrial bodies. The second problem concerns the nature of the embodied light in terrestrial bodies, especially in a fiery body. This sort of body is completed ultimately by the form of fire, by which it burns and heats; but a fire also gives light, it can be brilliant, and it has a coloured glow or flame. Thus, it is evident that a fire has a proper principle of illumination. The problem is whether the principle is accidental or substantial; again, if it is substantial, whether it is a proper form of the fire or an embodied light found in it. Regarding the nature of the celestial bodies, Bonaventure teaches that each luminary, perfecting the whole of a species, is a single species. The multiplicity of luminaries, therefore, is not a numerical division of one and the same species.72 The luminaries, then, are diverse from one another in form and species. The purpose of the luminaries, according to Bonaventure, is to exercise diverse influences on terrestrial bodies. For this reason, .the luminaries have diverse species and powers, so that a perfect effect can come about from the conjunction of their diverse powers. Moreover, the matter in mixed bodies can support diverse forms according to the diversity of those bodies; in like manner, the matter in simple bodies can support diverse forms according to the greater rarity and density of its parts. For instance, among the elements, matter, according to its greater density, can sustain the form of earth and, according as it is more and less rarified, matter is also disposed to sustain the forms of the other elements. There is also a rarity and density of the matter among the celestial bodies, as Averroes shows, and so celestial matter can sustain a diversity of forms, but not in the same way as the matter of the elements. The rarity and density of matter among the elements are caused by their active and passive qualities, which dispose the parts of matter for diverse forms. The rarity and density of celestial matter, however, are caused only according to the diverse sites of its parts. In the density of matter, the parts are close to one another because they are compact; in the rarity of matter, the parts are distant from one another because they are sparse. Consequently, the parts of celestial matter are more united in its density than in its rarity. 73 Furthermore, light is one common form in all the luminaries, and they are more and less noble according to their greater and lesser participation in light. Since they share diversely in that form, the luminaries have diverse degrees of completion and, therefore, diverse completive forms.7'1 72 2 Sent., 14.2.2.1, fa. 1-4 (2.357; ed. min., fa. a-d, 2.362-63). 73 Loc. cit, Resp. "... raro sparsae." (2.358-59; ed. min., 2.363-64); cf. Averroes, De substantia orbts. c. 2, vol. 9, fol. 7vl-8rE (Venetiis, 1573). 74 "Lux enim est una forma communis, reperta in omnibus luminaribus, et secundum cuius participationem maiorem et minorem sunt magis et minus nobilia; et ideo, cum istam formam diversimode

246

CHAPTER THREE

To understand what Bonaventure means by the completive forms of the luminaries, we must join his reason for their formal diversity to his twofold reason for their material diversity. He illustrates the latter diversity, in the first place, by a comparison between mixed bodies and simple bodies with regard to the aptitude of their matter to sustain diverse forms. Since the matter of a mixed body has a form which is not necessarily different in species from the form of another mixed body, there can be many such bodies in one and the same species. But the matter of a simple body has a form constituting a single species with that body; therefore, each element and each luminary is a single species, because they are simple bodies. The completive form of a luminary, then, is the specific perfection of a simple body.75 Bonaventure illustrates the material diversity of the luminaries, in the second place, by comparing them with the elements according to a similarity and difference between celestial matter and terrestrial matter. Their similarity consists in a rarity and density of parts; their difference has to do with distinctive modes of sustaining diverse forms. These two features of celestial and terrestrial matter have been described, though in another way, by Bonaventure in a previous text. In that text, he speaks of celestial and terrestrial matter as the same when considered as subject to substantial form and extension, or quantity; but they are different with respect to quality, or contrariety, because only terrestrial matter, which is the same in the elements, is subjected to contrary qualities.76 Thus, the rarity and density of either celestial or terrestrial matter can sustain a diversity of substantial forms according to a diversity of quantity. The different quantities of terrestrial matter in the elements, however, are determined according to the contrary dispositions of their active and passive qualities, whereas the different quantities of celestial matter in the luminaries are determined by their diverse sites in the firmament. Consequently, each luminary is a specific body with a quantity of matter determined by its proper site in the starry heaven. The completive form of a luminary, therefore, is simply one specification, or a special determination, of the general form of light, and so this common form is completed substantially, and in diverse ways, according to its specific perfections in the different luminaries. Evidently, then, for Bonaventure, the expression completive form does not necessarily imply the presence of two or more substantial forms in one and the same body. With reference to a luminary, which is a simple body having one only substantial form, the expression designates a single specific form of light, and this form is similar more and less to the specific forms of the other luminaries only by way of analogy and according to their varying degrees of nobility. When Bonaventure speaks either of light as the noblest corporeal form or of the noblest form in anything as its ultimate and completive form, he does not say that light is a substantial form in terrestrial participent, diversos habent gradus completionis, ideo etiam diversas formas completivas." — Loc. cit., Resp. in finem (2.359; ed. min., 2.364). 75 See: toe. cit., sc 1 & ad 1 (2.358-59; ed. min., 2.363-64). 76 See above: pp. 228-30.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

247

bodies, nor does he say that it completes another form in celestial bodies. On the contrary, he says that an ultimate form is a completive form with respect to those forms which dispose the body to receive it, and that light is a form perfecting other corporeal forms rather than disposing the body to receive them, since they are more and less complete according to their greater and lesser participation in light. This participation, as we have shown, refers to the extrinsic influence exercised on terrestrial bodies by celestial light, conserving their being, giving them efficacy of acting, and measuring their degrees of nobility. In other words, light is the noblest of corporeal forms only regarding the forms that are extraneous to it, namely, the forms of terrestrial bodies. Light is not the noblest form in celestial bodies, because, in them, its power and nature are preserved completely, and so it is the only form in a luminary." The material and formal causes of the luminaries do not constitute the total reason of their diversity. That reason includes their final cause, which looks to the diverse influences of the luminaries on terrestrial bodies. Hence, the luminaries are also diversified by their particular powers and operations.78 Explaining this diversity, Bonaventure teaches that the luminaries, by their proper operations, alter the qualities of the elements, thus causing them to mix with one another. Having no alteration of qualities, the luminaries exercise that influence because, with their superior nature, they have power over the elements and the elementary bodies. In the opinion of Averroes, the diversity of powers among the elements follows a diversity of qualities, which they have in common with the elements, though only in an equivocal way, for the luminaries act on inferior bodies and not on one another. Since an equivocal diversity of qualities would really prevent the luminaries from influencing the elements, the opinion of Averroes is unacceptable to Bonaventure. In his view, a diversity of powers is found in the luminaries because they are incorruptible bodies placed in the firmament to rule and to regulate the corruptible bodies on the earth. As a consequence, the luminaries have diverse powers, following a diversity of species, with regard to the different elements and to the different mineral bodies on the earth. For instance, the moon has a natural power that, with the help of lumen, looks to the element of water; so, through the influence of the moon, dampness is increased on the earth and the tides of the seas ebb back and forth. Comparable in77 "Item, nobilissima forma, quae sit in sole, est ipsius lux: et nobilissima forma in unaquaque re est forma ultima: ergo lux est forma ultima et completiva solis in specie sua. Sed in luce convenit cum omnibus aliis luminaribus; ergo videtur quod luminaria caeli specie non sint distincta."— Loc. cit., sc 4 (2.358; ed. min., 2.363). "Ad illud ... quod forma ultima est completiva, dicendum quod hoc est verum respecta formarum quae disponunt ad ipsam; lux autem potius est forma perficiens alias formas corporales quam ad eas disponens, cum secundum eius participationem maiorem et minorem formae corporales sint magis et minus completae. —Vel dicendum quod lux est nobilissima formarum corporalium, earum scilicet quae sunt ei extraneae; s'ed non est verum de formis luminarium caelestium, in quibus virtus euis et natura complete salvatur." — Eo. loc., ad 4 (2.359; ed. min, 2.354). 78 Loc. cit., sc 2-3, ad 2-3 (2.358-59; at min., 2.363-64).

248

CHAPTER

THREE

fluences, Bonaventure remarks, can be assigned to the other luminaries.79 By causing the elements to mingle in the generation of mixed bodies, the luminaries do not impart their own forms, or any other forms, to those bodies. Rather, exercising their proper influences, the luminaries draw into act what is already in potency, and so, with the help of the elements, they bring about a multiplication of terrestrial forms and species. Thus, by their conjoined influence, which is founded on their common power of light, the luminaries work together with the elements in the generation of mineral bodies, whose natures and qualities are conserved, ruled and regulated by the power of the celestial bodies.80 We have now established, from the texts of Bonaventure, the following points on the nature and power of the celestial bodies. First, in each luminary, there is one only substantial form, which is a specification of the general form of light; this special form is a single form completing and perfecting the matter of a simple body, with which it constitutes a whole species. Secondly, found only in celestial bodies, light as a substantial form is extraneous to the forms of terrestrial bodies; by comparison with those bodies, and only those bodies, light is said to be the noblest of corporeal forms. Thirdly, each luminary has a proper power following the nature of its species; this power has an extrinsic influence on the qualities of the elements, and so, giving efficacy of action to the elements in that way, it causes them to mingle in the generation of mixed or mineral bodies. Fourthly, in causing the generation of terrestrial bodies, no luminary imparts to them any substantial form, particularly a form of light; terrestrial bodies are formed, under the influence of the luminaries, by the eduction into act of specific forms already contained in the potency of terrestrial matter. Finally, the perfection and conservation of terrestrial bodies are effected by the extrinsic power and influence of celestial light; those effects are achieved by the luminaries with the help of their lumen. The introduction of lumen takes us to the final feature of the luminaries, and to the point of transition to the problem on the connexion between the nature of light and terrestrial fire. In his first question on lumen, Bonaventure shows that the lumen emerging from a luminous body is a quality and not a body. He takes this position with some support from Augustine, but much support from Aristotle.81 If a lumen and a ray of light are understood with precision, Bonaventure says, neither of them will be seen as a body, nor will either of them be seen as something flowing from a body.82 Although the source of lumen is a lighted body, the transmission of lumen through a medium does 79 2 Sent, 14.2.2.2, Resp. (2.360; ed. min., 2.366); for the reference to Averroes see above: n. 73. On the different species of influence exercised by the luminaries over the elements consult: ad 4-5 (2.361; ed min., 2.367); cf. Brevil., 2.5 "Collocantur etiam ... sunt intelligenda." (5.223; ed min., n. 7, 5.43). 80 2 Sent., 14.2.2.2, ad 3 (2.361; ed. min., 2.366-67). 81 2 Sent., 13.3.1, ad opp. 1-8 (2.324; ed. min., ad opp. a-h, 2.326); Augustine is cited here once and Aristotle three times 82 Lac. cit., Resp. "Et ideo ..." (2.325; ed min., 2. 327-28).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

249

not entail a change of place, properly speaking, but a generation and diffusion of lumen itself. This quality does not act by a proper power, but by the power of the luminous body producing it, and which really acts by it.83 Thus, coming forth from a lighted body, lumen is a quality of that body and the instrument by which it is actively luminous. Taken concretely, then, a luminous body has lumen by which it actually illuminates. In his second question on lumen Bonaventure handles the problem of its substantial or accidental nature in the air, which is the medium of its transmission to terrestrial bodies. His solution to the problem follows a presentation of three other solutions, two of which he presents without comment. The first solution rests on the view that light and lumen do not differ in essence, but only by a mode of being. In that view, lumen is generated univocally from light; therefore, since light is a substantial form in its source, lumen is a substance in the air, even though it exists there with an accidental mode of being. According to the second solution, lumen is caused by a luminous body only inasmuch as it is brilliant; therefore, lumen is an accident with respect to both the luminous body, which is its principle, and the air, which is its subject. The third solution regards lumen in the air as neither a substance nor an accident, properly considered, because it has being there only in a spiritual way as abstracted from matter, and not in a natural way as concretized in matter. Bonaventure takes immediate exception to this view. In his judgment, lumen in the air has a spiritual operation in the soul with respect to vision, and a natural operation regarding the illumination of bodies; so, in the air, lumen has both a spiritual or habitual being and a natural being.84 Offering his own solution to the problem, Bonaventure holds that, emerging from a luminous body, lumen in the air is an active power by which a celestial body operates and has an influence on terrestrial bodies; so it is a substantial power in the luminous body itself. Thus, Damascene speaks: "we say that a fire gives light because of the lumen coming forth from it; we do not say that lumen is a ministering organ of the fire, because it is from the fire, but a natural power of the fire." Interpreting this statement, Bonaventure says that the lumen from a fire is not something instrumental or accidental to it, but a connatural power, which is consubstantial to the fire. Although the active power of lumen cannot be seen, nevertheless, it draws all the senses into act. Such is the view of Augustine, and of the philosophers who say that the celestial bodies, by their mediating lumen, have an influence on the generation of mineral bodies. Consequently, it is true to say that lumen is a substance related accidentally to the air.85 But lumen is not only an active and invisible power, it is also a 83 Loc. «t, ad 1 & 6 (2.325-26; ed. min., 2.328-29). 84 2 Sent., 13.3.2, Resp. "... valde verisimiie." (2.327-28; ed. min., 2.330). 85 Loc. cit., Resp. "Propterea intelligendum ... accidentaliter comparator." (2.328; ed. min., 2.330-31); cf. 13.3.1, ad 1 (2.325; ed. min., 2.328), and see in St. John Damascene: Defide orthod., 1.8 (PG 94.819-22), and in St Augustine: De Gen. ad litt., 12.16.32-33 (PL 34.466-67).

250

CHAPTER THREE

sensible quality drawing the sense of sight into act. Hence, Avicenna describes lumen as a "quality of a body having light". It is equally true to say, therefore, that lumen is an accident when compared to the air receiving it and to the body that causes it, because it emerges from a body inasmuch as the body is brilliant, and thus lumen is an object of sight. According to its substantial nature and to its accidental nature, Bonaventure explains, lumen is in the air as in a medium and a transporting subject, but not as in a first subject. With respect to the air itself, lumen does not have a natural mode of existing, nor is it a natural form. It exists in the air by way of a habitus, and it is a likeness of a form, just as a similitude of a colour is not properly the colour, but is like the colour. The lumen in the air, nonetheless, has a very great approximation to its first subject, so that it flows from the luminous body without the aid of an extrinsic principle. Wherefore, lumen does not have a material principle in the air; rather, it flows from an original principle, to which it returns when it ceases to be the air. This is the way that lumen is described by Averroes, who says that it is a habitus of a transparent body.86 Summing up his position, Bonaventure maintains that, as an active power, lumen in the air is a substance having the mode of an accident; in this regard, it comes to something already complete in being. As a sensible quality, lumen is an accident not having the full nature of an accident with respect to the air, because it is there as in a transparent subject and not as in a sustaining subject. In that regard, lumen is related to a transparent body as colour is related to a demarcated body.87 Bonaventure is talking here about lumen as it is transmitted through the air, which is a transparent body, from celestial bodies to terrestrial bodies. Considering lumen in that way, he describes it as an accident and as an substance. As an accident, it flows from the celestial bodies, according as they are brilliant, passes through the air and illumines the terrestrial bodies. It is a visible quality of the air, as colour is a visible quality of a body. But colour is a natural form of its body, whereas lumen in the air is a likeness of the form in a celestial body giving rise to it. Thus, as an accident, lumen is not sustained in being by the air as a colour is sustained by its subject. Strictly speaking, therefore, lumen is related to the air in the same way that the similitude of a colour is related to the air in passing through it from a coloured body to the eye of a beholder. As a substance, lumen is an active power flowing from the celestial bodies into the air and, through its 86 Lac. at., Resp. "Non solum ... tertiaopinio." (2.328-29; ed. min., 2.330-31). Gf. Avicenna, De anima, 3.1., fol. 10r(Venetiis, 1508); Averroes, In De anima, 2.2, text 70, vol. 6.1-2, fol. 86v (Venetiis, 1574), or Crawford, p. 237. 87 "Ex his igitur patet quod lumen in medio, in quantum dicit vim activam, dicit substantiam habentem modum accidentis; in quantum dicit qualitatem sensibilem, dicit accidens illud relatum ad aerem, non habet plene rationem accidentis naturalis sed similitudinis vel intentionis, quia est ibi non sicut in subiecto sustinente sed sicut in deferente." —Loc. tit., Resp. in finem (2.329; ed. min., 2.331); cf. ad fa. 1-4 (a-c).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

251

mediation, influencing the generation of terrestial bodies. Hence, it is an invisible quality of the air, where it exists after the manner of an accident or a habitus, because the air itself is already complete in substantial being. As a substance, then, lumen has its proper being only in the celestial or luminous bodies, where it exists substantially as an active power. Since lumen is not a body, but a form or quality of a body, and since it has no material principle of origin in the air, therefore, lumen does not coexist with the air, because it is not mixed up with the air. Lumen has only an accidental or habitual mode of existing in the air. In other words, the illumination of the air by a substantial power of lumen entails neither the formation of a mixed body by two substantial forms, nor their coexistence with substantial being in one and the same body.88 In Bonaventure's view, evidently, a form with a substantial nature can exist habitually or accidentally in a body which is completed in substantial being by a proper form. This is how he accounts for the presence of lumen in the air, which is not its first subject, nor its original principle. Lumen has its origin in a luminous or lighted body and, as a substantial power, is subject to that body, while emerging from the body as an effect of its brilliance. It is in this manner that Bonaventure explains the action of illumination by the celestial bodies, and by a fire. In the latter instance, he says that lumen is connatural to a fire, because it is a consubstantial power by which the fire gives light, or illuminates. It would appear, then, that the principle of light in a fire is neither an accidental form nor a substantial form, but a consubstantial power of lumen. With this in mind, we shall now turn out attention to the problem of the relation between light and fire in the texts of Bonaventure. We shall introduce the problem with his question on the nature of the firmament, which is sometimes said to be of the same nature as the element of fire. Concurring with Aristotle on this question, Bonaventure maintains that the nature of the firmament is other than the nature of the four elements.89 Of the several reasons given by Bonaventure in support of his position, only two concern us here. The first touches the differences between the firmament and the element of fire. Because the one is naturally incorruptible and the other naturally corruptible, therefore, having different completive forms, they are not of the same nature. The second reason pertains to the power and influence of the firmament with regard to the elements: reconciling their contrary qualities by its influence, the firmament brings the elements together to form mixed bodies; therefore, having a natural power

88 For Bonaventure's rejection of the coexistence of lumen with the air see: 2 Sent., 13.3.1, Resp. "Licet autem ... solis influentiam." (2.325; ed. min., 2.327). There can be a coexistence of two spiritual forms in one human body, e.g., when a man is possessed by an evil spirit; however, the presence of such a spirit in a human body is accidental and not substantial: 2 Sent., 8.2.un. 1, ad 3-4 (2.225; ed. min., 2.222). 89 2 Sent., 14.1.1.2, ad opp. 1 (2.339; ed. min., ad opp. a, 2.341); cf. Aristotle, De caelo, 1.2 (268bl2269bl7).

252

CHAPTER THREE

over the elements, the firmament is different in nature from each of them.90 Now, noting that the theologians seem to contradict the philosophers on the firmament, Bonaventure says that the philosophers posit there a nature which is not corruptible nor subject to contrariety. For those reasons, the philosophers say that the celestial nature reconciles the contrary qualities of the four elements and conserves them in being. Although the theologians seem to say that fire is the nature of the firmament, nevertheless, Bonaventure observes, right reason shows that the firmament has a nature different from the nature of any element. On this point, arriving at the truth, the philosophers can be followed. Moreover, the theologians do not depart from them intentionally, but only in a verbal manner, as the words of Augustine indicate. He says in many places that the element of fire is named from the perfection of light, while the philosophers name fire from its property of heat. Since the nature of light is found both in the firmament and in the element of fire, therefore, Augustine says that the two are of one nature. But they are not of one nature, Bonaventure holds, because they have one form of the most special species. Rather, the firmament and the element of fire participate in the nature of light according to a community of analogy: the firmament, unlike fire, is not subjected to contrariety, and so it alone has light in a pure way. This is why the philosophers say that fire and the firmament are other in nature.91 Relying on his own understanding of light, Bonaventure reconciles the doctrine of Augustine with the doctrine of the philosophers, notably Aristotle, on the nature of fire and of the firmament. Following the philosophers, he posits a different nature in the firmament and in fire, which is properly named from its heat. At the same time, following Augustine, he puts the nature of light in both fire and the firmament. Reducing their community of light to an analogical participation, however, Bonaventure posits a purity of light, or its proper form, only in the firmament. Holding his own doctrine on the nature of light, therefore, he is able to differentiate celestial light from terrestrial light, while retaining their similarity in an analogical manner. In his doctrine, only that light which is in terrestrial matter is a species of fire. This is the sort of light which has heat connected with it, informing the same matter; but celestial light is not of that kind, even though it is conformable in some way to the light which is a species of fire.92 The conformity of the firmament to fire consists in a conformed participation in light. Hence, the firmament can be taken under the name of fire, just as the crystalline heaven, having some properly of water, can be considered under the name of water.93 Now the 90 Lac. cit, ad opp. 2 & 6 (b & f). 91 Loc. cit., Resp. (2.339-40; ed. min., 2.341-42); there are copious references here to theOe Gen. adlitt, where St. Augustine speaks of fire and light 92 Loc. cit., arg. 5, ad 5 (2.339-40; ed. min., 2.341, 343), see above: n. 69, p. 242. 93 "Ideo enim caelum comprehenditur sub igne propter conformem lucis participationem. Unde, sicut dictum est supra, quod caelum crystallinum censeri potest nomine aquae, quia aliquam proprietatem eius in se habet, sic et in proposito intelligi potest" — Loc. cit., ad 2-3 (2.340; ed. min., 2.342).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

253

element of water has three properties: transparency, coldness and heaviness. The crystalline heaven and the element of water are alike in transparency, because, of their nature, they can receive lumen and, unlike the air, they can retain it in some way. Thus, water retains lumen in such a way that a polished stone, a ruby, for instance, glows in the dark when placed in a glass of water. Regarding the property of heaviness, the crystalline heaven and the element of water are simply different, for the watery nature of the heaven is subject neither to weight nor to downward motion. There is likeness and difference in coldness between the heaven and water, since both are effectively cold, but only water is formally and chiefly cold.94 The element of fire also has three properties: luminosity, heat and levity. With respect to luminosity, fire and the firmament are alike; but they are simply different with respect to levity. From the point of view of heat, however, they are alike and different. Both fire and the firmament are effectively hot, but fire alone is formally and chiefly hot. If the firmament had informing heat, Bonaventure remarks, it would then have contrariety.95 Since fire and the firmament have a conformed participation in light, they do not have the nature of light in either an equivocal or a univocal way. If they had light equivocally, there would be no real similarity between them; but the firmament and fire are similar through their property of luminosity. If they had light univocally, there would be no real difference between them; but fire and the firmament do not have the same completive form, for light is such a form only in a celestial body. Consequently, the participation in light by fire and the firmament is analogical, and so partly univocal and partly equivocal. Light is found as a completive form in the firmament where it gives rise to the substantial power of lumen, thus producing the luminosity of the celestial bodies. Light is found in an embodied way in fire where it supports the consubstantial power of lumen causing the luminosity of a fiery body. Hence, light is partly univocal because it is a common principle of luminosity in fire and in the firmament; it is also partly equivocal because it is a completive form in the firmament but not in a fire, which has its own ultimate form. This analogical nature of light has certain consequences for fire and the firmament regarding heat, which they both cause efficiently, and yet it is found formally only in fire. Since heat is a natural property of fire, heat is 94 2 Sent., 14.1.1, Resp. "Et ideo ..." (2.337-38; ed. min., 2.339-40); cf. fm. 4 (2.336; ed. min., fm. d, 2.337). 95 "Triplex enira est ignis proprietas, sicut supra dictum est de aqua; una est luminositas, altera caliditas et tertia levitas, per quam movetur inotu qui est sursum. In prima proprietate ignis et firmamentum conveniunt. In tertia ignis et firmamentum simpliciter differunt. In media vero partim conveniunt et partim differunt. Conveniunt utique in hoc quod tarn ignis quam firmamentum est calidum effective. Differunt vero in hoc quod ignis est calidus formaliter, firmamentum vero minime; si enim haberet caliditatem informantem, haberet utique contrarietatem." — 2 Sent., 14.1.1.2, ad 2-3 (2.340; ed. min., 2.342).

254

CHAPTER THREE

generated by a fire according to its nature, but not according to its connatural power of lumen. There is no natural property of heat in the firmament, because it has no contrariety; therefore, the firmament causes heat in terrestrial bodies through the force of a substantial power of lumen, and this can be shown, Bonaventure notes, by gathering heat from the rays of the sun with the aid of a concave mirror. The lumen of every celestial body does not cause heat, however, for the moon produces dew and cold. Evidently, then, the conformity of the firmament to fire in the effective production of heat is not the same as their conformity in light. All the luminaries in the firmament are alike with respect to the nature of light; because the element of fire is similar most of all to the firmament, the luminaries have a universal conformity to fire more than to any other element. On the other hand, each luminary has its special effect on the elements, so that one luminary produces heat and another produces cold. In short, the conformity of the firmament to fire with regard to heat is less universal than its conformity with respect to light; but the latter conformity depends upon an analogical participation in the nature of light.96 Bonaventure's position on the conformed participation of fire and the firmament in light, as the above texts show, is really a particular instance of the analogical participation in light of terrestrial and celestial bodies. Although the element of fire, which is a luminous body, is more similar than the other elements to the nature of the celestial bodies, nevertheless, it does not have the substantial form of light. The fiery element is a simple substance, and so it can have one only substantial form, namely, the form of fire. This form completes the matter of the element, which has the accidental qualities of heat and subtlety; but it also has the substantial quality of lumen, which is a connatural or substantial power of any fire giving light. Hence, the term light designates a fire from its active quality of lumen, and not from a substantial form of light 97 In Bonaventure's estimation, furthermore, not every fire gives light, for there are three sorts of fire. The first is pure fire, which is fire in its proper matter. This fire is light, giving light purely and abundantly. The second sort is embodied fire, or fire in foreign matter, for example, fire in the air or in the earth. That sort of fire, including glow and flame, gives light and expels darkness. The third sort of fire is both embodied and all mixed up in matter, for instance, a sulphurous or smoky fire. Giving no light, a fire of this sort is darkness, and such will be the fire in hell.98 Pure fire, as stated here, seems to be light itself. As the

96 Cf. loc. at., ad 6 (2.340-41; ed. min., 2.343); 14.2.2.2, ad 6 (2.361; ed. min., 2.367). 97 See above: pp. 237-38. 98 "... notandum quod ignis est in triplici differentia. Est enim ignis purus, ut est in propria raateria; et est ignis incorporates, ut est in materia aliena, ut in terrea ve! aerea; et est ignis non tantum incorporates, sed etiam permixtus, ut ignis sulphureus et fumosus. Primus est lux et pure lucet et abundanter. Secundus est ignis, carbo et flamma; hic autem lucet et tenebram expellit. Tertius est ignis fumosus, et talis est tenebrosus, et iste erit in inferno." — 4 Sent., 50.1.2.3, Resp. (4.1041; ed. min., 4,1024).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

255

text stands, however, it refers to a fire giving light "according to the purity of light illuminating for delight", a fire not found in hell." Bonaventure is speaking, therefore, about a fire having the sensible quality of lumen, illuminating its surroundings and giving delight to the sense of sight. Such is the sort of fire that he prefers not to posit in hell. 10° But he also prefers not to put there the second sort of fire, including glow and flame, which is embodied in foreign matter. Bonaventure refers here to a fire in another body containing it, emitting a glow or flame, for example, a body of ignited iron, which glows, or a body of burning oil, which flames, both of them radiating light and heat. Although the nature of fire is present in those bodies, the form of fire is not united substantially to their matter: the iron remains iron and the oil remains oil, even though they are ignited, unless they are consumed entirely by the action of fire. In sum, an embodied fire does not impart its substantial form to a body containing it, for the matter of that body is foreign to the form of the fire. On the other hand, with glow and flame, light is a species of fire. Since light, however, follows fire in all matter preserving the species of fire, therefore, light is apparently not an accident of fire, but is of the substance of fire. If the fire in hell has no light, how can hell-fire have the form, the nature and species of fire?101 Answering the question, Bonaventure affirms that fire is divided materially into light, flame and glow. Though the nature of light is preserved in all three species, it is preserved least of all in terrestrial matter; so, in terrestrial bodies most of all, fire has little of light and much capacity for dissolution into smokiness. In matter of that kind, such as in sulphur and in pitch, fire is darkened rather than lighted, because it more impedes than helps sight. Thus, aided by the authority of Scripture, we can imagine hell-fire.102 Having the true form and nature of fire, in Bonaventure's opinion, the fire in hell is likened to those terrestrial fires that are deficient in the

99 "Nam rationes probantes quod non sit ibi ignis lucens, procedunt secundum iucis puritatem illuminantem ad delectandum." — Lac. at., in finem (4.1041; ed. mill, 4.1025). 100 "Quia constat quod reprobi habent potentiam videndi vel etiam habituri sunt post iudiciunr ergo, cum visus natus sit exire in actum. videtur quod videre debeant; sed non est videre sine luce: ergo etc." — Loc. at, arg. 1 (4.1040; ed. min., 4.1024). "Item, lux naturaliter sequitur ignem, ergo ubi est aggregatio ignis, et luminis; sed haec est in inferno: ergo etc." —Eo. toe., arg. 3 (4.1041; ed. min., 4.1024). "Item, dulce est lumen et delectabile: ergo, si damnatis est omnis delectatio auferenda, ergo et omnis illuminatio corporalis." — Eo. lac., con. 3-c. It is really a question of designating pure fire as light from the purity of lumen in the fire. 101 4 Sent, 44.2.2.1, arg. 3 (4.925; ed. min, 4.917). 102 "Ad illud quod ofaicitur de luciditate, dicendum quod ignis tres sunt species, scilicet lux, flamma et carbo, et istae sunt species materiales; et quamvis in omnibus his salvatur natura lucis, tamen minime est in materia terrestri, et maxime terrestris parum habet de Juce et multum resolubilis est in fumositatem; et in tali materia, utpote in suiphure et pice, ignis potius est tenebrosus quam lucidus, quia magis visum impedit quam adiuveL Et per hunc modum imaginari possumus ignem infernalem et ad hoc adiuvari auctoritate Scripturae. Dicitur enim Apocalypsis (14.10): 'Cruciabuntur igne et suiphure'; item Isaiae (34.9): 'Convertentur torrentes eius in picem et humus eius in suiphure'." —Loc. cit., ad 3 (4.927-28; ed. min, 4918).

256

CHAPTER THREE

species of light. But the three species of fire are material and not formal divisions of fire, which can also give light as a glow or a flame. The deficiency of light in a sulphurous fire, therefore, is not due to the privation of light as a specific form of fire. It is due only to the inability of that sort of fire to be luminous, even though the nature of light is preserved in the fire, i.e. in its connatural power of lumen. The fire cannot be luminous because it is all mixed up with the foreign matter in which it is embodied. Forming no substantial union with such matter, the fire in sulphur is also prevented from exercising its power of lumen there. Consequently, unable to illuminate, this sort of fire cannot give light. It is quite clear, therefore, that Bonaventure does not consider light to be of the substance or of the nature of fire, as fire.103 We can conclude now that the principle of light in a fire is not a substantial form, but a connatural power of lumen. This is a power by which a fire is luminous, through which it illuminates, or radiates light, and from which it has the property of luminosity and the quality of brilliance. We can also conclude that the source of light in a fire is not the embodied light posited by Bonaventure in terrestrial matter. Consequently, embodied light is neither the formal cause of lumen nor the active principle of luminosity in a terrestrial body. What is Bonaventure's reason, then, for positing an embodied light in terrestrial bodies? We know that, in his doctrine, the form of light gives substantial being only to lighted bodies. Although a terrestrial body can be a vehicle of light, for instance, a candle or a lantern, no such body is formally a lighted body, because terrestrial matter is not the proper matter for the substantial form of light, which is found only in celestial bodies. Terrestrial matter is the proper matter of the four elements and of the bodies generated from them. But no matter can be deprived entirely of light, for matter is not a pure privation; rather, by reason of its essence, matter has something of beauty and something of light.104 This something of light is its seminal reason, which has been perfected as a substantial form in celestial bodies, but not in terrestrial bodies, where it remains as a 103 Although fire can be contained by some bodies and all mixed up with other bodies, it does not form one substance with any of those bodies, whose matter remains foreign to the form of the fire, which has a proper matter. A fire embodied in foreign matter gives heat and light; a fire that is also mixed up with such matter gives heat but not light Only some fires give light, therefore, while every fire gives heat, which is the proper quality of fire. Now, as we have seen, the form of a fire perfects each part of its matter in a uniform manner, thus completing the whole body of fire as an individual substance. This substance has complete being from its specific form, which is individuated in a supposiL Consequently, the proper action of heating is attributed to a fire in a uniform way, because each part of it is the fire, and so each part of it heats. A fire heats through an accidental form, however, and not through its substantial form, from which it receives substantial being. (See above: pp. 231-32). Since no fire has substantial being from a form of light, the lumen in any fire is not a substantial form. Rather, going together with the nature and substance of fire, lumen is a power and principle of illumination and, as such, it is the source of light in a fire. 104 "Nam materia nori est privatio pura, immo ratione suae essentiae habet aliquid de pulcritudine et aliquid de luce." — 2 Sent., 1.1.1.1, in ad 2 (2.17; ed mm, 2.11).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

257

disposition of their matter. Thus, the light embodied in terrestrial things disposes them to become actually luminous in some way, namely, through colour. Bonaventure explains this in his account of the luminous condition of the human body following its resurrexion into glory. In that condition, the human body will be coloured, because, as Augustine teaches: "all beauty is a coming together of parts with a certain sweetness of colour"; since the human body will be most beautiful when it is glorified, it will also have the sweetness of colour. Besides, according to Aristotle: "colour is the extremity of transparency in a demarcated body"; but a glorified body is a demarcated body, and so it will have colour, which results from a concourse of light and the qualities of the elements.105 According to Bonaventure himself, perviousness is a nobler quality than colour, and light is nobler than perviousness: since a glorified body will be a most perfect body, it will be more luminous than coloured, shining like the sun, which is neither pervious nor coloured.106 Every theologian, Bonaventure observes, holds that the glorified bodies of men will be luminous. Some theologians, however, say that those bodies will be pervious because of their subtlety, but they will be luminous by reason of their brightness and additional brilliance. If glorified bodies were to be pervious, Bonaventure comments, they would not then have a true distinction of parts; therefore, they could not be properly discerned by sight. A great quantity of lumen, furthermore, does not make a body to be transparent. The sun, for example, and a candle contain an aggregation of lumen, but neither of them is transparent. Other theologians say, therefore, that glorified bodies will be at once both luminous and coloured. They will be luminous from an additional lumen, and they will be coloured through the qualities of the four elements in the human body. Bonaventure accepts this view, because it stands to reason that men in glory will recognize one another. They will have the visual images required to see glorified bodies, and their eyes will discern the surfaces of those bodies, even though they will have added splendour. Clarifying his point of view, Bonaventure illustrates it with the following examples. A sword does not lose its colour after much polishing; rather, a splendour is added to its colour. A piece of coal, by its nature, has some colour; however, when it is put into a fire, the coal is made luminous, notwithstanding that it is coloured, because there is in it the light embodied in terrestrial matter. From those illustrations, particularly regarding the coal, we can understand that a resurrected body, by its nature, will have colour and the brightness of lumen clothing it. 107 105 4 Sent., 49.2.2.2.1, fa. 1-3 (4.1025; ed. min., fa. a-c, 4.1010); cf. St Augustine, De civit. Dei, 22.19.2 (PL 41.781), and Aristotle, De sensu et sensibili, c. 3 (439blO-13). 106 Loc. cit, fa. 5-7 (e-g). 107 Loc. cit., Resp. (4.1025; ed min., 4.1010-11); cf. ad 2. Note the passage with the example of coal: "Sicut etiam carbo per sui naturara alicuius coloris est, adveniente autem igne, efficitur luminosus; et tamen nihilominus est coloratus, quia est ibi lux materiae terrestri incorporate sic in proposito intelligendum, quod corpus resurgens per naturam suam habebit colorem, et claritas luminis superinduet ipsum sicut ignis carbonem."

258

CHAPTER THREE

Bonaventure posits an embodied light in terrestrial bodies, including the human body, as the intrinsic source of their colour. The extrinsic source of colour is the radiating light, or the visible lumen, of a luminous body whether celestial or terrestrial. Following Augustine's description of colour as a delightful joining of parts, Bonaventure considers it necessary for a body to be constituted from a harmonious union of the four elements and their qualities. Following Aristotle's definition of colour as the extremity of transparency in a delineated body, Bonaventure regards colour as a quality of a body bounded by a surface. When a body having all those features undergoes an illumination, the light embodied in its matter becomes active under the influence of the lumen received and reflected by the body. As a result, the surface of the body becomes both actually luminous and coloured. The light embodied in terrestrial matter, therefore, is not a substantial form of light, but a substantial power or source of colour in earthly bodies. Consequently, responding to the extrinsic influence of lumen, embodied light is a virtual disposition of terrestrial matter and, through the mediation of the four elements and their qualities, the formal cause of colour in earthly bodies. The intensity or splendour of colour in such a body depends not only on the perfection of the union in it of the elements and their qualities, but also on the degree of act attained by the light embodied in its matter, and that action depends on the power of the lumen producing it. Hence, perfected beyond the terrestrial condition of matter, the glorified bodies of men will be shining with light and resplendent with colour, because those bodies will receive and retain an additional lumen making them luminous in an intrinsic manner, as the sun is now luminous according to its lighted nature. Among terrestrial bodies, however, a fire has an intrinsic lumen, and so the light embodied in the matter of a fire responds to the power of its internal lumen. The colour of a fire, then, has a wholly interior source, so that the light embodied in a fire supports its lumen in a way analogous to the support given to the lumen in a luminary by its light. But the analogy, like every analogy, does not entail an exact similarity between the two sides of the comparison. The light embodied in a fire unites with its lumen to produce a coloured luminosity, whereas a luminary, though it has a substantial form of light, does not have a coloured luminosity from the action of its lumen. The reason why a luminary has no colour is that a celestial body has no delineated surface, for no luminary is a demarcated body.108 108 Following the thought of his time, Bonaventure understands all the luminaries to be situated in one continuous body and, unlike a solid body, to be without a delineated surface. They are located in diverse orbs or spheres, which are distinguished through a diversity of movements, but not by a discontinuity of surface, just as diverse currents of air and of water have a continuous surface while moving in contrary directions. The distinction of one luminary from another, within their continuous surface, involves not only their proper locations in the different spheres, but also their diverse properties of lumen, supported by specific forms of light — 2 Sent., 14.2.1.1 (2.351-52; ed. min., 2.355-57); 14.1.2.1 (2.341-42; ed. min., 2.343-45); 14.2.dub.4 (2.369-70; ed. min., 2.377-79). The matter of a luminary, to Bonaventure

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

259

We shall now synthesize very briefly the main points in the texts of Bonaventure on corporeal light. As described in his texts, that light exists as a substantial form only in celestial matter, which is its proper matter. Found diversely in the luminaries, light is their common form only by way of analogy. Each luminary is a lighted body with a specific form of light, and this is its one completive form. In addition to that form, which causes an accidental quality of brilliance, a luminary has a substantial and active power of lumen giving the body a quality of luminosity and making it luminous. The lumen of a celestial body has a twofold and exterior effect: first, a visible light or lumen bringing about an illumination of terrestrial bodies, thus making them perceptible to sight; secondly, an invisible force of lumen influencing the mixture of the elements in the formation of other bodies and drawing the sense powers of living bodies into act. The visible quality of lumen in the air is an accident resembling the substantial quality of lumen in its source; but the invisible quality of lumen in the air is a substantial and active power existing there with the mode of an accident. The influence of the invisible force of lumen on the elementary bodies makes them efficacious in the generation of other bodies, which are then conserved in being by the continual influence of celestial lumen. As a consequence, in proportion to their capacity to participate in that influence, terrestrial bodies are more and less noble as beings, but in an analogical way. Hence, celestial light is, as it were, a general principle for distinguishing the corporeal forms of terrestrial things. The matter of those things contains an embodied light, which is a substantial principle of their colour. The light embodied in terrestrial matter is not a substantial form, but a virtual disposition of earthly bodies to be coloured when they are illumined extrinsically. Having a connatural power of lumen, however, a fiery body has an intrinsic property of illumination, causing the fire to be luminous and conferring on it a quality of luminosity. Drawn into act by the lumen in the fire, the light embodied in its matter gives colour to the fire, so that it has a coloured luminosity. The one substantial form of a fire is its specific and completive form of fire. Giving a uniformity in being to all the parts of a fire, that form gives rise to an accidental quality of heat, and. this is the proper quality of a fire as a fire, for only a fire is formally hot, whereas both a fire and a luminary are formally luminous.

himself, is formed as a special vehicle of light in the firmament, so that the body of a luminary is a compact or rarified part of celestial matter formed by a special aggregation of light Moreover, as fire is similar, more than any other element, to the firmament, so the moon, more than any other luminary, is similar to the earth. Though the moon has a substantial form of light, there is so little light in the moon that it does not give light of itself, but receives and reflects lumen from the sun. Thus, having a partially transparent and opaque nature, the moon has some delineation in this sense, that there is a great density in some of its parts; so, on some occasions, the moon appears to be coloured. — 2 Sent, 14.2.dub.3, Resp. "Secundo modo ..." (2.367-69; ed. min., 2.375-77); Bonaventure follows here both St. John Damascene and St Basil.

260

CHAPTER THREE

Bonaventure develops his doctrine on light and lumen with the aid of many and widely distant sources. In the texts that we have seen, he cites Aristotle, Augustine and Damascene an almost equal number of times; he cites Avicenna once and Averroes thrice, rejecting his opinion on one of those occasions.109 Maintaining that light is a form or quality and not a body, Bonaventure conjoins the doctrine of Damascene with the doctrines of Aristotle and Augustine; however, when developing his own position, Bonaventure uses the doctrines only of Damascene and Augustine. Taking an abstract approach to light, Bonaventure employs Damascene's description of light as a quality of fire to show that light names fire from a natural quality of lumen, thus designating fire as a luminous substance. Taking a concrete approach to light, Bonaventure employs Augustine's doctrine on light as the first among bodily things to indicate that light also names fire as a luminous substance, and so the term designates the luminous body itself. Of the two approaches, Bonaventure decides that the first is the proper one, because light is the name of a form or quality, but not of a body. His fundamental approach to light, then, depends more on the doctrine of Damascene than on the doctrine of Augustine. In presenting his views on light as both a substantial and an accidental form, Bonaventure contrasts different opinions on the question without referring to their sources.110 It is in this important text that he introduces his own doctrine on the celestial bodies as lighted bodies, because they are formed substantially by light, and on terrestrial bodies as coloured bodies, because they are demarcated bodies having an embodied light, which is their substantial power of colour. From the latter position, Bonaventure combines an Augustinian description with an Aristotelean definition of colour, thus accounting for it as an accidental quality of earthly bodies illumined by light and constituted from a harmonious union of the elements. On showing how the celestial bodies occupy different sites in the firmament, Bonaventure accepts the doctrine of Averroes on the rarity and density of celestial matter; but he rejects the opinion of Averroes that the diverse powers of the luminaries are a consequence of a diversity of qualities. In his own view, the diversity of powers in the luminaries is due to their different functions with regard to terrestrial bodies. Those functions are carried out through an emission of lumen by the luminaries. His understanding of lumen as a quality, and not a body, rests more on the doctrine of Aristotle than on the doctrine of Augustine. When discussing the 109 It should be noted that, in his initial question on light, Bonaventure prefers not to follow Augustine's interpretation of the production of light as the production of the spiritual nature of the angels: 2 Sent., 13.1.1, Resp. (2.312-13; ed. min., 2.314-15). 110 But he chooses to give a substantial nature more than an accidental one to light, and for these reasons: "Sed quoniam sacra Scriptura lucem inter ceteras formas pure corporales commendat, et catholici tractatores, sicut Dionysius, in quarto De divinis nominibus, et Augustinus in multis locis, et philosophi etiam principatum operand! in corporibus luci attribuunt, ideo lucem magis esse substantiam quam accidens sentire videntur." — 2 Sent., 13.2.2, in Resp. (2.320; ed. min., 2.323).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

261

existence of lumen in the air, Bonaventure accepts the concept of lumen by Averroes as a habitus of a transparent body; so, lacking the true nature of an accident, lumen in such a condition is a likeness of its principle. Bonaventure also accepts Avicenna's definition of the visible lumen as a quality of a body having light; at the same time, he follows Augustine on the invisible lumen as a force bringing all the sense powers into act. Moreover, returning to Damascene for the proper approach to the nature of lumen, Bonaventure describes it as an active and consubstantial power of a luminary, and again as a connatural and consubstantial power of a fire. Finally, following the philosophers, particularly Aristotle, on the nature of the firmament, he reconciles Augustine's statements on the natural unity of fire and light with the philosophical understanding of heat as the proper quality of fire. Bonaventure's reconciliation is grounded in his own conception of fire and the firmament as having a conformed participation, or an analogical community, in the nature of light, which exists in its pure state only in the firmament. Adopting the views of Damascene and Basil, then, Bonaventure considers the luminaries to be special aggregations, or vehicles, of light in the firmament. The choice of sources made by Bonaventure and his resourceful combination of doctrines show that, concerning the various problems on corporeal light, he is not committed to any one historical course of philosophical thought. Rather, selecting the materials that he needs to form his own doctrine, Bonaventure organizes and original synthesis, presenting a wellbalanced composition of doctrines drawn from several historical sources. Our second general problem here has to do with the forms and species of the mixed or mineral bodies generated from the elements. Regarding the elements themselves, we have seen that they are the first forms giving complete being to terrestrial matter. Furthermore, the matter under each element has being from an incorruptible form, so that no one element has a potency for the form of any other element. Through the rarity and density of its parts, nevertheless, the matter of an elementary body, according to its active and passive qualities, is disposed for other forms, and they are the forms of mixed bodies. * l ' Those bodies participate in the elementary forms as general or common forms; but they are common by way of analogy and not of univocation. Consequently, mixed bodies have the elementary forms in an analogical and not in a univocal way; therefore, the nature of any elementary form is not quite the same in every mixed body.112 All the mixed bodies are formed by the power of the luminaries, which alter the qualities of the elements, thus causing them to mingle with one another. The luminaries do not communicate any forms to mixed bodies; rather, cooperating with the elements, the luminaries draw new forms into act 111 See above: p. 225 (n. 26); p. 228 (n. 34); p. 245 (nn. 72-73).

112 See above: p. 241 (nn. 67-68).

262

CHAFFER THREE

from the potency of terrestrial matter, and so the forms and species of mineral bodies are produced. "3 A body of this sort, saving the unity of its form, has a rarity and density of parts disposing it to receive other forms. All bodies similar in nature and species, moreover, have complete being under one substantial form and a determinate quantity, but with a possibility of contrariety.114 An inanimate body, such as a stone, because it has complete being, can fulfil those conditions.115 The ultimate form of any body, however, is the completive form with respect to the other forms disposing the body to receive it. 116 From what we have seen, thus far, it seems that a mixed body has one substantial form, which is drawn from the potency of elementary matter under the influence of celestial light. The body is generated by a mixture of the elements, and their differences are reconciled in the mixture through the power of the heavenly bodies. Since a mixed body is a composite body, it is quite distinct from an elementary body, which is a simple body. Speaking about the simplicity of God, Bonaventure outlines four kinds of composition. The first kind is a composition of essence from essential principles. They are composed with one another, or put together at once, because they are different; but there are no such principles in God, who is life through His essence. The second kind is a composition of substance from natural principles, or from matter and form. Those principles go together because, depending on each other, they cannot stand apart from one another. Since God is power through His essence, He is neither weak nor unstable; so He is not composed of matter and form. The third kind is the composition of a mixed body from miscible principles. Where there is a mixture, Bonaventure says, there is also an obscurity, owing to some sort of confusion of forms. Miscible principles can come together because of their imperfection; but God is light, and so He is not composed from obscure and imperfect principles. The fourth kind is the composition of a living thing from unequal parts, such as a soul and a body. These principles are not perfect, nor are they similar in form. If they were entirely perfect and conformed, Bonaventure remarks, they could not constitute anything, because two beings do not unite to compose another actual being. Consequently, God cannot be composed from unequal and dissimilar principles, for He is a spirit through His essence.117 Speaking earlier on the 113 See above: pp. 247-48 (nn. 78-80). 114 See above: p. 225 (n. 25); pp. 228-29 (nn. 34-35). 115 On the complete being of an inanimate body note: "Cum enim sit triplex agens, scilicet Deus, natura et intelligentia, ista sunt agentia ordinata, ita quod primum praesupponitur a secundo et secundum praesupponitur a tertio. Deus enim operatur ex nihilo; natura vero non facit ex nihilo, sed ex ente in potentia; ars supponit operationem naturae et operatur super ens completum; non enim facit lapides, sed domum de lapidibus. Unde sicut natura non potest anticipare operationem Dei, quae est de nihilo producere, sic nee ars operationem naturae." — 2 Sent., 7.2.2.2, in Resp. (2.202; ed. mm., 2.196). 116 See above: pp. 246-47 (nn. 75-77). 117 1 Sent., 8.2.dub.6. Resp. (1.176-77; ed. mm., 1.140-41).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

263

same subject, Bonaventure mentions only three sorts of composition. The first is the composition of the essential parts found in every thing which is a being through itself. The second is the composition of the integrating parts that are in all bodies. The third is the composition of dissimilar or repugnant parts in animate bodies and living things. Because every creature is spiritual or corporeal, or a composite of the two, there is a composition in every substance which is a being through itself.118 Hence, as a privation of composition, simplicity is proper only to the substance of God; every other substance has at least a composition of actual and possible principles.119 As a result, having being mixed from act and potency, every creature is a composite substance and, having limited being, it is further contracted in a genus and species. In short, receiving being from God, a creature does not have being from itself, and so it is a composite substance.120 Taking all these texts together, and relying on what we know of Bonaventure's doctrine, we can say that the composition from the essential parts of a substance that is a being through itself includes the composition of essence and of substance. The composition of essence from essential principles refers to the composition of being and existing in a being subsisting through itself. The composition of substance from natural principles refers to the composition of form and matter in the essence of a creature which is a being through itself. Now the form and matter of a substance are the actual and possible principles of its essential being and existing: therefore, every creature existing as a substantial being has the composition of essence and of substance, because it is a being subsisting essentially through itself and in a proper matter and form.121 Bonaventure distinguishes this sort of being from an accidental being, which is composed with or in another being. A substance, however, is composed from principles that are simple in themselves, because they are the first principles and, as such, they cannot have an intrinsic composition. Considered in themselves, therefore, form and matter are the first and simple principles of composition in every created substance.122 The first principles of a mixed body, according to Bonaventure, are the simple matter and forms of the elements. Since he describes every composite body as constituted from integrating parts, it follows that the elements are the integrating parts of a mixed body. But a mixed body, as we have shown, is a complete being. It should also follow, then, that a mixed body, which is a substantial being, subsists essentially through itself and in a proper matter and form. On the other hand, Bonaventure says that a mixed body is composed from imperfect principles coming together to conns 119 120 121 122

1 Sent., 8.2.2, Resp. "Unde notandum ... ex utroque." (1.168; ed. min., 1.133). Lac. cit., "Si ergo... actual! saltern." (1.168; ed. min., 1.134). Eo. lac., "Concedendum ergo ... in compositionem." See above: n. 16, p. 142; n. 46, p. 158. Cf. 1 Sent., 8.2.2, Resp. "Aliter potest ..." (1.168; ed. mm, 1.134).

264

CHAPTER THREE

stitute a mixture, which has an obscurity or darkness owing to a sort of confusion of forms. Furthermore, every created being subsisting through itself, because it has limited being, is contracted by a genus and species; if a mixed body is such a being, it has the multiplicity of genus, species and difference. Consequently, whether a mixture has a confusion of forms or is a properly constituted being, in either instance, we are confronted with the problem of multiformity, or a multiplicity of forms, in corporeal substances.123 There are only a few texts in Bonaventure's writings on the nature of mixed bodies. He speaks about them, for the most part, only when developing other doctrinal questions.124 We know that a mixed body is generated in the course of nature from an interaction of the elements, influenced by celestial light. Since a mixture is a natural body, it cannot be a disordered confusion of the elements. Bonaventure talks about the elements in that way with regard to hell, where there is not a mixture, but a certain confusion of the elements.125 In a mixed body, then, the confusion of the elements is really a flowing-together of the elements in the formation of a true mixture. What is a true mixture? In the first place, it is not a body formed from a blending of all the elements with one predominant over the rest. If the body were formed from a full mixture of the elements, it would be a complex body, which is disposed to receive life; but a mixed body is not of that kind. Neither is it formed chiefly from one element with a mixture of another element, such as a cloud of vaporous air, which is an elementary body of air containing some water.126 A sulphurous fire, likewise, is an elementary body of fire mixed up with sulphur. Thus, hellfire is not a mixed body, but an elementary fire belonging to the species of fire, for species properly names a substantial and specifying form, just as every water in all water is said to be of the same species.127 123 See above: p. 223 (n. 20). For the present, we are setting aside the composition of living bodies, which are outside our immediate problem; however, living bodies will be included, at least implicitly, in the problem of a multiplicity of forms regarding genus, species and difference. 124 The relative silence of the Scriptures on inanimate things may well account for Bonaventure's lack of interest in them: "Quod vero obicitur de corporibus mineralibus, dicendum quod qui parum recedunt a natura terrae, et quia latent sub terra, non curavit Scriptura specialiter exprimere." — 2 Sent., 14.2.dub.2, in Resp. (2.366; ed. min., 2.374). 125 "... et ibi non est commixtio, sed potius quaedam confusio, sicut dicitur quod 'ignis et grando mixta pariter ferebantur' (Exod., 9.24). Unde ibi erit ignis ardens et aqua congelans et aeris inquietude et perturbatio et terrae foetor." — 4 Sent., 44.2.2.2, ad 3-4 (4.928; ed. min., 4.920). 126 Cf. 2 Sent., 8.1.2.2, Resp. (2.217-18; ed. min., 2.212-13). Bonaventure is talking here about the apparently human body formed by an angel, who cannot form a natural mixture, as the sun can by its influence: cf. 2 Sent., 1.2.2.2, ad 6 (2.202; ed. min., 2.196-97). 127 "Sed utrum ille ignis sit elementaris sive eiusdem speciei cum igne qui apud nos est, hoc non ita potest pro constant! a quocumque determinari. Attamen, si quis non adducat fortiores rationes quam quae adductae sunt, non eompellimur ponere ignem infernalem esse diversae naturae et speciei ab igne qui apud nos, si proprie velimus speciem appellare formam substantialem et specificativam, secundum quod dicitur quod omnis aqua omni aquae est eadem in specie." — 4 Sent., 44.2.2.1, in Resp. (4.926; ed. min., 4.918); that this fire, in his view, is elementary see: con. 3 (c).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

265

A truly mixed body, therefore, is not formed from either an accidental union of two other bodies or a substantial union of the elements. On the contrary, a true mixture results from a union of miscible principles capable of coming together to form one substance, which is different in form and in kind from the elements. Bonaventure refers to that fact when discussing the mode of union between the divine and human natures in Christ. There is one mode of union resulting in the conversion of one nature into another: a drop of water is converted when united to a jar of wine, which is possible because of the repugnance and predominance of the wine regarding the water. A second mode of union involves an alteration of two natures and the production of a third nature. The elements are united in that way to constitute mixed bodies; this is possible because of the repugnance, but no predominance, of the one uniting principle with respect to the other. A third mode of union, unlike the second, does not involve a transmutation of the uniting principles; however, it results in the constitution of a third nature, as a body and a soul are united to constitute a man. Such a union comes about because the principles, having no repugnance, depend on each other. A fourth mode of union, applying to Christ, excludes both a transmutation of the principles, one being founded on the other, and the constitution of a third nature, since there is no repugnance and no essential dependence of the principles, though one has a predominance over the other. Such is the sort of union obtained when one tree is grafted on to another: each tree keeps its own nature, yet one of them is given substance in the trunk of the other, so that there is one trunk for both trees.128 It is important to note that the first and fourth modes of union do not result in a new nature or substance. Since those modes do not apply to a mixed body, a mixture is not produced by the conversion of one element into another; nor is it a body with two forms, each keeping its own nature with one receiving substance from the other, which is predominant. A mixed body and a human nature are new substances emerging from the natural union of constitutive principles. Having a natural union, each of the new substances, as a native unity, is a conjoining of different natures coming together to constitute a third nature; so, as a constitutive unity, each substance is a binding together of things formally different, or of parts different in kind. 129 The constitutive principles of a mixed body, which is our 128 3 Sent., 6.2.1. Resp. (3.158; ed. min., 3.149). Note the passages on mixed bodies and human nature: "Quaedam vero est unio, in qua est utriusque unibilis alteratio et tertiae naturae productio; et hoc quia est ibi repugnantia et non excellens praedominatio, sicut uniuntur elementa ad cotlstituendum corpora mixta, Quaedam vero est unio, in qua non est unitorum transmutatio, sed tertiae naturae constitutio; et hoc est quia unibilia non habent repugnantiam, habent tamen mutuam dependentiam, sicut uniuntur corpus et anima ad constitutionem hominis." 129 "... quaedam est per colligationem rerum formaliter differentium sive partium heterogenearum, et sic est unitas constitutiva ... quaedam per unionem differentium naturarum in unionem concurrentium, et sic est unitas nativa." — 3 Sent., 6.2.2, in ad 4 (3.161-62; ed. min., 3.152-53); cf. fm. 3 (c). See in St. Bernard: De consideration, 8.18 (PL 182.799).

266

CHAPTER THREE

immediate problem, are two elementary natures differing in kind or in form. To constitute a third nature, the elementary natures, because they repel each other, must be so altered that, neither of them attaining predominance, their elementary matter can undergo a transmutation or substantial change of form. In the mixture thus produced, the elementary natures do not exist under their own forms; rather, existing under a new form produced from the potency of their matter, the two elementary natures now have a unified being in the mixture under one substantial form. The reception of a form depends on the dispositions of matter, and they are of two kinds. The first kind are the accidental dispositions preparing matter for a new substantial form. 130 In the generation of a mixed body, then, the alterations of the elements are the accidental dispositions preparing elementary matter for a new substantial form. The second kind are substantial dispositions. Bonaventure refers to those dispositions in a general way as an appetite ordering matter to its substantial perfection, which is form; from a form and matter, one thing results, provided the form belongs to the same genus as the matter.131 Since elementary matter has an appetite for the form of a mixture, as that body has an appetite for the form of a complex body, therefore, the new substantial form of the mixed body satisfies the appetite of the matter in the elements entering into the constitution of the mixture.132 Taking the substantial dispositions of matter in a particular way, Bonaventure calls them the seminal reasons, or first essences, of the forms to be produced from its potency. Concreated in matter by God, seminal reasons are in act regarding matter itself, but in potency regarding the forms to be produced from it. They are produced by a power of nature operating exteriorly, and through accidental dispositions, so that the forms are brought into being according to their seminal reasons, or primary essences.133 The natural power operating exteriorly in the generation of a mixed body is celestial lumen; the changes caused in the elements by their alterating qualities are the accidental dispositions preparing elementary matter to receive the form of the mixture. When the preparation is completed, the new form is drawn from the potency of matter, with which it constitutes one substantial being. Since a substantial form is also a specific form, the new form generated from a mixing of the elements posits the mixed body in a species different from the specific natures of the elements themselves. Moreover, in every composite body, the ultimate form is so conjoined to its matter that all the dispositions preparing for this form are completed rather than destroyed on its arrival.134 Our problem is, then, whether those dispositions, which are substantial,

130 131 132 133 134

Cf. Cf. See Cf. Cf.

2 Sent., 1.1.3.1, Resp. (2.32; ed. min., 2.24); see above: pp. 150-51 (n. 33). 1 Sent., 1.3.2, ad 1 (1.41; ed. min., 1.30); text given above in n. 11, p. 106. above: n. 31, p. 117. 2 Sent., 7.2.dub.3-4 (2.206-07; ed. min., 2.201-02). Coll in Hexaem., 2.2 (5.356; Delorme, p. 20); text cited above in n. 11, p. 106.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

267

remain as forms in the completed substance. The problem, seen in its context, has its origin in Bonaventure's understanding of seminal reasons and their contributions to the constitution of an individual substance with a specific nature. We must, therefore, consider his texts on the nature of a seminal reason with reference to the nature of an individual substance. Bonaventure treats this subject at considerable length in his question: "Whether a seminal reason is a universal or a singular form." He develops his response to the question in four parts. He notes, first of all, that a seminal reason is both an active potency inserted in matter and the essence of a form to be produced from it by a natural operation; the form and its seminal reason differ according to complete and incomplete being, or according to being in act and in potency. The question to be resolved is whether or not a seminal reason is a universal form. 135 In one solution to the question, universal forms are seen to be really and truly in the mind and in nature. Since everything in nature must be founded on matter, both universal and singular forms must be in matter. A universal form does not differ from a singular form, therefore, because the one is abstracted from matter and the other is concretized in it. They differ, rather, by an addition on the one to the other and by a more and less completion. This is shown in the coordination of genera and species, for the form of a species is most complete and most composite, whereas the form of a genus is a being in potency regarding the form of a species, and so the form of a genus becomes more actual by an added difference. Commenting on this solution, Bonaventure says that it seems to concord with authority, reason and sense. It concords with authority because, according to Averroes, matter receives singular forms by mediating universal forms. It concords with reason because a singular thing is a being in act and matter is a being in potency, but a universal form is midway between the two; so it seems reasonable for matter to be taken to its complete form by mediating universal forms. The solution concords with sense because, according to Aristotle, progress in human knowledge is assimilated to the progress of nature in its operation; but human knowledge proceeds from the more to the less universal, so also, therefore, ought nature to proceed in its operation. Anyone wishing to hold this position, Bonaventure remarks, would have to turn aside the reasons showing that a seminal reason is a singular and not a universal form, since those reasons look to a universal form as having abstract being in the mind. 136 In the third part of his response, Bonaventure sets forth a second solution

!35 2 Sent, 18.1.3, Resp. "... forma universal!." (2.440; ed. min., 2.453). 136 Loc. cit., Resp. "Quidam enim ... non obviant" (2.440-41; ed. min., 2.453-54); cf. Aristotle, Physica, 1.1 (184a9-184bl4); Averroes, In Metaph., lib. 1, text. 17, vol. 8, fol. 14F-M (Venetiis, 1574). The reasons showing that a seminal reason is a singular form, because a universal is a form abstracted by the mind, are Bonaventure's own reasons, which we shall consider further on.

268

CHAPTER THREE

to the problem. Maintaining that a universal is a form, this solution distinguishes between the form of a part and the form of a whole, which is the properly universal form. Thus, the soul is a universal form with respect to man and not to one man, for the form of a whole gives being to the whole; called the essence of a thing, this form is considered by a metaphysician. The form of a part has being in a genus only by a reduction to the genus; nevertheless, since the form is indifferent to the many things that can come to-be from it, the form can be called a universal in its roots, just as a cause is universal in its effects. Wherefore, a seminal reason can be called a universal form, not properly as considered by a metaphysician, but largely as a natural philosopher considers it, i.e. as a certain indifference of principle. Stating that this is the better and the more widely accepted solution, Bonaventure goes on to show how it concurs with reason, authority and sense. It concurs with reason because universal forms are necessary for both cognition and univocation of predication. Integral cognition is had of a thing only when its whole being is known, and this is known only through its form: therefore, it is necessary that there be some form enfolding the whole being of a thing; such a form is called an essence, and it is a universal form, as Avicenna says: "an essence is nothing other than the universal quiddity of a thing." 137 In like manner, true univocation requires some things to be really assimilated in one common form, which is predicated essentially of them. This sort of form can be only a universal form, and a form enfolding the whole of which it is predicated; therefore, a universal form is the form of a whole, since it is a form that, by its nature, can be in many things. This form not particularized by the addition of an ulterior form. Rather, Bonaventure says, referring explicitly to his own doctrine on individuation, the form is particularized by its conjunction with matter and, as a result of their conjunction, the form appropriates to itself the matter, and the matter appropriates to itself the form. Since a form is never separated from matter, a universal form is never without a particular form, or a form of the whole without a form of the part, even though the one differs from the other: whiteness, which is not a body, cannot be without a body, yet their inseparability is not a total identity.138 The solution also concurs with authority. Aristotle says: "when I say heaven, I say form; when I say this heaven, I say matter"; therefore, Bonaventure affirms, the individual adds to the universal form, not a form, but matter. Furthermore, according to Boethius: "a species is the whole being of an individual"; therefore, Bonaventure adds, the universal form,

137 Cf. Metaph., 3.8, fol. 82r, 4.1, fol. 83v-84v (Venetiis, 1508). 138 2 Sent., 18.1.3, Resp. "Aliorum vero ... identitatem omnimodam." (2.441; ed mm., 2.454). Note the passage: "Forma igitur universalis non est aliud quam forma totius, quae, cum de se nata sit esse in multis, universalis est; particularizatur autem non per additionem ulterioris formae, sed per coniunctionem sui cum materia, ex qua coniunctione materia appropriat sibi formam, et forma materiam, sicut dictum est supra." Cf. 2 Sent., 3.1.2.2-3 (2.105-10; ed. min., 2.95-100); see above: n. 39, p. 231.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

269

which is a species, is a form of the whole thing and, enfolding its whole being, the form is the sufficient reason of knowing the thing with respect to its substantial being, as Bonaventure himself has shown in a previous text.139 The solution, finally, concurs with sense, for the order and mode in the emergence of species from a genus is different from the order and mode in the eduction of forms from the potency of matter. A natural philosopher considers the potency of matter according as it is reduced to act by an operation of nature; so, in his view, matter first receives an elementary form and, thereafter, by the mediation of this form, the matter receives the form of a mixture and then, by the mediation of that form, the matter receives the form of a complex body. But a metaphysician considers universal forms, or essences, in which singular things have to be assimilated; so, taking a different view, he posits a more and less universal according as several or fewer things have to be assimilated in it. Thus, he calls the most general genus that in which there is a first assimilation, and he calls the most special species that in which there is a perfect assimilation; therefore, he says that the species is added to the genus, and so the sum total is found in the thing, but the genus, because it is in several things, is simpler than the species. 14° In the final portion of his response, Bonaventure speaks of the difficulties in choosing between the two positions on the problem. To one considering the particular operations of nature, he observes, the views of the natural philosopher and the metaphysician seem to be diverse, nor can they be readily reconciled. For instance, whiteness is defined in one way and produced by nature in other way: it is defined by its genus colour, and this is defined by a higher genus, and so we can go on until we reach the highest of its genera; going the other way, nature produces whiteness according to an operation of the elementaty qualities, influenced by a power of lumen. Of these two positions, Bonaventure says, the latter is more common, more intelligible and closer to sense.m Consequently, opting for the second solution, Bonaventure affirms that a seminal reason is not a universal form, if such a form is properly understood as a form according to which a thing

139 2 Sent., 18.1.3, Resp. "Concordat etiam ... et hoc melius tactum est supra, distinctione tertia" (2.441; ed. min., 2.454-55); cf. Aristotle, De caelo, 1.9 (278alO-I7); Boethius, Comm. in Pmphyr., c. 3 (PL 64.105-06, 115). See: 2 Sent., 3.1.1.2 (2.94-98; ed. min., 2.82-88); and above: pp. 145-48 (nn. 24-26). 140 2 Sent., 18.1.3, Resp. "Concordat etiam ... minus universal!." (2.441-42; ed. min., 2.455). 141 Lac. cit., Resp. "Harum autem ... sensui vicinior." (2.442; ed. min., 2.455). Bonaventure's judgment can be clarified by his own reason for choosing the way of production over the way of definition: "Item, si forma universalis respectu particularis esset ratio seminalis, cum ergo haec albedo dicat formam singularem et albedo dicat formam speciei et color formam generis, et qualitas sensibilis adhuc formam superioris generis, et qualitas corporalis adhuc formam magis universalem, et qualitas adhuc formam universalissimam, tune natura in productione huius albedinis perveniret mediantibus omnibus praedictis: ergo prius faceret qualitatem quam qualitatem corporalem, et qualitatem corporalem prius quam qualitatem sensibilem, et qualitatem sensibilem prius quam colorem, quod non est intelligible." — Loc. cit., con. 6 (2.440; ed. min., con. f. 2.453).

270

CHAPTER THREE

can be ordered in a genus, considered by a metaphysician. A seminal reason can be called a universal form, however, if a universal form refers to a form both existing according to an incomplete being in matter and possible with respect to the production of many things. Having taken this position, Bonaventure points out that his fundamental reasons proving a seminal reason not to be a universal form follow the proper understanding of a universal. The opposing reasons follow an understanding of the universal as a sort of form existing in potency, whether it be the form of the whole or of a part.142 Our best way to handle those opposing reasons, and Bonaventure's fundamental reasons, is to take account of them as we examine the significance of his stand on the nature of a seminal reason. The first point to consider is the position that Bonaventure does not accept: a seminal reason is a universal form, because it is in potency to the acts of many particular forms. The position depends on the view that both universal forms and singular forms are really found in things, their singular forms consisting in a coordination of genera and species with added differences. Consequently, a singular form is the most actual form, since it is the most composite form, and so it is the form completing the being of an individual thing. By not accepting this positon, Bonaventure obviously refuses to posit in an individual substance either a multiplicity of forms or a composite form, which would be a completive form. In his view, therefore, an individual substance is not completed in a genus and a species, with an added difference, through either a plurality or a composition of forms. Although a multiformity of genus, species and difference is found in a thing according to the cognitive order of abstraction, no such multiformity is found in the thing according to its natural order of production. Because the order of cognition is grounded in the order of nature, the whole position rests upon the premise that the two orders are alike. This is why Bonaventure says that the position, with reference to the universal nature of seminal reason, seems to concord with reason and with the doctrines of Aristotle and Averroes. In particular, Bonaventure shows that the position does not concord with Aristotle's doctrine. According to Aristotle, animal is prior to man: therefore, nature produces the form of a species by the mediating form of a genus; since a seminal reason is a medium by which nature reaches an ultimate complement, a seminal reason is a universal form. Granting that animal is prior to man, nonetheless, Bonaventure holds that this does not make a seminal reason to be a universal form, properly speaking, for a universal form comes to-be only through the eduction of a singular form. 143 But

142 Lx. cil., Resp. "Hanc igitur ..." (2.442; ed. min., 2.455-56). 143 "Nam illud quod primo obicit, quod prius est animal quam homo, non cogit quod ratio seminalis sit forma universalis proprie dicta. Nam homo et animal et quaecumque alia universalis forma non dicitur esse nisi per eductionem alicuius singularis." —Loc. cit., ad 1 (2.442; ed min, 2.456); cf. arg. 1 (2.439; ed. min., 2.451), and see in Aristotle, De gener. animal., 2.3 (736bl-5).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

271

surely the universal is the simpler and, therefore, the prior form? In every ordered process, furthermore, what is posterior is attained through what is prior. In the order of generation, therefore, nature arrives at a singular form by a mediating universal form. Since a seminal reason is a medium by which a complete effect is attained, a seminal reason must be a universal form. It is true, Bonaventure replies, that a universal is a simpler form ar cording as it has a coordination with what is less universal, i.e. in the order of definition; but a universal has only an accidental coordination in the order of generation. Though it happens sometimes that, by an operation of nature, a genus is prior to a species, nonetheless, a species never is but that it is an individual thing.144 Bonaventure clearly rejects the position that a seminal reason is a universal form existing in potency to many particular acts, which involve multiple forms, terminating in a singular and most composite form as the ultimate complement of a substance. In rejecting this position, he maintains that a universal form comes to-be in a substance with the coming to-be of its singular form, and that a species exists only in an individual way. Consequently, there cannot be a universal, or any other, form in a substance before it has the singular form by which it is an individual in a species and, as a result, in a genus. Taking the concrete approach to a substance, Bonaventure considers its one form to be the specifying act of its matter, so that, by this act, the individual substance is also both in a genus and different from similar substances. The genus, species and difference can taken as universal forms, properly speaking, by an abstract approach to a substance, or in the order of definition. It is in this order that a universal is truly in potency to the acts of additional forms. 145 For our next points, we turn to the solution accepted by Bonaventure: a seminal reason is not a universal form, properly understood, but a singular form existing with incomplete being in matter and capable of becoming many things. The solution depends on the concrete order of being and existing and not on the abstract order of genus and species; so the solution is based on the natural order regulating the production of forms rather than on the cognitive order ruling their definitions.146 There are two points to be considered here: the proper understanding of a universal form, and the nature of a seminal reason as a particular form. Now, in the order of 144 "Ad illud quod siniiliter quod obicit, quod universale est simplicius, patet responsio. Verum est enim quod universale est simplicius secundum earn viam secundum quam habet coordinationem ad id quod est minus universale, scilicet secundum esse definitivum. Secundum autem via generationis, non habet coordinationem nisi solum per accidens: accidit enim quod per operationem naturae prius sit aliquando genus quam species; species autem nunquam est quin sit individuum." — Loc. dt., ad 2 (2.442; ed mm., 2.456); cf. arg. 2 (2.439; ed. min., 2.456). 145 This is the proper way to take the texts cited above: n. 20, p. 223. See also: DMT, 3.1, con. 4 & 11 (5.69-70), ad 4 & 11 (5.71-72, 73); 3.2, arg. 2, ad 2 (5.73, 76-77): in the next text here, Bonaventure takes the concrete approach to a universal form — arg. 3 ad 3 (5.73-74, 77). 146 We shall be drawing here continually on the doctrine already established from the texts to which Bonaventure directs us, as noted above in nn. 138-39, pp. 268-69.

272

CHAPTER THREE

nature, a universal form is an essence or species enclosing the whole being of an individual substance. Properly understood, then, a universal form is the form of a whole individual thing. This is what Bonaventure, interpreting Boethius and Avicenna, calls the specific form or common nature of an individual. As a specific form, it is constituted by the union of a proper form with its proper matter; as a common nature, it is found in every individual of the species. The form is common to every individual, however, in two distinct ways. It is common, in the first place, according as it enters into the constitution of the individuals in the species and, in the second place, according as it is predicated essentially of those individuals. Bonaventure describes the specific form, from the first point of view, as that which results from the conjunction of this matter and this form in every individual of the species. Consequently, as a common nature, the specific form consists in form and matter taken universally, as man is taken universally or commonly regarding all men. This is the form that, Bonaventure says, is not particularized by the addition of an ulterior form, because, as the form of a whole, a universal form results from the coming together of a singular form and a singular matter. Hence, a universal form is posterior to the conjunction of a singular matter and form. Since a seminal reason is always prior to the form to be produced, and since a seminal reason looks to this matter, where it has a determinate foundation, therefore, a seminal reason cannot be a universal form. 147 If a seminal reason is a universal form, Bonaventure adds, it is either the form of a genus, and thus there is in man a seminal reason of an ass, or it is the form of a species, and so humanity is the seminal reason of this man. As a consequence, a seminal reason, before it pre-exists in matter, would be a thing complete in act; therefore, the form of humanity, before it is in matter, will be a complete thing. Since it is both false and unintelligible to say that the form of humanity would be in something, and that this something would not be a complete thing, therefore, it cannot be said that a seminal reason is a universal form. 148 It may be objected that a man generates a man and not an ass, because there is a conformity between one man and another, but not between a man and an ass. This conformity consists in a universal form, which must be a seminal reason, for the form of humanity is the 147 "Philosophus, in libro De anima (1.1; 402b5-9): 'Universale aut nihil est aut posterius est'; sed ratio seminalis semper prior est ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universale ... Item, universale est semper et ubique; sed ratio seminalis respicit hanc materiam, in qua fundatur determinate: ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universale." — 2 Sent., 18.1.3, con. 1-2 (2.439; ed. min., con. a-b, 2.452). 148 "Item, si ratio seminalis dicit formam universalem, aut ergo formam generis aut formam speciei. Si formam generis: ergo in homine est ratio seminalis respectu asini; si formam specier. ergo humanitas est ratio seminalis huius hominis. Sed illud est ratio seminalis alicuius, quod ante praeexistit in materia quam sit res completa in actu: ergo ante erit forma humanitatis in materia quam sit res completa. Sed hoc est falsum et non intelligible quod forma humanitatis sit ahquo et illud non sit res completa: ergo non est ponere quod forma universalis dicat rationern seminalem." — Loc. cit, con. 5 (2.440; ed. min.f con e, 2.453).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

273

reason why a man generates a man. Answering the objection very briefly, Bonaventure replies that a man generates a man, not because of the form of humanity, but because of a power given to human nature for producing something similar to itself. 149 Now, as we have seen, a specific form, such as humanity, is common to all the constituent parts of an individual substance; because the specific form is more complete than the substantial form, which is its formal part, the specific form is the completive form of the individual substance. 15° As a form of the whole, moreover, a specific form is a second substance individuated in a first substance, or supposit. Thus, as a form, the species is particularized by the individuating matter in which the whole being of the substance is realized. Bonaventure confirms this on the authority of Aristotle, who shows that the individual adds matter, and not a form, to a universal form. In other words, a universal form is particularized because of its contraction by the proper matter of the individual substance, whose singular form and matter come together concretely to constitute one supposit of a specific nature. No form, then, in Bonaventure's judgment, ever exists in nature without an appropriate matter A singular form exists always in a singular matter, and a universal form exists always in the individuated matter of a supposit; but the universal form and its individual matter are really the one substantial form with its proper matter according as they are completed in a singular thing, which is at once in a species and a being subsisting through itself. Since every operation of nature terminates at a singular thing having a form and matter, and not at a universal form, which, precisely as a universal, is only a form, therefore, a seminal reason, which is a principle of operation, is not a universal form. l51 The universal or specific form in an individual thing is the sufficient reason for knowing its substantial being. Bonaventure confirms this on the authority of Boethius, who says that a species is the whole being of an individual thing. Following Avicenna in the same context, Bonaventure calls the species the essence or universal quiddity of a thing. Thus, the concrete universal is the foundation of the abstract universal by which a thing is known integrally, and according to which the specific form is known to be common to many singular things. From that point of view, the specific form is predicated both essentially and univocally of all the singular things in a species; such a predication is possible because those things are assimilated, or made to be alike, in a common nature. But a seminal reason 149 Lac. at, arg. 5 & ad 5 (2.439, 443; ett. min., 2.452, 456). 150 Cf. 4 Sent., 43.1.1, fm. 5 (4.883; «/. min., fin. e, 4.872); text cited above: n. 138, p. 204. See also: n. 72, p. 171; n. 75, p. 172. We shall return to this question in our next section. 151 "Item, omnis operatio naturae terminatur ad hoc aliquid et est circa hoc aliquid; hoc aliquid autem dicit formam cum materia, universale autem dicit formam tantum: ergo forma universalis, secundum quod huiusmodi, nee est operationis principium nee est operationis terminus per se; sed ratio seminalis dicit operationis principium: ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universalis." —•- 2 Sent., 18.1.3, con. 4 (2.440; ed. min., con. d, 2.452-53).

274

CHAPTER THREE

is not predicated of the thing to be produced from it, for we do not say that the man is his seminal reason, or that this body is its embryo; therefore, a seminal reason cannot be a universal form. 152 Bonaventure is faced here with a rather strong opposing argument, based on the true correspondence between an abstract universal in the intellect and a real universal in the thing known. Both a logican and a metaphysician say that the differences in things are taken from the potency of their genus. What they say is entirely meaningless unless, in things themselves, the less universal forms come forth into being from forms that are more universal. If what they say is not meaningless, it follows that universal forms are the media by which singular forms are brought into being; but seminal reasons are such media, so they are universal forms. 153 The considerations of philosophy, Bonaventure responds, are not in vain, for they do correspond to something in things themselves. The likeness between two men, or between a man and an ass, is both true and real, so that it is necessary to posit some third nature in which the two are made alike. It is not necessary, nonetheless, for the essences of things to be produced in the way that they have to be known. It suffices that they have to-be as they have to-be-known, but it is not necessary that they be with respect to their production as they are with respect to our knowledge of them. 154 In rejecting a universal nature for a seminal reason, Bonaventure insists constantly on the diversity of the order of knowledge from the order of nature. In the order of knowledge, regulating abstract universals, he grants their multiplicity and their priority over the singular form in an individual substance. In the order of nature, ruling the production of forms, he holds firmly that the singular form of a substance is prior to its universal form, but the latter is not really other than the singular form itself. Rather, as a metaphysical consideration of this form and this matter, the universal form is nothing else than a specialization of what is concretely individual, or a generalization of what is really particular, in a singular thing or supposit. Thus, considered metaphysically, a universal form is the real and concrete foundation of the abstract universals by which many individual things are known to be alike, either according to species or according to genus. Taking this position, Bonaventure will not accept the opposite, that there are really several forms in a singular thing because they can be abstracted 152 "Item, ratio seminalis non praedicatur de eo cuius est seminalis ratio: non enim potest dici quod homo sit semen vel quod corpus hominis sit embryo; sed universale praedicatur de singular!: ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universalis." — Loc. cit., con. 3 (2.439; ed. min., con. c, 2.452). 153 Loc. cit, arg. 3 (2.439; ed. min., 2.452). 154 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod consideration! philosophicae aliquid respondet in re, dicendum quod verum est. Vera enim et realis est similitude inter Petrum et Paulum, et ita necesse est ponere aliquid tertium, in quo assimilantur. Similiter inter hominem et asinum realis est similitudo, et ideo consideratio philosophica non est vana; nee tamen oportet ita essentias rerum produci sicut habent cognosci: sufficit enim quod sic se habeant ad esse sicut se habent ad cognitionem, sed non oportet quod sic se habeant ad productionem."—Loc. cit, ad 3 (2.442-43; ed. min., 2.456).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

275

from it, and that otherwise no two things can be really alike. In his view, the abstraction of a species and a genus from a singular thing is quite different from the production of forms from the potency of matter. The principle and terminus of the latter operation is always something singular, having this matter and this form. For that reason, he maintains that a seminal reason is not a universal form, but a singular form. This brings us to the other point in the solution accepted by Bonaventure: a seminal reason is a singular form existing with incomplete being in matter and capable of becoming many things. Remaining within the order of the production of forms, Bonaventure holds that a seminal reason is a singular form because it is the form of a part, or a particular form, and not the form of a whole. If matter is a being entirely in potency, however, and a particular form is a being in complete act, how can a seminal reason, which is an incomplete being, be a particular form? An incomplete being, since it is partly in act and partly in potency, is a medium between a being entirely in potency and a being entirely in act. Such a medium is a universal form, which is in act regarding matter and in potency regarding an ulterior form. It seems, therefore, that a seminal reason is a universal form, because a seminal reason is a medium through which the potency of matter is brought to a complete act.155 It is true, Bonaventure says, that the medium by which a being in potency is brought to complete being is in some way in act and in some way in potency. But it is a being in potency with an ordination to a particular act; so, as an active potency, a seminal reason is the form of a part. On the other hand, a seminal reason is not the singular form of any body, not even of an elementary body, such as a fire or a body of air, for it is indifferent to both. Consequently, a singular form can be drawn from an elementary body, and the form can also be resolved back into that body. The principle and terminus of both operations is a seminal reason.156 What is the part, of which a seminal reason is the form? A seminal reason is certainly not a part of the form to be produced from it; rather, what can be a form becomes a form from a seminal reason, just as a flower comes to-be from its seed. When a form is produced, moreover, no new quiddity or essence cornes into being. The production of a form involves only the giving of a new disposition to a seminal reason, so that what has 155 Loc. cit., arg. 4 (2.439; ed. min., 2.452). 156 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod forma particularis dicit ens in actu complete, dicendum quod verum est quod illud, quo mediante pervenitur ab ente in potentia ad esse complemm, est quodam modo ens in actu, quodam modo in potehtia. Sed hoc non est quocumque modo ens in potentia, sed illud quod habet ordinationem ad hoc; et hoc est potentia materiae activa, quae rationem universalis non habet, cum sit forma partis, quamvis sit quodam modo in actu, quodam modo in potentia." — Loc. cit., ad 4 (2.443; ed. min., 2.456). "Ad ultimum patet responsio. Concede enim quod potentia ilia activa non est forma singularis nee ignis nee aeris, sed est indifferens ad utrumque; et ideo ex ilia quaelibet earum potest educi et in illam quaelibet earum habet resolvi; et ilia dici potest ratio seminalis." — EC. he., ad 6; cf. arg. 6 (2.439; ed. min., 2.452).

276

CHAPTER THREE

been in potency is now in act, for act and potency are diverse substantial dispositions of the same thing.'" As the form of a part, therefore, a seminal reason is a substantial disposition of this matter, where it has both a determinate foundation and an ordination to the being of a singular form. Why does Bonaventure say, then, that a seminal reason is indifferent to a given form, and that it is able to become many things? Speaking that way, he refers really to the seed-bed (seminarium) inserted in matter and containing its active potencies. Thus, speaking properly, he says that the essence of matter alone is receptive, while its seed-bed is active in one way and possible in another, since it cooperates with the exterior agent, and yet the seed-bed is varied from one disposition into another.158 It is the seed-bed also which is indifferent to the eduction of this or of that form. A seminal reason, because it is embedded in matter, is very far from complete act; nor can it be drawn into complete act without the help and support of many agents, whose combined influence, conforming to the seminal reason and to its nature, bring it into act.159 Properly considered, then, a seminal reason is not a substantial dispositon of matter regarding any and every form. On the contrary, existing in this matter and having an ordination to a particular form, a seminal reason disposes the matter of a bodily substance to receive a new form. The reception of a new form, as Bonaventure indicates, follows the natural order of the production of forms. Existing first under an imperfect form, bodily matter receives an initial perfection from an elementary form; thereafter, the matter of an elementary body, through the mediation of its form, is perfected by the form of a mixed body and, through the mediation of that form, the matter of a mixed body is perfected by the form of a complex body, which has a substantial disposition for a living form. On the arrival of each new form, the 157 "Alia via est quod formae surt in potentia materiae, non solum in qua et a qua aliquo modo, sed etiam ex qua. Et hoc dicunt, non quia ipsa essentia materiae sit ex qua res producitur, sed quod in ipsa materia aliquid est concreatum ex quo agens, dum agit in ipsam, educit formam; non, inquam, ex illo tamquam ex aliquo, quod sit tamquam aliqua pars formae producendae, sed quia illud potest esse forma et fit forma, sicut globus rosae fit rosa. Et ista positio ponit quod in materia sint veritates omnium formarum producendarum naturaliter; et cum producitur, nulla quidditas, nulla veritas essentiae inducitur de novo, sed datur ei nova dispositio, ut quod erat in potentia fiat in actu. Differunt enim actus et potentia, non quia dicant diversas quidditates, sed dispositiones diversas eiusdem; non tarnen sunt dispositiones accidentalis sed substantiates. Et hoc non est magnum si est in potentia agentis creati, ut quod est uno modo faciat esse alio modo. Et haec positio inter omnes praedictas videtur esse intelligibilior et veritati vicinior. Haec positionem credo esse tenendam, non solum quia earn suadeat ratio, sed etiam quia confirmat auctoritas Augustini ..." — Sent, 7.2.2.1, Resp. (2.198; ed. min., 2. 192-93); see above: pp. 108-09. 158 "Et si tu obicias, quod materia non agit nee constituit, dicendum quod essentia materiae solum se habet per modum receptivi; sed seminarium inditum se habet quodam modo per modum activi, quodam modo per modum passivi, quoniam cooperatur agenti, et nihilominus ipsum variatur ab una dispositione in aliam." — Loc. at., ad 6 (2.199; ed. min., 2.194). 159 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod formae sunt in materia seminaliter, dicendum quod ilia ratio seminalis valde remota est ab actu completo nee potest ad aetum reduci, nisi multa adoiiniculantia, ex quorum influentia, sibi et naturae suae conveniente, proficiat, quousque in actum perveniant" — 2 Sent, 7.2.2.2, ad 5 (2.202; ed. min., 2.196); cf. Resp. "Sed tune ..."

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

277

preceding form remains in the matter, but not as a form; rather, perfected by a nobler form, the preceding form is present as a material disposition with respect to the new form.160 Consequently, the antecedent form remains as an substantial disposition, but not as a substantial form, of the newly generated body. Thus, in the order of resolution or of corruption, the substantial dispositions of matter enable it to fall back under the less noble forms, until it arrives at the elementary forms, which terminate the process of resolution and corruption.161 In the generation of a mixed or mineral body, therefore, the antecedent elementary forms become substantial dispositions of the mixture. The elementary natures do not enter, as substantial forms, into the constitution of the nature of the mixed body. This body has a proper and single form, which is specifically different from the forms of the elements. The form of the mixed body is produced from the potency of elementary matter and, giving a new mode of being to such matter, the form unites with it to constitute an individual substance, which is both a supposit of a specific nature and a being subsisting through itself and in a singular form and matter. In short, turning to Aristotle, speaking properly: "the form is not generated, but the composite", Bonaventure teaches that a form is produced neither in itself nor through itself, but as in matter, and so the form makes the composite, and this is the terminus of generation. Nonetheless, Bonaventure adds, generation or natural production looks to the composite principally for the sake of the form. 162 From our study of Bonaventure's texts, we conclude that he posits a plurality of substantial dispositions in the matter of a terrestrial body having a form produced from a seminal reason. Only a singular form existing in its proper matter can be brought forth from a seminal reason. Maintaining a unity of form in all bodily substances, therefore, Bonaventure does not posit a plurality of forms in any body, particularly an inanimate body, which has its being from a form originating from a seminal reason. Giving rise always to this form in this matter, a seminal reason is neither a universal form nor a potency for such a form. A seminal reason can be taken as universal only in its roots, namely, according to the seed-bed inserted in matter and giving to it a potency or appetite for many singular forms. A

160 "Item, quanto forma posterior et ulterior, tanto nobilior, pro eo quod anteriora sunt materialia respectu posteriorum: ergo nobilior est forma mixti quam forma elementi. Si ergo anima sensibilis, cum sit forma nobilis, debet habere corpus nobile, ergo corpus animalis non tantum non est corpus simplex, sed constans ex diversis elementis." — 2 Sent., 15.1.2, ad opp. 4 (2.378; ed. min., ad opp. d, 2.386). 161 Cf. 2 Sent, 7.2.2.1, ad 3 (2.199; ed. min., 2.193); 4 Sent., 48.2.4, Resp. (4.994; ed. min., 4.981-82). 162 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod actio naturae ad hoc aliquid terminatur, dicendum quod, sicut dicit Philosophus, proprie loquendo: 'forma non generator, sed compositum'. Cum enim producitur forma, non producitur in se nee per se, sed ut in materia, et sic facit compositum et ad illud terminatur generatio; nihilominus generatio vel productio naturalis respicit compositum principaliter gratia formae." — 2 Sent., 7.2.2.1, ad 4 (2.199; ed. min., 2.193); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 7.8 (1033a24-1033bl8).

278

CHAPTER THREE

universal form in the order of nature is a specific form or common nature found in substances of the same species or genus. But that universal form is posterior to their singular forms, because it comes to-be from the conjunction of each of those forms with its proper matter in a supposit. The common nature or specific form, therefore, is a concrete universal and the formal ground stabilizing the similarity between two or more substances in a genus or species. According to their metaphysical consideration, which does not follow the natural order of production, universal forms are simpler and, as a consequence, prior to singular forms. From that point of view, but not according to nature, singular forms proceed from universal forms and the less universal from the more universal forms. Consequently, in the metaphysical order, a genus gives rise to species, and they give rise to the individuals participating in them. Thus, coordinating the various genera and species, the human mind establishes an order of abstract universals, or an order of definition, beyond the natural order of the production of forms. All three orders: the natural order, the metaphysical order and the logical order, depend on God, for only in His knowledge are all things really and truly one. We see no difficulty, therefore, in reconciling with Bonaventure's early writings his last text on the question of universals.163 Regarding the historical sources used by Bonaventure for this question, we need say only that his use of them conforms to what we have seen in our previous studies of the other texts similar in content to those examined above. The position that he takes here, no less than the ones he takes elsewhere, reflects his own thinking rather than the thought of his historical sources. Forms of Animate Bodies

There are two different kinds of form in question here. The first kind, found in plants and animals, originates from a seminal reason. The second 163 "Dico ergo, quod est universale unum ad multa, unum in multis, unum praeter multa. Unum ad multa est in potentia materiae, quod non est completum; unum in multis, ut natura communis in suis particularibus; et unum praeter multa in anima. Unum autem ad multa et unum in multis et unum praeter multa in arte aeterna sunt; per illam enim artem et rationem consistit in re. Planum est enim, quod duo homines assimilantur, et non homo et asinus: ergo necesse est, ut ilia similitudo fundetur et stabiliatur in aliqua forma slahili, non quae est in altero, quia ilia est particularis: ergo in aliqua universal!. Ratio autem universalis non est tola in anima, sed in re secundum processum generis ad speciem, ut, communicamus primo in substantia ut in generalissimo, deinde in aliis usque ad formam hominis ultimatam." — Coll. in Hexaim., 4.9 (5.350). "Unde nota quod forma, qua unus homo cum alio convenit, est convenientia realis stabilita in forma universal!; nam universal! est unum in multis, unum praeter multa, unum ad multa. Secundum quod est potentia in materia, sed non completa, est unum ad multa; secundum autem quod est in particularibus, est unum in multis: secundum quod est in anima, est unum praeter multa. Secundum autem quod est ad multa, in multis, praeter multa, est ratio in arte aeterna et completissime. Ratio enim universalis non est complete in anima, quae est secundum processum generis ad speciem, ut ego et tu in substantia, in corporeitate, in animalitate, in humanitate, secundum quod est coordinatio praedicamentalis." — Delorme, pp. 52-53.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

279

kind, found only in man, has its origin through creation. Both kinds, however, are principles of life, or souls, and they require complex and organized bodies. The degrees of complexion and organization in any living body are proportionate to its soul. The least noble soul, giving only vegetative life, exists in a plant. God produced the plants and the earth on the same day, according to Bonaventure, and for two reasons. First, to remove error, as Basil writes: "lest it be believed that the sun is the principal cause of things borne by the earth", just as Aristotle says: "the earth is the mother of plants, and the sun is their father". The second reason is that plants and herbs are, so to speak, connatural to the earth; originating from the earth, they are rooted there, drawing nourishment from the soil.164 Although man can now plant seeds and, by tilling the soil, expedite the products of the earth, he cannot produce the natural form of any plant. The form of a plant comes from its seed by an operation of nature. Thus, containing a seminal reason and produced by a power of nature, the seed of a plant is ordered to the production of a form of vegetative life, for a natural power can produce only that form which is proper to this matter.165 Giving both vegetative and sensitive life, the form of an animal is nobler than the form of a plant. The sensitive soul, like the vegetative soul, is produced only by the power of nature, and from a seminal reason. In Bonaventure's view, as we have seen, the forms of the first animals have been produced by God from their seminal reasons in matter. Those animals have been given a seminal or active power of nature to generate other animals; so animals are now produced by seminal generation. Hence, combining the teachings of Aristotle and Augustine on the formation of plants and animals, Bonaventure holds that their vegetative and sensitive souls are potentially in their seeds and, with regard to an animal, that the active potency within the seed forms the body, which is then organized by the soul produced from the seminal power of the two animals generating a third Since the bodies of some animals have a greater perfection and organization than the bodies of other animals, the more perfect animals are generated by propagation, so that they are similar in nature to their generating principles; but the less perfect animals are generated by putrefaction, thus requiring a lesser power and assistance than the other animals to be produced into being.166 Explaining those differences, Bonaventure says that the animals generated by propagation require agents that are similar to them in nature and species. Having bodies with perfect complexion and organization, such animals need a productive power with a great actuality, because their 164 2 Sent., 14.2.dub.2, Resp. "... primum obiectum." (2.366; ed. min., 2.374). Cf. St. Basil, Hexaem., homil., 6.2 (PG 29.119); Aristotle, De plantis, 1.2 (817a26): the text taken from here represents an opinion attributed by Aristotle to other philosophers, following Anaxagoras. 165 2 Sent., 7.2.2.2, Resp. "Ad hanc ... potest producere." (2.201-02; ed min., 2.195) 166 2 Sent., 15.1.1, Resp. "Et ideo ..." (2.374-75, ed. min., 2.379-85); see above: n. 27, p. 115.

280

CHAPTER THREE

seminal reasons are brought into act with great, difficulty; therefore, the production of their forms necessitates much assistance from agents of their own kind. Animals produced by putrefaction, however, have a sufficient cause in the universal power of the celestial bodies, assisted by the power of the elements. Consequently, animals with bodies having an imperfect complexion and organization are generated without the help of any particular agent similar to them in species. Because these animals are imperfect in their duration, and sometimes cease to exist, it is necessary that their cause of generation be in another nature, in which their generative force is contained, as Aristotle says: "in order that they be perpetuated in being".167 What is the natural source, then, of a form produced by putrefaction? Answering the question, Bonaventure compares the production of that sort of form with one produced by propagation. In the latter instance, the semen is made from moist matter by the generative potency and, afterward, the semen is made into an organic body in the mother, so that the soul, which was in potency, is brought into act both by the power of the generator and with the help of the celestial bodies. In a similar manner, the other sort of soul is produced from the seed-bed in the earth: on the concourse of the elements, influenced by the celestial bodies, there is caused a life-giving heat which makes the semen; previously hidden in the earth's seed-bed and assist in the perfecting of the seminal reason, nevertheless, they do not give the ultimate form to the generated animal. That form, which is the specific complement of the animal, comes to-be from its seminal reason. In other words, the essence of a species of this kind is in the potency of matter, and such an essence, or seminal reason, is so ordered to the production of the form of the species that no other form can be drawn from it; therefore, Bonaventure insists, when the form has been drawn into act, it has both being and such being, or the proper being of a species. The form, or soul, is in act as a consequence of the action of exterior agents, but it is in a species because of the seminal reason, which has been inserted as the essence of its form in matter; otherwise, Bonaventure remarks, the power given to nature by God could not bring .that form into being.168

167 2 Sent., 8.1.2.1, Resp. (2.214-15; ed. min., 2.209-10); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 2.4 (416bl5-16). 168 2 Sent., 15.1.1, ad 4 (2.376; ed. min., 2.384). Regarding the mode of generation by propagation, note: "Ad ultimum similiter patet responsio, quia, cum animal generetur ab animali per propagationem, etsi non decidatur anima ab anima, sicut corpus deciditur a corpore, quia non est anima divisibilis, ut corpus, deciduntur tamen cum ipso corpore spiritus et calores et virtus etiam animalis, quae adiuvat cum virtute matricis continentis, ut ilia potentis activa, quae erat in humore seminario, ad actum completum perveniat Et ex hoc non sequitur quod anima producat aliam animam ex nihilo, nee quod producat ex materia, nee etiam quod producat ex se ipsa." — Loc. cit., ad 6 (2.376; ed. min., 2.385). And on the r&le of the celestial bodies in the production of souls: "Item, nullum accidens est causa substantiae; sed lux corporis caelestis est principium educendi animam vegetabilem et sensibilem, quae sunt formae substantiales: ergo videtur quod sit substantial — 2 Sent., 13.2.2, fm. 4 (2.319; ed. min., fm. d, 2.322).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

281

Three points can be set down from the above texts of Bonaventure. First, every plant and animal, whether generated by propagation or putrefaction, has a proper form produced from a seminal reason ordained by nature to the production of that one substantial form alone. The power of celestial light and of the elements are extrinsic factors in the generation of plants and animals; neither the celestial bodies nor the elements can give a living form to matter. Secondly, the generation of a plant or an animal involves the giving of a living form to matter of the same kind, or species, so that a plant can produce only a vegetative seed and an animal can produce only a sensitive seed. In the generation of an animal, therefore, a vegetative soul does not precede the sensitive soul, which is the only form that can be produced from the seminal reason of an animal. Thirdly, the substantial form of a plant or an animal posits the individual in a species, thus constituting the common nature of the species in the individuated substance. Consequently, having the singular form produced from a proper seminal reason, the individual body of a plant and of an animal is constituted in substantial being by one only form, from which it also has a specific nature. In sum, conforming to the position taken by Bonaventure on the seminal reason as a singular form, and on its essential ordination to be this form, his texts on the production of a plant and of an animal show that he posits in each of them a unity of substantial form, and not a plurality of substantial forms.169 In saying that an animal body has in itself the nature of the four elements, Bonaventure is not inferring that this body has the substantial forms of the elements. It is here, in fact, where he says that the antecedent forms are material with respect to those following them. 170 Hence, the natures of the elements are present as substantial dispositions in an animal body, which is a complex body and must be properly disposed for the operations of life and of sense.171 Those substantial dispositions constitute 169 Note the following, and interesting, text: "Nam quod obicitur de divisione corporis annulosi, iam apertum est. Quia enim copus annulosum est modicae organizationis et quasi consimilis in partibus et in toto, ideo in qualibet sui parte est anima in proxima dispositione ad hoc quod sit actu; et ideo facia divisione, virtute prioris formae et beneficio corporis caelestis, subito indueitur forma. Plures autem sunt alii modi dicendi circa hoc. Quidam enim dicunt quod anima muhiplicatur, cum sit spiritualis, sicut punctus ad divisionem lineae, et species ad divisionem speculi; verumlamen in neutro horum intelligendum est quod illud idem, quod fuit unum, fiat plura; et ideo praecedens via est magis plana." — 2 Sent., 15.1.1, ad 5 (2.376; ed. min., 2.384-85); cf. con. 6. 170 See above: n. 160, p. 277. 171 2 Sent., 15.1.2, Resp. (2.378; ed. min., 2.386); text given in n. 28, p. 115. Note the rest of the text, describing the perfection of the mixture constituting such a body. "Et propter hoc debet habere aliquem gradum perfectum mixtionis, ubi non tantum fit mixtio sed etiam complexio; perfecta autem mixtio non est, quousque concurrant quatuor elementa. Aqua enim, cum sit subtilior terra in decupla proportione, penetrat partes terrae; sed non perfecte pro eo quod aliquam habeat grossitiem. ASro vero, qui est subtilior in centupla proportione, adhuc intimius se profundat Sed ignis, qui est subtilior et rarior in millesima proportione, sua subtilitate penetrat usque ad intima, et sic fit alteratio plena usque ad minima et mixtio perfecta, quia miscibilia sunt perfecte alterata. — Et sic patet quod taliter debent componi corpora perficienda ab anima sensibili."

282

CHAPTER THREE

the necessary foundation of the diversity of potencies required by an animal to perform its proper operations.172 The multiformity of an animal, therefore, refers to its multiple potencies, which depend for their formation on the predominant disposition of the elements as they exist in the animal's body.173 The noblest soul, existing in man, is the rational soul, which is a spiritual substance originating through creation and not from a seminal reason. The human body, however, is propagated by seminal generation, and so it originates from a seminal reason. Thus, the composite nature of man presents a problem of a very different kind from the one that we have just considered with regard to the plants and the animals. To introduce the problem on human nature, we shall take Bonaventure's final text on the nature of a seminal reason. The text is divided into two parts; so we shall take each part separately. In the first part, Bonaventure speaks of a seminal reason as a potency which is a force, or a power, because it is the sort of potency that sometimes adds a part of being, or of essence, to an act. It adds life, for instance, in a real way to the nature of body, for life is something real; nevertheless, the living body is ordered to the nature of sense, so a seminal reason adds this nature to a living body, and thus the seminal power operates all the way up to man. There is a similar progression in the potencies of a soul: as a tetragon adds one angle to the trigon and a pentagon adds another angle to the tetragon, so a sensitive potency is added to the vegetative potency and a rational potency is added to the sensitive potency.174 When Bonaventure says that a seminal reason, as a potency, adds a part of being, or of essence, to an act, he refers undoubtedly to the seminal reason as having incomplete being in matter, or as the essence of a form to be produced from it. He talks, therefore, about a seminal reason as an incomplete act, or as an active potency, of matter; as the principle of a form, a seminal reason has in potency the act or being of the form to be produced from it, and to which it has a proper ordination. Consequently, by adding a part of being, or of essence, to an act, a seminal reason provides the source of being regarding the particular form depending essentially on that

172 "Item, quanta forma est spiritualior, tanto est plurium operationum principium; sed anima sensibilis est forma valde spiritualist ergo est principium multiplicis operationis. Sed corpus datum est ad subministrandum ei: ergo necesse est quod corpus sit aptum et idoneum ad diversas operationes; sed non est aptum ad diversas operationes nisi per diversas virtutes. nee ad diversas virtutes nisi per diversas naturas, nee habet diversas nisi quia ex diversis compositum: ergo etc." —Loc. cit., ad opp. 3 (2.377-78; ed. min., ad opp. c, 2.386). 173 We have shown this above: pp. 115-16. 1 74 "De potentia, quae est ratio seminalis, haec est vis: quia potentia talis super actum aliquando addit partem essendi, vel essentiae, ut super rationem corporis addit animatum secumdum rem, pro eo quod animatio aliquid est, ordinatum tamen ad sensibile; et super animatum addit sensibile, et sic usque ad hominem. Sic similiter de potentiis animae, quod sicut tetragonus addit urium angulum ad trigonum, et pentagonus ad tetragonum, sic sensitivum ad vegetativum, et rationale ad sensitivum." — ColL m Hexaem., 4.10 (5.350-51).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

283

seminal reason.175 We have seen Bonaveiiture describing a living thing as composed from unequal parts dissimilar in form; at the same time, he holds that two beings do not unite to compose another actual being.' 76 He has also insisted that a seminal reason is founded determinately in a particular matter, thus ordering this matter to receive the singular form which is its proper form. He maintains, furthermore, that it is not the form which is generated, but the composite made by the form. In adding life to the nature of body, then, a seminal reason does not add a soul to the form of a body. Nor does a seminal reason, by adding the nature of sense to a living body, add a sensitive soul to a vegetative soul of a body. When life is added to the nature of body to produce a living body, a real and substantial change takes effect, so that a new substance is formed by the soul generated from the seminal reason ordained to the production of that particular form. A similar change and transformation of substance takes effect when the nature of sense is added to a living body.177 Evidently, then, Bonaventure is not talking about an addition of forms, or of souls, to one another in the same substance. He talks, rather, about an addition of forms according to their ascending degrees of nobility, moving from the inanimate body to the human body. This progression, in the order of nature, follows the appetite of matter under one kind of form to be under the next and nobler kind. Bonaventure speaks of a similar progression in the order of time, particularly regarding living things, for the plants were produced by God prior to His production of the animals, which were produced before the formation of man. In the temporal order of production, moreover, plant life has been a predisposition for the nature of sense, and the latter has been a predisposition for the nature of man. In that way, the rest of corporeal creation has been a predisposition for the production of man, and so it was ordained to the formation of the human body. l78 It is here that we meet our problem on the composite nature of man. Describing 175 Note the passage in the Delorme version: "Si loquamur de potentia quae est actus incompletus, ut est ratio seminaiis, quae secundum naturalem philosophum dicitur potentia activa et est aliquid formae, hie actus super potentiam alicubi addit modum essendi, alicubi partem essentiae, non alterius, sed ordinabilis cum illo." — Op. cit., p. 53. According to this version, a seminal reason, as an act, gives an incomplete mode of being to matter, on the one hand, and, on the other, it is the principle of the essence of the form to be produced from matter: the difference between the two versions is really one of emphasis. 176 "Quarta est compositio animati ex partibus disparibus, ex anima videlicet et corpore ... Si enim essent omnino conformia et perfecta. non possent aliquid constituere, quia ex duobus entibus actu nihil fit" — 1 Sent., 8.2.dub.6, Resp. (1.176; ed. min., 1.141). 177 "Ad illud quod quaeritur, quodsi est ex aliquo, quod illud est aut spirituale aut corporate, dicendum quod nee est materia spiritualis nee est corporalis, sed est quaedam potentia spiritualis, indita a Creatore materiae corporali et ei innitens et ab ea dependens. Et propterea anima sensibilis in brutis generatur et corrumpitur per transmutationem corporalis naturae." — 2 Sent, 15.1.1, ad 2 (2.375:; ed. min., 2.383). "Sensibile enim in homine nominal potentiam, scilicet animae rationalis ... sensibile vero in brutis nominal formam, quae substanlificatur in materia transmutabili; et quia pendet ex ilia quantum ad esse, corrumpitur, ilia corrupta." — 2 Sent, 19.1.2, ad 3 (2.463; ed. min., 2.476-77). 178 See above: pp. 103, 137.

284

CHAPTER THREE

the requirements for the union of Adam's body with his soul, Bonaventure says that the elementary form was united to Adam's soul by the mediating form of the mixture, this form disposing his body for the form of complexion, which established an equality among the elements, thus enabling Adam's body to receive life from his soul. Although Bonaventure does not describe the union of body and soul that way in other men, nevertheless, he says that the human body propagated by Adam is constituted from the four elements.179 Looking at this body from one point of view, Bonaventure maintains that it is organized in a way similar to the mode of organization proper to the more perfect animals.18t> From this viewpoint, it appears that the elements enter as substantial dispositions, and not as forms, into the constitution of the human body. Bonaventure's mathematical illustration of the progressive formation of potencies seems to bear this out, because he uses the same illustration to show that the sensitive and intellective parts of man have one substantial principle.181 There is a problem here, nonetheless, and one that we must explore, on the unity of the potencies in man. Looking at the human body from another point of view, Bonaventure refers to it on many occasions as a corporeal substance. From that viewpoint, the human body is united to the rational soul as to a spiritual substance, and so the two substances constitute a third, which enfolds the whole being of human nature. Bonaventure has stated that the union of body and soul in man comes about without a transmutation of either one, yet they constitute a third nature because neither one repels the other, since they depend on each other. As a natural union of constitutive principles, the composite nature of man is a conjoining of different natures and a binding together of things formally different, or of parts different in kind. 182 The question facing us here is: has the human body some sort of form completed by the rational soul, so that the whole being of human nature consists in the being of the body along with the being of the soul? The intrinsic composition of form and matter in the soul itself seems to support a positive answer to the question. 183 179 See above pp. 120-21. 180 "Quaedam completam, ut animalia sensibilia perfects et gradientia, ut equus; et talia non potest nisi per vim formativam influxam cum decisione seminis; et tale est corpus humanum, quod non potest naturaliter organizari nisi adsit semen et debitum vas suscipiens, scilicet matrix; et ideo non est simile de serpentibus." — 4 Sent, 43.1.5, ad 5-6 (4.893; ed. min., 4.882). 181 See above: p. 122. The passage in the Delorme version applies this illustration to the order of nature and not to the order of operation: "Quod patet, quia animatum addit vere super corpus, sensibile super animatum, rationale super sensibile. Si ergo loquamur de hac additione, hie est additio realis, quia anima est aliquid ultra naturam corporis, licet essentialiter ad illud ordinatum; similiter de sensibilitate et rationabilitate, ut tetragonum super trigonum addit novum angulum et pentagonum super tetragonum addit non solum modum essendi, ut patet II De anima, in principio (414b20-31)." — Op. cit., p. 53. The substance of the doctrine here is the same as that in the text of the critical edition: die passage above refers to the essential unity of the principle supporting the progressive perfections of the potencies from vegetative life to rational life. 182 Texts given above in nn. 128-29, p. 265. 183 See the texts cited in n. 7, p. 220.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

285

We come now to the second part of Bonaventure's final text on the nature of a seminal reason. In this portion of the text, he says, still speaking of a seminal reason as a force or power, that it sometimes adds only a mode of being to an act. For instance, in the order of life, when a being is brought into act from a being in potency, the seminal reason adds only a mode of being to the latter which is not conjoined to matter absolutely, but "to matter having life in radical potency". Wherefore, it is unsound to say that the ultimate form may be added to prime matter without some principle or potency disposing it for this form, or to say that no form lies between prime matter and an ultimate form.184 Bonaventure is clearly speaking now of a seminal reason which is a potential and radical principle of life in matter; this is not prime matter, but matter disposed substantially to receive life from a form, or soul. The proper matter for a soul, therefore, is matter suitably disposed by a seminal reason which is to become a living form, thereby giving life actually to such matter. The act of giving life to this matter by the soul is a new mode of being by comparison with the seminal reason, which gives life to the matter only in a potential way. Since the soul comes from its seminal reason, as an act from its potency, the soul, as an ultimate form, cannot be conjoined simply or immediately to prime matter. A soul drawn from the potency of matter is always preceded by a seminal reason rooted in that potency; as a disposition giving life potentially to a particular matter, the seminal reason is an incomplete form, or a formal principle, lying between the soul and prime matter. But the soul and its seminal reason are not two different forms of the same matter; they differ as complete and incomplete beings, or according to their modes of being as act and potency, and these are simply substantial dispositions of the same thing.1B5 There are no particular difficulties in the text with respect to a plant or to an animal. For Bonaventure, as we have shown, only a vegetative soul can come from the seed or seminal reason of a plant; likewise, the seminal reason of an animal is disposed to become only a sensitive soul. In each instance, the complete being of the soul is a more perfect mode than the incomplete being of its seminal reason, which intervenes as an imperfect form between the soul and the potency or essence of matter. But there are a number of difficulties concerning the nature of man, for the human body alone is generated by way of a seminal reason. Several questions may be raised here; for instance, what sort of form, if any, is produced by the act of human generation? If no form is generated by that act, what lies between the rational soul and prime matter? Those questions entail many others, especially on the true significance for Bonaventure, 184 "Aliquando autem addit solum modum essendi, ut, si de uho in potentia fiat unum in actu, addit solum modum essendi, quia unum non coniungitur materiae simpliciter, sed materiae habenti vitam in potentia radical!. — Unde insanum est dicere, quod ultima forma addatur materiae primae sine aliquo, quod sit dispositio vel in potentia ad illam, vel nulla forma interiecta." — Coll, in Hexaim., 4.10 (5.351). 185 See above: pp. 275-77 (nn. 157-61).

286

CHAPTER THREE

regarding man, of such terms as: substance and nature, union and composition; we can also include the expressions, regarding the human soul: ultimate form and completive form. In short, our problem takes in almost the entire doctrine of Bonaventure on man.1"6 We shall begin our study of the problem with the natural generation of the human body. Bonaventure treats this subject in connexion with the body assumed by an angel, and with the formation of Christ's body. The body assumed by an angel cannot be a truly human body, because it does not originate through natural generation. The power informing a human body is the same power that forms it, for the force forming it comes from its informing and perfecting principle. Now a human body can be generated only by a nature similar to it in species; therefore, the production and formation of a human body requires the generation of a man by a man. If the body assumed by an angel were a truly human body, Bonaventure says, it would have an appetite for a rational soul, which God would infuse into it at once. 187 In Bonaventure's judgment, the body assumed by an angel does not have the true organization belonging to a human body, because such an organization is the work of the formative power conveyed with the generative seeds. An assumed body is conformed to a human body through a certain protraction of features, which do not presuppose an equality of complexion, since a craftsman can do the same in wood or in stone. The proper quality of mixture required for a true human body is that mixture having the specifying power directing and completing it with respect to a man. Although the human body is in its seminal reasons, as are 186 Note the passage in the Delorme version: "Si autem loquamur de potentia quae solum est passiva, ut quod modo est in potentia. modo in actu, add it modum essendi solum. Hie nota quod hoc rum est verum, quod ultima forma addatur primae materiae nulla forma interiecta, quia sensibile et vegetabile interponuntur et ilia etiam additio est realis et natural is; nee tatnen de vivo potentia fit actu vivum: radicale vivum erat ibi." — Op. at., pp. 52-53. In this version, Bonaventure speaks of a seminal reason as an active potency giving a mode of being to the passive potency of matter: therefore, it is not true to say that the ultimate form (i.e. the rational soul) may be added to prime matter with no form lying between, because there are interposed a sensitive soul and a vegetative soul; the ultimate form (rational soul) is a real and natural addition, and from a thing living in potency, nevertheless, a living thing in act does not come to be, for it was mere radically (in a seminal reason). Compared with the critical edition of the text, there are no fundamental differences in either the first or the last portions of the above passage; but there is a notable difference in the middle portion, namely, concerning the interposing of a sensitive and of a vegetative soul between prime matter and the rational soul. If the rational soul is taken as the ultimate form of corporeal matter in the order of time, the text would then refer only to the progressive production of forms, so that, between prime matter and human nature, other kinds of living things had to be produced as predispositions for the formation of the human body. If the rational soul is taken as an ultimate form in the order of nature, the text could still have the same meaning, for the rational soul, as die noblest form, would then follow the two other forms, both really and naturally, but not necessarily in the same body, however, the text could also mean that the rational soul, as an ultimate form, is added to a sensitive soul and to a vegetative soul in the man. (L. Veuthey, for instance, interprets Bonaventure's doctrine in the latter way: Si. Bonav. philos. christ., pp. 161-62.) To know which of those two meanings is the correct one, we shall have to take account of Bonaventure's doctrine on the formal unity of man. 187 2 Sent., 8.1.2.1, ad opp. 1-4 (2.214; ed. mm., ad opp. a-d, 2.208-09).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

287

other bodies in their seminal reasons, it can be drawn from them only through the concourse of the exterior power residing in the man and the woman, without whom the human body cannot be brought into perfect act. I88 The body assumed by an angel cannot really be a human body, furthermore, because the angel cannot use it to produce a truly human body by an act of generation. The product of generation is similar in species to its principle, so a truly human body can be produced only by a proper act of human generation, which is an act of the whole man. Flowing from the vegetative power of human nature, the generative act of man conforms to the organic conditions of transmission and reception proper to the species. But those conditions do not exist in the body assumed by an angel. l89 According to these texts of Bonaventure, a human body is producible only by the specific act of generation proper to human nature, or to a man and a woman. The human body is contained inchoatively in a seminal mixture having a specifying power, or a formative force, which organizes the mixture in such a way that, presupposing an equality of complexion, it can become a truly human body. In his question on the propagation of Christ's human body, Bonaventure distinguishes between a material and a formal acceptation of the term flesh. Accepted materially, the term designates matter as subject to propagation according to the law of nature; accepted formally, flesh designates matter as having actual being under a given form and according to the law of propagation. The flesh of any man, excepting Christ, originates from his parents according to a seminal reason, because, following the law of propagation, his flesh comes into being by a power and operation of nature in his parents, from whom his flesh has its species or completion. The conception of Christ's flesh, however, has been above the power of nature, since His flesh was conceived solely from a woman. Consequently, the propagation of Christ's flesh falls under the material and not under the formal acceptation of the term: His human body was brought into being and into complete act by the power of the Holy Spirit. 19° How, then, is Christ's flesh contained in the matter propagated from Adam according to the mode of seminal reason? This manner of propagation, Bonaventure replies, follows the law of nature, which has been superseded in the conception of Christ. Under the law of nature, the seed of human flesh has a seminal reason in its formal part and a bodily matter in its

188 "Ad illud quod obicitur. quod est ibi organizatio et aequalis compiexio, dicendum quod falsum est. Non enim ibi vere organizatio, quae competit corpori humano, quae quidem est a virtute formativa, cum seminibus delata, sed potius quaedam lineamentorum protractio secundum illius cotiformitatem; et haec non praesupponit aequalitatem complexionis, quia talis protractio potest fieri ab artifice in ligno et lapide. Nee quaecumque qualilas mixtionis est ilia quae facit ad veritatern corporis humani, sed ilia quae habet virtutem specificatam, hominis completivam et directivam."—Loc. cit.. ad 2 (2.215; ed min., 2,210); cf. ad 3. 189 2 Sent, 8.1.3.1 (2.219-20; ed. min., 2.214-16). 190 3 Sent, 3.2.2.2, Resp., ad 2 (3.88-89; ed min., 3.81-83).

288

CHAPTER THREE

material part, so that, from the power of the seminal reason at work in this matter, a human body can come into being. But, in the conception of Christ, God by His infinite power produced a human body solely from the matter in the seed, and so without the natural operation of a seminal reason.191 In conceiving Christ, His mother cooperated with the Holy Spirit. Some theologians think that her cooperation consisted solely in supplying the material principle of Christ's body. Their opinion rests on Aristotle's doctrine: in the generation of offspring, the female is as a material principle and the seed of the male is as an effective and operative principle. l92 Thus, in the generation of Christ, the Holy Spirit supplied what was lacking on the part of the man. Bonaventure dismisses the opinion as having little value, because a mother has both a passive and an active potency for generating children. Other theologians think that the mother of Christ cooperated with the Holy Spirit both in preparing the matter and in the production of the ultimate form of Christ's body; however, she did not cooperate in the whole operation, since the instantaneous formation, or total transformation, of His body could have been achieved only by an infinite power. She did cooperate in the production of the ultimate form, because this sort of form can be produced instantly by nature, or by a created power. Bonaventure sees some difficulties in accepting that opinion, particularly regarding the ultimate form. To produce such a form is a nobler operation than to prepare the matter; so it seems unfitting for the Holy Spirit to prepare the matter by Himself, but to produce the ultimate form with the mother of Christ. Moreover, Bonaventure observes, it is difficult to see what that ultimate form might be: it is not a rational soul, which originates solely through creation; nor is it a corporeal organization, because nature does not organize matter suddenly, but in a period of time and, as Aristotle shows, through movement and not mutation.193 Setting down another opinion, which he accepts, Bonaventure holds that, in generating Christ, His mother was given a power by the Holy Spirit to supply the matter having both a sufficiency and a power for producing her child. The power in the matter, however, could come forth into act only in a period of time. Since it was not fitting for Christ's flesh to be formed in that way, therefore, by His infinite power, the Holy Spirit brought this matter forth into complete act, thus accelerating into being what in other women, relying solely on nature, can be produced only over a 191 Lac. at., ad 3 (3.89-90; ed. min., 3.83-84). 192 Consult in Aristotle: De gener. animal., !.2 (716a2-17), 1.20 (728b33-729a33). 193 3 Sent., 4.3.1, Resp. "... dicit Philosophus." (3.111; ed. min., 3.105-06); cf. Aristotle, Physica, 5.1 (225al2-29). Note the passage: "Difficile est nihilominus assignare quae sit ilia forma ultima, in cuius inductione ccoperatur Virginis potentia generativa. Ilia enim non potest esse aniraa, quoniam a sola creatione habet originem; non organizatio corporea, ut videtur, quia ilia non inducitur subito, sed per successionem a narura: inducitur etiim per motum, non per mutationem; 'raotus enim est transmutatio successiva, mutatio, instantanea', ut dicit Philosophus."

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

289

period of time.194 If the mother of Christ supplied the matter and not a seminal reason for His body, and if generation is an active and cooperative force for producing a form, in what way did she cooperate with the Holy Spirit? Taking a seminal reason as that according to which nature usually works, Bonaventure insists that the body of Christ was not in His mother by way of a seminal reason. God gave her another active potency beyond the power of nature and, operating in obedience to His power, it was taken to perfect act in a way above nature and a seminal reason. Bonaventure illustrates his point with the following example: if God, after the coition of a man and a woman, were to confer instantly on the fetus the fulness of a perfect organization, such a formation could not be said to come about according to a seminal reason, even though there would be in the fetus an active force capable of bringing that organization into being in time.195 By His infinite power, then, God organized the body of Christ, and in a perfect manner, at the moment of His conception. On this point, Bonaventure follows Augustine, who says that the flesh of Christ was conceived as united to the Word of God, and He assumed a true human body with its rational soul.196 Presenting his own reasons for the doctrine, Bonaventure teaches that it was fitting for the Word to assume a whole human nature, consisting in the flesh and the soul of man; therefore, it was necessary for Christ's body to be perfectly organized in the first instant of its conception, because the nature of the soul is such that it is united only to a formed and organized flesh. Thus, showing His wonderful power, God formed the body of Christ in an instant, an operation that nature can perform only during a period of time. Since Mary was the Mother of God only through His union to the flesh that she conceived, and since this flesh was united in a fitting manner to its soul and to God only according as it had a due distinction of members, therefore, from the first instant of its conception, the body of Christ was duly perfected in the distinction of its members.197 Bonaventure, though he is speaking about Christ, has much to say on the natural mode of producing a human body. Taking the term flesh materially, he considers the seminal mixture produced by human parents to be the material principle of a human body propagated according to the law of nature. Taking flesh formally, but still according to the natural law of propagation, he considers the rational soul to be the formal principle of being in a human body, which is completed in its proper species because of 194 Loc. cit., Resp. "Et quoniam ..." (3.112; ed. min., 3.106-07). 195 Loc. cit., ad 3 (3.112-13; ed. min., 3.108-09). 196 "Dicendum quod absque dubio, sicut dicit Augustinus, corpus Ghristi ab instant! conceptionis habuit perfectionem organizationis." — 3 Sent, 3.2.3.2, Resp. initio (3.93; ed. min, 3.87). For the doctrine of Augustine see: Loc. cit, sc 1-2 (a-b); cf. De fide ad Petrum, c. 18 (PL 40.772), and De Trinit., 13.17-18 (PL 42.1031-33). 197 Loc. cit., Resp. "Et ratio ...", ad 4 (3.93-94; ed. min., 3.87-88). Note the sentence: "Et quoniam anima non est nata uniri nisi carni formatae et organizatae, ideo in primo instanti conceptionis necesse fuit corpus ad perfectionem organizationis perduci" — in Resp.

290

CHAPTER THREE

the specific nature of its generative origins. The original mixture produced by human parents is composed of complex matter and a seminal reason, giving incomplete being to its matter. Having a natural force or power of organization, the seminal reason forms its matter organically in preparation for the reception of a rational soul. This preparatory formation and organization, including the proper distinction of bodily members, requires both time and motion, but not a mutation of the bodily matter, or flesh. When the flesh is suitably disposed in its formation and organization to receive its specifying and substantial form, a rational soul created by God comes into being as united to this flesh, thereby transforming it and communicating to it a complete act of being, thus perfecting its due organization as a human body. Bonaventure's doctrine in these texts, therefore, conforms precisely to his previous texts dealing with the same subject. 198 None of those texts show Bonaventure positing a form of organization between the human body and its rational soul. A form of organization, just as any other corporeal form, would have to come into being suddenly, because it involves a mutation in being; but the original organization of human flesh takes effect in time and without a mutation in being. The organization of the human body is begun by its seminal reason and completed by the rational soul, which is the one and only substantial form in a human body. The rational soul is the ultimate form of such a body, not because the soul completes some other form there, but because the soul is the ultimate principle perfecting the bodily matter, or flesh, of a man both in the order of time and in the order of nature. Although the conception of Christ and the organization of His body are exceptions in both orders, nevertheless, differing only with respect to the mode or manner of generation, the human nature of Christ conforms in every other respect to the specific nature of man. 199 By forming and organizing the original mixture of human matter, the seminal reason disposes it substantially to receive a rational soul. Since an antecedent form is material with respect to a posterior and nobler form, therefore, when a rational soul comes to-be in a matter disposed organically to receive it, the seminal reason, which was its disposing principle, becomes material with respect to the rational soul. Thus, the seminal reason remains as a substantial disposition, or an active potency, of the 198 See above: pp. 121-24 (nn. 42-47). 199 In the order of time and of nature, the body of Christ grew and developed, so that, attaining perfection with respect to quantity, His body was duly disposed for the natural operations proper to a man: 3 Sent., 3.2.3.1 (3.90-92; ed. min., 3.84-86). Christ assumed a true human body and a true human soul: 2.2.12 (3.44-47; ed. min., 3.39-43); note especially: "... Christus assumit verum corpus et veram animam cum suis potentiis vegetabili, sensibili et rational) ... et ideo secundum humanam naturam Christus formam creatam habuit completivam; et sic certissime credendum est Christus assumsisse et veram carnem et veram animam rationalem." — 2.2.2, in Resp., ad 4 (3.47; erf. min., 3.42-43). "Sic autem definitur homo: homo est substantia animate: per hoc tangitur vegetabilis ... sensibilis ... rationalis." — 4 Sent., 15.2.dub.2, Resp. (4.376-77; ed min., 4.359). "... assumptio non tantum est carnis sensibilis, sed etiam spiritus rationalis secundum vegetandi, sentiendi et intelligendi." — Brevil., 4.2. (5.242; ed. min., n. 2, 5.79).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

291

organic body, which has its complete being from the act of the rational soul. Wherefore, Bonaventure can say: "as the whole man is composed of flesh and soul, so the whole body is composed of organic parts".200 Those parts are the members of the body, and they are perfected by the potencies of the soul; nevertheless, because of the complexion of the body, its organic parts, perfected by one principle, are uniform and disposed for the same kind of life. 201 The multiform organization of the human body, then, looks to its diverse organs, which depend on the multiple potencies in the soul. The equality of complexion in the body, on the other hand, looks to its uniformity in being and life, which originate from the rational soul.202 Does the equality of complexion, which is presupposed by the organization of the body, result from a form of complexion? The answer to our question can be found in a text where Bonaventure dismisses the opinion that the nature of the heavenly bodies is constituted from the four elements. If those bodies had a nature mixed from the elements, Bonaventure says, the mixture would be so exceedingly noble that, by their nature, the heavens would be animated, which is contrary to the common teaching of the theologians. In his own judgment, the nature of the heavenly bodies could not have a complexion of the elements and be without life, because complexion in men is a proximate disposition for receiving the soul.203 Neither the complexion nor the organization of a human body, therefore, has its origin from a substantial form existing in the body together with its rational soul. The complexion in founded upon a disposition of the generated matter to receive human life from a rational soul. Presupposing that complexion, the seminal reason organizes the matter, so that, as an embryo, it actually has one form which is a disposition looking to the diverse members to be organized there.204 If there is neither a form of complexion nor a form of organization in the human embryo, how can Bonaventure say that, as an organic body, it is composed of matter and form? He says this in response to an argument opposing his position on the composition of matter and form in the rational soul. According to the argument, everything constituted from matter and form is something singular and complete, so that it cannot enter into the constitution of a third thing; but the rational soul and the human body con-

200 Cf. 3 Sent, 21.1.3, sc 3 (3.440; ed. min., sc c, 3.432). 201 We have noted this point before; see: 1 Sent., 8.2.un.3, ad 4 (1.172; ed. min., 1.137). Note: "Non enim fit unum per essentiam ex gratificato et gratia, sicut fit unum per essentiam ex corpore vivificato et anima vivifirante." — 2 Sent., 26.un.3, ad 4 (2.639; ed min., 2.659-60). 202 BreviL, 2.10 "Ut vero ... rectitudini attestaretur." (5.228; ed. min., n. 4, 5.52). 203 2 Sent., 14.2dub.3, Resp. "... videtur approbandus." (2.367; ed min., 2.375). Bonaventure gives.his own judgment in the form of a question: "Quod si dicas, ilia esse compiexionata non tamen animata, quomodo verum esse poterit, cum nobis complexio sit ad suscipiendum animam proxima dispositio?" 204 See text cited above in n. 24, p. 225. The perfection or completion of the body's organization is the work of the rational soul.

292

CHAPTER THREE

stitute a third thing, which is one through its essence: therefore, the soul is not something singular, and so it is only a form. 205 It is not generally true, Bonaventure responds, that a composite of matter and form is a complete being. It is true only when the matter terminates the whole appetite of the form, and the form terminates the whole appetite of the matter, because there is then no appetite for anything else, nor a possibility of composition, which requires beforehand an appetite and inclination in the component principles. Although the rational soul has a composition of matter and form, nevertheless, it has an appetite for perfecting a corporeal nature, just as the organic body is composed of matter and form, and it has, nevertheless, an appetite for receiving the soul.206 Let us take another argument and response based on the nature of a complete being. In the argument, it is said that only what is here and now, which is something singular, is in place: only an individual thing, and every such thing is a complete being, is a singular thing; therefore, only a complete being is in place from the beginning, and so, prime matter, which was not a complete being, has not been situated in a place.207 Answering the argument, Bonaventure replies that, if it is understood of perfect completion, it is false to say that only a complete being is in place: an embryo is in a place, and yet the embryo is something incomplete. The deduction is invalid, moreover, because it is false to say that everything which is a singular thing is a complete being. The individual thing itself has complete being, but an individual form has being that is less complete.208 As the component principles of a human nature, both the embryo and the rational soul are incomplete beings, or things that have incomplete being. The embryo, having being from a seminal reason, is incomplete with respect to form. The rational soul, though it has being from a substantial form, is incomplete with respect to corporeal matter. We shall consider each of the two components separately, keeping in mind, however, that we are handling here the general problem of the composition of human nature, and not the particular problem of the composition of the rational soul, which we shall treat in due course. As an organic body, the embryo receives incomplete being from a seminal reason; this principle functions as a form before the arrival of a rational soul. The seminal reason is not a substantial form, strictly speaking, because a substantial form constitutes with its matter both a complete individual thing and a form of the whole individual, thus establishing 205 2 Sent., 17.1.2, arg. 6 (2.413; ed. min., 2.425). 206 Luc. at., ad 6 (2.415-16; ed. min., 2.427); text cited in n. 7, p. 220. 207 2 Sent., 12.2.3, ad opp. 1 (2.305; ed. min., 2.308). 208 "Ad illud ergo quod primo obicitur in contrarium, quod nihil est in loco nisi ens completum, dicendum quod hoc est falsum, si intelligatur de completione perfecta; embryo enim in loco est, quamvis sit aliquid incompletum. Nee valet ilia deductio; peccat enim in hoc quod dicit omne quod est hoc aliquid, est completum. Hoc enim falsum •sst, nam ipsum individuum et forma individualis habet esse completum et minus completum." — Lx. cii, ad 1 (2.305; ed. min., 2.309).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

293

a supposit in a species completing the whole being of an individual substance. The seminal reason, properly considered, is the form of a part and, as such, it is in the genus of substance only by a reduction to that genus. Hence, an embryo is not a substance in the proper sense of the word. Indeed, Bonaventure refers to the original matter of the embryo as a corporeal substance, and he speaks of the whole body as an organ of the rational soul.209 He also teaches that some things, such as species and individuals, are in a genus through themselves, because they participate in its complete essence. But there are other things that are in a genus only by reduction, because they do not have its complete essence. Consequently, to understand his application of the term substance to an organic body, which is composed of matter and a seminal reason functioning as a form, we must look at his doctrine on reduction to a genus. He lists five different groups of things in a genus only by way of reduction. The first group includes principles either constituting an essence or integrating a substance, for example, the essential principles of matter and form, or the integral parts of a body, namely, the elements. Those principles and parts are in the genus of substance solely because of the essence or substance of which they are the principles or the parts. The second group comprises things that fulfil a substance either by an act or by an aptitude. The first act of a substance, for instance, is taken back to the genus of that substance; so also is an act of being, or an act of life, taken back to the genus of the substance having such an act. In like manner, the completive difference is taken back to the genus of the same substance to which belongs the species having the difference, thus rational falls into the genus animal by way of the species man, of which rational is the completive difference. The third group contains things that are ways to something or ways from something. As ways to something, movements and mutations are taken back to the genus of substance, as generation is reduced to that genus. The potencies of a substance are ways from something; they are taken back to the genus of the substance from which they come forth as first principles of action, for they are not so distant from the substance as to be another complete essence. The fourth group of things consists of similitudes, and they are placed in the same genus containing the things of which they are likenesses: the similitude of a colour is not the colour, but is as the colour, so it is put into the genus of 209 "Quamvis enim in aliquo semine sit ratio seminalis secundum quamlibet eius partem. saltern formalem, ut ex eo aliquid possit fieri, tamen, si Deus aliquid facial ex illo semine, ad quod non habeat ordinanonem secundum naturam, dicitur fuisse in illo semine secundum corpulentam substantiam, non secundum rationem seminalem, quia semen illud respectu illius quod Deus educit, non habet vim sufficienter activam, sed passivam, secundum quam subministrat corporalem substantiam, esto etiam quod ilia seminalis ratio cooperaretur ad subministrationem materiam illius rei factae: ut si plantaretur unum semen parvum, ita quod de illo produceretur arbor magna, cuius magnitude materia esset ad productionem magni corporis alterius speciei ..." — 3 Sent., 3.2.2.2, ad 3 (3.89-90; ed. min., 3.83). "Item, sicut corpus, ad hoc quod sit animae congruum organum, requirit debitam qualitatem, ita etiam debitam quantitatem ..." — 4 Sent., 49.2.1.2.1, con. 2 (4.1015; ed. min., con. b, 4.1000).

294

CHAPTER THREE

colour. The fifth group of things has to do with privations, which have their essence only through a proper habitus; for that reason, a privation is placed in the same genus to which its habitus is reduced. 210 An organic body is a material component of a human nature. As a constituent principle of a human essence, therefore, the body is put into the genus of substance, and so it is called a substance. The elements are integral parts of an organic body, which is composed in a complex manner from the elements; they are placed in the genus of substance to which that body belongs. But the organic body constituting a human nature is in the genus of substance to which man belongs; as principles integrating the material component of his nature, the elements in his body are in the same genus of substance as the body itself. In that respect, they are substantial dispositions of the human body.211 As integrating principles of a human body, moreover, the elements entering into the organic body are so mixed that, from the specifying power of a seminal reason in the mixture, the generated matter has an aptitude to be the component part of a rational substance. The matter formed and organized by such a seminal reason is directed to the completive difference of a rational substance; this difference comes from the rational soul as the form completing the work of the seminal reason, which is an incomplete act disposing the organic body to receive the soul. As a power of organization, the seminal reason is a principle of movement in the organic body. Consequently, as an active potency disposing the organic matter for a rational form, the seminal reason is the way to that form, or its substantial predisposition, in the order of generation. Thus, as a form of the part, or a formal principle, the seminal reason is brought back to the same genus of the substance, or the composite, which terminates the action of generation. The seminal reason remains, however, as a realized or substantial disposition of the completed human body; so, ultimately, the seminal reason is brought back with the human body itself to the genus of the substance containing that body. In 210 2 Sent., 24.1.2.1, ad 8 "Sunt enim ..." (2.562-63; ed. min., 2.580). The fourth and fifth groups do not concern us; the first and second groups, as we shall show, take in the rational soul as the natural form of the human body. 211 The following text indicates the way in which the elements function in the human body: "Ordo partium in microcosmo sive in minori mundo respondet ordini partium in maiori mundo; sed sic videmus in natura corporis humani, quod supra cor, quod est calidum et naturae igneae, ponitur cerebrum, quod est frigidum et naturae aqueae: ergo et in maiori mundo supra solem et alia corpora calefacentia erit ponere naturam aqueam." — 2 Sent., 14.1.1.1, fm. 3 (2.336; ed. min., fm. c, 2.337). Bonaventure's doctrine on the nature and function of the elements in the human body is found, for the most part, in his texts on the reconstitution of that body at its resurrexion. The elements dispose the body both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that it can be duly organized to suit the rational soul, which is its perfection and mover, the suitability of the parts of the resurrected body will be fundamentally the same as it is in the present life. Consult: 4 Sent., 49.2.1.2.1 (4.1015-16; ed min., 4.999-1001), and 49.2.2.1.1 (4.1021-23; ed min., 4.100608). Bonaventure refuses to accept the opinion that the resurrected body will be without quantity, and the opinion that it will be a lighted body, having a form of light: 4 Sent., 49.2.2.3.1, Resp. (4.1028-29; ed. min., 4.1013-14); 43.1.5, ad 6 (4.893; ed. min., 4.882-83).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

295

short, as a composite of human matter and a seminal reason, an organic body is called a substance, because, through its matter and its seminal reason, it is placed in the genus of substance as a material component of a human nature. Since the body does not participate in the complete essence of that nature, it is neither a first nor a second substance: it is a substance only by reduction to the genus containing human nature. The formal component of a human nature is a rational soul, which is the proper form of the human body. As a constitutent principle of a human essence, therefore, a rational soul is put into the genus of substance by way of reduction. In that way, first of all, a rational soul is called a substance. The natural condition of a rational soul requires it to exist in the human body of which, as its substantial form, the soul is the first act. Thus, as the first act of a human body, the rational soul is taken back to the same genus of substance as the body to which it gives an act of both being and life. This is the second way that a rational soul is called a substance.212 A rational soul is also the principle of the completive difference of a human nature, for a rational soul has a proper aptitude to be united to a human body.213 The completive difference rooted in a rational soul is itself reduced to the genus of substance containing the soul as a formal component of human nature. Moreover, setting the rational soul apart from other kinds of soul and from an angel, the completive difference of his soul gives to a man both his species and his specific act, which is the act of reason.214 A rational soul considered in itself, or apart from a body, has being that is less complete than the being of the individual substance constituted by a soul and a

212 "... innotescit nobis anima non solum secundum accidentia, sed etiam secundum substantiam et naturam, et non solum secundum id quod indignitatis est, sed etiam secundum id quod nobilitatis. Hoc enim quod est animam uniri corpori humano sive vivificare corpus humanum, non dicit actum accidentalem nee dicit actum ignobilem: non accidentalem, quia ratione illius est anima forma substantialis; non ignobilem, quia ratione illius est anima nobilissima formarum omnium, et in anima stat appetitus totius naturae. Corpus enim humanum nobilissima complexione et organizatione, quae sit in natura, est organizatum et complexionatum; ideo non completur nee natum est compleri nisi nobilissima forma sive natura. Illud ergo, quo anima est unibilis corpori, tale dicit quid essentiaJe respiciens quod est nobilissimum in anima; et ita penes illud recte sumitur specifica differentia, secundum quam anima differt a narura angelica." — 2 Sent., 1.2.3.2, Resp. (2.50; ed. min., 2.42-43). 213 "Quod obicitur, quod differentia completiva debet esse propna, dicendum quod uniri corpori non est proprium animae rationalis; sed tamen uniri corpori humano, sicut dicit illud quod est animae essentiale et nobile, sic etiam importat quod est proprium." — Loc. cit., ad 2 (2.50; ed. min., 2.43); cf. fm. 4 (2.49; ed. min., fm. d, 2.41). 214 "Quae differunt specie habent diversas perfectiones secundum speciem; sed homo et angelus differunt specie, constat, et anima dat speciem homini et actum specificum ... sed anima humana per essentiam est sensibilis et vegetabilis, alioquin non faceret animal: ergo cum differat specie ab anima sensibili tantum et vegetabili, multo plus differt a spiritu angelico, qui nee sensibilis nee vegetabilis." — 2 Sent., 1.2.3.1, fa. 1 & 3 (2.47; ed. min., fa. a & c, 2.39). "Item, quorum differentia ultimo completiva est specie una, ipsa sunt specie unum; sed differentia ultimo completiva animae rationalis et angeli est hoc quod est rationale sive intellectuale, et in hoc communicant... dicendum quod rationale, secundum quod est differentia animae et angeli differt. Nam rationale angeli est intellectuale: sed rationale animae proprie est rationale..." —Loc. cit., con. 2, ad 2 (2.47-48; ed. min., 2.40-41).

296

CHAPTER THREE

body. Since a rational soul has complete being only in a whole man, therefore, since it is a part of a man, a rational soul has its complete being only in a man, and as a part of his nature. 215 Consequently, as the form of a part, a rational soul is brought back to the genus of the substance of which, as the principle of completive difference, it is the specifying and substantial form. This is the third way of calling the rational soul a substance: Thus, a rational soul, like an organic body, is neither a first nor a second substance according to any one of the three ways in which it is called a substance. The soul does not have the complete essence of the human nature of which it is the formal component, and to which it gives a completive and specific difference. As a consequence, the soul does not have the whole being of a man's essence, even though the soul is the first act giving him being and life. His rational soul may be called a species; however, it is properly the form, or formal part, of a species.216 When Bonaventure refers either to the rational soul or to the human body as a substance, he does not infer evidently that the one or the other is something complete in itself, or that it is a whole individual thing. He uses the term substance, in each instance, to indicate a substantial component of an individual nature or thing. In his doctrine, moreover, the term nature can have as many meanings as the term thing or substance. Nature may signify either a thing which is a being through itself or a property inhering naturally in a thing. Given a wider sense, nature signifies anything that conserves a nature, or at least that does not deprive it of some good. Taken in the widest way, the term designates every being that is in some natural thing, whether or not the being naturally inheres in the thing, or whether it conserves the thing's nature. In a similar manner, the term substance has many meanings. According to Aristotle, the term signifies the matter, the form, the composite and the essence of any one thing. According to Augustine, substance designates a thing that is permanent and standing on its own, or a permanent thing inhering in something else, or even any essence whatsoever that is an actual being, whether or not it stands on its own, and in this sense the term is extended to every being. 217 215 "Item, pars suum esse completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in toto; ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, suum esse completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in toto suo, scilicet in homine, ut pars." — 2 Sent., 1.2.3.2, fm. 3 (2.49; ed. min., fm. c, 2.41). 216 "Nam, proprie loquendo, potius est forma specie! sive pars formalis, quam species; extenso tamen nomine potest species appellari." — 2 Sent., 1.2.3.1, Resp. in finem (2.48; ed. min., 2.40). 217 "Dicendum quod sicut hoc nomen 'res' triplicter accipitur, ita hoc nomen 'natura'. Uno enim modo dicitur natura res quae naturaliter est vel proprietas quae naturaliter inest. Secundo modo dicitur natura largius, non solum res per se ens vel proprietas naturaliter inhaerens, sed etiam omne quod conservat naturam vel quod saltern aliquo bono non privat ... Tertio modo dicitur natura largissime omne ens quod est in aliqua re natural!, sive sit naturaliter inhaerens sive non, sive sit salvativum sive non." — 2 Sent., 37.dub.2, Resp. (2.876; ed. min., 2.910-11). Note: "Conservatio enim et vegetatio, quae est operatic vitae, procedit a forma completiva operante per modum naturae ..." — 3 Sent., 21.2.2, ad 4 (3.445; ed. min., 3.437). "Dicendum quod sicut nomen naturae multipliciter accipitur, ita et nomen substantiae. Praeter enim illos quatuor modos, quos dicit Philosophus, quod substantia dicitur materia, forma, com-

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

297

It is clear, therefore, that Bonaventure is not using the terms substance and nature in their strictest senses when he speaks of the conjunction of a rational soul and a human body, either as a composition of an incorporeal substance and a corporeal substance or as a union of a spiritual nature and a corporeal nature.218 It is also clear that his description of the union or composition of a soul and body as two things, or natures, conjoining to constitute a third thing, or nature, does not entail a coming together of two complete things, or natures, that are somehow juxtaposed with each other. In his judgment, wherever there is a composition, there is an imperfection in both extremes and, as composing principles, they can come together to make a composite, because two actual beings do not unite to make a third A composite, furthermore, is not predicated of either extreme, nor are the extremes predicated of each other: a man is composed of a soul and flesh, but he is neither the soul nor the flesh; again, his flesh is not his soul, and his soul is not his flesh. The soul and the flesh of a man are indeed diverse, because the one is spiritual and the other is corporeal; nevertheless, they are parts constituting one thing in essence and in nature.219 The soul and the flesh can come together to constitute one thing, because, properly considered, composition is a union of two things having a mutual inclination for constituting a third Thus, speaking of Christ's human nature, Bonaventure says that one composite results from a form and matter; therefore, if the soul has a natural inclination for a body as for the proper matter that it perfects, it was necessary for die soul and the flesh in Christ to constitute some third thing, and so it was necessary that from them a substance would come to-be.220 The nature assumed by God was a true human nature, because, as Aristotle says, nature is taken for true matter and true form. Since God assumed a human soul and flesh, and since the soul is the formal principle of a man and the flesh is his material principle, therefore, a whole human nature was assumed by God in Christ.221 Now, positum et essentia uniuscuiusque, potest aliter distingui substantia iuxta verba beati Augustini: uno modo, ut dicatur res permanens et per se stans; alio modo, ut dicatur res permanens, non tamen per se stans, sed alii inhaerens; tertio modo, ut dicatur substantia quaelibet essentia actu ens, sive per se stans sive non; et hoc modo substantia se extendit ad omne ens. Et sic accipit Augustinus, cum dicit 'Quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est'." — 2 Sent., 37.dub.4, Resp. (2.877; ed. min., 2.911). See in Aristotle: De anima, 2.1 (412a6-ll); Metaph., 5.8 (1017blO-25). On the citation from Augustine see: Enarrat in Psalm., n. 68, sermo 1.5 (PL 36.844). For the prior reference to Augustine consult: Hypognosticm, 1.5.7 (PL 45.1618); on the authenticity of this work see: P. Glorieux, Melang. de scien. relig., 9 (1952), suppl., p. 33. 218 Cf. 2 Sent., 1.2.1.2, sc 1-4 (2.41-42; ed min., sc a-d, 2.33-34); see above: n. 78, pp. 173-74. 219 "Ad illud ergo quod primo obicitur, quod caro et anima sunt diversa unibilia, quia unum spirituale, alterum corporate, dicendum quod, licet caro et anima diversitatem habeant inter se, sunt tamen partes constituentes unum in essentia et natura ..." — 3 Sent., 21.1.3, ad 1 (3.441; ed min., 3.433). Cf. 6.1.2, sc 3-5 (3.152; ed. min., sc c-f, 3.143), and ad 5 (3.153; ed. min., 3.144); 22.un.l,sc 2 (3.450; ed. min., sc b, 3.441). 220 3 Sent., 6.1.2, Resp. initio (3.153; ed min., 3.143); and6.dub.2, Resp. "... inde substantia." (3.16465; ed min., 3.156). 221 3 Sent., 5.2.1, Resp. (3.130-31; ed min., 3.125); cf. Aristotle, Physica, 2.1 (I93a27-31). Note the passage: "Quoniam igitur Deus assumsit carnem at animam humanam, et caro est principium hominis

298

CHAPTER THREE

according to Bonaventure, when two things are so related that the one is material with respect to the other, to which it is conformable, then it is possible for the one to be united to the other. But union and composition do not always have the same signification. A union is a conjunction of two things in a third, whether or not they are united to constitute the third (an accident, for instance, is united to a substance without constituting a third thing). A composition is a conjunction of two things coming together to constitute a third, and every such thing is material in some way with respect to the other (a body, for example, is material with respect to a soul). Consequently, a composition always implies an imperfection in the composing principles, but a union does not.222 For Bonaventure, then, the term union has a wider meaning than the term composition, but each term signifies a conjunction of two things coming together in a third. As a conjunction constituting a human nature, the coming together of a rational soul and a human body is both a union and a composition; however, a soul and a body are component principles of one thing or nature, so their conjunction is more properly a composition than a union. The composition of a soul and a body is grounded in their mutual appetite and inclination for conjoining not only as a proper form and a proper matter, but also as the formal and material principles of one human nature. The resulting composite is a substance in the strict sense of that term, for the union of a soul and a body constitutes a hypostasis, which is here and now, so that they cannot be united in the same hypostasis but that they make a man. 223 Constituting a whole human nature, the composite of a soul and a body is a first and individual substance with the specific difference of a man. Thus, speaking again of Christ's human nature, Bonaventure says that all four definitions of nature given by Boethius apply to the human nature assumed by Christ; but, because He has the completive and specific difference of a man, the fourth definition by Boethius applies most of all to Christ's human nature: "nature is the specific difference informing any one thing".224 That someone be a man, there is necessarily required beforehand and continually the union of a soul and flesh, since man names the form of a whole or the form following a whole

materiale, anima vero formale, hinc est quod vere, non solum humanam naturam, sed etiani totam humanam naturam dicitur assumsisse." 222 "Item, quando duo sic se habeant quod urmm est materiale respectu alterius et illi conforme, possibili est uniri unum alteri ..." — 3 Sent., 1.1.1, sc 3 (3.9; ed. min., sc c, 3.5). "... dicendum quod, si proprie accipiatur verbum 'componendi', in plus est unio quam compositio. Unio enirn dicit coniunctionem duorum in tertio, sive uniantur ad constitutionem tertii sive non. Compositio vero dicit coniunctionem aliquorum, ita quod veniunt ad constitutionem tertii; et omne tale aliquo modo est materiale respectu alterius. Et ideo compositio semper importat imperfectionem in componentibus, unio vero non." —Loc. cit, ad 2 (3.10; ed min., 3.6); cf. arg. 2. 223 3 Sent., 22.un.l, ad 4 (3.453; ed. min., 3.444). 224 3 Sent., 5.2.1, ad 4 (3.131; ed. min., 3.126); cf. sc 4, and see in Boethius: De una persona ..., c. 1 (PL 64.1341-42).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

299

composite.224 Consequently, by the name human nature, the principles constituting a man are sometimes understood; at other times, the name is taken for the completive form of a man, and this form gives to the supposit the fulfilment and due operation of its species, according as Boethius says: "nature is the specific difference informing any one thing". 226 Bonaventure's texts show very clearly that he posits one only substantial form in a human body. The substantial union or composition of a rational soul and human flesh constitutes a man, who is one thing essentially through his specific form or human nature. He is also a hypostasis and, as such, he is completed in his being and supported in his operations by his human nature, which is constituted in him by the conjunction of a rational soul with human flesh. The specific form of a man, therefore, as the form of his whole nature, is the completive form perfecting his individual nature. When Bonaventure speaks of the specific form, or the species, as enfolding the whole being of the individual man, he is not saying that this being is composed from the being of a soul and the being of a body. On the contrary, speaking of the actual or formal being in this one and individual man, he is saying that, as the form of the whole man, the species has the perfection and completion of the being which the rational soul communicates to the body, thus differentiating the man both from other corporeal substances and from the spiritual substance of an angel. By his specific and completive form, which is the source of his rational difference, a man stands between the world of purely corporeal substances and the world of purely spiritual substances. Compared with other corporeal substances, the human substance, because it is composed from a spiritual and a corporeal principle, is by far the best proportioned both absolutely and in relation to the end The soul and body of a man are proportioned absolutely, because, in a human nature, the highest of bodies is united to the lowest of spirits. The rational or animal spirit has a potency giving life to the body, a potency for nourishing the body, and a potency for sensing. The human body has an equality of complexion and a multiplicity of organs; it also has the three subtle spirits: the vital spirit, the natural spirit, and the animal spirit. The vital spirit, establishing the best connexion, is a medium between the equal complexion of the body and the potency or power of life in the soul. The natural spirit and the animal spirit, establishing the best proportion and a wonderful connexion, look not only to the body's equal complexion, but 225 "... ad hoc quod aliquis sit homo, necessario praeexigitur et coexigitur unio animae ad carnem, cum homo dicat formam totius sive consequentem totum compositum." — 3 Sent., 22.un.l, in Resp. (3.452; ed. min., 3.444). "Item, nulla forma praedicatur de toto quia forma, sed quia est forma consequens totum compositum ..." —Lac. at., sc 3 (3.450-51; ed. min., sc c, 3.441); cf. 6.1.3, Resp., ad 3 (3.155-56; ed. min., 3.146-47). 226 "... dicendum quod nomine humanae naturae aliquando intelliguntur principia constituentia hominem; aliquando intelligitur forma hominis completiva, quae dat ipsi supposito complementum et operationem debitam illi speciei, secundum illud quod dicit Boethius: 'Natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia'." — 3 Sent., 22.un.l, ad 3 (3.453; ed. min., 3.444).

300

CHAPTER THREE

also to its organization and to the perfection of its organization: the natural spirit is a medium between the body and the vegetative power in the soul, while the animal spirit mediates between the body and the soul's sensitive power.227 The proportion between the soul and body of a man is also perfect in relation to the end. Since there was given to the human soul a freedom of choice through which the man could stand, fall and rise up again, so there was given to the soul a body not subject to death, then subjected to death and, thereafter, able to live on eternally. Moreover, since the soul was created as an unmarked tablet, there was given to it a body having multiple organs, so that, in this body, the soul could be perfected by the sciences. The perfect proportion of the human body in relation to the end is based by Bonaventure on the order of corporeal forms: the form of an element is ordered to the form of a mixture, this form is ordered to the form of a complex body, and the form of a plant to the form of an animal. Now the order of forms ought not to terminate in a corporeal and imperfect thing: so, not ending there, all those forms are disposed ultimately for the rational soul, through which even the human body and every corporeal nature can participate in eternal beatitude.228 The specific and completive difference of a man with regard to an angel, as we have seen, is founded on the nature of the rational soul as the form of a human body. It is in this regard that Bonaventure speaks of the natural difference of the rational soul as consisting in its inseparable property or aptitude of unibility with respect to a human body. Although the soul can be separated from the body to which it is united, nevertheless, its separability is really a consequence of sin and not an aptitude of the soul's proper nature. Furthermore, Bonaventure adds, there could not be a separation of the soul from its body unless they were already united; 227 "Quod obicitur, quod in omni coniunctione debet esse salva proportio, dicendum est quod in coniunctione animae ad corpus salva est proportio, et absolute, et in relatione ad finem: absolute, nam quamvis supremum spiritus et infimum corporis multam habeant elongationem, tamen supremum corporis et infimum spiritus summam habent vicinitatem. Spiritus enim animalis sive rationalis habet potentiam vivificandi, potentiam vegetandi et sentient!!; corpus autem humanum habet complexionis aequalitatem, habet organorum multiplicitatem, habet rursus spirituum subtilitatem, et secundum triplicem differentiam: habet enim spiritum vitalem, spiritum naturalem et spiritum animalem. Comparando igitur complexionem aequalein ad vim vivificativam per medium et vinculum spiritus vitalis, optimus est nexus. Similiter comparando non solum complexionis aequalitatem, sed et organizationem et organizations perfectionem ad vim vegetandi et sentiendi mediante spiritu natural! et animali, optima est proportio et mirabilis nexus." — 2 Sent., 1.2.3.2, ad 2-3 (2.42; erf. mm., 2.34-35). 228 "Cum enim animae humanae data sit libertas arbitrii vertibilis et revertibilis, id est potens stare et cadere et resurgere, datum est ei corpus potens mori, et potens non mori, et deinde potens in sempiternum vivificari. Rursus, cum anima creata sit veluti tabula rasa, datum est ei corpus habens organa multiplicia, ut in illo posset perfici scientiis. Cum enim sit ordo in form is corporalibus — quod patet, quia forma element! ad formam mixti, et forma mixtionis ad formam complexionis, et rursus vegetabilis ad sensibilem — et non sit status in re corporali et imperfecta; non est status ibi, sed ultimo disponunt huiusmodi formae ad animam rationalem, per quam etiam corpus et natura corporalis efficitur particeps aeternae beatitudinis." — Ibid.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

301

therefore, the aptitude of the soul for union with a human body is its natural difference as a substantial form with regard to the angelic spirit.229 This difference is manifested particularly in the necessity of the rational soul to have a vegetative and a sensitive nature, or potency, which an angel does not need, because it is a pure spirit.230 The union and proportion between the rational soul and the human body, as Bonaventure's texts show, are established by a medium on the part of the soul and a threefold media on the part of the body. The medium on the side of the soul is its inseparable property of unibility, or the natural and completive difference by which it is a rational form; the media on the side of the body are its subtle spirits, and they are generated from the bodily humors.231 The vegetative and sensitive natures of the rational soul consist in potencies that are necessary to it, and not in souls, or substantial forms, interposed between the rational spirit and its human body. The order of forms disposing corporeal matter for the rational spirit involves both time and nature: according to time, the rational spirit is the last substantial form of corporeal matter, and so it is the ultimate form in the corporeal world; according to nature, the rational spirit is the noblest substantial form of corporeal matter; therefore, as the terminus of every other corporeal form, the rational spirit has the nature or power of the living forms that are antecedent to it, while the body united to the rational soul has the nature or disposition of the other bodies preceding it.232 The rational soul, because it is the one form perfecting the human body, is the sufficient mover of the human body. As a consequence, the union of soul and body in substantial being is completed by their union in the accidental being of operation. According to Bonaventure, the operations of a man flow from his soul either as the mover of his body or as its perfection, or again as both the perfection and the mover of his body. The soul, as the mover of his body, exercises operations both in and through the body: the soul moves the exterior members of the body and, through them, it moves other bodies. As the perfection of the body, the soul exercises operations not only in and through the body, but also with the body: the soul moves the bodily organs, particularly the senses, so that it operates through them 229 2 Sent., 1.2.3.2, ad 4 (2.51; ed. min., 2.43). 230 Cf. 2 Sent., 1.2.1.2, ad 4 (2.43-44; ed. min., 2.35); see also text cited above in n. 214, p. 295. The vegetative and sensitive potencies are so truly a part of human nature that Bonaventure refuses to posit them in the body assumed by an angel: 2 Sent., 8.1.3.2, ad opp. 1-3 (2.221; ed. min., ad opp. a-c, 2.217). 231 Those humors are in the veins, so that the vital spirit, for instance, is contained in the blood: the humors produce a radical humidity giving to the bodily members both their nutrition and their complexion, or temperament; consisting in an equality of proportion among the bodily members, that complexion is supported by the fundamental complexion, or harmony, of the elements in the human body: 4 Sent., 44.1.1.1 (4.907-08; ed. min., 4.896-98). 232 If the Delorme version of the passage cited above in n. 186, p. 286, represents Bonaventure's authentic doctrine, then, considering the evidence in the many texts that we have now seen, we conclude that the first meaning suggested for that version is the correct one.

302

CHAPTER THREE

and with them, just as the eyes must be opened for the soul to see through and with them. These two modes of operation are combined in the operations exercised by the soul as both the mover and the perfection of the body. Laughter, for instance, is a movement of the jaws coming from the soul as a mover; but laughter is also an interior exhilaration of the heart coming from the soul as the perfection of the bodily organs.233 Although those operations depend on the formal unity of human nature, none of them flows from the soul as an intellective substance. In what way, then, does the soul operate as an intellective substance within the forma! unity of man? Since the soul and the body unite to constitute a third thing, which is one essentially, a proper operation is attributed to the composite according as it is one. This operation, Bonaventure says, is the act of reasoning or of understanding. The soul, because of its union with the body, depends in some way on the body for the act of understanding. With respect to the acts of its vegetative and sensitive potencies, the soul can operate only in the body, because it must exercise those acts through the organs of the body: in the operation of sight, for example, a species is received by the organ, but the judgment is exercised by the power of the soul. With respect to the act of understanding, the soul, though it understands in the body, does not operate through a bodily organ: the species is received by the possible intellect, and the judgment is exercised by the agent intellect. The intellective power, therefore, is not bound down by the matter of the body. Although the being of the soul in itself does not depend on the body, nevertheless, the soul, in order to-be, depends on the body, which must be duly disposed to receive the soul. Just as the soul cannot exist in the body, which it perfects, unless the body is suitably disposed for it, so also the soul cannot understand in the body unless there is a proper disposition of the body enabling the soul to exercise its act of understanding there. This disposition is present in the highest part of the body, namely, in the noblest of its spirits situated in its noblest organs, particularly the imagination, and they are located in the brain. Thus, by that disposition, the human body is conformed to the intellective operation of its rational soul. But the operation of the intellect in itself is not communicated to the body, because, as Aristotle shows, the intellect is not mixed in with the body in any way. Consequently, the act of understanding is not attributed either to the whole body or to a part of it. On the contrary, the act is attributed to the whole conjunct, or to the man, and by reason of the soul, which is a part of the whole man. 234 Within the formal unity of human nature, the soul and the body of man undergo a mutual appropriation, because the one is the sole principle of perfection and the other is the only perfectible principle of man. As the 233 2 Seat., 8.1.3.2, Resp., ad 3 (2.221-22; ed mirL, 2.217-18). 234 2 Sent., 25.2.tm.6, Resp. "Et propterea est tertius ... quam imaginationis." (2.622-23; ed. min., 2.643-45); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 3.4 (429alO-28); De gener. animaL, 2.3 (736b25-29).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

303

mover of the human body, however, the soul is the source of the multiple operations attributed properly to human nature.235 The perfection of human nature in the order of substantial or first being is due to the union of soul and body as the constitutive principles of man. Originating from those principles, the perfection of human nature in the order of accidental or second being is due to the multiple operations of the potencies mediating between the soul arid the body as the moving and movable parts of a man.236 Now, according to Bonaventure, there is an optimum with regard to the first being of the soul, and an optimum with regard to its second being. Though the optimum regarding its first being is one, namely, the ultimately completive form of man, nevertheless, regarding the second being of the soul, the optimum is not necessarily one, unless it is understood to be one as something brought together from many, just as many things come together for some sort of well-being. Since the potency of a creature is restricted, a creature cannot have a perfect power unless there is in the creature a multitude of potencies, so that, one supplying what is lacking in another, there would result from their coming together or unification one complete power, just as it can be observed clearly in the organs of the human body, for any one of them needs to be helped by the power of the SOUI. 23'

Relying on the unity of the completive form, which is the perfect and optimum principle of substantial being in man, all the potencies of human nature, including the intellect, unite to constitute one complete power, thus forming a perfect and optimum principle of accidental being in the whole man. It is the man who really performs al! the operations of the soulx whether they depend entirely or only dispositively on the body and its organs. Because the intellective operations of his soul do not depend intrinsically on the body, the soul, on its separation from the body, can continue to exercise those operations, but in an imperfect manner. In speaking of the separated soul, Bonaventure refers to it as a substance and a substantial form, or a thing having a substantial form. It is a spirit and a subStance, since it is a thing existing through itself, standing under accidents by itself, and capable according to its nature of change with respect to con-

235 2 Sent., 8.2.un. 1, ad 3 (2.225; ed. min., 2.222). Note: "... dicendum quod ... unius perfectibilis una sola est perfectio; perfectio enim appropriat sibi perfectibile, et e converse; sed ... unus motor multa potest movere, maxime quando ilia habent aliqucm ordinem." 236 Gf. 2 Sent., 29.1.2, ad 3 & 5 (2.699; ed. min., 2.721-22). 237 "Ad illud quod obicitur de optimo animae, dicendum quod est optimum ad esse primum et optimum ad esse secundum. Etsi optimum quantum ad esse primum unum sit, utpote forma ultimo completiva, tamen quantum ad esse secundum non oportet quod sit unum nisi intelligatur esse unum, quod ex multis est collectum, sicut ad aliquod bene esse multa concurrunt Et sic, quoniam potentia creaturae arctata est, non potuit creatura habere posse perfectum nisi esset in ea multitude potentiarum, ex quarum collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius, resultaret unum posse completum. sicut manifeste animadvert! potest in organis human! corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute adiuvari." — 2 Seal., 24.1.1.1, in ad 8 (2.562; ed. min., 2.579-80).

304

CHAPTER THREE

trary qualities. A separated soul is properly a substance and it is rightly in the genus of substance, as a first substance is in that genus.238 The separation of a soul from its body through death, as we have seen, is a consequence of sin and not of the proper nature of the soul, even though it is a spiritual substance. Hence, to be a first substance, or to exist individually apart from a human body, does not belong properly to the soul, because, according to its essence, it is the substantial form of a human body and the completive part of a human nature. A rational soul has a natural appetite for its body, and this is evident, Bonaventure says, because a soul does not will to be separated even from a body existing in misery. Since beatitude is the fulfilment of every desire, therefore, it is necessary for the body to be restored to the soul in order that it be perfectly blessed.239 Thus, the completion of a human nature is a proper requirement of beatitude, and so it is a reason for the necessity of the resurrexion of the human body. 24° For the perfection of a human nature, Bonaventure explains, a rational spirit must give life to a proper body, because "a proper act must come tobe in a proper matter". The nature of the rational and immortal soul also requires its body to possess perpetual life, just as the soul itself has perpetual being. Since the body has a necessary ordination to perpetual life, therefore, to be reunited with its soul, the body must consist in its entire substance, i.e. its principal members, its radical humidity, and its specific flesh. The body will also have whatever parts are fitting for its adornment. Wherefore, preserving the integrity of a human nature, God will fulfil the natural desire of a soul for reunion with its body, a desire beyond the capacity of the soul itself to realize.241 The desire of a separated soul for reunion with its own body is described by Bonaventure as a great longing to be united with the substance of the flesh that the soul previously vivified.242 His use of the term substance in this respect, quite obviously, has to do with the nature of the human body as the material component of a substance, and not with an individual substance having a proper matter and form: a soul can be satisfied only with the same body that it had in its natural existence as a part of a whole man. The iden-

238 2 Sent, 1.2.3.1, Resp. (2.48; ed. min., 2.40). 239 4 Sent., 43.1.1, fm. 4 (4.883; ed. min., fm. d, 4.872). 240 "Et ideo in opere retributionis necesse est quod ipsa fiat, secundum quod exigit ... completio naturae ... completio naturae vero requirit, ut homo constet simul ex corpore et anima tanquam ex materia et forma, quae mutuum habent appetitum et inclinationem mutuam ..."— Brevil., 7.5 (5.286; ed min., n. 2, 5.165). 241 Loc. cil., "Postremo, quia ..." (5.287; ed. min., n. 5, 5.166-67); cf. "De resurrectione ..." (5.286; ed. min., n. 1, 5.164-65), and 4 Sent., 44.1.1.2 (4.909-10; ed. min., 4.898-900). Note the phrase, taken from the first text "... natura spiritus rationalis exigit, quid vivificat corpus proprium, quia 'proprius actus in propria materia habet fieri'." 242 "Sic anima tanto affectu unitur substantiae carnis quam prius vivificat, quod non complete ei satisfit nisi ilia eadam, ubicumque lateat, reparetur." — 4 Sent., 43.1.3, in ad 6 (4.894; ed. min., 4.884).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

305

tity of a thing comes from its substantial principles and, at the resurrexion, the material principle and the formal principle will be the same as before; so the same man will be reconstituted from his own principles. This position of Bonaventure is a necessary consequence of the axiom that he lays down repeatedly: it is the nature of a proper form to come to-be, or tobe, only in a proper matter.243 Is the human body, which is restored to its soul, identical in number with the body united previously to the soul? Among the opinions recorded by Bonaventure on the question, there is one holding that the human body is dissolved at death by the separation of its component principles or parts: since God knows where to find them and how to restore them, He can reconstitute from them the same body having the identical perfection that it had prior to its dissolution. Consequently, the dissolution of a human body does not entail the corruption of a form, because a form, once corrupted, cannot be the same again, since the new form, having a new essence, is necessarily different, as Aristotle says: "every form that is corrupted and generated again is not the same in number, but in species".244 This opinion does not really answer the question, Bonaventure says, for it is certain that the form of human flesh is corrupted, since worms and maggots are generated from it. As the form of the flesh can be corrupted in that way, so can it be dissolved, as any animal can, even into the four elements, and any one of these can be corrupted into another; in such a manner, the forms of mixtures and of the elements are corrupted, and so it is necessary for the elements and the restored flesh of a man to be other in number.245 Offering his own solution to the problem, Bonaventure maintains that the restoration of a human body comes about by a divine power, but according to the principles of nature. Those principles are the seminal reasons from which all corporeal forms are drawn from the potency of matter. Because dissolution ends where generation begins, no form is corrupted entirely; so, when corrupted, a form remains in matter, just as it was there before production. Hence, as Augustine teaches, all corrupted forms are found in matter according to their seminal reasons. But nature, Bonaventure goes on, cannot bring back a corrupted form with the same being that it had

243 "Item, ratione videtur, quia identitas rei venit ab identitate principiorum substantialium; sed idem est principium materiale et idem formale: ergo idem homo qui prius ... Item, propria forma non est nata Fieri nisi in propria materia. Ergo, cum anima sit propria forma corporis quod perficit, non est nata uniri nisi illi: ergo, si unitur in resurrectione, unitur eidem. Et si hoc, cum ipsa sit eadem, totum erit idem."— Loc. tit., fa. 3-4 (4.887-88; ed. min., fa. c-d, 4.877). 244 Loc. cit., Resp. "Et propter ... est idem." (4.888-89; ed, min., 4.878); cf. con. 1, and see in Aristotle, De gener. et corrupt. 2.11 (338b 12-20). 245 "Certum est enim quod forma camis humanae corrumpitur, dum generatur inde vermis et serpens; et sicut potest corrumpi in carnem serpentis vel alterius animalis, sic resolvi potest sicut et illud animal, etiam in quatuor elementa et unumquodque elementorum corrumpi in aliud, et ita corrumpuntur formae mixti et elementi: ergo necesse est elementa alia esse numero et aliam carnem. Et ita non potest stare ista responsio." — Loc. cit, in Resp. (4.889; ed. min., 4.878).

306

CHAPTER THREE

before: on producing a form from a seminal reason, a natural agent gives a new mode of substantial being to a composite, which then has complete or actual being; as a consequence, the whole product is a thing that can be numbered substantially, and thus diversified from other things. God, on the other hand, can produce from a seminal reason the same form with the same being, so that no new composite results, for He can produce the same thing which was before. It is in this way that God will restore the same human body, and according to the same order in which the body has been previously formed. For instance: if all the elements are turned into fire, God can reform from it the same elements that were in the fire according to their seminal reasons and, from them, He can produce a form of the flesh, thus reconsituting a human body with the same numerical identity that it had prior to its corruption.2*6 What is this form of the flesh? Is it a substantial form of the human body, or a seminal reason taken as a form of human flesh? Bonaventure refers again to a form of the flesh when discussing the validity of an example given by Augustine on the restoration of a human body. In the example, Augustine compares the reformation of a body by God with the restoration by a craftsman of a statue, now destroyed, from its original matter: the example seems to be invalid, because the restored statue is not quite the same as the original artifact.247 To those accepting the validity of the example, Bonaventure observes, it is conformable perfectly to the identity of the reformed human body: just as the matter of the restored statue is the same as the matter of the one that was destroyed, but the artificial form is different, so the matter of the resurrected body is the same, but the form of the flesh and the generated accidents are different; nonetheless, the man is not different, since the ultimately completive form and the primary matter are both one and the same according to substance, even though the intermediate forms are not the same as they were before the body was dissolved. In sum, the man is really the same, especially by reason of his form, because the whole foundation of personality is in the rational soul. Bonaventure thinks that this interpretation of Augustine's example is inaccurate, particularly since the resurrexion has to do properly with the human body and not which the conjunct of soul and body. If the resurrexion ought to deal with the same body, it is necessary for that body to be of the same flesh as before; therefore, it is also necessary for the flesh itself, which is an intermediate form, to be the same and, with equal reason, the other intermediate forms, since the members of the body must be the same as they were previously. Interpreting Augustine's example in another way, Bonaventure remarks that Gods's work of returning the same numerical 246 Loc. cit., Resp. "Et propterea ..." (4.889; ed. mm, 4.878-89); cf. 2 Sent, 7.2.2.1, ad 3 (2.199; ed. min., 2.193). For the references to St Augustine consult De Trinit., 3.18.13-19.16 (PL 42.875-78). 247 4 Sent., 44.1.dub.4, "... quam ante." (4.919; ed. min., 4.910); cf. St Augustine, Enchirid., cc. 88-89 (PL 40.273-74): text cited in St. Bonav., if. omn., 4.905.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

307

form to a human body is above nature, and so no adequate example for it can be found in the works of nature. Augustine's example, therefore, is not to be understood with respect to the returning of a form to a human body, but to God's work of repairing the body in such a way that, as the body of this man, it is the same in substance as his body was prior to its dissolution.24a In this text, Bonaventure describes human flesh itself as an intermediate form, and he links it with other intermediate forms, namely, the antecedent forms of complex bodies and of mixed bodies. In the preceding question, moreover, he maintains that the resurrected body will be reconstituted in the same order according to which it was first constituted as the body of this whole man. The order to which Bonaventure refers, obviously, is the order of nature governing the production and generation of a human body: God, on reconstituting the body, does suddenly at the resurrexion what nature does in generation over a period of time. In the order of nature, all the forms preceding the production of the human body are present in it as substantial dispositions. The seminal reason giving rise to the human body, moreover, is an imperfect and incomplete form of the flesh. On the arrival of the rational soul, the seminal reason remains as a substantial disposition of the body, thus holding the way of the body toward corruption after death. Since the same body is restored at the resurrexion, therefore, the same seminal reason becomes the way of the body back to its proper form, from which the body degenerated after death. In short, the form of the flesh is not a substantial form interposed between the rational soul and its human body; that form is nothing other than a seminal reason, whether in the order of generation, degeneration or resurrexion.249 The weight of the evidence contained in Bonaventure's texts is such that it is really impossible to attribute to him a doctrine of plural forms with regard to animate bodies. Invoking constantly the principle or maxim: it is 248 Loc. cit., "Ad hoc ..." (4.919; ed. min., 4.910). Note the following: "Si ergo resurrectio debet esse eiusdem, necesse est quod corpus humanum sit idem; sed nunquam est idem corpus nisi sit eadem caro: ergo oportet caro, quae est forma intermedia, sit eadem; pari ratione et de aliis f'ormis intermediis; et si oportet quod caro sit eadem, oportet quod partes officiates, ut manus et pes, sint eaedem." 249 Bonaventure refers to the degeneration of the human body in this text "Ad illud quod obicitur de productione eorum quae sunt per putrefactionem et commixtionem, quod sunt novae species, dicendum quod tarn ilia quae generantur per putrefactionem quam ilia quae generantur per diversarum specierum commixtionem, producta sunt in suis principiis et rationibus seminalibus, quamvis non sint producta in simili secundum formam. Principia enim eorum sunt de primaria constitutione universi, utpote species completae et rationes seminales; sed illarum specierum actualis existentia ad primariam constitutionem universi non special, quia species illae quodam modo sunt degenerantes et quasi per quamdam degenerationem product habent, sicut vermes producuntur ex humano corpore per cormptionem aliquam, quae quidem facit corpus humanum a propria forma degenerare ..."—2 Sent., 15.2.3, ad 5-6 (2.387; ed. min, 2.398). It is significant that, when considering the nature of Christ's body in the tomb, Bonaventure speaks neither of & forma camis nor of a forma corporis; he speaks, rather, of the continuing union of the Word with the material part or component of His human nature: 3 Sent., 22.un. 1 (3.450-53; ed min., 3.441-45).

308

CHAPTER THREE

the nature of a proper form to be in a proper matter, he posits a unity of substantial form, or one only soul, in each animate body. At the same time, he posits in that body a plurality of substantial dispositions, or realized actualities, grounded both in time and according to nature in the preceding form of inanimate bodies. The substantial dispositions of an animate body are founded ultimately on the nature of the elements, which enter into the constitution of a living body according to the equality of its complexion and the perfection of its organization, supporting the potencies of operation in the soul. The very best proportion and harmony of the elements exists in the human body, because it is united to or composed with a rational spirit, with which it is conjoined to constitute one thing in essence and nature as an individual substance or hypostasis. The conjunction of a human body and a rational spirit also constitutes in the individual man his ultimately completive form, which is his human nature, his formal principle of unity in substantial being and the unified source of his accidental or operational being. Consequently, completing and perfecting the whole order of corporeal creation, the human substance, because it is a singular thing having a rational nature, is really and truly one in the being and existing of a spiritual soul and a human body or flesh. Only a few historical sources are employed by Bonaventure in the texts that we have examined on the forms of animate bodies. This indicates clearly enough that, on their unity of form, he has a doctrine depending more on his own principles than on the support of his historical sources. They are largely the same sources that we have seen him use in his other texts on the formation of animate substances. He combines Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines on the generation and formation of both plants and animals. As a consequence, Bonaventure understands the souls of these living things to be contained potentially in their seeds, or their seminal reasons, which are the primary principles of organization in animate bodies, including the human body. Following Aristotle in particular, though interpreting his doctrine in a distinctive manner, Bonaventure attributes the organization of the human body to a natural force or power operating in time and through movement, but not mutation. This power, in Bonaventure's judgment, and here he is influenced by Augustine, is a seminal reason existing in the seminal mixture produced by the generative act proper to human parents. But Bonaventure does not follow Aristotle on the succession of forms in the formation of either the body of an animal or the body of a man. Rather, under the influence of Augustine's doctrine on seminal reasons, Bonaventure posits generation as an act which is proper to the specific nature of the generators, so that the body of an animal can have only a sensitive soul and the body of a man only a rational soul. Bonaventure's interpretation of the meaning of the terms substance and nature also reflects the combined influence of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines on his own thought. Considering Christ's human nature, Bonaventure follows Augustine in affirming that Christ has a true human body and a

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

309

true rational soul; thereafter, defending the true nature of Christ's humanity, Bonaventure follows Aristotle's understanding of nature as including both a true form and a true matter. This understanding of Aristotle is expressed in the principle, which becomes fundamental for Bonaventure, that a proper form must come to-be in a proper matter. Turning to Boethius, however, Bonaventure accepts still another understanding of nature as the specific difference informing a thing. This particular understanding of nature includes the principle that the species of a thing contains its whole being, thus providing Bonaventure with the source of formal unity in substantial being, or the completive form, in the individual man. The combined influence of all those historical positions on man is readily seen in the Bonaventurean descriptions of the union of soul and body in the individual man: he is a conjunct of formal and material components constituting one human nature, which is completed by its specific form; he is also a composite of spiritual and corporeal natures coming together to form one substance, which is a singular thing of a rational nature. In his own distinctive way, nonetheless, Bonaventure describes the soul of a man in itself as a rational spirit, and he describes the man's body as human flesh, but the two are indivisibly one in the whole man, who is a rational substance precisely because of the union of his spirit and flesh. Finally, regarding the corruption and regeneration of corporeal forms, Bonaventure is able once again to combine successfully the doctrines of Augustine and Aristotle. For Augustine, all corrupted forms remain in matter according to their seminal reasons. For Aristotle, a corrupted form cannot be regenerated with the same numerical identity as before. Drawing the two positions together, Bonaventure holds that, from any seminal reason, a new mode of substantial being can be conferred on a composite, thus diversifying it both substantially and numerically from every other individual thing. Bonaventure's realization of the seminal reason as a substantial disposition of a completed thing, then, is a consequence of his bringing together of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines on form and matter as constitutive principles of corporeal substances.250

Seeing that Bonaventure and Aquinas concur in positing one only substantial form in a corporeal substance, we have no need to compare their doctrines in any detail on the problem of plural forms. As our previous comparisons have shown, however, they have very different views on the nature and function of seminal reasons in bodily substances. As a consequence, their two positions on the unity of substantial form in a corporeal 250 It would be interesting to compare Bonaventure's doctrine on the unity in form of human nature with Avicebron's doctrine on the plurality of forms in man; but such a comparison is beyond the proper objectives of our present study on the historical constitution of Bonaventurean philosophy.

310

CHAPTER THREE

substance are by no means identical. In the view of Aquinas, who posits prime matter as a pure potency for the being of a substantial form, the original matter of the universe was concreated in being under different substantial forms. From the beginning, then, matter has been differentiated substantially by the being of many forms; so, realizing the potency of matter in a proper manner, the form of any one body excludes from it any other principle of substantial being. Thus, reducing the seminal reasons in bodies to the order of accidental being., Aquinas considers seminal reasons to be active and passive forces by which the elements, acting on one another, are altered in such a way that, one element becoming predominant over the others, a mixed body comes into being as a new composite having a proper substantial form. A complex body depends in a similar way on the power of its predominant elements, so that, for Aquinas, there is no need to posit a form of complexion as a substantial preparation or disposition of matter to receive a soul. In the human body, for instance, fire and air, because they are required for life, predominate according to power, while water and earth are predominant according to quantity. Consequently, rejecting the doctrine on seminal reasons as incomplete forms in matter, Aquinas teaches that substantial forms are drawn immediately from the potency of matter, and not generated from active potencies mediating between corporeal matter and its complete forms. In the judgment of Aquinas, therefore, it is not enough to posit a formative power or seminal force in the generative seed to account for the initial formation of a human body. The act of human generation produces successively a vegetative soul and a sensitive soul; the rational soul, when created, displaces the sensitive soul, which is then corrupted, as the vegetative soul is corrupted on the arrival of the sensitive soul. As a result, Aquinas can say that the soul and body of a man are united immediately as a proper form and a proper matter; therefore, because the essence of a rational soul is united immediately to a human body as a form is united to matter, there is no medium between a rational soul and prime matter, and so the dispositions of a human body belong to its accidental nature. 251 Although both Aquinas and Bonaventure subscribe to the same Aristotelean principle: a proper form has to be in a proper matter, nevertheless, the application of the principle to the formation of bodily substances by Aquinas marks the fundamental difference between him and Bonaventure on the unity of form in corporeal things. Aristotle's principle, as understood by Aquinas, makes it impossible to posit an incomplete form in matter, because a form gives an act to matter as to its proper potency, thus composing with it to constitute a complete substance, which is one in 251 For our presentation of these doctrines of Aquinas see above: pp. 109-12, 117-19, 130-33; we have shown also (p. 117) that Aquinas rejects the position, held by Bonaventure, that light is a substantial form in a celestial body. On the unity of soul and body in man see especially, 5CC, 2.58 -(2.184-86); ST, la, 76.3 (1.453a-55a); DA, a. 9 (2.312-17); DSpC, a. 3 (2.378-84).

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

31 1

both being and nature. Since the substantial form is the first act of a body, and its only substantial act, every other act, including a seminal reason or a bodily disposition, must be accidental to the substance. Bonaventure conjoins Augustine's doctrine on seminal reasons with Aristotle's principle, and so it is possible for Bonaventure to take a seminal reason as an incomplete form giving incomplete being to matter. But a seminal reason, looking to a particular matter, is ordained by nature to become the proper form of a proper matter, to which the form gives a complete act of being, thus composing with that matter to constitute one substance, and this is complete in both being and nature. Although the form is the first act of the completed body, nonetheless, because the seminal reason is the way of corporeal matter to the being of a proper form, the seminal reason remains as a substantial disposition of the body, where it exists as a medium between the form and the potency of matter. It is in this way that Bonaventure ensures the possibility of drawing new forms from matter: when a body corrupts, the seminal reason remains, because it is incorruptible, thus enabling another form, though of a different composite, to be drawn from the potency of matter. Aquinas does not posit any medium between a form and the potency of matter; so, when a body corrupts, its form goes back immediately into the potency of matter, from which an entirely new form, or first act, is drawn for a newly generated composite. The first act of a composite, moreover, is its act of substantial being. But that act and the act of living are one in an animate body; therefore, in the order of generation, the first form of any living body must be a form that gives living being to matter. Consequently, in the generation of an animal, a vegetative soul must precede the sensitive soul and, in the generation of a man, both a vegetative and a sensitive soul must precede the rational soul. Those consequences are necessary for Aquinas not only because he eliminates seminal reasons as substantial dispositions preparing matter for a proper form, but also and chiefly because he maintains that a substantial form is the first act giving being to a proper matter. For Bonaventure, on the other hand, the first act of a body must be the act of substantial being coming from a form of a specific nature. Since the proper act of an animal is to be as an animal, therefore, its first and only act of substantial being must come from a sensitive soul, which is the form specifying an animal nature. For similar reasons, the first and only act of substantial being in a man comes from his specifying form, which is a rational soul. Because the proper matter of a sensitive soul, and of a rational soul, must be prepared and disposed to receive its proper form, Bonaventure posits a seminal reason as an intermediate principle between the incomplete and the completed body of a living thing.252 252 Since Bonaventure's doctrine on the unity of substantial form includes a plurality of substantial dispositions, but the doctrine of Aquinas does not, then, from the viewpoint of a plurality of forms, we would differentiate Bonaventure's position from the position of Aquinas by saying that the one has a doctrine of a unity in substantial form, but the other has a doctrine of uniqueness in substantial form.

312

CHAPTER THREE

Regarding the composite substance of man, we have seen Aquinas say that it is impossible for the rational soul both to be the form of a human body and to be composed of a form and matter. The soul, as a spiritual creature, has a composition of act and potency, or of being and essence; but the being of the soul is also the being of the whole man, of whose body the soul is the proper and immediate form. If his soul were composed of a form and matter, then, as the form of his body, the soul would be the form of a form, since the body would also have a proper form. Now this is not possible for Aquinas, who insists that the soul, according to its whole essence, is the form of a human body; therefore, because matter is a pure potency and the immediate subject of a substantial form, the rational soul simply cannot be composed of a form and matter. Furthermore, if the soul had matter, the soul would then be a form through that part of itself which is in act, but not through its whole self, since matter is a potency and not an act; as a consequence, if the soul is also the form of a human body, the one form is an act of both a spiritual matter and a corporeal matter. This too is impossible for Aquinas, who cannot see how the one form can be an act of both spiritual matter and corporeal matter, because they would be diverse according to genus, and one act cannot perfect diverse potencies in the genus of substance.253 Even when Aquinas considers the rational soul as a spiritual substance, he still thinks that the soul, if it is a composite of form and matter, cannot be the form of a body. The spiritual matter of the soul would have to be the first subject of its form, which could not then be subjected to corporeal matter. As a composite of form and matter, therefore, the soul could not according to its whole self be the form of something else, and so, because it would be neither the form nor the mover of this man's body, the act of understanding, which is the proper act of a man, could not be attributed to this individual man.254 If the composition of form and matter in a spiritual substance is taken as a consequence of its composition of act and potency, however, Aquinas concedes the possibility of positing form and matter in a spiritual substance, provided form names every act and matter names every potency. In his own judgment, nonetheless, the common use of names does not permit form and matter to be employed in that improper way.255 Is it possible to interpret Bonaventure's doctrine on the composition of form and matter in the rational soul by calling every act form and every potency matter? We do not think so, because, in his doctrine, a seminal reason is an active potency and a medium between the potency of matter 253 See above: pp. 161-62. Though Aquinas and Bonaventure concur on the singular and selfsubsistent nature of a separated soul, Bonaventure puts this soul, because it has a form and matter, directly in the genus of substance, whereas Aquinas does not put it properly in that genus, because a separated soul is still a part of a human nature. See above: n. 112, p. 193; see also: p. 212 (n. 158). 254 Texts given in nn. 162-63, p. 215. 255 Text cited in n. 167, p. 216.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

313

and the act of a form: a seminal reason is in act regarding matter and in potency regarding a form. For Bonaventure, therefore, it is not possible to identify act and potency in a simple way with form and matter. In his doctrine, moreover, form is the principle of being and matter is the principle of existing. Since every creature must have both being and existing, it is impossible for Bonaventure to posit a created form, whether spiritual or corporeal, which would have being unsupported by the existing of matter. The positing of a form and matter in the rational soul is consistent with Bonaventure's principles, just as the rejection of such a composition is consistent with the principles of Aquinas. When Aquinas says that the rational soul is composed only of being and essence, he is saying that the soul is a pure form in potency to an act of being; nevertheless, as the form of a human body, the soul is also a principle of act, since the body is in potency to the being of the soul, which gives its being to the body, so that the whole composite is one in a proper act of being. Hence, in the order of being, the soul is a potency and, in the order of nature, the soul is an act; however, in both orders taken together, the soul subsists in being as the form of a body, and thus the whole composite is related to its one being as a potency is related to its proper act. All this is intrinsically consistent with the fundamental principles of Aquinas. But Bonaventure, following his own principles, cannot accept the basic postulate of Aquinas on the rational soul, namely, that it is a pure form in potency to an act of being. In Bonaventure's view, God alone can be called a pure form, because such a form must be its own being. Since no created form can be its own being, therefore, it has being only because of the potency of matter, which gives a stability of existing to every form, thus supporting its being as a created form. For Bonaventure, then, a created form is an act, never a potency, but it depends on the potency and existing of matter in order to be as an act. The rational soul comes to-be as the proper act of a human body, which is the potential principle of a human nature and its completive principle of existing. The rational soul itself is the completive principle of being in a human nature; but that being comes from the form of the soul, so there is really only one principle of being in a human nature, since the spiritual form of the soul itself is the solitary substantial form existing there. Consequently, the position of Aquinas on the impossibility of one form perfecting matter in diverse genera of substance would seem to stand against this position of Bonaventure. In Bonaventurean doctrine, however, the genus of matter is the same as the genus of its proper form, because, in itself and according to its essence, matter is indifferent to the being of any particular form.256 In his

256 "Item, omne quod est unum, est unum vel genere vel specie vel numero; sed materia non est eadem in spiritualibus et corporalibus imitate generis vel specie, cum ilia sit solum a forma: ergo a divisione materia est una numero ... Item, cum dicitur materia lapidis est materia et materia angeli est materia, aut dicitur univoce aut aequivoce aut idem praedicatur de se. Sed non aequivoce, quia tune angelus et lapis aequivoce dicerentur substantiae; non univoce, quia univocatio est solum in formis et in

314

CHAPTER THREE

own way, therefore, Bonaventure reduces the matter of the human body to the same genus of substance as the rational soul, and so he reduces both the soul, including its spiritual matter, and the human body to the genus of substance containing human nature.257 Since Bonaventure's doctrine on human nature is intrinsically consistent with his fundamental principles of being and existing, it should be possible to show how he can posit in man one substantial form giving an act of being to both a spiritual matter and a corporeal matter, even though he reduces them by way of the soul and the body to the same genus of substance. But there are no texts in Bonaventure's writings dealing explicitly with the problem. He comes close to it when he says that the composition of form and matter in the soul does not preclude its composing with a human body, because the soul has a natural appetite for perfecting a corporeal nature.258 The solution to the problem seems to lie in his texts on the essential and numerical identity of all matter, whether spiritual or corporeal.259 When treating the essential identity of matter, Bonaventure is very careful beforehand to say that he takes matter as standing for every potential principle uniting with another principle in the constitution or, so to speak, the foundation of a thing. Taking matter in this way, he holds that, as a common nature, it is the same through its essence, but different according to being, in spiritual and corporeal substances. Although Bonaventure is speaking here specifically about the spiritual substance of an angel, and not of a rational soul, even so, since the soul has a spiritual matter, and since it is also the form of a corporeal substance, what he says of the essential unity of matter applies in a unique way to the soul and body of a man. Because matter in itself has an essential unity rendering it indifferent to all forms, and even to its own capacity for receiving forms, i.e. according to its existing, which is the essential foundation for forms, therefore, considered his quae dicunt formam: ergo oportet quod idem praedicetur de se: ergo si materia lapidis et materia angeli non sunt plures materiae, sed unica, restat quod materia est in spiritualibus et corporalibus numero una" — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.3, fa. 2 & 4 (2.99; ed min., fa. b & d, 2.88); cf. fm. 6 (f). "Quod obicitur de potentia suscipiendi, dicendum quod potentia materiae secundum se consideratae non est magis ad hanc formam quam ad aliam, immo indifferenter se habet ad oinnem. Nam materia in se considerata nee est spiritualis nee corporalis; et ideo capacttas consequens essentiam materiae indifferenter se habet ad formam sive spiritualem sive corporalem ..." — 2 Sent., 3.1.1.2, ad 3 (2.98; ed. min., 2.87). 257 From Bonaventure's point of view, his own position on the substance of the soul uniting through media with the substance of the body does not stand or fall because it conforms or does not conform to another set of principles, for example, those employed by Aquinas in this text "Sed quidam ponentes secundum opinionem Platonis animam uniri corpori sicut unam substantiam, alii necesse habuerunt ponere media quibus anima uniretur corpori; quia diversae substantiae et distantes non colligantur, nisi sit aliquid quod uniat eas. Et sic posuerunt quidam spiritum et humorem esse medium inter animam et corpus, et quidam lucem, et quidam potentias animae, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Sed nullum istorum est necessarium, si anima est forma corporis; quia unumquodque secundum quod est ens, est unum. Unde cum forma secundum seipsam det esse materiae, secundum seipsam unitur materiae primae, et non per aliquod ligamentum."—DA, a. 9, Resp. in finem (2.315). 258 See above pp. 291-92 (nn. 205-08). 259 We have already examined these texts on pp. 146-48; see here: nn. 256-57.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

315

essentially, the matter in the spiritual soul and the matter of the human body have the common nature of a potential principle in the constitution or foundation of a human substance, whose actual principle is the form of the soul. In giving being to the potency of matter, the form differentiates between the matter united immediately to the form itself and between the matter to which the form is united through the mediation of corporeal dispositions. Accordingly, the difference in being between the spiritual matter in the soul and the corporeal matter of the body is not a difference involving two kinds of being; rather, the difference has to do with the ways in which spiritual matter and corporeal matter receive the same act of being. The spiritual matter receives the act immediately, and so this matter receives being from the form in such a way that the matter is raised above extension, privation and corruption. 260 The corporeal matter, having been prepared by a substantial disposition preceding the creation of the rational soul, must receive the act of the form through the mediation of a seminal reason, so that, on receiving being from the form in the soul, the corporeal matter remains subject to extension, even though matter in itself, or according to its essence, is not subjected to parts or quantity.261 In sum, originating in and with a human body, the form of a rational soul exists immediately in a spiritual matter; but this existence is completed in the human body of an individual man, who is the one that truly exists by his body and soul. Treating the numerical unity of matter, Bonaventure looks upon matter as a being entirely in potency. From this point of view, matter is of one kind in both spiritual and corporeal substances; therefore, whether it is considered apart from all forms or as having being under every form, matter in itself always remains one in number, since there is no distinction in matter according to its essence.262 Every distinction of matter comes from a form; 260 "Cum igitur principium, a quo est fixa existentia creaturae in se, sit principium materiale, concedendum est animam humanam materiam habere. Ilia autem materia sublevata est supra esse extensionis et supra esse privationis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis. Et propterea illi qui locuti sunt de materiali principle quantum ad esse extensionis et prbut habet esse sub privatione, dixerunt animam rationalem non habere materiam, non intendentes de materia in sua generalitate sed prout ad earn stat resolutio physica, sicut dictum est de simplicitate angeli."— 2 Sent, 17.1.2, Resp. in finem (2.415; ed. min., 2.426). 261 "Quod obicitur de partibilitate, dicendum quod hoc non est ratione ipsius materiae, quia materia, abstracta omni forma, simplex est; non tamen habet actualem simplicitatem, ut punctus, sed est simplex, quia caret actual! extensione, habet tamen possibilitatem ad illam; et cum natura formae corporalis illi materiae datur, tune reducitur ad actum. Unde cum dicitur quod extensio est a materia, non est intelligendum quod a materia secundum suam essentiam, sed secundum esse, prout suscipit formam corporalem, quae non est nata esse in materia nisi cum extensione, quamvis ipsa in se sit simplici essentia consistens." — 2 Stnt., 3.1.1.2, ad 4 (2.98; ed. min., 2.87); cf. fm. 4 (2.94-95; ed. min., fm. d, 2.83). 262 "Omne illud quod ita est unum, quod non recipit distinctionem, est unum numero; materia per essentiam suam ita est unum, quod omnino nullam habet distinctionem secundum suam essentiam, quia omnis distinctio est a forma: ergo necesse est materiam in omnibus esse unam numero ... Item, intelligamus materiam sive spiritualium sive corporalium per abstractionem ab omnibus formis; intelligitur

316

CHAPTER THREE

but matter never loses either its essential unity or its numerical unity, even under the being of many forms; therefore, the spiritual matter of the rational soul and the corporeal matter of the human body retain both an essential unity and a numerical unity under the being of one substantial form. The unity of matter is so strong, Bonaventure says, that it cannot be disrupted by any multitude. The possibility of matter is so great that, remaining always one, it can sustain every kind of diversity: at once and at the same time, matter contains opposites, it can be both in a thing and in the potency of an agent, and it can be produced by diverse productions, just as it can be informed by diverse forms. For instance, the form of humanity is one by a unity of universality: therefore, it is true at the same time that it is a man who is generated, that it is the man who must be generated, and that it is the man who is white and who is black; nonetheless, in all these instances, the universal form of humanity is one.263 Though humanity is not one in number, but in species, even so, Bonaventure goes on, the unity of homogeneity belonging to matter has a greater amplitude and admits a greater diversity than the unity of humanity. Consequently, there is no opposition and no contradiction whatever to the unity of matter according to being, when matter is compared to opposite things. To understand that unity, however, it is necessary to rise above the imagination completely and to think of matter as a being entirely in potency through privation. There is, therefore, no inherent contradiction, to Bonaventure, in positing both a spiritual matter and a corporeal matter as having being from one substantial form.264 CONCLUSION The doctrine of St. Bonaventure on the unity of form in corporeal substances follows his principle of participation. All created substances participate in matter, which is the essential possibility of existing for every created form. The essence of matter is identical in all created substances, but its being is differentiated in them according to this or that proper form. As a being entirely in potency, matter always remains one in number, even materia ut simplex, intelligitur materia ut unica, nullo mode multiplicata nee distincta; sed formae supervenientes non mutant essentiam materiae, sed solum esse: ergo si prius erat quantum ad essentiam unica numero, ergo nunc, cum habet formas."— 2 Sent-, 3.1.1.3, fa. 1 & 5 (2.99; ed. min., fa. a & e, 2.88). 263 Loc. cit, ad 4-6 (2.100; ed min. 2.90-91). Note the illustration: "Et hoc patet, quia forma humanitatis una est unitate universalitatis; ideo simul verum est, quod est homo qui generatur, et est homo qui generandus est, et est homo albus, et est homo niger, et in omnibus his est forma universalis una." 264 "... dico quod quamvis non sit una numero sed specie, tamen unitas materiae quae est unitas homogeneitatis, maioris amplitudinis est quam humanitas ipsa, et maiorem diversitatem admittit Et ideo nulla est oppositio, nulla omnino contradictio ex comparatione oppositorum ad unitatem materiae secundum esse ... Si quis enim vult unitatem materiae intelligere, oportet ab unitate individual! animum abstrahere et super actum imaginations conscendere et omnino ens in potentia per privationem cogitare; et sic potent aliqualiter capere." — Eo. loc.

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

317

under the being of different forms, whether spiritual or corporeal, thus giving to them a common participation in existing. The matter in a spiritual substance shares in the incorruptible being of its form; but the matter in corporeal substances shares in the being of both incorruptible and corruptible forms. Existing at first under one form, which had incomplete being, corporeal matter now exists incorruptibly under the forms of celestial bodies and of elementary bodies; it exists in a corruptible way under the forms of bodies generated from the elementary bodies. Excepting the rational soul, all the forms of corporeal matter originate from seminal reasons concreated with the form of prime matter. As the first form to come from a seminal reason, the form of light is the noblest of all inanimate forms. The celestial bodies participate in the form of light, not univocally, but analogically; each luminary has a proper and specific form of light, which is its completive form and its one substantial form. Terrestrial bodies participate in an embodied light, which is not a substantial form, but a virtual disposition of a body to become coloured under the influence of an extrinsic illumination. A fiery body has a connatural power of.lumen, however, and so this body has an intrinsic source of light and of illumination. The forms of the elements are the first forms to give specific modes of being to terrestrial matter. Drawn from a seminal reason, the form of an element is the specifying form, and the single substantial form, of a simple body. Having active and passive qualitites, the elementary bodies act on one another and, under the external influence of celestial lumen, they come together in the formation of mixed bodies. The form of a mixed body is brought into being from a seminal reason existing in the matter of the elements constituting the mixture. On the formation of a mixture, the elementary bodies undergo a transmutation in being, thus giving rise to a composite body having a proper and single substantial form. The elementary natures remain in the mixed body as substantial dispositions and, as such, they contribute to the body its active and passive qualities. In that way, a mixed body, maintaining the unity of its form, participates in the nature of the elementary bodies. Complex bodies are formed in a similar manner from mixed bodies; but a complex body is disposed to receive a living form, and so the elements in that body are properly proportioned and organized by its seminal reason, which prepares the matter for a soul. Participating in the nature of the elements, the body of an animate substance is disposed for life by their active and passive qualities, which support the organization of an animate body. The least noble soul exists in a plant, which has vegetative life from its soul, and this is its one substantial form. An animal, having both vegetative and sensitive life, possesses a nobler and sensitive soul, whi.ch is the only substantial form of the animal. Both the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul are generated from a seminal reason existing in the potency of matter. But the soul of a man is produced through creation. This is a retional soul and the noblest form giving being to corporeal matter. Containing vegetative, sensitive and intellective poten-

318

CHAPTER THREE

cies, the rational soul is the one and proper substantial form of a man. Thus, maintaining a unity of form, the human body participates in both sensitive life and vegetative life; also maintaining a unity of form, the body of an animal participates in the vegetative life which is found properly in a plant. The form and the matter of every composite body, whether animate or inanimate, come together in such a way that, through a mutual appropriation of being and existing, they participate in the constitution of an individual substance. The substance is completed essentially by a specific form resulting from the conjunction of this proper form with this proper matter. Providing a concrete foundation for universal or abstract knowledge, the specific form of a substance constitutes the unified source of its natural operations. The specific and completive form of a man is his human nature, which participates at once, through his body and soul, in a corporeal substance and in a spiritual substance. The being of a man comes from the form of his soul, which is united immediately to a spiritual matter. The existing of a man comes from the matter of his soul and of his body, which is united to the form of his soul by the mediation of corporeal dispositions. Since matter in itself is both essentially and numerically one, therefore, as the undifferentiated foundation of existing and the one principle of substantial potency, the matter of a human nature can receive an act of being in diverse ways from one substantial form. Consequently, participating at once in a spiritual and in a corporeal mode of existing, the form of a rational spirit is the one substantial form giving being to a human nature. The Bonaventurean synthesis on the unity of substantial form is supported historically by a multiplicity of sources, each participating in the composition of the synthesis. The participational character of the synthesis is manifested vividly in many texts of St. Bonaventure. For instance, on the nature of light, he composes his synthesis from the doctrines of Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. John Damascene; he adds to those sources, on the nature of lumen, doctrines taken from Avicenna and Averroes. St. Bonaventure utilizes the same sources, excepting St. John Damascene but including Boethius. when developing his synthesis on the nature of a seminal reason as a singular and not a universal form. Although he interprets Augustinian according to Aristotelean philosophy on the nature of fire and of the firmament, St. Bonaventure also interprets *Aristotelean philosophy according to Augustinian doctrine on the return of corrupted forms to matter by way of their seminal reasons. On the other hand, he makes equal use of Aristotelean and Augustinian principles regarding the truth of human nature, and so he goes to both Aristotle and St. Augustine for the meanings of the terms substance and nature. It is from Boethius, nonetheless, that St. Bonaventure acquires the principle of specif!: difference in human nature, thus aiding him to develop his doctrine on the specific and completive form of man. The intrinsic complexity of composition characterizing the Bonaventurean synthesis, from the historical viewpoint, demonstrates quite

PROBLEM OF PLURAL FORMS

319

clearly that St. Bonaventure is not committed personally to any given tradition of philosophical thought. Relying on his own fundamental principles, he selects the materials for his synthesis from those sources that he can conform to his understanding of created substances. Hence, reconciling different doctrines on the nature of form and matter, St, Bonaventure produces a unique synthesis on the complete unity of a proper form and a proper matter in each corporeal substance and, notwithstanding, the individual substance can sustain a plurality of substantial dispositions. His synthesis is quite different from the one produced by St. Thomas, who proceeds from principles that are other than those employed by St. Bonaventure. Even though both theologians, at times, make use of the same historical sources, their two syntheses on the unity of substantial form present doctrines differing sharply on the nature of corporeal things, and most especially on the union of body and soul in man. The coherence of either synthesis, however, depends on the intrinsic consistency of its doctrine with the fundamental principles of its author, and not on its conformity, or lack of conformity, to the principles or doctrine of any other author.

This page intentionally left blank

PART TWO POWERS AND OPERATIONS OF HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE

'"pHE works of God, St. Bonaventure writes, are known to us either by faith or by human knowledge. To know what God has willed is sufficient for the solidarity of faith, and we believe that God wills only what is reasonable. The solidarity of human knowledge comes from reason, which must seek the divine causes of things from the created works of God' In seeking those causes, human reason moves from exterior and inferior things to interior and superior things, because a man acquires knowledge by way of his senses, memory, experience. 2 Thus, according to St. Augustine, the human mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the senses of the body; however, the mind knows incorporeal things through its own nature. He says this, Bonaventure observes, because the cognitive species of things are aquired through the senses, but the species of incorporeal things cannot be obtained in that way.3 Human speculation, according to St. Bonaventure, begins with sense knowledge and, progressing through the imagination, follows reason and the intellect; then, going beyond the intellect, human speculation moves through the intelligence and terminates in the unity of wisdom. 4 In acquiring understanding, the human mind depends on a possible intellect, which is its power of comprehension, and on an agent intellect, which is its power of judgment. The human mind cannot be sufficiently illumined to know truth, however, without another and superior light from God. St. Bonaventure supports his view on this point from the Scriptures: "The body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul" (Wisd., 9.15); but he also finds support in Aristotle, who says: "As the eye of a bat is to the light of a sun, so is our intellect to the most manifest things of nature". 5 1 2 Sent., 1.2.dub.3, Resp. (2.52; ed. min., 2.45). 2 2 Sent, 23.2.1, fm. 4 (2.537; ed. min., fm. d, 2.555); cf. 1 Sent, 9.dub.4, Resp. (1.189; ed. min., 1.15152). 3 2 Sent, 3.2.2.1, fm. 2 (2.118; ed min, fm. b, 2.109); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 9.3.3 (PL 42.96263). 4 Brevit., 5.6 "Ex dictis ... gloria sempiterna." (5.260; ed. min., n. 7, 5.113-14). 5 Coil de donis, 8.20 (5.498); cf. Aristotle. Melaph. 2.1 (993b9-ll). See also: 1 Sent., 16.un.2 (1.28082; ed min., 1.229-31).

322

PART Two

These introductory texts sketch St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the powers and operations of human knowledge, which he distinguishes from Christian faith. The powers of knowledge seem to include the senses and the imagination, reason, intelligence and the mind, which also has a possible intellect and an agent intellect. The operations of the cognitive powers extend from sense perception through the speculation of reason and the intellect to the contemplation of intelligence and the mind. We shall treat, in our first chapter here, the proper powers together with their distinctions that St. Bonaventure assigns to man for the acquistion of knowledge. Particular attention will be given in this chapter to the distinction between the possible intellect and the agent intellect, to which St. Bonaventure attributes respectively comprehension and judgment. Our second chapter will deal with the proper operations of the cognitive powers, including the different modes of human knowledge, such as science and wisdom. Since the question of the illumination of the human mind presents a special problem, we shall consider St. Bonaventure's doctrine on that question in the next part of our work.

CHAPTER FOUR POTENCIES OF HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE

CT. Bonaventure distinguishes the cognitive potencies in several different ways, each way depending on the point of view or particular end that he has in mind. In his early writings, seeking an understanding through science, he distinguishes the cognitive potencies within a general division of the powers attributed to human nature. In his middle and late writings, setting forth a contemplation through wisdom, he distinguishes the cognitive potencies is as many different ways as the occasions on which he speaks of them. Consequently, in our presentation of his doctrine on the potencies of human knowledge, we shall consider, in our first section, their place within his general perspective of the human potencies. This consideration will include all his texts on the distinctions between the various potencies of human knowledge. Then, in our second section, we shall examine his texts on the particular distinctions between the sensitive and intellective potencies.' General Division of Potencies

In an early text on the division of the potencies, Bonaventure presents no less than six ways of differentiating them. They are differentiated first and properly according to their nature as vegetative, sensitive and rational potencies, the rational potency being further divided into intellect and will. The next four differentiations, concerning only the cognitive part of the soul, follow the functions, states, objects and acts of the intellect. The functions of the intellect differentiate its superior reason from its inferior reason. The states of the intellect differentiate it as speculative and prac1 St. Bonaventure's complete description of the memory, intelligence and will involves his doctrine on the rational soul as an image of God. The problem of the distinction of those powers from the soul arises within that context, where the three powers are seen to be consubstantial with the essence of the soul. Since the detailed doctrine of the soul as an image of God is beyond the limits of our study, we cannot deal with the problem of the consubstantiality of the soul with its powers. On the problem of the relation between the powers and the soul see: O. Lottin, "L'identite de I'ame et de ses facultes pendant la premiere moitie du XIII' siecle", RNSP, 36 (1934), pp. 191-210: cf. "L'identite ... facultes avant saint Thomas d'Aquin", Psychologic et morale aux XII' et XIII' sitcles, v. 1, Problemes de psychologic (Louvain, Abbaye du Mont Cesar: 1942), pp. 483-502; C.M. O'Donnell, The Psychol. of St. Bonaventure ..., pp. 53-60; M.R Dady, The Theory of Knowledge of St. Bomoenture (Washington, C.U.A: 1939), pp. 4-9; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 185-88; F. d'Eysden, "La distinction de la substance et ses puissances d'opfiration d'apres saint Bonaventure", EF (NS), 2 (1951), pp. 5-23, 147-71.

324

CHAPTER FOUR

tical, for the intellect is practical according as it is conjoined to the will in ruling and dictating. The difference of objects has to do with the distinctions between reason, intellect and intelligence. Reason looks to inferior things, the intellect looks to interior things, and the intelligence regards those things that are superior to the rational soul. The acts of the intellect differentiate its power of learning (inventio) from its power of judging (iudicatio), but the act of the one power is ordered to the act of the other. The sixth differentiation follows the movements of the soul, and so the potencies are divided according to their natural and deliberative movements. This division concerns the human will, which is said to be natural because of man's desire for beatitude, a desire grounded in an immutable inclination of his will toward goodness. The human will is said to be deliberative because of a man's choosing this or that good thing, a choice flowing from a judgment of his reason regarding contrary things. 2 Now, according to Sacred Scripture, the exterior man differs from the interior man: "Although our exterior man is corrupted, nevertheless, our interior man is renewed from day to day" (2 Cor., 4.16). Commenting on this difference, Bonaventure maintains that the exterior man refers to the human body together with the sense powers of the soul, whereas the interior man refers to the rational spirit according as it directs the human person toward spiritual things. The powers of the interior man are so integrated that they constitute one perfect power of the soul. This integral power (fotestas) is called liberty of choice, and it rules the interior man. In a similar manner, the powers of the exterior man are integrated as one perfect power, called sensuality, which includes both the cognitive and the appetitive potencies of the exterior man. Thus, the interior man follows the superior part of reason, while the exterior man follows its inferior part. Now the term sensuality, though it is taken from the Scriptures, names the sensitive potency with respect to its proper nature; but it also names the potency with respect to its rebellion against reason, a condition resulting from original sin. Since the philosophers have not arrived at a knowledge of original sin, or of the fall of man, they do not use sensuality as Sacred Scripture does.3 Considering the whole power of sensuality in itself, Bonaventure, following Augustine, says that it is common to men and animals. Considering the power as proper to man, however, he says that it is subject to the order of reason. In that way, human sensuality has to be controlled by 2 2 Sent., 24.1.2.3, Resp. "Unde notandum est ..." (2.566; ed min., 2.584-85). Regarding the rational soul in itself, Bonaventure says that its potencies are divided sufficiently as cognitive and affective, or into intellect and will: 25.1.un.2, sc 1 (2.595; ed. min., sc a, 2.613). 3 2 Sent., 24.2.dub.3, Resp. (2.587-88; ed. min., 2.608-09). Note: "Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare philosophi non hoc nomine utuntur, dicendum quod sensualitas non tantum nominal ipsam potentiam sensibilem quantum ad propriam naturam, sed etiam in quantum respectu rationalis habet quamdam rebellionem, quae ex peccato originali in homine traducitur. Et quoniam non pervenerunt ad cognitionem originalis peccati nee lapsus hominis, ideo non utuntur hoc nomine sicut sacra Scriptura."

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

325

the law of justice.4 Thus, in a man, sensuality is a power by which he desires a good thing here and now; so the power is in both the sensitive and the rational part of his nature. As a sensitive power of the soul, on the other hand, sensuality is that by which the soul is present in the sense organs of the body. Consequently, as subject to the flesh, sensuality has a greater dependence in its operation than reason on the human body.5 When the name reason is taken commonly, Bonaventure teaches, it designates that whole part of the soul which is distinguished from sensuality, for this includes the inferior part of reason. The proper meaning of reason, however, has to do with the potency of reason as distinct from the concupiscible and irascible appetites of man. Taking reason properly, Bonaventure attributes to the superior part of reason the power or function of judgment with respect to its inferior part, which controls the sensitive power of man. When a delectable good is perceived by the senses, the inferior part of reason adverts to the delectation of the good; but the decision to take delight in its goodness is made by the superior part of reason. The interior man and the exterior man are united, therefore, in regard to the proper choice of the good which is perceived and desired by the power of sensuality.6 Bonaventure divides all the sense potencies as an integral power of sensuality from the intellect and the will as an integral power of liberty of choice (libertas arbitrii). But he also unifies all the potencies of man in a single habitus or faculty of free choice (liberum arbitrium). Within the unity of this faculty, which we shall call freedom of choice, human reason includes both the intelligence and the memory, while the will includes the irascible and concupiscible appetites.7 In short, sharing in the acts of all the potencies, freedom of choice constitutes a potential whole of reason and will. 8 4 "... respondetur communiter quod sensualitas dupliciter potest considerari: aut in se aut prout est ordinabilis a raticme et sub ratione. Si in se consideretur, hoc modo habet usum in furiosis, et hoc rnodo dicit Augustinus quod in ea communicamus cum brutis ... Alio modo est loqui de sensualitate secundum quod ipsa ordinabilis est ad rationem et sub ratione; et hoc modo habet regulari secundum legem iustitiae." — 2 Sent., 24.2.3.1, Resp. (2.588; ed. mm., 2.604); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 12.1.1 (PL 42.997-99); 12.12.17 (PL 42.1007-08). 5 Cf. 2 Sent., 24.2.2.1, Resp. (2.578-79; ed. min., 2.598-99); 3 Sent., 16.2.3, fm. 5 (3.357; ed. min., fm. e, 3.352). 6 4 Sent., 14.1.2.1, ad 2 (4.325; ed. min, 2.310); 2 Sent., 24.2.2.2, Resp. "... et deordinationem." (2.581; ed. mm., 2.601-02). 7 "Et hoc patet, quia ipsa ratio includit in se intelligentiam et memoriam, et ita aliquid per quod assimilatur Patri, et aliquid per quod assimilatur Filio. Ipsa voluntas includit in se irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et ita potentiam per quam appetit et potentiam per quam potest. Et ideo non oportet liberum arbitrium esse aliquam potentiam praeter has." — 2 Sent., 25.1.un.2, ad 1-3 (2.597; ed. min., 2.615). On the freedom of choice as a faculty or habitus see: 25.1.un.4-6 (2.600-23; ed. min., 2.619-25). 8 "... dicendum quod non complectitur eas omnino sicut totum integrale nee omnino sicut totum universale, sed sicut totum potentiale, quod paitim habet naturam totius integri, partim naturam totius universalis: naturam totius integri in hoc quod in una potentiarum non potest salvari absque altera; naturam vero totius universalis habet, quia ex earum concursu ad invicem denominat... sic libertas dicitur esse in ratione et voluntate, ita quod utraque illarum potentiarum est libera ex coniunctione sui cum alia;

326

CHAPTER FOUR

According to Aristotle, the part of the soul sharing in reason is properly called rational; but the name is also extended to the part of the soul obeying reason.9 Accepting Aristotle's distinction, Bonaventure says that liberty of choice is in the part of the soul which is properly rational. This is the part containing the virtues, both moral and speculative, though the speculative virtues are subject only to the intellect. Liberty of choice is the formal principle of the faculty of freedom of choice, which controls the inferior part of the soul; regulating the power of sensuality, including the irascible and concupiscible appetites, freedom of choice relies on the moral virtues to bring about the obedience of sensuality to human reason. I0 It is here that Bonaventure distinguishes, within the potency of reason, the speculative intellect from the practical intellect. The judgment of the speculative intellect, considering what is true, concerns things that are to be known. The judgment of the practical intellect, considering what is good, concerns things that are to be done, and so the practical intellect belongs to the faculty of freedom of choice.'' The practical intellect is perfected by conscience, just as the speculative intellect is perfected by science. Explaining the meaning of conscience, Bonaventure contrasts the name with the term intellect. The latter term has a threefold designation: the potency of understanding, the habitus of understanding, and the principle by which something is understood. The name conscience, in like manner, has a threefold signification. It signifies the thing known, as Damascene says: "conscience is the law of our intellect"; so, Bonaventure comments, it is the law that is known through conscience. The name signifies, secondly, a habitus by which the law is known, just as science is a habitus by which speculative truth is known. The name signifies, thirdly, the potency of knowledge, for the natural law is said to be written on a man's conscience. Of the three significations, Bonaventure says that the second is the one more usually attributed to the name, and so he understands the human conscience to be a habitus of the practical intellect. As a habitus, conscience perfects the intellect according as it is conjoined with the will regarding moral actions. This conforms, Bonaventure concludes, with the teaching of Aristotle: "the speculative and practical intellects are the same potency, differing only in extension". 12 How does the intelligence of the soul differ from its intellect? The intelligence, in Bonaventure's doctrine, is closely connected with the nature nee tamen sunt in eis duae libertates, sed una." — 2 Sent., 25. l.un.3, ad 6 (2.599-600; ed. min., 2.618); cf. 3 Sent., 33.un.2, ad 2 (3.714-15; ed. min., 3.716). On Bonaventure's doctrine of freedom of choice see: L. Veuthey, Si. Btmav. philos. chris., pp. 180-85. 9 See: Etkica niam., 1.13 (1102b29-1103a3). 10 Cf. 3 Sent, 33.3.un.3, Resp., ad 1 (3.716-17; ed. min., 3.718-20). 11 2 Sent., 7.2.1, Resp. "... liberi arbitrii." (2.190; ed. min., 2.183). 12 2 Sent., 39.1.1, Resp. (2.899; ed. min., 2.933-34); cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orthod., 4.22 (PG 94.1199); Aristotle, De anima, 3.10 (433al3-21). Moral truths are regulated by the natural law impressed on every man according to his nature; so those truths are known by the science of philosophy under the direction of freedom of choice and the habitus of conscience: 2 Sent., 25.l.dub. 1 (2.607; ed. min., 2.626).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

327

of the soul as an image of God Outside that context, Bonaventure has only a few references to the intelligence. Speaking about the human way of knowing God's simplicity, for instance, he says that the intellect ascends in some way through the intelligence to a simple perception of the divine simplicity. But this perception can be expressed by the intellect only in a composite way: human understanding, unlike the simple mode of divine knowledge, proceeds in a complex manner regarding many things. The knowledge acquired by the highest part of the intellect is perhaps a simple mode of understanding, for the soul knows in that way by a simple glance.13 Designating the highest part of the intellect, the intelligence is not a potency distinct from the intellect itself. The intelligence refers, rather, to the intellect with respect to its supreme object, which is God, and with respect to its simple mode of knowing that object. Reason, likewise, is not a potency distinct from the intellect; reason names the intellect both from its lowest object, which is the truth of corporeal things, and from its complex mode of understanding. Thus, properly considered, intellect names the potency of understanding. The name, thereafter, designates the potency from its habitual mode of understanding and with respect to its object, which is the intellective principle by which things are known. In other words, the differentiation of reason, intellect and intelligence diversifies the rational, intellectual and intelligent modes of operation appropriate to the human potency of understanding. Since the speculative and practical intellects are states of the same potency, they diversify it only with regard to a consideration of what is true and of what is good, the latter consideration requiring a direction of the will. The superior and inferior reasons, as we saw in our second chapter, diversify the same potency according as it looks to either eternal things or temporal things. Hence, the functions, states and objects of the intellect do not diversify it into different potencies.14 13 "Quamvis cnim in Deo sit summa simplicitas, tamen exprirai non potest nisi per complexionem. Et ideo bene dicit Augustinus, 'quod verius est Deus quam cogitatur, et verius cogitatur quam dicitur'. Nam, etsi intellectus aliquo modo per intelligentiam ascendat ad contuitum simpticitatis, non tamen potest hoc expriraere voce simplici, sed composita." — 1 Sent, 34.un.2, Resp. in finem (1.590; ed, min, 1.471); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 7.4.7 (PL 42.939). "Unde intelligere multa per modum complexionis nee est omnino virtutis, nee omnino imperfectionis; et ideo non ponitur nee in cognitione Ultima, ut sensitiva, nee in cognitione suprema, ut in divina, et fortassis non etiam in cognitione suprema ipsius aniraae, quae dicitur intellectiva prout est in sua summo: cognoscit enim per modum simplicis aspectus." — 1 Sent., 41.2.1, in Resp. (1.737; ed. min., 1.584). 14 On the general division of potencies in Bonaventure's doctrine see: M.R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge ... , pp. 3-12. See also, by L. Veuthey: Si Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 174-80; "Bonaventura (s.)", ENF, v. 1, cc. 756-57; "Le potenze dell'anima secondo S. Bonaventura", Miscellanea francescana, 69 (1969), pp. 134-39. The agent and possible intellects, as we shall see, are diverse potencies of the intellect, which they diversify according to their proper acts of judging and receiving. The superior reason is not equivalent to the intelligence: the superior reason considers eternal things according as they are the rules of temporal things, whereas the intelligence looks to God himself, particularly as He is known from His image in the human soul.

328

CHAPTER FOUR

Bonaventure cites Aristotle, Augustine and Damascene in the texts that we have used to explain his division of the potencies and their unification in the moral faculty of free choice. Though he follows Augustine on the nature of sensuality as common to men and animals, Bonaventure goes to Aristotle for the proper meaning of rational, and for the obedience of the sensitive part of the soul to its rational part. Moreover, following Damascene, he posits the natural law as the object of conscience; but it is again to Aristotle that he goes, on this occasion, for the distinction of the speculative intellect from the practical intellect, where Bonaventure puts the habitus of conscience. Thus far, from the historical point of view, Bonaventure's doctrine on the potencies manifests, for the most part, an Aristotelean influence. In his next text on the general division of the potencies, Bonaventure differentiates them in much the same way as in his previous text, though in some respects this second division is more detailed than the first. Considering the rational soul as the perfection and mover of the human body, he says that the soul, as a form and principle of perfection, gives being to the body; as a result, the soul moves the body through potencies of life, sense and understanding. Regarding life, the soul has a vegetative potency, which is the principle of generation, nutrition and growth. With regard to sense, the soul has a sensitive potency, which is its principle of apprehending sensible things, of retaining what it apprehends, and of composing and dividing what it has retained. Apprehension is the work of the five exterior senses, which correspond to the five principal bodies of the world, namely, the four elementary natures and the luminous nature of the heavens. Retention is done by the memory, while composition and division are carried out by the phantasia, which is the first comparative power. With respect to understanding, the soul has an intellective potency by which it discerns what is true and, fleeing from evil, seeks what is good. Truth is discerned by the rational power, which is the potency of cognition. Evil is repulsed by the irascible appetite, and good things are sought by the concupiscible appetite, for these powers are affective potencies. Consequently, the whole soul is divided into cognitive and affective potencies. Since cognition has to do with what is true either as true or as good, and since what is good is either eternal or temporal, the cognitive potency is divided into intellect and reason, so that the intellect is both speculative and practical, but reason has both a superior and an inferior function. The appetite of the soul desires what is good either according to a natural instinct or according to deliberation and choice; so the affective potency is divided into natural will and elective will, but the elective will is the will according to its proper name (voluntas). Since election is indifferent to each side of a choice, the will acts from freedom of choice. The indifference preceding a choice is grounded in an antecedent deliberation of the intellect as conjoined to the will. Hence, freedom of choice is a faculty of reason and will;, therefore, all the rational potencies mentioned above are contained within that faculty as

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

329

Augustine says: "when we speak of freedom of choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but certainly of the whole soul". From the concourse of those potencies, with reason reflecting upon itself and the will accompanying it, there comes to be in the soul an integral liberty, which is the principle directing a man's choice of good, or of evil.15 The broad division of the potencies, in the above text, follows their proper diversity, in Bonaventure's previous text, as vegetative, sensitive and rational potencies, with a sufficient diversity of the rational potency into intellect and will. The individual differences within any one of those potencies follow proper acts diversifying the potency in particular ways. Thus, taken widely, the vegetative potency has to do with life; however, taken strictly, the potency is diversified by the acts of generation, nutrition and growth. The whole vegetative potency, then, is divided into three particular potencies, each having a proper act.16 The whole sensitive potency of cognition is divided likewise into exterior and interior potencies. The exterior senses are the potencies by which bodily things are apprehended, each of the five senses having a proper correspondence to a particular sort of body.17 The interior senses, as given here, are the memory, which is a potency of retention, and the phantasia, which is a potency of judgment. Bonaventure speaks also in this work, as we have shown, of the imagination as a medium between reason and the exterior senses. We have a problem here regarding the phantasta, because, as a comparative power, it ought to be the common sense; nevertheless, according to its name, it would seem to be the imagination. Bonaventure's subsequent texts on the sense potencies may, perhaps, help us to solve the problem. 18 Turning to the diversities within the intellective potency, we find Bonaventure arranging them in a different way by comparison with his earlier division, but his diversification of the rational potencies is basically the same in both divisions. He assigns to the intellect the act of discerning truth, both speculative and practical. In discerning practical truth, however, 15 Brevil., 2.9 "Quoniam autem ..." (5.227; ed. min., nn. 5-8, 5.50-51). 16 Bonaventure's threefold division of the vegetative potency is influenced, no doubt, by Aristotle's doctrine; see De anima, 2.4 (415al4-416b31); De gener. et corrupt., 1.5 (320a9-322b35). 17 This correspondence, which Bonaventure finds in Augustine, will be shown when we consider the operations of the exterior senses. For the dependence on Augustine see: De Gen. ad litt., 3.4.6-7 (PL 34,281-82); cf. 2 Sent, 15.1.3, Resp. (2.380-81; ed mm., 2.388-90). 18 See above: p. 321. On the problem of the imagination and the phantasia, note the following editorial annotations: "Potentia sensibilis apprehensiva enim dividitur in exteriorem et interiorem, prior comprehendit quinque sensus exteriores, posterior vero sensum communem, imaginationem (phantasiam), aestimativam et memoriam." — Itiner., 2.5 (5.300, n. 6): C.M. O'Donnell bases his division of the sense potencies in Bonaventure's doctrine on this editorial annotation — The Psychol. of St. Bonaventure ..., p. 53. "Potentia sensibilis apprehensiva dividitur in exteriorem et interiorem; prior comprehendit quinque sensus exteriores, posterior vero sensum communem, potentiam, quae videt se videre' (In I Sent., d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, ad 4; I, 297), imagination seu phantasiam (de qua supra in Brevil. p. 2, c. 9, n. 5), memoriam, et aestimativam (infra, n. 6). Gf. In Hexatm., coll. 5, 24 (ed. F. Delorme, 86)." — Op. at., 2.5 (ed. min., 5.189, n. 7). We shall examine each of the texts, mentioned here, in due course.

330

CHAPTER FOUR

the intellective potency looks to eternal things and to temporal things, and so it is in the moral order that the potency, taken as reason, functions in a superior way and in an inferior way. As a superior reason, the potency has the function or task of consulting the eternal laws regulating moral truths; as an interior reason, it has the task of function of obeying those laws when directing the appetitive potencies in pursuing good or avoiding evil. In that way, submitting to the guidance of conscience, the instinctive desires of sensuality are brought under the control of the will within the total faculty of freedom of choice. '9 Describing the original condition of human nature, Bonaventure teaches that man, prior to original sin, could have moved from a knowledge of creatures to a simple perception of the lumen of divine wisdom. Man could have then become wise by looking upon the universe of corporeal things in themselves, in their proper genus, and in their eternal principle. He could, therefore, have seen those things according as they have being in their proper nature, in a created intelligence, and in the uncreated principle of all things. Hugh of St. Victor, speaking of that threefold vision, attributes to man an eye of the flesh, an eye of reason, and an eye of contemplation. Following Hugh's attribution, Bonaventure assigns to the eye of the flesh a vision of the exterior and corporeal world; he assigns to the eye of reason a vision of the interior and spiritual world of the soul, and he assigns to the eye of contemplation a vision of the superior and eternal world of things in God. Having lost the eye of contemplation because of sin, man no longer has the perfect act of contemplation; however, it will be restored to him in everlasting glory. In the meantime, a man can prepare for the restoration of perfect contemplation through grace, faith and an understanding of the Scriptures, for these gifts purge, illumine and perfect the human mind Thus, a man cannot arrive at an everlasting contemplation unless he first recognizes the defects and the darkness impairing his mind because of original sin.20 We have here a theological and mystical description rather than a philosophical division of the cognitive potencies and their objects. The description, nonetheless, has a foundation in the division of the potencies into sensitive and intellective principles of cognition, the intellective principle being differentiated, not according to potencies, but according to its three sorts of object: eternal and corporeal things, known according to

19 Bonaventure, as he says himself, follows Augustine on freedom of choice as belonging to the whole soul; however, Bonaventure explains the operations of that faculty in his own distinctive way: BreviL ,2.11 "Et quia ..." (5.229-30; ed. min., nn. 3-6, 5,54-55); 3.2 "Similiter modus ..." (5.232; ed. min., n. 5, 5.60-61). Note the following passage from the first reference: "Et quia cuilibet sensui respondet motus, ideo duplex datus est homini motus: unus secundum instinctum rationis in mente, alius secundum instinctum sensualitas in carne. Primi est imperare, secundi est obtemperare secundum rectum ordinem; quando autem fit e converse, tune rectitudo et regimen animae praecipitatur de statu suo." 20 BreviL, 2.12 "Est igitur ..." (5.230; ed. min., nn. 4-5, 5.56-57); cf. Hugh of St Victor, De sacrum., 1.102 (PL 176-329C).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

331

reason in conjunction with the senses; internal and spiritual things, which are known according to the intellect, superior and eternal things in God, who is known according to the intelligence. Bonaventure, manifesting his versatility, often describes the cognitive potencies and operations of man in this way, varying the manner of his description according to its context.21 The next text of Bonaventure on the division of the potencies belongs to the middle period of his writings. Portraying the journey of the Christian to God through both science and wisdom, he bases this division on the three different stages in that journey. In the first stage, purged through justice, the soul uses its animality or sensuality, its exterior sense and imagination, as it moves from corporeal things to go within itself. In the second stage, illumined through science, the soul as a spirit uses its reason and intellect while considering and reflecting upon temporal things within its power. In the third stage, perfected through wisdom, the spirit uses its intelligence and the peak of its mind, or its spark of synderesis, as it contemplates eternal things in God, who is the principle and cause of the universe.22 The three stages of the journey are distinguished properly more by the different steps toward God than by the combination of potencies associated with them. There is, then, with respect to the potencies, a certain overlapping of the stages. Toward the end of the first stage, which starts from God's vestiges in corporeal things, reason and the intellect perfect the work of the senses; the acts of reason and the intellect are likewise perfected by the intelligence and the mind in the second stage, which moves from God's image in the rational spirit. All the natural acts of cognition are elevated through grace in the second stage; they are then perfected through the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the third stage, which goes on to God from His likeness in the rational spirit, i.e. from His image as it is reformed by grace and the theological virtues. Keeping all this in view, we shall look briefly at the different cognitive potencies. The sense potencies seem to present no problems, the soul's animality or sensuality referring to its sensitive appetites. When explaining the operations of the senses, nevertheless, Bonaventure speaks first of the exterior senses as perceiving the particular aspects of corporeal things. He speaks, secondly, of the sense potency apprehending their common aspects, such as magnitude and number. Though he does not name a particular potency by which the common aspects are apprehended, it would seem to be the common sense. Since this sense apprehends its objects in a comparative manner, it would also appear that the common sense is the phan21 For example: "... dicendum quod dupliciter potest considerari homo: vel ens in se vel extra Primo modo non pervenit per creaturas a se in Deum, sed ens extra se per cognitionem creaturarum recoiligitur in se et elevatur supra se. Vel dicendum quod aliae creaturae possunt considerari ut res vel ut signa. Primo modo sunt inferiores homine, secundo modo sunt media in deveniendo sive in via, non in termino, quia illae non perveniunt, sed per illas pervenit homo ad Deum, illis post se relictis." — 1 Sent., 3.1.un,3, ad 2 (1.75; ed. mm., 1.54). 22 Itiner., 1.1-6 (5.296-97; ed. min., 5.182-84).

332

CHAPTER FOUR

tasia. On the other hand, explaining the act of judging, Bonaventure attributes to the particular sense, again without naming a proper potency, the act of deciding whether a corporeal thing has this or that quality; at the same time, he attributes to the interior sense the act of deciding whether a thing is useful or harmful, but he does not name any special power to which the act belongs. The decision of the interior sense requires the confirmation of reason, because this is the potency that judges truth, and so it belongs to reason to decide whether or not to take delight in a good thing perceived by the sense potency. Although Bonaventure refers to the act of judging, attributed to the interior sense, as an abstractive preparation of the species to be received by the intellect, he does not speak of the imagination as taking part in that preparation. Consequently, we cannot determine exactly from this particular text what interior sense exercises the act of judging. 23 Another text, from the same period, speaks clearly of the imagination as a potency of apprehending corporeal things; but the text says nothing about the act of judging, though the imagination seems to be in the line of abstraction.2* The part of the journey to God that depends on reason and the intellect presents no particular problems. Reason, considering the data passed on by the senses, withdraws from the limitations of time and place, thus permitting the intellect to judge the truth most certainly of sensible things according to their eternal laws and rules in the mind of God. The intellect, on judging the truths of sensible things, does not perceive their eternal laws and rules immediately; rather, it perceives them as they are reflected in the memory, which contains, as the first principles of rational knowledge, indelible impressions of the eternal principles in the divine mind. The memory of which Bonaventure speaks here is not the memory serving the senses, but the one serving the intellect and the intelligence.25 This is the memory that, along with intelligence and will, belongs to the image of God in the rational spirit. In the journey to God, the spirit, approaching Him as 23 Op. cit., 2.3-6 (5.300-01; ed. min., 5.188-90). On the problem concerning the interior sense note: "Post hanc ... fit diiudicatio, qua non solum diiudicatur, utrum hoc sit album vel nigrum, quia hoc pertinet ad sensum particularem; non solum, utrum sit salubre vel nocivum, quia hoc pertinet ad sensum interiorem; verum etiam, qua diiudicatur et ratio redditur, quare hoc delectat; et in hoc actu inquiritur de ratione delectationis, quae in sensu percipitur ab obiecto ... Abstrahit igitur a loco, tempore et motu, ac per hoc est incomrautabilis, incircumscriptibilis, interminabilis et omnino spiritualis. Diiudicatio igitur est actio, quae speciem sensibilem, sensibiliter per sensus acceptam, introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam intellectivam." 24 "Quadruplex est virtus in anima, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, ratio et intelligentia. Vide, quantum sensus capit. Oculus enim in puncto pupillae totum apprehenderet mundum, secundum quosdam, si non haberet obstaculum. Imaginatio vero multos tales potest apprehendere mundos. Ratio vero ulterius apprehendit, quia abstrahit universale, quod est semper et ubique, a particulari, quod est hie et nunc. Si ergo sensus, imaginatio, ratio tantae sunt capacitatis et apprehensionis; quid est intelligentia, quae nata est apprehendere Deum summum Oonum?" — Sermo, "De regno Dei ..." n. 9 (5.541-42; ed. mzn., 5.417), 25 Itinn., 2.9 (5.301-02; ed. min., 5.191-92).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

333

His image, acts as one mind knowing and loving itself, thereby becoming aware of His presence within its memory. Then, turning toward God by its intelligence, the spirit moves on to Him from the peak of its mind, and so, by its will, the spirit is united to God in love.26 In his late writings, Bonaventure has some texts presenting either a short description of the cognitive potencies or a simple enumeration of them. In one text, he describes the soul as having three operations. The soul, as the form of a body, turns toward corporeal things, so that, from a frequency of experience, it learns many things, as Aristotle teaches: "many acts of the senses give rise to one memory, and many acts of memory give rise to one experience; from many experiences, there conies to-be one universal, which is the principle of art and science". As a spiritual substance, the soul turns in upon itself; so, through its natural lumen, the soul knows the first principles of created things. Thirdly, as an image of God, the soul has a capacity to turn up to God, thus enabling it to know Him according to its intelligence.27 It is in this context that Bonaventure talks of the human soul as apprehending truth by a possible intellect and judging truth by an agent intellect, which is the natural lumen of the soul. 28 When describing the mystical contemplation of wisdom, Bonaventure calls it a most secret operation transcending all understanding. Then, enumerating the following powers of apprehension: sensitive, imaginative, estimative and intellective, he says that, moving on to wisdom, the soul must leave those powers behind and, at the peak of its mind, find God in a union of love.29 This is the first time that we have seen Bonaventure naming an estimative power, which he calls a power of apprehension. In a parallel text on wisdom, however, he does not include an estimative power in his description and enumeration of the potencies. In that text, Bonaventure says that the soul, to enter the way of wisdom, must go within itself and reflect upon itself with the eye of its mind and not the eye of the flesh. In other words, the soul must reflect directly upon its potencies and their acts. Now the soul has three potencies: an animal potency, an intellectual potency, and a divine potency; they correspond respectively to the eye of

26 Cf. Op. cit., c. 3 (5.303-06; ed. min., 5.193-99). Bonaventure does not mention the spark of synderesis here; however, it is the natural foundation of the will's orientation toward goodness: "Duplicem enim indidit rectitudinem ipsi naturae: unam ad recte iudicandum, et haec est rectitudo conscientiae; aliam ad recte volendum, et haec est synderesis, cuius est remurmurare contra malum et stimulare ad bonum." — Brevii, 2.11 (5.229; ed. min., n. 6, 5.55). 27 Coll. de donis., 8.13 (5.496); cf. Aristotle, AnaL poster., 2.19 (100a4-8). 28 Cf. Op. «(., 8.20 (5.498); see above: p. 321 (n. 5). 29 "Et ibi est operatio transcendent omnem intellectum, secretissima; quod nemo scit, nisi qui experitur. In anima enim sunt virtutes multae apprehensivae: sensitiva, imaginativa, aestimativa, intellectiva; et omnes oportet relinquere, et in vertice est unitio amoris, et haec omnes transcendit." — Coll. in Hexdem., 2.29 (5.341). "Oportet ergo ilia omnia relinquere eum. qui secundum hanc sapientiam vult sursum agi. Virtus enim speculativa, cuius est istus actus, transcendit intellectivam ... Habet autem anima multas potentias apprehensivas et super omnes habet unionem. Amor autem unionis transcendit omnem intellectum et scientiam." — Delorme, p. 30.

334

CHAPTER FOUR

the flesh, the eye of reason, and the eye of contemplation. The animal potency is divided according as it considers, on the one hand, the objects of the particular senses and of the common sense and, on the other hand, the phantasms of sensible things, and those phantasms divide the potency into the exterior sense and the imagination. The intellectual potency is differentiated through its considerations of abstract universals and spiritual substances. Thus, the potency is differentiated as reason and intellect: reason proceeds in an argumentative manner, but the intellect is that by which the soul knows itself and other spiritual things. The divine potency is distinguished through its intelligence, by which the soul perceives divine things, and through its will or unitive power, by which the soul takes delight most secretly in the sweet things of God.30 As described in this text, reason, intellect and intelligence do not vary regarding their differences by comparison with Bonaventure's previous accounts of them. His description of the sensitive potencies, however, does vary with respect to his earlier texts on the general division of the potencies. Bonaventure names the common sense within a division of the sense potencies, something that he has not done before in similar texts. Moreover, he puts the common sense on the side of the particular or exterior senses. Their work of apprehending sensible things is completed in phantasms, formed apparently by the common sense, or phantasia, thus preparing the way for the interior operation of apprehension, which is the work of the imagination.31 Bonaventure, discussing the degrees of contemplation, tells us that God can be contemplated from things outside us, within us, and above us. Those three degrees of contemplation proceed according to our exterior or animal potency, our interior or intellectual potency, and our superior or divine potency. Drawing attention to the first potency, Bonaventure affirms that bodily things are perceived by the exterior senses, then by the common

30 Of. cit., 5.24 (5.357-58). Note the passage on the senses: "Potentia animalis duplex est; vel in obiecta sensuum paiticularium et sensus communis, vel in phantasmata sensibiiimn, et sic est sensus et imaginatio." 31 Although the Delorrne version is almost identical with the critical edition of the text on the intellectual and the divine potencies, there is a very considerable difference in the Delorme version on the divisions of the sensitive potencies: "Prima operatic sive potentia dupliciter convertitur, scilicet aut super obiecta exteriora, et hoc fit per quinque sensus, scilicet visum, gustum, auditum, tactum et olfactum; aut super interiora phantasmata recepta a sensibus, et hoc fit per quinque interiores vires, scilicet per sensum communem, imaginationem, phantasiam, aestimationem, meraoriam." — Of. cit., p. 86. This version, presenting a numerical correspondence between the exterior and interior senses, puts the common sense on the side of the interior senses, so that the sensible phantasms are formed by the exterior senses apart from the common sense; notwithstanding, the phantasm is placed as an interior sense between the imagination and the estimative sense. Surely we have here a faulty version of the text? It is unfortunate that the editors of the minor edition of Bonaventure's works have chosen this particular passage to identify the phantasia with the imagination in his doctrine (see above: n. IS, p. 329). Our subsequent account of the particular divisions of the sense potencies will show that the phantasia is, in fact, the common sense.

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

335

sense; after that, they are perceived by the imagination and retained by the memory, following a consideration of reason.32 Our final text enumerating the cognitive potencies is also taken from a discourse on wisdom. The text, following a now familiar pattern, places a power of estimation between reason and the imagination. Bonaventure places it there because it apprehends some sort of spiritual good.33 Consequently, it is the estimative sense that decides, in conjunction with the imagination and under the control of reason, whether a sensible thing is useful or harmful with particular regard to the spiritual good of the human person. Having seen the texts of Bonaventure dividing and enumerating the potencies of operation, we shall now summarize his doctrine on the various distinctions between those potencies. They are divided properly into vegetative, sensitive and intellective potencies. This division follows the nature of man, who also acts sufficiently by the cognitive and affective or appetitive powers of his rational soul. The vegetative potency has the three particular powers of generation, nutrition and growth. The sensitive potency, forming an integral power of sensuality or animality, is divided into cognitive and appetitive parts. The cognitive part has exterior and interior potencies. The exterior potencies, five in number, apprehend the particular properties of bodily things. Exterior sensation is completed by the common sense, or phantasia, which apprehends the common properties of sensible things by comparing their particular properties, and so this is the exterior power of judgment. The interior potencies are the senses of imagination and estimation. The imagination, mediating between reason and the common sense, apprehends bodily things by an act of abstraction. The estimative sense, working with the imagination under the control of reason, apprehends the good or evil in sensible things. On apprehending those qualities, the estimative sense decides whether sensible things are useful or harmful, thus mediating between reason and the sense appetites. The appetitive part of sensuality has an irascible potency turning a man away from evil, and a concupiscible potency moving him toward things that 32 Op. cit., 22.34-35 (5.442; Delorme, pp. 260-61). Note this passage: "Et secundum philosophum, 'omnis anima nobi'is tres habet operationes', scilicet animalem ad extra, intellectualem ad intra, divinam ad supra." The Delorme version has no reference to Aristotle, to whom the citation ought not be assigned, because, at this time, Bonaventure knew that its source was not Aristotle, but the Liber de causis (propos. 3), as the following shows: "Unde dixit ille: "Prima rerum creatarum omnium esse' ...", Coll. in Hexalm., 10.18 (5.379; cf. Delorme, p. 132). In any event, Bonaventure has cited the first text, without'referring to Aristotle, in Coll. de dimis, 8.13 (5.496); he seems to suggest a Platonist source for the doctrine in his earliest reference to it: 2 Sent, 10.2.1. Resp. (2.263-64; ed. min., 2.264-65). 33 "Sunt enim septem virtutes interiores, quasi circulus intra circulum, quas oportet recolligere, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, aestimatio, quae media est inter rationem et imaginationem, quoniam apprehendit aliquod spirituaie bonum; ratio, per quam anima cognoscit se et cognoscendo se cognoscit alias substantiates spirituales; intellectus, in quo sunt principia legum aeternum; intelligentia, quae contemplatur ipsum Deum; et apex mentis, quod est summum ipsius animae et quasi centrum, in quo recolliguntur oranes alias vires." — Sermo, Epiph., n. 4 (9.162).

336

CHAPTER FOUR

are good, particularly regarding his spiritual needs. The intellective potency is divided according to its act of apprehending, which is proper to the possible intellect, and its act of judging, which is proper to the agent intellect, or the natural lumen of the rational soul. The intellective potency has rational, intellectual and intelligent modes of operation, and thus the potency is called respectively reason, intellect and intelligence. Looking toward corporeal things, reason operates in a discursive manner through the mediation of the senses. Looking within the soul itself, intellect operates in a self-reflexive way, with particular regard to the first principles of rational knowledge. Looking up to God, intelligence has a simple mode of operation, glancing at the first principle and cause of all things. All the cognitve operations of the senses and the intellective potency utilize the memory, which serves those potencies by retaining both the first principles of truth and the experiences acquired through sense knowledge, thus giving rise to the principles of art and science. Supporting the operation of reason, science perfects the operation of the intellect; but wisdom, perfecting the operation of intelligence, completes and unifies all the activities of the intellective potency. The affective potency of the rational soul consists in the will. This potency is called natural from its instinctive desire for goodness; it is called deliberative or elective from its act of choosing a particular good, an act flowing from the will following a deliberation of reason. In the moral order, then, the cognitive and affective potencies of the soul form one integral power of liberty of choice. From this point of view, the cognitive potency is said to be directed by the will; so, seeking to know what is good, the intellect is called practical. On the other hand, seeking to know what is true simply as true, the intellect is called speculative. These two ways of naming the intellect refer to states, however, and not to a difference of potencies. The naming of the intellect as a superior reason and an inferior reason, likewise, does not signify that the intellect has two distinct potencies of reason. Rather, as a superior reason, the intellect consults the eternal laws ruling human actions and, as an inferior reason, the intellect obeys those laws while directing and controlling the acts of the sense appetites. The superior and inferior functions of human reason are regulated by the will, which is conjoined to reason within the integral power of freedom of choice. Consequently, uniting liberty of choice with sensuality, freedom of choice is a faculty by which a man, guided by a habitus of conscience, advances in virtue according to the principles and dictates of the natural law. Bonaventure refers explicitly to only one historical source in his texts on the division and enumeration of the potencies. He cites Hugh of St. Victor, who describes the cognitive powers as eyes of the flesh, reason and contemplation. Bonaventure adapts this description to his own view of the potencies as animal, intellectual and divine; however, that particular view has a Platonist source, which Bonaventure meets by way of Augustine. Thus, the Bonaventurean perspective of contemplation as an activity beginning in ex-

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

337

terior things, moving within the spirit, and going up to God has both an Augustinian and a Platonist background It is from Augustine also that Bonaventure gets his understanding of the human mind as gathering knowledge of bodily things through the senses, but of spiritual things through its own nature. It is from Aristotle, however, that Bonaventure acquires his understanding of the r&le played by the senses and human experiences in universal knowledge, which is the foundation of science. He also acquires from Aristotle many proper distinctions, such as those between the rational and irrational parts of the soul, and between the speculative and practical intellects. These distinctions harmonize, in Bonaventurean doctrine, with the Augustinian notions of sensuality and freedom of choice, which involves the whole man. Finally, Bonaventure goes to Damascene, from whom he learns that the natural law is the object of conscience, which Bonaventure puts in the practical intellect. The outcome of Bonaventure's utilization of these sources is a doctrine in which now one and then another of his sources exercises a prominent influence.

Thomas Aquinas has two different ways of dividing the potencies of operation in man. The first way, following their objects, results in five potencies, namely, vegetative, sensitive, intellective, appetitive and a power of local motion. The second way, following their subjects or modes of acting, gives vegetative, sensitive and intellective potencies, but they include the appetitive potency and the power of local motion. This second way is based on the three kinds of operation found in the human soul with regard to matter. The first kind has to do with the body united to the soul itself. The vegetative potency, therefore, dealing with life, operates according to its powers of generation, growth and nutrition. The second kind of operation is concerned with bodies not united to the human soul. This is the operation of the sensitive potency, which receives species from bodily things according to their material conditions; however, their species are received without matter, even though they are received in the organs of the human body. Reception of the species belongs to the five exterior senses by which other bodies are perceived. The species are then brought together in the common sense, which is the potency of judgment and discernment regarding exterior sensations. After the judgment of the common sense, the species are conserved in the imagination, or phantasia, so that they can be recalled by the memory. Aquinas distinguishes the memory from all the other senses, because they act according to a movement of things toward the soul, whereas the memory acts according to a movement from the soul toward things. When a man recalls something from the past, he proceeds by way of inquiry and study. For that reason, the human memory is a potency of reminiscence. Since the useful or harmful qualities of sensible things are not apprehended either by the exterior senses or by the

338

CHAPTER FOUR

imagination, another interior sense is required for this operation. That sense is called estimative in the animals, because, in them, it is a natural instinct. It is called a cogitative sense in man, who estimates the useful or harmful qualities of sensible things in a discursive manner; so, comparing the particular values of sensible things, his sense of estimation is also called a particular reason. The third kind of operation goes beyond matter and all the conditions of matter. This operation belongs to the intellective potency, whichich is differentiated as an agent intellect and a possible intellect, and they operate immediately with the interior senses, particularly the imagination, which is an abstractive power. The power of local motion belongs to the more perfect animals, since they can move from place to place in search of their necessities of life. The appetitive potency of a soul follows its proper mode of cognition, and so the animals have a sensitive appetite, but man also has an intellective or rational appetite. His sensitive appetite has a concupiscible potency moving him to take delight in the good of sensible things; it also has an irascible appetite moving him away from those things that, causing sadness, are opposed to the good of his sensitive nature. The appetitive potency following the intellect is the human will, which seeks the universal good. Consequently, the will is united to the intellect, so that both powers are contained by the human mind. 34 Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in most respects on the division of the potencies in man. Their enumeration by Aquinas is almost identical with Bonaventure's, as is the second general way in which Aquinas classifies them according to their distinct modes of operation.35 But Aquinas differs from Bonaventure regarding the interior senses. According to Aquinas, the imagination is the potency that conserves sensible species, and the memory is the potency recalling them. Both the conservation and the recalling of species are attributed by Bonaventure to the memory. Though he does not use the names cogitative sense and particular reason, Bonaventure's description of the estimative sense in man is not much different from the one given by Aquinas, for Bonaventure maintains that it is reason which decides whether or not to take delight in a good thing perceived through the senses. For both theologians, then, the sense of estimation is conjoined to the sense appetites, but it operates under the control of reason. Aquinas takes a different stand from Bonaventure, however, on the signification of sensuality. For Bonaventure, the name signifies an integral power unifying both the cognitive and the appetitive potencies of a man's sensitive nature. For Aquinas, the name sensibility designates the totality of cognitive and appetitive potencies of sense in a man, whereas sensuality, properly understood, stands only for his sense appetites. Thus, in the view of Aquinas, the cogitative sense is connected to sensuality in a way similar to the connexion between the practical intellect and the will in the 34 DV, 10.1, ad 2 (1.192); DA, a. 13, Resp. (2.329-31); ST, la, 78.1-2 (1.472a-74b). 35 Although Bonaventure does not include a power of local motion in his general division of the potencies, he does attribute the power to an animal nature: 2 Sent., 15.1.2, Resp. (2.378; ed. min, 2.38687); see above: n. 28, p. 115.

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

339

action of free choice. The imagination is connected to sensuality only in a remote way, as the speculative intellect is connected to the will.36 Aquinas with Bonaventure follows Aristotle's distinction between the speculative and the practical intellect. But Aquinas, unlike Bonaventure, does not describe the distinction as a difference of states. Rather, for Aquinas, the distinction is an accidental difference with respect to the object of the intellect : the speculative intellect considers truth absolutely, the practical intellect considering truth as ordered to operation; so they are named from the different ends that they have in view.37 In his interpretation of the meaning of conscience, Aquinas, using the same method as Bonaventure, contrasts the term with intellect, and according as both terms can designate an object, a potency or a habitus. But Aquinas adds a fourth designation: an act, which he selects as the proper one for conscience. Thus, the term signifies acting-with-science, or an actual application of moral knowledge to a particular action. The application depends not only on the memory of similar actions in the past, but also on the habitus of synderesis, which has the first natural principles of moral truth. Consequently, for Aquinas, conscience is an act of the practical intellect proceeding from the habitus of synderesis and directed by a habitus of moral science.38 The differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the practical intellect and on the nature of conscience are reflected in their doctrines on freedom of choice. Aquinas does not accept the view that freedom of choice is a habitus of reason and will. A habitus, properly understood, is a quality or principle of act perfecting a single potency; so freedom of choice cannot be a habitus facilitating at once both reason and will. Now the will has its facility of acting, and a dominion over its acts, from its own nature; therefore, because choice is properly an act of the will, freedom of choice designates the mode of action by which the will chooses something good or evil. Since choice presupposes knowledge of what is to be chosen, some deliberation and desire must precede the act of choice. Bringing reason and will together in that way, Aquinas says that freedom of choice is a faculty of both powers. As thus united, reason offers counsel to the will, but the act of choice is made chiefly by the will, i.e. according as the counsel of reason remains in the will, and so freedom of choice designates a deliberative will. In other words, ordering the desired good to the end, reason presents the good to the will, which tends toward that good according to the order established by reason. The act by which the proposed good is desired, therefore, belongs materially to the will and formally to reason. But the act by which the good is chosen belongs substantially to the will itself. Although freedom of choice, as a faculty, gathers together those sensitive powers required to discern what is good and to choose one good rather 36 2 Sent., 24.2.1, Sol., ad 2-3 (2.601-03). Cf. DV, 25.1-2 (1.468-73); 57", la, 81.1-3 (1.497a-500b). 37 ST, la, 79.11 (1.492a-93a). Cf. 3 Sent., 23.2.3, Sol. 2 (2.732-33); DV, 3.3, Resp. (1.68-69). 38 DV, 17.1, Resp. (1.328-29); 2 Sent., 24.2.4, Sol. (2.612-13). See also: ST, la, 79.13, Resp. (1.494b).

340

CHAPTER FOUR

than another, even so, according to Aquinas, the union of such powers has its foundation in their common origin, which is the essence of the soul, and not in a common habitus of reason and will.39 The term faculty, designating freedom of choice, has a different significance for Aquinas than for Bonaventure. To Aquinas, the term signifies a bringing together of all the powers, each exercising its proper act, for the deliberation of reason and the choice of will regarding a desired good. The union of those powers is made possible by their common participation in the essence of the soul, whence all the potencies originate. To Bonaventure, faculty signifies the bringing together of an integral power of sensuality and an integral power of liberty of choice, which is founded on the habitual conjunction of reason and will in the practical order. Bonaventure, moreover, confines the superior and inferior functions of reason to the practical order, whereas Aquinas, as we have seen, attributes those functions to reason also in the speculative order, for reason considers eternal and temporal things, whether as true absolutely or as pertaining to action. Aquinas, again differing from Bonaventure, does not use the terms reason, intellect and intelligence to designate modes of operation regarding objects inferior to the soul, on a part with it, and superior to its nature. The term intellect designates the potency of understanding and, thereafter, the habitus of understanding, which contains the first principles of speculative knowledge. The term reason stands for the discursive manner of understanding proper to the human intellect, which deduces particular or singular conclusions from universal principles. Finally, the term intelligence simply designates the act of intellection, or the act by which the intellect understands its object.40 The deepest difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the division of the potencies has to do with the principle by which one potency is properly distinguished from another. According to Bonaventure, this principle is the proper act of the potency; for example: he distinguishes one cognitive potency from another as a power of apprehending from a power of judging. According to Aquinas, however, the principle is the proper object specifying the act of the potency.41 The various differences between the two theologians, on these questions, stem from their individual approaches to the nature and r61e of the potencies regarding the well-being of man. Granting their differences, we find, nonetheless, that they have much in common on the objects and acts of the potencies in man.

39 On the doctrine of freedom of choice see the following: 2 Sent., 24.1.1-3 (2.589-98); DV, 24.4-6 (1.440-45); ST, la, 83.2-4 (1.508a-510b), and Ia2ae, 13.1 (2.785b-86a). Aquinas follows here both Aristotle and Augustine. On the unity of the powers through their common participation in the essence of the soul see: 1 Sent., 3.4.2-3 (1.115-19); ST, la, 77.6-7 (1.468b-470b). 40 Cf. ST, la, 79.8-10 (1.488b-492a). On the term intelligence note: "Dicendum quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum intellectus qui est intelligere." — 79.10, Resp. (1.491b). 41 Cf. ST, la, 77.3 (Resp. (1.466ab).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

341

Particular Divisions of the Cognitive Potencies

Bonaventure distinguishes the particular kinds of cognitive potencies from one another in his question on the use of the sensitive potency by a rational soul after the death of the body. He sets down three opinions on the question. The first opinion concedes to a separated soul the use of its vegetative, sensitive and rational potencies. According to the second opinion, a separated soul has the use of its sensitive and rational potencies. Since all the exterior senses are one in origin, arising from the common sense, but are many according to their distinct organs in the body, therefore, in a separated soul, the exterior senses are united in the common sense through which the soul can do what it could do before through the several organs of the body. The soul can also use its interior sense, which retains the phantasms after the death of the body. Those who hold the opinion, Bonaventure notes, confirm it through Augustine, who says that a separated soul retains its images of corporeal things, so that, throught its images, the soul can know in a sensitive way.42 The third opinion maintains that a separated soul knows only through the mediation of its intellective potency. Because the vegetative and sensitive potencies need bodily organs to operate, as human experience shows, a separated soul cannot use those particular potencies. Thus, everything known by such a soul is known through its intellect. In that way, it knows things under material conditions and in the presence of matter, this is the manner in which they are known by the exterior senses. A separated soul also knows, through its intellect, things under material conditions but in the absence of matter, which is the way of knowing things by the imagination. The same things are known as abstracted from all the conditions of matter, and so they are known properly by the intellect. Consequently, a separated soul is rightly said to sense, to imagine and to understand through its intellect, as an angel knows material things through its intellect alone. Bonaventure accepts this opinion, but he interprets it according to a principle borrowed from Aristotle: every nature has something by which there is a becoming and something by which there is a making. Applying the principle to cognition. Bonaventure holds that knowledge requires both an active and a passive potency. The intellect, having the more abstractive power, has an active potency by reason of the form in the soul, and a passive potency by reason of the matter in the soul. The senses, having the less abstractive power, are active on the side of the soul and passive on the side of the body and its organs. The operation of the senses, therefore, belongs properly to the conjunct of soul and body. When a soul is separated from its body, the passive parts of the exterior and interior senses are lost to the soul, and so it cannot use any of its sense potencies.43 42 Cf. De Gen. ad litt., 12.32-33.60-62 (PL 34.480-81). 43 4 Sent, 50.2.1.1, Resp. (4.1045-46; ed. mini, 4.1029-30); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 3.5 (430alO-19).

