Great Power Strategy in Asia: Empire, Culture and Trade, 1905-2005

Great Power Strategy in Asia

This book analyses the enduring themes underlying the strategic struggles in Asia, beginning with the pivotal 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War. It aims to show how the most important areas of current international affairs have their roots in often-forgotten corners of military history. The first part of the book examines the explosive factors that led to war between Russia and Japan in 1904, and offers a 10-year perspective on the War, focusing on its consequences: cultural shock in ‘the West’, realignment of Asian imperial geography and the failure to learn vital military lessons as the First World War approached. The second part offers a 35-year perspective on the war, as Japan repeated the essential strategic, operational and tactical ploys of its war against Russia in 1904 in its strike upon the USA in 1941. Allied victory assured the downfall of Europe’s empires in Asia, with the USA inheriting much of the old imperial legacy. The third part takes a centennial view of the Russo-Japanese War and finds that many of the broader issues identifiable in 1904–5 remain at the heart of today’s strategic discourse: Western apprehension about the economic rise of Japan, the anomalies of an ‘American Empire’, tensions between the Occident and the Orient, the apparent new relevance of geopolitics and the importance of demography in perceptions of global power. This is the story of military innovation, the pathology of learning lessons from the experience of war and the anticipated rise of Chinese power a century after the false dawn of Japanese victory in 1905. The book will appeal to students of military history, strategic studies, Asian politics and international relations in general. Jonathan Bailey retired from the British Army in 2005 as a major general. He is the author of The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare (Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996), and Field Artillery and Firepower (Naval Institute Press, 2004).

Great Power Strategy in Asia Empire, culture and trade, 1905–2005 Jonathan Bailey

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 Jonathan Bailey This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-96941-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–40458–4 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–96941–3 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–40458–7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–96941–0 (ebk)

Contents

Introduction

1

Context 1 The contention 1 PART I

The Russo-Japanese War: a 10-year perspective 1 Portents

7 9

Strategy: racial and commercial dynamics 9 Military omens 32 2 The experience of 1904–5

35

Outline of events 35 The tactics of attack and defence 36 Campaign planning 38 3 1905 – the future of war: a 10-year perspective

41

Morale 41 Racial and cultural struggle 42 Lessons to be learned 54 PART II

From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour: a 35-year perspective 4 Grand strategy: racial angst and diplomatic odyssey

59 61

vi Contents 5 Military strategy: the paradox of inevitability and surprise

85

6 Tactics and technology: novelty repeated

97

PART III

Imperial tectonics: the plates shift. A centennial perspective

111

7 Europe bows out

113

8 Asia on the march

128

9 America advances

136

The USA and the Asians 136 The USA and Britain 140 10 Nippon resurgat

148

Economic rebirth and confused identity 148 Cultural reflections 157 The lens of history 163 The anomalies of self-defence 167 Unfinished business – a settlement with Russia? 172 Futures and choices 172 11 The next hundred years: Chinese futures

177

A new balance: made in China 177 The short march to prosperity and the frictions of ‘The China-Trade’ 180 The fruits of power 188 Demography: people power again 196 Alternative futures 198 12 Conclusion: centennial themes Race, culture, war and competition 211 ‘The China-Trade’ 212 The Asian century at last? 213

211

Contents vii East and West, the Orient and the Occident, modernity and tradition 214 China and Japan: a shared identity? 217 Russian identities 217 A civilizing mission? 218 The American empire and the ‘Whiteman’s burden’ 220 Geo-strategy and Geopolitics 222 Demography 224 The lessons of military lessons and the paradox of surprise 224 Notes Bibliography Index

228 273 293

Introduction

Context The Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) was short and intense, leaving the world shocked and enthralled by its drama. It was witnessed by a large number of foreign military observers and journalists whose findings were widely publicized in popular books and official studies. The Russian and American empires drove in from east and west upon a region from which Japan sought to expand, and in which older European empires tried to consolidate their stakes while China festered. It was immediately acknowledged that this war would offer important insights into the nature of future conflict at a time of seemingly revolutionary technological change, social upheaval and a novel strategic geography. The validation of the lessons learned or forgotten in this Asian–Pacific ‘experiment’ would be made in 1914–18 and, rather unexpectedly, in 1941. The consequences would reverberate through the 1950s and 1960s; the full logic and strategic implications of the events of 1904–5 will probably only become apparent more than 100 years later.

The contention In 1905 Japan defeated Russia in a war fought to determine which would control Manchuria, and perhaps eventually the trade of China. Even at the time, the significance and consequences of the conflict were acknowledged to be far more profound. Japan had been forced open for trade by the USA and was seeking to maintain its national independence from Western powers, conscious of the fate of other Asian peoples. It had adopted Western modernity to protect itself from those who brought it, and believed that it required an empire on the Western model to sustain the economic power that would underwrite that independence. Japan’s expansion would inevitably bring confrontation with others who felt that their interests were threatened: the West European empires, that had had stakes in the region for hundreds of years; Russia, which had an ambitious plan for aggrandizement in its Far East; and the USA, whose

2 Introduction territorial and commercial expansion in the Pacific and East Asia was growing fast. The great prize was the trade of China, a decayed empire now unable to defend itself. Britain and the USA supported Japan against Russia, for Japan seemed to be the champion of modernity against a Russia which threatened their own interests, and in some ways seemed more Asiatic than the Japanese. Their support for their protégé soon waned as the manner of Japan’s meticulously planned victory and its consequences were appreciated. Japan was now a power to be reckoned with and Britain, but especially the USA, soon realized that one day they would very likely also have to fight Japan. Japan’s vigorous military performance and the rapid changes to the balance of power in East Asia were explained in terms of geopolitics, Darwinian and Malthusian theories, race, notions of cultural conflict and the rise and fall of civilizations. They challenged Western assumptions of natural superiority and threatened the existing order of the Whiteman’s empires, throwing Western societies into dismay at their own apparent decadence. Asia was rising and Japan was its champion; but some, even in Japan, foresaw a time when China might succeed to that title. They speculated that should China ever become a strong state and harness its vast productive resources, the implications for Western economies, both in terms of opportunities and threats, would be immense. It would very likely end the West’s dominance of global affairs. The war witnessed many military novelties, above all the first convincing demonstration of the power of new technologies in defence: machine guns, indirect firing artillery, magazine-fed rifles combined with trenches and barbed wire. Hopes of rapid and decisive victories in battles of offensive manoeuvre faded. With hindsight it is hard to identify any ‘lesson’ of the war which was not appreciated and documented at the time. Inevitably many of these lessons were mutually contradictory, peculiar to the theatre, and more or less appropriate to different military cultures. They were viewed through the distorting lenses of political intrigue, social attitude, military orthodoxy and wishful thinking, with the result that what we now see as clear auguries of the future of warfare, à la 1914–18, generally went unheeded. Nations and their militaries were unwilling to acknowledge the consequences of the new technologies. They tended to put their faith in the human spirit to overcome those factors which might make a war in Europe unwinnable, and thus perhaps unthinkable. The price of this folly would be immense in 1914. The Russo-Japanese War ended with perhaps the most decisive battle in naval history at Tsushima, the triumph of the battleship, but it did not give Japan control of the seas for a century, as Trafalgar had given the British in 1805. It did, however, convince the Japanese of the need to possess a powerful navy and to put itself at the forefront of naval innovation in amphibious warfare and, in time, naval air power.

Introduction 3 By the 1930s, Japan felt a pressing need to build an empire on the Asian mainland as it had in 1904; and besides, many of its rivals were still recovering from the exertions of the First World War in which Japan had played only a minimal role. This ambition would soon extend to establishing an area of economic control across much of South-East Asia. The USA felt compelled to prevent this, not only fearing the forfeit of its dominant position in the Pacific but also the inclusion of China in some expanded Japanese empire. It feared the loss of European possessions to the Japanese, but at the same time was reluctant to support European empires which in their own way were an affront to American sensibilities and ambitions in the region. The USA had supported China against Japanese aggression for some years before it was itself attacked by Japan, just as it had supported Britain against Germany before Hitler declared war on the USA. This support cost it little in relative terms, but ensured that the USA went to war when its enemies were already deeply committed and its allies tiring and ruined. By 1941 little of the military innovation of 1904–5 seemed relevant, yet the manner in which Japan initiated its war on the USA and Britain was very similar, a surprise torpedo attack on a fleet at anchor and a vigorous land campaign mounted by troops shipped rapidly from Japan. The main technological difference was the manner in which the torpedoes were delivered, by aircraft. The day of the battleship was over. By 1945, the Axis was defeated, but so too in a sense were all the West European nations, even the ‘victors’. The USSR was able to regain much of what Russia had lost in 1905, and the USA was in a position of unrivalled power and prosperity. Japan may have claimed to have defeated Europe’s Far Eastern empires morally, but in practice they collapsed from bankruptcy, exhaustion and at American insistence. Western views of Japan swerved erratically, as deeper explanations were sought for the tides of military fortune. The admiration for Japan’s performance in 1904–5 and grudging respect for the qualities of its servicemen in the Second World War had turned to contempt for the social, cultural and military systems which had created such poor systems of government and decision making. Perhaps, it was suggested, there was even something genetically amiss with the Japanese. In 1945, any thoughts of ‘Asia rising’ seemed misplaced as Asia lay in ruins. Japan was disarmed, bankrupt and docile, and Communist China was unlikely ever to develop a powerful economy. The USSR was formidable, but no longer purveyed itself as ‘Asian’. The ‘American Century’ had begun and the USA became the new imperial power in East Asia, albeit not on the earlier European model of territorial occupation, for it held sway by other means, cultural, economic and at times military. The limits of this military power were tested, but the USA did provide the stability in which others could develop economically, politically and in some respects culturally.

4 Introduction Many Asian nations gained independence in the two decades after 1945 as their European masters departed; and within 30 years Japan had miraculously rebuilt a world-class economy. This startling reversal of fortune required an explanation. This was couched in many of the same admiring but fearful terms that had been used after 1905, but dismissed in 1945. Once again, cultural panic took hold as the West tried to learn the secrets of Japanese success, with some asserting that Japan was once more a dire strategic threat and had in a sense ‘won’ after all. The subsequent difficulties of the Japanese economy led many to revert to earlier explanations for Japanese incompetence, the West seemingly unable to grapple adequately with the two sides of the coin that make up the totality that is Japan. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR left the USA with unrivalled power in East Asia, even though it was not itself an Asian nation. It had grown used to, and comfortable with, the assumptions of global responsibilities, rather as had previous European empires. The power of the local champion, Japan, was much reduced; but it soon became clear that it might have a successor. China was again a strong state and apparently intent on becoming wealthy as a means of developing its broader national power, a model set by Japan a century earlier. The big players in Asian strategy were no longer Russia and Japan, but China and the USA; but the issues had become familiar over the previous century. How might the economic potential of China be unleashed and to what end? If Asia could produce a world-class power, how would that power in the world be exercised? Would there be some new Asian empire of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ to which others would have to kowtow? Could the West, including Japan, compete with this Asian champion, and would it have to surrender some of its interests, political, economic and cultural? On the other hand, if the historical model of a modernizing Asian champion was disturbingly familiar, could events be managed to ensure that they did not again lead to military conflict? The debate as to whether China will be a benign or a menacing power in the twenty-first century and how others should best react, by cooperating, containing, or challenging, preoccupies policy makers. This is especially so in the USA, which 100 years after an Asian power first defeated a European one, is in effect the last of the great ‘European’ empires left standing in East Asia. The dynamics of these strategic upheavals are explained in terms familiar 100 years ago: the clash of civilizations, the rise and fall of empires, geopolitics, demography, competition for raw materials and markets and a new military balance featuring not so much battleships as submarines, missiles and nuclear weapons, in scenarios where surprise and deceptions are widely discussed. The perception of the USA as an empire of many aspects is itself heavily contested and the resolution of the controversy, if there is one, will do much to determine whether this non-Asian nation continues to be the primary actor in East Asian strategic affairs. It may also be that today’s Western

Introduction 5 model of modernity is no more transferable to China than was the Western imperial model of modernity to Japan a century ago. This analysis will examine how the future seemed in 1905 in the light of the intellectual and strategic dynamics of the day. It will look back and assess the significance of the Russo-Japanese War in a centennial perspective and peer forward at the new but paradoxically familiar possible futures and the choices they entail. That perspective was, and remains, one of imperial, economic and cultural rivalry – the roots of Asian strategy over the last hundred years. This was often expressed militarily during the twentieth century, but maybe in future it can take some more benign form as the Occident and the Orient establish new relationships. This test seems set to be the dominant feature of the strategy of the twenty-first century.

Part I

The Russo-Japanese War A 10-year perspective

1

Portents

Strategy: racial and commercial dynamics Theory In the late eighteenth century, Johann Gottfried von Herder maintained that all peoples possessed a spirit of their own, a Volksgeist, manifest in their cultural achievements, languages and customs. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a contemporary, maintained that people have ‘natural borders’ which they will expand to fill, sharing a common identity with their territory. For Fichte, Germany, conscious of its superiority, was to become the leading nation, fulfilling the Destiny of the Universal Spirit. Such notions helped to shape rising nationalisms and later extrapolations of Darwinian ideas, emphasizing the importance of the nation over the individual. Some sought a medical explanation for the superiority of the Caucasian race as evidenced by its material success. In 1839, Dr S.G. Morton of Philadelphia published Crania Americana, an examination of skull capacity which seemed to confirm the intellectual prowess of the Whiteman.1 J.C. Nott and G.R. Gliddon’s Types of Mankind of 1854 maintained that this superiority had arisen primarily from racial competition and the stimulants of conquest and colonization.2 It might have been natural to conclude from this, if it were so, that such martial activities were therefore beneficial to the Caucasian race and should be continued. Darwin’s The Origin of Species of 1859 did not support the idea of a preordained racial hierarchy, but rather one where certain species prospered in particular environments and divergence was the norm. This might explain how Europeans had risen to their position of pre-eminence in the world, but as international conditions changed, it was entirely plausible that new human varieties would emerge, better adapted to those new conditions. Herbert Spencer coined the phrase, ‘survival of the fittest’ in his Social Statistics of 1851, maintaining that evolution and acquired characteristics produced progress, not merely diversity. This cast the debate in a new light, for if nations could also acquire characteristics, then competition was natural, dominance and extinction were not predetermined and the

10 The Russo-Japanese War outcomes had a moral validity. Collective social competition was added to biological selection, laying the foundation for Social-Darwinism.3 Over 500,000 copies of Spencer’s work were sold in the USA where they helped to explain, justify and demand westward expansion – its Manifest Destiny. Darwin’s The Descent of Man of 18714 maintained that some peoples and nations would go into relative decline and that other more dynamic ones in more favourable environments such as North America would lead the march of progress. In time, the civilized races would exterminate and replace the savage races, a theory that no doubt gave comfort to those who planned such action anyway. As Alexis de Tocqueville had noted, the justification for exterminating the American Indians was that they did not have the capacity to become civilized, and the true owners of their continent were those able to exploit its riches. The Europeans who became Americans sought to replace what they found with what they found familiar, confident that their way was also superior. The idea that the development of species, including peoples, is determined primarily by their adaptation to their geographical environment was reflected in Friedrich Ratzel’s late-nineteenth-century term Lebensraum,5 and that notion was further reinfornced by Halford Mackinder’s work of the early twentieth century.6 Mackinder believed that the world had become a closed system. A dynamic expanding people would necessarily require an expanding Lebensraum to match their energy and natural superiority.7 As the frontiers of the great empires of the world met, future strategy would concern competition for occupied territories rather than new ones. The search for Lebensraum would now necessarily entail war. Such ideas were seen by many to find sympathetic, and more objective, scientific expression in the works of Darwin. Strategic thinking became infused with Social-Darwinism and the notion that struggle between peoples was a part of nature’s design – a form of eugenic ‘creative destruction’. Social devastation was the natural price to be paid by the defeated, Vae Victis, and lethal competition between societies was the essence of human relations, and indeed progress. In the anonymous The Battle of Dorking of 1871, the author described Britain’s future military downfall as a ‘judgement . . . deserved’. ‘A nation too selfish to defend its liberty could not have been fit to retain it.’8 Friedrich Von Bernhardi, who was greatly attracted by Ratzel’s ideas, also went on to conclude that warfare was a beneficial part of ethnic competition. The American Admiral S.B. Luce maintained that ‘War is one of the great agencies by which human progress is effected.’ It is the ‘operation of the economic laws of nature . . . it stimulates national growth . . . and solves otherwise insoluble problems. Man is perfected through suffering.’9 Luce maintained that for the USA, ‘The operation of this law is not to be arrested on the hither shores of the Pacific.’10 China, he maintained, represented a good example of what became of a stagnant people unaccustomed to war with a superior race, and it was a terrible warning of what could become of the modern world without the stimulus of war.11 By the end of

Portents 11 the nineteenth century, other more pessimistic constructions were being placed on the conduct of international affairs. Jan Bloch predicted the dire effects of modern military technology on societies, emphasizing the destructive consequences rather than the eugenic benefits of war. There were broad implications for foreign policy. Certainly the evidence available in the world at the time seemed to show that the more vigorous, technologically advanced nations did indeed find it possible to expand their Lebensraum, with imperial conquests and migration. These seemed to further reinforce their future prosperity through the exclusive use of such territories, by gaining access to raw materials and markets for their own produce. From 1871, the need for Lebensraum became a common political cry in Germany by those seeking to acquire colonies to balance those of Britain and France. These ideas also entered the common political discourse of Japan at the height of its desire to learn from the example of the European powers. Theodore Parker noted an imperial paradox, maintaining that ‘The history of the Anglo-Saxon for last three hundred years has been one of aggression, invasion and extermination. God often makes the folly and sin of men contribute to the progress of mankind.’12 J.E. Chamberlain described the world as it seemed to him which, as a matter of observed fact, was dominated by the ‘Anglo-Saxons’. ‘Is the world the inheritance of the AngloSaxon? There are signs that the Anglo-Saxon at least thinks so, and that the rest of the world is not disposed to actively dispute his claim.’13 He saw the history of England over the previous 300 years as the history of territorial acquisition, a dynamic pursued energetically by the USA. ‘It has improved on the original . . . America has already Anglo-Saxonized California, Louisiana and Texas, and will some day Anglo-Saxonize Mexico.’14 John Fiske believed that the retreat of barbarism in the face of superior races and civilization was inevitable, and that by the Year 2000 North America would have a White population of 600 million, while Africa would have followed America and become a mighty nation of English descent – the hubris of assumed predetermined superiority.15 Chamberlain predicted that ‘The whole continent of Africa from the delta of the Nile to the Cape of Good Hope, and from Babel Mandeb to Sierra Leone, is destined to fall into British hands at a time not too far distant’ – not an obviously wayward speculation at the time. He predicted that within 50 years, North America, Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Polynesia and the British Isles would be British possessions. ‘It will present, in short, almost a monopoly of the undeveloped resources of the globe.’ He did not envisage a reunified British nation, but an Anglo-Saxon political, commercial and defensive league with a rotating imperial capital between London, Washington DC and Melbourne. That said, ‘The United States is destined to be the chief seat and breeding ground of the race for many generations to come.’ 16 His assertion was not based on a racial theory per se, but rather one which held that the USA could absorb all comers

12 The Russo-Japanese War without losing the characteristics Chamberlain described as Anglo-Saxon: a love of order, energy, industry, political freedoms and commercial association. Herbert Spencer maintained that the mixing of races had beneficial genetic effects such that ‘The Americans may reasonably look forward to a time when they will have produced a civilization grander than any the world has known.’17 In 1885, an American, the Reverend Josiah Strong, noted that ‘The mighty Anglo-Saxon race was on the march’ and ‘ruled more than one third of the earth’s surface’. Its advance would result in ‘the extinction of the inferior races’ through the force of ‘vitality and civilization’.18 ‘Can anyone doubt that the result of this competition will be the “survival of the fittest”?’19 In 1891, Strong noted how Anglo-Saxons had multiplied sixfold, to 120 million in 90 years, and taken possession of one third of the globe. He expected them to dominate the world when their numbers reached 1 billion.20 This would only come after a great clash of civilizations, for as the American frontier reached the Pacific, pressure of population would mean that the USA would be bound to compete for dominion elsewhere, thanks to ‘The mighty centrifugal tendency in this stock . . . strengthened in the United States.’ The USA’s ‘leap across the Pacific’, to intervene in 1893 and subsequently to annex Hawaii and to take the Philippines in 1898, seemed to confirm Strong’s theory. ‘Inferior races’ could not be saved but by pliant assimilation; but more profoundly, ‘What if it should be God’s plan to people the world with better and finer material?’21 Theodore Roosevelt described the American campaign in the Philippines as the triumph of civilization over ‘The Black chaos of savagery and barbarism’,22 a judgement in keeping with his world view on race, power and civilization.23 He saw the necessity for ‘inferior races’ to be replaced by their betters. It was ‘of incalculable importance that America, Australia and Siberia should pass out of the hands of their Red, Black and Yellow aboriginal owners and become the heritage of the dominant world races’.24 He was not concerned whether this territory was won by treaty or by war, so long as it was won, for this would benefit mankind and civilization. He believed that ‘It was our manifest destiny to swallow up the lands of all adjoining nations who were too weak to withstand us.’25 Roosevelt did not subscribe to the [w]arped, perverse and silly morality which would forbid a course of conquest that has turned whole continents into the seats of mighty and flourishing civilized nations. All men of sane and wholesome thought must dismiss with impatient contempt the plea that these continents should be reserved for the use of scattered savage tribes, whose life was but a few degrees less meaningless, squalid, and ferocious than that of the wild beasts with whom they held joint ownership . . . Most fortunately the hard, energetic, practical men who do the rough pioneer work of civilization . . . are not prone to false sentimentality.26

Portents 13 It was this proudly imperial USA which reached out into Asia just as Japan was also expanding in the region, having been roughly awakened by the USA in 1853. Ironically it is the republican empire of the USA, unlike other European empires, that has retained elements of its imperial acquisitions of the nineteenth century and which remains, 100 years later, the most powerful non-Asian power in that continent. Some rejected the Darwinian explanation of events and there was concern at American policy. The decay and subjugation of the Hawaiian race . . . which is generally accepted as . . . the inevitable result of an inferior race coming in contact and in racial competition with a superior – an outcome of the law of the survival of the fittest . . . there is therefore no cure . . . only a philosophical regret, for such a condition in the supposed natural order of things . . . It is the beast of prey that has caused the downfall of the Hawaiian . . . not the contest of an inferior with a superior race.27 As the ideas and practice of demographic and imperial expansion developed, so the notion grew of an inevitable clash between the civilizations of the East and West. Such ideas were postulated by men such as Viscount Esher in Britain and in the USA by Captain A.T. Mahan in his A Twentieth Century Outlook of 1897. ‘All around us is strife; “the struggle of life”, “the race of life”, are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others.’28 In 1898, Lord Salisbury described the world as divided between the ‘living’ and the ‘dying’ powers, with states, like animal species, subject to Darwinian principles.29 He saw the strong becoming stronger and the weak becoming weaker in a predetermined sense. Mahan and Halford Mackinder were familiar with each other’s work, and Mahan agreed with Mackinder’s view that the world was a closed political system in which no state could live alone. If such a system was also dynamic, then national survival and interests had to be secured in the face of threats from rivals. As Mahan noted, ‘more and more . . . states are touching each other throughout the world, with consequent friction of varying degree’.30 States would either grow and expand, or wither and die. The USA therefore needed to grow, even if that meant clashes with others, for the alternative was to decline and to become subservient to more vital nations. Fears grew that Western nations might not actually have the demographic resources to sustain their imperial destiny. Theodore Roosevelt fretted about the ‘race suicide’ of the ‘Nordic European’ races, brought about by contraception and self-indulgent, decadent populations determined to enjoy themselves rather than attend to what he regarded as their reproductive duties. These higher races were in danger of being swamped by a tide of inferiors.31 He termed this ‘the warfare of the cradle’, akin to the notion of

14 The Russo-Japanese War ‘The Empty Cradle’ purveyed in the discourse on strategic demographics 100 years later.32 Roosevelt saw the solution to the problem to be the same offered by some today: tax penalties and financial incentives.33 While some praised and asserted the spiritual superiority of Eastern culture, strategists such as Mahan feared the power of a dynamic Orient which lacked the Christian and moral development of the West. Problems between East and West were bound to occur as the ‘outward impulse’ of Western nations clashed with the stirrings of the Oriental nations, nations which now shared ‘ideas of material advantage, without a corresponding sympathy in spiritual ideas’.34 The West had either to ‘receive into its own bosom and raise to its own ideals those ancient and different civilizations . . . or perish’.35 The West might therefore have to use military means to prevent the Orient ruling the world. ‘Whether Eastern or Western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and control its future’36 would be the most serious problem of the twentieth century. Mahan foresaw that at some future date Britain might have to exchange its global empire and naval supremacy for a subordinate relationship in a great ‘Teutonic’ federation, led by the USA. Andrew Carnegie wanted to unite Britain and the USA, the ‘two leading Anglo-Saxon nations’, and advocated ‘race imperialism’. President Cleveland’s Secretary of State, Richard Olney, justified his support for Britain as ‘patriotism of race’.37 Mahan noted the paradox inherent in any empire of a democratic state that ‘equity and kindliness are only to be maintained by the presence of force’.38 Mahan maintained that if a people did not make productive use of the land they occupied, then they should forfeit it to those who would. Control of territory should thus depend not upon claims of natural right, but upon political fitness and the use of resources for the general good. Failure to make such use ‘justifies . . . compulsion from outside’.39 Equally, if a nation refused to open itself to the world for trade, the interests of the world in opening it up should take precedence – the greater good. Mahan asserted the right of people to be governed under their own arrangements, but it should not be assumed that this meant that oppressive regimes represented the interests of those they ruled. Regimes should therefore be overthrown in the interests of their people. ‘There need be no tenderness in dealing with them as institutions.’40 ‘That rude and imperfect, but not ignoble arbiter, force . . . which . . . still secures the greatest triumphs of good’ would have to be applied.41 After all, ‘Force has been the instrument by which ideas have lifted the European world to the plane on which it now is, and it still supports our political systems, national and international, as well as our social organization.’42 Thus at the end of the nineteenth century, the idea that the Whiteman was the Darwinian winner in the competition between the races, seemed compelling. The Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, William Inge, saw the Diamond Jubilee of 1897 as the culmination of ‘White Ascendancy’.43 To be White was to be Western, but there was a catch.44 The proposition

Portents 15 implied a need for social egalitarianism within the White race, and yet this was at odds with the social premises of the day. How could ‘the lower orders’, ‘the great unwashed’, exemplify racial superiority? It soon seemed more helpful to explain any superiority in terms of culture rather than race, a culture embodied only in the higher elements of society; and to emphasis the idea of Western cultural, as opposed to mere racial, superiority. This made it easier to explain the admission of the ‘arriviste’ Japanese into the civilized society of nations. Whiteness could not be copied, but Westernism could be fully adopted. Nevertheless many still doubted that superiority could be separated entirely from race or other alien cultural roots. This made the allegedly Westernized Oriental potentially duplicitous and dangerous. Nietzsche predicted the emergence of a Western community based on the notion of ‘the defence of freedom’, and that Britain would be part of an American rather than European grouping.45 Benjamin Kidd’s Principles of Western Civilization of 1902 was perhaps the first to describe the West as a political and cultural entity. Kidd predicted a future of unceasing military struggle, and saw the peoples of the West to be militarily supreme and the winners in the process of evolution. ‘We are par excellence the military peoples, not only of the entire world, but of the evolutionary process itself.’46 Lord Wolseley, commander-in-chief of the British Army, was also a student of Darwin and maintained that all cultural vitality, empires and civilization stemmed from war. He cautioned that ‘war has often acted as a sharp corrective of sloth and luxury’.47 ‘When the drill sergeant and gymnastics instructor are replaced by the ballet dancer and singer, not only does national power decline, but all healthy civilization seems to perish with it.’48 The fears of many Europeans were expressed in the painting Gelbe Gefahr (Yellow Peril), commissioned by Kaiser Wilhelm II in the 1890s. Ironically, Western military culture itself encouraged many values which it held in common with the Samurai code.49 Europeans were militarily supreme, and it was axiomatic that the security of their empires depended upon maintaining this material and moral advantage. The British had been defeated in relatively small battles in the Indian subcontinent and Africa in the late nineteenth century; but these had generally been decisively avenged, if only to restore the ‘face’ of the European. The Italians had suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1892, and this was deemed by the British to be a ‘moral’ danger to their standing in their own empire. It was one reason for their decision in 1896 to reconquer the Sudan from the Dervishes and thereby win an exemplary military victory. As early as 1893, Mahan noted that Japan’s ambitions made it a potential threat to the USA. In 1897 he wrote to the Assistant Secretary for the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, describing the growing threat, even though in the short term he saw Japan as a useful balance to the expanding power of Russia which threatened American interests in China. He specified Hawaii

16 The Russo-Japanese War as the likely focus of trouble between Japan and the USA. That year, J.G. Bennett of the New York Herald predicted that war with Japan would be inevitable. Yet by 1900, Mahan and others were taking a more conciliatory view of Japan which seemed to have acquired and to display the sort of Western and Christian values50 that someday might also be characteristic of China. This led Mahan to see Japan as a likely candidate to become an honorary member of the Teutonic club of maritime powers. ‘The Teutonic group and Japan are at one.’51 Nevertheless, he fretted lest Japan had merely acquired the appearances of Western civilization: ‘It is not possible that change can have penetrated far below the surface, modifying essential traits and modes of thought.’52 ‘Her own participation in the spirit of the institutions of Christendom, as distinguished from its exterior manifestations in material results, is yet too recent to permit of maturity.’53 One hundred years later, it is still a matter of debate whether Japan is indeed a member of the Western grouping, as it has apparently been since 1945, or whether its indigenous cultural roots and values are deeper than appearances. The Japanese noted how technology enabled European powers to advance rapidly around the world, with Russia’s building of the TransSiberian Railway54 and Britain’s construction of a railway across Canada. The works of Darwin and Samuel Smiles were widely read in Japan, and Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo pondered the ‘world-wide racial struggle between the White and coloured races’ which would test the relative vitality of nations.55 The Japanese perceived themselves to be likely victims of ever-growing imperial expansion and Yamagata Aritomo concluded that The days when there is peace in the West are therefore the time for them to contemplate long-term strategies for the East . . . the heritage and resources of the East are like so many pieces of meat about to be devoured by tigers.56 In 1899, Meredith Townsend predicted a great European assault upon Asia, to divide it up as the great powers had Africa, provided Europe could avoid internal wars or a war with an aggrandized USA. He foresaw Europe as mistress of Asia by 2000 and ‘at liberty, as her people think, to enjoy’.57 This proposition would not have seemed especially bold or unpalatable at the time, for such ethno-imperial strategy had already fuelled the occupation of North and South America and Australia by Europeans, while the imperial requisitioning of Africa was an apparently successful ‘ongoing project’. The British view of the Chinese had for centuries been generally derogatory. Between 1700 and 1759, Britain suffered a painful trade deficit with China, with its exports of £9 million exceeded by imports from China worth £26 million. This required the physical transfer of silver of that value from Britain to China.58 Most European nations were irritated that the

Portents 17 Chinese would not accept a Western view of international relations. In 1834, Major General Sir Robert Napier reported that the Chinese people wallowed in ‘the extreme degree of mental imbecility and moral degradation, dreaming themselves to be the only people on earth and being entirely ignorant of the theory and practice of international law’.59 Some were cautious about ideas of any ‘Manifest Destiny’ of the White races to expand, and saw the possibility of challenges. Lord Wolseley noted the moral rot of Chinese civilization which had led to its humiliation in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, but observed the many qualities of the Chinese. He predicted that China would have a great future, if it could make itself fit again.60 This was the hope of many patriotic Chinese. The Chinese self-strengtheners’ agenda at the turn of the century had similarities to that of the Japanese. The Chinese military attaché in Paris, Chen Jitong explained, We will get everything we need, all the technology of your intellectual and material culture, but we will adopt not one element of your faith, not one of your ideas or even one of your tastes . . . You are yourselves providing the means whereby we will vanquish you.61 By 1894, C.H. Pearson, the former Minister for Education of the State of Victoria, feared that the decadent West was doomed and that ‘In the long run the lower civilization has a more vigorous life than the privileged . . . we shall wake to find ourselves thrust aside by peoples whom we looked down upon as servile.’62 China would be that vigorous nation. No one can doubt that if China were to get for sovereign a man with the organizing and aggressive genius of Peter the Great or Frederick the Second, it would be a very formidable neighbour to either British India or Russia.63 He predicted that, A hundred years hence when these . . . Chinese, Hindu and Negro . . . races, which are now as two to one to the higher (White race), shall be as three to one; when they have borrowed the science of Europe, and developed their still virgin worlds, the pressure of their competition on the Whiteman will be irresistible. He will be driven from every neutral market and forced to confine himself within his own. The day is at hand when China will have cheap fuel . . . cheap transport . . . and technical schools to develop her industries . . . she may wrest control of the world’s markets . . . The preponderance of China over any rival – even over the USA – is likely to be overwhelming.64 In Pearson’s mind, China’s economic power would also eventually find expression in military expansionism. B. Kidd responded that Pearson’s ideas

18 The Russo-Japanese War on the passing of ‘Aryan’, Christian, Western civilization was ‘no more than the legitimate application of those theories of the Manchester School . . . ’.65 In 1902, John Hobson’s Imperialism described other dangers in the economic development of China. He foresaw the demise of Western productivity and an unhealthy, decadent dependence on China. ‘The greater part of Western Europe might then assume the appearance and character already exhibited by tracts of country in the south of England, in the Riviera, and in the tourist-ridden or residential parts of Italy and Switzerland, little clusters of wealthy aristocrats drawing dividends and pensions from the Far East.’66 If the USA needed to protect its commercial interests in China to maintain its own health as a nation, Mahan recognized that this would have broader historical, cultural and strategic consequences. For European civilization . . . has now arrived . . . a day of visitation, a process has begun which must end either in bringing the Eastern and Western civilizations face to face, as opponents who have nothing in common, or else in receiving the new elements, the Chinese especially, as factors which, however they may preserve their individuality . . . may proceed quietly to work out peacefully its natural results.67 Mahan never thought that China would become Western, rather that it would maintain its own identity alongside that which it took from the West, making perhaps a powerful new hybrid, rather as the Teutons had infused new energies into what emerged from the ruins of Rome to create a new dynamic Christendom, not merely another version of Rome. ‘What we have to hope for is a renewed Asia, not another Europe’;68 and Mahan saw this to be to the benefit of mankind.69 If the West wished to bring the benefits of civilization, trade and consequent wealth to China, it faced a dilemma, for wealth equated to power. A successful China would surely demand its democratic say in the world in material terms, or as Mahan put it in 1900: ‘The great inevitable future, when, aroused to the consciousness of power, and organized by the appropriation of European methods . . . China . . . shall be able to assert an influence proportionate to [its] mass, and to demand (its) share in the general advantage.’70 The Western hold on global power would have to be shared. Should China become wealthy and powerful without the social and cultural values of the West, ‘the result of centuries of Christian increment’,71 then the outcome could be very serious. [t]he danger to us . . . is infinitely greater of a China enriched and strengthened by the material advantages we have to offer . . . but uncontrolled by any clear understanding . . . of the mental and moral forces which have generated and in large measure govern our political and social action72 . . . It is scarcely desirable that so vast a proportion of

Portents 19 mankind as the Chinese constitute, should be animated by but one spirit and moved as a single man.73 It is difficult to contemplate with equanimity such a vast mass as the four hundred millions of China, concentrated into one effective political organization, equipped with modern appliances, and cooped within a territory already narrow for it.74 China might threaten the West. ‘Many military men look with apprehension toward the day when the vast mass of China – now inert – may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion.’75 Mahan’s solution was to encourage the development of China and to preserve its territorial integrity, but not as a unified political entity, at least until the time that it had developed more Western values. He saw benefit in its varied regional development under the influence of Western trading nations.76 Practice Many Americans resented their national policy of keeping China ‘open for trade’, for it promised to be ‘the great workshop’ whose labour would take jobs from American manufacturers. Brooks Adams expressed the growing fear of economic globalization, ‘by electricity and steam, all people are welded . . . competition brings all down to a common level . . . factories can be equipped as easily in India, Japan and China as in Lancashire or Massachusetts and the products of the cheapest labour sold . . .’77 On the other hand, the lobby to gain access to, and even to control The China-Trade in the face of European and Japanese competition was very influential, and the fundamentals of this debate remain as contentious today as they were then. By the mid-nineteenth century, many Americans were warning that their burgeoning production needed fresh markets, without which their economy would be stifled. The critical issue from this point of view was not the protection of American manufacturers, or even the principle of free trade, but rather that the USA should win the competition for Asian markets in what was seen by some to be virtually a zero-sum game. The USA had long sought to prevent other empires from competing in North America and on the Pacific coast. Russian advances into Alaska caused the American President to declare his Monroe Doctrine in 1832, arrogating to the USA an imperial mandate in North America. In effect, this claimed that it was the enlightened political ideology of the US regime that legitimized its existence, and gave it, rather than Europeans, the right to continue to colonize that continent. In the event it merely served to protect the USA from the competition of other powers in its own great imperial enterprise in the Western Hemisphere. President Fillmore sent Commodore Perry to Japan in 1853 to open up the Pacific for trade. The Japan he found was far from being some small

20 The Russo-Japanese War and primitive nation, a void to be filled by a dynamic Western civilization. It had the most urbanized society in the world and a population of 31 million, compared to the 23 million of the USA. Tokyo was the world’s largest city with a population of over 1 million, while that of Washington DC was 35,000. In Western commercial terms, however, it was indeed a void to be filled. The views of the American government on the efficacy of military power were often very similar to those of European ones. The American Secretary of State, W.H. Seward, maintained that ‘The simple people of Japan’ were to be made to respect ‘the institutions of Christianity . . . humanity demands and expects a continually extending sway for the Christian religion’.78 His friend Robert Pruyn reminded him that the opening of Japan had not been caused by any Japanese concern for the common good; but rather by ‘the silent but no less potent utterances of the bayonet and wide-mouthed cannon . . . our foothold can be maintained with the hand on the sword . . . It is here as with our Indian tribes.’79 Yet the differences between East and West seemed to become less clear-cut. While Japan seemed to be the new champion of Asia, its acquired Western characteristics soon gave it an ambivalent status in the minds of many. In 1896, W.E. Curtis described the Japanese as The Yankees of the East. East Asia was termed the Far East, but some Americans asked whether it should not more properly be seen as the USA’s Far West and new ‘frontier’. By the end of the nineteenth century some Americans believed that this frontier was fated to fall to them: ‘The same law of civilization that has compelled the red men . . . to retire before the superior hardihood of our pioneers will require the people of the Japanese Empire to abandon their cruelty.’80 Walt Whitman rejoiced at the new American ‘imperialism’, ‘I chant the new empire grander than before, as in a vision it comes to me, I chant America the mistress, I chant supremacy, my sail-ships and steam-ships threading the archipelagos, my stars and stripes fluttering in the wind.’81 America had behaved very like European nations in securing extraterritorial privileges in China and ‘opening up’ Japan. When Commodore R. Shufeldt ‘opened up’ Korea to American trade in 1882, he proclaimed the United States’ destiny, The Pacific is the ocean bride of America – China and Japan and Korea – with their innumerable islands hanging like necklaces about them, are the bridesmaids . . . Let us determine while yet in our power, that no commercial rival, or hostile flag can float with impunity over the long swell of the Pacific sea.82 Clearly some extension of the theory of Manifest Destiny, stretching west of California had evolved, and it would have to be defended by some extended Monroe Doctrine.

Portents 21 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, American isolationism had protected continental expansionism, but Mahan maintained that in the twentieth century this was no longer an appropriate policy for a healthy and dynamic nation. He believed that the USA should make a contribution to the expense of maintaining an open-door policy in China and not leave it solely to the Europeans. The USA ‘should be ashamed to receive more than we give’.83 In 1878, Emory Upton had predicted that ‘Japan is no longer contented with progress at home (and) is destined to play an important part in the history of the world.’84 Some believed that a collision between East and West seemed inevitable; but for now the friction would be merely intellectual and political. While Japan adopted much from the West, cultural resistance grew and was even publicized in the USA. Okakura Kakuzo published a piece in English in the USA contrasting Eastern spirituality with Western materialism, asking, ‘The West is for progress, but toward what? . . . modern civilization [makes] slaves.’85 The first significant clash between the USA and Japan occurred over the future of Hawaii. In 1883 there were 116 Japanese in Hawaii, but by 1896 there were 24,000. Only 7,200 White Americans lived in Hawaii out of a total population of 109,000. President Grover Cleveland condemned the landing of American troops on 16 January 1893, describing it as an act of war against the constitutional government of Hawaii: ‘There is little basis for the pretense that such forces were landed for the security of American life and property.’86 Cleveland maintained that Hawaii was taken by an unauthorized act of war by an American diplomatic representative: ‘Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States forces without the consent or wish of the government of the islands, or of anybody else so far as shown, except the United States Minister.’87 There was concern that the ‘blessings of civilization’ were merely a convenient American slogan for political and economic domination on the European model, ‘they proclaim to the “children of nature” that peace is a jewel from heaven – while Krupp and Maxim ride anchor in the bay’.88 Men such as John Cabot Lodge ensured that the USA would challenge its rivals in the Pacific as ardently as any other empire. He insisted that Hawaii should come under American control, governed by men of American blood . . . we should take all the outlying territory necessary to our own defense, to the protection of the Isthmian canal, to the upbuilding of our trade and commerce . . . I cannot bear to see the American flag pulled down where it has once been run up . . . 89 He believed it imperative to take the islands before the British occupied them, for the British had ‘always oppressed, thwarted and sought to injure us’.90

22 The Russo-Japanese War Arguments against the annexation of Hawaii were mainly on points of ethics and constitutional propriety, but they were also racial, as they had been against annexing the whole of Mexico in 1848. The Senate was alerted to the possibility of having ‘pig-tailed, pagan Chinese’ taking part in its debates.91 In March 1897, the White Hawaiian Government turned away Japanese immigrants on the grounds that they threatened its moral, sanitary and economic interests. In response, Japan sent a battleship to protect its citizens. On 1 May 1897, A.T. Mahan noted in a letter to Roosevelt that the Japanese Navy represented a threat to Hawaii, and Roosevelt instructed the Naval War College to study the problem of the Japanese moving against Hawaii. In 1898, with some prescience, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that necessity. Pragmatic imperialism won the day, and that year the USA annexed Hawaii, despite Japanese disapproval.92 In 1900, native Hawaiians became US citizens, but without the right to vote in Presidential elections. The American frontier continued its advance into Asia in the name of trade and civilization. John Burgess, the founder of Political Science at Columbia University insisted that people who were incapable of civilizing themselves had a duty to submit to those who would civilize them. The USA had a ‘transcendent right and duty to establish political and legal order everywhere . . . a great world duty’ to eradicate ‘permanent instability on the part of any state or semi-state’.93 In 1898, the USA sought a lease on Samsah Bay in Fukien. That same year it bought Spain’s interest in the Philippines for $20 m, with the stated desire to ‘uplift, civilise and Christianise them’. In 1900, Senator A.J. Beveridge described the Philippines as the gateway to The China-Trade and essential for the USA to possess. He predicted that most future wars would be about commerce and asserted that The China-Trade was vital to future American interests. Secretary of State John Hay believed that ‘The storm center of the world has shifted . . . to China. Whoever understands that mighty Empire . . . has a key to world politics for the next five centuries.’94 Others disowned the USA’s imperial behaviour. Roosevelt’s psychology professor at Harvard, William James, condemned the taking of the Philippines: ‘We can destroy their ideals but we cannot give them ours.’95 Others condemned American military intervention in the affairs of millions of people in foreign lands, even if it was judged to be good for them. The American constitution should not be imposed on others by force. The Republican William E. Mason warned, ‘God almighty help the party that seeks to give civilization and Christian liberty hypodermically with thirteen inch guns.’96 Senator Swanson warned that large numbers of troops would be required to fight an inevitable guerrilla war over many years, and that they would end up committing atrocities as the Spanish had done. On 9 January 1899, Senator G.F. Hoar noted that the Monroe Doctrine had

Portents 23 been discarded and every European nation now had the right to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere. Henry Cabot Lodge had some demographic/Darwinian misgivings about this American expansion, believing that when a ‘lower race’ mixes with a ‘higher’ one in sufficient numbers, ‘the lower will prevail’.97 However, his defence of American actions in the Philippines was robust. On 7 May 1900, he announced in the US Senate that the USA had not asked for the consent of the people of Louisiana and Mexico before annexing their territory and did not need popular consent to take the Philippines. On 7 September 1900, T.R. Roosevelt agreed that the consent of aboriginal Americans, the people of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Louisiana, Mexico, Hawaii and Alaska had not been required when the USA seized their territory, and neither did the USA require the consent of the citizens of the Philippines to annex theirs. In his inaugural address, Roosevelt noted the benefits of British rule in India and Egypt98 and hoped that the USA would replicate this in the Philippines.99 Perhaps he was mindful that this American imperial venture had been abetted by its erstwhile imperial rival Britain.100 American policy in Asia suddenly seemed to be dependent upon its new base at Manila; but the purchase brought with it a war against Filipino ‘freedom fighters’ who had taken the American Declaration of Independence as their model. President McKinley termed this an insurrection101 and it was defeated, but at a moral price. Allegations were made that American forces had committed atrocities similar to those associated with the old imperial powers.102 These allegations were investigated, but action was not taken because of the serious consequences of their findings being made public – the ‘facts would develop implicating others’.103 American editors complained that executing prisoners was a Spanish method inappropriate for American forces.104 Arthur MacArthur recommended that, should the opportunity arise, the USA should not stop at the Philippines but also invade and occupy Japan. ‘If Japan should come into our hands . . . I should say keep it by all means.’105 The Philippines was an expensive and apparently valuable asset, but it was soon apparent that it might also be a strategic liability, threatened by a Japan concerned by this acquisition, with its implications for trade and further territorial expansion. The Japanese had their own strategic imperatives. Prior to the agitation caused by their modernizing and imperial ambitions, the Japanese had traditionally sought harmony, over disruption and risk for material gain. In the early eighteenth century, Arai Hakuseki contrasted the ‘spiritual civilization’ of Japan with the ‘material civilization’ of the West, a distinction which has proved a popular fiction to this day. Others were more ambitious. In A Secret Strategy for Expansion of 1823, Sato Nobuhiro proposed an ultra-nationalist policy that would make the rest of the world provinces of Japan; and this expansion would begin with the conquest of China, striking first into Manchuria.106 Japan remained an

24 The Russo-Japanese War international hermit until Commodore Perry’s arrival, but in 1857, the shogun’s adviser, Hotta Masayoshi noted pragmatically, that ‘military power always springs from national wealth’,107 and that such wealth sprang principally from trade and commerce. This seemed the key to Japanese independence, requiring alliances with trading partners and the emulation of their best practice. He advised, I am therefore convinced that our policy should be to stake everything on the present opportunity, to conclude friendly alliances, to send ships to foreign countries everywhere and conduct trade, to copy the foreigners where they are at their best and so repair our shortcomings, to foster our national strength and complete our armaments, and so gradually subject the foreigners to our influence until in the end all the countries of the world know the blessings of perfect tranquillity, and our hegemony is acknowledged throughout the globe.108 Western ideas were not necessarily regarded as inferior and materialistic, as they often were later; rather the reformers wanted the ‘Civilization and Enlightenment’ which they saw to be essentially Western notions. The modernizer, Fukuzawa Yukichi, wanted Japan to ‘leave Asia’ and to enter the ‘rational civilization’ of the Occident.109 He also noted the essential requirements of Occidental modernity: ‘When others use violence, we must be violent too.’110 In 1865, the Shogun Iemochi also urged that the ways of the ‘barbarians’ be copied in order to subdue them. By copying Western technology, techniques and commerce, Japan could remain powerful in robust international company, and avoid the foreign subjugation that had humiliated China. Japan would build its military strength to protect itself and then destroy the unequal treaties which had been imposed on it.111 It was clear to the Japanese in the last 30 years of the nineteenth century, that power and prosperity in the world went to those who used military power to seize them, and Japan set about achieving these. Accordingly, in 1874, the Japanese landed a force on Formosa.112 In 1875, Japan copied Perry’s ‘opening of Japan’ by sending warships to ‘open Korea’ to Japanese trade, applying what it now saw to be ‘the public law of the whole world’.113 A treaty was signed in 1876 effectively detaching Korea from Chinese control, and granting Japanese extraterritoriality in Korea. In 1887, Viscount Tani advised that Japan should build up its strength until there was a time of confusion in Europe, to remain aloof from it and then to claim its place as the leader of Asia. Japan’s Meiji leaders of the 1890s noted that economic resources were the basis of a nation’s power, and used Ito Hirobumi’s expression ‘peacetime war’ to describe the struggle for them and the expansion of trade and investment abroad to create further power. Many in the West falsely assumed that the Japanese appetite for Western things meant that Japan was in some way becoming Western in

Portents 25 spirit, with the accompanying social and political implications, when the Japanese intent was the very opposite.114 Japan’s growing self-confidence created confusion in the West about the Japanese identity, a confusion which seems to endure. It is seen either as barbaric and primitive, or as advanced, admirable and successful. Sometimes it is seen as both, thereby apparently defying explanation. It has been characterized in the terms of the day: by race, religion, region, modernity and culture, resulting in great confusion. The Japanese seemed to have some redeeming qualities. E.S. Morse, writing in the 1870s and 1880s, alerted the West to the ability of the Japanese to assimilate Western technology and methods. He also admired Japan’s ancient civilization which he believed Christian missionaries were subverting. The latter resented Morse, not least because he introduced Darwin’s theories of evolution to Japan in a number of public lectures. It was, however, troubling to many Americans that the Japanese were both heathen and yet almost ‘civilized’, allegedly a profound, mutually exclusive dichotomy, one that would be seen by others, through another lens, as the separation of East and West. Attempts at understanding became ever more desperate and bizarre, but above all, expedient. The treaties ending 40 years of extraterritoriality took effect on 17 July 1899, causing Minister Komura Jutaro to observe that this was the first time that Western powers had recognized the full sovereignty of an Oriental state. American newspapers declared Japan to be a civilized equal; and missionaries in Japan rejoiced that for the first time ‘Whiteskinned, Occidental, Christian peoples have put themselves and their belongings under the rule of a Yellow-skinned, Oriental, non-Christian people’.115 The missionary M.L. Gordon said that they had done so because Japan was now Occidental in government and law despite being Oriental by geography. In keeping with this, strange pseudo-scientific studies emerged to ‘prove’ that the Japanese were not racially Asian. If the Japanese were to become Christian and could be proven to be White, then the world had not really been turned upside down, but rather the earlier relationship of race, religion and civilization had been reinforced. The Japanese were now said to be either descended from Europeans through the White Ainu aboriginals of Japan, or to be some sophisticated hybrid product of evolutionary processes. A.M. Knapp and G. Kennan maintained that the Japanese were ‘Aryans to all intents and purposes’.116 In 1894 when Korea had felt threatened by Japan, the Koreans had appealed to the USA under the terms of the ‘Shufeldt Treaty’ of 1882, by which the USA had been the first to recognize that country, but the USA declined to intervene.117 The Dark Ocean Society set out to ‘start a fire’ in Korea, giving Japanese troops the excuse to invade without a declaration of war. Japanese ninjas assassinated the Korean Queen in her palace and the Japanese occupied Korea for the next 50 years.118 The US Minister

26 The Russo-Japanese War Horace Allen informed his government that ‘These people (Koreans) cannot govern themselves.’ A ‘civilized race’ like Japan should takeover ‘these kindly Asiatics for the good of the people . . . and the development of commerce’.119 There were fundamental tensions inherent in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Chinese policy was to keep China unchanged, while Japanese policy was to maintain its own autonomy; Japan became, in modern terms, the first successful developing country. Japan saw the creation of its own empire and sphere of influence to be essential to its own economic development, and therefore the key to its independence from the West. China was regarded as a part of that sphere, requiring a high degree of control. Prior to 1895, Japan was regarded as a quaint country, far from capable of modern accomplishments. China by contrast, despite the despair of many, was still given credit as the ‘only great Asiatic state that really commands the respect of the great powers of the world’.120 Japan’s victory over China transformed perceptions. China’s place as the leader of the Confucian world was shattered more effectively by defeat in 1895 at the hands of Japan, another Confucian power, than if it had been defeated by a Western one. China is only now recovering that reputation lost in 1895. By contrast with Japan, China had come to seem, ‘corrupt to the core, illgoverned, lacking cohesion and without means to defend herself . . . to believe in the recuperative power of China is mere wasted faith . . . China as a political entity is doomed.’121 The US Secretary of the Navy, H.A. Herbert wrote, Japan has leaped, almost at one bound, to a place among the great nations of the earth . . . this small island kingdom . . . so little taken account of heretofore . . . has within a few decades stridden over ground traversed by other nations only within centuries.122 The Anglo-Japanese alliance, concluded on 30 January 1902, was Britain’s only alliance between 1815 and 1914; from Britain’s point of view, it was more about balancing the power of Russia, and the latter’s threat to British India, than about protecting commercial interests in the Far East, although these were none the less important for that. The British journalist, Sir Henry Norman noted that ‘The war with China and the treaty with England will at last force foreigners to see Japan as she is. The Japanese are a martial and proud race, with marvellous intelligence, and untiring energy and enthusiasm.’123 Putnam Weale on the other hand saw the treaty as giving Japan licence to rob Korea and an admission to 300 million Asians that they could not be protected from European aggression except with the help of Japan.124 He predicted that the pragmatic alliance with Britain would not last beyond the 1920s or 1930s.

Portents 27 Nevertheless, Japan found itself torn between the desire for an autonomy sustained by a global economy, and a deep cultural solidarity with its Asian neighbours. Following the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Ito Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang negotiated the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Admiral Yuko explained why the Japanese had not followed the Chinese way. Japan ‘owes her preservation and her integrity today wholly to the fact that she then [thirty years ago] broke away from the old and attached herself to the new’.125 The Japanese asked why the Chinese seemed so reluctant to abide by the rules and customs of other nations, as they themselves had decided to do. In reply the Chinese proposed that ‘It is quite time the Yellow race should prepare against the White.’126 Some in Japan were also now inclined to agree, for the interference of Western powers in 1895 encouraged Japanese fears of their influence and resentment at the apparent worship of Western ways.127 Victory over China did not bring the Japanese peace of mind. On 12 April 1895, Marshal Yamagata Aritomo predicted, ‘It is certain that the situation in Asia will grow steadily worse in the future . . . and we must make preparation for another war within the next ten years.’128 Friction between the USA and Japan was essentially about whether and how China would be part of the global trading system, and whether China’s commerce would be defined primarily by its relationship with an Asian sphere led by Japan. Japan saw China as a vital source of raw materials and a massive consumer market, but it also dreaded the unfulfilled military potential of China – a predicament whose fundamentals persist at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Japanese publicist Adachi Kinnosuke noted that The twentieth century Jenghiz Khan threatening the Sun-Flag with a Mongol horde armed with Krupp guns may possibly strike the Western sense of humour . . . Japan cannot forget that between this nightmare of armed China and herself there is only a very narrow sea.129 If China was both an economic opportunity and a potential military threat, other Japanese saw it as a potential strategic ally. In the 1890s, the Asia Solidarity Society took an idealistic approach and argued that Japan should increase its cooperation with China. The Black Dragon Society argued that Japan should assert its leadership in Asia, and accept the premises of some special relationship between Japan and China, and the divide between East and West. In 1904, Kakuzo Okakura asserted that ‘Asia is One’, and that Japan was its natural leader. ‘The rock of our race pride and organic union has stood firm throughout the ages.’130 From this, some developed the idea that it was Japan’s ability to preserve its identity over the centuries that gave it a special place as the leader of Asia. Nevertheless, as the century turned, there was little practical evidence to

28 The Russo-Japanese War suggest that other cultures might threaten the supremacy of the Europeans, and the Japanese understood how this had come to pass. At times, Japan’s ambitions appeared unsettling. Europeans reported debates in Japan about the future of Australia, which the Japanese regarded as a vast, rich, empty continent in which the White Australians and Britain were playing ‘dog in a manger’. They believed that Japan should have a role in its development and that if this were resisted, then at least part of it should be annexed. Ironically, the Japanese were citing the argument of Terra Nullius which the British themselves had used to justify their rights to Aboriginal land in Australia. While the interests of European empires and the USA had expanded in the Pacific, the Russians had advanced from the west, and in a manner that seemed more menacing to the Japanese. For now, the USA and Japan maintained generally cordial relations, and Japan was more intent on learning from European nations than challenging them. It was Russia, the quasiEuropean, Asiatic empire which seemed to pose the greatest threat to Japanese ambitions on the Asian mainland. Both Russia and Japan lie on cultural fault lines, and what has often been portrayed as a clash between East and West is perhaps better seen as a clash between a European nation that believed itself also to be in some way Asian, and an Asian nation that believed it had also become ‘modern’, and thus in some respects Western. Just as the Japanese saw a need to adopt aspects of Western culture in order to preserve their own national identity, making them appear, to some at least, as Westernized and civilized Asians, so too, many Russians, far from regarding themselves as Western, believed that they were part of an essentially Asian and more ‘spiritual’ civilization. Fyodor Dostoyevsky observed that In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatic, whereas in Asia, too, Europeans . . . to us Asia is like the then undiscovered America. With our aspiration for Asia, our spirit and force will be regenerated.131 Debates about this confused Russian identity were often acrimonious. ‘Asianists’ relished Russia’s exotic cultural identity, seeing it as their sacred mission to reunite Russia with China – ‘That light, shining from the Orient, reconciles East with West.’132 They favoured peaceful engagement with the East, disapproved of explorers and ‘conquistadors’ such as Nikolai Przhevalskii,133 and saw the Orient as refined rather than weak. According to the Asianists, Russia in reality conquers nothing in the East, since all the alien races visibly absorbed by her are related to us by blood, in tradition, in thought. We are only tightening the bonds between us and that which in reality was always ours.134

Portents 29 Nikolai Fedorov urged Russians to champion the ‘cult of the ancestors’ over the Anglo-American ‘cult of gold’. Prince Esper Ukhtomskii despised the ‘scientific’ approach of the West, and in 1900 criticized the ‘rude egotism of the Anglo-Saxon and his impulse to rule over weaker races . . . We feel our spiritual and political isolation from the Romano-Germanic countries.’135 The Asianists maintained that Asia needed no infusion of such an alien culture. Ukhtomskii, who acted as tutor to the Tsarevich Nicholas on his grand tour of Asia in 1890,136 saw Russia’s destiny to lie in the East, as the peaceful partner of China. He regretted that Russia had surrendered its power and prestige in Asia to the British, French and other European empires.137 He saw problems ahead for these empires and the necessity for Russia to remain detached from them for now, building its power secretly in the East, ready for the great clash of civilizations. He saw Russia as part-Asian, an identity which had devastated it but which would also renovate it. It was Przhevalskii more than any other who popularized the idea of Russia’s special destiny in Asia, rather as G.A. Henty made the notion of imperialism noble and orthodox in the hearts of the teenage boys who went on to run Britain’s empire. Przhevalskii believed that Russia was a great European power with a mission to conquer Asia. Our military conquests in Asia bring glory not only to Russia; they are also victories for the good of mankind. Carbine bullets and rifled cannon bear those elements of civilization that would otherwise be very long in coming to the petrified realms of the Inner Asian Khans.138 The Chinaman here is a Jew plus a Muscovite pickpocket both squared.139 He spoke of the moral superiority of European energy and courage compared to the degraded races, and their inner yearning to be ruled by the Tsar. ‘I know all about the unimaginably cowardly character of these peoples. Anyway, we are all very well armed, and (rifle) fire . . . has a spellbinding effect on the half-savage natives’;140 besides, ‘International law does not apply to savages’.141 Europeans must come here to bear away in the name of civilization all these dregs of the human race. A thousand of our soldiers would be enough to subdue all of Asia from Lake Baikal to the Himalayas . . . Here we can repeat the exploits of Cortez.142 Finally there was a scientific Darwinian justification for such policies. The struggle for existence seems to be coming to head. The powerful weapons of science and technology only intensify the egotistical competition amongst the nations . . . We must not tarry in our actions, never forgetting that might always and everywhere makes right.143

30 The Russo-Japanese War Some pessimists believed that the conquest of the East was required to pre-empt another subjugation of the Russian people by the Mongol horde, the modern ‘Tartar’.144 In 1897, Dmitri Mamin-Sibiriak published the story of Europe’s conquest by the people of an island off the coast of East Asia, who had been taught the arts of destruction by those same Europeans. The new conquerors sold Europe to American billionaires who turned it into a park for hunting vacations. All versions of ‘Asianism’ involved engagement and expansion in the East, most notably in the form of the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which became a ‘driving-belt to the machinery of world imperialism’, championed by Count Sergei Witte. As with Western ambitions elsewhere, China was the key. ‘Building a railway track is one of the best ways to guarantee our economic influence in China.’145 Nicholas II also fell under the beguiling spell of this militant form of Asianism, seeing himself as a combination of conqueror, civilizer and Asian potentate, a vanity which ultimately led him to tragedy. Only a few condemned this Asian obsession, fearing Germany as the true threat to Russia, and seeing such activity in the East as a dangerous distraction and drain on economic resources. General A. Kuropatkin had complained to the General Staff as early as 1885 about such developments. In 1889 Kuropatkin worried about the Tsar’s fascination with the East and where such fantasies would lead.146 He shared the opinion of many Russians who saw the East as the Yellow Peril rather than as a valued part of their own identity. Kuropatkin fretted about the increasing military competence of ‘primitive races’. In 1887, he maintained that ‘It is horrifying to contemplate what will become of Russia – the tears the Russian people will shed, the rivers of blood which will flow, the vast sums of money squandered, if we are taken on by 400 million Chinese . . . ’.147 ‘The twentieth century will witness the great struggle in Asia between Christians and non-Christians. For the good of humanity, we must ally ourselves with England against the Orient’s heathen tribes.’148 Russian expansion in the East, but especially in China, developed its own dynamic, encouraging a Japanese competitive reaction, complicated by German territorial ambitions in the region. This friction ensured that by 1904 Russian policy was based more on the assumption that Russia was a representative of Western culture, battling the Yellow Peril, than on any benign version of Asianism. The Sino-Japanese War was ostensibly a conflict between Japan and China, but in reality it was an attempt by Japan to pre-empt Russian expansion down the Korean Peninsula which would limit Japanese options on the Asian mainland.149 Containing Russia remained a key element in Japanese foreign policy from 1894–1945. Ironically, the Japanese attempt to keep Russia away from the Pacific coast, ensured that Russia would intensify its

Portents 31 efforts to protect its interests on its Siberian border and ultimately that it would clash with Japan. Russia intensified its efforts to colonize and develop Manchuria, putting the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria rather than along the north bank of the River Amur. For some Russians, China was seen as a possible ally against British commercial interests in Asia. For these factions, Japanese victory over China in 1895 and the peace of Shimonoseki were the heralds of future trouble. ‘The desire to lead . . . the Yellow races against the White . . . this is what drives the Japanese to make Port Arthur their Gibraltar . . . a thorn . . . which we will sooner or later have to take out.’150 Yet, Russia itself would be the architect of many future troubles. Seeing China’s weakness as an opportunity to secure an ice-free port on the Pacific, Russia took Port Arthur in 1897, following negotiations with the Chinese. This was viewed by some Russians at the time with foreboding. Count Witte observed to Grand Duke Michaelovich, ‘Your Highness, remember this day, you will see what dire results this fatal step will have for Russia.’151 Russia’s actions drove the Japanese to similar conclusions to those the Russians themselves had held earlier – that Port Arthur was a ‘thorn’ in their side which would have to be removed. There was outrage in Japan which was exacerbated by the expansion of Russian logging companies into Korea, and the extension, in 1898, of the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria to Vladivostok. These seemed clear enough indications of Russia’s strategic ambitions on the Pacific coast. The very name, Vladivostok, meaning ‘Ruler of the East’, seemed to betray this design. Yet others were troubled by these events. The Boxer Rebellion stirred fear of the Yellow Peril in the painter Vasilii Vereschagin who wondered how it would be possible to defeat the inevitable advance of 600 million Chinese. He, like Kuropatkin, urged Russia to avoid conflict in the East.152 Yet in April 1903, Russia violated an agreement with China requiring Russian troops to conduct a staged withdrawal from Manchuria, and rejected Japan’s offer to recognize Russia’s predominance in Manchuria if Russia would recognize Japan’s in Korea. It was this Russian imperial expansion in what Japan saw as its own vital expanding sphere that determined that Russia would be the first Western power to fight the Orient’s new champion. Equally, it was the USA’s desire to keep open its markets in China that earned Japan tacit American support in 1904. In 1899, Mahan had written that ‘Russia’s aggressive advance moves over the inert Asiatics like a steamroller.’153 He and Roosevelt were convinced that Russia’s advance to the Pacific from its ‘Asian heartland’ could not be stopped by a maritime power. This advance, which was in accordance with ‘natural law and race instinct’,154 posed a threat to China’s territorial integrity and any American policy based upon an ‘open door’ for Chinese trade. Yet Russia could only

32 The Russo-Japanese War be confronted by maritime powers once it had reached the Pacific coast. It was these developments that led Britain to make its alliance with Japan; and it was the logic of Japanese and American expansion, and rivalry over access to China, that would lead to a yet more fateful clash of empires 35 years later.

Military omens The Russo-Japanese War came as a shock, even though there had been intimations of what was in store. In 1898 Jan Bloch, a Pole with eclectic strategic interests, published a six-volume work on the future of war. The last of these volumes, Is War Possible? The Future of War in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations was published in English 1 year later.155 He concluded that war between great states was now impossible, or rather suicidal, because ‘The dimensions of modern armaments and the organization of society have rendered its prosecution an economic impossibility.’156 Bloch’s argument was based upon the mathematics of the lethal range of rifles and artillery, which made it impossible for infantry and cavalry to close with the enemy, preventing a rapid, decisive outcome. Instead, armies would have to dig themselves protection from the storm of fire that would be unleashed. Bloch also quoted the German General von der Goltz who maintained that ‘The economic resources will dry up before the armed forces are exhausted.’157 He predicted famine, bankruptcy and social collapse; he cited civilian stamina and the propensity for revolution as the decisive elements in modern war.158 The prescience of Bloch is now clear, whereas at the time his ideas were both acknowledged or rejected but had little effect upon military planning. Bloch was not alone in noting the technological changes in warfare that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. The theory of indirect artillery fire had been explained in the 1880s and developed primarily by the Russians. The most important development at this time seemed to be, however, not the improvements in artillery but the enhanced firepower of the infantry. Many contemporary writers referred to the new generations of rifle as ‘hand artillery’ in admiration of the firepower the infantry could now generate. Others had visions of more far-fetched military technology. In 1887, the Frenchman Albert Robida published La Guerre au Vingtieme Siécle, a vision of modern war depicting submarines, tanks, planes and poison gas; and in 1903, H.G. Wells produced his prophetic The Land Ironclads.159 Nevertheless, the idea that the balance of power might be shifting from infantry to artillery, let alone to some fantastic armoured force, was not evident in mainstream military doctrine. In December 1904, the American pioneer of air warfare, Octave Chanute, proposed that the Wright brothers sell their planes to Japan

Portents 33 for $100,000. They agreed to build a two-man craft with a range of 80 km, given that the American Government seemed content for other nations to take the lead in air warfare.160 Rudyard Kipling wrote of a time when the world would be at peace ruled by an international Aerial Board of Control using Anglo-Saxon air power to preserve global order and harmony.161 Concern about the ethical implications of the new sciences of war was manifest. The Hague Conference on peace and disarmament was due to meet in 1904 to discuss the implications of warfare in three dimensions, using submarines and balloons, but this was postponed due to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Despite the evidence of 1870 of high infantry casualties in the assault, by 1884 French regulations again prescribed, ‘The principle of the decisive attack, head held high, unconcerned about casualties.’ The British and all major armies held similar beliefs. Yet, during the Boer War defenders were often able to protect themselves behind cover and, by generating a high rate of rifle fire, occupy unprecedentedly wide frontages, overlapping frontal assaults. The attacker faced the novelty of the apparently ‘empty battlefield’. Men no longer advanced against a mass of visible enemy but against an invisible one, creating the fear that he was everywhere and probably in great strength. There was the psychological terror of being enveloped by this unseen enemy, rather than merely facing those immediately to the front. Attacks in close order under heavy fire proved suicidal and shook morale. Rather, The most brilliant offensive victories were . . . those won by surprise, by adroit manoeuvre, by mystifying and misleading the enemy, by turning the ground to best account, and where the butcher’s bill was small . . . the old (system) is impossible except at a cost of life which no army and no nation can afford.162 Most armies were aware of the problems created by the increasing lethality of firepower. Assaults would require immense tenacity, identified as the crucial quality. Colonel Ferdinand Foch declared in 1903 that in the attack, eventually [T]here is, so to speak, an ‘impassable’ zone; no defiladed ways of access are left; a hail of bullets sweeps the ground . . . To run away or fall on, such is the unavoidable dilemma. To fall on, but in numbers and masses: therein lies salvation.163 The power of the defence in the Boer War had perversely caused most to dwell on the need for high morale and a constant offensive mentality, rather than some more balanced approach to the complicated technological–human conundrum. In 1904, European armies regarded high morale rather than

34 The Russo-Japanese War artillery fire as the primary means by which infantry could redress the physical effects of defensive firepower. Ironically, that emphasis was itself largely the product of doubts identified as early as 1870 by Ardent du Picq about the frailty of the individual on the frightening modern battlefield. This anxiety was compounded by fear that urban life was leading to the military degeneracy of the civil populations which would have to man massed armies.

2

The experience of 1904–5

The experience of the Russo-Japanese War should have resulted in a revolutionary change in the conduct of war; and the failure to learn from that experience brought severe penalties when change did come 10 years later. The War had novelties: indirect artillery fire, machine guns, barbed wire, hand-grenades, searchlights, wireless1 and motor vehicles were in common use in Manchuria for the first time. Less obviously, the War was fought on the world’s financial markets and on the streets of Russia’s Empire. The War was scrutinized minutely, many believing that in it they were glimpsing the future and others that, armed with new insights, they could craft something different. Many of their visions were quite shocking, and many of the ideas about mankind and societies which the War appeared to endorse were to be as significant as any tactical or technological innovation.

Outline of events Japan intended to fight a quick, limited campaign in Korea and Manchuria to curb Russian expansion in the Far East, to reinforce its own control over Korea2 and to exact revenge for Russian interference after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5.3 The deployment of Japanese troops to the mainland theatre required command of the sea. This in turn required the destruction of Russia’s Far Eastern fleet and the capture of Port Arthur, its only ice-free port on the Pacific coast, whose loss would deny a base to the Russian Baltic fleet should it sail to the Far East. On land, the Japanese planned to defeat the relatively small Russian Army in the region before Russia’s overwhelming resources could be dispatched along the Trans-Siberian Railway to reinforce it.4 The War began on 8 February 1904 with a surprise torpedo5 attack by the Japanese Navy on the Russian Pacific fleet at Port Arthur, modelled on Japan’s decisive torpedo attack on the Chinese fleet in Wei-hai-wei harbour on 5 February 1895.6 On 10 February 1904, the Japanese Government declared war on Russia. The Japanese landed at Chemulpo in Korea and advanced to lay siege to Port Arthur. The Russian Army Commander General Kuropatkin bided

36 The Russo-Japanese War his time, intending to build up his forces before relieving the garrison in the summer. Various attempts to save Port Arthur failed. Japanese land forces converged on the Russian defensive positions to the north. A series of ferocious yet indecisive battles took place at Liao-Yang from 25 August to 3 September, but Kuropatkin, believing himself defeated, withdrew again, north to Mukden. Both armies were exhausted and dug in. Further Russian attacks failed and resulted in the now familiar withdrawals. Meanwhile, Port Arthur had held out against a series of brutal frontal assaults by the Japanese under General Nogi, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers.7 The garrison finally surrendered on 2 January 1905 when it was clear that they would not be relieved. On 21 February 1905, the main opposing armies, each of about 300,000, faced each other across 75 km of entrenchments at the Battle of Mukden. Both sides lost approximately one third of their force at Mukden and this marked the end of the land campaign. At this point the Japanese seemed masters of the theatre but faced mounting logistic and financial problems, while the Russian war machine was only just beginning to deliver vast quantities of men and materiel to the Far East. On 15 October 1904, the Russian Baltic fleet had sailed for the Pacific, beset by almost insuperable logistical problems. After a desperate voyage, this fleet of largely obsolete vessels met a modern Japanese force of comparable numbers under Admiral Togo Heihachiro in the Tsushima Strait on 27 May 1905. The Russian fleet was destroyed in arguably the most complete victory in naval history, affirming the ascendancy of the armoured battleship. The defeat caused civil unrest in Russia and, although its armies were far from exhausted, the political imperative for peace seemed overwhelming. The Japanese had achieved their objectives and were keen to reap their reward before their advantage ebbed away.8 The USA brokered the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth on 6 September 1905, by which Russia evacuated Manchuria, and Korea was recognized as part of Japan’s sphere of influence. President Theodore Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

The tactics of attack and defence By 1890 the Japanese Army had been transformed under the instruction of the German General Klemens von Meckel into one designed for offensive action on the European model. The Japanese saw the offensive as a strategic imperative, and their capacity for high morale also made attack a potent tactic. They craved a ‘Sedan’ or a ‘Plevna’ and identified Port Arthur as such a key to their campaign. Ironically, their opponent, Kuropatkin, had been an observer at Sedan. He, by contrast, looked to 1812 for his model, and

The experience of 1904–5 37 his aide Kharkevich lectured his headquarters on this theme as their train headed east. He envisaged retreats, stretching the enemy lines of communications, weakening him to the point of collapse. The Germans, and hence the Japanese, favoured frontal attacks, but these generally failed to dislodge the Russians who had little difficulty in holding their positions if well-sited and protected by wire and mines. Russian infantry were often spectators as Japanese infantry was shredded by indirect artillery fire. It became clear that frontal assaults would only be likely to succeed if supported by massive firepower, or if the enemy proved irresolute. Every attack launched by the Japanese against prepared Russian positions failed with heavy loss except in cases where the Russians suffered a moral rather than material collapse. This led some to note the power of the defence, while others judged that such defence was doomed to succumb eventually to the will of the attacker. Here lay the seed of the postwar controversy that set the style in which Europe would go to war in 1914. Having generally failed with frontal assaults, the Japanese resorted to envelopments which appeared to threaten flanks, creating a sense of uncertainty which curbed the Russians’ ability to manoeuvre and usually resulted in their withdrawing. The Russians accepted that when advancing against the Japanese, the zone of effective infantry fire began at 1,500 m and became intolerable at 1,000 m. At such ranges The reality of the field of battle today is that one has to deal with an invisible enemy. . . . There was nothing and nobody. This created a painful feeling of uncertainty and distrust. . . . Before the men can engage in the fighting, they are already materially and morally weakened.9 At the other extreme, combat could be close and prolonged, The real fact is, the last position today is no more than some dozen of paces from the enemy. On this position one remains glued to the ground, often for long periods of time, because neither side ventures to risk an assault.10 Firepower was changing the shape of the battlefield and the character of warfare itself. The most obvious tactical response to the increase in firepower was to build fortifications and entrenchments. At Mukden, the front was 75 km long and both sides were dug in. The weakness of such entrenchments was revealed once their flank was turned, but in frontal defence they were extremely potent.

38 The Russo-Japanese War The new quick-firing guns made an immediate impact on the battlefield. Sir Ian Hamilton witnessed an artillery duel at Manjuyama on 2 September 1904. I have no words left to convey an impression of one hundred quick-firers discharging their unlimited ammunition at top speed . . . if I were struck deaf and blind tomorrow, it would be of consolation to me for the rest of my life that I had heard and seen the great cannonade today.11 The fundamental, common factor in the Russians’ ability to hold off Japanese attacks was that Russian artillery outranged that of the Japanese and was able to fire indirectly from cover without coming under counterbattery fire. If the Japanese accurately located the Russian guns, they had to move forward into the open to engage them and were usually destroyed. That said, although Russian artillery was technically superior, their standards of training were generally inferior. The dominance of artillery fire encouraged both sides to increase the depth of no-man’s-land and made the attack even more difficult, prolonging the battle and increasing the digging on both sides. The spade replaced the shield as the infantryman’s armour.

Campaign planning Liddell-Hart observed that ‘[Grand] strategy must always remember that peace follows war’.12 Sir Julian Corbett asserted that when pursuing limited objectives it was important to recognize ‘a limit beyond which it would be bad policy to spend that vigour, a point at which, long before your force was exhausted, or even fully developed’.13 Identifying one’s own objectives, understanding the enemy and how to manipulate him by a wide range of pressures, including battle, have proved important factors in success in war. Preparing the conditions for terminating conflict is as crucial as the preparations for the conflict itself. Arguably the most successful aspect of Japan’s campaign was its clear planning and preparation, shaping the circumstances that would bring Russia to the table, and the financial planning that, matched by military competence in the field, would bring Japan to that point coincidentally, on optimal terms. Victories on land and sea were merely the operational stepping stones along this predetermined path to strategic triumph. By the time the Japanese had reached their culminating point financially, and could not go on, they had achieved their campaign objectives. The key was how to break off fighting while retaining the advantage in negotiations. Lt Gen Kodama understood this dynamic, and it was largely his influence that caused Japan to settle for a negotiated peace while still in a position of strength. Oyama, the land force commander, told the Navy Minister before leaving for Manchuria, ‘I will take care of the fighting in Manchuria, but I am counting

The experience of 1904–5 39 on you as the man to decide when to stop’.14 The Russians were unaware of this critical moment of Japanese vulnerability when they themselves were far from exhausted financially or militarily. They were, however, wounded politically, with insurrection across the Tsar’s empire. The Japanese had a better understanding than the Russians of their relative positions. Deep attack While Japan fought Russia on the Far Eastern battlefields and its diplomats struggled with it at the conference table at Portsmouth, its forces were also active against the Tsar’s regime itself, perhaps assisted by the British Government.15 Colonel Akashi Motojiro16 was entrusted with operations to undermine the Russian Empire from within.17 He received 1 million yen from Imperial General Headquarters to finance these activities from Switzerland where most Russian revolutionary exiles, including Lenin, were based. One Japanese source indicates that Akashi paid Lenin 50,000 yen.18 It is likely that some of this was used to finance Lenin’s newspaper Vperyod which appeared on 4 January 1905 and whose second edition reported the fall of Port Arthur. Lenin observed after the fall of Port Arthur that the defeat of Russian absolutism was essential for the struggle for socialism by the international and Russian proletariats, ‘The disaster that has overtaken our mortal enemy not only signifies the approach of freedom in Russia, it also presages a new revolutionary upsurge of the European proletariat.’19 On 1 October 1904, Konni Zilliacus assembled thirteen opposition parties in Paris to orchestrate a campaign against autarchy.20 This would include tying down troops with riots in Poland and assassinations in the Caucasus. Akashi agreed to finance these operations and bought weapons in London, Hamburg, France and the USA.21 On 22 January 1905 St Petersburg suffered rioting, and on 4 June, 5,000 demonstrators clashed with police at Tsarskoe Selo in the wake of the defeat at Tsushima. There were riots in Warsaw and Lodz. In the Caucasus mobilization was halted. The Georgian revolutionary, Dekansky, supported by 40,000 yen from Akashi, stirred mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet in Odessa in June 1905.22 Finance The vulnerability of a small industrial power to its international economic partners and financiers was acknowledged before the war started, and Japan monitored its credit anxiously throughout. Confidence among its creditors depended upon battlefield success, and early victories were essential to maintain this international support. Consideration of this potentially weak ‘flank’ formed the basis for the Japanese strategic plan, and preparations to secure the necessary loans began as early as 1903.23

40 The Russo-Japanese War Before the war, Japan had debts of $282,000,000 and it would have to borrow another $500,000,000 before victory at Tsushima in May 1905. Japanese Government bond prices started to rise in April 1904 following battlefield successes, and the terms of loans improved still further after Tsushima in May 1905. That Japan could raise such large loans in contemporary terms was thanks in part to the pogrom of Jews at Kishinev in April 1902. Jacob H. Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, the New York bankers, was infuriated by such Russian anti-Semitism and did all he could to raise funds for the Japanese;24 but the key to success in the battle for finance was early success on the battlefield itself. The markets were happy to back a winner.

3

1905 – the future of war A 10-year perspective

Morale A recurrent theme of accounts of the war was the vulnerability and virtual isolation of the individual beset by the technology of war. Not surprisingly, the pre-war concern for the maintenance of morale and sustaining esprit de corps assumed a fresh urgency, with many stressing the moral and psychological qualities needed to win, criticizing Bloch for ignoring the human spirit. ‘The moral is to the physical as three to one’ became the mantra of armies studying the Russo-Japanese War and was much relied upon by General Hamley in his influential work Operations of War.1 Unfortunately it also resulted in the neglect of the most obvious lessons on how best to organize and apply the physical. Colonel Maude and others insisted that casualties and suffering were inevitable and that victory would go to whoever had the fortitude to bear them. In 1907, Major General Douglas Haig lent his support to this view. Colonel Maude was a Social-Darwinist who asserted that Clausewitz saw war as beneficial to society; and he popularized this opinion in his version of On War in 1908. In 1913 Major General W.G. Knox predicted that a small British Expeditionary Force would lose 60,000 men in the first month on the continent.2 By 1914 it was generally accepted that casualties in future wars would be very heavy and that moral qualities would determine their outcome. Major General Altham spoke of ‘punishing losses’ in The Principles of War3 of 1914, and Brigadier General R.C.B. Haking stressed the importance of the offensive spirit and willpower to overcome man’s weak inner nature, ‘The little devil inside’.4 But where was such stalwart human material to be found? The Russo-Japanese War had excited fears that urban proletariats lacked martial ardour and moral fibre, and demands grew for remedial action. How were discipline and esprit de corps to be instilled in these degenerate populations? Some stressed the need to ‘improve’ the individual in a SocialDarwinian sense. This imperative to struggle and overcome was readily applied to the whole of society as much as to the individual; thereby creating not merely a better-trained and enthusiastic soldier, but also a reinvigorated and vital society.