342

CHAPTER FOUR

In this text, Bonaventure rejects two opinions permitting a separated soul to use potencies that, in his own view, need bodily organs in order to act. By rejecting those opinions, he withdraws from a separated soul the use of images, or phantasms, retained in the sense memory: but the soul has the use of an intellectual memory, which does not need a bodily organ.44 On the other hand, Bonaventure does not reject the view that the exterior senses have distinct organs, but one origin in the common sense. His rejection of the use by a separated soul of its sense potencies is based on their natural need for bodily organs, without which they cannot act. Though Bonaventure follows Aristotle here, yet he goes beyond Aristotle himself bv applying his principle to the necessity of the soul to have form and matter in order to have an active and a passive potency of knowledge. Since Bonaventure accepts the third opinion, then, following this opinion, he distinguishes three particular kinds of cognitive potencies according to their modes af acting with regard to the material conditions of corporeal things. The first kind includes the exterior senses, and they are confined to the particular conditions of corporeal matter. The second kind are the interior senses, notably the imagination, which can abstract its object from the particular conditions of corporeal matter. The third kind consists in the intellect, and this potency can abstract its object from every condition of matter. Every power of sensing, Bonaventure teaches, is constituted from the conjunction of a potency in the soul with a bodily organ well-disposed for acting; but the act of sensing results from the conjunction of the power with its object. The exterior senses have for their objects the absolute and intermediate properties of bodies. The absolute properties are the objects of sight, which perceives luminosity and colour, and of touch, which perceives weight and levity. The power of sight is conjoined to its object by a transparent medium; the power of touch is conjoined to its object by the mediation of the flesh, which is the organ of touch. The intermediate properties, emanating from bodies, are odour, sound and savour. Odour is perceived by the power of smell through the mediation of vapour, or a mixture of water and air. Sound is perceived by the power of hearing through the mediation of air, and savour is perceived by the power of taste through the mediation of water. 45 With respect to essence, a power of exterior sensation is rooted in the soul, from which it is inseparable. With regard to use, however, the power requires a well-disposed organ and a proper medium such as the illumined medium required for the power of sight. 46 44 "Anima enim defert imagines non tantum in potentia inferior!; seel, cum separatur, habet in memoria intelligibili, quae non eget organo corporali." — Loc. cit., ad 1 (4.1046; ed. min, 4.1030). 45 4 Sent., 49.2.1.3.1, Resp (4.1018-19; ed. min., 4.1003-04); cf. 2 Sent., 15.1.3, Resp. (2.380-81; ed. min., 2.388-90). 46 "Dicendum quod sicut de potentia visiva est loqui dupliciter: vel quantum ad essentiam ve! quantum ad usum; et quantum ad essentiam fundatur haec potentia radicallter in anima nee deserit unquam; quantum ad usum vero exigit organum bene dispositum et medium illuminatum ..." — 4 Sent., 19.2.2, Resp. (4.506; ed. mm., 4.490).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

343

The particular powers of exterior sensation are made one in the common sense, which perceives the common properties of corporeal things. A particular sense simply perceives its object; but the common sense perceives that it perceives, and so the common sense is properly distinguished from the particular sense.47 Bonaventure, speaking of error in exterior sensation, says that a particular sense, provided it has a well-disposed organ and a proper medium, cannot be deceived concerning its proper object. Deception in exterior sensation is due to the common sense or phantasia, which is called the comparative sense, and which is mixed with the particular sense. The common sense judges that something, perceived by the common sense itself, is perceived by a particular sense, thus causing error or deception in exterior sensation.48 The term phantasia, therefore, signifying a sense power, designates the common sense, which is the power that compares or collates the species received from sensible things. The term may also designate an apparition, or a fancy, which can be produced even by a spiritual creature, such as a demon.49 The interior sense of imagination also has an active potency on the side of the soul and a passive potency or organ on the side of the body. The passive potency receives the phantasms from the common sense; but the active potency of imagination forms the images that are proper to this sense power. The phantasms received by the imagination are not released or abstracted from the particular conditions of corporeal matter. The images formed by the imagination are abstracted from those conditions, but not from every condition, of corporeal matter. When the species in the imagination are presented to the intellect, a new kind of lumen or active potency is required, because the intellect abstracts its species from all the conditions of matter. The sense of imagination, therefore, is a power of apprehension mediating between the common sense and the intellect. 50 The interior power of sense judgment, as we have seen, is the sense of estimation. Controlled by reason, the estimative sense acts in conjunction 47 Et si quaeretur ratio, quare potentia intellectiva nata est supra se redire et voluntas, alibi dicetur; sed modo tantum sufficiat, quia sunt simplices potentiae et in substantia simplici t'undatac et organo non alligatae; et ideo patet, quod non est simile illud quod obici consuevit in sensibus alia est potentia, quae videt, et alia quae videt se videre; quod similiter debeat esse in intellectu." — 1 Sent., 17.l.un.2, ad 4 (1.297; ed. min., 1.241-42). 48 "Ad illud enim quod obicitur, quod sensus non errat circa proprium obiectum, dicendum quod hoc intelligitur, quantum est de sui natura, salva scilicet media dispositione organi, medii et obiecta. Intelligitur etiam de sensu particulari per se. In hac deceptione sensus communis sive phantasia, quae dicitur collativa, admiscetur sensui particulari et iudicat esse alterius quod est suum." — 2 Sent., 8.2.un.3, ad 1 (2.229; ed min., 2.227), 49 "... dicendum quod phantasia dupliciter accipitur: aliquando pro vi sensitiva, collativa sensibilium receptorum; aliquando phantasia dicitur apparitio, secundum quod dicitur a 'phanos', quod est apparitio; et primo modo est in solis corporalibus, secundo modo in spiritibus. Haec autem phantasia dicitur proterva esse in daemonibus ... quia, cum secundum iudicium suum veritatem cognoscant, tamen cognitam scienter impugnant: et hoc est protervire, scilicet veritati intellectae obviare; ideo habent phantasiam protervam." — 2 Sent., 7.2.2.1, ad 2 (2.190-91; ed. min., 2.184). 50 2 Sent., 24.1.2.4, ad 2 (2.570; ed. min., 2.589); 1 Sent., 37.1.dub.4, Resp. (1.650; ed. min., 1.516).

344

CHAPTER FOUR

with the power of imagination. According to Augustine, perfection of sight requires a concourse of the organ with its object through the interior power of the eyes. Likewise, Bonaventure says, perfection of exterior sensation requires a concourse of the exterior with the interior powers, so that the appetitive potencies are brought into act. This concourse constitutes the integral power of sensuality by which, as Augustine teaches, the interior powers of the soul are present in the bodily organs. Thus, as a power of judgment, the estimative sense discerns between the good and evil, or between the useful and harmful, things desired or repulsed by the appetitive powers.51 The active and passive potencies of the intellective power, in Bonaventure's doctrine, are founded on the form and matter in the rational soul. The proper act of the intellective power, therefore, does not depend on any organ of the human body. Bonaventure, on this point, follows Aristotle, even though, in positing form and matter in the soul, Bonaventure goes his own way.52 The rational soul, as considered by Bonaventure, is a spiritual substance; so, operating without a dependence on the body, the soul is able to turn in upon itself by knowing and loving itself.53 Thus, the powers of the rational soul, taken in itself, consist in the intellect and the will. The act encompassing the whole intellective power is intellection or understanding; but the act embracing the whole affective power is affection or loving. Since those first and proper acts are essentially diverse from each other, the potencies of which they are the acts are similarly diverse.54 Now, according to Aristotle, potencies of operation are distinguished by their objects: if the first ground of distinction between potencies is taken from their objects, the distinction of the intellect from the will can be no greater than the distinction between their objects; but the object of the intellect is truth and the object of the will is goodness, so the intellect and the will ought to be the same in essence, because the truth and the goodness that they seek are one in essence.55 Departing from Aristotle here, Bonaventure holds that potencies are distinguished more immediately by their acts than by their objects. He maintains that a diversity of objects according to reason is suf51 Cf. 3 Sent., 17.1.2, ad sc 4 (3.367; ed. min., ad sc d, 3.360-61); see in St. Augustine: Dt Trinit., 11.2 (PL 42.985-88). Since the memory of the senses is very closely associated by Bonaventure with the memory of the intellect, we shall consider his particular divisions of the memory after our presentation of his distinctions within the intellective potency. 52 "Ad illud ... quod anima secundum partem rationis nullius partis corporis est actus ... dicendum quod Philosophus in illo verbo non vult negare naturalem coniunctionem ipsius intellectus ad corpus, sed hoc vult dicere quod intellectus non determinat sibi organum, in quantum egreditur in actum proprium." — 3 Sent., 16.2.1, ad 1 (3.354; ed. min., 3.348); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 2.1 (413a-6), 3.4 (429al9-29). 53 Cf. 2 Sent., 19.1.1, ad opp. 7 & 9 (2.459; ed. min., ad opp. g & i, 2.471). 54 "Item, ratione videtur. Cuiuslibet potentiae unius est unum primum actum assignare; sed actus complectens totam intelligentiam est intelligere, actus vero complectens totam affectivam est affici: ergo, si actus primi et proprii istarum potentiarum sunt diversi essentialiter, videtur pari ratione quod similiter et ipsae potentiae." — 2 Sent., 24.1.2.1, sc 4 (2.559; ed. min., sc d, 2.576). 55 Loc. cit., arg. 3 (2.558; ed. mm., 2.575); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 2.4 (415al6-22).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

345

ficient for an essential difference of potencies: though the true and the good are not essentially different, the acts of knowing and loving are undoubtedly different; therefore, the intellect and the will have an essential diversity.56 Assigning one first act to any given potency, Bonaventure assigns the act of understanding to the whole intellect as its first and proper act. In that way, he diversifies it from the will to which he assigns the act of loving as its first and proper act. The acts of the two potencies, moreover, are diversified by their proper objects of truth and goodness. Speaking of the diversification of acts by their objects, Bonaventure says that one act is diversified from another act by a first and essential object. This is not the material object, but the active and motive object, or the one actually moving the potency into its operation.57 With respect to the whole intellect, then, its first and essential object is truth, for this is the object that actually moves the whole potency into operation. The subsequent acts of the intellect, regarding truth now as a common object, diversify the potency in particular ways, and according as they direct it toward apprehending or judging truth. Those acts diversity the potency as an agent intellect and a possible intellect, which are unquestionably Aristotelean in origin. The question is, however, how does Bonaventure account for that diversification? His handling of the problem provides us with another good example of his own method of solving a problem by reconciling many different positions taken on it.58 In his initial approach to the problem, Bonaventure takes the stand that the agent intellect and the possible intellect are diverse potencies of the rational soul. He approaches the problem from Aristotelean principles, particularly those supporting the position that the agent intellect is related to the possible intellect, so to speak, as a form and an efficient cause are related to matter, and as an active potency is related to a passive potency. For his own part, Bonaventure argues that, because it is impossible for one thing to be both in act and in potency at once and at the same time with respect to the same thing, the soul must have an agent intellect and a 56 "... dicendum quod immediatius distinguuntur potentiae per actus quam obiecta. Ad differentiam autem potentiarum essentialem sufficit diversitas obiectorum secundum rationem; et ideo, quamvis verum et bonum non differant essentialiter, nihilominus tamen, quia cognoscere et amare absque dubio sunt actus differentes, potentiae, quae sunt ad hos actus, per se ipsas diversitatem habent" — Loc. cit., ad 3 (2.561; ed. min., 2.578). 57 "Ad illud vero quod primo obicitur, quod actus diversificantur per obiecta, iam patet responsio, quoniam hoc non intelligitur de quocumque obiecto, sed de obiecto quod est obiectum per se et primo, quod quidem non tantum habet rationem materialis, sed etiam rationem activi et motivi." — 3 Sent., 23.1.3, ad I (3.479; ed. min., 3.469). 58 "Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est praenotandum quod variis modis tentaverunt praedecessores nostri assignare differentiam intellectus possibilis ad agentem. Quidam enim dixerunt quod differunt sicut duae substantiae; alii dixerunt quod differunt sicut duae potentiae; tertio modo dixerunt alii quod differunt sicut habitus et potentia; quarto modo dixerunt alii quod differunt sicut potentia absoluta et comparata." — 2 Sent., 24.1.2.4, Resp. initio (2.568; ed. min., 2.586).

346

CHAPTER FOUR

possible intellect. The soul is continually in act according to the one, but not to the other: its agent intellect is, as it were, a light in the soul, and the possible intellect is, so to speak, illumined by that light. 59 Of the four positions that Bonaventure examines here, the first holds that the agent intellect and the possible intellect are diverse according to substance. Their diversity is explained in two different ways. In the one way, the agent intellect is said to be an intelligence separated from the soul, but the possible intellect is the soul as conjoined to the body. This explanation follows the view that the rational soul is illumined by the tenth intelligence in the heavens, and so the soul is perfected by its conjunction with that intelligence. Bonaventure rejects this opinion as false, because no created substance has the power to illumine or to perfect the soul: as Augustine shows, the human mind is illumined immediately by God. In another way, the agent intellect is taken for God and the possible intellect for the human soul, a view depending on the words of Augustine: "God is the light which illumines us, the master who teaches us, and the truth that directs us". Although this view has a true foundation, Bonaventure says, nonetheless, it has nothing to do with the problem, because the soul has both a proper potency of understanding and a proper power capable of bringing that potency into act, and yet God is the principal cause of the operation belonging to the soul.60 The second position holds that the agent intellect and the possible intellect are different potencies, and this position has given rise to two opinions. The first opinion takes the possible intellect as a purely material potency and the agent intellect as a purely formal potency, the one belonging to the soul because of its matter and the other because of its form. The opinion seems to be founded on Aristotle's words: "the possible intellect is that by which the soul becomes all things, and the agent intellect is that by which it knows them". Bonaventure rejects the opinion as both false and a misinterpretation of Aristotle: if the possible intellect were a purely passive potency depending entirely on matter, everything having a material principle would have a possible intellect, which is absurd. The second opinion has the agent intellect and the possible intellect in the soul, so that the one is appropriated to the form and the other to the matter in the soul. The agent intellect is ordered to abstracting a species, and so the potency is not entirely in act, for it cannot understand without the help of a species united to it and abstracted from a phantasm (phantasmate). The possible intellect is ordered to receiving the species, and thus the potency is not purely passive, because it has to turn itself toward the species existing 59 Lot, at., fa. 1-4 (2.567; ed. min., fa. a-d, 2.585-86). See in Aristotle: Physica, 2.7 (198a25-28); Meiaph., 9.1 (1046a4-31); De anima, 3.5 (430alO-19). 60 Loc. cit, Resp. "Primus autera ... duae substantiae." (2.568; ed. min., 2.586-87); there are copious references here to St. Augustine. The doctrine of the tenth intelligence, as a single and separate agent intellect for all men, is found in Avicenna: De anima, 3.5, fol. 25rb (Venetiis, 1508); Metaph., 9.3, fol. 104rb-E (Venetiis, 1508).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

347

in the phantasm and, on turning toward it, the possible intellect receives and passes judgment on it with the help of the agent intellect. Consequently, neither the agent intellect nor the possible intellect can operate without the help of the other. Approving of this opinion, Bonaventure says that it is based on the words of Aristotle, who teaches that the two potencies are differences of the intellect: just as light and transparency are necessary for the power of sight to abstract a species from its object and for the organ of sight to receive the species, so also, in the one complete act of understanding, an agent intellect and a possible intellect must concur in abstracting and receiving a species from a phantasm. 61 The third position maintains that the agent intellect differs from the possible intellect as a habitus from a potency. Thus, from one point of view, the agent intellect is said to be a habitus constituted from all the principles of understanding, whereas the possible intellect is a potency of acquiring cognition through phantasms. This view is supported by Boethius, who says that the mind retains universal truths, but loses its cognition of singular things. Those taking the view insist that the agent intellect must have an innate cognition of universal principles, because it could not otherwise, even by abstracting from the senses, make the possible intellect actually understand its object. Bonaventure rejects this interpretation of Boethius, since it is contrary to Aristotle's teaching: "the soul comes to-be as an unmarked tablet ... not having innate or habitual cognition, it acquires knowledge by the mediation of the senses and of experience". The agent intellect, from another point of view, is said to be a habitual potency and not purely a habitus, a point of view acceptable to Bonaventure and of which he approves, because it has both a theological and a philosophical foundation. According to Dionysius, every intellectual substance is a lumen; therefore, Bonaventure says, the perfection and complement of an intellectual substance is a spiritual light, and so the intellective potency of the soul is a sort of lumen. Aristotle understands this lumen to be an agent intellect: "the intellect, by which all things are known, is a kind of habitus like lumen".6'2 The fourth position maintains that the possible intellect is a potency by comparison with the body, while the agent intellect is a potency, speaking absolutely. From the position, taken in one way, the agent and possible intellects are seen to be one and the same potency. It is an agent intellect when considered in itself, and a possible intellect when considered as 61 Loc. cit, Resp. "Secundum autem ... suam complete." (2.568-69; ed. min., 2.587-88); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 3.5 (430al4-17). The probable source of the doctrine of the possible intellect as a material potency is Alexander of Aphrodisias, whose view would have been known to Bonaventure from Averroes: De anima, c. 5; the pertinent texts are to hand in Sumrna contra gentiles, 2.62 (Romae, Marietti: 1961}, t II, pp. 196-97, n. 7, and p. 197, nn. 1-3. 62 Loc. cit., Resp. "Tertius modus ... sibi inditi." (2.569; ed. min., 2.569). Cf. Boethius, De consul philos., 5, metr. 3 (PL 63.845); Dionysius, De caelest. hierarck., 3.2 (PC 3.166); Aristotle, De anima, 3.4-5 (429b29430al7).

348

CHAPTER FOUR

united to the body and to phantasms. The opinion is supported apparently by Aristotle's words: "the agent intellect is always in act, but the possible intellect is sometimes in act and sometimes not"; so the interruption of understanding is due to the conjuction of the soul with the body. Bonaventure rejects this interpretation of Aristotle because, after death, a rational soul has both an agent intellect and a possible intellect, which is not therefore in the soul solely from its conjunction with the body. The same position, taken in another way, does not hold that the agent and possible intellects are entirely the same potency. The agent intellect is ordered to the act of abstracting, but the possible intellect is ordered to the act of receiving, so that the one is complete in itself and ready for action, but the other is not. The possible intellect, by its nature, must be completed and made ready for action by the mediation of the body and its senses; so the possible intellect is in the soul according as the soul has an inclination toward the body. Consequently, the potency has a twofold possibility: one with respect to its act, which is impeded now and again by the body, and another with respect to the phantasms by which the possible intellect is brought into act because of its conjunction with the body, even though, of its own nature, the potency can become all things whether the soul is in the body or separated from it.63 Summing up his presentation of the above positions, Bonaventure draws attention to the three particular views, including the last one, that he approves, saying that they do not oppose one another, but that one has its origin from another. Then, drawing the three views together, he reaffirms that the agent and possible intellects are two potencies dividing the intellective power. Although they both look to the whole composite of form and matter in the soul, the agent intellect looks more to the complement and form than to the matter, and the possible intellect looks more to the material principle of the soul than to its form. Hence, the agent intellect is always in act, and it has the nature of a habitual potency, conforming to the soul considered in itself. The possible intellect is not always in act, having purely the nature of a potency, and so it follows the inclination of the soul toward the body. The soul, moreover, is not always actually understanding by its agent intellect; rather, always active, this spiritual lumen of the soul is ever ready to illumine the possible intellect, which is not illumined sometimes, nevertheless, because it is impeded by the body and its senses.64 To see precisely where Bonaventure stands with respect to the proper distinction between the agent and possible intellects, it is necessary to see both what he rejects and what he accepts regarding the various opinions and points of view that he has presented. He rejects, first of all, the doctrine of Avicenna, who posits the agent intellect as a separate intelligence from

63 Loc. cit., Resp. "Quartus autem ... anima separata." (2.569-70; ed. min., 2.588-89). 64 Loc. cit., Resp. "Sic igitur ..." (2.570; ed. min., 2.589).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

349

the individual soul, which has only a possible intellect. Bonaventure refuses to identify the agent intellect with the light of God, as described by Augustine; however, Bonaventure interprets the doctrine of Augustine to mean that God is the principal cause of the whole operation of the intellective power in the soul. But the soul is able to operate properly as a spiritual creature, having both an agent and a possible intellect. Insisting on the proper distinction between the two potencies, Bonaventure rejects the opinion that they are simply one potency, which is an agent intellect in itself and a possible intellect as united to the body, an opinion that he judges to be a false interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine. The two potencies cannot be simply one, to Bonaventure, because no single thing can be both in act and in potency simultaneously and at once with respect to the same thing. Since the soul is in potency to the reception of cognitive species, it cannot also be at the same time in act regarding them by one and the same potency. Though Bonaventure maintains that the soul is a composite of form and matter, he rejects the view that the agent intellect is subject solely to the form of the soul, with the possible intellect subject solely to its matter; this view, in Bonaventure's judgment, takes the agent intellect as a purely active potency and the possible intellect as a purely passive potency. In his own view, the agent intellect needs a phantasm in order to operate, and the possible intellect is able to turn itself toward the phantasm, so that the one potency is not purely active, and the other is not purely or entirely passive. Consequently, coming together in one complete act of understanding, the two potencies look to the whole composit of form and matter in the soul. Because the agent intellect is always in act, or ever ready to operate, it looks more to the form than to the matter of the soul; therefore, Bonaventure prefers to appropriate the agent intellect to the form of the soul. Because the possible intellect, which can be impeded by the body, is not always in act, it looks more to the matter of the soul than to its form; so Bonaventure prefers to appropriate the possible intellect to the material principle of the soul. Following Aristotle's doctrine very closely, Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelean position on the human soul, when it comes to-be, as having no innate or habitual cognition, and so it must acquire cognition of corporeal things through the senses and by experience, which requires the use of the memory. As a result, he rejects the opinion that the agent intellect is a habitus constituted from universal principles innate to the human mind, an opinion founded on the doctrine of Boethius. Following Aristotle again, Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelean description of the agent intellect as a sort of habitus like lumen; as a consequence, he prefers to call the agent intellect a habitual potency, conforming to the soul considered in itself. Hence, combining Aristotle's description of the agent intellect with the description given by Dionysius of the soul as an intellectual substance, Bonaventure understands the agent intellect to be a kind of spiritual light or lumen in the soul, perfecting and completing its nature as a spiritual

350

CHAPTER FOUR

creature. From this point of view, the agent intellect is complete in itself and always ready to act in conjunction with the possible intellect. He understands the possible intellect, on the other hand, to be purely a potency, following the soul's inclination toward the body. Thus, incomplete in itself and not always ready to act, the possible intellect must be disposed through the mediation of the senses in order to operate in conjunction with the agent intellect. The possible intellect is in potency, therefore, both to the reception of species from phantasms and to the illun-ination of the agent intellect, which abstracts the species from the phantasms. The proper ground of distinction between the two potencies, then, according to Bonaventure, lies in their ordinations to distinctive acts. The agent intellect, which is more properly active, is ordered to the act of abstracting species from phantasms; this is an act of illumination. The possible intellect, which is more properly passive, is ordered to the act of receiving the species abstracted from the phantasms; that act is completed, under the illuminating influence of the agent intellect, in a judgment concerning the species received by the possible intellect, which is capable by its nature of becoming all things. Still following Aristotle's doctrine, Bonaventure insists that the two acts really constitute one complete act of understanding. Although the soul is not always actually understanding, nevertheless, its agent intellect is constantly illumining its possible intellect, which is unable to be illumined now and again because it is connected to the body.65 Now, according to Aristotle, the agent intellect makes that which is potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible, just as lumen makes a potential colour to be an actual colour.66 Explaining Aristotle's illustration, Bonaventure says that a cat's eye has not only, through its transparency, a potency of receiving a species, but also, through its natural lumen, a potency of making the species.67 Those two potencies, the first receptive and the second abstractive, come together to complete one organ, but not to dispose it in the same way. The cat's eye is disposed by its transparency to receive a species, but it is disposed by its luminosity to abstract the species from its object. In a similar fashion, a receptive potency and an abstractive potency, though they have diverse natures, come together to complete one intellect; nonetheless, each potency disposes the intellect in a different way 65 On Bonaventure's doctrine concerning the agent and possible intellects see: M. R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 13-17; G. Bonafede, // "De Scientia Christi" ..., Atti della Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti di Palermo, 4 ser. v. IX (Palermo, Presso L'Accademia' 1950), pp. 125-33; also found in Saggi sutla fitosofia medioevate (Torino, Societa Editrice Internazionale: 1950), pp. 227-33; by the same author Ilpensiero francescano ne secoloXIH (Palermo, G. Mori: 1952), pp. 74-79. E. Bettoni understands that the agent and possible intellects are contained by the inferior reason, whereas the superior reason contains the intellect and the intelligence of the soul: 11 problfma della cognoscibilitti di Dio ... (Padova, A. Milani: 1950), pp. 146-48. 66 Cf. De anima, 3.5 (430al4-17). 67 "Huius autem simile potest poni in oculo cati, qui non solum habet potentiam suscipiendi per naturam perspecui sicut aiii oculi, sed etiam potentiam faciendi in se speciem per naturam luminis sibi inditi." — 2 Sent., 24.1.2.4, in Resp. (2.569; ed. min., 2.588).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

351

with regard to its proper species.68 Tt is disposed to receive the species by the agent intellect, which abstracts the species from a phantasm; but it is disposed to make a judgment about the species by the possible intellect, which receives the abstracted species. The acts of the two potencies are so ordered to one another, nevertheless, that one perfect act of understanding results from their conjunction, just as the one being of a composite is constituted from the conjunction of its formal and material principles.69 Though Bonaventure upholds the natural differences between the two potencies of the intellect, even so, he also upholds the complete and perfect unity of the act of human understanding. The possible intellect is not a purely passive potency, since it has the power to turn itself toward the species to be received; nevertheless, the intellective potency can neither abstract the species nor pass judgment on it apart from the agent intellect. Moreover, the agent intellect cannot perfect the operation of understanding unless the possible intellect is formed by an intelligible species. It is from this formation, Bonaventure says, that the possible intellect has a more complete actuality with respect to what it ought to know than it had before it received the species. The two potencies are not so diverse, therefore, that the one can complete or perfect its operation apart from the other. In fact, it is neither the agent intellect nor the possible intellect that understands, but the man to whom the whole power of understanding belongs.70 Positing truth as the first and essential object of the whole human intellect, Bonaventure diversifies that intellect according as it acts with respect to the intelligible species by which it knows the truth of corporeal things. The intelligible species is, so to speak, the material or common principle by which both potencies of the intellect bring about the operation of understanding in man. As a principle to be abstracted from a phantasm, the intelligible species is the formal or proper object of the act of the agent intellect, which is an abstractive potency. As a principle to be received by 68 Loc. cit., ad 3 (2.570; ed. min., 2.589-90). 69 "... dicendum quod ... ad nostrum intelligere concurrit recipere et iudicare sive abstrahere et suscipere; et his sunt plures actus ad invicem ordinati, ex quibus resultat unus actus perfectus. Sic et in potentiis intelligendum est se habere quod sic sunt diversae differentiae intellectus ut tamen in suis actionibus ad invicem ordinatae sint et coniunctae ad actum intelligendi perficiendum, sicut materiaie et formale principium ad unum esse compositi constituendum." — Loc. cit., ad 4 (2.570; ed. min., 2.590). 70 "... dicendum quod intellectus possibilis non est pure passivus ... habet enim potentiam se convertendi; nee tamen est adeo activus sicut agens, quia non potest sua conversione nee speciem abstrahere nee de specie iudicare nisi adiutorio agentis. Similiter nee ipse intellectus agens operationem intelligendi potest perflcere nisi formetur acies intellectus possibilis ab ipso intelligibili, ex qua formatione est in pleniori actualitate respectu cms quod debet cognoscere quam erat, cum carebat specie. — Et ita, cum cogitamus de intellectu agente et possibili, non debemus cogitare quasi de duabus substantiis vel quasi de duabus potentiis ita separatis quod una sine alia habeat operationem suam perflcere, et aliquid intelligat intellectus agens sine possibili, et aliquid cognoscat intellectus agens quod tamen homo, cuius est ille intellectus, ignoret Haec enim vana sunt et frivola, ut aliquid sciat intellectus meus quod ego nesciam; sed sic cogitandae sunt esse illae duae differentiae, quod in unam operationem completam intelligendi veniant inseparabiliter, sicut lumen et diaphanum veniunt in abstractionem coloris." — Loc. cit., ad 5-6 (2.570-71; ed. min., 2.590).

352

CHAPTER FOUR

the intellect, the species is the formal or proper object of the act of the possible intellect, which is a receptive potency. Consequently, looking to one and the same species or object, though in different ways, the two potencies concur in judging the truth of the thing to be known by the mediation of the senses, which provide the phantasm for the intellect. The thing is potentially intelligible before the abstraction of the species by the agent intellect. The thing is actually intelligible after the reception of the abstracted species by the possible intellect. But the thing is actually understood by the whole intellect in the judgment which is made by means of the intelligible species. Since this species is abstracted from a phantasm, through the mediation of the imagination, the intellect knows the truth of the thing by means of the species abstracted and received from it by the exterior senses. In short, as Bonaventure so strongly affirms, it is really the man, or the human person, who knows the truth of the thing. From the historical viewpoint, as we have noted, Bonaventure follows Augustine in attributing to God the principal source of truth and of illumination for the human intellect. He also follows Dionysius in attributing to the spiritual substance of the human soul the complement and perfection of an intellectual lumen; but Bonaventure explains the nature of that lumen by way of Aristotle, whose doctrine on the agent and possible intellects he accepts and defends, in his own distinctive manner, as the true teaching on the proper mode of human understanding. His distinctive manner of accepting and defending Aristotle's doctrine is reflected in Bonaventure's personal position, for instance, on the agent intellect as not fully in act with regard to all the things that the possible intellect can know. The agent intellect, to come into act, needs the help of the thing to be known, or the help of God, who is entirely in act with respect to all beings and to all true things. Consequently, going beyond Aristotle, who did not know of creation, Bonaventure posits in both the agent intellect and the possible intellect a potency to some things that are above the power of a creature. Thus, distinguishing the mode of comprehending things from the mode of apprehending them, Bonaventure limits the natural capacity of the human intellect to understand all things. The intellect can comprehend nothing of God, who is entirely infinite. Regarding the mode of apprehending things, Bonaventure says that the human intellect, because of its receptive potency or possible intellect, can certainly understand everything that it can receive; but the lumen of the agent intellect is not great enough to enable the human intellect to understand all things in the present and in the future, because there are many things beyond its judgment. 71 Taking memory in a broad way, Bonaventure joins it to the intelligence and distinguishes both powers from the will. The common object of 71 2 Sent, 7.2.1.3, ad 4 (2.195-96; ed. min., 2.190); 1 Seat., 19.1.dub.3 (1.352; ed. min., 1.281-82). We shall meet the comprehending and apprehending acts of knowledge by the human, intellect in our next chapter.

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

353

memory and intelligence is what is true, as true, or what is good according as it is true. The object of the will is what is good according as it is good.72 The act of the memory distinguishes it from the intelligence, for the memory retains the principles of knowledge, but the intelligence knows truth by means of those principles. Bonaventure's doctrine on the memory is closely connected with his doctrine on the image of God in the human soul, which is one in essence and triune according to its powers of memory, intelligence and will. It seems, however, that the memory ought not to be a part of God's image, which is essential to the soul because of its rational nature. The memory, as Aristotle teaches, has to do with sensible things, and so it is found in the animals; but man has a potency of reminiscence, which is not found in the animals. Moreover, even if the memory were said to retain intelligible species, it still ought not to be posited in the rational part of the human soul, because memory looks to the past, but reason abstracts from the conditions of both time and the senses.73 Bonaventure, replying to the argument, says that the memory can be taken in three ways. In the first way, following the senses, the memory both receives and retains the sensible species of things known in the past. In the second way, following intelligence and will, the memoVy retains species, whether sensible or intelligible, of things known in the past. In the third way, going before the other two, the memory retains species, such as innate species, by abstracting from every difference of time; it is in this way that the memory belongs to the image of God in the soul. 74 In each of the three ways that Bonaventure takes the memory, he attributes to it the act of retaining cognitive species. Maintaining this act as the proper act of memory, he distinguishes a memory of the senses from a memory of the intelligence and the will; but he also distinguishes from those two memories another memory which, together with intelligence and will, is a part of God's image in the human soul. The memory of the senses receives and retains sensible species of things known in the past; so, taken properly, this memory, needing a bodily organ, is a sense potency and, as such, is quite distinct from the intellectual memory, which does not need a bodily organ.75 Bonaventure describes the latter memory, however, as retaining both sensible and intelligible species of things known in the past.

72 Bonum enim, in quantum bonum, est obiectum affectus, non intellectus. Intelligentiae autem et memoriae obiectum est verum sub ratione veri vel bonum sub ratione veri." — 2 Sent, 39.dub. 1, in Resp. (2.916; ed. min., 2.952). 73 1 Sent., 3.2.1.1, sc 3 (1.80; ed. min., 1.59); cf. Aristotle, De memor. et remin., c. 1 (450al5-25). 74 "... dicendum quod memoria accipitur tripliciter uno modo prout est receptiva et retentiva sensibilium et praeteritorum; alio modo prout est retentiva praeteritorum sive sensibilium sive intelligibilium; et tertio modo prout est retentiva specierum, abstrahando ab omni differentia temporis, utpote specierum innatarum. Et hoc tertio modo est pars imaginis; sed obiecto currit de aliis primis duobus modis. Primo modo memoria sequitur sensum, secundo modo sequitur ipsam intelligentiam et voluntatem, tertio modo antecedit et respondit Patri." — Loc. cit., ad 3 (1.81; ed. min., 1.60). 75 See the text cited above: n. 44, p. 342.

354

CHAPTER FOUR

He also infers that this is the potency of reminiscence about which Aristotle speaks. Bonaventure, moreover, does not ascribe to this particular potency, or memory, a reception of either sensible or intelligible species. Since the sensible species are received and retained by the memory of the senses, but the intelligible species, following their reception by the possible intellect, are retained by the intellectual memory, therefore, Bonaventure is speaking here of the two potencies of memory coming together, supplying both sensible and intelligible species as they are required for the rational act of reminiscence regarding things known or understood in the past. The conjunction of the two potencies takes place within the total conjunction of the senses and the intellect in the one action of rational understanding. The memory belonging to the soul as an image of God, on the other hand, retains species that are innate to the soul. Though this memory is not subject to the conditions of time, nonetheless, Bonaventure ascribes to it the act of retaining species. Hence, having retention of species as its proper act, the memory attributed to the soul as an image of God is not a distinct potency from the intellectual memory. Rather, looking to different objects, the same potency retains intelligible species conditioned by time, because they have been received through the possible intellect, and innate species not conditioned by time, since they are found in the memory itself and not acquired by way of abstraction. The intellectual memory, as part of God's image in the soul, is that by which the soul habitually remembers itself, even though it is not always actually reflecting upon itself or thinking about itself. Thus, Augustine describes the soul as a mind knowing and loving itself, the term mind, Bonaventure observes, standing for the potency of remembering. Giving a wider meaning to memory than that given to it by Aristotle, who confides the memory to the past, Augustine attributes to the soul the habitual capacity of remembering itself in the present. 76 The innate species in the intellectual memory are discovered there by the mind or the intellect in its act of self-reflexion. On judging the truth of corporeal things, the intellect turns toward their intelligible species and,

76 "Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit 'Sic condita est mens humana, ut nunquam sui non meminerit' etc. Contra primum obicitur sic: memoria est rei absentis et praeteritae; anima nunquam est sibi absens et praeterita ergo nunquam meminit sui ... Dicendum quod ilia tria, quae tangitur in littera, dupliciter possunt attribui animae, videlicet actu vel habitu. Si habitu, sic vere et semper attribuuntur ei, quoniam anima per se ipsam nata est sui meminisse, se intelligere et se diligere. Si autem intelligatur in actu, sic non semper sibi attribuuntur, quia non semper se cogitat nee semper se convertitur. Augustinus ergo loquitur quantum ad habitum, non quantum ad actum. — Ad illud quod obicitur, quod memoria est respectu praeteritorum, dicendum quod Augustinus largius accipit memoriam quam Philosophus, sicut in primo fuit ostensum." — 3 Sent., 27.dub.3 (3.617-18; ed. min., 3.613). "Mens enim secundum quadruplicem modum accipiendi diversificatur ... Quarto modo dicitur a 'meminisse'; et sic stat pro memoria et quantum ad actum et quantum ad habitum. Dicunt ergo, quod in assignatione huius trinitatis mens stat pro habitu memoriae; sed in adaptione, cum dicit Augustine: 'Mens novit se et diligit', stat pro potentia memorandi." — 1 Sent., 3.2.2.1, in Resp. (1.89; ed. min., 1.66-67). See in St. Augustine: De Trinit., 14.14.18 (PL 42.1049-50), 15.7.11 (PL 42.1065); Enarr. in psalm., 3.1 (PL 36.73-74).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

355

reflecting on them apart from every condition of place and time, becomes aware of the first principles of created truth present in the memory. As indelible impressions of the eternal laws in the mind of God, the first principles in the intellectual memory direct the intelligence to turn toward God, thus enabling the human mind to judge with complete certitude the truth of corporeal things. 77 The position taken by Bonaventure on the human memory, as his texts show, is influenced by the doctrines of Aristotle and Augustine. An Aristotelean influence is manifested in Bonaventure's position on the memory of both the senses and the intellect as retaining species of things known in the past; this influence is seen particularly with regard to the potency of reminiscence, which recalls things understood in the past. An Augustinian influence is seen in Bonaventure's view of the intellectual memory, first, as a capacity of the soul for remembering itself in the present and, secondly, as a power of retaining non-abstract or innate species. Drawing his Augustinian and Aristotelean sources together, however, Bonaventure's doctrine on the memory is such that it is neither Aristotelean nor Augustinian, but properly Bonaventurean. Thus, positing retention of cognitive species as the first and proper act of the power of memory, he distinguishes it from all the other cognitive potencies, which are engaged either in abstracting species from corporeal things or in judging them by means of their species. Receiving and retaining sensible species, the memory of the senses depends on a bodily organ; thus it is distinguished from the intellectual memory, which, retaining intelligible species, is subject to the soul alone. The two potencies of memory are conjoined to form one power of reminiscence, and so they act together with respect to things known in the past. Supporting the considerations of reason, the power of reminiscence participates in the intellective and sensitive operations of the human soul. The intellectual memory, taken alone, supports both the self-reflexions of the intellect and the simple perceptions of the intelligence. The memory supports the intellect by conserving the intelligible species required for its reflexions; but it supports the intelligence by conserving the first principles required to judge the truth of corporeal things according to their eternal laws or rules in the divine mind. The intellectual memory, therefore, participates in every operation of human or rational understanding. 78

77 Itiner., 2.9 (5.301-02; ed. min., 5.191-92). Bonaventure is following Augustine here; see: De lib. arbit., 2.14.38 (PL 32.1261-62); De vem relig., 31.58 (PL 34.147-48). 78 For a very general account of the intellective potencies in Bonaventure's doctrine see: Norbert de Guise, "La recherche de la vtritt chez saint Bonaventure", EF (NS), 12 (1962), pp. 161-66. E. Bettoni describes the Bonaventurean doctrine on the memory as a combination of Augustinian and Aristotelean elements; however, he considers the memory, as understood by Bonaventure, to be a single faculty with the intellect: 5. Bonaventura, p. 118; ET p. 90. The latter consideration is difficult to reconcile with both

356

CHAPTER FOUR

The reason why the exterior sense has five particular powers, according to Aquinas, is that this sense is a passive potency which can undergo an immutation in five different ways, each way being proper and essential to one particular power. The immutation of the sense potency is caused by the exterior things that it perceives directly or immediately; therefore, the potency is diversified according to the different kinds of immutation caused in it by its proper objects. Aquinas speaks here of a natural immutation and a spiritual immutation. A natural immutation results from the reception of a form according to material being, such as the reception of heat causing a body to become hot. A spiritual immutation results from the reception of a form according to immaterial being, as the form of a colour is received by the pupil of an eye, yet the eye itself does not become coloured. The operation of the exterior sense potency, Aquinas maintains, requires a spiritual immutation through which a likeness or species of a form comes to-be in an organ of the potency. In some of the particular senses, however, the spiritual immutation is accompanied by a natural immutation, either on the side of the object alone or also on the side of the sense organ. There is a natural immutation according to place on the side of the object with respect to sound, which is the object of hearing, for sound is caused by a commotion of the air. Since a body must be altered in some way to emit an odour, which is the object of smell, there is also a natural immutation on the side of the object regarding the sense of smell. The senses of taste and touch undergo a natural immutation on the side of the organ as well as on the side of the object: a tongue becomes moist through the moisture of things that it savours, and a hand becomes hot on touching things that are hot. There is only a spiritual immutation with respect to light and colour, which are the objects of sight. The sense of sight, therefore, is the most spiritual of all the particular senses. The sense of hearing, then the sense of smell, come after sight with regard to spiritual immutation, since hearing and smell have a natural immutation only on the side of their object, hearing precedes smell because, as Aristotle proves, local movement is more perfect than alteration, to which it is prior by nature. The senses of taste and touch require a natural change on the part of the organ; so, operating through a conjoined medium, taste and touch are the least spiritual of the senses.79 Though Aquinas and Bonaventure concur on the proper object of each particular sense, they differ regarding the mode of distinguishing the five the theological and the philosophical principles of Bonaventure. From the theological viewpoint, the essential unity of the three potencies of memory, intelligence and will constitute the soul as an image of the Trinity. From the philosophical viewpoint, the proper distinction of potencies follows their first and essential acts; so the memory is distinguished by its proper act, which is retention or conservation of species, from every other cognitive potency, which either abstracts species or makes a judgment concerning them. 79 ST, la, 78.3, Resp. (1.475b-76a); cf. DA, a. 13, Resp. "Quia vero ... et incorruptibilibus." (2.330). See in Aristotle: Phjisica, 8.7 (260a20-261b26).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

357

senses from one another. Aquinas distinguishes them according to their degrees of spiritual immutation, or the ways in which they receive species from their proper objects. From his point of view, taste and touch are the least spiritual, because they receive their species by a natural or material immutation in the sense organs. The sense of sight is the most spiritual, since it receives a species solely by a spiritual or immaterial change in the organ. Hearing and smell are intermediate senses, receiving their species according to an immaterial change in the sense organs and a material change on the part of their objects. Bonaventure distinguishes the exterior senses according to their correspondence with the particular properties of bodies. The senses of touch and sight perceive the absolute properties of bodies, their relative properties being perceived by the other three senses; so, falling between touch and sight, the intermediate senses are smell, hearing and taste.80 The position taken by Aquinas on the agent and possible intellects coincides in many ways with the position taken by Bonaventure. Both theologians reject the opinion that the agent intellect is a single intelligence separated from the individual souls of men, each man having only a possible intellect. The two theologians are also at one in rejecting the view of the human intellect as an agent intellect because it contains universal principles of knowledge, and as a possible intellect because it has particular knowledge of things through the senses of the body. Thus, Bonaventure and Aquinas hold in common that each human soul has by its own nature both an agent intellect and a possible intellect, the one being distinct from the other. There is also a unanimity between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the natural necessity of the human intellect to obtain intelligible species from phantasms, and yet the intrinsic operation of the intellect has no dependence on a bodily organ. They are again of one mind on the ultimate necessity of subjecting the whole operation of human understanding to God, as to its principal cause. They both maintain, moreover, that the agent intellect is continually in act, but the possible intellect is not. Finally, Bonaventure and Aquinas are united in limiting the capacity of the human intellect, as a created potency, to know or understand all things.81 Granting that Bonaventure and Aquinas concur extensively in their views on the nature of the human intellect, we find that they also differ with 80 We have already compared above (pp. 337-39) the positions of Aquinas and Bonaventure on the proper distinctions between the interior senses. It is sufficient to note here that Aquinas, differing from Bonaventure, uses the term pkantasia for the imagination and not for the common sense. Their differences regarding the r&le of the common sense in exterior sensation will be discussed in our next chapter. On the interior senses in Aquinas see: ST, la, 78.4, Resp. (1.477b-78b). 81 For the texts of Aquinas on these points consult the following: 2 Sent., 17.2.1 (2.420-30); 3 Sent., 14.1, Sol. 2, ad 2-3 (3.435-38); DV, 10.6 (1.200-02); ST, la, 79.1-5 (1.479b-85b). There is no need to stress here that Aquinas follows Aristotle on the agent and possible intellects. Aquinas, however, like Bonaventure, follows Augustine in subjecting the whole operation of the intellect to the principal causality of God. On this particular point see in Aquinas: DSpC, a. 10, Resp. (2.408).

358

CHAPTER FOUR

regard to the distinction between the agent and possible intellects. Their difference, in this regard, has its source in the fundamental reason why two such potencies must be assigned to the intellect. For Bonaventure, the reason is that the human soul is a composite of form and matter.82 For Aquinas, however, the reason has to do with the immaterial nature of the intellective soul. Although the soul has an immaterial nature, the things that are known by the soul are material in nature, and so they are not actually intelligible to it. The soul must make them to be intelligible, therefore, by withdrawing them from matter and from all the conditions of matter. Consequently, to make them intelligible, the soul has an active potency, or a lumen, which is called an agent intellect, and this is in act without receiving anything from another potency. But the soul, because its essence is limited, cannot be assimilated through its agent intellect to all the things that it understands; to complete the assimilation of the soul to its intelligible objects, it has a passive potency, which is called a possible intellect. Acccording to that potency, which depends on the agent intellect, the soul is able to receive the quiddities of corporeal things. The fundamental reason why the intellect has two potencies, therefore, is that the essence of the soul is limited in being. Because of this limitation, the possibility or potency of the soul regarding its proper object must be perfected by the addition of some principle, an intelligible form or a habitus, enabling the intellect to operate. That addition comes to-be in the soul through the action of its agent intellect.83 The differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the agent and possible intellects, therefore, are due to their very different positions on the nature of the human soul. To Bonaventure, the soul is a composite of matter and form; to Aquinas, the soul is simply a form. Their different positions on the soul have inevitable consequences regarding the human intellect. Those consequences flow particularly from the different modes of union that Bonaventure and Aquinas attribute to the soul and body of man. Their union is immediate according to Aquinas, but not according to Bonaventure. Hence, for Bonaventure, the intellective power can operate to a certain degree without reference to the senses. As a power of reason, the intellect always acts in conjunction with the senses; however, as an intellect, it can reflect upon intelligible species apart from the phantasms and, as an 82 "Intellectiva namque ... habet utramque potentiam quae respicit substantiam spiritualem, ita quod activa est ratione ipsius quo est et passiva ratione ipsius quod est, scilicet materia et forma," — 4 Sent., 50.2.1.1, Resp. (4.1046; ed. min., 4.1030). The essence of an angel is also composed of matter and form, so Bonaventure posits an agent and possible intellect in the angel's intellective power: 2 Sent, 3.2.2.1, Resp. (2.119-20; ed. min., 2.110-12). To Aquinas, the essence of an angel is a pure form, so he does not distinguish a possible intellect from an agent intellect in the angel: SCC, 2.96-97 (2.266-68); ST, la, 54.4 (1.335a-36a). 83 3 Sent., 14.1, Sol. 2, ad 2-3 (3.437-38); cf. Resp. (3.435-36). For a complete exposition of this doctrine by Aquinas see: SCG, 2.73-78 (2.207-30). For shorter expositions consult DA, aa 3-5 (2.290-300); DSpC, aa 9-11 (2.400-15).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

359

intelligence, it can turn directly toward God from the nature of the soul alone. The reflective acts of the intellective power, particularly in regard to intelligible species, follow the proper operations of the agent and possible intellects. The agent intellect, as the active and abstractive potency, looks directly toward the phantasms from which it abstracts intelligible species. The possible intellect, as the passive and receptive potency, looks directly to the agent intellect from which it receives the species abstracted from the phantasms. Consequently, in obtaining intelligible species, the possible intellect turns itself toward the agent intellect more than toward the phantasms, for they are the direct concern of the agent intellect, which must continually dispose the possible intellect to receive them and to pass judgment on them. Aquinas, taking a very different view of the agent and possible intellects, never grants to the human intellect the power to reflect on its objects apart from the phantasms containing the intelligible species. Considering the agent and possible intellects, he distinguishes them by their objects and not by their acts. Accordingly, he assigns to the agent intellect as its proper object the intelligible species in potency; he assigns to the possible intellect as its proper object the intelligible species in act. It is through the agent intellect that the species is made actually intelligible; it is by the species, as actually intelligible, that the possible intellect goes from potency into act.84 For Aquinas, therefore, the possible intellect is in potency to receiving actual likenesses, or intelligible species, of sensible things; but the agent intellect is an active power operating on the phantasms and making them actually intelligible. Since the action of the agent intellect on a phantasm precedes the reception of a species by the possible intellect, the principal cause of the action of understanding is attributed to the agent intellect and not to the phantasms.85 Aquinas, positing an immediate union of soul and body in man, has the agent intellect acting immediately on the phantasms from which it abstracts the intelligible species to be received by the possible intellect. Although the human intellect, as such, knows directly only those intelligible species, or universal forms, nevertheless, by a sort of reflexion, the intellect knows singular or sensible things indirectly. Having abstracted intelligible species, the intellect can actually understand according to them only by turning itself toward the phantasms in which, as Aristotle says, it understands the in-

84 "Sic etiam circa intellectum agens et possibilis intellectus distinguuntur. Non enim cadem rationc cst obiectum aliquid in quantum est in actu et in quantum est in potentia, aut in quantum agit et patitur, intelligibile enim actu est obiectum intellectus possibilis, agens quasi in ipsum, prout eo exit de potentia in actum; intelligible vero in potentia est obiectum intellectus agentis, prout fit per intellectum agentum intelligibile actu." — DV, 15.2, in Resp. (1.312). 85 "Est igitur in anima intellectiva virtus activa in phantasmata. faciens ea intelligibilia actu: et haec potentia animae vocatur intellectus agens. Est etiam in ea virtus quae est in potentia ad determinatas similitudines rerum sensibilium: et haec est potentia intellectus passibilts ... Et ideo actio intellectus agentis in phantasmate praecedit receptionem intellectus possibilis. Et sic principalitas actionis non attribuitur phantasmatibus, sed intellectui agenti." — SCG, 2.77 (2.226).

360

CHAPTER FOUR

telligible species.86 In its reflexive action, the intellect knows a phantasm while considering the nature of its own act, the nature of the species through which it knows, and the nature of the phantasm from which it abstracts the species. When the intellect is turned toward a phantasm, the intellect, according to a sort of continuity with the imagination, knows in a certain way the singular thing, of which the phantasm is a particular likeness.87 From the position taken by Aquinas, the human intellect is seen to understand intelligible species, or universal forms, in the phantasms from which they are abstracted. The reflexive act of the whole intellect is directed toward the phantasms and, through the imagination that forms them, the intellect knows the singular things giving rise to the phantasms. Hence, for Aquinas, the reflexions of the intellect cannot come about apart from phantasms, as they can for Bonaventure, who does not posit an immediate union between the rational soul and the human body. But the primary reason for the differences between the two theologians on the human intellect lies in their individual positions on the nature of the human soul. For Bonaventure, the soul is a composite of form and matter; for Aquinas it is simply a form.88 The earliest texts of Aquinas on the power of memory belong to his treatment of the human soul as an image of God. In this context, he takes memory, intelligence and will as three distinct powers that are united in the essence of the soul. Explaining why memory is distinct from the other two powers, Aquinas says that, in this instance, every property belonging to the soul according to its nature is called a potency, whether ordered to 86 ST, la, 86.1, Resp. (1.535b-36a). Note: "Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi universalium. Indirecte autem et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare ... etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxerit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III De an." —Cf. Aristotle, De anima, 3.7 (431b2-19). 37 "Unde intellectus noster non directe ex specie quam suscipit fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma, sed ad cognoscendum rem cuius est phantasma. Sed tamen per quandam reflexionem redit etiam in cognitionem ipsius phantasmatis, dum considerat naturam actus sui, et specei per quam intuetur, et eius a quo speciem abstrahit. scilicet phantasmatis ... Inquantum ergo intellectus noster per similitudinem quam accepit a phantasmate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasma a quo speciem abstrahit, quod est similitude particularis, habet quamdam cognitionem de singular) secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem." — D V , 2.6, in Resp. (1.42). Properly speaking, Aquinas notes, it is the man who knows the singular thing by his senses and his intellect Loc. cit., ad 3. 88 This is not the primary reason for their differences according to L. Veuthey: "Non convenit tamen Bonaventura cum Aquinate de propria indole utriusque intellectus: pro isto enim intellectus agens est simpticiter et semper in actu, dum possibilis est pure et simpliciter in potentia; pro Seraphico econtra intellectus agens potest agere, sed non semper in actu, dum intellectus possibilis non est simpliciter passivus ..." — Si Bonav. philos. chris., p. 58. We believe that this judgment rests upon a transposition of Bonaventure's words: "Nee ... est omnino in actu", by Veuthey's words: "non est semper in actu" — cf. Loc. cit., n. 5. Note the following text: "Item, impossible est idem secundum idem esse in actu et in potentia simul et semel; sed anima secundum intellectum agentem est continue in suo actu, secundum possibilem autem non: ergo etc." — 2 Sent., 24.1.2.4, fm. 3 (2.567; ed. min., fm. c, 2.586).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

361

operation or not. Since the soul by its nature can receive and retain impressions, or species, the potency of retaining them is called a memory, even though it does not require a bodily organ. Thus, the power of memory is distinguished from intelligence, which is a power of understanding, and from the will, which is a power of loving.89 According to Augustine, however, memory belongs to sensuality, which is common to men and animals. It seems, therefore, that memory is a sense potency and ought not to be a part of God's image in the human soul. Responding to this objection, Aquinas says that memory, as a part of God's image, is not common to men and animals. As Aristotle shows, the intellective soul retains what it receives, the sensitive soul retaining its species in a bodily organ.90 The subsequent texts of Aquinas on the memory do not distinguish it from the intelligence, or intellect, even in the context of the soul as an image of God. Taking memory according to its common meaning, Aquinas holds that the term signifies knowledge of things in the past. To know something in the past according as it is past belongs to a sense power, which knows things in the present according as they are present. The intellect knows a singular thing or a particular thing, not as such, but only in a universal manner, and so the intellect does not know things according as they are past or present. Consequently, taken properly, memory has to do with what is past with respect to something now present; therefore, as Aristotle proves, the memory is a sensitive potency and not an intellective potency. Since the intellect not only understands what is intelligible, but also understands that it knows what is intelligible, memory is extended to the knowledge by which the intellect understands that it has previously known some intelligible object, even though the object is not known as something in the past. In that way, Aquinas says, any knowledge of the intellect not requiring a new object can be called memory. The name can be applied to knowledge of this sort whether it is continuous or interrupted; but memory is applied more properly to interrupted knowledge, because it is closer than continuous knowledge to the nature of what is past. In such a manner, then, a memory can be posited in the intellective part of the soul. It is thus, Aquinas observes, that Augustine understands the memory to be a part of God's image in the human soul: Augustine wants to call memory everything held habitually, but not actually under consideration, by the human mind.91 Aquinas, employing his principles for distinguishing the potencies, does not diversify the memory in the intellect from the intellect itself, because 39 1 Sent., 3.4.1, Sol. (1.112-13); cf. arg. 5, ad 5. 90 Loc. cit., arg. 1, ad 1 (1.111, 113). See in St. Augustine, De Trinit., 12.1.1 (PL 42.997); and in Aristotle, De anima, 3.4 (429alO-28). 91 DV, 10.2, Resp. (1.194). See in Aristotle: De memor. et remin., c. 1 (449b4-451al3); and in St. Augustine: De Trinit., 12.4 (PL 42.999), 12.7 (PL 42.1003). As a result of his revised position on the memory, Aquinas reduces the Augustinian doctrine on the mind as knowing and loving itself to an aptitude of the soul, on knowing other things, for self-knowledge and, as a consequence, for loving itself: ST, la, 93.7, ad 4 (1.580); cf. 3t. Augustine, op. cit. 12.14 (PL 42.1010-11).

362

CHAPTER FOUR

they have the same formal object. The act of retaining or conserving species is not sufficent in the view of Aquinas, as it is in the view of Bonaventure, to distinguish an intellective potency of memory from the potency of understanding. The human mind, to Aquinas, is indifferent to every temporal condition of its objects. The temporal conditions of knowable objects specify the species retained by the sensitive memory, which has to do with things known in the past and able to be recalled in the present.92 The objects of the memory in the intellect are the intelligible species received by the possible intellect and remaining in it after the intellect has actually considered them. The power by which the human mind can retain its intelligible species is called memory, and those species are ordered to the habitus of science. The memory in the intellect, therefore, is the possible intellect according as it conserves intelligible species habitually. When the mind wants to reconsider them, the possible intellect must then refer them to the phantasms from which they have been abstracted, for the human intellect cannot actually consider its intelligible species apart from their phantasms.93 The position of Aquinas on the power of memory in man has some elements in common, and others that are not, with the position of Bonaventure. Both theologians, following Aristotle, distinguish the sensitive memory from a memory in the intellective part of the soul. They also hold in common that the one memory looks to sensible species and the other to intelligible species, and so Aquinas and Bonaventure concur on the proper objects of the two memories. For Aquinas, however, the objects of the memory in the intellect are not formally different from the objects of the intellect itself. Since he distinguishes potencies by their proper objects rather than by their proper acts, he does not posit an intellectual memory as a distinct potency from the possible intellect, which both receives and retains intelligible species. On this point, Aquinas follows Aristotle and, interpreting Augustine's doctrine, considers the memory in the intellect to be the habitual capacity of the mind for retaining all that it knows, but without reference to time. Bonaventure distinguishes the potencies according to their proper and essential acts, and not according to their proper objects. Since the act of retaining species is diverse from receiving and knowing them, he distinguishes an intellectual memory from the intellect as a potency of conserving species from a potency of receiving and of understanding them. Although he concurs with Aquinas in withdrawing intelligible species from all conditions of time, Bonaventure, in his interpretation of Augustine's doctrine, considers the soul to be capable of remembering itself in the present. As a consequence, he allows the soul to

92 Cf. ST, la, 79.6, Resp. (1.486ab); DV, 10.3, Resp. (1.196-97). 93 DV, 10.2, ad 4 & 7 (1.195): cf. Resp. "Et ideo ..." (1.194-95). See also: SCO, 2.74 (2.214-17); ST, la, 79.7 (1.487b-88a).

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

363

remember itself both habitually and actually, or in a temporal manner, according to its intellectual memory. Thus, for Aquinas, the memory is in the intellect, so that the intellect has a memory; for Bonaventure, the memory is in the soul, and so the soul has a memory, which is an intellectual memory. Because of Bonaventure's position on the composite nature of the soul, moreover, he grants to the intellectual memory the power of supporting the intellect in its acts of reflexion apart from phantasms. Aquinas, however, because of his position on the simple nature of the soul, does not allow the memory in the intellect to operate reflectively in that way. The differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the nature of the memory, therefore, are grounded in their individual positions on the nature of the human soul and on its union with the body. CONCLUSION St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the nature of the operative potencies in man conforms to his doctrine on the nature of the rational soul and its natural union with a human body. Though he attributes diverse potencies, both cognitive and affective, to the personal nature of man, he also unites them in such a way that they all participate in one whole power of operation, whether speculative or practical. The two extremes of the total or participational power in the order of speculation are the intellect and the exterior senses, which are united in the common sense. These two extremes come together in the operations of reason as the intellect considers the truth of exterior or corporeal things by the mediation of the interior sense of imagination. The intellectual memory and the memory of the senses share at once in the rational operations of the intellect, thus conserving the unity of its actions by retaining the intelligible and sensible species abstracted from its objects. The power of the intellectual memory participates in the operations of the intellect both as an intellect and as an intelligence. As an intellect, it acts in a reflexive manner and shares intelligible species with the memory. The species are abstracted by the agent intellect and received by the possible intellect, both potencies coming together to constitite one complete act of understanding. As an intelligence, the whole human intellect acts in a simple way, sharing with the memory the non-abstract species, or first principles of truth, found in the potency of the intellectual memory itself. Thus, participating in every act of human understanding, the intellectual memory maintains the unity of participation by the cognitive potencies in the total power of speculative knowledge. In the practical order, the two extremes participating in the total power of operation consist in sensuality and liberty of choice. Sensuality is an integral power uniting all the cognitive and the appetitive potencies of a man's sensitive nature. Liberty of choice is an integral power uniting the cognitive and appetitive potencies of his rational spirit. These two integral powers come together to constitute the faculty or habitual power of freedom of choice. Thus, all the

364

CHAPTER FOUR

potencies of the man participate in his moral actions. The potencies of his sensitive nature are controlled by his intellect, functioning as an inferior reason by the mediation of his interior sense of estimation. His knowledge of what is good and evil is controlled by his intellect, functioning as a superior reason under the direction of his will. Since his intellectual memory has a habitus of conscience containing the natural principles of moral truth, therefore, the intellectual memory is the source of unity for the participation of the potencies in the total power of freedom of choice. In short, the Bonaventurean synthesis on the nature of the operative potencies in man depends essentially on the principle of participation. St. Bonaventure composes his synthesis on the nature of the potencies with the help of a number of historical sources. The most prominent source used by him is the doctrine of Aristotle, who contributes to the Bonaventurean synthesis many distinctions and precisions regarding the potencies in man. It is from Aristotle, for instance, that St. Bonaventure acquires the doctrine of the primary division of the cognitive powers into active and passive potencies: following this principle, he distinguishes each of the interior and exterior senses into an active potency on the part of the soul and a passive potency on the part of the body; he also distinguishes the intellective power into an agent intellect and a possible intellect, an Aristotelian doctrine that he considers essential for a proper understanding of the nature and the operation of the human intellect, even though he departs from Aristotle himself both on the nature of the human soul and on the proper principle for distinguishing the potencies, namely, their acts rather than their objects. St. Bonaventure, again influenced by Aristotle, insists on the necessity of the intellect to acquire knowledge of its objects by way of the senses, memory and experience, for the human soul comes to-be devoid of innate or habitual cognition. Aristotle's doctrine on the sense memory and on the human power of reminiscence, moreover, contribute much to St. Bonaventure's development of his own doctrine on the power of memory. In the practical order, the Aristotelean distinction between the speculative and the practical intellects, and the distinction between the rational and irrational parts of the human soul, find their place in the Bonaventurean doctrine on freedom of choice. Among the other sources used by St. Bonaventure, the doctrine of St. Augustine has first place. It is from his doctrine that St. Bonaventure learns that the human mind knows incorporeal things through its own nature and not through the senses, which give knowledge only of corporeal things, St. Bonaventure also follows St. Augustine on the necessity, in an act of sensation, for a concourse of the sense organ with the object through the interior power of the soul. St. Augustine, in addition, contributes to the Bonaventurean synthesis a doctrine on the intellectual memory as a power able to remember itself in the present, a wider interpretation of memory than that found in Aristotle. This Augustinian doctrine enables St. Bonaventure to develop his own thought on the rational soul or spirit as capable of reflecting within itself,

POTENCIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

365

thus imitating God by knowing and loving itself. In the moral order, St. Bonaventure relies heavily on St. Augustine regarding the nature of sensuality in man and the nature of his freedom of choice. The Augustinian and Aristotelean doctrines used by St. Bonaventure are transformed by his own principles in such a way that the two groups of doctrines, along with others that are less prominent, enter into the composition of a Bonaventurean synthesis. With respect to the less prominent doctrines, we have seen St. Bonaventure using and developing in a unique way the Platonist doctrine, known through St. Augustine, on the threefold power of the soul concerning exterior things, interior things, and things superior to the soul itself. In his own development of the doctrine, St. Bonaventure turns to Hugh of St. Victor, who provides him with a mystical approach from creatures to the wisdom of God. Dionysius, on the other hand, provides St. Bonaventure with a view of the soul as an intellectual substance, or a sort of lumen; combining the view with the Aristotelean doctrine on the agent intellect as a kind of lumen, St. Bonaventure arrives at an understanding of the soul as a spiritual creature having the complement and perfection of a spiritual light. From St. John Damascene, finally, St. Bonaventure gets his notion of conscience as a law of the human mind; so, for St. Bonaventure, the natural law is the proper object of conscience, which perfects the practical intellect. In sum, all the historical sources used by St. Bonaventure share, each in a different way, in the composition of a truly Bonaventurean doctrine on the nature of the operative potencies in man. The doctrine of St. Thomas on the potencies of operation, as we have shown, concurs in many respects with the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. There are also several points of difference between them, both on the nature of some potencies and on the proper principle for distinguishing one potency from another. Their differences are grounded in separate views of the nature of the soul and its union with the body. St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, nonetheless, hold a large number of positions in common on the personal nature of man and his operative potencies. The separate approaches of the two theologians to those questions account for their individual interpretations of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines. St. Thomas, differing from St. Bonaventure, limits the Augustinian doctrine on sensuality to the appetitive part of human nature; he also draws the Augustinian doctrine on the memory in the soul close to the Aristotelean doctrine on the memory in the intellect. But St. Thomas, coming near St. Bonaventure, draws on both Aristotle and St. Augustine in developing the doctrine of freedom of choice. For the most part, however, St. Thomas follows Aristotle on the nature of the potencies and on their proper principle of distinction. Each theologian, therefore, employing Aristotelean and Augustinian sources, develops a distinctive synthesis of philosophical doctrine: the one synthesis is distinctively Thomist and the other is distinctively Bonaventurean, each of them depending in its own characteristic manner on the historical sources contributing to its proper organization and development.

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER FIVE ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE

c

REATED things, St. Bonaventure tells us, have a threefold existence. They exist in the world according to their proper being or entity. They also exist according to their similitudes or likenesses both in the intellect and in the mind of God, who is their eternal exemplar. The being of things in themselves is more true, speaking absolutely, than the being that they have according to their similitudes. The being of things according to their similitudes in the human intellect, however, is more noble than their being in themselves, because, as St. Augustine shows, they have a spiritual mode of existence in the human mind. Thus, they are more true in the human intellect than they are in themselves. But the being of things is most noble in the divine mind, for they exist in God according to their eternal exemplar, which is God Himself. The being of things is most true, therefore, in the mind of God. ' St. Bonaventure speaks of two kinds of similitude, The first kind is a similitude in which two things come together, so that the one is similar to the other, just as two things are alike because they are similar in colour. The second kind of similitude is such that it is similar by itself to something else, just as a creature is similar by its nature to the Creator. This kind of similitude is the principle of knowledge. The similitude of a thing in God is the very truth of the thing, whereas the thing known to God is a similitude of its truth in Him, who is the first truth itself. Since the principle of truth in God is the first truth, He expresses the truth of things in a most perfect way, and so they are assimilated most perfectly to their similitudes in the mind of God. Created things are assimilated in a converse way to their similitudes in the human intellect. The similitude of a thing is the principle of knowledge for the human intellect, and the truth known by the intellect is the thing itself. Hence, the similitudes of things are impressed on the intellect, which receives its similitudes from exterior things. For this reason, the intellect is said to be in potency with respect to the things that it can know; therefore, it must be brought into act by their similitudes. Consequently, the ground of truth in the intellect lies in the proper being of the exterior things that it knows. 2 While the human soul is conjoined to a body, the intellect must acquire knowledge of exterior things through the imagination and the particular

1 1 Sent., 36.2.2, Resp. (1.625-26; ed min., 1.497-98); cf. St Augustine, De Trinit., 9.4.4 (PL 42.963). 2 1 Sent, 35.un.l, Resp. "Ad intclligentiam ..." (1.600; ed min., 1.479-80); 36.2.2, ad 2 (1.626; ed. min., 1.498).

368

CHAPTER FIVE

senses. It is by means of the sense powers, therefore, that the intellect knows singular things. In knowing them, the intellect abstracts universal forms from them, for the intellect itself cannot know a singular thing in itself. Abstraction by the intellect of universal forms, or intelligible species, from singular things proceeds according to its active and passive potencies. Thus, by means of its intelligible species, the human intellect can grasp the universal natures of singular things; but it knows them concretely by the mediation of the senses.3 Everything known through the senses is also known by way of species that are abstracted from it by the exterior senses and by the imagination. The species abstracted by the exterior senses are limited by the concrete conditions of matter, but the species abstracted by the imagination are limited only by the general conditions of matter. The intellect, acting with the senses, knows corporeal things both in themselves and in relation to one another. Relations between things, such as cause and effect, are known to the intellect by comparing one thing with another, and so the intellect can judge whether the one is similar or dissimilar to the other. The spiritual things that are interior to the soul, such as a habitus, are also known to the human intellect. This knowledge is a sort of interior experience by which the soul can know with certitude that it is able to act, because it has a power or a habitus of principles enabling it to act, whether the act be one of knowledge or of love. In that way, the soul can reflect upon its innate principles of truth and of love.4 Any knowledge possessed according to species, St. Augustine teaches, makes the knower similar to the thing known. This similarity, St. Bonaventure says, is expressed by the knower in his similitude of the thing that he knows. According to Aristotle, moreover, the human intellect is all things in some way; but that cannot be, St. Bonaventure observes, unless the intellect is assimilated to what it understands, since the nature of understanding requires an assimilation of the intellect to the thing understood. For perfect understanding, there must also be an adequation of the intellect to the thing to be understood. This adequation is founded upon the similitude of the thing in the intellect understanding it.5 Because truth is an adequation of the thing and the intellect, therefore, as often as a man understands a thing as it is in itself, so often is he said to have truth, and his intellect is said to be true. When a human intellect is true, it is then conformed to the divine intellect, and so truth is the rectitude of the human intellect, as justice is the rectitude of the human will, which ought to be conformed to the divine will. 6 If the divine will and its dispositions were fully 3 1 Sent., 39.1.2, ad 2 (1.689; ed. min., 1.547-48); 27.1.un.3, Resp. "... circa ipsum." (1.476; ed. min., 1.376). Cf. DMT, 3.1, Resp. "Oportet etiam ... per multa." (5.70-71), 4 3 Sent., 23.dub.4, Resp. "Et propterea ..." (3.504-05; ed. min., 3.495-96). 5 DSC, q. 2, fa. 3-5 (5.7). See in St Augustine, De Trinit., 9.11.16 (PL 42.969); and in Aristotle, De anima, 3.8 (431b20-21). The adequation of intellect and thing is expressed in the concept or mental word: 1 Sent., 9.dub.4, Resp. (1.189; ed. min., 1.151-52). 6 1 Sent, 46.un.4, fm. 2 (1.827; ed. min., fm. b, 1.656); 48.1.2, fm. 4 (1.853; ed min., fm. d, 1.677).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

369

known, St. Bonaventure says, a man would never desire to know any other cause of created things, for he would know them in their primordial causes. Since the dispositions of God's will are not fully known, however, and since the human intellect has the power to act in its own way, therefore, St. Bonaventure maintains, it is good and very useful for a man to be engaged in considering the created causes of things, so that he may come to know in some way, though incompletely, that supreme cause which is the end of all cognition.7 A man knows a thing incompletely or imperfectly when he knows it according to its accidents or according to some operation. He knows the thing perfectly when he has full or complete knowledge of its substance, power and operation, and when he knows their causes and reasons. Because the power of a thing is not easy to perceive, and because the substance of a thing is remote from the senses, there are many things that are difficult for us to know. The human intellect very rarely knows a substantial form except from posterior or accidental forms; because names are imposed according to the intellect's way of knowing, differences that are prior by nature are named, for the most part, from what is posterior.8 But a man knowing God, and seeing a thing most certainly and most nobly in Him, knows the thing, as St. Augustine says, in its prior causes.9 The natural knowledge of the soul, capable of knowing all things in some way, is not confined by created things. The soul's knowledge is made full only by that object having in itself all knowable things and by which, when it is known, all things are known. 10 Complete perfection of human knowledge, therefore, requires a knowledge of God, who is the first and supreme cause of all created things. Now God cannot be known immediately from corporeal things: so, withdrawing from the forms and figures of those things, the human mind must ascend to God through the mediation of its rational spirit.'' Our short sketch of the acts and modes of human knowledge, as 7 1 Sent., 45.2.2, con. 4 & ad 4 (1.806-07; ed min., 1.641-42). 8 "... dicendum, quod est cognoscere semiplene, ut quando cognoscitur secundum accidentia, vel secundum aliquam operatlonem. Est iterum cognoscere perfecte, et ille perfecte cognoscit, qui plene novit substantiam. virtutem et operationem et causas et rationes horum. Et quia virtus est occulta, et substantia remota a sensibus; ideo cunctae res nobis sunt difficiles." —- Comm. in Ecctes., 1.11, q. 1, Resp. (6.16). "Intellectus enim noster rartssime pervenit ad cognitionem formae substantialis nisi a posterioribus; et quia sic cognoscit, sic nominat, ideo differentias per naturam priores ut plurimum nominal a posteriori." — 2 Sent., 1.2.3.2, in ad 4 (2.51; ed. min., 2.43). 9 "Item, omnis qui rem cognoscit certissime et nobilissime, cognoscit per causam proximam et immediatam; sed cognoscens Deum et videns cognoscit in eo res certissime et nobilissime tamquarn in causis prioribus, ut dicit Augustinus." — 1 Sent., 45.2.2, fm. 5 (1.806; ed. min., fm. e, 1.640): there are many references here to the sources in St. Augustine. 10 "Cognitio enim animae naturalis est cognitio non arctata: unde nata est quodam modo omnia cognoscere, unde non impletur cognitio eius aliquo cognoscibili, nisi quod habet in se omnia cognoscibilia et quo cognito omnia cognoscuntur." — 1 Sent., 1.3.2, in Resp. (1.40-41; ed. min., 1.30-31). 11 2 Sent., 8.1.dub.l, Resp. (2.223; ed min., 2.219); cf. 1 Sent, 3.1.un.2, ad 1 (1.72; ed. min., 1.51).

370

CHAPTER FIVE

described by St. Bonaventure, suggests two general subjects for examination on those questions. The first subject is the actual consideration of the truth of corporeal things, a consideration depending on the senses and the intellect. The acts of the senses prepare the way for the acts of the intellect, which is the power of knowing truth according to intelligible similitudes or species of corporeal things. Their truth is fully or perfectly known only when it is known according to their prior causes in God, whose similitudes of created things are the principal reasons of their truth. Consequently, to simplify our presentation of St. Bonaventure's doctrine, we shall divide our subject into two particular parts, and so we shall examine first the acts of the sense powers, then the acts of the intellective power. The second general subject has to do with the habitual modes of knowledge, and they depend on the power of memory. This subject includes St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the habitus of science and the habitus of wisdom, both science and wisdom depending on the habitus of first principles in the intellectual memory. Those principles, which are innate to the memory, are created similitudes of the eternal reasons of things in God. The complete certitude of both science and wisdom requires a conformity of the human mind to the mind of God through the mediation of the first principles in the memory. That conformity involves a knowledge of God, who is known by the human mind in some way when it judges the truth of created things with the certitude of science, or of wisdom. Since God is known through the mediation of the rational spirit, which knows Him habitually from His image in the mind itself, the natural knowledge of God by the human mind presents a special problem, because, as we shall see, St. Bonaventure refers to that knowledge as innate to the rational spirit. Hence, we shall also divide our second general subject into two particular parts. The first part will deal with the habitual knowledge of science and wisdom, the second part dealing with our natural knowledge of God. Acts of the Sense Powers

The term sensing (sentire), according to Bonaventure, can be taken in three ways. In the first way, taken commonly, the term means to know a thing as present to the knower, a meaning found in Augustine. Taken properly, in the second way, sensing means to know a thing here and now; this is the meaning of the term in Boethius, who says that the senses know particular things and the intellect knows what is universal. The third and truly proper meaning, which is given by Aristotle, is to receive beyond matter, by means of a bodily organ, a species existing in matter. The first and second meanings, Bonaventure notes, do not sufficiently distinguish sensing from understanding, because the intellect can also know a thing either as present or as here and now. The third meaning, however, differentiates the sense powers from the intellect, which does not receive species by means of a bodily organ. Accepting Aristotle's meaning for the term sen-

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

371

sing, therefore, Bonaventure considers the act of a sense power to be subject to the conjunct of the soul and body.12 Each of the exterior senses, as we have seen, has a proper correspondence to a particular property or quality of corporeal things.13 A particular sense, perceiving its corresponding quality, undergoes an immutation on the part of the organ, which receives a similitude of the quality, as the organ of sight receives a likeness of a colour. This similitude assimilates the sense of sight to the thing by way of its colour, and so the power of sight apprehends the thing according to its colour.14 Now, as we have also seen, the similitude of a colour received by the organ of sight is a likeness of the natural form of the colour in the coloured thing. 15 Comparing truth with colour, Bonaventure gives two definitions of colour from Aristotle. In relation to the thing, "colour is the extremity of transparence in a demarcated body"; in relation to the sense potency, "colour is the motive principle of sight according to the act of a lighted body". Likewise, in relation to the thing, as Augustine says: "truth is that which is"; in relation to the intellect, as Aristotle shows: "truth is the end of speculative understanding".16 Thus, for Bonaventure, as the natural truth of a thing moves the intellect into the act of understanding, so the natural colour of a thing moves the sense of sight into the act of seeing. The potency of sight, by means of its organ, receives a similitude of the colour in a thing; then, by the power of its active potency, the sense of sight abstracts a species of the colour as it is received by the organ, so that the whole power of sight perceives or apprehends the thing in a particular way as coloured.'' The acts of the exterior senses, therefore, arise from the reception of similitudes or species by the organs of the potencies. Although the species 12 2 Sent., 8.1.3.2, ad 4 (2.222; ed. min., 2.218); 4 Sent, 50.2.1.1, con. 1 (4.1045; ed. min., con. a, 4.1028). Consult: St. Augustine, De videndo Dei (Epist. 147), 2.7 (PL 33.599-600); Boethius, De consol. philos., 5, pr. 4 (PL 63.849), and Camm. in Porph., 1 (PL 64.85B-C); Aristotle, De anima, 2.12 (424al7-23), and De somno et vigilia, 1 (454a7-!0). 13 "Homo igitur, qui dicitur minor mundus, habet quinque sensus quasi quinque portas, per quas intrat cognitio omnium, quae sunt in mundo sensibili, in animam ipsius. Nam per visum intrant corpora sublimia et luminosa et cetera colorata, per tactum vero corpora solida ct terrestria, per tres vero sensus intermedios intrant intermedia, ut per gustum aquea, per auditum aerea, per odoratum vaporabilia, quae aliquid habent de natura humida, aliquid de aerea, aliquid de ignea seu calida, sicut patet in fumo ex aromatibus resoluto." — Itiner., 2.3 (5.300; ed. min., 5.188). 14 Cf. 4 Sent., 49.2.1.3.2, con. 4 & ad 4 (4.1020-21; ed. min., 4.1005-06); 27.1.1, ad 3 (4.676; ed. min., 4.663). 15 Cf. 2 Sent., 13.3.2, Resp. "Secundum autem ... tertio opinio." (2.328; ed. min., 2.331). 16 1 Sent., 3.1.dub.4 (1.79-80; ed. min., 1.57-58); cf. St Augustine, Solii, 2.5.8 (PL 32.888-89). See in Aristotle: De sensu et sens., c. 3 (439blO-12); De anima, 2.7 (418bl-3); Melaph., 2.1 (993b20). 17 2 Sent., 24.1.2.4, ad 3 (2.570; ed. min., 2.589-90). We have already shown that Bonaventure, following Augustine, considers the invisible power of lumen irradiating from the heavenly bodies to be the fundamental force moving all the sense powers into act: 2 Sent., 13.3.2. Resp. "Propterea intelligendum ..." (2.328-29; ed. min., 2.330-31). See in St. Augustine: De Gen. ad litt., 12.15.21, 12.19.25 (PL 34.363-64). On this aspect of sensation in Bonaventure's doctrine consult: Augustus Pisvin, O.F.M., "L'intuition sensible selon S. Bonaventure", SRHCI, pp» 367-68.

372

CHAPTER FIVE

are received beyond the matter of the things apprehended, even so, the species are received according to the material conditions, or the here and now, of those things.18 The species received by the organs are generated in their proper media, as the species of sound are generated in the air. After their reception by the particular senses, the species are transmitted to the interior potency, or common sense, which completes the acts of apprehension by the exterior senses.19 When the sense of touch, for instance, apprehends a division of parts and their number, they are sensed commonly and through themselves; so, for their complete apprehension, the act of the common sense must follow the act of the particular sense.20 The common sense, as we noted before, perceives the common properties of bodily things. 21 This sense power, which is a comparative power, apprehends its objects by comparing the perceptions of one particular sense with another, thus passing judgment on their acts. The common sense receives its species principally by reason of the organ, but the act of judging is carried out by reason of the power or active potency. The reception of species, Bonaventure adds, is such that they are received equally by the active potency. The judgment of the active potency, therefore, does not take place apart from the organ. Consequently, both reception and judgment belong to the whole conjunct of soul and body.22 The phantasms formed by the common sense are received by the organ of the imagination, which is the interior sense of apprehension. The active potency or power of the imagination abstracts from the phantasms species or images of the things perceived by the particular senses. Those images, however, are not abstracted entirely from the material conditions of bodily things, the intellect alone having the power to abstract species in that way. 23

18 4 Sent, 12.1.2.3, fm. 3 (4.280; ed. min., fm. c, 4.264); cf. 12.2.1.1, ad 3 (4.290; ed. min., 4.275). 19 "Haec autem sensibilia exteriora sunt quae primo ingrediuntur in animam per portas quinque sensuum; intrant, inquam, non per substantias, sed per similitudines suas primo generates in medio et de medio in organo et de organo exteriori in interiori et de hoc in potentiam apprehensivam; et sic generatio specie! in medio et de medio in organo et conversio potentiae apprehensivae super illam facit apprehensionem omnium eorum quae exterius anima apprehendit" — Itiner., 2.4 (5.300; ed. min., 5.189). 20 "... cum tactus apprehendat partitionem et numerum partium, sicut sensatum commune et per se, et sensus communis necessario sequatur ad completam apprehensionem sensus particularis ..." — 4 Sent., 12.1.dub. 1, in Resp. (4.286; ed. min., 4.271). 21 "Quia vero sensu percipimus non solum haec sensibilia particularia, quae sunt lux, sonus, odor, sapor et quatuor primariae qualitates, quae apprehendit tactus; verum etiam sensibilia communia, quae sunt numerus, magnitude, figura, quies et motus ..." — Itiner., 2.3 (5.300; ed. min.t 5.188). 22 "... dicendum quod cum ista duo sint in sensu, videlicet receptio et iudicum; receptio est principaliter ratione organi, sed iudicium ratione virtutis. In sensu autem corporeo sic est receptio in organo, quod est receptio pariter et in virtute; et sic iudicium virtutis illius in organo, quod non praeter organum: et ideo tarn receptio quam iudicium est totius coniuncti." — 2 Sent, 8.1.3.2, ad 7 (2.223; ed. min., 2.219). 23 "Ad illud quod obicitur de imaginatione, quod non differt potentia activa et passiva, dici potest quod magis differt quam in intellectu, quia organum corporate, in quo recipiuntur phantasmata, est ei loco potentiae passivae; ipsa vero vis imaginaria est loco potentiae activae. Aliter potest dici quod non est

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

373

When the intellect, acting as reason, has considered the things known through the senses, the sensible species of those things are then deposited in the memory for future use.24 The acts of the sense powers, as described by Bonaventure, depend on the reception of species by the organs of the body. The species are similitudes or likenesses of the natural properties of corporeal things, which generate them in their appropriate media, as the likeness of a colour is generated in the transparency of the air. On receiving the species of its corresponding property in the thing, the organ of a particular sense undergoes an immutation or change, but not in a material way. Following the reception of the species, the active potency of the sense power abstracts a proper species or similitude of its object, and so the whole power is assimilated to the object, thus perceiving or apprehending the thing according to its particular quality. The species abstracted by the particular senses are received by the organ of the common sense, or phantasia, which unifies the perceptions of the particular senses. Having received their species, the common sense, by its active potency, judges the acts of the particular senses by comparing them with one another. As a consequence, the common sense, forming phantasms, completes the work of exterior apprehension by perceiving the common properties or qualities of corporeal things. The phantasms are then received by the organ of the imagination, which is the interior sense of apprehension. The active potency of the imagination abstracts from the phantasms species or images of the things apprehended by the exterior senses. The images in the imagination are based on both the common and the particular qualities of corporeal things; however, going beyond their qualities but not their material conditions, the imagination abstracts species representing the general or quantitative properties of corporeal things. The species formed by the sense powers are received by the memory, which retains and conserves them for future use, particularly by the intellect in its acts of reminiscence. 25 Bonaventure's doctrine on the acts of the sense powers is influenced most of all by Aristotle, whose meaning of sensing he adopts as the truly proper

simile, quia, cum species defertur a sensu usque ad imaginationem, non exit genus abstractionis, quae quidem fit in sensu particular!; sed cum species pervenit ad intellectum, novum genus abstractionis ibi exigitur et aliud genus luminis." — 2 Sent., 24.1.2.4, ad 2 (2.570; ed. win., 2.589). Bonaventure, speaking of sensory illusions caused by demons, describes the working of the imagination with the phantasms of the common sense in: 2 Sent, 8.2.un.3 (2.227-30; ed. min, 2.224-27). 24 "Sensus enim percipit exteriora et post, sensus communis; deinde imaginatio, et ratio considerat et reponit in memoria" — ColL in Hexaem., 22.35 (5.442; cf. Delorme, p. 261). There are no other texts in Bonaventure's writings on the acts of the estimative sense beyond the ones that we have already seen; cf. Itimr., 2.6 "... ab obiecto." (5.301; ed. min., 5.190). 25 For other accounts of Bonaventure's doctrine on sensation see: J. Rohmer, "La theorie de ['abstraction dans I'ecole franciscaine", AHDLM, 3 (1928), pp. 144-46; M. R Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 21-24; Edward B. Costello, "The Theory of Knowledge of Saint Bonaventure", Studies in Medieval Culture (Western Michigan University, 1964) pp. 60-62; Augustus Pisvin, SRHC1, pp. 368-75.

374

CHAPTER FIVE

meaning of the term. The reception and abstraction of species assigned by Bonaventure to the sense powers follow the Aristotelean doctrine on sensation, which Bonaventure, also following Aristotle, subjects to the whole conjunct of soul and body.26 An influence of Boethius is manifested in Bonaventure's adaptation of the proper meaning of sensing as a knowing of a thing here and now to Aristotle's definition of sensing as a reception of species without matter.27 There is also an influence of Augustine on Bonaventure's doctrine, an influence that seems, at first sight, to be confined to the common meaning of sensing'as a knowing of a thing as present to the knower. But the influence of Augustine goes deeper than that, for it is from him that Bonaventure adopts the doctrine of corporeal light or lumen as the fundamental force at work in all the sense powers. It is from Augustine, moreover, that Bonaventure adopts the correspondence of the acts of the particular senses to the different properties of corporeal things, and it is from Augustine that he adapts to his doctrine the necessity of a concourse of the object with the sense power to bring about the act of sensing. In short, Bonaventure's doctrine on the acts of the sense powers represents in many respects a combination of Aristotelean and Augustinian elements.28

In our previous presentation of the doctrine of Aquinas on the distinctions between the exterior senses, we have shown that each particular sense undergoes a spiritual or immaterial change on the part of the organ, which 26 L. Veuthey considers the acts of the senses in Bonaventure's doctrine to be so Augustinian in character that sensation is the exclusive work of the rational soul: Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 47-54. Bonaventure's insistence on the nature of sensation as an operation of the whole conjunct does not support the view of Veuthey. 27 "Item, sensus est suspectivus specierum praeter materiam, tamen sub conditionibus materialibus hie et nunc ..." — 4 Sent., 12.1.2.3, fm. 3 (4.280; ed. min., fm. c, 4.264). 28 On the influence of Augustine note: "Secundum lumen, quod Hluminat nos ad formas naturales apprehendendas, est lumen cognitionis sensitivae, quod recte dicitur inferius, quia cognitio sensitiva ab inferiori incipit et fit beneficio lucis corporalis. Et hoc quintuplicatur secundum quinque sensus. Quorum sufficientiam sumit Augustinus secundum naturam luminis elementorum in tertio Super Genesi (4-5.6-7; PL 34.281-82) hoc modo: quia lumen sive lux faciens ad distinctionem rerum corporcarum aut est in suae proprietatis eminentia et quadam puritate, et sic est sensus visus; aut commisetur aftri, et sic est auditus; aut vapori, et sic est odoratus; aut humori, et sic est gustus; aut terrae grossitiei, et sic est tactus. Spiritus enim sensibilis naturam luminis habet, unde in nervis viget, quorum natura est clara et pervia; et in istis quinque sensibus multiplicatur secundum maiorem et minorem depurationem. Itaque cum quinque sint corpora mundi simplicia, scilicet quatuor elementa et quinta essentia; ut homo formas corporeas posset percipere, quinque sensus habet illis correspondentes, quia nulla fit apprehensio nisi per aliquam similitudinem et convenientiam organ! et obiecti, pro eo quod sensus est natura determinate Est alius modus sumendi sufficientiam sensuum, sed hunc approbat Augustinus, et rationabilis videtur, quia ad hanc sufficientiam simul concurrunt correspondentia ex parte orgar.i, medii et obiecti." — De reduc. artium, n. 3 (5.320; ed. min., 5.219); cf. 3 Sent., 17.1.2, ad sc 4 (3.367; ed. min., ad sc d, 3.360-61).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

375

receives the species enabling the sense power to perceive its proper object immediately. In this respect, Aquinas and Bonaventure hold a common ground, even though, as we have indicated, they differ in other respects.29 According to Aquinas, the proper objects of the particular senses are the alternating qualities of material things. The proper objects of the common sense, on the other hand, are magnitude, number, figure, movement and rest. Hence, regarding the objects of the common sense, Aquinas and Bonaventure also hold a common ground. For Aquinas, however, the common properties of material things can be reduced in some way to quantity, which is the proximate subject of their alternating qualities. The common properties, then, are sensed by reason of the alternating qualities and not immediately, just as the surface of a thing is seen, not immediately, but because of its colour. A particular sense, moreover, judges its proper object, distinguishing it from other objects perceived by the same power. The sense of sight, for instance, distinguishes betwen a white thing and a green thing. But to differentiate between a white thing and a sweet thing does not belong to either sight or taste: sight cannot perceive a sweet thing, nor can taste perceive a coloured thing. To differentiate between the proper perceptions of this and of that particular sense, therefore, belongs to the common sense, the root and principle of all the exterior senses. Consequently, exterior sensation terminates in the common sense, which undergoes an immutation on the part of the organ whenever any one of the particular senses receives its species.30 Though Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure on the objects of the particular senses and the common sense, and on the necessity for the common sense to complete exterior sensation, he gives a different account than Bonaventure of the acts of the particular senses. Bonaventure accounts for those acts by a reception of species on the part of the organ and an abstraction of proper species by an active potency, the whole power perceiving the object but not judging it, because judgment is the proper act of the common sense, which is the first comparative power. Bonaventure's account depends on his way of distinguishing the particular senses from the common sense; he distinguishes them as potencies of apprehending from a potency of judging. Aquinas, distinguishing the particular senses from the common sense by their proper objects, accounts for the acts of the particular senses according to a reception of species in the organ followed by a discernment or judgment of the object by the exterior sense itself. Thus, Aquinas has a particular sense discerning or judging between the qualities that it perceives, while the common sense judges between the various perceptions of the particular senses: on the latter point, he concurs with Bonaventure. Aquinas, unlike Bonaventure, does not speak of an active and passive potency in a sense power; he speaks, rather, of the act of a bodily 29 See above: pp. 356-57; cf. in Aquinas: 2 Sent,, 2.2.2, ad 5 (2.74-75). 30 ST, la, 78.3, ad 1-2 (1.476ab); 78.4, ad 1-2 (1.478b).

376

CHAPTER FIVE

organ, to which it is connatural to know singular and material things. 31 Although Aquinas refers to the reception of species by the bodily organs, and to the abstraction of species by the sense powers, he does not attribute, as Bonaventure does, the act of abstraction to an active potency as distinct from a passive potency in the sense power.32 On the other hand, Aquinas refers to the sense of sight as having something of light enabling it to make colours actually visible. 33 In sum, Aquinas and Bonaventure have a lot in common, yet they differ in many respects, on the acts of the sense powers.34 Acts of the Intellective Power

The intellective power, as we have seen, is distinguished by Bonaventure according to its acts of abstraction and reception. Abstraction is proper to the agent intellect, which gathers intelligible species or universal forms from the images and phantasms of singular things. Reception is proper to the possible intellect, which receives the abstracted species or forms by an illumination of the agent intellect. Following their proper acts of abstraction and reception, the two potencies of the intellect act together as one power in every operation of human understanding. Their conjoint action has to do immediately with the universal forms or species of the particular things known by the senses. Thus, in an act of understanding, the 31 "Ea igitur quae non habent esse nisi in materia individual!, cognoscere est nobis connaturale, co quod anima nostra, per quam cognoscimus, est forma alicuius rnateriae. Quae tamen habet duas vittutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae est actus alicuius corporei organi. Et huic connaturale est cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individual!, unde sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia ..." —ST, la, 12.4, Resp. (1.64b). 32 "... dicendum quod sensus recipit species sensibilium in organis corporalibus, et est cognoscitivus particularium; intellectus enim recipit species rerum absque organo corporali, et est cognoscitivus universalium." — DA, a. 13, ad 19 (2.332). "Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster singulare cognoscit; ut enim Philosophus dicit in III De anima (c. 7; 431b2-4), phantasmata se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut colores, qui sunt extra animam, ad visum; unde, sicut species quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a rebus ipsis, et per earn cognitio sensus continuatur ad ipsas res sensibiles; ita intellectus noster abstrahit speciem a phantasmatibus, et per earn cognitio eius quodammodo ad phantasmata continuatur. Sed tamen tantum interest; quod similitude quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab obiecto cognoscibili, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitudinem directe cognoscitur, similitude autem quae est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut obiecto cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est in speculo, dum fertur in earn non ut in rem quamdam, sed ut in similitudinem rei." — DV, 2.6. Resp. (2.42). 33 "Huius autem exemplum omnino simile esset si oculus, simul cum hoc quod est diaphanum et susceptivus colorum, haberet tantum de luce quod posset colores facere visibiles actu: sicut quaedam animalia dicuntur sui oculi luce sufficienter sibi illuminare obiecta; propter quod de node vident magis, in die vero minus; sunt enim debilium oculorum, quia parva luce moventur, ad multam autem confunduntur." — SCO, 2.77 (2.226); cf. DSpC, a. 10, ad 4 (2.409). 34 We have compared sufficiently the doctrines of Aquinas and Bonaventure on the memory and on the imagination, which Aquinas calls the phantasia; see above: pp. 337-39, and consult in Aquinas: DV, 2.6, ad 1 (1,42); ST, la, 85.1, ad 2 (1.525ab). Aquinas it at one with Bonaventure in distinguishing sense cognition from intellectual cognition as knowledge of singular things from knowledge of universals; however, Aquinas cites both Aristotle and Boethius on this question: DV, 2.6, sc (1.42), 10.5, sc (1.199); ST, la, 86,1, sc (1.535b).Cf.Boethius,Comm. in Porp/i.,l (PL 64.85B-C); Aristotle, Physica, 1.5 (189a5-.9).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

377

human intellect is united to the thing understood by means of its intelligible species, which represents the object known to the intellect. The intellect's act of understanding, therefore, comes to-be from the abstract species or form representing the concrete species or form by which the thing known has actual being.35 The term understanding, according to Bonaventure, can be taken in two ways. In the first way, it is the same as knowing 'what is', for such is the nominal meaning of the term. In the second way, it is the same as comprehending by reason.36 The term understanding, in the first way, has a wide meaning, and so it stands for the act by which the intellect knows the essence or species of some thing. Taken in the second way, however, the term signifies the act by which the intellect, after reasoning or thinking, comprehends its object. It is according to the second way, Bonaventure says, that Augustine distinguishes the act of understanding from the act of believing: "what we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, we owe to authority".37 Bonaventure also refers to the intellect both as an apprehending intellect and as a resolving intellect. The first name designates the intellect from the act of apprehending a thing, and the second from the act of comprehending it, an act requiring the intellect to analyze the thing according to its component or constitutive elements. To understand a thing by apprehending it, the intellect must know the thing by its principle of understanding: a man, for instance, must be known by his humanity, or universal form. But the intellect, apprehending a thing, can understand it without knowing its cause: a man can be understood without knowing thereby what caused him. For this reason, Aristotle says that whoever speaks of one thing speaks also of many things, not absolutely, but implicity in some way. To understand a thing by comprehending it, the intellect must consider or analyze the essential principles of the thing, such as its form and matter. This consideration results in an incomplete comprehension of the thing, if the 35 "Quando enim dicitur quod ad actum intelligent!! requiritur quod ex intellecto et intelligente fiat unum, hoc intelligitur quantum ad speciem, quae unitur intellectui, non quantum ad ipsum obiectum extrinsecum. Ilia autem species, quae intellectui unitur, habet comparationem ad intellectum, in quo est, et ad obiectum, ad quod est et quod repraesentat."— 2 Sent., 18.2.1, in ad 5 (2.447; ed min., 2.460). "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod substantia intellectiva nihil cognoscit nisi quod abstrahitur a materia, dicendum quod hoc non facit propter hoc quod ipsa sit omnino immaterialis, sed propter hoc quod res non potest ei uniri secundum veritatem. Ideo oportet quod uniatur secundum similitudinem, quam anima abstrahit a re. Alia est etiam ratio, quia intellectus per.similitudinem, per quam intelligit, debet fieri in actu intelligendi; illud autem quod facit rem esse in actu, species est et forma. Ideo anima non cognoscit rem nisi speciem eius et formam sibi imprimat; et hoc non potest esse nisi ilia abstrahatur a materia." — 2 Sent., 17.1.2, ad 4 (2.415; ed min., 2.427). 36 "Dicendum quod intelligere dupliciter dicitur: uno modo idem est quod cognoscere 'quid est', quod per nomen dicitur, alio modo idem est quod ratione comprehendere." — 1 Sent., 19.2.dub.l, Resp. (1.365; ed min., 1.292). 37 3 Sent., 24.dub.3, Resp. (3.530; ed. min., 3.522-23); cf. St. Augustine, De utilit. creden., c. 11 (PL 42.83); Retract, 1.14.3 (PL 32.607).

378

CHAPTER FIVE

analysis of its principles does not bring about an understanding of the first being. When the analysis includes an understanding of the first being, however, the intellect then has a complete comprehension of the thing, because it is understood according to its first cause.38 The act of comprehending a thing is completed by what Bonaventure calls the composing intellect. This name refers to the act by which the intellect, having analyzed a thing abstractly, brings together again the principles of the thing by synthesizing them in accordance with the concrete being of the thing.39 The human intellect, therefore, as a power of understanding, knows corporeal things both by apprehending them and by comprehending them. Knowledge by way of apprehension consists in a manifestation of the truth of the thing known; this knowledge requires the thing and the intellect to be proportioned to each other by a relation of suitability. Kowledge by way of comprehension consists in an understanding of the whole truth of the thing, an understanding which requires the intellect and the thing to be proportioned to one another by a relation of equality.40 In other words, on apprehending a corporeal thing, the intellect manifests the truth of the thing by an understanding of its universal form, which establishes between the thing and the intellect a relation giving the intellect a capacity to know the thing by its essence or species. On comprehending a corporeal thing, the intellect grasps the whole truth of the thing by an understanding based on a relation of equality, which enables the intellect to know the whole being of the thing not only in itself, but also according k> its essential principles and causes. Now, unable to judge the object, an exterior sense apprehends a thing in an incomplex or simple way: the sense of sight, for example, apprehends a white thing without judging it, for the act of judging belongs to the common sense. But the intellect, apprehending the same thing, knows it in a complex manner, predicating 'white' of 'thing'; so, saying that 'this thing is white', the intellect apprehends it in a judgment. 41 The human intellect can judge a thing in two ways. In the first way, regarding any object, the intellect judges a thing by discerning whether it is, or

38 1 Sent, 28.dub.l, Resp. "Sed quod ... non intellecto." (1.504; ed. min., 1.401); cf. Aristotle, P/ysica, 1.2 (185b5-10). 39 "Dicendum quod secundum intellectum componentem sapere dicitur a sapientia, quia intellectus componens procedit ab abstracto ad concretum; secundum vero intellectum resolventem est e converso ..." — 1 Sent., 8.1.dub.3, Resp. (1.162; ed. min, 1.127). 40 "... dicendum quod est cognitio per comprehensionem et per apprehensionem. Cognitio per apprehensionem consistit in manifestatione veritatis rei cognitae; cognitio vero comprehensionis consisut in inclusione totalitatis. Ad primam cognitionem requiritur proportio convenientiae ... Quantum ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur proportio aequalitatis et aequiparantiae ..." — 1 Sent., 3.l.un. 1, ad 1 (1.69; ed min., 1.49). 41 "Sensus enim, dum apprehendit rern albain, apprehendit per modum cuiusdam incomplexionis, quia non novit sensus exterior componere nee dividere; sed intellectus, dum illud idem apprehendit quod sensus apprehendebat, sub modo complexionis accipit, praedicans hoc de hoc, componens hoc illi et dicens hoc esse album ..." — 3 Sent., 24.1.3, ad 3 (3.516; ed, min., 3.508).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

379

whether it is not. Hence, in this way, which is the way of apprehension, the intellect makes a judgment concerning the truth, or the being, of things in themselves. In the other way, which is the way of comprehension, the intellect judges a thing by approving or disapproving of it, thus determining whether it ought to be this or that. Consequently, comprehending things in such a manner, the intellect does not make judgments concerning their truth; rather, it judges them according to the first truth and, as Augustine says, no man judges that truth, and yet no one can judge other things without it: a judge passes judgment on others according to the law, but he does not judge the law itself.42 The act of the intellect on considering a thing, particularly on comprehending it, is called thinking (cogitare). Bonaventure discusses the meaning of the term thinking when treating the question: Whether God, or the divine being, can be thought not to-be. The intellect, he says, can think that something is not, either falsely or with truth. It can think falsely, for instance, that 'man is an ass'; to think this, Bonaventure remarks, is nothing else than to understand the significance of 'man' and 'ass'. In other words, the thinking of the intellect with regard to 'man' and 'ass' is true, but the judgment that 'man is an ass' is false: it is true that 'man is an animal', and that 'ass is an animal'; but it is not true that 'man is an ass'. It is in such a manner that the divine being can be thought not to-be, and so this thinking is erroneous. When the human intellect assents to the thought that something is not, which really is, the error is due to a defect either on the part of the knower or on the part of the thing to be known. The defect on the part of the knower is either ignorance or blindness regarding the truth, so that, not knowing what the thing is, he thinks that it is not. Thus, not knowing what God is, some men think that He is not. The defect on the part of the thing to be known is due either to its absence or to a lack of evidence, and so. to think with truth, the intellect must understand the nature of the thing as it is present or known to the senses. Since there is plenty of evidence in the sense world showing that God is, and since He is present always and everywhere in the universe, therefore, Bonaventure maintains, the human intellect can always think with truth that 'God is', even though it can never think or comprehend 'what God is'.43 But the human intellect can think, in general, that 'nothing is' and it can think, in particular, that 'God is not': therefore, it seems that the intellect is true in thinking that 'God is not'. Bonaventure, answering his opponent, says that thinking, taken generally, stands for an act of the mind, whether or not it is in error, or whether it assents or does not assent to its thought. From this point of view, the thought of the intellect regarding God is true. Taken properly, however, thinking stands for thought with an assent

42 1 Sent, 3.1.un.l, ad 4 (1.69; ed. min., 1.50); cf. St. Augustine, De sera relig., 31.58 (PL 34.147-48). 43 1 Seat, 8.1.1, Resp. (1.154-55; ed. mm., 1.119-21).

380

CHAPTER FIVE

of the mind. From that point of view, the thought of the intellect about God is false, because, as Aristotle says, it contradicts the principles with respect to the exterior reason of its thinking, and yet the intellect does not contradict the principles governing the interior reason of its thought.44 Hence, for Bonaventure, the thinking of the human intellect is true whenever it conforms to the interior principles of reason, even though the judgment terminating the thought of the intellect does not conform to the exterior principles of truth in the thing under consideration. When the intellect assents to the truth of the exterior thing as it is known to the senses, the intellect is then not only true in its thinking, but also in its judgment, because it has the truth concerning the being or nature of the thing known. The first consideration of a thing by the intellect terminates in the judgment apprehending the thing by means of the senses. Following that judgment, the intellect withdraws from the senses and, thinking apart from them, it ascends what Bonaventure calls the predicamental line of universal forms. Thus, thinking about its object, the intellect analyzes the essence or species of the thing apprehended; this analysis, beginning with the lowest genus, proceeds until the highest genus is attained, so that the essence of the thing becomes known according to its most general or first principles of truth. Thereafter, descending the predicamental line, the intellect moves from the most general genus to the individual thing itself, and so, by an act of synthesis, the intellect comprehends the truth of the individual thing according to the essential principles of its species.45 The intellect, for example, apprehends what a thing is, either essentially or accidentally: 'this thing is a man', or 'this man is white'. Having thought about the object, both by analysis and by synthesis, the intellect comprehends the truth of the thing, since the intellect now knows the reason for the essential or accidental being of the thing: 'this thing is a man, because it is rational', or 'this man is white, because he has a body'. As a consequence, a thing comprehended by the intellect can be defined by its proper genus and species: ' man is a rational animal', and 'white is a species of colour'. The truth of the judgment by which the intellect comprehends a thing, however, depends on the first principles in the memory, for it is at those principles that the analysis of the thing's essence terminates. Although the thing is comprehended with certitude whenever it is understood according to the first principles in the memory, nevertheless, because their truth depends on the eternal reasons of things in the mind of God, the certitude of com44 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod contingit exprimere contingit et cogitare, dicendum quod potest accipi cogitare gcneraliter pro actu mentis sive errantis sive non, sive assentis sive non: et tune est illud verum; vel pro cogitatione cum assensu: et sic est falsum; quia dignitatibus contingit contradicere quantum ad exterius rationem, non tamen quantum ad interius, ut dicit Philosophus, in libro Posteriorum." — Lac. cit, ad 6 (1.155; ed. min., 1.121); cf. sc 6. See in Aristotle, AnaL poster., 1.9 (76a26-30), and 1.10 (76b35-77a2). 45 4 Sent, 50.2.un.l, ad 4-7 (4.1046-47; ed. min., 4.1030). For the source of the doctrine on the predicamental line of abstraction see: Boethius, Canon, in Parphyr., lib. 3 (PL 64.99-116).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

381

prehensive knowledge must be judged according to His eternal reasons, since they are the first causes of truth in created things. In judging the certitude of comprehension, the intellect apprehends the conformity of the thing to its eternal reason in God, and so the intellect knows that the thing cannot be otherwise than it is, because it is necessary for the thing to-be in accordance with its eternal reason. In that way, the intellect knows with perfect certitude that it is necessary for 'man' to be 'rational'; therefore, judging the certitude of comprehensive knowledge, the intellect understands that 'this thing is a man, because it is rational; and it is rational, because of its eternal reason in God'. In short, acquired from a perception of God, who is the first truth, perfect comprehension of corporeal things is infallibly and immutably true.*6 In what way is God known to the human mind in its judgment of the certitude of comprehensive knowledge? God is known, Bonaventure notes, either in the creature or through the creature. To know God in the creature is to know His presence and influence there; this way of knowing Him, as Augustine says, is imperfect in the present life, but it will be perfect in beatitude, when God will be seen as He is. To know God through the creature is to be elevated by means of a ladder, as it were, from a knowledge of the creature to a knowledge of the Creator. To know God in that way, as Bernard says, is proper to a man in the present life. Consequently, when God is known by the human mind in judging the certitude of comprehension, He is known only indirectly and as the first principle and cause of all truth.47 The universal form, or intelligible species, by which the intellect understands its object is a similitude or likeness of the thing known. The species, as a similitude, assimilates the intellect to the thing, thus making the intellect to be like the thing in a cognitional way. This assimilation results from the proportion established between the thing and the intellect by the intelligible species, which is impressed on the possible intellect by an illumination of the agent intellect. When the intellective power apprehends or comprehends the truth of the thing, the human mind then ex46 Itiner., 2.9 (5.301-02; ed. min., 5.191-92); 3.3 "... conditionibus praelibatis." (5.304; ed. min., 5.19596). For the comparable analyses and syntheses of the practical intellect see: Op. cit., 3.4 (5.304-05; ed. min., 5.197-98); for the corresponding movements of the will see: 4 Sent., 14.2.dub. 7, Resp. (4.343; ed. min., 4.329). 47 "... notandum quod aliud est cognoscere Deum in creatura, aliud per creaturam. Cognoscere Deum in creatura est cognoscere ipsius praesentiam et influentiam in creatura. Et hoc quidem est viatorum semiplene, sed comprehensorum perfecte; unde dicit Augustinus, in fine libri De doit. Dei (22.30.4; PL 41.803-04), quod tune expresse Deus videbitur, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus. Cognoscere autem Deum per creaturam est elevari a cognitione creaturae ad cognitionem Dei quasi per scalam rnediam. Et hoc est proprie viatorum, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium." — 1 Sent, 3.1.un.3, Resp. (1.74; ed. min., 1.53); cf. St. Bernard, De consider., 5.1 (PL 182.787-89). The image of the ladder between the creature and the Creator is taken from Genesis, 28.11-22, with a probable influence of Boethius: De consoL philos., \, pr. 1 (PL 63.587-91). Bonaventure uses the same image in describing the ascent of the mind to God by abstracting from the forms and figures of corporeal things: 2 Sent, 8. l.dub.l, Resp. (2.223; ed. min., 2.219).

382

CHAPTER FIVE

presses that truth in an intelligible word. Emanating from the mind by way of conception, the intelligible word is called a concept.*6 Bonaventure's doctrine on the concept is contained in his texts on the conception of the divine Word in God. To present his doctrine on the concept in human knowledge, therefore, we must examine those texts on the Word of God. Now, according to Augustine, there is a spoken word, an intelligible word, and a mediating word. A spoken word is produced by the human voice. An intelligible word is conceived by the mind on thinking about some thing. A mediating word is formed by the mind in thinking about the vocal presentation of its concept. Illustrating the difference between the three words, Bonaventure says that a man first thinks what some thing might be; then he thinks about the way that he ought to present his thought in speech, and so he pronounces a vocal word presenting the thought contained by his intelligible word. Of the three words, only the intelligible word is expressed as a similitude of the thing as it exists in the human mind. The intelligible word proceeds from the mind in a natural way, so that it is similar and equal in every respect to the mind itself. For this reason, Bonaventure observes, the intelligible word is called a concept of the mind. The generation of a concept, moreover, precedes every decision of a man concerning things to be done. From this viewpoint, the concept is a disposition of the human mind, directing its thinking about some work, even though no work actually follows the thought of the mind. Finally,, as an intelligible word, the concept is united to the spoken word, and yet the concept remains an integral word of the mind from which it is inseparable. Comparing the word of the human mind with the Word of God, Bonaventure notes certain differences between them. The human mind, as Augustine shows, frequently thinks of things about which it has no true knowledge, and thus the human concept can contain what is false or untrue. The human mind also thinks frequently of things that a man is unwilling to do, or is incapable of doing, with the result that the human concept can be a source of sorrow, or be conjoined to impotence. The divine Word, by contrast, is most true, most pleasing, and most powerful. To resemble the divine Word properly, then, the human concept must be a word of certain knowledge, pleasing to the mind, and capable of moving the will into action. This is the human word, Bonaventure says, that is conceived in thought conjoined to the will; but the word is perfect when, having power, it moves the will to love what is true and good. Consequently, the perfect word of the human mind is "knowledge with love and power".49

48 "Item, ratione videtur, quia verbum est quod emanat a. mente per modum conceptionis, ergo verbum de se dicit conceptum ..." — I Sent, 27.2.un.l, fm. 4 (1.481; ed. min., fm. d, 1.381). 49 1 Sent., 27.2.un.4, Resp. (1.489-90; ed. min., 1.388-90). See in St Augustine, I)e Trinit, 15.10.11 (PL 42.1071-73), and 15.13-14.22-24 (PL 42.1075-77).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

383

The spoken word, according to Bonaventure, is an exterior word and, as such, it is a sign of the interior word or concept. When an interior word is untrue, or even doubtful, it does not empower the mind to express a true similitude of its object. The mind cannot be assimilated in truth to an object, therefore, unless the interior word conceived by the mind is a true likeness of the exterior thing.50 A true interior word, because it is a proper likeness of an exterior thing, draws the attention of the mind to that thing, as both Augustine and Anselm show, and not to the mind itself. This interior word, consequently, is quite distinct from the mental word conceived by the mind when reflecting upon itself. The mental word is generated, as it were, by an act of self-conversation. The mind, speaking of itself, understands itself and, by understanding itself, conceives a word similar to itself, and so the intelligence is assimilated to the mind. When the mind speaks to itself of other things, however, it is assimilated to those things, because it understands them in words that are similar to them. But a mental word, like an intelligible word, can be made known exteriorly in a spoken word.51 Bonaventure, following Anselm, teaches that an interior word is generated whenever a similitude or image of an object is conceived by the human mind. The interior word, furthermore, looks to the object that it represents to the mind. Since the human mind cannot think at once, nor by one and the same act, both of itself and of other things, therefore, the mind thinks of itself by a word which is different from the words that it conceives in thinking of other things. To understand its many objects, then, the human mind must conceive a multiplicity of words. The mind cannot express all its thoughts in a single word, as the Father in God expresses all that He knows in a single concept, which is the Word of God. In short, every act of understanding by the human mind must be expressed in a separate concept.52 The assimilation of the human intellect in truth to the things that it understands, either by apprehension or by comprehension, requires the conception of intelligible words conforming the intellect to its objects. The conformity of one thing to another by means of a similitude can come about in three different ways. In one way, two things are assimilated to

50 Lac. cit, "His visis, patent obiecta ..." (1.490; ed. min., 1.390). 51 1 Sent., 27.2.un.l, Resp. "Sed hoc ... verbum prolatum." (1.482-83; ed. min., 1.382); cf. St. Anselm, Manol, c. 63 (PL 158.209). See in St. Augustine: De Trinit, 5.13.14 (PL 42.920); 6.2.3 (PL 42.925); 7.2.3 (PL 42.936). 52 1 Sent., 27.2.un.2, Resp. "... Dei sapientia." (1.485; ed min., 1.384), cf. St Anselm, op. cit., cc. 31-33 (PL 158.184-88). From the theological point of view, the Word of God is seen to contain the eternal reasons or similitudes of truth in all created things, a perspective taken from St. Augustine, but developed by St Bonaventure in his characteristic way: 1 Sent., 31.2.1.3, ad 5 (1.544; ed. min., 1.432-3; cf. 3 Sent., 14.2.1, sc 1-2 & ad 1-2 (3.307-08; ed. min., 3.300-01). See in St Augustine, De Trinit., 6.10.11 (PL 42.931).

384

CHAPTER FIVE

each other by participating in a third, as a swan and snow are alike through a participation in whiteness. In another way, two things are assimilated or conformed to each other because the one is a similitude of the other, as the species of a colour is conformed to the colour of which it is a likeness. The conformity between two things comes about, in the third way, when one of them participates in a similitude of the other. In this way, a mirror or an eye participates in the similitude of a colour, thus assimilating the eye or the mirror to a coloured thing.53 On the basis of this text, we can say that the intellect is assimilated by means of a concept to a thing that it understands, because they participate in the same truth, just as a swan and snow participate in the form of whiteness. The assimilation in truth of the intellect to the thing rests upon the prior conformity of the intelligible species to the thing, of which the species is a likeness. This species, as we have seen, sets up a proportion between the thing and the intellect enabling it to know the truth of the thing. Hence, completing that initial proportion, the intellect conceives a word expressing the truth of the thing; so, forming its own similitude of the thing, the intellect is conformed or assimilated in truth to the thing itself. The principle of the conformity, and so of the concept, is the intelligible species, which is the ground of the intellect's participation in the truth of its object. Consequently, the intelligible species is the imperfect principle of truth in the intellect, whereas the intelligible word, expressing the assimilation of the intellect to the thing, is the perfect principle of truth, for the word or concept is a similitude containing the adequation of the intellect and the thing. The fundamental principle or possibility of truth in the intellect, however, consists in its natural potency to become all things by means of their intelligible species. Those species, following their abstraction by the agent intellect, are impressed upon or received by the possible intellect. Since the intelligible species are similitudes of the things from which they are abstracted, therefore, by receiving those species, the possible intellect is conformed to the things that they represent, and so it can be assimilated to them in truth by the formation or conception of intelligible words. The truth expressed by an intelligible word, as Augustine indicates, is the entity or being of the thing understood. Thus, for Bonaventure, the truth of the thing itself is the remote ground of intellectual knowledge. From this viewpoint, truth exists properly in the thing more than in the intellect. The intelligible species abstracted from the thing, on the other hand, is the proximate ground of intellectual knowledge, and the intelligible word expressed by the intellect is its im53 "Dicendum quod aliquid conformari alicui contingit duplicitcr aut quantum ad similitudinem aut quantum ad habitudinem. Quantum ad similitudinem contingit tripliciten aut quando aliqua duo participant tertium, in quo assimilantur, ut cygnus et nix in albedine; aut cum aliqua duo sic se habent quod unum est similitudo alterius, ut species colons sive idolum assimilatur colon sive conformatur, aut quando aliquid participat similitudinem, ut speculum vel oculus assimilatur vel conformatur corpori obiecto." — 1 Sent, 48.1.1, Resp. (1.852; ed. min., 1.676).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

385

mediate ground of knowledge. Since the truth of the thing in the intellect depends on its spiritual light, which is the efficient cause of intellectual knowledge, truth exists more nobly in the intellect than in the thing, for "truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone", as Anselm says. But truth exists most nobly and properly in the exemplar similitude of the thing in God. His similitude expresses the thing, Bonaventure teaches, more perfectly than the thing can express itself. To know a thing according to its similitude in God, then, is to know it more perfectly than to know the thing in itself. For this reason, Augustine says that knowing a thing in God is knowing it in the light of day, whereas knowing a thing in itself is knowing it in the shadow of the evening, for every creature is in darkness with respect to the light of God.54 The similitude of a thing in God, according to Bonaventure, is the very truth of the thing. Truth is defined by Bonaventure, in common with his contemporaries, as the adequation of the intellect and the thing understood. The intellect which is adequated to the thing, Bonaventure maintains, is the divine intellect, which causes the thing to-be. A created thing is true in itself, therefore, when it conforms to all the conditions of its being as expressed by its similitude in God. Those conditions include the different categories or predicaments applicable to the thing, or its substance and accidents, so that the whole truth of the thing must represent its complete and perfect conformity to its similitude in the divine intellect. Consequently, the complete and perfect adequation of the human intellect to a thing that it understands comes about when the intelligible word of the intellect expresses the full conformity of the thing to its exemplar similitude in the creating intellect of God Since the thing is not its own adequation to the divine intellect, Bonaventure insists, the human intellect cannot be perfectly adequated to the thing: as Augustine says, every creature is false, considered apart from God; this is why Augustine, in the interpretation of Bonaventure, describes the creature as a shadow with respect to the Creator.55 In Bonaventure's view, therefore, a man is said to be right when his intelligence, in knowing other things, is adequated to them according to their similitudes in the divine mind. This adequation follows an actual consideration of the assimilation of created things to their uncreated truths, or eternal reasons, in the mind of God. By considering those reasons, the

54 DSC, q. 2, ad 9 (5.10); cf. St Anselm, Dialog, de vent., c. 11 (PL 158.479-80). Consult in St. Augustine: De Gen. ad lift., 4.22.39 (PL 34.311-12), 4.30.47 (PL 34.315-16); Confess., 12.8.8 (PL 32.829). 55 Coll. in Hexaim., 3.8 (5.344; cf. Delorme, p. 37); cf. St. Augustine, De vera relig., 36.66 (PL 34.15152); In loann. Evang., 1.13 (PL 35.1385-86). Bonaventure speaks here of the adequation of the divine intellect as true: "Haec adaequatio vera est, quando res est tanta, talis, ordinem habens, agens, patiens, tune, ubi, cum situm habet, secundum differentias praedicamentorum. Tune enim res sunt verae, quando sunt in re vel in universe, sicut sunt in arte aeterna, vel sicut ibi exprimuntur. Res autem vera est, secundum quod adaequatur intellectui causanti." (The Delorme version omits most of this text).

386

CHAPTER FIVE

human intelligence is confirmed in truth, so it is said to be rectified in truth. As a consequence, the human mind can judge with rectitude the truths of its objects, and it can express its judgments in concepts representing with perfect certitude its adequations to those objects. But a complete word or concept of the mind has power to move the will to love what is good. Now a man is also said to be right when his will, in loving good things, is adequated to the divine will, which is the supreme cause of goodness in created things. By conforming his will to the divine will, a man is confirmed in justice, so he is said to be rectified in goodness, as Anselm indicates: "justice is rectitude of the will". Wherefore, conformed to the supreme goodness of God, a man can justly and rightly love the goodness in every created thing.56 Bonaventure's texts on man's intellectual knowledge contain a welldeveloped and unified synthesis on the operations of the human intellect. The composition of the synthesis, though Bonaventurean in character, is influenced in various ways and at different levels by some four historical sources. Aristotle's influence is evident chiefly in the principle, invoked constantly by Bonaventure, that the human intellect has a natural capacity for knowing all things in some way, a principle involving the Aristotelean doctrine on the agent and possible intellects. This principle is used by Bonaventure to show that the nature of understanding requires an assimilation of the knower to the things that he knows. An Aristotelean influence is manifested also in Bonaventure's reference to the necessity of the human intellect to conform to the exterior reason of its thought, a conformity necessary to know the truth of the exterior thing, even though the thinking of the intellect conforms to its interior principles. Still another influence of Aristotle is seen in Bonaventure's view that the apprehension of a thing by the intellect gives only implicit knowledge of the thing's cause, thus requiring the intellect to comprehend its object in order to know its cause explicitly. Bonaventure's account of the intellect's comprehensive understanding of its objects shows the influence of Boethius, whose doctrine on the predicamental line of abstraction Bonaventure adapts to his own synthesis on intellectual knowledge. The influence of Augustine appears at every level of the Bonaventurean synthesis. It is to Augustine that Bonaventure goes for his doctrine of truth in the thing as the entity or being of the thing. Bonaventure also goes to Augustine for the nobler mode of being that the thing has in the human mind, where it exists in a spiritual way, and so the thing is said to be more true there than it is in itself. An Augustinian influence is visible in Bonaventure's account of the comprehension of truth as an act following previous thought by the human mind about its object. His doctrine on the certitude of comprehension, moreover, represents an

56 2 Sent, Proocm. "Tune enim ... eos inclinatur." (2.4; ed. min., 2.5); cf. St. Anselm, Dialog, de liber, arbitr., c. 3 (PL 158.494).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

387

adaptation to his synthesis of Augustine's teaching on the seeing of things most certainly and most nobly in God; this teaching includes the necessity of judging all things according to the first truth, so that they are known as they exist in their prior causes, or eternal reasons. Consequently, still depending on Augustine, Bonaventure maintains that the human intellect cannot know the truth of its objects with perfect certitude, if they are known apart from God, who is their first cause; so, knowing them in God, the intellect perfects its assimilation in truth to its objects, because it is adequated to them as they are in the mind of God. Bonaventure's doctrine on the interior words of the human mind is based on the doctrine of Augustine, but it is developed under the influence of Anselm, from whom Bonaventure gets his notions of truth as rectifying the mind, and of justice as rectifying the will. Giving all his sources a share in the development of his philosophical thought, Bonaventure organizes them in a coherent manner as he composes an original synthesis on the acts of the intellective power in man. 57

We have seen that Bonaventure and Aquinas hold some views in common and other views that are different on the nature of the human intellect. Their common views look principally to the agent intellect as a potency that abstracts universal forms from particular things, and to the possible intellect as a potency that receives the forms abstracted by the agent intellect. Their different views look first to the proper principle distinguishing the one potency from the other: Bonaventure distinguishes them by their acts; Aquinas distinguishes them by their objects. Their views differ, secondly, on the action of the intellect regarding the phantasms: in Bonaventure's view, the intellect can act without reference to the phantasms, particularly in its acts of reflexion; in the view of Aquinas, the intellect must act always in conjunction with the phantasms, even in its reflexive acts. Those common and different views of Bonaventure and Aquinas mark their doctrines on the acts or operations of the human intellect. Thus, holding that the intellect is perfected by successive acts, Aquinas teaches that the intellect does not acquire perfect cognition when it first apprehends a corporeal thing. The intellect's initial apprehension of the thing has to do only with its essence or quiddity, which is the proper object of the intellect.

57 For some other accounts of the Bonaventurean doctrine on man's intellectual knowledge see: Z. Van de Woestyne, "Augustinismus in gnoseologia S. Bonaventurae et S. Thomae", Antonianum, 8 (1933), pp. 282-83; C. M. O'Donnell, The Psychol of St. Bonaventure..., pp. 61-69; H. Guthrie, The Modem Schoolman, 15 (1938), pp. 86-87; M. R Dady, Theory of Knowledge..., pp. 18-21, 24-30, 63-69; E. Bettoni, S. Bonaventura, pp. 119-23, ET pp. 91-94; L. Veuthey, "Bonaventura (S)", ENF, v. 1, cc. 747-50; Norbert de Guise, EF (NS), 12 (1962), pp. 161-77: he gives a fine account of the Bonaventurean doctrine on the search for God as Truth from the truth of creatures.

388

CHAPTER FIVE

Thereafter, the intellect understands the accidents of the thing; so, to understand the whole thing, the intellect, reasoning about it, must judge the thing according to its substance and accidents.58 The intellect judges the thing, moreover, by predicating of its particular parts the universal form, or by predicating the accidents of the thing's substance. On judging a man, for example, the intellect predicates of him both animal nature and rational nature; therefore, the intellect understands the individual man to be a rational animal. The intellect likewise predicates whiteness of the man, and so the man is understood to be white, because he has the accident of whiteness. Consequently, to judge the truth of its object, the intellect must know the thing according as it is apprehended by the senses.59 In the view of Aquinas, then, as in the view of Bonaventure, the apprehension of a corporeal thing is complete when the judgment of the intellect, following an abstraction and a reception of an intelligible species, gives an understanding of the thing according to its concrete principles, for they are the first ground of human knowledge. On this point, Aquinas turns to Aristotle, who teaches that the intellect must judge its objects in accordance with the evidence provided by the senses, because human knowledge originates from sensible things.60 The human intellect, Aquinas says, can err in its judgment, if its predication of a universal form does not correspond to the concrete conditions of the thing known. For instance, having abstracted the form whiteness from a white thing, the intellect would err in judging that the form is not in that thing. But the intellect does not err in abstracting and considering the form whiteness apart from the white thing, since the thing does not belong to the nature of whiteness, which is a universal form common to many particular things. In a similar way, the intellect does not err in abstracting and considering the form humanity apart from this or that particular man. Those abstractions and considerations have to do only with universal forms or intelligible species acquired from phantasms. Aquinas compares the inerrancy of the intellect with the similar inerrancy of an exterior sense power. Excepting some defect in the organ, an exterior sense cannot be deceived with regard to its proper object: the sense of sight does not err in perceiving a colour; but the common sense can make an erroneous judgment concerning the exterior thing, judging it to be round, for example, when it is straight. Since the essence of the thing is the proper object of the intellect, therefore, speaking absolutely, the intellect cannot be deceived concerning the thing's essence. The intellect can be deceived, however, either in its reasoning about the particular conditons of an essence, or in its judgment about the properties and accidents belonging to an essence. Thus, the intellect can apply the definition of circle 58 59 60 caelo,

ST, la, 85.5, Resp. "... est ratiocinari." (1.531b). Loc. tit., ad 3 (1.531b-32a); cf. 84.8, Resp. (1.522b-23a). ST, 2a2ae, 154.5, ad 3 (3.2178b); DV, 12.3, ad 2 (1.242), and 28.3, ad 6 (1.539). See in Aristotle: De 3.7 (306a5-18); Ethica nicom., 6.8 (1142al2-19).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

389

erroneously to something triangular, or it can form a definition that is false, because it is composed of incompatible elements, such as: 'a rational animal is fourfooted'. The human intellect, nevertheless, can never err regarding self-evident propositions, nor can it ever be in error about the first principles of knowledge, since they are the infallible ground of its truth.61 There is, quite obviously, a fundamental concurrence between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the acts of the intellect in apprehending corporeal things. There is also a noticeable difference in their individual approaches to the intellect's acquisition of apprehensive knowledge. Bonaventure approaches it first from the acts of the intellect, then from its objects. Aquinas approaches the same question first from the objects of the intellect, then from its acts, thus differing also from Bonaventure in regard to the language used to describe the operations of the intellect. Neither the language nor the approach of Bonaventure and Aquinas, though they differ in those respects, involves a diversity of doctrine on the necessity of the intellect, in apprehending a corporeal thing, both to abstract an intelligible species from a phantasm and, by means of that species or universal form, to judge the exterior thing according as it is known through the senses. On those points, both theologians are influenced by the doctrine of Aristotle.62 Although Aquinas, unlike Bonaventure, does not allow the human intellect, in comprehending corporeal things, to consider or to think about its objects apart from phantasms, even so, he attributes to the intellect a natural ability to know incorporeal or spiritual things. But the intellect knows such things only indirectly and never apart from its proper objects, which are natures existing in corporeal matter. If universal forms were really existent apart from matter, as the Platonists say, then, according to Aquinas, the human intellect would not have to turn itself toward phantasms in order to actually understand those forms. But the human intellect, in the judgment of Aquinas, cannot understand any object without comparing it with something sensible. The intellect cannot understand incorporeal things without comparing them in some way with sensible things by means of their phantasms. The intellect knows incorporeal things, therefore, by removing from corporeal things those qualities and properties 61 ST, la, 85.1, ad 1 (1.524b-25a), and 85.6, Resp. (1.532b-33a); cf. 17.3 (1.123a-24a). 62 Many scholars account for the differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas on man's intellectual knowledge by saying that Bonaventure, in contrast with Aquinas, substitutes an Augustinian judgment for an Aristotelean abstraction, so that the intellect either does not acquire universal forms from phantasms or, if does acquire universal forms in this way, the intellect knows singular things by judgments made apart from phantasms. See the following: J. Rohmer, AHDLM, 3 (1928), pp. 149-56; F. Schwendiger, "Die Erkenntis in den ewigen Ideen nach der Lehre des HI. Bonaventura", FKS, 15 (1928), pp. 82-84;J. M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure (Paris, J. Vrin: 1928), pp. 236-37; Z. Van de Woestyne, Antoniamm, 8 (1933), pp. 204-91; E. Bettoni //problema della cognasc. diDio ..., p. 205. For some variations on the above views see: C. M. O'Donnell, The PsychoL of St. Bonaventure ..., pp. 73-79; J. G. Bougerol, Introd. s. Bonav., p. 99.

390

CHAPTER FIVE

that would be incompatible with spiritual substances. It is in this way that Aquinas, following Dionysius, attributes to the intellect the ability to know God as the cause of created things. In knowing God, however, the intellect removes from Him not only the properties of corporeal things, but also the properties belonging to creatures according as they are creatures.63 While Bonaventure does not permit the human intellect to know God entirely apart from sensible or corporeal things, even so, in knowing God, the intellect acts as an intelligence, so that, turning away from corporeal things, it approaches God from His image in the human mind. In the view of Aquinas, God can never be known by the human intellect apart from its immediate knowledge of corporeal things. Granting these differences, we find Aquinas concurring with Bonaventure in other respects on the intellect's natural knowledge of God. Aquinas considers contemplation of God to be the end of human life, a view that he Finds in Aristotle, whereas Bonaventure goes to Augustine for a similar view. Aquinas, moreover, maintains that the human intellect, though it can know God, cannot comprehend the divine essence, for the intellect cannot know God as He knows Himself. 64 Aquinas, furthermore, adapts to his own doctrine the teaching of Augustine on the human mind judging all things according to their truth in God. In adapting this Augustinian teaching to his doctrine, however, Aquinas says that the intellect knows and judges all things in God through a participation in His lumen: the lumen of natural reason is, as it were, a participation in the lumen of God.65 With regard to the intellect's acts of apprehension and comprehension, then, Bonaventure and Aquinas have much in common. They express their common views, now and again, in different terms. On the other hand, they hold some positions in common, but for different reasons. They hold in common and in almost identical terms the doctrine that an intelligible species or form is a similitude by which the intellect understands a corporeal thing. 66 They hold also in common that an exterior thing has a greater dignity in the human intellect than the thing has in itself, but they express their common view on this point in different terms. Bonaventure speaks of a corporeal thing as having a nobler existence in the intellect, because it exists there in a spiritual way. Aquinas speaks of a material thing as being simpler in the intellect, because the thing is there in an immaterial way.67 Finally, they hold in common, but for different reasons, that the

63 ST, la, 84.7, Resp., ad 3(1.521b-22a); cf. Dionysius, De div. nomin., 1.5 (PG 3.593). The human intellect, according to St Thomas, cannot use even the species conserved in its memory without adverting to the phantasms from which they have been abstracted: Lac. cit, ad 1 (1.522a). 64 1 Sent, 3.1.1, con. 2, Resp. (1.91); cf. Aristotle, Ethica nicom., 10.8 (1178b8-1179b32). See also: DV, 1.12, Resp. (1.25). 65 ST, la, 12.11, ad 3 (1.72b-73a); cf. St. Augustine, Solil., 1.8.15 (PL 32.877). 66 See in Aquinas: ST, la, 85.2, Resp. "Et ideo ...", ad 1 (1.527). 67 1 Seat, 3.1.1, ad 3 (1.92).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

391

human soul has an ability to know itself, and to know its own powers and principles of action. Bonaventure grants this ability to the soul because of its capacity to reflect upon itself apart from a direct knowledge of exterior things. Aquinas insists that the soul cannot know itself, nor can it know its powers and principles of operation, without adverting immediately to phantasms, because the human intellect must act always in some way with respect to its proper object, which is the nature of a sensible thing. 68 Treating of the concept, Aquinas refers to three kinds of words, but not in the same terms as Bonaventure. Aquinas, associating word with speech, says that the interior speech of the intellect has a word of the heart, a word which is a similitude of the thing understood, and so it is also called a word of the thing. Damascene refers to this word as a natural movement of the intellect, for it is by the word that the intellect thinks and understands, and thus the word, as it were, is the light and splendour of the intellect. Augustine refers to the same word as to something impressed on the human spirit. The speech of the imagination has a word which is an image of the vocal word; so the word of the imagination is the means by which a speaker imagines his voice as presenting the concept of his intellect. Damascene refers to the imagined word as to that which is pronounced, not exteriorly, but in the heart. Augustine refers to it as to the word which is thought with syllables. Vocal speech has a word requiring a movement of the tongue and of the jaws, so it is a vocal word signifying the interior word of the intellect, as Aristotle says: the human voice signifies a conception of the intellect. Damascene calls the vocal word the messenger of the intellect, and Augustine describes it as the word pronounced with syllables. Explaining the origin of the interior word, Aquinas distinguishes two steps in the intellect's operation. The first step is a simple consideration of something to be understood, a consideration not involving an interior word. The second step is a manifestation by the intellect of its consideration of the thing, now understood; this manifestation, made either to the intellect alone or to someone else, requires the expression of a word, and thus the word is an emanation, by way of manifestation, from the intellect. Since the intellect can consider either a thing which is simply true or a thing which is also good, the perfect word of the intellect is the word moving the will to love, and so Augustine says that the word is impressed on the spirit.69 The interior word, as explained by Aquinas, results from an actual consideration of a thing by the intellect. Requiring an act of understanding, the interior word issues from a perfect movement of the intellect, as Aristotle suggests, or a natural movement of the intellect, as Damascene indicates.

68 DV, 10.9, Resp. "... increata consulitur." (1.211-12). 69 1 Sent., 27.2.1, Sol. "Si ergo ..." (1.654-55); ST, la, 34.1, Resp. (1.219b-20a); cf. 85.5, sc (1.531ab). See the following: St John Damascene, Deftde ortkod., 1.13.151 (PC 94.858); St Augustine, De Trinit, 9.10.15 (PL 42.969-70); Aristotle, Perihcr., 1.2 (16a3-8).

392

CHAPTER FIVE

Since the word terminates the movement of the intellect, it is not necessary, Aquinas says, for the word to be accompanied by discourse, or thinking. To speak a word, it is sufficient for the intellect to consider, or simply to understand, a thing in some way. Because the human mind more frequently understands a thing by discourse, both Damascene and Anselm, defining word, say that an interior word is formed with thought, but they use thought, Aquinas notes, in place of consideration. In the view of Aquinas himself, the act of thinking consists properly in an inquiry concerning some truth. Since the form of a truth is attained by the intellect in its word, the intellect can contemplate a truth perfectly without thought, which requires rational discourse, whereas the word emanates as something already complete from the intellect 70 Aquinas differentiates the conception of a word by the intellect from the three other elements required for intellectual knowledge. The conception of a word is other than the thing understood, which is exterior to the intellect, and to which the conception is ordained as to its end, for the intellect conceives a word in order to understand the thing. The word's conception is also different from the intelligible species, which is the principle causing the intellect's action of understanding. This action, moreover, is not the same as the conception of a word, which is the terminus of understanding, so that the act of conceiving a word is constituted by the intellect's understanding of the thing. The vocal word, therefore, signifies the word conceived by the intellect. This interior word represents the thing understood, and it is a simlitude of that thing. When the intellect understands itself, it then conceives a similitude of itself according as it is understanding itself. Since the intellect is here the thing understood, the word expressing the intellect to itself is a similitude of the thing understood, just as the word expressing something else to the intellect is a similitude of what the intellect understands. Thus, for Aquinas, whether the intellect understands itself or something other than itself, the word conceived by the intellect is always a similitude of the thing understood; it cannot be also a similitude of the intellect, as it can in the doctrine of Bonaventure. On the other hand, coming closer to Bonaventure, Aquinas teaches that the word conceived by the intellect as it is understanding itself can be made known exteriorly by a vocal word. Aquinas, again drawing nearer to Bonaventure, maintains that the human intellect has to conceive a multiplicity of words, because it understands its objects by many acts of understanding. Consequently, having an imperfect mode of understanding by comparison with the divine mode of understanding, the human intellect frequently conceives words that are imperfect, but God expresses all things in one perfect Word.71 70 DV, 4.1. arg. 1 & ad 1 (1.75, 77); ST, la 34.1, ad 2 (1.220b); 1 Sent., 27.2.1, ad 3 (1.655-56). Cf. Aristotle, De anima, 3.7 (431al-8); St. John Damascene, loc. cit.; St Anselm, Monol., c. 63 (PL 158.208). 71 DPD, 8.1, Resp. "Relinquitur ergo..." (2.214-15); 9.5, Resp. "Hoc ergo... est imperfectum." (2.236).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

393

The doctrines of Aquinas and Bonaventure on the human concept are not very different from each other. The two theologians, using different terms, present quite similar accounts of the nature and function of the words conceived by the human intellect in its acts of understanding. They differ noticeably, however, regarding the historical sources that they use in developing their doctrines. Bonaventure draws on both Augustine and Anselm, whereas Aquinas draws first on Damascene and Augustine, then on Aristotle, and only indirectly on Anselm. Bonaventure and Aquinas hold in common, nonetheless, that the concept expresses the truth of the thing according as it is understood by the intellect. There are differences, on the other hand, between the two theologians on the question of truth with regard to human knowledge. To Aquinas, in particular, the truth of the intellect consists in its understanding of the thing, just as it is.72 The intellect, furthermore, can analyze its every conception, going all the way back to its first conception, and this, according to Avicenna, is the conception of being. All subsequent conceptions are additions of some sort to an understanding of being, which is the object most known to the intellect. Those additions are of two kinds: special modes of being, and general modes of being. The special modes of being are substances, for they constitute beings that have being through themselves. The general modes of being either follow every being in itself, or they follow some beings that are ordered to other beings. Thus, in itself, every being can be called a thing, which designates its essence or quiddity, as Avicenna indicates, whereas the term being (ens) designates its act of being (esse). Every being, as an undivided being, can also be called one. A being can be ordered to another being either according as the one is divided from the other or according as the one can come together with the other. In the first instance, the order is expressed by the term something, which signifies someother-thing. In the second instance, the order is expressed by the term good, designating a relation to an appetite, or by the term true, designating a relation to an intellect. Now, all knowledge is perfected by an assimilation of the knower to what he knows, so that the assimilation is said to be the cause of his knowledge. The first relation of a being to an intellect consists in a correspondence of the one to the other, a correspondence called an adequation of the thing and the intellect; so the perfection of what is true is found in that adequation, which adds to the being a conformity to the intellect, thus enabling the intellect to know the thing. Hence, the entity of the thing precedes its truth, which causes the intellect to know the thing. Consequently, the different definitions of truth, and of what is true, given by various authors, as seen by Aquinas, are based on the entity of the thing,

72 "Veritas enim intellectus in hoc consistit, quod intelligatur res esse sicuti est" — ST, la, 85.7, ad 2 (1.534a).

394

CHAPTER FIVE

or on its adequation to the intellect, or on the consequent effect of that adequation.73 In the view of Aquinas, then, the entity of a thing is the ground of its truth and the foundation of what is true according as the thing is related to the human intellect. It is thus that he interprets Augustine's definition of true as 'that which is'. The definition, signifying the foundation of what is true, is understood by Aquinas to be the same as Aristotle's definition of true as 'that which is ... or that which is not'. 74 The term truth, designating the adequation of the thing and the intellect, signifies the perfection of the conformity of the thing, as true, to the intellect. It is in this way that Aquinas interprets Anselm's definition of truth as 'rectitude perceptible by the mind alone'; so, taking rectitude to imply a sort of adequation, Aquinas also unites Anselm's definition of truth to Aristotle's definition of true. Hence, showing a preference for Aristotle's definition, Aquinas grounds both truth and what is true in the entity or reality of the thing as ordered to the intellect.75 Aquinas comes back to Augustine, however, for the definition of truth as a manifestation of what is true. Requiring the conception of a word, this manifestation comes about in a judgment giving the intellect knowledge of the thing under consideration. According to Aquinas himself, the consideration of the essence of a thing does not give truth to the intellect. Truth is founded on the being of the thing and not on its essence; therefore, expressed in an interior word, truth results from the judgment and not from the formation of an intelligible species. The judgment of the intellect, nevertheless, expresses the true com-

73 DV, 1.1, Resp. (1.2-3); cf. Avicenna, Metaph., 1.6-8, fol. 72r-73v (Venetiis, 1508). On the different definitions of truth, and of what is true, note: "Uno modo secundum id quod praecedit rationem veritatis, et in quo verum fundatur, et sic Augustinus definit in lib. Solil. (c. v): 'Verum est id quod est'; et Avicenna in XI Metaphysic. (c. ii): 'Veritas cuiuslibet rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est rei'; et quidarn sic: 'Verum est indivisio esse, et eius quod est'. Et alio modo definitur secundum id quod formaliter rationem veri perficit; et sic dicit Isaac quod Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus'; et Anselmus in Lib. De veritate (cap. xii): 'Veritas est rectitude sola mente perceptibilis'. Rectitudo enim ista secundum adaequationem quamdam dicitur, secundum quod Philosophus in IV Metaphysic. (com. 27) dicit, quod definientes verum dicimus esse quod est, aut non esse quod non est. Et tertio modo definitur verum, secundum effectum consequentem; et sic definit Hilarius, quod 'verum est manifestativum et declarativum esse'; et Augustinus in lib. De vera relig. (c. xxxvi): 'Veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est'; et in eodem (cap. xxxi): 'Veritas est secundum quam de inferioribus iudicamus'." For a similar exposition by Aquinas regarding truth consult 1 Sent., 19.5.1, Sol. (1.486-88); cf. ST, la, 16.1 (1.113b-14b). 74 "Augustinus enim in lib. SoliL (cap. v) dicit, quod 'verum est id quod est'. Sed id quod est, nihil est nisi ens. Ergo verum idem significat omnino quod ens." — D V , 1.1. arg. 1 (1.1). "Adprimum ergo dicitur, quod definitio ilia Augustini datur de vero secundum id quod habet fundamentum in re, et non secundum id quo veri ratio completur in adaequatione rei ad intellectum. Vel dicendum, quod cum dicitur, 'Verum est id quod est', non accipitur ibi secundum quod significat actum essendi, sed secundum quod est nomen intellectus compositi, scilicet prout significat affirmationem propositionis, ut sit sensus: verum est id quod est, id est cum dicitur esse de aliquo quod est, ut sic in idem redeat definitio Augustini cum definitione Philosophi supra inducta." — Loc. at., ad 1 (1.3). 75 Cf. Loc. at., arg. 5 & ad 5 (1.1-2, 4); ST, la, 16.3 (1.115b-16b).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

395

position of being and essence in the thing, so that the whole entity of the thing is known by the truth in the intellect. In short, consisting in an adequation of the thing and the intellect, truth is found formally in the intellect, but the ground of truth is found in the being of the thing itself.76 The doctrine of Aquinas on truth has undoubtedly many points in common with the doctrine of Bonaventure. Both theologians teach that the entity of the thing known is the fundamental ground of truth in the intellect. They also teach that the intelligible species of the thing moves the intellect into act, thus causing it to express the truth of the thing by an interior word formed in judging the thing itself. They concur, furthermore, in teaching that truth, formally considered, consists in an adequation of the thing and the intellect, which knows the thing to be true because the intellect is assimilated to it in truth. The two theologians, finally, come together in holding that, for complete understanding of a thing, the intellect must first analyze its object until it attains the primary truth known to the intellect, and then, by an act of synthesis, recompose its object in a judgment of the thing according as it is known through the senses. Although Bonaventure and Aquinas have all those points in common, even so, they differ with regard both to the significance of truth as said of the thing known and to the nature of the primary truth, or first object, known to the human intellect. To Aquinas, the term truth designates the entity of the thing as it is known to the intellect, but that entity consists in a real composition of being and essence. To Bonaventure, the term truth also designates the entity of the thing known to the intellect; however, interpreting Augustine's definition of true as 'that which is' to signify truth, Bonaventure understands the entity of the thing to be its truth. Since the truth of the thing consists in its composition of being and existing, the intellect is said to be true when, having the truth of the thing, it knows its real composition of being and existing.77 For Aquinas, moreover, the first object of the intellect is being (ens), which is the object most known to it. For Bonaventure, on the other hand, the first object of the intellect is the divine being (esse), and it is according to this being that the human intellect understands the truth of other things. 78 Thus, approaching the human intellect from its object, Aquinas considers it to be a power that understands being, first in itself, and then according to its different modes of perfection, each of them representing an addition to being, considered in itself. For Aquinas, then, the intellect has 76 1 Sent., 19.5.1, ad 7 (1.489-90); DV, 1.3 (1.6); ST, la, 16.2 (l.HSab). 77 In addition to reinterpreting Augustine's definition, Bonaventure conjoins a definition of truth by Aristotle to Hilary's definition, but in a different way than Aquinas: "Sed contra Augustinus, in Soliloquio (2.5.8; PL 32.889): 'Veritas est id quod est' ... veritas potest considerari in comparatione ad id in quo est; et sic verum est id quod est; alio modo per comparationem ad intellectum, quern movet; et sic veritas, ut dicit Philosophus in II Metaphysicae (c. 2; 994b9-16), 'est finis intelligentiae speculativae' ... Quantum ad secundum modum dicit Hilarius, quod 'veritas est declarativum esse'." — 1 Sent, 3.1.dub.4 (1.79; td. rain., 1.57-58). 78 Cf. Itiner., 5.3-8 (5.308-10; ed. min., 5.204-08).

396

CHAPTER FIVE

truth when it knows being and the true conditions of being. Approaching the human intellect from its act, Bonaventure considers it to be a power searching for truth, which is found primarily in God, then in the thing according as it is assimilated to the divine truth, and ultimately in the human intellect, which knows the whole truth of the thing in knowing the thing's assimilation to its divine truth. Habitual Knowledge of Science and Wisdom

The intelligible species abstracted by the human intellect from corporeal things are ordered, Bonaventure writes, not only to an actual understanding of those things by the intellect, but also to the generation of habitual knowledge, such as the knowledge obtained through science.79 Anything that a man learns, Bonaventure notes, he learns by way of his senses, memory and experience. Human knowledge arises from experience, therefore, as Aristotle says: "one memory comes to be from many acts of the senses".80 Interpreting Aristotle's doctrine on the acquisition of science through experience, Bonaventure points out that experience causes knowledge in two distinct ways. In one way, human experience, involves a movement of reason from something unknown to something known; contributing to the formation of science, this sort of experience is a road, as it were, to the acquisition of science. Human experience, in another way, brings about knowledge from a different point of view regarding something already known; experience of this kind, using science previously acquired, is the road to the perfection of human knowledge.81 According to Bonaventure, then, human experience is the cause of science, both as a habitus and as an actual consideration of corporeal things. Defining the term science, he says that it designates knowledge of conclusions drawn from premisses, just as the term understanding designates the habitus of principles, which rule the intellect.82 The objects of a science are those things that can be comprehended by reason with certitude, such as the subjects of the liberal arts. Matters of opinion, on the other hand, are those things that can be known only by a sort of conjecture, such as chance events, or things subject to the

79 Cf. 3 Sent, 14.3.2, ad 4 (3.322; ed, min., 3.316). 80 2 Sent., 23.2.1, fm. 4 (2.537; ed. min., fm. d, 2.555); 4 Sent., 10.2.2.1, fm. 2 (4.234; ed. min., fm. b, 4.221). See in Aristotle: Anal, poster., 2.19 (100a4-8); Metaph., 1.1 (980a28-981al 1). 81 3 Sent, 14.3.2, ad 3 (3.322; ed. min., 3.316). 82 "Et iteram, scientia, quantum est de ratione sui nominis, in via imponitur a collatione praemissarum ad conclusionem secundum quod dicitur quod scientia est conclusionum et intellectus est habitus principiorum ..." — 3 Sent., 33.un.6, ad 4 (3.727; ed. min., 3.729). "... affectio ... quarto modo dicitur habitus afiectivus, sicut intellectus uno modo dicitur habitus principiorum, qui est regula intellectus." — 1 Sent., 17.2.dub.2, Resp. (1.318; ed. min., 1.258-59). Cf. 3 Sent, 23.1.5, ad 2 (3.485; ed. min., 3.475-76); 4 Sent, 16.1.3.1, ad 3 (4.391; ed. min., 4.374).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

397

free choice of a will. 83 Now, according to Aristotle, we know several things by science; but we know one thing alone by understanding. Aristotle says this, Bonaventure observes, because science names habitual knowledge, whereas understanding names actual knowledge; therefore, by nature, a habitus of knowledge includes several more things than an act of knowledge.84 Every habitus of knowledge, whether of principles or of conclusions, is retained and conserved by the intellectual memory. Bonaventure assigns to this memory the habitual act of receiving or retaining intelligible species. Because the memory holds those species continually, its act of retaining them is said to be a state of the memory, or its conservation of species, rather than an action or operation. The conservation of species is natural to the memory; so, in this respect, it is not subject to the will. But the memory also recalls or remembers things from the past, and this act is subject to the command of the will.85 Thus, the operation of the intellectual memory consists in its presentation of species to the intellect, particularly in the act of recalling or remembering things from the past. The proper condition or state of the memory, however, consists in its conservation of intelligible species. Properly considered, then, the intellectual memory is not confined to things known in the past; rather, as described by Bonaventure, the memory has a capacity to retain the similitudes of things extending from the past into the future. The memory retains present things by receiving their similitudes and, having received them, it records them as species of things known in the past. By an act of prevision, moreover, the intellect, relying on the species conserved by the memory, considers things in the future. All the species in the memory that have a temporal mark are abstracted from phantasms, and so those species represent things succeeding one another in time. But the intellectual memory also has the simple forms of knowledge, or the first principles of truth, and they are not abstracted from phantasms, because they cannot enter the human mind through the senses. Along with the first principles of truth and knowledge, the memory holds the axioms and principles of the human sciences. Having an everlasting and invariable nature, those principles and axioms can never be forgotten by the memory. They are ever at the disposal of reason, which always assents to them, Bonaventure says, as to the rules that it recognizes 83 "Scibilia autem dico ilia quae certa ratione comprehend; possum, sicut ilia de quibus sunt scientiae liberates. Opinibilia vero voco ilia quae non habent cognosci nisi per quandam coniecturam, sicut... quae fiunt casu et fortuna vel voluntate libera." — 2 Sent., 23.2.2, in Resp. (2.540; ed. min., 2.558). 84 "Sicut vult Philosophus, 'scimus plura, sed intelligimus unum solum'; hoc autem ob aliud non est nisi quia 'scire' nominal cognitionem in habitu, sed 'intelligere' in actu: ergo ad plura se extendit habitus quam actus per naturam ..." — 3 Sent, 14.2.2, sc 1 (3.310; ed. min., sc a, 3.303); cf. Aristotle, Tapica, 2.10 (114b32-36). 85 2 Sent., 7.2.1.2. Resp. "... ad malum." (2.193; ed. min., 2.186-87). The act of recalling something from the past requires the expression of an interior word by the mind, a point taken by Bonaventure from Anselm: 1 Sent., 27.2.un.3, Resp. (1.487-88; ed. min., 1.387); cf. Mono/., c. 33 (PL 158.188).

398

CHAPTER FIVE

as innate and familiar to the memory. Now they are the rules that, according to Aristotle, human reason in its thinking cannot contradict. They cannot be contradicted, Bonaventure remarks, because they are known and remembered by the human mind in its own unchangeable light of truth.86 The intellectual memory, therefore, holds two kinds of species. The first kind, having a temporal nature, are the similitudes abstracted from phantasms by the intellect. They are the species that, depending on human experience, contribute to the formation of the habitus of science. The second kind, having an everlasting and invariable nature, are the simple forms or first principles of truth. They are not acquired or abstracted from phantasms; rather, forming the habitus of understanding, they depend solely on the connatural light of the intellect, and they include the principles and axioms of the human sciences. It seems, then, that a habitus of science is innate with respect to its principles and acquired with respect to its conclusions. This poses a problem regarding the nature of a habitus of science in Bonaventure's doctrine, a problem requiring an examination of his position on both the nature of a habitus and the nature of innate principles of knowledge. He speaks of a habitus as that by which a potency is facilitated in its act, and in three different ways. The human will, for instance, has a facility for loving good things exterior to the soul, and this facility is a virtue or an acquired disposition of the will. There is, secondly, a facility of the will for loving the good of the soul itself, a facility arising from an innate disposition of the will. A third facility of the will disposes it to love the very nature of the soul; the will has that facility from its natural origin, and so, by its nature, the will is always able and ready to love the soul. In like manner, Bonaventure says, the human intellect, to which the soul is always present, is ever ready and able to know the soul.87 The first sort of habitus is a virtue or an acquired disposition of a potency, directing it toward objects that are exterior to the soul. This sort of habitus orders a potency more immediately than it is ordered in itself to an act or operation.88 A habitus acquired by the intellect, for example, enables it to operate easily and readily with regard to corporeal things, such as the forms and figures of bodies; so, as something added to the intellect, an acquired habitus is an accident of the potency, facilitating it in its act of un-

86 Itiner., 3.2 (5.303-04; ed mm, 5.194-95); cf. Aristotle, Anal poster., 1.10 (76b24-27). Although the human mind cannot contradict the first principles of truth, since it cannot err regarding them, nonetheless, it does not always draw the right conclusions from them, particularly in the practical order. The mind is entirely free from error only when it judges things according to their eternal rules in God, and those rules are represented in the memory by the first principles of truth. See: Op. at., 2.9 (5.301-02; ed. min., 5.191-92); 3 Sent., 33.un.3, ad 5 (3.718; ed. min., 3.720-21). 87 1 Sent., 3.2.2.1, ad 1 (1.89-90; ed. min., 1.67). 88 "... responsio est, quod operatic est per virtutem, et virtus ... est ultimum potentiae sive est potentia ultimata ... Aliter potest dici, quod virtus dicit immediatiorem ordinationem ad actum quam potentia, quia potentia ordinatur ad opus per dispositionem ..." — 1 Sent, 32.2.2, ad 5 (1.564; ed. min., 1.450).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

399

derstanding. The second sort of habitus is a facility originating from a disposition which is innate to a potency; this is the way that Bonaventure refers to the habitus of principles in the intellectual memory regarding truth and knowledge. The third sort of habitus, which we have met before, is the natural disposition of the soul, or of the mind, for remembering, knowing and loving itself. That disposition of the soul does not add anything to its potencies, except to our way of understanding their actions; so, belonging to the soul by its nature, the third sort of habitus is really the natural ability of a potency to act with regard to an object that is present immediately to it.89 Our problem is, then, what precisely Bonaventure means by saying that the habitus of first principles, or the principles themselves, are innate to the intellectual memory. He explains the significance of the term innate, regarding cognitive species, in his question on the ability of a Christian to know whether or not he has the virtue of charity. Only a man having the virtue, Bonaventure teaches, can know it from experience. But any man, even one not having the virtue, can certainly know charity by speculative knowledge. Charity cannot be known speculatively, however, either through its essence or through a similitude acquired by way of the senses. Consequently, the virtue is known by speculative knowledge either through an infused or an innate similitude. Each of these similitudes, as Augustine shows, is known in the eternal truth of God, who infuses knowledge into the human mind, or impresses knowledge on the mind when He creates the soul: "The light of your face, O Lord, is impressed on us" (Ps. 4.7). Since a man lacking charity does not know it by an infused species, Bonaventure affirms, he can know it only by an innate species. There are, however, two kinds of innate species. The first kind consits only in a similitude of something, such as the species of a stone. This kind of similitude, which is not in the soul from its origin, is a sort of picture abstracted from a thing by the intellect. Such a similitude is said to be innate, in the first place, because it is abstracted by the natural lumen of the mind; it is innate, in the second place, because, after its abstraction, the species is retained or conserved naturally in the memory. The second kind of innate species is a similitude which is also a sort of truth in itself; it is present in the soul from the beginning, and thus this species is said to be innate. It is, so to speak, an impression in the soul of the divine truth, just as the soul has from its origin a natural lumen directing its acts of cognition. In a similar manner, the soul has a natural love directing the acts of the will toward what is good Hence, knowing what rectitude is, and knowing what the rectitude of love is, the soul knows charily, which is a rectitude of love, and it knows charity by a sort of truth which is a similitude of charity. Thus, the soul has in its intellect a similitude by which it knows the truth of charity, and this is the sort of 89 2 Sent., 25.1.un.5, Resp. "... et rem." (2.603; ed. mm., 2.622).

400

CHAPTER FIVE

habitus that, according to Augustine, is known in the divine truth by means of a similitude reflecting that truth. Augustine does not say this, Bonaventure remarks, because no other sort of species comes to-be in the human intellect. He says it, rather, because there is no pure species in the human soul, but a sort of truth impressed on it by God, who is truth itself.90 Every species of intellectual knowledge, therefore, in Bonaventure's doctrine, is innate to the human mind. Acquired species are innate both by reason of the natural lumen in the mind and by reason of their natural conservation in the memory. The species not acquired by abstraction are innate because they are connatural to the mind itself, and because they are concreated as reflexions of divine truth in the intellectual memory. The next point regarding our problem has to do with the origin in the mind of the innate species or principles not acquired by way of abstraction. Bonaventure handles this aspect of the problem in his question: Whether conscience is an innate or an acquired habitus.91 In his response to the question, Bonaventure first draws attention to the Platonic position that every habitus of knowledge is innate, simply speaking, to the human soul; however, on entering a body, the soul in time forgets its innate knowledge. Both Aristotle and Augustine, disproving this opinion, have rejected it.92 There are three other positions on the question, Bonaventure goes on, and they concur in holding that the general or cardinal virtues are neither entirely from nature nor entirely acquired, but partly innate and partly acquired. A cognitive habitus is said, in a similar manner, to be innate in one way and acquired in another; however, there are different opinions on both the way in which a cognitive habitus is innate and the way in which it is acquired. According to one opinion, a cognitive habitus is innate with respect to the agent intellect, but acquired with respect to the possible intellect. The opinion is based on Aristotle, who says that the human soul, when it comes to-be, has no knowlege, so that its possible intellect must be perfected by means of the sense potencies. This opinion, in Bonaventure's estimation, is both untrue and a misrepresentation of Aristotle's doctrine. If the agent intellect were to have an innate habitus of knowledge, then, Bonaventure asks, why could it not communicate the innate species to the possible intellect without the help of the senses? Besides, if there were species innate to the agent intellect, the soul would come to-be, not as having no knowledge, but as actually knowing, because it would already have cognitive species. This is con-

90 1 Sent., 17.1.un.4, Resp. (1.301-02; ed. mm, 1.245); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit, 9.6.9 (PL 42.966), 9.13 (PL 42.959-60). 91 2 Sent, 39.1.2 (2.901-04; ed. min., 2.935-39). This question resembles in many respects the question on the agent and possible intellects: 2 Sent., 24.1.2.4 (2.567-71; ed. min., 2.585-90). 92 2 Sent., 39.1.2, Resp. "... quam Augustinus" (2.902; ed. mm, 2.937). See the following: Plato, Meno, 82B-85B; Aristotle, Metap/i., 1.9 (992b24-993alO): cf. Ethica nicam., 6.8 (1141al2-19); St. Augustine, Retract., 1.4.4 (PL 32.590): cf. 8.2 (PL 32.594),

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

401

trary to Aristotle's doctrine, for he teaches that the agent intellect is that by which the soul abstracts species, and the possible intellect is that by which the soul receives the abstracted species. According to another opinion, a cognitive habitus is innate with respect to universal knowledge, which is knowledge of principles, but it is acquired with respect to particular knowledge, which is knowledge of conclusions. This particular opinion, in Bonaventure's estimation, is contrary to the teaching both of Aristotle and of Augustine. Knowledge of principles is not innate to the human soul, as Aristotle proves: "knowledge of principles is acquired by way of the senses, memory and experience". Augustine shows the same thing, though in a different manner. Thus, speaking of a little boy who manifests knowledge of the principles of geometry, Augustine says that the boy's knowledge does not imply that his soul has prior knowledge of those principles; it implies, rather, that "he has seen them in a sort of incorporeal light, as the eye of his body sees in a corporeal light those things that are adjacent to it, for the eye is capable of seeing in that light". 93 The third opinion, falling between the other two, holds that a cognitive habitus is partly innate and partly acquired regarding both the knowledge of principles and the knowledge of conclusions. Every act of knowledge requires the necessary concourse of an object and a lumen by which the object is judged; this is evident, Bonaventure says, in the act of sight, as the preceding example given by Augustine indicates. Consequently, a cognitive habitus is innate by reason of the natural lumen of understanding in the soul; but the habitus is also acquired by reason of the species abstracted from corporeal things. This opinion, Bonaventure observes, concurs with the doctrine of Aristotle and with the doctrine of Augustine. It is commonly accepted, moreover, that there is a natural lumen in the human intellect, and this lumen is its natural seat of judgment. As Aristotle shows, furthermore, the species and similitudes of things are acquired by the intellect through the mediation of the senses, a fact made known to each man by his own experience. Thus, no man would ever know whole or part, father or mother, unless he has received their species by some exterior sense. It is for that reason Aristotle says: "they who lose one sense must of necessity lose one science". Finally, it is the natural lumen of the intellect that directs the soul in its judgment both of what it knows of what it ought to do.94 Bonaventure, endorsing the third opinion, draws out its consequences and applies them to his question on the origin of a cognitive habitus, particularly the habitus of conscience. He notes, first of all, that some

93 Lac. cit., Resp. "tres fuerunt ... est creatus'." (2.902-03; ed. min., 2.937). See: Aristotle, De anima, 3.4-5 (492al3-430al7); AnaL poster., 1.1 (71alO-71b8), and 1.14 (81a37-81b9); St Augustine, De Trinit., 12.15.24 (PL 42.1011-12). 94 Lot. cit., Resp. "Et propterea ... de operabilibus." (2.903; ed. min., 2.937-38). Cf. Aristotle, Anal, poster., 1.18 (81a37-39); De anima, 3.8 (432a3-14).

402

CHAPTER FIVE

knowable objects are extremely evident, such as the first principles of truth and the axioms of the speculative sciences, whereas other objects are less evident, such as the conclusions of a science. Then, directing his attention to human actions, Bonaventure points out that the truth of some actions is especially evident, for instance: "what you would not have done unto yourself, you ought not to do unto others" (Tobias, 4.16). Concerning evidence of that sort, Bonaventure comments: just as knowledge of first speculative principles is innate to the soul by reason of its natural lumen, because this lumen is sufficient for knowing them after an abstraction of species and without any persuasion over and above their own evidence, so also knowledge of first moral principles is innate to the soul, because the same natural seat of judgment is sufficient for knowing those principles. Again, Bonaventure continues, as the knowledge of the particular conclusions of a science is acquired, because the innate lumen of the soul is not fully sufficient for knowing them without the aid of some additional persuasion and a new habituation, so also an additional instruction and a new habituation are required for the moral actions that a man must carry out according to his conscience. Since conscience is a habitus directing a man's judgment concerning actions that he must perform, Bonaventure says, conscience is innate with respect to those things belonging to the first dictates of the natural law, and it is acquired with respect to those things that are added to the natural law by way of institution or instruction. In other words, conscience is an innate habitus with respect to the natural lumen directing the soul in its acts of judgment; but it is an acquired habitus with respect to the species abstracted from exterior things and by which those things are known to the intellect. Every man, therefore, has a natural lumen sufficient for knowing that he ought to honour his parents, and that he ought not to injure his neighbours; nevertheless, Bonaventure adds, no man has naturally impressed on his mind a species of his father, or a species of his neighbour, because each man has to acquire species of that sort by way of abstraction and, therefore, through the mediation of his senses. Summing up his position on the question, Bonaventure reaffirms that conscience is a habitus innate to the soul by reason of its lumen, which is an impression in the soul of the divine lumen. From this point of view, conscience is the seedbed (seminarium) of every moral habitus of knowledge to be acquired by the human soul. Bonaventure also reaffirms that conscience is a habitus acquired by reason of the species abstracted from exterior things by the human intellect, particularly regarding its acquisition of knowledge about those things that a man ought to do.95 95 loc. cit., Resp. "Sed hoc ... rationes ostendunt." (2.903-04; ed. min., 2.938-39). See the following: J. Rohmer, AHDLM, 3 (1928), pp. 158-61; Z. Van de Woestyne, Antonianum, 8 (1933), pp. 301-03; C. M. O'Donnell, The PsjichoL of St. Bonaventure ..., pp. 65-66; M. R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 25-30; H. Guthrie, The Modern Schoolman, 15 (1938), pp. 85-86; L. Veuthey, Si Bonav. fthilos. chris., pp. 54-55, 100-107, 235-37; G. Bonafede, // "De Scientia Christi" ..., pp. 133-38, or Saggl sulia fllosofia medioevale, pp. 233-36.

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

403

In Bonaventure's view, then, every habitus of science, whether practical or speculative, is partly innate and partly acquired A habitus is innate because of the natural lumen of truth in the human mind: depending on that lumen, the habitus of conscience contains innate principles of truth regarding the natural law, and the habitus of understanding contains innate principles of truth regarding the nature of things known by speculative science. A habitus is acquired because of the species abstracted by the human intellect from exterior things: completed by such species, conscience contains particular forms of habitual knowledge, or modes of instruction, regarding moral actions to be judged and directed according to the universal principles of the natural law, whereas a speculative science contains particular forms of habitual knowledge, or demonstrated conclusions, regarding the nature of things that are judged and understood according to the universal principles and axioms of understanding. There are, therefore, three elements constituting a habitus of science. Two of those elements are innate, properly speaking, and the other element is acquired, though it is said to be innate because of its natural dependence both on the lumen of the intellect and on the conservation of the memory. The first innate element is the lumen of truth in the intellect, a lumen that Bonaventure often compares with the lumen of sight. He says, for instance, that the lumen of sight is connatural to the eye and inseparable from it, but the lumen is not sufficient for seeing unless it is helped by the animal spirit coming from the optical nerve. In a similar fashion, the intellect has a connatural lumen that is not sufficient for directing knowledge unless it is assisted by a habitus of science.96 Thus, the lumen of truth in the intellect is innate because it is connatural to the soul directing its sciential knowledge of created things. This knowledge depends on the first principles or simple forms of truth, and they constitute the second innate element of a habitus of science. Bonaventure refers to conscience as a seed-bed of every subsequent habitus of moral knowledge, which is acquired by means of abstract species. We can say, likewise, that the habitus of understanding is a seed-bed of every habitus of speculative knowledge, or science, which is acquired by means of abstract species. Hence, the first principles or simple forms of truth are, so to speak, the seeds of the sciences. Contrasting human knowledge with angelic knowledge, Bonaventure maintains that a man, when he is born, has no knowledge of singular things, nor has he either either a common or a proper species of them. By the sole direction of his glance upon things, nevertheless, a man knows all visible things, thus receiving at once a certain knowledge and species of them, because he has come into the world without the form that he receives in that way. If a man had had species 96 "Similiter est in oculo corporali, quia ibi est lumen connaturale, inseparable, sed insufficiens ad videndum, nisi venial spiritus visibilis a nervo optico. Similiter in intellectu est lumen connaturale, inseparabile, non sufficiens ad dirigendam cognitionem, nisi superveniat habitus scientiae." — 4 Sent., S.l.un.l, in Resp. (4.138; ed. min, 4.126).

404

CHAPTER FIVE

originally, he could then have known things in a much better manner, not by receiving species which he already had, but by directing his gaze toward earthly things in such a way that he would clearly have known them from applying and appropriating to them, and from composing with them, the species that he had innately from his origin.97 A human person, therefore, in Bonaventure's judgment, is born without knowledge of singular things, and without every form or species, including innate species, of universal knowledge. With his first act of cognition, a human person receives or acquires species enabling him to know all corporeal things with certitude. Now, as we have just seen, Bonaventure maintains that the lumen of the intellect is sufficient for knowing, by their own evidence alone, the first principles of the sciences after an abstraction of species by the intellect from corporeal things. Thus, the form received or abstracted by a human person in his first act of cognition brings into being all at once in his memory the first principles or seeds of truth. Existing there in potency prior to the first act of cognition, the seeds of truth are brought into act immediately by the connatural lumen of the intellect, and so the habitus of understanding is formed at once within the memory. This habitus is innate, therefore, because it comes to-be entirely both from the natural potency of the human mind and from the natural action of its intellectual lumen. In other words, the seeds or first principles of truth are innate because they are formed within the human mind solely and immediately by its connatural lumen. According to Bonaventure, the lumen of the human mind reflects the divine lumen, and the seeds of truth in the human mind reflect the eternal truths in the divine mind; therefore, the seeds or intellectual reasons in the human mind stand between the eternal or ideal reasons in the divine mind and the seminal reasons or active potencies in corporeal things. Consequently, the human mind, by conjoining its intellectual reasons with the species abstracted from corporeal things, is able to express in a sciential manner the truth of those things as they are proportioned to their ideal reasons in the mind of God.98 The formation of a habitus of science, however, requires both time and experience. A habitus of science is formed from the first principles of truth: they are the universal forms of knowledge and, when conjoined with the particular forms or intelligible species abstracted from corporeal things, they enable the human mind to reach conclusions with certitude concerning those things, conclusions that it expresses in intelligible words. Thus, a habitus of science 97 "Homo enim, cum nascitur, non habet cognitionem nee speciem singularium, nee communem nee propriam; sola tamen directione aspectus super res cognoscit omnia visibilia et recipit simul cognitionem certain et speciem, quia denudatus erat a forma recepti. Quodsi haberet species, multo melius posset, dirigendo aspectum ad res mundanas, eas cognoscere, non suscipiendo species, cum iam habeat, sed ex directione, et applicare et appropriare et componere et distinctione nosse." — 2 Sent., 3.2.2.1, ad 4 (2.121; ed. min., 2.112); cf. sc 4. 98 De reduc. artium, n. 20 (5.324; ed. min., 5.226).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

405

depends primarily on the universal forms innate to the memory, and secondarily on the particular forms abstracted from corporeal things; however, the conclusions of a science are expressed in the interior words representing the adequations in truth and certitude of the mind and its objects, but those adequations depend upon the prior proportions established between the primary and the secondary principles of sciential knowledge. The certitude of a science, moreover, depends on the thing known, which causes that certitude by the necessity of its existence. The foundation of certitude, then, lies in the existence of the thing outside the human mind. When the necessity of the thing's existence is apprehended by a science, the human mind can go on to comprehend by that science the truth of the whole thing with certitude." It is very evident from the texts of Bonaventure, following both Aristotle and Augustine, that he does not posit either innate ideas or innate species in the human mind, if the term innate is taken to signify an original habitus of principles enabling the mind to know singular things directly by applying such principles to them. This is the way that an angel, but not a human person, obtains knowledge of singular things. 10° Bonaventure posits an original habitus of universal species, similar to the innate habitus of an angel, only in the mind of Adam. Because of Adam's sin, however, no other human person has been given an innate habitus of that kind, a deprivation inflicted on each human person for Adam's sin.101 Christ is the only man exempted from that penalty: He has a more perfect habitus of innate species than the habitus given to Adam, an endowment made to Christ in His capacity as the Redeemer of mankind.102 Bonaventure's doctrine on the origin and nature of habitual knowledge, especially of sciential knowledge, is influenced considerably by the teaching of Aristotle. It is from Aristotle that Bonaventure gets his doctrine on the necessity of the human intellect to acquire its species through the mediation of the senses, because the human soul comes to-be without cognitive species of any kind. The intellect acquires its species, as Aristotle shows, by abstracting them from sensible things. Hence, all human knowledge begins at the level of the senses and, retained by the memory, is developed through experience, which is necessary for the formation of a human science. As habitual knowledge, again according to Aristotle, a science has to do with several more things than an act of understanding. Finally, as we have noted before, Bonaventure follows Aristotle in main-

99 Cf. 1 Sent, 41.2.2, Resp. "... esse falsum." (1.739-40; ed. min., 1.586); 39.1.2, sc 3 & ad 3 (1.689; ed. min., 1.547-48); 35.dub.5, Resp. (1.615; ed. min., 1.491). 100 Cf. 2 Sent., 3.2.2.1 (2.117-21; ed. min., 2.108-12); ll.dub.2, Resp. (2.290; ed. min., 2.293-94). 101 Cf. 2 Sent., 23.2.1 (2.537-38; ed. min., 2.555-57); 7.2.1.1, ad 3 (2.191; ed. min., 2.184). 102 Cf. 3 Sent., 14.3.1 (3.318-20; ed. min., 3.312-14); Breoii, 4.6 (5.246-47; ed min., 5.87-89); ColL in Hexaem., 3.14-15 (5.345-46; Delorme, pp. 39-40).

406

CHAPTER FIVE

taining that human reason cannot contradict the evidence of the first principles of truth. The influence of Augustine on Bonaventure's doctrine is not as extensive here as the influence of Aristotle. The Augustinian influence, nonetheless, is quite significant, especially regarding the innate origin of the first principles, and the innate lumen, in the human mind. It is from Augustine, in particular, that Bonaventure acquires his doctrine on the first principles and on the intellectual lumen as reflexions of the eternal rules and the lumen of God. On the other hand, in Bonaventure's judgment, the doctrines of Augustine and Aristotle concur in every respect concerning the natural origin of the first principles and the nature of the lumen in the human intellect. Although Augustine teaches that there are similitudes in the human mind which are not acquired through the senses, even so, Bonaventure insists that Augustine does not teach that the human mind has no species acquired through the senses. Consequently, positing both innate and acquired species as necessary for a habitus of science, Bonaventure is able to harmonize the doctrine of Augustine with the doctrine of Aristotle on the origin of habitual knowledge. There are, according to Bonaventure, four different sorts of science. The first sort, which he calls human philosophy, consists in a purely speculative understanding founded on the principles of human reason and acquired from a knowledge of creatures. The second sort of science, called theology, consists in an understanding inclined by the human will, but not acquired in any way from creatures. The science of theology is founded on the principles or articles of Christian faith, and so, to obtain it, a man must have infused faith, even though he lacks the gift of grace. The third sort of science consists in a rational understanding directed by the will toward operation. This is the virtue of prudence, which is founded on the principles of natural law, and they direct a man toward a good and honourable life. The fourth sort of science, which is the gift of knowledge, comes from the Holy Spirit. It consists in an understanding inclined by Christian faith and directing the will to act with respect to what is good The gift of knowledge, therefore, is founded on the principles of Christian faith, but it originates from the gift of grace.l03 Every science, Bonaventure says, rests upon the principle that opposites concerning the same thing are not true at the same time.104 Each science, relying on that principle, seeks the truth of its objects by drawing conclusions from axioms common to the other sciences; but each science arrives at its own conclusions by means of principles that are proper and 103 3 Sent., 35.un.2, Resp. "... Spiritus sancti." (3.776; ed. min., 3.781). Bonaventure, in a later text, combines the second and third sorts of science, so that the fourth sort is the science of glory, or of eternal beatitude; the reconciliation of the two texts belongs to a theological rather than to a philosophical consideration of Bonaventure's doctrine: Coll. de donis, 4.5-25 (5.474-79). 104 "... omnis scientia supponit illud principium, quod opposita non sunt simul vera de eodem." — 1 Sent., 42.un.3, initio (1.750; ed. min., 1.594).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

407

intrinsic to it. The science of theology, for example, depending on the illumination of Christian faith, draws conclusions from the common or antecedent dictates of the natural law and by way of the articles of Christian faith. As a consequence, the science reaches an understanding of its principal objects, which are the truths of Christian faith.105 The act of Christian faith is believing, and Augustine, as we have seen, describes believing as "thinking with assent". Adapting this description to his doctrine, Bonaventure teaches that a man, to have a full and integral habitus of faith, must be instructed in the objects of belief, so that, thinking about them, he will be inclined to assent to them. The instruction received concerning the objects of belief constitutes the material element of faith, but the thought of the believer regarding them constitutes the formal element of faith; both elements are found in the mind of every Christian, even in one who lacks the grace of charity. Consequently, the habitus of Christian faith is acquired with respect to its material element, which concerns the articles of belief, and it is infused with respect to its formal element, which has to do with the assent of the believer to the articles of belief. His assent is made voluntarily, but by a concomitant and divine illumination elevating his reason toward the truths proposed for his belief. In short, the material element of Christian faith consists in an exterior instruction in the objects of belief; the formal element of Christian faith consists in a voluntary assent to the objects of belief, an assent depending on a divine illumination which moves the believer to accept the truths of faith.106 As the foundation of theology, Christian faith provides this science with its objects. A cognitive habitus, in Bonaventure's view, has both a common object and a proper object. The common object is material or accidental with respect to the habitus, and the proper object is formal or essential with respect to it. The common object of faith is that which is believed to be true, whether assent is made to it for its own sake or for the sake of something else. In this way, the habitus includes both uncreated and created truths, because the Christian assents not only to God, but also to whatever God has revealed, and He has made known many truths about His creatures. The proper and principal object of faith, however, is the uncreated truth of God himself. Thus, through the illumination of faith, God moves the human intellect in a formal way with respect to the articles presenting the truths of the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Redemption;

105 3 Sent., 25.1.1, Resp. (3.535; frf. mm., 3.526). 106 3 Sent., 23.2.2, Resp. (3.490-91; ed. min., 3.480-81). Note the following portion of the text "Quidam autem assentiunt veritati fidei propter divinam illustrationem, sicut illi qui innituntur primae Veritati super omnia et propter se, sicut multi Christiani qui caritatem non habent; et in talibus fides est per infusionem. Voluntarie enim assentiunt, concomitante divina illuminatione: illuminatione, inquam, quae rationem elevat in his quae sunt supra ipsam." This is one of Bonaventure's rare uses of the expression divina illuminatio, which he reserves exclusively for Christian faith, never using the expression in connexion with the natural operation of human reason.

408

CHAPTER FIVE

but He also moves the human intellect through the same illumination, though in a material way, with respect to created things, such as the works and actions of men.107 Since theology is founded on Christian faith, then, as the science of Christian faith, theology has to do materially with all the truths, both created and uncreated, revealed by God; but the proper and principal object of theology is the uncreated truth of God in Himself, a truth including the mysteries surrounding Christ. The formal reason or principle by which theology, proceeding from common axioms but inclined by the will, understands its proper object consists in a voluntary assent, assisted by a divine illumination, to the truth of God which is contained in the articles of the Christian creed. The science of human philosophy, differing from theology, has to do only with created truths, and they are known formally by both the natural lumen of reason and by the intelligible principles acquired from creatures. Founded on the innate axioms of human reason, philosophy deals materially with the truths that can be known from creatures. Because those truths depend on the three kinds of causes giving rise to creatures, human philosophy is divided into three different sciences, each having a proper object, which is understood according to its appropriate cause. The science of rational philosophy considers the truth of speech; so this science directs the human intellect toward the cause and principle of understanding. The science of natural philosophy considers the truth of things, thus directing the intellect toward the cause and ground of being. The science of moral philosophy considers the truth of human actions, and they direct the intellect toward the cause and order of human life. Bonaventure subdivides each of the three philosophical sciences according as they consider special conditions of their proper objects. Rational philosophy is subdivided into grammar, logic and rhetoric. Grammar, looking to the act of apprehending truth, considers the vocal expressions of truth through the use of suitable words. Logic looks to the act of judging truth, and so the science considers the teaching of truth through words that are true. Rhetoric is concerned with the motivations of reason, so that, by the use of polished speech, this science orders truth toward belief, or love, or hatred. Moral philosophy is subdivided into monastic, economic and political disciplines; they deal respectively with the truth of human life regarding one man, a single family, and a whole community. As practical disciplines, the sciences of moral philosophy are rooted in the habitus of conscience and, following the rules of natural law, they are perfected by the virtue of prudence, which is directed by the will toward what is right and just with respect to human life. Natural philosophy is subdivided into physics, mathematics and metaphysics. Physics considers the natural forms of bodies, and so this science judges the truth of corporeal things according 107 3 Sent., 24.1.2, Resp., ad 1 (3.513; ed. miti, 3.504).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

409

to their powers and seminal reasons. Mathematics deals with the abstract forms of bodily things, judging the truth of those things according to their intellectual reasons in the human mind Metaphysics is concerned with the truth of all beings, reducing them to their one first principle, from which they come forth in accordance with their ideal reasons. Hence, unifying all the philosophical sciences, metaphysics takes them back to God as to the first principle, the final end, and the exemplar cause of creation.108 The whole of philosophy, therefore, comes to an end at God, who is the one cause of all created things. Each of the three principal sciences, however, arrives at God according to its own order of causality. In the order of efficient causality, natural philosophy goes from mutable beings to the immutable being, thus coming to rest in the unmoved mover. In the order of final causality, moral philosophy proceeds from the good to the better, so that the science reposes in the best of all goods, which is the supreme good In the order of formal causality, rational philosophy moves from the beautiful to the more beautiful, and so the science terminates in that which is most beautiful, namely, in the essential principle and exemplar of all beauty.109 The three orders of causality are one in God. Consequently, for the perfection of philosophical knowledge, the three principal sciences must be brought together to form one source of knowledge about God as the supreme cause of creatures. This unification of the philosophical sciences gives rise to the habitus of wisdom, which is the ultimate perfection of natural knowledge in man.110 The term wisdom, Bonaventure notes, is used in four different ways, some by the philosophers and others by the theologians. In the first place, the term is used commonly to designate a general knowledge of things. Augustine, for instance, defines wisdom as "knowledge of things both divine and human"; Aristotle speaks in a similar fashion: "the wise man is the one who knows all things". In the second place, the term is used less commonly to designate a knowledge of eternal things, as St. Paul writes: "The word of wisdom is given to one ... and the word of science to another" (1 Cor., 12.8). Commenting on this text, Augustine says: "wisdom is knowledge of eternal things, but science is knowledge of created things". Aristotle refers to the same sort of wisdom, calling it "knowledge of the highest causes". In the third place, the term is used properly to signify knowledge of God according to piety, a knowledge obtained in the Christian religion by the worship of God through faith, hope and charity. Thus, in the view of

108 De reduc. artium, n. 4 (5.320-21; ed. min., 5.219-21). Cf. ColL de dmis, 4.1-12 (5.473-76); ColL in Hexaem., 4-7 (5.348-68; Delorme, pp. 48-108). We have presented, for now, only a general outline of Bonaventure's doctrine on the divisions of the philosophical sciences. We shall present his doctrine in more detail in a later part of our work. 109 1 Sent., 3.1.dub.l, Resp. "In aliis ... per essentiam." (1.78; ed. min., 1.56). 110 Cf. 1 Sent, 35.un.2, con. 3 (1.605; ed. min., con. c, 1.481); 42.un.l, sc 4 (1.747; ed. min., sc d, 1.591); DMT, 2.1, fm. 6 (5.60).

410

CHAPTER FIVE

Augustine, Christian piety is the same as wisdom. In the fourth place, wisdom is used also properly and in a better way to signify an experiential knowledge of God. This knowledge, originating from the gift of the Holy Spirit, is accompanied by a tasting of divine sweetness. Since an interior tasting has delight, Bonaventure says, the gift of wisdom brings about a necessary conjunction of love in the will with apprehension in the intellect, so that the act of the gift is at once partly affective and partly cognitive. Beginning in knowledge but consummated in love, the gift of wisdom is both a sweet knowledge and an experiential tasting of the divine goodness. The principal and indeed proper act of the gift, as described by Dionysius, consists in an ecstatic love of God.''' The first two uses of wisdom are concerned only with knowledge, whereas the last two uses of the term have to do with both knowledge and love. When used to designate knowledge alone, the term signifies a natural or philosophical wisdom. In this regard, wisdom is used commonly to stand for a general knowledge of things, whether created or uncreated, and less commonly to stand for a knowledge of eternal things or the highest causes of created things. The term signifies a theological wisdom, however, when it is used to designate both knowledge and love. In that way, wisdom is used properly both to stand for a devout knowledge of God through the theological virtues and, in the better way, to stand for a mystical experience of God by the gift of the Holy Spirit. Speaking of wisdom according to its etymological significance (sapientia), Bonaventure says that a first sort of wisdom takes its name from the act of knowing (sapere), and a second sort from savour (sapor), so that the gift of wisdom includes charity. Natural wisdom, consisting in knowledge of divine and human things, is found in both good and evil men, for the human intellect is illumined to know many true things about God and creatures. Because a man does not lose his intelligence, he is not deprived of this sort of wisdom. Infused wisdom is found only in good men, since it involves taste and love, savour and order; a man can be deprived of infused wisdom through sin, by which he is made foolish.112

1 1 1 3 Sent., 35.un.l, Resp. (3.774; ed. mm., 3.778-78); 1 Sent., 46.dub.5, Resp. (1.835; ed. min., 1.663). See the following: St. Augustine, De Trinit, 14.1.1-3, (PL 42.1035-37), De civil. Dei, 10.13 (PL 41.27879), Enckirid, 2-3 (PL 41.278-79), Enchirid., 2-3 (PL 40.231-33); Aristotle, Metaph., 1.2 (982a5-982blO, 983b6-ll), De anima, 2.3 (414bl-5); Dionysius, De nyst. theol., c. 2 (PG 3.1026). 112 "... dicendum quod sapientia, secundum quod est donum excellentissimum, est dicta a sapore non a sapere, et ita includit caritatem." — 2 Sent, 9.un.4, ad 7 (2.249; ed min, 2.249). "Dicendum, quod sapientia uno modo importat cognitionem solum, et sic dicitur 'sapientia rerum divinarum humanarumque cognitio'; alio modo importat gustum et affectus, saporem et ordinem, et sic dicitur sapientia a sapore. Primo modo sapere est in bonis et mails, qui habent intellecturn iliuminatum ad vivendum multa vera de Deo et creaturis; secundo modo tantum in bonis. Primo modo perseveravit, quia intelligentiam non amisit; secundo modo am is it, cum peccavit et stulus factus est." — Comm. in Eccles., 2.10, q. 3, Resp. (6.23). We shall compare Bonaventure's doctrine on natural wisdom and infused wisdom at greater length in the fourth part of our work.

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

41 1

Natural wisdom, according to Bonaventure, consists solely in knowledge. In one way, it is a general knowledge of all things both created and uncreated. In another way, natural wisdom is a knowledge of eternal things, or a knowledge of the highest causes of creatures. Although Bonaventure limits natural wisdom to knowledge, even so, as we are about to see, the act of this wisdom puts order into human knowledge and, in the practical domain, depends on a love of natural goodness. Now, noting that a wise man sets things in order, Bonaventure says that God, who is supremely wise, arranges things in the best order. God has ordered them so well that He could in no way order them better. The order that He has established in the universe is twofold: an order of parts in the whole, and an order of parts to the end. The first order pertains to divine wisdom, and the second order pertains to divine goodness; but both orders are so conjoined that the one is conformed to the other, and thus the order of parts in the universe is for the sake of their ordination to the end. "3 According to Aristotle, an end is that for the sake of which something is, or is done. Bonaventure, following Aristotle, maintains that an end can be a terminus, which is an end under an end, or it can be an ultimate end in which there is repose, and this most of all is what the term properly designates. In other words, a terminus is a proximate end contained under the ultimate end, which completes and perfects the whole.114 The proximate end of the universe, then, is a created end, or its intrinsic goodness; but the ultimate end of the universe is God, who is the universal end of creation. Thus, all things in the universe are good because they tend toward God, and because they are ordered to God, for the reckoning of end follows principally the reckoning of good. "5 In brief, the ordering of parts in a whole belongs principally to knowledge, or wisdom, and the ordering of the parts to their end belongs principally more to love, which inclines things toward their end, or goodness.116 113 "Item, sapientis est ordinare: ergo summe sapientis summe sive optime ordinare: ergo Deus res ita bene ordinavit, quod nullo modo potuit ordinare melius." — 1 Sent., 44.1.3, fm. 4 (1.786; ed. min., fm. d, 1.624). "Dicendum quod est ordo partium in toto, et est ordo partium in finem. Primus ordo respicit sapientiam, secundus ordo respicit bonitatem. Et sunt isti duo ordines ita coniuncti, ut unus alteri conformetur, et ordo partium in universe est propter ordinationem ad finem." — Loc. cit, Resp. 114 "Sicut dicit Philosophus, 'Idem est finis et propter quod'. Finis autem dupliciter est: uno modo finis ultimus, qui propriissime est finis, in quo est status, aiio modo finis sub fine, qui dicitur proprie terminus. Sic et 'propter quod' diversificatur ..." — 1 Sent., l.dub.15, Resp. (1.45; ed. min., 1.34); cf. 43.un.2, Resp. "A parte finis ... et statu." (1.769-70; ed. min., 1.610). See in Aristotle, Physica, 2.3 (194b32195a2). 115 "... dicendum quod ordo creaturae quantum ad finem est dupliciter: vel quantum ad finem creatum vel quantum ad finem ultimum, qui Deust est, qui est finis universalis." — 4 Sent., 44.1.3.2, ad 4 (4.917; ed. min., 4.907). "... si Deus mediante alio produceret res, videtur quod mediante alio conservaret et perficeret: ergo res nullo modo Deo indigerent, ergo nee ad Deum tenderent. Sed omnia sunt bona, quia tendunt ad ipsum, et ordinata: ergo nihil esset bonum nee ordinatum; in quo enim principaliter est ratio finis, in eodem est ratio boni." — 2 Sent, 1.1.2.2, fm. 2 (2.28; ed. min., fm. b, 2.21). 116 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod ordo maxime videtur spectare ad actum cognitivae, cum sapientis sit ordinare, responderi potest primo distinguendo, quod duplex est ordo: quidam partium in toto et rerum in

412

CHAPTER FIVE

Considering natural wisdom as speculative knowledge, we can say, in accordance with Bonaventure's principles, that it looks to the order established by God in the universe between creatures, since they constitute its parts. Because a wise man sets things in order, therefore, knowing the order of creatures in the universe, the wise man puts into his understanding of them an order corresponding to their true arrangment in the universe as established by God Thus, knowing the proximate ends of the parts within the whole, or the order of creature to creature, the wise man can discover the order of the whole to its ultimate end, or to God, who is the universal end of all creatures. Consequently, setting his understanding of the universe in complete order, the wise man establishes in his knowledge of the universe an order similar to the one in the universe as it is ordered to God. Considering natural wisdom as practical knowledge, moreover, we can say that it looks to the order established by God in the various modes of human life. Hence, knowing the order of one virtue to another, the wise man puts into his understanding of human virtues an order corresponding to the true arrangement of human life by God From his knowledge of the proximate ends of the virtues with regard to the whole of human life, the wise man can discover the order of the whole to its ultimate end, which is God as the supreme good. Wherefore, putting his understanding of human virtue into a complete order, the wise man establishes in his knowledge of human life an order similar to the one directing all men to God. To attain his ultimate end, however, a wise man must live a virtuous life. He ought, therefore, to conjoin the orders of truth and goodness, so that, the one conforming to the other, he establishes a single order of natural perfection in wisdom and in love.117 There are two sorts of order pertaining to natural wisdom, as our description shows, and they correspond to the twofold order of things in the universe. The first order of wisdom, corresponding to the order among things in the universe, looks to human knowledge of all things in a general way, and so it has to do with the truth of things according to their created and uncreated causes. The second order of wisdom, corresponding to the order of the whole universe to God, looks to human knowledge of things in a special way, thus dealing with the truth of things according to their highest or uncreated causes in God Bonaventure compares the general and special modes of natural wisdom to the similar modes of natural justice. As a general virtue, justice contains all the other moral virtues; however, as a

universe, quidam vero eorum quae sunt in finem ad ipsum finem. Et quamvis primus ordo principaliter sit circa cognitionem, secundus tamen principalius consistit circa affectionem et dilectionem, cuius est in finem inclinare ..." — 3 Sent., 29.un.l, ad 3 (3.639-40; ed. min., 3.634-35); cf. 1 Seat, 3.1.dub.4, Resp. "Ad illud ..." (1.80; ed. min., 1.58). 117 There are many problems, both doctrinal and historical, concerning Bonaventure's stand on the natural capacity of a man to know and to attain his ultimate end. We shall meet those problems in our treatment of his theological evaluations of the doctrines of the philosophers regarding beatitude.

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

413

special or cardinal virtue, justice is distinct from the other virtues. In a similar way, wisdom is a general habitus containing and including a knowledge of all things; but it is also a special habitus of knowledge dealing properly with the highest causes of things. Aristotle refers to this special habitus when he says that a man who is wise about the being of something seeks to know its reason or cause. The general habitus of wisdom, on the other hand, enfolds the diverse sciences of philosophy, whether dealing with creatures alone or with both creatures and their Creator. Since man shares in the nature of every creature in the universe, as Gregory teaches, therefore, man can stand for all created things. Consequently, in defining wisdom, Gregory says that it is the science of things both divine and human, so that human things stand for all created things, in which the supreme wisdom of God is manifested.'18 Thus, the sciences look properly to the temporal reasons of creatures more than to their eternal reasons, which are the proper concern of wisdom. From this point of view, wisdom is a habitus formally diverse from the sciences. Since the sciences also acquire some knowledge of the eternal reasons of creatures, wisdom is said to be, from that point of view, only materially diverse from the sciences.119 A philosophical science, as we have seen, considers its objects in such a way that it is directed by them to God as to their principal cause; as a consequence, the science comprehends the truth of its objects with certitude according to His eternal reasons. The science of natural philosophy, for example, considering the being of corporeal things, is directed to God as to their first efficient cause; as a result, the science comprehends the truth of corporeal being with certitude according to its eternal reason in God. Natural philosophy, therefore, on analyzing its objects, ends at God as the principal cause of their being. The sciences of rational philosophy and moral philosophy likewise comprehend the truth of their objects according to their eternal reasons in God: rational philosophy attains God and ends at God as the exemplar cause of human understanding; moral philosophy attains God and ends at God as the final cause of natural goodness. None of the philosophical sciences comes to rest in God, however, because there is rest only in knowledge of principles, and not in knowledge of conclusions, for they are drawn from principles through a middle term. 12° Each of the philosophical sciences, drawing conclusions concerning its objects, returns to those objects from God as it judges them in accordance with His eternal reasons. In the science of moral philosophy, for instance, the superior 118 3 Sent., 35.dub.l, Resp. "... sapientia Dei." (3.787; ed. min., 3.793-94); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 1.2 (982a5-19). See in St. Gregory: In Evang., homil., 29.2 (PL 76.1214); he does not speak here of wisdom as the science of things both divine and human, so this reference ought perhaps to be made to St Augustine: De Trinit, 14.1.1-3 (PL 42.1035-37). 119 3 Sent., 35.dub.4 (3.788; ed. min., 3.795). 120 "Item, in cognitions conclusionum non est quies, sed solum in cognitione principiorum: et ratio huius est, quia anima cognoscit conclusiones per medium, principia vero cognoscit sine medio." — 3 Sent., 14.1.3, sc 3 (3.303; ed. min., sc c, 3.296).

414

CHAPTER FIVE

reason of the intellect has to judge the truth of its objects not only according to their eternal laws, but also according to its own lumen of truth, and according to the lumen of knowledge acquired from the senses by the inferior reason. Although the superior reason does not err when judging its objects according to their eternal laws, nevertheless, it can err in judging them according to its innate lumen, and according to those things that it perceives by the senses.121 Hence, the philosophical sciences attain the eternal reasons as the principles moving the human mind to comprehend its objects; but the mind on attaining the eternal reasons through wisdom reposes or rests in them as in the uncreated principles of truth. Perfect repose in the eternal reasons of God, however, requires the gift of wisdom, which no one has without Christian faith.122 The proper concern of the philosophical sciences, therefore, is the truth of corporeal things. They are known first from the innate principles in the memory through the mediation of the species acquired by way of the senses. Corporeal things are known secondly according to their eternal reasons in God, and that knowledge is obtained because the human mind is moved by those reasons to judge the truth of its objects with complete certitude. Thus, the sciences of philosophy end ultimately at the things about which they draw proper conclusions, both by means of the temporal reasons acquired by the mind through the senses and in accordance with the eternal reasons that it perceives in God. Since the mind perceives the eternal reasons of God rather than God himself, it perceives Him only indirectly at the terminus of its analyses of corporeal things. In other words, God is perceived as the uncreated cause of the particular aspect of the thing under consideration. Because the mind does not rest in God, but returns to the thing that it has analyzed, the particular causality of God known by a philosophical science is only a proximate end of human knowledge. In the science of natural philosophy, for instance, God is perceived as the unmoved mover of a corporeal thing, which is then comprehended as a mobile being when it is judged according to the uncaused cause of all motion. Similarly, in the science of moral philosophy, God is perceived as the supreme good of human life, which is known thereafter to be wholly good when it is judged according to the universal end of all goodness. Com-

121 "... ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum leges aeternas, sed etiam iudicare secundum lumen proprium et secundum lumen sibi ab inferior! acquisitum. Et quamvis aspkiendo ad leges aeternas non peccet iudicando, tamen, secundum ea quae percipit a sensibus vel etiam seeundurn lumen sibi datum et innaturn, potest deficere et errare, maxime in statu naturae lapsae." — 2 Sent., 24.2.1.1, Resp. (2.575; ed. min, 2.594). 122 "Ad illud quod obicitur. quod mentis humanae acies invalida in tarn excellent! luce non figitur, etc., dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod cognoscat per aeternas rationes, non oportet quod in illis figatur, nisi quantum cognoscit sapientialiter. Aliter enim attingit illas rationes sapiens, et aliter sciens: sciens attingit illas ut moventes, sapiens vero ut quietantes; et ad hanc sapientiam nemo pervenit, 'nisi primo per fidei iustitiam emundetur'." —DSC, q. 4, ad 2 (5.24); cf. sc 2 (5.21). The citation on the cleansing of the mind by the justice of faith is taken from St. Augustine: De Trinit., 1.2.4 (PL 42.822).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

415

plete perfection of the philosophical sciences, however, requires their unification through wisdom. As a general mode of knowledge containing all the sciences, wisdom orders their particular perceptions of the divine causality, or their proximate ends, into a single whole under God, who is then perceived in a simple way as the one supreme cause of all created things. Thus, attaining the threefold causality of God in a unified way, the general mode of wisdom is formally one with the sciences, for this sort of wisdom consists in the unification of the sciences with regard to their knowledge of all created things according to their uncreated causes. Wisdom is materially diverse from the sciences, nonetheless, because each of the sciences judges its object in one particular order of causality, whereas wisdom judges its object all at once in the three orders of causality. A created thing is comprehended all at once by wisdom, therefore, as a being that is one, true and good. Consequently, knowing the whole truth of a created being through wisdom, the human mind comprehends the being with a more perfect certitude by wisdom than by a philosophical science. In comprehending a created being by wisdom, however, the human mind is drawn immediately to God from the first principles of truth in the memory. Since those principles are reflexions of the eternal reasons in God, the mind attains His eternal reasons through wisdom immediately from the first principles themselves. From this point of view, the habitus of wisdom looks properly to the eternal reasons of creatures in God, and so it is formally diverse from the sciences, which look properly to the temporal rather than to the eternal reasons of created beings. As a special mode of knowledge, then, wisdom has to do with the eternal reasons of creatures in God, who is thus attained as the ultimate end of natural knowledge. Hence, reposing in the eternal reasons through wisdom, the human mind apprehends God directly as the supreme cause of the unity, truth and goodness of created beings. 123 When the human mind apprehends God, either indirectly by a science or directly through wisdom, it perceives Him immediately, for there cannot be a medium between God and the human mind. According to Augustine, the mind is so made in the image of God that it is formed immediately by the first truth, which is God. According to Bonaventure, interpreting Augustine, the intelligence of the mind is drawn naturally and immediately unto God, who alone can illumine the human mind.'24 Bonaventure, again 123 Cf. Itiner., 3.1-4 (5.303-05; ed. min., 5.193-98). 124 "Augustinus. in libro 83 quaestionum (51.4; PL 40.33): Mentem dicimus, quae ita ad imaginem Dei facta est, ut immediate a prima veritate formetur; et in pluribus locis dicit quod inter mentem et Deum nihil cadit medium: ergo si intelligentia nostra attenditur secundum animae supremum, videtur quod non possit illuminari ab angelo." — 2 Sent., 10.2.2, ad opp. 1 (2.265; ed. min., ad opp. a. 2.266). "Item, ita immediate nata est ferri in Deum intelligentia, ut voluntas: ergo si angelus non potest voluntatem rectificare, non poterit intelligentiam illuminare." — Loc. cit., ad opp. 6 (f); cf. ad 5-6 (2.267; ed. min., 2.267).

416

CHAPTER FIVE

interpreting Augustine, distinguishes an efficient medium from a disposing medium of truth. When Augustine says that there is no medium between God and the human mind, he ought to be understood to say that there is no efficient medium between them, since God is the efficient means of truth, and He is the object of the mind itself. Augustine, moreover, speaks against those philosophers who were of the opinion that the human mind could not have been conjoined immediately to the first truth, but by the mediation of a created intelligence125 As the disposing medium, God is present through truth to the human intellect, which does not need to abstract a similitude from God in order to know Him. While He is known by the intellect, it is informed by a sort of knowledge, which is, as it were, a kind of non-abstract but impressed likeness of God. This likeness is inferior to God, because it is in an inferior nature, as Augustine teaches; nevertheless, the likeness of God is superior to the human soul, because it makes the soul better than it was before it had knowledge of God.126 Since knowledge of things present to the soul is more true, according to Augustine, than knowledge of things known through similitudes acquired by the soul, therefore, because God is united to the soul through His presence there, He is more truly known than those things that are known through their similitudes.127 To contemplate the invisible things of God, Bonaventure says, a wise man must First fix his gaze on the being of God, for the divine being is the most certain of all the objects known to man. The divine being is so certain in itself that God cannot be thought not to-be. To know God in that way, however, the wise man must transcend all the limitations of created being. On transcending those limitations, he understands that the divine being is the primary object of the human mind and, therefore, that the being of every creature is known by the divine being. Truly blind, Bonaventure remarks, is the man who does not consider that which his intellect sees before all other things, and without which it cannot know them. Just as the human eye can 125 "... dicendum quod duplex est medium, scilicet efficiens et disponens. De primo medio debet intelligi quod dixit Augustinus, sed de secundo non; quoniam Deus est medium efficiens et obiectum ipsius mentis. Illud autem verbum dicit Augustinus contra philosophos, quorum opinio erat, quod mens non coniungeretur primo immediate, sed mediante aliqua intelligentia." — 1 Sent, 3.1.un.3, ad 1 (1.75; ed. mm., 1.53-54); cf. St. Augustine, De diver, tjuaes., 51.2 (PL 40.32-33). 126 "... dicendum quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferior! est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem. Et hoc dicit Augustinus, IX De Trinitate, c. 11 (n. 16; PL 42.969-70): 'Quemadmodum, cum per sensus corporum discimus corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro: ita cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei; ilia notitia tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est'." — 1 Sent., S.l.un.l, ad 5 (1.69-70; ed. mm., 1.50). 127 "Item, cum sit cognitio aliquorum per praesentiam, aliquorum per simititudinem, ilia cognoscitur verius, quae cognoscuntur per praesentiam, ut dicit Augustinus; sed Deus est unitus ipsi animae per praesentiam: ergo Deus verius cognoscitur quam alia, quae cognoscuntur per similitudinem." — Loc. at., con. 3 (1.68; ed. mm., con. c, 1.49); cf. St. Augustine, De videndo Dei (Eput., 147), 16.38 (PL 33.613-14).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

417

be intent on a variety of colours that it sees in the light of the sun, but does not see or advert to the sunlight itself, so also the human mind can be intent on the being of creatures that it sees in the being of their Creator, but the mind neither sees nor adverts to the divine being without which it cannot know the truth of any created being. Aristotle has indicated this in a very evident way: "as the eye of a bat is to the light of day, so is the human intellect to the most manifest things of nature". Commenting on the text, Bonaventure observes that the mind of a man can become so accustomed to the darkness of creatures, and to the phantasms of sensible things, that he cannot see the light of the supreme being of God. Consequently, as the human eye seems to see nothing at all when it sees pure light, so a man, bound down by creatures, seems to see nothing whatever when he turns his mind up to God, for such a man does not understand that the very darkness of God is indeed the supreme illumination of the human mind.128 Although Bonaventure, influenced chiefly by Augustine and Dionysius, limits the full perfection of wisdom to the knowledge and love of God founded on Christian faith and consummated by the gift of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless, he attributes to the human mind a natural habitus of wisdom, and in this regard he is influenced by both Augustine and Aristotle. The total doctrine of Bonaventure on natural wisdom presents a synthesis of Augustinian and Aristotelean thought. His description of the general mode of natural wisdom contains a combination of Aristotle's doctrine on wisdom as knowledge of all things and of Augustine's teaching on wisdom as knowledge of things both divine and human. Bonaventure draws the two doctrines together in his own account of wisdom as knowledge of created things according to their created and uncreated principles. He is influenced here to some extent by Gregory's teaching on man as representing all creatures in the universe. Bonaventure's description of the special mode of wisdom, moreover, contains a combination of Aristotle's definition of wisdom as knowledge of the highest causes of things and of Augustine's notion of wisdom as knowledge of their eternal reasons in God. The union of these two views of wisdom in Bonaventure's synthesis produces an original perspective of natural wisdom as a knowledge of God, who is at once the supreme cause of the unity, truth and goodness of created beings, which are comprehended with certitude according to the unity of their eternal reasons in God. The influence of Aristotle on Bonaventure's doctrine is also evident in his use of the Aristotelean principle that a wise man sets things in order. This principle, along with Aristotle's definition of end, enables Bonaventure to order the philosophical sciences according to their proximate ends, or their particular perceptions of the divine causality, and

128 Itiner., 5.3-4 (5.308-09; ed. min., 5.204-06); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 2.1 (993b9-ll). The divine being, or the uncreated being, is the first object of the human mind in both the speculative and the practical order of truth. With regard to the practical order of truth see: ColL de prate,, 2.3 (5.511).

418

CHAPTER FIVE

so to unify them under God as the ultimate end of human knowledge. The unification of the sciences constitutes the general mode of wisdom as knowledge of all things, both in themselves and in their divine causes. The special mode of wisdom, however, consists properly in knowledge of the divine causes and the eternal reasons of created things. As knowledge of the divine causes, this wisdom reflects the influence of Aristotle, who teaches that a wise man, knowing the being of a thing, seeks to know its principle and cause. As knowledge of the eternal reasons, the special mode of wisdom manifests the influence of Augustine, who associates the eternal reasons with wisdom, thus distinguishing it from science, which considers the temporal reasons of things. The Augustinian influence on Bonaventure extends to his doctrine on the manner in which God is known to the human mind, whether by science or by wisdom, namely, through a nonabstract similitude making God known immediately to the human mind. This doctrine depends on the Augustinian notion of the mind as an image of God, who is the first truth forming the human mind immediately in truth. When positing the being of God as the first object of the human intellect, nonetheless, Bonaventure utilizes Aristotle's description of the natural limitations of human understanding to account for the difficulties facing the intellect in contemplating God: His supreme illumination blinds the mind of a man who does not understand that the divine being is the principle by which the being of creatures is known to be true. Thus, by uniting the doctrines of Aristotle and Augustine, Bonaventure develops many latent possibilities in those doctrines as he composes his synthesis on natural wisdom, a synthesis which is manifestly Bonaventurean in character. 129

The doctrine of Aquinas on the habitual modes of knowledge is similar in some respects and dissimilar in others to the doctrine of Bonaventure. Speaking of science, Aquinas says that it can be considered from three points of view. It can be considered first from its mode of acting. From this point of view, science is a way of understanding things, as Aristotle shows, by means of phantasms, so that a science depends on species acquired through the senses. Science can be considered, secondly, according to its 129 M. R. Dady does not distinguish sufficiently between the natural and the infused modes of science and wisdom in Bonaventure's doctrine: Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 52-58. L. Veuthey and R. W. Mulligan associate Bonaventure's doctrine on science with the Aristotelean elements of his philosophy, while associating his doctrine on wisdom with the Augustinian elements of his thought Veuthey limits Bonaventurean science to abstractive knowledge of corporeal things, so that wisdom alone falls formally under the illumination coming from God: Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 46-47, 65-67. Mulligan confines science to the inferior part of reason, thus attributing Bonaventurean wisdom solely to the superior part of reason: FS, 15 (1955), pp. 338-47.

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

419

act, which is rational discourse. First analyzing an object, the intellect moves toward the first principles of truth; then, reflecting on the object according to those principles, the intellect draws conclusions from them, thus terminating in a knowledge of the object with certitude. The third consideration of science looks to its nature as a habitus or quality facilitating the intellect in its act of understanding. The movement or discourse of reason terminates at the essence of the thing known; but the first principles from which conclusions are drawn concerning the thing are known immediately and without a discourse of reason. Consequently, the first principles of knowledge constitute an immediate habitus of understanding. The habitus of a science, however, is formed in the possible intellect by the lumen of the agent intellect, which abstracts the intelligible species required to constitute a habitus of science. An intellectual habitus, therefore, is a quality or connatural form by which the intellect is prompt to act and in an easy manner regarding objects that are difficult to understand. 13° For Aquinas, then, as for Bonaventure, the habitus of a science stands between the habitus of understanding, or the first principles, and the complete knowledge acquired of a thing by an act of comprehension.l31 Thus, for both theologians, a science is habitus of conclusions drawn from the first principles of understanding and depending on intelligible species acquired from sensible things. Aquinas and Bonaventure are also close to each other in their views on the origin and nature of the first principles. Aquinas refers to them as the pre-existing seeds of the sciences, or the common conceptions of the intellect; they are known immediately in the lumen of the agent intellect and by means of the intelligible species abstracted from sensible things. The first principles are the seminal reasons of knowledge, so to speak, or the universal principles from which the intellect derives actual knowledge of particular things. Knowing particular things in that way, the intellect is said to acquire scientific knowledge of them, so that a science is said to pre-exist in the potency of its seminal reasons, or first principles, from which it is brought into act by a discourse of reason. Hence, applying common principles to a particular object, the intellect acquires knowledge of something previously unknown; so, by a discourse of reason, the intellect moves from the unknown thing to common or universal principles, drawing from them particular conclusions concerning the thing, which then becomes known by science to the intellect. 132 Although Aquinas does not speak of the habitus of first principles as innate to the human mind, he refers to the knowledge of the universal conceptions as inserted naturally in the mind, or as seeds of things known subsequently from 130 3 Sent, 31.2.4, Resp. (3.996-97); 35.2.2, Sol. 1 (3.1198); 14.1, Sol. 2 "In intellectu ..." (3.436). See in Aristotle, De anima, 3.7 (431al4-l9). 131 ST, la, 85.3, Resp. (1.528a-29t>); cf. 84.3, ad 3 (1.515b-16a). See also: DV, 2.1, arg. 4 (1.23), ad 4 (1.25-26); 10.2, ad 4 (1.195); 10.6, Resp. "Et ideo prae omnibus..." (1.201-02). 132 DV, 11.1, Resp. "Similiter etiam ..." (1.225-26). Gf. Lac. at., ad 12 (1.227), and DV, 10.6, sc 2 (1.201); ST, 2a2ae, 8.1, ad 2 (3.1444b).

420

CHAPTER FIVE

those conceptions. A science is drawn into act, therefore, from the principles in which it pre-exists originally or virtually. l33 Aquinas also says that the common principles are known naturally and at once by the natural lumen of the intellect. Again, following Aristotle, he teaches that the habitus of first principles is from nature, and so the principles are said to be known naturally. 134 There are in man, Aquinas explains, some dispositions existing in him partly from nature and partly from an exterior principle. The habitus of first principles is a natural habitus of the intellect according to both the specific nature and the individual nature of a man. It is a natural habitus according to his specific nature, because, owing to the intellectual nature of his soul, a man knows at once, for example, part and whole, thus knowing immediately that 'every whole is greater than its part'. But he can know what part is, and what whole is, only by intelligible species acquired from phantasms. This is why Aristotle says that knowledge of principles comes about by way of the senses. The habitus of first principles is natural according to a man's individual nature, because each man knows those principles in accordance with the natural dispositions of his sense organs, so that one man is more apt than another for the act of understanding, which requires the assistance of the bodily organs. The habitus of first principles, therefore, is natural with respect to its origin within the intellect. But knowledge of the principles contained by the habitus depends on intelligible species acquired through the senses.135 Though Aquinas uses different terms from those used by Bonaventure, even so, their two doctrines on the habitus of first principles are very similar to one another. The two theologians maintain, each in his own terms, that a habitus of science is acquired with respect to its particular conclusions; but it is not acquired with respect to its universal principles. Aquinas also concurs with Bonaventure in rejecting the Platonic position that the human intellect by nature has all the species of its objects, but cannot actually use them because of its union with a body. If the intellect were filled with species, Aquinas observes, the human soul would have a natural knowledge of all things, a knowledge that it could not forget, since it would

133 "... dicendum, quod in eo qui docetur, scientia praeexistebat, non quidem in actu completo, sed quasi in rationibus seminalibus, secundum quod universales conceptiones, quarum cognitio est nobis naturaliter insita, sunt quasi semina quaedam omnium sequentium cognitorum. Quamvis autem per virtutem creatam rau'ones seminales non hoc mode educantur in actum quasi per aliquam virtutem creatam infundantur, tamen in quod est in eis originaliter et virtualiter, actione creatae virtutis in actum educi potest" — D V , 11.1, ad 5 (1.227). 134 "Dicendum quod per lumen naturale nobis inditum statim cognoscuntur quaedam principia communia, quae sunt naturaliter nota." — S T , 2a2ae, 8.1, ad 1 (3.1444b). "Sed contra est quod in VI Eth., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus principiorum, qui est a natura; unde et principia prima dicuntur naturaliter cognita." — ST, Ia2ae, 51.1 (2.978a); cf. Aristotle, Ethica nicom., 6.6 (1140b30-l 141a7). 135 ST, Ia2ae, 51.1, Resp. "Sunt ergo ... virtutibus sensitivis." (2.978b); cf. Aristotle, Anal, poster., 2.15 (100a4-13).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

421

not forget that it has known those things through science. No man can forget, moreover, what he knows naturally, for every man remembers the first principles of knowledge. Since the soul is united naturally to the body, it would be unnatural for the body to impede the soul in its recollection of natural knowledge. Now the loss of one sense involves the loss of the science by which the objects of that sense are known to the intellect; but this would not be, if the intellect had by nature the intelligible species of all things. Consequently, the position of Plato is false, as Aristotle has demonstrated: experience shows that the human soul comes to-be without any cognitive species, because the soul must acquire such species by means of the senses.136 The first cognitive principles of the natural law, in the view of Aquinas, are also inserted naturally in the human mind Since a man discerns what is good and what is evil by the lumen of his natural reason, and since good and evil pertain to the natural law, therefore, the natural law is an impression of the divine lumen in the human mind, and so the natural law of man is a participation of the eternal law of God. Considering law to be a dictate of practical reason, Aquinas teaches that practical reason draws conclusions, or human laws, from the indemonstrable precepts of natural law in the same way that speculative reason draws conclusions, or the human sciences, from the indemonstrable principles known naturally to the human mind Wherefore, directing the judgments of practical reason regarding moral science, the precepts of natural law are principles or rules inserted naturally in the human mind 137 As a dictate of human reason, the natural law is not a habitus, properly considered, for a habitus is that by which an act is exercised with a certain facility. Because the precepts or principles of the natural law are held habitually by the mind, however, the natural law can be called a habitus by reason of its principles, just as understanding is called a habitus by reason of the first principles that it holds for the speculative sciences. The first of all principles in the speculative order is that an affirmation and a negation cannot be made of the same thing at the same time. This indemonstrable truth is founded on being (ens), the first thing apprehended absolutely by the intellect. The very first principle in the practical order is that good must be done and evil must be avoided. This primary precept is founded on the good (bonum), which is the first thing apprehended by practical reason.138 The similarities between the doctrine of Aquinas and the doctrine of Bonaventure on the connatural character of the first principles, whether speculative or practical, are sufficiently evident and need no further comment. There are, nonetheless, some differences between them of both a 136 ST, la, 84.3, sc & Resp. (1.515ab); cf Aristotle, Deanima, 3.4 (429b29-430a9). See also: DV, 18.7, Resp. (1.353-54); SCG, 2.83 "Item. Si aliquis ... corpori uniretur." (2.244, nn. 1676-79). 137 ST, Ia2ae, 91.2, Resp. & ad 2 (2.1210ab); 91-3, Resp. & ad 1-2 (2.1211ab). 138 ST, Ia2ae, 94.1, Resp. & ad 2 (2.1224ab); 94.2, Resp. (2.1225ab).

422

CHAPTER FIVE

historical and a doctrinal kind From the historical viewpoint, Bonaventure depends on Aristotle and Augustine, whereas Aquinas follows Aristotle almost exclusively. From the doctrinal viewpoint, their differences stem from the positions taken by Bonaventure and Aquinas with regard to the doctrines that we have already seen on the intellective powers and operations of man. The first principles of knowledge are placed by both theologians in the memory, which is the same as the possible intellect for Aquinas, but is a distinct potency from the intellect for Bonaventure. The intellect can reflect on the first principles without reference to the senses according to Bonaventure, but it cannot reflect on them in that way according to Aquinas.l39 Finally, the habitus of moral principles constitutes conscience in the doctrine of Bonaventure, who posits the natural law as the object of conscience; however, in the doctrine of Aquinas, conscience is an act of the intellect drawing conclusions from the principles of the natural law, which is the rule of human law and the measure of truth for the moral sciences.1*0 The doctrine of Aquinas on natural wisdom follows his interpretation of Aristotle's principle: a wise man sets things in order.141 This is proper to a wise man, Aquinas says, because wisdom is the most powerful perfection of human reason, to which it is proper to know order. Now there are two sorts of order in things. One sort is an order of parts within a whole. Another sort is an order of a whole to an end, and this order is more fundamental than the other, which is perfected by the ordination of the whole to its end. The order of things known to a wise man is fourfold, however, thus giving rise to four different sciences, and they are placed in order by wisdom. There is, first of all, the order of natural things that reason considers but does not make. Those things are considered by natural philosophy, which includes metaphysics. There is, secondly, the order of things established by the consideration of reason looking to its own acts. This order, belonging to rational philosophy, has to do with human concepts and spoken words, and

139 DV, 10.8, Resp. & ad 1 (1.207-08); ST, la, 87.1-2 (1.539b-42b). 140 The expression naturale iudicatarium is used by Bonaventure when referring to the human intellect in the moral order of truth. But the expression is also used by Aquinas in the same context: ST, Ia2ae, 71.6, ad 4 (2.1094b). Consequently, the differences between them on the acts of the intellect cannot be put down simply to a preference by Bonaventure, in contrast with Aquinas, for a natural seat of judgment of Augustinian origin to an abstractive action of Aristotelean origin, so that the act of abstraction gives way to a causal influence of an act of judgment, thus reducing abstracdon to a judgment of the intellect. Such is the view, with incidental variations, of the following: J. Rohmer, AHDLM, 3 (1928), pp. 151-61, 181; Z. Van de Woestyne, Antonianum, 8 (1933), pp. 284-91; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philas. chris., pp. 54-64. Their view is based on Bonaventure's texts in Itiner., 2.6, 2.9 (5.301-02; ed. min., 5.190-92), where he speaks of abstraction as a withdrawal from the limitadons of created truth, thus enabling the mind to judge it according to its uncreated reasons: "The mental state in which the 'rationes' are apprehended is termed "diiudicatio" and involves an abstraction from time, place and change." — I. Hislop, O. P., "Introduction to St. Bonaventure's Theory of Knowledge", Dominican Studies (Oxon.), 2 (1949), p. 54. 141 Metaph., 1.2 (982a5-19).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

423

with the principles and conclusions of rational demonstrations. The third order is established by reason in considering the acts of the human will, and so the order pertains to moral philosophy, which relates one voluntary act to another and directs every act of the will to an end The fourth order, which is the domain of the mechanical arts, is established by reason in its consideration of things to be produced by the work of human hands. The first order falls within the consideration of speculative reason, and the other three orders fall within the considerations of practical reason. Directing his attention to moral philosophy, Aquinas says that the subject of this particular science is human action according as it is ordered to an end, or man himself as a voluntary agent acting for the sake of an end. Since there are three different ends directing human actions, the science of moral philosophy has three different parts: monastic, economic, and political. The first part considers human actions with regard to the end sought by one man alone. The second part considers the operations of a family or domestic household regarding its proper end. The third part deals with the actions of a civil society with respect to its due end.142 Although the science of moral philosophy has to do with human actions, they flow from human virtues and not from moral science. Thus, moral philosophy cannot be called an art, a name that can be given to rational philosophy, which is placed by Aquinas among the seven liberal arts. Constituting the trivium of the liberal arts, rational philosophy is concerned with the mode of operation proper to the speculative sciences. Their manner of operation is studied chiefly by the science or art of logic, which establishes the rules and forms of scientific demonstrations.143 All the arts and sciences, Aquinas maintains, are ordained to the one end of human perfection, or the happiness of man. It is necessary that one of the sciences rule the others, therefore, and this science rightly deserves the name wisdom. To know the science that rules the others, it is necessary to know which science is both the most intellectual and has the most intelligible things for its objects. Now the most intelligible things can be taken in three ways. They can be taken, in the first way, from the order of understanding, for the intellect has its certitude from those things that seem to be the more intelligible. The intellect acquires its certitude from the causes of things, so that knowledge of their causes seems to be the most intellectual. Consequently, the science that considers the first causes of things seems most of all to be the one ruling the other sciences. The most intelligible things can be taken, secondly, from a comparison of the intellect 142 In Ethic. Arist., 1.1 (Spiazzi, nn. 1-6, pp. 3-4). 143 Expos, de Trin., 5.1, ad 2-3 (Decker, pp. 167.12-169.2). St Thomas does not speak here of the differences between grammar, rhetoric and logic, as St. Bonaventure does in his accounts of rational philosophy, nor does St Thomas refer here, except in passing, to the mechanical arts, whereas St Bonaventure presents a complete outline of them in his De reduc. artium, n. 2 (5.319-20; ed. min., 5.21718).

424

CHAPTER FIVE

to the senses. Since the senses know particular things and the intellect comprehends universals, therefore, the science dealing with the most universal principles is the most intellectual science. Those principles are being and the attributes that follow being, and they are all treated by one common science, so that it is the ruler of every other science. The most intelligible things can be taken, thirdly, from the knowledge possessed by the intellect itself. A thing has an intellective power because the thing is free from matter; so, because an intellect and its objects must be proportionate to one another, the most intelligible things are those that are separated most from matter. Things of that sort are free not only from the concrete conditions of matter, such as the natural forms studied in a universal way by physics, but also from the particular conditions of matter, going beyond the forms studied by mathematics to the separate intelligences and to God. Wherefore, the science considering those immaterial forms seems to be the most intellectual, and to be the ruler or director of all the other sciences. Thus, one and the same science considers the first causes of things, their most universal principles, and the substances separated entirely from matter. Now those substances are the first and universal causes of being: since the science considering the proper causes of a genus also considers the genus itself, therefore, the science considering the separated substances also considers being-in-common, for this is the genus of which they are the common and universal causes. Of the three objects studied by the science, however, only being-in-common is its subject, since the subject of a science is that whose causes and attributes it studies, and not the causes themselves, which are its end Because the science has to do also with the separated substances, and with the first causes of things, it is given three names corresponding to the three considerations manifesting its perfection. As the science considering God and the separate intelligences, it is called divine science, or theology. As the science considering being and the attributes of being, it is called metaphysics, or the science, following the way of analysis, that conies after physics. Finally, considering the first causes of things, the science is called first philosophy.144 In the view of Aquinas, then, natural wisdom establishes a unity among the philosophical sciences and, ruling them, orders them to the perfection or happiness of man. Aquinas, invoking Aristotle, posits the ultimate happiness of man in the best operation of his highest potency, or his intellect, with respect to its most intelligible objects, which are, simply speaking, the first causes of things. Although the human intellect stands in relation to the first causes as the eye of a bat stands in relation to the light of the sun, nonetheless, Aquinas says, the ultimate happiness that a man can have in this life must consist in the consideration of the first causes. The little that can be known about them, as Aristotle indicates, is more lovable and more 144 In Metaph. Arist., Prooem. (Cathala-Spiazzi, pp. 1-2).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

425

noble than all that can be known about inferior things. A man will receive perfect beatitude after this life, moreover, according as his knowledge of the first causes is perfected: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the one true God" {/«., 17.3). All the considerations of the philosophers, Aquinas remarks, have in view a knowledge of the first causes. For this reason, they approach the science of the first causes last of all, preparing the way to that science through logic and mathematics, then by natural philosophy and moral philosophy, thus turning finally to the divine science, or human wisdom.145 The way that Aquinas distinguishes and unites the philosophical sciences is notably different from the way of Bonaventure. Their two positions, however, on the nature of the diverse sciences and their unity through wisdom are very similar to one another. The main differences between the two theologians consist in their individual approaches to the proper order of the three principal sciences of philosophy, and to their unity of order as established by metaphysics, or natural wisdom. Bonaventure, in his approach, relates each of the sciences to a particular order of causality, so that God is perceived as the first cause by each science within its appropriate order. Thereafter, unifying the three perceptions of divine causality, natural wisdom or metaphysics orders them as proximate ends of human knowledge to its ultimate end, which is God as He is perceived to be at once the first principle, the exemplar cause, and the final end of all creatures. Aquinas, taking another approach, associates natural philosophy with the order of things as they exist in the universe. At the same time, he associates rational philosophy with an order to be established by human reason in its own acts; in a similar manner, he associates moral philosophy with an order to be established by reason in human actions. Then, unifying the philosophical sciences, he attributes to wisdom or metaphysics the task of ordering them according to its conception of being, which directs the intellect ultimately to the end of human knowledge, namely, the first causes or universal principles of all things in God. The question arising at this point is: whether or not the individual approaches of Aquinas and Bonaventure to the order established by wisdom entails a difference of doctrine between them on the nature of wisdom itself. To answer the question, we must take a closer look at the doctrine of Aquinas on wisdom. Speaking about the intellectual virtues, Aquinas says that a speculative virtue perfects the intellect in its consideration of what is true. Now things are known to be true either through themselves or through something else. Things known to be true through themselves are perceived immediately by the intellect; so, in its consideration of those things, the intellect is perfected by the habitus of understanding, or of principles. Things known to

145 Expos, lib. De causis, Prooem. (Saffrey, pp. 1-2); there are many references here to the sources in Aristotle employed by Aquinas. See also: In Ethic. Arist, 6.7 (Spiazzi, pp. 330-31; nn. 1209-11).

426

CHAPTER FIVE

be true through something else are perceived by the intellect after a discourse of reason, but in two different ways. In one way, what is known to be true can be the last thing in a genus, and thus the considerations of the intellect are perfected by the sciences, each science perfecting it habitually according to one genus of knowable objects. In another way, the thing known is the ultimate object with respect to the whole of human knowledge; in this regard, the consideration of the intellect is perfected by the habitus of wisdom, which looks to the highest causes of things. Consequently, wisdom judges and orders all the other speculative virtues, because a thing must be known in its first causes in order that it be judged both perfectly and universally. Hence, demonstrating conclusions from principles, wisdom is numbered among the sciences; however, judging the other sciences with regard to their conclusions and the first principles, wisdom is distinct from the sciences, which do not consider the highest causes of things. Clarifying his position, Aquinas teaches that the habitus of understanding considers the first principles in themselves, but a habitus of science considers them together with the conclusions that it draws from them, and so a science depends more on understanding as on the principal habitus. But understanding and the sciences depend mostly on wisdom as on the principal habitus, because wisdom, considering the first principles according to the highest or universal causes of all things, judges the principles of understanding and the conclusions of the sciences.146 Natural wisdom, as described by Aquinas, has a twofold act. It puts order into human knowledge, and it judges inferior things according to their superior rules or highest causes. The superior rules of things are their divine rules, which are preeminent over every other rule or law, so that he is wise, simply speaking, who knows the eternal laws of all things in God. Now a man can be wise when he knows the highest cause in a particular genus; but such a man is wise only with respect to the things in that genus, as a prudent man is said to be wise with respect to human actions. Consequently, whether wisdom is taken as an intellectual virtue or as a gift of the Holy Spirit, it is most certain in its judgments because every other mode of knowledge falls under the judgment of wisdom. The certitude of wisdom, therefore, is greater than the certitude of a science, for wisdom looks properly to divine things, whereas the proper consideration of a science has to do with created things.147 Speaking more precisely, Aquinas says that a wise man considers the highest cause through which he judges things most certainly, and according to which he puts order into them. This is not the highest cause known to a particular science, which judges things in a single genus, so that the certitude of a science follows its judgments of

146 57", Ia2ae, 57.2, Rcsp., ad 1-2 (2.1006ab). Gf. 1 Sent., 35.1.1, ad 5 (1.813); 3 Sent., 34.1.2, Resp nn. 53-57 (3.1117-18). 147 Sent., 35.2.1, Sol. 2 (3.1194-95); 35.2.3, Sol. 2 (3.1203).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

427

those things according to the highest cause of their genus. Rather, the highest cause attained by wisdom is God himself; therefore, that man is said to be wise, speaking absolutely, who judges and orders all things according to their divine rules that he perceives in God. Thus, knowledge obtained through the sciences is concerned with human and created things, and they are known properly by a science more through their second causes than through their first cause. But knowledge obtained through wisdom is concerned with divine and uncreated things, and so this knowledge has to do properly with the first cause itself, namely, with God. Although wisdom and the sciences are one materially with respect to their knowledge of created things, nevertheless, looking properly to God, wisdom is formally distinct from the sciences, which have knowledge of God only in judging human and created things in accordance with their divine and eternal laws. The perfection of wisdom, however, is found in the man who is wise through the gift of wisdom communicated by the Holy Spirit.H8 The doctrine of Aquinas on natural wisdom is not very different from the doctrine of Bonaventure. Indeed, their two doctrines on wisdom have much in common, even though their individual ways of speaking about wisdom are obviously different. Bonaventure speaks of a general mode of wisdom as formally one with the sciences, because wisdom represents the unification of sciential knowledge of all things according to their uncreated causes; but wisdom is materially diverse from the sciences, because each science judges its objects in one only order of causality, while wisdom judges its objects all at once in the three orders of causality. Aquinas speaks of wisdom as one with the sciences in a material way, because both wisdom and science judge created things; he also unites wisdom and the sciences in a formal way, because wisdom, as a science, demonstrates conclusions from principles. But wisdom is formally diverse from the sciences, since wisdom, looking properly to God, judges created things according to their one first cause, whereas science, looking properly to creatures, judges them only according to the first cause in a single genus. Thus, the two theologians, each in his own way, attributes a proper certitude to a science within a single domain of causality, and they attribute to wisdom a perfection of certitude flowing from a knowledge of God as the supreme cause of all things. For both theologians, moreover, the certitude of a science is affirmed in the judgment of wisdom, which moves to the eternal reasons or rules of created things from the first principles of truth in the memory. In the view of

148 ST, 2a2ae, 45.1, Resp. (3.1656a-57b); 9.2, Resp., ad 3 (3.1452a-53a). Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in attributing the fulness of certitude to the gift of wisdom infused by the Holy Spirit For Aquinas, as for Bonaventure, this wisdom is both cognitive and affective, containing a connatural taste for the things of God, to whom the Christian is united in charity, which moves him to love God according as He is known through wisdom from His created effects : ST, 2a2ae, 45.2-3 (3.1657b-59a); cf. 3 Sent, 35.2.2, Sol. 3 (3.1200).

428

CHAFFER FIVE

Aquinas, as in the view of Bonaventure, the first principles of truth reflect the eternal wisdom of God.149 There are a number of differences, nonetheless, between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the natural wisdom. For Bonaventure, the general mode of wisdom is one with the sciences because it unifies their proximate ends, or their particular perceptions of divine causality, under the ultimate end of human knowledge, which is God as the threefold cause of creatures. For Aquinas, on the other hand, wisdom is one with the other modes of knowledge because wisdom embraces both knowledge of principles and knowledge of conclusions, thus drawing science and understanding together into a single habitus. Aquinas, as a consequence, attributes a limited wisdom to a science, namely, according as it draws conclusions from principles that are understood in their highest cause, but not in the one first cause of all things. While Bonaventure attributes to a science knowledge of its proper objects according to their first cause, even so, the conclusions of a science, though they are known with complete certitude, do not constitute a wisdom, even in a limited way, because wisdom consists essentially in a unified knowledge of created things according to their threefold order of causality. In the final analysis, however, both Aquinas and Bonaventure look upon natural wisdom as the ultimate perfection of the human intellect, a perfection that cannot be acquired by a man apart from a good moral life.150 Our Natural Knowledge of God

In the doctrine of Bonaventure, as we have seen, God is made known to the human mind by means of a similitude which is not an abstract similitude, but a likeness of God impressed on the human spirit by God himself. Although God can become known from the evidence of His being and from His presence in the corporeal world, nevertheless, when God becomes known to the human mind, He is known from the evidence of His truth and from His presence in the spiritual soul. The mind, in order to know God, must move from the exterior world of bodies into the interior world of the spirit, so that God, making Himself known, draws the mind up toward Himself. In other words, according to Bonaventure, God is known from within the human mind, or in an innate manner. Thus, we are faced with the problem of the innate mode of knowing God Bonaventure adverts

149 "Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet." — SCG, 1.7 (2.11, n. 44). 150 We are referring here to the fact of A passible perfection of human nature, a fact accepted by both Bonaventure and Aquinas, each in his own way. The actual attaining of this perfection as a historical problem will be dealt with in the last part of our work. There are, in addition, some problems on the certitude and illumination of human knowledge in the doctrines of Bonaventure and Aquinas. We shall consider those problems in the next part of our work.

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

429

to this mode of knowing God on concluding his lengthy question concerning the origin of the habitus of conscience. He says there that conscience is innate, simply speaking, with respect to any object known through its essence and not through a species, such as the obligation to love God, or to fear God. Now God is not known by a similitude acquired through the senses. On the contrary, as Augustine says, knowledge of God is inserted naturally in us. A man knows what love is, furthermore, and what fear is, not by species acquired through the senses, but through their essence, because love and fear are present essentially in the soul. It is necessary, therefore, Bonaventure continues, to hold that the soul knows both God and itself without the help of the exterior senses. If Aristotle says, now and again, that there is in the intellect only what has first passed through the senses, and that all knowledge has its origin from the senses, he should be understood to speak on those occasions of the things that have to be in the soul through abstracted similitudes, for such things are said to be in the soul after the manner of a picture, or an inscription. It is very noteworthy, Bonaventure remarks, that Aristotle speaks of the soul as having no original inscription, not because there is no knowledge in the soul at first, but because, in the beginning, there is neither a picture nor an abstracted similitude in the soul. This is what Augustine also says, speaking of the natural power of judgment given by God to the soul, which knows light and darkness in the divine truth, because truth is impressed naturally on the heart of man.151 What does Bonaventure mean in saying that, because love and fear are present essentially in the soul, they are known through their essence and not by species acquired through the senses? Love and fear are principles of action in the human will, just as whole and part are principles of operation in the human intellect. The soul, from its creation, has a natural power or seat of judgment directing the intellect to know what is true. Likewise, from its creation, the soul has a natural disposition or tendency directing the will to seek what is good. Just as the intellect is directed toward both speculative and moral truths, so also the will is directed toward both the good of utility and the good of probity. The direction of the intellect toward moral truth comes from conscience, which disposes the practical intellect habitually to judge what ought to be done according to the natural law. In a similar manner, the will is directed toward moral actions by synderesis, which disposes the will habitually to seek the good of probity in accordance with the natural law. Consequently, containing the first principles of moral action, synderesis is a habitus inclining or stimulating the will to pursue the good of probity.152 Thus, love and fear are essentially in the soul because

151 2 Sent., 39.1.2, Resp. "Si qua ..." (2.904; ed. min., 2.939); cf. St. Augustine, De civil. Dei, 11.27.2 (PL 41.341); De lib. arbit., 3.20.56 (PL 32.1298). 152 2 Sent., 39.2.1, Resp. "Et propterea ..." (2.910; ed min., 2.944-45); cf. ad 3-4.

430

CHAPTER FIVE

they are habitual principles of action contained by the habitus of synderesis. This habitus is the counterpart in the will of the innate habitus of conscience in the memory. The principles contained by conscience, as we have seen, are the seeds of truth drawn by the intellect from the natural law by way of moral science. The principles contained by synderesis are likewise the seeds of upright action executed by the will in accordance with the natural law through moral virtue. Moreover, just as the first principles of moral truth in the memory are known innately by the connatural lumen of the intellect, so the first principles of moral goodness in the will are also known innately by the same connatural lumen of truth. Both sets of innate principles, therefore, are known immediately in the connatural lumen of the soul and without species acquired through the senses. Now God is known by the soul through the influence of its connatural lumen, which Augustine calls a sort of similitude of God: it is not abstracted from God, but infused by Him, and so it is inferior to God, because it is in an inferior nature.l53 We have now seen two accounts, the one complementing the other, of the innate manner in which God is known to the human soul, both accounts depending on the doctrine of Augustine. In the one account, the soul is said to know God because of an impressed likeness of Him informing the mind. In the other account, God is known through the influence of the soul's connatural lumen, which is an infused likeness of God. Both likenesses are said to be non-abstract similitudes of God, and they are founded on His presence in the soul: the first is founded on His informing presence as truth; the second is founded on His influencing presence as the light of truth. Bonaventure, appealing to reason, holds that all spiritual cognition comes about because of light and, as Augustine teaches, because of the uncreated light of God. But light is a most knowable object, and God is the supreme light; therefore, God is the object most knowable to the human soul.154 As the supreme light and the most knowable object, God is, so to speak, the light Filling out the human intellect in a supreme way, and the object that, of itself, would be supremely knowable to the intellect were it not for the defects that will not be removed completely from the intellect until the soul is beatified. Apart from those defects, God is in Himself the object most clearly knowable to the human intellect.155

153 "Cognoscitur autem Deum ... per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod 'est similitude quaedam Dei, non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferior! natura', sicut dicit Augustinus, in IX De Trinitate (11.16; PL 41.969-70), et habiium est in prirao." — 2 Sent., 3.2.2.2, ad 4 (2.123; ed. min., 2.115). Cf. 1 Sent., S.l.un.l, ad 5 (1.69-70; ed. min., 1.50); text cited above in n. 126, p. 416. 154 "Item, ratione ostenditur sic: omnis cognitio spirituals fit ratione lucis, et ratione lucis increatae, ut dicit Augustinus, in Soliloquiis (1.8.15; PL 32.877); sed lux est maxime cognoscibilis, et Deum est summe kix: ergo maxime est cognoscibilis ipsi animae: ergo etc." — 1 Sent., S.l.un.l, con. 2 (1.68; ed. min., con. b, 1.48-49); cf. con. 4 (d). 155 Loc. at., Resp. (1.69; ed. min., 1.49).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

431

God is the object of the soul according as it is His image. The soul is an image of God, according to Augustine, because it is capable of knowing and of loving Him, and because it can participate in being. The soul can know and love God, Bonaventure maintains, because it is ordered immediately to God As a consequence, the soul by its nature is conformed to God and, for this reason, bears within itself and from its origin the lumen of God. Since a similitude is attained by a coming together in an order, then, with respect to similitude, the soul is said perfectly to be an image of God, because it is assimilated expressly to God!56 The non-abstract similitude of God impressed on the soul, therefore, consists in the image of God there, an image accompanied by an infused lumen reflecting the lumen of God Now the soul has a natural knowledge of itself, since it is present to itself and is able to know itself. But God is most present to the soul and, by Himself, God is knowable to the soul; therefore, knowledge of God himself is given to the soul. Thus, God is known interiorly by the soul, even though a proportion cannot be established between God and the soul. If a proportionality were required necessarily for knowledge, Bonaventure says, the soul would never arrive at a knowledge of God. In order to know God, however, the soul must advert to His presence, and so be united to God as a knower is united to its object. Although God is in all things essentially and intimately, only a few men actually know Him, 137 Our innate knowledge of God, as Bonaventure's texts show, is simply a natural knowledge of God from His image in the soul and from the resemblance to His lumen in the connatural lumen of the intellect. The soul is an image of God by its nature, and the connatural lumen of its intellect is a replica of the divine lumen. Thus, Bonaventure can say, following John Damascene, that a knowledge of the divine being is impressed naturally on the minds of men. Since natural impressions are never lost, the truth of 156 "Anima rationalis est ad imaginem Dei. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro De Trinitate (15.8.11; PL 42.1044-45) ... 'eo mens est imago Dei quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest'. Capere autem non est secundum substantiam vel essentiam, quia sic est in omnibus creaturis: ergo per cognitionem et amorem: ergo Deus potest cognosci a creatura." — Loc. at, con. 1 (1.68; ed. min., con. a, 1.48). "Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, De Trinitate XIV (ibid.), quod 'eo est anima imago Dei quo capax eius est et particeps esse potest'. O_uia enim et immediate ordinatur, ideo capax eius est vel e converse; et quia capax est, nata est ei configurari; et propter hoc fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini. Et ideo quantum ad similitudinem, quae attendilur ad convenientiam ordinis, perfecte dicitur imago Dei, quia in hoc assimilatur expresse." — 2 Sent., 16.1.1, in Resp. (2.395; ed. min., 2.405). 157 "Item, inserta est animae rationalis notitia sui, eo quod anima sibi praesens est et se ipsa cognoscibilis; sed Dens praesentissimus est ipsi animae et se ipso cognoscibilis: ergc inserta est ipsi animae notitia. Dei sui. Si dicas, quod non est simile, quia anima est sibi proportionalis, non sic Deus proportionalis animae, contra: nulla est instantia: quia, si ad cognitionem necessario requireretur proportionalitas, anima nunquam ad Dei notitiam perveniret, quia proportionari ei non potest, nee per naturam, nee per gratiam, nee per gloriam." — DMT, 1.1, fm. 10 (5.46). Note also: "... dicendum quod non quaecumque unto cognoscentis ad cognoscibilis sufficit ad cognitionem, immo requiritur quod uriiantur per modum cognoscentis. Sicut enim ... Deum est in omnibus essentialiter et intimus omnibus et tamen a paucis cognoscitur." — 3 Sent., 14.1.1, in ad 2 (3.298; ed.min., 3.290).

432

CHAPTER FIVE

God impressed on the human mind is inseparable from it, so that God cannot be thought by the mind not to-be.158 The truth of the divine being is greater than the truth of any created principle of knowledge; but a created principle is so true that it cannot be contradicted by the interior reason: therefore, such a truth cannot be thought not to-be. It is true to say with much greater reason, Bonaventure maintains, that the first truth cannot be thought not to-be. The human intellect, moreover, understands its objects only through the first truth and the first light, so that, even in thinking that something is-not, the intellect thinks through the First light. But the intellect cannot think through the first light that the first truth is-not; therefore, in no way can the intellect think that the first truth or the first light is-not. Every thought of the human mind, furthermore, and every statement uttered by a man affirm that there is a first truth. Now the most negative statement that a man can make is: 'there is no truth'. Augustine has shown that this statement actually affirms the being of truth: if 'there is no truth', it is then true that 'there is no truth'; since this statement is true, therefore, something is true, so that truth itself must be. Consequently, in denying the being of truth, a man really affirms it and, in affirming it, he affirms the being of the first truth.159 Bonaventure is well aware, as we have seen, that some men do not think that there is a God. Their error is due, in his judgment, to a misunderstanding about God, but not to a lack of evidence for the truth of His being. The evidence for the being of God is so abundant in the universe, according to Bonaventure, that no man, thinking rightly within himself, can be mistaken about the truth of God.160 Bonaventure's position on the ease with which a man can know the divine being is based on the exterior evidence of God's presence in the corporeal world, and on the interior evidence of His presence in the spiritual soul. Every being in the corporeal world has being through participation, or from God, who is present to all corporeal beings as a cause is present in its effects. His presence, on becoming known to the human mind, directs the thought of the mind toward the more immediate presence of God in the spiritual soul. God is present to the soul not only because it participates in being, but also because it is a natural image of God, who can become known immediately to the soul in its connatural lumen, which resembles the lumen of God. It is from this position that Bonaventure endorses Damascene's teaching on the knowledge of God's being as impressed naturally on the human mind. But Bonaventure also endorses Augustine's

158 "Item, Damascenus dicit, quod cognitio essendi Deum nobis naturaiiter est impressa; sed naturales impressiones non relinquunt nee assuescunt in contrarium: ergo veritas Dei impressa menti humanae est inseparabilis ab ipsa: ergo non potest cogitari non esse " — 1 Sent., 8.1.1.2, fm. 2 (1.153; ed. min.. Cm. b, 1.118); cf. St. John Damascene, De fide mthod., 1.1 (PG 94.790). See also: DMT. 1.1, fm. 1 (5.45). 159 Loc. cit., fa 3-7 (1.153; ed. min., fa. c-g, 1.118-19): cf. St. Augustine, Solil, 2.2.2 (PL 32.886); 2.15.28 (PL 32.898). 160 Loc. cit, Resp. (1.154-55; ed. min., 1.119-21); see above: pp. 379-80 (nn. 43-44).

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

433

teaching in the same context. According to Augustine, the image of God in the soul is founded on a relation of the soul to God, so that His image consists in the mind, knowledge and love of the soul. If the soul by its nature is an image of God in that way, therefore, Bonaventure argues, there has to be a naturally inserted knowledge of God in the soul. Since the first thing that can be known about God is that He is, the knowledge of God inserted naturally in the soul must consist in the truth that God is. Augustine also teaches that a desire for beatitude and a desire for peace are found naturally in the soul. Now no man spurns beatitude, and every man longs for peace: therefore, because peace is had with the eternal and immutable being, and because beatitude is possessed with the supreme good, the desires for beatitude and peace presuppose that God can be known naturally by the soul, which cannot doubt the truth of His being.161 Bonaventure finds a similar support for his position in Boethius, who says that "a desire for what is true and good is implanted in the minds of men". Such a desire, to Bonaventure, presupposes a knowledge of what is true and good; since they are chiefly in God, there is implanted in the human mind a natural desire to know and to love God.162 Finally, Bonaventure turns to Aristotle, who says that it would be unfitting for us to possess the noblest habitus, which contains the first principles, and to have it hidden from us. Now the noblest truth in us, Bonaventure reasons, and the one most present to us, is the truth that God is. It would be most unfitting, therefore, if that truth were hidden from the human mind. Aristotle teaches, moreover, that the human mind has a natural appetite for wisdom; but the wisdom which is most desirable is eternal wisdom, and so the human mind has been given a natural and most powerful desire for eternal wisdom. This desire would be in vain, however, unless it were preceded by a knowledge of eternal wisdom. Consequently, some sort of knowledge of eternal wisdom must be impressed naturally on the human mind, and this knowledge consists primarily in the truth that God is.163 Bonaventure's doctrine on our innate knowledge of God, as his texts show, has to do with the truth that God is, and not what God is. His position, moreover, is supported by a variety of historical sources. Combining those sources, Bonaventure develops a doctrine that he expresses in his own characteristic manner. For instance, granting that the truth God is' is above the soul according to nature, he insists, nevertheless, that it is within the soul according to knowledge, and outside the soul according to representation and persuasion. Thus, in his view, every creature is a 161 DMT, 1.1, fa. 4, 7-8 (5.45-46); cf. St Augustine: De Trinit, 9.2.2 (PL 42.961-62); 12.4.4 (PL 42.1000); 14.8.11 (PL 42.1044-45). See also: Loc. tit., fm. 9, where Bonaventure, again following Augustine, shows that the rational nrind, having a natural love of truth, must have a natural love of the first truth, which is therefore known naturally from within the mind itself. 162 Loc. tit, fm. 3 (5.45); cf. Boethius, De consoL philas., 3, pr. 2, n. 177 (PL 63.724-25). 163 Loc. tit, fa 5-6 (5.45-46); cf. Aristotle, Anal poster., 2.19 (99b20-27); Metaph., 1.1 (980a22-27).

434

CHAPTER FIVE

representation of the truth that 'God is', and so every creature persuades the soul to accept it, because this truth is both enclosed and understood in every truth known by the intellect.164 Putting forth his view very concisely, Bonaventure says that the truth of God's being is certain to the intellect comprehending it. This truth is certain because knowledge of it is innate to the rational mind inasmuch as it is an image of God. Because the soul is God's image, it has been given a natural desire, knowledge and memory of God, toward whom the soul naturally tends in order that it may be beatified in Him.165 There is nothing in the texts of Bonaventure to suggest that our innate knowledge of God is founded upon an idea of God, which is present in the soul from its origin. Bonaventure never speaks of an innate idea of God in the human mind. Our innate knowledge of God is limited to the truth of His being, and it is founded on both the natural image of God in the spiritual soul and the resemblance to the lumen of God in the connatural lumen of the human intellect. In the view of Bonaventure, God is the ultimate end of human knowledge and of human love. God is known to man because He is present in the human soul "according to truth, and He is more intimate to the soul than it is to itself'. Consequently, "the soul comes into being to perceive the infinite good, which is God; therefore, in Him alone ought it to rest and to seek enjoyment".166

The doctrine of Aquinas on the natural knowledge of God in man conforms to his principles on the way that a man knows any object by his natural reason. In the view of Aquinas, therefore, a man knows God through an intelligible form abstracted by the lumen of the agent intellect 164 "... licet Deum esse sit supra animam secundum naturam, est tarnen intra animam secundum notitiam et extra secundum repraesentationem et persuasionem, quam sibi facit omnis creatura, quia haec veritas est in omni veritate clausa et intellects " — Loc. cit., ad 10 (5.51). 165 "Est enim certum ipsi comprehendenti, quia cognitio hums veri innata est menti rational!, in quantum tenet rationem imaginis, ratione cuius insertus est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et memoria illius, ad cuius imaginem facta est, in quern naturaliter tendit, ut in illo possit beatificari." — Loc. cit, in Resp. (5.49). 166 1 Sent., 1.3.2, in Resp. (1.41; ed. min., 1.30). There are a number of scholars who attribute to Bonaventure a doctrine of an innate idea or habitus directing the human mind to know God, a doctrine that they associate with a divine illumination of natural knowledge. We shall refer to those scholars in the next part of our work when we shall consider both the certitude of human knowledge, including knowledge of God, and the illumination of natural knowledge. For the views of other scholars on Bonaventure's doctrine of our innate knowledge of God see: L. Veuthey, "Le probleme de 1'existence de Dieu chez S. Bonaventure", Antmianum, 28 (1953), pp. 19-38; G. Scheltens: 1) "De Bonaventuriaanse Illuminatieleer", TP, 17 (1955), pp. 384-407, French summary on pp. 407-08; 2) "Una metaflsica de la verdad (San Buenventura)", W, 18 (1960), pp. 209-20; 3) "Kritische Wurdigung der Illuminationslehre des HI. Bonaventura", WW, 24 (1961), pp. 167-81; Anton C. Pegis, "The Bonaventurean Way to God", MS, 29 (1967), pp. 206-42.

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

435

from sensible things.167 Thus, interpreting Damascene's doctrine, Aquinas teaches that knowledge of God's existence is said to be inserted naturally in all men, because there is something inserted naturally in them enabling them to know that God is.16? In other words, Damascene should be understood to speak of knowing God according to a similitude of Him and not according as God is in His own nature, just as all things desire God, not as He is considered in His own nature, but as He is in His likeness. Although God is in the human soul through His essence, power and presence, nevertheless, God is not in the soul as an object of the intellect, as is required for knowledge. The human soul, though it is present to itself, can know itself only by reasoning from the objects of its acts, and from its acts to the potencies giving rise to them. In short, for Aquinas, God is known to man only by means of an intelligible form abstracted from things.169 Aquinas, therefore, differing clearly from Bonaventure, does not think that the being of God can be known immediately by the human mind, or apart from intelligible species abstracted from material things. Nor does Aquinas, unlike Bonaventure, hold that God is the first object knowable to the human intellect. In the judgment of Aquinas, the truth 'God is' is selfevident in itself because the essence of God is His being; but this truth is not self-evident to us, since we do not see the essence of God Knowledge of God's being is said to be innate in us, nevertheless, inasmuch as we can easily perceive from the principles innate in us that God is.170 Returning again to Damascene's doctrine, Aquinas maintains that there is naturally inserted in the minds of men a knowledge that God is. This knowledge, however, is a common awareness of God, who is known in some confused way to be the beatitude of man. Since a man has a natural desire for beatitude, he must also have a natural knowledge of beatitude, for a man desires only what he knows. But this is not to know, speaking ab-

167 "Sed cognitio Dei ad quam naturaliter homo pervenire potest, est ut cognoscat ipsum per formam intelligibilem, quae lumine intellectus agentis est a sensibilibus abstracta; et ideo Rom. cap. I, 20, super illud, 'Invisibilia Dei ... per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntiir', dicit Glossa, quod homo iuvatur ad cognoscendum Deum per creaturas sensibiles per lumen naturalis rationis." — DV, 8.3, in Resp. (1.143). 168 "Sed cognitio existendi Deum omnibus naturaliter est inserta, ut dicit Damascenus ..." DV, 10.12, arg. 1 (1.218); cf. De Jute orthod., 1.1 (PG 94.790). "... dicendum, quod cognitio existendi Deum dicitur omnibus naturaliter inserta, quia omnibus naturaliter insertum est aliquid unde potest pervenire ad cognoscendum Deum esse" — Lac. cit, ad 1 (1.220). 169 1 Sent, 3.1.2, arg. 1 & 3, ad 1 & 3 (1.93-95). 170 "Praeterea, naturaliter cognita et quae non possunt intelligi non esse sunt ilia quae primo nostrae cognition! occurrunt Sed cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est omnibus inserta, ut dicit Damascenus. Nee potest Deus cogitari non esse, ut dicit Anselmus. Ergo Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscimr." Expos, de Trim., 1.3, arg. 6 (Decker, p. 70). "... dicendum quod Deum esse, quantum est in se, est per se notum, quia sua essentia est suum esse — et hoc modo loquitur Anselmus — non autem nobis qui eius essentiam non videmus. Sed tamen eius cognitio nobis innata esse dicitur, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse" — Lac. cit, ad 6 (Decker, pp. 73-74).

436

CHAPTER FIVE

solutely, that God is: many men think that the perfect good, or the beatitude, of man consists in riches, pleasure and other such things. Consequently, the common knowledge of beatitude in man does not necessarily imply that knowledge of God's being is inserted naturally in the human mind.171 CONCLUSION Human knowledge, in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, begins at the level of the senses. The exterior senses apprehend the particular qualities of bodies, each quality corresponding to one of the five senses. The common sense, judging the acts of the particular senses, apprehends the common qualities of bodies. Uniting the apprehensions of the particular senses, the common sense shares in their acts by forming phantasms, which represent the common and particular properties of bodily things. The interior sense of imagination, receiving phantasms from the common sense, apprehends the quantitative properties of bodies. The imagination forms images representing both the quantitative and the qualitative properties of bodies. Thus, sharing in the operation of the common sense, the imagination completes the acts of apprehension begun by the exterior senses. The intellect, following the acts of the imagination and the common sense, abstracts intelligible species from the things apprehended by the exterior senses. Those species represent the essences of corporeal things as they are perceived by the intellect. On abstracting an intelligible species from a thing, the intellect apprehends the thing as it is in itself, thus participating in the truth of the thing through the mediation of the senses. The apprehension of a thing by the intellect comes about in a judgment contained by an intelligible word, which expresses the adequation of the thing and the intellect in truth. Though the truth of the thing in itself is known when it is apprehended by the intellect, the whole truth of the thing cannot be known until it is comprehended by the intellect. On comprehending a thing, the intellect, thinking about it, analyzes the thing according to its constitutive principles. The analysis proceeds until the thing is known according to its first cause and its eternal reasons in God. Thereafter, returning to the thing itself, the intellect judges it in accordance with its eternal reasons, and so the intellect comprehends the truth of the thing with certitude. As a consequence, the intellect participates in the whole truth of the thing, which is known both as it exists in itself and as it exists in God The synthesis of St.

171 ST, la,2.1, arg. 1 & ad 1 (l.llb-12b); cf. SCO, 3.38 (3.43-44). For both Aquinas and Bonaventure, as we shall see in our next chapter, man's natural knowledge of God involves analogical modes of knowing. This aspect of their doctrines does not appear in the studies of: Z. Van de Woestyne, Antonianum, 9 (1933), pp. 383-96; M. R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 88-95.

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

437

Bonaventure on the acts of the cognitive potencies, therefore, is developed according to his use of the principle of participation. The two extremes of participation consist in the exterior truth of created things and their superior truth in God, who is their Creator. The extremes come together in the interior truth of the human intellect, which is right and true according as its adequation to created things expresses the truth of their conformity to the eternal reasons of their Creator. The participational character of St. Bonaventure's synthesis is manifested also in his doctrine on the habitual modes of human knowledge. The two extremes of participation, in this instance, are united by the innate principles of truth retained habitually in the intellectual memory. Those principles share at once in the truth of God's ideal reasons and in the truth of the intellectual reasons, or intelligible species, acquired from sensible things. Forming the habitus of understanding, the innate principles include the axioms of the speculative sciences and the rules of the moral sciences. Those sciences are developed through experience or instruction and over a long period of time. A science is a habitus of conclusions drawn from the common principles of truth through the mediation of the intelligible species abstracted from sensible things. There are three principal sciences of philosophy, and they participate in the common or first principles of truth. A philosophical science contains conclusions drawn with certitude from those principles by means of the acquired species that constitute the proper reasons, or secondary principles, of the science. Complete certitude of truth is obtained by each science when, knowing the first cause of its objects, it judges them in accordance with their eternal reasons in God. Thus, a philosophical science apprehends God as the first cause of truth in a particular order of causality, and so each of the sciences arrives at a proximate end of human knowledge. The three proximate ends of the sciences are brought together by the general mode of philosophical wisdom, which is a knowledge of all things according to their created and uncreated causes. Participating in the truth of the sciences, the general wisdom of philosophy unites them under God as the one principle, the exemplar cause, and the final end of all creatures. Consequently, attaining the ultimate end of human knowledge, the special mode of wisdom apprehends God as the one supreme cause of all things, and as the first being by which every other being is known to be one, true and good. In apprehending God, whether by a science or by wisdom, the human mind perceives Him immediately, or innately, both from His image in the rational spirit and from the resemblance of His lumen in the lumen of the human intellect. The rational spirit is a natural image of God through its participation in being, and through its imitation of God as a mind knowing and loving itself. As a resemblance of the divine lumen, the connatural lumen of the human intellect participates in the light of the divine truth, which forms the human mind immediately in truth. In sum, the Bonaventurean synthesis on the acts and modes of human knowledge draws essentially on the principle of participation.

438

CHAPTER FIVE

The composition of the Bonaventurean synthesis on human knowledge has the support of two principal sources: the doctrine of Aristotle and the doctrine of St. Augustine. Those sources are conjoined now and again to other sources, notably the doctrines of Boethius and St. Anselm. At the level of sense knowledge, St. Bonaventure follows the truly proper meaning of sensing found in Aristotle, whose doctrine on sensation makes its way into the Bonaventurean synthesis. Nonetheless, as we have shown, St. Bonaventure combines the doctrine of Aristotle with the doctrine of St. Augustine, whose teaching on the modes of sensation also enters the Bonaventurean synthesis. The contribution of Boethius to the synthesis on sense knowledge is not as significant as his contribution on intellectual knowledge. In the latter instance, he provides St. Bonaventure with the intellectual mode of analysis and synthesis according to the predicamental line of abstraction. St. Bonaventure's doctrine on intellectual knowledge, however, owes much more to Aristotle and to St. Augustine than to Boethius. He makes incessant use of Aristotle's principle that the human intellect in some way becomes all things, a becoming that involves an assimilation of the intellect to its objects. This assimilation, as interpreted by St. Bonaventure, enters into the very nature of knowledge. But he finds the same principle in St. Augustine, who shows that any knowledge acquired by means of a similitude makes the knower similar to the thing known. It is from St. Augustine, moreover, that St. Bonaventure acquires his doctrine on the nobler being of corporeal things in the human intellect, where they have a spiritual mode of existence; but they exist most nobly in God, so that, in Him, the being of things is most true. Hence, to know a thing in God, as St. Augustine also shows, is to know it most nobly and most certainly, because it is known as in its superior cause. St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, turns to Aristotle for the necessity to know a thing in its cause, in order to comprehend the whole truth of the thing. Aristotle, in addition, contributes to St. Bonaventure's synthesis the necessity of the intellect, on thinking about its objects, to remain true to the interior principles of human reason. St. Augustine supports St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the act of comprehension by contributing to his synthesis the necessity to judge the truth of created things according to the first truth, which cannot itself be judged by the human mind. The synthesis of St. Bonaventure on man's intellectual knowledge, therefore, presents, for the most part, a skilful and coherent composition of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines. There is a notable exception, however, to this Bonaventurean exploitation of historical sources. With regard to the interior word of truth in the human intellect, St Bonaventure does not seek the support of Aristotle. The Bonaventurean doctrine on the interior word is supported fundamentally by St. Augustine, whose teaching St. Bonaventure supplements with the teaching of St. Anselm. St. Bonaventure's thought on the habitual modes of intellectual knowledge is developed, from the historical viewpoint, almost exclusively

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

439

with the aid of Aristotelean and Augustinian sources. His doctrine on sciential knowledge is taken well-nigh directly from Aristotle. St Bonaventure's doctrine on the r&le of human experience in the formation of science, and of universal knowledge, is a direct exploitation of Aristotle to show the necessity of grounding the habitual knowledge of science in sensation. It is to Aristotle that St. Bonaventure goes, furthermore, to prove that there are no originally innate species in the human soul. This doctrine, in St. Bonaventure's judgment, is not contrary to the teaching of St. Augustine, who says that the soul gathers species of incorporeal things without the aid of the senses. St. Bonaventure reconciles the two positions in his account of the formation of an intellectual habitus, which he describes as innate with respect to the first principles and acquired with respect to the species gathered through the senses. The innate species come to-be in the memory, however, as a result of the first acquisition of species through the senses. Thus, the innate species are known in the connatural lumen of the intellect, a lumen that St. Bonaventure, following St. Augustine, calls a natural seat or power of judgment and, following Aristotle, an agent intellect or power of illumination. The synthesis of St. Bonaventure on natural wisdom completes his composition of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines on the habitual modes of human knowledge. He brings together the Aristotelean conception of wisdom as a knowledge of all things and the Augustinian notion of wisdom as a knowledge of things both divine and human. As a consequence, St. Bonaventure arrives at a general mode of wisdom, which is a knowledge of things both created and uncreated. In this regard, he has some support from St. Gregory; however, the order established by wisdom in sciential knowledge has the support of Aristotle. The special mode of wisdom, moreover, presents a union of St. Augustine's doctrine on the eternal reasons of things in God and of Aristotle's doctrine on their highest causes. Following Aristotle's teaching on the principle of finalty, St. Bonaventure is of one mind with Aristotle in teaching that the wise man seeks to know the causes of things. Following the teaching of St. Augustin on the manner of knowing God, St. Bonaventure is of one accord with St. Augustine in teaching that God, who is the first truth and the supreme cause, is known immediately to the human mind from His presence in creation. Although St. Bonaventure relies exclusively on St. Augustine in accounting for the immediate mode of knowing God, nevertheless, in accounting for the difficulties facing the human intellect in turning toward God, St. Bonaventure invokes the principle of Aristotle on the difficulty with which the intellect comes to know the most manifest things in nature. This in another way of saying, with St. Augustine, that all created things are in darkness with respect to the light of God. Aristotle's final contribution to the Bonaventurean synthesis consists in his affirmation that there is in man a natural desire for wisdom. From this affirmation, St. Bonaventure shows that there must also be in man a natural knowledge of the being of God, who is wisdom itself. Thus, conjoining Aristotelean and

440

CHAPTER FIVE

Augustinian elements once again, St. Bonaventure holds that a knowledge of the divine being is inserted naturally in the human mind Though he holds the position on the strength of many Augustinian doctrines, particularly on the natural likenesses of God in the spiritual soul, St. Bonaventure also finds strong support for his position in the doctrine of St. John Damascene, and additional support in the doctrine of Boethius. Considering the use of historical sources by St. Bonaventure, with particular regard to Aristotle and St. Augustine, we find that his synthesis actualizes many of the possibilities latent in those sources. St. Bonaventure achieves this result by complementing one source with another: either a source in St. Augustine with a source in Aristotle, or a source in Aristotle with a source in St. Augustine; he also, at times, supplements the doctrine of St. Augustine or of Aristotle with doctrines taken from other sources, such as St. Anselm and Boethius. As a consequence, St. Bonaventure has produced a synthesis that, utilizing the different sources available to him, presents a Bonaventurean doctrine on the acts and modes of human knowledge. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, as we have shown, hold very many views in common on the acts of the cognitive potencies, and on the habitual modes of human knowledge. They also differ in a number of respects in their views on some aspects of those questions. The one question on which they hold views that are simply different is the manner in which the human mind knows the being of God For St. Thomas, God can never be known by a man in this life apart from some intelligible form abstracted from a sensible thing; for St. Bonaventure, God can be known immediately by a man from within his mind, or innately, provided he has been properly disposed to know God from His presence in other things. The constant insistence of St. Thomas on the necessity of the human intellect to refer to phantasms in its every act of cognition marks the principal point of his departure from St. Bonaventure, who permits the intellect to act within itself without reference to phantasms. The other points of difference between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, as we have indicated, have to do only with their individual choice of terms, or with their individual ways of handling common problems. For the greater part, their two doctrines present very similar positions on those problems, even though, at times, the two theologians hold their positions for different reasons. Regarding the question of historical sources, we have seen that St. Thomas, though he cites many sources, particularly St. Augustine, shows a decided preference for the principles and doctrines of Aristotle. The wide range of concurrence between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure indicates clearly enough that their two syntheses are not diverse from one another. At the same time, their individual points of difference show that their syntheses are not simply developing stages of one common doctrine. The syntheses of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure are two separate compositions and developments of doctrine, each depending fundamentally on the per-

ACTS AND MODES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

441

sonal insights of their authors into the nature of human knowledge. Though the two syntheses contain many similar solutions to common problems, even so, those solutions, in several instances, rest upon different reasons involving dissimilar perspectives that, as we have noted elsewhere, characterize the personal approaches of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure to the common problems of their time.

This page intentionally left blank

PART THREE CERTITUDE AND ILLUMINATION

OF KNOWLEDGE

CT. Bonaventure, speaking about the light of God, says that, as Scripture *** teaches, God is "the light which illumines every man coming into this world" (Jn., 1.9). Everything that a man knows. St. Bonaventure comments, he knows through an illumination from God. A man cannot know any truth, unless he is illumined by God, who is the first truth. Every created truth is mutable, so that, apart from the immutable and uncreated truth, no created truth can be apprehended by the human intellect. This fact is indicated by Christ, who says: "I am the light of the world; he who follows me shall not walk in darkness, but he shall the light of life" (Jn., 8.12). The text, in the interpretation of St. Bonaventure, teaches that a man, to know any truth, must follow the light of God through whom every truth is known, and by whom every man is illumined to know truth. God is the first light, and He is, as it were, a polished mirror in which a man knows both himself and other things.' A man can know other things either by considering them himself or by receiving instruction about them from someone else. Knowledge obtained by a consideration of things has certitude when they are present to the knower. His consideration of things that are absent, however, can result only in conjecture concerning them, and so knowledge obtained in this way is subject to both doubt and error. For certitude of knowledge, therefore, the thing known must be present to the knower. Knowledge acquired by way of instruction can result from the teaching given by another man, or the teaching given by God. Divine teaching consists in an instruction given by an illumination, which makes truth known to a man through a revelation from God.2 No one truly deserves the name teacher, St. Bonaventure says, except Christ, who is both God and man. To teach truth to another, the teacher must have certitude and infallibility of truth, and the thing that he teaches must be immutable. Hence, Aristotle says: "Everything that is known through science is necessary in itself, without mutability, and certain to the one knowing it. We know a thing through science, when we think that we know the cause of the thing, and when we know that the cause is the cause of the thing, and so we know that it is impossible for the thing to be other 1 Sermo, Domin. Ill Advent, n. 14 "Deus ergo ... Dei maiestatis'." (9.73). 2 4 Sent., 50.2.1.2, Resp. (4.1048; ed. min., 4.1031-32).

444

PART THREE

than it is". No created thing, St. Bonaventure observes, has immutability of being either in itself or in the human mind, because every creature has being from non-being, and thus it is changeable with respect to being. Immutability of being and of truth is found only in the eternal Word, who is the principle and source of all created things. Consequently, no man can communicate immutable truth to another, unless the Word of God is present to their minds. It is necessary for a teacher, moreover, to have certitude and infallibility of truth. Since the light of a created intellect can be obscured, no such intellect can possess certitude and infallibility of truth without an illumination from God This is what St. Augustine says: "as the earth cannot be seen unless it is illuminated by the sun, so also those things that are known in the sciences, and which anyone understands to be most true and beyond all doubt, cannot be understood unless they are illuminated by Christ, as by a spiritual sun". Commenting on St. Augustine's text, St. Bonaventure maintains that Christ, who is the eternal Word, is our one teacher because He is the fontal principle and source of every human science. Wherefore, just as the sun is one, yet it emits many rays, so also our teacher is one and from Him, as from a spiritual sun, proceed the many and diverse sciences found in man. They come forth as multiple and distinct rivers from a single fount, which is Christ, and so the diverse sciences emerge from Him as from their one, indefectible fountainhead.3 Contrasting divine knowledge with human knowledge, St. Bonaventure says that God is identical with His knowledge, which is not caused by its objects, nor does it depend on them. Human knowledge is caused by its objects, so that, depending on them, it can change according to the exigencies of the things that cause it. Thus, the certitude of human knowledge depends on the things causing it, whereas the certitude of divine knowledge does not depend on the things that God knows, for He is their cause.4 Where there is mutability, furthermore, there cannot be any certitude. If God were to know things in a mutable manner, He would know them uncertainly. Since God has the perfect nobility of knowledge, He must know all things immutably and with perfect certitude. 5 This is not to say, however, that God does not know the mutability of created things. On the contrary, God knows their mutability, but He knows it by an immutable act, because His knowledge is not subject to reception of species, succession of acts, and forgetfulness. Human knowledge, on the other hand, can be changed through successive considerations of its objects, on which the intellect depends for its species. Human knowledge, since it is subject to a created 3 Sermo, Domin. post Pentec,, n. 1 "Primo igitur ... diversarum scientiarum." (9.441-42); cf. Sermo, Domin. U Advent., n. 5 (9.51-52). See in Aristotle: Anal poster., 1.2 (71b8-15); Ethica nicom., 6.3 (1139bl4-24); and in St. Augustine, Solii, 1.8.15 (PL 32.877). 4 1 Sent, 39.2.1, Resp. "... parte cogniti." (1.693; ed. min., 1.550); 39.1.2, sc 3 & ad 3 (1.689; ed. min., 1.547-48); Comm. in Eccles., 7.1, q. 3, Resp. (6.54). Cf. 2 Sent, 7.2.1.3, sc 2 (2.194; ed. min., sc b, 2.188). 5 1 Sent, 39.2.2, fm. 6 (1.694; ed. min., fm. f, 1.551).

CERTITUDE AND ILLUMINATION

445

intellect, can also undergo change either because of error or because of forgetfulness.6 The human intellect, therefore, unlike the divine intellect, is in potency with respect to its objects, which it knows by means of species received from them. Consequently, the human intellect, to attain its perfection, must be brought into act by exterior things, and so, depending on them, it is subject to mutation. But the divine intellect does not depend on its objects, so that God, having certitude of knowledge in the simple act of His intellect, knows all things with infallibility, even those that are contingent or in the future. 7 St. Bonaventure speaks, in the texts above, about the certitude of knowledge, both divine and human. He also speaks about the necessity for the human intellect, in order to know truth, to be illumined by God. Thus, there are two general problems to be considered in this part of our work. The first problem concerns the certitude of natural knowledge in man. St. Bonaventure attributes perfect certitude of knowledge to the divine intellect, which acts in a simple and immutable manner. Having infallibility with regard to every object, divine knowledge alone neither depends on its objects nor is caused by them. The infallibility and certitude of knowledge in God are necessary consequences of the immutable act of His intellect. The act of the human intellect, because it is a created potency, is subject to change, doubt and error. Human knowledge, as a consequence, does not have infallibility solely from the power of the human intellect. Human knowledge, moreover, depends on its objects, which bring the human intellect into act by means of the species that it receives from them. The certitude of human knowledge, as a result, is caused by the exterior things that the intellect knows. Since they are mutable with respect to being, they cannot make themselves known to the human intellect with immutable truth. Hence, the certitude of human knowledge cannot come entirely from its objects, because certitude of knowledge, as Aristotle points out, follows the necessity of its objects, and their necessity is known only when their cause is known. To have complete certitude of knowledge, therefore, the human intellect must know the cause of its objects, and it must know them as they are in their cause. Now the first cause of all things is God, and they are known in Him by the human intellect as in a polished mirror. The expression polished mirror, as we shall see, is one of St. Bonaventure's ways of saying that God is known to the human intellect by means of analogy. To know things in God, therefore, the human intellect must approach Him by way of analogy. Our first problem, then, regarding the certitude of natural knowledge, will be concerned with the different degrees of certitude in human knowledge, the analogical approaches to God by the human in-

6 Loc. at, Resp (1.694; ed. min., 1.552). 7 1 Sent, 39.1.!, Resp. "Et propterea ..." (1.686; ed. min., 1.545); 38.2.2, Resp. "Et ideo ..." (1.678-79; ed. min., 1.539-40).

446

PART THREE

tellect, and the intrinsic relations between analogical knowledge and the certitude of knowledge. The second problem has to do with the necessity for the human intellect to receive an illumination from God. On this question, St. Bonaventure holds that whatever a man knows, he knows through an illumination from God, who is the first light and the first truth. If a man were not illumined by God, he could not know any truth. Since every created truth is mutable, the human intellect, to apprehend a created truth, must be illuminated by the light of the immutable and uncreated truth. In that way alone can the human intellect act with infallibility and with certitude regarding the truth of its objects, provided they are present to the intellect. The necessity for an illumination from God, as St. Augustine indicates, extends to the necessary truths known to the human mind in the sciences. St. Bonaventure, speaking theologically, attributes the principle and source of all the human sciences to Christ, who is both God and man. From the philosophical point of view, however, the human sciences have their origin from God as from the first principle and source of truth, for He is the cause of created truth. Consequently, by His illumination of the human mind, God gives it a participation in His infallibility and certitude of truth. Our second problem, then, looking to the illumination of natural knowledge, will deal with the following subjects: the illumination of science and of wisdom, the intrinsic effects of that illumination in the human intellect, and the illumination of philosophical knowledge. The last subject will include a consideration of St. Bonaventure's evaluation of the errors committed, in his judgment, by the philosophers. This consideration, however, will be limited to his evaluation of those errors from the philosophical point of view. We shall examine his theological evaluation of philosophical errors in the fourth part of our work.

CHAPTER SIX CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

of knowledge is attributed by St. Bonaventure, as we have C ERTITUDE shown, to human science and to human wisdom. The human intellect,

having apprehended a thing as it is in itself, can comprehend the thing with certitude through science when it judges the truth of the thing according to the invariable principles of knowledge in the memory. Going beyond those principles, the intellect can comprehend its object with complete certitude when, apprehending God as the first cause of the thing, it judges the thing according to the truth of its eternal reasons in God. A more complete certitude of natural knowledge is attained by the human mind through wisdom, which directs it toward the unity of causality in God, thus enabling the mind to comprehend its objects according to the unity of their eternal reasons in God. Now, in apprehending God, the human mind perceives Him as the cause shining out in its effects, and as the wise artisan manifesting Himself in His work. Every creature, as an effect of God, directs the human intellect to God more than to any other object. Since God is, as it were, the light which is supremely spiritual, but the human intellect has a material principle, God cannot be known in His spirituality by the intellect. Consequently, the human intellect needs to know God through the mediation of His creatures. God can be known through His creatures, Bonaventure says, because there is a community of analogy between creatures and their Creator. This community is founded either on a relation of one to one, as an artifact is related to its model, or on a relation of two to two, as a sailor and his ship are related to a teacher and his student, for the sailor guides the ship as the teacher guides the student.1 Proceeding by way of analogy, then, the human intellect can obtain a knowledge of God. Even though there is nothing common between the Creator and a creature, nevertheless, by an analogical comparison of one to the other, the intellect can see that there is in God a truth which is a similitude of the creature, and that there is of the creature a truth which has a similitude in God.2 Every creature, in Bonaventure's view, is assimilated to the Creator in some analogical way: a stone is similar to God in terms of being, and an animal is similar to God in terms of being and life. But the analogical similarity between the Creator and a creature also contains a 1 1 Sent., 3.1.un.2, Resp., arg. 3 & ad 3 (1.71-72; ed. min., 1.50-51); cf. fa. 2-3 (b-c). 2 1 Sent., 39.2.1, con. 3, ad 3 (1.692-93; ed. min., 1.550-51).

448

CHAPTER SIX

dissimilarity: a man is similar to God in terms of being, life and intelligence; these three are one and the same in God, but not in a man.3 Human knowledge, as Bonaventure accounts for it, has varying degrees of certitude. They range from the judgment apprehending a thing in itself to the judgments comprehending the thing according to its eternal reasons in God, who is perceived as its cause. Our first subject in this chapter, then, is Bonaventure's doctrine on the degrees of certitude. In perceiving God as the cause of creatures, the human intellect approaches Him by way of analogy, namely, according to a relation of one to one, or a relation of two to two. Hence, our second subject is Bonaventure's understanding of analogy and his use of analogical comparisons with respect to our natural knowledge of God.4 Since an apprehension of God is necessary for the human intellect to acquire certitude of truth, therefore, the intellect, to acquire such certitude, must approach God by way of analogy. Consequently, following our consideration of Bonaventure's doctrine on analogy, we shall examine the r61e of analogy in the acquisition of natural certitude. Degrees of Certitude

We are concerned here with certitude of natural knowledge. To avoid confusing it with the certitude of infused knowledge, we shall first examine Bonaventure's doctrine on the different kinds of certitude. He refers to four kinds of certitude. The first kind is certitude of demonstration, a certitude so strong that a man, however unwilling, must assent to the truth of the demonstration. This is a natural certitude; when it is dominant, Christian faith is made void. The second kind is certitude of authority, which is founded on Sacred Scripture and gives rise to the free assent of a believer to the truths of Christian faith. The third kind is certitude of interior illumination. This certitude is founded on the light of natural reason, which is completed and perfected by the light of Christian faith. The fourth kind is certitude of exterior persuasion, a certitude following Christian faith and resulting from the application of suitable and efficacious reasons to the truths accepted by faith. This is the certitude of theology, which is an understanding of Christian faith, and so the reasons employed in theology must conform to the revelation of God.5 Thus, according to Bonaventure, Christian faith has 3 1 Sent, 45.2.1, ad 1 (1.805; ed. min., 1.639). 4 The analogical relation of two to two is a relation of proportions, or a proportionality. Bonaventure, following Augustine, speaks also of a three-term proportion: "Omnis autem proportio et proportionalitas est secundum rationem ternarii et quaternarii: quia necesse est, ubi est proportionalitas, ut sit in quatuor terminis vel secundum rem, vel secundum rationem. Unde Augustinus prime Musicae (12.23; PL 32.1096-97) ostendit, proportionem ascendere usque ad quatuor, quae ex partibus quaternarii generatur." — Coll. in Hexaem., 16.8 (5.404; Delorme, p. 182). Bonaventure, as we shall see, does not use a three-term comparison between God and creatures. 5 Comm. in loann., n. 9, q. 2, Resp., ad 1-2 (6.243).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

449

certitude both from authority and from an interior illumination. The authority supporting Christian faith is divine authority. Relying on divine authority, which persuades the heart of a believer, a Christian assents to truths that are neither evident to nor seen by him in the light of his natural reason. No man assents to divine authority, however, unless he is also assisted by a divine illumination. The act of Christian belief, therefore, depends both on divine authority and on a divine illumination. The authority of God, who illustrates the truths of faith, persuades the Christian to believe by instructing him in the words of the Scriptures. The illumination infused by God, who elevates human reason beyond its natural power, moves the Christian to assent to divine truth for its own sake and above every other truth.6 The certitude of Christian faith, as Bonaventure explains it, does not depend on the things that are believed. Christian faith has no need to be conformed to the objects of belief as they exist in themselves. Christian faith is conformed to its objects as they exist in their superior cause, or in God, who reveals them through the lumen of faith, and so they are known with certitude by the lumen of faith. Human science, on the other hand, must be conformed to its objects as they exist in themselves. Depending on that conformity, human science has certitude according as it knows its objects in their inferior causes and by inferior reasons.7 Contrasting the certitude of Christian faith and human science, Bonaventure says that when faith and science are concerned with the same objects, faith is more certain, speaking absolutely, than science. If any of the philosophers have known, for instance, that God is a creator and a remunerator, he has never known those truths through his science with the complete certitude that the Christian has in adhering to them through his faith. When faith and science are taken simply as modes of knowing, however, faith is more certain in one way and less certain in another way than science. Explaining the difference, Bonaventure distinguishes certitude of speculation in the intellect from certitude of adhesion in the will. With regard to certitude of adhesion, faith has a greater certitude than science, because faith moves the believer to adhere more firmly to what he believes than science moves a man to adhere to what he knows. Illustrating his point, Bonaventure refers to the many martyrs who suffered torture and death rather than deny the truths of Christian faith. Excepting a refusal to lie about the truth, no man of science, who is of sound mind, Bonaventure remarks, would to the same for what he knows: a geometer would be a fool, for example, to dare to undergo death for the sake of a certain conclusion of his science. The adhesion of a Christian to the truth of his faith is so great that,' if he were to know the whole of philosophy, he would prefer to lose the whole science

6 3 Sent., 23.1.1, ad 3 (3.472; ed. min., 3.463), 23.2.2. ad 2 & 4 (3.491-92; ed. min., 3.481-82). 7 3 Sent, 24.1.1, ad 2 (3.509-10; W min., 3.500-01).

450

CHAPTER SIX

rather than ignore even one article of the Christian faith. Hence, in Bonaventure's view, the certitude of adhesion belonging to Christian faith is greater than the certitude of adhesion found in the science of philosophy. With regard to certitude of speculation, which has to do with truth without reference to the will, there is greater certitude in some human sciences than in Christian faith. A man can know something through science with such complete certitude that he can in no way either doubt or disbelieve, nor can he ever contradict in his heart, the truth of what he knows. It is in this way, Bonaventure concludes, that a man knows the truth of the first principles of knowledge and of the universal axioms of the sciences.8 There is clearly a well-defined distinction in the doctrine of Bonaventure between the certitude of Christian faith and the certitude of human science. Christian faith has its certitude from the authority of God and a divine illumination, which moves the believer to give his formal assent to the truths of divine revelation. The certitude of faith, then, depends formally on a divine illumination, so that the objects of belief are known, not in themselves, but as they are in God, who reveals them. Thus, the assent and the certitude of Christian faith depend on an act of the will, which moves the intellect to adhere to the truths revealed by God. The intellect adheres to them solely on the authority of God, however, because it has no evidence for those truths, which are beyond the natural capacity of the intellect to know. It is the weight of divine authority and the power of a divine illumination, therefore, that confer the greater certitude of adhesion on faith as contrasted by Bonaventure with human science. In the order of speculation, nonetheless, a human science can have a greater certitude than Christian faith. The certitude of a science, depending on the light of natural reason, is rooted exteriorly in the existence of its objects and interiorly in the axioms or first principles of truth. The certitude of a science is so strong, according to Bonaventure, that a man must assent to the truth demonstrated by a science, and so no man can either doubt or contradict a truth that he knows with the certitude of demonstration. Indeed, in Bonaventure's view, when certitude of demonstration dominates, Christian faith becomes void.9 Bonaventure refers to two other sorts of certitude of knowledge. The one sort is an infallible certitude, which is obtained when something is so 8 3 Sent., 23.1.4, Resp. (3.481-82; ed. min, 3.471-72); cf. DMT, 1.1, ad 8 (5.50-51). Consult M.R Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 69-77. 9 Ian Hislop sees Bonaventure witholding true knowledge and certitude from natural reason, unless it is supplemented by faith: "It would appear to be evident that the act of intuition postulated by St. Bonaventure requires extrinsic illumination even in the natural sphere and when it is a question of true knowledge it must be supplemented by faith ... The point at issue ... is whether the human mind can by its own 'light' attain certitude in the natural order. Bonaventure clearly thought not and is forced to posit an 'illumination' which is very difficult to distinguish from an intuition of the divine essence unless one interprets it in terms of a priori categories of thought." —Dominican Studies (Oxford), 2 (1949), pp. 46-55, citations from p. 51 & p. 55.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

451

known that the knower cannot be deceived. The other sort is a probable certitude, and this is possessed when the knower has reasons that are apparently true with respect to one side of a proposition, so that he has either no reasons or few reasons for the opposite side.10 The human intellect can have infallible certitude with regard only to the objects of science, for they are comprehended with a certitude of reason. Thus, the intellect has probable certitude with regard to the objects of opinion, because they are known by conjecture.11 But the human intellect cannot be entirely free from error in the present life. The certitude of the intellect, in the present life, is such that it has the power to overcome error and doubt. In beatitude, however, there will be a certitude making it impossible for the intellect to fall into error.12 Christian theology is a science founded on the authority and illumination of Christian faith. Since the certitude of Christian faith is greater, speaking absolutely, than the certitude of human science, it would seem that the science of theology is more certain than any human science. If the certitude of a science is proportionate to its nobility and perfection, then, because theology is the noblest and the highest science, it would seem also that theology is the most certain science.13 In Bonaventure's view, however, the certitude of a science is not proportionate to its nobility. Following Aristotle on this point, he notes that mathematics has a greater certitude than metaphysics, or the divine science, which is nobler than mathematics. The lesser certitude of metaphysics is not due to a defect on the part of its objects, but to the weakness of the human intellect, as Aristotle indicates, with regard to things that are most evident in themselves. According to Bonaventure, moreover, the human intellect is sometimes in doubt about things that are most certain in themselves. Although the intellect has a less certain knowledge of those things, nevertheless, because they are nobler than other things, the intellect's knowledge of them is nobler and more perfect than its knowledge of things that it knows more certainly. In short: "it is better to know a little something about God than to have knowledge of things in the heavens or on the earth".H Thus, for Bonaventure, nobility of 10 "Certitude ex parte cognitivae est duplex, una scilicet infallibilis, ut quando ita scit aliqiiid quod non potest falli; altera probabilis, ut quaiido habet verisimiles rationes ad hoc siv- ad unam partem, ita quod ad oppositum aut millas habet aut paucas." — 2 Sent., 4.2.1, ad 2 (2.136; ed. min., 2.128). 11 "Scibilia autem dice ilia quae certa ratione comprehendi possunt, sicut sunt ilia de quibus sunt scientiae Uberales. Opinabilia vero voco ilia quae non habent cognosci nisi per quandam coniecturam, sicut secreta aliena conscientiae et futura contingentia ..." — 2 Sent., 23.2.2, Resp. (2.540; ed min., 2.558). 12 "Sed attendendum est quod certitude circa intellectum habet esse duobus modis. Quaedam est enim quae facit intellectum potentem ad vicendum errorem et excludendum dubitationem; et talis certitude est certitude viae. Quaedam autem est certitude quae reddit intellectum impossibilem ad errorem; et haec est certitude patriae." — 3 Sent., 26.1.5, Resp. (3.567; ed. min., 3.560). Note his definition of doubt: "Dicendum quod dubitatio proprie dicit indifferentiam iudicii rationis respectu utriusque partis contradictionis, ita quod neutrum praeeligat alter! ..." — 3 Sent., 17.dub.3, Resp. (3.376; ed. min., 3.370). 13 3 Sent., 23.1.4, arg. 5 (3.481; ed. min., 3.471). 14 Loc. cit., ad 5 (3.482-83; ed. min., 3.473). For the references to Aristotle consult: St. Bonaventure, op. omn., 3.482-83, note 8.

452

CHAPTER SIX

human knowledge is distinct from its certitude. Nobility of knowledge looks to the certitude of its objects, or to the indubitability with which they can be known, an indubitability founded on the intrinsic evidence of their truth. Certitude of knowledge looks to the indubitable manner in which the intellect knows its objects. The less evident they are, the less noble is human knowledge, even though the intellect has a greater certainty regarding a less evident truth than it has regarding a more evident truth. Now the certitude of human knowledge depends on the truth of corporeal things, for they are both the objects and the cause of human knowledge. But the truth of corporeal things is the least evident to the human intellect, which must acquire knowledge of them through the senses. Bonaventure, following Augustine, maintains that truth is properly in God, not in created things, which imitate God but do not match Him. Every creature, since it is from nothing, is mixed up with non-being, and so every creature in itself has falsehood, or an emptiness of truth. With respect to the supreme light of God, therefore, as Augustine says, every creature is dark. Consequently, as a creature is not able to attain the supreme stability of God, so is it unable to attain the supreme luminosity of His truth.15 The human intellect, in its search for truth, cannot rest in created things, as otherwise it cannot know them with certitude. There is rest only in the first being, which is the principle of every other being, and without which no other being can be. Likewise, rest in knowledge must be in the first knower, or God, from whom must be all knowledge, through whom all things must be known, and without whom nothing can be known. To know a thing most certainly and most nobly, then, a man must know it in God as in its prior causes.16 The sciential operation of the human intellect, in the speculative order, consists in its perception of the meaning of terms, propositions, and the inferences of rational demonstrations. The intellect grasps the significances

15 "Item, Augustinus, De vera religione (36.66; PL 34.151-52): 'Falsitas est ex istis rebus, quae imilaritur illud unum, quo est unum quidquid est, inquantum illud implere non possunt'. Si ergo nulla creatura potest illud summum unum implere, veritas non est in aliqua creatura, sed in omnibus falsitas ... rationibus probatur sic: veritas et vanitas opponuntur; sed omnis creatura habet vanitatem et permixtionem cum non esse, cum sit ex nihilo, et solus Deus hac caret omnino: ergo in solo Deo est veritas." — 1 Sent., 8.1.1.1, fa. 2 & 5 (1.150; ed. min., fa. b & e, 1.116). "Dicendum quod respectu summae lucis omnis creatura tenebra est, sicut dicit Augustinus, eo ipso quod ex nihilo est. Unde sicut non potest pervenire ad summam stabilitatem, ita non potest venire ad summam luminositatem." — 3 Sent., 14.dub.3, Resp. (3.326; ed. min., 3.320-21); cf. St. Augustine, Confess., 12.3.3 (PL 32.827). 16 "Item, in entibus est status, ergo pari ratione et in cognoscibilibus; sed primum ens, in quo est status, est principium, a quo est omnis entitas, et sine quo nihil est, nee aliquid est nisi ab eo: ergo eadem ratione in primo cognoscente, si status est, necesse est quod ab ipso sit omnis cognitio, et quod per ipsum omnia cognoscuntur, et sine ipso nihil ..." — 1 Sent., 39.1.1, fm. 4 (1.685; ed. min., fm. d, 1.544). "Item, omnis qui rem cognoscit certissime et nobilissime, cognoscit per causam proximam et immediatam; sed cognoscens Deum et videns cognoscit in eo res certissime et nobilissime tamquam in causis prioribus ..." — 1 Sent, 45.2.2, fm. 5 (1.806; ed. min., fm. e, 1.640); cf. sc 4, ad 4.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

453

of terms when it comprehends what a thing is through its definition. The definition of a created being cannot be completely understood until the being is known definitively as an effect of the first being, which alone is a being through itself. If the first being is not known, Bonaventure insists, the whole truth of a created being cannot be understood. In other words, if the intellect does not analyze its object completely, so that it perceives the first being as the cause of the created being, the intellect cannot comprehend its object completely, and so it will not understand the truth of the created being with complete certitude. To analyze an object in that way, the human intellect must be assisted by the divine intellect, which has the eternal reasons of all created things. When the human intellect understands the terms of a definition according to their significations in their eternal principles, it comprehends the truth of the definition, and thus the intellect knows with certitude that the definition is true. The intellect comprehends the meaning of a proposition when it knows with certitude that the proposition is true. When the intellect comprehends a proposition in that way, the intellect also knows that it cannot be deceived in its comprehension, for it knows that the truth of the proposition cannot be otherwise than it is. As a consequence, having infallible certitude, the intellect knows that this truth is immutable. Since the human mind is subject to mutability, this immutable truth cannot be seen by the mind in its mutable light without the assistance of the entirely immutable light of God. The human mind, therefore, knows immutable truth in the immutable light of God. The human intellect grasps the inference of a demonstration when it perceives that the conclusion of the demonstration follows necessarily from the premisses. The intellect perceives this, Bonaventure says, not only with regard to necessary terms, but also with regard to contingent terms, such as: if a man runs, a man is moving. The necessity of an inference of this kind does not come either from the existence of a thing in matter, because matter is contingent, or from the existence of a thing in the human mind, because the thing, if it were not outside the mind, would then be a fiction of the mind. The necessity of the inference, therefore, comes from the eternal exemplar of every relation among created things. For this reason, Augustine says that the lumen of true reasoning is kindled by the eternal truth, which the human mind strives to know. It is quite evident, Bonaventure concludes, that the human intellect must be conjoined to the eternal truth in order to know with certitude the truth of created things.17 The sciential operation of the human intellect, in the practical order, consists in its twofold action of counsel and judgment. The act of counsel involves a consideration of two good things with a view to deciding which is the better. The decision can be made only with reference to the best of all good things, and this is the supreme good To determine which of the two 17 Itiner., 3.3 (5.304; ed. mm., 5.195-97); cf. St. Augustine, De vera relig., 39.72 (PL 34.154).

454

CHAPTER SIX

particular goods is the better, the intellect must know which one has the greater assimilation to the supreme good. This determination is possible because there is a notion of the supreme good impressed on the human mind. Following the act of counsel, the intellect judges the truth of its decision with certitude through a law known to be right, and which the intellect ought not to judge. Since the human mind judges itself, but cannot pass judgment on the law through which it judges the truth of moral acts, therefore, that law is superior to the human mind, and so it is the eternal law, because God alone is superior to the human mind. Consequently, having an impression of the eternal law, the human mind can judge the truth of its moral decisions with full certitude, provided it consults the eternal law of God18 The human intellect, acting through wisdom, knows God from His universal presence in creatures, and particularly from His presence in the human soul. Since certitude of knowledge follows the presence of its object, the human intellect knows a thing more certainly which is more present to it than some other thing. Now one thing can be more present than another, Bonaventure says, either with respect to substance or with respect to knowledge. Thus, with respect to substance, God is more present than anything else to each and every creature. With respect to knowledge, however, Bonaventure distinguishes the degree of presence on the side of the object from the degree of presence on the side of the knower. As an object of knowledge, God is more present than any creature to the human intellect; nevertheless, God is not always known by a human intellect, just as the sun is present to every man, but it cannot be seen by a man who is blind. With regard to the knower, sensible things are more present than God to the human intellect, which must depend on the senses for its knowledge while the human soul exists in a body. Consequently, the intellect knows sensible things more certainly in themselves, but it knows God more certainly in His effects. Because God is present in the human soul, which has knowledge and love that are effected by Him, God can be more known than any sensible thing by the human intellect.19 The man who knows God through wisdom can see that his own wisdom is immutable in the rules of the divine laws. Those rules, Bonaventure observes, shine out in the minds of men in such a manner that, through them, a wise man knows and judges that which cannot be otherwise than it is. He knows, for instance, that God should receive the highest veneration as the supreme principle, that He ought to be believed as the supreme truth, and that He must be loved as the supreme good. These truths manifest wisdom and they are so certain, Bonaventure maintains, that they cannot be other-

18 Op. cit., 3.4 (5.304-05; ed. mm., 5.197-98). 19 1 Sent, 17.1.dub.2, (1.304; ed. min., 1.246).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

455

wise than they are. The eternal rules of divine wisdom, moreover, are the infallible norms of all truth. It is through those rules that the human mind judges the truth of created things, but the mind does not judge the eternal rules themselves, for they are immutable and illimitable, and so they cannot be confined by the limitation and mutability of a human mind. The divine rules of truth are so certain in themselves that no man can contradict them in any way; however, a man can be mistaken about them, if, as Aristotle has shown, he reasons erroneously about the truth of exterior things. To know all this, Bonaventure remarks, belongs clearly to wisdom, and it is the wise man who knows that the truth of the divine rules is ever inexhaustible. He knows that they are rooted in the eternal light, and that they bring the human mind into this light, but that it remains unseen by the mind. Hence, seeing the divine rules in their eternal light, the wise man knows that they cannot be rooted in any created mind. Consequently, the wise man knows that the divine rules pertain to the very fount of wisdom, which is God. Since God makes his eternal rules known to every human mind, His eternal wisdom radiates upon the soul of every man, assisting him in his knowledge of exterior things, so that he may know God from His presence in the soul itself. 20 The human intellect, in Bonaventure's view, obtains certain knowledge of sensible or corporeal things, provided they are present to it, and at every level of natural understanding. Certain knowledge is obtained by the intellect of corporeal things when, apprehending them, it knows them as they exist in themselves. The intellect knows them with greater certitude through science, because it then judges them in accordance with the universal principles of truth in the memory. Completing its sciential knowledge, the intellect knows corporeal things with a complete certitude when, considering them as effects of their first cause, it comprehends them in accordance with their truth in God's eternal reasons. Bonaventure attributes to the intellect an infallible certitude in knowing that it cannot be deceived, because the truth that it knows cannot be otherwise that it is. Thus, knowing the immutability of truth, the intellect knows with infallible certitude that the conclusions of its sciential demonstrations are drawn with necessity from their principles, and so the intellect has certain knowledge of the necessary truth of its objects. This infallible certitude comes about through an illumination from God, who also assists the human intellect with His eternal reasons in completing the comprehension of its objects as effects of His causality, whether in the speculative order or in the practical order. But the intellect knows through wisdom that God illumines the human mind, and that He assists its judgments with His eternal reasons. It is through wisdom, moreover, that the intellect knows that the necessity of

20 CoU. in Hexalm., 2.9-10 (5.337-38; Delorme, pp. 23-24); cf. Aristotle, Anal paster., 1.10 (76b23-26).

456

CHAPTER SIX

its sciental judgments is rooted in the necessity of divine truth, which regulates the understanding of truth by the human mind The highest degree of natural certitude, therefore, is obtained by the human intellect through wisdom. The object of human wisdom is God as the first principle or supreme cause of creatures. He is so present to them that, as His effects, they direct the human intellect more certainly to God than to themselves. Although the being of God is known innately by the human mind from the image of God in the rational soul, every creature proclaims the indubitable truth that 'God is'.21 Every true thing which is certain to the extent that it cannot be thought not to-be is indubitably true. Since the being of God is a thing of this kind, it is indubitably true that 'God is'. The first proposition is self-evident, Bonaventure says, as he proposes nine arguments demonstrating the truth of the second proposition.22 The first four arguments are based on the doctrine of Anselm, who shows that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. Bonaventure, developing Anselm's doctrine, argues that a thing which cannot be thought not to-be is more true than a thing which can be thought not to-be. If God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, He could not be thought not to-be. Now a being than which nothing greater can be thought is of such a nature that the being can be thought only if it is real, because, if it were not real, it would not be a being than which a greater could not be thought. If such a being is thought to-be, therefore, it is necessary that it be a real being, because it could not be thought not to-be. Hence, Anselm addresses God: "You alone are whatever is better to-be than not to-be". But everything which is indubitably true, Bonaventure reasons, is better than everything which is not indubitably true. Consequently, to-be must be attributed indubitably to God.23 The next two arguments of Bonaventure are based on the doctrine of Augustine, who teaches that no truth can be seen except through the first truth. According to Bonaventure, that thing is most indubitably true through which all other things are seen to be true. As a consequence, that 'God is' is not only indubitably true, but it is also a truth than which no other can be thought

21 "His igitur rationibus ostenditur, quod Deum esse sit menti humanae indubitabile, tanquam sibi naturaliter insertum ... Item ostenditur hoc ipsum secunda via sic: omne verum, quod clamat omnis creatura, est verum indubitabile; sed Deum esse omnis creatura clamet ergo etc." — D M T , 1.1, inter fm. 10 et fm. 11 (5.46); see above: pp. 431-34. Bonaventure demonstrates the indubitability of the truth 'God is' from ten conditions and self-evident suppositions of created being: Loc. cit, fa. 11-20 (5.46-47). For instance: "... si est ens compositum, est ens simplex: quia compositum non habet esse a se, ergo necesse est, quod a simplici recipiat originem; sed ens simplicissimum, nihil de compositione habens non est nisi ens primum: ergo omne aliud ens infert Deum." — fm. 19. 22 "Omne verum, quod est adeo certum, quod non potest cogitari non esse, est verum indubitabile; sed Deum esse est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Prima per se nota est, secunda ostenditur multipliciter." — Loc. cit., inter fm. 20 et fm. 21 (5.47). 23 Loc. cit, fa. 21-24 (5.47): cf. con. 4 & 6, ad 4 & 6 (5.48, 50); 1 Sent, 8.1.1.2, fm. 1 (1.153; ed. min., fm. a, 1.119). See in St. Anselm, Proshg., cc. 3-5 (PL 158.228-29).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

457

more indubitably; therefore, that 'God is' cannot be thought not to be true. No man can say in truth, furthermore, that 'God is-not'. Augustine has proved that a man cannot say 'God is-not' except in saying at the same time "God is'. Bonaventure, for his part, argues that, if there is no truth, it is true to say 'no truth is'; if this statement is true, there is comething which is true and, if that is true, there is a first being which is true: therefore, a man cannot say in truth that 'God is-not', and so neither can he think with truth that 'God is-not'.24 The three remaining arguments of Bonaventure present his own reasons for the indubitable truth that God cannot be thought not to-be. The first argument is influenced by Aristotle, however, and the second is influenced by Boethius. In the first argument, Bonaventure sets out from the principle that the more a truth is prior and universal, so much the more is it known by the human intellect: but the truth by which the first being is said to-be is the first of all truths; therefore, of necessity, this truth must be both the most certain in itself and the one most evident to the intellect. Now the truths of the axioms or common conceptions of the mind are so evident to the intellect, because of their priority, that they cannot be thought not to-be; in like manner, the human intellect cannot doubt that there is a first truth, nor can it think that the first truth is-not.25 The next argument rests on the premise that no proposition is more true than one in which the same thing is predicated of itself. In the proposition 'God is', the predicate is the same as the subject, because the being said of God is entirely the same as God, for God is His own being. There can be no proposition which is more true and more evident, therefore, than the proposition 'God is', and so no man can either doubt its truth or think that it is false.26 The final argument of Bonaventure is based on the proposition that 'the best is the best', a proposition of which no man can be unaware, nor can any man think that it is false. Thus, showing that the best is the most complete being, and that such a being by this fact is an actual being, Bonaventure argues that 'if the best is the best', therefore, 'the best is'. It can be argued in a similar way, he says, that 'if God is God', therefore, 'God is'. The proposition 'God is God' is so true, Bonaventure insists, that God cannot be thought not to-be. In short, it is indubitably true that 'God is'.27 If the truth of God's being is so certain that it cannot be doubted by the human mind, how then does Bonaventure account for the fact of doubt in the minds of some men concerning the being of God? In accounting for the

24 2.2.2 25 26 D). 27 adeo

Loc. cit, fa 25-26 (5.47); cf. con. 5, ad 5 (5.48, 50). See in St. Augustine: Solil., 1.8.15 (PL 32.877); (PL 32.885-86); 2.15.28-29 (PL 32.898-99). Loc. cit, fm. 27 (5.48); cf. Aristotle, Anal, poster., 1.2 (71bl6-72a4). Loc. cit, fm. 28 (5.48); of. Boethius, In Perifter., comm. min., 1.14 (23bl5-27), vel 2.4 (PL 64.387CLoc. cit, fm. 29 (5.49). Note: "Similiter argui potest: si Deus est Deus, Deus est; sed antecedens est verum, quod non potest cogitari non esse; ergo Deum esse est verum indubitabile."

458

CHAPTER SIX

fact, Bonaventure distinguishes a doubtful thing with respect to the discourse of reason from a doubtful thing with respect to a defect of reason. In the first instance, a thing is said to be doubtful on the side both of the object and of the intellect. In the second instance, a thing is doubtful only on the side of the intellect. With regard to the first instance, Bonaventure says that something true can be doubted owing to a want of evidence for its truth in one of three ways. Evidence may be wanting, first of all, to an intellect apprehending an object. To an intellect comprehending an object, however, the truth that 'God is' is certain, because it is perceived innately by the intellect from the image of God in the rational mind. Evidence may be wanting, secondly, because of an insufficient reason preventing the intellect from arriving at a certain conclusion concerning an object. From this point of view, Bonaventure observes, the evidence for the truth that 'God is' is more abundant, so that the intellect can know the being of God more certainly than it can from within the rational mind alone. All the creatures in the universe, whether they are perfect or imperfect, cry out most strongly and most loudly that 'God is': they manifest their need for God, upon whom they depend both for their being and for their different completions in being. Evidence may be wanting, thirdly, in the thing itself. There is no want of evidence, Bonaventure affirms, for the truth that 'God is'. This truth is most certain in itself, because it is the first truth and the one which is most immediate to the human mind. For example, as it is most evidently false to say of the same thing at the same time that 'it is in the highest way' and 'it is in no way', so also it is most evidently true to say at once of the same being that 'it is the first being, and 'it is the supreme being'. Thus, the certitude of the truth of the being of God, who is the first and the supreme being, is most evident to the human mind. Consequently, with respect to the discourse of human reason, the being of God is beyond all doubt and can be known by an intellect reasoning rightly, whether it reflects within the mind, or considers other creatures, or goes above all creatures to look upon the Creator. With respect to a thing which is doubtful only on the part of the intellect, Bonaventure accepts the fact of doubt by some men about the being of God. Their doubt is due to a defect in their understanding, a defect arising in three different ways. The defect arises, in one way, from a failure to apprehend the right and full meaning of the name God, so that He is known only according to some aspect of His being. It is in this way, Bonaventure remarks, that the pagans have thought God to be something above man and to be capable of foreseeing the future. Believing their idols to be gods, the pagans adored their idols as something divine, because they gave true answers to questions about things in the future. A defect in understanding arises, in another way, from a failure to analyze an object completely. A foolish man, for instance, seeing a wicked man escaping justice, infers from this that there is no law in the universe, and so he may also infer that the universe has no first and supreme ruler, thus falling into doubt about God. A third defect comes about in a man's

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

459

understanding of an object by his failure to rise above his senses, so that he is unable to see anything beyond the corporeal things surrounding him. For this reason, Bonaventure says, there have been some men who thought that the visible sun in the heavens was God because it holds the highest place among bodies. Those men have not been able to arrive at a knowledge of incorporeal substance; therefore, they have not known the first principle of all things. Summing up his account, Bonaventure concedes that a man who misunderstands God in any of these three ways can think that 'God is-not'. The chief reason for thinking of God in that erroneous way is the failure to understand sufficiently and integrally the significance of the name God. A man who apprehends the full significance of God, however, in thinking that God is a being than which nothing greater can be thought, he not only cannot be in any doubt about whether 'God is', but also cannot think in any way that 'God is-not'.28 In saying that the being of God can be known with indubitable truth, Bonaventure is not saying that the being of God is a truth which is selfevident to the human intellect. If the being of God were knowable to the intellect in that way, no man could doubt its truth; but there are men who doubt the truth of God's being, a fact readily granted by Bonaventure, who accounts for the fact according to his own understanding of the acts of the human intellect. Although he holds that the truth 'God is' is most certain and most evident in itself, and that it is most evident and most immediate to the human mind, even so, Bonaventure holds at the same time that a man, to know indubitably that 'God is' is true, must not only apprehend the right and full significance of the name God, but must also exercise his reason in a right and proper manner as he thinks about the evidence for the truth of the being of God. This position of Bonaventure is influenced, from the historical viewpoint, most of all by the doctrine of Anselm on God as that than which nothing greater or better can be thought. Anselm's doctrine is employed by Bonaventure as a frame of reference, or a way of interpretation, with respect to the doctrines that he uses from other sources to demonstrate the indubitability of the truth that 'God is'. Bonaventure's use of those other doctrines is such, however, that it is not possible to isolate any one of them as more influential than the rest on the development of his own doctrine. His use of Augustine's doctrine on the seeing of truth by the human mind only through the first truth is neither more nor less significant than his use of Aristotle's doctrine on the greater knowability of truth according to its priority and universality. From Augustine's doctrine, Bonaventure draws the conclusion that the first truth is indubitably true:

28 Loc. cit., Resp. (5.49-50); cf. con. 7, ad 7 (5.48, 50). On the doctrine of our natural knowledge of God in Bonaventure see: M.R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 83-86; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 107-13, and ENF, v. 1, cc. 750-53; Luis A. Cruz, "La participation en la filosofia de San Buenaventura", EX, 1 (1951), pp. 245-48. See also: E. Bettoni, S. Bonattentura, pp. 49-57, 123-31, ET pp. 37-43, 94-101; // problema delta cognoscibilitti di Dio ..., pp. 214-42: in this work, Bettoni speaks of man knowing God from an infused or an innate notion of God in the human soul.

460

CHAPTER SIX

from Aristotle's doctrine, he draws the conclusion that the first truth is the most evident and the most certain truth; as a result, both doctrines enable Bonaventure to show that there cannot be any doubt about the being of the first truth, which is God. The influence of Boethius on Bonaventure is equal to the influence of either Aristotle or Augustine. Using the doctrine of Boethius on the truth of a proposition predicating a thing of itself, Bonaventure shows that there can be no doubt about the proposition 'God is', because God alone is His being, and so the predicate is entirely the same as the subject in the proposition 'God is'. Bonaventure's doctrine on the certitude of human knowledge of created things manifests the influence only of Aristotle and of Augustine. Aristotle's influence appears in Bonaventure's explanation of the difference between the nobility and the certitude of a science. Augustine's influence is evident in Bonaventure's understanding of truth as found properly in God, so that, to know the truth of creatures with certitude, the human intellect must be illumined and assisted by the eternal truth. Bonaventure, for the most part, presents his doctrine on the certitude of human knowledge regarding creatures without the help of historical sources. Consequently, his doctrine on this question does not depend essentially on any particular historical source.

Christian faith, according to Aquinas requires an assent of the intellect to the object of belief, which is God. The intellect assents to an object in one of two ways. In the first way, the intellect assents because it is moved by the object itself. The intellect can be moved either by an object known through itself, such as an axiom of a science, or by an object which is known through something else, such as a conclusion of a science. In the second way, the intellect assents because it is inclined by the will to rest in one side rather than in the other side of an argument. If assent is made to the one side with doubt or anxiety regarding the other side, the intellect will have only an opinion with respect to the object If assent to the one side is made with certitude, or without anxiety regarding the other side, the intellect will then have faith with respect to the object. Since those things that move the intellect through themselves are said to be seen, but the things known through opinion and faith are said to be unseen, the intellect assents with the certitude of Christian faith to things that are unseen. Although the assent is made under the influence of the will, the intellect assents to the objects of belief in the lumen of Christian faith, and so the intellect is said to see those objects in the lumen of faith. Thus, as Augustine shows, Christian belief can be defined as 'thinking with assent'.29 Aquinas, interpreting the

29 Cf. De praedest. sanct, 2.5 (PL 44.963).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

461

definition, says that thinking, taken properly, signifies a movement of a deliberating mind not yet perfected through the full vision of truth. The definition, taken in that way, contains the whole ground of the act of belief. Now there are some acts of the intellect involving a firm assent without a movement of thought, such as the act by which the first principles are understood. There are other acts by which the intellect has knowledge without a firm assent. The intellect may remain in doubt about a particular proposal, because it is not inclined to accept either side of the proposal; or it may have a suspicion that one side is more acceptable than the other, and thus the intellect may also adhere to the one side, so that, retaining an anxiety concerning the other, the assent of the intellect results only in opinion. The act of Christian belief, however, requires a firm adhesion of the intellect to the one side with the exclusion of the other. But the adhesion to the one side results from the influence of the will. Consequently, the act belief, having certitude, is similar to an act of science and to an act of understanding its principles; nevertheless, lacking perfect vision of truth, the act of belief is also similar to doubt, suspicion and opinion.30 The position of Aquinas on the certitude of Christian faith is quite similar to the position of Bonaventure, even though Aquinas treats the question differently by comparison with Bonaventure. Aquinas treats the question by distinguishing the certitude of faith from the uncertainties of doubt and human opinion; however, with Bonaventure, he also distinguishes the certitude of faith from the certitude of human science. For both theologians, the certitude and assent of Christian faith depend on an act of the will, which moves the intellect to adhere to the objects of belief; the intellect accepts the truth of those objects, which remain unseen, in the lumen of Christian faith. Although the two theologians teach in common that both the lumen of faith and the truths accepted through faith come solely from God, nevertheless, Bonaventure stresses the r6le of divine authority in the certitude of faith more than Aquinas, who prefers to speak of the judgment of the intellect in the lumen of faith, depending on the infallible truth of God.31 Aquinas also differs from Bonaventure in his comparison of the certitude of Christian faith with the certitude of human science. Their difference, however, lies more in their mode of comparison than in the stand that they take on the question. In the view of Aquinas, certitude consists in a determination of the intellect with respect to one side as opposed to the other, so that a stronger cause of the determination will bring about a greater certitude in the intellect. The determination of the understanding of principles

30 ST, 2a2ae, 1.4, Resp., ad 3 (3.1404ab); 2.1, Resp., ad 3 (3.1413b-14b). Cf. 3 Sent., 23.2.2, Sol. 1-2 (3.724-27); DV, 14.1, Resp. (1.280-81); Expos, de Trin., 3.1, Resp. (Decker, pp. 109.12-110.15). 31 Expos, de Trin., 3.1, ad 4 (Decker, pp. 114.4-115.10).

462

CHAPTER SIX

is caused by the lumen of understanding, which is sufficient of itself for knowing them. The determination of a scientific conclusion is caused by the act of reason composing the conclusion in accordance with self-evident principles. The determination of the intellect with regard to Christian faith is caused by an act of the will. But the will does not terminate the act of the intellect in the same way as the lumen of understanding, or the comprehension of a science. Rather, the will determines the intellect in such a way that it adheres firmly to one side while excluding the other. Thus, the certitude of the understanding of principles and the certitude of the conclusion of a science are caused by the very evidence of things that are said to be certain, whereas the certitude of belief through Christian faith is caused by the firm adhesion of the intellect to the objects of belief. Now this adhesion is made to the first truth, which is God, who can cause a stronger determination of the intellect than either its own lumen or its act of reasoning. Hence, Christian faith has a greater certitude with respect to strength of adhesion than the certitude of a science or the understanding of principles, even though both science and understanding have greater evidence for the objects to which the intellect assents.32 Stating his position more precisely, Aquinas says that a habitus is more certain when it relies on a more certain cause. Since the habitus of Christian faith relies on divine truth, but the intellectual virtues rely on human reason, the habitus of Christian faith is more certain than the three intellectual virtues of understanding, science and wisdom. But the intellect is more certain, on the other hand, when its knowledge is more completely in accord with human reason. From this point of view, Christian faith is less certain than the intellectual virtues, because they deal with things that are more in accord with human reason than the things belonging to faith. An object of knowledge is judged absolutely according to its cause, however, so that Christian faith is more certain absolutely than the intellectual virtues, whose objects are more certain with respect to man, but not with respect to their cause.33 Aquinas concurs quite evidently with Bonaventure in attributing to Christian faith, both absolutely and with respect to adhesion, a greater certitude than the certitude of science. Aquinas concurs also with Bonaventure in attributing to science a greater certitude than the certitude of faith with regard to the evidence of their objects. The two theologians arrive at their common views, however, in different ways. Those ways resemble the different approaches that they take to the nature of knowledge in man. Bonaventure attributes the greater certitude to faith, speaking absolutely, when faith and science are concerned with the same object. Aquinas speaks of faith as more certain absolutely than science, because faith knows its object

32 3 Sent, 23.2.2, So!. 3 & ad 1 (3.728-29). Cf. DV, 14.2, ad 7 (1.281). 33 ST, 2a2ae, 4.8, Resp. (3.1434b).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

463

in a higher and more certain cause than science. Bonaventure, considering faith and science simply as modes of knowing, posits a greater certitude of adhesion in faith and a greater certitude of speculation in science. Aquinas, considering the operation of human reason in regard to its objects, attributes a more certain adhesion to faith and a more certain knowledge to science. The common views, but different considerations, of Aquinas and Bonaventure concerning certitude extend to their treatments of the nobility of theology. For Bonaventure, theology is the noblest science because of its object, which is in itself the most certain and the most evident, even though it is known with lesser certitude than the object of a philosophical science. For Aquinas, theology is a nobler science than any of the speculative sciences both with respect to certitude and with respect to subject matter. Theology has its certitude from the divine lumen, which cannot be deceived; a speculative science has its certitude from the lumen of human reason, which can fall into error. The subject matter of theology consists chiefly in things transcending human reason; the subject matter of a speculative science consists only in those things falling under human reason. Theology is also nobler than any of the practical sciences: the end of theology is eternal beatitude, and it is to this end, as to the ultimate end, that all the ends of the practical sciences are ordained. Though the objects of theology are more certain according to their nature than the objects of the other sciences, the objects of theology can be known less certainly because of the weakness of the human intellect. Nonetheless, as Aristotle indicates, the very little that can be known of the highest causes is more desirable than the most certain knowledge of the least things.34 In discussing the certitudes of Christian faith and theology, Aquinas has also, as we have seen, spoken about the certitude of natural knowledge. Thus, defining certitude as a firm assent to one side of a proposal, or to the truth of a thing, he has distinguished certitude of understanding from certitude of science. Certitude of understanding is obtained immediately, or without a movement of thought, when the intellect perceives the selfevident truth of first principles. This certitude, then, results from the necessary assent of the intellect to the truth of such principles. Certitude of science is obtained when the intellect, after a movement of thought, comprehends the truth of conclusions drawn from self-evident principles. The truth of a conclusion and, therefore, the certitude of a science depend on the truth of the medium through which the conclusion is drawn from an indemonstrable principle. Since the truth of the medium follows a judgment of the intellect apprehending an exterior thing, which is the subject of

34 ST, la, 1.5, Resp., ad 1 (1.5a); cf. Aristotle, De part, animal., 1.5 (644b23-645a4). The certitude of theology depends also on the necessary and superior principles of divine knowledge, whereas the certitude of a philosophical'science depends on the self-evident but inferior principles of knowledge in the memory: Loc. cit., 1.2 (1.3ab); 1 Sent., Pro!., a. 3, Sol. 2 (1.13-14).

464

CHAPTER SIX

demonstration, the certitude of the conclusion follows the necessity of the exterior thing. This necessity is contained by the order of the conclusion, through the medium, to the principle of the demonstration. The certitude of a science, then, results from the necessity of demonstrative truth. Because this truth is necessary, the intellect assents to it of necessity, and so the intellect knows that the exterior thing cannot be otherwise than it is.35 Certitude of human knowledge, for Aquinas as for Bonaventure, is required for its perfection. This perfection is attained through science by which alone we know, as Aristotle shows, that it is impossible for a thing to be otherwise that it is. To know a thing in that way is to know it with certitude.36 Aquinas holds in common with Bonaventure, finally, that a man who demonstrates the truth of a thing by science is also certain that he knows the thing by his science. Thus, according to Aquinas, when a man has certain knowledge of something through a scientific demonstration, he can judge the thing in accordance with its proper principle. In consequence, knowing by his science that he knows the truth of the thing, he also knows with certitude that he has knowledge of the thing by his science.37 Bonaventure and Aquinas come together, as we have seen, in attributing to the human intellect a complete certitude of knowledge both through science and through wisdom. Complete certitude through science follows the analysis of an object according to its first cause in God, and a full certitude through wisdom follows an analysis of an object according to the unity of its causality in God, who is the one supreme cause of all things. In analyzing an object completely through science or through wisdom, the intellect acquires a knowledge of the object according to its eternal reasons, so that the complete certitude of the intellect follows a judgment of the object in accordance with its eternal reasons in God. In Bonaventure's doctrine, the human intellect attains the eternal reasons by an apprehension of God, either indirectly through science or directly through wisdom. An apprehension of God is necessary, in Bonaventure's view, because neither the first principles in the memory nor the truth of the exterior thing in itself are sufficiently stable, or immutable, for the intellect to know the thing with complete certitude, which depends ultimately on the eternal and immutable truth of God. There is no need, in the view of Aquinas, for the intellect to apprehend God in order to know a thing with complete certitude. Aquinas, no less than Bonaventure, maintains that, as the being of every creature would be defective unless it were contained by the uncreated being, so is 35 See the following: Expos, in Peri Hermen., 1.9, lect. 14.24 (Spiazzi, p. 74; Leon., 1.70-71); Expos, in Poster, anal, 1.23, lect. 36.11 (Spiazzi, pp. 280-81; Leon., pp. 287-88), and 1.33, lect. 44.3-8 (Spiazzi, pp. 314-16; Leon., pp. 319-21). 36 "Ad perfectionem autem cognitionis requiritur certitudo: unde scire aliter non dicimur nisi cognoscamus quod impossibile est aliter se habere, ut patet in I Posteriorum (c. 2; 72bl-4)." — SCG, 3.39 (p. 45, n. 2171); cf. DV, 2.1, ad 4 (1.25-26). 37 ST, Ia2ae, 112.5, Resp., ad 2 (2.1378ab).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

465

every created truth subject to defect except to the extent that it is rectified by the uncreated truth.38 Thus, for Aquinas, certitude of science can be said to come solely from God; however, it comes from God inasmuch as He has given to us the lumen of reason through which we know the principles giving rise to the certitude of science.39 In the view of Aquinas, then, the whole certitude of a science comes from its principles, for the conclusions of a science are said to be known with certitude when they are analyzed into their principles. A thing is known with certitude, therefore, because it is known from the lumen of reason given to us interiorly by God and by which He speaks to us. We have certitude of knowledge, Aquinas says, from an exterior teacher only to the extent that he analyzes his conclusions into their principles; nevertheless, we would not have certitude of science from such a teacher unless we also had within ourselves a certitude of the principles into which the conclusions are analyzed. 40 In the judgment of Aquinas, taking a different position from Bonaventure, both the certitude of principles and the lumen of human reason are sufficient, presupposing their dependence on God, for the intellect to know its objects with the proper certitude of a science. The position taken by Aquinas on this question is reflected in his considerations of the truth 'God is'. Unlike Bonaventure, who approaches this truth as indubitable to the human mind, Aquinas seeks to know whether this truth is known through itself, i.e. whether it self-evident. He concurs simply with Bonaventure in one respect, namely, that the truth of God's being, considered in itself, is self-evident only to God. Thereafter, Aquinas handles the question in quite a different way from Bonaventure. Aquinas, in his first treatment of the question, says that God can be compared to the human intellect in two ways. He can be compared to the intellect according to its similitude of His truth, for the intellect participates in divine truth, which is the exemplar of every other truth. Since the intellect knows other truths only through divine truth, therefore, knowing through itself that 'truth is', the intellect also knows through God himself that 'He is'. God can be compared to the intellect, moreover, according as, in His own nature, He is something incorporeal. In this comparison, God's being is not known through itself. In38 "... sicut autem esse creatum, .quantum est de se, varium est et defectibile, nisi contineatur ab ente increato; ita omnis creata veritas defectibilis est, nisi quantenus per veritatem increatam rectificatur." — DV, 14.8, in Resp. (1.295). 39 "... dicendum, quod certitudinem scientiae ... habet aliquis a solo Deo, qui nobis lumen rationis indidit, per quod principia cognoscimus, ex quibus oritur scientiae certitude ..." — Op. cit., 11.1, ad 17 (1.228). 40 "... dicendum, quod certitudo scientiae tola oritur ex certitudine principiorum: tune enim conclusiones per certitudinem sciuntur, quando resolvuntur in principia. Et ideo, quod aliquid per certitudinem sciatur, est ex lumine rationis divinitus interius indito, quo in nobis loquitur Deus: non autem ab homine exterius docente, nisi quatenus conclusiones in principia resolvit, nos docens: ex quo tamen nos certitudinem scientiae non acciperemus, nisi inesset nobis certitudo principiorum, in quae conclusiones resolvuntur." — Loc. cit., ad 13 (1.227).

466

CHAPTER SIX

deed, Aquinas notes, many men and some philosophers have denied that there is a God. The reason for their denial, according to Aquinas, is that what is known to a man through itself is known to him by his senses, just as a man, seeing a whole and a part, knows at once that every whole is greater than its part. But no man, on seeing sensible things, knows God at once, or immediately. On the contrary, on knowing that sensible things are caused, he argues within himself that everything which is caused is caused by an agent, and that the first agent cannot be a body; therefore, reasoning in this manner, he arrives at the knowledge that God is something incorporeal, a sort of substance that cannot be known self-evidently to the human mind.41 Aquinas, in his subsequent treatments of this question, handles the truth 'God is' as a self-evident proposition. A proposition is self-evident when the predicate is included in the meaning of the subject. In the proposition 'man is an animal', for instance, 'animal' is included in the meaning of 'man', for animal belongs to the nature of man. If everyone knows what the predicate is and what the subject is in a self-evident proposition, the proposition will be known through itself by every man, just as all men know the self-evident principles, or primary propositions, supporting rational demonstrations. If some men do not know what the predicate is or what the subject is, the proposition, as it stands, will still be known through itself, but not by men who do not know the meaning of the predicate or of the subject. It is for this reason that Boethius says: "there are some common conceptions of the mind that are known through themselves only among the wise". Now the proposition 'God is', as it stands, is known through itself, because the predicate is the same as the subject, since God is His own being. But we do not know what God is: therefore, His being is not known to us through itself, and so it must be demonstrated through those things that are more known to us, though less known with respect to nature. In short, the truth of the proposition 'God' is must be demonstrated from the visible effects of God in the universe.42 Although Aquinas, with Bonaventure, holds that the proposition 'God is' expresses the identity of being and essence in God, nonetheless, Aquinas, departing from Bonaventure, does not hold thereby that there is no proposition more true and more evident than 'God is', so that no one can doubt it or think it to be false. For Aquinas, the truth of the proposition is self-evident in itself, but not to the human mind, and so we must demonstrate the truth that 'God is' from the visible things surrounding us. Moreover, Aquinas does not follow Bonaventure in positing the first truth as the one which is most evident to the human intellect. In the view of Aquinas, it is self-evident that there is truth,

41 1 Sent., 3.1.2, Sol. (1.93-94). 42 ST, la, 2.1, Resp. (1.12a); cf. Boethius, De kebdom., (PL 64.1311). See also: DV, 10.12, Resp. (1.219-20); DPD, 7.2, ad 11 (2.192-93); SCG, 1.10 (2.13-14).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

467

taken commonly; but it cannot be known self-evidently to us that there is a first truth, and so this must be demonstrated.43 The fact of the denial by some men that there is a God makes it quite evident to Aquinas that the proposition 'God is' cannot be known by us through itself. Aristotle, speaking about the first principles of demonstration, shows that no one can think the opposite of that which is known through itself. But the opposite of 'God is' can be thought: "The fool said in his heart, there is no God" (Ps., 50.1). Considering Anselm's argument, but without naming Anselm himself, Aquinas says that perhaps a man who hears the name God does not understand it to signify something than which a greater cannot be thought. Granted that the man does understand God to signify that than which a greater cannot be thought, nevertheless, Aquinas maintains, it does not follow thereby that what he understands by God has being in the nature of things, but only that it has being in the apprehension of his intellect. It cannot be argued that what the man understands by the name God is real, unless it is granted that there is something real than which a greater cannot be thought. But this is not granted by those who posit that 'God is-not'.44 Aquinas does not grant, as Bonaventure does, that the thought 'God is' is indubitably true to the human mind. The thought is true, as Anselm's argument is valid, only when it is founded on the exterior evidence for the being of God in His visible effects. Hence, Aquinas does not admit that the being of God can known by the human mind from its own thought alone. Bonaventure holds that the human mind, from the being of its own truth, can perceive the being of the first truth, so that God, who is the first truth, cannot be thought not to-be. Bonaventure, though he holds this position, does not say that the truth of God's being is self-evident to the human mind On the contrary, he insists that the mind must gather knowledge from corporeal things, so that God becomes known to the mind, even from its own thought, only after acquiring knowledge of them. Bonaventure's position is a consequence of his view that every creature has an intrinsic mutability, thus preventing the human intellect from knowing the truth of a creature immutably and with certitude apart from the assistance of the immutable truth and infallible light of God. Because God is present in that way to the human intellect, it can know Him indubitably both from its own thought

43 "Dicendum quod veritatem esse in comrauni, est per se notum; sed primam veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos." — ST, la, 2.1, ad 3 (1.12b). 44 Loc. cit, sc & ad 2 (1.1 Ib, 12b); cf. SCO, 1.11 (2.14-15). See in Aristotle: Metapk., 4.3 (1005b6-33); Anai poster., 1.10 (76b23-24). Note the first treatment by Aquinas of the argument by Anselm, whose name is cited explicitly: "... dicendum, quod ratio Anselmi ita intelligenda est. Postquam intelligimus 'Deum', non potest intelligi quod sit Deus et possit cogitari non esse; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod aliquis non possit negare vel cogitare 'Deum non esse'; potest enim cogitare 'nihil huiusmodi esse quo maius cogitari non possit'; et ideo ratio sua procedit ex hac suppositione, quod supponatur aliquid esse quo maius cogitari non potest" — 1 Sent., 3.1.2, ad 4 (1.95): the editing of the text is mine.

468

CHAPTER SIX

and from its own truth. The position of Aquinas is a consequence of his view that the creature is intrinsically stable, so that the human intellect, though depending on God, can know the truth of a creature immutably and with certitude from self-evident principles and from the exterior evidence in the creature itself. Because the human intellect cannot think apart from the exterior evidence in the creature, the human mind cannot know the Creator without moving to Him from His exterior effects in creation, and so the mind cannot move directly to God either from its own thought or from its own truth. For Aquinas, then, the truth of God's being must be demonstrated from sensible things, even though both the lumen of reason and the first principles of truth in the human mind reflect the lumen and principles of truth in the divine mind. For Bonaventure, on the other hand, the truth of God's being can be known from within the human mind, particularly because its lumen of reason and its first principles of truth reflect the lumen and the principles of truth in the mind of God Analogical Modes of Knowledge

The doctrine of Bonaventure on analogical knowledge is mainly theological, thus restricting our examination of his texts on the subject. His doctrine is based, for the most part, on the similitudes of the Trinity in creatures. A corporeal creature is said to be a vestige of the Trinity, for example, when the unity, truth and goodness of being in the creature are appropriated to the three persons in the being of God The human soul is said likewise to be an image of the Trinity by an appropriation to the three persons in God of the memory, intelligence and will in the soul.45 The foundations of these analogical similitudes of God in creatures consist in their natural properties and powers. Since those properties and powers are similar to the essential qualities of God there is a sufficient treatment by Bonaventure of that similarity to enable us to present an adequate account of his philosophical thought on the analogical modes of knowing God Bonaventure has no doubt about the ability of natural reason to know and to name God by way of His creatures.46 Although every creature is similar to God nevertheless, as Augustine says, a creature is more dissimilar than similar to God This is also indicated by Hilary, who says that every comparison of inferior things would be more useful to men than appropriate to God47 Can the being of a 45 Cf. 1 Sent, 3.1.un.2, ad 1 & 4 (1.72-73; ed, mm., 1.51-52); Brevii, 2.12 (5.230; ed. min., 5.55-57). 46 For instance: "Quod autem obicitur, quod non debemus Deum nominare absolute, dicendum quod, quamvis nominemus Deum per creaturas, tamen etiam per creaturas cognoscimus, eum habere esse absolutum." — 1 Sent., 23.1.3, ad 1 (1.410; ed. min., 1.326-27). 47 "Quamvis enim creatura sit Deo similis, tamen plus est dissimilis quam similis, sicut dicit Augustinus, XV De Trinitate (2.39; PL 42.1088), et Hilarius similiter: "Omnis comparatio inferiorum

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

469

creature be compared to the essence of God? Such a comparison is possible, according to Bonaventure, and in two ways. The comparison can be made on the ground of God's influence and the reception of His influence by the creature. When compared to God on that ground, the creature is seen to have more dignity in being than it has when it is not compared to God The comparison can also be made on the ground of a relation of equality and proportion. It can be seen, in this way, that there cannot be any proportion between God and a creature with respect to being. Every creature is, as it were, nothing in itself, because it is not its own being. Consequently, there is no ground for a proportion or an equality in being between God and a creature, as there is between one creature and another.48 With respect to being, therefore, every creature is infinitely distant from God Now God and a creature cannot participate in a common nature, for there is nothing univocal to a creature and the Creator, and so a creature cannot be in any way equal to God A creature and the Creator can be brought together, however, on the grounds of order and imitation. The rational creature, for instance, is ordered to God and, as His image, it imitates God Hence, having an assimilation to God the rational creature can come together with God, because it similar to Him by reason of His image in the rational soul.49 Granting that a creature is similar to God Bonaventure denies, nonetheless, that there is a similitude of God in a creature through a participation of one nature. There is, rather, a similitude according to analogy and relation, a similitude found in a creature from a comparison with the Creator as an effect is compared to its cause.50 Since the creature and the Creator are similar to one another in an analogical way,, their similarity is neither equivocal nor univocal. Some things are said to have an equivocal similarity because they are alike only in name. Other things are said to have a univocal similarity because they are alike both in name and in plus habeatur hominibus utilis quam Deo apta'." — 1 Sent., lS.dub.8, (1.241; ed. min., 1.197); cf. Comm. in loam., 1.2.8 (6.248). See in St. Hilary, De Trinit., 1.19 (PL 10.38). 48 1 Sent., 8. l.dub.6, Resp. (1.163; ed. min., 1.128). Note the following text: "Dicendum quod magis et minus dupliciter possunt considerari, scilicet in comparatione ad idem; et sic dicunt intensionem et remissionem; vel in comparatione ad diversas substantias et naturas; et sic dicunt gradum et excessum, et sic est bene ponere magis et minus in ente respectu creaturarum ad invicem. Sed in comparatione Creatoris ad creaturam est excessus improportionabilis et infinitus; respectu creaturarum ad invicem est proportionabilis." — Lac. at., dub.4, Resp. (1.162-63; ed. min., 1.128). 49 3 Sent., 2.1.1, ad 2 (3.38; ed. min., 3.33); cf. DSC, q. 2, con. 3 & ad 3 (5.7 & 9). The whole world of sensible things imitates God, though imperfectly: "Quod obicitur de archetype et sensibili mundo, dicendum iste imitatur ilium in quantum potest, sed deficit. In illo enim est summa pulcritudo per omnimodam unitatem; hie autem, si esset unitas, non esset pulcritudo, quia non esset ordo nee perfectio. Et ideo ut mundus hie imitaretur in perfectione et pulcritudine, oportuit quod haberet multitudinem, ut multa facerent quod unum facere per se non posset." — 2 Sent., 1.2.1.1, ad 3 (2.40; ed. min., 2.32). 50 "Quod enim obicitur, quod nulla est similitude, quia summa est distantia, dicendum quod non est similitudo per unius naturae participationem, est tamen similitude secundum analogiam et habitudinem, et hoc in comparatione ad effectus." — 1 Sent., 34.un.4, ad 1-3 (1.594; ed. min., 1.474).

470

CHAPTER SIX

nature. Those things that are said to have an analogical similarity, however, have a community according to a likeness of proportion, but not according to a unity of nature. Thus, standing between equivocity and univocity, a community of analogy is established by human reason.51 Let us take, by way of explanation, Bonaventure's text on the application of the term principle to God with reference to creatures. Now the name God is univocal and, as such, it signifies the same thing in different predications. When we say 'God is a Trinity', and 'God generates a Son', the term God stands, in the first instance, for the divine nature and, in the second instance, for a divine person, but the person and the nature are really the same. The name Father is equivocal, on the other hand, because it signifies in one way a divine person: 'Father of the Son', and it signifies in another way the divine essence: 'our Father'. The signification of the term Father is equivocal, therefore, because the fatherhood of God is common only in name to the divine person and to the divine essence. The term principle, standing between God and person, is analogical. When principle is predicated essentially of God, it connotes a created effect, and so the term designates God as the cause of creatures. When principle is said personally of God, however, it designates the origin of a person in God, and thus the term does not connote any created effect. The term is applied to God analogically, therefore, because it is used to designate diverse things having only a unity of proportion. The term is not equivocal, because it does not designate things that are entirely diverse; it is not univocal, because it signifies things that are not the same in nature. Consequently, the term principle is said analogically of God, so that it signifies the act of producing without indicating whether it is a personal act of originating or the essential act of creating.52 In Bonaventure's view, then, analogical predication falls between equivocal predication and univocal predication. In other words, an analogical predication establishes a unity of proportion between what is equivocal and what is univocal. There is a double signification referring to a single being in an equivocal predication, or mode of speaking. The term man, for instance, has a double meaning when it is said of a man in a portrait and of a real man, who alone has the being of a man. There is one signification referring to a twofold being in a univocal mode of speaking. The term man, in this instance, has one meaning when it is said of Socrates and Plato, but each of them has his own being. There is more than one signification referring to more than one being in an analogical mode of speaking, because it partakes of the nature of the other two modes.53

51 1 Sent, l.dub.5 (1.43; ed. min., 1.31-32). 52 1 Sent, 29.1.2, Resp. (1.511; ed. min., 1.406); cf. ad 1. 53 "Cum est modus dicendi aequivocus, ibi est geminatio circa dici et non circa esse. Unde homo pictus et homo verus dupliciter dicitur homo, sed non est duplex homo vel duo homines. Cum est modus dicendi univocus, et geminatio circa esse et non circa dici. Unde homo verus in Socrate et Platone numeratur, quia sunt duo homines, sed non multipliciter dicitur, Ubi est modus dicendi analogus, quia

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

471

An analogical similitude, representing a unity of proportion, draws together the two extremes of univocity and equivocity. On the side of univocity, the similitude contains a comparison of the more and the less, or of the prior and the posterior. When two celestial bodies are compared with reference to the substantial form of light, for example, the being of the substantial form is seen to be more perfect in the one than in the other, even though the substantial form itself is not less in the second body than in the first. It is in this way that the substantial form of light is said to be more perfect in the sun than in the stars, because their forms of light are seen to be posterior to the light of the sun, which has the prior form of light. From these comparisons, the form of light is said to be common to the heavenly bodies, not univocally, but by way of analogy. On the side of equivocity, an analogical similitude contains a comparison of things that are distinct within a multiplicity. Although the choice of the will, for instance, is free because of its essential freedom from coercion, nevertheless, the freedom of its choice is said to be analogical not only on the side of univocity, where the freedom is more and less in relation to its objects, but also on the side of equivocity because the freedom is related to a multiplicity of objects each distinct from the other. When the human will is compared to the divine will, then, following a reference of the one to the other as the posterior to the prior, the human will is said to be, on the side of univocity, more or less similar to the divine will and, on the side of equivocity, the human will is said to be diverse from the divine will. Hence, by means of an analogical comparison, the human will is seen to be perfect in proportion to its conformity to the divine will.54 We have seen, at the beginning of this chapter, that Bonaventure speaks of a twofold community of analogy between creatures and their Creator. There is a community founded on a relation of one to one, and this community is obtained by a comparison of the posterior to the prior. There is also a community founded on a relation of two to two, which is a relation of proportions, or a proportionality. Where there is an analogy, properly speaking, there is a comparison of a prior and a posterior with reference to something which is one.55 Bonaventure uses this sort of comparison to show that the name image is said analogically of the Son of God and of a human person. Now the work of a human artisan follows nature, so that his work is artificial rather than natural. The work of the divine Artisan, however, is the very cause of nature, for God is the Creator of nature, and so His work is truly natural. When the term creation is applied to the work of God in partem tenet de natura univoci, partem de natura aequivoci, ibi est numeratio et in essendo et in dicendo." — 1 Sent., 14.1.2, Resp. (1.247; ed. min, 1.201). 54 2 Sent, 25.2.dub.3, Resp. "Ad illud quod ..." (2.626; ed. min., 2.648); 13.2.2, ad 3 (2.321; ed. min., 2.324); I Sent., 48.1.1, ad 1-4 (1.852-53; ed. min., 1.677). 55 "Ubi autem est analogia, ibi est comparatio ad aliquid unum secundum prius et posterius, maxime ubi est dicere proprie analogia." — 3 Sent., 34.2.dub.l, in Resp. (3.768; ed. min, 3.772).

472

CHAPTER SIX

nature, the term is used according to its proper signification and without an equivocal meaning. When the term is applied also to the work of a human artisan, the term is used improperly and, with reference to what is natural, it has an equivocal meaning, just as the term man is equivocal when it said of a real man and of his image. The name man designates first and foremost the real man; the name is used thereafter, but with a different meaning, to designate his image. The name image is not used in such an equivocal way to designate the similarity of a man to the Son of God. The name is imposed first and foremost on the Son of God, because it designates Him properly as representing the Father, of whom He is the natural and perfect image; the name is imposed thereafter, but also properly, on a man as representing the Creator, or the origin of natural things, and thus a man is a natural though imperfect image of his origin. Through his natural representation of the Creator, therefore, a man is similar analogically to the Son of God, who is the natural representation of the Father.56 This sort of analogy is obtained by reducing, or taking back, the two sides of the comparison to a unity of nature: a man and the Son of God are taken back analogically to the unity of the nature of image, which is found first in the Son of God and thereafter in the man. The same sort of analogy can be obtained by comparing one creature to another creature, provided they are referred to something which is one, and which is universal to both sides of the comparison. For example, in the comparison of the stars to the sun with reference to their common form of light, the two sides are taken back analogically to the unity of the nature of light, which is found first in the sun and thereafter in the stars. Since this analogy is based on a common property, or on a participation in one nature, the comparison gives rise to a similitude of proportion: the sun and the stars are seen to be similar in proportion to their common participation in the property or form of light. The analogy founded on a relation of two to two, or a relation of proportions, is obtained by taking back the two sides of the comparison to the unity of a proportional similitude, but not to a unity of nature. The subject, or form, through which the two sides are compared in the analogy is not found among them, but is above them, so that it not attributed to them properly except by way of extension. In the comparison of creatures to the Creator, for instance, being is attributed properly to the two sides only by extension, because God is not a being among all beings, but a being above all beings: God is His being, whereas creatures have being from God Consequently, the relation of creatures to being and the relation of the Creator to being are similar as proportions only by way of analogy, and so their similarity in this respect is taken back, not to a unity of nature, but to the unity of a similitude of proportionality.57 56 2 Sent., 16.dub.4, Resp. (2.407-08; ed. min., 2.420). 57 Our analysis is based on the following texts: "Quamvis enim Creator et creatura non habeant commune univocum, habent tamen analogum. Notadum est, quod duplex est analogia: quaedam per reduc-

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

473

The similarity between the goodness of a creature and the goodness of the Creator is also understood by Bonaventure to be analogical. Although the uncreated good is said to be the supreme good, the term supreme does not add anything real to the uncreated good The term is an addition made by the human intellect, whose understanding of good encloses an understanding of a supreme good. Moreover, no created good participates in a common nature with the uncreated good, which is far more simple than any created good The uncreated good so exceeds every created good that there cannot be any univocal proportion between them. When the term good is said of both a creature and the Creator, therefore, the term is said of them by way of analogy. In this instance, the analogy is of the posterior and the prior, because every created goodness depends on the uncreated goodness as an effect depending on its first cause. Since the goodness of a creature is posterior to the goodness of the Creator, the one lacks the supreme simplicity of the other; likewise, since the goodness of the Creator is the first goodness, it is also the most simple goodness. When the Creator is said to be the most simple being, the expression most simple does not add anything to the first being, which is not a composite being; therefore, neither does the term supreme add anything to the first goodness when it is said to be the supreme good, for it is not a composite good The first goodness is called the supreme good only by an analogical comparison with the goodness of a creature, which is good because it is an effect of the Creator.58 Since a creature and the Creator do not participate in a common nature, or in a common form, there cannot be a univocal proportion between them. A proportion in the strict sense is a measuring of things in the same genus, such as the proportion measuring the relation of a man to an ass in the genus animal. The relation of a created good to the uncreated good is established by bringing them together in an analogical way. As a consequence, the relation can be called a proportion only in the wide sense of the term.59 tionem ad unitatem naturae secundum prius et posterius; et haec potest esse comparando creaturam ad creaturam, et in hac signum distribuit pro omnibus contentis, nisi sit distributio restricta ex additione, vel ex usu sive modo loquendi, sicut dicitur distributio accommoda, ut si dicatur: caelum tegit omnia. Alia est analogia per reductionem ad unitatem similitudinis proportionalis, non naturae; et quod sic analogatur non est inter alia, sed super alia Unde distributio proprie pro illo non distribuit, nisi sit extensa. Unde Deus non est ens inter omnia, sed super omnia." — 1 Sent., 7.un.4. in Resp. (1.143; ed. min., 1.112). "Dicendum quod similitudo duobus modis attenditur: uno modo secundum unius rationis proprietatem sive naturae participationem; alio modo secundum unius formae comparationem. Prima dicitur similitudo proportionis, secunda dicitur similitudo proportionalitatis." — 4 Sent., l.l.dub.3, Resp. (4.23; ed. min., 4.29). 58 DMT, 3.1, ad 4 (5.72). 59 "... dicendum quod proportio dupliciter accipitur: stricte et large. Si stride dicatur proportio, sic dicit quamdam commensurationem et est rerum eiusdem generis; et hoc modo non habet veritatem ... quod ubicumque est ordo, ibi sit proportio. Si vero accipiatur large, ut dicatur proportio quaecumque habitude quae attenditur secundum convenientiam analogiae, hoc modo proportio est boni creati ad increatum et etiam ordo secundum rationem causalitatis et primitatis." — 3 Sent., 29,un. 1 ad 2

474

CHAPTER SIX

Every comparison of a creature to the Creator, in Bonaventure's view, brings them together into a community of analogy, or a community of proportion. He speaks of three different communities of analogy. The first is established by a similar comparison of two to two: as man is to animal, so is white to colour. The second community is established by a dissimilar comparison of two to one, such as the comparison of food and animal to health. The third community is established by a comparison of two to each other, one of which is an imitation or a similitude of the other; this sort of similitude is similar by itself to that of which it is an imitation, as the human soul is similar by its nature to God, of whom it is an imitation, and thus it is His image or expressed similitude.60 When two things come together in such a way that they participate in one nature, they are united in a community of univocation, and this is expressed in a similitude which is univocal to them. When two things are brought together into the third community of analogy, they are not united in something which is common to them; rather, the one is similar by its nature to the other, and so they are not alike in some third thing. It is in this way that a creature is said to be a similitude of God, or God is said conversely to be a similitude of the creature. Taking similitude in this way, Bonaventure says that it is the ground of knowledge, and that it is called an idea.61 In the third community of analogy, then, the Creator is known from a creature because the creature by its nature resembles its idea or exemplar in the Creator. A creature is related to its exemplar in God as an artifact is related to its idea or exemplar in the mind of an artisan. Thus, with reference to its exemplar, a creature can be proportioned analogically to the Creator, as an effect is proportioned to its cause, which is prior to the effect. In consequence, the Creator can be known analogically from the creature by a similitude of proportion. Bonaventure has not given a proper name to the analogy by which God is known in this way. Since the analogy (3.639; ed. min., 3.634). The relation of the Creator to a creature is habitual rather than actual: "... dicendum quod relatio actualis ponit utrumque cxtremum in actu, non autem relatio habitualis, sicut patet, quod Deus aeternaliter dicitur exemplar creaturae temporalis." — 1 Sent., 18.un.2, ad 3 (1.326; ed. min, 1.263). 60 1 Sent., 1.3.1, ad 1 (1.38-39; ed. min., 1.27). 61 "... dicendum, quod est convenientia per unius naturae participationem vel per comparationem communem. Prima convenientia facit communitatem univocationis, secunda communitatem analogiae sive proportionis ..." — Ibid. "Similitudo autern dupliciter dicitur: uno modo secundum convenientiarn duorum in tertio, et haec est similitudo secundum univocationem; alio modo est similitudo secundum quod unum dicitur similitudo alterius; et haec similitudo non concernit convenientiam in aliquo cornmuni, quia similitudo se ipsa est similis, non in tertio; et hoc modo dicitur creatura similitudo Dei, vel e converso Deus similitudo creaturae. Hoc modo sumendo similitudinem, similitudo est ratio cognoscendi, et haec dicitur idea." — 1 Sent., 35.im.l, Resp. (1.601; ed. min., 1.479-80). In this text, the name idea refers to the similitude of a creature in God; the term is also used by Bonaventure for the species or exemplar of an artifact in the mind of a human artisan: "Et dicendum quod operatic naturalis per naturam prius est in eodem quam operatic artis. Et praeterea ... quia agens per naturam producit sibi similem secundum veritatem, sed agens secundum artem similem solum secundum speciem vel ideam vel exemplar." — 2 Sent., 7.2.2.2, in Resp. (2.202; ed min., 2.196).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

475

establishes a proportion between the creature and the Creator, who is known thereby according to a similitude of proportion, therefore, distinguishing it from the other communities of analogy, we shall call it the ana logy of proportion.62 The first of the other two communities of analogy is established by a comparison of two to two: as man is to animal, so is white to colour. This is a comparison of similar proportions or relations between a species and a genus. The relation of the species man to the genus animal is similar to the relation of the species white to the genus colour. Taken alone, each of the two relations is a proportion in the strict sense, because it concerns a measuring of things in the same genus: man has a proportion to ass in the genus animal, and white has a proportion to green in the genus colour. Each of these proportions is founded on a participation in a common nature, and so, in each instance, the proportion is univocal. Thus, the comparison of man and animal to white and colour is a comparison of two univocal proportions. But the comparison does not establish the two proportions in a community of univocation, because they do not come together in a common nature; rather, they are conformed to each other as proportions in diverse genera, the one in the genus of substance and the other in the genus of accident. The two proportions are brought together, therefore, into a community of proportionality. Hence, their similarity is known analogically by a proportional similitude, or a likeness of their proportionality. Since this proportionality represents the relation established analogically between the two proportions, it can be called a proportion in the wide sense of the term.63 This community of analogy also has no proper name in the texts of Bonaventure. Seeing that the analogy has to do with a community of proportionality, which is expressed in a proportional similitude, we shall call it the analogy of proportionality. Now, because the perfections of a creature are conformed to the perfections of the Creator, the analogy of proportionality, presupposing the analogy of proportion, can be established between a creature and its Creator by comparing a perfection of the one to a perfection of the other. The will of a man and the will of God, for example, are conformed, or ought to be conformed, to each other according to their acts, objects and ends. What God wills, He wills freely and lovingly, or justly and for the right end; in like manner, what a man wills, he must will freely and lovingly, or justly and for the right end. The will of a man is

62 L.A. Cruz names it the analogy of intrinsic attribution, a name derived from the dependence of the creature on the Creator by way of participation: EX, 1 (1951), pp. 222-38. 63 "Alio modo contingit conformari aliquid alicui secundum consimilem habitudinem sive comparationem, quae potest dici proportio, cum est rerum eiusdem generis, et proportionalitas, cum est rerum diversorum generum sive non communicantium, ut fiat vis in verbo. Large tamen loquendo utraque potest dici proportio; et haec nihil ponit commune, quia est per comparationem duorum ad duo, et potest esse et est inter summe distantia." — 1 Sent., 48.1.1, in Resp. (1.852; ed. min., 1.676).

476

CHAPTER SIX

made just when it is conformed in those ways to the will of God.64 Bonaventure uses a similar comparison to show that our freedom of choice is conformed analogically to the freedom of choice in God; at the same time, proceeding in an analogical way, he shows that freedom of choice in God is far more perfect than freedom of choice in His creatures, thus illustrating how a perfection of the Creator can be known from a perfection in creatures.65 The remaining community of analogy is established by a dissimilar comparison of two to one, as animal and food are compared to health. By this comparison, an animal is seen to be healthy because it is the subject of health, and an item of food or drink is seen to be healthy because it disposes the animal for health. An animal and its urine can be compared to health in a similar way, so that the urine is said to be healthy because, showing that the animal is healthy, the urine is a natural sign of health.66 In these comparisons, the relations or proportions to health are dissimilar to one another. An animal has a proportion to health as its subject. An item of food or drink has a proportion to health as its disposition. Urine has a proportion to health as a sign of health in an animal. Although each one of the relations is a proper proportion, nevertheless, no two of them are univocal, because they are dissimilar, and neither are they equivocal, since

64 "Dicendum quod conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam attenditur secundum proportionem ... Duplex est autem proportio voluntatis, scilicet ad actum et ad volitum. Simiiis propoitio ad actum consistit in hoc, quod, sicut Deus quod vult, vult ex caritate et liberaliter sive iuste et recto fine, sic et homo velit. Simiiis proportio ad obiectum est, ut quod vult Deus, etiam homo velit. Potest igitur conformitas attendi secundum hanc duplicem similitudinem et comparationem, et sic est sufficiens et facit voluntatem iustam." — 1 Sent., 48.1.2, Resp. (1.854; ed. min., 1.678); cf. fa. 3-4 (c-d). "Et secundum hanc potest voluntas nostra conformari divinae, videlicet per similem habitudinem ad actum, ut, sicut Deus quod vult, vult liberaliter et caritative, ita et homo; et per similem comparationem ad obiectum, ut quod vult Deus, velit homo; et eodem fine, quo vult Deus, velit homo. Hoc totum possibile est esse, et totum possibile est non esse; et ideo possibile est voluntatem nostram divinae conformari et difformari." — 1 Sent., 48.1.1, in Resp. (1.852; ed. mm., 1.676). 65 "Dicendum quod est loqui de libero arbitrio secundum generales conditiones et secundum speciales. Si loquamur secundum generales conditiones, sic liberum arbitrium dicit facultatem liberam a coactione et ordinatam ad rectitudinis conservationem. Et hoc modo reperitur in creatura et Deo conformiter et secundum eamdem rationem, non conrbrmitate et unitate univocationis, sed potius analogiae et consimilis habitudinis, quae inter Deum et creaturam esse potest. Alio modo est loqui de libero arbitrio secundum proprietates speciales, et sic liberum arbitrium est facultas, quae quidem non est substantia rei, sed quaedam habilitas. Sic etiam est potestas servandi rectitudinem, quod non est ipsa rectitudo; et ideo potest a rectitudine obliquari, quantum est de se, in creatura. In Deo autem, liberum arbitrium est ipsa divina essentia, est etiam ipsa iustitia, ideo nee obliquari potest nee mutari. Et quantum ad has conditiones speciales ... liberum arbitrium aliter in Deo, aliter in creaturis reperiri." — 2 Sent., 25.1.dub.3, Resp. (2.608; ed. mm., 2.628). 66 "... notandum, quod ... aliquid dicitur esse sanum tripliciter: aut subiective, ut animal dicitur sanum; aut dispositive, ut potio dicitur sana; aut ostensive, ut urina sana ..." — 1 Sent., 46.un.5, in Resp. (1.831; ed. min., 1.659). "... res non communicat signo dato nomen, communicat tamen signo naturali, ut patet nam urina dicitur sana, quia est signum sanitatis; est enim signum, quod causatur naturaliter." — 1 Sent., 45.3.1, ad 3 (1.809; ed. min., 1.643).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

477

the term health designates the same thing in any two of the relations. Thus, the comparison of two proportions of this kind establishes them in a community of analogy. This sort of analogy cannot be established between a creature and the Creator, because they cannot be compared in dissimilar ways to some third thing, as though they were its subject, or its disposition, or its sign. Though every analogical comparison of a creature to the Creator shows that the one is dissimilar to the other, even so, it also shows that they are similar in some respect, and so no comparison of their proper proportions can be simply dissimilar. The analogy established between created things by a dissimilar comparison is also unnamed by Bonaventure. Since the analogy has to do with the attribution of a natural property to two things, which are said to possess the property in dissimilar ways, we shall call it the analogy of attribution.67 When a man knows God, he can speak about God and he can give God a name. No man, however, can speak about God or name Him in such a way that he expresses perfectly what God is. God can be understood only by Himself, so that He alone can truly speak of Himself and give Himself a name. In speaking of Himself to us. God uses no other words and no other name than / am (Exodus, 3.14); but this divine name, Bonaventure remarks, is incomprehensible to us. When we speak of God, therefore, and when we give Him a name, we talk of God and we name Him in proportion to our knowledge of Him. Since God is better known to a believer, who knows Him from the Scriptures, than to a non-believer, who knows God by human reason or philosophy, a believer can both speak of God and name Him in a betterway than a non-believer.68 How can we impose a name on God? Every name devised by human reason in imposed on a form, but God is above all forms; therefore, as Augustine shows, God is beyond the understanding of the human intellect, which cannot impose a name on Him. 69 Answering the objection, Bonaventure says that God does not have a form of the sort that the human intellect acquires through the senses. God has a form, nonetheless, because He himself is the form which is the principle of knowledge. Although we do not know this form in itself, God knows Himself in it, and we know it in a created form. Wherefore, we impose names on God from the created forms that we see and understand.70 It is necessary for us to impose several names on God, according to Bonaventure, because we cannot express the divine being in a single name. Every perfection is in God and is understood to be in God; but no one name devised by man can designate all the perfections of God. Moreover, we must use either several names or one equivocal name to designate that in which many things both come together and differ. Since an equivocal 67 calls 68 69 70

L. A Cruz calls it the analogy of extrinsic attribution, thus distinguishing it from the analogy that he the analogy of intrinsic attribution: EX, 1 (1951), p. 233. 1 Sent, 22.un.l, Resp. (1.391; ed. mm., 1.312). Loc. at., arg. 4 (1.390; ed. mm., 1.312); cf. St. Augustine, Sermo, 117.2.3 (PL 38.662). Loc. cit., ad 4 (1.391; ed. min., 1.313).

478

CHAPTER SIX

name give rise to ambiguity, it is fitting for us to express the community and the difference of things by using diverse names. For the same reason, it is necessary that we use several names to designate what in God is common and proper, or essential and personal." Showing how we impose several names on God, Bonaventure distinguishes three elements of a name. The first consists in a spoken word signifying a thing by its name: Peter is spoken to signify an Apostle by his name; in a similar way, can speak many words as names designating God in several respects. The second element consists in the thing signified by a name. From this point of view, all the things that are said essentially of God are brought together under the one name essence or being, which is the same in name as essence, just as good is the same in name as upright. The things that are said personally of God, however, have several names, each name corresponding to the Person whom it signifies. The third element consists in the reason for imposing a name on a thing, and this reason follows the principle bywhich the thing is known to the human intellect. When the reason for naming God is taken from creatures, or His effects, it follows the threefold principle of causality, removal and excellence. Consequently, we can apply many names to God because He has a multiplicity of effects, from which we can remove multiple imperfections, thus attaining a knowledge of His perfections, which are more numerous and far more exellent than the perfections in creatures.72 Since we know God from creatures according to the threefold principle of causality, removal and excellence, we name God from creatures in accordance with that threefold principle. Some of the names imposed by us on God from creatures are transferred to Him from them, but others are not. Thus, when we know God from His effects, or by the analogy of proportion, we do not transfer their names to God either by way of imposition or according to what they signify. We say that God is immense and eternal, for instance, not because the properties signified by those names are in creatures, but because they are known to be in God from their opposites in creatures, which are limited and temporal in their natures. We do not impose on God, therefore, such names as immensity and eternity. God is really and truly what those names signify, and so they do not designate the divine nature according to a similitude of God in the nature of His creatures. When we know God by the analogy of proportionality, however, we transfer names to Him from creatures, but in two different ways. Some names signify properties that, on the one hand, are really in God and, on the other, have similitudes in creatures. Names of this sort, such as wisdom and love, are transferred from creatures to God by our imposition, but not according to the things that the names signify. They are first imposed on

71 1 Sent., 22.un.2, fa. 3-4 (1.392; eii min., fa. c-d, 1.313). 72 Loc. cit, Resp. (1.393; ed. min., 1.314).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

479

creatures, then on God, even though the things or properties signified by the names are found first in God. In other words, on removing from creatures the imperfections in the properties signified by the names and, thereafter, transferring those names to God, we impose them on Him in such a way that they signify the properties in God, who has them without any imperfection. By comparison with a man, for example, God is said to be wise and loving in a perfect way, because He is wisdom and love, whereas the man, having a similitude of God's wisdom and love, is said to be wise and loving in an imperfect way. Hence, following the way of removal, we name God from creatures by removing that in creatures which is dissimilar to God and, thereafter, attributing first to God that which in creatures is similar to what is really in God. Other names signify properties that are really in creatures, and that are in God according to their similitudes, such as the stability signified by rock, and the strength signified by lion. When these names are transferred from creatures to God, they are imposed properly on Him, so that, what they signify is said to be in God and in a far more excellent way than in creatures. Wherefore, following the way of excellence, we name God from creatures by attributing to Him more excellently that which is really in creatures and to which there is something similar in God.73 The names that we give to God by means of the analogy of proportion designate properties in God from their opposites in creatures. Since these names follow our knowledge of God according to the way of causality, we would err in attributing to the Creator names designating properties belonging specifically to creatures, such as the name mutability. The names that we give to God by means of the analogy of proportionality designate either properties that are really in God with similitudes of them in creatures, or similitudes in God of properties that are really in creatures. The first of these two sorts of names follow the way of removal. We would err here in transferring to God the names imposed on creatures, if we did not remove from those names the imperfections of the properties designated by them as they are imposed on creatures. We would err in transferring potency to God, then, if we did not remove from that name the imperfection of a created power, which is a similitude or likeness of the uncreated power of God. The second of these two sorts of names follows the way of excellence. We would err, following this way, in transferring to God the names of created properties, if we did not impose those names to signify the similitudes of such properties in God, for they are far nobler as similitudes in God than they are as realities in creatures. We would err in transferring to God, therefore, such names as lamb and serpent, if we did not impose

73 1 Sent., 22.un.3, Resp. "Sed haec ..." (1.396; ed. min., 1.316); cf. con. 3-4 (c-d). Bonaventure, following Dionysius, speaks also of our knowing and naming God by way of negation, which belongs to the order of mystical theology: Loc. cit., arg. 2-3, ad 2-3 (1.394, 396; ed. min., 1.315, 316-17).

480

CHAPTER SIX

them to signify in God the similitudes of meekness and prudence, which are far nobler than those properties are in creatures. Because names of this kind are transferred to God not only to express our knowledge of Him, but also to give Him praise, we ought not to transfer to God, Bonaventure says, the names of any creatures having properties that we consider to be lacking in dignity or nobility. We ought not, for example, to call God a toad or a fox, because we do not praise Him by indicating that He is ugly or wily, as we do by indicating that He is gentle in speaking of Him as a dove. Moreover, since we transfer names from creatures to God for our own instruction concerning Him, we ought to transfer names from those creatures that are more known to us, thus avoiding error in naming Him. For this reason, we should transfer to God names of corporeal creatures rather than names of spiritual creatures, because the greater similitude of God in an angel carries with it the greater danger of mistaking an angel than any other created thing for God. Now the creature which is best known to us is man himself, who is at once both corporeal and spiritual in nature. Consequently, God is best known by us from human nature, which is made in His image and likeness; therefore, we can name God most appropriately from our own nature. 74 God can become known to us from any creature, Bonaventure says, because He is present to every creature in the universe. God can become known to us, therefore, from the nature of a corporeal creature, and from the nature of a spiritual creature. But the human soul, which is formed by the first truth, is conjoined immediately to God, so that He is known more immediately to us from His image in the nature of man than from the nature of an angel or from the nature of a corporeal creature. God is known to us from creatures, then, in proportion to the ways in which they resemble Him. Every creature resembles the Creator, first of all, from a distance and in a confused manner. God is His own being, whereas every creature has its being from nothing, and so the creature is said to be in darkness with respect to God. From this point of view, the creature is called a shadow of God. The human mind knows God, from His shadow, to be the cause of the creature, but only in a general or indeterminate way. Every creature resembles the Creator, secondly, from a distance but in a distinct manner. From that point of view, the creature has a clear imprint of God, and thus it is called a vestige of God. The human mind knows God, from His vestige, to be the efficient, formal and final cause of the creature, and this knowledge is attained from the likeness of the unity, truth and goodness of the Creator in the creature. Every spiritual creature, moreover, resembles the Creator in a more distinct manner, because, having a spiritual nature, it is closer to 74 1 Sent., 3.1.un.2, ad 1 (1.72; ed. mm., 1.51): cf. con. 2-4 (b-d); 34.un.4, Resp. (1.594; ed. min., 1.474). On our analogical modes of knowing and naming God as described by Bonaventure see: M.R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 78-88; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 76-85; L.A. Cruz, EX, 1 (1951), pp. 238-48.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

481

God than the corporeal creature. For this reason, a spiritual creature is called an image of God. Thus, possessing memory, intelligence and will, a spiritual creature leads the human mind to God not only as to the threefold cause of creatures, but also as to an object of remembrance, knowledge and love. Since man is a rational creature, which is at once both spiritual and corporeal, the human mind can ascend to God and can know His properties more immediately from the nature of the rational creature than from the nature of either a purely corporeal creature or a purely spiritual creature.75 The names shadow, vestige and image, which are of Augustinian origin, have analogical connotations in the doctrine of Bonaventure. These similitudes of God in creatures are, as it were, different steps of a ladder by which the human mind ascends from creatures to a knowledge of the Creature. When the Creator becomes known in that way to the human mind, it is said to see the Creator through the creature as through a mirror, or in an analogical manner. 76 Hence, the terms ladder and mirror have analogical, and not metaphorical, meanings when they are used by Bonaventure to describe our modes of knowing God, whether from natural reason or from Christian faith. 77 Bonaventure also uses the term book to describe our analogical ways of knowing God from His similitudes in creatures. He says, for instance, that the Creator, or the first principle, has made the corporeal world to manifest Himself, so that, with love and praise, man would be taken back to God through the corporeal world as through a mirror or vestige of his Creator. For this purpose, God has made the twofold book of corporeal things and spiritual things, the one visible and the other invisible. The visible and exterior book is read by the brute animal, which has only sense knowledge. The invisible and interior book is read by the angel, who has only intellectual knowledge. To perfect the universe, therefore, God has made man and given to him both sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. Accordingly, as a rational creature, man can read the exterior book of corporeal things and the interior book of spiritual things. As a consequence, knowing both the exterior and the interior works of God, man can ascend to the Creator himself, who is wise in all His works, and so man can know the eternal art and wisdom of God

75 1 Sent, 3.1.un.2, ad 4 (1.72-73; erf min., 1.51-52). Cf. Itiner., 1.1-5 (5.296-97; erf. min., 5.182-83). Ermenegildo Bertola suggests an intrinsic influence from a little known source of Jewish origin on the doctrinal development of Bonaventure's Itinerarium: "Platonismo scolastico-cristiano e arabo-giudaico: S. Bonaventura e R Bachja ben Paquda", Saggi e studi difilosofin medioevale. II pensiero medioevale, serie 1.3 (Padova, A. Milani: 1951), pp. 94-107; also found in Sefarad, 10 (1950), pp. 385-400. 76 1 Sent.. 3.1.un.3, Resp. (1.74-75; ed. min., 1.53); cf. 3 Sent., 31.2.1, ad 5 (3.682; ed. min., 3.681). 77 For an example of his use of ladder in this way see: Itiner., 4.1-2 (5.306; ed. min., 5.199-200). An example of his similar use of mirror, regarding natural reason and philosophy, is found in Coll. in HexaSm., 5.23-33 (5.357-59; Delorme, pp. 85-90), and 10.10-18 (5.378-79; Delorme, pp. 129-32); with regard to faith and theology, see: 11.1-21 (5.379-83: Delorme, pp. 132-40).

482

CHAPTER SIX

from His twofold book of corporeal creatures and spiritual creatures.78 It is remarkable that, in developing his doctrine on the analogical modes of knowledge, Bonaventure cites very few historical sources. We have seen him citing both Hilary and Augustine on the greater dissimilarity than similarity between creatures and the Creator. We have also shown Bonaventure, in a late text, citing Augustine on the different kinds of proportion established by human reason. Bonaventure also refers to Aristotle, who points out that some sort of equivocation is frequently hidden in a comparison according to analogy.79 When we take into account the Augustinian influence on Bonaventure regarding the similitudes of God in creatures, we can then see an extensive influence of Augustine on the Bonaventurean doctrine of analogy. But Bonaventure uses the Augustinian notions of shadow, vestige and image in his own way. He looks upon matter as the reason why every creature is a shadow of the Creator. Bonaventure considers every creature to be a vestige of the Creator because it bears, so to speak His footprint (vestigium). Thus, for Bonaventure, to investigate the creature, as it were to trace the footprints of the Creator, or to walk in the footsteps of God, especially in the corporeal creature.80 Since the Creator is reflected more perfectly in His image than in His vestiges, Bonaventure prefers to use the analogy of the mirror when speaking of our knowledge of God from His similitude in a spiritual creature, particularly in the rational soul. When the human mind sees the divine perfections reflected in the rational soul as in a mirror (speculum), the mind is then said to speculate (speculari) rather than to investigate. Using this analogy more extensively, Bonaventure, referring to the speculation (speculatio) of philosophy, likens its threefold science to a triple mirror directing the human mind to God, so that, through the contemplation of wisdom, the mind beholds God as the threefold cause but one principle of all things.81

78 Brevil., 2.11 "... sui operis." (5.229; ed. min., nn. 1-2, 5.53-54). Bonaventure adds here: "Et quia in Christo simul concurrit aeterna Sapientia et eius opus in una persona, ideo dicitur liber scriptus intus et foris ad reparationem mundi." 79 "luxta hoc quaeritur de istis duabus definitionibus praetactis, quoniam videntur sibi contrariari. Si enim fuga et exspectatio opponuntur, et timor est fuga ... non ergo est exspectatio ..." — 3 Sent., 34.2.dub. 1 (3.767; ed. min., 3.772). "Sed quia iuxta analogiam frequenter latet aequivocatio quaedam, secundum Philosophum, propter tollendam arabiguitatem Magister primo maluit dividere quam defmiri, quia in multiplicibus primo est dividendum et postea difiniendum. " — Loc. cit, Resp. (3.768; ed. min., 3.772-73). See in Aristotle, Physita, 7.4 (2.48b7-249a7). 80 2 Sent., 1.1.1.2, Resp. (2.22; ed. min., 2.15); Praelocutio "... tenuis compilator." (2.1; ed. min., 2.1), On the authenticity of this Praelocutio see: Prolegomena in ... "Summae fratris Alexandri" (Quaracchi, Florentinae: 1948). pp. 342-44. For a theological use by Bonaventure of vestige with regard to sciential knowledge see: De triplici via, Prol. (8.3; Decem ofiuscula, p. 3). 81 Itiner., 3.5-6 (5.305; ed. min., 5.198-99); Coll. in Hexaem., 2.21-26 (5.340; Delorme, pp. 26-28). Bonaventure uses the analogy both of the mirror and of the ladder with reference to the construction of theology with the aid of philosophy: Brevil., Prol., "Progressus autem ... capacitatis humanae." (5.201-02; ed. min., n. 3, 5-4); "Et hoc ...", (5.205; ed. min., 3.2-3, 5.9-10). On the analogical character of philosophy in Bonaventure's doctrine see: M.R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 59-62.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

483

The Creator and the creature are united, according to Aquinas, not in a community of univocation, but in a community of analogy. In his view, there are two communities of analogy. The first results from the participation by two things, one of which is prior to the other, in something which is one, as a substance and an accident come together in one being. The second community of analogy conies about because the one thing has both being and the reason of its being from the other, and such is the analogy by which a creature is compared to the Creator. A creature has being only because of the first being, and so a creature is named a being only inasmuch as it imitates the first being. Likewise, Aquinas says, a creature is called wise or good only according as it imitates the wisdom or goodness of the Creator, from whom a creature has goodness and wisdom. Thus, by way of this analogy, a creature is assimilated to the Creator not only because the creature has its being and perfections from the Creator, but also because the creature imitates its idea in the mind of God, as an artifact imitates its form in the mind of an artisan.82 In the judgment of Aquinas, therefore, we cannot predicate anything univocally of God and a creature. Giving his reason for this, Aquinas says that, because the nature of a creature is other than its being, a community of univocation must be founded on the nature of creatures and not on their being, which is not the same in any two creatures: the nature of man is univocal to all men, but is not found according to the same being in any two men. Whenever the nature or form signified by a name is being itself, that form cannot be said univocally of any other, so that whatever is said of God and creatures cannot be said univocally, because the form or nature of God is being itself, for the being of God is His nature. Whatever is said of God and creatures, however, is not predicated of the two by a pure equivocation, for those things that are purely equivocal come together through chance, so that the one is not known from the other. Since God is known to us from creatures, we cannot say anything of God and creatures that is entirely equivocal. Consequently, what we say of God and creatures, we say analogically, and thus we predicate of both God and creatures such things as knowledge and love. In predicating those things of God and creatures, however, we do not say that the Creator and a creature come together as prior and posterior participants in one knowledge and in one love, because this sort of analogy cannot be established between the Creator and a creature. We say, rather, that they come together according as the creature can imitate the Creator, who cannot be imitated perfectly, and this is the analogy that we can establish between the creature and the Creator. We say, therefore, that the creature is similar to God rather than that God is similar to the creature.83 The first community of analogy, as described by

82 1 Sent., Pro!., a. 2, ad 2 (1.10); DPD, 3.4, ad 9 (2.48). 83 1 Sent., 35.un.4, Sol. (1.819-20); cf. ad 6 (1.821).

484

CHAPTER SIX

Aquinas, gives rise to a likeness or similitude of proportion. This similitude is found between two things in the same genus, or sharing in the same form, to which they each have a proper proportion. Since God and a creature do not come together in a genus, nor share in a common form, they cannot have a proper proportion to the same form; so there cannot be a similitude or likeness of proportion between God and a creature. In other words, for Aquinas, the analogy of proportion cannot be employed to compare creatures and the Creator. Because God is the first cause of creatures, however, their perfections are related to His perfections in such a way that, when the former are referred to the latter, the perfections of God are seen to be prior to the perfections of creatures. It is by way of reference, therefore, rather than by way of analogy, that the human intellect knows God to be the first cause of the posterior perfections of creatures. The second community of analogy, which is the analogy of proportionality, gives rise to a likeness or similitude of proportionality. This similitude is established between things of diverse genera, such- as the similitude between the proportion of eight to four and the proportion of six to three, or the likeness between the ruler of a city and the captain of a ship. Because there are in creatures proportions of this sort that are similar, though imperfectly, to proportions in God, similitudes of proportionality can be established between a creature and the Creator. It is in this way, for instance, that the human intellect and its knowledge are said to be similar to the divine intellect and its knowledge. Although the similarity between the two proportions is imperfect, for the one is finite and the other is infinite, even so, because the human intellect is related to the divine intellect as an effect to its cause, the one can be proportioned to the other, so that the human intellect can know God by comparing His perfections with the proportionate perfections of creatures.84 Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in many ways regarding our analogical modes of knowledge and predication. For both men, an analogical predication is partly univocal and partly equivocal, for the things that we compare by way of analogy are said to be similar in one respect and dissimilar in another. Both theologians maintain, moreover, that whatever we say at once of God and creatures must be said analogically. As a result, Aquinas and Bonaventure are of one mind in rejecting even the possibility of predicating at once of God and creatures anything univocal, or anything equivocal. God and creatures can be brought together only in a community of analogy. But Aquinas limits the union of God and creatures to the analogy of proportionality, whereas Bonaventure extends their union to the analogy of proportion. As a consequence, for Aquinas, a creature is said to have only a proportional similarity to God, whose perfections the creature

84 1 Sent., 34.3.1, ad 2 (1.798); OF, 2.3, ad 4 (1.33), and 2.11, ad 2 (1.51); ST, la, 12.2, ad 4 (1.61b). See also: DPD, 7.7 (2.202-05).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

485

imitates, and so it is assimilated to God; but God is not assimilated to the creature, so that He is not said to be similar to the creature. Rather, the creature is said to be similar to God inasmuch as the perfections of a creature are proportioned to the perfections of the Creator. Although Bonaventure speaks in much the same way of the similarities that we establish by the analogy of proportionality between creatures and the Creator, even so, he also speaks of the Creator as similar to the creature, and of the creature as similar to the Creator, and thus by the analogy of proportion the one can be compared to the other as an effect is compared to its cause. The comparison is made, however, with reference to what is prior in the Creator and posterior in the creature, so that the Creator and the creature are united as cause and effect in a community of analogy. Though a proportion is established in this way between the creature and the Creator with reference to what is common to them, nevertheless, they are not said to participate in that which is common, because there is nothing univocal to them, nor are they said to be related to it in entirely different ways, since there is nothing that is entirely equivocal with respect to the creature and the Creator. Consequently, the proportion established between them is analogical, and it is by means of this analogical proportion that Bonaventure attributes to the human intellect the capacity to know God as the cause of the creature not only with respect to its being, but also with respect to its unity, truth and goodness. Aquinas takes a different approach to the Creator from the creature in the order of causality. He attributes to the human intellect an ability to know God as the cause of the creature by referring its perfections to the Creator as to their first cause. This way of reference, in the view of Aquinas, does not include a proportioning of the creature to the Creator, because no proportion can be established between them. A proportion can be established between two things sharing in the same form, and an analogy of proportion can be established between two things sharing in a common perfection according to priority and posteriority. But the creature and the Creator do not share in one and the same form, nor do they share in a common perfection according to a priority and posteriority; therefore, no proper proportion can be established between them, and so the analogy of proportion cannot be used to compare the one to the other. God is known as the first cause from His effects by way of reference and not by way of analogy. When God has become known in this way, however, the human intellect can be proportioned to the divine intellect, because the one depends on the other as an effect on its cause. But this proportion is established between the proper relations of the two intellects to their respective modes of knowledge. Concurring with Bonaventure on that point, Aquinas attributes to the human intellect an ability to know the divine perfections from the proportionate perfections of creatures, because every creature has its perfections through a dependence on the Creator.

486

CHAPTER SIX

Hence, as a vestige of the Creator, every creature manifests the perfections of the Creator.85 We name things, Aquinas says, according as we know and understand them. Since we know God from creatures, we name Him from them according as He is their principle. Thus, we name God either by removing imperfections from creatures or by attributing their perfections to Him in a more excellent way. We do not understand what God is in Himself, however, for God alone can comprehend what He is. When we name Him from creatures, therefore, we name Him in an imperfect manner. A perfect name expresses in a definition the essence of the thing signified by the name; but we cannot express the essence of God in a definition, and so we have no perfect name for God86 The names that we give God either in a negative manner, such as infinite, or as signifying a relation to creatures, such as first cause, do not designate His substance in any way. Those names indicate the removal from God of either the imperfections of creatures or their relations to Him. But the names that we give God in an absolute and affirmative manner, such as power and wise, signify His substance, even though they name it imperfectly. They signify God according as we know Him from creatures, and we know God from them inasmuch they resemble Him. Every creature resembles God in proportion to its perfection; nonetheless, because a creature is far inferior to God, it resembles Him as its excelling principle, and yet the creature, as an effect of God, is in some way similar to God. Thus, when we say 'God is good', we are saying that what we call goodness in creatures pre-exists in God in a higher way than in creatures, because every perfection found in creatures pre-exists in God, who is, so to speak, simply and universally perfect. We do not say, then, that God is good because He is the cause of goodness in creatures. On the contrary, we say that, because God is good, He causes goodness in creatures, as Augustine says: "Inasmuch He is good, we are". Names of this sort, i.e. good and life, are said of creatures becauses they participate in the properties so signified. When those names are said of God, however, they are said of Him as of the first cause of the properties that they signify. Hence, said essentially of God, they signify the divine substance.87 85 See in Aquinas: 1 Sent, 3.2.3 (1.103-05). The difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the analogy of proportion regarding God and creatures is due fundamentally to different conceptions of the creature as a being and its relation to the first being. Aquinas distinguishes the essence of the creature from its being, thus preventing any proportion between the creature and the Creator in being, because the essence of God is His being. Bonaventure distinguishes the being of the creature from its substantial form, but not from its specific form or essence: this permits him to establish an analogical proportion between the creature and the Creator, because the being of the Creator is entirely the same as His essence, whereas the being of the creature is partly the same as its essence and partly other than its essence, which also has an intrinsic principle of existence; thus, the essence of a creature is at once both similar and dissimilar to the essence of the Creator. 86 ST, la, 13.1, Resp. (i:75b-76a); 1 Sent., 22.1.1, Sol. (1.532). 87 ST, la, 13.2, Resp. (1.77ab); cf. St Augustine, De doct. ckris., 1.32.35 (PL 34.32). See also: DPD, 7.5, sc 3, Resp. (2.197-99).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

487

In the view of Aquinas, therefore, we know from the perfections caused by God in creatures that He is perfect in a more eminent way than creatures. Although we name the divine perfections according as they are known to us from their similar perfections in creatures, nevertheless, the names that we impose on God designate His perfections absolutely. Now there are two elements to be considered in the names that we impose on creatures, and then transfer to God. The first element is that which the names signify. The name knowledge, for instance, signifies a perfection without specifying whether it pertains to a sensitive nature or to an intellective nature, and thus knowledge signifies a perfection absolutely. When this name is imposed on God, it is attributed to Him not only by way of priority, but also in a way that is proper to Him and not to creatures. The second element to be considered in names is their mode of signification. Every name that we impose on created perfections designates them as participated perfections, because they are received from God and, as such, they are similitudes or representations of His perfections. The names of perfections that we impose on God from creatures both properly and through priority do not attribute those perfections to Him as they are in creatures, but as they are absolutely in God, who is the exemplar cause of every created perfection. Any name signifying a perfection of a material creature, however, inasmuch as it is material, cannot be transferred properly to God, because such a name includes an imperfection in its proper signification. Names of this sort, therefore, are said of God only in a metaphorical manner. It is in this manner, according to Aquinas, that we call God a rock, or a /zoH.88 All the names that we give God signify essentially one and the same divine substance; nevertheless, in the judgment of Aquinas, we must name God in several ways both because of our modes of knowing Him and because of the things signified by the names. We know God as He is in Himself, and as He is related to creatures. The first mode of knowing God enables us to name Him in as many ways as there are imperfections that we can remove from creatures. In this respect, we can impose names on God that negate the conditions of creatures, considered universally, and so we can speak of God as uncreated, immense and eternal. Because of the second mode of knowing God, we are able to impose as many names on God as the relations that He has to creatures. These relations, properly considered, are not really in God, but in creatures; so, knowing how they are related to God as effects to their cause, we can say of God that He is Creator and Lord, the first being and the first truth. The names imposed by us on God from our modes of knowing Him depend on our conceptions of the similarities between the perfections of creatures and the prior or pre-existing perfections of God Those names, therefore, are imposed on God from the proportional similitudes of His perfections in creatures. With regard to the things

88 1 Sent., 22.1.2, Sol. (1.534-36); ST, la, 13.3, Resp. ad 1 & 3 (1.78b-79a), SCO, 1.30-31 (2.42-44).

488

CHAPTER SIX

signified by the divine names, there are no real distinctions in God. His wisdom and goodness, for example, are really identical. But the ground of wisdom is not the same as the ground of goodness, so that we can distinguish the one from the other according to reason. As a consequence, in saying 'God is wise', we do not say quite the same thing in saying 'God is good'. Since the divine persons are really distinct from one another, however, there are real differences in the names that we predicate properly of one person with respect to another.89 Now, according to Aquinas, a univocal name signifies something common to two or more things that are equal to one another, just as man signifies a nature which is common to Peter and Paul, who are equal as men, though they are diverse in being. But the being of God is His nature, so that diverse in every respect from creatures, the divine nature cannot be designated univocally by any name signifying either the nature or the perfection of a creature, no matter how much it imitates the Creator. When we say 'Paul is wise' and 'God is wise', the term wise does not signify the same thing in both predications. The term, in the first predication, signifies a perfection which is distinct from the nature of the subject, whereas in the second predication, the term signifies a perfection which is identical with the nature of the subject. The term wise, therefore, is not predicated univocally of Paul and God, as it is of Paul and Peter, and so we do not attribute wisdom to God in the same way that we attribute it to creatures. Neither do we attribute wisdom to God and creatures in a purely equivocal way. An equivocal name signifies only a unity in name between two or more things that do not come together either in the same nature or in a common perfection, for example, as the name dog is said of the animal and of its likeness in a picture. But the perfections of creatures are really similar to the perfections of the Creator, so that the name wisdom cannot be predicated of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way. Such names must be said of God and creatures, therefore, in a proportional or analogical way. They are not said of God and creatures, however, according to the analogy of proportion. The Creator and a creature are not so related to each other, even through priority and posteriority, that they can be united in some third thing, as a substance and an accident are united in a being; nor can they be proportioned to each other as urine and health are proportioned to an animal, for urine is a sign of health in the animal. Those analogies are founded on a determinate relation between things to which some third thing is said to be common; but no creature is related to the Creator in such a determinate way that they can be said to participate in one and the same perfection. The names said of God and creatures, therefore, are predicated of both according to the analogy of propor-

89 1 Seat., 22.1.3, Sol. (1.537-38); ST, la, 13.4, Resp. (1.79b). Cf. DPD, 7.6 (2.200-02); SCG, 1.35 (2.46); CT, 1.25 (p. 20).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

489

tionality, which does not involve any determinate relation of a creature to the Creator with respect to the perfection signified by the same name given to both. This analogy rests upon an order of the creature to the Creator as of effect to cause: just as health is caused by the medicine ordered to the production of that effect, so is the creature ordered to the Creator as to its principle and cause, in whom all the perfections of creatures pre-exist, as health pre-exists, so to speak, in the medicine producing it in an animal. Thus, the names that we impose on God and creatures according to the analogy of proportionality are neither univocal nor purely equivocal, but partly equivocal and partly univocal. Those names signify diverse proportions in God and creatures with respect to one perfection, which is attributed to God both properly and more excellently than to creatures, for they receive it from God.90 Aquinas maintains that, if we were to impose on God solely by way of causality the names that we ought to give him properly and by way of analogy, the properties signified by those names would not then be designated as they are in God. If we were to call God good, for instance, because He is the cause of goodness in creatures, the name good would then include in its signification the goodness of creatures. To attribute this name properly to God, we must attribute it to Him prior to creatures, and so we must not only call God good because He is the cause of created goodness, but also and principally because He is essentially good, since He is goodness itself. The names that we give God metaphorically, on the other hand, are said first of creatures and, thereafter, they are said of God to signify their similitudes in Him. When we say 'God is a lion', for example, we signify by the name lion only that God has in His works a strength similar to that found in a lion, which has God for its cause.91 Aquinas has a number of points in common with Bonaventure regarding the ways of naming God. Both theologians maintain that God can be comprehended only by Himself, so that He cannot be named perfectly by us, who must approach God from His creatures. Aquinas and Bonaventure, moreover, concur in teaching that all the names imposed by us on God signify essentially the one substance of God; those names are plural in number both because of our several ways of knowing God and because of

90 DV, 2.11, Resp., ad 8 (1.50-52); ST, la, 13.5, Resp. (1.80b-81a). Cf. SCO, 1.32-34 (2.44-46); DPD, 7.7 (2.202-05); CT, 1.27 (p. 21). 91 ST, la, 13.6, Resp. (1.82ab). In the view of Aquinas, it is easier for us to teach truths concerning God by the use of similitudes taken from corporeal creatures than from spiritual creatures, because corporeal creatures are known to us immediately through the senses, which is our natural mode of knowing; moreover, there is much more to be gained in taking similitudes of God from less noble things than from those that are more noble, because the truths of God are so exalted that the more we have to remove from creatures to know God, so much the less will we err in getting to know Him, though we ought never to take our similitudes of Him form creatures having deformities: 1 Sent., 34.3.1-2 (1.796-80); cf. 22.1.3, ad 3 (1.539).

490

CHAPTER SIX

the different grounds of the perfections that we attribute to Him from creatures. The two theologians come together also in denying the possibility of predicating either univocal or purely equivocal names of God and creatures. But Aquinas differs considerably from Bonaventure on the use of analogy in attributing names to God from creatures. For Bonaventure, as we have seen, the analogy of proportion is used to name God from creatures by way of causality. In naming God that way, we do not transfer names to Him from creatures; rather, we name those perfections in God, such as immensity and eternity, that have no proper similitudes in creatures, and so we name such perfections from their opposites in creatures. For Aquinas, on the other hand, the analogy of proportion cannot be used to name any of the divine perfections. This analogy, in his view, rests upon a determinate relation between two things with respect to something common to both; but there are no relations of that sort between a creature and the Creator, for they are related simply as effect to cause. Thus, in naming God from His effects, we simply remove their relations to Him, knowing God to be the first principle, we name Him as the first in this or in that order of causality, such as the first being and the first truth. Names of this kind, however, according to Aquinas, do not designate the divine substance in a proper way, but as the principle or cause of a given perfection. Aquinas, therefore, unlike Bonaventure, does not hold that we can name the divine substance in a proper manner by way of causality. In the judgment of Aquinas, furthermore, the names that we impose on God by removing the imperfections of creatures do not properly signify His substance. When we say that God is immense or eternal, we are really saying what He is-not rather than what He is. For Bonaventure, however, the names immensity and eternity, though they signify something in opposition to creatures, designate proper perfections known to be in God by way of the analogy of proportion. These differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the naming of God by the way of causality introduce still further differences between them on the naming of His perfections by the use of the analogy of proportionality. The use of this analogy, in the view of Aquinas, depends on the knowledge that we have of God as the cause of creatures. Completing this knowledge, the knowledge that we have of God through the analogy of proportionality enables us to name His substance properly from the similitudes of His perfections in creatures. In naming God that way, we not only attribute the names of those perfections first and foremost to God, but we also attribute them to Him in such a way that the perfections signified by the names are said to be in God more excellently than in creatures. No name signifying a perfection of a material creature, inasmuch as it is material, can be transferred in this manner to God, who has only similitudes of the perfections belonging properly to material creatures. Consequently, names signifying those perfections are transferred to God only in a metaphorical or symbolical manner. For Bonaventure, on the other hand, names of this sort, though they signify in God similitudes of

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

491

perfections belonging properly to creatures, are transferred to God in a proper manner, and so the perfections that they signify are said to be in God more excellently than they are in creatures. The other names that we impose on God by the analogy of proportionality are also transferred to Him in a proper manner. These names are transferred to God after the removal of the imperfections that they designate in creatures; as a result, the properties signified by the names are said to be first and chiefly in God, while the proportionate properties in creatures are said to be similitudes of those properties in God There are obviously very wide differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the ways in which we give God names from creatures. Bonaventure says that immensity names a positive perfection known to be in God from the limitation of the creature; the perfection is attributed to God both by way of causality and by way of the analogy of proportion. For Aquinas, immensity does not name a positive perfection of God, nor is it said of Him by way of analogy; rather, it is said of God by removing the relation that the creature has as a limited being to the Creator, who is known thereby to be an unlimited being. Aquinas says that wisdom is attributed to God by affirming it of Him from its similitude in the creature and in a more excellent way than it is in the creature; the affirmation is made by way of the analogy of proportionality. Although Bonaventure also attributes wisdom to God from its similitude in the creature and by way of proportionality, nevertheless, he says that we attribute the perfection to God by removing the dissimilarity from the proportionate perfection in the creature. Finally, for Bonaventure, God is called strong and stable in a proper manner by affirming those perfections of Him in a more excellent way than they are in creatures; this affirmation is also made by way of the analogy of proportionality. Aquinas attributes the same qualities to God only in a metaphorical way, because they belong properly to material creatures. In short, to Aquinas, we name God properly only by affirming of Him more excellently and by means of the analogy of proportionality those properties found universally in creatures according as they imitate the perfections of their Creator. To Bonaventure, however, we name God properly not only in the way of which Aquinas speaks, but also from any condition of the creature, whether through opposition by way of causality and the analogy of proportion, or by attributing to Him more excellently and by the analogy of proportionality the proper perfections of creatures, as creatures.92

92 Aquinas joins Bonaventure in using the term mirror to describe our knowing and naming God in an analogical manner. For instance: "Diversitatis ergo vel multiplicitatis nominum causa est ex parte intellectus nostri, qui non potest pertingere ad illam Dei essentiam videndam secundum quod est, sed videt earn per multas similitudines eius deficientes, in creaturis quasi in speculo resultantes." —DPD, 7.7, in Resp. (2.202).

492

CHAPTER SIX

Analogy and Certitude

We have shown that the human intellect, in Bonaventure's view, acquires complete certitude of its objects when it judges them in accordance with their eternal reasons in God Now, according to Bonaventure, every knower is similar to its object, so that the knower either has a similitude of the object or is itself a similitude of the object. Since God knows all the things that He creates, He has in Himself the similitudes through which He knows those things, and in which they are known by the human intellect when it knows them in accordance with their eternal reasons. Those similitudes or reasons are called by Augustine the primordial causes or the ideas of created things.93 Thus, a divine idea is a similitude by which God is said to be similar to the thing that He both knows and produces; so His idea of the thing is its eternal reason or exemplar form. Because the thing is produced or caused by God according to His idea of it, the thing itself is similar to its idea in God. Consequently, the thing is said to be a similitude of God, since it is an imitation of God. But God is infinite and the thing is finite: therefore, the thing in itself is far more dissimilar than similar to God; nonetheless, when the thing expresses its truth in a similitude received by the human intellect, the thing is then more similar to God, whose idea is not only the principle of His knowledge of the thing, but also the very truth of the thing, for it is the cause of the thing, which comes to-be as God knows and expresses it. God's idea of the thing expresses its truth far more perfectly than the thing itself, which can express its truth only through its idea in God. Since God's knowledge and expression of the thing is most perfect, the thing itself is assimilated perfectly to His idea of it. To know the truth of the thing perfectly, therefore, the human intellect must know the assimilation of the thing to its idea in God.94 The human intellect knows the truth of its object by means of the species or similitude that it receives from the object, and which is expressed by the object itself. This similitude represents the assimilation of the object to its idea in God; so the similitude directs the intellect to the divine idea of its object. When the intellect turns toward God, it sees the truth of its object in God as in an eternal mirror reflecting the ideas of all created things. Hence, as Augustine indicates, the human mind knows its objects more rightly in the eternal mirror of God than in themselves, because it knows them in their divine ideas.95 These ideas are the means by which God 93 1 Sent., 35.un.l, Resp. "Sed haec ... causas primordiales." (1.601; ed. min., 1.479); cf. Loc. cit., fa. 1 & 4 (a & d); DSC, q. 2, fm. 8 (5.8). See in St. Augustine, De diver, quaes., 46.2 (PL 40.30-31). 94 1 Sent., 35.un.l, Resp. "Ad intelligentiam ...", ad 2-3 (1.601-02; ed. min., 1.479-80); cf. 39.1.1, ad 25 (1.686; ed. min., 1.545-46). 95 Loc. cit, fm. 3 (1.600; ed. min., fm. c, 1.478); cf. St. Augustine, De civil Dei, 11.29 (PL 41.343). See also: DSC, q. 2, fm. 9, Resp. "... earum similitudines." (5.8).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

493

knows and causes created things. Explaining this point, Bonaventure again distinguishes the similitude between two things participating in a third from the similitude between two things resembling each other. He differentiates the second similitude into two sorts. The first sort is found in a thing imitating another, and thus the creature is said to be a similitude of the Creator. The second sort consists in the exemplar of a thing, so that the idea in the Creator is said to be a similitude of the creature. Both sorts of similitude are necessary for knowledge, because it is by them that the truth of a thing is expressed. Now, according to Bonaventure, knowledge caused by a thing is not the same as knowledge causing a thing to-be. Knowledge caused by a thing requires a similitude imitating the thing, a similitude originating exteriorly to the knower, such as the similitude by which the human intellect knows a corporeal thing. Knowledge causing a thing to-be requires a similitude which is an exemplar of the thing, and which does not originate exteriorly to the knower, such as the similitude or idea of an artifact in the mind of an artisan. Because the divine intellect is the supreme light, the full truth and pure act, Bonaventure says, the divine light and the divine truth are able by themselves to express all things, just as the divine power by itself can produce all things. Since the expression of truth is an intrinsic act, and since God is eternal, the divine intellect expresses the truth of all things by an eternal act. But the expression of truth consists in an assimilation of an intellect to its object; therefore, the divine intellect is assimilated eternally to all things. Consequently, expressing their truth in eternal reasons, the divine intellect has eternally the exemplar similitudes or ideas of all creatures, and those ideas are essentially the same as God himself. Because God expresses the truth of creatures according as He is the supreme light and pure act, He expresses their truth most luminously, most clearly and most perfectly. God expresses the truth of creatures in those ways, Bonaventure maintains, according to the intentions of His ideas of them, and so He knows the truth of every creature most perfectly, most distinctly and most integrally. Since human knowledge of a creature depends on the similitude received extrinsically from the thing itself, a man knows the thing only in an imperfect or incomplete manner. To complete his knowledge of the thing, a man must know the creature according to the truth of its intrinsic or exemplar similitude in the mind of the Creator, whose idea of the creature is the perfect reason or ground of its truth.96 It is quite evident that, for Bonaventure, the full certitude of human knowledge requires an analogical approach by the human mind to the Creator from His creatures. This approach follows the way of causality, for the creature, as an effect imitating its cause, directs the human mind to the Creator, who contains the perfect truth of the creature in His idea, which is its causal reason or exemplar similitude. Thus, the complete certitude of 96 DSC, q. 2, Resp. "Ad intelligentiam ..." (5.8-9); cf. ad 2-5 (5.9), ad 9 & 12-13 (5.10).

494

CHAPTER SIX

truth acquired by a philosophical science requires a knowledge of its objects in their divine ideas. Each of the philosophical sciences analyzes its objects until it arrives at a knowledge of their first cause. Since the first cause is known by way of the analogy of proportion, the consequent judgments by a science of its objects in their divine ideas rest upon that mode of analogy. To know the whole truth of its objects, however, a science must know the proper perfections of its objects according as they imitate their exemplar perfections in God. This knowledge is acquired by way of the analogy of proportionality; so, to obtain full certitude of its objects, a science must know their ideal perfections in God and, by a comparison of proportionality, must judge the proper perfections of its objects according to the truth expressed by their ideal perfections. Perfect certitude of human knowledge is attained through wisdom, which judges the truth of all created things according to the unity of their divine causality. In judging their truth that way, wisdom arrives at the knowledge of the unity of the divine ideas of created things. It is the wise man, therefore, who knows that the divine ideas are really one, for they consist in the divine exemplar, which is a simple similitude of every creature.97 Bonaventure's doctrine on the real unity of the divine ideas is influenced by Augustine, who teaches that all things are one in the eternal reason of God.98 But Augustine also teaches that the divine ideas are eternal and unchangeable forms; so it would seem that, for Augustine, the divine ideas are not really one. Furthermore, an idea is a similitude expressing the whole truth of some thing: if God has only one idea of all things, they would be indifferent to it; therefore, each and every thing must have a proper idea in God.99 In Bonaventure's judgment, however, Augustine uses the term form to designate an exemplar principle and not a principle of being or perfection. The term form, in the latter instance, is said with respect to matter, which it informs; but it is said, in the first instance, with respect to an artifact of which it is the similitude. Since an exemplar form is related to something else, Bonaventure says, Augustine speaks of several forms in God, not because there is a plurality of ideas in Him, but because the divine exemplar is related to many things. This is a difficult point to understand, Bonaventure observes, for there is nothing similar enough to it that can be used to illustrate it. The divine exemplar is at once the truth, the similitude and the idea in God of every creature. Since God is pure act and truth itself,

97 1 Sent., 35.un.2, con. 3 (1.605; ed. min., con. c, 1.481). 98 "Et ideo ... ideae sunt unura secundurn rem. Et hoc patet sic: idea in Deo dicit similitudinem, quae est ratio cognoscendi: ilia autem secundum rem est ipsa divina veritas ... et quia ilia est una. patet, quod secundum rem omnes ideae unum sunt. Et hoc dicit Augustinus expresse, quod in ilia arte omnia sunt unum."—Loc. cit., Resp. (1.605-06; ed. min., 1.481-82). "Augustinus, VI De Trinitate (10.11; PL 42.93132): 'Filius est ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium, et omnia in ipso unum sunt'." — Loc. cit., con. 1 (a). See also: DSC, q. 3, sc 3 (5.12). 99 Loc. cit., arg. 1 (1.605; ed. min., 1.481); cf. St. Augustine, De diver, quaes., 46.2 (PL 40.30).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

495

everything else is in potency with respect to the power of God. Just as one thing according to its form can be assimilated to several things diverse according to matter, so also the one real idea in God can be assimilated to everything known to Him. A single light, for example, can express many and various species of colour, in like manner, though far more perfectly, the one idea in God expresses the truth of the many and various sorts of creatures in His power. Because the human mode of knowledge depends extrinsically on its objects, Bonaventure remarks, it is much more dissimilar than similar to the divine mode of knowledge. For that reason, it is difficult for us, considering our way of knowing, to understand how the divine intellect can be assimilated all at once to many things in one idea.100 The one idea in which God knows all things is really the essence of God himself. By knowing His essence, God knows Himself as the similitude of other things, for He knows Himself as the truth and the supreme light expressing them. There is only one divine truth, Bonaventure insists, both really and according to reason, even though the things expressed by it are plural in number. Although the divine expression of those things is really the divine truth, even so, considered with respect to them, their expression by God is taken as His relation to them rather than as the divine truth. Wherefore, the expression of one thing and of another thing in the divine truth, or by the divine truth, involves no plurality on God's part. There is a plurality on the part of the things that God expresses, however, for to create a man is not to create an angel. Since the ideal reasons of things in God designate the expressions of His truth with respect to creatures, those reasons are said to be plural in number, not according to what they signify in God, which is His essence, but according to what they connote outside God, which is the world of created things. Now there are no real relations in God to the things existing outside God, because He cannot be referred to anything extrinsic to Him. God is related to creatures, therefore, only according as we understand their real relations to Him as to their Creator. Consequently, the ideal reasons of creatures are not pluralized in God, but by us, and so there is a plurality of divine ideas solely according to reason. Nevertheless, Bonaventure adds, this plurality does not come entirely from the way of understanding the divine exemplarity; it comes also in part from the divine idea itself, which is expressed in as many ways as there are creatures imitating it. Bonaventure observes here, as in his previous text, that no perfect likeness of this divine perfection can be found in creation. He seeks to illustrate the point, nonetheless, with the following example: supposing that light were its own illumination and irradiation, we could say that there would be several illuminations of the same light and lumen, because an irradiation is a central or rectangular direction of the lumen emanating from the light, so that there would be in the one light and in the 100 Loc. at., ad 1-2 (1.606; ed. min, 1.482); cf. DSC, q. 3, sc 5 & 11 (5.12-13).

496

CHAPTER SIX

one lumen several irradiations of illuminated and diverse things. The relation of the one idea in God to several things can be understood in a somewhat similar manner: the divine truth is light, and the expressions of this truth with respect to creatures are, as it were, luminous irradiations, though intrinsic to God, and they direct the mind to see that which is expressed in the divine light.101 It is by means of analogical comparisons, then, according to Bonaventure, that the human mind obtains knowledge of the ideal reasons of creatures in their Creator. It is also by means of analogy that the mind attains a knowledge of the unity of the divine ideas,102 Although there are no real relations to creatures in God, nevertheless, using analogical comparisons, we designate His essence by several names signifying the different relations established by reason between God and creatures. When those relations are unified in God, they are then designated by the single term idea, a name signifying the divine essence as related to creatures. The one idea in God is a similitude of all that He knows of creatures. Though this similitude is an absolute likeness of them, it is also said to be a relation to them in God according as He understands them, and so His idea of creatures is said to be the relative medium by which He knows them. As the medium of divine knowledge, the idea of creatures is really one with respect to the divine intellect. From God's way of understanding this idea in relation to creatures, however, it is more properly called a similitude, so that the plurality of divine ideas has to do with the different similitudes of creatures as they are known to God in His essence, which is their one exemplar. Thus, the name idea signifies the reason or ground of God's knowledge of creatures, whereas the name similitude signifies the essence of God according as He knows that He can be imitated in multiple ways by creatures. We may speak, therefore, of a plurality of ideas and of several similitudes of creatures in God; but we can speak of only one exemplar of them in Him, for the exemplar of creatures is the one divine essence. The divine ideas or similitudes are multiplied, moreover, according as they connote different things outside God. Those things in themselves are from time, but they are connoted in God both temporally and eternally. They are connoted temporally with respect to their actual existence outside God, and they are connoted eternally with respect to God's habitual knowledge of them. Since the eternal connotation of creatures in God looks to their 101 DSC, q. 3, Resp. (5.13-H). Note Bonaventure's illustration: "Huius autem simile non perfecte reperitur in creatura; sed si intelligeretur per impossible, quod lux esset sua illuminatio et irradiatio, dicere possumus, quod eiusdem lucis et luminis essent plures irradiationes, propter hoc quod irradiatio dicit diametralem sive orthogonalem ipsius luminis directionem; propter quod diversorum illuminatorum plures dicerentur irradiationes, in una tamen luce et in uno lumine. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quia ipsa divina veritas est lux, et ipsius expressiones respectu rerum sunt quasi luminosae irradiationes, licet intrinsecae, quae determinate ducunt et dirigunt in id quod exprimitur. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius ..." Cf. De divin. nomin., 7.2 (PG 3.879-86). 102 Loc. cit., ad 4-7 (5.14-15); ad 14 (5.16).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

497

existence from time, they constitute a real multiplicity only from time. God is said to have many eternal reasons, therefore, because the multiplicity of creatures coming to-be from time are connoted habitually from eternity by His one idea of them. In short, when we speak of a plurality of eternal reasons in God, we are speaking about the multiplicity of created things existing in God as in their exemplar cause.l03 In Bonaventure's judgment, as his texts show, the divine ideas are said to be many in number from a comparison of creatures to their divine exemplar. On God's part, however, the ideas of creatures are really one, because they are identical with the divine truth. According to His way of knowing creatures, on the other hand, the divine idea is said to be their one similitude and, as such, it is the principle by which He knows them, or expresses their truth. God knows all things both universally and individually; expressing the whole truth of each and every creature, God has a similitude of each universal as a universal, and a similitude of every individual as an individual. He has a similitude of man, for example, and a similitude of every individual man. In other words, as Augustine teaches, the divine ideas are multiplied according to the similitudes in God both of universals and of individuals. I04 The things that God knows by His wisdom are without number, nor can they be numbered: "there is no number to the divine wisdom" (Ps., 146.5). The things known to God by His wisdom, then, are infinite in number. Thus, according to Augustine, the wisdom of God is one, containing an infinite treasure of all intelligible things.105 Knowing an infinite number of things, God has an infinite number of eternal reasons. Since He alone can comprehend the infinite, the human intellect cannot comprehend the infinity of the eternal reasons. When the human mind knows those reasons, it knows them only in a finite and imperfect manner, because it cannot grasp the immensity of the divine truth in which God expresses all the things that He knows, and that He can create by his perfect and unlimited power.106 103 1 Sent., 35.un.3, Resp., ad 2-5 (1.608; ed min., 1.484-85); cf. DSC, q. 3, ad 15-20 (5.16). 104 1 Sent., 35.un.4 (1.609-10; ed. min., 1.485-86); cf. St Augustine, Epist., 14.4 (PL 33.80). God also has ideas of both perfect and imperfect beings. His idea of an imperfect being, such as matter, is a perfect similitude of it, for there are no imperfections in God; but there are no ideas of evil things in God, who cannot be a cause of evil, which He knows as a privation of good. Cf. 1 Sent., 36.3.1-2 (1.626-29; ed. min., 1.498-501); see also: 2 Sent., 37.2.3, sc 1 (2.874; ed. min., sc a, 2.907). 105 "Dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in Psalmo: 'divinae sapientiae non est numerus', ac per hoc nee rationum, per quas divina sapientia cognoscit; et quoniam non habent i.umerum, non sunt numerabiles: ideo non sunt in numero finito, sed inifinito ..." — 1 Sent, 35.un.5, Resp. (1.612; ed. min., 1.487). • "Augustinus. De civitate Dei, XI (10.3; PL 41.327): 'Una est sapientia, in qua infiniti sunt thesauri omnium rerum intelligibilium'." —Loc. cit., fm. 1 (1.611; ed. min., fm. a, 1.487). See also: DSC, q. 1, fa. 1-2 (5-3); Resp. "... scire infinita." (5.4-5). 106 1 Sent., 35.un.5, ad 1-4 (1.612; ed. min., 1.487-88); cf. DSC, q. 1, Resp. "Ratio autem ..." (5.5), and ad 7-8 (5.6). Because the divine ideas are really one, there is neither priority and posteriority nor a greater and a lesser nobility among them with respect to God's knowledge of the different things present to Him as their cause; the order among creatures is known to God in His idea of them, because He is the cause of their order: 1 Sent., 35.un.6 (1.613; ed. min., 1.488-89); cf. DSC, q. 1, ad 6 (5.6).

498

CHAPTER SIX

Created things are said by Bonaventure to have being in the universe, in a cognitive substance, and in their cause. They have being in the universe according to their actual existence and, in this respect, they are known by the human mind through similitudes that are distinct from both the intellect receiving them and the things producing them. But the exemplar form through which God knows created things is truly God himself, or the divine essence; so they have being more truly in their divine exemplar than in their similitudes received by the human intellect. Created things have being in God, moreover, as in a cognitive substance and as in their cause. They are present to the divine intellect through their eternal reasons, for God knows created things before they come to-be in the universe. They are in God as in their causative power, because He has eternally the power to cause their being from time. Thus, in regard to knowledge, created things are in God actually according to their exemplar cause; in regard to power, they are in God potentially according to their productive cause. With regard to both knowledge and power, created things are>in God eternally and immutably, even though in the universe they have mutable being and from time. Since God knows created things through their eternal and immutable exemplar, which is also the medium by which He produces them, their being is more true in that exemplar than in the mutable and temporal similitudes produced by those things themselves, and through which they are known by the human intellect. Consequently, to know the truth of created things with complete certitude, the philosopher must know them in their eternal reasons, or their divine exemplar; therefore, he must know created things as they exist in their first cause, and this knowledge is obtained only by way of analogy.107 Bonaventure, speaking as a theologian, says that the divine essence is common absolutely to the three persons in God, but a divine property is relative to a person, as sonship is a property of the Son. There are also in God common attributes that, signifying God as the cause of creatures, are appropriated to one or to another of the persons. In this way, for example, unity is appropriated to the Father, truth to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. When created things are said to be in God as in their cause, then, properly speaking, they are said to be in God neither by reason of the divine essence nor by reason of the divine persons, but by reason of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons.108 The Trinity of persons in God can be known solely by Christian faith, because this divine mystery is

107 1 Sent, 36.1.1 (1.620-21; ed. min., 1.493-94); cf. 36.2.2 (1.625-26; ed. min., 1.497-98). The knowledge and power of God must concur in order that He be the exemplar of created things: "Ad illud quod dicitur: ratione cuius res dicuntur in Deo vita etc., dicendum quod ratione potentiae et notitiae simul, quia ista duo concurrunt ad rationem exemplaris; non enim est exemplar Deus nisi eorum quae cognoscit et potest." — 1 Sent, 36.2.1, ad 2 (1.624; ed. min., 1.496); cf. Resp. "Et propterea ..." (1.623-24; ed. min., 1.496). 108 1 Sent, 36.1.2 (1.621-22; ed. min., 1.494-95).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

499

entirely beyond human reason, so that it cannot be known through creatures, even by analogical knowledge. There is nothing similar in creatures to the Trinity of God, nor can human reason, moving to God from creatures, come to know that there is a plurality of persons in the unity of the divine essence. The analogical similarities that we establish between creatures and the Trinity depend entirely on our belief in a plurality of persons in God. Consequently, Bonaventure maintains that no philosopher by his reason alone could have known the mystery of the Trinity. The philosophers have known the triune appropriations, however, for they have understood from creatures that the divinity is one, true and good. This is evident, according to Bonaventure, from the threefold division of natural, rational and moral philosophy made by the philosophers. Although there have been wise men among the philosophers, those men have not known that God is a Trinity of persons. The wise philosopher has known, at most, the essential unity of the triune appropriations in God. This aspect of the divinity can be known from the vestige of God in creatures, whether corporeal or spiritual. Thus, from the nature of the rational soul, the philosophers have been able to know that in God there is an essential unity of memory, intelligence and will; but they could never know that the rational soul is an image of the Trinity of persons in God, because that knowledge requires an illumination of Christian faith. The philosophers have understood, moreover, that the divine substance is a mind knowing and loving itself; however, lacking Christian faith, they have known only the essential attributes of the divinity, and so they have not understood that the soul, as a mind knowing and loving itself, is a proper image of the persons in God. In short, not knowing the Trinity, the philosophers have had only an imperfect knowledge of the rational soul as an image of God.109 When a philosopher, seeking complete certitude of truth, arrives at the existence of creatures in God as in their first cause, he cannot go beyond the essential attributes of God. But the theologian, believing in the Trinity can appropriate the essential attributes to this or to that divine person. As a consequence, considering the existence of creatures in their divine causality, the theologian knows their truth in a nobler way than the philosopher. Thus, proceeding analogically, the philosopher can judge the truth of creatures according to their eternal reasons or ideas, which the wise philosopher understands to be one in the divine essence as the exemplar cause of creatures. The theologian, also proceeding analogically, appropriates the divine exemplarity of creatures to the Son and Word of God; so he understands that the Father, speaking all things by His Word, disposes them in the Son. For this reason, the Son and Word of God is said,

109 1 Seat, 3.1.un.4 (i.75-77; ed min., 1.54-55); 3.2.2.3 (1.92-93; ed. min., 1.69-70). Cf. DMT, 1.1, ad 9 (5.51).

500

CHAPTER SIX

by the theologian, to be the Exemplar containing the ideas or eternal reasons of created things. From the theological viewpoint, then, creatures are seen to exist in the Word of God, so that the cause of their truth and wisdom is appropriated to the Word, which is, therefore, the principle and similitude of all created things. 110 Whenever Bonaventure speaks either of the eternal Word or of Christ as the principle and source of human knowledge and truth, and as the cause of their infallible certitude, he is speaking strictly as a theologian, thus appropriating to the Son of God what the philosopher can attribute only to the divine essence.111 This is not to say that the philosopher is unable to acquire complete certitude of truth either through science or through wisdom. It is to say, rather, that the theologian, by appropriating the origin and cause of human understanding to the eternal Word, or to Christ, as to the Exemplar of creatures, attains a nobler degree of certitude than that attained by the philosopher concerning the truth of creatures. Though the philosopher, using human reason alone, does not know the divine Word, even so, by his science and wisdom, the philosopher can obtain an infallible certitude of the truth of creatures.112 What we have seen concerning analogy and certitude, thus far, has to do with the similitudes required for knowledge. Now light is also required for knowledge: corporeal light is needed for sense knowledge; spiritual light is needed for intellectual knowledge. In Bonaventure's view, the term light signifies properly a spiritual nature, even though, according to common usage, the term designates a corporeal nature. When speaking of light, we refer usually to corporeal light; nevertheless, because our knowledge begins with the senses, we arrive at an understanding of spiritual light through corporeal light. 113 Since light designates chiefly a spiritual nature, only a 110 1 Sent., 6.un.3 (1.129-30; ed. min., 1.99-101); cf. 4 Sent., 43.2.2, Resp. (4.898; ed. min., 4.888). The term Ward, unlike truth and wisdom, belongs properly to the Son of God, even though we understand its significance only by analogical comparisons with the word or concept of the human mind: 1 Sent., 27.2.un.l-4, dub.1-2 (1.481-91; ed. min., 1.380-91). For a detailed account of the analogical meanings of the many terms applied to God from creatures by Bonaventure see; Brevii, 1.8 (5.216-18; ed. min., 5.3032). 111 See above: pp. 443-44 (n. 3). 112 This fact will be shown in our next chapter. On Bonaventure's doctrine of the ideas and exemplar principles of creatures in God see: J.M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 3-99. For analyses of his doctrine of the Word as the Exemplar of creatures consult: Op. cit, pp. 101-51; F. Schwendiger, "Die Erkenntnis in den ewigen Ideen nach der Lehre des hi. Bonaventura", FKS, 16 (1929), pp. 193-202; M. R Dady, Theory of Knowledge ..., pp. 31-42; L. Veuthey, Si Bonau. philos. chris., pp. 116-18, Bonaventure's appropriation of truth and wisdom to Christ as the Son and Word of God has given rise to what is called the Christocentric aspects of his doctrine; on this question see: L. Veuthey, op. cit., pp. 118-20; E. Belton^ S. Bonaventura, pp. 123-31, ET, pp. 94-101, and IIproblema delta cognoscibiliU di Die ..., pp. 155-57; Giulio Bonafede, // "De Scientia Christ" ..., pp. 84-96, 106-20, or in Saggi sullafilosofia medioevale, pp. 197206, 213-33; L. A. Cruz, EX, 1 (1951), pp. 257-61. 113 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod lux principalius convenit naturae spirituali, dicendum est quod verum est quantum ad proprietatem vocabuli, non est tamen verum quantum ad usum communem.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

501

spiritual substance can be purely light. Demonstrating this point, Bonaventure holds that spiritual light is common by way of analogy to the Creator and the creature. Because the Creator is purely act, light can be found in every sort of actuality among spiritual substances, so that this light is not subject to either the possibility of matter or to the darkness of ignorance. But corporeal light is found only in the creature that, to exist through itself, has to be sustained by matter. This is why we cannot find among corporeal creatures a light entirely free from the possibility of matter. There is in the sun, however, a light which is pure because, in the sun, there is neither opaqueness nor darkness."4 Since the principal significance of light has to do with a spiritual nature, and since spiritual light is common to the creature and the Creator by way of analogy, the spiritual light of the human soul is referred analogically to the spiritual light of God as an effect to its cause. The light of the human soul and the light of God, then, do not come together in a common form or nature; rather, as posterior and prior instances of light, they are brought together by an analogy of proportion. Augustine, according to Bonaventure, indicates the analogical character of light in the soul with reference to the divine light, for he says that the soul "knows in a sort of light of its own kind". Augustine calls this the uncreated light, and he says that it is "of its own kind" because, like the soul, it has a spiritual nature.115 Thus, in Bonaventure's judgment, light is said according to an analogy of proportion not only of spiritual and corporeal creatures, but also of spiritual creatures and the Creator. The immediate effect of corporeal light, as we have seen, is a certain brilliance or splendour, which does not lessen the simplicity of the light producing it. The similar effect of spiritual light consists in the word produced by the mind, and this effect does not diminish the simplicity of the intellective substance giving rise to it. Consequently, speaking theologically, Bonaventure maintains that the production of the eternal

Nominata enim luce, nisi determinetur per antecedentia et subsequentia, lucem intelligimus corporalem, per quam tamen perducimur ad intelligendum etiam spiritualem, quia cognitio nostra incipit a sensu." — 2 Sent., 13.1.1, ad 3 (2.313; ed. min., 2.316). 114 "Ad illud enim quod obicitur de similitudine spiritualium et corporalium, non est simile, quia lux spiritualis est commune Creatori et creaturae secundum analogiam. Et quia Creator pure actus est, ideo potest reperiri in spiritualibus lux in omnimoda actualitate, ita quod nihil habet de possibilitate materiae nee de tenebrositate ignorantiae. Corporalis vero lux non reperitur nisi in creatura, quae ad hoc, ut per se existat, indiget sustentante materia; et ideo non potest inveniri lux pura per omnimodam exclusionem possibilitatis materiae, potest tamen reperiri pura lux per exclusionem opacitatis et tenebrae; et sic est in sole." — 2 Sent, 13.2.1, ad 4 (2.318; ed. min., 2.321-22). 115 "... dicendum quod genus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo proprie, et sic dicuntur aliqua convenire in genere, quae convenit in aliqua forma et natura communi. Alio modo accipitur large, et sic dicuntur aliqua convenire in genere, in quibus est aliqua convenientia specialis secundum habitudinem analogiae. Et sic dicit Augustinus, XII, De Trinitate (15.24; PL 42.1011-12), quod anima 'cognoscit in quadam luce sui generis'; et vocat illam lucem lucem increatam. quam dicit esse sui generis propter hoc quod est spiritualis, sicut anima." — 2 Sent., 17.1.1, ad 3 (2.412; ed. min., 2.424).

502

CHAPTER SIX

Splendour, or the divine Word, by the Father does not diminish the simplicity of the divine light. This uncreated light can produce its Splendour more powerfully than a created light; but a created light is never without splendour, and so neither is the uncreated light of God.116 The similarity between the production of splendour by corporeal light and the production of a word or concept by spiritual light, whether in God or in a human mind, is established by Bonaventure according to an analogy of proportionality. It is quite evident, therefore, that the light of truth in a human mind is an analogical imitation of the light of truth in the divine mind. It follows from this that when the light of a human mind manifests the truth of creatures as it is manifested by the divine light, a human mind knows the truth of creatures with a certitude reflecting the certitude of their truth as it is known to God In other words, a philosopher has complete certitude of truth when his knowledge of creatures is properly proportioned to the certitude of their truth in the divine knowledge, for his knowledge and certitude of truth are analogical reflexions of the knowledge and truth in the mind of God. But a theologian, attaining a nobler certitude than the philosopher, appropriates light to both the Father and the Son in God. Believing in the Trinity, a theologian appropriates light to the Son because it has an intrinsic nature of manifestation, and so it looks to knowledge; he appropriates light to the Father because of its intrinsic power of multiplication or of generating splendour.117 The light of the human mind is regarded by Bonaventure as a reflexion of the divine light, just as he considers the similitudes of creatures in the human mind to be reflexions of their similitudes or ideas in the mind of God. Thus, the two elements required for the truth and certitude of human knowledge are fully understood only when they are seen analogically as effects imitating their divine principles and cause. Indeed, according to Bonaventure, the truth of any creature is fully understood only when it is known to be an imitation and expression of divine truth, and this also is known by way of analogy. The term truth has three distinct meanings for Bonaventure. In the first instance, the term designates the act and the undivided nature of a potency; in this respect, truth is related to the subject which it informs. In the second instance, truth is related to its divine principle, so that the term signifies a representation or imitation of the first and 116 "Item, lux dicitur de substantia spiritual! et corporal!, et spiritual! creata et increata, secundum quandam proportionem et analogiam; sed productio splendoris materialis nihil diminuit de simplicitate lucis materialis, productio etiam lucis spiritualis, utpote intelligentiae sive verbi a mente, nihil diminuit de simplicitate substantiae intellectivae: ergo productio aeterni Splendoris a Patre nihil diminui de simplicitate lucis aeternae." — DMT, 3.2, con. 8 ( 5.75 ). "Item, potentior est lux increata ad producendum suum splendorem quam lux creata; scd lux creata nunquam est sine splendore, ergo nee lux increata ..." — Op. at, 5.2, sc 5 (5.94). 117 "... dicendum quod lux habet in se naturam manifestandi; et ita respicit cognitionem et appropriatur Filio; habet in se vim multiplicand! sive generandi splendorem; et ita appropriatur Patri." — 1 Sent., 9.dub.7, in Resp. (1.190; ed. mm., 1.153).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

503

supreme unity. In the third instance, the term refers to the ground of understanding, and so truth is related to the intellect which it arouses. These three relationships of truth follow its twofold distinction from falsity and purity. Truth is opposed to falsity which is not only contrary to the act and undivided nature of the subject informed by truth, but is also a privation of both the imitation of divine unity and the ground of understanding that are proper to truth. Now every creature is undivided in itself and, imitating its Creator, expresses the unity of its being. There is, therefore, some measure of truth in every created thing. But the truth of a creature, because it is subject to the impurity and darkness of matter, is distinct and even divided from the purity and clarity of divine truth. The Creator is purely simple and without diversity in nature, whereas a creature, though it is undivided, has composition and diversity of act and potency. There is a perfect imitation in God, moreover, and a pure similitude having nothing dissimilar to its origin, for the Son of God is the perfect image and likeness of the Father. A creature, however, though it is a similitude of the Creator, imitates its divine principle in such a way as always to remain somewhat dissimilar. Finally, the expression of lumen in God is ever pure and clear, while the expression of lumen by a creature is never free from imperfection and obscurity. From these analogical comparisons of created and uncreated truth, Bonaventure concludes that, with respect to purity and clarity, truth is a property of God alone. Truth belongs to a creature only to the extent that the creature, not without a mixture of many imperfections, imitates its divine principle, thus expressing the truth of its origin."8 The analogical character of the light and truth of human knowledge, for Bonaventure, is both theological and philosophical. The human soul, for example, from its memory, intelligence and will directs the philosopher to the eternity, truth and goodness of God From the order, origin and mutual relations of the soul's potencies, however, the theologian is directed beyond the essential attributes of God to the personal properties of the Trinity. Thus, considering the memory in the soul as a mind generating a word in the intelligence and giving rise to love in the will, the theologian arrives at a knowledge of the order, origin and relations of the divine persons. To arrive at this knowledge, which Bonaventure describes as a seeing of the Trinity in the mirror of the soul, the theologian needs the help of the philosophical sciences, for they form a threefold lumen reflecting the Trinity and perfecting the human mind in truth. Natural philosophy, dealing with the cause of being, assists the theologian in knowing the Father, to whom power is appropriated. Rational philosophy, looking to the cause of un118 1 Sent., 8.1.1.1, Resp. (1.151; ed. min., 1.116-17). Note. "Creatura enim procedit a Deo ut umbra, Filius procedit ut splendor, sed quam cito est lux, statim est splendor, et statim est umbra, si sit corpus opacum eiobiectum."— 2 Sent., 1.1.1.2 in Resp. (2.22; ed min., 2.15). Cf. 2 Sent., 1.1.1.1, ad opp. 2 & ad 2 (2.15, 17; ed. min., 2.10-11); 1 Sent., 9.dub.7, Resp. "Et nota ... a luce." (1.190; ed. min., 1.153), and 37.2.2.3, ad 1 "Sed aliter ..." (1.663; ed. min., 1.528).

504

CHAPTER SIX

derstanding, aids the theologian to know the Son or divine Word, to whom wisdom is appropriated. Moral philosophy has to do with the order of life, and so this science helps the theologian to know the Holy Spirit or divine Love, to whom goodness is appropriated. Each of these philosophical sciences, furthermore, is subdivided into three particular disciplines and, as Bonaventure indicates, any group of them can direct the theologian in his speculations about the Trinity of persons in God All of the philosophical sciences, moreover, depend on certain and infallible rules, or first principles of truth, descending, so to speak, as rays or lumina into the human mind from the eternal law of God. The irradiations of that law within the human mind are of such great splendour, Bonaventure says, that they can direct the mind through itself, unless it be blind, to contemplate God's eternal light, which wise men hold in suspended admiration, and which causes foolish men to tremble, because they do not believe in order that they may understand.119 In conclusion, we can say that all the factors contributing to the certitude of truth in a human mind are considered by Bonaventure to be analogical. The light and the similitudes coming together in the manifestation of truth by a human mind cause certitude of knowledge whenever those factors express the truth of creatures as they are known to God, both in His supreme light and by His eternal similitudes. The certitude of human knowledge, then, is an analogical representation or imitation of the certitude of divine knowledge, which is the exemplar cause of truth in created things, as such, and in the human intellect that knows them. Although a theologian, by appropriating to the divine persons the attributes of the divine essence, attains a nobler certitude than that attained by a philosopher, nevertheless, when a philosopher knows that his understanding of creatures corresponds to their truth in God, he has complete certitude of knowledge regarding them, for he understands their truth as it is known immutably and eternally to God In a word, the philosopher has an infallible certitude, because he knows that his knowledge of creatures cannot be otherwise than it is.120 The doctrine of Augustine is the almost exclusive source employed explicitly by Bonaventure in the texts that we have used on the question of analogy and certitude. Bonaventure, following Augustine, describes the similitudes and eternal reasons of creatures in God as their ideas or primordial causes; thereafter, influenced by Augustine, he holds that the human mind knows its objects more rightly in the eternal mirror of God than in

119 Itiner., 3.4-7: "Vide igitur ..." (5.305-06; ed. min., 5.198-99); cf. Colt, in Hexaem., 4.1-5 (5.349; Delorme, pp. 48-51). Bonaventure is influenced here by Augustine: De civil. Dei, 8.4 (PL 41.227-29); 11.25 (PL 41.338-39). 120 On the analogy of light and truth with respect to human knowledge in the doctrine of Bonaventure see:J.M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 158-87; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 101-07. Fora theological consideration of the doctrine consult: G. Tavard, "The Light of God in the Theology of St. Bonaventure", Eastern Churches Quarterly, 8 (1950), pp. 407-17.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

505

themselves, because the mind knows them in their divine ideas. It is from Augustine that Bonaventure also seeks support in showing that all created things are really one in the mind of God, so that His essence is their one exemplar form. Although God has really only one idea of creatures in His eternal wisdom, which Augustine calls an infinite treasure of all things, God is said also by Bonaventure, again influenced by Augustine, to have as many ideas of creatures as the relations that we can establish in Him to them, and so He is said to have an idea of every universal and every individual form, of every perfect and imperfect being. The influence of Augustine on Bonaventure extends to the analogical character of light, especially regarding the spiritual light of knowledge and truth in the human soul. Accepting Augustine's teaching on God as all light and the simple truth, Bonaventure turns to Augustine to show that the soul, knowing truth in a spiritual light, has an understanding of truth in the uncreated light of God; therefore, according to Bonaventure, the light of the soul and the light of God come together in a community of analogy. Bonaventure goes to Dionysius, however, to show that the expressions of truth by God concerning creatures are, so to speak, luminous rays of divine light directing the human mind to see created things as they are manifested in that light. This appeal to Dionysius by Bonaventure follows his previous adversion to the doctrine of Dionysius that an intellectual substance is a lumen, so that, for Bonaventure, the human soul, having a spiritual light, has an intellective potency which is a sort of lumen.m Though Bonaventure does not cite Aristotle explicity in the texts that we have used here, even so, there is an evident influence of Aristotle on Bonaventure's thought, particularly with regard to God as pure act, and with regard to the creature as dissimilar in truth to God because of its intrinsic composition and diversity of act and potency. Moreover, the spiritual light of the soul is understood by Bonaventure to be, as we have shown before, not only the natural seat of judgment as described by Augustine, but also the agent intellect as described by Aristotle. Thus, in analogating the light and truth in the human soul to the light and truth of God, who is pure act, Bonaventure is comparing the agent intellect and its act of illumination to the divine intellect and its act of illumination. Consequently, the truth of creatures known in the light of the agent intellect is said to be certain when it is seen to correspond with their truth as it is known to God in His supreme light. While Bonaventure develops the Augustinian teaching on the rules of human truth as reflexions of God's eternal laws in the mirror of the soul, at the same time, he identifies those rules with the first principles or habitual norms of truth found in Aristotle. In sum, the analogical character of human certitude in the doctrine of Bonaventure, though influenced deeply by Augustine, does not

121 See above: p. 347. The analogical character of the lumen in the human soul with respect to God is also based on the doctrine of Augustine; see above: pp. 429-30.

506

CHAPTER SIX

exclude the Aristotelean elements of his synthesis on the light and truth of human knowledge.122

The term idea, as understood by Aquinas, designates the form of a thing according as the form exists outside the thing itself. A form existing in that way can be related to being either as the exemplar of a thing or as the similitude by which the thing is known. Whether idea signifies an exemplar or a principle of knowledge, Aquinas says, it is necessary to posit ideas of created things in the divine mind Giving his reasons for this necessity, Aquinas observes that a form must be the end of generation in all things not generated by chance. Now an agent acts for the sake of a form only inasmuch as there is a similitude of the form in it. The form of a thing which is to-be according to natural being pre-exists in some agents, such as those acting according to nature, as a man generates another man. But the form of a thing can also pre-exist according to intelligible being in other agents, who act through intelligence, just as the similitude of a building pre-exists in the mind of an architect. Because the architect intends that the building be assimilated, or made like, to the form which he conceives in his mind, his similitude of the building can be called an idea. Since the world has not been made by chance, but by God, who acts through intelligence, there must be in the divine mind a form according to whose likeness God has made the world. This form or exemplar is the divine essence, for God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore, as the exemplar of created things and the principle by which God knows them, the essence of God is His idea of creatures.123 An exemplar form, in the view of Aquinas, is a form in whose likeness something is constituted. Since the name idea is usually taken to stand for an exemplar form, an idea is the same as a form that something imitates. A form can be imitated expressly from the intention of an agent: a portrait by a painter, for example, is made expressly as an imitation of the man whom it represents. A form may also be imitated accidentally, or beyond the agent's intention, as a picture of one man resembles another by chance. An idea or exemplar form, as that in whose likeness something is formed, must be imitated essentially and not by accident. Consequently, a thing imitating a form accidentally or by chance is not said to be an intentional likeness of that form; such a likeness requires the thing to be ordered to the form as to its end. A thing acts for the sake of an end, furthermore, either according as 122 From the theological viewpoint, Bonaventure depends on Augustine with respect to the appropriations of the cause of being to the Father, of the ground of understanding to the Son, and of the order of iife to the Holy Spirit. The nobility of theological certitude in Bonaventure's doctrine, then, reflects the influence of Augustine. 123 ST, la, 15.1, Resp. & ad 3 (l.UOab); cf. 1 Sent., 36.2.1, Sol., ad 2-3 (1.839-40).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

507

an agent, having intelligence, determines for itself what the end is to be, as a man determines the end of his own actions, or according as the end is determined by a principal agent, just as the operation of nature, working toward a fixed end, presupposes the order and direction of an intelligent agent, who predetermines that end. If something is made in order to imitate something else, but the agent does not determine for itself what the end is to be of the thing which is made, the form thus imitated is not an exemplar form or idea. The form of a man generating another man, for instance, is not the exemplar or idea of the man who is generated. A form is an idea or exemplar of a thing only when an agent, acting for the sake of an end, determines for itself what that end is to be, whether the form is outside the agent or in the agent itself. It is in this way that the form of an artifact in the mind of an artisan is said to be the exemplar of his artifact; likewise, a form existing outside the artisan and imitated by his artifact is said to be the exemplar or idea of that artifact. Hence, for Aquinas, an idea or exemplar is a form imitated by something in accordance with the intention of an agent, who determines for himself the end of his work. Since this end is constituted by the exemplar or idea by which the agent acts, therefore, because God acts for the sake of no other end than Himself, it is necessary to say that God has the ideas of all things in His mind. 124 There is, quite obviously, a concordance between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the nature of the divine ideas. They are, for both theologians, the similitudes by which God knows the things that He creates, and those things are imitations of their ideas in God Aquinas and Bonaventure concur also in identifying the idea of a thing with its exemplar form, which is the principle or reason of the thing's being, whether in the mind of the Creator or in the mind of an artisan. There is, however, an important difference between the two theologians regarding the r6le of the divine ideas in human knowledge. This difference arises from the individual views of Aquinas and Bonaventure on the use of analogy in attaining knowledge of God by way of causality. In Bonaventure's view, we know by the analogy of proportion that God is the cause of creatures, so that, to know their truth with full certitude, we must compare them analogically with their exemplar principles in God. As effects of the divine causality, creatures imitate their ideas in the divine mind; so, expressing the truth of those ideas, creatures manifest an intrinsic dependence on their ideal reasons both as the causal principles of their being and as the immutable rules of their truth. In the view of Aquinas, we do not know by the analogy of proportion that God is the cause of creatures; rather, we know God in this way by referring creatures to Him as effects to their principle and cause. Though creatures

124 DV, 3.1, Resp. "Tertio modo ..." (1.63): Aquinas supports his point of view here with the doctrine of Dionysius; see also: sc 1-10 (1.62), where Aquinas strengthens his position with citations from Aristotle and Boethius, and five citations from Augustine.

508

CHAPTER SIX

imitate their ideas in the divine mind, even so, in imitating their divine ideas, creatures are following the intentions of the Creator, thus manifesting the end for which they are created rather than the truth of their ideas in God. When creatures express their truth, they express it without manifesting an intrinsic dependence on their divine ideas, because creatures are related to those ideas in the order of final causality rather than in the order of formal causality. As a consequence, to know the truth of creatures with full certitude, we do not need to compare them with their exemplar principles in God. Created with an intrinsic necessity in being, creatures can express themselves in truth, so that the human intellect, relying on its self-evident principles, can know their truth with full certitude by reducing that truth to God as to its first cause. It is in this way that the human intellect, attaining its proper end, is seen by Aquinas to imitate the divine intellect. 125 Aquinas is in accord with Bonaventure on the necessity to posit in God a plurality of ideas. The treatment of this question by Aquinas, however, reflects his difference from Bonaventure on the finality of the divine ideas. According to Aquinas, the ultimate end of any effect is that which is properly intended by the principal agent. Now the very best good in the world, as Aristotle has shown, is the good of its whole order. Since this order is intended properly by God, who created it, He has the idea of the whole universe. But God's idea of the universe must include the proper reasons of its parts, which are the different things constituting the universe, just as the idea that an architect has of a building must include a proper reason for each of its parts. There is in the divine mind, then, as Augustine indicates, a proper reason for each thing in the universe. Hence, according as God understands the proper reasons of creatures, there are several ideas in His mind. God, knowing His essence perfectly, knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. He knows His essence, therefore, not only as it is in itself, but also as creatures can participate in its likeness. Each and every creature has a proper species, so that, according to its species, a creature in some way participates in a likeness of the divine essence. In knowing His essence as it can be imitated thus by a creature, God knows His essence as it is the proper reason and idea of that creature. But God knows His essence in this way with respect to all creatures; so, understanding their proper reasons as the reasons of several things, God has several ideas of them in His mind. The term idea, in this respect, names the divine essence inasmuch as it is the similitude or reason of this or of that creature. Since God understands the reason of every creature from His one essence, God has from His essence the ideas of all creatures. Those ideas

125 On the differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure concerning the divine ideas as the exemplar principles of creatures see: J.M. Bissen. L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 29-31, 51-53; see also: pp. 90-99, where their two doctrines are set side by side as variant interpretations of Augustine.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

509

are not caused by the things that God knows; on the contrary, they are caused by His intellect in comparing His essence to the things that He knows. Consequently, the relations multiplying the divine ideas are not in creatures, but in God, though they are not real in God. They are relations of understanding between the divine intellect and the divine essence, which are identical.126 Apart from the primary emphasis on the Finality of the divine ideas, Aquinas, for the most part, is of one mind with Bonaventure on the necessity to posit a plurality of ideas in the divine mind. Aquinas, along with Bonaventure, holds that the ideas of creatures have no degrees of excellence or perfection in God himself, for His essence is entirely perfect; though creatures have temporal being in themselves, they are in God eternally, and so His ideas of them are their eternal reasons.127 Aquinas differs considerably from Bonaventure, on the other hand, regarding the significance of light with respect to spiritual substances and to intellectual knowledge. Aquinas, following Ambrose, maintains that the splendour resulting from the multiplication of lumen falls among those things that we transfer to God from corporeal creatures. According to Dionysius, moreover, God is called lumen because, with respect to causality, a likeness of God is taken most of all from a ray of the sun. In the view of Aquinas himself, furthermore, every name imposed on God from His similitude in a corporeal creature is said of God metaphorically, not properly, so that light is said of Him in a metaphorical way.128 The stand taken on this question by Ambrose and Dionysius is approved by Aquinas, even though Augustine seems to hold that light is found more truly in spiritual substances than in corporeal substances. In the judgment of Aquinas, whatever is essentially corporeal can be attributed to something spiritual only in a metaphorical manner. Although there can be an

126 ST, la, 15.2 (l.llla-12b). Cf. 1 Sent., 36.2.2, ad 1, 3-4 (1.842-43); DV, 3.2, Resp. "Modus autem ...", ad 6 & 8 (1.66-67). See in Aristotle, Metaph., 12.10 (1075al2-24); in Augustine, De diver, quaes., q. 46 (PL 40.30). Aquinas opposes here (first reference) the doctrine of Avicenna that God created only the first creature, which created the next, and so on until the whole multitude of things in the universe was created. If this were true, Aquinas remarks, God would have only the idea of the first creature. Aquinas, supporting his view with the teachings of Dionysius and Augustine, refutes the above doctrine in DV, 3.2, Resp. "!.. plures ideas". (1.65-66). 127 DV, 3.2, ad 5 & 7 (1.67); 1 Sent., 36.2.2, ad 2 (1.842). In the Sol. of the latter text, Aquinas says of the term idea: "cum ... nominet essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura, divina essentia erit propria idea istius rei secundum determinatum imitationis modum." — Cf Qdi, 4.1.1. or 4.1 (p. 71). Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure, moreover, in positing ideas in God of universals and of singular things, though not of something evil, which God knows through its opposite good; however, regarding prime .natter, Aquinas holds that God does not have a proper idea of it, because He knows both matter and form in His idea of the composite, but He can be said to have an idea, broadly speaking, of matter according as He can consider it apart from its form: 1 Sent., 36.2.3 (1.843-45); DV, 3.4-5 (1.70-71), 3.8 (1.73-74). 128 2 Sent., 13.1.2, sc 1-2 (2.329). Cf. St. Ambrose, De fide ad Gratianum, 1-2, Prol. (PL 16.583-86); Dionysius, De divin. nomin, 4.4 (PC 3.698-99).

510

CHAPTER SIX

analogical community of spiritual and corporeal things, nevertheless, such a community cannot be established on the basis of something essentially corporeal. Spiritual and corporeal things can come together analogically with respect to being, which can be said of a corporeal and of a spiritual substance, but they cannot be brought together analogically with respect to heat, which is an essentially corporeal quality. Since light is also an essentially corporeal quality, which is confined to the order of sense knowledge, it can be said of a spiritual substance only either equivocally or metaphorically. Corporeal qualities are transferred to spiritual things, nonetheless, by means of a likeness of proportionality, which requires their union in either a community of univocation or a community of analogy. Now the light attributed to a spiritual substance refers to its manifestation in the order of intellectual knowledge, just as corporeal light is related to manifestation in the order of sense knowledge. The power or quality of manifestation is more true in spiritual substances; therefore, in this respect, Augustine is quite right, according to Aquinas, in saying that light is found more truly in them than in corporeal substances. Light exists according to its proper nature, however, only in corporeal substances, so that it is said to be in spiritual substances only according to their power or quality of manifestion with regard to truth. It is in this latter sense that a spiritual substance is said to have light, or lumen. Thus, God is called the true light from the similitude of His truth in creatures, and not from the nature of light, which is essentially corporeal.129 When we speak of intellectual lumen, Aquinas says, we must speak of it as a similitude of corporeal lumen. As a medium by which we see visible things, corporeal lumen serves our sense of sight, and in two ways. In the first way, it makes things actually visible that were potentially visible. In the second way, it strengthens the power of sight to see visible things, so that corporeal lumen must enter into the composition of the organ of sight. In speaking of intellectual lumen, then, we are talking about a similitude in an intellect of the interior lumen strengthening the sense of sight. An intellectual lumen, therefore, is the vigour enabling an intellect to understand, or that by which something is made known to it. !3° The term seeing, from its first imposition, signifies the act of the sense of sight. Because of the nobility and certitude of that sense, the term seeing is extended by common usage to the knowledge acquired by the other senses. We say, for instance, 'see how this thing tastes', or 'see how hot this thing is'. The common use of the word see goes beyond the senses to the intellect, for we also speak of seeing the truth of this or of that thing. Our use of the name light, Aquinas observes, follows a similar pattern. The name light, from its first imposition, signifies that which brings about manifestation in the sense of

129 Lac. tit, Sol, ad 1-2 (2.329-30); cf. St. Augustine, De Cm. ad lift., 4.28 (PL 34.315-16). 130 DV, 9.1, Resp, "... nobis notum." (1.180).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

51 1

sight. The name is used thereafter to signify anything bringing about manifestation in any sort of knowledge. The terms light and lumen, therefore, from their first and proper impositions, are applied metaphorically to spiritual substances. According to the common and extended use of the terms, however, they are said properly of spiritual substances, and thus the terms signify that which in those substances brings about the manifestation of truth. 131 With regard to the human soul, the terms designate the agent intellect, which Aristotle compares to corporeal lumen. By his comparison, Aristotle shows that an agent intellect is necessary for the soul to make those things actually intelligible which are potentially intelligible. Consequently, speaking analogically, Aristotle says that the agent intellect is a sort of lumen.132 When Aristotle compares the agent intellect to corporeal lumen, he is comparing the intellect, according to Aquinas, to that lumen as it is received in the air, or in some transparent medium. Plato, as Themistius relates, posits the intellect as a substance separated from the human soul, and so he compares the intellect to the sun. It is for this reason that Augustine, in the view of Aquinas, compares God to the sun, for God is the separated substance illumining the human soul. Since God is the Creator of the soul, its intellectual lumen, or agent intellect, is a participation in the divine lumen.l33 The agent intellect, as understood by Aquinas, is a lumen impressed immediately on the soul by God, so that, sharing in His lumen, the agent intellect manifests to the soul what is true and good. Now, according to Augustine, we cannot know the most certain things in the sciences unless our minds are illuminated by God, as earthly things are illuminated by the sun. In this comparison, Augustine is not referring to the agent intellect of which Aristotle speaks, but to God as the principal agent of human understanding.134 To Aquinas, therefore, interpreting both Aristotle and Augustine, God is the original source of the intellective power in the human soul. This power is a participated likeness of the divine intellect, and so the intellective power of the soul is said to be a sort of intelligible lumen derived, as it were, from the first light.135 131 ST, la, 67.1 (1.407fa-08a). 132 DA, a. 4, ad 4 (2.296). Note the concluding passage: "Gomparatio ergo luminis ad intellectum agentem non est quantum ad omnia; cum intellectus agens ad hoc sit necessarius ut facial intclligibilia in potentia esse inteliigibilia actu. Et hoc significavit Aristotles in III De anima (c. 5; 430a!4-l7), cum dixit, quod intellectus agens est quasi lumen quoquo modo." 133 De mo/o, 16.12, ad 1 (2.698); ST, la, 79.4, Resp. "Et ideo ..." (1.484a). See in St Augustine: Solii, 1.7-8.14-15 (PL 32.876-77). For the reference to Plato, see in Themistius: Paraphrases ... De anima, 3.5 (430a25; Verbeke, p. 235.7-12). 134 DSpC, a. 10, Resp. "Unde dicimus ..." (2.408); cf. St. Augustine, of. cit., 1.6.12 (PL 32.875). 135 "Manifestum est autem quod Deus ... est auctor intellectivae virtutis ... quod sit aliqua participata similitude ipsius, qui est primus intellectus. Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum." — 57", la, 12.2, in Resp. (i.62a). "In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus invenitur virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis." — 57', la, 89.1, in Resp. (1.550b).

512

CHAPTER SIX

The differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the use and meaning of light, and of lumen, are very noticeable. For Bonaventure, light has a properly spiritual nature, so that the term light designates a corporeal nature only from common usage. The term is predicated by an analogy of proportion, moreover, not only of corporeal and spiritual creatures, but also of spiritual creatures and the Creator. For Aquinas, light has an essentially corporeal nature, and so the term light is used only metaphorically to designate a spiritual substance. Since the proper meaning of light is confined univocally to corporeal things, the term cannot be predicated of corporeal and spiritual things by an analogy of proportion. As a result, there is no possibility, even according to analogy, of attributing the nature of light to either a spiritual creature or the Creator. In Bonaventure's view, however, light has a properly spiritual nature found principally in the Creator, who is purely light and, as such, the cause of the light in the human soul. The light of truth in the soul is referred analogically to the light of truth in God, as an effect is referred to its cause. The products of the soul's spiritual light consist in the splendour of an intelligible word and in the lumen or manifestation of truth, and they are related by analogies of proportionality to the splendour and the lumen of the truly spiritual light of God. Aquinas bases his view of the light and lumen of God on a wider historical foundation than that chosen by Bonaventure, who follows the doctrine of Augustine almost exclusively. In the judgment of Aquinas, then, the qualities signified by the terms splendour and lumen are transferred to God in the same way as the property of light, i.e. metaphorically or equivocally. As a consequence, with respect to the proper nature of splendour and of lumen, there is no way of establishing a community of analogy between God and the human soul. Drawing close to Bonaventure, nonetheless, Aquinas takes lumen in a broad sense to mean a manifestation of truth. Using lumen in that common way, he establishes a community of proportionality between the human intellect and the divine intellect with regard to the manifestation of truth. Hence, the lumen of the human mind is seen to be a likeness of the divine lumen, for the one is a created impression or imitation of the other. Since there cannot be an analogy of proportion between a creature and the Creator in the doctrine of Aquinas, the analogical imitation of the divine lumen by the lumen of the human mind is known only from a comparison of proportionality. As a proportional imitation or likeness of the divine mind, therefore, the human mind can acquire in its own way a complete certitude of truth without the necessity of establishing a proportion between its knowledge of creatures and the knowledge that the Creator has of them. The human mind is seen by Bonaventure, on the other hand, to be in every respect an analogical imitation of the divine mind. In consequence, to be certain of the truth of creatures, the human mind must reflect their certitude of truth in the divine mind. But to know the truth of creatures with complete certitude, the human mind must establish analogical proportions between the truth of its

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

513

knowledge and the truth of knowledge in the mind of God Although Bonaventure and Aquinas take very different positions on the nature of light, of lumen, and of the proportion between them and God, even so, the two theologians come together in their respective views on God as the principal cause of human understanding. In this regard, Bonaventure relies on the doctrine of Augustine, though, as we have shown, not to the exclusion of Aristotle's doctrine on the agent intellect. But Aquinas is careful to show that the agent intellect, of which Aristotle speaks, is the lumen impressed by God on the human soul; at the same time, he also shows that Augustine's doctrine on God as the source of certitude in human science is in true harmony with the doctrine of Aristotle an the agent intellect. This reconciliation of Augustinian and Aristotelean doctrines by Aquinas can be seen also in his understanding of God as the true light: God is the cause of created truth, but He is not truly light, which is a bodily quality through its essence.136 Considering the relation of created truths to the uncreated truth, Aquinas says that truth is found properly in either the human intellect or the divine intellect, just as health is found properly in an animal. Truth is found in created things according as they are related to an intellect, as health is said to be in the food causing and preserving the health of an animal. Thus, found first and properly in the divine intellect, truth is found thereafter properly in a human intellect and improperly in other things, which have truth only in relation to the human and divine intellects. There is in the divine intellect only one truth from which are derived the numerous truths in the human intellect, just as several similitudes of one human face are reflected in a mirror. The truths in created things are as numerous as the entities of those things themselves. In relation to the human intellect, the truth of a thing is accidental to it, so to speak, because, if there were no human intellect, the thing would still continue to-be in its own essence. But the truth of a thing in relation to the divine intellect is inseparable from the thing, because created things can subsist only through the divine intellect, which is the cause of their being. Since the truth of a thing's being is caused by the divine intellect, but the thing itself is the cause of its truth in the human intellect, each and every thing is true principally more from its relation to the divine intellect than from its relation to the human intellect, and so truth is found first and foremost in God. When truth is taken in this way, as Anselm takes it, all creatures are said to be true by the one truth of the divine intellect. When truth is taken according as things are true either in relation to the human intellect or in their own being, there are then 136 The reconciliation by Aquinas of Augustine and Aristotle is also evident in the following text "Deus hominis scientiae causa est excellentissimo modo; quia et ipsam animam intellectual! lumine insignivit, et notitiam prirnorum principiorum ei impressit, quae sunt quasi quaedam seminaria scientiarum; sicut et aliis naturalibus rebus impressit seminales rationes omnium effectum producendorum." — D V , 11.3, in Resp. (1.231).

514

CHAPTER SIX

numerous truths both in the diverse intellects of men and in the things created by God. Those things are called true, therefore, not from an intrinsic form, but from the truth of the divine intellect and from the truth of a human intellect, just as food is called healthy, not from an intrinsic form, but from the health in an animal. In short, things are said to be true from the truth which is the adequation of their entity to an intellect, and thus their truth is, as it were, from an inherent form, as food is said to be healthy from a quality inherent to it.137 In the consideration of Aquinas, the truth of a created being depends primarily on the divine intellect, which causes the truth of the being, and secondarily on the human intellect in which the being itself is a cause of truth. Now every being participates in created being, of which the efficient and exemplar principle is the one being of God, who causes the diversity of being in creatures. Each human intellect, moreover, has an intrinsic operation enabling it to know the truth of creatures. But every human intellect participates in created lumen, of which the uncreated lumen is the exemplar cause, and by which the intellect judges rightly the truth of created things. Consequently, all created truths, whether in things or in a human intellect, are referred back to the uncreated truth as to their one efficient and exemplar cause. Thus, for Aquinas, a created truth is taken back to the uncreated truth by way of causality and not by an analogy of proportion. Aquinas speaks here of three sorts of analogy. The first sort requires a community of intention, but not of being, so that the intention is referred first to one thing and thereafter to several things, as the intention of health is referred first to an animal and then to urine, to food and to drink, but the being of health is only in the animal. The second sort of analogy requires a community of being, but not of intention; this analogy is obtained when several things are made equal in an intention of something common to them, but which does not have the being of one reason in all of them, as all bodies are equalized in the intention of corporeity. A logician, considering only intentions, says that body is predicated univocally of all bodies, but that the being of bodily nature does not have the same reason in corruptible and incorruptible bodies. A metaphysician, considering things according to their being, says that neither body nor any other name is predicated univocally of corruptible and incorruptible things, and this is clear from the analogical manner in which Aristotle speaks of them. Each of these two sorts of analogy, constituting a community of proportion, is excluded by Aquinas in his reference of created truth to the uncreated truth. The third analogy involves a community both of intention and of being, an analogy not requiring an equalizing of things either in a common intention or in being. It is in this way, for example, that both a substance and an accident are said to be a being, for each of them has something of being, but a sub-

137 DV, 1.4, Resp. (1.8); cf. St. Anselm, Dialog, de mrit., cc. 8-11 (PL 158.475-80).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

515

stance has being more perfectly than an accident. The property of truth is said to be in both God and creatures by an analogy of this sort, which is an analogy of proportionality. We say: as truth is in a creature, so is truth in God but far more perfectly, because the uncreated truth is the divine being, whereas a created truth is not the being of a thing, but its adequation to an intellect. Since truth is in created things chiefly because of the divine or first truth, they are true principally by that truth, and thus all things, each according to its own entity, are assimilated in truth primarily to the divine intellect.138 It is within a community of proportionality, therefore, that Aquinas finds a likeness between the truth in a creature and the truth in God. Every creature is true according to its proportional imitation of truth in the divine intellect, which is the measure of truth in all things. A creature is also true, though secondarily, according as it is apprehended by a human intellect, which is measured in truth by the things that it knows. The entitative truth of a creature comes totally from the Creator, who is the first cause of the form by which the creature is adequated to a human intellect. Now the good of an intellect, as Aristotle shows, consists in its perfect operation and, for the human intellect, this is to know what is true. But every good comes from God; so the good of the human intellect is derived from God. Consequently, every created truth, whether in the thing or in the intellect, is derived absolutely from God l39 The truth of a science can be acquired by the human intellect either through its own interior operation or through the exterior aid of a teacher, just as health can be had by a body through its own nature alone or through the exterior assistance of a doctor working with nature. The interior operation of the intellect consists in a movement of reason from the known to the unknown, so that, applying common and self-evident principles to determinate subjects, the intellect proceeds to conclusions, thus discovering the truth of its objects. A teacher helps his student by offering him signs that, appealing to his intellect, prompt him to exercise his reason in the discovery of truth. In this way, a teacher is said to cause science in his student, who acquires the science through the interior work of his own intellect. To acquire the science, however, the student must hold with certitude those things that he sees as following necessarily from self-evident principles, which he knows by a lumen derived from God. This lumen is, as it were, a sort of similitude of the uncreated truth. Since all human teaching has its efficacy only from the power of the lumen in the intellect, God alone is the interior and principal teacher of man, just as nature alone is the interior and principal cause of health in a body. When the human intellect is said to judge all things according to truth, therefore, it is said to judge them 138 1 Sent., 19.5.2, SoL & ad 1 (1.491-92); ST, la, 16.6, Resp. (1.118ab). Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 11.3 (1060b30-1061bl7). 139 DV, 1.8, Resp. (1.17); cf. Aristotle, Etkica nicom., 6.2 (1139al6-1139bl3).

516

CHAPTER SIX

according to the first truth. In other words, the truth of self-evident and first principles by which the intellect judges all things is caused by the divine intellect, which is the exemplar principle of created truth. Wherefore, the human intellect judges things according to the first truth because the truth of first principles is a similitude of the divine truth.140 It is in this context that Aquinas understands Augustine's statement on the human mind as knowing all things in a "light of its own kind". Augustine, in the interpretation of Aquinas, speaks of the truth resulting in the human mind from the exemplar cause of truth in the divine mind as the similitude of a face is reflected in a mirror. Augustine is referring, then, to the first truth as belonging in some way to the same genus as the human soul, and so he takes genus in a broad sense, just as all intelligible or all incorporeal things are said to be of one kind. 141 Aquinas has some things in common with Bonaventure, while differing from him on other things, regarding the nature of created truth and its relation to the uncreated truth. Approaching these questions in different ways, Bonaventure and Aquinas concur, nevertheless, in teaching that the truth of a creature is an imitation of divine truth by which all creatures are true in themselves, and according to which the human intellect knows their truth. The two theologians concur, then, in distinguishing created truths from the uncreated truth. They also concur in distinguishing the entitative truth of creatures from their truth in the human intellect. Aquinas teaches in common with Bonaventure, moreover, that the lumen of the human intellect is a reflexion of the divine lumen, so that the intellect knows the truth of created things through the influence of the first truth. With regard to the nature of truth, Aquinas insists constantly that truth is found properly in either the human intellect or the divine intellect. Truth is found improperly in created things; it is in them primarily from their adequation to the divine intellect, and secondarily from their adequation to the human intellect. The truth of creatures is inseparable from them in relation to the divine intellect, which is the measure of all truth, but not in relation to the human intellect, since it is measured by their truth. In every respect, therefore, created truth depends primarily on God, and so it is reduced to God as to its efficient and exemplar cause, but not by way of an analogy of proportion. Bonaventure considers created truth to be by its nature an expression of the uncreated truth, so that the one must be reduced to the other within an analogy of proportion. Thus, from his point of view, created truth is found first in the thing as in its subject, then in relation to its divine principle, which it expresses, and thereafter in the human intellect that knows the 140 DV, 11.1, Resp. "Sicut ergo aliquis ..." (1.226); 1.4, ad 5 (1.8). 141 "... Augustinus loquitur dc veritate ab ipsa mcntc divina in mcnte nostra, sicut similitude faciei resultat in speculo ... Vel dicendum, quod veritas prima cst quodammodo de genere animae largo modo accipiendo genus, secundum quod omnia intclligibilia vel incorporalia unius generis esse dicuntur."— DV, 1.4, ad con. 8 (1.9); cf. ST, la, 16.6, ad 1 (1.118b).

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

517

thing. In proportion to the uncreated truth, which is absolutely one, simple and clear, a created truth is imperfectly one, composed of act and potency, while subject to the obscurity of matter or the darkness of ignorance. The truth of every creature, therefore, is more dissimilar than similar to divine truth, which is the exemplar cause of all created truths. The lumen by which the human intellect knows the truth of creatures is also reduced by Bonaventure through an analogy of proportion to the divine lumen. From his comparison of the one to the other, the expression of lumen in God is seen to be ever pure and clear, whereas the similar expression of lumen in the human mind is never without imperfection and darkness. In consequence, the human mind, depending on its adequation to created things, is said to be an imitation of the divine mind because the one participates in the truth and in the lumen of the other. This participation is manifested in Bonaventure's description of the infallible rules or first principles of truth descending, so to speak, as rays into the human mind from the lumen of God's eternal law. Because the human mind imitates the divine mind by sharing in its lumen and in its principles of truth, the operation of the human intellect must also imitate the operation of the divine intellect by sharing in its infallible certitude of truth. From an analogy of proportionality, then, Bonaventure understands the certitude of truth in the human intellect to be a representation or expression of the certitude of truth in the divine intellect. Although Aquinas maintains that the lumen and truth of the human intellect are participated perfections, even so, in his judgment, they participate in the lumen and in the truth of the divine intellect as created similitudes of their exemplar principle and cause. It is because the lumen and the truth of the human intellect imitate their divine exemplars, therefore, that they are said to participate in the lumen and in the truth of God Hence, for Aquinas, the first principles of truth in the human mind are sufficient of themselves to enable the human intellect to know created truth with certitude. Consequently, the analogical likeness of the human intellect to the divine intellect is established by Aquinas solely according to their proper operations. Since the operation of the human intellect is an analogical likeness or imitation of the operation of the divine intellect, the certitude acquired by the human intellect is an analogical imitation or representation of divine certitude, and thus the human intellect is said to participate in the certitude of the divine intellect. The differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the analogical character of certitude in human knowledge stem from their particular stands on the relation of the creature to the Creator. From the position of Aquinas, the creature is seen to be related to the Creator as a being with a caused necessity to the being which is uncaused in its necessity. Following that relation, the human intellect depends on the divine intellect as a created power having an intrinsic necessity in knowing truth on the uncreated power which has an absolute necessity in the knowledge of truth. The human intellect imitates the divine intellect, therefore, because of an

518

CHAPTER SIX

analogical assimilation of the perfection of the one to the perfections of the other, and so the human intellect is able to participate in the lumen and in the certitude of truth in the divine intellect. From Bonaventure's position, the creature is seen to be related to the Creator as a contingent being to the necessary being, so that the Creator must be present to the creature in order to give it a necessity in being by conferring on it the stability of existing. As a result, the human intellect depends on the divine intellect as a contingent power of knowledge on the necessary power of knowledge, so that the light and truth of divine knowledge must be present to the light and truth of human knowledge in order to give it the necessity of certitude by conferring infallibility on the intellect and immutability on its object. The human intellect is assimilated to the divine intellect, therefore, because of an analogical participation of the perfections of the one in the perfections of the other, thus making it possible for the human intellect to imitate the divine intellect. CONCLUSION The certitude of human knowledge, in St. Bonaventure's doctrine, depends exteriorly on the immutability of its proper objects and interiorly on the infallibility of the human intellect. Those two factors depend on the immutable truth of the divine ideas and on the infallible light of truth in the divine intellect. Hence, the certitude of human knowledge is established by the participation of the human mind in the certitude of knowledge in the divine mind The two extremes of the participation are the truth of created things in themselves and the truth of their ideas or eternal reasons in the mind of God These extremes are united in the truth of the human intellect, which judges created things according to the truth of their eternal reasons in God Created things come into being by the power of God, who is their efficient cause, and they are true in their being because they are assimilated to their eternal reasons in God, who is also their exemplar cause. Though the being of creatures in contingent in itself, causing their truth to be mutable, they have necessity in being and immutability in truth through the presence of God as their conserving cause. In that way, created things participate in the necessity of their being in the divine power, and in the immutability of their truth in the divine intellect. Thus, assimilated to God, created things are similitudes of God, and so they imitate their divine ideas by expressing or representing the truth of their being in God. The human intellect, on knowing the truth of created things, is directed by them to their ideas or similitudes in the mind of God. Establishing proportions between creatures and their Creator by means of analogy, the intellect obtains knowledge of creatures in their divine causality, so that, judging them according to their eternal similitudes, the intellect participates in the certitude of their truth as it is expressed by the mind of God. As a result, and

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

519

by analogies of proportion, the intellect can name God in a proper way from His effects in creation. By subsequent comparisons of the perfections in creatures to the perfections of their Creator, the human intellect, proceeding by analogies of proportionality, completes its knowledge of creatures by relating their perfections to the perfections of God, who is known to be the exemplar cause of every created perfection. As a consequence, participating in the complete certitude of divine knowledge, the human intellect knows the perfections of creatures as they are assimilated to the perfections of the Creator. Moreover, using analogies of proportionality, the human intellect can impose names on the Creator from the perfections in creatures. Because the human intellect participates in the infallible certitude of divine knowledge, the light and manifestation of truth in the human mind are assimilated to the light and manifestation of truth in the divine mind, and so the human mind is an imitation or analogical representation of the divine mind Although the light of the human intellect is fallible in itself, and the truth in the human intellect is subject to mutability, nevertheless, because God is present to the light and truth of the intellect, the one participates in the infallibility of the divine light, and the other participates in the immutability of divine truth. Consequently, assimilated to the light and truth of God, the light and truth of the human intellect are similitudes of their divine principle and cause, so that, resembling the divine mind in every respect, the human mind has an infallible certitude of knowledge which is an imitation of the infallible certitude of knowledge in the mind of God In brief, as presented in the synthesis of St. Bonaventure, the certitude of human knowledge and the analogical character of that certitude conform to his use of the principle of participation. The synthesis of St. Bonaventure on the certitude of human knowledge, excepting the indubitable knowledge of God, is composed chiefly under the influence of St. Augustine's doctrine. The composition of St. Bonaventure's synthesis is influenced also by the doctrine of Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, by the doctrines of St. Hilary and Dionysius. The influence of St. Augustine is seen in St. Bonaventure's appeal to a necessary illumination from God in order that the human intellect have infallibility and certitude of truth. St. Bonaventure also turns to St. Augustine in showing that truth is found properly in God who is unmatched by creatures, even though they imitate their Creator. As a consequence, all creatures are in darkness by comparison with the Creator, who is all light and the simple truth; so, striving to know the Creator from His creatures, the human mind must rely on the light of eternal truth, which kindles the lumen of true human reasoning. These Augustinian elements of the Bonaventurean synthesis are supplemented by a number of Aristotelean elements. Thus, subscribing to Aristotle's doctrine on certitude, St. Bonaventure holds that the objects of a science are necessary in themselves and immutable to the knower, so that, knowing their cause, he has certain knowledge of them, because he knows that they cannot be other than they are. The difference between the cer-

520

CHAPTER SIX

titude and the nobility of a science is also taken by St. Bonaventure from Aristotle, who shows that mathematics is more certain than metaphysics, which is the nobler science, since its objects are the most evident in themselves. Finally, following Aristotle on the necessity of exterior reason to conform to the principles of interior reason, St. Bonaventure teaches that error in the exercise of exterior reason leads ultimately to a misunderstanding of the eternal rules of truth in the wisdom of God. With regard to the analogical modes of knowledge, and to their foundations in the relations between creatures and the Creator, St. Bonaventure finds in St. Augustine the three sorts of proportion giving rise to analogical comparisons; in addition to this, he learns from Aristotle that every analogy includes something which is equivocal. It is to St. Augustine, and to St. Hilary, that St. Bonaventure goes to show that the natural condition of creatures is more dissimilar than similar to the being of their Creator. But the Bonaventurean doctrine on the analogical likenesses of creatures to God as His shadows, vestiges and images is influenced primarily by St. Augustine. A similar Augustinian influence on Bonaventurean doctrine is evident in regard to the divine ideas. Following St. Augustine in an almost singular manner, St. Bonaventure considers the divine ideas to be the primordial causes and the eternal reasons of created things. Those things are known by the human mind more rightly in God than in themselves, because, when they are known in God, they are seen as in a mirror reflecting their eternal similitudes. St. Bonaventure also maintains, again under the influence of St. Augustine, that all creatures are one in the eternal reason of God, whose essence is the unique exemplar form of every creature, and yet there is an infinite number of ideas in the divine mind, since there is no limit to the number of ways in which the essence of God can be related in His knowledge to the things that He can create. It is to St. Augustine, lastly, that St. Bonaventure turns for support in his doctrine on the analogical character of the spiritual light in the human soul with respect to the spiritual light of God. This particular element of Augustinian teaching is augmented from Dionysius, who provides St. Bonaventure with an apt illustration of the expression of divine truth regarding creatures: they are, as it were, luminous rays of the divine light directing the human mind to their truth in the Creator. The influence of St. Anselm is predominant in St. Bonaventure's composition of doctrines on the indubitability with which the being of God can be known by the human intellect. In this instance, as we have shown, St. Bonaventure uses as a frame of reference the doctrine of St. Anselm on God as that than which nothing greater can be thought. Within that frame of reference, St. Bonaventure employs the doctrine of St. Augustine to prove principally that the human mind cannot see any truth except by the first truth, which is God, so that even to say 'God is-not' implies the truth 'God is'. At the same time, though indirectly, St. Bonaventure has equal recourse to the doctrines of Aristotle and Boethius. From Aristotle, he takes

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

521

the principle that the more a truth is prior and universal, so much the more is it known because of its evidence and certainty; but the first truth is the most prior and universal, so it is also the most evident and certain. From Boethius, he takes the principle that no proposition is more true than the one predicating a thing of itself; but the proposition 'God is' predicates being of God, who is His own being, and so no other proposition can be more true than 'God is'. These two demonstrations, and the demonstration based on the doctrine of St. Augustine, are employed by St. Bonaventure to support his interpretation of St. Anselm's doctrine. The demonstrations are employed with equal force to prove that the divine being, as the being which cannot be thought not to-be, is so true that it must be thought indubitably to-be. Thus, in one important respect, the predominant influence on the synthesis of St. Bonaventure comes from St. Anselm. In many other respects, the primary influence comes from St. Augustine, whose doctrines are combined in the Bonaventurean synthesis with other sources, principally in Aristotle. Presenting an original composition of doctrines, the whole synthesis of St. Bonaventure on the certitude of human knowledge transcends each and every one of the historical sources entering into the organization of his philosophical thought. The synthesis of St. Thomas, as we have indicated, concurs in a variety of ways with, though often departing from, the synthesis of St. Bonaventure. The two syntheses concur, for instance, on the differences between the certitude of Christian faith and the certitude of human science; but the reasons for their differences are not the same in both syntheses. They depart from each other, however, on the necessity for the human intellect to apprehend God in order to acquire complete certitude of natural knowledge. In the synthesis of St. Thomas, but not in that of St. Bonaventure, the first principles and the lumen of truth are sufficient of themselves to enable the intellect to obtain natural knowledge with complete certitude. Though the two syntheses hold in common that the proposition 'God is' cannot be selfevident to the human mind, even so, the reasons supporting this position are quite different in the one synthesis as compared with the other. There are similar points of concurrence and difference, as we have shown, in the two syntheses regarding the nature and number of the divine ideas along with the nature and analogical character of truth. The greatest points of difference between the two syntheses have to do with their respective presentations of the proper nature of light and of lumen, and of the ways in which the human intellect both knows and names God from creatures. With regard to the first point, the Bonaventurean synthesis presents light as properly spiritual and, as such, the light of the human intellect comes together analogically with the divine light. The Thomist synthesis presents light as essentially corporeal, so that no spiritual substance, especially the divine substance, can be said to have or to be light. The two syntheses concur, however, in presenting lumen as that by which an intellect is said to manifest truth, and so they hold a common position on the analogical

522

CHAPTER SIX

character of lumen in the human mind with respect to the divine lumen. With regard to the second point, the synthesis of St. Bonaventure contains an analogical approach to God from creatures, both in knowing and in naming God not only by ways of proportionality, but also by means of proportions established between them as effects are related to their cause. The synthesis of St. Thomas contains no way of knowing or naming God from creatures by establishing proportions between them; so, in the order of causality, God is known and named from creatures by way of reference rather than by way of analogy. God is named properly from the knowledge obtained of Him by analogies of proportionality, and thus, to some extent, the synthesis of St. Thomas holds a common ground with the synthesis of St. Bonaventure. Moreover, for St. Bonaventure, but not for St. Thomas, the human intellect must know created things in their divine ideas in order to know those things in themselves with an infallible certitude. This particular point of difference results from the converse ways in which their two syntheses, accounting for the relation of the creature to the Creator, depend on the principle of participation. In the Thomist synthesis, participation is a consequence of assimilation: the creature participates in similitudes of the divine perfections because it is made like to the Creator, so the human intellect participates in the certitude of the divine intellect because the human mind is a likeness of the divine mind In the Bonaventurean synthesis, participation precedes assimilation: the creature is made like to the Creator as a result of its participation in His perfections; so the human intellect is alike in certitude to the divine intellect as a consequence of the participation of the one in the perfections of the other. The number of historical sources used by St. Thomas contrasts sharply with the number used by St. Bonaventure. For example, on the divine essence as the exemplar form of creatures, St. Bonaventure relies solely on the doctrine of St. Augustine while St. Thomas depends, in addition, on the doctrines of Aristotle, Boethius and Dionysius. The contrast is yet more vivid regarding the nature of light: St. Bonaventure relies almost entirely on St. Augustine; but St. Thomas turns to Aristotle, Dionysius and St. Ambrose, thus enabling St. Thomas to present a different interpretation than St. Bonaventure of St. Augustine's doctrine. Although St. Thomas conjoins the doctrines of Aristotle and St. Anselm on the nature of created truth and its relation to God, nevertheless, departing clearly from St. Bonaventure, he does not accept the validity of St. Anselm's argument, as it stands, concerning God as the being than which a greater cannot be thought. Finally, St. Thomas follows Aristotle closely on the nature of certitude in human knowledge, whereas, on this question, St. Bonaventure combines the doctrines of Aristotle and St. Augustine. The syntheses of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, as the evidence shows, rest fundamentally on their personal approaches both to the common problems of their time and to the proper interpretation of the doctrines transmitted to them from the past.

CHAPTER SEVEN ILLUMINATION

OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

'l 'HE hidden treasures of science, St. Bonaventure tells us, can be discovered in a knowledge of the highest causes, and in a knowledge of either the principles or the conclusions of sciential demonstrations. To discover those treasures, a man must commit himself to the study of truth. Every man has the capacity to understand truth, a capacity coming partly from an exterior lumen of experience, partly from an interior lumen of reason, and partly from a superior lumen as from a manifestation of the eternal light. By his exterior lumen or frequency of experience, a man can acquire an understanding of many things: "A man experienced in many things will know many things" (Ecclesiasticus, 34.9). Aristotle teaches this when he says that many acts of the senses give rise to one memory, and many memories cause one experience, so that, from many experiences, there comes to-be one universal, which is the beginning of art and of science.' The interior lumen of reason is a natural power by which a man can understand the truth of corporeal creatures, of spiritual creatures, and of their Creator. This understanding comes partly from a dictate of nature, or the first principles of truth, and partly from the natural lumen of reason, by which a man knows the first principles. Now they are known, as Aristotle shows, only inasmuch as the terms are known: a man must know the meaning of whole and of part in order to know that every whole is greater than its part.2 Although a man may have much experience and a strong lumen of reason, they are not sufficient for him to understand truth, St. Bonaventure says, without the influence of an illumination from God, who "gives wisdom to wise men and science to men of understanding" (Daniel, 2.21). Thus, the certitudes of wisdom, science and understanding come from God, for such, according to Bonaventure, is the doctrine of Sacred Scripture. Regarding the certitude of wisdom, Scripture teaches that God "reveals profound and hidden things; He knows things that are constituted in darkness, and light is with Him" (Daniel, 2.22). With regard to the certitude of science, St. Paul writes that God "has kindled a light in our hearts, illumining them in the science of the glory of God" (2 Cor., 4.6). Concerning the certitude of understanding, St. John speaks of God as "the true

1 Anal poster., 2.19 (100a4-8). 2 CoiL de dona, 8.12-14 (5.496); cf. Aristotle, op. cit., 1.10 (76a40-76b22).

524

CHAPTER SEVEN

light which illumines every man coming into this world" (/n., 1.9). God alone, therefore, Bonaventure comments, can illumine any man to know truth with certitude. This is the teaching of Augustine, who says that even a wicked man judges rightly according to the eternal laws written in the book of eternal light; they are ever with God, though they are imprinted on the souls of men, just as a seal keeps its image, even though it has made many impressions on wax.3 Now an angel can assist a man to receive God's illumination, as Gabriel assisted Daniel in his search for truth (Daniel, 8.1516). But God alone can illumine a human mind perfectly, because only God has the power to produce a rational soul, which He himself informs immediately with truth. Thus, God illumines the minds of all men, whereas an angel illumines a human mind by disposing it to turn toward God, just as a man illumines a house by opening a window to let in the light. It is not true to say, as some philosophers have said, that one created intelligence creates another. This is untrue, Bonaventure maintains, because the act of creating belongs only to the omnipotent God, and so no creature has the power to create another. Likewise, because God is pure act, only His light has the power to illumine another mind. St. Paul writes, moreover, referring to God: "We live in Him, and in Him we are moved and have our being" (Acts, 17.28). The Apostle is speaking here, according to Augustine, not of our bodily life, but of our intellectual life. Taking the text in a broader sense, however, Augustine says that Paul speaks of God, regarding all things, as "the cause of being, the source of understanding, and the order of life".4 Bonaventure, interpreting Augustine, teaches that God, as the cause of being, is the producer of all things, whether spiritual or corporeal, everlasting or temporal. As the source of understanding, God is the origin of certitude in every created mind, so that, if all creatures were to cease to exist, certitude of truth would remain in the mind of God. As the order of life, God dwells in the human soul and, through the gift of the Holy Spirit, rules its life according to justice. Summing up his interpretation, Bonaventure observes that God enters the human soul as its principle of being, as its sun of intelligence, and as its gift of life. As the sun of the soul's intelligence, Bonaventure adds, God illumines all men to know truth; but some men have wandered away from God, and so the light of God does not shine forth in their hearts (Wisd., 13.17-18).5

3 De Trinit., 14.15.21 (PL 42.1051-52). 4 Op. tit., 14.12.16 (PL 42.1049); De civit Dei, 8.4 (PL 41.228-29). 5 Coll. de donis, 8.15 (5.496-97). On the doctrine, coming from Avicenna, concerning the creation of one intelligence by another see above: n. 60, p. 346; see also: 2 Sent., 1.1.2.2 (2.28-30; ed. min., 2.20-23). On the immediacy of the illumination of the human intellect by God in Bonaventure's doctrine consult the following: J. M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 188-94; F. Schwendiger, FKS, 15 (1928), pp. 23233; Bernardo Madriga, "La 'imagen de Dios' en la metafisica del hombre segun San Buenventura", W, 7 (1949), pp. 301-07; G. Bonafede, // "De Scientia Christi" ..., pp. 125-32, or Saggi sulla filosofia medioeoale, pp. 227-33.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

525

Our introductory text, taken from a late work of Bonaventure, presents his doctrine in a simple way on the necessity of the human mind to be illumined by God to know truth and to have certitude of natural knowledge. Bonaventure speaks there of three kinds of knowledge, or human understanding. The first kind, described as coming from an exterior lumen, is an understanding which originates from a frequency of experience and gives rise to the universal knowledge of science, a position held by Bonaventure under the influence of Aristotle. The second and third kinds include science, which is directed to creatures, and wisdom, directing the human mind to God. Those two kinds of knowledge are said to come from an interior lumen of reason, depending on both experience and the first principles of understanding. The illumination of the mind by God influences every level of human understanding, namely, of the first principles, of science and of wisdom. Though Bonaventure, speaking theologically, supports his position on this illumination from Sacred Scripture, nevertheless, referring to Augustine's doctrine, he implies that every human mind is illumined by God to know truth, so that, judging things rightly according to their eternal laws, or eternal reasons, a man can acquire knowledge with certitude according as he knows the truth of things in the eternal light of God. Thus, the illumination of the human mind by God has to do with its knowing or seeing of created things according to their eternal reasons, an activity of the mind that, as we have shown, involves analogical comparisons of creatures to their Creator. Our first problem, then, is concerned with illumination inasmuch as it brings about certitude in the human mind through a knowledge of creatures according to their eternal reasons in God. Our second problem, flowing from the first, deals with the intrinsic effects in the human mind of the illumination coming from God. Those effects, which Bonaventure describes in analogical terms, assimilate the human mind in certitude to the divine mind, an assimilation caused by the participation of the human mind in the knowledge that God has of creatures in His ideas of them. Bonaventure, in his reference to Augustine, adverts to this particular participation as an imprinting or impression of the eternal laws on the human soul, but they remain in the mind of God Since His illumination of the human mind enables it to judge created things according to their eternal laws or reasons, we shall consider here what Bonaventure means in saying that the human mind knows or sees created things in and by their eternal reasons. There is a third problem to be considered, namely, the illumination of philosophical knowledge, or the certitude of knowledge obtained by the philosophers, some of whom are said by Bonaventure to have fallen into error regarding God and creation. Bonaventure has spoken in particular of the error of attributing to a created intelligence the power to create another, and to illumine another mind. He has also spoken of some men wandering away from God, whose light, as a consequence, does not shine forth in their hearts. All this raises the question, in our view, of the

526

CHAPTER SEVEN

certitude that Bonaventure attributes to the doctrine of the philosophers, and so it concerns the illumination of philosophical knowledge.6 Illumination of Human Science and Wisdom

We have seen that, for Bonaventure, the divine ideas are identical with the divine essence. As the eternal reasons of created things, then, the divine ideas are really indistinct in the divine intellect. Presupposing that to be true, Bonaventure asks whether the ideas in God are the reasons supporting all knowledge having certitude, which is to ask: Whether whatever we know with certitude is known by us in the eternal reasons themselves?7 Giving an affirmative answer to the question, Bonaventure prepares the way for his response by presenting no less than thirty-four arguments upholding the position that he takes. Of those arguments, more than half are based on the doctrine of Augustine, while the remaining arguments are founded almost equally on other historical sources, including Aristotle, and on human reason. The arguments based on Augustinian doctrine have to do, in general, with the three following points. The first point is that the power of natural reason, to have the immutability and the necessity required for certitude of knowledge, must depend on the infallible light of truth in God, because both the lumen of reason and the objects of human understanding have a mutable and contingent nature. The second point concerns the presence of God as truth in the human soul, and His presence as lumen in the human mind. The third point, rounding off the other two, touches the lumen and truth of God as the law through which the human mind judges all things with certitude. We shall first examine each of those points from Bonaventure's texts and, explaining or illustrating them, then consider the remaining foundation arguments as presented by Bonaventure.8

6 For a general exposition of Bonaventure's doctrine on illumination see: P. J. McAndrew, "The Theory of Divine Illumination in St Bonaventure", NSC, 6 (1932), pp. 32-50; G. Bonafede, "II problema deU'illuminazione in S. Bonaventura", Sophia, 4 (1936), pp. 78-82, and 5 (1937), pp. 48-55; L. Bellofiore, "La dottrina dell'illuminazione dell'intelletto in S. Bonaventura", Sophia, 6 (1938), pp. 535-37, and 7 (1939), pp. 172-87; M. R, Dady, Theorr of Knowledge ..., pp. 43-51; E. Bettoni, S. Bonaventura, pp. 131-36, ET pp. 101-05; G. Scheltens, "De Metaphysische grondslag de kennis bij S. Bonaventura", TJP, 16 (1954), pp. 579-601: French summary, pp. 601-02; G. Bonafede, 11 pensiero francescano net scolo Xlll (Palermo, G. Mori: 1952), pp. 129-40; R. W. Mulligan, FS, 15 (1955), pp. 340-47; L. Veuthey, "Bonaventura (S)", ENF, 1.758-59. 7 "Supposito, quod rationes aeternae sint realiter indistinctae in divina arte sive cognitione, quaeritur, utrum sint rationes cognoscendi in omni certiiudinali cognitione; hoc est quaerere, utrum quidquid certitudinaliter cognoscitur a nobis cognoscatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis." — DSC, q. 4, initio (5.17). 8 He indicates many of his Augustinian sources only in a general way: "Item, hoc idem ostenditur ... rationibus sumptis ex verbis Augustini ... Innuit enim Augustinus. in secundo libro De libero arbitrio, et De vera religione, et De magistro, sexto Musicae et octavo De Trinitate, huiusmodi rationes." —Loc. cit., inter fa. 16 & 17 (5.19); particular references to those writings of Augustine are given there in the notes to fa. 17-27.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

527

On the first point, Bonaventure says that everything which is immutable is superior to what is mutable; but the principle by which the human mind has knowledge with certitude is immutable, because what is true is necessary: therefore, since the human mind is mutable, the principle by which it has knowledge with certitude is superior to the mind itself. Consequently, this principle is the eternal truth of God, so that His truth, or eternal reason, is that by which the human mind has truth with certitude. Now the eternal truth cannot be judged by the human mind, to which it is superior; but the human mind can be judged, since it is subject to the eternal law, which is also superior to the mind of man: therefore, the human mind judges other things by the eternal law, and this is the same as the truth or eternal reason of God. Moreover, Bonaventure continues, everything which is infallible is superior to what is fallible; since the human mind has certitude of knowledge by an infallible light and truth, but the mind itself is fallible, therefore, that light and truth are superior to the human mind, for they are the eternal light and truth of God. Everything which is necessary, furthermore, is also endless or unceasing, because it cannot in any way be otherwise than it is; but the principle by which we have certitude of knowledge through science is that which is necessarily true, and so this principle is never-ending. Every principle of that sort is superior to every creature, Bonaventure maintains, because each creature has come into being from non-being, and thus every creature has an intrinsic possibility of returning to non-being. In consequence, the principle by which we have certitude of knowledge through science is above every created truth, so that' it must be the uncreated truth, which is God. All created truths, moreover, are imperfect in themselves, or with respect to the uncreated truth; so, just as an imperfect being is known only through a perfect being, a created truth is understood by the human intellect only through the perfect truth, which is the supreme truth of God. Now God is the source of understanding and the order of life, just as He is the cause of being; but God causes being in such a way what nothing can be effected by another cause unless He himself move it into operation, and by His eternal power: therefore, nothing can be understood by another intellect unless God himself illumine it immediately, and by His eternal truth. In short, according to Bonaventure, the human intellect understands truth with certitude, and has certitude of knowledge through science, because it judges created things by the infallible light and the eternal law of God, who is the supreme and uncreated truth, which alone is necessary and unceasing, immutable and perfect. God illumines the human intellect, therefore, because He is the source of all understanding and, as such, moves the intellect into operation by manifesting to it the truth of creatures in their eternal reasons,9 9 Loc.cit., fa. 17-19, 21, 24-25 (5.19-20). Note the (blowing texts, containing similar arguments: "Item, Ambrosius: 'Per me ipsum nihil video nisi vana, fluxa et caduca': ergo si aliquid certitudinaliter video, video per aliquid, quod est supra me." — fm. 9 (5.18), die citation is taken, not from Ambrose, but from

528

CHAPTER SEVEN

Regarding our second point, we find Bonaventure simply citing two texts from Augustine. In the first text, Augustine speaks about the presence of divine truth and wisdom to the human mind: "Concerning all things, we understand them not by listening to one who speaks from outside, but by consulting the truth presiding inside the mind itself. The truth that we consult, moreover, teaches us, for this is Christ, who is said to dwell in the interior man, and He is the unchangeable power of God and His eternal wisdom, which indeed every rational soul consults."10 Bonaventure, following Augustine's doctrine, recalls here the difference between the inferior and superior portions of reason in the rational soul. The inferior portion directs the soul toward temporal things; the superior portion directs it toward their eternal laws. Since the knowledge of eternal things in the soul is prior, and by nature, to its knowledge of temporal things, Bonaventure argues, it is impossible for the soul to know anything with certitude unless it is assisted by the eternal reasons of God. Now the soul by its nature turns toward objects to be understood, either as they are outside the soul, or within it, or above it. The turning of the soul toward its exterior objects is the least simple; its turning toward interior objects is more simple, while its superior objects require the simplest turning of all. But the greatest simplicity entails the greatest priority, so that the turning of the soul toward its superior objects is naturally prior to its turning toward either interior or exterior objects. Since the supreme truth is superior to the soul, therefore, it is impossible for the soul to know anything without having a prior knowledge of the supreme truth, which is intimate to the soul itself. 11 In the second text, Augustine speaks of the philosophers: "Those whom we have deservedly put before all the rest have said that the very same God, by whom all things were made, is the lumen by which we learn all things."12 Bonaventure again relying on Augustine, maintains that every lumen giving knowledge with certitude has no restriction, because it shows itself to all things and Augustine: Solil., cap. ult. (PL 47.1150G, or 1158C). "Item, super illud psalmi (118.73): 'Manus tuae fecerunt me et plasmaverunt me, da mihi intellectum'; Glossa: "Solus Deus dat intellectum; Deus enim per se ipsum, qui lux est, iliuminat pias mentes'." — fm. 14 (5. 18). 10 Lac. at., fm. 1 (5. 17); cf. St. Augustine De magistra, 11 38 (PL 32.1216). Bonaventure has a text on the same lines from St Gregory: "Item, Gregorius, super illud loannis decimoquarto: 'Ille vos docebit omnia', dicit: 'Nisi idem Spiritus cordi adsit audientis, otiosus est sermo doctoris; nemo ergo docenti homini tribuat quod ex ore docentis intelligit, quia, nisi intus sit qui doceat, doctoris lingua exterius in vacuum laborai'." — fm. 10 (5.18); cf. St. Gregory, Homil. in Evangel., 2.30.3 (PL 76.1222). 11 Lac. cit., fa. 27 & 31 (5.20). 12 Loc. cit., fm. 4 (5.17); cf. St Augustine, De civil. Dei, 8.7 (PL 41.232): the philosophers to whom Augustine refers are, of course, the Platonists. We can take with this text, the remainder of St. Gregory's text, as cited by Bonaventure: "Item, idem ibidem: 'Ecce unam loquentis vocem omnes pariter auditis, nee tamen sensus auditae vocis omnes aequaliter perpenditis. Cum ergo vox dispar non sit, cur in cordibus vestris dispar est vocis intelligentia, nisi quia per hoc, quod vox loquentis communiter admonet, est magister interior, qui de vocis intelligentia quosdam specialiter docet?' Sed si intellectus noster sufficeret sibi ad intelligendum per lumen veritatis creatae, non indigeret superno doctore: cum igitur indigeat, patet, etc." — fm. 11 (5.18); cf. St. Gregory, ibid.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

529

makes every object known with the same certitude. But a lumen of this kind is necessarily not created, since created lumen is limited and restricted, and it is multiplied in diverse minds. The lumen by which a human mind has knowledge with certitude, therefore, must be the uncreated lumen of God.13 Thus, for Bonaventure, influenced by Augustine, the human mind cannot have any knowledge of creatures unless it has a prior knowledge of the supreme truth, which is present so intimately to the rational soul that it turns naturally toward that truth in the simplest way. As a consequence, the human mind must first consult the eternal wisdom of God, so that, assisted in its superior reason by His eternal laws, it can judge temporal things with certitude by its inferior reason. The lumen by which the human intellect has certitude of knowledge, furthermore, is not its created lumen, but the uncreated lumen of God. His lumen alone is unrestricted and able to make all things known with equal certitude. In sum, as a creature of God, the human mind must be illuminated by Him, i.e. be assisted by His truth and His lumen, in order both to know and to judge any created thing with certitude. Indeed, according to Bonaventure himself, if all created things were destroyed, so that the rational spirit alone remained, it would retain a knowledge of the sciences, not because of the true being that creatures would have in the universe or in the soul's knowledge, but because of the being that they have in the Creator. 14 With regard to our third point' Bonaventure has a whole series of texts from Augustine. His first text has to do with the law above the human mind: "There appears to be above our mind a law, which is called truth: now there can be no doubt that this law is altogether immutable ... and that it is God; this is that immutable truth which is rightly said to be the law of every art, and the art of the omnipotent Artisan." 15 The next text chosen by Bonaventure has a vivid account of the beauty of God's truth and wisdom, which Augustine describes as eternal and immovable, immutable and spiritual, ever-present to all men, admonishing them exteriorly and teaching them interiorly. Augustine then concludes: "No one judges of truth; no one judges well without it. From this, therefore, it is manifest that truth is without doubt more powerful than our minds, each of which is made wise by it alone. We do not pass judgment on truth; rather, we pass judgment through it on the rest of things." It is not to be inferred from this text, Bonaventure says, that we see created things by, but not in, their eternal

13 Lee. cit., fm. 20 (5.19). 14 "Item, destructis omnibus creaturis, remanente solo spiritu rational!, remanet apud eum cognitio disciplinarum ... sed hoc non est propter verum esse, quod habeant apud ipsum, nee apud universum: ergo necesse est, quod propter esse, quod habent apud summurn artificem." — Loc. cit., fm. 33 (5.20). 15 Loc. cit., fm. 2 (5.17); cf. St. Augustine, De vera relig., 31.57 (PL 43.147). Another text of a similar nature: "Item, octavo De Trinitae, capitulo tertio (n. 5; PL 42.950): 'Cum animus nobis placet, ut eum omni luci corporeae praeferamus, non in se ipso nobis placet, sed in ilia arte, qua factus est. Inde enim approbatur factus, unde videtur fuisse faciendus; haec est veritas et simplex bonum'." — fm. 5 (Ibid).

530

CHAPTER SEVEN

reasons. Such an inference would be contrary to the words of Augustine: "If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we both see it? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me, but we both see it in that immutable truth which is above our minds."16 Again, from Augustine: "We see with the sight of our mind in that eternal truth, from which all temporal things have come to be, the form according to which we are, and according to which we do anything, either in ourselves or in bodies, with true and right reason."17 Bonaventure, following Augustine's doctrine, holds that a thing is known rightly and with certitude when it is compared to its rule, from which we cannot depart in any way. Now the rule of a thing is nothing less than its essential rectitude: since that rectitude can be only the truth or eternal reason of the thing, therefore, we cannot know any thing with certitude unless we compare it to its eternal rule in God.18 In the remaining text selected by Bonaventure from Augustine, we find the latter asking the question: Where do men, who lack justice, see the rules according to which everyone ought to live? "Not in their own nature", Augustine replies, because "their minds are mutable, but those rules are immutable; nor in a habitus of their mind, since those rules belong to justice. Where does an unjust man perceive that which he ought to have, but which he does not have? Where else are those rules written, therefore, but in the book of that light which is called truth, and from which every just law is transcribed?" Although Augustine seems to have revised the doctrine in this text, Bonaventure maintains that Augustine has not revised it, as his own words show: "It is to believed that, about some of the disciplines, even men unskilled in them can answer things that are true, when they are able to take hold of the eternal lumen of reason where they perceive those immutably true things, and not because they have had prior knowledge of them, afterward forgetting them, as Plato has said ... An intellectual nature is connected not only to intelligible things, but also to immutable things, and by an order which is so made that an intellect, when it is moved either toward those things to which it is connected or toward itself, is as capable of answering what is true about such things as it is capable of seeing them."19 Now, interpreting Augustine's doctrine, but 16 Lac. cit., fm. 3 (5.17). Cf. St. Augustine, De lib. arbit., 2.14.38 (PL 32.1261-62); Confess., 12.25.35 (PL 32.840). 17 Lac. cit., fm. 7 (5.17); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 9.7.12 (PL 42.967). 18 Loc. cit., fm. 26 (5.20). There is a text from Augustine in Bonaventure, supporting his point of view: "Item, nono De Trinitate, capitulo sexto (n. 10; PL 42.966): 'Aliis omnino regulis, supra mentem nostram incommutabiliter manentibus, vel approbare, vel improbare convincimur, cum recte aliquid approbamus, vel improbamus'." — fm. 6 (5.17). 19 Loc. cit., fm. 8 (5.17-18). See in St. Augustine: De Trinit., 14.15.21 (PL 42.1050-51); Retract., 1.4.4 (PL 32.590), and 1.8.2 (PL 32.594). We may add the following text "Item, Origenes: 'Humana natura, etsi non peccasset, suis propriis viribus lucere non posset'. Sed intelligere est quoddam lucere: ergo etiam si non peccasset, propriis viribus non posset intelligere, ergo indiget superiore agente." — fm. 13 (5.18): the source of the citation from Origen is given and discussed here in n. 6 (ibid.).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

531

following his principles, Bonaventure says that an unjust man, when he knows justice, knows it either through its presence in him, or through a similitude of it received by his senses, or through something superior to him. Since the man is without justice, it is not present in him, and so he does not know it through its presence. Neither does he know justice through a similitude received by his senses, because justice has no similitude that can be abstracted through the senses. He must know justice through something else, therefore, and this is necessarily superior to his intellect. Hence, with equal reason, he also knows in their eternal reasons all the other spiritual things that he knows, so that, if an unjust man knows such things in this way, it is much more true to say that a man knows them in their eternal reasons. Can an unjust man, however, know justice from its effect? Not in Bonaventure's view, which he bases on the teaching of Augustine. Thus, according to Bonaventure, a man who does not know a thing in any way does not know what can be effected by it. If someone does not know what a man is, for example, he can never know what can be done by a man, because he must first know the nature of man. Likewise, if someone has no prior knowledge of justice, he will never know whether this or that action comes from justice. It remains, therefore, that justice must be known in its eternal reason. A similar argument can be brought forward, Bonaventure adds, concerning any substantial form knowable by the human intellect and, in this way, concerning all the knowledge that it has with certitude.20 To sum up our third point, Bonaventure relies on Augustine in teaching that the law above the human mind is the immutable truth of God, who is the origin of all creatures and the principal cause of their operations, so that, to know with certitude the truth of creatures and of their effects, the human mind must first know their truths in God's eternal reason, which is the law or rule of every created thing. To know creatures both rightly and with certitude, then, the human mind must compare them with their eternal laws or reasons; so the mind must know the truths of creatures and of their actions by the eternal and immutable truth of God. To this end, His truth is ever-present to all men, particularly to those who are just, guiding them exteriorly and teaching them interiorly. Because this truth is more powerful than any created mind, no man can pass judgment on it; rather, every man must pass judgment through it on all other things, for they can be known with certitude only when they are seen both in and by their eternal reasons. The rules of right living for men are contained in God's eternal truth, which Augustine calls the book of light. The rules of sciential knowledge are known in God's eternal lumen, so that the human mind can know through science the truths of creatures inasmuch as it is able to see their immutable truths in the lumen of God. Hence, considering human un-

20 Loc. cit., fm. 23 (5.19); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 8.6.9 (PL 42.953-56).

532

CHAPTER

SEVEN

derstanding as a sort of illumination, Bonaventure holds that, because the human intellect is a created power, it cannot know or understand truth with certitude without the aid of an illumination from the Creator, as from the principal agent of the light and truth in the human mind The latter aspect of Bonaventure's doctrine is stressed in two of the three remaining arguments based by him on texts from historical sources. The first argument is founded on a text from Anselm: "How great is the light from which every true thing shines forth, giving light to the rational mind! How full is this truth in which is everything that is true, and outside which there is only what is empty and what is false!" If what is true is seen only where it is, Bonaventure concludes, no thing is seen to be true except in God's eternal reason.21 The second argument is given with a text from Isaac de Stella: "Just as light, from which the sun can be seen, comes from the sun and, nevertheless, the light that shows the sun is not absent from the sun, so the light in God comes forth from God to irradiate upon the mind, so that the mind may first see the shining of His light, without which the mind could not see, and then see in it other things." All created things, therefore, Bonaventure terminates, are seen in the light of God.22 The final argument offered by Bonaventure, citing his historical sources, depends on a text from Aristotle. "We all suppose", Aristotle says, "that what we know through science cannot be otherwise than it is; when things that can be otherwise have passed beyond our speculation, we do not know whether they are, or whether they are not. The object of science, therefore, is eternal from necessity, for things that are simply from necessity are all eternal, and eternal things are ingenerate and incorruptible." Consequently, Bonaventure argues, there cannot be in any way knowledge with certitude apart from the reason of eternal truth. 23 Among the arguments based on the doctrine of Augustine, there is one in which Bonaventure appeals also to Aristotle. In this argument, Bonaventure first enuntiates the principle that every created thing, considered in itself, can be comprehended; next, invoking Aristotle's doctrine, he infers that the laws of numbers, figures and demonstrations cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, because those laws can be increased in an infinite way. Since laws of that kind are seen by the human intellect, Bonaventure says, they must be seen in something which exceeds everything created, and that something can be only God, or His eternal reason.24 The doctrine of Aristotle appears again in one of the demonstrations presented by Bonaventure from human reason. He opens the demonstration with the principle that every being in potency is reduced to act by something actually existing 21 Lac. cit., fm. 12 (5.18); cf. St. Anselm, Proslogion, c. 14 (PL 158.235.33B). 22 Loc. cit., fm. 15 (5.18); cf. Isaac de Stella, De ardma, (PL 194.1888A). 23 Lx. cit., fm. 16 (5.18-19); cf. Aristotle, Ethica nicom., 6.3 (1139bl8-24). 24 Loc. cit., fm. 22 (5.19): the many Aristotelean and Augustinian sources on which Bonaventure relies are indicated here in n. 4 (ibid.)

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

533

in the same genus. But the human intellect is in potency, as it is in a boy, for instance, who, in order to actually understand, must be moved by that which actually understands all things, and this is none other than the eternal wisdom of God. If the boy's intellect is said to be moved into the act of understanding by an agent intellect, Bonaventure goes on, then this agent intellect either was or was not actually understanding what the boy has learned. If the agent intellect was not actually understanding, the boy could not have been moved by it into the act of understanding. On the other hand, if the agent intellect was actually understanding, either the boy who learns is both understanding and ignorant at the same time, or else the agent intellect is not a power of his soul, but something above his soul. It follows, therefore, that a soul which is actually understanding must apprehend whatever it apprehends by something superior to the soul itself; such a soul, Bonaventure insists, must apprehend things by the wisdom of God, for He alone is superior to the human soul. But surely the intellect by which a soul is moved to understand is called an agent intellect not because it actually understands, but because it brings about understanding? If so, there is no need to go beyond an agent intellect to account for the act of understanding in a human soul. Bonaventure responds to this objection in the following way: everything which has understanding is superior to and better than anything which has no understanding; since the agent intellect is not able to bring about something better than and superior to itself, therefore, if the agent intellect is not understanding, it will never bring itself or any other intellect into the act of understanding: if the agent intellect is brought into the act of understanding, this must necessarily come about through something superior to it; but that can be only the eternal reason and truth of God. Consequently, the agent intellect itself is moved into act by God, who alone is actually understanding all things.25 The illumination of the human mind by God, as Bonaventure accounts for it, concerns both the agent and the possible intellect in the human soul. Moved into act by God, the agent intellect illumines the possible intellect to understand its objects under the influence of their immutable truth in His eternal reason. It is in this way that Bonaventure unites the doctrines of Aristotle and Augustine on the certitude of human knowledge. In uniting them, Bonaventure also draws together the doctrine of Aristotle on the object of science with the doctrine of Augustine on the eternal reasons in God, and so Bonaventure finds that the certitude of science depends upon the necessity of its objects in their eternal reasons. Although Bonaventure utilizes numerous historical sources, even so, there can be no doubt about the predominantly Augustinian influence on his fundamental arguments presented in preparation for his own solution to the problem of certitude in human knowledge. This influence is manifested even in the

25 Loc. «'«., fm. 32 (5.20); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 9.7-8 (1048b35-1050a2).

534

CHAPTER SEVEN

three following arguments given by Bonaventure on the basis of human reason. He adverts, in the first argument, to the doctrine of Augustine that, as several men can have sense knowledge of the same thing, at once and at the same time, only through something common to them, so also they can have intellectual knowledge of the same thing, at once and at the same time, only through some truth common to all of them. On this ground, Bonaventure argues that, because one truth not multiplied in any way can be understood by diverse men, such a truth is necessarily understood through something which is one, and which is in no way multiplied. But a truth of that kind can be only God, who is truth itself; so the truth of God is the principle of understanding in diverse men concerning any one truth.26 In the next argument, Bonaventure compares goodness and the will to truth and the intellect: as the will is to what is good, so is the intellect to what is true; and as every good thing is from the supreme good, so also every true thing is from the supreme truth. Since it is impossible for the human will to be drawn directly toward any good thing without attaining the supreme good in some way, therefore, it is impossible for the human intellect to know any true thing with certitude without in some way attaining the supreme truth.27 Thus, in the succeeding argument, coming clearly under Anselm's influence, Bonaventure holds that what is true is known only through truth, and through the most powerful truth, which is the one that is most easily known. Now this is the truth that cannot be thought not to-be: therefore, it is the uncreated truth, so that we know in the eternal truth and reason of God whatever we know through science and with certitude.28 Bonaventure restates the problem in replying formally to the question, which he answers affirmatively in this form: "Everything known with certitude is known in the light of the eternal reason". Expounding his answer, he says that it can be understood in three ways. It can be understood to mean in one way that the evidence of the eternal light, taken as both the whole and the sole principle of knowledge, accompanies the activity of the human intellect, thus giving it knowledge with ceritude. But this un-

26 Lac. cit., fm. 28 (5.20); cf. St. Augustine, De lib. arbit., 2.7-12 (PL 32.1249-1260). 27 Loc. cit., fm. 29 (5.20); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 8.3.4 (PL 42.949-50). There is also a probable influence on Bonaventure here from Anselm: Dialog, de verit., c. 10 (PL 158.478-79), and c. 13 (PL 158.484-86). 28 Loc. cit., fm. 30 (5.20). See in St. Augustine: De diver, quaes., q. 1 (PL 40.11), q. 23 (PL 40.16-17); and in St. Anselm: Op. cit., c. 1 (PL 158.468-69); cf. Mono!., c. 18 (PL 158.167D-168B). On the foundation arguments of Bonaventure in this question see the following: J. M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 228-33, G. Bonafede, II "De Scientia Christi..., pp. 114-20, 142-44, or Saggi' sulla filosofia mediaeval*, pp. 213-19, 239-41. On the truth of God as the one most easily known by us see: Vincent Mayer, "The Doctrine of St Bonaventure Concerning our Knowledge of God", Franciscan Studies, 2 (New York, J. F. Wagner. 1924), pp. 39-54; L. Veuthey, Antmianum, 28 (1953), pp. 19-38; G. Scheltens, TP, 16 (1954), pp. 579-602, and 17 (1955), pp. 383-403; by the same author, "Una metafisica de la verdad", W, 18 (1960), pp. 209-20; R. Sciamannini, La ctmtuizione bonavtmturiana (Firenze, "Citta di vita": 1957), pp. 109-16.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

535

derstanding is hardly right, because, according to it, there would be no difference between our knowledge in the present life and in beatitude, or between our knowledge of things in God, and in themselves; nor would there be any difference between the knowledge that we have through wisdom and through science, through nature and through grace, or from reason and revelation. Such an understanding, Bonaventure observes, gives rise to the error originating in the Old Academy, that there is knowledge with certitude only in the archetypal and intelligible world of things. The New Academy, moreover, has taught that nothing at all can be known with certitude, or through science, because that intelligible world is hidden from human minds. Consequently, a small error in the beginning, as Aristotle points out, leads to a greater one in the end.29 A second way of understanding the answer to the question posits only a necessary influence of the eternal reason of God on the human mind, so that, in knowing with certitude, the mind does not reach His eternal reason itself. This understanding, Bonaventure observes, is insufficient according to the words of Augustine. Giving clear reasons for his teaching, Augustine has shown explicitly that the mind to know with certitude, has to be regulated by the immutable and eternal rules governing it, not through a habitus of the mind itself, but through themselves inasmuch as they are above the mind in the eternal truth. Hence, to say that the human mind in knowing truth does not rise above the influence of the uncreated light to reach the eternal reason of God, Bonaventure remarks, is to say that Augustine has been deceived, since it is not easy, when explaining his doctrine, to bring his texts into line with that view. Now this is an extremely absurd thing to say of so great a Father and Doctor, Bonaventure declares, for the authority of Augustine is most great among all the exponents of the Scriptures. Furthermore, the influence of the uncreated light is either general or special: God has one influence on all creatures, and another influence on some through grace. If the human mind receives the influence of God's light within the general order of creation, God ought no more to be called the giver of wisdom than the giver of fertility to the earth, nor would science be said to come from God any more than money. If the influence of His light is received by the human mind in the special order of grace, all human knowledge is infused and none of it is either innate or acquired, and those are also absurd things to say.30 The third way of understanding the answer to the question is the one taken by Bonaventure, a way that he describes as midway between the other two. According to this understanding, the human intellect, to have knowledge with certitude, depends necessarily on God's eternal reason as the regulating and moving principle of knowledge, but not as its sole prin29 DSC, q. 4, Resp. "... in fine'." (5.23); cf. Aristotle, De caelo, 1.5 (271B9-10). Bonaventure, in referring to the Old and New Academies, draws explicitly on Augustine's Contra Academicos, 2.5-6 (PL 32.924-26). 30 Loc. cit., Resp. "Alio modo ... sunt absurda.'' (5.23).

536

CHAPTER SEVEN

ciple, nor is His eternal reason seen in its every kind of lustre; rather, the eternal reason of God is required necessarily with the created reason of the human mind, and as His reason is perceived by the mind according to the state of man in this life. Such is the teaching of Augustine, who says that an unjust man remembers God in order that he may turn toward Him as to the light by which, even when the man was turned away from God, he was touched in some way; so, thinking of His eternal rules, men who are unjust pass censure on many things, while praising just men for their upright actions. Augustine, considering those judgments of unjust men, affirms that they make their judgments through the rules "written in the book of that light, which is called truth".31 Setting forth his own view, Bonaventure states that both a nobility of knowledge and a dignity on the side of the knower are required, in attaining certitude, to arrive at the eternal rules and the immutable reasons of God. Nobility of knowledge is required because there cannot be knowledge with certitude unless the object of human science has immutability and the light of the human mind has infallibility. Now created truth is not absolutely immutable, nor is the proper power of the light of the human mind entirely infallible; both the object of science and the light of the mind come into being from non-being, and so the one is subject to mutability, the other to fallibility. To have complete knowledge of an object of science, therefore, the human mind must have recourse to that truth which is entirely immutable and stable, and to that light which altogether infallible. It is necessary, then, for the human mind, in order to have complete knowledge, to turn toward the eternal reason of God as toward the truth giving immutability to the object of science, and toward the light giving infallibility to the mind Consequently, neither the truth of things as they are in themselves, nor their truth as they are in the mind, is sufficient to enable the human soul to have the certitude of sciential knowledge, because the truth of things in their own being and the truth of their being in the human mind are both mutable. To have the certitude of sciential knowledge, therefore, the human mind must also know the objects of science as they are in the eternal reason of God The dignity required on the side of the knower is said by Bonaventure to be in the superior part of the human soul. Showing this, he says that the inferior reason does not suffice without the superior reason for the soul either to make a complete judgment about speculative things or to make a complete and deliberative judgment about practical things. Thus, it is by the superior reason, or the higher function of reason, that the soul is in contact with God's eternal rules and, through them, judges and defines whatever it defines and knows with certitude. Since the image of God is found in the superior part of the soul, therefore, inasmuch

31 Loc, cit., Resp. "Et ideo ... veritas dicitur'." (5.23); cf St. Augustine, De Trimt., 14.15.21 (PL 42.1050-52).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

537

as the soul is an image of God, it judges and defines things with certitude through their eternal rules. Elaborating on this particular point, Bonaventure compares the creature to the Creator according as the one is a vestige, or an image, or a likeness of the other. Every creature is a vestige of the Creator, to whom it is referred as to the principle of its being; in this respect, the natural operations of any creature require the cooperation of God as its creative principle. Every spiritual creature is an image of God, to whom it is referred as to the object of its potencies; from this point of view, the operations of the rational spirit require the further cooperation of God as its moving principle. To terminate in knowledge with ceritude, then, the natural operations of the human mind require the cooperation of God as the moving principle of knowledge. Only that spiritual creature in which God dwells through grace is said to be His likeness, so that, looking to God as to an infused gift, a rational spirit living in grace needs His cooperation in order to act meritoriously and in a way that is pleasing to God.32 Since knowledge with certitude is acquired by the rational spirit inasmuch as it is an image of God, Bonaventure goes on, the rational spirit arrives at His eternal reasons in the knowledge that it has of things with certitude. Because the rational spirit is not fully conformed to God in the present life, however, it is not able to reach His eternal reasons in such a way that it sees them completely, clearly and distinctly. Rather, they are seen more or less according as the rational spirit is more or less conformed to God; but it always reaches the eternal reasons of God in some way, because His image can never be removed from the rational soul. Developing this point, Bonaventure speaks of three states of the human soul: a state of innocence, a state of fallen nature, and a state of beatitude. In the first state, the image of God in the soul was not deformed by sin, but it was not fully conformed to God, since it was not beatified; so the soul arrived at His eternal reasons only in part, but not under a cloud. In the state of fallen nature, the soul is yet lacking in its conformity to God, and it has a deformity resulting from original sin; in consequence, it reaches the eternal reasons of God not only in part, but also in some darkness. In the state of beatitude, the soul will have no deformity, so that, fully conformed to God as His image and likeness, it will see the eternal reasons both clearly and completely. Moreover, because the soul is not an image of God by its whole nature, it cannot rely solely on His eternal reasons to have certitude; therefore, along with them, it must have similitudes abstracted from phantasms by the intellect, for those similitudes are the proper and distinct principles of knowledge for the human intellect. If the intellect were to have no abstract similitudes, the lumen of the eternal reason of God would not be sufficient for the intellect to have knowledge as long as the soul is confined to the conditions of the present life. Those con32 Lac. cit., Resp. "Quod autem ... sine superiori." (5.23-24).

538

CHAPTER SEVEN

ditions can be transcended, however, as they have been in the revelations of God to some of the Prophets, or as they transcended by a special revelation of God, such as the revelations that He makes to men rapt in ecstasy. In concluding, Bonaventure says that, as the texts of Augustine explicitly declare, the eternal reasons or principles of knowledge are reached by the human mind in the knowledge that it has of creatures with certitude, but they are attained differently in the present life and in beatitude, by wisdom and by science, through revelation and through natural reason, which is common to all men.33 Thus, for Bonaventure, to say that the human mind is illumined by God means that, whatever the mind knows, it knows with certitude in the light of God's eternal reason. This does not imply, in the first place, that His eternal light, which comes together with the human intellect, is the whole and sole principle of human knowledge or of its certitude. Bonaventure insists on the necessity of the human intellect to have similitudes abstracted from corporeal things, because those similitudes are its proper and distinct principles of knowledge; therefore, if the intellect has no similitudes of that kind, it cannot have knowledge, except by a special intervention of God, and so the lumen of His eternal reason alone is insufficient to move the intellect into operation according to the condition of the human mind in the present state of man. In other words, the illumination of the human intellect by God does not dispense it from the need to see in its own lumen, because the intellect, not perceiving its objects properly and distinctly in God, must understand created things properly and distinctly from their own similitudes and from its own principles of knowledge. It is along with the truth of principles in the human intellect, therefore, that the eternal reason of God moves it to know, so that His eternal reason is known, not in itself, but as it shines forth in those principles, and as it illuminates the mind of every man. This is why, Bonaventure notes, the eternal reason is the most certain truth for us in some way, for the human intellect cannot think in any way that the eternal truth is-not, which cannot be thought of any created truth.34 To say that the human mind knows in the light of the eternal reason does not imply, in the second place, that only an influence of God's eternal light, and not a perception of His eternal reason, is necessary for the human mind to know with certitude. It is in this respect that Bonaventure refers to Augustine, whose authority as a theologian he values very highly while regarding his teaching on the certitude of natural knowledge as having a solid and evident foundation in human experience. Siding with Augustine, then, Bonaventure accepts the view that the human mind must be regulated in its knowledge and judgments by the immutable 33 Loc. cit., Resp. "Quonian igitur ..." (5.24). 34 DSC, q. 4, sc 15-16 (5.22), ad 15-16 (5.25). When Bonaventure says that the eternal reason shines forth in the principles of the human mind, he is speaking analogically, i.e. the created principles of truth in the mind reflect the uncreated principles of truth in God.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

539

and eternal rules of God They regulate the mind, not through a created habitus of the mind, but through themselves as they are in the eternal truth.35 Bonaventure, for his own part, maintains that the human mind, to know with certitude, cannot rely solely on an influence of the eternal light. As the Creator of all things, God has a general influence on creatures. Hence, as the creative principle of their being, God cooperates in a general way with the natural work of His creatures, and so His influence on a rational creature is not distinct from His influence on any other creature. God has a special influence on rational creatures, moreover, according as they are similar to Him through grace; so, as an infused gift, God cooperates in a special way with the meritorious works of rational creatures, and thus His influence on them is not the same as His influence in the order of nature. Neither the general nor the special influence of God in creation, therefore, accounts for His cooperation with the mind of the rational creature in obtaining knowledge with certitude in the order of nature. Bonaventure is both very firm and very clear in his stand that the special influence of God is not involved in the natural knowledge, or in the certitude of natural knowledge, obtained by the human intellect. Even before Adam sinned, he was able to see the eternal reasons of God only in a partial way, because his mind did not have the complete conformity to God found only in beatitude, and this is the sole state in which the human mind can see His eternal reasons clearly and completely. In the present state of human nature, subsequent to Adam's sin, the human mind sees the eternal reasons not only in a partial way, but also with a degree of obscurity, because the human soul is both lacking in a full conformity to God and suffering from the consequences of original sin. Although the gift of grace repairs the deformity resulting in the soul from sin, nevertheless, the cooperation and influence of God regarding the human mind in the order of grace is above His cooperation and influence in the order of nature. Thus, Bonaventure does not confuse the order of natural reason with the order of divine revelation. Speaking on this very point, he says that, though God is simple and uniform, He is known in his eternal light and exemplar either exteriorly and openly or interiorly and secretly. He is known exteriorly and openly with respect to those things that come to-be according to the necessary order which He has established in the universe, so that, by the natural judgment of reason, the human intellect knows natural things in His eter-

35 "Et hie quidem modus dicendi est insufficiens secundum verba beati Augustini ... quod mens in certitudinali cognitione per incommutabiles et aeternas regulas habeat regular!, non tanquam per habirum suae mentis ..." —Loc. cit., Resp. (5.23); see above: p. 530 (n. 19). J. M. Bissen attributes to Bonaventure a doctrine on illumination that, proceeding from God, constitutes in the rational soul a habitus mentis containing an impression of the eternal laws and consisting of innate species found in the soul from its creation; those species, which are distinct from the first principles of truth, are the media through which the mind arrives at God's eternal reasons: L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 195-98.