42 The Russo-Japanese War

Racial and cultural struggle Bloch had predicted that modern war would lead to the collapse of societies; and the Russo-Japanese War seemed to confirm that war was indeed an evolutionary struggle between races and cultures, rather than merely some Clausewitzian extension of policy. It could no longer be assumed that European ascendancy was the natural condition. Warfare was now commonly held to be a natural, normal and in a sense necessary biological process, that shaped not merely the individual but the ‘organism’ of human society itself. Von Bernhardi maintained that war was ‘a necessity on which the further development of our people depends as a civilized nation . . . we must rely on the sword’.5 Such notions were to find their clearest expression in the ideology of the Third Reich, but were common in much determinist thinking. National morale and spirit were deemed vital for success, and thus wars were contests of national and cultural vigour. They would be ‘selections’ in which only the fittest would survive, and fitness was itself a malleable quality.6 The very vocabulary of these views makes uncomfortable reading, but has accurately reflected the character of the twentieth century’s World Wars, the Cold War and more recent discourse on ‘clashing civilizations’7 and demographic strategy. The Russo-Japanese War was neither a ‘Western civil war’, nor was it a colonial war. It was not merely a war between two empires, but rather the first modern war between a ‘Western’, or at least an ethnically European power, and a rival ‘Eastern’, or at least an Asian one, fought on effectively equal terms. Francis McCullagh, a British journalist who rode with Russian Cossacks during the war wrote, [T]hese faces which shine white in the flash of the Russian rifles, are the faces of Orientals, this cry is for the blood of Whitemen . . . the cry of that monstrous Asia with which Europe has been at feud for thrice a thousand years . . . it demands vengeance not only for Port Arthur . . . but for Salamis . . . for Plassy, for Kandahar, for Mindanao.8 Lenin noted as early as January 1905 that ‘Progressive Asia has dealt reactionary Europe an irreparable blow.’9 The Times of London of 6 February 1904 noted of the War that ‘It is really the contest of two civilisations, and in this lies, perhaps, its profoundest interest to the observer.’ The German National Zeitung of 31 May 1905 warned that the Russian defeat ‘must cause grave anxiety to all those who believe in the great commercial and civilizing mission of the White race throughout the world’.10 Japan seemed to be ‘Mysterious islands wherein the forlorn hope of Asia is fashioning its thunderbolts . . . the Japanese are bound to have it all their own way in the Far East for a long time to come.’11 In 1910, B.L. Putnam Weale contemplated what he believed would be the inevitable conflict between East and West and feared that if the USA and

1905 – the future of war 43 Britain did not combine the efforts of their navies in the Pacific, then ‘they will cease to be a factor in Eastern Asia’.12 He saw the chances of the West uniting in the face of the threat from Asia to be undermined by Britain’s alliance with Japan, placing itself for the first time ‘by formal treaty on an absolute equality with an Asian race . . . by this act the power was given to Japan at once to attack Russia – the old champion of Europe against Asia’.13 He predicted that the shores of the Pacific Ocean, ‘are really destined to play the part of the world’s great battle-ground . . .’.14 The senior British observer General Sir Ian Hamilton wrote: ‘I have today seen the most stupendous spectacle it is possible for the mortal brain to conceive – Asia advancing, Europe falling back, the wall of mist and the writing thereon’. Concerned about the fundamental shift in strategic affairs which he had just witnessed, Hamilton wrote, [I]t should cause European statesmen some anxiety when their people seem to forget that there are millions outside the charmed circle of Western Civilization who are ready to pluck the sceptre from nerveless hands . . . as if Asia and Africa were not even now . . . dreaming dim dreams of conquest and of war . . . England has time, therefore – time to put her affairs in order . . . time to prepare for a disturbed and anxious twentieth century.15 Francis McCullagh, travelling with Russian prisoners being ‘freighted’ to Japan, surveyed a crowd of broken Whitemen whom the despised little slant-eye had compelled by the keen logic of the bayonet point, to travel in trucks that might have been useful for carrying coal or ballast . . . a more efficient way of destroying the prestige of the White race . . . could hardly be conceived . . . it is the overthrow of invincibility.16 The mass of Russian prisoners seemed to be unaware of the deeper significance of their capture. They were captives to the vague, legendary Cipango. They failed to see . . . that history had opened a new account, that the axis of the earth had shifted, that the Universe had entered on an entirely new phase . . . Adowa was nothing by comparison with it.17 Hundreds of thousands of Russian prisoners travelled in such conditions through the ports of North-East Asia, heading for captivity in Japan; and were observed by an astonished and thoughtful Asian population. The scene and moral were to be repeated 36 years later. The effects of the defeats of 1904–5 on Russian society were shattering, and Tsushima and Mukden became synonymous with the bankruptcy of

44 The Russo-Japanese War Russian autocracy.18 Having styled itself as Europe’s champion in Asia it was all the more humiliating to be defeated by that ‘inferior’ culture, a defeat which cast the Russians once more into soul-searching about their own cultural identity. Russians who had styled themselves as an Eastern civilization that would surpass the corrupt and decaying West, now found themselves to be merely a backward part of the Western world in the front line against a rising East of which they were not a part.19 Even Leo Tolstoy who had opposed the war on pacifist grounds found himself unable to control his nationalist instincts in the face of defeat at Tsushima. He subsequently attempted to explain events with an intellectual somersault that nevertheless had resonance with pre-war ‘Asianist’ thinking. He described the Japanese victory in 1905 as a triumph of Western materialism over Russia’s Asiatic soul – so the Japanese were modern and Western after all. Terrifying folk-memories of subservience to an Asiatic master arose to torment the Russians, entwined with fin de siécle premonitions of impending Apocalypse. In his novel of Tartar Armageddon, Petersburg, Andrei Bely despaired, Port Arthur has fallen. That region has been inundated by Yellow-faced people. The legends about the horsemen of Genghis Khan have come to life . . . Listen closely: there is a sound of galloping horsemen . . . from the Ural steppes. It is horsemen.20 Vladimir Solovev wrote of the approaching Mongol horde that would impose a new yoke on Russia and the West.21 Yet this fearful sense of déja vu also entailed an ironic recognition that an otherwise ‘European’ Russia had many of its historical, cultural and ethnic roots in Asia.22 The poet Valerii Bruisov, sensing the decay of his own society asked, ‘are you . . . marching Huns? . . . You who will destroy me, I welcome with a hymn of greeting . . . . To revive our prematurely decrepit bodies with a wave of burning blood’.23 Andrei Bely wrote of the ‘Yellow hordes [whose struggle with the West would] encrimson the fields of Europe in oceans of blood.’24 Bolshevism at first seemed to offer a riposte to Asia’s challenge. Communism was a Western ideology of globalization, of another sort to that Western notion which today holds centre-stage. The Bolsheviks and many socialists in Europe did not see the West to be synonymous with Capitalism or free markets and Democracy, but rather that Communism was the West’s crowning achievement. The Bolsheviks, saw themselves as representatives of European, Western modernity overthrowing the ancient corruptions which Russia’s Asian identity seemed to typify. The Bolsheviks launched themselves into the Asian heartland with missionary zeal, creating Soviet republics to Europeanize the East. In 1923, Trotsky maintained that ‘The revolution means the final break of the people with Asianism . . . an assimilation of the whole people of civilization.’25

1905 – the future of war 45 Many in the West, however, saw Communism as an ideological and racial treason, alien to Western values, which amplified Russia’s Asian identity. They were only too ready to see Russia’s alien ‘Asian’ character. Bertrand Russell condemned Lenin’s ‘Mongolian cruelty’, and even Rosa Luxemburg referred to the ‘Tartar-Mongolian savagery’ of the Bolsheviks.26 This, however, was an image that many Soviets were keen to foster as a means of regaining a Russian sense of pride after the disasters of war. In 1918, Aleksander Blok wrote The Scythians, an appeal to Europe to accept the Bolshevik revolution, but also a reminder to Europe that Russia should be feared ‘You have your millions. We are hordes and hordes and hordes. Just try it! Take us on! We are Asians too, from shores that breed squint eyes bespeaking greed.’ No longer would Russia protect Europe from the barbarous East: ‘We will turn our Asiatic face to you.’27 In 1923, Sergei Esenin wrote, ‘Let us be Asians, let us stink, let us scratch our buttocks shamelessly in front of everyone . . . Only an invasion of “barbarians” like us can save and reshape them. The march on Europe is necessary.’28 Once it was clear that Europe would not follow Russia’s road to revolution, Stalin rediscovered the USSR’s Asian identity, setting it against the idea of the West, which became identified with all that was not Communist. The West was now held to be materialistic and decadent, and Communism was set on a higher plane of human development. T.M. Maguire noted in his lecture to Aldershot Command on 16 November 1909, The Yellow Race determined that it must not be unduly controlled or limited in its policy, tastes or aspirations by Whites . . . (it is their opinion that) . . . the civilization of the European races is no whit, even in theory, superior . . . nothing worse than the present French, English and American civilization could well be conceived.29 (a foretaste of ‘Asian Values’) Maguire understood that Japan’s victory, like Britain’s after Trafalgar, was not so much the end of a process as the beginning of one: ‘The ambitions of the Japanese are not yet satisfied. But by the shores of the Pacific they find enormous fields for commercial expansion, and to the unoccupied lands of South America and Australia, panting for want of development and labour, they turn their longing eyes.’ Maguire had astutely identified the strategic dynamics of the next 40 years, while many others were pondering merely the tactics of the next 10. Homer Lea’s book The Valor of Ignorance,30 written in 1904 but published in 1909, sold 40,000 copies in Japan and was read by Douglas MacArthur who heavily scored his own copy for future reference.31 Lea believed that Japan and the USA were bound to fight each other as their empires expanded across the Pacific. ‘The Republic and Japan are approaching, careless on the one hand and pre-determined on the other,

46 The Russo-Japanese War that point of contact that is war.’32 He maintained that ‘The centralization of power in the Pacific is impossible to any nation other than China, Japan or the United States.’33 Some were critical of Western attitudes. Francis McCullagh who had lived in Japan before the War maintained that It does not take very long for a Whiteman to forget that their skin is not quite the same colour as his. If there is ever a ‘Yellow peril’, it will be an educated peril, and not the wild, barbaric, mysterious and inhuman monster with visions of which some people have tortured their brains.34 As war had erupted, the American missionary Sidney Gulick had pondered the possible outcomes. He maintained that Japan was not so much adopting Western technology and methods to defend its own enduring identity and values, as genuinely transforming itself into a Western Christian capitalist democracy, based on individual rights, the rule of law and a non-aggressive policy towards weaker states. ‘Japan stands for the essentials of Anglo-Saxon civilization.’35 He believed that China would eventually rise up, become a great economic power and take revenge on the Europeans.36 Theodore Roosevelt, who was a great admirer of Nitobe’s Bushido: The Soul of Japan, gave copies to his friends and took judo lessons three times per week, wrote shortly after the War started, ‘The Japs have played our game because they have played the game of civilized mankind.’37 He noted that ‘The non-Aryan far-eastern Japanese were in some essentials closer to us than their chief opponents (the Russians).’38 Picking up on pre-war anthropological studies, W.E Griffis’ The Japanese Nation in Evolution of 1907 declared the source of Japanese success to be ‘The White blood in the Japanese’.39 In a cultural reversal, some Americans now saw the descendants of the Mongols to be fighting under the Russian flag not the Japanese. In a matter of decades, the Oriental, backward and heathen Japanese had somehow in the minds of some Westerners become progressive, industrialized, White and Christian, for there could be no other explanation for their success without challenging the profound assumptions upon which Western behaviour itself was based. Others took a more pragmatic strategic viewpoint. By 1911, Meredith Townsend, who just 12 years previously had anticipated the dominance of Asia by Europeans, now predicted the expulsion of the Whiteman from Asia. ‘The flash of the Japanese guns across the murky waters of Port Arthur harbour revealed to a startled world – the beginning of the ebb.’40 Townsend noted that the 200-year-old process of European imperialism in the Far East ‘must now terminate . . . Japanese victories will give new heart and energy to all Asiatic nations and tribes which now fret under European rule . . . and will spread through them a strong impulse to avail themselves

1905 – the future of war 47 of Japanese instruction.’41 H.M. Hyndman wrote in 1918 that the West had shut its eyes to the obvious in 1905, that Japan was now the ‘mistress of Asia’ and that if it had its way in Asia against Europe . . . ‘a war more terrible than that which is now being concluded may easily confront our successors’.42 The Japanese victory in 1905 served to exacerbate fears of Asia in general, but of China in particular. In 1905 school children in China were heard to chant, ‘I pray that the frontiers of my country become hard as bronze; that it surpass Europe and America; that it subjugate Japan . . . May our empire, like a sleeping tiger suddenly awakened, spring roaring into the arena of combats.’43 Some in Russia noted that significant strategic changes had been set in motion. After the War, Kuropatkin predicted that, ‘The battle is only just beginning. What happened in the fields of Manchuria in 1904–5 was nothing more than a skirmish with the advance guard.’44 He now recommended the seizure of a ‘cordon sanitaire’ across the frontier with China to defend against future assaults. In 1916, as administrator of Central Asia, Kuropatkin warned of the emergence of China as the real threat to Russia: ‘As for China, the danger menacing Russia in the future from that empire of 400,000,000 people is not to be doubted’.45 Before the start of the war, Sir Robert Hart, Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs, had advocated building up China to improve the balance of power in the region, but was roundly condemned by The Times of London which declared that his proposals ‘will doubtless be read with a shudder by all alarmed at the threatened development of the Yellow Peril’.46 In 1905 there were 8,000 Chinese students in Japan, but by 1906 there were 15,000, including Chiang Kai-shek. Many of these students provided the political base for Sun Yat-sen when he returned from Europe in July 1905. In 1907, W.A.P. Martin maintained in his Awakening of China that China is the theatre of the greatest movement now taking place on the face of the globe. In comparison with it, the agitation in Russia shrinks into insignificance . . . It promises nothing short of the complete renovation of the oldest, most populous and most conservative empires.47 Another book China in Transformation, of 1912, declared that, with the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, China ‘will be remodelled . . . as efficient in her way as the new Japan, and more wealthy – perhaps more powerful’.48 It wasn’t only Chinese nationalists who were inspired by the events of 1904–5. Mao Zedong was taught English and music by a teacher who stressed the importance of Russia’s defeat by Japan which had given hope to other Asian nations and that the route to this had been modernization. Halford Mackinder believed that China could become a major power if managed by Japan. Many Japanese ultra-nationalists agreed, viewing China as ‘the steed’ upon which Japan would ride to victory, a country that could

48 The Russo-Japanese War turn Japan’s population of 50 million into 500 million and conquer Asia as far west as the Balkans. They saw the USA as a ‘fatuous booby with no brains or cohesion . . . a race of thieves with hearts of rabbits . . . an immense melon ripe for cutting’; but would the ‘warrior races of England and Germany’ allow Japan to ‘slice and eat our fill’? ‘North America will support a billion people, that billion shall be Japanese with their slaves . . . it shall be ours by right of conquest.’49 In 1910, Putnam Weale recognized Japan’s perceived necessity to unite the Asians, and that China, the Asian nation with the greatest potential, had to be the priority for its attention. Yet the fundamental problem faced by Japan in confronting China was that, ‘No amount of efficiency or cunning can destroy the fact that a nation outnumbered by eight to one is a nation hopelessly outnumbered in any struggle à outrance.’50 Whatever the odds, it was clear to Putnam Weale that Sino-Japanese relations would be the key to the future of East Asian affairs. For it is certain that the vast region immediately beyond the Great Wall of China is the Flanders of the Far East – and that the next inevitable war which will destroy China or make her something of a nation must be fought on that soil just as two other wars have been fought there during the past twenty years. But this does not belong to contemporary politics; it is an affair of the Chinese Army of 1925 or 1935.51 Jack London’s The Unparalleled Invasion of 1910 speculated that the power of Japan would fade, but only after China, ‘a kindred race’, had learned from it the skills of the West. By 1976, China would dominate the world economy and threaten the West. This challenge could only be met by a united assault on China by Western nations, led by the USA. In London’s tale, Western victory was assured by the use of air-delivered biological weapons, in an ‘ultra-modern war . . . the war of the scientist and the laboratory’ in the aftermath of which ‘All (Chinese) survivors were put to death’.52 V. Solovev’s War and Christianity, from a Russian Point of View of 1915, told of how the Japanese rapidly adopted the material forms of Western culture, tutored the Chinese and united the peoples of the East under their military leadership in a struggle against Europe. The Russians sided with Christendom and perished with honour. All of Europe fell, except Britain, which paid a tribute of £1 billion. Meanwhile in Japan, victory in 1905 had led to the creation of many nationalist groups with ethno-strategic agendas. Count Okuma founded the Pan-Asiatic Association and the Pacific Ocean Society, and the IndoJapanese Association agitated for Japan to lead Asia against the West. In 1907, Okuma called for Japan to give protection to the 300 million Indians oppressed by the British, and to reach out to the South Pacific and elsewhere in the world. In 1909 Kato Satori published a brochure

1905 – the future of war 49 Mastery of the Pacific in which he noted that Japan could Overrun the Pacific with fleets manned by men who have made Nelson their model and transported to the armadas of the Far East the spirit that was victorious at Trafalgar. Whether Japan avows it or not, her persistent aim is to gain mastery of the Pacific.53 Sir Robert Douglas noted in 1912 that as a result of its victory in 1905, Japan had ‘virtually proclaimed a sort of Monroe Doctrine to the effect that European nations already hold quite sufficient territory in the Far East’.54 To his mind, a Russian victory would probably have resulted in the partition of China. The Burmese journal Budhism discussed the possibility of an alliance between China and Japan to impose such a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East, guaranteeing it against aggression from the West. It noted that the West had justified its own aggression against the East by the doctrine of ‘Survival of the Fittest’, which claimed that this was best for humanity. So be it, in any struggle between ‘Aryan’ and ‘Mongol’, if the Mongol should win, this should not be seen negatively as a triumph for the ‘Yellow Peril’, but as an outcome that was best for mankind.55 Tokutomi Soho wrote The Yellow Man’s Burden, justifying an imperial role for Japan in the Pacific. His faith in the ‘gospel of power’ and militarism was reinforced by the events of the First World War; and while he initially predicted the success of German militarism over British liberalism, he came to see Germany’s eventual defeat as mere evidence of Britain’s imperialism being even more effective and admirable than Germany’s.56 Phan Boi Chau saw Japanese success against Russia as an example to his own Vietnamese nation, but recognized that it would need help from others. In 1904, he left home to study in Japan. Military action against Western decadence seemed the surest way to achieve independence. Members of the Annam royal family of Indochina visited Tokyo and called for revolt against the French. When the French opened a new university in Hanoi in 1907, it was forced to close within the year as a result of student nationalism.57 After Japan’s victory, the Filipino nationalist leader, Artemio Ricarte fled to Japan to preach independence from the Americans, and the American Governor of Hawaii noted the increasing disaffection of the majority Asian population of Hawaii following the Japanese victory in 1905. In Britain, Lord Kitchener noted that the people of the Orient had been awakened, and he expected this to result in insurrection in India and trouble in Afghanistan. Governor-General Gallieni attributed the revolt against French rule in Madagascar in 1904 to the Russo-Japanese War. The Russian Revolution of 1905, if not itself inspired by an Asian triumph, was triggered by the Russo-Japanese War, and went on to have a deep inspirational effect upon the revolutionaries of Turkey and Persia.58

50 The Russo-Japanese War However matters appeared to others, there had been little sign in Japan of popular enthusiasm for the war in the arts or cinema, and there was concern about Japan’s apparently rotten and effeminate youth. In 1905 an infantry captain described volunteers to become cadets: ‘The weakness of youth in Gifu prefecture is shocking! Look at the volunteers’ pretty silk garments, hair combed in the latest fashion, smelling of perfume and pomade.’59 Some felt that Japan’s diplomatic failure at Portsmouth was a reflection of this creeping degeneracy. In September 1913, an editor of a newspaper from Takayama wrote, What of general morals in our society? Murders, suicide, theft, deceit, how frequent these crimes are! . . . all rush to follow the fashionable. We cannot but mourn the way in which the careful and the industrious labourer seems to recede from the people’s thoughts.60 It was this perception of degeneracy and weakness that caused some such as Nitobe Inazo to seek to revitalize Japanese society by stressing the ideals of Bushido. Nevertheless, the belief that the Russo-Japanese War had proven the martial spirit to be the supreme virtue caused expressions of concern in many countries about the quality of the human material available. President T. Roosevelt maintained that ‘The nation which abandons itself to an existence of ease and looks upon war with horror, rots away without advancing. It is destined to decline and become a slave of other nations which have not lost the virile qualities’.61 ‘A rich nation which is slothful, timid, or unwieldy is an easy prey for any people which still retains those most valuable of all qualities, the soldierly virtues.’62 Homer Lea also believed that racially homogenous nations, or at least ones led by a dominant race, were more likely to survive; and he warned against ‘frenzied crowds . . . theorists . . . feminists . . . for these are but the feverish phantasms and sickly disorders of national life’.63 Evolutionary science and mysticism became entwined in attempts to describe the decline of Western societies. General de Negrier, InspectorGeneral of the French Army and observer of the War, spoke despairingly of France’s apparent degeneracy, urging the nation to work [T]owards our complete state of perfection, [exerting itself] so that our descendants may reach an intellectual and moral standard superior to our own. It is thus that races of warriors and brave men develop themselves. The Japanese are giving us at the present moment an example of this.64 Life is an accident which death atones for . . . To the force which this moral develops must be added that intense gratification, that under all trying conditions, no matter what a man’s social condition may be, he will have no feeling of fear. It is for the man a sure source of consolation, of which decadent nations have deprived themselves, because the

1905 – the future of war 51 materialism in which they wallow necessarily destroys noble sentiments by the degradation of character.65 He maintained that races became pusillanimous when education destroyed patriotism and that nature ruthlessly punishes the coward: ‘Conquered and dismembered they disappear from the scenes of the world. It is the immutable justice of things.’ Decadent humanitarian theories purveyed by university professors and schoolmasters, imbued with notions of peace, humanity and fraternalism, were identified as the cause of Frenchmen becoming timid poltroons. De Negrier agreed with the Evolutionary ideas of the Italian physiologist Dr Mosso that ‘Instinct is the voice of past generations, which resounds as a distinct echo in the cells of the nervous systems.’ Mosso developed programmes to develop physical endurance in school children and troops and was applauded by de Negrier who believed that ‘The Latin race seems to succumb to the law that the industrial developments, mechanical and intellectual, accentuates its physical decadence.’66 The Japanese also took an interest in Darwinian aspects of international affairs with Professor Adachi Buntaro conducting blood tests in 1912 which claimed to show which races were the closest to and the most distant from the apes.67 Japan had been a good student of Western political culture, and it began to dawn on the teacher that the lessons it had taught might be turned to challenge its own imperial primacy. Thomas Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle of Population had been widely read in Japan before the First World War and meshed with other ideas about populations, the space required to support them and the likelihood of mass migrations to satisfy this. The consequent notion that Japan and the USA were fated to collide as their peoples expanded was commonly discussed and the USA was said to lack spiritual and moral qualities. Japanese textbooks attacked the ‘Western evils’ of ‘individualism, liberalism, utilitarianism and materialism’, and there was talk of ‘the White Peril’.68 Japanese ‘Double Patriots’ such as Kita Ikki maintained that if socialists argued the justice of class struggle between the oppressors and their victims, then it was hypocritical to condemn that same moral principle when acted upon by oppressed nations such as Japan – Social-Darwinism should be applied to the society of nations as well as the societies of nations.69 A Russian General Staff Paper appearing in Razviedchik on 3 August 1909 maintained that, ‘War is no longer a duel between armies, but a life and death struggle between nations. Nothing short of paralysing the whole life of a country [to such an extent that any prolongation of it implies national death] constitutes final victory.’ Having correctly, if inadvertently, identified the nature of Russia’s collapse 8 years later, the paper confidently compared Russia’s vast resources with the perils facing any invading army, ‘We have nothing to fear from an enemy – only our own lack of spirit. War is at hand . . .’.

52 The Russo-Japanese War Fear about the degeneracy of modern urban populations was widespread in Germany before 1914. Colonel William Balck maintained that The steadily improving standards of living tend to increase the instinct of self-preservation and to diminish the spirit of self-sacrifice . . . The manner of fast living at the present day undermines the nervous system . . . the physical powers of the human species are also partly diminishing.70 There was concern in some quarters in Britain about the fitness of the nation to bear its necessary martial burdens. In the United Service Magazine of June 1904, Captain Bellairs described the British nation as being ‘in a wild debauch of so-called freedom. It is time to call a halt . . . to inculcate discipline’. Sir Alexander Bannerman noted in 1910 that ‘With all the old restraints removed, the nation must either have a new discipline or go to pieces. It is universal discipline which has brought Japan to her present pitch of efficiency.’71 On that same occasion Bellairs complained that unlike the Japanese, English education instilled discontent, teaching children how to extract their rights but with no mention of duty or sacrifice to the nation. He blamed London County Council for what would later be called ‘Loony Leftism’ when, in 1905, it refused to fly the Union Flag at an elementary school even though a benefactor had offered to meet the cost.72 Bellairs would no doubt have been impressed by the report of Sir Frederick Treves who visited Japanese hospitals during the War. He witnessed surgery performed without anaesthetic on impassive patients and was told by the surgeon that ‘Our men do not always require chloroform or any anaesthetic; it is not necessary to use it with our men like it is with you whitemen’.73 Those who held forthright racial views did not necessarily do so out of uncritical regard for their own people. Jack London74 said that if he were God for one hour, he would ‘blot out London and its 6,000,000 people, as Sodom and Gomorrah were blotted out’.75 To him, the London Abyss was another Social Pit. The inefficient were weeded out and flung downwards. The efficient emigrated, taking the best qualities of the stock with them. The British race was enfeebling itself into two classes, a master race and a ghetto race. A short and stunted race was being created – a breed strikingly different than their rulers.76 The patriotism provoked by the Russo-Japanese War was viewed with concern by many socialists who saw the ‘spectacle of the working classes uniting to applaud the crimes of their exploiters’. Race and cultural struggle seemed to be taking over from class struggle,77 and in Nazi Germany the race and cultural struggle would be united. In times of national peril, Soviet Marxism soon

1905 – the future of war 53 adopted traditional patriotic themes against threats from both the Oriental Japanese and the European invaders from Germany. In German eyes, it was the Russians who took on the mantle of ‘Oriental monster’ in the Second World War, just as the Japanese filled this role for the Allies. In the First World War, the German ‘Huns’ acted that part in the minds of the British, given that the ‘plucky little Japs’ were their allies. The military academic, T.M. Maguire, asked Are English mothers so situated that they can give birth to men and breed and rear them as fit instruments for individual and national elevation? Come with me and wander the poorer streets of Glasgow, Edinburgh, Liverpool, Dublin and London, and the stoutest warrior here . . . will stammer out ‘No, alas No’, with tears in his eyes. Our position is endangered by political intrigue, lack of self-denial, lack of knowledge, cult of games of a spectacular kind, and the terrible deterioration of so many mothers in the crowded towns, who are the victims of machines that can produce anything but men. Yet still less a race of Military men.78 Maguire would have been heartened to know that from the other side of the Channel, Albion seemed to be in distressingly rude health. The pride in the cult of the ‘Old Country’, decision and gallantry, inculcated in children from the earliest age, have made England a rich and powerful nation, which knows how to found its prosperity on the employment of arms. With her the doors of the Temple of Janus are never closed. Thus her people, who swarm everywhere, march on towards the conquest of the world.79 One practical method of producing a disciplined fighting force was to initiate youth training. General Baden-Powell’s Boy Scout movement was seen to meet many of the needs for rebuilding national discipline and morale. ‘Be Prepared’ meant ‘Be prepared to die for your country’. In 1910, Colonel J.H. Rossiter, a retired officer working for a Schools Union, responded to Baden-Powell’s call for volunteers to recruit for ‘the modern Bushido or Boy Scout movement . . . permeating itself over the whole country’.80 There was a belief that society could reinvigorate itself by teaching this Bushido spirit. One scoutmaster reported, ‘Colonel, you see we are really going to have a new generation of boys, quite different from the present generation’.81 Maybe his premise was wrong or his conclusion was right, and the results were revealed in the fortitude of troops in the war just 4 years away. In the same debate, in words of which President J.F. Kennedy would no doubt have approved, Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Plumer urged that a boy be taught to regard himself judged ‘not by his own success, but by what he has done for his country’.82

54 The Russo-Japanese War In the decade prior to 1914, many believed that the answer to the military problems of the day lay in manipulating human nature rather than understanding and addressing the emerging technologies and tactical possibilities of war. By 1910, Sir Ian Hamilton had adopted a semi-mystical view of fighting spirit, despite his own experience of the Russo-Japanese War, maintaining that the will could overcome wire- and fire-swept zones. He was to discover at Gallipoli that this theory was incomplete. Some believed that the spiritual could be communicated in ‘thought waves’. In a vision which seems less fantastic today than it probably did at the time, Colonel Maude predicted the day of the ‘automatic regiment’ in which the commander would be the sender of ‘waves’ and each private a ‘Marconi receiver’, with an esprit de corps impervious to suffering.83 Ironically, it was the very recognition of the technological realities of modern war, described by Bloch and manifest in the Russo-Japanese War, that caused armies to seek desperate, alternative, non-technological remedies in the form of discipline, fortitude, moral strength and esprit de corps. The emphasis was on shaping human character to overcome firepower and in this bracing spirit Europe took to the field in 1914. The consequences of this proved disastrous and it would take 3 years for armies to catch up with the harsh tactical and technological realities; but only after the troops had demonstrated the qualities of which many had believed them incapable. Man’s inherent sense of self-defence evidently mastered any veneer of recently acquired social decadence – Monsieur Poilu proved no poltroon. The astonishing evidence of the First World War was that civilians in uniform could sustain their morale in appalling conditions, although the eventual national collapse that Bloch had predicted did strike down three of the major participants – wars had indeed become struggles of social attrition and dominance.

Lessons to be learned The official histories of the major powers were translated into English, as were the reports of most foreign observers. Despite the urging of many observers for radical reform, traditional views prevailed and doctrinal regression soon set in.84 The justifiable visions of 1905 were being fundamentally distorted by 1910 and resulted in a nightmare in 1914. Sir Ian Hamilton noted that ‘On the actual day of battle naked truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following morning they have already begun to get into their uniforms.’85 Liddell-Hart noted that If the study of war in the past has so often proved fallible as a guide to the course of the next war, it implies not that war is unsuited to scientific study but that the study has not been scientific enough in spirit and method.86

1905 – the future of war 55 After 1905 the process of constructive analysis went disastrously astray, distorted by the military’s prevailing culture. A bundle of new, sometimes mutually contradictory views intruded upon a powerful doctrinal orthodoxy, itself based on the immutable strategic premises of the day. National politics and strategy largely determine military culture and these, rather than awkward tactical ‘lessons learned’ in Manchuria, proved decisive as 1914 approached. One lesson of the War was the frequency with which different observers could view an event and come to totally different conclusions, and partisans tended to find what they wanted to suit their own interest. While some saw the inevitability of trench warfare and the dominance of artillery in a future European war, others believed that Japanese moral qualities had overcome physical obstacles. By 1914, the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War had been so selected as to achieve the precise opposite of what might more obviously have been deduced, and after the First World War many similar mistakes were made. Within months, the First World War proved to be startlingly different to what the prevailing doctrines had anticipated, but almost exactly what many observers of the Russo-Japanese War had foreseen. The power of defence was dominant in the first 3 years of the First World War, largely because little had been done to structure and equip forces and devise tactics to make it otherwise. Instead, a substantially counterproductive belief in manoeuvre and élan in the attack with inadequate firepower prevailed, relying in the final analysis on moral factors.87 The essential debate after 1905 turned on whether or not the power of modern defence precluded the possibility of successful offence. Although the power of defensive technology was recognized, there was a fundamental belief that the charge was necessary and could succeed if there were enough men, sufficiently motivated. The evidence available in 1905, and not merely with hindsight post-1918, should have led to the conclusion that in defence, well-sited machine guns and concealed artillery had little to fear from a purely infantry attack, however determined. A successful attack required a careful, and possibly complex, artillery fireplan that neutralized enemy artillery and machine guns so that infantry could manoeuvre to close with the enemy, but the evidence was neglected. Some also realized that all operations, whether offensive or defensive, were changing and would be conducted at an unprecedented pace over prolonged periods, with fighting by night and day. In Britain, Captain C.E.P. Sankey, an officer of the Royal Engineers wrote in 1907, ‘May we not expect that future sieges and battles will be reckoned in weeks and will in fact be indistinguishable?’ He predicted that in a European war, unless one side blundered badly, both would entrench and all attacks would be frontal attacks and ‘each army will then practically become the garrison of an enormous extended fortress’.88

56 The Russo-Japanese War The rise of artillery as the principal arm of firepower in modern warfare had been evident to some but ignored by most for many years; and although its power was amply demonstrated during the Russo-Japanese War, the implications were not well received or acted upon. Little was done after the War to acknowledge the dominance of artillery or the power of the machine gun in defence when combined with wire, trenches and obstacles and the possible use of chemical weapons. In armies obsessed with élan vital et pantalons rouges, morale and shock, the ‘firepower school’ was paid scant attention. The emphasis in most armies seemed to be less on how technology could change the next war, than how new technology might permit a return to the old ways.89 After the Russo-Japanese War, many serious officers were eager to seize on the new ideas and their consequences. The forum for debate on innovation was the military journal and the general view of the authors was that in the new circumstances there was a pressing need for more howitzers, machine guns, mortars, hand grenades, mines and barbed wire. Unfortunately these generally remained no more than the ideas of those with the time to write articles. Their main concern was how enemy trenches, which would feature prominently in future warfare, might be reached and overrun without overwhelming losses. Captain Rogers of the Royal Engineers believed that engineers would have to take on the old role of artillery in preparing a path for a final assault.90 Major H.S. Jeudwine won the Royal Artillery Institute’s Duncan Prize of 1907 with his paper suggesting that long-range heavy guns were essential for enfilading the lines of trenches that any European army would have to construct. Second place in the Duncan Competition went to Major C.C. Robertson who warned that ‘If we do not accept the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War exactly as if it had been our own campaign we shall make mistakes in the next war which it is most necessary to avoid’.91 Major J.M. Home observed, The great impression made on me by all I saw is that artillery is now the decisive arm and that all other arms are auxiliary to it. The importance of artillery cannot be too strongly insisted upon, for, other things being equal, the side which has the best artillery will always win . . . . It seems almost a question for deliberate consideration whether artillery should not be largely increased even at the expense of other arms.92 However, little was done to build an indirect fire capability. In 1913, Major General W.G. Knox attacked the Secretary of State for War over the predicament of Britain’s artillery, ‘outranged by hostile gun and rifle, untrained to recognize friend from foe, innocent of the tactical requirement of a combined fire fight, does not the result spell murder?’93

1905 – the future of war 57 The First World War witnessed a ‘Military Revolution’ in which the dominance of indirect artillery fire, ‘three-dimensional’ warfare and Deep Battle were established.94 This had become the conscious orthodoxy of all major armies by 1917. That Revolution should have been the immediate consequence of the experience of the Russo-Japanese War; but although its basic components were evident in that War and their implications noted by observers, there seemed to be little institutional awareness of them, of the scale or significance of their sum, let alone of the need for appropriate reform. For military doctrine, 1905 was the false dawn of the Military Revolution of 1917 as much as it was for the political and social revolutions of that year.

Part II

From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour A 35-year perspective

4

Grand strategy Racial angst and diplomatic odyssey

The Russo-Japanese War offered tantalizing insights into the character of war as it would be fought in the twentieth century. Many factors were identified and many discounted; but they were eventually to coalesce in a new style of warfare by 1918. These profound military developments were matched by equally dramatic political and strategic ones in East Asia over the next 35 years. The phenomenon of ‘world war’ had been evident since the eighteenth century, and in 1900 A.T. Mahan had noted that thanks to the speed of maritime travel, ‘The world has grown smaller’.1 The Russo-Japanese War confirmed that global character and its increasing industrialization. Huge steam ships, ship canals, trans-continent railways and the telegraph have not altered strategy, but they have altered its application . . . overseas expeditions of enormous magnitude are common . . . 2 Global war had become the norm, and with it the increased possibility of global ideological and cultural struggle. The dynamics of that globalization have burgeoned to this day, expanding the scope of potential operations, while constraining them with added complexity and pressures of time. The Fourth Dimension contracts while the others, including cyberspace, expand. Victory over a European empire provoked high emotion in Japan. It established its credentials as a major power, but what had been won on the battlefield seemed to evaporate, as it had done after the Sino-Japanese War, at the negotiating table at Portsmouth, leaving Japan bitter and mistrustful of international diplomacy.3 What was seen to have been lost was not merely a province, but the source of essential agricultural and industrial sustenance, vital for Japan’s survival. It also seemed an affront to Japan’s right to expand in what it saw as its natural and imperial sphere; following the pattern set by Western nations. This ‘injustice’ was attributed in Japan to international cultural and racial bias against an Asian nation.

62 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour Francis McCullagh saw little long-term benefit to Japan from its victory. I doubt that at the apex of their prosperity they will enjoy anything like the national happiness which is theirs today. . . . Time and wealth and factory servitude, the great corroders of martial virtue, will gradually take the fine edge from off their valour.4 Some Japanese were also deeply uneasy about their victory. The radical Japanese journalist Kotoku Shusui viewed Japan’s success with dread, believing that Japan would merely be beggared by the expense of its imperial commitments and subject to immeasurable strategic liabilities thereafter. In his The Melancholy of Victory, the Christian pacifist Tokutomi Roka maintained that nothing had really been changed by military triumph, for Japan remained dependent on its relationships with other powers. Paradoxically, the stronger Japan grew, the more insecure its position would become; and any future struggle would continue to be seen in cultural and racial terms. A successful resort to force might enable Japan to become a great power, but he warned that ‘Those who live by the sword shall perish by the sword’, and that victory over Russia had cheered the world’s Coloured races, provoked the White race and could become the prelude to an inter-racial conflict ‘unprecedented in the annals of world history’.5 Japan’s new position in the world also came at a financial price. By 1906, a victorious yet discontented Japan had a foreign debt-to-GNP (Gross National Product) ratio of 91 per cent and hoped to cut back military expenditure; but by 1910 it still felt obliged to join the naval construction race. There followed a period of intense rivalry in Japan between the Army and the Navy, not merely over funding, but over the foreign policy that justified it. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the USA was not so much concerned with Japanese reactions to its Pacific expansion, as with the potential power of China, fearing the long-term threat of the latter to its Pacific coast more than any to its Atlantic front facing Europe. President Theodore Roosevelt had therefore supported Japan in 1904, driven largely by the desire to keep China weak and to control a slice of its trade.6 It was assumed that after the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese would open up the whole of Asia and its 800 million people for free trade, making the Pacific an ‘American lake’. It soon became apparent that this would not be the case. The Treaty of Portsmouth was brokered by the USA and marked its real emergence as a Pacific power; but it generated a lasting hostility against it in Japan, where it was blamed for the loss of the expected Russian indemnity.7 US–Japanese relations deteriorated rapidly thereafter; while the negotiations at Portsmouth seemed to cast the USA in the role of ‘honest broker’, in reality they were the occasion on which the Russians ‘passed the baton’ as the

Grand strategy 63 primary rival of the Japanese; and the greater clash between East and West would wait until 1941. In 1870, Chinese immigrants had represented 20 per cent of the Californian labour market. In 1882, Congress had passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which restricted Chinese immigration for the next 60 years and was the only American immigration law based on race. The Chinese were soon replaced by a growing number of Japanese, Korean and Indian labourers on the West Coast;8 but fears continued to be widespread in California of what the San Francisco Examiner called the ‘Brown stream of Japanese immigration and . . . the complete orientalization of the Pacific Coast.’9 In 1890, 2,000 Japanese lived in California; but by 1900 there were 24,000. Japan was outraged by the segregation of Japanese school children by the San Francisco School Board in October 1906, and by American legislation limiting Japanese immigration.10 Mainichi Shimbun called for Admiral Togo and Japanese warships to be sent to California to protect Japanese citizens and save civilization from American barbarity.11 Homer Lea, an ardent American patriot, nevertheless believed that the USA was dealing unfairly with its Japanese population, and that unlike injustices against the supine Chinese, such affronts were bound to hasten the outbreak of war with a martial Japan. When that war came, he feared that these injustices would cause the rest of the world to side with Japan. Unions in California generally resented ‘coolies’ taking jobs from ‘Americans’, and The San Francisco Chronicle ran stories headed, ‘The Yellow Peril – How Japanese Crowd out the White Race’ and ‘Japanese a Menace to American Women’. In May 1907 there were anti-Japanese riots in San Francisco, and Japanese immigration was restricted by ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. Roosevelt noted that the Japanese [W]ould like to be considered as on a full equality with, as one of the brotherhood of, Occidental nations, and have been bitterly humiliated to find that even their allies, the English, and their friends, the Americans, won’t admit them to association and citizenship as they admit the least advanced or most decadent European peoples . . . our people will not permit the Japanese to come in large numbers among them . . . 12 Canada experienced similar frictions over Asian immigration. The later Prime Minister of Canada, W.L. Mackenzie King, noted in his 1908 ‘Report on the Causes of Anti-Oriental Riots of 1907’, ‘the native of India is not a person suited to this country’;13 and Canada imposed immigration restrictions after those riots. It was, however, Japanese immigrants who were seen to be the greatest threat to British Columbia, where the newspaper The Province declared that ‘The Japanese does not assimilate, and never will. His sons and daughters will never be Canadians. They will always, in

64 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour reality, owe allegiance to the Mikado.’14 Another newspaper, The Industrial World, asked Is nothing to be done to stop the influx of the Mongols into this province? . . . The workers of British Columbia may be forced to give the government to understand, once and for all, that they intend that this community shall remain Anglo-Saxon.15 The Saturday Sunset maintained that ‘Even the riff-raff of the White race that Europe sends, can be boiled down into a decent Canadian citizen in a couple of generations at least, but an Oriental does not change.’ The Premier, Richard McBride insisted that ‘British Columbia must be kept White’.16 Roosevelt maintained that ‘Nineteenth century democracy needs no more vindication for its existence than the fact that it kept for the White race the best portions of the New World’s surface, temperate America and Australia.’17 He was determined to meet the challenge from any ‘race foe’ to these lands and there were many who agreed with him. Fears for Australia’s security, and therefore the British Empire, were expressed as early as 1905. Octavius Beale argued that In Australia we have three million five hundred thousand square miles . . . half empty, in security by the British fleet. We are there between East and West and you know gentlemen, at the Battle of Tsushima the centre was actually shifted very seriously. We are not far removed from the great disturbance . . . a very great change has taken place in what you call the Far East simply by iron and blood.18 He maintained that Australia was held [I]n trust for the race to which we belong and any proposal for handing it over to the Black or Yellow man comes too late for serious consideration . . . I say that you can no longer keep track or control if you open those gates as they have been opened in South Africa, and it is very hard indeed to see how this is going to be corrected.19 The irony of Western protests about possible Japanese expansion does not seem to have disturbed the accusers. One Australian senator noted in November 1905, Japan has shown that she is an aggressive nation. She has shown that she is desirous of pushing out all around. What has always been the effect of victory and conquest upon nations? Do we not know that it stimulates them to further conquest? to obtain fresh territory? Has not that been the history of our own race? Is there any country that offers such a temptation to Japan as Australia does?20

Grand strategy 65 Japan’s victory over Russia had stopped Russian expansion and reduced the perceived threat to India at no cost to Britain. Nevertheless, the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 12 August 1905 recognized India as a factor more explicitly than had the Treaty of 1902, and there was provision to invoke the treaty if India were attacked by a single power. Initially, the British hoped that the treaty would require Japan to send troops to defend India, but the British themselves soon dropped this idea; a richly ironic one given that within 30 years Japan would be purveying itself as the champion of the colonized, and sending its own Army to conquer or colonize the Indian subcontinent from Britain. The British were aware of potential ‘cultural’ problems should Japanese troops be used in India. On 12 April 1905, the Committee of Imperial Defence noted that ‘It is of primary importance to ascertain the views of the Indian Government as to the desirability of the troops of another Asiatic power co-operating with our native Indian troops.’21 The Secretary of War, H.O. Arnold-Foster noted with prescience, the [D]anger that the people of India will cease to regard us as the masters of India. If ever we cease to hold India by the strong hand, and India knows it, the day will not be far distant when we shall lose India altogether.22 A War Office report of 4 November 1905 noted that defending India with Japanese troops would, ‘be highly detrimental if not absolutely fatal to our prestige throughout the Asiatic continent’.23 The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905 was one reason why the British felt able to reduce their fleet in the Pacific, thereby ruling themselves out as a possible enemy of the USA. The secret Note A to the Treaty judged that ‘It is now recognized as a cardinal feature of British foreign policy that war between Great Britain and the United States is not a contingency sufficiently probable to need special steps to meet it.’24 The British had noted the Russians’ vulnerability in having a single inadequate naval base at Port Arthur, and as early as 23 April 1909 the Committee of Imperial Defence wondered whether Hong Kong and Singapore could be defended against Japanese attacks which seemed increasingly plausible. Equally, many Japanese doubted the benefits of the alliance with Britain. In 1912, the semi-official Japan Magazine suggested that Japan would benefit more from an alliance with Germany than with Britain; and it was clear that British survival in the Far East would become increasingly precarious. Rather as the Russians in 1904–5, the British would fight the Second World War in the Pacific at the end of a perilously extended and weak line of communications, but without even a slender railway. Roosevelt judged the capacity of a race for self-rule to be an important factor in international relations and in the immediate aftermath of victory he deemed the Japanese not only capable of self-rule, but also to be agents of civilization in Asia. He had favoured the Japanese having a position in

66 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour Korea, much as the Americans had in Cuba, controlling the periphery of the Yellow Sea, much as the USA controlled the periphery of the Caribbean; but Roosevelt soon also saw a menacing aspect to this. He believed that the Japanese combined self-confidence, ferociousness and conceit and a ‘great touchiness’,25 and would soon be greater rivals in the Asian trade than the Western nations. Japan invested heavily in China and it was increasingly regarded by the USA as a threat to an ‘open China’, rather than as a fellow capitalist like the Western nations. There were already fears that Japan might attack the Panama Canal, even though this was not due to be completed until 1914. Those predicting war between the USA and Japan saw access to raw materials and trade as the key to future conflict, just as it had been in the previous century.26 The American occupation of the Philippines was seen by Japan to block its access to the raw materials of South-East Asia which it now regarded as vital to its growth. The Japanese clearly understood the strategic risks inherent in such commercial rivalry, and in the 1906 draft of the Imperial Defense Policy, Tanaka Giichi outlined plans to fight the USA in the Philippines. Once we begin to take away the Chinese trade of Western nations, the latter will cease to be . . . cordial towards us. But that is something we cannot help. We are poor; our natural resources are limited . . . If we entice away your customers by under-selling, that is no fault of ours.27 Admiral W.M. Folger feared that an American base at Subic Bay could result in the US fleet being trapped like the Russian fleet in Port Arthur in 1904. That fleet, like the Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-wei, 10 years earlier, had eventually been destroyed by heavy artillery positioned on high ground. Subic Bay was likened to the bottom of a soup plate and was clearly vulnerable to a major ground attack. Previous studies had considered raids by small forces on American island possessions, but since 1904, the USA’s position had deteriorated. On 21 January 1907, the American General Staff reported that Hawaii was ‘in a deplorably defenceless position’.28 The US Army Staff was impressed by Japan’s joint capabilities, and in 1908 noted that the Japanese could land 100,000 men on Hawaii before reinforcements could arrive from the American West Coast. As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Congress appropriated $862,395 for fortifications on Hawaii, and $700,000 for fortifications on the Philippines. On 5 September 1907, the US Army Chief of Staff, J.F. Bell, said that it would be absurd to try to defend Subic Bay, even though the General Board declared it to be essential. By 1908, Bell’s position had been accepted, and instead Pearl Harbour became the focus for the US Navy’s defensive plans, receiving another $900,000 for fortifications.29 In 1907 President Roosevelt decided to move the US Navy’s battle fleet, ‘The Great White Fleet’, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, citing ‘unknown

Grand strategy 67 possibilities both as regards their (Japanese) motives and purposes’.30 The fleet, including sixteen cruisers, arrived in Tokyo in October 1908. The Japanese had planned that 160 of their warships would be deployed in a friendly, if ambiguous greeting at sea. In the event, a typhoon prevented the meeting. What the voyage made clear, however, was that the USA could not sustain a fleet of that size in the Pacific without new and immense investment in infrastructure, for it had had to borrow coal from the British to complete its 434 days of sailing.31 The fleet pulled back to Hawaii, anticipating the obvious, that it could not defend the Philippines. Wargames that year revealed how easy it would be for the Japanese to land a large invasion force on those islands. In 1909, Major General J.P. Story predicted that the Japanese could land 400,000 men anywhere on the West Coast of the USA in 3 months,32 and there was a flurry of literature predicting that Japan would win any war with the USA. In 1911, following disastrous exercises near San Antonio, Major General Leonard Wood declared that the US Army was not prepared ‘to meet with a trained enemy’.33 In 1910, Mahan compared the self-assertion and expansionism of Japan and Germany to Sparta. ‘If Japan seriously starts to reorganize China and makes headway, there will result a real shifting of the center of equilibrium so far as the White races are concerned.’34 The Russians also stirred American fears by maintaining that having taken Korea the Japanese would soon be planning to take the Philippines. By 1910, it was apparent that the USA would have to defend on a line through Hawaii; but it was unclear how the USA would protect its trading interests in Asia in this way, let alone fulfil its ambitions to expand them. From 1908, there had also been clear signs of Japanese involvement in Mexico, with talk of Japan securing Magdalena Bay on the Pacific coast as a naval base. The Japanese also spoke increasingly of the Mexicans as racial brothers. In 1911, Admiral Yoshiro visited Mexico and asserted at a banquet that ‘The same blood flows in [our] veins.’35 From 1911, Japan planned for war with the USA, and American strategic and ethnic concerns about Japan became more pronounced. Germany was keen to gain the support of two nations with a grudge against the USA: Japan and Mexico; German involvement in Mexico seemed troubling, with many Americans believing that the USA faced an imminent invasion by a German-led Japanese Army from Mexico. In March 1911, President Taft mobilized two thirds of the US Army on the Mexican border and sent the US Fleet to the Gulf of Mexico. In 1913, a Japanese ship visited Mexico, and Japan supplied arms to the Huerta Government in Mexico in retaliation for the Californian Alien Exclusion Act.36 That year Japan could field twenty-five divisions, while the US Army had trouble putting together one for operations on the Mexican border. Even President Woodrow Wilson supported policies that would exclude certain races from immigrating to the USA. In 1912, he maintained that

68 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour ‘We cannot make a homogenous population of a people who do not blend with the Caucasian race.’37 Wilson was impressed by the technical ability of the Japanese, but noted that the problems in California had arisen because Americans did not want to ‘have an intimate association’ with them, because ‘they are not on the same plane with us. That . . . is something that diplomacy itself cannot handle.’38 Negative assumptions about the Japanese soon replaced the positive images that had so recently prevailed. In 1915, Lt Cdr L.A. Cotton, the American naval attaché in Japan wrote an essay on the Japanese character which did much to shape both military and civilian opinion in the USA in succeeding decades. He described the Japanese commitment to the warrior ethos, but in terms of acceptance of suffering and discipline. He noted Japanese arrogance, their inability to think creatively and to innovate, their predilection for secrecy and deceit, and their ruthless pursuit of self-interest. It was partly such assumptions about race that made Wilson reluctant to have Americans fight in Europe. On 5 February 1917 he noted the damage which the war in Europe would do to ‘White civilization’; and that it was necessary to keep at least part of the ‘White race’ strong to face the ‘Yellow race’.39 Black American leaders sometimes saw a connection between their own condition in American society and that of the ‘victims’ of American imperialism abroad. This was especially so after the First World War when the Japanese set themselves up as the champions of equal rights for all races at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and the standard-bearers for Black emancipation in the USA. When the Japanese delegation stopped in New York on its way to the Conference, it was lobbied by Black activists urging it to try harder to ensure that racial discrimination in the USA was outlawed. Japan’s bid to incorporate pronouncements on race in the final agreements failed, thanks to opposition by President Wilson who was determined not to grant the Japanese equal racial status with Caucasians.40 In 1919, some calculations predicted that California would have a majority Japanese population by 1949.41 In 1922, the US Supreme Court ruled that Japanese immigrants were not eligible for citizenship, as they were not Whites and therefore of Caucasian race,42 and the Exclusion Act of 1924 halted all Japanese immigration. California’s Alien Land Laws prevented those ineligible for citizenship from owning or leasing land. During the debate on these laws one assemblyman said that he intensely hated the Japanese, whom he characterized as a ‘bandy-legged bugaboo, miserable craven Simian, degenerated rotten little devil’.43 In the 1912 Presidential election campaign, Woodrow Wilson campaigned on the need to find an outlet for burgeoning American production; and recommended the use of diplomacy, and if necessary political power, to open Asian markets. The American empire was on the march, into a region that Japan’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ considered to be in Japan’s vital interest to dominate.

Grand strategy 69 The USA, however, often seemed reluctant to become embroiled in Asian territorial disputes; and as early as 1914, Robert Lansing maintained that ‘It would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question of China’s territorial integrity to entangle the United States in international difficulties.’ Nevertheless, in January 1915, Japan demanded control of the Yangtse River Valley; and in May of that year, Roosevelt told the Japanese that the USA would not tolerate any infringement of the ‘political or territorial integrity of China’.44 Germany was the next European Empire to suffer at the hands of the Japanese. In 1904 the Russians had had no large dry dock in the Pacific and planned, bizarrely, to use Japanese facilities if required. Germany appreciated that it would need a major dry dock in the Far East to sustain its presence. In the years before 1914, it spent large sums on port facilities at its colony at Tsingtao, including a 16,000-ton floating dry dock. The Germans concentrated their efforts on building the defences to face the land, against a likely Chinese assault; but they neglected those against naval attack by Japan. On 7 November 1914, Tsingtao fell to the Japanese, supported by a small infantry contingent from its ally Great Britain.45 By the end of 1914, Japan had seized all Germany’s Pacific colonies and in 1915 Japanese warships cruised off California. In July 1916, Russia recognized Japanese ascendancy over most of China, the issue which had essentially provoked the Russo-Japanese War.46 Japan had thus knocked out two of Europe’s empires from the Far East, but ironically it was Japan’s ally, Britain, which now seemed to pose the greatest obstacle to Japan’s further ambitions. Nevertheless, the Japanese placed a naval squadron of fourteen warships under British command in Malta for convoy-protection duties,47 and when the USA entered the war Japan and the USA became allies of a kind. Yet the Japanese became increasingly sceptical about relations with the USA, and in July 1917 the Navy Minister Kato Tomosabuo told the Japanese Cabinet that the United States had become a hypothetical enemy. That year Germany sought an alliance with Japan in support of a Mexican attack on the USA to regain territory lost in 1848;48 but Germany’s plans were revealed to the USA in the Zimmermann Telegram, precipitating the USA’s entry into the war.49 Anti-Japanese feeling remained common in the USA, and in March 1917 President Wilson tried unsuccessfully to suppress W.R. Hearst’s film Patria which showed Japanese troops invading the USA from Mexico and committing atrocities. Yet both the USA and Japan were pragmatic in securing their interests. On 2 November 1917, the Lansing–Ishii Agreement established that the USA recognized Japan’s special interests in Manchuria, and in return Japan agreed to the USA’s having equal commercial access to China. A further secret protocol agreed that neither would take advantage of the European war to seek special privileges at the other’s expense. On 21 August 1918, American forces, deploying to Siberia on an uncertain mission during the Russian Civil War, stopped to refuel in

70 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour Nagasaki, and for a short time seem to have accepted orders from Japanese commanders.50 The First World War weakened the European empires in the Far East and strengthened Japan’s position in Asia. After Germany’s defeat in the First World War, Gustav Stresemann warned his countrymen not to rejoice at the reduced strength of the British in East Asia: ‘The liquidation of the East Asian branch of the British economy’, for its transfer to the Japanese, would ‘mark a significant defeat for the entire White race’.51 The USA, however, was the true ‘winner’ of the First World War. On 28 July 1915, Rear Admiral A.M. Knight, President of the US Naval War College (NWC) observed, ‘The present almost world-wide war appears to be a struggle for industrial and commercial supremacy; or more concretely, for control of the markets and the carrying trade of the world.’52 The relatively unscathed USA was aware of how its economic power, and the crippling effects of 3 years of war on other belligerents, would bolster its position in the world. Its enemies would be defeated and its allies virtually bankrupted. In July 1917, Woodrow Wilson noted that the USA would be able to force its own terms, not merely on Germany, but also on France and Britain: ‘When the war is over we can force them to our way of thinking, because by that time they will, among other things, be financially in our hands.’53 Many saw the First World War as but the beginning of a longer and more vicious racial struggle. The Japanese feared that it indicated that race was at the heart of international conflict; and that it would ultimately manifest itself in a terrible Armageddon between the ‘White’ and ‘Yellow’ races. Yamagata Aritomo believed that Japan had to ally itself more closely to its ‘race-ally’ China, but also to seek good relations with Britain and the USA to avert catastrophe. On 27 July 1915, Captain W.L. Rogers explained the US Navy’s ‘world view’. ‘As the world fills up and strong and virile peoples find they must expand or starve, the victors must finally challenge the United States.’54 In these circumstances, he maintained, ‘the code of international manners which we call “international law” will become as of little force as is the code of individual manners in a panic-stricken crowd.’55 The desire for ‘Lebensraum’ was noted, albeit in other words, by the US Navy General Board Memorandum No. 21 of 1918 which observed of dynamic races, ‘When their racial characteristics are virile and militaristic, and their form of government autocratic, strong tendency towards forcible expansion must be expected. Germany and Japan are nations which fulfil these conditions.’56 Others would have argued that this was the very dynamic which had propelled White Europeans around the world, especially across North America and into the Pacific, and been celebrated by them with some triumphalism as Manifest Destiny. In 1921, the American Admiral R.R. Belknap expressed his concerns about the ‘unification of the Yellow races’ under Japan, ‘with effect too

Grand strategy 71 far-reaching on White civilization for such a possible eventuality to be accepted. The outcome would threaten our race.’57 It was in these precepts that the idea of an inevitable war with Japan took root; and subsequent Japanese behaviour in China seemed to confirm the image of the Japanese as both racially delinquent and dangerous, just as they had often been described in contemporary interpretations of Social-Darwinian theory. The war blew away the myth of the Whiteman’s invincibility and stirred Asian passions. In his book The Rising Tide of Color Against White WorldSupremacy of 1920, Lothrop Stoddard asserted that ‘The Russo-Japanese War is one of those landmarks in human history whose significance increases with the lapse of time . . . The legend of White invincibility was shattered, the veil of prestige that draped White civilization was torn aside . . . ’.58 He saw the War as ‘an Asian revolt against White supremacy’, which had been followed by the ‘White world’s’ descent into a ‘Peloponnesian War’ in 1914–18. Men such as Madison Grant, the Chairman of the New York Zoological Society, saw the advance of the ‘lesser races’ of Asia as a lethal threat to the Nordic race, what he termed ‘The Great Race’. Stoddard believed that ideas of ‘survival of the fittest’ had encouraged a fatal, arrogant complacency in the West, for it had overlooked the possibility that the ‘best’ might succumb to the ‘worst’ when conditions favoured ‘the low type’. In the 1920s some felt that the Europeans were living through the last cycle of their civilization. The poet Gottfried Benn predicted that Europe would fall to the Slavs and Mongols, ‘the last strenuous, self-assertion of an ancient race’.59 There were calls for White solidarity against the Yellow threat. In 1925, Sir Leo Chiozza Money acknowledged that ‘the rifle or machine-gun or aeroplane or “chemicals” may arm a Yellow attack upon the West’, but thought it far more likely that the West would be destroyed by ‘race suicide and internecine war’.60 He urged the White races to give up their fratricidal rivalries and that European nations form a federation. Equally, if the White races did not expand and occupy the other territories of the world, they could not expect ‘the rest of the world – the great majority of its people – to be debarred from inhabiting and profiting by what the White refuses to develop’.61 The notion of Lebensraum and the assertion of Terra Nullius doctrine now seemed to militate against the Europeans. It was not merely un-populated land which troubled Chiozza Money, but ‘empty cradles’ constituting some kind of evolutionary reverse. He believed that Western ethics, law, philosophy, art and science would decline along with European populations, and he maintained that, ‘in Europe and America alike, the White races appear to be dying off from the top downwards, in Britain, in especial, the most intelligent people are refraining from rearing families’.62 The Scotsman, J.H. Curle, perhaps influenced by the experiences of the First World War, took a dark view of the human condition in a natural world of unremitting violence, with its ‘widespread killing, blotting out of

72 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour life, and wantonness throughout the organic world’.63 He fretted that ‘If we do not take drastic steps about our breeding, the British Race – all the wonderful White Race – will decline and its meaning for the world’s future fade away.’64 White culture was seen to be in as much danger from its own proletariat as from outside. This stirred debate about eugenics and Curle predicted war with the masses of the ‘unfit’ who would seek to thwart the eugenic legislation which he deemed necessary to contain them and to promote the one in twenty-five possessing ‘what is good in the British’.65 He saw the USA as the future leader of the Anglo-Saxons, even though race per se might no longer be significant. ‘In the United States, the British strain may disappear outwardly (but) many of its qualities remain . . . the Americans will become materially the greatest White people.’66 Japan increasingly saw the Far East as its just and necessary domain, and control over China as the highest priority. In 1918 Japan sent a large force to Siberia asserting that conviction. The collapse of Germany was a blow to Japan, for the continuation of the war would have further weakened its European rivals, while allowing it to consolidate its position in Asia.67 On the other hand, the longer the war went on the more powerful the USA would also become, and even by 1918 the once virtually unarmed USA had become a great military power. Yet the USA was accommodating. After the First World War, President Wilson agreed to let the Japanese keep Shantung,68 and was condemned for it by the likes of Henry Cabot Lodge on the grounds that it appeared to oblige the USA to provide military assistance to the Japanese to hold onto their gains. Lodge called the Japanese ‘the coming danger of the world’ and ‘the Prussia of the Far East’.69 In 1921, the American Professor J.O. Dealey declared, ‘If Japan is allowed to dominate Asia and the Pacific, it means ultimately a war of races, the struggle of the Yellows and the Browns against the Whites, under the leadership of a Prussianized Japan.’70 In 1924 President Coolidge, a strong supporter of the preservation of ‘the Nordic race’, signed the Exclusion Act in order ‘to prevent our cherished institutions’ being ‘diluted by a stream of alien blood’.71 The offence caused in Japan did much to negate any goodwill arising from the Washington Treaty of 1922. One effect was to encourage Japanese emigration elsewhere, and for Japan to work more closely with what it regarded as kindred races in Asia. Japan was angered by criticism of this Japanese emigration to the Asian mainland, and Earl Balfour observed that if White nations refused to allow Japanese immigration, ‘It was somewhat unreasonable to say that she [Japan] was not to expand in a country where there was a Yellow race.’72 The Japanese ultra-nationalist, Hashimoto Kingoro maintained that there were only three ways that Japan could escape its problem of overpopulation: emigration, find a larger place for its produce in world markets or expand its territory. The first was not permitted by the anti-Japanese immigration policies of other nations and world markets were increasingly

Grand strategy 73 being closed by tariff barriers. That left expansion as the preferred option. Hashimoto denied that this would entail annexation by Japan, rather the Japanese were ‘looking for a place overseas where Japanese capital, Japanese skills and Japanese labour can have free play, free from the oppression of the White race’.73 Hashimoto complained that if the White race believed that Japan’s occupation of Manchuria had been excessively violent, Ask which country it was that sent warships and troops to India, South Africa and Australia . . . and proclaimed these territories as their own . . . They will invariably reply, these lands were all lands inhabited by untamed savages. These people did not know how to develop the abundant resources of their land for the benefit of mankind. Therefore it was the wish of God . . . to develop these undeveloped lands . . . Would it not then be God’s will and the will of Providence that Japan go there and develop those resources for the benefit of mankind?74 The mood was set by Hirohito’s enthronement in 1928, when newspapers characterized the coming Showa era in terms of Japan’s youth and its mission to become the world’s hub and guide to all peoples.75 Matsuoka Yosuke, who was to become Foreign Minister in July 1940, noted that ‘Japan is expanding, and what country in its expansion has ever failed to be trying to its neighbours? Ask the American Indian or Mexican how excruciatingly trying the young United States used to be once upon a time.’76 In 1929, Ikezaki Tadakata advocated expansion into China to accommodate Japan’s growing population; and that year Ishiwara Kanji drafted a plan to solve the ‘Manchurian and Mongolian problem’ and ‘to change our country’s destiny’. In 1930 he wrote that ‘China is not a unified nation. It is Japan’s divine mission to assist the Chinese people. The four races of Japan, China, Korea and Manchuria will share a common prosperity . . . .’77 Britain’s concern for the security of its Far Eastern possessions was made more urgent after the Washington Conference of 1921–2 when, following an apparent American threat to recognize Sinn Fein in Ireland, it abruptly dropped its alliance of 21 years with Japan.78 The Treaty led to the scrapping of the bulk of the Royal Navy’s capital ships, removing their protection from Britain’s far-flung Empire. When the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was not renewed, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield noted, ‘We had weakened most gravely our Imperial strategic defence. We had turned a proved friend . . . into a potential and powerful foe.’79 That potential ‘foe’ felt itself to be very much the victim, but not necessarily the loser in any future conflict. If Japan and America Fight (1921) by Sato Kojiro, ‘the Japanese Bernhardi’, criticized the USA as the source of Japan’s problems. He claimed that the USA advocated an ‘open door’ policy, but was all the time pursuing an imperial policy in East Asia. He contrasted the corrupt ‘gold poisoning’ of the USA with the spirit and

74 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour willpower of the Japanese. In any war with the USA, ‘bands of death-daring men . . . thrown in upon San Francisco would be very interesting indeed’.80 Sato was certain that Japanese spirit would confound the mathematics of superior force ratios. ‘To divide four by two and obtain two is an ordinary material judgement. But if we should obtain three, an invisible coefficient [the Japanese spirit] must have been multiplied by the visible coefficient.’81 In 1926, J.H. Curle described Japan’s strategic imperative ‘to exploit large areas of China and the unlimited Chinese markets. Here she will stand no dictation from the Whites; she will surrender China to one people only – to the Chinese themselves, when at last they awake from their sleep.’82 Such an awakening would one day have profound consequences for the entire global economy. The Chinese are a world personality. Their racial energy is appalling . . . being brilliant and daring traders . . . they would make the world if they had the chance. They are a protean people . . . the most capable and efficient race in the world . . . They have no military skill . . . but when it acquires knowledge of science . . . we will see tremendous ferments at work . . . with its appalling energy the old economics of the world are liable to go up in smoke.83 The invasion of the Philippines was discussed at the Japanese War College as early as the 1920s and General Tanaka Giichi is reputed to have submitted a secret blueprint for Japanese expansion to the Emperor on 25 July 1927. The document, known as the ‘Tanaka Memorial’ has never been found and is generally assumed to have been a Chinese forgery, if it ever existed. Whether genuine or not, the ideas contained in the ‘Memorial’ matched, to a large extent, the events of the years that followed: an attack on China, followed by offensives into South-East Asia and Australasia and war against the USA and European imperial powers. Stories of such Japanese ambitions were known to Roosevelt and Stimson,84 and the idea that this might somehow be Japan’s ongoing policy, albeit pursued by other means, has excited much anti-Japanese sentiment since the Second World War.85 The future Admiral, C.W. Nimitz,86 believed that historical evidence showed war to be the prevailing human condition and that until it could be abolished, force and right would jointly rule the world. In his NWC thesis of 1922, he noted that Japan was bound to prepare its armed forces, building its strength for the time when it was able to ‘stop by force our continual obstruction of her policies’.87 In 1926, the future naval commander at Pearl Harbour, H. Kimmel, noted that war with Japan was inevitable if its expansionist policies continued. Race and cultural awareness played an increasingly important part in shaping the views of future American military leaders; and it seems that this common cultural outlook and collective self-confidence contributed mightily to the effectiveness of the US Navy in subsequent decades.88

Grand strategy 75 Between the wars, each class at the NWC received thirteen lectures on the ‘scientific’ subject of race and from 1922–37 Lothrop Stoddard was the leading expert on the subject. From 1931–7, he lectured annually on ‘Racial Aspirations as the Foundation of National Policy’. In 1935, one third of the books reviewed at the NWC were about Japan. One sixth were about the control of raw materials and the remainder were about race and Social-Darwinism. In 1929, amidst economic recession, the USA stopped the interest-free loans it had been giving the Japanese to prevent their incursions into China. Japan also believed that the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 discriminated against Japanese trade, and it set about creating its own autonomous trade sphere.89 There was concern in the USA that China might come to terms with Japan and that India might throw out the British and reach a similar accommodation. There was fear that the chasm between the Oriental and the Occidental cultures would increasingly be perceived in racial terms. The USA therefore saw a need to keep China an ally and not let it become a part of the ‘Asia for the Asian’ movement. Some Britons took a more sceptical view about China ever making progress. Contempt for the Chinese was expressed by Sir Alexander Cadogan from the British Embassy in Nanking in the 1930s, ‘What was wrong with China was that there was something wrong with the Chinese – something at least that made them unable properly to adjust to Western standards.’90 On 7 January 1932, the USA condemned the Japanese creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo; and this ‘Stimson Doctrine’ asserted the right of the USA to guarantee the sovereignty of China. The Monroe Doctrine had, in effect, spread halfway around the globe. It was for these reasons that, in the 1920s and 1930s, the USA rather than the USSR emerged in Japanese minds as the primary military, racial and cultural power curbing their imperial aspirations. Meanwhile in the USSR, Japanese expansion in Manchuria was seen to be but the first step of an advance into Mongolia and Siberia. The idea that Japan was surrounded by hostile powers was fundamental to much of Japanese thinking between the World Wars. The Japanese feared that the USA would link up ‘The Three A’s’: America, Alaska and Asia, by a tunnel under the Bering Straits, threatening Japan from the north as well as from its bases in the Philippines. In 1932, Ikezaki Tadakata recommended seizing Guam and the Philippines at the outset of war with the USA. To compound this, the Japanese felt threatened by Nationalist China and a Communist USSR from the west. A film of 1933 paraphrased the words of the War Minister General Araki Sadao, Can we expect the waves of the Pacific of tomorrow to be as calm as they are today? It is the holy mission of Japan to establish peace in the Orient . . . The day will come when we will make the whole world look up to our national virtues.91

76 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour At the London Naval Conference of 1934, the Japanese asked for naval parity with Great Britain and the USA but were offered 70 per cent, leaving them as bitter as they had been with the outcome of the international negotiations of 1895 and 1905. Japan believed that it was becoming subject to an essentially Anglo-American economic order in the Pacific, which constrained its growth once it had become too competitive. The world has witnessed the conquest, by the White races of the coloured peoples. Japan too was once treated as if she were a dominion of White races . . . China is like an unchaste woman. She is a sycophant before the stronger, and a braggart before the weaker.92 Books such as The Rising Tide of Colour93 persuaded the Japanese of the fundamental divide between East and West, and General Tanaka Giichi advocated closer cooperation with China. Prime Minister Prince Konoe saw Japan’s task to be one not merely of dominating China but also of undertaking an altruistic mission, ‘the development and not the ruin of China. It is China’s cooperation and not conquest that Japan desires.’94 In 1938, a Japanese official informed the US naval attaché in Shanghai that the purpose of Japanese policy was to drive all Whites from China, destroy Chinese industry and control Chinese customs. The naval rivalry of 1919–29 had been more between Britain and the USA than between those two and Japan; and Anglophobia in the USA overshadowed the influence of its Anglo-Saxon elite. In the early 1920s the US Navy maintained Plan RED, the Atlantic Strategic War Plan, based on a war with Great Britain, resulting from the latter’s alliance with Japan. Plan RED–ORANGE hypothesized a war in two oceans with the need to defeat Great Britain in the Atlantic first, before defeating Japan in the Pacific.95 This view soon changed as the latter emerged as the primary threat; although in the event, the logic of winning against a European enemy first again prevailed. The idea grew that the USA should become a global force to be unleashed on its rejuvenated mission and destiny. Captain D.W. Knox maintained that ‘The United States must eliminate altruism from its national strategy.’96 The notion that a future war would have a cultural dimension was expressed in the crisis of 1931–3 by the US Secretary of State, Stimson, who maintained that it was ‘almost impossible that two such different civilizations’ as the USA and Japan could avoid clashing head-on.97 The USA was effectively an East Asian power only by proxy; and in the 1930s that proxy was China, just as it was Japan after 1945. When Japan sought once more to establish its position in Manchuria in the 1930s, it was thus bound to confront the USA as well, rather as Russia’s advance into Manchuria in 1900 had set the course for war with Japan. J.O. Richardson bemoaned the fact that the American public were as unlikely to support entanglements in Asia as they were commitments in Europe. General D. MacArthur saw the interrelationship of trade and

Grand strategy 77 military power and the consequent importance to the USA of its base in the Philippines. ‘The Pacific will be the theatre of future commercial and military struggles between nations . . . and these Islands will be the center of all such future contests for supremacy.’98 Such notions had a racial and cultural dimension. One American Governor of the Philippines between the World Wars believed that the USA should retain the islands in order to sustain ‘Anglo-Saxonism in the Western Pacific in the Far East and in India’.99 It was not surprising that many Asians saw little to distinguish American activity in the Pacific region from that of other ‘Europeans’. The supply of raw materials was a prominent theme in the strategic debates of the 1930s, being seen to favour the Anglo-Saxons and to constitute a weakness for the Japanese. Brooks Emeny regarded the USA’s situation as the most favourable, except ‘in the case of open hostilities with the British’. On the other hand, the raw material position . . . of her Empire is not only comparable to ours in many ways, but largely complementary . . . the United States would have no problem of procurement in time of war so long as the British, possessed of their Empire, were either allied or neutral.100 He saw that The richest raw material regions of the world are in great part under the dominance of the Anglo-American Powers: and that these two national groups, which account for over sixty percent of the world’s industrial output and exercise financial or sovereign control over seventy-five percent of the mineral resources, hold the balance of power in so far as the essential commodities of war are concerned.101 The Japanese shared a similar view and drew the natural conclusions regarding their own vulnerability to encirclement by the Anglo-Saxons. By 1933, the Kwantung Army noted the vast coal and iron-ore deposits of northern China and that If we are careless, these resources will end up in English or American hands . . . Talking about ‘International Morality’ and allowing others to get the jump on us, will give Japan the short end of the stick . . . taking north China is vital to Japan.102 Prime Minister Prince Konoe believed that unequal distribution of land and natural resources cause war. ‘We cannot achieve real peace until we change the present irrational international state of affairs. We cannot wait for a rationalizing adjustment of the world system.’103 Speculating on where the solution might lie, in July 1937, Konoe said, ‘I think North China is vital, particularly for our economic development.’104

78 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour The Japanese understood their material inferiority when fighting a war against the Western powers and the need to win before that difference could tell, using surprise, tenacity and Sato’s invisible coefficient, the Japanese spirit. In 1932, Ikezaki Tadakata had decried any calculus based on material factors, saying that the Japanese could ‘fight on with our bare fists if necessary’.105 Nevertheless, the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ were far from united. From 1919 to 1932, Anglo-American relations were damaged by memories of the USA’s late entry into the First World War and the USA’s decision not to join the League of Nations. British diplomats saw the threat of an alliance with the USA, and even with the USSR, as a useful lever against the Japanese; but the Americans were loath to enter any formal relationship with Britain for fear of antagonizing the Japanese, but also because they did not want to be an ally of the British Empire in Asia. In 1934, some American policy makers suspected that Britain was seeking to revive the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to protect its possessions in the Far East. Yet by the early 1930s, the Japanese Navy seemed convinced that Britain would necessarily be its future opponent, since every act of expansion by Japan would inevitably intrude upon Britain’s interests. By the mid-1930s, most Americans believed that their participation in the Great War had been a profound mistake and that a similar commitment was not to be repeated. Britain was usually seen as the cause of the USA being dragged into that war. The British were also condemned for not standing up to Hitler, and for creating an environment where fascism could thrive.106 In 1936, Roosevelt refused to lodge a protest about Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland and likened Britain’s lack of action following the annexation of Austria to a ‘Chief of Police making a deal with the leading gangsters . . . ’.107 On the other hand, Roosevelt himself took no action. The Neutrality Act of 1937 was primarily intended to keep the USA out of European wars. In Chicago on 5 October Roosevelt condemned Japan’s attack on China but was accused of trying to get involved in an Asian war to save Britain’s empire in the Far East. In 1938, A.W. Griswold’s book, Far Eastern Policy of the United States108 argued that the USA and Britain had no community of interests in Asia. A clash between the USA and Japan may have been deemed inevitable, and if that were the case, then in practical terms, the Japanese invasion of China was in some respects of strategic benefit to the USA. The USA did not send decisive assistance to the Chinese, whose precarious survival pinned down a massive Japanese army at great expense in the years before the USA’s own long-anticipated war with Japan. In 1940 its war in China consumed 40 per cent of Japan’s national budget, and 1.1 million Japanese troops were serving overseas. This made American economic pressure and military power even more effective when it was eventually applied. When war with the Western powers came, sufficient Japanese troops to invade

Grand strategy 79 Australia or India were not available – they were already committed in China, where Japan now had 2,100,000 men. There were also curious inconsistencies in the American reaction to Japanese operations in China. Even after the widely condemned attacks by Japan on Chinese cities, Japan apparently continued to receive essential war supplies from the USA;109 and by 1938, Japan was consuming 43,000 tons of 100-octane aircraft fuel from the USA for its war in China.110 Even in 1940, the British were dismayed at American sales of aviation fuel and aircraft parts to Japan.111 Despite the USA warning Britain against any deal with Japan, in 1937 Great Britain concluded that no support could be expected from the USA in the Far East in the event of a Japanese attack. Neville Chamberlain bitterly remarked, ‘It is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words.’112 The challenge was to find a way to change that, for the British Government feared that war with Japan was imminent and that Britain might stand alone. In 1938, Admiral Chatfield wrote, ‘I have no doubt that sooner or later it will be our turn to face the music.’113 The British had understood the need for a dry dock in the Far East. They considered Sydney, but over 30 years planned a massive investment in the facilities and defences of Singapore. If a serious Japanese threat were to develop, Singapore would have to hold out until the British fleet arrived. However, progress in developing Singapore in the 1920s and 1930s was disappointingly slow and there were insufficient funds to make the base large enough to take the main battle fleet. The British relief plan seemed even less credible after the London Naval Treaty imposed further restrictions on the building and replacement of warships. In 1932 the British had assessed that, in an emergency, a fleet could sail to relieve Singapore within 38 days. In 1938, Major General W.G.S. Dobbie wrote a secret appreciation of the defence of Malaya and Singapore noting that Singapore might well be attacked from Malaya; and by 1939 the commander of Singapore reckoned that he needed 556 front-line aircraft to defend the island. The time estimated for a fleet to sail to the relief of Singapore had by now risen to 180 days. In the event, there were only 158 largely obsolete British aircraft available to defend Malaya, and it took the Japanese just 70 days to capture Singapore. ‘Imperial overstretch’ was undisguisable. Yet as late as March 1939, Churchill appeared indifferent to the Japanese threat, writing to Chamberlain, ‘Consider how vain is the menace that Japan will send a fleet and army to conquer Singapore.’114 Nevertheless, the British War Cabinet took a gloomy view of prospects in the Far East. Its minute of 8 August 1940 noted that since Britain was, ‘Unable to send the fleet to the Far East . . . it must avoid (an) open clash with Japan.’ It recommended that no British action be taken if the Japanese attacked Siam and Indochina, or if Dutch possessions were attacked and the Dutch did not resist. This soon became known to the Japanese Government,115 and was reported by the Navy Minister Oikawa Koshiro at a conference on 27 December 1940.

80 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour It was clear that the British would only be sending their Grand Fleet to the Pacific in extremis, and that it was unlikely that this ‘Baltic’ fleet would have to be fought at a ‘Tsushima’. A ‘Tsushima’ would instead have to be fought against the ‘The Great White Fleet’. In May 1940, in a vain hope of American support, Churchill even invited Roosevelt to send American warships to visit Singapore, ‘to keep the Japanese dog quiet in the Pacific’.116 There seemed little hope of American intervention in Europe either, but knowing this to be vital, Churchill resolved on 18 May 1940, ‘I shall drag the United States in.’117 It was only on 29 December 1940 that Roosevelt declared to his people that the USA would support Britain’s war effort as ‘the great arsenal of democracy’,118 but that was not the same as going to war. Americans such as Henry Morgenthau were suspicious of Britain’s attempts to persuade the USA to take a tougher approach in its dealings with Japan, seeing deeper economic rivalries at stake: ‘It is an international battle between Japan, Great Britain and ourselves, and China is the bone in the middle.’119 Senator Wheeler noted that fighting Japan would simply be ‘undertaking to preserve the British domination of Asia’.120 In May 1941, a Gallup Poll showed 79 per cent of the American people were against entering the war voluntarily. Even at Placentia Bay in August 1941, the USA would not give Britain an undertaking to go to war in the event of a Japanese move southwards. This reluctance contrasted with the USA’s readiness to engage the German Navy in the Atlantic. German U-boats attacked American ships, but not on orders from above, and the US Navy retaliated.121 In July 1941, Roosevelt issued a ‘shoot on sight’ directive to attack German U-boats. Admiral King’s Operation Order 6–41 of 19 July 1941 directed the US Navy to attack any German or Italian ship within 100 miles of an American-escorted convoy, in effect declaring war on Germany over 4 months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Nevertheless, it seems that Roosevelt did all he could to ensure that clashes with the German Navy were avoided.122 Had the US Navy actually attacked German U-boats, then Japan would have been required under the terms of the Tripartite Pact to come to Germany’s aid, and Pearl Harbour would probably have been placed on a high state of alert. As it was, Kimmel was not informed of King’s directive.123 In 1893, Mahan remarked upon an American inclination to express sympathy for the suffering of other nations but to take no practical action to prevent it until ‘the interests of the United States as a nation’ were at stake.124 From a practical American perspective, the USA’s entry into the First and Second World Wars were both at times when its opponents had expended much of their capacities. They also occurred when its future allies were approaching exhaustion and the American economy was benefiting from their efforts, ensuring that the USA that would be the true, in some respects sole, victor and the primary arbiter of the peace, as it had been at

Grand strategy 81 Portsmouth in 1905 and at Versailles in 1919. The strategy of combining the maximum power of decision, economic growth and the minimum expenditure of lives proved a highly effective one for the USA in the twentieth century. While Christopher Thorne125 has pointed out the tensions in AngloAmerican relations in the pre-war years, Greg Kennedy126 has shown that behind the public pronouncements, close working relationships developed between the militaries of the two countries, which stood them in good stead when war came. At heart, Roosevelt saw the survival of Britain and its interests as inseparable from those of the USA. He feared that the British fleet might fall into German hands, pitting the might of all Europe’s navies and Japan’s against the US Navy, standing alone. Rather, he saw the Royal Navy as a future, junior partner of the US Navy in policing the world. Roosevelt had to be mindful of and manage isolationist and Anglophobic public opinion, but saw the necessity of preparing for war with Britain as an ally. Nevertheless, it was only from 1936 that Roosevelt started to persuade American public opinion of the need to engage with the world’s problems, especially in the Far East. At the same time he permitted closer relationships between the British and American navies which had a long tradition of cooperation in the Pacific. The balance of power in the Far East was, however, complex for both Britain and the USA wanted to use Japanese imperialism to contain the USSR, yet did not want it to crush China. The two nations had a parallel, not a joint relationship in the Far East and they shared little common ground on European policy. One was isolationist by instinct and the other deeply committed to empire. There may have been no plans to fight together in the Pacific, but there was a clear understanding as to how a war would be fought. The alliance was not so much the result of any sense of shared values, but rather a manifestation of the balance of power at work in satisfying British and American interests in the face of the threat from Japan. Despite its lingering isolationism, the USA’s determination to confront an expansionist Japan may well have precipitated war in the Pacific. It was widely accepted by American planners that cutting off oil supplies to the Japanese would precipitate their invasion of the Dutch East Indies. In 1938, Admiral H.E. Yarnell recommended to Roosevelt that the USA and its allies ‘strangle’ Japan to death by denying it raw materials. Admiral Leahy, Chief of US Naval Operations had earlier proposed a plan to blockade Japan, by which after three months ‘Japan will be broken economically.’127 In the event, the USA, Britain and the Netherlands cut off oil supplies to Japan between 25 and 27 July 1941.128 It has also been argued that American plans, framed by Secretary Morgenthau and Chennault, the American air adviser to the Chinese, to bomb Japan into submission provoked the Japanese to pre-empt this action by attacking Pearl Harbour.129 On 14 November 1941, General Marshall briefed the press that the USA was

82 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour planning an offensive war against Japan, and this was leaked to the New York Times, which published the story on 19 November 1941.130 Churchill was anxious that if the USSR were knocked out in 1942, while Britain still ‘stood alone’, then Britain’s situation would become unsustainable. He hoped for salvation through the eventual joining of the English-speaking peoples; and in 1941 there was discussion of how Britons and Americans might share civic rights in each other’s countries. The entry of the USA into the war in any way possible became Britain’s highest priority; and by November 1941 Britain had stated that it would accept American leadership in a future war in the Pacific.131 When the British Ambassador to Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, wrote a scathing account of the incompetence of the final American negotiations with Japan, Churchill expressed surprise that Craigie saw the outcome as a disaster – for him it was a blessing that would lead Japan to war. By November 1941, Britain had agreed to support the USA if it was attacked by the Japanese, but this undertaking was not reciprocated. The USA calculated that the British had no option but to offer unconditional support, while the USA did not need to. On 28 November 1941, the US Secretary of State for War, Stimson, did acknowledge that if the Japanese invaded Siam and if the British fought, the Americans would have to as well. On the other hand, Cordell Hull later told Admiral Stark that if the Japanese had avoided attacking American possessions, the USA might not have fought them.132 It seems that it was only with a causal pledge by Roosevelt in the first week of December 1941 that the USA guaranteed cooperation with Britain in the Far East should Japan attack; but if such assurances were made, they were not passed down the American chain of command. On 7 December 1941, Churchill told the American Ambassador, John Winant, that Britain would declare war on Japan if it attacked the USA. He asked if the USA would declare war on Japan if it attacked Britain, and Winant replied correctly, but unhelpfully, that that would be up to Congress.133 On hearing news of the attack on Pearl Harbour on the radio, Churchill’s first words were, ‘We shall declare war on Japan.’ An alarmed Winant sought to restrain Churchill, ‘Good God, you can’t declare war on a radio announcement.’134 Yet on the day of the attack, the USA and Britain were de facto allies only against Japan, for Roosevelt made no public mention of war with Germany. Churchill’s hopes were only to be fulfilled thanks to Hitler’s declaration of war135 on the USA on 11 December.136 Many in Japan and the West believed that the inimical ideologies of Japan and the USSR probably made war between them unavoidable. Japan had been reluctant to attack in the Far East lest the USSR ally itself with Europe’s imperial powers and the USA against it while it was already heavily engaged in China.137 In March 1941, besides cementing relations with Germany, the Japanese secured a neutrality treaty with the USSR. On 12 April 1941, Matsuoka even offered Stalin Karachi as a warm-water

Grand strategy 83 port.138 Stalin characterized the issue in racial and cultural terms, assuring the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka Yosuke, that ‘We are both Asiatics, Japan can now move south.’139 The possibility of a German attack on the USSR soon became clear, however, and Germany agreed that should it go to war with the USSR, the best assistance Japan could provide would be to attack the British in Singapore. On 27 May 1941, the Japanese told the Germans that they would reserve their position in the event of war between the Axis and the USSR, evidently concerned about creating further expensive commitments on the Asian mainland. Stalin’s reaction to the German invasion of June 1941 was one of shock, similar to the effect created by the attacks on Port Arthur and Pearl Harbour. The collapse of the USSR soon seemed inevitable. Hitler urged the Japanese to join in its destruction before embarking together on the great battle between the continents, the battle with the USA. The strength of Soviet resistance at Smolensk in late July made the Japanese cautious and on 9 August 1941, the Japanese decided not to intervene in the German–Soviet war.140 On the other hand, on 15 August 1941, Germany did offer to declare war on the USA if Japan attacked it.141 From June 1941, the USSR was ‘fixed’ by Germany, and although the USSR would now be Japan’s enemy, it was no longer regarded as such a serious threat to Japanese ambitions. The USSR was indeed now Britain’s ally, but this carried less weight than the earlier unfulfilled threat of an alliance of Britain with an unfettered USSR. Japan was no longer deterred and had a freer hand. On the eve of world war, against this background of real politik, the Japanese continued to regard race as a substantial factor in their calculations. Hara Yoshimichi, President of the Privy Council, speaking at the Imperial Conference on 5 November 1941, noted that Great Britain, Germany and the United States, all had populations which [B]elong to the White race . . . Hitler has said that the Japanese are a second class race . . . I fear that if Japan begins a war against the United States and Great Britain, Great Britain, Germany and the United States will come to terms, leaving Japan by herself . . . hatred of the Yellow race might shift the hatred now being directed against Germany to Japan . . . We must give serious considerations to race relations and exercise constant care to avoid being surrounded by the entire Aryan race.142 He went on to note the historical importance of not giving in to American pressure: ‘If we were to give in, we would give up in one stroke, not only our gains in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, but also the benefits of the Manchurian Incident’.143 The paradoxes and confusions about what these events meant in cultural terms were troubling but were made no clearer by war. Just before the

84 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour attack on Pearl Harbour, one Japanese commentator sought to ‘square this circle’, defining Japan’s task as to ‘Asianize the Europeanization of Asia’.144 Of the attack on Pearl Harbour, Okuna Takao enthused that All the feelings of inferiority of a coloured people from a backward country, towards White people from the developed world, disappeared in that one blow . . . never in our history had we Japanese felt such pride in ourselves as a race as we did then.145 Some sought refuge in approaches that would circumvent the inevitable problems of materiel inferiority – by ignoring them. At a conference in Kyoto in July 1942 scholars identified ‘modernity’ as an essentially European phenomenon and something to be overcome by the Orient. In a sense, Shintoism, Bushido and Fascism had been combined in a ‘nativist revolt’ by the ‘spiritual’ Orient against the materialism of the Occident,146 at least in the minds of some Japanese, but ironically using the tools of Western modernity to stage it. Four years later in the face of catastrophe, the Japanese naval commander on Iwo Jima, Admiral Ichimaru, wrote a letter to President Roosevelt informing him that ‘Only brute force rules the world’; and Japanese propaganda claimed that the USA in battle had ‘no spiritual incentive and relied upon material superiority’.147 Even in defeat some Japanese hoped that the ‘spirit’ of the Orient might yet prevail because of it, rather as some Russians in 1905 had grimly welcomed their spiritual refreshment through their own bloodshed. As the war came to a close, some philosophers at Kyoto University saw Japan’s impending collapse as an opportunity to restore traditional values.

5

Military strategy The paradox of inevitability and surprise

From 1907 to 1940, Japan’s naval strategy was essentially based on a plan of ‘interception and attrition’. Following the Washington Conference, the Japanese Navy’s mission was to secure command of the Western Pacific, and as Japan’s strategy became more offensive, the location of the planned ‘decisive battle’, the next Tsushima, moved further and further east, the conditions for success having been set by preliminary operations. Yet the force ratios originally set for what was still a defensive strategy had scarcely changed. The Japanese Army faced even worse problems than did the Navy. Many conservative officers rejected the modernization of the Japanese Army in the 1920s, because Japan was a relatively poor country and could not expect to win a war based on any material calculus. General Uehara doubted that Japan even needed a technologically modern army to defeat China or the USSR. Throughout the 1920s, Japanese military colleges taught the primacy of tactics over strategy;1 and in 1928, the General Staff revived the Principles of Command which stressed the simple concept of an all-out offensive and the supreme importance of surprise attack and fighting spirit – 1904 and 1914, refought. The role of spiritual elements was emphasized, and some even argued that strong firepower was inhuman.2 They were not alone. In the West after the shock of the First World War there was also a growing rejection of ‘materialism’ and the ‘soul-killing technology’ of science which was seen in some way to have inspired it. The Japanese strategy of 1941 would be similar to that of 1904, as would the Japanese tactical approach – high morale, surprise, well-considered use of ground and costly bayonet assaults. Every Japanese infantry manual from 1909 to 1945 stressed the role of the offensive, and training included ‘spiritual education’ in the certainty of victory, in loyalty, tradition, duty and esprit de corps. The eventual triumph of new offensive tactics and technologies in 1918, combined with the imperative to avoid a long war of attrition, encouraged Germany to adopt an offensive strategy in the 1930s and to develop further the tactical and operational means to prosecute it using tanks linked to close air support by radio. The Japanese also sought to adapt their model

86 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour to exploit these offensive technologies, albeit on a more modest scale, but with more emphasis on amphibious-air than land–air operations, ‘maritime Blitzkrieg’. Amphibious concepts had developed rapidly after 1914 when the Japanese had carried out wide-ranging operations in the Pacific to seize German islands. It was largely as a result of this experience that in 1941–2 the Japanese were able to mount the largest amphibious operations yet seen.3 In land operations, however, the Japanese were far from innovative, sticking to what they believed to be the traditional key to success – determination and ‘spiritual’ factors. These values, especially when expressed in hand-to-hand combat at night, seemed to have been vindicated in action against the Chinese in the late 1930s, and more significantly when matched against superior Soviet firepower in a surprise night attack at Lake Khasan on 31 July 1938. The Japanese attacked again at Khalkhin-Gol in June 1939, but were repulsed by Soviet and Mongolian forces led by General G. Zhukov. The clash was significant in that it persuaded the Japanese to avoid further clashes with the USSR and to seek softer targets for territorial expansion further to the south and east. Nevertheless, the Japanese’s confidence in their martial prowess, and belief in shock-action to launch a campaign, remained undimmed; but they would prove a costly combination after 1941. Throughout the 1930s, Japanese officers searched for alternatives to a war of attrition; they studied how they might achieve victory with a single pre-emptive and decisive blow. In the West, the military lessons of the Russo-Japanese War seemed outmoded by the 1930s, relative to those of the First World War and in comparison to the new opportunities offered by mechanization and armoured warfare. In the Japanese mind, however, they remained entirely relevant and a model for strategic planning. If war was to be fought, Japan needed a quick success in the Far East, neutralizing American power in the region, forcing it to operate at great distances across the Pacific Ocean, rather as the great land mass of Siberia had acted as an obstacle to the Russians in 1904–5. Such a plan offered the possibility of negating the adverse correlation of materiel;4 but it depended upon the USA losing its political resolve and agreeing to negotiate.5 Encouraging new evidence was soon available to support these ideas. The success of Germany’s campaign in France in May 1940 reinforced the view that speed and surprise could offer disproportionate advantages; and Germany’s need for quick victories over the massive forces of the USSR in the summer of 1941 followed the same logic as Japan’s in 1904. This was again confirmed as the model for a future campaign in the Asia-Pacific theatre. Disturbing flaws in this concept became apparent by the end of 1941; but by then Japan had committed itself to its own ‘BARBAROSSA’ and was to suffer a similar fate to the Germans’, in a prolonged war of attrition in which its opponent had the materiel advantage.6 Prince Fushimi, Chief of the Japanese Naval Staff advised the Emperor that it would be hard to achieve successes such as those obtained against the

Military strategy 87 Russians in 1905 and that ‘war with the United States must be avoided’.7 The Japanese Navy’s exercises of spring 1940 showed that Japan had no chance of winning a war; but neither the Navy Minister nor the Naval Chief of Staff told the Japanese Government or the Army.8 From September 1940, the Japanese Navy’s opposition to war with the USA became marginalized by the Army’s more aggressive position, and naval planners turned their attention to how such a war might be won. The implications of the Asia-Pacific strategic conundrum were considered in remarkable and visionary detail by the British journalist and secret agent Hector Bywater, over the 20 years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbour. His first book, Sea Power in the Pacific, was published in 1921 and became required reading for all senior Japanese naval officers at the Imperial Naval Academy and the Japanese Naval War College. Under the Washington Treaty, the USA agreed not to build any new defences on islands in the Western Pacific if the Japanese scrapped some ships. Bywater saw this to be to Japan’s advantage and recommended that the USA build bases to ensure that it could support an island-hopping campaign, which he saw to be the key to eventual American success after a Japanese attack. Bywater debated his points with F.D. Roosevelt, but the latter maintained that the USA and Japan were too geographically removed from each other to go to war. Partly in response to Roosevelt’s scepticism, Bywater published a larger work in 1925, The Great Pacific War.9 This analysed strategy in the Pacific, and received even more international attention. Bywater’s scenario began with a Japanese occupation of China in 1930, and the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet, but ended with American victory, following a campaign from Hawaii, via Truk to the Philippines. Bywater’s new work was not popular with those in the USA involved in framing US–Japanese policy. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) saw merit in Bywater’s approach, but received no support. There had been no change in the American War Plan ORANGE since 1917, and there were no plans to build up bases in the Pacific. In the event of trouble, the US fleet would sail directly to the Philippines. Bywater regarded this as flawed, and saw an amphibious ‘island-hopping’ campaign through the South-East Pacific as the best solution. The Japanese noted Bywater’s work but felt the ending was too pessimistic, for many believed that Japan could win. Japanese planning since 1907 had been based on drawing the American fleet out into the seas off Japan and destroying it in a traditional major fleet action. Yamamoto studied Bywater’s works while the naval attaché in Washington DC from 1926–8, and was inspired to devise a new approach. In 1928, he lectured on a possible war between Japan and the USA, drawing on Bywater’s ideas, maintaining that Japan would lose if it based its plan on defence. On 3 December 1934, Bywater discussed his ideas with Yamamoto at the latter’s suite at Grosvenor House in London, where he was staying as a delegate at the Naval Conference. The commander of the subsequent air attack on

88 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour Pearl Harbour, Fuchida Mitsuo, also claimed that Bywater’s books had influenced Japanese strategy. It was agreed that maintaining the military and political initiative was essential if such a strategy was to succeed. In 1934, a lecturer at the Japanese Imperial War College addressed a group of senior officers attending a secret course, saying that in future wars Japan would shorten the preliminary negotiating period to prevent its opponent from seizing the initiative. Accordingly, between 1935 and 1941 the idea of a pre-emptive decisive battle at Pearl Harbour took shape, under Minoru Genda, directed by Yamamoto. Even though this marked a change to earlier plans, it was still steeped in the Japanese experience of 1904–5, and inspiration came from some unexpected quarters. The irony was that Yamamoto, the architect and chief executor of the wounding blow at Pearl Harbour, opposed going to war with the USA on the pragmatic grounds that Japan would most likely lose. He admired the preparation and judgement shown by the Japanese Command in 1905 in breaking off its war and seeking peace at a time when their forces seemed triumphant. He fretted that this might not be achieved against the Allies, for the Japanese people were unlikely to accept a compromise while their forces were successful; by the time they might accept a deal, the Americans probably would not, had they ever been inclined to, which was improbable. Apocalypse, rather than negotiation, seemed the more likely outcome. Yamamoto noted that should Japan opt for war, half measures would fail and the object should be not merely the seizure of some islands in the Pacific and some negotiated settlement, but an American capitulation in the White House. He wondered if Japan’s leaders comprehended the sacrifices that such a favourable outcome would require. He himself did not believe it was possible, given the balance of resources.10 The belief in spirit over technology was widespread, even though men like Yamamoto and General Yamashita Tomoyuki were well informed about the material resources and technologies of the West. Yamamoto had spent years in the USA and had seen much of its industrial capacity. Yamashita visited Germany in December 1940 and reported that Britain could not defeat Germany, and that the USA would not be ready to fight an Axis of Germany, Italy and Japan until 1944. However, by the time of his return to Japan early in 1941, he reported on the power and efficiency of Western armaments industries, the importance of airpower and the problems that Germany was having in defeating Britain. He warned members of his delegation not to encourage any idea of going to war with Britain and the USA. Yet Japanese observers who noted the resilience of London under air attack, and warned not to dismiss British power, were regarded as yet more who had had their ‘heads turned by the West’.11 The Japanese were amazed at the early German victories in Europe, and decided that they must join in to gain its benefits before it was over. Once Japan was at war, the

Military strategy 89 fundamentals could not be avoided. Yamamoto described it as a competition between Japanese discipline and American technology.12 Yamamoto believed that the only hope was to inflict such early destruction that it would have a decisive effect on the morale of the US Navy and the American people.13 On 11 October 1941, he wrote, ‘I find my present position extremely odd – obliged to make up my mind to pursue unswervingly, a course that is precisely the opposite of my personal views. Perhaps this, too, is the will of Heaven.’14 As Japan was set on a course for war, Yamamoto noted, Now that things have come to this pass, I’ll throw everything I have into the fight, I expect to die in battle on board the Nagato.15 By that time, I imagine, Tokyo will be set on fire at least three times and Japan reduced to a pitiful state . . . I don’t like it, but there is no going back now.16 Yamamoto’s plan called for a decisive early attack at Pearl Harbour and the interception of an American fleet, before it could come to the relief of American Pacific island bases. It would be defeated in a major fleet action, his own ‘Trafalgar’ and second ‘Tsushima’. The problem was, however, that the attack on Pearl Harbour was itself intended to be the decisive blow, when the chances of it actually being so were more a matter of political judgement about the psychology of the American response than any purely military calculus. The ‘decisive’ Pearl Harbour operation might prove a sudden and shocking blow, as was the attack on Port Arthur; but it was unlikely to be decisive in the sense that Tsushima was.17 Tsushima caught Russia at the point where it could not sustain the war politically and had no immediate means of replacing its fleet. Although Russia remained extremely powerful and its land forces were far from expended or beaten, by Spring 1905 it was approaching its ‘culminating point’ strategically, on the home front, if not in the field. In a sense, Togo’s knockout blow came after a year of material and psychological attrition against a failing state. By comparison, in 1941, the USA had not yet begun to fight, had massive resources and the will to apply them. Yamamoto’s painful blow merely wakened the ‘sleeping giant’. The miscalculation was that the USA would negotiate, as the Russians had in 1905 with American encouragement.18 The attacks on Pearl Harbour were indeed as decisive in their way as the Battle of Tsushima, but only in as much as they ensured that the USA was bound to apply its full power against Japan in a war which Japan could not be expected to win. It was not that the concept of a knockout blow was invalid, or that Tsushima was a defective model, it was just that Pearl Harbour was not going to be a Tsushima in terms of timing or possible decisive scale. If anything this was a tribute to Togo’s victory, immaculate in timing and proportion. In the mid-1940s, Chihaya Masataka wrote a devastating critique of Japanese strategy and tactics.19 He criticized the Japanese character and

90 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour cultural approach to complex strategic issues, holding these to be responsible in large part for Japan’s downfall. He saw an emotional attachment to the model of Tsushima, the single decisive battle, as an alibi for rigorous planning and analysis, for success in such a sudden blow apparently obviated the requirement for all other uncomfortable considerations, ones fraught with internal political complexity and inter-Service rivalries. Chihaya Masataka maintained that it was related characteristics such as reckless impatience, delusional thinking, short-sightedness and deficiency in endurance which blighted Japanese endeavours throughout the war: ‘The great defect of the Japanese character is the lack of cooperative spirit.’20 Chihaya Masataka claimed that the prevailing group dynamic of the Japanese Navy leadership was one in which individuality was ‘engulfed . . . absorbed and . . . annihilated . . . the Navy drifted into war by inertia’.21 Chihaya Masataka complained that Japan did not make adequate assessments of American power; that it did not study its enemies, the American and British armies;22 and that its institutions were not capable of coherent and cohesive action but were plagued by individualism. This undermined cooperation in what would have to be a great and complex piece of teamwork. He attributed to the Allies, overgenerously, great unity of purpose and actions, which the Japanese could not match. He claimed that the Japanese underestimated the capacity of the ‘materialistic’ and ‘spiritually degenerate’ Americans, believing that they could neither stand up for an ideal such as the liberty which they proclaimed nor sacrifice their individuality in heroism in death. This analysis may seem surprising, for it was displays of collective patriotism, cohesion, the capacity for self-sacrifice and team spirit, certainly at the tactical level, that so often impressed Japan’s enemies, as they had in 1904–5. According to Chihaya Masataka, there was much in Oriental fable and temperament to explain Japanese action ‘Let us seek life in death itself.’23 That Japan’s strategic miscalculation in 1941 was not appreciated at the time, except by a few such as Yamamoto, does indeed seem to validate Chihaya Masataka’s criticism. Yet, in a sense it was appreciated, and accepted, in a strategic calculation which was indeed very ‘Japanese’. Japan had no clear expectation of victory, it merely saw the opportunity to attack at Pearl Harbour as the only possible course in what appeared to be a hopeless strategic predicament. It accepted the risk, and there was a clear understanding of that risk. Tojo argued, When hardship comes, the people will gird up their loins. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, we took our stand with no prospect of victory, and that was the situation for one year, from the Battle of the Yalu River. Yet we won.24 As Tojo explained, ‘Sometimes people have to shut their eyes and take the plunge.’25

Military strategy 91 The decision-making process which accepted such risks may be questioned, but given its historical and cultural perspective, it seemed that Japan’s only alternative would have been to accept that it was not a great power like Western nations, had no right to its own empire and that it was a second-class nation for essentially racial and cultural reasons. Given the determination not to give up its new-found status, it did indeed risk all on a ‘spin of the wheel’, and was clear about the implications, just as it had accepted the equal odds on defeat in 1904. Yamamoto ‘accepted his fate’ like any ancient Japanese hero and made a whole-hearted commitment to his course of action once the decision to fight had been made. At the same time, Yamamoto would probably have agreed with Clausewitz’s conviction that ‘In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.’26 As an inveterate gambler, he was well equipped by temperament to follow his chosen course.27 As Yamamoto had foreseen, the challenge for Japan, once committed, was how to replicate the timing of 1905 and end the war quickly after initial, early and relatively easy successes, in this case after seizing the rich resources of South-East Asia. On the eve of Japan’s attack on the USA, Hara Yoshimichi maintained that [W]e cannot avoid a long-term war this time, but I believe that we must somehow get around this and bring about an early settlement. In order to do this, we will need to start thinking now about how to end the war.28 Staff officers noted Yamamoto’s irritation and depression, and like him understood that ‘To end a war while it’s going favourably for ones own side requires a different, special kind of effort. Even the Russo-Japanese War was only brought to a favourable conclusion with great difficulty.’29 Japanese success made Yamamoto’s desire to seek peace politically impossible for both sides, and thus ultimately sealed Japan’s fate. The Battle of Midway could be seen as Yamamoto’s attempt at a second victory that would set the conditions for an elusive peace deal, but it was not to be. The Americans trod a similar path of intellectual exploration in this novel strategic circumstance. Nevertheless, prior to 1904, the Russians rather than the Japanese seemed the most likely threat to American interests. The NWC ‘Problem of 1902’ had the USA in alliance with Britain and Japan fighting Russia in a war which, 50 years too early, reached stalemate in Korea on the 38th Parallel. The first planning study at the US Army War College (AWC) which contemplated war with Germany and Japan was conducted in 1904. The USA became even more apprehensive after Japanese victory in 1905, given that Japan was closer to the USA’s newly acquired Pacific possessions than it was itself. In 1906, without a Panama Canal, NWC exercises envisaged the US fleet sailing via the Suez Canal to meet a fresh Japanese fleet, as Russia’s had had

92 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour to do the year before. In August 1907 Roosevelt maintained that ‘The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous.’30 The voyage and travails of the ‘Great White Fleet’s’ friendly visit to Japan in 1908, made possible only by chartering many foreign support ships, revealed the hazards of the American predicament in the Far East. An American fleet arriving in the Philippines would have no coal or base from which to operate. By the late 1930s Japan had become the ‘inevitable enemy’. The US Navy became so familiar with the scenario that it became the ‘American mission’ to find a way of dealing with an enemy who was likely to hold local naval superiority in the area of the Philippines and possess fortified bases in the Caroline, Mariana and Marshall Islands, cutting across American lines of communications. This was analogous to the Russian problem in 1904, of how to hold on in the remote Far East before its massive materiel superiority could be brought to bear. The outlook was bleak, and by 1911 Japan had been codified as opponent ORANGE in US naval planning. Britain’s thinking on imperial defence was studied with care by the US Navy as if it were almost a model for its own analyses, and Britain (RED), was the opponent of choice for the most demanding war games. By the early 1930s, awe of Britain’s power had evaporated and the US Navy could meet the Royal Navy on equal terms; but that was not to say that the USA could defend its interests in the Pacific against the rising power of Japan. In 1932, the former chief of staff of the US Army, Peyton March, said that the US military was ‘impotent’; in 1938, the US War Department reported that USA did not have a single complete division.31 US rearmament effectively only began on 14 November 1938 when President Roosevelt initiated a massive aircraft construction plan. Fortunately for the USA, much of the thinking on how best to employ the impending flow of military might had already been conducted at its war colleges, and it was familiar to most of those who would lead its forces after 1941. In 1934, AWC planners considered war against Japan, and in subsequent years, war against a combination of Germany and Japan. It was assumed that Japan would strike without a declaration of war and that the Philippines would soon be lost. An interesting aspect of the 1934 planning was the minority report that called for a generous peace with a defeated Japan, in the light of what was regarded as the excessively harsh terms imposed on Germany after 1918, and the vacuum that a crushed Japan would leave to be filled by the USSR. A rebuilt Japan, modelled on the commercially powerful, but militarily weak Netherlands, seemed a possibility. The census of Hawaii of 1920 showed that of a population of 255,912, 109,274 were Japanese. By the 1930s there was concern about the loyalty of the now 121,000 residents of Japanese descent. In 1936, President Roosevelt received reports that Japanese Americans in Honolulu often

Military strategy 93 greeted and entertained crew members of visiting Japanese merchant ships. He wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations, One obvious thought occurs to me – that every Japanese citizen or non-citizen on the Island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble.32 Planning of 1937 noted that dependencies of the United States with a population composed largely of coloured, oriental and mixed races could not be depended upon to assist in the event of war against a foreign power. It was also noted in 1934 that Australia would look primarily to the US Navy rather than to the British Royal Navy for its security. Over the years, critical perceptive insights emerged in AWC planning that would indeed be significant factors in the coming war with Japan. For example, planning in 1935 noted that the Japanese ‘generally begin their wars by surprise attacks before there is any declaration of war’; however, it went on to conclude that Japan would probably adopt a defensive strategy.33 That year the AWC also studied the prospect of the USA and its allies fighting a German–Japanese alliance. While Europe was seen to be the priority, it was deemed essential that a strong naval force be stationed in the Pacific. The Americans had the same problem with the Philippines as the Russians had had with Port Arthur, the Germans with Tsingtao, the Dutch with the East Indies and the British with Hong Kong and Singapore. All of these fell to the Japanese in various wars in similar ways and by a similar logic. These bases could be either a source of power, or a lethal and expensive vulnerability; it was hard for policy makers to decide which, and to invest accordingly. There was no hope of holding such ‘imperial’ possessions without huge expenditure on dockyards and fortresses, yet such vast expense, like that of the British at Wei-hai-wei, the lease for which was voluntarily surrendered after the Washington Conference in 1922, could prove to be a self-defeating waste of money, like the walls of Renaissance Sienna, merely making the potential loss the more grievous. The Philippines were 9,000 miles from the continental USA, a forward deployment offering the Japanese a tempting weakness to exploit. Hawaii was a powerful base and far removed from the Japanese, but even this might prove vulnerable. If the Philippines had to be held, the issue was for how long, and whether a relieving force would be able to reach it in time. This led the Americans into calculations similar to those of the British to save Singapore. From 1898 to 1941, the USA failed to fortify the Philippines adequately, even though it was regarded as the key to early success or failure in a war

94 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour with Japan, a war which seemed increasingly inevitable. After the Russo-Japanese War, the Americans planned to build a base at Subic Bay; and this ‘Port Arthur’ would be tasked to hold out for 3 months until America’s ‘Baltic Fleet’ from the Atlantic could sail to the rescue. Mahan’s reaction to this plan was, ‘That we should have a stronghold impregnable as Port Arthur . . . Absit omen’.34 In 1907 the US Joint Board recognized the need for the Philippines to hold out until reinforcements could arrive; but by 1908 the balance of investment had been switched to Hawaii, and in 1919, Captain H.E. Yarnell, a US Navy planner, predicted the loss of the Philippines and the capture of its garrison. From 1914–20, it was a working assumption at the NWC that the Philippines could not be held against a Japanese invasion. The Washington Conference in effect gave Japan naval dominance of the Western Pacific in return for agreeing to work with American financiers to develop China. In 1921–2, Captain D.W. Knox claimed that the USA had thereby given up ‘all chances of defending the Philippines’.35 The issue of the Philippines continued to dog planning efforts. AWC planning for 1936 concluded that ‘We did not feel that there need be any great apprehension as to the security of our West Coast, the Hawaiian Islands or the Panama Canal. The Philippines, of course, we expected would be overrun by Japan very shortly.’36 Yet in a letter to General H.A. Drum, commanding the Hawaiian Department, on 25 July 1936, General Douglas MacArthur observed complacently that ‘The United States can look with perfect serenity upon the developments in the Pacific situation in the decades to come.’37 The planners were more realistic. If the garrison of the Philippines could hold out, victory would be cheaper and quicker; but if it couldn’t, then the slow and painful process of establishing bases in a steady advance across the Pacific seemed inevitable. This was the accepted view at the NWC from 1933, and at the AWC from 1939. The AWC study of 1938 envisaged a bold thrust to the Philippines to fight an early decisive battle, but planning thereafter directed that there should instead be a methodical island-hopping campaign. The expectation in the late 1930s was that the Philippines would receive independence in 1946, and this complicated American calculations about heavy expenditure on bases that would soon be handed over. In the event, American bases in the Philippines would remain until 1992. Some at the AWC looked for a way around the problem, advocating the construction of ‘a Guantanamo at Dumanquilas Bay and making it an American Hong Kong’,38 on the grounds that Congress would not fund a purely military base, but that the US Navy could use a commercial base in the event of war. In practice, over 40 years, little was done to make Manila defensible. Some saw the US garrison in the Philippines as a liability rather than an asset. Major (later General) Lawton Collins observed in 1939, ‘When we consider the actual situation in the Philippines today, it seems to me nothing

Military strategy 95 short of a crime that the Army and Navy let themselves get into the hole we are in the Philippines.’39 He noted that Manila and Olangapo were indefensible and that millions of dollars had been poured into Corregidor, which all agreed could not be held. Major General J.L. DeWitt, Commandant of the AWC believed that the USA would pay heavily for its failure to fortify the Philippines. He maintained that after independence in 1946, the Philippines would lie within the Japanese political sphere of influence, not the USA’s – ‘I don’t think we as a nation can depend on them after 1946.’40 General J.M. Wainwright, who had contributed to the AWC planning study of 1934 and who was to surrender the Philippines in 1942, wrote to his daughter on 17 August 1941, ‘The P.A. (Philippines Army) troops are not well-trained and so I will have a job getting them ready to fight.’41 B.G. Chynoweth, who assumed command of a Philippine Army division shortly before the outbreak of war, described the situation as hopeless and that ‘MacArthur’s army was mostly a political myth’. He claimed that MacArthur was ‘lazy, shiftless, frivolous, uncommunicative and uncooperative . . . and a supreme emotional actor’.42 AWC planning of 1938 estimated that the Japanese would find it hard to take and hold Hawaii, and would therefore go on the defensive having taken Guam and the Philippines, fighting a long and expensive war of attrition lasting 3 years. The US Navy estimate was that it would take no less than 4 years to defeat Japan. Contemporaneous Japanese logic was that Japan could not fight such a war of attrition which it was doomed to lose, and that it would have to strike a painful enough blow to make success appear too expensive for the USA, which would seek a negotiated settlement – similar analysis, but with opposite concluding assumptions. There were other contrasting expectations closer to home. The American public expected rapid success, yet there was only a remote chance of accomplishing it. This caused some planners to suggest the need for allies, most probably either the USSR or Britain. Some have criticized the failure of the US military, which had clearly identified the USA’s strategic dilemmas, to communicate these to the American public, or rather the failure of their political masters to do so. Ultimately, the obstacle to dealing with the Japanese threat and securing the commensurate funding was American isolationism, often expressed as Anglophobia and opposition to European imperialism in general. It was widely accepted up to December 1941, not least in AWC planning, that ‘War with Japan is not probable in the immediate future, [but] war with Japan is ultimately inevitable.’43 When war came, Japan would take advantage of strategic and tactical surprise and seize the Philippines and Guam. Ironically, the US military could describe in advance the Japanese war plan of 1941, almost exactly, as the AWC did in 1939, and deem war with Japan to be inevitable, and note that the element of surprise would be at the heart of Japanese planning. The moment when Japan would attack

96 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour was predicted intellectually by Major General J.L. DeWitt, Commandant of the AWC in 1939, as the moment when ‘economic pressure on Japan . . . is going to bring on a world war right away’. Thomas Handy, who had been on a planning team at the AWC in 1935, and spent most of the Second World War in the War Plans Division, noted after the war that the Japanese had little choice. If they had to jump us, what could have been a better time? You see, the war in Europe was going very well for the Germans . . . we practically told the Japanese to give up their ambitions in Asia, just like if some body told us to give up ours in America.44 Clearly he shared the concerns of Tasker Bliss, the President of the AWC, who had noted in 1904 that an extended Monroe Doctrine would be the most probable cause of the future wars which the USA would fight. For the US Navy’s part, the notion of a decisive fleet engagement, a Trafalgar, was as enticing as it was to the Japanese, and as the dream of a Vernichtungschlag ‘Cannae’ was to the German General Staff. The US Navy planned consistently throughout the 1920s and 1930s to fight an American Trafalgar, even though its preparations often had the unfortunate appearance of another ‘Jutland’.45 Subsequently, some in the US Navy fretted that the Battle of Midway and the escape of the Japanese fleet was indeed in some way the US Navy’s Jutland, and not the Trafalgar that they also hoped for. Even the Battle of Leyte Gulf brought disappointment, but with the same consolation as Jutland, that the enemy’s sea power had effectively been broken, even if his fleet had not been destroyed.

6

Tactics and technology Novelty repeated

The early twentieth century was a period of speculation and visionary thinking about warfare. In 1906, N. Stern’s Die Eroberung der Luft had envisaged aircraft technology as a force for good, binding nations together in peace, while others such as Paul Scheerbart, with his Die Entwicklung der Luftmilitarismus und die Auflösung der Europaeischen Landheere, Festungen and Seeflotten of 1909, had seen aerial militarism as so terrifying that it would lead to the dissolution of armies and navies. The Frenchman, Ferdinand Ferber, believed that aircraft would prove very effective in war, while the German, Wilhelm Kress believed that their frightfulness would help to deter conflict.1 In 1908, H.G. Wells published The War in the Air which envisaged an airborne armada of German Drachenflieger attacking the USA. This force determined the outcome of a great naval battle by destroying the American Dreadnoughts with bombs, and went on to leave New York a ‘furnace of crimson flames, from which there was no escape’.2 The notion that aircraft might give a nation such a first strike capability was mooted in practical terms by Helmut von Moltke. On 24 December 1912, he told the War Ministry that In the newest Z-ships we possess a weapon that is far superior to all similar ones of our opponents and that cannot be imitated in the foreseeable future if we work energetically to perfect it. Its speediest development as a weapon is required to enable us, at the beginning of a war, to strike a first and telling blow whose practical and moral effect could be quite extraordinary.3 The performance of German zeppelins on this count proved relatively disappointing during the First World War, but their operations did provoke a counter theory by those seeking revenge. The British Secretary of State for Air played with the idea of starting ‘a really big fire’ in German cities to undermine German morale.4 In 1914, Wells published The World Set Free, coining the term ‘atom bomb’ and describing the instant destruction of cities by this new weapon.

98 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour It was the torpedo and daring naval tactics that brought Japan operational success at Port Arthur in February 1904. Over the next 37 years there were significant advances in torpedo technology, but most importantly, in the manner in which torpedoes could be delivered. Russia led the way in building a submarine force with the potential to fire torpedoes; but not in time for its war with Japan.5 On 10 November 1910, the American, Eugene Ely, flew a plane off the USS Birmingham, and on 18 January 1911 landed a plane on the USS Pennsylvania.6 In 1911, the Italian, Captain A. Guidoni, had flown a Fairman biplane carrying a 350 lb torpedo. That year, Lieutenants Kimura and Tokuda of the Imperial Japanese Navy took flying instructions in France. In 1912, Japanese pilots were trained in Hammondsport, New York, others were trained in Germany, and in 1912 the Japanese set up a Naval Air Service. In 1913, Admiral Sir Percy Scott wrote to The Times of London, ‘Battleships are no use either for defensive or offensive purposes. Submarines and aeroplanes have entirely revolutionized naval warfare.’7 That year the British Admiralty became interested in air-launched torpedoes, and in 1914 Captain M.F. Sueter was tasked to convert three steamers to carry aircraft to positions to attack enemy ships. On 19 March 1914, Sueter and Lieutenant D.H. Hyde-Thomson, applied for a patent relating to seaplanes carrying torpedoes. In August 1914, Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) aircraft hit three Turkish ships near the Dardanelles using 1897-pattern torpedoes and the British planned to attack the Goeben with aerial-launched torpedoes. On 25 September 1914, a seaplane from the Japanese Wakamiya Maru may have sunk a German torpedo boat off Tsingtao with a converted naval shell. Some cite this as the first occasion that an aircraft sank a ship.8 Acknowledging these dramatic changes in naval warfare, Admiral Fisher insisted of the Royal Navy in April 1915 that ‘You must have aeroplanes’,9 and events were soon amplifying his point. On 17 August 1915, Flight Commander C.H.K. Edmonds sank a Turkish military transport in the Sea of Marmara with a 14-inch torpedo dropped from his Short 184 biplane, flying from the seaplane carrier Ben-my Chree. Some regard this as the first successful aerial torpedo attack.10 The idea proved attractive, and on 1 May 1917, a German Brandenburger aircraft sank the British merchantman Gena with a torpedo. By 1917, the British were planning to make shallowwater torpedo attacks on the German High Seas Fleet in Wilhelmshaven, using the specially designed Sopwith T1, but the war ended before the operation could be mounted. The RNAS vented its frustration in 1919 by ‘attacking’ the British Atlantic Fleet off Portland with inert torpedoes, proving that such attacks were feasible. By 1918, Britain had the greatest experience of operating with aircraft carriers, possessing the only three in the world. The Japanese lacked the technology and tactical capabilities to develop their naval air arm, and Britain agreed to assist its ally. The British Naval-Air Mission, led by the

Tactics and technology 99 traitor, Colonel W.F. Sempill,11 operated in Japan from 1921–2, and its work marked the beginning of an effective Japanese naval air force. Sempill’s team provided a comprehensive package of training and technology transfer, including demonstrations of aerial torpedo attacks at Kasumigaura. The Sempill team left Japan aboard a British warship. Steaming 2 hours out from Yokohama, a formation of Japanese aircraft bade them farewell by flying overhead – a gracious but portentous gesture. The Japanese built their first carrier, Hosho, and in February 1923, William Jordan, a former RNAS pilot, became the first man to land and take off from a Japanese carrier.12 The proposition that the carrier would be more important than the battleship in future naval warfare was hotly debated in many nations. In 1921, the American, Billy Mitchell, conducted a series of controversial experiments to demonstrate the vulnerability of armoured warships to aerial bombing, eventually sinking the former German battleship Ostfriesland in the Chesapeake Bay. In April 1926, he predicted that Japan would initiate a Pacific war with a surprise attack using aircraft carriers.13 On 21 July 1923, Admiral Sir Percy Scott again wrote to The Times, ‘Everyone ought to realize that our base at Singapore should be defended by submarines and aeroplanes, which would keep any battleships from coming near the island.’14 Meanwhile in Japan, the relatively junior Yamamoto declared in 1925 that ‘The most important ship of the future will be a ship to carry aeroplanes.’15 He envisaged the sort of naval war which would prove the key to American success in the Pacific, as described by Hector Bywater. Naval operations in the future will consist of capturing an island, then building an airfield on it in as short a time as possible . . . moving up air units, and using them to gain air and surface control over the next stretch of ocean.16 Despite that, the Japanese went on to build the mightiest battleships ever seen, yet also stole a lead in the theory, technology and tactics of naval-air warfare. Yamamoto resented the money spent on big ships like Yamato and Musashi, which could have been spent on naval aviation. It was said in Japan at the time that the three great follies of the world were the Great Wall of China, the pyramids and the Yamato.17 Japanese carrier aircraft practised dive-bombing in the early 1930s, and this capability was greatly enhanced with the arrival of the D3A bomber in the mid-1930s. By the early 1930s, the emphasis in Britain and the USA was on dropping bombs. The Japanese concentrated instead on dropping torpedoes, sinking their old battleships Satsuma and Aki with oxygen-breathing torpedoes that were twice as powerful as any British or American ones. Japanese I-Type aircraft of 1938 were capable of 300 knots with a range of 650 nm, dropping 24-inch torpedoes from 1,000 feet at maximum speed.

100 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour At the same time the British Swordfish was capable of just 100 knots with 18-inch torpedoes dropped from 18 feet. These Japanese technical capabilities remained secret. Airpower had not been factored into the Washington Treaty ratio and it helped, in Japanese eyes, to make up for their disadvantages. A concentration of aircraft required the close concentration of carriers as well. Genda conceived the idea of the carrier task force in 1936, but the concept was not realized until 1 April 1941, when the First Air Fleet, based on carriers, was formed at Yamamoto’s request. There had seldom been more than 180 aircraft assembled, but Yamamoto believed that about 400 would be necessary to make the Pearl Harbour operation viable, and this became the urgent requirement. Yet, ideas about the power of naval aviation were also vibrant in Britain. In 1929 E.F. Spanner published the prophetic work, The Broken Trident, which described the destruction of the British surface fleet by torpedoes launched by enemy aircraft. The British squandered their early lead in naval aviation, and in 1935 the American Chief of Naval Operations reported that ‘Britain has virtually no airforce in the navy’.18 By 1936, the Japanese had overtaken the British in carrier design, and many in the Royal Navy seriously underestimated the efficacy of naval airpower.19 In 1938, ‘Bomber’ Harris joked of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, the future commander of the ill-fated Force Z, ‘Tom, when the first bomb hits, you’ll say, “My God, what a hell of a mine”.’20 The two capital ships of Force Z, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, commanded by Phillips, were sunk by Japanese aircraft on 10 December 1941. Churchill had believed that the destruction of the Bismarck would have a salutary effect upon the Japanese. The effect it did have was to convince them that, but for attacks by Swordfish torpedoes, Bismarck would have made port safely. Admiral Phillips, like Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvenski in 1905, had also found himself despatched on a mission to retrieve a deteriorating situation in the Far East. Both became increasingly aware of their vulnerability the closer they came to an enemy possessing superior naval technology. That said, in the event Force Z was sunk by the Japanese landbased 22nd Air Flotilla, a ‘child’ of Yamamoto.21 Repulse and Prince of Wales were in a similar predicament in the Far East to German battleships in European waters, hunted and sunk; and Japan’s capital ships would also be destroyed, primarily by airpower. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 was the ultimate demonstration of the primacy of the armoured battleship, the heir to Nelsonian navies and doctrine. The demise in 1945 of the Yamato, the largest battleship ever built and the ultimate expression of that technology and doctrine, was the final evidence that both had yielded to others. The US Navy was also developing its naval aviation. In exercises in January 1924, carrier-based aircraft attacked ships at Colon, but were criticized for ‘low-level stunting’. In American exercises for Fleet Problem VII, conducted in 1928, the carrier USS Langley launched a surprise attack

Tactics and technology 101 on Pearl Harbour and was deemed to have succeeded. In 1929, the US Navy practised even more elaborate exercises using carrier-borne aircraft over the Panama Canal, the USS Saratoga launching eighty-three planes in one night. Fleet Problem XIV of 1932 involved the undetected approach of aircraft carriers to Hawaii. Admiral Yarnell ‘attacked’ Pearl Harbour before dawn on a Sunday morning with 152 aircraft from the USS Saratoga and the USS Lexington and achieved complete surprise. In August 1937, Lieutenant L.C. Ramsey wrote an article for the US Naval Institute Proceedings, entitled ‘Aerial Attacks on Fleets at Anchor’.22 In 1938, Admiral King also achieved success in an exercise against Pearl Harbour. In 1927–8, Kusaka Ryunosuke had written a plan at the Japanese Navy Staff College for an attack on Pearl Harbour which he recommended as the best way of opening a war with the USA; but it was not until November 1936 that the first specific studies of an air attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbour were conducted. In August 1939, Yamamoto was made commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet and became convinced that an air attack on Pearl Harbour could succeed. He conducted low-altitude torpedo trials against targets in shallow water in Kagoshima Bay, selected for its many similarities to Pearl Harbour. On 7 January 1941, Yamamoto wrote to the Navy Minister Oikawa Koshiro, expressing his opinions on preparations for war and the initial operational plan. This started with a statement of the main lesson learned in the Russo-Japanese War: the need for a surprise attack on the enemy main force at the outset, ‘deciding the fate of the war on its first day’.23 A precedent for a devastating surprise air attack was set by Japan’s First Combined Air Force on 14 August 1937. It flew from Taiwan to attack airfields at Kuangte and Hangchow, virtually knocking out the Chinese National Air Force in the first trans-oceanic air attack in history.24 On 9 December 1941, this feat was repeated when 200 Japanese aircraft from Taiwan caught most of the US Far East Air Force on the ground at Clark Field near Manila, destroying the majority of it at a cost of just seven planes. MacArthur had been ordered to use his B-17 bombers to fend off Japanese attacks and was given 10 hours’ warning of the Japanese attack on the Philippines and news of the attack on Pearl Harbour, but he apparently locked himself in his room all morning and refused to order an attack on Japanese forces on Formosa. The destruction on the ground of half of all the USA’s heavy bombers was arguably a more severe blow than the damage inflicted on its elderly battleships at Pearl Harbour just hours earlier.25 For unexplained reasons, MacArthur’s failure was ignored by General George Marshall who heaped praise on his ‘resolute and effective fighting’ in the Philippines and quashed any attempt to hold an enquiry into the debacle in the Philippines, even though there was an extensive enquiry into the attacks on Hawaii.26 MacArthur’s failure to distribute urgently required food and combat supplies was also overlooked as he acquired the aura of a hero.27

102 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour Despite the obsolescence of their Swordfish biplanes, it was the British who first demonstrated the devastating effects of naval airpower, flying against the Italian fleet at Taranto on 11 November 1940.28 This had a profound effect on the calculations of other navies, for it was now evident that the problem of shallow-water attack had been solved. In his letter of 7 January 1941, Yamamoto stated that the attack on Port Arthur was to be the strategic blueprint for Pearl Harbour; but in the event, its execution would be based more on the British Operation JUDGEMENT at Taranto.29 Port Arthur/Taranto became the model for the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. On 15 December 1940, two German officers, Baron von Gronau and Colonel J. Jebson surveyed the aftermath of the British attack at Taranto, and their findings were forwarded to the Japanese. The Japanese assistant air attaché in London, Genda Minoru, had also been asked to report on the British attack;30 and in February 1941, Yamamoto asked him for his views on the feasibility of an attack on Pearl Harbour. He supported the plan and became air staff officer of the First Air Fleet for the operation. A major Japanese delegation, led by Rear Admiral Abe Koki visited Taranto from 18 May to 8 June 1941 to make a more detailed analysis of the British operation. Lieutenant Naito Takeshi, the assistant naval attaché in Berlin had visited Taranto a few days after the attack to take measurements of depths and distances; and on 23 October 1941, he gave a lecture on Operation JUDGEMENT to Yamamoto’s staff, which included his old friend Fuchida, who would lead the attack on Pearl Harbour. The British success at Taranto seems therefore to have tipped the balance once more back in favour of the plan to attack Pearl Harbour. Admiral J.O. Richardson, commander of the US Pacific fleet, had already complained to Admiral H.A. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, that Pearl Harbour was too vulnerable to Japanese attack, but his views were dismissed. He raised the matter with President Roosevelt at a lunch on 8 October 1940 and was subsequently relieved of his command for raising the matter outside the chain of command. The Americans did, however, take note of the British operation at Taranto. On 22 November 1940, Admiral Stark wrote to Richardson, ‘Since the Taranto incident, my concern for the safety of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater.’31 Admiral H.E. Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941 and joined with his predecessor, Richardson, in pointing out to Stark the deficiencies in the defences of Oahu. He was told that the fleet must accept greater responsibility for its own security. On 5 February 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a letter from Secretary Knox who, mindful of the British attack on Taranto, warned, ‘If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbour.’32 Major General W.C. Short, who assumed command of the Hawaiian Department

Tactics and technology 103 on 5 February 1941, was clear from the outset that the primary threat came from aerial attack using bombs and torpedoes. Yet, on 7 February 1941, Secretary for War, H.L. Stimson declared that ‘The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments.’33 Oahu was sometimes referred to as the ‘Gibraltar of the Pacific’. On 15 February 1941, Stark wrote a letter to Kimmel, which he received on 8 March, pointing out that British torpedoes had been launched into water 14–15 fathoms deep (about 90 feet).34 He concluded that torpedo nets were unnecessary at Pearl Harbour because a minimum depth of water of 75 feet was required to drop a torpedo from an aircraft.35 The issue of the depth of water at Taranto continues to perplex. The Hart enquiry into the attack on Pearl Harbour found that the British had dropped torpedoes in 45 feet of water at Taranto. In 1944, the Secretary of the US Navy, J.V. Forrestal noted that the US Navy had information in April 1941 that the British had successfully launched torpedoes into 42 feet of water, against the French battleship Richelieu at Dakar. These reports of British developments do not appear to have been noted in Hawaii where, prior to the Japanese attack, it was still believed that the water was too shallow. Major General F.L. Martin of the Army Air Corps, and Rear Admiral N.L. Bellinger commanding the Naval Air Base at Hawaii made an estimate of the air defence of Pearl Harbour in March 1941 and noted that Axis powers often attacked on weekends and public holidays and that Japan ‘had never made a declaration of war, before launching hostile actions’. . . and that Japan might ‘send a fast carrier raiding force to make a sudden attack, with no prior warning, to Pearl Harbor’.36 Despite these warnings, the War Plans Division in Washington still maintained that ‘The danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from carrierbased aviation is not serious.’37 In April and May 1941, American planes reduced their patrols over the seas north of Hawaii. On 13 June 1941 Rear Admiral R. Ingersoll sent a memo to all naval district commanders, citing the attack at Taranto and noting that 75 feet should no longer be regarded as the minimum depth for a successful torpedo attack, ‘no minimum depth of water may . . . be assumed as providing safety’.38 On 10 July 1941, the American Military Attaché in Tokyo reported that Japanese aircraft had been secretly practising torpedo attacks on capital ships in Ariake Bay. The Secretary of the US Navy, Knox, was also concerned about the implications of the British attack. The defence of Pearl Harbour was the responsibility of the US Army, and Knox wrote to Secretary Stimson in the War Department, citing the attack on Taranto as a possible model for an attack on Pearl Harbour and urging that its defences be increased. He was told that the US Army was aware of its responsibilities and that defences were already better than adequate. On 18 July 1941, Roosevelt told his cabinet that Indochina would probably be occupied in a matter of days; but apart from cutting off supplies of high-grade aviation fuel he apparently took no significant action.

104 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour Strangely, on 20 October 1941, Churchill went so far as to tell the Cabinet’s Defence Committee that he did not foresee a Japanese attack on Malaya. On 25 November 1941, with a Japanese naval force, including five infantry divisions sailing south, probably to attack British or Dutch possessions, Roosevelt noted that ‘The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.’39 That day Roosevelt told his war cabinet that ‘We are likely to be attacked as soon as next Monday 1 December, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning.’ On 27 November 1941, the British Joint Intelligence Committee considered the Japanese fleet to be a threat to Pearl Harbour and apparently informed President Roosevelt, through the British Security Organization in New York. On 29 November 1941, the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull warned the American Chiefs of Staff that war with Japan was imminent, yet there were still no torpedo nets in Pearl Harbour. Stimson clearly expected a Japanese attack. Days before the attack, he urged the Chinese Nationalist T.V. Soong ‘to have just a little more patience and then I think all things will be well’.40 On the night before the attack on Pearl Harbour, Roosevelt observed to Harry Hopkins of the Japanese position, ‘This means war.’ No warnings were issued to the fleet but fortunately, contrary to normal weekend custom, both the carriers USS Lexington and the USS Enterprise were out of harbour during the attack. Having looked at the fourteenth section of Japan’s final communication, Admiral Stark is said to have refused his staff permission to pass on the warnings to Hawaii.41 As the AWC had divined, the USA would fully expect such an attack and would at the same time be surprised by it.42 There are four lines in historiography on British warnings of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour: that the British knew nothing of it in advance; that they knew but did not tell the Americans; that they told the Americans but no one thought it credible; and that Roosevelt was warned but he chose not to warn American forces in Hawaii. Many of the theories propounded about the true course of events leading up to the attacks on Pearl Harbour have been regarded merely as sensational journalism, and the episode is often regarded as a lightning conductor for conspiracy theorists. Many of these theories have, however, passed beyond that; it seems probable that the orthodox ‘received’ account as purveyed by those in power at the time is wanting and often misleading. The ‘cranks’ now seem to have a measure of orthodoxy on their side, and the onus is now perhaps on others to prove them wrong. This is unlikely to be possible without the release of all available documents. Some would perhaps prefer to believe that, on ‘the day of infamy’, the American Government and armed forces were surprised by the Japanese attack, that Roosevelt and others were horrified at the USA being propelled into a war that they had sought to avoid and that blame for the damage

Tactics and technology 105 should lie with the tactical commanders in Hawaii who failed to appreciate and act upon the threat. They would prefer to believe that the British also had no warning of the Japanese offensive; and that if they had, they would certainly have warned the American Government, which in turn would surely have acted decisively on receipt of such intelligence. They would prefer to believe that these conclusions are based on the full availability of all the relevant records in the USA and the UK, but these illusions are hard to sustain. Despite his unpopular ideological bent and flawed reputation, David Irving’s record as a researcher has sometimes been formidable. He has maintained that the British started to read Japanese Naval Code JN-2543 in September 1939, and that George Marshall wrote to Roosevelt complaining that the British were not releasing their intercepts to them. He claims that although the British read Japanese secure communications, none, if any, are apparently available for public scrutiny, while transcripts of American intercepts are. Irving maintains that if the British displayed transcripts from after 1941, they would also have to display those before December 1941 which would be embarrassing. The British intelligence files on Japan for the month preceding the attack on Pearl Harbour have apparently been removed from public view; and there is no reference to the intercepted ‘Winds’ messages by which the Japanese alerted their diplomatic staff about the outbreak of war. Certain British Foreign Office files for September–December 1941 have also apparently been withdrawn. The United States Navy Office of Censorship, which would have recorded the telephone conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill were, Irving claims, ordered closed in perpetuity by President Truman at the end of the war.44 The matter is far from clear or resolved. On balance, it seems likely that Britain did have reason to expect an attack on Pearl Harbour on 8 December 1941 and warned the Canadians of this.45 However, the British decision not to publish an authoritative account of these events means that little that is definitive can be stated of what was known and who knew it. The British Foreign Secretary apparently announced in 1997 that records referring to the matter would remain closed for the foreseeable future.46 After the attack, Stimson was relieved that events had been brought to a head, uniting the American people, a view shared in the offices of Time magazine in New York where journalists ‘were gleeful . . . it was the right war and it had to be fought and won’.47 Stimson encouraged Roosevelt to blame Hitler for Japan’s attack and to declare war on Germany, but Roosevelt declined. It was left for Hitler to declare war on the USA on 11 December, blaming the Chinese and the British and American desire to dominate the Orient. Prince Konoe is thought to have been appalled by the attack on the USA, anticipating the national catastrophe that would ensue. The events of 9 December 1941 were rich in historical echoes and strange ironies.48 According to Chihaya Masataka,49 the inspiration for the

106 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour Japanese naval operations in 1904–5, and hence 1941, owed much to the study of Western history. The attack on Port Arthur was itself inspired by the bold actions of the American Admiral Farragut dashing into Mobile Bay on 5 August 1864, and by Admiral Dewey’s entry into Manila Bay on 1 May 1898. The American attempt to block Santiago Harbour in June 1898 was studied by the Japanese attaché in Washington DC, Commander Akiyama, who was attached to Admiral William Sampson’s fleet; it was Akiyama who blocked Port Arthur in 1904.50 Chihaya Masataka also claimed that the attack by the Confederate torpedo boat David on the New Ironsides off Charleston in 1863 set the example to those Japanese pilots who attacked Pearl Harbour in December 1941.51 Admiral Togo had used such shock tactics against the Chinese in 1894, and he repeated these in 1904 with a surprise attack by ten destroyers, armed with Whitehead torpedoes, on the Russian Second Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur, commanded by a Russian, Admiral Stark, who was having dinner ashore at the time. The Times of London commented that that attack was ‘destined to take a place of honour in naval annals’. The US President, Theodore Roosevelt, who said, ‘I have done all I could, consistent with international law, to advance her interests, I thoroughly admire and believe in the Japanese’,52 called their surprise attack, ‘a bold initiative’ and referred to ‘gallant little Japs’.53 Roosevelt was equally enthused about the Japanese victory at Tsushima: ‘This is the greatest phenomenon the world has ever seen . . . I could not believe it . . . as reports came, I grew so excited that I myself became almost like a Japanese, and I could not attend to official duties.’54 The absence of a declaration of war had long been regarded as normal. The American Homer Lea noted the Japanese preference for action prior to any declaration of war, and he observed that of the 120 wars fought in the Occident between 1790 and 1870, only ten had begun with a declaration of war. ‘All such formality in modern conflicts has been and is considered by nations prepared for war as superfluous. Only those countries unprepared groan at such activity, and the overpowering advantage this initiative gives to their adversaries.’55 The Japanese plan for the attack on Pearl Harbour was code-named Operation Z,56 in honour of Admiral Togo’s ‘Z Signal’ flown at Tsushima, itself modelled on Nelson’s ‘England expects. . . . ’ at Trafalgar 100 years earlier: ‘On this one battle rests the fate of our nation. Now let every man do his utmost.’57 On the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbour, Yamamoto issued his final order from his anchorage at Hashirajima in precisely these words,58 and on Akagi, Admiral Kusaka raised the ‘Z Signal’, the very flag that had flown from Togo’s Mikasa during his attack on Port Arthur in 1904. Commander Fuchida Mitsuo, who led the attack on Pearl Harbour, astonished to see the American fleet below him, asked ‘Had the Americans never heard of Port Arthur?’.59 The echoes were not only naval. In March 1942, the Japanese Fourteenth Army in the Philippines made a point of celebrating the thirty-seventh

Tactics and technology 107 anniversary of the Battle of Mukden, even though still engaged in operations against the Americans. For the rest of the world, most of the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were learned or lost by December 1914, and were apparently of little further relevance; but for the Japanese, 1941 was a replay of 1904 in strategic dimension, risk and execution. The emotions on both occasions were similar. On hearing that Japan was at war with Russia in 1904, Staff Officer Moriyama Keizaburo of the Second Fleet wrote, At that moment I felt as if something had hit me hard in the head. I looked down and felt tears streaming down my cheeks. That moment the feeling that went through my entire body was for our great Japanese Empire which had continued for more than 2,500 years. Would it perish forever because of this war?60 Similar powerful emotions were also commonly expressed by Japanese officers in 1941. The author, Hayashi Fusao, on hearing of the attack on Pearl Harbour felt ‘as if a heavy load had been lifted from my shoulders’.61 Less than 4 years later, the fate of Japan was symbolized by that of the appropriately named Yamato; yet the Yamato did not fight in a ‘big fleet action’, leading ‘ships of the line’. The pride of the Japanese Navy sailed to its destruction ‘for honour alone’.62 The Yamato might have seemed like an armoured kamikaze warrior, but its crew were not on a suicide mission, although most perished. Their aim was to distract the American force attacking Okinawa, but to survive and fight again if thwarted.63 Like Force Z, the Yamato’s task force would lack air cover despite the protests of its commander, Admiral Ito. He was told, ‘You are being requested to die gloriously, heralding the deaths of 100,000,000 Japanese who prefer death to surrender.’64 Contrary to the ‘mindless sacrifice’ noted of some Japanese soldiers, the crew of the Yamato questioned the sense of their hopeless mission which would achieve so little at such cost. The irony was clear: ‘What country showed the world what aircraft could do by sinking Prince of Wales?’65 It was in a sense a desperate and futile gesture, as much of honour as the voyage of the Russian Baltic fleet in 1905 and Force Z in 1941, even though in all these cases many managed to persuade themselves that they could succeed. The psychology of the suicidal Oriental warrior has troubled Western observers who have generally characterized it as mad fanaticism; some, however, have seen it in a different and noble light. Yamamoto did not approve of the suicidal tradition of captains going down with their ships, a tradition inherited from the British Royal Navy, which found great cultural affinity in Japan.66 The typical Japanese volunteer for the Tokkotai human torpedo corps was a humanities student with an interest in German philosophy, French literature and Marxist economics. In The Nobility of Failure. Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan, Ivan Morris described

108 From Port Arthur to Pearl Harbour kamikaze pilots as ‘quiet, serious and above average in both culture and sensibility’.67 He described them as ‘individuals who waged a forlorn struggle against overwhelming odds . . . eager, outrageous, uncalculating men whose purity of purpose doomed them to a hard journey leading ultimately to disaster’.68 The Allied assault on Okinawa in April 1945 was named Operation ICEBERG. Into this ‘iceberg’, on 6–7 April crashed the task force of ten Japanese vessels led by Yamato. The war in the Far East started with dramatic evidence that the battleship had been replaced by the carrier as the most important element in naval warfare. The naval war ended with this phenomenon confirmed, with the sinking of Yamato. It was the end of the ship and the Japanese Navy, and symbolic of the demise of the country after which it was named. It was a tragedy greater and even more ironic than the destruction of the triumphantly named Russian battleships Knyaz Suvorov and Borodino at Tsushima in 1905, whose defeat had confirmed the supremacy of their own genus and the concept of the decisive great battle.69 Yet, still the beguiling dream of a Tsushima lived on. On 17 June 1945, the Emperor Hirohito70 urged Admiral Shimada to, ‘Rise to the challenge, make a tremendous effort, achieve a splendid victory like at the time of the Japan Sea naval battle [Tsushima].’71 The German Navy entered the Second World War with a similar pessimistic fatalism and pride. Admiral Erich Raeder reported the Battle of the Atlantic lost on 3 September 1939, the day that Britain declared war on Germany, saying, Today the war against England and France broke out . . . It is self evident that the Navy is in no manner sufficiently equipped in the Autumn of 1939 to embark on a great struggle with England. . . . Surface forces . . . are still so few in numbers and strength compared to the English fleet that they . . . can only show that they know how to die with honour.72 The shock and shame of the attack on Pearl Harbour were not forgotten and were expressed in the symbolism of defeat at the surrender ceremony on 2 September 1945. MacArthur and Nimitz were ferried to the USS Missouri on the destroyer USS Buchanan, named after the first American to land in Japan. In an affirmation of the potency of air power, four hundred B-29s flew over the battleships as the proceedings concluded. One of the flags displayed on the USS Missouri during the ceremony had flown over the White House on the day the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour. The deeper historical perspectives were also noted. The flag flown by Admiral Perry on his flagship USS Powhatten, when he had forced open Japan for trade in 1853, was brought hurriedly from Annapolis to complete the message, both of retribution, but also perhaps of the start of a different, broader relationship.73 However, even as Japanese newspapers published news of the surrender, they also noted the racial superiority of the Japanese.

Tactics and technology 109 Japan failed against a larger opponent in a massive theatre for much the same reasons that Germany had failed against the USSR. Unlike 1905, there could be no intermediary74 and peace would come, not at the conference table,75 but after collapse in Manchuria76 and atomic strikes, symbolic of the Sun-God’s decisive power in the determining of human affairs.77 In 1941, the Japanese confirmed their cultural preference for a sudden decisive blow to achieve their desired objective, but ironically, it was the American atom bomb in 1945, not Japanese torpedoes, that resulted in a rapid capitulation, in a style understood exactly by this national psychology. Japanese defeat was not merely a ‘Blochian’ socio-political collapse, but represented a moral earthquake.78 It confirmed, just as certainly, the dominance of the USA’s position in the Pacific, foreseen in Japanese eyes at the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, and seemingly accepted by it since 1945. It also confirmed the demise of the West European Empires in the Far East, albeit in a less cataclysmic manner. The long-term consequences of this, and the longevity of that American dominance, have yet to be determined.

Part III

Imperial tectonics The plates shift. A centennial perspective Viewed over the hundred years since 1905, the Russo-Japanese War has been most remarkable for beginning a major realignment of global power which is as yet incomplete. It was the first time that Western powers had had to deal with an Asian power on equal terms, and they had seen the Orient victorious in war. Over the next 100 years, Asia may yet come into its own after a century of unfulfilled predictions.

7

Europe bows out

Britain initially welcomed the success of its ally in the Russo-Japanese War. In October 1905, the Japanese Minister of Marine declared that ‘Our navy ever since its creation has been modelled on that of Great Britain’.1 A British journalist wrote, ‘An admiral [Togo] who received his early professional training in England and served afloat in British men-of-war has won the greatest naval victory in history, not excepting Trafalgar, with men-of-war constructed almost exclusively in British shipyards’.2 A British poem of 1905 enthused, The die is cast, the East is now aflame! Colossal Russia fights her gallant Foe Japan – styled ‘England fair of Eastern Seas’.3 That year, Britain withdrew its China-Station battleships and Sir Ian Hamilton suggested an exchange of troops, with Japanese infantry serving in India and the British sending cavalry to Japan. On hearing the recommendation that in the event of war the British fleet in the Far East be placed under Japanese command, the First Sea Lord, Walter Kerr, observed that ‘I would not mind serving under Togo’s leadership’.4 The triumphant Japanese impressed foreigners with their modesty, ‘A Japanese who boasts of his country’s warlike prowess is to me inconceivable.’5 The Japanese qualities of 1904, typified by Admiral Togo, were admired well into the 1930s; yet, disillusion and anxiety about Japan emerged shortly after the War and there were inklings, even in 1905, that the future might be rather different. ‘Japan is on her good behaviour this time; and next time she can permit herself to indulge in the usual barbarities of Christian nations.’6 In a private letter in February 1907, Sir Ian Hamilton wrote ‘We have our rupture with Japan. If it comes it will be definite and instant, i.e. in what is apparently time of peace, a Japanese fleet will sail for, say Hong Kong or Singapore to strike the first blow.’7 In 1909, Hamilton, a firm admirer of Japanese military capability, wrote to The Times of London, protesting against the ‘bloody tyranny, cruel bullying and oppression’ of the Japanese Army of occupation in Korea. Observing the growing commercial

114 Imperial tectonics rivalry between Britain and Japan, he concluded that ‘My own belief is that we have no more deadly enemies in the world than our Japanese allies.’8 Thirty-two years later, Hamilton’s fears were realized. Despite decades of anticipation, the Japanese attack on Malaya in 1941 still seemed to take the British garrisons of Malaya and Singapore by surprise. The British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert BrookePopham reported to London that ‘We are ready. We have had plenty of warning and our preparations are made . . . we are confident. Our defences are strong.’9 Sir Shelton Thomas, the Governor of Singapore was woken by General Percival and told that the Japanese had landed in Malaya. Thomas replied, ‘I trust that you’ll chase the little men off.’10 From overestimating the ‘racial’ and cultural characteristics of the Japanese after 1905, Westerners suffered from underestimating the qualities of the Japanese once they became their potential enemies – a scorn born of fear.11 The complacency and derision with which British commanders described the Japanese had the ominous ring of the Russians’ in 1904.12 In April 1941, the British military attaché in Tokyo, Colonel G.T. Wards, lectured the Singapore garrison on the outstanding military qualities of the Japanese. The Commander of Singapore, General Bond countered the lecturer with the reassurance to his men that ‘What the lecturer has told you is his own opinion and is in no way a correct appreciation of the situation . . . I do not think much of them and you can take it from me that we have nothing to fear from them.’13 General Blamey, Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army and Commander of Allied land forces in New Guinea buoyed up his troops by saying that ‘Your enemy is a curious race, a cross between the human being and the ape . . . he is inferior to you and you know it. You know that we have to exterminate these vermin.’14 A common view was that Japanese soldiers, ‘were like clever animals with certain human characteristics, but by no means the full range . . . this is not murder, killing such repulsive-looking animals’.15 Two fifths of US Army chaplains interviewed after the Second World War apparently regarded killing Japanese prisoners to be legitimate.16 The war against Japan caused far greater emotion in the USA than did the war against Germany. This was caused in part by anger at the humiliation of Pearl Harbour but also by racial animosity, a feature of the propaganda of both sides. A US State Department report of 30 April 1942 noted the ‘cultural inferiority’ of the Japanese, their ‘well-known intellectual sterility’, the absence of any sense of ‘abstract justice’ in Japanese culture and the Japanese ‘insensitivity to true ethics’. Some have sought to play down the racial aspect of the war in the Asian–Pacific Theatre, which certainly sits uncomfortably with current mores; but it was undeniably an important element in the thinking of the time and it has remained an important factor in the subsequent debate about that campaign. In the event, the Japanese proved formidable soldiers, just as they had 36 years earlier. Every Japanese soldier was issued with the booklet,

Europe bows out 115 Just Read This and the War is Won. It described the enemy as, ‘The weak-spirited Westerner’, and urged readers to, ‘Regard yourself as an avenger come at last face-to-face with your father’s murderer.’ The Japanese commonly railed at the ‘arrogance’ and ‘impudence’ of the Allies and expressed the desire to kill them all. Early Japanese successes apparently supported their claims of Western decadence. The war was frequently viewed by the Japanese in broader racial terms. American history was characterized as one of aggression against Indians, Negroes and now the people of Asia. The Americans were described as ‘albino apes’, devoid of humanity. The Japanese, by contrast, regarded themselves as a race descended from God, and their war as a divine mission. As the Yamato race, they were unique, pure and foremost among other ‘master races’, ‘friendly races’ and ‘guest races’ in Asia. In summer 1943, a Japanese Commission called the war, ‘The counter-offensive of the Oriental races against Occidental aggression’.17 Turning the Japanese claims of uniqueness against them, the Allies often portrayed their enemy as ‘genetically delinquent’, ‘pathologically abnormal’ and scarcely human.18 Prime Minister John Curtin justified Australia’s entry into the war against Japan in terms of its commitment to the principle of ‘White Australia’. After victory at Milne Bay in August 1942, the commander of the Australian 7th Brigade described the destruction of the Japanese as, ‘a most effective way of demonstrating the superiority of the White race’.19 The position of European empires in the Far East began to erode even before the attacks of 1941. It was not merely the defeat of Europeans in the Far East that undermined the moral strength of their empires; it was also their defeat at the hands of other Europeans. In June 1940, the French philosopher, Simone Weil, observing the presence of German soldiers on the streets of Paris, noted in her diary that it was a great day for the people of Indochina, for the humiliation of France gave encouragement to Japanese ambitions. In 1942, the British suffered at Singapore a worse and quicker fate than that of the Russians at Port Arthur, in the direst disaster in British military history about which no official investigation has yet been published.20 The British were concerned that their performance had revealed decadence and cultural degeneracy, or that they were too civilized. Yet, this disaster made very little difference to the outcome of the Second World War. Its effect was far greater in the wider context of nearly 500 years of European involvement in the Far East as the perception of Britain’s imperial power, built at such expense over centuries, collapsed in weeks.21 Adolf Hitler had celebrated Japan’s early successes. After the attack on Pearl Harbour, he exclaimed, ‘The fact that the Japanese Government, which has been negotiating for years with this man, has at last become tired of being mocked by him in such an unworthy way, fills us all, the German people, and I think, all decent people in the world, with deep satisfaction.’22 On later reflection he bemoaned that ‘What is happening in

116 Imperial tectonics the Far East is happening by no will of mine’; and he was moved by the demise of Europe’s Asian empires: ‘Three centuries of effort are going up in smoke. . . . The White race will disappear from those regions.’23 Winston Churchill, on the other hand, saw the long-term strategic consequences of the USA’s entry into the War after Pearl Harbour rather differently, musing on the night that he heard the news, ‘So we had won after all! . . . We should not be wiped out. Our history would not come to an end . . . the Japanese, they would be ground to powder’.24 In 1943 he observed that it was a blessing that Japan had attacked the USA. ‘Greater good fortune has rarely happened to the British Empire.’25 Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Japanese government banned the term ‘Far East’ on the grounds that it was an obnoxious reflection of the notion that England was the centre of the world. It would not be again. The British Empire may have appeared to have enjoyed a reprieve in 1945, but the long-term effect of the war against Japan was to knock Europe out of the Pacific strategic equation permanently, leaving a vacuum to be filled by a freshly confident USA. The shock of the fall of Singapore was, nevertheless, keenly felt in the USA. Admiral E. King, US Chief of Naval Operations and a frequent critic of the British, argued that Australia and New Zealand must be saved because they were ‘White men’s countries’,26 echoing Churchill’s conviction that ‘We could never stand by and see a British Dominion overwhelmed by a Yellow race.’27 Stimson had warned Roosevelt that the fall of Singapore would be ‘an almost vital blow to the British Empire as well as to our own commercial interests in the Pacific’.28 Another senior US official asserted that the loss would ‘lower immeasurably . . . the prestige of the White race and particularly of the British Empire and the United States in the eyes of the natives of the Netherlands East Indies, of the Philippines, of Burma and of India’.29 The need to fight and defeat Japan was seen in a long-term racial perspective and any idea of a negotiated settlement was unlikely. In 1942, Patrick Hurley believed that Japan’s defeat was essential to prevent Japan leading Asia against the White race. That year Herbert Hoover described his fears of Asian unity: The White man has kept control of the Asiatics by dividing parts of them each against the other . . . Universally, the White man is hated. Unless they are defeated, they will demand entry and equality in emigration . . . that may take a million American lives and eight or ten years, but it will have to be done.30 Some Americans were concerned that, even in the event of an Allied victory, the stability of Asia would be seriously disrupted by the war with Japan. In March 1943, Senator E.D. Thomas expressed alarm at the forces being unleashed, ‘Genghis Khan got into Europe, and we can loose in Asia

Europe bows out 117 forces so great that the world will be deluged and there will be no way to prevent it’.31 In 1941, Admiral King32 worried about the repercussions of Japanese victories among the non-White peoples of the world, and Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, feared that Japan might ‘succeed in combining most of the Asiatic peoples against the Whites’. In March 1945, Roosevelt observed that ‘1,100,000,000 potential enemies are dangerous’. His son Elliot apparently favoured bombing Japan until half the population had been killed. Admiral Halsey believed that the near elimination of the Japanese race was necessary if ‘White civilization’ was to survive. In April 1945, Paul McNutt, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, is reported to have called for the extermination of the Japanese race in toto.33 The racial threat was sometimes seen as internal, from Japanese Americans, as well as an external one from Japan. General DeWitt maintained that ‘A Jap’s a Jap, it makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not’.34 Some also saw the possibility of an insurrection by the Black population of the USA, heartened by Japanese successes.35 The Black activist Elijah Mohammed was jailed for declaring that he favoured Japan so that Black Americans could be freed by another coloured people. Gandhi observed to Roosevelt that ‘The Allied declaration that they are fighting to make the world safe for freedom of the individual sounds hollow, so long as India, and for that matter Africa, are exploited by Great Britain, and America has the Negro problem in her own home.’36 The Allies soon realized that their assumed superiority over the Japanese might be misplaced. Contempt for the ‘Yellow Dwarfs’, which had been prevalent in Hawaii before the attack on Pearl Harbour, soon turned to near panic. Stunning Japanese victories in 1941 and 1942 and the determination of the Japanese soldier37 soon caused another radical and unbalanced shift in Western perceptions. These had a positive aspect and mirrored those of 1905. The legend of the Japanese as being unbeatable in the jungle soon spread, and there were expressions of admiration for the Japanese, emphasizing the ‘spiritual’ element: ‘They believed in something, and were willing to die for it, for any smallest detail that would help them achieve it. What else is bravery? . . . They came on using their skill and rage, until they were stopped by death.’38 It soon became clear that Japanese military equipment, such as the Mitsubishi Zero, was not merely the product of clever imitators, but of innovative designers and high-quality production – ‘it is actually superior to our own planes of a similar type’.39 Equally, The greatest surprise to our fighter and bomber pilots in the South Pacific was the remarkable accuracy of Japanese gunnery . . . On many occasions the Japanese pilot demonstrated admirable skill . . . this may be explained, at least partially, by the determination of the attacking Jap and his insistence on ‘closing’ with his enemy.40

118 Imperial tectonics Such observations were tantamount to praise for Japanese courage and therefore had to be caveated. While we would hardly describe the fatalistic Jap as a ‘brave’ man, he, nevertheless, does have an unbelievable courage (or lack of imagination if you will) in coming to close grips with his enemy and in braving murderous fire to attack his man. Of course, the Jap’s religious fanaticism and his firm belief that ‘to die for the Emperor is to live for ever!’ is the most logical explanation of this trait among warriors. But it has trebled, even quadrupled the problem of defeating him.41 Soldierly respect for the Japanese caused alarm in Allied governments which countered vigorously with their own propaganda. As late as 1945, the training syllabus at the Australian jungle warfare training school still laid down that recruits be told that the concept of the Japanese ‘supersoldier’ was a myth.42 As one Australian soldier noted, ‘He is a tough nut to crack, this so often despised little Yellow chap.’43 The Australian official historian Dudley McCarthy described the Japanese as ‘superb in their acceptance of death as a soldier’s obligation’;44 but judged that this was only possible for men fighting with an alien world view and untroubled by the complex internal struggles of the Occidentals. Respect for Japanese military prowess was soon to be matched by contempt; and by 1945, ‘the Japanese had passed from being figures of fun to figures of awe and then to figures whose humiliation was a source of joy’.45 The Japanese were seen often to fight to the death when they could have improvised, survived and fought again. Their courage was seen to be dysfunctional, resulting in poor tactics. ‘They are game blighters – or mad.’46 Japanese tactical rigidity was constantly seen to be the cause of unnecessary casualties.47 One diarist wrote that ‘The enemy has done nothing to entitle him to our respect during the operation.’48 ‘Japanese’ characteristics were seen as explanations for defeat, just as earlier they had been explanations for Japan’s victories. Nippon remained a mystery to the West, its society and culture often appearing to have unseen dimensions like the secret floors of Himeji Castle, and the confusion remains today. The victory over Japan in 1945 was not a victory for, or even the salvation of European empires, but the start of the process of their removal from East Asia, which in Britain’s case was determined by 1971, with a complete withdrawal of troops from Singapore in 1976.49 The departure of Britain from its empire was not only a consequence of its experience in fighting Japan and the rise of Asian nationalisms, but also at the USA’s insistence, on moral principle and in American self-interest, making Britain’s empire diplomatically unsustainable. Ho Chi Minh declared in 1945 that the White man was finished in Asia.50 Yet the USA was victorious, expansionist and ‘White’; and it would soon fill much of the imperial vacuum left by the Europeans, despite ‘Uncle Ho’s’ efforts 20 years later.

Europe bows out 119 The British did not regard their empire as merely one of cynical self-aggrandizement. To many it had a ‘civilizing mission’ which brought Western notions of social, economic and political development, even if these could not all be implemented immediately in profoundly differing cultures. By any historical measure, however, Britain’s imperial achievement on these grounds was impressive, albeit at a cost endorsed by few after its demise. The idea that Britain was fighting for a noble cause was supported by commanders like Field Marshal Slim who wrote after the War, with troubling contradictions, that his Army had, ‘fought in a just cause . . . coveted no man’s country . . . we wished to impose no form of government on any nation. We fought for the clean, the decent, the free things of life’.51 In Britain there was a new and sometimes ill-tempered debate about how to manage the country’s new circumstances, how the colonies would be governed and whether the Empire could or should survive in any form. For the most part, the British accepted that their days of empire were numbered and few had any appetite for rebuilding from the wreckage. Meanwhile, in the USA the national sentiment was quite the opposite. The pragmatic acceptance that ‘the Whiteman was finished in Asia’, or at least so far as the British were concerned, was bolstered by the ideologists of the Left who had persistently opposed the Empire on moral grounds. The British Army also prepared its men through education schemes for the dissolution of empire, discounting the need for ‘possessions’ and asserting that ‘self government is better than good government’, or more irreverently that colonies ‘had the right to make a mess of their own affairs’. The Empire seemed to many to be more of a burden than a benefit; whatever the sentimental baggage, the financial costs of maintaining it clearly seemed prohibitive. Most Britons believed that winning the war in Europe had been Britain’s greatest achievement, and interest in the Far East and any imperial prospectus was limited. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour ensured that Britain and the USA would become de facto allies, and this relationship was at its most successful in Europe. In the Far East, however, from where that warfighting relationship primarily sprang, the alliance was characterized by ill-feeling and fundamental differences over the nature of the war, its objectives and the future of the Pacific region. What was hard for the British to accept was that they should dismantle their empire at the insistence of the USA, which seemed eager to take its place, in all but name, as an imperial power; reaping the benefits, while claiming the moral high ground as an anti-imperial force. Disagreements between Britain and the USA at that time are still often glossed over, but they had serious consequences in subsequent decades. The remnants of the antagonisms, rooted in the Far Eastern ‘Alliance’, were seen later in the Suez crisis, with severe mistrust on both sides. It was also evident in the British Government’s lack of military support for the USA in Vietnam, where the USA was perceived by many to be reaping the whirlwind of policies which it had earlier condemned in Britain and France,

120 Imperial tectonics there being more of the nationalist than the Communist in their opponents, whatever the superficial appearances. In the 1930s and 1940s, it was policy over China that proved the principal point of disagreement between the USA and Britain. The Americans saw China as a close ally to be supported and a source of liberal political views in Asia. They were keen to support China militarily and were upset that the British seemed lukewarm in their support. Relations between British forces and the Anglophobe General Joseph Stilwell were poor throughout most of the campaign. Stilwell noted in his diary, ‘The more I see of the Limies, the worse I hate them, the bastardly hypocrites do their best to cut our throats on all occasions. The pig-fuckers.’52 He believed that the British were halfhearted in their efforts and wanted the Americans to do all the fighting and pay all the bills in order to restore their empire. The Atlantic Charter, signed on 12 August 1941, raised issues of interpretation and created imperial tensions for the British. Article 3 declared, ‘The right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live.’ Clement Atlee declared that this applied to all peoples and races of the world. Churchill’s response was that this could not possibly apply to the peoples of say, Africa. The Burmese Prime Minister, U Saw, wrote to The Times in October 1941, asking, What Burma wants to know is whether in fighting with many other countries for the freedom of the world, she is also fighting for her own freedom . . . The demand for complete self-government is a unanimous demand of the Burmese people, and it was made incessantly, long before the Atlantic Charter.53 The USA’s entry into the war and material support to Britain caused alarm to some. Patrick Hurley complained to Roosevelt that ‘British imperialism seems to have acquired a new lease of life . . . ’ through ‘the infusion, into its emaciated form, of the blood of productivity and liberty from a free nation through lend lease.’54 American policy was to ensure that in South East Asia Command, the USA did not come to be associated with the British and British imperialism. The word ‘Ally’ was not to be used when referring to the British, lest it also label Americans imperialists, rather than agents of anti-imperialism. MacArthur might well tell British officers that ‘It had always been my firm wish to see a strong British Empire and to see the best of relations between the peoples of America and the British Empire’, but he rejected the transfer of command of part of the South West Pacific Area to the British on the grounds that it would lead to a ‘deterioration of American prestige and commercial prospects throughout the Far East’.55 There was also disagreement between Britain and the USA about whether Mountbatten had the right to operate in French Indochina without the agreement of Chiang Kai-shek and his American staff officers. The OSS Psychological Warfare Division advised American propagandists to avoid

Europe bows out 121 referring to ‘British’ Malaya, and not to associate the USA with Britain. Even the Duchess of Windsor, in an unusual foray into foreign policy, confided to an American State Department official that ‘The Empire must be cut down, particularly in the Far East.’56 In 1942, one American survey showed anti-British feeling to be greater than anti-Russian or anti-Chinese feeling. About 40 per cent of Americans in 1942 believed that ‘The British got us into this war’, and a slightly smaller percentage believed that ‘The British will try to get us to do most of the fighting.’57 Fifty-six per cent of those polled believed the British to be ‘oppressors’. On 9 April and 7 June 1942, the Chicago Tribune maintained that it was the selfish policies of European imperialists that had helped to make the USA itself unprepared for war. Many Americans tended to see the British as exhausted, cynical pragmatists who had lost their idealism. Marshall was so concerned at anti-British feeling in the US Forces that on 19 December 1942 he called for steps to counteract ‘a marked hostility or contempt for the British among American soldiers’.58 Wendell Wilkie’s book, One World, advocated a foreign policy opposed to all empires, including Britain’s. In December 1943, Stanley Hornbeck of the State Department asserted that In the US, we place a much higher valuation upon the concept of political freedom and independence than do the British . . . we assume to a far greater extent that various and sundry now-dependent or quasidependent national groups have capacity for self-government.59 The historical irony that the USA was itself the creation of White colonists who, far from liquidating their possessions, had held onto their colonies at the expense of the indigenous population, who were never offered independence,60 was noted and irritated its erstwhile British allies. American anti-imperialism jarred with the British who referred to the anomalous position of Puerto Rico in the light of such assertions. The British claimed that they were no more embarrassed about seeking to retake Burma from the Japanese than the USA was about seeking to retake the Philippines. The British enjoyed some perverse satisfaction at the high rate of collaboration, at least initially, by the Filipinos with the Japanese, whom they welcomed as liberators from American colonial rule.61 The British also resented the Americans taking a moralistic line on the political liberties of the ‘oppressed peoples’ of its empire, given the state of race relations in the USA and in the American forces stationed in Britain.62 Lord Halifax noted that ‘The more I hear, the more I resent their criticism of us in India. We may have been a bit slow politically, but socially and administratively we are miles ahead of them.’63 The British Cabinet debated the issue, and there was disagreement as to whether British forces in Britain should be ‘educated’ to accept the American rules which maintained racial segregation in their forces stationed in Britain.64

122 Imperial tectonics Many in the USA maintained that after the war the British Empire, its responsibilities and privileges in Asia should be placed under international control, ‘the function of British imperialism in the Orient will have been fulfilled’.65 Herbert Feis, the State Department’s Economic Adviser declared with great vehemence to the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs that, ‘Never again would the great American nation allow the British and Dutch to dictate the prices at which it could buy its tin and its rubber.’66 The American Ambassador to China noted in a letter to President Truman in May 1945, ‘The question is, will we now permit British, French and Dutch imperialists to use the resources of America’s democracy to re-establish imperialism in Asia.’67 The American plan for the break-up of European Empires was based on the notion of United Nations trusteeship, obviating the idea that the USA was in some way the occupier or claimant to sovereignty over whatever territory it might hold after the war. Welles solved one difficulty by asserting that the trusteeship principle need not be applied to the western hemisphere where the USA needed bases for reasons of overwhelming strategic security. This logic was not, however, to be applied to Singapore which he proposed be placed under international control. Roosevelt also hoped that Britain would give up Hong Kong to China after the war as a gesture of goodwill. In Britain, these ideas caused an outcry as the war was seen to be the means by which the USA would assume proprietary rights over its empire. The USA was reluctant to see Britain regain its Asian possessions, and Congress planned to terminate lend-lease immediately after victory in Europe. Equally, France and the Netherlands were not to be permitted to take part in the battles against the Japanese in 1945, lest this be used to justify claims to repossess their empires. That said, as victory came into sight, many American opinion-formers came to see the temporary utility of the British Empire as a stabilizing influence, given the impracticality of giving independence to politically diverse and unstable populations. The USSR loomed as a future threat in the Pacific, and the USA looked for ways to build alliances against it. Some in the Senate wondered if Great Britain could give the USA the support it needed in a potential clash with the USSR if the USA had undermined its global position. The Americans found themselves in a dilemma. Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information noted that Our policy is apparently based on the conviction that we need Britain as a first-class power; Britain cannot be a first-class power without its empire; we are accordingly committed to the support of the British empire . . . there is a very real danger that . . . as a result, the American people (will feel) that they have been made dupes of British imperialism.68 Meanwhile in Britain, such ideas were already fast being overtaken by events as public opinion realized that the days of Empire, as they had been,

Europe bows out 123 were gone forever. In France the desire to hold onto its imperial possessions was stronger than in Britain, and the USA became a party to the unsuccessful attempts to prevent its disintegration, inheriting a disastrous legacy.69 In the early years of war in the Far East, Roosevelt had opposed the return of colonies to France, but this was reversed on 20 October 1945 when he even denied that the USA had ever questioned French sovereignty in Indochina. In 1949, the USA breached its own arms embargo on military assistance to France, delivering naval vessels from its west coast to Vietnam. On 8 May 1950, Dean Acheson declared the USA’s intention to provide economic and military aid to those, including the French, who opposed the advance of Communism.70 The USA opposed France negotiating a settlement which made concessions to the Viet Minh and determined to help France avoid military reverses. By 1952, the USA was paying almost half of the cost of the French war in Indochina.71 In 1952, Eisenhower urged that the French war in Indochina be seen not as a colonial war, but as ‘a matter between freedom and Communism’.72 From seeing European rule in Asia as vicious colonialism, the American Government now saw it as the bulwark of freedom; but even the erstwhile imperialist British were now opposed to involvement in France’s war in Indochina, despite American urging not to appease Communism – for them the days of empires were over. The USA by contrast, continued to support the French and considered assisting the beleaguered garrison at Dien Bien Phu with atomic strikes.73 It even considered the possibility of supplying France with atomic weapons. Dulles was concerned about the reaction of Asians to the use of American atomic weapons; but there might also have been problems with its allies had the USA intervened, ‘If US intervention results in war expanding to China, and the Soviet Union becomes involved, British and NATO opinion might well be split as to support of the US in use of any British or NATO bases.’74 The dangers of intervention were keenly appreciated by the American military. In 1953, Vice Admiral A.C. Davis, the advisor on foreign military affairs to the Secretary of Defense declared that ‘Involvement of US forces in the Indo-China war should be avoided at all practical costs’; and a CIA report warned that ‘Even if the United States defeated the Viet Minh field forces, guerrilla action could be continued indefinitely . . . and the United States might have to maintain a military commitment in Indo-China for years to come.’75 Eisenhower’s regrets at not intervening in Indochina were apparently edited out of his memoir Mandate for Change, ‘It is exasperating and depressing to stand by and watch a free nation losing a battle to slavery . . . the conditions which prevented American intervention with military force on behalf of the French Union was surely frustrating to me.’76 He recognized, however, that those conditions were the anti-colonial traditions of the American people which confirmed the timing of the departure of France from Asia.