540

CHAPTER SEVEN

nal reasons. God is known interiorly and secretly with respect to the things that come to-be according to the hidden disposition of His will, and so the human intellect knows supernatural things in His eternal reasons solely by a gift of divine revelation. Furthermore, even what is known through revelation is seen under a veil, so to speak, and in obscurity. But this does not imply that the human mind cannot know anything clearly and with certitude, Bonaventure insists, because the mind can see openly and limpidly, though not apart from God's eternal reasons, the created or natural principles of truth, which are its proper means of acquiring knowledge in this life, and with certitude. In sum, the special intervention of God in the work of the human intellect is above and beyond the order of natural knowledge and its proper certitude.36 Consequently, looking upon the rational creature as an image of the Creator, Bonaventure posits God as the object of its potencies. As the moving principle of knowledge, then, God cooperates with the natural operations of the human mind not only by the influence of His light, but also by directing the mind in such a way that, perceiving His eternal reasons, it obtains knowledge of creatures with certitude. In Bonaventure's view, therefore, to know any object with certitude, the human mind must receive both a cooperation of the eternal truth and an influence of the eternal light. Although Augustine says that the mind knows corporeal things through the senses and incorporeal things through its own nature, even so, according to Bonaventure, he is not excluding the cooperation of the uncreated truth in God with the created truth in the human mind, for the one truth is included in the other. When Augustine teaches, furthermore, that the mind according to its nature sees intelligible things in a sort of incorporeal light of the same kind as the mind itself, just as the sense of sight sees bodily things in its corporeal light, he is not teaching that the spiritual and created light of the mind is sufficient of itself to enable the intellect to know intelligible things, as the corporeal light of sight suffices for it to know bodily things. On the contrary, in Bonaventure's interpretation of Augustine, the expression 'light of the same kind' refers to all incorporeal light whether created or uncreated; so, when the expression is referred to created light, it does not exclude the uncreated light, nor does it follow that the mind does not see in the eternal reason of God, but that it does not see in this truth alone, since the human mind must also see its objects in the lumen of created truth.37

36 DSC, q. 4, ad 20-22 (5.26); cf. sc 20-22 (5.22). J. M. Bissen considers the illumination of natural knowledge to be a special intervention by God, influencing the work of the human mind through the innate likeness, or mental habitus, of His eternal reasons in the rational soul: L'exemptarisme diein ..., pp. 209-15; see also: pp. 250-51, 263. G. Scheltens describes illumination as constituting a special relation to God, a relation setting intellectual knowledge apart from the natural actions of creatures: "Una metafisica de la verdad", W, 18 (1960), pp. 226-29. 37 Loc. cit., sc 3-4 (5.21), ad 3-4 (5.24); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 9.3.3 (PL 42.963), and 12.15.24 (PL 42.1011).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

541

We have now shown what Bonaventure does not mean in saying that the human mind knows, whatever it knows, in the light of God's eternal reason. What, then, does his statement mean? It means, as we have seen, that the human mind depends necessarily on the eternal reason as on the regulating and moving principle of knowledge, so that, influencing and cooperating with the natural activity of the mind, the eternal reason is perceived by the mind in the knowledge that it has of creatures with certitude. Consisting in the influence and cooperation of God, His illumination of the mind confers certitude on its sciential knowledge, provided there is a nobility on the side of the object and a dignity on the side of the knower. With regard to the first of those two conditions, Bonaventure speaks of the necessity for the object of science to be immutable, something not found in any created thing considered absolutely, because every creature has its being from non-being. As a consequence, to have complete knowledge of an object of science, the human mind must have recourse to the eternal reason of God as to that truth which, giving immutability and stability to all created truths, is alone entirely stable and immutable. Bonaventure also speaks here of the necessity for the light of the human mind to have infallibility, which is not present in the mind of itself, since it is a created power, and so it is contingent in its being and operation. To have the complete knowledge that is proper to human science, therefore, the mind must turn toward the eternal light, which is the only light altogether infallible and the one conferring infallibility on the created light of the human mind In short, the mind has the certitude belonging to human science, because the mind shares in the infallibility of the eternal light and the object of sciences shares in the immutability of the eternal reason or truth of God. On putting forward this solution to the problem of illumination, Bonaventure refers directly to the doctrine of Augustine on the necessity of the human mind both to know and to judge all things in the light of the eternal truth of God. There are a number of objections to Augustine's doctrine, however, that Bonaventure is obliged to handle. Thus, if all immutable truths are superior to the human soul, every such truth is eternal, and so it is God; since the truth of any demonstrative principle is immutable, a truth of this sort would be God, so that nothing would be known through science except God. If every immutable truth, moreover, is a truth of the eternal exemplar, and this is but one, all immutable truths would be but one truth; in consequence, all beings would be but one being, because there is some immutable truth even in every contingent being, such as: 'if Socrates runs, Socrates is moving'. From a theological viewpoint, furthermore, if the truth of an immutable principle is God, then, because God must be worshipped, truths of that kind ought to be worshipped. On the other hand, if every truth is God, anyone clearly seeing an immutable truth also clearly sees God; but the demons clearly see some immutable truths, and so, clearly seeing God, they would be beatified, which is quite an absurd thing to say.38 38 "Item obiicitur contra rationes Augustini sic ..." — Loc. cit., sc 23-26 (5.22).

542

CHAPTER SEVEN

Replying all at once to these objections, Bonaventure says that a truth is called immutable either absolutely or conditionally. When an immutable truth is said to be superior to the human mind, and to be God, that truth is immutable absolutely. When the truth of a demonstrative principle is said to be immutable, then, if this truth names something created, it is immutable conditionally, because everything created starts out from non-being and can go back into non-being. Although the truth of a demonstrative principle seems to be certain absolutely to the rational soul, even so, as a created truth, a demonstrative principle is a complex and not a simple thing. The truth signified by such a principle can be signified according as it is in matter, or in the soul, or in the eternal exemplar, or even with certitude in all of those ways at once. Now the truth in an exterior sign is itself a sign of the truth in the soul, as Aristotle indicates: "Spoken words are symbols of experiences in the soul". Since the soul is a medium between created things and the Creator, it looks toward temporal things according to its inferior reason, and toward eternal things according to its superior reason; therefore, as a medium between two extremes, truth in the soul looks to both created and uncreated truth, so that the soul has certitude in a relative way from its inferior reason, and in an absolute way from its superior reason. Consequently, a truth known in the latter way by the soul is superior as an immutable truth to the soul itself, and this is the way that Augustine speaks of immutable truth as superior to the human mind. The objections to Augustine's doctrine, therefore, are based on the conditional immutability of truth. This sort of immutability is taken properly into account in a demonstration, and it is the kind of immutability multiplied in diverse truths; but this kind of immutable truth, which the demons can see, is not the subject of divine worship. The truth which is absolutely immutable, or God, can be seen clearly only by those who can enter into the deep silence of their minds; but no sinner can accomplish that, which can be done solely by one who is a very great lover of God.39 Does this mean that God can be seen by some men, or is accessible to them, in their present life? If so, then it is contrary to the teaching of Scripture that God alone "dwells in inaccessible light, which no man sees, and which no man can see" (Timothy, 2.4). But everything by which and in which a man knows truth is accessible to him; therefore, this cannot be the light of the eternal truth or reason of God, which is not accessible to any man. Bonaventure, interpreting the text of Scripture, holds that it has to do with seeing the divine light in the fulness of its lustre and brilliance, a way in which it can seen by a created intellect only when it is beatified.40 Nevertheless, according to Gregory, whatever a human mind sees perfectly when

39 Loc. cit., ad 23-26 (5.26-27); cf. Aristotle, Periher., c. 1 (16a3-4). On this question see: J. M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 245-51; F. Schwendiger, FKS, 15 (1928), pp. 220-27; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 65-67; J. G. Bougerol, Introd. s. Bonav., pp. 119-20. 40 Loc. cit,, sc 1 (5.21), ad 1 (5.24).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

543

it is suspended in contemplation, it does not see God. Since the principle of perfect knowledge is seen by the mind whenever it knows with certitude, then, because the mind does not see God, that principle cannot be in God. According to Dionysius, furthermore, if a man who sees God understands what he sees, he does not see God; rather, he sees something created, for God is the substance which is beyond human understanding, and so the uncreated truth is not reached by a human mind in the knowledge that it has during the present life. Replying to both objections, Bonaventure points out that neither Gregory nor Dionysius deny that the true lumen which "illumines every man coming into this world" (,/"., 1.9) is reached by the human mind; they simply say that it cannot be seen completely by a man in his present life. 41 But it is impossible, nonetheless, to see something in God without seeing God himself, just as something cannot be seen in a mirror without seeing the mirror. It follows that, if what is known with certitude is seen in God's eternal reasons, His lumen and truth are also seen, and thus God himself must be seen. Besides, if created things are known with certitude by their eternal reasons, the certitude of human knowledge would be the same both regarding necessary and contingent things, and regarding present and future things, because all things are equally certain in their eternal reasons. Bonaventure, in reply, grants that it is not possible to see an image in a mirror without also seeing the mirror itself, since it reflects the image properly and distinctly while terminating the vision of the beholder. But those conditions are found in the eternal mirror of God with respect only to those who see Him face to face in beatitude. With respect to those not yet beatified, it would be true to say that their knowledge of the different kinds of created things would have the same certitude, if they were seen completely in their eternal reasons, and if those reasons were the whole ground of human knowledge. Now that is not so, because, in the present state of life, the human intellect needs, along with the eternal reasons, its proper similitudes and the determinate principles that it receives from created things. Not having principles of this sort from contingent and future things, the intellect cannot know them with certitude, which belongs only to the knowledge that it has of necessary things, and of things that are present to it.42 The second condition required for the certitude of human science is a dignity on the side of the knower. Bonaventure sees this condition fulfilled 41 Loc. tit., sc 5-6 (5.21), ad 5-6 (5.25). See in St. Gregory, Moralium, 5.26.66 (PL 75.716); and in Dionysius, Epist., n. 1 (PG 3.1066): cf. Scotus Erigena, in PL 122.1177. 42 Loc. cit., sc 17-18 (5.22), ad 17-18 (5.26). On the view of Bonaventure that God is not perceived in Himself by the mind when, in this life, it sees His eternal reasons consult V. Mayer, "The Doctrine of St. Bonaventure ...", pp. 39-46; M. R. Dady, Theory of Knowledge .... pp. 33-42; L. Cruz, EX, 1 (1951), pp. 241-43. G. Bonafede, in a note to // "De Scientia Christi" ..., pp. 167-70, or Saggi sulla filosofia medioevale, pp. 257-59, gives a concise analysis of the problem of ontologism discussed by many historians in connexion with Bonaventure's doctrine on illumination. In our view, there is no basis for such a problem in his doctrine.

544

CHAPTER SEVEN

in the superior part of the rational soul, the part containing the image of God. The soul does not judge the truth completely either of speculative or of practical things by its inferior reason alone; to judge things completely, the soul must act by its superior reason, which is in contact with the eternal rules of God. It is by the superior reason, then, or the higher function of reason, that the soul judges and defines with certitude whatever it judges and defines according to God's eternal rules. In this regard, Bonaventure i confronted with several difficulties, most of them stemming from the doctrine of Aristotle. The act of human understanding is temporal and often interrupted, as Aristotle shows, but the eternal reasons are so entirely above time that the intellect, in its understanding, cannot reach them in any way. Now the operations of the agent and possible intellects, as Aristotle speaks of them, are sufficient for the soul to acquire perfect knowledge, so that the soul does not need the help of the eternal reason of God. Aristotle also shows that human experience, originating from sense knowledge, gives rise to the universal knowledge belonging to science, which has a proper certitude. Kowledge with certitude, therefore, comes from the inferior reason. Since our knowledge of things in their eternal reasons comes from the superior reason, it would seem that, in our present life, we do not have knowledge through the lumen of the eternal reasons. Bonaventure, handling these difficulties, says that they indicate the need for the lumen of the intellect and the principles of created truth to come together in order that the intellect may understand; nevertheless, this does not exclude the light of God and the principle of eternal truth, because it is possible for the soul, according to its inferior reason, to know temporal things by its superior reason reaching eternal things, which are above the soul.43 The difficulties, however, are not yet resolved. There is knowledge with certitude in the senses, and they do not rely on the certitude of God's eternal reason; but the intellect is more powerful than any sense, and so, even more strongly than the senses, it ought to be capable of knowing, and of understanding. Integral knowledge of an object requires only a knower, an abstract principle or similitude, and a turning of the knower upon that similitude. A man has an intellective potency that can abstract a similitude from its object and turn itself toward this similitude without the help of God's eternal reason. Surely, then, the human intellect can acquire knowledge with certitude apart from the eternal truth? The certitude of sense knowledge, Bonaventure rejoins, is not like the certitude of intellectual knowledge. A sense

43 DSC, q. 4, sc 7-9 (5.21), ad 7-9 (5.25). See in Aristotle: De aruma, 3.5-6 (430alO-430bl9); AaaL poster., 2.19 (100a4-8). F. Schwendiger associates certitude of knowledge with the superior reason in such a way that the work of the inferior reason is not influenced by the illumination from God, because His illumination has to do directly with the certitude of knowledge, and not with its acquisition, as such; this view directs Schwendiger's whole analysis of Bonaventure's doctrine on illumination: FKS, 15 (1928), pp. 193-244; FKS, 16 (1929), pp. 29-64. As we have seen, however, Bonaventure insists on the influence and cooperation of God at all levels of intellectual knowledge in man.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

545

power has certitude because, by way of nature, its potency of operation is restricted to a determinate object, as hearing is restricted to sound; but the certitude of the intellect cannot come from a limitation of that kind, since, as Aristotle insists, the intellect has an unrestricted potency enabling it to understand all things. The certitude of the intellect, therefore, must come from something having no restriction regarding either immutability or infallibility. That something is nothing else than the eternal light and the eternal truth of God, so that the human intellect must have recourse to His eternal reason as to the fount of all certitude. Although the intellect turns itself toward its proper object, even so, its turning includes a judgment that cannot be certain unless it is made according to the eternal law, which alone is so certain that, as Augustine has said, no one judges its truth, nor can anyone judge well without it. Consequently, every certain judgment of the human intellect includes the eternal truth and reason of God.44 There is one other difficulty remaining: Aristotle has shown that the principles of being and of knowledge are the same; if the proper and intrinsic principles of being in creatures are only created principles, therefore, whatever is known by a science depending on created principles is not known according to the uncreated lumen and reason of God. Bonaventure handles this difficulty in the following manner: as the intrinsic principles of being are insufficient to give being to a creature apart from its extrinsic and first principle, which is God, so those same principles cannot of themselves give complete knowledge to the intellect apart from God, who is the first principle of knowledge. The principles of being in creatures are the ground of sciential knowledge in such a way that they do not exclude from it the very first ground of knowledge, just as the very first ground of being is not excluded from the act of being in any creature.45 In Bonaventure's solution to the question of certitude in human science, there is no problem in uniting the doctrine of Aristotle to the doctrine of Augustine. Distinguishing the certitude of sense knowledge from the certitude of intellectual knowledge, Bonaventure stays with Aristotle in attributing certitude to a sense power because of its natural restriction to a determinate object and, at the same time, in attributing to the intellect an unrestricted capacity to know all things in some way. Though the intellect

44 Loc. cit., sc 10-13 (5.21-22), ad 10-13 (5.25). See in Aristotle: De anima, 3.4 (429alO-28); Metaph., 9.2 (1046a36-28); 9.5 (1047b31-1048a24). 45 Loc. cit., sc 14 (5.22), ad 14 (5.25); cf. Aristotle, Anal poster., 1.2 (71b8-33; 72a25-72b4). According to Z. Van de Woestyne, there is no direct influence of the eternal reasons on the actual formation of concepts, so that God's illumination of the intellect is confined to the certitude of truth pronounced in its judgments; thus, it is the art of judgment that falls directly under the illumination from God Antmianum, 9 (1933), pp. 475-504; see in particular pp. 479-81. But Bonaventure is very clear about the all-inclusive nature of God's illumination: as the principal cause and agent of all knowledge, He influences and cooperates with the entire activity of the human intellect, which is a created agent and cause of knowledge.

546

CHAPTER SEVEN

is able to know its objects in its own lumen, by its own principles, and through the similitudes that it abstracts from created things, nevertheless, it could not operate at all, according to Bonaventure, apart from the influence and cooperation of the lumen and truth of God. Thus, turning to Augustine's doctrine, Bonaventure completes the doctrine of Aristotle by positing the infallible light and the immutable truth of God as the primary and, therefore, indispensable source of certitude in human science. As a consequence, for Bonaventure, the certitude of every judgment by the human intellect contains, or reflects analogically, the certitude of truth in God, because the intellect cannot judge anything apart from the first principle and cause of the being and truth of created things. Since the intellect judges its objects in their eternal reasons by the superior portion of its natural power of reason, Bonaventure attributes to the superior part of the rational soul the natural dignity that it needs to know and to judge its proper objects with certitude. This dignity consists in the image of God; therefore, as an image of God, the soul has the capacity to know with certitude, so that, in knowing its objects with certitude, the soul arrives at their eternal reasons in God. Because the soul of every man is created in the image of God, the intellect of each man in the world is illumined by God, and so His eternal reasons are always perceived in some way by a man having knowledge with certitude. Bonaventure refers here, as we have seen, to the natural capability of a man as an image of God to perceive His eternal reasons according as the man is more or less conformed to God. Every man, then, can have certain knowledge, at least to the extent that he apprehends the truth of creatures as they are in themselves: their truth includes the eternal truth, thus manifesting it to the man who judges things rightly. But a man comprehending the truth of creatures through science has a greater certitude than one who does not know them in that way. The certitude of sciential knowledge results from a comprehension of creatures as they are in their causes, which include and, therefore, make known the first and principal cause of created things. Hence, perceiving the Creator from His creatures, the man of science is conformed in his knowledge to God in such a way that his judgments of creatures proceed according to their eternal reasons in the Creator, and so this man knows that creatures cannot be otherwise than they are. His certitude can become even greater when he knows that his knowledge of created things is necessarily true, because it cannot be otherwise than it is. Certitude of that sort comes from a comparison by the man of his reasons with God's reasons concerning the truth of creatures, a comparison undertaken, of course, by way of analogy. The greatest certitude belonging to human knowledge, however, is found in natural wisdom. The certitude of natural wisdom, necessitating the most perfect conformity of the rational spirit to God, proceeds from a knowledge of all created things according to the unity of their causality in the one eter-

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

547

nal reason and truth of God, who is perceived both from creatures and in creatures as their one supreme cause.46 What exactly is the difference between the illumination of science and the illumination of wisdom? If the human mind knows things in their eternal reasons, and if those reasons are the highest causes of truth, then, because wisdom is the knowledge of the highest causes, it would seem that a man who has knowledge with certitude necessarily has wisdom. To become wise, Bonaventure maintains, a man must not only arrive at God's eternal reasons, but also rest in them and know with certitude that he has reached them. A man of science is drawn toward the eternal reasons as to the principles moving his intellect to know the truths of creatures, whereas a man of wisdom is drawn back again to the eternal reasons, so that, resting in them, he contemplates the truth of creatures in their eternal reasons. Thus, Bonaventure remarks, there are many men of science, but only a few men of wisdom, because only a small number of men know with certitude that they have arrived at the eternal reasons of God. Indeed, Bonaventure adds, it seems difficult to a man who has not yet been raised in contemplation of God to see that God is present to his intellect; God is very close to all of us, for He is, as Scripture says, "not far away from any one of us" (Acts, 17.27). 47 How great a natural conformity to God, then, must a man have to be wise? According to Augustine, for instance, the gaze of a human mind not cleansed through the holiness of faith cannot be fixed upon the eternal light. It would seem from this that, to be wise, a man must be free from sin, and even holy. In Bonaventure's view, however, to know truth through the eternal reasons of God, it is necessary for the gaze of the mind to be fixed on His eternal light only when truth is known by wisdom, which arrives at the eternal reasons as the end of knowledge. To rest ultimately in the eternal reasons, however, a man must be cleansed through faith, and this is the sort of wisdom to which Augustine refers.48 Speaking formally of the illumination of wisdom, and specifically of the wisdom of Christ, Bonaventure teaches that a man is wise by a perfection or habitus of wisdom. This perfection is not the uncreated wisdom of God, because His wisdom is only the exemplar form, and not the intrinsic form, of created wisdom, which is an accidental perfection of the intellective part of the human soul. A man having wisdom, therefore, is wise through a participation in the eternal wisdom of God. The man participates in that eternal wisdom, however, not according to its essence, but according as it in-

46 G. Bonafede considers the image of God to be constituted in the soul by its act of attaining His eternal reasons: II "De Scientia Chriiti" ..., pp. 145-58, or Saggi sulta Jtltaofia medioevale, pp. 242-51. Bonaventure holds, however, that the soul arrives at God's eternal reasons because it is His image. For some other accounts of Bonaventure's doctrine on illumination see: L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 65-70; B. Madariga, W, 7 (1949), pp. 307-10; E. Bettoni, // probiema della cognosc. di Deo ..., pp. 166-69. 47 DSC, q. 4, sc 19 (5.22), ad 19 (5.26). 48 Loc. at., sc 2 (5.21), ad 2 (5.24); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 1.2.4 (PL 42.822).

548

CHAPTER SEVEN

fluences his mind to understand truth. Now God is most present through His wisdom to the intellect of every man: if His presence alone were sufficient to make a man wise, every man would be wise; but that is not true, and so a man, to be wise, must also have a created form of wisdom. To have wisdom, moreover, a man must be united in knowledge to an object, to which his intellect is assimilated. Since every assimilation comes about according to some quality, therefore, in possessing wisdom, a man has a created and spiritual quality, or habitus, disposing his intellect to know the truth of its object in the uncreated wisdom of God. In order that he reach this fount of wisdom in a full or perfect way, however, the man must be conformed to God through grace, which is the created source of the wisdom founded on Christian faith.49 To understand how the human mind has the certitude of wisdom, Bonaventure observes, it is necessary to keep in view that the mind, to have any knowledge with certitude, needs both the influence and the cooperation, or presence, of the eternal light. This need is due to the nature of the creature: no created thing can stabilize the soul in perfect knowledge until the mind has reached the immutable truth and the infallible light of God Regarding sapiential knowledge, then, Bonaventure says that the influence and the presence of the eternal light are both necessary in order that the human soul become wise, not because of any defect on the part of the eternal light itself, but because the human mind can arrive at the fontal wisdom of God only if the human soul is conformed to God through grace. To be conformed to God in that way, the soul must be properly disposed in itself and elevated above itself to know God It is necessary for the soul, therefore, to receive the influence of the eternal light in such a way that its effect, which is the habitus of created wisdom, is both proportionate to and inherent in the soul. Furthermore, to perfect the soul interiorly and to draw it up to God, His eternal light must influence the soul as its moving principle, its guiding reason, and its reposing end As a consequence, the created wisdom in the soul is not because of itself called wisdom, but because of the uncreated wisdom from which it flows, according to which it is guided, and toward which it is drawn. For this reason, Bonaventure remarks, the wise men who have been elevated above themselves in contemplation of God have attributed the name wisdom principally and properly to the uncreated wisdom alone, for it is the fount of all wisdom. According to the common understanding of the name, nonetheless, wisdom is also attributed to the influence of God inasmuch as it habilitates the human mind, thus giving it a capacity for perfect knowledge. This is the kind of knowledge requiring a concourse of the uncreated wisdom with a created wisdom as its moving principle, its guiding reason, and its reposing end Hence, as Augustine suggests, men have wisdom from the concourse

49 DSC, q. 5, sc 3-7, 9-10 (5.29).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

549

of the eternal truth with the knowledge that they conceive of truth, a knowledge informing or perfecting the human soul.50 Bonaventure's account of the illumination of wisdom shows that it completes the illumination of science. He insists that both science and wisdom, as certain modes of knowledge, need the influence and presence of the eternal light and truth of God. For the certitude of science, His eternal reasons are needed as the principles that move and regulate the intellect in its operations, terminating them in a knowledge of creatures according to the truth of their eternal reasons, but without the intellect knowing that it has reached them. For the certitude of wisdom, however, the eternal reasons are needed not only as the principles moving and guiding the intellect, but also as the end in which it reposes, or the truth that it contemplates, and so the intellect knows that it has arrived at the eternal principles of truth in God. Regarding the illumination of wisdom, Bonaventure talks about a habitus of wisdom, whether natural or infused, effected in the human soul by God. This habitus is a created perfection inhering in the soul and habilitating it, thus disposing it to participate in the uncreated wisdom through the influence of God's eternal light.51 It is by means of the habitus of created wisdom, therefore, that the uncreated wisdom is present to the human intellect. Bonaventure explains this point, with respect to infused wisdom, by comparing God as the life of the soul to the soul as the life of the body. The soul is said to be the life of the body either as its form and perfection or as a mover exercising an influence in the body. Now the soul, in vivifying the body, resembles God in giving life to the soul only inasmuch as the soul is the mover of the body. The soul moves the body by means of its own potencies and by means of the body's dispositions, which make it fit for the influence of the soul. In a similar manner, the eternal light and love of God move and vivify the soul by means of the grace and the wisdom that He causes in the soul.52 To arrive at the uncreated wisdom, then, the human intellect must be disposed or habilitated by a created wisdom, and this wisdom, Bonaventure says, is not able to illumine the soul, nor is it able to subsist there, without the light and influence of the uncreated wisdom of God.53 In this regard, Bonaventure maintains that Augustine does not exclude the created wisdom in the soul when he speaks of the uncreated wisdom as the wisdom which alone is immutable and, therefore, as the one wisdom by which men are wise. Whenever Augustine talks about wisdom, 50 Lac. cit, Resp. (5.29-30); cf. arg. 1 & 16 (5.27-28), ad 1 & 16 (5.30-31). Note the passage from Augustine: "In ilia aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam, secundum quam sumus et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus, atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam tanquam verburn apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus, nee a nobis nascendo discedit" — De Trinit., 9.7.12 (PL 42.967). 51 Bonaventure speaks in like manner about the habitus of science, which disposes the soul to participate in the uncreated science of God Loc. cit., arg. 10 (5.28), ad 10 (5.31). 52 Loc. cit., arg. 11 (5.28), ad 11 (5.31); cf. arg. 13, ad 13. 53 Cf. loc. at., arg. 17-18 (5.28), ad 17-18 (5.31-32).

550

CHAPTER SEVEN

Bonaventure affirms, he talks nearly always about the uncreated wisdom either because, by comparison with it, created wisdom does not deserve the name wisdom or because, with respect to its influence, created wisdom depends totally on it. Consequently, in Bonaventure's judgment, created wisdom is properly said more to belong to a being than to be a being, and so it is properly named an effect or an irradiation of wisdom.54 The name wisdom, according to Bonaventure, belongs principally and properly to the fontal wisdom of God. This is the wisdom from which every form of created wisdom flows, by which it is guided, and toward which it is drawn as to the one source of all truth. Bonaventure applies the name wisdom, as we have already seen, both to an infused knowledge founded on Christian faith and to a natural knowledge founded on human reason. In the first instance, the name is applied properly to the worship of God according to the theological virtues; it is applied also properly and in a better way to the gift of wisdom coming from the Holy Spirit. Hence, applied to a habitus in the soul, wisdom designates a knowledge of things revealed by God according to His will and known in His eternal light by way of divine revelation. In the second instance, the name is applied commonly to a general knowledge of all things, or of things human and divine, and it is applied less commonly to a knowledge of the highest causes, or of eternal things. When wisdom is thus applied to a habitus of the soul, the name designates a knowledge of things established by God in the natural order of the universe and known in His eternal light by way of natural reason.55 It is with respect to the latter form of created wisdom that Bonaventure speaks in saying that the uncreated wisdom is most present to the intellect of every men, even though only a few men actually advert to its presence, or arrive knowingly at its eternal reasons, and so become wise. Those men who have natural wisdom are disposed for it by an influence of the eternal light, which habilitates their minds by giving them a capacity for perfect knowledge, or knowledge with certitude, through a habitus of wisdom. This habitus is effected in their minds by a concourse of the eternal truth with the knowledge that they form or conceive, under the influence of the eternal light, of the truth of God as the supreme cause of creatures.56

54 Loc. cit., arg 2-3 (5.27), ad 2-3 (5.30); cf. arg. 6-7, ad 6-7. See in St. Augustine: De lib. orbit., 2.19.52 (PL 32.1268); De diver, quaes., 73.1 (PL 40.84). For a similar interpretation of the doctrine of Hugh of St Victor on the nature of wisdom see: arg. 4-5 (5.27), ad 4-5 (5.30); cf. De sapientia animae Christi, (PL 176.85 IB, 853C-854A). 55 See above: pp. 409-15. 56 DSC, q. 6, Resp. "... veritas informant" (5.34); q. 7, ad 19-21 (5.42-43). On the problem of the illumination of natural wisdom in Bonaventure see: E. Bettoni, Ilproblema della cognosc. di Dio ..., pp. 17784. L. Veuthey has the opinion that, for Bonaventure, sciential knowledge cannot be truly certain apart from the more perfect illumination of wisdom, an illumination that does not involve a reposing of the human mind in the eternal reasons of God: Si. Bonav. philos. ckris., pp. 65-74; see also: "Les divers courants de la philosophic augustino-franciscaine au moyen-age", SRHCI, pp. 638-40.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

551

Bonaventure's presentation of his doctrine on the illumination of wisdom manifests a dependence only on the doctrine of Augustine. This dependence is confined to Augustine's teaching on the necessity for a concourse of the eternal truth with the knowledge that men, becoming wise, conceive of the truth of God, or of His eternal reasons. Thus, contrasting sharply with Bonaventure's doctrine on the illumination of science, his doctrine on the illumination of wisdom is presented, for the most part, without the aid of historical sources.

Considering the divine truth, Thomas Aquinas says that it alone is eternal truth, because it is founded on the divine being, which is the only eternal being. The divine truth is likewise the only immutable truth, speaking absolutely, for the being of God is the one being which is absolutely immutable. The being of creatures is said to be mutable because it can be changed either through variation or through a return to nothing, which would happen if the creature were not sustained by God. Since the being of a creature is the foundation of its truth, there is no necessary truth in creatures, considered absolutely; therefore, the truth of a thing in the human intellect, which has a variable nature, is neither immutable nor eternal in itself. This is why Augustine, in the judgment of Aquinas, attributes eternity and immutability solely or absolutely, to divine truth. 57 A creature is said to be true, according to Aquinas, by an instrinsic measure, which is its inherent truth, and by an extrinsic measure, which is the first truth. Although creatures are true by their varied participations in the first truth, nevertheless, their variety of participations does not involve any change whatever in the first truth itself, as Augustine says: "Our minds see this truth sometimes more, sometimes less, but it stays the same in itself, neither improving when we see it more nor deteriorating when we see it less."58 But the inherent truth of a creature is said to be changed according as the creature is changed with respect to its truth. Now a creature has truth either in itself or in an intellect, whether human or divine. When the truth of created things is taken according as they are ordered to the divine intellect, the truth of a thing can be seen to change into another truth, but not into what is false, for truth is a most general form, since it is the same as a thing's entity. Just as a thing remains a being after a change 57 1 Sent,, 19.5.3, con. & Sol. (1.495-96); cf. St. Augustine, De natura bmi, c. 1 (PL 42.551-52). On the divine truth as the solely eternal truth note: "Dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum autem, secundum Philosophum, VI Metaph. (c. 4; 1027b 17-29), est 'in intellectu'. Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in intellectu aeterno, qui est' intellectus divinus solus. Unde non sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum." — ST, la, 10.3, ad 3 (l.Slb). See also: ST, la, 16.7 (1.118b-19b); SCG, 2.84 "Quod vero secundo ... eius aeternitas." (2.245-46, n. 1688); DV, 1.5 (1.9-13). 58 De lib. arbit., 2.12.34 (PL 32.1259).

552

CHAPTER SEVEN

from one form to another, according to which it now has being, so a thing always remains true after such a change; however, it is now true by another truth because of a new form, so that the thing is still conformed to the divine intellect, to which it is known according to its every disposition. When the truth of created things is taken according as they are ordered to the human intellect, or as the intellect is ordered to them, the truth of a thing is changed sometimes into what is false and sometimes into another truth. Thus, Aquinas explains, when equals are subtracted from equals, equal though different quantities remain, as two from four leaves two. When the intellect and a thing undergo an equal change, they remain adequated, but in a different truth: when a man is seated, he is understood as sitting; when he is no longer seated, he is understood as not-sitting. On the other hand, if unequals are subtracted from equals, unequal quantities remain, as three from four leaves one. If the intellect and a thing undergo an unequal change, they are then no longer equal with respect to truth, and so their adequation is false: if a man is white, he is understood to be white; if he becomes black, but is still understood to be white, the intellect is then false in its understanding of the man's true colour. A created thing is always true in itself, therefore, because its nature is conformed in truth to the divine mind. As long as a thing continues to exist, Aquinas says, it cannot change with respect to whatever is essential to it, so that, in this respect, the truth of a thing is immutable. But a thing can change with respect to what is accidental to it; so, in that respect, the truth of a thing is mutable. The mind of a man is true whenever it is conformed in truth to a thing, so that, while the thing remains unchanged, its truth in his intellect is immutable. When a thing changes, however, its truth in the man's intellect must also change, and thus truth in a human intellect is mutable, not in itself, but according as the thing known changes from one truth to another. A man speaks the truth, therefore, when his words conform to the truth in his intellect. This truth consists in an adequation of his intellect to the thing; but the truth in the thing consists in its conformity to the divine intellect, which is adequated immutably to every condition and every disposition of the thing. Consequently, truth is entirely immutable only in the divine mind, and so the immutability of truth in the mind and in the speech of a man depends on the exemplar of all truth in the mind of God.59 Aquinas differs quite remarkably from Bonaventure in handling the question of the immutability of created truth. They are not altogether apart, nonetheless, in their individual solutions to that question. The two theologians are, rather, quite close in some respects. Thus, both of them, explaining Augustine's doctrine, maintain that truth is absolutely immutable only in God, since His being alone is entirely unchangeable: because the being of creature comes from nothing, it is mutable in itself, or

59 DV, 1.6, Resp. "Dictum est...", ad 2 & 4 (1.14-15); ST, la, 16.8, Resp., ad 3-4 (1.120ab).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

553

considered apart from its conserving cause, which is God; as a consequence, the truth of creatures is not immutable absolutely either in itself or in the human mind, or as it is expressed in speech. The immutability of created truth is described by Bonaventure as conditional, namely, it is immutable because of a participation in the immutability of the uncreated truth. As a result of that participation, created truth is assimilated immutably to the uncreated truth in such a way that the one, because it is essentially contingent, depends intrinsically on the necessity and stability of the other. Aquinas describes the immutability of created truth in the following manner: created truth participates in divine truth because of the conformity or assimilation of the nature of a creature in truth to the divine mind Hence, measured intrinsically by an inherent truth, a creature, following its essential necessity as a being, has an intrinsic immutability in truth, but with an extrinsic dependence on the first truth. The differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure, then, are due to their respective positions on the constitution of the creature and its relations to the Creator rather than to their immediate reasons why created truth is mutable. Though Bonaventure insists that the uncreated truth always remains extrinsic to the created truth in a thing and in a human intellect, at the same time, he also insists that the truth of every created thing, as a similitude of the Creator, includes the uncreated truth. For this reason, Bonaventure holds that every created truth gives the intellect an implicit knowledge of God, and so His truth is said to be the most certain and the one most knowable to the human intellect. Aquinas, however, positing only an extrinsic dependence of the creature on the Creator, does not hold that the truth of God is so enclosed in the nature of a creature that He is most certain and most knowable to the human intellect. In his judgment, the first principles are the truths most certain to the intellect, because they are its intrinsic ground of knowledge, and they are known in the natural light of human reason. But this light is not known immediately by the intellect; it is known only after some intelligible object is known and, even then, following many acts of inquiry regarding both the nature of the intellect and the nature of its knowledge. Seeing that it is so difficult to know the light of the human intellect, Aquinas says that it is still more difficult to arrive at a knowledge of the influence of the light of God on the intellect. Consequently, the divine truth is not the one most knowable to the human intellect and, therefore, is not the first truth that a man can know. When Augustine says that we know all things in the first truth, and that we judge them through it, he is not saying that this truth is the first to be known by us, nor is he saying that the uncreated truth is the proximate principle by which we know and judge created things. On the contrary, according to Aquinas, he says that we know and judge those things through our natural lumen of reason, which is a likeness or created impression of the first truth and has its efficacy only from the first light, just as the second principles of demonstration have their certitude only from the power of the first prin-

554

CHAPTER

SEVEN

ciples. Since the natural lumen of reason is not what we know when we know truth, but that by which truth is made known to us, therefore, the divine truth is not what we know when we know truth by the lumen of reason, because the first truth is even less known to us than our natural lumen of reason.60 Because Aquinas differs from Bonaventure on the constitution of the creature and its dependence on the Creator, the interpretation by Aquinas differs from Bonaventure's interpretation of the doctrine of Augustine on the illumination of the human mind, particularly with regard to the seeing of His eternal reasons. Thus, concerning Augustine's statement that the human mind judges corporeal things according to incorporeal and eternal reasons, Aquinas calls attention again to the nature of the first principles, which are known innately, as created similutudes of the uncreated truth. Since the first principles are natural likenesses of the uncreated truth, the human mind is said to judge created things through immutable reasons or principles according as it judges creatures through its first principles of truth. Augustine's statement, therefore, should be understood as referring to the superior part of human reason, which is the part that contemplates eternal things. But the operation of the superior reason is posterior to the operation of the inferior reason, Aquinas adds, even though the superior reason is prior to the inferior reason in dignity. On the latter point, at least, Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure.61 But Aquinas differs considerably from Bonaventure with regard to Augustine's doctrine on the seeing of God's eternal reasons. In this regard, Aquinas is confronted with the teaching of Augustine on the inability of the senses to judge truth because they are mutable; from that teaching the following conclusion seems evident: since everything created is mutable, the human mind cannot judge truth according to anything created; therefore, the agent intellect is not something created, but something above and superior to the soul.62 Aquinas, opposing this conclusion, distinguishes two ways in which the human intellect judges something by its truth. In the first way, the intellect judges by means of something else, as it judges the truth of a conclusion drawn from a principle by a middle term. It is in this way that Augustine speaks of the mind judging things according to their eternal or immutable rules: something mutable, or capable of deceiving the intellect, cannot be an infallible rule of truth. The intellect judges, in the second way, by its power of judgment, which is the agent intellect. But Augustine does not speak about an agent intellect: how, then, is he speaking the truth about the judgments of the human intellect? Handling

60 Expos, de Trin., 1.3, Resp. "... influentia lucis." (Decker, pp. 70-71); cf. arg. 1 & ad 1 (Decker, p. 68 & pp. 72-73). See also: ST, la, 88.3, Resp., ad 1 (1.549a). 61 DV, 10.6, arg. 6 & ad 6 (1.200, 202); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit, 12.2.2 (PL 42.999). 62 DSpC, a. 10, arg. 8 (2.406): cf. St. Augustine, De diver, quaes., q. 9 (PL 40.13-14).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

555

this problem, Aquinas says that, prior to Augustine, there have been philosophers who posited no other cognitive power in man than his sense power, and no other beings than sensible beings. Those philosophers say, therefore, that we cannot know truth with certitude. They say this, first, because they consider sensible things to be always changing and to have nothing stable in them; secondly, because they find different men judging the same thing in diverse ways, so that it seems impossible to decide which man has the truer opinion about the thing, since each man has some likeness of its truth. Wherefore, having no hope of grasping the truth of things, Socrates turns entirely to moral philosophy; but Plato, the disciple of Socrates, has concurred with the earlier philosophers. Thus, Plato maintains that sensible things are always in motion and in a condition of change, so that the power of man cannot make certain judgments of them. To ensure the stability necessary for the certitude of science, Plato posits as the objects of science immobile species that, he says, are separated from sensible things. He also posits in man a cognitive power superior to the senses, namely, a mind or an intellect, which he says is enlightened by a superior and intelligible sun, just as the sense of sight is enlightened by the visible sun in the corporeal world. Augustine, following Plato as far as Catholic faith allows, has not posited self-subsisting species of things; rather, he posits the reasons or principles of things in the divine mind. As a consequence, Augustine says that we judge all things through their eternal reasons according as the human intellect is enlightened by the divine light; but he does not say that we see those reasons themselves, since that would be impossible, unless we were to see the essence of God Augustine implies only that we see the eternal reasons of God according as they are imprinted or impressed on our minds. Plato, on the other hand, teaches that the sciences deal with species separated from sensible things; though the human mind does not see those species, nevertheless, participating in them, it has scientific knowledge by them of sensible things. Referring to Plato's doctrine, Augustine says that many truths shine forth in our minds from the one first truth, as many reflexions of one face shine forth in several mirrors.63 Aristotle, however, offers another solution to the problem. He shows, time and again, that there is something stable in sensible things; he shows also that the judgments of the senses are true with respect to their proper objects, though deception is possible with regard to their common objects. Moreover, advancing beyond the senses, Aristotle has posited in man an intellective power that judges the truth of things, not through intelligible species existing outside the mind, but through the lumen of an agent intellect, which makes its objects to be intelligible. It is not going much beyond this to say, Aquinas concludes, that the intelligible species in

63 Enarr. in Psalm,, 11.2 (PL 36.138).

556

CHAPTER SEVEN

the intellect participate in their eternal principles in God, or that the lumen of the agent intellect participates in His divine lumen.64 The reconciliation by Aquinas of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines on the judgment of truth by the human intellect and its dependence on the lumen and eternal reasons of God is unquestionably different from their reconciliation by Bonaventure. Although Bonaventure accepts and, as we have seen, even defends Aristotle's doctrine on the agent intellect, which Bonaventure posits as the lumen of natural reason in the human soul, nonetheless, he also identifies the human intellect with the natural seat of judgment in the doctrine of Augustine. In reconciling their two doctrines on the source of natural certitude, then, Bonaventure finds it necessary to have the human mind arrive at the eternal reasons of God, who is not seen in Himself by the mind in its natural perception of His eternal reasons. They are seen, not as in a habitus of the mind, but as they are in God. The first principles of truth, however, because they are created similitudes of the eternal reasons, dispose the mind to turn toward God. In that way, the first principles, forming the innate habitus of understanding, habilitate the mind or the intellect to judge the truth of its objects in the light of their eternal reasons. The intellect is also disposed by its own nature to judge truth in the eternal light, for the natural lumen of the intellect is a created likeness of the divine lumen. Aquinas, no less than Bonaventure, takes over the Augustinian doctrines on the similarity of the lumen in the intellect to the divine lumen, and of created truths in the mind to the uncreated principles of truth in God. In reconciling those doctrines with the Aristotelean doctrine on the intellect, however, Aquinas sees no necessity for the intellect to arrive at the uncreated principles of truth as they are in God Rather, because the agent intellect is a created likeness of the divine lumen, and because the first principles of natural truth are created reflexions of the eternal truth, the human intellect reaches the eternal reasons of God simply by judging its objects in the natural lumen of reason and according to the innate truth of the first principles. Thus, for Aquinas, the illumination of the human intellect by God looks to His communication of the natural lumen of reason to the human soul, and so the agent intellect, as a lumen given to the soul by God, illuminates the phantasms.65 It is in this way that Aquinas interprets the text of Augustine on the unjust or wicked men who, seeing the immutable rules of truth in the eternal light, judge things rightly according

64 DSpC, a 10, ad 8 (2.409-10); cf. ST, la, 87.1, Resp. (1.540a-41b). Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure on the impossibility of a man seeing the eternal law of God in itself by his natural power of reason: "... sicut aliquis non videns solem in sua substantia, cognoscit ipsum in sua irradiatione. Sic igitur dicendum est quod legem aeternam nullus potest cognoscere secundum quod in seipsa est, nisi solus Deus et beati, qui Deum per essentiam vident." — ST, Ia2ae, 93.2, in Resp. (2.1219a). 65 "... dicendum quod proprium est Dei illuminare homines, imprimendo lumen naturale intellectus agentis ... sed intellectus agens illustrat phantasmata, sicut lumen a Deo impressum." — DSpC, a. 10, ad I (2.408); cf. arg. 1 (2.405).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

557

to their eternal laws. The rules that those men see, Aquinas says, are the first principles of moral actions; they are seen, just as the first principles of the speculative sciences are seen, through the lumen of the agent intellect, which is a participation in the lumen of God66 In short, for Aquinas, the texts of Augustine on the illumination of the human mind, regarding both science and wisdom, are to be referred to the influence of the first light, which is present to the human soul in the participated lumen of the agent intellect.67 In the view of Aquinas, departing clearly from Bonaventure, the human mind has a sufficient illumination from the agent intellect without the aid of an additional illumination from God. If the lumen of the agent intellect, as something created, were insufficient to empower the mind to know truth, then, according to Aquinas, the mind would require a new illumination, or another lumen; but this lumen, since it would also be created, would be no more sufficient than the agent intellect itself: therefore, to avoid an endless series of illuminations, which would really make it impossible for the mind to know any truth, Aquinas insists that the first lumen, or the connatural power of the agent intellect, is sufficient to enable the mind to know truth.68 Explaining this point, Aquinas refers to the difference between a passive potency and an active potency. A passive potency cannot come into act unless it is moved by its proper active potency, which does not need to be moved by another potency in order to operate. Now, in the opinion of Avicenna, the human soul has only a possible intellect, which is a passive potency; so, to come into act or to have knowledge of truth, the possible intellect must be illuminated by the exterior lumen of a separated substance that Avicenna says is the agent intellect. But the text of Aristotle on the agent intellect, Aquinas comments, seems to say that it is a potency of the human soul. Aristotle's words, moreover, conform to the teaching of Sacred Scripture: "The light of your face is sealed upon us, O Lord" (Ps., 4.7). Consequently, the human soul has both an active potency and a passive potency of understanding, and they are sufficient by their conjoined and

66 "... dicendum quod regulae illae quas impii conspiciunt, sunt prima principia in agendis, quae conspiciuntur per lumen intellectus agentis a Deo participati, sicut etiam prima principia scientiarum speculativarum." — Lx. cit., ad 9 (2.410); cf. ad 10 & 12 (ibid.). For the text of Augustine see arg. 9 (2.406); cf. De Trinit., 14.15.21 (PL 42.1050-51). 67 Lac. cit., sc 2-3 (2.407); see in St. Augustine: De Trinit., 12.15.24 (PL 42.1011), and 4.16.21 (PL 42.902). With regard to wisdom note: "Praeterea, in eodem libro: 'Si summum bonum omnibus unum est, oportet etiam veritatem in qua cernitur et tenetur, id est sapientiam, omnibus unam esse communem.' Sed summum bonum cernitur et tenetur a nobis per intellectual, et praecipue per agentem. Ergo intellectus agens est unus in omnibus." —Lac. cit., arg. 13 (2.406); cf. St. Augustine, De lib. arbit., 2.9.27 (PL 32.1255). "... dicendum quod veritas ilia in qua tenetur summum bonum, est communis omnibus mendbus vel ratione unitatis rei, vel ratione unitatis primae lucis in omnes mentes influentis." — Eo. lac., ad 13 (2.410). Cf. DV, 11.1, arg. 10, ad 10 (1.224, 227). 68 Expos, de Trin., 1.1, sc 1-4 (Decker, pp. 58-59).

558

CHAPTER SEVEN

natural operations to empower the soul to perceive truth.69 An active potency which is created, however, has a finite power with a sufficiency confined to a limited number of effects. Since the agent intellect is such a potency, its efficacy is confined to the truths of the principles known naturally by a man, and to the truths that he deduces from them. The natural power of the agent intellect is not extended to the truth of future or of contingent things, nor is it extended to the truths of Christian faith, because they exceed the faculty of human reason. To know the truths of faith, therefore, the human mind must be illuminated by a new lumen, which is over and above the natural lumen of reason. Although the mind does not need ar. additional lumen to know the things within the capacity of its natural lumen, nonetheless, the mind does require the cooperation of God, who works together with all the operations of natural things by directing and moving their powers into their proper acts. Hence, every active potency in creatures is brought into act according as it is moved and directed by the Creator; so, in illuminating the human mind, the agent intellect needs the cooperation of God, who moves and directs it into act with regard to what a man can know by his natural reason, and without the help of the additional light required to know other things.70 The illumination of the human mind by God, as Aquinas understands it, includes His influence and cooperation, but excludes any additional lumen, whether natural or infused, from God fortifying the mind in its proper knowledge of truth. Aquinas insists that the mind knows truth by an act of intellectual lumen, an act involving both a movement by the intellect as the natural agent of understanding, and a movement from God as the principal agent of understanding and as the first cause of the human intellect. Because the natural power of the intellect is derived from God as the first cause of truth, the lumen of the intellect makes truth known to the mind through the influence of God Because the active potency of the intellect is moved into act and directed in its operation by God as the principal agent of truth, the actions of the intellective power bring about a knowledge of truth through the cooperation of God. Neither the natural power of the intellect nor its natural actions require any other assistance from God than His influence and cooperation in the ordinary course of His providence over the universe. His illumination of the human intellect, therefore, consists both in a communication to it of a natural lumen of reason, which is the agent intellect, and in the movement and direction of that active potency into its proper operations.71 69 Loc. cii., Resp. "... perceptionem veritatis." (Decker, pp. 59-60; the text containing Avicenna's doctrine is given here on p. 60, n. 1); cf. Aristotle, D« anima, 3.5 (430alO-15). 70 Loc. cit., Resp. "Cum autem ...", ad 1 (Decker, pp. 60-61); cf. 2 Sent., 28.1.5, Sol., ad 1-2 (2.731-32). 7! ST, Ia2ae. 109.1, Resp., ad 1-3 (2.1352ab). Note the following; "Nam Deus est quidem quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita quod alia non cogoscantur nisi eo cognito, sicut in principiis per se notis accidit: sed quia per eius influentiam omnis causatur in nobis cognitio." — SCO, 1.11 (2.15, n. 71). "... dicen-

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

559

There are evidently some points in common between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the necessity of God's influence on the human mind and his cooperation with its natural operations. Both theologians hold that God, as the first cause of the human intellect, must move the agent intellect into its proper operation and, as the principal agent of understanding, must cooperate with the human intellect by directing its proper actions toward an understanding of truth. The two theologians also hold in common that the influence and cooperation of God must be continuous, and that God alone can illumine the intellect by communicating to it a natural lumen and an innate capacity to know truth. Finally, Aquinas and Bonaventure distinguish the natural lumen of human reason very clearly from the infused lumen of Christian faith. But Aquinas, unlike Bonaventure, does not refer to a threefold influence and cooperation of God corresponding to His vestiges, images and infused likenesses in creation. Aquinas, then, does not associate the illumination of natural knowledge with God's image in the rational soul. Moreover, in the order of natural reason, he positively excludes any and every sort of additional illumination from God beyond His communication of a lumen to the human mind and His providence over its proper acts. Thus, for Aquinas, the natural manifestation of truth by the agent intellect is God's illumination of the human mind The power of illumination belonging to the agent intellect, presupposing its dependence as a creature on the influence and cooperation of the Creator, is as sufficient of itself with regard to the natural manifestation of truth as the first principles are self-evident in their regard to the natural grounds of truth. The self-sufficiency of the agent intellect and the self-evidence of the first principles are both immediate consequences of the intrinsic, though created, immutability and necessity of the union of being and essence in human nature, particularly in the human soul. For Bonaventure, on the other hand, the presence of matter, which is the principle of mutability, in the human soul confers an intrinsic contingency on the nature of man and, as a direct consequence, on the natural operations of his intellect. The natural power of the agent intellect is not sufficient of itself, then, to manifest truth without an illumination from God. Neither are the first principles entirely evident of themselves with regard to the natural grounds of dum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus sum propria principia activa in unoquoque genere, licet Deus sit causa agens prima et communis, ita etiam requiritur proprium lumen intellectuale in homine, quamvis Deus sit prima lux omnes communiter illuminans." — DA. a. 4. ad 7 (2.296). "Propter Deum autem alia cognoscuntur non sicut propter primum cognitum, sed sicut propter primam cognoscitivae virtutis causam." — ST, la, 88.3, ad 2 (I.549a). "... dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus VIII Super Genesim (12.26; PL 34.383), sicut aer illuininatur a lumine praesente, quod si fuerit absens continuo tenebatur, ita et mens illuminatur a Deo. Et ideo etiam lumen naturale in anima semper Deus causat, non aliud et aliud, sed idem; non enim est causa fieri eius solum, sed etiam esse illius. In hoc ergo continue Deus operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen naturale causat et ipsum dirigit, et sic mens non sine operatione causae primae in operationem suam procedit." — Expos, de Trin., 1.1, ad 6 (Decker, p. 62); cf. 2 Sent., 28.1.5, ad 5 (2.733).

560

CHAPTER SEVEN

truth apart from the immutability and necessity of truth in the eternal reasons of God. In sum, as understood by Bonaventure, the illumination of natural knowledge by God includes His causality and direction of the proper operations of the human intellect; but His illumination goes beyond that by conferring on those operations a necessity and stability not found in the intellect according to its natural condition as a created power of knowledge. As understood by Aquinas, however, the illumination of natural knowledge by God consists and terminates in His causality and direction of the proper operations of the human intellect; so His illumination does not go beyond those operations, as such, because they have the necessity and stability that are proper to a created power of knowledge.72

Intrinsic Effects

of Illumination

Bonaventure has referred to two intrinsic effects of God's illumination of the human intellect. The first effect consists in the actual operation of the intellect, an effect necessitating the continual and cooperative influence of God. The second effect consists in the habituation of the intellect by the first principles of understanding; this effect disposes the intellect to judge the truths of created things by and in their eternal reasons. Thus, we have two particular problems to examine here in connexion with Bonaventure's doctrine on the illumination of natural knowledge: the cooperative influence of God in the order of natural reason, and the ability of the human mind to judge the truth of creatures by and in their eternal reasons. Since the second effect of God's illumination follows and depends on the first, we shall take up the first problem immediately. With regard to this problem, we have seen Bonaventure saying that, if the influence of the eternal light on the human mind were confined to the general order of creation, God would not be the cause of human science or wisdom any more than the cause of money or of the earth's fertility. On the other hand, it" the influence of His eternal light were received by the mind only in the special order of grace, all human knowledge would be infused, and so the mind would have no natural knowledge, whether innate or acquired. Taking a middle position between those two alternatives, Bonaventure puts down the cooperative influence of God on the human mind to His particular causality with respect to the natural operations of the rational spirit as a creature sealed in His image. As the source and teacher of all knowledge, God cooperates with the human intellect neither in a general way, as He cooperates with the senses, nor in a special way by a gift of grace, but in a

72 For some other comparisons between the doctrines of Bonaventure and Aquinas on the illumination of the human mind see: L. Bellofiore, Sophia, 7 (1939), pp. 176-80; E. Bettoni, S. Bonaventura, pp. 131-36, ET pp. 101-05.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

561

particular way, because the intellect arrives at God as the lumen of every mind and as the ground of knowing everything that is true. 73 The cooperative influence of God, then, does not include the operations of the sense powers in man. They require the influence of God only according to His general cooperation with the natural actions flowing from creatures inasmuch as, on the one hand, they are the vestiges of the Creator and, on the other, they depend on Him as on the creative principle of their being. Thus, a sense potency has a natural certitude because of its proper limitation to a determinate object, as sight is limited to perceiving luminous and coloured things. 74 The cooperative influence of God on the human mind in the order of natural knowledge, moreover, is quite distinct from His influence on the mind in the order of infused knowledge, which needs a divine illumination, such as the illumination of Christian faith, depending on divine revelation. Since the natural illumination of the mind does not go beyond God's particular cooperation with the intellect in acquiring knowledge of truth by its proper power, this illumination does not give the intellect a power to know the eternal reasons of God in themselves, because they can be known in that way by a created mind only on seeing God immediately in beatitude. Although the mind of an angel is more powerful by nature than the mind of a man, even so, no angel by its natural intelligence alone can perceive the divine light in itself. The light of God is above every created intellect, no matter how excellent it may be in its natural power of understanding; so, Bonaventure says, no created intellect, whether angelic or human, can ascend by its own power to see God as He is. Such an ascent to God must follow upon His prior coming into the mind through grace: just as it is impossible to see the lumen of the sun unless it sends forth its rays, no matter how powerful a lumen of another kind the sense of sight may have, so also it is impossible to arrive at a sight (contuitus) of the eternal light by any illumination, natural or acquired, unless God sends forth the rays of His lumen through grace. Consequently, no created mind by its natural power can know the divine light in itself.75 This does not mean, however, that the human mind cannot perceive God without the divine illumination accompanying His infused knowledge. God shines out in every creature as the cause in its effect, Bonaventure observes, and so He can be known from any creature, especially from the rational

73 "Item ... Deus dicitur esse doctor omnis scientiae; aut igitur quia generaliter cooperatur omni intellectui, sicut et aliis creaturis, aut quia donum gratiae infundit, aut quia intellectus in cognoscendo ipsum attingit Si quia generaliter cooperatur: ergo ita diceretur docere sensum, sicut intellectum; quod absurdum est. Si quia donum gratiae infundit ergo omnis cognitio erit gratuita vel infusa, nulla ergo acquisita, vel innata; quod absurdissimum est Restat ergo, quod hoc dicitur, quia intellectus noster ad ipsum attingit tanquam ad lumen mentium et rationem cognoscendi omne verum. — DSC, q. 4, fm. 34 (5.20-21); see above: pp. 534-38. 74 See above: pp. 543-45. 75 2 Sent., 3.2.2.2, con. 1-6 (2.122-23; ed mm., con. a-f, 2.114); cf. Resp.

562

CHAPTER SEVEN

creature, which is His image. But the human mind cannot see God "face to face" (1 Cor., 13.12) until the soul is illumined in the glory of beatitude. By illumining the mind in its natural condition, God makes Himself present to the mind as its cause and its conserving and cooperating principle, but not as its immediate and moving object, for such is the way that a habitus of the soul, and the soul itself, is present to the mind. God is present to the mind as its immediate object only in the state of beatitude.76 The cooperative influence of God on the natural operations of the human intellect, therefore, makes God present to it as the first cause and conserving principle of its being and actions. Now, depending on God, every creature comes forth from God. As the one exemplar of all creatures, God alone has their ideal forms; so, on causing creatures, He gives to each one a proper form and principle of action. Moreover, as the conserving cause of creatures, God is present to them and, directing all their actions, conserves them in accordance with the eternal rules through which He guides and governs all things in the universe. As the exemplar and conserving cause of the human intellect, God is said to be the teacher of truth. God teaches with infallibility and so certainly, Bonaventure says, that what He teaches cannot be otherwise than it is. Speaking theologically, Bonaventure refers to Christ as the interior teacher through whom every truth is known with certitude, because He illumines our minds, since He is present intimately to the soul of every man. In speaking of Christ this way, Bonaventure obviously is not talking of Him as man, but as God, who is the source of the light that, making known His eternal reasons, shines forth in the darkness of every human intellect. By illuminating the intellects of men, God makes His eternal reasons known to them in such a way that, causing their intellects to understand, His eternal reasons cast light upon the darkness of the intelligible species abstracted from and obscured by phantasms. If to know a thing with certitude is to know that it is impossible for the thing to be other than it is, then, Bonaventure affirms, it is necessary to hold that God alone can bring about knowledge with certitude, since he is the one who knows truth and the one who has truth in Himself. God is also the exemplar of justice; so, governing human life, He has the most just laws, and they are imprinted on the minds of men according to nature, so that every man, consulting those laws, can progress in virtue. They are also impressed, though more perfectly, on the minds of men through grace, thus directing them toward the life of eternal beatitude. As the exemplar of all justice, therefore, God has in His light, which is the book of life, the eternal

76 Loc. cit., ad 2-3 (2.123; ed. min., 2.115). For a line analysis of Bonaventure's doctrine on the sighting (contuitio) of God see: R. Sciamannini, La contuiz. bonav. pp. 9-53, 69-75, 109-16. Less detailed analyses are found in: L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. ckris., pp. 77-79; SRHCI, pp. 636-39; Antonianum, 28 (1953), pp. 20-28. Z. Van de Woestyne equates contuitio with intuitio as a non-abstract knowledge of God from His presence in the rational soul: Antonianum, 9 (1933), pp. 383-90.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

563

laws and rules of all right living. When a man's conscience conforms to the exemplar of justice in God, the man's life is right and just, because it is directed by the light of the eternal truth. 77 The divine exemplar of creatures, Bonaventure reaffirms, is most present to them. Although the divine exemplar is one in itself, nevertheless, it expresses the truth of all creatures both distinctly and with certitude, for God is their first and immediate cause. He is the first cause of creatures because, depending on no other cause, God is the most powerful of all agents. God is the immediate cause of creatures because He is the most actual of causes and, effecting many things all at once, He is the one cause from which every other cause has its proper efficacy. The prime causality of God, therefore, is most efficacious with respect both to His intrinsic knowledge of creatures and to His extrinsic production of them. As the first cause of knowledge, then, God is the eternal light of truth. Though His light in itself is inaccessible to the human soul, even so, God is closer to the soul than the soul is to itself. Hence, the light of God reaches the depths of the soul, but this can be known only by the man who, raised above himself to God, sees by a simple glance (simplex contuitus) the one, and yet multiple, power of God. A man still immersed in phantasms, Bonaventure explains, cannot think how the divine power can contain an infinite number of things, unless he stretches out, so to speak, the omnipotent power of God. Such a man, in consequence, can attain a simple perception of the divine omnipotence only after he has approached it by the way of human reasoning. Since the power of God is the first and immediate cause of all things, His power is the uncaused cause containing all caused things. Since the eternal reasons of God, furthermore, are the causal principles of creatures, His reasons are the uncaused principles of truth in created things. Consequently, the eternal reasons of God are the infallible causes of truth, even in contingent things, because He knows every thing infallibly both as it is in itself and in every other way that it can be: truths that are contingent in creatures have infallibility in God. His eternal reasons, likewise, are the immutable causes of truth in mutable things, because God knows each mutable thing by an immutable principle. All these splendours of God's exemplar truths, Bonaventure remarks, can be made known to the human mind from reason and from faith. Assisting the mind in its exercise of reason, the whole world of corporeal things is a shadow of the eternal truth. Every corporeal creature, directing the mind to God, reflects the brilliance of His light, but with a certain mixture of darkness: a corporeal thing has, so to speak, an opaqueness with regard to the lumen of God, The corporeal world is also a way to God; taking the mind to God as to the end of all things, corporeal creatures direct the attention of the mind to their divine exemplar from their diverse properties as from a multiplicity

77 Coll. in Hexaim., 12.3-8 (5.385; Delorme, pp. 141-42).

564

CHAPTER SEVEN

of rays manifesting the splendour of the divine light. The world of corporeal things, in addition, is one vestige of the eternal wisdom of God, so that, as a sort of imitation of divine wisdom, the community of corporeal creatures aids the human mind to move from them to the truth of their one exemplar in God. Thus, the whole corporeal world is a book, as it were, inscribed with divine truth enabling the human mind to go to the source of true knowledge, which is in God. It belongs to men of very great wisdom, Bonaventure notes, to read the entire book of corporeal creatures, but not to natural philosophers, because, by their science, they know only the nature of corporeal things, and so they do not know that they are a vestige of God. Along with the exterior book of corporeal things, the mind has the assistance of the interior book of the spiritual creature, which Bonaventure describes as a lumen, a mirror and an image. Every spiritual substance is a lumen resembling the divine lumen; so, having the nature of lumen, the rational spirit has the power to make judgments about created things. Since the rational spirit is also a mirror, it is able to receive and to manifest all things to itself. Holding the whole world within itself, the rational spirit is an image of the created universe. Wherefore, resembling God, the rational spirit is able to retain its images of things, images that it forms as a mirror and judges as a lumen. But no created thing can enter the depths of the spiritual soul where, as an image of God, the mind has God alone for its object. The interior book of the spiritual soul, therefore, opens the human mind to the truth of God, who is present in the depths of the human spirit. In exercising Christian faith, the mind is aided by the exterior and interior book of the Scriptures, containing the mysteries of God. The Scriptures are an exterior book because they present the history of salvation and teach many truths about natural things. The Scriptures are an interior book because they present the mysteries of God and His understanding of many different things. Bonaventure remarks here that it is perilous for a man, unless he holds fast to the testimony of Christ and the Prophets, to descend from the words of Scripture to the secular sciences in order to acquire certitude from them. Inspired by the Holy Spirit, the Scriptures teach the truth about things past, present and future.78 Bonaventure's doctrine regarding God's cooperative influence on the natural operations of the human intellect, as we can see, is a particular application to the intellect of his general teaching on the divine causality and conservation of creatures. Bonaventure is careful at all times not to confuse this particular activity of God with His special activity in the order of faith, which depends exclusively on a gift of infused grace. Moreover, from the language used by Bonaventure to depict the function of the eternal reasons in God's guidance of the human intellect, it is very clear that, for Bonaventure, the intellect arrives at the eternal reasons, not in themselves, but as

78 Loc. cit., nn. 9-17 (5.385-87; Delormc, pp. 142-45).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

565

they can be reached from their reflexions and similitudes in created things, namely, by means of analogy both in the order of causality, which looks to the being of creatures, and in the order of perfection, which has to do with the well-being of their operations. The immediacy of God's causality to His effects, including the human intellect, does not take away the proper causality of a created agent. On the contrary, the proper efficacy of a created agent is derived from its Creator, whose immediate influence and presence in the creature is necessary in order that, as a cause, it can produce its proper effects. Indeed, even within the order of created causes, it is not necessary, according to Bonaventure, for every natural effect to be from an intrinsic principle as from a total cause. It is sufficient for an intrinsic principle, in producing its effect, to act together with an extrinsic agent.79 Since God is the most primordial cause, however, His influence is the greatest of all on secondary causes. God's influence on them is so great, Bonaventure maintains, that they cannot produce the most insignificant effect without His omnipotent cooperation. Every created potency is imperfect in itself, since it is not purely active; as a consequence, even the least operation of such a potency must have the assistance of the divine potency, which is pure act because of its complete freedom from matter. The power of God is the only power that is sufficient of itself, and so His power does not need to be helped in any way by some other cause.80 When Bonaventure speaks of God as the spiritual light which is the source of the natural illumination of the rational spirit, he is not saying that the light of God itself forms and perfects the rational mind, for God cannot be the form or perfection of any created thing. Because God is most omnipotent, Bonaventure argues, He can produce a created light conformed to His light in some way. Since a created light is not self-sufficient, even after its production by God, therefore, it needs the presence of His influence, and so the created light of the rational soul needs to be conserved by the influence of His eternal light.81 79 "Sicut vult Philosophus: "Natura est principium motus et quietis in eo, in quo est: ergo omnis motus naturalis est a forma intrinseca; sed motus caeli est naturalis, sicut probat Philosophus: ergo est a propria forma." — 2 Sent., 14.1.3.2, arg. 1 (2.347; ed. min., 2.350); cf. Aristotle, De caelo, 1.2 (269a30269bl7). "... dicendum quod motus ille per comparationem ad primum mobile naturalis esse dicitur, quia natura eius et figura illi motui concordat Nee oportet quod omne quod est naturale sit a principio intrinseco sicut a tota causa, sed sufficit quod virtus intrinseca cooperatur virtuti activae." — Loc. cit., ad 1 (2.349; ed. min., 1.353). 80 "Quia enim Deus est causa primordialissima, ideo est influentiae maximae in causas secundas, et adeo magnae influentiae ut nee modicum seu quantuincumque parvum, dum tamen aliquo modo sit ens, proccdat ab aliqua causa creata nisi cooperante divina omnipotentia Omnis etiam potentia creata, quantum est de se, defectiva est nee est pure activa. Ergo quantumcumque facial modicum operationem, necesse habet adiuvari ab ea potentia quae est actus purus propter omnimodam impermixtionem cum materia et quae sola sibi sufficit, nullo modo indigens iuvari a causa alia." — 2 Sent., 37.1.1, in Resp. (2.862; ed. min., 2.893-94); cf. 1 Sent., 43.un.l, Resp. (1.765-66; ed. min., 1.606-07). 81 "Lux enim spirituals, quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima, non potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarum. Cum autem sit omnipotentissima, potest producere et facere lucem createm aliquo

566

CHAPTER SEVEN

The help given by God to the human intellect in its natural operations is said, by Bonaventure, to be a gift from God. The term gift is understood by Bonaventure in two ways. Understanding the term properly, he refers it to something coming absolutely from another source, such as the infused grace given by God to a human soul. Understanding the term in a common way, he refers it to a divine assistance accompanying something that a creature acquires by its own power, but which cannot be had without the help of God For example: God has given to us seeds that become corn, and he has given to the earth a power to produce the corn; so God gives us the bountiful crop of corn that we gather from the good earth, and this is a gift from God in the common or wide meaning of the term. If God were to produce a crop of corn from barren soil, however, and without any seeds, that would be a gift from Him in the proper and strict meaning of the word. Now God has given to the spiritual creature, from its beginning, a lumen enabling it to acquire knowledge of many things. Since God does not take back what He has given, but conserves it, He is said to teach the spiritual creature, not through inspired or infused knowledge, which is a gift in the strict sense, but by cooperating with and conserving the lumen that He has given from the beginning, and thus His conservation of the human intellect and His cooperation with its operations are a gift in the wide meaning of the word.82 As a gift from God, however, His illumination of the human intellect is also said to be a grace, because it is something good coming from God When grace is used to designate a good thing, Bonaventure points out, the name must not be understood to signify a habitus added over and above the principles of nature. It is to be understood, rather, to signify the gratuitous influence through which God conserves creatures and assists them in order that they may complete their operations. This is the proper way, according to Bonaventure, to understand the doctrine of Augustine that no man can learn anything unless God teaches him. Augustine does not hold this because all human knowledge is infused, but because the created lumen of the soul cannot perfect its operation apart from the cooperation of the uncreated lumen of God This also is the proper way, Bonaventure adds, to understand other thinkers, particularly Dionysius, when they say that every essence is from the first essence and all life is from the first life, that every intelligence is from the first intelligence and all goodness is from the first goodness. Those things are said, not because God is the total cause of the effects produced by a created power, but because that sort of power cannot act at all without the help of the first cause.83 modo sibi conformem; quae tamen sibi non sufficit, etiam postquam products est, nisi adsit ei summae lucis influentia. Et sic intelligendura est in anima humana quod ipsa habet lucem propriam, scilicet creatam, per quam completur, quae a luce aeterna et producitur et conservator." — 2 Sent., 17.1.1, ad 6 (2.412-13; ed. nun., 2.424); cf. arg. 6 (2.411; ed. min., 2.422). 82 2 Sent., 7.2.1.1, ad 6 (2.191; ed min., 2.185); cf. 1 Sent., Prol., dub.5 (1.24; ed min., 1.15). 83 2 Sent., 28.2.3, Resp. (2.689-90; ed. min., 2.712-13). See in St. Augustine: De magistro, 12.40 (PL 32.1217-18); and in Dionysius: De din. nomin., 4.10, 5.7 (PG 3.706, 822).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

567

Although Bonaventure applies the terms grace and gift to the effects caused by God in His illumination of the human mind in the order of natural knowledge, nevertheless, at the same time, Bonaventure is again very careful to distinguish that illumination from the illumination of infused knowledge, which is a divine illumination. The terms grace and gift are used properly to designate only what God infuses into the human soul over and above its natural principles. When those distinctions of Bonaventure are maintained, there cannot be any doubt about his teaching that the natural illumination of the intellect is an activity of God as the first cause and as the principle of conservation of both the proper lumen and the proper operations of the human intellect. Likewise, as long as Bonaventure's distinctions are kept between the way that a theologian approaches God and the way that a philosopher approaches Him, there can be no obstacle to a correct understanding of Bonaventure's appropriation to Christ of the natural illumination of the human intellect. In appropriating that illumination to Christ, Bonaventure is attributing to the Word of God what a philosopher can attribute only to the divine causality, which he knows from its effects in the natural operations of the human intellect. Similarly, in appropriating the source of truth to Christ as the divine teacher, Bonaventure is attributing to the divine Word what the philosopher can attribute only essentially to God as the first cause of natural truth. These theological appropriations, however, include the illumination founded on the gift of infused grace and the source of truth known by infused knowledge. Hence, as a theologian, Bonaventure appropriates to Christ all the effects in the orders of nature and grace that God causes in the human mind But this theological appropriation does not imply that, because Christ is said to be "the fontal principle of illumination" and "the fount of all right knowledge", the activity of God in the natural work of the human intellect can be known only by the theologian. Bonaventure's appropriation, on the contrary, takes into consideration that what the philosopher can know of God's activity in the work of the intellect the theologian is able to complete, because he knows the divine causality in a nobler way than the philosopher. When this is kept in view, no difficulty should arise concerning Bonaventure's reference to Christ as the teacher of knowledge acquired by human reason, because He is truth. Explaining that appropriation, Bonaventure reaffirms that, for sciential knowledge, the object must be immutable and the knower must have infallible certitude, since everything known through science is both necessary in itself and certain to the one knowing it, as Aristotle points out: "We know a thing through science when we think that we know the cause for whose sake the thing is, and when we know that it is impossible for the thing to be otherwise than it is.'" Thereafter, Bonaventure shows, on the one hand, from Scripture and, on the other, from Augustine that immutable truth cannot be found in created things apart from the sustaining influence of God, and

568

CHAPTER SEVEN

that infallible certitude cannot be found in a created intellect, because such an intellect is not sufficient of itself to have certain comprehension of anything whatsoever without the cooperating influence of God's eternal light. Hence, in appropriating those influences to Christ, Bonaventure is attributing to the Word of God what he has previously shown to be demonstrable by natural reason in its proper understanding of God as the principal source and primary agent of human knowledge.84 Having explained how Christ is the teacher and master of rational knowledge, Bonaventure goes on to explain how Christ is the master of contemplative knowledge. His explanation, in this instance, is based chiefly on Sacred Scripture. Summing up his presentation, Bonaventure says that, to arrive at the wisdom exemplified in Christ, a man must set out from the stability of faith and, proceeding by a serenity of reason, come to rest in the sweetness of contemplation. Bonaventure is referring here to a Christian or theological wisdom: "Unless you have believed, you will not understand* (Is., 7.9). Since the philosophers, knowing nothing about Christian faith, have been totally dependent on reason, they have not known the order of Christian wisdom, and so they could not have arrived in any way at a contemplation of God, as Augustine states: "the feeble glance of the human mind, unless it is cleansed through the holiness of faith, cannot be fixed upon so excellent a light".85 Returning to Christ according as the function of teaching is appropriated to Him, Bonaventure describes Christ as the director and helper of human understanding not only in a general way, as in all the works of nature, and in the special way required by the works depending on infused grace, but also in a way falling between those two, namely, in the particular way demanded by our natural understanding. Bonaventure then shows again how the guidance and assistance of God are associated generally with all creatures as His vestiges, particularly with spiritual creatures as His images, and specially with the spiritual creatures that are His likenesses. Because God cooperates with creatures in these three ways, Augustine has said that "God is the cause of being, the source of understanding, and the order of life".86 When God is said to be the source of understanding, He must not be taken as the sole cause of knowledge, Bonaventure reaffirms, nor as its immediate object, nor as the whole ground of truth. If God were the sole cause of knowledge, there would be 84 Chris, unus omnium magis., nn. 1-10 (5.567-70; ed. min, 5.295-300); cf. Aristotle, Anal poster., 1.2 (71blO-12). Bonaventure's attribution to Christ of the natural illumination of the human intellect seems to support the view that this illumination is Christocentric, see, for instance, J. M. Bissen, L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 183-87. In our view, considering the very clear and careful distinctions made by Bonaventure between natural and infused knowledge, it is entirely improper to describe any of his philosophical doctrines as Christocentric; Bonaventure's attribution to Christ of a divine property known by philosophy is a theological appropriation to the divine Word of an essential attribute of God. We might add that Bonaventure presents, in the sermon under consideration, a summary of his doctrine already shown above on pp. 526-47. 85 Loc. cit., nn. 11-15 (5.570-71; ed. min., 5.300-02); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinil., 1.2.4 (PL 42.822). 86 Loc. cit., nn. 16-17 (5.571-72; ed. min., 5.302-03); cf. St. Augustine, De civil. Dei, 8.4 (PL 41.228-29).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

569

no difference between science and wisdom, between knowledge of things in themselves and in God If He were the immediate object of knowledge, God would be known in the present life as He is in beatitude, and this cannot be upheld because, in the present life, the human intellect cannot know without the aid of phantasms. Finally, if God were the whole ground of truth, the human intellect would not need the species that it receives from corporeal things in order that it may know them. This is also unacceptable to Bonaventure because, as Aristotle points out, a man losing one sense potency necessarily loses the science depending on that potency. Although the human soul, according to Augustine, is in contact with the eternal laws (whose lumen, Bonaventure remarks, is reached in some way by the soul through the highest power of its agent intellect and the higher function of its reason), nevertheless, it is indubitably true, as Aristotle teaches, that knowledge is generated in us by way of our senses, memory and experience, which give rise to the universal form in the human intellect, and this form is the principle of art and of science. Because Plato turned all certain knowledge toward the intelligible or ideal world, he has been deservedly reproached by Aristotle, not because he may have been wrong in saying that there are ideas and eternal reasons, since Augustine praises Plato for positing ideas, but because, contemning the sense world, he has sought to reduce all certain knowledge to those ideas. Though Plato seems to have given stability to the way to wisdom, which is attained according to eternal principles, he has destroyed the way to science, which is acquired according to created principles. Aristotle, on the other hand, has given stability to the way to science, but by neglecting the superior road to wisdom. In Bonaventure's judgment, therefore, it seems that, among the philosophers, to express wisdom has been given to Plato, who looked principally to superior things, but to express science has been given to Aristotle, who looked chiefly to inferior things. To express both wisdom and science, however, has been given through the Holy Spirit to Augustine as to an extraordinary exponent of the whole of Sacred Scripture, which he has explained with his sufficient excellence in wisdom and science, as it appears from his writings. But the expression of wisdom and science has to be found in a more excellent way in Moses and in the Apostle Paul. Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians (Acts., 7.22); and he legislated for the Hebrews according to the divine exemplar shown to him on Mount Sinai (Exod., 25.10). The Apostle Paul has told us himself that he proclaims among simple people to know through science only Christ crucified; nonetheless, with those who are wise, he speaks wisdom (1 Cor., 2.2-6), which he learned when he was rapt up to the third heaven (2 Cor., 12.2). To express wisdom and science belongs most excellently to Christ, Bonaventure concludes, for He is the principal legislator, and He was perfect while living on earth when, at the same time, He was perfect in His

570

CHAPTER SEVEN

immediate knowledge of God in heaven. Christ alone, therefore, is our principal master and teacher.87 The above appraisal of Bonaventure must be understood in its proper context and according to the principles that he himself has set down regarding the illumination of the human intellect. We have seen Bonaventure distinguishing a common gift from a proper gift of God: His illumination of natural knowledge is a common gift, since it is bestowed on all men as rational creatures; His illumination of infused knowledge is a proper gift bestowed only on those men who have infused grace. Thus, the wisdom of Plato and the science of Aristotle are natural gifts of illumination received from God according to His particular cooperation with the work of the human intellect. In Bonaventure's estimation, however, the effect of God's illumination in Plato differs from its effect in Aristotle. Using the gift of God according to their natural abilities, Plato follows the way of wisdom only to destroy the way to science, and Aristotle follows the way to science while neglecting the way to wisdom. Accordingly, in the judgment of Bonaventure, appraising the historical data concerning Plato and Aristotle, neither of the two philosophers has attained perfect certitude of knowledge, not because they lacked an illumination from God, but because they each took an imperfect road to certitude. Thus, Bonaventure finds imperfections both in Plato and in Aristotle, though not in philosophy itself: nonetheless, since their doctrines are natural effects of an illumination from God, Bonaventure does not disparage the wisdom of Plato, whom Augustine has praised, or the science of Aristotle, whom Bonaventure himself has set alongside Augustine. Now the gifts of wisdom and science received by Augustine, to whom Bonaventure refers explicitly as to a theologian, are proper gifts of God, for they are given to Augustine through the Holy Spirit. Hence, those gifts are the effects in Augustine of an infused or a divine illumination depending on God's special cooperation with the human intellect in the order of grace. There is no affirmation here by Bonaventure of a superiority of Augustine as a philosopher over Plato and Aristotle. There is, rather, a confirmation of the excellence or nobility of theological knowledge with respect to philosophical knowledge, which lacks perfect certitude in Plato and in Aristotle. This confirmation is made on historical grounds, furthermore, so that Moses and the Apostle Paul, who received their gifts through an inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have had a more excellent science and wisdom than those received by Augustine. Consequently, Bonaventure's model of science and wisdom is not Augustine, but Christ, who has wisdom and science in a most excellent way, because He is at once the uncreated and the incarnate Word of God. Christ is also the exemplar of all science and wisdom for Bonaventure on doctrinal

87 Loc. cit., nn. 18-19 (5.572; ed min., 5.303-04). See in Aristotle: Anal poster., 1.18 (81a37-39), 2.19 (99b20-27); and in St. Augustine: De diver, quaes., q. 46 (PL 40.29-31); De civil. Dei, 8.6 (PL 41.231-32).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

571

grounds. It is on those grounds that Bonaventure appropriates to Christ the divine causality with regard to everything involving the natural work of the human intellect. Moreover, because Moses and the Apostle Paul are inspired authors of Sacred Scripture, their doctrine is more excellent that the doctrine of Augustine, who is an exponent of the Scriptures. The doctrine of Augustine, however, in Bonaventure's view, stands out among the theologians. The excellence and nobility of Augustine are due to him as a theologian, particularly as an authority on the understanding of Sacred Scripture. But Bonaventure also considers Augustine, as we have seen, to be a most profound metaphysician; so, in Bonaventure's judgment, Augustine excels as a philosopher as well as a theologian. Since Augustine has a philosophy harmonizing with his theology, therefore, Bonaventure prefers to go to Augustine rather than to the philosophers, particularly on those questions that touch the truths on Christian faith. At the same time, nevertheless, Bonaventure acknowledges that the doctrines of the philosophers are of great value for understanding truth and refuting error, so that many difficulties regarding an understanding of Christian faith cannot be removed without the help of the philosophers.88 The philosophical doctrines of Augustine, therefore, are considered by Bonaventure to be better than those of the philosophers, taken as a whole. This does not necessarily indicate that the philosophical teaching of Augustine is superior in every instance to the teaching of a particular philosopher, such as Aristotle. It indicates, rather, that the teaching of Augustine on philosophical questions is a better source for a theologian than the teaching of Aristotle, who has no knowledge of the Christian faith. But there is much in Aristotle that is not in Augustine, and there are many things in Augustine that can be completed by the doctrine of Aristotle: Bonaventure goes to Aristotle as often as the need arises to settle a question requiring the use of philosophy and he shows on several occasions, as we have seen, either that Aristotle and Augustine concur in their doctrines or that their doctrines, when properly understood, are not contrary to each other. Thus, with regard to the question of the natural

88 Epist. de trib. quaes. (8.331-36). Note the following passage: "Quodsi verba philosophorum aliquando plus valent ad intelligentiam veritatis et confutationem errorum, non deviat a puritate aliquando in his studere, maxime cum multae sint quaestiones fidei, quae sine his non possunt terminari. Unde si velimus nimis stride iudicare, fortasse ipsos Sanctos, quod impium est, iudicabimus curiosos. Nam nullus melius naturam temporis et materiae describit quam Augustinus, inquirendo et disputando in libro Confessionum; nullus melius exitus formarum et propaginem rerum quam ipse super Genesim ad litteram; nullus melius quaestiones de anima et de Deo quam ipse in libro de Trinitate; nullus melius naturam creationis mundi quam idem in libro de Civitate Dei. Et ut breviter dicam, pauca aut nulla posuerunt magistri in scriptis suis, quin ilia reperias in libris Augustini. Lege Augustinum de Doctrina Christiana, ubi ostendit, quod non potest intelligi sacra Scriptura sine aliarum scientiarum peritia; ostendit etiam, quod sicut filii Israel asportaverunt vasa Aegypti, sic doctores theologi doctrinam philosophicam. Unde multa, quae non didicimus per philosophies et de dictis philosophiae, discimus per Sanctos." — Loc. cit., n. 12 (8.335-36).

572

CHAPTER SEVEN

illumination of the human intellect, Bonaventure follows Augustine on the connexion of the soul to the eternal laws and, at the same time, Bonaventure maintains that it is indubitably true, as Aristotle teaches, that human knowledge is generated by way of the senses, memory and experience. In Bonaventure's doctrine, then, the illumination of the intellect entails a cooperative influence of God on every natural activity of the intellect, whether in abstracting species from corporeal things or in judging them according to their truth in God. As a distinctively Bonaventurean doctrine, however, the natural illumination of the human intellect is the gift to it of God's influence, cooperation and conservation. This is a gift over and above the natural lumen of the agent intellect, which is not a self-sufficient potency. Although the source of the gift is extrinsic to the intellect, nevertheless, as an intrinsic effect of the eternal light of God, the gift is received by the intellect in accordance with its natural power to know created truth.89 Our second problem has to do with the ability of the human intellect to judge the truth of creatures by and in their eternal reasons or, as Bonaventure says by way of appropriation, by and in the eternal Word of God. Now, according to Anselm, all things are true by the first truth; he intends to say, Bonaventure argues, that they are formally true by the first truth, which is God, so that truth is His property alone. This seems to be supported by reason, moreover, for truth is that by which anything is true and, as an object of knowledge, truth is also true, but by no other thing than itself, because otherwise there would be no first truth. Since that truth is true through its essence, it is the uncreated truth; so truth seems to be a property only of God.90 Bonaventure, interpreting Anselm's doctrine, points out that the word true signifies the relation of a thing to an exemplar cause, which the thing expresses, and so it is said to be true, just as good signifies the relation of a thing to a final cause, and thus the thing is said to be good because of its order to an end. When a created thing is said to be good by the uncreated goodness, the word by shows that this goodness predicates the end of the thing and not its form, because the goodness of God is not the form of any created thing. Likewise, when all things are said to be true

89 For some other accounts of Bonaventure's doctrine on the cooperative activity of God regarding the human intellect consult F. Schwendiger, FKS, 15 (1928), pp. 205-12, 230-43; L. Veuthey, Si. Bonav. philos. chris., pp. 67-70; G. Bonafede, // "D« ScienM Christi"..., pp. 153-58, or Saggi sulla ftlasofia medioeeale, pp. 247-52. E. Bettoni, stressing the unity of the illumination from God, grounds it in an originally innate and habitual idea of God in the rational soul, an idea functioning as the principle of His cooperating influence on the acquisition of abstract species by the intellect "La dottrina bonaventuriana dell'illuminazione intellettuale", RNFS, 36 (1944), pp. 149-58. That there is no such doctrine of Bonaventure see: Jean de Dieu de Champsecret, "L'intuition sans concept et la theorie bonaventurienne de la contemplation", EF (NS), 7 (1956), pp. 67-69; R. Sciamannini, La contuiz. bonav., pp. 69-75; G. Scheltens, W, 18 (1960), pp. 209-17. 90 1 Sent., 8.1.1.1, fa 4 & 7 (1.150; ed. min., fa. d & g, 1.116); cf. St. Anselm, Dialog, de verit., c. 13 (PL 154.484-86).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

573

by the uncreated truth, the word by signifies that this truth is their formal and exemplar cause, for all things are true, and they are created to express their truth, through the manifestation of the supreme lumen of God. If the influence of His lumen were to cease, Bonaventure remarks, created things would no longer be true. Consequently, a created thing is not true through its essence, but through a participation in the uncreated truth. 91 But Augustine says that the uncreated light is the principle of knowing this light and other knowable objects; therefore, if truth is the principle of knowledge, and if the uncreated light is truth, surely truth is in God alone?92 Just as colour is the object of sight, Bonaventure replies, and as colour is the principle moving the potency of sight into act, but not without the act of corporeal light, which is other than the object of sight, so also created truth is the object of the intellect, which cannot be moved by it into act apart from the action of the uncreated truth; and yet created truth in its own way, though depending on the act of the uncreated light, moves the intellect into act.93 There are, then, two ways of understanding that the uncreated truth is the principle by which all other things are known. In one way, this is understood formally, when it applies only to God, because His eternal wisdom or Word is the principle by which all things are known to God In another way, it is understood causally, and then all things are known by the eternal wisdom and Word of God inasmuch as He is the cause of knowing them. Since God cannot be the proper form of a created intellect, He is said to be its exemplar form. Moreover, since every perfect act of knowledge is from wisdom not only by way of efficient causality, but also from a form perfecting the human intellect, therefore, to know the very fount of wisdom, there must flow from that fount a created wisdom, which is a form or habitus of the human soul.94 Thus, in Bonaventure's view, it is because God is the exemplar cause of creatures and the exemplar principle of knowing them that He is at once the cause and the principle by which they are true and by which their truth is known to the human intellect. Although God does not perfect any creature by giving His being to its matter, nevertheless, He can cause the human intellect to know any other created thing. Granting the necessity for the possible intellect to be formed by intelligible species in the order to understand anything, Bonaventure maintains his position that the formation of the possible intellect by those species depends on the influence of the eternal lumen through which the intellect is conformed to the divine exemplar, or the eternal Word, which is the principle of knowing created things, whose similitudes are contained by that exem91 92 relig., 93 94

Loc. cit., ad fa. 4-7 (1.151-52; ed. nun., ad fa. d-g, 1.117). Loc. cit., fm. 3 (1.150; ed. mm., fm. c, 1.116); cf. St. Augustine, Solil., 1.8.15 (PL 32.877); De vera 34-36.64-66 (PL 34.150-52). Loc. cit., ad fm. 3 (1.151; ed. min., ad fro. c, 1.117). 3 Sent., 14.1.1, ad 1 (3.297-98; ed. min., 3.290).

574

CHAPTER SEVEN

plar. Since the intellect must be assimilated to an object in order to know its truth, but the similitude abstracted from a created thing is not sufficient of itself to bring about that assimilation, therefore, to know the truth of an object, the intellect must also be assimilated to the divine exemplar, which is the principle and cause of its knowing the object.95 When Bonaventure speaks of the human intellect judging the truth of creatures by their eternal reasons, he is referring to an intrinsic effect in the intellect of the efficient and exemplar causality of God As the efficient and exemplar cause of all things, God is the principle of their being and of their truth, which they have through a participation in His being and truth. Having a participation in the uncreated truth, all things are true by that truth, which is the exemplar form of created truth. Every creature undergoes an unceasing influence of the uncreated lumen, and this causes the creature to manifest its truth to the human intellect. The first cause of the manifestation is the uncreated light or truth, and its second cause is the created truth moving the intellect into act through intelligible species. Thus, the uncreated truth cooperates with created truth in moving the intellect, so that, in knowing created truth, it also knows implicitly the efficient and exemplar cause of that truth, which is a similitude of the uncreated truth. God is also the efficient and exemplar cause of the human intellect. As its efficient cause, God moves the intellect into act through an influence on the lumen of the agent intellect, and so He directs it toward the formation of the possible intellect through the intelligible species abstracted from corporeal things. In that way, God is the first cause of truth in the intellect, and the agent intellect is its second cause. As the exemplar cause of the intellect, God is the truth by which it knows created things, and He is the truth by which the intellect itself is true. Cooperating with the intellect as its exemplar cause, then, God conforms it to the light of His eternal reason, so that the intellect, already disposed through a habitus of science or of wisdom, is drawn toward the uncreated truth from, but not without, its similitudes in created things. As a consequence, the intellect's assimilation to created things is completed in its assimilation to their similitudes in the eternal reason of God. Arriving at God in this way, which is wholly analogical, the intellect is moved by His eternal light to judge creatures by their exemplar cause, or their eternal reasons, which direct the judgment of the intellect in such a manner that it knows the truth of creatures with certitude in their first cause.95 95 3 Sent., 14.2.1, ad 1-2 (3.308; ed min., 3.301-02). 96 F. Schwendiger understands that the eternal reasons, though moving the intellect to judge with certitude, are not the medium by which God illumines the intellect when it has a partial glimpse of the uncreated truth from the participated truth in the rational soul: FKS, 16 (1929), pp. 29-52. P. J. McAndrew posits the eternal reasons as the object ruling and stabilizing human thoughts, and the object moving the intellect while directing it according to the truth of its first principles: NSC, 6 (1932), pp. 41-45. E. Bettoni describes the eternal reasons as the efficient cause ruling the intellect extrinsically and, as the exemplar cause, moving and directing it intrinsically toward the stability of truth: RNFS, 36 (1944), pp. 145-49; //

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

575

To grasp the significance of Bonaventure's doctrine on the ability of the human mind to judge the truth of creatures in their first cause, or their eternal reasons, we shall have to go to a few of his texts on the Trinity. In one text, Bonaventure talks about the implications of certain prepositions with reference to the relations between the Father and the Son. Some prepositions involve opposition, such as against (contra); other prepositions involve diversity or distance, such as toward (ad) and near (prope). These two kinds of prepositions, Bonaventure says, are not to be used in any way of the relations between the Father and the Son. There are two other kinds, however, that can be used of those divine relations. The first kind implies causality, such as from (de) and out (ex), but they are not convertible, for the Father cannot be said to come from or out of the Son. The second kind implies a coming together or a conformity, such as in (in) and with (cum), and these are convertible, because they signify a relation of total equality between the Father and the Son.97 Thus, the word in, or with, signifies a coming together of two things conformed to each other, as the Father and the Son come together through their mutual conformity, so that they are with one another in their relation of total equality. Now, as we have seen, there is no such relation between any created thing and the Creator, but only relations of causality and dependence. A created thing and the Creator, as a consequence, come together solely through analogical conformities. It follows, then, that the human mind, as a created thing, can be with God to judge truth in His eternal reasons only through an analogical conformity to God. The preposition in, according to a second text, sometimes connotes an inherence, as an accident is in a subject, and sometimes makes known an identity, as the ideas of creatures are in God. for their ideas are God and not outside God. The preposition, at other times, makes known a causality, as creatures are in God himself, and they are in Him according as He is their efficient, exemplar and final cause. The term cause, moreover, signifies His relation to creatures according to His principle of understanding them; so, as signifying causality, the preposition in is used only with terms predicating a relation of God to creatures. Since the names substance and essence do not predicate a relation, the preposition in does not make known an identity or an inherence when it is said, for example, that creatures are in the substance of God. Although His substance is really the same as His knowledge, nevertheless, it is not the same thing to say that creatures are in the substance of God as it is to say that they are t'n His knowledge. Those statements differ in their mode of signification and of understanding: the first statement signifies either that creatures problema delta cognosc. diDio .... pp. 169-77. R Sciamannini sees the eternal reasons moving and ruling the human mind through its proper principles that of themselves direct it toward God, because they are His similitudes and, as such, they dispose the mind to know the first truth, which irradiates as an infallible light on a fallible intellect La cmtuiz. btmav., pp. 25-29. 97 1 Sent., 19.un.4, ad 5 (1.350: ed. mm., 1.279-80).

576

CHAPTER SEVEN

inhere in God or that they are identical with God and are not outside God, neither signification yielding a true understanding of the relation in God to creatures; the second statement signifies that creatures are in God according as He is their cause, and so this signification expresses a true understanding of the relation that creatures have to God in His knowledge of them. When Anselm says that the creature in the Creator is His essence as creative, he means, according to Bonaventure, that the creature is its idea or its similitude with the Creator. Anselm does not say, therefore, that the creature is the essence of the Creator. Rather, he says that the similitude of the creature is the Creator's essence as creative. For Bonaventure, then, the ideas of creatures are said to be in the divine essence, because the preposition in makes truly known the identity of God with His ideas, an identity that cannot be predicated of God and the proper being of His creatures.9B Following the above distinctions regarding the signification of in, we can say that the human mind on judging the truth of creatures in God does not inhere in their eternal reasons, nor has it an identity with them. The mind is a created thing and, as such, is not and cannot be God, who is infinitely distant from the proper being of every created thing. When the mind is said to judge the truth of creatures in God, therefore, the word in makes known that God, or His eternal reasons, is the cause of the judgment by which the mind has truth. The word in, accordingly, signifies a relation of the mind to God This is a relation in the order of knowledge, a relation founded upon the analogical conformity of the mind to God as His image and depending on the proper principles by which the mind understands the truth of creatures according to their own being. The relation enables the mind to be, as it were or analogically, with God and, therefore, in Him as the cause of creatures. As a consequence, the mind can judge the truth of creatures according to their being that they have in the eternal reasons, or divine ideas, which the mind reaches, not in themselves and apart from creatures, but as they are reflected from creatures, which are conformed to them." Our third text contains a response by Bonaventure to an argument based on the following passage from Augustine: "God the Father knows all things in Himself; He knows also in the Son". But to know all things and to be

98 1 Sent., 36.dub.l (1.630; ed min., 1.502); cf. St. Anselm, Monol., cc. 34-37 (PL 158.188-91). 99 J. M. Bissen understands Bonaventure to say that the eternal reason of God has, as the moving principle of knowledge, an impelling action on the human soul, thus causing the mind to assent of itself to the insufficiency of the created principles to bring about truth with certitude; following that assent, the mind is drawn toward the necessary and immutable truth of God as to the principle of the certitude acquired by the mind. Consequently, the eternal law of God is the regulating principle by which the mind judges that created things have necessity, and so, through the habitually innate similitudes of the eternal reasons in the soul, the judgments of the mind express the exemplar truth of creatures in God; but those judgments require a special intervention of God through His eternal reasons operating, as universal principles of knowledge, by means of their similitudes in the human soul. See: L'exemplansmt divin ..., pp. 209-15.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

577

most wise are one and the same; therefore, if the Father knows all things in the Son, the Father is not only wise by Himself, but He is also wise by the Son.100 Answering the argument, Bonaventure distinguishes the statement 'He knows by the Son' from the statement 'He knows in the Son'. The first statement is false absolutely, Bonaventure says, because the word by implies that the Son has the nature of a form, or of a principle, on which the Father depends for His act of knowing. With regard to the second statement, Bonaventure notes that the term in, having a causal signification, can limit the words 'He knows' to a comparison of the Father with the Son as the subject known to the Father. Understood that way, the statement is false, for it means that the Son is the ground of the Father's act of knowing. But the term in can fix the meaning of the words 'He knows' to a comparison of the Father with the Son as the object known to the Father. The statement is true, understood this way, because it means that the Son is the principle, the exemplar and the cause of production with respect to the things known to the Father. According to Bonaventure, the latter meaning of the statement is the one intended by Augustine. Now a person knowing another person perfectly, Bonaventure remarks, knows all that is in the other person: but the Father knows the Son perfectly; therefore, He knows all things in the Son, because all things are in the Son. It does not follow, Bonaventure concludes, that the Father is wise by the Son, since by signifies that, for the Father, the Son is the ground or principle of knowing.101 We can add here another text of Bonaventure, handling a problem connected with Augustine's statement that the Word is "a kind of art of the omnipotent and wise God".102 Bonaventure indicates that Augustine says 'kind of art' and not 'art absolutely', because the Son is not the art by which the Father knows, but the art where or in which He knows. The Son is not the art by which the Father is wise, therefore, but the art from the wise Father, and the art through which He accomplishes all things, because He has produced all things through the Son. The term art and, likewise, the term word include an intention or direction of power and wisdom, but in different ways: word designates an emanation from the Father and a relation to Him; therefore, Word is proper to the Son, whereas art is appropriated to Him.103 100 1 Sent., 33.2.1, arg. 4 (1.562; ed. mm., 1.447); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 15.14.23 (PL 42.1077). 101 Loc. cit., ad 4 (1.562-63; ed. min., 1.448-49). 102 "Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit quod 'est ars quaedam omnipotentis et sapientis' etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia unusquisque, non intellecta arte, est iners: ergo si Filius est ars Patris, non intellecto Filio esse, Pater est iners: ergo videtur, quod rationabiliter operari habeat Pater a Filio suo." — 1 Sent., 31.2.dub.2 (1.550; ed min., 1.438). Note the full passage from Augustine: "... tanquam Verbum perfectum, cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium; et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno, cum quo unum." — De Trinit., 6.10.11 (PL 42.931). 103 "Dicendum quod ... non dicit, quod sit 'ars simpliciter', sed quod sit 'ars quaedam', quia non est ars, 'qua' Pater novit, sed 'uni' novit; non est ars Patris, qua Pater sit sapiens, sed quae est a Patre

578

CHAPTER SEVEN

To know a thing by something else, then, is to depend on another as on a form or principle required for the act of knowing. Since the Father does not depend in any way on the Son, Bonaventure excludes the use of by with reference to the Father's knowledge of things through the Son. But the human mind has a dependence on God for its act of knowing; therefore, the human mind can be said, as we have shown, to know things by their divine form, which is their exemplar form, and by their divine principles or ideas. To know a thing in another, however, is to know the other either as the subject causing the act of knowing or as the object containing the thing that is known. Bonaventure rejects the use of in designating the Son as the subject causing the Father's knowledge of things, since the Son cannot be the ground or principle giving rise to the Father's act of knowing. As a consequence, he restricts the meaning of in to its designation of the Son as the object known to the Father, so that He knows the Son as the principle, the exemplar and the productive cause of things, which the Father creates through the Son. Thus, as the object known to the Father, the Son is, so to speak, where the Father knows creatures, or the object in which He knows them; so the Son is, as it were, the art directing the power and wisdom through which the Father produces all things, for the Son, or the Word, is said to contain their immutable reasons or ideas. But the art of God is appropriated by Bonaventure to the Son, and so it is really an essential attribute of God. When the human mind, therefore, using natural reason alone, knows the ideas or eternal reasons of things in God, it does not reach the Word of God, but the divine essence. The mind reaches the divine essence, moreover, not as such, but as the power and wisdom producing the things known to the mind, which depends on the divine causality for its act of knowing. On attaining the divine essence, the mind knows the subject causing not only the things that it knows, but also its own act of knowing. The mind can be said this way to judge the truth of things in God as in their creative principle, and as in the creative principle of human knowledge. When the mind reaches the divine essence as an object of knowledge, as it can from the vestiges of the divine essence in corporeal creatures and, more perfectly, from its reflexion or image in the rational spirit, the mind can then be said to know where, or the object in which, it judges the truth of creatures with certitude, because it knows God as the source of understanding and the truth containing all the ideas or immutable reasons of created things. Whether the mind reaches God as the subject or as the object of its knowledge, it arrives at God in an analogical manner from His effects in creation. As a consequence, the mind knows the eternal reasons, not as such, but only from their reflexions in creatures. In short, on judging sapiente, per quam Pater omnia operatur, quia omnia produxit per Filium. Et notandum, quod cum ars includat et intentionem virtutis et sapientiae, et similiter verbum; tamen differenter, quia verbum dicit emanationem et respectum, ideo est proprium, ars autem appropriatum." —Loc. cit., Resp. (1.550; ed. min., 1.438).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

579

the truth of creatures in the eternal reasons, the mind reaches them with the creatures that it knows and never apart from those creatures, so that neither God nor His ideas are known by the mind apart from its proper principles of truth and knowledge.104 Since God is not known immediately by the mind when it knows Him from creatures, they must be a medium in some way between the mind and God But Augustine seems to say, speaking of the angels, that there can be no medium between any created mind and God It is difficult to see according to human reason, furthermore, how there can be a medium, because it would have to be more or less proportional to God than to the created mind, such as the mind of an angel. If the medium were more proportional to God than to an angel's mind, there would then be a creature superior to the angel. If the medium were less proportional to God than to the angel, the medium woud be an obstacle rather than a help to the angel's mind in knowing God It seems, therefore, that there cannot be any medium of knowledge between a created mind and God.105 In Bonaventure's interpretation of Augustine, there is a medium, namely, the effect of God, for He is known through His creature as by a mirror reflecting His similitude, which is more proportional to the created mind than to God This is not contrary to Augustine's doctrine, Bonaventure maintains, because he wanted to say that there is no medium between God and the mind in the order of efficient cause or influence. There is a medium of guidance between them, however, but this does not have the nature of a medium, properly speaking, since it serves the needs of the knowing potency rather than presiding over it. In other words, the similitude of God in His effect serves as a medium guiding a created mind toward a knowledge of Him from that effect.106 The knowledge that the human mind has of creatures by and in their eternal reasons is made possible through the illumination that the mind receives from God His illumination is an act which is extrinsic to the human soul, but the effect of the act is intrinsic to the soul itself. Acts of this kind, according to Bonaventure, can come either from that efficient cause which is the principal agent with regard to the soul, or from an impelling cause that arouses the soul, thus moving it into act. Acts coming 104 Even the human intellect of Christ had to be disposed through a created habitus in order to know the Word of God: "Quoniam ... ad hoc quod anima Christ! cognoscat Verburn, necesse est intervenire sapientiam creatam, quae quidem est disponens et habilitans ipsam animam ad cognitionem Verbi, nee est ipsa summa sapientia, sed influentia ab ea procedens." — 3 Sent., 14.2.3, in Resp. (3.315; ed.min., 3.308). 105 2 Sent., 3.2.2.2, arg. 6 (2.123; ed.min, 2.113-14). See in St. Augustine: De cioit. Dei, 22.1.2 (PL 41.753); De Trinit,, 11.5.8 (PL 42.991). 106 Lac. cit., ad 6 (2.124; ed. min., 2.115). Note the passage: "Nee illud est contra Augustinum, quia ... Augustinus vult, quod inter mentem et Deum non cadit medium in ratione causae efftcientis vel influentis, cadit tamen medium manuductionis, quod tamen non habet rationem medii proprie, quia magis subsetvit potentiae cognoscenti quam praesit"

580

CHAPTER SEVEN

from the first sort of cause belong properly to God, who alone is the principal agent that can generate and form thoughts in the very depths of the soul. The second sort of cause acts in the soul only in a wide or improper meaning of the term cause. An illumination requires a certain power and a sufficient authority to have an effect in the human mind; but no impelling cause, such as thoughts suggested by an angel exciting the soul, has the power and the authority to illumine the mind intrinsically. God alone can insert thoughts into the human mind, since only He can form the mind in truth. On this point, Bonaventure also follows Augustine's doctrine, that there cannot be any medium between the mind and God. Although an angel is between God and the rational soul according to nobility of nature, even so, there is nothing between the soul and God according to causality and influence. God has an immediate influence on the human mind, which is formed immediately by God as the first truth.107 Bonaventure refers to three modes of mediation between agents and their products. The first mode, excluding only immediacy, is concerned with an order and diversity of agents separated from one another. This mode can be seen when an ultimate effect is not connected to the influence of its prior cause, but is produced entirely through a medium without the cooperation of the prior cause. There cannot be a medium of that sort between God and His effects, because He is the cause which is first absolutely, and His influence is so great that, if it is taken away, a creature cannot act in any way. The second mode looks to causes ordered to one another and, though diverse as agents, not separated in their actions. There is a mediation in this way with regard to God and the effects produced by a created cause. The uncreated cause and a created cause are ordered to each other; though diverse in their powers, they are not separated because the action of God, operating through Himself, is intrinsic to the created power through which He acts, since it is from God. The third mode of mediation has to do with an order of agents that are neither diverse nor separated in their powers. This is the mode found in the Godhead, where the agents are the divine persons among whom there is order, because what one does He has from another; however, the divine persons are not diverse or separated in their powers, for the three persons act equally and intrinsically by their one power. Thus, the Father produces the Holy Spirit by the Son's mediation, not because the Son is a medium different or separated from the Father, but because it is from the Father that the Son has what He produces, so that they are ordered to each other.108 The first and second modes of mediation, but not the third, apply to Bonaventure's doctrine on the illumination of the

107 2 Sent., 8.2.un.4, con. 2-3, Resp. "... cogitationes suggerere." (2.230-31; ed. min., 2.228-29); 1.2.2.2, con. 1 & ad 1 (2.45-46; ed. min., 2.38-39). See in St. Augustine: De diver, quaes., 51.4 (PL 40.33); and above in n. 105. 108 1 Sent., 12.un.3, ad 1 (1.223-24; ed. min., 1.181); cf. 37.1.1.1, fm 2 (1.638; ed. min., fm. b, 1.506).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

581

human mind As an extrinsic act with a truly intrinsic effect, a natural illumination of the mind can come only from God, who is the principal agent of understanding, and who alone can generate and form thoughts in a created mind As the first truth, then, God has an immediate influence in the human mind According to the first mode of mediation, therefore, God is the first cause absolutely of the actions of the human mind in knowing and judging truth. His influence and cooperation are altogether necessary, as a consequence, for the mind to act in any way whatsoever, and they are necessarily immediate to its proper actions. According to the second mode of mediation, however, the intrinsic effect of God's action is such that, operating through Himself or immediately, He causes the mind to know and to judge truth by His influence in it and by His cooperation with it. God brings about the proper acts of the mind that way because He is its first cause and the principal agent of its thoughts. His influence and cooperation, though they are absolutely necessary and immediate, do not dispense with the proper power of the mind. On the contrary, acting through that power, God causes knowledge and truth in the mind through the mediation of its own power, which He moves into act while conserving it. The proper medium through which God causes the mind to know and to judge truth both by and in His eternal reasons, therefore, is the natural power of the mind itself and not the eternal reasons. The mind reaches the eternal reasons through the guiding medium of God's similitudes in creatures, and it arrives at the eternal reasons as the principle and cause not only of the truth of other things, but also of the truth of its own knowledge of those things.109 In the texts that we have studied on our second problem, Bonaventure makes use of only two historical sources: the doctrines of Anselm and Augustine. Although Bonaventure accepts Anselm's teaching that created things are true by the first truth, at the same time, he interprets Anselm as saying that creatures are formally true by the uncreated truth, to which they are compared as to their exemplar cause. In Bonaventure's view, as a result, the uncreated truth is the exemplar form of the truth of creatures. They make known their exemplar truth in God by the manifestation of His lumen 109 L. Bellofiore considers the eternal reasons to be the medium by which God illumines the human mind, so that God himself is not the subject known when the mind judges truth with certitude; God moves and rules the intellect's proper acts in and by His eternal light through innate reflexions of His eternal reasons in the memory of the soul, and so the eternal reasons are the medium quid of His illumination: Sophia, 7 (1939), pp. 180-87. Z. Van de Woestyne has Bonaventure positing the eternal reasons as the object moving the human intellect, so that, on analyzing its proper objects, it can acquire certitude whenever its analyses end in the eternal reasons, for they are the object by which the truth of the intellect's judgments are known to it Antmianum, 9 (1933), pp. 483-87. For some other accounts of Bonaventure's doctrine on the significance of understanding truth by and in the eternal reasons see the following: G. Bonafede, // "De Scientia Christi" ..., pp. 160-71, or Saggi sulla fitosofia medioevale, pp. 252-60; L. A. Cruz, EX, 1 (1951), pp. 269-71; G. Scheltens, TP, 16 (1954), pp. 579-602, and 17 (1955), pp. 383-408; by the same author, W, 18 (I960), pp. 217-29; R Sciamannini, La contuiz. bonav., pp. 34-43, 69-75.

582

CHAPTER SEVEN

through which they express their own truth, and so creatures are true because of a participation in the uncreated truth. Hence, when Anselm says that a creature in the Creator is His essence as creative, Bonaventure insists that a creature in the Creator is its idea or similitude with God, so that its similitude or idea in Him is His essence as creative. Interpreting Augustine's doctrine on the uncreated light as the principle of knowing truth, Bonaventure maintains that created truth is the proper object of the human intellect, and that this truth in its own way moves the intellect into act. Nonetheless, as Augustine is saying, created truth depends on the light of the uncreated truth; therefore, Bonaventure holds, the human intellect cannot be moved, even through a created truth, apart from the illuminating action of the uncreated truth. It is according to the doctrine of Augustine, moreover, that Bonaventure develops his position on the immediacy of God to the human mind in His act of illuminating it. This action, consisting in His influence and cooperation, must be immediate because of its effect, which is the immediate formation of the mind by God as the first truth. On the other hand, the mind needs the guiding medium of His similitudes in creatures, but this is, as it were, a medium in the formal order and not in the order of efficiency or influence. Bonaventure's theological understanding of knowing one thing in another is also a development of Augustinian doctrine. As developed by Bonaventure, knowledge in another is a knowledge either of a subject causing the knowledge or of an object which is the productive cause and exemplar principle of the thing known. From the theological viewpoint, then, the Father knows the Son as the object or art containing all the immutable reasons of created things. But this is an essential attribute appropriated by Bonaventure to the Son or Word of God; so, from the philosophical point of view, the human mind is said to judge truth by and in the immutable reasons of God, because it knows the divine essence both as the subject causing created truth and as the object containing its uncreated principles.

In what way does Aquinas attribute to God the r6le of the teacher with regard to the human mind? Augustine shows, as Aquinas knows, that a man cannot, unless taught interiorly by God, learn anything from an exterior teacher. It seems from this, that a man can have knowledge of truth only through the help of divine grace, which works within the soul. Now an interior teaching results from an illumination of the mind: but Augustine shows also that Christ is the one and only teacher instructing a man interiorly; therefore, it appears that God is the only one who can illumine a created mind.110 But Augustine shows in addition, Aquinas notes, that a 110 2 Sent., 28.1.5, arg. 3 (2.730); 9.1.2, arg. 4 (2.229). See in St. Augustine: De magistro, cc. 11-12 (PL 32.1215-18); In Epist. loaan., 3.2.13 (PL 35.2004-05).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

583

man who teaches is similar to one who moves his finger to point to something: just as a man can move his finger exteriorly that way, but cannot give the power of sight through which his student adverts to what is known visibly, so also a man can put forth words exteriorly as signs of truth, but cannot give his student the power of understanding what is true, because God alone can give such a power. God is said to be our one and only teacher, therefore, because He causes and conserves in us our power of understanding, and not because, in any knowledge of truth, He infuses over and above that power a new lumen of grace. Furthermore, as an inferior agent in natural actions is efficacious in producing effects only through the power of the first agent, so an inferior agent in intellectual actions can produce an effect, or an illumination, only through the power of God, the first source of illumination. This is why God is the one who teaches all created minds; but His teaching does not exclude an illumination from other agents, just as His action in natural things does not exclude the work of other natural agents. A teacher, properly speaking, directs another in his knowledge of a thing. There are required for intellectual knowledge both an intelligible object and a lumen to see the object; so someone is said to teach either in presenting an intelligible object or in giving a lumen to understand it. A lumen of this sort can be intrinsic or extrinsic. God alone can teach by giving to a created intellect an intrinsic or connatural lumen. An extrinsic lumen is an added strength given to the connatural power of an intellect, as the lumen of a candle gives strength to the power of sight. In this way, one angel can illumine another angel, or even a man; but one man cannot illumine another man, because the lumen of the human intellect is much too weak for a man to teach that way. An intelligible object can also be of two kinds. The intellect of a man is sufficient for understanding the first kind, provided the object is offered to him for his consideration. A man is said to teach when he presents an object of this kind to another, as it were, directing a student in his knowledge, as one man directs the sight of another by pointing to an object visible to both of them. The other kind of intelligible object is not sufficient for the intellect of a student to understand it, unless he is guided through something else more known to him, such as the first principles of truth. The one who presents that more known object to the mind of a student is his true teacher, and this is God, who teaches interiorly by illuminating the human mind. Consequently, a man imparts truth to another, not by way of illumination, but by way of discourse.''' According to Aquinas, then, God teaches us interiorly about the natural things known to us, because He causes in us our natural lumen, which He directs in truth. God teaches us about other things that are beyond nature

HI 2 Sent., 28.1.5, ad 3 (2.732-33); 9.1.2, ad 4 (2.231-32); cf, St. Augustine, De doct. chris., Prol., n. 3 (PL 34.16-17). See also in St. Thomas: DA, a. 4, ad 6 (2.296).

584

CHAPTER SEVEN

by infusing a new lumen into our minds. Although the natural lumen caused in the human mind by God is sufficient for knowing the truth of natural things without a new lumen, nevertheless, the mind must be moved by God in order that it know its natural objects. Since God is the cause of that natural lumen, which He conserves and directs in its actions, therefore, our perception of truth is attributed principally to God, as a work of art is attributed more to the artisan than to the instrument that he uses in his work.112 Thus, in teaching a man, God moves the man's intellect with regard both to its natural power and to the intelligible forms that constitute its proper principles of operation. God moves the human intellect in the first way by giving to it the power to understand. The human intellect is a created thing and, as such, is in potency with respect to the first being in the order of intelligence. Since the first in any order is the cause of everything else in the order, every subsequent power of understanding must come from God, who is the first in the order of intelligence. God moves the human intellect in the second way by impressing on its potency the similitudes of the objects that it knows. Because God is the first being in the order of being, every other being pre-exists in Him as in its first cause, so that, according to His way of understanding them, all created beings are in the intellect of God Hence, all the reasons of creatures exist in His intellect, and other intellects have those reasons from God in order that they may actually understand creatures, which subsist as beings because of their eternal reasons. Depending on the first cause of understanding, therefore, the natural operations of the human intellect come from it as from the second cause of understanding. In other words, for Aquinas, the natural lumen of the intellect and the proper similitudes of its objects are sufficient, though secondary, causes of human understanding. The similitudes of created things move the intellect in such a way that it can understand them by its own power, presupposing the necessary dependence on the primary causality of God in the intellect and in the action of its objects.113 God is present in all creatures, then, as an agent is present to a thing in which it acts. Since God is being itself through His essence, His proper effect must be created being, or the to-be of creatures, just as to-set-on-fire is the proper effect of fire. God causes the being of creatures when they first begin to-be; He also causes them to-be as long as they are conserved in being, as a lumen caused in the air by the sun remains in the air as long as it is illuminated. As the cause of created being, accordingly, God is present in every creature and, by His own power, acts immediately in it, for a thing which is moved and its first mover, as Aristotle proves, must always be together without a medium. As long as a creature has being, consequently, God must be present to it according to the mode in which it has being. Of

112 Expos, de Trin., 1.1., ad 2, 5, 8 (Decker, pp. 61-63). 113 ST, la, 105.3 (1.628b-29b).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

585

all that which is in a creature, being is most intrinsic; therefore, as the agent causing and conserving the being of all creatures, God must be most intrinsically in every creature, and so it belongs to His omnipotent power to be immediately in every one of His effects."4 God is in all creatures through His power inasmuch as they are subjected to His control and influence; He is in them through His presence inasmuch as they are exposed and unclosed to Him. But God is in all things through His essence, not as though He were part of their essence, but inasmuch as He is in all things as the cause of their being. Now, among God's effects, there is the rational soul and its intellectual potencies. God is present to the rational soul, according to Aquinas, not only as its first cause and conserving principle, but also as an object of operation is present in an operator. Thus, God is in the soul as an object of knowledge is in a knower, and as an object of love is in a lover. Because the rational creature knows and loves God actually or habitually, He is in that creature in a special way both through nature and through grace, which is a perfection added above nature. Although it belongs to a power to be the principle of acting in another, so that the agent is in the other to which it relates and applies its power, nonetheless, it is more true according to knowledge and love to say that creatures are in God than to say that God is in creatures.115 The doctrine of Aquinas on the influence and cooperation of God with regard to the human intellect, which He causes and conserves, concurs with and differs from the doctrine of Bonaventure in much the same ways that we have indicated in our previous comparison of their positions on the natural illumination of the intellect. They concur as follows: God is the first agent of illumination, because He is the first cause of intelligence, and so He illumines the human intellect immediately through His influence and cooperation; therefore, as the creating and conserving principle of the natural lumen in the intellect, God teaches a man truth intrinsically both by moving his intellect to understand and by impressing on its potency the similitudes that he needs in order to know created things. Aquinas and Bonaventure concur in this, then, that the illumination of the intellect by God is extrinsic in its origin but intrinsic in its effect. The two theologians differ sharply, however, in their views regarding the nature of that effect. To Bonaventure, the illumination from God moves and directs an intellect having proper principles and a connatural lumen that, because of their intrinsic contingency, are not sufficient of themselves to bring about a knowledge of truth with certitude; so the illumination of the intellect is something more than its natural operation of understanding, and yet something received by the intellect in accordance with its natural power of operation. To Aquinas, the illumination from God moves and directs an in114 ST, la, 8.1 (1.41a-42b); cf. Aristotle, Pkysica, 7.2 (243a4-245bl). 115 ST, la, 8.3 (1.43a-44b).

586

CHAPTER SEVEN

tellect having proper principles and a connatural lumen that, because of their created necessity, are sufficient of themselves to bring about truth with certitude; so the illumination of the intellect is not something above its natural operation of understanding, even though it is something received by the intellect in accordance with its condition as a created power of intelligence. In the view of Bonaventure, moreover, the cooperation of God with the intellect is a particular affect of His conservation by comparison with His general conservation of creatures in being and His special conservation of spiritual creatures in grace. In the view of Aquinas, however, God effects the conservation of all creatures in being through the presence of His power and influence, while conserving the human intellect through His presence in a special way as an object of its knowledge, whether natural or infused, the latter always requiring a lumen over and above the natural power of the intellect.116 Bonaventure's insistence on the necessity of the human mind to know creatures by and in their eternal reasons is based on many texts that he brings forward from Augustine. In the previous section of this chapter, we have shown that Aquinas has a different interpretation than Bonaventure of some of the texts in Augustine.117 The other texts of Augustine used by Bonaventure are handled all at once by Aquinas, saying that they pose a difficulty, because it seems from them that God can be seen by us in our present life. These are the texts where Augustine speaks of seeing truth in the eternal reasons, or in the immutable truth above our minds, and of judging truth according to, or by, the divine truth through which, as the first truth, we can know other things. 118 It is not to be believed, Aquinas remarks, that Augustine intends to say in those texts that we can, in our present life, understand God through His essence. Hence, it is necessary to determine how we can see the immutable truth, or the eternal reasons, according to which we judge of other things. Aquinas first points out that Augustine shows truth to be in the rational soul, and so he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. 119 But truth is not in the soul, Aquinas maintains, as God is said to be

116 J. M. Bissen understands both Bonaventure and Aquinas to say that God's work in the intellect is a special effect by comparison with His work in other created things. Bonaventure, positing no other illumination than that effected by the natural lumen of the intellect itself, grounds and terminates the certitude of human knowledge in first principles that are in the mind originally and innately, Aquinas grounds and terminates the certitude of human knowledge in first principles that are not in the mind originally or innately. Thus, for Aquinas, the intellect acquires certitude by an abstractive operation; for Bonaventure, the intellect attains certitude by a self-reflexive operation. See: L'exemplarisme divin ..., pp. 256-71. 117 See above: pp. 551-57. 118 SCO, 3.47 "Difficultatem autem ... aliis iudicemus." (3.61-62, n. 2241). See in St. Augustine: De Trinit., 9.7.12 (PL 42.976), and 12.2.2 (PL 42.999); Confess., 12.25.35 (PL 32.840); De vera relig., 31.57 (PL 43.147); Solil., 1.25.27 (PL 32.883). 119 Cf. Solit., 2.19.33 (PL 32.901).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

587

in other things through His essence. Nor is truth in the soul as truth is in every other thing, where truth is said to be according to a similitude, for a thing is called true according as it is a similitude of God, and this applies to the nature of the soul no less than to the nature of any other created thing. God is in the soul in a special way, however, since He is present there inasmuch as the soul knows truth, and what the soul knows is true according as it is a sort of similitude in the soul of the truth known to God. It is of this that Augustine speaks in saying: "just as many images of one face shine forth from a mirror, so also many truths shine forth in the minds of men from the one first truth".120 Although diverse times are known and believed to be true by diverse men, nevertheless, there are certain things that all men accept as true, such as the first principles of both speculative and practical understanding, and they are true according as they are a sort of image, so to speak, of the divine truth, which shines forth universally from all human minds. Any human mind knows a thing with certitude, therefore, whenever it analyzes the thing into the first truth by inspecting those first principles in the mind, according to, or bjt, which it judges of all things. It is in this manner that the mind sees all things in the divine truth, or in the eternal reasons, by which it judges all other things. Augustine himself speaks that way: "the truths of the sciences are seen in the divine truth, just as these visible things are seen in the lumen of the sun".121 It is clear, Aquinas comments, that visible things are not seen in the very body of the sun, but by its lumen, which is a similitude in the air of the sun's brilliance. Consequently, Augustine in saying that we see God in this life, not according to His substance, but only as in a mirror: "We see now through a mirror in darkness" (1 Cor., 13.12). Though this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects a similitude of God more clearly than corporeal creatures, even so, since the soul knows its own nature only from its understanding of corporeal things, the knowledge that the human mind can have of God cannot go beyond its dependence on sense cognition. As a consequence, in the present life, God cannot be known in any higher way than as a cause is known by or through its effect. 122 There are many men, Aquinas observes, who have true knowledge from demonstrative conclusions without considering the first truth. Furthermore, Augustine teaches that no man passes judgment on the first truth, though a man cannot judge other things well without it. If no man can judge of the first truth, Aquinas argues, it is not known to any man when he judges other things, nor are they known to him in it.123 The similitudes in the 120 Cf. Enarr. in Psalm., 11.2 (PL 36.138). 121 Cf. Soli!., 1.8.15 (PL 32.877). 122 SCG, 3.47 "Non est..." (3.62-63, nn. 2242-45); cf. 3.54 (3.73-74). Note: "... dicendum, quod licet causa prima, quae Deus est, non intret essentiam creatarum; tamen esse, quod rebus creatis inest, non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ad esse divino; sicut nee proprius effectus potest intelligi nisi ut deductus a causa propria." — DPD, 3.5, ad 1 (2.49); cf. DV. 10.8, Resp. "Si vero ..." (1.208). 123 Qdl., 10.4.1, or 10.7, sc 1-2 (p. 203); cf. St. Augustine, De lib. arbit., 2.12.34 (PL 32.1259).

588

CHAPTER SEVEN

human mind of the first truth, or of the divine lumen, are the first principles known naturally by the mind. Those principles and the lumen of the human intellect can make truth known to the mind only as the one is a similitude of the first truth and the other is a similitude of the divine lumen, from which the principles and the lumen of the human intellect have immutability and infallibility of truth. Created things are not seen by the human mind, therefore, in the first truth itself, since the mind does not see the divine essence. Rather, the mind knows created things in the first truth by reason of its image, which is the truth in the soul itself and of which the first truth is the exemplar cause. When two men see the same truth, they see it inasmuch as there is in the mind of each man a truth coming from the same first truth, as from its exemplar cause. It is thus, according to Aquinas, that the words of Augustine are to be understood. For Aquinas himself, the truth caused in a human mind by the first truth is known to the mind partly from necessity, since other things are known in it, and partly not from necessity, because it is not necessary to know the lumen of the intellect by which that truth is known, for the agent intellect is an instrument through which the man knows truth.124 We are also said to see all things in God, according to Aquinas, and to judge them by His truth, because it is through a participation in His lumen that we know and judge them: the lumen of natural reason is a sort of participation in the divine lumen. Aquinas insists, once again, that this is what Augustine means in saying that the truth of the sciences can be seen only if they are illuminated by God, as by their sun. Just as it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, Aquinas explains, in order to see the things manifested by its light, so also it is not necessary to see the essence of God in order to see the intelligible things manifested by His light.125 It is quite evident that Aquinas and Bonaventure differ, but not completely, regarding the ability of the human intellect to see created truths in and by their eternal reasons. In the view of Aquinas, on the one hand, because the lumen of natural reason is a similitude of the divine lumen and, on the other hand, because the first principles are similitudes of the eternal reasons, the human intellect and its first principles participate in the lumen and in the truth of God As a consequence, the intellect and its principles are sufficient in their own order, depending on the efficient and exemplar causality of God, to bring about a knowledge of truth with certitude. Having a proper infallibility by its natural power and a proper immutability in its natural principles, the intellect has no need to know or to judge the truth of creatures in and by their eternal reasons. God causes the human intellect in such a way that, assimilating it to His intellect, the natural truth of its first principles is an image of the truth of the eternal reasons; so, through

124 Loc. at., Resp., ad 2 (p. 203); cf. St Augustine, Cmftss., 12.25.35 (PL 32.840). 125 ST, la, 12.11, ad 3 (1.72b-73a); cf. St. Augustine, Solil., 1.8.15 (PL 32.877).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

589

His cooperation with the intellect, God makes known to it the truth of His eternal reasons whenever the intellect judges its objects in the truth of the first principles and by the lumen of natural reason. The intellect is said to understand its objects by and in the eternal reasons, therefore, simply because the lumen of the intellect and its first principles are created similitudes of the divine lumen and its eternal reasons. In Bonaventure's view, the intellect has a natural fallibility and its first principles have a natural mutability preventing a proper sufficiency for knowledge of truth with certitude. Because of this insufficiency, the intellect must participate in the infallibility of the eternal light and the first principles must participate in the immutability of the eternal reasons, so that the intellect needs to know the truth of creatures by and in the light of their eternal reasons. Although the intellect knows and judges the truth of creatures that way, even so, it does not see their eternal reasons in themselves, but only as they can be seen from, or along with, their similitudes in created things. Guided toward God by those similitudes, the intellect is disposed to turn toward the eternal reasons from their effects both in the intellect itself and in its proper objects. Thus, with regard to the certitude of natural knowledge, Bonaventure and Aquinas take different roads to God from His effects in creation. The road taken by Bonaventure is entirely analogical, because the first cause of created truth can be reached by the human mind only inasmuch as the first cause can be known from its effect, and, as we have seen, this depends on an analogical similitude of the Creator in the creature, which is related to the Creator as to the principle of its being and perfection. The road taken by Aquinas is not entirely analogical, since the first cause of created truth can be reached by the human mind simply in referring created truth to God as to its first cause; the analogical character of the way taken by Aquinas to God in truth is confined to the similarity of the human mind to the divine mind, for the one is a created reflexion or an analogical imitation of the other. From the point of view of Aquinas, then, the illumination of the human mind by God is partly analogical, whereas it is wholly analogical from Bonaventure's point of view.126 On this question, as on many others, Bonaventure and Aquinas have much in common, even though their interpretations of Augustine's doctrine are not always in harmony. Bonaventure and Aquinas concur in prin-

126 Z. Van de Woestyne sees nothing analogical in Bonaventure's account of illumination, which involves a direct influence of God on the human mind, whereas, involving only an indirect influence of God, the illumination of the mind as described by Aquinas is analogical: Antonianum, 9 (1934), pp. 475504, esp. pp. 499-504. M. Hurley grants only a metaphorical character to illumination as presented by Bonaventure, because it entails a special cooperation of God with the mind solely "in the line of formal causality": Bonaventure, by "accentuating formal and ignoring efficient causality", limits God's influence on the mind to the concomitant action of His presence in the soul, and thus Bonaventure sets himself apart from Aquinas on the problem of illumination: "Illumination, according to St. Bonaventure", Gregorianum, 32 (1951), pp. 388-404.

590

CHAPTER SEVEN

ciple on some aspects of the necessity for the human mind to receive an illumination from God as the first cause of human understanding. Two aspects in particular are worthy of mention. Both theologians posit the illumination of the mind in the natural order of human understanding, and so they both reject the necessity for the mind to receive an infused illumination to obtain natural knowledge of any object. Thus, distinguishing the illumination of faith from the illumination of reason, the two theologians also posit the illumination of reason as something that God gives to every man because of his nature as a rational creature. Although Aquinas gives a different evaluation that Bonaventure of the historical position occupied by Augustine in relation to Plato and Aristotle, nonetheless, in Bonaventure's view, the illumination of natural reason is common to all men, including the ancient philosophers.127 Illumination of Philosophical Knowledge

We have established that, for Bonaventure, the illumination of natural reason by God gives to the human mind an intrinsic ability to know its proper objects with certitude both through science and through wisdom. There is no doubt on Bonaventure's part, then, about the proper capacity of natural reason, as such, to have with certitude both the science and the wisdom of philosophy. But there is no doubt also on Bonaventure's part about the imperfect certitude of philosophical science in Aristotle, who has neglected the way to wisdom, and about the imperfect certitude of philosophical wisdom in Plato, who has destroyed the way to science. Thus, we are confronted with the problem of error in the thought of the ancient philosophers as they are known to Bonaventure. Since he maintains that the natural reason of every man is illumined to know and to judge truth with certitude, we must give an account of his philosophical reasons for the 127 Note: "Secundo habet relucere ut lux ratiocinationis praeclarae, quae est iliuminativa per manifestationem formarum et apertionem scientiarum ... Gum enim duplex sit genus operum creationis, quaedam recreationis; de primis est philosophia, de secundis theologia; prima spectant ad naturam; secunda, ad gratiam; prima sunt profunda; secunda, abscondita; utraque revelat divina Sapientia, sed prima revelat per cornmunem illuminationem, secundum illud ad Romanos primo (v. 19) ... Impossibiie namque est, quod quis perveniat ad comprehensionem lucis alicuius veritatis nisi per lucem infallibilem, quae est lux Veritatis aeternae. Quia creatura vertibilis et obscurabilis de 'se, ideo fallibilis ... Secunda autem revelat per illustrationem spiritualem et supra rationem; et est in prophetia necessaria et supra illam debet fundari, secundum illud secundae Petri primo (v. 19) ..." — Sermo de S. Dominica, (9.563-64). In the moral order "Punit autem Dominus illos etiam, quibus Legem non dedit, a quibus requirit iustitiam, quia, etsi non babent legem scriptam, habent legem naturae interius impressam; propter quod dicitur ad Romanos secundo (12): 'Qui sine lege peecaverunt sine lege peribunt'. Unde et ibidem (14-16): 'Cum enim gentiles, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt, eiusmodi legem non habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex, qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, testimonium reddente illis conscientia ipsorum'." — Comm. in luc., 19.21.34 (7.484); cf. DPE, 4.1, Resp. (5.181).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

591

errors, or the mistakes, that he finds in the doctrines of the ancient philosophers.12S Beginning with Bonaventure's early writings, we find him noting that Plato, though positing the rational soul as immortal, has erred with regard to beatitude in holding that the souls of men will go after death from the body of one beast to another.129 The next three texts have to do with the origin of the corporeal universe. In the first text, Bonaventure says that the truth of this question, namely, that the whole corporeal world has been brought into being from nothing, is now clear and without obscurity to any Christian, but it has not been discovered through the wisdom of philosophy, even though it has been explored for a long time and in devious ways. Some of the ancient philosophers, not seeing how something could be made from nothing, have said that the world was made by God from His own essence. Their opinion is entirely unacceptable to Christians. Besides, to subsequent philosophers, it has appeared improbable that the most perfect and altogether invariable essence of God could have become the matter of corporeal and variable things, for matter is imperfect of itself unless it is perfected through form. Anaxagoras has said that the world was made from matter and form as from pre-existing principles, but the forms were hidden in matter before they were produced by the divine mind Because right reason cannot understand how the forms of things are all in matter at the same time, the philosophers following Anaxagoras rejected his position as untenable. The Platonists have also said that the world was made from matter and form as from preexisting principles; however, they posited matter by itself, so that the forms were separate from it for a time before the maker of the world conjoined them with matter. But the subsequent philosophers have rejected this position, because it seemed unreasonable to say that matter was imperfect from eternity, and that the same form could be equally separated from and conjoined with matter. The Peripatetics, whose chief and leader was Aristotle, have come more closely to the truth in saying that the world was not made, as Aristotle says in many places, from pre-existing principles. Aristotle wants to say that the world has always been filled with plants and animals. "Whether he has posited matter and form as made from nothing", Bonaventure remarks, "this I do not know; nevertheless, I believe that he has not arrived at this ... therefore, even he has failed, though less than the others." Where the skill of the philosophers has failed, Sacred Scripture has come to help us. The Scriptures teach both that all things have been

128 The texts that we are about to examine are of course theological, but the reasons given by Bonaventure for the errors of the philosophers are not always exclusively theological. An account of his strictly theological reasons for those errors will be given in the final chapter of our work. 129 "Unde et Plato, qui animam posuit immortalem, rursus erravit in beatitudine, qui posuit, animas brutorum corpora circuire." — Comm. in Eccles., 3.22, q. 2, Resp. (6.37); cf. Phaedo (81-83).

592

CHAPTER SEVEN

created and that everything which they have in being has been produced from nothing; but reason is in harmony with faith on this question, Bonaventure adds, as he himself has shown. 13° How has Bonaventure shown the harmony of reason with faith on the origin of the corporeal world? He says that, according to the theologians and the philosophers, all the things in the world have had a productive principle because of their variety, their mutability, their order and their imperfection: multiplicity has its origin from unity, and the mutable comes from the immutable; order is directed toward what is first, and the imperfect is taken back to the perfect. On the supposition that the things in the world have had a causal principle in some way, Bonaventure asks whether they have been produced entirely according to both their material principle and their formal principle, or only according to one of those principles.'31 In his view, corporeal things have been produced according to both their form and their matter. He demonstrates this first with respect to their producer, then with respect to things themselves. Since the prior and more perfect producer has the greater influence in producing a thing, the influence of the first and most perfect producer must enter into the production of the whole thing; but the first agent is a producer of that kind: therefore, this agent has produced the whole of the world. The nobler and the more perfect agent, moreover, needs fewer instruments in order to act, so that the noblest of all agents needs no exterior instruments for its action; if the noblest agent were the only one to-be, other things could still be produced, but not from the agent's own nature, since it is simple and has no parts: therefore, those things would be produced from nothing, and so it is evident that God, acting from His whole substance, can produce the whole substance, or the matter and the form, of a creature.132 Regarding things themselves, Bonaventure says that what is not from another is from itself and needs no other in order to-be; but every intrinsic principle of a thing needs another, as form and matter need each other: therefore, corporeal things are from another and not from themselves. Furthermore, efficient and final causes are correlative, so that what is not from another is not for another; but all the things in the world seek what is good, and so they are ordered to another. Because there is rest only in the supreme good, which is not ordered to any other being, since it is the being that is good by itself, therefore, all the things in the world are ordered to the supreme good, and thus they are from another, or from the first efficient cause. If they are not totally from that cause, this must be due either to form or to matter. It cannot be due to form, Bonaventure says, because human experience shows that forms are produced; if they are not produced, nothing whatever is 130 2 Sent., 1.1.1.1, Resp. (2.16-17; edmin., 2.10-11). See in Aristotle: Physica, 1.4 (187a20-188al8); Metaph., 1.3-4 (983b7-985b20); Meteor., 2.3 (356B6-7); De plantis, 1.2 (817b35-40). 131 2 Sent., 1.1.1.1, initio (2.14; ed min., 2.8-9). 132 Loc. cit., fa 1-3 (2.14-15; ed. min., fa a-c, 2.9).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

593

produced. Nor can it be due to matter, which is a passive potency and, as Aristotle shows, act comes before such a potency, whether the act is a form or an efficient cause; since the act of a composite thing is received from another, therefore, the matter of the thing is also from another. Supposing that matter were not from another, Bonaventure goes on, would this be because it is a principle from which the rest of things are made, but matter itself has no principle? If so, is form made from something, or is it from nothing? If it is from nothing, Bonaventure replies, so also and with equal reason is matter from nothing. If form is made from something, what is that something? It is not the essence of matter, since a form is a simple thing; therefore, form is not made from matter, and so matter is not the constitutive principle of form. Nor is form made from matter, so that matter becomes form; rather, form is made from something in matter, and this something, because it becomes form, is not matter. To avoid an endless regression in seeking the cause of things, Bonaventure concludes, we must posit that the essences of forms have been produced from nothing by the first efficient cause; therefore, it is equally necessary to posit that the same cause has produced matter from nothing.133 Thus, in Bonaventure's judgment, human reason can show that the material and formal principles of the world have originated from nothing, or through creation. He puts creation between acting and making: as an acting, to-create refers not to what is done, but to the action in doing it; as a making, to-create refers to what is produced and not to its production. Consequently, to-be-created is to-be-made from nothing through an action of God.134 Knowing that the world has a causal principle, then, the philosophers could also have known that the world is created. They have failed to know this, because they did not analyze the principles of things into their true first cause, an analysis demanded by Bonaventure, as we have seen, in order to have the complete certitude of philosophical knowledge. Considering in particular Plato's position, Bonaventure distinguishes a natural agent from an intellectual agent. A natural agent causes its effects through forms that are truly in nature, as one ass begets another ass; an intellectual agent causes its effects through forms that are not in things, but are ideas in the agent's mind, as an artisan produces an artifact through his ideas. It is in the latter way that created things are produced by God, who has their eternal forms in His mind, and yet they are God himself. If this is what Plato has held, and Augustine says that he has, Plato is to be commended, Bonaventure remarks; however, if Plato has gone beyond this, as Aristotle says he has, Plato is undoubtedly in error, for Aristotle has shown that the forms of things outside God and separated from singular things are of no consequence with regard either to natural

133 Loc. cit., fa 4-6 (2.15; ed. min., fa d-f, 2.9); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 9.8 (1049b4-12). 134 Loc, cit., ad 5 (2.17-18; ed. min., 2.12).

594

CHAPTER SEVEN

operation or to cognition.135 But Aristotle has posited matter as ingenerate: on this point, as we noted before, Bonaventure maintains that a thing comes to-be from nothing both materially and from an efficient cause having an infinite power not needing the support of matter; so God can produce something from nothing as easily as He can produce one thing from another, and this power is proper to God alone.136 In the second text on the origin of the world, Bonaventure handles the question of its temporal or eternal production. He opens his solution to the question with the remark that it is entirely contrary to both truth and reason to hold that the world is eternal, by holding that all things are produced from nothing. According to Bonaventure, this is so contrary to reason that, implying an obviously inherent contradiction, it has not been held by any of the philosophers. To hold, however, that the world is eternal, presupposing the eternity of matter, seems reasonable and understandable to Bonaventure, who illustrates the point by ways of analogy. The things in the world come forth from God as His vestige, or footprint. If there were an eternal foot, and if the dust were also eternal in which the foot's print, or vestige, is formed, there would be no obstacle to understanding that the footprint is coeternal with the foot, and yet the footprint would be from that foot. In a similar manner, if matter, or the potential principle of things, were coeternal with its Author, there would be nothing to prevent His vestige, or the world of things, from being eternal. A creature comes forth as a shadow from God, moreover, as the Son is the Splendour or Brightness proceeding from the Father. As soon as there is light, there is immediately a brightness and, if there is an opaque body casting back the light, there is also and immediately a shadow; if matter, as something opaque, is coeternal with its Author, then, just as it is reasonable to hold that the Son is coeternal with the Father as His Brightness or Splendour, so also it seems reasonable to hold that creatures are eternal, because the world is a shadow of the supreme light. This is more reasonable than its opposite, that matter was eternally imperfect and without form or divine influence, as some of the philosophers have held. The first position is so much more reasonable, Bonaventure says, that even Aristotle, "the more excellent among the philosophers", has fallen into this error as the theologians understand him, as his commentators explain him, and as his own words imply. But there are some contemporary thinkers, Bonaventure states, who say that Aristotle has neither thought nor intended to prove that the world has not begun entirely, but that it has not begun by natural motion. "Which of these may be 135 Loc. cit., ad 3-4 (2.17; ed. min., 2.11-12). See in St. Augustine: De diner, quaes., 46.2 (PL 40.30); and in Aristotle: Metaph., 1.9 (991a8-18). 136 Loc. cit., arg. 6 & ad 6 (2.16, 18; ed. min., 2.10, 12); cf. Aristotle, Physica, 1.9 (192a25-33). On the capability of knowing through philosophy the true first cause of things, according to Bonaventure, see: 1 Sent., 3.1.dub.l, Resp. (1.77-78; ed. min., 1.56); 2 Sent., 3.1.1.3, fra. 3 (2.99; ed min., fm. c, 2.88): cf. Brevil., 2.1 "Ratio autem ..." (5.219; ed. min., nn. 3-4, 5.35-36).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

595

more true", Bonaventure comments, "I do not know; one thing I do know, that if he posited the world not to have begun according to nature, he has posited what is true, and his reasons taken from motion and time are efficacious. If, however, he has thought this, that the world has begun in no way, he has obviously erred ... To avoid contradiction, it was necessary for him to hold either that the world was not made or that it was not made from nothing. To avoid an actual infinity, moreover, it was necessary to hold either the corruption of the rational soul or its unity or its circulation, and so to take away beatitude. Wherefore, this error has an evil beginning, and it has the worst end 137 Bonaventure does not say simply that it is contrary to reason to hold that the world is eternal. He says, rather, that this position is unreasonable and contradictory, if it is held with regard to a world produced from nothing. To hold that the world is eternal, presupposing matter to be eternal, is not unreasonable to Bonaventure, who rejects it as erroneous, nevertheless, because matter is not eternal. Although his examples showing how that position is reasonable may seem to be imaginative and of little doctrinal value, those examples involve an appreciation of Bonaventure's doctrine on the analogical nature of corporeal creatures as shadows and vestiges of the Creator, or the cause of the universe. Hence, Bonaventure is saying that, if the world is eternal because of its matter, God would cause eternal things in the world, and so they would be His eternal similitudes as shadows and vestiges of their eternal cause. To hold that the world is eternal because of its matter is so reasonable, Bonaventure says, that even Aristotle, the more excellent philosopher, has held such a position. Now, regarding Aristotle's doctrine, Bonaventure says that he does not know whether Aristotle has posited matter and form as produced from nothing, though he believes that Aristotle has not done so, thus deviating from the truth. Bonaventure also says that he does not know whether Aristotle holds precisely that the world is eternal, having had no beginning, or simply that it has not begun by natural motion, as some of his interpreters maintain. If Aristotle holds the latter position, then, in Bonaventure's view, Aristotle is not in error, but has the truth. If he holds the other position, Aristotle is in error, and this appears to be the position attributed to him by Bonaventure, who speaks of Aristotle as avoiding contradiction by holding either that the world was not made or that it was not made from nothing. Bonaventure's hesitation here is due to the conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine given by his commentators and by Christian thinkers, a circumstance arising from the difficulties in the texts of Aristotle himself. Considering Aristotle's own words, however, Bonaventure is of the opinion that Aristotle holds the 137 2 Sent., 1.1.1.2, Resp. (2.22-23; ed. min., 2.15-16). See in Aristotle: De caelo, 1.10 (279b4-280a35); 3.6 (304b23-305a33). Note that, while attributing explicitly to Aristotle either a world that was not made or one not made from nothing, Bonaventure does not attribute to him explicitly the errors regarding the rational soul.

596

CHAPTER SEVEN

world to be eternal, thus falling into error for several of the reasons that Bonaventure has shown, and which he takes from propositions that are selfevident according to reason and philosophy.138 The propositions in question are six in number, five dealing with the notion of the infinite. The first proposition is that it is impossible for anything to be added to the infinite. This proposition is self-evident because everything to which something is added becomes greater, but there is nothing greater than the infinite; therefore, if the world has no beginning, it has an infinite duration, and nothing can be added to its duration. Now that is clearly false, Bonaventure argues, because one revolution is added day by day to another. Nor can it be said that the world is infinite with respect to the past and, nevertheless, that it is actually finite with respect to the present, so that, with reference to the past, the world is greater in the present. This cannot be said, according to Bonaventure, because it is an infallible truth that, if the world is eternal, the revolutions of the sun in its orb are infinite; moreover, there must have been twelve revolutions of the moon for one revolution of the sun: therefore, the moon revolves more times than the sun, yet the sun revolves an infinite number of times, and so there is an excess of infinite revolutions on the part of the sun by which they are infinite, and this, Bonaventure says, is impossible.l39 If the world has a beginning, however, it must have begun either in an instant or in time. But there is a time before every time and before every instant, so that time is before all things having a beginning; therefore, since time could not have been before the world and before movement, the world has not had a beginning. Moreover, time is a circular measure of motion, and every point in a circle is both a beginning and an end; therefore, every instant of time is both the beginning of the future and the end of the past, and so before every now there has been a past. Furthermore, if time is produced, it has been produced either in time or in an instant; but it has not been produced in an instant, because time is not in an instant: therefore, it has been produced in time, which has a before and an after, or a past and a future. Besides, if time was produced in time, there was a time before every time, which is impossible, as Aristotle shows, and thus the world, having no beginning in time, must be eternal. 14° Replying to these objections, Bonaventure says that the now of time is to be understood as a point ought to be understood in a circle. A point is assigned to a circle either when it is made or after it has been made. A first point is laid down when a circle is 138 "Aristoteles, secundum quod ... verba eius praetendunt, in hunc errorem dilapsus fuerit... Si autem hoc sensit, quod nullo modo coeperit, manifeste erravit, sicut pluribus rationibus ostensum est supra." — 2 Sent., 1.1.1.2, in Resp. (2.22-23; ed. min., 2.15). "Sed ad oppositum sunt rationes ex propositionibus per se notis secundum rationem et philosophiam." — Loc. cit, (2.20; ed. min., 2.13). 139 Loc. cit., ad opp. 1 (2.20-21; ed. min., ad opp. a, 2.13). 140 Loc. cit., arg. 3-4 (2.19-20; ed. min., 2.12-13). These arguments are based on the following places in Aristotle: Physica, 4.11-14 (218b21-224al4), and 8.1 (251a8-252b4); Metaph., 12.6 (1071b3-1072al8).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

597

made; there is no first point in the circle after it has been made. Similarly, in the production of time, there was a first now, before which there was no other, since that now was the beginning of time in which all things have been produced; however, after its production, time is truly a terminus of the past and a circular measure, but things were not produced with a past in an already perfect time. Rather, time itself began in its own beginning, which was a now, or an instant. Time can be considered, Bonaventure observes, either according to its essence or according to its being. The whole essence of time consists in the now, and this started with a movable thing, not in another now; therefore, the first now started in itself, and so it has not had any other measure. Considered according to its being, time is said to start with the movement of variable things and not through creation, for the being of time depends on the change of changeable things.141 Bonaventure's second self-evident proposition is that it is impossible for infinite things to be ordered. Every order flows from a principle by way of a medium, so that there is no order if there is no first principle; but the duration of the world, or the revolutions of the heavens, cannot have a first principle if the world is infinite: therefore, the revolutions of the heavens have no order, and so one is not before the other. Bonaventure considers this to be false, so that there must be a first principle of the revolutions of the heavens, or of the duration of the world. Is it necessary, however, to posit a state of order among things other than those ordered according to causality, which necessarily requires a state of order? Why not? Bonaventure replies, for there has never been a revolution of the heavens but that there has also been the generation of an animal from an animal, and the one is ordered to the other from which it is generated according to an order of causes; therefore, if it necessary to posit a state of order among those things ordered according to an order of causes, as Aristotle himself says and as reason demands, it is also necessary to posit a first animal in the generation of animals, so that the world has not been without animals. Consequently, it is necessary to posit an order in the duration of the world, and so it is necessary to posit a first principle, or a beginning, of its duration.142 If the world is considered on the side of its producing cause, then, because the positing of an actual and sufficient cause also posits its effect, the world has to be eternal, since it comes from God as from an eternal cause which is actual and sufficient. God is an actual cause, for He is

141 2 Sent., 1.1.1.2, ad 3-4 (2.23; ed. min., 2.16). God concreated movement with the first movable thing: "... dicendum quod motus non exit in esse per se, nee in se, sed cum alio. Et quoniam Deus in eodem instant! mobile fecit et ut motor super mobile influxit, ideo motum mobili concreavit" —Loc. cit., ad 2 (2.23; ed. min., 2.16). 142 Loc. cit., ad opp. 2 (2.21; ed. min., ad opp. b, 2.13-14); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 2.2 (994al-994b30). On the state of order as proceeding through a medium from a first principle to which the last in the order is reduced see: 2 Sent., 11.1.1, sc 3 (2.277; ed. min., sc c, 2.278); 4 Sent., 19.3.1, con. 4 (4.508; ed. min., con. d, 4.493).

598

CHAPTER SEVEN

pure act and His own willing, as Aristotle shows and as the theologians maintain, saying that God is His own acting. God is a sufficient cause, moreover, since He does not need anything to create the world beyond His own power, wisdom and goodness, and they are in God most perfectly from eternity. It follows, therefore, that the world is eternal.143 Bonaventure, answering the objection, recalls his distinction between a natural agent and an intellectual agent, which acts through its will. With regard to a sufficient cause, its effect is produced at once if that cause is a natural agent. If it is an intellectual and voluntary agent, however, the effect is not necessarily posited by positing its cause, which acts according to wisdom and at its own discretion, thus considering the suitability of its effect. Since eternity is not suitable to the nature of a creature, therefore, it was not fitting for God to give this most noble condition to any creature. For this reason, the divine will, acting according to wisdom, produced creatures in time and not from eternity. God produced them in accordance with His disposition and His will, and He has willed to produce creatures then, when he has produced them, just as a man wills now, to do something tomorrow. In a similar way, Bonaventure continues, it can be said that there are two sorts of actual causes. One sort is actual in itself, as the sun is said actually to give light. It is in this way that God always was in act, because He is pure act and has none of the imperfections of potentiality. Another sort of cause is actual in its effect, as the sun is said to illuminate the world God has not always been in act that way, because He has not always been producing the world, which has come to-be in time and not from eternity. l44 In the three remaining arguments revolving around the notion of the infinite, Bonaventure demonstrates the necessity to posit a beginning of the world from the following propositions. First, it is impossible for infinite things to be traversed; if the world has not begun, its revolutions have been infinite: therefore, to traverse them is impossible, so that it was not possible for them to have arrived at the position that they now have. Secondly, it is impossible for infinite things to be comprehended by a finite power; if the world has no beginning, infinite things are comprehended by a finite power, which is contradictory. For instance: suppose that the power of God alone is actually infinite, and that the movement of the heavens was never without a created spiritual substance, which either made the heavens or knew it and could never forget it; such a spiritual creature would actually know all the revolutions of the heavens and, since those revolutions are infinite, it would know infinite things all at once by its finite power. Thirdly, it is impossible for infinite things to-be all at once; if the world is eternal and without a beginning, then, because it is not without a man, who has a finite duration, there would be an infinite number of men; therefore, as the

143 2 Sent., 1.1.1.2, arg. 5 (2.20; ed min., 2.13); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 12.6 (1071b3-1072al8). 144 Loc. at., ad 5 (2.23-24; ed. min., 2.16-17).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

599

number of rational souls is the same as the number of men, there has been an infinite number of souls. This conclusion cannot be evaded, Bonaventure says, by maintaining that human souls go from one body to another, or that there is one soul in all men. The first position is an error in philosophy, because "a proper act is in its proper matter", as Aristotle teaches, and thus a soul perfecting one body cannot be the perfection of another body, as Aristotle also teaches. The second position is more erroneous, since it is much less possible for the one soul to perfect all human bodies.145 The sixth and final reason given by Bonaventure is based on the proposition that it is impossible for a thing that has being after not-being to be eternal; therefore, the world cannot be eternal, since it has being after notbeing, which Bonaventure proceeds to prove, relying on the reasons that he has already brought forward in the preceding question. Everything that has being totally from another is produced from nothing by the other; but the world has being totally from God, and so the world is not from matter, but originates from nothing: everything which is produced totally by another differing essentially from it must have being from nothing, because to be totally produced is to be produced according to matter and form; but matter has no principle from which it can be produced: therefore, it must be from nothing, so that the world must be produced totally by God.146 On the other hand, if God produces the world totally, so that it has a beginning, He must begin to produce it, thus moving from inaction to action. But anything beginning to act, or beginning to produce, is subject to change and to mutability; since these are contrary to the supreme goodness and to the supreme simplicity of God, they cannot be said to be in Him. Consequently, God does not begin to produce the world, and so it must be eternal.147 In reply to this, Bonaventure insists that God is not like a created agent, which is changed and fulfilled when it moves from inaction to action. God is His own action and, in producing creatures, is neither changed nor fulfilled in any way; because He is not inactive prior to His production of creatures, God does not move into action on producing them. Even the philosophers have known that God is His own action, for they have said that God is most simple. Thus, they have been foolish in saying, at the same time, that God would have been inactive had He not produced things eternally, and that, without them, He would not have been the perfect good; they have also said, nonetheless, that God is most perfect, because He is perfect of Himself. Now, if God for the sake of immutability had to produce things from eternity, He could not produce any new thing in the universe. 145 Lac. at., ad opp. 3-5 (2.21; ed min., ad opp. c-e, 2.14-15); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 2.2 (414a24-28). Bonaventure's use of Aristotelean principles here explains why, as we mentioned above (n. 137, p. 595), he does not attribute explicitly to Aristotle the errors concerning the human soul. 146 Loc. cii., ad opp. 6 (2.21-22; ed. min., ad opp. f, 2.15). 147 Loc. cit., arg. 6 (2.20; ed. min., 2.13).

600

CHAPTER SEVEN

What sort of God would this be, Bonaventure asks, who could not act any longer through Himself? Surely, Bonaventure answers, all this reflects a lack of reason rather than an understanding of God through philosophy. Although a human intellect, because it is conjoined with an imagination, cannot fully grasp the truth that God acts of Himself without beginning to act, even so, a man can be convinced of this truth by its necessary reason, or its intrinsic necessity. To grasp that truth in some way, Bonaventure says, a man must turn away from sensible things and look toward intelligible things. To know the truth of God's immutable power more perfectly, a man must know through contemplation that God is most perfect and most simple. Because He is most perfect, every perfection is attributed to God. Because God is most simple, there is no diversity in Him, and so He is not subject to variation or mutability. In short, God remains unmoved in Himself while moving the rest of things.148 All the demonstrations given by Bonaventure, proving that the world began in time, are founded on natural reason, as he says himself, and not on Christian faith; those demonstrations proceed according to philosophy, as Bonaventure also says, and not according to theology. He refers directly to the doctrine of Aristotle in two of the five demonstrations depending on the notion of the infinite. A comparison of all five demonstrations with Aristotle's doctrine, however, shows that Bonaventure is in fact using, for the most part, Aristotle's principles to prove that the world had to have a beginning in time. This is a truth that, in Bonaventure's judgment, Aristotle could have known, as the sixth demonstration of Bonaventure indicates, if Aristotle had known that the world came to-be from nothing, another truth that Bonaventure considers to have been within Aristotle's grasp.149 It is evident, then, that Bonaventure is not professing an ignorance of what Aristotle holds with regard to the question of the eternity of the world. It is even more evident that Bonaventure is not manifesting a superficial understanding of Aristotle's philosophy. On the contrary, Bonaventure has a sufficient knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy to show that it is consistent with his philosophical principles to conclude from them that the world, originating from nothing, has to have a temporal beginning. Bonaventure's treatment of Aristotle's principles with respect to the now, or the instant, of time shows a similar understanding of Aristotelean philosophy.150

148 Loc. cit., ad 6 (2.24; ed. min., 2.17). 149 The five demonstrations to which we refer are: ad opp. 1-5 (2.20-22; ed. min., a-e, 2.13-15). Their sources in Aristotle are as follows: ad opp. 1 (a); De caelo, 1.12 (281a27-281b31, 283a2-24), Physica, 3.6 (206a8-206b2); ad opp. 2 (b), Physica, 8.5 (256a3-257a33, 258b4-9); ad opp. 3 (c), Physica, 3.4-5 (204a216), 3.6 (206b3-12), De caelo, 1.5 (271b26-273a5), Metaph., 11.10 (1066a35-1067a37); ad opp. 4 (d), Physica, 3.6 (207a7-31); ad opp. 5 (e), Physica, 3.5 (204al7-205a35), 2.2 (194a26-194bl5). 150 "Hae sunt rationes Philosophi quae sunt sumptae a parte ipsius mundi." — 2 Sent., 1.1.1.2 (2.20; ed. min., 2.13); see above: pp. 597-98.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

601

His demonstrations regarding the causality and immutability of God, as the first principle of the universe, are made in response to objections based, not directly on the doctrine of Aristotle himself, but on interpretations of it given by his commentators and by more modern thinkers. '51 In view of their different interpretations of Aristotle's thought, on the one hand, and in view of the texts of Aristotle himself, on the other hand, Bonaventure is really saying in his own way that it is difficult to know, or that he does not readily know, why Aristotle holds the world to be eternal, as his texts indicate and the theologians suggest, when his own principles could have led him to conclude otherwise, as some of his interpreters maintain in saying that he intended to show that the world did hot begin by natural motion, and not that the world had no beginning altogether.152 Bonaventure's conviction that natural reason has the ability to demonstrate the truth of the temporal beginning of the world is an inevitable consequence of his doctrine on the illumination of the human mind by God. Because His illumination is given to every man, it was received by the philosophers, who could have known thereby that the world has begun in time. To appreciate Bonaventure's philosophical reasons for the failure of the philosophers to arrive at this truth, we must understand what he means by saying that the world was created in the beginning of time. If time began, as Bonaventure says, with the first movable thing, which is the heavenly body coming to-be on the second day, it would seem that the world began before time, for there was a first day. Handling this difficulty, Bonaventure sets down three ways of considering time. In the first way, which is most common, time is taken as the measure of the coming forth from non-being into being. In the second and common way, time is taken as the measure of any sort of change, but most of all of that change which came to-be before the production of the first movable thing. Time is taken properly in the third way as the measure of the movement of the first movable thing. Since the first consideration of time takes it as a measure preceding the other two, the world is said to be created in the beginning of

151 "Hae sunt rationes, quas commentatores et moderniores superaddunt rationibus Aristotelis, sive ad has possunt adduci." — Ibid. The men in question, including Avicenna and Averroes, are enumerated and their various positions indicated here: Op. omn., 2.20, nn. 3-6. 152 Bonaventure's statements of not knowing whether this or that position is the true one held by Aristotle reflect a modesty on Bonaventure's part similar to that expressed elsewhere by him regarding his own thought "Nee quisquam aestimet, quod novi script! velim esse fabricator, hoc enim sentio et fateor quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator." — 2 Sent., Praelocutio (2.1; ed min., 2.1). "... notandum, quod quadruplex est modus faciendi librum. Aliquis enim scribit aliena, nihil addendo vel mutando; et iste mere dicitur scriptor. Aliquis scribit aliena, addendo, sed non de suo; et iste compilator dicitur. Aliquis scribit et aliena et sua, sed aliena tamquam principalia, et sua tamquam annexa ad evidentiam; et iste dicitur commentator, non auctor. Aliquis scribit et sua et aliena, sed sua tamquam principalia, aliena tamquam annexa ad confirmationcm; et talis debet auctor. Talis fuit Magister, qui sententias suas ponit et Patrum sententiis confirmat..." — 1 Sent., Prooem., q. 4, Resp. (1.14; ed. min., 1.12).

602

CHAPTER SEVEN

that time measuring its coming into being from non-being.153 There are, then, two meanings of the word temporal with reference to the beginning of the world The word means, in the first place, that the beginning of the world is its coming into being from non-being; so the world has temporal being, which is subject to mutation and variation. The second meaning of the word has to do with the first movement in the created world, a movement that, as we have noted, was concreated with the first movable thing; thus, the world has motion, which is either successive or continuous. The word temporal is said of the world thereafter according as its various movements are measured and regulated by the motions of the heavenly bodies.154 When talking about the temporal beginning of the world, Bonaventure follows Augustine in speaking of a beginning from time, in time, and with time. The word from involves order and presupposes an anterior time, so that only a thing depending on time begins to be from time, since it follows time. Implying a container, the word in refers to the existence containing time; but time is a measure of succession and, therefore, only a thing depending on time can come to be in dme, for time itself has its existence with the things that it measures. Because time and the things created at the beginning of the world are not exceeded by or are not beyond what is temporal, the world is properly said to begin with time, the word with signifying simultaneity. Hence, time and the world began together: the world had its beginning with the existence of time, and time had its beginning with the being of the world.155 We turn now to the third text in Bonaventure's early writings dealing with the errors of the philosophers regarding the origin of the world. In this text, he accounts for three errors concerning the production of the world by attributing to the philosophers a misunderstanding of the significance of the word in with respect to the expression 'in the beginning'. The first error is found in some modern thinkers engaging in philosophy, who say that the world was made from time and through a mediating intelligence, so that God first made the angels and then, working with them, He made the corporeal world. This error is due to a misunderstanding of the prepostion in as indicating purely the order of creation, for 'in the beginning' is the same as 'before other things'; the preposition, from this point of view, connotes both the absence of temporal things prior to creation and the 153 2 Sent., l.l.dub.4 (2.38; ed. min., 2.30). Aristotle's consideration of time as the measure of motion, successive or continuous, is said by Bonaventure to be a restricted understanding of time, though it is the truly proper consideration of time; the theologians, considering dme as the measure of duration, take time as the measure, first and most commonly, of any duration, secondly and commonly, of every change with respect to being, thirdly and properly, of successive and continuous variations in creatures: 2 Sent., 2.1.2.1 (2.64-65; ed. min., 2.55-57); cf. 2.1.1.1, con. 2 & ad 2 (2.55, 57; ed. min., 2.47-48). 154 1 Sent., 14.1.1, ad 5 (1.246; ed. min., 1.200); Brevil., 2.3 "Natura vero ..." (5.221; ed. min., nn. 4-5, 5.39), and 2.4 "Ratio autem ..." (5.221; ed. min., n. 2, 5.40). 155 2 Sent., 2.1.dub.2, Resp. "... large accipimus." (2.69-70; ed. min., 2.61-62); 1 Sent., 30.dub.2, Resp. (1.527-28; ed. min., 1.421). See in St Augustine De civit Dei, 11.6 (PL 41.322).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

603

presence of them after creation. The second error is found among the Aristoteleans, who say that the world has an eternal foundation, because, if it was made from nothing 'in the beginning' of time, the world was not without a beginning. They are not able to see in what way the world has begun, and in what it came to-be then, but was-not, before, when it was produced. Their error results from a misunderstanding of the preposition in as designating a measure, because *in the beginning' is the same as 'in the first instant' of time. The third error is found among the Platonists, who posit God, matter and an exemplar as the three eternal principles of the world. If God made the world from nothing, but in His wisdom as in His eternal exemplar, there is no need, Bonaventure remarks, for matter or a separate exemplar in order to produce the world. The Platonists are not able to understand how something can come to-be from nothing; therefore, their error comes from a misunderstanding, regarding the expression 'in the beginning', of the preposition in as involving a causal relation, for the preposition makes known both the efficient and the exemplar cause of creation, so that all things are known to be created by God in His wisdom. This is why, from the theological point of view, the expression 'in the beginning' is taken to mean ''in the Son', who is the Exemplar of creation. Bonaventure adds a fourth error, the worst of all, which was incurred by the Manicheans, who posited two first principles of the universe: a supreme good and a supreme evil. This error destroys the order and the unity of the universe; so, going contrary to philosophical truth, the Manicheans take away the goodness and the power of God, the one first principle of the universe. The first of the other three errors involves only a failure to understand the principle from which the world was produced. The error of the Aristoteleans, positing a foundation of the world from eternity, involves a failure to understand both the principle from which the world was produced and when it came to-be. The error of the Platonists entails a failure on three accounts to understand the origin of the world. First, because the Platonists say that the world was made from matter and not from nothing, they do not grasp the principle from which the world was produced. Secondly, positing an exemplar other than God, they do not know the principle through which the world was made. Thirdly, holding matter to be imperfect from eternity, the Platonists do not understand when the world came to-be, and so their error is worse than that of Aristotle, who says that matter was perfected eternally by its form. The term principle, Bonaventure concludes, can be predicated of the creature, so that the term signifies the beginning of time as a concomitant measure of the creature. To say that God created the world 'in the beginning' of time, therefore, is to say that the heavens and the earth began to-be 'with the beginning' of time. From the theological point of view, however, the world is said to have its beginning in the Son, to whom the principle or wisdom of creation is appropriated.l56 156 2 Sent., l.l.dub.2, Resp. (2.36-37; ed. min., 2.28-29); cf. 1 Sent., 44.1.4 (1.787-89; ed. min.

604

CHAPTER SEVEN

Our next group of texts, from Bonaventure's early writings, concerning the errors of the philosophers deal with the first of the three errors given above and with the errors of the Platonists on the rational soul and beatitude. Now, according to Bonaventure, it is contrary to both reason and Christian faith to say that God has produced created things through the mediation of another agent. This opinion is so entirely contrary to reason that Bonaventure, positing all things as produced from nothing, finds it hard to understand how an agent with a finite power can produce something from nothing. Consequently, it is difficult for Bonaventure to believe that any of the ancient philosophers have held the opinion. There were several philosophers, however, who presupposed a potential or material principle of the world. They have spoken of an order in the production of the world, an order descending from God, who is entirely simple and whose act is understanding, and so He has produced only the first intelligence. This creature was a composite being and, by understanding itself, produced its own heavenly orb and the intelligence of the second orb; all the other intelligences and their orbs were produced in like manner down to the orb of the moon and the tenth intelligence, which irradiates on our rational souls, and thus the order of illumination is the same as the order of production. The source of this error, in Bonaventure's judgment, is the false assumption that the material principle of the universe was not produced, but is eternal. The error flows also from this false reason, that God, because He is most simple, can produce only one thing. In fact, the opposite is true, for the most simple being is the most powerful agent, so that God can produce all things without a medium. If God, because of His simplicity, can produce only one thing, then, since the first of the created intelligences is more simple than all the rest, how is it that there is a greater variety of stars in the first orb than in any of the others? If the opinion of the philosophers is true, there should be a uniformity throughout the celestial spheres. Christian faith teaches, moreover, that all things were produced immediately by God. The truth of faith has support from natural reason, which understands creation to be the production of the whole substance of a thing and according to the totality of its matter and form. A production of such a kind requires an infinite power, which is in God alone.157 The reason why the philosophers posit the production of rational souls by the mediation of a separate intelligence is, as the Liber de causis suggests, that the divine unity cannot be fractured, as it would be if God were to produce many things immediately, and that the divine immutability cannot 1.625-28). For Bonaventure's refutation of the errors of the Manicheans see: 2 Sent., 1.1.2.1 (2.25-27; ed. min., 2.17-20); cf. 17.1.1, Resp. (2.411-12; ed. min., 2.423). 157 2 Sent., 1.1.2.2, Resp., ad 1-2 (2.29; ed. min., 2.21-22); cf. sc 4 (d). Bonaventure does not identify the philosophers to whom he attributes this error, they are Neoplatonists and modemiori philasophantes, notably Avicenna, but also Alfarabi and Avicebron — see here: Op. omn., 2.29, n. 3.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

605

be disturbed, as it would be if God were to produce new things. But those assumptions have been shown by Bonaventure to be false, and so he rejects them as contrary to reason and faith. The doctrine of the Liber de causis is not to be followed on this question, Bonaventure remarks, unless it is understood to mean that human souls are created by a separate intelligence inasmuch as they receive an illumination by the mediation of such an intelligent creature. Thus, according to Aristotle, a separate intelligence exceeds the rational soul in clarity of cognition; this is expressed by another philosopher, who says: "the rational soul is created in the shadow of intelligence, and the sensitive soul in the shadow of the rational soul", for the rational soul lacks the perfection of a separate intelligence, but the soul is not produced by such an intelligence, which is a created being. 158 The next error concerning the rational soul is a consequence of the opinion that God works in the corporeal world through the mediation of separate intelligences. Bonaventure distinguishes, in this regard, the influence of God in the rational soul from the influence of a creature on the soul. God's influence comes from the principal agent and efficient cause of the soul, whereas the influence of a creature comes from an agent arousing the soul to action and helping it in its operation. There are some philosophers who say that the soul, as an instrument, falls under the influence of a separate intelligence, which moves and perfects the soul in its operation. They say that the soul has a threefold operation: an animal operation flowing from the soul itself, an intellectual operation resulting from the influence of a separate intelligence, and a divine operation caused by the influence of God. Bonaventure rejects this doctrine as erroneous from point of view of both reason and faith. The philosophers teaching the doctrine do not understand, as Augustine does, that the soul is moved, perfected and beatified immediately by God; therefore, Bonaventure regards their doctrine as containing a misunderstanding of the liberty of choice in man, of the natural dignity of his rational soul, and of the sublimity of his eternal beatitude. Augustine has refuted this erroneous teaching whenever he speaks of the created mind, and so he shows that the rational soul, according to its mind, is united immediately to God, as also is the mind of an angel.159 158 2 Sent., 18.2.3, Resp. "... ab altera" (2.452-53; ed. min., 2.465-66), cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 12.9 (1074bl5-20). The citation from the unidentified philosopher comes apparently from Isaac de Stella: De defmitionibus, fol. 3r (Lugundi, 1515). See in the Liber de causis; prop. 5, 9, 19 (Bardenhewer, pp. 168-69, 173-74, 181-82). 159 2 Sent., 10.2.1, Resp. (2.263-64; ed. min., 2.264-65); cf, 1 Sent., 3.1.un.3, sc 1, ad 1 (1.74-75; ed. min., 1.53-54). See in St Augustine: De civit Dei, 12.1.3 (PL 41.349-50); De dioer. guaes., 51.2 (PL 40.3334). The philosophers in question are again Neoplatonists and Arabians, particularly Avicenna. Concerning the first, consult Liber de causis, prop. 3 (Bardenhewer, pp. 165-66). Concerning the Arabians note: "Philosophi Arabes dubitaverunt, utrum anima esset vera perfectio corporis; sed verum est, quod anima et corpus est una species, et anima propria est actus corporis et forma et per essentiam inclinatur ad corpus sicut proprius actus ad propriam materiam, quia anima est proprius actus corporis. Oportet igitur

606

CHAPTER SEVEN

Connected with the above error concerning the rational soul and human beatitude, there is another error that Bonaventure finds in Plato and his followers, including Macrobius. They say that human souls were made all at once in an equal state in the heavens; thereafter, when suitable bodies were formed for them, human souls vivified those bodies, which they entered by descending to earth through the Milky Way and the other orbs of the planets. When the bodies vivified by human souls are corrupted, the souls return to their former place, where they no longer remember the evils that they endured in their bodies; in the course of time, the souls come back to earth again, but they have no memory of what they knew prior to this descent into bodies. This doctrine, according to Bonaventure, is a dream rather than a true understanding of the origin and nature of the rational soul. Because the doctrine contains no certitude whatever in regard to the nature and origin of the soul, no man can be convinced of it by human reasoning, for no man has any recollection of a former state of his own soul. The doctrine is absurd, moreover, since it posits a circulation of souls in and out of bodies, so that no soul would be the true perfection of any body, which is contrary to Aristotle, who teaches that a proper act must come to-be in its proper matter. Finally, the doctrine removes the possibility of beatitude, which demands perpetuity and certitude, as Augustine has shown. 16° Our final text, from Bonaventure's early writings, on the errors of the philosophers has to do with the question whether the rational souls of all men are one or diverse in number. Now, there have been some philosophers who believed that the same soul, which they mistook for God, was in all men and in all animals, a belief attributed by Augustine to Pythagoras and Varro, who thought that the human soul most of all was divine. In Bonaventure's estimation, this belief was based on the nobility and spirituality of the human soul with regard to its act of understanding (or the agent intellect), and on the nature of its potency of understanding (or the possible intellect), which was believed to be the same as prime matter, because the soul can receive all things, so that it has no cognitional form originally. Bonaventure dismisses the opinion as obvious foolishness and not philosophy: the human soul is subject to the variation of accidents and to the possibility of mutation in being, so it cannot be divine; further-

quod in quolibet corpore sit anima tamquam eius propria forma, quae inclinatur ad corpus et individuatur secundum individuationem corporis." — Sermo, Sabbato sancto, n. 14 (9.269). See in Avicenna: De anima, 3.5, fol. 25rb (Venetiis, 1508); Metaph., 9.3, fol. 104rb-E (Venetiis, 1508). 160 Bonaventure goes on to refute the doctrine of the Manicheans on the same question, a doctrine contrary to Catholic faith, philosophy and sense experience: 2 Sent., 18.2.2, Resp. "... recordantur aliqua?" (2.449; ed. min., 2.461-62); cf. 39.1.2, Resp. "... habituum cognitivorum." (2.902; ed. min,, 2.937). See in Aristotle, De anima, 2.2 (414a24-28); and in St. Augustine, De Trinit., 14.14.20 (PL 42.1051). For the doctrine of Plato and Macrobius, see in Macrobius, Comment, in Somnium Scipionis, 1.14, 1.21 ( Willis, 2.55-60, 2.84-91).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

607

more, the human soul is the noblest form among the natural forms and, as the act and perfection of a proper body, it is distinct from other natural forms, and thus the human soul cannot be prime matter.161 There was on this question another opinion, which was held by Averroes, who said that there was in all men one intellectual soul, according as it is intellectual; this soul was one in number with respect to both the agent intellect and the possible intellect. The reason for holding the opinion was the immaterial and incorruptible nature of the intellectual soul. Because of the immateriality of the soul, and because it did not depend on a body, the soul could not be individuated by a body and, as Aristotle said, it was neither a body nor a power in a body. Since the soul was incorruptible, it did not need to be multiplied, for it could be conserved as numerically one. Averroes imposed this position on Aristotle, according to Bonaventure, both because the Philosopher posited the world as eternal with innumerable men succeeding one another and because he held that there is no spiritual substance not moving a body, so that, if there were diverse souls in diverse men, those souls, after the death of their bodies, would cease to be in the act of moving, and yet they were actually infinite, since the movement of the heavens had no beginning, as Aristotle did say. To overcome the obstacles to his position, Averroes distinguished three parts in the human soul, or in the intellect of the soul: an agent intellect and a receiving intellect, both of which are eternal, and a passive intellect, which is generated and corrupted, and so it is nothing else than the power of imagination. Averroes has upheld his position in this way: just as, in the sense of sight, there is a colour, a light and an eye that sees, so also, in the intellect, there is a species in the imagination, an agent intellect and a possible intellect that understands; therefore, as the act of seeing results from the concourse of the three elements in the sense of sight, so the act of understanding results from the concourse of the three elements in the intellect. Hence, the diversity of the act of understanding in diverse men is caused by the diversity of their imaginations, or by the diverse species existing in them; in like manner, the different acts of understanding in one and the same man are caused by the different species existing in his imagination, for no man can understand apart from his phantasms. Nevertheless, Bonaventure maintains in opposition to Averroes, when Aristotle says that the intellect is corrupted by some sort of interior corruption, he does not intend to say that any sort of intellect is corrupted; he intends to say precisely this, that the human soul loses an understanding that it has achieved.162 Accordingly, the interpretation by Averroes of Aristotle's doc161 2 Sent., 18.2.1, Resp. "... non potest" (2.446; ed. min., 2.458): cf. 24.1.2.4, Resp. "Secundus autem ... dici intellectus." (2.568; ed. min., 2.587); see above: pp. 346-47. Consult in St Augustine, De cieit. Dei: 4.31 (PL 41.137-38); 7.6 (PL 41.199-200); 7.23 (PL 41.211-13). 162 2 Sent., 18.2.1, Resp. "Alii autem ... opinionem sequuntur." (2.446; ed. min., 2.458-59); cf. Averroes, Comment, in De anima, 3.4 (Crawford, pp. 383-420, 436-37). See in Aristotle, De anima: 3.4-5 (429alO-430a25); 1.4 (408bl8-31).

608

CHAPTER

SEVEN

trine is considered by Bonaventure to be not only in error, but also to be the worst of errors, because it is contrary to the Christian religion, to right reason and to sense experience. It is contrary to the Christian religion because there would be no eternal rewards, if there were one soul for all men. The opinion of Averroes is contrary to right reason, which understands that an intellective soul, as it is intellective, is the perfection of a man, according as he is man; therefore, if men are not diverse solely as animals, but are also diverse as men, they not only have diverse imaginations and sensitive souls, but they also have diverse intellects and rational souls. The opinion of Averroes goes against sense experience, which shows that diverse men have diverse and even contrary acts of thought and love. This diversity cannot come from diverse species existing in the imaginations of men, because men are diversified not only with respect to the intelligible species that they abstract from things by way of the senses, but also with respect to what is beyond the power of imagination, such as human virtues, which are understood through their essences and not through species acquired by the power of imagination. Now God most of all is not known through species abstracted from the imagination, and men differ in their dispositions toward God: some men love Him, other men defy Him.163 Bonaventure opposes and rejects the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine by Averroes chiefly on philosophical grounds, but also on theological grounds. Arguing philosophically, Bonaventure follows Aristotle himself by insisting that, because a proper act must come to-be in a proper matter, the rational soul is the act and entelechy of a human body. Consequently, there is a proper rational soul perfecting the body of each individual man. Moreover, the soul and the body of a man are proportioned to each other as the perfecting and the perfectible principles of a human nature; since a human nature has a proper being and a proper unity or distinction in being from its rational soul, it is impossible for the soul perfecting one human body to be also the principle of perfection in another human body. Furthermore, if the same soul is in many men, then, because one man knows a thing and another is ignorant of it, and one man is good and another is evil, even hating the man who is good, there will be contraries in one and the same subject, which is even contrary to itself; since this is impossible, the doctrine of one soul in all men must be rejected as contrary to philosophy. Proceeding according to theology, Bonaventure says that, if there is one soul in all men, a just man has nothing more after death than an unjust man; therefore, the good man will not be rewarded and the evil man will not be punished. It follows from this, Bonaventure argues, that God is unjust and that a man is a fool to do anything good, and so there is no order in the universe; but all that is contrary both to Christian faith and to the true

163 2 Sent., 18.2.1, Resp. "... hoc probantes." (2.446-47; ed min., 2.459)

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

609

understanding of human reason. If the opinion of Averroes were true, then, after death, no one man would be more beatified than another. Now the state of beatitude is attained by a man according to his virtues, and there are many men lacking the necessary virtues for beatitude: therefore, if every man has the same soul, no man will attain beatitude, and thus the life of all men is fruitless; since this is entirely false and contrary to divine justice, it is also entirely false and contrary to divine justice to say that there is one soul in all men.164 There is one point of doctrine in Aristotle, however, that seems to support the position taken by Averroes. According to the Philosopher, a spiritual substance has the act and function of moving and ruling a corporeal substance; so, if no thing in nature is idle, as Aristotle says, a spiritual substance must always be posited as moving a corporeal substance. On the other hand, if there were diverse substances of a spiritual nature in diverse men, then, because those substances are separated through death from their bodies, such spiritual substances would cease to act, and so they would be idle things in nature.165 Bonaventure sees two defects in this argument offered in defence of Averroes. It is defective, in the first place, because a spiritual substance has not been made principally to move and to rule a corporeal substance, for all motion will come to an end. Since the latter truth was unknown to Aristotle, he has reasoned in vain when assuming that the number of movers corresponds to the number of movements and mobile things. There are far more spiritual substances or angels than the celestial bodies that they move; and they have not been created to move those bodies, but to enjoy God in beatitude. The argument defending Averroes is defective, in the second place, because each rational soul will be restored to its own body on the day of resurrexion. Since this truth was also unknown to Aristotle, it is no wonder that he has failed in a truth of this kind, Bonaventure says, "for it is inevitable that a man who philosophizes fall into some error, unless he is aided by a ray of faith." 166

164 Lac. cit., con. 1-5 (2.445; ed. min., con. a-e, 2.457-58). The opinion of Averroes is contrary to the understanding of reason regarding beatitude, because knowledge of beatitude is innate to the mind of every man: this knowledge is an indubitable or inerrant dictate of the natural law ordering each man toward the supreme good through a natural and sufficient appetite for it, but a man must direct himself in seeking that good, or beatitude, by his freedom of choice; so, regulating his life according to natural justice, each man can be disposed for beatitude under the natural law by seeking the supreme good in the particular goods that he knows and chooses during the course of his life on earth: 4 Sent., 49.l.un.2 (4.1002-04; ed. min., 4.987-89). 165 2 Sent., 18.2.1, arg. 6 (2.445; ed. min., 2.457). See in Aristotle: De caelo, 2.3 (286a2-20); De anima, 3.9 (432b20-433a7). 166 Loc. cit., ad 6 (2.447-48; ed. min., 2.460); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 12.8 (1073bl-1074al3). Note Bonaventure's concluding observation: "Necesse est enim philosophans in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adiuvetur per radium fidei." The term philosophans, as used here, signifies any man who philosophizes, or who engages in philosophy: "... in hac quaestione multi philosophantes multa dixerunt falsa etvana" — Loc. cit., Resp., initio (2.446; ed. min., 2.458). Bonaventure also uses the term to designate those who are

610

CHAPTER SEVEN

What exactly is Bonaventure saying in his response to the argument defending the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine given by Averroes? Bonaventure is saying that Aristotle, lacking Christian faith, did not know either that all motion will end or that human bodies will be restored in a future life. Recognizing that Aristotle was invincibly ignorant of the truth of Christian faith, Bonaventure says simply that the Philosopher could not avoid falling into error on the question of the correspondence between the number of spiritual substances and the number of movements and mobile things in the heavens, a correspondance that Aristotle associated with the proper end of those spiritual substances. Thus, Bonaventure is not finding fault with Aristotle for attributing to spiritual substances the function of moving and ruling corporeal substances; Christian theologians do the same, identifying the separate substances or intelligences with the angels, to whom they attribute especially the function of ruling the universe, under God, in the present order of redemption.167 Moreover, knowing that Aristotle lacked Christian faith, again not through his own fault, Bonaventure observes simply that the Philosopher could not but fall into error on the truth regarding the future condition of human souls. Hence, Bonaventure is neither criticizing nor upbraiding Aristotle for his failure on this question; rather, Bonaventure is evaluating Aristotle's doctrine according to the theological principle that, without the aid of Christian faith, a man engaging in philosophy cannot avoid error in regard to truths known only through revelation. This is what Bonaventure means by saying that such a man inevitably falls "into some error". Consequently, Bonaventure is not saying that any or every man who philosophizes must always fall into error, unless he is aided by Christian faith. If Bonaventure were saying as much as that, then, teaching also that God has illumined natural reason to know its proper objects with even an infallible certitude, Bonaventure would be not only denying the truth and validity of his own doctrine, but also attributing to God an illumination incapable of producing its proper effect, and this is something that Bonaventure would never attribute to God. engaging in philosophy at the Faculty of Arts in Paris: "Restat autem, ut de philosophantibus aliquid subiungamus, amice carissime. Utinam in ceteris sicut et in hoc pariter concordemus! Fateor, displicent tibi curiositates, displicent et mihi, displicent et Fratribus bonis, displicent et Deo et Angelis eius. Nee defendo circa scripta puerilia mussitantes, sed detestor eos pariter tecum. Unum tibi et mihi consulo, ut habeamus zelum secundum scientiam nee detestemur plus, quam oportet, vel non oportet..." —Epist. de trib. quaes., n. 12 (8.335); see above: n. 88, p. 571. It is in this latter sense that Bonaventure uses the term philosophans, with certain derogatory overtones, in his later writings where he speaks of those in Paris who follow Averroes. 167 "Regentia haec et ilia sunt substantiae spirituales ... ut sunt spiritus caelestes, quos philosophi Intelligentias, nos Angelos appellamus. Quibus secundum philosophos competit movere corpora caelestia, ac per hoc eis attribuitur administratio universi, suscipiendo a prima causa, scilicet Deo, virtutis influentiam, quam refundunt secundum opus gubernationis, quod respicit rerum consistentiam naturalem. Secundum autem theologos attribuitur eisdem regimen universi secundum imperium summi Dei quantum ad opera reparationis, secundum quae dicuntur administratorii spiritus, missi propter eos qui hereditatem capiunt salutis." — Itiner., 2.2 (5.300; ed. mm., 5.188).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

611

When it is a question of a truth that natural reason can know with certitude, therefore, Bonaventure exercises great care to indicate, particularly regarding Aristotle, that a philosopher has known it, if this can be shown from his doctrine, as Bonaventure is aware of it. For instance: Aristotle teaches that "the intellect is corrupted in some way by an interior corruption"; but the intellect is corrupted only by the corruption of the rational soul, and thus Aristotle seems to hold that the rational soul is not immortal. 16S The statement of Aristotle must be understood according to piety, Bonaventure replies, because it is not to be believed that the Philosopher wants to say that the intellect is corruptible, when he proves afterward that it is impassible, incorruptible and immortal. What Aristotle wants to say is that the operation which the intellect has in the body is impeded because of some injury suffered interiorly by the organ of the imagination, or by the organ of another sense power. When Aristotle speaks in this way, he is clearly speaking the truth, as the sense powers show.!69 The accounts given by Bonaventure, in his early writings, of the errors that he finds in the philosophers, as they were known to him, show that all the philosophers, though they were illumined by God, have failed in their thinking to arrive at the truth of the creation of the universe. Their failure in this regard resulted from their own incomplete understanding of the principles of created things with respect to their first efficient and exemplar cause, a mistake introducing a misunderstanding of the final cause of things, thus ending in error with regard to the beatitude of man. The latter error, including a concomitant error on the nature of the rational soul, was incurred most of all by Plato and his followers, by the Manicheans and the Arabian philosophers. Both Averroes and the Manicheans have been considered by Bonaventure to fall into the worst of errors, which he has shown to be contrary to Christian faith, human philosophy and sense experience. The Platonists have not erred as grievously as Averroes and the Manicheans; however, in Bonaventure's judgment, the errors of the Platonists were worse than those of Aristotle, who has erred at most, from the philosophical viewpoint, on the origin of the world and on its temporal condition. It is not surprising, therefore, that Bonaventure, finding less error, or more truth, in Aristotle than in any of the other philosophers, goes

168 2 Sent., 19.1.1, arg. 3 (2.457; ed. min., 2.469); cf. Aristotle, De anima, 1.4 (408bl8-31). 169 "... dicendum quod illud verbura pium debet habere intellectual. Non enim credendum est quod Philosophus voiuerit dicere intellectum esse corruptibilem, cum postea probet ipsum impassibilem, incorruptibiiem et immortalem esse, sicut in III De anima (cap. 4; 429alO-29), expresse patet; sed vu!t dicere quod operatio inteliectus, quam habet in corpore, impeditur propter aliquam laesionem factam interius in organo imaginationis vel alterius virtutis sensibilis. Et quantum ad hoc verum dixit, sicut patet et est manifestum sensui." —Loc. at, ad 3 (2.460-61; ed. min., 2.473). We shall explain the significance of an interpretation according to piety, by Bonaventure, in the next part of our work when we consider his theological mode of procedure.

612

CHAPTER SEVEN

more often to Aristotle than to the other philosophers. In that way, Bonaventure testifies to the truth of his own conviction that Aristotle was "the more excellent among the philosophers". Following that conviction, Bonaventure conjoins, whenever possible, the doctrine of Aristotle with the doctrine of Augustine, as we have shown on numerous occasions. Even though Bonaventure considers Augustine to have been "a most profound metaphysician", at the same time, Bonaventure departs occasionally from a position taken by Augustine. 170 In short, seeking truth in the philosophers rather than looking for their errors, Bonaventure cites even Averroes with approval on more than one occasion.171 The errors of the philosophers are discussed by Bonaventure in his late writings chiefly from a theological point of view. But he discusses those errors also from a philosophical point of view in his final work, which has to do in the main with a sixfold illumination of the Church. In the beginning of this work, Bonaventure speaks of Christ, because He is the mediator between God and men, as the medium by which all things are known. If anyone wishes to arrive at Christian wisdom, he must start out from Christ without whom no creature can be known, for all things have been made through the Word of God. Thus, Christ is the medium of all the sciences: in Him "are hidden all the treasures of the wisdom and the science of God" (Col., 2.3). Hence, speaking theologically, Bonaventure looks upon Christ as the sevenfold medium of metaphysics, physics, mathematics, logic, ethics, politics and theology.172 Since we are concerned here only with Bonaventure's discussion of philosophical errors, we shall limit our presentation to his consideration of those errors. They are brought forward in the theological context of Christ as the medium of metaphysics, which studies the essences of things, or their being. The being of things comes from the Father as its originating principle; it is received in things according to the mediation of the Son, who is the exemplar principle of being, and it is completed by the Holy Spirit as the terminating principle of the being of creatures. Now the metaphysician does 170 For instance, that God produced matter in perfect actuality: 2 Sent., 12.1.2, Resp. (2.296-97; ed. min., 2.299-300); dial He produced spiritual light prior to corporeal light 2 Sent., 13.1.1, Resp. (2.312; ed. min., 2.314-15). 171 On the nature of lumen: 2 Sent., 13.3.2, Resp. "Secundum autem ... tertio opinio." (2.329; ed. min., 2.331); on the relation between singular and universal forms: 2 Sent., 18.1.3, Resp. "Quidam enim ... non obviant." (2.440-41; ed. min., 2.453-54). With some modifications, Bonaventure accepts the opinion of Averroes on the notion of privation:. 1 Sent., 24.1.1, ad opp. 2 & ad 2 (1.420-21; ed. min., 1.333, 335); on the active and passive dispositions of bodies: 2 Sent., 14.1.2.2, con. 2 & ad 2 (2.343-44; ed. min., 2.346-47); and on the assimilation of celestial bodies to God 4 Sent., 48.2.2, con. 3 & ad 3 (4.991-92; ed. min., 4.97879). 172 Coll. in Hexaem., 1.10-11 (5.330-31; Delorme, pp. 4-5); cf. Coll. in loann., 4.6-7 (6.541). Although the classification of the seven sciences in the Delorme version (n. 11, p. 5) differs from that in the critical edition of the text (n. 11, 5.331), nevertheless, the subsequent descriptions of the sciences are the same in both publications (nn. 13-38, 5.331-35; Delorme, pp. 6-19). There is clearly a defect in the text of the Delorme version regarding the classification of the sciences.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

613

not arrive at a knowledge of the Holy Trinity, even though, from a consideration of the principles of a created substance, he arrives at a knowledge of the uncreated substance, so that he knows the divine being as the originating principle, the exemplar medium and the ultimate end of creatures. When the metaphysician considers the divine being as the originating principle of all things, he is one with the physicist, or natural philosopher, who considers the origins of natural things. Likewise, when the metaphysician considers the divine being as the ultimate end of all things, he is one with the ethician, or moral philosopher, who considers felicity as practical or as speculative, and so he takes back all things to the one supreme good as to their ultimate end. The metaphysician acts according to his true capacity as a metaphysician, however, when he considers the divine being as the exemplar medium of creatures. Since the principle of being is the same as the principle of knowing, therefore, no object can be known by science except through the immutable truth of God, because, as Aristotle teaches, the object of science, as an object of science, is eternal. Thus, the divine truth, or the Word of God, is the medium through which any truth is known, whether by an angel or by a prophet, or by a philosopher.173 There are some men who fall into error by believing that the world was made eternally. They think that our minds have a kinship with eternal substances; so these men say that all things have been produced eternally in this world, as they have been eternally in their divine exemplar. According to Bonaventure, that view of the created world is contrary to divine revelation, which makes known to us that all things, including the intellects of angels and of men, have been made through the Word of God (/«., 1.1-5), who is the tree of life in paradise (Gen., 2.9); therefore, the Word of God as Christ is the medium through which men return to the Father, and in whom they are vivified as in the fount of life (Ps., 35.10). If a man in his experience of created things bends down to investigate them more than he ought, Bonaventure says, he will fall away from a true contemplation and taste the forbidden fruit of the tree of the science of good and evil, thus losing knowledge of truth, as Lucifer lost it and fell away from the Father in heaven. The forbidden tree, by nourishing the mind with an inordinate love of creatures, is an occasion of death, or the loss of eternal life. But the divine truth, which is the medium of true science, is the tree of life restoring all men to union with God. The divine truth is, therefore, the medium of the science of metaphysics. Thus, the whole of this science consists in a knowledge of the truth concerning the emanation of things from God, their exemplarity in God, and their consummation through a return to God. To be a true metaphysician, then, a man must be illumined interiorly in order to know this threefold truth.174 173 Op. cit., 1.12-14 (5.331-32; Delorme, p. 6); cf. Aristotle, Etkica nicom., 6.3 (1139bl9-24). 174 Op. cit., 1.15-17 (5.332; Delorme, pp. 6-7). The Delorme version alone has the phrase: "errorem philosophantium caecorum", which would probably refer to the masters in the Faculty of Arts at Paris.

614

CHAPTER SEVEN

In the above text, Bonaventure says less about his philosophical reason for judging as erroneous the view that the world is eternal than about his theological reason, which is an inordinate investigation of the nature of corporeal things. Nevertheless, Bonaventure's philosophical reason for calling that view erroneous is quite clear, namely, a mistaken conclusion concerning the production of the world with respect to its exemplar cause, which is the divine essence. Bonaventure points out, moreover, that Christian wisdom has a knowledge of the persons in God as the threefold principle of creation, whereas philosophical wisdom, or metaphysics, has a knowledge only of the divine essence as the threefold principle of creatures. In other words, Bonaventure takes the position that the metaphysician is illumined adequately by God to know that He is the threefold cause of creatures; because the proper function of the metaphysician is to relate all things to the divine essence as to their exemplar principle, he ought to know that principle without error, or with certitude, since the divine essence is the medium through which a philosopher knows any truth. Although Christian wisdom is more perfect than philosophical wisdom, even so, the former does not rule out the intrinsic capability of the latter to arrive at the wisdom of God as it is manifested in His work of creation. Each created thing is regulated by the divine wisdom, and so every creature expresses the divine wisdom, which can be known with certitude by a philosopher who knows all the properties of the creature, for all creatures reflect the wisdom of God. The man who does not arrive at that wisdom is like an illiterate person who has a book and does not care to read it, and thus a philosopher can fail to know the true source of all things. From the theological viewpoint, however, Bonaventure says that the divine truth moves very far away from the man who investigates it by scrutinizing creatures with an undue curiosity.175 Bonaventure, drawing an analogy with the six days of creation, speaks of the rational soul as having a sixfold vision of God. The first vision alone concerns us, for it is grounded in the soul's natural power of understanding. This is the context in which Bonaventure now discusses all the difficulties of the philosophers. Although they have given us nine sciences and promised a tenth bestowing contemplation, nonetheless, many of the philosophers have fallen into great errors while trying to discover truth and to avoid the darkness of ignorance. Those philosophers considered themselves to be wise, but they became foolish by taking pride in themselves because of their knowledge. All those who lived before Christ, Bonaventure says, have been assisted by the divine light, which irradiates as an unfailing truth in the rational soul. The irradiation of divine truth is so strong that,

175 Op. cit., 2.20-21 (5.339-40; Delorme, pp. 26-27); cf. nn. 9-10 (5.337-38; Delorme, pp. 23-24): these passages, notably different in the Delorme version, are an abridgment of I finer., 2.9 (5.301-02; «/. mia., 5.191-92).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

615

apart from contradicting himself, a man cannot think that this truth is-not. The divine truth sheds three rays of light on the rational soul, and they are the sciences of natural philosophy, rational philosophy and moral philosophy. The philosophers have not discovered those sciences without divine help, because, as Augustine remarks, they were made known to the philosophers by their adverting to the truth already in their minds, i.e. the innate truth of first principles.176 Hence, reaffirming his earlier teaching, Bonaventure speaks of a proper illumination of philosophical knowledge. He considers this illumination here on the part of its originating principle, of its receiving subject, and of its terminating object. The originating principle of illumination is God as the threefold cause of creation; so the human mind is drawn toward God as the cause of being (natural philosophy), as the source of understanding (rational philosophy), and as the order of life (moral philosophy). Accordingly, the rational soul, as the receiving subject of illumination, has a proper capacity to speculate about the truth of things, to compare and to interpret the truth of human words, and to deliberate about the truth of human actions. With regard to the terminating object of illumination, then, the soul can arrive at the truth of everything which is, whether from nature, or natural reason, or the human will. In sum, receiving an illumination from God, the rational soul can be drawn from a knowledge of all things to a knowledge of their one cause. But the elevation of the mind to God is easier when it is aided by Christian faith, Bonaventure adds, because the threefold cause of things can then be appropriated to the divine persons.177 The distinction between Christian wisdom, relying on faith, and philosophical wisdom, relying on reason, is stressed above by Bonaventure as he draws attention to the nobler knowledge of the theologian, by comparison with the philosopher, concerning the truth of the divine causality. Bonaventure insists also that human reason has a natural capacity for knowing the truth of all created things, because it has been illumined by God for that very purpose. His illumination brings about the different sciences of philosophy in the human mind, so that it can know God himself in a philosophical way as the one, though threefold, cause of creatures. Bonaventure is not content with simply stating those facts in regard to philosophy, however, for he goes on to describe precisely what can be known with certitude in each of the nine philosophical sciences.178 176 Coll in Hexaim., 4.1-2 (5.349; Delorme, pp. 48-50); cf. St. Augustine, De civil. Dei, 8.4 (PL 41.228). For a description of the nine philosophical sciences see below, n. 178. 177 Op. tit., 4.3-5 (5.349; Delorme, pp. 50-51). Note the concluding passage: "Ergo secundum principium, subiectum et obiectum est triplex radius veritatis in anima, per quem anima possit elevari ad perpetua, et etiam ad causam omnium; sed si addatur condimentum fldei, tune facilius, ut causa essendi attribuatur Patri, ratio intelligendi Filio, ordo vivendi Spiritui sancto." 178 Op. cit., 4.6-5.22 (5.349-57; Delorme, pp. 51-84). His description proceeds as follows: 1) natural philosophy, with metaphysics, mathematics and physics, 4.6-17 (5.349-52; Delorme, pp. 51-60); 2) rational philosophy, with grammar, logic and rhetoric, 4.18-25 (5.352-53; Delorme, pp. 60-72); 3) moral

616

CHAPTER SEVEN

During the course of his description, Bonaventure adverts now and then to specific errors of the philosophers. Handling the science of metaphysics, he adverts to errors in connexion with universal forms, matter and form, act and potency, cause and effect. With regard to the first, he notes that some men have said that universal forms are only in the human mind, and that Plato put them only in God. Bonaventure corrects those errors by giving universal forms a foundation in things from which the intellect abstracts them, and they reflect their ideas in God.179 With regard to the second, Bonaventure rejects the view that the rational soul is united immediately to prime matter, because the rational soul informs matter already disposed to receive it.180 Concerning the third point, Bonaventure says that it erroneous to hold that any creature is entirely simple, as it would be pure act, which is proper to God alone, and to attribute to a creature what belongs only to God is perilous. It is less perilous to say that an angel, or a spiritual substance, is a composite being than a simple being, even if this were not true, because it shows piety and reverence toward God by not attributing to a creature what belongs to Him alone. Though Bonaventure is speaking theologically here, nevertheless, he adds that, according to truth (or philosophy), it is apparently true that an angel is a composite being, because, as Boethius says, a form without matter cannot be a subject of accidents. If an angel were a simple form, it would then be pure act and could not be subject to accidents; so we must say that God alone is absolutely simple.181 On the fourth point, which is cause and effect, Bonaventure adverts again to the many errors of the philosophers who posit the world as eternal. The wise men among them concur in this, that something cannot be made from nothing, and so they say that the world must be eternal: just as a thing would cease to-be if it were to fall into nothing, so also, if the world were from nothing, it would have to begin to-be, which was considered impossible by the philosophers. Some of them posited matter as ingenerate, so that God did not produce it; neither did He produce form, because this cannot come from nothing, as the philosophers assumed, nor can it come from matter, since form cannot be produced from the essence of matter. Now it is erroneous, Bonaventure maintains, to think that the divine power needs the support of matter in order to produce anything. In addition, to hold that the world is eternal, because it cannot be produced from nothing, is contrary to the foundation of faith.182 philosophy, including the common virtues, the social virtues and the political virtues, 5.1-20 (5.353-57; Delorme, pp. 73-83). This is followed by a description of wisdom, recalling the tenth science promised by the philosophers: 5.23-33 (5.357-59; Delorme, pp. 85-90). 179 Op. at., 4.9 (5.350; Delorme, pp. 52-53); see above: pp. 277-78. 180 Op. cit., 4.10 (5.350; Delorme, pp. 53-54); see above: pp. 282-83, 309-12. 181 Op. cit., 4.12 (5.351; Delorme, p. 54). Bonaventure speaks here more probably against Averroes than Aquinas; nevertheless, see above: pp. 312-16. 182 Op. cit., 4.13 (5.351; Delorme, p. 55). On treating mathematics, Bonaventure remarks: "... una de corporibus regulatis per motum, et sic astronomia; alia de influentia, et haec partim est secura et partim

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

617

Bonaventure's description of moral philosophy draws heavily on Aristotle's doctrine with regard to the common (cardinal) and social virtues; his doctrine, as it stands, is shown by Bonaventure to be an inadequate support for the Christian life, though the Aristotelean doctrine on the intellectual virtues gives an adequate support to Christian wisdom.183 Turning to the political virtues, Bonaventure says that he speaks about them as a philosopher speaks; so, gathering together many things from the philosophers, Bonaventure organizes those things under four headings. The first heading is the rite of worship. All the true philosophers, in Bonaventure's estimation, have worshipped one God: Socrates, for instance, suffered death for preventing sacrifice to Apollo; when Plato tried to persuade Socrates to take flight, Socrates refused to deny the truth for which he stood, and so Plato, ashamed because of his conduct, was absent when Socrates was put to death. Cicero considered piety to consist in worship of the gods; but his use of the term gods is displeasing to the Christian, who worships the one God by praise and sacrifice.. Both natural reason and the natural law, as all the philosophers testify, oblige men to offer to God sacrifices of praise, and to give to their parents the honour due to them. 184 The second heading is the form of communal life, which is controlled by the natural dictate of the eternal law: "What you would not have done unto yourself, you ought not to do unto another" (Tob., 4.16). From this dictate, Bonaventure remarks, flow the rules and laws protecting the state (respublica) from injury by wrongdoers. The third heading is the pattern of administration, or norm of government. This has to do with the manner in which the ruler ought to stand in relation to the populace, and vice versa. The true pattern of administration depends on God as the first truth; therefore, the people ought to assist their ruler, who should seek the welfare of the state and not, as a tyrant, seek his own advantage. Reviewing many evils attending political rule, Bonaventure considers hereditary succession to be a great error, because it does not ensure a ruler who knows how to periculosa, et haec est astrologia. Periculosa est propter iudicia, quae sequuntur, et ab hac fluit geomantia, vel nigromantia et ceterae species divinationis." — Cf. 2 Sent., 14.2.2.3 (2.361-65; ed. min., 2.367-72). Bonaventure's description of natural philosophy consists simply in a sketch of the organization of Aristotle's Naturalia; see: Coll. in Hexafm., 4.17 (5.352; Delorme, pp. 59-60); cf. 2 Sent., 3.1.1.2, Resp. (2.96-98; min., 2.84-87). Bonaventure's organization of the Naturalia has a close resemblance to the organization of the sciences in ms. Ripoll 109, Barcelona, as described by M. Grabmann, "Erne fur Examinazwecke abgefasste Quaestionensammlung der Pariser Artistenfakultat aus der ersten Halfte des XIII Jahrhunderts", Miliclalterliches Geisteslebtn, B. 2 (Mtinchen, Max Hueber: 1936), pp. 183-99, or RNSP, 36 (1934), pp. 211-29; see also: / diaieti ecclesiastici di Aristotele sotto Innxemo III e Gregorio IX. Miscellanea Historiae Pontificae, vol. v (Roma, Saler. 1941), pp. 112-33. 183 ColL in Hexaem., 5.1-13 (3.353-56; Delorme, pp. 73-80, with few references to Aristotle). Bonaventure singles out St. Francis as a model of Christian virtue, especially of poverty: n. 5 (5.354; Delorme, p. 77). 184 Op. tit., 5.14-17 (5.356-57; Delorme, pp. 80-81); for the sources of the reference to Socrates and Plato see: 5.356, n. 6; Delorme, p. 80, n. 1. For the source in Cicero see: De natura dearum, 1.41; cf. De officiis, 2.3. See also in Aristotle: Topica, 1.11 (105a3-9), and 2.11 (115bll-35).

618

CHAPTER SEVEN

govern. In his view, it is a wise thing to elect the ruler of a state, as the Romans did when they chose wise men to govern them. The fourth heading is the office of judging. This function also depends on God as the first truth: it is through the divine truth that a man knows how something ought to be judged, whether it be a thing, a human person, or his manner of acting. 185 Bonaventure draws his description of the philosophical sciences to a close by restating in a general way the errors of the philosophers; at the same time, he notes that, of all the sciences, moral philosophy has been an occasion for fewer errors, because it does not stand still in speculation. But each of the nine philosophical sciences is, so to speak, a lumen from God, who has illuminated the minds of the philosophers. Drawn by the truth, the philosophers wanted to arrive at wisdom, or beatitude, which they promised to give as an accomplished understanding to their disciples.186 Because the philosophers received an illumination from God, it was possible for them to have a natural wisdom, as Bonaventure proceeds to demonstrate. Natural wisdom is acquired by a man in reflecting first upon his own soul, then upon the created intelligences, and thereafter upon God and His eternal reasons. A man reflects upon his soul according to his mind by which he considers his own potencies and their acts. Each man has animal potencies, or exterior and interior senses, intellectual potencies, including reason and intellect, and divine potencies which are intelligence and the unitive force of the will. When a man reflects on his potencies and their acts, he sees his soul as a mirror, so to speak, resplendent with the truth of all things. Looking into that mirror, then, a man sees the truth of corporeal things, which he knows by his animal potencies. On looking more closely into the mirror, a man is drawn by his spiritual nature to see the truth of things in the spiritual world. Thus, from his reason and intellect, a man can move on to see the truth of the angels, or the spiritual substances that, according to the philosophers, regulate the movements of celestial bodies and, through them, exercise an influence on earthly bodies. Since it is evident that a cause is nobler than its effect, Bonaventure says, and that a living body is nobler than a non-living body, therefore, some of the philosophers, considering the influence of celestial bodies on earthly bodies, concluded erroneously that the souls of living bodies are caused by the influence of spiritual substances through the influence of celestial bodies. Other philosophers fixed the number of those substances in accordance with the number of natural movements in the heavens; some other philosophers, following only the influences of the heavens on earthly things, posited no

185 Coli in Hexaim., 5.18-20 (5.357; Delorme, pp. 81-83). 186 Op. cit., 5.21-22 (5.357; Delorme, n. 21, pp. 83-84). Beside the moral error of bad political government Bonaventure mentions the error of idolatry; "Daemones autem propter superbiam suam volunt coli ut Deus, ut habeant in terra quod habere non potuerunt in caelo; et quia maxime alienantur homines a Deo." — n. 16 (5.356; cf. Delorme, pp. 80-81); see above pp. 457-59 (n. 28).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

619

more than ten spiritual substances or intelligences. Bonaventure rejects all these opinions as both unsound and contrived, for a spiritual substance can well exist without moving any body. The spiritual substances have only a ministerial function with regard to rational souls, through which men are governed by the created intelligences, and they exercise that function by disposing men to receive the illumination coming immediately from God. Hence, the created intelligences do not perfect the minds of men interiorly, which God alone can do. The minds of men are drawn to God exteriorly by the superior minds of the intelligences, who are also illumined by God; so, turning toward Him, those intelligences lead all things back to God in love and praise. Now the philosophers have known that praise and thanks are due to God, and they have known that the intelligences have an influence on the minds of men; therefore, the philosophers could have known the true nature of that influence and, guided by the created intelligences, they were capable of giving true praise and thanks to God.187 A man looking into the mirror of his soul, Bonaventure continues, can go beyond the created intelligences by moving from a consideration of the conditions of created being to a consideration of its cause, thus arriving at God and the eternal reasons of created things. In consequence, knowing the reasons of created things in their first cause, a man can also know the conditions of the first being by comparing it with the conditions of created being, which is its effect. In that way, a man can have a most certain knowledge of God as the Creator, and of creatures as His effects. Although this knowledge is attained by a man according to his intelligence, he cannot attain it apart from a proper reasoning, a personal experience and a true understanding with respect to the conditions of created being as it is known to him. From a proper reasoning about a composite thing, for example, he can see that there must be a simple thing, which is the cause of being in the composite thing. Likewise, from an imperfect thing, he can know that there must be a perfect thing, which is the cause of perfection in other things. Aristotle proceeds in the latter way to show that the world is eternal, because local and circular motion, which is perfect, precedes every other movement and change. Commenting on this, Bonaventure says: "It is true that the perfect is before the imperfect, speaking of the perfect absolutely, but not speaking of the perfect in a genus, of which kind is local motion." Aristotle's reasoning is improper, therefore, because other movements come before the perfect movement of circular motion.188 From a personal experience, a man knows the truth of principles, such as: "all knowledge comes to-be from some pre-existing knowledge"; therefore, from his per-

187 Op. cit, 5.23-27 (5.357-58; Delorme, nn. 22-27, pp. 85-88); cf. Brevil., 2.4 "Et quoniam ..." (5.22122; ed. win, nn. 4-5, 5.40-41), and 2.10 "Ratio autem ... rectitudini attestaretur." (5.228; ed. min., nn. 2-4, 5.52). 188 Coll. in Hexaim., 5.28-29 (5.358-59; Delorme, pp. 88-90); Aristotle, Phfsica, 8.5 (257a34-258b9).

620

CHAFFER SEVEN

sonal experience, a man can know that he has an interior lumen through which he can also know that there is a first being. Consequently, from a true understanding of created being, a man can see that being belongs truly to the first being alone, and that all other beings have their being from the first, which is being itself and, therefore, that than which nothing better can be understood, for it is the being that cannot be thought not to-be. When a man knows God in that way, he can repose in God, because he understands that God is good through His essence and, as the supreme good, that He is supremely desirable. Thus, God ought to be desired in a supreme way, for He is the beatitude of all things. Summing up, Bonaventure restates that a man can become wise by reflecting first on his own soul, then on the created intelligences, which are the media guiding men toward the eternal light of God, in whom a man can repose as in the fontal object of contemplative truth. Such is the accomplished understanding, or contemplation, that the philosophers promised to their disciples; however, the philosophers were aware that, to attain it, moral virtues were required, and so the philosophers engaged themselves in teaching moral virtue. Socrates, in particular, spent himself that way, because he realized that a man could not arrive at contemplation unless he first cleansed his soul through moral virtue.189 Bonaventure turns next to the wisdom that, in his view, the philosophers actually attained, or failed to attain. The noble and ancient philosophers, he begins, have known that things have a principle, an end and an exemplar cause. Although those philosophers have seen that there is a principle, or first cause, and an end of all things, nonetheless, with regard to their exemplar cause, there has been a wide difference among the philosophers, some of whom deny that there are exemplar forms in the first cause. The leader of those who deny that truth seems to be Aristotle; he has execrated many times in his Metaphysics the ideas posited by Plato. According to Aristotle, God knows only Himself, not needing knowledge of any other thing, and He moves as He is desired and loved; so Aristotle and his followers hold that God knows no particular thing. Aristotle, in his Ethics, opposes the doctrine of ideas on the ground that the supreme good cannot be an idea. Having no weight, however, Aristotle's reasons in this regard were taken away by his commentator. 19° Aristotle's position on the question of divine ideas is not only erroneous, according to Bonaventure, but also the cause of the error that God has 189 Op. tit., 5.30-33 (5.359; Delorme, pp. 89-90); for the reference to Socrates see in St. Augustine, De dvit Dei, 8.3 (PL 41.226). 190 Op. at., 6.1.2 (5.360; Delorme, pp. 90-91); cf. 1 Sent., 39.1.1, sc 1 & ad 1 (1.685-86; ed. mm., 1.54445). The commentator to whom Bonaventure refers is not Averroes, but Eustratius; see: Coil, in Hexae'm., 6.2 (5.361, n. 1; Delorme, p. 91, n. 4). For Bonaventure's reference to Aristotle's doctrine on divine knowledge consult Metaph., 12.7 (1072al8-1073al2), 12.9 (1074bl5-1075all). For his references to Aristotle's critiques of Plato's doctrine of ideas consult Metaph., 1.9 (990bl-992bl3); 7.13-14 (1038bl1039bl9); 12.3 (1070a9-30), 13.4-5 (1078b7-1080all); Ethica nicom., 1,6 (1096all-1096b7).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

621

neither prescience nor providence, since He does not have in Himself the reasons, or exemplar forms, by which He might know other things. Aristotle and his followers also say that, excepting necessary things, there is no truth in regard to future things.191 It follows, therefore, that all things come to-be either from chance or from the necessity of fate; but it is impossible for them to come to-be from chance, and so the Arabian commentators say that all things are determined by the necessity of fate, i.e. the separate substances moving the celestial bodies are necessary causes of all other things. From the theological viewpoint, furthermore, it follows that there is no hell, nor are there any demons; so there are no punishments or awards in a future life. Bonaventure remarks here that Aristotle, apparently, has not spoken anywhere about the demons, nor has he appeared to posit a beatitude after the present life of man. Consequently, Aristotle and his followers have erred with respect to the exemplar causality of God, to His providence over the universe, and to His dispositions for the future condition of the world, particularly the beatitude of men. Those philosophers, from that threefold error, have fallen into a triple blindness or darkness. They have fallen into the initial darkness of an eternal world, which is opposed to the lumen of truth. According to the Greek Fathers, Aristotle seems to say that the world is eternal; all his Arabian commentators maintain that he holds this opinion, as Aristotle's own words seem to suggest. He never says that the world had a principle, or a beginning; on the contrary, he contradicts Plato, who alone seems to hold that time had a beginning.192 From the darkness of an eternal world, there follows a blindness concerning the unity of intellect among men. If the world is eternal, Bonaventure says, one of the following consequences must be true: human souls are infinite, since there has been an infinite number of men; or the human soul is corruptible, or it goes from one body to another, or the intellect is one in all men, and Averroes attributes the latter error to Aristotle. From that error, which is a consequence of an eternal world, there follows the third darkness, namely, that there is neither felicity nor punishment for men after their present life. The philosophers holding the above opinions, Bonaventure concludes, have fallen into many errors extinguishing the light appearing in those men with regard to the preceding sciences.193 191 See in Aristotle, Periherm., c. 9 (18a28-19b4). 192 Coll in Hexaim., 6.3-4 (5.361; Delorme, pp. 91-92). Consult in Aristotle: Physica, 8.1 (251bl6-27); De caelo, 1.10 (280a23-35). The Greek Fathers named by Bonaventure are Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa and John Damascene; see: Coll. in Hexaim., 6.4 (5.361, n. 3; Delorme, p. 92, n. 2). 193 Cotl. in Hexaim., 6.4-5 (5.361; Delorme, p. 92). Note the considerable differences concerning Aristotle in these two passages: "... licet enim magna lux videretur in eis praecedentibus scientiis, tamen omnis extinguitur per errores praedictos. Et alii videntes, quod tantus fuit Aristoteles in aliis et ita veritatem, credere non possunt, quin in istis dixerit verum." — 6.5 (5.361). "Cautius ergo est dicere quod Aristoteles non senserit mundum aeternum ... quia tantus fuit quod omnes ipsum sequerentur et assererentur idem dicere; sic omnis lux determinata in praecedentibus extingueretur. Sequamur autem nos cum in quibus bene dixit, non in eis in quibus fuit tenebrosus, quae nescivit ve! quae celavit" — Delorme, p. 92.

622

CHAPTER SEVEN

In Bonaventure's judgment, then, Aristotle has erred by holding that the world is eternal, an error resulting from the failure of Aristotle, though he was a great philosopher, to posit exemplar forms, or ideas, in the first principle of things. God's eternal light is the exemplar of all things, Bonaventure states, and the human mind can be elevated, as were the minds of other noble and ancient philosophers, so that it can arrive at a knowledge of the divine exemplarity. The exemplars of human virtues come together first of all in God's eternal light, as Plotinus says: "It is absurd for the exemplars of other things to be in God, and not-the exemplars of the virtues".194 Bonaventures goes on to cite Philo, "speaking as a philosopher", in order to explain how the eternal light of God contains the exemplars of the virtues. Turning then to the four cardinal virtues, Bonaventure says that they are impressed on the human soul by the eternal light of God, and they are the exemplars in the soul of the other moral virtues. Sacred Scripture indicates this, but Aristotle has not thought about the cardinal virtues that way, as other ancient and noble philosophers have.195 Bonaventure proceeds next to show three things: first, that the other moral virtues are attained through the cardinal virtues; secondly, that the cardinal virtues are those in which the other virtues are integrated; thirdly, that the whole reason of human life has to be directed and regulated by the cardinal virtues, which assimilate the human mind, both in action and in contemplation, to the exemplar virtues in God. Now, on showing the first of these three things, Bonaventure notes that Aristotle teaches that a virtue consists in the mean between two extremes as determined by a wise man; but Augustine teaches that a virtue consists in a mode of life or of acting, and prudence establishes the mode, thus guiding human actions toward the centre lest they go to excess. Hence, for Bonaventure, prudence is the director of the moral virtues, because it establishes their mode, which temperance guards, justice distributes and fortitude defends.196 Having shown how the cardinal virtues integrate the other virtues and control the whole reason of human life, Bonaventure then describes each of the cardinal virtues according to the doctrine of Cicero.l97 Those four virtues, Bonaventure continues, direct human life through the rule of reason, which reflects the 194 Op. at., 6.6 (5.361; Delorme, p. 92). For the source of Bonaventure's citation from Plotinus see: Macrobius, Comment, in Somnium Scipionis, 1.8 (Willis, 2.39). See also: Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans, by William Harris Stahl (New York, Columbia Univ. Press: 1952), p. 121, n. 8. Consult in Plotinus: Enneads, 1.2.1, 6-7. 195 Coll. in Hexaem., 6.7-10 (5.361-62; Delorme, pp. 92-93). For Bonaventure's sources in Philo, who is not mentioned in the Delorme version, see: n. 7 (5.361, n. 8). Note this passage: "Hae sunt quatuor virtutes exemplares, de quibus tola sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensic, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi." — 6.10 (5.362). The Delorme version has only: "De iis virtutibus loquitur sacra Scriptura." — n. 11, p. 93. 196 Op. cit., 6.11-12 (5.362; Delorme, pp. 93-94). See the following: Aristotle, Ethica nicom., 2.6 (1106a24-1106b27); St. Augustine, De morib. Eccles., 19.35 (PL 32.1326). 197 Coll. in Hexaem., 6.13-18 (5.362-63; Delomre, pp. 94-95); cf. Cicero, De invention:, 2.54-55.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

623

wisdom of God's eternal reason. Unless a man has the cardinal virtues, therefore, he cannot have the life of wisdom, no matter to what extent he may have the other sciences. The cardinal virtues flow from the eternal light of God into the human soul, and they direct it back to God as to its origin; so a man needs the cardinal virtues, for they regulate human life in its moral action, and they cleanse the human soul in its contemplation. When the soul is properly cleansed by those virtues, they direct it toward a vision of the eternal light, and in this consists beatitude, as the noble philosophers of old have known.198 On completing the account of philosophical wisdom, both speculative and practical, Bonaventure sets down very briefly all the points that he has brought forward to show how the sciences and the wisdom of philosophy are the natural effects of an illumination from God. Bonaventure then enumerates the errors of the philosophers and, accounting for those errors, he finds sufficient reasons to excuse most of the philosophers for their mistakes. Considering the three errors in speculative wisdom, he says that Aristotle seems to posit an eternal world, thus failing to understand the divine exemplarity, and he has not posited a felicity after this life, thus erring on human beatitude. The error of one intellect for all men is not found in Aristotle, but in Averroes, who has erred concerning the truth of divine providence. Aristotle could be excused for his error on the eternity of the world, because, as a natural philosopher, he has understood the world to be eternal in this sense, that it could not begin through nature, or natural motion. Moreover, saying that the separate intelligences have their perfection by moving bodies, Aristotle could say only that and no more, because the intelligences are not idle, since there is no idle thing in nature. With regard to beatitude, Aristotle posited human felicity in this life, because, though he has thought about eternal life, he has not undertaken a study of eternal life, perhaps because this was beyond his consideration. Concerning the unity of the intellect, it could be said that Aristotle understands the human intellect to be one by reason of the influence of eternal light, but not by reason of the intellect itself, for he attributes an intellect to the soul of each man.199 Whatever Aristotle actually thought about the above questions, Bonaventure remarks, other philosophers, manifesting their illumination, posited ideas in God Those philosophers said that every good thing is in God, and

198 Op. at., 6.19-25 (5.363-64; Delorme, pp. 95-96). To show that the noble philosophers have known such a beatitude, Bonaventure cites a very long passage from the Comment, in Somnnim Scipionis, 1.8, where Macrobius speaks of the virtues as described by Plato and riotinus: Coll. in ffexaim., 5.25-32 (5.364); the Delorme version (pp. 97-98), has only a brief summary of the main points in the text of Macrobius. 199 Op. cit., 7.1-3 (5.365; Delorme, pp. 98-99). See in Aristotle: De caelo, 1.2 (269bl4-17), 1.3 (270b525), 1.9 (279al9-279b38); De aroma, 2.2 (414a25-27). Bonaventure's reference to Averroes is not found in the Delorme version (p. 99), a serious omission as Bonaventure is carefully excusing Aristotle and disassociating him from Averroes.

624

CHAPTER SEVEN

so, in the order of practical wisdom, they posited in God the exemplar virtues from which the cardinal virtues flow into the human soul. Bonaventure attributes this position to Plotinus "of the sect of Plato", and to Cicero "of the sect of the Academy". Although they seemed to be illumined in such a way that they could have felicity by their own virtue, they were still in darkness, because they did not have the lumen of faith that we now have. Relying only on the natural illumination of reason, those philosophers arrived at a knowledge of the cardinal virtues, which, they said, regulated the actions of the soul, cleansed it in view of contemplation, and reformed the soul in order that it come to rest in the divine exemplar. But the philosophers were not able to achieve their goal, and for three reasons. They could not, first of all, order their life to its ultimate end. Now, according to Augustine, a true virtue directs the mind to God in whom there is repose with both an eternity which is certain, because it cannot be lost, and a peace which is perfect, because it includes a reunion of the soul with its body.200 The philosophers did not know that their final end consisted in a certain eternity; so they thought that human souls would first ascend into the heavens and then return to the earth where, forgetting what they previously knew, they would be united in misery to other bodies. Neither did the philosophers know the perfect peace of beatitude, nor that the world would come to an end; so they thought that human souls would continue to circulate from one body to another, and this is not surprising, Bonaventure comments, because the philosophers, having only the power of reason, could not know that human bodies will rise again, a truth known only by the virtue of faith. The philosophers could not, in the second place, rectify their wills by natural virtues alone. That was not possible because of the ordination of men to eternal beatitude, so that, without the power of grace and the infused virtues, the philosophers could not have sufficient merits to attain the beatitude of eternal life awarded to men by a condescending God. The philosophers could not, in the third place, overcome the sickness of sin. They were not aware of that sickness, since they did not know its cause, and so they could not know its cure. Although the philosophers were aware of the effects of sin, such as ignorance and concupiscence, they thought that those effects were caused by a conflict between the sensitive nature and the intellective nature of man, but they were deceived, Bonaventure observes, because sin has weakened both the sensitive and the intellective part of human nature. Since the philosophers had to rely on natural reason, they could not have known about original sin, which has been revealed to us by faith; therefore, they did not know the cause of the disorders in human nature. As a consequence, not realizing that they needed to be healed, the philosophers were not aware of the cure contained in the grace of the Holy

200 See in St. Augustine: De civil. Dei, 19.25 (PL 41.656), 19.10 (PL 41.636); cf. De Trinit., 13.20.2526 (PL 42.1034-36), 14.1.3 (PL 42.1038), 14.9.12 (PL 42.1046).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

625

Spirit and coming to us from the salutary sufferings of Christ, who is the one doctor through whom the souls of men can be healed from the ignorance and concupiscence caused by sin. In short, having the wings of ostriches, the philosophers were not able to lift themselves up to God in the beatitude of contempation: lacking Christian virtue, they could not escape the darkness inflicted on human reason because of sin.201 The philosophical errors reviewed by Bonaventure in his final work are the same as those that he handled in his earlier writings. There is a notable difference, however, between his two treatments of the errors of the philosophers. In his earlier writings, he seeks only to expose those errors and, at the same time, to refute them according to reason and philosophy while showing, in some instances, that they are also contrary to the truth of Christian faith. Bonaventure excuses the error of a philosopher on one occasion alone, namely, when he says that Aristotle could not avoid falling into error on the number of the created intelligences, because he did not know the revealed truth concerning either the beatitude of spiritual creatures or the resurrexion of human bodies. Bonaventure employs this theological reason in his final work to excuse the philosophers who have erred on the nature of human felicity and on the cause of the disorders in human nature. It is solely on theological grounds, then, that Bonaventure excuses those philosophers for their errors. On philosophical grounds, he attributes to them, particularly Cicero and Plotinus, a true knowledge of the cardinal virtues and of their exemplars in God; knowing the truth of the divine exemplarity, the philosophers in question were on the road to practical wisdom. But they did not attain that wisdom, as the evidence shows, particularly with regard to the Platonists, who erred, even on philosophical grounds, by positing a never-ending circulation of the human soul from one body to another. Thus, evaluating the errors of those philosophers, especially the Platonists, but on his own principles, Bonaventure does not find ah accomplished wisdom among them, because, failing in regard to the final cause, they did not suceed in unifying all things under God as the threefold cause of creation.202 Aristotle is the only philosopher who is excused for his errors by Bonaventure on philosophical grounds. Looking upon Aristotle as a natural philosopher, or a physicist, Bonaventure says that Aristotle could well understand the world to be eternal, because he knew that it could not have begun through natural motion. Likewise, knowing that no thing is idle in 201 Coli in Hexaem., 7.4-12 (5.366; Delorme, pp. 99-103). Bonaventure concludes his description of the work of natural reason and of philosophy by showing how the Christian virtues perfect the imperfect virtues of the philosophers, i.e. the cardinal virtues of which Cicero and Plotinus speak: Op. cit., 7.13-22 (5.367-68; Delorme, pp. 103-08); see: G. Bonafede, // "De Scientia Ckiisti" ..., pp. 97-106, or Saggi sulla filosefia medioevale, pp. 219-27. 202 Bonaventure gives no excusing reasons for the errors of the Arabian philosophers, particularly Averroes, whom he accuses of attributing his error on the intellect to Aristotle.

626

CHAPTER SEVEN

nature, he could not but say that the separate intelligences are not idle; so, as a physicist, Aristotle could well understand that they had to move bodies. Moreover, though he thought about an eternal life for man, Aristotle did not undertake a study of that subject, which he deemed perhaps to be beyond his proper consideration, and thus he is to be excused for positing a felicity for man in his present life. In Bonaventure's judgment, then, Aristotle is inexcusable for one only error, namely, his rejection of the ideas or exemplar forms of things in the First principle, both as the cause and as the end of the universe. It is for this reason that Bonaventure, on the basis of his own philosophical principles, considers Aristotle to have neglected the way to wisdom. According to the philosophical principles of Bonaventure, the true metaphysician, or the truly wise philosopher, is the one who not only unifies all things under God as their threefold cause, but also and expressly takes them back to God as to their one exemplar principle, for that is the proper function of the metaphysician, as a metaphysician. Bonaventure finds Aristotle inexcusable in this regard, because he ought to have unified the three causes of things in their one first principle and taken them back to their divine exemplar, since he did know that the three kinds of causes can coincide in one thing.203 In Bonaventure's estimation, then, Aristotle has failed to understand the truth of the divine exemplarity in both the speculative order and the practical order. As a consequence, he has not attained the wisdom of contemplation either speculatively or practically. This does not mean that Bonaventure rejects the philosophy of Aristotle, particularly his ethics and metaphysics. On the contrary, attributing to Aristotle a true knowledge in the order of science, Bonaventure considers him to be quite outstanding among the ancient philosophers and, deferring to his authority as the Philosopher, Bonaventure seeks the truth wherever he can find it in the thought of Aristotle, including his ethics and metaphysics.204

Our considerations of Bonaventure's evaluations of philosophical errors have shown that, in his view, the philosophers erred for the most part concerning the origin and temporal condition of the world, the immediate creation of spiritual substances and rational souls, the true nature of the human intellect and of human beatitude, and the truth of the divine ideas,

203 Bonaventure adverts to this knowledge of Aristotle in the following passage: "... sicut ipse Deus habet rationem efficientis, in quantum movet, et formalis, in quantum dirigit, et finalis, in quantum quietat sic et ipsa caritas respectu operis rationem habet isdus triplicis causae; nee est inconveniens, quia, secundum Philosophum, tria genera causarum possunt in unum coincidere." 2 Sent., 38.1.2, in ad 6 (2.885; ed. min., 2.919); cf. Aristotle, Pkysica, 2.7 (198a23-31). 204 We believe that the last sentence in the text of the Delorme version cited above (n. 193, p. 621) represents the true attitude of Bonaventure toward Aristotle's thought

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

627

or exemplar forms in God, of created things. Bonaventure exposes the errors of the philosophers first in his early writings, and again in his late treatises. His early writings belong to the period of his teaching at Paris, which came to an end in 1257, when Bonaventure became minister genera of the Franciscan Order. His late treatises, dating from 1267 to 1273. represent his part in the controversies at Paris about certain features of the doctrine of Averroes, which was taught there in the Faculty of Arts from about 1265. These two series of texts on the errors of the philsophers are the main sources for Bonaventure's thought regarding that problem. The writings of Aquinas, however, date continually from 1252 to 1273. They can be divided conveniently into three periods: a) his early years at Paris, 1252 to 1259, a period corresponding closely to Bonaventure's teachin there; b) his time away from Paris, 1259 to 1268; c) his late years spent both in Paris, 1268 to 1272, and in Naples, 1272 to 1273. During each of the three periods of his writings, Aquinas handled all of the questions, some at considerable length, that Bonaventure treated in connexion with the errors of the philosophers, As a consequence, the writings of Aquinas contain vastly more texts on those questions than the writings of Bonaventure, thus making it virtually impossible within the limits of our study to compare in detail the positions of Bonaventure and Aquinas on the problems that, in their judgments, have given rise to errors on the part of the philosophers. We shall base our comparison, then, on a general consideration of the positions taken by Aquinas on the questions treated by Bonaventure. We shall consider in some detail, however, a number of questions on which the two theologians take very different positions.205 Our first question has to do with the production of things by God from nothing. On this question, Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in holding that the creation of the universe in not only known by Christian faith, but can also demonstrated by reason. Both theologians understand creation to be a bringing forth of a thing from nothing into being, so that there is neither a subject nor a principle pre-existing the production of the thing. Aquinas differs from Bonaventure in this respect, nevertheless, that reason can demonstrate the truth of creation according to the order of nature, but not according to the order of time. It is in the latter sense that, in the view of Aquinas, creation is known solely by Christian faith.206 With regard to the philosophers, Aquinas speaks of their errors in a somewhat different

205 We are following the chronology of the writings of Aquinas as established by I. T. Eschmann, O.P., "A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works" in Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by L. K_ Shook, C.S.B (London, V. Gollancz: 1957). pp. 381-430. 206 2 Sent., 1.1.2, Sol. (2.17-18); cf. SCO, 2.15 (2.23-24). There is a wide difference, of course, between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the being that God creates: Bonaventure speaks of God producing the whole substance of a thing, or its form and matter, which are the principles of its being and existing; Aquinas speaks of God producing the whole being of a thing, whether this is a pure form or a composite of form and matter.

628

CHAPTER SEVEN

manner than Bonaventure. According to Aquinas, the ancient philosophers have erred by positing two or more original causes of the universe, which has only one primary principle, and this is God, who is at once the first agent, the exemplar and the ultimate end of all things. In particular, the Pythagoreans divided all things into two orders, one depending on a good principle and another depending on an evil principle, thus giving rise to the heresy of the Manicheans, who posited a good god and an evil god as the first principles of the universe. Anaxagoras erred in positing all natural forms as hidden in matter from which they were extracted by the first agent, and so he was mistaken about the formal cause of things. Plato posited separate or exemplar forms, which he called ideas, as the cause of forms in matter, so that the world was caused by matter, an agent and exemplar forms. Taking a middle position, Aristotle has shown that all forms are in the potency of prime matter, and that a natural agent in actualizing the potency of matter produces a whole composite and not a form. Aristotle's position is acceptable to Aquinas, who says that a natural agent in its action is, as it were, an instrument of God, who created matter and gave to form the power to form a composite produced by way of generation.207 There are many texts, or series of texts, on the creation of the world in the writings from the second period of Aquinas. In one series of texts, he first demonstrates that God can produce things from nothing; Aquinas then shows that creation cannot involve a mutation according to either nature or time, because a created thing has nothing pre-existing it. Consequently, regarding the creature, creation is the beginning of being and a relation to the Creator, who produces the being of the creature from nothing.208 With this understanding of creation, Aquinas reviews the errors of the ancient philosophers. The first philosophers were so preoccupied with sensible things that they scarcely knew intelligible things; thinking that all forms were accidental and that matter alone was substantial, those philosophers posited only matter as the cause of things, thus erring particularly with respect to their efficient cause. The next philosophers arrived at a knowledge of substantial forms, but not of the universal agent; therefore, considering only the actions of particular agents, this group of philosophers posited two or more first causes, which produced things by changing matter in different ways, such as the principles of love and hate posited by Empedocles. Plato and Aristotle, however, posited a universal cause, an opinion acceptable to Catholic faith. Plato's position is acceptable to this 207 2 Sent., 1.1.1, Sol. "Circa hoc..." (2.13), and ad 5 (2.16); 1.1.4, ad 4 (2.26-27). Aquinas observes, in the first reference, that Plato's opinion supported the view of Avicenna, in Dejluxu entis, that all substantial forms came from a separate intelligence while natural agents of generation only prepared matter to receive forms. Cf. Liber de causis primis et secundis, ed. by R. de Vaux, O.P., Notes et textes SUT t'avicennisme latin ... (Paris, J. Vrin: 1934), pp. 97-102. 208 DPD, 3.1-3 (2.37-44).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

629

extent, that he posited before the multitude of things some sort of unity both according to number and according to nature. Aristotle's position is acceptable because he posited a first perfect being as the cause of imperfect beings. The position of Avicenna is also acceptable, since he held that all beings have being through participation and from one being. Thus, according to Aquinas, reason demonstrates and faith holds that all things are created by God. Aquinas returns again to- the errors of Empedocles, Pythagoras and the Manicheans; he handles their errors in much the same way as before, though here he gives more attention to the errors of the Manicheans.209 In a second series of texts, using many Aristotelean principles, Aquinas proceeds along the same lines. He refers to the errors of the philosophers only in the first text of the series where he concentrates chiefly on showing that, because God can produce things from nothing, it is not necessary to suppose that things in the universe have been made from preexisting matter. Having shown this at length from reason, Aquinas says that Scripture confirms it (Gen., 1.1). He concludes that reason and revelation confute the error of the ancient philosophers who said that there was no cause whatever of matter, which was always presupposed by the actions of particular agents, and so the philosophers held in common that no thing could come to-be from nothing. They spoke the truth about particular agents, Aquinas remarks, but they were mistaken about the universal agent, which causes the whole being of things without pre-existing matter, a truth not known by the philosophers.210 In a third series of texts, Aquinas follows a similar pattern. He shows first that God has created all things; in showing this, Aquinas refers again to Plato positing a unity before a multiplicity and to Aristotle positing a perfect being as the cause of imperfect beings. Aquinas then reviews the errors of the earlier philosophers on the first principle of things, a review resembling his previous examinations of those errors, which come chiefly from the supposition that matter pre-existed the formation of things in the would. 211 Our final text from this period stresses the failure of the philosophers to see that there is a universal agent which does not presuppose matter, as a particular agent does, in order to produce a thing. The philosophers have failed to see that the matter preceding the action of a particular agent was produced by the first and universal agent of all things. This is not contrary to Aristotle's intention, Aquinas says, because Aristotle teaches that the being which is most true and which is being in the highest degree is the cause of being in all existing things. Wherefore, the being that prime matter 209 DPD, 3.5-6 (2.48-55). 210 SCG, 2.16 (2.124-26). Aquinas goes on here to show that creation does not entail any change, even of a potential principle, according to nature, motion or time: 2.17-19 (2.126-28). 211 ST, la, 44.1-2 (1.279a-281b). Aquinas also demonstrates that creation is a production from nothing, that God can create without a pre-existing subject, and that creation is the beginning of being in a creature: 45.1-4 (1.283a-287b).

630

CHAPTER SEVEN

has in potency is derived from the first principle of being, and this principle is being in the highest degree. Since every movement needs a subject, as Aristotle proves, it follows, Aquinas argues, that the universal production of being by God is not a movement nor a mutation, but a simple emanation, as it were, so that to-become and to-make are used equivocally of this universal production. Consequently, whether things are produced by God eternally, as Aristotle and several Platonists say, or whether they have been produced after they were-not, as Christian faith holds, in either instance, acccording to Aquinas, it is not necessary to presuppose that created things have a preexisting subject, because creation is neither a movement nor a mutation. When Aristotle says that every movement and mutation requires an already existing subject, he is not saying anything contrary to Christian faith. Likewise, he says nothing contrary to faith when he says that it is necessary for a particular being to come to-be from not-this-being, but not from not-being; for instance, if a man comes to-be, he must come to-be from not-man, but not from not-being. If a particular being comes to-be, then it does not come to-be entirely from not-being. If a whole being comes to-be, Aquinas adds, it must come to-be completely from not-being, because coming to-be as a whole being is to become a being as a being. Now, unlike Plato and Aristotle, the earlier philosophers, considering only the causes of particular changes, did not arrive at a first cause of the whole being of things, and so those philosophers thought that every becoming was an alteration. If their error is to be avoided, Aquinas observes, we must go beyond the particular effects of particular causes to the universal effect of the whole being of things by the first principle of being; at the same time, we must not presuppose that the first principles needs matter in order to produce an effect. 212 The writings from the third period of Aquinas have texts dealing with the creation of the world principally from the viewpoint of the problem of its eternal or temporal condition; so we shall meet those texts in due course. Now, with regard to the errors of the philosophers on the natural production of the world, Aquinas holds many things in common with Bonaventure. They both maintain, each in his own way, that the early philosophers erred because of their failure to know the true first principle of the universe. With respect to Plato, the two theologians say that he erred, not because he posited ideas or exemplar forms, but because he separated them from the things in the world, an error corrected by Aristotle. In one respect, however, Aquinas differs here from Bonaventure. In his first period, Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in saying that Plato erred by positing 212 In Physic., 8.1, lect. 2, :'Sed si ... potentia universal!." (Maggiolo, nn. 974-75, p. 506). These texts are set down in opposition to the interpretation of Aristotle by Averroes: Loc. at., "Ex hac ... absque subiecto." (Maggiolo, n. 973, p. 505). Aquinas moves on here to show the truth of Aristotle's position that the world could not come to-be from natural motion or mutation: Loc. cit., "Si motus ... esse prima." (Maggiolo, nn. 976-79, pp. 506-08).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

631

more than one first cause of things in the universe; but Aquinas, in his second period, makes no reference to this error of Plato, whom he couples with Aristotle as knowing one universal cause of things. Concerning Aristotle, Bonaventure says that, in his opinion, the Philosopher has not known that the world came to-be from nothing, and so he failed to understand the true origin of the universe. Aquinas does not say explicitly whether or not Aristotle has held that the world came to-be from nothing. Aquinas knows that none of the ancient philsophers have understood that there is a universal agent which can produce things without the necessity of pre-existing matter; but he considers Aristotle's position to be true in regard to the necessity for a particular being to come to-be from an existing subject and not from nothing. At the same time, Aquinas holds that it is not contrary to Aristotle's intention to say that the coming to-be of a whole being, or of the whole being of a thing, involves a production from nothing. In that way, Aquinas keeps open the question of Aristotle's intention with respect to the natural origin of the universe. Although Aquinas differs here from Bonaventure, the two theologians come together in regard to the truth of Aristotle's thought on the impossibility of the world coming to-be from natural motion. Our second problem, in the order followed by Aquinas, has to do with the question whether God, in creating the universe, produced things immediately, i.e. without the necessity of a medium. The question involves particularly the opinion held by some philosophers that God produced onl the first creature, which was an intelligence, and that one created intelligence caused the next, while the last intelligence produced rational souls and, finally, that corporeal nature is produced by spiritual creatures. This opinion is rejected as heretical by Aquinas, because it borders on idolatry by attributing to the creature an honour due to God. Other philosophers say that the power to create, because it is infinite, can neither belong nor be given to a creature; some other philosphers say that this power, though not belonging to a creature, can be given to a creature. Each of those opinions, according to Aquinas, seems to be reasonable, particularly when creation is understood as requiring a power not depending in the order of nature on a pre-existing subject or principle. Thus, considered on the part of the Creator, creation is an action not founded on the act of any preceding cause; belonging solely to the first cause, the power to create cannot be given to any creature. Considered on the part of the product, creation refers properly to the being of the creature, and it is this being that has no pre-existing principle or subject. Now, stating that the first creature is being to which other perfections are added by way of formation, the Liber de causis says that the created being of composite things is matter, which can be produced by a creature through the power of the first cause operating in the creature. It is in this way that the power to create can be given to a creature, as some philosophers attributed it to the separate intelligences, a position viewed by Aquinas as heretical. The philosophers

632

CHAPTER SEVEN

erred in maintaining that position, especially with regard to the production of rational souls. The reasoning of the philosophers could be interpreted in this way, however, that the intelligences, by moving the celestial bodies, dispose human bodies to receive rational souls. But that, Aquinas adds, is not what the philosophers intend to say. For his own part, Aquinas insists that the action of the first cause includes the creating of matter, which must be presupposed by the natural action of a second cause.213 Treating the question again, Aquinas refers to the early philosophers who did not know any other substance except bodily substance. They thought that the noblest bodies were the noblest beings; so, believing that the celestial bodies were gods, the philosophers fell into idolatry, and they attributed to the celestial bodies a primary and immediate influence on earthly bodies. This position is not only contrary to faith, but also an error in philosophy, as subsequent philosophers have shown in proving that the first substances were intellectual, and in indicating that one of those substances was the first cause of all things. Some other philosophers, however, particularly Avicenna, thought that earthly bodies proceeded from God through the mediation of the celestial bodies, or of their intelligences. This opinion is also erroneous and contrary to faith, which teaches that God alone is the Creator of matter and of all things. But Avicenna also distinguished a divine agent, which gives being, from a natural agent, which is the cause of change. Aquinas, interpreting Avicenna's distinction, maintains that the divine agent is God, who is the sole cause of being, and that the natural agent is a creature, which causes a thing to-be through generation. Hence, by moving the celestial bodies, the created intelligences dispose earthly matter to receive specific being according to this or to that substantial form. 214 In his second period, Aquinas reconsiders the problem in three of his works. In the first of these, he attributes the error of positing the necessity of a medium in creation to the Liber de causis, Avicenna and Algazel. Having shown that their positions are contrary to Catholic faith, Aquinas

213 2 Sent., 1.1.3, Sol., ad 1 & 5 (2.2123). The doctrine of the Liber de causis is acceptable, Aquinas says later, provided it is understood to mean that the causality of God, as the sole and immediate cause of being, is more fundamental to a thing than the causality of a created agent, so that God works immediately with a created cause in producing its effect, which comes to-be in a particular way through the action of that cause as it is determined by God 2 Sent., 1.1.4, con. 2, Sol. (2.24-26); cf. DPD, 3.1, Resp. "Et inde ..." (2.39). See also: Super Librum de causis, prop. 1, 4, 9 (Saffrey, pp. 4-10, 26-34, 57-66); cf. In De divin. nomin., c. 5. lect 1 (Pera, pp. 231-38). 214 2 Sent., 15.1.2, Sol. (2.371-72); cf. 15.1.3 (2.374-77), and 25.1.2, ad 5 (2.650-51). See also: 4 Sent., 5.1.3, qa. 3 (4.206-07, 209-11); DV, 5.9, Resp. "Quidam vero ..." (1.107). Aquinas associates with this error many other errors of different philosophers concerning the cooperation of God with created agents. See the following: 1) DV, 5.9-10 (1.104-11). 2) DPD, 3.7-8 (2.55-63); SCG: 3.69 (3.93-98), 3.76 (3.10709), 3.84-85 (3.118-24), 3.87 (3.126-27), 3.94 (3.138-41); ST: la, 22.3 (1.156a-57a), 45.8 (1.291b-92b), 65.4 (1.399a-400b), 110.2 (1.658b-59b), 115.1 (1.682b-84b). 3) In Metaphysk., 7.8, lect. 7 (Splazzi, pp. 348-50).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

633

demonstrates that it is impossible to accept as true that one creature, because the divine power operates in it, can create or give being to another. This cannot be true even if the First creature is said to be only an instrument of the first cause in creating the world Aquinas gives five reasons for not accepting this. The first and second reasons are founded on the infinite distance between non-being and a determinate being, and on the finite power of a created cause, which cannot give rise to an infinite act. The third and fourth reasons are based on the distinction between substance and power in a created agent, which is not its own action, and on the identity of substance and power in God, who is His own action which, never presupposing a subject in potency, is the primary source of the mode and order of operation by a created agent. The fifth reason has to do with the impossibility of a finite power producing something without presupposing a subject in potency: a proper proportion cannot be established between a finite power, even as an instrument of God, and that which is-not, for there is no proportion between what is and what is-not.215 In his second work, employing several Aristotelean principles, Aquinas argues in a similar manner to demonstrate, in the first place, the contrary to the false position of the philosophers who said that the celestial bodies caused the matter of the elements on the earth; in the second place, opposing the error that God created only the first creature, Aquinas demonstrates that God alone can create, because only He, as the universal cause of being, has the omnipotent power to produce a being absolutely, an omnipotence that cannot be communicated even instrumentally to a creature, which must depend in its operation both on the prior action of God and on a pre-existing potency or subject. Thus, reason can show that creation is an act of God alone, and this conforms to the teaching of Scripture, which says that God created the heavens and the earth (Gen., 1.1). 2I6 The texts in the third work of Aquinas in this period proceed along much the same lines, while stressing the universality of being as an effect demanding the most universal cause, which is the only cause that can produce a whole being, whether corporeal or spiritual, with particular reference to the immediate production of the rational soul by God.217 Aquinas returns to the problem again in his late works on three separate 215 DPD, 3.4, Resp. (2.45-46) cf. ad 2, 5, 7 & 14 (2.46-47). Aquinas conjoins the opinion of Avicenna with that of both Anaxagoras and Empedocles as an error contrary to the truth that the universe has one efficient cause, or error committed in the order of formal cause by Origen and the Manicheans.and in the order of final cause by Plato and the Platonists: DPD, 3.16, Resp. (2.87-89). Cf. SCO, 2.39-45 (2.15556); ST, la, 47.1, Resp. (l.SOOab); In Metaphysic., 12.2, lect. 2 (Spiazzi, nn. 2428-39, pp. 570-72). 216 SCG, 2.20-21 (2.128-31). Aquinas also opposes the error of the ancient philosophers (Democritus, Empedocles and the Stoics) who thought that the celestial bodies exercised an immediate influence on the human intellect, an error corrected by Plato and Aristotle, whose positions on the question conform to the teaching of Scripture that God alone is the origin of human intelligence: SCG, 3.84 (3.118-21); cf. ST, la, 115.3, ad 2 (1.686b-87a). 217 ST, la, 45.5 (1.287b-89a); 65.3 (1.398a-99a) 90.3 (1.560b-61a).

634

CHAPTER SEVEN

occasions, but he refers to the erroneous doctrines of the philosophers on only one of those occasions. He mentions specifically the doctrine of Avicenna, who seems to be supported by the doctrine of the Liber de causis. Refuting their doctrines at some length, Aquinas shows how they destroy the good of the universe by falsifying the true order of its production and the proper distinction of its parts. The good of the universe is contained in the intention of its first and universal agent, so that both the order of its production and its distinction of parts pre-exist in the divine intellect. Since the parts of the universe, or created things, emanate from God acccording to His knowledge of them, their order of emanation and their natural distinctions do not follow the necessity of His simple essence and the necessity of the composite nature of created beings; on the contrary, they follow His intention, which is to create the whole universe immediately. Consequently, there is no need to say that, because God is simple in His essence, one only creature can emanate from Him and that, because this creature is composite, other creatures can come forth from it. Thus, Avicenna's error resulted from his confusing creation with generation: he failed to see that creation is a production without motion and mutation, and so he thought that it was the same as generation, which takes place not only according to motion and mutation, but also according as the first cause operates in its effects through the mediation of second causes. As a consequence, Avicenna did not arrive at the true difference between the power of a second cause and the power of the first cause, which is the only cause that can produce being universally, without the necessity of any medium, and apart from motion or change.218 There is a remarkable concurrence in many respects between Aquinas and Bonaventure in their considerations of the error concerning the necessity of the universe to emanate from God by the mediation of a created intelligence. Both theologians oppose the error as contrary to Christian faith and human reason; however, seeing the error as a cause of idolatry, Aquinas opposes it more strongly than Bonaventure on the grounds of Christian faith. On the grounds of human reason, the two men are of one accord both in rejecting the possibility of a creature possessing an infinite power and in finding fault with the philosophers in question for failing to see that the first cause does not need matter, or a potential principle, in order to produce its effect. With regard to the Liber de causis, Bonaventure and Aquinas are at one in opposition to its erroneous doctrine; nevertheless, having recourse to Aristotle, they suggest, though in different ways, acceptable modes of interpreting that doctrine. There are also evident differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas in their approaches

218 Throughout the rest of his text, Aquinas repeats many of the reasons given in his previous works showing that God is the only one that can create: De substan. separ., c. 10 (Spiazzi, pp. 37-39). For the other texts in this period see: Qdi., 3.3.1, or 3.6 (pp. 44-45); CT, c. 70 (p. 34).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

635

to this particular error. Aquinas, for instance, unlike Bonaventure, attributes it especially and many times to Avicenna, whose position he interprets in an acceptable manner on at least one occasion; at the same time, Aquinas associates this error with other errors not enumerated by Bonaventure. These differences are due, perhaps, to the historical circumstance of the uninterrupted teaching of Aquinas, who had far more occasions than Bonaventure to review his understanding of the errors of the philosophers. Our third problem involves the question of the eternal or temporal condition of the world Aquinas outlines three positions on the problem in his first text dealing with the question. He assigns the first position to the philosophers. Those preceding Aristotle thought that the world was eternal, and in the following ways. Empedocles held the opinion that the whole world, just as the individual things in it, was subject to generation and corruption, so that one world succeeded another. Anaxagoras had the opinion that things were dormant in an infinite time and they began to be moved by a mind, which distinguished one thing from another. Other philosophers thought that things were moved eternally by an unordered motion, but they were reduced to order in time either by chance, as Democritus held, or by a creator, as Plato said. Aristotle, however, and all the philosophers following him, maintained that things existed eternally according to the order they have now; this is the more probable opinion, Aquinas says, though all the opinions of the philosophers are both false and heretical. The second position is held by some theologians, saying that the world, and everything except God, began to-be after it was-not, and that God could not make an eternal world, not because He lacks the power, but because the world is created. They say, therefore, that both Christian faith teaches and human reason proves or demonstrates that the world has begun. The third position is held by other theologians, who say everything except God began to-be, but human reason cannot prove or demonstrate that the world has begun, because this is a truth which is held and believed through divine revelation. Aquinas says that he agrees with the third position, for he does not believe that human reason can demonstrate that the world has begun to-be, just as human reason cannot demonstrate that the Trinity is, even though it is impossible that the Trinity not-be. That reason cannot demonstrate a beginning to the world is shown, Aquinas remarks, by the weakness of the arguments brought forward against the demonstrations by the philosophers holding the eternity of the world. Consequently, if a theologian relies on those arguments as proving the beginning of the world against the positions of the philosophers, he brings derision on Christian faith rather than confirming it. In the judgment of Aquinas, then, human reason can find only probable reasons, and not demonstrative reasons, to show either that the world is eternal or that it has a beginning. This is the significance of Aristotle's words in saying that we have no solutions for some problems, such as the problem whether the world is eternal, and so he himself never intended to demonstrate that the

636

CHAPTER SEVEN

world is eternal. His own mode of procedure makes this clear, for Aristotle always adds, whenever he handles the question, some persuasion either from the opinion of others or from the approbation of their reasons, and that is not the mode in which demonstration proceeds. Now, according to Aquinas, we cannot demonstrate either that the world is eternal or that it has a beginning, and for this reason: as the nature of a man already born and perfect is other than the nature of a man who is imperfect and still in the womb, so the nature of a thing is not the same as it is in perfect being, as it is in its first becoming, and as it comes forth from its cause; therefore, just as he is mistaken who wants to show the conditions of a man who is imperfect and existing in the womb from the conditions of a man already born and perfect, so also they are mistaken who to want to show either the necessity or the impossibility of the beginning of the world from the manner of the becoming of things in a world already perfect. As the world is now, what begins to-be, begins through motion; therefore, what comes tobe must be preceded by a mover in duration and also by nature, but those two conditions are contrary to each other, nor are they necessary for the progress of the world to be from God.219 Thus, in the understanding of Aquinas, human reason cannot demonstrate from the coming to-be of things in the world as we know it that, in the order of time, it either has or has not had a beginning. Human experience shows that the coming to-be of a thing in the world as it is now involves generation, which always requires movement and, therefore, a mover prior to the actual coming to-be of this or of that particular thing. On the other hand, human reason can show that the coming to-be of a thing absolutely does not involve generation or motion, and so a mover does not precede the absolute coming to-be of a thing. Since a demonstration is a rational argument founded on experience and containing a conclusion drawn from a self-evident principle, there cannot be a demonstration of either side of the proposition concerning the beginning of the world, because neither human experience nor human reason can provide a selfevident principle from which to demonstrate in fact whether the world has or has not begun to-be. Consequently, the truth that the world is not eternal, but has come to-be in time, can be known only through divine revelation. On this question, then, Aquinas differs sharply from Bonaventure, who has presented six arguments that, in his understanding of the question, flow from self-evident propositions and demonstrate that it is im219 2 Sent., 1.1.5, Sol. (2.32-34); cf. Aristotle, Tcpica, 1.11 (104bl-17). Aquinas illustrates his point thus: "... sicut narrat Rabbi Moyses, lib. De perplexis Veteris Testamenti, cap. XVIII, de quodam puero, qui mortua matre cum esset paucorum mensium, et nutriuus fuisset in quadam insula solitaria. perveniens ad annos discretions, quaesivit a quodam, an homines essent facti, et quomodo; cui cum exponerent ordinem nativitatis humanae, objecit puer hoc esse impossible, asserens, quia homo nisi respiret et comedat, et superflua expellat, nee per unum diem vivere potest; unde nee in utero matris per novem menses vivere potuit"

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

637

possible for the world to be eternal, and so its duration must have had a beginning. Five of the six arguments presented by Bonaventure, as we have seen, deal with the notion of the infinite. Those five arguments appear in summary fashion among nine demonstrations that Aquinas rejects because of their weak reasons as opposed to the position held by the philosophers on the eternity of the world. Although Aquinas concedes that the arguments in question have true conclusions, nevertheless, refusing to accept the arguments as demonstrations, he replies to them on behalf of the philosophers. 22° The first argument of Bonaventure, for example, shows that, because it is impossible to add to the infinite, the world cannot be eternal since it would have an infinite number of days in the past to which others would have to be added in the future. Replying to this argument, Aquinas says than an addition is made to what is actually finite, which can be more or less, but not to the infinite as a total succession, for the infinite is that to which more is added, or succeeds, only in potency. If it were said, for instance, that some species of numbers exceed the number ten but not one hundred, it could then be said that more species exceed ten than one hundred; so, since infinite species exceed the number one hundred, there is something greater than the infinite. In this way, it is clear that addition and excess concern only something in act or really existing, or something which is actually known. Arguments of such a sort, which are based on sophistic reasons, show sufficiently that the world is not actually infinite, nor must it be so in order to be eternal. 221 As another example, let us take Bonaventure's third argument showing that, if the world is eternal, its revolutions are infinite, and so they could not be where they are now, or today, because it is impossible to traverse the infinite. In reply, Aquinas maintains that the actually infinite is impossible, but an infinite succession is not impossible, for any one member of such a succession is finite. Now the notion of traversing can be understood only as a going from one fixed point to another fixed point, so that whatever determinate time is assigned to the traversing the latter is always a going from that particular time to this finite time, and so we arrive at the present time. It could also be said, Aquinas adds, that past time is infinite on the side of what is anterior and finite on the side of what is posterior. From the side which is finite, however, there is posited on any one side a beginning or an end. Since past time is infinite on the anterior side, that time has an end but no beginning. Consequently, a man who commences to enumerate the days, starting from this present day, cannot

220 "Et quia ad rationes in contrarium factas, quas dixi demonstrationes non esse, inveniuntur philosophorum responsiones; ideo quamvis verum concludant, ad eas etiam respondendum est, secundum quod ipsi philosophi respondent, ne alicui disputant! contra aeternitatem mundi ex improvise occurrant" — Lac. cit, ante ad sc 1 (2.38); cf. sc 1-9 (2.31-32). For the five arguments of Bonaventure see above: pp. 596-99. 221 Loc. cit., ad sc 4 (2.39).