124 Imperial tectonics While the War in the Far East was seen to bring about the end of the European Empires, more immediately it resulted in Japan’s long-standing ambitions for national aggrandisement, of at last being First in the World, being dashed, along with its hopes of some Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Ironically, it was the justification of Western states, including the USA, for their own Asian empires that became an embarrassing prop for the Japanese facing criminal charges after the War. The tribunal to try alleged war criminals sat in Tokyo from May 1946 to November 1948. It ran into difficulty at the outset when the Japanese were accused by the American Chief Prosecutor Keenan of trying to destroy democracy and government ‘by and for the people’. The Indian Justice R. Pal set this in context, noting that ‘It would be pertinent to recall . . . that the majority of the interests claimed by the Western prosecuting powers in the Eastern Hemisphere including China were acquired by such aggressive means.’ He dwelt on the terms used by Western nations for their own colonial and imperial expansion: ‘Manifest Destiny’, ‘the protection of vital interests’, ‘national honour’ and the ‘Whiteman’s burden’. When the Japanese behaved in a similar way they were now accused of ‘aggressive aggrandizement’.77 He quoted the Royal Institute of International Affairs on how the Japanese had followed the precedent of European imperialism; he compared the Japanese ‘Amau Doctrine’ of 1934, with its enunciation of special rights and interests in China, with that of the USA’s Monroe Doctrine. He also pointed out that the reintroduction of European colonial rule in the Far East could hardly be ‘by and for the people’. Proceedings proved unsatisfactory in many ways. An Imperial instruction to every Japanese soldier had told him that every order he received should be regarded as one given by the Emperor himself. Yet, the Emperor was deemed not responsible for the actions of his soldiers or any war crime. Blame was instead placed on the ‘militarists’.78 This apparently absolved the ordinary Japanese soldier of guilt, along with the Emperor of waging ‘aggressive war’, and all in a sense became victims of those militarists.79 Tojo spoiled this construction by saying that neither he nor his colleagues would ever have acted against the Emperor’s will. His questioning was cut short by the court, and one week later Tojo recanted and affirmed that in fact the Emperor had always loved and wanted peace. This expression of loyalty, the assertion that he had in effect all along acted disloyally and contrary to the Emperor’s wishes, compared perhaps with the suicide of General Nogi on 13 September 1912, although Tojo’s own suicide attempt was less competent.80 He was restored to health to be hanged on 22 December 1948. While Western Europe’s empires enjoyed a short reprieve in the Far East in 1945, the Russian Soviet Empire sought to consolidate its position in victory, after what it regarded as 40 years of humiliation. For the Russians, the wound inflicted by the attack on Port Arthur had never healed. Eight days after the Japanese attack in 1904, the Russian Government had issued

Europe bows out 125 a communiqué declaring that ‘Russia was shaken with profound indignation against an enemy who suddenly broke off negotiations, and, by a treacherous attack, endeavoured to obtain an easy success in a war long desired. The Russian nation, with natural impatience, desires prompt vengeance . . . ’. French officials noted, ‘Public opinion in Russia feels the humiliation very deeply. In all ranks of society, including the rural masses, and in every part of the Empire irritation is becoming more and more pronounced.’81 Lenin viewed the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 as a useful means of bringing down the Tsar’s regime.82 The new Soviet Government, however, soon acquired a more nationalist outlook. The transition from covert ally of the Bolsheviks to outright enmity was caused partly by Japan’s prompt exploitation of Soviet weakness in the Far East in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution.83 By 1920, Lenin had condemned ‘the colonial and financial strangulation . . . of the world . . . by a handful of “advanced countries” .’ The ‘three powerful world marauders, armed to the teeth’84 were named as the USA, Britain and Japan, recognition indeed of Japan’s astonishing rise to international prominence. The Nazi–Soviet pacts of August and September 1939 secured Stalin’s western flank and gave him the confidence to seek a revision of the Treaty of Portsmouth in return for a non-aggression pact. Instead he secured merely a neutrality pact and his position was suddenly undermined by the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941. Japan’s attack on the USA ensured that the latter would be the USSR’s strategic partner against the Axis, but the terms on which the Soviets wished to base that cooperation surprised many, with their very specific historical references to 1904–5. On 14 December 1943, Stalin named his price for Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific: the restitution of territory lost by the Treaty of Portsmouth and the acquisition of the Kurile Islands which Russia had lost in 1875. Stalin also wanted to rent Port Arthur and Dalny from China, along with the railways linking them to the USSR. The issue arose again at Yalta in February 1945, when Stalin demanded ‘The restoration of the rights belonging to Russia that were broken by Japan’s treacherous attack in 1904’ and, alluding to the psychological aspects of the problem, claimed that it was essential to have the terms formalized on paper so that ‘the Soviet people would understand why the USSR will enter the war against Japan’.85 Stalin chose the same language as the Tsarist communiqué of February 1904 to condemn Japanese action in a war, the prosecution of which his own party had not supported at the time, whilst encouraging insurrection on the home front. Stalin chose similar phraseology on 2 September 1945 in his declaration of victory over Japan, ‘we have a special account to settle with Japan. Japan began its aggression against our country as early as 1904.’ He went on to describe Japanese treachery, Russian defeat and the seizure of Russian territory ‘tearing away Russia from its Far East’. He described Japan’s

126 Imperial tectonics ‘predatory’ actions of torment and plunder after 1918 and its offensives of 1938: ‘The defeat of Russian forces in 1904 . . . left painful memories in the consciousness of our people. It left a black stain on our country. Our people believed and waited for the day when Japan would be beaten and the stain would be liquidated. We waited forty years, the people of the old generation, for this day. And here we are, this day has come.’86 This hardly reflected Stalin’s feelings of glee when Port Arthur had fallen to the Japanese in 1904 and the Tsar’s regime tottered: ‘Workers of the Caucasus, the time for revenge has come!’87 References to the trauma of 1904–5 recurred frequently in Soviet foreign policy. In many ways it proved a worse shock for the Russians than did Pearl Harbour for the Americans; 60 years later, Japan and Russia have yet to sign a peace treaty to settle the end of the Second World War. The impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Russia might be compared to that of an outcome to the Second World War in which Japan had defeated the US Navy decisively at Midway, gone on to win the war and then occupied Hawaii, as a condition of a peace treaty. In 1945, Stalin enjoyed some revenge for defeat in the Russo-Japanese War by controlling Port Arthur, before the Communist Chinese Government asserted its authority. He appeared obsessed by Tsarist Russia’s defeat in the East, and this humiliation seems to have caused him, at times, to pursue policies for emotional reasons, even when these were perhaps contrary to the USSR’s immediate interests.88 After the Second World War, the USSR was apparently content to see its enemy occupied by the USA, and slow to note its transformation into a base for American maritime power, Japan’s proxy, ‘locking-in’ the USSR from its outlets to the Pacific. It was only in August 1953 that the USSR sought a peace treaty with Japan, and talks took place in London in June 1955. The historically emotive issues of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin prevented a successful completion of the negotiations, the Soviet Foreign Minister pointing out that the Japanese attack of 1904 had negated the treaties of the nineteenth century. The opportunity to draw the wavering Japanese away from American influence to a neutral position was lost, as the power of history took precedence over real politik and strategic self-interest.89 With Japan ‘neutralized’, the two great Communist powers of Asia, China and the USSR, enjoyed good relations following the Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. However, China was soon regarded once more as a terrifying alien menace, and relations deteriorated under Khrushchev who refused to pass nuclear weapons technology to China. During the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, the Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik published Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, which foretold of a terrible war with China and the collapse of the USSR. Fears of outright war between China and the USSR were prevalent during the 1960s.90 Border disputes became a source of irritation in September 1963 when China raised the issue of ‘unequal treaties’, and in

Europe bows out 127 1964 negotiations on the border broke down.91 In October 1964, China conducted its first nuclear tests. The USSR feared that any conflict in Europe would be exploited by China’s numerical strength to overrun territories on the border and it reinforced its garrisons in Asia.92 In the face of the perceived Soviet threat, China sought improved relations with the USA93 and Japan, and in August 1978 China concluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan, which included a clause opposing Soviet hegemony. In April 1979 China announced that it would not renew its Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance with the USSR which was due to expire in April 1980.94 However, from 1982 the presidency of Ronald Reagan was perceived as a common threat to both the USSR and China; and relations between the two countries improved. Despite an apparent diplomatic rapprochement since 1986, underlying attitudes in Russia towards China appear remarkably similar to those of Kuropatkin’s day. Not least because of Russia’s concerns about the ‘demographic threat’ from China to Russia’s eastern territories, echoing Western fears of ‘The Yellow Peril’ of a hundred years ago. The collapse of the USSR weakened Russia’s position in the Far East, making way for other Asian powers to exercise their relative strength. Bloch would not have been surprised that in modern war, even a Cold War, the consequence of defeat could be political, social and economic collapse.95 Maybe the Blochian character of the end of the Cold War sets the pattern for future conflict, which will not necessarily be military, but rather feature struggles of other forms between systems, cultures and economic models. From 1905, war would be seen in terms of cultural values and competition, and in the Information Age cultural values could become a casus belli and in themselves constitute weapons of choice. This notion is itself a very Western one. Just as Marxism was a product of the European bourgeoisie, turned on itself, so perhaps the concept of Cultural-Darwinism is also a peculiarly European notion. It may also be the intellectual construct which spawns and shapes the next challenge to the culture which produced it, invigorating those who reject the idea of a universal Western culture at the ‘end of history’ and who believe that demography is also on their side.

8

Asia on the march

If 1905 marked the waning of the Europeans in Asia, it also marked the waxing of the Asians themselves. J.F.C. Fuller regarded the Russo-Japanese War as one of the great turning points in Western history for It was not merely a trial of strength between an Asiatic and a semiEuropean power, but above all it was a challenge to Western supremacy in Asia . . . The fall of Port Arthur in 1905, like the fall of Constantinople in 1453, rightly may be numbered among the few really great events of history.1 Putnam Weale, writing in 1910, saw the rise of nationalist movements across Asia to be a direct consequence of Japan’s victory over Russia. The War of 1904–5 had had a profound influence on those Indian nationalists, such as Subhas Chandra Bose, who were to fight for the Japanese during the Second World War, and who would be recognized officially by the Indian Government 50 years later as heroes of independence. Pandit Nehru recalled that ‘Japanese victories stirred up my enthusiasm . . . Nationalistic ideas filled my mind. I mused of Indian freedom and Asiatic freedom from the thraldom of Europe.’2 Curle noted that ‘Ever since the Japanese smashed the Russians . . . they believe they are now our military equals, and would welcome the call to rise and drive us out.’3 ‘Japan is the pioneer of the new age: she is the hope of Asia’, wrote Kawai Tatsuo in 1938 in his The Goal of Japanese Expansion.4 The Indonesian nationalist, Ahmad Subardjo, saw Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, as the turning point in the history of Asia; and its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 and its advocacy of a ‘return to Asia’ as a watershed in its foreign policy. Admiration for the Japanese character and its wider strategic implications persisted in the West right up to the outbreak of war in 1941, evoking the cultural panic in Europe after 1905. In his foreword to a biography of Admiral Togo of 1937, B.A. Fiske eulogized

Asia on the march 129 Togo’s noble character and equated it to that of Japan itself. He warned Americans that Woe to us if we fail to read the handwriting on the wall . . . So hindered are Americans by the multitudinous factions in our political and social life, so swept along are we by the forceful impulse of our ‘rugged individualists’, so obedient are we to the doctrine of ‘every man for himself’, so eager are we in the pursuit of luxury and pleasure, that the picture here presented of a modest gentleman – self-effacing and loyal, yet acclaimed, the world over as one of the greatest warriors – is almost unbelievable . . . No nation of self-indulgent individuals . . . can compete with a nation of self-sacrificing individuals . . . .5 He contrasted the state of contemporary American life with the ‘plain living and high thinking’6 of the Pilgrim Fathers and compared the fall of earlier great civilizations with the fate that awaited the USA. In the 1930s, the black American, W.E.B. Du Bois, supported the Japanese invasion of China, a country regarded as some sort of international ‘Uncle Tom’, as this seemed preferable to its domination by Americans and Europeans.7 The Jamaican Black activist, Marcus Garvey believed that the new-found racial pride of non-Whites would inspire all those suffering from racial oppression. J.S. McIntyre wrote, ‘Let the Negro pick a page from the book of Japan with its united and phenomenally progressive people – an answer to an impudent and degenerate Western civilization . . . .’8 Japanese success against Russia in 1904 had owed much to its intelligence preparations and subversive operations in Russia itself. Similar actions had been planned against China during the First World War and this formula was repeated prior to operations in Manchuria and throughout the latter’s occupation. The Black Dragon Society and Japanese military intelligence supported Pan-Asianist societies such as the Morality Society and the Society for the Great Unity of World Religions that were already active in Manchuria. They combined again in the late 1930s to fight a ‘deep battle’ to weaken the British Empire from within as Japanese forces struck. Their method was to encourage the creation, under Japanese control, of revolutionary nationalist armies which would fight for the independence of European and American colonies, just as they had encouraged insurrection against the Tsar. The Japanese consulate in Calcutta was the centre of Japanese espionage in India from 1936, in conjunction with the German vice-consul in the city, the Baron von Richthofen. Japanese infiltration of British India was often under cover of Buddhist charitable movements, with Japanese agents disguised as monks making frequent visits to Benares and Gaya. The Japanese supported the Indian revolutionary Rash Behari Bose in exile, and in April 1941, Subhas Chandra Bose reached Berlin via Moscow and Afghanistan, an ‘Indian Lenin’.

130 Imperial tectonics Colonel Suzuki Keiji, a latter day Colonel Akashi, was tasked with keeping the Burma Road closed, thereby disabling Anglo-American support for resistance to Japanese operations in China.9 Suzuki’s primary objective was to develop an offensive strategy against British Asia by enlisting the support of young nationalists across the region. In May 1940, he moved from Bangkok, setting up his secret headquarters in Rangoon. There he created networks for the Minami Kikan, the Japanese subversion organization which advanced the cause of Asian nationalism against the colonial powers.10 Colonel Suzuki stirred up discontent in Indian Army garrisons in Singapore and was especially active in Malaya where there were extensive Japanese commercial interests whose employees also often acted as his agents.11 On 12 November 1940, Aung San, Thakin12 visited Japan to discuss the setting up of the Burmese Defence Army (BDA), which he would command, and its cooperation with the future Japanese conquerors/liberators of his country. Britain tried to negotiate with the Burmese nationalist politician, U Saw, to ensure Burma’s support in any war with Japan; but after the attacks on Pearl Harbour, he concluded that the Western powers would be defeated by the Japanese, with whom he negotiated instead.13 The first exposition of a Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere appeared on 1 August 1940. It included northern China, Indochina and Indonesia and would be created at the expense of existing European influence. Japan was torn between a conviction of its unique racial superiority and the idea of a common Asian racial brotherhood which might conveniently entail economic advantages. The ‘Asian’ ideal attracted many Chinese, even from the Kuomintang, who joined the Hsin-min Hui, the organization that promoted Sino-Japanese collaboration. Many Koreans were prepared to collaborate with the Japanese through organizations such as Nissen Kyowakai, and to join in hunting down resisters. At an Imperial conference in July 1941, the Japanese Prime Minister Konoe maintained that it was essential for Japan to obtain in East Asia whatever it could not produce itself. By 30 July, this Sphere had expanded to include Australia and New Zealand. Japan did not wish to conquer the USA; rather it wanted to drive the USA and the Europeans out of the Western Pacific, which it considered its legitimate area of influence. Congressman Hamilton Fish noted that this was in effect a declaration of Japan’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’. The Japanese Government claimed that its war was ‘to emancipate the East Asian nations from Anglo-Saxon domination and to construct a new order.’14 Chandra Bose and others were taken with European notions of nationalism with which to reject the West, and sided with the ‘spiritual’ champion of the Orient, Japan, which made its challenge with the ‘modern’ means inspired by the West. President Manuel Quezon15 of the Philippines was relieved when Japan attacked, for he was worried that Japan would be a threat to the Philippines after its independence, due to be granted in 1946. He was confident that Japan would now be defeated and that the

Asia on the march 131 Philippines would thereby be secure in the longer term. Nevertheless, in 1942 he asked the USA to grant the Philippines independence so that he might come to terms with the Japanese, pending American victory.16 The Indonesian nationalist Sjahrir Soetan had urged the Dutch government to liberalize its regime and unite with the people of its colonies to resist the Japanese, but he noted that most of his countrymen rejoiced at news of Japanese victories. The Japanese entered Bangkok on Thai Constitution Day, with the full support of the Thai Government. The Japanese were cheered by the people of Guam, supported by the Government of Mongolia, and more predictably by the Government of Manchukuo and the Vichy Government in Indochina, the latter pledging its support against the Anglo-Saxons. Professor Miyazawa Toshiyoshi of the Imperial University in Tokyo wrote, ‘The Anglo-Saxon influence is rapidly waning and in its place a rapid rise is being witnessed in Asiatic countries. The war of Greater East Asia will create a new and glorious page in the history of the world.’17 At the Great East Asia Conference in Tokyo in November 1943, Tojo condemned the hypocrisy of the Western powers who stressed the need to uphold international justice and peace, but on their terms, based on imperial domination and colonial exploitation. He stressed the age, refinement and spirituality of Asian civilization which would save the world from the materialism of the West. Yet the conference itself was intended to stress the need for concerted planning and economic modernization. Commanders such as General Yamashita Tomoyuki, the conqueror of Malaya, declared their support for a benevolent East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.18 Decree Number 1 of the Japanese Sixteenth Army in Java declared that the Japanese and Indonesians were of one race. Japan was said to be heir to the ancient culture of China and part of an Asian civilization that was both ethically and aesthetically superior to that of the West. Asian culture had lacked only the advantages of science. Japan would provide Asia with this scientific leadership, blending the Oriental and the Occidental cultures. That leadership would also be military, and over half-a-million Chinese troops served under the Japanese.19 The Japanese set up local security forces in the Philippines, Java, and Malaya to fight against resistance guerrillas, such as the Hukbalahap in the Philippines.20 The Japanese were especially active amongst the Indian Diaspora of South-East Asia. In May 1942 the Indian Independence League held its conference in Bangkok, seeking to unify the leadership of Indian populations across South-East Asia. On 12 August 1942, 125,000 people gathered in Farrer Park in Singapore to hear Rash Bihari Bose call for the overthrow of British India. Prime Minister Tojo offered Burma and the Philippines independence if they would cooperate with Japan, and by 1943 India seemed likely to receive the same offer. Burma was declared independent on 1 August 1943. Much of the support for Japan’s great project was opportunistic, idealistic or feigned. With Japan at war with China, it was hard for all to accept

132 Imperial tectonics Japanese assertions of their benevolent Asianism; and it was largely Japanese contempt for the Chinese that had prevented Japan from securing an advantageous settlement with Chiang Kai-shek in 1940. Even Subhas Chandra Bose asked why Japan’s renaissance could not have been achieved, ‘without imperialism, without dismembering the Chinese republic, without humiliating another proud, cultured and ancient race’.21 The Chinese in the British Empire raised money and agitated in support of China in its war against the Japanese; and many of those who opposed British imperialism became the rump of resistance to the Japanese. It is estimated that by 1939 there were over 700 Chinese organizations dedicated to opposing Japan.22 The Japanese in turn warned that the Overseas Chinese lay outside the ‘Asian brotherhood’ and could expect no mercy in Japanese-occupied territories. The Communist Party also supported the British against the Japanese as part of an anti-fascist front, although its members were not always trusted by the British.23 The Chinese Communist leaders in Yenan and the Indian Communist Party, loyal to the USSR, both urged the people of their countries to support the Western powers they had formerly condemned, in order to defeat imperial Japan. The Indonesian nationalist, Mohammed Hatta, regarded Japan’s Asian ‘mission’ as no more than a ploy by Japan’s fascists who would hope to sink their teeth into Indonesia . . . Japan has continued to imitate the Western races. It has gone so far as to imitate Western imperialism in its dealings with the Asian races . . . This desire to be seen as racially equal to the West, and the resultant willingness to behave just as they do – this is the psychological basis for Japan’s mistaken policies.24 He saw the coming struggle, not as one between Asia and Europe, but rather between Fascism and Democracy. The Japanese also failed to win over the Moslem populations of Asia. From 5 to 7 April 1942, they held a conference for Islamic leaders in Singapore at which Japan promised to protect Islam. The Japanese Governor of Pahang asked the Mufti of Pahang, ‘Can the Malay States declare a holy war against the British and their allies?’ The Mufti replied, ‘Yes, provided the Japanese Emperor is a Muslim.’25 The main effect of the conference was to create an awareness of a Moslem identity in the region separate from the state. The Japanese were soon seen to behave like the European imperial powers, for example, bringing in opium from China and Taiwan to sell in Burma.26 On 14 March 1942, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Hoshino Naoki proclaimed that ‘There are no restrictions on us. These were enemy possessions. We can take them, do anything we want . . . we must not promise independence to the local peoples or encourage any wilful ambitions.’27 The Japanese warned the inhabitants of their occupied territories to cooperate or be crushed, and many of their Asian supporters soon turned against them on witnessing their atrocities in occupied territories. In Singapore, according to Yokota Yasuo, ‘The pompous English were replaced by the

Asia on the march 133 rough, vulgar Japanese. Simply a change from bad to worse. Forms of racial discrimination never practised even by the British were imposed.’28 The Burmese nationalist, and later Prime Minister Ba Maw, who had frequently called for solidarity of Asian blood with the Japanese, rapidly changed his view once subject to Japanese occupation, denouncing their ‘brutality, arrogance and racial pretensions’ and forced programmes of Japanization.29 In India, Gandhi30 had set his heart against the supposed Western corruption of human values. He organized non-violent displays of ‘soul force’, and urged Indians not to support the British or to fight the Japanese. Others, however, such as Jawaharlal Nehru recognized the benefits of Western science that could modernize Asia, and the most successful Asian states have accepted that proposition. Nehru also refused to make statements against the British. ‘It distresses me that Indians should talk of the Japanese coming to liberate India. Japan comes here either for imperialist reason straight-forward or to fight with the British Government . . . it does not come to liberate.’31 By 1944, as the tide of the war turned, the BDA was already plotting to switch sides to fight the Japanese; in February 1945, its commander, Aung San, Thakin, was making public speeches against the Japanese. Mohan Singh, commander of the Indian National Army (INA), who had believed that Japanese victories raised the morale of all Asians and brought shame on Europeans and the Americans, soon saw this credit ebbing away. He noted that the inhabitants of occupied lands had less autonomy under the Japanese than they had had under their former colonial masters, and he continued to see the British in a favourable light.32 Plans for a united Asian empire fell apart, and on 17 August 1945, Sukarno declared Indonesian independence, but this did not include Malaya. The Japanese told the Malayan nationalists that the dream of a Greater Asia was over, and that ‘Malayan independence is now your problem. You are on your own.’33 The Japanese had failed to realize that the ideal of Asianism could not be sustained while they were engaged in a prolonged war of aggression in China, in the face of wide ethnic, religious and political diversity in the region and in the light of the harsh behaviour of their occupying forces. The war with Japan in East Asia had turned out to be as much a series of civil wars, reflecting the diversity between the Indians, Burmese and Malayans, as about imperial rivalry between the major powers. Nevertheless, Japanese idealism persisted to the end, even though it had often meant little in practice and was frequently self-serving. The Emperor’s so-called surrender speech of 15 August 1945 did not contain the word surrender; but it did express regret to Japan’s Asian allies who had cooperated with it in seeking the emancipation of East Asia. [W]e declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan’s self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandisement.34

134 Imperial tectonics Yet the first idea in this passage was not entirely invalid and the message remained deeply attractive to many. The consequences of Japan’s defeat in 1945 were not straightforward, and some believed that even in defeat, Japan had in a sense won its war. Many Asians warned against too harsh a treatment of Japan, for whatever the USA’s attempts to dissociate itself from the European imperial powers, the issue was seen by many Asian nationalists quite simply in racial or, at least, cultural terms. The war had been a victory for the Whiteman in Asia, and many were unhappy about it. This was evident in the nationalist struggles against the departing Europeans, and more damagingly against the Americans in Vietnam, who in the mind of their opponents acted out the role that racist Asians had attributed to them in 1945. Some Asian nationalists concluded in 1945 that the Japanese, though defeated in a general sense, had won the war in Asia by creating a situation in which European rule would end. It would be those nationalists in South-East Asia who would evict not only the French, but also subsequently the Americans from Vietnam. On the day of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour, Sun Fo, a Kuomintang official, anticipating the former’s defeat and the consequences for China, declared that it would now be ‘a world of America, Britain, China and Russia’.35 In the event, only the USA and Russia, the two most successful ‘European’ empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have stayed the course in Asia, while China’s potential remains unfulfilled. Ironically, Japanese success in 1941 created fear of a rising China, which was encouraged by the visit of Chiang Kai-shek to New Delhi in 1942. Chiang Kai-shek and his wife told Indian leaders that Asians had much in common; and some Chinese Marxists such as Li Ta-chao now believed that the class struggle had turned into racial struggle. President Quezon of the Philippines, even during its occupation by the Japanese, regarded the Chinese as ‘the greatest potential danger in Asia, far greater than Japan’.36 Equally, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan of the Government of India also expressed concern about China: ‘China after the war is going to be a very formidable problem indeed.’37 To the end, the Japanese saw the Second World War as essentially a Great East Asian War in which the issue of China was central, and that if this could be solved then accommodation could be reached with the West. In that sense it was about who would be the champion of Asia – Japan or China? The years of cooperation between the USA and China, prior to the Communists’ seizure of power in 1949, inclined Americans to take a more positive view of the Chinese than did the British. The Americans saw the Chinese as agents of emerging democracy and open trade. Roosevelt was advised by his envoy, Patrick Hurley, that Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese people favoured democracy and liberty and were opposed to the principles of imperialism and communism. Roosevelt assured Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander in South-East Asia, that it was a triumph to have won

Asia on the march 135 over 450 million Chinese to the Allied cause, because they would ‘be useful twenty-five or fifty years hence’.38 When Churchill argued with Roosevelt that China presented a long-term threat to Indochina, he was rebuffed as out-of-date and unaware that, ‘A new period opened in the world’s history, and you will have to adjust to it.’39 Despite Japan’s achievements since 1945, the Second World War established China as the major Asian power, albeit often a dormant one. Japan was both the military and economic expression of a resurgent Asia in the twentieth century, but it is China that seems set to inherit the power that will flow from it in the twenty-first century.

9

America advances

The USA and the Asians The USA took its ‘stride across the Pacific’ in the nineteenth century, yet saw its moral position in the world to be on an entirely higher plane than the self-seeking empires of the Europeans. Commodore Perry intended to carry the gospel of God to the heathen, but he also encouraged the Japanese to adopt rapid economic modernization and the protection of the USA which would act as a balance against Britain, the ‘first-chop’ power in the region. The Spanish-American War of 1898 preserved the isolation of the USA in the East but left it thoroughly enmeshed and engaged in the imperial politics of the Pacific. Halford Mackinder’s world map of 1904, astutely showed the east coast of the USA twice, to show how the USA was both a Pacific and an Atlantic power. The USA had a moral and political problem in asserting its Monroe Doctrine while at the same time denying Japan the right to enforce its own version of that doctrine in Asia – a point noted by Tasker Bliss, the President of the AWC, in a paper of 1904. There is no doubt that this will result in due time in the formulation of a second line of foreign policy; we shall then have one policy based on contact with, and another policy based on isolation from, the rest of the world. We may yet find ourselves fighting for our Monroe Doctrine on one side of the world, and fighting somebody else’s Monroe Doctrine on the other side of the world. However, that time has not yet come.1 In a memorandum to the Joint Board on 10 June 1904, Rear Admiral Taylor concluded that ‘The sacredness of the Monroe Doctrine [would] drop to second in the national mind, and our trade relations with east Asia assume first place, and become the primal cause of war.’ In his mind, trade with China was the ‘ultimate objective’.2 American commercial expansion in China and the Pacific continued after the Russo-Japanese War, although there was reluctance to equate this with the imperialism of European nations. Americans were involved in

Amercia advances 137 the Chinese opium trade, imported Chinese coolie labour to the USA and the USA maintained its extraterritorial rights in China.3 The USA condemned the imperial process yet accepted many of its advantages. This was an accident of history, that we Americans could enjoy the East Asia treaty privileges, the fruits of European aggression, without the moral burden of ourselves committing aggression. It gave us a holier than thou attitude, a righteous self-esteem, an undeserved moral grandeur in our own eyes that was built on self-deception and has lasted into our own day . . . 4 Work conducted by the NWC and the AWC before the Second World War was pragmatic military, rather than political, planning; and there were evident limits to American ‘missionary zeal’. The USA was not prepared to go to war against Japan to defend China, any more than it had been prepared to defend European nations against Nazi Germany. After Japan had attacked Pearl Harbour and Hitler had declared war on the USA in 1941, some in the USA were inclined to believe that that was what they had done. Nevertheless, once committed, both notions had utility in sustaining the American war effort and in setting the moral and ideological tone for the USA’s position in the post-war world. The future of Japanese-mandated Pacific islands became an issue. Despite criticism of British imperialism, some such as Senator P. McCarran were forthright in their support for a new American imperialism, ‘I’m a helltootin’ American from out West, and ‘I’m for keeping the mandates under the Stars and Stripes.’5 In November 1944, the State Department made it clear that it expected to maintain bases in Egypt, India and Burma after the war; and that it would demand rights on French, Portuguese and Australian territory. The USA claimed to need bases in the Marshalls, Carolines, Philippines, Formosa and the Chinese coast, as well as the formerly Japanese-mandated islands. The New York Tribune, of 15 August 1945 observed that ‘We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that ours is the supreme position.’ The Chicago Daily News of 31 January and 25 June 1945 proclaimed, Manifest destiny is bigger than we are . . . Destiny has cast us in the role of protecting others too weak to protect themselves. If we are to accept the responsibilities destiny has thrust upon us, we must have those naval and air bases. The list of islands required by the USA included some under British sovereignty, which provoked further ill feeling; and it was pointed out that under American rule Guam would have less political freedom than it had had under the Spanish. The idea of self-determination would take second place to the security interests of the USA, which saw no need to discuss this

138 Imperial tectonics with other nations any more than it had the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines 50 years earlier. Many Americans believed that the world could only be saved by reorganizing it under American leadership and that that leadership depended upon the USA, rather than some alliance, winning the war. It was accepted that American values would be good for the peoples of Asia who were in a sense nascent Americans, and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reports continued to stress the hunger of Asian peoples for American leadership. Nevertheless, Roosevelt was cautious, and he envisaged these territories being held in trusteeship by the USA at the request of the United Nations, with authority to fortify them without a decision on permanent sovereignty. Far from being resentful, Churchill was pragmatic and keen to see Western interests dominant in the Far East. He told Bernard Baruch, ‘You can take the whole Pacific Ocean, whatever America wants there will satisfy us.’6 Some Americans were uneasy with the contradictions in American plans for the Pacific. Ralph Bunche feared that the USA would not have ‘clean hands’. ‘If we free the Philippines on the one hand and take over the Japanese mandated islands on the other hand, it won’t prove much and would lead to the development of an American empire in the Pacific.’7 Some like Welles and Hornbeck raised warnings about possible embarrassment ahead for the USA should the United Nations trusteeship principle also be applied to Hawaii, the Philippines and the Panama Canal Zone. Representative Eaton, for example, asked whether, ‘it was intended that the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Hawaii should be placed under the trusteeship principle’,8 which the USA insisted upon for European territories in the Far East. MacArthur feared that true independence for the Philippines would mean revolution, and he was influenced by the old elite of illustrados, families such as Aquino, Marcos and Soriano. The nationalist lawyer, Sergio Osmena, who had become President in exile in the USA in August 1944 was regarded as a threat by MacArthur. On witnessing the handover of independence to the Philippines on 4 March 1946, MacArthur announced in Manila that ‘America buried imperialism here today.’9 Cynics noted that it was Japanese not American imperialism that he had buried. MacArthur made every excuse not to work with Osmena after formal independence in 1946, and instead he supported Manuel Roxas who had collaborated with the Japanese, along with 5,000 other illustrados. In August 1945 MacArthur exonerated them of all collaborationist crimes. In 1946 Roxas became the first President of the Philippine Republic, supported by MacArthur, and the islands were in effect recolonized culturally, politically and economically. The US gained Subic Bay naval base and Clark Air Base almost rent free, and its personnel on those bases received legal immunity – a form of the imperial notion of extraterritoriality in China, once so condemned when applied to European interests.10 US commanders increasingly took account of commercial factors after the war, and the need for the USA to win the war alone was clearly

Amercia advances 139 understood.11 Despite its support for Chiang Kai-shek, the USA allowed his regime no say in running the war against Japan.12 Even in 1941 during hostilities against Japan, it still seemed to some Chinese that the USA, with its urge to Americanize the world, was the greater long-term threat.13 Eliot Janeway, sounding like many American businessmen over the previous hundred years, noted that after the war, the USA would have to find customers for its unprecedented industrial production, and it would need allies like China to soak up this surplus. China would be the ‘new economic frontier’ keeping America’s ‘shop open for business’. In January 1943, the USA had forced Britain to relinquish its extraterritoriality rights in China, although an agreement of the same year granted extraterritoriality rights in China to the USA.14 By 1945 this extended to 60,000 American troops in China, much to the annoyance of the Chinese Communists.15 At Yalta, Roosevelt had in effect given the USSR an empire in Eastern Europe in exchange for American dominance in the Far East, but he had agreed to the USSR’s keeping southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, and the use of the railway through Manchuria to Port Arthur. The matter was not discussed with Chinese, restoring to Russia the ‘former rights . . . violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904’.16 Roosevelt wanted Port Arthur to be internationalized, even though Manchuria had been Chinese, and that internationalization would contradict the principles of the Atlantic Charter.17 In the event, US and Soviet interests in Korea were split with the division of the peninsula. As the Second World War drew to a close, the USA became more concerned about containing a future Soviet threat, and the US Navy considered establishing bases in China in preparation for what was thought to be the coming war with the USSR. The USA occupied and ruled South Korea without introducing democracy. General Hodge prosecuted thousands of left-wing Koreans for treason in American courts martial rather than in Korean courts. In October 1949 the US National Security Council (Statement NSC-48) described the island chain of Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines as ‘our first line of defense and, in addition, our first line of offense from which we can seek to reduce the area of Communist control, using whatever means we can develop’.18 The forces that spawned the Russo-Japanese War re-emerged in new but familiar forms as historical shadows. The Korean War was an ideological struggle between the two pseudo-colonial powers of the Cold War; but it also replicated the Russo-Japanese War, by proxy, with the US/UN, the ‘maritime’ power, defending Japanese security interests against the North Koreans, representing the Chinese and Russians, the ‘continental’ power. It ended with the division of the country along the line proposed by the Japanese to separate their own and Russian forces in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5. One young observer of the final throes of the Russo-Japanese War had been Douglas MacArthur, ADC to his father Major General Arthur MacArthur.

140 Imperial tectonics His statue stands today on a hillside overlooking Inchon, also known as Chemulpo, the site in 1950 of his greatest military achievement. It was also the site of the successful amphibious landings by the Japanese in 1894 and from 10 to 27 February 1904. Although he only arrived in Korea in March 1905 as the War was ending, as a guest of the Japanese Army, Douglas McArthur was moved by the War’s scale and novelty, and he studied the battlefields and their lessons. He may have drawn inspiration from the Chemulpo landings for his own crowning masterstroke 45 years later. One consequence of the Korean War was that the USA would remain an ‘Asian’ power, with military garrisons spread across the region for an indefinite period. This has been seen as a vital stabilizing factor, a provocative intrusion, an anachronism, or even all three. In Vietnam, the USA would fight what was not so much a Communist movement as a nationalist one, a relic from the Second World War, when so many nationalist groups had fought both against the Empire of a conquering Japan, and with the Japanese against long-established ones, including that of the USA. Defeat in Vietnam 20 years later did not mark the end of the United States’ presence in Asia, as it had for France. On the contrary, the USA’s departure from Vietnam in a sense strengthened its position in support of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; and economic and cultural factors remained vital elements in American ‘imperial power’ in Asia. The former Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro noted that it was after US forces withdrew from Indochina and Thailand in the 1970s that economic growth in SouthEast Asia gained momentum and economic relations with the USA began to expand. Edward Luttwak has noted the irony that ‘The American conquest of Vietnam began the moment the last American helicopter flew out of Saigon.’19

The USA and Britain The British and Americans had been concerned about the fate of their possessions in the face of the Japanese onslaught; but the British were also concerned about the consequences of American victory. For most of the 1930s, American military planners continued to consider war in the Atlantic and Canada against Britain (RED); but by the end of that decade this planning was merely to exercise against the most demanding case, and the threat in the East was seen to come from Germany (BLACK). It was also clear that the German-Soviet Pact made the USSR an unlikely ally in the Far East. The only realistic ally for the USA was Britain, its empire and the Dominions; and yet by strange irony, the war in the Pacific would also represent an imperial struggle between RED and its reluctant but de facto ally, the USA, which had not been foreseen in interwar planning. American military planners were mainly Anglo-Saxon in cultural outlook, but the views of the American public were more complex and

Amercia advances 141 strongly isolationist, with the result that politically, such an alliance was far from obvious right up until the attack on Pearl Harbour. The residue of Anglophobia remained a powerful theme in the USA’s relationship with Britain throughout the war and into the 1950s. Nevertheless the idea that British Imperialism was at odds with American ideals remained powerful until 1948, when the Soviet threat and the demise of the British Empire ensured that the USA would be dominant in any Anglo-American relationship. The new relationship was then seen to enhance American power, rather than to exploit or diminish it. Anglophobia appeared in virulent form soon after the First World War ended, for Britain was seen, as the New Republic pointed out, as ‘the only great power which is in a position seriously to damage or threaten the United States’.20 In 1921, Hearst newspapers began a campaign attacking the positive view of Britain portrayed in school textbooks which were ‘falsifications of history . . . written by men of “British mind” ’.21 Anglophobia and opposition to British policy in Ireland were the forces in American politics which impeded the Versailles Treaty and put a Republican in the White House. The British Empire was termed by some American Anglophobes, ‘the evil empire’ which had imposed slavery on three fifths of the world.22 The US Navy noted that every commercial rival of Great Britain had eventually found itself at war with the Royal Navy, and Congressman H.C. Pell maintained that the USA was now in ‘Germany’s position as the chief enemy of England’. He urged that the USA seize ‘the maritime control of the world’.23 Ironically, the Four Powers Treaty of 1922 was opposed by many Congressmen even though it ended Britain’s alliance with Japan, because it was seen to make the USA an ally of Britain. The US Navy saw the Treaty rather differently. In 1920, Britain’s battle fleet was the size of the next five powers combined. Its willingness to cut its fleet 2 years later was greeted with astonishment by the US Navy which had always had the utmost regard for the Royal Navy’s ‘imponderable moral ascendancy’. ‘Having measured four years in blood to hold a historical primacy, they meekly surrendered with mere ink four centuries of strategic tradition.’24 The Battle of Jutland was never the ‘Trafalgar’ that some had expected; and by 1922 the Royal Navy had taken on the aura of failure – of a force in Spenglerian decline. Anglophobia in the 1920s was about commercial rivalry, naval parity and apprehension about British strength. In the 1930s, Anglophobia was more about British weakness and fear that the USA was paying to prop up a decaying empire which still ruled one quarter of the globe. Those who wanted the USA to build a larger navy were accused of wanting to use American power to save Britain’s decaying empire, ‘to pull England’s chestnuts out of the fire’.25 Naval rebuilding in 1938 was condemned by many Congressmen who feared that they would be mere auxiliaries of the

142 Imperial tectonics Royal Navy in pursuit of a policy made in Downing Street, not the State Department. The Republican Senator Hiram Johnson noted of America’s new ships that ‘We may need it to whip the Japs; but we don’t need it as an auxiliary of Great Britain.’26 By the end of 1938 Britain’s popularity was very low in American public opinion. Polls in 1939 showed 83 per cent of Americans were against sending American troops to help Britain and France. In October 1939, polls showed that 40 per cent of Americans believed that it was British propaganda that had caused the USA to go to war in 1917; there was concern that British propagandists were at work again to inveigle the USA into another war. Many in Congress continued to oppose Britain, equating Hitler’s expansion to that of British imperialism; as H.S. Johnson, director of Roosevelt’s National Recovery Administration put it, ‘Britain is fighting her own war . . . for continued imperial domination over weaker and exploited, subdued and subject peoples.’27 In June 1940, Stafford Cripps predicted bleakly that after the War, the world would be divided into four big power blocks: an Asian one under Japan, a Euro-Asian one under the USSR, a European one under Germany and an American one under the USA, incorporating Great Britain, with the balance of power shifting to the USA. Henry Luce saw the opening up of global markets as ushering in an era in which the USA would be the guardian of that environment; and the expanded Asian market would be essential to it. As early as 1941, in his article ‘The American Century’, Luce urged Americans to prove that American democracy could create A vital international economy and . . . an international moral order. In any sort of partnership with the British Empire, Great Britain is perfectly willing that the USA should assume the role of senior partner . . . With due regard for the varying problems of the British Commonwealth, what we want will be okay with them.28 Even before the USA had entered the war, Gaullists were convinced that it would be the real ‘winner’. In September 1941, Verité declared, ‘The Americans are going to be the principal, eventual winners. The role of the USA is hourly becoming more significant. It is they who will be dictating the terms of the peace to the Boche.’29 The USA justified its own role in the Asian–Pacific Theatre partly on the grounds that it was anti-imperialist; but some noted the uneasy irony that ‘It will be a long, hard war, but after it is over Uncle Sam will do the talking in this world.’30 Many commentators noted the advantages of British defeat and the dismemberment of its empire. Senator G.P. Nye suggested that German victory might help US trade ‘by removing our chief competitor’.31 Nye also noted, following the attack on Pearl Harbour, ‘It’s just what the British planned for us.’32

Amercia advances 143 British interests in the Far East before the Second World War were greater than those of the USA, and there was considerable commercial friction between the two.33 In autumn 1942, the British War Office feared that the Americans wished to replace a Pax Britannica with a Pax Americana. Churchill encouraged the USA to play a wider role in the world, ‘The people of the United States cannot escape world responsibility’,34 but he would be dismayed when this entailed encroachments on the British Empire and a relative diminution of British power. Churchill believed that the Anglo-Saxon peoples and their civilization could share power ‘in order to confer the benefit of freedom on the rest of the world’.35 In their hopes for a new post-war world order, the British were caught between two contradictory fears: one, that the USA would be isolationist and cut itself off from their concerns; and on the other hand, that American imperialism would take over their empire and expand its commercial interests at their expense. The prospect of some equal relationship seemed elusive, and would certainly have been unacceptable to the USA. Britain’s Dominion’s Secretary Clement Atlee reported that prominent Americans spoke as if the British Empire was in the process of dissolution, and there was concern in the Dominions over the Economic imperialism of American business interests, which is quite active under the cloak of benevolent and avuncular internationalism. In particular, the activities of Pan American Airways and of radio interests in staking out claims for the post-war period are viewed with considerable apprehension.36 General Brehon Somervell saw the world protected by a ring of American bases, with markets and resources available to the USA by the maintenance of an ‘Open Door’ policy. On 10 January 1942, the Chicago Tribune declared that the United States was, ‘The natural leader of the democratic forces. If there is to be a partnership between the United States and Britain, we are, by every right, the controlling partner. We can get along without them. They can’t get along without us.’ Even in June 1942, a Gallup poll found that less than 20 per cent of Americans felt that there should be closer cooperation with Britain after the war. Polls that month showed that 60 per cent of Americans believed that the British were oppressors, and the South East Asia Command (SEAC) was often nicknamed Save England’s Asian Colonies. Even Roosevelt noted that ‘We will have more trouble with Great Britain after the war than we are having with Germany now.’37 Men like Hornbeck and Morgenthau realized that Britain was ruined and spoke of the opportunities to get British agreement to virtually any plan, given that the British were ‘dependent upon us for their preservation’.38 Morgenthau maintained that the US Army did not want the British in the Pacific, and that if they were to be there, they should have an ineffective

144 Imperial tectonics role – it was to be an American victory. He noted that the power of the dollar would mean that The United States, when the war is over, is going to settle what kind of Europe it is going to be . . . Who is going to pay for it? We are going to pay for it. The English are going to be busted . . . I think it had better be Franklin Roosevelt, without Winston, who writes the peace treaty.39 This new Anglophobia was not based merely on isolationism, but also upon a swelling American nationalism, the urge to further the USA’s national interests and in effect a growing imperial sentiment, although it could seldom be acknowledged as such. The US Undersecretary of State Adolf Berle gloated of the lend-lease of fifty un-seaworthy destroyers to Britain, ‘With one single gulp we have managed to obtain a large part of the British Empire, in return for nothing.’40 Australia and New Zealand had been forced to turn to the USA for security and resented the way in which Britain had apparently neglected their defence, although Britain’s dire circumstances in 1940 were evident enough. In summer 1940, the fostering of an American belief in ‘common interest and close ideological ties with the peoples of Australasia’ was regarded by the Australian Department of Information as being ‘an Australian defence measure of the first importance’. The Prime Minister, Menzies, told his Advisory War Panel in November 1940 that in the event of the defeat of Great Britain, ‘a regrouping of the English-speaking peoples might arise’.41 At the same time, Australia and New Zealand soon came to regard the USA’s replacing of Britain as even more culturally challenging, and by the end of the war, were keen to do all they could to support the British Empire’s revival in the Far East. Australian officers such as General Sir Thomas Blamey and Lieutenant General E.K. Smart were angry that Australia had had little say in the conduct of the American-led war. It dawned on Australia that it might in effect become a satellite of the USA; and as the war drew to a close, anti-American sentiments were expressed – very different to those of 1941. The relationship between Britain and Australia would, however, never be the same again. The Australians and New Zealanders insisted on representing themselves at the surrender ceremonies, and Commonwealth, not British-led, forces formed part of the occupation force, then under the command of the US Eighth Army. By the time of the Teheran Conference of 28 November–8 December 1943, it was clear to both the British and to Roosevelt that ‘at the end of the war there would be only two great powers in existence – Russia and America . . . ’.42 From January 1944, the USA’s most important relationship was with the USSR rather than Britain; even the Anglophile Harry Hopkins feared that Britain might be trying to inveigle it into an alliance against the USSR. Churchill felt that the Americans were effectively taking over the British armed forces or causing them to be misdirected.43

Amercia advances 145 Harry Hopkins was, however, alarmed by the extent of American Anglophobic opinions, and he observed in August 1945 that ‘To hear some people talk about the British, you would think the British were our potential enemies.’44 The US State Department also feared that undermining European interests in the Far East would weaken the position of the USA, which was apprehensive about the prospect of nationalist revolts, and many of these would soon become synonymous with Communist revolution, which often seemed no more than a ‘flag of convenience’ for those revolts. The siting of the headquarters of the UN in New York symbolized the end of European domination of world affairs. The USA became increasingly aware of its new power, and neo-imperial instincts were hard to suppress. Between 1939 and 1945, American GNP grew from $88.6 billion to $198.7 billion, establishing the grounds for the USA’s post-war dominance over a ravaged global economy. Apart from neutral countries, most developed nations were bankrupt. The American journalist T.H. White described Morgenthau’s world view at Bretton Woods in July 1944: ‘Only the British understood [the] American dream of restoration. The British had centralized the 19th Century world that America was now trying to re-create.’45 Roosevelt would use the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US Dollar to force open the British and French empires’ trading systems to American industrial produce. The American ‘Empire’ had much of the British imperial ethos about it, and the belief that foreign policy had a ‘civilizing mission’ was evident in the American press. In July 1942, the Christian Science Monitor asked, ‘How many have considered what a different balance the world might have today were not the Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek) a Christian and his wife American-educated?’ As Japan surrendered, President Truman spoke on the radio denouncing the ‘forces of evil’ represented by Japan which had threatened to overthrow God’s civilization. MacArthur referred to the war as a ‘Holy mission’ to save civilization, the Japanese having rejected enlightenment and progress to oppress and enslave.46 As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, MacArthur believed himself to be embarked upon a civilizing mission; bringing democracy and Christianity. He distributed thousands of bibles and claimed to have brought about a ‘spiritual revolution’, which ‘almost overnight tore asunder a theory and practice of life built upon 2,000 years of history and tradition and legend’.47 In 1951, MacArthur remarked that in terms of modern civilization, the Japanese were in a ‘very tuitionary condition’ and ‘a nation of twelve-year-olds’.48 He maintained that ‘The future and indeed the existence of America, were irrevocably entwined with Asia and its island outposts . . . Western civilization’s last earth frontier.’49 The US Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, had in effect made it a condition of the USA’s helping Britain to defeat Hitler that Britain and its empire should be bankrupted;50 and despite the many similarities in outlook between Britain and the USA, Anglophobia remained rife in the

146 Imperial tectonics USA in the immediate post-war years. Henry Wallace, former Vice President, but now Secretary of Agriculture, condemned Winston Churchill’s ‘shocking’ ‘Iron Curtain Speech’ at Fulton on the grounds that, ‘It was not a primary objective of the United States to save the British Empire’,51 and that Britain was now trying to lure the USA into an anti-Soviet alliance. Victory in the Second World War made the USA, a non-Asian nation, the continent’s dominant power. The scale of the Soviet threat to the USA soon also persuaded most Americans that an alliance with Britain was indispensable to defend American national interests around the world; and some even regretted that Britain chose to withdraw from its empire so rapidly, especially in the Middle East. In practice, over the next 50 years the new American Empire went on to inherit many of the imperial security responsibilities of the British Empire in the Levant, Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and the Far East. Some saw this as merely the continuation of an instinct for dominion by military conquest.52 In many ways, the USA also inherited the mission of the British Empire to take ideas of personal and collective freedoms to the rest of the world, if necessary by force. Its Victorian tone would have been very acceptable to Britain’s empire builders, but less comfortable among the more cynical policy makers of Britain in the aftermath of the Second World War. The USA was both loved and resented by many Asians, who often found American and Western culture materially and morally attractive and gratifying, yet somehow also alien, domineering and, therefore, unwelcome. Debates about the purpose of an American military presence in Asia, and the methods employed in pursuing it, became even more intense during the period of the USA’s war in Vietnam. After the Cold War, the USA was in the supreme military position53 and had an instinct for global leadership. ‘The drive to inflict American leadership upon the world . . . reflects a definition of US interests that is a tapestry of ideological, security and economic factors. To remove one thread would unravel the entire fabric.’54 Madeleine Albright asserted that ‘If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see farther into the future.’55 In 1998, enjoying this supremacy, and before the USA had embarked on its ‘Global War on Terror’, Ralph Peters described the growing wealth of the USA in the Information Age, by which its empire would enjoy an even greater advantage over others. ‘We are not Trojans. We are mightier. We rule the skies and seas and possess the power to rule the land when we are sufficiently roused.’56 He noted that this power would cause envy in those who would ultimately attack a complacent West, and those future enemies were the ‘perfect embodiment of all the evil potential that lies at the heart of man’. They would be let loose on the children of the West who in turn would be ‘sent out to fight the legions of darkness57 . . . Man not space is the last frontier’.58 Peters struck a Darwinian note, asserting that in this

Amercia advances 147 great global competition, the losers would have only themselves and their ancestors to blame. Peters, often cast as the wayward radical, had anticipated the new orthodoxy of American strategic thought that was to dominate the next decade. Ideas that were commonplace a century ago, but had since been on the margins of academic respectability, resurfaced. For example, it was suggested that an ‘Anglosphere’, with its strong traditions of civil society, would be uniquely suited to compete in the coming century of technological, economic and social change.59 American self-belief had echoes of the European empires that the USA helped to bring down. Alexander Joffe, for example, maintained that ‘Ultimately, the only answer for a stable and prosperous planet will be a global system that is structurally and morally similar to the American Union’,60 in a sense the most ambitious imperial prospectus ever. Yet, the idea that the USA was somehow an imperial nation was vehemently opposed by many. Thomas Barnett, for example rejected the notion on very traditional grounds, ironically in seeking to explain a novel strategic geography.61 In effect, however, he merely affirmed American exceptionalism. He regarded empires as narrowly malign, and since the USA’s motives were benign, its objectives and actions should not be seen as imperial. ‘America has displayed a generosity towards its empire that renders the word ludicrous.’62 ‘All attempts to explain ourselves in unselfish terms are immediately dismissed by the isolationist wings of both left and right as either sheer hypocrisy or betrayal of our historical roots.’63 Nevertheless, American imperial self-confidence seemed evident: ‘The American military is now the strongest the world has ever known . . . stronger than the Wehrmacht in 1940 . . . than the legions of Rome at the height of Roman power. For years to come, no other nation is likely even to try to rival American might.’64 Comparisons between the American Empire and Britain’s seemed increasingly valid and were analysed in a flood of literature by historians such as Niall Ferguson.65 Max Boot maintained that when it came to protecting the USA’s imperial interests and fighting enemies all over the world, ‘There is no finer example of how to do this cheaply and effectively than the British Empire.’66

10 Nippon resurgat

Japan’s military catastrophe in 1945 was also seen in a cultural context. Like many Europeans after the Russian defeat in 1905, some Japanese attributed their own bloody demise in 1945 to decadent worldliness: ‘We have been too wedded to selfish ethics; we have forgotten true progress.’ Defeat could even be seen to be culturally and spiritually beneficial – echoes of Solovev and Bruisov. ‘How else can Japan be saved except by losing and coming to its senses. We will lead the way. We will die as harbingers of Japan’s new life. That’s where our real satisfaction lies . . . .’1 Japan would rise again, transformed; renouncing 40 years of military action that had been in large part responsible for the rise of Communist regimes in both Russia and China. Just as the Russo-Japanese War was largely responsible for the eventual demise of the Tsar and the rise of the Japanese client Lenin, so it was war with Japan that undermined Chiang Kai-shek, devastated China and helped to bring the Communists to power under Mao Zedong.2 No wonder that in 1972, Chairman Mao reputedly thanked the visiting Japanese Prime Minister for his country, Japan’s invasion of China which had destroyed the regime which he had sought to replace.3

Economic rebirth and confused identity An enduring feature of the struggle between empires in Asia has been access to its huge economy. The frictions have been over raw materials, markets, investment and protecting labour. They have also been about how to use the military power that flows from economic power to protect national interests, which are often seen to include national culture as well as wealth and political freedom of action. After 1945, Japan regained the image of the ‘good Asian country’, while the Korean War soon gave Communist China the image of the ‘bad Asian country’. Under American rule, Japan adopted a Constitution, Article Nine of which prohibited it from having armed forces and waging war.4 Japan now turned wholeheartedly to the construction of a first-class economy, with all the advantages that would flow from it.

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Before the war, military power had seemed a necessary element in the equation; but now ironically, the military power which Japan needed for its economic and political security was provided free of charge by the nation which Japan had only recently felt compelled to fight to achieve that security. There was a political and cultural price to pay for this, yet in 1941, despite much theorizing and initial and attractive appearances to the contrary, Japan had not been able to offer its Asian vassals a true ‘Asian model’. By contrast, the USA now seemed to offer a broadly attractive Western model, which the Japanese and many other Asians felt disposed to adopt, or at least to adapt. On surrender in 1945, Japan’s caretaker Government under Prince Higashikuni authorized payments to the zaibatsu cartels for unfulfilled war contracts, ensuring that they would survive, albeit at huge cost in inflation and hardship for the Japanese people. Japan’s prospects did not look good. The USA had spared Russia paying Japan reparations in 1905, now MacArthur announced that Japan would pay no reparations, but even so he told The Chicago Tribune, ‘Japan has fallen to a fourth-rate nation. It will not be possible for her to emerge again as a strong nation in the world.’5 From the outset of the occupation, the USA sought to dismantle the zaibatsu which were seen to be elemental to Japanese militarism. Edwin Reischauer, a post-war ambassador to Japan, wondered if the Japanese would ever again be able to achieve a reasonable standard of living, arguing that Japan should have opened up its economy to foreign investment in the post-war years and relied on its cheap labour to attract even more. In the mid-1950s, US officials noted that the Japanese were intent on preserving their unique culture, which they believed to be superior to that of the USA. Equally, the Japanese continued to be unsure whether they were part of the Far East or the Far West, rather as the Russians could not be sure if they were Europeans or Asians. The Korean War brought a change in American policy, the zaibatsu were now to be saved; it was thus, indirectly, thanks to the Russians/Soviets that the foundations of the modern Japanese economic superpower were laid.6 In 1944, Japanese industrial production was twice that of 1934, but by 1946 half that of 1934. By 1956, Japan was the world’s largest shipbuilder. The Japanese sought access to raw materials and markets, but also economic control over their domestic economy. This required control over the ownership of capital, and that depended upon having certain financial structures and a propensity to save to generate investment. This was a familiar model, for the Japanese have always sought to maintain control over their own capital flows and to avoid reliance on foreign investment. There remains relatively little stock of foreign capital in Japan; in 1885, 1905 and 1945 the Japanese were prepared to make sacrifices to generate their own savings and investment, giving them greater control over their own affairs, thereby preserving their national culture and identity.

150 Imperial tectonics After 1945, the USA encouraged Japan to develop its markets in regions formerly associated with its military expansion. John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson were determined to replace Britain’s trading position in the Far East with one based on the US–Japanese model, with Japan’s economic power acting as a bulwark against Communism in the region. In the late 1940s, Dulles encouraged Japan to engage with South-East Asia, trading manufactured exports for raw materials. In later years the region would also provide the Japanese with a source of cheap labour for their companies. Exports to South-East Asia would also soak up Japanese production, protecting American manufacturing from the dumping of Japanese surpluses in the USA. Ironically this Asian economic regime shared many ideas with Japan’s former and ill-fated Co-Prosperity Sphere; it was now the American hope that Japanese demand for raw materials would stimulate the economies of its South-East Asian allies. The USA believed that this arrangement was preferable to Japan’s having some kind of special economic relationship with China. Trading with China would, in the words of the Secretary of Defense C.E. Wilson, be like ‘selling firearms to the Indians’.7 In July 1952, Japan was obliged to enter into a secret agreement with the USA restricting its trading relations with China, beyond those agreed in public. Trade with the USA was seen as a means of reinforcing Japan in the face of Communism, and between 1953 and 1956 Japanese exports to the USA doubled. The USA wanted to keep Japan economically dependent, but there were soon historical echoes in the concern about the effect of these imports from Japan on American manufacturing jobs. Pressure on Japan to curb its exports grew, and by the late 1950s Japan had agreed to reduce its exports to the USA. Yet it was hard for the USA to insist that Japan should impose such restraint but not allow it to trade with China instead. There was concern between 1954 and 1956 that Japan might even become a Communist state,8 and ironically President Eisenhower eventually agreed that Japan must be allowed to trade with China to keep it in the Western sphere. The Japanese saw the strategic logic rather differently. After the war that had freed Asian nations not only from European imperialism but also from Japanese occupation, those nations which Japan had sought to colonize now sought its economic help. Japan believed that its capital would be at least as effective in pursuing its national objectives as American military power would be in pursuing American interests.9 The Japanese thus distanced themselves from the American idea that the ‘dominoes’ of Asia would fall to Communism.10 It suited Japan to be seen as a bulwark against Communism and to have the USA maintain a military presence in Japan in exchange for its economic freedom; but many influential Japanese saw little cause for such defences. Japan hardly felt threatened until the end of the Cold War with the perceived menace from a well-armed and economically desperate North Korea. On 27 January 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida

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observed that ‘We do not have the slightest expectation that the Communist countries will invade Japan.’11 Just as Japan benefited from the Korean War, so too it suited the Japanese economically to have the USA bogged down militarily in Vietnam. The war was good for the Japanese economy and it ensured a greater degree of American accommodation of Japanese wishes. The Japanese were intent on trading with potential ‘dominoes’ and with the Communist states that apparently threatened to topple them. Thus Japan continued to trade with East-Asian Communist nations, especially North Vietnam, throughout the Vietnam War. Before the Vietnam War, the USA had a trade surplus with Japan, thereafter it would have a deficit; it seems likely that the War was worth about $1 billion per year to the Japanese economy. However, any thought of American defeat or loss of resolve was highly alarming, as it might have led to a partial American withdrawal from the region and threatened the security upon which Japanese prosperity depended. Growing prosperity in the 1960s allowed the Japanese to see themselves as a pillar of the global system, on a par with the USA and Western Europe. By 1967, Japan lay third behind the USA and the USSR, although with hindsight the true GNP of the USSR at that time must remain a mystery. China could not become the market that Japan hoped for because of the self-destruction caused by Communist economic policies. Despite that, trade between the two countries increased from $136 million in 1963 to $560 million in 1969, and was widely regarded as that with the greatest potential for further growth. In the 1960s, President de Gaulle referred to the visiting Japanese Prime Minister as a transistor salesman; but the phenomenal scale of Japan’s economic success, and its sometimes disturbing implications, were only fully appreciated in the 1970s. Commentators started to discuss the consequences of Japanese economic power, and whether it would also be expressed in political power and military regeneration. ‘The Japanese are no longer coming. They have arrived.’12 By the late 1960s, American patience with Japan was wearing thin. It seemed to many that Japan had no affection for, or true alliance with, the USA but regarded itself as having to cooperate in a relationship which it would exploit for its own advantage. It was hard to deny the Japanese such a privilege if other nations were entitled to pursue their own national agendas, and the Japanese took great care never to overstep the mark where they could be justifiably criticized. However, it was often hard for Western nations, especially the USA, to identify exactly where that mark might be, let alone whether Japan could be proved to have overstepped it. Nevertheless, it was felt that Japan was profiting from American defence guarantees while failing to pay its way. The Japanese understood that they could only prosper if the international trading system remained open to them, and this required international

152 Imperial tectonics cooperation and support for international institutions. Yet, Japan’s trading partners still saw their own positions continue to deteriorate. Japan survived the oil shock of the 1970s and became the world’s most efficient user of energy. Japan’s trade amounted to 6 per cent of the world total in 1970, and other nations became ever more irritated by its exportoriented industrial policy and the trade barriers that seemed to protect the Japanese market. During the 1970s, Japan’s trade increased by 700 per cent, but it was only after 1982 that it achieved consistent trade surpluses; and 28 per cent of the USA’s trade deficit was with Japan.13 Business, rather than aircraft carriers suddenly gave Japan global reach.14 The USA increasingly saw Japan as a major competitor, and their relationship became at least as much about bilateral trade as about regional security. Henry Kissinger declared that strategic cooperation was only possible when there was economic cooperation, which trade statistics seemed to question. Japan continued to pursue its own economic interests; in 1978, China and Japan signed a treaty of Peace and Friendship. There were also talks about integrating China into a system of raw materials supply, investment and technology. In 1980, Japan had only one of the world’s top ten banks, but by 1986 it had seven. American economic and cultural panic at the rise of Japan centred on matters of great substance, such as American debts, but was often portrayed symbolically in terms of the loss of leadership in key technologies, such as semiconductors. Pessimists recommended that the USA abandon any industry in which the Japanese had decided to compete.15 By 1986–7 the US trade deficit with Japan was $59 billion. This, combined with high US interest rates, made Japanese investment in the USA highly attractive. However, growing American criticism caused the Japanese to switch more investment and exports to Asia, although this trend had already begun, for even in 1985 Japan was China’s leading trading partner. The conventional economic explanations of commentators such as Hugh Patrick now seemed inadequate in the face of Japan’s remarkable achievements. The so-called revisionists of the 1980s, such as Chalmers Johnson (MITI and the Japanese Miracle)16 and Clyde Prestowitz (Trading Places)17 purveyed a more radical and menacing theory, that Japan’s economic miracle had all along been due to its different form of democracy, a brand of capitalism that was somehow not of a genuinely Western sort, and that all had been directed by the usually hidden hand of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and LDP manipulators. With the rise of Japanese economic power in the 1980s, some wondered how this would be expressed on the international stage. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro spoke of the need to spread Japan’s ideals of Yamatoism around the world; but by its very self-proclaimed uniqueness, Japan seemed unable to offer a viable political, social and intellectual model to others, despite its widely copied industrial approach and its talents in aesthetics.

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Notwithstanding the economic tensions, Japan had to be concerned for its own security in a dangerous world, and its relationship with the USA remained central to it. In the 1980s, fear of the USSR ensured that strategic cooperation between the USA and Japan would be close. In 1981, during a visit to the USA, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko formally used the term ‘alliance’. This caused such an upset in Japan that he had to pretend that there had been a mis-translation of his words. The same ‘mistranslation’ occurred when Prime Minister Nakasone spoke in the USA in 1983 of Japan’s role as the West’s ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ in the Pacific, and of the USA and Japan constituting a ‘community of destiny’.18 In 1984, a joint strategy for the region assigned Japan the task of patrolling 1,000 miles of sea lanes; Japan became steadily more confident in international affairs. In 1987, Japan’s nominal per capita income ($19,553) overtook the USA’s ($18,570), thanks largely to an inflated exchange rate; but despite that, Japan’s trade surplus continued to rise to almost $100 billion in 1987, mainly with the USA. This created the impression that Japan was behaving selfishly. Japan’s perceived new assertiveness was reinforced by books such as Ishihara Shintaro’s A Japan that Can Say No.19 In 1987, the Japanese social critic, Eto Jun noted how Japan had rebuilt itself since 1945 and exulted of Japan, Hey boy, you still call after him, but he is no longer willing to do all you want him to . . . Under the mask you gave us, our own physiognomy is taking shape . . . We feel the time has come when we should show it to the world. The real face is our own global strategy.20 Marvin Wolf’s The Japanese Conspiracy21 described how Japan was plotting to takeover Western industry. Russell Braddon’s The Other Hundred Years War22 asserted Japan’s long-standing struggle to match the West. Clyde Prestowitz saw the rise of Japan as heralding ‘The End of the American Century’.23 In Trading Places he maintained that this was surely the first time in history that a territory in the process of being colonized had actually paid for the right to defend the colonizer.24 On 19 October 1987, the US stock market fell sharply, in large part due to the US trade deficit which persisted despite a depreciated dollar; many saw this as an indicator that the USA had overstretched its strategic capacities. In May 1987, the Japanese MITI gave warning to the USA of the consequences should Japan refuse to buy US Government bonds, and even such a warning had an immediate effect on American mortgage rates. The rise of the Yen gave the Japanese major ‘shopping’ opportunities in the USA, both as consumers and investors. To some, the power of the Yen made life in the USA like that of the expatriate living in a developing country. It even seemed that the Japanese were building a separate economy

154 Imperial tectonics of their own within the USA, which had now itself become part of its Co-Prosperity Sphere. In the late 1980s, Hawaii was sometimes jokingly referred to as the 24th Prefecture of Tokyo, and suggestions were made that the USA might sell Hawaii to Japan in lieu of its debts.25 The MITI think tank even speculated that the USA’s debts to Japan might be paid off by exporting elderly Japanese from their overcrowded islands to retirement homes in the USA where they would be cared for by low-paid Americans. In 1989, in a speech laden with historical ironies, Kurokawa Masaaki, the chairman of Nomura Securities International, reportedly floated the idea of a common currency with the USA and the establishment of a joint economic community in California, to enter which neither Americans nor Japanese would require visas. California would take several million skilled Japanese workers to complement the state’s own pool of cheap labour, raising productivity to Japanese levels.26 In 1988, Daniel Burstein told a cautionary tale about how by 2004 Japan had become the world’s richest country and the financially battered USA was obliged to accommodate Japanese strategic wishes – Pax Nipponica.27 As a debtor, the USA would have to permit ever-greater Japanese control over the running of its economy and endure austerity measures imposed on it by international institutions. Burstein believed that American indebtedness could be used as a political lever by the Japanese, and that the USA might even face a ‘financial Pearl Harbour’. There was a growing feeling that the USA might face a militarily resurgent Japan, bent on revenge and buoyed up by its ‘miracle economy’.28 In the care of Japan, moreover, it is not just any foreign country to whom we’ve sold our birthright. Japan is our mirror image and our fiercest competitor. Japan is strong precisely where we are weak . . . Japan is becoming a superpower in its own right. A Japanese empire is being born that will pose a fundamental challenge to American power in every sphere.29 Many urged that the USA adopt aspects of the successful Japanese model and set up its own MITI to organize and support American strategic industries. Demoralized Americans were urged to set aside selfish economic practices and to pull together, E Pluribus Unum, lest their nation go under in the face of Japan’s strategic economic onslaught.30 Predictions that the USA would lose its innovative lead, and the wealth generation arising from it, were misplaced, but the issue of debt remained: could the USA continue to sustain its twin deficits, which seemed likely to continue to grow, and maintain its supreme position in the world while remaining its largest debtor? In 1988, a poll showed that 68 per cent of Americans believed Japan to be the greatest threat to the USA, compared with only 22 per cent citing the USSR;31 in 1990, Lieutenant General H.C. Stackpole asserted that

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American forces were based in Japan to prevent the rise of the ‘monster’ of Japanese nationalism.32 There was a further genre of literature predicting the decline of American power and the rise of Japan at a time when the familiar threat from the USSR was looking increasingly implausible. The Coming War with Japan of 1991 by G. Friedman and M. LeBard33 highlighted American concerns about Japan’s growing economic strength and some believed that the USA had lost its independence after over 200 years. ‘If we become a fourth-world country with all our assets owned abroad, won’t our political, economic and even leisure decisions come to be made abroad? What are the hazards of becoming a colonial territory again?’.34 Robert Kearns’ Zaibatsu America: How Japanese Firms are Colonizing Vital US Industries35 encouraged these fears. Yet between 1989 and 1993 Japanese investments in the USA fell by 50 per cent. The more the Americans complained about exports to, and investment in the USA, the less they could complain about the Japanese sending these elsewhere and building up their position in Asia in its new ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’. Between January 1980 and January 1990, Japan invested overseas ten times what it had over the previous 30 years, and the USA’s share of the world’s economic production was falling. Experts are frequently wrong about Japan, as Prestowitz, a leading prophet of American doom maintained, although he may well have been wrong himself.36 Even in the late 1980s the overestimation of Japan’s strength or, rather, underestimation of its latent weaknesses was evident. Japanese assertiveness soon seemed like hubris, for in September 1990 the Japanese ‘bubble’ burst. The Tokyo stock market fell by 48 per cent and property prices began their slide. By 1990, Japanese overseas investment was falling fast, from $137 billion in 1987 to $43.6 billion in 1990. As so often over the previous hundred years, the West found it hard to assess Japan. On the one hand some criticized Japan’s incoherent, chaotic, impenetrable decision-making, while others asserted the quality of its supreme, focussed, strategic-planning. In the economic doldrums of the 1990s, those who had cited MITI as the agent of Japan’s economic prowess now had to explain why the workers of miracles had ceased to perform them. Their first reaction was often denial that there was a problem, or even to maintain that the bursting bubble was but a Government policy to punish speculators. Others who had never accepted the ‘miracle’ model for Japan provided a new revisionist explanation. This held that the magic hands of MITI and the LDP fixers had never been as effective as some in the 1980s had maintained.37 By the late 1990s, American comment on the woes of the Japanese economy was often triumphalist. M.B. Zuckerman exhorted, ‘Let us celebrate an American triumph . . . The mantra is privatize, deregulate and do not interfere in the market.’38 Unfortunately, the American formula for success, while valid in many respects, was built largely on debt financed by others; and there were growing doubts about the staying power of the USA.

156 Imperial tectonics The USA’s position in the Asia-Pacific region after 1945 was shaped by two factors, the Cold War with the USSR and American economic dominance. By the early 1990s, the first factor had essentially disappeared and some believed that ‘American economic hegemony has waned more slowly but no less dramatically.’39 Economic power was seen to be more important in international relations than ever, and the USA seemed to be in relative decline while the power of many Asian economies was growing rapidly. American decline in Asia was seen by many Asians to be linked to its moral and spiritual deficiencies associated with the USA’s failure to solve its own social and economic problems.40 It was also possible that Japan had not been weakened to the extent that some claimed. Ivan Hall lamented the USA’s ‘colossal inattention and euphoria toward Japan in the 1990s’.41 He was convinced that the USA had been systematically deceived by the Japanese and that, despite the apparent economic setbacks of the 1990s, the Japanese had grown increasingly powerful and continued to evade fair trade to gain advantage over the USA. Despite Japan’s economic recession, its current account surplus over the decade of the 1990s was $987 billion, 2.37 times that of the 1980s. Its external assets increased fourfold in value in the 1990s. There was similar concern in parts of Europe, in France in particular, which saw Japanese investments transforming the UK into a ‘Japanese aircraft carrier’. Le Nouvel Economiste proclaimed that ‘The Japanese are Killers’ and explained ‘How the Japanese have patiently and pitilessly organized the encirclement of European economies’,42 rather as the Japanese themselves had spoken of European empires in Asia 50 years earlier encircling them. In 1991, the French Prime Minister, Edith Cresson saw the issue as one of Japanese world conquest. French criticism of international investments and takeovers had previously been levelled at American multinational corporations; but now complaints about the Japanese seemed to overlook similar transactions by Americans and other Europeans, thereby taking on a cultural dimension. Fifty years earlier it might have been termed racial rather than cultural. The 1990s were, according to Hayashi Fumio, the lost decade for Japan, lacking political and economic reform and resulting in reduced international power and influence. It became clear that the hype of Japan as No.1 had been misplaced, and that after the Cold War it was instead the USA that was ‘Number One’. It also became clear that the scale of Japanese power would have to be measured in proportion, not only to that of the USA, but also to the rising power of China which clearly viewed its rightful historical position to be that of ‘first-chop nation’, ‘the Middle Kingdom’ to which tribute would eventually have to be paid. By 2004, Japanese wages were twenty to thirty times higher than those in China, yet Japanese industry retained many advantages, for example, in fast computers, nanotechnology, automobile technology and pharmaceuticals, and it was estimated that only one fifth of Chinese exports competed

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with those of Japan.43 Some saw Japan in the new millennium as entering its third great modernization. Its apparent recovery in early 2004 was partly due to corporate restructuring, but largely to a massive demand from China and the rest of Asia for Japanese products.44 ‘Japan and China are so complementary. A greater, stronger more successful China helps Japanese industries sharpen their focus on what they are good at.’45 The energy generated by China’s economic growth was seen as a new kamikaze divine wind, blowing Japan’s Kansai region from the rocks of economic recession. In 2003, the Director of Osaka’s Port and Harbour Bureau maintained that ‘something like a big industrial complex is being created with China’.46 Nevertheless, the Japanese Government’s debt stood at 160 per cent of GDP, the population was ageing, and the prospect of economic dependence on a vibrant China, with its political implications, could prove uncomfortable. In the longer term, Japan sees the growth of China’s virtual empire with apprehension and resentment, threatening the local economic foundations which underpin Japan’s regional status.

Cultural reflections There have been frequent reminders in Western media about the alien nature of Japanese culture.47 Japan is often popularly depicted in terms of some Oriental fantasy land, a delusion prevailing in the West prior to 1904, encouraged by the works of Pierre Loti. Today that cultural image has a modern face: Japan you will hear, is a beeping neon, sci-fi wonderland where hi-tech gnomes inhabit soaring skyscrapers and even the lavatory seats have control panels. Others will talk of misty mountains and rice paddies tended by old men in pointy hats or return with tales of hospitality, or courtesy and almost embarrassing kindness . . . each is accurate . . . but a fraction of the whole.48 The latter characteristics have been common in reports of Occidental encounters with Japan over the last hundred years.49 James Clavell, a former prisoner of the Japanese, wrote Shogun (1975), which appeared as a film in 1980, portraying the dominant themes in Western perceptions and experiences of Japanese culture. It portrayed Japan as a mystifying combination of exquisite cultural refinement and shocking, exotic violence – civilization and barbarity as one, both inherent in and defining that society: the seemingly irreconcilable, reconciled and the Occidental left baffled. The extraordinary outbursts of violence in Western society in the twentieth century tend by contrast to be seen in the West as aberrations, rather than a perplexing systemic cultural contradiction; it therefore does not diminish its own cultural assumptions about its own

158 Imperial tectonics civilization. It seems difficult for the West to make such a separation when viewing the Orient, its culture and behaviour across history. Western perceptions of Japan which have barely changed in over a century remain complex, contradictory and unresolved, and it is the cinema that continues to be the medium through which societies tend to blurt out their caricatures of each other most engagingly. During the occupation of Japan, MacArthur banned the Kabuki play, The Tale of the 47 Ronin, which honoured the loyalty of samurai to their defeated lord, to the death. The story was transformed into the film, Ronin (1998), with a contemporary American plot, and its tragic heroism struck a chord with Western audiences. The Magnificent Seven (1960) had similarly paid veiled homage to the nobility of the samurai tradition portrayed in The Seven Samurai of 1954. Tales of ninjas comfortably fitted Western preferences for a vision of the Orient at once exotic, violent and suffused with low-cunning. Perhaps it was not chance that the fashion for films about ninjas coincided with Western fears about the insinuation of Japanese economic interests into its societies. Ezra Vogel’s Japan As No.1,50 which celebrated Japan’s new position of power in the world, came as a shock to those who had defeated it militarily 40 years earlier. How could the Japanese have recovered their strength so quickly? Did Japan now constitute some new threat in some ill-defined, non-military, yet menacing form? These questions led to intensive studies of the ‘Japanese phenomenon’, very similar to the socio-ethnic analyses that typified Western confusion after Japan’s shocking victory in 1905. The Japanese were seen to have accepted the West’s technology as they had in the nineteenth century, studied its techniques and now appeared to have beaten it at its own game. While their military empire had been defeated, Japan now seemed to have built a powerful new kind of empire under the very noses and protection of those who had humbled it. Yet again it was postulated that the Japanese had found a previously unknown formula for success, which might be unique to themselves, that could possibly be transferable in part to Western society; but, more disturbingly, might be one which was unattainable by others. In the Darwinism of the market it might herald the long-term decline of the West and the triumph of the Orient, despite the outcome of the Second World War. Just as Europeans wallowed in self-doubt in 1905 and sought to re-engineer their societies to revitalize their performance to match the newly vibrant Orient which seemed to have learned from them too well, so Western companies in the 1970s and 1980s were encouraged by their governments to study the success of Japanese business and to emulate it. Much of what has often been assumed to be modern Japanese business theory was learned by the Japanese in the 1950s from Americans, such as L.O. Mellen and W.E. Deming, who evangelized the needs of the customer and the ‘total system’, with cooperation, not competition, the key to

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achieving top quality. Deming advocated long-term objectives rather than maximum production, and bringing the workforce into the decision-making process. These industrial techniques along with cultural factors were identified as the causes of Japanese economic success, along with unfair trade protection. Lessons were learned about the need to create a new culture of the workplace in terms of human relations, organizations and industrial techniques. Western businesses developed an easy familiarity with terms such as Kanban and just-in-time stock delivery; and declared their devotion to Kaizan, continuous improvement. ‘Quality control’ and ‘zero defects’ were key tenets, and it was judged important that every worker could contribute his or her ideas through Workers Voluntary Group Activities, or Jishu Kanri.51 Corporations such as the Nippon Steel Corporation practised ‘seniority management’, whereby salary depended upon years of service, not responsibility or performance. ‘Even a very able employee cannot be promoted without a minimum number of years of service in the organization.’52 While curious to the Western mind, this was seen to have the benefit of encouraging loyalty, cohesion, respect and a long-term approach. Connected to this was the system of ‘lifetime employment’ in a single enterprise, which would allow such long-term seniority, career and remuneration planning. The problems would come when economic forces were such that an organization was not able to maintain ‘lifetime employment’, and with the sense of betrayal that would result, or the inefficiency that would be a consequence of the failure to restructure. Even this system was seen by the Japanese themselves to have a racial dimension, ‘The adoption of seniority wage system is made easier in Japan by the racial homogeneity of the Japanese people . . .’.53 There were long debates in the West about the meaning of being Japanese and the characteristics that distinguished Japanese culture and society from those of the West: group harmony versus individualism, particularism versus universalism, subjectivity and intuition versus ratiocination, conciliation versus litigation. The inter-business relationships known as keiretsu, and dango, the system of consultation prior to submitting bids, were noted as being particularly Japanese, as was the role of government in business relations and long-term planning. Asian values were held to include ideas of human and social capital, trust, loyalty, hierarchy, respect for elders and the group, personal thriftiness and public-spirited attitudes. The factors that were deemed to constitute the foundations of Japanese economic strength seemed disturbingly similar to those identified with the military ‘Yamato spirit’ of 1904 and 1941. The Japanese took pride in their economic achievements and, as in the past, were prone to ascribe their success to unique racial and cultural features, so-called Nihonjin-ron.54 These assertions did little to reassure Westerners, yet the notion had perils, for if uniqueness explained success, then Japan should take care not to undermine it. In the past, Japan

160 Imperial tectonics had proved the exemplar of how to adapt the ideas of others, but in an increasingly globalized economy, it could now be put at a comparative disadvantage if it sought to preserve its uniqueness too rigorously. Some found it discomforting when men such as Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made frequent reference to the importance of, race, in preserving the national character which accounted for Japan’s success. In 1986, he claimed at a Liberal Party meeting that Japan’s intellectual level was higher than that of the USA because of the presence of ‘blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans’, and that this multiracial complexion was holding back the USA’s progress, whereas Japan’s homogeneity was an advantage.55 A connection between race, culture and progress has proved a popular and enduring theme in the debate over the last 150 years. Asian assertiveness grew, echoing the sentiments of Japan as No.1 in the 1980s, as did the proselytizing of Asian values, particularly by Singapore and Malaysia in the 1990s.56 At the end of 1995, the Far East Economic Review declared that ‘As we move towards 2000, Asia will become the dominant region of the world: economically, politically and culturally. We are on the threshold of the Asian renaissance.’57 Europe was now widely seen to be afflicted by ‘economic sclerosis’, a lethargy similar to its malaise of the early 1900s, when Japan seemed so vital; and meanwhile the USA was seen to be dependent on Japanese capital, a ‘loan-junkie’, a reversal of the situation in 1905. The glamour of modern hi-tech Japan was matched by another more menacing cinematic perception in the likes of Black Rain (1989), which featured the treachery of a violent and exploitative industrial Japan, which was beyond the ken of the American hero, portrayed by Michael Douglas, who nevertheless prevailed. Similar menacing ideas were articulated most vehemently in 1992 in Michael Crichton’s novel Rising Sun. This saw Japanese inward investment to the USA between 1986 and 1991 as a broader challenge than merely a shifting of capital in a global market, rather, a no-holds-barred conflict in which control of American technology was the fiercely coveted prize.58 Tom Clancy’s Debt of Honor of 1994 envisaged the possibility of an all-out war between the USA and Japan. The Asian slump of 1997 left many Asian countries disappointed and bitter, believing as they had that they had been about to overtake the West. The Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad saw global competition in a racial light that few in the West would care or dare to emulate. He apparently viewed the Asian economic collapse in terms of racial struggle and colonialism, claiming that foreign powers were trying to re-colonize Malaysia. He blamed currency dealers and stockbrokers for destabilizing his country. ‘Whitemen’ would not stop their attack on Malaysia’s economy until they had ‘100 percent’ control of it. ‘Remember, those who created the economic turmoil that we are facing now are just like the colonialists.’59 Even after recovery was well underway, Mahathir and some of his neighbours were equally sensitive and blunt on issues of security.60

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Some of the dramatic predictions of Asian dominance had proven rather premature in the face of this collapse, but such temporary economic woes seemed unlikely to prevent the rise of Asia, merely to ensure that the consequent reforms made its development more stable and sustainable. Even so, on retirement, Mahathir apparently regretted that he had not achieved more in racial terms. ‘I have achieved too little in my principal task of making my race a successful race, a race that is respected.’61 Such a prospectus had long become taboo in the West. The characteristics that led to Japanese success in 1905 and 1941 were later seen to be the causes of disaster in 1945, which revealed the inadequacies of the selfsame system that had created its might. The admirable military qualities of the Japanese soldier were seen to be but one side of a coin with many flaws. What had so recently seemed to be terrifying military strength, built on factors that Western democracies could not possess or even understand, was shown to entail fatal weaknesses, and those ‘qualities’ also to be lethally self-damaging and the causes of Japan’s systemic economic, political and, thus, military weakness. After 1945, blame for Japan’s disaster was placed upon the powerful group of apparently unaccountable militarists who had led Japan to early, surprising triumph, but ultimately to disaster. They had operated unchecked by a head of state who held power in theory but not in practice.62 The Japanese people were thus to be regarded as the victims of what was an irresponsible, systemic weakness in Japanese society and public life. During the 1970s and 1980s, the MITI was often cast as the civilian and industrial equivalent of those militarists of the 1930s, delivering miraculous victories over the forces, albeit industrial ones, of the West. When hardship hit Japan’s new economic empire in the 1990s, the analysis and apportionment of blame seemed familiar, and the negative interpretation of the Japanese identity expanded as the Japanese economy contracted. As it had done so often before, Western opinion veered violently from underestimation of Japan to excessive admiration, back again to criticism and then on to what seemed at times like gleeful enjoyment of its misfortunes. Blame was placed on Japan’s centralized, unresponsive and apparently unaccountable bureaucracies, analogous to the militarist’s clique that took the blame in 1945 for Japan’s military problems – both somehow held to be products of an enduring Japanese identity, which was still not truly comprehended. In the 1990s, as much as in the 1940s, the Japanese were deemed to have succumbed to the ‘supremacy of tradition’, ‘submission to authority’ and ‘avoidance of responsibility’,63 contradictions which could be as dangerous in a modern economy as in the Pacific War. Social cohesion was now seen in negative terms as ‘regulation’, ‘collusion’, ‘covert social safety nets’ and ‘lifetime employment’. ‘Social capital’ could also be interpreted as ‘vested interest’. Japanese economic structures and customs were now regarded as but anti-competitive ‘crony-capitalism’, and responsible for market rigidities that hindered ‘creative destruction’ and prevented the adoption of new courses of action and reform.

162 Imperial tectonics The merits of a society that saved to fund the heroic domestic investment that created a modern industrial state in the nineteenth century and rebuilt it after 1945, were now seen to be fatal flaws in the economy restricting demand: ‘Japan will never solve its chronic deficiency of demand until it shifts a greater share of national income to the consumer.’64 Japan’s economic problems caused it to look abroad once more for inspiration and American business practice was again being emulated by the Japanese.65 Yet Japan seemed unable to implement the systematic restructuring required to rejuvenate itself. Richard Katz maintained that ‘Japan’s dysfunctions are so deep-seated that even if it did everything right today, it would take five years to achieve truly vibrant growth . . . Japan will not do everything right today.’66 It seemed impossible for Japan to reform in the face of resistance from the ‘Iron-Triangle’ of banks, corporations and members of the LDP. Japan’s political system was a democratic one, and yet it seemed in some strange way to lack some characteristics of Western democracies, and proved difficult to reform. Once again Western portrayals of Japan changed, but only to confirm the cultural confusion. A less violent, but even less flattering view of Japan, or rather the West’s understanding of it, appeared in the Oscar-winning Lost in Translation (2003), which harked back to the ancient theme of the sheer mutual incomprehension of Japanese and American societies.67 On the other hand, the samurai theme which cast Japanese martial prowess in a very much more favourable light was resurrected in Western cinema, just as Japan seemed to become less threatening politically. The Last Samurai (2003), once more revealed the West’s confusion and tension in coping with Japanese identity. The American hero comes to appreciate the ‘alien code’ of Bushido, with its notions of honour, duty, integrity and acceptance of death.68 He masters Japanese martial skills and sides with those seeking to preserve traditional Japanese society against the inroads of his own. He fights with his samurai comrades, against the overwhelming forces of Meiji modernizers, their American mentors and the latest military technology. The ‘fanaticism’ of the Japanese warrior and inhuman indifference to death, so familiar in portrayals of the Second World War, were here transformed into positive images, befitting an American hero. A similar, if more sensational, view of the Orient, expressed with lethal blades and bloody mayhem recurred in Quentin Tarantino’s Kill Bill (1) (2002). In the climactic scene, the Aryan-looking heroine masters Japanese swordplay, and wielding a noble samurai blade, dispatches human wave after wave of evil, clone-like masked little Yakusa gangsters, identically dressed in dark business suits, who are intent on killing her. The latter contains elements of almost every Western aesthetic, racial, cultural, military and economic anxiety about Japan, confused and compounded by a profound cultural admiration and the possibility of common sentiments. The Japanese have illustrated their cultural paradoxes with productions of their own. In 1989, a series of comics, The Silent Service began to be

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published and was made into a film in 1995. It is a Japanese national empowerment fantasy, just as Superman was perhaps an American personal empowerment fantasy. Japan’s first nuclear submarine, The Seabat, developed with American help, is seized by its mutinous crew, who declare independence, rename it Yamato,69 and stymie their American and Russian pursuers off New York. Acknowledging Japan’s paradoxical sensitivities, the vessel’s mission is to impose nuclear disarmament. This violent adventure of a ship, embodying and glorifying the mystical and noble spirit of Japan and the Empire’s most famous warship, was published in 32 volumes and sold 7 million copies. Those who have dismissed it as merely a foolish child’s tale have not been following the plot of Japanese life closely enough.70 Westerners have often referred to ‘the Japanese Enigma’, in trying to explain their own confusion over one and a half centuries. In The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation,71 Karel von Wolferen maintained that the socio-political system of Japan crushes intellectual curiosity, creative thought and individualism. Critics of Japan, asserting the same Anglo-Saxon, Christian paradigm have attributed this to ‘an absence of any absolutes or moral imperatives . . . and an ageless, amoral, manipulative and controlling culture – not to be emulated – suited only to this race in this place’,72 apparently agreeing with the Japanese premise of their own uniqueness. The creation of race identities to explain cultural complexity has often proved unhelpful; it is unlikely to illuminate the future debate, but will no doubt remain a part of it.

The lens of history The Japanese Constitution begins, ‘We the Japanese people . . . ’, but it was a constitution imposed by the American people after a war and total defeat. It was imposed by conquest under duress, and was in that sense not a Japanese constitution at all. There was also a growing feeling in the 1990s that Japan had the right to be ‘normal’ and to be proud of its traditions and achievements. Sometimes this resentment was expressed in historical terms, angering neighbours who still bore a sense of grievance against Japanese militarism and nationalism. It seemed to them that expressions of national pride might indicate aggressive militarism lurking below a pacifist surface. These controversies mined rich, ironic themes of twentieth-century history. The post-war debate about Japanese history epitomized the crisis of national identity – ‘we fail to pay proper respect to our predecessors’ struggle’.73 Who are we? How can we be ourselves? In order to make these simple questions meaningful, we must once more review the significance of the war. In Japan’s long history, only during this one hundred-year period was it necessary to wage war to preserve our identity. In order to wage this war, inevitably we were made increasingly aware of this identity.74

164 Imperial tectonics After 1945, the pre-war nationalist General Ishihara Kanji coined the phrase ‘One hundred million people united in repentance’; but this had another meaning – shared responsibility for defeat. Ishihara maintained that the true tragedy of the ‘One Hundred Years War’ was that the ‘ “barbarians” could only be expelled by deliberate Westernization’. Ishihara maintained that Japan should resist the Cold War dichotomy of ideological friend or foe and, ‘Whenever the Americans or the Soviets press for Japan’s rearmament sometime in the future, we must never submit to this request no matter how powerful the pressure.’75 Ishihara also saw the war as being more about culture than national boundaries. To him, Japan’s tragedy was that it ended up fighting those nations it sought to liberate from the West, and going to war before those people were confirmed as friends rather than enemies. Historical perceptions of Japan’s history have been categorized by Shoji Jun’ichiro.76 Japanese textbooks published in 1951 were strongly anti-nationalist, but were soon branded left wing or sympathetic to the new Communist threat. Attempts by Ienaga Saburo77 to prevent a more nationalist approach in these books failed. In 1957, the Textbook Authorization Council criticized him for straying ‘from the goals of teaching Japanese history . . . [namely] to recognize the efforts of ancestors, to heighten one’s consciousness of being Japanese, and to instil a rich love of the race’.78 In 1962, new Japanese textbooks portrayed the country’s wartime role in a more positive light, provoking a heated debate at home and abroad. In 1964 the importance of establishing the Russo-Japanese War as a defensive one was seen to have implications for the way in which Japan’s role in the Second World War could be presented. The Russo-Japanese War was a large war which Japan fought at the risk of the ruin of the destiny of a nation. After World War II, the tendency which defines this war as a war of aggression, prevailed for some time. However, recently the theories assuming it to be a defensive war are becoming powerful.79 The Central Education Council’s The Expected Image of Society of 1966 maintained that defeat in 1945 caused misunderstandings, as if Japan’s past and Japanese ideal ways were mistaken entirely. Between 1978–9 there were growing assertions that Japan had not surrendered unconditionally as Germany had done. In 1984, Shimizu Hayao of Tokyo University maintained that the demand for a revised view of history by the Japanese people reflected their desire to re-establish their sense of national identity. The Japanese historian Hayashi Fusao saw the Second World War as the ‘100-Year East Asia War’, corresponding to the heyday of European colonialism and the century following the end of the Tokugawa period. He saw the bombardment by the British at Kagoshima in 1863 as the opening shots of that war. He noted the

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tragic, hopeless struggle against the White races that Japan was fated to fight: ‘What a reckless war we fought for one hundred years!’80 For him this was evidence of the dynamism of expansionist, powerful White races in Asia, just as Westerners saw the Japanese response as evidence of the same traits in them. Hayashi saw the Japanese ‘invasion’ of mainland Asia as no more morally reprehensible than the European invasion of North America. Hayashi maintained that although Japan appeared to accept foreign doctrines without question, it did so because it was fundamentally immune to those ideas – the Yamato spirit reigned supreme. From 1997, the so-called Liberal School of History and the Society for the Creation of New History Textbooks produced a series of patriotic versions of Japanese history. A textbook of 2000 claimed that before the Second World War, ‘The people were awaiting the outbreak of war to liberate the Oriental races from 400 years of domination and bondage by the Anglo-Saxons.’81 The Chinese Government responded that the book could damage Sino-Japanese relations. The hero of Kobayashi Yoshinori’s A Theory of War of 1998 proclaimed, ‘The day will come when this war is reappraised for what it truly was, the most beautiful, cruel and noble battle ever waged by mankind.’82 In 2001, Kobayashi went on to draft the controversial chapter in The New History textbook on the war in the Pacific, with the intent of making Japanese children aware of their own culture. In April 2001 a group of Chinese veterans who had fought against the Japanese gathered in Harbin to denounce the militarism of Japanese textbooks. Nevertheless, the New History of Japan was approved for use in Schools from April 2002 and as a result the South Korean ambassador was withdrawn. China made formal protests and demanded that revisions be made.83 The debate over history has done much to poison relationships, and history remains a vital force in contemporary international relations. Its weight bears down on modern Japanese politicians. In September 1986, the Japanese Minister of Education resigned following his assertion that Korea had willingly accepted colonization by Japan in 1910. Others in political life continued to assert that it was Europeans who had colonized Asia, yet it was Japan which had been blamed for militarism and aggression. In August 1982, Nakasone caused an uproar when he became the first postwar Japanese prime minister to visit the Yasukuni Shrine which venerates the spirits of 2,500,000 Japanese killed in wars since the mid-nineteenth century, including the fourteen Class-A war criminals commemorated there in 1978. In April 2001, it was reported that the leader of Japan’s Liberal Party, Koizumi Junichiro would visit the Yasukuni Shrine. In July 2001, the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan protested about Koizumi’s visit to the Shrine; but he went on to make further visits and Japanese courts made conflicting judgements on their constitutional legality.84 Such visits

166 Imperial tectonics routinely caused an outcry, especially in China and South Korea, and the antagonism readily found populist expression.85 Public opinion polls in Japan in December 2004 showed strong support for Mr Koizumi’s now traditional visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, largely because few would be happy to see Japan bow to Chinese pressure. The cycle of tension became worse, coincidentally with friction over the Chinese violation of Japanese waters and the publication in December 2004 of Japan’s 5-year Defence Policy which named China, along with North Korea, as ‘a country to be watched’. In 2005, hackers disabled Mr Koizumi’s personal website;86 and the Japanese established an agency to defend Japanese institutions and corporations against the flurry of cyber attacks, thought to come from China, which had begun in earnest in 2000.87 One Japanese official maintained that ‘Yasukuni is an issue that China is using politically to win concessions from Japan . . . they don’t really want to resolve it.’88 Nevertheless, on 1 June 2005, seven former Japanese Prime Ministers urged Mr Koizumi not to make his annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.89 Public expression of nationalistic sentiment was common at the start of the new millennium. Buses toured Tokyo, painted with the Rising Sun and equipped with loudspeakers demanding the eviction of Russia from Japanese territory, and that school children should sing the national anthem; but these were generally ignored. The national flag of a red disc on a white background, the Hinomaru, and the national anthem, the Kimigayo, were only officially recognized on 9 August 1999. In 2003, the Japanese Government expressed concern about the apparent degeneration of national standards and rising crime amongst its youth, and it announced its determination to reform the education system. Such measures included raising the Japanese flag and singing the national anthem in schools.90 In May 2005, the Japanese Government determined that from 2007 Hirohito’s birthday would be named Showa Day. Nationalist views about Japan’s history were not common in the entertainment industry until the 1990s. In 1998 the Japanese film, Pride, portrayed Japan as the liberator of India, and the Tokyo war crimes tribunal as a ‘frame-up’. The publication in 1999 of The Rape of Nanking by Iris Chang provoked an outcry in the conservative media which called for it to be withdrawn. In May 2001 the film Merdeka, the Indonesian word for ‘independence’, opened in Tokyo, another indication of diminishing reticence about the Second World War. It portrayed the selfless decision by 2,000 Japanese officers to remain in Indonesia after the surrender in 1945 to assist the Indonesians to fight for their independence from the Dutch. It challenged the conventional view of the Japanese as brutal aggressors and perpetrators of atrocities.91 Memories may have been short or Japanese efforts unappreciated, for on 15 January 1974, anti-Japanese riots had broken out in Jakarta when Prime Minister Tanaka visited Indonesia. When Japanese troops arrived in East Timor under UN auspices in 2002, they faced demonstrations from protesters referring to the 40,000 Timorese who died in 1942–5.

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The anomalies of self-defence Some see the revival of nationalist ideas as the precursor to military expansion; but until recently Japan was more often censured for its lack of military commitment. As early as 1953, Richard Nixon said that he thought Japan should rearm; but the idea found little support. On 19 January 1960, the USA and Japan signed a new treaty in the East Room of the White House, where Japan’s first diplomatic mission to the USA had been welcomed 100 years earlier. The USA committed itself to defending Japan, but to consult with the Japanese before sending forces into action. There was also apparently a secret agreement to allow the USA to bring nuclear weapons in and out of Japan. The problem was whether this would oblige Japan to assist the USA in any conflict with China over Taiwan, or some new conflict over Korea.92 These arrangements were, however, essentially measures to satisfy American requirements rather than an expression of deeper Japanese military engagement. Japan remained wedded to its policy of self-defence and avoided foreign military commitments.93 Japan never joined South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), declining any military role in its new economic sphere. The feeling was largely reciprocal. When the USA and North Vietnam signed the deal that allowed American troops to withdraw from Vietnam, they did so in the presence of China and the USSR, but Japan was not invited to attend. Tokyo’s first formal statement of its defence policy was made in 1976 and focussed on deterrence. By the 1980s, the Japanese perceived American military power to be waning in relative terms and there was a feeling that Japan should not be so dependent upon US forces, that the two countries should have a more balanced relationship. In 1984, Prime Minister Nakasone explained that Japan represented the leadership of Asian culture and that Japan was moving with America, the heir to European culture, to bring together two great cultures that would hereafter dominate the world.94 Popular sentiment did not necessarily concur with this grandiose proposition. By the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, opinion polls showed that Japanese and Americans regarded each other as the greatest threat. Japan contributed $13 billion to the cost of the First Gulf War in 1991, but received considerable criticism for not committing troops to fight; and Kuwait did not list Japan amongst those who had contributed to its liberation. There were soon signs that Japan might reconsider its post-1945 policy on defence; and the 1990s were in a sense the ‘decade in which Japan finally took steps to becoming an ordinary country’.95 From 1995, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) began to reassess their capabilities against the background of rapidly changing global circumstances, and in 1996 Japanese ships paid their first visits to Russia and South Korea.96 Japan sought a seat on the UN Security Council, but this proved elusive. Its economy relied on a global approach, and any attempt to be the local, Asian champion might run counter to this and not be welcomed by its

168 Imperial tectonics smaller neighbours and China. Taking part in multinational military operations in support of the UN was one way for Japan to play a larger role in international affairs. In 1992, it made new rules enabling its troops to deploy on UN military missions, once a ceasefire existed, and permitting the use of minimum force for self-protection.97 Nevertheless, the Japanese Constitution constrained the role of its forces, even in Japan, and was increasingly questioned. When an earthquake struck Kobe in 1995, the JSDF was not given permission to enter the disaster area for several days. In 1995 security cooperation between Japan and the USA had been strengthened by Japan’s revision of its National Defence Programme Outline. This aroused concern in China which saw that it might have an impact on its relations with Taiwan. In 1999, 57 per cent of those polled by Yomiuri Shiimbun thought that Japan would come under military attack; and while the military support of the USA may have been comforting, many Japanese wondered whether this dependency was wise given their doubt that the USA would necessarily come to their aid. Both the traditionalist mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara, and the more liberal governor of Nagano prefecture, Tanaka Yasuo, argued that Japan should free itself from its overdependent relationship with the USA.98 Ishihara pledged to have American airbases in Tokyo turned over to joint use with Japanese forces, and Professor K. Saeki maintained that ‘There is a feeling Japan has to open more space between itself and the US.’99 In January 1999, the Justice Minister Nakamura Shozaburo declared that his countrymen were ‘writhing in pain’ because Japan’s Constitution prevented it from going to war or even defending itself. He also criticized American-style capitalism as ‘the kind of freedom that lets loose atom bombs and missiles just when another country appears to gain advantage’.100 In July 1999, the Japanese Diet voted to consider a reassessment of the American-imposed Constitution which had not been amended for 52 years. On 31 August 1999, the North Koreans fired a three-stage missile over the Japanese archipelago and many were surprised by the strength of the Japanese reaction. That year Japan passed legislation about how its own forces would coordinate operations with American forces. On 11 September 2001, following Al Qaeda’s attacks on New York and Washington DC, the Japanese Government passed a law to help the USA indirectly in Afghanistan; and that year Japan announced a 5-year $20.1 billion military modernization plan.101 In November 2001, five Japanese naval vessels sailed to the Indian Ocean to support US operations in Afghanistan in Japan’s first overt wartime venture abroad since 1945. Japan seemed to become more assertive in other areas of foreign policy. In December 2001, the JSDF showed an unusual resolve to act decisively by attacking a North Korean spy ship, detected in Japanese waters, sinking it in China’s economic zone.

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While some saw Japan’s continuing dependence on the USA for its security as increasingly incongruous for a wealthy developed nation, others found the relationship less so as Japan’s own national power waned. The majority of the Japanese public has begun to sense the ageing of its country into national maturity and the unavoidable decline in its national power. The public understands the need to judiciously utilize the power held by the US, as the world’s most powerful state, in preserving world order to ensure the protection of Japan’s national interests.102 In 2003, the Japanese Government succeeded in extending a law which enabled Japanese ships to operate in support of Coalition operations in Afghanistan. This seemed to some to be an indication of Japan’s adopting a more normal policy on defence; by the end of 2003, Japan had sent 1,000 men to Iraq to help the US-led Coalition in non-combat roles. Japan’s military operation in Iraq in 2003–4 was its first without a UN mandate. The deployment was agreed after Parliament passed a special law and circumvented the constitution by designating southern Iraq a ‘non-combat’ zone. This resulted in bizarre inconsistencies when that area was clearly revealed to be a combat zone. As the Secretary General of the ruling LDP, Abe Shinzo, pointed out, Japan had 550 heavily armed and well-trained troops in Iraq and none of them empowered to help Japanese hostages. He advocated amending the constitution to permit such action.103 The kidnapping of Japanese hostages by the so-called Saraya al-Mujahideen on 8 April 2004, placed the Japanese Government in a difficult position and had a surprising outcome. Despite an emotional public outpouring, mainly by family and friends, demanding that the Government give in to the kidnappers’ demands, public opinion in Japan held firm and reinforced the Government’s resolve. This paid off and when the hostages were eventually released, they were vilified by politicians and in the press for imperilling Japan’s national interests by their foolhardy actions in allowing themselves to have been taken prisoner in the first place. Japan perceived a threat from international terrorism, and in 2003 it passed legislation about how it would deal with an attack on its homeland. Most worryingly it faced a growing threat from an unstable North Korea, making it apparently less secure than it had been during the Cold War.104 There had been other missile scares in 1993, 1998 and 1999, but by 2003 it was reported that up to two hundred North Korean missiles were pointing at Japan,105 and Japan had no adequate missile defence system.106 There was a growing call by members of the Japanese Diet to acquire missile defence systems in response to this perceived threat.107 In February 2005, North Korea announced that it possessed nuclear weapons and pulled out of disarmament talks, causing Japan to threaten trade sanctions, beginning on 1 March 2005, ‘that will bring North Korea to the negotiating

170 Imperial tectonics table’.108 The North Koreans responded that they would consider such trade sanctions to be a declaration of war. Japan’s defence budget for 2005 represented the sharpest increase since 1997 and a restructuring initiative due for 2006 was intended to create joint operational command organizations.109 All of this was done with linkages to American forces in mind. By 2005, growing military tension between mainland China and Taiwan and between China and Japan over maritime oil fields, compounded by apprehension about North Korea’s claim to possess nuclear weapons, led Japan to adopt a more assertive approach in global affairs. On 13 April 2005, it announced that it would allow Japanese companies to drill for oil in disputed areas of the East China Sea. It decided to stop its soft loans to China by 2008 and was reported to have joined the USA in identifying security in the Taiwan Straits as ‘a common strategic objective’.110 Abe Shinzo, of the LDP declared, ‘It would be wrong to send a signal to China that the United States and Japan will tolerate China’s invasion of Taiwan.’111 Japan would certainly not wish to see China dominate its sea lanes from naval bases on Taiwan. In April 2005, relations between China and Japan deteriorated over the familiar issues of Japanese history books,112 Japan’s growing support for Taiwan and China’s opposition to Japan’s gaining a seat on the UN Security Council. It seemed possible that violent popular protests might even damage the close economic relations between the two countries. The Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing observed, ‘The Chinese Government has never done anything for which it has to apologize to the Japanese people.’113 On 24 April 2005, the Japanese Government retaliated against the one-way stream of criticism from China by announcing that it would conduct an examination of Chinese textbooks to ensure that they contained no historical bias. The Communist Revolution, the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and China’s record on human rights promised to provide interesting material for such analysis.114 After three weeks the Chinese Government restored order and brought the anti-Japanese demonstrations to an end. Perhaps it was keen to protect the $35 billion of Japanese investment in China with its 2 million jobs, and to maintain Japanese markets for Chinese products. By 2005, China was again being characterized by some in the USA as an ideologically wayward state and potential future threat.115 The growing power of China and the perceived threat from North Korea seemed to push the USA and Japan closer together.116 ‘Washington now sees Japan as a new UK, that is a core security partner’,117 an intriguing alignment when viewed across the last hundred years of strategic history. Yet at the same time both countries also had increasingly close relations with China economically. The balance of this complex economic and military equation, how it will develop and how it can be managed, lies at the heart of the strategic concerns of the twenty-first century.

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Despite a growing desire to be a ‘normal country’, Japan’s Constitution contained formidable obstacles to any such condition. Given the constitution, Ishiba Shigeru, Japan’s Defence Agency Chief, suggested in 2003 that if Japan came under missile attack from North Korea, the JSDF might have to restrict its actions to clearing up the post-strike wreckage. When Japan decided in December 2003 to adopt comprehensive missile defence in the face of the threat from North Korea, there was little of the protest that might have been expected a few years earlier, especially from Japan’s neighbours. On 13 February 2003, Ishiba Shigeru threatened to make a pre-emptive strike on North Korea if Japan judged that country to be preparing to make a missile attack. This threat to make a pre-emptive attack on its neighbour marked a major step away from Japan’s post-war constitution which renounced the right to use force.118 In 2004, Kanzaki Takenori, leader of the ruling coalition’s pacifist Buddhist Komeito Party maintained that ‘Peace is the foundation of our party; but now we are entering a new era. In the past, Japan lived happily on its own, but we cannot live like that any longer.’119 On 3 December 2004, the Defence Minister Ono Yoshinori complained that ‘Article 51 of the UN Charter gives Japan the inherent right to collective self-defence, and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution means we cannot exercise it.’ He said that the Constitution could soon be revised, giving Japan greater licence to make offensive weapons, and he stressed his concern about China’s rising defence budget, noting that China’s ‘economy is booming but political relations are cold’.120 In November 2005, Mori Yoshiro observed that ‘The Americans compiled the current constitution. We cannot possibly say the constitution was created by the people’s own hands . . . the time has come for us to compile our own . . . .’121 By the late 1950s, Prime Ministers such as Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobusuke had favoured Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, if it was for the limited purpose of self-defence. China’s explosion of an atomic device in 1964 made Japan more dependent upon American protection, but increased calls by some for Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons; and despite American pressure, Japan did not sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It seemed likely that Japan would build a space capability which might eventually be matched with a nuclear weapon, derived from its peaceful nuclear energy programme; in 1994, the Japanese Prime Minister announced that Japan had the capability to possess nuclear weapons but had not made them. As the perceived threat from North Korea grew, there was open discussion of the possibility of Japan striking first in the face of an imminent missile attack, and of acquiring a nuclear capability. Nishimura Shingo, Vice-Minister for Defence, had to resign in 1999 after suggesting that Japan should consider making these weapons, but by 2003, he was discussing such matters on Japanese television. The Chief Cabinet Secretary, Fukuda Yasuo also discussed the willingness to consider the production of nuclear weapons. No doubt the issue will persist if the matter of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is not settled.

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Unfinished business – a settlement with Russia? One hundred years after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan has other unsettled business – the territorial dispute with Russia whose origins lay in the War of 1904–5. Article Nine of the October 1956 Soviet–Japanese Declaration that ended the state of war between the USSR and Japan stated that the two southernmost Kurile Islands would be transferred to Japan once a peace treaty was concluded. Moscow has seemed reluctant to agree to such a treaty, given the territory it would concede to Japan. In July 2000, Vladimir Putin said that he believed a treaty could be concluded if the problems that were at the basis of the peace treaty were to lose their priority. In other words, Putin wanted to detach the issue of territory from a peace treaty. The Japanese apparently wished to keep the two issues very much entwined. On 25 August 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi announced his intention to inspect the Kurile Islands from a distance, months before President Putin’s state visit to Japan in 2005. The Japanese were clearly linking the issue of ownership of the islands to Japan’s ongoing investment in Russia’s oil industry. A senior Japanese diplomat remarked that the economic relationship ‘could not go to the next level’ unless progress was made over the disputed islands.122 Despite these fundamental difficulties, relations between Russia and Japan have remained cordial, with Russia agreeing in 2003 to support Japan as a candidate for membership of the UN Security Council. There was also a growing economic relationship based on energy supplies, a relationship which complicated the relations of both with China. The Japanese wished to diversify their sources of supply. They were involved in oil projects on Sakhalin and assessed the possibility of building a pipeline to China or to Hokkaido. Japan was willing to help finance this pipeline from Angarsk to Nakhodka, taking 1 million barrels of oil per day, if it was built; but the matter was not a simple one. The Chinese challenged Japanese proposals for the pipeline from Angarsk, hoping instead to take it to Daqing. Russia seemed to delay its decision about the direction of the pipeline to gain maximum advantage from both potential customers, and by May 2005 it looked likely that a spur would be laid to China before the main line was built to the coast at Perevoznaya opposite Japan.123 Japan and China seem set to be rivals in their search for Asian raw materials, and the routes of pipelines and the location of terminals reflect many of the dynamics in the disputes of earlier times over railway lines and warm-water ports, albeit today with scant prospect of military action.

Futures and choices Japan set the agenda for Asian-Pacific affairs in the twentieth century and salvaged prosperity from the wreckage of 1945; but Japan is unlikely to set

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the agenda in the twenty-first century. It will, however, contribute to it, although the nature of its contribution remains to be determined and will be beset with difficulties and historical impedimenta. Japan’s economic difficulties at the turn of the millennium prompted Prime Minister Koizumi to declare that Japan had lost confidence in itself. In turn, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, noted that Japan’s economic problems could damage American interests, since ‘Japan’s influence gradually declines and its ability to assist declines with it’.124 Japan’s economic problems in the early years of the new millennium changed the balance of power in the Far East, tipping it away from Japan and emphasizing China’s dominant position among Asian countries.125 This will have military implications. Okamoto Yukio, a Japanese foreign policy adviser, believed that ‘Japan will have to become a subject of China’ if the USA does not play a strong military role in Asia.126 In 2004, Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations at Renmin University in Beijing maintained that China should accommodate Japan’s changing role in the world, ‘I understand Japanese peoples’ wariness about their security . . . [and] their aspirations to become a normal international power’; but he believed that Japan was seeking to be the wrong sort of power. They should understand there is an historical transition of power. China is rising, India is rising and Japan cannot be a 19th Century great-power . . . This is the world of superpowers. That means the US and a future China and a future India and a future united Europe. So Japan should know that it can achieve normal national greatness. But there are limits.127 Japan’s only way of preserving its independence from China might be by becoming more Western in its culture and associations.128 It may be, however, that Japan will have little desire to compete aggressively with a more powerful China in matters of political prestige, and that it will content itself with the soothing pleasures of a prosperous and stable ‘new Edo Period’. Perhaps the notion of being Number One will no longer seem so compelling. Japan’s New Year’s Eve television song show in 2003 ended with a song by Japan’s favourite group, SMAP, which include the thought that Small flowers, big flowers, none of them are alike So it’s OK not to be No.1 Every one of them is the only one129 Strangely, despite its perception of itself as a peace-loving society, in which the JSDF have kept a low profile, Japanese society thrives on the production of violent Manga comics, and probably with less sense of guilt than in Western societies which also find violence entertaining.

174 Imperial tectonics The Japanese themselves remain enamoured of their samurai past, perhaps as a reaction to the modernity of which they have become the global exemplars, with their fascination for technical innovation and gadgets. Some have seen modern Japanese society as robustly self-confident. For example, the President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan in 1999, Glen Fukushima, maintained that Japan retained a strong ‘sense of national mission that Japan can be successful economically. There is a sense of Japan being unique, of Japan being peculiar in a positive way.’130 Others see the fabric of Japanese society crumbling under the pressures of modern life, resulting in an identity crisis, exemplified by youth delinquency and family breakdown. To some, Japan is still characterized by ‘over-confidence, fanaticism, a shrill sense of inferiority, and a sometimes obsessive pre-occupation with national status’.131 Is Japan in reality not so much an ‘Asian’ nation as a Western one which happens to be located in the Orient? Can Japan remain anti-nuclear and in favour of disarmament while dependent upon the USA and its nuclear weapons for its security?132 Will Japan prefer another ‘Anglo-Saxon’ alliance to a future closer, yet unbalanced, relationship with China? – probably. Will Japan become a more potent military ally as well as economic partner to the USA? Or, will Japan cease to be the vital asset to the USA which it has been since 1945, for China could become more important economically to the USA than is Japan. China and Japan share an ocean over which they see the US currently holding hegemony. The issue is whether such an Asian view will be more compelling than any local rivalry between them – unlikely. Yet, China and Japan seem likely to replace the USA as each other’s most important trading partner. Will economic considerations force Japan to have to lean towards China, as many Japanese over the last hundred years have believed it should – albeit now as a loyal deputy to its new champion China under a Pax Sinica?133 Such Pan-Asianist dreams seem misplaced. Others believe that Japan’s relationship with the USA has always been entirely self-serving and that were the USA to confront China, it would find that it did so entirely alone.134 Could Japan suffer some kind of ‘Finlandization’ thanks to its proximity and possible dependence upon China? – perhaps. Funabashi Yoichi, a Japanese commentator noted, that ‘The nightmare for Japan is a deterioration in relations between China and America, then we would be forced to choose.’135 Japan adopted Western attributes in order to remain independent of the West and saw its domination of China as part of that imperial formula; but it also saw the possibility that it might itself one day be dominated by China. In the twenty-first century, that ‘surrender’ is a possibility. If Japan is to avoid forfeiting its freedom of action to China, which would probably find satisfaction in making clear Japan’s ‘tributary status’, it may have to further develop its Western characteristics, at the expense of its Asian ones.

Nippon resurgat

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This might entail establishing a closer association with a new Europe and Russia, if not the USA, as an alternative point of reference in a world that seems increasingly dominated by Japan’s over-mighty neighbour. This would constitute a shift in cultural affiliation from its historic Chinese heritage to one less than 200 years old. This might indeed fulfil the notions of those in the late nineteenth century who believed falsely that Japan had somehow become Western; but they would have been right in identifying the first step along that path and the symbolism of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. Japanese aversion to being absorbed in a Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere might melt away as old hostilities between Asian nations came to be as outdated as those between the once-warring nations of Europe. In the European model, however, there is no single dominating great power, and the Chinese are unlikely ever to accept a status in Asia similar to that of a mere member in the European Union. National antagonisms in a region which never had precedents of identity analogous to Rome, Christendom or Charlemagne would be harder to achieve. On balance, it seems that in the near future Japan will increase its military capability and the constitutional freedom to use it, while at the same time integrating its forces more closely with those of the USA. The USA will try to enhance its relationship with Japan for all the benefits it brings to the American position in Asia,136 while trying not to upset China unduly and disrupt the economic relationship which are so important to all. Japan continues to present contradictions to the world. It remains a wealthy state but a militarily weak one, despite the large sums actually spent on military capability. It is a capitalist country which seems suspicious of markets, a country with democratic elections but whose political system seems to operate in ways and with outcomes unfamiliar in mainstream Western experience. Some are inclined to see Japan as an island nation, poor in resources but with a homogenous people among whom unity of opinion makes open debate unnecessary. This seems at times to perpetuate an appearance of old-fashioned nationalism in a state which also seems to have thoroughly renounced nationalism and militarism.137 Some see nationalism as a demon lurking in modern Japan, and others feel that Japanese opinions post-1945 are somehow exempt from normal analysis thanks to its unique historical experiences.138 No other nation seems so absorbed and depressed by considerations of its identity, its intangibility, character or singularity, but these are equally subjects of intense foreign interest.139 The Japanese remain confused about the source of their own identity. Does it lie in their language, is it embodied in their Emperor, or does it reside in some genetic singularity? Is it the gratification of fitting harmoniously into a vertical social hierarchy, of personal place in a society where ‘placing’ is an ancient aesthetic?140 Is that identity substantial in itself, or is it some Zen-like space merely defined by the boundaries of the identities of others?141

176 Imperial tectonics Some Japanese feel that their anxieties stem from being disconnected from their past, twice at American insistence, but also with their own complicity. Unlike the Chinese with whose history and civilization they share so much, they have become alienated from and forced to reject their former and irrecoverable identity; but they have to recognize that they have also done this willingly, not only to retain their autonomy but also as a means of dominating their neighbours. That past is not mere history; it has become their own cultural identity. It is a hybrid, but then so are all others. Are the Japanese like ‘orphaned’ Asians brought up as Westerners, yearning for a lost national life of their own heredity, yet perennially uncomfortable when reunited with other Asians? None of this makes for straightforward foreign relations.

11 The next hundred years Chinese futures

A new balance: made in China In 1904, the British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, German, Russian, Chinese, Japanese and American empires were all represented in East Asia and the Pacific; it was far from clear that of the non-Asian nations, 100 years later, only the USA would remain, let alone be the most powerful of them all. The USA is in effect the last of the great ‘European’ Empires, manifest not necessarily in terms of territorial occupation, but certainly in ‘trading posts’, military bases to defend its interests and the trappings of empire such as extraterritoriality. This ‘empire’ is also one of cultural pre-eminence and an empire of ideas; in the eyes of many Asians, it seems also in some way to be an Anglo-Saxon one. Ideas of American imperial decline were popularized by Paul Kennedy as the Cold War drew to a close;1 but by the late 1990s, it was much of Asia that seemed to be in economic decline, and the USA remained in an unrivalled position of economic and political superiority, gaining power in relation to Japan, Russia and Europe. Some Chinese believed that the USA used strategies ‘to contain, control, incorporate and suppress those countries and regions that might become one of the multiple poles. It has controlled and incorporated Europe and Japan, and suppressed and contained Russia and China’.2 Francis Sempa has maintained that ‘the USA is the geo-political successor to the British Empire’,3 that the USA is virtually also an island, and just as Britain once determined the balance of power in Europe, so the USA today holds the Eurasian balance of power. He is optimistic ‘that perhaps the Twenty-first Century will be more of an American Century than was the Twentieth’.4 That said, Kennedy may yet be proved right in his description of American overextension; but that will depend upon the outcome of the USA’s military ventures and the health of its economy, whose debt dependence seemed worrying in the early years of the new millennium. An American pessimist, Chalmers Johnson, maintained that American militarism, manifest in its ‘empire of bases’, will bring an end to globalization and bankrupt the USA.5

178 Imperial tectonics For over 150 years, the root of American strategic interest in Asia has been ‘The China-Trade’, entailing military reach to support its interests; but until the early twenty-first century that was always against the background of a weak China. In future, the USA will have to find a formula for protecting its interests when China is strong. Coming decades will probably see the unprecedented coincidence of both China and Japan being economically and politically powerful simultaneously. Japan has greater demographic and economic limitations which means that China, or perhaps even India, will more likely be the dominant Asian power to which the USA must primarily relate its future interests.6 While Japan became Asia’s first modern state and peer of Western nations at the end of the nineteenth century, the USA, today’s solitary superpower, now seems set to be challenged, at least locally, by Asia’s rising champion, China. Whether this will amount to enmity, rivalry, partnership or something in between is likely to be the critical issue of the twenty-first century. If the end of the Cold War and American economic problems seemed the two most significant factors affecting the USA’s strategic position in Asia in the early 1990s, ten years later these had been replaced by the rise of China and the economic decline of Japan,7 although some American economic problems again seemed vexing. The Western-Japanese paradigm established in the late nineteenth century now seems set to be replaced by an analogous one, the West and China. The model contains both encouraging and uncomfortable features, but the outcomes can be very different depending upon how the relationship is handled. Like Japan, China is an Asian power that was eventually coerced into trading with the West, and adopted Western technology and techniques but retained its own powerful sense of a unique identity and a lingering awareness of historic grievance.8 In 1900, A.T. Mahan warned that ‘The incorporation of this vast mass of beings . . . into our civilization . . . is one of the greatest problems that humanity has yet to be solved.’9 The question remains essentially the same over a century later. Can relations with China be managed to ensure that it achieves success through peaceful means alone; and that its consequent, possibly dominant power is not exercised to the detriment of the West? In more objective, historical terms, is that aspiration even reasonable? In any event the scale of the impact of China’s emergence is clear. In 1993, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew observed that The size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance in thirty to forty years. It’s not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of man.10 In August 2001, the US Deputy Secretary for Defense, P.D. Wolfowitz forecast that China is, ‘almost certain to become a super power in the next

The next hundred years 179 half-century, and maybe in the next quarter-century, and that’s pretty fast by historical standards’.11 According to the Chief Economist of Rio Tinto, ‘What is taking place there is on a scale that has no real precedent.’12 Asian countries will increasingly have to take account of China rather than the USA. ‘China is such a large force, the only rational response is to figure out how to work with it. It can’t be stopped.’13 The economic position of the USA in Asia seems set to decline in relative terms and as a result, ‘The policy leverage of the United States as the great market is sure to decline.’14 In time historians may view the brief rise and fall of the West as today they muse over the fate of the Mongols and Maya, and those historians would be Chinese.15 A new emissary from the greatest Western trading empire, Henry Kissinger, visited Beijing in July 1971, following in the footsteps of Lord Macartney 178 years earlier. President Nixon followed in February 1972, astonishing all, not least the Japanese and Russians. Part of the new understanding between the USA and China was that the USA would contain Japan. Nixon observed that ‘We are now in the extraordinary situation that, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the People’s Republic of China might well be closest to us in its global perceptions.’16 During the 1980s, the USA regarded China more as a counterbalance to Soviet military power than as a potential rival, and it assisted Chinese military modernization.17 With the ending of the Cold War, détente with a totalitarian Chinese Government looked somewhat anomalous; as the USA scanned the horizon looking for a possible future threat to its unique international status, a resurgent China seemed the obvious candidate.18 In a flurry of publications and conferences, China provided the spectre of a ‘peer competitor’.19 Opinion was sharply divided on whether China was to be feared, or regarded as militarily benign and merely a long-term economic rival or partner. The debate about the future of China is sharpest in the USA, but hardly less important to the rest of the world, most notably to China’s principal neighbours, Russia and Japan. In March 2001, the US AWC held a conference to assess the implications of ‘The Rise of China in Asia’.20 It noted that, since the previous conference on the subject in 1996, the rise of China as a great power in the new century now seemed less clearly defined, and its implications more complex. Nevertheless, Thomas Barnett maintained that the Pentagon long hankered after a major Chinese threat on which to base its future plans.21 The USA has traditionally tried to avoid a continental commitment on mainland Asia and has generally not interfered in China. Equally, the Chinese have no tradition in recent centuries of naval power. The dynamics of contemporary Asian power-politics is thus historically familiar, with the ‘maritime’ US–Japanese alliance facing the rising ‘continental’ power of China, which will have replaced Russia in that role in East Asia. China will probably have to find ways of projecting its power at sea if it is to protect

180 Imperial tectonics its interests in an interdependent global economy. Were China to succeed in developing a dominant naval force, it would emerge as both the maritime and continental power, the hegemon, achieving what Russia, Japan, the USA and European Empires failed to achieve over 200 years, and what the USA has fought three Asian wars in the last 60 years to prevent. If it achieved that status, would the consequences be as dire as often imagined? That conclusion will determine the nature of the response to the phenomenon.

The short march to prosperity and the frictions of ‘The China-Trade’ China has the world’s largest population, although it is likely to be overtaken by India;22 a growing military capacity and the world’s most dynamic economy. It is this economic power that is the key to China’s future military power.23 Like Japan’s 100 years ago, this can only be built on the foundation of economic strength. ‘First we must uphold the central task of economic development . . . and lay a solid material foundation for us to meet the challenges brought about by the new changes in the world military arena.’24 China’s economic reforms began in 1978, and from 1980 to 2000 its GDP grew fivefold. By 2004, China had the sixth largest economy in the world and was set to overtake the UK by 2006. Although just 3 per cent of the world’s economy, it accounted for 10 per cent of its growth. IMF statistics of 2004 indicated that in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), China’s GDP would overtake that of the USA by 2020.25 However, to set this in perspective, if American growth in GDP were to rise at 2 per cent from 2004 and China’s at 4 per cent, it would take China a century to catch up with the USA’s output. A milestone in China’s emergence as a great power was passed in April 2005 when China became a net donor of foreign aid, having been a net recipient for decades.26 China also faces many future problems and constraints. Despite the wealth created so rapidly, economic growth, the expectations generated and demographic changes will impose huge new financial pressures on the country. In August 2005, a Chinese Government report, published in Chinese newspapers, claimed that the country faced a social meltdown by 2010 if solutions were not found to the consequences of its rapid economic growth and the gap between rich and poor.27 China also faces many environmental challenges from pollution and lack of access to clean water and energy supplies.28 These will impose massive costs on an increasingly sensitive and wealthy society.29 In the year till July 2003, China’s trade surplus with the USA was $116 billion, while the USA’s deficit with Japan was just $69 billion. Overall in 2003, China’s surplus with the USA was $130 billion, leading to calls for China to allow its currency to rise, breaking the peg with the dollar.30 By 2004, China and the European Union were each other’s largest trading

The next hundred years 181 partners.31 The growth of China’s economy also increased its dependency on those export markets, while at the same time creating a vast market for its neighbours, serving the rapidly expanding Chinese consumers’ appetite. China’s imports did much to bolster flagging Asian economies in 2003 and continued to grow thereafter. In 2004, China consumed 40 per cent of the world’s concrete. That year China also consumed more than half the world’s pork, and some predicted that China would require 300 million tons of grain from world markets by 2030, greater than all available stocks available for export in 1999.32 The United Nations Development Programme estimated that by 2020 China will consume more coal in one year than the USA has burned since the Industrial Revolution.33 The International Energy Agency predicted that global demand for energy will increase by 60 per cent by 2030, and that two thirds of that will come from China and India,34 with major consequences for prices in competitive bidding on world markets. Such consumption will lead to increasing competition with others who are used to dominating the international markets. ‘On present policies there will be a direct conflict between the advance of the world’s two most populous countries and stable prosperity in the West.’35 When the Chinese steelmaker, Baosteel, negotiated and accepted a 70 per cent rise in iron ore prices in early 2005, analysts noted this Chinese assertiveness, ‘for the first time the Asians have taken the lead in the negotiations . . . They were putting down a marker’.36 China’s economic needs had consequences for its foreign policy. While the USA focussed on its operations in Iraq and maintaining good relations with China to support its ‘War on Terror’, China was busy using its ‘soft-power’ to build a new foreign policy in support of its long-term security objectives not only in Asia but also around the world, to bolster its economic security. China’s need for strategic raw materials, especially oil, seemed likely to cause it to extend its sphere inland to the North-East Asian mainland.37 Like Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, China perceived a need to look both ways to secure access to raw materials, markets and domestic stability. After 1945, Japan managed to secure its place in the market place without deploying military might, but largely because the market was ‘policed’ by the USA which also guaranteed Japan’s own security. China cannot make such a pact. China might prefer to be merely a regional power, but the requirements of economic growth will dictate otherwise. In a global market for raw materials and its manufactured produce, China will necessarily develop global security interests, and energy supplies will be the most contentious commodities. The imperative to secure future energy supplies led to massive Chinese investment overseas. By 2004, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was estimated to have invested $40 billion in foreign oil development, and China seemed set to spend some of its cash on mining and power

182 Imperial tectonics companies in Australia and Canada. It was competing hard with another newcomer, the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation in Burma, Vietnam, the Sudan, Russia and Angola. The Chinese also expanded their operations in Africa, in what was characterized as ‘the new scramble for Africa’. China sought to secure energy supplies from Brazil as well, at what some regarded as three times the market price, a sign perhaps that the Chinese anticipated future shortages. The competition for resources may increase the risk of military conflict between China and its neighbours. In 2004, China overtook Japan as the second largest consumer of energy; and there was tension between the two nations over a Chinese gas project close to Japanese waters.38 A Japanese official explained, ‘We are pursuing a policy of proportional escalation. If they do something then we will do something until they understand our determination.’39 Disputes over oil between Japan and China are more than about oil. They are laden with history and national pride and are indicative of the future ‘pecking order’ in Asia: who is the ‘first-chop nation’ – Number One. Most of China’s new supplies would be strategically vulnerable to hostile interception, and pipelines are perhaps even more vulnerable than sea lanes. Nevertheless, in 2003, Hu Jintao, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, is reported to have directed that China secure energy supplies that could not be interdicted by the US Navy in the event of a war over Taiwan. At the same time, China will very likely build a navy capable of protecting its vital global interests, such as sea lanes, and play a more active part in the politics of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. It seems likely that dependence on vulnerable supplies of imported energy is also likely to encourage both India and China to develop their nuclear power programmes. China sought to develop regional economic structures. On 4 November 2002, it signed an agreement with the ASEAN to create a free-trade zone covering 1.7 billion people, which China would inevitably dominate. There was talk of ASEAN members eventually forming a monetary union and members also agreed to exercise restraint in any future territorial disputes. This was seen by some commentators as not so much an attempt by China to control ASEAN as an attempt to woo them away from Japan. Reacting to these developments, Aoki Yutaka, a senior official at the Japanese Embassy in Phnom Penh was quoted as saying that ‘China is a frightening figure. ASEAN members fear that China may take away foreign investment. They see China as a major competitor rather than a partner.’40 The Japanese Prime Minister insisted that Japan was not ceding economic leadership of the region to China, and announced Japan’s own plans for free trade in the area.41 By 2003, there was a growing belief in the need to set up Asian security frameworks, preferably by engaging China, South Korea and Japan with ASEAN, termed ASEAN Plus Three (APT). Both China and Japan seemed cautious that APT might turn into a means for smaller countries to

The next hundred years 183 constrain their interests and little came of it.42 On 29 November 2004, however, China signed an agreement with ASEAN at its annual meeting in Laos. This agreement was designed to continue the process of creating the world’s largest free-trade area, potentially drawing its members closer to China at the expense of their relations with the USA and Japan.43 The ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong explained that China wished to be a superpower like the USA and, ‘we have to learn how to live with our big neighbour. I don’t think they are aggressive, they are just nearby’. He saw that ASEAN would ‘become less and less in the driving seat’ and perhaps become merely ‘the Navigator’.44 If this were the case, then China would in a sense have taken over ASEAN, at the expense of Japan, and thereby have created its own ‘Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’, which others hope will be benign. These arrangements certainly served many of China’s strategic purposes, for the regional organizations which it joined were effectively barred from discussing issues such as Taiwan, the very topics on which members might have been expected to wish to form a collective view, but then their silence suggested that indeed they had – one which accommodates China. No Asian organization seems likely to follow the European model, which necessitates a sharing of sovereignty, for this remains an enduring anathema to China. On 6 December 2004, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi said that the Summit of 2005 would lay the foundations for an East Asian Community (EAC). The EAC would be a free-trade area and entail a security pact, and most significantly the USA would not be a member. The problems for the EAC would probably be not between ASEAN members, who had already signed similar undertakings among themselves, but with the additional three. Japan’s main interest in engaging with ASEAN lay in preventing China from dominating it.45 China reinforced these collective developments with bilateral measures. It supported economic integration with investment in infrastructure, for example a $16 billion rail network throughout the region. In 2004, the Chinese agreed to contribute £140 million to pay for 230 km of track in Cambodia, linking China with Singapore; and there were other grandiose schemes devised for Latin America. Railways thus retain the geo-strategic importance they had in the region a hundred years ago, but without apparently generating the same military frictions. China seemed more intent on building trade with its neighbours than exacting tribute, although the effect in terms of power-relationships may be the same.46 This appeared to be China exercising the sway of its soft-power at a time when the USA’s willingness to apply its hard-power seemed increasingly unattractive to some.47 ‘Chinese trade with Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Burma is seen in Beijing as a modern form of relations that once existed between its empire and smaller kingdoms which paid it tribute.’48 Smaller nations sought to secure their economic future, because China could be both a vital partner but also a threatening rival.

184 Imperial tectonics By 2004, joint ventures and foreign companies produced 27 per cent of China’s industrial output.49 It was estimated that 20,000 South Korean companies had relocated some of their manufacturing to China, taking advantage of low production costs. South Korea sold more to China in 2003 than it did to the USA, and much of the modern industry of Fujian province was owned and equipped by Taiwanese. The South Korean economy became dependent on exports to China and its companies on the competitiveness of their Chinese production facilities; but at the same time they were beholden to the Chinese Government officials who might approve their ventures or not. It also seemed possible that South Korean technology might be transferred to China on a massive scale, ‘hollowing out’ South Korea’s domestic industry, and it planned to relocate some of its manufacturing base to North Korea instead.50 American business leaders noted the coming challenge from China. The former chief executive of General Electric, Jack Welch, remarked in September 2001, ‘I think we are going to see in the next twenty years a Chinese threat that’s going to dwarf what the Japanese threat looked like when I took over the company.’51 While the American economy lost over 1 million jobs in the year to November 2003, the Chinese economy and its exports boomed, and some saw a connection between the two, with frequent calls for the Chinese to revalue the Renminbi against the US Dollar. One New Zealand publisher warned that ‘China has the capacity, the willpower, the structure and the command economy to rip the heart out of manufacturing growth in Europe and America over the next two decades.’52 In 2003, the US Commerce Secretary, Don Evans, denounced China as a closed market, and in November 2003 the USA imposed tariffs on $500 million worth of Chinese textiles, supported by the traditional constituency of South Carolina. By 2005, however, many Western countries clamouring for informal quotas on textiles and shoes were having to acknowledge that their position was compromised. Having allowed the Chinese to join a rules-based organization, the WTO, how could they then disregard those rules on account of their supposed harshness? Worse, if they did, how could they complain if the Chinese chose to ignore the rules on some subsequent occasion? China’s ambitions grew beyond mere production and on to ownership and control. In December 2004, the Chinese Government-owned computer company, Lenovo, bought the PC business of IBM. This was just the most conspicuous deal among many which saw Chinese enterprises buying foreign companies, signalling their desire to become global players and business leaders.53 Henning Kagermann of the German software company SAP warned that the greatest threat to his business came not from Microsoft but from Chinese companies.54 By 2005, China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) had bid unsuccessfully for the American oil company Unocal and the Chinese company Haier had bid for Maytag, the American maker of domestic appliances.

The next hundred years 185 China’s acquisition of Western corporate assets seemed to typify the dilemmas and confusion in Western thinking about an ebullient China. To some it may have seemed as if China was just following the Japanese pattern of the 1980s by investing in the West, but there were significant differences. Japan was a democratic nation and quasi-ally of the USA while China was not, but rather a rival of the USA for influence in Asia. China had become a major competitor with the West for energy resources and the Chinese ‘investors’ were state-owned corporations seeking strategic Western assets as part of some expansionist policy, whereas Japanese private corporations had merely had business objectives.55 The former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, is reported to have said of the Chinese, ‘Somebody needs to break their sword.’56 Others saw things differently, welcoming Chinese investment which gave China a greater stake in the success of the global economy. The thwarting of the Chinese bid for Unocal had led some to a similar conclusion: ‘China might reasonably conclude from the episode that it cannot rely on global trade rules to secure its energy supplies and should look instead to mercantilist or even military means to do so.’57 Some Chinese, perhaps unconsciously, echoed the sentiments of another Asian nation 65 years earlier: ‘To spread the “China Threat” and try to curb China’s progress and starve its energy needs is not in the interests of world stability and development.’58 International friction over ‘The China-Trade’ thus continued as it had for over 200 years; and the prophecies of C.H. Pearson and Brooks Adams of the late nineteenth century about Chinese economic power seemed to have a new relevance and urgency, magnified now by a globalism in which time and distance have been reduced by the Internet and air travel. Many Americans felt that the USA was losing out in trade and investment in China and the Pacific region to European and Asian countries; and some American views on trade with China sounded similar to complaints made against Japan a decade earlier. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bangkok in October 2003, President Bush raised his concerns with China’s President, hoping that the Chinese would revalue their currency and reduce their trade surplus with the USA. China had assumed the mantle of the prime trade enemy of the USA, a position long held by the Japanese. The grounds for this in American eyes were that China’s economy was not free and Chinese workers were deprived of many human rights, making its competition unfair. China’s trade surplus with the USA continued to mount, yet the WTO rules covered neither labour standards nor exchange rate policy about which the USA complained. There was increasing concern that the US Dollar’s status as a reserve currency would be untenable if its deficits and consequent devaluations continued.59 In 2004, foreign holdings of US Dollars were estimated to be $11 trillion; and between 2002 and 2004, the Dollar fell by 35 per cent against the Euro and 24 per cent against the Yen. A further fall on a similar scale would in effect constitute the largest default in history. Meanwhile

186 Imperial tectonics the Renminbi was pegged to the Dollar and further calls for its revaluation were only partially assuaged by a revaluation of 2.1 per cent in July 2005. From 1994 to 2001, however, its trade-weighted exchange rate had already risen by 30 per cent, appreciating with the US Dollar; and even if China did scrap exchange controls, the desire of the Chinese to save and invest in other currencies might actually have caused the Renminbi to fall. In 2004, the OECD predicted that the USA’s current account deficit would rise to 6.4 per cent of GDP by 2006, and others suggested 8 per cent by 2008. Never before has the world’s reserve currency also belonged to its biggest debtor. Comparisons were drawn with the demise of Sterling as a reserve currency. Sterling remained the world’s reserve currency for 50 years after the USA’s GDP overtook Britain’s, but eventually gave up under the burden of huge war-debts, economic mismanagement and consequent devaluations. Yet criticisms that China was an ‘unfair trader’, as Japan had been deemed to be, seemed wide of the mark.60 Besides, in 2004 China produced 13 per cent of American imports, while in 1986 Japan had produced 22 per cent.61 N.R. Lardy disagreed with the view that China was closed to trade; after all, in 2003 it had a trade deficit of $67.2 billion. Overall, Chinese imports grew by $55 billion in 2000,62 by $100 million in 2003,63 and its neighbours became increasingly dependent on its consumption of their products. By 2003 China had become the world’s third largest importer. Japan imposed what were regarded as ‘unfair’ trade restrictions in its years of greatest export growth, appeared to shut out foreign investment, and was heavily criticized for this practice. The same could not be said of China which did not follow the pattern of Japanese mercantilism. China welcomed massive foreign direct investment and the Chinese economy may even have suffered from excessive, and thus inefficient, investment.64 In 2002, China attracted $53 billion of foreign investment, and in 2003 China overtook the USA as the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Foreign investments in China acted both as a means of increasing China’s economic power and of giving foreigners a capital stake in China’s boom; but they also constituted a ‘hostage’, which foreigners valued too highly to risk losing by upsetting China. Mutual dependence was growing not only through markets and investments but also through debt. Chinese economic growth had benefits for the American economy. Companies such as Dell and General Motors relied on China for significant parts of their supply chain; and China remained the biggest potential market for American products. Masses of cheap products from China were largely responsible for reducing inflation in developed economies,65 and the American Government was reliant upon Chinese surpluses to finance its debts. Equally, China’s economic growth was dependent upon its exports to the USA; the financing of China’s current and future defence spending may depend in part on maintaining the USA as its primary export market and source of technology.

The next hundred years 187 Americans understood that their power in international affairs was necessarily underwritten by economic strength. When its enemies were defeated and its allies ‘busted’ by war in 1945, the USA was supreme. There were fears in the 1980s that the USA was busted, and that it would be supplicant and mendicant upon an economically powerful Japan. Japanese strength may have been misjudged, but in many senses the weakness of the American economy had not been corrected, despite its high rate of growth sustained by rising debt; and in the first decade of the new millennium, the troubling relationship was with the USA’s creditor, China, more than Japan. In 1980, the USA was the world’s largest net lender, with a positive net balance of assets; but by 2004 its net investment was minus $3 trillion.66 In 2004, the USA’s rate of borrowing was £540 billion per year, at 5.4 per cent of GDP, compared to just 3.5 per cent of GDP at the time of the Wall Street crash of 1987.67 It was Chinese money that enabled the USA to maintain its trade deficit, cut taxes and fight its wars. This created a strategic vulnerability, with the USA a ‘loan-junkie’ hooked on China’s ‘financial opium’, in hock to China, just as it had been to Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. China’s central bank ‘has acquired the means to alter the course of the US economy in a way terrorists, or the still-feeble Chinese military would find difficult’.68 The USA would be in serious trouble if it ever had to finance its debts by some other arrangement, as was seen on 26 November 2004, when rumours that China might be cutting back holdings of US Dollars helped to push down the value of the Dollar.69 In March 2005, Warren Buffet warned that the American trade deficit and excessive consumption risked turning the country into a nation of ‘sharecroppers’ dependent on foreign landlords.70 In 2004, the US Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, forecast ‘a day of serious reckoning’.71 There would be a severe danger to the world’s economy if American consumers and Chinese producers were both to change their habits too precipitately. Those who gained most from the American propensity to import, such as China and Japan, seemed reluctant to wreck the formula, and to be content to finance the USA’s debt, even if it meant the devaluation of their Dollar savings. Nevertheless, while such mutual symbiotic entanglement could be a source of stability by encouraging mutual dependence, it might also perpetuate mutual bad habits, and be a potential source of weakness to both countries, depending upon which could best stand the political consequences of its disruption.72 For now, China may need American consumers for its products and the USA may need China’s cash to shore up its debts; but at some stage China may not be so dependent upon those consumers, while those American debts may remain. That time might also coincide with a period of unprecedented Chinese economic and military power.73 That China had arrived as a major power in the world was acknowledged in 2004, ironically when the overheating of its economy was cited as one of five major risks threatening the world economy.74 By 2004, many were

188 Imperial tectonics pessimistic about whether China could sustain its rate of growth: ‘Asia is facing its worst prospects since 1998.’75 The consequences of a Chinese recession for the American economy, combined with other factors, such as America’s national debt, could be severe, ‘Put oil, the Fed and China into the equation – all deflationary forces – and the endgame starts to look downright treacherous.’76 In a more optimistic scenario, where China’s economy powers ahead, China will have an increasing influence over the developed world’s inflation, interest rates, wages, profits and house prices.

The fruits of power Prior to 1904, others fought over China’s feeble carcass for its wealth, whereas today China’s wealth, or potential wealth, is a sign of its strength which others have to respect if they are to share China’s treasures. China had become the leading state in Asia by the late 1990s, and by 2003, China’s currency was widely recognized as the de facto anchor of the Asian region.77 Relentless economic growth seemed likely to encourage China to exercise its new-found power, following the historical pattern set by European nations, the USA and Japan. Others, especially the USA, faced the problem of how to deal with this new phenomenon. President Clinton’s trip to China in 1998 was seen by some as formal recognition that ‘the economic and geopolitical leader of the region is no longer Japan but China’;78 the USA became more dependent upon the Chinese Renminbi than upon the Japanese Yen. Presidential candidate George W. Bush termed China a ‘strategic competitor’, in contrast to President Clinton’s term ‘strategic partner’. Soon after taking office, however, the Bush administration had dropped its more challenging designation.79 The change was thanks in part to a new perception in the USA of China’s value after the terrorist attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001. President Bush visited China on 18 October 2001 and it seemed that China and the USA had created a new and better relationship, united against terrorism and setting aside previous frictions. President Bush’s visit to China in February 2002, following its acceptance into the WTO the previous November, was seen by some as cementing what could be ‘the most influential economic partnership of the new Century.’80 From being seen as a potential strategic competitor, after 11 September 2001 China became in a sense, once more a strategic partner, as it had been in the 1930s, the 1940s and under President Nixon. The US National Security Strategy of September 2002 stated that ‘Today the world’s great powers find [themselves] on the same side – united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.’81 By 2005, however, the Pentagon seemed to be viewing China once more as a future peer competitor, as it had before President Bush’s election in 2000;82 but the State Department remained adamant that its policy was one of engagement with China, and that China was a ‘Co-operative

The next hundred years 189 player and often a partner.’83 It seemed likely that President George W. Bush was at heart as keen to engage with China as his father had been. As the only superpower, the USA tends to favour the status quo and hopes to dissuade China from following the path of military competition, while preserving its own military superiority which is, awkwardly, in itself an endorsement of the efficacy of military power. Engagement seemed indispensable. President Bush’s visit of 2001 was redolent of other historic visits by Westerners seeking to make China part of the international trading system, in this case the WTO. There was, however, a significant and ironic difference. China was now attempting to gain access to global, but primarily Western markets, but on Chinese terms, possibly to be seen as ‘unequal treaties’ of its own making. The West was not seeking to ‘open China for trade’ per se, but rather insisting that an eager China should have to operate by the rules of the international system which the West had constructed and still dominated. It was hoped that this would foster China’s status as a partner, rather than opponent, and lead to its Westernization. Conversely, this is what many in China appear determined to avoid. China seeks the technical modernizations, trade and investments that contact with the West makes possible, but its Government at least appears to reject the sort of society which produces them, seeing it as a cultural threat. Many Chinese would prefer China to ‘reawaken’ as a self-confident, powerful nation of fundamentally different traditions, whose new wealth protects rather than surrenders their identity. This approach is somewhat akin to the modernization of Japan in the late nineteenth century, which was accompanied by assertions of Japanese uniqueness, and ultimately resulted in a richer and more powerful Japan ready to fight the West. Thus China could become a formidable rival to the West, but not necessarily in a military sense. The time frame and seriousness of any potential military challenge is not clear. In 1996, Zhang Xiaobo and Song Qiang wrote an article, China Can Say No to America, echoing the idea of The Japan That Can Say No, a notion that seemed popular with many young people. Many Chinese also believe that the USA will become the enemy of China, and Chinese statements and behaviour have often encouraged this view in the West. Nevertheless, China may be in no hurry to take a conventional route to military power, for Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation was to hide China’s capabilities and bide its time. Yet unease was aroused by views such as those reported of Lieutenant General Mi Zhenyu, Vice-President of the Beijing Academy of Military Sciences, regarding the United States: ‘For a relatively long time it will be absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance’.84 Europe and the USA both have a vested interest in the political stability of East Asia, but only the USA has a practical role in guaranteeing it. There have been numerous incidents over recent decades to excite opinion that China and the USA are bound to clash in the long term as

190 Imperial tectonics strategic rivals: the issues of Tibet and human rights; the alleged theft by Chinese spies of nuclear secrets from Los Alamos in the 1990s; the American bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999; the longrunning confrontation over Taiwan; the detention of an American EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft in China in April 2001 and American plans for national missile defence. In an echo of Michael Crichton’s warning of 1992 about the insidious threat from Japan in Rising Sun, on 16 February 2005 CNN reported the widespread theft of American military technology by Chinese espionage under the headline, ‘Red Star Rising’. China’s attitude to its military security has certainly been transformed since the 1980s. The demonstration of American military prowess in the First Gulf War of 1990–1 seemed to alarm the Chinese; and resulted in their announcement in 1997 of plans to modernize their forces, for ‘local war under high-technology conditions’.85 Some commentators in the 1990s believed that China could become a great military power with neutron bombs, miniaturized nuclear weapons and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Particular concern was voiced in the US military community about China’s apparent attempts to follow the debates on ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’ and the technical opportunities the latter might offer to challenge the USA on equal terms.86 Fear of China’s military potential provoked alarmist, futuristic fiction about war between China, its neighbours and confrontation with the West, in much the same vein as the literature of Jack London, Spanner, Bywater and Salisbury. The security of oil supplies and surprise attacks on fleets at anchor remained popular themes.87 From the late 1990s, China saw American hegemony as taking the form of a modern ‘gunboat policy’, but also manifesting itself in the manipulation of international regulations, rules and norms. However, confrontation with the USA was not seen to be the solution, for it would only damage Chinese interests and lead to its isolation. China lacked the allies and means to challenge American power openly. China saw that for the time being, the USA was in a dominant if complex position; but China was still likely to seek to balance it, and to wait for the tides of history to turn. Even if China does seek to balance the power of the USA, its own ability to act as a hegemon will be constrained by many complex relationships. There were further moves by China to upgrade its defences after 1999.88 American campaigns in the Gulf and Balkans were assessed by the Chinese to make US intervention elsewhere more likely, and reinforced China’s conviction that it must master new defence information technologies and long-range precision weapons. Yet the reforms after 1992, which were essentially about ‘mechanization’, were not complete by 2002 when a new programme of ‘informationization’ was announced. The analyst of Chinese military reform, You Ji, considered that ‘The “Double Construction” may mean falling between two stools.’89 Chinese views on warfare became more sophisticated and complex.

The next hundred years 191 Warfare is no longer an exclusively Imperial garden where professional soldiers alone can mingle . . . it is precisely the diversity of the means employed that has enlarged the concept of warfare . . . warfare is the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units and military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians, scientists and even bankers.90 Books such as Unrestricted Warfare by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, argued in favour of a ‘dirty war’, echoing Japan’s plans for deep attacks on Tsarist Russia prior to 1904. The book described twenty-four types of attack, such as the infiltration of Western society; the sabotage of its pillars, banks, financial markets and public services; and the use of drug trafficking, terrorism and environmental degradation. ‘It takes non-military forms and military forms and creates a war on many fronts’.91 Colonel Qiao Liang also saw the issue in terms of culture and civilization. He is reported to have said that ‘All strong countries make rules, while all rising ones break them and exploit loopholes. “Barbarians” always rise by breaking the rules of civilized and developed countries, which is what human history is all about.’92 Equally, the ideas proposed in Unrestricted Warfare might be seen merely as ‘an important expression of China’s feelings of powerlessness when confronted by US might’.93 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine stressed the principles of ‘Actively Taking the Initiative’ and ‘Catching the Enemy Unprepared’ – the importance of shock and surprise, achieved by pre-emption, which allow a smaller force to dominate an enemy.94 Chinese scenarios for war with the USA were based on an assumption that American forces would have to be neutralized prior to any Chinese operations against Taiwan. The Chinese therefore saw the need to strike hard and decisively without operational warning, having established a casus belli over time; but without alerting their enemy, leaving him unaware of the dimensions of the attack for as long as possible95 – a familiar scenario over a hundred years of East Asian history.96 President Jiang Zemin was quoted in the South China Morning Post of 15 December 1999 as saying that ‘The civilian and military leaderships are hopeful that by 2010 the mainland’s defence muscle will have developed to the extent the US will not dare intervene in a China-related conflict, for example, one arising in the Taiwan Strait.’ Hence, in the early years of the new millennium, China focussed on procuring ballistic missiles, submarines and precision anti-ship cruise missiles to prevent an American carrier task force from positioning itself in the Taiwan Strait, as it did during the crisis of 1996.97 China’s Defence White Paper of October 2000 identified the USA as its principal threat. China warned the USA not to intervene should war break out between the People’s Republic and Taiwan, noting that such a conflict could include long-range strikes, which was presumably a threat to attack the West Coast of the USA with China’s long-range missiles.

192 Imperial tectonics This was expressed most graphically in 2005, albeit unofficially by General Zhu Chenghu: ‘If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons . . . the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.’98 When studying the factors in a future war with the USA, Chinese analysts made observations on American vulnerabilities with resonances of 1941. For example, it was thought that American forces would be dependent upon a precarious extended line of logistics from the USA to the Western Pacific; and their ability to launch offensive operations would depend initially upon their aircraft carriers.99 The Chinese deduced the need to keep those carriers out of striking range of the Chinese mainland by threatening them with air or torpedo attack;100 and the need to attack American forward bases from the air with cruise missiles. Surprise would be achieved thanks to the degradation of American communications and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) by attacking American platforms in space.101 China was expected to procure new space systems, airborne early-warning aircraft and long-range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs). ‘The mastery of outer space will be a requisite for military victory, with outer space becoming the new commanding heights for combat.’102 The Chinese saw space as the ‘high ground’ of future battle, as offering the potential for observation, communications, electronic warfare, high-energy laser platforms to destroy other platforms, and navigation satellites to provide precision targeting for missiles. Some argued that the only way to ascertain China’s true objectives in space is to cooperate with it.103 However, the notion of a pre-emptive ‘Pearl Harbour’ in space offered the USA a troubling analogy. ‘The PLA now has the technology to make microand nano-satellites that can be used as interceptors’, capable of shooting down American satellites.104 In October 2003, China announced its preparations for its first manned space flight in December that year, which could give it military capabilities at some later date to threaten American military satellites.105 The launching of China’s first astronaut aboard a Shenzhou106 military rocket on 15 October 2003, and plans to set up a moonbase, signalled the scale of China’s strategic ambitions and seemed to exemplify its ebullient self-confidence. Not unreasonably, the Chinese chose US-like opponents as the top-grade enemies for their wargames. They made an exhaustive study of Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003, just as they and the Russians had studied Operation Desert Storm. The study heightened Chinese awareness of the need for special forces, encouraged a recognition that airpower alone cannot prevail and highlighted the scope for guerrilla warfare, perhaps reinforcing older Chinese ideas about ‘People’s War’. The US Department of Defense (DoD) Annual Report to Congress on 29 May 2004 maintained that China’s military modernization programme had eroded the challenges that inhibited the use of force against Taiwan.107

The next hundred years 193 ‘At this new century, nowhere is the danger for Americans as great as in the Taiwan Strait, where the potential for a war with China, a nuclear-armed great power, could erupt out of miscalculation, misunderstanding or accident.’108 A Pentagon official, Kurt Campbell, warned that ‘I would probably place China–Taiwan at the top of the list . . . for a strategic surprise . . . above North Korea.’109 Matters became even more tense in March 2005, when China passed a law making it legal to use force should Taiwan secede; such a possibility seemed more credible when in mid-August 2005 China held exercises with Russian forces to demonstrate their intervention capability. On the other hand, no party to the problem appeared to have an interest in initiating a military clash. In 2005, China’s defence budget was due to grow by more than 12 per cent, excluding equipment procurement, and it was predicted that spending would increase three to four times by 2025. There appeared to be a continuing move in Chinese doctrine towards surprise, deception and shock effects in the opening phases of any campaign; China was reported to be placing greater emphasis on stealthy aircraft, cruise missiles, helicopters and defence against precision strikes and electronic warfare. In December 2005 the new Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro asserted that increased Chinese defence spending was making China ‘a considerable threat’.110 The Chinese have worked hard to analyse and develop concepts of Information Warfare for the PLA, with definitions and approaches rather different to those in the West.111 Some have speculated on the possibility of what might amount to a new ‘Port Arthur/Pearl Harbour’ of the Information Age, a Chinese digital blitzkrieg – a cyber ‘torpedo attack’ into the ‘hard drive’ of the ‘USS America’. The PLA has considered creating a new service, the ‘Net Force’, and how to apply its thirty-six stratagems of war to Information War, with a ‘peoples’ army’ of information warriors armed with IT weapons.112 In keeping with this, violations of cyberspace are regarded by the Chinese as being as important as violations of national sovereignty. In the near future China will be but a regional power, with freedom of action in its own sphere. China apparently wishes to achieve ‘parity’ in political, economic and military strength with other great powers, and believes that it will achieve the status of a ‘medium-sized’ great power by 2050 at a minimum, becoming the pre-eminent power in Asia. A.T. Mahan’s greatest fear was that a land power might conquer a coastal region and also become a great maritime power. He saw that potential power, at some distant future date, to be China; twenty-first-century China could indeed fulfil Mahan’s vision. To achieve Asian dominance, China would have to build a ‘blue-water’ navy, and it has been argued that the USA should strengthen Japan to meet this potential challenge.113 By 2002, China seemed, for the time being, to have set aside plans to build and deploy aircraft carriers; but parts of the Chinese Air Force and Navy had modern equipment, supplied mostly from Russia.114

194 Imperial tectonics Whatever its actual military capabilities, China has at times struck an apparently aggressive stance.115 From a Chinese point of view, North America, Europe and Japan have seemed to coalesce into a grand alliance, underpinned by common values and foreign policy outlook, as well as shared interests. Many Chinese have felt that American policy in particular has been to, ‘divide China territorially, subvert politically, contain strategically and frustrate economically’.116 Its leaders have asserted that the USA seeks to maintain a dominant geo-strategic position and President Jiang Zemin is reported to have argued that ‘Western hostile forces have not for a moment abandoned their plot to Westernize and divide our country.’117 The strength of US–Japanese relations and an increased American presence in the western Pacific have been seen as manifestations of such attempts to contain Chinese interests. The Chinese have probably seen American involvement in India and Central Asia as strategic encirclement, albeit of a ‘soft’ variety, maintaining that the United States has led the way to ‘to build up a new world order guided by Western values’.118 This perception of being culturally surrounded by those who would constrain what are regarded as legitimate aspirations has echoes of Japan in the 1930s. Some Chinese commentators have referred to an American sense of cultural superiority, and even ‘potential racial exclusionism’, which sees China as a threatening, non-Western power.119 Such resentments against the West, but especially the USA, help to explain the apparent rapprochement of convenience between President Putin’s Russia and China, which began as early as the summer of 2000. In 1996, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai is reported to have explained the value of China’s nuclear weapons in its strategic relations with the USA: ‘In the 1950s, you threatened China with nuclear strikes three times. You could do that because we couldn’t hit back. Now we can. So you’re not going to threaten us again because, in the end, you care a lot more about Los Angeles than you do about Taipei.’120 The People’s Liberation Army Daily, the official military newspaper, noted that ‘China is not Iraq, nor Yugoslavia. She is a country with certain strategic attack capabilities. It would not be wise to fight a country like China.’121 Such capabilities help to explain the USA’s interest in missile defence. China’s growing assertiveness in international affairs became apparent in 2003 when it tried to calm the nuclear missile crisis with North Korea.122 It was now seen to be pivotal in dealing with the ‘axis of evil’. The former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, saw China as having the decisive role in the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis by removing the regime of Kim Jong II, ‘We see no alternative but for China to use its substantial economic leverage, derived from North Korea’s dependence on it for fuel and food . . . .’123 China might well wish to retain North Korea as a buffer between itself and South Korea, but nonetheless prefer it not to possess nuclear weapons, if only to restrain the Japanese from developing a counter. More crucially,

The next hundred years 195 China would probably seek to dispose of any North Korean nuclear weapons prior to what may be seen as its inevitable unification with the South. A unified nuclear-armed Korea would significantly increase the chances of Japan developing nuclear weapons in reply. More than a decade earlier, Henry Kissinger had hoped to play off the Chinese against the Japanese. He believed that the Japanese would eventually get nuclear weapons and that it was no bad thing for the Chinese to be concerned about such a development.124 In a similar way, in 2003, the USA may even have encouraged discussion of a nuclear deterrent in Japan to encourage the Chinese to restrain the North Korean nuclear programme. Progress was slow, but on 20 September 2005, it appeared that some had indeed been made in reaching a solution, and China claimed most of the credit for what seemed like a breakthrough, although many were extremely sceptical about this outcome. This agreement was even greeted by some as a triumph for China to be compared with that of the USA in brokering the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, with China establishing itself as the great arbiter in the disputes of other powers in the region. Hopes that problems over North Korea would reveal common interests between the USA and China seemed misplaced. In 2005, China announced an increase in Defence spending of 12.6 per cent, which the Japanese maintained underestimated actual spending by up to 50 per cent.125 At the same time, China seemed determined to build a blue-water navy. One attaché in Beijing noted that this could be compared to the Soviet Union’s race to become an ocean-going navy to rival the US in the 1970s. China upgraded its surface fleet and submarines and introduced numerous new missiles. The benchmark for the reforms and reorganization of the Chinese armed forces seemed to be to build a force that could prevail in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and deter American intervention, ultimately presenting Taipei with no option but to capitulate. The CIA’s 2005 report on global threats placed less emphasis on Sino-American cooperation, and it noted that China was making determined efforts to counter what it saw as US efforts to contain or encircle China. American concerns about China were summarized by the US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in September 2005. He noted that the USA had watched China integrate itself into the international system over three decades, but that the time had now come for China to become ‘a responsible stakeholder in the international system’. China could not ‘take the US market for granted’. The idea that economic growth and nationalism ‘could sustain the Communist Party in its power monopoly was . . . risky and mistaken’. China’s efforts to ‘lock up world energy supplies was not sensible’. China was guilty of the ‘rampant theft’ of intellectual property and involvement with ‘troublesome states’. All of these concerns would lead the USA and others to ‘hedge relations with China’.126 Yet the USA’s seemed a twin-track approach, for when President Bush visited China in November 2005 the emphasis was on engagement and common interests.