638

CHAPTER SEVEN

arrive at a first day.222 Aquinas responds with arguments of a similar kind to the other three demonstrations presented by Bonaventure. The purpose of Aquinas in his responses is to show that the temporal beginning of the world cannot be demonstrated from reasons based on the notion of infinity.223 Aquinas also brings forward and responds to fourteen arguments from the philosophers on the eternity of the world. The first four arguments, taken from Aristotle, are based on the substance of the heavens.224 The next three arguments follow the nature of time as it is explained respectively by Aristotle, Averroes and Avicenna.225 The three succeeding arguments are founded on motion: two of them come from Aristotle, and the other is from Averroes. In replying to the argument from Averroes on the eternal being of motion, Aquinas draws close to Bonaventure in saying that the divine will is the eternal cause of the universe, which God has brought into being after it was-not; moreover, in willing the world to-be, God acts freely and not necessarily, even though His will is unchanging, and so He wills eternally that the world come to-be in time according to the disposition of His will. Aquinas differs here from Bonaventure, however, in one respect. According to Bonaventure, the divine will acts from divine wisdom by which God knows that eternity does not befit the nature of a creature; for this reason, which Aquinas does not give, Bonaventure maintains that God has willed to produce a temporal and not an eternal world.226 The four remaining arguments from the philosophers are founded on the nature of the mover or agent of the universe. These arguments are taken chiefly from Aristotle and Averroes; but Aquinas also refers to the position of Avicenna on the natural necessity of the first agent to produce only one effect.227 The first and second of those arguments depend on the doctrine of all three philosophers concerning the immobility of the first mover and the immutability of the first agent. In his reply to them, Aquinas again draws close to Bonaventure in pointing out that God is His own action, and that His will does not move from potency into act; therefore, though His action is eternal, God produces His effects without any change in Himself and according to the end that He 222 Loc. cit., ad sc 3 (2.38-39). 223 For his response to Bonaventure's second demonstration sec: Loc. cit., ad sc 5 (2.39-40); for the response to the fourth and fifth demonstrations of Bonaventure see: ad sc 8 & 6 (2.40). Aquinas considers the fifth demonstration, rejecting the possibility of an infinite number of rational souls, to be the strongest of the nine to which he responds; but he does not believe that this particular argument demonstrates the contrary to the position of Averroes, that there is only one intellectual substance and not several human souls remaining after the deaths of men. For the rest of the responses of Aquinas showing the probability of the eternity of the world see: Loc. cit., ad sc 1-2 (2.38); ad sc 7 & 9 (2.40-41). 224 Loc. cit., arg. 1-4 '(2.27-28); ad 1-4 (2.34-35): the fourth argument also depends on Averroes. 225 Loc. cit., arg. 5-7 (2.28); ad 5-7 (2.35). 226 Loc. cit., arg. 8-10 (2.28-29); ad 8-10 (2.35-36): the ninth argument and response are those involving AveiToes. For the demonstrations presented by Bonaventure see above: pp. 597-98. 227 Loc. cit., arg. 11-14 (2.29-30); ad 11-14 (2.37-38).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

639

determines for them by His will, which is the cause of their being. The will of God, in causing the being of things, proceeds from His wisdom, and this wisdom, Aquinas remarks, exceeds every human perception. Unlike Bonaventure, then, Aquinas does not say that a man can grasp the necessary reason why God acts of Himself without beginning to act. To grasp that reason, Bonaventure says, a man must turn away from sensible things toward intelligible things. Aquinas, for his part, does not hold that a man can approach God apart from sense experience.228 Two conclusions may be drawn from the early text of Aquinas, with reference to the position of Bonaventure, on the question of the beginning of the world. Bonaventure holds the position that, though the temporal duration of the world is a truth of divine revelation, human reason can demonstrate that the world must begin to-be in time, because it is contradictory to maintain that the world is eternal and that it has its being from nothing. Aquinas holds the view that the beginning of the world in time can be known with certitude only through divine revelation; as a consequence, he denies that human reason can demonstrate either that the world began to-be in time or that it is eternal. Bonaventure considers the views of the philosophers on the eternity of the world to be erroneous not only according to Christian faith and theology, but also according to human reason and philosophy; his consideration depends on the position that the temporal beginning of the world can be demonstrated, provided that the world is understood to come to-be from nothing. Aquinas considers the opinions of the philosophers to be erroneous from the viewpoint of Christian faith and theology, but not necessarily from the viewpoint of human reason and philosophy; his consideration depends on the view that the temporal beginning of the universe cannot be known with certitude without divine revelation.229 Aquinas handles the problem again on at least three occasions in the second period of his work. On the first occasion, he divides the problem into two questions, of which the first is whether something diverse in essence from God can have always been. Having stated the question, Aquinas proposes nine affirmative arguments and ten contrary arguments.230 His formal response to the question is based on a contrast of the possible with the impossible. The possible can be taken either according to potency, both active and passive, or according to no potency, and thus something is said to be possible in a metaphorical way, as the terms of a statement are possible because they are not opposed to one another. By contrast, impossible things are opposed of themselves to one 228 Cf. Loc. at., ad 11-12 (2.37); see above: pp. 599-600. 229 Giving theological reasons, Aquinas explains how the revelation of the beginning of the world in time offsets the erroneous opinions of the philosophers: 2 Sent., 1.1.6 (2.41-42); cf. ST, !a, 46.3 (1.298b99b). 230 DPD, 3.14, arg. 1-9, sc 1-10 (2.79-80).

640

CHAPTER SEVEN

another, such as an affirmation and a negation about the same subject at once. Hence, it is not impossible to state that some existing thing diverse from God in substance has always been: this is not impossible, because to say that the thing has being from another is not opposed to saying that it always has being, unless the thing proceeds from another through motion, which is not the way that things proceed from God. If the possible is referred to something that can be according to an active potency, God will be seen to have eternally the potency to produce an essence other than Himself. If the possible is referred to something that can be according to a passive potency, then, presupposing the truth of Catholic faith, we cannot say that what proceeds from God and is diverse from Him in essence could always be, because faith teaches that everything except God has not always been.231 The second question is whether the world has always been. Answering this question, Aquinas again reviews the opinions of the philosophers, though with some modifications. He does not refer to Plato's doctrine, and he shows that Aristotle, in positing the eternity of the world, argues from motion and in opposition to the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. The followers of Aristotle, however, do not argue from motion. Rather, considering the emanation of the whole universe from God, they try to show that the world is eternal because it is caused by His will, which acts immutably and not in time. But the proper consideration of the emanation of the universe from God includes time, of which He is the cause; considering the production of the universe in that way, we should ask why God prefixed the measure of time in such time, and not why He produced the world in such time. Now the prefixing of the measure of time depends on the simple will of God, who willed that the world would not always be, but that it would begin to-be at some time. Hence, the answer to the question can be given only from divine revelation: time is extrinsic to the nature of things; therefore, human reason cannot determine the beginning of time, which is always successive.232 Aquinas handles the problem on the next occasion in a different way. He shows that it is not necessary to hold that created things are eternal not only because there is no necessity that they be absolutely with reference to their first cause and final end, but also because they proceed from the divine 231 Loc. cit., Resp. (2.80). Aquinas replies to the nine affirmative arguments to show that their reasons do not demonstrate that something other than God has always been: ad 1-9 (2.80-81). He then replies to the ten negative arguments, none of them referring to Bonaventure, to show that they do not prove conclusively that it is impossible for something except God to have always been: ad sc 1-10 (2.81-82); Aquinas grounds some of his replies, in this instance, on the possibility of something having an infinite duration, or an infinite succession in time, but not an eternal duration which is tola simul, since this is proper to God alone. 232 DPD, 3.17, Resp. (2.93-94). Aquinas sets forth and replies here to thirty arguments showing that the world has an eternal duration: arg. 1-30 (2.90-92); ad 1-30 (2.94-96). He presents only four contrary arguments, of which the first alone, which is based on Scripture, is necessarily conclusive: sc 1-4 (2.9293); ad sc (2.96).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

641

will, which has no necessity to produce an eternal universe.233 Aquinas then considers three general positions held by the philosophers, without naming them, who have tried to demonstrate that the world always was. The eternity of the world is held by some philosophers arguing on the side of God and by others arguing on the side of creatures, either as creatures or according to the way in which they come to-be anew. Giving numerous reasons for each of the three positions, Aquinas brings forward an equal number of contrary reasons indicating that none of those positions is strong enough to move human reason to conclude of necessity that the created universe is eternal. Though the reasons given for the eternity of the world are said by the philosophers to have demonstrative force, those reasons contradict Catholic faith, which teaches that God alone is eternal, for only He has always been, all other things having begun to-be.234 Aquinas closes his consideration of the problem by presenting six reasons from those theologians who seek to prove that the world has not always been. Their reasons have only probability, Aquinas maintains once again, and so the truth of Catholic faith cannot be supported solidly by them. Consequently, following his earlier procedure, Aquinas gives contrary reasons taken from the philosophers. For his own part, Aquinas holds that the errors of the philosophers can be overcome only by the truth of Catholic faith.235 On the third occasion of handling the problem, Aquinas asks whether the created universe has begun to-be, or whether it is eternal; thereafter, he asks whether the truth that the world has begun to-be is an article of faith, or whether it can be demonstrated by reason. In his answer to the first question, Aquinas reaffirms his position that God alone is necessarily eternal, and that His will is the cause of created things; since God has no necessity, speaking absolutely, to cause any creature, there is no necessity for the world to-be eternally, and so reason cannot demonstrate that the world has always been. Although Aristotle gives many reasons showing that the world is eternal, his reasons are not demonstrative, considered absolutely, but only in a relative way, namely, according as they are given to contradict the reasons of his predecessors, who said that the world has begun, and thus he shows that their reasons are impossible to sustain.236 233 SCG, 2.31 (2.145-46). 234 SCG, 2.32-37 (2.146-53). The greater number of the reasons given here by Aquinas, both for and against an eternal universe, resemble those in his previous texts. 235 SCG, 2.38 (2.153-54). Reasons three to six, as given by Aquinas, correspond to four of Bonaventure's demonstrations depending on the notion of the infinite: the contrary reasons offered here by Aquinas are basically the same as those in his early text; however, he handles at greater length Bonaventure's demonstration opposing the possibility of an infinite number of rational souls in the past, an argument said by Aquinas to be the more difficult to counterbalance. 236 ST, la, 46.1, Resp. (1.294ab); cf. arg. 1-10, ad 1-10: these arguments and replies have appeared, in one way or another, in the previous texts of Aquinas. Note the repetition of his early remarks about Aristotle's persuasive mode of procedure: "Secundo, quia ubicumque de hac materia loquitur, inducit testimonia antiquorum, quod non est demonstratoris, sed probabiliter persuadentis. Tertio, quia expresse

642

CHAPTER SEVEN

Answering the other question, Aquinas restates his position that we can know only through Christian faith, or divine revelation, that the world has not always been, or that it has begun to-be. Consequently, no one can demonstrate this truth, and for two reasons. First, because demonstration proceeds from the essence or essential properties of a thing, and because they are withdrawn from the here and now, we cannot proceed demonstratively to the conclusion that man, or any other species, has not always been. Secondly, we can investigate the divine will only with regard to those things that God wills necessarily and absolutely; but He does not act that way in regard to creatures. Hence, we know only through revelation, which supports faith, that the world has begun to-be; so we ought not to bring derision on our faith by presuming to demonstrate from non-necessary reasons that the world had a beginning.237 On this occasion, Aquinas takes account of eight arguments demonstrating that the world has begun; two of those arguments are based on the notion of the infinite, supporting demonstrations by Bonaventure. The one argument, resting on the impossibility of traversing the infinite, shows that, if the world is eternal, an infinite number of days has already preceded the present day, and thus the world could not have arrived at this day. Replying to the argument, Aquinas says that it proceeds as though there were infinite media between the two given extremes; stating his own position, he reiterates that the notion of traversing always implies a passage from one terminus to another, so that, no matter how many days are assigned to the past, only a finite period can be traversed in passing from one given point to another.238 The other argument shows the impossibility of an eternal world, because it would involve an actually infinite number of rational souls. Aquinas now considers this argument to be an evasion of the problem posed by those who hold the eternity of the world. They maintain either that the number of rational souls is actually though accidentally infinite, or that they are corrupted with their bodies, or that one only intellectual substance remains after the deaths of men, or that human souls sometime after death enter other bodies. Though Aquinas rejects those opinions as erroneous, he believes that it is possible to maintain that some creature can be eternal, such as an angel but not a man, and so the argument to the contrary does not conclude universally that no creature can have been from eternity.239 It is very evident that, during the second period of his work, Aquinas

dicit in I libro Toft., quod quaedam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habernus, ut 'utrum mundus sit aeternum1." — Loc. cit, Resp. in finem (1.294b). For a detailed exposition by Aquinas at this time of Aristotle's position on the problem see: In Physic., 8.1, lect. 2, "Si motus non semper fuit..." (Spiazzi, nn. 976-990, pp. 506-11). 237 57", la, 46.2, Resp. (2.297a). 238 Loc. cit., arg. 5 (1.296b); ad 6 (1.298a). 239 Loc. cit., arg. 8 (1.296b) ad 8 (1.298ab). Cf. SCG, 2.38 "Quod autem ... durationis daret" (2.154, nn. 1148-49).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

643

consolidates his position regarding the temporal beginning of the universe as a truth knowable solely by faith or revelation. At the same time, he develops the reasons supporting his position, while maintaining again and again that it is impossible for natural reason to demonstrate conclusively either that the world is eternal or that it has begun to-be. Although he does not always counter Bonaventure's demonstrations from infinity, nonetheless, disassociating the notion of infinity from the problem of the eternity of the world, Aquinas refuses to accept the validity of Bonaventure's arguments as demonstrations or proofs compelling natural reason to conclude that the world must have begun to-be. In particular, Aquinas maintains that it is possible to hold that an angel, but not a man, could be eternal. This is possible, to Aquinas, because an angel is a spiritual substance, and so it does not need matter in order to-be, whereas a man, though he has a spiritual soul, cannot be without a body. Since time is extrinsic to the nature of things, moreover, the philosophers could also hold that some corporeal substances at least, such as the celestial bodies, have always been. But Bonaventure cannot admit either of those two possibilities, and for one and the same reason. According to his philosophical principles, every created substance, whether spiritual or corporeal, is constituted by the union of a form and matter from which it receives respectively being and existing, so that a created substance, having being after not-being, is necessarily conditioned by the existing of its matter, and thus the substance is subject intrinsically to time, which is taken as the measure of its coming forth into being from non-being. From Bonaventure's point of view, therefore, it is necessary to conclude that no creature can be eternal, because every creature has being which is conditioned intrinsically by time, not as the measure of motion, but as the measure of created existence. Hence, following his own philosophical principles, Bonaventure can say with conviction, even in his later writings, what Aquinas has thus far refused to say, namely, that the philosophers, including Aristotle, have erred on rational grounds in maintaining that the world is eternal, or that it has riot come to-be in time. Aquinas comes back to the question of the eternity of the world several times in the third period of his work. He deals with the question seven times at Paris from 1269 to 1271, and four more times from 1271 to 1273 during his stay at Naples. His first and second texts on the question in Paris repeat briefly what he has already said in some of his former texts.240 His third text has to do specifically with the opinion that the being of the separate or spiritual substances is not caused by God. Aquinas sketches three different modes of that opinion, which is based on the supposition that what comes to-be must have a material principle; since the spiritual substances are pure and simple forms, they do not come to-be, for it is im240 Qdl., 3.14.2, or 3.31 (pp. 68-69); 12.6.1, or 12.7 (p. 227).

644

CHAFFER SEVEN

possible that something come to-be from nothing. It can also be shown from Plato and Aristotle that spiritual substances do not begin to-be, and so they must be everlasting, as Plato and Aristotle have thought. In the view of Aquinas, however, the opinion that spiritual substances do not come to-be is founded on the false premise that the way in which material substances come to-be is the only way that a substance can come to-be. Reviewing the positions of the philosophers once again, Aquinas shows why the early philosophers did not arrive at a knowledge of immaterial or spiritual beings, as Plato and Aristotle did, so that those two philosophers, seeking the first principle of things, attributed the being of the universe to a first being. Then, drawing together many points from his previous texts, Aquinas explains the necessity to posit a universal cause of the being of all things; thereafter, relying on his explanation, he points out that the fundamental reason for the mistakes of the philosophers consists in their assuming as a principle that something could not come to-be absolutely from nothing. With regard to the spiritual substances in particular, the philosophers, knowing that those beings have not come to-be from motion or change, thought that they have always been, because, though they emanate from the first principle, they have their being as effects existing simultaneously with their cause, which cannot change, and so it produces them eternally, or without the succession of before and after. It is not to be thought, therefore, Aquinas says, that Plato and Aristotle failed to posit a cause of the being of the universe, because they posited that the celestial bodies have always been. Although, in holding that some substances are eternal, Plato and Aristotle have maintained what is contrary to Catholic faith, even so, they have not said anything contrary to our faith with respect to the cause of the being of such substances. Aquinas closes this particular text by showing, as in his previous texts, why it is not necessary to conclude that any created substance is eternal, even though it originates without motion and from an immobile principle.241 The last text of Aquinas in this series is his polemical treatise on the eternity of the world, written at Paris in 1271. Noting that some philosophers, falling into error, posited the world as eternal, Aquinas opens the treatise in the following way: be it supposed, as Catholic faith teaches, that the world 241 De substan. separ., c. 9 (Spiazzi, pp. 35-37). The fourth and fifth texts of Aquinas at Paris contain his expositions of Aristotle's reasons for the eternity of motion, the everlasting duration of time and the number of separate substances, reasons said by Aquinas to be only probable, whereas Aristotle's reasons for the eternity, immateriality and immobility of the first substance, which is pure act, are demonstrative and lead to necessary conclusions, because the first substance is truly God: In Metaphysic., 12.5, lect. 5 (Spiazzi, pp. 582-84); 12.8, lect. 10 "Concludit ex numero ..." (Spiazzi, nn. 2586-2599, pp. 603-04). In his sixth text, correcting heretical consequences of a proposition in the Liber de causis, Aquinas shows that God produces time together with a thing produced in time: God is the sole substance which is both eternal and capable of acting in time, without movement or change; so, on producing the world, God also produces the being of motion and time, for He understands and wills eternally that the world along with motion and time come to-be after not-being. Cf. Super Liber de fousts, propos. 11 (Saffrey, pp. 72-77).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

645

is not eternal, but has a beginning of duration, as Sacred Scripture testifies infallibly, there is a doubt raised by some whether the world could have always been. To resolve the doubt, Aquinas proposes to show in what ways he agrees with and differs from his opponents, who say that the world could not be eternal. Now it is an abominable error in both faith and philosophy, Aquinas begins, to think that there could be something eternal along with God, but not made by Him. The question is, then, whether it is possible for God to cause the whole of something which is eternal. Everyone agrees that God, having an infinite power, can make something which is eternal. The point at issue, therefore, is whether it is possible for something eternal to come to-be. This can be said to be impossible, in the first place, because a passive potency is lacking. Responding to that, Aquinas argues as follows: an angel could not come to-be before it was made, because no passive potency comes before the angel's being, for an angel is not made from preceding matter; nevertheless, God could have made an angel, and He could have made it come to-be, since He has made the angel, and it has come to-be. Understanding the question that way, Aquinas says that it must be granted absolutely, according to Catholic faith, that God could not cause a thing to-be always, because, if He could, there would have to be eternally a passive potency, and this is contrary to faith. It does not follow, nonetheless, that God could not cause some being which has always been made. It can be said, in the second place, that it is impossible for something eternal to come to-be, because the contrary involves contradictory modes of understanding, as an affirmation and a negation cannot be true at once of the same thing, even though some say that God could bring this about, while others say that He could not. In the judgment of Aquinas, it is evident that God cannot bring this about, because it would be self-contradictory to say, for example, that God could make the past not to have been. Though Aquinas rejects as false the opinion that God could do that, even so, he does not consider the opinion to be contrary to faith. Likewise, he does not think it contrary to faith to say that something can be made by God, so that He causes it to-be always. If this contains contradictory modes of understanding, it is false; however, if it is not selfcontradictory, the statement is not only not false, but also impossible to be otherwise, and so it would be an error to say that it can be otherwise. Consequently, it is derogatory to the divine omnipotence, which exceeds every created power and understanding, to say that we can understand in creatures something which cannot have its origin from God.242 The whole question consists in this, Aquinas goes on, whether or not it is self-contradictory to say that a thing, according to its whole substance, is created by God and that its duration has no beginning. The statement can be self-contradictory either because an agent must precede by duration the being that it causes, or because non-being must precede being by duration, for 242 De aetern. mumti, "... nihil sunt." (Spiazzi, nn. 295-97, pp. 105-06).

646

CHAPTER SEVEN

it is thus that a thing created by God is made from nothing. Aquinas brings forward four arguments showing that it is not necessary for God, as an agent, to precede by duration the being that He causes. The first argument rests on the premise that God produces His effect suddenly and not through motion, which demands an agent prior by duration to its effect. The second argument shows that, because God produces the whole substance of a thing, He does not draw it from the potency of matter, and so He can cause a thing to-be at whatever time the thing is. The third argument, flowing from the principle that God is always complete as an agent, indicates how it is possible, on positing His causation, to posit His effect as everlasting and not necessarily preceded by its cause according to duration. The fouth argument points out how God, as an agent acting by His will, can cause a thing to come to-be as He wills it, and He can will that it never was-not. Aquinas presents next two arguments showing that it is not necessary for non-being to precede being by duration. His first argument, in this regard, is based on a text from Anselm to the effect that a thing coming to-be from nothing is not ordered to nothing as to something from which the thing must first be made and afterward be something.243 In his second argument, Aquinas supposes that there is an order of the thing to nothing, so that, to be made from nothing, a creature is made after nothing, the term after implying order absolutely. Considering this, Aquinas says that, for a creature to-be after nothing, it is not necessary that, by priority of duration, there be nothing and afterward something; it is sufficient that, by priority of nature, there be nothing rather than a being. Now, in any thing, that is prior which belongs naturally to the thing in itself rather than that which the thing has solely from another; but a creature has being only from another: therefore, left to itself, a creature, considered in itself, is nothing, and thus nothing rather than being is naturally prior in the thing itself. This does not mean, however, either that nothing and a being must be simultaneous, because nothing did not precede the being by duration, or that, if a creature has always been, nothing is in some time; rather, it means that the nature of a created being is such that, if it were left to itself, it would be nothing. It is obvious, therefore, Aquinas concludes, that there is no contradiction in saying that God has made something and that it never was-not. If there is a contradiction, it is a wonder how Augustine has not seen it, because such a contradiction would be the most efficacious way to disprove the eternity of the world, which Augustine opposed in so many ways that Aquinas asks: "Whence has he overlooked this way entirely?"244 243 St. Anselm, Mono/., 8.1 (PL 158.156C); see also in St. Thomas: DPD, 3.14, ad 7 (2.81). 244 De aetern, mundi, "In hoc ... oranino praetermittit?" (Spiazzi, nn. 298-306, pp. 106-07). Aquinas cites a number of texts from Augustine's De citiit. Dei (lib. 10-12) to support the view that it is not contradictory to say that God can cause a thing to-be, which is eternal; this view is also upheld by the philosophers who thought that the world was eternal, and yet they said that it was made by God Following that, Aquinas indicates how the position of his opponents depends on a weak foundation supported by

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

647

Aquinas draws his treatise to a close with the observation that his opponents rely on reasons known to the philosophers, who have dismissed them. The more difficult of those reasons is that, if the world is eternal, there must be an infinite number of human souls. This reason, however, is beside the point. God could have made the world without men and their souls, or God could have made a man when He did, even if the whole of the rest of the world had been from eternity, and thus there would not be an infinite number of human souls surviving their bodies. But it has not yet been demonstrated that God cannot produce an actually infinite number of rational souls. With regard to the other reasons of his opponents, Aquinas says that he passes over them, because he has replied to them elsewhere, and because some of them are so weak that their very weakness makes the contrary seem more probable.245 In the above texts, Aquinas insists again and very strongly that it is contrary to Catholic faith, but not necessarily to human reason, to say that the created universe is eternal. Though all the philosophers, assuming that a thing could not come to-be entirely from nothing, have held what is contrary to faith in maintaining the eternity of the world, nevertheless, the early philosophers erred in philosophy only by their failure to see that all things, including material substances, must come to-be through the action of one first principle, which is spiritual in nature, an error that Aquinas refuses to attribute to Plato and to Aristotle. In his polemical treatise, Aquinas, holding firmly to the truth of faith and revelation, takes and defends the position that God could create the world from nothing, and yet the world could be eternal, or without a beginning of duration. The content of the arguments presented by Aquinas in defending his position shows that Bonaventure is not among those opposing him directly. Bonaventure's position on the question is included only indirectly, i.e. to the extent that Aquinas continues to hold that human reason alone is not able to resolve the problem of the duration of the world. The argument of Aquinas regarding the creation of an angel does not refer directly to Bonaventure, who holds the position that spiritual matter, unlike corporeal matter, is created in perfect being received at once from a proper form that cannot be exchanged for another form, even of a spiritual nature. Although Bonaventure does not say explicitly that it is self-contradictory to maintain that the world is eternal and that it comes to-be, he implies as much, at least indirectly, in his demonstration of the necessity for the world to begin in time, because it is impossible for a thing having being after not-being to be eternal.2*6 Hence, Bonaventure's doctrine is not the direct concern of the four arguments of such authorities as John Damascene and Hugh of St. Victor, whose opinions Aquinas counterbalances with texts from Boethius and Augustine: Op. cit., "Qjjinunmo innuere ... lib. Canfessionum." (Spiazzi, nn. 306-09, pp. 107-08). 245 Op. cit., "Aduuntur etiam ..." (Spiazzi, nn. 310-11, p. 108). 246 See above: p. 599 (n. 146).

648

CHAPTER SEVEN

Aquinas, dealing with the proposition that an agent must precede by duration the being that it causes. In fact, Bonaventure, no less than Aquinas, teaches that God produces His effects suddenly, not through motion, that He produces the whole substance of a thing, including its matter, and that He causes it to-be whensoever He wills it to-be. In other words, holding some principles in common with Bonaventure, Aquinas is not arguing directly against his position that the world cannot be eternal, because, originating from nothing, its being comes totally from God. Moreover, Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in saying that God, on producing the world from nothing, produced it with time, since He is the cause of every creature, including time. Thus, it is not against Bonaventure's position that Aquinas proceeds directly in his two arguments concerning the order of the creature to nothing as to something from which the creature is made to-be. While Bonaventure maintains that a thing, to be produced from nothing, must have being after not-being, at the same time, he also insists that this does not mean that the nothing is essentially mutable, or the subject from which the thing is made, but that the production by which something is made a being, which before was not a being, necessarily posits a beginning and a mutation.247 Consequently, the arguments of Aquinas are not directed immediately against Bonaventure, because Aquinas is opposing the depicting of nothing as an imaginary something, having a duration, and to which the created being is ordered as to that from which it comes to be something which it was not before. The opponents of Aquinas seem to be, rather, theologians in Paris employing Bonaventure's principles in a way going beyond his own use of them. This is clear from the final argument of Aquinas against the probable reason employed by his opponents (not opponent) regarding the impossibility of the existence of an infinite number of rational souls, a reason that Aquinas, transcending his previous considerations of it, dismisses as irrelevant.248 It would be a mistake, however, to minimize the wide differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the question of the eternity of the world. Bonaventure is convinced that human reason can demonstrate that the world must begin to-be in time. This conviction is a consequence of his position that a creature, having being after not-being, is both essentially con-

247 Cf. DMT, 62, ad 10 (5.106); text cited above: n. 38, p. 153. 248 Arguing solely according to reason and philosophy, Bonaventure does not rely on any theological authorities, particularly those cited by Aquinas (see above: n. 244); the effort of Aquinas to show that Augustine sees no contradiction in holding that an eternal world could come to-be from nothing would indicate that the opponents of Aquinas sought support for their position in Augustine, something that Bonaventure has not done. It is quite likely that those opponents are the theologians, particularly John Pecham, who opposed at Easter in 1270 the position of Aquinas on the unity of substantial form in man. It is very unlikely that Aquinas had Bonaventure himself in mind, because, apart from a short visit in October-November of 1270, Bonaventure was absent entirely from Paris between the winter of 1269 and the spring of 1273. See: J. G. Bougerol, Introd. s. Bonav., pp. 244-45.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

649

tingent and intrinsically dependent on the Creator; therefore, its duration in being is measured intrinsically by a substantial principle of existing, or matter, by which every created being stands-outside nothing. Aquinas is no less convinced that human reason cannot demonstrate either that the world has begun in time or that it is eternal, even though it comes to-be from nothing. His conviction follows the position that a creature, though it has being from nothing, is not essentially contingent nor has it an intrinsic measure of duration; rather, depending extrinsically on the Creator, a created being has an intrinsic necessity in being and an extrinsic measure of duration, thus making it impossible for human reason to determine demonstratively whether the created universe is eternal or has come to-be in time.249 The next two errors found by Bonaventure in the philosophers have to do respectively with the origin and destiny of rational souls, and with their unity or diversity in number, both questions involving the eternal beatitude of individual men. The first error is found by Bonaventure in Plato and his followers, particularly Macrobius. Considering this error, Aquinas attributes it to both Plato and the Pythagoreans. Plato has the opinion that human souls were made outside bodies from the beginning, an error causing him to say that a human soul is united accidentally to a body, and so a man is a soul clothed with a body. As a consequence, the Pythagoreans hold that a human soul passes from one body to another. Those positions have been rejected by Aristotle and Avicenna. Aristotle shows that a human soul gives substantial and specific being to a human body, so that, giving being essentially to one body, a human soul cannot also perfect another body. Avicenna indicates that there are several souls of the same species only because they are diversified by the matter in which they are; so, if human souls were created before any body, they would have to be either diverse in species, because forms without matter are diverse in species, or one only soul in number, an error treated separately by Aquinas. For his own part, Aquinas rejects the opinion under consideration in much the same way as Bonaventure: following Aristotle's doctrine, Aquinas insists that a proper act is in a proper potency; therefore, a rational soul cannot be before the generation of a human body, and thus the soul is only in that body of which it is the proper act.250 249 Of the four texts written by Aquinas during his stay at Naples, 1271-1273, the first and second texts explain Aristotle's probable reasons, opposing the reasons of other philosophers, for the ingenerate and eternal nature of the celestial bodies: In De caeto, 1.3, lect 6 (Spiazzi, pp. 28-32), and 1.12, lect. 29 (Spiazzi, pp. 134-39); the third text explains the view of Aristotle, supposing motion and the world to be eternal, that the material cause of generation and corruption is everlasting: In De gener. et corrupt., c. 3, lect 7 (Spiazzi, pp. 346-48). The fourth text shows why it is not necessary to posit either that motion is eternal or that matter must precede the production of the universe; this text, in two parts, presents in a simple and straightforward manner the essential points set out in the many other texts that we have seen of Aquinas on the problem of the eternity of the created universe: CT, cc. 98-99 (pp. 47-49). 250 2 Sent., 17.2.2, sc 1-2, Sol. (2.431-32); cf. ad 4 (2.433). Plato and the Pythagoreans erred con-

650

CHAPTER SEVEN

The next text of Aquinas on this particular question opposes the erroneous opinion, attributed here to Plato and Macrobius, that all souls were made at once outside any body. Aquinas, adding the authority of Boethius to that of Aristotle and Avicenna, rejects the opinion for reasons similar to those in his previous text; however, also opposing Origen's opinion, Aquinas remarks that, if God unites rational souls to bodies in punishment for sin, the substantial union of soul and body in man would be neither natural nor according to God's primary intention in creating man, both of which are contrary to the divine goodness.251 In his subsquent text on the problem, Aquinas handles it in two parts. He indicates, in the first part, why Plato, his followers, and Origen hold both that human souls are made before any bodies and that those souls pass from one body to another, opinions found also among the Manicheans. That done, using copious arguments similar to his former ones, Aquinas shows that those opinions are contrary to the truth of the natural and essential union of soul and body in man as instituted by God. In the second part, Aquinas considers the basic assumption of the erroneous opinion that rational souls pre-existed human bodies, namely, that the souls of men are eternal. He presents four reasons showing that the contrary is true. In concluding, he observes that Aristotle has not said that the human intellect is eternal, but that it is perpetual, a condition belonging to things that will always be, even though they have not always been. Hence, in excepting the intellective soul from the condition of other natural forms, Aristotle has not said that this soul existed before matter, as Plato said about the ideas. Although Aristotle might have said some such thing about the intellective soul, he has said that it remains after the death of the body.252 Though Aquinas and Bonaventure deal with the above error in ways notably different, even so, the two theologians come together in rejecting it, particularly as contrary to the Aristotelean principle that a proper act must have a proper potency, thus making it impossible for a rational soul to per-

cerning human beatitude, because they held that human souls will continue to pass in eternity from one body to another 2 Sent., 19.1.1, Sol. "Secunda fuit... hujus corporis." (2.482); cf. SCG, 2.81 "Alii autem ... infra agitur." (2.234, n. 1622, d). Aquinas rejects the opinion of Avicenna that rational souls are created immediately by a separate substance: 2 Sent., 18.2.2 (2.462-66); cf. De substan. separ., c. 10 (Spiazzi. pp. 37-38). 251 DPD, 3.10, Resp. (2.70-71); cf. 3.9, Resp. (2.65-66). With regard to Macrobius and other Platonists, Aquinas says that they posited the rational soul as complete in itself, and so they thought that, because it is immortal and not generated, it is united to another body after the death of one body, a position taken to avoid an infinite number of souls: Loc. cit., arg. 5 (2.69) ad 5 (2.71). 252 SCG, 2.83-84 (2.239-46); cf. Aristotle, Mttaph., 12.2 (1070a9-30). In his final text on the problem, Aquinas refers explicitly only to Origen- In this text, Aquinas considers at some length the opinion of Augustine, considered briefly in previous texts, that Adam's soul was created with the angels and before his body, which was produced on the sixth day, an opinion not asserted as the truth by Augustine, but as not contradicting Sacred Scripture; however, not following Augustine on this point, Aquinas maintains that Adam's soul was created together with his body: ST, la, 90.4 (1.561a-62b); 118.3 (1.703b-04b).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

651

feet any body other than the one in which it comes to-be. We find a similar difference and concurrence in the ways that Bonaventure and Aquinas deal with the next error of the philosophers, an error regarding the question whether intellective souls are one or diverse in number. Handling the question for the first time, Aquinas distinguishes two sorts of opinion about it among the philosophers. The one sort is held by those who say that there is only one intellect, which is the divine intellect. The other sort is held by the philosophers who posit in various ways that there is but one intellect among all men. Setting aside the first sort, Aquinas prepares the way for his consideration of the second by distinguishing between a possible intellect, which is in potency to receiving all intelligible forms, and an agent intellect, which makes those forms to be actually understood, and a formal or habitual intellect, which is the possible intellect as perfected by the intelligible forms enabling it to operate.253 Having made those distinctions, Aquinas says thai almost all the philosophers after Aristotle concur in holding that the agent and possible intellects differ in substance. They also hold that the agent intellect, which is the last of the intelligences, is separate from human souls, and so it is related to the possible intellect, by which men understand, as the other intelligent substances are related to the souls of the celestial spheres. Because those opinions, destroying the true beatitude of men, are contrary to Christian faith, some theologians, seeking to correct the philosophers while following them in part, have said that God himself is the agent intellect. With regard to the possible intellect, Aquinas finds a great diversity among the philosophers after Aristotle. Some say that each man has a possible intellect, but others say that it is one in all men. The first of those two positions is held in three different ways. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the possible intellect is a bodily power preparing a man to receive an impression of the agent intellect, a view contrary to the intention of Aristotle, who teaches that the possible intellect, receiving intelligible species, cannot be a bodily power. According to Avempace, the possible intellect is the power of imagination as it holds the forms that have been actually understood, a view said by Aquinas to be impossible, because, as Aristotle also teaches, the phantasms in the imagination move the possible intellect into act, and so it cannot move and be moved at once with respect to the same forms. These two ways, reducing the possible intellect to a bodily power, entail the generation and corruption of human intellects, so

253 2 Sent., 17.2.1, Sol. "... speciem coloris." (2.422). The opinion set aside by Aquinas is the one, in the same context, considered by Bonaventure, who attributes it to Pythagoras and Varro (see above: pp. 606-07). In three later texts, Aquinas takes account of this opinion, which posits die human soul to be part of the divine substance, an opinion that he attributes to Varro and the Manicheans. Concurring with Bonaventure, though offering more reasons of the same kind, Aquinas rejects the opinion as wholly erroneous, and as the contrary to Catholic faith. See the following: SCG, 2.85 (2.246-47); 57", la, 90.1 (1.558b-59b); CT, c. 94 (p. 46).

652

CHAPTER SEVEN

that the one agent intellect would be the only intellect surviving the deaths of men, and this is erroneous, because it destroys the merits of eternal life achieved through Christian faith. The third way is taken by Avicenna, who attributes to each man a possible intellect which is not a power of his body, but is rooted in his rational soul, thus beginning with his body and surviving its death. This view is not contrary to Catholic faith, even though Avicenna has erred with other philosophers in positing one agent intellect for all men.254 The second position, that the possible intellect is one in all men, is held by Averroes, who takes it by correcting an opinion that he imposes on Themistius and Theophrastus. They are said by Averroes to posit in all men a formal or habitual intellect, which is one and eternal. This intellect is composed of an agent intellect and a possible intellect: the one is the form of the other, so that, operating habitually in men, the agent intellect is the habitual power through which men understand according as they abstract species from phantasms. Thus, drawing on the doctrine of Aristotle, this opinion holds that the possible intellect is one in all men because it is not a bodily power, but a substance distinct from every man, and so it is eternal. Since the agent intellect is likewise eternal, then, because the effect of an eternal agent and recipient cannot be generated or corrupted, the species of intellectual knowledge are also eternal. Consequently, it is not because new intellectual species come to-be that the habitual intellect sometimes understands and sometimes does not; rather, this comes about from the conjunction of the agent intellect with the possible intellect through which the agent intellect operates in men. If this opinion were true, Averroes reasons, the forms that men understand in natural things would be eternally without matter, and they would be outside human souls; therefore, as intellectual species, they would not be the form of the possible intellect, for that form is said to be the agent intellect. Furthermore, if the opinion were true, one man would not differ from any other man in perfection with respect to either their possible intellect or their habitual intellect, and thus there would be one being and one operation for all men, which is impossible. Giving his own opinion, then, Averroes posits that, as the agent intellect is eternal, so is the possible intellect, and it is one in all men. Moreover, intellectual species are not eternal, nor is the agent intellect the form of the possible intellect, which is formed by species abstracted from phantasms, so that the habitual intellect is constituted from those species and from the possible intellect. In that way, Averroes tries to avoid all the

254 2 Sent., 17.2.1, Sol. "His ergo ... dictum est." (2.422-24). Since Bonaventure does not treat in any special way the error of one agent intellect for all men, we shall not consider the many texts of Aquinas on this problem. For those texts see: 1) 2 Sent., 28.1.5 (2.730-33). 2) SCG, 2.76-78 (2.221-30); DSpC, a. 10 (2.405-11); DA, aa. 4-5 (2.294-300); ST, la, 79.4-5 (1.483a-85b). 3) In De anima, 3.5 "Occasione autem ... substantiae separatee." (Pirotta, nn. 734-36, p. 241); CT, c. 86 (pp. 41-42).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

653

impossibilities resulting from the position of Themistius. To consolidate his own view, Averroes shows that, if the agent and possible intellects are eternal, it is not necessary for intellectual species also to be eternal. Since those species are subject to the imagination, they are not eternal, for they have material being in phantasms; but intellectual species are also subject to the possible intellect, and thus, having spiritual being, they cannot be generated or corrupted. Aquinas dismisses this view as irrelevant: the species in the imagination and in the possible intellect are numerically different, so that, having a different subject, those in the imagination can be generated and corrupted; intellectual species may be said to be eternal absolutely with respect to the possible intellect, but it would still follow that eternal species would not be abstracted from phantasms and, nevertheless, Aristotle teaches explicitly that the possible intellect has species that are abstracted from phantasms. Averroes consolidates his position also by showing that it avoids the impossibility of all men having one being and one operation. He says that an intellectual species is related to the possible intellect as form is related to matter, thus constituting one thing; the conjunction of the one with the other takes place in men through their phantasms, so that the one intellectual species is diversified by the diversity of phantasms. It is in this way that men have diverse being, and one man knows what another does not, because the one intellectual species is conjoined to this man but not to that man, and yet the primary conceptions of understanding are conjoined to the phantasms of every man. Averroes concludes from this that the human intellect is incorruptible in regard to the possible intellect, which contains intellectual species eternally, but it is corruptible in regard to the diverse phantasms in men, and so there is no diversity of rational souls after the corruption of human bodies. This particular view of Averroes is rejected as nonsense by Aquinas, who opposes it as contrary explicitly to the doctrine of Aristotle. In the first place, a species in the possible intellect is numerically different from a phantasm in the imagination, for the one is an intelligible likeness of the other; therefore, the possible intellect could not be conjoined through one species to different imaginations, and so it would be impossible for diverse men to have any understanding. Secondly, the conjunction of the possible intellect with an intellectual species belongs to the second and not to the first perfection of a man: therefore, it is impossible for a man by means of such a conjunction to acquire his first perfection, which is substantial being; likewise, since a man is said by Averroes to have an intellect from a conjunction of that sort, no man would be in the species man because of his intellect, for the intellectual species establishing the conjunction is between the two extremes, thus joining the possible intellect and the imagination in an accidental manner. Thirdly, an operation flows from a potency and from an object: if the possible intellect is conjoined to men only because of a species subject to their imaginations, it follows that this particular man does

654

CHAPTER SEVEN

not understand, but the separate intellect understands what the man imagines, which is ridiculous.255 Aquinas brings his protracted consideration of the question to a close by presenting his own position on it at some length. He says, in brief, that he accepts the view of Avicenna, that a possible intellect begins to-be in the body of each man and survives the death of his body; however, Aquinas adds over and above this, that each man also has his own agent intellect, which is distinct from his possible intellect, the latter receiving intelligible species and the former making them to be actually understood by abstracting them from phantasms in his imagination.256 The analysis by Aquinas of the position of Averroes that there is one only possible intellect, or intellective substance, in all men differs from Bonaventure's analysis chiefly in the historical grounds for that position. Bonaventure considers the position simply as an imposition by Averroes on Aristotle, but Aquinas takes a wider perspective, considering the position as a correction by Averroes of an opinion that he imposes on both Themistius and Theophrastus as commentators on Aristotle. The different approaches of Bonaventure and Aquinas to the problem account for the particular points that they stress in analyzing the position of Averroes, whose opinion they reject in common as contrary to Christian faith and the truth of Aristotle's doctrine, especially the truth of a proper act in a proper potency, thus necessitating a proper intellective soul in each human body. Aquinas, in his approach to Averroes, stresses the two following points: the eternal and incorruptible nature of intellectual species, and their relations to the possible intellect and the imagination. Bonaventure, for his part, stresses the point in Averroes that a separate substance cannot be idle, a principle taken from Aristotle, but from which Averroes draws the conclusion that there cannot be an intellective soul in each man, because, if there were, every intellective soul would be idle, having no body to move, after the death of the man.257 Bonaventure also stresses this point: the human intellect is corrupted, a point misrepresented by Averroes from Aristotle, who says only that the soul loses some understanding because of an injury to a sense organ. Apart from those particular differences, Aquinas and Bonaventure oppose the position of Averroes on similar grounds. With regard to faith, they reject the position as destroying the truth of eternal

255 2 Sent., 17.2,1, Sol. "Eorum autem ... est adducere." (2.424-27), The opinion that the agent intellect is one and separate from all men, as the similar opinion regarding the possible intellect, is understood by Aquinas to be contrary to the substantial incorruption of rational souls and the true beatitude of men: 2 Sent., 19.1.1, Sol. "Tertio positio ..." (2.482-83); cf. ad 2-4 (2.483-84). 256 2 Sent., 17.2.1, Sol. "Et ideo ..." (2.427-28). 257 Note how Aquinas handles the position of the philosophers on the celestial movers: "Praeterea, anima est forma corporis et motor. Sed in corporibus caelestibus, secundum positionem philosophorum, diversis corporibus assignantur diversi motores. Ergo videtur quod multo fortius in diversis hominibus sint diversae animae." — Loc. cit., sc 3 (2.422).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

655

beatitude. With regard to reason and experience, they reject, in their individual ways, the position as contrary to the truth of the intellective nature of men: it involves the impossible opinion that the one intellective substance constitutes the diverse being and perfection of men, thus positing the same intellective substance, which is eternal, as the simultaneous cause of ignorance and knowledge, of virtue and vice in men, a position which is contradictory.25B The subsequent analyses of the problem by Aquinas, in the second period of his teaching, stress the same points as the ones in his first text. In those analyses, however, he opposes the position of Averroes more directly as a misrepresentation of Aristotle's doctrine on the nature of the possible intellect. Defending that doctrine, Aquinas produces numerous arguments, in addition to his previous arguments, demonstrating the necessity to posit a possible intellect in the soul of each man in order that the act of understanding and the habitus of science be attributed to him as an individual man, or a human person.259 We have seen Bonaventure, in his final work, reviewing the errors of the philosophers. In the course of his review, he excuses Aristotle on philosophical grounds for his mistakes, excepting his error on the exemplar causality of God. This error, flowing from a repudiation of Plato's doctrine of ideas, consists in Aristotle's failure to put in God, or in the first principle, the exemplar forms of created things, particularly of human virtues. Aquinas takes a very different view of Aristotle's position on this question. Aquinas treats the question under the title: "Whether all things are good by the first goodness". Now, according to the Platonists, all things are formally good by the first goodness, which Plato posits as separate from them according to both being and understanding. Thus, just as man has being and can be understood apart from individual men, who participate in the idea of man, so also good has being and can be understood apart from the individual things participating in the idea of good. Since all things participate in the idea of good, therefore, that which is good through itself, or God, is the universal principle of all things. Consequently, as all men are men through a participation in a separate man, but not through an inherent humanity, so 258 See in Aquinas: Loc. at., sc 1-2 (2.421-22). 259 SCC, 2.59-61 (2.186-96), and 2.73, 75 (2.207-14, 217-21); Aquinas treats here separately the opinions of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Galens on the possible intellect: 2,62-63 (2.196-99). See also: DSpC, a. 9 (2.400-05); DA, aa. 2-3 (2.285-94): Aquinas makes no reference to Averroes in the second of these articles; ST, la, 76.1-2 (1.447b-453a). In his third period, Aquinas has three texts on the problem. The first has his exposition of Aristotle's doctrine on the nature of the possible intellect: In De anima, 3.4, lect 7-8 (Pirotta, pp. 224-35). The second text is the treatise written by Aquinas in 1270 against those, particularly Siger of Brabant, in Paris propagating the error of Averroes on the substantial unity of the possible intellect and its substantial separation from the diverse souls of men: De imitate intellectus (Spiazzi, pp. 63-90). The third text, naming no philosophers holding the erroneous opinion, emphasizes again the necessity for each man to have a proper possible intellect, or a proper intellective soul, because he is one in being and the proper agent of his own acts of understanding: CT, c. 85 (pp. 39-41).

656

CHAPTER SEVEN

all things are good through a participation in a separate good, which is the first goodness, but not through an inherent goodness. This is the opinion that Aristotle opposes, showing in many ways that it is untenable. He shows that the forms of things are in particular things themselves, and not separate from them. Even supposing separate ideas, Aristotle indicates that Plato's opinion has no bearing on the goodness of things, for they are not good through a univocal goodness, and so a common or univocal idea cannot be assigned as the cause of the good in things. Stating his own view, Aquinas maintains that Plato's opinion is false, as it stands. It can be corrected, however, in the following manner. Because every created thing, as an effect of the first goodness, has an intrinsic likeness of its cause, the thing is good by an inherent form, which is a similitude in it of the supreme good. Hence, all creatures are inherently good by the first goodness to which they are assimilated as to the efficient, exemplar and final cause of every created good.260 In the judgment of Aquinas, then, Aristotle does not intend to say that there are no ideas in the divine intellect. He shows only that the natural forms of things cannot be as Plato thinks they are, namely, as existing through themselves and apart from matter. By positing those forms in things themselves, Aristotle corrects and completes the doctrine of Plato, who sought the truth of the nature of corporeal forms, though he did not attain it.261 According to Aquinas, moreover, the doctrine of the Platonists on the exemplar virtues is not opposed to Aristotle's thought. Although Aristotle says that the cardinal virtues are not found in God, nevertheless, in saying so, he is speaking of the virtues as they regulate human actions, such as the control of buying and selling by justice, or the regulation of fear and concupiscence by fortitude and temperance. It is in this regard only that Aristotle refuses to posit exemplar virtues in God.262 Although Aquinas and Bonaventure are united in attributing some error to Aristotle on theological grounds, nevertheless, Aquinas departs from Bonaventure in finding no demonstrable error in Aristotle on purely philosophical grounds. The difference between the two theologians in this regard, as we have shown from their analyses of philosophical errors, stems from the fundamental principles governing their respective conceptions of creatures and their relations to the Creator. Bonaventure's principles are such that, in his conception, the errors of the philosophers, including Aristotle, could have been avoided because they have been illumined sufficiently by God to attain a truly natural wisdom, both speculative and practical. The principles of Aquinas, who does not refer in this context to an 260 DV, Resp. "Et ideo ..." (1.382); ST, la, 6.4 (1.35b-36a). Cf. Aristotle: Metafh., 7.14-16 (1039a231040M); Etkica nicom., 1.6 (1096all-1097al4). See also: Metaph., 1.6 (987b7-14); 1.9 (992a24-34). 261 1 Sent., 36.2.1, arg. 1 (1.838); ad 1 (1.840). 262 ST, Ia2ae, 61 5, arg. 1 (2.1032a); ad 1 (2.1033a): cf. 3 Sent., 34.1.1, arg. 6. (3.1111); ad 6 (3.1115). See in Aristotle: Etkica nicom., 10.8 (1178b8-23); 7.1 (1145al5-32).

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

657

illumination from God, give rise to a conception enabling him to see no error in Aristotle and to concur with Bonaventure in some respects, while departing from him in other respects, with regard to the errors that they both find in the rest of the philosophers. CONCLUSION The synthesis of St. Bonaventure on illumination completes his thought on the certitude of natural knowledge. The synthesis contains his philosophical reasons for the necessaty of the human intellect to receive an illumination from God in order to know and to judge the truth of its objects with certitude. This illumination is necessary, on the one hand, because the light of the intellect is intrinsically fallible and, on the other hand, because the objects of the intellect are essentially mutable.The intrinsic fallibility of the intellect and the essential mutability of its objects are both due to the natural condition of the creature, which has its being from nothing. To have the immutability required for certitude of truth, the objects of the intellect must participate in the immutable truth of their eternal reasons in God. Likewise, to have the infallibility required to know and to judge creatures with certitude, the human intellect must participate in the infallible light of truth in God. Thus, at the one extreme, the immutability of the objects of the intellect depend on their participation in God's eternal reason and, at the other extreme, the infallibility of the intellect depends on its participation in God's eternal light. Because of those two participations, the human mind is able to know the immutable truth of its objects and to judge them with an infallible certitude. The acts by which the mind knows and judges its objects flow from its natural light of truth, and they are directed by its first principles of knowledge. Because the light of truth in the mind is a created power, it cannot illumine the mind apart from the influence and cooperation of God's eternal light. Similarly, because the first principles are created forms of knowledge, they cannot direct the mind toward truth apart from the influence and cooperation of God's eternal reason. Consequently, by a twofold influence and cooperation, God illumines the human mind, so that, participating in His eternal light and in His eternal reason, the mind can attain the human truth of its objects, with an infallible certitude by its connatural lumen and its first principles of knowledge The interior illumination of the mind, then, depends on an exterior illumination from God, who influences and cooperates with the intellectual operations of the rational spirit because of its natural dignity as an image of God. As the cause of being, God conserves the being of every creature while moving its natural potencies into act and directing them in their operations. As the order of life, God preserves the gift of grace in His spiritual creatures and bestows merit on their infused acts of knowledge and love. As the source of understanding, God sustains the light and principles of knowledge in the rational spirit while moving its powers of un-

658

CHAPTER SEVEN

derstanding into act and directing their operations toward truth, which is known immutably and infallibly in and by the light of God's eternal reason. Hence, influencing and cooperating with the intellectual operations of the rational spirit, God gives it a participation in the immutable truth and in the infallible certitude of His knowledge of creatures. This participation has an analogical foundation in the natural dignity of the rational spirit as an image of God The illumination of natural knowledge, therefore, as described in the synthesis of St. Bonaventure, is a necessary consequence of his understanding of the principle of participation. At the one extreme, there are the infallible light of God and the immutable truth of His eternal principles; at the other extreme, there are the faMible light of the human intellect and the mutable truth of its created principles. The two extremes are united analogically in the acts by which the intellect, through the mediation of the memory, knows the truth of its objects immutably and judges them infallibly, thus, comprehending their necessity with certitude, for it knows that they cannot be otherwise than they are. Coming from God, the illumination of natural knowledge is one in its source. Entering the human mind, His illumination is manifold in its effects, particularly in the sciences of natural, rational and moral philosophy. By the science of natural philosophy, the mind is illumined to comprehend the truth of the being of things, and so the mind, apprehending God as the cause of being, is able to judge the truth of creatures with certitude by apprehending them in God as the efficient cause of being. By the science of rational philosophy, the mind is illumined to comprehend the truth of human thoughts, so that, knowing God as the source of understanding, the mind can judge the truth of rational knowledge with certitude by seeing the source of understanding in God as the exemplar cause of knowledge. Illumined by the science of moral philosophy, the mind is able to comprehend the truth of moral actions with certitude by perceiving them in God as the final cause of perfection. These three effects of God's illumination are unified in the natural wisdom of philosophy, which reduces the sciences of philosophy to the truth of God as the one principle or supreme cause of all created things. Thus, correlating the truths of things in their final and efficient causes, the mind, having philosophical wisdom, reduces the one to the other through the mediation of the truth of things in their exemplar cause. As a consequence, the mind can see the identity in the divine essence, which is the one exemplar of all things, of the eternal laws ruling the goodness of creatures with the eternal reasons regulating the being of creatures. In that way, understanding that all things are one in their divine exemplar, the mind is able to comprehend the unity of truth in creatures and to judge them universally with certitude because it perceives that, in the divine exemplar, the truth of being and the truth of goodness in creatures are one. Through the wisdom of philosophy, then, the human mind has the natural capacity to understand at once that God is the originating cause, the exemplar principle, and the final end of all created things.

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

659

Though the philosophers were illumined by God, who illumines every man coming into the world, they did not attain the complete wisdom of philosophical knowledge. They did not analyze the truth of creatures completely with regard to the first principle; so the philosophers erred both concerning the truth of creation and concerning the relations between creatures and the Creator. All the philosophers erred concerning the efficient cause of creatures by positing the world as eternal, because it could not be made from nothing. Platonist and Arabian philosophers erred also concerning the exemplar cause by positing that the first principle, or God, could cause only one being, so that every subsequent creature was caused through the mediation of a created being. This error, on the part of the Arabians, included the further error, supported by Aristotle, that the first principle could not know particular things, because the first principle does not have the ideas or exemplar forms of created things. Averroes, in particular, erred still further by positing that all the rational souls of men are one in number, a position denying the possibility of beatitude for individual men, thus erring concerning the final cause of created things. Plato and his followers also erred concerning the final cause, for they thought that rational souls, pre-existing their bodies, would go eternally from one body to another. Hence, though the Platonists had the truth of the exemplar virtues in God, they were mistaken about the truth of human beatitude. The Manicheans erred concerning all three causes by positing a supreme good and a supreme evil as the first principles of the universe, and so the Manicheans destroyed the unity, truth and order of the universe. The errors of the early philosophers on the efficient cause of the universe, then, prepared the way for further errors on its exemplar cause, so that, in the end, other errors were introduced concerning its final cause, particularly with regard to human beatitude. Consequently, failing to understand the full truth of creatures and their relations to the Creator, the philosophers did not know the truth of God as the one first principle and threefold cause of the created universe. The philosophers were illumined by God, and so they could have become wise, for they had the natural capacity both to understand the full truth of creatures and to know the truth of their Creator as the one supreme cause of the whole universe. St. Bonaventure's thought on the illumination of sciential knowledge is developed under the predominant influence of St. Augustine. His doctrines are augmented by St. Bonaventure with other doctrines from a number of sources, particularly from St. Gregory and St. Anselm, but especially from the philosophy of Aristotle. We have shown how St. Bonaventure follows St. Augustine both by citing many texts from his writings and by referring to numerous places where St. Augustine speaks of the necessity of the human mind, in order to know with certitude, to see the truth of creatures in and by the light of their eternal reasons. We have also shown how the other sources influencing St. Bonaventure confirm or supplement the doctrines that he employs from St. Augustine. With regard to Aristotle in par-

660

CHAPTER SEVEN

ticular, we have seen St. Bonaventure drawing together in his synthesis the doctrine of Aristotle on the object of science with the doctrine of St. Augustine on the eternal reason of God, so that the certitude of human science is seen to depend on the necessity of its object in God's eternal reason. We have indicated, at the same time, that St. Bonaventure understands the illumination of the mind by God to be His way of moving the agent intellect into act, thus illumining the possible intellect with the result that the human mind knows and judges its objects under the influence of their immutable truth in the mind of God In the view of St. Bonaventure, then, the agent and possible intellects along with the first principles of truth are insufficient of themselves to cause a knowledge of truth apart from an illumination from God. On the other hand, the seeing of things in their eternal reasons cannot make them known with certitude to the human mind apart from species abstracted through the senses. Hence, complementing the doctrine of St. Augustine, as on other occasions, St. Bonaventure maintains with Aristotle that sense knowledge and human experience are altogether necessary for a man to have knowledge with certitude. Because Plato took little heed of sense knowledge and experience, St. Bonaventure considers the wisdom of Plato to lack a concrete foundation. Because Aristotle neglected the eternal reasons or divine ideas of things, St. Bonaventure considers the science of Aristotle to stop short at the threshold of wisdom. Since St. Augustine has grounded his philosophical wisdom in a sciential knowledge founded on experience and sense cognition, St. Bonaventure considers the doctrine of St. Augustine to be the best source of philosophical thought for the Christian. But there are many things that St. Augustine has not treated, or has treated only in a limited way; so, regarding those things, St. Bonaventure never hesitates to go to Aristotle, whom he judges to be the more excellent among the philosophers, a judgment borne out by the steady effort of St. Bonaventure to unite, or to reconcile, the doctrines of Aristotle with those of St. Augustine. Though St. Bonaventure, in composing his synthesis on illumination, relies predominantly on St. Augustine, even so, by grounding the necessity for that illumination in the dignity of the knower and in the nobility of his object, St. Bonaventure develops a position presenting his own thought on the question. Thus, regarding the illumination of wisdom, he develops his position without reference to historical sources, excepting a citation from St. Augustine on the necessity of the eternal reasons to concur with human concepts in order that a man know God truly and with certitude. St. Bonaventure also handles the errors of the philosophers, for the most part, without the aid of historical sources. When he refers to such sources, he refers usually to Aristotle, whose doctrine he uses to show why the position of a given philosopher, especially Averroes, is erroneous. But St. Bonaventure refers to St. Augustine and the Platonists to indicate that Aristotle's doctrine on the moral virtues is deficient with respect to the cardinal virtues. In short, though the influence of St. Augustine is

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

661

predominant in the composition of St. Bonaventure's synthesis on the illumination of natural knowledge, his synthesis does not present a formally Augustinian doctrine on the question. The doctrine of St. Augustine is modified in so many ways by other doctrines, particularly from St. Anselm and especially from Aristotle, that it simply cannot be the formal element of St. Bonaventure's synthesis. His synthesis, conforming to his personal principles of philosophy, forms part of St. Bonaventure's total perspective of the created universe and its dependence on the Creator. Consequently, containing St. Bonaventure's interpretation of the historical sources utilized by him, the synthesis presents his personal thought on illumination, and so, formally speaking, his synthesis is a truly Bonaventurean development of philosophical thought. The synthesis of St. Thomas on illumination also completes his thought on the certitude of natural knowledge. In that respect, the similarities and dissimilarities of his synthesis to the synthesis of St. Bonaventure, as we have noted, follow their individual thought on the certitude of natural knowledge. St. Thomas, no less than St. Bonaventure, develops his synthesis on illumination under the influence of St. Augustine. But the interpretation of St. Augustine's doctrine on this question by St. Thomas conforms to his understanding of St. Augustine's teaching on the certitude of human knowledge. Hence, with regard to St. Augustine, the position of St. Thomas on the question both concurs and differs from the position of St. Bonaventure. They concur, for instance, in maintaining that the divine truth alone is absolutely eternal and immutable. They maintain this because of the condition of the creature, which is mutable and variable considered in itself, or apart from the Creator, whose truth concerning the creature never changes. They differ, however, in their understanding of the necessity for the human mind to see created truths in and by their eternal reasons. For St. Bonaventure, this necessity is due to the natural insufficiency of the mind to know any truth apart from an extrinsic illumination from God. As a consequence, the mind must see created truths in the light of their eternal reasons, but through the mediation of the first principles of truth. For St. Thomas, the mind has a natural sufficiency to know truth without the aid of an additional illumination from God. As a result, in knowing created truths by their first principles, the mind sees the eternal reasons as they are reflected in those principles. Both theologians concur in holding, moreover, that the natural lumen of reason and the first principles of truth are similitudes of the divine lumen and the eternal reasons of truth. In the view of St. Thomas, however, it is sufficient to know truth in the lumen of reason and by the first principles in order to know truth in the divine lumen and by the eternal reasons. But that is not sufficient in the view of St. Bonaventure, because the mind must go beyond the created similitudes of truth, and so it must perceive the truth of creatures in the eternal lumen and reasons of God. The view of St. Bonaventure depends on his position that the creature is essentially contingent, just as the view of St.

662

CHAPTER SEVEN

Thomas depends on his position that the creature has an intrinsic necessity. Their differences in this regard account also for the differences between them on the necessity for God to cooperate with the operations of the human intellect. St. Bonaventure considers God's cooperation to be necessary not only because the rational creature is an image of God, but also because the lumen of the agent intellect is essentially contingent, thus needing an extrinsic illumination from God. St. Thomas considers God's cooperation to be necessary, however, simply because no created power can move itself into act, and so, having nothing to do with God's image in the rational creature, His cooperation consists in moving and sustaining the agent intellect, which is a self-sufficient power that He has given to the human mind. Apart from those differences, the two theologians hold in common that God, as the first agent of understanding, must move the human intellect into act immediately, and that He conserves the intellect in its actions, which flow interiorly from the lumen of the human mind. The interpretations of St. Augustine's doctrine given by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas manifest a common tendency to unite, or to reconcile, that doctrine with the philosophy of Aristotle, but not in the same way. St. Bonaventure is more inclined, though not always, to draw the philosophy of Aristotle toward the doctrine of St. Augustine, whereas St. Thomas is less inclined in that direction, though he has a greater preference for the philosophy of Aristotle. Thus, on explaining St. Augustine's correction of Plato's position on the ideas of things, St. Thomas accepts Aristotle's doctrine on the agent and possible intellects as the better solution to the problem. For this reason, the synthesis of St. Thomas on illumination reflects a greater influence from Aristotle than from St. Augustine, particularly in regard to the self-sufficiency of the agent intellect, which participates in the divine lumen, and in regard to the self-evidence of the first principles, which participate in the divine truth. The greater or lesser influence of Aristotelean or Augustinian doctrines on the thought of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, however, does not account for the distinctive character of their individual syntheses on illumination. That character depends on the fundamental principles directing the personal thought of the two theologians, including their interpretations of the historical doctrines known to them. Their fundamental principles are such that, as we have seen, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas can analyze the same philosophical errors and, as the syntheses of the two theologians concur and differ in certain respects, so their appraisal of the errors of the philosophers concur and differ in similar respects. They concur in rejecting most of the errors of the philosophers, but not always for the same reasons. They differ in their views on some philosophical positions, particularly on the eternity of the world. In the view of St. Bonaventure, it is an error in philosophy to hold the eternity of the world, which comes to-be from nothing; in the view of St. Thomas, this position is not necessarily erroneous, because human reason cannot demonstrate either that the world is eternal or that it began

ILLUMINATION OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

663

to-be in time. St. Bonaventure's view is a necessary consequence of his fundamental principles of being and existing, which constitute every creature as essentially contingent and as measured intrinsically by time. The view of St. Thomas is a necessary consequence of his fundamental principles of being and essence, which constitute a creature with an intrinsic necessity and as measured extrinsically by time. The very wide differences between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure on this problem, taken doctrinally or historically, indicate the impossibility of reducing their two syntheses to a common movement of philosophical thought. Since those differences exist within a common view of the ability of natural reason to demonstrate that a creature has its being from nothing in the order of nature, the syntheses of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas cannot be separated entirely as diverse organizations of philosophical thought. Consequently, forming parts of two personal perspectives of the whole of the universe and of the dependence of the creature on the Creator, the syntheses of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure contain both common and alternative solutions to the particular problems confronting them in their own time.

This page intentionally left blank

PART FOUR FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE '"pHE whole of Christian faith is founded on the belief that God is triune, or a Trinity. To keep this foundation intact, St. Bonaventure teaches, we have a threefold testimony to the truth of the Trinity. The first testimony is contained in the book of the creature, which draws the human mind toward God. The book has two witnesses to the Trinity: the one, resembling God from afar, is the corporeal creature, and the other, resembling God close by, is the intellectual creature. The corporeal creature, as a vestige of God, has an essential unity, truth and goodness which, by appropriation, correspond to the Trinity of persons, and so the corporeal creature testifies that God is triune. The intellectual creature, as an image of God, has a memory, an intelligence and a will, or a mind with knowledge and love. Since a mind brings forth a concept, or a mental word, and love proceeds from a mind and its love, the intellectual creature expresses the origin, emanation and distinction of the persons in the Trinity, and thus the intellectual creature testifies that God is triune. The two witnesses in the book of the creature were efficacious, before Adam sinned, in testifying to the truth of the Trinity, After Adam sinned, the minds of men were darkened and the book of the creature was obscured Because men could not read the testimony in that book, God in His providence has supplied a second testimony in the book of the Scriptures, which contains the divine revelation obliging men to believe in the Trinity. The Scriptures also have two witnesses to the truth that God is a Trinity of persons. The first witness is the Old Testament, which testifies to that truth implicitly both in figures and in words. The second witness is the New Testament, which testifies to the Trinity explicitly in the sacraments and in the teachings of Christ. The testimony of the New Testament is so efficacious and clear, St. Bonaventure says, that it compels and obligates men to believe the truth of the Trinity. Because some men do not obey the Gospel, and because the truth of the Trinity is beyond the reach of human reason, God in his wisdom has provided a third testimony in the book of life. This book is an inviolable witness of the Trinity, both explicitly and expressly, to those who see God openly in beatitude. The book also testifies to the Trinity by an illumination given to men who are journeying toward God, for God "illumines every man coming into this world" (/«., 1.9). God illumines th mind of a man through reason and through faith, so that, from the concourse of the lumen of faith with the lumen of reason, a habitus of belief is brought forth elevating the mind of the man to believe that God is triune

666

PART FOUR

and, in consequence, to believe every other truth pertaining to the worship of the Christian religion.1 Coming from God, the natural lumen of reason is, as it were, a seal of the divine lumen in the mind of a man. Thus, directed by his own reason, a man knows how he ought to think of God, who is his first principle. Because a man has no other principle, he ought to think of God in the loftiest way. Because all other things come from the first principle, a man ought to think of God in the most pious way. But a man cannot be directed by his natural lumen of reason to think of God as a Trinity. To think of God that way, a man must be directed by an infused lumen of faith, which concurs with his natural lumen of reason in directing him to think, as he ought, of God in the loftiest and most pious manner. When a man thinks of God in that manner, he gives to God supreme honour, veneration and worship. It is apparent, St. Bonaventure observes, that belief in the Trinity is the root and foundation of divine worship and of the whole of the Christian religion. The man who is a Christian, having faith in the Trinity, believes that God is the Creator of all things, that He punishes evildoers, rewards those who are good and consoles those who are in misery. Since God is most exalted, it befits His nobility to do things that are great and just. Since God is most pious, it befits His dignity to regard the lowly and to lift up those who have fallen. Consequently, the Christian believes that the Son of God, because of supreme piety, has become man and suffered death; because of supreme justice, He will judge the whole world at the end of time, These are the truths, founded on belief in the Trinity, pertaining to the worship of God. This worship is exemplified in Christ, who commanded that it be preached throughout the whole world, thus obligating all men to believe explicitly in the truth of the Trinity on the worthy testimony of the Gospel, aided by the fitting testimony of the resemblances to God in His creatures. The illumination from the book of life, however, according to St. Bonaventure, is that which moves the Christian principally to believe the truth of the Trinity. This is an illumination proceeding from God's eternal lumen, which attracts the Christian to the service of God. Hence, submitting to God in veneration and worship, the Christian is illumined to believe all things, though they are above human reason, that give honour to God in divine worship. The illumination of the Christian begins in his natural lumen of reason and is consummated in his infused lumen of faith. It is a total illumination of reason and faith, then, that moves the Christian to think loftily and piously of God. There are other factors moving a man to believe the truth of the Trinity, but those factors are instruments, so to speak, inducing a man to believe, and so they are secondary to the

1 DMT, 1.2, Resp. "... religionis cultum." (5.54-55). St. Bonaventurc's descriptions of the creature as a vestige or as an image of the Trinity depend on St. Augustine: De diver, quaes., q. 18 (PL 40.15); De Trinit., 9.4.4 (PL 42.963), 9.5.8 (PL 42.965), 9.12.17 (PL 42.970).

FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT

667

illumination from God. Thus, as Richard of St. Victor shows, a man can be moved to believe the truth of the Trinity from the irrefutable evidence of miracles, from the examples of saints and martyrs, from the arguments of theologians and from the conviction of the universal Church. 2 Christ established the universal Church, which is the Kingdom of God To belong to the Kingdom of God, a man must have the grace of Christ This grace is said by St. Bonaventure to be a sapiential grace integrating the speculations, desires and actions of the Christian. Possessing sapiential grace, then, a Christian is directed by wisdom in his speculations about the holy things of God in His creatures, in the Scriptures, and in the works of Christ, who is our Redeemer. A Christian, having sapiential grace, is also regulated by wisdom in his desires, so that his soul is cleansed from mundane things, his mind is elevated toward heavenly things, and his heart is inflamed with love for God Finally, because of his sapiential grace, a Christian is influenced through wisdom in his actions, and so he acts with a loving heart as he exercises proper control over his own body and instructs the mind of his neighbour.3 Perfected through sapiential grace, therefore, a Christian seeks what is good and shuns what is evil. According to St. Augustine, evil is a privation of good, and everything coming from God is good4 Because a creature is an undivided being, it has a unity in being. Because a creature is one in its being, it has truth as a being. Since a creature is a being which is both one and true in its being, it also has goodness in its actions. Consequently, since goodness is self-diffusive, one creature by its actions gives itself to another, thus sharing its goodness with the other, as God communicates goodness to all creatures by giving to them a proper mode, species and order. The privation of any one of those three conditions of a creature constitutes an evil. Such a privation cannot come from God, who is the efficient cause of goodness in a creature. Though an irrational creature, by its own actions, can bring about a privation of goodness, even so, in causing an evil, an irrational creature is without fault. A rational creature, however, is responsible for its actions. If a rational creature acts so deficiently as to cause a privation of goodness, the action of that creature is not without fault, because such a creature can either order or fail to order its own actions according to a liberty of choice. Hence, as a rational creature, a man ought to imitate God in His action, which is never lacking in goodness. A man ought to look upon God, therefore, as the principle, exemplar and end of human actions, thus putting a proper mode, species and order into his own acts. But a man is also a creature originating from nothing. As a consequence, his actions can be deficient in either their proper mode, or their proper species, or their proper order. They can be deficient in their proper order, for example, when a man loves himself to 2 DMT, 1.2, Resp. "Et hoc ..." (5.55-56); cf. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinit., 1.2 (PL 196.981). 3 Sermo, "De regno Dei ...", nn. 34-35 (5.548; ed. mm., 5.428). 4 Enchirid., 11.3 (PL 40.236); De natura bmi, c. 4 (PL 42.553).

668

PART FOUR

excess, so that, establishing himself as the end of his actions, he does not act for the sake of God, who is his true end Acting in that way, a man is said to be evil, because he departs from the right order of human actions.5 The above texts contain the principal points of St. Bonaventure's position on the formation and development of theological knowledge. He speaks of belief in the Trinity as the root and foundation of Christian faith, which depends exteriorly on the book of the Scriptures and interiorly on the book of life. The book of the Scriptures presents the revelation of the Trinity implicity in the Old Testament and explicitly in the New Testament. The book of life reveals the truth of the Trinity by an infused lumen of faith, which is perfected in the vision of God in beatitude. The primary object of Christian faith, then, is the Trinity of persons in God, and the final end of Christian faith is the eternal vision of the Trinity in beatitude. The primary cause of Christian faith is the eternal lumen of God, who illumines the mind of the Christian in such a way that he believes not only the truth of the Trinity, but also all the truths revealed by God as the Creator and Provider of the universe, as the Redeemer and Judge of men. These truths are summed up in the worship of the Christian religion through which God is given the honour and veneration due to Him from rational creatures. The habitus of Christian faith, however, is formed from a concourse of the infused lumen of faith with the natural lumen of reason, which is also an effect of the eternal lumen. The natural lumen of reason directs a man's thoughts to the book of the creature, which is both exterior and interior. Considering the exterior book, a man sees that the corporeal creature reflects the unity, truth and goodness of God. The Christian can strengthen his belief in the Trinity by appropriating those properties to corresponding persons in God. Moreover, considering the interior book, a man sees that the intellectual creature is a reflexion of God's mind, knowledge and love. The Christian can fortify his belief in the Trinity by comparing the generation of a mental word and the procession of love from the human mind with the origin, emanation and distinction of the persons in God. Through the mediation of the book of the creature, then, the book of the Scriptures and the book of life are brought together by a total illumination uniting reason and faith, thus moving the Christian in his belief of the Trinity to think of God in the loftiest and most pious way. Thinking of God that way, the Christian can arrive at an understanding of God as He known through faith. This understanding is made possible by the concourse of reason with faith in a total illumination, which is a theological illumination, enabling the Christian to order what he knows by his natural lumen of reason to what he believes by his infused lumen of faith. Our first general topic, then, is the order of reason and faith in St. Bonaventure's theology. This topic includes a, number of particular sub5 Sermo, "De regno Dei ...", n. 43 (5.551-52; ed. min., 5.433-34).

FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT

669

jects, such as the manner in which philosophy is given a participation in the theology of St. Bonaventure, and the r&le of piety in the organization of that theology. Our second general topic is the notion of Christian philosophy as it appears in the writings of St. Bonaventure. This question has to do with his evaluation, as a Christian, of philosophy and of errors in philosophy, and so the question extends to his thought on such problems as ignorance, error and moral defects, particularly in men lacking Christian faith. Before Adam sinned, St. Bonaventure has said, the human mind could go to God without difficulty from His creatures. After Adam sinned, the minds of men were darkened and the natures of creatures became difficult to understand. As a consequence, without divine revelation, men cannot readily know God from His creatures, and so we meet the problem of the cause of ignorance and of error in human thought regarding God and creatures. This problem is but one aspect of the more general problem of evil, particularly in men. They are said by St. Bonaventure to become evil, or to deprive themselves of goodness, if they fail to order their actions according to liberty of choice, which God has given to men for their own good. But a man is a creature originating from nothing and, as such, needs the help of his Creator in order to put a proper mode, species and order into his actions. We are faced, then, with the problem of the cause of moral defects in human actions, a problem closely connected with the preceding problem of ignorance and error. The remedy for all of those defects is found by St. Bonaventure in the Kingdom of God, or the universal Church, established by Christ. The grace of Christ, as described by St. Bonaventure, integrates the thoughts, desires and actions of a Christian in a true wisdom. This is a Christian wisdom establishing a unity in the speculative and practical thoughts of men, and in the moral actions of their personal and social lives. Moreover, it is a theological wisdom directing the Christian, particularly the theologian, to show a devout love for God by instructing other men in the redeeming truth of Christ. Thus, we meet the problem of the task of the theologian who, for the benefit of other men, must integrate philosophical knowledge, both speculative and practical, with Christian faith within the unity of a Christian wisdom, which has as its end the good of all men in eternal beatitude.

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER EIGHT ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

'IpRANSCENDING natural reason, Christian faith passes beyond the investigation of reason. Christian faith, excluding doubt and hesitation, elevates human reason to see divine things, stabilizes it in truth, and fills the human mind with a multiform lumen enabling the mind to speculate about the things of God. Since God is the only interior teacher, a man can receive the lumen of faith from God alone. The strength of Christian faith consists in the act of belief coming from the willing response of the believer as he hears the words of God. Relying on a loving response to divine truth, Christian faith is meritorious because of an adhesion to truth which is unseen, but which is believed because of an infused lumen. Thus, Christian faith is at once clouded in darkness and radiant in light. Christian faith is a gift both sublime and profound. Because of its sublimity, faith is above natural reason; because of its profundity, faith cannot be the subjected to the investigation of natural reason. As a sublime gift, Christian faith makes God known in His eternity. As a profound gift, Christian faith makes God known in His humanity, or the humility of the Word Incarnate. To know God in His eternity is to possess wisdom, which looks to things that are divine. To know God in His humanity is to possess science, which looks to things that are human. To possess this science and wisdom, a man must have Christian faith in order that he may know the unity of things divine and human.' The Gospel tells us that the whole Law and all the Prophets teach love of God and love of neighbour. The same twofold love, according to Augustine, is taught by the whole wisdom of philosophy.2 For his own part, Bonaventure says that, because our neighbour is an image of the Trinity, piety is due to him as a reflexion of the Father, truth is due to him as a reflexion of the Son, and benignity is due to him as a reflexion of the Holy Spirit. 3 Our brief outline of Bonaventure's doctrine on Christian faith shows that, in his view, it is a gift of God, who is the only interior teacher of truth. God teaches interiorly by infusing a lumen of faith into the human mind. 1 Coll. m Hexaem., 8.2-5 (5.369-70; Delorme, pp. 110-11). 2 "Nam unctio docet dilectionem Dei et proximi, et in hoc 'uriiversa Lex pendet et Propheta', secundum quod dicitur Matthei vigesimo secundo (vs. 40). Tota etiam sapientia philosophiae, sicut dicir Augustinus, 'hie est physica, ethica et civilis'." — Comm, in Luc., 12.20 (7.316); cf. St. Augustine, Epist., 137.5.17 (PL 33.524). 3 Brevil., 5.9 "Quia vero ... decem praeceptis." (5.263; ed. min., n. 5, 5.120).

672

CHAPTER EIGHT

The act of belief, relying on that infused lumen, follows the hearing, or exterior presentation, of the words of God. This act involves a willing or loving response to divine truth, which is unseen or without evidence to natural reason. The truth accepted through Christian faith makes God known in His eternity, so that He is known by a wisdom transcending the wisdom of natural reason. The truth accepted through Christian faith also makes God known in His humanity, and so He is known in Christ by a science passing beyond the science of natural reason. The science and the wisdom of faith depend interiorly on an infused lumen elevating the mind of a Christian and, stabilizing it in truth, enabling him to speculate about the things of God. Thus, going beyond the investigation of natural reason, a Christian theologian has a certitude of truth from his faith that permits him to unify his knowledge of things both divine and human, as they are one in Christ. Moreover, following the teaching and the example of Christ, the theologian has an obligation to teach love of God and love of neighbour, a twofold love taught in a natural way by philosophical wisdom. Hence, uniting philosophy and faith, the Christian theologian knows that his neighbour is an image of the Trinity. As a consequence, the theologian, seeking Christian science and wisdom, ought to manifest piety toward others, acknowledge their right to have truth, and treat them with benignity or kindness. We have, then, two particular problems to consider here. The first problem concerns the manner in which Bonaventure brings faith and reason, or philosophy, together in his Christian theology, a problem dealing with his constitution of theological knowledge. The second problem has to do with the consequences for philosophical knowledge following its union with faith in Bonaventure's theology. This particular problem includes his use of piety as a theological principle regulating the conjunction of faith and philosophy within Christian theology. Constitution of Theological Knowledge

Bonaventure considers the constitution of theological knowledge on three separate occasions. He handles the problem, on the first occasion, according to the four causes of theology. Beginning with the material cause, he says that the subject of theology is God and His works, such as creation and redemption. The subject of theology is divided into things and signs, but they are all one inasmuch as they belong to the object of belief and as this object is to be understand through reasons brought forward for that purpose.4 Now the subject of any science or doctrine can be taken in three ways. In the first way, a subject is that to which all the things in a science are reduced as to their radical principle, as the things treated in geometry are reduced to the point. In that way, the subject of theology is God, who is 4 1 Sent., Prooem., q. 1, fa. 1-3 (1.6; ed. min.. fa. a-c, 1.6).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

673

studied in Himself and in His works. In the second way, a subject is that to which all the things in a science are reduced as to an integral whole, as the things studied in geometry are reduced to a body, which contains in itself every sort of dimension. In this way, the subject of theology is Christ, who has both the divine nature, which is uncreated, and a human nature which is created. Giving a wide meaning to an integral whole, Bonaventure says that the subject of theology encompasses many things not only by composing one thing with another, but also by uniting them and by establishing an order among them. In the third way, a subject is that to which all the things in a science are reduced as to a universal whole, as geometrical things are reduced to a continuous quantity, which is immobile. From that viewpoint, the subject of theology is the object of belief, as this object is to be understood by the addition of reason. Of the three subjects, the third is taken by Bonaventure as the proper matter of theology, and so the proper subject of his theology is the object of Christian faith, as this object is to be understood with the help of human reason. In short, as an intelligible object, the truth of Christian faith is the matter, or subject, with which Bonaventure's theology is properly concerned.5 The principal subject of theology, as Bonaventure takes it, is God in Himself and in His work of creation and redemption. This subject, taken integrally, is summed up in Christ, who is at once both God and man, or the Creator and the creature. Thus, as the subject of theology, Christ is an integral whole encompassing things both human and divine, or created and uncreated. In a similar way, reflecting the truth of Christ, theology is an integral whole enclosing human and divine things, or created and uncreated things, so that, composed with another, those things are united and put into order. Now, as we have seen, an integral whole is constituted from parts retaining their proper natures. Any one of those parts, then, taken apart from the whole, stands on its own ground Taken as part of the whole, however, any one part is a composite element of the whole in which it is united and ordered to the other parts.6 The integral parts of theology consist in truths concerning the Creator and the creature, or things divine and human; so, taken separately, any one of those truths stands on its own ground, and yet, taken as part of the whole, any one truth is a composite element of theology in which it is united and ordered to other truths. In other words, theology can deal with divine things apart from human things, or vice versa, and it can deal with both at the same time, because they are integral parts of one science or doctrine. Since the Creator and the creature are known by natural reason and by Christian faith, then, regarding the same truths known by reason and by faith, the theologian can deal separately with any one of them on its own ground of reason or of faith

5 Loc. at., Resp., ad 1-2 (1.7-8; ed. mm., 1.7-8); cf. ad 3-4. 6 1 Sent., 19.2.un.l (1.355-56; ed. mm., 1.284-86).

674

CHAPTER EIGHT

and, nevertheless, he can consider that truth together with other truths as parts of the same integral whole, or as elements composing a theology in which many truths are united and ordered in an integral way. It would seem, therefore, that faith and philosophy can stand together, each on its own ground, as integral parts of Bonaventure's theology and, nonetheless, faith and philosophy can be taken together as composite elements united and ordered to each other as parts of the same integral whole of theology. On the other hand, taken universally, the subject of Bonaventure's theology is the truth of Christian faith, as this truth is to be understood by the addition of reason. This subject, which is a universal whole, is the proper subject of Bonaventure's theology. A universal whole, as we have also seen, is so constituted that any one of its parts signifies the whole. All the parts of a universal whole are uniform, so they can be lessened or multiplied without altering either the universal nature of the whole or the universal signification of each of its parts.7 A genus, for example, is a universal whole which is signified by each of its parts, or species, sharing in its uniform perfection; the addition or subtraction of species does not alter either the universal signification of any given species or the universal nature of the genus itself. No one of the many species in a genus, however, has the whole essence or nature of the genus. Each species is a particular determination, or formal specification, of the universal whole to which, as to the one material principle, all the species are subject. Thus, as a universal whole, the proper subject of theology is signified by any one of the truths of faith as they are to be understood by the addition of reason. Those truths share in the uniform perfection of the universal nature of theology; so the addition or subtraction of truths does not change either the universal, and properly theological, nature of any given truth or the universal and proper nature of theology itself. Each truth, or intelligible object of belief, is a particular determination, or formal specification, of the universal whole to which, as to their one material principle, all the truths of theology are subject. Consequently, whether this or that particular truth be taken either according to its credibility or according to its intelligibility, it signifies, in each instance, a universal and theological truth and not, in one instance, something credible and, in the other, something intelligible. The addition of reason to the object of belief in Bonaventure's theology is such, therefore, that neither faith nor philosophy can stand on its own ground alone in that theology with respect to its proper subject. There is, then, a very real problem, which we shall keep in view as we proceed, concerning the proper order of philosophy, or natural reason, to Christian faith in Bonaventure's theology.8 7 1 Sent., 19.2.un.2 (1.357-59; ed. min., 1.286-87). 8 On the subject matter of Bonaventure's theology see: G. H. Tavard, Transiency and Permanence (St. Bonaventure, New York, Franciscan Institute: 1954), pp. 103-13; Alejandro Villalmonte, "Orientacion Cristocentrica en la Teologia de San Buenaventura"; Estudios franciscanos, 59 (1958), pp. 321-22. Tavard overlooks the formal and final causes of Bonaventure's theology, an oversight having regrettable results in

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

675

One thing is clear, however: Bonaventure distinguishes the object of belief as it belongs to the virtue of faith from the same object as it pertains to Sacred Scripture and to theology. Belonging to the virtue, the object of belief depends on the first truth to which the believer assents for its own sake and above all other things. Pertaining to Sacred Scripture, the ooject of belief depends not only on the first truth, but also on divine authority, which Augustine describes as greater than the acumen of the human mind Finally, in addition to the first truth and to divine authority, the object of belief as it pertains to theology depends on probable reasons brought forward for an understanding of Christian faith. 9 The formal cause of theology, according to Bonaventure, is its mode of procedure. Theology, exposing its subject to a thorough scrutiny, employs an inquisitive mode of procedure. There are many men who seek the reason why Christians believe, but some men seek that reason only to discredit Christian faith. It is useful and fitting, therefore, to explain Christian faith by employing an inquisitive or argumentative mode of procedure. Moreover, as Richard of St. Victor points out, Christian faith has to do with necessary things, even though the reasons for their necessity are hidden from those who believe. But the effort can be made, however, to find the necessary reasons for the truths of faith. That effort demands a thorough scrutiny of those truths, a scrutiny requiring an argumentative mode of procedure. Furthermore, a human science defends its truths against attack; so, with equal reason, theology defends the truths of Christian faith against attack. Hence, proceeding argumentatively, theology refutes the false reasons of heretics with true reasons presented by Christian doctors.I0 Now an end imposes necessity on the means, as Aristotle says: "A saw has teeth, because its purpose is to saw". Since the purpose of theology is to promote Christian faith, theology needs an argumentative or inquisitive mode of procedure. Thus, moving against the adversaries of Christian faith, theology uses suitable reasons, as Augustine shows, to defend the truths of faith against the arguments advanced by its enemies. Strengthening the faith of weak Christians, theology uses probable arguments, as God fortifies the charity of such Christians with temporal benefits. Providing perfect Christians with necessary reasons for their faith, theology gives them a wonderful delight in understanding what they believe, and so Bernard says: "We understand nothing more delightfully than what we already believe by faith"." Tavard's subsequent analysis of the scientific nature of that theology: Op. cit., pp. 166-73. Villalmonte interprets the subject of Bonaventure's theology according to a work attributed incorrectly to him by Tavard. The work in question is "De Theologia", RTAM, 17 (1950), pp. 187-236; on its authenticity see: H. F. Dondaine, RTAM, 19 (1952), pp. 240-70. 9 1 Sent., Prooem., q. 1, ad 5-6 (1.8; ed. nan., 1.8); cf. St. Augustine, De Gen. ad lilt., 2.5.9 (PL 34.267). 10 1 Sent., Prooem., q. 2, sc 1-4 (i.10; ed. min., sc a-d, 1.9); cf. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinit., 1.4 (PL 196.8821 11 Lac. cit., Resp. (1.10-11; ed. min., 1.9-10). Consult: Aristotle, Physica, 2.9 (200alO-13); St. Augustine, De Trinit., 1.2.4 (PL 42.822); St. Bernard, De consider, 5.3.6 (PL 182.790-91).

676

CHAPTER EIGHT

The formal constituent of Bonaventure's theology, as his texts show, is an inquisitive or argumentative mode of procedure. This procedure consists in a thorough scrutiny of truth by way of inquiry and argumentation, or by way of reasoning. The scrutiny in question is a studious, and not a curious, examination of truth.12 The reasoning employed by theology, then, is designed to meet the needs of Christians in their belief. But the object of belief is above natural reason, and Sacred Scripture presents the object of belief by way of narration and example, not by way of reasoning; therefore, how can theology defend or advance Christian faith by way of reasoning? Moreover, as Aristotle indicates, the mode of procedure ought to conform to the subject of a science; but the subject of theology is the object of belief, which is not advanced by human reasons. This is why Gregory says that faith has no merit when human reason is the cause of belief. Taking a similar view, Jerome rejects the use of dialectic arguments to support Christian faith.13 Considering those objections, Bonaventure maintains that theology is reduced, or taken back, to Sacred Scripture of which it is a subalternate part, but not a principal part. The reasons of the theologians defending their faith are taken back to Sacred Scripture in a similar manner. Explaining the point, Bonaventure says that every particular determination of a subject does not bring about a subalternate science, which results from a determination drawing the subject apart toward another principle and away from the principal science. Since Sacred Scripture deals with the object of belief as something credible, but theology deals with the object of belief as something intelligible, theology draws the object of belief toward intelligibility and apart from credibility, as such, or in the words of Augustine: "what we believe, we owe to authority, and what we understand, we owe to reason".14 Hence, the mode of certitude in the superior science of Sacred Scripture is other than the mode of certitude in the inferior science of theology, and so the two sciences have different modes of procedure. Consequently, whenever the certitude of reason is lacking to theology, this science has recourse to the certitude of authority found in Sacred Scripture, for the certitude of divine authority exceeds all the certitude of human reason.Though the object of belief as something credible is above reason with regard to human science, even so, that object is not above reason as it is elevated by faith, by the gifts of science and understanding coming from the Holy Spirit. Elevating human reason, faith moves the Christian to assent to the object of belief, so that, through the gifts of science and understanding, he can understand what he believes. The use of reasoning in theology, therefore, takes away the merit of faith 12 1 Sent., Prooem., q. 2, ad 1-3 (1.11; ed. min., 1.10). 13 Lac. cit., arg. 4-6 (1.10; ed. min., 1.8-9). Consult: Aristotle, Ethka nicom., 2.2 (1104al-4); St. Gregory, Hamil. in Evang., 2.26.1 (PL 76.1197); the reference to St. Jerome should be to St Ambrose, De fide, 1.13.84 (PL 16.548). 14 De utilit. cred., 11.25 (PL 42.83).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

677

only when a theologian assents to the object of belief because of his reason, which then displaces his faith, since he relies principally on rational or dialectic arguments. When he assents to the object of belief, not because of his reason, but because of his love for God, who is the object of belief, a theologian wants to have reasons in order to understand the object of his belief. As a consequence, his faith not only has merit, but is also a source of increasing solace, because the theologian relies principally on divine authority and not on human reason.15 Bonaventure is speaking evidently about the way that a theologian proceeds with respect to the proper subject, or universal whole, of the science of theology. This is evident from the contrast made between the science of theology and the science of Sacred Scripture. The latter science is concerned with the object of belief as something credible, whereas theology is concerned with the object of belief as something intelligible. The science of Scripture, presupposing an assent to God from faith motivated by love, has a proper certitude from the authority of God, who presents the object of belief in the Scriptures by way of narration and example, not by way of reasoning. The science of Sacred Scripture, then, studies the object of belief without reasoning, a procedure befitting a doctrine depending on divine authority, which supplies the place of reason while persuading the heart of a man to assent to God from a virtue of faith.16 The science of theology, presupposing the authority of Scripture, has a proper certitude from reason, not in its natural condition, but as it is elevated by the virtue of faith and perfected by the gifts of science and understanding. Seeking the intelligibility of belief, the theologian looks for suitable reasons to defend Christian faith against its adversaries, for probable reasons to strengthen the faith of weak Christians, and for necessary reasons to bring about an understanding of faith in perfect Christians. Thus, making the object of belief to be intelligible, the theologian proceeds by way of reasoning within his faith, a procedure befitting a doctrine depending essentially on both reason and revelation, or on a theological illumination constituted from the natural illumination of reason and the divine illumination of faith. Now the theologian has to look for the reasons to be added to faith; so, when searching for them, his theology has an integral dependence on both reason and revelation. In that respect, reason and revelation remain on their own grounds until the theologian can bring them together into a universal whole; thus leading to an under15 1 Sent., Prooem., q. 2, ad 4-6 (1.11; ed. min., 1.10). 16 "Ad illud ... quod credere sine ratione est vituperabile, dicendum quod illud verum est ubi auctoritas non supplet locum rationis; ubi vero auctoritas locum supplet rationis, non est vituperabile, sed valde commendabile. Sic autem est in fide, quoniam, etsi non adsit intellectui ipsius credentis ratio propter quam debeat veritati assentire, adest tarnen summae Veritatis auctoritas, quae cordi suo suadet; quam etiam summam Veritatem scimus mentiri non posse, et ideo impium est ei non credere. Propterea hoc non tollit, immo potius confert fidei esse virtutem." — 3 Sent., 23.1.1. ad 3 (3.472; ed. min., 3.463); cf. sc 3.

678

CHAPTER EIGHT

standing of the object of belief by making it to be intelligible, i.e. by subjecting it to theological reasoning. When treating the object of belief this way, the theologian must not allow the reason for the intelligibility of the object of belief to displace his primary assent to that object as a truth of revelation; nor must he permit the certitude of natural reason to take the place of the certitude of divine authority, which supports the testimony of the Scriptures and upholds the assent of faith. On studying his subject as a universal whole, then, the theologian must be prepared, maintaining his assent of faith, to rely chiefly on divine authority and not on human reason, as otherwise his belief has no merit because of his principal dependence on human reason and not on divine authority. In searching for reasons to bring about an intelligibility of the object of belief, however, the theologian depends on the natural certitude of reason and on the authoritative certitude of the Scriptures. But he is not always able to have the natural certitude of reason, and so the theologian must fall back on the authoritative certitude of Sacred Scripture. Considering his subject as an integral whole, therefore, the theologian must be ready to rely on the certitude of divine authority whenever he cannot have the certitude of natural reason, thus avoiding the error of adding to the object of belief a reason thought to be certain when it is only probable or even false. We have now, apparently, a partial solution to the problem of the proper order of reason to revelation, or of philosophy to faith, in Bonaventure's theology. As an integral whole, the matter of his theology is, as it were, subject to a scrutiny searching for ways to bring faith and philosophy together within the universal whole that he posits as the proper matter of theology. Philosophy is first ordered to faith in an integral way and, when the one is seen to be compatible with the other, they are then ordered to each other to consitute a universal whole. The best way to present this partial solution is to show, from the texts of Bonaventure, how he proceeds in his theological mode of reasoning, a mode designed to bring about an understanding of the truth of Christian faith. Let us first recall his explanation of understanding. This term is the equivalent of knowing, which designates an act preceding the assent of faith. In that way, an object of faith is said to be understood because it is known in some manner before it is believed. The term understanding is also equivalent to comprehending by reason, which designates an act following previous thought about an object. In this way, an object of faith is said to be understood after previous thought about it, not by human reason alone, but by reason under the influence of an illumination of faith. Now, taking understanding in the second way, Bonaventure presents the following interpretation of Augustine's doctrine. Some truths are always understood before they are believed; it is known from a dictate of natural law, for example, that God is, or that God is good. Other truths must be believed before they are understood, such as the truths of the Trinity and of the Incarnation. There are truths, in addition, that are believed but never

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

679

understood, because reason cannot prove them. Truths of this kind, for instance, that Abraham was the father of Isaac, can be known only from authority, and they include the historical events and deeds of men recorded in Sacred Scripture. Consequently, faith and understanding can be compatible with respect to the same truth, and so thay can be ordered to the same truth, though not always in the same way: faith sometimes follows understanding; faith at other times precedes understanding. 17 Giving a theological meaning to understanding, Bonaventure sees two modes of compatibility between faith and philosophy regarding the same truth. In the one mode, a truth is first comprehended by natural reason and, thereafter, the same truth is believed by Christian faith. This sort of truth, such as the being of God, is understood subsequently by theological reasoning. Thus, taken in an integral manner, the being of God is considered now on a philosophical ground, then on the ground of faith, and eventually on both grounds at once, or as the one ground is ordered to the other within a universal whole. In the other mode, a truth is first believed by faith, and subsequently understood by reason, taken theologically. The truth of the Trinity, for instance, is first considered on the ground of faith, then on some philosophical ground, so that the Trinity is comprehended in a theological way within a universal whole ordering the ground of philosophy to the ground of faith. We shall see later how Bonaventure arrives at those modes of theological understanding; for the moment, we are concerned only with showing that he proceeds toward a universal understanding of truth by an integral, or intermediate, ordering of philosophy to faith. In proceeding this way, Bonaventure follows a very evident order. He relies principally on the authority of Sacred Scripture, to which he subordinates what he knows by reason or philosophy. As a consequence, he insists that theological authorities ought not to be drawn toward human reason, but that human reason ought to be subjected to theological authorities, provided thay do not hold what is clearly absurd l8 Let us take as an example his understanding of the divine infinity. He considers and rejects two positions on the question: first, that God is finite in essence and infinite in power; secondly, that God is finite in Himself and infinite with respect to creatures. He then accepts and holds as true the position that God is actually infinite in essence and in power. This position is to be held as true, because it is more in harmony with faith, which teaches that God is immense (3 Kings, 8.27); it is also more in harmony with the theological authorities, with the opinions of the masters in theology, and with human reason. Bonaventure closes his consideration of 17 3 Sent., 24.dub.3, Resp. (3.530; ed. mm., 3.522-23); cf. St. Augustine, De diver, quaes., q. 48 (PL 40.31). See also: 1 Sent., 19.2.dub.l (1.365; ed. mm., 1.292); DMT, 1.2, fm. 14 (5.53). 18 "... noil debemus auctoritates Sanctorum trahere ad nostram rationem, sed magis e converso rationem nostram auctoritatibus subiicere, ubi non continent expressam absurditatem." — 1 Sent., 15.1.un.4, Resp., in medio (1.265; ed. mm., 1.215).

680

CHAPTER EIGHT

the question by showing how that position produces an understanding of the divine infinity, an understanding grounded principally in the truth of the supreme immensity of God.19 Bonaventure proceeds in a similar way with regard to his understanding of the nature of the species by which an angel knows created things. Examining two positions on the question, he rejects the one as false and the other as impossible; he then presents his own position, holding that an angel knows all things through innate species, so that it has no need to acquire new species, but that it can receive new species if God were to create them. Having shown the reasons for this position, Bonaventure concludes by saying that it is more acceptable, because it harmonizes with reason, philosophy and Sacred Scripture.20 Handling the question on the creation of light (Gen., 1.2), Bonaventure discusses different positions taken on the problem. According to Augustine, the light created on the first day refers to the spiritual nature of the angels; this position is said by Bonaventure to conform sufficiently to Scripture, and so Augustine's view is in harmony with faith and with reason.21 Other commentators, however, though they follow Augustine, take a different position, holding that the work of the first day consisted in the formation of corporeal light. This position, according to Bonaventure, depends more on the text of Scripture and is more in harmony with the commentators, even those willingly following Augustine; therefore, Bonaventure accepts this position as the more secure and useful. 22 These three examples, which could be augmented, are sufficient to show that Bonaventure, relying chiefly on the authority of Scripture, forms and develops his theological understanding of Christian faith by first looking for reasons, particularly philosophical ones, compatible with his belief, and then by drawing his reasons toward faith, sometimes through the mediation of theological authorities, in order to make the object of belief intelligible on the universal ground of his theological thought. While searching for compatible reasons on the integral ground of that thought, Bonaventure is ready to accept any reason, especially from philosophy, which does not contradict the truth of Scripture; at the same time, he rejects every reason that, in his 19 "Necesse est ergo, quod omnino infmita sit actu. Et hoc concedendum est et tenendum est tamquam verum, eo quod magis est consonum fidei, quae dicit Deum immensum, et magis consonum auctoritatibus Sanctorum, qui omnes dicunt ipsum infinitum ... magis etiam consonum sententiis magistrorum, magis etiam consonum rationi." — 1 Sent., 43.un.2, Resp. (1.769-70; ed. min., 1.609-10); cf. fm. 3 (c). 20 "Et haec positio magis placet, quia concors est rationi et philosophiae et sacrae Scripturae." — 2 Sent., 3.2.2.1, Resp. (2.119-20; ed. nan., 2.110-12); cf. fa. 1-6 (a-f). 21 "Ad hanc autem positionem manifestandam, satis Scripturam conformat ... Multa etiam ad hoc adducit, quae ostendunt ipsam positionem esse consonam tarn fidei quam Scripturae quam etiam rationi ..." — 2 Sent., 13.1.1, Resp. (2.312; ed. min., 2.314). 22 "Et quia istam positionem magis insinuat textus Scripturae, et magis sequuntur expositores, etiam illi qui Augustinum libenter secuti sunt, ideo postio ista securius et utilius est sustinenda. Secundum hanc igitur positionem dicendum est quod Scriptura per lucem illam, quam dicit primo esse factam, corporalem lucem insinuat ..." — Ibid.

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

681

judgment, is either false or contrary to the truth of Scripture. Regarding the first of those two points, Bonaventure says that any reason contradicting Scripture must be rejected. It is entirely unacceptable, for instance, to say that there are three essences in God, whereas it is acceptable, as the Church teaches, to say that there are three persons in God. The meaning of essence forbids the application of the term to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit; but the meaning of person permits its application to each of them individually. Consequently, it is against Scripture to say that God has three essences, but not to say that God has three persons.23 Regarding our second point, Bonaventure distinguishes between the contrary to an opinion depending on natural reason and the contrary to an opinion depending on Christian faith. A theologian may hold the contrary to the first sort of opinion, because it is not connected with salvation; he may also assert the contrary to such an opinion, because the opinion is subject to inquiry by human reason. There are three sorts of opinion depending on Christian faith. One sort has to do with things necessary for salvation. If a theologian holds the contrary to an opinion of this sort, he errs by holding a false opinion; but if he asserts and defends his contrary opinion, he falls into heresy because of his presumption. Another sort of opinion concerns the certitude of Scripture. Men who do not know the Scriptures, Bonaventure says, may hold without guilt an opinion contrary to them. But a theologian cannot be without guilt if he holds such an opinion and, if he defends it, he contradicts Scripture, so that, because of his presumption, he is to be judged a heretic. The third sort of opinion looks to things belonging to faith or to Scripture. To hold the contrary to those things before a thorough scrutiny of them is not always erroneous; but it is both erroneous and culpable for a theologian, after a thorough scrutiny of those things, to maintain the contrary to them. On the other hand, whenever he is in doubt about a matter connected with faith, but neither depending on faith nor opposing it, a theologian may hold a contrary opinion following his own reasoning; nevertheless, he ought not to assert his opinion, because to assert a doubtful matter concerning God is an act of pride and of presumption.24 When theological authorities hold an opinion that seems to be unsound, the theologian should understand the opinion with piety, particularly because the authorities in question may be passing on an opinion held by someone else. Some authorities seem to hold, for instance, that the rational soul was created before the human body. If they are not passing on the opinion of 23 1 Sent., 23.dub.3 (1.417; ed. mm., 1.332). 24 1 Sent., 27.1.un.4, Resp. (1.478; ed min., 1.377-78). On the cause of heresy note: "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod haereticus iudicaretur qui pertinaciter negaret quae in Sacra Scriptura dicuntur, dicendum quod hoc non est quia omnia quae in Sacra Scriptura continentur teneant rationem obiecti proprii et motivi respectu ipsius fidei, sed hoc est quia consequuntur ad eius obiectum proprium. Quia enim Sacra Scriptura edita est ab ipsa Veritale increata et a Spiritu Sancto, qui contradiceret Sacrae Scripturae contradiceret ei cui fides assentit propter se, videlicet ipsi summae Veritati..." — 3 Sent., 24.1.2, ad 4 (3.51314; ed. mm., 3.505).

682

CHAPTER EIGHT

someone else, those authorities are to be understoood to hold that the soul is prior to the body, not in the order of time, but in the order of nature.25 There are some things, finally, about which Scripture has nothing to say. Things of that kind, Bonaventure remarks, can be known satisfactorily by philosophy. Scriptural commentators prefer to remain in doubt about such things because, out of reverence for Sacred Scripture, the commentators do, not take it upon themselves to explain things that God has not revealed. In that way, the theologian is put on his guard lest, out of curiosity, he go beyond the things contained in the Scriptures. Since some men approach the Scriptures from curiosity, however, the theologian has to settle many questions having nothing to do with salvation, and which would be better passed over in silence.26 Bonaventure's theology, as his texts show, is formed according to the mode of procedure that he himself sets down for the science of theology. Seeking reasons compatible with faith, he first orders reason or philosophy to faith as he composes one with the other in an integral whole of theological thought. Guided chiefly by the authority of Sacred Scripture, Bonaventure accepts every philosophical reason conforming to Christian faith, and he rejects any reason or opinion that he considers to be false or erroneous. Having composed faith and philosophy in an integral way, Bonaventure then conjoins them on the ground of a universal whole, thus making the object of belief to be intelligible, so that it can be comprehended by a theological mode of reasoning. In his view, therefore, theological knowledge is constituted intrinsically by a mode of procedure ordering and uniting philosophy to faith, or reason to revelation. As a consequence, theological knowledge has its certitude principally from divine authority, which supports the testimony of Scripture and upholds the loving assent of faith. Presupposing the authority of Scripture and the lumen of faith, theological knowledge has certitude in an inferior way from the commentators on Sacred Scripture, or theological authorities, and from the lumen of reason, or human philosophy, which is subordinated to the authoritative science of Scripture. Considered formally, then, theological knowledge is constituted from the concourse of the natural lumen of reason with the infused lumen of faith. This concourse results in a theological illumination of truth known with certitude primarily by the authority of God and, through the mediation of theological authorities, secondarily by the evidence of reason. Considered materially, theological knowledge is constituted from the union of the object of reason with the object of faith. The union, relying on the compatibility of reason with faith, establishes a universal object which is at once both credible and intelligible, thus 25 Bonaventure is referring particularly to Gregory Na^ianzen, who depends on Origen, and to John Damascene, who depends on Gregory Na/.ianzen: 2 Sent., 18.2.2. Resp. "De istis ..." (2.450; ed. min., 2.463). 26 2 Seat., 14.1.2.1, Resp. (2.342; ed. mm., 2.344).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

683

making possible a theological understanding of God in Himself and in His work of creation and redemption. The composition of reason with faith leading to that understanding follows the integral order of the creature to the Creator in the union of a human nature with the divine nature in Christ, Since Christ is the medium through which all things are reconciled and taken back to God, therefore, Christ is the one medium through which the truths of reason and of faith are reconciled and brought back to God, who is the radical principle of theological knowledge. 27 The two remaining causes of theology are its extrinsic factors. Treating first the final cause, Bonaventure asks whether theology is for the sake of contemplation, or whether its end is to make men good. He takes the view that the end of theology is to make men good. Preparing the ground for his position, Bonaventure presents three reasons in support of his view. In the first place, every doctrine dealing with things to be known for right living is a doctrine ordered to making men good; but theology makes known the things of faith without which "it is impossible to please God" (Heb., 11.6) and to live rightly: therefore, the end of theology is to make men good. Secondly, every doctrine conforming to the object of a virtue seeks to make men good; but theology conforms to the object of faith, and so theology seeks to make men good Thirdly, a particular doctrine conforms to the end of the whole of which it is a part; but the end of the whole of Scripture is not only that men be made good, but also that they be beatified: therefore, since beatitude is the optimum good, the end of theology is that men be made good.28 Establishing his position, Bonaventure sets forth three ways in which the human intellect can be perfected by science, namely, in itself, as it is engaged in some work, and as it is extended to the will. Because it is possible for the intellect to err according to its threefold state of perfectipn, God has given to the intellect a threefold habitus directing it in its operations. Taken in itself, the intellect is properly speculative, and thus it is perfected by a habitus of speculative science, which is for the sake of contemplation. Considered as engaged in some work, the intellect is perfected by a habitus of practical or moral science, which makes the man good. When the intellect is considered as extended to the will, however, the intellect is seen to be perfected by a habitus holding the middle between speculative science and practical science. This habitus, which is both speculative and practical, is the habitus of wisdom containing at once knowledge and love. The habitus of wisdom, then, is for the sake of contemplation, and to make men good, which is its principal end Theological knowledge also has as its principal end that men be made good Aided by theological knowledge, faith is in the intellect in such a way that faith, of its own nature, has the capacity to move the will. Illustrating the point,

27 Cf. 3 Sent., 19.2.2 (3.409-11; ed. min.. 3.402-04); Coll. in loann., 1.26, 4.1-11 (6.540-42). 28 1 Sent., Prooem., q. 3, fa. 1-3 (1.12; ed. min., fa. a-c, 1.10-11).

684

CHAPTER EIGHT

Bonaventure says that the knowledge of Christ dying on our behalf is such that a man, unless he is hardened in sin, is moved to love Christ, an effect not following a mathematical truth, which does not of itself move a disciple to love his master. In short, theological knowledge does not rest in an understanding of revelation, but in a love for God, who is contemplated in beatitude.29 To grasp the significance of Bonaventure's position on the final cause of theology, we shall have to recall some of the meanings that he gives to the terms end and order. He gives end two meanings: properly considered, the term designates that in which there is rest, or the ultimate end; the term also designates a terminus, or a proximate end. The term end is similar in meaning, then, to the term good which signifies an inclination to an end, and principally to God, to whom all things are ordered as to their ultimate end Among the meanings that Bonaventure has for order, there is one distinguishing the order of parts in a whole, or of things in the universe, from their order as a whole to their end. The first order looks chiefly to knowledge, and the second order looks chiefly to love, which inclines things to their end.30 The ultimate or principal end of theology, taken as a whole, is to make men good as Christians. Theology is inclined toward this end chiefly by love, or the virtue of charity. The end itself consists in the right order of Christian living, an order established by charity, which directs the thoughts, desires and actions of the Christian toward God, who is the supreme good and the beatitude of all men. In this respect, theology is a work of love offering to the Christian an understanding of what he believes, so that moving him to love God as the supreme good, he can order his life by an intelligent belief, thus meriting the reward of eternal beatitude. The terminus or proximate end of theology, then, is its understanding of revelation, an end ordered to the universal good of the Christian life. Since the understanding of revelation contains many parts, both speculative and practical, there are many proximate ends of theology, taken as a whole, which have to be ordered to its ultimate end. In the speculative order, for instance, there are the ends or parts looking to an understanding of God in Himself and in His creatures. All the parts in this order are united by a habitus of speculative science perfecting the Christian in his contemplation of God. In the practical order, moreover, there are parts looking, for example, to an understanding of God in His work of redemption and of beatification. All the parts in that order are united by a habitus of practical or moral science making the Christian to be good. Since the principal end of all the parts of theology is the good of the Christian, the habitus of speculative science is ordered to the habitus of practical science, so that the 29 Lac. cit., Resp., ad 1-3 (1.13; ed. min., 1.11). 30 See the following: 1 Sent., l.dub.15, Resp. (1.45; ed. min., 1.34); 2 Sent., 1.1.2.2, fm. 2 (2.28; ed. mm., fm. b, 2.21); 3 Sent., 29.un.l, ad 3 (3.639-40; ed min., 3.634-35).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

685

contemplation of God in theology is ordered to the good of the Christian. This order is established by wisdom: as a cognitive habitus, wisdom perfects at once the speculative and practical knowledge of theology; as an affective habitus, wisdom perfects the love inclining theology to seek the good of Christian life by an understanding of revelation. Thus, the ordering of part to part in theology and the ordering of the whole of theology to its principal end are both accomplished by the one habitus of wisdom. Now, considering the parts of Bonaventure's theology as an integral whole, we can see that its speculative parts are ordered and united to one another by a speculative habitus, and that its practical parts are ordered in a similar way by a moral habitus. All of its speculative parts are ordered and united to its practical parts by wisdom, which inclines and orders the whole in a universal way to its ultimate end. Since this end, which is its principal end, is the good of the Christian, therefore, making the Christian good is the principal end determining all of Bonaventure's reasons making the object of belief to be intelligible. Since his speculative knowledge is ordered to his practical knowledge, furthermore, his choice of this or of that particular reason, whether speculative or practical, is determined by its compatibility with faith as it looks to the good or perfection of Christian life. Consequently, the ordering of philosophy to faith in Bonaventure's theology, taken on the ground of an integral or of a universal whole, is determined extrinsically by his inclination to form and to develop a theological knowledge that will make the Christian good In other words, Bonaventure's intention is to establish a theology drawing together, for the good of the Christian, faith and philosophy within a total order of wisdom perfecting his knowledge and love of God as He is known and loved in a natural and in an infused manner. In establishing such a theology, Bonaventure depends largely on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. This particular aspect of his theological doctrine belongs to a proper study of his theological thought; however, a brief description of the work of the gifts concerned will suffice to show how they function in the constitution of his theological knowledge. The gift of understanding perfects the assent of faith: directing the search for speculative reasons, this gift brings about the contemplation of God from both created and uncreated principles. The gift of science perfects the practical intellect: directing the search for practical reasons, the gift orders theological knowledge to the good of moral actions. Those actions are chosen under the influence of the gift of counsel, which regulates Christian life according to both the natural law and the divine law. The gift of wisdom perfects the whole intellect and the will, which is moved through charity; so, beginning in knowledge and ending in love, the gift orders Christian knowledge to a loving contemplation of God from uncreated principles, an order established for the eternal good of the Christian. Hence, the parts of Bonaventure's theology, as an integral whole, are perfected by the gifts of understanding and science, the latter gift falling under the influence of the gift of counsel. The parts of Bonaventure's theology, as a universal whole,

686

CHAPTER EIGHT

are made uniform by the gift of wisdom, which is a single perfection of both knowledge and love.31 The other extrinsic factor of theology is its efficient cause. Considering that factor with reference to the Sentences, Bonaventure says that Peter Lombard is the efficient cause of the doctrine in the book of which he is the author. Explaining this, Bonaventure speaks about four ways of composing a book. A scribe writes a book by copying something else without addition or change. A compiler writes a book by copying something else to which he makes additions, but not of his own. A commentator composes a book from the writings of someone else, whose doctrine is the principal content of the book, which contains other things set down by the commentator as his own explanation of the doctrine. An author composes a book by setting down his own doctrine as the principal content of the book, which has things from other sources used to confirm the author's doctrine. It is in the latter way that Bonaventure refers to Lombard as the author of the Sentences.3'2 According to Augustine, however, Christ alone is a teacher, and so He ought to be the only author of a theological doctrine. Moreover, according to Aristotle, a man is not said to be a grammarian because he does something grammatical by chance or with the support of someone else. Since Lombard has composed his book from the doctrines of the Fathers, he ought not to be called an author, even if he has set down his own thoughts in the Sentences.33 Bonaventure says, in reply, that Augustine refers to two sorts of teaching. A man teaches by presenting what he knows to another either in speech or in writing; God teaches by imprinting on the human mind a habitus of science, and so He is said to be the principal teacher and author, or efficient cause, of theological doctrine. It is not to be said that Lombard, because he is supported by the Fathers, has composed his book from their doctrines. If his theology depended entirely on them, so that he himself did not have a habitus of theology, he would not be a theologian any more than a man imitating the good Latin of other men would be a grammarian. But Lombard acquired a habitus of theology over a long time and with much labour as he composed his book and confirmed his thoughts with the doctrines of the Fathers. The presence in his book of many sayings of other men does not take away his authorship, or authority, but confirms it and commends his humility. 34 There are three points to be noted with regard to Bonaventure's treat31 3 Sent., 34.1.2-3 (3.739-43; ed. min., 3.739-44); 35.un.l-4 (3.772-82; ed. mm., 3.777-88). We shall examine later Bonaventurc's dependence on the gift of piety, which has a significant function in the formation and development of his theological knowledge. 32 "Talis fuit Magister, qui sententias suas ponit et Patrum sententiis confirmat. Unde vero debet dici auctor hums libri." — ! Sent., Prooem., q. 4, Resp. (1.14-15: ed. min., 1.12); cf. con. 1-2 (a-b). See above: n. 152, p. 601. 33 Loc. cit., arg 1-2 (1.14; ed. min., 1.12). Cf. St. Augustine, De magistro, 14.46 (PL 32.1220); Aristotle, Ethica nicmn., 2.4 (H05a22-26). 34 Loc. cit., ad 1-2 (1.15; ed. min., 1.12); cf. St. Augustine, De doct. chris., Prol. nn. 8-9 (PL 34.18-20).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

687

ment of the efficient cause of theology. First of all, he attributes to God as the author and teacher of truth the principal cause of theological doctrine. Depending on God, the secondary cause of a theological doctrine is its human author, as Peter Lombard is the author of the Sentences. Our second point has to do with the interesting description by Bonaventure of the various ways that, in his time, a book could be said to be composed. His description explains, in particular, the difference between a commentator, such as Averroes with respect to Aristotle, and an author, such as Lombard or Aristotle. As a commentator, Averroes adds his own thoughts, by way of explanation or exposition, to the doctrine of Aristotle, who is not to be held accountable for them. As an author, on the other hand, Aristotle speaks with authority on philosophical questions, just as Lombard writes with authority on theological questions. Our third point concerns the authentic, or original, composition of a theological doctrine. In this regard, Bonaventure defends the authorship of Lombard, who has produced an original theological doctrine from his own thoughts, which depend on his habitus of theology. Though he supports his doctrine from the Fathers, whose texts he introduces into his own book, their doctrines simply confirm Lombard's doctrine and commend his humility. Consequently, the doctrines of the Fathers do not constitute the principal content of his Sentences. Although Bonaventure, as we have noted, refers to himself as a compiler, he is manifesting a humility in the way that he commends Lombard Bonaventure, even as a commentator on the Sentences, is doing far more than simply explaining or exposing Lombard's doctrine, which is not the principal content of Bonaventure's commentary. The content of Bonaventure's own composition shows quite plainly that he has produced an original theological doctrine reflecting his personal thoughts, which depend on his habitus of theology. Bonaventure is, therefore, the true author of a theological doctrine, which is confirmed by, but not composed principally from, the many doctrines that he uses in forming and developing it. While those doctrines, as parts of an integral whole, stand on their own particular grounds, even so, as elements of a universal whole, they are rendered uniform by Bonaventure who, as the efficient cause of his own theological knowledge, employs his personal principles and reasons to make the object of belief to be intelligible. Consequently, Bonaventure's theology is a truly Bonaventurean doctrine, even though, in its formation and development, it is influenced in many and different ways by the doctrines of other authors, such as Augustine and Aristotle. 35 35 Since Bonaventure's philosophy is an integral part of his theology, the conclusions that we have reached, in the preceding parts of our study, concerning the historical constitution of his philosophy are borne out by Bonaventure's texts on the authorship of a doctrine: his doctrine is properly and authentically Bonaventurean, because it is the product of Bonaventure alone; though many other elements besides his own thought have influenced the direction of his doctrine, they become properly Bonaventureau by their incorporation into the synthesis of which Bonaventure is the efficient cause. This holds true for his philosophy no less than for his theology.

688

CHAPTER EIGHT

Considering the nature of theology on a second occasion, Bonaventure describes theological knowledge according to the origin, progress and end of Sacred Scripture. The Scriptures originate, not through human investigation, but through the divine revelation coming from the Father, who gives us through His Son, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit. The Spirit distributes to each of us the gifts of God, particularly the gift of faith by which Christ dwells in our hearts. The unshakable truth and our understanding of Scripture depend on Christ, so that no man can know the revelation of God unless he has faith in Christ. As the measure of wisdom given to men by God, Christian faith is the means by which they have knowledge of the Scriptures. The progress of Scripture, or of theology, is not restricted to the laws regulating the human sciences, nor is it confined to a part of the created universe. Rather, proceeding according to the supernatural lumen of faith, the doctrine of theology gives to men a sufficient knowledge of things expedient for their salvation, and it offers that knowledge while describing the contents of the whole universe according to its width, length, height and depth. This mode of procedure is required by the condition of the human mind, which has the capacity to understand in many and magnificent ways an amplitude of abundant things. The human mind is, as it were, a most noble mirror reflecting, both naturally and supernaturally, the universality of earthly things. The doctrine of Scripture, then, or of theology, progresses according to the requirements of the human mind The end or fruit of Scripture consists in the fulness of eternal felicity. Containing the words of eternal life, the Scriptures have been written not only for our belief, but also for our eternal life, so that, seeing and loving God in beatitude, we shall have our every desire fulfilled. This is the end toward which we are directed by the Scriptures, and it is that end which is pursued in the thorough scrutiny, the teaching, and the hearing of revealed truth. To attain the end or fruit of theological doctrine, therefore, we must start out from simple faith in the Trinity and progress along the right road of Scripture. Approaching the Father with faith, we must come to know and to love Him through the Son and in the Holy Spirit. Knowing and loving Christ most firmly, we shall be able to know the width, the length, the height, and the depth of the Scriptures. Consequently, we shall arrive at a very plentiful knowledge and a most exceeding love of the Blessed Trinity, which is the end and the fulfilment of all that is true and good. Summing up, Bonaventure says that when the end of Scripture is desired and its principle believed, the progress of theological doctrine is readily seen to follow the many parts of Scripture (width), its account of times and ages (length), its description of ordered or gradated hierarchies (height), and the multiplicity of its mystical senses and hidden meanings (depth).36 Although Bonaventure's manner of speaking and of presenting his thoughts on the nature of theology in the above text differs from his 36 Breml., Prol. "... et intelligentiarum." (5.201-02; ed. mm., 5.3-5).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

689

previous texts, nevertheless, what he says and what he thinks about the subject on both occasions are essentially the same. In attributing the origin of theological doctrine to the Trinity, Bonaventure is attributing to God the principal causality of theological knowledge, which is an understanding of revelation as it is contained in Scripture. The ultimate end, or final cause, of theology is the good of eternal life, which consists in a loving contemplation, or a contemplative love, of the Blessed Trinity. This end is revealed in the Scriptures, and they are the right road to eternal life; so, in scrutinizing and in teaching the revelation of Scripture, theology pursues as its proximate end an understanding of the road leading to eternal felicity. To know and to understand the revelation of Scripture, we must have faith in Christ through whom the Father speaks to us in the Holy Spirit, who distributes to us the gifts of God Thus, depending principally on the lumen of faith, the doctrine of theology makes known from the Scriptures those things that are expedient for our salvation. In speaking about the progress of theological doctrine, then, Bonaventure refers at once to its formal cause, or mode of procedure, and to its material cause, or subject matter. The mode of procedure is not restricted to the laws regulating the human sciences, because theology, depending chiefly on the lumen of faith and the revelation of Scripture, proceeds not only by way of reasoning, which is required by the condition of the human mind, but also from authority, which is the principal source of theological certitude. The subject matter of theology, unlike a philosophical science, is not confined to a part of the universe; rather, including the whole work of creation and redemption, the subject of theology contains the whole history of human salvation. Hence, the matter of theology, following the Scriptures, extends from the beginning to the end of the universe. In this way, it can be seen that the subject matter of theology has to do radically with God, who is the principle and end of the universe. Moreover, summed up in Christ the Redeemer, who is creature and Creator, the matter of theology encompasses both spiritual and corporeal creatures, every age and time. From this point of view, it can be seen that, having many parts, the subject matter of theology, following Christ as its exemplar, is an integral whole containing many mystical senses and hidden meanings concerning the multiple conditions of the creature and its manifold relations to the Creator. Finally, enclosing many modes of intelligibility, the matter of theology is subjected to the condition of the human mind, which has the capacity to understand things in a universal manner. Consequently, it can be seen that the subject of theology, embracing the universality of the Scriptures, is a universal whole having a uniform mode of intelligibility, which is both natural and supernatural. Bonaventure goes on, in our present text, to show what he means by the four dimetisions of Scripture. The width of Scripture covers the Old Testament and the New Testament, each of them consisting of books that are legal, historical, sapiential and prophetical. Though the Scripture is divided into Old and New Testaments, those two principal parts do not

690

CHAPTER EIGHT

follow the theoretical and practical divisions of philosophy, which separates the truth of moral science from the truth of speculative science. Since Scripture is founded properly on the virtue of faith, therefore, because faith is the true basis of all moral conduct and of the whole of right living, Scripture cannot be divided into a knowledge of things to be believed and a knowledge of moral actions. On the contrary, moving men toward gpod and recalling them from evil, the knowledge offered by Scripture stirs up fear and love; for that reason, Scripture is divided into Old and New Testaments. Because men can be moved toward good and recalled from evil in a fourfold manner, the books of the Old Testament and of the New Testament have a fourfold division. The legal books move men to action through precepts coming from the divine omnipotence. The historical books move men to action by the examples and benefits provided by the divine goodness. The sapiential books move men to act because of the teachings of divine truth. The prophetical books, as their contents show, move men to act because of a conjoining of divine precepts, examples and teachings, thus manifesting the unity of the Scriptures. Those truths are all made known to the Church by the Holy Spirit, who teaches us in accordance with the promise of Christ.37 Including every time and every age, the length of Scripture goes from the beginning of the world to the day of universal judgment. The times of the world are three in number: the interior law of nature, the exterior law given in the Old Testament, and the infused law of grace communicated in the New Testament. The world has seven ages. The first, from Adam to Noah included the formation of the world, the fall of the demons, and the glorification of the angels. The second age, from Noah to Abraham, included the flood by which evil men were punished and good men were saved. The third age, from Abraham to David, had the institution of the synagogue, which was intended for the worship of God. In the fourth age, from David to the Babylonian Captivity, the kingdom and the priesthood of the Hebrews flourished, thus advancing divine worship. But the fifth age, from the Babylonian Captivity to Christ, was a period of trial and tribulation. The sixth age saw the birth of Christ, who is truly the image of God; this age will continue until the end of the world. The seventh age, beginning with Christ's burial, contains the souls of the just awaiting the clay of universal resurrexion; on that day, an eighth and everlasting age will begin. Having shown the correspondence of the seven ages of the world to the seven ages of man, Bonaventure remarks that Scripture describes, like a most beautiful song, the whole order and course of the world from its beginning to its end. As a song must be heard in its entirety to be fully appreciated, so the universe, to be wholly appreciated, must be seen in the totality of its order and government, which depend on divine wisdom. 37 Op. cit., Prol., n. 1 (5.202-03; ed. min., 5.5-7). For the particular books assigned by Bonaventure to each of the four divisions of the Old and New Testaments see: Loc. at., 5.202, n. 10.

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

691

Because no man lives long enough to have such a view, the Holy Spirit has given us the book of Sacred Scripture with a length measuring the course and government of the whole universe.38 The height of Scripture consists in its description of ordered or gradated hierarchies. The lowest hierarchy is the Church on earth, the highest hierarchy is the Blessed Trinity, and the middle hierarchy holds the angels, or the Church in heaven. Explaining this, Bonaventure says that things have being in a fivefold way. They have being in matter, or in nature, and in the knowledge that we acquire of them; these two ways of being are studied in philosophy, which considers things in their own nature and as they are known by innate principles or by acquired principles. Things have being in our infused knowledge, or through grace, and in the knowledge by which they are known in beatitude; they also have being in the eternal Wisdom or Word of God. Those three ways of being are studied in theology, which is a science founded on faith and made known by the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, making a substrate of philosophical knowledge, theology takes whatever it needs from natural things to make a mirror, so that, by this mirror, theology is a reflexion of divine things. Thus, theology erects a ladder, as it were, with its base touching the earth and its peak touching heaven. The whole of theology, therefore, is constituted through the one hierarch, who is Christ. Because of His human nature, Christ is the head of the hierarchy on earth, or the militant Church, and He is the head of the hierarchy in heaven, or the celestial Church. In His divine nature, Christ is the middle person of the hierarchy of the Blessed Trinity. Consequently, every grace flows into the Church, both militant and celestial, from the Father through His Son, Jesus Christ. Though the created universe is a thing of great beauty, the Church on earth has a greater beauty, which is surpassed only by the greatest beauty of the heavenly Church. But the supreme beauty, which cannot be surpassed, belongs to the Most Blessed Trinity. Beholding those several beauties, Sacred Scripture has the most exalted subject matter, a matter capable of delighting the human mind and elevating its intelligence. As the mind gazes more and more upon the wonderful things of God in the Scriptures, it delights more and more in seeking an understanding of them. 39 38 Op. cit., Prol., 11. 2 (5.203-04; ed. min., 5.7-9); for the sources of Bonaventure's doctrine on the seven ages of the world see: Loc. cit., ed. min., 5.7, n. 19. Bonaventure compares, in an earlier text, the order of the universe to the melodious rhythm of a song: "Similiter optime ordinatae sunt res in finem, salvo ordine universi, quia universum est tamquam pulchen'imum carmen, quod decurrit secundum optimas consonantias, aliis partibus succedentibus aliis, quousque perfecte ordinentur in finem. Unde sicut in productione rerum manifestatur potentia, sed in comparatione sive in ordine ad non-ens ostenditur summa potentia, creans ex nihito: sic ordo rerum in universo in se ostendit sapientiam, et ordo ad finem bonitatem, sed in comparatione unius ad alterum ostenditur summa sapientia et bonitas, quia nihil potest hunc ordinem deordinare ..." — 1 Sent., 44.1.3, Resp. (1.786; ed. min., 1.625). 39 Breail., Prol., n. 3 (5.204-05; ed. min., 5.9-10). Bonaventure describes the theological ladder to God in a trinitarian way in Sermo, Domin. in albis, 1.2 (9.290-91); Sermo, feria II post Pascha, "Primo igitur ... ulterius ascendere." (9.286-87).

692

CHAPTER EIGHT

The depth of Scripture goes down to the multiplicity of its mystical meanings. Beside the one literal sense, Scripture has meanings that are allegorical, moral or tropological, and anagogical.An allegorical meaning is unfolded when one event or deed points to another, which is to be believed. A tropological meaning is disclosed when by one action another is understood, and which is to be carried out. An anagogical meaning is exposed when, raising the mind to God, a passage of Scripture gives an understanding of what is to be desired, such as eternal felicity. The subject of Scripture, taken as a whole, is the object of belief. Because the conditions of believers are different, however, the one literal sense of Scripture has many modes of understanding, or intelligibility. With regard to substance, the subject of Scripture is God as one and triune; so Scripture has one literal sense with a triune intelligibility. With regard to power, the subject of Scripture is Christ, who is the one divine Word through whom all things were made and in whom they shine forth; therefore, Scripture has one wisdom with a multiform intelligibility. With regard to operation, the subject of Scripture is the work of redemption or reparation, which includes many deeds summed up in the principal oblation of Christ. These divisions of the subject of Scripture, Bonaventure maintains, suit its hearer, its origin and its end. To grasp the mystical and deep meanings hidden beneath the literal sense of Scripture, its hearer must have a humble and clean heart, a believing and studious mind. Thus disposed, the hearer of Scripture can penetrate its depths; so, seeking salvation, he can understand them in proportion to his ability. Although the depth of Scripture exceeds our understanding, even so, Scripture has such a multiform intelligibility that it can be understood in some way by every man. Suited to all men, then, the Scriptures illumine the mind and inflame the heart of the man who studies them diligently. The division of the subject of Scripture suits its origin, for it comes to us from the Father through Christ and the Holy Spirit, who speaks through the prophets and the other sacred writers. Scripture contains the revelation of God in both words and deeds: since all created things speak of God as effects make known their cause, the words and deeds in Scripture ought to speak of God. Moreover, Christ our teacher was humble in His humanity, but exalted in His divinity; so it was fitting that Christ and His doctrine be humble in speech, but profound in meaning: as Christ was wrapped in swaddling clothes, so the wisdom of God is clothed in the humble figures of Scripture. Furthermore, illuminating the minds of the prophets, the Holy Spirit revealed many things to them and in diverse ways: no understanding of Scripture can be hidden from the Holy Spirit, who was sent to teach us all truth; therefore, it was fitting that His teaching in Scripture should have multiple meanings hidden beneath the one literal sense. The division of the subject of Scripture suits its end, which is to direct us in our knowledge and actions, so that, making the right choices, we will attain eternal life. Since all things in the corporeal world were created to serve us on our way to God, Scripture instructs us about the diverse species of

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

693

creatures, thus using them to teach us the wisdom leading to eternal life. Wherefore, using the book of the creature and directing us to our end, the Holy Spirit reveals to us in the book of Sacred Scripture what we must believe, what we must do, and what we must love in order that we may see, may love, and may enjoy God forever in the book of life.40 Bonaventure's explanation of the four dimensions of Scripture manifests his originality as an author and a theologian. Those dimensions extend from the principal origin of Scripture to its ultimate end, and they enclose both the hearer of Scripture and its proper subject matter. The principal origin of Scripture is the Blessed Trinity: coming from the Father through Christ and the Holy Spirit, Scripture reveals many things about God in words and deeds concealing a multiplicity of meanings, as the human nature of Christ conceals the manifold mystery of His divine nature; the revelation of Scripture is made known by the Holy Spirit, who speaks through the human authors of Scripture and teaches us both the literal meaning of its texts and their threefold form of intelligibility. The end of Scripture is to direct us in our freedom of choice to know from faith and to do from charity those things that will bring us the reward of eternal beatitude. Directing us to our ultimate end, Scripture draws our attention to the different sorts of creatures in the corporeal world: because they have been made for our benefit, Scripture teaches us true wisdom through the good use of creatures, which direct our minds to God as to their principal cause. When Bonaventure's doctrine on the origin and end of Scripture is applied to his theology, which has the same origin and end as the Scriptures, it can be seen without difficulty that what he has said in his previous texts on the efficient cause and final end of theology conforms in every way to what he says about the source and fruit of Sacred Scripture, even though he describes the latter in an eminently trinitarian manner. Moreover, referring to the hearer of Scripture, Bonaventure speaks not only of the proper dispositions required to listen to the Scriptures, but also of the capability of each man to grasp their intelligibility according to his condition of understanding. In this regard, adverting no doubt to the theologian, Bonaventure cautions the man studying Scripture to avoid those attitudes of heart and mind that, causing error, are not conducive to a true understanding of the mysteries revealed in Scripture.41 The proper subject of Scripture, taken in its totality, is the object of belief, as an object of belief. This object is presented in different ways by Scripture, which is divided into different parts. The broadest division consists in the Old Testament and the New Testament, the one presenting the 40 Brevil., Pro!., n. 4 (5.205-06; ed. mm., 5.10-12). 41 "Ideo sub cortice litterae apertae occultatur mystica et profunda intelligentia ad comprimendum superbiam, ut ipsius profunditate in humilitate litterae latente et superbi comprimantur, et immundi repellantur, et fraudulent! declinentur, et negligentes excitentur ad intelligentiam mysteriorum." — Loc. at., (5.206; ed. min., 5.11).

694

CHAPTER EIGHT

object of belief chiefly through fear, and the other chiefly through love. Including the Old and New Testament, the next division has a trinitarian aspect: the legal books look to the divine omnipotence, the sapiential books look to the divine truth, the historical books look to the divine goodness, and the prophetical books unite the other three kinds by conjoining the precepts, the teachings and the examples in Scripture with respect to the object of belief. Thus, the first division suggests the two natures and the one person of Christ; the second division suggests the three persons and the one nature of the Trinity. The trinitarian aspect, with a particular reference to the Holy Spirit, is maintained in Bonaventure's division of the subject of Scripture according to the three times of the world and its seven ages, which correspond to the seven ages of men. The times and ages of men and the world will come to an end with the beginning of an eighth age in an everlasting beatitude. Those several divisions of the subject of Scripture are brought together, finally, in a way enabling the theologian to understand the object of belief. Considering the substance of Scripture, the theologian arrives at an understanding of God as one and triune. Considering the power of Scripture, the theologian attains an understanding of Christ as the one Word through whom all things were made and in whom they are known. Regarding the operation of Scripture, the theologian reaches an understanding of the redemption and salvation of men. Consequently, going beyond the one literal meaning of Scripture, the theologian comes to a knowledge of its triune intelligibility, and so he understands that Scripture has one wisdom with a multiformity of meanings, just as the one sacrifice of Christ includes the multiplicity of His actions. The various divisions or parts of Scripture, then, furnish the theologian with the integral parts of his theology. Depending on Scripture, theology is a work of the Holy Spirit and is founded on faith, which is the basis of Christian life. Differing from philosophy, furthermore, theology does not divide its subject into speculative and practical parts. Rather, following Scripture, theology divides its subject into parts treating different aspects of the history of human salvation. For that reason, the subject of theology is divided integrally into God and creation, Christ and redemption, the Church in heaven and on earth. Thus, Bonaventure's use of the analogy of the ladder, with its base on the earth and its peak in heaven, is another way of descrioing theology as an integral whole: each rung of the ladder represents a part or division of theology; taken together, all the rungs represent theology as a whole composed of integral parts, which are ordered and united within the whole, as the two natures of Christ are ordered and united in His one person. Moreover, Bonaventure's use of the analogy of the mirror, which is made from natural and supernatural knowledge, is another way of describing theology as a universal whole: making a substrate of philosophical knowledge, theology takes what it needs from philosophy, which studies the being of things in nature and in our natural knowledge; subordinating philosophy to faith, theology studies the being that things have

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

695

through grace, in beatitude, and in the Wisdom or Word of God. In other words, philosophy is so ordered to faith by theology that philosophical knowledge is transformed within a universal whole, which is a theological understanding reflecting the object of belief as it is made to be intelligible. Those two analogical ways of describing theology enable us to see more clearly the true solution to the problem of the proper order of philosophy to faith in Bonaventure's theological knowledge. On the ground of a universal whole, his theological knowledge is constituted in such a way that, by subordinating philosophy to faith, the one is ordered to the other, so to speak, as matter is ordered to form. Hence, to form and to develop his theology, Bonaventure depends only in a material way on philosophy, which supplies, at his own discretion, whatever he needs to make his faith intelligible in a formally theological way. Moreover, in taking what he needs from philosophy, Bonaventure selects those reasons that, as we have seen, are compatible with faith according as it is determined by the good or perfection of Christian life. As a consequence, the order of philosophy to faith in Bonaventure's theological knowledge, considered on the ground of a universal or of an integral whole, is determined extrinsically by the end that he has in view, namely, to make the Christian good by living the life revealed in Scripture. In his ordering of philosophy to faith, then, Bonaventure is guided by the book of Scripture, which uses the book of the creature to teach us about God as the Creator in order that we may know Christ as our Redeemer. Concerning the Creator, Scripture speaks in a sublime way of God as the supreme being and the first principle; therefore, referring to His effects only in a general way, Scripture does not describe the particular natures, movements, powers and properties of creatures. Rather, reflecting its trinitarian origin, Scripture describes the work of creation according to the power, wisdom and goodness of God as the cause of nature, the principle of its order, and the end of its perfection. As a doctrine of salvation, therefore, Scripture speaks of creation only with a view to making known Christ's work of reparation. For that reason, Scripture is silent on many things, such as the creation and fall of the angels, for the fallen angels are not included in the work of reparation. To know of the creation and fall of the angels, the theologian must penetrate the literal sense of Scripture and arrive at an understanding of its spiritual or mystical meanings. In that way, the theologian can know the sevenfold hierarchy of the angels in heaven by an analogy with the sevenfold state of the Church, or the hierarchy on earth, a state corresponding to the ages of men and to the days of creation. In short, on forming and developing his theology, Bonaventure conforms to the book of Scripture by taking from the book of the creature only what he needs to arrive at a theological understanding of Christ's work of reparation; using the book of the creature in this way, Bonaventure first integrates with faith compatible reasons taken from philosophy, which he then subordinates in a material way to faith, so that, as a material constituent of his theological

696

CHAPTER EIGHT

knowledge, Bonaventure's philosophy makes an appropriate contribution to the formation and development of a universal understanding of divine revelation, which has a distinctively trinitarian character.42 Bonaventure completes his second account of the nature of theology with a description of the mode of procedure proper to Scripture. Having a multiform wisdom, Scripture also has one authentic mode of procedure containing many subordinate forms of presentation. Since the end of Scripture is our good and salvation, Scripture proceeds according to an inclination of the will and not according to a speculative consideration of truth. Scripture proceeds, accordingly, more by way of examples than by arguments, by way of promises rather than by reasons, and by way of piety instead of definition. Differing from the human sciences, Scripture proceeds according to the diverse inclinations of the wills of men: it moves some men by precepts, prohibitions and examples; it moves other men through benefits, and it moves still other men by promises and threats. Those several forms of presentation belong to the one mode of narration; so they cannot depend on the certitude of natural reason, because particular deeds cannot be proven by human reason. Lest the testimony of Scripture be held in doubt, however, God has given to Scripture a certitude of authority in place of the certitude of reason. Since certitude of authority belongs only to one who can neither deceive nor be deceived, therefore, because those qualities belong to the Holy Spirit, Scripture ought to have a perfectly authentic mode of procedure suited to divine revelation, and not to human investigation. Seeing that the Holy Spirit is the most perfect author of Scripture, Bonaventure says that nothing in Scripture is to be scorned as useless, or despised as false, or rejected as inadequate, for the Holy Spirit cannot say anything which is superfluous, or false, or of small measure. Wherefore, following the proper procedure of Scripture, the theologian must use an appropriate method in expounding the text of Scripture and in attaining an understanding of it. He ought to expose the multiple meanings, or forms of understanding, hidden beneath the one literal sense. The theologian cannot do that with ease unless, becoming thoroughly familiar with the Bible, he commits it to memory by a constant reading of the text. He must not try to expound or to understand the different parts of Scripture in one and the same way, for the words and deeds in one part of Scripture do not have the same significance as those in another part. To explain the true meaning of the literal sense of Scripture, then, and to understand its threefold mystical meaning, the theologian must follow the right rules for the interpretation of the text of Scripture. Observing those rules, he will come to know how Scripture describes the beginning, the progress and the consummation of the universe, which contains both good and evil men, the one advancing toward an eternal reward and the other falling back toward 42 Op. cit., 2.5 (5.222-24; ed. min., 5.41-44).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

697

eternal punishment. Knowing all that, the theologian can understand that Scripture speaks of the universe, as it were, in the form of an intelligible cross revealing to the human mind the four dimensions of truth concerning the course of things in the whole world To attain such an understanding, the theologian must know the sevenfold truth of Scripture: God, who is the first principle, the creation of the universe, the fall of man, his redemption through the blood of Christ, the reformation of man through grace, his medication through the sacraments, and his final retribution through punishment or eternal glory. The Doctors of the Church, Bonaventure remarks, have attained this understanding. But their doctrine is so diffused that other men, studying Scripture, cannot get to know it even after a long period of time. Moreover, those starting out in theology have difficulty in making their way through Scripture, which seems to them to be an impenetrable forest. Hence, in response to requests from his associates, Bonaventure says, again in his humble way, that he has composed from his poor small knowledge a summary of the truth of theology, a summary including the more important points of revealed doctrine, to which he has added some reasons, as they occur to him, leading to its understanding. Since theology is a word expressing the truth of God, or of the first principle, therefore, as the highest science and doctrine, theology takes all things back to God as to their first and supreme principle. In assigning reasons for the truth of Scripture in his theology, Bonaventure takes them from the first principle in order to show that the truth of Scripture comes from God, that it is according to God, and that it is for sake of God. Proceeding that way, Bonaventure indicates that the understanding of Scripture is a single and ordered science deserving the name theology.*3 Though abounding more in detail, Bonaventure's doctrine in the above text is essentially the same as his doctrine in the previous texts on the modes of procedure that are proper to Scripture and the science of theology. Possessing one wisdom, but communicating it in several ways, Scripture, has one mode of procedure, but several subsidiary forms of presentation. Those forms are used by Scripture in order to adapt the revelation of God to the different dispositions of men, who are drawn toward good and recalled from evil according to the various inclinations of their wills. Since Scripture accomplishes its purpose by words and deeds that are not subject to the certitude of natural reason, the truth of Scripture depends on the Holy Spirit, who supports its authentic mode of narration with the certitude of divine authority, a certitude which is infallible because of its origin. Thus, as in his previous texts on the subject, Bonaventure maintains that Scripture does not investigate truth after the manner of a human science,

43 Op. cit., Prol., nn. 5-6 (5.206-08; ed. min., 5.12-16). The right rules for interpreting Scripture are drawn up by Bonaventure from Augustine's De doctrine Christiana: 2.9-14 (PL 34.42-46); 3.10-27 (PL 34.71-90).

698

CHAPTER EIGHT

which has certitude from reason; rather, having certitude from divine authority, Scripture teaches truth by way of divine revelation, which appeals to faith, and so the truth of Scripture is beyond the natural certitude of reason. Now the Christian is bound to believe in a general way all the things in Scripture; however, he is bound in a special and proper way to believe the articles of the Apostolic Creed. The Christian has an illumination through faith, which is superior to the illumination of reason; because the illumination of faith comes from God, who is the supreme truth, the Christian is bound to believe God more than anyone else. The Christian must, therefore, believe whatever God has revealed, whether this be according to reason, or above reason, or even contrary to experience. If the Christian refuses to believe a truth of revelation, he lacks the reverence due to God as the supreme truth, because he prefers the judgment of his own rational skill to the revelation of God, thus falling into pride and conceit. A truth of revelation is above or beyond human reason because of a lack of evidence on which reason can rely to see the truth. This is why, Bonaventure says, the mind of the believer must be illuminated through faith and strengthened by the testimony of authority supporting the revelation of Scripture. Both the illumination of faith and the authority of Scripture come from the supreme truth: they are received through Christ, who is the Word and Splendour of the Father, and through the Holy Spirit, who teaches divine truth and moves the believer to accept it. Hence, divine authority supports faith, which assents to that authority; because the divine authority resides chiefly in Scripture, the truth of Christian faith is in complete harmony with Scripture. Harmonizing with Scripture, then, Christian faith presents the fundamental truths of belief in the Apostolic Creed Though the Creed contains those truths within the twofold truth of the Trinity and of Christ, all the truths of faith constitute one object of belief, which is God as the supreme and threefold truth.44 To make the object of belief to be intelligible, a theologian must first know the object as it is presented by Scripture. Following the proper procedure of Scripture, a theologian must rely mainly on the authority of faith as he scrutinizes and studies the sacred text. Moreover, to understand its mystical or spiritual meanings, a theologian has to know and to use the right rules for interpreting Scripture both literally and theologically. When those rules are properly employed by a theologian familiar with the text of Scripture, he can explain its many meanings in such a way that, obtaining a universal perspective of revelation, he is able to understand that the different or integral parts of Scripture form, as it were, an intelligible cross manifesting to the human mind the manifold wisdom of divine revelation. To reach such an understanding, however, a theologian has to know by faith what Bonaventure calls the sevenfold truth of Scripture. This is his

44 Breail., 5.7 (5.260-61; ed. min., 5.114-16).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

699

way of saying that, to understand the object of belief, a theologian must be guided by the Holy Spirit, who is the most perfect author of Scripture. In other words, a theologian needs the gifts of the Holy Spirit, for He is the divine teacher making known to us the true meaning of revelation. As presented here by Bonaventure, then, the proper procedure for theology is evidently and essentially the same as the one set down in his earlier work. Though he stresses the necessity for a theologian to proceed according to the proper method of Scripture, at the same time, Bonaventure calls attention to the need of a theologian to proceed also according to a method appropriate to his science of theology. Both methods depend principally upon the lumen of faith, which relies on divine authority; but the science of theology is an understanding of revelation, so that, relying also on the lumen of reason, theology proceeds according to the condition of the human mind. As a consequence, seeking theological certitude by scrutinizing the text of Scripture, the science of theology proceeds in such a way that, never departing from the authority of faith or of Scripture, it unites and subordinates reason to revelation with the help of theological and other doctrinal authorities. 45 In forming and developing his own theology, Bonaventure makes the object of belief to be intelligible with reasons that he takes from God, or the first principle. Bonaventure does this, as he says himself, in order to show that his theological knowledge, which is a single and ordered whole, depends on God as its primary cause, exemplar principle and ultimate end. This is not to say that the reasons used by Bonaventure to constitute his theology are founded solely on faith. It is to say, rather, that his reasons are selected with a view to the principal or primary object of his theology, which is the first principle, or the one and triune God. Keeping that object in view, Bonaventure says that theology, including his own, provides an understanding of divine things inasmuch as knowledge of them is necessary for salvation. Accordingly, theology looks to God as the principle of creation, redemption and retribution. Theology has to do not only with God, therefore, but also with creatures, particularly the rational creature. Since the rational creature has fallen into sin and is in need of redemption, theology handles the problems of sin and the incarnation of the Word; it also treats questions on the grace of the Holy Spirit, the life of the sacraments, and the state of final judgment. Thus, in Bonaventure's view, the science of theology is the only perfect science, because it starts out from the first principle, which is God as the Creator of all things, and it arrives at the ultimate end, which is the eternal reward or punishment of men. Theology is also the only perfect wisdom, since it begins with God as the 45 This is precisely the way that Bonaventure himself proceeds in his Breviloquium, as any particular chapter of the work will show: he first states and explains a truth from Scripture, and then, adding his own reasons, he proceeds to demonstrate how the truth is to be understood; he confirms his doctrine now and again with texts taken from other theological authorities, or by simply referring to them.

700

CHAPTER EIGHT

supreme cause of all things, moves down from God as the remedy for sins, and comes back to God as the reward of a meritorious life and the end of every desire. Beginning where philosophical knowledge terminates, therefore, theological wisdom contains a perfect delight, for the wisdom of theology is the life and salvation of men. Consequently, every Christian ought to be inflamed with a desire to possess theological wisdom.46 The reasons used by Bonaventure in his theology, then, are selected with a view to making intelligible the object of belief, which is God as the principle of creation, redemption and retribution. When considering God as the principle of creation, for instance, Bonaventure also takes into account the things that God creates. Since philosophy provides a knowledge of creatures as effects of the Creator, who is known to be their cause, Bonaventure uses reasons taken from philosophy in order to arrive at a theological understanding of God as the Creator of the universe. In a similar way, using philosophical reasons concerning the nature and moral life of man, Bonaventure reaches a theological understanding of God as the principle of redemption and retribution. On adapting his philosophical reasons to Christian faith, as we have shown, Bonaventure subordinates them in a material way to the truths of faith, a subordination including a formal subjection of the lumen of reason to the lumen of faith, thus giving rise to a theological mode of understanding. In that way, Bonaventure's philosophical reasons undergo a Christian transformation on the universal ground of his theological knowledge, which looks to God as the primary and principal object of belief. This transformation comes about at the moment when Bonaventure's theology takes as a principle what his philosophy provides as a conclusion; such is the significance of his position that theological knowledge begins where philosophical knowledge terminates. We have now the final element of our solution to the problem of the proper order of philosophy to faith in Bonaventure's theology. On the universal ground of his theology, philosophy is ordered formally to faith by the subjection of the lumen and certitude of reason to the lumen and certitude of faith, which relies on the authority of Scripture. Philosophy is ordered materially to faith by the subordination of the conclusions of the one to the truths of the other, so that the latter are taken as the primary principles and the former as the secondary principles of understanding in Bonaventure's theology. The philosophical conclusions subordinated in that way to the

46 Brevit.^ 1.1 "... omnium Christianorum." (5.210; ed. min., nn. 1-3, 5.19). Although theology deals with many and various things, nevertheless, it is one science, even though its subject has a sevenfold division: "Ex his patet, quod licet theologia sit de tot et tarn variis, est tamen scientia una, cuius subiectum, ut a quo omnia, est Deus; ut per quod omnia, Christus; ut ad quod omnia, opus reparationis; ut circa quod omnia, unicum caritatis vinculum, quo caelestia et terrestria connectuntur; ut de quo omnia in libris canonicis comprehensa, credibile ut credibile; ut de quo omnia in libris expositorum, credibile ut intelligibile, secundum Augustinum, de Utilitate credendi (11.25; PL 42.83), quia quod credimus, debemus auctoritari, quod intelligimus, ration!'." — Loc. cit., (5.210; ed. min., n. 4, 5.20).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

701

truths of faith are reached by Bonaventure in his consideration of this or of that part of the subject of his theology, taken as an integral whole, and so allowing faith and philosophy to stand on their own grounds.47 Describing the nature of theology a third time, Bonaventure contrasts it as a science with philosophy, with the gift of science from the Holy Spirit, and with the science of glory or beatitude. He is speaking expressly of the gift of science, which has two antecedents and two consequences. The antecedents are the innate lumen of reason and the infused lumen of faith; the consequences are a natural knowledge of the Creator and a revealed knowledge of the Saviour. The science of philosophy depends on the lumen of reason to have a clear knowledge of the Creator; the science of theology depends, as a Christian science, on the lumen of faith to attain a clear knowledge of the Saviour. Taking gift in the broad sense, Bonaventure shows how philosophy and theology are gifts of God; that done, he proceeds to describe the nature of philosophy and of theology in order to give an understanding of the gift of science, which is a gift in the strict sense. Considering the nature of philosophy, Bonaventure describes it as "certain knowledge of truth that can be scrutinized". He then outlines and discusses, as in his previous texts on the subject, the three principal sciences of philosophy and their individual parts, or subsidiary sciences. Following that, Bonaventure talks about the dangers besetting the Christian who does not integrate every part of philosophy with, and subordinate it to, his faith: the science of philosophy is a way to the other sciences of theology and the gift of the Holy Spirit; therefore, a Christian who wants to stand still in philosophy runs the risk of falling back into darkness.48 Turning to the science of theology, Bonaventure describes it as "devout knowledge of truth that can be believed". This knowledge is caused by the eternal light of God, so that, to receive it, a man must be cleansed through the holiness of faith. The science of theology is founded on the articles of faith contained by the Creed, as the science of philosophy is based on the first principles of truth contained by reason. As an understanding of Scripture, theology penetrates the depth of divine mysteries, which can be known only through faith, and that rests upon a humble submission of heart and mind to God. With those dispositions, a theologian can understand the multiformity of meanings in the words and deeds recorded in Scripture, an understanding communicated by the Holy Spirit, who perfects the Church, or the hierarchy on earth. It is the task of the Church, Bonaventure observes, to refute those

47 In an earlier text, Bonaventure shows that theology, taking what it needs from the human sciences, draws conclusions from the principles of faith contained by the articles of the Apostolic Greed, thus attaining an understanding of the object of belief: 3 Sent, 24.3.1 (3.524-27; ed. min., 3.517-19). In the next section of this chapter, we shall put to the test our solution to the problem of the proper order of philosophy to faith in Bonaventure's theology. 48 Coll. df donis, 4.2-13 (5.474-76). We shall return to Bonaventure's warning here in our next chapter; for the moment, we are simply showing the context of his description of the science of theology.

702

CHAPTER EIGHT

who weaken its foundations by distorting or contradicting the truth of Scripture. For this reason, every prelate in the Church should have a knowledge of the science of theology, as otherwise he will be like one blind man leading another (Matt., 15.14). Picturing theology as a science seeking the good of the Church, Bonaventure illustrates some of the dire consequences for the prelate falling into error by his failure to instruct his people from a theological understanding of the truth of Scripture.49 This last account by Bonaventure of the nature of theology is clearly a brief summary of the fundamental points of his doctrine on the question. He emphasizes in particular the dependence of the science on the gift of piety and its foundation on the articles of faith. In addition, he accents the practical side of theology, which seeks the good of the Church, or of the Christian life, thus imposing an obligation on prelates to obtain a sufficient knowledge of theology to instruct other Christians in the truth of Scripture. With regard to philosophy, Bonaventure still insists that the theologian integrate it with, and subordinate it to, his faith lest he fall into error by relying solely on philosophy, which he ought to use as a means to understand his faith. There is, then, no fundamental difference between this brief account of the nature of theology by Bonaventure and his earlier accounts of the same subject. Considered historically, Bonaventure's doctrine on the nature of theology is influenced primarily by Augustine, who contributes a number of things to the constitution of Bonaventure's theological knowledge. He takes from Augustine the twofold principle that belief is due to authority, and that understanding is due to reason. Using the principle in his own way, Bonaventure maintains that faith has its certitude from divine authority, which supports the revelation of Scripture; adding reason to faith, theology arrives at an understanding of revelation by means of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal author of Scripture. Bonaventure's doctrine on theology as a proper mode of understanding is also influenced by Augustine. In this regard, Bonaventure adapts to his own synthesis the distinction made by Augustine between understanding as an activity preceding belief and an activity following belief. Taking understanding the first way, Bonaventure teaches that Christian faith is preceded by the natural act of understanding, because the object of faith must be known in some way before the believer can assent to it. Taking understanding the second way, which follows previous thought about an object, Bonaventure teaches that the believer can comprehend the truths of faith in two different modes. Some truths are antecedent to faith, such as the being of God, and they can be comprehended before they are believed; but they must be believed as they are

49 Lot. cit., 4.14-18 (5.476-77). Bonaventure's description of the other two sorts of knowledge does not concern us: his account of the gift of science concentrates on its practical function as "holy knowledge of truth that can be believed and loved": 4.19-24 (5.477-79).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

703

made known through revelation in order that the believer can have merit in his theological understanding of them. Other truths are consequent upon faith, such as the Trinity, and they can be comprehended only after they are believed, so that they are understood solely in a theological mode. There are many truths, such as the historical events in Scripture, that can never be comprehended by reason, even in a theological mode; those truths are known only by faith, and so they are accepted on authority of God alone, which is greater, according to Augustine, then the skill of the human mind. Bonaventure's theological understanding of the Trinity from the vestige and image of God in creation also reflects an Augustinian influence; but the way that Bonaventure attains his understanding of the Trinity from those similitudes, as we shall see later, depends on his own use of the principle of appropriation. The practical end determining Bonaventure's integration of philosophy with faith in his theology shows to some degree an Augustinian influence: he follows Augustine in saying that the whole wisdom of philosophy teaches love of God and of neighbour, who is an image of God; this twofold love, Bonaventure points out, is the teaching of the whole of Scripture. Bonaventure goes to Augustine, moreover, to show that theology uses suitable reasons to defend Christian faith against its adversaries; however, he goes to Richard of St. Victor to show that theology seeks the necessary reasons upholding faith, a search resulting in an understanding that, according to Bernard, gives delight to perfect Christians. It is on Aristotle, nonetheless, that Bonaventure relies to show the fundamental reason why theology seeks to understand the Christian faith: because the end imposes a necessity on the means, theology must employ suitable arguments to defend the faith, bring forward probable reasons to fortify weak Christians, and bring out the necessary reasons giving joy to those who are perfect in their belief. Augustine provides Bonaventure, finally, with the distinction between the primary and the secondary causes of theology, or its principal author, who is God, and its secondary author, who is the theologian. On applying this distinction to Lombard's Sentences, Bonaventure provides us with the evidence that he himself is a true author, and not simply a disciple or a follower of Augustine, or of any other doctrinal authority. Although the teachings of other authors confirm Bonaventure's doctrine, and even influence its formation and development, those teachings are at most instrumental causes of his doctrine, which is properly Bonaventurean, because its principal content is the original thought of Bonaventure, who is the efficient cause of his own knowledge, both theological and philosophical.50

50 It is very important to note that, excepting Augustine, whom Bonaventure judges to be a philosopher and a theologian, no philosopher whatsoever, not even Aristotle, is cited throughout the Breviloquatm, a work depending essentially on the use of philosophy for an understanding of faith. This

704

CHAPTER EIGHT

The original character of Bonaventure's theological knowledge is very evident, on the one hand, in the many ways that it reflects its principal cause and, on the other hand, in the distinctive r61es given to Christ and the Holy Spirit in its constitution. As a reflexion of its principal cause, Bonaventure's theology has a remarkably trinitarian character, which appears almost everywhere in his writings. Revolving around the central mystery of the Trinity, Bonaventure's theology is essentially one with a triune understanding of revelation. Among the many ways that he describes the subject of his theology, for example, the most characteristic way is that describing God as the principle of creation, redemption and retribution. This description follows the revelation of the power, truth and goodness of God in Scripture, which comes to us from the Father through Christ and the Holy Spirit. As an extension of the mystery of the Trinity, the incarnate Word, who is Christ, has several distinctive roles in the constitution of Bonaventure's theology. For instance, because Christ is both God and man, He is the exemplar cause of the integration of the different parts of theology into a single whole ordering and uniting one part to another, as the divine and human natures are ordered and united in the one person of Christ. As a consequence, Christ is the one and only medium by which every theological truth, whether founded on faith or on reason, is taken back to its origin in God As the principal author of Scripture, the Holy Spirit has many distinctive r61es in the constitution of Bonaventure's theology, which is rooted firmly in the teaching of Scripture. The work of the Holy Spirit, who has been sent to teach us every truth, is particularly evident in the r61e assigned by Bonaventure to the gifts of the Spirit in the formation and development of a true understanding of divine revelation. It is by means of the gifts of the Spirit, who illumines our minds in order that we may understand, that Bonaventure unites philosophy to faith within the universal whole of his theological thought. As a result, considered materially, his theology subordinates natural knowledge to infused knowledge; considered formally, his theology subjects the natural lumen of reason to the infused lumen of faith. Consequently, the many sevenfold ways that the theology of Bonaventure handles the object of belief manifest the work of the Holy Spirit.51

There are two series of texts that we shall examine on the nature of theology in the writings of Aquinas, who does not approach the problem in testifies to the authentically Bonaventurean character of the philosophy in that work, even though the philosophy there shows the influence of other philosophical authorities. 51 This manifestation, as we have seen, is most evident in the Breviloquium, which has a sevenfold organization reflecting the work of the Holy Spirit in Bonaventure's theology.

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

705

the same way as Bonaventure. The first question posed by Aquinas in both series of texts is whether we need theology in addition to the philosophical sciences. In his first reply to the question, he says that we need theology both because philosophy cannot deal with the things known by faith "without which it is impossible to please God" (Heb., 11.6), and because philosophy makes God known from creatures, thus giving us an imperfect knowledge of God Depending on revelation, the higher doctrine of theology is necessary, therefore, to supply the knowledge that philosophy cannot give.52 All who think rightly, Aquinas continues, posit contemplation of God as the end of human life. God can be contemplated either from creatures, which is an imperfect contemplation, or immediately as He is in Himself, and this is a perfect contemplation. The first sort of contemplation, according to Aristotle, is the felicity of human life and the end to which the whole of philosophy is ordained. The second sort of contemplation is found in beatitude and is possible for man because of faith. Since the means must be proportioned to the end, a man, to attain the contemplation of beatitude, must have knowledge of God as it is inspired immediately by the divine lumen, and such is the doctrine of theology. Consequently, theology commands all the other sciences as their principal; using them for its own purpose, theology puts their ends under its own end, so that the end of the whole of philosophy is contained in and ordered to the end of theology.53 Replying again to the question, Aquinas maintains that, because philosophy relies on human reason, the doctrine of divine revelation in Scripture, not pertaining to philosophy, is necessary for human salvation. Men are ordered to God as to an end exceeding the comprehension of reason; therefore, to order their lives toward that end, men must know it beforehand, and so they need to know it by a divine revelation. Moreover, only a few men can know the truth that reason is able to discover about God and, taking a long time to discover it, they fall into many errors in the course of their investigations. Since the whole of human salvation depends on knowledge of this truth, therefore, to make salvation easier and more certain, it is necessary that men be instructed by a divine revelation in the truth of God and of divine things, an instruction received through faith. Pertaining to the doctrine of Scripture, theology differs in kind from philosophy. Though they can treat the same things, theology treats them as they are known by the lumen of revelation, whereas philosophy treats them as they can be known by the lumen of natural reason.54 The view of Aquinas on the need for theology contains some similar and different points with respect to the doctrine of Bonaventure, who does not treat explicitly the question of the necessity for theology. Both men posit 52 1 Sent., Prol., a. 1, con. 1-2 (1.7). 53 Lac. at.. Sol. (1.7-8); cf. Aristotle, Ethica nicom., 10.7 (1177al2-1178a7). 54 ST, la, 1.1 (1.2ab).

706

CHAPTER EIGHT

theology as depending on the revelation of Scripture and the lumen of faith. They also concur in saying that theology, dealing with things necessary for salvation, subordinates philosophy to the end of human life, as that end is known by divine revelation. Consequently, Bonaventure and Aquinas hold in common that philosophy and theology can handle the same things, but not in the same way. It is in regard to the latter point that we find the principal difference between the two theologians. According to Bonaventure, faith and philosophy first stand on their own grounds in theology, taken as an integral whole; then, as a universal whole, theology subordinates the truths of philosophy in a material way to the truths of faith, while subjecting formally the lumen of reason to the lumen of revelation. That subordination and subjection are controlled by the end determining the science of theology. According to Aquinas, the subordination of philosophy consists in an ordering of its end to the end of theology; so, perfecting the end and not the truth of philosophy, theology considers things as they are made known by the lumen of revelation, while philosophy considers them as they are subject to the lumen of reason. This raises the problem of the order of philosophy, as such, to faith in the theology of Aquinas, a problem to which we shall give our attention as we proceed. The next question asked by Aquinas has to do with the unity of theology. He replies that theology is one science, because it studies several things as they fall under the divine reason, which embraces all things, just as metaphysics studies all things as they fall under being. Moreover, in the one Book of Scripture, we learn of the Creator, the creature and human actions. Those things do not disrupt the unity of Scripture; likewise, the unity of theology is not disrupted by the different things that it studies. The unity of knowledge and the plurality of its objects are proportionate to its dignity. Now the divine knowledge is highest in dignity, for God knows all things distinctly by one act; therefore, theology is the highest science, because its efficacy, as Dionysius teaches, comes from the lumen of God. Remaining one through the divine lumen, theology knows many things under one reason, which is the divine reason. The unity of theology, as a result, is not like the unity of philosophy, which is both one through metaphysics and diversified by many sciences, such as natural philosophy and moral philosophy. Differing from philosophy, then, the science of theology has a unity and an efficacy from the certitude of the divine lumen, which enables theology to study many things at once. Although theology considers natural things and human actions, even so, as Augustine indicates, the proper work of the theologian is to study God's work in men.55 In his second reply to this question, Aquinas handles it in a simpler way. He says that the unity of a potency or of a habitus should be taken from 55 1 Sent., Prol., a. 2 (1.9-11). Cf. Dionysius, De cad. hier., cc. 1-2 (PL 3.119.22); St. Augustine, De lib. arbit., 2.19.50 (PL 32.1267-68).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

707

their formal object, as a man and an ass are united in that which is coloured, or in the formal object of sight. Since Scripture considers things as they are revealed by God, all things whatsover that can be revealed by God belong to the one formal object of sacred doctrine, or theology. As a single science, theology looks chiefly to God and it considers creatures as they are referred to God, either as to their principle or as to their end. The things that philosophy treats in diverse sciences are treated in one science of theology under one reason, namely, as those things can be revealed by God. Hence, the science of theology is, so to speak, an impression of the divine science, which is a single and simple knowledge of all things. 56 In Bonaventure's consideration, the unity of theology also differentiates it from philosophy, which has speculative and practical sciences. Theology is one science, in his view, because it is founded on the unity of divine revelation contained in Scripture and known by Christian faith. Although the science of theology, as Bonaventure understands it, divides its subject into several parts, nonetheless, all the parts of his theology are one in its principal object, which is God, to whom creatures are reduced as to their origin, exemplar and end. Thus, in many respects, the positions of Bonaventure and Aquinas on the unity of theology are quite alike. There are other respects, however, in which their two positions are not alike. The unity and efficacy of theology, in Bonaventure's view, are due formally to a concurrence of the lumen of reason with the lumen of faith, and they are due materially to a conjunction of natural truth with revealed truth; the principal and determining factors are on the nobler sides of faith and revelation. In the view of Aquinas, the unity and efficacy of theology are due formally to the divine lumen and materially to the divine reason. As a result, reflecting the divine knowledge, the theology of Aquinas considers the things that God has revealed in Scripture and any other thing, including a thing studied in philosophy, that can be revealed by God, or contained within the formal object of theological knowledge. In the judgment of Aquinas, therefore, one and the same thing can be a material object of faith and philosophy. In his theology, however, that thing is considered formally inasmuch as it can be, or has been, revealed by God. The third question put by Aquinas is whether theology is a practical science. Dividing the question into three parts, he says, in the first part, that the noblest science is for its own sake, as Aristotle shows, but a practical science is for sake of a work to be done. Because theology is the noblest science, it is speculative and not practical, for it considers many things that are not directed to a work to be done by us.57 As one science, theology is able to perfect man sufficiently both in operation and in contemplation. Thus, considered according to its essence, theology is practical and 56 ST, la, 1.3 (1.3b-4a). 57 1 Sent., Pro!., a. 3, qa. 1, con 1-2 (1.11).

708

CHAPTER EIGHT

speculative. But a science is determined principally by its end; therefore, theology is principally speculative, because its ultimate end is contemplation of truth in beatitude. This is the end to which are directed all the good works studied in theology. Now, according to Aristotle, metaphysics is the principal science, for it studies the highest causes. Since metaphysics knows those causes from created principles, it is a wisdom or divine science only with respect to its subject. Theology knows the highest causes immediately through faith, and so theology is more properly a wisdom than metaphysics, because theology is a divine science with respect to both its subject and its mode of knowing.5B Aquinas returns to this aspect of theology in the third part of the question, where he insists that theology most of all is properly a wisdom: "We speak wisdom among the perfect" (1 Cor., 2.6). Natural wisdom consists in a knowledge of both science and understanding, or of conclusions and principles. A Christian assents more readily and more firmly, Aquinas maintains, to the things of faith than to the first principles of reason. The articles or principles of faith are above the understanding of reason, however, thus causing a deficiency in our knowledge of them. That deficiency is not due to a lack of certitude in the principles of faith, but to the condition of the human intellect. Guided by faith, nonetheless, human reason can comprehend more fully what it accepts by belief, and so reason can in some way understand what it believes.59 The unity of theology is such, according to Aquinas, that the science encompasses the things contained by philosophy in diverse sciences. Theology is able to do that because of the formal object in which it unites different things, so that it can handle them as they are knowable by the divine lumen. Consequently, as God knows by the same science both Himself and what He does, so the sacred doctrine of theology comprehends at once both speculative and practical things. Dealing principally more with divine things than with human actions, however, theology is more speculative than practical. It deals with human actions according as they order man to the perfect knowledge of God in which eternal beatitude consists. As the noblest science, then, theology transcends all the philosophical sciences. It transcends the speculative sciences of philosophy with respect to certitude and to subject matter. Theology has its certitude from the inerrant lumen of divine knowledge, whereas the philosophical sciences have their certitude from the lumen of human reason, which can fall into error. Theology has to do chiefly with things going beyond human reason, while the philosophical sciences have to do with things falling under human reason. The end of theology, moreover, is eternal beatitude to which, as to the ultimate end, all the ends of the practical sciences of philosophy are ordained. Since theology is superior to all the philosophical 58 Loc. cit.. Sol. 1, ad 1 (1.12-13); cf. Expos, de Trin., 2.2, ad 1-2 (Decker, pp. 87-88). See in Aristotle, Ethica nicom., 6.7 (1141a9-19). 59 1 Seat., Prol., a. 3, Sol. 3 (1.14); cf. qa. 3, con. (1.12).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

709

sciences, it does not depend on them in any necessary way. Rather, receiving its principles from the revelation of God, theology uses the philosophical sciences in order to manifest more clearly the truth of revelation in Scripture. In other words, using the sciences of philosophy in an instrumental way, theology employs them to obtain a knowledge of things known by natural reason in order to attain more easily an understanding of things transcending natural reason. Having a superiority over the whole of philosophy, the sacred doctrine of theology is the greatest wisdom. The speculative wisdom of philosophy judges the inferior sciences through their highest causes, and the practical wisdom of philosophy orders human actions while directing them to the end of the whole of human life. The sacred doctrine of theology, however, looks properly, or absolutely, to God as the highest cause of the whole universe. On looking to God that way, theology considers God not only as He can be known from creatures, which is the way that philosophy considers God, but also as He is known to Himself and by Himself alone, a knowledge that God communicates to others by revelation. Because wisdom is a knowledge of divine things, as Augustine teaches, theology most of all is properly a wisdom. With respect to philosophical wisdom, theology is an absolute wisdom and, as a divine science, it takes its principles from the wisdom of God, who orders the whole of human knowledge. Although theology does not prove the principles of the philosophical sciences, nevertheless, it is proper to theology to judge those principles and to reject as false whatever it finds in the sciences of philosophy to be contrary to the truth of sacred doctrine. In passing judgment on the philosophical sciences, theology depends on the knowledge obtained by studying the truth of revelation, and not on a knowledge attained from an inclination toward moral goodness. The latter knowledge, in the order of nature, is the result of virtue, as Aristotle shows; but, in the order of grace, this knowledge results from the gift of wisdom coming from the Holy Spirit, as Dionysius explains and Scripture teaches (1 Cor., 2.15-16).60 It would appear, at first sight, that Aquinas takes an entirely different view than Bonaventure of theology both as a practical science and as a wisdom. The views of Bonaventure and Aquinas regarding those questions are undoubtedly different, but their differences do not prevent the two theologians from holding some very important points in common. With regard to theology as a practical science, they concur in saying that theology is essentially practical and speculative, but they differ in saying whether the science is principally practical or speculative. Bonaventure says that it is principally practical, because its end or final cause is to make men good. In his view, the ultimate end of theology is the good of eternal life,

60 ST, la, 1.4-6 (1.4a-6b). Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 12.14.22 (PL 42.1009); Aristotle, Ethka nicom., 10.5 (1176al4-28); Dionysius, De divin. nomin., 2.9 (PG 3.648).

710

CHAPTER EIGHT

which consists in a contemplative love, or a loving contemplation, of God in beatitude. To attain that end, the science of theology seeks an understanding of the revelation in Scripture, which contains the way of life that a Christian must follow in order to see and to love God with joy in the life of eternal glory. In positing theology as principally practical, then, Bonaventure does not attribute a priority to love over contemplation. Rather, he considers contemplation of God to be the ultimate good of the Christian way of life, which is founded on faith. Seeking to understand that way of life, theology directs the believer to perfect his faith by living in a perfectly Christian manner in order that his love for God may increase. As a consequence, perfected in love, the believer will be perfected ultimately in knowledge by contemplating God eternally in beatitude. Thus, the ultimate end of theological knowledge is the beatific contemplation of God, a contemplation consummated in love: the combined perfection of contemplation and love cause the perfect joy of possessing God forever in peace. In the view of Aquinas, the ultimate end of theology is the contemplation of truth in beatitude, or the eternal contemplation of God as He is in Himself. Because a science is considered by Aquinas to be determined principally by its end, he maintains that theology is principally speculative. Although theology studies the good of the Christian life as it is presented in Scripture, nevertheless, theology seeks to know the truth of that life more than to direct the believer in his moral actions. The science of theology studies the truth of moral actions and of moral virtues inasmuch as by them the Christian is ordered to his ultimate end. Hence, the knowledge that theology attains of the Christian life, including its moral aspects, is directed to the beatific contemplation of God. Stressing the unity of theological knowledge as a reflexion of the divine knowledge, Aquinas brings together the speculative and practical truths of theology within the unity of its formal object, just as the truth of what God knows and the truth of what God does are essentially one in His knowledge. Reflecting the divine knowledge, then, theological knowledge looks principally to divine things and, seeking the perfection of contemplation in beatitude, orders to God all other things, including the virtues and actions that are necessary to attain the reward of eternal life. In sum, Aquinas and Bonaventure are of one mind with regard to the contemplation of God as the ultimate end of the Christian life; but they differ in their understanding of the principal end of theology: for Aquinas, this is the same as the ultimate end of the Christian life; for Bonaventure, it is the good of the Christian life, which is ordered to the ultimate good of eternal contemplation. It is in regard to the unity of theology as a wisdom ordering all things to God that Aquinas and Bonaventure manifest their greatest differences. In this respect, Bonaventure speaks of theology as having the perfection of a speculative habitus and the perfection of a practical habitus; the two perfections are made one in a habitus of wisdom uniting the intellect and the will while ordering the whole of theology through love to the good of eternal

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

71 1

contemplation. The unity of theological knowledge, therefore, and its order to the end of Christian life, are established by the gift of wisdom coming from the Holy Spirit, to whom Bonaventure attributes a most important rdle in the constitution of theological knowledge. Aquinas does not concur with Bonaventure in attributing the unity of theology to the work of the Holy Spirit, or to His gift of wisdom. According to Aquinas, the gift of wisdom belongs to the practical order of Christian virtue, and so the knowledge obtained by the gift of wisdom does not pertain to the constitution of theological wisdom. Theology is a wisdom both because it is a knowledge of the highest causes of things, particularly as they are known through faith, and because it is at once a knowledge of principles and conclusions, or of the articles of faith and the consequences drawn from them by the science of theology. There are, therefore, some similarities between the views of Aquinas and Bonaventure on the nature of theological wisdom. They hold in common that theology is a perfect wisdom because of its principle, which is the highest cause as it is known immediately by faith, and because of its object and end, namely, God as the first cause of all things and as the ultimate good of human life. Bonaventure and Aquinas also hold in common that the wisdom of theology transcends the wisdom of philosophy, which knows the highest causes only from their effects. Thus, for both theologians, the wisdom of theology has its origin from the one supreme cause, which is known by philosophical wisdom at the conclusion or end of its considerations. The two theologians differ, however, in their conceptions of the way that theology, as the nobler and superior discipline, uses philosophical knowledge to obtain an understanding of God and His effects from the articles or principles of Christian faith. Bonaventure has theology subordinating philosophical knowledge to the principles of faith on the ground of a universal whole, so that the one communicates an intelligiblity to the other; similarly, theology subjects the lumen of reason to the lumen of faith, thus giving rise to a theological lumen in which God and His effects are understood with a certitude founded chiefly on the lumen of faith and the authority of Scripture. Aquinas has theology subordinating philosophical knowledge, not to the principles of faith, but to the end of faith and within the one formal object of divine revelation. Guided by revelation, theology uses philosophical knowledge as an instrument to bring about, from the principles of faith, an understanding of God and His effects with a certitude coming from the lumen of faith. Since the lumen and principles of faith are derived from the lumen of divine knowledge, the certitude of theology is founded primarily on the lumen of divine knowledge. Now the end of Christian faith is an understanding of the things revealed by God. This understanding is attained in theology by the instrumental addition to faith of philosophical knowledge. 61 61 Cf. Expos, df Trm., 2.2, ad 6-7 (Decker, pp. 89-90).

712

CHAPTER EIGHT

There are some things in the above texts of Aquinas that can contribute to a solution of our problem concerning the order of philosophy to faith in his theology. A thing known by faith and philosophy is taken in a material way by Aquinas in his theology, which considers the thing formally as it has been, or can be, revealed by God Thus, ordering philosophy to faith within the community of a material object, Aquinas unites philosophy and faith in the one formal object of his theology. That object contains the truth of divine revelation, which is known with certitude by the lumen of divine knowledge and communicated to us through faith. From this point of view, the philosophical knowledge brought by Aquinas into his theology is formally theological, because it is one with faith in the single formal object of his theological knowledge, which depends primarily on the lumen of divine knowledge. Aquinas obtains his theological knowledge by drawing conclusions from the principles of faith by the lumen of faith. In formulating his conclusions, however, Aquinas uses philosophical knowledge in such a way that, subordinating the conclusions of philosophy to the end sought by faith, he attains a clear understanding of divine revelation by the instrumental use of what he knows through philosophy to bring about a theological knowledge of what he believes through faith. In other words, Aquinas takes from philosophy what he knows about God from creatures and, ordering this knowledge to an understanding of divine revelation, he conforms the conclusions of philosophy to the principles of faith. As a result, Aquinas has an understanding of God as He is believed through faith to be the cause of creatures, an understanding brought about with the instrumental aid of philosophy, which provides Aquinas with a knowledge of the relation of creatures to God as their supreme cause. It is the conclusions of philosophy, therefore, that Aquinas orders or subordinates in a material way to the principles of faith. Following that subordination, he conforms philosophy to faith within the one formal object of his theology, and so his theological knowledge, relying principally on the lumen of faith, manifests a secondary or auxiliary reliance on philosophy, or the lumen of reason. Employing the lumen of reason, Aquinas establishes the truth of his philosophical conclusions before he subordinates them to the principles of faith. Though he does not judge the principles of philosophy by the lumen of faith, even so, guided by his faith, he rejects as false any philosophical conclusion contrary to the truth of revelation. The end determining his use of philosophy in his theology, therefore, and the principal reason determining his rejection of philosophical errors pertain to the order of faith and revelation.62 In the remaining portion of the question under examination, Aquinas follows Augustine in teaching that theology is a science of the things pertaining to man's salvation.63 As a science, theology deals with particular 62 Our solution to this problem is still incomplete, for we have not yet seen all the texts of Aquinas on the nature of theology; when we have seen them, we shall then compare his position on the prohlem to the position of Bonaventure. 63 1 Sent., Prol., a. 3, qa. 2, con. (1.11-12); cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 14.1.1 (PL 42.1035-37).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

713

things only inasmuch as they are examples of human actions. Every science, consisting in knowledge with certitude, has to do with necessary things, since contingent things cannot cause certain knowledge. Every science, moreover, is a knowledge of conclusions drawn from principles. A superior science draws its conclusions from self-evident principles, whereas an inferior science draws its conclusions from principles known to be true by a superior science. The science of geometry, for example, depends on self-evident principles, but the science of optics depends on the conclusions of geometry; using those conclusions, the science of optics is subalternated to the science of geometry, the latter considering magnitude and the former considering visual magnitude. In a similar way, but in regard to the mode of knowing, the science of theology is subalternated to the divine knowledge: theology knows imperfectly what God knows most perfectly; depending on the divine knowledge, theology proceeds from the articles of faith as from principles proved infallibly in the divine knowledge. Thus, the first principles of theology are the articles of faith, which are known self-evidently through the lumen of faith by one who has the virtue of faith, just as the first principles of reason are known self-evidently by every man through his agent intellect. The science of theology, nonetheless, does not spurn the principles of reason, nor does it try to prove the articles of faith. On the contrary, as any other science derives its conclusions from the innate principles of reason, theology derives its conclusions from the articles of faith as from principles infused by God.64 The similarities and differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure are readily apparent with regard to the nature of theology as a subalternate science. For both men, the science of theology derives its conclusions from the articles of faith, and those principles have certitude from the revelation of God. Bonaventure subalternates his theology to the revelation in Scripture, which leans on the divine authority upholding faith, whereas Aquinas subalternates his theology to the divine knowledge, which is the source of the revelation in Scripture accepted on faith. As a subalternate science, the theology of Aquinas gets its principles from the divine knowledge, while Bonaventure's theology, as a subalternate science, gets its subject matter from the revelation in Scripture. Considering the matter of theology, Aquinas maintains that the science ought to have a proper subject distinguishing it from every other science. Aquinas bases his consideration of this question on a threefold comparison between a science and its subject. In one way, the comparison shows that all things studied by a science are contained in its subject. In this way, some theologians posit things and signs (res et signa) as the subject of theology; other theologians posit as its subject the whole Christ, Head and members. In a second way, the com-

64 Loc. cit., Sol. 2, ad 1-2 (1.13-14); cf Expos, de Trin., 2.2, ad 4-5 (Decker, pp. 88-89). The next treatment by Aquinas of this aspect of theology adds nothing to his first text; see: 57", la, 1.2 (l.Sab).

714

CHAFFER EIGHT

parison shows that knowledge of the subject is the principal intention of a science. In that way, some theologians posit God as the subject of theology, because knowledge of God is its principal intention. In the third way, the comparison shows that the proper subject of a science distinguishes it from another science. In this respect, some theologians posit the object of belief as the subject of theology, because the science proceeds by the lumen of faith; other theologians posit the work of redemption as the subject of theology, because the whole science is ordered to a knowledge of the effect of redemption. Seeking one subject embracing all the subjects in the threefold comparison, Aquinas posits as the subject of theology the divine being according as it can be known by the lumen of faith: all the things studied in theology are either God himself, or they are from God or for God; therefore, considering things principally as they are related to God, theology studies them in proportion to their proximity to the truth of the Divinity.65 Now the subject of a science is similar to the object of a potency. Since the proper object of a potency is that on whose account all things are referred to the potency, as all coloured things are referred to sight on account of their colour, therefore, the subject of theology is God, because all things are studied in theology on account of God, either because they are God himself, or because they are ordered to God as to their principle and end This is clear, Aquinas says, from the principles of theology, for they are from God; so the subject of theology is God, for the whole of a science is contained in the power of its principles. Consequently, all the other subjects assigned to theology by different theologians belong to its proper subject according as those many subjects are ordered to God, but they are not parts or species of its one subject. Although what God is cannot be known by a science, even so, by using His effect, whether of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, the science of theology can consider the things pertaining to God, just as a philosophical science can demonstrate something about a cause from its effect by using that effect in place of a definition of the cause.66 No one of the many subjects of theology found by Aquinas in other theologians coincides exactly with any one of the three subjects assigned to theology by Bonaventure. Some of the subjects mentioned by Aquinas, such as God and Christ, are found in Bonaventure, but not in the precise way that Aquinas refers to them. According to Bonaventure, the radical subject of theology is God, to whom all things are reduced as to their original principle; in this regard, his position is not very far apart from the position of Aquinas. Again, for Bonaventure, the subject of theology as an integral whole is Christ, who is both human and divine, or creature and Creator; as a subject of theology, Christ is the exemplar of the order and union of the different things studied in the science, and so He is the medium through 65 1 Sent., Prol., a. 4 (1.14-16); cf. Expos, de Trin., 2.2, ad 3 (Decker, p. 88). 66 ST, la, 1.7 (1.6b-7a).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

715

which all those things are taken back in theology to their radical principle. This view of the subject of theology is different from the view taken by Aquinas; nevertheless, the two views are not altogether different, because they come together in ordering all things to God. The difference between the two views is that the theology of Bonaventure orders things to God through Christ, but the theology of Aquinas does not. Finally, in Bonaventure's judgment, the proper subject of theology as a universal whole is the object of belief as it can be made intelligible by the addition of reason. In the judgment of Aquinas, however, the proper subject of theology is the divine being, or God as He can be known by the lumen of faith. It is in regard to the proper subject of the science that the greatest differences exist between Bonaventure and Aquinas. They concur in positing God, or the first truth, as the object of belief with respect to the virtue of faith; but they differ considerably in their views of the object of belief as it pertains to the science of theology. In Bonaventure's view, theology considers the object of belief as it is found in Scripture, so that, presupposing the assent of the virtue of faith and the authority of Scripture, theology takes as its proper subject the Blessed Trinity as this object can become intelligible by the addition of reason. Consequently, the object of belief considered in Bonaventure's theology, as a science subalternated to Scripture, is God as one and triune. When that object is made to be intelligible, it is then understood to be God as the principle of creation, redemption and retribution. Thus, on the one hand, Bonaventure's theology resembles the theology of Aquinas and, on the other hand, their two theologies are very different. The one theology resembles the other inasmuch as they both deal principally with God, to whom they order or reduce all things as to the principle and end of nature and of grace, or of creation and of restoration. The theology of Bonaventure has a distinctively trinitarian character, however, a feature not marking the theology of Aquinas. In his view, theology considers the object of belief as it is known through faith; so, presupposing the assent of the virtue of faith, theology takes its subject from the divine knowledge, which is communicated to us in the revelation of Scripture. Hence, the object of belief considered in his theology, as a science subalternated to the divine knowledge, is the divine being rather than the Trinity, or God as the one principle and end of all things both of nature and of grace. This does not mean that the Trinity is outside the subject of the theology of Aquinas, for the Trinity is contained within that subject. It means, rather, that the Divinity and not the Trinity is the formal object of his theology, which considers the Trinity according as the three persons are related or ordered to one another within the Divinity. It is on account of the Divinity as God can be known through faith, moreover, that Aquinas orders or relates philosophical knowledge to the theological understanding that he seeks of the object of belief. On conforming the conclusions of philosophy to the principles of faith, Aquinas uses his philosophical knowledge of what God effects in nature in order to obtain a better understanding of what God ef-

716

CHAPTER EIGHT

fects through grace. In that way, Aquinas conforms his knowledge of God's action in nature to his belief in God's action through grace; this conformation takes place within the one formal object of his theology. As a result, by using any of God's effects, whether of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, Aquinas is able to demonstrate the truth of an effect from its cause, which is understood in a theological way, because the whole of theology is contained in the power of its principles, or in the lumen of divine knowledge from which the articles of faith are derived. This introduces the question of the mode of procedure assigned by Aquinas to the science of theology, a question handled by him in a way that, following Boethius and Aristotle, requires a consideration of the matter of theology.67 Beginning his consideration, Aquinas says that the principles of theology are received through revelation, so that their mode of reception ought to follow the revelation of God and the condition of the man receiving them. Now, beside an infused lumen, faith depends on the exterior words by which the objects of belief are made known (Rom., 10.4), just as the understanding of natural principles depends on sense knowledge. Moreover, the truth of the exterior words used in communicating faith is confirmed by signs, such as the miracles wrought by the Apostles (Mark, 16.20). Consequently, the mode of procedure in theology, following Scripture, must be narrative with respect to the signs confirming Christian faith. But the principles of theology are not proportionate to human reason, which must rely on the senses; therefore, guided by similitudes taken from the senses, theology knows its principles by way of the signs given in Scripture, which proceeds in a metaphorical, symbolical and figurative mode. The signs in Scripture are given for the destruction of error, the instruction of morals, and the contemplation of truth. Since error cannot be destroyed without the use of arguments, Scripture uses arguments from authority, or even from reason and from similitudes taken from natural things. In defending faith against error, the science of theology must follow the literal sense of Scripture. The other senses of Scripture are contained by similitudes that cannot be used in an argumentative way, because, as Dionysius teaches, symbolical or mystical theology is not argumentative. 68 Moral instruction is given in so many ways that Scripture proceeds by precepts in the legal books, by warnings and promises in the prophetical books, and by the examples narrated in the historical books. The science of theology, regarding moral instruction, must first proceed according to the historical sense of Scripture in order to know the truths of faith; thereafter, proceeding from the historical sense, theology imparts proper instruction from the moral sense of Scripture. There are many things in Scripture directing our con67 "Respondeo dicendum, quod modus cujusque scientiae debet inquiri secundum considerationem materiae, ut dicit Boetius ... et Philosophus." — 1 Sent., Prol., a. 5, Sol. (1.17). Cf. Boethius, De Trinit., Prooem. (PL 64.1247-49); Aristotle, Ethica nicom., 1.1 (1094al-17). 68 Dionysius, Epist., 9.1 (PC 3.1103-07). See also in St. Thomas: Expos, de Trm., 2.3, ad 5 (Decker, p. 96).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

717

templation of truth. To understand truth, a theologian must proceed in an argumentative manner, as the Fathers do in their writings and as Lombard does in his Sentences, for those authorities follow the procedure of Scripture and compose their books from its doctrine. On proceeding toward contemplation of truth, then, theology follows the allegorical sense of Scripture in regard to things of the present life, and it follows the anagogical sense in regard to things of the life of beatitude. In short, though theology is one science, it has many modes of procedure, because it deals with many different things and various forms of truth: theology uses arguments to defend Christian faith and to discover the truth of questions arising from the principles of faith. 69 Reconsidering the question, Aquinas divides it into three parts, one concerning theology and two concerning Scripture. With regard to Scripture, he considers first its metaphorical mode of procedure, and then the three spiritual senses hidden beneath its one literal sense. He maintains that it is fitting for Scripture to use metaphors in order to teach us spiritual things in the guise of corporeal things. This manner of teaching is natural to man, who must know intellectual things from sensible things. By using metaphors, Scripture teaches unlearned men truths that they can grasp; but Scripture teaches the same truths without metaphors in other places that learned men, or theologians, can consult in order to understand divine revelation. Since God is the author of Scripture, He has the power to convey truth not only by the significance of its words, but also by making the things signified by the words of Scripture to stand for other things. The first sense of Scripture is its historical meaning, which is its literal sense, or the primary signification of its words. Although this is the sense intended by God, nevertheless, because God comprehends all things at once in His understanding, the one literal sense of Scripture has been given by God several spiritual senses, particularly the allegorical, moral and anagogical senses. In the allegorical sense, the things of the Old Testament signify the things of the New Testament. According to the moral sense, the things either done in Christ or standing for Christ are signs of the things that Christians ought to do. Taken according to the anagogical sense, the texts of Scripture signify the things of eternal beatitude. Proceeding from the texts of Scripture, the theologian ought to argue solely by way of their literal sense, because the things hidden beneath the spiritual senses are not necessary for Christian faith. All the things that are necessary for Christian faith are contained in the literal sense of Scripture, and this sense is always true, even though it consists sometimes of metaphors.70 69 1 Sent., Prol., a. 5 (1.16-19). 70 ST, la, 1.9-10 (1.8b-lla). Citing Scripture extensively in these articles, Aquinas also follows Dionysius: De cael. hier., 1.2 (PG 3.121), and 2.2 (PC 3.136); St. Augustine: Confess., 12.31.46 (PL 32.844); St. Gregory: Moral., 20.1 (PL 76.135). To compare the particular differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure, who follows Augustine exclusively, concerning the spiritual senses of Scripture would take us beyond our proper objective; however, it is useful to note that Aquinas and Bonaventure concur in

718

CHAPTER EIGHT

Referring to theology, Aquinas affirms that the science proceeds in an argumentative way, as the philosophical sciences do. A physicist, for instance, neither proves the principles of his natural philosophy nor disputes with a man denying its principles. The physicist leaves those tasks to the metaphysician, who proceeds in one of two ways against the man denying the principles of the lower science. If the man denying the principles is willing to concede some point, the metaphysician argues against him on the basis of that point, taken as a common ground. If the man is unwilling to concede any point, the metaphysician cannot argue against him; nevertheless, the metaphysician can proceed to disprove the reasons given by his adversary for denying the principles in question. Similarly, following Scripture, the theologian can argue against a man denying the articles of faith, but willing to concede something of divine revelation. It is in this way, Aquinas says, that the theologian uses one article of faith against a man denying another article; in the same way, the theologian invokes authorities in theology to refute the arguments of heretics. If an adversary does not believe anything revealed by God, however, the theologian cannot use reasons to manifest the truth of the articles of faith, but he can use reasons to disprove any arguments opposing faith. Since faith depends on the infallible truth of God, it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary to a truth held by faith. No reasons advanced against Christian faith, therefore, can be demonstrative, and so such reasons are arguments that can be disproved." Now, according to Ambrose, arguments have no place where faith is; but theology relies on faith: therefore, theology ought not to proceed in an argumentative way. Moreover, if theology is argumentative, the theologian must argue either from authority or from reason. He should not argue from authority, because, as Boethius indicates, arguments from authority are the weakest; neither should he argue from reason, since this mode of procedure, as Gregory shows, takes away the merit of faith. 72 Replying to these objections, Aquinas says that, in theology, arguments from human reason have no place as proofs for the truths accepted on faith; nevertheless, the science of theology proceeds from the articles of faith to draw other truths from them in an argumentative way. Furthermore, it is proper most of all for the theologian to argue from authority, because he takes the principles of his science from divine revelation, and so he must have faith in the authority of those men to whom God has made His revelation. This does not lessen the dignity of theology, because the place taken by an authority founded on divine revelation is most efficacious, whereas the place taken by maintaining that the literal or historical sense of Scripture contains the truths of faith and, as such, this sense is the proper foundation for the arguments of a theologian proceeding according to the modes of Scripture. See in Bonaventure: Brevil., Pro!., n. 5 "Debet autein ... referenda sunt." (5.207-08; ed. min., n. 3, 5.14-15). 71 ST, la, 1.8, Resp. (1.7b-8a). 72 Lac. at., arg. 1-2 (1.1.7b); cf. Expos, de Trio., 2.1, arg. 3-5 (Decker, pp. 80-81). Consult: St. Ambrose, De fide, 1.13 (PL 16.570); St. Gregory, Hmr.il m Etiaiig., 2.26 (PL 76.1179).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

719

an authority relying on human reason is very weak. The theologian uses human reason in his science, nonetheless, but not to prove the truths of faith, for that would take away its merit. The theologian uses human reason to manifest some other truths treated in theology: just as grace does not take away nature, but perfects it, so also natural reason serves the needs of faith, as the natural inclination of the will follows the requirements of charity. When using human reason, the theologian can rely on arguments from the philosophers, who have been able to know truth by natural reason. Arguments taken from philosophers, however, are used as extrinsic and probable reasons by the theologian in his own science. Arguments taken from theological authorities are also used as probable reasons, but the theologian uses them to argue from the proper principles of theology. Since Christian faith depends on the revelation made by God to the Apostles and the Prophets, from whom we have received the books of Scripture, the theologian argues from necessity whenever he argues from the authorities of Scripture, as Augustine teaches.73 The science of theology, as Aquinas conceives it, has to do necessarily with the truths of faith, or the divine things revealed to the authors of Scripture. A philosopher knows divine things from the created things that he perceives by his senses; so his knowledge of divine things is derived from principles depending on corporeal things. A theologian knows divine things through faith, which is a sort of participation in divine knowledge. Taking the principles of his science from the divine knowledge as he participates in it by faith, the theologian proceeds by way of discourse toward conclusions giving him a knowledge of divine things within the bounds of Christian faith. 74 The science of theology depends on the lumen of faith, which perfects the lumen of reason supporting the philosophical sciences. Since both the lumen of reason and the lumen of faith come from God, Aquinas says, it is impossible for a necessary conclusion of reason to contradict the truth of faith. But the lumen of reason is not sufficient to manifest the truths that are manifested by the lumen of faith; therefore, the truths belonging to philosophy are imperfect with respect to the truths belonging to faith. Consequently, as imperfect things imitate perfect things, so the truths of philosophy are, as it were, imitations or similitudes of the truths of faith, and thus the truths of philosophy go before the truths of faith, as nature goes before grace. Now, if a philosopher says something contrary to faith, what he says is not a true conclusion of philosophy, but an abuse of it. 73 ST, la, 1.8, ad 1-2 (l.Sab); cf. Expos, de Trin., 2.1, ad 3-5 (Decker, pp. 83-84). See in St. Augustine: Epist., 82.1 (PL 33.277). Note the following text: "Dicendurn quod rationes quae inducuntur a Sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossible quod in fide proponitur. Vel procedunt ex principiis fidei, scilicet ex auctoritatibus Sacrae Scripturae, sicut dicit Uionysius, II cap. De Div. Norn., (n. 2; PG 3.640). Ex his autem principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes. Unde etiam theologia scientia est, ut in principio Operis dictum est." ST, 2a2ae, 1.5, ad 2 (3.1405b). 74 Expos, de Trin., 2.2, Resp. (Decker, pp. 86-87).

720

CHAPTER EIGHT

When an error of that kind is found in a philosopher by the theologian, he can refute it according to philosophical principles either by showing that what the philosopher says is impossible or by showing that it is not necessarily true. There are, then, Aquinas notes, three ways of using philosophical doctrines in theology. The first way consists in demonstrating truths going before faith, but which are necessary to know in faith, such as the truths known by natural reason about the being and the unity of God, or about God and creatures. The second way consists in manifesting the truths of faith by suitable similitudes, as Augustine makes use of philosophical doctrines to manifest the truths of the Trinity. The third way involves defending the truths of faith by showing that the arguments advanced against it are either false or not necessarily true. A theologian using philosophy in his own science, however, can fall into error either by using reasons contrary to faith or by not believing a truth unless it is contained within the bounds of philosophy. The theologian must reject as a corruption of philosophy any reason1 contrary to faith; he must also bring philosophy within the bounds of faith, and so he can use the doctrines of the philosophers as a secondary source of truth for his science. As the superior science, therefore, theology puts to its own use the principles of all the other sciences, which go before it in the order of generation. In using the writings of the philosophers, the theologian accepts their doctrines because of the reasons supporting them and not because of the authority of the philosophers. When he uses the doctrine of one philosopher to refute the argument of another, however, the theologian does so inasmuch as the philosopher whom he cites holds the position of an authority with respect to the one refuted, for the testimony of an adversary always carries more weight. 75 There are unquestionably many points of similarity between the positions of Aquinas and Bonaventure on the proper mode of procedure for the science of theology. The two theologians insist that the science should, before all else, follow the various ways in which the revelation of God is communicated in Scripture. Though Aquinas and Bonaventure differ in their interpretations of the spiritual senses of Scripture, even so, they both maintain that its literal sense presents the truths to be believed by Christian faith, which provides theology with its principles. Both theologians teach that Scripture presents divine revelation in ways suited to the different conditions of men, so that, when necessary, Scripture proceeds in an argumentative manner. Thus, taking Scripture as their exemplar, 75 Op. Cit., 2.3, Resp., ad 1, 7-8 (Decker, pp. 94-95, 97). Aquinas bases his position here on Scripture, St. Jerome and St. Augustine; cf. sc 1-6 (Decker, pp. 92-93). Aquinas also teaches that the theologian, in scrutinizing the truths of faith, must not try to comprehend them perfectly, because such an effort on his part would be presumptuous, leading him into error, each theologian ought to stay within the limits of his capacity to scrutinize the truths of faith: Op. cit., 2.1, Resp., ad 1 (Decker, pp. 82-83). He adds to this, that a theologian ought to be careful in manifesting his knowledge to others who are not theologians, while concealing from unbelievers truths that they would only deride: Ofi. at., 2.4 (Decker, pp. 97-100).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

721

Aquinas and Bonaventure assign an argumentative mode of procedure to the science of theology for the threefold purpose of defending Christian faith against its adversaries, of fortifying some Christians by instructing them in their faith, and of providing other Christians with an understanding of their faith, thus directing them to a contemplation of God. Insisting that theology has its primary source in divine revelation, the two theologians concur in attributing a secondary role to theological authorities in the constitution of theological knowledge; at the same time, showing how errors are to be treated or avoided by the theologian, they teach in common that the doctrines of the philosophers, and the philosophical sciences, are to be subordinated to divine revelation and to the doctrines of those who have authority in theology. Aquinas and Bonaventure are at one in saying that the theologian can use his natural reason to demonstrate a number of truths that are understood before they are believed; however, to have merit, the theologian must accept those truths as they are known by faith, even though he has demonstrated them in a philosophical way within his theology. Both theologians are also united in attributing to theology a proper use of philosophical doctrines to manifest the truths of faith, such as the use of natural similitudes between creatures and the Creator in order to make known the truth of the Trinity. The main differences between the two theologians have to do with the manner in which they permit theology to use philosophy, or the sciences of natural reason. Since those differences involve the problem of the proper order of philosophy to faith in theology, then, before showing the differences, we must complete our consideration of that problem in the theology of Aquinas. He maintains constantly that the science of theology draws its conclusions from the principles of faith. Although theology reaches its conclusions in an argumentative way, nevertheless, arguments founded on human reason alone have no place as proofs in the science of theology for truths accepted on faith. Rather, used in theology, human reason serves the needs of faith, which perfects the work of natural reason. Thus, putting human reason at the service of Christian faith, Aquinas uses reason to refute arguments supporting what is contrary to faith, to demonstrate natural truths that are necessary to uphold faith, and to bring about an understanding of truths that are known only by faith. In using reason to refute or to disprove arguments contrary to faith, Aquinas shows that those arguments are either false or not necessarly true. We have seen him showing, for instance, that the arguments of the philosophers for the eternity of the world are not demonstrative, but are only probable, as Aquinas indicates by presenting other arguments, that are equally probable, showing that the world began to-be in time. Using this type of reasoning, Aquinas proceeds in a philosophical manner, but for a theological purpose, namely, to uphold the truth of faith against philosophical arguments apparently contradicting divine revelation, or to show that what is believed by faith cannot be contradicted by that which is necessarily true according to a demonstration of reason. In this regard, Aquinas holds a common ground with

722

CHAPTER EIGHT

Bonaventure, whom we have also seen reasoning in a philosophical manner for the theological purpose of upholding the truth of faith: for instance, his manner of opposing the arguments of Averroes for the numerical unity of intellectual souls in men. When Aquinas uses reason to demonstrate natural truths that are necessary to support Christian faith, he is also proceeding in a philosophical way for a theological end. In this respect, as we mentioned previously, he is using philosophical principles to establish necessary conclusions concerning God as He is known from creatures. Aquinas reaches those conclusions within the bounds of Christian faith; so, subordinating them to the end sought by faith, he employs philosophical principles in the service of faith by demonstrating from them on its behalf the truths that must go before faith. In other words, Aquinas proceeds in a philosophical way to prepare the ground for the ordering of philosophy to faith within the unity of a material or common object, so that he can unite them in the one formal object of his theology. It is while considering the formal or proper object of his theology that Aquinas uses reason to bring about an understanding of revealed truth; it is also by this particular use of reason, or of philosophy, that the theology of Aquinas articulates or expresses the truths of faith in a scientific mode. Hence, conforming the conclusions of his philosophy to the principles of Christian faith, Aquinas proceeds in a strictly theological manner to draw from the principles of faith conclusions expressing or manifesting the truths of faith in such a way that his understanding of them shows an instrumental dependence on philosophy. His theological understanding of God, for example, shows such a dependence on philosophy, from which Aquinas takes suitable similitudes to articulate his thought, such as his use of the human conception of a mental word to express his thought about the eternal conception of the divine Word. The theological knowledge that Aquinas obtains in that way depends fundamentally on the lumen of faith and instrumentally on the lumen of reason, but it depends on the latter inasmuch as it is perfected by the former within the unity of a science and wisdom founded on divine revelation. With all that in mind, we can quickly show the main differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure regarding the order of philosophy to faith within their two theologies. In the theology of Bonaventure, faith and philosophy first stand on their own grounds within an integral whole, so that Bonaventure can proceed now according to philosophy and then according to faith, or vice versa; having established the compatibility of his philosophical conclusions with the truths of faith, he orders the one to the other, and so he composes the one with the other within the unity of an integral whole containing the revelation of God In the theology of Aquinas, however, philosophy alone is first taken on its own ground in order to establish the truth of the things that are necessary supports of faith. When Aquinas has established those truths, he orders them to the principles of faith, and thus he composes the one with the other within the unity of a material object, or

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

723

of the revelation of God. Aquinas and Bonaventure come together at this level of their theologies in so far as they reject any philosophical reason or argument that they judge to be contrary to Christian faith. Again, on the universal ground of Bonaventurean theology, the truths of philosophy are subordinated to the principles of faith as matter is subjected to form. In Thomist theology, however, the truths of philosophy are subordinated to the end of faith, so that, falling under the one formal object of divine revelation, they are conformed to the principles of faith. The two theologies have this in common, on the other hand, that they proceed chiefly and primarily from the principles of faith, while submitting the lumen of reason to the control of the lumen of faith. Aquinas and Bonaventure, throughout their whole work, concur as theologians in one very important respect: the philosophical reasons, arguments and truths that they bring into their theologies are chosen because of the end envisaged by those theologies. As a consequence, the two theologians are at one, not in their particular choices of philosophical positions, but in selecting their philosophical materials with a view to forming and developing, or constituting, a science and wisdom of Christian theology. Hence, the philosophies of Bonaventure and Aquinas are determined extrinsically by the theological purpose governing their individual choices of suitable materials from the philosophical sciences. With regard to all this, Aquinas no less than Bonaventure is his own best witness to the personal authorship of his philosophical doctrines. Aquinas maintains that, in using the writings of the philosophers, the theologian accepts their doctrines because of the reasons supporting them, not because of the authority of the philosophers themselves. The authority of the Fathers is only persuasive in the theology of Aquinas, who has his own reasons for the truths that he holds. He relies mainly on the authors of Scripture and primarily on the revelation of God, who is most of all the proper author of Scripture. In short, though the doctrine of Aquinas shows influences from other authorities, his theology and his philosophy, considered doctrinally and historically, are properly Thomist. Union of Faith and Philosophy

In Bonaventure's doctrine, as we have seen, the concourse of the lumen of faith with the lumen of reason results in the formation of a habitus of belief and a theological illumination of the human mind. Hence, to know all the implications of his doctrine on the union of faith and philosophy in theology, we must understand his position on the natural foundation in the human mind for the lumen of faith; we must also have a sufficient understanding of his doctrine on the habitus or virtue of faith. To obtain that twofold understanding, we must grasp the meaning of the term potency as Bonaventure explains it. He says that the term signifies both an active

724

CHAPTER EIGHT

principle and a passive principle. An active potency is a principle causing a change in another and, as such, the potency is essentially complete with respect to its act. A passive potency is a principle causing a thing to be changed by another, so that the potency is passive either simply or relatively, it is passive simply, if it is close to act; it is passive relatively, if it is remote from act. The first sort of passive potency can be brought into act either by an inferior active potency with the cooperation of a superior active potency, as the potency of wood to be burned can be activated by a spark coming from a fire, or by a superior active potency with an inferior active potency concurring in some way, as the potency of a sinner to be justified is activated by the divine will with the concurrence of the will of the sinner. The second sort of passive potency can be brought into act only by a superior active potency and without any cooperation of an inferior active potency, as the potency of a dead body to be restored to life can be activated by the divine power alone. This sort of passive potency is a potency of obedience: it is drawn into act, as it were, by obeying the active potency of God, who alone has the power to activate such a passive potency.76 In activating a potency of obedience, God does not do anything contrary to nature. The term nature, as Bonaventure understands it, can refer to either the natural course of creatures or the natural obedience of a creature to its Creator. In the natural course of creatures, God frequently does things that are beyond nature, or even contrary to it, such as His miraculous works. Now the human intellect can be taken either as it reasons according to its own light or as it is subjected to God's eternal light. The first way looks to the natural course of human understanding; the second way looks to the natural obedience of the intellect to God. He does not dictate anything contrary to human understanding with respect to the natural obedience of the intellect; however, with respect to its natural course of reasoning, God dictates something that seems to be contrary to human understanding, but which is made to harmonize with it after a lumen of faith has been infused into the intellect. In that way, what first seemed impossible to reason, or difficult to believe, became afterward most easy to believe.77 The natural foundation of the lumen of faith, as the above texts show, consists in the natural obedience of the human intellect to the eternal light of God. The lumen of faith is received by the intellect, therefore, according 76 1 Sent., 42.un.4, Resp. "Nomen autem ... per adiunctum." (1.757-58; ed. min., 1.600-01). 77 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod Conditor naturae nihil facit contra naturam; dicendum, quod natura dicitur dupliciten vel naturalis cursus, vel naturalis obedientia creaturae. Secundo modo nihil facit, primo frequenter facit, ut in operibus, quae sunt supra naturam, vel contra, ut opera miraculosa. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est de natural! intelligentia, quod dupliciter est de ipsa loqui: vel in quantum nata est ratiocinari secundum lucem propriam, vel in quantum nata est se subiicere sub luce aeterna Hoc ultimo modo nihil dictat contra intelligentiam; primo autem modo dictat aliquid, quod etsi videatur esse contrarium, post lumen infusum fit consonum; quia quod prius videbatur ration] impossibile sive difficile ad credendum, postea fit ad credendum facillimum, adeo ut verus credens dicat ipsi aeterno Doctori: 'Testimonia tua credibilia facta sunt nimis' (Ps., 92.5)." — DMT, 1.2, ad 7 (5.57).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

725

to its natural potency of obedience. Since this sort of potency is relatively and not simply passive, the potency of obedience in the intellect is found in the agent intellect and not in the possible intellect, which is a simply passive potency. Consequently, the lumen of faith is received by the agent intellect as it is subjected in obedience to the action of God's eternal light; however, the agent intellect does not cooperate actively with the eternal light in the infusion of the lumen of faith. Now, in the natural course of human understanding, the agent intellect is an active potency moving the passive potency of the possible intellect into act; but the agent intellect is a created power: therefore, it is moved into act by the divine intellect, which is the superior active potency. In the course of nature, then, the passive potency of the possible intellect is activated by the superior active potency of the divine intellect with the concurrence of the inferior active potency of the agent intellect. Since God does not act contrary to nature with respect to a potency of obedience, He must act in accordance with nature in activating such a potency. Hence, though the lumen of faith is above the nature of the agent intellect, God does not act contrary to the nature of the agent intellect by infusing the lumen of faith. Rather, He gives the lumen of faith in accordance with the nature of the agent intellect. As a result, the possible intellect is moved into the act of belief by the eternal light of God through the lumen of faith that He gives to the agent intellect according to its nature, so that the lumen of faith harmonizes with the lumen of reason, thus giving rise to the habitus or virtue of faith in the human mind. All this conforms to what we have already seen regarding the virtue of faith as both an acquired and an infused habitus. As an acquired habitus, the virtue relies materially on an instruction in the articles of faith, an instruction given exteriorly in human words, which are accompanied by a divine persuasion or manifestation moving the believer to assent to the truth of what he hears. As an infused habitus, the virtue relies formally on the thinking of the believer about the articles of faith; this thinking is accompanied by a divine illumination giving the believer a power to assent voluntarily to God as the First truth and, for His sake alone, to assent to the truth of the articles of faith. The common and material object of the virtue consists in whatever is to be believed, because it is revealed by God, so that the believer, for the sake of God, assents to both the created and the uncreated truths that He reveals. The proper and formal object of the virtue is the uncreated truth of God himself as it is presented in the articles of faith on the Trinity, the Incarnation and Redemption. Moved by the illumination of faith, the believer assents principally to the formal object of belief, and he assents secondarily to the created truths that God reveals along with uncreated truths. The certitude of belief is caused, therefore, by the divine illumination of faith and the authority of divine revelation. The illumination of faith is founded on the natural light of the agent intellect inasmuch as it obeys the eternal light of the divine intellect. The authority of divine revelation is founded on Sacred Scripture, and it is this authority, which is the divine authority, that persuades the believer to assent voluntarily to the truths revealed by God,

726

CHAPTER EIGHT

but not evident in themselves to the natural light of the agent intellect. The certitude of belief, then, is not dependent on the objects known through faith, nor is it conformed to the secondary objects of faith as they are in themselves. Rather, the certitude of belief flows from the divine illumination and the divine authority by which the objects of faith are made known as they are in their superior causes. A philosophical science, on the other hand, must be conformed to its objects as they exist in themselves; its certitude depends on the natural illumination of reason and on the knowledge of created things as they are in their inferior causes. When faith and philosophy look to the same object, faith has the greater certitude, considered absolutely, because it has a certitude of adhesion depending on the will; but philosophy has the greater certitude of speculation, because this certitude depends on the first principles of natural understanding. The speculative certitude of philosophy is so great that, as a demonstrative certitude, it can make void the belief of Christian faith; however, this belief can stand together with philosophical knowledge in the science of theology, which is founded on faith and participates in the certitude of adhesion, a nobler certitude than the certitude of speculation belonging to philosophy, which is founded on the principles of natural reason.78 What we have seen of the virtue of faith, thus far, and of its relation to philosophy is almost enough for us to understand how Bonaventure unites faith and philosophy in his theology. It will be sufficient for us now to bring forward only a few more texts on the virtue of faith. Our first text deals with the question whether faith is in the intellect or in the will. On considering the question, Bonaventure first presents and discusses three solutions to it; then, integrating them, he presents and explains his own solution to the question. He holds that faith as a virtue is a principle of merit and, as such, it is subject to the faculty of freedom of choice. As a habitus, faith subjects the intellect in obedience to God as the first truth; in this respect, faith is in the speculative intellect and the act of faith is to believe what is true, because it is true. Moreover, because the intellect assents to God at a command of the will, faith is also in the practical intellect, so that the act of faith is to believe willingly, or to tend unto God by believing in Him. Since a willing belief is essential to faith, the habitus does not have to do only with the intellect, whether speculative or practical; rather, having to do also with the will and its act, faith has a willing assent to God as to an object that the intellect alone cannot attain. Thus, as a habitus, faith is subject to the intellect; as a virtue and principle of merit, faith is subject to both reason and will as they constitute the faculty of freedom of choice. Faith looks to reason with respect to the material act of belief, which is to assent to what God reveals. Faith looks to the will with respect to the formal act of belief, which is to assent willingly to God, or to the first truth and for its sake alone. This is similar, Bonaventure says, to a 78 See above: pp. 406-07, pp. 448-52.

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

727

habitus of science, which looks to the memory with regard to retention of species, and which looks to the intellect with regard to the act of understanding. Although the memory and the intellect are distinct potencies, as are reason and will, nonetheless, they are grounded in one subject through which they share in the same property, just as all the members of a human body share in the same health, or several human acts share in the same goodness. Summing up his solution to the question, Bonaventure maintains that faith as a principle of merit is subject to the faculty of freedom of choice. As a habitus facilitating the intellect to think about revealed truth, faith illumines the mind, reforms reason and subjects the intellect in obedience to God, thus disposing the believer to see God eternally in beatitude. Consequently, faith perfects the intellect under the direction of the will; for this reason, faith is in the will in some way, namely, as a voluntary habitus or an ordered love, so that, as a willing assent to God, the act of belief cannot be imposed on any man who is unwilling to believe. It is necessary for the being of the virtue of faith, therefore, that an act of reason and an act of will concur at once, as Scripture teaches: "Faith is the substance of things for which we hope, and the evidence of things that are not seen" (Heb., 11.1). Faith would never be a virtue no matter how much it could illumine the intellect, Bonaventure observes, unless faith also rectifies the will. This is clear in the gift of prophecy: it illumines the intellect of the prophet with regard to the same truths known by the illumination of faith; but the gift of prophecy is not said to be a virtue, because its illumination is not accompanied by a cooperation of the will, which collaborates with the assent of faith. 79 Our second text contains Bonaventure's response to an argument showing that faith is not a virtue, but a habitus of science. The argument is based on Aristotle's doctrine and flows from his principle that one habitus is distinct by its act from another habitus, while their acts are distinguished from one another by their objects. Since a virtue looks to what is good, but a science considers what is true, faith is a science and not a virtue, because it assents to the first truth for its own sake alone. 80 The virtue about which Aristotle speaks, Bonaventure replies, is the sort that regulates human acts and orders a man to seek the things directing him to his end. Now there are also intellectual virtues, such as wisdom and understanding, which order a man to the end itself. Faith is a virtue of this sort and, as such, it is not the same as a habitus of science. The object of a science is not only what is true, but also what is seen to be true. Although the object of faith is what is true, nevertheless, the object is both unseen and salvific. Because the object is unseen, there is required to know it a habitus other than a habitus of 79 3 Sent., 23.1.2, Resp. "His praesuppositis ..." (3.476-77; ed. min., 3.466-68); cf. 4 Sent., 5.3.1, ad 3 (4.128-29; ed. min., 4.119-20). For Bonaventure's explanation of the text of Scripture (Heb., 11.1) as a perfect description, or definition, of the virtue of faith see: 3 Sent., 23.1.5 (3.483-86; ed. min., 3.473-77). 80 3 Seal., 23.1.1, sc 2 (3.470-71; ed. min., 3.461); cf. Aristotle, Etkica mcom., 2.6 (1106al4-1106b28).

728

CHAPTER EIGHT

science; because the object is salvific, the habitus of faith orders the believer to eternal life, and so the habitus has the nature of a complete virtue. As unseen, furthermore, the object of faith is believed willingly; as salvific, the object is believed both willingly and meritoriously, features that are foreign to the act of a speculative science. The truth that faith believes is a truth "according to piety" (Titus, 1.1), a truth which is known to Catholics, but which was unknown to the philosophers.81 Our third and last text has to do with the certitude of faith as compared with the certitude of philosophy. This text also contains a response of Bonaventure to an opposing argument, which is based on the principle that certitude is proportionate to the impossibility of error. Since faith cannot be in error, but the philosophers have fallen into many errors, faith has a greater certitude than any philosophical science.82 Answering the argument, Bonaventure concedes that faith cannot be in error; however, he maintains that a science, inasmuch as it is a science, cannot be in error, which is a defect in the knower rather than in his knowledge. Likewise, error can be found in a believer, who can • fall into heresy by mixing falsehood with faith, thus distorting its truth. It does not follow, nonetheless, that faith is more certain than science. It is true that the doctrine of faith has been passed on more truthfully than any philosophical science, because both Christ and the Holy Spirit, who teach us the truth of faith and of Scripture, do not say anything which is false, nor can any fault be found in them. In Bonaventure's estimation, the doctrines of the philosophers have not been passed on without falsehood, for their teachings have many false things mixed in with those that are true. 83 These texts, taken with the others summarized above, are very important for an understanding of the union of faith and philosophy in Bonaventure's theology. He subjects the virtue of faith as a principle of merit to the believer's freedom of choice, so that no man can be compelled to believe against his will, nor can a man have merit for his belief unless it is a truly willing belief, or a faith ordered by charity. A man engaged in philosophy, for instance, cannot be compelled against his will to believe the truths of Christian faith; if he is unwilling to believe them, he cannot unite philosophy to faith, because he lacks the virtue of faith. On the other hand, to have merit, a theologian must continue to assent willingly to those truths of faith that he combines with philosophy in his theology. When uniting faith with philosophy, therefore, the theologian must follow his will more than his intellect, for the formal act of belief depends essentially on the will, or on a love for God. The material act of belief depends on the intellect, to which the habitus of faith is subject in two distinct ways. It is subject to the speculative intellect inasmuch as faith directs the intellect toward 81 Loc. cit., ad 2 (3.472; ed. min., 3.462-63); cf. Aristotle, op. at., 2.1 (1103al4-20). 82 3 Sent., 23.1.4, arg 4 (3.481; ed. min., 3.471). 83 Loc. cit., ad 4 (3.482; ed. nun., 3.472-73).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

729

what is true, because it is true. In this way, the intellect is subjected in obedience to God as the first truth, so that faith illumines the mind and gives the intellect a readiness to think about revealed truth. The combining of faith with the speculative knowledge of philosophy in Bonaventure's theology takes place at this particular level of the material act of belief. The habitus of faith is also subject to the practical intellect according as the will commands the intellect to assent to whatever God has revealed. In that way, the intellect assents to God as the first truth and for His sake alone; so, tending unto God by believing in Him, the reason of the believer is reformed by the illumination of faith, thus disposing him in hope to see God eternally in beatitude. The combining of faith with the practical knowledge of philosophy in Bonaventure's theology takes place at this level of the material act of belief. The believing of truth, whether speculative or practical, constitutes the material act of faith; but its formal act is constituted by the willing or free assent to God at the command of the will. To possess the virtue of faith, therefore, a believer must act at once according to his reason and will as they are conjoined in his freedom of choice. On combining faith with philosophy, then, the theologian must act at once and freely according to his reason and will. As a consequence, in uniting philosophy to faith, the theologian freely subordinates the one to the other while willingly subjecting the lumen of his reason to the lumen of his faith. Because the truths known by philosophy are evident to natural reason, but not those accepted by Christian faith, the theologian must first proceed according to philosophy with regard to truths that are evident to reason, and he must proceed "according to piety" with regard to truths accepted by Christian faith, but not known by philosophy. This mode of procedure is necessary because the habitus of faith is distinct from the philosophical sciences: the object of faith is unseen and salvific, so that it must be believed willingly and meritoriously; the objects of the philosophical sciences are seen or understood by reason, which can speculate about those objects apart from the will and without merit. Since both faith and the philosophical sciences are inerrant sources of truth, therefore, by proceeding "according to piety" and according to philosophy. Bonaventure can establish the compatibility of philosophy with faith while rejecting both the falsehood mixed with the truth in the doctrines handed down from the philosophers and the falsehood distorting the truth of faith in those who have fallen into heresy. Having established the compatibility of philosophy with faith, Bonaventure can then unite the one to the other: first, on the ground of the material act of faith, where the certitude of philosophy is the greater because of its inerrant speculation; secondly, on the ground of the formal act of faith, where the certitude of faith is the greater because of its inerrant adhesion to the first truth. Hence, following the union of philosophy with faith, Bonaventure's theology has a nobler certitude of the same truths that are known by philosophy, because his theology has an understanding of them with a certitude founded principally on an inerrant and loving adhesion to God. In short, the union of philosophy with faith in Bonaventure's theology depends

730

CHAPTER EIGHT

materially on the subordination of what he knows by philosophy to what he believes by faith; but it depends formally on his willing assent or loving adhesion to God, which results, on the one hand, in a voluntary subjection of the lumen of reason to the lumen of faith and, on the other hand, in a free assent to the created and uncreated truths revealed by God84 Our immediate task now is to show how Bonaventure establishes in his theology the compatibility of philosophy with faith. When this has been shown, we shall be able to see how he unites philosophy with faith to attain a strictly theological understanding of truth. After that, we shall consider the role of piety in the constitution of his theological knowledge. Regarding the first point, we shall start with his question whether there can be faith concerning things that we can know by the sense of sight. Answering the question, Bonaventure says that a thing seen simply and totally by sight is known so clearly and perfectly that it cannot also be believed at once and at the same time by Christian faith. But there are some things seen in such a way that one aspect of them is sensed while another aspect is concealed; with respect to such things, there can be at once and at the same time sense knowledge concerning what is seen and faith concerning what is concealed. This is the way that the Apostles both saw and believed Christ: they saw His human body, but they believed that He was God; therefore, the same divine Person was both known and unknown at once by the sense of sight, for He was known according to His human nature, but unknown according to His divine nature. Thus, Bonaventure maintains, there can be at once and at the same time, but not in the same respect, sense knowledge and faith concerning the same thing. This is quite easy to understand, he says, if one realizes that there can be certitude and doubt concerning the same thing according to diverse respects and diverse conditions. In a similar way, one and the same thing can be seen and be believed, though not according to the same respect or condition. 85 Bonaventure asks next whether there can be faith concerning things about which we have probable opinions. He observes that the gifts of understanding, science and wisdom can stand together with faith; but we believe because of authority, and we understand because of reason: therefore, as reasoning can stand together with faith, so also can a probable opinion, which is generated by reasoning with probability. Moreover, the doctrine of theology stands together with faith; but there are many probable reasons employed in theology: therefore, if those reasons can stand together with faith, the probability of opinions generated by them can likewise be with faith in the same knower and with respect to the same thing. 86 Now there are two sorts of probable opinions. The first sort involves accepting the one side of a

84 For a concise presentation by Bonaventure of the created and uncreated truths revealed by God see: Brevil., 5.7 "Postremo, quia ... articuli continentur." (5.261; ed. min., nn. 6-7, 5.115-16). 85 3 Sent., 24.2.1, Resp. (3.518; ed. rain., 3.510). 86 3 Sent., 24.2.2, fa. 3-4 (3.520; ed. mm., fa. c-d, 3.511).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

73 1

proposal with the fear that the other side may be true. This sort of opinion cannot stand together with faith concerning the same matter, because faith includes a complete consent to the one side, so that the other side is repudiated entirely as false and erroneous. Since no intervening reason can incline faith to what is opposed to it, a probable opinion involving fluctuation or hesitation cannot stand together with faith, because it is not compatible with faith. The second sort of probable opinion is the one caused by a probable reason, or generated by a dialectical syllogism, just as the certain conclusion of a science is caused or generated by a demonstrative syllogism. An opinion of that sort can be with faith concerning the same thing, at once and at the same time, for there are many Christians who have probable reasons giving rise to probable opinions about the things that they believe. These are the opinions strengthening the faith of weak Christians and delighting perfect Christians.87 Bonaventure's third question is a very important question, asking whether there is faith concerning things known by science. Giving an affirmative answer, he bases it on the following arguments. Any philosopher knowing by compelling reasons that God is one, and that God is the Creator of all things, can begin to believe without forgetting those reasons, which give him sciential knowledge of God. It seems, therefore, that there can be faith and science at once concerning the same thing. Again, anyone knowing something by a demonstration from effect to cause does not lose this knowledge if he begins to know the same thing in a nobler way by a demonstration from cause to effect. Since those two kinds of knowledge can stand together concerning the same thing, therefore, it seems that something can be known at once by sciential reasoning and an infused illumination. Moreover, intellective knowledge does not take away sensitive knowledge, even though the former is nobler and more perfect than the latter. Likewise, faith does not take away sciential knowledge, and so there can be at once faith and science in regard to the same thing. According to Aristotle, experience is the beginning of science: since there can be faith and experience regarding one and the same thing, as the Virgin Mary knew by faith and experience that she conceived from the Holy Spirit, a man can have faith and science concerning one and the same thing. 88 To understand his position, Bonaventure says, it is necessary to distinguish knowledge attained by open apprehension from knowledge acquired by rational discourse. God is known in beatitude by open comprehension, a knowledge taking away faith, which is incompatible with the direct vision of God. Consequently, in beatitude, there cannot be both knowledge and faith concerning the same thing. Knowledge obtained by a science is acquired by rational discourse. According to some theologians, a science cannot stand together with faith, because, by a science, the intellect 87 Loc. cit., Resp. (3.520-21; ed. min., 3.512). 88 3 Sent., 24.2.3, fa. 1-4 (3.521-22; ed. min., fa. a-d, 3.513); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 1.1 (980b25-98lb9).

732

CHAPTER EIGHT

assents to the known thing principally, even necessarily, for the sake of the reason by which it is known; the intellect also assents to that thing as to something inferior to the intellect itself. The contrary is true of faith, which assents to the first truth for its own sake and in a voluntary manner, so that faith elevates human reason above its natural condition. As a result, faith and science are mutually exclusive, just as charity excludes that love by which a man loves God principally for the sake of temporal things. According to other theologians, however, there can be at once concerning one and the same thing both faith and a science acquired by rational discourse. Such is the view of Augustine in his explanation of this text: "The word of wisdom is given to one by the Holy Spirit, and the word of science is given to another" (1 Cor., 12.8). Explaining the text, Augustine says: "I give to this science that by which the most salutary faith, which takes us to the true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended and strengthened: the greater part of the believers do not have that science, even though they have faith". Richard of St. Victor teaches the same thing: "Regarding those things belonging to faith, we can have not only probable reasons, but also necessary reasons, even though it happens sometimes that they are hidden from us".89 Interpreting those statements, Bonaventure maintains that a man believing God to be one, and to be the Creator of all things, does not cease to have faith if he begins to know the same truths from necessary reasons. Neither does a man on becoming a believer lose his prior knowledge of God from necessary reasons, as experience shows. The reason why an acquired science can stand with faith concerning the same truths, Bonaventure tells us, is that the certitude and the evidence of a science regarding divine things are not entirely clear to the human intellect in the present life of man. Although a man can prove by necessary reasons that God is, and that He is one, nevertheless, unless the man is cleansed by the holiness of faith, he cannot perceive the divine being itself or the very unity of God, nor can he discern how that unity does not exclude a plurality of persons. The illumination and certitude of an acquired science is not so great, therefore, that a man possessing such a science does not need an illumination of faith. On the contrary, Bonaventure observes, it is exceedingly necessary that, with an acquired science, there be an illumination of faith. This is shown in the philosophers, who knew many true things about God and, notwithstanding, because they lacked faith, the philosophers erred in many ways, or even failed to reach the truth, concerning God. Whence, Bonaventure concludes, just as faith can stand with exterior sight, because this has a conjoined latency concerning the person of Christ, so also the habitus of faith and an acquired science can be compatible at once in the same knower and with respect to the same thing. 90 89 Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinit., 14.1.3 (PL 42.1037); Richard of St. Victor, De Trinit., 1.4 (PL 196.892). 90 3 Sent., 24.2.3, Resp. (3.522-23; ed. min., 3.514-15). Note Bonaventure's conclusion: "Unde, sicut in praecedentlbus dictum est quod fides potest stare cum visione exteriori, quia ilia habet coniunctam laten-

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

733

What precisely does Bonaventure say in the above texts? He says, first of all, that faith is incompatible with the beatific vision of God. This is similar to the incompatibility of faith with the visual knowledge of a thing known simply and totally by the sense of sight. God is known so clearly and perfectly in beatitude that faith cannot stand together with the direct vision of God.91 If faith is taken away because of the certitude and of the evidence with which God is seen in beatitude, surely then faith ought also to be taken away now by a science because of the certitude and of the evidence with which its object is known? The two instances are not similar, according to Bonaventure, for nothing is hidden to the knower in beatitude, whereas, in the present life, he cannot comprehend God openly by an acquired science.92 Indeed, in Bonaventure's judgment, an acquired science will not be taken away even in beatitude, when the science will be completed as a habitus, since there is nothing incompatible with seeing God and also knowing the principles, propositions and conclusions of a science. All the imperfections attending a science in the present condition of man will be removed in beatitude, so that, proceeding no longer by rational discourse, a science will then attain truth by a simple perception of God, who is the first cause of all things. Although faith is more perfect than a science with regard to both truth and the lumen of truth, nevertheless, faith is inseparably connected with a darkness or enigma incompatible with beatitude. This is not true of a science, which, of its very nature, is perfect in proportion to the certitude and the clarity with which it knows its object. For that reason, differing from faith, a science will be perfected according to its own nature in eternal beatitude.93 Bonaventure speaks, secondly, about the compatibility of faith with an acquired science. He refers here to, but does not accept, the position that faith and science are mutually exclusive, as charity excludes a disordered love for God. Because charity is a love of God for His own sake and above tiam circa personam Christi, sic intelligendum est circa habitum fidei et talem modum sciendi quod possunt se simul in eodem et respectu eiusdcm compati." This does not mean that faith and a science can be compatible in one and the same knower according to the same respect: "Concedendum est igitur quod fides et visio possunt esse circa unum et eundem, quamvis non secundum idem." — 3 Sent., 24.2.1, Resp. (3.518; ed. min., 3.510). Bonaventure says, therefore, that Christian faith and an acquired science can be compatible in one and the same knower, but according to formally diverse respects or aspects of a common and material object, just as the truth of a thing can be known to a man either by a demonstration from effect to cause, or by a demonstration from cause to effect, but not in both ways simultaneously. 91 On this question see: 3 Sent., 31.2.1 (3.680-82; ed. min., 3.678-82); cf. 23.1.4, ad 3 (3.482; ed. min., 3.472). 92 3 Sent., 24.2.3, sc 2 (3.522; ed. min., 3.514); ad 2 (3.524; ed. min., 3.516). 93 3 Sent., 31.2.3, Resp., ad 3-5 (3.686-87; ed. min., 3.685-87). Bonaventure gives many reasons here why a science, including a philosophical science, will remain in beatitude. For instance, according to Aristotle, a science is destroyed because of a defect on the part of either the knower or the reason causing his knowledge; but there will be no such defects in beatitude. Again, if a science were removed in beatitude, the science would be reckoned among transitory goods, so that those who labour to acquire it would be as foolish as those who labour to become rich, and a great theologian would be no better than a simple peasant, which is far from the truth. Cf. sc 1-5 (3.686; ed. min., sc a-e, 3.685).

734

CHAPTER EIGHT

all other things, it cannot be compatible with the love of God chiefly for the sake of earthly things. But faith assents to the first truth for its own sake and above everything else; therefore, it does not seem that faith can be compatible with an acquired science, which adheres chiefly to truth acquired by reasoning. How, then, can faith be with science concerning the same thing, at once and at the same time? 94 Answering the objection, Bonaventure says that the comparison between charity and faith is not valid. To love God finally for the sake of the creature is iniquitous and inordinate, and so it is repugnant to a rightly ordered love for God. On the other hand, to assent to what is true for the sake of a necessary reason proving it to be true is neither a fault nor an error, so that an assent of this kind is not repugnant to faith. But this does not answer the objection completely, Bonaventure goes on, because it does not seem possible for a man, regarding a truth that he believes, to assent to it at once both for its own sake and for the sake of something else. Attending to this difficulty, Bonaventure says that the expression 'for the sake of (profiler) can be taken in two ways. It can be taken to designate a final cause, a way in which it is impossible that the same thing be believed both for its own sake and for the sake of something else. The expression can also be taken to designate a reason moving a man to assent to something. There can be several reasons moving a man to assent to one and the same thing; for instance, the same truth can be proved by an extrinsic reason or by an intrinsic reason, or the one conclusion can be proved by a cause or by an effect, and so it is not impossible for a man to assent to one and the same truth both for its own sake and for the sake of something else, provided he assents according to diverse considerations and a diversity of habitus. But the problem is not yet fully resolved, Bonaventure states, because it still seems that the assent of faith is not compatible with the assent of a science, which depends principally on human reason. It could be said, for example, that, where there is faith, a science remains with respect to its habitus, but not to its act or use. Bonaventure does not accept that sort of solution to the problem. He says, rather, that when a man knows by science and. at the same time, believes by faith, the habitus of faith takes the principal place, so that, assenting from faith to the first truth for its own sake, he is said to adhere to the first truth because it is the reason moving him principally to make his assent. Although the man also assents to the same truth from his science for the sake of an acquired reason, nonetheless, this reason is not the one moving him principally to give his assent. Now it is impossible to believe one and the same truth both for its own sake and for the sake of something else, if each of those reasons is a principal reason; however, it is not impossible, but quite compatible, to believe or to assent to one and the same truth principally for its own sake and secondarily, or subordinately, for the sake of something else.95 94 3 Sent., 24.2.3, sc 1 (3.522; ed. mm., 3.513-14). 95 Loc. at., ad 1 (3.523-24; ed mm., 3.515-16).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

735

Thus, by not accepting the position that faith and a science are mutually exclusive, Bonaventure holds that the two are quite compatible, but in well defined ways. They are compatible, in the first place, because the habitus of faith looks to the first truth for its own sake, whereas a habitus of science looks to the same first truth for the sake of some other truth. They are compatible, in the second place, because the consideration of faith moves from cause to effect, or from Creator to creature, while the consideration of a science moves from effect to cause in order to know the Creator from the creature. Faith and a science are compatible, finally, because the first truth is the principal reason moving a believer to assent to revealed truths, whereas a man of science, or a philosopher, is moved principally by acquired truths to assent to the first truth. Consequently, when the same man is a believer and a philosopher, his faith holds the principal place, so that, subordinating his science to his faith, he assents to the first truth principally for its own .sake and secondarily for the sake of the truths of his science. A Christian philosopher, and a theologian, would lose the merit of his faith, therefore, if he were to assent to the first truth solely or principally for the sake of the acquired reasons of his science. As long as he assents to the first truth principally for its own sake, however, he can merit because of this assent, which comes from faith. There is nothing, then, to prevent such a man from knowing by his science the same thing that he believes by his faith; but he knows and believes the thing according to different respects and considerations.96 Bonaventure is saying, thirdly, that a man can have faith and philosophical knowledge at once and at the same time concerning one and the same thing, but not according to one and the same respect. Though a Christian, studying philosophy, begins to know from necessary reasons that God is one, and that God is the Creator of the universe, even so, he still believes those truths, just as a philosopher, on becoming a Christian, does not lose his sciential knowledge of God. The reason why faith and philosophical knowledge can be together in the same man is, according to Bonaventure, that the certitude and the evidence of a philosophical science regarding divine things are not altogether clear to us in our present life. Bonaventure grants that a man can prove by necessary reasons that God is, and that God is one; but he does not grant that a man lacking Christian faith can perceive the divine being in itself or the very unity of God, or that such a man can discern how the divine unity does not exclude a plurality of persons. Now, as we have seen, Bonaventure proves the divine being to be so indubitably true that natural reason can know with an infallible certitude

96 "Ad illud quod ohicitur, quod evacuatur fidei meritum; dicendum, quod hoc verum esset, si sokim propter rationes huic vero assentiretur; nunc autem, dum non assentitur propter rationes principaliter, sed propter ipsam veritatem, ideo potest habere meritum propter fidem assensum. Nihil autem prohibet, secundum alium et alium respectum et considerationem, idem esse scitum et creditum." — D M T , 2.1, ad 3 (5.62); cf. ad opp. 3 (5.60).

736

CHAPTER EIGHT

that 'God is'; as a result, a man using his reason rightly can in no way think that 'God is-not'. But God is known that way from creatures as a cause is known from its effects; therefore, in saying that a man lacking Christian faith cannot perceive the divine being in itself, Bonaventure is saying simply that such a man, relying solely on reason, cannot know in the nobler way that a Christian, relying on reason and faith, can know that God is the cause of creatures, for a Christian knows this truth without moving to God from His effects in creation. There is a problem here, nonetheless, because it seems impossible for a Christian to have merit in believing that 'God is', since this truth, on the one hand, is the principle of merit and, on the other hand, it is a truth that natural reason can know with an unfailing certitude. 97 In Bonaventure's judgment, to believe the truth that 'God is', as it is in itself, is meritorious only because it is the basis of the truth that 'God is triune', or of the other articles of faith, which are founded on the truth of the divine being. It is by reason of those other truths, therefore, that there can be merit in believing that 'God is'; but there can be no merit in believing it apart from the articles of faith. The truth of the divine being has been given to a man in a natural way, so that he cannot excuse himself through ignorance on the ground that the human intellect, of its own nature, can know nothing about God.98 Having the habitus of faith, then, a Christian has a nobler and more perfect knowledge of the divine being than a philosopher who is not a Christian. Likewise, because of his faith, a Christian has a better knowledge of the divine unity than a philosopher lacking Christian faith. With regard to the latter truth, Bonaventure is faced with the following objection. The human mind cannot dissent in any way from what it knows by a habitus of science, which contains truths known by way of demonstration; but what the mind believes by faith, it believes in a voluntary way: therefore, since the truths of faith can be disbelieved, it does not seem that sciential knowledge can stand together with Christian belief concerning the same things. 99 It is true, Bonaventure replies, that a philosopher cannot dissent from what he knows by his science; nevertheless, he can dissent from whatever is hidden from him and cannot be known by science. It is necessary, therefore, that he have faith in order to know a truth hidden from him and from his science. For instance, any philosopher who proves in his science and by a necessary reason that God is one cannot dissent from that truth; however, he would dissent, if 97 DMT, 1.2, ad opp. 14 (5.49). 98 "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod credere indubitabile non est meritorium; dici potest. quod credere, Deum esse, quantum est de se, non est meritorium nisi per hoc, quod substernitur ei quod est, Deum esse trinum, vel aiiis articulis fidei, cum supra istum fundantur, et ratione illorum potest fieri meritorium; quia, si per se nude credatur, non est efficax ad merendum. Apostolus autem loquitur de hoc quod est, Deum esse, prout substramentum aliorum credibilium; et hoc substramentum est homini a natura insitum, ne, si intellectus humanus de natura propria nihil de Deo cognosceret, excusare se posset per ignorantiam." — Lac. at., ad 14 (5.51). 99 3 Sent., 24.2.3, sc 3 (3.522; ed. mm., 3.514).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

737

someone were to say that the divine unity can be compatible with a plurality, because this truth is hidden from him and it exceeds the powers of his knowledge and of his science.100 What Bonaventure says in the latter text conforms to his position that no man can be compelled against his will to believe the revelation of God, because a willing assent is an essential and formal element of the infused virtue of faith. Since a philosopher lacking Christian faith does not believe the truth of the Trinity, he cannot be compelled against his will to assent to the truth of the divine unity as it is known by faith to be compatible with a plurality of persons. A nonChristian philosopher, then, can dissent from that truth, but he cannot dissent from the truth of the divine unity as it demonstrated by him in his own science. Speaking elsewhere about the same problem, Bonaventure says that the article on the Trinity and Unity of God is not only repugnant to the power of sense and to the imagination, but is also discordant from the natural judgment of reason. Consequently, if the human intellect according to its own lumen, or by considering inferior reasons, were to judge that truth, the intellect would fail to reach the truth and fall into both disbelief and error.101 Thus, in Bonaventure's judgment, a Christian philosopher and a Christian theologian have a nobler and more perfect knowledge than a non-Christian philosopher of the being and the unity of God. Though the latter philosopher knows the divine being and the divine unity from necessary reasons and with an infallible certitude, nonetheless, he knows God only from creatures and, therefore, in an imperfect way. As a consequence, the sciential knowledge that a non-Christian philosopher has of God, while it is indubitably true, lacks the full clarity and certitude belonging to the nature of his science, as a science, and which philosophical knowledge cannot have until the science is perfected according to its nature in eternal beatitude. The Christian thinker has the advantage of his belief, so that, possessing at once both faith and philosophy, he has at the same time a belief in and a philosophical knowledge of the being and the unity of God. The Christian thinker can, as a result, think about those truths in such a way that, considering them at once and at the same time as belonging to faith and to philosophy, he takes the being and the unity of God, first, in a material manner and, secondly, in a formal mode, but in the diverse ways according to which faith and philosophy proceed with respect to the truths of the divine being and the divine unity. 100 Loc. cit., ad 3 (3.524; ed. min., 3.516). Note the passage: "... aliquis philosophus sciens probare Deum esse unutn ratione necessaria, ab hoc non potest dissentire; dissentiret (amen ab hoc, si quis diceret quod ilia unitas potest compati secum pluralitatem; quod quidem eum latet et excedit vires cognitionis suae et scientiae." 101 "Esto enim quod sibi proponatur credibile et aliquis articulus fidei, utpote articulus de Trinitate et Unitate, cum iste non solum repugnet sensui et imaginationi, sed etiam discrepet a naturali iudicio ration is, si noster intellectus secundum lumen proprium vel aspiciendo ad partes inferiores iudicaret, deficeret et discrederet et peccaret" — 2 Sent., 24.2.1.1, in Resp. (2.575; ed. min., 2.594).

738

CHAPTER EIGHT

Since these truths constitute a common object of his considerations as a Christian and a philosopher, or a theologian, then, in thinking about them formally according to his philosophy, he continues to adhere to them willingly for the sake of God as the first truth, and so he is guided in his philosophical thinking by the certitude and the illumination of his Christian faith. This brings us to the fourth and final point about which Bonaventure speaks in the texts that we are examining. He says that it is exceedingly necessary to have an illumination of faith with an acquired science, such as a philosophical science, because its certitude and illumination are not so great that the illumination of faith would be superfluous. Bonaventure confirms his view by pointing out that some of the philosophers, though they knew many true things about God by their science, erred in many ways concerning God or even failed to reach Him, because they lacked faith. 102 When these statements of Bonaventure are taken in their proper context, their true significance is not too difficult to grasp. He has said, as we have seen, that a science, as a science, cannot be in error, a feature that it shares with infused faith. He has said, at the same time, that error is the fault of the knower, whether he be a philosopher or a believer, the one falling into error by mixing falsehood with his science, and the other by mixing falsehood with his faith. Consequently, Bonaventure is not saying that a habitus or a science of philosophy needs an illumination of faith in order to avoid error, or to know its objects with certitude. On the contrary, he is saying that the Christian who is a philosopher or a theologian needs the illumination of his faith, in the first place, to avoid falling into error, as the ancient philosophers erred by mixing falsehood with the indubitable truth of their science. Guided by his faith, therefore, the Christian can be prevented from thinking erroneously in his philosophy, thus avoiding the possibility of accepting as necessarily true conclusions that are only probable or even false. The Christian thinker needs the illumination of his faith, in the second place, to be directed in his philosophical considerations of truths to which he has given his assent from faith. Directed by this assent, therefore, the Christian can be assisted in his philosophical thought to find the necessary reasons by which he can draw from the principles of his science conclusions that are indubitably true and infallibly certain according to the understanding of his natural reason. The illumination of faith, then, influences the Christian thinker both intrinsically and extrinsically. It influences him intrinsically by perfecting his intellect, which is subjected interiorly to the lumen of faith; it perfects him extrinsically by protecting his philosophy from error while attracting it toward the proper reasons to be considered in drawing true conclusions 102 "Unde illuminatio et certitudo talis scientiae non est tanta quod, habita ilia, superfluat illuminatio fidei, immo valde est cum ilia pernecessaria. Et huius signum est, quia, licet aliqui philosophi de Deo sciverint multa vera, tamen, quia fide caruerunt, in multis erraverunt vel etiam defecemnt." — 3 Sent., 24.2.3, Resp. (3.523; ed. min., 3.515).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

739

from natural principles. In other words, what the Christian knows by philosophy is subjected to his natural reason, and what he believes by faith is above his natural reason, because the illumination of faith elevates reason above its natural condition. Now this goes to the heart of the problem, for it does not seem possible that the same truth can be both subjected to natural reason and be also above natural reason, so that the truth can be known at once, or at the same time, by a science and by faith.103 Bonaventure has no difficulty in handling this seeming impossibility. He points out once more that one and the same thing can be both hidden and open to the sense of sight; similarly, one and the same thing can be known according as it is subjected to reason and it can believed according as it is above reason, and so the thing is known according to one respect by a science and it is believed according to a different respect by faith. The power and nature of God, for instance, can be known by an acquired science, but it is entirely above such a science and natural reason to know the divine power and nature as they are with respect to a plurality of persons, or to know the divine power and nature as they are with respect to the human nature of Christ. If a man were to rely on the judgment of his natural reason and on his acquired science, Bonaventure insists, he would in no way whatsoever believe it possible that the divine unity is compatible with a plurality of persons, that God could be united to a human nature, and that the divine power, while remaining immutable, can go from nonaction into action. These truths, and others of a similar kind, appear to be contrary, according to philosophy, to the common conceptions of the human mind. This is why very little knowledge of divine things is attained by means of a science, unless it has the support of faith, because, in one and the same thing, what is most open to faith is most hidden to a science All this is clear from the philosophers, from whom was hidden the truth of the highest and noblest questions, such as the creation of the world, the power and wisdom of God, questions that are now open or clear to simple Christians. Because all the wisdom of man concerning God is folly rather than true science when it lacks the support of faith, therefore, Scripture says: "God has made foolish the wisdom of this world" (1 Cor., 1.20). Bonaventure concludes: "A man scrutinizing divine things sinks down into error, unless he is directed and assisted by an illumination of faith; wherefore a science is not removed by faith, but is rather perfected by it.10* It is quite evident that Bonaventure, in the text above, attributes the sinking down into error to the man scrutinizing divine things and not to his philosophical science. It is no less evident that Bonaventure speaks of the man, and not of his science, as needing the direction and assistance of an 103 Lac. cit., sc 4 (3.522; ed. min., 3.514). 104 Loc. cit., ad 4 (3.524; ed. min., 3.516), Note the closing statement: "Deprimit enim perscrutantem in errorem, nisi dirigatur et iuvetur per fidei illuminationem; unde per ipsam non expellitur, sed magis perficitur."

740

CHAPTER EIGHT

illumination of faith. Consequently, the perfecting of his philosophical science by faith results from an extrinsic control and aid that the Christian receives from the illumination of his faith. The lumen of faith is an intrinsic perfection of the mind of the Christian, who believes and thinks by one and the same intellect; but the lumen and habitus of his faith are distinct from the lumen of his reason and his habitus or science of philosophy, and so the illumination of his faith, though perfecting his intellect intrinsically, remains extrinsic to his philosophical science according as it relies intrinsically on the lumen of his reason and as the science is constituted by its own principles, reasons and conclusions. It is the man, or the human person, who is perfected by the illumination of faith; but the same man, who is a Christian, also has an illumination of reason. As a consequence, the Christian engaging in philosophy considers one and the same object in two ways that are formally diverse. He considers it, in one way, according to the lumen and habitus of faith. He considers the object, in another and diverse way, according to the lumen of his reason and his habitus or science of philosophy. This is what Bonaventure means in saying that one and the same thing can be known according as it is subjected to reason and it can be believed according as it is above reason, so that the thing is known according to one respect by a science and according to a different respect by faith. Bonaventure reinforces his position, furthermore, by holding that a man relying on his philosophy and on the judgment of his natural reason would never in any way believe even the possibility of the divine truths that, according to philosophy, appear to contradict the principles of natural reason. In holding that view, Bonaventure is upholding the necessary distinction of faith from philosophy. He adds on the authority of Scripture, however, that a philosophy lacking the support of faith is foolishness rather than a true science, a fact that Bonaventure illustrates by pointing out that simple Christians possess the truth of the highest and noblest questions to which the non-Christian philosophers could not find the answers. Here again, it is the philosophers and not their science that failed to find the answers to the questions, which Bonaventure himself, as we have seen at some length, handles in a formally philosophical manner. We are referring specifically to the questions, examined in our last chapter, on the creation of the world, and on the power and wisdom of God as the Creator of the universe; in addition to those questions, we have also seen Bonaventure showing, again in a formally philosophical manner, how the philosophers could have attained the indubitable truth and infallible certitude of both science and wisdom by the lumen of natural reason. In doing all that, Bonaventure is demonstrating in his own theology, on its ground as an integral whole, the truth of his position that the illumination of faith directs and aids the Christian extrinsically to discover without error by his connatural power of understanding the necessary reasons by which truly certain conclusions can be drawn from the primary principles constituting the foundation of philosophy. Although he refers repeatedly to the divine unity

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

741

as one of the truths that the philosophers have not been able to understand as perfectly as the Christian, nevertheless, Bonaventure also shows in his theology that the science of philosophy can make known with certitude the truth that there is but one God, and this is the way that a philosopher can know the indubitable truth of the divine unity, namely, that the divine being is supremely one. Demonstrating the divine unity from reason, Bonaventure shows that the divine being, which cannot be thought not to-be, must be supremely one because of the sublime nature and of the omnipotence of God, because of the sovereignity of His wisdom and goodness, and because of His all-pervading influence and of His all-surpassing causality with regard to creatures.l05 Those properties of the divine essence, according to Bonaventure, are sufficient to demonstrate that, from the divine being taken in itself, we must posit only one God. But there is also adequate evidence in creatures to show the truth that the divine being is supremely one. Every creature has a natural goodness, and so it has a natural unity, as Boethius and Augustine indicate: they have established that a creature would not be unless it were one, a truth which is evident to any man from his own experience and understanding.106 Every creature, therefore, from its natural goodness and unity, bears witness to the sovereign goodness and supreme unity of God. The unity of an individual creature does not take away the diversity of creatures in the universe; however, they are all contained within the one universe, which is finite and limited in itself. Now the diversity of creatures would not be contained within the one universe unless their plurality could be taken back to one final end and to one first principle; therefore, the universal unity of creatures bears witness to the truth that 'God is one'. This is necessarily true, Bonaventure maintains, and it is known to this extent, that a man having the use of reason does not doubt it, provided he knows what is meant by the name God. If the name signifies the first and supreme principle of all things, then, because its signification includes the universality of creatures, a man understanding the name in that way also understands, as a consequence, that 'God is one'. Hence, as the significance of self-evident principles is known at once when the meaning of their terms is understood, so the significance of the term God is indubitably certain to every man understanding it rightly, and thus he understands that 'God is one'. Many men, nevertheless, not knowing the true meaning of God, have erred in thinking that there are several gods. Because men think 105 DMT, 2.1, initio, fa. 1-6 (5.59-60). Bonaventure sums up all six proofs thus: "Ex parte praedictorum sic arguitur quia, si plures dii essent, aut omnino convenirent in omnibus conditionibus praedictis, aut ornnino different Si omnino convenirent: ergo non essent plures dii; si omnino different ergo si unus esset Deus, alter non esset Deus; si vero partim sic et partim non: ergo in quolibet esset aliquid et aliquid: ergo neuter simplex, ac per hoc neuter Deus. Ex his arguitur, quod divinum esse non potest multiplicari nee re nee aestimatione." — Lac. at., fm. 7 (5.60). 106 Cf. Boethius, De unitate et uno, (PL 63.1075-78); St. Augustine, De morib. manich., 2.6.8 (PL 32.1348).

742

CHAPTER EIGHT

that to be God which supersedes human power and human knowing, some men believed the demons to be gods. As a result, falling into error, those men have been blinded in their understanding, and they have fallen down in the worship of idols. It is no wonder that they have fallen so low, Bonaventure remarks, because, as Aristotle says: "a small error in the beginning is great in the end". Philosophy takes away this error, but Christian faith removes it in a much better way, for faith and philosophy concur in the truth that the divine being is supremely one. 107 The men falling into error by believing that there are several gods have not used the name God according to its proper institution, which does not allow a plural use of the term. Since a man blinded in his understanding frequently mistakes what is false for what is true, therefore, it is necessary that he have an illumination of faith in order to see the true unity of God. It could be said, nevertheless, that the truth 'God is one', as the divine unity is considered absolutely, has to be proved by reason; but the illumination of faith is necessary to see the divine unity as it is with respect to the plurality of persons.108 We have now shown how Bonaventure establishes in his theology, on its ground as an integral whole, the compatibility of philosophy with faith. The best way to sum up our findings is to illustrate them by indicating how Bonaventure himself manifests the compatibility of his philosophy with faith, for instance, with respect to his knowledge and his belief concerning our love of God. Bonaventure distinguishes the love founded on nature from the love founded on grace. Natural love flows from a facility and a rectitude with respect to what is good, but the love of charity subjects the will in obedience to Christ, just as faith subjects the intellect in obedience to Him. Natural love is set in motion by natural knowledge, whereas love of charity is set in motion by Christian faith. In the course of nature, God is known to be supremely good because of the diffusion of goodness in His created effects. According to faith, God is believed to be supremely good through the communication of goodness among the divine persons. Both natural knowledge and Christian faith proclaim, therefore, that God is supremely good, and that God is to be loved in the highest way. Christian faith proclaims those truths, however, in a much nobler way than natural knowledge, and so a man loves God in a greater and nobler way by charity than by natural love. Moreover, God is loved by an upright man from his 107 DMT, 2.1, Resp. (5.61); cf. Aristotle, De caelo, 1.5 (271b9-10). Note the closing passage: "Ab hoc errore eripit philosophia, sed multo melius fides Christiana; quae communiter in hoc concurrunt, quod divinum esse sit summe unum." 108 Loc. cit., ad 1 (5.61-62). Again, note: "Posset tamen dici, quod Deum esse unum habet probari per rationem, in quantum eius unitas consideratur absolute; sed necessaria est fidei illuminatio, in quantum comparatur ad personarum pluralitatem." Bonaventure, arguing in a similar way, goes on in the rest of this treatise (De nysterio Trinitatis) to show how reason can know that the divine being is most simple, omnipotent, infinite, eternal, immutable and necessary; these truths all stand together with the revelation of God as a Trinity and as the first principle of created things.

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

743

natural love, because he knows that God is good for him: such a man loves God in the highest way, because he also knows that God is supremely good for him, and that every good which he has and every good thing comes from God, without whom nothing would be; therefore, an upright man loves God even more than himself. A Christian, loving God from charity, loves God because He is good and, because God is supremely good, a Christian loves God in the highest way. Since a Christian knows that he is good only as he is directed to God, therefore, a Christian loves himself only for the sake of God, and this love is the love of charity. Accordingly, as the intellect assents in faith to the first truth, even though God dictates what is contrary to reason, so the will adheres in charity to the supreme good in such a way that it is prepared for love of Christ to hate what it is inclined to love in the course of nature. The love of charity is the sort of love moving a man for the sake of God to despise all desirable things, such as honours and even life itself, while loving those who hurt or hate him. Coming from grace, the love of charity is the only love that God accepts and rewards, for it is the sole love uniting a man to God for His own sake. Hence, the Christian loves God as He is known through faith, which moves the man to love God from charity, to love Him for His own sake alone, and it moves the man to love himself for the sake of God. A man loving God from natural love loves God as He is known by natural reason, which moves the man to love God for sake of the good things that he has from God, even though God is loved by the man, as an upright man, more than he loves himself. 109 By this comparison of natural love with Christian charity, Bonaventure manifests the compatibility of his understanding of the one with his belief in the other, a compatibility enabling him to consider our love of God according to the different and formal respects of natural reason and Christian faith. As a Christian and a theologian, however, Bonaventure retains his assent to God as the first truth, and for His own sake, while considering our natural love of God in a formally philosophical way. 110 Our next task is to show how Bonaventure unites philosophy and faith in his theology, on its ground as a universal whole, in order to obtain his strictly theological understanding of the object of belief. In uniting philosophy and faith, Bonaventure no longer considers one and tiie same object according to respects that are formally diverse. Rather, going beyond his preparatory integration of philosophy with faith, he proceeds formally by subjecting the lumen of reason to the lumen of faith while subordinating the 109 2 Sent., 3.2.3.1, ad 3 (2.126; ed. nun., 2.117-18). 110 For the principles supporting Bonaventure's philosophical consideration of human love see: 1 Sent., 1.3.2, Resp. (1.40-41; ed. min., 1.29-30). Bonaventure also compares the different ways in which a philosopher and a theologian assign the reasons for the diverse dispositions or aptitudes of men regarding the exercise of the mechanical arts and the various sciences of philosophy, the physicist, for instance, assigns reasons based on the bodily dispositions of men, but the theologian assigns the truly principal cause, which is the gift of natural talents by God to men: 2 Sent., 32.dub.6, Resp. (2.777-78; ed. min., 2.804-05).