196 Imperial tectonics

Demography: people power again Despite being regarded as ‘politically incorrect’ for decades, many traditional areas of debate have resurfaced in the discourse on global strategy. Ethno-cultural geopolitics, and their relation to trade and the consumption of raw materials are once more familiar themes. Pearson, Stoddard and Malthus would have clearly recognized the dynamics of the debate, although some of today’s participants might be discomforted to be in such company.127 Strategic shifts of power were once commonly described in terms of dynamic expanding races and cultures set against the dying and contracting ones, with the demographic force and resource requirements of the former having profound political consequences. Today, what is essentially the same analysis is generally expressed merely in terms of demography and culture. The modern Malthusians are prone to describe the strategic consequences of diminishing populations as much as they are of expanding ones. The notion of an ‘Old’ and a ‘New Europe’, of a decaying culture and society contrasting with a reinvigorated and dynamic one, was popularized in the USA by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2002–3. The debate also has Darwinian tones when applied to demography. Some postulate that modern Western society, but maybe all modern societies, have created an environment in which the ‘fittest’ have fewest children.128 T.G. Dyer ended his Theodore Roosevelt and his Idea of Race of 1980: ‘Theodore Roosevelt died making the extraordinarily inaccurate prophecy of race suicide.’129 Twenty years on, the case is not yet regarded as closed by many influential commentators such as Pat Buchanan and P. Longman or even the sober The Economist.130 Longman’s views on the strategic perils faced by the USA as a consequence of its demographic collapse, The Empty Cradle, mirror those of Theodore Roosevelt, 100 years ago, albeit Roosevelt’s urging American women to do their duty and mother large numbers of children ‘so that the race shall increase not decrease’,131 was expressed in terms that would not be used today. Pat Buchanan concluded that Europeans do not plan to continue as a great vital race. What then are we defending? Christianity? That is dead in Europe. Western Civilization? But, by their decision not to have children Europeans have already accepted a Twenty-Second Century end to their civilization.132 In 2004, the American Walter Russell Mead asked, ‘Does Europe have the biological and cultural will to live?’133 Daniel Gouré maintained that the economic, numeric and psychological consequences of demographic decline in Europe and Japan will limit their future military capabilities.134 The French Institute for International Affairs predicted that the economic consequences of Europe’s relative economic decline would be the EU’s ‘slow

The next hundred years 197 but inexorable exit from history’.135 ‘The political and economic renaissance of Europe that was predicted . . . is likely to be still-born.’136 For Russia the demographic outlook is even more bleak, with all its ramifications for territorial security in its Far East. Pat Buchanan maintained that the West’s self-indulgent practices such as contraception and abortion, combined with materialism had led to collapsing birth rates.137 Now that all the Western empires are gone, Western man, relieved of his duties to civilize and Christianize mankind, ‘revelling in luxury in our age of self-indulgence, seems to have lost his will to live . . .’.138 A hundred years ago, Kitchener and Colonel Maude would also have recognized this vision of the West’s ‘wild debauch’ and its menacing consequences. The transfer of power from the West to the East is gathering pace with profound consequences. ‘This time, the populous states of Asia are the aspirants seeking to play a greater role.’139 This analysis has been familiar for over a hundred years, but causes some to feel no less threatened for that and to display the sort of cultural panic characteristic of 1905. The demographic demise of Europe and Japan are widely discussed.140 The rising powers of China and India141 are seen to combine demographic strength and fundamentally different ‘Asian’ cultures with growing economic power, unleashing their masses from poverty by means of the technology and economic models of the West. Europe, by contrast, is seen by many in the USA, but especially in Asia, to be in long-term decline, with a complacent, state-subsidized society. It is also asserted that ‘the fact that Europe’s population is shrinking and ageing will inevitably also affect the aspirations of some Europeans to create a superpower to rival the USA.’142 The UN predicted that the EU’s population will have fallen from 482 m to 454 m by 2040. A European Commissioner, Fritz Bolkenstein, created a stir in September 2004 when he called demography ‘the mother of politics’. He predicted that the youth and dynamism of the USA would enable it to remain the world’s only superpower, alongside a rising China, with Europe succumbing to the rising tide of Islam should Turkey be granted membership of the European Union.143 Bernard Lewis predicted that by the end of the twenty-first century at the latest, Europe would be ‘part of the Arabic west, the Maghreb’.144 The novelist Umberto Eco maintained that unless Europe found the energy to become a third power between the USA and the Far East, it would remain divided, economically stagnant and strategically irrelevant.145 On the other hand, some Americans saw Europe as a future colossus.146 T.R. Reid of The Washington Post contemplated Europe as ‘a new superpower and the end of American supremacy’.147 Another American, Jeremy Rifkin believed that Europe had the edge in new ideas, and that ‘while the American spirit is tiring and languishing in the past, a new European Dream is being born. It is a dream far better suited to the next stage of the human journey.’ Rifkin noted, however, Europe’s demographic decline and that without massive immigration ‘Europe is likely to wither and die’.148

198 Imperial tectonics Demographic power is also seen to be linked to the USA’s future strategic power. Some have seen the USA as a demographic dynamo: ‘The long-term logic of demography seems likely to entrench American power and to widen existing transatlantic rifts.’149 Others fear that its ageing population will be a brake on its economic power and strategic capacities, relative to areas of the world with growing birth rates, or at least on the USA’s ability to deal with global problems that arise in part from those birth rates.150 In 2004, the cost of funding what the US Government had promised in future social benefits alone exceeded GDP by 500 per cent. Longman maintained that In another twenty years, the USA will be no more able to afford the role of world policeman than Europe or Japan can today. Nor will China be able to assume the job, since it will soon start to suffer from the kind of hyper-ageing that Japan is already experiencing.151 The Russian, Anatoly Utkin, maintained that the West was dying out and that the power of the USA would fade. ‘The USA will simply not be physically able to create a version of the “MacArthur regency” over the huge Arab world. Russia will need to find a position for itself in a world of shifting power.’152 Fears of cultural dilution were also expressed for the West as a whole ‘Multiculturalism is really a suicide cult conceived by the Western elites not to celebrate all cultures but to deny their own . . . at a time when the benefits of the Britannic inheritance are more and more apparent everywhere else.’153 China has often been portrayed as a demographic titan and it is this demographic strength that has so often terrified its neighbours, especially Russia, and continues to do so.154 Yet China too faces serious demographic challenges, some created by the one-child policy which was designed to alleviate them.155 By 2030, thanks to this policy’,156 its workforce will start to fall; but China will still have a massive population and its people will be increasingly prosperous by their own historical standards. China may be the first major country to grow old before it becomes rich. Historically, nations’ economies have not grown when their populations contract; but China may break this pattern, albeit with many attendant problems.157

Alternative futures Free market capitalism and democracy are sometimes regarded as the epitome of what it is to be Western; it is thought that as China adopts these ideas, it will somehow become less traditionally Chinese. This is true to an extent, but ignores the grip of European, as opposed to Western ideas on the Chinese state over the last 50 years. Communism had been the West’s most influential ideological export to China, but by the end of the twentieth century, it was being displaced in the market by a variant of

The next hundred years 199 another product, Capitalism, which raised more people from poverty in a shorter time than any other economic phenomenon in history. It seemed unlikely that this freer market had really exploited the Chinese people more than had their Communist Government over many decades. Chinese Communism of the new millennium was very different to that of Chairman Mao. A paradox lies at the heart of the Chinese Government’s policy, for after the dramas on Tiananmen Square, China’s leaders made a deal to allow greater commercial and social freedoms, provided the power of the Party was not challenged. Capitalists and former ‘class-enemies’ were now allowed to become members of the Communist Party. By 2005, disparity in the distribution of wealth in Communist China was greater than in Capitalist Taiwan. A quarter of the names on the 2004 EuromoneyChina’s list of its hundred richest people were Communists.158 As one Shanghai student noted, ‘Before I joined the Communist Party, we needed to learn Marxism, but most commonly I looked at this book.’ He was referring to Principles of Economics by N. Gregory Mankiw, chief economics adviser to President Bush.159 Reconciling these phenomena may yet be problematic. China constitutes a puzzle. Is it a Communist or Capitalist state, or neither? Does it practise market socialism or state corporatism? Could China be neither a socialist planned economy, nor a free market economy operating in a democracy? Could it combine censorship and a controlled media with a transparent political system which was dynamic, entrepreneurial and innovative? Could an economic and political crisis be avoided by finding a third way between these poles and melding Chinese traditions and innovations with those of the West? It is often asked how the West will handle the rise of China, but how will China handle the West? China probably believes that the USA wishes to maintain its dominant position in the Eurasian balance of power and to prevent the long-term resurgence of Russia. It has apparently assessed the USA as wishing to maintain its unique position of power by strengthening defence ties with Japan, expanding NATO’s roles outside Western Europe and increasingly acting unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions around the world. For example, the USA made efforts to improve its relations with India to balance the growing power of China. Predictions are risky and prophecies of hegemonic rise and decline have been notoriously unreliable whether applied to the USA, China, India or Japan.160 However, there are clear differences of opinion in the West between those who see China as some kind of threat and those who feel that it could become a partner. Some see China to be less like the West than Japan, and as a far more formidable threat. China has been compared to Nazi Germany, the last of the great dictatorships whose overthrow is unfinished business. They have regarded engagement as appeasement on a grand scale and would like to confront the Chinese Government to free the Chinese people from what

200 Imperial tectonics they see as tyranny. They maintain that it is foolish to imagine that by trading with China it can be democratized. Others seek change in a more benign if insidious way. Like missionaries of old, they want to change and convert the Chinese to Western ways. Zbigniew Brzezinski observed that ‘China is big, it’s large on the map, it’s Yellow, so there is an under-the-surface racist element, and it fits very nicely an obsessive state of mind. I imagine it will last a couple of years, because China is big enough to sustain this obsession.’161 Many argue that the USA should not ‘lose China again’ as it did during the Communist Revolution, the Korean War and the Vietnam War; but rather that it should seize the opportunity to lock China into the international system. Henry Kissinger criticized those who saw China as an inevitable rival, characterizing this view as a ‘nostalgia for confrontation’. He claimed that ‘We have no great conflicting interests. China will become a great power and have greater influence. We have to get used to this.’162 The former US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger maintained that ‘China is not going to be a world power in the existing period and possibly never. They recognize it and the last thing they want is to tangle with the United States.’163 The USA, abjuring a traditional empire in Asia of territorial occupation, has needed a proxy to be an Asian power and to propagate its own values. It has continued to project those values onto those proxies even when the latter had other motives for seeking American support. The Japanese were described by some as ethnically White, Western, civilized and essentially Christian when they emerged as a ‘modern’ state in the late nineteenth century. Equally, many in the 1930s saw Nationalist China as latently Western, liberal and the great hope for Christianity and democracy in Asia, perhaps genuinely, but also because it suited their political wishes to see China thus. It was a necessary requirement if American support for its proxy was to be justified.164 T.V Soong and Madame Chiang Kai-shek assured American audiences that their regime had picked up the torch of democracy from the American founding fathers. Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime was essentially a fascist one. As he himself declared in Social-Darwinian terms, ‘Fascism is a stimulant for a declining society . . . Can fascism save China? We answer, Yes.’165 After the Communist triumph, Japan took over the role of the proxy upon which the USA could project its own values. Is twenty-first-century China really adopting Western values; has the West any reasonable right to expect it to; and are Western hopes in this vein merely familiar serial delusions? The essence of US policy since 1971 has been one of strategic engagement, seeking to draw China into a series of economic, political and institutional arrangements, leading to internal change and a more cooperative international relationship, the means by which the long-term security issues may be resolved – management without appeasement. Today many argue that the assumption of the trappings of Western economic organization and production in China will entail its adoption of Western values, the ideals of

The next hundred years 201 democracy, human rights and international benevolence. If they are wrong, others argue, then the West faces a daunting strategic challenge. Over 100 years ago, it baffled Mahan and others how China might ever be reformed: ‘Under what impulse, under the genius of what race, or of what institutions is the movement to arise and to progress’.166 Surprisingly, it may yet be the Chinese Communist Party that accomplishes that task, but no doubt Mahan and others would question whether this is suitably imbued with Western liberal values. Some such as B. Gilley believe that China will be.167 That said, if the Chinese model of development is going to prosper it will have to incorporate ‘Chinese characteristics’.168 In a booming China, few seem inclined to complain about lack of personal freedom. In 2001, President Jiang Zemin warned that ‘Should China apply the parliamentary democracy of the Western world, the only result would be that 1.2 billion Chinese people would not have enough food to eat’.169 Gilley maintained that the laws of social science apply in China as they do elsewhere, and that China will indeed become a functioning democracy. The opening of the economy has released the people from thrall to the Party and the ‘opening up’ of China is virtually inevitable.170 For him, China was already developing precisely along the lines that those favouring engagement with China had hoped, with a stake in a liberal, rule-based international system. The optimists believe that there are deep forces at work, linking economic progress with democratic developments.171 Dr Zhu Xueqin, Dean of Shanghai University’s Peace and Development Institution maintained that ‘It is almost impossible for a country to sustain a situation of being Westernized, or modernized in the economy, but Sovietized politically. So political reform is perhaps inevitable.’172 Some see fear of the rise of China as a ‘phantom menace’.173 They believe that an overestimation of Chinese economic strength has led to an exaggeration of the consequent changes in global trade and the military threat to the USA that would result from it. China has become highly dependent upon foreign investment and technology and could not afford to threaten these while its economy is taking off, with all the inevitable and dramatic social change. China is like many other emerging nations, dependent on others, with serious deficiencies in its infrastructure and social welfare system, and huge expectations from a rising tide of aspirant consumers. It may not be able to unlock its full economic potential unless it does institute political reform. Its potential to threaten the global balance of power is therefore limited. Burstein and de Keijzer took an optimistic view that, despite troubles along the way, China is likely to become the largest economy in the 2030s and will emerge over the next hundred years as a vibrant economy and powerful in every other sense – politically, militarily, culturally and technologically.174 There will be two superpowers, the USA and China who will at times be rivals, but both will find ways to cooperate and coexist peacefully. The Sino-American relationship could be one of productive cooperation.

202 Imperial tectonics The USA may have been engaged in an economic Cold War with Japan, but this relationship need not be replicated with China. Besides, China will have too many problems to menace the USA or the West in general. It will have enough trouble feeding its people and building its infrastructure to be concerned with confronting the USA. Other Western optimists once more see China as the great hope for ‘civilization’ and Christianity,175 rather as missionaries persuaded themselves of Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, and some American politicians believed of China in the 1930s. China is again portrayed as a great Christian nation of the future, an ally of the USA and Israel against the rise of Islam. Christians are said to have won over important members of the Communist Party who see Christianity as the cause of the rise of the West and its continuing power. David Aikman maintains that China may in time adopt an Augustinian ‘imperial’ view of the world, characterized by ‘a profound sense of restraint, order and justice in the wielding of state power . . . both Britain and the United States have possessed this at the heights of their imperial power and influence, and the US still possesses it’.176 He thinks it possible that China might take over some of the benevolent tasks in the world currently undertaken by the USA over the last 50 years, suppressing piracy in the China Sea rather as the British Royal Navy suppressed slavery around the world in the nineteenth century. If China became a world power, it might give Christianity the sort of global boost that it received from the Roman Empire – the Dragon tamed by the Lamb.177 Such political assertions about the Christianizing of both Japan and China, have perhaps been driven by religious convictions, rather than real politik. Such projections of Western values onto those whose adoption of them would be appealing, have so far proved delusional, and seem likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the Chinese themselves have certainly been eager to reject notions of China becoming a threat to the West. In November 2003 China launched a campaign to promote the ideas of its ‘peaceful rise’, and to assert that China is not an aggressive nation.178 This is but an element in the debate over whether China’s history reveals it to be essentially an aspirant hegemon, or a nation which has always been essentially defensive in outlook, with the Great Wall of China remaining the paradigm into the new millennium. Yet China’s aggressive military actions in pursuit of what it sees to be a defensive strategy are not seen that way by those whom China has attacked. China thus sees itself as a status quo, defensive power, while its neighbours may justifiably see it otherwise.179 Chinese policy may also be one of peaceful engagement, containing elements of Ito Hirobumi’s nineteenth-century expression ‘peacetime war’, the means by which it may eventually steer its own more independent path in international affairs. China certainly seems likely to develop those capabilities that reduce the constraints on its freedom of action, capabilities which would affect the calculations of its neighbours. However,

The next hundred years 203 Kenneth Lieberthal maintained that China was likely to avoid direct confrontation with the USA as this would damage its economic growth, and because the difference in the military power of the two countries was so great. Far from declining, and despite China’s preference for a multi-polar world, he argued that China has been forced to recognize that the USA is for now even stronger than it was at the end of the Cold War.180 There may be dangers if China’s power increases without it becoming more peaceful and democratic;181 and some dismiss ‘the wishful thinking that economic and institutional engagement will automatically bring about a democratic and peaceful China’.182 A richer, stronger China may become more democratic as society grows more prosperous, educated and vociferous; yet it would also become more capable, perhaps belligerent, and probably more interested in following its own agenda than that of those it regarded as hegemonists.183 L.F. Kaplan maintained that ‘The idea that capitalism alone will make China a democracy is a libertarian fantasy backed by the US Government.’ He noted that 100 years ago in Germany and in Japan, capitalist development was an ally, not an enemy, of authoritarianism. In ‘revolutions from above’, capitalist transformations weakened liberalism, and China’s brand of economic reform hinders political reform. Kaplan asked what ultimately made Germany and Japan democracies in 1945, and cautioned that it was not Capitalism.184 Some critics of engagement believe that the exercise of military power and pressure on China to democratize should be fundamental to American strategy. Some detected in peaceful rise a veiled threat, with China’s rise being a given, but its manner being as yet perhaps undetermined. In June 2004, the American Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly said that China was challenging the status quo ‘aggressively’.185 Perhaps it was for this reason that by 2005 the catch phrase of the moment had become ‘Harmonious World’ along with words such as ‘stakeholder’. Some Americans see an eventual clash between the USA and China as inevitable, unless the latter’s political culture is fundamentally changed, just as some in the 1920s and 1930s saw a clash with Imperial Japan as inevitable. John Derbyshire maintained that the Chinese state ideology is based on concepts of racial superiority, nationalism, historical grievance and the restoration of ancient glories. It is ‘a fascist dictatorship . . . Early 20th Century Japan was not bent on world conquest, only a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere – precisely what China wishes to construct in Central Asia and the West Pacific’.186 China represents a major threat to the national security of the USA in the coming century, according to Bill Gertz. Gertz maintained that China was positioning itself commercially and militarily along key naval choke points between the Indian Ocean (Burma), the South China Sea (Hong Kong), the Straits of Malacca (the Spratley Islands), the Central Pacific (Tarawa), the Caribbean (Cuba and the Bahamas) and the Panama Canal.187 He described a possible future war between China and the USA over Taiwan, involving

204 Imperial tectonics the Panama Canal, a scenario strangely analogous to Hector Bywater’s for war with Japan in the 1930s.188 Some discounted the possibility of any true meeting of minds between China and the USA. The former was an autocratic state, whose rulers’ legitimacy stemmed from Mao, and whose highest priority seemed to be maintaining stability based on their own power, while the latter was a constitutional democracy rooted in the European Enlightenment. ‘There is no way the United States can please Beijing. The craving for respect could not be fulfilled by a thousand concessions . . . the PRC’s anger is absolute, beyond analysis or disregard.’189 In 2004, Cecelia Malmstrom, a Swedish MEP, arguing for the continuance of the EU’s embargo on arms sales to China, maintained that China ‘is still the world’s biggest dictatorship’.190 The British historian Andrew Roberts saw history siding with Beijing’s totalitarian rulers, and China’s emergence as a great power in the early twenty-first century as a Second Boxer Rising, fought on the battlefield of trade. When the imperial baton passed from Britain to the US at least the succeeding power spoke our language, shared our values and had twice been our battle-tested ally. By contrast, China is one of the most vicious states in existence . . . the present hegemony of the English-speaking states cannot last forever, but it will be tragic when – not if – Western civilization is overtaken in power, wealth and prestige by Chinese Communo-militarism.191 John Tkacik maintained that China had ‘been taken over by a group of nationalist militarists’, intent not on implementing Communist ideology but on increasing ‘the comprehensive strength of the nation’.192 Professor Peter Morici of Maryland University described China as ‘well-armed, authoritarian . . . bent on subverting global institutions that support democracy and free market values . . . a fascist menace with global reach’.193 China’s variant of authoritarian nationalism has also been portrayed as the modern heir to the hundred-year tradition of Social-Darwinian thinking, with an extremism influenced by the Communism whose ideology it has supplanted – the ethno-nationalism of Sun Yat-sen and his Japanese mentors, in place of the thoughts of Chairman Mao.194 Pessimists believe that China cannot succeed in becoming a superpower because the Communist Party will not allow China to democratize; its economy will falter and its society break apart.195 It is not clear whether a rising China would be more or less dangerous than a declining China. Some maintain that China lacks the institutions to create a stable modern economy in the foreseeable future.196 China could fall apart, amidst rapid and unequal regional growth as attempts to restructure the economy and to reduce the size of the loss-making state sector fail.197 The current regime

The next hundred years 205 could be replaced by a nationalist one, and the new China might be less rich and capable but more dangerous. Gordon Chang believes that China is unlikely to cope with the competition required by the WTO; its banks will be crushed by debt, unemployment will grow and China will not be able to maintain a consistent high growth rate. As a result of these woes, it will have problems meeting the rapidly expanding expectations of its people whose resentment at their plight and Party corruption will boil over. If China had 30 years to transform itself, it might emerge as a successful nation, but Chang believes it does not have this luxury, given that its problems will become overwhelming in 5 to 10 years.198 The China Century Monument in Beijing tells the story of the Chinese people on 262 bronze tablets. The last of these is blank, the future being unknown. Chang maintains that it will record that the Chinese Communist Party failed the people.199 Even if China were to become wealthy and militarily benign, it would certainly be expected to have a larger say in the conduct of the international system in which it could be the largest entity on many counts. How could the West object to that, except on selfish, undemocratic grounds? Even if China’s economic development created markets for Western products, China and India would be competitors for raw materials and their demand would raise prices. Higher energy prices will squeeze profit margins . . . have a negative effect on consumer prices . . . they may help erode Western wealth . . . softening up stock markets, as growth increasingly centres on other parts of the world. The awakening of China and India suggests that the West will have to get used to a world where it is no longer the monopoly buyer of the world’s scarce resources.200 The dramatic rise in oil prices in 2004–5, caused in part by increased demand in China, at a time of uncertainty over global supplies, seemed to confirm this. Equally, while European nations may no longer have a presence in East Asia, the sharing of ‘The China-Trade’ may still be a source of friction between these former imperial powers and the USA. ‘Transatlantic relations will be increasingly determined by the level of transatlantic agreement or disagreement on how to adapt to the rise of Chinese power.’201 The path to possible military confrontation between the USA and China is reminiscent of some of that which emerged between the USA and Japan in the 50 years before the attack on Pearl Harbour. The American Government has asserted its desire to ‘build and maintain our defences beyond challenge’ and to ‘dissuade future military competition’. It also warns that ‘in pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path

206 Imperial tectonics that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness’. Some have argued that this amounts to the US saying ‘Do as we say, not as we do.’202 It was this same contradiction that made a clash between Japan and the empires of the West almost inevitable in the first half of the twentieth century. The Japanese could not see the justice in others having the right to build empires, when that right was denied to them by Russia in 1904 and by the USA in 1941. In a sense, the USA now has a ‘virtual’ Monroe Doctrine, applied globally – the right to protect, by pre-emptive action if necessary, any threat to its interests; but ideally the right to deter by the threat of pre-emption. The UN has also sanctioned the right of the international community to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign nations in the name of human rights. Yet China is admonished for building a military capability that might threaten its neighbours, when the USA clearly demonstrates the utility of that concept by building its own unrivalled military power. Some of Western mindset find this comforting; but the Chinese see no reason why they should not pursue a similar strategic logic to that of the USA. According to American Empire Steps Up to Fourth Expansion,203 China intends to follow the US model to become the unmatched global superpower. It sees four phases in the USA’s imperial history: Continental Domination, Overseas Domination, Contention for Global Hegemony (1949–91) and a Move to World Domination (1991⫹). It regards the current manifestation of the American empire as not so much one of territory, but rather the relentless export of cultural, political, economic and military influences. It attributes American success to four enabling strengths: political stability, scientific and technological innovation, economic development and expansionism. It is this model that the Chinese apparently seek to emulate, applying soft-power rather than military power where possible. In the medium- to long-term, Tasker Bliss’s warning of 1904 that the greatest strategic challenge to the USA would come when its Monroe Doctrine ran up against someone else’s may take on a new relevance. The most likely deterrent to a potential arms race is probably the historical appreciation of the devastation wrought by such a dynamic, even if hostilities never came to pass. Nevertheless, the potential for a clash of rival cultures seems clear. The balance of power in Asia will surely shift, and if it is to be successful, the USA will have to adapt to this new environment, testing the Darwinian theories which over a century ago provided the theoretical underpinning of so much of international affairs. One hundred years later, much of Mahan’s geopolitical arguments, with their ‘currency’, such as Teutonism, sound dated, yet his analysis is remarkably similar to that purveyed today. An open China is likely to become wealthy and, if sufficiently imbued with values shared with the West, could become its partner, bringing wider benefits to all mankind; but it will also necessarily remain true to its own cultural identity and not merely become

The next hundred years 207 a clone of the West. The West would have to expect to share its global sway with this newly powerful China. If, however, China became powerful while maintaining an ideology antipathetic to the West, then it might become a threat to it. How to manage this problem remains as difficult and contentious today as it was when laid out by Mahan 100 years ago. China is now the big player in the Asian drama. The richer and more powerful that China grows, the less amenable it may become, with the power to thwart the wishes of the ‘Western Empire’. ‘The West’s military dominance has held for so long that it is taken for granted, the unnoticed backdrop to international affairs . . . but a world of new military powers is appearing right before our eyes.’204 There is often a natural assumption of American power in North-East Asia, even though the USA is not an Asian nation, which implies some kind of imperial mandate. Thomas Wilborn, writing in 1996 maintained that ‘The major powers of Northeast Asia – those nations which can demand to be involved in all significant regional decisions – are China, Japan and the United States.’205 He excluded Russia from this group until its political, economic and military capabilities were restored. On the other hand, Chalmers Johnson argued that there was no need for American forces to be based around Asia when there was no threat to the USA from these countries. The USA’s original Peace Treaty with Japan in 1951 stipulated that the occupation of Japan by Allied troops would not exceed 90 days. Some such as William Pfaff ask what, as the only non-Asia actor in the East-Asian theatre, the USA’s objectives in East Asia might be. Since 1945 and the defeat of Japan, the United States has been in the abnormal position of effectively dominating Japan . . . This military deployment has only remotely to do with the security of the United States. Neither China nor Japan has now or ever had an interest in conquering the United States . . . What does the United States want, since it is the non-Asian actor in this situation? Being the foreign power, it must in the long-term leave the region to them . . . What the United States cannot reasonably want is to exercise permanent power in the Far East, against China’s power and eventually that of Japan, which sooner or later will shake off its subordination to the United States.206 In the late nineteenth century, the USA regarded bases in Hawaii and the Philippines as essential in bridging the great space of the Pacific, but they also brought strategic liabilities. Were the USA to find the means to project its air power effectively from the continental USA, which is indeed what it intends, then Asian bases would be less important; but the statement of a commitment which these bases represent should not be underestimated. ‘Empires’ based on the mandate of air power have long been attractive to military visionaries but are unlikely to realize their dreams. On the other hand, this stratagem may be the only one deemed acceptable.

208 Imperial tectonics Any change in the current balance of power, in which the USA is a crucial element, is likely to lead to instability in the Pacific region. In the short term, there is the danger of worsening relations between China and Taiwan, complicated by instability in North Korea and the consequent possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons. Given the multitude of disputes and potential frictions in East Asia, the best means of maintaining stability would be for the USA to maintain its presence until there is clear reason to believe that the economic development of China will lead to political and social transformation. The problems of the region would very likely be exacerbated by any strategic withdrawal, say to a military line through Guam. China’s long-term objective is very likely the withdrawal of American forces from Asia back across the Pacific, thereby isolating Japan and making it amenable to its will. The USA’s interest, if it can afford it, is likely to be to afford smaller nations the option of independence from the ‘Middle Kingdom’ and the alternative of membership of its own ‘Empire of Ideas’, but the costs of defending this disparate global empire are uncertain, but certainly large. The outcome of operations in Iraq and their costs and any effect of these on the will of the American people will affect the issue. Just as Japan and China recognized that economic power is the foundation of global power, and just as the USA has benefited from over 50 years of economic dominance, so its strategic diminution is more likely to be the result of some economic setback, rather than military defeat. Economic retreat, or even relative economic decline, let alone a broader loss of confidence or some new neo-isolationist inclination, would certainly change the USA’s position in East Asia. The USA is the last European or Western empire remaining in the East Asia-Pacific region, but an empire in the sense that it applies telling military, political, economic and cultural power over a wide area where it has little sovereign territory per se and where it is widely perceived by others to be imperial, even if it does not share this view of itself. If the USA does intend to maintain its dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region indefinitely, it will indeed be fulfilling the role of the last ‘European Empire’ in Asia, despite the portents of 1905. That presence, enduring or not, may yet be the crucial element required finally to open China for sustainable trade. The American presence has ensured that, in the hundred years since the RussoJapanese War, Asia has not had its own native regional hegemon. The eventual withdrawal of the USA would complete the motion started in 1904, with Asia producing its own champion. How this dynamic develops is likely to be the critical strategic drama of the twenty-first century. China’s development as a world power should not be seen merely in terms of its relationship to the West and the USA in particular. There are great implications for its immediate neighbours, but these might also complicate China’s relations with the West. As China’s economy grows, it may wish to secure its sources of raw materials and markets and thus sea

The next hundred years 209 lanes, for its own ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’; it may feel tempted to act as ‘The Middle Kingdom’. China seems increasingly likely to seek to become a maritime power, creating further tension in the region. Steven Metz has predicted that the Asia-Pacific region ‘has the most complex regional security environment on earth . . . and will be the laboratory for the revolution in military affairs in the coming decades’.207 On the other hand, despite the seizure of Tibet, its war with Vietnam and the dispute with Taiwan, China has shown little apparent appetite for foreign adventures for it now has no blue-water capability and is only a regional power. Few nations in the region today seem to view China as a military threat. China sees its claims over Tibet and disputed islands as being far more reasonable than the USA’s acquisition of Texas and Hawaii, and its behaviour over Cuba and the Philippines in the nineteenth century. Its assumed status as ‘The Middle Kingdom’ is seen by the Chinese as more acceptable than was the USA’s Manifest Destiny. In 2003, China completed a major upgrading of its border defences; but it has sought to resolve long-standing border disputes with a generosity that has surprised some used to China’s traditional unrelenting line on ‘unequal treaties’.208 On 11 April 2005, China and India agreed to settle their outstanding border dispute, clearing the way for a new relationship between the world’s two most populous nations.209 China has often been very constructive in helping neighbours such as Thailand and Indonesia; and in November 2002 it cancelled Cambodia’s debt of £130 million. Confrontation with Taiwan seems the only, albeit serious, exception and possible military flashpoint with the USA. China’s economic power places its smaller neighbours in a dilemma. They see little long-term advantage in the growth of Chinese economic power, since China seems likely to outperform them all in every aspect of economic endeavour. Yet, there is apparently little option but ever-closer cooperation, with significant mutual economic gain; but will that gain outweigh the disadvantages of the growing overall imbalance in their relationship? The collapse of the USSR increased Sino-Japanese rivalry. The Japanese sought greater security from the USA, and the Chinese hoped that this relationship would contain Japan and reduce the likelihood of its rearming on a major scale.210 Tomohisa Sakanaka, a commentator on security issues noted that ‘If you ask them (the Chinese) which they prefer – an autonomous (Japanese) defence posture or the Japan–US alliance – the answer is clear.’211 Yet China seems to remain concerned by the close American relationship with Japan, and apparently fears that an American missile defence system would embolden the Japanese to develop a more aggressive military position. On the other hand, good relations with China has to be a high priority for Japan for security and economic reasons, and it could, like others, become a vassal in some new Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere. Although cynics might doubt the likelihood of a long-term Sino-Russian community of interests, after the Cold War, Russia sought a friendly

210 Imperial tectonics relationship with China. This was in part because of its desire to be a major player in the Asia-Pacific region, because of its relative economic weakness, its demographic vulnerability in the Far East, their shared concern about Islamic extremism in southern Asia and the importance of China as a market for Russian armaments, gas and oil. In July 2000 President V. Putin of Russia said that bilateral relations went beyond ‘strategic partnership’, which the Chinese press termed ‘mutual coordination’. In July 2001, the Russians and Chinese signed a ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation’. In 2005, China and Russia agreed to hold military exercises, giving the Chinese the opportunity to assess their ability against a first-class force. China might even have seen the strengthening of ties with Russia as offering a counterbalance to what appeared to be growing military cooperation between the USA and Japan.212 While not wanting to set up some obvious pole of opposition to the USA, Russia’s friendly relationship with China was presumably thought to help to offset American power without causing the USA undue concern. Perhaps the USA calculated that Sino-Russian relations would always be flawed and limited. The questions remained: is Russia really an Asian nation or a European state, fascinated by its own Asian territories and historical cultural roots? Is it better to seek alliances with the West against some more generic Asian menace across its long and thinly populated borders? Like the West, should it seek peaceful economic engagement with China? Can it afford to arm a future hypothetical threat? These same themes pervade the debate in Russia today as they did before the Russo-Japanese War. Whatever the character of its relations with Asian nations, it seems that Russia will see itself as essentially European and Western with critical interests in Asia, just as it did in 1904. Equally, Russia would see little merit in being but a small player in the Western camp and might well seek to remind the world of its greater aspirations by taking an independent line. Nevertheless, rather as Bismarck forecast that the decisive strategic factor of the twentieth century would be that the Americans spoke English, so the decisive factor of the twenty-first century may be that the Russians see themselves culturally and ethnically as Europeans rather than as Asians.

12 Conclusion Centennial themes

The Russo-Japanese War was seen to be extraordinary from a military point of view, but also to be a seminal cultural event. The themes that led to war in 1904 and were then accentuated by it have remained familiar; some which came to seem archaic, and even unfashionable in the discourse on warfare and international relations, have found a fresh relevance in the twenty-first century, even though some may find it too uncomfortable to recognize the heritage of these ideas.

Race, culture, war and competition The superior position of the Europeans and Americans in the affairs of the world in the nineteenth century had seemed explicable in terms of race and Darwinian competition, but these powers had increasingly to note the apparently anomalous presence of Japan in their calculations. In a ‘closed world’ where there were no more frontiers to expand, except at the expense of others, the future seemed to be one of continuous conflict to secure living space for growing populations and raw materials, conflict which the more dynamic races would win. Those who failed to measure up in this evolutionary process were regarded as nature’s necessary victims, and warfare seemed a beneficial agency on the road of human progress. There were fears, however, that ‘lower’ more numerous peoples might nevertheless enjoy some advantages in certain conditions; the ‘higher’ Western races were urged to breed, gird themselves and to expand to fulfil the destiny that nature intended for them. When Japan apparently proved more ‘vital’ than the Russians in 1904–5, there was alarm and cultural panic at the complacency and decadence of the West. Fears of Western demographic demise – the rocking of empty cradles – and ‘race suicide’ were widespread. In Nazi Germany and Japan, demography, living space and fears for national survival were powerful factors leading to war, just as they were in the imperial spirit of the European empires and the USA. They also played a major role in the eugenics movement across the developed world.

212 Imperial tectonics At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Darwinian perspectives are again in fashion. ‘The failure of Marxism has prompted an opening of minds, and Darwinism is back with a vengeance’.1 Fears of Western demographic demise, and the cultural collapse and political consequences that would result from it, are once more widespread. So too is concern over access to raw materials, especially energy supplies, both their source and the security of the routes along which they travel. The decline of Western populations is seen to be the likely cause of the possible erosion of Western values in the face of more vital nations and people, especially those of Asia. As so often in history, Westerners fret about the consequences of a powerful Asian nation, China, which does not subscribe to the precepts of their own moral universe. The West asserts the fundamentals of its own beliefs and their universal applicability, but is unable to offer convincing arguments and objective historical perspectives as to why others should have to comply with them. The fear that they will not has spanned the centuries.

‘The China-Trade’ The enduring motive for the presence of non-Asian nations and empires in East Asia has been trade, but especially access to the greatest and most valuable element of it, ‘The China-Trade’. ‘The Middle Kingdom’ had always had its regional trading relationships, but these only became internationally contentious when more distant states and multinational corporations wanted relationships on their own terms. Trade between China and its immediate neighbours attained a military dimension once the most powerful, Japan, began to behave like European empires and the USA; this contest was conducted over a politically enfeebled Chinese state. Japan had been opened to trade by force with the intention of making it a part of the USA’s Pacific trading domain, rivalling the trading empires of the Europeans, and as an expression of broader American commercial interests in the region, specifically in China. The Japanese opened themselves to the ways of the ‘barbarians’ in order to avoid subjugation by them, but also perhaps even to subdue the ‘barbarians’ in due course. Japan now wanted its share of The China-Trade, without which it perceived it would lack the means to achieve its international and domestic objectives, and from 1895 China was to varying degrees a part of Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere. This set Japan at odds with the commercial and political interests of the European Empires and the emerging one of the USA, but the Second World War appeared to knock Japan out of the competition for China’s riches. Communism made China a strong state, and although it reduced what China had to offer economically, Japan became a closer trading partner of China than did the USA. By the end of the twentieth century, China was not only a strong state but one focussed on creating the wealth that would make it powerful as well as

Conclusion 213 independent, rather as industry and commerce had made Japan a force to be reckoned with in the late nineteenth century, and again after 1945. This economic power gave China unprecedented international influence, but also made it more dependent on international relationships, with closer ties to its sources of supply and markets. In a sense, China agreed that it would operate in a global Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the nations of the world scrambled for their slice of the trade from an ever more powerful China which will increasingly determine, rather than merely accept, the terms of that trade. Neighbours could not ignore their massive partner, any more than could the USA which became ‘hooked’ on Chinese credit, as it had earlier been reliant on Japanese loans. China became the USA’s new economic frontier, keeping America’s ‘shop open for business’; but at the same time, China’s workshops became dependent upon the American market, at least for the time being. The importance of The China-Trade remained at the heart of international affairs, but now in the context of a strong China, a state with ill-defined, long-term objectives. It was not clear whether China’s unprecedented wealth and power would benignly underpin the existing foundations of the global economic system, or whether competition for raw materials, markets and political influence would at some point cast China once more as ‘The Middle Kingdom’. If that were to happen, some wondered what form the necessary ‘tribute’ might take, and whether China’s power would be exercised through economic strength alone, or whether it would take on some military aspect. Yet wealth also created potential vulnerabilities, and China’s international economy would be as vulnerable to interdiction by hostile action as any other. With an awakened, aspirant and energetic population, China seemed as dependent on the need for continuing high economic growth as others were on its cheap products and credit. A new dynamic had emerged, but one still rooted in the allure of ‘The China-Trade’.

The Asian century at last? One hundred years ago, the American Secretary of State John Hay believed that ‘The storm center of the world has shifted . . . to China. Whoever understands that mighty Empire . . . has a key to world politics for the next five centuries.’2 Even when China was a politically weak nation endowed with great human resources and wealth, many noted the consequences should China ever become politically organized. They speculated on the effect this would have on the terms of trade, on the competitive consequences for their own domestic manufacturers, on the strategic implications of Chinese military power, on the future of their own empires in Asia and whether this power would even reach out to touch their own continents. It was feared that China, with economic and military power derived from Western scientific and industrial expertise, but lacking the moral and cultural values of the West, would be a new and horrifying threat, unmatched since the

214 Imperial tectonics Mongol invasions of earlier times, threatening Western civilization.3 Others were less anxious, believing that the ‘civilizing’ effects of Christianity, wealth, democracy and progress would inevitably counter any such menace. China may have been a constant factor in world affairs, and the cultural reference point in East Asia for millennia, but it was Japan, not China, that was Asia’s champion in the twentieth century. In the event, it was not to be Asia’s century, for any such hopes fell with Japan’s in 1945; instead, it was to be an American Century. In the latter half of the twentieth century, Communist China seemed a possible threat, but its economic incompetence precluded any such reality, and its primary offences were inflicted on its own people rather than other nations. Some fear that in the twenty-first century, an economically and militarily powerful, totalitarian China might develop into a threat once again, as a state which has no fundamental stake in or understanding of Western values. The rise of Japan and its role in the Second World War has seemed a negative model that China might emulate. China is seen by some to be heir to exactly the ethno-nationalism and Social-Darwinian attitudes that underwrote many of the misfortunes of the twentieth century, and these may yet be visited upon the twenty-first century. This negative view is once more countered by that which sees a post-war, prosperous and democratic Japan as a more positive model for China. The optimists believe that there might be another great shift in China’s national position, that wealth, democracy and even Christianity will prevent the aggressive exploitation of China’s position of advantage, making it like ‘us’, or at least some benign new variant of the constant that is ever China. This vision sees the greatness of China manifest in its cultural sway and achievements rather than in some archaic view of a nation’s weight in the balance of power. The twenty-first century could indeed be the Asian Century at last, led by China; although this notion has its own history of prophecy, of doom and of promise. China may be the first civilization to rise, fall and rise again; the world built by the Europeans, and then dominated by the USA, may be coming to an end. Perhaps a new episode is beginning where the values and ways of others will predominate.

East and West, the Orient and the Occident, modernity and tradition The very identity and meaning of cultures is a rich source of intellectual confusion, and the terms remain inadequate. Differences are sometimes expressed as a contrast between the old and the new, modernity and tradition, materialism and spirituality, East and West, the Orient and the Occident, Asian-Confucianism and Christendom, White and Yellow, authoritarianism and democracy and as identity and uniqueness versus interdependence and cooperation. Attempts are made to affix these notions to national identities, thereby in some way validating, or at least asserting,

Conclusion 215 the merits of one state in opposition to another. Yet tradition, culture, religion, ideology and economic development defy such easy national associations. Some saw Communism and Fascism as inherently European and even atheist, while many of those persuasions felt themselves to be both more ‘spiritual’ and ‘Oriental’; the anti-modernism of the Orient has often been derived from the Occident.4 The West has meant Christendom, but it has also become synonymous with high individual consumption and personal freedoms. At times Communists have believed that they represented the most advanced stage of the evolution of Western civilization. During the Cold War, the ‘Third World’, with few other cards to play, fell back on the assumption of its own moral superiority.5 The irony is that the ‘Tiger economies’ of Asia have represented a materialism of heroic proportions, scarcely paralleled in the West, and shown little of the new ‘spirituality’ of the religious revival in the USA, where by 2004 morality and ‘values’ seemed to be a major factor in the outcome of the American Presidential election. Asian nations may assert their unique values, but they also seek to outdo the West in its own alleged materialism, with high rates of growth, investment and ever-taller buildings. The West has been said to be in decline for as long as it has also been said to be triumphant, and the debate about the cultural rivalry of the West and ‘the rest’ remains controversial.6 It is but an episode in the age-old story of how established powers manage the rise of others who resent the status quo, by challenging or assimilating them. The West’s triumph was heralded rather prematurely by Francis Fukuyama7 in The End of History of 1992.8 It was also explained in a series of works by Victor Davis Hanson, primarily his Why the West Has Won of 2001; and the demise of the West was announced in 2002 by Pat Buchanan’s The Death of the West.9 If the West is to decline it will most likely do so in relation to Asia, but to China in particular. Many in the West thought that nineteenth-century Japan was Westernizing because of the merits of Western society. Some Japanese agreed and saw themselves to be the most ‘progressive’ Asian nation with the task of modernizing not only themselves, but Asia as well. This would enable Asia to play its rightful place in world affairs. Other Japanese believed that they were adopting Western skills and knowledge to avoid surrendering their national independence and unique spiritual culture, modernizing to protect tradition. In practice, the process of interaction with the West changed Japanese attitudes and society profoundly, although many denied it. Today it is still debated whether particular Asian values exist, and if they do, whether the Western skills that have given these values a voice in the world have simultaneously corrupted or overthrown them. Is their affirmation merely a necessary political and psychological ploy to make their demise acceptable and maintain Asian self-respect? In the twenty-first century, the situation may be reversed. Will modernization in the West come to mean adopting the material standards and perhaps newly

216 Imperial tectonics attractive values of the new East, especially China? Will the West accept these new influences to preserve its identity in the face of the competitive power of China; or will China fail to produce the ‘big ideas’ about political life, society, culture and ethics to match its economic vibrancy, assuming even that endures? Will China repeat the Japanese experience and fail to offer its global Co-Prosperity Sphere any attractive model, and instead alienate it?10 Western Imperialism, apparently the model for successful modern nations in the nineteenth century, did not prove to be transferable to Japan in the first half of the twentieth century, because global affairs had taken on the character of a zero-sum game. Japan might have a temporary alliance with Britain and periods of cordial relations with the USA or Germany; but there was no room for Japan to build an empire among peers if territory, sources of raw materials and markets could only be acquired at the expense of those who already possessed them. The Western, post-war model was adopted successfully, too successfully for some, by Japan in the second half of the twentieth century. Is this model, rooted in consumption and individual fulfilment, the current Western but especially American formula for a successful modern nation, transferable more widely in Asia, to India, but particularly to China which seems about to test the feasibility of such a project? What would be the consequences of all Chinese and Indians consuming as much as and in the manner of all Americans and Europeans?11 The competition for raw materials and for markets, along with the consequences for the domestic economies of others and the environment of all, may leave no room for major newcomers and competitors in what might in effect be another form of neo-imperial zero-sum game. This model is one rooted in culture and trade, underwritten by military power, one in which the West holds a modern form of imperial dominion, and might not accommodate newcomers challenging for real power in it. The current Western model has been purveyed as one which is universally applicable, the very embodiment of the idea of mankind’s progress, but that proposition may be fallacious without serious modification. Maybe ways can be found to give another two or three billion people the spending power and rates of consumption to match the West; but if they cannot, then the enduring elements of culture and trade will have played the same determining role in Asian strategy in the twenty-first century that they did in the twentieth century, with volatile consequences. What would be the moral implications of that model being only selectively applicable, and how might any disappointment at a false prospectus be managed? The question cuts both ways. Perhaps growing, ebullient Asian societies will be the winners in this new zero-sum game and a complacent West the loser. Perhaps the Orient will take the lead in some new unequal relationship in what would become their model. Would such a realignment of power and the accompanying perception of cultural success be explained in neo-Darwinian terms as many sought to do 100 years ago?

Conclusion 217

China and Japan: a shared identity? At the end of the nineteenth century, Japan sought to establish a relationship with China and Korea based on their economic and political subordination. This was expanded into a Co-Prosperity Sphere which collapsed in 1945; but Japan went on to build a virtual Co-Prosperity Sphere under American protection, although some saw this to be but a subset of a greater American economic condominium. The leadership of Asia is now passing to China; as Putnam Weale noted in 1910, ‘If a new China really arises, Japan must be relegated to the relative position she occupied before the war of 1894–5.’12 Japan sees no prospect of preventing this, and yet subordination to China, though long expected in much Japanese thought over the last 150 years, is deeply unattractive, for it might entail bullying and humiliation if not aggression, out of revenge for centuries of perceived outrages. Far from seeing itself as the saviour of Asia, will Japan now retreat from its Asian identity? Will it feel that it can only preserve its independence from China by building on its existing global economic networks, and become neither Eastern nor Western, but the unique state and people that it has always been inclined to believe itself to be?13 Would such an inclination to be independent and different reinforce Japan’s other identity of ‘world citizen’, and merely continue the process initiated by Commodore Perry? Such a process need neither entail Japan being a vassal to the USA in the twenty-first century, nor Japan keeping its American-authored constitution; but without an American military presence, can its security be preserved? Its independence of China would certainly seem diminished without it. Japan needs the USA and a new relationship with it, but will the USA wish or be able to remain committed to the region and for how long? How will this inclination to a closer military relationship with the USA square with ever-greater economic entanglement with China?

Russian identities The defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905 was most commonly portrayed as a victory of the East over the West. Yet some saw Japan as a Western nation in Asia, behaving like a European or American empire. When it fought Russia in 1904–5, it fought a nation which many thought represented a more Asian identity than did Japan. Japan’s victory was somehow therefore also the defeat of decadent Asia by a youthful and Westernized Japan, a victory for the ideas and modernity of the West, even if many, especially the Russians, did not see it that way, pace their own assumed Asian identity. Equally, Japan’s defeat in 1945 was seen by the Anglo-Saxons as a triumph for the West over an alien Asian nation, but also over a dictatorship out-of-keeping with their Western cultural values, even though Fascism, like Communism was also a European ideology. Anglo-Saxon values had

218 Imperial tectonics become Western values, and so the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War was also seen as a victory of Western ideas over those of their opposite, epitomized by Communism, which now seemed to be championed by Asian powers, rather than the states from which it had originated. The USSR was, however, not obviously Asian with its ethnic domination by Russians, and a political and a demographic centre closer to Europe than to say, China. The Russians still have to resolve their self-identity as Europeans or nonEuropeans. If Europeans, they will uniquely be Europeans with large Asian territories acquired in times of empire. That thought itself brings fears of the need to protect what they see as theirs, but also the apocalyptic thought of how Russia might someday lose what is not a physical part of the Europe which is its cultural home. The European inclination is likely to prevail, but only after many protestations and manifestations to the contrary, echoing the debates and confusions of the late nineteenth century.

A civilizing mission? Today’s clash of civilizations is often portrayed in terms of culture, and rights versus denial of rights, whereas in the past it was often portrayed in terms of race, a factor which many are reluctant to acknowledge today lest it infect the debate and undermine support for their cause by invidious historical comparisons. In the past, the so-called benighted were given the benefits of Western civilization by imperialists whether they liked it or not. Today they are said to be ‘liberated’ and are offered, or have imposed upon them, Human Rights, a rebranding of a package of venerable Western values which once more provide the West with its own home-grown moral mandate for global action. It has become an essential tenet of the proposition of Human Rights that they are not a Western construct, but enjoy a universality whose precepts are common to all major cultures. This is in itself culturally patronizing, a ‘colonizing’ of the intellectual traditions of others. All cultures have maintained a rich mix of often contradictory values, but only the West has formulated a concept of Human Rights and led a plan of action to promote them while at the same time asserting that those who follow or must obey are both among the sources of those ideas and in the vanguard of supporting them. This avoids the perils of accusations of neocolonialism or cultural imperialism, for these rights are thus not the impositions of Western civilization, which might seem condescending, but merely deserts to enjoy what was already the entitlement of the recipients. That said, these Human Rights seem curiously congruent with the Anglo-Saxon variant of Western values, and while they accommodate diversity and multiculturalism, these are placed strictly within the confines of what is acceptable to Western sensibilities – what the Victorians would have termed ‘civilized and Christian’ behaviour. Human Rights have their own moral imperatives and a universalism for which the West recognizes no frontiers. Those frontiers of morality are

Conclusion 219 being pushed out ever further in the drive to fulfil some new Western ‘soft’ notion of Manifest Destiny, asserting values to be defended by some new virtual ‘Monroe Doctrine’ which will tolerate no interference in this new empire of ideas. These frontiers are to be policed physically, rather as the abolition of slavery was enforced unilaterally by the forces of the British Empire from the mid-nineteenth century. All may be well, but as Tasker Bliss noted in 1904, a Manifest Destiny and Monroe Doctrine can lead to trouble when they come up against somebody else’s versions of the same. In future those may be China’s. By similar analogy, the USA’s virtual Monroe Doctrine of universal Western values may already have met the Monroe Doctrine of some revived notion of the Moslem Caliphate. The new civilizing mission, endorsed since 1998 by the United Nations, sets the rights of the individual above those of the governments of sovereign states who may be denying them their rights. Mahan would no doubt have approved; especially as this moral and legal validation is now seen to extend to the right of nations to intervene unilaterally, and even sometimes pre-emptively, in support of this higher good. Military intervention has created unusual ideological companions as the old polarities of the Cold War prove inappropriate to the new dynamic. In caricature: the old left who detest the assumption that ‘West is Best’ denounce military intervention, seeing it as incorrigible, serial misbehaviour by those who cannot let go of old imperial habits. They are joined in their policy conclusions by members of the old right, of nationalist or isolationist instincts, who believe that it is not worth the bones of their grenadiers or the gold of their treasuries to save those who are incapable of ruling themselves, people who will at heart resent any help they are given. At odds with this odd couple are the new interventionists. They also come from the old left, but are now transformed into ‘Fabian Imperialists’.14 David Livingstone took ‘Christianity and Civilization’ to Africa, both of which have become somewhat ‘politically incorrect’ ideas, followed by the soldier and the Union Jack. These fundamentally Judeo-Christian notions have been repackaged for a new age, and rebranded as Human Rights, supported by the word of international law if not the word of scripture, enforced by blue helmets not pith helmets and under the UN not the Union Flag. These interventionists know that ‘up-river in the heart of darkness’ unspeakable things are being done, and that it is their moral duty to put a stop to it, by force if necessary – for their militaries are also branded as ‘A Force for Good’, in what President George W. Bush has called ‘The forward strategy of freedom’.15 Their allies come from the old imperial right, ‘Kipling’s Men’, who are not surprised that other folk make a mess of their own affairs and believe that it falls to them to sort out the resultant horrors, confident in their comparative advantage built up from centuries of global military experience.16 A. Bonnett has argued that ‘For the majority of Western triumphalists, all that needs to happen is that the world “opens up,” begins to see things

220 Imperial tectonics “our way” and acts accordingly.’17 This is not merely ‘opening up’ in the sense of nineteenth-century Japan or the ‘open door policy’ towards China, it is the notion that the empire of ideas must expand. It is about the open door of the WTO, the open door of a free global press, corporate accountability, a global accounting standard, intellectual property rights and international law. That said, the US is not necessarily amenable to all of these global ideas and the constraints on its actions any more than it was supportive of the League of Nations which it championed but did not join. The idea that it is natural and normal for dynamic rising societies and economies to adopt the formulae of the old world, as if these were compulsory and necessary, is not obvious to them. New great powers such as India and China will surely create new norms of behaviour for their societies, constitutions and international relations.18 They may for now accept the rules of the old powers, and the received norms of international relations; but it would be an historical anomaly if, once the power of independence was theirs, the two oldest surviving civilizations of the world failed to influence and shape the future norms of thought and behaviour of others in relative decline.19 At the beginning of the early-twenty-first century, Americans and Europeans argued about the meaning, implications and obligations of their Western civilization; in another ironic turn, many Americans resented what they saw as a European tendency to isolationism and reluctance to take on strategic challenges, traits for which the USA had itself been criticized in the 1930s. It was now the Americans who were the more likely to embark upon and seek moral justification for military action to further these cultural objectives, warning against the appeasement of tyranny. Many people of the old European imperial powers opposed American interventions such as that in Iraq in 2003, having long lost their appetites for military expeditions to change regimes, resenting and perhaps humbled by the imperial confidence of the USA which saw such action to be necessary rather than anachronistic. Meanwhile, Europe itself was fortunate to be a strategic ‘quiet sector’ after centuries of mayhem; almost as if the European Union needed time quietly to digest both its old and its new members and in time emerge as a new political entity, rather as the newly independent colonies of the USA had in the century before its eventual ‘leap across the Pacific’ out of ‘Monroe’s chrysalis’. Equally, many, especially in the English-speaking world, saw the European project as flawed in both theory and practice, with little prospect of ever constituting an entity to rival the power of the USA, or a future Middle Kingdom.

The American empire and the ‘Whiteman’s burden’ It is much debated whether in historical terms the USA is an empire, or whether it merely behaves like one at times.20 Manifest Destiny turned the

Conclusion 221 Far East into the American Far West, and the USA was both a Pacific and an Atlantic power. The USA has one of the largest territories acquired by the colonial and imperial transactions of its non-indigenous people. The westward expansion of the American frontier has a fonder and more romantic place in its ‘national story’ than does any other nation’s imperial experience and it is a non-negotiable maxim and mantra of its ‘patriotic history’. The USA is the product of the world’s most successful imperial enterprise. At the same time the USA has a national identity which must deny that self-evident phenomenon. As Donald Rumsfeld is reported to have said, ‘We don’t do empires.’21 Vice President Dick Cheney maintained in January 2004 that ‘If we were a true empire, we would currently preside over a much greater piece of the earth’s surface than we do. That’s not the way we operate.’22 President Bush maintained in his State of The Union Address that ‘We have no ambitions of empire . . . ’.23 Others were not so coy. David Frum admitted to preferring ‘the more forthright if also more controversial term American Empire . . . sort of like the way some gays embrace the “queer” label’.24 In the late nineteenth century the USA acquired an overseas territorial empire which its frontier traditions cherished and much of its other heritage reviled. The intellectual and political debates raged, creating necessary paradoxes in American politics and in the minds of the American people as they pursued their national self-interest, and what they hoped was also a missionary project that would bring Western values of democracy, individual freedoms and free markets to those denied them, although such aspirations were often not realized in the face of real politik. Paul Krugman even maintained that American foreign policy could be distinguished from that of all previous great powers by being informed by ‘a high moral purpose’,25 an element in the notion of American exceptionalism. President J.F. Kennedy believed that the USA would be militarily successful in Indo-China whereas the French had failed because American motives were superior ‘They were fighting for a colony, for an ignoble cause. We’re fighting for freedom, to free them from the Communists, from China, for their independence.’26 The idea that the West is an agent of progress, embarked on a civilizing mission and fighting for ‘good’ against ‘evil’, has been attractive to many and remains especially strong in the USA, even though the language used in the discourse may have changed somewhat. From an American point of view, the evil to be challenged has included at different times Native Americans, the British Empire, the Japanese Empire, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Empire, Chinese Communism, ‘The Axis of Evil’ and global terrorism. In a more secular Britain, a titanic struggle between good and evil still seems more incongruous in policy formulation than it does in the USA, where the paradoxes which are necessary to maintain an empire, or at least the interests of a benevolent superpower, are perhaps more readily accommodated.

222 Imperial tectonics The British received little thanks for their ‘civilizing mission’ from those who benefited from the legacy of their empire. It has become axiomatic that it must be condemned. It seems equally unlikely that those who benefit from the fruits of the American Empire, President Bush’s ‘democratic dominoes’, will feel inclined to acknowledge their debt to the USA. The American imperial debate is in effect a continuation of that about isolationism or engagement, and unease at the paradoxes endemic in imperial democracies, whose existence is often salved by denial.27 ‘It is past time . . . for Americans to consider why we have created an empire – a word from which we shy away – and what the consequences of our imperial stance may be for the rest of the world and for ourselves.’28 Those with empires are seldom reliable judges of their own status29 and ‘American power has given the USA a global responsibility it cannot shake off.’30 Most Europeans have long lost the will, and certainly the means, to propagate the virtues of the West with all the paradoxes and anomalies that project entails, weighed down with a moral relativity and sense of historic guilt less common in the USA where the USA is usually cast as a victim of European imperialism not a perpetrator of it. It is for that reason, matched with the means, that the USA, ‘the indispensable nation’, will continue as the last of the European empires – but for how long? Many have predicted doom for the American empire, brought down by ‘internal economic contradictions, imperial overstretch and an inability to reform . . . The blowback from the second half of the Twentieth Century has only just begun.’31 Many Chinese commentators have convinced themselves that the American empire is doomed, that this ‘Fifth Empire’ will go the way of the ‘Fourth Empire’, the USSR.32 Matthew Parris has judged the USA to be ‘over-stretched, losing economic momentum, losing world leadership, and losing the philosophical plot. America is running into the sand.’33 If warfare becomes too self-destructive for developed states to indulge in against each other, rivalry between them might take other forms which Ito Hirobumi would recognize, and such a challenge to the USA might come not only from China but also from an expanding European Union. Whether an empire or not, whatever its ethos and for however long its strength remains, it seems clear that the focus of the USA will increasingly be on Asia, a focus first sharpened by Commodore Perry.

Geo-strategy and Geopolitics In 1942, Life ran an article entitled, ‘Geopolitics: The Lurid Career of a Scientific System which a Briton invented, the Germans Used, and the Americans Need to Study’.34 Nevertheless, Geostrategy and Geopolitics were long out of vogue, as was Strategic-demography. These topics had often been matters of disrepute and self-censorship in academic strategic circles, fearful of association with the likes of Mackinder and Haushofer. They hovered on the frontiers of respectability for 50 years, but at the

Conclusion 223 beginning of the twenty-first century were fast returning to fashion for ideas about the contest for raw materials,35 access to routes and other aspects of broader Geography had come to look highly relevant. Nevertheless, some such as Christopher Fettweis also maintained that the ideas themselves were passé, and that the ideas of Mackinder and his hegemon heartland36 were irrelevant to the new technological conditions, and that the USA should not accept their premise, which may ‘cripple the way we run our foreign policy’.37 Instead the USA should play a more active role in shaping the future of that ‘heartland’. According to Barry Posen, it is the technological superiority of the USA that gives it control of the global ‘commons’, the oceans, the air and space, an idea championed by Mahan a century ago.38 This gives it power except in the so-called contested zones where military power yields little dividend. The relevance of Geopolitics as a factor in strategic discourse seems unassailable, if unpalatable to some for its tainted history. Whether the USA does indeed have the ability to project its power effectively from ‘the rim’ into ‘the heartland’, through military technology and its soft power, will determine whether the last European empire remains a functioning one in East and South-West Asia. Whether it cannot sustain the effort because the military tools lack utility and do not have their way, or the cost is too high, remains to be seen. If the USA fails, then perhaps Mackinder’s old analysis, from a different circumstance in history, may yet remain relevant. Besides, a return to an older strategic view of the world seems likely, and disquiet at such intellectual constructions does not make their enduring logic any the less powerful. The significance of geography in politics seems obvious enough, for example, in the dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians, over control of Kashmir, over the oil supplies of the Middle East, the South China Sea and the waters between China and Japan.39 As Colin Gray has asserted, By the 2020s and then beyond, the defining threats of the century most likely will stem from a dangerous combination of the return of active great power geopolitical rivalry, and accelerating global environmental crisis. Those theorists who would have us believe that in the information age geography does not matter, will be shown to have been comprehensively in error . . . Land, indeed access to material resources, will be at a premium, as it has been throughout history.40 In similar vein, Paul Bracken has described the Eurasian ‘chessboard’ as a shrinking one. Parts otherwise unrelated are now linked, pawns take on the range of knights and bishops, and old techniques of power relying on bases, arms control and ‘managing China’ have less utility, ‘They cannot be the foundations for future American presence in Asia.’41 The earlier notion of a closed world, an international zero-sum game has been updated and is now expressed in environmental and ecological terms.

224 Imperial tectonics This focuses on the world’s finite resources and the belief that its people must find a way, not only of sharing them fairly to prevent the deprivation that is said to amount to violence against the disadvantaged, but also to reduce consumption to save the very planet, or at least mankind, from catastrophe. Mackinder described the World Island; but to today’s environmentalist, the entire world has become an ‘Easter Island’, consuming non-renewable resources with disaster looming. The ‘Easter Island Effect’ of violence and social destruction resulting from unbalanced demography and the scarcity of resources has become orthodox thinking about the future of mankind, although the moral imperative is now seen to be to alleviate the ‘Malthusian’ consequences, rather than to accept them as the Darwinian agency by which the progress of mankind is secured. The debate on the role of Evolution in international relations was revived by Dominic Johnson who linked the advantageous evolutionary trait of overconfidence to excessive optimism amongst political leaders, which in itself made war more likely.42 This was not to say that such a trait in itself, and its belligerent outcome, were beneficial in the modern world, merely notable factors in its affairs.

Demography In the 1920s and 1930s, Japan’s demographic and economic growth encouraged emigration and demands for access to strategic materials and markets, destabilizing the international scene. In the early twenty-first century, the demographic expansion of other regions of the world, mainly the Middle East and Africa, is not a direct consequence of economic growth; but it seems equally destabilizing, with the risk of war, unacceptable migration, competition for resources such as water and the appalling medical consequences of AIDS and other diseases. Some demographers urge, ‘Include demographic data . . . in security and threat assessments.’43 In the past, large populations were often regarded as valuable ‘cannon fodder’, but today parents in the developed world appear less sanguine about risking the lives of their fewer children in war. At the same time, they feel threatened by the scale of possible migration into their countries and by the apparently low value placed on human life by the societies which produce suicide bombers. Equally, large numbers of ‘surplus’ young men are seen to be as much a threat to their own developing societies, through civil war and disorder, as they ever were to their neighbours. The colonies of nineteenth-century empires conveniently soaked up these demographic surpluses, allowing Europeans to populate new continents at the expense of others, but not today; those seeking economic opportunities in the developed world are often unwelcome there.

The lessons of military lessons and the paradox of surprise The Russo-Japanese War showed how hard it is to learn the appropriate lessons from even the recent past, when so many strategic, tactical,

Conclusion 225 technological and conceptual factors are in flux. One shake of the military kaleidoscope and a very different pattern can emerge. The shocking, but perhaps not surprising revelation is that even though so much was apparently obvious and well-understood about the events of 1904–5, denial and dysfunction prevailed. In the face of readily available evidence, the militaries of 1914 denied the power of technology in defence, fostered ‘the cult of the offensive’ and hoped that these would obviate some calculus based on materiel. Yet, they were no more culpable than those Germans and Japanese of 1941 who persuaded themselves of the same in the planning for operations against the USSR and against the USA in East Asia and the Pacific. Attempts to prevail in a short and decisive war have meant that strategic surprise has also been a pervasive theme of the twentieth century. Yet, paradoxically, that surprise has frequently been expected but inadequately accounted for. Equally, militaries have been surprised when their opponents have learned lessons while they themselves have been unable or chosen not to. It has seemed to be a prevalent centennial delusion to believe that countries will be able to fight the war they wish to fight, given that the alternatives are deemed unacceptable. Perversely, this makes the war they wish to fight the more acceptable because their purpose-designed force seems so likely to succeed in it. This thought governs the structure, doctrine and equipment of their armies. When war comes, it is not necessarily the one that was expected. The kaleidoscope turns and the tiles create unwelcome patterns. In the West, the wish has often been based on the need to win a short, decisive war using high technology. It would perhaps have surprised those who fought in its early battles to know that over 50 years later the Korean War goes on, having ‘morphed’ through many phases and that it may yet have a nuclear phase. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) remodelled itself to win the June War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 ever more effectively in the years that followed, believing that it had been victorious in some rather profound and enduring sense. It seemed not to realize that these were but vivid episodes of high intensity in a complex campaign lasting more than 60 years, and the IDF was consequently ill-configured or ill-suited to succeed against the Intifadas, which may with hindsight turn out to be the more decisive phases of the long campaign. The American experience in Vietnam was expected to differ from that of the French, but in essence did not, and the Vietnamese war of national independence ended with the repelling of the Chinese invasion of 1979, having begun well before 1945. After the Cold War, there was a determination that the US military would achieve the USA’s strategic objectives with smaller, high-tech forces, eschewing the more likely prolonged, manpower-intensive counter-insurgency, stability and nation-building operations. This repeated the disappointment. So early in the new century it may be foolish to characterize the decades to follow in terms of the first, but the essential point remains valid.

226 Imperial tectonics Those who focussed on ‘high-technology forces as a substitute for manpower and force numbers have been proved terribly wrong. They failed to see that most enemies in the twenty-first century would be asymmetric forces such as terrorists and insurgents . . . ’ requiring ‘human-centric forces’.44 And yet, if a wealthy and militarized China were to become a serious threat to American interests, this assessment might also come to seem quaint. Meanwhile, 100 years after Tsushima, some other dynamics looked familiar. In East Asia, giant battleships were no longer the currency of international rivalry, but national and economic pride was expressed through the competition to attract inward investment and symbolically in the construction of ever-taller prestige buildings in national capitals. On the other hand, there was an arms race of another kind, as nuclear weapons proliferated and nations such as North Korea built longer-range missiles to carry them, while other nations considered acquiring the systems to destroy them on the ground or in flight. This new arms race had political fallout as the Japanese pondered the merits of possessing nuclear weapons and anti-missile systems, stirring old animosities on the continental mainland. The Korean War is not over, Japan is likely to be a more effective military power in 2020 than it was in 2000, the frontiers of China are not agreed and China may well become more than a regional military power. Possibilities for achieving strategic surprise abound, even though they would not themselves be surprising. Russia cannot be omitted from any military calculus in East Asia. It has yet to sign a treaty with Japan to settle its disputes of 1945, but the reality of 1905, and its mineral wealth will underwrite its future political influence, however that may be directed. The USA must also be reckoned with, for its presence in Asia, far from being a historical provocation, may remain the ingredient that stabilizes this volatile region, at least for long enough for it to find its own Asian equilibrium, probably under the sway of ‘The Middle Kingdom’. The ripples of 1904 were felt in 1914, a wave followed in 1941, but the Asian Tsunami may be for the twenty-first century. If we are approaching the birth of the Asian Century, then it has been 100 years in gestation after many misleading ‘contractions’. The Russo-Japanese War was not so much a ‘Military Revolution’, although it heralded one, as the start of a ‘Revolution in Strategic Affairs’, whose implications are clearly pressing nearly a century later, but have yet to be fully revealed. The balance of power in East Asia is shifting, and whether this is manifested in mere economic partnership or competition, a new Cold War or conflict, the dynamics of this phenomenon reflect the essential components of the crisis of 1904–5: the rivalry between ‘continental’ and ‘maritime’ powers, the clash of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ cultural values and people, the pursuit of ‘The China-Trade’ and an Asian power challenging for elusive hegemony in that region. Those who pass judgement today on the flawed attempts of belligerents and contemporary students of the Russo-Japanese War to understand the significance of what had happened should exercise cautious humility, for it

Conclusion 227 falls to them to make equally important assessments about the significance of major advances in military technology and the strategic implications for their own time of ‘Asia rising’: whether it is on the march, or whether the West has merely succeeded, at last, in opening up Asia for trade as Macartney, Raffles and Perry wanted. Are we approaching the culmination of a military, economic or cultural process, or the beginning of a new destructive cycle?

Notes

1 Portents 1 Theodore Roosevelt studied Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race, and corresponded with him on the connection between cranial typology and cultural behaviour. Dyer (1980), p.17. 2 Henning (2000), p.12. 3 Ibid., pp.15–16. 4 Darwin (2004). 5 Adolf Hitler read Ratzel’s theories in Landsberg prison in 1924. He was supplied with Ratzel’s work by Professor Karl Haushofer who had observed Japanese military exercises in 1908 and formed strong opinions about the vitality of races. Haushofer, whose works were widely read in Japan, emphasized that Germany was ill-placed to fulfil the potential of its people, given its confined geography, and his conclusions found expression in Mein Kampf, Hitler (1971), and more lethally in the territorial expansion of Germany and Japan in the 1930s. 6 Mackinder styled himself a geographer and his work lacked the obvious Social-Darwinian perspective of many of his contemporaries; but he studied Animal Morphology at Oxford under the leading Darwinian scholar of the day, Henry Moseley. 7 Adolf Hitler maintained that ‘Our movement must seek to abolish the present disastrous proportion between our population and the area of our national territory . . . in striving for this it must bear in mind the fact that we are members of the highest species of humanity on this earth.’ Hitler (1971), p.526. 8 Clarke (1995), p.73. This notion resurfaced in the 1990s in a novel form in the extremist Islamic approach to the West. In his ‘Declaration of War against the Americans’ in 1996, following the bombing of hotels in Aden, and the USA’s precipitate withdrawal from Somalia, Osama bin Laden is reported to have said, ‘You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew. The extent of your impotence and weakness became very clear.’ Steyn (2004). 9 Luce (1891), p.672. Edward Luttwak has made the case for war as sometimes the best means of achieving a lasting settlement of conflict. See Luttwak (1999). 10 Luce (1891), p.675. 11 He also believed that Christianity had often had to be furthered by military force and that the USA should not leave Britain to pursue such noble endeavours alone. Luce (1891), pp.675 and 680. 12 Quoted in Stephanson (1996), p.54. 13 Chamberlain (1877), p.788. 14 Ibid. Over 100 years later, some question whether the Anglo-Saxonizing of this half of Mexico, lost to the USA in 1848, might not undergo a degree of reversal.

Notes to pp. 11–16 229 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51 52 53

Clarke (1995), p.81. Chamberlain (1877), pp.788–9. Quoted in Strong (1891), p.2. Stephanson (1996), p.80. Strong (1891), p.3. Ibid., p.1. Ibid., p.3. Dower (1986), p.151. Miller (1982), p.251. In January 2001, President Clinton awarded Roosevelt the Medal of Honor, posthumously, for his role in the campaign in Cuba in 1898. Roosevelt never took San Juan Hill, which was captured by the 24th Infantry Regiment, an all Black unit. Rather, his own unit was on Kettle Hill and came up to San Juan Hill subsequently. Roosevelt also subscribed to the view of Gustave LeBon that each race had a ‘soul’ and character of its own. Dyer (1980), p.11. Roosevelt (1995), p.63. Ibid., p.62. Roosevelt (1995), p.62. ‘I have even scanter patience with those who make a pretence of humanitarianism to hide and cover their timidity and who cant about “liberty” and “the consent of the governed”.’ Roosevelt (1995), p.188. Lopez and Patterson (1904), pp.3–4. Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.38. Grenville (1970), pp.165–6. Mahan (2003), p.14. Dyer (1980), Chapter VII. He also blamed ‘excessive urban growth’, ‘love of luxury’ and ‘the turning of sport into a craze by the upper classes’, ‘love of ease’ and ‘shrinking from risk’. Dyer (1980), p.149 and p.163. Longman (2004a). Dyer (1980), p.163. Mahan (2003), p.18. Ibid. This forecast now seems more relevant as a question for the twenty-first century. Miller (1982), p.122. Mahan (2003), p.110. Ibid., p.104. Ibid. Ibid., p.18. Ibid., p.115. Mahan saw the USA as an essentially European state and culture, using the term ‘European’ to include the USA. Bonnett (2004b), p.16. Ibid., Chapter 1. Nietzsche’s view is analysed in Coker (1998), p.10 Kidd (1902), p.458. Wolseley (1897), p.562. He extolled the martial qualities being instilled by the newly established Boys Brigades, pp.567 and 570. Ruskin observed that ‘All great nations . . . were born in war and expired in peace.’ Wolseley (1897), p.561. Wolseley (1897), especially p.577. A.T. Mahan praised the self-discipline required of a naval officer, uncomplaining, noble self-abnegation. Mahan (2003), p.105. Ibid., p.108. Ibid., p.109. Ibid., p.130.

230 Notes to pp. 16–21 54 In 1891, the Russian Tsarevich visited Vladivostok to hammer in the first bolt of the Trans-Siberian railway. Two of the accompanying warships were called Manchuria and Korea. These names were unlikely to reassure the Japanese, since both Manchuria and Korea were their economic colonies at the time. Connaughton (1990), p.2. 55 Thorne (1985), p.31. The Japanese certainly resented their political case being influenced by racial considerations. Shortly before the Russo-Japanese War, a German visitor to Japan was told, ‘What is really wrong with us is that we have Yellow skins. If our skins were as white as yours, the whole world would rejoice at our calling a halt to Russia’s inexorable aggression.’ Quoted in Lincoln (1986), p.236. 56 Iriye (1997), p.13. 57 Quoted in Stoddard (1920), Chapter VI. 58 The USA’s modern trade deficit with China can be more easily managed by the Chinese purchase of American Government bonds, or so it is hoped. The British solution of the day to this trade imbalance was to export opium to China. 59 Hanes and Sanello (2003), p.30. 60 Wolseley (1897), pp.575–6. 61 Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.83. 62 Pearson (1894), pp.68 and 85. 63 Ibid., p.49. 64 Pearson (1894), pp.133–7. Pearson cautioned Western nations against economic protectionism that would weaken the West in competition against China, and he speculated on the future threat of a resurgent Islam, pp.137–41. 65 Kidd (1902), p.449. 66 This vision was noted by Lenin in 1917, in Lenin (2004), p.103. It is a vision that today appeals to many who see investment in China and a stake in its productivity as vital to securing the future living standards of Western consumers and an essential part of any pension-fund portfolio. 67 Mahan (2003), p.99. 68 Ibid., pp.99 and 109. 69 This argument perhaps finds a modern equivalent in Buzan and Segal’s idea of China becoming ‘Westernistic’. Buzan and Segal (1997). Equally, Mahan’s perspectives on the roles of empires in promoting religions and value systems is shared in modern times with David Aikman, who has seen China as the possible new champion of global Christianity, just as Rome once was. Aikman (2003). 70 Mahan (2003), p.100. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., p.138. 73 Ibid., p.106. 74 Ibid., p.98. 75 Quoted by F.P. Sempa in the Introduction to Mahan (2003), p.10. 76 Mahan (2003), p.88. 77 Quoted in Iriye (1967), p.62. 78 Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.27. 79 Ibid., p.28. 80 Ibid., p.5. 81 Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.11. 82 Quoted in Thompson (2001), p.45. 83 Mahan (2003), p.144. 84 E. Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, quoted in Carlson (1998), p.7. 85 Henning (2000), p.106. 86 On 21 January 1993, President Clinton made the USA’s formal apology for the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii through Public Law 103–50.

Notes to pp. 21–23 231

87 88 89 90 91

92 93 94 95 96

97 98 99

100

101

102 103

In September 2005, Senator Daniel Akaka tabled a bill that would give self-governance to native Hawaiians. This carried the possibility of ‘different laws for different races’ and even, as the Senator observed, independence for native Hawaiians. ‘Sun, Surf and Secession?’, The Economist, 3 September 2005, p.48. Letter from President Grover Cleveland to the US Senate, 18 December 1893. Lopez and Patterson (1904), pp.1–2. Zimmermann (2002), p.150. Ibid., p.150. Ibid., p.292. In the 1870s, Senator Carl Schurz opposed the USA’s acquisition of ‘tropical’ territories and populations on the grounds that such people were incapable of republicanism. Others feared that the ‘Whiteman’s burden’ entailed domestic risks, for the ‘lesser races’ of these territories would have to be given constitutional rights and representation in Congress, with serious implications for the position of Blacks in some Southern States, still disadvantaged despite the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution. It was not clear to the many Japanese who visited the islands before 1898, such as Togo Heihachiro, that they should necessarily belong to the USA rather than to Japan. Quoted in Stephanson (1996), p.84. Zimmermann (2002), p.446. Ibid., p.342. Miller (1982), p.27. The British imperialist, Sir Alfred Lyall maintained that there had been ‘no instance in history of a nation being educated by another nation into self-government and independence; every nation has fought its [own] way up’. Porter (2005), p.33. Quoted in Chimes, p.4. Roosevelt (1995), p.188. ‘It is infinitely better for the whole world that . . . England should have taken India . . . The same reasoning applies to our dealings with the Philippines.’ Roosevelt (1995), p.182. Roosevelt had played a crucial role in shaping the war with Spain. One afternoon Navy Secretary, John D. Long, kept a doctor’s appointment and left his Assistant, Roosevelt, in charge of his Department. Roosevelt put the US Navy on a war-footing and sent Admiral Dewey to Hong Kong with instructions to take Manila in the event of war. Long felt unable to countermand these measures. Cooperation at that time sometimes took unusual forms. American ships under Admiral Kautz joined the British Royal Navy in shelling Samoan villages. The Captain of HMS Porpoise explained the mission, ‘We are out here in this beastly God-forsaken country and we had to have some fun to keep alive.’ During this recreational firing, a shell from the USS Philadelphia narrowly missed the American consul’s house but killed a US Marine. Miller (1982), p.164. In the 1960s the Philippines Ambassador Carlos Romulo asked that the American Government recognize that the ‘Philippines Insurrection’ be acknowledged to have been the Philippine–American War, in other words that the USA had not been the legitimate government in the Philippines at the time, but rather had been an invader. The request was denied. Dyer (1980), p.266. Between 4 February 1899 and 4 July 1902, over 250,000 Filipinos died during the ‘pacification’ of the Philippines. Bradley (2003), pp.68–71. Strangely, the order issued by General Jacob Smith on 25 October 1905 that all natives over 10 years of age in the area of Basey and Balangiga be killed was ‘to avenge our late comrades in North China, the murdered men of the Ninth US Infantry’. Miller (1982), pp.89 and 220.

232 Notes to pp. 23–27 104 Arthur MacArthur maintained that captured guerrillas would be treated as criminals and murderers, not soldiers; and he banished the journalist G.T. Rice for exposing corruption amongst American forces in Manila. Miller (1982), p.165. MacArthur’s ideals were underpinned by a conviction of Aryan superiority on which he lectured the committee investigating misdeeds. Hardliners urged tougher methods against insurgents, such as those used by the British Empire against the Boers in South Africa. 105 Miller (1982), p.240. 106 Ienaga (1978), p.5. 107 Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.20. 108 Quoted in Prestowitz (1988), p.21. 109 Bonnett (2004a). His priority was to maintain Japan’s political independence, rather than to maintain some spiritual identity. Ian Buruma sees a clear line from the illiberal ethnic-nationalism of Japan in the late nineteenth century, through the Leninist nationalism of Mao to the modern authoritarian Chinese state, intent on avoiding the weakness that typified the Chinese state over centuries. Buruma (2005). 110 Quoted in Bradley (2003), p.9. 111 Michael Auslin has argued that these treaties were not as unequal as is often purported. Auslin (2004). 112 The Japanese received American military and legal advice and cited international law to reject Chinese complaints about the invasion. The Chinese replied that international law was a recent Western invention and that they preferred truth. LaFeber (1998), p.44. 113 Smith (1998), p.266. 114 In 1872, the American President, Ulysses Grant, met the Emperor Meiji and advised great caution in accepting popular democracy and institutions such as an elected legislature, measures which could not be readily reversed. 115 Quoted in Henning (2000), p.135. 116 Henning (2000), p.160. 117 In July 1905, the US Secretary of War, Howard Taft, recommended that the Japanese should secure their military occupation of Korea and control its foreign policy. The Taft–Katsura agreement, as a quid pro quo, recognized American rule in the Philippines. This deal was kept secret for 20 years. 118 The secret Black Dragon Society played a similar important role in preparing for Japan’s war with Russia 9 years later, its war in China in the 1930s and against the British prior to 1941. 119 Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.78. 120 The North China Herald, quoted in Paine (2002), p.15. 121 Alexis Krausse, quoted in Paine (2002), p.18. 122 Paine (2002), p.3 123 Ibid., p.17. 124 Putnam Weale (1910), p.115. The Kaiser regarded the Treaty with Japan as a racial betrayal. 125 Paine (2002), p.229. 126 Terrill (2003), p.283. 127 The so-called triple intervention of 1895, by Russia, Germany and France saw these nations make significant gains in Manchuria, at the expense of a China weakened by Japan. The Japanese resentment at this encroachment resulted in a campaign known as Ga-Shin-Sho-Tan, ‘Submit to any hardship to achieve revenge’. Koda (2005), p.4. 128 Quoted in Paine (2002), p.367. 129 Stoddard (1920), p.26. 130 Iriye (1997), pp.18–19 and Bonnett (2004b), p.84.

Notes to pp. 28–32 233 131 Quoted by Yu Bin in Pumphrey (2002), p.113. 132 V.S. Solovev, Prince Ukhtomskii’s friend, writing in 1890, quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.56. 133 Przhevalskii’s advocacy of war in China was removed from the reprint of his work by the Soviets in 1946. In 1952, the USSR produced a romantic film, Przhevalskii, about the explorer’s progressive role in furthering Russian culture in Asia, what Joseph Conrad termed ‘militant geography’. It lauded his humanitarian actions in promoting friendship between the Russian and Chinese people. The Chinese Government protested at this portrayal of a man whom they regarded as a ruthless Tsarist military spy and agent of imperialism. 134 Ukhtomskii, writing in 1900, quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.44. 135 Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), pp.57–8. 136 The Tsarevich travelled to Japan and China by ship, returning overland across Siberia. While in Japan on 29 April 1891, Nicholas received a sword cut to the forehead from a disaffected Japanese nationalist constable, but took the blow in good heart and without diplomatic offence. 137 Ukhtomskii (1896). 138 Przhevalskii, quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.24. 139 Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.35. 140 Ibid., p.30. 141 Ibid., p.34. 142 Ibid., p.34. 143 Ibid., p.37. The leading advocate of Przhevalskii’s ideas was Peter Badmaev who in 1893, funded with two million Roubles from Count Witte, even persuaded Tsar Alexander III to support a fantastic plan to seize Mongolia and Tibet. Badmaev was a fashionable St Petersburg ‘quack’ who used Tibetan herbal remedies to cure ‘disturbances of the female physiology’. Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.199. 144 The Mongols have not been shy to make humourous reference to others’ folk memories of Mongolian terror. The Mongolian contingent serving with Coalition forces in Iraq in 2005 apparently sported black T-shirts depicting piles of white skulls with the caption in Arabic saying, ‘We’re Back’. 145 Count S. Witte, quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.75. 146 Count Witte, who felt that he was the target of such criticisms, claimed that he and his railway were no more responsible for the Russo-Japanese War than he would be if he had invited his friends to The Aquarium night club in St Petersburg and they had become drunk and subsequently started a fight in a brothel. 147 Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.90. 148 Quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), pp.101–2. Part of Russia’s fear of annexing Asian territory was that it would bring large numbers of racial inferiors into its empire, rather as the USA declined to annex the populous southern part of Mexico after its defeat in 1848. Others feared the demographic consequences of the USA’s leap across the Pacific for similar reasons. 149 Paine (2002). 150 Novoe Vremia, 8 April 1895, quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.126. 151 Warner (2002), p.113. 152 Vereschagin died when the flagship of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, Petropavlovsk, was sunk by a mine off Port Arthur in March 1904. 153 Mahan (2003), p.19. 154 Ibid., p.68. 155 de Bloch (1899).

234 Notes to pp. 32–38 156 de Bloch (1899), p.xi. 157 Bloch (1993), p.23. 158 A study of the relevance of Bloch’s vision to the circumstances of the 1990s is given in Bellamy (1992), pp.50–6. 159 Hendrick (1998), p.30. The first patent application for an armoured fighting vehicle was presented on 3 April 1855. Clarke (1995), p.16. 160 Hallion (2003), p.296. 161 Ibid., p.298. 162 Henderson (1905), p.375. 163 Foch (1918), p.341. 2 The experience of 1904–5 1 As so often, it was the press that led the introduction of new information technology. The Times of London used wireless to report from the theatre. 2 Following the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese negotiated with the Russians, suggesting the division of Korea between the two countries along the 38th Parallel, the line later agreed between the USA and Russia for their zones of occupation in 1945, and subsequently the approximate border between North and South Korea. 3 Japan had gained Port Arthur from China as a result of the war, but had been forced to return it under direct military pressure from European powers. The Japanese decided to spend their £5 million reparation from China on a new navy, built mainly in Britain. The Japanese Navy’s plan called for 104 new ships to be built between 1896 and 1905. Koda (2005), p.4. The Japanese newspaper Kokumin, declared that, ‘It was but yesterday that we were robbers because we were weak. Today we are stronger and can fight the robbers. Tomorrow they will learn to leave us alone in peace.’ Connaughton (1990), p.4. 4 Before the outbreak of war, Japan planned to sabotage the railway. Japanese agents sought fifty saboteurs from the Japanese community in Beijing. All volunteered, and some of those rejected committed suicide out of shame. Warner (2002), p.172. 5 Robert Whitehead’s revolutionary torpedo was first demonstrated in 1866. Whitehead’s secret plans were probably stolen during a dinner party in 1883 attended by the director of the German firm Schwarzkopf, which soon produced versions of his design. Lowry and Wellham (2000), p.37. The Japanese had previously commenced hostilities without a declaration of war. On 25 July 1894, they sank the Chinese troop ship Kowshing, but issued their declaration only on 1 August. 6 Ironically, attack by long-range torpedoes, rather than close engagement by torpedo boats, seems originally to have been the idea of the Russian, Stepan Makarov, in 1900. Evans and Peattie (1997), p.92. 7 Nogi committed ceremonial suicide as the Emperor’s hearse left the Imperial palace on 13 September 1912. 8 One fifth of Japan’s male population had already been called up, and there was concern at the declining standards of new recruits. 9 ‘Infantry Combat in the Russo-Japanese War . . . ’ (1906), p.1275. 10 Ibid., p.1175. 11 Hamilton (1907), vol.II, pp.110–11. 12 Quoted in Hamby (2004), p.334. An analysis of Japanese military planning in Clausewitzian terms, comparing it to the American Weinberger Doctrine of the 1990s is given in Hamby (2004). In Hamby’s view the Japanese achieved what were later formulated as Casper Weinberger’s conditions that ‘If we do decide

Notes to pp. 38–42 235

13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24

to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined military and strategic objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.’ Hamby (2004), p.334. Quoted in Hamby (2004), p.335. Ibid. On 19 December 1903, the British Secretary of State for War, H.O. Arnold-Foster met with the Army Board to discuss the likelihood of war between Russia and Japan and how to ‘foment internal troubles’ in Russia. See Neilson (1989), p.63. In 1918, Akashi Motojiro became the seventh Governor-General of Japanese-occupied Formosa. He was buried in Taipei at his own request. In 1999 the relocation of his remains created public protests. Koda (2005), Footnote 9. Akashi was appointed roving military attaché around Europe at the instigation of the Black Dragon Society, the ultra-nationalist secret society which, in 1903, had taken upon itself the task of executing covert operations in preparation for war with Russia. See Deacon (1990), pp.42–51. Quoted in Warner (1974), p.451. Lenin (1905), pp.2–7. Zilliacus’s son became a Labour Member of Parliament for Gateshead. Deacon (1990), p.55. Akashi stayed at the Charing Cross Hotel in London while building up his store of weapons and explosives in a bookshop cellar for shipment to Russia. Warner (1974), p.452. Deacon (1990), p.57. Suzuki (1994), pp.83–137. Ibid., pp. 87–97.

3 1905 – the future of war: a 10-year perspective 1 2 3 4 5 6

Hamley (1922). Knox (1913), p.22. Altham (1914). Haking (1913), p.344. Von Bernhardi (1912), vol.1, pp.6–11. Wen I-to describing the malaise of China during its war against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, declared, ‘We have been civilized too long . . . we shall have to release the animal nature in us . . . let us see whether there still exists in our blood the motive power of the ancient beasts; if not, then we had better admit that as a people we are spiritual eunuchs, and give up trying to survive in this world’. Spence (1982), p.279. 7 Huntington’s analysis of ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ was generally compatible with this view of competing value systems. Huntington (1993), pp.48–9. He hypothesized that in future, wars between different civilizations, essentially identified by religious tradition, would be frequent, sustained and violent. These were likely to be between the West and its competitors. The significant question is whether a multi-cultural world can accommodate peaceful competition. It has been argued that a ‘clash of cultures’ is a false analysis. Buzan and Segal argue that Asian states or cultures cannot compete with Western nations without borrowing many of the latter’s characteristics, and that all successful societies will in future be more culturally homogenized, following a ‘Westernistic’ pattern. See Buzan and Segal (1997). Edward Said’s Orientalism, Said (1979), maintained that the West held derogatory stereotypical views of the East. Equally, Eastern views of the West, ‘Occidentalism’, which have been no less unhelpfully confusing, have been analysed in Buruma and Margalit (2004).

236 Notes to pp. 42–47 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

McCullagh (2004), p.110. Lenin (1905), p.2. Wilson and Wells (1999), p.14. McCullagh (2004), pp.386 and 392. Putnam Weale (1910), p.179. Ibid., p.113. Ibid., p.126. Hamilton (1907), pp.11–12. McCullagh (2004), pp.362–3 and 387. Ibid., p.366. McDonald (1992). See Jones, ‘Easts and Wests Befuddled: Russian Intelligentsia Responses to the Russo-Japanese War’, in Wilson and Wells (1999), pp.134–59. Quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.4. His most outspoken work was Panmongolizm in 1894. Solovev described Japan as ‘A real threat to Russia and to the whole Christian world’. Quoted in Wilson and Wells (1999), p.3. Solovev noted its seductive appeal, ‘Panmongolism! The word is savage but it sounds caressing as if it were full of the omen of God’s great plan.’ Solovev, p.185. Ironically the Russian Army had much of Asia about it: ‘One of the most composite forces that ever met together in Asia . . . Mishchenko’s force seemed to contain within it all the elements of a Yellow Peril, combined with a faint hint of a Moslem Peril’. McCullagh (2004), p.164. Quoted in Lincoln (1994), p.263. Ibid., p.267. Bonnett (2004b), p.49. Thorne (1986). Quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), pp.10 and 43. Quoted in Bonnett (2004b), p.46. Maguire (1909), p.5. Lea (2001). Manchester (1983), p.80. Lea (2001), p.173. In an unpublished article for The New York Times in August 1908, the Kaiser warned that ‘within a year or two the Americans would certainly have to fight the Japanese’. Tuchman (2004), p.28. The article was suppressed on the advice of Theodore Roosevelt who later noted of the Kaiser, ‘I really like and in a way admire him, but I do wish he would not have brainstorms’ p.29. Lea (2001), p.160. McCullagh (2004), p.353. Metraux (2000), p.97. Ibid., p.3. Quoted in Henning (2000), p.145. Dyer (1980), p.136. Henning (2000), p.160. Quoted in Stoddard (1920), Chapter VI. M. Townsend (1911), pp.xvii–xix. Quoted in Tsuzuki (1961), p.255. Stoddard (1920), p.27. Quoted in Schimmelpenninck van Oye (2001), p.102. Warner (2002), p.546. Ibid., p.177. Quoted in Kristof and Wudunn (1995), p.442. Ibid., p.444.

Notes to pp. 48–52 237 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71

72 73

74 75

Stoddard (1920), pp.51–2. Putnam Weale (1910), p.149. Putnam Weale (1918), Chapter VI, p.2. Quoted in Clarke (1995), pp.269–70. Stoddard (1920), p.49. Douglas (1912), pp. 473–4. Stoddard (1920), p.23. ‘Tokutomi Soho and Imperial Japan’s Destiny’ (2002). Thorne (1972), p.26. Yet, disillusion amongst Asian nationalists had set in as early as 1907, when Japan agreed to deport Vietnamese activists from Japan. President Wilson welcomed the Russian Revolution, describing it as ‘wonderful and heartening’, making Russia ‘A fit partner for a League of Honour’. Tuchman (2004), p.170. Gifu Nichi Nichi-Shimbun, 21 April 1905. Quoted in Lone (1998), p.14. The degenerate hobby of collecting erotic postcards was especially frowned upon. Lone (2005), p.27. de Negrier (1905), p.1428. Quoted in Kesler (1998). Lea (2001), p.23. de Negrier (1905), p.1428. Ibid., p.1429. Ibid., p.1431. The allegedly ‘scientific’ results were reprinted 1928 and again in 1944. They are highly politically incorrect – suffice to say that the Dutch should have cause for self-confidence. See Dower (1986), pp.217–18. Evolutionary factors were also considered in the West during the Second World War. One academic view held that the evolution of the Japanese brain had been retarded by 2,000 years and it was suggested that the Japanese be encouraged to intermarry with other races after the war. See Dower (1986), p.108. Japanese contempt for the West was reinforced by the experience of Japanese officers in Siberia, supporting the White Admiral Kolchak against the Bolsheviks, who witnessed the collapse of a European society. Kita resented the ingratitude of China which had been protected by the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 and ‘not only has failed to repay us but instead despises us’. Kita Ikki in Morris (1963), p.20. Balck (1911), p.194. Bannerman (1910), p.709. Major General W.G. Knox noted that ‘The habits of individual liberty in England cannot, unless provoked, accept the heavy yoke of organization. Those habits, fostered by self-indulgence, are gradually but surely leading to a demand for free bread and cinematographs.’ He condemned, ‘waste products of prosperity . . . costly and luxurious life and its craving for newspaper advertisement . . . unwholesome gorging in fashionable restaurants . . . the mania of the masses for football matches . . . beer and betting slips’. Knox (1913), pp.53–4. Knox (1913), p.711. Kirton (1905), p.282. Similar observations unnerved Americans in the Second World War. Japanese casualties were ‘curiously active in spite of their wounds, men shot through the head, neck, body, arms and legs being observed walking around or hopping around, as the case might be, cheerful and lively and indifferent to their wounds’. Quoted in Toland (1988), p.282. Jack London covered the Russo-Japanese War as a journalist, and was eventually attached to the headquarters of the Japanese First Army. He left frustrated having achieved little. Kingman (1979), p.115.

238 Notes to pp. 52–63 76 Sinclair (1977), p.89. 77 Belfort Bax (1904), p.7. 78 Miller Maguire maintained that at least two thirds of spectators at football matches ‘must be degenerates’. Maguire (1909), p.11. 79 De Negrier (1905), p.1431. 80 Bannerman (1910), p.713. By the Second World War the word Bushido had been given a very different value. The American film Know Your Enemy: Japan described Bushido as an ‘art of double-dealing and treachery’, Thorne (1985), p.125. 81 Bannerman (1910), p.714. 82 Ibid., p.719. 83 Travers (1979), p.283. Modern ideas about how thoughts might be transmitted between brains without wires are outlined in Zimmer (2004). Sony’s plans for a device which can transmit data directly into the brain are described in Horsnell (2005). 84 The failure to learn lessons from the Russo-Japanese War is described in Bailey (2006). 85 Hamilton (1907), vol.II, Preface, p.v. 86 Quoted in Connaughton (1988), p.275. 87 This failing was repeated in the 1920s and 1930s, when armies again selected those lessons of the First World War which suited their own intellectual constructions. In Germany, manoeuvre and élan were emphasized, in a new ‘Cult of the Offensive’, seemingly designed to obviate the unacceptable possibility of a war of the style and duration of the First World War ever recurring. This wishful thinking was disastrously triumphant in France in 1940. After the First World War, the USSR alone learned the unfashionable and distasteful lessons of the Western Front and acted upon them. 88 Sankey (1907), pp.4–6. 89 Marble (1996), pp.89–106. 90 Rogers (1913), p.283. 91 Towle (1971), p.65. 92 The Russo-Japanese War, Reports from British Officers (1908), pp.209–10. 93 Knox (1913), p.41. 94 Bailey (2004), Chapter 16. 4 Grand strategy: racial angst and diplomatic odyssey 1 Mahan (2003), p.14. 2 Maguire (1909), p.12. 3 Some such as Ogawa Heikichi took part in violent street protests at the perceived betrayal of Japan’s victory by the Treaty of Portsmouth. 4 McCullagh (2004), p.392. 5 Iriye (1997), p.33. 6 Neilson (1989), p.76. 7 Early in 1905, Roosevelt had secretly promised the Koreans that he would insist that Japan grant them independence. At Portsmouth, he broke his word and agreed to Japan’s keeping Korea and southern Manchuria, if it would forgo Russian reparations. 8 Asian Indians arriving from Canada were termed the ‘Tide of the Turbans’ and their immigration was halted when Congress, with an ‘elastic’ appreciation of geography, declared India to be part of the Pacific zone of excluded Asian countries. Between 1906 and 1908, 4,740 Asian Indians arrived in Canada. Basdeo (2003), p.5.

Notes to pp. 63–69 239 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42

43

44

Iriye (1967), p.105 and Puska (1998). Warner (1974), p.548. Hoyt (2001), pp.38–40. T.R. Roosevelt letter to Senator Knox. Papers of T.R. Roosevelt, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, pp.120–6. Basdeo (2003), p.2. Ibid., p.3. Ibid., p.4. Ibid., p.10. Quoted in Kesler (1998). Beale (1905), p.4. Octavius Beale argued that Australia’s inexhaustible supply of coal and the quality of Sydney Harbour seemed to make the latter the natural home for the British fleet in the Far East. Beale (1905), pp.5–6. Quoted in Lone (1998), p.7. Quoted in Kuhlmann (1992), p.16. Ibid., p.21. Ibid., p.25. Ibid., p.21. T.R. Roosevelt letter to Senator Knox. Papers of T.R. Roosevelt, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, pp.120–6. Friedman and Lebard (1991). Kiyoshi Kawakami writing in 1910. Quoted in Friedman and Lebard (1991), p.44. Linn (1997), p.85. Ibid., p.87. Storry (1979), p.95. The British were, however, chagrined that the Australian Government invited the fleet to visit Sydney, intimating a new awareness of future American power in the Pacific. See Story’s introduction to Lea (2001). Schom (2004), p.177. Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.80. Tuchman (2004), p.30. Britain had also supplied arms in May 1913 to secure supplies of Mexican oil. Thorne (1978), p.9. Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.106. Tuchman (2004), pp.129–30. The League of Nations Commission rejected the Japanese request that a declaration of racial equality be written into the League’s covenant. Eleven out of sixteen nations voted in favour of racial equality, but this was rejected by President Wilson, the Chairman, because it was not unanimous. Storry (1979), p.111 and Macmillan (2003), Chapter 23. Stoddard (1920), p.288. The USA’s naturalization Act of 1790 provided that any ‘alien being a free white person may be admitted to become a citizen’. In 1870 the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution had extended this right to aliens of African birth and descent. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 n.4 (1948), quoted in Smith (2003). In 1896, in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan noted the anomaly of Chinese people sharing rights to mix with Whites while Black Americans could not. In 1927, in the case of Gong Lum v. Rice it was recognized that ‘The Mongolian or Yellow race could not insist on being classed with the Whites . . . ’. Quoted in Thorne (1972), p.23.

240 Notes to pp. 69–73 45 Burdick (1976). 46 In 1914, the Japanese Black Dragon Society called for the destabilization of China prior to its military occupation by Japan, thus solving ‘The China Question’, while Europe was distracted by its war. This would ostensibly leave sovereignty with China, but create a defensive alliance with Japan, in which Japan would determine the two countries’ foreign and security policies. 47 The Japanese regarded convoy protection as meriting little attention in the formulation of subsequent doctrine, and apparently learned little from the experience. It would have stood them in good stead 25 years later. Evans and Peattie (1997), p.169. The Japanese Navy provided other assistance to Britain. In 1915 the British had to enlist the help of Japanese sailors to suppress a mutiny by Indian troops in Singapore. 48 From 1914, the Germans hoped to bring Japan and Mexico into the war against the USA, distracting the USA from thoughts of joining the Allies, or at least delaying any intervention in Europe before Germany had won the war on the Western Front. In return, Germany would offer Mexico its lost territories of Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. The Japanese enjoyed being wooed by Germany, since this encouraged greater appreciation from their allies. 49 The British intercepted the Zimmermann Telegram which announced Germany’s intent to resume unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917, by when Germany believed it would be in a position to win the Battle of the Atlantic. The Zimmermann Telegram also revealed Germany’s intent to attack the USA from the south with Mexican and it was hoped Japanese support. See Tuchman (2004). Ironically in 1941, the USA in effect declared unrestricted warfare against German submarines in the Atlantic, long before Hitler declared war on the USA. 50 Lowe (2000). 51 Coker (1998), p.143. 52 Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.39. 53 Watt (1984), p.32. 54 Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.40. 55 Ibid., p.45. 56 Vlahos (1980), p.41. 57 Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.41. 58 Stoddard (1920), Chapter VII. 59 Quoted in Coker (1998), p.144. 60 Chiozza Money (1925), p.83. 61 Ibid., p.159. 62 Ibid., p.160. 63 Curle (1926), p.74. 64 Ibid., pp.294–5. 65 Ibid., p.62. 66 Ibid., p.104. 67 Between 1914 and 1917 Japan’s exports quadrupled. 68 Wilson agreed in return for Japan dropping its demands to be treated as a racial equal. Falk (1937), p.443. 69 LaFeber (1998), p.126. 70 Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.127. 71 LaFeber (1998), p.145. 72 Quoted in Thorne (1972), p.44. 73 Hashimoto in Morris (1963), p.64. 74 Ibid., p.65. 75 Bix (2000), p.200. 76 Quoted in Bradley (2003), p.52. 77 Ienaga (1978), pp.11–12.

Notes to pp. 73–78 241 78 See Storry (1979), p.121 and Moser (1999), p.26. 79 Quoted in Grant and Tamayama (1999), p.22. Admiral Chatfield knew the Japanese well. He was to lose £20 playing cards with Yamamoto in 1934 during the London Naval Conference. Agawa (1979), p.41. 80 Sato (1921), p.173. 81 Sato (1921), p.82. The notion of a unique Japanese identity and spirit was popular but intangible. In 1906, Natsume Soseki had taken a cynical view, ‘The Japanese spirit is a spirit. There is no one in Japan who hasn’t had it on the tip of his tongue, but there is no one who has actually seen it . . . It is perhaps that long-nosed braggadocio, the goblin.’ Quoted in Introduction to Dale (1986). 82 Curle (1926), p.128. 83 Ibid., pp.124–5. 84 Kennedy (2002), p.151. 85 Russell Braddon recalled his release from Japanese captivity in 1945. Passing a Japanese officer he asked in elation and spite, ‘This war last one hundred years?’ ‘Ninety-six years to go’, came the reply. Braddon (1983), p.129. 86 The young Midshipman Nimitz had attended the Tsushima victory party at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo in 1905 and had enjoyed a conversation with Admiral Togo who addressed him in English. Schom (2004), p.166. 87 Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.83. 88 National character and racial considerations played an important part in the intelligence assessments of all the major powers. In the USA this category was termed ‘psychologic’ or merely ‘racial characteristics’. The French termed it mentalité. Ferris (2005), p.115. 89 In 1926–7, Japan’s trade with China exceeded that of Britain’s. In 1931, Japan’s trade with China was three times that of Britain’s. 90 Thorne (1978), p.27. 91 Quoted in Butow (1961), p.46. 92 Ishihara Koichiro (1934). Ishihara favoured a Japanese rapprochement with Germany and the USSR, and the racial unification of Asia. 93 Stoddard (1920). 94 Thompson (2001), p.71. 95 In 1941, the RED element of this plan became the basis for naval operations against Germany rather than Great Britain. Quoting this as an analogy, some note that planning operations against a nation does not make it an enemy. Today, for example, planning military contingencies against China, would not in itself make China an enemy, any more than China’s planning against the USA would mean that the USA will be its enemy. An observation in Wortzel (1998), Note 14, p.26. 96 Quoted in Vlahos (1980), p.50. 97 Quoted in Thorne (1978), p.31. In 1945, the US Government was prepared to destroy the major cities of Japan including Kyoto, the ancient imperial capital. Stimson had spent his second honeymoon in Kyoto, and warned against the consequences of destroying so important a cultural site. Kyoto was spared. 98 Linn (1997), p.82. 99 Thorne (1978), pp.20 and 27. 100 Emeny (1936), p.168. 101 Ibid., p.174. 102 Ienaga (1978), p.68. 103 Schom (2004), p.26. 104 Ienaga (1978), p.69. 105 Ibid., p.138. 106 A view apparently shared by the German President, Johannes Rau, in his pronouncements of September 2003.

242 Notes to pp. 78–83 107 Moser (1999), p.109. 108 Griswold (1938). 109 Equally, supplies to the Nationalists came from surprising sources. During 1941, the Kuomintang Army received twice as many war supplies through the Japanese lines as it received from the Burma Road. In return, the Kuomintang Army supplied the Japanese with tungsten and food it received from the Red Cross. L.E. Eastman cited in Thorne (1986), p.20. 110 Schom (2004), p.62. 111 Ibid., p.109. 112 Friedman and Lebard (1991), p.68. 113 Thorne (1978), p.143. 114 Ibid., p.3. 115 This document, along with sixty others, fell into the hands of the Japanese on 4 December 1940, following the capture of the British steamer Automedon by the German raider Atlantis off the Nicobar Islands on 11 November 1940. Iriye (1999), pp.128–9. 116 Meacham (2004), p.49. 117 Ibid., p.51. 118 Ibid., p.79. 119 Thorne (1978), p.43. 120 Ibid., p.82. 121 On 10 April 1941 the USS Niblack tried to sink a U-boat off Iceland. On 4 September 1941, the U-652 attacked the USS Greer. Following that attack, Churchill noted, ‘Now we shan’t be long.’ Meacham (2004), p.127. On 31 October 1941, the U-552 sank the USS Reuben James, the first American warship sunk in the Second World War. 122 Weinberg (2003), p.31. 123 Gannon (2002), pp.85–6. 124 Mahan (2003), p.15. 125 Thorne (1978). 126 Kennedy (2002). 127 Thompson (2001), p.67. 128 It is not clear whether Winston Churchill instigated these sanctions on oil supplies in his conversations with Roosevelt on the night of 24–5 July 1941. 129 Thompson (2001), pp.91–2. 130 Ibid., pp.96–7. 131 Thorne (1978), p.73. 132 Ibid., pp.7, 43, 80 and 82. 133 Meacham (2004), p.128. 134 Ibid., p.130. 135 Hitler’s declaration of war on the USA was rooted in his cultural and racial prejudices, in his contempt and underestimation of that country, betraying at the same time his own anti-modernism. ‘I don’t see much future for the Americans . . . It’s a decayed country . . . it’s half Judaized and the other half negrified. How can one expect a state like that to hold together? . . . everything is built on the dollar.’ Meacham (2004), p.134. The Japanese may have been ‘too foreign for us, by their way of living, by their culture . . . But my feelings against Americanism are feelings of hatred and deep repugnance.’ Quoted in Buruma and Margalit (2004), pp.7–8. 136 Churchill’s approach to diplomacy with the USA could now change. As Churchill put it, ‘That is the way we talked to her while we were wooing her, now that she is in the harem we will talk to her quite differently!’ Meacham (2004), p.135. 137 Kennedy (2002), p.59. 138 Bix (2000), p.393.

Notes to pp. 83–89 243 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147

Quoted in Hoyt (2001), p.199. Iriye (1999), pp.221 and 225–6. Wilford (2002), p.137. Iriye (1999), p.36. Ibid., p.37. Quoted in Thorne (1986), p.69. Quoted in Buruma (2003b), pp.89–90. Buruma and Margalit (2004). Ellis (1990), p.495.

5 Military strategy: the paradox of inevitability and surprise 1 Bix (2000), p.47. 2 Kitaoka (1993), pp.77–8. 3 The Japanese had also demonstrated the value of amphibious operations at Shanghai in 1932 and 1937. Grove (1997), p.34. 4 By 1941, Britain’s GDP was five times Japan’s and the USA’s twelve times. 5 The United States subsequently concluded that this had indeed been the Japanese intention. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey summary of July 1946 assessed that Japan had had no intention to defeat the USA, but rather to achieve limited objectives prior to negotiating a favourable settlement. Ellis (1990), p.445. 6 Japan miscalculated the likely cost of the war. The Japanese Navy estimated that losses in the first year would be 1,000,000 tons of shipping and 800,000 tons in each subsequent year. In fact, losses in the first year were 1,250,000 tons, 2,560,000 tons in the second and 3,480,000 tons in the third year, four times the estimate. Butow (1961), p.317. Another fatal miscalculation was the belief that a small cadre of first-class naval pilots would suffice for what would be a short war. Peattie (2002), p.134. 7 Quoted in Butow (1961), p.164. 8 Ellis (1990), p.444. On 6 October 1941, Fukudome Shigeru, chief of the first division of naval staff, told his colleagues that he had no confidence that Japan could win the war. 9 Bywater (1925). This was based on earlier articles he had written for the London Daily Telegraph. 10 Agawa (1979), p.291. 11 Ibid., p.326. 12 Japan’s logistic debacle is described in Ellis (1990), Chapter 10. In late 1942, Tojo was so concerned about the lack of fuel supplies that he directed his technicians to find an aviation fuel made from ‘something like air’. They laughed until they realized that he was serious. Ellis (1990), p.465. By 1944 there were four tons of supplies and weapons for every deployed American serviceman in the Pacific Theatre. His Japanese counterpart had just two pounds of guns, ammunition and food. Webster (2004), p.179. Between 1941 and 1945, the USA spent $288 billion on the war while Japan could find just $41 billion. By summer 1941, the USA had laid down over 300 carrier hulls, although not all of these ships were completed. The disproportionate scale of the resources sometimes took unlikely forms. The USA built a ship to produce 5,100 gallons of ice cream per hour for US forces in the Pacific. 13 Similarly, Colonel Tsuji Masanoubu, who planned the assault on Singapore, believed that the effete and selfish Anglo-Saxons would put mercantile profit above all else and make a deal rather than fight a protracted war. He boasted that his own successes were due to the beneficial effects of consuming brewed human liver. Bradley (2003), p.200.

244 Notes to pp. 89–96 14 Agawa (1979), p.231. He predicted that Japan would last out for only 18 months against the USA. Agawa (1979), p.233. 15 Yamamoto mused that after the war he would either be guillotined or sent to St Helena. Agawa (1979), p.331. Yamamoto was to die on 18 April 1943, ambushed by American aircraft, following a breach of Japanese signals security. 16 Agawa (1979), p.192. 17 The attacks on Pearl Harbour might have been more damaging. Yamamoto envisaged landings on Hawaii and capturing all US naval officers, who would be hard to replace. Fuchida reported to Admiral Nagumo that the American fleet could not do battle for 6 months. This may have encouraged Nagumo to sail away from Pearl Harbour without making further devastating attacks. The Japanese, for unknown reasons, also failed to hit the US Navy’s huge oil reserves at Pearl Harbour. Schom (2004), p.63. 18 The Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Nagano Osumi, assured the Emperor that it would take just 3 months to win the war in the South Pacific. A worried Emperor reminded him that he had also assured him in 1937 that the proposed war in China would be over in 1 month. Having deployed just 250,000 troops in 1937, there were 2,000,000 on Chinese soil by 1941. Schom (2004), p.84. 19 Reproduced in Goldstein and Dillon (2000), Chapter 19. 20 Ibid., p.365. 21 Ibid., p.331. 22 The Japanese Navy studied European and American military history, whereas the Japanese Army’s study of these was said to be ‘indifferent’. Goldstein and Dillon (2000), p.328. 23 Goldstein and Dillon (2000), p.332. 24 Bix (2000), p.420. 25 Quoted in Buruma (2003b), p.97. 26 Von Clausewitz (1976), p.86. 27 Yamamoto was allegedly barred from the casino at Monte Carlo in 1923 because of his excessive wins. 28 One of Yamamoto’s staff officers, Fujii Shigeru, quoted in Agawa (1979), p.290. 29 Quoted in Agawa (1979), p.290. 30 Zimmermann (2002), p.445. 31 Gole (2003), p.xv. 32 Memorandum, FDR to the Chief of Naval Operations, 10 August 1936, PSF, Departmental: War Department: Harry Woodring, FDRL. Courtesy of Dr Calvin L. Christman. 33 Gole (2003), p.56. 34 Vlahos (1980), p.117. 35 Gole (2003), p.42. 36 Ibid., p.65. 37 Linn (1997), p.232. 38 Gole (2003), p.90. 39 Ibid., p.94. 40 Ibid., p.96. 41 Ibid., p.88. 42 Ibid., p.86. 43 Ibid., p.86. 44 Ibid., pp.141–2. 45 The US NWC fought fifty ‘Jutlands’ against RED, the Royal Navy, the most challenging opponent; but it was Japan that was the most likely opponent, and most games against ORANGE had messy and unsatisfactory outcomes.

Notes to pp. 97–101 245 6 Tactics and technology: novelty repeated 1 Morrow (1996), p.2. 2 Quoted in Morrow (1996), p.1. 3 Quoted in Morrow (1996), p.3. Nearly 100 years later, this would be termed ‘shock and awe’. 4 Quoted in Morrow (1996), p.5. 5 In 1904, the American inventor, Simon Lake, sold his revolutionary submarine Protector to Russia for $250,000 and agreed to build five more for the Russian Navy. The purchase followed trials in which the Russian object was to find a boat capable of penetrating the harbour of Libau without being detected. Protector achieved this, surfacing alongside a Russian battleship. Lake (2000), p.1. The Japanese commissioned five submarines from the USA. These were laid down at Quincy near Boston but were not completed in time for the war. Meanwhile the Japanese seem to have had various secret submarine programmes of their own, but these produced little. Warner (2002), p.243. 6 Hallion (2003), pp.304–5. The next to achieve this feat were the British in 1917. 7 Hough (1999), pp.20–1. 8 Grove (1997), p.30. Peattie reports the dropping of nearly 200 bombs around Tsingtao in 1914, but not the sinking of a vessel. Peattie (2002), pp.8–9. 9 Hough (1999), p.39. 10 Wragg (2003), pp.22–3. 11 The later Lord Sempill was a founder of the Royal Flying Corps and a respected figure, but in 1926 he was discovered to have been a Japanese spy. He was not prosecuted, so as to conceal the fact that Britain was intercepting Japanese diplomatic mail. This scandal was only made public in 2002 with the release of declassified documents from the Public Record Office (PRO). Strangely, Sempill was decorated by a grateful Japanese Government as late as 1961, before his treachery was made public. See Day (2002) and Phillips (2002) and PRO Documents KV2/871-874. 12 A small British team remained. Peattie (2002), p.24. As late as 1930 and 1931, the RAF ran courses on aerial gunnery and tactics for the Japanese Navy. Peattie (2002), p.43. 13 Bradley (2003), p.49. 14 Hough (1999), p.78. 15 Ibid., p.58. 16 Agawa (1979), p.127. 17 Ibid., pp.92–3. 18 Hough (1999), p.58. 19 On 10 April 1940, the German cruiser Königsberg was sunk by the 500 lb bombs of British Skua dive-bombers. The leading attacker, Lieutenant Fraser Fraser-Harris, had been warned some years earlier by Captain Tom Phillips not to become a naval pilot, as the future belonged to gunners and navigators. Obituary of F. Fraser-Harris in The Daily Telegraph, London, 8 November 2003. Phillips was to be killed by Japanese aircraft. 20 Quoted in Warren, History, vol.88, no.291, July 2003, p.522. 21 Yamamoto had to pay one of his staff officers, Miwa Yoshitaki, 120 bottles of beer in payment of a bet, Miwa having claimed that the Japanese could sink both Repulse and Prince of Wales. Agawa (1979), pp.267–8. 22 Ramsey was the first to sound the alarm at Pearl Harbour when the Japanese attacked. 23 Hoyt (2001), p.32.

246 Notes to pp. 101–105 24 The Type-96 land-attack aircraft was produced in large numbers unseen by the rest of the world. It had superior automatic-pilot and radio equipment and a return range of 1,200 miles. Agawa (1979), p.106. 25 Gole (2003), p.81. 26 Schom (2004), pp.149–50. After the war, all commanders who had served in the Philippines between 1941–2 were asked to provide accounts of their experiences. MacArthur declined to submit a report. Schom (2004), p.241. 27 Millions of gallons of gasoline in Manila and million of rounds of ammunition in Cebu remained in storage. MacArthur ordered American forces to destroy the gasoline, even though tanks in Manila lacked enough fuel to deploy. Troops in Bataan had to go without. Schom (2004), p.231. 28 The British originally planned to make their attack on the Italian fleet on Trafalgar Day, 21 October 1940. 29 The British operation at Taranto was a startling achievement even by comparison with that of the Japanese at Pearl Harbour, despite its much smaller scale. At Taranto in one night, twenty-one biplanes from one ship inflicted more damage on their enemy than had Nelson at Trafalgar, and twice the damage inflicted on the German High Seas Fleet at Jutland in 1916, with few losses, albeit without the immense strategic consequences. It was conducted in the face of an enemy in a state of war, with 1,000 anti-aircraft guns in twenty-one shore-based batteries of anti-aircraft guns, which alone fired 12,800 rounds, and the air defences of sixty-four Italian naval vessels which fired many more. The Swordfish sank or damaged seven ships. At Pearl Harbour, 350 Japanese planes sank or damaged fourteen unprepared American warships, with minimal anti-aircraft support. 30 Genda said, after the war, that the attack on Taranto had not affected Japanese thinking; but when interviewed for the TV series The World at War, he testified that it had. Genda subsequently became head of air forces in the Japanese Self-Defence Force. 31 Quoted in Gannon (2002), p.14. 32 Ibid., p.66. 33 Ibid., p.13. 34 Letter Exhibit No.17 in the Hart Enquiry. 35 Lowry and Wellham (2000), p.87. In August 1944, Kimmel explained that he feared a submarine attack on Pearl Harbour, but believed that there was no chance of an aerial attack, given the maximum depth of Pearl Harbour was 45 feet. 36 Quoted in Gannon (2002), p.20. 37 Ibid., p.22. 38 Lowry and Wellham (2000), p.93. 39 Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.209. 40 Quoted in Thorne (1986), p.9. 41 Agawa (1979), p.279. 42 Eight hours before the attack on Pearl Harbour, American cryptologists apparently decoded a ‘Magic’ intercept which indicated that Japan planned a major operation. Two and a half hours before the attack General Marshall finished reading this report and a warning was sent to Hawaii, but by Western Union telegram rather than scrambler, and it was handed over 2 hours after the attack had commenced. 43 Others maintain that it was only early versions of JN-25 that had been cracked as early as 1939. See Stripp (1989), p.68. 44 Even in the USA, two of the forty, serial-numbered, telegrams between London and Washington are apparently not available for viewing. Irving claimed that the diaries of Stimson covering the period before the Japanese attack on

Notes to pp. 105–107 247

45 46 47 48

49 50 51

52 53 54

55 56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Pearl Harbour seem to have been rewritten after the event, omitting reference to Magic intercepts. On 4 November 1944, Morgenthau wrote that Stimson had apparently spent ‘two weeks on the Pearl Harbor report, to keep out anything that might hurt the President’. Quoted in Irving, p.5. Wilford (2004), p.131. Ibid., pp.141–2 and 155. Theodore White, quoted in Thorne (1986), p.9. At 10:20 hours on 7 December 1941, a Japanese aircraft shot down a British aircraft tracking the Japanese invasion force heading for Malaya. Goldstein and Dillon (2000), p.84. The Japanese landed in Malaya over an hour before the attack on Pearl Harbour, so Japan attacked Britain first, rather than the USA – its war with the West did not start at Pearl Harbour. Goldstein and Dillon (2000), p.84. Goldstein and Dillon (2000), p.329. Koda (2005), Footnote 12. Chihaya Masataka appears to have his details wrong in using this example. He states that the attack took place in 1865 and that the David was commanded by a Lieutenant Jackson. The attack took place on the 5 October 1863 and the commander was Lieutenant W.T. Glassell. Warner (2002), p.205. Storry (1979), p.63. Quoted in Wilson and Wells (1999), p.23. Speaking as he gave up sea command on 20 December 1905, Togo referred to the Battles of the Nile and Trafalgar and how these had placed Britain at the forefront of the world economically and strategically. Roosevelt was so impressed by Togo’s address that he directed it be issued in the form of General Orders to the US Navy and Army. Falk (1937), pp.425–6. Togo reciprocated the admiration by presenting President Roosevelt with a miniature set of samurai armour. Lea (2001), pp.290–1. By coincidence, the British naval force sent to reinforce Singapore in early 1941 was named Force Z. To the annoyance of his impatient Government, he waited until 21 October 1905, the centenary of the Battle of Trafalgar, to make his triumphant return to Tokyo. Following Tsushima, Togo was presented with a bust of Nelson carved from the wood of HMS Victory and a lock of Nelson’s hair. He returned a lock of his own. Togo had trained on HMS Worcester and presented the ship with the battle flag he had flown on Mikasa at Tsushima. On the centenary of the Battle, this flag was in turn presented by Britain’s Marine Society to the Togo Shrine, built in Tokyo in 1940. Joyce (2005a). Before the Battle of the Marianas in June 1944, Admiral Yamamoto again urged on his fleet with the same message, ‘The fate of the Empire hangs on the outcome of this battle.’ Warner (2002), p.20. Warner (1974), pp.181–2. Quoted in Buruma (2003b), pp.89–90. The spirit of Yamato was also fuelled by the Yamato’s bunkers of edible vegetable oil, there being no other fuel left to the Japanese Navy. Miller (1982), p.131. As defences on Okinawa collapsed, Japanese civilians committed suicide in front of the memorial to the Russo-Japanese War. Yoshida (1999), p.38. Ibid., p.17. Although Japanese bomber crews wore parachutes in training, even in the 1930s they declined to use them on operations. The idea was to ‘go down with their aircraft’ and to avoid any chance of capture. Peattie (2002), p.107.

248 Notes to pp. 108–109 67 Morris (1975), p.306. Disturbingly similar traits in terms of education and social standing were noted of the suicide bombers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. 68 Quoted in Yoshida (1999), p.xxi. 69 Musashi, Yamato’s sister ship was also sunk by American aircraft, just as the Tirpitz was destroyed by British bombers in Operation TUNGSTEN in April 1944. 70 The degree of the Emperor’s involvement in wartime decision making has been controversial. In 1988, the Mayor of Nagasaki, Motoshima Hitoshi raised the subject of imperial responsibility. He was shot by a right-wing assailant but received massive support from the general public. Smith (1998), p.230. 71 Quoted in Bradley (2003), p.150. 72 Murray and Millett (1996), p.241. 73 The USS Missouri was remembered over half-a-century later as a suitable venue for surrender ceremonies, rather as a French railway carriage had been in 1940. Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell hoped to use the ship to take the surrender of Iraqi forces in 1991. No doubt, they hoped to associate their victory in the First Gulf War with the decisive outcome of 1945, and in contrast to that of the Vietnam War. Apparently it would have taken too long to put the ship in place. President George H.W. Bush expressed regret that such a ceremony had not been possible. Eliot Cohen has noted the two generals’ ‘astonishing lack of historical perspective as well as their misperception of the completeness of the military’s success’. Cohen (2002), pp.197–8. 74 A negotiated end to the war was first discussed officially in Japan at the Imperial Conference on 22 June 1945. Frank (1999), p.281. 75 On 25 July 1945, Ambassador Sato in Moscow asked for the USSR’s help to achieve a peace settlement short of unconditional surrender. Molotov was leaving for Potsdam and delayed his response. Japanese hopes were dashed on 9 August 1945 with the Soviet declaration of war and massive offensive in Manchuria. 76 It seems probable that the astonishing Soviet defeat of the million-man Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria played a major part in convincing the Japanese that the war was lost. It also played a part in shaping future Soviet theory on nuclear deterrence. In the immediate post-war years before the USSR had its own atomic weapons, the presence of the US Army in Western Europe, held ‘hostage’ by the potential damage that could be caused by massive Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, was seen to deter any American threat to Soviet cities. 77 In 1281 the Mongol fleet sailing to attack Japan had been destroyed by the ‘kamikaze’ typhoon. Had the Second World War not ended when it did in 1945, thanks to the atom bomb, a similar typhoon would almost certainly have devastated the Allied fleet invading Japan. The typhoon that struck the US Third Fleet east of the Philippines on 18 December 1944 had caused more loss than the most damaging massed kamikaze attack. 78 The Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King was relieved that the bombs had been dropped on Asian rather than the White races in Europe. Ironically, atom bombs might have been available to drop on Germany, but for a delay of many months in their production caused by Japanese intervention, in the second most significant strategic attack on the USA in the Second World War. On 10 March 1945, an incendiary balloon launched from Japan damaged the Hanford power facility which provided electricity for the Manhattan programme, delaying production of the weapons until after Germany’s defeat.

Notes to pp. 113–115 249 7 Europe bows out 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17

18

19 20

21

Towle (1974), p.69. Ibid., p.69. Quoted in Wilson and Wells (1999), p.16. Towle (1974), p.70. McCullagh (2004), p.327. Ibid., p.375. Letter to N. Sellar, quoted in Lee (2000), p.96. Towle, p.70. Quoted in Warren (2002), p.46. Alfred Duff Cooper reported that Brooke-Popham was ‘damned near gaga’. Bayly and Harper (2004), p.112. Lewis and Steele (2001), p.25. John Ferris maintained that misjudgements about the Japanese were not so much based on racism per se, but on an ethnocentricism that saw the Western approach as the universal measure of military value. Ferris (2005), p.121. In 1935, the British naval attaché in Tokyo informed the Admiralty that the Japanese ‘have peculiarly slow brains’. Thorne (1978), p.4. The British commander in the Far East, visiting Hong Kong in 1940, described the Japanese across the border as ‘various sub-human species dressed in dirty grey uniform’. Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands looked for the defeat of Germany before turning to the Japanese who should then be ‘drowned like rats’. Quoted in Thorne (1985), pp.18–19. Quoted in Lewis and Steele (2001), p.26. Ibid., p.144. ‘The most eloquent contention that the Allies’ war with Japan was at root a ‘race war’ is made in Horne (2004). Johnston (2000), pp.86–7. Ferguson (2004a), p.181. Dower (1986), p.59. Cultural misunderstandings sometimes took unlikely forms. Japanese soldiers were heard to call out abuse at some of Merrill’s Marauders in Burma with the humiliating slur on the American First Lady’s culinary competence, ‘Eleanor eats powdered eggs.’ Webster (2004), p.175. Opinion polls during the Second World War showed that 10–13 per cent of the American population favoured the extermination of the Japanese people. A poll for Fortune magazine in December 1945 found that 22.7 per cent regretted that the Japanese had surrendered before the USA had had the opportunity to drop more atom bombs on Japan. See Dower (1986), p.54. Roosevelt projected himself as the champion of colonial peoples but was prone to outbursts about their inferiority. He was so convinced of Japanese racial delinquency, caused by malformation of the skull, that he suggested, in private, that this could only be cured by a programme of cross-breeding with Europeans. Roosevelt was apparently serious enough to set Dr Ales Hrdlicka, curator of the Division of Physical Anthropology at the Smithsonian Institution, to work on the issue. He once joked about Puerto Rico’s excessive birth rate being dealt with by ‘the methods which Hitler used effectively’. Thorne (1978), p.159. Johnston (2000), p.86. The day after Emperor Hirohito renamed Singapore ‘Shonan’, Churchill faced an angry and disturbed House of Commons, yet the fall of Singapore was barely considered. The cause of the Commons’ anger was the humiliating escape of the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from Brest up the English Channel. Churchill noted that a debate on Singapore would not be appropriate. Christie (1998), p.99. Ironically, Britain went on to fight a successful internal security campaign in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 and defended Malaysia successfully against attacks

250 Notes to pp. 115–118

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

from Indonesia from 1962 to 1964. Malaysia and Singapore, along with Hong Kong, went on to become the most successful of all Britain’s former colonies, and among the most prosperous states in the world. Toland (1988), p.279. Hitler (1953), Night 28/29 December 1941, pp.152–3. Churchill (1964), p.209. Irving (1989), p.285. Thorne (1978), p.7. Ibid., p.7. Ibid., p.207. Ibid., p.207. Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.217. Thorne (1978), pp.207 and 291. Admiral King remembered fondly his youthful service aboard the USS Cincinnati cruising Chinese waters, tracking the events of the Russo-Japanese War. Dower (1986), pp.7–8 and 53. Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.222. DeWitt maintained that ‘The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on the United States’ soil . . . have become “Americanized”, their racial strains are undiluted.’ Quoted in Azuma (2005), p.209. Secretary of War Stimson believed that Japanese and Communist agitators were behind Black demands for equality. General Marshall declared that he ‘would rather handle everything the Germans, Italians and Japanese can throw at me, than face the trouble I see in the Negro question’. Dower (1986), p.173. A piece in the Atlantic Monthly in 1943 noted that ‘Like the natives of Malaya and Burma, the American Negroes are sometimes imbued with the notion that a victory for the Yellow races over the white race might also be a victory for them.’ Walter White, head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People equated the lot of the Negro in America to that of the Asian people under White rule in Asia and urged resistance to the ‘Anglo-Saxon practices’ of racism and imperialism. See Dower (1986), pp.173–8. See also Horne (2004). Thorne (1978), p.9. Allied troops, for example, were disturbed by the ferocity of Japanese prisoners hospitalized on Rabaul who, on regaining consciousness, tried to commit suicide by pulling out their drips or biting off their tongues. Masters (2002), p.163. ‘Again we were wrong in our estimate of Japanese production and design . . . on both of these counts he has exhibited an originality and an engineering experience and skill at least comparable with our own.’ ‘Tojo’s Terror’ (1944), p.2. Ibid., p.1. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden was so convinced of Japanese aerial incompetence that he attributed Japan’s successes to hundreds of seconded German pilots. Toland (1988), pp.283–4. ‘Tojo’s Terror’ (1944), p.1. Quoted in Johnston (2000), p.106. Ibid., p.103. Ibid., p.93. Johnston (2000), p.123. Ibid., p.112. On one occasion Japanese troops repeatedly advanced six abreast down a track having warned of their approach with bugle blasts. The Australian soldiers were ordered never to shoot the bugler. Johnston (2000), p.107. What was most incomprehensible was that Japanese soldiers would often commit suicide for no military purpose when they might have fought on and inflicted casualties.

Notes to pp. 118–123 251 48 Johnston (2000), p.108. On the Bonga-Wareo track in October 1943, the Australian 2/32nd Battalion placed Vickers machine guns enfilading the track and ‘became “almost hysterical with joy” as day after day groups of Japanese continued to walk along the track – heedless of the piles of Japanese corpses around them – to their deaths’. Australian troops so enjoyed their task that they refused to be relieved in the line. Johnston (2000), p.111. 49 Britain’s return to the Far East would subsequently be of a very modest sort, providing peacekeepers alongside the Japanese in UN-mandated operations in East Timor in 1999, tidying up the unfinished business of the Netherlands’ Far Eastern Empire and the nationalists who had inherited it. 50 On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnamese independence. Three days after the war ended, a Vietminh flag flew over government offices. 51 Slim (1956), p.139. 52 Thorne (1978), p.453. 53 Ibid., p.59. 54 Ibid., p.391. 55 Quoted in Thorne (1986), p.106. 56 Thorne (1978), p.455. 57 Ibid., p.146. 58 Ibid., p.149. 59 Ibid., p.95. 60 The historical confusion persists. When President Bush visited Mongolia on 21 November 2005, he celebrated the common experience of settling the plains and shaking off colonial rule. Sanger (2005). It was as if he spoke as the chief of the Sioux Nation, rather than as the leader of the descendents of those who had conquered it and colonized their plains. 61 The Philippine pre-war government ministers José Laurel and Jorge Vargas endorsed the role of Japan in fighting for Asia against what they saw as Anglo-Saxon imperialism. The Philippines was declared independent on 14 October 1943, and President Laurel declared war on the USA in September 1944. Three quarters of the pre-war elected Senate served in Laurel’s administration. In spring 1943, many leading Filipinos were sent to Japan for training as political leaders, including President Laurel’s son. 62 Stimson denounced the mixing of the two races. John Foster Dulles and others were particularly concerned that when Black Americans were serving in Great Britain, the rules of segregation that applied at home were not enforced by the British, and Stimson complained to Roosevelt about this. There were many racial incidents, sometimes involving gunfire, among American troops in Britain as attempts were made to impose social segregation in a country where the imperial ethos mandated that all the Kings subjects were entitled to the same treatment, irrespective of race. Violent incidents are described in James (2001), pp.673–84. A contrary view highlighting British intolerance is given in Horne (2004), pp. 234–43. 63 Thorne (1978), p.143. Others resented the American accusations that the British Empire was a means of economic exploitation, while at the same time regarding Latin America as the USA’s economic preserve. 64 Lord Cranborne was indignant that one of his own coloured staff at the Colonial Office was barred from his usual lunchtime restaurant because it was used by White American officers. 65 Thorne (1978), p.339. 66 Ibid., p.209. 67 Ibid., pp.82 and 13. 68 Ibid., p.339. 69 By 1954, the USA was paying 90 per cent of the costs of France’s war in Indochina.

252 Notes to pp. 123–125 70 Prados (2002), p.8. 71 By 1952, the USA had supplied the French with 777 armoured vehicles, 13,000 transport vehicles, 228 aircraft and 253 naval vessels. Prados (2002), p.10. By 1954, France was being given $1.1 billion per year and was the largest recipient of American military aid. 72 Prados (2002), p.13. 73 As the US Air Force Chief of Staff put it, ‘You could take all day to drop a bomb, make sure you put it in the right place . . . and clean those Commies out of there; and the band could play the Marseillaise and the French could come marching out . . . in great shape.’ Prados (2002), p.212. 74 Prados (2002), p.214. 75 Johnson (2004c), pp.131–2. General Matthew Ridgeway’s assessment was that American involvement would require more than 300,000 troops who would suffer heavy casualties for up to 7 years, at great financial cost. Johnson (2004c), p.132. 76 Prados (2002), p.213. 77 Dower (2000), p.471. 78 The USA created the offence of ‘waging an aggressive war’ retrospectively. General William Chase wrote, ‘We used to say in Tokyo that the US had better not lose the next war or our generals and admirals would all be shot at sunrise without a hearing of any sort.’ The US Army Chief of Staff, George Marshall apparently ruled that the receipt of orders by American service personnel could be used in legal defence of any American accused. This was not to apply to Japanese defendants. Bradley (2003), pp.315 and 320. 79 Before Japan’s attack on the USA, Hirohito obviously had some intimation that he might be held responsible if Japan lost. On 16 September 1941, he asked Konoe, ‘What will happen should Japan be defeated? Will you, Prime Minister, bear the burden with me?’ Bix (2000), p.382. 80 Tojo was asked after the war who had been responsible for starting it. He replied to his American captors that ‘You are the victors and you are able to name him now. But historians 500 or 1,000 years from now may judge differently.’ On 11 September 1945, Tojo attempted and failed, perhaps deliberately, to commit suicide with an American pistol, a culturally aberrant choice of weapon. In his redundant suicide note he predicted that with the continuation of the Imperial house and the loyalty of the people, Japan would return to prosperity. Butow (1961), pp.448, 451, 462, 465 and 468. 81 Haslam (1991), p.41. 82 On news of the fall of Port Arthur, Lenin exclaimed, ‘The European bourgeoisie has its reasons to be frightened, the proletariat has its reasons to rejoice. The disaster that befell our worst enemy meant not only that Russian freedom had come nearer.’ Deutscher (1966), p.515. See also Lenin (1905). 83 The USSR never recognized the Treaty of Portsmouth and Japan’s control over South Sakhalin. From 1918 to 1922, the Japanese occupied the Soviet Far Eastern province and only departed North Sakhalin in 1925. Soviet fears were raised once more by the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in September 1931 which was seen to threaten Soviet territory. 84 Lenin, in the preface to the 1920 French and German editions of (Lenin 2004) which was first published in 1917. 85 The terms were agreed, and Stalin was elated that the USA had thus ‘rehabilitated’ itself, in his eyes, after its role in drawing up the Treaty of Portsmouth. Andrei Gromyko later recalled Stalin’s reception of Roosevelt’s letter, ‘Several times he passed through the room . . . with it in his hands, as though he did not want to let go of what he had received. And he was still holding the letter in his hand at the moment I left him.’ Quoted in Haslam (1991), p.43.

Notes to pp. 126–130 253 86 87 88 89

90 91 92 93 94 95

Quoted in Haslam (1991), p.44. Deutscher (1966), p.515. Haslam (1991), pp.38–50. In 1957, Khrushchev described the complexity of Soviet relations with Japan and the enduring impression left by the Japanese attacks of 1904 and 1918. In a letter to Prime Minister Ikeda on 8 December 1961, he again referred to the aggression of 1904 which ‘inflicted a great deal of grief on the Russian people’. Haslam (1991), pp.46–7. Attempts to settle territorial issues were renewed in October 1969 but foundered, for the same reason. Gromyko noted, ‘History has reinforced a sense of caution in the consciousness of our people towards the good intentions expressed by the politicians of that country. They know about the treacherous attack by Japan in 1904 on Port Arthur, that led to the start of the Russo-Japanese War.’ Haslam (1991), p.40. For example, Harrison Salisbury’s The Coming War between Russia and China of 1969 maintained that war was imminent. Salisbury (1969). Between 1960 and 1964 there were about 1,000 incidents on the border, and there were 4,189 between October 1964 and March 1969 when the major Sino-Soviet clash occurred. Kaneko, Sakaguchi and Mayama (2003), p.5. In 1965 the USSR had twenty divisions on the frontier with China, but by 1973 it had forty-five and fifty-five by the mid-1980s. The complexities of the tri-polar relations between the USA, China and the USA and the Cold War are described in Ross (1993). Kaneko, Sakaguchi and Mayama (2003), p.8. Bellamy (1992), pp.50–6.

8 Asia on the march 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11

12

13

14

Fuller (1963), pp.142 and 170. Quoted in Warner (1974), p.541. Curle (1926), p.283. Quoted in Warner (2002), p.545. Falk (1937), pp.vii–viii. Ibid., p.viii. This ‘Black Internationalism’ is described in Gallicchio (2000). Clarke (1998). Admiral Koda Yoji has criticized Japan’s failure to disrupt the USA in 1941 as it had Russia in 1904. ‘The United States . . . had problems that Japan could have capitalized upon . . . nationwide racial issues, and her relationship with Mexico.’ Koda (2005), p.22. Bayly and Harper (2004), pp.7–8. In September 1940, the British arrested the Japanese press attaché, Shinozaki Mamoru following a ‘sightseeing tour’ of southern Malaya with two companions, one of whom was Colonel T. Tanikawa, chief of planning for the Imperial Army. Bayly and Harper (2004), p.26. In June 1940, Aung San, Thakin had been particularly offended by the British placing a price on his head of just Rs 5, the price of a chicken. Bayly and Harper (2004), p.12. Aung San’s daughter became a prominent dissident against the Burmese Government 50 years later. While travelling back to Burma from London via Hawaii, he called at the Japanese consulate, which remained open even after the Japanese air attacks, to offer his services should Japan invade Burma. Bayly and Harper (2004), p.104. Quoted in Hoyt (2001), p.245.

254 Notes to pp. 130–133 15 Quezon had fought as a nationalist against American forces in the Philippines, but surrendered in 1900 to Major General Arthur MacArthur. Schom (2004), p.174. 16 The proposal was endorsed by Douglas MacArthur who chose at the same time to accept a gift of $500,000 from the Philippine Government. Thorne (1986), p.204. 17 Quoted in Hoyt (2001), p.250. 18 In 1942, Yamashita was ‘banished’ to command in Manchuria having made a speech in Singapore referring to the conquered as citizens of Imperial Japan. The authorities in Tokyo saw matters differently. Yamashita was executed by the Allies on 23 February 1946. 19 L.E. Eastman cited in Thorne (1986), p.20. 20 After the war the Huk was disarmed, but in 1948 it began a guerrilla campaign against the Philippine government. MacArthur refused to send forces to fight the Huk, saying that if he were a Filipino peasant, he would be a member of it himself. Manchester (1983), p.16. 21 Bayly and Harper (2004), p.16. 22 Ibid., p.23. 23 In May 1941, the British arrested Ng Yeh Lu the leader of the Malayan Communist Party. By 1970, he had become Singapore’s Ambassador to Japan, under another name. Chin Peng of the Malayan Communist Party set up the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army. He was awarded the Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE) by the British at the end of the war but went on to lead the Chinese Communist insurgency against the British in Malaya which had failed by the early 1950s. 24 Iriye (1999), pp.213, 215 and 218. 25 Bayly and Harper (2004), p.316. 26 Ibid., p.313. The Japanese Army sold Persian heroin in China. Ienaga (1978), p.165. 27 Ienaga (1978), p.155. 28 Ibid., p.173. Gerald Horne paints a very different picture, emphasing how much the Japanese conquested Malaya and Singapore was welcomed by much of their population. See Horne (2004), Chapter 8. 29 Dower (1986), p.7. 30 For Gandhi, ‘Machinery . . . represents a great sin . . . ’ and millions of his countrymen probably died from the poverty that resulted from policies sympathetic to this notion. This judgement is at odds with the emotional attraction of his views and is thus often rejected, especially by those who have not been the victims of Gandhi’s economic theories. The admiration of Gandhi and his advocacy of non-violence by so many in the West has been more sentimental and irresponsible than their consciences would probably bear on reflection or in practice – but it is appealing in the cinema. Gandhi opposed British resistance to Nazi Germany, ‘I would at once ask the English to lay down their arms . . . and defy all the totalitarians of the world to do their worst. Englishmen will die unresistingly and go down as heroes of non-violence . . . ’. Gandhi ‘found no differences in kind’ between the two sides in the war in Europe. Quoted in ‘Thorne (1986), pp.41 and 164.’ Gandhi initially urged that the Japanese should not be resisted since they would eventually tire of killing. By 1942, he was claiming that India would show its valour when it was attacked, if this martial commitment were traded for independence. His principles were clearly ultimately tradable commodities where self-interest was concerned. 31 Bayly and Harper (2004), p.246. 32 After the war, contrasting his experience of the Japanese with his knowledge of the British, Mohan Singh praised the nobility of the British race which he had once hated.

Notes to pp. 133–141 255 33 34 35 36 37

Quoted in Bayly and Harper (2004), p.455. Quoted in Thorne (1986), p.113. Iriye (1967), p.232. Thorne (1978), p.310. Ibid., p.310. The influential Indian scholar, K.M. Panikar, warned in his India and the Indian Ocean of the expansion of China as an Asian power, in the wake of Japan’s defeat. J. Brobst in Edmonds and Gray (2001), pp.144–51. 38 Thorne (1978), p.308. 39 Ibid., pp.326–8.

9 America advances 1 Gole (2003), p.21. 2 Ibid., p.24. 3 Embarrassingly, some of F.D. Roosevelt’s family fortune was apparently derived from the opium trade. 4 Fairbank (1970). 5 Moser (1999), p.174. 6 Thorne (1978), p.663. 7 Ibid., p.597. 8 Lingering resentment against the American ‘colonial presence’ in the Far East was witnessed in the rejection by the Philippines in 1992 of continuing the US Forces’ basing-rights in that country. The degree to which the Philippines had moved away from American influence was evident in the erection of a statue in memory of the kamikaze pilots on Mabalacat Airfield (formerly the American Clark Air Base), albeit with commercial motives in mind. In 2004, Japan overtook the USA as the Philippines’ primary trading partner. Berger, 2005. 9 Quoted in Thompson (2001), p.326. 10 Thompson (2001), p.379. Chalmers Johnson’s has described American extraterritoriality in its ‘colonies’ as typical of the ‘imperial’ attitude that generated anti-Americanism in South Korea, Japan and the Philippines. Johnson cited American support for actions such as the killing by Syngman Rhee’s Government of tens of thousands of rebels on Cheju Island between April 1948 and May 1949. Johnson (2004a), pp.100–1. 11 Thorne (1986), pp.197–8. 12 Roosevelt agreed to Stalin’s terms for entering the war against Japan without reference to the Chinese. 13 Coker (1998), p.12. 14 In 1945 the USA received rights of extraterritoriality in Okinawa similar to those of the British treaty-ports in nineteenth-century China. The USA occupied and ruled Okinawa until 1972. Similar rights were established in 1954 for American bases on Taiwan. 15 Thompson (2001), pp.328–9. 16 Ibid., p.308. 17 Ibid., p.309. 18 Ibid., p.387. 19 Edward Luttwak, ‘Imperialism Ancient and Modern’, The British Academy, 29 October 2004. 20 Moser (1999), p.5. 21 Ibid., p.40. 22 Ibid., p.178. 23 Ibid., p.24. 24 Vlahos (1980), p.106.

256 Notes to pp. 141–146 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54

Moser (1999), p.107. Ibid., p.108. Ibid., p.127. Thorne (1978), p.107. Quoted in Thorne (1986), p.24. Quoted in Thorne (1985), p.25. Moser (1999), p.131. Ibid., p.145. The value of the investments of the Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil Company in the Netherlands East Indies was greater than the value of all American investments in China and Japan combined. The USA was also dependent upon parts of the British Empire for some strategic commodities, taking 90 per cent of its rubber and 75 per cent of its tin from Malaya. Meacham (2004), p.238. Ibid., p.239. Thorne (1978), p.140. In 1936, President Roosevelt had sent US Marines to take the British owned Canton Island in the Phoenix Islands for use as a stop off for Pan American Airways. Thorne (1986), p.227. The British were shocked by the tough terms of American material support, the payment of the maximum amount in cash, with gold shipped from South Africa. Churchill, who acknowledged the absolute necessity to keep American support noted unhappily, ‘As far as I can make out we are not only to be skinned but flayed to the bone.’ Thorne (1978), p.105. During the war, Britain’s external disinvestment was £30 billion. The principle of equal sacrifice and full partnership between Allies caused further resentment in Britain, for over 75 per cent of public opinion in the USA wanted Britain to repay the full cost of lend-lease material. Thorne (1978), p.138. In 1939, Britain had gold reserves of £650 billion; but by 1945, these stood at £1 billion. Irving (1989), p.9. Thorne (1978), p.72. Meacham (2004), p.245. Ibid., p.295. Thorne (1978), p.508. Thompson (2004), p.276. Bradley (2003), p.304. Thorne (1978), p.689. Dower (2000), p.550. Thorne (1978), p.12. ‘The bankrupting of Britain’ remained a sensitive issue 60 years later in the debate about ‘Anglo-Saxonism’, values and empire. A.N. Wilson depicted the USA as behaving like a predatory empire bent on bringing down Britain. Wilson (2005). Andrew Roberts criticized this thesis on the grounds that, given Britain’s collapse, ‘it was imperative for the other half of the English-speaking peoples to step into the breach’. Roberts (2005b). Thus, the view that there is but one broadly beneficial Anglo-Saxon imperium and that it has some ongoing mission in international affairs lives on in today’s debate about twentieth- and twenty-first-century history. Moser (1999), p.184. Anderson and Cayton (2005). The implications of the ending of the tri-polarity of the Cold War are assessed in Ross (1993). Layne and Schwarz (1993), p.21.

Notes to pp. 146–148 257 55 Johnson (2004a), p.217. 56 Peters (1998), p.238. An even more optimistic view of the waxing power of the USA was offered in Peters (2005). 57 Peters (1998), p.215. 58 Ibid., p.216. 59 Bennett (2004). 60 Joffe (2004), p.25. For Joffe, the American empire would be one based upon a definition of mutual interests and the creation of reciprocal obligations, rather than military occupation and economic exploitation. The USA’s primary imperial agency was thus the granting of preferential access to the USA’s market, technology, culture and society; but even membership of organizations such as the WTO brings nations into this imperial orbit. Eventual global governance ‘can only be done with American leadership and American-led institutions . . . America’s guiding vision for the 21st Century’, Joffe (2004), p.36. 61 Barnett (2004). Barnett condemned ‘The Myth of America as Globocop’ and the ‘Myth of the American Empire’. Barnett (2004), pp.350 and 354–66. 62 Ibid., p.359. 63 Ibid., p.360. Barnett asserted that ‘Globalization does not come with a ruler, but with rules.’ The USA, however, was often the enforcer of the rules which were based on Western values, and those rules were often of the USA’s making. Barnett merely noted, without apparent sense of irony, that ‘America seeks global adherence to protocols, nothing more.’ He did not explain why others should observe these protocols, any more than why the USA should observe the protocols of others. Indeed there is stiff resistance in the USA to the notion of its complying with international laws, let alone with any that might be at odds with its Constitution. His was thus a deeply traditional, Western imperial world view, rooted in a new American exceptionalism. Barnett insisted that ‘It is not nationalism that drives America to spread its ideals around the world but an innate need to share our belief in a better tomorrow.’ Barnett (2004), p.356. For him, it was therefore this ‘soft Manifest Destiny’, not imperialism, that motivated the USA. Barnett thereby appeared inadvertently to make the case he sought to deny. 64 Galeti (2004), p.3. 65 Ferguson (2004b). 66 Boot noted that Britain had controlled a quarter of the globe with 331,000 servicemen and by spending just 2.4 per cent of its GDP on defence. Boot (2005), p.2. He advocated the creation by the USA of a class of colonial administrators and agents similar to that of the British Empire, and the use of large numbers of indigenous auxiliaries, conducting nation-building by proxy and by stealth.

10 Nippon resurgat 1 Yoshida (1999), p.40. 2 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday claim that it was Chiang Kai-shek, not Mao, who wanted a united front against the Japanese. Mao calculated that if Chiang were defeated then the Soviets would be forced to intervene against Japan. They assert that after the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 1939, Mao reached an agreement with Japanese military intelligence to help undermine Chiang. They allege that after 1945, Mao used former Japanese prisoners of war of the Soviets to train his army and to create his air force. Some Japanese apparently also fought for him. Chang and Halliday (2005). 3 Buruma (2003a). Terrill (2003), pp.283–4.

258 Notes to pp. 148–155 4 In 1953, Vice-President Richard Nixon described this element of the Japanese Constitution as ‘an honest mistake’. Quoted in Buruma (2003b), p.132. 5 Nathan (2004), p.13. 6 During the Korean War, Toyota supplied the US Army with 1,500 trucks per month, the proceeds of which were largely invested in future car production. Stalin’s death in 1953 caused the Tokyo stock exchange to plummet as the economic cost of peace was appreciated. 7 Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.305. 8 From 1955 and into the 1960s the CIA is widely thought to have provided secret funding to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as a bulwark against Communism. Johnson (2004a), p.16. 9 Japan played a critical role in setting up the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), without major American involvement. 10 Nevertheless, in September 1950 when MacArthur counter-attacked north of the 38th Parallel he was apparently assisted by undisclosed secret Japanese units. See, The Unknown War by J. Halliday and B. Cummings (1988). In October 1950, Japanese minesweepers were said to have cleared Wonsan Harbour. Friedman and Lebard (1991), p.285. 11 Friedman and Lebard (1991), p.121. 12 Emmott (1989), pp.1–3. 13 Iriye (1997), p.168. 14 See Barnet and Mueller (1974). 15 Prestowitz (1988), p.70. 16 Johnson (1982). 17 Prestowitz (1988). 18 Emmott (1989), p.196. 19 Ishihara (1992). 20 Quoted in Burstein (1988), p.13. 21 Wolf (1983). 22 Braddon (1983). 23 Quoted in Emmott (1989), pp.8–9. When Japan seemed not to fulfil this dire prediction, Prestowitz transferred that mantle of menace to China, whose roaring economic development would be the USA’s downfall. This case may be stronger than his first. Prestowitz (2005). 24 Prestowitz (1988). 25 Burstein (1988), p.67. 26 Ibid., p.35. 27 Ibid., pp.13–20. 28 Such arguments were reinforced by claims that the post-war Japanese government was very similar, at least in its cast of personalities to that of the defeated regime of 1945. The role in the founding of the Liberal Party by convicted war criminals Kodama Yoshio and Tsuji Karoku was seen as evidence of this, as was the appointment of another war criminal Kimura Toutaro to the post of Minister of Justice. 29 Burstein (1988), p.6. 30 Prestowitz (1988), p.333. 31 Friedman and Lebard (1991), p.7. 32 Johnson (2004a), p.60. 33 Friedman and Lebard (1991). 34 Prestowitz (1988), p.305. 35 Kearns (1992). 36 Prestowitz (1988), p.110.

Notes to pp. 155–160 259 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56

57 58

59 60

Beason and Patterson (2004). Hall (2002), p.10. Bosworth (1992), p.113. ‘Asian leaders find it incomprehensible that the United States does not recognize the inevitable consequences for its national power of its mounting debt . . . ’. Bosworth (1992), p.128. Hall (2002), p. xxiv. Quoted in Emmott (1993), p.38. ‘So Hard to be Friends’, The Economist, 26 March 2005, p.26, London. By 2003, Asia accounted for 48 per cent of Japanese exports and the USA for only 24 per cent. The main reason for Japan’s current account surplus increasing by 13 per cent in early 2004 was exports to China. Zaun (2004). Pilling (2004b). Ibid. In October 2003, Western literature described the fate of the colleagues of the first President George Bush, shot down and captured by the Japanese in September 1944 on Chichi Jima, the island at which Perry had called on his way to Tokyo. They were apparently butchered by garrison surgeons and selected body parts cooked with soy sauce and eaten at a special dinner for Japanese officers. Bradley (2003). Lloyd Parry (2004), p.2. See for example, Menpes (1905). Vogel (1981). Nippon Steel Corporation had 8,000 such groups in 1982. Nippon . . . (1982), p.131. Nippon . . . (1982), p.119. Ibid., p.123. By 1990 there were about 1,000 books on the subject. Some explained Japanese uniqueness on their having 10 metres more intestine than other races, on their brains and thinking processes being organized differently, or on the peculiarities of Japanese soil. The website www.alllooksame.com playfully pointed out that any difference was hard to discern. Henning (2000), pp.170–1. A polemical view was published by Dr Mahathir Mohamad, and the Japanese nationalist, Shintaro Ishihara, in 1995 in their The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century. Their assertion that by 2000 combined Asian GNP would exceed that of America and Europe was made to look wayward by the economic woes of 1997–8. Calls for Japan to act as a more assertive leader for Asians and to stop worrying about criticism of its role in the Second World War were made by Mahathir Mohamad in June 2000. Quoted in Smith (1998), p.10. Underlying the plot of Rising Sun is the apparent assumption that Japanese men are motivated by the desire to obtain Aryan American women, and that the demise of the USA in the face of this onslaught is a consequence of social indiscipline and Western moral degeneracy. Colonel Maude and Lord Kitchener would probably have enjoyed the film. Quoted in Spillius (1998). The language of historical grievance and cultural divide lay just beneath the surface of Asian politics. In December 2002, the Australian Prime Minister said that he would authorize pre-emptive strikes on neighbouring countries if they threatened Australia’s interests. This was reported to have provoked a vigorous response from Dr Mahathir, using his familiar points of historical reference. ‘This country (Australia) stands out like a sore thumb in Asia, trying to impose

260 Notes to pp. 160–165

61

62

63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83

colonial values . . . as if these are the good old days where people can shoot at Aborigines without caring for human rights.’ Johnston (2002). He is reported to have declared the British, Americans and Australians proponents of ‘war, sodomy and genocide’. Quoted in Simpson (2003). Mahathir who considered himself a Malay despite being the son of an Indian immigrant, seemed impatient with his people, ‘I still cannot get Malays to understand the workings of a free market economy and what they must do about it.’ Quoted in Spillius (2003). Ian Buruma has attributed Japanese political failure in managing the growing crisis of 1940–1 to a systemic irresponsibility, with decision-makers lurching from one crisis to another, reacting to events, while the emperor, the ultimate authority, in effect had none. Buruma (2003b), p.97. Katz (2003), p.125. ‘The American Way’, The Economist, 3 April 2004, p.73, London. Katz (2003), p.115. The American hero is temporarily marooned in Japan, confounded by anatomical difference and cast adrift in cultural bewilderment. The film created a stormy debate on the internet, with many accusing it of bigotry and racism. Day (2004). The film represents the story of Saigo Takamori, the samurai who helped to restore the Meiji emperor, only to see the samurai class stripped of its traditions as Japan was launched on the path of modernization. Another popular manga, Space Battleship Yamato appealed to the same patriotic sentiment. The Yamato Museum, which opened in April 2005, featuring a one tenth scale model of the battleship Yamato, astonished by attracting 430,000 visitors in its first 4 months, more than three times original estimates. Fackler (2005), p.5. The model was the star of a stirring war film about the ship’s demise, released in 2005. von Wolferen (1989). Report of a CIA-funded seminar of 1991, Japan 2000, quoted in Henning (2000), p.172. Hasegawa (1984), p.11. Ibid., p.12. Quoted in Hasegawa (1984), p.10. Shoji (2003). A nationalist view developed that Japan had fought a war to liberate Asia from Western imperialism; a war that began when Commodore Perry forced the West upon it – the ‘Hundred Years War’. The ‘Fifteen Year War’ interpretation saw Japan as waging a war of aggression against Asia, in particular against China, beginning with the ‘Manchurian Incident’ and ending in 1945. This was seen as a war in which the rest of Asia defeated Japan. The ‘Seventy Years War’ saw China triumph over Japan after a prolonged struggle following China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Ienaga Saburo was an opponent of the Japanese ‘patriotic’ version of history for over 30 years, fighting his campaign in the courts against what he saw as Government censorship. Kersten (2004), p.22. Okamoto (1998), Period 1, p.6. Murao Jiro, quoted in Okamoto (1998), Period 3, p.1. Quoted in Hasegawa (1984), p.4. Reported in The Daily Telegraph, 23 February 2001. Quoted in Nathan (2004), p.131. Kersten (2004), p.21. While the Chinese complained that the Japanese have never faced up to their culpability in the Second World War, the Chinese

Notes to pp. 165–170 261

84 85

86 87 88 89 90 91

92

93 94 95 96 97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

Communist Party (CCP) has arguably been even more remiss in facing up to its own history. Chinese textbooks make no reference to China’s 1,000-year colonization of Vietnam, or of its invasion and rule of Korea. They make no reference to the famine caused by ‘the great leap forward’, or to Japan’s inadvertent role in the CCP’s rise to power. See ‘Court Rules Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine Visits Were Private’, Japan Today, 14 May 2004. During the Asian Cup football final on 7 August 2004, in Beijing between China and Japan, the Chinese crowd displayed aggressive nationalist behaviour against anyone looking Japanese. See ‘Grudge Match’, The Economist, 14 August 2004, p.50. ‘So Hard to be Friends’, The Economist, 26 March 2005, p.27, London. Lloyd Parry (2005c). Reported in Nakamoto (2004). Lloyd Parry (2005c). The Emperor Akihito caused nationalists some consternation when he asserted privately, but presumably no less authoritatively, that it was not necessary to stand during the playing of Kimigayo (‘His Majesty’s Reign’). Joyce (2004). The film opens with the statement that ‘The Greater East Asian War was fought in self-defense’, echoing the Emperor Hirohito’s words when Japan declared war in 1941. Kase Hideaki, the co-producer of the film said that his was the first film about Japan as the liberator of Asia. The role of Japanese soldiers in fighting for Indonesian independence and shaping its system of government is described in Greenlees (2005), p.5. The Japanese have always tried to avoid obligations of collaborative military action in their alliances, and the same is true of their alliance with the USA since 1945. In 1960, it was agreed that American forces based in Japan would only be used after ‘prior consultation’. In practice this was never observed because agreement after consultation would have implied Japanese support for that action. Koji (2000), p.22. Japan apparently secretly sent twenty-eight landing craft, flying the US flag, manned by Japanese in US uniforms, to operate along the Vietnam coast. They sustained deaths and other casualties. LaFeber (1998), p.343. Hoyt (2001), p.x. Funabashi (2003), p.46. Karniol (2005b), p.27. Japan deployed troops for UN duty in Cambodia in 1992 and in Mozambique in 1993. It helped with relief to Rwanda in 1994 and deployed UN observers on The Golan Heights from 1996. Japan contributed a further 600 troops for peacekeeping in East Timor in 2002. Review of Nathan (2004) in The Economist, 7 February 2004, p.85, London. Larimer (1999). Quoted in Larimer (1999). See Sherman (2001). ‘Report on Defense and Strategic Studies . . . ’ (2003), Part IV, p.23. Pilling (2004a). An assessment of North Korea’s strategic intentions is given in Scobell (2005). Quoted in Green (2003). Ibid. Sherman and Kallender (2003). Okada Katsuya, Japan’s main opposition leader, quoted in Brooke and Sanger (2005), p.A8. Alan Dupont saw the deterioration in relations between China and Japan as an inevitable consequence of both states being powerful simultaneously; but that

262 Notes to pp. 170–174

110 111

112

113 114

115 116

117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128

129 130 131 132 133 134

the tipping of the balance in favour of China would tend to strengthen Japan’s ties with the USA. The Australian Chief of Army’s Conference, 22–23 September 2005. Harris (2005). Ibid. The President of Japan’s National Defence Academy, Masahi Nishihara, maintained that ‘If there is a conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan, Japan would be almost immediately involved.’ Joyce and La Guardia (2005). He speculated that China might mount a Pearl Harbour-style attack on American forces on Okinawa to prevent them assisting Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. On 12 April 2005, the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, insisted that ‘Only a country that respects history, takes responsibility for past history and wins over the trust of the people of Asia and the world at large can take greater responsibility in the international community.’ Lewis (2005). Spencer (2005a). The Japanese Foreign Minister, Machimura Nobutaka announced the initiative, saying that ‘From the perspective of a Japanese person, Chinese textbooks appear to teach that everything the Chinese Government has done has been correct . . . the Chinese textbooks are extreme in the way they uniformly convey the “Our Country is Correct” point of view.’ Lloyd Parry (2005b). ‘The China Question’, The Economist, 23 April 2005, pp.16–17. Improved relations between Japan and the USA caused outrage in South Korea when it was reported that in May 2005 a Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister, Yachi Shotaro, had told South Korean Members of Parliament that Japan was reluctant to share American intelligence with South Korea because the USA did not trust South Korea as much as it trusted Japan. Opinion polls showed that South Koreans held Japan to be a greater threat to peace on their peninsula than either North Korea or the USA. ‘America Loves One of them More’, The Economist, 11 June 2005, p.60. Karniol (2005b), p.28. Former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage expressed the hope that the US–Japan alliance would become more like that between the USA and the UK. Taniguchi (2002). Joyce and Gedye (2003). Pilling (2004a). Lewis (2004). Joyce (2005b). Quoted in Pilling (2004c). See also ‘North or South?’, The Economist, 4 September 2004, p.61, London. ‘King Solomon’s Pipes’, The Economist, 7 May 2005, pp.70–2, London. Quoted in The Economist, 23 February 2002, p.77. ‘China’s New Stature’ (1998). Roach (1998). Burstein and de Keijzer (1999), p.146. Pilling (2004b). By 2005, Japan’s growing assertiveness and its closer military partnership with USA was resented by the Chinese who complained that this partnership made no sense and was ‘ . . . outdated – but what we see is that it is being strengthened’. Mallet and Dinmore (2005). Quoted in Onishi (2004), p.A4. Larimer (1999). Buruma (2003b), p.xi. The possible consequences of an American military withdrawal from Japan are discussed in Tadashi (1998), pp.27–30. Burstein and de Keijzer (1999), pp.305–7. Ibid., p.147.

Notes to pp. 174–179 263 135 Quoted in The Economist, 17 March 2001, p.24, London. 136 The development of Japan’s military capabilities and their integration with those of the USA is described in Hughes (2004). 137 McVeigh (2004), p.282. 138 Ibid. He concludes that nationalism does indeed exist in post-imperial Japan and that it is diverse but is often subject to forces demanding a single identity. 139 For example, Smith (1998) and Nathan (2004). 140 Menpes (1905), Chapter IV. 141 In 1911, Natsume Soseki pondered whether the Japanese civilization was ‘internally motivated’ like that of the West or ‘externally motivated’, formed by pressure from external forces. ‘A nation, a people that incurs a civilization in this way can only feel a sense of emptiness, of dissatisfaction and anxiety . . . and this is what makes us so pitiful.’ Nathan (2004), p.11.

11 The next hundred years: Chinese futures 1 Kennedy (1989). 2 Yao Youzhi, head of the Department of Strategic Research in the Chinese Academy of Military Research, quoted in Deng (2001), p.347. 3 F.P. Sempa in the Introduction to Mahan (2003), p.38. 4 Sempa in Mahan (2003), p.39. 5 Johnson (2004a). 6 The relationship between India and China was discussed in ‘The Tiger in Front. A Survey of India and China’, in The Economist, 5 March 2005, London. Indians may have to choose between a bias to the USA or to China, rather as their forebears in 1941 had to choose between the British and the Japanese. 7 Abramowitz and Bosworth (2003), p.119. 8 Whereas many in the twentieth century spoke of conflict in terms of race, culture and civilization, and the meaning of those terms often overlapped, the Communist lexicon’s code for such differences was often ‘class’, frequently applied to the whole of Western society. What Communist China sometimes portrayed as class struggle was often merely an expression of traditional East–West cultural conflict. Deng Xiaoping often spoke of ‘spiritual pollution’ from the West and its ‘bourgeois liberalism’, as much as any Japanese imperialist or follower of Gandhi. 9 Mahan (2003), p.99. 10 Quoted in Kristof and Wudunn (1995), pp.368–9. 11 Atkeson (2001), p.8. 12 ‘The Hungry Dragon’, The Economist, 21 February 2004, p.69, London. 13 N.R. Lardy, quoted in Perlez (2002). 14 J. Castle, former leader of the American Chamber of Commerce, quoted in Perlez (2002). 15 Kristof and Wudunn (1995), p.374. 16 Quoted in LaFeber (1998), p.358. 17 Pollack (2001b) refers to J.D. Pollack, ‘The Cox Reports’ Dirty Little Secret’, Arms Control Today, vol.29, no.3, April–May 1999. 18 Sutter (1996). 19 In April 1996 the US AWC at Carlisle held a conference entitled, ‘China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner or Peer Competitor?’ By contrast, the AWC Conference of 1–3 October 2004 had a less confrontational title, ‘Chinese Crisis Management’. 20 Pumphrey (2002). 21 Barnett (2004), pp.101–6, 226.

264 Notes to pp. 180–183 22 On 24 February 2005, the United Nations’ World Population Prospects predicted that India’s population would overtake China’s in 2030. Turner (2005). 23 The rise of China’s economic power and its implications for others is discussed in Fishman (2005) and Shenkar (2005). 24 General Fu Quanyou, Chief of the PLA General Staff, quoted in Godwin (2003), p.73. 25 ‘The Dragon and the Eagle. A Survey of the World Economy’, The Economist, 2 October 2004, p.8, London. 26 McGregor (2005). 27 Spencer (2005c). 28 John Gittings maintained that environmental degradation was a greater threat to Chinese people than political or economic instability. Gittings (2005). 29 ‘The Great Wall of Waste’, Special Report on China’s Environment, The Economist, 21 August 2004, pp.63–5, London. The World Bank estimated that environmental degradation costs China $170 billion per year. ‘China’s Growing Pains’, The Economist, 21 August 2004, p.11, London. China also faces the rapid desertification of much of its farmland. Kuehl (2005). 30 It seemed that China’s surplus with the USA in 2005 might rise to $200 billion. 31 In 2003, China replaced Japan as South Korea’s largest export market. 32 Burstein and de Keijzer (1999), p.175. 33 Ibid., p.172. Such consumption would carry penalties. The environmental threat to all of China and India consuming resources at the rate that Western populations have become accustomed to, ‘would be catastrophic’. Searjeant (2004). 34 In December 2004, the United States National Intelligence Council maintained that ‘The single most important factor affecting the demand for energy will be global economic growth, particularly that of China and India.’ Quoted in Mallet (2005), p.11. 35 Searjeant (2004). 36 Dyer (2005a). 37 Daly (2003), p.4. In October 2003, China made an agreement with the Kazakh Government to build a 400,000 bpd oil pipeline at a cost of $800 million to supply North-West China. 38 The Chinese People’s Daily maintained that competition over the East China Sea was ‘A prelude of the game between China and Japan in the area of international energy’. The competition for resources between China and Japan was reported to be at the heart of the incident in November 2004 when a Chinese submarine entered Japanese territorial waters. Spencer (2004). The Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary complained that ‘It is an act of provocation.’ Nakamoto (2004). 39 Pilling (2005), p.7. 40 Spillius (2002). 41 Kazmin (2002). 42 Acharya and Seng (2003), p.145. 43 Chao Chien-min, a Taiwanese professor of political science maintained that ‘China is using its huge market as a bait to lure ASEAN nations away from the US and Japan . . . Japan is in a terrible dilemma now. China’s call for a free trade area has forced Japan to do something in order to remain as a major player in the region.’ Berger (2004). 44 Ibid. 45 ‘Yankee Stay Home’, The Economist, 11 December 2004, p.11, London. 46 China’s aim seemed to be to create a secure environment around its frontiers. In June 2003, China offered Mongolia $300m, more than its foreign exchange reserves, and in December 2003 Mongolia paid off its $250m debt to Russia. A Mongolian banker noted that ‘It was as if we had decided to close the account with Russia and open it with China.’ Murphy (2004).

Notes to pp. 183–187 265 47 Kurlantzick (2005). 48 Sheridan (2004b). 49 ‘The Dragon and the Eagle. A Survey of the World Economy’, The Economist, 2 October 2004, p.5, London. 50 South Korea hoped that production in North Korea might provide an even greater cost advantage and reduce its dependency upon China. At a summit meeting in 2000, North and South Korea agreed to build the Kaesong industrial complex on the northern side of their border. This would provide South Korean industry with a cheap source of labour and avoid having to move much of its manufacturing base to China. Ward (2004). 51 Atkeson (2001), p.15. 52 Gaillard (2003). 53 Smith and Rushe (2004). 54 Cave (2005). 55 Stelzer (2005). 56 Quoted in Russell (2005), p.14. 57 ‘The Dragon Comes Calling’, The Economist, 3 September 2005, p.26, London. 58 Zhang Guobao, Vice-Chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, referring to efforts by American politicians to block the bid for Unocal. Quoted in ‘The Dragon Tucks In’, The Economist, 2 July 2005, p.70, London. 59 See ‘The Disappearing Dollar’ and ‘The Passing of the Buck’, in The Economist, 4 December 2004, pp.9 and 77–80, London. 60 At 4.4 per cent in 2002, China’s exports were a smaller percentage of world exports than were those of Japan’s record of 10.1 per cent in 1986, and even its 6.6 per cent of 2001. ‘Is the Waking Giant a Monster?’ The Economist, 15 February 2003, p.74, London. 61 ‘The Dragon and the Eagle. A Survey of the World Economy’, The Economist, 2 October 2004, p.11, London. 62 ‘Enter the Dragon’, The Economist, 10 March 2001, pp.25–8. 63 Pine (2003), p.19. 64 ‘Losing its Balance’, The Economist, 20 March 2004, p.14, London. 65 Morgan Stanley estimated that by 2004 low-cost production in China had saved American consumers $100 billion. Watts (2004), p.7. It may be that the entire increase in American consumption in the 1990s can be attributed to the difference in the price of products imported from China and the cost of those products if they had been made elsewhere. 66 Quoted in Peterson (2004), p.119. 67 The USA, the world’s largest debtor, has the particular advantage of being able to denominate its debts in its own currency. Others have had to finance their debts, denominated in foreign currency, with their own interest rates rising, and a falling domestic currency, causing those debts to spiral rapidly out of control, placing them at the mercy of direction from international institutions. 68 Meek (2004), p.3. 69 Hosking (2004), p.72. 70 Roberts (2005a). 71 Quoted in Peterson (2004), p.119. 72 Japan and China’s falling birth rates, and the probable future need to finance care for their elderly, will almost certainly require that some of their capital financing American debt be repatriated – the timing of that will be critical for the global economy. Peterson (2004), p.123. 73 Fears of the threat posed to the USA by China’s growing power were graphically described in books such as Clyde Prestowitz’s Three Billion New Capitalists. The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East. Prestowitz (2005).

266 Notes to pp. 187–192 74 75 76 77 78

79 80 81 82 83 84

85 86 87

88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107

Bergsten (2004). Morgan Stanley’s Andy Xie, quoted in Berman (2004), p.1. Morgan Stanley’s Stephen Roach, quoted in Berman (2004), p.1. Scotland (2003), p.13. China had warned that a devaluation of the Yen could lead to a competitive devaluation of the Renminbi, and international markets took note. Asia as a whole was now seen to depend more on Chinese economic stability than on the Japanese economy. Roach (1998). ‘Bush Poised to Seal New Friendship with China’, The Daily Telegraph, 19 October 2001, p.13, and Gertz (2002), p.xii, London. Sheridan (2002), p.9. Quoted in Wolf (2003), p.21. The hardening of American views about China is described in Small (2004). Mallet and Dinmore (2005), p.11. Bernstein and Munro (1997), p.3. The authors argued that China has set itself strategic goals contrary to American interests, that conflict seems to be the most likely condition between the two countries and that a wealthy China presents a greater threat than did a poor Communist one. Karniol (2000), p.23. Gill and Henley (1996). H. Hawksley and H. Holberton’s Dragon Strike, for example, envisaged China going to war with its neighbours, with a surprise air attack on the Vietnamese fleet at Cam Ranh Bay, to secure oil supplies in the South China Sea for its growing economy. Hawksley and Holberton (1997). Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, United States Congress, 22 June 2000, p.2. You Ji speaking at the Australian Chief of Army’s Conference, Canberra, 22–23 September 2005. Quoted in Gertz (2002), p.16. Pomfret (1999). Quoted in Harrison and McElroy (1999). Ming Zhang (1999). The Pentagon’s Report of 2002 on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, quoted in Tkacik (2003), pp.314–15. Ibid., p.314. The extraordinary story of strategic surprise, and the psychology that has made it possible, is analysed by Keith Payne in his Introduction to Payne (2001). Heisbourg (2004). Spencer (2005b). Godwin (2003), p.35. China was reported to be investing in long-range missiles to keep the US Navy at a distance from its coast. Taniguchi (2002). Godwin (2003), p.42. Quoted in Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, US Congress, Washington DC, 2002, p.14. Editorial in DefenseNews, 13 October 2003. Richard Fisher, quoted in Sheridan (2003), p.31. Lynch (2003), p.15A. With echoes of the Japanese battleship Yamato, Shenzhou means ‘divine vessel’, a homonym of the poetic term for China, Divine Land. This perceived threat caused the Taiwanese Prime Minister, Yu Shyi-kun, to suggest that Taiwan should build a missile force to establish a ‘balance of terror’ in response to the threat of Chinese missiles. It was reported that Taiwan had tested its own missiles with a range of 150 km. ‘Tit for Tat’, The Economist, 2 October 2004, p.64, London.