744

CHAPTER EIGHT

habitus or science of philosophy to the habitus of faith within the science of theology. This procedure is strictly theological and, as we have seen, gives rise to the predominantly trinitarian character of Bonaventure's theological understanding of the object of belief. His philosophy contributes in a material way to the trinitarian character of his theology by providing a knowledge of the creature as an analogical resemblance of the Creator. Every creature, as an effect of the Creator, is understood by Bonaventure to be a vestige of God, to whom it is referred as to the principle of its being; and so, according to the unity, truth and goodness of its being, the creature is understood to be conformed to the Trinity. Every rational and intellectual creature is understood by Bonaventure to be an image of the Creator, to whom a spiritual creature is referred as to the object of its knowledge and love, so that, by its memory, intelligence and will, the spiritual creature is conformed to the Trinity. Every spiritual creature justified through the grace of the Holy Spirit is seen by Bonaventure to bear a likeness to the Creator, thus relating the creature to God as to an indwelling gift and conforming the creature to the Trinity by the virtues of faith, hope and charity. These three degrees of conformity to the Trinity are said by Bonaventure to be, as it were, the three rungs of the ladder by which the theologian ascends to God as to the supreme principle of all things. 111 Our task is, then, to show how Bonaventure unites philosophy to faith so as to obtain a theological understanding of the Trinity from the natural and infused resemblances of creatures to their Creator. What we have to do, therefore, is to indicate the way in which Bonaventure brings the philosophical sciences into the universal whole of his theology, which depends principally on the illumination of Christian faith and on the authority of Sacred Scripture. Bonaventure describes all this in a short treatise dealing with the reduction of the mechanical and liberal arts to the science and wisdom of theology. He opens his treatise with a fourfold distinction of the lumen given to man by the Father, who is the original principle of every illumination. The first lumen directs the human mind exteriorly to the truth of artifical forms, or the objects of the mechanical arts, which seek those objects to supply the needs of the human body. The lumen of the mechanical arts is said to be an exterior lumen because it is beneath philosophical knowledge, which the mechanical arts serve in some way.112

111 Brevil., 2.12 "... tertia similitude." (5.230; ed. min., nn. 1-3, 5.55-56). 112 De reduc. artium, nn. 1-2 (5.319-20; ed. min., 5.217-18). Bonaventure, following the Didascalion of Hugh of St. Victor, gives here a summary account of the seven mechanical arts: weaving, weaponry, agriculture, hunting, navigation, medicine and the theatre. He distinguishes, elsewhere, the practical science of the mechanical arts from the practical science of moral philosophy: "Uno modo dicitur scientia practica, quae est de opere, sicut moialis philosophia dicitur de opere, quae est de operibus procedentibus a libera voluntate. Alio modo dicitur scientia practica, quae est de opere et in opere, sicut faber, quando fabricat, dicitur habere cognitionem practicam fabricandi." — 3 Sent., 14.3.3, ad 5 (3.325; ed. min., 3.319).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

745

The second lumen, which is the inferior lumen of sensitive knowledge, directs the human mind toward the truth of natural forms. Bonaventure summarizes here his earlier accounts of the distinctions between the five exterior senses, their organic constitutions and their proper modes of operation. That done, he turns to the third lumen, which is the interior lumen of philosophical knowledge. Directing the mind to the truth of intellectual forms, the lumen of philosophy makes known the hidden causes of things from the principles of the sciences and of natural truth, principles that are connatural to the human mind. At this point, Bonaventure states his views, which we recorded previously, on the sciences of natural philosophy, rational philosophy and moral philosophy as seeking respectively the cause of being, the source of understanding and the order of human life; so, receiving an illumination from God, the philosophical sciences can reach God as the efficient cause of things, the formal cause of truth and the final cause of human actions. Considering those sciences from another viewpoint, Bonaventure describes natural philosophy as containing the truth of science, rational philosophy as containing the truth of doctrine and moral philosophy as containing the truth of human life. On that basis, he distinguishes the three subordinate sciences within each of the principal sciences: natural philosophy has physics, mathematics and metaphysics; rational philosophy has grammar, rhetoric and logic; moral philosophy contains the disciplines dealing with the life of the individual, the household and the political community." 3 The fourth lumen is the superior lumen of Scripture, which illumines the mind to see the truth of salvation, a truth above natural reason and known only by divine revelation. Maintaining the one literal sense of the words of Scripture, Bonaventure relates the allegorical sense to faith, the moral sense to the Christian life, and the anagogical sense to the end of both faith and the Christian life. Thus, the spiritual senses of Scripture teach us what we are to believe about the Divinity and the Incarnation, the way to live the Christian life, and how we are to adhere to God. The whole of Scripture, then, teaches the threefold truth about the Trinity and Christ, the order of Christian life, and the union of the soul with God. Summing up, Bonaventure says that the fourfold lumen of the mind gives rise to the sixfold illumination of the mechanical arts, sensitive knowledge, the three principal sciences of philosophical knowledge, and Sacred Scripture. These six illuminations will be perfected by a seventh, which is the illumination of glory in eternal beatitude. Of the six forms of knowledge in the present life, the five natural forms are ordered to the knowledge of Scripture in which they are enclosed and perfected, and by whose mediation they are directed to the illumination of glory. Every form of natural knowledge, therefore, comes to rest in the

113 De reduc. artium, nn. 3-4 (5.320-21; ed. min.., 5.219-21). See above: n. 28, p. 374; pp. 408-09.

746

CHAPTER EIGHT

knowledge of Scripture, which has its own rest in God from whom every illumination has its origin." 4 Bonaventure proceeds to show how the five illuminations of natural knowledge are taken back to the lumen and threefold truth of Scripture, a reduction which is the proper task of the science and wisdom of theology. Taking first the illumination of sensitive knowledge, he considers its medium, exercise and delight. The medium of sensitive knowledge is the similitude generated by the object and united to the sense power, which perceives the object through its medium. The theologian understands from this medium that an eternal similitude or Word is generated by the divine mind, and that the eternal Word is united to a human nature, so that, through Christ, every human mind is brought back to God through faith and by the medium of the true Image of the Father. The exercise of the sense powers make known the true order of life, because each of the cognitive senses seeks its proper object, shuns what is harmful and does not take to itself what belongs to any other of the senses. Acting in a similar manner, the appetitive senses move against negligence, concupiscence and pride. Thus, acting ordinately, the senses have a delight directing the mind to the union of the soul with God. Each sense seeks its proper object with a desire giving way to a joy when the sense finds its object, and no sense ever tires of repeating its operation again and again. Hence, the wisdom of God is contained secretly in the whole of sensitive knowledge, which is taken back to Scripture according as the life of the senses directs the theologian to the Trinity and Christ, the order of Christian life, and the union of the soul with God."5 The same threefold truth is brought to the attention of the theologian by the mechanical arts, which deal with the production of artificial forms. In this instance, Bonaventure considers the art of working, the quality of the artifact and its fruit or enjoyment. With regard to the art of working, he says that the artisan produces his artifact by the mediation of an exemplar conceived in his mind before he produces his exterior effect, which he knows and loves as his own product. From this feature of the mechanical arts, the theologian understands that every creature proceeds from the Creator through the eternal Word in whom the Father disposed all things, and through whom He produced not only those creatures that are vestiges of God, but also those that are images of God, to whom they are assimilated through knowledge and love. Since the mind of the rational creature has been darkened by sin, therefore, it was most fitting that the invisible Word should have become visible and assume a human nature in order to bring men back to the Father. Every artisan, moreover, intends to produce a work which is dear to him because of its beauty, utility and durability. An artifact has beauty from the artisan's knowledge, it has utility 114 Op. cit., nn. 5-7 (5.321-22; ed. min., 5.221-22). Sermo, Epiphania, n. 3 "Sequitur de ... earn" inveniat" (9.159). 115 De reduc. artium, nn. 8-10 (5.322; ed. min., 5.222-23).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

747

from his will, and it has durability from his perseverance in producing the work. Thus, the theologian understands that the order of life ought to have beauty from science, utility from virtue, and durability from perseverance in truth and goodness. Considering the fruit of the mechanical arts, Bonaventure notes that every artisan produces an artifact either to be praised for it, or to obtain something else for it, or simply to enjoy it. In a similar fashion, God produced the rational soul in order that it would praise Him, serve Him, and take its enjoyment and rest in Him through charity. In that way, the mechanical arts make known to the theologian the union of the soul with God, who dwells in the soul through charity. The whole of the mechanical arts, therefore, is a way to the illumination of Scripture, which proclaims only the true wisdom of God, and so Scripture frequently represents the divine wisdom by using examples taken from the mechanical arts."6 The lumen of the senses and the lumen of the mechanical arts are ordered and reduced to the lumen of Scripture by the mediation of the threefold lumen of the philosophical sciences, which enable the theologian to get a better understanding of the threefold truth of Scripture. Every word of human speech studied in rational philosophy signifies a concept of the mind, or an interior word, which is known to the one conceiving it. To make his interior word known to other men, a man must clothe it with a vocal form and, by this means, communicate his interior word to other men without parting with it in any way himself. The theologian, as a consequence, can see something similar in the eternal Word conceived by the Father, but never leaving Him, even though the divine Word is clothed in the visible form of a human nature. Every spoken word, furthermore, is perfect when it has suitability, truth and polish; so, directing the mind to the order of life, the perfection of human speech shows that human life ought to have a proper mode from a moderation in exterior actions, a proper species from a purity in affections, and a proper order from a rectitude of intentions. Accordingly, considering the end of human speech and thought, Bonaventure says that they are directed toward the expression of truth by means of similitudes, toward the teaching of truth by way of arguments, and toward moving the mind to accept truth by its own power. It is in this regard that Augustine speaks of Christ as the only true teacher, because, as the Word of God, He gives the mind its similitudes, lumen and power to know truth. Since those three elements are united interiorly to the soul, therefore, to know God from an interior reflexion, the theologian must be united in his soul to the eternal Word of God. 117 The science of natural philosophy has to do with seminal reasons in matter, intellectual 116 Op. cit., nn. 11-14 (5.322-23; ed. min., 5.223-24). 117 Op. cit., nn. 15-18 (5.323-24; ed. min., 5.224-26); cf. St. Augustine, In Epist loann., 3.2.13 (PL 35.2004). Note the closing text "Ex quo patet, quam mira est haec contemplatio, per quam Augustinus in multis libris manuducit ad divinam sapientiam."

748

CHAPTER EIGHT

reasons in the soul, and ideal reasons in God. Considering all those reasons according to a relation of proportion, Bonaventure maintains that the theologian can see in them the eternal Word and the incarnate Word. The intellectual reasons in the soul hold a middle position between the seminal reasons in matter and the ideal reasons in God; but seminal reasons cannot be in matter without the generation and production of a form, neither can intellectual reasons be in the soul without the generation of a mental word: therefore, according to a relation of proportion, there cannot be ideal reasons in God without the production and generation of the Word by the Father. Moreover, the appetite of matter is ordered to the intellectual reasons in the rational soul, so that there would not be a perfect generation if this soul were not united to corporeal matter. In a similar manner, Bonaventure says, there could not be the highest and noblest perfection in the universe if there did not come together at once in the personal unity of the incarnate Word the nature of corporeal matter and the nature of the rational soul. Consequently, the whole of natural philosophy proclaims, by a relation of proportion, the eternal and incarnate Word of God, who was begotten before all time, but who is now incarnate for all ages. The three sorts of reasons studied in natural philosophy can also be considered according to the effect of causality, and so they indicate the order of life. Now there can be generation in corruptible matter according to seminal reasons only by the influence of the lumen of the celestial bodies, namely, the sun, the moon and the stars, which are ingenerate and incorruptible. Hence, the theologian can see that the soul can bring forth living works only by the influence of the lumen of Christ's grace, the help of His Mother Mary, and by imitating the examples of the saints. The reasons studied in natural philosophy, considered according to the medium of union, lead the theologian to see the union of the soul with God. Just as the soul cannot be united to a corporeal nature except through the mediation of the humor, spirit and heat of the body, so also God cannot offer the life of grace to the soul, nor be united to it, except through compunction and piety, contempt of all earthly things, and a desire for the knowledge and love of its heavenly home. Thus, the wisdom of God is hidden in natural philosophy.118 The illumination of moral philosophy directs the mind of the theologian in like manner to the lumen of Scripture. The principal intention of moral philosophy is rectitude, which is known in a threefold way. It is known, in one way, as the medium between two extremes. If the supreme rectitude is in God as the beginning and the end of all things, there must be in God a middle person who is both producing and produced; similarly, there must be a middle principle in the emanation and return of creatures, so that they must come forth from God through the divine Word and go back to God through the incarnate Word, who is the mediator between God and men.

118 De redue. artium, nn. 19-22 (5.324-25; ed. mm., 5.226-27).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

749

Rectitude is known, in another way, as that which is conformed to rule. Manifesting the order of life, this rectitude is found in a man who, living rightly, is directed according to the rules of divine law. To live rightly, then, a man must assent willingly to necessary precepts, salutary warnings and perfect counsels; in that way, the man bears witness to the goodness, beneficence and perfection of the divine will. Rectitude is known, finally, as the summit of perfection, thus indicating the union of the soul with God. Since God is high above man, the peak of the human mind must be raised on high in order that it assent by its rational potency to the first truth for its own sake alone, depend by its irascible potency on the divine generosity, and adhere by its concupiscible potency to the divine goodness. A man united to God in that manner is seen by the theologian to be also one in spirit (1 Peter, 4.11). 119 Closing his treatise, Bonaventure says that the multiform wisdom of God, which is transmitted in the light of Scripture, is hidden in all knowledge and in every nature. The knowledge of every science and of every art pertains to the universality of theology, which takes to itself and for its own purpose all the examples and words belonging to every kind of knowledge. It is clear, Bonaventure remarks, how ample theology is as an illuminative way to God, and how God is hidden in everything known to man by his senses or by his intellect. The fruit of all the other sciences consists in this, therefore, that God is honoured because, in all of them, faith is erected, moral conduct is put into order, and consolation is drawn from the union of the soul with God. That union is brought about through charity, which is the end intended by the whole of Scripture and, as a consequence, of every illumination received by man from God. For this reason, Bonaventure concludes, any knowledge without charity is empty, because no man can ever come to Christ, the Son of God, except through the Holy Spirit, who teaches us every truth. 120 This short treatise of Bonaventure shows explicitly how he unites all natural knowledge to faith in order to obtain a universal understanding of truth in his theology. The union of natural knowledge with infused knowledge is accomplished both formally and materially, each way manifesting the nature of his theology as a subalternate science of Scripture. The union is achieved formally by reducing or subjecting the threefold lumen of natural knowledge to the lumen of Scripture; so the ordering and relating of the triple lumen of nature to the one lumen of Scripture reflects the order and relations of the persons in the Trinity. The union is also achieved formally by subjecting the twofold illumination of sensitive knowledge and the mechanical arts to the threefold illumination of phi119 Op. cit., nn. 23-25 (5.325; ed. min., 5.227-28). Bonaventure interprets rectitude here as it pertains to general justice, a notion that he takes from St. Anselm: Dialog, de vent., c. 12 (PL 158.482). 120 De reduc. artium, n. 26 (5.325; ed. min., 5.228). See the article by A. Villalmonte, Estudios franciscanas, 59 (1958), pp. 324-72.

750

CHAPTER EIGHT

losophical knowledge, and by subjecting the latter illumination to the one illumination of Scripture. In this instance, the twofold illumination manifests the truth of natural and artificial forms, and so it reflects the truth of the divine and human natures in Christ. The twofold illumination is reduced, however, to the threefold illumination of philosophical knowledge within the unity of a single illumination of Scripture; in that way, there is represented in the one illumination of theology the order of Christ to the Trinity and Unity of God. The theological union of natural and .infused illuminations, therefore, indicates the threefold subject of theological understanding, which is founded on the truth of Scripture. This subject is the Trinity and Christ, the order of Christian life, which is indicated by the ordering of the natural illuminations to the illumination of Scripture, and the union of the soul with God, which is indicated by the conjoining of the natural illuminations with the illumination of Scripture through the bond of charity. The union of natural knowledge with faith is accomplished materially, therefore, by reducing or subordinating the truths of the first to the truth of the second, so that each of the five forms of natural knowledge provides Bonaventure with reasons enabling him to understand the threefold truth of faith as it is presented in Scripture. That truth is contained in Scripture fundamentally according to its literal sense, but it is understood subsequently according to the threefold spiritual sense of Scripture. In this respect, each form of natural knowledge makes a proper contribution to each one of the spiritual senses of Scripture, and so Bonaventure subordinates every form of natural knowledge to every sense of Scripture. Considering its allegorical sense, which appeals to faith, Bonaventure understands the truth of the Trinity and of Christ. Within the Trinity, he understands the Father to dispose and to produce all things through His Word, who became incarnate for the redemption of men. According to this sense of Scripture, therefore, Bonaventure understands God as the principle of creation and redemption. Considering the moral sense of Scripture, which appeals to charity, Bonaventure understands the true order of Christian life, an order depending on the work of Christ and the grace of the Holy Spirit. Thus, according to this particular sense of Scripture, Bonaventure has a better understanding of God as the principle of redemption by the divine work of restoration. Considering the anagogica! sense of Scripture, which appeals to hope, Bonaventure understands the union of the soul with God, a union depending on the working of the Holy Spirit. According to that sense of Scripture, then, Bonaventure has an understanding of God as the end of all things and as the principle of retribution. In short, Bonaventure unites his natural knowledge to faith in order to obtain a theologial understanding of God as the principle of creation, redemption and retribution, a threefold subject that he takes from Scripture, which is itself a representation of the Trinity. 121 121 "'Ecce descripsi earn tibi tripliciter etc.', Proverbiorum vigesimo secundo (vs. 20). Cum omnis

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

751

In Bonaventure's view, it is not inappropriate to unite natural knowledge to faith, because Scripture frequently uses natural things and human knowledge to teach the truth of divine revelation. Indeed, according to Bonaventure, Scripture has a knowledge of all the philosophical sciences. Furthermore, natural philosophy attains God as the cause of being, rational philosophy attains God as the source of understanding, and moral philosophy arrives at God as the order of life. Consequently, the whole of philosophical knowledge is a vestige of the Trinity and, as such, it can be used to obtain an understanding of revelation.122 By uniting his philosophical knowledge to Christian faith in his theology, therefore, Bonaventure makes an appropriate use of his philosophy to get a theological understanding of the object of Christian faith. In other words, on the universal ground of his theology, Bonaventure appropriates to his faith whatever he knows by his philosophy in order to unite the two by way of that appropriation. The foundations of his appropriation, as we have seen on many occasions, are the natural vestige of God in the corporeal creature and the natural image of God in the rational creature. As an effect of God, the corporeal creature has many properties, such as its essential unity, truth and goodness, which point the way to the efficient, exemplar and final causality of the Creator. When the natural resemblance of the corporeal creature to its Creator is united by way appropriation to the revelation of the Trinity, the threefold properties of the creature assist Bonaventure in his theological understanding of the Trinity by appropriating to the three divine persons respectively the efficient, exemplar and final causality of the creature. As a consequence, Bonaventure has a theological understanding of the corporeal creature itself, because he sees that it is from the Father, it is conformed to the Son, and it is ordered to the Holy Spirit. Since every creature is constituted in being by the Creator, the rational creaturf is afso; a natural vestige of God and, as such, reflects the essential unity, Sfuth and goodness of the Creator. From this point of view, the natural properties of the rational creature are also appropriated by Bonaventure to the three scientia gerat Trinitatis insigne, praecipue ilia quae docetur in sacra Scriptura, debet in se repraesentare vestigium Trinitatis; propter quod dicit Sapiens de hac sacra doctrina, se earn tripliciter descripsisse propter triplicem ipsius intellectual spiritualem, scilicet moralem, allegoricum et anagogicum. Hie autem triplex intellectus respondet triplici actui hierarchico, scilicet purgationi, illumination! et perfection!. Purgatio autem ad pacem ducit, illuminatio ad veritatem, perfectio ad caritatem; quibus perfecte adeptis, anima beatificatur, et secundum quod circa haec versatur, suscipit meriti incrementum. In horum igitur trium cognitione pendet scientia totius sacrae Scripturae, pendet etiam meritum vitae aeternae." — De triplici via, Prol. (8.3; Dec. opusc., p. 3). For a detailed description of the three spiritual senses of Scripture see: Coll. in Hexaim., c. 13 (5.387-92; Delorme, pp. 146-55). 122 Call de donis, 4.6-11 (5.474-75). Note the closing passage: "Ostendit igitur Salomon, se pervenisse ad triformem descriptionem scientiae philosophicae, scilicet ad descriptionem scientiae rationalis, moralis et naturalis et ad triformem descriptionem quarumlibet istarum. Qui haberet descriptionem istarum scientiarum secundum veritatem, maximum speculum haberet ad cognoscendum, quia nihil est in aliqua istarum scientiarum, quod non importet vestigium Trinitatis. Illud esset facile ostendere, sed longum esset"

752

CHAPTER EIGHT

divine persons, with the consequence that the rational creature is understood in the same theological way as the corporeal creature. But the rational creature is properly a natural image of God. Having memory, intelligence and will, the rational creature is assimilated to God by its mind, knowledge and love. When those spiritual properties are united by way of appropriation to the revelation of the Trinity, they assist Bonaventure to understand the order and relations of the three divine persons to whom he appropriates respectively memory and mind, intelligence and knowledge, will and love. As a result of this appropriation, Bonaventure has a nobler theological understanding of the rational creature, because he perceives in it an image of the Trinity, and so he conceives the full personal dignity of man. l23 Although Bonaventure knows by his philosophy, on the one hand, that every creature is a natural vestige of the Creator and, on the other hand, that the rational creature is a natural image of the Creator, nevertheless, he does not know by his philosophy that the creature is a vestige of the Trinity, or that the rational creature is an image of the Trinity. Again, though he attains the threefold causality of the Creator in a philosophical way from His vestige in the creature, nonetheless, Bonaventure appropriates the threefold causality of God to the divine persons solely in a theological way. Likewise, he proceeds solely in a theological manner when he appropriates to the divine persons the qualities of the rational creature as an image of the Creator. Consequently, it is according to his theological knowledge, and not to his philosophical knowledge, that Bonaventure understands a creature to be a natural vestige or a natural image of the Trinity. Stopping short at the divine essence, philosophical knowledge has only an imperfect understanding of the threefold causality of God and of the divine mind, knowledge and love; therefore, as we have seen, philosophical knowledge can give only an imperfect understanding of the creature as a vestige or an image of God.!24 Granting that there is nothing more excellent in man, according to nature, than the image of God, Bonaventure maintains, at the same time, that the divine image in man is indifferent to God's acceptance or non-acceptance. To be accepted by God, any human soul must have over and above its natural properties the added gift of infused grace.125 A man lacking infused grace may well advance in purely speculative knowledge, but not in moral knowledge or in virtuous activity.126 A man having

123 Breuil., 2.1 (5.219; ed. min., 5.35-36); 2.9 (5.226-27; ed. min., 5.48-51); cf. Serma, De triplici testimonio sanctissime Trinitatis, (5.535-38; ed. min., 5.231-38). See above: pp. 612-15. 124 See above: pp. 498-99 (nn. 108-09). 125 "Item, nihil excellentius est secundum naturam in homine quam ipsa imago; sed imago indifferens est ad acceptandum et non acceptandum: ergo ad hoc quod aiiqua anima a Deo acceptetur, necesse est ultra naturalia esse aliquod donum naturae superadditum." — 2 Sent., 19.1.1, sc 4 (2.695; ed min., sc d, 2.717). 126 "Quod enim dicitur, quod intellectus viget in peccatoribus, dicendum quod verum est secundum

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

753

infused grace, however, has the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. As a consequence, the image of God is reformed in the soul of such a man, who is led by his natural knowledge of God from His image to know the Trinity from the reformed image, or similitude, which perfects the natural image of God in the rational soul.127 To know God according to faith, moreover, is to know God "according to piety". Although it seems very difficult to a man proceeding in a purely speculative way to believe that God is one and triune, or a Trinity, nevertheless, to a man filled with piety, Bonaventure says, it is very easy to think that the Father has an only begotten Son whom the Father loves as He loves Himself, and whom He handed over to death for the salvation of man.128 This introduces the subject of the role of piety in the constitution of Bonaventure's theological knowledge. In his question on the gift of piety, Bonaventure notes that the term piety has several meanings, as Augustine shows: "Piety, in its proper sense, is usually understood to designate the worship of God, which the Greeks call theosebia; nevertheless, piety is said to designate that which is had dutifully for parents, but common customfrequently applies the name also to works of mercy."129 The term piety then, designates the worship of God, a duty to parents, and works of mercy on behalf of our neighbour. The first meaning of the term, according to Bonaventure, does not include the gift of piety, but refers to the virtue of religion, and Augustine speaks of Christian piety in this sense as "the true wisdom".130 The second meaning of piety still does not include the gift, because the piety owed to parents is a species of the virtue of justice, for we are bound both by necessity and by the rule of natural law to revere our parents. The third meaning of the term, therefore, is the one involving the gift of piety, and so, as a gift of the Holy Spirit, piety has to do with works of mercy on behalf of our neighbour. The virtue of mercy regulates the actions of a man toward his neighbour in need or in misery, because he and his neighbour have a conformity in human nature; but the gift of piety regulates a man's actions toward his neighbour, because the neighbour has in himself an image of God. The gift of piety, then, makes a man

actum qui est purae speculationis, sed non prout extenditur ad affectum vel opus." — 4 Sent., 18.2.dub.3, in Resp. (4.496; ed. min., 4.482). 127 "Item, Deus est obiectum virtutum theologicarum, in quibus consistit imago reformation is: ergo, cum idem sit obiectum utriusque imaginis, quia una est ductiva alterius et perfectiva, si Deus est obiectum unius, et alterius." — 1 Sent., 3.2.1.2, fm. 4 (1.83; ed. min. d, 1.61). On the reformation of the soul by the action of infused grace see: 2 Sent., 26.un.3, qq. 3-6 (2.637-46; ed. min., 2.657-68). 128 " ... dicendum, quod cognitio secundum fidem est cognitio 'secundum pietatem', sicut dicitur ad Titum primo (vs. 1). Et licet intellectui procedenti secundum ariditatem speculationis videatur illud difficillimum credere, quod est, Deum esse trinum et unum; intellectui tamen pietate pleno facillimum est illud sentire de summo Patre, quod Unigenitum habeat, quern sicut se ipsum diligat, quern etiam pro salute hominum tradat" — DMT, 1.2, ad 8 (5.57). 129 Cf. De civil. Dei, 10.1.3 (PL 41.278-79). 130 Cf. De Trinit., 14.1.1 (PL 42.1035-37).

754

CHAPTER EIGHT

benevolent toward every other man by reason of the image of God in all men. The benevolence of the gift of piety, consequently, moves a man sometimes to be compassionate toward his neighbour according to the circumstances of time and place, while it also moves a man sometimes to be beneficent toward his neighbour by works of mercy. Thus, the act of the gift of piety is to be benevolent toward the neighbour inasmuch as he bears the image of God. For that reason, Bonaventure says, the gift of piety must be directed in knowledge by the gift of science, which is founded on the principles of faith and orders human life according to the example of Christ. Hence, though the act of piety consists chiefly in benevolence toward the neighbour, the gift also moves a man to hear Sacred Scripture with benevolence and to remember benevolently the sufferings of Christ on behalf of all men. 131 Now, as a wisdom, piety is understood by Augustine, as Bonaventure knows, to be a knowledge which is the true religion or worship of God, so that Christian piety consists in the virtues of faith, hope and charity. 132 Since Augustine's understanding of Christian piety is founded on Scripture, Bonaventure has to account for his own position that the gift of piety does not consist chiefly and properly in the worship of God.133 Explaining his position, Bonaventure affirms that a man ought to be benevolent first and foremost toward God by offering Him the worship and service, both primary and principal, that are His due as the Creator in whose likeness the man is made and on whom the man depends as a creature, for God is the original principle of the man's being. Thereafter, because a man's father bears the image of the Father in God, and a son bears the image of the earthly father from whom he originates, therefore, derived from the piety owed to God, the second mode of piety is the benevolence owed to parents. Lastly, because every man is created in the divine image, the third mode of piety consists in the benevolence and beneficence to be given to each man by reason of his similarity to God. Although the third mode of piety is posterior to the other two, it is taken by Bonaventure as the proper way to understand the gift of piety. The worship of God, then, is the prior instance of piety to which the obligation to parents and the mercy to a neighbour are referred by analogies of proportion, so that the worship of God is found analogically in the second and third modes of piety. The gift of piety, however, is similar to the virtues of meekness and mercy, but also differs from them. It is similar to meekness in a loving compassion for the neighbour, and it is similar to mercy in relieving his misery. The virtue of

131 3 Sent., 35.un.6, Resp. (3.785-86; ed. mm., 3.791-92). 132 " ... quarto modo sapientia non dicit aliam cognitionem quam religionem divinam sive cultura, secundum quod dicitur, quod pietas ipsa est sapientia sive theosebia; et haec consistit, ut dicit Augustinus, in fide, spe et caritate, et hoc modo claudit in se virtutem, et ita opponitur culpae." — 1 Sent., 46.dub.5, Resp. (1.835; ed. min., 1.663); cf. St. Augustine, Enchirid., 1.2-3 (PL 40.231-32). 133 3 Sent., 35.un.6, arg. 1-4 (3.785; ed. min., 3.789).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

755

meekness opposes the irritation caused by an injury, whereas the gift of piety opposes the hardness of heart preventing a man from showing either love or benevolence toward his neighbours, who are created in God's image. The virtue of mercy regulates a man's actions toward his neighbour because of their natural likeness as rational beings, and so the virtue is conformed to the natural law according to the rule of prudence. But the gift of piety directs a man's actions toward his neighbour because of the natural likeness of the neighbour to God, and thus the gift is conformed to the divine law according to the rule of the gift of science.134 The principal meaning of piety, according to Bonaventure, has to do with divine worship and the virtue of religion. Taking the term in that sense, he posits the worship of God as the prior instance of piety; therefore, the primary and principal forms of worship are owed to God by every man, because, as the Creator, God is the original principle of the being of each man. Thereafter, by the analogy of proportion, Bonaventure takes the posterior instances of natural piety toward parents and Christian piety toward neighbours as analogical forms of divine worship. In an analogical way, then, worship is offered to God by a man showing benevolence toward his parents, who are the secondary principles of his being, and toward his neighbours, who are made in the likeness of God, Worship is given in a similar way by a man: first, in showing benevolence toward those from he learns truth, inasmuch as he is related to them as to the secondary principles or agents of his knowledge; secondly, in showing both benevolence and beneficence toward his neighbours to whom he imparts truth as to those who are created in the image of God. The first of these forms of piety, which is a special form of justice founded on the natural law, is the sort regulating Bonaventure's benevolence with respect to the authority of the men from whom learns truth, whereas his benevolence with respect to the divine authority, or to God as the first truth, is regulated by the piety consisting properly in divine worship and pertaining to the virtue and to the wisdom of the Christian religion. The second of those forms of piety, which is the gift, is conformed to the divine law and directed in knowledge according to the rule of the gift of science, which is founded on the principles of Christian faith. The gift of piety, therefore, is the form of piety regulating Bonaventure's benevolence and beneficence toward those to whom he teaches truth and who are created in the image of God. Wherefore, in teaching truth according to piety, Bonaventure is performing a spiritual work of mercy for the benefit of those who listen to him and who read his writings. On the other hand, benevolence and beneficence are owed to every man as an image of God; so, giving honour to God, Bonaventure manifests Christian piety by accepting truth wherever and whenever he finds it in other men to whom he listens, or whose writings he

134 Loc. cit., ad 1-4 (3.786-87; ed. min., 3.792-93); 3 Sent., 9.2.1, ad 3 (3.214; ed. min., 3.206).

756

CHAPTER EIGHT

reads and studies. In this respect, Bonaventure manifests his piety most of all toward Christ, who is the exemplar of the true order of human life, and toward the books of Scripture, which were written by the Holy Spirit. There are, then, three ways in which piety functions in the constitution of Bonaventure's theological knowledge. In the first way, pertaining to the virtue and wisdom of the Christian religion, piety regulates his theological knowledge according to the authority of God, who is not only the first squrce of truth, but also the original principle of being and the final end of man. This is the way that, as we have seen, Bonaventure speaks of Christian doctrine as pertaining to the worship of God, and of the obligation of the Christian to think of God in the loftiest and most pious way, thus giving to God supreme honour and veneration. 135 In the second way, following the virtue of justice and the natural law, piety regulates Bonaventure's theological knowledge according to the authority of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church, who are magisterial sources of Christian doctrine, and according to the authority of the philosophers, whether Christian or nonChristian, who are revered sources of natural truth. It is according to this mode of piety that Bonaventure proceeds in confirming or supporting his own doctrinal positions with the historical sources at his disposal; so his use of them manifests his benevolence toward the different authors who contribute in varying degrees to the formation and development of his own doctrine. In the third way, belonging to the gift of the Holy Spirit, piety regulates the theology of Bonaventure according to the divine law and under the direction of the gift of science, which is founded on the principles of Christian faith and orders human life according to the teachings and example of Christ. This is the mode 6f piety moving Bonaventure to assent always and principally to the first truth for its own sake alone and to gather the primary materials for his theology from Scripture, which comes from the Holy Spirit and contains the teachings and example of Christ. In that way, Bonaventure shows benevolence toward God for the benefit of those to whom he communicates truth. Jvloreover, the gift of piety moves Bonaventure to honour God in His created image by accepting truth wherever and whenever he meets it in any other man. Consequently, motivated by Christian piety, Bonaventure shows benevolence and beneficence toward other authors, both Christian and non-Christian, by welcoming the truth of their doctrines, whether theological or philosophical, and, by excusing as much as possible any author who has fallen into error. We have seen Bonaventure proceeding that way in his interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine on the immortality of the rational soul, in excusing Aristotle for all but one of his mistakes, and in excusing other non-Christian philosophers for going astray because of their invincible ignorance of divine revelation.136 But the piety of Bonaventure with respect to human authority 135 See above: pp. 666-67 (n. 2). 136 See above: p. 611; pp. 623-26. Bonaventure does not excuse Averroes, because the latter shows im-

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

757

is always subordinated to his piety with respect to divine authority, which supports the revelation of Scripture and the truth of faith. In this regard, we have shown how Bonaventure is willing to accept any philosophical reason not contradicting the truth of Scripture, whereas he rejects any position or opinion contrary to Scripture and faith; we have also shown how he invokes the rule of piety in order to obtain an acceptable understanding of an apparently unsound opinion of authorities in theology. At the same time, Bonaventure indicates how the theologian may hold the contrary to a theological or a philosophical opinion, but not to a truth of revelation, because he would err by opposing divine revelation and he would fall into heresy if he presumed to assert his erroneous opinion. Finally, Bonaventure maintains that some things, though they are known sufficiently by philosophy, are better left in doubt by the theologian out of reverence for Scripture, which has little or nothing to say about them. Hence, confining himself to the revelation of Scripture, the theologian should shun idle curiosity about things not connected with man's salvation.137 The things about which Scripture has little to say have to do, for the most part, with the nature and movement of the celestial bodies. It is in regard to matters of this sort that Bonaventure speaks about avoiding idle curiosity, or even remaining in doubt rather than asserting something with certitude. For instance, having set forth three opinions on the nature of the watery heaven, he takes only a probable position on the question rather than assert something with certitude regarding a matter which is uncertain, "for it is better to doubt piously than to define something rashly".138 With regard to the fiery heaven, Bonaventure notes that the theologians say little about it, and the philosophers still less, but that the existence of such a heaven is to be posited on the authority of Scripture; Bonaventure prefers to hold only a probable opinion on the influence of the fiery heaven on earthly bodies.139 Considering the movement of the celestial bodies, he says that, because the heavens are far away from man's senses, only a few of the philosophers, relying on astronomers, obtained by reasoning a knowledge of the movement of the watery heaven. The theologians, on the other hand, hold commonly on the authority of Scripture that such a heaven does exist; but Bonaventure again prefers to hold only an opinion on the question of the movement of the watery heaven. 14° Nevertheless, he rejects as erroneous and contrary to Scripture the position of some philosophers that the celestial bodies are animated, so that they are moved by their own souls. He piety by attributing to Aristotle the error of one intellect for all men, an error that Bonaventure does not find in Aristotle. 137 See above: pp. 679-82. 138 "Hanc autem viam tertiam satis sustinere possumus probabiliter, cum nihil videatur sibi obviare. Hoc autem praecipue attendendum est, ne in incerta materia aliquid certitudinaliter asseratur, melius enim pie dubitare quam aliquid temerarie definire." — 2 Sent., 14.1.1.1, Resp. (2.338; ed. min., 2.340). 139 2 Sent., 2.2.1.1, Resp. (2.71; ed. min., 2.63); 2.2.1.2, Resp. (2.74; ed. min., 2.66). 140 2 Sent., 14.2.1.3, Resp. (2.355-56; ed. min., 2.360-62).

758

CHAPTER EIGHT

prefers to hold, with Augustine, that God moves the celestial bodies by means of the angels, a position held by the greater number both in theology and in philosophy, because it seems to harmonize for the most part with the piety of faith and with reason. 141 Under his rule of piety, Bonaventure tries to reconcile as often as possible the differences of opinion either among theologians or between theologians and philosophers; it is in this spirit that he reconciles different doctrinal positions on the nature and movement of the celestial bodies.142 Because the philosophers do not always take things back to their first and principal cause, the reasons, though true enough, given by the philosophers for many things, such as the divine causality and the celestial orbs, are said by Bonaventure to be wanting at times in truth. 143 The theologian, supplementing the needs of philosophy, ought to provide what is wanting in the doctrines of the philosophers, particularly on divine things. But the theologian, in providing for philosophy, ought to avoid the empty curiosity of philosophers lest, through pride and presumption, he becomes foolish in his science, falls into error and even corrupts the wisdom of philosophy itself. !44 The theologian, therefore, must not scrutinize divine things with either the pride and presumption of heretics or the empty curiosity of philosophers; rather, he ought to follow the example of piety given by the Prophets and the Apostles in Sacred Scripture. 145 Regulated by the piety of the Christian religion, the theology of Bonaventure relies principally on the authority of God, to whom as to the original principle of truth Bonaventure shows benevolence first and foremost, thus honouring and venerating God by assenting to whatever is true, witholding assent to what is doubtful, and rejecting whatever is false or erroneous. Directed by the piety of natural justice, the theology of Bonaventure relies secondarily on the acceptable authority of those theologians and philosophers from whom he learns truth; so, venerating God, Bonaventure manifests his reverence and benevolence toward his forefathers in truth. Finally, guided by the gift of piety, the theology of Bonaventure is founded chiefly on the truth of faith as it is contained in Scripture; however, giving honour to God, Bonaventure welcomes truth wherever and whenever he finds it, and so he shows both benevolence beneficence toward any man teaching or transmitting truth, because every man is made in the image and likeness of God. Thus out of reverence for God as the principal author of truth, Bonaventure attributes to God not only the doctrine of Scripture, but also the doctrine of the human sciences; 141 "Et haec positio magnorum est tarn in theologia quam in philosophia, quia concors pietati fidei et ration! plurimura esse videturv' — 2 Sent., 14.1.3.2, Resp. (2.348-49; ed. min., 2.351-53). Cf. St Augustine, De Gen. ad lilt., 8.23.44 (PL 34.390); De lit:, arbit., 3.11.33 (PL 32.1287). 142 2 Sent., 2.2.dub.2 (2.85-86; ed. min., 2.77-78); cf. 14.1.1.2, Resp. (2.339-40; ed. min., 2.341-42). 143 1 Sent., 45.dub.7 (1.813; ed. min., 1.647); 2 Sent., 2.2.1.1, ad 4 (2.72; ed. min., 2.64). Cf. Sermo, De ss. Angelis, n. 1 "Quarta proprietas caeli ... psallam tibi'." (9.612). 144 Comm. in Eccles., Prooem., nn. 10-13 (6.4-5); cf. 2.17 (6.25-26). 145 Comm. in loann., Prooem., n. 11, q. 3 (6.243-44).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

759

therefore, according to Bonaventure, all those sciences serve Sacred Scripture, which surpasses all of them. In short, under the rule of Christian piety, Bonaventure finds no conflict between theology and a true philosophy with regard to divine things. I46 He finds a difference, however, between Christian wisdom and the philosophers concerning virtuous actions. Christian wisdom teaches that a man cannot have merit for his good works unless they are formed by charity; but the philosophers say that a man is good because of his good works, and so, unless the philosophers are rightly understood, they lead a Christian into error, for the position of the philosophers is based solely on human nature. 147 Nonetheless, in his benevolence and beneficence toward the philosophers, Bonaventure does not despise their many examples of virtuous actions.148 The threefold function of piety in the constitution of Bonaventure's theology shows the influence of Augustine's triple meaning of piety. The first function of piety, regulating Bonaventure's theology according to divine authority, follows Augustine's meaning of piety as the wisdom of Christian religion, which is manifested in the true worship of God. The second function of piety, directing Bonaventure's theology according to human authority, indicates the influence of Augustine's meaning of piety as a duty toward parents. This duty is fulfilled by Bonaventure in revering his forefathers or teachers who, in relation to God, are secondary agents of truth, as Augustine also shows. The third function of piety, guiding the theology of Bonaventure according to faith and Scripture, reflects the influence of Augustine's meaning of piety as consisting in works of mercy. Bonaventure performs spiritual works of mercy in his theology by his benevolence and beneficence in teaching truth to other men and in accepting the true doctrines of human authorities, both Christian and nonChristian, out of reverence for the supreme authority of God. In addition, Bonaventure does a work of mercy by showing compassion toward those who have fallen into error, a compassion expressed by his benevolence in

146 "Sicut Dominus in prima conditione mundi, quando condidit hominem et posuit eura in paradise, diversa lignorum genera in paradiso produxit: quaedam ad continuandam vitam, quaedam ad perpetuandam, ut lignum vitae; ita Deus homini quasdam doctrinas ad ordinem vitae hominis, quasdam doctritias ad acquirendum vitam aeternam; et haec est sacra scientia; et ideo omnes aliae isti famulantur, et ista omnibus, et ista omnibus aliis antecellit." — Sermo, De s. Andrea, n. 1 (9.463). "Intelligatis, quod Dominus nulli innititur, quia non dependet ab aliquo, ut habemus in theologia; et in vera philosophia principium non dependet ab aliqua re, et colligltur ex theologia et philosophia, quod vera relatione non refertur Deus ad aliquid extra; sed intra ad Filium refertur vera relatione, in aliis vero est eius relatio secundum dici." — Sermo, De ss. Angelis, collatio (9.618). 147 Sermo, De s. Stephana, n. 1, collatio "Sapientia Christiana ... et prodigiosa" (9.482). 148 "Innumera quoque ad hoc (i.e. abstinentia) exempla suppetunt virorum illustrium, non solum in Christum credentium, verum etiam gentilium philosophorum, sicut ex variis historiis colligi potest, et praecipue de libro Hieronymi Contra lovinianum (2.9-14; PL 23.311-19), et ex eo quern conscripsit Ambrosius de Vita brachmanorum (PL 17.1167-84). Nee horum contemnenda exempla ..." —Apologia pauperum, 5.22 (8.264).

760

CHAPTER EIGHT

excusing them for their mistakes.149 Augustine's influence on Bonaventure's union of faith and philosophy is quite apparent in the twofold ground of the vestige and image of God, for this is the universal ground on which Bonaventure transforms philosophical knowledge by Christian faith, so that the philosophical sciences, from his theological perspective, become a vestige of the Trinity. Moreover, in showing how rational philosophy points the way to the truth of the Trinity, Bonaventure singles out Augustine as one leading the Christian in contemplation along that way through Christ, the eternal and incarnate Word of God. Bonaventure is influenced by Anselm, however, in describing how the rectitude of natural justice, which is studied in moral philosophy, puts the Christian on the right road to the Trinity. The position taken by Bonaventure on the integral compatibility of faith with philosophy in a Christian thinker is influenced by both Augustine and Richard of St. Victor, though the latter, in this instance, has the greater influence on Bonaventure, who takes from him the view that the Christian can have both probable and necessary reasons for the objects of his belief. The influence of Aristotle is expressed in Bonaventure's stand on the integral compatibility of faith and experience in the Christian, a compatibility supporting the position that faith and sciential knowledge can be together, at once and at the same time, in a Christian thinker. On demonstrating the truth of this position with respect to the divine unity, Bonaventure confirms his position with the authority of both Augustine and Boethius, who teach that a thing is good because of its unity without which it would not be. On the same occasion, Bonaventure confirms his doctrine on the magnitude of the error of idolatry with the authority of Aristotle, who shows that a small error in the beginning is magnified in the end. Although Bonaventure finds fault now and then with the philosophers because of their errors, nevertheless, he insists that a science, as a science, cannot be in error. His position on that question is influenced by Aristotle, from whom Bonaventure learns that a science cannot be destroyed except by a defect either on the part of the knower or on the part of his object. These several influences contribute in their individual ways to the composition of Bonaventure's theological knowledge, but they are only instrumental in the constitution of that knowledge, which is unique.ly Bonaventurean. I5°

149 Bonaventure's understanding of piety is also influenced by other sources, particularly by St Gregory who associates the gift of piety with works of mercy, and by Cicero who says that piety is benevolence toward parents: 3 Sent., 35.un.6, sc 1-5 (3.785; ed. min., sc a-e, 3.791). 150 Bonaventure's explicit testimony on the supporting r&le of other authorities in the constitution of a theological doctrine makes it necessary to assign an instrumental agency to their contribution to the constitution of his own doctrine, which cannot, therefore, be characterized properly or historically in any other way than Bonaventurean. His personal doctrine on the natural virtue and the Christian gift of piety,

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

761

The doctrine of Aquinas on the natural obedience of the creature to the Creator is basically the same as the doctrine of Bonaventure, though Aquinas presents his doctrine in a different way than Bonaventure. According to Aquinas, the more superior active potency produces the more superior effect, as nature produces things beyond the skill of man. But every created nature is in potency to producing through the divine power effects that are beyond the inferior power of nature; therefore, every creature has a potency of obedience according to which it obeys the Creator. Whatever God does in a creature according to its potency of obedience is above but not contrary to the nature of the creature, which is subject naturally to the action of its Creator. l51 Something similar is found in the order of natural agents in the universe: the celestial bodies produce in earthly bodies effects beyond the inferior power of earthly agents, such as the effects caused by the sun as the universal agent of heat; likewise, every creature has an obediential potency by which the Creator causes in the creature whatever He wills. The obediential potency of a creature is distinct from its natural potency; for example, a man can acquire virtues according to the connatural potency of his soul, but he can have infused virtues only according to his potency of obedience, which is activated by the divine power alone. 152 The potency of obedience in the human soul, therefore, is a passive potency having no corresponding active potency in the natural order. On activating that potency, however, God works in the soul according to its nature, as He worked in the Prophets by giving to them the lumen of prophecy. Thus, in the order of nature, the agent intellect cannot move the possible intellect in such a way that the man knows future events; but, at the disposition of the divine will, the human intellect can know future events as they are revealed by God in the lumen received by the intellect obeying God according to its passive potency of obedience.153 By its connatural potency, then, a created intellect has the power to know all the things that can be manifested by its natural lumen; but no created intellect can know things above and beyond its natural power, unless God activates the obediential potency of its lumen, thus giving the intellect a capacity to know those things. 154 Hence, obeying God, the human intellect receives a lumen of faith strengthening the natural lumen of the mind in a supernatural way, so that a

moreover, would require that benevolence and beneficence be shown toward him as an author by attributing to his doctrine the primary and proper character of his personal authorship, and then the secondary and instrumental features depending on the authorities supporting his doctrine, whether theological or philosophical, without in any way whatsoever minimizing their individual contributions to the formation and development of his personal thought 151 DPD, 6.1, ad 18 (2.161); DC malo, 5.5, ad 4 (2.554). 152 De sirt. in comm., a. 10, ad 13 (2.737). 153 DV, 12.3, ad 18 (1.244); 8.12, ad 4 (1.167). 154 Op. cit., 8.4, ad 13 (1.149); 29.3, ad 3 (1.558).

762

CHAPTER EIGHT

believer knows God more fully and more perfectly than a man having only natural reason. Consequently, the lumen of faith is a new or divine illumination strengthening the natural lumen of the believer, who knows God in a way beyond the comprehension of natural reason.155 The illumination of faith involves not only an acceptance of things heard exteriorly and to which the believer assents, but also a habitus of belief infused by God inclining the believer to assent to the truth of what he hears. The habitus of belief moves the human mind more sufficiently to assent to truth, Aquinas says, than any scientific demonstration, because, though such a demonstration never produces a false conclusion, a man frequently fails by thinking that he has a demonstration when he has not. The habitus of belief, however, moves a man to assent to truth more from his will than from his intellect; as a result, a man cannot be compelled to assent to the truths of faith, which are not seen but believed in a voluntary manner. The lumen of faith, furthermore, is more sufficient than the lumen of reason for judging truth: assent is made to first principles by the lumen of reason, which is often impeded by defects of the human body; the lumen of faith is, as it were, a seal of the first truth in the human mind, and so the lumen of faith cannot fail, as God cannot be deceived nor can He lie. God is, therefore, the origin of the two parts of faith. The first and interior part consists in the lumen and the habitus of faith moving the believer to assent to the truth of the things that he hears and which are proposed for his belief. Those things, forming the exterior part of faith, stand in relation to the interior part as exterior things stand in relation to the principles of science: faith follows the hearing of the things to be believed, though the lumen and the habitus of faith are infused, just as science follows the knowledge of exterior things, though the lumen and the habitus of principles are innate to the mind. 156 The position of Aquinas on the origin of the lumen and habitus of faith corresponds in every way to what we have seen before of his doctrine on Christian faith. He has described faith as requiring an assent of the intellect inclined by the will toward God, who is the object of Christian belief. Although the object is not seen by the intellect, the assent to the object is made with certitude because of the inclination of the will, which moves the intellect to adhere firmly to God without doubt or hesitation. Adhering to God with confidence, then, the intellect accepts His revelation in the lumen of faith, so that, as Augustine teaches, the act of belief is defined as ' thinking with assent'. In this respect, we have shown that Aquinas differs from Bonaventure not in regard to the certitude of faith, as such, but in 155 "In hoc autem profectu cognitionis maxime iuvatur mens humana, cum lumen eius naturale nova illustratione cohfortatur; sicut est lumen fidei et doni sapientiae et intellectus, per quod mens in contemplatione supra se elevari dicitur, in quantum cognoscit deum esse supra omne id, quod naturaliter comprehendit" —Expos, de Trio., 1.2, in Resp. (Decker, p. 66.18-22); cf. ST, la, 12.13 (1.74ab). 156 Expos, de Trin., 3.1, ad 4 "Unde et ..." (Decker, pp. 114-15).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

763

regard to the principle upholding faith. We have also shown that the two theologians concur in their views with regard to the certitude of faith as compared with the certitude of a science; but they differ with regard to the way in which they compare Christian faith and a science on the grounds of their respective certitudes. Finally, Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure, for the most part, on the nature of theology as a nobler science than any human science.157 We can see, in addition, that the two theologians are at one on some rather important points concerning Christian faith, and its relation to science. They hold in common that the lumen and the habitus of faith come to-be in the human intellect because of its subjection in obedience to God, to whom the believer assents voluntarily on hearing the things proposed for his belief, so that no man can be compelled to believe the truths of faith against his will. Aquinas and Bonaventure also hold in common that the habitus of faith moves a believer to assent to truth more firmly than a habitus of science, which cannot contain error, though the man possessing the science can be at fault in his thinking. To compare the postions of the two theologians on the union of faith and philosophy in theology, however, we need to know a little more of the doctrine of Aquinas on the habitus and virtue of faith, particularly its subject, its act and its object. Considering the subject of faith, Aquinas asks whether it is in the will or in the intellect. He replies that the will causes the act of the intellect in believing things that are above reason; so the intellect must have a habitus in order to obey the will with ease. Since the habitus in the intellect is the habitus of faith, it is subject to the intellect and not to the will. 158 The next question of Aquinas is whether faith is in the speculative or the practical intellect. In reply, he says that the speculative intellect considers absolutely what is true, but the practical intellect considers what is true according as it is ordered to some work. The consideration of a practical matter, however, can be either speculative or practical. A moral virtue, for instance, can be studied simply as a virtue, or it can be studied as it is orderd to its proper action; the first way belongs to the speculative intellect and the second belongs to the practical intellect. Moreover, a practical matter can be considered in itself, because of its dignity, and apart from its ordination to action, as divine things are considered absolutely, though they direct human actions, for the vision of God is the ultimate end of human action. A consideration of this sort pertains principally to the speculative intellect and secondarily to the practical intellect. Since the proper object of faith is the first truth, which is the end of human action and, therefore, the rule of human action, faith is principally in the speculative intellect and secondarily in the practical intellect. The speculative intellect considers the first truth in itself, or as the end of action, and the practical intellect considers it 157 See above: pp. 460-63. 158 3 Sent., 23.2.3, Sol. 1, ad 3 (3.731-32).

764

CHAPTER EIGHT

as the rule of action.159 This does not mean that the habitus of faith is an intellectual virtue. The nature of a virtue requires not only that it perfect a potency with regard to its object, but also that it perfect the potency in its way of acting, so that the act of the potency is good both because a good work is done and because it is done well or perfectly. Since the good of the intellect consists in what is true, which is the end and perfection of the potency, therefore, to have a virtue, the intellect must not only know what is true, but also consider what is true by an act which is perfect, so that the intellect knows its object well or perfectly. Although the intellect is perfected by the habitus of faith with regard to the first truth, nevertheless, faith does not perfect the intellect's way of acting, because faith does not enable the intellect of itself either to inspect what it believes or to reduce what it believes to the things that it can inspect. Because the lumen of the agent intellect is sufficient to inspect the principles of the human sciences, the habitus of principles is said to be an intellectual virtue; but neither the lumen of reason nor the lumen of faith is sufficient to inspect the articles of faith, and so the habitus of faith is not an intellectual virtue. Consequently, the inerrancy of faith is not due to a perfect mode of understanding, but to the infallible reason of God directing the human will. 16° Thus, for Aquinas, because the act of belief is a 'thinking with assent', the habitus of faith is subject to the intellect and not to the will. Again, because the practical intellect considers the proximate rules of action, or the reasons for acting, the habitus of faith is in the speculative intellect, for the object of faith is the uncreated truth, which is not something to be done. But the object of faith is a remote reason for doing something through love, so that the habitus of faith is not in the speculative intellect absolutely, but according as it is subject to the command of the will. Faith is said to be in the will, then, to the extent that the act of belief is a willing or voluntary act. In other words, faith is in the will as in its cause, and so the perfection of faith as a virtue consists in its adherence to God at the command of the will. Obeying the command of the will, the virtue of faith acts through love in considering God, who is the end of every desire and action of man. 161 Because the virtue of faith is in the intellect as it obeys the will, the cognitive part of faith is, so to speak, its material part and the affective part of the virtue is its principle of formation. Since charity is the perfection of the will, charity is the form, or formal part, of the virtue of faith, and thus faith has merit from an act of the will. The act of faith is ordered to the object of the will as to its end, for the end of Christian faith is the divine good, which is the object of charity. Consequently, charity is the form of faith, because charity perfects the act of faith.162 Hence, the act of faith has a 159 160 161 162

Loc. cit., Sol. 2, ad 1 (3.732-33). Loc. cit., Sol. 3, ad 2-3 (3.733-34); cf. DV, 14.8, Resp. "... testimonium consideratur." (1.295). DV, 14.4, Resp., ad 2-3 (1.288-89); ST, 2a2ae, 4.2, Resp., ad 3 (3.1428b-29a). DV, 14.5, Resp. (1.290-91); ST, 2a2ae, 4.3, Resp. (3.1429ab): cf. 3 Sent., 23.3.1, Sol. 1 (3.743-44).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

765

threefold relation to its object. Regarding the material object, the act of faith is to believe things on account of God, since only that is proposed for belief which pertains to God. Regarding the formal object, or the formal reason for considering an object of belief, the act of faith is to believe God, because God is the first truth to whom the believer adheres and for whose sake he assents to the other objects of belief. When the act of faith is taken on the side of the will, however, the act is to believe in God, or to believe by seeking God, for the first truth is referred to the will because of the end, which is God.163 Speaking of the object of faith, Aquinas says that there are three elements to be considered in the object of any habitus. The first is that which is known materially in the object; this element is taken as the material object of a habitus. The second element is that which is formal in the object, or that by which the object is known formally, and so it is taken as the formal reason for considering the object of a habitus. The third element is that which is accidental, an element extending to the things connected with, or following upon, the formal reason of the object of a habitus. In regard to faith, then, the accidental element consists in the things that are not essential to the habitus, namely, the created things revealed by God and the events or human actions recorded in Scripture under divine inspiration. The material object of faith includes God and whatever is believed about God, such as the suffering of Christ; the material object also includes whatever is believed because of its ordination to God, and this extends to the things revealed by God about creatures, such as the articles of the Creed concerning created things. The formal reason for considering an object of belief is the first truth, because the assent of faith is made to God formally by reason of the revelation coming from Him as the first truth. Since God's knowledge has to do primarily and principally with God himself and consequently with creatures, which He knows by knowing Himself, therefore, because the assent of faith unites the believer to the divine knowledge, the first and principal object of faith is God, so that every subsequent object is believed because of the principal assent to God as the first truth. As a consequence, the created things revealed by God are secondary objects of faith; for this reason, the proper object of faith is not the Creator as the Creator, but the Creator as the first truth. It is not necessary, therefore, that the proper object of faith include the creature, because the Creator can be believed principally as the first truth while God directs the believer secondarily to the creature. IM The position of Aquinas on the subject, act and object of faith has much in common with the position of Bonaventure, and yet they hold quite different views on some aspects of those questions. Both theologians, taking 163 ST, 2a2ae, 2.2, Resp, ad 1 (3.1414b-15a). 164 3 Sent., 24.1, Sol. 1, ad 1-2 (3.762-63); ST, 2a2ae, 1.1, Resp., ad 1 (3.1401b-02a); DV, 14.8, Resp. "Unde oportet ...", ad 1-2, 7-9 (1.295-96).

766

CHAPTER EIGHT

faith as a habitus, posit it in the intellect on the ground that the act of faith is 'to think with assent'. Taking faith as a virtue, they understand it to be a principle of merit, so they hold in common that faith depends on the will. In the view of Aquinas, however, the habitus of faith is subject principally to the speculative intellect and secondarily to the practical intellect. His view is based on the nature of the object of faith, which is a truth to be believed for its own sake and not for the sake of action. Nonetheless, because the object of faith is a remote reason of action, the habitus of faith is subject secondarily to the practical intellect, and so faith acts through the mediation of love, which gives merit to the virtue of faith. In Bonaventure's view, the habitus of faith is in the speculative intellect because of the act of faith, which is to believe the object of faith because it is true. The habitus is also in the practical intellect because of the voluntary nature of the act of faith, which is to assent willingly to God as the first truth and for His own sake. As consequence, depending on a concourse of reason and will, the virtue of faith is subject to the will inasmuch as it conjoined with reason in the faculty of freedom of choice; in that way, the virtue has merit because of its act, which flows as a willing assent, or an ordered love, from freedom of choice. Thus, Bonaventure speaks of the formal act of faith as relying essentially on the will, or on a love for God; so, as a willing belief in God, the act of faith is a tending toward God by believing in Him through love. The material act of faith is subject to the intellect, both speculative and practical. The act of faith in the speculative intellect consists in thinking about revealed truths simply as truths; in the practical intellect, the act of faith consists in assenting to those truths under the will's influence and for the sake of the first truth, which is God. Aquinas also speaks of the material and formal parts of the act of faith, but not in quite the same way as Bonaventure. Although Aquinas puts the material part of faith in the intellect, he does not distinguish the act of faith according to the difference between the speculative and the practical intellects. Rather, he posits the material part of faith in the whole intellect, because the intellect obeys the will in such a way that the habitus of faith is subject immediately to the speculative intellect and consequently to the practical intellect. Hence, in the view of Aquinas, the speculative intellect assents absolutely to what God has revealed, while the practical intellect looks to His revelation as a proximate rule or reason of action. On distinguishing the acts of faith in the intellect, therefore, Aquinas follows the difference between the material and formal aspects of the object of faith rather than the different modes of operation assigned by Bonaventure to the speculative and practical intellects. Though Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in attributing the formal part of the act of faith to the will under the influence of charity, even so, Aquinas speaks of the will as the formative principle of faith in the intellect, thus maintaining his position that faith is only in the intellect, whereas Bonaventure speaks of the will as forming with the intellect an integral faculty of freedom of choice, so that faith is subject at once to both

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

767

reason and will. These differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas, however, are not as deep as they appear to be. In the final analysis, the two theologians teach in common that the act of faith, on the part of the intellect, is to believe God for His own sake and, on His account, to believe whatever He has revealed; on the part of the will, the act of faith is to believe in God, who is the ultimate end of man. Thus, as a seeking after God, the act of belief has merit because of charity, which motivates the assent of the intellect to truths that are unseen, and so Bonaventure and Aquinas come together in teaching that faith is a virtue formally because of its loving assent to God as the first truth and for His sake alone. The two theologians also have much in common with respect to the object of faith. They are at one in saying that the material object includes God and whatever else is to be believed because He has revealed it. They are united, moreover, in positing the first truth, or the uncreated truth, as the proper and principal object of faith, so that the other truths of faith constitute its accidental and secondary objects to which assent is given for the sake of God, who reveals them. Nevertheless, there are some differences between Aquinas and Bonaventure, particularly with regard to the proper object of faith. Aquinas speaks of the first truth as the formal reason by which the other objects of faith are known and believed; this view is a consequence of his position that the certitude of belief depends primarily on the infallible reason of God. Bonaventure speaks of the first truth as the reason moving the believer to assent to the other objects of faith; his view follows the position that the certitude of belief depends primarily on the infallible authority of God. Our next task is, then, to compare the positions of the two theologians on the union of faith and philosophy in theology. On this problem, we have three main texts of Aquinas. In his first text, he handles the question whether there can be faith concerning things known by science. Giving a negative answer, he says that science results from an understanding of principles, so that, while faith remains, there cannot be an understanding of what is believed, for science is an effect of reason and faith looks to things above reason.165 Accounting for his position, Aquinas recalls his distinction between things belonging essentially to faith, thus pertaining to it always and everywhere, and things belonging accidentally to faith, and so pertaining to it because of this or of that circumstance. Anything pertaining to God and exceeding human understanding absolutely belongs essentially to faith and is known by divine revelation; a thing of that sort cannot be proved by demonstration, because a demonstration is founded on an understanding of principles. It is impossible, therefore, to know by science a thing belonging essentially to faith. A thing exceeding the understanding of this or of that man, but not of every man, belongs accidentally to faith; this sort of thing, going before

165 3 Seat., 24.2, qa. 2, sc 1-2 (3.767).

768

CHAPTER EIGHT

faith, can be demonstrated, so it can be known by science. The man who cannot demonstrate things of that sort, such as the truth 'God is', has to believe them; faith gives him a sufficient inclination to assent to all the things proposed for belief, whether they go before or come after the things belonging essentially to faith. Now faith stands in relation to divine reason as science stands in relation to human reason; therefore, as science relies on human reason to prove the truth of things known by reason, so faith relies on the divine reason to show the truth of things believed according to revelation; however, human reason is used by the theologian to defend Christian faith by showing what it proposes is not impossible to believe, but this is a persuasive and not a demonstrative use of reason.l66 Handling the same question in the second text, Aquinas points out that the principal object of faith is the first truth, or God, about whom we cannot have science here in this life. For that reason, there cannot be faith and science regarding the same object. Moreover, science is perfected by human reason, whose power makes faith void, as Gregory teaches; therefore, because faith is an imperfect knowledge, but scientific knowledge is perfect, faith and science do not concur in the same thing. 167 According to Augustine, those things are believed that are absent from the senses, and those are seen that are present either to the senses or to the mind. I6B Interpreting Augustine, Aquinas says that there is no problem regarding the seeing of things present to the senses; but there is a problem concerning the seeing of things present to the mind. A thing is said to be present to the mind when the thing does not exceed the capacity of the intellect, which assents to the thing not for the sake of the testimony of someone else, but because the intellect of itself understands the thing. A thing exceeding the capacity of the intellect is said to be absent from the mind, so that the intellect cannot be moved by the thing in a determinate way; as a result, the intellect cannot of itself understand the thing, and so, as an object of belief, the thing is accepted on the testimony of someone else. Since the object of Christian faith is something absent from the human mind, that object is believed as something unseen or inapparent, as Scripture says: "Faith is the substance of things for which we hope, and the evidence of things that are not seen" (Heb., 11.1). l69 When the intellect lacks the reason for knowing its proper object, the intellect cannot act with regard to its object; so, as soon as some thing begins to be present or apparent to the mind, the intellect cannot assent to that thing as an object falling under the act of faith. Any thing whatever that is known by science, Aquinas says, taking science in the strict and proper sense, is known by analyzing it into the first principles of understanding, which are present 166 167 168 169

Loc. cit., Resp., ad 3 (3.769-70). DV, 14.9, sc 1-3 (1.297); cf. St. Gregory, Homil. in Evang., 26.1 (PL 76.1197). Cf. De videndo Devm (Epist., 147), 2.7 (PL 33.599). For the interpretation of this by Aquinas see: Of, 14.2 (1.281-85); ST, 2a2ae, 4.1 (3.1426a-28a).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

769

through themselves, or essentially, to the intellect, and thus every science is perfected in seeing a thing present to the mind. Consequently, it is impossible that there be faith and science concerning the same thing. On the other hand, a thing is an object of faith either absolutely or in some respect. The truth 'God is triune', for example, is an object of faith absolutely, because it exceeds the capacity of all men existing in this world. It is impossible for any man, therefore, to have scientific knowledge of an object believed absolutely; nevertheless, an object of that kind is said to be present to and known by a believer who assents to it because of the testimony of God. The truth 'God is', as such, is an object of belief in this respect, that it exceeds the capacity of some men to know by their reason. There is nothing to prevent other men, who can demonstrate a truth of this kind, from knowing the being of God by science. Hence, one and the same truth is believed by some men and known through science by other men; but it is impossible that such a truth be believed and also be known through science by the same man. 170 Now, as Aquinas is aware, Richard of St. Victor teaches that there are both probable and necessary reasons for the truths of faith. He does not imply, according to Aquinas, that we can know by science what belongs to faith, because he also says that the necessary reasons of the truths of faith happen to the hidden from us. In the view of Aquinas, then, those reasons are not known to us, but to God, and to the saints enjoying the vision of God. 171 Nonetheless, the testimony of God is more certain and more efficacious than the testimony of any man no matter how much he knows by science; but a man is said to have scientific knowledge of things that he understands from principles presupposed on the testimony of a superior or a subalternating science: therefore, there is a much stronger reason for holding that a man can have scientific knowledge of the things belonging to faith, because they are presupposed on the testimony of God. In the judgment of Aquinas, however, a man having a subalternate science does not attain perfectly the reason for knowing the truths of the science, unless his knowledge is contained in some way within the knowledge of the one having the subalternating science. The man with the inferior science, moreover, does not have scientific knowledge of the things presupposed by him in the superior science; he has, rather, a scientific knowledge of conclusions drawn with necessity from principles that he presupposes, and this is the way that a theologian can be said to have scientific knowledge of conclusions drawn from the articles of faith. 172 But Damascene teaches that knowledge of God is inserted naturally in all men; since what is known naturally can be known by science, therefore, because faith is a knowledge of God, there must be science of the things belonging to faith. Furthermore, we believe that God is one, and the philosophers can 170 DV, 14.9, Rcsp. (1.297-98). 171 Loc. cit., arg. 1 (1.297); ad 1 (1.298). Gf. Richard of St. Victor, De Trinit., 1.4 (PL 196.892). 172 Loc. cit., arg. 3 (1.297); ad 3 (1.298).

770

CHAPTER EIGHT

prove this truth demonstratively. Likewise, we believe that God is, but we do not believe this because it is acceptable to God, since no one can estimate what is acceptable to God without first estimating that there is a God who accepts things. If the estimation by which a man thinks 'God is' precedes the estimation by which the man thinks that something is acceptable to God, then to think 'God is' cannot be caused by thinking that something is acceptable to God. We are led, nevertheless, to believe what we do not know, because we believe that this is acceptable to God. It seems, therefore, that the truth 'God is' is both believed and also known through science. 173 Answering those arguments, Aquinas says that faith does not look to God with respect to what we know naturally about God, but with respect to that which exceeds our natural knowledge. Hence, the truth 'God is one' is not an article of faith to the extent that it is demonstrated by science, and so it is presupposed by faith, which is supported by natural knowledge as grace is upheld by nature. The article of faith on the unity of the divine essence has to do with certain aspects of God that cannot be proven by natural reason. From this point of view, a man can begin to believe something that he has previously considered with a lack of conviction, so that it is possible for him to estimate that 'God is' before believing it. In that way, it is acceptable to God that the man believe God to-be, even though this truth, because it can be proved demonstratively, is not an article of faith, but goes before faith. 174 There is one other point to be considered in this second text of Aquinas, a point touching the imperfection of faith. He grants that the lumen of faith infused by God is more efficacious than the natural lumen of reason; but he maintains at the same time that the lumen of faith is an imperfect participation in the divine lumen, so that the lumen of faith cannot enable us to see what we believe as we shall see in beatitude, when we shall see perfectly in the lumen of God.17S Now one opposite excludes the other: since the perfect and the imperfect are opposed to each other, therefore, with regard to the same thing, it is impossible that there be a perfection and an imperfection at once and according to the same respect. But imperfection of knowledge is of the nature of Christian faith, which assents to an inapparent object, whereas perfection of knowledge is of the nature of beatitude. Consequently, those who are beatified see perfectly the same object known imperfectly by us through faith, and so, with respect to the same object, faith cannot remain with the perfect vision of beatitude.176 173 Loc. at., arg. 5, 8-9 (1.297); cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orthod., 1.1 (PG 94.790). 174 Loc. cit., ad 5, 8-9 (1.298). With regard to the conception of Christ by the Virgin Mary, Aquinas maintains that she knew one thing from experience, but believed something else on faith: she knew that she did not conceive from a man, but she believed on the testimony of Gabriel that she conceived from the Holy Spirit; therefore, there is no question here of knowing and believing the same thing: Lac. cit., arg. 7 (1.297); ad 7 (1.298). 175 Loc. cit., arg. 2 (1.297); ad 2 (1.298). Cf. DV, 14.3, ad 6 (1.287); 14.10, ad 8 (1.301). 176 ST, Ia2ae, 67.3, Resp., ad 2 (2.1061b-63b). Aquinas, concurring for the most part with Bonaven-

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

771

In this third text, Aquinas restates the question by asking whether the things of faith can be known by science. In his reply to the question, however, Aquinas reiterates the principal points of his previous texts, namely, that it is impossible for the same man to see and to believe the same thing, but not for one man to believe what another man can see, though no man in this life can see, or know by science, an object pertaining absolutely to faith. There are two other points made by Aquinas in this text. The first point is that every science is founded on principles that are self-evident and, as a result, that are seen, thus making it necessary for everything known by science to be seen in some way by the lumen of reason, whereas the things of faith are known inasmuch as they are seen to be credible by the lumen of faith. The second point is made in response to this opposing argument: because science and opinion can be together in some way regarding the same thing, as Aristotle says, therefore, science and faith can stand together in some way. Aquinas calls attention to the rest of Aristotle's text, which says that it is entirely possible for diverse men to have science and opinion regarding the same thing. Then, turning to faith, Aquinas maintains that one and the same man can have faith and science concerning the same thing in a relative way, or concerning a subject in different respects: just as there can be concerning one and the same thing a knowledge through science in one man regarding some aspect of the thing and an opinion in another man regarding some other aspect of the thing, so also there can be concerning God both a knowledge through science and a belief through faith in the same man who demonstrates that 'God is one' and believes that 'God is triune'. But there cannot be in the same man either science and opinion or science and faith at once concerning the same thing and according to the same respect. Science cannot stand together absolutely with opinion concerning the same thing, because it is the nature of science that what it knows is thought to be impossible to be otherwise than it is; but it is the nature of opinion that what it estimates can be otherwise than it is. On the other hand, because of the certitude of faith, what is believed is considered to be impossible to be otherwise than it is; for that reason, the same thing cannot be known through science and be believed through faith, at once and according to the same respect, because what is known is seen and what is believed is not seen. 177 Although Aquinas takes an obviously different approach than Bonaventure to the question of knowing through science what is believed through

ture, teaches that the acquired sciences will not only remain in beatitude, but will also be perfected in certitude while their acts will no longer be discursive: 3 Sent., 31.2.4 (3.995-98). An acquired science can stand with the beatific vision, because the mode of knowing which is proper to a science, unlike faith, is not opposed to the immediate vision of God: ST, Ia2ae, 67.3, ad 1 (2.1063b); cf. 67.2 (2.1061a-62a). See also: ST, la, 89.5-6 (1.554a-56). 177 ST, 2a2ae, 1.5 (3.1404b-05b); cf. DV, 14.9, arg. 6 & ad 6 (1.297-98). See in Aristotle: Ami poster., 1.33 (89al7-89b5).

772

CHAPTER EIGHT

faith, nonetheless, their responses manifest in many ways a common solution to this very important question. The two theologians teach that it is quite compatible for one and the same man to demonstrate one truth about God and, at the same time, to believe another truth about God: a man can demonstrate the unity of God and, at the same time, believe the Trinity of God. Even though the subject of demonstration is the same as the subject of belief, the object of the one is formally different from the object of the other: God is the common subject of both science and faith; but the object of science is the divine unity as it is known by natural reason, whereas the object of faith is the Trinity of persons in the one God, a truth known only by the lumen of faith. Thus, positing the natural and philosophical knowledge of God as antecedent to faith, both Bonaventure and Aquinas maintain that the truths known about God by the lumen of reason support the truths about God accepted on faith. In that way, preserving the merit of belief, the two theologians hold that a man can, at one and the same time, know by his science, or philosophy, that 'God is one' and believe by his faith that 'God is triune'; but no man can ever know by his philosophy any truth, such as the Trinity, which is entirely beyond the natural capacity of human reason. Both theologians, furthermore, teach that it is impossible for the same man, at once and in the same respect, to know by science and to believe by faith one and the same truth, A man who demonstrates the truth ' God is' cannot at the same time believe it in the same way, or for the same reason, that he knows it by his science. He assents to the truth by faith in this material sense, that what he believes about God absolutely and formally pertains to the same God who is known to-be from a demonstration of science. Once again, it is a question of the same material or common subject known in one way by science and, without relinquishing the knowledge of science, believed in another way by faith, and this entails the impossibility of knowing and believing at once the same formal object in a common or material subject of science and faith. Aquinas expresses his views on the question in terms of the difference between the formal reason for knowing a thing and the formal reason for believing it; Bonaventure expresses his views in terms of the difference between the reason moving the intellect to know a thing and the reason moving the intellect to believe the thing. These differences do not imply a diversity of views on the relations between science and faith; rather, they reflect the preceding differences between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the nature of human reason and on the virtue of faith. In the final analysis, both the formal reason of a science, as understood by Aquinas, and the reason moving the intellect, as explained by Bonaventure, refer to the evidence available to natural reason; similarly, with regard to faith, the formal principle of Aquinas and the moving principle of Bonaventure refer to the testimony of God as the first truth. There are some other points held in common by Bonaventure and Aquinas, such as the compatibility of faith with probable opinions and, in beatitude, the compatibility of science, but the incompatibility of faith, with

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

773

the vision of God. On the other hand, Aquinas stresses continually that science is a perfect mode of knowing and faith is an imperfect mode of knowing: the perfection of science results from the natural ability of reason to see its object, which is evident of itself to the intellect; the imperfection of faith results from the natural inability of reason to see the object of belief, because the object is not evident of itself to the intellect. Although Bonaventure speaks of science as perfect according to its nature, even so, he also speaks of the certitude of science as not so great concerning divine things that an illumination of faith would be superfluous in a man having sciential knowledge of God. Bonaventure makes his point by referring to the many errors of the philosophers on questions about God, and so he concludes that, to avoid falling into error, a man of science has a very great need for an illumination of faith. This raises the question whether Aquinas, because of the perfection that he attributes to science, sees any necessity for a man to have faith in order to avoid falling into error on things within the natural capacity of reason. The answer to our question is that Aquinas, in complete harmony with Bonaventure, does see the need for Christian faith to prevent erroneous conclusions about things, particularly divine things, falling within the grasp of natural reason. l78 In showing why there is such a need, Aquinas distinguishes between the modes of manifesting truth by natural reason and by Christian faith. The first mode is followed by philosophers, who can demonstrate the being, the unity and similar truths of God. The second mode, exceeding natural reason, makes known other truths about God, such as the Trinity of persons in one essence. Depending on the natural lumen of reason, a philosopher cannot know what the divine substance is, because God's effects in creatures cannot make known the full power of their Creator to an intellect which must approach God from corporeal things. A philosopher can know, however, that 'God is', and he can attribute to God those properties that can be assigned to the divine being as the first principle of creatures. Now corporeal things have many properties unknown to us, because we cannot know perfectly all the reasons for the things apprehended by our senses. The investigation of human reason, Aquinas says, is much more insufficient to make known to us all the properties of the most excelling sub stance of God, a truth in harmony with the teaching of Aristotle and the doctrine of Scripture. 179

178 One of the aims of Aquinas in his Summa contra Gentiles is to show this necessity, which he does at great length throughout the work; he states his aim at the beginning: Op. cit., 1.2 (2.4). 179 "Huic etiam consonat dictum Philosophi, qui in II Metaphys. (993b9-ll) asserit quod 'intellects noster se habet ad prima entium, quae sunt manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad solem'. Huic etiam veritati Sacra Scriptura testimonium perhibet Dicitur enim lob, 11.7: 'Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et Omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies?' Et 36.26: 'Ecce, Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram'. Et I Cor., 13.9: 'Ex parte cognoscimus'." — SCG., 1.3 (2.4-5).

774

CHAPTER EIGHT

It is fitting, Aquinas continues, that God should propose to man for his belief truths transcending the ability of human reason and truths knowable by human investigation. Since it may seem to be in vain to propose for belief by a supernatural inspiration truths knowable by natural reason, Aquinas shows three consequences that would follow if those truths were left solely to the investigation of reason. The three consequences described by Aquinas are the same as the three reasons that he gives constantly to show the necessity for men to have faith: only a few men would acquire knowledge of God, and they would take a long time to attain it, but not without many errors. Describing the third consequence, Aquinas, speaking more forcefully than Bonaventure, says that the investigation of human reason is very frequently mixed with falsehood. This is caused by the weakness of the human intellect in judging truth and by the reliance of the intellect on phantasms. Because of those factors, many men, not knowing the power of demonstration, would remain in doubt even about things that have been most truly demonstrated, especially when such men see other men, reputed to be wise, teaching diverse doctrines. Moreover, with true things that are demonstrated, falsehood is mingled sometimes and, though what is false is not demonstrated, is asserted on the ground of a probable or sophistic reason put forward as a demonstration. It has been necessary, therefore, to give men through the way of faith a fixed certitude and the pure truth of divine things. Manifesting mercy toward men, then, God provided for their benefit that what can be investigated by reason they must hold by faith, so that they can participate in the divine knowledge without doubt and error. 18° Aquinas goes on to demonstrate that it is necessary for men to have proposed for their belief divine truths exceeding natural reason. This necessity is based on the eternal good toward which men are ordered; to desire that good, which surpasses the whole state of the present life, it was necessary for men to be given a knowledge of it, because it is a higher good than any good within the reach of human frailty. The Christian religion promises to men their eternal good, and so Christian faith proposes for their belief many things transcending human reason. The Old Testament promised temporal goods, and it proposed for belief only a few things tran180 Loc. cit., 1.4 (2.5-6). Gf. 3 Sent., 24.3, Sol 1, ad 1-3 (3.773-75); Expos, de Trin., 3.1, Resp. (Decker, pp. 109-13); DV, 14.10, Resp., ad 1 & 5 (1.300-01); ST, 2a2ae, 2.3-4 (3.14l5b-17a). Note the following: "... cum humana inquisitio propter imbecillitatem intellectus noster sit facilis ad errorem, et hoc aperte ostenditur ex ipsis philosophis, qui per viam rationis finem humanae vitae quaerentes et modum perveniendi in ipsum in errores multiplices et turpissimos inciderunt, adeo sibi invicem dissentientes, ut vix duorum aut trium esset de his per orania una concors sententia, cum tamen per fidem videamus in unam sententiam etiam plurimos populos convenire." —Expos, de Trin., 3.1, ad 3 (Decker, pp. 113-14). "Ratio enim humana in rebus divinis est multum deficiens, cuius signum est quia philosophi de rebus humanis naturali investigatione perscrutantes in multis erraverunt et sibi ipsis contraria senserunt Ut ergo esset indubitata et certa cognitio apud homines de Deo, oportuit quod divina eis per modum fidei traderentur, quasi a Deo dicta, qui mentiri non potest" — ST, 2a2ae, 2.4, Resp. (3.1417a).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

775

scending reason. The ancient philosophers took care to direct men away from the delights of bodily things and to show that there were spiritual goods giving sweeter delight to men of virtue. It was necessary for men to believe divine truths by faith, furthermore, in order that they might have a truer knowledge of God, who is known truly when He is believed to be above everything that a man can think is possible concerning God. To believe God that way, a man must at least have an opinion that God is something above what the man himself can think. But there are some men who, having a presumptions opinion of their own ability alone, think that they can know by their own intellect the whole nature of things. They think that whatever seems true to themselves is true, and whatever does not seem true to them is false. Consequently, to free men from such presumption, which is the mother of error, and to direct men toward a moderate investigation of truth, it was necessary for men to have proposed for their belief divine things transcending their understanding entirely. Although human reason is not able to grasp fully what is beyond its natural capacity, nonetheless, it acquires great perfection if it holds by faith in any way whatsoever the truths proposed by God for belief. 181 Aquinas is in complete concord with Bonaventure on the necessity for a man to have Christian faith in order to avoid falling into error on the truth of many things, especially divine things, within the proper grasp of natural reason. Indeed, if there is any difference between them on this question, it lies in the stronger position taken by Aquinas than by Bonaventure on the frequency, and perhaps also the inevitability, of error accompanying the natural investigation of truth by human reason, particularly by the philosophers. Aquinas attributes, as Bonaventure attributes, error to the man and not to science, or to the philosophers and not to philosophy. Positing a debility in human reason, Aquinas maintains that Christian faith is necessary in order to perfect the intellect, so that, fortified by the lumen of faith, a man can think better and, therefore, guided by what he believes, avoid falling into error regarding what he knows, or can know, by his natural reason, especially about God. Thus, it is the man's intellect, not his science, which is perfected by Christian faith, for the habitus of faith, as Aquinas constantly insists, remains distinct from a habitus of science. Hence, as a perfection, Christian faith is intrinsic to the man's intellect, but extrinsic to his science both regarding the mode of manifesting truth and regarding the principles from which the proper conclusions of his science 181 SCG, 1.5 (2.7-8). Aquinas also shows here that truths pertaining absolutely to faith, though they transcend reason, are not contrary to reason, for God is the one source of all truths, both natural and revealed: 1.7 (2.11). See also: 3 Sent., 23.2.4, Sol. 1, ad 3 (3.737); DV, 14.10, ad 7 & 9 (1.301); Expos, de Trin., 3.1, ad 1 & 5 (Decker, pp. 144-15). On the natural disposition of reason to accept the truths of faith note: "... dicendum, quod ad ea quae sunt fidei, non naturaliter determinatur intellectus quasi naturaliter cognoscat; sed quodammodo naturaiiter ordinatur in ipsa cognoscenda, sicut nature dicitur ordinari ad gratiam ex divina institutione. Unde hoc non removet quin habitu fidei indigeamus." — D V , 14.10, ad4 (1.300-01).

776

CHAPTER EIGHT

are demonstrated. On this important question, then, Aquinas is in full accord with Bonaventure. Aquinas, for his part, bases the necessity for Christian faith on the eternal good of beatitude to which men are ordered, but of which they cannot have knowledge by natural reason. In his view, human nature has been ordered from the very beginning to beatitude, not as to an end due to man according to his nature, but solely from the liberality of his Creator. For that reason, without the help of the divine gifts added to nature, the principles of human nature are not enough for a man to attain his ultimate end. 182 Although a man, according to his nature, can have both a knowledge and a love of God, even so, he can act only with respect to things leading him to the end. In order to act with respect to the end itself, which is above human nature, he needs faith to know the ultimate end. A natural virtue is sufficient of itself with regard to the things leading a man to the end according to the dictate of nature, but not to attain the end as it can be known only by faith. Consequently, to arrive at his ultimate end, a man needs infused virtues in order to act in a more perfect way concerning the same things leading to the end according to nature. 183 The material community of faith and philosophy regarding the final end or good of man is the ground on which Aquinas conjoins faith and philosophy in his theology. As we have seen, Aquinas holds that theology contains the end of the whole of philosophy and orders, or subordinates, that end to the ultimate end or good of man. In order to show how Aquinas unites faith and philosophy on the material ground of the final good of man, we must take a further account of his doctrine on the nature of faith as a theological virtue, with specific reference to its relation to man's final end. He compares the different considerations by the philosopher and the theologian of the ultimate good of man. The philosopher considers as the ultimate good that which is proportionate to human powers and which consists in an act of the man himself, so that his felicity is said to be an operation of some sort. According to the philosopher, then, an act is said to be good absolutely inasmuch as it is conformed to and perfects its potency. Every habitus giving rise to such an act is said by the philosopher to be a virtue, whether is it intellectual or moral. The theologian considers eternal life as the ultimate good, which transcends human nature. The theologian, therefore, does not posit the end of man in the good of human acts, and so he does not consider that good absolutely. Rather, he declares that act alone to be completely good which, concerning a proximate good, is ordered to the final good, and this is the kind of act that is meritorious for eternal life. Any habitus giving rise to a meritorious act is said by the theologian to be a

182 "... dicendum, quod ab ipsa prima institutione natura humana est ordinata in finem beatitudinis, non quasi in finem debitum homini secundum naturam eius, sed ex sola divina liberalitate. Et ideo non oportet quod principia naturae sufflciant ad finem ilium consequendum, nisi fuerint adiuta donis superadditis ex divina liberalitate." — DV, 14.10, ad 2 (1.300); cf. Expos, de Trin., 3.1, ad 2 (Decker, p. 113). 183 DV, 14.10, ad 3 (1.300).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

777

virtue. Since the act of Christian faith is controlled by the will, which is the principle of merit, the act of belief is a meritorious act and the habitus giving rise to it is a theologial virtue.184 The good to which any virtue is ordered is the perfect act of the potency to which the virtue is subject. Although what is true differs according to reason from what is good, nevertheless, to consider what is true is, so to speak, the good of the intellect. Hence, to assent to the first truth for its own sake is, so to speak, a meritorious good of the intellect. Faith is a virtue, therefore, because it assents to the first truth, which, inasmuch as it is not seen, is the proper object of belief. The goodness of faith in the intellect, then, comes from proper object of faith. The perfect goodness of faith, however, comes from the will to which the intellect is subject in its adherence to God, and from which the intellect has both the strength and the certitude of belief in its obedience to God. Faith is a theological virtue, therefore, because it causes a good act in the intellect, an act flowing from the goodness of the will. 185 In moving the intellect to believe, the will is itself moved by God as the first truth. Since God is the infallible truth, then, in moving the intellect, the will is the cause of the infallibility of truth in the intellect assenting to the first truth. Thus, the certitude and perfection of faith, depending on the goodness of the will, result from a participation in divine truth. 186 The perfection of belief, consequently, requires two things. It requires the intellect to tend infallibly toward its good, which is what is true; the act of faith perfects the intellect that way, for it is of the nature of faith to draw the intellect always toward what is true, since nothing false can fall under faith. The perfection of belief also requires the will to tend infallibly toward the ultimate end, for whose sake the will assents to what is true; the virtue of charity, which is the form of faith, brings this about by ordering the will infallibly to the final or ultimate good.187 To sum up, as a theologial virtue, faith has a common subject with the intellectual and moral virtues, but it differs from them in its proper object: the intellectual and moral virtues look properly to things concerning the end of man; faith looks properly to the ultimate end of man. The philosophers consider as the end of human life a good not transcending the ability of nature, but a good toward which man tends by a natural inclination and for which he does not need a habitus elevating his intellect above its nature. The theologians consider as the end of human life a good transcending human nature, and so, to attain that good, a man needs a habitus elevating his intellect above its natural ability.188 Thus, in the view of Aquinas, the end of human life unites the virtue of 184 DV, 14.3, Resp. "Aliud est ..." (1.286-87). 185 Loc. cit., ad 3, 6 & 8 (1.287); 3 Sent., 23.2.4, Sol. (3.736). 186 3 Sent., 23.2.4, Sol. 1, ad 2 & 5 (3.737); cf. ST, 2a2ae, 4.5, ad 2 (3.1431b). 187 ST, 2a2ae, 4.5, Resp. (3.1431ab). 188 DV, 14.3, ad 9 (1.287).

778

CHAPTER EIGHT

faith in a material way with the natural virtues of philosophy. Faith differs from those virtues formally, however, for faith looks to the end of human life as a good transcending human nature, whereas the natural virtues look to the end of human life as a good that can be known and attained according to the principles of nature. Now, as we have seen, the end of life pertaining to faith is the same end pertaining to theology as an understanding of faith. This one end is the good of eternal life, or the perfect contemplation of God in beatitude. The end of human life as it is understood in philosophy is the good of contemplating God according to the ability of natural reason; but this is an imperfect contemplation by comparison with the contemplation of God in eternal glory. Consequently, on uniting philosophy to faith in his theology, Aquinas orders and subordinates the contemplation of God according to natural reason to the contemplation of God according to Christian faith, which is ordered ultimately to contemplating God in the eternal life of beatitude. Since the whole of philosophy is ordained to the good of contemplating God, therefore, all the conclusions of the philosophical sciences are ordered to that good as to their proper end. Hence, by ordering the end of philosophy to the end of faith within his theology, Aquinas orders the conclusions of the philosophical sciences by way of their proper end to the end sought by Christian faith through an understanding of divine revelation. Because of his ordination of philosophy to faith on the common or material ground of the final good of man, Aquinas is able to conform the conclusions of philosophy to the principles of faith within the material community of divine revelation; as a result, he is able to attain a theological understanding of God and His effects, whether natural or supernatural, by considering the objects of belief according to a single formal reason, which is the first truth, or the formal principle of divine revelation. Taken materially, then, the objects of belief in the theology of Aquinas are all one under the divine being, to which all the effects of God are ordered as to their principle and end. Taken formally, the objects of belief in his theology are one under the first truth, which is the formal reason by which all things are understood in relation to God. All the subjects studied in the theology of Aquinas, therefore, are understood formally according to the first truth, which is contemplated in itself by the speculative intellect and is considered as the rule of human action by the practical intellect. The understanding of those subjects, whether speculative or practical, is ordained to the ultimate end or good of human life, which is the eternal contemplation of God in beatitude. The ground of union between faith and philosophy in the theology of Aquinas is clearly different from that in the theology of Bonaventure. Faith is first united to philosophy in Bonaventure's theology on the ground of a material act belonging to the intellect and subjecting the truths of philosophy to the truths of faith. This union of faith and philosophy is completed on the ground of a formal act depending on the will and consisting

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

779

in a loving adhesion to God as the first truth, for whose sake assent is given to all the truths of revelation. The end of Bonaventure's theology is the good of the Christian life; but the end of Christian faith is the eternal life of contemplating God. Consequently, Bonaventure orders and subordinates philosophical knowledge to the truths of faith rather than to the end of faith. He orders theological knowledge, strictly speaking, to the ultimate good of the Christian life, or the eternal contemplation of the Trinity. In uniting philosophy to faith, moreover, Bonaventure depends on their common ground of the vestige and image of God in creation. This is the ground on which he forms and develops his theological knowledge in a distinctively trinitarian manner, which is not characteristic of the theological knowledge of Aquinas. Although the Trinity is the primary object of the theology of Aquinas, he considers the Trinity according to the formal reason of the first truth, and so he considers the divine persons as they are ordered and related to one another in the divine being. It is in this way that he uses the vestige and image of God in creation to obtain a formally theological understanding of the Trinity by appropriating to the divine persons the essential attributes of God as they are known from creatures.l89 The similtudes of God in creatures are useful in obtaining an understanding of the Trinity, Aquinas says, provided the theologian does not presume that he can by them either comprehend or demonstrate the mystery of the Trinity. 190 This view of Aquinas conforms to his position that the necessary reasons for the essential truths of faith are not known to us, but to God and to those having the beatific vision of God. Though Aquinas seems to differ here from Bonaventure, nevertheless, he does not differ from Bonaventure, because the latter theologian, in saying that we can know the necessary reasons for some of the truths of faith, speaks about the secondary or accidental truths that can be known by natural reason, particularly under the influence of faith as it directs the believer toward the necessary reasons by which he can know those truths with a true certitude in the natural lumen of his intellect. Aquinas concurs completely with Bonaventure, finally, on the impossibility of a man knowing the Trinity by philosophy, or by the power of his natural reason.191 There is one last point of comparison to be made between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the nature of theological knowledge. Bonaventure gives an important role to Christian piety in the constitution of his theology. 189 1 Sent., 3.2.1 (1.99-101); ST, la, 93.4-9 (1.575a-583a). On the modes of appropriating the divine attributes to the three Persons see: ST, la, 39.8 (1.247b-250b). 190 SCG, 1.8 (2.11-12). 191 1 Sent., 3.1.4 (1.98); DV, 10.13 (1.221-23); ST, la, 32.1 (1.208a-210b). We should note here that the position taken by Aquinas on the relation between faith and experience in the Virgin Mary, as the Mother of Christ, is not opposed to the position of Bonaventure. Aquinas considers the question according to two different objects: human conception pertaining to experience and conception by the Holy Spirit pertaining to faith; Bonaventure considers the question according to one object the conception by the Holy Spirit as a fact of experience and as a truth of faith compatible with that fact

780

CHAFFER EIGHT

Aquinas associates Christian piety with his theology in a different way than Bonaventure. According to Aquinas, following Augustine, religion and piety pertain to the worship of God. The term theosebia, taken absolutely, designates divine worship, whereas the term religion designates the bond according to which a man is obliged to give God worship.. Piety has to do with the spirit of a man engaged in divine worship; therefore, because a sort of divine veneration, so to speak, is owed to those who are our superiors, the beneficial acts that we perform for other men are said to be, as it were, sacrifices offered to God, and so the names piety and religion are transferred to works of mercy, especially to the beneficial acts toward parents and relatives. The name latria, however, signifies a debt of worship, or a reason for worshipping God, because He is the Creator to whom every man owes his service on account of his whole being, which comes from God. The act of religion, then, consists in. the worship of God by men in offering themselves to God. Since this act is principally spiritual, Augustine says that God is worshipped in the Christian religion by the acts of faith, hope and charity, to which Aquinas adds the acts of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But men are corporeal creatures; so, in worshipping God, they are required to perform bodily acts in order to serve God with their whole being. Hence, all the acts by which men serve God belong to the virtue of religion; however, because the things that Christians do for the benefit of their neighbour are done for the sake of God, the acts of Christian mercy pertain to the same service belonging to the Christian religion. There is, then, a proper order among the acts of the Christian religion. The first and principal act is the spiritual worship of God; the secondary acts include all the bodily actions pertaining to divine worship, and they are higher in order than the acts of mercy done on behalf of other men for the sake of God. Positing religion as a special part of the virtue of justice, Aquinas maintains that the act of Christian faith belongs materially to the virtue of religion, but is distinct formally from that virtue by reason of their proper objects. Faith is the cause and principle of Christian religion, but the latter virtue is also one in a material way with hope and charity, which offer to God the worship that is His due. The proper object of religion is the worship owed to God, who is the end of religion; but the proper object of faith is God himself, and so faith and religion are distinct as virtues.192 The terms piety and religion, as Aquinas understands them, signify divine worship. Religion designates the bond obliging a man to worship God; piety designates the proper spirit in which a man ought to engage in the worship of God. Thereafter, the meaning of the two terms is transferred analogically to works of mercy, or acts benefitting other men, especially parents, for the sake of God. The act of faith pertains materially both to the Christian religion, which looks formally to divine worship, and to Christian piety, 192 Expos, de Trin., 3.2, Resp. (Decker, pp. 117-19). See in St. Augustine: De civit Dei, 10.1-6 (PL 41.277-84); De cum pro mortuis agenda. 5.7 (PL 40.596-97).

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

781

which has to do formally with works of mercy. Neither the virtue of religion nor the virtue or gift of piety, therefore, enter into the formal constitution of theological knowledge, which depends essentially on the virtue of faith and on the formal object of belief. Differing from Bonaventure, then, Aquinas does not give a formal role to Christian piety in the constitution of his theological knowledge. This does not mean, however, that Christian piety and the Christian religion have no influence on the formation of the theology of Aquinas. Christian piety exercises an extrinsic influence on the constitution of his theology, which is directed in its formation by the personal piety of Aquinas himself, just as the gifts of the Holy Spirit are said by Aquinas to belong to the personal perfection of a theologian rather than to the intrinsic perfection of his doctrine. In sum, performing a spiritual work of mercy, Aquinas invokes piety in his own way to correct the errors of the philosophers and to bring philosophy into harmony with the faith of the Christian religion.193 CONCLUSION St. Bonaventure orders reason to faith in his theology both on the ground of an integral whole and on the ground of a universal whole. His theology is composed, on the ground of an integral whole, of parts ordered and united to one another: as the human nature of Christ is ordered to His divine nature in the unity of a single Person, so the truth of natural reason is ordered to the truth of divine revelation in the unity of a single theology. Thus, the truth of the divine unity as it is known by philosophy is ordered to the truth of the Trinity known only by faith, with the result that a philosophical knowledge of the one God can be used by St. Bonaventure to obtain a theological understanding of the same God believed by faith to be a Trinity of Persons. The integral union of faith and philosophy in St. Bonaventure's theology depends on the compatibility of the truth of natural reason with the truth of divine revelation, particularly about God as one and triune. Establishing this compatibility, St. Bonaventure proceeds according to philosophy with regard to the truth of reason, and according to faith with regard to the truth of revelation. While proceeding according to philosophy, he relies on the natural lumen of reason and on the evidence of things that are seen. In this way, following the proper principles and methods of philosophy, he seeks a true and certain knowledge of things that 193 "Assumpta igitur ex divina pietate fiducia sapientis officium proscquendi, quamvis proprias vires excedat, propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides catholica profitetur, pro nostro modulo manifestare, errores eliminando contraries ... Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est Simul autem veritatem aliquam investigantes ostendemus qui errores per earn excludantur. et quomodo demonstrativa veritas, Fidei christianae religionis concordet" — SCO, 1.2 (2.3-4).

782

CHAPTER EIGHT

can be understood by the natural power of reason. While proceeding according to faith, he relies on an infused lumen and on the testimony of God about things that are unseen or inapparent. In that way, observing the proper principles and methods of the science of Scripture, he manifests the truth and certitude of things that can be known only if they are believed by the persuasive power of divine authority. As a consequence, philosophy and faith give St. Bonaventure a knowledge of the same things, but according to diverse respects and considerations. Because the lumen of faith is an intrinsic perfection of the human intellect, St. Bonaventure is guided and directed by his Christian faith in his philosophical thinking. This guidance and direction support him in his search for the necessary reasons by which true and certain conclusions can be drawn from the proper principles of philosophy by the natural lumen of reason with respect to its proper objects. The control of natural reason by Christian faith is extrinsic to his philosophical knowledge, as such, but intrinsic to his intellect as the one potency by which he both believes the truths of faith and knows the truths of philosophy. It is on the ground of his theology as an integral whole that St. Bonaventure defends Christian faith against its adversaries by refuting their arguments with suitable reasons taken, according to the circumstances, either from faith or from philosophy. At the same time, he removes the false opinions of the heretics, corrects the errors that he sees in the philosophers, and gives a benign interpretation of apparently contrary opinions among the theologians or between them and the philosophers. It is on the same ground that St. Bonaventure uses probable opinions to fortify Christians who are weak in their faith and, for Christians who are strong in their faith, he brings forward necessary reasons for those truths of revelation that can be understood by human reason. All the work of St. Bonaventure on the integral ground of his theology is done in order to obtain a strictly theological understanding of the truth of revelation. This understanding is attained by ordering reason to faith on the ground of his theology as a universal whole. On the material level, St. Bonaventure subordinates the truth of natural reason to the truth of divine revelation; on the formal level, he subjects the lumen of reason to the lumen of faith. The act of theological understanding depends chiefly on the lumen of faith and secondarily on the lumen of reason. Considered materially, that act pertains to the speculative intellect, which believes what is true, because it is true; the act pertains to the practical intellect, which assents to the truths of faith at the command of the will. The act flows from an initial union of reason and faith accomplished, on the one hand, in the speculative intellect by the gift of understanding and, on the other hand, in the practical intellect by the gift of science under the influence of the gift of counsel. Considered formally, the act of theological understanding pertains to the will, which moves the intellect to assent to the first truth for its own sake alone; this assent is caused primarily by divine authority, which persuades the will to move the intellect, so that the assent to the first truth is a

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

783

loving assent to God, who is the source of all truth. The formal act of theological understanding flows from a complete union of reason and faith achieved by the gift of wisdom, which forms faith with charity, thus conjoining the intellect and the will in a single perfection of knowledge and love. This perfection is ordered to making men good, so that they may grow in love for God in the hope of contemplating the Trinity eternally in beatitude. The theological knowledge of St. Bonaventure, reflecting his views on the nature of man and on his proper mode of knowing, is constituted in accordance with the principle of participation. The two extremes of participation are the natural knowledge of philosophy and the revealed knowledge of faith; they are united through the mediation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The ground of this participational union consists in the natural and infused similitudes of God in creation. In the order of nature, every creature is a vestige reflecting the unity, truth and goodness of the Creator, and every spiritual creature is an image resembling the Creator by way of mind, knowledge and love. In the order of grace, a rational creature having the virtues of faith, hope and charity is a likeness of the Trinity. By uniting the natural similitudes of God in creatures to the infused similitude of the Trinity in the rational creature reformed by grace, St. Bonaventure is able to obtain a theological understanding of the Trinity by appropriating to each of the three Persons those properties in creatures that can be attributed to Him by reason of His order, relation and distinction in the Godhead. In making his appropriations, St. Bonaventure is guided chiefly by the revelation of Scripture, which communicates truth in a principally trinitarian mode; he is guided secondarily by the threefold sciences of philosophy, which he understands to be a vestige of the Trinity. The natural image of God in the spiritual creature holds the middle ground between the vestige of God in the corporeal creature and the infused likeness of the Trinity in the rational creature restored through grace. Consequently, in the theology of St. Bonaventure, the natural knowledge of philosophy participates with the revealed knowledge of faith in a universal understanding of truth through the mediation of his knowledge of the image of God in the human person. In short, St. Bonaventure transforms his philosophical knowledge by Christian faith on the neutral ground of God's image in the rational soul of man. In that way, he obtains a strictly theological understanding not only of the Trinity as the cause of being, the source of truth and the order of life, but also and indeed properly of God as the one and triune principle of creation, redemption and retribution. St. Bonaventure's description of the nature of theology is influenced by a number of historical sources, especially the doctrine of St. Augustine and, to some extent, the doctrines of Aristotle, Richard of St. Victor and St. Bernard The formation and development of St. Bonaventure's theological knowledge shows the influence of the same sources, excepting St. Bernard, and the doctrines of Boethius and St. Anselm. Of those sources, the doctrine of St. Augustine is predominant, particularly with regard to St.

784

CHAPTER EIGHT

Bonaventure's use of the similtudes of God in creation to obtain a theological knowledge of the Trinity and, as a consequence, a theological understanding of creatures as reflexions of the Trinity. The constitution of St. Bonaventure's theological knowledge is also influenced in a predominant manner by St. Augustine's doctrine on piety. Interpreting that doctrine, St. Bonaventure describes the work of the theologian as pertaining to the worship of God in the Christian religion, for the theologian ought to think about God in the loftiest and most pious way. In his own theology, St. Bonaventure honours and venerates God as the first principle of being, the principal source of truth and the .final cause of goodness. Worshipping God that way, St. Bonaventure exercises natural piety toward those human authorities from whom he learns truth, whether theological or philosophical, thus showing benignity toward his forefathers in truth. St. Bonaventure worships God in a distinctly Christian manner from the gift of piety by showing benevolence and beneficence toward human authors in accepting truth whenever and wherever he finds it in them, because they are made in the image of God; at the same time, performing a work of mercy, he corrects the errors of the philosophers for the benefit of their science, which he unites to Christian doctrine in his own theology. The primary and principal source of truth for St. Bonaventure's theology is the revelation of Scripture, to which he subalternates all his theological knowledge. Directed by the gift of piety, he honours and venerates God by assenting to Him for His own sake as the first truth, and so he assents primarily and principally to God as the author of all truth. The main source of truth in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, therefore, is the revelation of God in Scripture, which must be accepted on Christian faith. The secondary source of truth in his doctrine is the manifestation of God in creation as this can be known by natural reason. In the order of faith, St. Bonaventure's thought is constituted with the assistance of theological authorities to whose doctrines he subordinates the doctrines of the philosophers, who assist in the constitution of his own thought in the order of reason. Whether his thought is taken on the integral ground of his theology, where faith and reason stand on their own bases, or on the universal ground of his theology, where reason is united inseparably to faith, the thought of St. Bonaventure constitutes a properly Bonaventurean doctrine, though manifesting the instrumental influences of the various authorities, theological and philosophical, whose doctrines he invokes or employs in forming and developing his own syntheses of philosophy and theology. St. Bonaventure himself bears witness to this fact and, in so doing, he confirms the conclusions that we have laboured step by step to reach concerning the historical and doctrinal authorship of his philosophical thought. St. Thomas concurs in numerous ways with St. Bonaventure, as we have seen, regarding the nature of theology, its constitutive elements, and its principal reliance on both the revelation of Scripture and the lumen of faith. St. Thomas holds different views from St. Bonaventure, as we have also

ORDER OF REASON TO FAITH IN THEOLOGY

785

seen, on many aspects of the science and wisdom of theology. With respect, in particular, to the order of reason to faith in theology, St. Thomas concurs with St. Bonaventure in proceeding according to philosophy both to defend the Christian faith against those attacking it with arguments from human reason and to demonstrate the secondary truths of faith that can be understood by natural reason. In that way, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure come together on the compatibility of reason with faith regarding the same truth according to diverse respects and considerations. St. Thomas, together with St. Bonaventure, relies on the compatibility of reason with faith in order to correct the errors of the philosophers and, in his own way, St. Thomas performs that task as a work of mercy and of Christian piety, thus offering worship to God But St. Thomas does not establish the compatibility of reason with faith on an integral ground of theological knowledge. He establishes it by coordinating reason with faith, a coordination looking toward the subordinating of the end of natural knowledge, or philosophy, to the end of revealed knowledge and of his own theology. Hence, St. Thomas does not transform philosophy by Christian faith in his theology on the same universal ground as the one chosen by St. Bonaventure. The theological knowledge of St. Thomas is constituted by drawing conclusions from the principles of faith through the mediation of the first truth as the formal reason by which the objects of belief are to be understood. In drawing his conclusions, St. Thomas employs his philosophical knowledge in an instrumental way to get a better or clearer understanding of the objects of belief. On a material ground, he conjoins philosophy with faith in his theology by subordinating the conclusions of the one by way of its end to the principles of the other. On a formal ground, he orders philosophy to faith in his theology by submitting the lumen of reason to the lumen of faith by means of his assent to the first truth as it is known through faith. Conjoining philosophy with faith in the unity of a material or common object, which is divine revelation, St. Thomas conforms the conclusions of the one to the principles of the other within the unity of a single formal object, which is God as the object of belief. In that universal way, St. Thomas considers all things, both natural and supernatural, under a single formal reason, which is the first truth, or God as the principle and end of all things. As a result, his theological knowledge does not manifest the trinitarian features marking the theological knowledge of St. Bonaventure. Drawing close to St. Bonaventure, however, St. Thomas uses the various similitudes of God in creatures to articulate his understanding of the Trinity in a scientific mode. There are many other points of likeness between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure regarding the nature of theological knowledge. They hold similar views, for instance, on the primary and principal role in theology of the virtue of faith, which looks to the revelation of Scripture. They also have views that are alike, though with some differences, regarding the material part of faith as pertaining to the intellect and the formal part of the virtue as belonging to the will,

786

CHAPTER EIGHT

which is the principle of meritorious acts. Most of the similarities and differences between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure on these questions stem from their individual positions on the nature of man, his potencies of operation and his natural mode of knowing. The two theologians are in complete harmony with respect both to the need that natural reason, to avoid error, has for Christian faith and to the intrinsic inerrancy of a human science, as a science. Though the lumen of faith is an intrinsic perfection of the lumen of reason, the influence of Christian faith on the philosophical thought of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure is extrinsic to that thought as it falls properly within the science of philosophy. The extrinsic influence of Christian faith on their philosophical doctrines is evident in their particular choices of materials to be developed according to natural reason, but under the control that the theological ends envisaged by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure exercise over their philosophical thought. In this regard, St. Thomas is his own best witness to the proper authorship of his philosophical doctrines. He teaches that the theologian should accept a philosophical doctrine because of its intrinsic reason and not because of the authority of the philosopher from whom it is taken. The philosopical doctrines of St. Thomas, therefore, depend primarily on the intrinsic reasons that he gives for them. In that sense, his philosophy is properly Thomist, and yet it shows the extrinsic influences of the doctrines of the different philosophers contributing to the formation of his synthesis. The same is true of his theological synthesis, which relies in many instrumental ways on the doctrines of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church and, to a lesser extent, on the Greek and Arabian philosophers. Those sources are also used by St. Bonaventure, though not always in the same degree or with the same effect as St. Thomas. In accounting for the nature of theology, for example, St. Thomas uses more than St. Bonaventure the doctrines of Aristotle and Dionysius, whereas St. Bonaventure has a more extensive use than St. Thomas of the doctrine of St. Augustine. The doctrinal syntheses of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, as their own texts indicate, are the consequences of the principles and reasons that each theologian employs, with or without the aid of secondary sources, to form and to develop his own understanding of God and the work, whether of nature or of grace, that God does in creation. Though the two syntheses are different in numerous ways, some of them irreconcilable, they are not entirely diverse, for they have in common a great many things both in philosophy and in theology.

CHAPTER NINE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

has been a controversy for a long time, as we recorded 'Tp HERE introduction, about the Christian character of Bonaventurean

in our philosophy. Bonaventure's philosophy has been called Christian for a number of reasons, notably because it is said to be inseparable from his theology while following a theological order of development. Bonaventure himself is said to maintain the necessity for a Christian philosophy because of the inevitability of error in human reasoning, as the plight of the philosophers shows, since they have erred in numerous ways through a want of Christian faith. This view is based on the teaching of Bonaventure that an illumination of faith is altogether necessary for a philosopher to avoid error in his thinking about some things, especially divine things, that he can know by his natural reason. The necessity is a consequence of original sin, according to Bonaventure, who teaches, as we have seen, that Adam could have become wise before his fall by contemplating the Creator in the creature; however, because of sin, the human intellect has been darkened, so that it is now difficult for us to know the truth even of creatures.' It seems from this that the Christian, having the lumen of faith, can know natural truths that the philosophers, lacking Christian faith, are not able to know, particularly with regard to God.2 Moreover, Bonaventure speaks of Christ as the master of morals and of the whole of moral philosophy, so that Christ would answer a question useful for the salvation of the whole world by beginning from the supreme and essential good, by which, according to which and toward which every good ought to be ordered, as otherwise it would cease to be good.3 There appears to be some ground, then, for saying that Bonaventure finds in the Christian a philosophy which is not to be found in men lacking the lumen of faith. He has said that a Christian demonstrating in philosophy a truth to which he assents from faith can have 1 Cf. Brevil, 2.12 "Est igitur ..." (5.230; ed. min., nn. 4-5, 5.56-57). Note: "Et cognoscere Deum in effectu, hoc est videre per speculum, et hoc dupliciter. aut per speculum lucidum et oculum, et sic videbat primus homo ante lapsum; aut per speculum obscuratum, et sic videmus nos modo, quia propter peccatum et oculi nostri caligaverunt, et omnes creaturae obtenebratae sunt; unde videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate ..." — Comm. in loam., 1.43, q. 3, Resp. (6.255-56). Cf. 4 Sent., l.l.dub.9 (4.31; ed. min., 4.24); 2 Sent., 23.2.3, Resp. (2.543-45; ed. min., 2.562-65). 2 "Philosophi, cum magna agerent, tamen non perv merunt ad magnum Deum, quia Deus elegit hum lies, ut totum Deo attribuerent" — Sermo, De s. Stephana, n. 1, collatio (9.483). 3 "Christus igitur responsurus quaestioni utili ad salutem totius mundi tanquam magister morum et moralis totius philosophiae incepit a sum mo bono per essentiam, a quo et secundum quod et ad quod ordinari debete omne bonum; alioquin desinit esse bonum." — Comm. in Luc., 18.37 (7.462).

788

CHAPTER NINE

merit by continuing to assent to that truth as it is known by faith. In this regard, Bonaventure speaks of three ways that assent can be given to the same truth. Taking as an example what Moses said: "In the beginning, God created heaven and earth" (Gen., 1.1), Bonaventure supposes that Aristotle and Arius say the same thing. The man who believes what Moses says has merit, because he believes a truth coming from the Holy Spirit, and so he believes the first truth. A man believing what Arius says has demerit, because the assent of the man, thinking Arius, who was a heretic, to be a true teacher, is founded on heresy. Any man who believes what Aristotle says has neither merit nor demerit, because such a man adheres to a mundane wisdom.4 Speaking in a similar manner, Bonaventure exhorts the Christian soul, from its natural desire to know, to love to see the mirror of the triune God, to desire to read and to study in that mirror, because to have seen it all at once is to have learned all things. Indeed, in that mirror, the theory of Plato, the philosophy of Aristotle and the astronomy of Ptolemy will appear and will be reckoned as foolishness, because whatever we understand in this life about truth is the smallest part of those things about which we are ignorant.5 It would seem, therefore, that Bonaventure, as a Christian, has a low esteem of philosophy and of other forms of natural knowledge. Now Christ has complained, and He might well still complain: "If I tell you the truth, why do you not believe me?" (,/«., 8.46). This complaint is justified, according to Bonaventure, because Christ was most experienced in the knowledge and the care of souls, but He was not and is not believed by many men. 6 The above texts, to which others could be added, are taken from the many different kinds of literature in the writings of Bonaventure. The tenor of those texts, as they stand, could support a view that Bonaventure thinks very little both of the ability of natural reason to acquire truth and of the various sciences acquired by human reasoning. Such a view, observing his position on the inclination of reason toward error, might lead to the con4 "Undc esto quod sicut Moyses dixit: 'In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram' (Gen., 1.1), ita etiam diceretur Aritoteles, ita etiam Arius; qui crederet quod Moyses dicit, mereretur, quia crederet quod Spiritu sancto fuerit afflatus, et ita crederet primae Veritati. Qui crederet quod Aristoteles dicit, nee mereretur nee demereretur, quia adhaereretur sapientiae mundanae. Qui crederet quod Arius dicit, putans Arium, qui fuit haereticus, esse doctorem verum, demereretur, quia assensus est fundatus super haeresim." — 4 Sent., 30.dub.2, Resp. (4.712; ed. min., 4.699). 5 "O anima, quae naturaliter scire desideras, hoc speculum [i.e. trinum Deum] videre affecta, in illo studere et legere desidera, quia hoc semel vidisse est omnia didicisse. Ibi revera stultia videbitur et reputabitur Platonis theoria, Aristotelis philosophia, Ptolomaei astronomia, quia quidquid hie de veritate intelligimus, minima pars eorum est, quae ignoramus." — Soliloquium, 4.5.24 (8.65; Dec. opusc., p. 148). 6 "'Si veritatem dico vobis, quare non creditis mini?' lonnis octavo (vs. 46)... Dicit igitur. 'Si veritatem dico etc.' Revera, si Prisciano creditur in ordinatione litterarum, Aristoteli in assignatione fallaciarum, Ptolomaeo in decursu et motu planetarum, Galeno de propinatione medicinarum, lustiniano in determinatione causarum; quia Christus erat peritissimus in scientia et cura animarum, et non sibi credebatur nee creditur a multis: ideo merito conquerebatur et conquer! potest, dicens; 'Si veritatem dico etc." — Sermo, Domin. de Passione, n. 3 (9.240).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

789

elusion that Bonaventure posits a real need for a Christian philosophy, if only to ward off the danger for the Christian in placing too much confidence in the doctrines of the philosophers, thus avoiding the occasion of falling back into the errors deceiving the philosophers.7 This view seems plausible when the name Christian is used to designate the man who follows the doctrine of Christ and of Scripture, so that he does not occupy himself unduly with the doctrine of a man who is not a Christian. 8 The attribution of a Christian philosophy to Bonaventure himself, finally, could be supported by the one text in which he speaks explicitly of such a philosophy. In this text, he says that only those who honour God will be honoured and glorified by Him; therefore, only those who are humble will be glorified, because they alone honour God. To receive God's threefold mercy, a man must be a humble servant in despising himself, in bearing with his neighbour and in revering God. This humility, according to Bonaventure, is the first part of Christian philosophy. Augustine was asked by Dioscorus what Christian philosophy would principally be; in response, Augustine says: "If you ask, what would be truly principal in rhetoric, I reply to you: eloquence ... So I say, for this part: if you ask, what would Christian philosophy be? I reply to you: humility ..." This is what the Gospel teaches, Bonaventure adds, for there is neither a page nor a line in Scripture that will not preach humility. If we are proud, we shall fall away from the true wisdom of the Prophets and the Apostles.9 The principal part of Christian philosophy, according to the above text, consists in a threefold humility founded on self-contempt, tolerance toward 7 "Notandum de Hieronymo, qui post studium Ciceronis non habebat saporem in propheticis libris; ideo flagellatus fuit ante tribunal. Hoc autern propter nos factum est; unde magistri cavere debent, ne commendent et appretientur dicta philosophorum, ne hac occasione populus revertatur in Aegyptum, vel exemplo eorum dimittat 'aquas Siloe', in quibus est summa perfectio, et vadant ad aquas philosophorum, in quibus est aeterna deceptio." — Coll. in Hexaem., 19.12 (5.422; cf. Delorme, p. 217); for the reference to St. Jerome see the next number. 8 "... Apocalypsis tertio (vs. 1): 'Nomen habes, quod vivas, et mortuus es'. Et hoc patet etiam in beato Hieronymo, qui de se scribit, quod semel, semotis libris divinis, Ciceronem legisset ductus fuit ad iudicium Dei; a quo cum ludex quaereret, quis esset, respondit 'Christianus sum'. Cui ludex: 'mentiris, inquit, Ciceronianus es, non Christianus'. Unde patet, quod quo homo magis occupatur, eius ei noinen imponitur. Unde qui vacat luxuriae, 'luxuriosus' dicitur, et sic de aliis vitiis, non Christianus." — Sermo, Domin. XXII post Pentecos., n. 6 (9.447); cf. St. Jerome, Epist. ad Eustoch., 22.30 (PL 22.416-17). 9 "Qui Deum honorant, illi solum honorantur et glorificantur; sed soli humiles Deum honorant: ideo soli humiles glorificabuntur. Vis igitur sumi ad triplicem misericordiam, esto servus humilis ex contemptu tui, ex supportatione proximi et ex reverentia Dei. Ista est prima pars philosophiae christianae. Dioscorus quaesivit ab Augustino, quid principaliter esset philosophia Christiana. Respondit Augustinus dicens: 'Si quaeras, quid principalius sit in rhetorica? respondeo tibi: eloquentia ... Ita dico ex parte ista; si quaeras: quid sit philosophia Christiana? respondeo tibi: humilitas ...' Hoc suadet Evangelium, nee est pagina nee linea in sacra Scriptura, quae non praedicet humilitatem. Si superbimus, cadimus a vera sapientia Prophetarum et Apostolorum." — Sermo, De patre nastro Francisco, n. 2 (9.578-79). Without referring to any other part of Christian philosophy, Bonaventure goes on here to speak of the humility of Francis of Assisi. Bonaventure's citation from Augustine is an adaptation, and a deliberate one, as we shall see, of his Epist., 118.3.22 (PL 33.442), where Augustine talks about Christiana religio and not philosophia Christiana.

790

CHAPTER NINE

neighbours and reverence for God. A man possessing that humility has the true wisdom of God, which is a Christian wisdom; so, honouring God, the man will be honoured and glorified eternally by God. A proud man, falling away from the wisdom of God, does not have Christian philosophy, because he is lacking .in humility. It would seem, consequently, that the Christian philosophy of which Bonaventure speaks has to do with the Christian way of life nourished by the doctrine of Scripture and founded on the Christian religion, which Augustine describes as a true wisdom. A Christian philosophy of that sort is, undoubtedly, a theological outlook on human life and man's dependence on God, particularly through the mediation of Christ. The expression Christian philosophy would not designate Bonaventure's philosophy alone on the universal ground of his theology, because, on that ground, his philosophy is inseparable from Christian faith, since the formal object of his theology is constituted by the union of reason and faith on the ground of a universal whole. This is the way, for example, that his philosophical knowledge of man as an image of God is inseparable from his faith in God as a Trinity, so that Bonaventure understands the Trinity of persons from the divine image in man, who is seen to be a likeness of the Trinity rather than of the divine essence. If the expression Christian philosophy were used on the universal ground of Bonaventure's theology, the name would have to designate the whole of his theological thought, which depends primarily on Scripture and has as its end the promotion of the Christian way of life. Moreover, on the integral ground of his theology, Bonaventure's philosophy can be set apart from Christian faith; so. on this ground, his philosophy is neither inseparable from his theology nor dependent on a theological order of development. It is on this particular ground that Bonaventure's philosophical knowledge of man as an image of the divine essence can be separated from his theological knowledge, founded on Christian faith, of man as an image of the Trinity. Although Bonaventure's selection of philosophical materials is determined here by the theological end that he has in view, which is the good of the Christian life, the control exercised by Christian faith over his philosophical thinking is extrinsic to his philosophical knowledge, which constitutes a distinct habitus from the habitus of faith. It seems, then, that Christian philosophy would not be an appropriate name for the science of philosophy as Bonaventure forms and develops it on the integral ground of his theology. He constitutes his philosophy on that ground according to the proper principles and methods that any acquired science, depending on the natural lumen of reason, follows in obtaining an understanding of its own object. The most that could be said, apparently, of his philosophy on this ground is that it is the philosophy of a Christian thinker, who is both a philosopher and a theologian. It is on this particular ground, furthermore, that Bonaventure adverts to the need for an illumination of faith in order to protect a Christian thinker from falling into the errors that, in Bonaventure's judgment, can be found in non-Christian thinkers. Some of Bonaventure's

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

791

texts, nonetheless, seem to imply that the Christian thinker alone can arrive at a number of natural truths, especially about God. For this reason, it may not be sufficient to say that, because error is the fault of the man and not of his science, there is no need for a Christian philosophy, because the illumination of faith perfects the philosopher and not his science, which is inerrant according to its nature. This may not be sufficient in view of Bonaventure's texts stating, on the one hand, that an illumination of faith perfects rather than removes a habitus of science and, on the other hand, that the doctrines of non-Christian philosophers are occasions of error for the Christian thinker, who ought to rely on his faith more than on the doctrines of the philosophers. There are, evidently, two sides to the problem of Christian philosophy as the problem concerns the doctrine of Bonaventure. To determine which side ought to stand, if this can be done, we must take account of a number of theological questions in Bonaventure's doctrine. There is, first, the question why natural reason is inclined to err, so that an illumination of faith is said to be necessary to avoid erroneous conclusions regarding things knowable by natural reason. This question includes a second, namely, whether the illumination of faith so perfects the intellect of a Christian that his faith has an intrinsic influence on his philosophical knowledge as a habitus of science. We have a third question, which deals with the Christian or non-Christian character of the philosophy that Bonaventure forms and develops on the integral ground of his theology, and then unites inseparably to Christian faith on the universal ground of his theological knowledge. We can divide our handling of the problem of Christian philosophy into two parts. The first part involves the necessity for an illumination of Christian faith to avoid errors in philosophy. This part calls for an examination of Bonaventure's doctrine on the causes of ignorance and of error in human reason, thus requiring a consideration of his Christian and theological evaluation of natural reason. The second part entails the proper significance of Christian philosophy as the expresssion can be applied to Bonaventure's doctrine. This particular part necessitates a more explicit account than our previous presentation of the theological transformation of philosophy by Christian faith in the doctrine of Bonaventure. Christian Evaluation of Natural Reason

We shall start with Bonaventure's question whether original sin was caused by ignorance. He notes that ignorance is said either properly or commonly to be a cause of sin. As ignorance is said properly to be a cause of sin, ignorance is understood to be a privation of knowledge. This sort of ignorance is not found in man because of his nature, but because of original sin; so the first sin was not caused by a privation of knowledge. When ignorance is said commonly to be a cause of sin, ignorance is then

792

CHAPTER NINE

understood to be a kind of nescience causing the sinner not to consider the gravity either of his sin or of its penalty. The first sin resulted from that sort of ignorance, which is not a penalty, but a certain imperfection of human nature. Our first parents were able to know that they had sinned, but they did not consider the severity of God's justice. Their sin resulted, therefore, from a nescience of the gravity of its penalty. This nescience is not ignorance in the proper sense of the term. Taken properly, ignorance signifies the penalty of original sin, namely, the nescience of those things that we should know to supply our wants. The ignorance of our first parents, then, consisted in a certain incompletion and imperfection of their knowledge, a condition due to the defect of a human nature not yet beatified. It does not follow, nevertheless, that their intellects were blinded or in darkness, since they had a lumen strong enough to discern what was right and just. Consequently, prior to original sin, our first parents did not have that proneness to error which is a disorder of human nature. I0 Bonaventure teaches that Adam was not afflicted with ignorance in his speculative intellect because of his sin. He had innate species of knowledge that he retained after original sin, for God does not take away His natural gifts to man. Adam was inflicted in his practical intellect, however, with the penalty of both ignorance and blindness. In Adam's descendants, the condition of the human body corrupted by sin has increased the difficulty of the practical intellect in making its judgments. In addition, Adam's descendants have been afflicted with ignorance in the speculative intellect, not because God has taken knowledge away from us, but because He has not given us the innate knowledge granted to Adam. Hence, God has inflicted an ignorance on the human intellect as a penalty for original sin, but He has not withdrawn His illumination of the intellect in the order of nature." Thus, because of original sin, the human intellect is now suffering from a twofold penalty of blindness. The speculative intellect is afflicted with an ignorance of the created universe, while the practical intellect is afflicted with an ignorance of the way of salvation. The blindness of the speculative intellect is not as great as the blindness of the practical intellect, Bonaventure says, because a man can acquire much knowledge about natural things by his own study and ability, whereas he cannot know very much about eternal life unless he is directed toward it by the teaching of divine revelation. For this reason, the doctrine revealed to us in Sacred Scripture by the Holy Spirit has to do more with the knowledge of faith and of morals than with the knowledge of natural things, though every truth is said to be in some way from the Holy Spirit. In speaking about the production of natural things, Sacred Scripture is not concerned with their specific natures and causes. It is concerned, rather, with providing the truths that the

10 2 Sent., 22.2.1, Resp., ad 4 (2.522-23; ed. min., 2.539-40). 11 2 Sent., 7.2.2.1, ad 3 (2.191; ed. min., 2.184); 1 Sent., Prooem., dub.5, Resp. (1.24; ed. min., 1.15).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

793

believer needs to know, and so Scripture speaks of the divine will as the first and supreme cause of all things, which were created and restored through the divine Word. l2 The next question is whether ignorance in any man, after Adam, can be a fault or a sin. Taking ignorance as a privation of knowledge, Bonaventure says that ignorance is known from its opposite, which is science. Now there are some sciences, such as the liberal arts, dealing with things that need not be known either to acquire virtue or to attain salvation. Ignorance of these things, though it is a privation of knowledge, is not a fault in any way whatsoever. There are other forms pf knowledge, such as Christian faith and human prudence, dealing with objects of belief and of moral action. Since it is necessary for an adult to know those objects in order to attain his salvation, he is obliged to know them, unless he is incapable of understanding, as some men are, for instance, because of insanity or a bodily defect. Ignorance of the objects of belief and of prudence is a fault in any man who can know them, but neglects to do so, thus falling into sin. Privation of knowledge about things necessary for salvation can come about in two ways. In the one way, it is not caused by the man himself, but is a penalty for original sin; as a consequence, the man has neither merit nor demerit for his actions. In the other way, the privation is caused by the man himself. He may know what is necessary for his salvation, but turn away voluntarily from the truth and fall into the pit of error. This privation is in heretics and is called erroneous ignorance. A man may want to stay in the way of salvation, but also desire to walk in the darkness of ignorance, and so he has an affected ignorance; or he may not bother to learn the truth because of his laziness and negligence, thus incurring the guilt of crass and supine ignorance. 13 In Bonaventure's view, then, ignorance in an adult is not a fault, but a penalty for original sin, when the ignorance is a pure nescience, and this is the ignorance found in the speculative intellect. In the practical intellect, however, ignorance is a fault when it is conjoined with a disordered will, such as the nescience accompanying concupiscence, which is opposed to virtue and to grace. Reforming the soul, grace rectifies the will through charity and the intellect through faith; in that way, grace reforms and perfects our liberty of choice, which consists at once in reason and will. 14 Deception and error, Bonaventure teaches, come from a disorder causing the intellect in its judgment to deviate from the truth. The intellect judges by way of reasoning: the speculative intellect judges what is true on the ground that it is true; the practical intellect judges what is to be done on the ground that is good, and so the practical intellect alone belongs to the

12 2 Sent., 23.dub.3, Resp. (2.548-49; ed. ram., 2.568). 13 2 Sent., 22.2.2, Resp. (2.524; ed. min., 2.541). 14 2 Sent., 30.2.2, Resp. "... voluntatc consistit." (2.725; ed. min., 2.747).

794

CHAPTER NINE

faculty of freedom of choice.1S The grace perfecting our freedom of choice is, so to speak, a light having a power of illumination. As a light, grace illuminates the whole soul, thus rectifying and reforming at once both the intellect and the will. Hence, grace is the root of every infused habitus and the principle of every meritorious work. For this reason, grace is called light and sin is called darkness. The latter name is appropriate for sin, Bonaventure maintains, because darkness is a privation of the act of light not only as it is in the sense of sight, but also as it is required for the operation of the other senses. Consequently, the darkness of sin is not found only in the intellect; it is found in the intellect as this potency is extended to the will, so that the darkness of sin also is a privation of the heat, or love, generated by grace as light. This is why Bonaventure says, as we have seen, that the intellect of a sinner can be strong with respect to its act of pure speculation, but not with respect to its operation as the intellect is extended to the will, and so to moral action. Illustrating his point, Bonaventure notes that a man with a knowledge of music may know very well the harmony of the harp, but not be a good harpist, which requires both knowledge and the practical experience acquired with much labour. 16 Thus, the manifestation of truth by lumen makes known both speculative truth and practical truth. Speculative truth is known by science, which is opposed to nescience, or the darkness of simple ignorance. Practical truth, in order of faith, has to do with the good of moral life according to grace, which opposes the darkness of malice or sin, and this is the darkness that dims the lumen of faith while driving out the heat of charity. 17 Using the language of Scripture, Bonaventure associates with the Egyptians, who held God's people in captivity, the blindness and darkness of error resulting from sin and malice, especially in heretics and particularly in the Manicheans, who taught that the two first principles of all things were Good and Evil. The remedy for sin is the medicinal grace of Christ, which is communicated to us in the sacraments of His Church, especially the sacrament of faith or of baptism liberating the new people of God from the darkness of Egypt by illumining their minds in divine truth and cleansing their hearts from concupiscence. 1B We shall pause here to summarize what we have found, thus far, in Bonaventure's texts on ignorance, error and sin. The human intellect, as a consequence of original sin, suffers from the penalty of blindness and ignorance in both the speculative order and the practical order, which ex-

15 2 Sent., 7.2.1.1, Resp. "... liberi arbitrii." (2.190; ed. min., 2.183). 16 4 Sent., 18.2.dub.l, Resp. (4.496; ed. min., 4.480). 17 1 Sent., 17.1.dub.3, Resp. (1.305; ed. min., 1.246). 18 1 Sent., Prooem., "Secundo, propter ... ego DominusV (1.2; ed. mm., 1.1-2): cf. "Profundum sacramentalis ... dicitur losue 4, 22-24." (1.4; ed. min., 1.4); Brevil, 6.6-7 (5.270-72; ed. min., 5.134-38). See also: Comm. in Luc., Prooem., n. 4 (7.3), and 2.56 (7.57); 2 Sent., 34.2.1, Resp. (2.811; ed. min., 2.83940); 4 Sent,, 6.1 un.4, ad 4 (4.144; ed. min., 4.132).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

795

tends to the will. In the speculative order, the intellect is penalized by the absence of innate knowledge, so that, unlike Adam, we are ignorant of the natures and species, the causes and origin of things in the created universe. To the extent that a knowledge of those truths is not necessary for salvation, ignorance of them is a pure nescience and always without fault or sin, and so error in regard to such truths is a consequence of simple ignorance, which is a penalty in us of original sin. In the practical order, the human intellect is penalized not only by an ignorance of the way to salvation, but also by a difficulty in making the right moral judgments, thus causing error in our knowledge of natural virtue. This condition of the practical intellect is aggravated by the penalty of disorder in the will and in the sense appetite. Whenever a man's ignorance of the things needed for salvation is simply a privation of knowledge, his ignorance is nothing more than the penalty of original sin; so there is no fault in the man for his lack of knowledge, but he has no merit, though he is not in error, nor has he demerit, if he is in error. When a man's ignorance of the things needed for salvation is a privation of knowledge conjoined voluntarily with his disordered appetite, his ignorance, though penal, becomes a cause of sin and, as such, is a fault in the man. He is responsible for his error, because he has not considered the gravity of his sin. If a man, knowing the things that are necessary for his salvation, loses his knowledge by a voluntary act turning him away from the truth, his ignorance is erroneous and the man himself becomes a heretic. When a man retains his knowledge of those things, but does not want to consider them, his ignorance is affected: if his failure to consider them is caused by laziness or negligence, his ignorance is crass or supine; since his ignorance is voluntary in each instance, the man is at fault and, falling into sin, he is to blame for his errors. The penalties inflicted on the human intellect, both speculative and practical, do not include a withdrawal of its illumination by God in the order of nature. The nescience in the speculative intellect can be removed to a great extent, even by a sinner, through the acquisition of science by the natural power of reason. The nescience in the practical intellect cannot be removed to any great extent without the teaching of divine revelation; therefore, the revelation of Scripture is concerned more with the truths of faith and of morals than of natural things, which are treated in Scripture only as they are needed for the way of salvation. To enter the way of salvation, a man must be restored from the effects of original sin through grace, which is the root of the infused virtues and the principle of meritorious acts. Illumining the whole soul, grace reforms the faculty of freedom of choice by rectifying the intellect through faith and the will through charity, thus removing the penal ignorance of the practical intellect, opposing the penalty of disorder and concupiscence in the appetites, and expelling the darkness or error of sin and malice. There are three points, relating to the problem of Christian philosophy, that can be taken from Bonaventure's doctrine on the defects of natural reason. The first point concerns the speculative intellect, which suffers the

796

CHAPTER NINE

penalty of nescience regarding the truth of natural things in the universe. Error in the speculative intellect with regard to that truth, as it is outside the way of salvation, results from a simple ignorance, which is a non-culpable ignorance. Consequently, in view of eternal life, a man falling into this sort of error has no demerit, just as he has no merit for the truth of his purely speculative science. Now, as we have seen, the natural image of God in man is said by Bonaventure to be indifferent to His acceptance or nonacceptance; to be acceptable to God, His image must be reformed through grace and its infused virtues. Likewise, because a purely speculative science is indifferent to the way of salvation, to be ignorant of the truth acquired by such a science is not displeasing to God, whereas to be a sinner is displeasing to God, because the sinner is without grace, which makes a man pleasing to God. l9 It follows, then, that the illumination of faith coming with grace is not directed principally to the perfection of the speculative intellect, but to the practical intellect. The illumination of faith perfects the speculative intellect only to the extent that the truth of natural things is.a necessary support or foundation for the way of salvation. Because all men need to know certain natural truths, particularly concerning God, in order to enter the way of salvation, Christian faith requires that those truths be believed, even though they can be known with certitude by the natural lumen of reason. Although the deprivation of innate knowledge makes it difficult for a philosopher to know the truth of some natural things with certitude, nonetheless, he can overcome the penalty of ignorance by his own study and by his natural reason, and so the philosopher can know the truth of natural things with certitude by his acquired science, which is a speculative science. No speculative science of philosophy dealing with the truth of natural things, consequently, has an intrinsic or an essential need for an illumination of faith in order to acquire true and certain knowledge of its proper object. Because human reason is a created power, however, it is subject by its natural condition to error, so that a man not yet beatified cannot be entirely free from error in his reasoning. There is a necessity for an illumination of faith, therefore, to avoid errors in thinking about the natural truths that a man must know for his salvation. The necessity is not due to his speculative science, which is indifferent to salvation, but to his speculative intellect, which has to act inerrantly with regard to those natural truths supporting the truths of divine revelation. Hence, the illumination of

19 "Item, absque gratia gratum faciente de ignorante potest fieri homo sciens, non solum in his quae subsunt naturae, sed etiam in his quae sunt supra naturam; ergo pari ratione absque gratia gratum faciente poterit homo fieri iustus de peccatore." — 2 Sent., 28.1.1, arg. 3 (2.675; ed. min., 2.695). "... dicendum quod non est simile; ignorantia enim, in quantum huiusmodi, potest dici defectum poenae quam culpae. Unde ignorans, secundum quod ignorans, non displicet Deo; peccans autem, secundum quod peccans, Deo displicet; et ideo culpae recte opponitur gratia, quae reddit Deo acceptum, sicut ignorantiae opponitur scientia. Et quoniam oppositum expelli habet per summ oppositum, ideo non sequitur quodsi ignoratia habet expelli sine gratia, quod similiter culpa." — Loc. cit., ad 3 (2.676-77; ed. min., 2.697).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

797

faith perfects the act of the speculative intellect and, as a consequence, enables the philosopher to think inerrantly by his natural reason about things that he knows infallibly by his faith. Thus, proceeding formally according to the natural lumen of reason with respect to truths that are materially the same as those known by faith, the philosopher can perfect his science intrinsically as a result of the perfecting of his reasoning by the lumen of faith. The illumination of faith, therefore, is an extrinsic cause of the perfection of his science, just as the illumination of the human intellect by God in the order of nature is an extrinsic cause of the intrinsic perfection of human thought. The second point has to do with the practical intellect, which endures the twofold penalty of ignorance regarding the way of salvation and of difficulty in acquiring truth about natural virtue. Since the practical intellect is commanded by the will, the burden imposed on the intellect in its search for moral truth is increased by the penalties of disorder in the will and of concupiscence in the sense appetite. There can be error in the practical intellect, then, for two different reasons. In the first place, a man can err because of his nescience or penal ignorance of the way to salvation. An error of this sort comes from a non-culpable privation of knowledge and is not the fault of the man, who has no demerit because of his error, as he has no merit for his truth or his virtue as long as he is outside the way of salvation. In the second place, a man can err because of the voluntary conjunction of his disordered appetites with his ignorance of the things needed for salvation. His ignorance is not culpable, but it becomes a cause of sin when conjoined with an immoral act contrary to the law and to the good of his nature. Though the man is deprived of the knowledge that he needs in order to be on the way to salvation, he is to blame for his sin, which adds to the darkness and blindness of his practical intellect, thus causing him to err concerning the truth of natural virtue. Now, speaking about the penalty of concupiscence, Bonaventure says that a man's soul is in order when his spirit is under God, when his flesh and his animal powers are under his spirit and follow its command. On the other hand, a man's soul is perverse, or in disorder, when his flesh and his animal powers preside over his rational spirit. This is indeed true, as a matter of fact, not only according to faith, but also according to philosophy. 20 Thus, in Bonaventure's judgment, philosophy can make known the truth of moral virtue, even though natural reason of itself, or without the help of grace, cannot judge the things belonging to Catholic faith. Left to itself, or without grace, human reason

20 "Certum est enim quod tune anima hominis est ordinata, quando spiritus est sub Deo et caro et virtutes animales sunt sub spiritu et sequuntur eius imperium. Ab oppositis igitur tune anima hominis est perversa, quando caro et virtutes animales praesunt spiritui rational!. Et hoc quidem verum est de piano, non tantummodo secundum fidem, verum etiam secundum philosophiam." — 2 Sent., 30.1.2, in Resp. (2.719; «/. mia., 2.741).

798

CHAPTER NINE

can err, it can turn away from the truths of faith, and so the man can incur the guilt of sin. 21 Error and sin in the practical intellect, then, are attributed by Bonaventure to the man and not to his science of moral philosophy. Though it is more difficult for a philosopher to acquire truth by a moral science than by a speculative science, even so, because the penalty of original sin does not include a loss of God's illumination of reason in the natural order, a philosopher has a sufficient power of reason to know with certitude, and without an illumination of faith, the truth of moral life and of moral virtue in the order of nature. In fact, as we have shown, Bonaventure finds a true and certain knowledge of those things in the Platonists, whom he praises for their philosophical wisdom, particularly for their knowledge of the exemplar virtues in God. The science of moral philosophy, therefore, has no essential or intrinsic necessity for an illumination of faith in order to know the truth of its proper objects with certitude. There is a necessity for an illumination of faith to make known the way of salvation, which cannot be discovered by any man according to his natural power of reason. The illumination of faith, as a perfection of the practical intellect, is directed to a knowledge of both the Christian way of life and the ultimate end of man. By making those truths known to men, the lumen of Christian faith dispels the principal darkness of ignorance caused in their intellects by original sin. To walk the way of salvation, a man must follow the Christian way of life, and so he must have the virtues that are infused with the salvific grace of Christ. Since the Christian way of life and the infused virtues presuppose the law of human nature and its proper virtues, therefore, in order to remain on the road to salvation, a Christian needs to know the fundamental truths of the natural law and of natural virtue. For that reason, Christian faith teaches many things about the natural law and natural virtue, even though they can be known with certitude by the natural lumen of reason. But the penalty of original sin makes it quite difficult for the practical intellect to judge moral things with certitude, while the disorder of the appetitive potencies adds to the difficulties of reason in making its moral judgments. There is a necessity for an illumination of faith, therefore, to ward off error in judging the truth of the natural virtues supporting the infusd virtues of the Christian life. It is not that the illumination of faith perfects the speculative intellect any the less than the practical intellect; but the latter has the greater necessity for this illumination in order to judge the truth of moral things inerrantly. Thus, influenced extrinsically by the lumen of Christian faith, the practical intellect is able to judge the truth of moral things with certitude by the lumen of natural reason. The errors of nonChristian philosophers in the moral order have resulted chiefly from their invincible ignorance of the true end or the ultimate good of human life.

21 2 Sent., 24.2.1.1, sc 5 (2.574; ed. min., sc e, 2.594).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

799

Because of their nescience, those philosophers simply could not know that no man is able by his natural virtue to achieve his ultimate good. Not knowing Christ or His way of life, they were not freed from the penalty of original sin, and so the non-Christian philosophers could not have had the salvific grace of Christ and its infused virtues. Consequently, to the extent that they were nescient of Christ and the way of salvation, Bonaventure always excuses them for their mistakes. But he does not excuse philosophers for taking pride in their virtues and good works to the extent that, deserving to be separated from Christ, they are excluded from the joys of paradise.22 It does not follow, however, that Bonaventure condemns the good works or the virtues of non-Christian philosophers. He finds fault with those particular philosophers who have given way to inordinate pride in their accomplishments. Nor does it follow that Bonaventure condemns the science of moral philosophy as worthless to a Christian because he has divine revelation. It is in the context of the moral order, moreover, that Bonaventure speaks of the inability of the philosophers to know God. Some of them have known God with a certain degree of love, thus tending toward God in some way; but their tendency toward God was not from faith, and so they could not have arrived at their salvation by their natural knowledge. It would be more true to say, Bonaventure remarks, that the philosophers were cast down, or dejected, than to say that they were tending toward God.23 Not knowing God as the ultimate good or the end of man, the philosophers could not rest ultimately in a contemplation of God. Their inability to arrive at God was a consequence of original sin, which was not known to the philosophers, though they could have known that there was some cause for the sinful condition of man. Explaining this, Bonaventure distinguishes two modes of inquiry by human reasoning. In the one mode, proceeding from the superior causes of things, human reason is assisted by a ray of faith, as Catholic theologians proceed when reasoning about the things of faith. Reasoning within their faith, the theologians conclude that it is in harmony with human reason to say that God has not made man from the beginning in the great condition of misery and calamity now afficting him. Indeed, to say the contrary would seem to a man of piety and of sound mind to be an act of great impiety toward the Creator. In the other mode, proceeding from the natures and inferior causes of things, human 22 "Sic igitur concedendum est quod nullus post lapsum salvari potuit absque fide Mediatoris; qua quia philosophi caruerunt, suis meritis et virtutibus inhaerentes, ideo tamquam superbi et a Christi membris et meritis separati, exclusi sunt a gaudiis paradisi." — 3 Sent., 25.1.2, Resp. in finem (3.541; ed. min., 3.533). 23 "Item, aliqui philosophi habuerunt cognitionem de Deo cum quadam dilectione, ergo habucrunt simul divinae Veritatis perceptionem cum quadam tendentia in ipsam, et tamen nee fidem nee fidei articulos habuerunt..." — 3 Sent., 24.3.2, arg. 7 (3.527-28; ed. min., 3.519). "... dicendum quod non erat ilia tendentia quae est ex fide; nunquam enim per illam cognitionem poterant pervenire ad salutem; ideo, ut verius loquamur, potius iacebant quam tenderent." — Loc. at., ad 7 (3.529; ed. min., 3.521).

800

CHAPTER NINE

reason depends on its natural power of judgment. This is the mode of reasoning followed by the philosophers, who acquire their science by way of the senses and human experience. The philosophers, on considering the condition of man, do not start from the principal cause of human nature, but from its component principles and connatural operations. Proceeding that way, human reason is out of harmony rather than in harmony with the truth of Catholic faith. This is why the philosophers have not arrived at a knowledge of the fall of man. Though they sought to know the true condition of human nature, the philosopers have not discovered it, because, to them, it seems most reasonable to say that man was made in the miserable condition now besetting him. To Catholic theologians, however, the contrary appears to be certainly true not only from faith, but also from the evidence of reasons based on the order and the nature of God's justice, wisdom and goodness. In short, the theologians know the true cause of man's suffering, because they have divine revelation; the philosophers have not known that cause, since they did not have divine revelation, but they could have known that man was not created in his present state of suffering, if they had considered the principal Author of human nature. 24 The philosophers are to be excused for their ignorance of original sin, which is the historical cause of the moral misery of man. By not taking into account the principal Author of human nature, however, the philosophers did not go far enough in their endeavour to understand man's true condition. For this reason, they failed to see that the present condition of man is not his original condition; so they were mistaken in thinking that man came into existence in a state of misery. Hence, many things appearing to be unreasonable to the philosophers seem to be most reasonable to Christians. As the judgment of a man surpasses the judgment of a boy, Bonaventure says, so the judgment of a Christian surpasses the judgment of a philosopher, and the judgment of a man's reason turned toward things above him surpasses the judgment of a man's reason cast down to things beneath him. In that way, a Christian believes many things, such as the worth of complete continence, that appear unreasonable to a man under the sway of his animal powers.25 The third and last point to be taken from Bonaventure's doctrine on the defects of natural reason concerns the will and the sense appetites as they influence the judgment of the practical intellect. Any man, Christian or otherwise, who falls into error in his practical intellect because of a voluntary act originating from his disordered appetites is responsible for his error, because he is guilty of sin, even though his action may flow from a

24 2 Sent., 30.1.1, Resp. (2.715-16; ed. min., 2.737); cf. fa. 1-6 (2.714-15; ed. min., a-f, 2.735-36). 25 3 Sent., 23.1.1, ad 4 (3.472; ed. min., 3.463). Note the comparison: "Et quantum praecellit iudicium viri iudicium pueri, tantum praecellit iudicium viri christiani iudicium unius philosophi et iudicium rationis sursum conversae iudicium rationis ad inferiora depressae ... quia credit aliqua quae videntur esse irrationabilia homini animali: sunt enim rationabilia homini spiritual!."

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

801

non-culpable ignorance. This kind of error is clearly distinguished by Bonaventure from the purely cognitive errors in the speculative intellect. A man may err in the speculative order, but without moral fault, by failing to consider a thing sufficiently according to its principles and causes. A failure of that sort in the practical order involves a moral fault only if the resulting ignorance becomes a cause of sin. Consequently, moral responsibility for error includes the guilt of sin, which requires an act of the faculty of freedom of choice. But every man has this natural faculty; so, using it rightly, he can avoid the kind of error resulting from sin. Because it is very difficult to exclude that kind of error, the grace of Christ and the infused moral virtues, especially charity, are necessary to offset the effects of original sin in the will and in the sense appetites. This necessity entails the concomitant necessity for an illumination of faith to know the truth about the redemptive and reparative work of Christ. Founded on His medicinal grace, faith and charity are needed to reform the faculty of freedom of choice by rectifying the powers of reason and will with a view to the Christian way of life and the reward of eternal salvation. Since a man cannot have the virtues of faith and charity unless he assents freely to the revelation of God, a responsible Christian falling into ignorance or error concerning the objects of faith and charity cannot be without fault or sin. The greatest fault of all is the erroneous ignorance of a heretic, who sins by turning himself voluntarily away from the truth of Catholic faith. The affected ignorance and the crass ignorance of Christians not wanting, or too lazy, to act according to their faith are not as culpable as the fault of a heretic; but they are sinful in proportion to their cause, which is an unwillingness to be guided along the way of salvation, though it has been freely entered upon by those Christians. All the faults and errors involving sin have to do with the right order of human life, whether Christian or not; so they affect man's freedom of choice, including his sensitive potencies. On this question, as we have already seen, Bonaventure notes that the philosophers do not use sensuality to designate the sensitive potencies of man. Scripture uses sensuality to signify the sensitive part of man as it is in a sort of rebellion against his rational part because of original sin, which was unknown to the philosophers.26 With regard to freedom of choice, Bonaventure teaches that the philosophers consider the faculty as it is the principle of moral life according to the rule and dictate of the natural law; but the theologians consider freedom of choice as it is the principle of meritorious works depending on grace, which is known by Catholic faith. Although the works of men without grace seem praiseworthy, nevertheless, to the theologians, all those works are in vain with respect to eternal life; but this consideration is beyond the ability of the philosophers.27

26 Cf. 2 Sent., 24.2.dub.3, Resp. "Ad illud..." (2.588; ed. min., 2.609); text cited above: n. 3, p. 324. 27 2 Sent., 25.1.dub.l, Resp. "Ad illud ..." (2.607; ed. min., 2.626).

802

CHAPTER NINE

In Bonaventure's doctrine, then, there are different ways of considering freedom of choice, particularly with regard to sin and error. The philosophers do not know how God is offended by sin and how it weakens the power of man's potencies. As a consequence, the philosophers think that a man can become just by his own actions, as he becomes unjust by departing from right reason. Aristotle, for instance, says that an immoral man, whose actions are changed for the better, either will progress toward virtue or is restored perfectly in the virtue opposing his former vice. 28 A heretic, having some sort of faith, knows that God is offended by sin, which is the cause of dammation. In his blindness, however, the heretic does not take into account how his nature is weakened by sin. Thus, in his erroneous ignorance, he thinks that his freedom of choice does not need to be restored by any healing grace, because God's gratuitous mercy is sufficient to remit sin through the suffering and death of Christ. According to Bonaventure, this position is contradictory: on the one hand, it is necessary for God to remit sin in order to restore freedom of choice; on the other hand, it is not necessary for the sinner to make a voluntary act to have his freedom of choice restored. But God is a just judge; so, in remitting sin, He requires something on the part of the sinner, who is to be reconciled to God by turning away from sin. Catholic theologians know from their faith and the authority of Scriptue that sin is offensive to God and damning to the sinner. He is no longer in God's service, while God's image in the soul of the sinner is deformed because of his sin. The theologians maintain, therefore, that a sinner's freedom of choice, to be restored to order, needs God's grace not only according to His gratuitous will and the merits of Christ, but also according to an infused habitus removing the man's sin and reforming the image of God in the man's soul. Hence, the restoration of a sinner's freedom of choice requires a voluntary act on his part. 29 It is very evident that Bonaventure distinguishes the order of human life according to nature from the order of life according to Christian faith and charity. He attributes to the philosophers a proper ability to know the order of human life as it ought to follow the rule and dictate of the natural law. He also attributes to them a sufficient freedom of choice to act in accordance with their knowledge of the natural law, so that, acting rightly, the philosophers can avoid the kind of error resulting from sin. Accordingly, the science of moral philosophy is sufficient without an illumination of faith to direct a man in his freedom of choice toward things that can be known and be done within the limits of the natural law, which is the proper boundary of human reason in the order of nature. Because the philosophers are nescient of original sin, they are invincibly ignorant of its effects, as effects of sin. Because the philosophers are also nescient of sin as offensive to 28 2 Sent., 28.1.1, Resp. "... habitum restituitur." (2.675-76; ed. min., 2.696); cf. Aritotle, Etkica mean., 2.1 (1103al4-1103b25). 29 Lx. cit., Resp. "Haeretici vero ..." (2.676; ed. min., 2.696-97).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

803

God and as injurious to their powers of operation, the philosophers do not know that natural virtues cannot remove sin or restore to perfection a sinner's freedom of choice. There is reasonable cause, then, to excuse the philosophers for their ignorance of the order of human life as it is affected by sin. Their moral philosophy is sufficient, nevertheless, to make known to them what is right and wrong according to the natural law. It is not their science of philosophy which is at fault, therefore, but the men who erred because of their violation of the natural law, or because they abused their faculty of freedom of choice. That faculty can also be considered by the Christian, whether he is a theologian or a philosopher. As a theologian, the Christian considers freedom of choice as it is reformed by the grace of Christ and as the principle of meritorious works carried out with a view to eternal salvation. The consideration of freedom of choice by a theologian proceeds principally according to the lumen of faith to which he subjects the lumen of reason, so that he subordinates to his belief whatever he knows by philosophy about freedom of choice. In that way, the Christian theologian has a very different understanding than the philosophers of freedom of choice. The theologian, relying on his Christian faith, has an understanding enabling him to see where and why the philosophers erred in their considerations of the moral life of man. On the other hand, knowing the necessity for faith and charity to rectify freedom of choice, the theologian is also able to see the reasons why the philosophers are to be excused, or not excused, for their errors; on the same ground, he can point out and refute the opinions of those men who are in error concerning the order of the Christian way of life. As a philosopher, the Christian considers freedom of choice as it is the principle of right order in the moral life of man according to the law of his nature. Although the Christian philosopher is assisted in his consideration by a lumen of faith, nonetheless, this assistance brings about the perfection of his science only in an extrinsic manner, because his consideration, as a philosophical one, is directed formally by the natural lumen of reason to the truth of moral life as it is ordered by the natural law of man. While the philosopher, as a Christian, also knows the truth of moral life as it is ordered by the law of grace, even so, he is directed formally to that truth by the lumen of faith according as he assents freely to God for His own sake as the first truth. Now, as Bonaventure teaches, two formally diverse considerations cannot be undertaken at the same time with respect to one and the same object: therefore, whether or not a natural truth of moral life forms part of divine revelation, the Christian philosopher simply cannot consider such a truth in a formally Christian way and, at the same time, in a formally philosophical way. In other words, his philosophical consideration cannot be directed formally to a truth because it is Christian, or revealed; his philosophical consideration can be directed formally to a truth only because it is knowable by natural reason. If one and the same truth is both Christian and knowable by natural reason, the Christian philosopher,

804

CHAPTER NINE

as a Christian, can do no more than take account of the truth in a material way with regard to his philosophical consideration of it. But this is to be guided in his thinking by the lumen of faith with a view to arriving at the natural truth the Christian wants to know in his philosophy by the lumen of reason. It is in the order of final causality and not of formal causality, therefore, that a truth known by faith determines a truth that the Christian knows by his philosophy. The three points taken from Bonaventure's doctrine on the defects of natural reason lead to the following conclusions. Because of original sin, an illumination of faith is necessary principally to perfect the practical intellect in order that we may know the way to salvation, the ultimate end of human life, and the meritorious use of human freedom. An illumination o faith is necessary, because of original sin, to perfect the speculative intellect to the extent that the truths of natural things, particularly with reference to God, are required to uphold the essential objects of belief. Those truths, as revealed by God, are not subject simply to the speculative intellect. They are in the speculative intellect inasmuch as they are true; but they are also in the practical intellect inasmuch as they are believed freely for the sake of God, who is the first truth. The act of belief is subject formally to the will, which is perfected through charity. In this respect, the act of faith is a loving and meritorious adhesion to God, so that He is believed for His own sake, because He is the first truth. In the course of nature, the speculative sciences of philosophy are indifferent to the way of salvation, as the natural image of God in man is indifferent to His acceptance or non-acceptance. Again, in the course of nature, the sciences of moral philosophy can make known sufficiently the truth of human virtue and the true order of moral life according to the principles of the natural law. Consequently, Bonaventure does not posit any necessity for an illumination of faith, either in the speculative order or in the practical and moral order, to bring forth a philosophy that would be formally or intrinsically Christian. He posits the need for an illumination of faith to perfect the human intellect in order that the philosopher, proceeding formally according to natural reason, may think inerrantly about those truths, both speculative and practical, pertaining at once to reason and faith. Bonaventure sees the necessity to posit an illumination of faith in that extrinsic way because of the blindness and ignorance inflicted on the human intellect as a penalty for original sin. This penalty has caused the philosophers to err on many things, especially in the practical and moral order; but they are not responsible for any errors resulting directly from the nescience caused by original sin. The philosophers, in common with all other men, are to be held accountable for the errors that they make as a consequence of their own sins. Our examination of Bonaventure's doctrine, thus far, has been confined to his early writings. The question facing us now is whether or not he teaches the same doctrine in his late writings. To answer the question, we shall have to consider the parts of his late writings where he presents a

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

805

theological critique of the errors of the philosophers. His first text on the subject is found in the context of an explanation of men's obligation to worship God. All men are bound to worship God and, in consequence, they are forbidden to fashion and to worship idols. Commenting on this prohibition, Bonaventure says that every error is a figment of the mind: error is caused by the darkening of reason as it is overshadowed by the senses, thus making something which is-not appear to-be. There are three sources of error. The first is the immoderate undertaking of philosophical investigation producing in the philosophers such errors as the eternity of the world and the unity of the intellect in all men. To posit an eternal world is to pervert the whole of Scripture and to deny the incarnation of the Son of God. To posit one intellect in all men is to say that Christian faith has no truth and that there is no human salvation, so that there is no personal immortality for arty man. He who fabricates, defends or maintains such falsehoods, Bonaventure teaches, errs most grievously, because he fashions false gods. The second source of error is the perverted understanding of Scripture in the heretics, who speak evilly of the Trinity and of the Holy Spirit. The third source of error is the inordinate love of carnal things, such as the love of bodily pleasures causing the errors of the Epicureans, who say that there is no other life beyond the present life. All these errors, whatever their source, ought to be abominated as false gods causing men to depart from the worship of the true God. The men who are guilty of those errors have become foolish, as Scripture says: "Every man is made foolish by his science" (ferem., 10.14). Applying the text to the philosophers, Bonaventure holds that they have been made foolish by going beyond the proper bounds of philosophical investigation, an error standing in the way of faith and opposing the worship of the true God. In a closing statement, Bonaventure remarks: "When I was a student, I heard that Aristotle posited the world to be eternal. When I heard the reasons and arguments brought forward for this, my heart began to beat and I started to think: 'how can this be?'; but now these (reasons and arguments) are so plain that no one could be in doubt about it."30 This closing statement of Bonaventure has to be taken as it stands and in its proper contest. As the statement stands, it is not an admission of a superficial knowledge of Aristotle's doctrine on the eternity of the world that Bonaventure had in his early years as a theologian. On the contrary, the statement refers explicitly to Bonaventure's years as a student when he heard the reasons and arguments of Aristotle in positing that the world is eternal, a doctrine causing Bonaventure, as a student, to ask how this could be. To hear Aristotle's reasons and arguments implies that Bonaventure, 30 ColL de praec., 2.24-28 (5.514-15). Note the passage: "Audivi, cum fui scholaris, de Aristotele, quod posuit mundum aeternum; et cum audivi rationes et argumenta, quae fiebant ad hoc, incepit concuti cor meum et incepit cogitare, quomodo potest hoc esse? Sed haec modo sunt ita manifesto, ut nullus de hoc possit dubitare." — Loc. cit., 2.28 (5.515).

806

CHAPTER NINE

when he was a student in the Faculty of Arts at Paris, attended readings in the writings of Aristotle on the question of an eternal world. This is in keeping with the data that we have on the possibility of Bonaventure hearing public readings of that sort, for Roger Bacon gave public readings in the Libri naturales and in the Metaphysica of Aristotle at the Faculty of Arts during Bonaventure's time there as a student.31 Bonaventure is testifying, then, to his deep distress in coming to know, when he was a student, the doctrine of Aristotle on the eternity of the world. The last part of Bonaventure's statement refers to the reading of the Commentaries of Averroes on the writings of Aristotle in the Faculty of Arts at Paris when, in 1267. Bonaventure made his statement. This part of the statement, taken in its context, is a reference to the no longer doubtful implications of Aristotle's doctrine as it was then interpreted by the masters in Arts, following Averroes, who is solely responsible, according to Bonaventure, for the erroneous opinion of one intellect in all men. Although Bonaventure in a later text, as we have seen, excuses Aristotle on philosophical grounds for his error on the eternity of the world, nevertheless, in this particular text, all the errors mentioned by Bonaventure are considered on theological grounds, where he attributes the errors in question to the men, whether philosophers or heretics, and not to their knowledge or science. In his theological judgment, those errors have come, as it were, from fashioning false gods. As a consequence, any man committing, defending or maintaining errors of that sort is responsible for them, because he is going against the virtue of religion. In particular, the philosophers have erred by their immoderate undertaking of philosophical investigation, thus going beyond the proper bounds of inquiry belonging to their science. Returning to this fault, Bonaventure considers it according to the teaching of Scripture: "Think always of the things that God has commanded you, and do not be curious about the greater part of his works" (Ecclesiaticus, 3.22). Commenting on the text, Bonaventure says that it applies especially to learned men. The text teaches them to think of useful things and to shun idle curiosity. The useful things are those directing us on the road to salvation, whereas curiosity dissipates our intelligence by drawing us away from the road to salvation. A great part of our intelligence is wasted because of curiosity, Bonaventure adds, and yet nothing is more precious to us than our intelligence. We grieve much in losing money, but we ought to grieve far more in losing our intelligence, because nothing is as dear to us the act of our intelligence. 32 31 Bonaventure was a student in the Faculty of Arts from 1236 to 1243, when he entered the Faculty of Theology, where he was a student up to 1248; in that year he commented on the Gospel of St. Luke and, from 1250 to 1252, he commented on the Sentences of Lombard. See: J. G. Bougerol, Introd. s. Bonav., pp. 239-41. Roger Bacon gave public readings, in the writings of Aristotle that we mentioned, in the Faculty of Arts at Paris from 1241 to approximately 1245. For the data on this see: F. Van Steenberghen, La pkilas. au Xllle siide, pp. 143-44. 32 Coll. depraec., 5.1 (5.522-23). Note the full text of Scripture to which Bonaventure refers: "Altiora te

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

807

The errors for which Bonaventure holds the philosophers responsible, as going contrary to the virtue of religion, result from their undue curiosity in pursuing their sciential investigations. The philosophers have erred by failing to give God from piety the worship that is His due as the Creator of the universe. But the Christian has the greater obligation to worship God from piety, as Bonaventure shows in his description of the gift of piety. Summarizing his earlier doctrine, Bonaventure states that piety is divine worship and Christian piety is true wisdom. Divine worship consists most of all in revering God with fear, thus obliging the Christian to think about God in the loftiest and most pious way. If he thinks that God cannot create all things from nothing, a Christian does not think very loftily of God's power. A Christian thinking that God cannot know intimately everything in the universe is not thinking very loftily of God's wisdom. A Christian who thinks that God cannot restore human bodies thinks evilly and not loftily of God's power and wisdom. If a Christian does not believe that God in His mercy grants grace, pardon and beatitude to men, he is not a worshipper of God. To think piously about God, a man must think of God, who is the supreme good, as the first and supreme origin of all things. As a river flows naturally toward the sea, which is its origin, so the rational creature reformed through grace and acting from piety seeks its origin by turning toward God through His image in the rational soul. Since God makes His truth known only to those men acting from piety, a man not acting that way cannot attain the origin of truth, because God conceals His revelation from the impious. To be a true student, Bonaventure counsels, a Christian must have piety: to know God according to piety is to know God in a salvific way.33 Bonaventure's description of the impious Christian shows very clearly that he has in mind the masters in the Faculty of Arts in Paris who are teaching the doctrine of Averroes. They do not think loftily or piously about God, and so they are not true worshippers of God, because they defend and maintain the errors and falsehoods of Averroes. Bonaventure refers again to those Christian philosophers in his subsequent comparison of Christian science, which is theology, with philosophical science.34 He goes on here, as we shown before, to describe the philosophical sciences and the Christian science of theology as gifts of God. That done, Bonaven-

ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris; sed quae praecepit tibi Deus, ilia cogita semper, et in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus." (Ecctesiasticus, 3.22). 33 Coll. de donis, 3.5 (5.469); 3.17 (5.472-73). The principal features of piety given here by Bonaventure are the same as those in his earlier writings: worship of God, benevolence and beneficence toward men as images of God; natural piety is perfected by the reformation of the soul through grace, and so the Christian religion is the proper foundation for affective wisdom: Op. cit., 3.6-16 (5.469-72). 34 "Claritas scientiae philosophicae est magna secundum opinionem hominum mundialium, parva tamen est in comparatione ad ciaritatem scientiae christianae. Claritas vero scientiae theologicae parva videtur secundum opinionem hominum mundialium, sed secundum veritatem magna est." — Op. cit, 4.3 (5.474).

808

CHAPTER NINE

ture repeats his observation that philosophy is considered to be great by wordly men. At this point, he says that the greatness of philosophy can be eclipsed by the foolishness of men, if they interpose anything between philosophy and God, who is the sun of justice. Once again citing Scripture: "Every man is made foolish by his science" (/erem., 10.14), Bonaventure holds that science is an occasion and not the cause of men's foolishness. The Christian putting his trust in philosophy, esteeming himself because of it, and believing himself to be the better for it, is made foolish when he believes that, without the lumen of faith, he can apprehend the Creator. Such a Christian is like a man trying to see the sun by the light of a candle. Although a Christian may acquire a knowledge of truth in every branch of rational philosophy and moral philosophy, nonetheless, unless he takes account of what he knows by faith, he cannot know the true nobility of the rational soul, nor can he know the true rite of divine worship. What man, Bonaventure asks, can know the true rite of divine worship by natural philosophy? Even though a man has the sciences of physics and metaphysics, which make known to him the highest substances, he cannot rest in them without falling into error, unless he is assisted by the lumen of faith, so that he believes God to be one and triune, the highest and the best in power according to the ultimate influence in goodness. If the man believes otherwise, he believes very foolish things concerning God: to attribute to a creature what is proper to God is to blaspheme and to be guilty of idolatry; this is to be said of a man, for instance, who attributes to the creature a divine simplicity, or any such attribute that belongs properly to God. Because the philosophers did not have the lumen of faith, their science was the occasion of their ruin casting them down into darkness. Bonaventure concludes here with the statement, which we have noted before: "Philosophical science is a way to the other sciences; but the man who wills to stand there falls down into darkness.35 There is, then, according to Bonaventure, a truly Christian science, which is theological science, but not philosophical science. He says very explicitly, moreover, that a man's science is an occasion and not the cause of his folly.36 The folly of the Christian philosopher defending and maintaining the errors of Averroes is not caused by philosophical science, but by the failure of the Christian philosopher to take due account of his faith in expounding the opinions of Averroes. Giving way to self-esteem, or pride, the Christian philosopher refuses to be guided in his philosophical thinking by the lumen of his faith. Thus, deliberately ignoring what he knows to be true by divine revelation, he acts with impiety toward God by stopping voluntarily at the view of natural things, particularly concerning God, given by Averroes, who has said what the Christian knows to be erroneous or 35 Op. at., 4.12 (5.475-76). 36 "leremias: 'Stultus factus est omnis homo a scientia sua', scilicet occasionaliler, non causaliter." — Lac. at., (5.475).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

809

false. Furthermore, the Christian should know from his faith that the philosophical sciences, though containing what is certainly true, cannot make known the truth of God or of His effects in the full and perfect way that the truth is known by revelation. Consequently, the lumen of faith is a twofold guide for the Christian philosopher: it guides him to the truth of his philosophical science by making known to him what God has revealed concerning the same things that he seeks to know by the lumen of reason; the lumen of faith also guides the Christian in such a way that, giving due worship to God, he will not go beyond the proper bounds of reason in his philosophical investigations. The guidance of the lumen of faith, therefore, ensures that the philosophy of a Christian is a true philosophy conforming to the proper needs of human reason. Hence, it is a perfectly philosophical science, not a Christian philosophy, that the Christian forms with the help of his lumen of faith. Because the non-Christian philosophers lacked the lumen of faith, they did not have the advantage in truth that the Christian now has. In their endeavours to discover the truths of natural things and of their causes, however, non-Christian philosophers sometimes went beyond the proper bounds of their science by seeking to know, from an uncontrolled curiosity, what they simply could not know by their natural reason alone. As a consequence, their philosophical sciences occasioned, but not caused, the errors resulting from their immoderate investigations. Bonaventure describes the errors in question, which are three in number, in a subsequent text warning the Christian thinker to beware of them. The first error is the eternity of the world. Founded on a false understanding of motion and time, the error opposes the truth of God as the cause of being by taking away from Him the power to create all things from nothing. The second error, founded on the movement of the stars, is that all things turn out according to the necessity of fate. According to this opinion, which is opposed to the truth of God as the source of understanding, a man born under this or that sign of the zodiac will be of necessity good or evil. As a consequence, the man has no freedom of choice, no merit and no reward in beatitude. What is the good of liberty of choice, Bonaventure asks, if a man must do from necessity whatever he does? Would it not follow also that God is the origin of all evils? Though it is true that the stars have some influence on earthly bodies, nevertheless, God alone is the principle of the rational soul and the source or origin of its understanding. The third error has to do with the unity of the human intellect arid is based on the opinion that there is only one intelligence, which is a separate intelligence, for all men. This particular error, opposing the truth of God as the order of life, includes the other two, and so it is the worst error of the three. To say that the human intellect is one in all men is to negate the truth of their personal distinction and individuation, because the human intellect has a distinct being in each man, who has his own principles of distinction and individuation. Besides, it is impossible for one created intelligence to illuminate all the intellects of men, because God alone can illumine the mind of any man. In Bonaven-

810

CHAPTER NINE

ture's judgment, the Christian thinker must steer clear of all three errors as totally false and contrary to the truth of Sacred Scripture, Christian faith and every wisdom.37 In our next text, Bonaventure speaks about the errors of mundane wisdom. He is speaking in the context of a description of the gift of wisdom: "Savor the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth" (Col., 3.2). The first part of that passage, Bonaventure says, exhorts us to raise our minds up to heavenly and invisible things, while urging us to . raise our hearts toward eternal things; the second part exhorts us to turn our minds away from earthly and corruptible things, while urging us to direct our hearts away from temporal things. Bonaventure then cites the following passage: "Do not glory, and do not be evil, against the truth ... this is not the wisdom descending from above, but an earthly, animal, diabolical wisdom" (fas., 3.14-15). Commenting on the passage, Bonaventure teaches that a man is earthly to the extent that he delights in the affluence of riches; he is animal according as he delights in sensual experiences, and he is diabolical in as much as he takes delight in the pompous ambition to have secular power, for pride is the root of all evils. These three sorts of mundane wisdom have been destroyed by the death of Christ, who has taught us to beware of them. The Apostle Paul teaches the same thing: "Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? It pleased God by the foolishness of our preaching to save those who believe ... the foolishness of God is wiser than men." (1 Cor., 1.20-21, 25). By selecting poverty, Christ has destroyed the earthly wisdom of riches. By choosing the bitterness of suffering, Christ has destroyed the animal wisdom of sensual pleasures. By willing to be despised and to be put to shame, Christ has done away with the diabolical wisdom of pompous ambition for secular power. While the death of Christ has shown the vanity of mundane wisdom, which He teaches us to spurn, His resurrexion and ascension show us true wisdom, which He teaches us to desire as He moves us to love the fount of life. The true wisdom, then, comes down from above to illumine our minds in truth, to rejoice our hearts in love, and to strengthen us in all our works. Aristotle says that wisdom has the greatest delights; but it is a far greater thing, Bonaventure says, for the Christian to rejoice in the love of his first principle. 38 Bonaventure is contrasting here in the language of Scripture the true wisdom coming from Christ, by the Holy Spirit, with the false and mundane wisdom found in foolish men dominated by their disordered appetites. The mundane wisdom to which Bonaventure refers is a foolish way of life and not the practical wisdom of philosophy, which is a true knowledge of the right way of life according to the natural law. In showing the folly of mundane wisdom, Bonaventure speaks only in a general way of men whose

37 Op at., 8.16-19 (5.497-98). 38 Op. at., 9.2-7 (5.499-500); cf. Aristotle, Ethica mcom., 10.7 (1177al2-1178a8).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

811

lives are summed up in a vain pursuit of riches, sensual pleasures and pompous ambition. In his next and last work, returning to this mundane wisdom, he speaks in a particular way of certain masters in Paris who, teaching falsehoods, are going back to the darkness of Egypt by impugning Christ's life and Christ's doctrine. Bonaventure speaks out against those Christian thinkers in a way that he has never spoken about any of the nonChristian philosophers. He describes them as men having a spirit of carnality and cupidity, who turn other Christians away from the common and spiritual good of the Church, thus casting them, into darkness. Manifesting a malign and cruel spirit, these Christian masters are envious and full of wrath. In their envy, they turn every good into evil; in their wrath, they turn every evil into good and they reckon as good the very doing of evil. Such Christians, Bonaventure says, are not fit to hear God's law, for "they put darkness as light and light as darkness" (Is., 5.20). Moved by a spirit of presumption and curiosity, they neither acknowledge the greatness of God nor do they praise Him; though they shine out in their science, they show no piety toward God. They make nests of wasps having no honey, when they should be making beehives filled with the sweet honey of Christian piety. For his own part, Bonaventure says that he speaks among his brothers, or men of the Church, who are spiritual men; so he wants to draw them away from mundane wisdom toward Christian wisdom. 39 The Christian wisdom described here by Bonaventure is a theological wisdom, not a philosophical wisdom. To possess Christian wisdom, as we have seen, a man must start out from Christ and, through His mediation, attain an understanding of truth in all the sciences. Thus, the philosophical sciences are to be conjoined to Christian faith by the theologian through the mediation of Christ, who is the medium of theological understanding. It is in this context that Bonaventure speaks of the error of the Christian masters who believe that the world is eternal, even though they know by their faith that the contrary is true. They have fallen into error because of the immoderation of their philosophical investigations and of their inordinate love of the creature; as Lucifer lost his knowledge of truth, so those Christians have tasted the fruit of the tree of good and evil, which has become the occasion of their death, or the loss of eternal life. 40 Bonaventure 39 Coll. in Hexaem., 1.6-9 (5.330; Delorme, pp. 3-4). Note the passage: "... sed loquendum est fratribus ... et viris spiritualibus, ut a sapientia mundana trahantur ad sapicntiam christianam." (1.9). "Sed viris ecclestiasticis et spiritualibus est loquendum, ut magis ac magis versus sapientiam christianam trahantur." (Delorme, p. 4). The Delorma version, differing from the critical edition, does not mention here the masters against whom Bonaventure speaks: "Praecessit enim impugnatio vitae Christi in moribus per theologos, et impugnatio doctrinae Christi per falsas positiones per artistas." (1.9). Neither does the Delorme version have some of the strong language of the critical edition; for instance: "Sunt canis et porcus. Canis enim semper est cupidus et nunquam communicare volens, porcus autem semper in Into vult." (1.6). 40 Op. cit., 1.10-17 (5.330-32; Delorme, pp. 4-7); see above: pp. 612-13. It is here that the Delorme version, referring to the masters in Arts, has the expression: "errorem philosophantium caecorum" (p. 6).

812

CHAPTER NINE

goes on here to show how Christ is the theological medium of the various sciences; in doing so, he refers now and again to the particular dangers confronting the Christian who, in his sciential thinking, departs from Christ, for He is also the medium of salvation and humility, a virtue that He exemplified on the Cross. Bonaventure speaks most of all of the death and resurrexion of Christ as confounding the sophistical and destructive arguments of Satan inviting Christians, engaged in rational philosophy, to eat the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge, thus going beyond the proper bounds of their science by idolizing the image of God in the rational soul.41 Bonaventure's hostility, in this work, is directed very plainly against the Christian masters who, in their impiety, are disrupting the peace and harmony of the Church by defaming the life and doctrine of Christ, who is the Head of the Church. In a text containing Bonaventure's strongest terms concerning mundane wisdom, he denounces the Christian masters who prefer the false and sinful charms of that wisdom to the true love of Christian wisdom. Speaking in a way that his audience understands, he says that the Jews were not willing to hear wisdom from the mouth of Wisdom; we have Christ within us, but we are unwilling to listen to His wisdom. It is the greatest abomination, Bonaventure exclaims, that the king's most beautiful daughter, who is Christian wisdom, is offered to us as our bride and we would rather be coupled, or find our delights, in lust with the ugliest maiden, who is mundane wisdom or mundane philosophy. 42 The next consideration by Bonaventure of the errors of the nonChristian philosophers is the long account of them that we have presented in a previous chapter, where we have seen how he shows that the philosophers could have attained certain knowledge of God and His effects according to the science and wisdom of human philosophy. 43 There are three points, however, that we should note here regarding this consideration of Bonaventure. The first point has to do with his appreciation of natural reason as a gift from God. Showing a truly Christian evaluation of natural

41 Of. fit., 1.18-38 (5.332-35; Delorme, pp. 7-18). 42 Op. cit., 2.7 (5.337; Delorme, p. 23). Note the passages: "... nos habemus Christum intra nos, et nolumus audire sapientiam eius. Abominatio maxima est quod filia regis pulcherrima offertur nobis in sponsam, et potius volumus copulari ancillae turpissimae et meretricari ..." Delorme: "... nos autem habentes Christum non adimus delectamurque magis in amplexu ancillae sapientiae mundialis et philosophiae quam dominae." Bonaventure is not saying here that philosophy, or philosophical wisdom, is a meretricious maiden by comparison with Christian wisdom; rather, he is saying that the false and erroneous opinions paraded mertriciously as a wisdom and a philosophy by impious Christians are alluring men away from the true doctrine of Christian wisdom, which must be preferred by the faithful followers of Christ, as a noble virgin does better to marry the king rather than to marry a peasant: "Melius enim est subesse superiori, quam superesse alicui inferior! ... melius nubit virgo nobilis, cum contrahit matrimonium cum rege, cui subest, quam cum contrahit cum rustico, cui praesit" — 3 Sent., 5.2.2, ad 2 (3.133; ed. min., 3.128). 43 See above: pp. 614-26.

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

813

reason, Bonaventure says that man has nothing without the natural lumen of reason, neither faith nor grace nor the lumen of wisdom. 44 The second point touches the cause why many of the philosophers fell into error. According to Bonaventure, they erred because of the pride that they took in their science, even though they were trying to divide themselves from the darkness of ignorance. 45 The third point concerns the nescience of the philosophers, particularly the Platonists, who acquired a true wisdom of philosophy. To the extent that they were invincibly ignorant of Christ and of His healing grace, those philosophers are excused by Bonaventure for their errors on human virtues and the sinful condition of man along with his true beatitude.46 It will suffice for our purposes to look at only two more texts in Bonaventure's final work. The first text is taken from his consideration of the fruit of Scripture in so far as it refreshes the human intellect in truth. Bonaventure shows how Scripture refreshes the intellect with the spiritual food of faith as it is exemplified in the lives and deeds of the Patriarchs, Prophets and Apostles; but, most of all, Scripture refreshes the intellect with the fruit of the life, deeds and doctrine of Christ. 47 That done, Bonaventure points out that Scripture also refreshes the intellect with food for thought in the different kinds and natures of things that God has created in the universe. Having shown how those things give rise to the various sciences and disciplines of human reason, such as the liberal and the mechanical arts, Bonaventure says that the theologian uses those sciences and disciplines as an arithmetician, an astronomer, a geometrician, a rhetorician and a physician. But there is a danger for the theologian in using the human sciences, as there is danger for a boy in wandering away 44 "Per primam [visionem] intelligitur, ad quid potcst extend! nostra intelligentia de se. Haec inteltigitur per primam diem, in qua 'facta est lux* (Gen., 1.3); unde in Psalmor 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine' (4.7). Sine isto lumine indito nihil habet homo, nee fidem nee gratiam nee lumen sapientiae; et ideo divisa est etiam lux a tenebris." — Coli in Hexaem., 3.25 (5.347; cf. Delorme, p. 44). 45 "Unde dicit Psalmus: 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine' (4.7). Et his possent explicari omnes difflcultates philosophise. Philosophi dederunt novem scientias et polliciti sunt dare decimam, scilicet contemplationem. Sed multi philosophi, dum se voluerunt dividere a tenebris erroris, magnis erroribus se immiscuerunt: 'dicentes enim, se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt' (Rom., 1.22); superbientes de sua scientia, luciferiani facti. Apud Aegyptios densissimae tenebrae erant, sed Sanctis tuis maxima erat lux. — Op. cit., 4.1 (5.349; cf. Delorme, p. 48). 46 Op. cit., 7.4-12 (5.366-67; cf. Delorme, pp. 99-103); see above: pp. 623-25. We have also seen Bonaventure referring to some philosophers, such as Socrates, as true worshippers of the one God. Bonaventure describes the difference between the piety of a philosopher and a Christian in this way: "Ratio ergo dictat, quod de Deo altissimo est sentiendum altissime et piissime, quod ilia essentia est nobilissimo modo ... Sentiendum est etiam piissime, quod ilia essentia est origo omnium, creans omnes res, et quod immediate ab ipsa omnes res procedunt. Nisi tu sentias, quod total itas rerum ab ipsa procedit, non sentis de Deo piissime. Plato commendavit animam suam factori; sed Petrus commendavit animam suam Creatori." — Op. cit., 9.24 (5.376; cf. Delorme. nn. 23-25, pp. 123-24); cf. 9.25-29 (5.376; Delorme, pp. 124-25). 47 Op. cit., 17.1-19 (5.409-12; Delorme, pp. 194-99).

814

CHAPTER NINE

from his home. The further away the theologian gets from his true home, which is Scripture, the greater is the danger that he will not find his way back; he may lose the way by studying too much in the human sciences, which are very diffused by comparison with the truth of Scripture.48 The second text is taken from Bonaventure's consideration of the fruit of Scripture as it deals with the right way and reason by which the theologian arrives at wisdom through science and sanctity. The wisdom that Bonaventure has in view is not a philosophical wisdom, but a theological and Christian wisdom founded on faith and formed by charity. To attain this wisdom, the theologian must put aside all vanity in seeking and in studying truth; so, in advancing from science to wisdom, he must travel along the road of sanctity and avoid taking an unholy delight in the experiences of his science. The theologian must, therefore, exercise self-discipline in his studies and, steering clear of pride and curiosity, must not dally in his scrutiny of natural things, because, if he does, he will become foolish by exchanging gold for tin. 49 To arrive at Christian wisdom, the theologian, or student, must observe four conditions. The first, which is our sole concern, is the proper order to be observed in using the sources of theological doctrine. They are, in the order of their priority, the books of Scripture, the writings of the Fathers, the commentaries or theological summaries of the masters, and the mundane doctrines of the philosophers. Any man wanting to learn a science, Bonaventure says, seeks the science in its fount, and this is Scripture for the science of theology. To learn theology, then, a man does not go first to the philosophers, because they have nothing to say about the remission of sins. Nor does he go first to the summaries of the masters, because they draw upon the original writings of the Fathers, who take their materials from Scripture, which is founded on faith. The student of Scripture ought to be a disciple of Christ; to know Christ and His doctrine, the student must be thoroughly at home in the books of Scripture. Keeping to his proper capacity, the student should fill his mind with the water of the literal sense of Scripture, so that the Holy Spirit can convert it into the wine of the spiritual sense of Scripture. A man cannot understand the spiritual sense of Scripture, however, unless he is helped by the original writings of the Fathers to whom the Holy Spirit has made known the spiritual meanings of Scripture. It is necessary for the theological student, therefore,

48 Lac. at., nn. 20-25 (5.412-13; Delorme, pp. 199-200). Note the passages: "... et de omnibus artibus liberalibus et mechanicis. Theologus modo eis utitur ut arithmeticus, morio ut astrologus, tnodo ut geometer; modo videbis eum rhetorem, modo medicum." — n. 24 (5.413); the Delorme version is almost exactly the same: p. 200. We have also seen Bonaventure speaking this way regarding moral philosophy: "Tertius radius veritatis illustrat ad morales iustitias secundum dictamen legum politicarum. Hie non debeo loqui sicut theologus nee sicut iurista, sed sicut philosophus loquitur." — Op. at., 5.14 (5.356). "Tertia huius radii erectio est ilium inatio ad morales iustitias secundum rectum dictamen legum politicarum. Nee sicut theologus vel decretista, sed sicut philosophus, loquor." — Delorme, p. 80. 49 Op. at., 19.1-5 (5.420-21; Delorme, pp. 212-14).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

815

to have recourse to those writings. But they are very difficult to master; so, to cope with them, the student must use the summaries of the masters. Since their summaries utilize the words of the philosophers, the student must know or learn the doctrines of the philosophers. There is, consequently, a threefold danger facing the theological student. The first and least danger is in going from Scripture to the writings of the Fathers, who speak more ornately than Scripture. The second and greater danger is in moving from the Patristic writings to the summaries of the masters, who are sometimes in error and, though they believe that they understand the Fathers, contradict the Patristic writers. The third and greatest danger consists in descending to the level of philosophy. It is here that Bonaventure refers to Jerome suffering before the tribunal of God, because he lost his taste for Scripture after reading Cicero: this is a warning to Christian masters not to commend or to prize the sayings of the philosophers, lest they be an occasion for God's people to return to the darkness of Egypt; or lest the examples of the masters cause their students to forsake the 'waters of Siloe' and their supreme perfection for the waters of the philosophers and their eternal deception.50 There are some masters, Bonaventure continues, who lap the waters of philosophy with their tongues, like dogs, but they manage to drink only a little of philosophy. There are other masters, bending their knees, who are bowed down so completely to the waters of philosophy that they are curved toward endless errors. Now the water of philosophy is not to be mixed with the wine of Scripture in such a way that the wine becomes water, which would be the worst of miracles. Rather, following the action of Christ, the theologian should turn the water of philosophy into the wine of Scripture; in that way, he can prove the truth of faith, not by reason, but through Scripture and the miracles of Christ. Observing the proper order of sources, then, the true Christian begins with Scripture to which he subordinates the writings of the Fathers; similarly, to their writings, he subordinates the summaries of the masters to which he subordinates the books of the philosophers. The Christian should take only what he needs from the philosophers and never stand still in their doctrines. He should not conceal the waters of philosophy, as thought it were an idol; nor should he allow the waters of Scripture, giving life, to go down to the sea of death, but he must bring them back to their first origin. 51 In these texts Bonaventure is talking specifically about the Christian theologian and theological student. In the first text, he says explicitly that the Christian theologian uses the human sciences; in using them, he observes their proper principles and methods. The Christian theologian uses 50 Lac. cit., nn. 6-12 (5.421-22; Delorme, pp. 214-17); see above: n. 7, p. 789. 51 Lac. cit., nn. 13-15 (5.422; Delorme, pp. 217-18). The other three conditions to be observed are perseverance, delight and moderation in studying Scripture: nn. 16-19 (5.422; Delorme, pp. 218-19). Bonaventure concludes with a description of the sanctity required by a theologian to advance from science to wisdom, which demands especially the virtue of humility: nn. 20-27 (5.422-23; Delorme, pp. 219-22).

816

CHAPTER NINE

the philosophical sciences and, in using them, he follows their principles and methods as Bonaventure himself does on the integral ground of his theology. Thus, though he is a Christian theologian, Bonaventure proceeds as a philosopher as often as it is necessary for him to use a philosophical science in his search for reasons to make intelligible the object of belief. Proceeding that way, Bonaventure is a Christian philosopher; but his philosophy conforms properly to the principles and the methods of the philosophical sciences. Consequently, though he is helped and guided by his Christian faith, Bonaventure develops a science which is intrinsically and formally philosophical, but not Christian, and yet it is the philosophy of a Christian, who develops it on the integral ground of his theology. Again, in the first text, Bonaventure warns of the danger facing the theologian moving too far away from Scripture, which is his true home, by engaging too much in the human sciences. Bonaventure returns to this in the second text, where he talks about the way that the theologian must proceed to attain Christian wisdom, which is a theological wisdom founded on faith and formed by charity. The order of procedure described here by Bonaventure, regarding the sources of theological doctrine, is the same in every respect as the one given in his early writings. The dangers that he sees facing the theologian in going from Scripture to the other sources of his science are not new, for we have met them before, though in a different form, in his early writings. With regard to the Fathers, for instance, we have seen Bonaventure showing how their seemingly erroneous or contradictory opinions are to be interpreted according to piety. With regard to the masters, we have seen him departing from the unacceptable opinion of Lombard that the human soul in itself is a person, an opinion having erroneous consequences for the personal nature of Christ's body in the tomb. The dangers on the philosophical level are described here by Bonaventure more vividly than before, not because he now realizes more than before the dangerous nature of philosophy, but because he is aware of the dangerous situation in Paris, where some Christian masters are reversing the proper order of sources by going to philosophy before they go to Scripture, thus abusing both philosophy and Scripture by attempting to explain Christian faith according to natural reason. The actions of those masters, turning the wine of Scripture into the water of philosophy, illustrate the very dangers of which Bonaventure speaks. By their actions, the masters have fallen down in idolatry before the waters of philosophy; as a consequence, they have fallen down into endless errors, which have been occasioned, but not caused, by philosophical science. Bonaventure does not condemn philosophical science in any way. On the contrary, as a Christian theologian, he insists that philosophy be so subordinated to Scripture that the water of the one be changed into the wine of the other. This is precisely what Bonaventure himself does on the universal ground of his theology in transforming the truth of philosophy by the truth of Christian faith. The object of his denunciation is not the science of philosophy, but the Christian

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

817

masters who have falsified the truth of philosophy and distorted the truth of Scripture. Referring again to those masters, Bonaventure compares them to the Scribes, who failed to recognize Christ because of their curiosity, and so they condemned Christ himself (/«., 9.29-34). Bonaventure also compares the masters to Adam, who was cast out of paradise for eating the fruit of the tree of life: by keeping strictly to the words of the philosophers, the Christian masters are perpetuating the strict observance of the letter of the Old Law by the Scribes; sharing with them the fruit of the tree of good and evil, the masters in question have been blinded and can no longer recognize Christ, because they have turned away from His doctrine by relying on their own reason. But the men who love Scripture, Bonaventure says, also love philosophy in order that, through it, they may strengthen Christian faith. Philosophy is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, however, because falsehood has been mixed up with the truth. If a man emulates the philosophers, he asks: 'how could Aristotle be deceived?' Such a man does not love Scripture, and so he necessarily falls away from the Christian faith. If a man says that the world is eternal, he knows nothing about Christ; if he says that there is one intellect in all men, that there is neither a felicity after this life nor a resurrexion of human bodies, he has eaten the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thus depriving himself of the Christian faith. When learning the things belonging to philosophy, therefore, Christians ought to flee from everything contrary to the doctrine of Christ. Scripture teaches: "If any man opens and digs a pit, but does not cover it, and an ox or an ass falls into it, the owner of the pit shall pay the price of the beasts" (Exod., 21.33). The Holy Spirit is not speaking here, Bonaventure comments, simply of a material pit. He speaks of the pit of error opened by a man making what is false appear to be true, and who fails to cover his pit by not resolving the doubts introduced by the reasons given by him to support his falsehoods. Any master causing his students to fall into such a pit is bound to make restitution to them. He is the sort of man who, knowing nothing, sets himself up as a master of science, but brings forth errors. Though Scripture is especially deep and difficult, he wills to settle the mystery of the Trinity through philosophy, but he does not know what he is saying. A man desiring to know the Trinity ought to be experienced, or to seek the help of someone who is experienced, in the science of Scripture, because he must walk in the simplicity of faith. 52 There is no fundamental difference between the late and the early writings of Bonaventure with respect to his doctrine on the defects of natural reason and the errors of the philosophers. He stresses more in his 52 Sermo, Domin. I/I Adven., n. 2 "Quid dicemus ... propter curiositatem." (9.62-63). Note the sentence: "Qui diligunt sacra Scripturam diligunt etiam philosophiam, ut per earn confirment fidem; sed philosophia est 'lignum scientiae boni et mali', quia veritati permixta est falsitas." (9.63).

818

CHAPTER NINE

late writings, speaking theologically, than in his early writings the personal responsibility of some non-Christian philosophers for the particular errors that they made because of pride and curiosity, which they manifested by the immoderation of their philosophical investigations. Never at any time does Bonaventure find fault with or condemn philosophical science, which he loves and treasures as a gift of God, though it is a smafl gift by comparison with theological science. He finds fault with the philosophers who, falling into error, have falsified the truth of philosophy, which was the occasion but not the cause of their downfall. It is the philosophy that has been falsified, particularly Aristotle's by Averroes, that Bonaventure opposes so vehemently in his late writings. He opposes it as especially dangerous for the Christian in view of the very great harm being done in Paris by certain Christian masters who, in their pride and presumption,, manifest impiety toward God not only in proclaiming as true according to reason what they know to be false according to faith, but also in deliberately leading Christian students into error by distorting the truth of Scripture while falsifying the truth of philosophy. In opposing the mundane wisdom and philosophy of those masters, Bonaventure, as a theologian, is fulfilling his obligation of Christian piety by drawing their students away from the pitfalls of error toward the true road to Christian wisdom. On the other hand, fulfilling his obligation of Christian piety toward God, who is the author of all truth, Bonaventure is unwilling to overlook the mistakes that he finds in the philosophy of non-Christians themselves. At the same time, in his benevolence and beneficence, Bonaventure excuses them as much as possible for their mistakes, which they have made in great part because of the penalties inflicted on human nature for original sin. The Christian masters, however, knowing the fall of man and its consequences, should have followed the guidance of their faith in their philosophical thinking, and so they would have recognized and avoided the errors of nonChristian philosophers. Ignoring their faith, the masters fell, in Bonaventure's view, into the error of idolizing both natural reason, though they knew that it was suffering from original sin, and a mundane philosophy, which they should have known to contain falsehood mixed up with the truth. If the Christian masters had followed the guidance of their faith, they would not only have been able to philosophize as Christians, but would also have been able, as a result, to remain so true to their philosophical science that they could have removed the errors falsifying its truth, thus doing a service to their students by presenting to them a true science of philosophy. This does not mean that the Christian, having a true philosophy, has a Christian philosophy. It means, rather, that the Christian is able, because of his faith, to arrive at the truth of philosophy in a more perfect, but natural, way than the non-Christian. As grace perfects but does not destroy human nature, so the lumen of faith perfects but does not displace the natural lumen of reason, which is able to act in a perfectly human way because it is rectified by faith, just as human nature is restored in its own order by the perfection of grace.

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

819

Thus, the philosophy constituted by Bonaventure himself on the integral ground of his theology is a truly philosophical doctrine depending properly on the natural lumen of reason. Though his philosophical thinking is perfected by his Christian faith, his philosophical doctrine is neither a Christian science nor a Christian wisdom. The Christian character of his doctrine, therefore, is confined clearly to his theological knowledge. This conclusion is inescapable from the evaluation of natural reason by Bonaventure in both his early and his late writings. He himself indicates as much in his description of Christ as the one to be honoured, heard and questioned as our principal master. Christ is to be honoured by us in following His words and in imitating His actions. He is to be heard with the humility belonging to faith, so that we may understand His words and obey Him in our actions. Christ is to be questioned from a desire to learn the truth and not from a curiosity or a disbelief putting Him to the test, as the Scribes questioned Him (Matt., 12.38-39). Questioning Christ from a studious mind, the theologian will learn from Him the truth of science, the holiness of discipline, and the goodness consisting in the benevolence of charity. As a ministerial master, then, the theologian ought to teach under the magisterial office of Christ. Ordering his life and teaching according to Christ, the theologian ought to seek the truth of faith, to keep Christ's commands and counsels, and to be benevolent in charity toward God and men. All Christian theologians, though they hold different views and follow various ways to the truth, ought to be united in charity and, sharing the gift of science, ought to concur in their opinions while standing together in the one truth taught by Christ. Hence, united through Christ, Christian theologians should avoid the dissension caused by differences of opinion, arising from presumption, and ending in despair of finding the truth. Relying on Christ, who is our one master, Christian theologians will be taught by Christ, as He can teach them by sending them His Holy Spirit {/«., 16.13). ^ We are led to the conclusion from Bonaventure's texts that the Christian character of his doctrine belongs, not to his philosophical knowledge, but to his theological knowledge, which is founded on faith, formed through charity and regulated by piety. His theological knowledge is developed with the assistance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, who is the author of Scripture and the source of every truth. Honouring God in the Christian religion, Bonaventure gives natural truth its due place in the constitution of his theological doctrine. Reforming natural knowledge according to Christian faith, he transforms the truth of the one by the truth of the other on the universal ground of his theology. In making this transformation, he reverses the consequence of original sin, which brought about the ignorance causing the philosophers to err in their thinking concerning the moral con-

53 Chris, urns amn. magis., nn. 20-28 (5.572-74; ed. min., 5.304-07).

820

CHAPTER NINE

dition of human nature and the exercise of human freedom. At the same time, Bonaventure transposes the natural indifference of philosophical speculation into a devout and Christian contemplation of God and of His effects. As a result, he makes the speculative knowledge of philosophy pleasing and acceptable to God, as grace makes pleasing and acceptable to God the naturally indifferent image of God in the soul. Both the speculative and the practical knowledge of philosophy, therefore, are transformed by Christian faith within the theology of Bonaventure. The question to be answered now is whether the name Christian philosophy can be applied to Bonaventure's philosophy as it is transformed by Christian faith within his theology. Christian Transformation of Natural Knowledge

Our question can be answered very readily by following the journey of the Christian soul to God, as Bonaventure describes the journey in his Itinerarium mentis in Deum. He describes it according to a sixfold illumination disposing the soul to go to God from creatures in the peace of Christian wisdom and with a most ardent love of Christ.54 The journey passes through six stages, which Bonaventure likens to the rungs of a ladder standing between heaven and earth. Identifying the ladder with Christ, Bonaventure organizes the stages of the journey according to the threefold substance of Christ. According to His corporeal substance, the soul is illumined in the first stage to know God from corporeal creatures and, in the second stage, to consider God in corporeal creatures, which are His vestiges. The two stages, constituting the exterior part of the journey, depend chiefly on the sense powers. According to Christ's spiritual substance, the soul is illumined in the third stage to know God from His image in the soul itself and, in the fourth stage, to consider God in His image as it is reformed by grace. These two stages constitute the interior portion of the journey; so they depend principally on reason and intellect. The soul is illumined, according to Christ's divine substance, to know God in the fifth stage from the name of His essence, which is being; in the sixth stage, the soul considers God in His goodness, which is the name of the Trinity. Those two stages are the superior parts of the journey, and so they depend primarily on intelligence and the peak of the mind, including the will. Turning to his analogy of the mirror, Bonaventure says that the soul, knowing God from His effects, knows God from the mirror of creatures; in this way, God is known as the first principle of all things. Considering God

54 Itiner., Pro!. (5.295-96; ed. min., 5.179-81). The sixfold illumination of the soul is based on the six wings of the Seraph that appeared, in the form of Christ crucified, to Francis of Assisi on Mt. Alverna in 1224; Bonaventure made a pilgrimage to Mt Alverna in October 1259, and it was this pilgrimage which provided the occasion for his Itinerarium.

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

821

in His effects, the soul considers God in the mirror of creatures; in that way, the soul knows God as the final end of all things. The six illuminations, or rungs of the ladder, direct the soul ultimately to the peace and repose of an ecstatic contemplation of the Supreme Good, which is the Trinity. Now, when man was first created, he was able to attain the peace of contemplation. By his sin, however, Adam caused the penalties now afflicting men with ignorance and concupiscence. Hence, blinded and bent down in darkness, we cannot attain the peace of contemplation without grace and justice, which overcome concupiscence, nor without science and wisdom, which dispel the darkness of ignorance. Since those remedies can be obtained only through Christ, then, to attain contemplation, our whole soul must first be rectified and reformed by the grace and truth of Christ. Consequently, to possess Christian wisdom, the soul must have the justice and science depending on grace, which is the foundation of the rectitude of the will and of the illumination of the mind. 55 The journey to God described by Bonaventure is unquestionably a theological wayfaring, or a distinctively Christian pilgrimage to God. There are, nonetheless, many philosophical elements incorporated by Bonaventure in his illuminative way to God. We have referred on several occasions to those philosophical elements; so it will be sufficient for our present purpose simply to show how Bonaventure transforms them by Christian faith. To show this, we shall follow him throughout the six stages of his journey to God. In the first stage, he passes from the mirror of the whole corporeal universe to its Creator, who can be known from His creatures, as they reflect His power, wisdom and goodness. These three attributes of the Creator can be known from creatures by contemplating their actual existence, or by believing their habitual passage in time, or by investigating their potential excellence in a reasonable manner. When things are contemplated in themselves, the power, wisdom and goodness of the Creator can be understood from their reflexions in His creatures, which resemble God as His vestiges, for example, by their substance, potency and operation. When creatures are considered according to faith, the origin of the world manifests God's power, the course and times of the world manifest His wisdom and providence, while the end of the world makes known His goodness and justice in the final judgment. When creatures are investigated in a reasonable manner, their being, corporeality and mutability

55 Op. at., 1.1-8 (5.296-98; ed. min., 5.182-85). It was not the illumination of natural reason that man lost because of Adam's sin, but an infused knowledge and contemplation of God, which are now restored to us through Christ; but we must do our part to obtain them: "Expone: 'mulier', anima rationalis, 'habens decem drachmas', id est decem illuminationes, quarum tres principales, scilicet naturalis, moralis et rationalis, et quaelibet istarum habet tres ... et ultra istas est decem illuminatio, scilicet cognitio divina. FA istam cognitionem anima rationalis amisit ... Quia igitur anima rationalis istam decimam drachmam, scilicet divinae cognitionis et contemplationis, amiserat. ideo quaerit earn modo historice, modo allegorice, modo tropologice, modo anagogice, quousque earn inveniat." — Sermo, Epiph., n. 3 (9.159).

822

CHAPTER NINE

make it known that God in His power, wisdom and goodness is the being which is purely spiritual and completely immutable. Bonaventure expands his consideration of God's power, wisdom and goodness from seven different aspects of their reflexions in creatures: the first aspect is taken from his belief in the creation of the universe as recorded in Scripture; the next five aspects are taken from his philosophical knowledge of the natures, properties and operations of corporeal things, while the seventh aspect is a combination of his knowledge of God's effects according to philosophy, Scripture and faith. This sevenfold consideration of God's attributes from corporeal creatures gives delight to the Christian soul.56 Using both natural and revealed knowledge, Bonaventure begins his journey to God from a natural knowledge of corporeal things, and then moves on to God from them as they are known by faith; thereafter, subordinating natural knowledge to faith, he arrives at a theological knowledge of God as the Creator or first principle of the corporeal universe, which reflects in numerous ways His power, wisdom and goodness. Manifesting the influence of the Holy Spirit, Bonaventure's sevenfold consideration of the reflexions of the divine attributes in corporeal things corresponds to the first seven days of the world. His first consideration, dealing with the Scriptural account of creation, corresponds to the first day; his five following considerations, dealing with corporeal creatures in themselves, correspond to the next five days, and his seventh consideration, having to do with the order of things both natural and revealed, corresponds to the day on which God took His rest. The first stage of the journey, then, is part of a theological way to God as the Creator of the universe. God is known by philosophy and then by faith, each on its own ground, but the one is transformed by the other, so that, at the end of the stage, God is known in a truly theological manner. Bonaventure follows a similar pattern in the second stage, where he contemplates God in His vestiges as they manifest His essence, potency and presence. To contemplate God that way, the human mind must know corporeal things through the senses. Showing how the mind acquires knowledge through the senses, Bonaventure presents a summary of his philosophical doctrine on the five kinds of corporeal substances, each kind corresponding to one of the five exterior senses by which it is apprehended, an operation completed by the common sense. Each of the exterior senses, perceiving its object by a similitude, is so proportioned to its object by means of the similitude, Bonaventure shows, that the sense power has a delight in apprehending the object. He attributes a similar delight to the interior senses as they perceive their objects by

56 Itiner., 1.9-14 (5.298-99; ed. min., 5.185-87). Note: "Qui igitur tantis rerum creaturarum splendoribus non illustratur caecus est; qui tantis clamoribus non evigilat surdus est; qui ex omnibus his effectibus Deum non laudat mutus est; qui ex tantis indiciis primum principium non advertit stultus est." — Loc. cit., n. 15 (5.299; ed. min., 5.187).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

823

means of similitudes, which are the immediate ground for the abstraction of spiritual similitudes by the intellective potency. Appealing next to faith, Bonaventure says that the similitude generated by the object and, impressed on the sense organ, directing the power to the object itself suggests clearly the Similitude generated by the Father and, united to a human nature, bringing man back to their formal Principle. Likewise, the proportion established by the similitude between the sense power and its object suggests that there is a supremely perfect proportion in God between the Father and his Similitude, which is the Word, so that the source of true delight is seen to be in God, to whom every other delight leads us. The same truths of God are made known more immediately and more certainly in the operations of the intellective potency. In showing this, Bonaventure gives a philosophical account of the judgment of the intellective potency, which abstracts similitudes from every limitation of time, place and mutability, thus judging its objects with certitude through their eternal reasons in God, who is seen to be eternal, uncircumscribed and immutable. God is also seen, in the operations of the intellect, to be the principle of all things, the infallible rule of all knowledge, and the light of truth by which every judgment is made; therefore, God's essence is known as the form producing all things, conserving all knowledge, and distinguishing every kind of truth. Bonaventure, going to Augustine, expands his consideration of God in the operations of the intellect according to seven different sorts of number, taken as seven steps to the Creator, so that He may be seen in all things. By this means and appealing to faith, Bonaventure shows how all things, having a proper proportion to number, are beautiful and give delight by taking the mind to their one exemplar, which is the Wisdom and Word of the Father.57 Summing up the first and second stages, Bonaventure says that they are the two parts of the journey taking the man of contemplation and of wisdom to God from the corporeal world in which the Creator is seen as its first principle, who is most powerful, most wise, and the best. Corporeal creatures resemble God as His vestiges in such a way that even a man who is unlearned can be taken from his knowledge of corporeal things to see God in them, because all corporeal things are, as it were, signs pointing the way to God. Bonaventure then combines five different modes in which corporeal things point the way to God: two modes are taken from philosophy, two are taken from Scripture, and one is based on faith. In conclusion, Bonaventure states that men who are unwilling to advert to God in His visible effects are inexcusable when they do not know, praise and love Him. 58 57 Op. cit., 2.1-10 (5.299-302; ed. min., 5.187-92). See in St. Augustine: De vera rslig., 40.74-76 (PL 34.155-56); De musica, c. 6 (PL 32.1161-1194). 58 Itiner., 2.11-13 (5.302-03; ed. min., 5.192-93). Note: "Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod 'invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur' (Rom., 1.20); ita ut qui nolunt ista

824

CHAPTER NINE

The third stage of the jouney proceeds from the natural image of God in the rational soul. Bonaventure refers to this stage as an entering within the mind, where the image of the Trinity is resplendent. Again using his philosophical knowledge, he speaks of the mind knowing and loving itself, so that the soul, as a natural image of the Creator, can arrive at God from the operations of its potencies. The memory, supporting the intelligence, retains cognitive species extending from the past into the future, thus taking the soul to the eternity of God. The intellective potency perceives the meaning of terms, propositions and conclusions; so this potency takes the soul to the eternal truth. The will relies on the counsel and judgment of the intellective potency; therefore, desiring what is good, the will draws the soul to the supreme good. Turning to faith, Bonaventure points out how the order, origin and relations of the three potencies give the soul a knowledge of the three persons in the Trinity: as the memory generates a word in the intelligence and the two potencies are connected by the love that they produce in the will, so the Father generates his Word, who is the Son, and they are connected by the Love that they produce, who is the Holy Spirit. 59 To see God this way from His image, the soul has the help of the threefold illumination of the philosophical sciences perfecting it in truth and representing the Trinity. Natural philosophy, seeking the cause of being, leads the soul to the power of the Father. Rational philosophy, searching for the source of understanding, takes the soul to the wisdom of the Word. Moral philosophy has to with the order of life, and so it directs the soul to the goodness of the Holy Spirit. Bonaventure then suggests ways in which the three branches of each of those sciences can lead to the Trinity from God's image in the soul. In natural philosophy, for example, metaphysics points to the Father as the first principle, mathematics points to the Son as the figure and image of the Father, and physics directs the soul to the Holy Spirit as the gift of the power and operation of the Father and the Son. All nine philosophical sciences, Bonaventure concludes, have certain and infallible rules descending as rays of illumination into the human mind from the eternal light. The human mind is so illuminated by those rays that it can, unless it is blind, be drawn from itself to contemplate that eternal light. In considering the eternal light and its irradiation on the soul, wise men are rapt in admiration, but fools are thrown back in confusion, because they do not believe in order that they may understand. 60 Bonaventure has now completed the first half of the journey to God. On completing it, he tells us explicitly how the philosophical sciences are an

advertere et Deum in his omnibus cognoscere, benedicere et amare, 'inexcusables sint' dum nolunt transferri 'de tenebris in admirabile lumen Dei' (1 Cor., 15.57)." — Loc. cit., n. 13 (5.303; ed. mia., 5.193). 59 Op. at., 3.1-5 (5.303-05; ed. mm., 5.193-98). 60 Loc. cit., nn. 6-7 (5.305-06; ed. min., 5.198-99). Note: "Huius autem lucis irradiatio et consideratio sapientes suspendit in admirationem et econtra insipientes, qui non credunt, ut intelligant, ducit in perturbationem ..." — Eo. loc., n. 7 (5.305-06; ed. min., 5.199).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

825

aid to the Christian in his considerations and contemplation of the Trinity. The Christian uses those sciences according as they assist him in his understanding of God as He is known through faith. There is, then, according to Bonaventure, a Christian use of philosophy within the order of faith. This Christian use of philosophy, however, does not produce a Christian philosophy. It produces, rather, a theological understanding of the object of belief. Bonaventure's own understanding of that object is attained by his thinking about the Trinity with the help of philosophy, so that, in conceiving his knowledge of the Trinity, he transforms philosophy by his Christian faith, thus permitting him to formulate his thought in a theological way depending principally on faith and secondarily on philosophy. As a Christian understanding of truth, therefore, his knowledge of the object of belief is formally theological and not philosophical. In order to use philosophy in his theological thinking, Bonaventure first proceeds in a formally philosophical way, as he proceeds in showing that the soul is a natural image of God. Although he presents his philosophical knowledge with a view to its Christian use in his theological thinking, even so, taken on its own ground, his philosophy is not formally Christian, but the philosophy that a Christian develops for the specific purpose of employing it in subordination to his faith on the universal ground of his theology. Hence, Bonaventure's philosophy is not developed here simply for its own sake, but for the sake of understanding God and His natural effects according to natural reason, so that God and all His effects, both of nature and of grace, can be contemplated by uniting reason and faith in a distinctively Christian and theological wisdom. 61 The fourth stage of the journey consists in a contemplation of God in His image as it is reformed by grace. Connecting this stage with the preceding one, Bonaventure says that there are so many men immersed in the life of the senses that very few men actually contemplate God from His image in the soul, because they do not overcome the seductions of concupiscence and the clouds formed by phantasms. Those obstacles to contemplation can be surmounted only through Christ, who has restored what was lost by original sin. No matter how much a man may be illumined according to nature, or how much he may know by an acquired science, he cannot enter the fourth stage of the journey without Christ, who is the gateway to true wisdom. The contemplation of God in His image, therefore, requires the reformation of grace and its accompanying virtues of faith, hope and charity. Bonaventure shows here how the Christian is directed by those virtues to contemplate the Trinity, through Christ our Mediator, in the image of God as it is restored by grace. The Christian is directed by faith to Christ as the uncreated Word and our source of truth; he is directed by hope to 61 The passages that we have noted concerning men who, through their own fault, do not know God from creatures show that, in Bonaventure's judgment, they can know God from creatures by the natural power of reason alone.

826

CHAPTER NINE

Christ as the inspired Word, who is our life, and he is drawn by charity to Christ, the incarnate Word and our way to the Father. When the soul of a Christian has been purified, illumined and perfected by the three theological virtues, he can then advance up the ladder of wisdom to a mystical contemplation of God through Christ, who is the Hierarch of the Church on earth and in heaven. To pass through the fourth stage of the journey to God, Bonaventure says, the Christian is helped principally by Scripture, just as he is helped by philosophy in the third stage. Dealing chiefly with human salvation, Scripture speaks especially of the theological virtues, which reform the soul. Scripture speaks most especially of charity toward God and one's neighbour, and our exemplar of charity is Christ. Bonaventure closes his exposition of this stage with an outline of the many ways that Scripture, presenting to us Christ and His Church, teaches us to live the life of Christian virtue, so that we may arrive at the peace and joy of contemplating God in His many works of grace.6' The two last stages of the journey are its superior parts, taking the mind above itself to contemplate God from His being, or essential properties, and in His goodness, or the personal properties of the Trinity. The fifth stage, taking the mind to the divine being, relies particularly on the Old Testament, which teaches the truth of the unity of the divine essence: "I am, who am" (Exod., 3.14). Following the Old Testament, John Damascene considers being as God's first name. The sixth stage, taking the mind to the divine goodness, relies on the New Testament, which makes known the three divine Persons: "... baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt., 28.19). Following Christ, who said: "No one is good except God alone" (LA:., 18.19), Dionysius considers good as the first name of God. Thus, according to Bonaventure, the first name of God in the Old Testament is being; but the first and principal name of God in the New Testament is goodness.63 Describing the fifth stage of the journey, Bonaventure says that a man who wants to contemplate the unity of the divine essence must first fix his attention on the divine being. Bonaventure, using his philosophical knowledge, shows how the divine essence is the most certain in itself, so that it cannot be thought not to-be. In showing this, he demonstrates that whatever a man knows he knows only by the divine being. Bonaventure then adverts to the blindness of the man who does not consider that which he first sees and without which he cannot see. The human mind can be so concerned with created beings that it does not rise up to see being itself: the mind is so accustomed to the darkness of creatures and of their phantasms 62 Itiner., 4.1-6 (5.306-07; ed. min., 5.199-203). In summing up stages three and four, Bonaventure first states that the third stage takes the mind to God from the natural potencies of the soul; he then recapitulates the principal steps of the fourth stage: nn. 7-8 (5.307-08; ed. min., 5.203). 63 Op. at., 5.1-2 (5.308; ed. min., 5.203-04). Cf. St. John Damascene, Defide orthod., 1.9 (PG 94.835); Dionysius, De din. nomin., 4.1 (PG 3.694).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

827

that, on seeing the being of the supreme light, the mind seems to see nothing at all, because it does not understand that the divine cloud is the supreme illumination of the mind itself. When the mind of a man can see the divine being, however, he can understand from the imperfections of creatures the perfections of the divine essence. Thus, thinking that the divine being cannot have any imperfection whatsoever, the man can understand that the perfections of the divine essence belong to one only being. Hence, knowing that the divine essence cannot be thought not to-be, he knows that being is the first name of God, who is the summit of perfection. Bonaventure, considering the essential properties of God goes on to show from them that God is the one beginning, exemplar and end of all things. That done, he compares creatures to their Creator and concludes, from his comparison, that God must be posited as their one, supreme and perfect cause.64 Making the transition to the sixth stage, Bonaventure says that being is the radical principle of our contemplation of God's essential properties, whereas good is the deepest and principal foundation of our contemplation of the personal properties of the Trinity. To enter the sixth stage of the journey, then, the Christian must know that the very best good is simply that than which nothing better can be thought. Bonaventure, speaking philosophically, indicates that this good is the sort that cannot be rightly thought not to-be, because it is altogether better to-be than not tobe. Consequently, speaking theologically, Bonaventure maintains that we cannot think rightly about God unless we think of God as one and triune. Bonaventure explains this according to the principle that good is selfdiffusive: because God is the Supreme Good, there must be in God a selfdiffusion which is supreme in every respect; so there must be in God a supreme production by way of generation, which is the emanation of the Son from the Father, and a supreme production by way of spiration, which is the emanation of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son. Since God is the Supreme Good, the emanations of the Persons are supremely perfect in every way, and so the three Persons are one in substance and nature, but distinct in relation and origin. Having shown how the divine goodness is the principle of the emanations in the Godhead, Bonaventure, using the language of philosophy and of Scripture, describes the ways in which the properties of the three Persons ought to be contemplated. In doing so, he warns us not to think that we can comprehend those properties, because they are incomprehensible to us; he also indicates how we can best contemplate the Trinity, namely, in the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are sent to us and yet never depart from the Godhead. In particular, knowing that we ourselves are made in the image of God, we can contemplate the mystery and the marvels of the Trinity through Christ, "who is by nature the Image of the invisible God."65 64 Itiner., 5.3-8 (5.308-10; ed. min., 5.204-08). 65 Op. cit., 6.1-7 (5.310-12; ed. min., 5.208-11). Bonaventure finishes the journey with a brief

828

CHAPTER NINE

The second half of the journey to God has far less philosophical elements than the first half. The fourth stage has almost nothing from philosophy, while the fifth and sixth stages have some philosophical elements introduced by Bonaventure in order to unite them eventually to Christian faith in his theological thinking about the Unity and Trinity of God. There is no problem, in this respect, with regard to the strictly theological nature of his thinking about the Trinity in the sixth stage of the journey. With regard to the fifth stage, however, there is a possibility of mistaking his thinking about the essential properties of God as a philosophical consideration of the attributes of the divine essence.66 The properties in question can, for the most part, be considered in a philosophical mode; but Bonaventure is thinking about them here as the essential properties of the divine being as the Essence of the Trinity. His thought about those properties is theological, therefore, because it is contained by the order of Christian faith, and so, including a Christian use of philosophy, his thinking depends principally on faith and secondarily on philosophy. Bonaventure's description of the second half of the journey to God, then, does not require any modification of the conclusion that we reached at the close of the first half, or the end of the third stage.67 We have been led to the conclusion that the name 'Christian philosophy' cannot be used in a proper or a formal way to designate Bonaventure's philosophical knowledge, whether it is taken on its own ground as a philosophical science and wisdom or as it is transformed by Christian faith within his science and wisdom of theology. It seems, therefore, that the Christian philosophy said by Bonaventure to consist principally in humility has to do with the Christian way of life nourished by the doctrine of Scripture and founded on the Christian religion. In other words, this Christian philosophy seems to be the true wisdom of the Christian religion, a wisdom said by Augustine to consist in the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity rooted in the grace of Christ. Apparently, then, Bonaventure's Christian philosophy is a theological outlook on human life and its dependence on God through the mediation of Christ. The question is, however, can this be confirmed in any way from Bonaventure's own texts? The best and quickest way to answer our question is to look at his texts on the virtue of humility, particularly as it pertains to Christian perfection, which is founded on the Gospel. In Bonaventure's

recapitulation of its six stages while stressing the indispensable mediation of Christ and the necessity to be reformed by His grace flowing from the Cross; he also insists that natural reason cannot attain Christian wisdom, which is truly a gift of the Holy Spirit, a gift possessed by Francis of Assisi and the Apostle Paul. Bonaventure's final words show very plainly that the end of the illuminative way to God is a mystical wisdom, which is a life of ecstatic love more than of knowledge; but the ultimate end is the peace and joy of eternal beatitude. Cf. Op. at., 7.1-6 (5.312-13; ed. min., 5.211-14). 66 Cf. Op. at., 5.5-8 (5.309-10; ed. min., 5.206-08). 67 See above: pp. 824-25.

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

829

view, the summit of the whole of Christian perfection consists in the virtue of humility, whose act is to hold oneself in little esteem, both exteriorly and interiorly, for the sake of God. Now the whole of Christian perfection is summed up in grace, justice and wisdom according as Christ is our way, our truth and our life. The gift of grace paves the way for justice, which has to do with action; the truth of justice leads to the taste of wisdom containing the solace of contemplation. When the Christian is perfect in grace, justice and wisdom, he can rise to the peak of evangelic perfection, which Christ has taught by His words and His example. Christ professed in a special way that He is our teacher of humility: "Learn from me, because I am meek and humble at heart" (Matt, 11.29). Humility is, consequently, the gateway to wisdom, the foundation of justice and the abode of grace.68 Humility is the gateway to wisdom because wisdom is a knowledge of the highest and first causes, Bonaventure says, not only in the speculative and intellectual order, but also in the order of love and experience. Since all things, no matter how they have come to-be, depend on one principle and are produced from nothing, that man is truly wise who recognizes his own nothingness, the nothingness of other things and the sublimity of God, the first principle. But no man can come to full knowledge of God unless he has a true and right knowledge of himself; nor can any man know himself without knowing his own nothingness: "Any man thinking himself to be something, whereas he is nothing, is deceiving himself (Gal., 6.3). To know one's own nothingness, Bonaventure says, this is to humble oneself and to open the gateway to wisdom: "Where humility is, there also is wisdom" (Prov., 11.2). Christ himself, who is Wisdom, tells us that His Father has "hidden these things from the wise and prudent, and ... revealed them to little children" (Matt., 11.25). The "little children" are men of humility, according to Bernard, who calls humility the "virtue by which a man, having true knowledge of himself, holds himself in little esteem ... for knowledge of truth consists in the summit of humility". 69 Humility is also the foundation of justice, which requires each man to give what is due to God and to a neighbour. Now, there is due to God both honour and reverence; but a man is disposed most of all by humility to honour and to revere God: "Great is the power of God alone, and he is honoured by the humble man" (Ecclesiasticus, 3.21). Since the beginning of all justice is the worship and honour of God, therefore, because those who are humble honour and worship God, humility is the root and foundation of 68 DPE, 1.1, Resp. "... habitaculum gratiae." (5.120). 69 Lac. cit., Resp. "Est ostium ... sapientiae participantur." (5.120-21); cf. St. Bernard, De gmd. humit., 1.1 (PL 182.941-42). Note the following: "Certe, quia oportet, quod homo incipiat ab humilitate ... Secundum quod dicit Philosophus: 'sapientia est cognitio causarum altissimarum'; originale autem principium est causa altissima. Si vis venire ad principium originale, quod est Deus, et ad principium, de quo tu es, quia es de nihilo; oportet, quod humilieris. Haec enim est sapientia prima. Oportet igitur, quod homo incipiat ab humilitate, qui vult addiscere sapientiam." — Sermo, S. Maria Magdalena, n. 1 (9.556); cf. Aristotle, Metaph., 1.1 (981b25-982al).

830

CHAPTER NINE

the whole of justice. Moreover, humility is the abode of grace, which makes pleasing to God that man who, possessing grace, knows himself to be unworthy to receive so great a gift from the Holy Spirit. Such a man, Bonaventure teaches, is truly humble: "On whom shall my Spirit rest, if not on him who is poor and lowly, of a contrite spirit, and who trembles at my words" (Is., 66.2). Because humility is the abode of grace, therefore, the summit of the whole of evangelical perfection consists in humility. This is the humility that Augustine, replying to the query of Dioscorus concerning the way of truth, describes as the precept containing every precept of the Christian religion. 70 Bonaventure, turning to the acts of humility, says that they consist, both interiorly and exteriorly, in holding oneself in little esteem. The reason for this is that there is in man a twofold nothingness: one is the opposite of the being that he has by nature; the other is the opposite of the being that he has through grace. Considering the first nothingness, which is in every creature, a man can have humility of truth. Considering the second nothingness, which is in man because of his faults, he can have humility of severity by which he, though dejected by his sins, censures himself severely through humility, thus holding himself in little esteem both in his own heart and in the eyes of other men. These interior and exterior acts of the virtue of humility, Bonaventure maintains, can be seen to harmonize with evangelical perfection, if the virtue is studied according to its origin, mode and fruit. The exterior act of humility arises from its interior act, which is based on the dictate and rule of a divine obligation. Acting according to the divine law, then, a man is rightly said to have humility when he conforms his will to the divine will. Having a proper mode, humility moves a man to act with manly vigour, truth and honesty; in that way, he avoids cowardice, hypocrisy and the dishonesty which makes men stubborn and foolish. The virtue of humility is the fruit, or product, of suffering humiliations: "you ought ... to wash one another's feet" (/n., 13.14). To wash another man's feet, a man has to lower himself to them, an act either producing humility or confirming in love a humility already possessed. Bernard describes humility as the foundation of the whole of the spiritual life; he says that, to

70 DPE, 1.1, Resp. "Est etiam ... necessitas cogeret'." (5.121-22). Note the citation from Augustine: "Non aliam tibi ad capessendam et obtinendam veritatem viam invenias, quam quae invents est ab illo qui gressura nostrorum tanquam Deus videt infirmitatem. Est autem prima humilitas, secunda humilitas, tertia humilitas, et quoties interrogares, hoc dicerem, non quod alia praecepta non sint, quae dicantur, sed nisi humilitas omnia, quaecumque bene facimus, et praecesserit et comitata et secuta fuerit, et proposita, quam intueamur, et opposita, cui adhaeramus et imposita, qua reprimamur, iam nobis de aliquo facto gaudentibus totum extorquet de manu superbis. Itaque, si interrogares et quoties interrogares de praeceptis Christianae religionis, non me aliud respondere nisi humilitatem liberet et si forte alia dicerem, necessitas cogeret" This text is very close to the Migne edition of Augustine's Epist., 118.3.22 (PL 33.442); there is no doubt that Bonaventure, knowing the original text of Augustine, substituted dhtiosatihm christiana for christiana religio to serve his own purpose in th etext cited bove, n. 9 p 789

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

831

desire humility, a man must be willing to suffer humiliations, because he cannot have humility unless he is ready to be humiliated and to endure opprobium, so that, in the end, he may be exalted and glorified in eternal life. It is clear, Bonaventure concludes, that to humble oneself and to hold oneself in little esteem for the sake of Christ are the work of a perfect virtue and a work harmonizing with the Christian religion and with Christian perfection.71 The doctrine of Bonaventure on the virtue of humility, as it pertains to Christian perfection and the Christian religion, contains all the elements of humility as it is said by him to be the principal part of Christian philosophy. In both instances, humility includes holding oneself in little esteem, worshipping and honouring God, and bearing with one's neighbour. Bonaventure teaches, furthermore, that humility is the gateway to a total wisdom, which is a distinctively Christian wisdom, and that it is the abode of grace, thus constituting humility as the summit of the whole of evangelical perfection and, as Augustine says, the precept containing all the precepts of the Christian religion. In view of Bonaventure's doctrine on humility as the summit of the whole of Christian perfection, which is founded on the Gospel, and in view of his statement that humility is the principal part of Christian philosophy, we conclude that the expression Christian philosophy, as Bonaventure understands it, designates the wisdom of the Christian religion, or a Christian wisdom founded on grace and its infused virtues. This is a wisdom nourished by the truth of Scripture, especially the Gospel of Christ. It is also a wisdom giving what is due according to Christian justice to both God and men. In short, Christian philosophy designates a truly Christian wisdonj, which is a theological outlook on human life, particularly with respect to the dependence of man on God, who gives him being from nothing, and especially with respect to our dependence on Christ, who gives us the being of grace to overcome the nothingness of sin. 72 71 DPE, 1.1, Resp. "Huiusmodi autem ..." (5.122); cf. St Bernard, Epist. ad Ogerium (87), n. 11 (PL 182.216-17). 72 Bonaventure's association of Christian philosophy with humility may be due to the influence on his doctrine of Bernard of Clairvaux, who also speaks of a Christian philosophy: "Spiritualis homo ille qui omne dijudicat, ut ipse a nemine judicetur, omne opus suum trina quadam consideratione perveniet. Primum quidem an liceat, deinde an deceat, postremo an et expediat Nam etsi constet in Christiana uti philosophia non decere nisi quod licet, non expedire nisi quod decet et licet non continue tamen omne quod licet, decere (aut) expedire consequens erit" —De consider., 3.4.15 (PL 182.767); cf. Sancti Bernard! opera, recensuerunt J. Leclercq et H. M. Rochais (Romae, Editiones Cistercienses: 1963), 3.442:20-25. This explains perhaps why Bonaventure has not used the text of Augustine, taking philosophy as a zeal or love of wisdom, on Christian philosophy as a true philosophy: "Obsecro te, non sit honestior philosophia Gentium, quam nostra Christiana, quae una est vera philosophia, quandoquidem studium vel amor sapientiae signiflcatur hoc nomine." Augustine's Christian philosophy is a pursuit of Wisdom, or Christ, and so it is a Christian way of life, or a love of truth; he shows here that there are many true things concerning virtue in Cicero, and yet "Haec ille dixit, qui nihil de primorum hominum vita, nihil de paradisi felicitate, nihil de corporum resurrectione crediderat Erubescamus interim veris disputationibus im-

832

CHAPTER NINE

There are two corollaries to our conclusion. The first has to do with Bonaventure's reference to Francis of Assisi as a perfect example of the humility pertaining to the perfection of the Christian way of life. The text that we have cited with the expression Christian philosophy is taken from one of five sermons of Bonaventure extolling the virtues of Francis, especially his humility. In another of those sermons^ Bonaventure speaks at some length of the humility of Francis and, in doing so, he refers once again to the reply of Augustine to Dioscorus. In this instance, Bonaventure uses Augustine's words in order to show that humility is the perfection of man, but especially of the Christian as exemplified by Francis. The reply of Augustine as indicated here by Bonaventure does not contain the words Christian philosophy, but the words summit of evangelical perfection. Finally, Bonaventure's description of humility, as he attributes it to Francis, is remarkably similar to his doctrine on the virtue that we have presented above.73 Our first corollary is, then, that the name Franciscan does not signify Bonaventure's philosophical knowledge as it is a science and wisdom depending on the lumen and principles of natural reason; nor does the name signify his philosophical knowledge as it is transformed by Christian faith within the science and wisdom of his theology. On the contrary, the name Franciscan designates the form of the Christian way of life, or of evangelical perfection, which is proper to the Order of St. Francis, and so the name signifies a special mode of religious life. 74

piorum, qui didicimus in vera verae pietatis sanctaque philosophic et contra spiritum carnem, et contra carnem concupiscere spiritum (Gal., 5.17)." — Contra Julianum, 4.14.72 (PL 44.774). 73 Sermo, De patre nostro Fransisco, n. 5.2 (5.594-97; ed. min., nn. 13-25, 5.406-13). Note the reference to Augustine: "Soli humiles Deum honorant, quia alii se ipsos volunt honorari, non Deum. Si igitur omnis nostra tustitia et totius christianae religionis summa in honorificatione Dei consistit, planum est, in humilitate esse abundantium iustitiam, et in abundant! iustitia virtutem maximam. Unde Augustinus ad Dioscorum quaerentem summam perfectionis evangelicae, respondit, sicut respondit quidam philosophus interrogatus, quid doceretur in rhetorica, respondit ille primo interrogatus, quod ibi doceretur eloquentia; interrogatus secundo, respondit eloquentia; interrogatus tertio, respondit eloquentia. Similiter Augustinus respondit: si quaeras, quae sit summa perfectionis evangelicae, respondeo humilitas; si secundo requiras, responded humilitas; et si tertio, respondeo humilitas ... Et Dominus interrogatus a discipulis, ut augeret eis iustitiam fidei, Lucae decimo septimo (vs. 10), respondit: 'Cum feceritis omnia, quae praecepta sunt vobis, dicite: Servi inutiles sumus, quod debuimus facere fecimus'." — Op. cit., n. 5.2 (5.595-96; ed. min., n. 18, 5.4Q9). On the authenticity of this sermon see the article by Ignatus Brady, O.F.M., in FS, 28 (1968), pp. 4-13. 74 'Qui descendit ipse est qui ascendit super omnes caelos, ut impleret omnia', ad Ephesos quarto (vs. 10) ... In verbis istis exemplo Christi, qui fuit liber et speculum et exemplar humani generis et totius evangelicae perfectionis, traditur Christianis et maxime Fratribus Minoribus forma religionis et salvationis; qui descendere et humiliari est via sive modus salutis sive bcatitudinis, qui (modus) est ascendere et elevari et donis salutaribus adimpleri." — Sermo, in Pentecos., n. 7 (9.336-37). If Bonaventure's doctrine is taken to be a Christian philosophy as this expression signifies the Christian way of life, then his doctrine could be called a Fransciscan philosophy, which would signify the Franciscan mode of the Christian life; but this would designate the spiritual theology of Bonaventure and not any special form of philosophy, • taken as his science and wisdom according to human reason.

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

833

Our second corollary concerns the extreme view that Bonaventure seems to take of human nature in his doctrine on humility and, as a consequence, in his Christian outlook on human life and man's dependence on God The point is: does Bonaventnre, as a Christian, in his doctrine on humility take an extreme view of human nature as something to be valued in itself, or for its own sake? We do not think so, even though he speaks of humility as the summit of the whole of evangelical or Christian perfection, so that the humble man holds himself in little esteem both in his own heart and in the eyes of other men. Defending his own point of view, Bonaventure says that the act of humility seems, on the surface, to be out of harmony with the natural instinct of man to seek his own good. A true understanding of human nature, however, shows that the act of humility harmonizes in several ways with human nature. Every created nature, because it originates from nothing, has an intrinsic imperfection. Manifesting this truth, every creature proclaims its natural condition of imperfection; so the humble man acknowledges his natural imperfections. Moreover, every creature is conserved in being by the unity of its component principles and the maintenance of its proper matter, both of which are necessary for the operations of its powers. A creature conserves its own being, therefore, by repelling as much as possible everything that can cause its dissolution. The humble man, likewise, preserves his unity in moral being by repelling the spirit of vanity and of pride. Every created nature, furthermore, advances in perfection by subjecting itself to the influence of a superior nature that can complete an inferior nature. Similarly, the humble man advances in perfection by submitting himself to the influence of God, who completes human nature by the gift of grace. Consequently, the act of humility is not contrary to human nature, even though the act of the virtue, which is founded on Christian faith, is above reason and transcends the bounds of nature.75 Insisting that humility is a virtue perfecting human nature, Bonaventure maintains that the act of holding oneself in little esteem is the true way to oppose hypocrisy; the act of humility is the perfect mean between the extreme of cowardice and the extreme of stubborness, or arrogance, which gives rise especially to pride. The virtue of humility is based on the truth of the divine law, which dictates that each man ought to think himself more than another man to be of little account. As each man is more aware of his own natural imperfections than he is aware of the imperfections of other men, so he ought to think about his own deficiencies more frequently and more closely than he thinks about the deficiencies of other men. He ought to take less account of himself, therefore, than of other men, not because he is certain that he is of less account than they are, but because he is more certain of his own defects and imperfections than he is of those in other men, who may very well have perfections that are

75 DPE, 1.1, ad 1 (5.122-23).

834

CHAPTER NINE

unknown to him. No man ought to put himself ahead of other men, then, by holding them in less esteem than he holds himself, for this would be to fall into pride, which opposes the reverence that a man ought to show from humility to those who are made in God's image. Hence, the act of humility is founded on an experiential knowledge of the truth of one's own defects and imperfections, and not on a false view of human nature. As an image of God, man is the noblest of His corporeal creatures, and so man is more excellent in nature than they are. In common with every creature, nevertheless, man has the imperfections accompanying all things that come to-be from nothing. Because man has been deformed by sin, however, he is in a less perfect condition than other corporeal creatures. Accordingly, as a sinner, a man ought to humble himself willingly in order that the effects of sin in him can be healed through the grace of Christ. 76 To hold oneself of little account in the eyes of other men is not necessarily a sign of the interior act of humility, which is to hold oneself of little account in one's own heart. The exterior act of humility, strictly speaking, is the sign of a willingness to be truly humble, and this ought to be found, as it is found, in every good man worshipping God from his heart. Thus, the religious man shows that he is willing to have humility, but not that he is humble. The virtue of humility, having its exemplar in God, is found perfectly in Christ. The divine exemplar of humility consists in this, Bonaventure says, that the virtue completes human nature by perfecting a man in such a way that, in his actions, he will not go beyond his proper bounds. But the divine exemplar of the virtue does not look either to the man's defects or to his subjection, for the sake of perfection, to the influence of a superior nature. The divine exemplar does not look to those elements of humility because there is neither a defect in God nor is there any nature superior to His nature. In order that man would not neglect to humble himself because of his defects, therefore, it pleased God to assume a human nature and, in this nature, to be humiliated, despised and held in small esteem. God has done that, Bonaventure teaches, in order that the rest of men, moved by the very great example of Christ, would be inflamed with love to hold themselves perfectly in little esteem.77 Our second corollary is, consequently, that Bonaventure does not take an extreme view, as a Christian, of human nature and of natural things in his doctrine on humility. Since he considers the peak of Christian perfection to consist in humility, his theological outlook on human life and man's dependence on God is not the view of a Christian extremist. Bonaventure's

76 Loc. at., ad 3-4, 6-7 (5.123-24); cf. ad 8-10 (5.124). 77 Loc. at., ad 11-14 (5.124). Considering virtue as an order of love, Bonaventure says that this order requires a man to prefer God before every creature: the greatest obstacle to that act is the personal and individual good of a man's own nature; therefore, to maintain the proper order of love, a man ought to take little account of his own nature, even to the extent of subjecting himself for the sake of God to the authority of another man: ad 2 (5.123); cf. ad 15 (5.124).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

835

view of man, including his twofold nothingness, and of the intrinsic value of human things, is taken from Scripture, particularly from the Gospel, which teaches the truth of human nature and the true worth of human things as they are in the sight of God. Looking at man from that point of view, Bonaventure takes account of the divine image in man, of his natural defects as a creature coming to-be from nothing, and of the deformity caused in human nature by original sin. Bonaventure teaches, as a consequence, that human nature is to be honoured because of its resemblance to God, that it can be reckoned to have little weight because of its deficiencies, and that it can be considered as wretched because of its deformity. Bonaventure does not treat human nature with contumely or contempt. He looks upon human nature as giving honour to God, an honour taken away solely by the deformity of vice and of sin. 78

Our primary interest in the doctrine of Aquinas has been to compare it with the particular problems that we have studied in the doctrine of Bonaventure. Since Aquinas does not use, to our knowledge, the expression Christian philosophy, there is really little to be gained by comparing his doctrine with that of Bonaventure concerning the problem of Christian philosophy. Indeed, in view of the comparisons that we made in our last chapter between their two theologies and the usage of philosophy that Bonaventure and Aquinas make in them, we are inclined to say that, because they both consider philosophy to be a science and wisdom depending on the natural principles and the natural power of human reason, the philosophy of Aquinas is not a Christian philosophy as the philosophy of Bonaventure is not a Christian philosophy. As we saw in our last chapter, Thomist philosophy and Bonaventurean philosophy have the following points in common with respect to theology. First, the two philosophies depend extrinsically on the lumen and the truth of Christian faith, which prevent human reason from falling into error. Secondly, they stand on their own grounds with regard to the truths that Bonaventure and Aquinas demonstrate according to principles and reasons belonging properly to natural intelligence. Thirdly, the philosophies of the two theologians are united materially to Christian faith under the formal direction of the lumen of faith, thus taking on a strictly theological character, so that their philosophical knowledge serves the purpose for which it is intended: to 78 "Ad illud: qui vilificat facturam; dicendum, quod factura, quia a Deo facta est de nihilo et vitiata est in homine primo original! peccato, habet in se aliquid deiformitatis ratione eius a quo est, et aliquid defectibilitatis ratione eius de quo est, et aliquid deformitatis ratione vitii sub quo est. Et sicut ratione deiformitatis est honoranda, quia relucet in ea vestigium, imago et similitude divina, sic ratione defectibilitatis parvipendi potest, ratione deformitatis vilis reputari, non ad contumeliam, sed ad honorem Dei, cum auferatur honor solum per deformitatem vitii et peccati." — Lac. «'(., ad 5 (5.123).

836

CHAPTER NINE

bring about an understanding of divine revelation within the order of Christian faith. In view of those common points, we do not see how Thomist philosophy, by comparison with Bonaventurean philosophy, can be said to be intrinsically or formally Christian, whether the philosophy of Aquinas is taken on its own ground containing the principles and lumen of natural reason, or whether it is taken as it is brought within the formal ground of his theology, which relies properly on the principles and lumen of Christian faith. 79 CONCLUSION Error in human reasoning is said by St. Bonaventure to come from ignorance, which is of two kinds. The first kind consists in an imperfection of human knowledge, a condition found in man according to his nature, which is a created nature. The second kind of ignorance consists in a nescience inflicted on the human intellect, both speculative and practical, as a penalty for original sin. In the speculative intellect, the nescience is a deprivation of innate species, which were granted to Adam, who was able to contemplate God with ease from His creatures in the universe. In the practical intellect, the nescience is a deprivation of infused knowledge revealing to man his eternal beatitude and the means to attain it. As a result of its practical nescience, the human intellect has great difficulty in judging the truth of moral life and of human virtue. This difficulty is made even greater by the disorder of concupiscence found in the human appetites because of original sin. As a consequence of the blindness inflicted on the human intellect, and of the disorder found in the human appetites, the natural faculty of freedom of choice has been impaired in man, who is now prone to error and to sin. He is prone to error in both the speculative and the practical intellect. Error in the speculative intellect comes from an ignorance of the natures and properties of created things. Though this ignorance may result from a failure to analyze natural things into their first principles and causes, the errors coming from such ignorance do not necessarily involve moral fault: purely speculative knowledge is indifferent of itself to the good or evil of human conduct. Error in the practical intellect flows either from an ignorance of man's true beatitude and the means to attain it, or from the same ignorance as it is conjoined voluntarily to the disorder in the human appetites. The first sort of practical error is not culpable, because it is grounded simply in the nescience caused by original sin. The second sort of error, involving sin, is culpable in proportion to the deliberate and willing acquiescence of the man in the disorder of 79 Our view of the philosophy of Aquinas conforms to his own texts both on the use of philosophy that he makes in his theology and on the nature of the philosophical sciences. For these texts see: SCO, 2.1 -4 (2.114-17); Expos, de Trin., qq. 5-6 (Decker, pp. 161-229). See also: DPD, 1.4 (2.16-17); ST, Ia2ae, qq. 91-94 (2.1209a-1230a).

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

837

concupiscence in his appetites. The penalties for original sin do not entail the withdrawal by God of His illumination of the human intellect in the order of nature. Thus, a man can overcome the nescience in his speculative intellect by his own effort and by the natural power of human reason. Likewise, though with more difficulty, he can know by his natural reason the truth of moral life and of human virtue as they are regulated by the dictates of the natural law. A man regulating his life according to the natural law can avoid the errors flowing from the ignorance causing sin. A man violating the natural law in a voluntary way is responsible for the errors caused by his sin. But no man can overcome by his natural reason alone the nescience of his true beatitude and of the virtues required to attain it. To know his true beatitude, a man must have Christian faith. To attain his true beatitude, a man must possess charity. To have faith and to possess charity, he must obtain the grace of Christ, which is the root of the infused virtues repairing the damage done to human nature by original sin. When a man's soul is reformed through grace, his intellect is rectified by faith and his will is rectified by charity. As a result, his freedom of choice is restored to a proper order, and so, by the power of grace, the man can act meritoriously with a view to his eternal beatitude. Because the philosophers did not have the grace of Christ, their intellects were not rectified by faith and their wills were not rectified by charity. Consequently, their freedom of choice was not restored to order by the infused virtues of grace. The philosophers were not able know the truth of their eternal beatitude; nor could they know that their natural virtues were incapable of perfecting their freedom of choice, which was impaired by original sin. Since purely speculative knowledge is indifferent to the way of salvation, as the natural image of God in men is neither pleasing nor displeasing to Him, the errors of the philosophers in their speculative sciences have not involved demerit, just as the philosophers have no merit for the truth acquired by them in those sciences. Having an invincible ignorance of salvation and of the means to obtain it, the philosophers have no demerit for the errors caused by their nescience of those truths; but the philosophers, because they were outside the way of salvation, have no merit for their virtuous actions, which are insufficient to heal the wounds of original sin. Although the philosophers could not know the fact of original sin, they could have known by a proper use of human reason that human nature was not founded in its present condition of disorder. Though they did not have the healing grace of Christ, the philosophers could have avoided sin by ordering their lives according to the rules of prudence and the natural law, which were known to them. Becoming immoderate in their philosophical investigations, some philosophers went beyond the proper bounds of natural reason, thus erring in many ways because of their sinful curiosity. Taking sinful pride in their virtues, other philosophers erred by their inordinate love of the good of human nature and the good of corporeal creatures. Falling down in idolatry, those philosophers manifested an im-

838

CHAPTER NINE

piety toward their Creator, whom they were obliged to honour and to worship by the natural law. The errors of the philosophers were occasioned, but not caused, by their science. Their errors made the philosophers foolish in their science, because they falsified its truth. But there were a number of philosophers, particularly Platonists, who did not err with regard to the truths of human virtue and divine worship. Nonetheless, because of their invincible ignorance of Christ and of His healing grace, those true philosophers could not attain that contemplation of God which can be attained only through Christian faith and charity. Thus, in the end, even the true philosophers were despondent in their anticipation of a future life of contemplation and beatitude. Healed by the grace of Christ, the soul of a Christian is reformed by the infused virtues accompanying grace. His intellect is rectified by faith and his will by charity; so his freedom of choice is restored to order by the reparation of grace. His speculative intellect is perfected by faith with regard to certain truths of natural things, particularly in relation to God, which he must know in order to make a reasonable assent to the principal objects of belief. His practical intellect is perfected by faith with regard to the truths of moral life and human virtue, so that he may have sufficient knowledge of them to order his life in a reasonable way according to the divine law, which regulates the Christian life according to its infused virtues. Perfecting the will of the Christian, the virtue of charity moves him to assent freely, lovingly and meritoriously to God for His own sake and, as a consequence, to believe whatever God has revealed. The Christian believes principally the truths of faith transcending natural reason; he believes secondarily the natural truths revealed by God to provide a proper foundation for the principal objects of faith. The secondary truths of faith can also be known by natural reason, but according to different respects and conditions. When the Christian considers those truths by his natural reason, he ought to be guided and directed by the lumen of his faith, thus avoiding the errors of the non-Christian philosophers, who lacked the advantage of a divine revelation. The lumen of faith perfects the natural power of reason in such a way that the Christian who is a philosopher can think inerrantly by his natural lumen of reason about the truths that occasioned many errors among non-Christian thinkers. Because the Christian philosopher can correct the errors of non-Christians, he is obliged from piety to correct them in his own philosophy both out of reverence for God, who is the author of all truth, and for the benefit of his philosophical science, which is a gift of God. Toward the end of St. Bonaventure's life, some Christian masters in Paris were not guided or directed by their faith in their philosophical thinking. In St. Bonaventure's judgment, they deliberately chose to ignore their faith while teaching as true according to philosophy what they knew to be false according to divine revelation. They clung to the errors of non-Christian philosophers, particularly Averroes, rather than correct them in view of the teaching of Christ. Thus, adhering to a mun-

PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

839

dane wisdom, those Christian masters falsified the truth of philosophy and distorted the truth of Scripture, which they tried to explain by natural reason. Falling lower than the non-Christian philosophers themselves, the Christian masters made an idol out of a philosophy mixing falsehood with the truth. Because of their unbridled curiosity, they went far beyond the due limits of philosophical investigation. Consequently, idolizing human reason, they made philosophy the occasion, though it was not the cause, of their willing return to the darkness of sin and error. In their pride and presumption, the Christian masters manifested a very great impiety toward God, whom they refused to honour and to worship by following the light of their faith in their philosophical thinking. Though the lumen of faith is necessary for a Christian to avoid error in his philosophical thinking, the influence of his faith remains extrinsic to his philosophical science and wisdom. Perfecting natural reason in its own order, as grace perfects human nature, the lumen of faith does not displace the natural lumen of reason. Rather, fortified by the lumen of faith, the Christian philosopher or theologian can think according to reason in such a natural and human way that he can form and develop a true philosophy. His philosophy, as a philosophy, depends intrinsically on the connatural principles and methods of human reason, which follows its natural lumen in seeking the truth of its proper objects. The philosophy thus constituted by a Christian is not a Christian philosophy, but the philosophy of a Christian. The philosophy of St. Bonaventure, accordingly, is not a Christian philosophy as he constitutes it on the integral ground of his theology. On this ground, he forms and develops his philosophy according to the intrinsic requirements of a science and wisdom relying formally on natural reason. Nor is his philosophy a Christian philosophy as he transforms it by faith on the universal ground of his theology. On that ground, he unites his philosophy to faith in such a way that his theological understanding of the object of belief is an inseparable expression of faith and philosophy, but manifesting a primary and principal dependence on the lumen and truth of faith. The name Christian philosophy, as St. Bonaventure uses it, signifies the wisdom of the Christian religion. This is a wisdom founded on grace and on the theological virtues, nourished by Scripture and containing a distinctively Christian outlook on human nature and human life as they depend on God through the mediation of Christ. The truly Christian philosophy of St. Bonaventure is a theological doctrine of the Christian way of life. His Christian philosophy has to do chiefly with humility, which is the summit of religious and evangelical perfection. As a doctrine of the spiritual life, the Christian philosophy of St. Bonaventure directs the Christian to order his life according to the teachings of Christ, who is our way, our truth and our life.

This page intentionally left blank

GENERAL CONCLUSION THE HISTORIANS

AND BONAVENTUREAN

PHILOSOPHY

VV7 E said at the end of the introduction to this work that its primary objective was not to resolve the conflicts of the historians concerning St. Bonaventure's philosophy, but to establish its historical constitution. At the same time, a contribution was promised at the end of the work to a solution of the problems dividing the historians on the constitution of Bonaventurean philosophy. The purpose of this general conclusion, therefore, is to make that contribution. It is not intended here either to settle the controversies among the historians or to start another controversy about the nature and character of St. Bonaventure's philosophy. The intention is, rather, to state whether or not the views of the historians are supported by the texts of St. Bonaventure as we have presented them. On carrying out that intention, the general conclusion will take for granted, on the one hand, the particular conclusions drawn in this work from the texts of St. Bonaventure and, on the other hand, the different views of his doctrine as they are recorded from the writings of the historians in the introduction to the work. There are, then, three things to be done here. The first is to state that the views of certain historians on St. Bonaventure's philosophy are borne out by his texts. The second is to state that the texts of St. Bonaventure do not bear out the viewe of some historians on his philosophy. The third thing is to show how the views not borne out by St. Bonaventure's texts can be reconciled with them, as far as the evidence permits. To accomplish those things, the general conclusion will be divided into three sections, each with its own subject. In the first section, the subject will be the character of St. Bonaventure's philosophy. In the second section, the question of Christian philosophy will be discussed as it concerns the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. The subject of the third section will be the community of philosophy in the writings of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas. Character of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy

The historians present several conflicting views of the proper character of St. Bonaventure's philosophy. Mandonnet puts St. Bonaventure among the theologians following the Neoplatonic doctrines of St. Augustine while resisting the entry of Aristoteleanism into Paris. In Mandonnet's view, then, St. Bonaventure's philosophy is a collection of NeoplatonicAugustinian doctrines. They are so confused with his theology, from which

842

GENERAL CONCLUSION

his philosophy is not formally distinct, that they cannot be formally separated from it. De Wulf concurs with Mandonnet in saying that St. Bonaventure is the best representative of Augustinianism. De Wulf maintains consistently, however, that either old scholasticism or pre-Thomism is a better name than Augustinianism for the school or movement represented by St. Bonaventure. Showing a natural inclination toward Augustinianism, St. Bonaventure has a philosophy containing Aristotelean factors along with the traditional teachings of the Augustinian school. St. Bonaventure's philosophy is an eclectic system of thought organized around the Aristotelean principles of act and potency. His philosophy, which is formally distinct from his theology, is an incoherent synthesis setting teachings from St. Augustine side by side with Arabian Aristoteleanism: equating matter with potency, and act with form, St. Bonaventure posits matter in every creature and plural forms in every corporeal creature; so his philosophy represents an imperfect interpretation of Aristoteleanism. His philosophical system, nevertheless, is an original one based on the Aristotelean principles of act and potency, even though it has certain Augustinian tendencies. The philosophical system of St. Bonaventure is Augustinian in this restricted sense, that it tends to superimpose teachings of St. Augustine on the principles of Aristotle. As a consequence, having a conservative spirit and a love- of tradition, St. Bonaventure compromises authentic teachings of St. Augustine by blending them with the new, or Arabian, form of Aristoteleanism, and so he used the doctrines of Aristotle to explain the teachings of St. Augustine. Gilson concurs with De Wulf to this extent, that St. Bonaventure's philosophy has an original character. Departing from De Wulf in other respects, Gilson denies that St. Bonaventure's philosophy is an imperfect stage of Aristoteleanism as it was developed in the thirteenth century. His philosophy is a perfection of a traditional Augustinianism: Gilson takes this term to signify strictly the doctrine of St. Augustine; in a wider sense, the term includes any doctrine or school influenced by St. Augustine. Even though St. Bonaventure uses many expressions and some doctrines of Aristotle, nevertheless, St. Bonaventure subordinates them to the spirit of his own Augustinianism. On the other hand, Gilson draws close to Mandonnet in holding that St. Bonaventure constantly resists the introduction of Aristotelean philosophy into theology, from which he never formally distinguishes his own philosophy. Going far beyond Mandonnet, however, Gilson maintains that St. Bonaventure subordinates Aristotle to St. Augustine because of an antipathy toward Aristotelean philosophy. Although St. Bonaventure admires Aristotle as a man excelling in knowledge, even so, St. Bonaventure opts deliberately for the traditional metaphysics of Augustinianism. Consequently, he starts out with an opposition to Aristoteleanism, never ceases to repudiate its spirit, and condemns Aristotelean philosophy as an erroneous doctrine. Nonetheless, in

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUKEAN PHILOSOPHY

843

his own philosophy, St. Bonaventure supplements Augustinian doctrine with Aristotelean principles, particularly in connexion with the divine illumination of the human intellect, a problem solved by St. Bonaventure in an Aristotelean-Augustinian manner. In Gilson's view, then, the philosophy of St. Bonaventure is not a basically Aristotelean synthesis, but a fundamentally Augustinian one with an original and a coherent development of medieval thought. Regarding the views of these three historians, let us say, in the first place, that St. Bonaventure's texts bear out the view of De Wulf, but not of Mandonnet or of Gilson. that there is in the writings of St. Bonaventure a philosophy which is formally distinct from his theology. Since the views of Mandonnet and Gilson on this point involve the further question of the relation of St. Bonaventure's philosophy to his theology, a question to be considered with the problem of Christian philosophy, the possibility of reconciling them with his texts cannot be discussed here. In the second place, the views of De Wulf and Gilson that St. Bonaventure has an original synthesis of philosophy are borne out by his texts, but not in the way that either of those historians characterize his philosophy. St. Bonaventure's texts show that he has formed and developed a coherent and very consistent synthesis of philosophical doctrines. His synthesis is not an eclectic system based on Aristotelean principles, though with Augustinian tendencies, as De Wulf has maintained. The coherency and consistency of St. Bonaventure's philosophical synthesis, however, do not depend on a traditional metaphysics of Augustinianism to which St. Bonaventure subordinates Aristotelean elements, as Gilson has maintained. Rather, as an original and indeed a unique organization of philosophical thought, St. Bonaventure's synthesis has its coherency and consistency from his personal use of the principle of participation, as we have shown at every level of his thought. The participational character of his synthesis is reflected, as has also been shown, in the way that he organizes and composes it under the influences of the different sources used by him in constituting his own philosophy. No one of those sources is fundamental by itself to the synthesis of St. Bonaventure, who uses them according as they conform, or can be conformed, to his own philosophical principles. No particular combination of his historical sources, moreover, can be isolated as fundamental to his synthesis of philosophy. His texts do not show that his philosophy is fundamentally Aristotelean with Augustinian inclinations, or that it tends to superimpose Augustinian doctrines on Aristotelean principles. Neither do his texts show that his philosophy is fundamentally Augustinian, though supplementing Augustinian doctrine with Aristotelean principles, and that the Aristotelean elements of his synthesis are subordinated to a spirit of Augustinianism. The abundance of texts from Aristotle in the writings of St. Bonaventure shows clearly that his philosophy is not, as Mandonnet has said, a collection of doctrines from Neoplatonic-Augustinian sources. On composing his philosophical synthesis, St. Bonaventure handles his sources

844

GENERAL CONCLUSION

in various ways, depending on the particular problems facing, him. On some occasions, he uses only one source and, on other occasions, he uses two sources, particularly Aristotle and St. Augustine. There are many times when he uses several sources, and a number of times when he uses no sources whatever. This has all been documented in our examination of his texts. It has been shown also how the different sources used by St. Bonaventure contribute, each in its own way, to the formation and development of his philosophical thought. The Aristotelean principles of act and potency, for instance, combine with the Augustinian principles of perfection and imperfection to give St. Bonaventure his personal' doctrine on form and matter as the universal principles of being and existing in created substances, both spiritual and corporeal. Representing a reconciliation of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines, this particular combination of them produces an original and a coherent interpretation of the active and passive principles of created substances. St. Bonaventure's combination of Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines regarding those principles is such that it also enables him to explain the same principles according to the doctrine of Boethius on the quo est and the quod est of individual substances. The compositional organization and the participational constitution of St. Bonaventure's philosophical synthesis, therefore, manifest both the multiple influences of his sources on its organization and the unique character of its thought as he himself constitutes it. For those reasons, the proper name of his philosophical synthesis is Bonaventurean. Although this name signifies that St. Bonaventure is the proper author and the principal agent of his own philosophy, the name does not exclude any of the many elements entering his philosophy from other authors as its secondary or instrumental agents: as a man's personal identity does not exclude certain characteristics of his manifold pedigree, so the proper identity of St. Bonaventure's philosophy as Bonaventurean does not exclude certain characteristics of its multiple lineage. Provided that St. Bonaventure's philosophy is taken principally and properly as Bonaventurean, the views of De Wulf and Gilson not borne by his texts can be reconciled with them in the following ways. Considering the particular influence of Aristotle on St. Bonaventure, one could say that Bonaventurean philosophy is Aristotelean in proportion to the influence of Aristotle's doctrine on the constitution of St. Bonaventure's synthesis, which would then manifest certain Aristotelean characteristics. Likewise, a consideration of the influence of St. Augustine on St. Bonaventure would show that his philosophy is Augustinian, and that his synthesis manifests certain Augustinian characteristics to the extent of the influence exercised on its constitution by the doctrine of St. Augustine. When the texts of St. Bonaventure show the influence of both Aristotle and St. Augustine regarding the same doctrine, Bonaventurean philosophy could be said, in regard to that doctrine, to manifest predominantly either Aristotelean or Augustinian characteristics, unless the influence of Aristotle and the in-

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

845

fluence of St. Augustine are such that neither one has a predominance over the other. Similar considerations of the particular and combined influences of other philosophers on the constitution of St. Bonaventure's synthesis, however, would show that his philosophical thought could also be characterized in ways other than Aristotelean and Augustinian. In considering the Augustinian characteristics of Bonaventurean philosophy, all three historians concur in attributing to St. Bonaventure a group of doctrines said to be typically Augustinian, though De Wulf insists that some of the doctrines, such as universality of matter and plurality of forms, belong to Arabian Aristoteleanism. Our examination of St. Bonaventure's texts shows that some of the doctrines in question are found in his synthesis, but some are not. The doctrines of St. Augustine on seminal reasons and the illumination of the human intellect are found in the Bonaventurean synthesis; but they are not found there simply as Augustinian doctrines. They belong to the synthesis according as St. Bonaventure, interpreting them in his own way, conforms them to the principles and requirements of his own philosophy. The doctrine of universality of matter is also present in the Bonaventurean synthesis, but not the doctrine of plurality of forms. These two doctrines, in particular, are said by De Wulf to pertain to Arabian Aristoteleanism. Since the texts of St. Bonaventure show that he does not posit plural forms in any corporeal creature, his synthesis does not manifest any influence of Arabian Aristoteleanism in regard to that doctrine. Although he posits matter in every creature, whether spiritual or corporeal, his texts do not refer to any historical source supplying him with this particular doctrine, which entered into thirtheenth-century philosophy from Avicebron, who was not an Arabian or Moslem thinker. The influence of Moslem thinkers on St. Bonaventure's philosophical thought is the least of all the influences exercised on it by his historical sources. On the few occasions that he uses Avicenna's doctrine, and the still fewer occasions that he uses the doctrine of Averroes, St. Bonaventure employs those doctrines to supplement what he finds in other philosophical authors, notably Boethius and Aristotle.' By attributing to St. Bonaventure a doctrine of plural forms in human nature, the historians, whose views we are considering, associate him with an Augustinian doctrine giving the rational soul an active part in the operations of sense knowledge, because the soul of man has a substantial independence with respect to the human body. The texts of St. Bonaven-

1 The immediate source of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the universality of matter is probably one or more of his predecessors in the thirteenth century depending in some way on Avicebron, who is not named in St. Bonaventure's texts. To establish the doctrinal dependence of St. Bonaventure on his immediate predecessors would be a huge task, and one not possible apart from the unedited ms. Btblto Assis. n. 138, which has many of the contemporary sources of his Commentary on the Sentences. On that ms. see: Franfois M. Henquinet, "Un recueil de questions annote par S. Bonaventure", AFH, 25 (1932), pp. 553-55; Prolegomena in librum HI... "Summae fratris Alexandri" (Quaracchi, Florentinae: 1948), pp. 138141.

846

GENERAL CONCLUSION

ture do not support these views of his doctrine on sense knowledge and the nature of man. He assigns all the acts of human knowledge to the man, or the human person, who knows by means of his natural powers of operation. The human person knows corporeal things first by means of his sense powers: their active principles are rooted in his soul and their passive principles are grounded in his bodily organs, so that the whole operation of sensation is subject to the conjunct of soul and body constituting the nature of the human person; the species of corporeal things are received by him in both the passive and the active parts of his sense powers, so his judgments are carried out by means of the active principles in the bodily organs of his sense powers. This doctrine on human sensation, as we have shown, is developed by St. Bonaventure from a combination of Aristotelean and Augustinian elements contributing to a truly Bonaventurean synthesis on the nature of the sense powers and their proper operations. The human person, knowing corporeal things by his senses, knows them subsequently by means of his intellective potencies, which are subject solely to his rational spirit. Although his intellectual knowledge of corporeal things is subsequent to his sense knowledge of them, even so, his acts of sensation and his acts of intellection are not independent of one another. They are two parts of one whole operation, which is rational understanding, and this depends on his whole capacity (totum posse) for human knowledge. Because the intellective part of that capacity is subject solely to his spirit, the human person is able to reflect within himself by his intellect, and so apart from the corporeal conditions limiting his acts of sensation. Nonetheless, his act of reflexion does not take place in complete isolation from the senses, for the objects of the intellect in his reflexions are the corporeal things known to the human person by means of his senses. Moreover, the capacity of the person to think in abstraction from his senses pertains to the order of accidental being, and not to the order of substantial being. Forming part of his whole operation of rational understanding, the capacity of the human person to reflect within himself, or to think in abstraction from his senses, does not entail any substantial independence of his soul, or rational spirit, from his human body. The soul and the body of a human person, as St. Bonaventure says explicitly, come together to constitute a single and undivided substance of rational nature. As the proper form and the proper matter of a human nature, the soul and the body of a man unite with each other to establish the specific and common nature man, or the whole being (totum esse) in which the person subsists as a singular and self-existent thing of rational nature. Consequently, united essentially as the formal and the material constituents of a personal nature, the soul and the body of a human person have such a reciprocal causation that they constitute the person as a single and undivided thing existing incommunicably in one rational being and in one rational life. This doctrine of St. Bonaventure is

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

847

influenced chiefly by Boethius, but also by Aristotle and St. Augustine. 2 Although Gilson's view of St. Bonaventure admiring Aristotle as a man excelling in knowledge is supported by St. Bonaventure's texts, the Augustinian opposition to Aristoteleanism ascribed by Gilson to St. Bonaventure is not borne put by his texts. There is no evidence in his writings to show that, because of an antipathy to Aristotelean philosophy, he subordinates Aristotle to St. Augustine; nor is there any evidence to show that St. Bonaventure, opting for a traditional metaphysics of Augustinianism, has always opposed Aristoteleanism, never ceased to repudiate its spirit, and condemned it as an erroneous doctrine. While it is true that St. Bonaventure considers Aristotle to be in error on the eternity of the world and on the beatitude of man, it is no less true that the Platonists, the Manicheans and the Arabian philosophers are considered to be in error on the same questions. But St. Bonaventure excuses Aristotle, and him alone, on philosophical grounds for his mistakes. -Now it is also true that Aristotle is not excused on any ground for his error in rejecting Plato's doctrine of ideas, an error involving the metaphysical principle of exemplarity; however, it is equally true that St. Bonaventure, though he praises Plato for his doctrine of ideas and his view of the world as beginning in time, considers the doctrine of Plato and his followers on creation to be erroneous in so far as they posit an exemplar other than God in the production of the world. St. Bonaventure's critique of philosophical errors is very impartial, and yet, because of his esteem for Aristotle, he shows a distinctive partiality toward the Philosopher not only by excusing him for his mistakes, but also by using his doctrine whenever it serves the needs of St. Bonaventure's own synthesis. In his metaphysical doctrine, furthermore, St. Bonaventure does not oppose Aristotle by subordinating him to St. Augustine. The doctrine of St. Bonaventure on the creation of the world, 2 In attributing to St. Bonaventure an Augustinian doctrine on the rational soul as substantially independent of the human body, Gilson assigns to him a doctrine giving to the soul: innate ideas by which it knows purely intelligible objects; a fundamental idea of its own substance enabling the soul to know corporeal things without receiving anything from the body; a fundamental idea of God, or an innate idea of His perfections, disposing the soul for an innate knowledge of God's existence, so that the soul is said to have an innate idea of God as necessarily existing — Philos. s. Bonav., pp. 122-40, 231 -33, 358-62 (ET pp. 125-38, 241-43, 374-78); 2e & 3' edd., pp. 104-18, 195-96, 300-04. These views of Gilson are not borne out by the texts of St Bonaventure, who speaks of innate species, not ideas, only in the souls of Adam and Christ. The first principles of human knowledge are said to be innate because of their immediate eduction from the natural seeds of truth in the intellect: this eduction conies about when the person makes his first act of knowledge, which is directed to some corporeal and exterior thing and not to the substance of his soul; every other principle of human knowledge is acquired by way of abstraction and sense knowledge, both of which are said by St. Bonaventure to be necessary in order that the intellect know its proper objects, namely, the natures and properties of corporeal things. He never speaks of innate ideas in the soul enabling the person to know purely intelligible objects; nor does he speak of the soul having any innate idea of God. On the contrary, St. Bonaventure insists that a man must be disposed formally by his knowledge of exterior things to enter within his own spirit, so that he may know God innately from His image in the soul.

848

GENERAL CONCLUSION

for instance, is influenced by St. John Damascene as much as by St. Augustine. Indeed, in demonstrating that the world had a temporal beginning, St. Bonaventure never once cites or refers to St. Augustine; he goes to Aristotle in order to show that his principles can, and do for St. Bonaventure, lead to the conclusion that the world is not eternal. Is there any way in which Gilson's views can be reconciled with St. Bonaventure's texts? There is a way to reconcile his view with regard to St. Bonaventure's subordination of Aristotle to St. Augustine. According to his own testimony, St. Bonaventure considers the writings of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church to be a better source than the writings of the philosophers for the Christian handling philosophical problems. Following this principle, St. Bonaventure prefers to go before all else to St. Augustine, whom he extolls as a very profound metaphysician. Since he goes to Aristotle to supplement the doctrine of St. Augustine, or to develop a philosophical point not found in St. Augustine, then, as a secondary source, Aristotle could be said to be subordinated to St. Augustine. This would be a subordination of historical sources, however, and not necessarily a subordination of doctrine. In fact, as his synthesis bears witness, St. Bonaventure subordinates Aristotelean philosophy to Augustinian doctrine in the same way that he subordinates any other philosophy to the doctrine of St. Augustine and other theological authorities within the science and wisdom of Christian theology. Within the order of philosophy, St. Bonaventure often uses Aristotelean philosophy for its own worth and, on other occasions, he either uses it in combination with Augustinian philosophy or defends it as not contrary to St. Augustine's thought. Van Steenberghen views St. Bonaventure's philosophical knowledge, in his early writings, according to the historical sources at his disposal and the doctrinal initiation he received in the Faculty of Arts at Paris. The most important sources available to him were Aristotelean writings with their Greek, Latin and Arabian commentaries. His initiation to philosophy introduced him to an incompletely assimilated Aristoteleanism mixed incoherently with Neoplatonic elements of diverse origins. An eclectic sort of philosophy, this was a Latin Aristoteleanism augmented by Neoplatonic doctrines, and so it was chiefly a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism. St. Bonaventure's introduction to Aristotle would have been limited to his Organon and Ethics (I-III), which were the only Aristotelean writings taught in Arts when St. Bonaventure was a student there. While he may have read other Aristotelean writings privately, his references to Aristotle have shown Van Steenberghen that St. Bonaventure's knowledge of Aristotelean metaphysics was quite superficial. Although he had a fairly wide knowledge of Aristotle's works, St. Bonaventure displayed either no or an inadequate knowledge of Aristotle's doctrine. St. Bonaventure himself has borne witness to this in declaring his inability to settle controverted questions about Aristotelean philosophy. He has also cited other philosophers; but he probably acquired a good number of his citations from his predecessors,

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

849

and so his knowledge of the philosophers shows no depth. In Van Steenberghen's view, then, St. Bonaventure's philosophy is a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism. Basically Aristotelean, it contains other elements of Arabian and Jewish origins, but not truly blended to form a coherent synthesis. He belongs to the Augustinian school only as a theologian; by comparison with Aristoteleanism, Augustinianism is a secondary source of his philosophical thought. His philosophy, therefore, is an eclectic and Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism serving an Augustinian theology. Van Steenberghen, opposing Gilson's view, has found that St. Bonaventure is never hostile to Aristotle, whom he always esteems and, at times, conjoins Aristotle's authority to that of St. Augustine and of other Christian thinkers. St. Bonaventure, in Van Steenberghen's view, has neither understood Aristotle's thought nor judged it and left it behind for a traditional Augustinianism. Nor has he condemned Aristoteleanism as an erroneous doctrine: excusing Aristotle's mistakes, particularly those resulting from his ignorance of revelation, St. Bonaventure chose the most benign interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy and did his best to avoid opposing it to Christianity and to the thought of St. Augustine. Gilson, for his part, has insisted that his view of St. Bonaventure as hostile to Aristotle is based on St. Bonaventure's texts, which Van Steenberghen interprets in his own way. Moreover, maintaining that St. Bonaventure's philosophy is truly Augustinian, Gilson takes the view that it is grounded in the essentialist metaphysics of St. Augustine; his doctrine on the immutability of the divine essence so dominates the problem of God's existence and its knowability in St. Bonaventure's philosophy, by way of St. Anselm, that he shows more interest in the knowability of God's existence than in its inner reality. Presenting the doctrine of St. Bonaventure's later writings, Van Steenberghen takes the view that this doctrine is truly Augustinian on the theological level, or as a Christian wisdom. Subordinated to a theology chiefly Augustinian in spirit, St. Bonaventure's philosophy remains an eclectic and Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, especially an Augustinizing Aristoteleanism. Van Steenberghen, adverting to Gilson's application to Aristotle of St. Bonaventure's texts on the inevitability of error in human reasoning, maintains that St. Bonaventure excuses the errors of Aristotle, who could not know what can be known only by revelation. St. Bonaventure is really referring to the inescapable aberration of human reason operating on a plane beyond its natural capacity. He is also following the Christian tradition in affirming the superiority of divine revelation over natural reason. Consequently, he concludes that reason, unaided by faith, strays unavoidably into error on divine things. Robert concurs with Van Steenberghen in rejecting Gilson's view of St. Bonaventure as condemning Aristotelean philosophy because it is an erroneous doctrine. On the other hand, Robert finds that Van Steenberghen has suppressed a thirteenth-century Augustinian philosophy of which St. Bonaventure is the chief representative. In Robert's view, Van

850

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Steenberghen's conclusions have been based on a limited examination of a few texts chosen from one of St. Bonaventure's early writings, thus not taking sufficient account of all the historical data to characterize his philosophy. Presenting texts not examined by Van Steenberghen from St. Bonaventure's early writings, Robert documents the different appraisals given by St. Bonaventure of Plato, Aristotle and St. Augustine: appraising Christian thinkers as the most competent philosophers, St. Bonaventure takes St. Augustine, the most profound metaphysician, as his guide in philosophy; he gives the word of wisdom to Plato and the word of science to Aristotle, the more excellent of the philosophers, but to St. Augustine he gives the word of wisdom and of science as to the master of both theology and philosophy. Robert also documents the statement of St. Bonaventure regarding his evaluation of historical sources in philosophy for the Christian student, who is told by St. Bonaventure that St. August'ne has handled incomparably many important problems in philosophy. St. Bonaventure's knowledge of Aristotelean philosophy is not profound, then, because he sees no use in going to Aristotle when the Fathers of the Church have transmitted the best part of the thought of the ancient philosophers. Though St. Bonaventure does not handle philosophical problems for their own sake, it does not follow, to Robert, that he has not treated them sufficiently and philosophically, or that the unity of his philosophy has to be theological. The elements of a really philosophical synthesis are present in his theological works, according to Robert, who finds that synthesis to be a medieval Augustinianism. This synthesis is essentially Augustinian in its inspiration, content and inclinations, even though it uses Aristotelean elements to make good the defects of Augustinian Neoplatonism. In Robert's view, consequently, St. Bonaventure's philosophy is an Augustinian synthesis utilizing the precision of Aristotle's scientific terminology and arranging its content according to his scientific method. Van Steenberghen has insisted, however, that the basis of St. Bonaventure's philosophy is the sort of Aristoteleanism forming the common philosophy in the Faculties of Arts and Theology at Paris when he was a student there. His theological writings show, moreover, that he has used a whole range of Aristotelean doctrines. Van Steenberghen, preserving his view of St. Bonaventure's philosophy, describes it as a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism serving an Augustinian theology. This philosophy, which is an eclectic and not a fully unified system, is often inspired by theological motives and does not always escape juxtaposing Aristotelean doctrines with Neoplatonic or Augustinian themes. The best formula for St. Bonaventure's philosophy, then, would be Augustinizing Aristoteleanism; but the most complete formula is Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, especially Augustinizing Aristoteleanism, serving a Franciscan and Augustinian theology. Explaining the formula Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, Van Steenberghen says that Aristoteleanism is substantive, and so it indicates the fundamental constituent or basic element of St. Bonaventure's philosophy; Neoplatonizing is an active

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUKEAN PHILOSOPHY

851

participle marking a new direction taken by the Aristoteleanism, or its extensions and corrections, thus giving the synthesis of St. Bonaventure its specific form and most characteristic, but essential, features. Although St. Bonaventure has expressed his profound admiration for St. Augustine, as Robert has shown, this is not sufficient for Van Steenberghen to characterize St. Bonaventure's philosophy as Augustinian, because its point of departure is Aristotle, whose philosophy is the stem on which St. Bonaventure has grafted Neoplatonic and particularly Augustinian doctrines. Ratzinger thinks that Van Steenberghen's view of St. Bonaventure's Augustinanism is accurate, though his anti-Aristoteleanism is deeper than Van Steenberghen would admit. Ratzinger himself holds the view that St. Bonaventure never intended to be an Augustinian; he sought only to give St. Augustine and Aristotle their proper places in the history of thought. Van de Laan, drawing close to Van Steenberghen, views St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a Platonizing Aristoteleanism, a form of thought represented particularly in his doctrine on exemplarism. He derived this doctrine, according to van der Laan, from Pythagoreanism by way of St. Augustine, whose philosophy may also be a Platonizing Aristoteleansim. Van der Laan does not think that Gilson has characterized adequately the modes of St. Bonaventure's thought. Though his philosophy has to be taken from his theology, which is in the Augustinian tradition, his philosophy does not thereby become Augustinian, because his Augustinianism is wholly theological. To get an insight into St. Bonaventure's conception, van der Laan suggests, a study is required of his theological works to arrive at a definite concept of their philosophical grounds, as Van Steenberghen has attained his concept of St. Bonaventure's thought, which is an eclectic and Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism serving an Augustinian theology. Van der Laan, seconding Van Steenberghen, finds that St. Bonaventure sees error in Aristotle on some things because of his ignorance of revelation; but St. Bonaventure never condemns every autonomy of philosophy. Though van der Laan's characterization of St. Bonaventure's philosophy is not entirely the same as that of Van Steenberghen, even so, in van de Laan's view, Van Steenberghen has established St. Bonaventure's Aristoteleanism with decisive arguments. With regard to the positions of these historians on the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, let us say first of all that his texts on the inevitability of error by human reason do not support Gilson's view of him as hostile toward Aristotelean philosophy. Since the question of St. Bonaventure's evaluation of Aristotle's errors has been treated above, it is sufficient to say here that the views of Robert and van der Laan on this subject are borne out by St. Bonaventure's doctrine. The interpretation of his texts by Van Steenberghen, moreover, conforms entirely both to the doctrine of St. Bonaventure and to his attitude toward Aristotle, whom he treats always with benignity and whose authority he adds to that of Scripture arid of the Fathers, particularly St. Augustine. Because Ratzinger's views on the anti-

852

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Aristoteleanism of St. Bonaventure involve the question of Christian philosophy, we shall not consider them until we meet that question. The grounding by Gilson of St. Bonaventure's philosophy in the essentialist metaphysics of St. Augustine is not substantiated by St. Bonaventure's texts on the being of God Although it is true that St. Bonaventure, following St. Augustine, considers God to be the immutable essence, even so, it is also true that St. Bonaventure, following Aristotle, considers the divine essence to be pure act. The Bonaventurean doctrine on the essence or being of God, therefore, is not characteristically Augustinian. Furthermore, the problem of God's existence and our knowledge of it is not so dominated by His immutability in St. Bonaventure's philosophy, by way of St. Anselm, that he shows more interest in the knowability of God's existence than in its inner reality. The question of the knowability of the being of God is handled by St. Bonaventure, in his De mysterio Trinitatis, on the basis of St. Anselm's doctrine, which is used as a Bonaventurean frame of reference for interpreting the doctrines of St. Augustine, Boethius and Aristotle, whose teachings are placed on an equal footing by St. Bonaventure within his own understanding of St. Anselm's doctrine. Having established the truth of God's being, or His essence, St. Bonaventure goes on in the rest, and major part, of his work to treat the inner reality of the being of God as He can be known by natural reason and by Christian faith. In presenting the dependence of St. Bonaventure on St. Augustine's essentialist metaphysics, Gilson analyzes the historical progress down to St. Bonaventure, through many intermediaries, of St. Augustine's doctrine on the immutable essence of God. In particular, Gilson notes that Richard of St. Victor interprets existere with regard to God to mean simultaneously essence and existence: ex signifies personal origin in God; sistere designates God's essence. Alexander of Hales understands existere to signify ex alio sistere (to stand out from another), and so he interprets existentia to signify "essence with reference to its source". Placed by Gilson in this line of development, St. Bonaventure is said to concentrate on the knowability of God's essence by reducing existential being to essential being.3 As we have seen, the term existere is used by St. Bonaventure, following Richard of St. Victor, to designate a divine person as standing-out with respect to the other persons in the divine essence, which is common to all three persons. Thus, existentia designates each of the divine persons, who are hypostases or supposits in the one being or divine essence. With reference to God, then, esse and essentia designate the same thing, but not esse and existere nor existentia and essentia. While it is possible to speak of the divine being as existential in the persons and as essential in their common nature, it is not possible to speak of reducing the existential being of the persons to the essential being of

3 See: Le thamisme, 1' ed, pp. 70-78; 5' 6d, pp. 73-81 (Chris. Philas. S. Thomas, pp. 48-54); ff ed, pp. 53-60.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

853

their nature, because the being of the persons and the being of their nature is the one divine essence in which the three persons are said to-be. When St. Bonaventure applies these metaphysical terms to a creature, they are given an analogical meaning, and so they have both a dissimilar and a similar significance with reference to God. Because a creature has being after notbeing, it has an essence standing-outside an original non-being; so, referring to a creature, essentia and existentia designate the same concrete thing, but not esse and essentia nor esse and existere. The nature of a creature is signified both by essentia and by existentia: essentia designates its nature according to esse, which comes from a proper form; existentia designates its nature according to existere, which comes from a proper matter. Consequently, the esse and the existere of a creature are both intrinsic to its nature, so that it is not possible to speak of reducing an existential being to an essential being, because a creature has only one being, which is its individual or personal being. These are the metaphysical grounds from which St. Bonaventure, in his De mysterio Trinitatis, approaches the inner reality of the divine being. Constrasting the being of God with the being of the creature, he finds that the divine being is marked by the absence of matter, so that the being of God is unique and infinite, simple and eternal, immutable and necessary. In attaining his knowledge of those attributes, he relies for the most part on his own understanding of God and the creature. Although St. Augustine appears more frequently than any of the other authorities cited occasionally by St. Bonaventure, nevertheless, in establishing the immutability of the divine being, he does not support his position with a single text from St. Augustine. The philosophy of St. Bonaventure, as his texts show, is not grounded in any essentialist metaphysics of St. Augustine. The basis of Bonaventurean metaphysics consists in the principles of being and existing: they are said by St. Bonaventure to come together in the creature by an act of being possessing a fixed existence, thus constituting an intrinsic dependence of the essence of the creature on both the creative and the conservative action of God.4 The view of Robert, that the Bonaventurean synthesis owes much to Aristotle, is borne out by St. Bonaventure's writings. But they do not bear

4 Gilson's interpretation of St. Bonaventure's terms esse and essentia, existere and existentia, has been influenced from the beginning by comparing them with esse and essentia as these are used by St. Thomas: the term esse has been taken by Gilson to signify existence for St. Thomas and St Bonaventure; with that significance, the Bonaventurean existere is used by Gilson interchangeably with esse as it is found in St. Bonaventure and St Thomas Consult: Philos. s. Bonav., pp. 235-38, 305-07 (ET pp. 245-49, 318-20); ? & 3C edd, pp. 197-200, 256-58. On the other hand, the texts of St. Bonavehture do not support Van Steenberghen's view that the Bonaventurean synthesis has Avicenna's composition of esse and essentia: La philos. IIF siecle, pp. 246-51. St Bonaventure uses Avicenna's doctrine of essence as the quiddity by which an integral or univocal knowledge is acquired of several things; in the metaphysical order, St. Bonaventure unites this essence with the species, or totum esse, and common nature of individual things as described by Boethius Consult 2 Sent., 18.1.3, Resp. (2.440-42; ed. min., 2.453-56); 3 Sent., 2.2.3, Resp. (3.48-49; ed. min., 3.43-44): cf. 10.1.3, Resp. (3.230-32; ed. min., 3.222-24).

854

GENERAL CONCLUSION

out, for the reasons given above, his view of St. Bonaventure's philosophical doctrines as forming part of a medieval Augustinianism. On this point, his doctrines support the view of Van Steenberghen that the texts cited by Robert, showing St. Bonaventure's admiration for St. Augustine, are not sufficient to characterize St. Bonaventure's philosophy as Augustinian. We have examined these particular texts and our understanding of them differs in some instances from that of Robert. In the first text, which is really one of a group of texts, St. Bonaventure takes the position that the natural philosopher unifies matter according to being, but the metaphysician unifies it according to essence. A theologian taking a metaphysical view of matter, however, unifies it according to essence while differentiating it according to being. St. Bonaventure concludes from this that the theologian has a more universal judgment of the question than either the natural philosopher or the metaphysician; having stated his conclusion, St. Bonaventure remarks that St. Augustine is a most profound metaphysician. Taken in its context, the praise of St. Augustine by St. Bonaventure does not imply that his own position on the question is Augustinian. The position taken by St. Bonaventure depends on his own doctrine, that a self-subsisting substance is stabilized ip existing by an act of being given to the substance by its form. In our subsequent analysis of St. Bonaventure's doctrine, we have shown that it is influenced by sources other than St. Augustine, particularly Aristotle and Boethius. The comparison made by St. Bonaventure between the philosophers and the theologian, then, does not lead to the conclusion that Christian thinkers are the most competent philosophers, or that St. Augusintine is the most profound metaphysician. St. Bonaventure says that, because a theologian can be a metaphysician (and St. Augustine is a very profound one), he can obtain a more universal knowledge of a particular question than the knowledge obtained of it by a natural philosopher or by a metaphysician in their own sciences.5 In the second text cited by Robert, the comparisons made by St. Bonaventure are again between the knowledge acquired by philosophers and the knowledge attained by St. Augustine as a theologian. St. Bonaventure says in this text: Plato follows the way of wisdom only to destroy the way to science, whereas Aristotle follows the way of science while neglecting the way to wisdom; therefore, neither philosopher has attained perfect certitude of knowledge, because each of them has taken an imperfect road to certitude, even though both of them were illumined sufficiently by God to find the perfect road. Naming St. Augustine explicitly as a theologian, St. Bonaventure attributes to him a sufficient excellence of both science and wisdom; but they consist in the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and so they depend on the divine illumination of Christian faith. In his comparison, then, St. Bonaventure is emphasizing the excellence and nobility of St. Augustine's

5 For the texts in question, and our analyses of them, see above: pp. 143-59.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

855

theological knowledge over the philosophical knowledge lacking perfect certitude in Plato and Aristotle. Moreover, by subsequent comparisons, St. Bonaventure shows that Moses and St. Paul, as authors of Scripture inspired by the Holy Spirit, have a more excellent science and wisdom than St. Augustine, who is only an expositor of Scripture. The most excellent science and wisdom, however, are attributed by St. Bonaventure to Christ the uncreated and incarnate Word of God. The whole point of his comparisons, therefore, is to show that our one master of science and wisdom is Christ, who is the source and exemplar of every science and wisdom. St. Bonaventure's comparisons bear out the view of Ratzinger, namely, that St. Bonaventure did not intend to be an Augustinian, but to give Aristotle and St. Augustine (along with Plato) their rightful places in the history of thought. On the other hand, the Bonaventurean synthesis of philosophy bears out Robert's interpretation of the third text cited by him. In this text, which compares St. Augustine as a philosopher with the ancient philosophers, St. Bonaventure records his personal consideration of three important points. Concerning the first one, he sets down a number of question";, which are fundamental to philosophy, that no one, in his judgment, has handled better than St. Augustine. In that way, St. Bonaventure testifies to his considered judgment that St. Augustine is a better philosopher, at least regarding those fundamental questions, than any of the ancient philosophers. Concerning the second point, St. Bonaventure advises Christian students that there are to be found in the writings of the Fathers many philosophical truths not found among the philosophers. For this reason, he counsels his students to go preferably to the writings of the Fathers, particularly St. Augustine. With respect to the third point, St. Bonaventure says that, because many difficulties concerning the understanding of Christian faith cannot be removed without the help of philosophy, the doctrines of the philosophers have a great value for the Christian in his understanding of truth and in his refutation of error. Hence, St. Bonaventure follows St. Augustine in urging Christians to take whatever they need from philosophy and the philosophers, just as the Hebrews started out for the Promised Land with the spoils that they took from the Egyptians. In urging his students to do this. St. Bonaventure is directing them, as they start out in theology, to bring with them what they can take from the doctrines of the philosophers, i.e. those things which, contributing to an understanding of Christian faith, are necessary to understand truth and to refute error.6 This particular text of St. Bonaventure, as Robert has seen, is very important for a proper understanding of his attitude toward historical sources of philosophical doctrines and, as a consequence, of his own use of such sources in developing his philosophical thought. The text contains both in-

6 See also: pp. 566-72.

856

GENERAL CONCLUSION

trinsic and first-hand evidence that St. Bonaventure considers the writings of the Fathers, especially of St. Augustine, to be of primary importance as sources of the philosophical doctrines required by a theologian in acquiring his understanding of Christian faith. The text also contains similar evidence that, in St. Bonaventure's consideration, the doctrines of the philosophers are of secondary importance as sources for the theologian, who uses them according as he needs them to understand truth and to refute error. This does not mean that the doctrines of the philosophers are necessarily inferior to the doctrines of the Fathers. The latter doctrines are preferable because they have already contributed to an understanding of Christian faith; the doctrines of the philosophers take second place because they are used to enrich that understanding either by strenghtening it or by contributing to it a necessary element not found in the writings of the Fathers. St. Bonaventure uses his sources in precisely this way, as his writings bear witness. The number of philosophical elements taken by him from the Fathers and Doctors of the Church far out-weigh the number of those taken from the philosophers. His principal sources of philosophy among Christian thinkers are St. Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius, St. Anselm and St. John Damascene, whom he cites explicitly as a philosopher and a theologian.7 Among the philosophers, Aristotle is the one principal source of St. Bonaventure's doctrine, which depends in small ways on the Arabians, especially on Avicenna, and in a particular way on the Neoplatonists, notably Cicero and Macrobius, with regard to moral philosophy. The intrinsic evidence of St. Bonaventure's texts, then, do not bear out the view of Van Steenberghen that the most important sources of philosophical doctrines available to St. Bonaventure are the writings of Aristotle and those of his commentators. The most important sources of philosophical doctrines for St. Bonaventure, according to his own testimony, are the writings of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, and of the Doctors of the Church. The writings of the philosophers are of less importance as sources to St. Bonaventure, who uses them at his own discretion and without any necessity to account for his knowledge of them or to rely chiefly on his initiation into Aristotelean philosophy, or any other philosophy, in the Parisian Faculty of Arts. As St. Bonaventure's texts show, his most important sources of philosophy among the philosophers are unquestionably the writings of Aristotle; but it does not follow from this that Aristotelean philosophy has to be the basic or fundamental element of St. Bonaventure's own philosophy. The foundation of his philosophical thought can be determined only by a thorough examination of the intrinsic evidence of the multitude of texts showing St. Bonaventure handling questions in a philosophical manner. We have seen St. Bonaventure using his sources to suit his own needs, thinking out a host of philosophical questions both suf7 "Item, per Damascenum, qut philosophus et theologus est ..." 2 Sent., 1.1.3.1, fm. 3 (2.31; ed. min., fm. c, 2.23).

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

857

ficiently and in a formally philosophical way. On this point, his texts support the views of Robert. As a theologian, however, St. Bonaventure is concerned with developing a synthesis of theological rather than of philosophical knowledge. For this reason, his lise of the doctrines of the philosophers and his development of philosophical themes are limited to the contributions that they can make to the formation of this theological thought. As a result, he does not necessarily show in his writings everything that he actually knows either of the doctrines of the philosophers or of their works; he shows only what he needs to make known in order to handle a question that, from his personal point of view, ought to be treated with the help of the philosophers. Hence, what the historian knows of St. Bonaventure's knowledge of the philosophers, according to the intrinsic evidence of his texts, is confined to what he himself has chosen to use in developing his synthesis. Consequently, if his choice of philosophical doctrines is taken as the evidence of what he knows of them rather than as the evidence of how they served to develop his own thought, then his knowledge of the philosophers might well appear to be extensive enough, but without any depth. Our work in drawing together the abundant elements of his philosophical knowledge shows that the doctrines chosen by St. Bonaventure from the philosophers, whether he knows them well or not, are so conformed to his own fundamental principles that those doctrines blend together harmoniously to form with his own thought a unified and coherent synthesis of philosophy. This synthesis is a properly Bonaventurean development and, as the evidence attests, cannot be characterized essentially by any of the names assigned to St. Bonaventure's philosophy by Van Steenberghen.8 There are some particular points in Van Steenberghen's view of St. Bonaventure's philosophical knowledge that do not stand up under the evidence of his texts. St. Bonaventure is said to manifest his inadequate knowledge of Aristotle's doctrine by declaring his inability to settle con8 Likewise, Bonaventurean philosophy cannot be characterized as a Platonizing Aristoteleanism, which is preferred by van der Laan, whose interpretation of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the divine exemplarity cannot be supported by his texts. According to van der Laan, St. Bonaventure posits no separate ideas in God of matter and form, because His ideas are related to the concrete reality consisting only of the thing and not of its limitations. As a consequence, St. Bonaventure's doctrine of exemplarism involves a gap between the divine ideas and the reality, which lacks an ideal structure, and this lack is made good by the formation of a structure according to the Aristotelean scheme of things. (See above: p. 86.) This interpretation of St Bonaventure's doctrine is tantamount to attributing to him an Aristotelean doctrine that he rejects as erroneous, particularly as it has been developed by Aristotle's commentators, namely, that God does not have an idea of each and every thing, of its many properties and elements, in the created universe. There is no gap between the divine ideas and the created universe in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure; he teaches that the whole of creation and its secondary causes depend intrinsically on the primary causation of God, who is the exemplar of all created things. St Bonaventure also teaches that God has a distinct and perfect idea of matter in itself, or as it is said to be an imperfect kind of essence; God does not have distinct ideas of privations or of evils, which He knows from their opposites. Cf. 1 Sent., 36.3.2, Resp. (1.629; ed. min., 1.501).

858

GENERAL CONCLUSION

troverted questions about Aristotelean philosophy. St. Bonaventure really does not go as far as all that. He says on one occasion that he does not know whether Aristotle has posited matter and form as made from nothing; nevertheless, he believes that Aristotle has not posited this, but he is closer to the truth than the other philosophers, because he says that the world has not been made from pre-existing principles. There is no word by St. Bonaventure in this text about a controversy concerning Aristotle's position on the production of matter and form. On a second occasion, St. Bonaventure says that he does not know whether it is more true to say that Aristotle holds the world to be eternal or to say that he intends to prove only that the world has not begun by natural motion. The first alternative is supported by the theologians, by Aristotle's commentators, and by the implication of his own words; the second alternative has the support only of thinkers who are contemporaries of St. Bonaventure. If the second alternative is true, then Aristotle is right, according to St. Bonaventure; if the first alternative is true, Aristotle is in error, and St. Bonaventure attributes the error to Aristotle, who speaks of avoiding contradiction by holding either that the world has not been made or that it has not been made from nothing. With regard to this question, which is controverted, St. Bonaventure gives clear and adequate reasons for his hesitation: the conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine as it is understood by the theologians and Aristotle's commentators on the one side and, on the other, by more contemporary thinkers; nonetheless, manifesting his own knowledge of Aristotelean philosophy, St. Bonaventure uses its principles to show how Aristotle, if he had known that the world has come to-be from nothing, could have concluded that the world had to have a beginning in time. The evidence of this entire text indicates that St. Bonaventure is not declaring his inability to settle controverted questions about Aristotelean philosophy, thus manifesting his inadequate knowledge of it.9 There are two occasions in St. Bonaventure's late writings when he returns to this particular question, which was not settled but still controverted up to the condemnation of 1277. On the first occasion, he refers to his consternation on hearing, as a student in Arts, the reasons and arguments that Aristotle brings forward to show that the world is eternal. On this occasion, which was in 1267, St. Bonaventure says, seeing the attitude of certain Parisian masters, that there is no longer any doubt about the implications of those reasons and arguments, which have become the grounds of the erroneous opinions of Arabian philosophers, particularly Averroes. St. Bonaventure himself, as we have seen, was well aware of those implications when he produced his early writings. On the second occasion, which was in 1273, he speaks of Aristotle's doctrine in much the same way as in the Sentences, i.e. he refers to the conflicting opinions concerning it, but he attributes to Aristotle the

9 See above: pp. 591-601.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

859

error of holding the world to be eternal; at the same time, he excuses Aristotle for this error. 10 St. Bonaventure's philosophy is said by Van Steenberghen to have Aristotle for its point of departure, because Aristotle's philosophy is the stem on which St. Bonaventure has grafted Neoplatonic and particularly Augustinian doctrines. The texts of St. Bonaventure show that, in treating philosophical questions, he has a twofold point of departure. In some instances, without invoking any philosophical authority, he sets out solely from the evidence provided by human experience, which is based on sense knowledge and is, therefore, the primary foundation of his philosophical knowledge. In other instances, maintaining that primary foundation, he sets out by exploring a question as it has been treated by this or by that authority, or by several authorities, whose doctrines St. Bonaventure has chosen to use in developing his own position on the question. Thus, the facts of human experience, as St. Bonaventure understands it, constitute the stem on to which he has grafted not only Augustinian doctrines, but also Aristotelean doctrines and all the other doctrines that he chooses to transform according to his personal principles of philosophical knowledge. This mode of procedure may seem to produce an eclectic system having no real unity because of a juxtaposing of a variety of doctrines taken from different sources. But this is not the product of St. Bonaventure's philosophical endeavours. He has produced a really unified synthesis of which the stem and the roots are his own experience and philosophical principles, and they are of such a kind that they can and do give new life to the many doctrines, or branches of philosophical knowledge, that he cares to graft on to the tree of his own knowledge, which is grounded in human experience. In giving new life to the philosophical doctrines incorporated into his synthesis, St. Bonaventure transforms the life-giving principles supporting those doctrines in their original sources. He transforms, for instance, the Aristotelean principles of act and potency by his own principles of being and existing, thus giving a really new direction to the Aristotelean principles of form and matter, a direction enabling his synthesis to receive, to contain and to blend harmoniously with them the Augustinian doctrine on the production and the formation of created substances. This way of developing a philosophical

10 See above: pp. 620-23. The real difficulty about Aristotle's position on the eternity of the world, as the prolonged controversy affirms, has to do with the texts of Aristotle's writings on the question. St. Thomas takes the view that Aristotle has given only probable reasons, but never demonstrative reasons, for the eternity of the world; several of the contemporaries of St. Thomas did not concur with him on this point, and there are many historians today who do not, particularly with respect to the reasons given by Aristotle in the 8th book of his Physics. (See above: pp. 635-49.) It should be noted here that St. Thomas, strangely enough, does not say whether or not he thinks or believes that Aristotle holds the world to be made from nothing; he is anxious only to show that what Aristotle says about motion requiring a preexisting subject is not contrary to Christian faith, and so it is not contrary to Aristotle's principles to say that a whole being must come to-be from nothing. (See above: pp. 629-30.)

860

GENERAL CONCLUSION

synthesis is no more eclectic than the way in which Aristotle himself develops his doctrine on the principles of form and matter, or on the four causes of natural things, in the first books of his Physics and Metaphysics. Aristotle follows a similar procedure in his De anima when he develops his knowledge of the human soul. St. Bonaventure's method of developing his synthesis gives a truly original direction to the doctrines that he uses to form it, just as Aristotle's method gives a really new direction to the doctrines of his predecessors, whose positions he transforms on the basis of his own principles. In short, the doctrine of Aristotle and the philosophical doctrines of Christian thinkers enter the philosophical synthesis of St. Bonaventure in a way similar to the one in which the doctrine of Plato and the doctrines of other ancient philosophers enter the synthesis of Aristotle. " Question of Christian Philosophy

This question has to do with Gilson's view, and the various reactions of other historians to his view, of St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a Christian philosophy. In handling the question, we shall first set down the main features of Gilson's position. That done, his position will be discussed to show how it does or does not conform to the texts of St. Bonaventure; at the same time, it will be shown whether or not the views of other historians, reacting to Gilson's position, are borne out by St. Bonaventure's texts. This will be followed by a consideration of some points raised by the historians concerning St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a doctrine developed within his theology. Gilson has said that St. Bonaventure's philosophy, because of its dependence on his theology, could not remain true if it were separated from the illumination of faith and the single order of a Christian wisdom. St. Bonaventure, drawing up an Augustinian synthesis of Christian philosophy, never keeps his philosophy apart from the Christian tradition. But he could not deny the formal distinction of faith from reason, or of theology from philosophy, because of the historical fact of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. In Gilson's view, St. Bonaventure judges those philosophies to be unable to avoid error, because they lack the illumination of Christian faith. Plato's philosophy is true in principle, since it tends toward God as its proper object; but Plato has not known the true end of man, and so, not knowing Christ, he has erred by resting finally in natural reason. Aristotle's philosophy is false in principle, since it tends toward earthly things; his philosophy contains the error of an eternal world ruled by fate and con11 Van Steenberghen's view of St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism could be reconciled with the texts of St. Bonaventure, if the writings of the philosophers alone were taken as primary sources of philosophical doctrines; in this event, the writings of Christian thinkers would not be as important as those of the philosophers, because the philosophical elements in the writings of theologians form part of their theological thought

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

861

trolled by separate intelligences. St. Bonaventure overcomes the errors of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophies by constructing a Christian philosophy having God as its true object. This philosophy, receiving its object from Christian faith, is constituted by a coexistence of faith and philosophy in regard to God, who must be known and believed at the same time and in the same respect. As a Christian philosophy in the Augustinian tradition, St. Bonaventure's philosophy relies essentially for its object on Christian faith; nevertheless, the content of his philosophy consists in truths demonstrated by human reason. Consequently, as a Christian philosopher, St. Bonaventure respects the proper orders of reason and revelation, but he considers revelation to be a source of light for his reason. In Gilson's view, then, St. Bonaventure makes his philosophy to be a department of his theology. He reduces reason and philosophy to Christian wisdom in such a way that, never distinguishing his philosophy concretely from his theology, he prefers to be theologically correct at the expense of reason, and so he solves problems in the natural order by making his philosophy to rely on a supernatural principle. His philosophy could not remain Christian, therefore, if it were separated from the theology to which St. Bonaventure himself has reduced it. 1 2 We must say, first of all, that the texts of St. Bonaventure do not support Gilson's view of Bonaventurean philosophy as unable to remain true if it were separated from the illumination of faith and the single order of a Christian wisdom. Bonaventurean philosophy does not depend essentially on an illumination of faith or on a single order of Christian wisdom. St. Bonaventure's texts do not show, moreover, that he has drawn up an Augustinian synthesis of Christian philosophy, even though he has a philosophy belonging to the Christian tradition, i.e. a philosophy formed and developed under the control of Christian faith and for theological ends. On these points, the texts of St. Bonaventure bear out the views of other historians, particularly De Wulf, Van Steenberghen and Robert. De Wulf has insisted that St. Bonaventure has observed the autonomy of philosophy in regard to theology with respect to their proper principles and objects,

12 Gilson's position, to be fully appreciated, has to be seen in his wider perspective of every medieval philosophy as a Christian philosophy, especially the philosophies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. As Gilson defines it, a Christian philosophy has a content of rational truths discovered and explored, or safeguarded, with the help received by reason from revelation. This help sets up an intrinsic relation between reason and revelation, thus enabling a Christian philosophy to establish certain truths known by revelation, but open to reason's investigation. The truth of a Christian philosophy depends on its rational content, whereas its constitution depends on the help of revelation, which gives to the philosophy a positive content of a specifically Christian origin. From this point of view, Christian philosophy is a species of philosophy with many systems, each owing its existence to the influence of the Christian religion: taken concretely, the various systems have their individual differences; taken commonly, they have specifically Christian characteristics, particularly a theological order of development, which is their most characteristic trait. A Christian philosophy is, therefore, one respecting the formal distinction between reason and revelation while considering Christian revelation to be an indispensable aid to reason.

862

GENERAL CONCLUSION

even though, in the final analysis, his philosophy is subordinated to his theology. St. Bonaventure completes his philosophy with Christian faith; but this does not mean that his philosophy is a Christian philosophy, because the influence of faith is extrinsic to his philosophy, as a philosophy. Van Steenberghen maintains that the thirteenth-century theologians have never intended to compose a Christian philosophy. In his view, Gilson is wrong in presenting as St. Bonaventure's philosophy a mutilated exposition of his theology. Although his philosophy is an instrument of his theological speculation, nonetheless, Van Steenberghen points out, the historian could distinguish in St. Bonaventure's theological synthesis the data of revelation from the truths established by reason. St. Bonaventure does not have a Christian philosophy, because he distinguishes philosophy as a work of reason from the use of philosophy by a theologian in his scientific elaboration of sacred doctrine, or in his personal acquisition of a theological wisdom. Robert, concurring with Van Steenberghen on this question, shows that St. Bonaventure has not constructed a Christian philosophy. He distinguishes the principles, methods and objects of philosophy from those of theology; but he also fulfils the aspirations of both philosophy and theology by uniting them in a Christian wisdom. The texts of St. Bonaventure, as we have seen, show very clearly that he attributes to human reason a natural ability to know truth with certitude and without the aid of an illumination of faith. Furthermore, he teaches explicitly that human reason is illumined by God in the order of nature, so that a philosophical science can attain the truth of its own objects, even with an infallible certitude, from the connatural principles of knowledge in the memory. Every philosophical science is grounded in human experience and, relying formally on the natural lumen of reason, acquires knowledge of its objects by demonstrating their truth from the first principles of knowledge through the mediation of the second principles obtained by way of abstraction, which depends on sense knowledge. The philosophical sciences acquire certitude of truth in understanding the properties and the natures of things according to their principles and causes; but the sciences acquire complete certitude of truth in understanding the created principles and causes of things according to their eternal reasons in God, who is the uncreated principle and cause of all things. When a philosopher knows that he has complete certitude of truth regarding the objects of his science, he is said by St. Bonaventure to have an infallible certitude, because he knows that his knowledge of them cannot be otherwise than it is, and so he knows that what he knows is necessarily true according to the principles of natural reason, which depends on the eternal reason of God. In handling philosophical problems, St. Bonaventure proceeds according to the method that he sets down as proper to the philosophical sciences. Although he philosophizes under the control of Christian faith and for theological ends, nevertheless, both the control of faith and his theological

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

863

ends remain extrinsic to his philosophical reasoning. The truths that he establishes in this way depend intrinsically on the natural illumination of reason and not on the divine illumination of faith. Wherefore, the truth of his philosophy does not depend on either the illumination of faith or on a single order of Christian wisdom. While it is true, as Gilson has stressed, that St. Bonaventure's philosophy is constituted within the order of his theology, even so, his philosophy is formed and developed within the theological order of an integral whole. This order allows his philosophy to stand on its own ground and to proceed in its own way until it is added inseparably to the object of belief within the theological order of a universal whole. Consequently, St. Bonaventure's philosophy can be separated as a true philosophy from his theology in accordance with its order as an integral whole, but not in accordance with its order as a universal whole. Since his philosophy is developed in a properly philosophical way within the integral order of his theological synthesis, therefore, when his philosophy is separated from his theology, his philosophy cannot have a theological order of development, and so it simply cannot be exposed in a theological way. Because his philosophy is an essential constituent of his theological synthesis according to its order as a universal whole, the philosophical constituent of that synthesis, as a universal whole, cannot be exposed as St. Bonaventure's philosophy, not even with a theological order of development. On these points, Van Steenberghen's understanding of St. Bonaventure's philosophy is borne out by his doctrine. Van Steenberghen has seen that St. Bonaventure's philosophy is an element of his theological synthesis, or a step on his way to Christian wisdom: as autonomous knowledge, his philosophy is constituted by its proper principles and methods; as an instrument of theological science, his philosophy has a subalternate role and is no longer autonomous, because, as a constituent element of St. Bonaventure's theology, his philosophy is subordinated to the articles of faith, or to the truths of revelation. His philosophy could be removed from his theological writings and, according to his own conception of philosophical science, it could be reconstituted from the copious materials embedded in his writings. Gilson does not think that this can be done, because St. Bonaventure has chosen, as has St. Thomas, to build a Christian philosophy. Van Steenberghen takes the opposite view, because St. Bonaventure, with St. Thomas, has distinguished philosophy from theology according to their proper orders and methods of exposition. 13 13 Gilson has conceded to Van Steenberghen that he is correct in saying that St. Bonaventure's philosophy, as Gilson presents it, is a mutilated exposition of his theology; however, Gilson maintains his position on the ground that St. Bonaventure's philosophy is real only when seen within his theology, and this holds true for the philosophy of every medieval theologian. Van Steenberghen admits, Gilson says, that the philosophy of St. Thomas is as truly heteronomous as that of St. Bonaventure; in Gilson's view, this seems to reduce medieval philosophy to the product of the Latin Averroists. The separation of medieval philosophies from their theologies, Gilson holds, tends to reduce those philosophies, lacking originality, to a common technique, thus confusing them with Aristotle's philosophy as it is received from

864

GENERAL CONCLUSION

With regard to the same points, St. Bonaventure's doctrine supports the views of De Wulf and Mandonnet, who have insisted that the philosophy of St. Bonavent-ure, and of St. Thomas, ought not to be exposed in a theological order. Mandonnet's view of St. Bonaventure's philosophy, however, is not upheld by his texts. Although his philosophy is conditioned by theological aims and is blended with Christian faith, as Mandonnet says, even so, the theological aims condition St. Bonaventure's philosophical thinking solely in an extrinsic manner, and his philosophy is united to faith only on the theological ground of a universal whole. Moreover, Mandonnet maintains that St. Bonaventure does not have a formal distinction of philosophy from theology, so that his doctrine is a total wisdom confusing reason and revelatjon while blurring the boundaries of nature and grace. St. Bonaventure, as we have seen, always distinguishes philosophy from theology as the science and wisdom of reason from the science and wisdom of faith. Though he unites philosophy to faith on the universal ground of his own theology, St. Bonaventure does not confuse reason with revelation, nor does he blur the boundaries of nature and grace. He teaches, for example, that the truth of a speculative science is no more pleasing or displeasing to God than His natural image in man; to be pleasing to God, His image must be reformed by grace, and the human intellect must be rectified by faith. This teaching is founded on a formal distinction of reason from revelation and of nature from grace. Chenu concurs with De Wulf and Mandonnet in saying that the philosophies of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas ought to be exposed in a philosophical, and not in a theological, order of development. For his own part, Chenu grants to Gilson that the philosophies of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas could be called Christian according as they are open to the supernatural; but a theological order of development does not transform a pure philosophy into a Christian philosophy, because philosophy is always autonomous even when obeying the demands of theology. Now, as we understand the texts of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, their philosophies are open to the supernatural as nature is open to grace, which perfects nature in its own order while elevating it to a higher order of being. The illumination of faith perfects reason in its own order and elevates it to a higher order of truth; by perfecting reason in its own order, faith enables the Christian philosopher to think better, or at least more inerrantly, than the non-Christian philosopher about some things, particularly divine things; by elevating reason to a higher order of truth, faith provides the theologian with the subject of his science, which is beyond the natural capacity of human reason. Hence, in Avicenna and Averroes. The reintegration of medieval philosophies within their theologies would show the originality both of the philosophies and of their authors, for philosophical thought became creative in its theological function. Hence, the understanding of Christian faith should not be separated from it; nor should faith be separated from its own understanding, because medieval philosophy owes its fecundity to its instrumental r&le in theology. (See above: pp. 59-60.)

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

865

the first instance, the Christian philosopher has a better ability than the non-Christian philosopher to develop a true philosophy, but not a Christian philosophy; in the second instance, the theologian can develop a theologial science with the subordinate aid of his philosophy. Thus, the texts of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas support the position of Van Steenberghen that they are Christian philosophers with true philosophies, but not with Christian philosophies. Gilson, replying to Chenu, says that he is not aware of any philosopher formulating a philosophy open to the supernatural. On the other hand, Gilson, replying also to Mandonnet, concedes that a philosophy, to be Christian, need not be exposed in a theological order, which is not an intrinsic mark of a Christian philosophy. A theological order, however, from the historical viewpoint, makes it possible to see the controlling influence of faith on reason. This influence, according to Gilson, confers a Christian character on a philosophy. A Christian philosophy could be exposed in a non-theological order, but this would diminish its Christian character. In our understanding of St. Bonaventure's texts, his philosophy is marked extrinsically by its development within the integral order of his theology: his philosophy is developed chiefly with a view to fulfilling the needs of his theology; as a consequence, his choice of philosophical materials is determined to a large extent by the theological truths that he intends to establish. Although this does not make his philosophy a Christian philosophy, nonetheless, as Gilson says, St. Bonaventure's philosophy is the product of a Christian philosopher, and so it manifests, though extrinsically, the controlling influence of his Christian faith.14 The second point to be considered is Gilson's view of St. Bonaventure's attitude toward the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. The texts of St. Bonaventure do not show that he has judged those philosophies to be unable to avoid error because they lack an illumination of faith. His texts show, rather, that non-Christian philosophers, because they are not illumined by faith, cannot avoid error on some things, especially divine 14 Gilson has said that medieval theologians did not begin with the philosophical sciences and then adapt them to theology; they began with faith and in its light transformed the sciences in order to take them into theology, and so each theologian reinterpreted the sciences in his own way to give them, especially metaphysics, an entirely new meaning. As a result, medieval philosophies owe their greatness to their theologies and to the theologians producing those theologies. (See the previous note.) Van Steenberghen has maintained that the medieval theologians, using philosophy in an instrumental way, have studied the common data of revelation, so that their theological systems differed by the philosophies introduced to them. The variety and originality of medieval theologies, then, is to be found mainly in the philosophical order. Thus, the value of medieval philosophies is due to their authors not as theologians, but as mature in their philosophical thinking, a necessity for a good theologian. (See: Philos. Movcm. Thirt. Cent., pp. 106-14; Hist, de la philos., pp. 170-75.) These contrary views of Gilson and Van Steenberghen can be reconciled, at least concerning St. Bonaventure: his philosophy owes much to the fact of its development for theological ends and within the theological order of an integral whole; at the same time, his theology owes much to the instrumental use within it of the philosophy that he has constituted for this purpose.

866

GENERAL CONCLUSION

things. Likewise, the Christian philosopher must be guided by his faith in order to escape error in his thinking about certain things that he also knows from revelation. St. Bonaventure never attributes error to the science or wisdom of philosophy, which is naturally inerrant as a habitus of truth. He attributes error to the philosophers, who have mixed up falsehood with the truth of philosophy. Moreover, he does not contrast Plato's philosophy as true in principle, because it is turned toward God as its object, with Aristotle's philosophy as false in principle, because it is turned toward earthly things. St. Bonaventure is contrasting the wisdom of Plato with the science of Aristotle: Plato's wisdom lacks a foundation in science, but Aristotle's science lacks a completion in wisdom; so the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle lack perfection in certitude, for the two philosophers follow imperfect roads to certitude. While it is true that St. Bonaventure attributes error to the Platonists because they rested finally in natural reason, even so, it is also true that he excuses them for falling into that error because of their invincible ignorance of Christ and of His healing grace. St. Bonaventure has excused, on similar grounds, the mistakes of Aristotle regarding things that he could not know without an illumination of faith. The texts of St. Bonaventure, then, do not bear out Gilson's view that St. Bonaventure overcomes the errors of Plato and Aristotle by constructing a Christian philosophy with God as its true object. St. Bonaventure has not said that God is the object of any philosophy, particularly of his own philosophy; nor has he said that his philosophy receives its object from Christian faith, so that it is constituted by a coexistence of faith and philosophy in regard to God, who is to be believed and known at the same time and in the same respect. St. Bonaventure says explicitly that the Christian can have at the same time, but according to different respects and conditions, knowledge and belief concerning some divine truths, such as the truth of God as the Creator. The term coexistence, as St. Bonaventure uses it, signifies an accidental union of two things; if the term is employed to signify the union of faith and philosophy in his doctrine, the term can designate only an accidental union of faith and philosophy, which is not sufficient to constitute a Christian philosophy.15 The views of other historians on these particular points are in accord with St. Bonaventure's texts. Mandonnet considers the Bonaventurean doctrine presented as a Christian philosophy by Gilson to be unreal, because its validity depends on a necessary concourse of reason with faith. Mandonnet finds Gilson confusing the objects of philosophy and theology; as a result, he produces as a philosophical system a material presentation rather than a formal presentation of St. Bonaventure's doctrine. His philosophy could be presented intelligibly, Mandonnet notes, if its principles were taken apart from his theology, a possibility seen but not actualized by 15 For the significance of coexistence in St. Bonaventure's doctrine see above: pp. 249-51.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

867

Gilson. From an examination of St. Bonaventure's texts, Robert rejects Gilson's view of Bonaventurean philosophy as a Christian philosophy. Robert shows that Gilson has confused the end with the object of philosophy as St. Bonaventure considers it; this confusion results from Gilson's mistaken position that, for St. Bonaventure, a purely rational science of God is impossible, since He must be both known and believed at the same time and in the same respect. Our own examination of St. Bonaventure's texts leads to the same conclusions reached by Robert: God is the end and not the object of philosophy, which does not need an illumination of faith in order to know truth with certitude; the truth of created things is the proper object of philosophy, which can be an occasion of error, but never its cause, though a Christian philosopher must recognize the due limits of philosophical investigation to avoid error in his reasoning. With regard to St. Bonaventure's late writings, Robert's view conforms completely to the texts, which do not show St. Bonaventure preferring a Christian philosophy while condemning autonomous philosophies. In these writings, as Robert indicates, St. Bonaventure is contrasting a form of mundane wisdom with Christian wisdom; he is not speaking about the autonomy of philosophy, but about the legacy bequeathed to Christians in the philosophical sciences that St. Bonaventure describes as a threefold ray of truth directing the mind to God as the first cause of creatures. Nor is St. Bonaventure denouncing a false outlook on the universe in Aristotle as opposed to a true outlook on it in Plato; the object of his denunciation is the false separation of the world from God by those Parisian masters who refuse to put the world under God. This denunciation is made on the level of Christian wisdom, where St. Bonaventure finds that natural reason alone is insufficient to satisfy man's aspirations concerning his final destiny. Van Steenberghen expresses a similar view of St. Bonaventure's late writings, which he sees as containing a defence of the unity of Christian wisdom against the pagan ideal of a separate philosophy holding forth as a supreme and definitive wisdom. As Van Steenberghen points out, St. Bonaventure's defence includes a distinction of theology from philosophy and an attribution to philosophy of its own principles, method and object. Thus, on the one hand, he attributes to philosophy the capacity to know truth with certitude; at the same time, he recognizes the positive value of philosophy to the theologian, who can unite its conclusions to the truths of faith. On the other hand, St. Bonaventure is aware of the limits of human reason, and so he teaches that philosophy, unaided by revelation, is exposed inevitably to error concerning God and His action in the world. Considering St. Bonaventure's texts, Van Steenberghen sees him excusing the errors of Aristotle, who could not have known the mysteries of revelation. For this reason, Van Steenberghen rejects Gilson's interpretation of those texts as a condemnation of pagan philosophies, particularly of Aristotelean philosophy. St. Bonaventure's ideal of Christian wisdom controls his judgment of the attitude of the Christian philosopher toward philosophical

868

GENERAL CONCLUSION

research, which is only a step on the road to Christian wisdom. Urging the Christian philosopher to keep his mind open to the light of faith, St. Bonaventure denounces the errors of those particular masters who separate philosophy from Christian wisdom by ignoring Christ's authority and by trying to make philosophy a self-sufficient wisdom. It does not follow from this, Van Steenberghen concludes, that St. Bonaventure's philosophy is either Christocentric or a Christian philosophy.16 Van der Laan, concurring with Van Steenberghen, also holds the view that St. Bonaventure, never condemning all autonomy in philosophy, excuses Aristotle's mistakes because of his ignorance of revelation. In van der Laan's view, however, Gilson is correct in saying that St. Bonaventure neither distinguishes philosophy from theology nor recognizes the possibility of a philosophy separate from theology. For this reason, he adopts a critical attitude toward Aristotle, whose philosophy he condemns as erroneous. Gilson is saying, according to van der Laan, that St. Bonaventure is rejecting the sort of autonomy which makes philosophy to be selfsufficient by placing it outside the twofold order of nature and grace. A philosophy is self-sufficient, van der Laan explains, when it is outside the frame of nature and grace; a philosophy is autonomous when it is inside that frame, which allows reason and philosophy to operate according to their own principles and methods. Hence, Gilson finds that St. Bonaventure does not recognize the autonomy of philosophy within the frame, or twofold order, of nature and grace. Van der Laan reaches his conclusion from Gilson's attribution to St. Bonaventure of a metaphysics of Christian wisdom depending on the coincidence of faith and reason, or on the coexistence of faith and philosophy. This view of Gilson's position and of St. Bonaventure's attitude toward philosophy is not in accord with the writings of the one or the texts of the other. Gilson has said that St. Bonaventure could not deny the formal distinction of philosophy from theology because of the historical fact of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. In his own synthesis, however, St. Bonaventure never distinguishes philosophy concretely from theology. Gilson has also said, as Mandonnet notes, that St. Bonaventure recognizes the possibility of natural reason contructing an ideal philosophy; but such a philosophy, lacking an

16 In our view, considering St. Bonaventure's clear distinction of reason from faith, his philosophy cannot be called Christocentric: when he assigns to Christ the origin of natural knowledge, St. Bonaventure is appropriating theologically to Christ as the Divine Word the exemplar causality of natural truth; this causality is also attributed by St. Bonaventure in a philosophical way to the divine essence, which can be known by natural reason and without the aid of Christian faith. It is more correct to say, moreover, that Christ is the medium through which natural knowledge is taken back to the Trinity, which is the central theme of St. Bonaventure's theological doctrine. In this respect, as Robert indicates, St. Bonaventure could not have opposed St. Thomas for failing to put Christ at the centre of his philosophy. Indeed, as we have seen and as Van Steenberghen shows, the attitude of St. Thomas toward the errors of non-Christian philosophers is not essentially different from the attitude of St. Bonaventure.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

869

illumination of faith, could not attain infallible certitude, and so Gilson sees St. Bonaventure adopting a critical attitude toward both Platonic and Aristotelean philosophies. Although Gilson says that St. Bonaventure rejects a philosophy not illumined by Christian faith, nevertheless, it is not within a frame of nature and grace, each following its own order, that Gilson takes his position regarding either a Christian philosophy in St. Bonaventure or his attitude toward an autonomy which makes philosophy to be self-sufficient. Gilson's position is taken from the necessity that he sees, in St. Bonaventure's doctrine, for reason and faith to form a unified order, which is an order of Christian love. With respect to St. Bonaventure's attitude toward philosophy, his texts show very clearly that he recognizes the autonomy of philosophy as the science and wisdom of natural reason. This autonomy is proper to philosophy quite apart from any theological order or frame of nature and grace. What St. Bonaventure rejects is the philosophy of certain Christian masters who claim that it can be self-sufficient in regard to Christian faith. He rejects their philosophy because of its corruption by the errors of non-Christian philosophers. The Christian masters ought to have removed those errors, thus doing a service to philosophy, which is a gift from God to man in the order of nature. Van der Laan's view of St. Bonaventure's attitude toward philosophy, however, can be reconciled with his texts. In handling the question of Christian philosophy, van der Laan bases his position on a distinction between theology and the sciences: theology depends on a supernatural light; the sciences, culminating in philosophy, depends on a natural light. From this position, van der Laan sees St. Bonaventure stressing the progressive character of philosophical investigations and the supernatural direction that they ought to take within a theological frame. He also sees St. Bonaventure insisting that a self-sufficient philosophy cannot take man to his final end. The third and last point to be discussed is Gilson's description of St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a Christian philosophy in the Augustinian tradition. Gilson speaks of St. Augustine as inaugurating an era of Christian philosophy by transforming in the light of faith, though in a rational way, the Plotinian doctrine of emanation into a Christian doctrine of creation. St. Augustine has given to thirteenth-century thought its most stable element, namely, the central theme of the Christian God as a Divinity of Being or Essence. Many different accounts of the world and of the plight of the soul on its way to God have revolved around that central theme of medieval Augustinianism, which has its best exponent in St. Bonaventure. His philosophy, in the Augustinian tradition, relies essentially for its object on Christian faith; nevertheless, the content of his philosophy consists in truths demonstrated by reason. St. Bonaventure is a Christian philosopher who respects the proper orders of reason and revelation, but he considers revelation to be a source of light for his reason. He has made his own philosophy a department of his theology, so that his philosophy could

870

GENERAL CONCLUSION

no longer be Christian if it were separated from the theology to which St. Bonaventure himself has reduced it. The theme of the Christian God, or the Trinity, is indeed the central motif of St. Bonaventure's theology, but not of his philosophy. Although he looks upon God in the philosophical order as Being or Essence, even so, as we have shown, his philosophical understanding of- God is not typically Augustinian; it contains in a constitutive way elements from other sources, especially from St. Anselm, but also from Boethius and Aristotle. St. Bonaventure's account of the world and of the soul in its journey to God revolves around His presence in creation rather than around the Christian God. His presence in creation is considered from a twofold point of view by St. Bonaventure. He considers it, in the first place, from the viewpoint of reason and philosophy; this consideration, which is based on natural knowledge, begins with the being and properties of created things and, having arrived at the divine essence as their cause, termintes in a contemplation of God as He is present in natural things, which are His effects. St. Bonaventure's second consideration is based on Christian faith and its revelation of the Trinity. That consideration begins with the Divinity as a Trinity and, without losing sight of the Trinity, goes down to created things of both nature and grace, but principally of grace. Thereafter, the presence of the Trinity is contemplated in creatures, which are seen to resemble the triune God; their resemblance is founded on an appropriation of their threefold properties to the three persons of the Trinity. The first consideration is a philosophical preparation for the second, which is theological; so, as St. Bonaventure says explicitly, the philosophical sciences are the natural means aiding the Christian in his theological approach to God along the road of Christian wisdom. Thus, in reducing the philosophical sciences to the wisdom of theology, St. Bonaventure is showing his Franciscan students how those sciences ought to serve the theologian in his progress on the way to Christian wisdom. Van Steenberghen has described this aspect of St. Bonaventure's synthesis as manifesting his effort to give an organic unity to Christian wisdom. While unifying Christian wisdom, St. Bonaventure organizes every phase of knowledge in a synthesis subordinating the sciences to Scripture within a dynamic order of his personal quest for the supreme truth and the supreme good. As a result, the sciences become steps of perfection in the journey to God, and so the journey constitutes a Franciscan wisdom, or a very rich theology of the spiritual life. This does not mean, as Van Steenberghen points out, that St. Bonaventure's philosophy, taking philosophy in the strict sense, is either a Franciscan or a Christian philosophy. Nonetheless, apart from calling that philosophy Franciscan and Christian, Gilson's view of it is borne out by St. Bonaventure's texts: his philosophy, as it is transformed by Christian faith, is inseparable from his theology to which, on the ground of a universal whole, he has reduced it; so, on this ground, his philosophy is not distinct concretely from his theology. But it does not follow that he

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

871

makes his philosophy rely on a supernatural principle in order to solve problems in the natural order, thus preferring to be theologically correct at the expense of reason. When reasoning on the integral ground of his theology, St. Bonaventure relies intrinsically and formally on the natural light of reason to solve problems in the natural order. In solving those problems, he uses his philosophical principles and follows the modes of reasoning belonging to the philosophical sciences as he understands them. St. Bonaventure's texts show that he handles philosophical problems with a view to an understanding of Christian faith; but they do not show that, with regard to such problems, he prefers to be theologically correct at the expense of reason, which he values as the necessary foundation for faith and theology. It is true, nevertheless, as Gilson says, that St. Bonaventure considers revelation to be a source of light for his reason. This consideration, however, looks to the guidance received from the lumen of faith in thinking philosophically about certain truths that are believed but are also demonstrable by reason. St. Bonaventure is guided extrinsically by his faith, which prevents him from reaching erroneous conclusions in his demonstrations; but the true conclusions that he attains are drawn from philosophical principles by means of reasons supported by human experience. Hence, as Gilson maintains, the content of St. Bonaventure's philosophy consists in truths demonstrated according to reason; however, it cannot be maintained that his philosophy relies essentially for its object on Christian faith. Rather, as Gilson has seen, St. Bonaventure respects the proper orders of reason and revelation; so, as his texts show, his philosophy relies for its object on the evidence provided by sense knowledge, which is the proper foundation of all philosophical investigation as St. Bonaventure describes it. There are some divine truths that he knows both by revelation and by philosophical investigation, such the unity of the divine essence. These truths are common in a material way to faith and philosophy; but they are formal objects of faith, whereas they are known by philosophy at the end of its investigations. Consequently, as St. Bonaventure himself teaches, theology begins where philosophy ends, namely, at God, who is the proper object of theological knowledge." There are some points to be considered in the views of the historians concerning St. Bonaventure's philosophy as a doctrine developed within his theology. The first point has to do with Christian philosophy as a historical 17 Robert has shown clearly from St. Bonaventure's texts the differences between his theological and philosophical considerations of the same truths. De Wulf sees Gilson presenting as the Christian philosophy of St. Bonaventure the apologetical aspects of his theology. In his own view, De Wulf sees philosophy to be coordinated with theology, which receives from philosophy both the dialectic method and certain truths to be used as motives of credibility. But philosophy is also subordinated to theology, which exercises an extrinsic control over the conclusions of rational speculation while giving to philosophy certain rational truths contained in revelation. Hence, philosophy and theology have a material community, but never a formal identity, of principles and objects, though philosophy is ultimately a step on the road to the perfection of theology.

872

GENERAL CONCLUSION

name for Bonaventurean philosophy. It must be said that the name, as Gilson uses it, cannot be applied to Bonaventurean philosophy, if philosophy is taken in the strict sense. The name Christian philosophy is used by St. Augustine to designate the way of life according to the teaching of Scripture. His use of the name follows the meaning of philosophy as a love of wisdom; so, in his doctrine, Christian philosophy means a love of Christ, who is the true Wisdom. In Van Steenberghen's view, the name Christian philosophy as St. Augustine uses it does not designate a scientific philosophy; the name stands for a Christian wisdom in which philosophy, in the strict sense, is not differentiated from theology. From this point of view, Christian philosophy is a Christian wisdom with a total and distinctively Christian outlook on the world and human life. It is in this sense, according to Van Steenberghen, that one can speak historically of Christian philosophy existing under the influence of St. Augustine down to the end of the twelfth century. Van Steenberghen describes St. Bonaventure as giving to Augustinian wisdom a structure and an organic unity while taking account of cultural progress since St. Augustine's time. This reformation of Augustinian wisdom is achieved under the influence of a Franciscan ideal of the Christian life. St. Bonaventure reorganizes human science interiorly and, through faith, subordinates it to the science of God. In that way, he prolongs and develops Augustinian wisdom while producing a Franciscan wisdom, which is a very rich theology of the spiritual life. The texts that we have seen in St. Bonaventure on the meaning of wisdom and of Christian philosophy bear out the views of Van Steenberghen in most respects. In particular, however, St. Bonaventure's texts do not show that his Christian wisdom is an Augustinian wisdom, or that he has reformed Augustinian wisdom. He speaks of four meanings given to wisdom, two in the speculative order and two in the practical order. In the speculative order, wisdom means commonly a general knowledge of things, or a knowledge of things human and divine; it means less commonly a knowledge of the highest causes, or a knowledge of eternal things. In the practical order, wisdom means properly a knowledge of God according to piety, or the knowledge of God according to the worship of the Christian religion; it means also properly and in a better way an experiential knowledge of God as He is known and loved through the gift of the Holy Spirit. The two common meanings of wisdom are taken from Aristotle and St. Augustine. The first proper meaning of the term is taken exclusively from St. Augustine; its truly proper meaning is based on the doctrines of St. Gregory, Dionysius and St. Bernard.18 Thus, the Christian wisdom of St. Bonaventure is properly the wisdom of the Christian religion, but even more the gift of wisdom coming from the Holy Spirit. Now, speaking of evangelical perfection, St. Bonaventure says that its summit consists in humility, which is the gateway to wisdom. The

18 See above: pp. 409-18.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

873

wisdom that he has in mind includes not only the order of love and experience, but also the speculative and intellectual order. The perfection of Christian wisdom, then, includes" the common and the proper meanings of wisdom. It can be said, therefore, that the Christian wisdom of St. Bonaventure, following his transformation of natural knowledge by Christian faith, involves a reformation of the human sciences and their subordination to the revelation of God in Scripture. Moreover, the perfection of humility includes both grace and Christian justice, which directs us in piety to give what is due to God and to our neighbour. This doctrine on humility is influenced by St. Augustine and by St. Bernard, who considers humility to be the foundation of the whole of the spiritual life. The humility required to possess Christian wisdom, as St. Bonaventure understands it, contains both the Christian worship of God, as described by St. Augustine, and the spiritual way of the Christian life, as described by St. Bernard. These two modes of humility are attributed by St. Bonaventure to St. Francis, whom he sees to be an ideal example of evangelical perfection. Consequently, when St. Bonaventure posits humility as the gateway to Christian wisdom and as the principal part of Christian philosophy, he is looking upon Christian wisdom as a Christian philosophy, which is the peak of Christian perfection. His Christian philosophy, therefore, is a truly Christian wisdom rooted in humility and containing a total outlook on man in his complete dependence on God in the unified order of nature and grace.19 In our view, the Christian philosophy, or wisdom, of St. Bonaventure is not specifically Augustinian. The principal inspiration of this philosophy is Christ as our way, our truth and our life; similarly, the principal source of this philosophy is the teaching of Christ. As a theological doctrine, St. Bonaventure's Christian philosophy is influenced in large measure by St. Augustine; but it is also influenced in a particular way by St. Bernard and in varying degrees by Aristotle, St. Gregory and Dionysius. As an outlook on human life, St. Bonaventure's Christian philosophy is influenced in a special way by the example of St. Francis. Hence, the Christian philosophy of St. Bonaventure is really a Bonaventurean form of Christian wisdom. This Bonaventurean wisdom, nevertheless, manifests the different influences of the historical sources contributing to its development; at the same time, it reflects the influence on St. Bonaventure's thought of the Christian way of life as it is exemplified in St. Francis. From the latter viewpoint, St. Bonaventure's Christian philosophy represents his theological outlook on the spiritual life of the Christian religion in its Franciscan form. Consequently, his Christian philosophy could be called a Franciscan philosophy, and his Christian wisdom could be called a Franciscan wisdom. The second point to be considered is the character of the theology containing St. Bonaventure's philosophy. His theology is described invariably

19 See above: pp. 828-35.

874

GENERAL CONCLUSION

as an Augustinian doctrine. There is no doubt that, in his texts on the nature of theological knowledge, St. Bonaventure follows St. Augustine on the formation and the development of Christian doctrine, particularly with regard to its dependence on Scripture. But there are other historical influences contributing to St. Bonaventure's understanding of the nature of theological doctrine. He teaches explicitly that theology is a habitus in the mind of the theologian, who is the agent of his own thought and the author of his own doctrine. When forming his thought and teaching his doctrine, a theologian may confirm the truth of his knowledge by appealing to other authorities, thus giving them an instrumental or secondary r61e in the constitution of his own theology. Since a theologian can express his theological thought in speech and in writing, the writings of St. Bonaventure are the expression of his theological thought, which was a habitus of his mind. The theology of St. Bonaventure, in company with his philosophy, is a specifically Bonaventurean doctrine, even though it is influenced by different sources. The third point is Van Steenberghen's view of the problem of the relation between reason and faith in St. Bonaventure's writings. This problem, Van Steenberghen says, arises for the Christian philosopher in submitting to the control of revelation while his philosophy has to remain faithful to its own principles and methods. St. Bonaventure has not been over anxious about the problem, for he neither guarantees the autonomy of philosophical research nor works out philosophical problems for themselves. As a result, his thought has a theological unity and not a philosophical unity, as both Mandonnet and Gilson have seen. Van Steenberghen sees St. Bonaventure's philosophy to be a heteronomous philosophy consisting in his theological speculation, or the philosophical themes that he uses to interpret revelation. Thus, in Van Steenberghen's view, the heteronomy of St. Bonaventure's theological reasoning appears where he evaluates human opinions in the light of Christian faith and accepts them only to the degree that they concord with Catholic truth. On questions touching Christian faith, he rejects philosophical conceptions that he judges to be incompatible with either revelation or traditional theological teaching; but he also prefers philosophical opinions concurring better with Scripture or the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. All this shows Van Steenberghen that St. Bonaventure understands imperfectly the role of reason and philosophy in the development of theology. Unlike St. Thomas, then, St. Bonaventure has not produced a sturdy philosophical synthesis. This view of Van Steenberghen is echoed by van der Laan, who says that the supremacy of theology in St. Bonaventure's theological synthesis has impeded the progress of philosophy. Now, in our examination of his writings, we have seen him taking care to handle philosophical questions by following the proper principles and methods of his philosophy. Although he submits his reason to the control of revelation, even so, he does not thereby jeopardize the autonomy of philosophical research. When

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

875

thinking philosophically, his reason is controlled materially and extrinsically by revelation; but this control, as Robert has indicated, does not prevent St. Bonaventure from working out the philosophical questions that he chooses to explore. As a theologian, his primary concern is the data of revelation and not philosophical problems or philosophical research. There are, nonetheless, as we have shown, numerous occasions when St. Bonaventure describes the work of all the philosophical sciences, whose truth he both guarantees by the connatural lumen of reason and safeguards as the proper effect of the connatural principles of reason, which relies on human experience. In his work as a theologian, St. Bonaventure has thought out many philosophical questions without invoking the truth of revelation; he has also compared the different ways that a theologian and a philosopher solve the same questions. His thought has a theological unity because it is a theological synthesis, just as the theological synthesis of St. Thomas gives his thought its theological unity. The philosophies found in the writings of both theologians are there only because of the value that those philosophies have for St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure in drawing up their theological synthesis. When St. Bonaventure's philosophy is taken on the integral ground of his theological reasoning, then, reconstructed according to its proper principles, method and object, his philosophy manifests its own unity while showing that, on its own ground, it constitutes a very sturdy synthesis of philosophical thought. St. Bonaventure, as a theologian, has the task of evaluating human opinions in the light of Christian faith; but he does not show a heteronomy of theological reasoning in accepting them only when they concord with Catholic truth. He evaluates human opinions in much the same way that he appraises theological opinions, namely, with a view to establishing the truth of the question under consideration. He grants that there are philosophical questions which cannot be resolved with certitude, so that a man is free to hold his own opinion on them. This point of view is in accord with his position that speculative knowledge in itself is indifferent to the way of salvation. Holding that position, St. Bonaventure sees no point in settling philosophical questions, such as those relating to the celestial bodies, that have nothing to do with human salvation. Since his objective is to draw up a theological synthesis, he depends on the lumen of faith and the authority of Scripture as the main sources of certitude for his Christian doctrine. Consequently, regarding human opinions that cannot be settled with natural certitude, he falls back on his main sources of certitude. There is nothing unusual, moreover, about St. Bonaventure's rejection of philosophical conceptions incompatible with revelation or traditional theological teaching. St. Thomas, as we have seen, rejects several philosophical conceptions as erroneous, and even heretical, from the standpoint of revelation and traditional theological teaching; he rejects as erroneous and heretical, for instance, the conception of the universe as necessarily eternal and the conception of a creating medium between God and his effects. It is true,

876

GENERAL CONCLUSION

however, that St. Bonaventure prefers philosophical opinions concurring better with Scripture or with theological authorities. But it is equally true that, as he states time and again, he prefers philosophical opinions harmonizing better with sense experience and with the science of philosophy. Thus, in the development of his own theology, St. Bonaventure understands perfectly and respects fully the role that he allots to reason and philosophy. His theological synthesis has not impeded the progress of philosophy: following his rule of piety, he attributes truth to the philosophers whenever and wherever he can; likewise, attributing to God the origin of all truth, he develops many philosophical truths beyond the points reached by the philosophers, thus doing them and their science a service by perfecting their philosophical knowledge within the ambit of his theology. The final point to be discussed is Ratzinger's evaluation of St. Bonaventure's attitude in his later years toward Aristoteleanism and scholastic thought. St. Bonaventure is said by Ratzinger to draw up a canon of antiAristoteleanism in opposition to certain thirteenth-century Aristoteleans attacking Christianity. His anti-Aristoteleanism has two forms: one consists in his upholding of a Christian concept of time against the Aristotelean concept of an eternal world; the other consists in St. Bonaventure's prophetic-eschatological view of events. St. Bonaventure, influenced by Joachim of Flora and Dionysius, develops an anti-philosophism in his later years when, prophesying the end of a theology relying on reason, he becomes anti-intellectual and anti-scholastic, attitudes founded on his original Franciscan ideal. These later developments of St. Bonaventure, who does not abandon his earlier mode of reasoning, have an extraphilosophical and an extra-theological element provoking a reappraisal of scholastic thought, which he continues to cultivate, though he sees it at that time to have no finality. St. Bonaventure's later writings, as we have examined them, do show that he continues to cultivate the form of thought developed in the schools, and that he reasons in the same way as in his early writings. But those writings also show that he retains his Christian love for philosophy as a work of human intelligence, which he describes as a precious possession of man. Moreover, he insists on the necessity for the theologian to use philosophy in order to understand the commentaries of the masters, whose writings are required for an understanding of the original texts of the Fathers to whom the Holy Spirit has made known the hidden meanings of Scripture. Furthermore, St. Bonaventure's statement about turning the water of philosophy into the wine of Scripture is simply another way of saying, as he says in his early writings, that philosophy ought to be subordinated by the theologian to Scripture through the mediation of theological authorities, especially the Fathers of the Church. In our view, he has not developed in his later years an anti-philosophism; nor has he become anti-intellectual and anti-scholastic. He has, rather, opposed very strongly the Christian masters at Paris who have endangered the order, unity and peace of the

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

877

Church by propagating and defending a corrupted form of mundane wisdom calling into question, in the name of reason and philosophy, certain truths accepted by the same masters on the authority of divine revelation. St. Bonaventure's condemnation of the errors of those particular masters is preceded by a clear statement, as we have seen, that a man cannot have faith, grace or the lumen of wisdom without the natural lumen of reason. That statement is preceded by a condemnation of Christians prostituting the science of philosophy while refusing to listen to Christ, who is Wisdom itself.20 The images and apocalyptic terms used by St. Bonaventure are not intended in any way as a condemnation of natural reason and philosophy in themselves; the whole context of his thought shows that he is referring to Christians falling back upon natural reason as it is darkened by sin and upon philosophy as it is contaminated by the errors of nonChristian philosophers. St. Bonaventure is not looking forward, then, to the end of a theology relying on reason. He is looking forward to a fully developed Christian wisdom supported on the level of mystical theology by Dionysius, and also on the level of Christian philosophy, as St. Bonaventure describes it, by the ideal of the Franciscan way of life. His late writings, in this respect, support the view of Van Steenberghen that they oppose a Christian vision of the universe, or the history of salvation through Christ, to the pagan vision of the universe adopted by certain Christian masters at Paris. St. Thomas, as Van Steenberghen indicates, opposes the same masters by setting his Christian view of the universe, and of Christ as the centre of history, against their cyclical and pagan vision of natural events. Although St. Bonaventure, in his late writings, looks upon philosophy and theology as having no finality in themselves, this perspective is found also in his early writings, where he says that every mode of human thought, whether philosophical or theological, remains imperfect until completed and perfected in the beatific vision of God. We have not seen St. Bonaventure, in his final work, using either an extra-philosophical or an extratheological element in a reappraisal of scholastic thought. Rather, at the beginning of the work, he situates Christ as the medium of all the sciences both philosophical and theological; his purpose in doing so is to draw his hearers away from a false wisdom toward a true wisdom, which is Christian wisdom. In particular, St. Bonaventure assigns to the metaphysician the function of unifying the philosophical sciences by reducing them to the exemplar causality of God. It is in this metaphysical context that he refers initially to the erroneous opinion of an eternal world. His next reference to that opinion is found in his description of the objects studied in natural philosophy, including metaphysics; he attributes the error here to a failure to see that God can create matter from nothing. The third reference to the erroneous opinion is the one containing the canon of anti-Aristoteleanism

20 See above: pp. 812-13 (nn. 42-44).

878

GENERAL CONCLUSION

assigned by Ratzinger to St. Bonaventure in his late years. This particular reference, however, draws together the other two. It is here that St. Bonaventure, on the one hand, attributes the error of an eternal world to Aristotle because of his misunderstanding of exemplar causality and, on the other hand, finds fault with Aristotle because of his rejection of Plato's doctrine of ideas and of his opinion that the world has begun in time. The context of this third reference to the error of an eternal world, then, shows that St. Bonaventure opposes it on metaphysical grounds as he opposed it in his early writings. The primary ground of his opposition is the conception of time as the measure of the coming to-be of the world from nothing; his conception of time as the measure of motion presupposes that the corporeal world has come to-be from nothing. Hence, St. Bonaventure's final opposition to the error of an eternal world is based both on his metaphysical conception of time as the measure of created existence and on his Christian conception of time as the history of salvation, which is centred on Christ. This opposition, nevertheless, does not form part of a canon of antiAristoteleanism. The list of errors drawn up by St. Bonaventure includes the errors that he has refuted in his early works. The errors in question are not classified only as Aristotelean by St. Bonaventure, who also attributes them to the Arabian philosophers. In the end. he excuses the Aristotelean errors on the eternity of the world and on the felicity of man; so his earlier opposition to the eternity of the world on metaphysical grounds does not give way in his later years to a view of heretical Aristoteleanism as an eschatological phenomenon. His later position on the problem is taken primarily against the Christian masters masquerading under the cloak of the Arabians, especially Averroes, and in the name of Aristotle, whom St. Bonaventure does not condemn, as Ratzinger has seen. 21 Community of Philosophical Doctrines

Mandonnet has held the position that, in the thirteenth century, there were conflicting movements, but not a common system, of philosophy in the university at Paris following the entry of Aristotelean and Arabian philosophies. Those philosophies were opposed by the PlatoriicAugustinian theologians, including St. Bonaventure, but there was no single school and no unified movement of thought among them. The Latin Averroists accepted the new doctrines, even when they contradicted Christian faith. St. Albert and St. Thomas, who became Christian Aristoteleans, accepted the new doctrines in part and what was accepted they interpreted either in their own way or according to Platonic doctrines. 21 See above: pp. 810-13. In our view, St Bonaventure is moving against the influence of Joachim of Flora by teaching that the Holy Spirit has been at work in creation from the beginning and in the Church from Pentecost; the Holy Spirit has been active also in the area of doctrine from the time of Moses, because the Holy Spirit is the true Author of Sacred Scripture and the inspirer of the Prophets and the Apostles.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

879

De Wulf speaks, in his first writings, of a common synthesis of philosophy in the thirteenth century. The synthesis contained incoherent systems among the old scholastics, not excluding St. Bonaventure; though basically Aristotelean, their philosophy had an incomplete assimilation of Aristotle's doctrine. St. Thomas gave an organic unity to the common synthesis: his philosophy had the same Aristotelean foundation as older scholasticism; but Thomism was a purer form of Aristoteleanisrn. De Wulf s use of common synthesis to designate thirteenth-century philosophies was criticized by other historians, notably Gilson and Cherm. As a result, in 1927, De Wulf abandoned the name in favour of common patrimony; this stood for a doctrinal community, or a common foundation allowing individual systems to make their proper contributions to a pluralist solution for common problems. The various systems reflected real differences within a community of philosophical doctrines based on the Aristotelean principles of potency and act along with matter and form. Each particular system offered a more or less coherent interpretation of the common patrimony according as the author of the system was more or less a philosopher. The philosophy of St. Bonaventure, for example, was less coherent than the philosophy of St. Thomas, because the one was preoccupied with religious themes while the other was more absorbed in an interpretation of rational doctrines. To see and to appreciate the common patrimony, the similarities and dissimilarities of its individual systems must be taken into account. Thus, in De Wulf s view, the thirteenth century was the age of metaphysics; this period gave rise to many individual systems not entirely diverse from one another, because they came together according as their authors developed their doctrines within a common frame of metaphysics, or on the common ground of Aristotle's metaphysical principles. The development of the common patrimony by St. Thomas, in comparison with that by St. Bonaventure, produced a new metaphysics on the basis of Aristotle's principles. Gilson has portrayed the entry of Aristotle into Paris as provoking a crisis of conscience for the theologians. The Augustinians, including St. Bonaventure, kept the new Aristoteleanism out of their theologies; but St. Thomas became an Aristotelean and his use of Aristotle's philosophy overcame the false doctrines of the Averroists. From a reconsideration of the relation between reason and revelation, then, there came forth great scholastic systems, which were best exemplified in Thomism. Gilson has taken the view that the philosophies of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure are both original doctrines, though Augustinianism has triumphed in St. Bonaventure while Aristoteleanism became the victor in St. Thomas. Their philosophical systems were different; but they had a common Christian origin, content and design. De Wulf thought that Gilson, concentrating on the diversities of thirteenth-century philosophies, had neglected the reality of their doctrinal community; as a result, he united them as Christian philosophies, or by an extrinsic element impoverishing their truly philosophical character. Van Steenberghen has the view that the

880

GENERAL CONCLUSION

philosophical trends at Paris were Aristotelean in the early part of the thirteenth century. By the year 1250. however, a Latin Aristoteleanism, or a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, had made its way into the Faculty of Theology. This common philosophy was used instrumentally by both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas in their theologies. St. Thomas, adopting the basic intuitions of Aristoteleanism, began a new stage in the development of Latin Aristoteleanism; but his philosophy was neither an integral nor a pure Aristoteleanism. It was a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism with nuances, and with merit in the perfect cohesion of Platonic, Aristotelean, Neoplatonic and Christian elements, which were all united on a solid foundation. In Van Steenberghen's view, consequently, Thomism was the first really original philosophy that the thirteenth century and, more generally, Christian civilization produced. The Christian Aristoteleanism of St. Thomas widened and transfigured Aristoteleanism in such a way that, transcending its historical sources, Thomism became an original philosophy. Van Steenberghen takes the position that the philosophies of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure cannot be opposed as irreducible syntheses: on the philosophical level, St. Thomas corrected Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism by deeping the epistemological and metaphysical bases of St. Bonaventure's theology; on the theological level, both theologians followed the Augustinian movement in using philosophy as a step toward an integral synthesis to be realized in theology. Their syntheses, then, were successive and not parallel forms of Christian thought in the thirteenth-century scientific movement. Gilson holds a different view of the achievement of Thomism. He understands that St. Thomas, substituting Aristotelean doctrines for Plotinian doctrines transmitted through St. Augustine, reformed philosophy by reforming theology. The transformation of philosophy by St. Thomas was not a stage in the discovery of Aristotle by Latin theologians. His transformation was theological before it was metaphysical; so, on the philosophical level, the thought of St. Thomas was a revolution and not an evolution of Aristoteleanism. Giving a new meaning to Aristotle's principles, St. Thomas produced a new metaphysics within his theology, which was ever true to the teaching of St. Augustine. Van Steenberghen, for his part, concurs with De Wulf in attributing to the theologians in the thirteenth century a common heritage of philosophical doctrines. Van Steenberghen understands that heritage to consist chiefly in fundamental doctrines, or a sort of common foundation giving rise to different philosophical edifices. He rejects Gilson's view that thirteenth-century philosophies had a common spirit making them to be Christian philosophies. Our comparative studies of the philosophical doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas have not disclosed any community between them as Christian philosophies. Their philosophical doctrines, it is true, are developed by the two theologians in constituting their theological syntheses. But the influence of Christian faith, as De Wulf has seen, is extrinsic to the proper development of the philosophical thought of both St. Bonaventure

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

881

and St. Thomas. Likewise, as Van Steenberghen maintains, their philosophies are not united by a common spirit making them to be Christian philosophies. Apart from calling them Christian philosophies, Gilson's view that the philosophies of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are both original philosophies is quite in accord with their texts. Their philosophical syntheses do not show, nonetheless, that St. Augustine has triumphed in St. Bonaventure and Aristotle has become the victor in St. Thomas. On the other hand, the texts of St. Bonaventure do not bear out the view of Van Steenberghen that the philosophy of St. Thomas was the first really original philosophy produced in the thirteenth century. Neither do the texts of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas support Van Steenberghen's position that their two philosophies are different stages in the development of a Latin Aristoteleanism or a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism. Similarly, their texts do not uphold the view of De Wulf that the two theologians developed their philosophical doctrines within a common frame of metaphysics, or on the common ground of Aristotle's metaphysical principles. Since the proper character of St. Bonaventure's philosophy has been discussed above, it will be sufficient here to discuss the character of the philosophy of St. Thomas. His philosophy, in common with Bonaventurean philosophy, is based before all else on human experience, which is the foundation of the philosophical doctrines of St. Thomas. He uses historical sources according as they provide suitable materials for his understanding of man and the universe; in selecting his sources, he has in mind the truths that he himself intends to establish in his philosophical reflexions. He states explicitly, that the theologian should accept what a philosopher says, not because of his authority, but because of the truth of what he says. Evidently, then, St. Thomas gathers his philosophical materials from various sources on the primary ground of truth, which he understands formally according to his own philosophical principles. Now, as we have seen, he gathers his materials from many other sources, including St. Augustine, besides Aristotle. By comparison with St. Bonaventure, moreover, St. Thomas goes more frequently to the Arabian philosophers, particularly Averroes. In using those sources, St. Thomas is not following their doctrines because they are Aristotelean, or Augustinian, or Averroist; he follows them because, in his philosophical judgment, their doctrines are true. Since he finds Aristotle's doctrine to be an invaluable source of truth, St. Thomas goes more often to Aristotle than to any other historical source of philosophical materials. In this respect, St. Thomas differs from St. Bonaventure, who gathers more philosophical materials from St. Augustine than from Aristotle. Nevertheless, in selecting their sources and in gathering their materials, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure make their choices chiefly on the grounds of their personal and philosophical perspectives, which guide their individual approaches to truth. Consequently, as St. Bonaventure's philosophy is neither fundamentally Augustinian nor essentially a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, but Bonaventurean, so also the

882

GENERAL CONCLUSION

philosophy of St. Thomas is neither basically Aristotelean nor essentially a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, but Thomist. This is not to say that Thomist philosophy owes little to Aristotelean philosophy, or to the other historical sources chosen by St. Thomas in developing his philosophical synthesis. The name Thomist means that the philosophy of St. Thomas has its unity and coherence from his personal conception and understanding of truth; but his synthesis is also what it is because of the influences of the different sources used by him in his search for truth. It is in regard to the search for truth that we see the philosophies of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas to be original, but not diverse, syntheses and, at the same time, to be both similar and dissimilar in many respects. All this has been shown, on both historical and doctrinal grounds, in our numerous comparisons between the philosophical positions taken by the two theologians on the common problems of their time. In regard to St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, then, De WulPs view of a common patrimony is borne out to some degree by their texts. Likewise, their texts support the view of Van Steenberghen that the common heritage consists in a sort of common foundation giving rise to different philosophical edifices. Those two views are substantiated in the many instances that St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas hold similar positions on common problems, though at times for different reasons, and on the various occasions that they use the same historical sources, but sometimes in different ways, in order to establish the truth of the philosophical questions confronting the theologians of the thirteenth century. In addition, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas use in large part a common vocabulary and handle several philosophical themes common to the thirteenth century. But the meanings of many common terms and the understanding of particular themes are so different in the Bonaventurean and Thomist syntheses that, as original compositions of philosophical doctrines, they really cannot be reduced fundamentally to a common frame of metaphysical principles. This fact is very evident in the different meanings of act and potency in the two syntheses, which employ the terms in formulating an understanding of the constitution of the creature and its dependence on the Creator. The two terms are given entirely new and metaphysical meanings not only in the synthesis of St. Thomas, as the historians all say, but also in the synthesis of St. Bonaventure. Thus, in the Thomist synthesis, act and potency designate the being and the essence of the creature, which has an extrinsic dependence on the Creator because of the intrinsic, though created, necessity conferred on a creature by the composition of its being and essence. In the Bonaventurean synthesis, however, act and potency designate the being and the existing of the essence of a creature, which has an intrinsic dependence on the Creator because the essential composition of being and existing does not exclude an intrinsic contingency. These different uses of act and potency by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure have direct consequences in the application of those terms to the principles of form and matter. In the Thomist synthesis, the

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

883

form of any creature, whether spiritual or corporeal, is referred to its being as a potency to its proper act; but the form of a corporeal creature is also referred to its matter as a proper act to its proper potency. Hence, for St. Thomas, one and the same substantial form of a corporeal creature is a potency in the order of metaphysics and an act in the order of nature. In the Bonaventurean synthesis, the form of every creature is the principle of its being and the matter of every creature is the principle of its existing; the form and the matter are so united as an act to its potency that the creature subsists in an act of being with a fixed or determinate existence. But the form of a human nature gives being at once to both a spiritual and a corporeal matter; this is possible because matter, the universal foundation of existence, has a unity of homogeneity enabling it to receive, while retaining its essential unity, the one being of a substantial form in both a spiritual and a corporeal way. For St. Bonaventure, then, one and the same matter is a potency capable of receiving the same act of being at once in the corporeal and spiritual orders. These different uses of act and potency by the two theologians make their syntheses irreducible not only to a common frame of metaphysics, but also to a common ground in the metaphysical principles of Aristotle. Although the metaphysical insights of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are expressed in Aristotelean terms, nevertheless, their personal insights are no more Aristotelean than the metaphysical insights of Aristotle himself are Platonic, and Aristotle expresses his personal insights in many Platonic terms. In our view, therefore, St. Thomas has not corrected a Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism by deepening the epistemological and metaphysical bases of St. Bonaventure's theology. Though the Thomist reformation of philosophy was not a stage in the discovery of Aristotle by Latin theologians, the transformation achieved by St. Thomas was accomplished on the metaphysical level before it had its effect on the theological level of his thought. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure approach the truth of the created universe, and of its dependence on God, from the two different bases on which they have built their philosophical edifices. Both theologians, in their philosophical reflexions, have transformed in their own way the Aristotelean principles of act and potency. These individual transformations of Aristotle's metaphysical principles resulted instrumentally in a reformation of theology in the syntheses of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. Those syntheses were the occasion of the philosophical reformations carried out by the two theologians; but their reformations were due to the transformed principles directing the personal conceptions formed by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas of the universe both in itself and in its relation to God.22 22 The historical doctrines used by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas in their philosophical syntheses are material in relation to their principles, which are the formal causes of the two syntheses; their efficient causes are their proper authors, who are assisted instrumentally by other authorities according as they provide suitable materials for the Bonaventurean and Thomist syntheses.

884

GENERAL CONCLUSION

The long debate between Gilson and De Wulf on the fundamental point of difference between St. Thomas and the Augustinians, particularly St. Bonaventure, had to do with the questions of a divine illumination and the metaphysical principles forming the bases of a common patrimony in the thirteenth century. Gilson had suggested that the theologians subscribing in one way or another to St. Augustine's doctrine of illumination could be called Augustinians, if his doctrine of illumination were taken as the proper mark of Augustinianism. In that way, Gilson said, the Augustinian illumination separated St. Thomas from the other theologians. De Wulf did not find a fundamental difference of doctrine on a divine illumination between St. Thomas and the Augustinians, including St. Bonaventure. Although a different mode of expression was used by St. Bonaventure, he thought along the same lines as St. Thomas; but the latter theologian put the Augustinian illumination on a firmer metaphysical ground. In De Wulfs view, the true point of departure between St. Thomas and the other theologians consisted in different conceptions of the metaphysical structure of contingent beings; those conceptions were formed within a common and Aristotelean framework and not a frame of reference to an Augustinian illumination. Gilson, at the close of the debate, paid tribute to De Wulf by showing that the positions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas on the divine illumination are the consequences of their metaphysical and epistemological principles. St. Bonaventure puts natural science into the human intellect by means of an Aristotelean abstraction, which depends on an unstable and Platonic world; at the same time, he guarantees the certitude of natural science by means of an Augustinian illumination, which accounts for the efficacy of God in human knowledge and His conservation of the human intellect. To save the Augustinian illumination and to guarantee the proper causality of the human intellect, St. Bonaventure offers a vague but prudent solution to the problem by not saying whether the divine concurrence with the intellect involves either the general or the special concourse of God with His creatures. St. Thomas attributes to the human intellect a true science having necessity and universality. Placing the Augustinian illumination within an Aristotelean universe, he looks to God as the ultimate source of natural truth in the human intellect, which He both conserves and assists in its operations. By positing God as the first cause and the intellect as the second cause of human knowledge, St. Thomas makes the divine cooperation to be the strength and not the weakness of the human intellect. The views of Gilson and De Wulf, then, have come together in two respects. In the one respect, they see that the fundamental point of departure between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure consists in their individual conceptions of the metaphysical constitution of the created universe. In the other respect, the two historians see St. Thomas giving a firmer ground in an Aristotelean universe to the Augustinian illumination. De Wulf and Gilson have remained apart, however, on the question of a community of metaphysical principles supporting the

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

885

positions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas on the constitution of the created universe. De Wulf, on the basis of a common patrimony, sees St Bonaventure thinking in much the same way as St. Thomas regarding the divine illumination. Gilson sees St. Bonaventure guaranteeing the certitude of human knowledge by using the Augustinian illumination to uphold an Aristotelean abstraction grounded in a contingent and Platonic world; but St. Thomas upholds the Augustinian illumination through an Aristotelean abstraction by an intellect with an intrinsic capacity to acquire a true science having a natural necessity. The texts of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure show that their positions on this problem are both similar and dissimilar. The two theologians are united in attributing the first cause of human knowledge to God and its second or created cause to the human intellect. They are also united in teaching that the certitude of human knowledge depends exteriorly on the necessity of corporeal things and interiorly on the first principles of truth along with the connatural lumen of the intellect. Moreover, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure hold in common not only that the intellect must acquire its knowledge by way of abstraction, as Aristotle says, but also, as St. Augustine says, that the first principles of truth and the connatural lumen of the intellect are created reflexions of the eternal reasons and the lumen of God. Thus, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure think along the same lines with regard to the certitude of human knowledge as it has been explained by both Aristotle and St. Augustine. The differences between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure on the question, however, stem from their own conceptions of the constitution of the universe and of the natural operations of the human intellect. In the conception of St. Thomas, the universe has a created necessity in being and the intellect has a created necessity in knowing. The necessity of the intellect is due to the self-evidence of its first principles and to the self-sufficiency of its natural power. As a created power, nevertheless, the intellect depends extrinsically on God, who conserves it in being while cooperating with its natural operations. Thus, in the conception of St. Thomas, the illumination of the intellect by God consists simply in His conservation of its being and in His cooperation with its operations, which God brings about as the first agent of knowledge. In the conception of St. Bonaventure, the universe has an intrinsic mutability in being and the human intellect has an intrinsic fallibility in knowing. To have immutability in being, the universe needs the presence of God, who conserves the being and cooperates with the natural actions of every creature as a vestige of the Creator. To have infallibility in knowing, the human intellect needs the influence of the light of God, who conserves the light of the intellect while cooperating with its natural operations according as the rational soul is an image of the Creator. By His presence in the memory and His influence on the light of the intellect, God stabilizes the truth of the first principles and He causes the light of the intellect to operate. Accordingly, the necessity of human knowledge is an intrinsic effect of an

886

GENERAL CONCLUSION

illumination from God, who must move and guide the intellect both because its natural light is not sufficient of itself to operate and because, apart from His presence, the First principles are not adequate of themselves to bring about a knowledge of truth. In St. Bonaventure's conception, then, the illumination of the intellect by God consists not only in His conservation of its light and in His cooperation with its actions, which He causes as the first agent of knowledge, but also in an extrinsic influence of His light moving and directing every act of the intellect intrinsically while stabilizing its first natural principles in truth. Hence, St. Bonaventure has given a clear and philosophical solution to the problem of illumination by situating the divine concurrence with the intellect in the natural course of its operations. He says explicitly that the illumination of the intellect by God cannot be placed in His general concourse with the work of creatures, because this concourse has to do with God's work in the order of being, which is the ground of the natural operations of every creature as a vestige of the Creator. St. Bonaventure also says specifically that the illumination of the intellect cannot be attributed to God's special concourse with the work of spiritual creatures, because that concourse is concerned solely with His cooperation in the order of grace, which is the foundation of the acts of a spiritual creature as a reformed likeness of the Trinity. Consequently, St. Bonaventure assigns the natural illumination of the intellect to a particular concourse of God with the rational spirit, since His cooperation in this instance has to do with His work in the natural order of truth and in the acts of knowledge belonging to the rational spirit as a natural image of the Creator. Although the influence of St. Augustine is predominant in St. Bonaventure's solution to the problem, and the influence of Aristotle is predominant in the solution of St. Thomas, even so, St. Bonaventure's solution owes a lot to Aristotle, as the solution of St. Thomas owes much to St. Augustine. In the final analysis, however, the two solutions to the problem depend essentially on the different principles of metaphysics and of knowledge supporting the personal conceptions by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas of the universe and its relation to God. 23 The entry of Aristotle into Paris gave rise, as Mandonnet and Gilson have stressed, to conflicting attitudes toward his philosophy and its interpretation by his commentators. Mandonnet included St. Bonaventure among the Augustinian theologians opposing the new Aristoteleanism and St. Thomas, who accepted Aristotelean philosophy in part to become a Christian Aristotelean. The movement of Christian Aristoteleanism soon submerged the movement of Augustinianism, which opposed in 1270 under John Peckham both St. Thomas and the Latin Averroists on the question of the unity of substantial form in man. Taking a different view, De Wulf saw little hostility between the Augustinians and Aristoteleanism, or Thomism, 23 Since St. Bonaventure speaks of a divine illumination only in regard to Christian faith, that expression ought not to be used to refer to the natural illumination of the human intellect in his doctrine.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

887

before the opposition of John Peckham to St. Thomas in 1270, when Augustinianism acquired mainly a polemical meaning. Gilson has taken the position that the debate of 1270 on the unity of substantial form in man caused only a doctrinal rupture between St. Thomas and the Augustinians. In Gilson's view, St. Bonaventure was an Augustinian theologian keeping the new Aristoteleanism put of his theology; but St. Thomas become an Aristotelean and, by his use of Aristotle's philosophy, overcame the false doctrines of the Averroists. All the thirteenth-century theologians, however, used Christian faith as an infallible guide in their understanding of truth. Following the pattern set by St. Augustine, they transformed the Greek philosophical wisdom into a Christian wisdom, which became the common ground of their opposition to the Averroists, who separated faith from philosophy. Because St. Thomas preferred to establish by philosophical arguments alone the truth of some questions, such as the eternity of the world, which invoked faith for the Augustinians, the latter theologians opposed St. Thomas and rejected a number of his conclusions as departing from the Christian tradition. Since St. Bonaventure would never permit philosophy to be separated from theology, Gilson saw him giving tacit approval to John Peckham in 1270, and this implied a rejection by St. Bonaventure of the Aristoteleanism of St. Thomas. On his part, St. Thomas opposed the Augustinians for rejecting the possibility of an eternal world. In Van Steenberghen's view, St. Bonaventure waged war on Aristotle and not on St. Thomas, whose opponent in 1270 was John Peckham. Holding on to his achievements, St. Thomas maintained his philosophical progress with regard to the unity of substantial form in man, and he showed that it was not contradictory to say that the world is both created and has no beginning in time. In showing this, he hit the weak point of St. Bonaventure's position, thus trying to save as much as possible of Aristotle's doctrine on the question of an eternal world. The conflict of 1270, according to Van Steenberghen, took place on the twofold ground of university life, where the Faculty of Arts was opposed to the Faculty of Theology, and of philosophical controversy, which involved two unequally evolved forms of Aristoteleanism. On the ground of university life, St. Bonaventure's actions from 1267 to 1273 were on the religious and theological level, where he defended Catholic doctrine and theology against the pretensions of a philosophy with pagan inspirations and a heterodox nature; on this ground, he stressed the danger for Christian faith and thought in following the leadership of Aristotle. Though St. Bonaventure exposed the philosophical errors of heterodox Aristoteleanism, he offered no refutation of them, because to refute them would have been out of place in his religious sermons. On the ground of philosophical controversy, the opposition of the Franciscan theologians and secular masters to St. Thomas was not a struggle between Augustinianism and Thomism, but a contest between Christianity and paganism, which was represented especially by Aristotle's philosophy. Although St. Bonaventure did not oppose St. Thomas on

888

GENERAL CONCLUSION

philosophical grounds in 1270, John Peckham was inspired by St. Bonaventure, who approved and encouraged him in his opposition to Thomism. Thus, in Van Steenberghen's view, St. Bonaventure inspired a neo-Augustinianism in the Franciscan school, which gathered together under the banner of St. Augustine to fight against the radical Aristoteleanism of Siger of Brabant and against the disquieting Aristoteleanism of St. Thomas. Taking a different stand on the question, Robert saw St. Thomas playing, on the ground of university life, a primary and as vigorous a role as St. Bonaventure in defence of Christian orthodoxy against heterodox Aristoteleanism. There was no confrontation on philosophical grounds, moreover, between two unequally evolved forms of Aristoteleanism. St. Thomas opposed the Faculty of Arts in order to restore Aristoteleanism to Christian thought; at the same time, he opposed both the Augustinianism and the majority of the masters in the Faculty of Theology. In Ratzinger's view, St. Bonaventure never condemned the Thomist form of Aristoteleanism; but he saw some danger for St. Thomas in following Aristotle too readily. Although St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure have never confronted each other, nonetheless, as their texts indicate, there is no doubt that they have taken contrary and even opposite stands on a number of questions. This is very evident in the questions concerning the nature of a spiritual creature and the nature of the human soul. According to St. Thomas, a spiritual creature is a pure form, and so its essence does not have a material principle, which is found only in corporeal substances. The human soul is a spiritual substance and, as such, has no material principle; if the soul were composed of form and matter, the soul could not also be the substantial form of a body. According to St. Bonaventure, only God is pure form, since He alone, having no matter, is entirely simple is essence. A spiritual creature is composed of form and matter; since the human soul is a spiritual substance, it is a composite of form and spiritual matter, even though the soul is also the substantial form of a human body. These opposite positions do not prevent the two theologians from holding in common that there is only one substantial form in the composite nature of man. Their positions are based on two very different conceptions of matter: St. Thomas conceives matter to be the potential principle of the essence only of corporeal things; St. Bonaventure conceives matter to be the potential principle of existing in the essence of every creature. In the conception of St. Thomas, the potency of matter can receive substantial being immediately from a form; in the conception of St. Bonaventure, the potency of matter can receive substantial being from a form only through the mediation of seminal reasons or substantial dispositions. St. Thomas holds that the matter of a human body is formed first by a vegetative soul, which is corrupted on the arrival of a sensitive soul, and this is corrupted with the infusion of a rational soul, which is created by God. St. Bonaventure holds that the matter of a human body is prepared by a seminal force, which disposes the

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

889

matter to receive a rational soul created in it by God. Thus, for St. Thomas, the rational soul is created in a human body to which the soul gives an act of being immediately as to prime matter, though following a succession of sensitive and vegetative souls. For St. Bonaventure, however, the rational soul is created in a human body to which the soul gives an act of being through the mediation of substantial dispositions, but without a succession of sensitive and vegetative souls; the form of the rational soul is the one and only substantial form ever to exist in the human body, which confers at once a corporeal mode of existing on the rational soul. St. Bonaventure speaks of a succession of forms only in connexion with the formation of inanimate bodies and with the original formation of animate bodies, including the body of Adam; nonetheless, in these instances, the antecedent forms remain only as substantial dispositions of the body after the arrival of the subsequent forms. The contrary positions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are not only the consequences of their own philosophical principles, but they are also found in their first writings, which were produced long before the debate of 1270 between St. Thomas and John Peckham. Hence the positions of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure on this question do not present either an Augustinian opposition to Aristoteleanism or an Aristotelean opposition to Augustinianism. They are simply the doctrinal positions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, following their personal conceptions, with regard to the nature and the generation of man. Moreover, St. Bonaventure was not in Paris during the debate of 1270; so he could not have given any form of personal assistance to John Peckham in his opposition to St. Thomas on the unity of substantial form in man. Furthermore, as Van Steenberghen points out, St. Thomas was not in Paris in 1273, when St. Bonaventure opposed the position that the rational soul is united immediately to prime matter. It is most unlikely, therefore, that St. Bonaventure had St. Thomas in mind on this occasion, when St. Bonaventure really did little more than present his own long-established position on the question: the rational soul cannot be united to prime matter without the intervention or mediation of substantial dispositions. Since the two theologians hold in common that there is only one substantial form in a human nature, there cannot be any opposition between them on this particular and very important aspect of the question. 24 The positions of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure on the question of the creation of the universe are similar to their positions on the nature of man. 24 Although it is certain that St. Bonaventure did not play a persona] role in the dispute between John Peckham and St. Thomas in 1270, a personal r&le cannot be ruled out entirely for St. Bonaventure in the condemnation of erroneous opinions by Etienne Tempier on December 10th, 1270. According to the evidence available at the present time, the debate between John Peckham and St. Thomas took place at Paris during the Easter Disputation of 1270; on this point see: I. T. Eschmann, O. P., "A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works", in E. Gilson, Christ pkitos. S. Thomas., pp. 388-89, 392-93. St. Bonaventure was in Spain throughout the Spring of 1270 and, having been in Toulouse on Easter Monday, April 14th, he was back in Spain on May 11th; he was in Paris on November 1st, and in Cologne on December 7th, 1270. See: J. G. Bougerol, Introd. s. Bonau., p. 244.

890

GENERAL CONCLUSION

St. Thomas holds the position that, because the temporal origin of the universe is a fact known only by revelation, it is not possible to demonstrate either that the universe began to-be in time or that it has being eternally. Natural reason can offer at most only probable reasons for the two sides of the question. St. Bonaventure holds the position that, even though the fact of the temporal beginning of the universe is known by revelation, natural reason can demonstrate the truth of the temporal origin of the universe. Some of the demonstrations given by St. Bonaventure to prove this truth are opposed explicitly by St. Thomas, who considers them to have only probability. Both theologians hold in common, nevertheless, that natural reason can demonstrate the truth of a creation from nothing. In holding this position, they also maintain that the fact of the world having been created from nothing has been made known by revelation. The two theolgians concur in saying that the ancient philosophers have not discovered either the fact or the truth of a creation from nothing, because they were not able to see how a thing could come into being without a preexisting subject. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure are also of one mind in saying that the necessity for a pre-existing subject is the reason why the ancient philosophers, and later on the Arabian philosophers, held that the world had to be eternal. St. Thomas has always taken the view that Aristotle never attempts to demonstrate the eternity of the world: whenever he handles the question, Aristotle offers only his opinion that the world is eternal. For his own part, St. Thomas maintains constantly that the truth of the temporal origin of the world can be known solely by revelation. St. Bonaventure has the view that Aristotle could have known the truth of the temporal origin of the world. St. Bonaventure supports his view by showing how Aristotle's principles can lead to the conclusion that the world must have had a temporal beginning. In showing this, St. Bonaventure proceeds entirely according to philosophy and never once appeals either to Christian faith or to the authority of St. Augustine. All that has been said, thus far, about the positions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas on the creation of the world is contained in the texts of their early writings. It is evident from those writings, then, that St. Bonaventure is not an Augustinian theologian opposing Aristotelean philosophy or keeping it out of his theology. It is equally evident that, regarding the eternity of the world, he is not an Augustinian opposing St. Thomas on theological grounds. Both St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, each in his own way, seek to reconcile with the truth of revelation, but on the ground of reason, the doctrine of Aristotle concerning the eternity of the world. St. Bonaventure reconciles Aristotle's doctrine by showing that his principles can lead to the truth known by revelation; St. Thomas reconciles Aristotle's doctrine by showing that natural reason cannot arrive at the truth known by revelation. Consequently, it is not St. Bonaventure, but St. Thomas, who invokes Christian faith in order to uphold the truth that the world is not eternal, but has begun in time. The contrary positions taken

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

891

on this question by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, in their early writings, show very clearly why they hold different views of Aristotle's doctrine. St. Bonaventure attributes to natural reason the ability to demonstrate the truth of the temporal beginning of the world. From his point of view, Aristotle has erred on philosophical grounds by saying that the world is eternal; his error is a consequence of his failure to see that the world has been created from nothing. St. Thomas refuses to attribute to natural reason the ability to demonstrate the truth that the world has begun in time. From his point of view, Aristotle has not erred on philosophical grounds by saying that the world is eternal; but St. Thomas is silent concerning Aristotle's failure to see that the world has been created from nothing. With regard to their own positions, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas concur in this respect alone: it is contrary to Christian faith to maintain that the world is eternal, or that it has not had a temporal beginning. On philosophical grounds, St. Bonaventure's position is based on his conception of matter as the created foundation of existence; in his philosophy, matter is the fundamental principle positing every creature in time and in place. St. Thomas does not conceive matter to be in the essence of spiritual creatures; on his philosophical grounds, St. Bonaventure's solution to the problem is not compelling, because, lacking universality, it does not take account of the duration of spiritual creatures as St. Thomas understands them. The late writings of St. Bonaventure make known that, in 1267 and 1268, he takes a somewhat different approach to the question of the eternity of the world. In those years, he opposes unorthodox Christians at Paris who are going contrary to their faith by maintaining and defending as true according to reason what they know to be false according to revelation. Because he is attacking those unorthodox Christians, St. Bonaventure stresses the point that it is an error in Christian faith to say that the world is eternal; but he also insists that Aristotle and his commentators have erred on philosophical grounds by holding the eternity of the world. St. Bonaventure demonstrates this fact according to the threefold causality of God; at the same time, he refutes the errors of the philosophers, and their Parisian disciples, as contrary respectively to the truths of a creation from nothing, of human liberty, and of the nature of the human intellect. In regard to those truths, he accuses the unorthodox Christians of impiety and even idolatry by worshipping the falsehoods of non-Christian philosophers, who have corrupted the truth of their philosophical science. In 1273, however, St. Bonaventure insists even more that the philosophers have erred on philosophical grounds, though he excepts the errors incurred by the philosophers through their invincible ignorance of the sinful condition of man and his true beatitude. It is on this occasion that St. Bonaventure, proceeding explicitly as a philosopher, shows how the non-Christian philosophers could have arrived with certitude at the truth of their philosophical science and wisdom. While showing all that, he points out their errors and, refuting them, corrects them on philosophical grounds

892

GENERAL CONCLUSION

alone. His philosophical reasoning at this time has the same metaphysical basis as his early years, particularly regarding the eternity of the world, for he still understands that position to be an error coming from the failure to see that the world has been created from nothing. His late writings, then, do not bear out exactly the view of Van Steenberghen that St. Bonaventure's actions, on the ground of university life, take place at the religious and theological level, where he defends Catholic doctrine and theology against the pretensions of a philosophy with pagan inspirations and a heterodox nature. His actions take place on both the theological and the philosophical level of university life. On the theological level, he points out the danger facing the Christian engaging in philosophy without taking due account, under the guidance of his faith, of the errors made by the philosophers. The purpose of St. Bonaventure in this regard is to protect Christian students and masters from the impiety of the unorthodox masters who have endangered the faith and the thought of other Christians not only by following the leadership of Aristotle, but also and even more by teaching and defending as true the errors of the Arabian commentators on Aristotle. The action of St. Bonaventure on the theological level, therefore, is undertaken in defence of philosophy as a good work of natural reason without which, in his view, a Christian wisdom is impossible. At the philosophical level, he defends the proper ability of natural reason to arrive at truth with certitude in the science and wisdom of philosophy. Although his purpose in making this defence is theological, or religious, he does not hesitate to refute and to correct on strictly philosophical grounds the errors that he exposes in the course of his conferences. The errors in question, moreover, are not confined to a heterodox Aristoteleanism, or to any particular form of philosophical thought. St. Bonaventure lists almost every sort of philosophical error known to him; in addition, he attributes philosophical errors explicitly to Plato and Aristotle, to the Platonists and the Epicureans, to the Arabian commentators, particularly Averroes, and to the unorthodox Christians at Paris. As far as St. Bonaventure is concerned, the conflict is not between two unequally evolved forms of Aristoteleanism, as Robert has maintained. According to St. Bonaventure's texts, his conflict is with unorthodox Christians who are defiling the good name of philosophy by attributing to it the errors of non-Christian philosophers, especially those of the Arabian commentators on Aristotle. St. Bonaventure's action on the philosophical level, therefore; is undertaken on behalf of the science and wisdom of philosophy, which he cherishes as a natural gift from God and which he disassociates from every error, whether of the philosophers or of the unorthodox Christians at Paris. The late writings of St. Thomas show that, during his second period of teaching at Paris, he holds essentially the same positions on the errors of the philosophers as in his early writings. With regard to the eternity of the world, however, his treatise of 1270 concentrates particularly on showing that the fact of the world having been created from nothing does not lead

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

893

necessarily, or demonstratively, to the conclusion that the world began tobe in time. St. Thomas holds on very firmly to his position that the temporal beginning of the world can be known with certitude solely by divine revelation. From this position, he insists that it is not an error in Christian faith to say that human reason cannot demonstrate a beginning of the world in time, but that it is an error in Christian faith to say that the world must be eternal. In his view, nevertheless, Aristotle has not said that the world must be eternal. He has stated only his opinion that the world is eternal; his opinion is erroneous according to Christian faith, but not necessarily according to human reason. The internal evidence of the treatise by St. Thomas shows that he is defending his position against other theologians opposing him in the name of several Christian authorities, notably St. Augustine. Since St. Bonaventure was not in Paris at this time, and since he has never supported his position on the question with the authority of the Christians, especially St. Augustine, named by St. Thomas, it is most unlikely that the latter has St. Bonaventure himself in mind as one of his opponents, who are very likely drawing some of their arguments from St. Bonaventure's writings. St. Thomas has constantly rejected, for many reasons, the argument of St. Bonaventure that an eternal world would entail an infinite number of rational souls. Van Steenberghen sees St. Thomas, rejecting the argument in 1270, hitting the weak point of St. Bonaventure's position. In our view, St. Thomas is rejecting the argument as used by his opponents, because, as he says, it has nothing to do with the question of an eternal world. Moreover, on this occasion, he does not have St. Bonaventure in view, but the particular theologians using his argument to uphold their own position, that it is contrary to Christian faith to say that human reason cannot demonstrate a beginning of the world in time. It is true from this viewpoint, that the opponents of St. Thomas draw some inspiration from the doctrine of St. Bonaventure; but it is not sufficient to say that St. Bonaventure inspired a neo-Augustinianism in opposition to a disquieting Aristoteleanism of St. Thomas. The opposition to St. Thomas in 1270 on the eternity of the world has a much broader base than the doctrine of St. Augustine; the opposition, according to St. Thomas himself, seeks support also in the doctrines of Boethius, St. John Damascene and Hugh ot St. Victor. St. Thomas is opposed, as Gilson says, by the other theologians acting on behalf of a Christian tradition, which St. Thomas, in their judgment, has endangered by his stand on the eternity of the world. On the other hand, as Van Steenberghen says, St. Thomas tries to save as much as possible of Aristotle's doctrine on this controverted question; so, as Robert points out, St. Thomas seeks to restore Aristotelean philosophy to Christian thought. St. Bonaventure was not in Paris when St. Thomas fought with his opponents in 1270; neither was St. Thomas in Paris on the occasions that St. Bonaventure opposed the unorthodox Christians there from 1267 to 1273. It is most improbable, then, that the two theologians had the intention of opposing each other during those years. Their opposition at that time, par-

894

GENERAL CONCLUSION

ticularly on the eternity of the world, could be said to be no more than their adherence to the contrary positions that they took in their early years and defended in their later years. One point at least is certain: the conflicts between 1267 and 1273 have not opposed St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas as an Augustinian and an Aristotelean on either philosophical or theological grounds. In our view, it is also certain that St. Bonaventure, during those conflicts, has not condemned either Aristotelean philosophy or its interpretation by St. Thomas; but St. Bonaventure may well have seen, as Ratzinger maintains, that there was some danger for St. Thomas in following Aristotle too readily. It is true, as Robert says, that St. Thomas played with St. Bonaventure a primary and vigorous role in defending Christian orthodoxy against, in our view, the unorthodox Christians calling certain truths of revelation into question, particularly in the name of Averroes. This has also been seen by Gilson, who shows that St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas had in Christian wisdom a common ground in their opposition to the Averroists, which is the name given by St. Thomas to the unorthodox Christians following Averroes on the unity of the human intellect. On the question of the eternity of the world, nevertheless, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure went their own ways in defending, for the sake of Christian wisdom, the proper ability of natural reason to attain truth with certitude. 25 Van Steenberghen has contrasted the attitudes of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, in protecting Christian wisdom, as a Christian humanism and a Christian extremism. In his first contrast, Van Steenberghen speaks of St. Bonaventure, personifying the Franciscan ideal, as advocating a radical return to evangelical simplicity in an exclusive search for God and supernatural goods, while showing a distrust for nature and a contempt for human values; he manifested those trends especially at the end of his life in his judgment of secular learning and philosophy. St. Thomas manifested a more moderate Christian attitude in his ideal of the Christian life as a harmony of nature and grace, of the human and the divine, in a pursuit of proximate ends and the supreme good; he had a greater desire than St. Bonaventure for better critical requirements and philosophical progress. This contrast by Van Steenberghen provoked a number of reactions, particularly by Robert, who indicated that St. Bonaventure had not moved against progress, but had sought the transformation of nature and of human values through grace, and so, though he denounced the errors of the heterodox Aristoteleans, St. Bonaventure never denounced secular learning or philosophy. Returning to the topic in 1966, Van Steenberghen says that his use of Christian extremism and Christian humanism was not meant to be pejorative, but to contrast the reactions of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas to the threat against the wisdom of the Gospel by the deviation of the 25 In a recent article, P. Bukowski takes the view that St. Thomas wrote his De aetermtate mundi in 1259, or earlier, in opposition to the position of St. Bonaventure. See: "An Early Dating for Aquinas' 'De aeternitate mundi'", Gregorianum, 51 (1970), pp. 277-303.

THE HISTORIANS AND BONAVENTUREAN PHILOSOPHY

895

heterodox Aristoteleans. St. Bonaventure prefered to sacrifice a human value when it seemed to be an obstacle to the Gospel, whereas St. Thomas chose to defend the same value by a serious and philosophical dialogue without endangering the Gospel. Van Steenberghen notes that his view of St. Bonaventure's attitude in his later life toward the value of secular learning has been confirmed by the studies of Ratzinger. We have shown above that St. Bonaventure's late writings do not support the view, taken by Ratzinger, of his attitude toward the value of human learning. St. Bonaventure maintains in his late writings the same love of human learning and philosophy that he holds in his early writings. In his unchanging judgment, human learning and philosophy are necessary though subordinate elements of Christian wisdom. His texts on evangelical perfection show that St. Bonaventure is contrasting human nature and human values as they are transformed by grace and humility with human nature and human values as they are vitiated by sin and pride. He is portraying human nature and human values as they are made known to us by God in Sacred Scripture, and especially by Christ in the Gospel. St. Bonaventure, in his appreciation of nature and human reason, attributes to the philosophers the natural ability to know what is true and good; at the same time, he attributes to them a proper capacity to live virtuously according to the natural law. Moreover, in his early and late writings, St. Bonaventure always seeks God both according to nature and according to grace; he insists particularly on the social obligations of justice, piety and love toward one's neighbours not only in the order of grace, but also in the order of nature. His attitude toward the Christian life is not so dissimilar to the attitude of St. Thomas that the one can be called an extremism and the other a humanism. The real difference between the two theologians regarding human nature lies in their dissimilar conceptions of the nature of man. It is on this ground that we see St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas opposing, in their own ways, the errors of the unorthodox Christians at Paris. With respect to the question of the eternity of the world, the two theologians are defending in their individual ways the proper ability of natural reason to arrive at the truth with certitude. St Thomas defends this ability by insisting that natural reason cannot be expected to demonstrate the truth of a temporal beginning of the world, because the truth is knowable with certitude only by divine revelation. St. Bonaventure defends the same ability by insisting that natural reason can demonstrate the truth of the temporal beginning of the world, even though the truth has been made known by divine revelation. While the two theologians hold opposite views on the proper ability of natural reason to demonstrate the truth in question, even so, they are firmly united in holding that it is contrary to Christian faith to maintain that the world is or must be eternal. It is true that St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure have reacted in different ways to the threat against Christian wisdom by the heretical stand of the unorthodox Christians at Paris. But it is no less true that the- two theologians have tried to protect both the truth of Christian

896

GENERAL CONCLUSION

faith and the true worth of human philosophy as a work of natural reason. Indeed, of the two theologians, it is St. Bonaventure who assigns the greater ability to natural reason, for it is he who attributes to human philosophy the power to arrive with certitude at the truth of the temporal origin of the universe. Consequently, if St. Bonaventure has gone to any extreme, then, in the view of St. Thomas, he has gone too far in the order of natural reason by attributing to it and to human philosophy the power to demonstrate the temporal origin of the universe. The philosophies of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas have a common foundation in the created universe which for them is the proper object of philosophical knowledge. Their philosophies also have a common foundation in the first principles of truth, which is the proper object of their philosophical reflexions. St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, moreover, have at their disposal a community of historical doctrines assisting them in their philosophical reflexions about the truth of the created universe. The results of those reflexions, as they are contained in their writings, show that St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas have formed and developed original syntheses of philosophical thought. Their syntheses depend primarily on their personal interpretations of human experience, and secondarily on the assistance given to them by the historical sources that they have chosen to use in formulating their philosophical thought. In many instances, the syntheses of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas have a common interpretation of human experience and a common use of historical sources. For those reasons, their syntheses can be considered abstractly as part of a community of philosophical doctrines in the thirteenth century. Thus, considered abstractly, the doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas can be said to have the doctrinal traits of scholasticism and certain historical characteristics, such as Aristoteleanism and Angustinianism. To verify the truth of these abstractions, however, it is necessary to go back to their concrete foundations in the Bonaventurean and Thomist syntheses. Hence, considered concretely, the two syntheses really manifest in different ways the influences both of their common origin in the schools and of their common sources in historical doctrines. Since the concrete consideration looks to the syntheses as personal developments of philosophical doctrines, then, in our view, it is preferable to speak, for instance, of Augustinian and Aristotelean influences on the constitution of the syntheses of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas rather than to speak of them abstractly as parts of an Augustinianism or an Aristoteleanism. Thus, maintaining their doctrinal and historical communities, the Bonaventurean and Thomist syntheses of philosophy display at once the original doctrines of their authors and the different influences exercised on them by various historical sources.26 26 Since Thomist philosophy neither flows in a direct current from Aristotle nor is it a Christian form of Aristotelean philosophy, the expression Christian Aristoteleanism does not seem to be a suitable name for the philosophical doctrines of St. Thomas, just as Christian Aristotelean seems to be an unsuitable name for St. Thomas himself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREFACE

The bibliography is divided into six sections. The first section has St. Bonaventure's writings along with translations of individual works in verious languages; in addition, it has a number of items on problems of authenticity and some entries of biographical and chronological studies. The second section has the writings of St. Thomas; his commentaries on the writings of other authors are listed under a separate heading. Apart from St. Bonaventure's works in translation, which are arranged alphabetically according to language, all the entries in these two sections are made in the chronological order of the different publications. The third section lists the particular writings cited by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas from other authors, whose names are arranged in alphabetical order. The fourth section has the writings of the historians, and the fifth section contains the Bonaventurean studies used or consulted in composing this book. The two sections in question are so arranged that they conform to the purpose of the book. Thus, in the fourth section, the writings examined in the introduction are arranged according to the chronological order of the historians whose views are recorded there. Their writings are followed by those of other historians whose works have been consulted or are mentioned in the notes. In the fifth section, opening with a list of general studies, the writings of Bonaventurean scholars are entered in the order of the problems studied in the book. In both sections, to show the progressive interest in St. Bonaventure's philosophy, all the publications are listed in their chronological order of appearance. Excepting the writings of the historians, the bibliography takes as its point of departure the year 1924, because a full survey of Bonaventurean studies published up to that year was made by Etienne Gilson in his monograph of 1924 on the philosophy of St. Bonaventure. The sixth section presents a list of the principal Bonaventurean bibliographies beginning with the year 1907, when the first bibliography appeared after the last volume was published in 1902 of the critical edition of St. Bonaventure's writings. To give a complete survey of the literature on St. Bonaventure's philosophy, the author includes some items that he has consulted but not mentioned during his composition of the book. There are also a number of entries marked with an asterik (* ) indicating that they are not available to the author, who has not consulted them.

898

BIBLIOGRAPHY

He wishes to express his thanks to the editors of the following publications for their valuable assistance in drawing up the bibliography: Bulletin de theologie ancienne et medievale (Louvain, Belgium). Bulletin thomiste (Paris, France; Montreal, Canada). Repertoire bibliographique de la philosophic (Louvain, Belgium). A note of gratitude is expressed also for the service rendered to the author, in establishing the chronology of St. Bonaventure's writings, by Jacques Guy Bougerol in his Introduction & ('etude de saint Bonaventure (Paris, besclee: 1961). Writings of St. Bonaventure 1 2 3

4

5

S. Bonaventurae opera omnia, edita studio et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 1882-1902), X, volumina. S. Bonaventurae opera theoiogica selecta, cura pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae edita, editio minor (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 1934-65), V volumina. Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana quaedam selecta, ad fidem codicum mss. ed. F. M. Delorme, O.F.M., Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevii, VIII (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 1934). Tria opuscula Seraphici Doctoris S. Bonaventurae. Breviloquium, Itinerarium mentis in Deum, et De reductions artium ad theologiam, notis illustrata, studio et cura pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae. Editio quinta cum critica editione collata (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 1938). ft. Bonaventurae decem opuscula ad theologiam myslicam spectantia, in textu correcta et notis illustrata a pp. Collegii S. Bonaventurae. Editio quarta cum critica editione collata (Florentina, ad Claras Aquas, Quaracchi: 1949).

Translations: English 6 7 8

9 10

11

Breviloquium, translation by Erwin Esser Nemers (St. Louis, Herder: 1946). The Breviloquium, translated by Jos6 de Vinck. The Works of Bonaventure, Cardinal, Seraphic Doctor and Saint, II (Paterson, New Jersey, St. Anthony Guild Press: 1963). De reductione artium ad theologiam, translated with a commentary and introduction by Sister E. Th. Healy. Works of Saint Bonaventure, 1 (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York: 1955). The Mind's Road to God, translated with an Introduction by G. Boas. The Library of Liberal Ars, 32 (New York, Liberal Arts Press: 1953). Itinerarium mentis in Deum, with an Introduction, translation and commentary by Ph. Boehner, O.F.M. Works of Saint Bonaventure, 2 (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York: 1956). The Journey of the Mind to God, translated byjose de Vinck. The Works of Bonaventure, Cardinal, Seraphic Doctor and Saint, I (Paterson, New Jersey, St. Anthony Guild Press: 1960). French

12

13

Saint Bonaventure, Breviloquium. Texte latin de Quaracchi et traduction francaise. Introduction general. Introduction au prologue et notes par Jacques Guy Bougerol, O.F.M. (Paris, Editions Franciscaines: 1966-67), 8 w. Itinerarium mentis in Deum, traduction de G. Palhories, Saint Bonaventure. La pensee chretienne (Paris: 1913), pp. 295-337.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 14

15

899

Itineraire de I'arne en elle-meme. Introduction et traduction du P. Jean de Dieu de Champsecret, O.F.M. Cap., commentaire du P. Louis de Mercin, O.F.M. Cap. Cfiuvres spirituelles de saint Bonaventure, 1 (Blois, Librairie mariale et franciscaine: 1956). Itineraire de I'esprit vers Dieu, texte de Quaracchi. Introduction, traduction et notes par Henry Dum€ry. Bibliotheque des textes philosophiques (Paris, J. Vrin: 1960).

German 16

S. Bonaventura, Itineranum mentis in Deum. Pilgerbuch des Geistes zu Gott, ilbersetzt von }. Kaup und Ph. Bohner, O.F.M. (Werl, 1932). 17 Wandenueg zu Gott, Wanderbuch fur den Besinn zu Gott. Am Steuer der Seele. Der Dreistieg oder die Feuersbrunst der Liebe. Bucher christlicher Weisheit (Freiburg, Otto Walter-Verlag: 1955). 18 Itinerarium mentis in Deum, De reductions artium ad theologiam, Lateinisch-deutsch. Eingeleitet, iibersetzt und erlautert von Julian Kaup (Miinchen, Kosel-Verlag: 1961). 19 Bonaventum, Collationes in Hexaemeron. Das Sechstagcwerk Lateinisch und deutsch, iibersetzt und eingeleitet von Wilhelm Nyssen (Munchen, Kosel-Verlag: 1964). Italian 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 ,!

Delia scienza di Cristo, introduzione e traduzione di Giulio Bonafede (Roma, Edizioni Paoline: 1951). San Bonaventura, II principio del conoscenza. II maestro interiors. Traduzione e commento di Giuseppe Muzio. Quaderni "Sodalitas Thomistica", n. 10 (Roma, Lib. Ed. Salesiana1966). // Breveloquio del serafico dottore San Bonaventura, tradutto e commentate dal P. Teodore M. Berbaliscia, O.F.M. (Pompei, Scuola Tipografica Pontificia: 1934), 2 w. Itinerario della mente verso Dio, tradotto dal G. Ottaviano (Palermo, 1933). Itinerario della mente in Dio, traduzione, introduzione e commentate di Enrico Vigorita. Collana di classic! di filosofia e pedagogia (Napoli, Istituto ed. del Mezzogiorno: 1950). Itinerario e scitti scelti. [Sulla riduzione delle art! alia teolologia ... Cristo unico maestro di tutti ... dal "de mysterio Trinitatis". ] Introduzione e traduzione di Giulio Bonafede (Roma, Edizioni Paoline: 1951). Itinerario della mente a Dio, studio introduttivo, traduzione dal latino e note di Lucia Nutrimento. Testi filosofici commentati (Treviso, ed. Canova: 1951). Itinerario della mente a Dio, testo latino, versione del Gaudenzio Melani, O.F.M. (Arezzo, Santuario della Verna: 1960). Portugese

28

Reduf&o das ciencias a teologia, trad, de I. de Sousa Ribeiro (Coimbra, Atlantida: 1948). Spanish

29

30 31 32

Obras de San Buenaventura. Biblioteca de Autores cristianos, edicion bilingiie, dirigida, anotada y con introducciones por los pp. Leon Amoro's, Bernardo Apperibay y Miguel Oromi (Madrid, B.A.C., Editorial Catolica: 1945-49), 6 w. Reduccidn de las ciencas a la teologia, texto y traduccidn por Ismael Quiles, S. J. (San Miguel, Argentina, Ciencia y Fe: 1945). El Itinerario de la mente hac'a Dios, texto latino revisado y traducido por Manuel Rio (Buenos Aires, Cursos de cultura Catolica: 1934). Hacia Dios, cinco lecciones acerca del "Itinerario" de San Buenaventura. Texto original y traduccirfn del opdsculo, por Pelayo de Zamaycoi, O.F.M.Cap. (Roma, 1940).

900

BIBLIOGRAPHY

33

Itinerario de la mente a Dios, seguido de Reduccitin de las ciencas a la teohgia, traduccidn de Pablo Masa, prdlogo de Antonio Rodriguez Huescar (Buenos Aires, Aguilan 1953).

Problems of Authenticity: 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48

49

Columban Fischer, O.F.M, "Die 'Meditationes vitae Christf. Ihre handschriftliche Ueberlieferung und die Verfasserfrage", Archivum franciscanum historicum, 25 (1932), pp. 3-35, 175-209, 305-48, 449-83. F. M. Henquinet, O.F.M., "Un recueil de questions annote par s. Bonaventure", Archivum franciscanum historicum, 25 (1932), pp. 553-55. (See below: n. 42.) — "Un brouillon autographe de saint Bonaventure sur le 'Commentaire des Sentences'", Etudes franciscaines, 44 (1932), pp. 633-35; 45 (1933), pp. 59-91. (See below: n. 42.) V. Doucet, O.F.M., "Descriptio codicis 172 bibliothecae communalis Assisiensis", Archivum franciscanum historicum, 25 (1932), pp. 43-50, 257-74, 278-79, 502-04. — "Quaestiones centum ad Scholam franciscanam saec. XIII ut plurimum spectantes in Cod. Florentino Bibl. Laur. 17. sin. 7., Appendix: De quaestionibus S. Bonaventurae adscriptis in Cod. Vat. Palat. lat. 612", Archivum franciscanum historicum, 26 (1933), pp. 183-202, 474-96. (See below: n. 42.) P. Glorieux, "Un manuscrit meconnu: Arras 873", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, 7 (1935), pp. 81-85. (See below: n. 43.) — "Questions disputees de saint Bonaventure", La France franciscaine, 21 (1938), document 2. (See below: n. 43.) F. Henquinet, "Trois petits ecrits theologiques de saint Bonaventure a la lumiere d'un quatrieme", Milanges Auguste Pelzer. Etudes d'histoire litteraire et doctrinale de la Scolastique medievale offerts a Monseigneur Auguste Pelzer a 1'occasion de son sixante-dixieme anniversaire (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1947), pp. 195-216. (See next number.) Prolegomena in librum III necnon et in libros I et II "Summae fratris Alexandre " (Quaracchi, 1948), pp. 138-41, 342-44. (See above: nn. 35-36, 38, 41.) H. F. Dondaine, "De I'attribution a s. Bonaventure des questions du ms. Arras 873", Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 19 (1949), pp. 313-78. (See above: nn. 39-40). P. Glorieux, Questions disputees "De caritale" et "De novissimis" (Paris, J. Vrin: 1950). (See above: n. 40.) G. H. Tavard, "St. Bonaventure's Disputed Questions 'De Theologia"', Recherches de thtolngie ancienne et medievale, 17 (1950), pp. 187-236. (See next number.) H. F. Dondaine, "L'auteur de la Question De Theologia du manuscrit Todi 39", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, 19 (1952), pp. 244-70. (See above: n. 45.) P. Glorieux, "La collection authentique des sermons de saint Bonaventure", Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, 22 (1955), pp. 119-25. Ermengildo Lio, O.F.M., S. Bonaventura e la questione autografa 'De Superfluo' contenuta nel ms. di Assist, Bibl. Comun. 186 citata al Concilia Vat. II. Testo con studio criticoletterario e dottrinale (Romae, Facultas theologica Pontificae Universitatis Lateranensis: 1966). Ignatius Brady, O.F.M., "The Authenticity of Two Sermons of Saint Bonaventure", Franciscan Studies, 28 (1968), pp. 4-26.

Biographical and Chronological Studies: 50 51 52

P. Glorieux, "Essai sur la chronologic de saint Bonaventure 1257-74", Archivum franciscanum historicum, 19 (1926), pp. 145-68. — "La date des Collationes de saint Bonaventure", Archivum franciscanum historicum, 22 (1929), pp. 257-72. Ignace-Marie, O.F.M., "Saint Bonaventure en Lorraine", ttevue eccllsiastique de Metz, 37 (1930), pp. 384-96.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

901

P. Glorieux, Repertoire des maitres en theologie de Paris au Xllf slide. Etudes de philosophic medievale, XVII-XVIII (Paris, 1933), 2 w. (See: v. 2, pp. 37-51.) Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., "S. Bonaventure et Cologne", Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 1 (1934), pp. 289-97. O. Righi, "S. Bonaventura entro nell'Ordine Fransescano in Parigi o nella Provincia romana?". Miscellanea frames cana, 36 (1936), pp. 505-11. Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., "Bonaventure, saint", Dictionnaire de spirituality (Paris, 1937), v. 1, cc. 1768-1843. — "Bonaventure (saint)", Dictionnaire d'histoire et de gtographie ecclisiastiques (Paris, 1937), v. 9, cc. 741-88. Giuseppe Abate, "Per la storia e la cronologia di S. Bonaventura", Miscellanea francescana, 49 (1949), pp. 534-68; 50 (1950), pp. 97-130. Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., "Bonaventure (saint)", Catholicisme [Hier-Aujourd'huiDemainl Encycloptdie (Paris, 1949), v. 2, cc. 122-28. H. Bedarida, "Ricordi .spiritual! e recordi figurativi di S. Bonaventura in Franc ia", Doctor Seraphicus, 4 (1957), pp. 23-25. F. Petrangeli Papini, "S. Bonaventura e Viterbo," Doctor Seraphicus, 4 (1957), 55-70. J. Guy Bougerol, O.F.M., Introduction a Vetude de saint Bonaventure. Bibliotheque de theologie, serie 1, theologie dogmatique, v. 2 (Tournai-Paris, Desclee: 1961). Francesco Petrangeli Papini, S. Bonaventura da Bagnoregio (Bagnoregio, 1962). J. G. Bougerol, S. Bonaventure et la sagesse chritienne. Mattres spirituels (Paris, Editions 'du Seuil: 1963). Introduction to the Works of St. Bonaventure, translated by Jose de Vinck (Paterson, New Jersey, St. Anthony Guild Press: 1964). (See above: n. 62.) Jacques Guy Bougerol, Saint Bonaventure. Un maitre de sagesse (Paris, Editions Franciscaines: 1966).

Writings of St. Thomas 67 68 69

70 71 72 73 74

S. Thomae Aquinas opera omnia, iussu Leonis XIII edita (Romae, 1882-1971), XXII volumina (to date). De ente et essentia, texte etabli d'apres les manuscrits parisiens, introduction, notes et etudes historiques, par M. D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., 2'' ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1948). Summa theologiae, cura et studio Institut Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis ad textum S. Pii Pp V iussu confectum recognita, edidit Commissio Piana (Ottawa, Harpell's Press Co-Operative: 1953), V volumina. Quaestiones disputatae, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, O.P., editio nona revisa (Taurini, Marietti: 1953), II volumina. Opuscula theologica, cura et studio P. Doct. Fr. Raymundi A. Verardo, O.P. (Taurini, Marietti: 1954). Opuscula philosophica, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini, Marietti: 1954). Quaestiones quodlibetales, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, O.P., editio nona (Taurini, Marietti: 1956). Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra errores Infidelium seu "Summa centre Gentiles ", textus Leoninus diligenter recognitus (Taurini, Marietti: 1961), w. II & III.

Commentaries: 75

76

Scriplum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis, cura P. Mandonnet, O.P., w. 1-2; recognovit atque iterum edidit Maria Fabianus Moos, O.P., w. 3-4 (Parisiis, P. Lethielleux: 1929-47). In Aristotelis hbrum De anima commentarium, cura ac studio P. Fr. Angeli M. Pirotta, O.P. (Taurini, Marietti: 1925).

902

BIBLIOGRAPHY

77

In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum exposito, cura ac studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini, Marietti: 1949). 78 In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, editio iam a M. R. Cathala, O.P. exarata retractatur, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini, Marietti: 1950). 79 In Aristotelis libros De caelo et mundo, De generations et corruptions, Meteorologicorum expositio, cum textu ex recensione leonina, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini, Marietti: 1952). 80 Super librum De causis expositio, par H. D. Saffrey, O.P. (Louvain, E. Nauwelaerts & Fribourg, Societe Philosophique: 1954). 81 Expositio super librum Boethii de Tnmtate, recencuit Bruno Decker, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, herausgegeben von Josef Koch, Band IV (Leiden, E/.J. Brill: 1955). 82 In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum analyticorum expositio, cum textu ex recensione leonina, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini, Marietti: 1955).

Authors cited by St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas The greater number of the entries in this section come from: a) Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina, edidit J. P. Migne (Parisiis, 18531902); b) Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, edidit J. P. Migne (Parisiis, 1857-1912). Avoiding repetition, entries from those publications are noted respectively as PL and PG with the appropriate volume and column numbers. Items attributed to the wrong authors, or of doubtful authenticity, in the PL collection are entered with a refernce to: P. Glorieux, "Pour revaloriser Migne". Cahier supplfimentaire. Melanges de science religieuse, 9 (1952), pp. 1-82. 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Alcher of Clairvaux. De spiritu et anima (PL 40.779-832). See: P. Glorieux, p. 27. Ambrose, St. De fide ad Gratianum Augustum (PL 16.549-726). — De moribus Brachmanorum (PL 17.1167-84). Anselm of Canterbury, St. Monologium (PL 158.141-224). —Proslogion (PL 158.223-48). — Dialogus de veritate (PL 158.467-86). — Dialogus de libero arbitrio (PL 158.489-506).

Aristotle: 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Aristotelis opera, edidit Academia Regia Borussica. Aristoteles graece, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, vv. 1-2; Aristoteles lattne, interpretibus variis, v. 3 (Berolini, Georgium Reimerum: 1831). Aristotelis opera omnia, graece et latine, editoribus Firmin-Didot et Sociis (Parisiis, Instituti Typographis: 1927), w. 1-3. The Works of Aristotle, an English translation edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1912-31), w. 1-3, 5-6, 8-9. The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited with an Introduction by Richard McKeon (New York, Random House: 1941). Categoriae (l-15b33). De interpretation (16al-24b9). Analvtica posteriora (71al-100bl7). Topiai (I00al8-164b20).

BIBLIOGRAPHY 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

903

Physica (184a9-267b26). De caelo et mundo (268al-313b25). De generatione et corruptions (314al-338b20). Meteorologica (338a20-390b20). De anima (402al-435b25). De sensu et sensibili (436al-449a33). De memoria et reminiscentia (449b3-453blO). De somno et vigilia (453bl l-458a33). De longitudine et brevitate vitae (464bl9-467b7). De generation animalium (715al-789b20). De plantis (815al-830b2). Metaphysica (980al-1093b29). Ethica nicomachea (1094al-l 181b25).

Augustine of Hippo, St. Aurelius: 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

Retmctiones (PL 32.583-656). Confessiones (PL 32.659-868). Soliloquia (PL 32.869-904). Contra Academicos (PL 32.905-58). De immortalitate animae (PL 32.1021-34). De musica (PL 32.1081-1194). De magistro (PL 32.1193-1220). De tobero arbitrio (PL 32.1221-1310). De morihus Manichaeorum (PL 32.1309-78). Epistolae XIV et CXVlll (PL 33.79-80, 431-49). De videndo Dei, Epistola CXLVII (PL 33.596-622). De doctrina Christiana (PL 34.15-122). De vem religions (PL 34.121-72). De Genesi ad litteram (PL 34.173-486). In Joannis Evangelium tractatus, cap. 1 (PL 35.1379-1450). In Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos, tractatus 3 (PL 35.1997-2004). De mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae, (PL 35.2149-2202). See: P. Glorieux, p. 23. Enarrationes in Psalmos III et XI (PL 36.72-78, 138-40). Sermo CXVll (PL 38.661-71). De diversis quaestionibus LXXXUI (PL 40.11-100).

131 132

Enchiridion ad Laurentium (PL 40.231-90). De cura pro mortuis gerenda ad Paulinum (PL 40.591-610).

133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143

Dialogus quaestionum LXV (PL 40.733-52). See: P. Glorieux, p. 27. De civitate Dei (PL 41.13-804). De Militate credendi (PL 42.65-92). De duabus animabus (PL 42.93-112). De natura boni contra Manichaeos (PL 42.551-72). De Trinitate (PL 42.819-1098). De ecdesiasticis dogmatibus (PL 42.1213-22). See: P. Glorieux, p. 32. Contra fulianum, iiber 4 (PL 44.758-82). De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44.959-92). Hypognosticon (PL 45.1611-64). See: P. Glorieux, p. 33. Averroes. Commentarium in Aristotelis de anima libros, recensuit F. Stuart Crawford. Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, v. 6.1 (Cambridge, Mass., Mediaeval Academy of America: 1953). 144 —De substantia orbis (Venetiis, 1573). 145 — In Aristotelis libros metaphysicorum commentana (Venetiis, 1574). 146 Avicenna. Logica, De anima, Metaphysica (Venetiis, 1508).

904 147 148 149 150

BIBLIOGRAPHY basil the Great, St. Homiliae in Hexaemeron, homilia 6 (PC 29.118-47). Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Epistola ad Ogerium (PL 182.211-17). — De consideration (PL 182.727-808). — De gradibus humilitatis (PL 182.941-58).

Boethius, Ancius Manlius Severinus: 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176

178 179

De consolations philosophiae (PL 63.549-862). De imitate et uno (PL 63.1075-78). fn Porphyrium commentaria (PL 64.71-158). De Trinitate (PL 64.1247-56). Utrum Pater et Filius ac Spiritus sanctus (PL 64.1299-1302). Qttomodo substantiae bonae sint (PL 64.1311-14). De una persona et duabus naturis, cap 1-3 (PL 64.1342-45). Cicero, Marcus Tullus. De inventione rhetorica. M. Tulli Ciceronis opera (Oxonii, 1783), v. 1, pp. 23-130. Dionysius. De coelesti hierarchia (PG 3.119-370). 160 — De divinis nominibus (PG 3.586-995). — De mystica theologia (PG 3.998-1063). — Epistola 1 (PG 3,1066). Gregory the Great, St. Moralium libri, liber 5 (PL 75.679-730); liber 19 (PL 76.95-136). —Homiliae in Evangelica, liber 2 (PL 76.1169-1312). Hilary, St. De Trinitate (PL 10.25-472). Hugh of St. Victor. De sacramentis (PL 176.173-618). — Eruditionis didascalicae (PL 176.739-838). — De sapientia animae Christi (PL 176.845-56). Isaac de Stella. De anima (PL 194.1875-90). Jerome, St. Ad Eustochium, Epistola XXII (PL 22.394-425). — Adversus fovinianum (PL 23.221-352). John Damascene, St. De fide othodoxa (PG 94.782-1227). Macrobius, Ambrosius Theodosius. Commentarium in Somnium Scipionis, edidit I Willis. Academia Scientiarum Germanica Berolinensis, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Lipsiae in aedibus G.B. Teubneri: 1963). Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, translation by William Harris Stahl (New York, Columbia University Press: 1952). Plato. Meno, interprete Henrico Aristippo, edidit Victor Kordeuter, recognivit et praefatione instruxit Carlotta Labowsky. Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevii, Plato latinus. edidit Raymundus Klibansky, v. 1 (Londinii, in aedibus Instituti Warburgiani: 1940). — Phaedo, interprete Henrico Aristippo, edidit et praefatione instruxit Laiirentius Minio-Paluello. Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevii, Plato latinus, edidit Raymundus Klibansky, v. 2 (Londinii, in aedibus Instituti Warburgiani: 1950). 177 Raymund Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages (London, The Warburg Institute: 1939). Richard of St. Victor. De Trinitate (PL 196.887-992). Themistius. Commentaire sur la traitf de I'ame d'Aristote, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Edition critique et etude sur ('utilisation du commentaire dans I'oeuvre de saint Thomas, par G. Verbeke (Louvain, Publications universitaires & Paris, Editions Beatrice Nauwelaerts: 1957).

Writings of the Historians 180 B. Haureau, La philosophic scolastique (Paris, Pagnerre: 1850), 2 w. 181 — Histoire de la philosophic scolastique (Paris, Durand et Pedone-Lauriel: 1872-80), 3 w.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

905

Maurice De Wulf: 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198

200

201

Histoire de la philosophic scolastique dans les Pays-Bas et la principauU de Liige jusqu'a la Revolution Franfaise (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1895). "Le probleme des universaux dans son evolution historique du IX' au XIII' siecle", Archie fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 9 (1996), pp. 427-44. "Qu'est-ce que la philosophic scolastique? Les notions fausses et incompletes". Revue neo-scolastique, 5 (1898), pp. 141-53, 282-96. "La synthese scolastique", Revue neo-scolastique, 6 (1899), pp. 41-65, 159-78. Qu'est-ce que la philosophic scolastique? (Paris, Alcan: 1899). (See above: nn. 184-85; see below: n. 190.) Histoire de la philosophic medievale (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1900). Le trade "De unitate formae " de Gilles de Lessines. Les philosophies Beiges (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1901). "Augustinisme et aristotelisme au XIII1 siecle", Revue neo-scolastique, 8 (1901), pp. 15166. (See above: n. 188, pp. 10-22.) "La notion de scolastique", Revue philosophique de la France et de I'ftranger, 53 (1902), pp. 631-45. Introduction a la philosophic neo-scolastique, (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1904). The History of Meidaeval Philosophy, an English translation of the 2nd French ed. (1905) by Ernest C. Messenger and published as a 3rd ed. (London, Longmans Green: 1909). Scholasticism Old and New, an Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy Mediaeval and Modern. translated by P. Coffey (London, Longmans Green: 1910). (See above: n. 191.) Histoire de la philosophic en Belgique (Bruxelles, 1910). "Philosophy", The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, Robert Appleton: 1911), v. 12, cc. 25-40. "Notion de la scolastique medievale", Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 18 (1911), pp. 177-96. "Les courants philosophiques du moyen age occidental". Revue de philosophic, 20 (1912),'pp- 225-42. This is found also in Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 19 (1912), pp. 157-76, 389-405, 592-603. Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (Princeton University Press: 1922); republished at New York, Dover Publications, 1953. 199 G. Thery, O.P., Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, 11 (1922), pp. 68870. Mediaeval Philosophy Illustrated from the System of Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press: 1922).

"The Autonomy of Mediaeval Philosophy", Havard Theological Quarterly (1923), pp. 143-46. 202 Histoire de la philosophic medievale. 5' ed. (Louvain Institut superieur de philosophic: 1924-25), 2 w. 203 E. Gilson, "Histoire des philosophies mfedievales et des doctrines religieuses", Revue philosophique de la France et de I'etranger, 100 (1925), pp. 289-90. 204 Fernand Sassen, Studio Catholica, 1 (1925), pp. 123-37. 205 R. Dalbiez, Revue de philosophic, 32 (1925), pp. 561-63. 206 M. D. Chenu, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 1 (1924-26): 1926, n. 630, pp. 84-86. 207 G. Thery, O.P., Revue des sciences philosophiques et thiologiques, 15 (1926), p. 549. 208 The History of Mediaeval Philosophy, translated by Ernest C. Messenger (London, Longmans Green: 1926), 2 w. (See above: n. 202.) 209 "Y-eut-il une philosophic scolastique au moyen age?", Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 28 (1927), pp. 5-27, 223-31. 210 M. D. Chenu, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 2 (1927-29): 1927, pp. 98-100. 211 "L'age de la metaphysique", Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 32 (1930), pp. 389-98.

906 212 213 214

217

BIBLIOGRAPHY "L'augustinisme 'avicennisant'", Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 33 (1933), pp. 1139. "Courants doctrinaux dans la philosophic europeenne du XIIT siecle", Revue neoscolastique de philosophic, 34 (1932), pp. 5-20. Histoire de la philosophic medievale, 6' fid. (Louvain, Institut supferieur de philosophic: 1934-47), 3 w. 215 M. D. Chenu, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 4 (1933-36): 1936, pp. 779-81. 216 Bulletin thomiste, 8 (1947-53), n. 2563, pp. 1280-81: a long list of reviews is found here. History of Mediaeval Philosophy, translated by Ernest C. Messenger (London, Longmans Green: 1935-37), 2 w. Biographical

218

Hommage a Monsieur le Prqfesseur Maurice De Wulf. Volume de melanges extrait de la Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 36 (1934). 219 Leon Noel, "L'oeuvre de Monsieur de Wulf, Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 36 (1934), pp. 11-38. 220 — "La carriere scientifique de Monsieur le Professor De Wulf, Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 36 (1934), pp. 39-66. 221 — "In Memoriam, Maurice De Wulf, Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic. 45 (1947), entre pp. 300-01. 222 F. Van Steenberghen, "Maurice De Wulf historien de la philosophic medievale", Revue philosophique de Louvain, 46 (1948), pp. 421-27. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P.: 223 224

Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au XIT siecle. Collectanea Friburgensia, vol. VIII (Fribourg-Suisse: 1899). (See above: n. 189.) Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au XIIF siecle, 2' ed. Les Philosophies Beiges, w. VIVII (Louvain, Institut supfirieur de philosophic: 1980-11); studies appeared in v. VI, 1911, and texts in v. VII, 1908. 225 Maurice De Wulf, Revue nio-scolastirjue de philosophic, 17 (1910), p. 408. 226 — "Note bibliographique sur un ouvrage de P. Mandonnet O.P. 'Siger de Brabant et I'averroisme latin au XIIF siecle, etude critique' (2' edition)", Bulletin de la classe des lettres de I'Academie royale de Belgique (1910), pp. 628-41. Biographical

227

Melanges Mandonnet. Etudes d'histoire litteraire et doctrinale du moyen age. Bibliotheque thomiste, XII (Paris, J. Vrin: 1930). 228 M. H. Laurent, "P. Pietro Mandonnet O.P.", Memorie domenicane, 53 (1936), pp. 6064. 229 — "Le T. R. Pere Mandonnet O.P.", Revue thomiste, 19 (1936), pp. 157-63 230 M. J. Congar, O.P., "Le R. Pere Mandonnet O.P.,", Revue des sciences philosophiqv.es et thiologiques, 25 (1936), pp. 377-401. 231 M. D. Chenu, O.P., "Le R. Pere Mandonnet O.P.,", Bulletin thomiste, 4 (1933-36): 1936, pp. 693-97. Etienne Gilson: 232 234

Le thomisme. Introduction au systime de saint Thomas d'Aquin (Strasbourg, Vix: 1919). 233 M. De Wulf, Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 23 (1922), pp. 229-30. Etudes de philosophic medievale (Strasbourg, Vix: 1921). 235 M. De Wulf, Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic. 23 (1922), pp. 230-39. 236 Revue de mitaphysique et de morale (avril-juin, 1922), supplement, p. 4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 237

240

245 246

257 258

261 262 263 265 266 267 268 269

907

La philosophic an moyen age de Scot Engine A G. d'Occam. Collection Payot (Paris, Payot: 1922), 2 w., reprinted in one volume, 1930. 238 Revue de metaphysique et de morale (avril-juin, 1922), supplement, pp. 54-55. 239 G. Thery, O.P., Revue des sciencesphilosophiques et thioloqiques, 11 (1922), pp. 67071. Le thomisme. Introduction au systlme de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 2' ed. Etudes de philosophic medievale, v. I (Paris, J. Vrin: 1922). 241 M. De Wulf, Revue nio-scolastique de philosophic, .24 (1923), p. 445. 242 G. Thery, O.P., Revue des sciences philosophiques et thiologiques, 12 (1923), pp. 54950. 243 P. Mandonnet, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 1 (1924-26): 1924, pp. 132-36. 244 Lists of reviews are given in Bulletin thomiste, 1 (1924-26): 1924, n. 78, p. 90; 1926, n. 697, p. 123. "Saint Bonaventure et Pevidence de Pexistence de Dieu", Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 25 (1923), pp. 237-62. Ln philosophic de saint Bonaventure. Etudes de philosophic medievale, v. IV (Paris, J. Vrin: 1924). (See above, on chapter 3: n. 245.) 247 J. Bittremieux, Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses, 1 (1924), pp. 584-86. 248 G. Thery, O.P., Revue des sciences philosophiques et thfohgiques, 13 (1924), pp. 54951. 249 Etienne Bihel, O.F.M., La France franciscaine, 8 (1925), pp. 165-69. 250 Noel Franqueterre, Revue des sciences religieuses, 5 (1925), pp. 543-52. 251 Paul Geny, S.I., Gregorianum, 6 (1925), pp. 118-21. 252 P. Gratien, O.F.M., Revue d'histoire franciscaine, 2 (1925), pp. 92-95. 253 P. W. Lampden, O.F.M., Archivum franciscanum historicum, 18 (1925), pp. 386-90. 254 P. Monnot, Archives de philosophic, 3 (1925), pp. 555-63. 255 P. Mandonnet, O.P., "L'augustinisme bonaventurien", Bulletin thomiste, \ (192426): mar. 1926, pp. 48-54. 256 A complete list of reviews is found in Bulletin thomiste, 1 (1924-26): 1926, n. 677, p. 107. The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, translation from 3rd Franch ed., prior to publication, by G. A. Bullough (Cambridge, Heffer & Sons: 1924); revised and enlarged in 1929. "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critique saint Augustin", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litterain du moyen age, 1 (1926), pp. 1-127. (See above: n. 212.) 259 M. D. Chenu, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 2 (1927-29): 1927, pp. 180-83. 260 M. M. Gorce, O. P., Bulletin thomiste, 3 (1930-33): 1930, pp. 188-89. "Saint Bonaventure (1221-1274)", La vie et les ceuvres de quelqu.es grands saints (Paris, Librairie de France: 1926), v. 1, pp. 222-36. "La philosophic franciscaine", Saint Francois d'Assise (Paris, Droz: 1927), pp. 148-75. Le thomisme. Introduction au systlme de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 3 ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1927). 264 M. D. Chenu, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 2 (1927-29): 1928, pp. 242-45. Introduction a I'etude de saint Augustin. Etudes de philosophic medievale, v. XI (Paris, j. Vrin: 1929). "Les sources grfico-arabes de Paugustinisme avicennisant", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, 4 (1929), pp. 5-149. (See above: n. 212.) "Le probleme de la philosophic chretienne". La vie spirituelle, 38 (1931), pp. 214-32. "La notion de philosophic chretienne". Bulletin de la Sociitf francaise de Philosophie, 31 (1931), pp. 37-93. L'esprit de la philosophic medievale (Paris, J. Vrin: 1932), 2 w. 270 M. D. Chenu, O.P., Revue des sciences philosophiques et thtologiques, 21 (1932), p. 231. 271 M. J. Congar, O.P., Revues des sciences philosophiques et thiologiques, 21 (1932), pp. 569-98. 272 O. Lottin, Bulletin de thiologie ancienne et medievale, 2 (1933-36), n. 130, pp. 65-67. 273 For a list of reviews see: Bulletin thomiste, 4 (1934-36): 1934, n. 420, p. 298.

908

BIBLIOGRAPHY

274

"Sur quelques difficultes de 1'illumination augustinienne", Revue nfo-scolastique de philosophic, 36 (1934), pp. 321-31. "L'intelligence au service du Christ-Roi", La vie spirituelle, 41 (1934), pp. 181-203. Christianisme et philosophic (Paris, J. Vrin: 1936). 277 A. R. Motte, Bulletin thomiste, 4 (1934-36): 1936, pp. 781-84. The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, translated by A.H.C. Dowries (New York, Scribner's Sons: 1936). (See above: n. 269.) The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York, Scribner's Sons: 1937; London, Sheed & Ward: 1938). Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York, Scribner's Sons: 1938); republished in paperback: SL 37. The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure, translated by llltyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (New York, Sheed & Ward: 1938); reprinted at Paterson, New Jersey, St. Anthony Guild Press: 1965. (See above: n. 246.) Christianity and Philosophy, translated by Ralph McDonald, C.S.B. (New York, Sheed & Ward: 1939). (See above: n. 276.) "Le christianisme et la tradition philosophique", Revue des sciences philosophiques el theologiques, 30 (1941-42), pp. 249-66. This is found also in Chercher Dieu. Rencontres, 13 (Paris, 1943), pp. 61-81. God and Philosophy (New Haven, Yale University Press: 1941). Le thomisme. Introduction a la philosophic de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 4' ed (Paris, J. Vrin: 1942). A. Forest, Bulletin thomiste, 6 (1940-42), pp. 23-29. 287 M. Cappuyns, Bulletin de thfologie ancienne et midievale, 4 (1941-45), n. 1497, pp. 280-81. Introduction a I'etude de saint Augustin, 21' ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1943). La phihiophie de saint Bonaventure, 2' ed. "Addenda et corrigenda" (Paris, J. Vrin: 1943). La philosophic au moyen age, des origines patristiques a la fin du XIV siecle, 2" ed., rev. et aug. (Paris, Payot: 1944)'. 291 MD., Chenu, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 7 (1943-46), pp. 111-12. 292 M. Cappuyns, Bulletin de thfologie ancienne et midiivale, 5 (1946-49), n. 742, pp. 259-60. 293 F. Van Steenberghen, Revue philosophique de Louvain, 46 (1948), pp. 111-13. L'esprit de la philosophic, 2' ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1944). Le thomisme. Introduction a la philosophic de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 5l ed. (Paris, f. Vrin: 1944). "Pierre Lombard et les theologiens de 1'essence", Revue du moyen age latin, 1 (1945), pp. 61-64. (See above: n. 295, c. 2.) La filosofia de San Buenventura, traduccion por Estaban de Zudaire (Buenos Aires, Desclee de Brouwer: 1948). (See above: n. 289.) Introduction a I'etude de saint Augustin, 3'' ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1949). Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: 1949). "Les recherches historico-critiques et 1'avenir de la scolastique", Scholastica rations historico-critica instauranda. Acta congressus scholastic! international is, Romae, 1950 (Roma, Antonianum: 1951), pp. 131-42. (See next number.) "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism", The Modern Schoolman, 29 (1951), pp. 1-10. Also found in n. 306, below, pp. 156-67. Being and Some Philosophers, corrected and enlarged (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: 1952). La philosophic de saint Bonaventure, 3' ed. (Paris, J. Vrin: 1953). History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, Random House & London, Sheed & Ward: 1955). The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, a translation, with minor changes, of the

275 276 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 288 289 290

294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305

BIBLIOGRAPHY

306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313

909

5th French ed. by L.K. Shook, with a "Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works", by I. T. Eschmann, O.P. (New York, Random House: 1956; London, Victor Gollancz: 1957). "What is Christian Philosophy?", A Gilson Reader. Selections from the writings of Etienne Gilson, edited with an Introduction by Anton C. Pegis (New York, Image Books D55: 1957), pp. 170-76. Le Philosophe el la thfotogie (Paris, Artheme Fayard: 1960). Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York, Doubleday: 1960). Die Philosophic des heiligen Bonaeentura, iibersetzt von Paul Alfred Schillter (Koln, Hegner: 1960). (See above: n. 303.) The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, an English equivalent of the 2nd French ed. by L. E. M. Lynch (New York, Random House: 1960). The Philosopher and Theology, translated by Cecile Gilson (New York, Random House: 1962). (See above: n. 307.) The Spirit of Thomism (New York, P. J. Kenedy: 1964). Le thomisme. Introduction A la philosophic de saint Thomas d'Aquin. & ed. (Paris, ]. Vrin: 1965). Biographical

314

Etienne Gilson, philosophe de la chretiente, avec "Preface" de M. .]. Maritain. Rencontres 30 (Paris, Editions du Cerf: 1949). 315 Mediaeval Studies. Etienne Gilson Anniversary Studies, 20 (1958); Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. 316 Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson de I'Acadtmie francaise (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies & Paris, J. Vrin: 1959). 317 Charles J. O'Neill, An Etienne Gilson tribute. Presented by his North American students, with a response by Etienne Gilson (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press: 1959). Fernand Van Steenbergen: 318

"Siger de Brabant d'apres ses ceuvres inedites", Revue neo-scolastique de philosophic, 32 (1930), pp. 403-23. 319 Siger de Brabant d'apres ses aeuvres intdites. Les Philosophies Beiges, w. XII-XIII (Louvain, Institut supfirieur de philosophic: 1931-42); texts issued in 1931, and studies in 1942. 320 E. Gilson, Bulletin thomiste, 6 (1940-42), pp. 5-22. 321 B. Lane, O.F.M., "The Extremism of St. Bonaventure", Catholic Survey (Galway), 1 (1951-52), pp. 3-18. 322 N. Egan, O.F.M., "Christian Extremism", Catholic Survey (Galway), I (1951-52), pp. 178-81. 323 Aristote en accident. Les origines de I'aristotSlisme parisien. Essais philosophiques, 1 (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1946). (See above: n. 319, v. XIII, c. 2.) 324 "Le mouvement doctrinal du Xlir siecle", Histoire de I'Eglise, edd. A. Fliche et E. Jarry (Paris, Bloud & Gay: 1951), pp. 177-328; 2nd ed. published in 1956. 325 "Siger of Brabant", The Modern Schoolman, 29 (1951), pp. 11-27. 326 The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century (Edinburgh, Nelson: 1955). 327 Aristotle in the West, a translation by Leonard Johnston (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1955). (See above: n. 323.) 328 Histoire de la philosophic. Periode chretienne (Louvain, Publications universitaires & Paris, Beatrice-Nauwelaerts: 1964). 329 La philosophic au XIIF siecle. Philosophes medievaux, v. IX (Louvain, Publications universitaires & Paris Beatrice-Nauwelaerts: 1966). Patrice Robert: 330

"St. Bonaventure Defender of Christian Wisdom" Franciscan Studies 3 (1943) pp. 15979.

910

BIBLIOGRAPHY

331

"Le probleme de la philosophic bonaventurienne. I. Aristotelisme platonisant ou augustinisme?", Laval tkeologique et philosophique, 6 (1950), pp. 145-63. 332 "Le probleme de la philosophic bonaventurienne. II. Discipline autonome ou heteronome?", Laval thtologique et philosophique, 1 (1951), pp. 9-58. 333 Joseph Ratzinger, Die Geschichtstheotogie des heiligen Bonaventura (Munchen und Zurich, Schnell & Steiner: 1959). 334 Hendrikus van der Laan, De wijsgerige grondslag van Bonaventura's theologie (Amsterdam, Buijten & Schipperheijn: 1968). Other Historians:

335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343

344 345 346

347 348 349 350* 351 352 353

Henricus Denifle, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (Parisiis, Fratres Delalain: 1889), v. 1. Clemens Baeumker, "Die Europaische Philosophic der Mittelalters", Die Kuttur der Gegenwart, I. V (Berlin, Paul Hinneberg: 1909). Jules d'AIbi, Saint Bonaventure el les luttes doctrinales de 1267-1277 (Tamines, Duculot: 'l922). Franz Ehrle, S.J., "L'agostinismo e I'aristotelismo nella scolastica del secolo XIII". Xenia tomistica, 3 (1925). pp. 517-88. C. Kranzic, "La scuola francescana e 1'averroismo", Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 21 (1929), pp. 444-94. — "Grandi lottatori contro l'averroismo", Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 22 (1930), pp. 161-207. Ludger Meier, O.F.M., "Bonaventuras Selbstzeugnis uber seinen Augustinismus", Franziskanische Studien, 17 (1930), pp. 342-55. M. M. Gorce, O.P., "La lutte Contra Gentiles a Paris au XIII1' siecle", Melanges Mandonnet (Paris, J. Vrin: 1930), pp. 223-43). Martin Grabmann, "De Gnaaestione 'Utrum aliquid possit esse simul creditum et scitum' inter Scholas Augustinismi et Aristotelico-Thomismi medii aevi agitata", Ada Hehdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae, Romae, 1930 (Roma, Marietti: 1931), pp. 11920. — Der lateinische Averroismus des XIII. fahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur chnsttuhen Weltanschauung (Munchen: 1931). M. M. Gorce, O.P., "Averroisme". Dictionnaire d'histoire et de geographic ecclistiastiques (Paris, 1931), v. 5, cc. 1032-92: see: cc. 1058-64. Martin Grabmann, "Eine filr Examinazwecke abgefasste Quaestionensammlung der Pariser Artistenfakultat aus der ersten Halfte des 13. Jahrhunderts", Revue nio-scolastique de philosophic, 36 (1934), pp. 211-29. Found also in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, Band 2 (Munchen, Max Hueber: 1936), pp. 183-99. Daniel A. Callus, O.P., "The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure and of St. Thomas", Blackfriars, 21 (1940). pp. 151-64, 249-67. Martin Grabmann, / devieti ecclesiastici di Aristotele sotto Innocenzo III e Gregorio IX. Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, v. V (Romae, Saler: 1941). F. J. Thonnard, S.I., "Augustinisme et aristotelisme au XIII'' siecle", Annie thiologique, 5 (1944), pp. 442-66. Pelayo de Zamayo'n, O.F.M.Cap., "L'aristotelismo di San Bonaventura ed altre caratteristiche della filosofia francescana", Italia francescana, 19 (1944), pp. 41-49. Angelo de Vinca, "L'aspetto filosofico dell'artistotelismo di San Bonaventura", Collectanea franciscana, 19 (1949), pp. 5-44. Ermengildo Bertola, "Platonismo escolSstico-cristiano y arabe-juido: S. Bonaventura y R. Babya ben Pacuda", Sefarad, 10 (1950), pp. 385-400; also available in n. 354, below, pp. 94-107. L. Veuthey, O.F.M.Conv., "Les divers courants de la philosophic augustinofranciscaine au moyen age", Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda. Acta

BIBLIOGRAPHY

354 355 356 357* 358 359 360

361* 362 363 364

365 366 367

911

congressus scholastici internationalis, Romae, 1950 (Roma, Antonianum: 1951), pp. 629-52. E. Bertola, Saggi e studi di filosofia medioevale. II pensiero medioevale, serie I, 3 (Padova, A. Milani: 1951). H. F. Dondaine, "Les scolastiques citent-ils les Peres de premiiere main?", Revue des sciences philosophiques et thtologiques, 36 (1952), pp. 231-43. M. de Gandillac, "Le platonisme aux XIF'-XIIF siecles", Actes du Congres de Tours et Poitiers (Association Guillaume Bude), 1953 (Paris, 1954), pp. 266-85. Antonio Zigrossi, Saggio sui neo-ptatonismo di San Bonaventura (Firenze, Studi francescani: 1954). Umberto A. Padovani, "Agostinismo bonaventuriano e agostinismo tomistico", Studio patavina. 1 (1954), pp. 85-98. Giuseppe Sperdutti, "Gli element! platonici del metodo filosofico di San Bonaventura", Studi francescani, 53 (1956), pp. 75-88. Hadrianus a Krizovljan, O.P.M.Cap., "Controversia doctrinalis inter magistros franciscanos et Sigerum de Brabant", Collectanea franciscana, 27 (1957), pp. 121-65; see: 127-42. E. Garin, Studi sul platonismo medieval (Firenze, 1958). E. P. Arns, "As confissdes de S. Agostinho nas obras de S. Bonaventura", Revista edesidstica brasileira, 18 (1958), pp. 24-35. Robert.J. Roch, S.J., "The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure — A Controversy", Franciscan Studies, 19 (1959), pp. 209-26. Christian Wenin, "La connaissance philosophique d'apres saint Bonaventure", L'homme et son destin d'apres les penseurs du moyen age. Actes du Premier Congres international de Philosophic Medievale, Louvain-Bruxelles, 1958 (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1960), pp. 485-94. Anton C. Pegis, The Middle Ages and Philosophy. Some Reflections on the Ambivalence of Modern Scholasticism (Chicago, Henry Regnery: 1963). Romano Guardini, Systembildende Elemente in der Theologie Bonaventuras, herausgegeben von Werner Dettloff (Leiden, E. J. Brill: 1964). J. G. Bougerol, "Saint Bonaventure et la hierarchic dionysienne", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littfraire du moyen age, 44 (1969), pp. 131-67.

Bonaventurean Studies General: 368

Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., "Bonaventure, saint", Dictionnaire de spirituaiiti (Paris, 1937), v. 1, cc. 1768-1843. 369 — "Bonaventure (saint)", Dictionnaire d'histoire et de giographie ccdtsiastiques (Paris, 1937), v. 9, cc. 741-88. 370 H. Guthrie, "St. Bonaventure", The Modern Schoolman, 15 (1938), pp. 83-88. 371 Valentin M. Breton, OEuores presentees par le rev. Pere V. M. Breton. Les mattres de la spiritualite chretienne, textes et etudes (Paris, Aubier: 1943). 372 J. Servais, "Saint Bonaventure", Revue de la table ronde, 2 (1945), pp. 52-53. 373 L. Veuthay, O.F.M.Conv., Si. Bonaventurae philosophia Christiana (Romae, Officium Libri Catholici: 1943). 374 Efrem Bettoni, S. Bonaventura (Brescia, La Scuola: 1945). 375 I. de Sousa Ribeiro, "Smtese Bonaventuriana e seu significao", Atlantico (Lisboa), 1 (1949-50), pp. 5-10. 376* A. Silva, "Pensamento de S. Bonaventura", Pax et Bonum (Lisboa), 1 (1952), pp. 7374, 119-37. 377 Louis de Mercin, O.F.M.Cap., "Essais sur saint Bonaventure", Etudes franciscaines (NS) 4 (1953), pp. 89-97. 378* Marius Noe, O.F.M.Cap., "A Burning and shining light", St. Bonaventure Seraphic Doctor (Paterson. New Jersey, St. Anthony Guild Press: 1955).

912

BIBLIOGRAPHY

379* Adriano Borak [Hadrianus a KriZovljan, O.F.M.Cap. ], Pkilosophia s. Bonaventurae (Romae, Collegium Internationale S. Laurentii a Brundisio: 1956). 380 L. Veuthey, O.F.M.Conv., "Bonaventura (s.)", Enciclopedia filosofica (Roma, 1957), v. 1, cc. 744-60. 381 Anselma Brennell, "Saint Bonaventure", The Month, 21 (1959), pp. 173-82. 382 J. Guy Bougerol, O.F.M., Introduction a I'itude de saint Bonaventure. Bibliotheque de thfiologie, serie 1, theologie dogmatique, v. 2 (Tournai-Paris, Desclfee: 1961). (See above: n. 65.) 383 Efrem Bettoni, St. Bonaventure, translated by Angelus Gambatese, O.F.M. (University of Notre Dame Press: 1964). See above: n. 374.) 384 Jacques Guy Bougerol, Saint Bonaventure. Un maitre de sagesse (Paris, Editions Franciscaines: 1966). 385 I. C. Brady, "Bonaventure, St.", New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, McGraw-Hill: 1967), v. 2, cc. 658-64. 386 Camille Berube, O.F.M.Cap., "De la philosophic a la sagesse dans 1'itineraire bonaventurien". Collectanea franciscana, 38 (1968), pp. 257-307. The Created Universe: 387

Pius M. a Mondreganes. O.F.M.Cap., "De mundi creatione ad mentem seraphici doctoris Si. Bonaventurae", Collectanea franciscana, 9 (1931), pp. 3-27. 388* M. Gierens, S.I., "Controversia de aeternitate mundi". Textus et documenta, series philosophica, 6 (Romae, Universitas Gregoriana: 1933). 389 Pius M. a Mondreganes, "De impossibilitate aeternae mundi creationis ad mentem Si. Bonaventurae", Collectanea franciscana, 5 (1935), pp. 529-70. 390 P. Robert, O.F.M., Hylimorphisme et devenir chez saint Bonaventure (Montreal, Librairie Saint-Francoise: 1936). '391 M. D. Chenu, O.P., Bulletin thomiste, 5 (1937-39): 1937, pp. 213-15. 392 J. Bittremieux, "Distinctio inter essentiam et esse apud S. Bonaventuram", Ephemerides theologicae lovanienses, 14 (1937), pp. 302-07. 393 F. Prezioso, O.F.M., De Aristotelis creationismo secundum S. Bonaventuram et secundum S. Thomam (Romae, Officium Libri Catholici: 1942). 394 G. B. Klubertanz, "Esse and Existere in St. Bonaventure", Mediaeval Studies, 8 (1946), pp. 169-88. 395 I. Quiles, S.J., "Un elemento existencial de la tradicion escolastica: la contingencia del ser finito (ens 'con(ingens)", Ciencia y Fe, 19 (1949), pp. 77-82. 396 Luiz Ambrosio Cruz, S.J., "La participacion en la filosofla de San Buenaventura", Ecclesiastica Xavermna (Bogota), 1 (1951), pp. 164-277. 397 G. H. Tavard, "On a misreading of St. Bonaventure's Doctrine on Creation", The Downside Review, 69 (1951), pp. 276-88. 398 Giulio Bonafede, // pensiero francescano nel secolo XIII (Palermo, G. Mori: 1952), pp. 189-98. 399 P. Da Silva, "Eloquencia do universe no pensamento de S. Bonaventura", Vozes de Petrfyotis, 13 (1955), pp. 604-16. 400 Ch. Bigi, O.F.M., "Concezione bonaventuriana della sostanza e concezione aristotelica", Studi francescani, 55 (1958), pp. 198-209. 401 — "II termine e il concetto di sostanza in S. Bonaventura, come risulto della discussione dei termini e concetti sinonimi e apparentati", Studi francescani, 56 (1959), pp. 16-36. 402 D. A. Callus, O.P., "The Problem of the Plurality of Forms in the Thirteenth Century. The Thomist Innovation", L'homme et son destin d'apris les penseurs du moyen age. Actes du Premier Congres international de Philosophic Medievale, Louvain-Bruxelles, 1958 (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1960), pp. 577-85. 403 — "The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form", Thomist, 24 (1961), pp. 257-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

913

85. Reprinted in The Dignity of Science. Studies in the Philosophy of Science presented to W. M. Kane, O.P. (Washington, 1961), pp. 121-49. 404 Louis de Mercin, O.F.M.Cap., "Notes sur le probleme de 1'etre selon saint Bonaventure", Etudes frandscaines (NS) 11 (1961), pp. 2-16. 405 Corrado da Altari, O.F.M.Cap., "La struttura dell'essere secondo S. Bonaventura", Collectanea frandscana, 32 (1962), pp. 209-29. 406 Marie-Benoit, O.F.M.Cap. "Assertions mfetaphysiques d'orientation bonaventurienne", Etudes frandscaines (NS) 13 (1963), pp. 143-65; (NS) 14 (1964), pp. 1-22. The Nature of Man: 407 408 490 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419

420 421 422

423

R. P. Symphorien. O.C., "L'itineraire de I'esprit vers Dieu de Saint Bonaventure", Annales de I'Inititut supirieur de philosophie, 5 (1924), pp. 1-38. J. Rohmer, "Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de Tame", Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littiraire du moyen age, 2 (1927), pp. 73-77. O. Lottin, "L'influence litteraire du. Chancelier Philippe sur les theologiens prfithomistes", Recherches de theologie ancienne et midievale, 2 (1930), pp. 311-26. Conrad O'Leary, The substantial composition of man according to St. Bonaventure (Washington, Catholic University of America Press: 1931). E. Szdzul, O.F.M., "Saint Bonaventure et le probieme du rapport entre Tame et le corps". La France franciscaine, 15 (1932), pp. 283-310. O. Lottin, "La composition hylemorphique des substances spirituelles. Les dSbuts de la controverse". Revue n(o-scolastique de philosophie, 34 (1932), pp. 191-210. — "L'identite de I'ame et de ses facultfts pendant la premiere moitifi du XIII' stecle", Revue nfo-scolastiijue de philosophie, 36 (1934), pp. 191-210. Anton C. Pegis, St Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto, St. Michael's College: 1934), see: pp. 26-76. G. R. Doran, De carports Adami origine doctrina Alexandri Halensis, Sancti Alberti Magni Sancti Thomae. Dissertatio doctoralis praesentata Facultati Theologiae S. Mariae ad Lacum, Sem. (Mundelein HI, 1936), pp. 30-40. Clement Maria O'Donnell, The Psychology of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas. Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, 36 (Washington, Catholic University of America Press: 1937). O. Lottin, "L'identite de Pane et de ses facultfis avant saint Thomas d'Aquin", Psychologic et morale aux XII' et XIIT siecles, v. 1. Problemes de psychologic (Louvain, Abbaye du Mont-Cesar: 1942), pp. 483-502. Fidele d'Eysden, O.F.M.Conv., "La distinction de la substance et de ses puissances d'opfiration d'apres saint Bonaventure", Etudes frandscaines (NS) 2 (1951), pp. 5-23, 147-71. I. Brady, "In seipsa subsistere". An examination of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the substantiality of the soul", Progress in Philosophy, ed. by J. A. McWilliams. Philosophical studies in honour of Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart (Milwaukee, Bruce: 1955), pp. 141-52. P. Bissels, "Die sachliche Begrundung und philosphiegeschichtliche Stellung der Lehre von der materia spiritualis in der Scholastik", Franziskanische Studien, 38 (1956), pp. 241-95. A. Gaddi, "Umanitk e umanesimo nella filosofia di S. Bonaventura", Doctor Seraphicus, 4 (1957), pp. 5-22. F. J. Thonnard, "La personne humaine dans 1'augustinisme medieval (Saint Anselme et saint Bonaventure)", L 'homme et son destin d'apres les penseurs du moyen age. Actes du Premier Congres international de Philosophie Medifivale, Louvain-Bruxelles, 1958 (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1960), pp. 163-72. Joseph Ratzinger, "Der Mensch und die Zeit in Denken des heiligen Bonaventura", Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Problem des mittelalterlichen Augustinismus, L'homme et. son destin d'apres les penseurs du moyen age. Actes du Premier Congres international de

914

424

425 426 427

BIBLIOGRAPHY Philosophic Medievale, Louvain-Bruxelles, 1958 (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1960), pp. 473-83. Michael Schmaus, "Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele un die Auferstehung des Leibes nach Bonaventura", L'homme et son destin d'aprls Its penseurs du moyen Age. Actes du Premier Congres international de Philosophic Medievale, Louvain-Bruxelles, 1958 (Louvain, Nauwelaerts: 1960), pp. 505-19. Alexander Schaefer, "The position and function of man in the created world according to St. Bonaventure", Franciscan Studies, 20 (1960), pp. 261-316; 21 (1961), pp. 233-382. Ch. Bigi, O.F.M., "Individuo e principle di individuazione in S. Bonaventura", Studi fmncescani, 58 (1961), pp. 264-86. Leone Veuthey, O.F.M.Conv., "Le potenze deH'anima secondo S. Bonaventura", Miscellanea francescana, 69 (1969), pp. 134-39.

Human Knowledge: 428 J. Rohmer, "La theorie de Pabstraction dans 1'ecole franciscaine d'Alexandre de Hales a Jean Peckham", Archives d'histoire doctrinal? et littiraire du moyen age, 3 (1928), pp. 10584; see in particular: pp. 141-61. 429 Fidelis Schwendiger, O.F.M., "Die Erkenntnis in den ewigen Ideen nach der Lehre des hi. Bonaventura", Franziskanische Studien, 15 (1928), pp. 69-85. 430 Zacharias van de Woestyne, O.F.M., "Augustinismus in gnoseologia S. Bonaventurae et S. Thomae", Antonianum, 8 (1933), pp. 281-306; 9 (1934), pp. 383-404, 475-504. 431* Th. Soiron, "Die Aszese des Erkennens nach heiligen Bonaventura", Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 1 (1934), pp. 310-16. 432 N. Spanjol, O.F.M., "II concetto dell'instruzione in S. Bonaventura", Rivista difilosofia neo-scolastica, 26 (1934), pp. 341-85. 433 Felicissimus Tinivella, O.F.M., "De impossibili sapientiae adeptione in philosophia pagana iuxta Collationes in Hexaemeron S. Bonaventurae", Antonianum, 11 (1936), pp. 2750^ 135-86, 277-318. 434* F. A. Ferrari, Sul problems della conoscenza in San Bonaventura (Bologna, Societa dpogr. gia compositori: 1938). 435 M. R. Dady, The Theory of Knowledge of St. Bonaventure. Catholic University of America Philosophical Studies, 52 (Washington, Catholic University of America Press: 1939). 436 I. Hislop. O.P., "Introduction to St. Bonaventure's Theory of Knowledge", Dominican Studies (Oxon.), 2 (1949), pp. 46-55. 437* V. M. Breton, "Saint Bonaventure. Mattre de Sagesse", Collectanea Franciscana Neerlandica, 1 (1950), pp. 5-10. 438 A. Pisvin, O.F.M., "L'intuition sensible selon S. Bonaventure", Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda. Acta congressus scholastic! internationalis, Romae, 1950 (Roma, Antonianum: 1951), pp. 365-78. 439* Shiro Kohyama, "The analogical intuition of St Bonaventure", Philosophy (Tokyo), 27 (1951), pp. 1-6, in Japanese with an English summary on pp. 7-8. 440* Giulio Bonafede, "Nota sull'Hexaemeron di San Bonaventura", Italia francescana, 26 (1951), pp. 66-71, 139-63. 441 T. Szab(5, O.F.M., "De distinctionis formalis origine Bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica", Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda. Acta congressus scholastici internationalis, Romae, 1950 (Roma, Antonianum: 1951), pp. 379-445. 442 Giulio Bonafede, II pensiero francescano nel secolo XIII (Palermo, G. Mori: 1952), pp. 74-83. 443 Alejandro de Villalmonte, O.F.M., "El argumento de razones necesarios en San Buenaventura", Estudios franciscanos, 53 (1952), pp. 5-44. 444 R. Messner, "Ueber die Gegenwartsbedeutung der Erkennislehre Bonaventuras und Ockhams", Antonianum, 28 (1953), pp. 131-47. 445 Robert W. Mulligan, "Portia Superior and Inferior Rationis in tne Writings of St. Bonaventure", Franciscan Studies, 15 (1955), pp. 332-49.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454

915

— "Ratio Superior and Ratio Inferior. The Historical Background", The New Scholasticism, 29 (1955), pp. 1-32. Jean de Dieu de Champsecret, O.F.M.Cap., "L'intuition sans concept et la thfiorie bonaventurienne de la contemplation", Etudes franciscaines (NS) 7 (1956), pp. 63-74, 133-54. — "L'intuition de la Presence et la theorie bonaventurienne de la formation du concept", Etudes franciscaines (NS) 9 (1958), pp. 35-56. (See below: n. 451.) KumatarO Kawada, "Bonaventure's theory of ideas", Studies in Mediaeval Thought, 3 (1960), pp. 1-17, in Japanese with an English summary. Helen Marie Beha, O.S.F., "Matthew of Aquasparta's Theory of Cognition", Franciscan Studies, 20 (1960), pp. 161-204: St. Bonaventure, pp. 185-93; 21 (1961), pp. 383465: St. Bonaventure, passim. Louis de Mercin, O.F.M.Cap., "L'intuition sans concept selon le P.Jean de Dieu", Etudes franciscaines (NS) 12 (1962), pp. 146-60. (See above: nn. 447-48.) Norbert de Guise, O.F.M.Cap., "La recherche de la verite chez Bonaventure", Etudes franciscaines (NS) 12 (1962), pp. 161-77. Edward B. Costello, "The Theory of Knowledge of Saint Bonaventure", Studies in Medieval Culture, ed. by John R. Sommerfeldt (Western Michigan University: 1964), pp. 59-64. Charles N. Foshee, "St. Bonaventure and the Augustinian Concept of mens", Franciscan Studies, 27 (1967), pp. 163-75.

Our Natural Knowledge of God: 455 456 457* 458 459* 460 461 462 463 464 465

Vincent Meyer, The Doctrine of St. Bonaventure concerning our Knowledge of God: St. Bonaventure, the seraphic doctor, his life and works. Franciscan Studies, 2 (New York, J. F. Wagner: 1924). J. M. Bissen, O.F.M., L'exemplarisme divin selon s. Bonaventure. Etudes de philosophic medievale, IX (Paris, J. Vrin: 1929). G. M. de Caria, Sulla concezione bonaventuriana della volonta divine come causa attuale. Estratto dell'annuario delFIstituto "C. Montanari" Verona, 1933-34 (Verona, 1935). P. M. Bordoy-Torrents, "Notas buenaventurianas acerca de la actividad de Dios en las criaturas", Verdad y vida, 2 (1944), pp. 566-75. B. Farnetani, "La conoscenza di Dio secondo S. Bonaventura", Citta di vita, 2 (1947), pp. 357-71. Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M., // problema della cognoscibilita di Dio nella scuola francescana: Alessandro d'hales, S. Bonaventura, Duns Scoto. II pensiero mediovale, serie 1.1 (Padova, A. Milani: 1950), pp. 109-253. Giulio Bonafede, II pensiero francescano net secolo XIII (Palermo, G. Mori: 1952), pp. 309-14. L. Veuthey, O.F.M.Conv., "Le probleme de 1'existence de Dieu chez s. Bonaventure", Antonianum, 28 (1953), pp. 19-38. Louis J. Secondo, T.O.R., The Relation of Human Reason to God's Nature and Existence in the Philosophy of St. Bonaventure. Dissertatio ad lauream in Facultate Philosophiae apud Pontificium Athenaeum "Angelicum" de Urbe (Romae, 1961). J. G. Bourgerol, O.F.M., "Sur le sens de Dieu", Etudes franciscaines (NS) 14 (1964), pp. "23-30. Anton C. Pegis, "The Bonaventurean Way to God", Mediaeval Studies, 29 (1967), pp. 206-42.

Problem of Illumination: 466

Fidelis Schwendiger, O.F.M., "Die Erkenntnis in den ewigen Ideen nach der Lehre des hi. Bonaventura", Franziskanische Studien, 15 (1928), pp. 193-244; 16 (1929), pp. 29-64.

916 467 468* 469* 470 471 472 473 474

475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484

BIBLIOGRAPHY P. J. McAndrew, "The Theory of Divine Illumination in St. Bonaventure", The New Scholasticism, 6 (1932), pp. 32-50. A. Engemann, O.F.M., "Erleuchtungslehre als Resolutio und Redactio nach Bonaventura", Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 1 (1934), pp. 211-42. F. Hohmann, "Analogia entis, analogia lucis", Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 3 (1936), pp. 218-27. Giulio Bonafede, "II problema dell'illuminazione in S. Bonaventura", Sophia, 4 (1936), pp. 78-82; 5 (1937), pp. 48-55. L. Bellofiore, "La dottrina deH'illuminazione dell'intelletto in S. Bonaventura", Sophia, 6 (1938), pp. 535-37; 7 (1939), pp. 172-87. Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M., "La dottrina bonaventuriana deH'illuminazione intellectuale", Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 36 (1944), pp. 139-58. G. Tavard, "The Light of God in the Theology of St. Bonaventure", Eastern Churches Quarterly, 8 (1950), pp. 407-17. Giulio Bonafede, "II 'De Scientia Christi', ossia il problema della Idee in S. Bonaventura", Atti delta Academia di Scienze Lettere e Arti di Palermo, ser. 4, v. 6 (Palermo, Presso 1'Accademia: 1950), pp. 67-171. Found also in Saggi sulla filosofia medioevale (Torino, Societa editrice internationale: 1951), pp. 185-260. Reinhold Messner, "Die Logik Ockhams und die Erleuchtungslehre Bonaventuras", Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 14 (1951), pp. 226-36. Giulio Bonafede, II pensiero francescano nel secolo XIII (Palermo, G. Mori: 1952), pp. 129-40. G. Scheltens, O.F.M., "De metaphysische grondslag van de kennis bij S. Bonaventura", Tijdschnft soar Philosophic, 16 (1954), pp. 579-601; sommaire en francais, pp. 601-02. — "De Bonaventuriaanse illuminatieleer", Tijdschnft voor Philosophie, 17 (1955), pp. 383-407; sommaire en franfais, pp. 407-08. R. Sciamannini, O.F.M.Conv., La contuizione bonaventuriana (Firenze, "Citta di vita": 1957). Joseph Antony Mazzeo, "Light Metaphysics, Dante's 'Convivio' and the Letter to can Grande della Scala", Traditio, 14 (1958), pp. 191-230. G. Scheltens, O.F.M., "Una metafisica de la verdad [San Buenaventura]", Verdad y vida, 18 (I960), pp. 209-29. — "Kritische Wiirdigung der Illuminationslehre des hi. Bonaventura", Wissenschaft und Weisheit, 24 (1961), pp. 167-81. V.Ch. Bigi, O.F.M., "La dottrina della luce in S. Bonaventura", Divus Thomas, 64 (1961), pp. 395-422. Bernard A. Gendreau, "The quest for certainty in Bonaventure", Franciscan Studies, 21 (1961), pp. 104-227.

Problem of Christian Philosophy: 485 486 487 488 489 490

Ferdinand M. Delorme, "Saint Bonaventure et le nombre apocalytique 666", La France franciscaine, 8 (1925), pp. 519-25. Bernard Vogt, "The Franciscan School", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 3 (1927), pp. 113-30. Silvio Vismara, "La mistica di S. Bonaventura", Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 21 (1929), pp. 184-91. Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., "S. Augustin et la pensee franciscaine", La France franciscaine, 15 (1932), pp. 5-76. Bernard Bardoux, "Quaestio de Philosophia Christiana", Antonianum, 11 (1936), pp. 486-552. Irenaeus Squadrani, O.F.M., "S. Bonaventura christianus philosophus", Antom, ,;:.-/.T. 16 (1941), pp. 103-30, 252-304.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

917

491

L. Veuthey, O.F.M.Conv., "Si. Bonaventurae philosophia Christiana", Miscellanea francescana, 42 (1942), pp. 1-38. 492 Ph. Boehner, O.F.M., "The Spirit of Franciscan Philosophy", Franciscan Studies, 2 (1942), pp. 217-37. 493* R. Lazzarini, 5. Bonaventura filosofo e mistico del Cristianesimo (Milano, Fratelli Bocca: 1946). 494* — Itmerari dell'uomo net pensiero di S. Bonaventura. Umanesimo e mondo cristiano, II (Roma, Editrice Studium Christi: 1951). 495 Anton C. Pegis, "St. Bonaventure, St. Francis and Philosophy", Mediaeval Studies, 15 (1953), pp. 1-13. 496 G. H. Tavard, Transiency and Permanence. The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure, Franciscan Institute Publications, theological series, 4 (Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York: 1954). 497* N. Simonelli, O.F.M., Doctrina christocentrica seraphici Doctoris S. Bonaventurae. Collana S. Darniano, 2 (lesu, Scuola tipgr. francescana: 1958). 498 Alejandro Villalmonte, O.F.M.Cap., "Orientacidn Cristocentrica en la Teologia de San Buenaventura", Estudios franciscanos, 59 (1958), pp. 321-72. 499 Ferruccio Ulivi, "II sentimento francescano delle cose e S. Bonaventura", Lettere italiane, 15 (1962), pp. 1-32. 500 Alfonso Pompei, O.F.M.Conv., "II 'De reductione' di S. Bonaventura per i teologi di oggi", Miscellanea francescana, 64 (1964), pp. 364-90. 510 Leone Veuthey, O.F.M.Conv., "Filosofia e Teologia neirinsegnamento di S. Bonaventura", Miscellanea francescana, 67 (1967), pp. 237-45. Influence of St. Bonaventure: 502 503 504 505 506 507

F. Hohmann, Bonaventura und das existenzielle Sein des Menschen, Abhdlgn. z. Philos. u. Psych, der Religion, 35-36 (Wurzburg, Becker: 1935). St. Bonaventure, 1243-1943. Cahiers des Cordeliers. 1 (Paris, Editions franciscaines: 1946). Pedro M. Bordoy-Torrents, "Estudios Buenaventurianos: Posicion y providencialismo de la corriente filos6fica franciscana", Estudios franciscanos, 52 (1951), pp. 161-80. C. J. Majchrak, O.F.M., A Brief History of Bonaventurianism (Pulaski, Wisconsin, Franciscan Publishers: 1957). Anthony Nemetz, "What St. Bonaventure has given to Philosophers today", Franciscan Studies, 19 (1959), pp. 1-12. J. G. Bougerol, O.F.M., "Le sens du renouveau bonaventurien", Etudes franciscaines '(NS) 16 0966), pp. 92-100.

Bonaventurean Bibliographies 508 509 510 511

512 513

Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, Robert Appleton: 1907), v. 2, c. 654. G. Pahlories, St. Bonaventure. La pensee chretienne (Paris, Bloud: 1913), pp. 361-74. E. Smeets, "Saint Bonaventure", Dictionnaire de thfologie catholique (Paris, 1923), v. 2.1, cc. 983-86. Etienne Gilson, La philosophic de saint Bonaventure. Etudes de philosophic medievale, v. IV (Paris, J. Vrin: 1924), pp. 474-82; ?' & 3'' edd., pp. 397-405. (See above: n. 289, and n. 303.) Maurice De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophic mfdiivale, 5' ed. (Louvain, Institut superieur de philosophic: 1925), v. 2, pp. 357-58. Friedrich Ueberwegs, Grundiss der Geschichte der Philosophic. Herausgegeben von Dr. Bernhard Geyer. Vol. 2. Die Patristicke und Scholastische Philosophic (Berlin, Verlegt bei E. S. Mittler & Sohn: 1928), pp. 928-29.

918 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522

BIBLIOGRAPHY Maurice De Wulf, Histoire de la philosophic medievale, 6' ed. (Louvain, Institut supfirieur de philosophic: 1936), v. 2, pp. 125-27. Ephrem Longprfi, O.F.M., "Bonaventure (saint)", Dictionnaire d'histoire et giographie ecclesiastiques (Paris, 1937), v. 9, cc. 787-88. — "Bonaventure, saint", Dictionnaire de spiritualite (Paris, 1937), v. 1, cc. 1942-43. Obras de San Buenaventura. Biblioteca de Autores cristianos, edici6"n bilingiie, dirigida, anotada y con introducciones por los pp. Leon Amoros, Bernardo Aperribay y Miguel Oromi (Madrid, B.A.C., Editorial Catolica: 1945), v. 1, pp. 65-76. Ephrem Longpre, O.F.M., "Bonaventure (saint)", Catholicisms \Hi;r-Aujourd'huiDemain], Encydopedie (Paris, 1949), v. 2, cc. 127-28. M. Castro y Castro, Atanasio Lopez, "San Buenaventura en le bibliografl'a espanola", Archive ibero-americano (Madrid), I I (1951), pp. 317-99. Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, Random House & London, Sheed & Ward: 1955), pp. 685-86, n. 7. J. Guy Bougerol, O.F.M., Introduction a I'etude de saint Bonaventure. Bibliotheque de theologie, serie 1, theologie dogmatique, v. 2 (Tournai-Paris, Desclee: 1961), pp. 1532.(See also: pp. 46, 57, 90, 127, 147, 175.) L. Di Fonzo, "Bonaventura da Bagnoregio", Bibliotheca Sanctorum (Roma, 1963), v. 3, cc. 271-78.

INDEX There are three parts to this Index: Analytical, Authors, and Historians. The first and second parts each have three (corresponding) sections dealing respectively with the work of the Historians, the synthesis of St. Bonaventure, and the synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas. The third part contains the names only of those Historians, and Medievalists: a) whose views are recorded, or who are singled out, in our Introduction and General Conclusion; b) whose positions on the doctrines of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are discussed in the notes to the rest of the book. The names of other Historians, and Medievalists, can be found in the Bibliography. All cross-references are made to the same section of a given part of the Index. There are, therefore, no such references from one section, or one part, of the Index to another. Entries in bold face show importance, formal treatment among frequent numbers, and subdivisions of long and complicated subjects. Numbers with parentheses refer to pages and notes, e.g., 62 (86) refers to page 62 and note 86; numbers with colons refer to notes alone' e.g., 58;84 refers to note 84 on, or commencing on, page 58.

ANALYTICAL Historical views Academy, Middle and New: 85. Act and potency, 18, 22, 31, 33, 36-37, 43, 45, 69, 84, 842, 879, 882-83, 888-89. Arabian, see: Aristoteleanism. Aristotelean, Augustinianism: 29, 34, 37-38, 44, 844-45; doctrine [philosophy]: 18, 20, 23-26 (20), 28, 34, 35, 37-38, 4243, 46, 47-48, 50-51 (68), 52-53, 55, 59, 69-70 (97), 71, 72, 74, 76, 81, 86, 87, 91-92, 94, 98, 842-45, 848-51, 854-61, 863:13, 866, 868-69, 872, 876, 878, 879, 884-85, 890, 892-94; errors: 2426, 50:68, 55-56 (57), 67, 84, 849, 85152, 858-59 (10), 865-66, 867-68, 878, 891-92; influence: 48-49, 69, 843-44, 870, 873, 896; principles: 18-19, 22, 31, 33 (41), 36-37, 42:58, 45, 69, 84, 86, 90:128, 842, 858-60, 879-80, 882-83, 888-89; school: 85. Aristoteleanism, 19-20,23, 24,27,28,34,35, 36-37 (48), 41-43, 45, 48, 49-50, 51, 52 (71), 54-55 (77), 60, 62 (86), 65-66, 69, 70:97, 71-74, 76, 77:109, 81, 82, 83 (120), 84, 86:124, 87-90, 91-93, 95, 96, 841-45, 849-52, 854-60, 865-66, 87678, 879-81, 886-89, 892-94; Arabian: 20, 842, 844-45 (see: Philosophy);

Augustinizing [Augustinian]: 68-94, 72 (101), 95, 843, 850-51, 854-57; Averroist: 35, 70:97 (see: Latin, Averroism); Avicennian: 70:97, 71 (see: Latin, Avicennianism); Christian: 18, 45, 52 (71), 878, 880, 886, 896:26; eclectic: 49, 50, 54, 68:94, 71, 83:120, 89-91, 859; heretical: 75, 96, 878; heterodox: 53-55, 62:86, 65, 67-68 (94), 70:97, 72:101, 83:120, 84:121, 9192, 93, 97, 98, 887-88, 892, 894-95: Latin, 47, 49-50, 52, 69, 71, 77:109, 83:120, 91, 94-95, 848-49, 854-57, 880. .881, 883; Neoplatonizing [Neoplatonic |: 48:64, 49, 50, 52, 68:94, 71, 72, 77:109, 81, 82, 83:120, 89, 9091, 95, 96, 98, 848-51, 854-57, 859-60 (11), 880, 881, 883; Platonizing: 85-86 (122), 90:128, 97, 850, 857:8; radical: 72:101, 73, 83:120, 91, 95. Augustinian, Aristoteleanism, see: Aristoteleanism; doctrine [philosophy]: 19-20, 23-24. 28-29 (30), 32 (36, '38), 3335 (41, 43), 36, 37-38, 40, 42, 43, 44-45, 46-47, 49, 51, 57, 60, 68-69, 70, 73, 74, 80, 85, 92, 94-95, 96, 98, 84145, 851-56, 859, 873, 884-86, 887; influence: 32-33, 43, 57, 66, 70-71, 86, 95, 842-43, 854-55, 860-61, 873-74; 896; mysticism: 23:18, 26-27; school: 18, 21, 49, 52, 83, 842, 878; spirit: 49,

920

INDEX

68:94, 72, 74, 89, 95; tradition: 25, 41, 55, 88, 860-61, 869-71; wisdom: 41, 66 (92), 94, 872 (see: Franciscan, wisdom). See also: Divine illumination. Augustinianism, 19-20 (4, 7), 21, 24, 26:24, 27-29 (30), 32-37 (36, 38, 41, 43), 38, 39, 42-44 (58), 47, 48:64, 49-50, 52, 5455, 58, 60, 61:85, 68-70 (95-96), 71, 74, 80, 81-82, 83, 88-89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 98, 841-45, 848-49, 850-51, 85257 (4), 859, 861, 873, 879, 884-86, 886-96; Aristotelean: 29, 34, 37-38, 44, 884-85; Avicennian: 29, 32 (36), 34, 39, 44, 50:67 (see: Latin, Avicennianism); Franciscan: 29-30 (31), 42:58, 66, 69:92; medieval: 24, 26, 58 (83), 62, 81, 92-93, 98. 849-50, 853-54, 869; neo-Augustitiianism: 53:73; 55, 68:94, 73, 74, 83:120, 92, 95, 888-96. See also: Neoplatotiic (Augustinianism), Ncoplatonism (Augustinian), Scholasticism (old). Averroism, see: Latin. Avicennian, see: Aristoteleanism. Beatitude, 41:74, 878. Bonaventurean, philosophy: 21-30 (20, 24), 31 39-40, 42-43 (58), 45, 50-52, 5557, 58:83, 59:84, 60-68 (90, 95), 71-72 (101), 74-79 (108), 81-90, 91-99 (129), 841-45, 848-57, 859-65 (1314), 866-67, 875, 882-83 (22), 896 (see: Sources); theology: 23, 39-41, 44-45, 51-52, 53, 56, 66-68, 72 (101), 74-76 (108), 77-79 (110), 81-84, 84-90, 9198, 849-51, 857, 861-63 (13), 866-67, 869-71, 873-74, 875-77, 883, 887, 890. Certitude, see: Human knowledge. Christ, knowledge of: 25, 63; and philosophy: 24-25, 29, 43, 63-64, 68, 70, 75, 80, 83, 93, 94, 855, 868:16; and theology: 24, 70, 75, 77 (110), 80, 84, 93, 855, 877. Christian, Aristoteleanism, see: Aristoteleanism; extremism, and humanism: 53, (73). 68:86. 84:121. 91, 894-96; faith, illumination of: 25-26, 32, 43, 50:68, 65, 854, 855, 860-67; and philosophy: 18. 23. 25-27, 32, 40. 42, 43-44, 55, 6365, 88-89. 93, 855. 862-64 (13). 866, 868, 869-71, 874-76, 877. 880-81, 887, 892-93. 895-96; and reason: 25-27, 43, 46, 51-52. 62-65, 67, 70-72, 78-79, 83, 84, 88-89. 93-94, 855, 856. 860, 864,

869, 871. 874-76, 877 (see: Reason); philosophy: 22-26, 27, 28, 30 (32), 31, 32-36 (47), 39-40, 43-45, 47, 51 (70), 54, 56. 57 (80), 58, 59, 64. 66:92, 67-68, 69:96, 70, 72, 73-74, 79, 91-98, 860-65 (12), 865-71, 871-73, 877, 879-81, 897; wisdom: 23, 36, 39, 40, 44. 46-47, 56, 64-67 (92), 72, 75, 78, 80. 84, 90-91, 93-94, 96, 98, 849, 86063. 867-68, 870, 872-73, 877, 887, 891. 892, 894-95 (see: Augustinian). See also: Christ, Ncoplatonism, Philosophy. Common, patrimony: 21, 28:28, 29:29, 3034, 38-39 (50, 53), 42-43, 45, 879-80, 880-83, 885-86: synthesis: 18, 19, 2021, 22, 28 (28), 29:29, 30-32, 41-42, 59:84, 76:108, 879, 880-83. See: Scholastic synthesis. Condemnation, of 1270: 54-55, 889:24; of 1277: 19, 54, 858. Conflict, of 1270: 19, 24, 26, 28-29, 32:36, 32:38, 39, 43, 54-55, 61:85, 72-73, 74, 91-92, 94, 886-96 (24); of 1277: 55, 6970 (97), 72-73. Divine illumination, 19, 21, 23:18, 28, 29, 32, 33-34 (43), 35, 37-38 (49), 39-40, 42:58, 43, 44, 50:67, 68-69, 86:123-24, 89, 884-86 (23). See: Christian (faith). Doctrinal movements, 18-19, 23-24, 36-37, 40, 42, 49-50, 53, 65-66, 70-74, 91, 851, 878-83, 889. Errors in philosophy, 23-26, 43, 50, 51:69, 55-56 (77), 60, 64, 67-68 (94), 73, 7475 (106), 79-80, 88, 89, 92-94, 96, 847, 851-52, 855, 858, 860-61, 865-69, 87778, 887, 891-92, 895. See: Aristotelean (errors). Eternity of the world, 24, 33:41, 35, 50:68, 54, 74-76, 80, 91, 96, 847-48, 858-59 (10), 860-61, 875-76, 877-78, 887, 889-94, 895 Faith, see: Christian (faith). Form and matter, 18, 19, 22, 31, 33:41, 36, 42:58, 60, 69, 84, 86, 90:128, 842, 84445, 858-60, 879, 882-83, 888-89. See: Plurality of forms, Substantial form. Franciscan, Augustinianism, see: Augustinianism; ideal: 53 (73), 62:86, 66, 67, 75, 94, 96, 872, 876, 877, 894; philosophy: 29-30 (31), 53:73, 78, 96, 870, 873; school: 5 - , 83:120. 91. 887-88; theology: 850, wisdom: 66 (92), 870, 872-73 (sec: Christian, wisdom). Gnosticism. 86:123.

INDEX God, journey [road, way] to: 23:18, 25, 29, 43, 53, 58, 66, 94, 857:8, 869-70, 894; knowledge of: 22:6, 28, 29-30 (31), 38:49, 41, 57, 62-64, 67, 86, 93-94, 847:1, 849, 852-53, 866-67, 870, 873; nature of: 29-30 (31), 38:49, 42:58, 57, 58, 63, 84, 85:122, 92, 849, 852-53, 869, 870, 888-89; and beatitude: 41, 74, 877; and human knowledge: 21, 25-26, 29, 34, 37-38, 40 (55), 42:58, 45, 66, 86, 876, 884-86; and philosophy: 2526, 43, 46, 61, 63-64, 86, 866-67, 892; and the human soul: 25, 64, 69, 85:122, 869-70, 889; and the universe [creatures]: 25, 65, 74-75, 85:122, 89, 90:128, 94, 875 (8), 878:21, 883, 88586. See: (The) Trinity. Human body, see: Human soul. Human knowledge, 19, 21-22, 25-26, 36-38, 42:58, 46, 62-69, 71-72, 77:110, 84, 86:124, 93, 845-47 (1), 853:4, 854, 862, 863:13, 866-67, 868:16, 871, 87576, 885-86, 892, 895-96. See: God (two entries), Science. Human soul, end of: 25, 64, 93; nature of: 22, 36, 68, 888-89; and the human body: 30:31, 33:41, 42:58, 68, 75:106, 85:122, 845-47, 888-89. See: God, Substantial form. Illumination, see: Christian (faith), Divine illumination. Influence, see: Aristotelean, Augustinian. Jewish doctrine [philosophy], 47, 48:63, 50, 55, 71, 844-45. Knowledge, see: Human knowledge. Latin, Aristoteleanism, see: Aristoteleanism; Averroism: 18-19, 20:7, 23, 24:20, 26, 35, 37:48, 40, 42, 50:67, 54 (75), 56 (78), 61:85, 70:97, 91, 863:13, 878-79, 886-87, 894; Avicennianism: 50:67, 77:109 (see: Aristoteleanism, Avicennian, and Augustinianism, Avicennian); Neoplatonism: 50. Man, see: Human soul. Matter, see: Form and matter. Medieval, see: Augustinianism, Philosophy, Theology. Mesoplatonism, 85. Mesopythagoreanism, 86:123. Movements, see: Doctrinal movements. Mysticism, 28:18, 26-27. Neoplatonic, Aristoteleanism, see: Aristoteleanism; Augustinianism: 18, 45, 49, 841-42, 843, 878 (see:

921

Augustinianism); doctrine [philosophy], see: Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism [Neoplatonist doctrine], 46, 49-50, 52, 66, 71, 73, 80, 82, 86:123-24; Augustinian: 62, 81, 92, 98, 850; Christian: 32-38; Latin: 50. Neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, see: Aristoteleanism. Neopythagoreanism, 86:123. Pagan errors, see: Errors in philosophy. Paris, 18, 23, 47-49, 58:83, 66:91, 71, 90-91, 95, 878-79, 886, 896; Faculty of Arts in: 19, 48-50, 51-54 (71), 61:85, 67, 7072, 91, 95, 848, 850, 856, 858, 887-88; Faculty of Theology in: 48-50, 54, 61:85, 71-72, 77:109, 90-91, 95, 850, 880, 887-88; schools of: 18-19, 42, 47; University of 18, 23, 47, 878. Philosophical, errors, see: Errors in philosophy; movements, see: Doctrinal. Philosophy, Arabian: 18, 20, 47, 48:63, 50, 55, 66, 71, 842, 844-45, 878, 881; autonomy of: 23-26, 43, 55, 61-65, 67, 71-72, 74-76, 78-79 (111), 87-90 (127), 93-98, 855-57, 860-63, 864, 866-69, 874-77, 891-92, 894, 895-96; broad and strict senses of: 46-47, 53:73, 66, 90, 872; medieval: 17, 19, 22, 23, 24:19, 27, 30, 38 (39), 41, 43, 44, 59, 68, 73, 7677 (108), 90, 94, 95, 863:13; Plotinian: 58, 69, 92, 869, 880; scholastic: 17-18, 23, 27, 28, 30-32 (36), 38-39 (50), 4142, 70, 73, 76, 876 (see: Scholasticism); and theology: 22-23 (17), 39-40, 48-49, 55, 56, 61-62, 64, 68 (94), 71, 73-80, 83-84, 88, 90, 92-98, 855, 862-65 (1314), 871 (17), 874, 877 (see: Theology). See also: Aristotelean (doctrine), Augustinian (doctrine), Bonaventurean, Christian (philosophy), Franciscan (philosophy), God, Jewish, Neoplatonism, Platonic doctrine. Thorn i st. Platonic-Augustinian school, 18, 49, 878. Platonic doctrine ]philosophy], 18, 25-26, 43, 52, 65, 84-86 (123-24), 90:128, 866, 868-69, 878, 892. Platonism [Platonic traits], 84-86 (123-24). Platonist philosophy, see: Platonic doctrine. Platonizing Aristoteleanism, 85-86 (122), 90:128, 97, 850, 857:8. Plotinian doctrine [philosophy], 58, 69, 92, 869, 880. Plurality of forms, 22, 30 (31), 33:41, 36-37,

922

INDEX

42:58, 68, 85:122, 842, 844-45. See: Form and matter. Principles, see: Aristotelean. Potency, see: Act and potency. Pythagoreanism, 85. Reason and revelation, 18-19, 23, 25, 32-33, 35-36, 40-41, 43-44, 46, 51-53, 70:97, 73-74, 78-80, 862-67 (14), 869, 871, 874-76, 877, 879, 887, 891, 893-94. See: Christian (faith, philosophy). Sacred Scripture, 25, 46, 58, 70, 75, 84, 9495, 97, 855, 870, 873, 874-76, 878:21, 894-95. Scholastic synthesis [system], 18, 20, 23, 4243, 46, 879. See: Scholasticism. Scholasticism, 17-18, 20-21 (7), 24:19, 27:27, 29-32 (29, 35), 34:43, 59, 68:95, 73-74, 879, 880-83; old: 18, 1920 (7), 21, 23-24, 28-29 (30), 32 (36, 38), 33-35 (41, 43), 37, 40, 42-43, 44, 46, 49-50, 68-69, 94, 842, 878, 879, 880-83, 884, 886-87. See: Augustinianism [sic|. Philosophy (scholastic). School, see: Aristotelean, Augustinian, Franciscan, Paris. Science, 37-38, 41, 46, 59, 60-61, 63-64, 6667, 70, 72-73, 77, 84, 89, 90, 92-95, 854, 862, 864-66 (14), 867, 870, 87273, 877, 884-85. See: Human knowledge. Scotism, 37:48, 53:73, 55. Seminal reasons, 30:31, 33:41, 36, 40, 42:58, 69, 85, 845, 888-89. Soul, see: Human soul. Sources of Bonaventurean philosophy, 1920, 21-22, 23, 24-26, 28, 29, 30-31, 33-34, 35, 36-38, 40-45, 50-51 (68), 56-58, 61-62, 66, 68-69, 72, 75-76, 77, 80-84, 85-86, 88, 91-98, 843-45, 85457, 859-60, 873. Spiritual matter, 19, 33:41, 60, 844-45, 883, 888-89. See: Form and matter, Plurality of forms. Substantial form, 24, 54, 69-70, 91, 887-89. See: Human soul. Synthesis, see: Common (synthesis), Scholastic synthesis. Theology, distinct from philosophy: 18, 20:7, 21, 23-26 (24), 27 (27), 30, 3940, 42:58, 43-44, 49, 51, 56-57, 64-65, 66:92, 67, 80, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96-99, 841-43, 860-68, 870-71, 874, 887 (see: Philosophy); medieval: 17, 27, 46-47,

59, 863:13. See also: Christ, Bonaventurean, God, Thomist. Thomism, see: Thomist (philosophy, theology). pre-Thomism, see: Scholasticism (old). Thomist,philosophy, 19, 20, 21, 22, (16-17), 23, 24 (20), 26, 28 (28), 29:30, 30, 3337 (41, 43), 39, 42-43, 45, 49-50, 5253, 55, 56, 57, 58:83, 59:84, 61:85, 64, 68:94, 69-70 (96), 72-73, 82-83, 84:121, 91, 94, 95, 97, 863:13, 864-65, 879-80, 880-83 (22), 887-88, 896; theology: 22:17, 39, 41, 44, 53, 69, 75, 82-83, 94, 97, 875. 877, 880, 883. Time, 74-76 (106), 82, 96, 876, 878. Tradition, see: Augustinian. (The) Trinity, 25, 58, 63-64, 868:16. See: God. University, see: Paris. Wisdom, see: Christian (wisdom). Bimaventurean synthesis

Abstraction, order of: 238, 270, 278; and matter: 249, 267, 341-43; and seminal reasons: 107, 268-71, 273-75; and universals: 333-34, 367; and the human intellect: 341-42, 343, 346-48, 350-55, 356, 359-60, 368, 372-73, 376, 378, 381:47, 384, 386, 387, 389 (62), 396-98, 399-404, 405-06, 416, 418:129, 422:140, 428-30, 435, 530, 537, 54446, 572 (89), 574, 607-08, 616 (179), 823; and the senses: 332, 335, 341-42, 343, 347, 350. 353-55, 356, 368, 37073, 374, 375-76, 530, 607-08; of forms: 274-75, 409. See: Human knowledge. Accident, 141, 168-169, 178-79, 180, 23840, 249, 250, 259-61, 303, 306, 369, 385, 398, 475, 575, 606, 616. Accidental, form: 146, 184, 219:3, 220, 238, 239-41, 244, 251, 256:103, 260, 369; modes: 249-50, 251; qualities: 230, 25 259, 260; union: 265. See: Being (Ens), Disposition, Perfection, Properties. Act, 164, 184, 232-34, 311, 410, 411, 48 complete (perfect]: 276, 287-88, 289; principles of: 181:91, 242, 244, 293, 302, 329, 429-30; substantial: 126, 221, 293, 609; of generation: 287, 294, 308 329; of matter: 104-06, 150, 225, 26 269, 271, 282, 283:175, 285, 288, 59 599, 606-08, 612:170; of the human will: 325, 328-29, 333-34, 336, 344-45,

INDEX 354-55, 382, 398-99, 406, 448-50, 461, 471, 475-76, 608-09 (164), 671-72, 692, 724, 725-30, 732, 743, 763, 766-67, 778-79, 793, 795, 800-04, 808-09, 82324, 830-31, 834 (77); of the intellectual memory: 353-55, 356, 362, 373, 39798, 399-400, 444-45, 481, 503, 536, 727, 823. See: Being (Ens), Being (Em). Christian faith, Form, Human hotly (rational soul). Human intellect, Human knowledge. Human mind, H u m a n reason. Love, Operation, Potency. Science, Senses, Substantial form. Action, 109, 151-52, 238, 240, 242, 251, 255, 256:103, 258, 264, 280, 293-94, 348, 404, 429-30, 531, 540:36, 561-62, 573, 580-81, 592-93, 599, 605, 667-68, 669, 684, 690, 692-93, 696, 725, 740, 747, 816, 818-19. See: God, Light (corporeal), Moral. Adam, 120-21 (38), 130, 137:1, 223 (19), 226:27, 284, 405, 539, 665, 669, 690, 787, 792-93, 795, 817, 821 (55), 836. Adequation, 367 (5), 384-85 (55), 385-86, 387, 395, 405, 517. Age(s), 688-91, 694, 695. Agent, 108, 109, 164, 184, 203, 232, 276, 279-80, 303, 316, 532, 545:45, 559, 563, 565, 568, 579-81, 585, 592-93, 598-99, 604, 648, 755, 759. Air, see: Elements. Alteration, 247, 265-66. Analogy, community of: 146-47, 241-42, 244-45, 252, 261, 447, 470-71, 471-72, 474-77 (62, 67), 484, 489-91, 505; knowledge by: 146-47, 436:171, 445-46, 448, 468-71, 474-76, 484, 492-98, 499500 (110), 501-04, 507, 512-13, 525, 530-32, 534, 537-40, (34-36), 545-47, 549, 563-65, 594-95, 618-20, 820-21; and being: 468-70, 472; and goodness: 473; and light: 501-02, 503, 505-06, 512-13; and lumen: 503-04, 505 (121), 512-13, 516-18; and truth: 502-04, 50506, 512-13, 516-18, 563-64. See: Being (Ens), Certitude, Conformity, KnowlecU ge (of God). Light (corporeal), Participation, Philosophy, Proportion, Relation, Similarity, Similitude, Theology, Unity. Angel, 125-26, 143 (19), 143-45, 149, 157, 161:54, 162, 165:60, 168-70, 175, 180, 264:126, 286-87, 295, 299, 300-01

923

(230), 341, 358:82, 403, 405, 480-81, 495, 524, 561, 579-80, 602, 605, 60910 (167), 613, 616 (181), 618-19, 643, 647, 680, 690-91, 695, 758, 820:54. See: Demons. Animal(s), 114-16, 118, 119, 124, 137:1, 140, 183, 226:27, 231-32, 233-35, 27982, 282-85, 300, 305, 308, 311, 324, 328, 338:35, 353, 447, 473-75, 476, 481, 591, 597, 599, 606, 608, 817. Animal potency, see: Sensuality. Apostles, 730, 758, 789, 813; St. Paul: 56971, 828:65; St. Peter: 478, 813:46. Appetite [Desire, Inclination] of, corporeal matter: 104, 106, 133, 222-23, 224-25, 266, 277, 283, 292, 298, 748; man: 32425, 368-69, 433, 609:164, 620, 624, 667, 669, 684, 688, 692, 700, 743, 81011, 831; nature: 175, 223, 228; substantial form: 292, 298; the human body: 121, 123, 286, 298; the human will: 324, 333:26, 336, 824; the rational soul: 121, 133, 176, 186, 199, 201, 221, 292, 298, 304-05, 313, 328, 348, 350, 433-34, 788; the senses: 325-26, 328. 330, 331, 335-36, 338, 344, 746, 749, 795, 797, 798, 800-01, 810-11 (see: Senses). Apprehension of, the human intellect: 333, 336, 345, 352, 377-78, 380-83, 386, 389-90, 405, 408, 410, 415, 443, 446, 447-48, 455, 458-59, 464, 533, 546, 731, 808; the senses: 114, 328-29, 33132, 334, 335, 340, 343, 371-73, 375, 378, 822. Appropriation [theological], 468, 498-500 (110, 112), 502, 503-04, 506:122, 562, 567-68 (84), 570-71, 572, 577-78, 582, 603, 615 (177), 665, 668, 703, 751-52. Argument, see: Demonstration. Art(s), divine: 471-72, 481-82, 577 (102), 578, 582, 749; human: 333, 336, 47172, 474, 493, 507, 523, 569, 593, 749; liberal: 396, 530, 744, 749, 793, 813-14; mechanical: 423:143, 743:110, 744 (112), 745-47, 749, 813. Assent, moral: 749, 803; of Christian faith: 407-08, 448-50, 461, 675, 676-78, 682, 685, 698, 702, 715, 725-27, 728-30, 732, 734-35, 737-38, 743, 763, 766-67, 772, 779, 787-88, 801, 803; to truth: 379-80, 397-98, 448, 450, 576:99, 675, 725, 727, 729, 731, 734-35, 743, 749,

924

INDEX

756, 758, 763, 766-67, 779, 788. Assimilation, 106, 269, 469, 525; analogical: 447-48, 574; in a common form: 268, 273, 383-84, 495; in knowledge and truth: 367-68, 371, 373, 381, 383-85, 386-87, 395-96, 493, 495, 518, 548, 553, 574; to God: 431, 447-48, 453-54, 469, 485, 492, 574, 612:170, 622, 746, 752. Astronomers, 616:182, 757. Author [Authorship], 686-87 (35), 692-93, 696, 702-04, 723, 756, 758, 761:158, 818, 819. See: Authority, Commentators. Authority, 267, 377, 448-50, 451, 461, 535, 580, 626, 648:248, 675, 676-78, 679-83, 686-87 (35), 689, 692-93, 696, 607, 698, 699 (45), 700, 702-03 (50), 711, 713, 715, 721, 723, 725-26, 730, 744, 755-60 (150), 767, 802, 818, 819, 834:77. Axioms [Rules], 397-98, 403, 406, 408, 450, 457, 688-89, 696-97 (43), 698, 739-40, 749. Beatitude [Eternal life, Felicity, Glory], and knowledge: 257, 451, 535, 539, 541, 542-43, 561-62, 569-70, 609:164, 665, 668, 701, 731, 733 (93), 739, 745, 746, 770:176, 772-73, 779, 801; and man: 257-58, 300, 324, 330, 381, 412:117, 562, 605-06, 608-10 (164), 612-13, 618, 620-21, 623-25, 626, 649, 654-55, 665, 668-69, 683-84, 688-89, 691-97, 70911, 727-29, 732-33 (93), 789-90, 792, 796, 801, 805, 807, 809, 811, 813, 817, 828:65, 831; and the rational soul: 304, 430, 433, 434, 537-38, 539, 562, 591 595, 604-06, 608, 623 (198), 625, 748. Beauty, 256-57, 304, 409, 529, 690-91 (38), 746-47, 823. Being (Ens), accidental: 263; actual: 231-32, 262, 283, 296-97, 457; body as a: 24041, 259, 296; complete: 262-63 (115), 272, 296; composition [union] and: 262, 283, 296, 472; first [God]: 378, 409, 452-53, 457-58, 464, 472-73, 486:85, 518, 592, 619-20, 695, 822; man as a: 165, 296, 755; spiritual: 140, 149-50, 165, 263, 296, 822; substantial: 162, 263, 296, and analogy: 447-48, 472-73, 486:85, 518; and creation: 15053, 604-05, 627:206, 648-49; and genus: 112, 164-65, ..39-40, 268; and God: 352, 432, 452, I '3, 616 (181); and

knowledge: 409, 415, 417, 452-53, 456:21, 456-57, 497:104, 505, 527, 541, 550, 619-20, 826-27; in act: 105 (8), 133, 146, 267, 272, 275, 285, 286:186, 296, 532-33; in potency: 105 (8), 106, 111, 133, 154-55, 267, 275, 285, 286:186, 296, 315-16, 497:104, 532-33; in se: 143-44, 296, 667; per se 140, 147, 148-49, 223, 262-64, 273, 277, 296, 303, 453, 501, 592. Being (Esse), 143, 164-65, 181, 239-40, 24951, 263-64 (123), 279-81, 303, 416, 469, 565, 727, 763, 809, 830, 831; accidental: 162, 301, 303, 308; act of: 147, 149, 155, 156, 158, 162, 170-71, 177, 181 (91), 193, 221, 290, 293, 295, 311, 313, 314, 315, 545; complete: 104, 109, 119, 126, 179, 182, 193, 199, 225, 228, 229-30 (36), 231, 234, 25051, 256:103, 261-62, 267, 270, 285, 290-91, 292, 296, 299, 306, 311; divine: 140, 152, 168, 198, 313, 379, 395, 416-17 (128), 418, 431-34, 435, 456 (21), 456-60, 465, 466, 467-68, 468-69, 472, 477-78, 480, 486:85, 534, 552-53, 573, 613, 620, 640:231, 678-79, 702, 732, 735-37, 741-42 (108), 772, 820, 826-27, 828; principle of: 105, 109, 111, 117-18, 119, 139, 142, 14 148-50, 153-56, 158, 162, 165, 170-71, 174, 181 (91), 186, 193-94, 206, 20 221-22, 225, 240, 243, 256, 261, 263, 268, 273, 277, 281-83 (175), 286:186, 289-90, 291-92, 295-96, 299, 303, 308 311-16, 413, 418, 494, 503, 507, 524 537, 545-46, 561-62, 574, 589, 599, 602, 612-13, 627 (206), 643, 647-48, 744, 754-56; substantial: 182, 239-40, 251, 256 (103), 259, 266, 269, 273, 281, 301, 303, 306, 308, 309, 311 (see here: and substantial form); whole: 172-74, 179-82, 186, 221-22, 224:21, 268-69, 272-73, 284, 293, 296, 299, 309; and creatures: 150-55, 159, 16 165, 198-99, 224, 226, 263, 274, 31 367, 416-17, 432, 458, 464, 468-69, 472, 480, 485, 486:85, 492-93, 497, 498, 503, 507, 509, 527, 529-30, 537, 539-40, 541-42, 545-46, 552-53, 561, 565, 568, 574, 576, 586, 589, 591-94, 598, 599, 601-03 (153), 612, 616, 620 21, 627 (206), 638-39, 643, 647-49, (248), 691, 694-95, 741, 743, 744, 7 760, 821, 829, 833, 834; and existing:

INDEX

164 (57), 199, 263, 271, 308, 395, 267:206; and knowledge: 267-68, 27374, 377-79, 380-81, 384-85, 386, 395, 404, 405, 413, 416-17, 418, 444-45, 456, 467-68, 470, 492, 493, 498, 506:122, 507, 518, 529, 532, 536, 541, 545, 576, 613, 619-20, 691, 694-95, 805, 827; and matter: 104-05 (6, 8), 109, 111, 113:22, 117-18, 142, 143-45, 147-49, 155-58, 163, 221, 224-25, 22830, 261, 267, 270-71, 273, 277, 282-83 (175), 287, 290, 311-16, 647, 691; and seminal reasons: 107, 109, 111, 267, 270-71, 274-75, 276-78, 282-83 (175), 289-90; and substantial form: 105, 109, 111, 117-19, 151, 153, 154-56, 158-59, 162-63, 170-71, 177, 193-94, 228-30, 233, 241-42, 247, 261-62, 26667, 270, 274, 276-77, 280, 282-83 (175), 287, 290, 305-06, 309, 311-16, 471, 486:85 (see here: substantial); and time: 152, 154, 239-40; of bodies: 11213, 119, 223, 228-30, 234, 238-41, 24345, 247, 252, 256 (103), 259, 277, 280, 281, 290-91, 311, 413, 601, 603; of the human body: 287-88, 289-90, 299; of the human person: 179, 182, 186, 194, 199, 222. See also: Cause, Christ, Composition, Conservation, Essence, Individual, Light (corporeal), Man, Mode, Nobility, Order, Participation, Perfection, Power, Rational soul, Substance, Substantial form, Truth, Unity. Belief, see: Christian faith, Opinion. Believer, see: (The) Christian. Beneficence [Benefit|, 669, 675, 690, 693, 696, 749, 754-56, 758-60 (150), 807:33, 818. Benevolence, 754-56, 758-60 (149-50), 807:33, 818, 819. Blind [Blindness], 379, 416-17, 418, 454, 504, 613:174, 621, 702, 742, 792, 79495, 797, 802, 804, 817, 821, 824, 82627. Body—(A), animate: 114-15, 183, 225-26, 233-35, 259, 262-64 (123), 276, 277, 278-82, 282-83, 285, 286:186, 291-92, 308-09, 311, 618; complex: 113-16, 119, 120, 219:4, 223, 223, 264, 266, 269, 276, 279-81, 284, 290-91, 294, 300, 307; composite: 226, 227, 235, 262-63, 266, 277, 283, 296, 298, 306, 309, 311, 351, 593, 619; demarcated [delineated]: 113, 239-40, 250, 257, 258

925 (109), 260, 371; inanimate: 112-14, 119, 219:3, 226-27 (27), 231-35, 23578 [244, 262, 264:124], 308, 618; lighted: 113, 239, 240, 242-43, 244, 248-49, 250-51, 256, 259, 260-61, 294:211, 371; luminous: 112-13, 120, 226-27, 235-36, 238-41, 242, 244, 248, 250-51, 253, 254, 256-58, 259, 260, 328-29 (17), 342, 561; mineral: 227-28, 234, 247-48, 249, 261-67, 277-78; mixed: 112-14, 119, 120, 223, 233, 23536, 245-46, 248, 251-52, 261-67, 27778, 300, 305, 307; opaque: 120, 225-27, 237, 239, 258:108, 501, 563, 594; organic: 123, 279, 292-96; simple: 113, 120, 162, 226-28, 230, 235, 245-46, 248, 254, 262, 619; transparent: 225-27, 235 (49), 237, 250, 253, 257-58 (108), 260, 342, 347, 350, 371, 373. — (B), acts and operations of: 230-34, 244, 247-49, 269, 311, 371, 821-22; dignity of: 120. 239-40 (see: Nobility); generation of: 229, 234, 248-49, 250-51. 25659, 262; 264-66, 276-77, 279-81, 283; genus of: 177, 225, 228, 239-40, 29396; nature of: 119, 146, 177, 219:3, 231, 233, 243, 245-48, 262-64, 266, 277, 282-83, 673; perfection of: 115, 128, 231-33, 241, 246, 248, 257-58, 619; specific form of: 219:3, 226, 22728, 234, 236, 240, 243-45; and movement: 146-47, 149, 226, 228, 253, 596-99 (141), 601-02, 607, 609-10, 618-19, 621, 623, 626, 757-58, 809. See also: Animal(s), Being (Ens), Being (Esse), Conservation, Difference (specific), Disposition, Elements, Human body. Matter (corporeal), Multiformity, Plural forms, Qualities, Species, Specific form, Substantial form (of corporeal substance), Uniformity. — (C), celestial [heavenly], formation and nature of: 113, 146-47, 149, 226-28, 228-30, 235 (49), 236-37, 238, 242, 245-48, 251-54, 256-57, 258 (108), 260-61, 291, 596-99, 601-02, 604, 612:170, 643, 757-58, 822; influence of: 227-28, 235, 236-37, 24041, 244-45, 247-48 (79), 249-52, 254, 259, 260, 261-62, 264 (126), 280 (168), 281, 371:14, 374 (28), 606, 618-19, 621, 748, 757, 809, 833, 634; lumen of: 24748, 249-51, 254, 258:108, 259, 261, 748 (see: Light, corporeal); power

926 of: 228, 245, 247-48, 249, 251-52, 26061, 262, 280-81; substantial form of: 226-28, 235-45, 245-46, 247-48, 249, 252-53, 254, 256, 258, 259, 471; and illumination: 228, 237-38, 240, 244, 249-51, 371:14, 374 (28), 444, 598; and the rational soul: 227-28. See also: Form (completive), (The) Heavens, Man, Uniformity. — (D), terrestrial [earthly |, nature of: 120, 146-47, 149, 220, 226-28, 229-31, 234, 235-36 (49), 237-45, 246-47, 251-54, 262, 258-59 (108), 260, 282-91 (see above: celestial, influence of); and corporeal light: 119, 219:3, 227, 235-36, 237-48, 249, 252, 254-56, 257-58 (108), 260, 281; and illumination: 228, 237, 244, 249-51, 258, 259, 260; and lumen: 248-49, 250, 258, 259. Book, 481, 524, 530, 531, 536, 562, 564, 614, 665, 666, 668, 686-87, 693, 695, 814-15. See: Sacred Scripture. Brilliance [Brightness, Lustre], 113, 239, 240-41, 244-45, 249-51, 256-57, 259, 501, 536, 542, 563, 594. See: Splendour. Cause (Causality], 107, 141, 143, 280, 369, 449, 563, 565, 574, 575, 580, 668, 669, 676; efficient: 345, 385, 409, 413, 574 (96), 579-80, 582, 592-94, 603, 6'2, 620, 667, 686-87 (35), 689, 693, 703, 745, 751; exemplar: 413, 425, 498-99, 504, 517, 562, 572-74 (96), 575, 381, 603, 612, 614, 620-21, 689, 693, 704, 746, 751, 834; final: 247-48, 409 41Z, 480, 572, 575, 592, 612, 620, 625 68386, 689, 692, 734, 741, 745, 751 804; first: 378, 381, 413, 428, 445, 455 464, 473, 494, 498, 499, 546, 559, 562, 563, 565, 574, 575, 580-81, 585, 589, 59294 (136), 612, 619-20, 630-31, 634, 686-87, 703, 711, 733, 758, 793, 829 (69); formal: 246-47, 250, 253-54, 256, 258-59, 408-09, 480, 573, 575, 582, 675-83, 689, 745, 804; material: 24647, 672-75, 689; knowledge of: 368-69, 377-78, 386-87, 396, 408-15, 417-18, 425, 427-28, 443-44, 445, 447-48, 45253, 480, 485, 494, 507, 523, 531, 546, 550, 563, 589, 615, 711, 726, 829 (69) — see: Human knowledge; and effect: 106, 268, 368, 432, 447, 469-70, 47374, 485, 493, 501-02, 507, 512, 527, 531, 561, 565, 566-67, 579-81, 589,

INDEX 592-93, 597-98, 616 (182), 618-20, 634, 692, 695, 700, 711, 724, 731, 733:90, 734-36, 744, 746, 748, 797, 799-801; of being: 151-52, 385, 408, 413, 432, 492, 498, 503, 506:122, 524, 527, 545, 552-53, 562, 568, 615, 61920, 639, 647-48, 743, 745, 751, 809, 824; of certitude: 405, 448-56, 655, 725; of creatures: 321, 368-69, 386, 408, 409, 425, 427-28, 443-44, 447-48, 452-53, 464, 470, 472, 480, 485, 490, 491, 492, 497:106, 498-500, 507, 531, 546-47, 547, 550, 562, 563, 591-94, 597-98, 614-15, 619-21, 626 (203), 630-31, 648, 699-700, 707, 711, 736, 745, 758, 792-93, 795, 799-800, 801, 809, 823, of error and ignorance. 791, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797-98, 800-01, 803, 805-09, 811, 813, 816-17, 818, 819; of sin: 624-25, 791-92, 795, 797, 799, 801. See: God, Truth. Certitude (Indubitability |, analogical: 446, 493-94, 498-500, 502, 504, 505-06, 512-13, 517-18, 525, 530-32, 537-40 (34), 546-47, 574; complete [perfect]: 370, 381, 386, 387, 414-15, 417, 427-28 (148), 444-45, 447, 449-50, 453-54, 455, 464, 492, 493-94, 498-500, 504, 512-13, 593; infallible 450-51, 453, 455, 500, 505, 517-18, 567-68, 610, 696-97, 735-39, 740; principles of: 527, 556, 576:99; and illumination: 525-51; and science: 370, 396, 40405, 413, 427, 447, 449-54, 455-56, 460, 461, 462-63, 464, 494, 500, 502, 523, 526-47, 549, 564, 567-68, 570-71, 590, 697-98, 728, 731-33, 735-39, 740, 763, 770:176, 773; of authority: 448-50, 676, 678, 696, 697-98; of Christian faith: 448-50 (9), 451, 461, 462-63, 672, 700, 702, 713, 725-26, 728, 729, 738, 762-63, 767; of demonstration: 448, 450, 726; of divine knowledge: 444-45, 493, 502, 504, 512-13, 544; of divine truth: 446, 456-60, 465, 467, 493, 512-13, 517, 524, 538, 553, 56263, 735-37, 826; of human reason: 676-78, 696-97, 700, 757; of knowledge: 367, 369, 380-82, 386-87, 403-04, 416-17, 434:166, 443-46, 44748, 448-56 (9), 458-59, 460, 464, 467, 493-94, 502, 504, 517-18, 523-25, 52651, 560, 569-71, 574, 585, 586:116, 5,i9, 590, 606, 609:164, 614-15, 619,

INDEX

927

624, 676, 730, 732, 735-39, 741, 779, 177-81, 194:13, 289, 691-94, 704, 73 732, 748; Redeemer 405, 625, 667-68, 796, 798, 812, 823, 826, 833; of Scripture: 676, 678, 681, 696, 697-98; of 689, 694-95, 697, 701, 745, 801-02; sufsense knowledge: 544-45, 560-61; of ferings and testimony of: 203:134, 564, theology: 448, 451, 463, 499-500 (110), 625, 665-66, 669, 671-72, 684, 690, 692, 694-95, 753, 754, 756, 802, 810, 502, 506:122, 676-77, 682, 689, 699, 811-12 (42), 813, 817, 820 (54), 82 711, 725, 729; of truth: 332, 355, 38687, 413, 434, 443-44, 446, 448, 452-60, 834; union in: 172, 175, 177-80, 185465, 467-68, 502, 504-05, 507, 512-13. 86 (101), 221, 265, 289, 671-72, 683, 517, 524, 527, 531-32, 534, 542, 704, 748, 750; and Christian faith: 408, 545:45, 546, 556, 560, 564, 574, 666, 688-89, 728, 730, 732, 788-89, 576:99, 578, 581:109, 590, 611, 672, 817; and the Church: 667, 669, 691, 682, 735-39, 740-41, 779, 798; of 794, 812, 826. See: (The) Trinity. wisdom: 370, 447, 454-56, 464, 494, (The) Christian [Believer], extremist: 833500, 523, 547-51, 570-71, 590, 614, 35, good of: 683-86, 689, 695, 702, 70 740. See: Cause, Philosophy. 11, 743, 779, 790, 801, 811; perfection Chance, 396, 621, 686. of: 667, 683-86, 731, 740, 791, 815 Change [Immutation, Variation), 146-47, 828-29, 831, 832, 833, 834; and 149, 228-30, 249, 265-66, 283, 303-04, creation: 591; and error: 738-39, 740, 371, 373, 374-75, 422:140, 444-45, 757-60, 796-97, 801-03, 805-10, 811597, 599, 601, 602:153, 619, 724; sub12 (40, 42), 815-18; and God: 331-33, stantial: 123, 147, 149, 228-30, 265-66, 427:128, 617, 665-69, 671-72, 675, 68 283. See: Mutability, Mutation. 692-93, 698, 721, 725-30, 735-36, 739Charity, 399-400, 407, 410, 427:148, 675, 40, 743, 745, 756, 760, 763, 788, 802, 684-85, 692-93, 728, 732, 733-34, 742807-10, 811, 815, 818, 820-31; and 43, 744, 747, 749-50, 753, 754, 759, philosophy, see: Philosophy; and 766-67, 793, 794, 795, 801, 803, 804, theology: 675-76, 692-93, 700, 703, 814, 816, 819, 825, 826, 828. 710, 731-32, 803, 814-15; and the Choice, see: Freedom of choice. philosophers: 591, 728, 736, 738, 74 Christ, being and existing of: 177-79, 186, 757-59, 787, 789, 791, 800, 803, 807 287; divine Wisdom: 812, 823, 824, 10, 813:46, 814-15, 817. 829, 831:72; divine Word [Son of God], Christian faith [belief], act of: 407-08, 448382-83, 444, 470, 471-72, 499-502 50, 454, 461, 499, 502, 504, 564, 568, (110, 112), 503-04, 567-68 (84), 570, 615, 665-66, 671-72, 683-84, 725, 726572-74, 577-78, 582, 612-13, 666, 671, 32, 735, 740, 763, 765-67, 778-79, 800, 691-92, 694-95, 698, 704, 746-48, 749, 804, 808 (see: Assent); articles [prin760, 793, 805, 820, 823, 824, 825-26; ciples] of: 406-08, 450, 698, 701-02 exemplar: 689, 704, 714, 756, 812, 819, (47), 711. 713, 723, 725, 736-37, 826, 834; grace of: 794, 798-99, 801, 754, 755-56, 762-63; illumination 803, 813, 821 (55), 825, 828 (65), 831, (divine) of: 407-08 (106), 443, 449 51, 834; human knowledge of: 204, 405, 499, 523, 561, 567, 570, 590, 609, 665547-50, 569-70, 579:104, 788 (see: 68, 677, 678, 692. 698, 704, 725-26, Human knowledge); human nature of: 727, 729, 731-32, 738-40, 742, 74 171-75, 177-81, 185-86 (101), 194:13, 773, 787, 790-91, 794, 795, 796-98, 221, 265, 286, 287-90 (199), 297-99, 801, 802, 804; nature of: 321-22, 407, 308-09, 443, 446, 562, 569-70, 671-72, 665-67, 671-72, 702, 725-28 (79), 72 673, 683, 690-94, 699, 730, 739, 74630, 730-31, 733-35, 737, 765-67, 772 48, 816, 820, 823, 834: love for: 743, objects of: 407-08, 449-50, 461, 462, 820 (54); Mediator: 612, 748, 790, 498-99, 540, 563, 615, 627, 665-68, 799:22, 825, 827 (65), 828; medium: 671, 672-78, 678-85, 687, 692-95, 698383, 577, 580, 612-13, 683, 691-92, 701 (47), 702, 704, 707, 711, 715, 72 694, 704, 714-15, 746, 748, 750, 793, 22, 724-26, 727-30, 730-32, 734-42, 811-12; mother of: 288-89, 731, 748, 742-45, 751, 760, 763, 765-67, 772, 779-191; person [suppositj of: 175-76, 788, 790, 792-93, 795, 797-804, 807-10,

928

INDEX

811, 816, 818, 821-22, 825; perfection of: 688, 733; science of, see below: Christian (science); truths of: 407-08, 448-50, 461, 564, 608-09, 609-10, 616, 624-25, 654-55, 665-68, 671-72, 67375, 676, 678-79, 681-83, 688-89, 698, 700-03 (49), 707, 718:70, 720-21, 722, 725-28, 729, 732, 734-39, 742-43, 750, 757-58, 763, 772, 775, 778-79 (191), 788, 792-93, 794-98, 799-800, 801, 803-04, 805, 807-10, 811, 815, 816-17, 818-19, 829-30, 835; wisdom of, see below: Christian (wisdom); and contemplation: 330, 547; and creation: 591-93, 604, 822; and human reason: 321-22, 377, 407, 448-49, 498-500, 539-40, 563-64, 567-70, 591-93, 600, 604-05, 606:160, 608-09 (164); 610, 611, 615, 624-25 (201), 627 (206), 634, 639, 654, 665-66, 668, 671-72, 672-83, 684-85, 688-89, 695-98 (45), 699-701, 702-04, 715, 720, 722, 723, 726-27, 729, 730-32, 733-34, 735-42, 742-43, 750, 757-59, 766-67, 775-76, 779, 79091, 795-804, 807-10, 812-13, 814-19, 833; and opinion: 730-31, 772; and theology: 406, 407-08, 448-50, 451, 639, 673-78, 685, 688-91, 694, 702-03, 710-11, 713, 720-21, 722-23, 723, 726, 728-30, 740-41, 742-43, 743-53, 75759, 778-79, 790-91, 814-15, 816-17, 818-20, 821-28, 832; and the human will: 449-50, 461, 725-30, 736-38, 74243, 763, 766-67, 778-79, 793, 801, 803, 804; and the senses: 730. See also: Certitude, End, Human intellect. Knowledge, Light (spiritual), Lumen (spiritual). Philosophy. Christian, life: 617, 683-86, 694-95, 702, 710-11, 745-50, 779, 790, 794, 798-99, 801, 802-03, 815, 819, 826, 828-29, 831 (72), 832 (74); philosopher: 728, 735-41, 790-91, 796-96, 803-04, 80710, 811, 816-18, 838-39; philosophy: 668, 787-839 [787-91 (9), 795, 804, 809, 816, 818-20, 824-25, 828, 830:70, 831 (72), 832 (74), 833 35, 835-36, 839]; religion: 409-10, 608, 666, 668, 753, 754-56, 758-59, 790, 806-07 (33), 819, 828, 830 (70), 831; science: 331, 409, 418:129, 523, 569-71, 671-72, 701, 807-08, 814-15 (51), 819, 821 (see: Science); understanding, see: Theology; virtue: 398, 608-09, 617:183

(201), 724, 828-35; wisdom: 331, 333, 409-10 (112), 414, 417, 427:148, 523, 547-50, 568-71, 612-15, 617 (183), 667, 669, 671-72, 688, 692-93, 753-56, 759, 789-90, 807 (33), 810-12 (42), 814-15, 816, 818, 819, 820, 821, 823, 825, 826, 828-29 (65), 831, 832 (see: Wisdom, natural). (The) Church, 612, 667, 669, 681, 690, 691, 694, 695, 701-02, 794, 811, 812, 815, 826. Coexistence, 251 (88), Cognition, see: Knowledge. Colour, 113, 117, 177 (87), 200, 221, 23940, 240-41, 244-45, 250, 257-58 (108), 259, 260, 268-69, 293-94, 316, 342, 350, 367, 371, 373, 376, 378, 380, 384, 417, 474-75, 495, 561, 573, 607. Commentators, 680, 682, 686-87, 814-15. See: Author. Common, form, see: Form; nature, see: Essence (as species); sense: 114, 329 (18), 331-32, 334 (31), 335, 341-42, 343, 357 (80), 372-73 (23), 375, 378, 822 (see: Phantasia, Senses). Comparison, see: Analogy. Composition, in being: 143-45, 164 (57), 181:91, 263, 296, 299; in creatures: 143-45, 157, 164 (57), 165, 223, 26264 (123), 283-84, 291-93, 313, 503, 505; in knowledge: 673-74; of body and soul in man: 103, 137:3, 164, 164-65, 172-74 (79), 179, 181-85, 192:110, 20306, 213-14, 222, 223-24 (21-22), 26263, 286, 291, 295-308, 308-09, 31116, 346, 348, 367; of form and matter: 146-48, 162-64, 170-71. 174, 180-81 (91), 220, 223, 233-34, 262-63, 268, 272, 277, 291-93, 311-16, 351, 509:127, 591; of the human body: 220, 291-95, 297-99. See: Being (Ens), God (and substantial form and matter), Matter (corporeal, and substantial forms), Part, Rational soul, Union. Comprehension, 321-22, 352, 377-82, 383, 386-87, 389-90, 396, 405, 413-15, 419, 434, 447-48, 453, 455, 459, 477, 489, 497, 532, 546, 568, 598, 678-79, 682, 702-03, 731, 733, 827. Concept [Intelligible word, Mental word], 368 (5), 382-83, 384-85, 387, 392-93, 395, 397:85, 404-05, 500:110, 501 02, 503, 512, 545:45, 549 (50), 55f-51, 665, 668, 746-48. 824.

INDEX Concupiscence, 624-25, 746, 793, 794, 795, 797, 821, 825. Concupiscible, see: Appetite of (the senses). Conformity, 262-63, 272, 286, 293, 302, 411, 749, 830; analogical: 252-54, 262, 471, 475-76, 565, 574-76, 744; in knowledge: 380, 383-86, 386, 448-49, 574; to God: 368-69, 370, 381, 385-86, 431, 475-77, 537, 539, 546, 547-48, 563, 565, 574-76, 744, 751. Conjecture, see: Opinion. Conjunct of body and soul in man, 172, 201, 222-24 (22); principle of his personal operations: 182, 185:99, 214, 302, 341; subject of his sense potencies: 165, 18285 (99), 203, 371-72, 374 (26). See: Composition. Connatural, light of the intellect: 398; lumen: 403-04, 430-32, 434, 585; operation: 800; power: 249, 251, 254, 256, 259, 740; principle: 745; quality: 254, 260; species of knowledge: 400. Connotation, 495-97, 602-03. Conscience [Moral, Practical, science], 326 (12). 328, 330, 336-37, 339, 400-04, 408, 422, 429-30, 544, 563, 683, 798. Conservation: 121, 154, 155, 242-44, 296, 823; and being: 244, 246-47, 252, 259, 585, 586, 833; of bodies: 242-44, 24748, 252, 259; of cognitive [innate ] principles: 332, 336, 347, 349, 353-54, 355; of cognitive species: 328, 335, 338, 342, 353-55 (78), 362; of creatures: 140, 564, 566, 586 (116), 833; of the human intellect: 566-68, 572, 585; of the human mind: 562, 581. Contemplation, 322, 323, 330, 333, 334, 336-37, 418, 482, 504, 542-43, 546, 548-49, 568, 600, 613, 614, 618-20. 622-26, 683-86, 689, 691, 710-11, 721, 760. 779, 787, 799, 820-28 (55), 829. Contingency, 445, 453, 518, 526-27, 54142, 553, 559, 563, 585, 648-49. Contradiction, 380, 398 (86), 406, 436, 450, 455, 594-95, 615, 621, 639, 647, 655, 680-81, 702, 802, 815, 816. Contrariety, 113-16, 146, 220, 227-30, 246, 251-54, 262, 303-04, 594, 608, 681-82, 723, 724-25, 743, 757, 810, 811, 817. Controversy [at Paris |, 627. 805-10, 810-12 (39-40, 42), 815-17, 818 Corporeity, 104 (5), 113:22, 140, 219:2-4, 225, 821. Corruption, 124, 140. 146, 147, 156, 227-28,

929

229-30, 234, 247, 277, 305-07, 309, 311, 315, 324, 595, 606, 607, 611 (169), 621, 654, 748, 758, 833. Counsel [Consultation |, 453-54, 529, 562, 685, 749, 819, 824. Creation, 103, 111, 120 (38), 131, 137, 15055, 158, 159, 163, 226 (27), 227, 3 409, 411, 470. 471-72, 495, 497, 535. 560, 563, 589, 591-94, 594-95, 596601, 601-02, 602-05, 612-14, 616, 62 21, 623. 625-26, 627 (206), 630-31, 638-39, 643, 647-49 (248), 680, 683, 689-90, 694, 695, 697, 699-700, 704, 715, 739, 740, 750, 779, 788, 792-93, 795, 807, 809, 813, 821-22, 829, 833. See: God, Matter (corporeal), Rational soul. Creator, see: Analogy, Creation, Creatures, God, Medium. Creatures, 107, 147, 151-52, 162-64, 165, 168, 170, 191, 193-94, 198-99, 223, 226 (27), 262-63, 274, 278, 296, 303, 313, 333, 367, 369, 386-87, 452, 467, 469, 478-81, 486:85, 495, 503, 516, 517, 527, 548, 553-54, 573, 591-94, 598, 612-14, 616 (181), 634, 638, 643, 64849, 656, 667, 669, 689, 691, 724, 741, 751-52, 792, 795, 799-800, 813, 814, 821-22, 827, 829-30, 832; corporeal: 103, 207, 262-63, 283, 300, 308, 368, 390, 468, 480-82, 499, 500, 501, 512, 523-24, 564, 569, 665, 668, 689, 69293, 748, 751, 810, 821-23, 833-34 (77); spiritual: 140, 142, 145, 199, 162-63, 213, 251:88, 263, 343, 369, 480-82, 499, 500, 512, 523-24, 537, 541-42, 564, 566, 568, 586, 598, 625, 689, 744, 833-34 (77); and the Creator: 129, 15152, 300, 352, 367, 385-86, 433-34, 444, 447-48 (4), 453, 458, 464-65, 468-69, 472, 474-76 (59), 477, 478-81, 484-85, 486:85, 489-91, 495-96, 497:106, 537, 540:36, 553-54, 560-65, 575-76, 578-79, 589, 603, 614, 619-20, 648-49, 656, 665-68, 683, 689, 692, 695, 699, 721, 724, 735, 737, 741, 744, 746, 748, 761, 787, 808, 820-24, 82626 (61). See: Angel, Being (Esse), Cause, Composition, Conservation, God, Human knowledge (objects of), Man, Medium, Operation, Rational soul, Similitude. Species, Substance. Curiosity, 614. 676, 682, 757, 758, 806, 807, 809, 811, 814, 817, 818, 819.