Notes to pp. 193–196 267 108 Nancy Bergkopf Tucker, quoted from Dangerous Strait, in ‘The Dragon Next Door’, The Economist, 15 January 2005, p.6, London. 109 Quoted in ‘The Dragon Next Door’, The Economist, 15 January 2005, p.6, London. 110 Quoted in ‘World Bulletin’, The Daily Telegraph, 23 December 2005, p.16, London. 111 The Chinese termed the attack on critical nodes as ‘Acupuncture War’. A cyber-skirmish between China and the USA, or what the Chinese themselves called a ‘network battle’, is thought to have occurred on 8 May 1999 following the American attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; and apparently involved the mobilization of thousands of IT users. T.L. Thomas (2003), p.12. The Japanese Government and institutions have been subject to continuous cyber attack since 2000; it seems likely that this emanates largely from China. As one Japanese cyber-expert maintained, ‘Whenever there is political tension between China and Japan, the attacks surge.’ Lloyd Parry (2005c). 112 T.L. Thomas (2003). 113 Bernstein and Munro (1997), pp.18–32. 114 For example, China’s Kilo-class submarines could pose a major threat to American carriers with wake-homing, 200-knot Russian Shkval torpedoes. Gaillard (2003). 115 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, US Congress, 2002, p.8. 116 Burstein and de Keijzer (1999), p.218. 117 Quoted in Burstein and de Keijzer (1999), p.218. 118 Deng (2001), pp.357–8. 119 Ibid., p.363. 120 Quoted in Yoshifumi (2000), pp.74–5. 121 Rennie (2000), p.18. 122 The North Koreans achieved strategic surprise with their development of long-range missiles. In November 1995, the American intelligence community reported that ‘No country, other than the declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next fifteen years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.’ On 31 August 1998, North Korea tested its Taepo-Dong I missile. Payne (2001), p.5. 123 Woolsey and McInerney (2003). Some also speculated that China might intervene militarily should the North Korean regime collapse. Foley (2004). 124 LaFeber (1998), p.xxi. 125 ‘So Hard to be Friends’, The Economist, 26 March 2005, p.25, London. 126 Armitage (2005). 127 Longman (2004b), p. 71. Longman pointed out that concern about declining fertility echoed that of Lothrop Stoddard’s Rising Tide of Colour in the 1920s. Longman (2004b), p.75. 128 Darwin’s logic led him to similar views to those who saw the expansion of the best to be desirable: ‘Our natural rate of increase . . . must not be greatly diminished by any means.’ Darwin (2004), p.liii. He feared that laws and customs might reduce competition, and prevent the best from out-breeding lesser people. Those whose children would be brought up in poverty should not marry. Today it is the prosperous who tend to refrain from multiplying. Longman (2004b), p. 71. Thomas Barnett has described the international frictions that will likely arise from the changes in the world’s population after 2050, especially those caused by underdeveloped nations with large youthful populations set against those of the developed world with falling populations. He struck a Darwinian tone, seeing the declining populations of the West as ‘completely against nature as we have come to understand it . . . frankly we shouldn’t be able to do this as a species . . . . Too many of the two billion young will be in the Gap’. Barnett (2004), pp.208–9.

268 Notes to pp. 196–200 129 Dyer (1980), p.167. 130 Longman (2004a) and Longman (2004b). ‘Death Wish’, The Economist, 2 October 2004, p.36, London. 131 Roosevelt (1995), p.314. 132 Buchanan (2002), p.109. 133 At a Brookings Institution seminar, quoted in The Economist, 18 December 2004, p.66, London. 134 Gouré (2004), pp.49 and 56. 135 ‘Europe’s Population Implosion’, The Economist, 19 July 2003, p.34, London. 136 Ibid. 137 Buchanan (2002), p.9. 138 Ibid., p.10. 139 Hoge (2004), p.2. 140 ‘The Incredible Shrinking Country . . . ’, p.71. 141 Between 2000 and 2050, the anticipated trebling of the world’s population to 9 billion, will occur entirely in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Buchanan (2002), p.12. 142 ‘Europe’s Population Implosion’, The Economist, 19 July 2003, p.34, London. 143 Evans-Pritchard (2004). 144 Quoted in ‘A Civil War on Terrorism’, The Economist, 27 November 2004, p.50, London. 145 Eco (2004), p.4. 146 Leonard (2005). 147 The Economist, 18 December 2004, p.66, London. 148 Ibid. 149 ‘Half a Billion Americans?’, The Economist, 21 August 2004, p.23, London. 150 Peterson (2004), pp.111–25. In 2004, the USA’s birth rate was 2.1 per woman, 1.5 in Western Europe, 1.4 in Japan and 1.2 in Italy. Peterson (2004), pp.121–2. 151 Longman (2004b), p.3. 152 Smith (2004), p.3. 153 Steyn (2005). 154 In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Chinese population increased by twice the total size of Russia’s, and in the eastern third of its territory the Russians had only 20 million people, many of whom were not ethnic Russians. At the same time, closer economic ties between China and Russia’s maritime regions could cause Moscow’s sovereignty to leak away by stealth. In 2004, Nikolai Markovstev a Member of Parliament for Vladivostok complained, ‘If official policies don’t change, within thirty years the Chinese will dominate the Far East. Last year alone 40,000 Russians left the coastal regions’. Strauss (2004). 155 The desire for a male child has led to illegal selective abortions of female foetuses. Abortion is regarded by many of its opponents as a modern self-inflicted ‘Holocaust’, echoing the language of ‘race suicide’. Ironically, in 2005, it was the USA which was accused of trying to thwart women’s rights by demanding that the UN renounce abortion rights. Goldenberg (2005). 156 China’s coercive population control policy was one of the main human rights grievances of the West. Dinmore (2004). 157 Longman (2004b), p.67. 158 Meek (2004), p.4. 159 Ibid., p.2. 160 K. Campbell in Pumphrey (2002), Chapter 3. 161 Burstein and de Keijzer (1999), p.8. 162 Ibid., p.8. 163 Quoted in Tyler (1999).

Notes to pp. 200–205 269 164 Frank Capra’s Why We Fight depicted China as a united liberal society. Pearl Buck saw China as the hope for the USA’s relations with Asia, while any association with Britain, the oppressor, would be detrimental to American interests. 165 Quoted in Thorne (1986), p.60. 166 Mahan (2003), p.91. 167 Gilley (2004). 168 Brahm (2001), p.413. 169 Atkeson (2001), p.3. 170 Gilley (2004). 171 Cheng Li maintains that divisions within the Communist Party could evolve into some form of bi-party political system. Li (2005). 172 Meek (2004), p.4. 173 Gilboy (2004), p.33. 174 Burstein and de Keijzer (1999). 175 David Aikman estimates that up to 30 per cent of China’s population may be Christian by 2030, and that Christianity will provide its dominant world view. Aikman (2003), p.285. 176 Aikman (2003), p.285. 177 Ibid., p.292. 178 This initiative was launched at the Boao Economic Forum on Hainan Island. The slogan was repeated when China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited the USA in December 2003. 179 Scobell (2003), p.198. 180 ‘Peaceful Rise’, The Economist, 26 June 2004, pp.67–8, London. 181 J. Grieco in Pumphrey (2002), Chapter 2. 182 Deng (2001), p.344. 183 See Scobell (2001). The differences are deep seated. China and the USA seem, for example, to disagree about fundamentals of international law and the use of force, and the UN. 184 Kaplan (2001), p.28. Kaplan cited the principal reasons for freedom around the world: tolerant cultural traditions, British colonization, international pressure, US military occupation and political influence. 185 ‘Peaceful Rise’, The Economist, 26 June 2004, p.67, London. 186 Derbyshire (2001). 187 Quoting the Santoli-Doran Report in Gertz (2002), pp.93–4. 188 Gertz (2002), pp.75–7. 189 Terrill (2003), p.299. 190 Ambrose-Pritchard (2004). 191 Roberts (2003), p.19. Concerns about an economically dynamic and potentially expansionist China, ruled by a regime trying to preserve its domestic position are described in Schweller (1999). 192 Mallet and Dinmore (2005). 193 Quoted in de Jonquieres (2005). 194 Ian Buruma saw the Chinese Government’s education programmes on patriotic history and its exhortations to its people to be disciplined and vigilant against future enemies as the only way to avoid repeating the humiliations of the past, as a modern form of Social-Darwinism. He regarded North Korean ideology as an even more extreme variant of this. Buruma (2005). 195 Martin Vander Weyer maintained that these flaws would eventually curb China’s economic growth. Vander Weyer (2005). 196 The record of false optimism over Asia’s advance is described in Smith (1998). 197 ‘Rich Man, Poor Man’, The Economist, 27 September 2003, London. 198 Chang (2001). Also discussed in J. Lloyd-Smith, ‘Is the Party Over?’, The Evening Standard, 23 January 2004, London.

270 Notes to pp. 205–215 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208

209 210 211 212

Chang (2001), pp.281–2. King (2004), p.29. Heisbourg (2004). Wolf (2003), p.21. Published by People’s Daily, Beijing, March 2003. Bracken (2000), p.xi. Wilborn (1996), p.v. Pfaff (2001). Quoted in Sherman (2002), p.1 China began its border security upgrade in 1996. It included 15,000 km of new roads. In negotiations with Kazakhstan, China kept only 20 per cent of disputed land, and it agreed to keep just 30 per cent of that disputed with Kyrgyzstan. China also conceded most of its claim to the Pamir Mountains to Tajikistan. Treaties with neighbours were praised by The Peoples’ Daily as bringing ‘A favourable and peaceful atmosphere to China’s northern borders’. Hill (2004). Johnson (2005). Tsuneo Watanabe in Pumphrey (2002), Chapter 8. Montagnon and Kynge (1999). Hu (2005), p.23.

12 Conclusion: centennial themes 1 ‘The Story of Man’, The Economist, Leader of 24th December 2005, p.9, London. 2 Zimmermann (2002), p.446. 3 Paul Bracken noted the ‘Needham Paradox’ in Bracken (2000), pp.20–3. In the fifteenth century, the Chinese suppressed the very military technology that did so much to give the West global dominance. Now the Chinese are developing Western industrial technology in a quasi-Capitalist system which will make them a great power, perhaps at the relative expense of the West. 4 For example, from Germany after the First World War. Hitler combined the same inner contradictions of the Japanese of the 1930s, a hatred of modernity alongside the eager and innovative use of its products. The Cambodian revolutionary Pol Pot acquired much of his ardour during his education in France. 5 As President Sukarno of Indonesia put it, ‘We can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia on the side of peace.’ Bonnett (2004b), p.111. 6 Ernest Gellner assessed the frictions and outcomes of meetings between ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultures, those which develop rapidly depending upon technology, industry and specialized education, and those which are spontaneously reproducing, less organized and, thus, poorer. He identified this cultural distinction, rather than race per se, as the cause of international upheaval. Gellner (1983). Samuel Huntington’s ideas were invigorated, not so much by friction with East Asia as with Islam, and the heated debate over ‘Orientalism’ and ‘Occidentalism’ goes on. 7 Francis Fukuyama’s grandfather emigrated from Japan to Los Angeles to avoid being conscripted for the Russo-Japanese War. 8 Fukuyama (1993). 9 Buchanan (2002). Timothy Garton-Ash’s Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time. Garton Ash (2004), took a more optimistic view, seeing opportunities for the West to prevail if Europe and the USA could agree on how to promote Western values. This theme had resonance with the situation 100 years ago when the USA and Europe argued about the manner by which they might promote the advance of ‘civilized’ Western values.

Notes to pp. 216–222 271 10 Martin Vander Weyer maintained that ‘superpowerdom’ is more than economic might, but also a matter of culture, education, science, military hardware and statesmanship. Vander Weyer (2005). 11 In 2005, China’s oil consumption per capita was still only one fifteenth of the USA; and its car ownership one per seventy people while in the USA it was one car for every two. ‘From T-shirts to T-Bonds’, The Economist, 30 July 2005, p.65, London. 12 Putnam Weale (1910), p.150, London. 13 Some aspects of Japan’s dilemma about whether its geographical location in Asia and its cultural heritage make it necessarily ‘Asian’ mirror the debate in the group of islands lying off the opposite western coast of the Eurasian ‘World Island’ as to whether they are truly ‘European’. 14 The predicament of liberal internationalism is described in Rieff (2005). 15 President Bush speaking at the Royal United Services Institute, London, 19 November 2003. Quoted in Strachan (2005), p.1. Bush asserted in various speeches that freedom was God’s gift to every individual, which would imply that the USA was acting as His agent in this strategy. This public association of a muscular Christianity with the formulation of foreign policy had a Victorian ring to it, absent from Western discourse for many decades. The relationship between culture, religion and strategy in modern times is described in Sloan (2005). 16 ‘Kipling’s Men’ admire the high-minded Victorian administrators of the Britain Empire, just as Theodore Roosevelt did. Max Boot claimed that what ‘Afghanistan and other troubled lands cry out for is the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets’. Porter (2005), p.32. 17 Bonnett (2004b), p.37. 18 Arnold Toynbee’s Civilization on Trial expressed an early form of globalism. He pointed out that the history of the West would also become the history of those whom it brought together, and the past of those cultures would also become a part of the West’s future. China is most likely to combine many strands in its way forward: its traditional culture, Christianity, authoritarianism, democracy, free markets and powerful central Government direction and spending power. 19 Hindu civilization is arguably the most successful in the history of mankind, in terms of its longevity and insusceptibility to external influence. 20 In 1998, Eliot Cohen maintained that the Pentagon had yet to realize ‘The reality of an America that now acts as a global empire, rather than as one of two superpowers, or a normal state.’ Cohen (1998), p.17. 21 Porter (2005), p.31. 22 Ibid., p.31. 23 Ibid., p.31. 24 Ibid., p.32. 25 Ibid., p.31. 26 Johnson (2004c), p.137. Kennedy appreciated the dangers of the war in Vietnam being seen in racial or cultural terms. ‘If it were ever converted into a whiteman’s war, we should lose it as the French had lost a decade earlier.’ Johnson (2004c), p.137. A sense of greater American competence also encouraged the belief that the USA would prevail. In 1961, the Joint Chiefs noted that ‘The French also tried to build the Panama Canal.’ Johnson (2004c), p.140. 27 ‘American innocence has been historically nurtured and protected by a conveniently selective collective memory.’ Miller (1982). p.253. 28 Johnson (2004a), p.5. 29 Edward Luttwak has maintained that few empires in history have had fixed boundaries, being identified rather by the sway they have had over political entities within their wide orbit, and the same is true of the USA in modern

272 Notes to pp. 222–226

30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39

40 41

42 43 44

times. ‘Empire exists and is defined only in the eyes and minds of those outside the empire. People who have an empire must never be trusted to talk about their empire and what it is.’ Edward Luttwak, ‘Imperialism Ancient and Modern’, The British Academy, 29 October 2004. Sir Michael Howard, speaking at a conference ‘Imperialism Ancient and Modern’, The British Academy, 29 October 2004. Johnson (2004a), p.xxii. In The Superpower Myth, Nancy Soderberg argued for an interventionist American foreign policy but that the USA is unable to bend the world to its will by unilateral military action. Gries (2005), p.405. Gries also discussed the spectrum of Chinese opinion about future relations with the USA and Japan. Parris (2005). Fettweis (2000), p.61. Thomas Barnett also highlighted the importance of the supply of raw materials in future international relations. ‘The Flow of Energy or Whose Blood for Whose Oil?’ Barnett (2004), p.214. Thomas Barnett described a new strategic geography. Barnett (2004). Future divisions would not be so much between the ‘Old Core’ countries, of what was once called the First World or even the West; but between them and the ‘New Core’, nations such as China, India, Brazil, South Korea and Russia. This distinction is, however, more likely to be overshadowed by that between the ‘Core’, participating in globalization, and the non-integrating ‘Gap’ of failing, underdeveloped or dysfunctional states. Fettweis (2000), p.71. Posen (2003). The growing debate about access to raw materials can create some rather strange and ironic associations. In the 1930s, the Japanese Minister Prince Konoe believed that the unequal distribution of land and natural resources caused war, and that the international system, especially regarding oil supplies, required rationalization to ensure their guaranteed supply in the face of possible disruption by nations such as the USA and Britain. In 2005, American Senator Gary Hart, undoubtedly with benign intent, called for the ‘Persian’ Gulf to be placed under international sovereignty, supported by an international force, to guarantee the supply of oil to the world’s consumers in the face of possible disruption by hostile states in the region. Gary Hart, speaking at the Leverhulme Programme’s ‘Changing Character of War’ Seminar, Oxford, 8 February 2005. Gray (2004), Paragraph 7. Bracken (2000), p.31. Bracken maintained that the Eurasian chessboard had run out of room for political and military manoeuvre, and that domestic crises could not be prevented from spilling over into international affairs. ‘Technology’s relationship to geography is shrinking everyone’s maneuvering room, political and military.’ Bracken (2000), p.32. Johnson (2004c). Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003). They believe that reducing populations and making them healthier and better educated will ‘help to bring about a more peaceful world’. Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003), p.19. Cordesman (2005).

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Index

Abdullah Badawi 183 Abe Koki 102 Abe Shinzo 169, 170 abortion 197, 268 n.155 Abyssinia 15 Acheson, Dean 123, 150 Adachi Buntaro 51 Adachi Kinnosuke 27 Adams, Brooks 19, 185 aerial warfare 32–3, 97; Chinese military developments 192, 193; kamikaze pilots 107–8; naval aviation 98–103 Afghanistan 49, 168, 169, 271 n.16 Africa 11, 16, 219, 224, 268 n.141 Aikman, David 202, 230 n.69, 269 n.175 aircraft carriers 98–9, 100, 108, 192, 193 Akagi 106 Akaka, Daniel 231 n.86 Akashi Motojiro 39, 235 nn.16, 17, 21 Aki 99 Akihito, Emperor 261 n.90 Akiyama, Commander 106 Alaska 19 Albright, Madeleine 146 Alexander III, Tsar 233 n.143 Allen, Horace 26 Altham, E.A. 41 Amalrik, Andrei 126 ‘Amau Doctrine’ 124 ‘American Century’ 3, 142, 153, 177, 214 American Declaration of Independence 23 Anastasion, D. 272 n.43 Anglophobia 76, 95, 120, 141, 143–4, 145–6

Anglo-Saxonism 11, 12, 14, 72, 77, 256 n.50 Angola 182 anti-Semitism 40 Aoki Yutaka 182 APEC see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APT see ASEAN Plus Three Arai Hakuseki 23 Araki Sadao 75 Armitage, Richard 262 n.117 Army War College (AWC) 91–6, 104, 136, 137, 179, 263 n.19 Arnold-Foster, H.O. 65, 235 n.15 artillery: indirect fire 2, 32, 35, 37, 38, 56, 57; lessons of Russo-Japanese War 55, 56; perceived importance of morale over 33–4; see also firepower ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 182–3 Asia: economic crisis (1997) 160; inevitable clash with Europe 42–3; population growth 268 n.141; rise of 2, 3, 4, 128–35, 161, 227; US post-war dominance 146; Western cultural panic 4, 197; see also the East; Orientalism Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 124, 130–1, 150, 155, 183, 203, 212, 217 ‘Asian Century’ 214, 226 Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) 258 n.9 Asian values 45, 159, 160, 215–16 ‘Asianism’ 28–9, 30, 44, 132, 133 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 185 Asia Solidarity Society 27 Aso Taro 193 ASPAC see Asian Pacific Council

294 Index Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 182–3, 258 n.9, 264 n.43 Atlantic, Battle of the 108 Atlantic Charter 120, 139 Atlantis 242 n.115 Atlee, Clement 120, 143 atom bomb 97, 109, 248 n.78; see also nuclear weapons Aung San, Thakin 130, 133, 253 n.12 Auslin, Michael 232 n.111 Australia: Anglo-Saxonism 11; Bonga-Wareo track 251 n.48; Britain relations with 144; Chinese investment in 182; European imperialism 16; fears about security 64; Japanese designs on 28; Mahathir critique of 259 n.60; US support for 93, 116, 144; view of the Japanese 118; ‘White Australia’ principle 115 authoritarianism 203, 204, 214 Automedon 242 n.115 AWC see Army War College ‘Axis of Evil’ 221 Baden-Powell, Robert 53 Badmaev, Peter 233 n.143 balance of power 77, 81, 206, 226; China 201, 214; Eurasian 177, 199; regional stability 208 Balck, William 52 Balfour, Earl 72 Ba Maw 133 Bannerman, Alexander 52 barbed wire 2, 35, 56 Barnett, Thomas 147, 179, 257 n.63, 267 n.128, 272 nn.35, 36 Baruch, Bernard 138 The Battle of Dorking of 1871 10 battleships 3, 99, 100, 108, 226 Beale, Octavius 64, 239 n.18 Belknap, R.R. 70–1 Bell, J.F. 66 Bellairs, Captain 52 Bellinger, N.L. 103 Bely, Andrei 44 Ben-my Chree 98 Benn, Gottfried 71 Bennett, J.G. 16 Berle, Adolf 144 Bernhardi, Friedrich von 10, 42 Bernstein, R. 266 n.84 Beveridge, A.J. 22 Bin Laden, Osama 228 n.8

Bismarck (battleship) 100 Bismarck, Otto von 210 Black Americans 68, 117, 231 n.91, 250 n.35, 251 n.62 Black Dragon Society 27, 129, 232 n.118, 235 n.16, 240 n.46 Black Rain 160 Black Sea Fleet 39 Blamey, Thomas 114, 144 Bliss, Tasker 96, 136, 206, 219 Bloch, Jan 11, 32, 41, 42, 54, 127 Blok, Aleksander 45 Boer War 33 Bolkenstein, Fritz 197 Bolsheviks 39, 44–5, 125, 237 n.68 Bond, General 114 Bonnett, A. 219–20 Boot, Max 147, 257 n.66, 271 n.16 Borodino 108 Bose, Rash Behari 129, 131 Bose, Subhas Chandra 128, 129, 130, 132 Bosworth, S.W. 259 n.40 Boxer Rebellion 31 Boy Scout Movement 53 Bracken, Paul 223, 270 n.3, 272 n.41 Braddon, Russell 153, 241 n.85 Brazil 182 Britain: Anglo-Japanese Treaty (1902) 26, 32, 43, 175; Anglo-Japanese Treaty (1905) 65; Anglophobia 76, 95, 120, 141, 143–4, 145–6; artillery 56; Australia 28, 144; ‘bankrupting of’ 70, 145, 256 nn.38, 50; China relations with 16–17, 75; concerns over nation’s discipline 52, 53, 115; gold reserves 256 n.39; Hashimoto critique of 73; Indian resistance to 133; Japanese threat to colonies 79–80; Japanese ultra-nationalist view of 48; Japan relations with 65, 69, 73, 113–14; Lodge’s view of 21; naval aviation 98–9, 100, 102, 103; naval rivalry with the USA 76, 92, 141; Pearl Harbour 104, 105; racial unity with the USA 14, 72; Singapore lost to Japan 93, 115, 116; Sterling devaluations 186; support for Japan in Russo-Japanese War 2, 39; US relations with 15, 77, 78, 80–2, 119–22, 140–6; World War One 49; see also Royal Navy British Empire 11, 15, 64, 78, 116, 142; abolition of slavery 219;

Index 295 Anglo-American tensions 119, 120, 121, 122, 141–2, 143, 146; Australasian support for 144; ‘civilizing mission’ 119, 222; collapse of 115, 118, 122–3, 141; ‘Kipling’s Men’ 271 n.16; as model for United States 23, 147; Pan-Asianist societies 129; US commodity dependence on 256 n.33; US discourse of ‘evil’ 221; withdrawal from Asia 118 Brooke-Popham, Robert 114 Bruisov, Valerii 44, 148 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 200 Buchanan, Pat 196, 197, 215 Buck, Pearl 269 n.164 Budhism (journal) 49 Buffet, Warren 187 Bunche, Ralph 138 Burgess, John 22 Burma 116, 120, 121, 182; Chinese trade with 183; independence 131; Japanese occupation 133; negotiations with Japan 130; US bases in 137 Burstein, Daniel 154, 201 Buruma, Ian 232 n.109, 260 n.62, 269 n.194 Bush, George W. 185, 188–9, 195, 219, 221, 222, 248 n.73, 251 n.60, 271 n.15 Bushido 50, 53, 84, 162, 238 n.80 Buzan, B. 230 n.69, 235 n.7 Bywater, Hector 87, 99, 204 Cadogan, Alexander 75 Cambodia 183, 209, 261 n.97 Campbell, Kurt 193 Canada 16, 63–4, 182, 238 n.8 Canton Island 256 n.36 capitalism 175, 198–9, 203 Capra, Frank 269 n.164 Carnegie, Andrew 14 Carolines 92, 137 Chamberlain, J.E. 11–12 Chamberlain, Neville 79 Chang, Gordon 205 Chang, Iris 166 Chang, Jung 257 n.2 Chanute, Octave 32–3 Chao Chien-min 264 n.43 Chase, William 252 n.78 Chatfield, Lord 73, 79, 241 n.79 Chemulpo 35, 140

Chen Jitong 17 Cheney, Dick 221 Chennault, Claire 81 Chiang Kai-shek 120, 132, 145, 148, 257 n.2; Fascism 200; India visit 134; as student in Japan 47; US support for 139 Chihaya Masataka 89–90, 105–6, 247 n.51 China 177–210, 216, 226; Anglo-American rivalry over 80, 120–1; ASEAN Plus Three 182–3; Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 130, 212, 217; as Asian champion 4, 178, 217; border security 270 n.208; British relations with 16–17, 75; Christianization 202, 230 n.69, 269 n.175; Curle on 74; demography 180, 197, 198, 268 n.154; economic growth 17, 156–7, 178, 180–8, 208–9, 212–13; economic instability 204–5, 214; energy consumption 181, 182, 205, 264 n.34, 271 n.11; exchange-rate friction with the USA 184, 185–6, 187; future of 198–210; immigration to the USA 63; India relations with 209; Japan conflict with 78–9, 132, 148; Japanese expansionism 73, 74; Japanese trade with 150, 151; Japanese trans-oceanic air attack on 101; Japan relations with 26–7, 47–8, 66, 76, 127, 152, 157, 170–1, 174–5, 209; Korean War 148; Lansing-Ishii Agreement 69; Luce on 10; military power and development 190–4; new norms of behaviour 220; oil projects 170, 172, 181–2; open-door policy in 21, 220; raw materials 77, 181; as regional power 193, 209; rising power of 2, 156, 173, 178–80, 197, 202, 203; Russia relations with 30, 31, 126–7, 179, 194, 209–10; ‘soft-power’ 181, 183, 206; as strong state 4, 212–13, 214; Taiwan 168, 170; territorial integrity 69; textbook controversies 165, 170, 261 n.83, 262 n.114; trade 2, 19, 22, 136, 178, 180–7, 189, 212–13, 230 n.58, 241 n.89; US commercial interests in 18, 20, 22, 31, 136–7, 178; US debts to 185, 186–7, 213, 265 n.72; US discourse of ‘evil’ 221;

296 Index China (Continued) US relations with 62, 75, 134–5, 139, 170, 178–80, 188–90, 195, 200–8; US as threat to 189–90, 191–2, 194, 195; weakness of 201, 232 n.109; Western concerns about 16–19, 46, 47–8, 199–200, 203–6, 212, 213–14; Yasukuni Shrine controversy 165–6; see also Sino-Japanese War China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 184 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 181–2 Chin Peng 254 n.23 Chiozza Money, Leo 71 Christianity 18, 145, 196, 215; Africa 219; China 200, 202, 214, 230 n.69, 269 n.175; ‘civilizing’ effects of 214; Japan 20, 25, 200; Russia 30; US religious revival 215, 271 n.15 Churchill, Winston: Anglo-American relations 143, 144, 242 n.136, 256 n.38; Atlantic Charter 120; Bismarck sinking 100; Chinese threat to Indochina 135; ‘Iron Curtain Speech’ 146; Japanese threat 79, 104; oil supplies 242 n.128; Singapore’s fall 249 n.20; US entry into war 80, 82, 116; US Pacific territories 138 Chynoweth, B.G. 95 Cincotta, R.P. 272 n.43 cinema 158, 160, 162, 166 ‘civilizing mission’ 42, 119, 145, 218–19, 221, 222 Clancy, Tom 160 Clark Air Base 138 clash of civilizations 4, 12, 42, 218, 235 n.7 class struggle 51, 52, 263 n.8 Clausewitz, C. von 41, 91 Clavell, James 157 Cleveland, Grover 14, 21 Clinton, Bill 188, 229 n.22, 230 n.86 CNOOC see China National Offshore Oil Corporation CNPC see China National Petroleum Corporation Cohen, Eliot 248 n.73, 271 n.20 Cold War 42, 127, 156, 167, 219; end of 4, 178, 179; Japan’s position 164; ‘Third World’ 215; US imperial decline 177; Western values 218

Collins, Lawton 94–5 Communism: China 132, 134, 151, 198–9, 202, 204, 212; class struggle 263 n.8; Cold War 218; as European ideology 215, 217; India 132; Indochina 123; Japan as bulwark against 150; Korea 139; Russia 44–5; US discourse of ‘evil’ 221; US fear of 145 Conrad, Joseph 233 n.133 Coolidge, Calvin 72 Corbett, Julian 38 Corregidor 95 Cotton, L.A. 68 Craigie, Robert 82 Cranborne, Lord 251 n.64 Cresson, Edith 156 Crichton, Michael 160, 190 Cuba 229 n.22 cultural conflict 2, 194, 263 n.8, 270 n.6 Cultural-Darwinism 127 cultural panic 4, 128, 152, 197, 211 cultural perceptions 15, 46, 51, 53, 74, 157–63, 200; see also race culture: clash of civilizations 218; Western model 216 Curle, J.H. 71–2, 74, 128 Curtin, John 115 Curtis, W.E. 20 cyber attacks 166, 193, 267 n.111 D3A bomber 99 Dark Ocean Society 25 Darwin, Charles 9, 10, 15, 16, 25, 267 n.128 Darwinian theories 2, 9–10, 13, 14, 23, 206, 211; Cultural-Darwinism 127; demography 196; Japanese scientists 51; resurgence of 212; Russian imperialism 29; Social-Darwinism 10, 41, 51, 71, 75, 204, 214, 269 n.194; see also ‘survival of the fittest’ Davis, A.C. 123 Davis, Elmer 122 de Keijzer, A. 201 Dealey, J.O. 72 Debt of Honor 160 ‘Deep Battle’ 57, 129, 191 defensive strategy 2, 33, 37–8, 55–6, 85, 93, 164 Dekansky, – 39 Dell 186

Index 297 Deming, W.E. 158–9 democracy 198, 200–1, 203, 214, 221 demography 4, 127, 224; China 180, 197, 198, 268 n.154; decline of the West 196–8, 211, 212; strategic 14, 42, 222 Deng Xiaoping 189, 263 n.8 Derbyshire, John 203 Dewey, Admiral 106, 231 n.99 DeWitt, J.L. 95, 96, 117, 250 n.34 Dobbie, W.G.S. 79 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor 28 ‘Double Patriots’ 51 Douglas, Robert 49 Drum, H.A. 94 Du Bois, W.E.B. 129 Dulles, John Foster 123, 150, 251 n.62 Dupont, Alan 261 n.109 Dutch East Indies 93, 116, 256 n.33; see also Netherlands Dyer, T.G. 196 EAC see East Asian Community the East 14, 16, 25; inevitable clash with the West 13, 42–3; Russian identity 28, 29, 30; spiritualism 21, 23; stereotyped views of the West 235 n.7; see also Orientalism East Asian Community (EAC) 183 ‘Easter Island Effect’ 224 East Timor 166, 251 n.49, 261 n.97 Eco, Umberto 197 economic issues: Chinese growth 17, 156–7, 178, 180–8, 208–9, 212–13; demographic expansion 224; Japanese post-war rebirth 148–57; US global dominance 143, 145, 156, 208; see also trade Eden, Anthony 250 n.40 Edmonds, C.H.K. 98 Egypt 137 Eisenhower, Dwight 123, 150 Ely, Eugene 98 Emeny, Brooks 77 ‘The Empty Cradle’ 13–14 ‘end of history’ 127 energy supplies 181, 182, 205, 212, 264 n.34; see also oil; raw materials Engelman, R. 272 n.43 engineers 56 entrenchments 37 environmental issues 223–4, 264 nn.28, 29, 33

Esenin, Sergei 45 Esher, Viscount 13 esprit de corps 41, 54, 85; see also morale Eto Jun 153 EU see European Union eugenics 10, 72, 211 Europe: anti-interventionism 220; Chinese economic threat to 18; concerns over Japanese economic dominance 156; decline of Empires 109, 115–16, 118, 122; demographic decline 196–7; ‘economic sclerosis’ 160; imperialism 16, 46, 122, 124, 222; inevitable clash with Asia 42–3; ‘Old’/’New’ dichotomy 196; Russia’s Asian identity 45; transatlantic relations regarding China 205; see also the West European Union (EU) 180–1, 196–7, 220, 222 Evans, Don 184 evolutionary theories 51, 224, 237 n.67; see also Darwinian theories; ‘survival of the fittest’ extraterritoriality 25, 255 nn.10, 14; Japanese in Korea 24; US in China 20, 137, 138, 139 ‘Fabian Imperialists’ 219 Farragut, Admiral 106 Fascism: China 200, 203, 204; as European ideology 215, 217; Japan 84, 132 Federov, Nikolai 29 Feis, Herbert 122 Ferber, Ferdinand 97 Ferguson, Niall 147 Ferris, John 249 n.11 Fettweis, Christopher 223 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 9 Fillmore, Millard 19 financial planning 39–40 firepower 32, 33, 34, 56; human character overcoming 54; Russo-Japanese War 37; versus manoeuvre 55; see also artillery First World War see World War One Fish, Hamilton 130 Fisher, Admiral 98 Fiske, B.A. 128–9 Fiske, John 11 Foch, Ferdinand 33 Folger, W.M. 66

298 Index Force Z 100, 107 foreign investment: China 181–2, 186; Japan 149, 152, 155, 186 Formosa 24, 137; see also Taiwan Forrestal, J.V. 103 Four Powers Treaty (1922) 141 France: concerns over Japanese economic dominance 156; financial weakness after World War One 70; German soldiers in Paris 115; imperial possessions 122; Indochina 49, 123; perceptions of degeneracy 50–1; ‘triple intervention’ 232 n.127; US military aid to 252 n.71 Fraser-Harris, Fraser 245 n.19 Friedman, G. 155 frontal assaults 37; see also offensive strategy Frum, David 221 Fuchida Mitsuo 87–8, 102, 106, 244 n.17 Fukuda Yasuo 171 Fukudome Shigeru 243 n.8 Fukushima, Glen 174 Fukuyama, Francis 215, 270 n.7 Fukuzawa Yukichi 24 Fuller, J.F.C. 128 Funabashi Yoichi 174 Fushimi, Prince 86–7 Ga-Shin-Sho-Tan campaign 232 n.127 Gallipoli 54 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 117, 133, 254 n.30 Garton Ash, Timothy 270 n.9 Garvey, Marcus 129 Gaulle, Charles de 151 Geertz, Bill 203–4 Gelbe Gefahr 15 Gellner, Ernest 270 n.6 Gena 98 Genda Minoru 88, 100, 102, 246 n.30 General Motors 186 geopolitics 2, 4, 196, 222–4 Germany: aerial warfare 97, 98; capitalism 203; ‘cult of the offensive’ 225, 238 n.87; demographic fears 211; Fichte 9; French campaign 86; German-Soviet Pact 125, 140, 257 n.2; Haushofer on 228 n.5; inter-war strategy 85; invasion of Soviet Union 83; Japanese seizure of Pacific colonies 69; Japanese ultra-nationalist view of 48;

Lebensraum 11; Mexico and Japan sought as allies 67, 69, 240 n.48; Navy 80, 96, 108; occupation of the Rhineland 78; perceptions of degeneracy 52; race and cultural struggle 52–3; Russian perception of threat from 30; ‘triple intervention’ 232 n.127; Tsingtao 69, 93, 98; US discourse of ‘evil’ 221; World War One 49, 70; Zimmerman Telegram 69, 240 n.49 Gilley, B. 201 Gittings, John 264 n.28 Glassell, W.T. 247 n.51 Gliddon, G.R. 9 ‘Global War on Terror’ 146, 181 globalization 19, 61, 177, 257 n.63, 272 n.36 Goeben 98 Golan Heights 261 n.97 Goltz, General von der 32 ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ discourse 221 Gordon, M.L. 25 Gouré, Daniel 196 Grant, Madison 71, 228 n.1 Grant, Ulysses 232 n.114 Gray, Colin 223 Great Britain see Britain Great East Asia Conference (1943) 131 Greater Asia see Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ‘Great White Fleet’ 66–7, 80, 92; see also US Navy Gries, P.H. 272 n.32 Griffis, W.E. 46 Griswold, A.W. 78 Gromyko, Andrei 252 n.85, 253 n.89 Gronau, Baron von 102 Guam 75, 95, 131, 137 Guidoni, A. 98 Gulf War (1990–1) 167, 190, 248 n.73 Gulick, Sidney 46 Haier 184 Haig, Douglas 41 Haking, R.C.B. 41 Halifax, Lord 121 Hall, Ivan 156 Halliday, John 257 n.2 Halsey, Admiral 117 Hamby, J.E. 234 n.12 Hamilton, Ian 38, 43, 54, 113–14 Hamley, E.B. 41 hand-grenades 35, 56

Index 299 Handy, Thomas 96 Hanson, Victor Davis 215 Hara Yoshimichi 83, 91 Harris, Arthur ‘Bomber’ 100 Hart, Gary 272 n.39 Hart, Robert 47 Hashimoto Kingoro 72–3 Hatta, Mohammed 132 Haushofer, Karl 222, 228 n.5 Hawaii 13, 15–16, 49, 66, 67, 154; Clinton apology for illegal overthrow 230 n.86; concerns about threat to Pearl Harbour 102–3; Japanese population 92–3; self-governance 231 n.86; strategic liabilities 207; US annexation of 12, 21–2, 138; US war planning 94, 95; see also Pearl Harbour Hawksley, H. 266 n.87 Hay, John 22, 213 Hayashi Fumio 156 Hayashi Fusao 107, 164–5 Hearst, W.R. 69, 141 Henty, G.A. 29 Herbert, H.A. 26 Herder, Johann Gottfried von 9 Higashikuni, Prince 149 Hindu civilization 271 n.19 Hirohito, Emperor 73, 108, 124, 133, 166, 248 n.70, 252 n.79, 261 n.91 Hitler, Adolf 78, 83, 142, 228 n.7; declaration of war against the USA 3, 82, 105, 137, 242 n.135; European imperial decline 115–16; on the Japanese 115; modernity 270 n.4; Ratzel influence 228 n.5 HMS Porpoise 231 n.100 HMS Prince of Wales 100, 107, 245 n.21 HMS Repulse 100, 245 n.21 HMS Victory 247 n.57 HMS Worcester 247 n.57 Hoar, G.F. 22–3 Hobson, John 18 Ho Chi Minh 118, 251 n.50 Holberton, H. 266 n.87 Home, J.M. 56 Hong Kong: Anglo-American tensions 122; success of 250 n.21; vulnerability to Japanese attack 65, 93, 113 Honolulu 92–3 Hoover, Herbert 116 Hopkins, Harry 104, 144–5

Hornbeck, Stanley 121, 138, 143 Horne, Gerald 254 n.28 Hoshino Naoki 132 Hosho 99 Hosokawa Morihiro 140 Hotta Masayoshi 24 Hrdlicka, Ales 249 n.18 Hsin-min Hui 130 Hu Jintao 182 Hukbalahap 131, 254 n.20 Hull, Cordell 82, 104 human nature 54 human rights 170, 185, 190, 201, 206, 218–19 ‘Hundred Years War’ concept 164, 165, 241 n.85, 260 n.76 Huntington, Samuel 235 n.7, 270 n.6 Hurley, Patrick 116, 120, 134 Hyde-Thomson, D.H. 98 Hyndman, H.M. 47 IBM 184 Ichimaru, Admiral 84 IDF see Israeli Defence Force Iemochi, Shogun 24 Ienaga Saburo 164, 260 n.77 Ikezaki Tadakata 73, 75, 78 illustrados 138 IMF see International Monetary Fund immigration 63–4, 67–8, 72, 238 n.8 imperialism: American 19–20, 22, 68, 136–40, 143, 147, 206, 220–2, 257 n.60; British 49, 120, 122, 141; cultural 218; European 16, 46, 122, 124, 222; Japanese 81, 132–3; ‘race’ 14; Russian 29; Western 216; see also British Empire Inchon 140 India: Anglo-Japanese cooperation 65, 113; British Empire 116, 117; China relations with 134, 209, 263 n.6; Communist Party 132; energy consumption 181, 205, 264 n.34; Gandhi’s opposition to the British 133; immigrants to the West 238 n.8; insurrection in 49; Japanese espionage 129; Japanese support for 131; nationalists 128; Nehru’s view of the Japanese 133; new norms of behaviour 220; nuclear power 182; population growth 180, 264 n.22; rise of 173, 197; US bases in 137; US relations with 199

300 Index Indochina 49, 79, 103, 115, 123; Anglo-American tensions 120; Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 130; Chinese threat to 135; US moral justifications for war 221; US withdrawal from 140; Vichy government 131; see also Vietnam Indo-Japanese Association 48 Indonesia 130, 131, 133, 166, 209, 250 n.21 Information Age: cultural values in 127; geopolitical rivalry 223 information technology 190, 193 Inge, William 14 Ingersoll, R. 103 intelligence: British 105; Japanese 129; racial considerations 241 n.88 international law 29, 70, 220; Chinese view towards 17, 232 n.112; human rights 219; US non-compliance 257 n.63 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 145 internet 166, 193, 267 n.111 interventionism 219, 220 inter-war period: Japanese strategy 85–8; military concepts and doctrine 85–6; US strategy 87, 91–6, 140; Western complacency about Japan 94 Iraq War (2003) 169, 220 Irving, David 105, 246 n.44 Ishiba Shigeru 171 Ishihara Kanji 164 Ishihara Koichiro 76, 241 n.92 Ishihara Shintaro 153, 168, 259 n.56 Ishiwara Kanji 73 Islam 132, 197, 202, 210, 230 n.64, 270 n.6 isolationism 21, 81, 95, 140–1, 219, 220, 222 Israeli Defence Force (IDF) 225 Italy 15, 102 Ito, Admiral 107 Ito Hirobumi 24, 27, 202, 222 Iwo Jima 84 James, William 22 Janeway, Eliot 139 Japan: Allied occupation 207; Anglo-Japanese Treaty (1902) 26, 32, 43, 175; Anglo-Japanese Treaty (1905) 65; anti-Americanism

255 n.10; ASEAN Plus Three 182–3; Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 124, 130–1, 150, 155, 203, 212, 217; Asian solidarity 27; as Asia’s champion 2, 20, 128, 214; Asia’s rise 128–35; Australia 28, 64; British view of Japanese 53, 113–14; business theory 158–9; campaign planning during Russo-Japanese War 38–40; capitalism 203; China relations with 26–7, 47–8, 66, 76, 127, 152, 157, 170–1, 174–5, 209; China’s rise 156, 157, 174–5, 179; Christianity 20, 200; cinematic representations of the Japanese 158, 160, 162, 166; Constitution of 163, 168, 171; costs of war 243 nn.6, 12; critique of Japanese strategy 89–90; ‘cult of the offensive’ 225; cultural perceptions 157–63, 200; defeat in World War Two 108–9, 134, 148, 149; defence policy 167–71; ‘degenerate’ youth and perceptions of decadence 50, 148, 166, 174; demography 211, 224; economic rebirth and threat to United States 148–57, 158–9; economic recession 155, 156, 161–2, 173; ethnicnationalism 232 n.109; expansionism 1–2, 3, 13, 23–4, 26, 45–6, 67, 73–4, 75; financial planning 39–40; future for 172–6; Ga-Shin-Sho-Tan campaign 232 n.127; Hawaii 21–2; history and revisionism 163–6; identity confusion 25, 149, 161, 163, 175–6, 217; immigrants from 63–4, 72; impact of victory in RussoJapanese War 45, 46–7, 49, 61–2; imperialism and empire-building 3, 81, 132–3, 206, 216; inevitability of conflict with the USA 16, 45–6, 51, 66, 71, 74, 76, 78, 95–6, 206; interwar strategy 85–8; kamikaze pilots 107–8; Korean border division 139, 234 n.2; Korea occupation 25–6; Mao agreement with 257 n.2; missionaries in 25, 202; modernization 189, 215; national discipline 52; naval aviation 2, 98–100, 101, 102; naval construction race 62; nuclear weapons 171, 195, 208, 226; oil competition with China 170, 172, 182; overestimated by the West 114, 155, 161; Pacific

Index 301 strategy 48–9; post-war resurgence 4, 148–76, 181; racial views held by the Japanese 51, 83, 84, 115, 159–60, 230 n.55; racial views held by the West towards 25, 68, 70–1, 72, 114, 115, 117–18, 163, 249 n.12; Roosevelt (Theodore) on 65–6; Russia relations with 1, 28, 30–1, 125–6, 172; Soviet neutrality treaty 82–3; ‘spirit’ of the Japanese 74, 78, 84, 117; submarines 245 n.5; Taft-Katsura agreement 232 n.117; threat to United States 15–16, 22, 23, 70–1, 116, 117; trade 1, 19–20, 24, 150–3, 156, 186, 212, 241 n.89; underestimated by the West 114, 161; US ‘civilizing mission’ to 145; US debts to 154, 265 n.72; US discourse of ‘evil’ 221; US relations with 27–8, 62–3, 66–79, 149–56, 167–70, 174–5, 217; US war planning 91–6; war crimes tribunal 124, 166; Westernization 15, 16, 24–5, 26, 215; World War Two 79–84, 88–91, 101–7, 114–15; see also Pearl Harbour; RussoJapanese War; Sino-Japanese War Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) 167, 168, 171, 173 Java 131 Jebson, J. 102 Jeudwine, H.S. 56 Jiang Zemin 191, 194, 201 Joffe, Alexander 147, 257 n.60 Johnson, Chalmers 152, 177, 207, 255 n.10 Johnson, Dominic 224 Johnson, Hiram 142 Johnson, Hugh Samuel 142 Jordan, William 99 JSDF see Japanese Self-Defence Forces Jutland, Battle of 96, 141, 246 n.29 Kagermann, Henning 184 Kagoshima 164 Kaizen 159 kamikaze pilots 107–8 Kanban 159 Kanzaki Takenori 171 Kaplan, L.F. 203, 269 n.184 Kase Hideaki 261 n.91 Kato Satori 48–9 Kato Tomosabuo 69 Katz, Richard 162

Kautz, Admiral 231 n.100 Kawai Tatsuo 128 Kazakhstan 264 n.37, 270 n.208 Kearns, Robert 155 Kelly, James 203 Kennan, G. 25 Kennedy, Greg 81 Kennedy, John F. 53, 221, 271 n.26 Kennedy, Paul 177 Kerr, Walter 113 Khalkhin-Gol 86 Khan, Mohammed Zafrullah 134 Khasan, Lake 86 Khrushchev, Nikita 126, 253 n.89 Kidd, Benjamin 15, 17–18 Kill Bill 162 Kim Jong Il 194 Kimmel, H.E. 74, 80, 102, 103, 246 n.35 Kimura, Lieutenant 98 Kimura Toutaro 258 n.28 King, E. 80, 101, 116, 117, 250 n.32 King, Mackenzie 248 n.78 Kipling, Rudyard 33 ‘Kipling’s Men’ 219, 271 n.16 Kishi Nobusuke 171 Kissinger, Henry 152, 179, 195, 200 Kita Ikki 51, 237 n.69 Kitchener, Horatio Herbert 49, 197, 259 n.58 Knapp, A.M. 25 Knight, A.M. 70 Knox, D.W. 76, 94, 102, 103 Knox, W.G. 41, 56, 237 n.71 Knyaz Suvorov 108 Kobayashi Yoshinori 165 Kodama, Lt General 38 Kodama Yoshio 258 n.28 Koda Yoji 253 n.9 Koizumi Junichiro 165–6, 172, 173 Kolchak, Admiral 237 n.68 Komura Jutaro 25 Königsberg 245 n.19 Konoe, Prince 76, 77, 105, 130, 272 n.39 Korea: Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere 130, 217; Chinese invasion and rule of 261 n.83; Japanese extraterritoriality in 24; Japanese occupation of 25–6, 31, 65–6, 113, 165, 232 n.117; ‘opened’ to US trade 20; Portsmouth Treaty 36, 238 n.7; Roosevelt’s betrayal 238 n.7;

302 Index Korea (Continued) Russo-Japanese War 35; see also North Korea; South Korea Korean War 139–40, 148, 149, 151, 200, 225, 226, 258 n.6 Kotoku Shusui 62 Kowshing 234 n.5 Kress, Wilhelm 97 Krugman, Paul 221 Kuomintang 130, 134, 242 n.109 Kurile Islands 125, 126, 139, 172 Kurokawa Masaaki 154 Kuropatkin, A. 30, 35–7, 47 Kusaka Ryunosuke 101, 106 Kyoto 241 n.97 Kyrgyzstan 270 n.208 Lake, Simon 245 n.5 Lansing, Robert 69 Lansing-Ishii Agreement (1917) 69 Laos 183 Lardy, N.R. 186 The Last Samurai 162 Latin America 268 n.141 Laurel, José 251 n.61 LDP see Liberal Democratic Party Lea, Homer 45–6, 50, 63, 106 League of Nations 78, 128, 220, 239 n.40 Leahy, Admiral 81, 117 LeBard, M. 155 Lebensraum 10, 11, 70, 71 LeBon, Gustave 229 n.23 Lee Kuan Yew 178 Lenin, V.I. 39, 42, 45, 125, 148, 230 n.66, 252 n.82 Lenovo 184 Lewis, Bernard 197 Leyte Gulf, Battle of 96 Li, Cheng 269 n.171 Liao-Yang 36 Li Hongzhang 27 Li Ta-chao 134 Li Zhaoxing 170 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 152, 155, 162, 169, 170, 258 n.8 Liddell-Hart, B.H. 38, 54 Lieberthal, Kenneth 203 ‘lifetime employment’ 159 Livingstone, David 219 Lodge, Henry Cabot 23, 72 Lodge, John Cabot 21 London 52 London, Jack 48, 52, 190, 237 n.74

London Naval Conference (1934) 76, 79 Long, John D. 231 n.99 Longman, P. 196, 198, 267 n.127 ‘Loony Leftism’ 52 Lost in Translation 162 Loti, Pierre 157 Luce, Henry 142 Luce, S.B. 10 Luttwak, Edward 140, 228 n.9, 271 n.29 Luxemburg, Rosa 45 Lyall, Alfred 231 n.96 MacArthur, Arthur 23, 139, 232 n.104, 254 n.15 MacArthur, Douglas 45, 108, 139–40, 258 n.10; Anglo-American tensions 120; banning of Kabuki play 158; ‘civilizing mission’ 145; on Japan 149; Philippines 76–7, 94, 95, 101, 138, 246 nn.26, 27, 254 nn.16, 20 McBride, Richard 64 McCarran, P. 137 McCarthy, Dudley 118 McCullagh, Francis 42, 43, 46, 62 Machimura Nobutaka 262 n.114 McIntyre, J.S. 129 Mackenzie King, W.L. 63 Mackinder, Halford 10, 13, 47, 136, 222, 223, 224, 228 n.6 McKinley, William 23 McNutt, Paul 117 machine guns 35, 55, 56 Madagascar 49 Magdalena Bay 67 The Magnificent Seven 158 Maguire, T.M. 45, 53, 238 n.78 Mahan, A.T 13, 14, 21, 219, 223; China 18–19, 178, 193, 201; geopolitical arguments 206; Japanese expansionism 15–16, 67; Japanese threat to Hawaii 22; maritime travel 61; naval officers’ self-discipline 229 n.49; Russian threat 31; Subic Bay base 94; US/Europe relationship 229 n.42; US national interests 80 Mahathir Mohamad 160, 161, 259 nn.56, 60, 260 n.61 Makarov, Stepan 234 n.6 Malaya 79, 104, 121, 254 n.23; British internal security campaign in 249 n.21; Japanese attack on 114, 247 n.48; Japanese commercial

Index 303 interests 130; Japanese Great Asia project 131, 133; Moslems 132; US trade with 256 n.33 Malaysia 160, 249 n.21 Malmstrom, Cecelia 204 Malthus, Thomas 51, 196 Malthusian theories 2, 224 Mamin-Sibiriak, Dmitri 30 Manchester School 18 Manchukuo 75, 131 Manchuria 1, 23, 47, 109, 139; Japanese intelligence 129; Japanese occupation of 73, 75, 76; Lansing-Ishii Agreement 69; new technologies 35; Peace Treaty of Portsmouth 36, 238 n.7; Russian expansionism 31; ‘triple intervention’ 232 n.127 Manchurian Incident 83, 260 n.76 Manifest Destiny 17, 20, 70, 137, 220–1; Chinese view of 209; Japanese imperialism comparison 124; Roosevelt 12; Social-Darwinism 10; ‘soft’ notion of 219, 257 n.63 Manila 23, 94–5, 101, 246 n.27 Manjuyama 38 Mankiw, N.Gregory 199 Mao Zedong 47, 148, 204, 232 n.109, 257 n.2 March, Peyton 92 Marianas 92; Battle of the 247 n.58 Markovstev, Nikolai 268 n.154 Marshall, George 81–2, 101, 105, 121, 246 n.42, 250 n.35, 252 n.78 Marshall Islands 92, 137 Martin, F.L. 103 Martin, W.A.P. 47 Marxism 52–3, 127, 199, 212 Masahi Nishihara 262 n.111 Mason, William E. 22 materialism: Asian ‘Tiger economies’ 215; Japanese critiques of 51, 85; Western 21, 23, 44, 50–1, 90, 131, 197, 214 Matsuoka Yosuke 73, 82–3 Maude, Colonel 41, 54, 197, 259 n.58 Maytag 184 Mead, Walter Russell 196 Meckel, Klemens von 36 Mellen, L.O. 158 Menzies, Robert Gordon 144 Merdeka 166 Metz, Steven 209

Mexico 23, 67, 69, 228 n.14, 240 n.48 Mi Zhenyu 189 Middle East 223, 224 ‘Middle Kingdom’ 156, 208, 209, 212, 213, 220, 226 Midway, Battle of 91, 96, 126 Mikasa 106, 247 n.57 militarism: American 177; Chinese 204; Japanese 49, 124, 149, 161, 163, 175 Miller, S.C. 271 n.27 Minami Kikan 130 mines 56 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 152, 153, 154, 155, 161 missionaries 25, 202 Mitchell, Billy 99 MITI see Ministry of International Trade and Industry Miwa Yoshitaki 245 n.21 Miyazawa Toshiyoshi 131 modernity 1, 4–5, 24, 214; Bolsheviks 44; as European phenomenon 84; Hitler’s contradictions 270 n.4; Russo-Japanese War 217 Mohammed, Elijah 117 Molotov, V. 248 n.75 Moltke, Helmut von 97 ‘Mongol horde’ metaphor 27, 30, 44 Mongolia 75, 131, 251 n.60, 264 n.46 Monroe Doctrine (1832) 19, 20, 22–3, 75, 96, 136; Japanese version 49, 68, 124, 130, 136; ‘virtual’ 206, 219 morale 33–4, 36, 42, 56; Japanese tactical approach 85; Russo-Japanese War 41; World War One 54 Morgenthau, Henry 80, 81, 143–4, 145, 247 n.44 Morici, Peter 204 Moriyama Keizaburo 107 Mori Yoshiro 171 Morris, Ivan 107–8 Morse, E.S. 25 mortars 56 Morton, S.G. 9 Moseley, Henry 228 n.6 Moslem states 132; see also Islam Mosso, Dr 51 Motoshima Hitoshi 248 n.70 Mountbatten, Louis, Lord 120, 134 Mozambique 261 n.97

304 Index Mukden, Battle of 36, 37, 43–4, 106–7 multiculturalism 198, 218 Munro, R.H. 266 n.84 Musashi 99, 248 n.69 Nagano Osumi 244 n.18 Nagumo, Admiral 244 n.17 Naito Takeshi 102 Nakamura Shozaburo 168 Nakasone Yasuhiro 152, 153, 160, 165, 167 Napier, Robert 17 national identity 214–15; American 221; China 178; Japan 28, 149, 161, 162, 163–4, 175–6, 217; Russia 28–9, 30, 44, 210, 217, 218 nationalism: American 144; Asian 118, 128, 129, 130, 134; Chinese 203, 204, 205, 232 n.109; Indian 128; Japanese 23, 47, 48–9, 72, 155, 166, 175, 263 n.138; ‘old right’ view of interventionism 219; Vietnam War 120, 140 Native American Indians 10, 221 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Natsume Soseki 241 n.81, 263 n.141 natural resources see raw materials Naval War College (NWC) 22, 70, 74, 75, 91–2, 94, 137 naval warfare 2, 80; China 179–80, 193, 195; inter-war period 85–8; Japanese inter-war strategy 85–7; naval aviation 98–103; RussoJapanese War 36; see also Royal Navy; Tsushima; US Navy negotiations in time of war 38 Negrier, Francois de 50–1 Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal 128, 133 neocolonialism 218 Netherlands 93, 122; see also Dutch East Indies New History of Japan 165 New Zealand 116, 144 Ng Yeh Lu 254 n.23 Nicholas II, Tsar 29, 30, 230 n.54, 233 n.136 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm 15 Nimitz, C.W. 74, 108, 241 n.86 ninjas 158 Nippon Steel Corporation 159, 259 n.151

Nishimura Shingo 171 Nissen Kyowakai 130 Nitobe Inazo 46, 50 Nixon, Richard 167, 179, 188, 258 n.4 Nogi, General 36, 124, 234 n.7 Nomura Securities International 154 Norman, Henry 26 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 123, 199 North Korea: border 234 n.2; Kaesong industrial complex 265 n.50; Korean War 139; long-range missiles 226, 267 n.112; nuclear weapons 169, 194–5, 226; regional instability 208; threat to Japan 150, 168, 169–70, 171; see also Korea Nott, J.C. 9 nuclear power 182 nuclear weapons: China 190, 192, 194; Japan 171, 195, 208, 226; North Korea 169, 194–5, 226; Soviet Union 248 n.76; see also atom bomb NWC see Naval War College Nye, G.P. 142 Oahu 93, 102, 103 Occidentalism 25, 75, 115, 214, 235 n.7; anti-modernism 215; Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 131; modernity 24, 84; see also the West offensive strategy 2, 36, 37, 55, 85–6, 225, 238 Ogawa Heikichi 238 n.3 Oikawa Koshiro 79, 101 oil 170, 172, 181–2, 205, 223, 264 n.37, 272 n.39; see also energy supplies Okakura Kakuzo 21, 27 Okamoto Yukio 173 Okinawa 107, 108, 139, 247 n.63, 255 n.14 Okuma, Count 48 Okuna Takao 84 Olangapo 95 Olney, Richard 14 Ong Keng Yong 183 Ono Yoshinori 171 Operation Desert Storm 192 Operation ICEBERG 108 Operation Iraqi Freedom 192 Operation JUDGEMENT 102

Index 305 opium trade 136–7, 255 n.3 Orientalism 14, 25, 75, 115, 214; anti-modernism 84, 215; Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 131; Western perceptions of Japan 157–8; see also the East Osmena, Sergio 138 Ostfriesland 99 Oyama, Commander 38–9 Pacific islands 137–8 Pacific Ocean Society 48 Pal, R. 124 Panama Canal 66, 94, 101, 138, 204 Pan-Asianism 129, 174 Pan-Asiatic Association 48 Panikar, K.M. 255 n.37 Paris Peace Conference (1919) 68; see also Versailles, Treaty of Parker, Theodore 11 Parris, Matthew 222 Patria 69 Patrick, Hugh 152 patriotism 51, 52, 90 Pearl Harbour 80, 81, 84, 101, 104–7, 137; aircraft numbers required for attack 100; anti-British feeling 142; British intelligence 105; Bywater’s influence on Japanese strategy 88; concerns over Japanese threat 102–3; ‘decisive’ nature of attack 89; fortifications expenditure 66; shock and shame of 108; Taranto as strategic blueprint for 102; US Navy training exercises 100–1 Pearson, C.H. 17, 185, 196, 230 n.64 Pell, H.C. 141 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 191, 192, 193 Perry, Commodore 19–20, 24, 108, 136, 217, 222, 227, 260 n.76 Peters, Ralph 146–7 Petropavlovsk 233 n.152 Pfaff, William 207 Phan Boi Chau 49 Philippines 116, 130–1, 137, 139; anti-Americanism 255 n.10; Bywater’s strategy 87; Filipino deaths during ‘pacification’ 231 n.102; Hukbalahap 131, 254 n.20; independence 138, 251 n.61; Japanese air attack on 101; Japanese threat to 66, 67, 74,

75; lingering resentment of US presence 255 n.8; as strategic liability 23, 93, 94, 207; Taft-Katsura agreement 232 n.117; US imperialism 121, 138; US occupation 12, 22–3, 66, 77, 231 n.101; US war planning 92, 93–5 Phillips, Tom 100, 245 n.19 Picq, Ardent du 34 PLA see People’s Liberation Army Plumer, Herbert 53 pogroms 40 Pol Pot 270 n.4 Port Arthur 31, 35–6, 39, 93; Atlantic Charter 139; as blueprint for Pearl Harbour 102; impact of defeat on Russia 44, 124, 125; Lenin on the fall of 252 n.82; significance of Russian defeat 128; Stalin’s control over 126; torpedoes and Japanese naval tactics 98; Western inspirations for 106 Portsmouth, Treaty of (1905) 36, 109, 125, 252 n.83; Japanese diplomatic failure 50, 61; US ‘broker’ role 62, 80–1, 195 Posen, Barry 223 Powell, Colin 248 n.73 Prestowitz, Clyde 152, 153, 155, 258 n.23, 265 n.73 Pride 166 Protector 245 n.5 Pruyn, Robert 20 Przhevalskii, Nikolai 28, 29, 233 n.133 psychology of kamikaze pilots 107–8 Puerto Rico 121, 138 Putin, Vladimir 172, 194, 210 Putnam Weale, B.L. 26, 42–3, 48, 128, 217 Qiao Liang 191 Quezon, Manuel 130–1, 134, 254 n.15 race 2, 14–15, 17, 64, 116–17; Anglo-Saxonism 11, 12, 14, 72, 77, 256 n.50; Asian economic crisis 160; Black Americans 68, 117, 231 n.91, 250 n.35, 251 n.62; British 52, 72; Chinese state ideology 203; clash of civilizations 218; cultural struggle 52–3;

306 Index race (Continued) Darwinian theories 9–10, 13, 14, 23, 211; demography 196; East/West conflict 45; Hawaii annexation 22; intelligence considerations 241 n.88; Japanese business practices 159; Japanese views on 51, 83, 84, 115, 159–60, 230 n.55; Mahathir’s views on 160, 161; racial homogeneity of nations 50; Roosevelt (Franklin) on 249 n.18; Roosevelt (Theodore) on 12, 13, 64, 229 n.23; Russian imperialism 29; Russo-Japanese War 42–3, 211; US military policy 74–5, 77; US racial segregation 121, 251 n.62; Western views of the Japanese 25, 68, 70–1, 72, 114, 115, 117–18, 163, 249 n.12; White supremacy 71–2; see also cultural perceptions; Yellow Peril ‘race suicide’ 13, 71, 196, 211, 268 n.155 Raeder, Erich 108 RAF see Royal Air force railways 183 Ramsey, L.C. 101, 245 n.22 The Rape of Nanking 166 Ratzel, Friedrich 10, 228 n.5 Rau, Johannes 241 n.106 raw materials 11, 66, 77, 212, 272 n.39; China 181, 205, 208–9, 213; competition for 4, 148, 216; geopolitics 196, 223, 224; Japan/China rivalry 27, 172; Japanese post-war resurgence 149, 150; see also energy supplies Reagan, Ronald 127 Reid, T.R. 197 Reischauer, Edwin 149 Rhee, Syngman 255 n.10 Ricarte, Artemio 49 Rice, G.T. 232 n.104 Richardson, J.O. 76, 102 Richelieu 103 Richthofen, Baron von 129 Ridgeway, Matthew 252 n.75 Rifkin, Jeremy 197 rifles 2, 32, 33 Rising Sun 160, 190, 259 n.58 RNAS see Royal Naval air Service Roberts, Andrew 204, 256 n.50 Robertson, C.C. 56 Robida, Albert 32 Rogers, W.L. 56, 70

Romulo, Carlos 231 n.101 Ronin 158 Roosevelt, Elliot 117 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 80, 81, 82, 84, 144, 255 n.12; Anglo-American tensions 78, 122, 143; Asiatic threat 117; Bywater’s debates with 87; Canton Island 256 n.36; China 134–5; economic policy 145; French Indochina 123; Japanese Americans in Hawaii 92–3; Japanese threat 74, 103–4; National Recovery Administration 142; opium trade wealth 255 n.3; Pacific territories 138; Pearl Harbour 102, 104, 105; Port Arthur 139; racial views 249 n.18; rearmament 92 Roosevelt, Theodore: admiration for Togo 247 n.54; Chinese territorial integrity 69; Cuban campaign 229 n.22; Grant correspondence with 228 n.1; Hawaii annexation 22; humanitarianism 229 n.26; on the Japanese 46, 63, 65–6, 106; Japanese threat 15, 66–7; on Kaiser Wilhelm II 236 n.32; Korea 238 n.7; Nobel Peace Prize 36; Philippines 23, 92, 231 n.98; race 12, 13–14, 64, 196, 229 n.23; Spanish-American War 231 n.99; support for Japan in Russo-Japanese War 31, 62; on war 50 Rossiter, J.H. 53 Roxas, Manuel 138 Royal Air Force (RAF) 245 n.12 Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) 98–9 Royal Navy 73, 81, 92, 93; aerial warfare 98, 100; suicidal tradition 107; suppression of slavery 202; US Anglophobia 141–2; US Navy cooperation with 231 n.100 Rozhestvenski, Zinovy 100 Rubin, Robert 187 Rumsfeld, Donald 196, 221 Ruskin, John 229 n.47 Russell, Bertrand 45 Russia 3, 28–32, 69, 124–7, 217–18, 226; advances into Alaska 19; anti-Semitism 40; Asian identity 28–9, 30, 44, 45, 210, 217; Bolshevism 44–5; China relations with 179, 194, 209–10; demography 197, 198, 268 n.154; energy supplies 182; European identity 210, 218;

Index 307 German racial views of 53; impact of defeat to Japan 43–4, 124–5, 126; imperialism 29, 30; Japan relations with 1, 28, 30–1, 125–6, 172; Japanese naval visit to 167; Korean border division 139, 234 n.2; Port Arthur 93, 106; Revolution (1905) 49; submarine force 98, 245 n.5; Trans-Siberian Railway 16, 30, 31, 35, 230 n.54; ‘triple intervention’ 232 n.127; Tsushima defeat 89; vast resources 51; see also Soviet Union Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) 1, 7–57; artillery influence 38, 55, 56; British view of Japan’s success 113; campaign planning 38–40; character of war 61; deep attack 39; finance 39–40; firepower overcome by strength of character 54; firepower versus manoeuvre 55; foreign military observers 42, 43, 54, 55; historical revisionism 164; international impact of 49; Japanese intelligence 129; Japanese risk-taking 90; Japanese victory 45, 46, 47, 49, 61–2, 83; Korean War comparison 139; lessons ignored 2, 55, 56, 224–5; lessons learned 54–7, 86, 101, 107; morale 41; new technologies of defence 2, 35; origins of 28, 30–2; outline of events 35–6; patriotism provoked by 52; racial struggle 42–3, 71; ‘Revolution in Strategic Affairs’ 226; role of Russian revolutionaries 39; Russian reaction to defeat 43–4, 124–5, 126; significance of 128, 211, 226; tactics of attack and defence 36–8, 55; Western perceptions of Asia 43, 45, 46–7 Rwanda 261 n.97 Saeki, K. 168 Said, Edward 235 n.7 Saigo Takamori 260 n.68 Sakhalin 126, 139, 172, 252 n.83 Salisbury, Harrison 253 n.90 Salisbury, Lord Robert Cecil 13 Sampson, William 106 Sankey, C.E.P. 55 Santiago Harbour 106 Sato Kojiro 73–4, 78 Sato Nobuhiro 23

Satsuma 99 Scheerbart, Paul 97 Schiff, Jacob H. 40 Schlesinger, James 200 Schurz, Carl 231 n.91 Schwarzkopf, Norman 248 n.73 Scott, Percy 98, 99 SEAC see South East Asia Command searchlights 35 Second World War see World War Two Sedan 36 Segal, G. 230 n.69, 235 n.7 Sempa, Francis 177 Sempill, W.F. 99, 245 n.11 September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks 168, 188, 248 n.67 The Seven Samurai 158 Seward, W.H. 20 Shell Oil Company 256 n.33 Shenzhou 266 n.106 Shimada, Admiral 108 Shimizu Hayao 164 Shimonoseki, Treaty of 27, 31 Shinozaki Mamoru 253 n.11 Shintoism 84 Shi Yinhong 173 Shogun 157 Shoji Jun’ichiro 164 Short, W.C. 102–3 Shufeldt, R. 20 Shufeldt Treaty (1882) 25 Siam 79, 82; see also Thailand Siberia 69, 72, 75, 86, 237 n.68 The Silent Service 162–3 Singapore 79, 80, 99, 122; Asian values 160; British loss to Japan 93, 114, 115, 116, 249 n.20; Indian Army discontent 130, 240 n.47; Japanese imperialism 132–3; success of 250 n.21; vulnerability to Japanese attack 65, 93, 113; withdrawal of British troops from 118 Singh, Mohan 133, 254 n.32 Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) 30, 35, 61, 83; Chinese humiliation 17, 26; Korean border division after 139, 234 n.2; Treaty of Shimonoseki 27 Sjahrir, Soetan 131 Slim, Field Marshal 119 Smart, E.K. 144 Smiles, Samuel 16 Smith, Jacob 231 n.103 Smoot-Hawley Act (1930) 75

308 Index Social-Darwinism 10, 41, 51, 71, 75, 204, 214, 269 n.194 socialists 51, 52 Soderberg, Nancy 272 n.31 ‘soft-power’ 181, 183, 206, 223 Solovev, Vladimir 44, 48, 148, 236 n.21 Somervell, Brehon 143 Song Qiang 189 Soong, T.V. 104, 200 Sopwith T1 98 South East Asia Command (SEAC) 120, 143 South Korea: anti-Americanism 255 n.10; ASEAN Plus Three 182–3; border 234 n.2; Chinese trade with 184; Japan perceived as threat to 262 n.116; Japanese naval visit to 167; Kaesong industrial complex 265 n.50; US occupation 139; see also Korea Soviet Union (USSR) 3, 124–7, 144; China relations with 126–7; Cold War defeat 218; collapse of 4, 127, 209; German invasion 83, 125; German-Soviet Pact 125, 140, 257 n.2; GNP 151; inter-war clashes with Japan 86; Japanese expansionism 75, 252 n.83; Japanese neutrality treaty 82–3; lessons learned from World War One 238 n.87; Manchuria offensive 248 n.75; threat to USA 122, 146, 154; US discourse of ‘evil’ 221; see also Russia space-based military technologies 192 Spanish-American War (1898) 136, 231 n.99 Spanner, E.F. 100 Spencer, Herbert 9, 10, 12 spiritual issues: Eastern spirituality versus Western materialism 21, 23, 131, 214; Japanese ‘spirit’ 74, 78, 84, 117, 241 n.81; Japanese tactical approach 85, 86; ‘thought waves’ 54; US religious revival 215 Stackpole, H.C. 154–5 Stafford Cripps, Richard 142 Stalin, Josef 45, 82–3, 125–6, 252 n.85, 255 n.12, 258 n.6 Stark, H.A. 82, 102, 103, 104 Stern, N. 97 Stilwell, Joseph 120

‘Stimson Doctrine’ 75 Stimson, H.L. 74, 76, 82, 116, 241 n.97; Black Americans 250 n.35, 251 n.62; Pearl Harbour 103, 104, 105, 246 n.44 stock markets 153, 155 Stoddard, Lothrop 71, 75, 196, 267 n.127 Story, J.P. 67 Stresemann, Gustav 70 Strong, Josiah 12 Subardjo, Ahmad 128 Subic Bay 66, 94, 138 submarines 32, 33, 98, 240 n.49, 245 n.5, 267 n.114 Sudan 15, 182 Sueter, M.F. 98 Suez Canal 91 suicidal attacks 107–8 Sukarno, President 133, 270 n.5 Sun Fo 134 Sun Yat-sen 47, 204 surprise attack 3, 4, 33, 225; Chinese tactics 191, 192, 193; Japanese tactics 78, 85, 86, 93, 95, 99, 101, 106; Russo-Japanese War 35 ‘survival of the fittest’ 9, 49, 71; see also Darwinian theories Suzuki Keiji 130 Suzuki Zenko 153 Swanson, Senator 22 Taft, Howard 232 n.117 Taft, William 67 Taiwan 139, 168, 170, 183, 208, 209; Japanese air attacks from 101; missile testing by 266 n.107; US-China tensions 190, 191, 192–3, 195, 203–4; see also Formosa Tajikistan 270 n.208 The Tale of the 47 Ronin 158 Tanaka Giichi 66, 74, 76 Tanaka Yasuo 168 Tang Jiaxuan 165 Tani, Viscount 24 Tanikawa, T. 253 n.11 tanks 32 Tarantino, Quentin 162 Taranto 102, 103, 246 n.29 Taylor, Rear Admiral 136 technological developments: Chinese military power 190, 192; enhanced firepower 32; high-technology

Index 309 forces 225, 226; naval aviation 98–102; Russo-Japanese War 2, 35 Terra Nullius doctrine 28, 71 terrorism 168, 169, 188, 221, 226 textbooks 164–5, 170, 261 n.83, 262 n.114 Thailand 131, 140, 183, 209; see also Siam Third Reich 42 Thomas, E.D. 116–17 Thomas, Shelton 114 Thorne, Christopher 81 ‘thought waves’ 54 ‘three-dimensional’ warfare 57 Tibet 190, 209 ‘Tiger economies’ 215 Tirpitz 248 n.69 Tkacik, John 204 Tocqueville, Alexis de 10 Togo Heihachiro 36, 63, 89, 106, 113, 128–9, 231 n.92, 241 n.86, 247 nn.54, 57 Tojo Hideki 90, 124, 131, 243 n.12, 252 n.80 Tokuda, Lieutenant 98 Tokutomi Roka 62 Tokutomi Soho 49 Tokyo 20 Tokyo war crimes tribunal 124, 166 Tolstoy, Leo 44 Tomohisa Sakanaka 209 torpedoes 3, 98, 99–100, 103, 234 nn.5, 6 Townsend, Meredith 16, 46–7 Toynbee, Arnold 271 n.18 trade 19–20, 216, 227; China 2, 22, 136, 178, 180–7, 189, 212–13, 230 n.58, 241 n.89; ethno-cultural geopolitics 196; Japan 1, 24, 27, 62, 75, 150–3, 212, 241 n.89; military power relationship 76–7; US dominance 145; US trade deficit 152, 153, 180, 186, 187, 230 n.58; World War One 70 Trafalgar, Battle of 2, 45, 49, 96, 106, 113, 246 n.29, 247 n.54 Trans-Siberian Railway 16, 30, 31, 35, 230 n.54 Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance (China/USSR) (1950) 126

Treaty of Peace and Friendship (China/Japan) (1978) 127, 152 trench warfare 2, 37, 55, 56 Treves, Frederick 52 Trotsky, Leon 44 Truman, Harry S. 105, 145 trusteeship principle 122, 138 Tsingtao 69, 93, 98 Tsuji Karoku 258 n.28 Tsuji Masanoubu 243 n.13 Tsushima, Battle of 2, 64, 108, 247 n.57; decisive nature of 89, 90; impact of defeat on Russian society 36, 39, 43–4; primacy of the battleship 36, 100; ‘Z Signal’ 106 Turkey 197 U-boats 80, 242 n.121 Uehara, General 85 Ukhtomskii, Prince Esper 29 UN see United Nations United Kingdom see Britain United Nations (UN) 122, 138, 145, 206; ‘civilizing mission’ 219; Japanese bid for Security Council seat 167–8, 170, 172; Japanese peacekeeping troops 168, 261 n.97 United States of America (USA): Anglo-Saxonism 11–12, 72; Anglophobia 76, 95, 120, 141, 143–4, 145–6; Army War College 91–6, 104, 136, 137, 179, 263 n.19; Asian immigrants to 63, 67–8; atom bombs dropped on Japan 109; Black Americans 68, 117, 231 n.91, 250 n.35, 251 n.62; Britain relations with 15, 77, 78, 80–2, 119–22, 140–6; British Empire decline 118, 121, 122, 141, 142; car ownership 271 n.11; China relations with 62, 75, 134–5, 139, 170, 178–80, 188–90, 195, 200–8; Chinese economic threat to 184–7; Chinese security fears 189–90, 191–2, 194, 195; commercial interests in China 18, 20, 22, 31, 136–7, 178; costs of war 243 n.12; demographic decline 196, 197, 198; economic dominance 143, 145, 156, 208; as empire 4, 13, 146, 147, 177, 208, 220–2; Eurasian balance of power 177, 199;

310 Index United States of America (USA) (Continued) ‘frontier’ 12, 20, 22, 221; geopolitics 223; global supremacy of 146–7; ‘Great White Fleet’ 66–7; Hawaii 21–2; high-tech military forces 225; imperialism 19–20, 22, 68, 136–40, 143, 147, 206, 257 n.60; individualism 129; Indochina 123; inevitability of conflict with Japan 16, 45–6, 51, 66, 71, 74, 76, 78, 95–6, 206; inter-war planning 91–6; international law 257 n.63; isolationism 21, 81, 95, 140–1; Japan relations with 27–8, 62–3, 66–79, 149–56, 167–70, 174–5, 217; Japanese inter-war strategy 87, 88; Japanese post-war economic resurgence 149, 150, 151, 152, 153–6; Japanese threat to 1–2, 3, 15–16, 22, 23, 45–6, 66–7, 70–1; Japanese ultra-nationalist view of 48; Korea occupation by Japanese 25–6; Korean border division 234 n.2; military interventionism 220; as model for Asia 149; multiracial society 160; Naturalization Act 239 n.42; naval aviation 100–1, 102–3; naval rivalry with Britain 76, 92, 141; Naval War College 22, 70, 74, 75, 91–2, 94, 137; Pearl Harbour concerns 102–3; Philippines 22–3, 232 n.117; racial unity with Britain 14, 72; racial views towards the Japanese 114; religious revival 215, 271 n.15; Sino-Russian relations 210; as stabilizing force in Asia 226; support for Japan in Russo-Japanese War 2, 62; Taiwan-China threat 192–3; territorial expansion 10, 11, 12; trade deficit 152, 153, 180, 186, 187, 230 n.58; trade with China 19, 22, 136–7, 178, 180–7, 212–13, 230 n.58; trade with Japan 1, 19–20, 212; Vietnam War 119, 140, 146, 151, 200, 225, 271 n.26; war supplies to Japan 79; World War Two 80–4, 102–8, 116; see also Manifest Destiny; Pearl Harbour; US Navy; the West United States Marine Corps (USMC) 87 Unocal 184, 185

Upton, Emory 21 U Saw 120, 130 US Navy 70, 80–1, 91–2, 93–5, 96; Anglophobia 141; Bywater’s strategic scenarios 87; naval aviation 100–1; race and cultural awareness 74–5; Royal Navy cooperation with 231 n.100; USS Birmingham 98; USS Buchanan 108; USS Cincinnati 250 n.32; USS Enterprise 104; USS Greer 242 n.121; USS Langley 100–1; USS Lexington 101, 104; USS Missouri 108, 248 n.73; USS Niblack 242 n.121; USS Pennsylvania 98; USS Philadelphia 231 n.100; USS Powhatten 108; USS Reuben James 242 n.121; USS Saratoga 101; see also ‘Great White Fleet’ USA see United States of America USMC see United States Marine Corps USSR see Soviet Union Utkin, Anatoly 198 values: Anglo-Saxon 217–18; Asian 45, 159, 160, 215–16; as casus belli 127; East/West clash 226; Human Rights discourse 218, 219; Japanese 16; US religious revival 215; Western 19, 194, 200–1, 202, 212, 214, 217–18, 221, 270 n.9; Western corruption of 133, 215 Vander Weyer, Martin 269 n.195, 271 n.10 Vargas, Jorge 251 n.61 Vereschagin, Vasilii 31, 233 n.152 Versailles, Treaty of (1919) 81, 141; see also Paris Peace Conference Vietnam 49, 134, 167, 182, 209, 251 n.50, 261 n.83; see also Indochina Vietnam War 119, 140, 146, 151, 200, 225, 271 n.26 Virgin Islands 138 Vladivostok 31 Vogel, Ezra 158 Wainwright, J.M. 95 Wakamiya Maru 98 Wallace, Henry 146 Wang Xiangsui 191 war, concept of 10–11, 15, 42 war crimes tribunal (Tokyo) 124, 166

Index 311 Wards, G.T. 114 ‘War on Terror’ 146, 181 Washington DC 20 Washington Treaty (1922) 72, 73, 87, 93, 94, 100 Wei-hai-wei harbour 35, 66, 93 Weil, Simone 115 Weinberger, Casper 234 n.12 Welch, Jack 184 Welles, Sumner 122, 138 Wells, H.G. 32, 97 Wen I-to 235 n.6 Wen Jiabao 262 n.112, 269 n.178 the West 14, 15, 25, 271 n.18; China as threat to 18–19, 48, 178, 189, 205–6, 207; cultural perceptions of Japan 4, 157–63; demographic decline 196–8, 211, 212; Human Rights discourse 218–19; inevitable clash with the East 13, 42–3; materialism 21, 23, 44; new Eastern influences 215–16; perceived decadence and decline 17–18, 50–1, 215; Russian identity 28; stereotyped views of the East 235 n.7; see also Occidentalism White, T.H. 145 White, Walter 250 n.35 Whitehead, Robert 234 n.5 ‘White Peril’ 51 Whitman, Walt 20 Wilborn, Thomas 207 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 15, 236 n.32 Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands 249 n.12 Wilkie, Wendell 121 Wilson, A.N. 256 n.50 Wilson, C.E. 150 Wilson, Woodrow 67–8, 69, 70, 72, 237 n.58, 239 n.40, 240 n.68 Winant, John 82 Windsor, Duchess of 121 wireless 35 Witte, Count Sergei 30, 31, 233 nn.143, 146 Wolf, Marvin 153 Wolferen, Karel von 163 Wolfowitz, Paul 173, 178–9 Wolseley, Lord 15, 17 Wood, Leonard 67 Woolsey, James 185, 194 World Bank 145

World Trade Organization (WTO) 184, 185, 188, 189, 205, 220, 257 n.60 World War One 2, 3, 49, 54; aerial warfare 97, 98; Anglo-American relations 78; ‘cult of the offensive’ 225, 238 n.87; defensive tactics 55; European empires weakened by 70; impact on Japan 72; ‘Military Revolution’ 57; mistakes made after 55; naval cooperation between Britain and Japan 69; racial categorizations 53 World War Two 3, 79–84; British strategic vulnerability in East Asia 65, 79–80; causes 81–2; China’s rise 135; ‘China-Trade’ after 212; demise of the battleship 99, 100, 108; Gandhi’s views on 254 n.30; Japanese historical representations of 164, 165; Japanese war planning 88–91; Japan’s defeat 108–9, 134, 148, 149; Japan’s war in China 78–9; long-term impact of 115–18; military strategy 88–91; naval aviation 101, 102–3; racial dimensions 53, 114–15; US reluctance to enter 80, 81, 142; US war planning 91–6, 137; see also Pearl Harbour WTO see World Trade Organization Xiong Guangkai 194 Yachi Shotaro 262 n.116 Yalta 139 Yamagata Aritomo 16, 27, 70 Yamamoto Isoroku 88–9, 90, 91; Battle of the Marianas 247 n.58; Bywater’s influence on 87; death of 244 n.15; gambling wins and losses 241 n.79, 244 n.27, 245 n.21; naval aviation 99; Pearl Harbour 88, 100, 101, 102, 106, 244 n.17; suicidal tradition 107 Yamashita Tomoyuki 88, 131, 254 n.18 Yamato 99, 100, 107, 108, 247 n.62, 260 n.70 ‘Yamato spirit’ 159, 165 Yarnell, H.E. 81, 94, 101 Yasukuni Shrine 165–6

312 Index Yellow Peril 46, 47, 49, 127; Asian immigrants in the USA 63; Gelbe Gefahr painting 15; Russian Army likened to 236 n.22; Russian fears of 30, 31; see also race Yokota Yasuo 132–3 Yoshida Shigeru 150–1, 171 Yoshiro, Admiral 67 You Ji 190–1 Yu Shyi-kun 266 n.107 Yuko, Admiral 27

zaibatsu cartels 149 zeppelins 97 Zhang Xiaobo 189 Zhu Chenghu 192 Zhu Xueqin 201 Zhukov, G. 86 Zilliacus, Konni 39 Zimmerman Telegram 69, 240 n.49 Zoellick, Robert 195 Zuckerman, M.B. 155