930

INDEX

Damnation, see: Eternal (punishment). Hell. philosophans: 609:166, 613:174; Danger, 701, 789, 812, 813-15, 816, 818. philosophy: 701, 406; piety: 753, 755, Darkness [Obscurity!, 146, 226, 237, 253759; potency: 108-09, 312-16, 723; 54, 255, 262-64, 330, 385, 417, 429, prepositions: 575-79, 602-03; principle: 443-44, 452, 480, 501, 503, 517, 523, 470, 603; proportion: 473; prudence: 537, 539-40, 562, 563, 614, 621, 624406; rational: 326, 328; reason: 325, 25, 665, 669, 671, 701, 733, 787, 792, 327, 336, 340, 358, 618; science: 396793, 794, 795, 797, 798, 805, 808, 811, 97, 406; sensing: 370-71, 373-74; sen813, 815, 821, 825, 826-27. suality: 324, 338, 801; shadow: 237, Death, see: Human body (rational soul, 480; similitude: 474, 496; sin: 794; separated from), Resurrexion. species: 172, 180, 264, 268; speculate: Deception, in knowledge: 450-51, 453, 455, 482 (81); spirit and soul: 199, 202-03; 535, 696, 789, 793, 815, 817, 829; in substance: 286, 293-97, 298, 304, 308sensation: 343, 372:23. 09, 575; temporal: 602; terms: 452-53, Defect, 330, 667-68, 669, 802, 833-35; and 470; theology: 406, 697, 701; thinking: knowledge: 379, 430, 451, 458-59, 464379-80; true: 572; truth: 371,-385, 395 65, 548, 609, 728, 733:93, 760, 793; of (77); ultimate form: 246-47; unhuman reason: 795, 800, 804, 817. derstanding: 377, 396-97, 678-79; Definition [Meaning], 171-72, 271, 278, union: 265-66, 286, 297-99; will: 328; 380-81, 452-53, 536-37, 544, 696, 757, wisdom: 409-10, 413 (118), 417, 548, 824; and nature: 269, 286, 296-99, 308550; Word (of God): 577. 09, 724; of, act, see here: potency; Delight, 255, 410, 427:148, 675, 691, 700, analogy: 471; Art: 577; cause: 107, 575; '703, 731, 746, 810-11, 812, 815:51, Christian: 789; Christian faith: 727:79; 822-23. Christian philosophy: 789 (9), 828, 831, Demerit, 788, 793, 795, 796, 797. 832:74, 839 (see here: philosophy); Demons [Evil spirits], 251:88, 373:23, 541colour: 257, 260, 371; completive form: 42, 621, 690, 695, 742; Lucifer [Satan]: 246-47, 259; composition: 262-64, 286, 613, 811-12. 297-99; comprehending: 678; concept: Demonstration [Argument, Proof, Proposi382 (48); conscience: 326, 339; tion], 448, 450, 452-54, 455-57 ( 2 1 ) , creation: 471-72, 593; creature: 151-52, 464, 466, 470, 523, 532, 541-42, 568, 593; end: 411, 417, 684; essence: 268, 636-39, 640:231. 641:235, 642-43, 648 575, 681; existing: 155-56, 198-99; (248), 667, 675-79, 696, 699:45, 703. faculty: 325, 340; Father (in God): 470; 718:70. 720-21, 722-23, 731, 732 (90). flesh: 287; Franciscan: 832; freedom of 734-37, 740-42 (108), 747, 760, 772, choice: 324, 325; gift: 566; gift of 775-76, 787, 805-06. 815, 824, 826, knowledge: 406; God: 458-59, 470, 835. 741-42; good: 572, 684; grace: 566, 794; Desire, see: Appetite. human nature: 289, 299; human perDevotion, see: Piety. son: 166-67 (see here: person); Difference [Distinction], between the humility: 829; idea: 474, 496; human potencies: 323-37, 338 (35), ignorance: 791, 792; immutable: 542; 339, 340, 341-55, 356-59 (80), 360:88, innate: 399-400; intellect: 326, 327, 362, 370, 375, 387, 727; individual and 336, 340, 358-59, 377, 378, 618; inpersonal: 168-71, 182, 809; kinds of: telligence: 327, 336, 340, 359, 618; in164-65, 177, 253, 262-63, 265, 293-96, vestigate: 482 (80); justice: 386; 298, 300-01, 369; specific: 125-26, knowing: 678; ladder: 481 (77); light: 161:54, 225, 238, 239-40, 241-42, 264 500-01; lumen: 250, 261; man: 171, 186, (123), 267, 277, 293-96, 298-99, 300, 221, 289, 290:199, 293, 298-99, 379-81, 308; and genus: 143, 264 (123), 265-66, 470, 472 (see here: human person); 269-71, 274; and substantial form: 265matter: 145, 314-16; mind: 205-06, 354; 66, 267, 270-71, 315-16; of matter mirror: 481 (77); name: 478; order: 145-48, 226-30, 236, 239, 245-47, 252, 411, 684; person: 165-68, 174-75, 185255, 256-57, 258-59 (108), 314-16; of 86, 187:102, 681; phantasia: 343; parts: 262-63, 265, 284. See: Species.

INDEX Dignity, 103, 120, 137-38 (5), 169, 170-71, 175-76, 239-40, 242-44, 246, 390, 469, 536, 541, 543-45, 546, 554, 605, 666. See: Nobility. Disposition, accidental: 150, 152, 220, 266; bodily: 242-44, 247, 267:170, mediating: 106, 220:5, 222-23; substantial: "l 11, 219 (4), 256-57, 275, 294, 300, 302, 307, 309; and the human body: 103, 115, 123, 228, 284, 290, 549, 616 (180), 743:110; and the human intellect: 201, 206-08, 350-51, 548-49, 556, 574; and the rational soul: 103, 131, 291, 294, 300-02, 315, 398-99, 429; of God: 598, 621, 638; of man: 608, 609:164, 619, 692-93, 696-97, 701, 720, 721, 729, 843:110, 829; of the human will: 398, 429-30. 701. See: Human mind. Matter (corporeal:. Distinction, see: Difference. Divine, see: Art(s), Certitude, Christian faith (illumination of). Contemplation, God, Hypostasis, Idea, Ideal (reasons), Inspiration, Law, Revelation, Worship. Doctrinal character (of the Bonaventurean synthesis), 105, 109, 124, 129, 133-35, 155-56, 164, 170-71, 179-85, 216-18, 259, 278, 308-09, 316-18, 319, 362-63, 363-64, 365, 389, 395-96, 421-22, 42728, 433-34, 436-37, 440-41, 459-60, 467-68, 482, 484-86 (85), 491 (92), 493-94, 502-04, 516-18, 518-19, 52122, 550, 568:64, 571-72 (88), 58990, 594-95, 601:15-2, 610-12, 61520, 622-26, 643, 647-48 (248), 654-55, 656-57, 657-59, 661-63, 678-83, 68486. 687 (35), 693-95, 699-70!, 704, 709-11. 722-23, 733-41. 749-53, 75556, 759-60 (150), 781-83, 784-86, 78791, 795-804, 815-16, 817-20, 824-25 (61), 828, 831-32 (72, 74), 834-35. 83536, 836-39 Doubt, 443-45, 450-51, 457-59, 460, 466, 671, 681-82, 696, 730-31, 741, 757, 758, 805-06. 817. Duty, see: Obligation. Earth, see: Elements. Ecstasy [Rapture |, 458, 569, 821, 824, 828:65. Effect, 106, 107, 141, 254, 259. 469, 501-02, 531, 579-81; of God: 427:148, 447, 45456, 473, 478, 507, 512, 548, 550, 563, 565, 567, 570, 574, 578-82, 585-86 (116), 589, 597-98, 604-05, 619-20,

931

623, 638-39, 648, 744-45. 751, 806, 809, 812, 820, 825; of illumination: 446, 560, 579-81, 610: of sin: 624-25, 800-01. 820-21, 822, 834. See: Cause. Egypt [Egyptians], 569, 789:7, 794, 811, 815. Elements, 112, 113-14, 115-16, 119, 12021, 219:4, 226-27, 228-30, 23435, 242-43, 245-46, 247-48 (79), 251-52, 254, 256-57, 258 (108), 25960, 261-66, 269, 275-77, 280, 281-82, 284, 291, 293, 294 (211), 301:231, 30506, 308, 328-29 (17), 822; air: 226, 235 (49). 238, 249-51 (88), 252, 254, 258:108, 259, 261. 264, 275. 342, 37273; earth: 116, 245, 254; fire: 116, 170, 226, 231-33, 235, 237-38, 241-45, 248, 249, 251-56, 257-58 (108), 259, 26061, 264 (127), 275, 306. 724; water: 116, 226-27, 235 (49), 247, 252-53, 258:108, 264-65, 342, 8)4-15, 816. Emanation, 495-96. 577, 613, 634, 748, 827. Embryo, 123-24, 131, 225, 274, 289, 291. 292-93 End [Purpose, Terminus |. final: 624-25, 668, 741, 745, 756. 821; principal: 137, 683-85; proximate: 411, 412, 414-15. 417-18, 425, 428, 684, 689; ultimate: 137, 411-12, 414-15, 418, 428, 434, 547-49, 613, 684, 685, 689, 699, 767, 798-99, 804; universal: 411-12, 414; and God: 137, 369, 409, 411, 413-15, 418, 425, 428, 434, 475-76, 547-49, 563-64, 568, 613, 620, 624-25, 638-39, 667-68, 684, 688-89, 692-93, 695, 699700, 707, 710, 715. 746-48, 750, 767, 799, 821, 822, 827; and time: 596-97, 666. 689-91, 694; of Christian faith: 568, 666, 668, 669, 745, 779; of creatures: 103, 137, 411-12, 417-18, 425, 428, 563-64, 572, 609-10, 613, 620, 638-39, 684, 689-91, 694, 695, 707, 715, 741, 748, 750, 821, 827; of human knowledge: 321, 369, 409, 41315, 417-18, 425, 428, 434, 547-49, 595, 613, 620, 683, 700, 747, 808, 825; of operation: 273, 275, 277, 294, 299300, 411, 414, 475-76, 746-47; of Scripture: 683, 688-89, 692-93, 696, 746; of theology: 675, 683-86, 688, 692, 695, 699, 703, 706, 722, 723, 779, 790, 825 (see: Theology, Final cause of). See also: Fruit, Man, Nature, Repose. Entity, 384. 386, 395.

932

INDEX

soul: 591, 595 (137), 598, 604-11, 616 Equivocal, name:. 477-78; predication: 470, (180), 618-19, 621, 623, 624-25, 626, 484, 490; proportion: 476, 485; 649-51 (253); the virtues: 624-25, 799. similarity: 469-70; terms: 470, 472. 802-03, 813, 819-20. Equivocity, 247, 469-71, 482, 484-85, 490. Essence, 138, 164-65 (57), 168-70; and being: Error [Mistake], moral: 702, 794-95, 797-98, 147-48, 162, 164 (57), 181:91, 268, 800-02, 803, 804, 805, 806-07, 810-12, 275, 282, 285, 457, 466, 478, 486:85, 817-18; theological: 608-09, 621, 639, 566; as species [common nature]: 166656, 678, 681-82, 693, 721, 738, 75667, 168, 171-74, 178, 180, 181:91, 59, 805-06, 815-16, 817-18; in 185-86, 192:110, 221-22,272, 273, 278, Christian faith: 604, 605, 608-09, 611, 280-81, 294-96, 308, 316, 475. See: 616, 625, 634, 639, 654, 728, 729, 731, Definition, Principle (essential), Quid737-38, 759, 793, 795, 801, 803, 811dity, Specific form, Whole (form of 12, 815-18, in knowledge [thought], 379, 398:86, 414, 432, 443, 445-46, the). 451, 455, 457-59, 479-80, 535, 571 Estimative sense [Estimation], 329:18, 333, 334:31, 335, 338, 343-44, 373 (24). (88), 590-91 (128), 594-95, 605, 616, 681-83, 728, 729, 734, 737, 738, 739, See: Senses. Eternal, forms: 593; law: 201, 204, 330, 332, 740-42, 756-60 (136), 763, 773, 774, 336. 335,, 414, 454-55, 504, 505, 517, 775, 787, 788, 791, 792, 793, 794-98, 800-01, 805, 808, 817-18, 835; in 524-25, 526-30, 531, 539:35, 545, philosophy: 599, 601, 602-03, 606, 608556:64, 562-63, 569, 572, 576:99, 617; 09 (166), 614, 616-18 (182, 186), 669, life, see: Beatitude; principle: 330, 414, 728, 729, 738-39, 740, 790-91, 815-18; 453, 549, 603; punishment [damin sensation: 343; of the philosophers: nation]: 666, 697, 699, 802, 811 (see: 446, 590-91 (128), 599, 601, 608-12, Hell), reasons: 370, 380-81, 383:52, 612, 614, 616, 623, 625-26 (202-04), 385-86, 387, 413-15, 417-18, 427, 44748, 453, 455, 464, 492-94, 497, 498626-28, 634-35, 649, 655, 656-57, 659, 662-63, 669, 728-29, 732, 738, 756-60 500, 504, 509, 525, 526-47, 549-51, (136), 775, 787, 789, 790-91, 798-99, 554, 556, 560-62, 563, 564-65, 569, 802-03, 804, 805-10, 812-13, 815, 572-82, 586, 588, 589, 618-19, 623, 816, 817, 817-18; on, beatitude: 591, 823 [judging by and seeing in: 529-30, 604, 605-06, 607, 621, 624-26, 626, 531, 560, 572-79, 579-82, 588]; rules: 649, 654-55, 813, 817, creatures: 616, 327:14, 332, 355, 398:86, 406, 427, 620-21, 634-35, 809-10; God: 524-25, 454-55, 530, 531, 535-36, 538-39, 544, 562-63. See also: Light (spiritual, of 535, 591, 599-600, 602-03, 616, 62022, 623, 626, 626-27, 630-31, 634-35, God), Truth (divine). Eternity, and creatures: 524, 532, 591, 598, 738, 760, 773, 805, 806, 808; illumination: 604-05; knowledge: 535, 624; and time: 496-97, 596-97, 598, 569-70, 616 (179), 620-22, 626, 630601, 603, 621, 637, 639, 642-43, 647; of God: 478, 490, 493-94, 498, 503, 31; man: 624-25, 626, 654-55, 800, 802-03, 809, 813, 819-20; the created 640:231, 671-72, 823, 824; of the world: 594-603, 607, 613-14, 616, 619, 621intelligences: 524 (5), 525, 602-03, 604-05, 613, 616, 618-19, 621, 623, 22, 623, 625-26, 636-39 (223), 640:231, 625-26, 626, 634-35, 757-58; the 642-43, 647-49 (248), 805-06, 809-10, creation of the world: 591-94, 594-95, 811, 817. See: Matter (corporeal). 599-600, 602-03, 604-05, 613, 614, Ethician, 613. Ethics, 612, 626, 671:2. See: Philosophy 616, 621, 623, 625, 626, 630-31, 63435, 643, 809; the eternity of the world (moral). 594-603, 613-14, 616, 621-22, 623, Evidence, self: 456 (21), 459, 465, 467, 559625, 626, 637-38, 639, 643, 805-06, 60, 596-600, 636-37, 726, 741; and 809-10, 817; the human intellect: 595, Christian faith: 449-50, 461, 462, 667, 599, 606-07, 607-11, 621, 623 (199), 671-72, 727-29, 735, 767; and God: 626, 647, 651 (253), 652:254, 654-55, 379, 428, 432, 465, 466, 467, 468, 733, 805, 806, 809-10, 817; the rational 741; and knowledge: 402, 404, 451,

INDEX

933

229-30, 246, 315, 472, 673. 466, 534, 727, 732, 735, 772; and Faculty, 325, 328-29, 340, 355:78, 726, 76 theology: 451, 463, 682, 703-04; and truth: 379, 406, 449, 452, 457-60, 559794, 795, 801, 803. See: University of 60, 671-72, 698, 729, 732, 741, 800. Paris. Faith, see: Christian faith. Evil, 328-30, 332, 335, 344, 458, 497:104, 509:127, 603, 606, 608, 613, 617-18, False [Falsehood, Falsity), 379-80, 382-83, 666-69, 690, 697, 746, 794, 807, 809, 385, 452, 453, 457-58, 466, 503, 52 577, 597, 604-05, 609, 675, 678, 68 810, 811, 817-18; spirits, see: Demons. Exemplar |Exemplarity|, see: Cause, Christ, 82, 696, 728-29, 731, 738, 742, 75, Form, God. 805, 809, 810, 811, 812 (42), 817-18 Existence, determination of: 142, 156, 159, 834. 171, 181, 183-84, 231: foundation and Fathers of the Church, 686-87, 697, 75 principle of: 105-06, 109, 142, 155, 814-15, 816. 163, 178-79, 181:91, 194, 222. 367 Fault. 667, 728, 734, 738, 763, 791, 793 (see: Matter); stability of: 155, 163; and 795, 797, 799, 801, 803, 825:61, 830. knowledge: 367, 386-87, 390, 404, 405, Fear, 429-30, 690, 694, 731, 807. 449-50, 453, 455, 496-98, 499-500, Felicity, see: Beatitude. 524, 726, 821; and person: 166-71, 178, Fire, see: Elements. 181-82, 185-86, 194, 199; and subFirmament, see (The) Heavens. Flame, 108, 238, 245, 255-56. stantial form: 163, 251, 266, 270; of corporeal light: 239, 242, 244, 259, 261; Flesh. 122-23, 287, 288, 289, 290, 297-98, 299, 304, 305-08, 309, 325, 330, 33 of corporeal matter: 104 (4), 106, 111, 113:22, 181:91, 224-25, 276, 453, 501; 336, 342, 797, 805. of lumen: 250-51, 261; of man: 179, Foolish [Foolishness, Folly], 733:93, 739-40, 181-82, 800; of the animals: 280; of the 758, 788, 805, 808, 810-11, 824, 83 rational soul: 142, 149, 156:43, 159, Force, see: Power (generative, seminal). 164, 165, 171, 183-84, 186, 231, 295, Form — (A), artifical: 744, 746, 750; completive: 113-14, 121, 138, 224:22 302, 304, 315, 454, 648. See also: 242-45, 246-47, 253, 259, 262, 27 Mode, Time. Existing, principle of: 111, 142, 145-48, 149273, 299, 303, 306, 308, 309; com50, 155-56, 158, 163-64, 170-71, 174, posite: 225-26, 267, 270-71, 278; 181 (91), 186, 193-94, 221, 313-14, elementary: 119, 225, 241, 269, 2 486:85, 627:206, 643, 649; stability of: 77, 284, 300; exemplar: 107, 477, 49 147, 155, 158, 171, 313, 518; and per93, 494, 498, 505, 507, 547, 578, 58 son: 166-71, 179, 181-82, 186, 191, 620-22, 626-27, 630, 655; general: 194. 198-99, 222, 315; of creatures: 170, 241, 244-45, 246-47, 261; ideal: 107, 562; incorruptible. 261; innate 313, 486:85; of lumen: 250-51, 259; of the human body: 181-82, 194; of the 404-05; intellectual: 745; mediating: rational soul: -142, 149-50, 155-56 (43), 219:3, 267, 269-71, 274, 276; natural: 107, 121, 201-03, 221, 250, 279, 159, 164, 171, 175-76, 181-83, 231, 303, 308, 313. See: Being (Esse), Mat293:210, 371, 408, 607, 745, 750; pa ticular: 107, 268, 270-72, 273, 275 ter, Mode. 282-83, 313-14, 403-05; proper: 121, Experience, 321, 333, 336-37, 341, 347, 349, 368, 396, 398, 399, 401, 404, 405, 410, 127, 181, 221, 251-52, 256, 263, 2 523, 525, 538, 541, 544, 569, 572, 606 277, 278, 279, 281, 283, 295, 298, (160), 608, 611, 613, 619-20, 655, 698, 05, 308, 309-11, 562, 573, 608, 647 731, 732, 741, 760, 779:191, 788, 794, pure: 313; simple: 225-26. 271, 27 397-98, 403, 593, 616 (181); singular: 800, 810, 814, 817, 829, 834. Expression [Manifestation ], of truth: 367-68 267-68, 612:170; spiritual: 251:88, 313, (5). 381-83, 384-86, 393, 404-05, 492647; ulterior: 268, 272; ultimate: 222, 94, 495-97, 502-03, 504-05, 507, 512, 242-43, 246-47, 253, 262, 266, 271, 280, 285, 286 (186), 288, 290, 516-17, 517, 559, 563, 572-74, 581-82, 614, 721, 747, 750, 794. 301.—
934

INDEX

accidents: 143. 145, 157 (44); and act: 149: 30, 150, 170, 270-71 (145), 593, 606-08; and matter: 106-07, 111, 112: 20, 117-18, 119, 132, 133, 145 (24), 146-48, 153-55, 162-64, 170-71, 174 (79), 180-81 (91), 193-94, 216 (167), 220. 221-23, 229, 233-34, 245-47, 251. 254-56, 262-64, 266, 267-69, 272-77, 283, 292-93, 296-98, 305, 309, 310-16, 345, 351, 377, 494-95, 59193, 594-95. 599, 603-04, 608, 616 (180). 627:206, 643, 647, 695, 723 (see: Union): as a common nature: 112-14, 172-73, 181:91, 219 (3), 221, 235-36, 241-42, 244-46, 259, 261, 268, 471-75, 501; of a mixture: 119, 120, 223, 266, 269, 276, 284, 300, 305, 307; of complexion: 119, 120, 219:4, 223, 269, 276, 284, 291, 300, 307; of genus and species: 267. 270, 272: of organization: 219:2-4, 288-90, of the flesh: 305-07. Sec also: Abstraction, Accidental, Body (complex), Difference, Eternal, Genus, Part, Plural forms. Principle. Priority, Species, Specific form. Substantial form. Universal, Whole. Formal, act: 726, 728-29, 766, 778-79, 804; difference: 265, 772; distinction: 177; objects: 351-52, 725, 772, 790; part of man: 203, 206, 213, 221-22, 273, 296, 302, 304; perfection: 220:5; principles: 142-44, 169, 174, 176, 181-82, 184, 203, 206, 221, 285, 289-90, 294-98, 305, 308, 309, 326, 348, 351, 408, 59293, 823. See: Cause. Franciscan, Order: 627, 832 (74); philosophy: 832 (74). Freedom of choice, 121, 137 (3), 300, 32425, 326 (12), 328, 328-29, 330 (19), 336-37, 396-97, 471, 476, 609:164, 692-93. 726-29, 766-67, 793-94, 795, 801-03, 804, 809, 819-20. See: Liberty of choice. Fruit, 613, 688, 693, 746-47, 749, 811-12, 813-14, 817, 830. See: End, Paradise.

nature: 115, 226, 227-28, 248, 254, 26 277, 279-81, 305-07, 308, 593. See: Body. Genus, 112, 125-26, 143, 149, 164-65, 168, 175, 177, 225, 228, 233-34, 239-40, 265-66, 267-72, 274-75, 278, 293-96, 304, 314, 330, 380, 473, 475, 533, 619; and form: 106, 170, 222, 231-34, 266, 274-75, 293, 295-96, 313-14 (see: Form); and matter: 106, 222, 225, 22 266, 293, 295-96, 313-14; and species: 125-26, 164-65, 231, 263, 264 (123), 267, 269-72, 274-75, 278, 280-81, 293, 380, 475, 674. Geometrician, 813. Geometry, 401, 449, 672-73. Gift, 566-67, 570, 572, 671, 688-89, 701, 727, 743:110, 744, 752, 792, 807, 812, 818, 833. See: Grace, Holy Spirit. Glory, see: Beatitude. Glow, 238, 245, 253, 255-56. God, action and power of: 108, 151-52, 157:45, 201, 225, 262, 288-89, 305-0 428, 430, 444-45, 471-72, 493, 495, 497-98 (107), 499-500, 503, 518, 524 527, 532, 533, 559, 563, 565-68. 573, 577-78, 579-81, 591-94, 597-98, 599600, 602-05, 616, 620, 638, 639, 648, 666-67, 679-80, 683-84, 690, 694, 695, 704, 724-25, 739, 740-41, 758, 807, 808, 809, 821-22, 823, 824, 826, 829; attributes of: 151, 262-63, 327, 3 352, 414, 434, 449, 452, 458, 468, 473 478-80, 490-91, 492, 497, 498-500, 503-04, 517, 524, 568:84, 577-78, 582, 594, 598-99, 616 (181), 621, 640:231, 666, 668, 671, 679-80, 741, 742:108, 749, 808, 811, 822-23, 826-27, 828, 829; authority of: 448-50, 461, 580, 675, 676-78, 682, 686-87, 696-99, 70203, 713, 725-26, 755-57, 758-59, 767, 818, 819; causality of: 151-52, 321, 331, 336, 346, 349, 357 (81), 368-69, 370, 378, 381, 385, 386, 387, 409, 41215, 417-18, 425, 427-28, 444-46, 44748, 449, 452-53, 455, 464, 470, 473, Generation, 115, 121-24, 139, 141, 147, 478-80, 490, 491, 492-94, 497:104, 498 150-51, 153, 158, 220, 226 (27), 238, (107), 498-500, 502, 507, 512, 51 248-49, 254, 266, 271, 272-73, 277, 524, 527, 546-47, 550, 552-53, 559-60, 279-81, 282-83, 286-91, 293-94, 301, 560-65, 565-66, 567-69, 571, 573-74, 305-06, 307, 308, 31!, 316, 328-29, 575-76, 577-78, 579-81, 585, 586 335, 532, 593, 607, 748, 779:191, 826; (116), 589, 592-94, 597-98, 599-601, and knowledge: 372-73, 382-83, 396, 614-15, 625, 626, 630-31, 634, 638-39, 607, 668, 746, 748, 823, 824; and 648, 655, 667, 686-87, 689, 692-93,

INDEX 695, 699-700, 707, 711, 733, 736, 741, 743 (110), 745, 751-52, 755, 758-59, 793, 809, 823, 827, 829 (69); essence and nature of: 140, 145, 165-68, 26263, 313, 379, 430, 433, 447-48, 453, 456-59, 460, 466, 469-70, 472, 477, 478-81, 486:85, 489-90, 493, 495-96, 498, 498-500, 503-04, 505, 526, 528, 565, 566, 575, 578, 580, 582, 591, 598600, 613-14, 620, 638, 665-66, 679, 681, 692, 739, 741-42, 752, 790, 820, 822, 823, 826-27, 828, 834; exemplarity of: 107, 367, 385, 409, 413, 425, 453, 474, 492-98 (107), 499-500 (110), 504-05, 507, 508:125, 517, 539, 541, 547, 562-64, 570-71, 573-74 (96), 575-76 (99), 577-78, 581-82, 603, 61214, 620-24, 625-26, 627, 655, 667, 699, 704, 707, 751, 798, 823, 827, 834; first principle: 106, 143, 331, 336, 381, 409, 425, 452, 454, 456, 458-59, 48182, 502-03, 516, 537, 545-46, 547-48, 601, 603, 612-14, 620-22, 630, 626, 655, 666-67, 688-89, 695, 697, 699700, 704, 711, 714-15, 741, 742:108, 744, 750, 754-56, 758, 807, 809, 810, 821-23, 824, 827, 829; first truth: 367, 379, 381, 387, 395-96, 415, 418, 432, 443, 446, 456-58, 459-60, 466, 467, 480, 516, 572, 575:96, 580-81, 617-18, 675, 698, 715, 725-27, 729-30, 732, 734-35, 738, 743, 749, 755-56, 766-67, 772, 779, 788, 803, 804 (see: Truth, divine, and God); goodness of: 386, 409, 411-12, 414, 433-34, 453-54, 457, 472, 480, 498-500, 503-04, 534, 566, 572, 592, 598-99, 603, 609:164, 620, 668, 678, 684, 690, 694-95, 704, 711, 741, 742, 749, 787, 794, 800, 807, 80 820, 821-22, 823, 824, 826, 827; immutability of: 201, 409, 433, 443-46, 453, 454-55, 464, 467, 494, 498, 504, 507, 527, 529-30, 531, 533, 535, 536, 538-39, 541, 542, 546, 548, 549, 55253, 560, 563, 567-68, 576:99, 578, 582, 586, 589, 592, 599-600, 604-05, 613, 638, 739, 742:108, 822, 823; influence and cooperation [presence] of: 333, 379, 381, 416, 428, 430-31, 432, 434, 444, 453, 454-56, 460, 467, 469, 480, 518, 526-29, 531-32, 533, 535, 537-40 (36), 541, 544-50 (43, 45), 551, 559-60, 560-72 (89), 573-74, 579-81, 585-86, 589:126, 594, 605, 614, 623, 669, 741,

935 808, 822, 833; intellect of: 368, 385, 445, 453, 493, 495, 498-99, 505, 51718, 526, 566, 725 (see: Human intellect); justice of: 121, 205, 475, 56 63, 608-09, 666, 792, 800, 802, 82 knowledge of: 278, 327, 444-45, 477 489, 492-93, 495-96, 497-98 (104, 106 07), 499, 502, 504-05, 507, 513, 518, 525, 562-63, 564, 573, 575-78, 582, 604, 612, 620-21, 638-39, 668, 752, 779, 807 (see: Knowledge); love of: 478-79, 499, 504, 549, 668, 752-53, 824 (see: Love); mind of: 332, 355, 367, 370, 380, 385, 387, 404, 468, 493, 499, 502, 505, 507, 512-13, 517, 524-25, 591, 668, 746, 752 (see: Human mind); names of: 166, 449, 458-59, 468, 470, 477-80 (73), 489-91 (92), 496, 500:110, 741-42, 820, 826-27; providence of: 665, 668, 690-91, 809, 821; pure act: 106, 352, 493, 494-95, 501, 505, 524, 565, 597-98, 616 (181); will of: 107, 201, 321, 368-69, 471, 475-76, 540, 550, 598, 638-39 (226), 648, 724, 749, 793, 802, 830; wisdom of: 137:1, 227, 330, 411, 428, 433, 455, 478-79, 481-82, 491, 497, 500:110, 505, 528-30, 533, 547-50, 548-50, 564, 574, 575, 576-78, 598, 603, 612, 614 623, 638 (226), 639, 665, 690-92, 695, 739, 740-41, 746, 747-49, 800, 807, 810, 812, 821-22, 823, 824, 829; and creation: 120:38, 151-53, 163, 226 (27), 227, 235-37, 278, 280, 409, 41112, 432, 470, 471-72, 481, 495, 497, 524, 577-78, 591-95, 597-600, 60205, 612, 614, 616, 620-21, 625, 627 (206), 630-31, 634-35, 648, 666, 672 73, 689, 694, 699-700, 704, 715, 735 36, 740, 750, 788, 793, 807, 809, 813 821-22; and creatures: 104-08, 11415, 118, 120:38, 129, 137, 140, 143-44, 152-53, 163, 263, 321, 367, 381 (47), 385, 412-15, 425, 427:148, 433-34, 444, 447-48 (4), 452, 454, 458, 469, 474-76, 478-82, 486:85, 489-91, 492504 (106-07, 110), 504-05, 507, 509 (127), 512, 517-18, 523, 527-29, 53132, 535, 540, 561-65, 566, 572-74, 575-77 (99), 578-81, 581-82, 586 (116), 589, 591-94, 594-95, 597-600, 602-05, 608-10, 612-14, 616, 619-23, 626, 627 (206), 630-31, 634-35, 638-39, 648, 655. 665-68, 669, 672-74, 679,

936

INDEX

683-85, 692, 695, 699-700, 707, 714-15, 724-25, 731-32, 735-36, 737, 741-43 (108), 744, 745-46, 748, 750, 793, 804, 807, 809, 813, 820-25 (61); and substantial form and matter: 103-09, 1 1 1 , 140, 155, 157:45, 477, 573, 59194, 594-95, 612:170, 616, 634, 648 (setMatter). See also: Being (Ens), i.e. first, and God, Being (Esse), i.e. divine, Christ, (The) Christian, Christian (philosophy), Creatures (and the Creator), Creation, End, Error, Eternal, Honour, Idea, Illumination, Judgment, Image, Life, Light (spiritual). Likeness, Lumen (spiritual), Man, Perfection, Person (divine), Philosophers, Philosophy, Rational soul, Reverence, Similarity, Similitude, Testimony, Theologians, Theology, (The) Trinity, Unity, Vestige, Worship. Good [Goodness, Usefulj, knowledge of: 328, 412, 417-18, 433, 452-53, 473, 497:104, 609:164, 613; and cause: 386, 417, 566, 572; and human reason: 330, 338, 414; and love: 411, 688, 819; and memory: 352-53; and the human intellect: 326-28, 336, 352-53, 369, 45354, 457, 566, 793; and the human will: 254-55, 327-30, 333:26, 336, 344, 353, 382, 386, 398-99, 406, 429-30, 433, 478, 534, 608-09 (164), 667, 669, 727, 742; and the senses: 325, 328, 330, 332, 335-36, 344; of man: 683-86, 690, 69597, 709-11, 733:93, 743, 759, 787, 790, 797, 798-99, 809, 811, 817, 833-34 (77); of nature: 296, 386, 411, 413, 509:127, 566, 592, 667, 741, 743, 760, 787. See: (The) Christian, God. Moral, Unity. Grace, 330-31, 406-07, 535, 537, 539, 54849, 560-62, 564, 566-67, 568, 570, 586, 624-25, 667, 669, 691, 694, 697, 699, 715, 742-43, 744, 748, 750, 752-53 (127), 793-94, 795-96, 797, 798-99, 801-02, 803, 807 (33), 813, 818, 820, 821, 825-26, 828-29 (65), 830-31, 833, 834'. Grammar, 408, 423:143, 615:178, 745. See: Philosophy (rational). Grammarian, 686. Habitual, being: 249; knowledge: 327, 347, 349, 354-55, 370, 396-97, 403-06, 418, 429, 433, 496, 560; mode of existing: 251; potency. 347-48, 349, 354-55;

principles: 429-30; relation: 474 (59). Habitus, 250-51, 261, 294, 325, 339, 347, 397-400, 405, 566, 727, 737; acquired: 398-99, 400-05, 725; cognitive: 397-98, 400-05, 530, 535, 539 (35), 556, 68385; nature of: 368, 397-99, 727; practical, and speculative: 683-85, 710-11; of Christian faith: 407, 665-67, 668, 723, 725-28, 728-30, 732, 734-36, 740, 744, 753. 763, 765-67, 775-76, 790, 825-26; of principles [understanding]: 326, 368, 370, 396, 398-99, 399-405, 405-06, 419, 420, 421-22, 505, 523, 524, 556, 560, 574:96, 586:116, 589, 614, 727, 741; of theology: 686-87, 71011. See: Christian (wisdom), Conscience, Freedom of choice, Habitual, Innate, Wisdom (natural). Harm [Harmful), 332, 335, 344, 746, 818. See: Evil. Hearing, 114, 342, 357, 545. See: Senses. Heat, 116, 228, 231, 237-38, 239, 244-45, 252-53, 254, 256:103, 259, 261, 280, 743, 794. (The) Heavens, crystalline: 226-28, 236, 252-53, 757; fiery: 226-27, 236, 239, 757; firmament [starry heaven[: 226-28, 234, 236, 246, 247, 251-54, 258:108, 260-61; luminaries: 227-28, 234, 23638, 240, 243-44, 245-48 (79), 253-54, 258:108, 259, 260-61, 261-62; moon: 226-27 (30), 241:68, 247, 254, 258 (108), 604, 748; planets: 226, 236, 606; stars: 226-27, 236, 471-72, 604, 748, 809; sun: 200, 226-27 (30), 237-38, 240-41, 254, 257, 258 (108), 264:126, 279, 321, 416, 444, 454, 459, 471-72, 501, 532, 561, 596, 598, 748, 808, See: Body (celestial). Hebrews [Jews), 569, 690, 812. Hell, 254-56, 264, 621. See: Eternal (punishment). Heresy, 681, 728-29, 757, 788. Heretics, 675, 681, 758, 788, 793, 794, 795, 801-02, 805, 806. Hierarchy, 688, 691, 695. Historical aspects (of the Bonaventurean synthesis), U-12, 99-100, 105, 109, l'll, 116-17, 124, F29, 131 (62), 13435, 156-59, 164, 185-86 (100), 206-07, 217-18, 260-61, 278, 308-09, 318-19, 328, 336-37, 352, 355 (78), 362-63, 364-65, 373-74 (26, 28), 386-87, 389:62, 393, 405-06, 417-18 (129), 422

INDEX (140), 438-41, 459-60, 482, 504-06 (121-22), 512-13, 519-21, 522, 526-34, 545-46, 551, 571-72 (88), 581-82, 590, 611-12, 620-23, 625-26, 654-55, 65961, 662-63, 686-87 (35), 702-03 (50), 723, 759-60 (149-50), 783-84, 786. Holiness, 547, 568, 667, 701, 702:49, 732, 814-15 (51), 819. Holy Spirit, gifts of: 331, 406, 409-10, 414, 417, 427:148, 524, 537, 550, 570-71, 676-77, 685-86, 688-89, 699, 701-02 (49), 704 (51), 711, 730, 744, 754-56, 810, 819, 824, 828:65, 830 (see: Piety); and Christ: 287-89, 264-65, 688, 690, 704, 728, 731, 749, 750, 779:191, 819; and Scripture: 564, 569, 690-94, 69699, 701-02, 704 (51), 728, 756, 788, 792, 805, 814, 817, 819, 822. Honour, 402, 406, 617, 666, 668, 743, 749, 755-56, 758, 789-90, 819, 829, 831, 835. See: Reverence. Hope, 727, 729, 744, 750, 753, 754, 825-26, 828. Human, action, see: Moral; belief, see: Opinion. Human body, 113, 130, 131, 194, 220, 230, 251:88, 257-58, 264:126, 282-86 (186), 324-25, 454, 530, 667, 681-82, 727, 744, 805; existing of: 181-82, 194; human intellect and the: 123, 184, 20107, 213-14, 222, 302-03, 344-45, 34650, 357, 420, 611, 792-93; life of the: 126-29, 133, 138, 140-41, 199, 205-06, 213, 219:2-4, 221-22, 232, 279, 284, 291, 295, 299-300, 304, 524, 549, 606, 724; perfection of the: 103, 121-23, 126-28, 131, 184, 185:99, 199, 201-03, 206, 221-24, 228, 232, 286-87, 289-91, 294, 297, 301-03, 313, 328, 549, 599, 606-08; rational soul, act of the body: 126, 133, 206, 221-22, 287-88, 294-95, 311, 313, 607-08, 649, 650-51, 654; gives being to the body: 127-28, 131, 133, 181-82, 206, 216:166, 221-22, 224:21, 289-91, 295, 299, 313, 328, 608, 650-51; in each part of the body: 127-28, 131, 138, 183, 203, 216:166, 221, 231-32, 325; independent of the body: 183-84, 213-14, 221-22, 231-34, 344, 607, 681-82; moves and rules the body: 121, 128-29, 131 (63), 138, 18385 (99), 203, 205-06, 213-14, 215, 216:166, 294:211, 301-03, 328, 549, 797; and organization of the body: 206,

937

291:204, 299-300, 302 (see: Organization); as separated from the body: 175-76, 182-83, 193:112, 205, 295, 300-01, 303-07, 312:253, 341-42, 348, 591, 595, 598-99, 606-07, 609-10, 621, 624-25, 638:223, 641:235, 642, 654. See also: Adam, Appetite, Christ (human nature of), Composition, Conjunct, Disposition, Light (corporeal), Man, Medium, Organs, Plural forms, Spirit, Substance (corporeal), Substantial form (of man), Union. Human intellect, act [operations] of: 184, 204-05, 207, 213-14, 222, 302-03, 321-22, 323-24, 325, 327 (14), 329, 333, 336, 340-43, 344-52, 354-55, 357 (81), 358-59, 360 (88), 362-63, 36770, 372-73, 376-87, 387, 389 (62), 39596, 396-99, 401, 403, 408, 416-17, 419, 422 (140), 430, 434, 444-45, 447-48, 450, 452-56, 458-59, 461, 464, 467, 473, 477, 492, 497, 516-18, 527, 530, 532-34, 544-46, 549, 556, 559-60, 56062, 564-65, 556-67, 569, 571-74, 581:109, 585, 586 (116), 600, 607, 611, 616 (179), 683, 724-27, 740, 743, 794, 796-97, 823; agent and possible: 302, 321-22, 327:124, 333, 336, 345-52, 354, 357-58, 359 (88), 376, 381, 384, 386, 387, 400-01 (91), 505, 517, 533, 544, 556, 557, 559, 569, 572, 573-74, 582, 606, 607, 652:254, 725-26; considerations of: 326-27, 331, 334, 370, 372, 377-80, 385-86, 453-54, 458, 619, 683, 737; foundation and potencies of: 165, 182-85, 200, 203-06, 222, 34144, 345, 349, 351, 359, 362, 368, 376, 381-82, 396, 422 (140), 445, 518, 54446, 556, 559-60, 561, 572, 585, 618, 724-25, 727, 820, 823; nature of: 14142, 156:43, 174:79, 183, 202, 206-07, 222, 321, 323-24 (2), 326-29, 330, 331, 332, 333-34 (31), 335, 336, 339, 342, 344-52, 355:78, 356, 357, 358-59, 37778, 384, 386, 387, 420, 422:140, 447, 450, 532-33, 545, 556, 559-60, 561, 568, 572, 589, 607-08, 611, 618, 621, 623 (199), 626, 724-25, 809, 820; objects Of: 321, 323-24, 326-32 (14), 334, 336, 341, 344-52, 354-55, 357, 362, 367-69, 370-71, 373, 376-81, 383-87, 389, 390, 393, 395-96, 398, 416-17, 418, 420, 429, 432, 434, 435, 445-46, 447-52, 452-56, 457, 458-59, 461, 464.

938

INDEX

465, 473, 477, 478, 485, 492-93, 49798, 505, 516-18, 530-31, 532-33, 538, 544-46, 548, 550, 553, 574:96, 581:109, 582, 589, 726, 731-32, 736, 749, 779, 787, 792, 813, 823; practical and speculative: 323-24, 326-27, 328-30, 336-37, 339, 381:46, 429-30, 683, 72627, 728-29, 766, 792-801, 804; principle of knowledge: 201, 203, 326-27, 345-52, 545:45; and analogy: 445-46, 447-48, 477, 492-93, 498, 505-06, 513, 516-17, 518, 534, 545-46, 549, 556, 564-65, 618, 820-21; and Christian faith: 407-08, 448-51, 461, 683-84, 724-29, 763, 765-67, 772, 776, 778, 791, 793, 795-98, 813; and God: 346, 349, 352, 357 (81), 368, 395-96, 425, 452, 454-56, 461, 465, 467-68, 485, 495, 516, 517, 518, 527, 531, 533, 53738, 539-40, 544-48, 553, 556, 559, 560, 561-63, 564-66, 567-68, 570, 573-74, 581:109, 582, 585-86 (116), 588, 589, 613, 616 (179), 724-25, 726-27, 743, 749, 763, 766-67, 792, 793, 797; and memory: 397, 727; and philosophy: 408-09, 414, 418, 430, 450-51, 477, 504, 568:84, 582, 600, 611, 618, 683, 734, 736, 772, 787. 798, 800-01, 804, 822-23; and sin: 792, 794-99, 800-01, 804, 818; and the human will: 323-28, 336, 344-45, 352, 461, 683-84, 710-11, 726-30, 766-67, 793-95, 797, 800-01. See: Apprehensian, Comprehension, Disposition, Human body, Human mind, Human reason, Illumination, Judgment, Light (spiritual), Lumen (spiritual), Perception, Perfection, Principle, Rational soul, Science, Senses, Truth, Unity. Human knowledge [Human understanding. Natural knowledge, Natural understanding], abstract and universal: 267-68, 270-71, 273-74, 333, 337, 40102, 404, 523, 524, 544, 688-89; acquired and particular: 347, 349, 357, 367-68, 398, 401-02, 403, 406, 523, 524, 535, 544-45, 560-61, 567; acts and operations of: 221, 234, 302, 321-22, 327-28, 331, 333, 341, 344-47, 348, 349-:i2, 354-55, 357 (81), 362, 367-70, 3 7 1 , 376-79, 380-81, 383, 384-85, 393, 395, 396-97, 401-02, 40s1, 410-12, 430, 432, 444-46, 457-59, 504^ 523, 528, 533, 538, 540-41, 544, 573,

585, 606, 607-08, 615, 618-20, 678-79, 702, 727, 741, 772-73, 779; cause of: 346, 349, 351, 444, 445-46, 452, 493, 503-04, 545:45, 559, 568-69, 573-74, 578, 580, 582, 590, 655, 733:93, 745, 751, 809, 824, (see: Cause); Christ and: 443, 444, 446, 528, 562, 567-70 (84), 612-13 (172), 614, 686, 692, 69 746-50, 787, 810-12, 819, 825, 829 (see: Christ); foundations and principles of: 102-03, 122, 165. 213-14, 232, 268, 273, 326, 327, 347, 351-52, 353, 357, 367-68, 377, 380-81, 384-85, 386. 396-98, 403-04, 408, 413, 419, 422, 432. 447, 450, 452, 474, 477-78, 493, 500, 502-03, 506:122, 518, 524, 527, 534, 537-38 (34), 541, 543, 54546, 547-48, 559, 560, 564, 568-69, 57273, 573-74, 576 (99), 578-79 (104), 582, 613. 614, 691, 726, 732. 745 755, 809, 826-27; nature of: 234, 302, 321-22, 367-69, 377, 378, 386, 396-97, 417-18, 431, 445, 454, 462, 523-25, 568:84, 578, 618, 678-79, 702, 724-25, 728, 730, 749, 752. 792, 819-20; objects of: 146, 204-05, 207, 271, 273, 274, 321, 324, 326, 328, 330, 333, 346-52, 354-55, 357, 367-69, 377-79, 381-83, 386-87, 391, 395, 396-97, 401, 403-04, 409-15, 415-17, 417-18 (129), 428-30, 433-34, 443-46, 449-55, 45859, 464, 467, 472, 475, 480-82, 492-93, 495. 500, 504-06, 507, 516-18, 523, 526, 528-31, 532-33, 535, 537, 540, 542-46, 549-51. 553, 559, 566-69, 57274, 577-79, 582, 585, 590, 600, 60304. 606, 609:164, 612-13, 618-20, 62425, 639, 654, 666. 669, 676, 678, 683 85, 688-91. 700, 726, 730-32, 733-43, 744, 746, 749, 757, 760, 772-73, 788, 790, 792-93, 794, 795-99, 802-03, 80809, 822-23, 825, 826-27, 829-30; potencies of: 221, 321-22, 323, 326, 328 341-42, 352, 362, 378, 606, 740, 792; practical and speculative: 321, 371 399, 406, 410-15, 417:128, 429, 536, 538, 544, 578, 585, 613, 618, 618-25, 656, 667, 669, 683, 685, 729, 752-53, 794-97, 797-99, 802-03, 804, 806, 820; of God, see Knowledge; of principles: 401-02, 413, 417, 450, 523, 534-36, 538, 619-20; of universal 274, 370, ^76:34, 378, 497. See also: Analogy, Assent, Being (Em), Being (Esse), Cer-

INDEX titude, Christian faith, Comprehension, Contemplation, End, Error, Habitual, Habitus, Human intellect (principle of knowledge). Human reason, Illumination, Innate, Intellective, Intellectual, Knowledge, Love, Mode, Order, Perfection, Rational soul, Science, Similitude, Truth, Unity, Universal, Wisdom. Human mind, 211, 267, 331, 349, 367, 400, 404-05, 406, 407, 417, 444, 455, 474, 498, 501-02, 503-04, 562, 581, 593, 609:164, 616, 619, 675, 688-89, 691-93, 699, 703, 725, 739, 746, 805, 814; acts of: 200, 202, 205-06, 337, 354-55, 369, 379-80, 382-83, 386, 398:86, 404-06, 414-17, 447, 453-56, 458, 461, 480-82, 492, 501-02, 504-05, 525, 529-32, 54143, 547, 556, 561-64, 568, 571-81 (109), 590, 622, 665, 691, 736, 746, 747, 748, 749, 822, 826; dispositions of: 382, 399, 556, 688-89, 701; illumination of: 205, 207, 321-22, 330, 346, 415-17 (128), 418 (129), 446, 456, 524-25, 526-51 (34-36), 554, 557, 560-62, 565, 567, 579-81 (109), 590, 601, 615, 618, 665-68, 692, 698, 704, 723, 727, 729, 745, 794, 809, 810, 82 824, 827; perfection of: 206-07, 330, 565, 740; and God: 205-07, 321, 333, 346, 369, 370, 381, 39&, 414-17 (128), 418 (129), 428-29, 431-34, 447, 45358, 459, 467, 468, 480-82, 492, 493, 500:110, 502, 503-05, 512-13, 517, 524-25, 526-33, 535-43 (34-36), 547, 548, 550, 554, 556, 557, 559, 560-62, 562, 563-64, 567, 573-74, 575-81 (109), 582, 586, 589-90 (126), 601, 605, 615, 619, 622, 624, 665-66, 66869, 671-72, 686, 691-93, 698, 701, 74647, 749, 809-10, 820-24, 826-27; and love: 333, 613, 665, 668, 824; and the philosophers: 416, 613, 616, 618, 619, 622; and truth: 205, 207, 321, 347, 367, 370, 382-83, 386-87, 397-98 (86), 404, 405, 409, 414-17 (128). 418, 42829, 431-34, 453-56, 457, 458, 459, 465, 467, 468, 494, 502, 504, 512-13, 517, 525, 526-32, 535-36, 539-43 (3435), 547, 548, 550, 553, 556, 563-64, 575-81 (109), 586, 589, 614, 615, 618, 672, 697, 707, 744, 745, 747, 794, 8 824. See: Image (of God), Judgment, Light (spiritual), Lumen (spiritual), Per-

939

ception. Science. Human nature, see: Man. Human parents, 288-90, 308, 401-02, 617, 753-55, 758-59, 760:149, 792. Human reason [Natural reason |, acts [operations] of: 200-02, 204, 207-08, 221, 224, 295, 302, 321-25, 329-30, 331, 334, 336, 338, 340, 353, 358, 377, 380-81, 386, 396-97, 406, 407:106, 408, 449, 455, 458-59, 464, 477, 481 (77), 495-96, 530, 53o, 563, 567-68, 592-93, 604, 606, 610-11, 615, 619, 622-23, 624-25 (201), 627, 639, 643, 648:248, 666, 671-72, 675-79, 681-82, 696, 703, 721, 722, 727, 729-32, 73337, 741-43 (108), 749, 757, 788, 793, 795, 796-98, 799-800, 803-04, 818; considerations [deliberations j of: 199-201, 328, 331-32, 334-36, 373, 396 408, 536, 696, 801; foundations and potencies of: 203, 205-07, 221, 44 523, 536, 546, 556:64, 590, 601, 618, 634, 740, 772, 788, 795, 798, 800, 82 825:61, 835; nature of: 199, 201, 203:134, 323-24, 325, 326, 327-28, 330-32, 333-34 (31), 335, 336, 350:65, 356, 535, 538, 556:64, 590, 615, 618, 624-25 (201), 648, 732, 772, 795, 79 800, 802, 804, 809, 812-13, 817-20, 820, 828:65; objects of: 201-02, 208, 321, 323-24, 328, 330-32, 334-36, 338, 340, 455, 477, 495, 542, 550, 610-11, 615, 617, 624-25, 668, 671-72, 678-79 682, 734. 738-41, 742-43, 772-73, 775, 779, 787, 791, 795-98, 799-801, 809; perfection of: 201, 204-05, 331, 79 801, 803; principles of: 124, 199, 20 03, 206-07, 380, 386, 397-98, 406, 432 634, 726, 739-40, 832 (74), 835-36 superior and inferior: 199-207, 208, 211, 324-25, 327 (14), 328, 330, 336, 340, 350:65, 413-14, 418:129, 528-29, 536, 542, 544 (43), 546, 569; and the human will: 324-25, 328-29, 336, 340, 726-27, 729-31, 766-67, 793; and the senses: 207, 324, 325, 326, 329-34, 335, 338, 341-42, 344, 373, 801, 805. See: Assent, Certitude, Christian faith. Comprehension, Human intellect, Human knowledge, Illumination, Judgment, Knowledge, Lumen (spiritual), Medium, Order, Revelation, Science, Truth, Unity. Human soul, See: Rational soul.

938

INDEX

Human understanding, see: Human knowledge. Human will, 323 (1), 324 (2), 325-27, 328, 329-30, 333 (26), 334 (31), 335, 336, 340, 344-45, 352, 353, 354-55, 368, 381:46, 382, 386, 387, 396-97, 398, 399, 406, 408, 410, 429-30, 449-50, 461, 471, 475-76, 503, 534, 598, 615, 608-09 (164), 615, 618, 624, 665, 67172, 683, 692, 696-97, 724-25, 726-27, 728-30, 732, 737, 743, 747, 763, 77879, 793, 794-95, 797, 800-01, 802-04, 808-10, 821, 823-24, 830-31, 834 (77). Human words [Speech], 382-83, 387, 391, 408, 478, 553, 686, 692, 735, 747. Humility, 686-97, 692, 697, 701, 789-90 (9), 812, 815:51, 819, 828-35 (69-70, 7273). Hypostasis, 166, 167, 168, 175, 178-80, 182, 185, 194, 222, 230:36, 298-99, 308. Idea, divine: 474, 492-97 (104, 106), 499500, 502, 504-05, 507, 508-09 (125-27), 525, 526, 575, 576 (99), 578-79, 582, 592, 616, 620-21, 622, 623, 626-27, 630, 655; innate: 405, 434 (166), 572:89; and knowledge: 474, 493, 569, 593, 620, 630, 655. Ideal, form: 107, 562; perfection: 494; reasons: 404, 409, 477, 494-96, 507, 748; world: 569. Identity, 145-48, 268, 304-07, 309, 312-16, 575-76, 593. Idolatry [Idols], 458, 617 (184), 618:186, 741-42, 760, 805, 806, 808, 815, 816, 818. Ignorance, 379, 501, 517, 533, 608, 609-10, 614, 624-25, 655, 669, 736, 756, 788, 791, 791-93, 794-98, 801-03, 804, 80809, 813, 818, 819, 821, 823. Illumination, 205, 251, 254-56, 259, 342, 612, 666-68, 727, 745-46, 747, 750, 793, 794; act [action] of: 238, 240, 251, 350; divine, see: Christian faith; theological: 665-68, 677, 682, 723, 749, 751; and corporeal light: 228, 237, 240, 244, 249, 255, 258, 444, 495-96, 524, 532; and corporeal lumen: 251, 255, 256:103, 259; by the agent intellect: 346, 348, 350, 376, 381, 505, 533; of human knowledge: 434:166, 446, 523, 526-51, 560, 560, 570, 745-46, 749-50; of human reason: 201, 204, 407:106, 448-49, 526-51, 560, 590 (127), 590-

91 (128), 610, 615, 624, 665-68, 677, 698, 726, 729, 798, 821:55; of man [human person]: 207, 443, 446, 523-24, 538, 543, 546, 590-91, 601, 619, 665, 749, 825; of philosophical knowledge: 446, 525-26, 601, 613, 61418, 618-25, 656, 726, 738, 745-50, 824; of science: 446, 523, 526-47, 549, 550:56, 551, 614-18, 732, 738, 825; of truth: 523-24, 526, 527-51, 682, 810; of wisdom: 446, 523, 547-51 (56), 61825; of the human intellect: 352, 444-46, 455, 460, 527-51, 559-60, 560, 562, 566-68 (84), 570-72 (89), 574:96, 582, 585-86 (116), 589-90 (126), 727, 79 793, 797-98, 809; of the rational soul: 331, 346, 549, 562, 604-05, 615, 794, 795, 820 (54), 821, 826. See: Body (celestial, terrestrial), Certitude, Human mind, Principle. Image, 257, 341-43, 372-73, 376, 383, 47172, 524, 543, 564, 754, 824; of God: 102 (2), 103, 137 (3), 140, 165:60, 20508, 210:152, 211, 323:1, 326-27 (14), 331-33, 353-54, 370, 390, 415, 418, 431-34, 456, 458, 469, 471-72, 474, 480-82, 499, 536-37, 540, 544, 546, 547:46, 559, 560, 563, 564, 568, 576, 578, 690, 703, 744, 746, 751-53, 75355, 756, 758, 760, 779, 790, 796, 802 804, 807 (33), 812, 820, 824, 825, 827 834, 835 (see: Likeness, (The) Trinity Imagination, 122, 302, 316, 321-22, 329 (18), 331, 332, 333, 334 (31), 335, 341-42, 343, 344, 352, 357 (80), 367 68, 372-73 (23), 376:34, 600, 607-08, 611, 737. See: Senses. Imitation, 469, 474, 492-96, 502-03, 504, 507, 512, 516-18, 564, 589, 667. Immutability [Invariability|, 398, 443-46, 464, 498, 518, 526-27, 536, 541, 545, 592; of truth: 381, 443-46, 453, 455, 464, 467, 504, 507, 527, 529-30, 531, 533, 536, 541, 542, 546, 548, 552-53, 560, 563, 567-68, 576:99, 578, 586, 613. See: God. Immutation, see: Change. Incarnation, 407, 570, 666, 678, 699, 704, 725, 745, 748, 750, 805. See: Christ. Inclination, see: Appetite. Incorruption, 105, 138, 139-40, 227-30, 247 252, 261, 311, 532, 607, 611, 748. Individual, being of the: 106, 172-74, 177, 180-81, 186, 222-23, 224:21, 230:36,

INDEX

941

Inspiration (divine), 564, 566, 570-71. 268-69, 270-73, 293, 295-96, 309, 315Instinct, 328, 336, 833. See: Synderesis. 16, 497; man: 165, 172-74, 176, 186, Instruction, 402-03, 407, 443, 449, 480, 66 192:110, 194, 214, 215, 221-22, 224:21, 669, 702, 721, 725. See: Learning. 226:27, 265, 272-73, 298, 299, 304, Instrument, see: Operation. 308, 309, 607-09, 649, 650-51, 654-55, Intellect, see: God, Human intellect. 745; substance: 146-47, 164-65, 168-69, Intellective, knowledge: 182, 185, 731 (see: 170-71, 172, 174-76, 180, 182:91, 221Medium); operation: 302-03, 355, 35823, 231, 234, 256:103, 267-78, 281, 59; potency: 200, 202, 205-06, 222, 302 292-93, 296, 304, 308, 309, 380, 497. 323, 328-30, 331, 333, 335-36, 341, See: Rational soul (and the individual 344-45, 347, 349, 351, 370, 376, 387, man). 422, 505 (121), 544, 547, 624; prinIndividuation, 107, 143:19, 148, 166, 169ciple: 327; rational soul as: 122-23, 142 82, 185, 186, 194, 198-99, 220, 221208, 215, 284, 302, 362, 501, 547, 608, 22, 231, 256:103, 268-69, 272, 273, 624, 654-55; substance: 123, 145, 50 274-77, 302, 809. See: Rational soul 654-55. (individuation of)Intellectual, agent: 593, 598; creature: 665, Indubitability, see: Certitude. 668, 744; form 745; knowledge: 102, Infallibility, 381, 443-44, 445, 446-47, 517138-39, 203, 376:34, 384-85, 386, 400, 18, 526-27, 536, 541, 545-46, 548, 481, 500, 534, 540:36, 544, 545; life: 562-63, 575:96, 589, 596, 614, 767, 206, 211, 524; lumen: 404, 406; 797, 823, 824. See: Certitude. memory: 325, 332-33, 336, 342, 352. Infinity (Infinite|, and creatures: 634; and 353-55 (78), 356, 362-63, 370, 380, man: 598-99, 607, 621, 638:223, and 397-400, 403-04, 405, 414-15, 422, the rational soul: 598-99, 621, 638:223, 427, 430, 434, 444-45, 447, 455, 464, 642, 648; and the world: 595, 596-99, 481, 503, 536, 581:109, 606, 727, 82 600 (149), 637-38 (223), 640:231, operation: 213-14, 222, 327, 336, 429 641:235, 642-43; of God: 288, 352, 434, 605; rational soul as: 607, 722; reasons: 469, 492, 497, 532, 563, 594, 598, 604, 404, 409, 747-48; substance: 347, 34 634, 679-80, 742:108. 352, 422, 505, 530, 624, 638:223; virInfused, gift: 537, 539-40, 564, 566-67; tues: 617 (183), 727. habitus: 794, 802; illumination: 731; Intelligence, human: 205-06, 321-22, 323:1, knowledge: 398, 443, 535, 560-61, 566324, 325, 327 (14), 330, 331, 333, 334 70 (84)i 691, 704, 749, 821:55 (see: (31), 336, 340, 350:65, 353, 355, 359, Knowledge); law: 690; lumen: 431, 666, 385-86, 390, 410, 415, 448, 481, 503, 668, 671-72, 682, 701, 704, 725; 511, 566, 585, 618, 619, 691, 806, 820, similitudes: 398, 744; species: 399; vir824, 835; separate [celestial]: 346 (60), tues: 398, 608-09, 725, 727, 795-96, 348-49, 357, 416, 524 (5), 561, 604798-99, 801, 821, 825, 831; wisdom: 05, 607-10 (167), 613, 618, 619, 620547-50. Innate, disposition: 398-99; forms: 404-05; 21, 623, 625-26, 626, 628:223, 634-35, 654, 808, 809. See: Image (of God), habitus: 399-400, 400-05, 405-06, 429Intelligible, species, see: Species; word, see: 30, 434:166, 540:36, 556; ideas: 405, 434 (166), 572:89; knowledge: 347, Concept. 349, 370, 400-01, 403-04, 405-06, 428Intention, 493, 577, 685, 747, 748. 34 (166), 456 (21), 458, 459:28, 468, Invariability, see: Immutability. Investigation, 482 (80), 613-14, 671-72, 535, 559, 560, 562:76, 609:164, 792, 688, 696. 697, 775, 805, 806-07, 809, 795, 796; lumen: 402-03, 406, 414, 431, 811, 818, 821. 701; principles: 368, 370, 398-99, 399Irascible, see: Appetite of (the senses). 405, 405-06, 408, 414, 429-30, 586:116, Irradiation, see: Radiation. 614, 691; similitude: 399, 406, 416, Jews, see: Hebrews. 418, 428-31, 540:36, 576:99, 581:109; Judgment, natural seat of: 401-02, 422:140, species: 353-55, 397-98, 399-405, 405429, 505, 556; of God: 666, 668, 690, 06, 429-30, 539:35, 540:36, 606, 608, 699, 789:8, 802, 815, 821; of human 680, 792; truth: 429, 614.

942

INDEX

reason: 205, 324, 332, 338, 355 (78), 413-14, 499, 524, 536-37, 544, 546, 590, 618, 698, 737, 739-40, 797, 798, 800; of the human intellect: 302, 32122, 324-25, 326, 327:14, 328-29, 332. 333, 336, 345, 347, 350-51, 352, 354, 355 (78), 359, 368, 378-81, 388. 389 (62), 395, 401-04, 408, 422:140. 427, 429, 447, 448, 453-55, 464, 492, 527, 545-46 (45), 556, 560, 572, 574-75, 581:109, 589, 792, 793, 795, 798, 80001, 823, 824; of the human mind: 321222, 355 (78), 370, 381-83, 386-87, 398:86, 403-04, 409, 414-15, 422:140, 427, 454-55, 456, 494, 499, 524, 525, 526-27, 529, 531, 536-37, 538-39, 541, 556, 560, 564, 576, 578-79, 581 (109), 582, 586; of the senses: 302, 328-29, 332, 335, 340, 343-44, 355 (78), 37273, 375, 378, 401. Knowledge, philosophical, see: Philosophical; rational: 102, 129, 138-39, 18285, 199. 201. 203-04, 207. 232, 268, 327, 332, 336, 354, 355, 406 (see: Human intellect, practical and speculative, Philosophy, rational, Units'); theological: 665-69, 671-72, 672-78, 678-83, 683-86 (31), 686-90, 692-96, 698-704, 710-11, 714-15, 72021, 729-30, 743-53, 756-60. 779, 781, 790, 807, 811, 813-15, 819-28, 835-36; of God, analogical: 445-46, 447-48, 468, 470, 474-76, 478-82, 484-86 (85), 489-91 (92), 492-98, 498-500 (110), 503-04, 504-06, 507, 546-47, 563-64, 564-65, 576-79 (104), 589, 618:20; human [natural]: 102, 321, 327 (14), 330-31, 333, 334. 336-37, 355, 359, 369, 370, 378, 379-81 (47), 385, 387, 390. 395-96, 409-10, 413-17, 417-18, 425, 427 (148), 428-34 (166), 435, 436:171, 443, 445-46, 447, 451-56, 456-60 (28), 464, 466, 467-68, 477, 499-500, 503-04, 523, 528-29, 535, 537-38 (34), 539-40, 541-43, 550-51, 553, 554, 556 (64), 561-62 (76), 56364, 567-70, 581:109, 582, 586, 589, 600, 608, 613-15, 618-20, 622-25, 63031, 639, 666, 669, 673-74, 681, 685, 700-01, 731-33, 735, 735-43, 751-53, 758-59, 772-73, 775, 787-88, 796, 799800, 808, 809, 812, 820-28 (61-62), 829; infused [Christian]: 407-08, 40910, 417, 427:148, 477. 481 (77), 498-

99, 535, 539-40, 542-43, 548, 561-63, 564, 615, 666-68, 671-72, 673-74, 685, 688, 693, 701, 711, 731-32, 737-39, 742-43, 745, 753, 766-67, 772, 790, 804, 807-08, 820-28 (55), 829; theological: 479:73, 481 (77), 499-500 (110), 503-04, 567, 615, 666, 668, 67172, 672-74, 682-86, 691 (39), 694-95, 700, 711, 715, 737-38, 747, 750-53, 807, 820-28, 829 (see: Beatitude, Contemplation). See aiso: Abstraction, Analogy, Apprehension, Assent, Being (Ens), Christian (philosophy), Comprehension, Concept, Deception, Demonstration, Error, Experience, Evidence, Human knowledge, Idea, Infused, Investigation, Judgment, Mode, Perception, Perfection, Philosophy, Predication, Principle, Scrutiny, Sense knowledge, Species, Speculation, Thinking. Ladder, 381:47, 481 (77), 482:81, 691 (39), 694, 744, 820, 821, 826. Law, 688-89, 803, 817; divine: 685, 749, 755-56, 811, 830, 833; natural: 288-89, 326 (12), 328, 336-37, 402-03, 406-08, 429-30, 458, 609:164, 617, 678, 685. 689, 753. 755-56, 797, 798, 801, 80203, 804, 810. See: Eternal, Learning, 324, 333, 396, 523, 533, 566, 569, 695-99, 755-56, 788, 813-15 (51), 81618, 819, 823, 829. See: Instruction, Study, Teaching. Liber de causis, 158 (48), 335:33, 604-05, 634-35. Liberty of choice, 325-26, 329, 336, 340, 605, 667, 669, 793, 809. See: Freedom of choice. Life, 141, 156, 211, 233, 447-48, 613, 830, 832 (74); act [operation] of: 221, 281, 293, 295; order of: 285, 408, 504, 524, 527, 568, 615, 684-85, 745-50, 751, 756, 801, 802-03, 804, 809, 819, 824; potency of: 285, 299-300, 323, 329, 335; rational: 126-27, 129, 133, 206; unity of: 127-29, 207, 221, 233-34, 291; and the celestial bodies: 291, 604, 606; of God: 262, 566; of man: 296, 406, 408, 412, 414, 428 (150), 536-38. 56263, 608-10 (124), 613, 617, 621, 62223, 624-26, 669, 683, 690-91, 700, 706, 71 i, 732, 735, 743, 745-49, 754, 756, 788, 794, 798-99, 801. 802-03, 804, 805, 810-11, 817, 819-20, 828, 831,

INDEX 833-35; of the animals: 114-16, 232-33, 279-82, 284-85; of the plants: 114-15, 278-79, 283, 285. See: Christian (life), Human body, Intellectual, Principle, Rational soul. Light — (A) corporeal, action of: 112-14, 219 (3), 227, 238-40, 242-44, 248, 25758, 495-96, 501-02, 532, 573, 594; being of: 239-41, 244. 249, 256; embodied: 239-40, 242-45, 253, 256-58, 259-60; nature of: 112-14, 117, 119, 219 (3), 226, 235-48, 252-58, 259-61, 472, 500-02, 512-13; production of: 104, 226, 235, 236-37, 238, 612:107, 680; specific forms of: 244-46, 258-59 (108); and analogy: 241-46, 252-54, 258-59, 261, 447, 471-72; and corporeal matter: 235-36 (49), 237, 252, 255, 256-57, 258-59; and fire: 238, 241-45, 249, 251-56, 260-61; and lumen: 248-49, 251, 253, 256, 258; and substantial forms: 112-14, 119, 242-44, 247, 251, 256 (see here: as a substantial form); and the human body: 120, 130:59, 219:3, 220, 294:211; and the senses: 200, 347, 371:16, 374 (28), 401, 500, 523, 540, 607, 794, 808; as an accidental form: 239-41, 260; as a common and general form: 112-13, 219:3, 235-36, 242, 245-47; as a principle: 113, 239, 240, 241-44, 256, 258, 25960; as a substantial form: 119, 219 (3), 220, 226, 228, 235-48, 249, 252, 254, 256, 258, 259, 260, 294:211, 310:251, 471-72; of the celestial bodies: 200, 219:3, 226-28, 235-48, 252-54, 256-58 (108), 259, 261-62, 264, 266, 281, 310:251, 321, 417, 471-72, 501, 532, 598. See: Body (terrestrial), Darkness, Existence, Illumination, Participation, Perfection, Principle, Plural forms. Power. — (B) spiritual, 236, 239, 347, 401, 429, 430, 444, 448-49, 450, 453, 500-02, 503, 505-06, 512-13, 518, 540, 565, 612:170, 67 f, 680, 749, 794, 811; of God: 262-63, 321, 346, 349, 399, 417, 430, 432, 443, 444, 446, 447. 452-53, 455, 467, 493, 496, 501-02, 504-05, 512, 518, 523-25, 530, 532, 534-36, 538-50, 560-64, 565. 568, 572-74 (96), 581:109, 582, 589, 594, 614, 620, 622-23. 701, 724-25, 823, 827; of the human intellect: 346, 347, 349-50, 385, 398, 444, 502, 505, 512,

943 518, 724-26; of the human mind: 398,

501-02, 512, 532, 536, 540-41, 565.

See: Truth. Likeness, of God: 331, 537, 559, 568, 744, 753, 790, 796, 820, 825-26. See: Image, Similitude. Limitations, 153-55, 164-65, 263-64 (123), 332, 369, 416, 417-18, 455, 545, 561, 823, 833-34; of creatures: 478, 491, 528-29, 833-34; of the human intellect: 352. 357. 369, 545. Logic, 278, 385, 408, 423:143, 612, 615:178, 676-77, 731, 745. See: Philosophy (rational). Logician, 143, 274. Love, act of: 344-45, 354-55, 368, 382, 386, 398, 399, 411, 608, 690, 694, 742-43, 830; inordinate: 613, 667-68, 732, 73334, 805, 810-11, 812 (42); principle of: 368; and knowledge: 382, 408-11, 42930, 683-86, 702:49, 742-43, 746, 749, 817, 831:72; and wisdom: 409-12 (117), 671-72, 683-86, 703, 710-11, 828:65, 829, 831:72; and the human will: 34445, 382, 386, 398, 410, 434, 475, 479, 503, 684, 692, 744, 754, 755, 794, 824, 834:77; and the rational soul: 344, 35455, 429-30, 431, 433, 454, 747-48, 824; of |for| God, infused [Christian]: 410, 417, 427:148, 537, 667, 669, 67172, 677, 682, 684-85, 688-ay, 693, 710, 727-29, 731, 733-34, 742-43, 766, 799, 804, 810, 828:65 (see: Charity); natural: 333, 429, 431, 433-34, 454, 481, 537, 608, 619-20, 671-72, 685, 703, 732, 733-34, 742-43 (110), 788, 799, 823 (58), 834. See also: Human mind, Union.

Lumen — (A), corporeal, 237, 238 (57), 247, 248-56, 257-61, 269, 350, 371:17, 374 (28), 401, 403, 414, 495-96, 523, 525, 561. See: Body (celestial), Light (corporeal). — (B), spiritual, 347, 401, 414, 503, 505, 512-13, 523, 529, 564, 566, 618, 620, 621, 711, 733, 744-45, 745-49, 794, 813; of Christian faith: 449, 461, 559, 624, 665-66, 668, 67172, 682, 688-89, 699, 700-01, 704, 706, 707, 711, 723, 723-25, 729-30, 738, 740, 743, 763, 772, 787, 794, 797, 798, 803-04, 808, 809, 818, 835:36; of God: 330, 402, 404, 431-32, 434, 468, 503, 512, 516-17, 523, 526, 528-29, 530-31, 537-38, 543-46, 556, 561-64, 566, 569,

944

INDEX

573-74, 581-82, 666, 668; of human reason: 408, 414, 453, 465, 468, 523, 525, 526, 556, 559, 665-66, 668, 682, 699, 700-01, 704, 706, 707, 711, 72325, 729-30, 740, 743, 772, 790, 796-97, 798, 803-04, 809, 813, 818-19. 832, 836; of the human intellect: 333, 343, 347, 348, 349-50, 352, 401, 403-04, 406, 430-31, 434, 505, 516-17, 529, 538, 544, 545-46, 556, 567, 572, 574, 585, 586:116, 737, 779; of the human mind: 399-400, 403-04, 406, 504, 517, 526, 529, 540, 744-45; of the rational soul: 333, 336, 348, 349, 352, 399, 40102, 430-31, 432, 505 (121), 512, 564, 566. Luminaries, see: (The) Heavens. Lustre, see: Brilliance. Man, 179, 199, 227-28, 251:88, 300, 308, 805; acts and operations of [human person]: 139, 182, 184-85, 213-15, 222, 227-28, 286, 290, 295, 299, 30103, 331, 335, 341, 351-52, 368-69. 382, 396, 403-04, 405-06, 422, 432, 443, 446, 449-50, 454-55, 457-59 (28), 48182, 492-93, 523-24, 530, 536, 542-43, 546, 547-48, 550, 556:64, 563-64, 566, 590-91 (128), 600, 607, 617-18 (186), 618-20, 639, 666-69, 684, 690, 692, 696, 727-28, 735-37, 741-43, 746-47, 753-55, 758-59, 763, 772, 775, 793, 795-98, 800-02, 807, 809-11, 819-20, 821:55. 826-27, 829-31, 833-34 (77); being of: 165, 173-75, 177, 179, 18182, 186, 199, 222, 224:21, 234, 284, 296, 299, 301, 308, 311, 313-16, 340, 470, 472, 608, 655, 754-56, 830, 831, 833, 835; dignity [nobility] of: 103, 137-38 (5), 751-52, 834; end of: 103, 137, 299-300, 412 (117), 425, 475-76, 620, 624-26, 667-68, 669, 688-89, 69293, 699-700, 706, 709-10, 727, 745, 747. 756, 767, 798-99, 804, 828:65, 831; essence and nature of: 102-03, 120-29, 137-38, 164-65, 167-68, 17273, 176, 179, 183-84, 186, 203:134, 204, 213, 219:4, 221-22, 223-24 (21), 226:27, 230, 232, 234, 265, 272-73, 282-85, 286:186, 289, 290 (199), 29192, 293-94, 295-308, 308-09, 313-16, 321, 324-25, 330, 335, 357, 379-81, 413, 417, 448, 470, 472, 480-81, 531, 537, 539, 559, 561-62, 590, 598, 606, 618, 621, 624-25, 638:223, 642, 643,

654-55, 667, 669, 700, 720, 759, 69192, 799-800, 802, 818, 819-20, 833-35 (77) —see: Nature (fallen); generation of: 121-24, 130, 228, 272-73, 285, 28691 306, 308-09, 316; individuation of: 171-82, 194, 198-99, 220-222, 302, 809; potencies of: 201-02, 284 (181), 302, 303, 321-23, 323-37, 338 (35), 340, 341-55, 356-57 (80), 357-59, 360:88, 362-63, 523, 618, 742, 793, 801-03, 812-13 (see: Potencies of operation); perfection of: 182, 184-85, 221-22, 232, 284 (181), 299, 302-03, 313, 385-86, 428 (150), 608, 624-25 (199), 655, 667, 740, 818, 832-34; personality of: 168-69, 175-76, 179, 18 unity of: 122, 133, 165, 173, 183-84, 186, 194:113, 203:134, 204, 216 (166), 221-22, 223-24, 234, 284 (181), 286:186, 287, 291-92, 297-98, 299, 302-04, 308-09 (250), 310-16, 324-25, 654-55, 749, 809, 833; and corporeal creatures: 103, 109, 127, 129, 137 (1), 279, 283, 299, 308, 324, 328, 692-93, 792, 810-11, 826, 834; and God: 10, 120-21 (38), 129, 137-38, 206-07, 30506, 307, 379-80, 429, 443, 448, 454-55, 471-72, 475-76, 477, 479, 523-24, 536, 547, 560-63, 566, 571, 585, 590 (127), 608-10 (164), 612-13, 617, 619, 624-25, 639, 665-69, 671, 675, 683, 688, 69293, 697, 699, 701, 710-11, 724, 73 739, 741-43 (110), 746, 748-51, 75256, 767, 789, 790, 792, 796, 798-800, 802, 804, 806-08, 810, 812, 820-21, 825 (61), 827-31, 833-35 (77). See also: Adam, Appetite, Being (Ens), Christ (human nature of), Composition, Difference (specific), Existence, Formal, Human body, Image (of God), Individual, Life, Person (human), Rational soul, Resurrexion, Sensitive, Specific form, Substance (corporeal), Substantial form, Union, Virtue. Manifestation, see: Expression. Martyrs, 449, 667. Mathematics, 408-09, 451, 596-97, 612, 615:178, 616:182, 684, 745, 824. See: Philosophy (natural). Matter — (A), essence [nature] of: 111, 119, 133, 140, 143, 145-46, 147-48, 150, 155-56, 158, 162-64, 228-30, 245-47, 285, 313-14, 314-16, 345, 453, 503, 616, 649, 591; potency of: 104-08, 11

INDEX 132, 133, 146-48, 149:30, 154-55, 157, 170, 216 (166-67), 223, 225, 228, 248, 261-62, 266-67, 269, 274, 275, 277, 280, 286:186, 305, 311-16, 482, 634; principle of mutation: 150-51, 154-57, 163, 181:91; proper: 121, 127, 131, 181. 221, 254, 256 (103), 263, 272, 273, 277-78, 279, 283, 297-98, 304-05, 308, 309, 310-11, 599, 606, 608, 833; unity of: 105:8, 111, 145-49, 157-58, 220, 228-30, 245, 314-16; and substance: 141, 145-48, 155-56, 162, 170, 220-21, 310-16, 648; and substantial form: 119, 148-49, 154-55, 229, 26263, 311-16 (see: Form, God). See also: Abstraction, Act, Being (Ens), i.e. in potency, Being (Esse), Difference, Existence (foundation and principle of), Existing (principle of, stability of), Genus, Privation, Time. Union. — (B), corporeal, active potency of: 106-09, 111, 119, 203, 267, 270/275-76, 279, 282, 289, 294, 311, 747-48 (see: Seminal reasons); creation of: 103-04 (4), 109, 111, 119, 224, 647; dispositions of: 103, 106, 108-09, 111, 133, 150, 222-23, 225, 245, 258, 26162, 266-67, 276-77, 281-82, 284, 285, 290-91, 294, 301, 307, 311-13, 315; essence [nature | of: 103, 104-06, 108, 112, 133, 222, 224-30, 237, 245-47, 248, 254, 256-57, 276, 280, 285, 29293, 294, 314, 501, 517, 591-92, 606-07, 616 (180); eternity of: 594-95, 599, 60304, 616; and corruption: 147, 156, 229, 305-07; and generation: 141, 147, 150, 287-88, 294; and mutability: 105:6, 105:8, 140, 143-44, 145, 150, 163; and substantial form: 103-09, 111, 117-18, 119, 220, 222, 224-35, 235-37, 237, 241, 245-47, 248, 251-52, 254, 255, 261-63, 266, 276-77, 281, 285, 290-91, 293-94, 306, 308-09, 311-16, 591-94, 594-95, 599, 748 (see: Plural forms); as individuated: 272-77, 285, 311, 315. See also: Appetite, Corporeity, Existence, Extension, Light (corporeal), Perfection, Privation, Rational soul, Time, — (C), spiritual, 139-40, 14145, 148-50, 155-56, 162, 171, 174 (79), 213, 311, 314-16, 647. See: Angel, Rational soul (composition of). Meaning, see: Definition. Medium, 151, 133, 249-51, 270, 275, 311-

945

13, 496, 443, 579-81 (109), 622, 748 49; between body and soul in man: 133, 164, 218, 219:3, 223 (19), 285, 290, 299-300, 301, 303, 306-07, 311-13, 314:257, 315, 328, 748; between creature and Creator: 129, 151-53, 36970, 542, 579-81, 683, 692, 694; between God and the human mind: 41516, 447, 579-81 (109); between human reason [human intellect] and the senses: 329 (18), 335-36, 337-38, 343, 348-49, 350, 352, 355, 357, 367-68, 400-02, 405-06, 414, 432. 498, 539:35, 540; matter as a: 143, 150, 155, 158: and creation: 150-56, 492-93, 498, 577-78, 597 (142), 602-05, 634-35, 746, 750; of intellective knowledge: 341, 368-69, 370, 376, 381-85, 389, 399-400, 40204, 413, 452, 492-93, 529-31, 560, 57274 (96), 578-82, 612-13, 614, 618-20, 683, 745; of sense knowledge: 342-43, 371-73, 746. See: Christ. Meekness, 480, 754-55. Memory, 321, 323:1, 328-29 (18), 333, 335, 336, 338, 342, 349, 352, 353-54, 355, 362, 370, 373, 376:34, 396, 401, 523, 569, 572 (see: Senses). See also: Intellectual (memory). Mental word, see Concept. Mercy, 753-54, 759-60 (149), 789, 802, 807. Merit, 537, 539, 624, 671, 676-78, 684, 703, 721, 726-28, 729, 735-36, 759, 766-67, 772, 788, 793-94, 795, 796, 797, 799 (22), 802, 803, 804, 809. See: Reward. Metaphysician, 143, 147, 148, 157, 158:46, 268-70, 274, 571, 612-14, 626. Metaphysics, 278, 408-09, 425, 451, 61214, 615:178, 616, 745, 808, 824. See: Philosophy (natural). Mind, see: God, Human mind. Miracles, 667, 725, 815. Mirror, 254, 384, 443, 445, 481-82 (77, 81), 491:92, 492, 503, 504-05, 543, 564, 579, 618-19, 688, 691, 694, 788, 820-21. Mistake, see: Error. Mode, substantial: 166-68, 171, 185, 265-66; of accident: 250, 259; of action (operation |: 327, 334, 336, 340, 342, 356-57, 622, 667-68, 669, 745-46, 766; of being: 249, 277, 283:175, 285, 286:186, 306, 309; of conformity: 38385, 830; of existence: 166-68, 185, 191, 199; of existing: 156, 179, 191, 250-51,

946

INDEX

259; of generation [production): 269, 289-90; of knowledge: 1,85, 322, 327, 334, 356-57, 367-70, 378-79, 403, 40809 (108), 412-15, 417-18, 427, 436:171, 449-50, 462, 484-85, 679, 689, 692-93, 700, 702-03, 823 (see: Analogy, Habitual); of life: 622, 822 (74); of procedure: 675-83, 688-89, 696-99, 718:70, 720-21, 722-23, 729-32, 734-41, 743, 743-44, 751-53, 756-60, 772, 787, 790, 797, 799-800, 803-04, 813-15 (51), 815-17, 825, 828; of quality: 169. See also: Union. Moon, see: (The) Heavens. Moral [Practical |, action [human]: 139, 326, 336, 382, 402-03, 408, 429-30, 454, 530-31, 536, 622, 667-69, 684-85, 690, 692-93, 727, 745, 749, 753-55, 793, 794, 797-99, 800-03, 819, 829, 834; good [goodness]: 409, 429-30, 683-86, 727, 747, 794; life: 406, 562-63, 700, 749, 798, 801-04, 810, 819-20; order: 330, 336, 340, 398:86, 411, 417:128, 422:140, 453-54, 455, 626, 667-68, 669, 684-85, 727-28, 749, 794-95, 797-99, 803-04, 829, 834:77; science, see: Conscience; truth: 326:12, 329-30, 402-03, 408, 417:128, 422:140, 429-30, 453-54, 455, 690, 729, 742-43, 752-53, 759 (148), 792, 794-95, 797-98, 803-04. See also: Life (order of), Philosophy (moral), Virtue (moral). Movement [Motion, Mover], 105:8, 115-16, 128-29, 146-47 (25), 149-52, 157, 220, 224, 226, 228, 253, 288, 290, 293, 303, 308, 338:35, 409, 414, 453, 599, 602, 605, 609-10 (166), 618-19, 621, 643, 654, 757-58, 809; and creation: 150-51, 594-95, 596-97 (141), 598-600, 601-02 (153), 619, 623, 625, 631, 637, 643, 648; and knowledge: 321, 330, 331, 333, 345, 371 (17), 380, 382, 386, 395, 396, 407-09, 414, 428, 449-50, 453, 461, 533, 538, 541, 547, 549, 559, 57374 (96), 581, 582, 585, 618-19, 666-67, 668, 675, 684, 734, 743, 747, 767, 772. Multiformity, 129, 221, 223, 226-28, 23435, 245, 264 (123), 270, 271, 274, 282, 291, 299-300, 303, 692-94, 696, 701. Mutability, 105:8, 140, 143-45, 150, 163, 409, 443-46, 453, 455, 467, 479, 498, 526-27, 531, 536, 552-53, 563, 589, 592, 599-600, 648, 821, 823. See: Change.

Mutation, 141, 150-55, 156-57, 163, 181:91, 288, 290, 293, 308, 445, 602, 606, 648. See: Change. Mystery, 498-99, 564, 693, 701, 704, 817, 827. Mystical, contemplation: 330, 333, 504, 826; senses of Scripture: 688-89, 692-93, 695-97, 698, 701, 717:70, 720, 745, 750 (121), 814-15; theology: 479:73; wisdom: 828:65. Name(s), 369, 469-70, 472, 477-80, 575, 790, 791, 828, 832, 839. See: Definition, God. Natural, see: Agent, Connatural (power), Form, Human knowledge, Human reason, Judgment, Mode (of generation), Operation, Philosophy (natural), Power, Principle (natural), Properties, Union. Nature, 111, 138, 162, 269, 270, 275, 286, 296-99, 308-09, 627, 715, 721, 742; completion of: 138, 175, 199; constitution of: 141, 265-66, 471-72, 833; fallen: 537, 539, 624-25, 697, 792-95, 799-800, 802, 813, 818, 819-20, 835; human, see: Man; order of: 104, 111, 162, 170, 173, 183-84, 203, 270-74, 276, 278, 280-81, 283, 286:186, 290:199, 306, 307, 308, 411-12, 535, 539, 550, 560, 567, 580, 590, 603, 60809, 627, 682, 724-25, 742-43, 792, 7 797-98, 802-03, 804, 818, 822, 825; power of: 266, 277, 279-80, 287-88, 289, 308, 695, 724; priority of: 104, 126, 152, 154-55, 162-63, 168, 270, 682; and end: 103, 137, 273, 277, 41112, 609, 624, 684, 821; and union: 265-66, 297-99, 470, 472, 741. See also: Appetite, Composition (in creatures, of form and matter), Essence (common nature), Generation, Good, Individual (substance), Natural, Operation (natural). Principle (of operation). Similarity, Time, Union. Necessity, 381, 386-87, 389, 404-06, 443-46, 453, 455-56, 504, 518, 526-27, 53233, 535-36, 538-39, 541, 543, 546, 54 48, 553, 560, 560, 562, 567, 573, 576:99, 581, 586, 590, 597-98, 600, 609 (166), 621, 634, 638:39, 639, 643, 647, 675, 677, 681, 699, 703, 705-06, 720, 732, 734-39, 740, 741-42, 749, 753, 760, 773, 775, 779, 787, 789-91, 793, 795-96, 798, 801, 802-03, 804,

INDEX

947

809, 814-15, 817, 828:65. Order, 269-71, 410, 411-14, 417 (128), 425, Nescience, 792, 793, 794, 795-96, 797, 799, 431, 469, 497:106, 572, 580, 592, 59798 (142), 667-68, 669, 673-74, 684, 802-03, 813. Neighbour, 402, 667, 671-72, 703, 743, 753690-91 (38), 727-28, 752, 800, 824, 55, 789-90, 826, 829-31, 833-34. 834:77; practical, see: Moral; Nobility, 130, 175, 178, 204, 238, 239-40, speculative: 417:128, 450, 452-53, 455, 241, 479-80, 497:106, 580. 592, 666, 626, 684-85, 794-95, 804, 829; 707, 742; of, being: 112, 238-41, 367; theological: 673-74, 678-79, 682, 68486, 694-95, 700-01, 704, 710-11, 71 bodies and the elements: 120, 238-45, 247, 257, 259, 291, 299, 302, 459, 618; 15, 721, 722-23, 745, 747-50, 787, 814 certitude: 500, 502, 504, 506:122, 726, 16, 819, 824-25, 828; of being: 162, 303 729; corporeal light: 238-40, 242, 245, of causality: 409, 425, 428, 565, 58 246-48, 257, 260; knowledge: 369, 433, 592, 597-98, 804; of Christian faith: 444, 451-52, 536, 541-43, 567, 570794, 828, 836; of forms: 103, 112-13, 71, 615, 731, 736, 752; science: 239, 170, 269-71, 275-78, 283, 300-01; of 451, 460; substantial forms: 238-39, grace: 535, 539, 560, 567, 570, 61 247-48, 277, 279, 283, 290; theology: 803; of knowledge: 173, 270, 274, 278 451-52, 463, 567, 570-71, 615, 711, 412, 425, 576, 590, 604, 829; of 726, 752, 763; truth: 385, 433, 499-500, operation: 203; of perfection: 184, 412, 742; the rational soul: 103, 126, 137-38, 565; of production (and generation) 171, 175-76, 228, 286:186, 301, 580, 103, 112-13, 270-71, 275-78, 283, 29 606-07, 808. See: Dignity, Man (dignity 307, 604; of reason: 324-25, 539, 56 of revelation: 539; of substance: 146-47, of). 154-55, 173. See: Life, Nature, Time. Ot-idience, 665, 724-25, 726-27, 729, 761, Organization, form of: 219:2-4, 288-90; 763, 819. principle of: 206, 234, 294; of the Obligation [Duty], 429, 617, 665-66, 672, animal body: 115-17, 279-80, 284, 30 698, 702, 753-54, 756, 759, 793, 805, of the human body: 120:38, 123-24, 807, 818, 829-30, 831. 126, 128-29, 206, 279, 284, 286-87, Obscurity, see: Darkness. 288-91, 294 (211), 299-300, 308; of the Ontologism, 543:42. inanimate body: 226, 233, 234, 27 Operation, instrument of: 239-40, 592; 308. natural: 267, 269-71, 273, 275, 277, 279, 287-89, 290, 308, 369, 537, 560, Organs of, the animal: 115-16, 183, 234-35, 282; the human body: 115, 128-29, 19 568, 609, 800 (see: Connatural); potencies of: 128, 164-65, 221, 308, 321-22, 203-04, 206, 221-22, 291, 293, 299323-27, 338 (35), 340, 341-45 (see: 303, 325, 341-42, 344, 357, 370; the senses: 115-16, 182-84, 204, 213, 341Potencies of operation); principles of: 44, 347, 353, 355, 370-73, 375-76, 611, 138, 182, 185:99, 192:110, 213-14, 216 654, 823. (166), 222, 234, 273, 275, 281-82, 288, 429-30, 567, 667, 742 (and the rational Paradise, 613, 817. See: Fruit. Parents, see: Human parents. soul: 109, 126, 141-42, 149:30, 165, Paris, see: University. 184, 206, 211, 213-14, 222, 301-03); of creatures: 531, 537, 539-40 (36), 562, Parts, composition form: 262-63, 284, 28 411-12. 673-74: constitutive: 297, 37 565-66, 580, 821-22, 833. See also: Act, 673-74; form of (the part): 268, 270, Action, Body, Christian faith, Human 275-76. 292, 294-95; formal: 287; intellect, Human knowledge, Human reason, Intellective, Intellectual, Life, material: 287, 315; organic (human body]: 289-91, 293-94 (211), 294, 301Man, Mode, Order, Rational soul, Sen02 (231), 304-06, 727 (see: Organs); ses, Substantial form. Unity. and substance: 262-63, 286, 294; of Opinion [Conjecture, Human belief], 396, 408, 443, 451, 591, 604-05, 621, 654human nature: 325, 335. See also: Dif 55, 679, 681-82, 730-31, 741-42, 757ference, Formal (part of man). Participation, 133-34, 141, 146, 156, 20 58, 772, 788, 803, 806, 808, 809, 207, 241, 259, 261, 278, 293, 295, 30 812:42, 816, 819.

948

INDEX

325, 355, 383-84, 446, 469, 472-73, 485, 493, 501, 517, 525, 541, 547-48, 549 (51), 553, 573-74 (96), 581, 589, 667, 669, 674, 726; analogical: 241-45, 252-54, 259, 261, 472-75, 485, 517-18; in being: 112, 156, 432, 574; in corporeal light: 113-14, 238-41, 243-45, 247, 252-54, 261, 471, 472. See: Doctrinal character, Historical aspects (i.e. bold face numbers, in both instances). Peace, 433, 624, 710, 812, 820, 821, 826, 828:65. Penalty, 792-93, 794-96, 797, 798-99, 804, 818, 821. Perception, sense: 322, 325, 331-32, 334-35, 338, 342-43, 357, 369, 371-73, 375, 561, 746, 822-23; of intelligence: 327, 330, 334, 355, 561, 563, 733; of the human intellect: 327, 330, 332, 334, 381, 453, 458, 530, 538, 561, 563, 732, 735-36, 824; of the human mind: 41415, 417-18, 425, 428, 447, 448, 530, 536, 540-41, 546-47, 556, 561, 563, 752. Perfection, accidental: 184, 547; evangelical: 828-33 (70); order of: 183 84, 565, 619; principles of: 12223, 127, 184, 185:99, 199, 201-03, 206, 221-22, 233, 241, 243, 302-03, 328, 331, 494, 589, 608; substantial: 106, 111, 169, 171, 184, 241, 314; uniform: 674; in being: 222, 647; of bodies: 114-15, 128, 227, 231-34, 241-42, 24546, 248, 257-58, 279; of corporeal light: 242-44, 246, 252; of corporeal matter: 103-05, 111, 222, 237, 248, 256:103, 266, 313, 603; of creatures: 475-76, 478, 481, 489-91, 494-95, 505, 518, 565, 589, 592, 674, 695, 833; of God: 475-76, 477-79, 482, 489-91, 493-95, 497:104, 503, 509, 518, 527, 598, 599-600, 749, 827; of knowledge: 207, 368-69 (5), 396, 409, 414-15, 419, 451, 464, 548, 685-86, 710, 711, 730, 733, 736, 741, 745, 797, 815; 818; of love: 686-86, 710; of science: 451-52, 544, 683, 733, 739-41, 770:176, 773, 791, 797, 803; of seminal reasons: 108-09, 111, 256-57, 280; of substantial form: 105, 113, 222, 224-25 (22), 246 47, 256-57; of the human intellect: 205, 326, 331, 336, 351, 400, 428 (150), 445, 518, 683, 685, 727, 738, 740, 791, 793-94, 795, 796-98,

804; of the human potencies: 324, 331, 344, 471; of the human will: 685, 793-94, 795, 801, 803, 804; of the rational soul: 204-05, 208, 222, 300, 331, 346, 349-50, 352, 548-49, 605, 793-94, 826. See: Body, Christian faith, Human body, Human mind. Human reason, Man, Substance, Theology. Person, angelic: 168-70, 198-99; divine: 16568, 175, 181, 185, 191, 742, (see: (The) Trinity); human: 120:38, 139, 165-68, 171-85, 186, 193-94 (112-13), 199, 202-03, 204-07, 213-15, 216 (166), 220, 222, 227-28, 232, 324, 335, 35152, 403-04, 405, 471-72, 607-08, 618, 619-20, 654-55, 805 (see: Man); and the rational soul: 167, 174-76 (85), 180, 185-86, 816. See also: Christ, Definition, Existing. Personality, 168-70, 175-78, 179, 182, 186, 194. Phantasia, 328, 329 (18), 331-32, 334 (31), 335, 343, 357 (80), 373. See: Common (sense). Phantasm, 334 (31), 341-42, 343, 346-52, 357, 358-59, 363, 372-73, 376, 387, 389 (62), 397-98, 416, 537, 562-63, 569, 607, 825, 826-27. Philosophers and, beatitude: 412:117, 611, 618, 623-25 (198), 799, 801; certitude: 449-50, 498-500, 502, 504, 525-26, 546, 547, 570-71, 624, 798; Christ: 799; Christian faith: 499-500, 568, 571 (88), 609-10, 611, 624-25, 669, 728, 732, 734-35, 735-42, 756-59, 787, 791, 796-97, 798-800, 808-09, 811, 813, 814-15; creation: 591-95, 604-05, 611, 613-14, 616. 799-800; freedom of choice: 801. 802-03; God: 499-500, 502, 503-04, 528, 564, 567-68, 570, 582, 591, 599, 611, 616, 617 (184), 619, 620-26, 656, 731, 732, 735-42, 758, 799-800, 802-03, 807, 812, 813:46; illumination: 570, 590 (127), 601, 613-14, 618, 623-25, 656; matter: 147, 157, 591-92, 594-95, 599, 616; original sin: 324, 624-25, 799-800, 802-03, 813; revelation: 610, 721; truth: 499-500, 504, 571 (88), 591, 611-12, 614, 617-18, 623-25, 728-29, 732-42, 756-59, 775. 796-97, 798-804, 809, 818; wisdom: 409-10, 568-71, 614-15, 618-26; the celestial bodies: 238, 249, 252, 261, 618-19, 757-58; the eternity

INDEX

of the world 594-603, 611, 613-14, 616; the natural law: 617, 801, 802-03; the rational soul: 499, 604-06 (159), 611, 616, 621-25; the Trinity: 499-500, 612-13, 735-37; the virtues: 617, 620, 622-23 (198), 624-25 (201), 759 (148), 798-99, 802-03. See: Error, Christian (philosopher), Definition, Ethician, Human mind, Logician, Metaphysician, Physicist, Science. Philosophical, see: Error, Illumination, Investigation, Science, Wisdom. See also: Experience, Human knowledge, Philosophers, Philosophy. Philosophy, certitude of: 449-50, 498-500, 502, 504, 525-26, 590-91, 593, 614, 682, 726, 728, 729, 735, 738-39, 74041; conclusions of: 414, 700-01, 711, 722, 738-39, 740, 791; considerations of: 274, 613, 691, 711, 738, 803-04, 828; moral 326:12, 408-09, 413-14, 430, 499, 503-04, 614-15 (178), 617 (183), 618 (186), 744:112, 745, 74849, 751, 760, 787, 798-800, 802-03, 804, 808, 810, 814:48, 824 (see: Ethics, Politics); natural: 408-09, 413-14, 499, 503-04, 564, 614-15 (178), 617:182, 745, 747-48, 751, 804, 808, 824 (see: Mathematics, Metaphysics, Physics); nature of: 406, 618, 701, 738-39, 740, 751, 790-91, 805, 806, 807-09, 816-17, 819-20, 831:72, 832 (74), 835-36; objects of: 408-09, 413-15, 451-52, 463, 477, 482, 494, 499-500, 503-04, 61215, 616 (181), 617, 682, 690, 691, 694, 700-01, 706, 711, 726, 729-30, 731-42, 744-45, 747-52, 757, 796, 798, 803-04, 824, 828; principles of: 408, 504, 505, 726, 738, 740, 790, 822, 824; rational: 408-09, 413, 423:143, 499, 503-04, 614-15 (178), 745, 747, 751, 760, 804, 808, 812, 824 (see: Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric); and analogy: 481:77, 482 (81), 499-500, 503-04; and Christ: 612 13 (172); and Christian faith: 606:160, 609-10, 611, 624-25 (201), 625, 639, 669, 671-72, 674, 678-83, 685, 691, 694-95, 700-02 (47), 703 (50), 706, 711, 721, 722-23, 723, 726, 728-30, 732-42, 742-43, 743-53, 75760, 772, 778-79, 790-91, 796-97, 80204, 805-07, 807-10, 811, 816-17, 81720, 821-28, 832, 835-36; and God: 409, 413-15, 417-18, 482, 568:84, 582,

949

594:136, 600, 616 (181), 623, 700, 749, 758-60, 772, 807-10, 812, 819-20; and revelation: 610, 756-59; and Scripture: 679, 682, 689-90, 691, 694-96, 728, 739-40, 745-51, 757-59, 788-89, 790, 861, 805, 806 (32), 808, 810-11, 813-15, 816-17, 817, 818-19, 822-23, 827; and truth: 603, 608-11 (164), 679, 690, 706, 721, 722-23, 729-30, 732-42 (108), 775, 778-79, 787, 796-97, 80304, 806-10, 816-18, 831:72, 835; and the Christian: 449-50, 609:166, 624, 669, 671-72, 701, 728, 735-42, 758-59, 779, 788, 791, 799, 803-04, 808-09, 811-19, 824-25; and the eternity of the world: 596-601, 603, 639, 648:248. See also: Christian (philosophy), Error, Illumination, Natural, Science, Theology, Wisdom. Physicist [Natural philosopher], 147, 268-69, 613, 623, 625-26, 743:110. Physics, 408-09, 612, 615:178, 617:182, 671:2, 745, 808, 824. See: Philosophy (natural). Piety fDevotion), 409-10, 611 (169), 616 (181), 617, 666, 668-69, 671-72, 68182, 686:31, 696, 701-02, 728, 729, 730, 748, 753, 753-60 (136, 149-50), 77980, 781, 799, 807 (33), 808, 811, 812 (42), 813:46, 816, 818, 818-20. Place [Position], 146, 170-71, 181, 183-84, 224, 234, 245-46, 249, 258:108, 261, 292, 332, 355, 422:140, 598, 754, 823. Planets, see: (The) Heavens. Plants, 113, 114-15, 227-28, 232-33, 234, 265, 275, 278-79, 281, 282-83, 285, 300, 308, 591. Plural forms, problem of: 121-24, 131:62, 133:67, 148, 169-71, 174:79, 219-24, 309. (A) — All bodies, 224-35 [being and matter: 228-30; celestial and terrestrial bodies: 226-28; corporeal matter: 224-25; uniformity of corporeal substances: 228-351J. (B)—Inaninmate bodies, 235-78 [celestial bodies: 235-48, 251-54; corporeal light: 235-61; fire: 251-56; lumen: 248-56; mineral and mixed bodies: 261^78 (their nature: 261-67, 277-78); seminal reasons and individual bodies: 267-78; terrestrial bodies: 235-45, 256-581]. (C) — Animate bodies, 278-309 [animals* and sensitive life: 279-82; composition and nature of the human

950 body: 295-308; generation and formation of the human body: 291-95; nature of man: 308-09; plants and vegetative life: 278-79; seminal reasons and the formation of bodies: 282-91], (D) — Relation of body and soul in man, 310-16 [act and potency: 312-16; composition of the rational soul: 31216; form and matter: 310-16; unity of matter: 314-16]. (E) — Conclusion, 259-61, 316-19 [doctrinal: 316-18; historical: 318-19]. See: Body, Form, Light (corporeal), Matter (corporeal), Rational soul. Substantial form (esp. of man. unity of). Politics, 612, 616:178, 617-18 (186), 671:2, 745, 810-11. See: Philosophy (moral). Position, see: Place. Potency |Possibility], 107, 164-65, 270-71 (145), 274, 293, 316, 606; abstractive: 341-43, 346-48, 350-52, 355, 359-60, 371-73, 375-76, 376; active: 106-09, 183, 203, 213, 267, 270, 275-76, 279, 286:186, 288-89, 312-13, 341-44, 345, 349, 359-60, 368, 371-73, 375-76, 565, 723-25 (see: Matter, corporeal); obediential: 107, 289, 352, 724-25; passive: 142, 145, 183, 213, 261, 286:186, 288, 341-44, 345-46, 349, 351, 359, 368, 375-76, 593, 723-25; receptive: 327:14, 343, 346-48, 350-52, 354, 359-60, 362, 371-73, 375-76, 376; and act: 108-09, 132-33, 143, 149 (30), 155, 162, 216, (166-76), 222-23, 230, 248, 263, 266-67, 270-71 (145), 275, 276, 280, 282-83 (175), 285, 289, 31216, 329, 345, 349, 398-99, 404, 445, 502-03, 505, 517, 532-33, 565, 566, 573, 593, 598, 616 (181), 618, 638, 649, 650. 654, 724-25; of creatures: 303, 479, 495, 724, 821. See: Being (Era), Life, Matter, Potencies of operation. Priority, Seminal reasons. Potencies of operation, see: Difference, Habitual, Human intellect, Human knowledge, Human mind, Human reason, Human will, Intellectual (memory), Man, Operation, Power, Rational soul, Senses, Sensuality, Subject, Unity, Vegetative. Poverty, 617:183, 810. Power of, being: 242, 244; corporeal light: 219:3, 227, 238, 248, 258, 266; corporeal lumen: 249, 251-56, 258-59, 269;

INDEX creatures: 303, 352, 408-09, 468, 524, 566, 579-81, 598, 833; fire: 249, 251, 254, 259. 261; generation [i.e. active, formative, generative (force), productive, seminal (force), specifying]: 115, 119, 131, 273, 279, 280, 282, 285, 28687, 288, 289, 290, 294, 308; seminal reasons: 287-88; substance [substantial]: 219:3, 249, 251, 253-54, 258-59, 261; the elements: 115-16, 119, 247, 280. See: Body (celestial), God, Judgment (natural seat of), Nature, Potency. Practical, see: Habitus, Human intellect, Human knowledge, Moral. Precept, 690, 694, 696, 749, 830, 831. Predication, 173, 268, 272-74, 378-79, 457, 458, 460, 470, 471-73, 484, 490, 572, 575-76, 603; analogical: 470, 471-73, 478-81, 484, 490, 501-02, 512. Prepositions, 575-79, 602-03. Pride, 681, 698, 746, 758, 789-90, 799, 808, 810, 813, 814, 818, 833-34. Principle, 105, 133-34, 147, 152, 154, 156, 163, 168-70, 182, 229, 236, 245, 259, 263, 330, 470, 603, 685, 703, 745; active: 141-42, 144, 213, 256, 276, 72324; actual: 144, 149-50, 156 (43), 162, 223, 263, 314-15; component [constitutive]: 262-63, 265-66, 284, 286, 292-96, 297-99, 302, 304-05, 309, 31316, 593, 672-73, 800, 833; efficient: 108, 148, 155, 288, 573; essential: 17071, 262-63, 293-94, 377-78, 380, 409; first: 263, 293, 308, 332-33, 336, 355, 370, 380, 397-98 (86), 402-04, 406, 415, 419, 421-22, 427-28, 429-30, 450, 464, 468, 504-05, 517, 523, 539:35, 546, 556, 559-60, 560, 574:96, 586:116, 589, 597 (142), 603, 614, 630, 666, 695, 697, 701, 711, 726, 740. 741, 742:108 (see: God); material: 108, 123, 141-44, 150-51, 153, 169, 174 (79), 199, 250-51, 288-89, 290, 294-95, 29798, 304-05, 309, 346, 348-49, 351, 447, 592-93, 604, 674; mediating: 133, 164, 311, 602-05; natural: 126, 262-63, 265-66, 305, 341, 540, 565-66, 745, 803: original: 108, 250-51, 612-13; passive [possible, potential |: 144-45, 148-50, 156 (43), 162, 213, 223, 263, 276, 313-16, 604, 634, 723-24; preexisting: 591, 619, 627; productive: 592-93, 611, 829; radical: 672-73, 683, 715; substantial: 113, 122-24, 129,

INDEX 169-71, 180-81, 184, 213, 240, 245, 259-60, 284, 296, 304-05, 649; universal: 347, 349, 357, 403, 420, 455, 576:99; of action: 109, 240, 258; of brilliance, and colour: 113, 239-41, 257-60; of corporeal light: 240, 244, 251, 254, 256; of distinction: 236, 259, 315-16, 340, 387, 727, 809; of form: 108, 148, 155; of generation: 141, 147, 150, 226:27, 272-73, 279, 287, 328; of illumination: 240-41, 245, 256:103; of individuation: 169-71, 809 (see: Formal); of intellectual knowledge: 203, 327, 351-52, 685, 728, 741, 772, 835 (see: Human intellect); of life: 115-16, 124, 140, 142, 156, 207, 221-22, 23233, 279-81, 285, 291, 299, 810; of lumen: 248-50, 253, 258-59, 261; of merit: 726-28, 736, 766, 794, 795, 801, 803; of movement [motion]: 105:8, 115-16, 128-29, 146-47, 157, 294, 414; of mutability: 105:6, 105:8, 143-44, 150-51, 163, 559; of rational knowledge: 199, 201, 203, 268, 332, 336; of reception: 105, 144, 276, 287, 302, 311, 314; of sense knowledge: 203, 233-34, 328, 329 (see: Senses); of the human intellect: 156:43, 174:79, 202-03, 205-06, 213, 406, 549, 585; of the natural law: 336, 801, 804; of the rational soul: 125-26 (52), 141-42, 148-50, 156 (43), 162, 348, 391, 566-67 (see: Rational soul). See also: Act, Being (Esse), Christian faith, Eternal, Existence, Existing, Habitus, Human reason, Innate, Intellective, Light (corporeal), Love, Matter, Operation, Organization, Perfection, Philosophy, Potencies of operation, Science, Substance, Substantial form, Theology, Truth, Unity. Priority, 155, 238-41, 457, 459; and posteriority: 146, 241-42, 271, 278, 369, 471, 473, 478-80, 485, 491, 497:106, 501, 528, 619, 754-55, 814-15; of cause: 369-70, 474, 592; of forms: 27172, 274, 278. See: Nature, Time. Privation, 237 (57), 256, 263, 294, 296, 405, 497:104, 503, 667, 791, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797; and matter: 105, 142-43, 146, 150, 315, 316. Probability, 675, 677-78, 703, 730-31, 732, 738, 757, 760, 772. Proof, see: Demonstration.

951

Properties, accidental: 152, 168-69; natural: 125, 252-54, 296, 468, 476-80, 491, 614, 668; of bodies and the elements: 251-54, 256, 259, 261, 335, 342-43, 357, 371-74, 472, 563-64, 751, 822; of individuation: 166, 185; of person and personality: 168-69, 174-75, 182, 498; of substances [substantial]: 114 (24), 146-47, 168, 169, 180, 182, 237-38, 246; of the angel: 143-44; of the rational soul: 125-26, 164, 176, 218, 300-01, 727, 752. See: Qualities. Prophets, 538, 564, 671, 679, 690, 692, 727, 758, 789, 813. Proportion, 378, 381, 384, 404-05, 431, 451, 469, 473, 476-77, 482, 548, 579, 748, 822-23; analogical: 448:4, 469-70, 47273, 474-77, 484-86 (85), 490-91, 494, 501-02, 507, 512, 517, 754-55. Propositions, see: Demonstration. Providence, see: God. Purpose, see: End. Putrefaction, 279-81. Qualities, active and passive [substantial]: 239, 245-46, 254, 259, 261; alterating: 247, 266; essential: 468; sensible: 25051, 254, 257, 259, 261, 332; spiritual: 548, 751-52; of bodies: 239-41, 248-52, 254, 258-61, 286, 294:211, 303-04, 316, 332, 369, 371, 373, 375, 746; of fire: 237-38, 254, 256:103, 259-61 (see: Heat); of the elements: 113-16, 227-28, 230, 245-48, 251-53, 257-58, 261, 269. See: Lumen (corporeal), Properties. Quantity, 116, 119, 146, 220, 229-30, 246, 262, 290:199, 294:211, 315, 331, 373, 673. Quiddity, 108-09, 268, 273, 275. See: Essence. Radiation [Irradiation], 255-56, 258, 495-96, 504, 517, 532, 550, 604, 614-15, 671. See: Ray. Rapture, see: Ecstasy. Rational, 323-25, 326, 328, 329, 368, 801; creature, see: Man; knowledge, see: Knowledge; life, see: Life; potencies, see: Freedom of choice, Human mind, Human reason, Human will; spirit, see: Rational soul; understanding, see: Knowledge (rational). Rational soul [Human soul, Spritual soul], acts [operations] of: 102, 133, 138, 20006, 213-14, 222, 232, 234, 290-91, 30102, 303-04, 311, 315, 331, 333, 340,

952

INDEX 341-42, 344, 346, 348-49, 353-56, 358-59, 362-63, 368, 391, 398-99, 402, 429-31, 434, 501, 503, 528, 534, 537, 540, 542, 546, 560, 564, 579-80, 605 (159), 606, 607-10, 624-25, 654, 748; being of: 121-22, 126-27, 129, 139-40, 142, 145, 149-50, 155-56, 159, 162, 164-65, 171, 174, 176, 181-83, 186, 194, 206, 211, 213, 221-22, 224:21, 233, 284, 290, 292, 295-96, 299, 30203, 304, 308, 311, 313-16, 347, 349, 400, 432, 434, 524, 606, 649, 650-51; composition of. 139-40, 141-43, 145, 148-50, 155-56 (43), 159, 161, 162, 164, 171, 174, 182-84, 215-16, 220, 284, 291-92, 311-16, 341-42, 344, 346, 348-49, 358, 360, 363, 559; essence [nature] of: 102-03, 121, 123, 125:50, 126-28, 137-59, 162, 164-86 [165, 171, 183-84], 199-207, 208, 209, 211, 21316 (166), 216-18, 222, 228, 286, 289, 290-92, 295-96, 297, 300-01, 303, 304, 309, 312-16, 323:1, 324:2, 325-26, 328, 337, 344, 347, 349-50, 352, 353, 357, 358-59, 360 (88), 431-33, 499, 503, 559, 595, 598, 605-06, 607-11, 611, 616 (181), 618-21, 642, 651, 722; form of the human species: 171-74, 181-82, 184, 204, 213, 221-22, 231, 267; individuation of: 174 (79), 176, 222, 607; life of: 216, 141-42, 156, 182, 206,. 524, 537, 549; potencies of 131, 199-203, 205-07, 213, 221-22, 282-84, 291, 299-300, 301 (230), 302-03, 323:1, 324 (2), 328-31, 383, 335-36, 341, 344-45, 355, 356, 387, 398-99, 429, 468, 503, 533, 537, 549, 556, 60711, 623. 824, 826:62; substantial form of: 182, 292, 301, 303, 311, 313-16; and corporeal matter: 131, 133, 13940, 142, 173, 199, 203, 213, 285, 286:186, 290-92, 294, 300-02, 310-16, 748; and freedom of choice: 121, 300; and genus: 125-26, 143, 294-95, 304, 314; and God: 102-03 (2), 121-22 (38), 124, 139-40, 159, 199 (125), 202, 205, 226:27, 286, 290, 304, 330-33, 334-35, 349, 399-400, 416, 428-34, 454-55, 459:28, 474, 480, 482, 503, 512, 52425, 526, 528-29, 539 (35), 540 (36), 544, 546, 548-49, 562, 563-64, 565-64, 565-66, 569, 572 (89), 573, 574:96, 576:99, 579-80, 605, 606-07, 614, 619, 622-25, 667, 745-50, 752-53, 788, 797,

809, 820-28; and knowledge: 141, 239, 300, 324, 331, 333-34, 336-37, 344, 349, 354-55, 362-63, 368-69, 399400, 400-01, 405, 416, 428-34, 454; and person [personality]: 167, 174-76 (85), 182, 184, 213-14, 222, 306, 816; and the angel: 125-26, 142, 143-45, 161:54, 162, 175, 295, 299-301 (230), 314, 341, 524, 561, 579-80, 605, 61819; and the celestial bodies: 227-28, 606, 616:182, 618-19, 624; and the human intellect: 165, 182, 184-85, 204, 213-14, 222, 336, 345-50, 358, 556; and the individual man: 174, 176, 181, 184, 203, 206, 295-96, 29798, 302, 304; and the sense potencies: 131, 206, 213, 222, 324-25, 341-44, 355, 400; as a principle: 109, 199, 133, 202-03, 206-07, 213-14, 222, 29 96, 301-03, 313; as a rational spirit: 205-06, 207, 213, 290:199, 299, 301, 304, 308, 324, 331-33, 369-70, 434, 529, 537, 546, 560, 564, 578, 797; as a spirit: 138-39 (5), 162, 185, 199(125), 202-03, 205-06, 208, 209, 211, 21 299, 303, 309, 331, 337, 428; as a substance: 162, 164, 173, 183-84, 202-03, 213, 295-96, 303-04, 312-15, 347, 34; as subsistent: 102, 125:50, 131:63, 138, 140, 142, 156, 159, 213-15, 303; i a species: 138, 139:7, 296; is created: 103, 122-26, 131, 139-40, 156, 165, 176, 221 226:27, 278-79, 282, 290, 300 315, 399, 429, 434, 546, 604-06, 618, 626, 649, 681-82; is immortal: 125:50, 140, 304, 591, 607, 611, 756, 805; is simple: 127-28, 139, 162, 199, 203, 501; is spiritual: 140, 142, 145, 149-50, 162, 165, 183-84, 199, 202-03, 213, 282, 297-99, 330-31, 333, 344, 349-50, 428, 564, 606-07, 618. See: Adam, Appetite, Beatitude, Disposition, Existence, Existing, Human body, Human mind, Illumination, Intellective, Light (spiritual), Love, Lumen (spiritual), Man (perfection of), Matter (spiritual), Medium, Nobility, Operation (principles of), Perfection, Plural forms, Properties, Science, Sensitive (soul), Time, Unity. Ray of, Christian faith: 609, 799; corporeal light: 248; divine light: 504-05, 517, 564, 614. 824; divine lumen: 561; the sun: 254, 444, 561. Set-: Radiation.

INDEX

Reason(s), see: Eternal, Human reason. Ideal, Seminal reasons. Rectitude [Right|, 368, 385, 386, 387, 399, 408, 454, 524, 530-31, 562-63, 683, 690, 727, 742, 747, 748-49 (120), 760, 792, 801-03, 810, 821, 827. Redeemer, see: Christ. Redemption [Reparation], 407, 610, 672-73, 683-84, 689, 692, 694-95, 697, 699-700, 704, 715, 725, 750, 801. See: Christ (Redeemer). Reduction, 268, 293-96, 314, 409, 472, 517, 532-33, 597:142, 672-73, 676, 683, 697, 707, 714-15, 744-50. Relations, 151-52, 153-56, 162-63, 165-66, 378, 433, 453, 469, 472, 475, 476-77, 495-96, 498-500, 502-04, 505, 516-18, 540:36, 572, 575-77, 578, 603, 612:171, 748, 749, 752, 824, 827; analogical: 447-48 (4), 469, 471, 474-75, 478-82, 486:85, 516-18. See: Creatures (and Creator). Religion, see: Christian (religion), Virtue. Reminiscence, 353-54, 355, 606. Reparation, see: Redemption. Repose, see: Rest. Resemblance, see: Similarity. Rest |Repose], 409, 411, 413-14, 434, 54749, 568, 620, 624, 684, 746, 747, 808, 822. See: End. Resurrexion, 257-58, 294:211, 304-07, 60910, 624-25, 690, 724, 807, 817. Retribution, 697, 699-700, 704, 715. Revelation. 407-08, 443, 448-50, 535, 538, 539-40, 550, 561, 610, 613, 624-25, 639, 665, 668-69, 677, 682, 684-85, 688-89, 692-93, 695-99, 701-04, 706, 707, 710, 713, 720-21, 722, 723, 725, 726-27, 729-30 (84), 735, 737, 742:108, 745. 751-52, 756-57, 766-67, 779, 792, 795, 796, 800, 801, 803, 804, 807, 80809, 822, 836; and reason: 677-78, 682, 699. Reverence, 698, 753, 756, 758-59, 789-90, 807, 829, 834. See: Honour. Reward, 666, 684, 693, 696, 699-700, 743, 801, 809. See: Merit. Rhetoric, 408, 423:123, 615:178, 745, 789. See: Philosophy (rational). Rhetorician, 813. Right, see: Rectitude. Rules, see: Axions, Eternal. Sacraments, 665, 697, 699, 794. Sacred Scripture, 137, 255, 264:124, 324,

953

330, 381:47, 477, 525, 535, 547, 564, 567-69, 571 (88), 591-92, 622, 665, 667-68, 671-72, 675-78, 679-83, 68899, 700-04, 706, 707, 710, 711, 713, 715, 717:70, 720, 725, 727-28 (79), 740, 744. 745-51, 754, 756-59, 788, 789, 790, 792-93, 794, 795, 801, 802, 805, 806 (31-32), 810, 813-15 (51), 816-17, 818-19, 822, 823, 826, 827, 828, 831, 835; citations from: 102, 137, 321, 324, 399, 402, 409, 443 [2], 497, 523-24 [6], 542, 543. 562, 568, 612, 617, 665, 683. 727, 732. 739. 788 [2], 805. 806, 808, 810 [3], 811, 817. 826 [3], 829 [5], 830 [2]; references to: 477, 524 [2]. 569 [4], 613 [3i. 679. 680. 702, 749. 817. 819 [2]: science of: 676-78, 682. 697, 817; wisdom of: 692-93, 696-98. 810. Salvation, 564. 681-82. 688-89, 692, 694-96, 699-700, 706, 745, 753, 757, 787. 79293, 795-99, 801. 803, 804, 805, 806, 807. 812. 826. Science, 322, 323, 331, 337, 396-98 (86), 401-02, 403-07, 413, 415, 418 (129), 419, 420, 427-28, 443-44, 446, 523, 525, 560, 569-71, 590, 612-13 (172), 626, 671-72, 696, 749, 758-59, 760, 763, 793, 794, 811-12, 825; act of: 452-54, 726-27, 770:176; moral [practical], see: Conscience; philosophers and: 564, 569-71, 614-18, 621, 626, 735-38, 743:110, 775, 791, 796-98, 800, 805-06, 815-16; principles of: 331, 333, 336-37, 397-98 (86), 404-06, 409, 413, 419-20, 427, 455, 465, 504, 523, 527, 531, 541-42, 544-46, 547, 549, 569, 676, 688-89, 733, 740, 745, 775-76, 790; speculative: 326, 401-03, 450, 463, 532, 544, 683, 794, 796-97, 798; subject of: 672-73, 676, 772; theologians and: 147, 735, 738-39, 747, 800, 811, 813-16 (51), 815-17; and Christian faith: 449-51, 462-63, 727-28, 731-42, 760, 763, 770:176, 771-73, 775, 791, 816, 824-25, 828, 832 (74) — see: Christian (science); and human reason: 406, 408, 450, 538, 542, 544, 546, 590, 697-98, 721, 73142, 772-73, 775. 788, 790-91, 795, 79698, 800, 813, 815-19. 832 (74); and theology: 147, 675, 688-89, 696, 701 (47), 721, 722-23, 749, 758-60, 763, 800, 813-15, 815-17 (see: Theology, as a science); and truth: 403-06, 408-09,

954

INDEX

413-14, 446, 450, 453-54, 455-56, 464, 494, 527, 531, 534, 536, 541-42, 54647, 613. 675, 697-98, 727-28, 733-42, 745, 772, 775, 794, 796, 797-98, 800, 811, 814-19; and the human intellect: 204, 336, 401-03, 405, 408, 430, 451, 452-54, 455-56, 464, 500, 532, 544-46, 547, 568-71, 574, 683, 727, 731-32, 737, 740, 772; and the human mind. 403-06, 414-15, 446, 454, 456, 527, 531-32, 535, 536, 538, 541-42, 560, 686; and the rational soul: 141, 239, 300, 402-03, 529, 541-42, 543-44, 546, 569; of Christ: 547-50, 569-70; of philosophy: 406, 408-09 (108), 41315, 417-18 (129), 425, 427-28, 449-50, 481, 494, 500, 503-04, 564, 590, 61213 (172), 614-15 (176), 616-18 (182, 186), 689-90, 701 (47), 707, 721, 723, 729, 738-41, 743:110, 744-45, 747-49, 751, 758-60, 775, 790-91, 804, 805-06, 807, 809, 811-13, 815-17, 818, 824-25, 828, 832 (74) — see: Philosophy. See also: Certitude, Demonstration, Illumination, Knowledge, Perfection, Sacred Scripture. Scribes, 817, 819. Scripture, see: Sacred Scripture. Scrutiny, 675-76, 678, 681, 688-89, 698-99, 701, 739, 758, 814. Semen, 107, 109, 123, 280. Seminal reasons, 106-09, 111, 115, 118, 119, 133, 223, 226 (27), 256-57, 266, 267-86 (186) 288, 289-95, 305-09, 311-13, 315, 404, 409, 593, 747-48. Sense knowledge, 102, 113, 114-16, 129, 182, 185, 203, 233-34, 302, 321-22, 328, 335-36, 341, 342-44, 347, 349, 368, 370-74 (26), 375-76, 378, 389, 395, 405, 417, 429, 481, 500, 534, 54445, 561, 569, 572, 607-08, 730, 731, 745, 746, 749. See: Apprehension, Judgment, Perception, Senses (objects of).

Senses, 114, 119:36, 122, 328-29 (17-18), 331-32, 334 (31), 335, 341, 342, 343, 344, 352, 357 (80), 367-68, 370-74, 375-76, 401, 429, 618, 745, 797, 82223; acts [operations] of: 114, 183-84, 192:110, 200, 213-14, 221, 232, 249-50, 259-61, 281, 301-02, 321-22, 325, 328, 329-30, 331-32, 333, 335-37, 338, 340, 341-44, 347, 353-55 (78), 362, 370-74 (26, 28), 375-76, 396, 401, 403, 416-

17, 523, 540, 543, 560-61, 607, 730, 745-46, 794, 822-23 (see: Apprehension, Judgment, Perception); objects of: 114, 239, 250-51, 258-59, 321, 325, 328, 329 (17), 330, 331-32, 33435, 340, 341-44, 347. 350. 352-53. 354. 357 (80), 362, 368, 370-74, 375-76, 544-45, 560-61, 573, 639, 730, 739, 746, 749, 757, 822-23; potencies of: 119:36, 122, 131, 165, 183-84, 199, 203-07, 213, 221-22, 232-34, 259, 299 300 (230), 301-02, 323, 324-25, 32829, 330-32, 333-34, 335, 338, 341-44, 347, 355, 371, 374 (28), 375-76, 400, 544, 545, 561, 569, 573, 608, 611, 73 746, 801, 820, 822-23; principles of: 115-16, 124, 206, 213-14; and lumen: 249-50, 259, 261, 371:17; and the human intellect: 200, 204-05, 207,302, 303, 321-22, 330-31, 341-44, 347-48, 349-50, 352, 358-59, 367-71, 373, 378 80, 389, 390, 395, 397, 400-02, 405-06, 414, 422, 429-30, 444-45, 452, 453, 458-59, 477, 500, 531, 540, 544-45, 569, 572, 600, 607-08, 731, 800, 82 23, 825; and the human will: 325, 79 795. See also: Conjunct, Human reason. Light (corporeal). Medium, Organs. Sensible, creatures [world], see: Creatures (corporeal); species, see: Species. Sensitive, soul: 115-16, 121-24, 124, 14 226, 232, 233-34, 278, 279-85, 286:186, 308, 311, 605, 608, 618; '".nowledge, see: Sense knowledge. Sensuality [Animal potency), 123, 324-25, 326, 328, 330-31, 333-37, 338, 340, 344, 618, 624, 801 (26), 810-11. Shadow, 237, 385, 480-82, 563, 594-95, 605. Sight |Vision]. 113, 183. 200, 239, 249-51, 255, 258-59, 301-02, 321, 330, 342, 344, 347, 350, 357, 371, 378, 401, 4 416-17, 532, 540, 543, 561, 573, 607, 730, 732-33, 739, 794. See: Senses. Similarity [Resemblance[, 152, 262-63, 36, 381-82, 469-70, 471-72, 492; analogical: 252-53, 258, 261, 447-48, 468-70, 472, 474, 475, 476, 479-80, 482, 484-85, 492, 499-500, 501-03, 504-05, 517, 556, 563-65, 744 (see: Knowledge, of God); between bodies: 229-31, 253-54, 258-59 (1-08), 271, 274, 278, 472; between creatures: 152, 36

INDEX 68, 383-84, 446, 472-73, 475, 493; in nature and species: 225, 228-29, 262, 265, 273-74, 279-81, 286-87, 469-70, 474; of creatures to Creator: 152, 367, 446-47, 468-69, 472, 476, 478-82, 485, 499, 503, 505, 517, 665-66, 744, 751, 823, 835. See: Similitude. Similitude, analogical: 468-69, 471-72. 474, 478-79, 480-82, 502, 574, 579, 589; nature of: 367, 431, 474, 496; and knowledge: 367-68, 370, 371, 373, 381-85, 390. 392, 399-401, 406, 416, 418, 428-31, 447, 478-80, 492-98 (104, 106), 500, 502, 504, 507, 531, 537-38, 543-46, 553, 556, 573-74, 576:99, 579, 582, 585, 589, 721, 74647, 822-23; and memory: 397-98; of colour: 250, 293-94, 371, 373, 384; of creatures: 367, 370, 490-91, 492-98, 502, 504, 573-74, 576, 582; of form: 250, 261, 384; of God: 416, 418, 428, 430-31, 468-69, 474, 478-79, 480-82, 490-91, 492-93, 503, 553, 556, 574 (96), 579, 581-82, 589, 703, 721, 744, 754. 823; of proportion, and proportionality: 470, 472, 474-75. See: Innate, Likeness, Similarity. Sin, 203:134, 330, 410, 537, 547, 624-25, 684, 699-700, 724, 746, 793, 794, 795, 797-98, 800-04, 814, 830, 831, 833, 835: original: 120, 125:50, 137:1, 304, 324, 330, 405, 537. 539, 624:25, 665, 669, 697, 746, 787, 791-92, 793-95, 798-804, 813, 818, 819, 821 (55), 825, 835. See: Nature (fallen). Sinner, 792, 794, 796, 802-03, 833. Site, 245-46, 261. Smell. 114, 342, 357. See: Senses. Son of God, see: Christ (divine Word). Soul, see: Rational soul, Sensitive, Vegetative. Species," 287, 289-90, 399, 667-68, 669; cognitive: 321. 349, 355, 398, 400, 40304, 405, 420, 429, 444, 536, 607-08, 727. 824; form of the whole being: 17274, 180, 182, 221-22, 268-69, 272, 29899, 309; individuation of: 171-82, 186, 221-22, 268-69, 272-75; intelligible: 302, 321, 332, 335, 346-47, 350-52, 353-55 (78), 357, 358, 359-60, 362, 368, 370, 376-77, 381, 384, 389, 390, 395, 396-98, 400-05, 405-06, 414. 419, 429-30, 435, 444-45, 477, 492, 530, 536, 538, 543-46, 562, 564, 569, 572

955

(89), 573-74, 608, 680: sensible: 328, 335, 338, 341-42, 343, 347, 350, 353-55 (78), 362, 368, 370-73, 375-76, 384, 399-401, 607, 746; and substantial form: 138, 228, 230, 264; of bodies: 228-30, 235, 242-43, 245-48, 264, 26667, 269, 270-71, 272, 273, 274-75, 278, 280-81, 292-93, 311, 475; of creatures: 226 (27), 227:30, 263-64 (123), 674, 692-93, 795; of fire [and corporeal light]: 231, 238, 252, 255-56, 264. See: Difference, Essence, Form, Genus, Innate, Rational soul, Similarity. Specific form, and essence: 173, 181:91, 308 (see: Essence); and knowledge: 377-78, 380-81, 475; of bodies: 177, 219:3, 227, 231, 234, 236, 240, 242-46, 248, 256 (103), 258-59 (108), 264, 266, 272-73, 277-78, 281, 475; of man: 174, 178, 181 (91), 204, 231, 272-73, 289-90, 294-96, 298-99, 308, 309, 316. 377, 475, 49 of the individual: 170, 172-73, 272-73, 281. Speculation, 321, 371, 399, 449-50, 463, 482 (81), 504, 532, 618, 667, 669, 67172, 726, 729, 794, 820. Speculative, see: Habitus, Human intellect, Human knowledge, Order, Science, Truth. Speech, see: Human words. Spirit, pure: 140, 301; of the animal body: 116, 403; of the human body: 299-300, 301 (231), 302, 403, 748. See: Demons, Holy Spirit, Rational soul (as a spirit, as a rational spirit). Spiritual, see: Creatures, Form, Light, Lumen, Matter, Qualities, Rational soul (is spiritual), Spirit, Substance. Splendour, 257-58, 501-02, 504, 512, 563 64, 594, 698. See: Brilliance. Stability, 143, 147, 155, 158, 163, 171, 181 313, 452, 464, 518, 536, 541, 548, 553, 560, 568-69, 574:96, 671-72. Stars, see: (The) Heavens. Study, 523, 692, 693, 756, 792, 795-96, 80506(31), 807, 813-15 (51), 816-18. See: Learning. Subject of, accidents: 575, 616; corporeal lumen: 249-50, 251, 261; mutation: 15456; the potencies of the intellect: 165, 182, 184-85, 204, 222, 727. See: Conjunct, Science, Theology. Substance — (A), 113-15, 119, 162, 165-66,

956

INDEX

174, 185-86, 199, 254, 283, 308-09; being of: 106, 118, 147, 149, 153-54, 163, 170-72, 176-81 (91), 182, 193-94, 199, 222-24, 226, 230:36, 238-40, 243, 251, 255, 256:103, 259, 263, 273, 297, 314, 330, 351, 627 (206), 643; complete: 176, 231-32, 234, 256:103, 267, 273, 291-93, 296, 297-99, 309, 311; existing of: 146-47, 149, 155, 164, 17071, 181, 193-94, 263, 643; genus [kinds] of: 144-49, 157, 167-68, 173, 175, 186 (101), 220, 229:30, 273, 278, 292, 293-96, 298, 304, 314; individuation of: 148, 169-82 (91), 185, 193-94, 220-22, 231, 268, 272, 273-74; luminous, see: Body (luminous); nature of: 141:14, 145, 147-49, 158:46, 163, 173, 238-40, 262-63, 265, 270, 274, 277-78, 293-97, 298, 304, 306, 308-09, 309-14, 575, 643; perfection of: 175, 199, 220:5, 224-25 (22), 347; principles of: 145-46, 147, 149-50, 162, 169-71, 180, 262-64, 265-67, 29293, 294, 296-98, 304-05, 309, 313-16, 592-93, 613, 627:206; rational, see: Man; and accident: 146, 164-65, 168, 180, 182, 250, 268, 298, 385, 475; and creation: 151-54, 163, 591-92, 592-93, 599-600, 604, 648; and substantial form: 112-17, 146-47, 170, 219:3, 22435, 236, 244, 259, 261-62, 267; as selfsubsistent: 102, 138, 140-41, 147-50, 158, 170-71, 182, 185, 194, 222, 26364, 273, 277; as singular: 166-71, 174, 176, 179, 181, 185-86, 193-94, 269, 271-73, 274-75, 277, 281, 283, 291, 292, 308, 309, 330. See also: Individual, Intellectual, Matter, Order, Properties, Rational soul (as a substance, as subsistent), Substantial, Union, Unity. — (B), corporeal, formation and generation of: 112-17, 118, 119, 225-26, 226-28, 238, 251-52, 26162, 264-66, 269, 270, 278-81, 283, 309, 310-11, 591-94, 643; nature of: 146, 149, 219:3, 220, 228-35, 246, 264, 266, 276, 283, 284, 293, 300, 309, 315, 320, 592, 643, 821-22; human body as a: 284, 313-14. See: Disposition, Man, Matter (corporeal: and substantial form), Rational soul. Substantial form, Union, Unity. —
229-30, 284, 297, 299, 304, 309, 31516, 321, 334, 459, 500-01, 540, 564, 598, 607, 609-10, 616 (181), 618-19, 643, 654, 808. See: Creatures (spiritual). Intellective, Matter (spiritual). Rational soul (is spiritual). Substantial form. Substantial, see: Act, Being (Ens), Being (Esse), Change, Disposition, Mode, Perfection, Power, Principle, Properties, Substantial form, Uniformity (of substance). Substantial form, acts [operations] of: 111, 132-33, 162, 216 (166-67), 225, 231, 233, 242, 244, 247, 261-62, 270-71 (145), 275, 282-83 (175), 285, 311-13; eduction and production of: 103-09, 111, 112, 114, 119, 133, 151, 153-55, 223, 225-26, 226-28, 242-44, 261-62, 266, 267, 269-72, 274, 275-77, 279-81, 282-83 (175), 285, 286:186, 289, 30506, 309, 311 (252), 313, 572, 591-94, 616, 748; essence |nature] of: 104-06, 133, 146, 150, 225, 228, 238-39, 24144, 247-48, 264, 266, 270-71 (145), 277, 280, 281, 292-93, 305, 311-16; foundation [principle] of: 148-49, 154-55, 163, 222, 277, 280, 282-83 (175), 285, 294, 305-06, 314; generation and succession of: 131, 150-51, 153, 219-20 (4), 266, 276-77, 280-81, 283, 285-86 (186), 290, 305, 308; genus and species of: 138, 228, 231-33, 273, 278; principle of being: 105, 109, 117-18, 147-49, 153-55, 158, 162, 170-71, 186, 221, 225, 311-16; unity of: 184, 220:5, 220-22, 228-32, 247-48, 250-51, 252, 254, 256:103, 259, 262, 265-66, 270-71, 273-75, 277-78, 281-82, 289-90, 291, 299300, 301, 307-09 (250), 309-16; and corporeal lumen: 248-51, 253-54, 256, 258-59, 261; and movement: 105:8, 146-47, 157, 233-34; of corporeal substance: 111, 112-17, 117-18, 119, 120, 146, 219:2-5, 224-35, 236, 244, 259, 265, 266, 269, 275-76, 278-81, 283, 285, 300-01, 309, 310-16, 369, 607-08, 654; of fire: 241, 242-45, 254-56 (103), 259; of man: 103, 121, 126-29, 130, 131, 132, 133, 138, 161:54, 162, 183, 185 (99), 199, 203, 206, 209, 213-16 (166), 219:2-5, 221, 223-24, 232, 27879, 284, 286-308, 311-16, 328, 333,

INDEX

531, 549; of spiritual substance: 146, 155, 220, 313-16 (see: Angel). See also: Appetite, Being (Esse), Body (celestial), Difference, Existence, Form, God (and substantial form and matter), Light (corporeal), Matter, Nobility, Order (of forms), Perfection, Plural forms, Rational soul, Seminal reasons, Sensitive (soul), Substance, Whole (form of the). Sun, see: (The) Heavens. Supposit, 164-65, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177-81, 182, 185-86, 194, 221. 222, 230:36, 231-32, 234, 256:103, 273-74, 277-78, 292-93, 299. Synderesis, 333:26, 429-30. See: Instinct. Taste, 114, 342, 357, 613. See: Senses. Teacher, 443, 560, 562, 567-68, 570, 67172, 686, 692-93, 699, 704, 747, 749, 810, 816-18, 819. See: Teaching. Teaching, 408, 443, 529, 531, 566, 568, 585, 665, 671-72, 686, 688-89, 692-93, 69599, 704, 747, 749, 751, 755-56, 758-59, 792, 795, 805-06 (31), 807, 810, 81315 (51), 816-18, 819, 829, 835. See: Learning. Temporal, see: Time. Terminus, see: End. Terms, 452-53, 470, 472. See: Definition, Demonstration. Testimony [Witness], and God: 749, 772; and truth: 665-67, 741; of Scripture: 678, 682, 696, 698. See: Christ. Theologians, 122-23, 147-48, 157-58, 252, 257, 592-93, 594-95, 601, 602:153, 610, 747, 748-49, 801-03, 814, 819; and certitude: 499-500, 502, 672; and Christ: 288, 669, 672, 746-49, 803, 811, 814-15, 819; and Christian faith: 669, 672-78, 681-82, 694, 698-99, 718:70, 728-29, 731-32, 737, 791, 799-800, 802-03, 808-03, 808-10, 813-19; and error: 738-39, 757-58, 803; and God: 567, 598, 669, 677, 681-82, 697, 703, 728, 737. 743, 744, 746-49, 791, 800, 819; and human reason: 676-83, 721, 731-32, 735, 799-800, 803, 817; and philosophy: 571-72 (88), 608-10, 669, 672, 721, 728-29, 733:93, 735, 737-41, 742-43 (110), 757-60, 790-91, 799-800, 803, 811, 813-17; and Scripture: 535, 571 (88), 676-82, 692-99, 718:70, 75758, 802, 813-15, 816; and truth: 499500, 672-74, 718:70, 721, 728-29, 732,

957

735, 737-39, 746-47, 756-58, 791, 799800, 803, 814, 819; and wisdom: 40910, 615, 669, 814 (51), 816; and the Trinity: 499-500 (110), 503-04, 667, 672, 746. See: Science. Theological, see: Appropriation, Error, Illumination, Knowledge, Science, Virtue, Wisdom. Theology, efficient cause of: 686-87 (35), 688-89, 692-93, 703-04, 721; final cause [end] of: 675, 683-86, 688-89, 692-93, 709-11, 721, 722, 723, 779, 790; formal cause of: 675-83, 688-89, 718:70, 720-21, 722-23, 753-60, 799800, 813-17; material cause [subject] of: 672-75. 676-78, 688-89, 691-95, 699-701 (46-47), 704, 707, 713, 714-15, 750, 756; nature of: 406, 479:73, 67172, 672-78, 682-86, 686-87 (35), 68889, 693-95, 696-97, 698-99, 701-02, 704, 705-06, 709-11, 713, 714-15, 72223, 725, 740, 749-50 (51), 751-53, 75660 (150), 763, 779-80, 781, 790, 81317, 819-20, 825, 832:74; objects of: 407-08, 451, 463, 675, 676-85, 691, 694-95, 699-700, 706, 707, 711, 744, 751-53, 790, 814-15; perfection of: 674, 683-86, 710-11; principles of: 407-08, 672-74, 684-86, 688-89, 700, 711, 720-21, 756, 814-15, 816, 819; truths of: 639, 673-74, 679, 697, 704, 706, 722-23, 729-30, 750, 823; and analogy: 499-500, 691 (39), 694-95; and Christ: 612, 673, 683, 686, 688-89, 691-95, 704, 714-15, 723, 750, 814-15, 817, 819; and God: 616, 672-73, 68386, 686-87, 688-89, 694, 697, 699700, 701, 703, 707, 710-11, 713, 71415, 721, 729; and philosophy: 482:81, 567, 570-71, 600, 639, 648:248, 669, 671-72, 674, 678-83, 685, 687:35, 691, 694-96, 700-01 (46-47), 701-02, 703, 706, 707, 711, 721, 722-23,723, 726, 728-30, 740-41, 742-43, 743-53, 75860, 778-79, 787, 790-91, 799-800, 807 (34), 813-20, 821-28, 835-36; and Scripture: 676, 679-82, 693-96, 715, 790, 813-15; as a Christian understanding: 406-08, 448, 504, 571 (88), 668, 672-75, 676-84, 684-86, 688-89, 691-99, 701-04 (50), 710-11, 721, 729, 730, 743-53, 756, 790, 803, 807-08, 811, 813-17, 824, 825, 835-36; as a science: 406-08, 451, 463, 672-

958

INDEX

78, 682-83, 688-89, 691, 697, 699, 701-02, 706, 707, 709-10, 713, 714-15, 720-21, 723, 744, 746, 749-50, 758, 763, 807, 808, 814-15, 818-19, 828, 832 (see: Science); as a wisdom: 683-86, 692-94, 699-700, 709-11, 723, 744, 746, 828, 832. See also: Certitude, Christian faith, Christian (science), Knowledge (theological [of God, theological 1), Nobility, Wisdom. Thinking [Thought], 354, 376, 379-81, 38283/386, 398, 407, 432, 443, 456-59, 459-60, 467-68, 536, 580-81, 608, 611, 615, 616, 620, 631, 666, 668-69, 678, 684, 686-87, 702, 703, 725, 727, 729, 736-42, 747, 753, 756, 763, 766, 787^ 790, 796-97, 802, 804, 805, 806, 807, 810, 813, 818, 819-20, 825, 826-27, 828, 829, 833. See: Error. Time, 170-71, 228, 280, 353, 564, 596-97, 602; order of: 103, 111, 183-84, 283, 286:186, 290:199, 301, 308, 597, 602, 624, 682; priority of: 104, 152, 154-55, 163, 239-41, 682; and being: 152, 154, 239-40, 497-98, 509, 530, 597-98, 60103 (153), 643, 647-49; and creation: 104:4, 152, 595, 596-97, 600 (149), 601-03 (153), 621, 636-39 (223), 643, 647-49; and creatures. 478, 496-97, 524, 591, 621, 666, 821; and existence: 163, 496-97, 602, 643; and generation: 150, 220, 288-89, 290, 307, 308; and knowledge: 370, 372-74, 445, 458, 54344, 621; and matter: 104 (4), 105:8, 154, 155, 224, 316, 591, 603, 643; and memory: 353-55, 362, 373, 397-98, 824; and motion: 595-97, 601-02 (153), 809; and nature: 288-89, 496; and place: 292, 332, 355, 598, 637, 754, 823; and Scripture: 688-91, 694, 69697; and the human intellect: 352, 362, 370, 404, 422:140, 823; and the rational soul: 181, 183-84, 354-55, 362-63. See: Eternity. Touch, 114, 116, 342, 357. 372. See: Senses. Transmigration, 591, 595, 598-99, 606, 621, 624-25. (The) Trinity, image of: 356, 468, 499, 66566 (1), 671-72, 744, 751-53, 790, 824 (see: Image, of God); persons in: 16568, 383, 468. 470, 478, 498-500 (110), 502, 504, 615, 665, 668, 671, 681, 68889, 691-95, 698, 704, 732, 735-37, 739,

742, 746-50, 751-52, 753, 772, 823, 826, 829; personal relations in: 152, 165-66, 383, 470, 472, 478, 498-500, 503-04, 575-77, 578, 580, 582, 594, 603, 612, 749, 751-52, 824, 826, 827; similitude of: 468, 744, 788, 790 (see: Likeness); vestige of: 468, 499, 665-66 (1), 744, 751-52, 760 (see: Vestige); and Christian faith: 407, 498-99, 66567, 668, 678-79, 688-89, 698, 725, 742:108, 746, 753, 772, 779, 790, 808; and theology: 688-89, 692-95, 699, 70304, 715, 744, 750-52, 760, 790, 805, 817, 820-21, 824-25, 826, 827, 828. See also: Appropriation, Christ, Truth. Truth [True |, 147-48, 347, 352-53, 397-98 (86), 399-400. 429-30, 443-46, 457, 459, 823, 829-30; cause of: 381, 417, 443-44, 446, 452, 458-59, 492, 512, 563, 567, 573, 576, 581-82, 589, 692, 745, 749, 807, 809, 818-19, 823, 825; divine: 207, 346, 396, 399, 400, 404, 428-30, 432-34, 443, 446, 447, 449, 452-53, 455-56, 456-60 (21), 464-65, 466, 467, 468, 480, 492, 493, 494-96, 497, 498-500 (110), 502-03, 504-05, 507, 512-13, 516-18, 523, 526-32, 53437, 540-42, 544-48, 549, 550, 552-53, 560, 562-64, 567-68, 572-74 (96), 576:99, 578, 581-82, 600, 613-15, 61718, 668-69, 671-72, 679-80, 690, 694, 697-98, 704, 725, 735-42, 750-5!, 767, 772, 787, 791, 794, 807, 809-10, 823, 824, 826, 833 (see: God, first truth); nature of: 368 (2), 371, 385, 395 (77), 443-44, 502-03, 516-17, 542. 572, 678-79; practical, see: Moral; principles of: 336, 355, 367, 370, 380-81, 383:52, 384, 395, 397-98 (86), 402-04, 406-07, 414-15, 418, 422:140, 427-28, 429-30, 446, 450, 455, 464, 468, 493, 500, 502. 504-05, 507, 517. 523, 538 (34), 539:35, 540, 544, 546, 549, 556, 559-60, 563, 567-69, 573-74, 576:99, 578-79, 581-82, 589, 701, 738-39, 745, 755-56, 758-59, 835; speculative: 326, 329, 429, 449-50, 452-53, 455, 690, 696, 729, 794; and being: 112, 367, 371,432-34,456-58,465,498,529,615, 667, 809; and God: 352, 385-86, 446, 464-65, 480, 671-72, 683, 687, 697, 725, 729-30 (84), 807; and knowledge: 321, 328, 378, 393, 395, 396, 412, 41718, 429, 433, 443-44, 446, 449-50, 452,

INDEX

959

and philosophy: 671-72, 678-83, 685, 453, 455-60, 464, 467-68, 493, 498694-95, 700-02 (47), 704, 722-23, 72 500, 502, 505-06, 507, 512-13, 516-17, 728-30, 743-53, 760, 778-79, 790, 518, 523, 531, 549, 553, 559, 561, 564, 825, 828, 835-36; of form and matter 571, 572-73, 581-82, 585, 589, 608-09, 611-13, 615, 618-21, 678-79, 701, 133, 170-71, 180-81, 193-94, 221-22, 702:49, 732, 738-39, 741-42, 750, 772, 251, 254-56, 266, 272, 273, 277, 285 779, 787-88, 796, 798, 806, 808, 810, of two natures [substances] to form a 811, 818-19, 819-20, 829, 834; and third: 173, 223, 265-66, 284, 292-96, human reason: 332, 406-08, 455, 523297-99, 309, 480-81. See: Being (Ens), 24, 530, 627, 655, 671-72, 672-75, 678Christ, Composition. 79, 681-83, 698, 701, 721, 733, 734-37, Unity, 168-69, 172-73, 221, 265, 316, 59 738-39, 745, 757-60, 772, 775, 779, 603, 607, 741, 760; principles of: 14 787-88, 796-98, 803-04, 809, 817-18, 207, 265; truth and goodness: 344, 412 835; and the human intellect: 326-28, 468, 480, 485, 665, 668, 744, 751; and 329-30, 332, 333, 336, 344-45, 351analogy: 470-72, 694-95; and being: 199, 52, 353-54, 355, 367-68, 370-71, 378207, 228-30, 259, 266, 308, 309, 313, 81, 383-86, 386-87, 395 (77), 396, 351, 503, 608, 667, 744, 827, 833; an 408-09, 410-12, 416, 422:140, 429, wisdom: 409, 415, 417-18, 425, 427-2 434, 443-46, 447, 452-54, 461, 466, 447. 464, 494, 667, 669, 683-86, 710467-68, 497, 503-05, 516-18, 527, 530, 11; of God: 493-96, 498-500, 502-03, 532-34, 538, 545-49, 553, 556, 559, 604-05, 668, 731-32, 735-39, 740-42, 560-62, 567-68, 572, 572-74 (96), 581750, 751, 760, 772, 813:46, 826-28; of 82, 585, 588-89, 600, 621, 726-29, 732, human knowledge [understanding]: 737, 766-67, 779, 793, 804, 813, 818; of 346-47, 349, 350-51, 354, 376, 671-72; Scripture: 564, 679-82, 688, 696-98, of human reason: 200-03 (134), 204, 699:45, 702, 728, 745-47, 750-51, 757, 206; of operation: 184, 216 (166), 303; 810, 813-15, 817, 831, 835; of the of philosophy: 409, 415, 417-18, 425 Trinity: 665-68, 678-79, 698, 703, 721, 427-28; of rational knowledge: 203, 735-37, 742:108, 745, 760, 772. See 207, 222, 354; of Scripture: 689-90, also: Analogy, Appropriation, Christian 694: of substance: 168-69, 173, 175, faith. Expression, Human mind, I l l u 177-78, 180, 182, 231-32, 265, 27 mination. Immutability, Philosophers, 309, 310; of theology. 697, 699-700 Philosophy, Theologians, Theology, (46), 704, 707, 710-11, 714, 819; of th Unity. human intellect: 200-02, 326-27, 336, Understanding, see: Definition, Habitus (of 346, 347-50, 351-52, 606-07, 607-11, principles). Human knowledge. Know621, 623 (199), 626, 647, 651 (253), ledge, Theology (as a Christian un652:254, 654-55, 722, 757:136, 805, derstanding). 809-10, 817; of the human mind: 202 Unibility, 125-26 (52), 128, 129, 133, 206-07, 333; of the human person: 173, 161:54, 176, 218, 300-01. 183-84, 186, 202-03, 204-06, 607-08, Uniformity, 228-35, 256:103, 674, 687, 689, 654-55; of the human potencies: 303, of bodies: 221, 226-28, 230-33, 234, 325-26. 328-29, 336, 338, 340, 354-55, 259, 291, 604. 356; of the rational soul: 206, 221, 595, Union, modes of: 265-66. 286. 297-99, 643; 599, 606-07, 607-11, 654-55, 722; o in charity: 427:148: in knowledge: 431, the sense potencies: 338, 341-44, 373. 548, 671-72, 673-74. 747; in love: 333, See: Life, Man, Matter, Substantial 334. 743, 819: of body and soul in man: form, Wisdom. 120-29, 130 (59). 133. 138, 165, 172Universal, 268, 280, 316, 405; knowledge, 73. 174 (79), 175. 176, 181-85 (99), see: Human knowledge; form: 267-78, 194:113, 203 (134), 213-16. 218, 219:2368, 376-78. 380-81 (45), 381-82, 387, 3. 220:5, 221-22. 223-24, 265, 284, 389 (62), 404-05, 505, 509:127, 523, 289, 290, 294, (211), 295-308, 308-09, 569, 612:170, 616 (179); truth: 457, 311-16, 321, 358, 360, 363, 400, 606, 459. 607-08, 616 (180), 624, 748; of faith University of Paris, 627, 648 (248); Faculty

960

INDEX

of Arts: 609:166. 613:174, 627, 806 (31), 807, 811:40; Faculty of Theology: 176:85, 806:31; masters in the: 806, 807, 811 (39-40), 812 (42), 814, 81518, 838-39. Univocal, predication: 268, 273-74, 470, 484, 490; proportion: 472-73, 474-76, 485; similarity: 469-70; similitude: 474; terms: 470. Univocation |Univocity|, 241-42. 244-45, '261, 469-71, 474-75, Useful, see: Good. Variation, see: Change. Vegetative, life: 278-79, 308; potencies of man: 131, 287, 299-300, 301 (230), 302-03. 323, 328-29 (16), 335, 341; soul: 115, 130-31, 279, 308, 618. See: Plural forms. Vestige, of God [Creator |: 331, 480-82, 499, 537, 559, 561, 564, 568, 578, 594-95, 665-66 ( 1 ) . 703, 744, 746, 751-52, 760, 779, 820, 821, 822, 823. See: (The) Trinity. Vice. 655, 802, 835. Virtue. 141. 326, 398. 406, 617 (183), 620, 622, 625, 683, 727-28; cardinal: 400, 412-13, 617. 622-23, 624, 625 (201), 655. 798; infused, see: Christian (virtue); moral: 326, 336, 412-14. 430, 616:178, 620, 622, 655, 727, 747, 793, 795. 797-99, 802-03, 804, 813. 831:72; speculative: 326; theological: 331. 40910. 524. 550. 825-26. 828 (see: Charity, Christian faith, Hope); and man: 608, 622-23. 655, 798-99; of justice: 120, 205. 325, 331, 368, 386, 387, 408, 41213, 458, 475-76, 530-31. 562-63, 60809 (164), 622, 724, 749:119, 753, 75556, 758, 760, 792, 802, 821. 829-30, 831; of prudence: 406, 408, 480, 622. 755, 793, 829; of religion: 753, 755. 806-07. See also: Humility, Meekness, Mercy. Vision, see: Beatitude, Contemplation, Sight. Water, see: Elements. Whole, form of the: 170-74, 181, 184, 186, 192:110. 204, 221-22. 270, 272, 275, 292-93, 298-99; integral, and universal: 673-74, 677-83, 685, 687, 689, 694-95, 700-01, 704, 706, 711, 714-15, 721. 723, 740, 742-43, 744, 790; potential: 325. See: Being (Esse), Parts. Will, see: God, Human will.

Wine. 265, 814-15, 816. Wisdom, mundane: 788, 810-12 (42), 818; natural [philosophical]: 321-22, 330-31, 333. 370, 409, 409-15, 417-18 (129), 425, 427-28 (148), 433, 446, 447, 45456, 479. 482, 491, 494. 499-500, 504, 523, 525. 529, 535, 538, 546-47. 54751, 560, 564, 569-71, 573-74, 590-91, 598, 614-15, 618, 618-25, 656, 671-72, 683. 703, 711, 727, 739, 740, 758, 798, 811, 812 (42), 813. 814-15, 828, 829 (69), 831:72. 832 (74). 835; theological: 410 (112), 568, 669, 683-86. 692-93, 699-700, 709-11, 810-11, 814-16, 825. 826 (see: Theology, as a wisdom). See also: Certitude, Christian (wisdom), Contemplation, Illumination. Witness, see: Testimony. Worcl(s). see: Christ, Concept, Human words. Worship, 409-10, 454, 541-42. 550, 617 (184). 619, 666-68, 690, 753, 754-56, 758-59, 789, 805, 807 (33), 808-09, 811. 813:46, 829-30, 831, 834. Writings (of St. Bonaventure), early: 323-31, 591-612, 625-26, 627, 627-28, 630-31, 634, 637-39, 642-43, 647-48 (248), 649, 650-51, 654-46, 686-87, 791-804, 81719; middle: 331-33, 820-28 (54); late: 333-35, 609:166, 612-26 (172, 175, 183, 193, 195, 198-99, 204), 627, 635, 643, 647-48 (248), 650-51, 654-55, 655-56, 804-19 (39-40). Th nut is t s}' n Ih csis

Abstraction, 110, 337-38, 358-60, 362, 37576, 387-89 (62-63), 419, 422:140, 43435, 585:116, 652-54. Accident, 117, 160, 187-88, 191-92, 195-98, 310-11, 388, 389, 483, 488, 514-15. Accidental, being: 110, 118, 198, 310, 51415; change: 112, 552; differences: 339; dispositions: 310-11; elements of faith: 756, 767-68; form: 109, 117, 119, 506, 628; perfection: 198, 513; properties: 112; union: 131, 649, 653. Act, and substantial form: 110, 111, 132-33, 161, 162, 216, 311; of contemplation: 208; of essence: 162, 212, 214; of life: 211, 311; of substance: 192-93, 311; of wisdom: 426-27; of the human body: 192, 212, 215, 313, 314:257, 649, 650-

INDEX 51, 654, 780; of the human mind: 211, 516, 551, 554-55, 557-59, 584, 587-88; of the human will: 339-40, 362, 391, 423, 460-62, 718, 762-65; of the individual: 187-88. See: Agent, Being (Esse), Christian faith, Conscience, Form, God, Human intellect. Human knowledge, Human reason, Man, Potency, Principle, Rational soul, Science, Senses. Action, 110-12, 117-18, 187-88, 310, 337, 338-39, 358-59. 391-92, 506, 583-84, 628, 631-34, 647, 716, 761; human [moral |: 208:146, 339, 423, 425, 426, 507, 557, 656, 706, 708-09, 710, 713, 763-64, 765, 766, 776-77, 778, 780-81. Adam, 130, 650:252. Adequation, 393-95, 514-15, 516, 552. Agent. 110-12, 214-15. 423, 466, 506-07, 508, 509, 558-59, 583, 584-85, 628-30 (207), 631-32 (213), 634. 638, 645-46, 648, 652, 655:259, 761. Air, 130, 310, 356, 511, 585, 587. See: Elements. Alteration, 118, 310, 356, 375, 630. Analogy, community of: 483-84, 509-10, 512, 514-15; knowledge by: 483-86, 487-91 (91-92), 507-08, 780; and certitude: 512; and light: 509-13; and lumen: 510-13; and truth: 514-16, 587. See: Being (Esse), Similarity. Angel, 160-61 (54), 190, 193, 358:82, 583, 642-43, 645, 647, 650:252, 770:174. Animals, 118-19(36), 188-89, 209, 310-11, 338, 361, 488, 513, 514, 707. Apostles, 716, 719. Appetite (Desire, Inclination |. 110-11, 130, 337-39. 435-36, 774. Apprehension. 207, 337-38, 387-89, 390-91, 421, 463, 464, 515. 773. Appropriation, 779 (189). Argument, see: Demonstration. Art(s). human: 423, 483, 506-08, 584; liberal: 423; mechanical: 423 (143). Assent. 460-62. 463-64, 762-63, 764, 766, 768, 777; of Christian faith: 460-61, 708, 715. 762, 763-69, 770, 772, 777. Assimilation, 358, 393, 395, 506; to God: 483, 485, 517-18, 553, 588, 656. Author [Authorship |, 717, 719, 723. Authority, 716-19, 720-21, 723. Axioms, 460. Beatitude (Eternal life. Felicity, Happiness], 423-25, 435-36, 463, 649:250, 651-52,

961

654-55 (255), 705, 708, 710, 717, 76 769, 770 (176), 772-78, 779. Being (Em), divine: 517, 714, 715, 773, 7 779; first [uncreated]: 464, 483, 486:85, 487, 490-91, 517, 584, 644; man as a: 214; and analogy: 510, 514, 517; and creation: 627:206, 629-34, 644, 645-46, 648-49; and knowledge: 393, 395-96, 421, 424, 425, 555, 584, 706; and truth: 514-15, 551-53; as a composite: 196, 483, 486:85, 488, 491. Keing (Esse), act of: 160, 162-64, 192-94, 198, 211, 214, 311, 313, 393; complet |perfect, whole]: 109, 110, 118, 16 196-97, 630-31, 636; principles of: 11718, 119. 131-33, 160-62 (51). 163 (56), 193. 212-15, 310-11. 313. 424, 50 630. 631-32: substantial: 110, 118, 1 160-61, 163. 164, 198, 310, 313, 514 15. 632. 649. 653; and analogy: 483. 514-15; and knowledge: 356, 393-95, 424, 467, 506-07, 636, 652-53, 655 (259); and matter: 109, 117-18. 133, 160-61, 163-64, 310-11, 356, 514, 629 30, 631-32; and substantial form: 111, 117-19, 133, 160-61. 163, 310. 506-07, 632; of creatures: 160-61 (54). 163-6 (56), 192-94. 196-98, 310, 358, 464, 483, 486:85, 507, 508, 509, 513-15, 551-52. 552-53, 582-83, 586. 627 (206). 628-33. 635-36. 638-39. 640-42 (231), 643-46 (241), 648 (248), 649, 650. 655, 721; of God (divine]: 160, 187, 192. 196. 198, 2 1 1 , 435-36,46568, 483, 486:85. 488, 490. 514-15, 551, 552-53, 584, 635, 641, 720, 768-70, 772, 773; of Christ: 197-98 (118); of the elements: 110-12, 118; of the human person: 194, 197-98. 214, 488 (see: Man). See also: Accidental. Cause, Essence, Human body (rational soul). Rational soul. Truth. Belief, see: Christian faith. Opinion. Believer, see: (The) Christian. Body, 109-12, 117-19, 130, 132-33, 310, '356, 632-33. 638, 642-44, 649:249, 651, 761. See: Form, Human body, Substance (composite). Sun. Brilliance, 509. 512, 587. Cause (Causality], 357 (81), 358, 461-63, 515, 628, 713, 764; efficient: 514, 516, 583, 588, 628, 633:215, 656; exemplar: 514, 516-17, 588, 656; final: 508, 628, 633:215, 656; first: 423-28, 464, 484-85,

962

INDEX

486, 508, 515, 558-59, 583, 584-85, 589-90, 628-30, 631-34, 634. 640, 709, 711; formal: 508, 628, 633:215, 656; knowledge of: 423-28, 462-63, 466, 484. 507-08, 587, 707, 7 1 1 (see: Human knowledge); material: 649:249; second: 427, 584, 632, 634; and effect: 484-85. 487. 489-90, 507, 583, 587. 630-34 (213), 634, 636. 638, 644, 64547 (244), 648, 655, 711, 714-16, 761. 770, 774, 777 (see: Effect); and matter: 628-29 (207), 632-33, 634, 649:249; of being: 424, 483, 513-14. 584-85, 62833 (213), 639, 640, 643-46 (241, 244), 648; of creatures: 390, 423-28, 464, 483-85, 486-87, 489-90, 507, 628-35, 638, 640-41. 644-47 (243), 648, 7 1 1 12. See: also: God. Celestial | Heavenly bodies, 117. 130, 63233 (216), 638, 643-44. 649:249, 651, 761. See: Sun. Certitude, 460-62, 465-68, 510, 517, 518, 553, 705, 708. 712, 769; complete |perfect|: 464. 508, 512; of Christian faith: 460-63, 708, 711, 713, 762-63, 767, 771, 774, 777; of human knowledge |understanding : 461-62, 463-65, 468, 517-18, 553-55. 586:116, 588-89, 639, 713; of science: 419, 423-24, 426-27, 461-65, 511, 513. 515, 555, 587, 708, 713, 763, 770:176; of theology; 463 (34), 706, 708, 711, 713; of truth: 46364, 465-68, 512, 517-18, 553-54 555, 586-88, 779; of wisdom: 426-27 (148), 462, 464-665 Chance. 506, 635. Change |Immutationj, 112, 356, 374-75, 551-52, 555. 628, 629:210, 630. 632, 634, 638-39. 644 (241). See: Mutability, Mutation. Charity. 427:148, 719, 764, 766-67, 780. Choice, see: Freedom of choice. Christ, 194-98 (113, 118), 582, 713, 71415, 717, 765, 77:174, 779:191. See: (The) Trinity. (The) Christian (Believer), 427:148, 708, 710, 7 1 7 , 721, 761-63, 765, 780. Christian faith [bclief|, act of: 460, 460-63, 652, 713, 762, 764-65, 766-67, 76771, 773, 777, 780-81; articles (principles | of: 641-42, 708. 711-13. 715-16. 717-18, 721-23. 763, 764, 765, 769-70. 778. 836; illumination (divine) of: 590. 762: nature of: 460-64, 762-65, 766-68,

770, 772, 775, 776-77; object of: 46063, 627, 639, 705, 707-08, 711-12, 71320. 721-22, 762-65, 765, 766-67, 76771, 772-73, 773-78, 779 (191), 780-81; truths of: 461, 558, 629-30, 632-33 (216), 635-36, 638, 640-41, 641-45. 647. 654-55, 706, 716, 717:70, 718-23 (75), 762-63, 766, 768-71, 772, 773-75 (181). 779. 835-36; and God: 460-63, 629, 633 (216), 634, 640-42, 645, 705. 711-13, 714-16, 719, 764-65, 766-67, 767-70, 771-73, 773-78, 779-80; and human reason: 558, 590, 627-29, 63133 (216). 634, 635-36. 638, 640-43, 640-43, 644 (241), 644-45, 647. 651. 654-55. 705, 708, 7 1 1 - 1 2 . 718-23, 76162, 767-71, 772-73, 773-75 (181); and the human intellect: 461, 761-64, 76667. 775. 777; and the human will: 46063. 762-65, 766. 777. See: Assent. Certitude, Error, Lumen, Philosophy, Science, Theology. Christian, life: 710; philosophy: 835-36; religion: 774, 780-81; understanding, see: Theology; virtue: 711, 761. Cogitative sense: 380. See: Senses. Cognition, see: Knowledge. Colour. 356, 375-76. 388, 352, 707, 714. Common, form: 184-85, 488; nature, see: Nature, Species; sense: 337, 357:80, 375, 388, 555 (see: Senses). Composition of, body and soul in man: 13 161, 164, 190, 191:110, 194, 212, 214, 312, 313: being and essence: 160-61 (54), 162-63. 192, 212, 214, 312-13; form and matter: 119, 130, 162, 19 213-16, 310-11, 312, 509:127, 627:206 (see: Form); the rational soul: 159-64, 213-16, 312-13. See also: Being (Ens), Definition, Human body (rational soul), Parts. Comprehension, 389-91, 419, 424. 462, 463, 486, 489, 705, 708, 720:75, 762, 779. Concept |Intelligible word], 391-92, 39394. 395, 422, 506, 722. See: Human i tellect (conceptions of). Concupiscence. 656. Concupiscible, see: Appetite. Conformity, 393-94, 552-53, 776. Conjunct (Conjunction], 192:110, 224:22. Connatural, form: 419. Conscience, 339, 422. Conservation. 163, 337-38, 361-62, 551,

INDEX 583-86.

Contemplation, 208, 390, 392, 554, 70S, 707-08, 710, 716-17. 721, 778. Contingency. 208:146, 558, 649, 713. Contradiction, 641, 645-46 (244), 648:248, 650:252, 655. 719, 721. Contrariety, 130, 163, 709, 718. 720-23. Corporeity. 514. Corruption. 130. 163, 310-11. 514, 635. 642, 649:249. 651-53, 720. Counsel. 339. Creation, 109-11, 130-31, 159, 163 (56), 193, 310. 506, 508, 509:126, 589. 62736, 637-40 (231), 642, 643-44 (241), 645-49 (243, 248-49), 650 (252), 715, 721, 779. Creator, see: Analogy, Creation, Creatures, Cod, Similarity. Creatures, 162-64, 191, 192, 196-98, 211, 361, 468, 483, 489:91, 509, 516, 55153, 554-55. 583-85, 586 (116), 587, 628-35, 637-38 (233). 640-41 (235), 642-47, 648-49 (248), 655-56, 705. 707, 709. 712, 714-15, 716, 719-20. 721, 761. 773. 775, 779; spiritual [immaterial |: 163, 192-94, 198, 212, 31213. 389, 489:91, 516, 631-32, 649. See: Being (Kns), Cause, Cod, Matter, Perfection, Rational soul, Similitude, Substance. Death, see: Human body (rational soul, separated from). Deception, 388, 463, 554-55, 762. Delect, in knowledge: 708. 762. Delight, 775. Definition | Meaning), 388-39, 486, 714, 716; of, act: 312; animal: 188, 189; art: 423; being (ens): 393: certitude: 461-62, 463; Christian belief (faith): 460, 762; completive form: 244:22; composition (conjunction): 224:22, conscience: 339; estimative sense: 338 (see here: sense); existing: 194-98; faculty: 340; form: 312; Cod: 467, 486; good: 393; hypostasis: 188-89, 191, 195-96; idea: 506, 508; individual: 187, 188. 195; intellect: 209, 339, 340; intelligence: 340; knowledge: 487; latria: 780; light: 510-12; lumen: 510-12; man: 188, 189-90, 388, 466; matter: 312; memory: 361. 362; metaphysics: 424; mind: 209-11: name: 190, 216; person: 187-88 (102), 189-91, 198; piety: 780; potency: 312. 360-61; reason: 207. 340; religion: 780; res

963

naturae: 195-96; science: 424, 768; seeing: 510-11 (see here: sense); seminal reason: 111; sense: 209; sensibility (sensuality): 338; something: 393: soul: 209; spirit: 209, 211-12; substance: 187, 188; supposit: 195-96; theology: 424; theosebia: 780; thinking: 461; thing: 393; true: 393-94 (73), 587; truth: 394-95 (73, 77); wisdom: 423. Demonstration (Argument, Proof, Proposition), 421, 423 (143), 426, 427, 463-64, 466-68, 553-54, 587, 635-36 (219), 637-38 (223), 639, 639-42 (23132, 235), 643-44 (241), 644-49 (248), 649, 713, 714, 716-22 (70), 723, 762, 767-71, 772-73, 774, 775-76, 779. Desire, see: Appetite. Difference [Distinction |, 161:54, 188-89, 192, 337-40, 356-63 (80-82, 88), 37476 (34), 387-88, 633, 635, 649, 772. Dignity, 189, 390, 554, 706, 718, 763. See: Nobility. Discernment, see: Judgment. Distinction, see: Difference. Disposition, 109, 118, 132-33, 208, 310-11, 420, 514, 552, 632 (214), 638, 716, 720, 761. Divine, see: Contemplation, God, Idea, Inspiration, Revelation, Science, Truth, Worship. Doctrinal character (of the Thomist synthesis), 135, 164. 218, 319. 362-63, 365. 389. 395-96. 421-22. 427-28, 44041, 467-68, 484-86 (85), 491 (92), 51618. 521-22. 589-90, 642-43, 647-48 (248), 654-55, 656-57, 661-63. 709-11, 722-23. 776-78, 784-86, 835-36 (79). Doubt. 460-61, 466, 645, 672, 774. Earth. 130, 310. See: Elements. Earthly bodies, see: Terrestrial bodies. Effect,' 117, 119. 394 (73), 558, 652. 767, 770; of creatures: 585-86 (116), 630, 631-34 (216). 634; of God: 427:148. 466-68, 484-86, 487, 489-90, 582-85, 585-86 (116), 589, 630. 631, 633-34 (216), 638-39, 644, 645-47, 648, 656, 715-16, 769, 773, 778. See: Cause. Elements. 110-12, 118, 118-19(36), 130. 310, 356. 511. 585, 587, 633. See: Body, Form (of bodies). Emanation, 630. 634, 640, 644. End (Purpose). 422-23, 506, 508, 637, 640, 712, 721. 722, 764-65; and God: 390. 628. 638, 705, 707. 711, 714. 715, 763,

964

INDEX

765, 767. 774-78, 780; and knowledge: 339, 392, 425, 463, 506-07, 508, 70506, 708-09, 710, 763-64, 776, 778; of man: 390, 423, 424, 507. 705-06, 709, 710. 763, 767, 774-78. See: Theology. Entity, 393-95, 513. 515, 516, 551. Equivocity, 484-85, 488-89, 490, 630. Error in, Christian faith: 631-32, 634, 639, 641, 644, 645, 647, 651-52 (253-54), 654-55, 716, 720-21 (75); knowledge: 388-89, 463, 489:91. 636, 705, 708, 763, 773 (178), 774-75, 835; philosophy: 632, 634, 639. 645, 652 (254). 656, 712, 719-20: theology: 639, 656, 720-21 (75); of the philosophers: 627, 634-35. 656-57, 662-63, 719-20, 774 (180), 775, 781; on, beatitude: 649:250, 651-52, 654-55 (255); creation: 628-35 (213-16, 218), 644 (241), 645, 647: creatures: 628-30, 630, 631-34 (214, 216), 642, 644-45; God: 628-30, 630 31, 631-34 (213-16, 218), 644. 650; the eternity of the world: 635, 638. 639 (229), 641, 644, 645, 647; the human intellect: 633:216, 638:223, 642, 651-54 (254-55), 655 (259); the rational soul: 631-32, 633, 638:223, 642, 649-52; the separate intelligences: 631-34 (214-16), 644, 650:250 Essence, and being: 160-61 (54), 162-64 (56). 192, 212, 214. 312-13. 393-95, 466. 486:85. 513. 559: and relation: 189; object of the intellect: 387-88. 391, 393-95. 419, 642. See: Man, Principle, Rational soul. Estimative (Cogitative) sense, 338. See: Senses.

Eternal, law: 421, 426-27, 556-57 (64); life, see: Beatitude: principles: 208 (146), 556; reasons: 427. 464. 509, 554-56. 584. 586-88. 588-89; rules: 208, 426, 427, 554. 557. Eternity, and time: 630, 635, 636-38, 639-40 (229, 2 3 1 ) , 642. 644-46, 648-49; of the world: 627. 630. 635-49 (223, 231, 248), 721. Evidence, 388, 460-61, 462, 467-68. 770; self: 389. 435. 462-63, 465-67, 468, 508. 515-16. 559, 636. 713, 771, 773; and Christian faith: 762, 767. 768, 770, 773, 777. Evil. 207, 337-38, 339, 421. 509:127. 628. Exemplar (Exemplarity |. see: Cause, Form, God.

Existence, 187. 191. 194. 389, 419-20. 425. 435-36, 506, 552. 644, 648. Existing, 163-64 (58). 188, 190-91. 194-98. 390, 637. Experience, 421, 636, 639, 655. 770:174. 779:191. Expression (Manifestation |, of truth: 391-93, 394-95, 508, 510-11, 512, 559, 709, 718-20, 721-22, 761, 773, 775 Faculty. 340. 558. False | Falsehood |, 389, 466, 551-52. 633-34, 635, 644. 645, 709. 712. 720, 721. 762, 774, 775, 777. Fathers, of the Church: 717. 723. Fault, 763. Felicity, sec: Beatitude. Fire, 130, 310, 585. See: Elements, Heat. Force, see: Power. Form, 192:110, 419, 484-85, 488, 551; completive: 224:22, exemplar: 506-07, 628. 630; intelligible: 192, 358. 434-35. 515. 584, 651 (see: Species); proper: 131-33, 310-11: pure (simple, spiritual |: 160-61 (54), 163-64, 192-93, 313, 358 ( 8 2 ) , 360, 361. 424, 627:206, 643-44, 649; specific: 109. 212, 215, 420, 632; and matter: 109-12 (20). 117-19, 130-33. 160-64, 192, 194, 213-16, 216,310-12. 313. 389-90, 509:127, 627:206, 628 (207)), 649-50. 656 (see: Matter); of bodies: 109, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 118-19, 130, 16061 (54), 163-64, 310-11. See also: Accidental, Human body (rational soul). Natural, Substantial form, Universal.

Formal, act: 339, 764, 766; object: 208, 36162, 707. 708, 710, 711/712, 715-16, 722-23, 765-66. 772, 778, 781; part: 192. See: Cause, Principle. Freedom of choice, 187-88, 338, 339-40 (39), 638. Generation, 110-12. 118, 130-31, 161, 163, 310-11, 337, 506-07, 628 (207), 632, 634, 635-36, 649 (249). 650:251, 65153, 720, 779. Genus, 109, 118, 130, 161-62, 187-88, 192, 195, 197, 312-13, 424, 426-27, 484, 516 Geometry, 713. Gift, 776. See: Grace. Holy Spirit. God (Creator), 211, 483, 558-59, 717, 723, 764; acts (actions | of: 506, 507, 556, 583-84, 631-34 (218), 638-40, 642, 644 (241), 645-47, 649, 706, 715-16, 761; causality of: 357 (81), 390, 423-28.

INDEX 462, 464, 484-85, 486-87, 489, 490, 507-08, 509, 511, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 552-53, 558, 559, 560, 583, 58485, 585-86 (116), 588-90, 628-30, 63132 (213), 633-35, 638-39, 640-41, 64344 (241), 645-47 (244), 648, 656, 70809, 711-12, 761, 733; essence and nature [substance] of: 160, 187, 18991, 192, 196, 435, 465-66. 467, 483, 486 (85), 487, 488-89, 490, 491, 506, 508-09, 511, 584-85, 633-34, 638-39, 640-41, 644:241, 714, 715, 770, 773, 778, 779; exemplar: 465, 483, 487, 506-08, 514, 516-17, 552, 588, 628, 655-56; first light, 511, 553, 557 (67) — see: Light; first principle: 486, 489, 507, 514, 585, 628-30. 644, 647, 707, 711, 714-15, 773, 778; first truth: 390, 395, 462, 466-67, 487, 490, 516, 551, 553-55, 586-88, 715-718, 762, 763-64, 765, 767, 768, 772, 777, 778, 779 (see: Truth, divine); goodness of: 436, 483, 486-87, 489, 515, 650, 65556, 711. 765; influence [cooperation, presence | of: 435, 551, 553, 557-59, 560, 582-85, 585-86, 586-87, 589 (126), 631-33 (213-14); intellect of: 484. 509, 511, 512, 513-16, 516-18, 551-52, 584, 588, 634, 651. 656 (see: Human intellect); knowledge of: 392, 463:34, 483-84, 486, 487, 489, 506-09, 512, 517, 518. 552. 584. 634, 644:241, 706-07, 708-09, 710-11, 712-13. 71517. 719, 765, 769, 774. 779 (see: Human knowledge); likeness {similitude | of: 435, 487, 489:91, 49091, 508, 510, 511, 512, 516, 553-54, 556, 559, 587-89, 656, 722, 779; mind of: 468. 483, 506, 507, 508, 512, 516, 552, 553, 589, 635 (see: Human mind); names of: 467, 486-91 (91-92), 509: power and will of: 163 (56), 435, 486, 517, 583-85, 586, 631-34, 638-39, 64042, 644:241, 645-46, 648, 717. 761, 773; reason of: 706-07, 764, 767, 768; wisdom of: 428, 483, 486-87, 488, 491, 638-39 (266), 709: Word of: 392, 722 (sec: Christ); and creation: 109-10, 130-31. 159. 163 (56), 506. 508. 589, 627-35 (206, 211, 218), 636. 638 (266). 640, 644 (241), 645-46 (243), 647-49. 650 (252), 715; and creatures: 110-11, 117-18, 163 (56). 192. 2 1 1 . 427:148. 435. 483-86 (85). 486-89

965

(91). 490-91. 506-09 (126), 510. 51115, 516-18. 551-53, 558, 559, 583-85, 586-88 (116). 590, 628-35, 635, 63942 (231, 235), 643-44 (241), 645-47, 648, 649, 655-57, 705-07, 709-12, 71416, 720-22, 761. 765, 773, 776, 779; and the rational soul: 130-31, 159, 435, 511, 512-13, 516, 557. 582, 585, 586-87. 633, 647, 649-51 (250-53), 761. See also: Beatitude, Being (F.sse), Christian faith. Effect, End, Error, Eternal, Idea, Illumination, Image, Infinity. Knowledge, Love, Lumen. Man, Perfection, Person, Philosophy, Revelation, Theologians, Theology, (The) Trinity, Unity, Worship. Good [Goodness |. 207, 337-40, 391, 393, 421, 483. 486. 489, 508, 509:127, 511, 515, 628, 634, 655-56, 709, 710-11, 764, 774-78, See: God. Grace. 582, 583, 585, 709. 714, 715-16, 719, 770, 776. Habitus, intellectual: 358, 419-20, 423-24; nature of: 339-40, 421. 462, 706-07, 776; of Christian faith: 762-66, 775, 776-77: of understanding (first principles |: 340, 419-22, 425-26, 427-28, 461-63, 553-54, 558-59, 587-88, 708, 713, 716, 762, 767-69. See: Science, Wisdom. Happiness, see: Beatitude. Hearing, 356-57. See: Senses. Heat, 356, 510/761. See: Fire. (The) Heavens, see: Celestial bodies. Heretics, 718. Historical aspects (of the Thomist synthesis), 111-12, 131:62, 135. 164, 218, 319, 362-63, 365, 389 (62), 393, 421-22, 440-41, 508:125, 511, 513, 522, 55457, 589-90, 635, 654-55. 661-63. 723, 786. Holy Spirit, 711, 770:174, 779:191; gifts of: 426-27, 709, 711, 776, 780-81. Honour, 631, 780. Hope, 768, 780. Human action, see: Action. Human body, organization [parts] of: 130, 131, 190; perfection of: 118, 132-33, 649-51; and the human intellect: 212, 214, 340 (39), 357, 424, 762; rational Soul, gives being to the body: 131-32, 160:151, 161, 212-15, 216:166, 313, 643, 649; in and moves the body: 131 (63), 212, 214, 312; separated from the

966

iNDEX

body: 192, 193:12, 312:253, 640, 641:235, 642, 647, 648. 649-50 (25052). 652-54. See: Act. Christ, Composition, Human knowledge, Man, Medium, Substance. Substantial form. Union. Human intellect, acts [operations] of: 212, 214-15. 338-40, 357-60 (81, 87-88), 362, 387-93, 394-96, 419, 422 (140), 423-24, 425-27, 434-36, 460-62, 46364, 484-85, 514, 515, 516-17, 553, 55458. 559-60, 584, 585-86 (116), 588-89, 639, 651-54, 761-62, 763-64, 767, 768, 774, 777; agent and possible: 338, 357-60. 387, 419-20, 422, 434, 511, 513, 554, 555-58, 559, 588, 651-54, 655 (259), 713, 761 (see: Lumen); conceptions of: 419-20, 425, 466, 653 (see: Concept); considerations of: 339, 359, 362, 388-89, 391-92, 394, 425-26, 583, 763-64, 778; memory of: 360, 361-63, 390:163, 420-21, 422, 427, 463:34 (see: Memory); nature of: 160, 209, 21415, 339-40, 357-60, 387-88, 420-21, 428, 463, 484, 511, 514, 553. 558, 58384, 586, 633:216, 638:223, 640, 642, 651, 651-54 (254-55), 655 (259), 708, 761. 764. 768, 774, 777: objects of: 212, 339-40, 359-61, 362. 387, 388-93, 393-96, 419-21, 422, 423-24, 425 26, 434-36, 460-62, 463-64, 465-68, 48485, 515-16, 553, 554, 555-58, 585-86, 588-89, 628, 642, 651-54, 717, 761-64, 768-69, 773-75, 777, 778; practical and speculative: 338, 339, 763-64, 766, 778; and God: 357:81, 465-68, 484, 485, 511-16, 553, 556, 557-60, 583-84, 585 (116), 588-89, 633:216, 761, 763. 766-67. 768-70, 777; and the human will: 338, 360, 461, 762-64, 766, 767, 777; as mind and spirit: 209, 211-12 (157), 338. See also: Human body. Illumination, Intellective, Intellectual, Light, Rational soul, Senses, Truth. Human knowledge [Human understanding, Natural knowledge, Natural understanding |, acts [operations) of: 21115, 312, 340, 357 (81), 358-61, 38793, 394-96, 418-20, 434-36 (171), 557-58, 583, 585, 586, 645, 651-55 (259), 761; cause of: 357 (81), 358, 393, 511, 513, 515, 583, 585-86, 590, 655 (see: Cause); nature of: 130, 193,

214-15, 340. 361, 388-89, 390, 424, 462, 483-84, 487, 553. 585-86, 588, 767: objects of: 357-60 (87), 361-62 (91). 388-92, 393-96, 419-20, 423-24, 425-27, 434-36. 461-66. 467-68, 48689 (91), 490, 512, 515. 552-54, 555, 559, 583, 584, 585-86, 586-88, 588-89, 590, 628, 645, 651-54, 655-56, 705-09, 7 1 4 , - 7 1 6 , 719, 761-62, 764, 767-71, 772 73, 774-78; practical and speculative: 339, 340, 557, 587, 709; and God: 210-11, 357 (81), 390, 462, 464-65, 483-84, 506, 507. 511-13, 559, 709. 776: and the human body [person]: 212, 214-15; as self-reflexive: 214. 361:91. 363. 392, 422; of principles: 419-21, 461-62, 465 (see: Principle): of universals: 376:34, 424. See also: Analogy, Apprehension, Assent, Being (£IM), Hcing (Esse), Certitude. Comprehension, End, Error, Illumination, Intellectual, Knowledge, Mode, Movement. Order. Perfection, Science, Similitude, Truth. Human mind. 209-12 (157), 338, 361 (91), 362, 390, 392, 394. 461, 468, 483, 511, 512, 516-17, 551-53, 554-55, 556. 55759, 582. 589-90 (126), 635, 639, 76869; and Cod: 421. 435-36. 466-68, 555, 556, 557-59, 582-84, 586-88, 761-62. Human nature, see: Man. Human parents, 780. Human [Natural] reason, acts [operations] of: 207-08, 338, 340, 419. 421, 422-23, 425-26, 462-63, 515, 553-54, 627, 63536, 639, 641-43, 649, 705, 708, 721, 722, 762, 767, 768-71, 773; considerations [deliberations | of: 207-08, 239-40, 388, 422-23, 716; nature of: 193, 337, 340, 556:64, 558, 772-75 (181), 778; objects of: 208, 339-40, 388, 434, 462-63, 553-54, 556:64, 558, 63536, 639. 641-43, 649, 719, 762, 768-69, 772-73, 774-78 (181), 779; practical and speculative: 208 (146), 421, 423; superior and inferior: 207-08 (146), 209-10, 211, 340, 554; and philosophy: 705. 723. 772, 835-36; and the human will: 207, 339-40; and the senses: 33840, 716. Sec: Christian faith. Estimative sense. Lumen, Order. Science, I heologians. Theology. Truth. Human soul, see: Rational soul. Human understanding, see: Human

INDEX knowledge. Human will, 207, 338-40, 360-62, 391, 46062, 463, 483, 719, 762-63. 763-65, 76667. 776, 777. Human words (Speech |, 391-92, 422-23, 552-53, 583, 716. Hypostasis. 187. 188-89, 190-91, 193-94, 195-96, 197-98. Idea. 506-08. 628, 630, 650, 655-56; divine; 483. 506-09 (125-27], Idolatry, 631, 634. Ignorance, 655. Illumination. 511, 555. 557 (67). 583. 584, 656-57; by the agent intellect: 556-58, 559; divine, see: Christian faith; of human knowledge: 559-60: of man: 583, 590, 657; of the human intellect: 555, 556-58, 559, 585-86 (116), 588: of the human mind: 511. 554-58, 559, 582-83, 588. 589-90 (126) Image, 391, 587-88; of God: 208-11 (152), 360-61, 559, 779. Imagination, 337-39, 357:80, 360, 376:34, 391, 651-54. See: Senses. Imitation. 483-85, 488, 491, 506-08, 512, 515-16, 517-18, 589, 719. Immaterial [Spiritual], see: Spirit, Spiritual. Immutability, 468, 551-53, 554-55, 556-57, 559, 586, 588, 638-39, 640, 644. Immutation. see: Change. Inclination, see: Appetite. Incorruption, 163, 514, 653-54 (255). Individual, man: 160, 191-92 (110), 193, 194-97, 214-15, 312, 388, 420, 423, 649-51, 651-55 (259); matter: 189-90, 191-94; substance: 187, 188, 190, 194, 195-96. 198, 212, 388, 393, 635. Individuation, 160, 164:58, 187-98, 649. Infallibility, 389, 461, 554, 588, 588-89, 645. 713, 718. 764. 767, 777. Infinity (Infinite), and creatures: 631, 633, 634, 637, 641:235; and time: 635. 637; and the rational soul: 638:223, 642, 647, 648, 650-5!; and the world: 637-38 (223), 641:235, 642-43; of God: 484, 486, 491, 631, 633, 645. Infused, illumination: 590; likeness of God: 559; lumen: 558-59, 583-84, 586, 716; principles: 713; virtues. 761, 776. Innate, habitus, 419-21, 762; knowledge: 435-36, 467, 468, 554, 559; lumen: 762; principles: 435, 556, 586:116, 713, 762. Inspiration, 705, 765, 774. Instinct, 338.

967

Instruction, 705, 716, 721. See: Learning. Instrument, 628, 633, 708, 711-12, 722. Intellect, see: God, Human intellect. Intellective, appetite: 338; knowledge: 487; operations: 214-15, 338; potency: 209, 211, 212:157, 214-15, 337-38, 361, 422, 424, 511, 558; rational soul as: 208-09, 215, 358, 361-62, 650-51, 654-55 (259); substance: 654-55. Intellectual, knowledge: 117, 376:34, 392, 509-10, 583; operations: 212-13, 583; potency: 585; principle: 212 (157), rational soul as: 420; substance: 632, 638:223, 640, 642; virtues: 425-26, 462, 655, 764, 776. 777. See: Habitus, Lumen, Medium. Intelligence, 161:54, 340, 361, 506-07. 584, 585-86, 633:216, 638:223, 642, 835; separate (celestial): 357, 424, 557, 628:207. 631-34, 638:223, 642, 643-44 (241), 650:250, 651-54 (255, 257). Intelligible, species, see: Species; word, see: Concept. Intention, 506-07, 508, 514, 634, 635-36, 650, 651, 714. Investigation, 642, 705, 773-74, 775. Irascible, see: Appetite. Judgment [Discernment] of, Christian faith: 762; human reason: 421, 422:140, 55354, 762; science and wisdom: 426-27, 464; theology: 709, 712; the human intellect. 388-90 (62), 395, 426-27, 46162, 463-64, 514, 515-16, 554-56, 58889, 774; the human mind: 390, 554-57. 586-88; the senses: 337, 375, 388, 38990, 394-95, 554, 555. See: Conscience. Knowledge, theological: 705, 706-09, 71011, 712, 713-16, 717, 719, 721-23; of God, analogical: 483-86 (85), 486-89 (91). 489-91 (92), 507-08, 587-88, 589; human (natural |: 390, 424, 425-27 (148), 428, 434-36 (171), 464, 465-68, 484-85, 486-90, 551, 553-54, 554-57 (64), 585-86, 586-88, 589, 630-31, 639, 705, 709, 712. 714, 715-16, 719-20, 722, 762, 763, 768-71, 772-73, 773-75, 776, 778; infused [Christian]: 583-84, 586, 705-09, 710, 711, 714, 715-16, 719, 762-63, 768-71, 772-73, 773-78; theological: 709-11, 714, 715-16, 722, 776-78. See: Concept, Demonstration, Evidence, Experience, Human knowledge. Intellective, Investigation. Judgment, Memory, Perception, Phan-

968

INDEX

tasm, Philosophy, Predication, Sense knowledge. Species, T h i n k i n g . Latria, 780. Law, 421, 422, 776. See: Eternal. Learning, 583, 705, 706, 721. See: Teacher. Liber lie causis, 631-32 (213), 632-34, 644:241. Life, 118, 130, 132-33, 210-12, 214, 310-11, 337-38, 425, 428 (150), 465, 586-87, 705-06, 709, 710, 717, 774-79. Light, 117-19, 130:59, 310:251, 356, 376, 424. 510-12, 513, 588; of God: 509-10, 512, 513, 553, 555. 556-57 (67), 558; of human reason: 553; of the human intellect: 391, 509-11, 558; of the human mind: 516. Limitations, and being: 491; and being: 19293, 358; of the human intellect: 357, 558; of the rational soul: 358. Logic, 423 (143), 425. See: Philosophy (rational). Logician, 514. Love, 361 (91), 391, 483: of (for) God, infused (Christian |: 427:148, 764, 766, (see: Charity); natural: 585, 776. Lumen, 510-11, 557, 583, 761; corporeal: 510-11, 512-13, 583-84. 587; intellectual: 510, 558, 583; of Christian faith: 460-61, 558-59, 705-06, 711-16, 719, 722-23, 761-62, 762-64, 770-72, 775. 835-36; of God: 390, 421, 463, 468. 509, 511, 512, 514, 516-18, 55657, 588-89, 705, 706-08, 711-12, 716, 770; of natural reason: 421, 462-63, 465, 468, 553-54, 556, 558-59. 588-89, 705-06, 708, 712, 719, 722-23, 762, 764, 770-72, 773, 836; of the agent intellect: 358, 390, 419-20, 434, 511, 513, 514, 516-17, 555-58, 559, 584, 585-86 (116), 588-89, 761, 764; of the human mind: 512, 558, 583-84, 761-62. Man, acts [operations] of: 196, 212, 214-16, 312, 360:87, 420-22, 424-27, 434-36, 466-67, 506, 552-54, 555, 556:64, 55658, 582-83, 586-88, 639, 651-54, 655 (259), 707, 7 1 7 , 761-62, 767-68, 76972, 774-76, 776-78, 780; being of: 16061 (54), 162-64, 192-94, 196, 197-98, 211-16, 311, 312, 340, 483, 488, 559, 636, 652-53. 655 (259), 780; essence and nature of: 130-32, 160, 162, 164 (58), 188, 189-90, 191-98 (113), 21415, 310-12 (253), 338, 357, 358, 388, 420, 466, 483, 558, 590, 636 (219),

638:223, 642-43, 647, 649-50, 651-56 (259), 720, 776, 777-78, 780; life of: 211, 214, 428(150), 705-06, 709, 711, 717, 774-79; potencies of: 337-40, 35663, 555-56, 761, 769, 774, 776; sub stantial form of: 130-33, 160-61 (54), 162, 193:112, 212-15, 216:166, 31113, 507, 632, 643, 648:248, 649-50, 654-55 (259); and God: 427:148, 705, 706, 710, 7 1 1 , 718-19, 721, 761-63, 765, 768-72, 774-76; 778-79, 780. See: Christ, Composition, End, Human body, Illumination, Perfection, Person, Rational soul, Species, Union. Manifestation, see: Expression. Mathematics, 424-25. See: Philosophy (natural). Matter, essence and nature of: 109-11, 112, 132-33, 163-64, 310-12, 628, 631-32; proper. 131-33, 310-12; spiritual: 161 (54), 162, 312; and act: 110, 132-33, 161, 310-11, 628; and creation: 62830, 631-33, 634, 643, 645-46, 648, 649:249, 650; and individuation: 160, 188-94; and knowledge: 424; and potency: 110-11, 118-19, 132-33, 161, 163-64, 194, 216 (166-67), 310-12, 628, 629-33, 634, 646; and substantial form: 109-12, 118-19, 130-32, 160-64, 213-16, 310-13 (see: Form); and the rational soul: 159-64, 193-94, 213-16, 310-11, 312-13, 337-38. See also: Abstraction, Heing (Esse). Meaning, see: Definition. Medium, and creation: 631-35; and motion: 584; between form and matter: 132-33, 164, 310-11; between soul and body in man: 131-32. 164, 215-16, 310, 314:257; of demonstration: 463-64, 553-54; of intellectual knowledge: 38889, 390-91, 418-19, 421, 425-26, 510, 553-56, 583, 588, 653; of sense knowledge: 356, 510-11, 583. Memory, intellectual, see: Human intellect; sense: 337-39, 361-62, 376:34 (see: Seses). Mercy, 774, 780-81. Merit, 710, 718-19, 721, 764, 766-67, 772, 776-77. Metaphorical, see: Analogy, Predication. Metaphysician, 514, 718. Metaphysics, 422, 424, 425, 706, 708. See: Philosophy (natural). Mind, see: God, Human mind.

INDEX Mirror, 419:92, 513, 516, 555, 587. Miracles, 716. Mode of, action [operation): 337-38, 339, 357, 418-19, 423, 633, 764, 773, 775; being: 393, 395-96; being: 584; existing: 188, 190-91, 194, 198, 390; knowledge: 117, 338, 340, 357, 361, 392, 418, 427, 436:171, 484, 485-88, 645, 708, 713, 722, 764, 770:176, 773, 773, 775; procedure: 636, 641:236, 716-23 (70), 767-72; of reception: 716. Moral, science: 339, 42!, 422 (140), 423, 716 (see: Practical). See also: Action (human), Philosophy (moral). Movement jMotion, Mover], 212, 337-38, 340, 356, 391, 555, 557, 583, 584-85, 632, 634, 636, 639, 641-42, 649:249; and creation: 629:210, 630, 631. 632, 634, 635-36, 638, 640, 642, 644 (241), 646, 648, 649:249; and knowledge: 212, 337-38, 391-92, 395, 419, 460-61, 463, 468, 515, 557-58, 559, 583-85, 651, 761-62, 768, 777. Mutability, 551-53, 554. See: Change. Mutation, 163, 628, 630 (212), 634. See: Change. Mystical, theology: 716. Name, 190, 216, 486-89. See: God. Naples, 627, 643, 649:249. Natural, form: 424, 628, 650, 652; rule: 423. See: Agent, Change, Human knowledge. Human reason, Law, Light, Lumen, Moral (science). Operation, Philosophy (natural), Power, Property. Nature, 162, 195-96, 435, 585, 627, 714, 715-16, 719, 770, 775; common: 188, 191-92 (110), 194, 195-96, 198 (see: Species); order of: 109-10, i l l , 162-64, 193-94, 207, 313, 422, 425, 590, 627, 631, 635, 709, 761; operation of: 507, 515, 628, 629:211, 761, 776; and being: 160, 163-64, 197, 311, 633. See: Natural, Priority. Necessity, 208:146, 463-64, 508, 517, 551, 553, 555, 559-60, 586, 588, 590, 62932, 634, 636, 638-42 (232), 644 (241), 645-46, 649 (249), 655:259, 705-06, 709-10, 713, 717, 719-20, 721-22, 769, 771, 773-76, 779. Neighbour, 780. Nobility, 130, 193, 463, 489:9t. 510, 632, 707-09, 711. 763. See: Dignity. Obedience, 761, 763, 766, 777. Obligation, 780.

969

Operation, see: Human intellect, Human knowledge. Human reason. Intellective, Intellectual, Man, Mode, Nature, Principle, Potencies of operation, Rational soul, Senses, Vegetative. Opinion (Human belief], 460-61, 555, 58 631, 635-36, 640, 642, 643, 645, 650-52 (252-53), 655, 768, 771-72, 775. Optics, 713. Order, 207-08, 311, 339, 393, 422-23, 42527, 464, 506-07, 584, 628, 633, 634, 635, 646, 648, 705, 708-09, 710, 712, 714-15, 720, 761, 774, 776-77, 778, 780, 836; theological: 705, 706, 71 712, 714-15, 721-23, 776, 778; of being: 118, 162, 193, 310, 313; of causality: 485. 489, 490, 508; of knowledge: 423, 425, 510, 584, 588, 590; of reason: 33940, 422-23, 425, 559; of substance: 118, 163. See: Nature, Practical, Speculative, Time. Organization, of the human body: 130. Organs, of the senses: 119:36, 130, 212, 21 337, 356-57, 361, 374-76, 388, 420, 510. Parents, 780. Paris, see: University. Parts, composition of: 160-61; distinction of: 633; formal: 192; material: 192, 714; of a composite: 130, 196, 388; of the human body: 131, 190. Participation, 340:59, 390, 421, 465, 483-85, 486-87, 488, 508. 511, 514, 517-18, 551, 553, 555-56, 557, 588, 629, 65556, 719, 770, 774, 777. Phantasm, see: Imagination. Perception by the, human intellect: 425-26, 427, 435, 558, 639; human mind: 435, 584, 639; senses: 337, 356, 375, 719 Perfection, 110, 111, 117, 132, 198, 208, 313, 427 (148), 513, 585, 764, 776; o Christian faith: 764, 770, 773, 777; o creatures: 198, 484-86, 486-89 (91), 489-91, 517-18; of God: 484-86, 48689 (91), 489-91, 509, 517 -18; of hu man reason: 208, 339, 422, 721, 722, 775; o knowledge: 387, 393, 419, 464, 71 761-62, 768-69, 770, 773; of man: 132 212, 423-25, 428 (150), 636, 652-53, 655, 707, 776; of science: 424, 768 769, 770 (176), 773; of substance: 110 112, 198, 312, 636; of truth: 393-95, 426, 706, 719; of the human intellect: 358, 387, 395-96, 425-26, 428, 517-18,

970

INDEX

651, 764, 775. See: Human body, Principle. Person, divine: 187 (102), 189-91 (108), 392, 488, 715, 779 (189) — see: Christ; human: 187-88 (102), 189-91, 193-94 (112-13), 194-98, 212, 214-16 (166), 488, 655. Personality, 187, 193 (112), 194, 198. Phantasm, 357-60, 362, 363, 387-89, 390:63, 391, 418, 420, 556, 651-54, 774. Philosophers, 425, 466, 555, 627, 628-30 (207), 630-31 (212), 631-32 (213-14), 633-35 (215-16), 635-36, 637-41 (22324, 229), 643, 643-44 (241), 644, 646:244, 647, 649:249, 649-50 (25052), 651 (253), 651-54 (257), 655-57 (259), 662-63, 719-20, 721-22, 723, 769-70, 773, 775-76, 777, 781. See: Error. Philosophical, see: Wisdom. See also: Human knowledge, Philosophers, Philosophy. Philosophy, conclusions of: 708, 710, 712, 715, 719, 722, 775-76, 778; considerations of: 706-07, 709; end of: 70506, 708-09, 776; moral: 423, 425, 555, 706 (see: Moral); natural: 422, 425, 706, 718 (see: Mathematics, Metaphysics, Physics); objects of: 70509, 711-12, 778; principles of: 709, 712, 718, 720, 722, 835-36; rational: 422-23 (143), 425 (see: Logic); and Christian faith: 639, 705, 706-07, 711, 712, 71923, 763, 767, 776-78, 781, 835-36; and God: 705, 709, 715, 719-21, 772, 778, 779; and truth: 706, 712, 719-23. See: Error, Science, Theology, Wisdom. Physicist, 718. Physics, 424. See: Philosophy (natural). Piety, 780-81. Place, 338, 356. Plants, 118-19, 188, 209, 310-11. Plural forms, 224:22, 309. See: Unity (of substantial form). Potency, 160, 163 (56), 192-93, 312, 338-39, 360-61, 585, 714, 761, 764; abstractive: 338, 358, 360, 362; active and passive: 110-12, 119, 310, 356, 358-59, 359, 375-76, 557-58, 639-40, 645, 761; receptive: 337, 356-58, 361-62; and act: 132, 160, 162, 192, 212, 214, 216(16667), 312-13, 337-40, 359, 510-11, 55758, 584, 628, 633, 637, 638-39, 649, 650-51, 653-54, 761, 764, 776-77; of

the rational soul: 131, 160, 209-10, 215. See: Matter, Potencies of operation. Principle (potential), Whole. Potencies of operation, see: Difference, Human intellect, Human knowledge, Human mind, Human reason, Human will, Intellective, Man, Operation, Potency, Power, Rational soul, Senses, Sensuality, Unity, Vegetative. Power, 110-12, 118-19, 130, 131, 209-11, 215, 310, 338, 359, 583, 628, 631, 633, 634, 645, 652, 714, 716, 761. See: God, Potency, Potencies of operation. Practical, order: 340, 421, 423, 425; science: 463, 707-09 (see: Moral); truth: 339, 421, 763-64; wisdom: 709. See: Human intellect, Human knowledge, Human reason. Precepts, 716. Predication, 388, 466, 486, 639-40; analogical: 483-86, 487-90, 514; equivocal: 117, 483-84, 488-90, 510, 512, 630; metaphorical: 487, 489-91, 509-11, 512, 639; univocal: 483-84, 488-90, 512, 514. Principle, 109, 110, 163, 188, 194, 208, 340, 356, 358, 361-62, 375, 387, 585-86, 707, 708, 766, 777, 835-36; active: 110, 118; essential fof essence): 159-60, 196; first: 339-40, 389, 419-22, 426-28, 435, 461, 463, 467-68, 507, 516-17, 554, 556-57, 559, 583, 586:116. 588-89, 628, 630, 631, 644, 647, 707, 708, 711, 713, 762 (see: God, Habitus); formal: 160:51, 778; intellective: 214-15, 340; material: 118, 192, 643; potential: 164, 629:210, 633, 634; pre-existing: 627-29 (211), 633, 643; rational soul as a: 131-32, 160 (51), 161, 212-15; self-evident: 462-63 (34), 466, 468, 508, 515-16, 636, 713; universal: 340, 357, 419-20, 424, 425, 655; of act: 339, 359, 391-92; of demonstration [ indemonstrable | 421, 423 (143), 463-64, 553-54, 636; of human knowledge: 210, 212, 340, 357, 388-89, 419-22, 463:34, 506, 510, 553, 555-56, 559, 583, 651-54, 708, 719, 769, 835 (see: Human knowledge); of individuation: 160, 188-89, 191, 193-94; of life: 21012, 214, 310; of operation: 192:110, 214, 216 (166), 339, 584 (see: Potencies of operation); of perfection: 312, 358. See also: Being (Esse), Christian faith,

INDEX Eternal, Innate, Intellectual, Philosophy, Science, Substance, Theology. Truth, Priority, 109, 357, 483-85, 487-89, 490, 513, 514, 554, 633, 636, 646. Probability, 635-36, 641, 643, 719, 721, 769, 772, 774. Proof, see: Demonstration. Property, 112, 132, 160, 187, 190, 195, 196, 209-10, 361, 375, 388, 389-90, 486, 491, 515, 643, 773. See: Quality, Prophets |Prophecy!, 719 - 761Proportion, 424, 484-86, 488, 633, 776; analogical: 484-86 (85), 488-89, 507, 512-13, 514-15, 516. Proportionality, 484, 487, 490, 510. Proposition, see: Demonstration, Purpose, see: End. Quality, 117-19, 337-38, 339, 356, 375, 38990. 419, 510, 512-13. See: Property. Quantify1, 118-19, 130, 310. 375, 552, 713. Quiddity, 358, 387, 393. See: Essence. Rational, knowledge: 130. See: Appetite, Human knowledge. Human reason, Philosophy (rational), Rational soul. Rational soul, acts [operations] of: 130, 132, 161, 211, 212-16,312-13, 337-38, 35758, 361:91, 391, 436, 585; being of: 160-61 (54), 162, 164, 192-93, 194, 211, 212-13, 312-13 (253), 358, 420, 559, 649, 650-51; essence and nature of: 130-32, 159-64, 192-94 (112), 208, 209-11, 212-16, 310, 312-13 (253), 340 (59), 357-58, 360 (88), 360-62, 363, 420, 559, 587, 616:181. 647, 648, 64950 (251-52), 651, 654-55 (259); potencies of: 130-31, 160, 209-10, 211, 214, 215. 337, 358, 340 (39), 361, (91), 391, 435, 554, 557-58, 585, 761; and human knowledge: 420-21, 435, 586-88; and the celestial intelligences: 631; and the human intellect: 160, 214-15, 358, ''60, 420-21, 511, 556-57, 650, 651-544 (255), 655 (259); as subsistent: 130, 131:63, 212 (157), 213-15, 312:253, 313, 616:181; as a spirit: 208, 209, 21112, 391; as a spiritual substance: 130, 192, 211-13 (157), 312, 358, 360, 363, 616:181, 643; is immortal: 586, 650 (251), 653:255. See: Composition, Error, God, Human body, Image (of God), Matter, Potency, Union. Reason, see: Eternal, God, Human reason. Seminal (reasons).

971

Rectitude, 394, 705. Redemption, 714, 715. Reduction, 310, 508, 514, 516. Relation, 118, 163 (56), 189-90, 191, 195, 207-08, 393-94, 484-85, 486, 487-90, 491, 508-09, 513, 516-18, 553, 628, 639-40, 654, 712, 772. Religion, 774, 780-81. Reminiscence, 337. Resemblance, see: Similarity. Revelation. 629, 635-36, 639 (229), 640, 642-43, 647, 705, 706-07. 709, 711-12, 713, 715. 716-19, 720-23, 723, 761, 762, 765, 766-68, 775:181, 778, 836. Reward, 710. See: Merit. Rules, see: Axioms, Eternal, Natural. Sacred Scripture, 633 (216), 640:232, 645. 650:252. 705-07. 709, 710, 713, 715, 716-17 (70), 718-20 (75), 723, 765, 773, 774-75; citations from: 425, 467, 557, 587, 705, 708, 768 (169); references to: 629, 633. 709, 716 |2|. Salvation, 705-06, 712. Science, 208, 362, 418-19, 424, 464. 555, 557, 587. 588, 655, 763, 768: act of; 419-20. 423, 426-27. 461, 462. 770:176; conclusions of: 208:146, 419, 420. 426, 428, 460-62, 463-64, 465, 708, 713, 762, 769, 773, 775-76; divine: 706-07, 708-09; practical: 463, 707-09 (see: Moral); principles of: 419-20, 421, 426, 428, 460, 462-64, 465, 708-09, 713, 714, 718, 720, 762, 764, 768-69, 771, 775-76; and Christian faith: 462-64, 763. 767-71 (176), 772-73, 775; and human reason: 418-19, 421, 462-63. 708-09, 713-14, 721, 767-68, 770-73, 774-76; and theology: 705-09, 713, 72021 (see: Theology); and the human intellect: 418-19, 421. 426, 462-64, 515, 768-69, 774-76, of philosophy: 422-24, 424-25, 427-28. 463 (34), 705, 706-10, 718-19. 721, 723, 769-70, 772, 775, 778, 836:79. See also: Certitude, Demonstration, Error, Judgment, Perfection, Speculative, Subject, Wisdom. Semen, 111, 131. Seminal, power: 118-19, 131, 310; reasons: 110-11, 111-12, 118, 119, 309,310-11, 419. Sense knowledge, 117, 193, 211, 214, 33738, 356, 361-62, 374-76 (34), 388, 388-90, 394. 395, 424, 487, 510-11, 554, 555, 583, 587, 716. 719. See: Sen-

972

INDEX

ses (objects of). Senses, 119:36, 209, 337-39, 356-57 (80), 374-76 (34), 388, 555, 713, 714: acts [operations | of: 131, 192:110, 212, 21415, 337-39, 340, 356-57, 361-62, 37476, 391, 424, 510-11, 554-55, 587-88, 651-54, 719; objects of: 337, 356-57, 360:87, 361-62, 375-76, 388, 421, 424, 555, 583, 587-88, 628, 707, 717, 768, 773; and human reason: 338, 466; and the human intellect: 212, 338-39, 357, 358-60 (87), 376:34, 388-90, 395, 421, 422, 423-24, 466, 510-11, 587, 716, 773-74; and the human mind: 212, 466; and the rational soul: 130, 211, 340 (39), 362. See: Appetite, Judgment, Organs, Sensitive. Sensible, creatures [world |, see: Creatures; species, see: Species. Sensitive, potencies: 119:36, 130. 210-11, 337-39, 356-57, 361, 374-76; soul: 118, 130-31, 209-11, 310-11, 361. Sensuality, 338-39, 361. Sight, 356-57, 375-76, 388, 510-11, 555, 583, 587-88, 707, 713, 714. See: Senses. Signs, 716. Similarity |Resemblance), analogical: 55657, 589; of creature to Creator: 483-85, 486, 487-89, 556-57, 589. Similitude, and knowledge: 390-91, 392, 435, 465, 489:91, 490, 506-11, 512, 516, 554, 584, 585, 587, 653, 716, 71920, 721-22; of creatures: 506, 508, 509, 513, 516; of lumen: 510; of proportionality: 484, 487, 490, 510. See: God, Likeness. Sin, 650. Smell, 356-57. See: Senses. Something, 393. Soul, see: Definition, Rational soul, Sensitive, Vegetative. Species, cognitive: 420-21; human [common nature]: 160-61 (51), 188, 189-90, 19192 (110), 193-94 (112-13), 196, 198, 212, 215, 420, 488, 642, 649, 653, 655; intelligible: 192, 357, 358, 360-61, 362, 388-89, 390 (63), 392, 394-95, 418-21, 434-35, 515, 555-56, 584, 651-54; sensible: 337-38, 356-57, 361-62, 375-76: of bodily substances: 118-19, 132, 188, 508; of spiritual creatures: 192-93, 194, 212, 649. Speculative, order: 340, 421, 423; science:

421, 423, 463, 557, 707-08, 709-10; truth: 339, 421, 707, 763; wisdom: 709. See: Human intellect, Human knowledge, Human reason. Speech, see Human words. Spirit, 209-12, 780. See: Angel, Holy Spirit, Rational soul. Spiritual, see: Creatures, Form, Matter, Rational soul, Substance. Splendour, 509, 512, 587. Stability, 163-64, 468, 555, 560. Subject, 160, 161. 163, 312, 337-38, 423; pre-existing: 628-30 (211), 631, 633; of Christian faith: 763-64, 767, 772, 77 of demonstration: 463-64, 772; of science: 424, 707, 713-14, 772. See: Theology. Substance, composite: 112, 118, 130, 16061, 163, 187, 192, 196, 198, 310-13, 627:206, 628, 631, 634; corporeal: 11012, 117-19, 132, 160-61, 163-64, 188, 309-11, 358, 389-90, 508, 509-10, 512, 631-32, 643, 644, 647, 651-54; first and second: 187-88, 190, 198, 644:241; genus and species of: 109, 130, 132, 161-62, 187-88, 195, 197, 312-13; individuation of: 187-89, 190, 194, 196, 198 (see: Individual); nature of: 132-33, 188-90, 311, 358, 393, 514, 633, 636; principles of: 110, 118, 163-64, 388, 628 (207); spiritual [immaterial |: 130, 132, 161:54, 193:112, 211-14 (157), 215-16 (166), 312, 389-90, 424, 466, 509-11, 512, 557, 643, 643-44 (241); and accident: 117, 195, 198, 310-11, 388, 483, 488, 514-15; as singular: 187, 188, 193:112, 194, 195-96, 198, 21 214; as subsistent: 187-93 (112), 19598, 212 (157). See also: Intellective, Intellectual, Matter, Relation, Substantia form. Substantial form, 109-12, 117-19, 130-31, 131-33, 160-62 (54), 163-64, 213-16, 310-13, 506-07, 551-52, 628 (207), 632, 643, 648:248. See: Man, Unity. Sun, 117-19, 424, 509, 511, 555, 584, 5888, 761. See: Celestial bodies. Supposit, 192-93, 195-96, 197-98. Suscipion, 461. Synderesis, 338, 339. Taste, 356-57, 375, 510. See: Senses. Teacher, 465, 515, 582-83, 585. See: Teaching. Teaching, 515, 582-84, 585, 717. See: In-

INDEX struction. Temporal, see: Time. Terrestrial bodies, 117, 632-33, 642, 761. See: Human body. Testimony, 720. 768-69, 770:174, 772. Theologians, 635, 641, 648 (248), 717-20 (70, 75); and Christian faith: 718 (70), 720 (75), 763, 767-68, 769; and God: 635, 651, 706, 714; and human reason: 635, 718-21, 768; and philosophy: 720, 763, 767; and theology: 713-14, 719, 720:75, 769, 781; and the philosophers: 635-37, 641, 651, 719-20, 721, 723, 776-77. Theological, see: Knowledge (theological (of God, theological |), Order, Theology. Theology, end of: 463 (34), 705-06, 708-11, 721. 723, 776, 778; nature of: 424, 704, 705, 706-07, 707-09, 709-11, 712-16, 721-22, 723, 763, 778, 779-81; objects of: 463. 639, 705-06, 707-09, 710-11, 712, 713. 715-16, 722-23, 778-79, 781; principles of: 709, 711, 713-14, 716, 718-19, 720; procedure of: 716-23; subject of: 463 (34), 708, 712-13, 713-14, 714-16, 778; and Christian faith: 639, 705-06, 708, 711, 712, 715-23 (75), 776-78, 781; and God: 705, 707, 709, 710-11, 713,714-16, 718-21,723,778, 779; and human reason: 639, 708, 712, 716, 718-23; and philosophy: 639, 70509, 711, 712, 715-16, 719-20, 721-23, 776-78, 835-36; and truth: 709-10, 712, 716-23; as a Christian understanding: 708-09, 711-12, 715-17, 720-22, 769, 778-79, 835-36 (79): as a science: 463, 706-10, 712-14, 715-22, 723 (see: Science); as a wisdom: 708-09, 710-11, 722-23. Thensehia, 780. Thinking (Thought |, 389, 391-92, 436, 46061, 463, 467-68, 628, 705, 722. 762-63, 764. 766, 770, 775. See: Error (knowledges. Thing, 393. Time, 109-10, 163-64; nature of: 637-38, 640, 642, 649; order of: 109-10, 111, 207-08, 627, 635-36; and being: 163-64, 509. 644 (241), 645-46, 648, 721; and creation: 627-28, 635-36, 637-40 (223, 231), 642, 643, 644 (241), 645-46, 647, 648-49, 721; and human knowledge: 361-62, 558, 587, 642, 705, 774: and memory: 337, 339, 361-62:

973

and movement: 635-36, 639, 640, 642, 644:241, 646. See: Eternity. Touch, 356-57, 510. See: Senses. Transmigration, 640, 649-50 (250-52). (The) Trinity, 635, 715, 720, 721, 769, 771 72, 773, 779 (189). See: God. Truth |True|, divine: 390, 461-62, 465, 46568, 487, 489:91, 508, 513-16, 516-18, 551-54, 556, 586-88, 588-89, 705, 709, 710, 714-15, 718, 764, 772, 773-75 (181), 777 (see: God, first truth); principles of: 339, 389, 394-95, 419, 427 28, 468, 513. 516-17, 554, 556-57, 55859, 583. 585-86 (116), 588-89, 835; and being: 513-14, 551; and human reason: 554, 627-29, 631-33 (215), 635-37, 650, 655, 705, 719-22, 768-70, 772, 774-75 (181), 779, 835; and knowledge: 212, 393-95 (73), 425-26, 464, 465-68, 508, 512-13, 516-18, 524-25, 551-55, 555, 557-59, 582-84, 587-89, 645, 713, 71 17, 720:75, 772, 775, 779; and the human intellect: 212, 339, 388-92, 393-96. 421, 422 (140), 425-26, 461, 463-67, 467-68, 508, 510-11, 513-16, 516-18, 551-58, 559, 583, 585, 588-89, 652, 707, 762-64, 774-75, 777, 779; an the human mind: 461, 467. 468, 512, 551-53, 554, 556-59, 582-84, 586-88, 589, 762; and the rational soul: 586-89; and the senses: 212, 388, 510-11, 554, 555; of revelation: 706, 712, 717, 72 755:181. See: Certitude, Christian faith. Immutability. Philosophy, Theology. Understanding, see: Habitus, Knowledge, Theology (as a Christian understanding). Unibility, 161:54. Union, accidental: 131, 649, 653; essential: 131-32 (see: Essence, and being); of form and matter: 131-32, 310-11 (see: Form): of soul and body in man: 130 (59), 131-32. 133, 160:51, 164, 192-94 ( 1 1 2 - 1 3 ) , 212-13, 215-16. 310, 311-13, 314:257, 337, 358-60, 363, 420-21, 616:181, 632, 643, 649-50 (250-52). See: Philosophy (and Christian faith). Unity, 628-29, 706; and hcing: 160, 192, 197, 311, 313, 652, 655:259; and wisdom: 424-25, 427, 464; of God: 508. 706, 720, 769-70, 771-72, 773; of man: 13133, 194:113, 214, 216 (166), 642, 647, 649-51. 651-55 (259); of substantial form: 110-12. 118, 131:62. 309-11

974

INDEX

trine (philosophy) of: 18, 20, 23-26 (252), 048:248 649-50; of theology: (20), 28, 34, 35,' 37-38, 42-43, 46, 47706-07. 708, 710-11. 712, 717, 722-23: 48, 50-51 (68), 52-53, 55, 59, 69-70 of the human intellect: 638:223, 640, (97), 71, 72, 74, 76, 81, 86, 87, 91-92, 651-54 (254-55), 655 (259); of the 94, 98, 842-45, 848-51, 854-56, 857-60, human potencies: 338-39, 340 (59), 860-61, 863:13, 866, 868-69, 872, 876 361-63, 375, 706-07, of the philo878, 897, 884-85, 890, 892-94; errors sophical sciences: 424-25, 427-28, of: 24-26, 50:68, 55-56 (57), 67, 84, 706; of the sense potencies: 338, 339. 849, 851-52, 858-59 (10), 865-66, 867Universal, form: 359-60, 387-89, 509:127 68, 878, 891-92; influence of: 48-49, (see: Form); good: 338; knowledge: 361 69, 843-44, 870, 873, 896; principles (see: Human knowledge). of: 18-19, 22, 31, 33 (41), 36-37, 42:58, University of Paris, 627, 643, 644 (241), 648 45, 69, 84, 86, 90:128, 842, 858-60, (248). 655:259. 879-80, 882-83, 888-89; writings of: 47Univocation, 483-84, 488, 489-90, 510, 512, 48 (63), 50-51, 58:83, 71, 848, 859; and 514, 656. Paris: 18, 23, 47-49, 50, 58:83, 66:91, Vegetative, operations: 131, 337-38; poten71, 90-91, 95, 878-79, 886, 896. See: cies: 130-31, 337; soul: 130-31, 209, Augustine, St., Augustinians, Bonaven310-11. ture, St., Thomas Aquinas, St. Vestige, of God: 486, 559, 779. Aristoteleans, 20:7, 74, 76, 85, 895; Vice, 655. Christian: 18, 45, 52 (71). 878, 880, Virtue, 423. 425-26, 462, 655, 656, 709, 886, 896:26. 710, 711, 761, 763-64, 774, 775, 776Augustine, St., authority of: 39, 55, 83:120, 78, 780-81. See: Charity, Christian 92, 888, 893; Christian philosophy of: faith. 34, 40, 44, 58, 69:96, 70, 79, 92, 869, Water. 130. 310. See: Elements. 872; doctrine [philosophy] of: 19-20, Whole, form of the: 192:110; potential: 21023-24, 28-29 (30), 32 (38), 33-35 (41, 11. See: Being (Esse). 43), 36, 37-38, 39-40, 42, 43, 44-45, 46Will, see: Clod, Human will. 47, 49, 51, 57, 68-69, 70, 73, 80, 85, Wisdom, natural (philosophical |: 208, 422, 92, 94-95, 96, 841-45, 851-56, 859, 423-25, 426-28 (148), 462, 464-65, 873, 884-86, 887, 888-97; influence of: 466, 483, 488, 557 (67), 708-09, 711, 32-33, 43, 57, 66, 70-71, 86, 95, 842, 774, 835. See: Certitude, Theology. Word(s). see: Concept, God, Human words. 843, 854-55, 860-61, 861, 873-74, 896; and Aristotle: 55, 89-90 (128), 91, 872. Worship, divine: 780. See: Bonaventure, St., Thomas Writings (of St. Thomas Aquinas), 627 (205); early: 627-28, 631-32, 635-39, Aquinas, St. 649-55: middle: 628-31, 632-33, 639Augustinians, 18-20 (7), 23-24, 28-29 (30) 43, 655-56; late: 630-31, 633-35, 643-49 " 32 (38), 33-35 (41, 43), 37, 40, 42, 43 (248). 650-51, 655-56. 44, 49. 68-69, 94, 878, 879, 884, 88687; Platonic: 18, 49, 878; and Aristotle: 29:30, 34, 69. AUTHORS: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL Auvergne, see: William of. Averroes, 48:54, 49, 51, 54, 59, 91, 92, 845, Nnincd hv the Histnrians 858, 864:13, 892, 894. Albert, St., 18, 19, 49, 50, 52:71, 55, 878. Averroists, see: Latin Averroists. Alexander of Hales, 23, 29, 49, 51, 77 (109), Avicebron, 85, 845. 852. Avicenna, 32, 39, 47, 49, 59, 92, 845 (1), 856, 864:13. Ammonius Saccas, 85. Anselm, St.. 21, 35, 36, 47, 57, 849, 852, Bacon, Roger. 29, 48 (64). 856, 870. Bonaventure, St., Aristoteleanism of: 21, Aquinas, see: Thomas Aquinas, St. 43, 72, 74, 81, 83, 84, 86:124, 89, 90, 841-45, 849-50 jAugustinizing Aristotle, commentators on: 19-20, 34, 42, (Augustinian): 68-94, 72 (101), 95, 47, 48:63, 50, 70, 71, 90-91, 95, 848, 856, 857-59 (10), 863:13, 892; doc843, 850-51, 854-57; eclectic: 68:94,

INDEX 83:120, 89, 91, 859; Latin: 83:120, 84849, 854-57, 880, 881, 883; Neoplatonizing (Neoplatonic): 52, 68:94, 72, 81,' 82, 83:120, 89, 91, 95, 96, 98, 848-51, 854-57, 859-60, 880, 881, 883; Platonizing: 85-86 (122), 90:128, 97, 850, 857:8); see here, below: and Aristotle, and Aristotelean doctrine, and Aristoteleanism; Augustinianism of: 19 (4), 21, 24, 26:24, 27, 42, 44, 68:95, 80, 81-82, 83, 88-89, 92, 96, 98, 841-45, 848-49, 85051, 852-57 (4), 879, 886-90 |Aristotelean: 29, 34, 37-38, 44; Franciscan: 29-30 (31), 42:58, 66, 69:92; medieval: 24, 26, 58 (83), 62, 81, 9293, 98, 849-50, 853-54, 869; Neoplatonic: 18, 45, 49, 841-42, 843, 8781; see here, below: and Augustine, and Augustinian doctrine, and neoAugustinianism; Christian extremism of: 53 (73), 68:86, 84:121, 91, 894-96; Christian philosophy of: 23-26, 27, 30 (32), 35, 39-40, 43-45, 51, 54, 56, 64, 66:92, 67-68, 72, 73-74, 79, 91, 93, 98, 860-65 (12), 865-71, 871-73, 877, 897 (see here, below: philosophy of); Christian wisdom of: 23, 39, 64-67 (92), 72, 75, 78, 80, 84, 90-91, 93-94, 96. 98, 849, 860-63, 867-68, 870, 87273, 877, 891, 894-95; Neoplatonism of: 80, 82, 86:124 [Augustinian: 62, 81, 92, 981; philosophy of:" 21-30 (20, 24), 31, 39-40, 42-43 (58), 45, 50-52, 5557, 58:83, 59:84, 60-68 (90, 95), 71-72 (101), 74-79 (108), 81-90, 91-99 (129), 841-45, 848-57, 859-60, 86165 (13-14), 866-67, 875, 882-83 (22), 896 (see here, above: Christian philosophy of; and below: and errors in philosophy, and the autonomy of philosophy, on philosophy); Platonism Of: 84-86 (123-24) —see here' below: and Plato, and Platonic doctrine; sources of (his philosophy): 19-20, 21-22, 23, 24-26, 28, 29, 30-31, 33-34, 35, 36-38, 40 45, 50-51 (68), 56-58, 6161, 66, 68-69, 72, 75-76, 80-84. 85-86, 88. 91-98, 843-45, 854-57, 859-60, 873; theology of: 23, 39-41, 44-45, 51-52, 53, 56, 66-68, 72 (101), 74-76 (108), 77-79 (110), 81-84, 84-90, 91-98, 84951. 857, 861-63 (13), 866-67, 869-71, 873-74, 875-77, 883, 887, 890 (see

975 here, below: on philosophy); writings Of: 50-51, 60, 64:89, 67, 68:95, 75-76; and Aristotle: 23-26, 28, 37, 41, 42, 50, 60-62, 65, 81, 87, 89, 91-93, 96, 98, 842-45, 847-48, 848-50, 852, 853-55, 856, 857-60, 870, 872, 873, 878, 883, 885, 886, 890-91, 896 [opposed to: 2326, 41, 50-51 (68), 55-56, 62:86, 65, 67, 68:94, 71, 74-76, 79-81, 87, 89, 92, 97, 98, 841-42, 847-48, 850, 851-52, 865-66, 867, 868, 876-78, 879, 8871; see here, above: Aristoteleanism of; and Aristotelean doctrine [philosophy ]: 28. 37, 50, 72, 81, 98, 842-45, 848-51, 854-57, 857-60, 860-61, 863:13, 866, 868, 879, 884-85, 888 [opposed to: 18, 23-26 (20), 43, 50:68, 51, 842, 848-50, 868-69, 876-78, 890, 894); see here, above: Aristoteleanism of: and Aristoteleanism: 23-24, 41, 42, 43, 45, 50, 55:77, 62:86, 74, 76, 87-88, 91-93, 98, 842. 849-52. 854-60, 865-66, 87678. 880. 886-89. 892 [heretical: 54-55, 65, 67-68. 83:120, 91-92, 98, 887-88, 892, 894-951; see here, above: Aristoteleanism of; and Augustine: 2324, 31, 42, 50:68, 51, 57, 60-62, 64, 66 (92). 76, 81, 86, 88, 92, 94, 96, 98, 842, 843-45, 847-48, 849-51, 852-57, 860, 872-74, 881, 885-86, 896 (see here, above: Augustinianism of); and Augustinian doctrine [philosophy |: 28, 37, 43, 45, 60, 62, 74, 80, 81, 92, 96, 98, 842, 852-57, 859 (see here, above: Augustinianism of); and neoAugustinianism: 53:73, 73, 74, 83:120, 92, 95, 888, 893; and errors in philosophy: 23-26, 50, 51:69, 55-56 (77), 60, 64, 67-68 (94), 74-75, 79-80. 88. 89. 92-94, 96, 847, 851-52, 855, 860-61, 865-69, 877-78, 887, 891-92, 895: and Christian faith: 25-26, 50:68, 65, 854, 860-64, 866-67 (see here, below: on philosophy, on reason); and human knowledge: 21-22. 25-26, 3738, 62-67. 71-72, 77:110, 84, 86:124, 93, 847:1. 853:4, 854, 862, 866-67, 868:16, 871, 875-76, 885-86. 892, 89596: and Latin Averroism |Averroists|: 24:20, 37:48, 54:75, 863:13; and Plato: 25-26, 35, 41, 61, 89, 93, 847, 850, 85455, 860-61, 866, 867, 878, 892; and Platonic doctrine [philosophy!: 2526, 43. 65, 84-86 (123-24), 866, 868-69.

976

INDEX

Plato, 25. 35, 41, 52, 57, 61, 65, 68, 85, 87, 89, 92, 93. 847, 850, 854-55, 860-61, 866, 867, 878, 892. Platonic-Augustinians, 18, 49, 878. Plotinus, 58, 68, 85. Pythagoreans, 86:123. Richard of St. Victor, 852. Scotus, see: Duns Scotus. Siger of Brabant, 18, 53-54, 68 (94), 72:101, (autonomy of: 55, 61-65, 67, 74-76, 83:120, 94, 888. 78-79 ( 1 1 1 ) , 88, 93-94, 96-97, 855-57, Thomas Aquinas, St., Aristoteleanism of: 860, 862-63, 866-69, 875-77, 891-92, 19, 20, 23-24, 27, 34, 42, 43, 49-50, 894, 895-96 (see here, above: and the 70:97. 83:120, 879-80, 886-89, 893 autonomy of philosophy); and Christian (Christian: 18, 45, 878, 880, 886, faith: 26-27, 43, 63-65,' 88-89, 93, 862896:26; Neoplatonizing (Neoplatonic): 64 (13), 866, 868, 869-71, 874-76, 88052. 91, 880, 883 |; see here, below: and 81, 887, 892, 895-96 (see here, above: Aristoteleanism; Christian philosophy and Christian faith); and theology: 22of: 22, 30 (32), 34-35, 43, 51, 56, 57 23, 39-40, 61-62, 64, 68:94, 75-80, 83, (80), 69:96, 72, 73-74, 79, 92, 98, 863, 84, 88, 92-93, 94, 95, 96-97, 855, 862864-65, 879. 880-81. philosophy of: 65 (13), 871 (17), 877 (see here, above: 19, 20, 21, 22 (16-17), 23, 24 (20), 26, theology of); distinct from theology: 21, 28 (28), 29:30, 30, 33-37 (41, 43), 39, 24-27 (24), 39-40, 51, 57, 64-65, 66:92, 42-43, 45, 49-50, 52-53, 55, 56, 57, 67, 80, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96-99, 84158:83, 59:84, 61:85, 64, 68:94, 69-70 43. 860-62, 864-65, 866-68. 870-71, (96), 72-73, 82-83, 84:121, 91, 94, 95, 874 (see here, above: theology of) I? on 97, 863:13, 864-65, 879-80, 880-83 reason |and Christian faith: 25-27, 43, (22), 887-88, 896 (see here, below: on 51-52, 62-65, 67, 71-72, 83, 84, 88, 89, philosophy): theology of: 22:17, 39, 93-94, 855, 860, 868 (16), 869, 871, 41, 44, 53, 69, 75, 82-83, 94, 97, 875 874-76, 877 (see here, above, and 877, 880, 883; and Aristotle: 22, 23Christian faith); and revelation: 25, 43, 24, 37, 41, 42, 52, 55:57, 56, 58. 69, 51-52, 78, 862-64, 866-67, 869, 871, 74-75, 80, 94, 859:10, 879, 881, 88 874-76, 877, 891, 8941. See also: 885, 887-96 (see here, below: on Thomas Aquinas, St. philosophy): and Aristoteleanism (raChristian Aristoteleans, see: Aristoteleans. dical): 73, 95; and Augustine: 20: Commentators, see: Aristotle. 21, 22, 29, 31, 35, 42, 69 (96), 75, 880, Coupon, Robert, 18. 881, 885, 896; and Augustinianisnt: Dionysius, 47, 75, 80, 96, 856, 872, 873. 29, 33-34 (41), 34-36 (43), 39, 44, Duns Scotus, 21, 28, 37 (48), 38, 60:84. 48:64, 886-89; and neo-AugusFrancis of Assisi, St., 29, 76, 77, 96, 873. tianism: 55, 83:120, 888, 893; and Gregory- IX, Pope, 18, 48. (the) Augustinians: 24, 33:41, 34Gundissalinus. 70. 35 (43), 42-44, 73, 884. 887; and Joachim of Flora, 75, 80, 96. Bonaventure: 22, 24 (19), 27, 30-31, John of la Rochelle, 49, 77. 35, 37-38 (48), 41, 43-45, 51 (69), Latin Averroists, 18-19, 23, 24:20, 40, 42, 55:77, 61-85, 67-68(94), 72-75, 78:111, 863:13, 878-79, 886-87, 894. 79-80, 83, 84:121, 91-92, 94, 97-98, Matthew of Aquasparta, 26, 58. 853:4, 863-65 (13), 868:16, 874-75, Moses, 89, 855. 877, 878-80, 880-96; and errors in Moses Maimonides, 49. philosophy: 51:69, 68:94, 877, 88 Neopythagoreans, 85. 891; and human knowledge: 21-22, Ockham, see: William of. 37-38, 875, 885-86, 895-96; and Lati Paul the Apostle, St., 36, 89, 855. Averroism [ Averroists |: 37:48, 40, Peckham |Pecharn |, John, 19, 20:7, 24, 25, 879; and the conflict of 1270: 19, 24, 29. 54, 68:94, 69, 73, 74, 92, 94, 95, 43, 54-55, 61:85, 69-70, 73, 74, 91-92, 886-88. 889 (24). 892; and the autonomy of philosophy: 23-26, 43, 62-65, 67. 7172, 78, 87-88 (127), 89-90, 93, 96-98, 864, 867 (see here, below: on philosophy); and the conflict of 1270: 24, 43. 61:85. 73, 74, 92, 886-96 (24); and the divine illumination: 19, 29, 37-38 (49), 884-86; on philosophy

INDEX 94, 886-96; and the divine illumination: 28, 34, 37-38, 44, 88486; on philosophy: 22:17, 56, 73-74, 98, 863-65 [distinct from theology: 23, 39, 43-44, 56-57, 98, 863-65]; 6n reason and revelation: 35, 40, 41, 43-44, 80, 875-77, 887, 893-94. pre-Thomists, see: Augustinians. William de la Mare, 26. William of Auvergne, 29, 49, 77:109. William of Ockham, 60:84. Synthesis «/ Si. Bonavcnturc

Academy, New and Old: 535 (29), 624. Alcher of Clairvaux, 138:5. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 347:61. Alfarabi, 604:157. Ambrose, St., 522, 527:9, 676:13, 759:148. Anaxagoras, 108, 279:164, 591. Anselm, St., 383, 385-86, 387, 393, 397:85, 438, 440, 456, 459. 520-21, 522, 532, 534, 572, 576, 581-82, 659, 661, 749:120, 783. Apollo, 617. Apostles, 478, 569-71, 730, 758, 789, 813 (46), 828:65. Arabians, 605:159, 611, 621, 625:202, 659, 780, 786. Aristotle (doctrine and influence; also Aristotelean doctrine [elements, factors) and influence), accident, see: substance; animals: 115, 116-17 (30), 279, 280, 308, 591, 597; beatitude: 609-10, 621, 623, 626; celestial bodies: 25152, 261, 318; certitude: 460, 505-06, 519-21. 522, 526, 532-33, 545-46, 556, 570-71, 590, 659-61; Christian faith: 609-10, 617 (183). 703 (50), 756, 760; colour: 257. 258, 260; corporeal light: 237, 260, 318; corporeal lumen: 248 (81), 260-61; creation: 158, 352, 591, 594-95, 600-01 (149-52), 603, 6Z1, 623, 625, 631, 634, 788: definition: 171, 217, 257, 258, 260; divine ideas: 593, 620-21, 622, 623, 626, 655; end: 411, 675, 703; errors (of): 591, 594-96 (137), 599:145, 601:152. 603, 609-10 (166), 611, 619, 620-22, 623 (199), 625-26 (202-04), 631, 643, 654-55, 656, 659, 756 (136), 805-06, 817, eternal world: 594-96 (137), 600-01 (149-52), 603, 607, 619, 621-22, 623, 625, 643, 805-06 (31); experience, see: senses; form and

977 matter 105-07, 108-09, 111, 134, 141, 145, 147 (25), 156, 157-58 (45, 48), 159, 170, 227, 268, 273, 277, 305, 30809, 310-11. 318, 591 (145), 593-94, 599, 606; God: 459-60, 505, 556, 598, 617:184, 620-21, 623, 626 (203), 655, 659; grammar: 686; human intellect (reason): 141-42, 200, 202, 205r06, 206-07, 211, 302, 321, 326, 328, 339, 344, 345-51, 352, 364, 365, 368, 389 (62), 405, 422:140, 429, 438, 439, 451, 505, 513, 532-33, 544-45, 556, 607, 611 (169), 621, 623 (199), 654, 660, 662; human knowledge: 267, 270, 321, 347, 364, 371, 377, 386, 389 (62), 393, 395 (77), 398, 400-01, 405-06, 413, 417, 418, 429, 438-40, 455, 457, 45960, 482, 505, 519-20, 520-21, 523, 532, 535, 544-45, 556, 569, 593-94, 654, 660-61, 662, 742; man: 103, 121-24, 128 (55), 129, 131 (62), 134, 137, 17 72, 217, 218, 288, 308-09, 318, 328, 329:16, 337, 364, 374, 607-09, 621, 623; memory: 353, 354, 355 (78), 362, 364 (see: senses): nature, see: substance; philosophy (of): 134, 157-58, 159, 279 (164); 364-65, 440, 522, 57172 (88), 590, 600-01 (150-52), 603, 607-12 (156), 617(182-83), 620 (190), 625-26 (203-04), 631, 654, 660, 662, 687, 703:50, 783-84, 788, 805-06 (31), 818; principles (of): 158, 341-42, 386, 417-18, 422, 433, 439, 520-21, 545, 593, 600-01, 608. 649, 650-51, 727; rational [human] soul: 123, 139, 14142, 145. 156, 200, 202, 217, 218, 326, 328, 335:32, 341-42, 347, 364, 439, 505, 556, 599 (145), 605-06, 607-11, 621, 649. 650-51, 654, 756; science: 397, 401, 418:129, 439, 443-44, 445, 451, 460, 519-20, 532-33, 545-46, 567, 569-71, 590, 613, 621 (193), 626, 65961, 676, 727, 733:93, 760; separate [celestial] intelligences: 605, 607, 609-10 (167), 623, 625-26, 654; senses and experience: 182-83, 217, 218, 333, 337, 347, 353-54, 364, 370-71, 371, 373-74, 396, 401, 429, 438, 439. 523, 525, 542, 544-45, 569, 611 (169), 654, 660, 731; substance [nature] and accident: 134, 135, 141 (14), 144, 156, 157. 158:46, 170, 296, 297, 308, 309, 318, 607, 609-10, 654; time: 596, 600 (149-50), 602:153, 603, 621, 643;

978

INDEX

truth: 609-11, 621, 626 (204), 630-31, 634, 654, 760 (see: human knowledge); virtue: 617 (183), 622 (195), 660, 727, 802; wisdom: 409, 417-18, 433, 439, 569-70, 590, 626, 660, 810, 829:69; writtings (of): 617:182, 620 (190). See: Commentators. Arius, 788. Augustine, St. (doctrine and influence; also Augustinian doctrine [elements, factors) and influence), analogy: 448:4, 468, 481, 482, 520, 522; angel: 144, 217. 758; animals: 115, 116-17, 279, 308, 324-25 (4), 328; beatitude: 605, 606; bodies: 249, 257-58, 758; certitude: 438, 460, 504-06 (122), 519-21, 522, 526-32, 533-34, 535, 538-39, 54546, 553, 556, 567-68, 580-81, 659-61; Christ: 289, 308-09, 686, 747; Christian faith: 377, 407, 547, 658, 675, 676, 702-03, 732, 760; Christian philosophy 789 (9), 830:70, 831:72, 832 (73); Christian religion: 753-54, 759-60, 784, 789:9, 830 (70), 831 (72), 832 (73); colour: 257, 258, 260; concept: 382-83 (52), 384; contemplation: 327:13, 336-37. 365, 390, 747:117, 760; creation (creatures]: 150 (32), 158, 385, 602, 648:248, 741, 760; divine ideas: 492, 494, 497, 505, 508:125, 520, 569, 593; (the) elements: 116-17, 252 318; eternal world: 648:248; evil: 667; exemplar: 494; form and matter: 10407, 108-09, 111, 134, 143-44, 148 (26), 155-57, 157-58 (46), 305, 306-07, 318; freedom of choice: 329, 330:19, 364, 365; God: 337, 346 (60), 349, 352, 355 (71), 357 (81), 364-65, 383:52, 385, 387, 406, 418, 429-30, 438, 439, 452, 456-57, 459-60, 477, 482, 494, 504-05 (121). 512-13, 519-21, 522, 524, 52631, 536, 541-42, 546, 551, 552-53, 554, 556, 566, 567-68, 577 (102), 579-80, 581-82, 586, 605, 659-60, 675, 686, 703, 741. 758, 760, 784, 823; goodness: 667. 741: human intellect [reason]: 200. 202:130, 206, 328, 337, 357:81, 422:140, 438, 439, 513, 556; human knowledge: 327:13, 364, 367-69 (9), 377, 381, 385, 389 (62), 393, 399-400, 400-01, 405, 406, 416, 438-40, 453, 459-60, 492, 501, 513, 522, 528-31, 532 (24), 534. 538-42, 556, 660-61, 662, 676; human mind: 200, 202, 205-

06, 206-07, 208, 211, 217, 321, 329, 346 (60), 354-55 (77), 364-65, 367, 386-87, 406, 415-16, 418, 432-33, 438, 439-40, 459, 504-05, 519, 520, 526-31, 554, 556, 568, 579-80, 582, 586, 605, 659-60. 703; illumination: 346 (60), 349, 352, 355 (77), 444, 446, 460, 519, 524-25, 526-32, 551, 554, 581, 582, 659-61, 662; immutability: 529-30, 541-42, 555-53, 567; light [corporeal: 237-38, 252, 260, 318; spiritual: 501, 505 (121), 512, 513. 520, 522, 540, 546, 573, 581, 582, 659-60, 680]; lumen [corporeal: 248 (81), 260-61, 371:17; spiritual: 512. 528-29. 556]; man: 121-24, 128 (55). 129, 131 (162), 138:5, 176. 217, 289. 306-08, 318, 324-25 (4), 328. 329, 330:19, 337, 365, 390; memory: 354-55 (77-78), 362, 364-65; nature, see: substance; philosophy (of): 134, 148 (26), 157-58 (46), 159, 364-65, 440, 503-04 (119), 522, 571-72 (88), 590, 612, 614. 620:184, 660, 662, 671, 760, 783-84; piety: 410, 753-54, 759-60, 784; rational [human] soul: 120-21, 127-28, 138:5, 139-41, 156, 159, 176, 186, 217, 289, 329, 330:19, 337, 341 (42). 354, 355, 364-65, 431, 433, 439, 440. 505 (121), 520, 526, 528, 529, 605, 606; Sacred Scripture: 697:43, 717:70; seminal reasons: 107, 115, 305, 308, 309, 311, 318; senses: 116, 134, 32425, 329:17, 337, 344, 364, 370, 371:17, 374 (26. 28), 406, 438, 439, 534; substance [nature]: 134, 296, 308, 318; theology: 157-48 (46), 569-71, 678-79, 687, 702-03 (50), 732, 760, 783-84, 786; time: 602; (the) Trinity: 186:100, 576-77, 666:1; truth: 371, 379, 384, 385. 386-87, 395 (77), 422, 438, 439, 452, 456-57, 459-60, 505, 512, 519, 520, 526-31, 536. 541-42, 545, 551, 552-53, 556, 581, 582. 586. 659-60; virtue: 530-31, 622, 624; wisdom: 40910, 413:118, 417-18 (129), 433, 439, 497, 505, 528-30, 548-50 (50), 551, 569-71, 660. Averroes, 218, 245, 247, 250, 260-61, 267, 318, 347:61, 601:151, 607-10 (164, 166), 611-12 (171), 616:181, 621, 623 (199), 625:202, 627, 638 (223-24, 226), 654-55, 659, 660, 687, 722, 756:136, 806, 807, 808, 818, 838. Avicebron, 159:50, 219 (1), 309:250,

INDEX

979

604:157. Origen, 530:19, 682:25. Avicenna, 172, 217, 218, 250, 260-61, 268, Paul the Apostle, St., 569-71, 828:65. 272-73, 318, 346:60, 348, 524:5, Pecham [Peckham ], John, 648:248. 601:151, 604:157, 605:159, 635, 638. Peter (the Apostle); St., 478, 813:46. Bachja ben Paquda, R., 481:75. Philo, 622 (195). Bacon, Roger, 806 (31). Plato, 314:257, 400, 420, 530, 569-70, 590, Basil, St., 258:108, 261, 279, 621:192. 590-91, 593-94, 606, 611, 616, 617 Bernard, St., 381, 675, 703, 783, 829, 830, (184), 620-21 (190), 623:198, 624, 831:72, 872, 873. 630-31, 649-50, 655-56. 659, 660, Boethius, 141, 143-45, 156, 157, 158:46, 662, 788, 813:46. 159, 165-68 (64), 172-75, 180, 185-86, Platonists, 335:32, 336-37, 365, 538:12, 591 187:102, 217, 218, 272-73, 298-99, 603-04 (157), 605:159, 606, 611, 625, 318, 347, 349, 370, 374, 380:45, 381:47, 655-56, 659, 660, 798, 813, 838. 386, 433, 440, 457, 460, 522, 741, 783, Plotinus, 622 (194), 623:198, 624-25 (201). Priscian, 788:6. 845, 852, 853:4, 854, 856, 870. Cicero, 617, 622, 624-25 (201), 760:149, Proclus, 158:48. Ptolemy, 788. 789:7-8, 815, 831:72, 856. Pythagoras, 606, 651:253. Commentators, on Aristotle: 594-95, 601 (151), 620-21. Richard of St. Victor, 165-68, 185-86. 217, Damascene, see: John Damascene, St. 218, 667, 675, 703, 732, 760, 783, 85 Dionysius, 347, 349, 352, 365, 410, 417, Scotus Erigena, John, 543:41. 479:73, 495-96 (101), 505, 519-20, 522, Socrates, 617 (184), 620 (189), 813:46. 543, 566, 786, 826. Tempier, Etienne, 889:24. Dioscorus, 789, 830. 832. Varro, 606, 651:253. Epicureans, 805, 892. William of Moerbeke, 158:48. Eustratius, 620:190. Francis of Assisi, St., 617:183, 789:9, fiynlhe.ii.t nf St. Thomas Aquinas 820:54, 828:65, 832. Galens, 788:6. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 651, 655:259. Gerard of Cremona, 158:48. Algazel, 632. Greeks, 780, 786. Ambrose, St., 509, 522, 718. Gregory Nazianzen, St., 621:192, 682:25. Anaxagoras, 628, 633:215, 635, 640. Gregory of Nyssa, St., 621:192. Anselm, St., 392, 393, 394 (73), 467 (44), Gregory the Great, St. 413 (118), 417, 439, 513. 522, 646. 528:10, 528:12, 542-43, 621:192, 659, Apostles, 716, 719. 676, 760:149, 872, 873. Arabians, 786. Grosseteste, Robert, 113:22. Aristotle (doctrine and influence; also Hilary, St., 394:73, 395:77, 468, 482, 519-20. Aristotelean doctrine and influence), Hugh of St. Victor, 176, 330, 336, 365, being: 629-31, 644: causality: 628-30, 550:54, 744:112. 644, 649:249; Christian faith: 628-30, Isaac cle Stella, 532, 605 (158). 644; contemplation: 705; creation: Jerome, St., 676 (13), 759:148, 789:7-8, 815. 628-31 (212), 633, 644 (241), 646 John Damascene, St., 150 (32), 174, 217, (244), 648 (248), 649:249; demon236-38, 249, 258 (108), 260-61, 318, stration, see: science; divine ideas: 326, 328, 337, 365, 393, 431, 432, 440, 655-56; errors (of): 643, 644, 647, 621:192, 682:25, 826, 848, 856. 656 57; eternal world: 630, 635-36, John Scotus Erigena, see: Scotus Erigena. 638, 640, 641 (236), 644 (241), 'Lombard, Peter, 138:5, 176 (85), 686-87, 649:249; form and matter: 110, i l l , 703, 816. 131, 161, 310, 628, 656; freedom of Macrobius, 606, 622:194, 623:198, 649-50, choice: 340:39; God: 628-30, 633, 64 856. (241), 647, 656, 773; goodness: 508 Manicheans, 122, 603 (156), 606:160, 611, human intellect [reason]: 209, 211, 650-51, 659, 794. 214-15, 333, 339, 357:81, 359-60, 365, Moses, 569-71, 788. 388, 389 (62), 391, 422:140, 424, 44

980

INDEX

511, 513 (136), 515, 522, 555-56, 557, 633:216, 650, 651, 652-55 (259), 662; human knowledge [understanding]: 214-15, 359-60, 376:34, 389 (62), 391, 393, 420-21, 424-25, 440, 463, 514, 522, 555, 662, 709; man: 130-32 (62), 193:112, 218, 390, 424, 630, 649; memory: 361, 362, 365; movement | motion | 357, 584, 630 (212), 631, 644:241, 649:249; philosophy (of): 135, 218, 365, 513 (136), 522, 590, 786; rational [human] soul: 131:62, 160, 193:112, 212, 214, 218, 361, 362, 649, 650, 650-51; science and demonstration: 418, 464, 467, 635-36, 707, 716, 771; senses: 361, 376:34, 555, 590; substance: 188, 368, 644 (241), 649:249; time: 638, 644:241; truth: 394, 422, 555-56, 630:212, 631, 634, 644, 654; virtue: 656. Augustine, St. (doctrine and influence; also Augustinian doctrine and influence), Christian faith: 460, 762; concept: 391; divine ideas: 508-09 (125-26); eternal world: 646 (244), 648:248; form and matter: 1 1 0 - 1 1 ; freedom of choice: 330:19, 340:39; God: 189:108, 210-11, 357-81, 486, 511, 513 (136), 516, 522, 552-53, 554-55, 586-88, 780; human intellect: 357:81; human knowledge: 393, 422:140, 440, 522, 553-57, 586-90, 662; human mind [spirit |: 207, 208-11, 361 (91), 362, 390, 516, 554, 557, 586-88; illumination: 511, 513 (136), 554-57, 590, 662; immutability: 551, 552-53, 556-57, 586; light: 509-10, 511, 513 (136), 516, 522; man: 131:62, 210-11, 365; memory: 361 (91), 362, 365; philosophy (of): 218, 365, 513 (136), 522, 786: rational [human | soul: 131:62, 161, 209-11, 218, 361, 362, 516, 650:252; science: 587-88; seminal reasons: 110-11; wisdom: 557 (67), 709; theology: 706, 712, 717:70, 719, 720 (75); troth: 394-95, 516, 522, 551, 552-53, 554-57, 582-83, 586-88, 768. Avempace, 651. Averroes, 130-31, 218, 630:212, 638 (22324, 226), 652-54, 655 (259). Avicebron, 109, 160:51. Avicenna, 109, 218, 393, 509:126, 557-58 (69), 628:207, 629, 632-34 (215), 635, 638, 649 (250), 650, 652, 654.

Boethius, 160, 161:53, 187-91 (102, 107), 218, 376:34, 466, 522, 647:244, 650, 716, 718, 893. Damascene, see: John Damascene, St. Democritus, 633:216, 635. Dionysius, 390, 509 (122), 522, 706, 709, 716, 717:70, 719:73, 786. Empedocles, 628-29, 633:215-16, 635, 640. Galens, 655:259. Greeks, 786. Gregory the Great, St., 718, 768. Hilary,'St., 394:73, 395:77. Hugh of St. Victor, 647:244, 893. Jerome, St., 720:75. John Damascene, St., 391-92, 393, 434-35, 647:244, 769, 893. Lombard, Peter, 717. Macrobius, 649-50 (251). Manicheans, 628-29, 633:215, 650-51 (253). Moses, Rabbi, 636:219. Origen, 633:215, 650 (252). Pecham [Peckham |, John, 648:248. Plato, 131:62, 193:112, 314:257, 420-21,

511 (133), 555, 590, 628-29 (207),

630-31, 633:215, 635, 640, 644, 647, 649-50 (250), 655-56, 662 Platonists, 389, 630. 633:215, 650 (251),

655-56

Pythagoras, 629. Pythagoreans, 628, 649 (250). Richard of St. Victor, 187-88, 190-91, 218, 769. Siger of Brabant, 655:259. Socrates, 555. Stoics, 633:216. Themistius, 511 (133), 652-53, 654. Theophrastus, 652, 654. Varro, 651. HISTORIANS AND MEDIEVALISTS d'AIbi, J., 24:20, 54:75. Baeumker, C., 21, 42. Bellofiore, L, 581:109. Bertola, E., 481:75. Bettoni, 128:55, 219:4, 350:65, 355:78, 389:62, 459:28, 500:112, 572:89, 574:96. Bigi, V. Ch., 219:3. Bissen, J. M., 389:62, 508:125, 539:35, 540:36, 568:84, 576:99, 586:116. Bonafede, G., 500:112, 543:42, 547:46. Bougerol, J. G., 77:110, 389:62, 806:31.

INDEX Brady, I., 125:50, 832:73. Bukowski, T. P., 894:25. Callus, D. A., 220:5. Chenu, M. D., 29:29, 30:32-34, 34:43, 36:47, 39:53, 57:81, 59:83, 864-65, 879. Crowley, Th., 48:64. Crux, L. A., 475:62, 477:67, 500:112, 543:42. Dady, M. R., 418:129, 436:171, 543:42. Dalbiex. R., 29:29. Delorme, F. M., 64:89. Denifle, H, 47. De Wulf, M., 17, 17-18, 19-22 (7, 16), 23 (18). 24:19, 26:24, 27-28, 29-30, 30-32 (38), 33-34, 36-37, 38-39, 41-43 (58), 43, 45, 49, 60:84, 69:96, 73, 76:108, 95, 98, 219:2, 842, 842, 843, 844-45, 861, 864, 871:17, 879, 879, 880, 881, 882, 884-85, 886-87 Dondaine, H. F., 675:8. Khrle, F.. 34:43.

Rschrnann, I. Th.. 627:205. Gendreau, B. A., 76:108. Gilson, E., 17, 22-26, 27 (26), 28-30 (34), 32-33 (36), 33, 34 (43), 34-36, 37-38, 39-41, 42 (58), 43-45 (59), 50:67-68, 51-52 (70), 53:73, 54, 56-59, 60, 62-65 (86), 66:92, 67, 68-70, 73-74, 76:108, 77-78 (110-11), 79, 81-83, 86-88 (125). 90:128, 91-98, 113:22, 219:3, 842-43, 843, 844, 847-48 (2), 849, 851-52, 853:4. 860-61, 861-62, 863-64 (13), 865-66 (14), 866-67, 868-69, 869-70, 871-72 ( 1 7 ) , 874, 879, 879, 880, 881, 884-85, 886. 887. Glorieux, P., 54. Grabmann, M., 17, 47-48, 54, 70, 617:182. Gorce. M. M., 54. de Guise. N., 387:57. Guthrie, H., 219:3. Haureau, B., 17. Hislop, I., 422:140, 450:9. Hurley, M., 589:126. Jean tie Dieu de Champsecret, 572:89. Klubertan/. G. P., 181:91. Krizovljan. H., 81:117. van der Laan, H., 84-90, 97-98, 851, 851, 857:4, 868-69, 874, 892. Lottin, O., 48. Mandonnet, P., 17, 18-19, 20:7, 22 (17), 23, 26:24, 27 (26), 29 (30), 34:42. 42 (58), 43-44, 45, 49, 51:70, 52. 54,

981

56:78-79, 57, 60, 69:96, 76:108, 78:111, 81, 83, 841-42, 842, 843, 864-65, 86667, 868, 874, 878, 886. Masonovo, A.. 48. Mayer, V., 543:42. Mazzeo, J. A., 219:3. McAndrew, P. J., 574:96. Mulligan, R. W., 202:130, 418:129. O'Donnell, C. M.. 128:55, 219:2, 329:18, 389:62. O'Leary, C., 126:52, 219:4. Pegis. A. C.. 76:108, 220:5, 434:166. Pelzer. A., 47. Picavet, F., 54. Ratzinger, J., 74-76, 77:109, 79-81, 82-83 (119-20), 84:121, 96, 97, 98, 851, 851, 876, 878, 894, 895. Renan, E., 54. Robert, P., 60-65. 68:95, 71 (100), 78:111, 81-82, 92-93, 94, 96, 98, 113:22, 149:30, 219:4, 849-50, 851, 853-57, 861, 862, 867, 868:16, 871:17, 875, 894. Roch, R. J., 76:108. Rohmer, 422:140. Sassen, F., 30:33. Scheltens, G., 434:166. 540:36. Schwendiger, F.. 389:62, 544:43, 574:96. Sciamannini, R., 572:89, 575:96. Sertillanges, A. D., 88:127. Szdzuj. E., 126:5, 185:99. Tavard, G. H., 81:117, 674:8. Thcry, G., 24:19, 27:26, 29:29, 30:32, 31:35, 219:2. Thonnard, F. J., 56:79. Van de Woestyne, 'L, 389:62, 422:140, 436:171, 545:45, 562:76, 581:109, 589:126. Van Steenberghen, F., 17, 45, 46-55, 55-56 (79), 58:83, 59:84, 60-62 (85-86), 65:90, 65-68, 70-74, 74, 76-84, 86 (125), 8890 (128), 90-98, 806:31, 848-49, 84950, 850-51, 851, 857, 859, 861, 862, 863-64 (12), 865 (14), 867-68 (16), 872 874. 877, 879-80, 881, 882, 887-88, 889, 892, 893, 894-95. Veuthey, L., 185:99, 360:88, 374:26, 418:129, 422:140, 434:166, 500:112, 550:56. Villalmonte, A., 674:8. da Vinca, A., 82:119. Vollenhoven. H. Th., 85, 86:123. Wenin. C., 76:108. 78:111, 79, 82.